Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Philip R. Skodinski

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Majorie Lawyer-Smith

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael J. Smith,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 5, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A05-1608-CR-1883

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Elizabeth C. 

Hurley, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D08-1509-F5-188

Mathias, Judge.

[1] After a jury trial in St. Joseph Superior Court, Michael J. Smith (“Smith”) was 

convicted of one count of Level 1 felony attempted murder and three counts of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 2 of 11

Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. In this appeal, Smith claims the evidence 

was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder and that the 

trial court abused its discretion by refusing tendered self-defense jury 

instruction. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural Posture

[3] Around 2:30 am on August 1, 2015, three vehicles pulled into the Always Open 

gas station located at the northwest corner of Lafayette and LaSalle streets (“the 

Intersection”) in South Bend, Indiana. First to pull in was a lime green GMC 

Suburban driven by Stephen Johnson (“Stephen”). Stephen’s brother Justin 

Sharp (“Sharp”) sat in the passenger seat, and a friend Marcus Harris (“Harris”) 

sat behind Justin. Following the Suburban was a tan Chevy Tahoe driven by 

Bryant Johnson1(“Bryant”). Finally, a white Mitsubishi Lancer driven by 

Herneisha Becton (“Becton”) entered the gas station. Ashley Irving (“Irving”) 

sat in the passenger seat of the Lancer, while Michael Smith (“Smith”), 

Bryant’s brother, sat in the back seat. 

[4] Stephen exited the Suburban and entered the gas station for about ten minutes 

while Sharp and Harris stayed inside the vehicle. During this time, the Tahoe 

and Lancer were parked off to the side in the gas station lot. Bryant called 

 

1 There is no indication in the record that Stephen Johnson and Bryant Johnson are related.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 3 of 11

Becton who put the call on speaker. Becton, Irving, and Smith listened as 

Bryant asked, “was that the guy?” Tr. Vol. II, p. 147. Smith responded, “if that 

was him, then we need to handle business.” Id. at 148. 

[5] Stephen returned to the Suburban and as he began to drive out of the gas station 

and head south on Lafayette, he noticed that the Tahoe pulled out at the same 

time, so he stopped and let the Tahoe exit first. The Tahoe driven by Bryant

made a right-hand turn out of the gas station, pulled up to the Intersection, and

stopped at the light in the right-hand lane. The Suburban driven by Stephen

pulled up next to the Tahoe in the left-hand turn lane. The Lancer driven by 

Becton pulled up directly behind the Suburban.

[6] At this point, Bryant, the driver of the Tahoe, rolled down his window and fired 

six shots into the passenger side of the Suburban before speeding off to the right, 

heading west on LaSalle. Stephen, attempting to flee, turned hard to the left,

but due to the sharp turn and the size of the wheel rims on the Suburban, the 

vehicle momentarily became immobile. He was also leaning out of the vehicle 

attempting to avoid the gunfire. The Becton-driven Lancer then entered the 

intersection, and once there, Smith fired five shots at the rear of the Suburban

out of the Lancer’s driver side, back-passenger window. The second round of 

gunfire spurred Stephen to fully re-enter the Suburban, correct the wheels, and 

drive off east on LaSalle. The Becton-driven Lancer followed the Bryant-driven 

Tahoe to Bryant’s sister’s home where Smith stated, “I think I killed him.” Id.

at 154.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 4 of 11

[7] Stephen, realizing both he and his brother had been shot, quickly turned the 

Suburban around and returned to the gas station. Sharp, who was sitting in the 

passenger seat, had been shot multiple times, and he was pronounced dead at 

the scene. Stephen suffered a bullet wound to his right shoulder and Harris was 

unhurt.

[8] On September 2, 2015, the State charged Smith in three counts: Count I, Level 

5 felony criminal recklessness against Harris; Count II, Level 5 felony criminal 

recklessness against Stephen; and Count III, Level 5 felony criminal 

recklessness against Sharp. On May 16, 2016, the State added Count IV, Level 

1 felony attempted murder against Stephen. A three-day jury trial commenced 

on June 14, 2016. Prior to final arguments, Smith requested a jury instruction 

for self-defense. After consideration, the trial court refused to give the offered 

instruction. 

[9] The jury found Smith guilty on all four counts. On July 19, 2016, the court 

merged Count II and Count IV and sentenced Smith to 38 years executed in the 

department of corrections for attempted murder, 5 years executed in the 

department of corrections for criminal recklessness to run consecutively, and a 

5-year suspended sentence to probation following release. Smith now timely 

appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 5 of 11

Discussion and Decision

[10] Smith presents two issues for our review: whether the evidence was sufficient to 

support his conviction for attempted murder; and whether the trial court abused 

its discretion by refusing to give the self-defense instruction to the jury.

The Evidence was Sufficient to Support Smith’s Conviction

[11] When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we 

consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

verdict. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016). It is the jury’s role, not 

ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless 

no reasonable fact-finder could have found the elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

[12] For attempted murder, the State needed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that Smith engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 

intentionally killing Stephen. See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1, 35-42-1-1. Our courts 

have consistently “held that intent to commit murder may be inferred from the 

use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily 

injury.” Booker v. State, 741 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis in 

original) (citing Chapman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1999)). The use 

of a deadly weapon on its own may not suffice to satisfy the specific intent 

requirement, however, “the trier of fact may infer that the defendant acted with 

conscious objective to kill from the circumstances surrounding the deliberate 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 6 of 11

use” of the deadly weapon. Id. at 756. Discharging a weapon in the direction of 

a victim is substantial evidence from which a jury could infer a specific intent to 

kill. Corbin v. State, 840 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Leon v. 

State, 525 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind. 1988)).

[13] In Perez v. State, the defendant fired three to five rounds out of his moving Acura 

towards a Chevy Malibu. 872 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. 

denied. After the shots were fired, the defendant discussed the shooting and told 

others he was sure he had hit the car. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that 

there was insufficient evidence to show he had intended to kill the driver of the 

Malibu. Id. at 212. In Perez, we upheld the attempted murder conviction finding 

there was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude the defendant’s 

conscious objective was to kill when he fired at the moving vehicle. Id. at 213.

[14] Perez is analogous to the situation before us here. Smith contends that the shots 

he fired at the Suburban were not likely to result in murder because the vehicles 

were traveling in opposite directions. Appellant’s Br. at 8–9. However, the 

record does not support this argument, nor would this fact be dispositive if it 

did. While all three vehicles were at the gas station, and just after Stephen 

exited the Suburban, Bryant made a phone call to Becton in the Lancer asking, 

“was that the guy?” Tr. Vol. II, p. 147. Smith then responded, “if that was him, 

then we need to handle business.” Id. at 148. Driving their respective vehicles 

out of the gas station, Bryant and Becton pulled up alongside and behind the 

Suburban at the Intersection. Bryant then fired six shots into the passenger side 

of the Suburban and Stephen attempted to turn left and flee. Before Stephen 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 7 of 11

was able to flee, Smith fired five shots from the Lancer towards Stephen and the 

Suburban while both vehicles were in the intersection.

2

Just after the shooting, 

once Bryant and Smith reconvened, Smith stated, “I think I killed him.” Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 154.

[15] For these reasons, there was substantial evidence to support Smith’s attempted 

murder conviction.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion when it Refused to Give Smith’s

Tendered Self-Defense Instruction to the Jury

[16] The trial court has broad discretion in how it instructs a jury and we review its 

discretion only for abuse. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763 (Ind. 2015). 

“To determine whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we consider: (1) 

whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was 

evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the 

substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given.” 

Id. at 763–64. The second element listed above is most applicable to the case 

before us which our supreme court has at times rephrased as “whether there 

was evidence to render the instruction applicable to the issues.” Hoskins v. State, 

737 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ind. 2000) (citing Williams v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 

(Ind. 1985)). This description by the court proves helpful for our analysis here.

 

2

It is immaterial that none of the shots actually struck Stephen. See Corbin v. State, 840 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006) (holding there is no requirement that shots fired actually strike the intended victim for the 

attempted murder statutes to be triggered).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 8 of 11

[17] A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on any 

theory of defense as long as it has some basis in the evidence. Creager v. State, 

737 N.E.2d 771, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. It does not matter 

whether the evidence is weak or even inconsistent; however, the evidence at 

trial must provide some probative value to support providing the instruction. Id.

Three facts must be proven when a defendant claims self-defense: 1) that he was 

in a place where had a right to be; 2) that he acted without fault; and 3) that he 

had reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great bodily harm. Miller v. 

State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 2000). Further, self-defense is not appropriate 

for a defendant who is the initial aggressor except in limited circumstances, 

which are inapplicable here. Id.

[18] Smith tendered the following instruction to the trial court:

I.C. 35-41-3-2 defines “self-defense” as follows:

A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other 

person to protect the person or a third person from what the 

person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful 

force.

A person:

(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat:

if the person reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent 

serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the 

commission of a forcible felony. No person in this state shall be 

placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the 

person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.

However, a person is not justified in using force if:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 9 of 11

(1) the person is committing or escaping after the commission of 

a crime;

(2) provokes unlawful action by another person, with intent to 

cause bodily injury to the other person; or

(3) the person has entered into combat with another person or is 

the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the 

encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to 

do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens 

to continue unlawful action. Use of force disproportionate to 

necessity exceeds the bounds of justifiable force. 

“Deadly force” is force that creates a substantial risk of serious 

bodily injury.

“Bodily injury” means any impairment of physical condition 

including physical pain.

“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a 

substantial risk of death or that causes: serious permanent 

disfigurement, unconsciousness, extreme pain, permanent or 

protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member 

or organ, or the loss of a fetus. 

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant did not act in self-defense. Self-defense may 

be disproved by the State either by producing additional evidence 

specifically disproving one of the elements of self-defense or by 

the evidence taken as a whole. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 20–21. Smith argued that the instruction was 

justified because Irving testified that when Stephen exited the Suburban, she 

was afraid he might shoot.3

 

3 There is conflicting testimony here as Stephen testified he never fully exited the Suburban, Tr. Vol. II, p. 

130, and when confronted with conflicting evidence we consider it most favorably to the ruling of the trial 

court. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d 644, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 10 of 11

[19] After due consideration, the trial court refused to give the tendered instruction 

and reasoned in part, “I did not believe there was, as required by case law, 

evidence on the record to support the requirement that the defendant himself 

would have foreseen some threat or some imminent bodily harm that would 

have led to then him acting in self-defense.” Final Statements Tr., p. 2. We 

agree.

[20] Even though only a scintilla of evidence is necessary to support providing a selfdefense instruction, there is no evidence that Smith faced any fear or 

apprehension of bodily harm at any point. Additionally, Smith acted as an

aggressor. Three witnesses testified at trial that there was no contact between 

the occupants of the Suburban and those in the other two vehicles prior to the 

first shots being fired. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 120, 141, 161. Also, there is no evidence 

that any of the occupants of the Suburban were carrying firearms at the time of 

the shooting. Id. at 26, 123-24, 138–39. Smith was never in danger and 

“[a]bsent evidence of impending danger, a self-defense instruction is not 

proper.” White v. State, 726 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

refused to give the jury Smith’s tendered instruction regarding self-defense.

Conclusion

[21] Considering the evidence favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the 

State presented sufficient evidence to support Smith’s attempted murder 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1608-CR-1883 | September 5, 2017 Page 11 of 11

conviction. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused

to give the jury Smith’s tendered instruction regarding self-defense.

[22] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.