U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

Heroic Deeds,

Heroic Men

The U.S. Marine Corps and the Final Phase

of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive

1–11 November 1918

DAVID J. BETTEZ, PhD

History Division

an imprint of MCU Press

Quantico, VA 22134

2020
This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the First World War, is published for the 

education and training of Marines as a History Division imprint by Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the Marine Corps’ observance of the centennial anniversary of that war. Editorial 

costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. 

No. 6 in the U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

Director of Marine Corps History Division

Dr. Edward T. Nevgloski

WWI Commemorative Series Historian

Annette D. Amerman

WWI Commemorative Series Editor

Angela J. Anderson

The original quote referenced in the title came from the order by Major General John A. Lejeune on 12 

November 1918 and read: 

On the night of November 10th, heroic deeds were done by heroic men. In the face of a heavy artillery 

and withering machine gun fire, the 2nd Engineers threw two foot bridges across the MEUSE and the 

first and second battalions of the 5th Marines crossed resolutely and unflinchingly to the east bank and 

carried out their mission.

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
1

THE SITUATION AND BACKGROUND

On the night of 31 October 1918, the 4th 

Brigade of United States Marines in 

France awaited the signal to begin an attack destined to end the Meuse-Argonne campaign 

and the devastating “war to end all wars”—World 

War I. Begun five weeks earlier, on 26 September, 

the campaign involved more than 1 million U.S. 

troops under the command of Army general John J. 

Pershing, the leader of the American Expeditionary 

Forces (AEF).1

The Army’s 2d Division was a hybrid, the only 

one to combine an Army and a Marine brigade. 

The 4th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, worked alongside the Army’s 3d Brigade and supporting units, all under the 

Marine Corps’ division leadership of Major General John Archer Lejeune. Even before Lejeune 

had taken command in July 1918, the division had 

forged a formidable reputation as one of the AEF’s 

leading units.2

1

 For more on the Meuse-Argonne campaign, see Edward G. 

Lengel, To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918—The Epic 

Battle that Ended the First World War (New York: Henry Holt, 

2008); and Mitchell Yockelson, Forty-Seven Days: How Pershing’s Warriors Came of Age to Defeat the German Army in World 

War I (New York: New American Library, 2016). See also Edward G. Lengel, ed., A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2014). Earlier histories 

include Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Shippensburg, 

PA: White Mane Books, 1998); and Robert H. Ferrell, America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007).

2

 For more on the 2d Division, see Oliver Spaulding and John 

Wright, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in 

France, 1917–1919 (New York: Hillman Press, 1937).

The 4th Brigade’s Leadership 

and Experience before September 1918

Soon after the United States entered the war in 

April 1917, Marine Corps Commandant Major 

General George Barnett put together the 4th Brigade to fight under Pershing in France. The brigade 

became an integral part of the 2d Division, which 

was formed in France under Brigadier General 

Charles A. Doyen’s temporary command in late 

1917. Two regiments formed the 4th Brigade—the 

5th and 6th Regiment. Many of its leaders had extensive experience with the Corps around the world 

before World War I. 

After Doyen was sent home in early 1918 due 

to impaired health, Pershing appointed one of his 

most trusted officers, U.S. Army brigadier general 

James G. Harbord, to command the Marine brigade.3

 Harbord led it through its World War I baptism by fire in the iconic Battle of Belleau Wood 

in June 1918, where the brigade reported significant casualties during that month-long fight. On 

6 June, the Corps suffered more casualties than 

it had throughout its history. Nevertheless, by 

the end of June, the 4th Brigade accomplished 

its goal—taking Belleau Wood—and established 

3

 Doyen would continue to serve even after returning stateside, 

assuming command of Marine Corps Training Camp and Marine Barracks Quantico, VA, until his death in 6 October 1918, 

when he and many others fell victim to the effects of Spanish 

influenza.
2 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN Metz Strasburg BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG Le Havre Saint-Malo Bayonne Marseille Nice Toulon Montpellier Lyon Plymouth BoulogneNieuport Caen Angers Toulouse Tours Poitiers Cherbourg Saint-Nazaire La Rochelle Miramas Rochefort Belfort Rennes ChartresBloisMontlucon Nimes Avignon Valence Cahors Issoire Mende Grenoble Moulins Moulins Basel Bourges Nevers

C

H

A

N

N

E L

M E D I N N A A E R R T E A S E

O C E A N

A T L A

C

N T

E

I

N

G L I S

H

A

N

P

S I

S

W

TI Z.

L

ATI Y

Compiegne

Blanc

Mont

Neufchâteau

Lille

Montdidier

Soissons

3 A R G O N N E

A R D E N N E S

250

150 50

50 0

0

100 200

100

150

Mulhouse

Km

Miles

B

Pont-a

-Mousson

Dijon

Agen

Bordeaux

F

R

A

N

C

E

Nantes

Orleans

Le Mans

Brest

A

A

R

A

N

Y

E

G

M

U

L . X

B

E

L

G I U

M

N

Coblenz

Rhone

Seine

Marne

Seine

Somme

Rhine

Saone

Rhine

Meuse

Meuse

Loire

Garonne

Dordogine

M A S S I F

C E N T R A L

J U R A

M T S

V O E S E G S

P L A S

N

E

E

E

R

Y

P

S

A L S A C E

Epinal Chaumont

Bourmont

Amiens

Verdun

Chablis

Saint-Mihiel

Belleau

Wood

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)

The World War in France 1917–18 

4th Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps

2d DIVISION 

A U.S. Army’s 1st Division and Marines of the 5th Regiment arrived at Saint-Nazaire in June 1917. The 

6th Regiment and 6th Machine Gun Battalion arrived October 1917–February 1918 at Saint-Nazaire and Brest. Marines were initially employed as line of communication troops and military police (MPs).

B

AEF main lines of communication/supply

Headquarters of the U.S. 2d Division, AEF, opened at Bourmont on 26 October 1917. The division included the Army’s 3d Infantry Brigade (9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and 5th Machine Gun Battalion), 2d Field Artillery Brigade, 4th Machine Gun Battalion, and supporting troops. Marines from 5th and 6th Regiments, plus 6th Machine Gun Battalion, formed the 4th Brigade, completing the division’s infantry component.

.

MAP LEGEND

HQ, AEF at Chaumont, General John J. Pershing commanding.

HQ, AEF, Services of Supply (SOS), at Tours.Principal seaports used by the AEF.

Toulon defense sector (between Saint-Mihiel and Verdun), 15 March–13 May 1918. 1

2 Aisne defensive, 31 May–5 June 1918 . Château-Thierry sector (Battle of Belleau Wood), 

6 June–9 July 1918.

4 Marbache defense sector (Pont-a-Mousson), 9–16 August 1918. 

5 Staint-Mihiel offensive, 12–16 September 1918. 

6 Meuse-Argonne offensive (Battle of Blanc Mont, Champagne sector), 1–10 October 1918. 

7 Meuse-Argonne offensive 1–11 November 1918.

3 Aisne-Marne offfensive (Battle of Soissons), 18–19 July 1918. 

LOCATION OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

OF THE 4TH BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS

2 6 7

1 5

4

PARIS Château -Thierry

THE WESTERN FRONT IN 1918

The front lines illustrate the ebb and flow of combat operations during 1918 through the Armistice ending hostilities that was signed on 11 November.

Farthest advance of the German spring offensive of March–July 1918.

Allied counteroffensives July–September 1918 pushed the German Army back to the fortified positions of the Siegfried Line, or Hindenburg Line by the Allies (double red line). 

Line reached by the Allied victory offensive when the Armistice was signed.

A

N

D

N

E

G

L

Calais

Reims

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 3

a reputation as an impressive fighting force.4

In summer and early fall 1918, the 4th Brigade 

continued fighting as part of the 2d Division. Harbord moved up to command the 2d Division for 

the Battle of Soissons in July 1918, while thenColonel Neville took over leadership of the 4th 

Brigade. Neville had graduated from the U.S. Naval 

Academy in Annapolis in 1890 and served in Cuba 

during the Spanish-American War, in China during 

the Boxer Rebellion, in the Philippines, and in the 

Caribbean. He received a Medal of Honor for his 

actions during the invasion of Veracruz, Mexico, in 

4

 For more on the Marine Corps in World War I, see BGen Edwin Howard Simmons and Col Joseph H. Alexander, Through 

the Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I (Annapolis, MD: 

Naval Institute Press, 2011); and Edwin McClellan, The United 

States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1920 

and 1968; History Division, Marine Corps University, 2015).

April 1914. On 1 January 1918, he had taken over 

command of the 5th Regiment and led it through 

the Battle of Belleau Wood.5

When Neville moved up to brigade commander 

in July 1918, leadership of the 5th Regiment passed 

to its second-in-command, then-Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland, a Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology-educated Kentuckian who had joined 

the Marine Corps in 1899 after a stint in the Kentucky State Guard. Feland served in Cuba, the 

Philippines, and the Caribbean. He was one of 

the first instructors at the Advanced Base School 

in New London, Connecticut, commander of the 

Advanced Base Force’s mining company, and head 

of the Philadelphia Military Training Camp (the 

5

 For more on Wendell Neville, see Allan R. Millett and Jack 

Shulimson, eds., Commandants of the Marine Corps (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 214–23.

Two future Commandants, John A. Lejeune and Wendell C. Neville. Lejeune commanded the 2d Division during the last phase of 

the Meuse-Argonne offensive, while Neville commanded the 4th 

Brigade. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

As second in command of the 5th Regiment during Belleau Wood, 

Kentuckian Logan Feland received the Distinguished Service Cross 

for his actions. After the battle, he moved up to command the 5th 

Regiment during the rest of the war. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
4 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Marine version of the Army’s Plattsburgh, New 

York, training camp movement). He and future 

General Robert H. Dunlap accompanied General Pershing in the first small AEF contingent 

to France on the RMS Baltic in late May 1917.6

During Belleau Wood, Feland had distinguished 

himself with fearless battleground leadership, 

earning the friendship of General Harbord for life. 

In July 1918, the 6th Regiment was led by 

then-Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, who had served 

in the Marine Corps during the Spanish-American 

War, spent several years on ships, and participated in 

expeditions to Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, 

Dominican Republic. Lee had taken over command 

of the 6th Regiment on 6 June, during the Battle of 

Belleau Wood, when regimental commander Colonel Albertus W. Catlin was seriously wounded in the 

chest by a sniper.7

At the brigade level, adjutant Lieutenant 

Colonel Earl H. Ellis served as General Neville’s 

right-hand man. Ellis would issue many of Neville’s orders during the final phase of the MeuseArgonne campaign. He had joined the Marine 

Corps as a private in 1900, and by the end of 1901, 

been commissioned a second lieutenant. He had 

served as Commandant Barnett’s aide-de-camp, 

and General Lejeune had requested his services 

when dispatched to France. Ellis would receive a 

Navy Cross for his work as brigade adjutant: 

He has ever shown himself ready for any 

emergency, even when he had been without 

sleep or rest for several days and nights at a 

time. His keen analytical mind, quick grasp 

of intricate problems, resourcefulness, decision and readiness to take prompt action on 

important questions arising during the temporary absence of the Brigade Commander 

within the Brigade, have contributed largely 

to the success of the Brigade, rendered his ser6

 More on Logan Feland can be found in David J. Bettez, Kentucky Marine: Major General Logan Feland and the Making of 

the Modern USMC (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

2014).

7

 A brief recount of Harry Lee’s Marine Corps career can be 

found in “History of Brigadier General Harry Lee, USMC,” 

Leatherneck, 15, no. 6, June 1932, 16; Harry Lee biographical file, 

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; and his military 

file at the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO.

vices invaluable and won for him the high 

esteem and complete confidence of the Brigade 

Commander.8

After Soissons, Pershing moved Harbord to 

command the Services of Supply, and eventually 

tapped Lejeune to command the 2d Division. An 

1888 U.S. Naval Academy graduate, Lejeune had 

led Marines in Panama, Cuba, the Philippines, and 

Mexico. He served as George Barnett’s Assistant to 

the Commandant after the war broke out in Europe in 1914. After the United States entered the 

war in April 1917, he oversaw the new Marine base 

8

 For more on Ellis, see Dirk A. Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett, Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880–1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996). Ellis’s Navy Cross 

commendation can be found at “Earl Hancock Ellis,” Valor.

MilitaryTimes.com.

Harry Lee was second in command of the 6th Regiment during Belleau Wood, but took over leadership when the commander, Albertus 

W. Catlin, was wounded. Lee would continue to lead the regiment 

through the rest of the war. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 5

at Quantico before being posted to France in 

summer 1918. Lejeune took command of the 2d 

Division on 28 July and led it through the rest of 

the war, including the Battle of Saint-Mihiel in 

mid-September and the Meuse-Argonne offensive.9

After the war, Lejeune would serve as Marine 

Corps Commandant from 1920 to 1929. Neville 

would become Marine Corps Commandant in 

1929, while Harry Lee and Logan Feland would 

become major generals before retiring in the 1930s. 

By the time the battle had moved to Soissons, 

strong leadership from veteran Marines would steer 

9

 For a biography of John Lejeune, see Merrill L. Bartlett, Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867–1942 (Columbia: University of 

South Carolina Press, 1991). See also Lejeune’s autobiography, 

MajGen John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia, PA: Dorrance, 1930). 

the division and the 4th Brigade and its regiments 

through the rest of World War I.10 The Marine 

Corps order of battle in the Meuse-Argonne operation for October–November 1918 is shown in 

appendix A.

The First Stages of the Meuse-Argonne 

Offensive, 26 September–23 October 1918

The first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive 

began on 26 September with optimistic goals: U.S. 

troops would drive north for 64 kilometers (km) to 

the town of Sedan, a key railroad junction serving 

the German Army. Historians Rolfe Hillman Jr. and 

Peter F. Owen note that “by cutting this railroad, or 

10 See also Gerald C. Thomas Jr., “Regimental Command ‘Over 

There’: 1917–1918,” Marine Corps Gazette 81, no. 12 (December 1997): 87, 81.

Dieppe

PARIS

AMIENS

Cantigny

Beauvais

Evreux

ORLEANS

Rouen

Dreux

Chartres

Chateaudun

Seine R

Seine R

Oise R

Oise R

Somme R

Dover

Colon

Montreal

Chalons-surMarne

NANCY Luneville

Saint-Die

STRASBOURG

Freiburg

Mulhouse

Vesoul

Belfort

Epinal

Longres

Saint-Dizier

REIMS

Dunkirk

Meaux

COLOGNE

Mayen

Bitburg

Prum

Trier

Etain

LUXEMBOURG

COBLENZ

SOISSONS

Chatillon

CHAUMONT

Troyes

Auxerre

Sens

Nogent

Provins TOUL

Sarrebruchen

R H I N E

R H I N E

R H I N E

Hillesheim

MAINZ

Oppenheim

Worms

Manheim

Speyer

Gemersheim

Karlsrugh

Kreuzmach

Kaiserlautern

Epernay

Roermond Dusseldorf

LIEGE

Wiltz

Bastogne

Marche

Huy NAMUR

La Roche

Fuskirchen

Aix La Chapelle

Siegen

Giessen

Fumay

Arion

Cambrai

Lille

Douai

Drocourt

OSTEND ANTWERP

Fontainbleau

Montargis

Seine R

Seine R

Seine R

Petit Marin Grand Marin

Aube R

Somme R

Marne R

Marne R

Marne R

Aisne R

Vesle R

Ourcq R

Aire R

Meuse R

Moselle R

Moselle R

Saone R

Moselle R

Meurthe R

Saar R

Saar R

Moselle R

Meuse R

Sambre R

Dendre R

Schelde R

Lys R

Lys R

Meuse R

La Fere

Aulnoye

St.

Menehould

Himson

Avesnes

Moyon

Nieuport

BRUSSELS

GHENT

MONS

Wavre

Florennes

Charleroi

Givet

Louvain Hasselt

Tongres

MAASTRICHT

Verviers

A R D E N N E S

F O R E S T

 J U R A

M T S

V O S G E S

M T S

Compiegne

SAINT-MIHIEL

English

Channel

N

Bourmont

Belleau

F R ANCE

GE R M ANY

LU X.

BE LG I U M E NGL AN D

Aisne R

METZ CHATEAU

THIERRY

Saarburg

VERDUN

(Castelnau)

XXXXX

EAST

FR

XXXX

EIGHTH

F R

XXXX

SEVENTH

F R

(Pershing)

XXXXX

AEF

US

(Gallwitz)

XXXXX

XXXX

DET C

(Albrecht)

XXXXX

XXXX NINETEENTH

XXXX

DET A

XXXX

DET B

(Rupprecht)

XXXXX

XXXX

SIXTH

XXXX

FOURTH

XXXX SEVENTEENTH

XXXX

SECOND

(Crown Prince)

XXXXX

XXXX

SEVENTH

XXXX

THIR D

XXXX

FIRST

XXXX EIGHTTEENTH

SEDAN

Roulers

Ailette R

Laon

Boulogne

Pont a- Mousson

Oise R

Avre R

Aisne R

(Haig)

XXXXX

BEF

(Fayolle)

XXXXX

RESERVE FR

(Maistre)

XXXXX

CENTER FR

(King Albert)

XXXXX

Belgium XXXX

SECOND

BR

XXXX

BELGIUM

XXXX

SIXTH

FR

XXXX

FIRST

BR

XXXX

FIFTH

B R

XXXX

FOURTH

B R

XXXX

THIRD

B R

XXXX

FIRST

FR

XXXX

TENTH

FR

XXXX

FIFTH

F R

XXXX

FIRST

U S

XXXX

SECOND

U S

Mulhouse

0 10 20 30 40 50

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Miles

Km

Front line 30 October 1918

 Front line 26 September 1918

During 26–29 Sep the Allies launched a massive coordinated 

offensive between the English Channel and Verdun. By 30 

October, the German Army was driven back to the front line 

shown here. On 11 November, the Allies would reach the Meuse 

River, resulting in Germany’s surrender and the Armistice ending 

hostilities.

WESTERN FRONT SITUATION

 26 SEPTEMBER–30 OCTOBER 1918

1 2

A R G O N N E

F O R E S T

1 After the Battle of Blanc Mont (3–10 October), U.S. 

2d Division units received replacements and were 

assigned to relatively quiet sectors to regroup.

2d Division was soon back in action with the 

American First Army. It relieved the U.S. 42d 

Division on the front line the night of 30–31 

October as part of U.S. V Corps.

2 XXXX

FOURTH

F R

FIFTH

XXXX

Diekirch

Aire R

Meuse R

Aisne R

Saint-Menehould

Verdun

Grandpre Saint-Juvin

Apremont

Beaumont

Mouzon

FIFTH

ARMY

ARMY

DET ‘C’

THIRD

ARMY

US FIRST ARMY

FOURTH

ARMY

FR

SECOND

ARMY

US XXXVIII

XXX

F R

I

XXX

US

V

XXX

US

XXX

LVIII

XXX

XVIII

XXX

XVI XXX

XXI 

XXX

XIII 

XXX

I 

Res XXX

V

Res 

XXX

V

XXX

IX

Res 

XXX

XII

Res 

XXX

US

III

XVII

XXX

F R

Chatillon The U.S. 2d Division occupied 

attack positions on the left of V 

Corps 30–31 October.

Unit sectors and positions are 

illustrative, not precise.

0 10 Miles

0 10 20 Km

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
6 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

just by clawing his way close enough to hit it with 

long-range artillery, Pershing hoped to achieve a 

colossal interruption in German logistics.”11 In the 

meantime, British and French troops would attack 

from the north and west. 

The American attack involved going through 

the Aire valley and skirting the Argonne Forest, an 

area heavily fortified by the Germans. In conjunction with French troops on their flanks, U.S. Army 

divisions attacked northward toward Sedan. Unfortunately, many of the American divisions involved 

in late September actions were untested, and the 

attack bogged down. By the end of the day on 28 

September, “even Pershing could not deny that the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive looked close to failure.”12

It was time to pause and regroup an American 

Army that was battered and exhausted. 

For the second phase of the offensive that began on 4 October, Pershing committed some of his 

more experienced divisions. This attack proceeded 

at a better pace, but at a tremendous cost in men. 

For the entire 47 days of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, more than 25,000 Americans died, while 

nearly 100,000 were wounded. Most of these losses came during the first two phases of the campaign.13

During the Battle of Blanc Mont, 3–10 October, the Marines suffered enormous casualties, 

surpassing the carnage of Belleau Wood. The battle had a devastating effect on the 4th Brigade; at 

one point, it nearly collapsed under the withering 

fire of German machine guns on its left flank. The 

5th Regiment’s 1st Battalion commander, Major 

11 This was the assessment provided by Rolfe Hillman Jr. and 

Peter F. Owen in their annotation of Carl Andrew Brannen, 

Over There: A Marine in the Great War (College Station: Texas 

A&M University Press, 1996), 53.

12 Lengel, To Conquer Hell, 160. See also Yockelson, Forty-Seven 

Days, 166, who noted a pause in the offensive was necessary 

because Pershing’s army was “beat-up and needed rest.”

13 See Ferrell, America’s Deadliest Battle, 148, which puts the 

number of dead at 26,277. See also Leonard P. Ayres, The 

War with Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1919), 113, 120. Ferrell uses 

Ayres’s statistics to compute the number of dead in the MeuseArgonne offensive. The chief of the Statistics Branch of the 

General Staff, Col Ayres cited a total of 120,000 casualties for 

the campaign. 

George W. Hamilton and then-First Lieutenant 

James A. Nelms, commanding the 5th Regiment’s 

machine gun company, managed to rally the Marines, but the battle cost the Marines more than 

2,400 casualties, including nearly 500 who were 

killed outright or later died of their wounds.14

By mid-October, General Pershing recognized 

that he could no longer lead effectively without 

adding subordinate commanders, which meant 

14 Marine casualty figures for the Battle of Blanc Mont, or the 

Meuse-Argonne (Champagne), are found in McClellan, The 

United States Marine Corps in the World War, 65. For more on 

the Battle of Blanc Mont, see Edwin McClellan, “The Battle 

of Blanc Mont Ridge,” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 1 (March 

1922): 1–21, and “The Battle of Blanc Mont Ridge (continued),” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 2 ( June 1922): 206–11; James 

R. Nilo, “The Battle of Blanc Mont,” Leatherneck 76, no. 10, 

October 1993, 10–15; Allan Bevilacqua, “The Battle of Blanc 

Mont Ridge,” Leatherneck 83, no. 11, November 2000, 26–31; 

and Edwin Simmons, “With the Marines at Blanc Mont,” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 11 (November 1993): 34–43.

Earl H. Ellis served as adjutant of the 4th Brigade and was a key 

contributor to Marine success on the battlefield during the Blanc 

Mont and Meuse-Argonne offensives. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 7

reorganizing the AEF. Instead of commanding it 

himself, Pershing appointed Major General Hunter Liggett to command the U.S. First Army, and 

named Major General Robert L. Bullard to head 

the new U.S. Second Army. He also named Army 

artilleryman and former 1st Division commander 

Major General Charles Pelot Summerall to head 

First Army’s V Corps, to which the 2d Division was 

assigned. 

An 1892 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Summerall had a reputation 

as a hard-driving, effective leader. At one point in 

mid-October, he removed a regimental and a brigade commander in the 42d Infantry Division; 

another brigade commander, Brigadier General 

Douglas MacArthur, was also in danger of being 

relieved.15 Under Summerall’s command, the Army 

V Corps would play a leading role in the final push. 

15 See Yockelson, Forty-Seven Days, 260–65, for the relief of the 

two commanders—the 83d Brigade’s BGen Michael J. Lenihan (USA) and 165th Infantry’s Col Harry Mitchell—and for 

the pressure Summerall put on MacArthur to gain objectives. 

For more on Summerall, see Charles Pelot Summerall, The Way 

of Duty, Honor, Country: The Memoir of Charles Pelot Summerall, ed. Timothy Nenninger (Lexington: University Press of 

Kentucky, 2010). The 42d Infantry Division was known as the 

Rainbow Division. The term rainbow came from Gen Douglas 

MacArthur, then colonel and newly appointed chief of staff of 

the division, because “it spanned the nation like a rainbow.” The 

division insignia resembles a rainbow in bright, red, gold, and 

blue colors.

Gen John J. Pershing (left) served as commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, while MajGen Charles Pelot Summerall (right) 

commanded V Corps, under which the Marine brigade served during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
8 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Douzy

Mairy

Bazeilles

Balan

Baalon

Nantillois

Montblainville Cheppy

Dombasle

Sassey

VERDUN

SEDAN

Autrecourt

Barricourt

Vienne

Cheveuges

Stonne

la Besace

les Gr des

Armoises

Bar R

Aisne R

Aire R

Aire R

Aisne

R

Meuse R

Meuse

R

Moulins-

 Saint-Hubert

Fleville

Marcq

Chevieres

Cornay

Montfaucon

Exermont

Apremont

Brieulles

Romagne

Malancourt

Consenvoye

Forges

Ville

Etraye Wavrille

Charny Bras

Vacherauville

Boureuilles Marre

Thieryville

Montzeville

Chattancourt

Neuvilly

Verennes

en Argonne

Dun

Jametz

Liny

Vilosnes Sivry

Damvillers

Thonnelle

Montmedy

Carignan

Margut

Foret de Dieulet

Foret de Hesse

Foret

de Jaulnay

le Grand Dieulet

Foretde Belval

Bois de Sommauthe

Bois de Berliere

Bois de

Brieulles

Bois de Franclieu

Foret

de

Four

Chiers R

Mouzon

Aincreville

Cunel

ServonMelzicourt

Binarville

Conde

Charpentry

Pouilly Cervizy

Maruncourt

Stenay

Beaumont

Mouzay

Haraucourt

Nourat

Foret de W evre o

US 2 XX

US 77 XX US 3 XX

US 42 XX

US 82 XX

US 78 XX

DICKMAN

I XXX

US SUMMERALL

V XXX

US HINES

XXX

US

N

Colonial

10 XX

FR

XXX

FR

XVII

US 1 XX US 32 XX

15

XX

FR

79 XX

FR

Bethencourt

XXX

FR

XXXVIII

Sommerance

Exact location of the boundary 

between the French Army 

corps and locations of their 

divisions are estimated.

26 XX

FR

Boult

Authe

Tailly

Fosse

Champigneulle Bantheville

Saint-Juvin

Thenorgues

Verpel

Buzancy

Harricourt

en Dieulet

Vaux

The Meuse is a major European 

waterway. It cuts a deep channel 

and the eastern side has steep 

ridges called the Heights of the 

Meuse. The Argonne Forest is a 

tangled mass of trees and 

underbrush that is almost impenetrable. The tributaries of the 

Bar, Aire, and Aisne Rivers make 

a series of ridges and valleys that 

are ideal for defense. The 

Germans took advantage of eastwest running ridges, forcing the 

Americans, whose direction of 

advance was northward, to 

attack cross-compartment. The 

Germans had excellent artillery 

positions and observation posts 

on the Heights of the Meuse, and 

until overrun, the high ground of 

Montfaucon, Romagne, and Bois 

de Barricourt.

By 30 October, the Americans 

had advanced to the line at 

Grandpre-Saint Juven-BenthevilleLiny where the Marines and 

soldiers of the 2d Division moved 

into line with V Corps, First Army. 

On 1 November, with 2d Division 

as the spearhead, First Army 

resumed the attack that drove 

the Germans back to the Meuse 

by 11 November. At 1100 on that 

day, hostilities ended on the 

western front according to the 

Armistice signed by the major 

belligerents. 

The U.S. First Army’s area of 

operations encompassed the 

ground between the Meuse River 

in the east, the Argonne Forest 

(inclusive) to the west, from 

Sedan in the north, and Verdun to 

the south. It was opposed mostly 

by elements of the German Fifth 

Army. 

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

U.S. First Army Area of Operations

30 October–11 November 1918

Sivry

les Buzancy

Bayonville

et Chennery

Remonville

Landreville

Imecourt

Grandpre Saint-Georges Landres

US 89 XX

US 80 XX

US 5 XX

US 90 XX

Doulcon

Front line 26 September 

at start of offensive

Front line 30 October 

Start attack 1 November

0

0

10

5 10 15

5 Miles

Km

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 9

Lejeune’s 2d Division and the 4th Brigade would 

play a key role in V Corps. 

After Blanc Mont, the 2d Division recuperated briefly, then underwent several forced marches 

while General Pershing reorganized the AEF. After 

refitting near Suippes during 10–14 October, the 

4th Brigade was temporarily detached from the 2d 

Division to serve with the French IX Army Corps 

near Leffincourt. The Marines marched to Leffincourt on 21 October, only to be told they were being reassigned and to march back to their former 

camp at Châlons. 

The Marines grew wet, cold, tired, hungry, and 

demoralized from their extensive marches. The 6th 

Regiment’s Private Thomas Bryan McQuain later 

asserted that, at one point, they had hiked “for some 

38 hours and seventy-five kilometers.”16 In addition, 

the ravages of the world-wide Spanish influenza 

epidemic plagued the Marine brigade. As a result, 

the brigade took in nearly 1,500 new men to replace Marines lost during the attack on Blanc Mont 

or lost to influenza, dysentery, and other maladies. 

Most of the replacements had little training and no 

war experience. Unit cohesiveness suffered.17

THE PLAN 

AND THE KICKOFF, 

24–31 OCTOBER 1918

After having been assigned to assist French forces, 

on 24 October, the 4th Brigade was returned to the 

2d Division for the kickoff of the final phase of the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive. The Americans would 

complete the drive north toward Sedan, now about 

48 km from their jumping-off point. 

By 25 October, plans for the third major phase 

of the offensive had evolved. The First Army’s V 

Corps would be the point of the spear in an American attack north toward Sedan, with III Corps on 

its right (east) and I Corps on its left (west). 

In the V Corps advance, the 2d Division would 

16 Thomas Bryan McQuain, To the Front and Back: A West Virginia Marine Fights World War I (Westminster, MD: Heritage 

Books, 2005), 77. 

17 See George B. Clark, Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World 

War I (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), 244, citing an operations report for 10–13 October 1918 that notes the number 

of replacements.

pair with the 89th Division, which would attack on 

the 2d Division’s right (eastern) flank. The 80th Division of I Corps would attack on the 2d Division’s 

left (western) flank. The first day’s objective was the 

heights of Barricourt about 40km southeast of Sedan, where the American Army had bogged down 

earlier in the face of intensive German resistance.18

In a post-war analysis of the task facing the 

First Army in this last stage of the Meuse-Argonne 

campaign, then Army major Andrew D. Bruce, the 

commander of the 2d Division’s 4th Machine Gun 

Battalion, explained: “The primary object of the 

First Army was to pierce the line through Landreset-St. Georges and form a wedge to the vicinity of 

Fosse. This in order to break the backbone of enemy 

resistance west of the Meuse, to immediately loosen 

the flanks of the Army, and force the retreat of the 

enemy to the east of the Meuse.”19

The Opposition: 

The Situation with Germany and Its Allies

The American forces may have been tired from 

fighting in September and October, but they were 

slowly succeeding in pushing back the Germans; 

the Central Powers alliance was collapsing. Bulgaria 

had dropped out of the war in late September. On 

27 October, German Army leader General Erich 

Ludendorff resigned. Germany’s ally Turkey signed 

an armistice on 30 October. The German Army 

weakened more every day, retreating but trying to 

consolidate behind prepared lines to keep up stubborn, deadly resistance. 

18 For the order of battle, see Lengel, To Conquer Hell, 386–87. 

See also Field Orders No. 49, 31 October 1918, Headquarters 

Second Division (Regular), 2d Division Field Orders, in Capt 

Cylburn O. Mattfeldt, Records of the Second Division (Regular), 

vol. 1, pt. 4 (Washington, DC: Army War College, 1924–29), 

noting that the “object of attack west of the MEUSE is to 

carry the heights of Barricourt.” All future references to regimental, brigade, and divisional orders and memorandums are 

taken from this 10-volume collection. The first eight volumes 

are available at the Archives Branch, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

19 See p. 6 of Andrew D. Bruce, “Operations of the Second 

Division (U.S.) during Third Phase of Meuse-Argonne,” Company Officers’ Course, 1923–1924, Military History Section, 

Department of General Subjects, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, a copy of which is found in the Army Heritage and 

Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA. 
10 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

In a post-war analysis published in Infantry 

Journal, the chief of staff of the German XVI Army 

Corps, Major Herman von Giehrl, asserted that the 

Germans knew a major attack was forthcoming, but 

they simply did not have the resources to thwart it. 

The Germans had sustained heavy losses early in 

October and lacked complete, fresh divisions for 

frontline or reserve action; they were well aware 

that Austria-Hungary was seeking an armistice. 

German troops knew that political discussions had 

occurred with the United States about a possible 

end of the war. Troops transferred from the Russian 

front “had been exposed too long to the destroying 

influence of the Russian revolution and Bolshevist 

propaganda.”20

Given these weaknesses, the Germans designed a plan to gradually withdraw to lines in 

the rear that were shorter, easier to defend, and 

supported by favorable terrain. This strategy also 

would enable German troops to get better food 

and shelter and recuperate before the impending 

American attack.21

The Initial Plan and the Kickoff

By 26 October, after more debilitating marching, 

the 2d Division had gathered near Exermont, about 

19km south of Barricourt, to prepare for what would 

be the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign 

and the war. Two German defensive lines remained 

to be breached: the Kriemhilde Stellung (eastern 

section of Hindenburg Line), and then the Freya 

Stellung (new section to the north), which lay along 

the Barricourt Heights. The plan was for the 2d Division to strike north about 9km, through an east/

west line from Saint-Georges to Landres-et-SaintGeorges, then onward to Landreville, Chennery, 

and Bayonville. Then, it would turn to the northeast 

to attack the heights of Barricourt. 

Division orders stipulated that, in the preattack 

movement northward, “every effort will be made to 

ensure secrecy of troop movements.” Troops would 

march during the day only under cover of bad 

20 Herman von Giehrl, “Battle of the Meuse-Argonne,” Infantry Journal 19, no. 4 (October 1921). 21 von Giehrl, “Battle of the Meuse-Argonne,” 383–84.

weather conditions or in wooded terrain; otherwise, 

the troops would march at night.22 D-day was set 

for 1 November; the attack would begin at H-hour, 

or 0530 that morning. 

The 2d Division would pass through 42d Division and assume command of the front at noon 

on 31 October, with the 23d Regiment on the right 

and 4th Brigade on the left. The 23d Regiment 

would advance with two battalions in the attack and 

one in support. The 4th Brigade would attack with 

regiments side by side. In each regiment, one battalion would follow another. Each battalion would 

include two lines of two companies each.23

Divisional instructions ordered that “a vigorous, powerful attack will be made, supported by 

every available means of delivering fire, including 

machine guns, 37 m/m guns and [British] Stokes’ 

[trench] mortars. Dense formations will be avoided.” The attacking infantry would not be alone. Artillery, machine gun detachments, engineers, tanks, 

gas and flame units, planes, combat liaison with 

flanking units, and reserve components would support the attacking Army and Marine units. Further 

instructions covered such issues as stragglers, prisoners of war, and burial details.24

The Kickoff: Visits by General Summerall

General Summerall visited his V Corps regiments 

and battalions in the two days prior to the expected 

offensive on 1 November. Marine Gunnery Sergeant Don V. Paradis remembered Summerall’s 

visit to the 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, as a positive moment. Summerall laid out the plan of the 

forthcoming attack, which he was sure would be a 

success and would help end the war quickly. Paradis 

22 Field Orders No. 47, 26 October 1918, vol. 1, pt. 4. 23 Field Orders No. 48, 31 October, 1918, vol. 1, pt. 4. For more 

on the Marine Corps in the Meuse-Argonne, see Edwin Simmons, “Marines in the Meuse-Argonne, Part I: Reaching the 

Meuse,” Fortitudine 23, no. 3, Winter 1993–94, 3–10; and 

“Marines in the Meuse-Argonne, Part II: Crossing the Meuse,” 

Fortitudine 23, no. 4, Spring 1994, 3–8. 24 See “Tentative Plan of Attack,” 25 October 1918, and Field 

Orders No. 48, 30 October 1918, Headquarters Second Division (Regular), 2d Division Field Orders, vol. 1, pt. 4. These 

instructions were repeated in Field Order No. 49 on 31 October 

1918. See also Field Orders No. 32, undated, Headquarters, 4th 

Brigade, vol. 2, pt. 1.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 11

remarked: “It was the only pep talk I had ever heard 

on any front and the only time we actually knew 

before we went in what our main purpose was outside of stopping the Heinies [Germans] or pushing 

them back. It sure had its effect on the morale of 

the men. It was the first really good news they had 

heard for months.”25

Paradis was fortunate. Appreciating the fact 

that the gunnery sergeant had never been wounded 

through all the earlier Marine battles, his captain, 

Kirt Green, delegated Paradis to the reserve detachment that made up 20 percent of his company.

Private Elton E. Mackin of the 1st Battalion, 

5th Regiment, vividly recalled Summerall’s visit to 

his battalion, though with a much different perspective. The Army general arrived on a “beautiful 

black horse” and lectured the Marines. 

He talked bare-headed, his two-starred helmet hanging from a saddletie [sic], his gloves 

tucked neatly in his Sam Browne [duty] belt. 

His riding crop, like his horse, was big and 

black and strong. He aimed it like a pointer, 

stressing things he wanted done, or slapped 

his booted leg to make a point. We gave him 

our full attention. He did not mince his 

words. He made us understand.26

Summerall admonished the veterans and new 

Marines to take a railhead, capture German artillery, and take three ridges. They were to take no 

prisoners or stop to aid friends. Mackin and his fellow Marines responded to Summerall’s speech with 

silence, after which the general gave a half-hearted 

salute and rode away, leaving them to grumble and 

curse him.27

Private Thomas McQuain recalled that “we 

of the 2d Division had been selected to attack 

the hardest part of the line near St. Georges and 

Landres-et-St. Georges. This would give us an 

opportunity to further distinguish ourselves. We 

25 Donald V. Paradis, The World War I Memoirs of Donald V. 

Paradis, Gunnery Sergeant, USMC, ed. Peter F. Owen (selfpublished, n.d.), 121. 

26 Elton E. Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die: Memoirs of 

a World War I Marine (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 225. 27 Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die, 225–27. 

thought that this would be nice, but it was further 

observed by us, that a lot of us would not be there 

to know anything about it.”28

One of the best chroniclers of the Marine experience in the last days of the war, Private John E. 

Ausland from Captain Charley Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, also wrote about Summerall’s 

appearance with General Lejeune.29 In Ausland’s 

war diary, he described how Lejeune stood on a 

28 McQuain, To the Front and Back, 84. 29 Born in Norway in 1896, Ausland had enlisted in the Marines as John E. Aasland. While serving under this name in 

the Meuse-Argonne campaign, he received his second Silver 

Star citation for “rescuing a wounded comrade under fire” on 

1 November. After the war, Ausland would assume the name 

John Ausland, by which he is better known, having published 

articles under the names John or Jack Ausland.

Elton E. Mackin served as a 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, runner. 

His World War I experiences were captured in the memoir Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die. 

Elton Mackin Collection, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential 

Library and Museums
12 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Romagne

Bois de

Bois de

Geshes

Bois de Moncy

Bois

de Chauvignon

Bois de Bantheville

Bois

d' Andevanne

Bois de Barricourt

Arbre

Bois de Nouart

Aire

R

Aaron R Aaron

R

Rau de la Rideuse

Rau d’Houy

Rau

Aviaux

des

Rau de Wassieux

Rau Ferba

Canal de Thenorgues

Rau du Moulin

Rau du Moulin

289

Mt des Grues

Cote de Maidah

Cote 263

Cote253

329

322

311

274

262

243

277

226

237

242

268

Cote 182

287

Fond de Verlet

Cote 278

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289

Grande Fonteine

les Grands Carres

le Gnd Carre Fme

Balandre

Ravine

die Fesse de

le Chateau Tme le Grande Fontaine

Chennery

Verpel

Bantheville

XX

52

XX

240

XX

88

XX

31

XX

27

XX

28

XX 15

Bav

XX

89

XX

80 XX

77

Bois

l’ Epasse

le Petite Bois

la Dhuy Fme

lmecourt

Landreville

Bayonville 

Remonville

Andevanne

Romagne

Saint-Juvin

Sommerance

Georges St

Rau

160 Rau Louvette

de

140 200

la Bergerie Fme

la Tuilerie Fme

Bois

Carpiere

les Tuileries

la Follarde

ls Boillogac

Fme de Masmes

Fme de la Bergerie

240

Buzancy

le Four a chaux Fosse Nouart

Fme du Fourpeau Tailly Harricourt

160 180

200

200

Breakdown into units below division level shown only for the 

U.S. 2d Division and German 52d ID. Also, the U.S. 1st and 42d 

Divisions, whose field artillery supported the U.S. 2d Division 

attack, are positioned south beyond the view of this map.

169

111 Georges

St

Rau

170

Bois des

Hazois

Landres 

 

23

5

Mar

6

Mar

4th BDE

Bois de

Chatillon

la Musarde Fme

Bois de Landres

XX

2

3d BDE

(- 23d Inf)

2d DIVISION PLAN OF ATTACK

1 November 1918

The field artillery brigades of the 1st, 2d, 

and 42d Divisions were to fire a two-hour 

preparation starting at 0330, followed by 

a rolling barrage beginning at H-hour. A 

special concentration of MG fire was to 

be provided by MG battalions of 2d and 

42d Divisions. When advancing troops 

masked their fire, MG units were to revert 

to control of their parent units. Company 

D, 1st Gas Regiment, and a light tank 

detachment from 1st Tank Brigade also 

supported the attack. 2d Engineers 

provided wire cutting details with the 

attacking infantry. 

At H-hour (0530), the plan called for 

Marines of the 4th Brigade to attack on 

the left. On the right, soldiers of the 23d 

Infantry, 3d Brigade, were to clear the 

enemy positions in/around Landres 

Saint-Georges and Bois l'Epasse. When 

that was done, the 23d Infantry was to 

reform with the 3d Brigade in reserve. On 

reaching objective 1, the 4th Brigade was 

to extend to the right and take over the 

entire 2d Division front.

The 80th Division would attack on the 2d 

Division’s left, the 89th Division on the 

right.

Saint-GeorgesFme d’en dela

N O M A N ‘ S L A N D

C O R PS

H+3

H+6 .50

H+6 .20

D A YS 1st

E L I N

E X PL O

O N

T A

I

I

T

Bois

de Folie

O B J 3

OB J 2

O B J 1

Sivry lez Buzancy

280

280

240 260

220

300 Cote 313

Magenta Fme

&

Barricourt

N

Contour interval 20 meters

0 2,000yards

0 500 1,000 2,000 meters

500 1,000

Rau de l’Agron

200 180

200

Bois de Fay

le Bois 

des 4 Vents 

Thenorgues

Malmy

ENEMY DISPOSITION

Morning of 1 November 1918

Immediately opposed to the U.S. 2d Division 

was the German 52d ID, which was in the last 

stages of relieving the 41st ID, with a sector 

front that almost corresponded exactly to 

that of the 2d Division. It was the left division 

of the Argonne Group (LVIII Corps); on its 

right was the 15th Bavarian ID, which 2d 

Division fought at Blanc Mont, and on its left 

the 88th ID. 

Units of the 52d ID had taken their positions, 

but elements of the 41st ID were still in the 

area. Command had been passed to the left 

(170th Infantry) and center (111th Infantry) 

regiments and was to be passed to the right 

regiment (169th Infantry) at 0700 and in 

division HQ at 1000. (Average strength of the 

regiments was about 800 troops; battalions 

were organized into three rifle companies 

and an MG company.)

9

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

U.S. 2d Division Plan of Attack and Enemy Dispositon

1 November 1918

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 13

stump and introduced Summerall, who proceeded 

to lay out their goal and warn the battalion that 

“ahead of you is much barbed wire, artillery, and 

many machine guns. Many Germans will bar your 

way, and many of you will be killed, but you have 

the point of honor and I know you will do it.” Ausland wrote that Summerall bowed; the Marines 

“applauded a little, not understanding all of what 

he had in mind, then they left for other battalions. 

Maybe he likes to josh us about getting killed.”30

To carry out the attack Summerall described, 

the Marines would have to traverse difficult terrain on foot, because few roads existed on which to 

bring in men and supplies. Army machine gun officer Major Andrew Bruce later described the landscape as “varied and ragged.”31 Immediately ahead, 

the territory south of the objective line, running 

from Saint-Georges to Landres-et-Saint-Georges, 

was littered with partially completed trenches, machine-gun emplacements, ravines, and barbed wire. 

Forests offered the Germans strong defensive 

points. In the hillsides above the Americans’ destination, the Germans held good positions from 

which to fire machine guns and artillery. Bruce 

pointed out that the Meuse River served to anchor 

the German left flank, and the hills on the east side 

of the river “afforded observation points and positions for the enemy to deliver oblique fire on our 

right.” Conversely, the 2d Division also could fire 

from heights and woods as it advanced northward, 

but only after moving uphill from the low ground.32

As the time of the attack approached, the Marines prepared. They had dinner, which in some 

cases consisted of steak, creamed potatoes, toast, 

coffee, and doughnuts. Officers gathered their men 

to review final tactics. Unfortunately, maps were at 

a premium with few to be shared.33

30 Diary entry of John Ausland, “The Last Kilometer, The 

Meuse-Argonne,” Wednesday, 30 October 1918, Ausland File, 

Box “2d Division, 5th Regiment,” World War I Veterans Survey Collection, AHEC, Carlisle, PA.

31 Bruce, “Operations of the Second Division (U.S.) during 

Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne.”

32 Bruce, “Operations of the Second Division (U.S.) during 

Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne,” 12–14.

33 Bruce, “Operations of the Second Division (U.S.) during 

Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne,” 25.

The Detailed Plan

Learning from the Battle of Blanc Mont, Generals Liggett, Summerall, and Lejeune planned 

a more thorough artillery bombardment prior to 

the attack. Before the troops moved north toward 

Saint-Georges, artillery would clear the way with a 

massive shelling. 

Historian Mark Ethan Grotelueschen asserts 

that “all three commanders shared, in varying degrees, an appreciation of the critical role of firepower 

in the attack and were not going to be constrained 

by the limitations of official AEF doctrine.” In other words, they would not simply order their men 

to charge forward with only rifle and bayonet into 

withering German artillery and machine gun fire 

without proper artillery support. To this end, “Summerall created the most powerful and comprehensive American attack plan of the war.”34

The plan recognized four phases of artillery 

support: “the period before the preliminary bombardment, the preliminary bombardment, the fire 

accompanying the infantry assault, and the support 

after the consolidation of the main objective.”35

In the first period, artillery would concentrate 

on firing “gas and explosive rounds on important 

targets such as batteries, command posts, and transportation routes.” The second phase would be a 

two-hour, intensive fire barrage “determined by the 

amount of ammunition available for the guns while 

firing at their maximum rate. During this period, 

the light guns were to hit the enemy front lines 

and suspected troop concentrations while the heavy 

howitzers hit towns, woods, strong points, and 

machine-gun nests. The guns with the longest range 

targeted enemy batteries to neutralize them before 

the attack, making extensive use of both persistent 

and nonpersistent gas.”36

34 Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2007), 267, 268.

35 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 269. 36 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 269–70. Nonpersistent 

gases are those that, when released into the air, disperse quickly, 

leaving no liquid contamination. Persistent gases are liquids that 

evaporate slowly. They give off vapor or remain dangerous until 

the liquid has dried both on and below the surface or until they 

have been rendered ineffective.
14 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Grotelueschen points out that “covering fire 

during the attack was even more important than 

the preliminary bombardment.”37 The first two periods were meant to negate counterbattery fire, but 

in the third period, all artillery would focus on a 

complex rolling barrage in front of the attacking 

troops. Lighter guns would fire rounds to land just 

ahead of the advancing men while heavier weapons 

fired a few hundred meters farther on. 

All this supporting fire was to be perfectly 

timed at so many meters per minute, depending 

on the terrain. To move the artillery forward, strict 

timetables, transportation paths, and new locations 

were planned. Grotelueschen concludes: “Without 

a doubt, it was the most centralized and complex 

fire plan the 2d Division ever executed.”38

To put this ambitious plan into effect, Summerall called on First Army and V Corps’ artillery 

to augment the 2d Division’s own 2d Field Artillery Brigade. This brigade consisted of three artillery regiments: the 12th and 15th Field Artillery 

Regiments, 75mm gun units, and the 17th Field 

Artillery Regiment, a 155mm howitzer unit. Altogether, more than 300 guns of various calibers 

would support each V Corps division. In addition, 

Summerall’s plan called for massive machine-gun 

and mortar fire.39

Two Marine Corps officers served in these 2d 

Division Army artillery units: Colonel Robert H. 

Dunlap and Major Edwin H. Brainard. Assigned 

in April 1914 to consolidate Marine artillery into 

a battalion during the invasion at Veracruz, Dunlap was known as the “father of Marine Corps artillery.” He became commander of the 17th Field 

Artillery just as the third phase of the MeuseArgonne campaign kicked off.40 Brainard command37 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 270. 38 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 270–71. 39 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 268–69. 40 He would receive the Navy Cross for his distinguished service as regimental commander.

ed the 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment.41

The 4th Brigade’s commander, General Neville, decided the order of battle. It called for the 5th 

Regiment under Colonel Feland to advance on the 

right, while the 6th Regiment under Colonel Lee 

41 For more on Robert Dunlap, see Gerald C. Thomas Jr., “A 

Warrior-Scholar in the World War: Robert Henry Dunlap,” 

Leatherneck 82, no. 1, January 1998, 88, 82. For Brainard, see 

“Major Brainard Resigns for Curtiss Position,” Leatherneck 12, 

no. 6, June 1929, 15. Brainard would receive the Navy Cross 

for his leadership earlier in the Meuse-Argonne campaign; in 

the 1920s, he would serve as officer in charge of Marine Corps 

Aviation.

A fearless warrior, George W. Hamilton commanded the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, during the Blanc Mont and Meuse-Argonne 

offensives, and commanded the Marine attack across the Meuse 

River on the last night of the war. Unscathed during the war, he 

died flying a Marine Corps plane during the Gettysburg maneuvers 

in 1922. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 15

moved forward on the left. In the 5th Regiment, 

the 1st Battalion would be led by Major Hamilton 

and supported by the 8th Machine Gun Company. 

The 2d Battalion, commanded by Captain Charley 

Dunbeck, would follow, supported by the 23d Machine Gun Company. The 3d Battalion was headed 

by Major Henry L. Larsen and supported by the 

77th Machine Gun Company. 

In the 6th Regiment, Major Frederick A. Barker would command the 1st Battalion; the 73d Machine Gun Company would provide support. The 

2d Battalion was led by Major Ernest C. Williams 

and supported by the 15th Machine Gun Company. 

Major George K. Shuler led the 3d Battalion, supported by the 81st Machine Gun Company. Each 

battalion had specific goals set out in a timetable, 

and they had to be prepared to pass through preceding battalions at the discretion of the regimental 

commanders.

Regimental commanders Feland and Lee could 

count on excellent, battle-hardened battalion commanders. George Hamilton had proven a brave and 

resourceful captain in the earliest stages of the Battle of Belleau Wood, when he led an attack on Hill 

142 just west of the wood. He also played a crucial 

role in keeping the Marines from disintegrating at 

one point during the Battle of Blanc Mont.42 With 

42 For more on George Hamilton, see Mark Mortensen, George 

W. Hamilton, USMC: America’s Greatest World War I Hero ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011); and Ronald J. Brown, “George 

Wallis Hamilton: The Forgotten Hero of World War I,” Leatherneck 86, no. 11, November 2003, 46–51.

Commanding the 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, during the 

Meuse-Argonne campaign, Charley Dunbeck led his Marines across 

the Meuse River on the last night of the war. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Henry L. Larsen commanded the 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, 

during the Meuse-Argonne offensive and would retire as a lieutenant general after serving in World War II. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
16 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

the Marine left flank in danger of collapsing under 

heavy German fire, Hamilton had rallied the Marines and stopped what could have become a grave 

defeat of the attack. 

After joining in 1903, Charley Dunbeck had 

worked his way up the enlisted ranks to be a Marine 

gunner. After the United States entered the war, he 

was quickly promoted to captain and then, while 

commanding the 43d Company, 2d Battalion, 5th 

Regiment, at Belleau Wood was shot in both legs. 

At the Battle of Blanc Mont, a head wound took 

Commander of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, during the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive, Frederick A. Barker received the Navy 

Cross for his leadership on 1 November 1918, the first day of the last 

stage of the offensive. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Ernest C. Williams commanded the 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, 

during the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He had previously received the Medal of Honor during the Dominican Republic campaign in 1916. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

George K. Shuler (shown at right as a captain) led the 3d Battalion, 

6th Regiment, during the last stages of the Meuse-Argonne offensive and made a fateful decision not to attack across the Meuse River 

on the last night of the war. Nevertheless, he served at Headquarters 

Marine Corps after the war, before leaving to become New York 

state treasurer. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 17

him off the battle field for a short time. After recuperating, he assumed command of the 2d Battalion 

on 16 October, just in time for the third phase of 

the Meuse-Argonne offensive.43

Henry Larsen had joined the Marine Corps in 

1913 as a second lieutenant and done expeditionary 

duty in Santo Domingo in 1916. He led valiantly as 

a captain during the Battle of Belleau Wood and as 

a major commanding the 3d Battalion in the Battle 

of Blanc Mont. Hamilton, Dunbeck, and Larsen all 

received the Navy Cross and Silver Star Citations 

for their bravery under fire.44

In the 6th Regiment, Frederick Barker had 

served three years as an Army enlisted man, then 

joined the Marine Corps in 1904, where he would 

see extensive service in Haiti and the Dominican 

Republic. He had already received three Silver Star 

Citations and would receive a Navy Cross and another Silver Star for his actions on November 1. 

Major George K. Shuler had joined the Marine 

Corps in 1910 and had extensive battle leadership, 

receiving three Silver Star Citations for his actions 

at Soissons, Saint-Mihiel, and Blanc Mont. Ernest 

Williams had received a Medal of Honor for his actions in attacking a fortress in the Dominican Republic in 1916. In 1918, he received a Navy Cross 

and three Silver Star Citations for his actions at 

Soissons, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne.45

Assessment of the German Opposition

Before the planned attack, General Summerall 

summoned his division commanders to his headquarters several times to discuss the coming battle and the German strengths. He alleged that the 

43 For more on Charley Dunbeck, see Maj Allan C. Bevilacqua, “World War I: A Marine Called Charley,” Leatherneck 95, 

no. 11, November 2012, 50–56. See also Gerald C. Thomas Jr., 

“Battalion Command ‘Over There’: The Fifth Marines, 1917–

1918,” Marine Corps Gazette 81, no. 9 (September 1997): 112, 

106.

44 Details on Henry Larsen and Charley Dunbeck are also 

found in their military files at the National Personnel Records

Center [NPRC], St. Louis, MO, while more on Dunbeck and 

Hamilton can be found in their personnel files contained in 

Record Group (RG) 125, Records of the Office of the Judge 

Advocate General (Navy), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, DC.

45 For more on the 6th Regiment battalion commanders, see 

Thomas, “Battalion Command ‘Over There’,” 88, 78.

German troops aligned against V Corps were the 

best, that they were extremely brave and “held their 

ground and, when surrounded, refused to surrender, 

but attacked their opponents with trench knives, 

and fought hand to hand until killed.” Summerall 

believed that earlier American attacks had failed 

because of heavy German machine gun fire at 

the beginning of the attack, which prevented the 

Americans from following behind their artillery 

barrages. For this reason, the V Corps commander 

believed in involving more artillery in the upcoming action.46

In previous attacks, the Germans had rushed 

machine guns into the gap in no-man’s-land to mow 

down the first line of advancing troops. To counter 

this maneuver, John Lejeune’s chief of staff, Army 

Colonel James C. Rhea, devised yet another plan: 

the Marines would pull back 300 hundred yards 

just before the planned artillery bombardment began. The rolling barrage would then be calibrated to 

fall into the no-man’s-land, wiping out the enemy 

machine guns before the Marines advanced.47

While the AEF made their plans, the German 

Army was relieving the forces arrayed against the 

Marines. The 52d Division had fought south of the 

region but had fallen back to Landres-et-SaintGeorges by mid-October. After being withdrawn, 

rested for two weeks, and supplemented by several 

replacement troops, the division had been sent back 

toward Landres-et-Saint-Georges on the night of 

31 October to relieve the 41st Division. 

The intelligence section of the U.S. general staff 

rated the 52d Division as “one of the best German 

divisions.” Before the division was in place, however, 

a battalion of the 169th Regiment lost 6 officers and 

220 enlisted to a massive American gas attack on 30 

October. Elements of the 41st Division would still 

be in the area after the American attack began on 1 

November, but the combination of the 41st and 52d 

46 Chief of staff, 2d Division [ J. C. Rhea], to commanding 

general, 2d Division [ John Lejeune], Report of Operations, 2d 

Division, 1–2 November 1918, dated 2 November 1918, Headquarters 2d Division, vol. 6, pt. 4, AHEC, hereafter Rhea letter.

47 Rhea letter. See also Ausland, “The Last Kilometer,” in which 

Ausland reproduces a handwritten letter (also in the file) from 

John Lejeune giving credit to Col Rhea for the idea to catch 

the German machine guns unaware in no-man’s-land. 
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Romagne

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les Grands Carres

le Gnd Carre Fme

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le Chateau Tme le Grande Fontaine

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ls Boillogac

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4th BDE

1 5

Mar 1 6

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lmecourt

Leading battalions 

attack formations from objective 2

80th Co 78thCo

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Objective 3 secured by 3d Battalion, 

5th Marines, at 1410 and by 2d 

Battalion, 6th Marines, at 1515. Units 

consolidated and dug-in. Patrols sent 

forward to exploitation line.

Fme du Fourpeau

Contour interval 20 meters

0 2,000yards

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O B J 3

The American First Army attacked as planned at 

H-hour (0530) on 1 November 1918. On the right of 

the 2d Division’s sector, the 23d Infantry cleared 

the enemy holding strong positions on the high 

ground and woods around the town of Landres, 

afterwhich it joined the 3d Brigade in division 

reserve. On the left, Marines of the 4th Brigade 

overran frontline entrenched enemy units then 

pressed the attack forward to seize Objectives 1, 

2, and 3. The next day, the 3d Brigade would pass 

through the 4th Brigade and lead the attack.

Losses inflicted on the German defenders were 

devastating. The 52d Division reported: “With its 

position penetrated on both flanks, the greater 

part of the infantry of the division, which defended 

itself with extraordinary valor had, (by 1000 hours) 

already been lost. Whoever the enemy succeeded 

in capturing, was, after the overwhelming artillery 

fire, for the most part dead or wounded. By 1000 

all of the guns of the 84th Foot (Heavy) Arty Bn 

and the 104th Field Arty of the division, as well as 

the 54th Res Field Arty and the 15th Foot (Heavy) 

Arty Bn, which were stationed in the sector, had 

likewise been lost after being disabled.” A few 

days later, of the 2,400 soldiers in the three 

infantry regiments of the German 52d Division at 

the start of the American attack, only 35 officers 

and 242 troops could be mustered. 

The planning and execution of the American 

attack was as flawless as could be expected. 

Overwhelming artillery support paved the way. 

The infantry formations used were tried and tested 

in many previous battles. During WWI, infantry 

regiments usually formed for attack in column of 

battalions, with about 500 meters between them. 

The leading battalion advanced with two 

companies in front and two behind in support. 

When close enemy contact was made, the 

battalion would deploy and assault. 

During the 4th Brigade’s advance this day, on 

reaching each objective, the second (support) 

battalion would leap frog the one in front and 

become the leading unit. The third (reserve) 

battalion then became second (support), and the 

former leader, the third (reserve) in column.

The 4th Brigade’s attack set one of the speed and 

distance records of World War I. In approximately 

10 hours, the Marines destroyed a German 

division and advanced more than nine kilometers. 

Leading battalions 

jump-off attack formations

76th Co 74th Co

75th Co

1/6 Mar

49th Co 66th Co

67th Co 17th Co

1/5 Mar

95th Co, 1/6 Mar liaison unit 

 between 2d and 80th Div [ ]

3/6 Mar 2/5 Mar

Leading battalions 

attack formations from objective 1

83d Co 51st Co

82d Co 84th Co

97th Co 55th Co

43d Co

18th Co, 2/5 Mar liaison unit 

 between 2d and 89th Div [ ]

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

The 4th Brigade Attack

1 November 1918

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 19

Divisions, including reserves from other German 

units, remained weak.48 

German frontline divisions had suffered great 

losses in the first stages of the Meuse-Argonne 

campaign. Their reserves also were insufficient, both 

in number of units available and in manpower. They 

never enabled the Germans to launch any effective 

counterattacks on a large scale. In short, the Germans suffered from disproportionate numbers of 

troops, much weaker than the American divisions 

they faced.49

To the west of the 52d Division, the German 

15th Bavarian Division had occupied positions 

since mid-October. U.S. intelligence forces concluded that “it did not offer a vigorous resistance to the 

American attacks at first, but in late October and 

early November it did all in its power to check the 

American advance.” The intelligence section rated 

the 15th Bavarian Division as third class, asserting 

that “heavy losses in Champagne in September and 

October, the prevalent sickness, political discontent, 

and dissatisfaction with Prussia continued to give 

the division a low morale.”50

THE BEGINNING 

OF THE END, 1 NOVEMBER 1918

Shortly after 2100 on 31 October, 2d Division units 

received orders affirming that the attack would 

48 Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army which Participated in the War (1914–1918) (Chaumont, France: AEF General Headquarters, 1919), 503. See also 

von Giehrl, “Battle of the Meuse-Argonne,” 534.

49 von Giehrl, “Battle of the Meuse-Argonne,” 540.

50 Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army, 261. Initially, the AEF graded the quality of the 

German divisions in 1918 using the French-produced evaluations/histories as an initial basis because the French Army had 

estimated the value of each German division in earlier years. 

For the Americans, the evaluation was done by the G-2 (intelligence), General Headquarters, AEF. The quality or class was 

a changing grade or estimate based on known abilities of the 

unit. As the war wore on, many of the divisions considered first 

class were downgraded as old men, young boys, and even the 

infirm were brought into some of the divisions. The G-2 used 

frontline U.S. reports and interviews to grade a unit according 

to four classes: first-class division, second-class division, thirdclass division, and fourth-class division. At the beginning of 

the war, certain units were rated first class; for example, infantry divisions were the best. Later, it was necessary to track the 

combat efficiency of the German divisions to gauge the caliber 

of the opposing force.

begin at 0530 on 1 November. Prior to the opening bombardment, Corporal Vincent B. Grube of 

the 23d Machine Gun Company, 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion, moved forward with his machine 

gun crew. Grube had arrived in France in August 

with the 1st Separate Machine Gun Replacement 

Battalion and had joined the 23d Machine Gun 

Company on 23 October. In pitch dark, he and his 

crew trudged single file through forests carrying 

their heavy equipment. After traversing banks and 

“rough places where wire, mud, limbs, etc., would 

trip you,” they came to a field, where they dug in to 

set up their machine gun post. When 0330 came, 

Grube and his men began firing their gun, expecting that they would use up to 3,000 rounds during 

the preattack bombardment.51

When the barrage began, to Grube, 

it seemed as though the gates of hell had been 

opened, and all its fury had launched at the 

enemy. All through this my gunner showed 

the greatest coolness and bravery. The Germans tried to neutralize our fire. Shells 

landed nearer and nearer. The earth shook as 

though there was an earthquake. Now and 

then I could hear a wounded man calling for 

first aid, and could see the Red Cross men 

hurrying here and there to give first aid to 

the injured. Litter bearers hurried them to the 

rear, and all the time the firing continued. I 

tried to keep cool, and all the time I prayed for 

God’s protection. Thoughts of home came to 

my mind, and I asked God to have mercy and 

spare my life. It certainly was hell on earth.52

When a shell hit 20 feet away, Grube saw “a 

piece of shrapnel hit my section sergeant right in 

the forehead, and split his head in half as though 

an ax had done it.” After Grube went “over the top,” 

he saw a captain blown to pieces by a shell, and he 

heard machine guns bullets zip by, “making a funny 

peeping noise like a sparrow. That’s just what they 

sounded to me—a sparrow chirping.”53

At 0330 on 1 November, Marines hunkered 

51 Diary of Vincent B. Grube, Archives Branch, Marine Corps 

History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Grube diary.

52 Grube diary.

53 Grube diary.
20 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

down in their holes while the immediate preattack 

bombardment began. East Tennessee native Private 

Clarence L. Richmond served as a stretcher-bearer 

in the 43d Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment. 

He would later receive a Distinguished Service 

Cross for service at Blanc Mont because he “unhesitatingly went through the heaviest machine-gun 

and artillery fire dressing and carrying wounded. 

Disregarding his own safety, he refused to take rest 

or food while there were wounded needing attention.”54

Richmond’s war diary described events the 

night of 1 November. He remarked that several 

54 For more on his Distinguished Service Cross, see “Clarence 

L. Richmond,” Valor.MilitaryTimes.com.

American batteries of 75mm cannon fired nearby, 

and that the Germans replied with a counterbarrage, but “not near in proportion to ours. The noise 

was so great that I could only hear a few enemy 

shells which fell right near us.” Unable to sleep, 

Richmond “watched the horizon, which was a continuous flash of fire from the hundreds of guns taking part in the barrage.”55

Captain James McBrayer Sellers, commanding 

officer of the 78th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, had already been wounded and received the 

Distinguished Service and the Navy Cross for his 

55 See “Recollections of a Buck Private ‘Somewhere in France’: 

The War Memoir of Clarence L. Richmond,” RobinRichmond.

com, 23 January 2014, hereafter Richmond war diary. The diary 

was first printed in the Cleveland (TN) Daily Banner in 1979.

Clarence L. Richmond received the Distinguished Service Cross for 

his actions at Blanc Mont. His World War I diary was reprinted in 

his local Cleveland, TN, newspaper. 

Courtesy of Robin Richmond (grandson), The War Diary of 

Clarence Richmond

Wounded at Belleau Wood, James M. Sellers returned to action and 

served bravely during the Blanc Mont offensive. After the war, he 

spent the rest of his life at Wentworth Military Academy in Lexington, MO, eventually serving as its president.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 21

actions on 6 June at Bouresches in the Battle of Belleau Wood as a first lieutenant. As he recalled the 

bombardment on the night of 31 October/1 November, Sellers noted that “the artillery was brought 

up very close to us. It was the only time I ever felt 

nervous. The artillery was just a few yards behind 

us, firing all night, and I could not sleep very well. I 

did not relish the situation and really felt uneasy.”56

The artillery bombardment also included gas 

shells: “Summerall was in full agreement with Liggett that the fire plan drench the enemy with various kinds of gas, especially on the enemy’s artillery 

batteries and most powerful strong points.”57 The 

task of setting up the gas attack fell to the 1st Gas 

Regiment’s 2d Battalion, which supported V Corps. 

In the week prior to the final attack, the battalion’s 

Company D supporting the Marines installed 160 

gas projectors 1.5km south of Saint-Georges and 

40 gas projectors a similar distance southwest of 

Landres-et-Saint-Georges. 

The gas projectors were tubes eight inches in diameter and closed at one end, resting on 

a 28-pound steel base plate. They came in three 

lengths—30, 33, and 48 inches—and weighed 65, 

105, and 150 pounds, respectively. They were set up 

in groups of 20 in a 9.75-m-long trench perpendicular to the line of attack. Covered with dirt so only 

a small amount of the tube stuck out of the ground, 

they were easy to camouflage. They fired cylindrical 

drums weighing 65 pounds and carrying 30 pounds 

of gas or high explosives for a maximum range of 

1,850 yards.58

When the attack came, Company D shot 80 

canisters of phosgene gas on enemy targets south 

of Saint-Georges. The 1st Gas Regiment’s chaplain, Army first lieutenant James Thayer Addison, 

recalled that “since the wind was south and carried 

through the village and down the ravine northward, 

enemy casualties were heavy. Prisoners later report56 Quote taken from a part of Sellers’s diary reproduced in 

George B. Clark, ed., Devil Dogs Chronicle: Voices of the 4th 

Marine Brigade in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of 

Kansas, 2013), 323.

57 Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 268. 58 James Thayer Addison, The Story of the First Gas Regiment

(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 172–73. See 

appendix D for a description of the equipment used by the regiment.

ed some 300 gas cases, and more than 20 bodies of 

men killed by gas were found on the position.” One 

minute before H-hour, “a group of 40 projectors 

discharged high explosive bombs upon the same 

targets, and still another launched the same number 

upon machine-gun nests southeast of Landres-etSt. Georges.”59

Stokes mortars joined the barrage, firing 50 

rounds of thermite bombs.60 Stokes mortars were 

4 inches in diameter and 48 inches long, firing a 

25-pound cylindrical drum holding seven pounds 

of gas, high explosive, thermite, or phosphorus, for 

a maximum distance of 1,150 yards. Chaplain Addison concluded that “the weapons described can 

produce a far more concentrated cloud of gas than 

it is possible to produce with artillery. Hence the 

Special Gas Troops have a field which it is impossible for the artillery to fill. The artillery, of course, 

have a tremendous advantage in range.”61

H-hour: Over the Top

At H-hour, officers blew their whistles and the 

Marines moved quickly into a dense fog, behind a 

rolling barrage designed to fall roughly 100 yards 

ahead of them. A complement of nearly 100 troops 

from 2d Engineers also charged forward with the 

Marines to blaze a path through the barbed wire. In 

addition, 15 light French tanks manned by Americans went forward; 5 tanks accompanied each of 

the 5th and 6th Regiments, with the other 5 serving 

initially to support the Army’s 23d Infantry on the 

right, before falling back into reserve.62

Private Ralph Williams of the 2d Engineers 

was happy to be assigned to support the Marines. 

59 Addison, The Story of the First Gas Regiment, 175. 60 Thermite grenades are one of the most destructive weapons 

used by the military, rendering a powerful incendiary device 

that produces intense heat through a chemical reaction and destroys anything it touches. Some thermite grenades have been 

known to burn at temperatures of nearly 4,000° Fahrenheit.

61 Addison, The Story of the First Gas Regiment, 175, 220. 62 For the setting of the time and date, see “Slap” [Feland], to 

commanding officers, 3d Battalion and 2d Battalion, 31 October 1918, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC. For 

more on brigade support provided, see “Operations Report, 4th 

Brigade Marines, covering period 24 Oct.–11 Nov. ’18,” vol. 

6, Headquarters 4th Brigade, AHEC. Details about the rolling barrage are found in 5th Regiment Field Order, 31 October 

1918, 5th Marines, Field Orders, vol. 3, AHEC.
22 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

He believed that “being in combat with the Marines, cutting wire and going over with them earned 

our battalion many honors, and they adopted us, 

which was very unusual for the Marines to do.”63

Williams’s platoon was tasked with cutting 

lanes through the German barbed wire. He remembered that “it was a miserable night, cold and wet. 

The fog was so thick that one had to keep in physical touch with the man in front, or get lost.” He 

recollected that, “when we got to the front line, a 

Marine asked what outfit we were with, and when 

we told him the 2d Engineers, he said ‘Great, now 

we can get through okay, and we know you fellows 

will go over with us’.”64

Williams and his platoon had no trouble cutting a wide path through the German wire, but 

were caught in an artillery barrage, followed by 

machine-gun and trench mortar fire, and then 

grenades. During the attack, Williams saw others 

wounded, and then “suddenly the lights went out 

for me. I did not know anything about it until a 

Marine [Navy] medic and two helpers arrived to 

bandage the other two [next to me] and called for 

a stretcher to carry us in.” Although not wounded 

by shellfire, Williams had been thrown against a 

tree and suffered four cracked ribs and a serious 

back injury.65 Williams could no longer take part 

in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, but his actions 

had paved the way for the Marines to move forward. 

The 23d Infantry Regiment of the Army’s 3d 

Brigade served on the 5th Regiment’s right flank, 

while the rest of the Army brigade followed the 

Marines in reserve. The plan was for the 23d Regiment to gain its initial objective, then fall back into 

reserve with the rest of the Army brigade. Supported by machine guns, a company of Marines from 

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Captain John 

R. Foster would maintain liaison with the 23d Regiment. When the soldiers pulled back into reserve, 

Foster’s command would then serve as liaison to the 

63 Ralph Williams folder, 2d Division, 2d Engineering Regiment, Company A, Box Divisional Troops, 2d Division, World 

War I Veterans Survey Collection, AHEC, hereafter Williams 

collection.

64 Williams collection.

65 Williams collection.

89th Division on the 5th Regiment’s right flank.66

The attack plan called for the Marines to move 

out in columns of battalions. In the 5th Regiment, 

the 1st Battalion would lead to the first objective, 

then the 2d Battalion would pass through and take 

the second objective, and finally the 3d Battalion 

would pass through and take the third goal. In the 

6th Regiment, the 1st Battalion would lead, followed by the 3d Battalion, then the 2d Battalion. 

Each battalion had two companies side-by-side, 

followed by two additional companies. 

In the 5th Regiment’s 1st Battalion under 

Hamilton, the 49th Company under Captain Francis S. Kieren, and the 66th Company under Captain 

Robert Blake had the honors of leading their regiment.67 Kieren had received a Silver Star Citation 

for “gallantry in action” during the Battle of Blanc 

Mont, while Blake would receive the Distinguished 

Service Cross and Navy Cross for his actions at 

Belleau Wood. 

In Barker’s 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, the 

lead-off honors went to the 76th Company under 

Captain Macon C. Overton and the 74th Company under First Lieutenant Leo D. Hermle.68 Overton would receive a Distinguished Service and a 

Navy Cross for his leadership at Blanc Mont, while 

Hermle received two Silver Star citations. Both 

would further distinguish themselves on 1 November.69

The Marines moved forward through intense 

smoke caused by the rolling barrage. In dispatches 

at 0800 and 0900, Major Hamilton’s 1st Battalion, 

5th Regiment, intelligence officer, Second Lieutenant Leonard E. Rea, notified Colonel Feland’s 

headquarters that the battalion had met its first objective, just south of Landreville. They had suffered 

five officer and “few” enlisted casualties. The battalion had captured a battery of 77mm cannon, but 

“few prisoners and no material.”70

66 5th Regiment Field Order. 67 Blake would continue to serve, leading Marines as a major 

general during World War II.

68 Hermle would later be promoted to lieutenant general during 

his service.

69 George Clark, Devil Dogs, 349. 70 See reports from Lt L. E. Rea, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 

1 November 1918, 0800 and 0900, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 

5, pt. 1, AHEC.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 23

Earlier, at 0810, Hamilton updated Feland 

with his own dispatch, noting that his men had 

“met slight machine gun resistance,” and had taken 

about 500 prisoners. He admitted that because of 

their start in the dark, all the companies were disorganized, but were regrouping. In the meantime, 

Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion was passing through Hamilton’s battalion to take up the advance. Heavy enemy machine gun fire was developing along the left 

front, where there were “large numbers of Germans” 

but no liaison with units on either flank. Hamilton 

closed his report by estimating that his battalion 

had suffered about 5 percent casualties.71

As it took over the lead, Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion 

met enemy opposition in the town of Landreville, 

about 3km north of Landres-et-Saint-Georges. A 

member of the battalion’s 43d Company, Private 

Clarence Richmond, observed later that “there was 

a heavy fog,” and that “walking was actually a difficulty, the ground had been so torn up by the [artillery] barrage.”72 Enemy artillery fired point-blank at 

the Marines, who nevertheless managed to capture 

several pieces. 

The Marines took prisoners and machine guns. 

Several German soldiers seemed happy to surrender. One of the captured German machine guns 

had been fired through a window from which a Red 

Cross flag was flying. The Marines waited briefly 

for their own artillery barrage to move forward, and 

Richmond observed that when the Marines drew 

closer to the supposed Red Cross station, “12 or 15 

Germans came running out, with their hands uplifted, and waving white handkerchiefs.”73

From a hill near Bayonville, 1.6km north, German machine guns raked Dunbeck’s battalion, so 

the 55th Company attacked from the flank, driving 

the enemy from the hill. In so doing, the battalion 

captured approximately 30 machine guns, a battery 

of 8-inch artillery, and about a dozen 6-inch cannons. Around the guns, the Marines found about 30 

German officers and noncommissioned officers ei71 Commanding officer [Hamilton], 1st Battalion, to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 

5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.

72 Richmond war diary.

73 Episode 18, “Fighting Continues: German Shells Fly Overhead, October 30–November 3, 1918,” Richmond war diary.

ther killed or wounded. The battalion moved northward, finally arriving in a ravine north of Bayonville, 

where they rested and waited for the 3d Battalion to 

pass through, according to plan.74

On the 5th Regiment’s right flank, the 18th 

Company’s commanding officer, Captain John R. 

Foster, confirmed to Colonel Feland that his liaison 

company was in contact with the 3d Brigade’s 23d 

Infantry soldiers: “assault wave going good.” He later added that he was in liaison with the 89th Division as well.75

Shortly before noon, Captain Dunbeck reported that his 2d Battalion had reached the second 

goal north of Bayonville, and Henry Larsen reported that his 3d Battalion had arrived and was getting 

ready to “go over the top” at 1220. Two hours later, 

Larsen added that his battalion had reached the 5th 

Regiment’s third objective south of Barricourt, and 

that they were “meeting no opposition, except our 

own artillery falling short. Enemy artillery is very 

weak.” Casualties were light at approximately 1 

percent, and the battalion had captured six artillery 

pieces and about 100 prisoners.76

By midday, George Hamilton acknowledged 

that his battalion (in support) was digging in and 

needed food: “Men in good spirits but physically 

weak on acct of diarrhoea [sic]. When can we have 

some chow?” Colonel Feland promised to send supplies “as soon as possible.”77

This communication from Hamilton did not 

satisfy the Kentuckian; later that evening, Feland 

chided Hamilton, saying that he had not heard 

any report from the 1st Battalion commander since 

0900. The colonel added that he had sent forward 

second-in-command Lieutenant Colonel Julius 

S. Turrill to set up a new command post and ad74 “Records of Marine Units, 1914–49,” RG 127.9, NARA, 20.

75 Capt John R. Foster, 18th Company, 5th Marines, to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 

0815 and 0920, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.

76 Slap A 1 [Dunbeck] to Slap 1 [Feland], 1 November 18, 

1130, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC; and Slap P 1 

[Larsen] to Slap 1 [Feland], 1 November 1918, 1153 and 1430, 

5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.

77 Commanding officer, 1st Battalion [Hamilton], to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 

1520, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC; and Slap to 

commanding officer [Feland], 1st Battalion, 1 November 1918, 

1615, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.
24 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

monished Hamilton to “locate them and send in to 

them frequent reports.”78 Despite this apparent criticism, Hamilton would remain Feland’s friend and 

most trusted commander. 

The 5th Regiment had met its first day objectives in a timely fashion. On the night of 1–2 

November, division orders called for the 3d Army 

Brigade to pass through the Marine brigade to lead 

the next day’s attack. But confusion still existed. 

Near midnight, 3d Battalion commander Henry Larsen warned of difficulties establishing liaison 

with the 89th Division on the right, and admitted 

he had no idea where the 3d Brigade units might 

be found. He clarified that it was foggy; runners, 

battalions, and regiments got lost in the darkness. 

The Marines were still encountering some light 

machine gun fire.79

The 6th Regiment Advances

On the left side of the Marine brigade, the 6th 

Regiment also was having a relatively routine operation on 1 November. At 0700, Colonel Lee 

assured General Neville that “everything [was] 

going well,” and the regiment was capturing many 

prisoners.80

The attack went ahead as planned, but not without cost. The commander of the 6th Regiment’s 1st 

Battalion, Major Frederick Barker, announced that 

he had reached the first objective at 0800, but an officer, 76th Company’s commander Captain Macon 

C. Overton, had been killed, and 5 officers and 143 

men enlisted were wounded.81

The other leader of the front two companies in 

78 Commanding officer [Hamilton], 1st Battalion, to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 

1520, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC; and Slap 

to commanding officer [Hamilton], 1st Battalion, 1 November 

1918, 1615, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC. Emphasis in original.

79 Slap P 1 [Larsen] to Slap 1 [Feland], 2 November 1918, 

1205, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.

80 See Site [Lee], to commanding officer [Neville], 4th Brigade, 

1 November 1918, 0700, 0720, and 0905, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC; and commanding officer [Shuler], 

3d Battalion, 1 November 1918, 0720, 6th Regiment Reports, 

vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

81 See commanding officer [Barker], 1st Battalion, to Site [Lee], 

1 November 1918, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

Barker’s battalion, First Lieutenant Leo D. Hermle, 

received a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on 1 November. His citation summed up his 

actions that day: 

When the company on his left was checked by 

heavy machine gun fire, Lieutenant Hermle led a platoon forward and surrounded a 

large number of the enemy, capturing one 

hundred fifty-five prisoners, and seventeen 

machine guns. Pushing on, he took the town 

of St. Georges and many machine gun positions. Although he was painfully wounded he 

refused to be evacuated and remained with 

his men for two days until he was ordered to 

the rear.82

82 “Leo D. Hermle,” Valor.MilitaryTimes.com. Hermle would 

recuperate and go on to serve as a brigadier general in World 

War II, retiring as a lieutenant general.

Leo D. Hermle received the Distinguished Service Cross for his 

leadership on 1 November 1918. He would go on to serve as assistant division commander of the 5th Marine Division during World 

War II and the Battle of Iwo Jima. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 25

CAP TAIN MACON C. OVERTON

Born in Georgia, Overton joined the Marine Corps 

as a private in November 1913. He spent two years 

on the USS New York (BB 34) before playing on a 

Marine baseball team in Washington, DC. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in July 1917, he 

was soon assigned to the 76th Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, headed for France. At Belleau 

Wood, he led an attack on a machine gun nest for 

which he would eventually receive a French Croix 

de Guerre and a Silver Star. He received a second 

Croix de Guerre and Silver Star for his actions at 

Soissons, and would posthumously receive a Distinguished Service and a Navy Cross (for the same 

action) for bravery under fire at Blanc Mont. 

Distinguished Service and Navy Cross Citations:

When his battalion was halted by severe fire, 

Captain Overton attacked and reduced one strong enemy machine-gun nest, and, moving forward, captured one field-piece that was firing point-blank at his company. He was wounded 

the next day, but he refused to be evacuated, and continued to lead his command with skill and 

courage throughout the engagement. On October 8 after occupying St. Etienne without casualties in his company, Captain Overton went through heavy artillery and machine-gun fire to 

establish liaison with another company, his conspicuous gallantry inspiring his men to repel two 

strong counterattacks.1

On 1 November, Overton again displayed courage for “leading his company under heavy artillery fire 

and silencing five machine-gun nests. He then personally undertook to guide a tank forward against machine-gun positions and while doing so was seriously wounded by a German anti-tank sniper.” For these 

actions, Overton would posthumously be awarded a second Distinguished Service Cross.2

1

 “Macon C. Overton,” Valor.MilitaryTimes.com; and C. Douglas Sterner, ed., Marine Corps Heroes: Navy Cross, 1915–WWII, vol. II 

(Pueblo, CO: CreateSpace, 2006), 71. Other details came from the Macon Overton File, Biographical Files, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA; and Macon Overton File, Box 835, Entry 62, RG 125, NARA.

2

 “Macon C. Overton.” In July 1919, the U.S. Navy commissioned a destroyer named for him, the USS Overton (DD 239), which 

would serve in convoy duty in World War II, earning eight battle stars. See “Overton (Destroyer No. 239),” Naval History and 

Heritage Command, 25 February 2016. 

The 2d Division’s publication The Indian showed this disabled 

two-man tank, possibly the one that Capt Macon Overton led toward Landres-et-Saint-Georges on 1 November 1918. The caption 

below the photograph noted that Overton had died in front of the 

town, and “his loss filled the [76th] company with a desire for revenge that doubled the vigor of their attack.” 

The Indian, 20 May 1919

Another member of Overton’s 76th Company 

also posthumously received a Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry on 1 November. Private 

First Class David T. DePue from Chicago charged 

through barbed wire at a machine gun nest while 

spraying it with a French Chauchat light machine 

gun. When his ammunition ran out, he used his rifle to club the Germans in the nest before being 

mortally wounded. His body was found near those 

of four dead Germans.83

Another company member, Sergeant William 

H. Faga, received a Distinguished Service and a 

Navy Cross for his actions that day, but he lived 

83 “David T. DePue,” Valor.MilitaryTimes.com.
26 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

to tell the story.84 On 1 November, he was severely 

wounded, but assumed command when his company’s leaders were wounded.85

The 73d Machine Gun Company’s role was to 

follow closely behind the advancing infantry Marines and move ahead in case of stiff opposition. The 

German opposition proved weaker than expected, 

and the Marines “were able to overcome resistance 

which was beginning to break at that time.” Running from shell hole to shell hole for cover, Private 

Raymond H. Stenback remained unharmed, al84 Faga also received a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during Soissons, where he captured a machine gun and 

then volunteered to take important messages to his battalion 

commander under heavy fire.

85 “William H. Faga,” Valor.MilitaryTimes.com.

though men near him suffered wounds. Later, he 

would write that they were under constant German 

artillery fire up to Armistice day, “but it wasn’t as 

heavy as the first day.” Wearing heavy overcoats in 

the rainy and chilly weather, Stenback and his fellow Marines saw many dead German soldiers and 

prisoners being led to the rear.86

The 6th Marines continued to attack. Colonel Lee’s 3d Battalion commander, Major George 

Shuler, thought his men were moving ahead but 

slowly. Soon the pace picked up, and by 0814, Shuler revealed that two of his companies were just 

86 “The Making of a Marine,” Raymond H. Stenback Personal 

Papers, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Division, World War I Veterans Survey Collection, AHEC.

PRIVATE RAYMOND H. STENBACK

Raymond H. Stenback joined the Marine Corps in 1917, expecting to go to France as an infantryman. Instead, he was assigned to be a machine gunner, and was posted to Galveston, Texas, where Marines served as 

a deterrent to possible war with Mexico. Stenback made it to France in late summer 1918 and was assigned 

to Gunnery Sergeant Daniel J. Daly’s old unit, the 73d Machine Gun Company that supported the 6th 

Regiment.1

 Very few of the original 73d Machine Gun Company were still around to do so. Their replacements also suffered. In his memoir, Stenback asserted that due to death, wounds, and sickness, only 37 men 

were left in his machine gun company by the time of the Armistice. 

Private Stenback arrived at the 6th Regiment in time for the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign. On his way to the front, Stenback observed: 

When moving up to the front lines, we passed over miles of destruction from previous battles. 

Villages were nothing but ruins and the ground was all torn apart by artillery fire and trenches. 

Not a blade of grass was left or a green tree—mostly destroyed by shell fire and gas. All kinds of 

articles of warfare were in evidence and here and there a part of a soldier—it was destruction 

and death beyond description.2

In his first battle, Stenback admitted that he and his fellow Marines “got a terrible baptism of exploding 

German shells and machine gun fire” from the counterbarrage brought on by the heavy American artillery 

fire. Unable to discern the difference between normal shell fire and mustard gas, the newcomers slapped on 

their gas masks. During this time, Stenback avowed that two lieutenants were wounded and “another went 

berserk because he just couldn’t take it,” and had to be replaced by noncommissioned officers.3

1

 Daly was a two-time Medal of Honor recipient who reportedly uttered a scathing challenge to his Marines at Belleau Wood: 

“Come on, you sons of bitches, do you want to live forever?” Wounded a second time at the Battle of Blanc Mont, Daly was unable 

to participate in the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign. For more on Daly, see “Sergeant Major Daniel ‘Dan’ Joseph Daly, 

USMC (deceased),” Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University.

2

 “The Making of a Marine,” Raymond H. Stenback Personal Papers, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Division, World War I Veterans 

Survey Collection, AHEC.

3

 “The Making of a Marine.”
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 27

south of their first objective. His battalion was passing through Major Barker’s 1st Battalion to lead the 

attack.87

At 1100, Shuler informed Colonel Lee that his 

3d Battalion continued to take prisoners, about 100 

in the latest group, “by using tanks with riflemen.” 

Enemy shelling continued from north of Bayonville. When the 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, met 

its second objective line, Major Ernest Williams 

was ready to lead his 2d Battalion through Shuler’s 

battalion to take the lead. They were held up, however, because U.S. artillery was falling short of its 

intended German targets, endangering the advancing Marines.88

87 Commanding officer [Shuler], 3d Battalion, to commanding 

officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, 0814, 1 November 1918, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

88 Commanding officer [Shuler], 3d Battalion, to commanding 

officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 1100, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC; and commanding officer 

[Williams], 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, to commanding officer [Shuler], 3d Battalion,1 November 1918, 1224, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

Captain Pell W. Foster’s Battery B of the 12th 

Field Artillery fired for six hours to support the 

6th Marines in the attack. He remembered that, 

even though the artillery batteries were situated in 

plain view, the Germans failed to launch counterbattery attacks. To keep up with the rapid advance 

of the Marines, his battery moved forward to the 

Landres and Landres-et-Saint-Georges road to 

continue their rolling barrage just ahead of the 

Marines.

On the far left flank, a force under Major George 

A. Stowell had the challenging task of maintaining liaison with elements of the neighboring 80th 

Infantry Division, part of I Corps. Stowell’s force 

consisted of 95th Company, 1st Battalion, 6th 

Regiment, and a company from the 319th Infantry 

Regiment of the 80th Division. The 80th Division 

was running into difficulties. Nevertheless, the 

319th Regiment proceeded to its destination of 

Imecourt, about 2.7km southeast of Landreville, 

The last drive into Argonne.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
28 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

while Stowell’s Marines pushed farther north.89

Having finally passed through Shuler’s 3d Battalion, Major Williams led his men forward, reaching the 6th Regiment’s third goal at the edge of the 

Bois de la Folie by 1515.90 He had liaison with Major Stowell on the left and the 5th Regiment on the 

right. Williams disclosed that casualties among the 

enlisted men had been light, but 50 percent of the 

officers had been wounded or killed. Patrols were 

being sent forward beyond the objective line to an 

exploitation line.91

The regimental second in command, Lieutenant 

Colonel Thomas Holcomb, was already moving to 

the regiment’s next command post in the hamlet of 

Chennery, less than a kilometer southwest of Bayonville. Colonel Lee stayed in Saint-Georges.92

A member of Williams’s 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, Private Carl Andrew Brannen, 80th Company, described what happened when his company 

attacked. It lost its captain and all its lieutenants, 

where “the top sergeant was commanding the remnant of the company.” Brannen himself was hit, 

when “the nozzle of a ten inch shell hit me a glancing blow in the chest, but the folds of my overcoat 

helped, and I had a narrow escape.”93

89 See American Battle Monuments Commission, 80th Division Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 41–42. Orders for 

Stowell’s liaison command are found in Field Order No. 22, 31 

October 1918, in 6th Regiment Reports, Field Orders, vol. 3, 

AHEC. See also commanding officer [Stowell], Left Flank Liaison Battalion (I and V Corps), to commanding officer [Barker], 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 1025, 6th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

90 Bois de la Folie roughly translates to Wood of the Madness.

91 Commanding officer [Williams], 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, to commanding officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 1525, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC. 

The term exploitation line refers to a type of offensive operation 

that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy.

92 See commanding officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, to commanding general [Lejeune], 2d Division, 1 November 1918, 1620, 

6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC. Lee’s secondin-command, Thomas Holcomb, would eventually become the 

17th Commandant of the Marine Corps. For more on Holcomb, see David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011). 

93 Brannen, Over There, 54–55.

By the end of the first day, rain was falling and 

it was cold. Brannen and his fellow Marines suffered: “We were drenched to the skin, and it was 

freezing. At night we lay in the mud, tired and hungry, and in the morning would take up the advance 

again.” In addition, Brannen observed that many of 

the men suffered with dysentery, brought about by 

“scanty unfit food and polluted water.”94

Brannen’s captain was Kirt Green. A veteran of 

13 years, Green had been promoted to second lieutenant from the enlisted ranks in April 1917. This 

last phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign was 

his first battle and, unfortunately, his last. When 

his company faced direct fire from a German field 

gun, Green called his company officers together to 

discuss how to deal with the threat. The Germans 

spied the gathering and fired a shell into the group. 

Green and First Lieutenant John G. Schneider Jr. 

died outright and two other officers were rendered 

hors de combat (literally, out of the fight), their war 

over. One of Green’s officers, Second Lieutenant 

George W. Hopke, survived, and aided by Gunnery 

Sergeant James Foley Jr., led the ensuing assault 

that captured the German gun.95

When apprised of the 6th Regiment’s advance, 

4th Brigade commander Colonel Neville cautioned: 

“We must make every effort to hold the woods to 

the front and left flank—so that the work will not 

have to be done again. Send out strong patrols with 

that end in view. The Boche [Germans] may attempt to filter in today. Good work today.”96

Despite the seemingly easy advance, Neville knew the Germans remained dangerous. They 

still had strong artillery and machine gun fire, but 

the chances of any massed infantry counterattack 

might be slim. Small German units might infiltrate 

the rapidly bypassing Marines and still wreak havoc 

on the brigade. 

Lieutenant Colonel Holcomb encouraged Major Williams to push forward a line of exploitation 

94 Brannen, Over There, 55. 95 Peter F. Owen, To the Limit of Endurance: A Battalion of Marines in the Great War (College Station: Texas A&M University 

Press, 2007), 182–82, 191–92.

96 Sister [Neville] to Site [Lee], 1 November 1918, 1715, 6th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 29

beyond his original goal and set up a position just 

north of the Bois de la Folie “unless stopped by serious resistance.” This movement forward could keep 

the Germans out of the woods. Williams, however, 

informed Lee that holding the northern edge of the 

wood required manning a line 5km across; his men 

currently held 2km, but had outposts pushed to the 

front.97

At the end of the day on 1 November, the 4th 

Brigade had captured its objectives and, in some 

places, had pressed slightly beyond to a line of exploitation. The brigade then dug in, anticipating 

that the 3d Brigade’s 23d Infantry Regiment would 

pass through their lines the next day as planned and 

lead the 2d Division’s advance north toward the 

town of Fosse. 

The day’s action resulted in 2 officers and 19 

enlisted men of the 6th Infantry Regiment killed, 

another 14 officers and 267 enlisted men wounded, 

2 officers and 17 enlisted men sick, and 80 enlisted 

missing. The sick included 1st Battalion commander Frederick Barker, who would be evacuated to a 

hospital on 2 November.98

Pershing’s war of maneuver was coming to 

fruition. The weakened German Army continued 

to retreat, while keeping up staunch artillery and 

machine-gun fire. For their actions on that first day, 

Summerall praised the Marine-led 2d Division. The 

men had taken more than 1,200 prisoners, along 

with much enemy armament and munitions. The 

division had achieved or surpassed its objectives, 

driving 9km into the German lines.99

97 Site 2 [Holcomb] to Williams, 1 November 1918, 1810, 6th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC; and Williams to commanding officer, 6th Regiment, 1 November 1918, 1920, 6th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

98 For more on Barker’s evacuation, see Report of Sixth Regiment, 2 November 1918, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, 

AHEC; and battalion adjutant, 1st Battalion, to regimental adjutant, 6th Regiment, 2 November 1918, 0940, 6th Regiment 

Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

99 Subfolder Journal of Operations, 20 May–30 November 

1918, Folder 2d Division Journal of Operations, Box 24 Hist. 

Dec. File 33.2, Summary of Operations March–October 1918 

to Hist. Dec. File 33.5 Diary 1926, Entry NM-91 1241, RG 

120, NARA, College Park, MD.

THE BAT TLE CONTINUES, 

2–9 NOVEMBER 1918

The Marines had achieved their goals on 1 November, but they still faced problems. In his 0800 

dispatch on 2 November, Major Henry Larsen described mixed results. While going around some 

obstacles, his 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment’s lines had 

become separated, but he had reorganized his troops 

and was in fine shape. His men had seen Germans 

in a ravine digging in along the skyline on a ridge in 

front. However, Larsen hesitated to call for artillery 

bombardment, given the uncertainty about whether 

American units were in the vicinity. The Germans 

had sent out strong patrols during the night, and 

one battalion member had been killed. Enemy artillery from the north had been active all night. Larsen 

was quite willing to have his runners conduct Army 

3d Brigade leaders to his command post so that he 

could apprise them of the situation.100

Throughout 2 November, the 2d Division 

sought to consolidate its position. Lejeune ordered 

the Army’s 3d Brigade to pass through the 4th Brigade lines to resume the attack on 3 November. 

The day was cold and it rained constantly. Heavy 

German artillery continued to pound the Marine 

brigade’s rear. German planes flew overhead, with 

no sight of American planes; unfortunately, antiaircraft guns were not available to the Marines. Despite these persistent problems, the Marines dug in 

while Army units slowly moved forward to take up 

a position at the line of exploitation just in front of 

Larsen’s line of objective.101

The 3d Brigade passed through the 4th Brigade 

on the night of 2 November, and the Army units 

stood ready to resume the attack at 0600 on 3 No100 Slap P 1 [Larsen] to Slap 1 [Feland], 2 November 1918, 

0800, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC.

101 See “Secret Memo to commanders of 5th and 6th Regiments and 6th Machine Gun,” 2 November 1918, 1430, from 

LtCol Earl Ellis, brigade adjutant, to Neville, 6th Regiment 

Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC, for postponement of 3d Brigade 

passing through the 4th Brigade lines. For orders to stand fast, 

see Slap [Feland] to his three battalion commanders, 2 November 1918, 1830; and for reports of German planes, see 1st 

Battalion Intelligence Officer [2dLt L. E. Rea] to regimental 

intelligence officer, 2 November 1918, 5th Regiment Reports, 

vol. 5, pt. 1, AHEC. See also History of the Second Battalion, 21, 

noting cold, rainy weather and enemy bombardment.
30 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

352 

353 

166

174

426 

Contour interval 10 meters

0 500 1,000yards

0 500 1,000 meters

X

Crossing by Marines 

of the 6th Regiment 

(reinforced with 3d 

Battalion, 5th Regiment) aborted due 

to heavy enemy 

artillery and MG fire. 

US 9

6

Mar US

(+ 3/5)

5

Mar US

(- 3/5)

Marines of the 5th Regiment 

crossed the Meuse against 

withering enemy fire. Once 

across, supported by 2d 

Battalion, 356th Infantry, 89th 

Division, the Americans 

established a bridgehead. (See 

appendix) 

N

70

469

471

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

The Last Hurrah—Forcing the Meuse

 Night of 10–11 November 1918

2d Division front line 

held by 9th Infantry

German front line 

German units were greatly 

under strength, down to 

one-third or one-half their 

authorized establishment.

2 US 356

From 82d Div

Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 31

vember. The plan was for the 4th Brigade to follow 

about 1,000 yards in support. On the right of the 

5th Regiment, the Army’s 9th Regiment would follow; on the left, the 6th Regiment would track behind the Army’s 23d Regiment. The Marines were 

ordered to keep in good liaison with the regiments 

of the 3d Brigade and with Army units on each 

flank. The 2d Division’s objective was a line running 

east-west through the town of Fosse.102

Following behind the 3d Brigade on 3 November, the Marines met only sporadic firing, but it 

was at times deadly. Arriving just north of Nouart, 

at the eastern end of the line across Fosse, the 2d 

Battalion, 5th Marines, dug in. Low-flying German planes strafed them from above, as the enemy 

artillery battery pounded them on the ground. The 

Marines suffered casualties, but counterbattery fire 

soon drove off the German artillery and the battalion settled in for the night. 

On the night of 3 November, with the 3d Brigade approaching the Beval-Bois-des-Dames, the 

commander of the 9th Regiment, Army Colonel 

Robert O. Van Horn, suggested that the Army 

troops push on through the area at night to avoid 

another debilitating fight in the woods, such as had 

occurred at Belleau Wood. The former 2d Division 

chief of staff and recently appointed 3d Brigade 

commander, Colonel James C. Rhea, and General 

Lejeune agreed with Van Horn. They collectively 

made a crucial decision to stage the night attack. 

This attack became what Marine John Ausland believed was “probably the most audacious stunt of 

the war.”103

In a column of twos, the 3d Brigade made 

a daring, 8km night march in the rain on a road 

through the thick woods. The march surprised and 

further demoralized the Germans. Led by Army 

Major Ladislav T. Janda’s 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, the Army brigade killed and captured many 

Germans as they proceeded through the woods to 

102 See Orders, 3 November 1918, issued by Earl Ellis under 

Neville’s name, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC.

103 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer.” Monday, Ausland credited 

the acting 3d Brigade commander, Robert O. Van Horn; on 

2 November, Rhea had replaced Van Horn, who went back to 

commanding the 9th Regiment. 

capture La Forge Farm, then continued northeastward to Tuilerie Farm south of Beaumont.104

At both farms, the Army brigade captured many 

Germans who were resting and recuperating to prepare for the attack they believed would come during 

daylight hours. Ausland acknowledged that “the 

night march of the 9th and 23d Infantry through 

the enemy lines in the dead of night was probably 

the most dashing piece of warfare of the entire war. 

They [the Army] lost a lot of men though.” 

Ausland and Captain Charley Dunbeck’s 2d 

Battalion, 5th Regiment, followed in close support 

of the Army troops, experiencing some casualties 

from enemy artillery fire. Ausland believed that 15 

men in the 5th Regiment had been killed on 4 November, while another 10 died from their wounds.105

Even if they were not killed or wounded, the Marines still suffered. 

Ausland described how his good friend, “Duke,” 

helped a wounded man back to a first aid station, 

then simply went to the 55th Company’s kitchen 

and stayed there for the rest of the war. Ausland 

explained that, at Blanc Mont, Duke and two other Marines had overwhelmed a German machine 

gun.106 Becoming sick on 1 November and nearly 

killed by artillery a couple of days later, Duke had 

simply had enough. Ausland asserted that “up until the time he’d had enough, Duke was the perfect 

soldier,” and commiserated that “Duke tried to do 

too much and played out before the war ended.”107

On 3 November, Austria-Hungary negotiated 

an armistice with the Allies. Austrian troops quickly withdrew from the battlefront, and German units 

had to be plugged in to the remaining gaps. The already thin German lines were being stretched even 

thinner, so they retreated to their Antwerp-Meuse 

104 For more on this night march, see the report by L. T. Janda 

on the night of 3 November 1918, Williamson File, Box 10 

( Janda Box), Rolfe Hillman Papers, AHEC, hereafter Janda 

report. See, also in the same file, S. T. Williamson, “A Night 

March: An Untold War Story,” New York Times Magazine, 4 

November 1928. 

105 For more on this night march, see Janda report; and Williamson, “A Night March.” 

106 These three Marines would later receive both the Distinguished Service Cross and French Croix de Guerre for their 

heroism.

107 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer.”
32 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

position. The German III and V Corps received orders to move to the east bank of the Meuse River to 

retain a line running north along the river to Sedan. 

Their east bank position remained weak, however, 

due to the lack of time and resources necessary to 

strengthen it. The Germans could only erect a few 

obstacles and clear fields of fire.108

Germans Weakening but Marines Suffering, 

4 –7 November 1918

The unrelenting cold, rainy weather, compounded 

by hunger and sickness, continued to take a toll; logistical problems ensued. On 4 November, Colonel 

Feland’s second in command, Lieutenant Colonel 

Julius Turrill, who was forward with the troops, 

cautioned: “Advise getting kitchens and rations up 

soon. 1st Bn. [Battalion] has had practically nothing 

[to eat], since day before yesterday. Rations are being held up on roads. Men very weak.”109

By midafternoon, Major Hamilton, 1st Battalion commander, questioned the need to move forward, wondering if he should wait for rations. He 

had sent men to retrieve rations held up by heavy 

traffic. The rations had been cooked, however, and 

were on their way forward. Captain Dunbeck, 2d 

Battalion commander, also pointed out that he 

could not get in touch with his food galleys: “Battalion under heavy bombardment (Gas and artillery) all afternoon. Casualties up to date 20%. Men 

forced to wear gas masks for four hours.”110

As the 2d Division inexorably moved forward 

to the north-northeast despite periodic heavy machine gun and artillery fire, the ultimate goal of 

reaching the Meuse River took shape. The Meuse 

flowed north from southeast to northwest, requiring that the 2d Division turn slightly to its right, 

northeast toward the town of Pouilly. The 5th Regiment would lead the Marines, with the 6th Regiment following closely in support. The objective 

108 von Giehrl, “Battle of the Meuse-Argonne,” 535–36.

109 Turrill to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Marines, 4 November 1918, 1055, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC.

110 Commanding officer [Hamilton], 1st Battalion, to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Regiment, 4 November 1918, 

1420, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC; and Slap 

A-1 [Dunbeck] to Slap [Feland], 4 November 1918, 2300, 5th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC.

was not only to reach the Meuse but to cross it as 

soon as possible.111

On 5 November, Colonel Logan Feland disclosed to General Neville that Lieutenant Colonel Turrill had gone forward to work with Major 

Larsen’s 3d Battalion to capture a ridge southeast 

of Pouilly. There, they could scout out a crossing of 

the Meuse. Neville replied to Feland that the “division directs us to use all haste to send a patrol to 

the bridge at Pouilly and of course cross it if we 

can.” The 3d Brigade had reported that “the Boche 

[Germans] have fled and will offer practically no 

resistance, etc. You know about the value to place on 

these reports so make haste with reason in carrying 

out the orders.”112

Shortly thereafter, Neville reiterated the plan 

to Colonels Lee and Feland for the 5th Regiment, 

followed by the 6th Regiment, to cross the Meuse 

at Pouilly and attack the heights on the eastern 

bank.113 Turrill remained with the troops on the 

front lines, reporting that Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion had moved toward the heights south of Pouilly in the forest of Jaulny, and that Major George 

Hamilton’s 1st Battalion had moved to the heights 

initially contemplated for Larsen’s battalion. Turrill 

believed “everything [was] going well.”114

As the Marine brigade moved to the northeast, 

however, the 89th Division to its right continued to 

move north. As a result, Major Larsen had to inform Colonel Feland that the 89th Division’s troops 

111 See Sister [Neville] to Slap [Feland] and Site [Lee], 5 November 1918, 1100, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC, 

noting that the 6th Regiment would follow in support of the 

5th Regiment as it sought to cross the Meuse at Pouilly, then 

hold the heights on the right bank of the Meuse. Hereafter 

Neville report to Feland and Lee.

112 See Feland to Ellis, 5 November 1918, 0800, 5th Regiment 

Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC; and Sister [Neville] to commanding officer, 5th Regiment, 1012, in 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 

5, pt. 2. 

113 Neville report to Feland and Lee. See also commanding officer, 6th Marines, to commanding officers, 1st, 2d, 3d Battalions, and commanding officer, Supply Company, 5 November 

1918, 6th Marines, Field Orders, vol. 3, AHEC, for Harry Lee 

informing his battalion commanders that the 5th Regiment 

would try to cross the Meuse at Pouilly, with the 6th Regiment 

in support.

114 LtCol Turrill to commanding officer [Feland], 5th Marines, 

5 November 1918, 1240, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, 

AHEC.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 33

had taken the position where Larsen’s battalion had 

headed. On 5 November, Larsen acknowledged: 

“They [89th Division] are in our sector, but if I can 

get over bridge first I’ll send message immediately. 

There appears to be no Boche [Germans on] this 

side of river but is shelling weakly.” Despite this 

weak German resistance, Larsen experienced some 

problems: “Men should have chow—only had 2 

cooked meals in 5 days. Their blankets are still at 

Landreville. Not much pep but [they] are willing to 

go to Hell if we say so.”115

Elements of the Marine brigade and 89th Division continued to advance on Pouilly. A 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, patrol under command of 

Second Lieutenant John T. Foster had crossed the 

canal on a lock near the town. Beyond the canal, 

an island split the river, and Foster crossed a bridge 

over the first part of the river. Although it was partly destroyed, Foster believed men could cross that 

bridge without assistance. Elements of the 89th Division had crossed over to the island, but no one had 

made it all the way across to the town of Pouilly. 

He estimated it would take an hour for a platoon 

to cross the canal lock and both parts of the river. 

Foster reconnoitered the second bridge, but did not 

cross it.116

The Marines could see Germans, their lines, 

outposts, and trenches on the east side of the Meuse 

River. German machine guns and artillery raked 

the American troops on the west side of the river, 

while German planes flew overhead. Furthermore, 

the Marines suffered from debilitating conditions. 

A Navy corpsman warned that the “physical condition” of Major Hamilton’s 1st Battalion “becomes 

increasingly worse. Diarrhoea [sic], exhaustion and 

influenza are rampant, numerous cases running 

a subnormal temperature, showing an exhaustive 

condition of the men. It has been found absolutely 

necessary to evacuate 26 men this date with above 

115 See reports P.-1-[Larsen] to Slap 1 [Feland], 5 November 1918, 1345 and 1445, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, 

AHEC.

116 See 2dLt J. T. Foster to regimental commander, 6 November 

1918, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC; and telephone message from Gen Neville to G-3, 6 November 1918, 

0900, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC.

complaints.”117 On 6 November, the 6th Regiment 

reported that 2 officers and 101 troops had been 

evacuated due to sickness, but the next day the 

number rose to 7 officers and 146 troops.118

The Marines continued northeast toward La 

Belle Farm, 3km south of Beaumont and approximately 6km directly southwest of Pouilly. On 6 

November, the 4th Brigade set up a base northeast 

of Beaumont, approximately 2km from the Meuse 

River. There, they waited for two days in rainy, 

freezing weather, while units continued to probe 

east toward the river.119

On the afternoon of 7 November, Colonel 

Feland had notified Lieutenant Colonel Turrill that 

the 5th Regiment would remain where it was; Turrill could pass along this message to the battalion 

commanders. Food supplies were finally brought 

forward. By midafternoon on 8 November, Major 

Larsen reported: “Kitchens are right here with me 

and we are feeding well for the present.”120

Armistice Negotiations Begin and Meuse River 

Crossings Delayed, 7–9 November 1918

German representatives led by Secretary of State 

Matthias Erzberger crossed through the lines on 7 

November to meet with the Supreme Allied Commander, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, to discuss possible terms of an armistice. 

Even before the final phase of the MeuseArgonne offensive had begun, Pershing had advocated that the Germans be forced to surrender 

unconditionally. Pershing realized that Allied morale was high, while the German morale was low. 

He believed that 

an armistice would revivify the low spirits of 

the German Army and enable it to reorganize 

and resist later on, and would deprive the Al117 See 1st Battalion intelligence officer [Lt Rea], to 5th Regiment Headquarters, 6 November 1918, 1945, 5th Regiment 

Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC; and battalion surgeon [P. A. 

McLendon, (USN)], 1st Battalion, to commanding officer, 6 

November 1918, 5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC.

118 See Capt H. P. Mason, operations officer, Reports of 6th 

Regiment, 6–7 November 1918, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, 

pt. 3, AHEC.

119 History of the Second Battalion, 21. 120 P-1-[Larsen] to Slap 1 [Feland], 8 November 1918, 1342, 

5th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC.
34 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

lies of the full measure of victory by failing to 

press their present advantage to its complete 

military end. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, 

the Allies should distrust their sincerity and 

their motives. The appeal for an armistice is 

undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a 

critical situation to one more advantageous.121

Despite Pershing’s hard stance, Armistice negotiations began between Foch and the German delegation. In the interim, Allied forces were to keep up 

the pressure on the German Army. Southeast of the 

2d Division, the Americans were driving toward the 

Meuse River. On 3–4 November, the 5th Division 

had crossed the Meuse near Brieulles-sur-Meuse, 

about 30.5km from Pouilly. From 7 to 9 November, 

elements of the 90th Division crossed the Meuse 

north of where the 5th Division had attacked.122

Initial plans called for the 2d Division to cross 

the Meuse on the night of 8 November. The attack, 

however, was postponed.123 All available pontoons 

had been allotted to the 89th Division on the 2d 

Division’s right flank. Marshal Foch encouraged 

General Pershing to strike: “The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, is withdrawing along 

the whole front. It is important to maintain and 

hasten our action. I appeal to the energy and initiative of the commanders in chief and to their armies 

to secure decisive results.”124

121 “Pershing to Allied Supreme War Council, Paris, 30 October 1918,” in United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: 

The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents, vol. 10, pt. 1 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1991), 28–30.

122 See “Crossing the Meuse,” in The Official History of the Fifth 

U.S. Division U.S.A. during the Period of its Organization and of 

Its Operations in the European World War, 1917–1919 (Washington, DC: Society of the Fifth Division, 1919), 199–225; and 

Maj George Wythe, A History of the 90th Division (New York: 

90th Division Association, 1920), 114–23.

123 For the announcement that the 4th Brigade would cross 

the Meuse, see Operations Memorandum No. 36, 8 November 1918, 1300, 4th Brigade Field Orders, vol. 2, pt. 1; for the 

postponement, see Operations Memorandum No. 37, 1615, 8 

November 1918, 4th Brigade Field Orders, vol. 2, pt. 1.

124 War Expenditures: Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 (Foreign Expenditures) of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the 

War Department, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 3,768.

On 9 November, General Summerall called a 

meeting at V Corps’ headquarters with his 2d and 

89th Division generals and chiefs of staff. At the 

meeting, General Lejeune suggested an alternative 

plan that would not force the 2d Division to cross 

the Meuse under heavy enemy fire. He suggested that, having already crossed the Meuse farther 

south, the 90th Division should move north and 

clear the east bank opposite the 89th Division. The 

89th Division would then cross unopposed, move 

north, and clear the enemy on the east bank opposite the 2d Division. In turn, the 2d Division would 

drive north along the east bank of the Meuse, clearing the enemy in front of the 77th Division, which 

was to cross the river between Mouzon and Sedan. 

In his reminiscences after the war, Lejeune 

lamented that his suggested plan was “taken under advisement,” but ultimately rejected.125 Instead, 

the 2d and 89th Divisions would attack across the 

Meuse River in the face of stout German resistance. 

By 9 November, Marine machine gunner Corporal Vincent Grube had been lugging a heavy machine gun for days and was “wet and cold and weak 

from hunger, as were the rest of our company.” He 

had seen friends get killed nearby. His machine gun 

company was down to 30 men from the original 

180. Finally, on 9 November, the Marines received 

food, including “all the rice we could eat.”126

On that same day, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Ellis sent orders from General Neville that the 6th 

Regiment would cross the Meuse near the town of 

Mouzon, approximately 6.75km directly north of 

Pouilly, but due to bends in the Meuse River, actually sat about 14.5km in river distance. This assault 

would form the main Marine brigade’s attack across 

the river. A battalion of the 5th Regiment, with an 

equal force from the 89th Division, would cross at 

the town of Letanne, 2.14km (about 3.3 river km) 

slightly northwest of Pouilly. The regiments were 

ordered to move to forests just short of the river 

to prepare for the crossing. Later that day, however, Ellis sent a message that “it looks like there will 

125 Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine, 399. 126 Grube diary. 
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 35

be no party tonight.”127 The crossing of the Meuse 

would wait yet another day. 

In the meantime, the German delegation that 

had crossed through Allied lines on 7 November 

continued discussing possible Armistice terms 

with Allied commander Foch. Rumors about the 

German delegation and a possible armistice ran 

through the troops. Captain LeRoy P. Hunt of 

the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, later summed up 

the attitude of many Marines who hoped the war 

127 See Field Orders No. 38, Headquarters, 4th Brigade, 9 November 1918, 0830, 4th Brigade Field Orders, vol. 2, pt. 1, 6th 

Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC; and Neville memorandum to commanding officers of 5th and 6th Regiments and 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion, 9 November 1918, 1050, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC. For postponement, see Sister [Neville] to Feland, 9 November 1918, 1755, 5th Regiment 

Reports, vol. 5, pt. 2, AHEC. Emphasis in original.

would end soon: “By this time the rumors of the 

armistice were beginning to drift in and we were 

all hanging desperately to the rabbit’s foot, hoping 

that the rumors might prove true, as I think most 

of us had had our fill.”128

The Marines also heard about other events 

marking the collapse of the Triple Alliance.129 The 

men learned that Turkey had signed an armistice on 

30 October, and that Austria-Hungary had capitulated on 3 November, the same day that mutinies 

broke out in the German fleet. Kaiser Wilhelm II 

abdicated on 9 November, and fled to Holland the 

following day. 

PLANNING TO CROSS 

THE MEUSE RIVER , 

10 NOVEMBER 1918

The end was near. On 10 November, orders came 

down the line for the Marines to carry out the 

planned attack across the Meuse. 

The Meuse River Crossing Controversy

The necessity of crossing the Meuse on what turned 

out to be the last night of the war raised questions 

at the time and after the war. On 9 November, Corporal John Ausland had written in his diary that 

the war is actually over. All objectives have 

been taken. The enemy is considering the 

terms and has a time limit on signing. We 

have a natural barrier, the river, between the 

2 armies. If they don’t agree to the terms the 

war, of course, must go on, but if, between this 

hour and the hour of the armistice we attack 

again, it will be just plain, damn, deliberate 

murder.130

Despite the reluctance of many men to sacrifice themselves in a seemingly meaningless attack 

across a natural boundary, in the face of a weakened 

but still deadly enemy, the Marines carried out their 

orders to the best of their ability (see appendix B). 

128 Capt Le Roy P. Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse River,” 

Argonaut 88, no. 2292, 26 February 1921, 131. 129 The Triple Alliance refers to a secret agreement between 

Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy that was formed in May 

1882 and renewed periodically until World War I.

130 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer.”

LeRoy P. Hunt received the Distinguished Service Cross for his valor at Blanc Mont, before leading Marines across the Meuse River 

on the last night of the war. He would eventually serve as a general 

officer in World War II.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
36 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

Meuse River Crossing Plans

Plans were made to attack across the Meuse River 

on the night of 10 November. Initial plans called 

for the 2d Division to cross the Meuse in conjunction with the 89th Division. Summerall left the decision about which units would cross the Meuse to 

the 2d Division commander, and General Lejeune 

assigned the task to Neville’s 4th Brigade. Neville suggested that they attack in one place across 

the river during daylight, “since he was convinced 

of the strength of the German positions on the 

east bank and because he had ‘little artillery with 

which to support even one crossing’.”131 This plan 

of action was denied however. A final plan evolved. 

Elements of the 5th and 6th Regiments, with support of Army units, would cross the Meuse at two 

points—near Mouzon and Letanne—small towns 

southeast of the major city of Sedan in northeastern France. 

Designated commander of the 2d Division’s 

crossing operations, at 0830 on 10 November, General Neville called a conference of his regimental 

commanders and their seconds in command at brigade headquarters in Beaumont. Two battalions of 

the 6th Regiment, supported by the 5th Regiment’s 

3d Battalion, would cross just north of Mouzon and 

take the heights northeast of the town. Those three 

battalions would form the 4th Brigade’s main attack. 

South of Mouzon, near Letanne, one battalion from each of the 2d and 89th Divisions were 

to cooperate in a mopping-up action. This group 

was originally to be commanded by someone from 

the 89th Division. Two companies of engineers 

and Company D of the 1st Gas Regiment, as well 

as artillery and signal corps troops, would provide 

support. The 3d Brigade would serve as a reserve. 

The attack was scheduled to begin at 1800 on 10 

November.132

Lieutenant Colonel Ellis requested a delay in 

131 Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood 

Press, 2001), 127.

132 Field Orders No. 59/60, Headquarters 2d Division (Regular), American Expeditionary Forces, 9 November 1918, 1700, 

Field Orders, vol. 1, pt. 4. See History of the Sixth Regiment 

United States Marines (Tientsin, China: Tientsin Press, 1928), 

49, for the brigade conference.

H-hour until later in the evening. General Lejeune’s chief of staff, Army Colonel Hu B. Myers, 

denied this postponement. The engineers would 

move their pontoon bridges to the river as soon as 

darkness afforded cover, and the Marines were to be 

ready to cross as soon as the bridges were in place.133

On 10 November, the Marine brigade received 

similar orders from division headquarters as before, 

but with one major change. General Neville was ordered to choose the commander of the combined 

2d and 89th Divisions mop-up unit crossing at 

Letanne. In conjunction with 5th Regiment commander, Logan Feland, Neville appointed the 5th 

Regiment’s valued officer, Major George Hamilton, 

to lead a combat liaison force across the Meuse. The 

2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, combined with an 89th 

Division battalion, would cross the Meuse on two 

footbridges just north of Letanne, east of the Bois 

de l’Hospice. 

After crossing the river, the combat liaison unit 

would seize two other woods: the Bois d’AlmaGisors and the Bois des Flaviers. Some of Hamilton’s men would then move north to link with 

Marines from the Mouzon crossing, and other men 

would move south to link with other units of the 

89th Division. The 23d Machine Gun Company 

and a Stokes mortar platoon would support Hamilton’s group.134

The stage was set for a two-pronged attack 

across the Meuse River near Mouzon and Letanne. Both actions were to be heavily supported by 

machine-gun and artillery fire. The 5th Regiment, 

less two battalions, would be in reserve for the 

crossings.135

133 Chief of staff [Hu B. Myers] to commanding general [Neville], 4th Brigade, 10 November 1918, Field Orders, vol. 1, pt. 4. 

134 In Field Orders 60/61, Headquarters 2d Division (Regular), 

American Expeditionary Forces, 10 November 1918, 1400, 

Field Orders, vol. 1, pt 4, the choice of commander of the Letanne crossing was left up to Neville. George Hamilton was 

named as commander of the unit in Field Orders No. 39, Headquarters, 4th Brigade, 10 November 1918, 1400, 4th Brigade, 

Field Orders, vol. 2, pt. 1, which set out the tasks of each unit 

in effecting the crossing and controlling the east bank of the 

Meuse. 

135 See also Field Orders No. 39, Headquarters, 4th Brigade, 10 

November 1918, 1400, 4th Brigade, Field Orders, vol. 2, pt. 1.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 37

CROSSING THE 

MEUSE RIVER, 

10–11 NOVEMBER 1918

In the 23d Machine Gun Company, Vincent Grube 

moved forward, believing that the war was nearly 

over and “hoping for the best.” Resting on a bank by 

the Meuse River with his machine gun crew, Grube was stunned when a shell landed among them, 

killing his crew. The concussion lifted up Grube 

and turned him over. He suffered a calf wound and 

“something seemed to snap,” as his “nerves went to 

pieces.”136

Grube said, “The last thing I remembered was 

blood—warm blood—flowing over me like a river.” 

He regained consciousness in a church and cried 

when a doctor asked him his name: “I don’t know 

why I cried, but I couldn’t stop myself.” Grube’s 

Great War had come to an end and was getting 

close to doing so for the rest of the Marines.137

The 2d Engineers Prepare Bridges 

for Crossing the Meuse at Letanne and Mouzon

After their retreat to defensive positions on the 

136 Grube diary.

137 Grube diary.

east bank of the Meuse River, the Germans had 

destroyed the bridges crossing the river. It was normally about 45m wide, but the fall rains had swelled 

the river, making it an even more formidable obstacle. To traverse it, the Americans would have to 

cross on temporary bridges. 

Colonel William A. Mitchell’s 2d Engineers 

had to construct footbridges for the Meuse River 

crossing, in addition to maintaining roads to the 2d 

Division battle front. While the Marines had been 

moving into place near the Meuse, on 8 November, 

two engineering companies went to a sawmill at 

Beaumont to construct the footbridges, using materials from former German barracks in the town 

and timber from nearby Letanne. 

The 2d Engineers built four footbridges. They 

would place two bridges about 60m apart at the 

Mouzon crossing point, and two bridges at the 

crossing point north of Letanne. The Marines’ success getting across the Meuse depended on these 

footbridges. 

The footbridges were described in a 2d Engineers 

report as a “raft pattern of our own,” which “consisted merely of a series of logs held together by skids, 

and looks something like a railroad track turned 

upside-down.” Bridge sections were 12 feet long, 

and about 6 feet wide.138

In writing about the bridges after the war, Captain LeRoy Hunt of the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, cautioned: 

Before going further, I wish to correct any 

false impression you may have received by the 

use of the word “bridge.” The word “bridge” 

generally creates in one’s mind a picture of 

a structure of solid foundation with a broad 

thoroughfare, together with the usual railings, 

braces, and the like. Blot out any such mental 

picture, and in its stead see a series of hastily constructed rafts of logs and rough boards, 

with possibly a couple of small pontoons, just 

as hastily lashed together with ropes, with 

no railing or supports of any kind, and you 

will have a correct picture of those bridges. I should say the “flooring” of the bridges 

138 Report is found in Folder “2d Engrs, Compiled History (8 

Chapters),” Box 68, 2d Engineers, 2d Division Files, NARA, 

College Park, MD.

The 2d Division’s 2d Engineers had the difficult task of building 

footbridges to span the Meuse River on the last night of the war. 

This sketch of the footbridges comes from the 2d Engineers’ official 

history of the war. 

W. A. Mitchell, The Official History of the Second Regiment of 

Engineers and Second Engineer Train, United States Army, in the 

World War
38 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

was about three feet wide. It took the Second 

Engineers just seven minutes to throw them 

across the river and secure them, so I think it 

can well be imagined that they were none too 

stable.139

On the night of the Meuse crossing, the engineers transported the bridge sections four to a 

wagon to within approximately 45m from the river. 

Then men skidded the bridge sections across the 

grass, up a eight-foot-high embankment, across 

railroad tracks, and down to the river. While they 

worked, an intense U.S. artillery barrage tried to 

keep the German machine guns and artillery on the 

east bank at bay. A dense fog covered the area, making it very difficult for the engineers to find their 

positions and work efficiently. But, the weather 

also favored the engineers. As they worked direct139 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse River,” 131.

ly across the river from the German artillery and 

machine-gun positions, the fog made it more difficult for the Germans to pinpoint the bridges and 

the engineers at work. 

The 6th Regiment Near Mouzon

For the attack north of Mouzon, 6th Regiment 

commander Colonel Harry Lee chose his senior 

battalion leader, Major George Shuler, with his 3d 

Battalion to lead the assault. Shuler’s Marines waited for the 2d Engineers to complete and float two 

footbridges across the Meuse. At midnight, Shuler reported to Lee that the 2d Engineers had suggested that the Marines cross the first bridge while 

waiting for the second to be floated across. Shuler 

balked at this idea, insisting that the Marines cross 

on two bridges at the same time. In the face of 

strong German shellfire, the engineers placed one 

bridge across the river. Even with the extra help 

of 40 Marines, the 2d Engineers could not get the 

The Last Night of the War by F. C. Yohn, 1921. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 39

other bridge across by the goal of 0400 hours.140

Estimating it would take an hour to get his 

troops across the river, Shuler had set 0400 as the 

last possible time that his men could get across the 

river safely before daybreak. When the hour had 

passed with only one bridge in place, in consultation with his battalion commanders, Shuler decided 

that the attack could not proceed. Instead, he ordered his Marines back to the shelter of a nearby 

forest, the Bois du Fond de Limon.141

The 6th Regiment’s attack across the two footbridges north of Mouzon would not occur. The only 

other place for the Marines to cross would be on the 

other two footbridges at Letanne.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 

Attacks the Meuse River at Letanne 

The 2d Battalion of the 356th Infantry Regiment 

in the flanking 89th Division had been initially 

scheduled to take part in the Meuse crossing near 

Letanne. Under command of Army Major Mark 

Hanna, the 2d Battalion could not make it to the 

river on time. Apprised of Hanna’s difficulties, 

Colonel Feland sent his reserve 1st Battalion (led 

now by Captain LeRoy Hunt) to the crossing, and 

notified General Neville of his command decision. 

Neville made Feland the commander of the attack, 

given that it was now completely a 5th Regiment 

affair.142

Although he was not present for the crossing near 

Letanne, Captain John Thomason of the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, heard multiple accounts from 

140 Commanding officer [Shuler], 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, 

to commanding officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, 11 November 

1918, 0001, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt. 3, AHEC. 

141 Commanding officer [Shuler], 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, 

to commanding officer [Lee], 6th Regiment, 11 November 

1918, 0300, 6th Regiment Reports, vol. 5, pt 3. See also Rolfe 

L. Hillman, “Crossing the Meuse,” Marine Corps Gazette 72, 

no. 11 (November 1988): 68–73.

142 Feland to secretary, American Battle Monuments Commission, 14 April 1930, File “Correspondence, 5th Marines,” Box 

194, Correspondence with Former Division Officers 2d Div, 

Record Group 117, NARA, College Park, MD. For Hanna’s 

role, see George H. English Jr., History of the 89th Division, 

U.S.A. from Its Organization in 1917, through Its Operations in 

the World War, the Occupation of Germany and until Demobilization in 1919 (Denver, CO: Smith-Brooks Printing, 1920), 224.

his fellow Marines. He captured the essence of their 

experiences as he wrote about the night of 10 November when the Marines moved toward the river:

The night was incredibly dark and the Meuse 

Valley was level full of mist, through which 

the slow rain fell. The only light came from 

the German shelling, for the German flares 

were blanketed in the fog. Nervous now and 

uneasy, the German guns placed fire of interdiction on the highway and on the river 

slope high-explosive and shrapnel. The column 

groped for the way with its feet, alternately 

blinded by shell flashes and plunged in darkness. Progress was terribly slow.143

When portions of the footbridges arrived at the 

river near Letanne, the engineers lashed them together end to end, then started shoving them across 

the Meuse. A guy rope held the forward end from 

drifting downstream. The Meuse River was running high and fast due to the large amount of rain 

since 1 November. While the engineers worked in 

groups about 60m apart, they pushed two 168-footlong bridges across the river. Fortunately, German 

machine-gun nests across the river fired high over 

their heads, aiming for a road higher up the bank 

from the river. When the rope on one bridge broke, 

engineer Sergeant First Class Willard H. Marshall 

ran across the bridge and relashed it. 

The engineers took only 7 minutes to get one 

bridge across; the other took 11 minutes. Just as the 

engineers got the bridges across to the east side, the 

Marines commanded by Major George Hamilton 

arrived and moved across the river on the rickety 

143 John W. Thomason Jr. “November 11, 1918,” Leatherneck

14, no. 11, November 1931, 10. For more on Thomason, see 

George B. Clark, “Col John W. Thomason Jr., the ‘Kipling of 

the Corps’,” Leatherneck 89, no. 8, August 2006, 26–29.Thomason was not actually part of the crossing; he had been recuperating from the flu after the battle of Blanc Mont. Thomason 

wrote several short stories about Marines that were published 

in serial magazines and collected in books, including Fix Bayonets! (1926) and Red Pants and Other Stories (1927). 
40 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

wooden bridges.144 The 2d Engineers guided the 

Marines along a path to the river. 

Captain LeRoy Hunt later described the approach to the river: 

At a certain point I was to find guides from 

the Second Engineers, who were to guide us 

down a ravine to the river and bridge. We 

were in single file, each man hanging on to 

the bayonet, rifle, or coat tail of the man in 

front of him to prevent the line from breaking or getting lost. The fog that blanketed the 

ground that night would have made London jealous. You actually could not see three 

feet ahead were it daylight, let alone it being 

night time. In fact, the fog continued until 

about 1 p.m. the next day. In many ways it 

proved a blessing.145

The grave nature of the situation could not be 

discounted. Thomason wrote: 

The [Marine] files went crouching and sliding as low as they could get, but the engineers, 

spaced along the muddy slope, stood up so that 

they could be seen. By the river there was a 

knot of them, toiling at a flimsy thing [the 

bridge] that ran out into the water. The column rushed upon it, one man behind another, and it immediately sank, but there was a 

guide rope and the thing stayed under your 

feet. Shrapnel spattered and sang around, and 

great explosions tore the fog, and there was the 

keening rush of machine gun bullets and an 

intolerable noise; in effect a foggy hell, seen by 

nightmare flashes. But the bridge held up and 

the men filed across in ordered intervals.146

Hunt paid special tribute to the efforts and sacrifices made by the 2d Engineers: 

Our whole route, from the point of first meet144 See the two versions of the history of the 2d Engineers: 

Alan Burton, History of the Second Engineers, 1916–1919 (Cologne, Germany: M. Dumont Schauberg, 1919), 70–74, and 

W. A. Mitchell, Official History of the Second Engineers in the 

World War, 1916–1919 (San Antonio, TX: San Antonio Printing, 1920), 76–79.

145 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse River.”

146 Thomason, “November 11, 1918,” 10, 53.

ing the Engineers to the river, was lined with 

guides who called out to us through the fog and 

thus directed us by their voices to the bridge. I 

was told later that most of these guides were 

killed and that the next day their bodies, still 

lying at their posts, mutely continued to point 

out the way to the bridge. Would that some 

one [sic] could some day [sic] write a fitting 

tribute to these Second Engineers, who made 

possible the crossing of the Meuse on this 

night.147

Shortly before midnight on the night of 10 November, the 1st Battalion crossed the river on the 

southernmost footbridge against strong German 

machine gun fire.Captain Hunt recalled:

The bullets were singing regularly and men 

were being hit at an alarming rate. At the 

water’s edge was a steep bank about four feet 

high. This made the first section of the bridge 

slope down at about a 45-degree angle. Each 

man that crossed the river that night had to 

crouch down on his haunches and slide down. 

Some were unfortunate enough not to start in 

the proper direction and as a consequence slid 

off into the river.148

Going into the river proved to be a problem 

for many men, including Major Hamilton. Hunt 

described this mishap: “Major Hamilton in coming across a little later miscalculated a step and 

walked off the bridge into the river. His Mussette 

bag, which was over his shoulder, swung around his 

neck and temporarily pulled him under.149 He had 

quite a time getting himself straightened out and 

back onto the bank.”150

Having taken Captain Hunt’s place as acting 

commander of the 17th Company when he took 

over temporary command of the 1st Battalion, First 

Lieutenant Marshall P. Madison led the first contingent across a bridge at Letanne. Although the 

Marines had encountered heavy shellfire while 

147 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse River,” 131–32.

148 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse River.”

149 The musette bag was a light alternative to a full backpack 

and was used to carry small equipment or personal items.

150 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse,” 132. 
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 41

About 100 Marines made it across. Madison concluded later that there was no delay and “the crossing functioned quite smoothly.151

Captain Hunt recalled the 1st Battalion’s crossing somewhat differently: 

It is difficult to put the crossing itself into 

words; men were blown off the bridge from 

the concussion of shells, some were victims of 

machine-gun bullets and were consequently knocked off, while still others fell off. The 

weight of the men on the bridge made it sink 

below water level, at times over a foot or more. 

This made it necessary for each man to feel his 

way across with his feet, which added much to 

our discomfort, for it was bitter cold.152

Arriving on the east bank of the Meuse, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, runner Private Elton Mackin 

remembered: “It was an eerie, ghostly, deadly sort 

of place, a saucer-shaped hollow hemmed about by 

brooding wooded hills, a pocket where the shadows 

hid in fog. Marsh grass was underfoot, bunchy stuff 

that grew heavy, like roadside lumps of rank timothy [grass]. The withered leafy stems were cushions 

for the sounds we made.”153 Mackin and a hundred 

of his colleagues moved out, aiming to push back 

the Germans who still fired toward the bridges. 

While all this was happening, 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion commander Major Matthew H. 

Kingman sent four Marine machine gun companies to the river. Their goal was to follow the troops 

across the bridges and set up on the other side of 

the Meuse and provide secure protection for other crossings. Unfortunately, only one of the battalion’s machine guns made it across, accompanying 

Captain Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion. Kingman later recounted that “the crews of the 4 guns left on 

the west side of the river experienced such heavy 

losses that all 4 guns had to be salvaged.” Kingman 

acknowledged that the 23d Company casualties 

151 Marshall Madison to Capt Howard F. K. Cahill, American Battle Monuments Commission, 13 November 1928, File 

“Correspondence, 5th Marines,” Box 194, Correspondence 

with Former Division Officers 2d Div, Record Group 117, 

NARA, College Park, MD.

152 Hunt, “The Crossing of the Meuse,” 132.

153 Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die, 258. 

These U.S. Signal Corps photographs show the bridges the 2d Engineers built and floated across the Meuse River on the last night 

of the war. 

National Archives and Records Administration

moving up to the bridge, Madison recalled that they 

did not undergo shelling during the actual crossing, 

but they did move through German machine-gun 

fire coming from the bottom of a slope just across 

the river. 

When the Marines made it across the bridge 

despite the heavy machine-gun fire, the Germans 

retreated up the eastern slope through the woods. 
42 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

during the crossing had been heavy, “but with this 

exception evacuations from wounds were light. All 

companies, however, suffered heavy losses by evacuation on account of sickness.”154

A decade later, the commander of the 67th 

Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, Captain 

Frank Whitehead, gave the American Battle Monuments Commission a very detailed report on the 

crossing of the Meuse. After being sent to the rear 

to recuperate from illness, Whitehead had returned 

to his battalion on 9 November. The 1st and 2d Battalion and company commanders only had a brief 

time to look at maps of the east bank of the Meuse 

before starting the crossing. Whitehead asserted that losses were heavy while crossing the river 

and that the “weight of the men on the temporary 

bridges was such that the bridge was submerged 

until men stood in water waist deep.”155

After crossing, the battalion and company commanders could not find a road through the woods to 

their original objective on the east bank because of 

the dense fog. Whitehead described how the men 

were formed in a column to “prevent straggling in 

the dense fog which reduced visibility to a few feet.” 

Several German soldiers stepped onto the path and 

“fired signal pistols at shoulder height in an attempt 

to illuminate the column. At one time the enemy 

fire was so accurate the column halted and facing to 

the left fired a volley into the woods.” This caused 

the Germans to retreat “and from the noise of the 

bodies crashing through the underbrush it was evident that the woods had been held by a considerable force.”156

Of the three Marine companies involved in 

the action on the east bank, only 86 men remained. 

Apprised of this number, battalion commander 

Captain Hunt ordered the men back to the crossing bridge, where they dug in. The Marines waited, 

still expecting reinforcements from Major Hanna’s 

Army battalion. 

154 See Matthew H. Kingman, “Report of Operations, November 25, 1918,” File “Adjutant and Inspector,” Box 42, Entry 240 

(World War I), Record Group 127, NARA, Washington, DC.

155 Undated letter from Frank Whitehead to the American Battle Monuments Commission, Box 194, Correspondence with 

Former Division Officers–2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD, hereafter Whitehead letter.

156 Whitehead letter.

Hanna crossed the river, not with his battalion, but with four men. Hunt was stunned. 

Hanna started back across the river to find the 

rest of his battalion, but he was killed by a shell 

burst.157 For his bravery in the last phase of the 

Meuse-Argonne campaign, Major Mark Hanna 

would receive the Distinguished Service Cross 

posthumously. Suffering heavy casualties, his 

battalion finally made it to the Meuse River and 

crossed, helping the Marines solidify their positions on the east bank.158

The 2d Battalion Crosses the Meuse

A bit farther north, the second footbridge at Letanne was damaged by artillery fire after very few 

men from Captain Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion had 

crossed the Meuse. Consequently, Dunbeck led 

the rest of his battalion to the southern footbridge, 

crossing after Captain Hunt’s 1st Battalion had dug 

in on the other side of the river. 

In his reminiscences written after the war, 

General Lejeune wrote about visiting a division 

field hospital soon after the Armistice. He asked a 

wounded, legless Marine why he had crossed the 

river when they fully expected the war to end within 

a few hours. The Marine replied that battalion commander Dunbeck had gathered his companies in a 

nearby ravine and simply said: “Men, I am going 

across that river, and I expect you to go with me.” 

The Marine, who had been hit by high-explosive 

shrapnel after crossing the Meuse, replied to Lejeune’s query: “What could we do but go across too? 

Surely we couldn’t let him go by himself; we love 

him too much for that.”159

Private Alfred H. Randall of the 18th Company 

in Captain Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion recalled the night 

of the crossing and the intense sniper, machinegun, and artillery fire. 

The darkness alone was our salvation for 

flares were almost useless, lighting the dense 

atmosphere for a matter of feet and not 

enough for them to be of use to the snipers. 

Amid this confusion the word “Walk in the 

middle of the planks,” came down our column. 

157 Hunt, “The Crossing of the River Meuse,” 132.

158 English, History of the 89th Division, 223–24. 159 Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine, 406.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 43

In the darkness I could not see the bridge itself, but followed the splash, splash of the man 

in front and was mighty glad when my feet 

struck land although they were both pretty 

wet.160

Private Clarence Richmond of Dunbeck’s battalion remembered how long it took to get across 

due to the fragile state of the bridge. Once Marines 

reached the center, the bridge would sink under 

the weight of so many bodies, causing everyone to 

get wet while at the same time trying to avoid the 

machine-gun fire, shells from trench mortars, and 

artillery fire. Richmond reported that

We had one element in our favor all during 

the night, and it was indeed a benefactor. A 

heavy fog hung over the valley, so thick that 

the enemy’s flares could not reveal our presence. Had there been no fog, it is doubtful 

if enough of us would have gotten across to 

have told the tale, for those flares would have 

shown us almost as if it were day. Had our 

exact position been known, the hundreds of 

machine guns and trench mortars along on 

the bluff over looking [sic] the river would 

have wiped us off the face of the earth, and 

they did a good job of it as it were, the next 

day revealed.161

In the fog and under machine-gun fire, Dunbeck’s battalion crossed the river before midnight 

via the precarious footbridge. Men fell into the river, though not all as a result of being wounded by 

German shell and machine-gun fire. Dunbeck apparently fished one officer out of the water, noting 

that at the point where the man was dunked, the 

river was only waist deep.162 It was time to move to 

the other side. 

Marines Establish Positions 

on the East Side of the Meuse River

At the crossing near Letanne under Hamilton’s 

160 Undated letter by A. H. Randall, “Our Last Battle,” Randall 

File, Archives Branch, History Division, Quantico, VA.

161 “The Last Battle of the War—Crossing the Meuse in the 

Fog, November 7–10, 1918,” Richmond war diary.

162 Hillman, “Crossing the Meuse,” 72. 

command, what was left of the 1st and 2d Battalions spread out on the eastern banks of the Meuse 

River. Their goal was to drive farther eastward into 

the heights and forests overlooking the river. The 

1st Battalion headed toward the Senegal Farm, 

about 1.6km beyond the river. The 2d Battalion 

moved toward Moulins, about 3km away.163

The senior captain in Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion, 

Captain Samuel C. Cumming, led his 51st Company over the footbridge across the Meuse in sleet and 

rain. Graduating from the Virginia Military Institute in May 1917, Cumming had been wounded at 

Belleau Wood. He received promotion to captain 

in July 1918, and for his bravery, Cumming would 

receive four Silver Star citations. On the morning 

of 11 November, he displayed strong leadership in 

gathering Marines together and continuing to fight 

the Germans.164

Arriving on the east bank of the river, Cumming 

linked up with Marines from four other 5th Regiment companies, including Captain John Foster’s 

18th Company and Captain Nathaniel H. Massie’s 

43d Company. Unable to communicate with Dunbeck or Hamilton, Cumming led the gathered Marines downriver north toward where Major Shuler’s 

6th Regiment was supposed to have crossed. Because of the fighting and communication difficulties, Cumming did not know that Shuler’s men had 

remained on the west bank. 

Under heavy shelling and continued machinegun fire, Cumming’s men suffered what he described as “heavy casualties.” At a bend in the river, 

a German machine gun held up the advance and 

hit several Marines. Determined to silence the 

gun, Cumming advanced with two men until, oddly enough, he “heard 3 men with beautiful voices 

163 See History of the Sixth Regiment, 49. See also James Nilo, 

“The Last Night of the War,” Leatherneck 76, 11 November 

1993, 18, 20; and Hillman, “Crossing the Meuse,” 73.

164 For more on Samuel Cumming, see the Cumming File, Biographical Files, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps 

History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Cumming file. 

Cumming would go on to be a brigadier general and assistant division commander of the 4th Marine Division during 

World War II. He retired as a brigadier general, then received 

a promotion to major general as a result of his combat citations 

during World War I. 
44 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

singing ‘Silent Night, Holy Night’ in German.”165

Working their way around to the rear, the three 

Marines charged the machine gun nest. Cumming’s 

men each bayonetted a German lying on either side 

of the gun, while Cumming shot the gunner in the 

back of the head with his pistol. After realizing 

the 6th Regiment was not going to cross the river 

by daylight, Cumming set up a defensive perimeter with 200 men at the projected crossing point. 

The Marines manned a tow path along the river, 

with less than a kilometer field of fire east toward 

165 Cumming file.

THE FIGHTING FIVE

When the United States joined the war, University of Pennsylvania students Second Lieutenant Henry 

P. Glendinning and now-First Lieutenant Sydney Thayer Jr., also in 43d Company prior to transferring 

to the 55th Company in November, had joined the Marines as enlisted along with three other 

Philadelphia-area friends attending the university. This “Fighting Five” came from some of the most prominent families in society. At Belleau Wood, one of them, Sergeant Thomas Roberts Reath, was mortally 

wounded after volunteering to take a message to the battalion commander. Eventually commissioned a second lieutenant in Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion, Sydney Thayer had taken command of the 55th Company after 

its skipper, First Lieutenant Charles D. Baylis, was wounded on 6 November.1

Several years later, First Lieutenant Thayer still had a “clear recollection” of the attack across the river. 

Thayer remembered that his company “was considerably delayed in crossing due to an accident to the bridge 

so that the 1st Battalion was actually across the river before my Company got across.” 

1

 See Charles D. Baylis to Jack Ausland, 13 November 1937, Ausland File, for Baylis noting he had been wounded “in the chest 

and lower left leg” on 6 November 1918. Baylis also noted that Lt Vincent A. Brady had been “seriously wounded.” Ausland notes 

in his diary on 6 November that “Lt. Sydney Thayer Jr. was given the company after Captain Baylis and a Lt. Brady were wounded.” For more on Sydney Thayer, see the Pennsylvania Gazette, 8 November 1918, 129. Ironically, the article notes that Thayer had 

written home after the fight in the Champagne (Blanc Mont), he was “the luckiest man in the world, I guess. Chateau Thierry, 

Soissons, St. Mihiel and Champagne, and not a scratch!” The article notes that the University of Pennsylvania students eschewed 

commissions to join the 5th Regiment and see action more quickly. Thayer, Sydney Gest, and H. Percy Glendinning all became 

officers and were decorated for bravery. The Fighting Five are mentioned in Pennsylvania, A Record of the University’s Men in the 

Great War, A Supplement to the Alumni Register, October 1920. See also Philadelphia War History Committee, Philadelphia in 

the World War, 1914–1919 (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford, 1922), 340, for more on Thomas Roberts Reath. After the 

war, an all-Marine American Legion post in Philadelphia was named after Reath. The post donated plaques commemorating the 

5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion on a statue, Crusading for Right, which stands in front of Butler Hall 

at Quantico. The statue is often incorrectly named “Iron Mike.” For the genesis of the statue, see Emily Martin, “ ‘Crusading for 

Right’: The Story,” Leatherneck 95, no. 3, March 2012, 42–46. 

Samuel C. Cumming (at right) led Marines across the Meuse River on the last night of the war, and his men were among the last 

to engage the enemy before finally learning of the Armistice signed 

earlier that day. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 45

dense, especially in the morning, making it almost 

impossible to see more than a few yards. The point 

[man] we had out in many cases ran into German 

sentinels along the tow path and shot them while 

the sentries [sic] relief slept in a dug out a few yards 

away.”167 Captain Foster also later commented on 

how foggy the morning had been, forcing the men 

to walk in single file and having “difficulty in keeping [in] touch with each other.” He also confirmed 

that his company of the 2d Battalion had been 

forced to cross over on the southernmost bridge.168

Eventually, Cumming’s group struck out to the 

northeast, attacking through two farms to reach its 

destination at Bellefontaine Farm. In the meantime, 

other elements of the assault drove inland from the 

river. Dunbeck and patrols from Captain Blake’s 

66th Company and Second Lieutenant Henry P. 

Glendinning’s 43d Company had reached the town 

of Moulins.169

Once across, Thayer led his troops northeast 

toward Bellefontaine Farm. Two men wielding 

automatic rifles led on point; the rest of the fighters following in a column of twos. At about 0600, 

they seized the farm “without much resistance,” and 

167 Frank Goettge to American Battle Monuments Commission, 11 December 1928, Box 194. Correspondence with Former Division Officers–2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College 

Park. Goettge would go on to be a star on the early 1920s 

Marine Corps football teams championed by Gen Smedley D. 

Butler. Goettge died in World War II, leading an ill-fated patrol at Guadalcanal. 

168 John R. Foster to American Battle Monuments Commission, Box 194, Correspondence with Former Division Officers–

2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD. 

169 Capt Samuel Cumming to American Battle Monuments 

Commission, 24 June 1929, Box 194, Correspondence with 

Former Division Officers–2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD. See also Samuel C. Cumming, “My Last Day in 

World War I,” Cumming Collection, Archives Branch, History 

Division, Quantico, VA, for more on the crossing of the Meuse 

and the final day of the war. For the push into Moulin, see Box 

194, Correspondence with Former Division Officers–2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD, for a handwritten 

undated note by Charley Dunbeck noting patrols in Moulins. 

1stLt James A. Nelms, a hero of Blanc Mont, headed the 8th 

Machine Gun Company that supported the crossing by the 1st 

Battalion. He also noted that Capt Blake had reported that his 

company had been into the town of Moulins. See James Nelms 

to the American Battle Monuments Commission, 21 August 

1926, Box 194, Correspondence with Former Division Officers–

2d Division, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD.

Graves near Meuse, ca. 1919.

From the George Barnett Collection (COLL/1635), Archives 

Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantic, VA

a north-south highway, where the Germans were 

situated behind an embankment. 

At 0730, Cumming asked for a volunteer to 

swim the river to carry a message back to Colonel 

Feland’s headquarters. The volunteer made it about 

two-thirds of the way across the river when German fire killed him. Another volunteer stepped 

forward and made it all the way across the river. Although Cumming did not name the successful volunteer, one of his men, Private John V. Bridgford, 

received a Distinguished Service Cross (and a Navy 

Cross) for his actions that day. His citation stated: 

“Private Bridgford delivered an important message 

from his company to regimental headquarters. In 

the performance of this mission, exposed to heavy 

machine-gun and artillery fire, and in full view of 

enemy machine gunners, he swam the Meuse river. 

In spite of the great danger, he delivered the message as directed.”166

Second Lieutenant Frank B. Goettge of the 

55th Company later reminisced that, after crossing 

the river, the Marines moved along a road “which 

was little more than a tow path for river boats.” 

Because the 43d and 55th Companies had been 

severely depleted, Goettge confirmed that the companies were unable to reach their original objectives 

east of the river, but instead moved along the river bank. Goettge remarked that “the fog was very 

166 For Bridgford’s citation, see “John V. Bridgford,” Valor

.MilitaryTimes.com.
46 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

consolidated their position with other units of the 

2d Battalion.

Thayer was wounded during the advance on 

the farm, but remained in command until he heard 

news of the Armistice. Left with little ammunition and food, Thayer admitted that “the Armistice came at just about the right time for us.” For 

his actions on 10–11 November, Sydney Thayer’s 

Distinguished Service Cross and Navy Cross citations stated: “After being wounded, Lieutenant 

Thayer remained with his company until its objective had been reached, refusing evacuation 

until rendered unconscious by loss of blood.”170 

 From a tactical standpoint, the crossing of the 

Meuse was a success. The Germans were driven 

back from the eastern bank, and the Marines had 

gained a valuable foothold across the river. The casualty total remains indeterminate. Records of the 

Army Adjutant General’s Corps stated that 22 men 

of the 2d Division had been killed and 371 “wounded seriously in action.” Army colonel and historian 

Rolfe L. Hillman later wrote that 31 Marines had 

been killed and 148 wounded.171

ARMISTICE DAY, 

11 NOVEMBER 1918

While the 5th Regiment’s Marines fought their 

way forward on the east bank of the Meuse River, 

the war was officially ending. The Germans signed 

the Armistice terms at 0500 on 11 November 1918. 

General Foch sent news of the Armistice to General Pershing’s headquarters soon thereafter. Hostilities were to cease at 1100—the 11th hour of the 

11th day of the 11th month. In turn, Pershing notified his corps commanders, and the news of the 

Armistice trickled downward. Lejeune’s headquarters received the news from Summerall’s V Corps 

170 Sydney Thayer to Clifton Cates, American Battle Monuments Commission, 15 August 1928, File “Correspondence, 

5th Marines,” Box 194, RG 117, NARA, College Park, MD. 

Thayer’s citation can be read at “Sidney Thayer,” Valor.Military

Times.com.

171 See United States, Congress, House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 

War Expenditures: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 (Foreign 

Expenditures) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1920), II, 2186, for the Adjutant General’s casualty figures. Hilman’s figures are found in Hilman, “Crossing the Meuse,” 73. 

headquarters around 0840 and passed it along in a 

telephone message to Marine brigade commander 

General Neville. Neville’s adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Ellis, wrote Peace Memorandum No. 1 a 

few minutes later, reproducing Lejeune’s telephone 

message.172

Even as word of the Armistice signing went 

out from higher command, orders in general were 

ambiguous about the time between the Armistice 

signature and the actual 1100 cessation of fighting. It was left up to subordinate commanders to 

decide how to continue in the interval; they could 

stop fighting and hold their positions, or they could 

press the attack up to the last moment. 

At General Neville’s command, Ellis sent another memorandum at 0900 to the commanders of 

the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine 

172 For Ellis’s Peace Memorandum No. 1, see File “4th Brigade 

Armistice,” Box 17, Entry 240, RG 127, NARA, Washington, 

DC.

This note from 5th Regiment commander Logan Feland was sent to 

George Hamilton, announcing the signing of the Armistice. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 47

Gun Battalion. It ordered that “troops will remain 

in place,” “troops will hold no intercourse with the 

enemy,” and “care must be taken to avoid exposure 

as it may happen that the enemy may not have received the same instructions and so as not to expose 

the location of our line.”173

In a follow-up to Peace Memorandum No. 1, 

Ellis wrote that “troops of the Marine Brigade will 

advance up to 11:00 A.M. At that hour the troops 

will dig in and consolidate the positions attained.” 

Ellis cautioned that “the enemy will be watched 

173 Headquarters 4th Brigade Marines, American Expeditionary Forces, to commanding officers, 5th Marines, 6th Marines, 

6th Machine Gun Battalion, 11 November 1918, 0900, “4th 

Brigade Armistice,” Box 17, Entry 240, RG 127, NARA, 

Washington, DC, hereafter Headquarters letter.

very carefully as he may be inclined to break the 

armistice and begin hostilities at any time,” though 

“organizations will be placed in complete condition 

for combat as soon as possible.”174

At 0910, Colonel Feland wrote a succinct note 

to Major Hamilton: “All firing will cease at 11.00 

a.m. today [so] hold every inch of ground that you 

have gained including that gained by patrols send in 

as soon as possible a sketch showing positions of all 

units at 11:00 a.m.”175

In response to the 1920 congressional subcommittee query regarding the last day of the war, 

General Feland stated that his troops were sup174 Headquarters letter.

175 Ellis’s follow-up memorandum and a copy of Feland’s note 

to Hamilton are also contained in File “4th Brigade Armistice.”

Dieppe

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At the 11th hour on the 11th day in the 11th Month of 1918, 

THE GUNS FELL SILENT

WESTERN FRONT SITUATION THE ARMISTICE, 11 NOVEMBER 1918

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Illustration by LtCol R. L. “Bill” Cody, USMC (Ret)
48 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

posed to continue their operations up to the time 

of the Armistice. This meant pushing ahead to 

higher ground. Feland said, “This was necessary, in 

my opinion at least, to establish the command in a 

more secure position. In other words, we could not 

stop where we were upon receipt of the notification of the signing of the Armistice.” He believed 

that “the casualties in the three hours preceding the 

time the Armistice went into effect were not great, 

[because] by far the greater part of the losses for 

the entire operation ha[d] been incurred during the 

crossing on the evening of November 10th.” 

Feland admitted that the message about the 

Armistice may have reached some of his patrol 

commanders after 1100. He reminded the subcommittee of the situation: the distance from his headquarters to some units was more than 8km, and the 

runners had to make long detours because of enemy 

firing. He thought all patrols had been notified by 

noon, and that no casualties had occurred after the 

Armistice.176 Although no casualties may have occurred after the Armistice went into effect, some 

Marines died shortly beforehand. 

In what was described as possibly “the final act of heroism in battle in France during the 

great war,” Private George W. Budde from Major Hamilton’s 17th Company, 1st Battalion, 

died the morning of 11 November. A Cincinnati, Ohio, native of German heritage and a student 

at Xavier University until he enlisted, Budde had 

been wounded by shrapnel on 6 June at Belleau 

Wood. Referring to his actions on the last day of 

the war, Budde’s posthumous Distinguished Ser176 Logan Feland to MajGen Commandant [ John Lejeune], 

“Information requested by Chairman of Select Committee on 

Expenditures in the War Department,” 6 February 1920, File: 

Wars, WW I–Correspondence, Subject Files, Marine Corps 

History Division, Quantico, VA.

This postwar image reveals the flimsiness of the footbridges that were used by the 5th Regiment to cross the Meuse River on the last night of 

the war.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 49

vice Cross and Navy Cross award citations stated 

that “upon his own initiative, Private Budde advanced in front of the line to determine whether a certain machine-gun position was hostile or 

friendly, and was killed by a machine-gun bullet.”177

Two days after the Armistice, 2d Division 

commander General Lejeune dispatched his division inspector, Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Lay, 

to investigate the last moment of the war. General 

Neville stated that, when he received orders about 

the Armistice from 2d Division, he had telephoned 

the Armistice orders to the commanding officers of 

the 5th and 6th Regiments and followed up with 

runners conveying the message. 

Colonel Feland asserted that “all the terms of 

the armistice have been scrupulously observed by 

the troops under my command.” Many officers 

and enlisted certified to Lieutenant Colonel Lay 

that no firing and no advance had been made after 

1100. Among others, this included Captain Samuel 

Cumming, who commanded the 51st Company, 2d 

Battalion, 5th Regiment.178

After the war, however, Captain Cumming asserted that both sides continued to exchange fire 

until around 1415. The Germans then ceased firing 

and started waving white handkerchiefs on their 

bayonets. A German captain and another soldier 

approached and discarded his pistol. Cumming and 

a German-speaking Marine went out to meet them. 

Noting that the Marines were surrounded with 

their backs to the Meuse, the German informed 

Cumming that the Armistice had taken place at 

1100. 

Returning to his lines, Cumming ordered his 

men to cease firing and stand up, after which the 

German soldiers poured out of their lines and ran 

toward the Americans. Cumming added: “Whereupon, they supplied German brandy and my men 

177 See the Recruiters’ Bulletin, 5, no. 4 (May 1919): 20, for the 

mention of “the final act of heroism.” For more on George 

Budde, see Felix Winternitz, “The Last Casualty,” Xavier Magazine, 2012. 178 LtCol H. Lay, division inspector, to commanding general 

[Lejeune], 2d Division, “Report of investigation concerning 

what happened in each front line unit between our men and 

the Boche at 11:00 a.m. November 11, 1918 and what has happened on our front since, November 14, 1918,” Headquarters 

2d Division, vol. 6, pt. 5.

supplied the cigarettes and one would have thought 

they were long lost brothers.” A half hour later, a 

messenger brought news of the Armistice. Cumming believed his men had fired the last shots of 

the war.179

For the Marines, the final phase of the 

Meuse-Argonne campaign had come more quickly 

than expected. Cumming recognized that his German opponents seemed exhausted, while his men 

had rested three days before making the final assault across the river. 

In any case, the Marines set about to fortify their tenuous position on the east bank of the 

Meuse. Field orders from General Summerall’s V 

Corps headquarters noted that “the present line 

attained will be organized in depth. Troops will 

be disposed so as to obtain the maximum rest and 

comfort consistent with necessary arrangements for 

security, and with preparations for further advance.” 

The order cautioned against any further communication with the enemy and added that “the present 

arrangements involving cessation of hostilities is 

an ARMISTICE only—and not a PEACE—and 

there must be no relaxation of vigilance.”180

Official records do not reveal how many Marines were killed in the assault across the Meuse on 

the last night of the war. Overall, the Marines suffered 8 officers and 189 enlisted killed during the 

final phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign. Another officer and 59 enlisted eventually died of their 

wounds. Seven officers were “wounded severely,” 20 

“wounded slightly,” and 6 “wounded, degree undetermined.” Enlisted were listed at 222 “wounded 

severely,” 467 “wounded slightly,” and another 206 

“wounded, degree undetermined.” Three officers 

and 55 enlisted were gassed.181

As had occurred throughout the war, Marines 

committed many deeds of bravery, some of them 

recognized in decorations, others not so. The last 

phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign had been 

179 Samuel C. Cumming, “My Last Day in World War I,” Cumming Collection, Archives Branch, History Division, Quantico, 

VA.

180 W. B. Burtt, chief of staff, Field Orders No. 128, 11 November 1918, 1700, Headquarters 2d Division, vol. 6, pt. 5.

181 McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, 

65.
50 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

the capstone of a long war and an arduous mission 

to help defeat the Germans. 

The day after the Armistice, General John Lejeune wrote appreciatively to the men of his 2d Division. He succinctly summed up their actions: 

On the night of November 10, heroic deeds 

were done by heroic men. In the face of a 

heavy artillery and withering machine gun 

fire, the Second Engineers threw two footbridges across the Meuse and the first and 

second battalions of the Fifth Marines crossed 

resolutely and unflinchingly to the east bank 

and carried out their mission. In the last battle of the war, as in all others in which this 

division has participated, it enforced its will 

on the enemy.182

182 McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, 

54. 
51

Unit Commander

4th Brigade BGen Wendell C. Neville

 Headquarters Detachment

5th Regiment Col Logan Feland

 Headquarters Company Capt Roswell Winans

 Supply Company Capt Edwin P. McCauley

 8th Company (Machine Guns) Capt James A. Nelms

 1st Battalion Maj George W. Hamilton

 17th Company (A) Capt Robert C. Anthony (to 10 November)

1stLt Marshall P. Madison (11 November)

 49th Company (B) Capt Francis S. Kieren

 66th Company (C) Capt Robert Blake

 67th Company (D) Capt Harry K. Cochran (KIA 1 November)

1stLt Elliott D. Cooke, USA (2–5 November)

Capt Frank Whitehead (6 November)

 2d Battalion Capt Charley Dunbeck

 18th Company (E) Capt John R. Foster

 43d Company (F) Capt Nathaniel H. Massie

 51st Company (G) Capt Samuel C. Cumming

 55th Company (H) Capt Percy D. Cornell

 3d Battalion Maj Henry L. Larsen

 16th Company (I) Capt Robert Yowell

 20th Company (K) Capt Francis Fisk

 45th Company (L) Capt James F. Rorke (WIA 1 November)

Capt Frank W. Wilson (2–9 November)

1stLt Earl F. Johnson (from 10 November)

 47th Company (M) Capt Clarence Ball (to 1 November)

2dLt Louis Cukela (2–7 November)

1stLt William H. Duckham (8 November)

APPENDIX A

MARINE ORDER OF BATTLE

4TH BRIGADE, 2D DIVISION

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE,

30 OCTOBER–11 NOVEMBER 1918
Unit Commander

6th Regiment Col Harry Lee

 Headquarters Company Capt Wesley W. Walker

 Supply Company Capt Fred G. Patchen

 73d Company (Machine Guns) 1stLt George R. Jackson (to 1 November)

Maj Louis E. Fagan Jr. (2 November)

 1st Battalion Maj Frederick A. Barker (to 2 November)

Capt Robert H. Shiel (5 November)

 74th Company (A) 1stLt Leo D. Hermle

 75th Company (B) Capt Glenn C. Cole

 76th Company (C) Capt Macon C. Overton (KIA 1 November)

 95th Company (D) Capt Clarence N. McClure

 2d Battalion Maj Earnest C. Williams

 78th Company (E) Capt James McB. Sellers

 79th Company (F) Capt Eugene F. C. Collier (WIA 1 November)

1stLt Lloyd H. Houchin (1 November)

 80th Company (G) Capt Peter C. Geyer Jr.

 96th Company (H) 1stLt Clifton B. Cates

 3d Battalion Maj George K. Shuler

 82d Company (I) Capt Pink H. Stone

 83d Company (K) Capt Alfred H. Noble

 84th Company (L) Capt Arnold W. Jacobsen

 97th Company (M) Capt Thomas T. McEvoy (WIA 1 November)

1stLt Albert G. Skelton (2–4 November)

Capt Lloyd B. Dysart (5 November)

6th Machine Gun Battalion Maj Littleton W. T. Waller Jr. (to 24 October)

Maj Matthew H. Kingman (24 October)

 15th Company (A) Capt James F. Moriarty

 23d Company (B) Capt Louis R. De Roode (to 30 October)

2dLt James P. Schwerin 

(30 October–6 November)

1stLt Oscar A. Swan 

(7 November–KIA 10 November)

2dLt James P. Schwerin (10 November)

 77th Company (C) Capt Augustus B. Hale

 81st Company (D) Capt William H. Taylor Jr. (WIA 2 November)

1stLt Cornelius H. Reece (2 November)

Note: During the World War I era, the Marine Corps numbered its companies. They were numbered corps-wide without regard 

to type or parent unit. The Army required that, while assigned to the AEF, rifle companies of the 5th and 6th Regiments and machine gun companies of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion also be given letters. The letters are indicated in parenthesis. Nevertheless, 

Marines proudly continued to refer to their companies by number, seldom using the letters, except occasionally in reports to higher 

headquarters. 

Source: George B. Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I: Battalion Histories Based on Official Documents ( Jefferson, NC: 

McFarland, 2015).
53

APPENDIX B

CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMIT TEE NO. 3’S 

INVESTIGATION ON THE LAST NIGHT OF THE WAR

Doubts about the decision to cross the 

Meuse on the night of 10–11 November 

eventually prompted a postwar congressional investigation. In 1919, the so-called “Subcommittee No. 3” of the House Select Committee on 

Expenditures in the War Department investigated 

the actions and decisions of the last day of the war. 

Some subcommittee members visited General 

Pershing in France just before his scheduled return 

home in late summer 1919. Pershing was not happy 

at the prospect of being second-guessed, and put 

off the subcommittee members, saying his papers 

were packed and he would thus not be able to give 

appropriate answers to their questions. Eventually, 

he did write an answer to a subcommittee member’s query, stating that “neither the French nor the 

American were regardless of the wastage of men on 

November 11 or at any other time.”1

Subcommittee No. 3 also questioned several 

other Army leaders, including First Army commander General Hunter Liggett and Brigadier 

General Fox Conner, who had served as Pershing’s 

chief of operations. Each denied that senseless 

slaughter had taken place. Conner admitted that 

if had he been 2d Division commander, he would 

have pressed the attack until 1100. The subcommittee issued a preliminary report criticizing the needless slaughter of troops on the final day of the war. 

1

 See Gen John J. Pershing to Congressman Alvan T. Fuller, 

21 November 1919, in Hearings before the Select Committee on 

Expenditures in the War Department: House of Representatives 

Sixty-Sixth Congress—War Expenditures (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1921). For Subcommittee No. 3’s 

investigation into the last day of the war, see Joseph E. Persico, 

“Nov. 11, 1918: Wasted Lives on Armistice Day,” MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History (Winter 2012).

Dissenting committee members prevailed, however, 

and this unpatriotic conclusion was struck from the 

final report.2

In his memoirs after the war, General Summerall, V Corps commander, wrote about the Meuse 

crossing: 

I learned later that the brigade of marines in 

the Second Division resented the order to cross 

the Meuse River, as the Armistice came immediately afterward, and blamed me for their 

losses, which they said were unnecessary. Of 

course, I knew nothing of an armistice and 

was obeying the most urgent orders from the 

high command. The selection of the brigade of 

marines to lead the crossing of the Second Division was done by the Second Division commander, General Lejeune, a marine, without 

any reference to me. No doubt, he wanted 

to gain credit for the marines. There was no 

complaint from the army brigade in the Second Division. From my experience with the 

marines, they should never be employed with 

the army or under army officers. They fight no 

better than the army, and they complain, seek 

quick relief, and try to gain publicity.3

2

 See testimony of Col Fox Conner, Hearings before the Select 

Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 1717. 3

 Charles Pelot Summerall, The Way of Duty, Honor, Country: 

The Memoir of Charles Pelot Summerall, ed. Timothy K. Nenninger (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 155. 

Nenninger in a footnote points out that Summerall believed 

the losses “excessive,” as cited in Grotelueschen, Doctrine under 

Trial, 127. In turn, Grotelueschen cites Summerall to deputy 

chief of staff, AEF, 5 January 1919, V Corps Historical File, 

Entry 1118, RG 120, NARA, 6.
54 HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN

General John Lejeune wrote in his autobiography that 

the night of this last battle of the war was the 

most trying night I have ever experienced. The 

knowledge that in all probability the Armistice was about to be signed caused the mental anguish, which I always felt because of the 

loss of life in battle, to be greatly accentuated, 

and I longed for the tidings of the cessation 

of hostilities to arrive before the engagement 

was initiated; but it was not to be, and many 

a brave man made the supreme sacrifice for his 

country in the last hours of the war.4

Lejeune went on to note that Marshal Foch 

had pressed to continue the attack, to force the 

Germans to accept Armistice terms at which they 

initially balked. In the long run, Foch believed the 

continued attack could save lives by forcing the 

Germans to accept the proffered Armistice terms 

and thereby shorten the war.5

In a letter to Lejeune after the war, Summerall 

wrote that Marine officers had complained about 

military action on the last day. Lejeune replied that 

there was “a feeling of deep sadness among all on 

account of the heavy losses just before the cessation 

of hostilities,” but he assured the Army general that 

he had not heard complaints from officers.6

Lejeune acknowledged that one enlisted had 

written a letter complaining about the Marine 

general as well as Summerall. Lejeune exonerated 

Summerall, noting that “I fully understand that all 

orders for the operations during the last 24 hours 

as well as at all other times emanated from the very 

highest military authority and not from any subordinate officer.”7

Despite his wariness of the Marines, Summerall found Lejeune to be an effective leader. In 

a secret report to General Pershing made a month 

after the Armistice regarding all V Corps generals, 

4

 Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine, 400. 5

 Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine. 6

 Lejeune to Summerall, 18 March 1920, “ ‘Controversies’—

Data on Drive toward Sedan, November 1–11, 1918,” Box 26, 

Charles P. Summerall Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 

Congress, hereafter Lejeune letter.

7

 Lejeune letter.

Summerall wrote that “Lejaune” was qualified for 

line work, and that “his mentality is such that he 

would develop into a very efficient administrative 

staff officer.” Lejeune’s command “exhibited satisfactory evidence of discipline.” The Marine general 

had a good understanding of supply. He also understood division staff work, which he closely supervised and which was “eminently satisfactory.” 

Summerall found Lejeune to be “physically strong, 

mentally active,” and circulating well forward with 

his troops during combat. He had a “quiet forceful manner, good poise, and expresses himself in a 

manner that inspires confidence.” He also was “very 

combative, takes a great pride in his profession, and 

is a determined, courageous, and aggressive officer.”8

In what was probably a reference to Lejeune’s 

suggestion for different units to cross the Meuse 

first, Summerall had one problem with Lejeune: 

[his] attitude towards higher authority is lacking in that absolute subordination and eager 

acceptance of difficult tasks imposed upon his 

command. He is inclined to insist upon being 

relieved after a period which he thinks sufficient, and to present objections and difficulties 

in the execution of missions assigned to him. 

However, when he commits himself to an undertaking he pursues his objective with admirable vigor, resourcefulness, and self-sacrifice.9

On the subject of Lejeune’s qualification for 

leadership, Summerall finally concluded that he 

had “a sound purpose as well as resolute on the part 

of superiors will obtain the finest results from this 

officer.” Summerall believed that Lejeune was a 

“valuable officer as a brigade or division commander, and his command may be relied upon to go fast 

and to go far in the missions entrusted to it.”10

In November 1937, the Saturday Evening 

Post published an article based on Corporal John 

Ausland’s diary. Accompanied by the drawings of 

8

 Commanding general, V Army Corps, to adjutant general, 

AEF, “Report on General Officers,” 15 December 1918, “Fifth 

Army Corps. Report on General Officers of Corps. December 

1918–February 1919,” Box 16, Summerall Papers, Library of 

Congress, hereafter Report on General Officers.

9

 Report on General Officers.

10 Report on General Officers.
HEROIC DEEDS, HEROIC MEN 55

famed Marine Corps writer and illustrator John W. 

Thomason, the article “The Last Kilometer” publicly described the Marine’s unhappiness with the task 

of crossing the Meuse. Ausland served in the 55th 

Company in Captain Dunbeck’s 2d Battalion, 5th 

Regiment. The company had been led on the last 

night by First Lieutenant Sydney Thayer Jr., one of 

the “Fighting Five” group of friends who were University of Pennsylvania students before entering the 

Marine Corps in 1917 (see sidebar “The Fighting 

Five”).11

Ausland based the article on his daily diary 

entries that questioned and criticized higher command, especially V Corps commander Summerall. 

Ausland remembered the Army general’s speech to 

the Marines before the final phase began, noting 

that afterward “we bowed and we applauded a little, 

not knowing what else to do. They left for another 

battalion, where the visiting general could spread 

some more applesauce and kid the boys about getting killed.”12

In his 9 November diary entry, Ausland noted 

that, during a march to a wood near the river, the 

Marines met other division members talking about 

the impending Armistice. He wrote that “everyone 

was all smiles. Surely there would be no more attacks.” Though, he reckoned that, “with all the enemy across the river and all of us on this side, it seems 

likely that we will have no more battle casualties. 

We have probably not lost a man since the fifth [of 

November].”13

When it seemed that the Marines were moving 

toward the river for a crossing attack, Ausland noted that the river was a natural boundary between 

the two forces, and that the Armistice was pending. 

11 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer,” 20ff.

12 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer,” 79.

13 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer,” 79.

He disparaged Summerall as “that general,” who 

had spoken so negatively to the Marines: “To him, 

our lives are just a matter of arithmetic. So many 

men, so many square feet of land. So many victories, 

so many more stars for the general.”14

Writing to Ausland after he read the Saturday 

Evening Post story, First Lieutenant Thayer acknowledged that it was “one Hell of a night” and 

“we were fortunate that we did not lose more men 

than we did but I must say there were several times 

when I felt like a cold-blooded murderer in having to give the orders I did, particularly when I sent 

out that patrol which was really to draw out whatever fire there might be so that the whole column 

wouldn’t catch it in the neck.”15

In a letter to Corporal Ausland after he read 

the Saturday Evening Post article, a former Army 

sergeant at 2d Division headquarters, F. A. Connett, 

congratulated the author on “bringing to light the 

disgraceful attack of the 2d Division’s costly attack 

across the Meuse River on the night of November 

10th–11th, 1918. I am very pleased that you did not 

lay the blame for the orders for this attack on the 

shoulders of General Lejeune.”16

Connett asserted that “General Lejeune was 

not at all in sympathy with this useless attack and 

took the question up with General Summerall at 

5th [V] Corps Headquarters and attempted to the 

best of his ability to have the attack orders countermanded.” Noting that the request was turned down 

flatly, Connett wrote, “I personally have always 

placed the blame on Summerall’s shoulders. In my 

opinion, it was the most useless sacrifice of life to 

satisfy the vain whims of a General.”17

14 Ausland, “The Last Kilometer,” 79.

15 See Sydney Thayer to John Ausland, 22 November 1937, 

Ausland File, Box “2d Division, 5th Regiment,” World War I 

Veterans Survey Collection, AHEC.

16 See F. A. Connett to John Ausland, 11 November 1937, 

Ausland File, Box “2d Division, 5th Regiment,” World War I 

Veterans Survey Collection, AHEC, hereafter Connett letter.

17 Connett letter.

57

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Annette Amerman, Kara Newcomer, and Angela Anderson of the 

Marine Corps History Division, and mapmaker Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Cody, for their guidance 

and support for this project. Also, thanks go to J. Michael Miller, retired head of the Marine Corps 

Archives, for getting the author involved in the U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative 

Series. Staff at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration and at the Army Heritage and 

Education Center, Carlisle, PA, and especially Dr. James Ginter and his colleagues at the Archives Branch, 

Quantico, VA, also proved very helpful with the research for this project. 

59

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David J. Bettez, PhD, is the author of Kentucky Marine: Major General Logan Feland and the Making of the Modern USMC (2014), which received the 2015 Colonel Joseph Alexander Award for 

biographical work from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation, and Kentucky and the Great War: 

World War I on the Home Front (2016), which received a 2017 Kentucky History Award from the Kentucky 

Historical Society. He received his BA in history from the University of Notre Dame and his MA and PhD 

in history from the University of Kentucky.