SAND 2004-3375P 

Unlimited Release 

July 2004 

Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking 

and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Retired 

Rawalpindi, Pakistan 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37 

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4 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Abstract 

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the national defense structures of Pakistan and India in 

1998 has not brought an era of peace and stability as some had forecast. Full-scale war was only

narrowly avoided in 1999 and 2002. The objective of this study is to evaluate the stability of

deterrence, particularly the concept of minimum deterrence in South Asia today. Within this

context, the study analyzes Pakistan’s strategic thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. 

Interviews with Pakistani and U.S. officials, ex-officials, military officers, and academics were 

conducted to gain insight into the development of policy. Site visits to civilian nuclear facilities 

were also conducted. The conclusions outline a path for Pakistan that would help achieve nuclear 

stability in South Asia, including a possible role for the U.S. 

Author’s Note 

The author of this report directed his research effort based on the concerns of officials and

scholars in the U.S. about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. While the author benefited from 

the very useful insights and views of scholars and policy influentials in Pakistan, the perspective 

and explanations offered by the Pakistan establishment, and the military establishment, this

assessment is that of the author and the author alone and does not represent the views of any 

government or any government agency. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Contents 

Abbreviations & Acronyms .............................................................................................. 9

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 11

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 15

1.1 Background........................................................................................................................15 

1.2 Objectives and Methodology of the Project.......................................................................16 

2. Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking ................................................................................ 17

2.1 Historical Perspective ........................................................................................................17 

2.2 Thinking Nuclear...............................................................................................................18 

2.3 Developing the Nuclear Weapon.......................................................................................18 

2.4 Delivery Systems...............................................................................................................20 

3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program – Views from the U.S................................. 21

3.1 Views of U.S. Officials......................................................................................................21 

3.2 Views of U.S. Scholars......................................................................................................22 

4. Pakistani Perceptions of the Nuclear Program...................................................... 23

4.1 Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy ..................................................................................................23 

4.1.1 Issues Related to Management of Nuclear Policy .................................................24 

4.1.2 Operational Issues..................................................................................................24 

4.1.3 Security Aspects.....................................................................................................25 

4.1.4 Source and Material Accountability ......................................................................25 

4.2 Views of Policy Influentials...............................................................................................25 

4.2.1 Building a Stable Deterrence .................................................................................26 

4.2.2 Security of Weapons..............................................................................................27 

4.2.3 Nuclear Decision Making Process.........................................................................27 

4.2.4 Growing Influence of Religious Fundamentalists.................................................28 

4.2.5 Presenting a Doctrine.............................................................................................28 

4.2.6 Nuclear War by Miscalculation .............................................................................29 

5. The A.Q. Khan Saga............................................................................................. 30

6. Net Assessment – Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.................................................... 31

6.1 Response to India...............................................................................................................31 

6.2 Nuclear Doctrine................................................................................................................31 

6.3 Minimum Deterrence.........................................................................................................31 

6.4 Nuclear Decision Making Process.....................................................................................32 

6.5 Deterrence: Stable or Dangerous? .....................................................................................32 

6.6 Safety of Nuclear Weapons ...............................................................................................33 

6.7 Security of Nuclear Weapons and Facilities......................................................................33 

6.8 Security of Nonmilitary Nuclear Installations...................................................................34 

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6.9 Author’s Assessment of Nonmilitary Installations............................................................35 

7. The Way Forward – Recommendations for Enhancing Stability ........................... 37

7.1 Learn from the Cold War...................................................................................................37 

7.2 Control Political Pressures.................................................................................................38 

7.3 Implement Crisis Management..........................................................................................38 

7.4 Prevent Nuclear Proliferation ............................................................................................40 

7.5 Strengthen Nuclear Command and Control.......................................................................42 

7.6 Initiate Nuclear Transparency............................................................................................42 

7.7 Avoid Nuclear War by Miscalculation ..............................................................................43 

7.8 Improve Security................................................................................................................43 

7.9 Enhance Nuclear Stability..................................................................................................44 

8. Concluding Thoughts ............................................................................................ 47

Appendix A: Management Structure of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability .......................... 49

Appendix B: Comments on Author’s Visit to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science 

and Technology (PINSTECH) and Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP), 

November 2003..................................................................................................... 52

Physical Protection.....................................................................................................................52 

Safety, Protection, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials .........................................................53 

Personnel Security .....................................................................................................................53 

About the Author ........................................................................................................... 55

Figures 

Figure 1. Shaheen II missile (Source: Pakistan Strategic Plans Division, file photo).................. 20 

Figure 2. Meeting of the National Command Authority (Source: Pakistan Strategic Plans 

Division) ............................................................................................................................... 25 

Figure 3. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Washington, DC, May 2003...................................... 38 

Figure 4. Organization Chart of National Command Authority................................................... 49 

Figure 5. Organization Chart of Strategic Plans Division ............................................................ 50 

Figure 6. PINSTECH Reactor, November 2003........................................................................... 54 

Figure 7. Author visiting CHASNUPP Control Room, November 2003..................................... 54 

Table 

Table 1. Pakistan Missile Inventory............................................................................................. 20 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Abbreviations & Acronyms 

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India) 

C4I

2

SR Command, Control, Communications, Computer Information, Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

CAS Chief of Air Force Staff 

CBM Confidence-Building Measure 

CD Conference on Disarmament 

CHASNUPP Chashma Nuclear Power Plant 

CJCSC Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

CNS Chief of Navy Staff 

COAS Chief of Army Staff 

DG SPD Director General Strategic Plans Division 

DGMO Director General of Military Operations 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IB Intelligence Bureau 

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence 

JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 

JSHQ Joint Service Headquarters 

LOC Line of Control 

MI Military Intelligence 

MMA Motahadda Majlis e Amal (United Council for Action) 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MW Megawatt 

MWe Megawatt (electric) 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCA National Command Authority 

NDC National Defence College 

NGO Nongovernmental Organization 

NRRC Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 

NSA Nuclear Security Agency 

PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 

PAL Permissive Action Link 

PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology 

PNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 

SFCP Strategic Forces Communication Planning 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SPD Strategic Plans Division 

UN United Nations 

U.S. United States 

VCOAS Vice-Chief of Army Staff 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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10 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Executive Summary

Following the May 1998 demonstrations of nuclear capability by India and Pakistan, the 

countries faced major crises in 1999 and 2002. Given their history of escalation, and the addition

of nuclear weapons to the ongoing dispute, this report seeks to: 

• Analyze Pakistan’s strategic thinking and the role of nuclear weapons, while 

judging the robustness of the nuclear decision making process, its strengths and 

its weaknesses; 

• Understand and evaluate the stability of the nuclear deterrence in South Asia as it

exists today;

• Understand the concept of minimum deterrence as perceived by the political and

military leadership of Pakistan; 

• Evaluate the physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear 

materials; and 

• Offer recommendations, mostly for unilateral action by Pakistan and some for

bilateral action by India and Pakistan, to improve stability. 

To achieve these objectives, the author of the study: 

• Interviewed relevant U.S. officials and scholars to understand their apprehensions 

about Pakistan’s nuclear program; 

• Interviewed prominent scholars, ex-civil and military officials, and political

leaders in Pakistan to enhance understanding of Pakistan’s strategic thinking and 

the role of nuclear weapons; 

• Held meetings in Pakistan with relevant military and civil officials of the 

Government of Pakistan to obtain a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s nuclear

program, policies, operations, and security of nuclear materials and weapons; and 

• Outlines a path for Pakistan to help achieve nuclear stability in South Asia. 

The interviews with U.S. officials and scholars revealed a consistent perception of concern for 

the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, apprehensions about the robustness of the decisionmaking system, the lack of conflict reduction mechanisms in the region, and the potential for 

proliferation from Pakistan. Although Pakistan has not publicly announced a formal nuclear 

doctrine, the author was able to determine four national nuclear policy objectives in meetings

with Pakistani officials and reviewing public official statements. 

1. Deterrence of all forms of external aggression that endanger national security. 

2. Deterrence will be achieved through the development and maintenance of an 

effective combination of conventional and strategic forces, at adequate levels

within the country’s resource constraints. 

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3. Deterrence of Pakistan’s adversaries from attempting a counter-force strategy 

against our strategic assets, by effectively securing our strategic assets and 

threatening nuclear retaliation should such an attempt be made. 

4. Stabilization of strategic deterrence in the South Asia region. 

Following two visits to civilian nuclear installations in Pakistan, the author concluded that fairly 

robust systems of physical protection and personnel reliability currently exist. Both the 

protection security and the personnel reliability programs are currently undergoing revision. The 

author recommends that the training of military and nonmilitary security forces be brought up to

international standards, conducting a realistic threat assessment based on the risk of terrorism, 

installing modern and sophisticated anti-intrusion devices, and requesting additional training in 

physical protection from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and/or the U.S. 

Drawing on the comments of various knowledgeable individuals and scholars within and outside 

Pakistan, there are a number of measures that Pakistan should consider taking unilaterally to 

improve nuclear stability and ensure the physical security of its nuclear arsenal, while some 

measures will need to be undertaken bilaterally by India and Pakistan. These measures include: 

• Controlling political pressures by reducing the radical religious influence in both 

countries and resolving lingering disputes through dialogue. 

• Implementing crisis management through a series of political and military

confidence-building measures including a crisis management agreement, media 

management, special emissaries to heads of government, additional hot lines, 

notification of alert status, separation of nuclear weapons from delivery systems, 

flag meetings, and implementing cooperative border monitoring. 

• Preventing nuclear proliferation by making legislative changes, taking stronger 

fiscal and technical control of weapons programs, improving operating procedures 

for weapons security, strengthening the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 

upgrading security at nuclear facilities, initiating international cooperation for 

physical protection technologies, upgrading the personnel reliability program, and 

training and equipping a special security force for nuclear assets. 

• Strengthening nuclear command and control through the National Command 

Authority and implementing dual control of nuclear weapons by the President and 

Prime Minister. Improving the decision-making process by educating the political

leadership and citizens of Pakistan on the role of nuclear weapons. 

• Initiating nuclear transparency to promote stability through declaration of the 

essential elements of nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons systems capability, and 

alert levels; and implementing measures to minimize the chances of nuclear 

accidents. 

• Avoiding nuclear war by miscalculation by establishing and practicing 

confidence-building measures (e.g., reaffirming the Lahore Memorandum of 

Understanding), resolving outstanding disputes, and initiating reciprocal 

transparency in nuclear topics. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

• Bringing about a change in the security culture of Pakistan by the design and 

implementation of a centralized security system to oversee the nuclear 

establishment and by conducting security audits. 

• Enhancing nuclear stability by avoiding rash decisions and establishing firewalls 

to interrupt progression along the path of escalation. 

• Learning from the Cold War. 

Possessing nuclear weapon systems places serious demands on a nation and its government. The 

foremost demand is the need for internal political stability and strong institutions. 

Acknowledging the concerns of the West, the author is also concerned with the possibility of a 

nuclear war in South Asia by miscalculation. While efforts are needed to address important 

issues like proliferation, safety, security and stability, avoidance of nuclear war by 

miscalculation needs immediate attention. Involvement of the U.S. to support and advise

Pakistan on improving the safety and security of its nuclear program would be essential. 

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14 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

1. Introduction 

1.1 Background 

On May 11, 1998 as the Balusa Group1

 was concluding its last day of dialogue in Italy, a senior 

Indian delegate received a telephone call from India, informing him that India had just exploded 

a nuclear device. Several more followed. While the Balusa Group was struggling to formulate 

ways to build bridges between the two nations, a new and dramatic event had taken place, 

radically changing the security landscape of South Asia. When the Pakistani participants 

returned home, a very emotional debate had gripped the nation—whether or not to respond to the

Indian nuclear test? The overwhelming sentiment was to “rise to the challenge,” and the rhetoric 

coming from India did not help. On May 28, Pakistan did respond by testing several nuclear 

devices. 

With time, the euphoria and offensive rhetoric that followed the nuclear tests diminished, and it 

seemed that the leadership in both countries realized the implications of going nuclear. A lowkey effort began with the objective of bringing stability in the perpetually unstable politicalmilitary environment of South Asia. This resulted in the Lahore Summit between the Prime 

Ministers of India and Pakistan in February 1999. 

In May 1999, almost a year after the nuclear tests and at the heels of the Lahore Summit, a 

serious outbreak of hostility occurred across the Line of Control (LOC)2

 near Kargil,3 a village in

Indian-controlled Kashmir. On July 4, 1999, the Prime Minister of Pakistan met with the U.S. 

President in Washington, DC. The U.S. brokered de-escalation averted a possible war. In spite of 

Pakistan’s explanations, the global community blamed Pakistan for initiating the Kargil Crisis.

Many scholars opined that the Kargil Crisis did not escalate into full-scale war because of the 

effectiveness of the nuclear deterrence; however, this opinion needs to be reexamined. 

Following the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. sent troops to 

Afghanistan to engage the perpetrators of the attack. Pakistan and India both supported the U.S. 

fight against terrorism and the allied operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan, because of its 

geographic location, became central to operations in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the negative 

bilateral agenda between India and Pakistan overshadowed their alliance with the U.S. India 

blamed Pakistan for sponsoring a terrorist attack on its Parliament in December 2001, a charge 

Pakistan strongly denied. Pakistan offered to cooperate with India in a joint investigation. India

refused and instead launched a massive military build-up against Pakistan. In Pakistan, this 

Indian action was considered as coercive diplomacy to force a solution of the lingering Kashmir

issue to its advantage. 

 

1

 Balusa Group is a small group of Pakistanis and Indians working for peace between their countries. Formed in 

1996, the group held its tenth meeting in Lahore, Pakistan in March 2002. The author of this report is a founding

member of the Balusa Group. Evidently, Balusa means peace in an ancient Indian language. 2

 The LOC represents the division of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian controlled and the 

Pakistani controlled portions of that state. 3

 Kargil, a small settlement on the Indian side of the LOC in Kashmir, was the centre of the sector where a limited

but bloody battle was fought in May/June 1999. While Pakistan underplayed the conflict as an action taken up by

Kashmiri freedom fighters, India proclaimed it as a war initiated by the Pakistan establishment. 

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It is important to note that India and Pakistan were again on the edge of war within two years of

becoming nuclear. Through a shuttle diplomatic initiative, the U.S. again saved the two nations 

from war that could have had nuclear implications. 

1.2 Objectives and Methodology of the Project 

The objectives of this project are: 

• Analyze Pakistan’s strategic thinking and the role of nuclear weapons, while 

judging the robustness of the nuclear decision making process, its strengths, and 

its weaknesses; 

• Understand and evaluate the stability of the nuclear deterrence in South Asia as it

exists today;

• Understand the concept of minimum deterrence as perceived by the political and

military leadership of Pakistan; 

• Evaluate the physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear 

materials; and 

• Offer recommendations, mostly for unilateral action by Pakistan and some for

bilateral action by India and Pakistan, to improve the nuclear environment in 

South Asia. 

To attain these objectives, the author of the study engaged in the following activities: 

1. Interviewed relevant U.S. officials and scholars to understand their apprehensions 

and fears about Pakistan’s nuclear program and endeavor to bridge the gap 

between perception and reality. Interviews were conducted on a not-forattribution basis. 

2. In Pakistan, interviewed prominent scholars, ex-civil and military officials, and

political leaders to enhance understanding of Pakistan’s strategic thinking and the 

role of nuclear weapons. Interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. 

3. In Pakistan, held meetings with the relevant senior military and civil officials of

the Government of Pakistan to obtain a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s 

nuclear program, its nuclear policy, operational aspects, and the physical security 

of the nuclear materials and weapons. 

4. After the evaluation process, outlined a forward path for Pakistan that would help 

achieve nuclear stability in South Asia, including the possible role the U.S. would 

play in assisting the process of nuclear stability in South Asia. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

2. Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking 

2.1 Historical Perspective 

The Hindus and the Muslims of the sub-continent have coexisted peacefully with each other over 

centuries, especially during the rule of some of the Mogul Kings and later under British rule. 

However, if one could categorize their relationship in a word, it is mistrust. This very mistrust

was responsible for the partition of British India. 

A retired Indian brigadier wrote of the historical and theocratic reasons for the Hindu Muslim 

divide: “The Hindu finds it hard to forget that because of his military incompetence and 

unpreparedness and above all because of his philosophy he had to suffer defeats and indignities 

at the hands of Muslims from 712 AD to nearly 1800 AD. Muslim kings and heroes (in South 

Asia) like Mahmood Ghaznavi, Mohammad Ghori, Alauddin Khilji, Aurangzeb, Ahmed Shah 

Abdali, and Nadir Shah are some of the names the Hindu remembers with considerable hate... 

In his own country the Hindu was reduced to the status of a slave.”4

 This single perspective may 

not symbolize the overall thinking in India or the views of the urbane intellectual but seems to

reflect the views of a sizable segment of Indian society. 

A retired colonel of the Pakistan Army told the author: “India never reconciled to the creation of

Pakistan. From day one, they have worked to undo partition. India occupied Kashmir by deceit. 

Indian forces had landed in Srinagar before the Hindu Maharaja signed the accession deed. 

Pakistan came into being because of the mistrust of Hindus. The Muslim feared that the Hindu if 

placed in positions of authority would make the life of the Muslims impossible. As events are

unfolding in India under the BJP,5

 the Muslim fear seems to be justified. The mask of secularism

has been torn apart. India did not lose the opportunity offered in 1971 and assisted Bengali 

nationalists to break away from Pakistan. India has hegemonic ambitions in South Asia both in 

economic and military terms. Today we have an effective nuclear deterrence and now we need to 

develop our economic strength to counter India’s evil designs. We want to live in peace but not 

at the cost of freedom and honor.” This is indeed a common view held by a sizable segment of 

the Pakistan nation, especially among those who lived through the carnage of partition. 

The 1965 and the 1971 wars with India heightened Pakistan’s sense of vulnerability. The 1965

war left Pakistan weakened and with a sense of disillusionment toward its traditional ally, the

United States. Again, in 1971, Pakistan’s traditional allies, the U.S. and China, could not deter 

India from playing the central role in the breaking away of its Eastern Wing to form Bangladesh. 

However, the sense of vulnerability strengthened the resolve of Pakistan’s strategic planners to 

look for alternate routes to bolster Pakistan’s conventional deterrence. After 1965, a major and 

sustained effort was launched to increase self-reliance in the production of conventional defense 

hardware. 

Pakistan’s strategic thinking is deeply colored by its perception of history. However, the same

historical experience as interpreted in India is very different. Brinkmanship and a rhetorical style

of leadership in both nations reinforce the existing mistrust. In the mind of Pakistani strategic 

 

4

 Personal letter addressed to the author. 5

 BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party. 

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thinkers, India is a nation that has suffered deep historical scars, is hegemonic, and resents the 

creation of Pakistan. It is this belief that motivates the Pakistan military planners to never give 

India an opportunity to “cut Pakistan down to size” by maintaining a potent deterrence both in 

the conventional and the nuclear field. This simple strategic philosophy is what propels the 

Pakistan military. Unfortunately, the Indian leadership has not helped to dispel Pakistan’s sense

of insecurity. 

2.2 Thinking Nuclear 

After the 1965 war, there was some fragmented thought in Pakistan about developing a nuclear 

capability to redress the conventional imbalance, but no serious attention was given to “going 

nuclear.” It was the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” by India that motivated Pakistan to 

undertake the creation of a nuclear deterrence. The decision to develop a nuclear capability was 

to respond to a looming nuclear threat from India, not to correct the conventional imbalance as is 

popularly believed. The nuclear program was created though a philosophy of “beg, borrow, or 

steal” and propelled by the resolve to defend the nation of Pakistan from a serious external 

threat. The sense of nationalism and pride amongst the technical community was no less than

what was felt by the “Manhattan Project” team in the U.S. 

While Pakistan’s nuclear program was progressing through the various phases of development,

no thought was given to the operational management of this new capability, nor was a nuclear 

doctrine considered seriously. It was only after the May 1998 tit-for-tat nuclear tests by India and 

Pakistan that serious attention was focused on this vital area. The understandable veil of secrecy 

that surrounded the Pakistani nuclear program (and the Indian program as well) contributed to 

the lack of dialogue on a nuclear doctrine. 

On many occasions prior to the nuclear tests, Pakistan proposed that South Asia should be a

nuclear free zone. Had India not demonstrated its nuclear capability, Pakistan would not have 

done so unilaterally. Pakistan considers itself a dominant player in the Islamic bloc and even 

harbors ambitions of being an important member of the world community, but gaining nuclear

capability as a means to achieve a prominent global status was never a consideration for its 

policy makers. Some security analysts in Pakistan now declare that Pakistan’s nuclear program is 

not India specific, but fulfills regional security concerns. 

2.3 Developing the Nuclear Weapon6

In response to the U.S. “Atoms for Peace” program and a United Nations (UN) conference on the 

peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1955, Pakistan established the Atomic Energy Commission 

(PAEC) in 1957. The PAEC’s first project was the establishment of the Pakistan Institute of

Science and Technology (PINSTECH), which included a research reactor, partially funded by 

the U.S. under the Atoms for Peace program. However, nuclear energy was not given high

priority by the government; the Chairman of the PAEC reported to a relatively junior officer in 

the Ministry of Industries. This very low-key and peaceful program provided Pakistan with the

basic knowledge of nuclear energy and helped it develop a small nucleus of nuclear 

 

6

 This section is based on interviews conducted in Pakistan and “Pakistan’s Bomb: Out of the Closet,” by David

Albright and Mark Hibbs, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1992.

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

technologists. India at this stage was ahead of Pakistan. In 1957, India was able to build its first 

nuclear reactor with generous foreign assistance.7

After the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, it is believed that Pakistan initially followed the 

plutonium route; however, two difficulties were faced at that stage, insufficient spent fuel and the 

lack of a reprocessing facility, which eventually forced the nuclear establishment to give up this 

route and adopt the enriched uranium route. Pakistan began trying to enrich uranium in earnest in

1976. Pakistan’s enrichment program developed at Kahuta, a rural site on the outskirts of 

Islamabad. The enrichment cycle was developed under the guidance and supervision of the wellknown nuclear engineer Mr. A.Q. Khan. 

Concurrent with its uranium enrichment project, Pakistan was struggling to develop a weapon 

design. Pakistan had to use clandestine means to acquire critical components, materials, 

equipment, and know-how before it could actually fabricate a bomb. Triggering mechanisms, 

initiating devices, and other electronics had to be fabricated or acquired. From the perspective of

Pakistani policy makers, scientists, and engineers, this clandestine effort was a sacred task for the

defense of Pakistan against an Indian nuclear threat. Once nuclear capability was developed and

demonstrated, they believed it would be an antidote to the growing conventional military 

imbalance with India. President Zia-ul-Haq, during a visit to the Kahuta labs, was so impressed 

by the progress made by Mr. A.Q. Khan that he renamed Kahuta Research Laboratories as the 

A.Q. Khan Laboratories. Because of the need for secrecy, the A.Q. Khan Laboratories and other

nuclear-weapons-related facilities were granted total freedom of action and an unaudited budget. 

Senior scientists who worked on the Pakistani nuclear program are virtual heroes with the

Pakistani public. 

According to the study by Albright and Hibbs (see footnote 6), A.Q. Khan announced in 1984 

that Kahuta was producing low-enriched uranium, but would not enrich uranium above the five

percent level. According to a 1986 memo prepared for Henry Kissinger, then a member of the 

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Kahuta had the nominal capability to produce 

“enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.”8

 But the memo did 

not indicate the actual amount produced. 

Although Pakistan’s nuclear program was clandestine, with the passage of time international 

media and foreign governments became aware that Pakistan was indeed pursuing a nuclear 

weapons program. Pakistan’s response to foreign concerns and criticism was an outright denial 

in the early stages of the program, evolving to greater ambiguity in the later years. In the view of

the author, ambiguity served Pakistan well, but after the Indian nuclear explosions of 1998, 

Pakistan decided to end the ambiguity and declare its hand. Ambiguity was no longer an option 

because of the threatening statements coming out of India after India’s nuclear explosions in

1998, and also because of the public outcry in Pakistan to give a befitting reply to the Indian

provocation. 

 

7 “Nuclearisation of South Asia”, Munir Ahmed Khan, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. 8

 National Archives, U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: 194591, Document No. 0232. 

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2.4 Delivery Systems 

Pakistan possesses two types of delivery systems in its inventory—high-performance aircraft

with the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles with the Pakistan Army. Like the 

nuclear program, Pakistan’s missile program went into full speed following India’s first Prithvi 

ballistic missile test in 1988. Missiles will likely continue to be the core of Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons delivery systems. The mainstay of the Pakistani missile force is the solid fuel Hatf III 

and Hatf IV. Pakistan will likely continue to carry out qualitative and quantitative improvements

to its missile arsenal (Figure 1). Additionally, the possibility of Pakistan developing a shiplaunched missile cannot be ruled out. 

Figure 1. Shaheen II missile (Source: Pakistan Strategic Plans 

Division, file photo)

The type and ranges of missiles currently in Pakistan’s inventory are tabulated in Table 1:9

Table 1. Pakistan Missile Inventory 

Missile Fuel Range (km) Payload (kg) 

Hatf-I Solid 50 – 90 450 

Hatf-II (Abdali) Solid 70 – 200 450 

Hatf-III (Ghaznavi) Solid 100 – 290 800 

Hatf-IV (Shaheen) Solid 200 – 650 850 

Hatf-V (Ghauri) Liquid 300 –1300 680 

Hatf-VI (Shaheen II) Solid 700 – 2,20010 1,100 

 

9

 The accuracy of this information has been confirmed during an interview with the Strategic Plans Division. 10 The first Hatf VI test was conducted in March 2004. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program – Views from the U.S. 

The author conducted interviews in Washington, DC during a short visit to the U.S. in May/June 

2003.11 The overall response of almost all the officials was consistent, yet there was significant 

difference in the emphasis on specific points. The views of U.S. officials and scholars are 

summarized in the following sections. 

3.1 Views of U.S. Officials 

The views of the U.S. establishment were acquired through meetings with senior and mid-level 

officials of the Department of the State, Department of Defense, Department of Energy and the 

National Security Council. Through the courtesy of the Department of Energy, an in-depth 

meeting was held with professional staff members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

which provided an important perspective of their basic concerns regarding Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons program. Officials of the Bureau of Nonproliferation at the State Department provided 

the most comprehensive perspective of the unofficial views of the U.S. establishment. The 

important issues and concerns expressed by the U.S. establishment are listed below: 

• The security of Pakistan's nuclear assets is probably the biggest concern, and the

risk of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material falling into the wrong hands 

is a concern that warrants constant attention. 

• Pakistan's overall image has not been helped by its past dealings with North 

Korea and the Taliban, or by loose talk of an “Islamic Bomb.” 

• The U.S. is very concerned by the prospect of nuclear-armed conflict in South 

Asia. 

• Both Pakistan and India have sufficient capability to destroy the political and

economic infrastructure of the other, and to kill countless numbers of people. It is 

time to put a cap on new weapons creation. 

• The Pakistani military is recognized to have an essential role in stability. It is the 

only institution in Pakistan, unfortunately, that has had a degree of stability. 

While the nation is establishing new, durable, and responsible democratic

institutions, the military can act as a stabilizing force. But, over the long term, the 

development of viable democratic institutions in Pakistan is essential for greater

nuclear stability. 

• What is important is (1) that those who are in the decision-making process are 

cautious, pragmatic, and not prone to rash decisions, (2) that the nuclear assets in

Pakistan are fully secured, and (3) that only those people who should have access

to the weapons do have access and only when needed. 

• The U.S. can help Pakistan develop its Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) if 

that is what Pakistan wants. Despite the cultural and political differences between 

our societies, the principles of PRP developed through the U.S. experience apply 

broadly to the Pakistani situation. 

 

11 The interviews were conducted prior to the A.Q. Khan disclosure in February 2004. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

• It is important to understand that a nuclear war cannot be “won” and therefore 

should never be fought. Thus, the U.S. has urged India and Pakistan not to deploy 

nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, not to develop new types of 

missiles, to exercise restraint in testing of ballistic missiles, to implement the 

confidence-building measures (CBMs) already agreed to, and to engage in 

bilateral dialogue. 

• Institutions like the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers could play a 

valuable role in the region. Such risk reduction centers are useful tools for 

exchanging information (troop movements, military exercises, implementation of 

CBMs, etc.) in agreed-upon formats. In fact, the routine, regularized 

communication in itself acts as a CBM. If and when both sides are amenable, the 

U.S. could assist in exploring this possibility. 

3.2 Views of U.S. Scholars 

A number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the United States contributed views on 

the Pakistan nuclear weapons program. The NGOs included the Brookings Institution, the 

Henry L. Stimson Center, and Johns Hopkins University, among others. 

• The most important worry is the potential for proliferation emanating from 

Pakistan. 

• To avoid war by miscalculation, the following need to be done: First, create 

greater transparency—both sides need to develop an accurate assessment of what

the other side will do. In a crisis, perception is everything. Second, risk-reduction 

measures need to be put in place. Third, additional CBMs and arms control 

measures need to be discussed. 

• Pakistan faces many challenges. Pakistan built the bomb, but needs to develop 

trust. An Islamic bomb is a concept with serious implications. What will increase

our confidence in Pakistan?

o Nuclear weapons are disassembled and not mated. 

o Politically tell the world that you are not on a hair trigger alert. 

o Build verifiable nuclear risk reduction regimes. 

• Nuclear risk reduction centers need to be created, and wise people need to get 

together (maybe with U.S. facilitators) to determine what the needs are (crisis 

management or merely communications), and how best to serve them. In addition 

to the current link between the Directors General of Military Operations 

(DGMOs), hot lines are needed between Army Chiefs, Air Force Chiefs, and

Navy Chiefs. 

• Associates of A.Q. Khan are disagreeable. This gives your program another 

dimension and creates difficulty with the U.S. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

4. Pakistani Perceptions of the Nuclear Program 

While Pakistan has not formally announced any nuclear doctrine, the President, Foreign 

Minister, and Foreign Secretary have mentioned on various occasions its main elements, such as 

restraint and responsibility, a minimum deterrent posture, avoidance of an arms race, non-use 

against non-nuclear states, and participation in universally applicable nondiscriminatory 

multilateral arms control negotiations. 

The unofficial view of the Pakistani establishment was obtained through a series of meetings 

with senior policy makers within the Pakistan Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the 

highest level of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the military organization that oversees

almost all aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. A summary of important points 

expressed by the Pakistani establishment is listed below. 

4.1 Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy12

The four objectives of Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy are: 

1. Deterrence of all forms of external aggression, which can endanger Pakistan’s 

national security. 

2. Deterrence will be achieved through the development and maintenance of an 

effective combination of conventional and strategic forces, at adequate levels

within the country’s resource constraints. 

3. Deterrence of Pakistan’s adversaries from attempting a counter-force strategy 

against its strategic assets by effectively securing the strategic assets and 

threatening nuclear retaliation should such an attempt be made. 

4. Stabilization of strategic deterrence in the South Asia region. 

The central theme of Pakistan’s nuclear policy is to act in a responsible manner and exercise 

maximum restraint in the conduct of its deterrence policy. Some of the salient elements are as

follows: 

• Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely for the purpose of deterrence of aggression 

and defense of sovereignty. 

• Pakistan will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state which 

does not possess nuclear weapons. 

• Maintenance of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence is the guiding principle of 

Pakistan’s security policy. 

• Pakistan will refrain from entering into any arms race. 

• Pakistan will not transfer nuclear weapons or weapons-related material or 

technology to any other entity or state. 

 

12 The presentation of Pakistan’s nuclear policy is based on interviews with officials in the Strategic Command

Authority, which is the secretariat of the National Command Authority. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

• Pakistan will continue to support international arms control and disarmament

initiatives, which are universal and non-discriminatory in character. 

• Command and control of nuclear forces will be vested in the President and will be

exercised through a National Command Authority assisted by the Strategic Plans 

Division as its secretariat and Strategic Commands within the Armed Forces.13

4.1.1 Issues Related to Management of Nuclear Policy 

The major problems associated with the management of the Indo-Pak nuclear equation are: 

1. Vulnerability of nuclear assets while the force structures are evolving. 

2. Gaps in surveillance, early warning and intelligence assets. 

3. Evolving command and control systems. 

4. Short flight times of missiles. 

5. Deep rooted mistrust and active disputes such as Kashmir. 

6. Lack of institutionalized crisis management mechanisms. 

Pakistan has determined the size of its minimum deterrent force irrespective of the eventual size

of the Indian arsenal. The President has stated on a number of occasions that Pakistan has 

quantified the size of its minimum nuclear deterrent and has made a conscious decision to 

eschew a nuclear/missile arms race with India. 

Pakistan believes that the best way to avoid nuclear war is to have no war at all. However, a nofirst-use policy may be construed by the conventionally stronger side as a license to exploit its 

conventional superiority. 

4.1.2 Operational Issues 

On February 7, 2000, Pakistan announced the establishment of a comprehensive command and 

control structure, which has three components: the National Command Authority, the Strategic 

Plans Division, and the Strategic Forces Commands. For details, see Appendix A. 

Pakistan has a well thought out operational doctrine; however, due to reasons of operational 

security its details cannot be divulged in this paper. The National Command Authority (NCA) is 

responsible for the employment and deployment aspects of the nuclear force. It coordinates the 

activities of strategic organizations, deals with arms control and disarmament matters, and

oversees the implementation of export controls, and safety and security of nuclear installations 

and materials. Each of the three services (Army, Air Force and Navy) has its respective strategic

force command; however, operational control remains with the NCA. The SPD, which acts as

the secretariat for the NCA, performs the coordination functions. 

The final authority to launch a nuclear strike is dependent upon consensus within the NCA 

(Figure 2), with the Chairman casting the final vote. At weapon launch sites the 2-3 man rule, 

codes, progressive alert status, etc., will be employed. Pakistan does not have a “launch on 

warning” posture. 

 

13 The Army, the Navy and the Air Force will have their respective strategic commands. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Figure 2. Meeting of the National Command Authority 

(Source: Pakistan Strategic Plans Division)

4.1.3 Security Aspects 

The physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a critical issue. Pakistan has multiple layers

of security, which are continuously reviewed and upgraded. At every site, there are security 

personnel from the concerned strategic organizations, and there is an additional security 

perimeter manned by military personnel. 

Regarding the security of nuclear materials, there is a system of internal auditing. In addition, all 

strategic organizations have integral security elements that are further overseen by the Counter 

Intelligence assets of the Advisor Security NCA. There is also an elaborate system embodying 

many elements of the U.S. PRP already in place, and it is being further refined. Any individual 

assigned to a sensitive task is security cleared by at least three intelligence/security agencies.

This clearance includes complete background checks on family, educational career, political 

affiliations/inclinations, etc. The same procedure is followed for recruitment of personnel for

strategic projects. Each strategic organization has its own internal security organization in 

addition to that set up by the Advisor Security NCA that oversees all components of the NCA 

and performs counterintelligence functions. 

4.1.4 Source and Material Accountability 

Pakistan is party to the Nuclear Safety Convention and has already established an autonomous

body—the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PRNA)—that oversees all aspects related to 

the safety and security of all radioactive sources, including those used in X-ray machines. The 

possibility of radioactive material being pilfered by unauthorized persons is perceived in 

Pakistan to be very low. 

4.2 Views of Policy Influentials 

Policy influentials are those Pakistanis who influence Pakistan’s strategic thinking through a 

variety of means. They include those who influenced or guided the development of some aspect 

of Pakistan’s nuclear program or policy while in the government’s service. The people 

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interviewed included retired senior military officers (some of whom had overseen the nuclear

weapons program), senior policy makers, retired Foreign Service officials, scientists/engineers 

who played an active role in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program, and opinion 

makers in journalism and academia. 

The views of the two main political parties (Pakistan Peoples Party and the Muslim League) and

the views of the most organized and largest religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, were also

obtained. In essence, the views of the knowledgeable political elite coincided with the views of 

the government. But only a handful of the leadership of the political and religious parties had a 

clear understanding of nuclear weapons; most saw a nuclear weapon as a very large bomb with 

devastating power. Many religious leaders viewed nuclear weapons as a panacea for military

weakness. However, the view of an enlightened religious scholar on one specific aspect is

worthy of mention: 

From an Islamic point of view, all WMD are bad because they do not differentiate 

between the belligerent and victim or the military and the civilians. Islam is

sensitive to the nuclear weapons. “No First Use” is just a pious phrase, usually 

voiced when not relevant. There are numerous examples of this in history. We 

want to have a ‘no war pact’ with all foreign powers. War takes place when there 

is a failure of foreign policy. Therefore, there needs to be greater emphasis on 

diplomacy. The aim should be to make war redundant. 

Significant opinions and views expressed by the policy influentials are tabulated in the following

sections. 

4.2.1 Building a Stable Deterrence 

Surprisingly, there was almost unanimity in the broad concept of a stable deterrence. From a 

Pakistani perspective, it was based on “the possession of sufficient numbers of weapons to 

convince the Indians of unacceptable damage in spite of a pre-emptive strike by them.” Built into 

this concept is the survivability of a sufficient number of nuclear weapons and their ability to 

penetrate the Indian defensive shield. Most influentials felt that Pakistan should focus on 

minimum deterrence and avoid a nuclear arms race with India. 

Although Pakistan hoped to never fight a nuclear war, it was felt that its military should train to

fight a nuclear war, for only then will its deterrence be effective. In other words, the deterrence

has to be demonstrable to be effective. 

There are pros and cons in declaring the nuclear doctrine. What India presented is a declaratory 

doctrine, which is different from an operational doctrine. Pakistan, too, should declare some 

elements of its nuclear doctrine, which it has already done in bits and pieces; however, an 

element of ambiguity better serves Pakistan’s interests. There is a need to define, in very general 

terms, when the nuclear option would be considered by Pakistan. However, no one was 

supportive of making such thresholds public. Most influentials felt that the present level of 

mistrust between India and Pakistan is an obstacle in the creation of a stable deterrence; 

therefore, an effort should be made to reduce this mistrust to achieve stability. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

4.2.2 Security of Weapons 

There exists a clear divide in the opinion on this issue. Retired military officers, especially those

who were involved with the nuclear program, were comfortable with the current level of

security. However, retired civil servants, scholars and journalists had a divergent view; they 

displayed a high level of concern on the security of nuclear weapons. 

The divergent view was of the opinion that the Pakistani society is increasingly divided. They 

were worried by the ideological penetration of the military. Others felt that baser considerations

like money could motivate the violation of systems and procedures. There is no room for 

complacency, they commented. Pakistan needs to learn from the West and adapt some of their 

systems to the local environment. 

Another issue in the minds of some was the overall level of incompetence and carelessness that 

has crept into Pakistani society. One observer commented, “We are unable to efficiently manage 

simple functions of state, the haphazard traffic on our roads is a reflection of our organization, 

how then can one expect that the security of our nuclear assets is foolproof?” A scholar 

recommended that the physical security of all our nuclear assets should be placed under a special 

security agency of the Army. The Army has the advantage of discipline and an enhanced sense 

of responsibility. 

4.2.3 Nuclear Decision Making Process 

Again, the opinion was divided, similar to the division of views on the security of weapons.

Those who had been a part of the decision-making system, or those who were involved as senior 

staffers, were satisfied with the current arrangements. A common view was that the Army will

continue to play a large role in the nuclear decision-making process. 

One of the scholars made useful recommendations to reform the decision-making process: 

• Clear strategic thinking is almost impossible without a stable political system. The 

first order of business should be to develop political stability. Frequent and direct 

military interventions cannot develop this stability. A dominant military role in 

the nuclear decision system is inevitable until the political system matures; 

however, even with a dominant role of the military, the final decision should rest

with the Prime Minister.

• The political leadership and the people of Pakistan need to be educated on the role 

of nuclear weapons in the overall security of the nation, and how nuclear weapons

can be an instrument of strategic policy (with the firm hope that they would never 

be used). The National Defense College and the handful of think tanks in Pakistan 

could play a central role in this education process of the masses.

• There should be constant interaction between the military and the political

leadership to evolve strategic thought. It should not be the exclusive domain of

one or the other. Such an interaction is a learning process for both, not only for 

technical and strategic issues but the different approaches to problem solving by 

the military and the political mind. The political mind is developed to think in

shades of grey, and compromise is an essential element of political thinking. The

military command structure is less flexible and tends to think in black and white. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

An interactive process between the military and the civilian leadership on this

important issue of nuclear policy and doctrine would benefit both. 

4.2.4 Growing Influence of Religious Fundamentalists 

Of the policy influentials interviewed, almost every one of them displayed a mild to a serious 

concern on this account. A senior retired soldier commented that the old personnel reliability 

program needs review. Religious views have encroached on the military as post-Zia acceptance 

of religious groups like the Tabliki Jamaat14 has increased. This is not considered inherently 

negative, but needs careful monitoring. One scholar believed that there has been penetration of

the military rank and file, and influence of religious groups is on the rise. After all, religious

zealots, including two to three Generals, were products of this Army. Recently, a Major 

Qaddus15 was apprehended by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for involvement with religious 

extremists. “The security of our nuclear assets may be very good, but there is no need for 

complacency,” the scholar said. 

Another scholar commented that though he was not certain of any extremist influences in the 

Army, he was uncomfortable. Some people in Pakistan believe that their duty to the Muslim

Ummah16 is more important than their commitment to the Nation. Another scholar commented 

that he was aware that the entire Army is religious, but it does not mean that they are extremists 

or fundamentalists. “I have great trust in our soldiers,” he said, “and believe that our soldiers will 

act in a responsible manner.” Another senior retired soldier commented that the personal 

reliability program and other security measures constantly need improvement. He also believed 

there are many sympathizers with political and religious parties in the military, but this does not 

mean that they will smuggle nuclear weapons or fissile materials. “The possibility of this is

almost zero. We should depend on good SOPs17 rather than worry about ideological leanings.” 

He commented that he would be more comfortable with some of the religious leaders than some

of our political leaders. The bottom line, he said, was to protect the nuclear assets and stop 

chasing ghosts where none exists.

4.2.5 Presenting a Doctrine 

There was almost a consensus that there is no need to present a formal doctrine, as ambiguity 

suits Pakistan. It was mentioned that the Government of Pakistan, through statements and 

interviews, has already spelled out certain elements of a nuclear doctrine. Instead of presenting a 

formal nuclear doctrine, it would be prudent to spell out those elements of the doctrine that are

relevant to the requirement at a point in time. 

 

14 The Tabliki Jamaat is a religious but nonpolitical organization devoted to the teachings of Islam. This 

organization conducts its activity both within and outside Pakistan. Within Pakistan, the Tabliki Jamaat focuses on

improving the understanding of Islam amongst the Muslims. At their annual convention, the Jamaat attracts 

hundreds of thousand of followers at their Headquarters at Raiwind—a small town near Lahore. 15 This officer, though belonging to the Pakistan Army, had retired years earlier. It is not uncommon for retired

military and nonmilitary personnel to lean toward greater religiosity after retirement. 16 Ummah roughly translated would mean the followers of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) or the

believers of the Quran. In a very general sense, it means the brotherhood of Muslims throughout the world,

irrespective of their national identity. 17 SOPs: Standard Operating Procedures 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Though in the minority, a few scholars extolled the virtue of a declaratory nuclear doctrine. A 

declared nuclear doctrine, they felt, would enhance the stability of the deterrence through

transparency. This doctrine could be refined with the passage of time. 

4.2.6 Nuclear War by Miscalculation 

To the last person, everyone interviewed felt that there is indeed the possibility of a nuclear war 

by miscalculation, more-so than during the Cold War. A number of factors were presented that 

could result in a war by miscalculation; however, the deep mistrust between the people and the 

military establishments of the two countries was the overarching factor. Additionally, the short 

time of flight between the two countries did not allow the available systems and procedures to 

accurately assess the launch of a missile. Lack of dedicated hot lines and good communication 

would also enhance the possibility of a war by miscalculation. 

Another important factor that increases the possibility of a nuclear war by miscalculation is the 

presence of a major political dispute (Kashmir) between the two nations and a disputed border 

(the Line of Control dividing Kashmir). The low intensity war in the Siachen Glacier region also

contributes to the problem. Combat-ready military forces of India and Pakistan are in eyeball 

contact with each other along the LOC, adding to the high tension. 

A number of suggestions were offered to minimize the chances of a war by miscalculation and 

are listed below: 

• The establishment and the practice of well-considered and verifiable nuclearrelated CBMs, in addition to the existing ones (non-attack on nuclear facilities, 

etc.). 

• An agreement to keep the nuclear weapons unmated to delivery systems during 

peacetime and during periods of heightened tensions. Each side should inform the

other side when the weapons are mated. 

• The involvement of regional and global powers as honest brokers to help reduce 

tensions and avoid conflict. 

• The resolution of outstanding disputes is the ultimate measure to reduce the risk 

of conflict. 

• Revisiting the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and reaffirming 

the commitments made therein would be a good starting point. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

5. The A.Q. Khan Saga 

On February 4, 2004, an event transpired in Pakistan that shattered the myth of security of 

Pakistan’s nuclear program. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Mr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, 

made a statement on national television taking full responsibility for the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons technology from Pakistan. The Pakistani nation was stunned. Many Pakistanis believed 

that Mr. Khan had performed yet another act of heroism by taking all the blame, which in the 

mind of many citizens should have been shared by the establishment, particularly the military.

By and large, the Pakistani media shared the views of the people. Emotionally the Pakistani 

nation has been in a state of denial, unwilling to accept the demolition of one of its few heroes. 

The Government of Pakistan conducted its investigation after receiving concrete evidence from 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Government in October 2003. The

Government has strongly denied the involvement of the establishment or that of any senior 

official of the Pakistan Army in the proliferation scandal. The international media, particularly 

Bernard-Henri Levy in a story in The Wall Street Journal on 17 February 2004, doubts that 

claim. Levy said, “It is inconceivable that Khan operated alone without orders or cover.” The 

issue is still unfolding, and it would be inappropriate for the author of this study to attempt a 

judgment. However, from the emerging information, it appears that Mr. Khan was selling 

nuclear technology for personal monetary gain. 

For the last many years, it was common knowledge among well-informed individuals in Pakistan 

that Mr. Khan had accumulated assets well beyond his known means of income, the common 

inference being that he had siphoned money from the funds provided to him for the nuclear

program. Few, if any suspected that A.Q. Khan might be selling state secrets for baser reasons.

That Mr. Khan operated a number of fake companies was in all probability known to the highest 

in the establishment, for such actions were considered essential to obtain technology for 

Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program. On coming to power, President Musharraf, probably 

suspecting Mr. Khan of impropriety, had eased him out of his powerful job of the chief executive 

of the A.Q. Khan Laboratories into a largely ceremonial position in 2000. 

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

6. Net Assessment – Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 

6.1 Response to India 

Pakistan’s nuclear program was initiated to respond to a looming nuclear threat from India. The 

offensive rhetoric and threats coming from India after the Indian nuclear explosions made 

Pakistan’s decision to develop nuclear capability easier. Pakistani strategic planners believe that 

only after Pakistan’s nuclear explosions did India seriously talk of peace; thus, they feel justified. 

It is very likely that had Pakistan not possessed nuclear weapons, India would have started an allout war during the Kargil Crisis and may have even declared war during the military stand off

resulting from the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. However, it is

also true that the Kargil Crisis may not have occurred if Pakistan had not developed confidence 

because of its nuclear capability. In the author’s assessment, Kargil was the result of flawed 

strategic thinking in Pakistan and not as a result of going nuclear. 

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, in all probability, will grow in capability. Greater attention 

will continue to be given to weapon systems improvements to match the Indian nuclear program 

developments. The primary area of development is likely to be in missile-launched weapons with 

a focus on accuracy, payload, and their ability to penetrate the adversary’s defenses. 

Pakistan will work toward the development of the triad by giving the Pakistan Navy nuclear 

capability. The desire for naval nuclear capability will gain urgency if it is felt by the leadership

in Pakistan that the ground-based systems do not provide the assured second-strike capability. 

The primary reason for not developing a naval nuclear option would be an inability to resolve the

technical problems. 

As Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program results from the threat from India, diminishing this 

threat may encourage Pakistan to curtail further expenditures on its nuclear program. 

6.2 Nuclear Doctrine 

The strategic thinkers in Pakistan are convinced that while not averse to transparency, Pakistan, a 

weaker power, benefits from a degree of ambiguity and avoids needless competition with India.

More recently, Pakistan has defined the four broad objectives of its nuclear policy and some

salient elements of its nuclear policy, as presented in section 4.1. In effect these objectives and 

elements of policy define Pakistan’s broad nuclear doctrine. Occasional policy statements from

the senior members of the National Command Authority elaborate the guiding objectives of 

Pakistan’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. Defining a nuclear doctrine is not a critical issue as long 

as a fairly high level of transparency is achieved between the two rivals in South Asia. 

6.3 Minimum Deterrence 

There is a basic consensus in Pakistan on what constitutes minimum deterrence, the basic 

concept being that Pakistan should possess the capability to strike back and inflict unacceptable

damage after having absorbed a nuclear strike. Without revealing the exact number of nuclear 

weapons, the government of Pakistan through various pronouncements has quantified the 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

number of weapons that constitutes minimum deterrence. If a few can do the job, then “why 

more?” is the reasoning.

Minimum deterrence as defined by a Senator from the Jamaat-e-Islami seems more realistic:

“Minimum deterrence is based on the perception of threat. It is dynamic, both technically and 

operationally. It is constantly changing along with the threat. It does not mean equality or 

proportionality. Deterrence is a combination of nuclear and the conventional, and above all, the 

national will to face a challenge.” 

Defining “unacceptable damage to the enemy” is difficult because it requires estimating a

punishment threshold that the adversary is not willing to accept. Because of the difficulty in

predicting unacceptable damage, overkill would by necessity be built into the response. 

6.4 Nuclear Decision Making Process 

With the establishment of the National Command Authority (NCA), a fairly balanced system has 

been developed with institutional checks and balances. The NCA has both civilian and military 

decision makers. It is possible that the role of the civilian leadership will increase as it develops a

better understanding of the nuclear environment. 

There is no doubt that the military will continue to play a major role in the nuclear decision 

making process as it does in the political arena. Irrespective of the role of the military, the

presence of the Prime Minister and a few cabinet colleagues will weigh heavily in creating a

balance. In the present environment, the final decision will probably rest with three people: the 

President, the Prime Minister, and the Army Chief. With a civilian President, the role of the

political leadership is likely to grow. 

6.5 Deterrence: Stable or Dangerous? 

Officials in both India and Pakistan feel that the deterrence between the two rivals is stable; this 

view is also shared by a large number of scholars in both countries. Such confidence may be

unwarranted. Nuclear deterrence in South Asia is unstable for the following reasons: 

• Territorial disputes. There are serious territorial disputes between India and 

Pakistan with strong emotional overtones. As the last fifty years of the Indo-Pak 

relationship has shown, it takes very little to escalate from relative peace to a high 

level of confrontation. 

• Mistrust. Mistrust when combined with brinkmanship and rhetoric, which are

common traits of the political leadership in India and Pakistan, can result in rash

decisions. 

• Lack of institutionalized crisis management mechanisms. Lack of an institutional 

mechanism for crisis management will certainly move India and Pakistan up the

escalation ladder in a short time. This has occurred before, even after both 

countries became nuclear powers. 

• Lack of understanding of the nuclear strategy and deterrence. Nuclear weapons

have been developed in great secrecy in India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, only a 

handful of military leaders and even fewer political decision makers were aware

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Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

of the nuclear programs, let alone being educated on the nuclear environments. 

However, the military in Pakistan has taken a bold step to educate the newly 

elected members of the parliament on issues of national security, including 

nuclear issues. 

Deterrence that is not designed for use will not deter.18 Stability will increase if the antagonists 

believe that the other will use the nuclear weapon after a notional red line is crossed. This may 

be a military condition, but could also be a politically intolerable situation. As Sir Michael 

Quinlan aptly describes, “Weapons deter by the possibility of their use and by no other route.” 

He further qualifies, “A structure of deterrence cannot be built upon a state policy of absolute nouse, or without genuine concepts of possible use.”19 The leadership in Pakistan understands this.

However, it is doubtful whether both India and Pakistan understand the pain threshold of the

other, or what is politically intolerable for the other in absolute terms. 

6.6 Safety of Nuclear Weapons 

Due to understandable opacity, it was not possible to evaluate directly the safety of Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons. However, scientists and users are confident that a Pakistani nuclear weapon 

will not explode due to accidents or mishandling and is unlikely to initiate a chain reaction, even

if detonated by conventional explosive. The conventional explosive of a nuclear weapon would 

at most spread radioactive contamination locally.

6.7 Security of Nuclear Weapons and Facilities 

Based on information provided by the officialdom, Pakistan is using a three-man rule, a variant 

of the two-man rule for security. The code to arm a weapon is divided between three people, 

rather than two people. For example, at an air force base the code may be divided between the 

base commander and the unit commander. In the army, the code may be divided between the

group commander and the unit commander. This rule also applies to a launch site. The only 

exception is a single pilot who will receive the full code during flight; however, a single person 

cannot provide the full code. The Pakistani system is not as sophisticated as the U.S. Permissive 

Action Link (PAL) system, but it appears that attention is being given to security issues. 

For the U.S. and the rest of the West, one of the most troubling aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear

program is inadequate physical security, which can lead to proliferation. This perception is based 

on two concerns. First is the belief that Pakistan does not have the systems, procedures and the

technical skills to ensure the total security of its nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. The 

second and the more serious concern is the belief that the nuclear weapons are within reach of 

the religious extremists within and outside the military. 

For many in the Pakistani military, particularly those presently in charge of nuclear weapons,

these concerns are not based on fact. It is their opinion that the possibility of nuclear weapons 

and technology landing in the hands of nonstate actors or some extremists within the military is

almost zero. However, knowledgeable scholars and some officials in the U.S. suspect senior 

 

18 This concept has also been attributed to Henry Kissinger, evidently espoused in relation to the Cold War. 

19 Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Michael Quinlan, RUSI Whitehall Paper Series 1997, page 15. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

nuclear scientists and even the state of Pakistan of proliferation. During interviews in May 2003, 

a U.S. official said, “The security of Pakistan's nuclear assets is probably the biggest concern.” 

Visits to two important sites, PINSTECH and CHASNUPP, suggested a different conclusion. 

The quality of security employed and the nuclear material accounting system of nonmilitary 

nuclear installations is much higher than before September 11, 2001. However, there is room for

improvement. (See Appendix B.) 

Religious influence has increased in Pakistan, with a special impetus being given in the late 

seventies and early eighties during the rule (July 1977 – August 1988) of General Zia-ul-Haq.20

Although a large percentage of people have become practicing Muslims, they remain liberal in 

the practice of their faith. Nevertheless, a sizable minority of the people in Pakistan, in particular 

the youth of the poorer sections of society, has been radicalized. 

In the most recent elections in Pakistan (October 2002), the MMA,21 a group of religious parties, 

won a large number of seats both in the provincial and the national assemblies, surprising

political analysts. Today two of the four provinces of Pakistan are dominated by coalitions

formed by the MMA, and they have an effective minority at the federal level. In the foreseeable 

future (three to five years), the elevation of the religious parties in the political arena will not 

affect overall nuclear stability or increase proliferation because the military will continue to play

the dominant role in managing the nuclear program. Nevertheless, growing extremism is a

serious threat to the generally liberal Pakistani society. If this trend is not arrested it will pose a

serious challenge to the security of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. 

Two steps could be taken to improve the security of nuclear weapons and facilities: 

1. Presently, the primary security apparatus charged with the security of nuclear

installations is answerable to the executive head of the protected institution; this 

method can result in security lapses and needs to change. 

2. There is an urgent need to improve the technical skills of personnel charged with 

the security of nuclear installations and develop an institutional security culture. 

6.8 Security of Nonmilitary Nuclear Installations22

Almost all nonmilitary nuclear installations in Pakistan are under the purview of the IAEA, 

through the civilian Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA). The PNRA oversees all the 

 

20 General Zia, in a genuine endeavor to increase literacy in a short time span, financially supported the religious

madrassas (schools), unfortunately without providing adequate direction on the syllabus. In addition, for a variety of

other reasons, which include poverty, joblessness, and the inadequacy of educational facilities, the madrassas 

flourished, churning out countless number of youth filled with religious zeal but no education that would equip them

for jobs, except as religious teachers in mosques and madrassas. Thousands of madrassas have now sprung up in

Pakistan, guided only by narrow understanding of Islam and with no facility for education in liberal arts or sciences. 

Most madrassas are nonviolent, but some are focused on militant Jihad. 21 MMA stands for “Motahadda Majlis e Amal,” a word in the Pakistani national language Urdu, roughly translated 

as United Council for Action. The MMA is a coalition of seven religious parties. The Jaamat-e-Islami party is its 

largest component. 22 Information is based on an in-depth interview with the Chairman of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 

discussion with a retired nuclear scientist from the PAEC, and on the author’s visits to two nuclear installations. 

34 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

nonmilitary nuclear activity, from power plants to nuclear medical facilities, for safety and

security of all radioactive sources. The PNRA is a relatively new agency in the process of

becoming established. 

The Chairman of the PNRA mentioned that Pakistan needs to develop higher standards of safety 

and security, and the PNRA is working toward those goals. The courses offered by the IAEA 

were very useful and form the foundation of the safety and security SOPs being implemented in 

Pakistan. He expanded that the PNRA is trying to promote a safety and security culture. 

Regulations continue to be evolved and standards that were acceptable in the past are not 

acceptable today, he said. “We need physical protection courses,” he expressed. 

Although the security of nonmilitary nuclear installations is not yet up to international standards,

much emphasis is being laid on this issue, and progress will be made. The Strategic Plans 

Division is in the process of developing a blueprint for the organization of a new security force

trained and equipped to act as a dedicated security agency for all nuclear facilities in Pakistan,

military and nonmilitary.

6.9 Author’s Assessment of Nonmilitary Installations 

Systems for physical protection of nuclear sites as well as a personnel reliability system are 

functioning. Based on their track record, they seem to be meeting the demands of today, 

including the threat from radicals. Both protection security and the personnel reliability program 

are undergoing revision. The author has the following recommendations: 

1. The training of the security force meant for both military and nonmilitary

installations/sites needs to be brought up to international standards. 

2. Pakistan should redefine the threat because of the growth of international 

terrorism. A realistic threat assessment is vital in drawing up a dynamic security 

plan to defeat the threat. Today the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear installations is 

both internal and external; additionally, it is multidimensional. All nations have

internal and external threats; however, they differ in the type of threat and its 

intensity. 

3. To defeat the multiple threats (internal and external), Pakistan needs to add

modern and sophisticated anti-intrusion devices to supplement the existing effort. 

A site “quick reaction force” is important to meet a serious terrorist threat. 

Frequent scenario playing will keep the security apparatus alert. 

4. Pakistan should request in-country special courses from the IAEA to train a

nucleus of 50 to 60 security persons on the physical protection of nuclear assets. 

5. The U.S., without being overly intrusive, should consider helping Pakistan 

improve safety and security training for Pakistan’s nonmilitary nuclear assets. To

supplement the efforts of IAEA, the U.S. also should consider providing both 

physical and economic help to Pakistan to make its nuclear program more safe

and secure. 

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36 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

7. The Way Forward – Recommendations for Enhancing Stability

Drawing on the comments and advice of various scholars within and outside Pakistan, there are a

number of measures that Pakistan needs to take unilaterally to improve nuclear stability and 

ensure the physical security of its nuclear arsenal. In all probability, the measures recommended 

for Pakistan would also be applicable for adoption in India. 

7.1 Learn from the Cold War 

Evoking history is a common practice; however, studying and learning from history is another 

matter. Many times political leaders evoke history while drawing the wrong lessons from it. This 

was true during World War II and the Cuban Missile Crisis.23 The end of the Cold War has

finally provided an opportunity to view events of the Cold War from multiple perspectives. 

Today an event of the Cold War can be analyzed from the views of both the adversarial parties.

The Indo-Pak political security environment is indeed different from the Cold War; therefore, it 

would be an imprudent exercise to mechanically transplant the lessons of the Cold War to that of

South Asia. However, while recognizing the differences, some broad lessons can be learned for

bilateral negotiation between India and Pakistan:24

• Negotiators should rely on gradualism and selectivity rather than seek “grand 

deals.” Partial progress is better than none. 

• Progress should be sought separately and simultaneously on a range of issues; 

each should be pursued regardless of what is happening on other fronts. 

• CBMs should be sought even when there are strong differences of views 

regarding states’ activities and policies. 

• Symbolism is important; tone and language should be kept positive and people-topeople contact encouraged at multiple levels. 

• A wide range of institutions should be established for continuous dialogue; 

regular contact should be maintained. To facilitate the change of mindsets, lowlevel and low-profile contacts must continue. 

• Establish “Risk Reduction Centers.” Following the example of Nuclear Risk 

Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in the Cold War (Figure 3), but going beyond their 

example, India and Pakistan need to consider establishing such centers to suit the

South Asia security environment. Some academic work has already been done to 

support this concept. Currently, a “Track Two” project undertaken by the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC is examining the idea 

of establishing such centers in India and Pakistan. 

 

23 “Perception and Misperception: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Paper presented by Len Scott at

Conference on Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan, 7 April 2003, Centre for Studies in

Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham. 24 From the Short Report on Wilton Park (UK) Conference WPS 01/12 on the Reshaping of European Security

Relations: 1980 – 2000. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

Figure 3. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 

Washington, DC, May 2003

• Avoid war. The most important lesson of the Cold War for nuclear stability is to

avoid war. The transition from tensions, to heightened tensions, to limited 

hostility, to an all out conventional war is an escalatory ladder all too familiar to

India and Pakistan. Therefore, there is a need to develop a number of firebreaks 

between the rungs of the escalatory ladder, firebreaks that will prevent a crisis

from snowballing into a war. Thus, there is a need for crisis management. 

7.2 Control Political Pressures 

• Reduce the radical religious influences on bilateral relations. This was a difficult 

proposition with the BJP controlling the government in New Delhi and the 

religious right influencing the Government in Islamabad. However, the recent 

change in government in India may provide opportunities. An agreement between 

the two countries to reduce hostile propaganda (including a statement that 

“religion will not be exploited by the establishments of both countries”) and 

discourage media use of this issue would be largely beneficial. 

• Maintain territorial status quo. Drawing on the Simla Agreement between the two 

countries, a commitment needs to be reaffirmed that violence of any kind will 

neither be used nor supported for changing the territorial status quo. During the 

Cold War, in spite of provocations and disputes, both the nuclear groupings

(Warsaw Pact and NATO) took great care not to resort to violence to change the 

status quo in Europe, especially in Berlin. 

• Resolve disputes. Lingering disputes, like Kashmir, between the two nations need 

to be addressed and hopefully resolved in a spirit of mutual accommodation, 

through a slow, deliberate and sustained process of dialogue. 

7.3 Implement Crisis Management

With serious unresolved problems and a high degree of mistrust, India and Pakistan have moved 

from one crisis to another, only a hair’s breadth away from war and possibly a nuclear war. 

Having attained nuclear status did not change this pattern—the Kargil Crisis and the recent 

military standoff of 2001–2002 are two recent examples. Some scholars discern a high degree of 

38 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

military brinkmanship by Pakistan in the first case and coercive diplomacy by India in the

second. 

The best method to control the almost automatic escalation of a situation is through crisis

management, based on an agreed agenda of deliberate measures. It is recommended that a set of 

well-considered CBMs, both political and military, be adopted by the two countries to manage 

crises and arrest escalation. A few recommendations for crisis management are: 

• Implement a crisis management agreement. As nuclear rivals, neither country can

afford to climb the escalatory ladder. It would therefore be an advantage for India 

and Pakistan to develop jointly a crisis-management agreement. For this, both 

countries will need to agree what constitutes a crisis. After defining what

constitutes a crisis in the Indo-Pakistan context, the agreement will then need to 

evolve a methodology for managing crises. 

• Appoint special emissaries to the heads of government. If agreed in advance, 

special emissaries could be appointed as soon as a serious crisis develops. The 

emissary, for necessary political clout, should have the status of a senior minister. 

Dialogue can be initiated in a third country. 

• Initiate media management. As an element of the crisis-management agreement,

both countries could set up a predetermined media-management mechanism at the

first indication of a crisis. A media-management mechanism would involve 

constituting a team comprising three to four senior members representing the 

independent media and a senior representative of the ministry of information from 

either side with direct access to the Prime Ministers of their countries. The 

primary mission of the media management mechanism would be to reduce hostile 

propaganda and develop harmony between the two nations. This mechanism 

would control the negative rhetoric, including control of what is released to the

media by the representatives of the government. 

• Establish hot lines. There is a need to establish dedicated and direct hot lines

between the heads of government in addition to the existing DGMO hot line. A

third hot line needs to be established between the Joint Staff Headquarters25 of the 

two countries. Besides the current voice circuit, a text messaging system like a 

teletype26 link should be added to the three hot lines. Redundancy and greater 

reliability need to be built into the hot lines. Satellite connections need to be 

added for greater reliability. The purpose of these communications would be crisis 

prevention as well as crisis management. For permanence and clarity, a protocol 

(hot line protocol) between the two countries would be important, not unlike the 

protocol signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in September 1987. 

• Notification of alert status. During a serious military crisis, the alert status of the

armed forces is progressively enhanced by adversaries. It would be useful if India 

 

25 A Joint Staff Headquarters already exists in Pakistan and a similar headquarters is in the offing in India. It is from

this headquarters that future wars would be managed, including the decision to move to the nuclear threshold. 26 Teletype messages have several advantages: they provide leaders with an opportunity to think before replying; a 

written message takes the emotionalism out of the dialogue; a written format provides less opportunity for 

misunderstandings; and the written format insures deliberate and well-considered messages. 

39
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

and Pakistan agree to inform each other of the alert status of the armed forces as 

soon as a decision is made to change the alert status of one element or the total 

force. An example of a possible alert status for an army could be: 

o Status 1: Six hours notice for combat units to move into dispersal areas close 

to garrisons. 

o Status 2: Actual move of combat units to dispersal areas. 

o Status 3: Move of defensive formations to operational areas. 

o Status 4: Deployment of defensive formations in their battle locations. 

o Status 5: Move of offensive formations into their operational areas. 

o Status 6: Issue of operational ammunition to all troops. 

• This is a hypothetical example and does not necessarily indicate the possible 

status of any army. However, agreeing to inform each other of the changing levels

of the alert status would be a useful confidence-building measure. 

• Keep nuclear weapons unmated from delivery systems. As an element of crisis 

management and nuclear risk reduction, India and Pakistan need to sign a 

protocol to keep their nuclear weapons unmated even during a crisis and place 

their weapons on full alert only after the actual outbreak of a major war. As a part 

of the protocol, both nations should be required to inform each other when nuclear 

weapons are placed on full alert. 

• Hold flag meetings. As part of the crisis-management agreement one provision 

could be holding periodic flag meetings between sector/divisional commanders

along the international border and also along the LOC with the definite objective 

of preventing/arresting escalation. This confidence-building measure would come

into effect only when regular troops are deployed along the international border. 

Issues like controlling small arms and artillery firing, and preventing/reversing 

encroachment across the border/LOC and other such incidents that are considered 

escalatory could be discussed at the flag meetings. The primary purpose of this 

CBM would be to humanize the relationship between the deployed troops at the 

lowest practical level. 

• Implement the proposal for cooperative border monitoring.27 This proposal needs 

to be implemented before the development of a crisis and would be an important 

instrument in managing a crisis. 

7.4 Prevent Nuclear Proliferation 

The majority of U.S. officials, members of the U.S. Senate staff and scholars, during interviews 

in May/June 2003, considered proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology as the most

serious threat from Pakistan. A senior U.S. official in the Department of Energy commented, 

“The biggest worry is your people sharing nuclear knowledge with other states/individuals. This 

is the greatest concern on a day-to-day basis.” 

 

27 Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, Enhancing Security Through a Cooperative Border Monitoring Experiment:

A Proposal for India and Pakistan, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/21. Also available on the CMC 

web site at http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/links/cmc-papers/sand-98-0505-21/sand-98-0505-21.html. 

40 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

The author was assured at the highest level in Pakistan that the Korean scandal was a 

misunderstanding. Pakistan has an official policy against exporting nuclear technology to any 

other country, which A.Q. Khan violated. The following measures are recommended to prevent

proliferation emanating from Pakistan: 

• Enact an ordinance and have it passed in Parliament forbidding the Government

(present and future), or any individual, from passing nuclear weapon related 

technology, materials, and actual weapons to any foreign power or person, except 

such information or technology that will enhance security of weapons and 

materials or contribute directly to nonproliferation.

• Implement stronger fiscal and technical control. Because of the clandestine nature 

of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, extensive liberty was granted by the

government to the weapons-related facilities and their leadership. It is now 

necessary to bring all weapons development facilities under greater fiscal and 

technical control. The recent Korean scandal and revelations about the activities 

of Mr. A.Q. Khan need to be addressed immediately. 

• Develop and publish SOPs related to security of weapons, materials and related 

subjects with the help of the U.S. and other allies. 

• Strengthen the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA). Providing greater

autonomy and enhanced powers for the PNRA would make it the prime institution

to ensure nonproliferation. Providing the PNRA with potent intelligence assets 

would enhance its capability. 

• Initiate greater cooperation with the U.S. departments of Energy and Defense. The 

purpose of this cooperation would not be to open Pakistani military secrets to a 

foreign power, but for Pakistan to learn from the U.S. the technologies, systems 

,and procedures for the protection of nuclear assets and the enhancement of nonproliferation regimes. 

• Upgrade the security of Pakistan’s nuclear military facilities. International 

physical protection standards for nuclear materials could be the basis for 

upgrades. 

• Utilize the services of the IAEA and the U.S. Government for the training of a 

maximum number of personnel on nuclear security issues. 

• Upgrade the personnel reliability program. Keeping in mind the threat from baser 

human weaknesses and the growing threat from religious extremists, the PRP 

needs to be redesigned. Though religious extremists may be fringe elements in the 

military today, they can pose a greater threat in the future. 

• Train and equip a special security force. The government of Pakistan is already 

designing a dedicated security force structure for its nuclear assets, which will be 

trained and equipped to ensure the security of nuclear assets. It is recommended 

the U.S. government consider providing Pakistan technical as well as financial 

support for the establishment of such a force. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

7.5 Strengthen Nuclear Command and Control 

The establishment of the National Command Authority, even under a military government, is a 

step in the right direction. As mentioned earlier, the military will continue to play the dominant 

role in the nuclear security decision-making process, but does now share some of its powers with 

the civilian government. However, in the view of the author, the presence of the Prime Minister 

and at least a minimum of three important cabinet colleagues will positively influence the 

military hierarchy in the decision-making process. Recommendations made in an interview by a

Pakistani scholar to improve the decision-making process (which the author of this report

supports) are listed below as recommendations of this report. 

• Develop political stability. A dominant military role in the nuclear decision

system is inevitable until the political system matures; however, even with a 

dominant role of the military, the views and recommendations of the political 

leadership should be decisive. 

• Educate the political leadership and the people of Pakistan on the role of the 

nuclear weapons in the overall security of the nation. The National Defence

College (NDC) and the handful of think tanks in Pakistan could play a central role 

in this education process. The NDC28 has already undertaken a series of 

workshops to educate newly elected members of the national assembly on 

national security issues. However, a larger effort to educate the public is needed 

by the think tanks to discuss and debate nuclear issues, using television channels 

and the radio.

• Increase interaction between the military and the political leadership to evolve 

strategic thought. It should not be the exclusive domain of one or the other. Such 

an interaction means a learning process by both, of not only technical and 

strategic issues but also the different approaches to problem solving. The political 

mind is developed to think in shades of gray, and compromise is an essential 

element of political thinking. The military is less flexible and tends to think in 

black and white. An interactive process between the military and the civilian

leadership on this important issue of nuclear policy and doctrine would benefit 

both. 

• Implement dual control by the President and the Prime Minister for nuclear 

weapons use. Akin to the two-man control of a nuclear weapon at the operational 

level, the same principle could apply at the ultimate strategic level. Under this 

arrangement, there will be two fingers on the nuclear button. Thus irrespective of 

the consensus of the Nuclear Command Authority, the President and the Prime 

Minister should exercise joint control on the use of nuclear weapons. 

7.6 Initiate Nuclear Transparency 

For stability, the overwhelming recommendation of officials and scholars in the West has been to 

develop a higher level of transparency, while the majority of the Pakistani scholars lean toward

opacity. Historically, transparency is against the very grain of conventional military thinking.

 

28 Each workshop has about sixty MNA attendees on a voluntary basis. The NDC plans to hold two or three 

workshops a year. 

42 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

However, in view of the devastating effects of a single nuclear weapon, a higher level of

transparency is a must. The recommended transparency will add to nuclear stability and not 

decrease the effectiveness of the deterrence. Some of the areas where transparency could be 

useful are: 

• Nuclear doctrine and deterrence. Essential elements of a declaratory political 

doctrine that will help avoid dangerous misinterpretation of intentions need to be

spelled out. A stable deterrence will require a high level of clarity; for example, 

there is no need to lay down red lines, but a doctrine must spell out what is not 

acceptable or the broad circumstances under which a nuclear weapon will be

used. 

• The overall capability of nuclear weapon systems (weapon and launcher).

• The level of alert of nuclear weapons at various stages of the escalatory ladder. 

Avoidance of hair trigger alert. 

• Effectiveness of deterrence exists only if the adversary believes that the 

deterrence will be used under certain conditions. Demonstration of the capability

and the will to use nuclear weapons are therefore essential. 

• Measures designed to minimize the chances of nuclear accidents and accidental 

launch of a weapon, plus safety and security measures. 

7.7 Avoid Nuclear War by Miscalculation 

A number of useful suggestions were offered by the policy influentials to minimize a war by 

miscalculation. 

• Agree to establish and practice verifiable nuclear-related CBMs in addition to the 

existing few. Some recommendations already offered would help, such as: the 

establishment of a reliable hot line between the heads of government, the

establishment of nuclear risk reduction center, and the holding of regular meetings 

between the senior levels in the armed forces to discuss risk reduction measures. 

• Resolve outstanding disputes to reduce the risk of conflict. 

• Revisit the Lahore MOU and reaffirm the commitments made therein. 

• Initiate reciprocal and gradual transparency in nuclear-related matters.

Transparency generates confidence and opacity breeds suspicion. 

7.8 Improve Security 

The author has been assured by the highest level of the establishment that a major security 

upgrade for Pakistan’s nuclear establishments is underway since the establishment of the SPD. 

As previously mentioned, a centralized security system to oversee all nuclear establishments is 

on the drawing board and will hopefully overcome the weaknesses in the old security system. 

The following recommendations are offered to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets: 

• Nuclear Security Agency. Establishment of an independent security agency 

directly under the National Command Authority to oversee the security of

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Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The Nuclear Security Agency (NSA) should be outside 

and independent of the command structure of the nuclear establishment/ 

facility/forces. Such a step will ensure that there are no “sacred cows” like 

A.Q. Khan, other senior scientists, or military commanders out of the security net.

Such a security force would benefit from support and advice of the U.S. 

departments of Energy and Defense. 

• Security Audit. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, like the ISI, Intelligence Bureau

(IB), or the Military Intelligence (MI), who have multiple other tasks, should not 

be involved in the security of the nuclear assets, except in a secondary role for 

background checks of personnel employed (military/nonmilitary) by the nuclear 

installations. A trained section of the ISI or IB could, however, be tasked to 

conduct a periodic security audit of the nuclear security agency. 

• Security Culture. In Pakistan, because of the traditional respect for elders, trust for 

people in authority, and awe of VIPs, security checks for important individuals 

are implemented with laxity or waived. There is a need to develop a sound 

security culture; this can best be done through personal example at the highest 

levels of authority. 

• Threat Assessment. There is a need to conduct a fresh assessment of the threat to 

Pakistan’s nuclear assets that will assist the security agency in designing security

to meet all possible threats. Two threats that need special focus are the threat from 

religious extremists and the threat from potential proliferators. 

• U.S. Support. More than ever before there is a need for the U.S. to help Pakistan

establish foolproof nonproliferation standards, including reliable security and 

safety practices. Pakistan will also need to show greater transparency and work

with international experts. 

7.9 Enhance Nuclear Stability 

The ultimate aim of most of the recommendations made above is the development of nuclear 

stability—a level of stability at which rash decisions are avoided, war by miscalculation is

minimized, the road to escalation is interrupted by a number of firewalls, and a healthy respect is 

developed for each other’s pain threshold. Because of the deep mistrust, a high level of

verifiability needs to be developed in some of the recommendations. The intrusiveness of 

verification procedures can be increased progressively. 

Almost all of the criticism in the West about the Pakistan nuclear program is based on 

speculation and inadequate information or intelligence. In the opinion of the author, it will be in 

the interest of Pakistan to show willingness to learn and display greater transparency in areas of 

concern, without compromising national security. Some of these areas are: 

• Personal Reliability Program (PRP). Greater transparency in this important area

would remove the misgivings in the West about the inadequacy of Pakistan’s PRP 

system. 

44 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

• Providing adequate details about SOPs on security of nuclear weapons and 

nuclear materials would help. Today most SOPs used in the U.S. in this important 

area are available on the Internet at appropriate sites. 

• Making available essential details about command, control, communication, 

surveillance and reconnaissance systems, without compromising national security. 

Merely saying that “systems are robust and sophisticated” does not convince 

many. 

• Convince the world that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are out of reach of the “wild

eyed fundamentalists” and in the hands of mature, disciplined and patriotic 

Pakistanis. 

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46 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

8. Concluding Thoughts 

While traveling in the West, the author was regularly asked by policy makers and scholars: 

“Where is Pakistan heading? Does Pakistan have a formula for a stable trajectory?” 

As the author was working on a draft of this report at his home in Rawalpindi, around 7:20 p.m. 

on December 14, the peace of the evening was shattered by a massive explosion. This was a 

nearly successful attempt on President Musharraf’s life as he drove home from Islamabad. The

remote device, planted under a bridge, exploded seconds after the last vehicle of the President’s 

cavalcade crossed the bridge. Two weeks later (December 25, 2003), they made a second 

attempt, this time using suicide bombers, striking the President’s cavalcade literally seconds after 

it had crossed the previous attack site. Musharraf was lucky the second time. In an interview with 

a TV news channel on May 27, 2004, President Musharraf mentioned that some junior officials 

of the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Air Force were involved in the assassination attempt.29 He 

also hinted at the involvement of Al Qaeda, confirming the worst fears of domestic and foreign 

scholars that the armed forces have been infiltrated by religious extremists. In the opinion of the 

author, Musharraf was paying a price for joining the international fight against terrorism. 

The issue of Pakistan’s direction is relevant and needs addressing by the Pakistani society and 

government. The author believes that radicalism is not what the vast majority of the Pakistani

nation wants, but a well-organized radical minority is capable of dragging the silent majority in a 

direction it does not want to go. The long-term goal of enlightened moderation for the Islamic 

world is a sound strategy, but events in Pakistan are moving fast and demand immediate and 

possible surgical procedures by the establishment. Therein lies Pakistan’s salvation. A senior 

U.S. policy person and a well-wisher of Pakistan commented, “The big question is about

Pakistan’s future, are you moving towards becoming a radicalized nation? Unfortunately 

problems are not like French wine; procrastination does not help.” 

Possessing weapon systems that have devastating power places serious demands on a nation and 

its government. The foremost demand is the need for internal political stability and strong 

institutions. Politically unstable countries tend to be unpredictable and irresponsible, especially 

those nations with theocratic overtones. An Islamic Pakistan at peace with itself and the world 

causes no concerns, but a Pakistan perceived as moving toward radicalism is a source of genuine 

anxiety, especially after the experience of 9/11. The Pakistan military, a strong institution, has 

partially filled the stability and institutional gap. For the short term (three to five years), effective 

military control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is reassuring, but for the long term, the answer 

is greater political stability by moving toward genuine democracy and building important 

institutions of state. 

The rank and file of the Pakistani military continues to be professional, disciplined, and

nationalistic. It is however now evident that a penetration by radicals has occurred, which will 

need to be monitored, contained, and removed. On the broader canvas, it would help Pakistan to 

focus greater attention on social, cultural, and religious modernity. Religious intolerance and 

 

29 “Musharraf says military men tried to kill him,” The Daily Dawn (www.dawn.com), May 28, 2004. 

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

radicalism that unfortunately exist in Pakistan are best fought through liberal education, 

economic prosperity, and democratic institutions. 

Acknowledging the concerns of the West, the author is seriously concerned with the possibility 

of a nuclear war in South Asia by miscalculation. While efforts need to be made to address 

important issues like proliferation, safety, security and stability, avoidance of nuclear war by 

miscalculation needs immediate attention. The highest priority should be accorded to minimizing 

chances of a conflict through the normalization of relations and the resolution of the Kashmir

issue. The Lahore MOU is a good starting point for a dialogue on nuclear CBMs. Involvement of 

the U.S. to support and advise Pakistan on improving the safety and security of its nuclear 

program would also be essential. 

48 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Appendix A: Management Structure of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability 

Strategic Command Organization. In the post-nuclear environment, the establishment of an 

effective Command and Control Organization was a strategic imperative, not only to establish a 

harmonized command and control mechanism, operational policy, and development strategy, but 

also to provide credible stability to strategic deterrence. This command and control structure was

announced on 7 February 2000 and was well received by all quarters. The Strategic Command 

Organization is structurally grouped under three constituents: 

Constituent 1 – National Command Authority 

Constituent 2 – Strategic Plans Division 

Constituent 3 – Strategic Forces Commands 

National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA’s responsibilities include policy formulation 

and the employment and development of strategic systems. It is the chief decision-making body 

under the chairmanship of the President, and the Prime Minister is the Vice Chairman. The two 

NCA committees, which are the Employment Control Committee, and the Development Control 

Committee, function separately for policy formulation, employment and development aspects 

respectively (Figure 4). 

Figure 4. Organization Chart of National Command Authority 

Chairman – 

President

Vice Chairman –

Prime Minister 

Employment Control Committee 

Deputy Chairman – Foreign Minister

Development Control Committee

Deputy Chairman – CJCSC 

Strategic Forces 

(Ops Control with NCA)

Members

Minister of Defence

Minister of Interior

Minister of Finance

Chairman JCSC

COAS/VCOAS 

CNS

CAS

Secretary DG SPD 

Others by Invitation

Members

COAS/VCOAS 

CNS

CAS

Secretary DG SPD

Heads of Concerned

Strategic Orgs, as

required 

Army Air Force Navy

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Cooperative Monitoring Center 

Main Functions of the Employment Control Committee

1. Review the latest information on the threat to the strategic weapons program and 

weapons deployment. 

2. Policy direction during peacetime and the authority to order, control, and direct 

use/deployment of tri-services strategic forces during war. 

3. Give policy direction and guidance for the evolution of doctrines and employment

policy based on technical capability and threat assessment. 

4. Establish hierarchy of command and policy for delegation of authority for 

employment of nuclear weapons. 

5. Establish guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard 

against accidental or unauthorized use, or strategic decisions based on inaccurate 

information. 

Main Functions of the Development Control Committee

1. Exercise technical, financial and essential administrative control over the strategic 

organizations. 

2. Oversee the systematic development of strategic weapons programs as per 

approved Development Strategy. 

3. Empowered to raise facilities/organization and integrate existing ones within 

established objectives. 

Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The SPD provides secretarial support to the NCA and handles 

all issues related to the nation’s nuclear capability. The SPD functions directly under the 

President, PM and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is headed by a Director General 

from the Army and comprises officers from the three services (Figure 5). 

Figure 5. Organization Chart of Strategic Plans Division

Operations & Plans SFCP Cell

Directorate 

Strategic Weapons

Development Directorate

Armament & 

Disarmament Affairs

Directorate 

C4I2SR

Directorate 

Advisor Security 

NCA 

Consultancy 

Directorate 

Director General 

50 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

Main Functions of SPD

While handling comprehensively all aspects of the strategic program, Strategic Plans 

Division performs the following specific functions on behalf of National Command 

Authority and makes recommendations for its approval: 

1. Formulation of the country’s nuclear policy, nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine. 

2. Formulation of short- and long-term development strategy and force goals for triservices strategic forces, within the ambit of national power potential, nuclear

doctrine, and arms control regimes, and overseeing its systematic implementation. 

3. Formulation of strategic/operational plans at the tri-services level for movement, 

deployment, and employment of strategic forces. 

4. Formulation of the chain of command/authority and pre-delegation. 

5. Measures for the safety and security of strategic assets in the short and long term. 

6. Assists President, Prime Minister, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

in exercising control over strategic organizations and coordinates their financial, 

technical, developmental, and essential administrative aspects.

7. Provides military inputs to the Foreign Office and the Conference on 

Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on international/regional arms control regimes, 

disarmament and related strategic issues. 

8. Coordinates and ensures the establishment of Strategic C4

I

2

SR system for

National Command Authority for command and control of strategic assets with 

real-time linkages to the Services C4

I

2

SR networks and Strategic Forces.30

Strategic Forces Command at Each Service Level. Separate Strategic Forces Commands are 

being raised in all three services. The services retain training, technical and administrative 

control over their Strategic Forces. However, operational planning and control rests with the 

NCA under the overall military direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

(CJCSC). SPD coordinates all related aspects with services headquarters. 

Operational Policy. Strategic operational policy framework and guidelines for employment of 

nuclear weapon systems are established by the NCA through the SPD. Based on these guidelines, 

the three services formulate their operational policies, which are meshed and harmonized at the 

tri-service level by the SPD in coordination with Director General Plans of the Joint Service

Headquarters (JSHQ). 

 

30 C4

I

2

SR: Command, Control, Communications, Computer Information, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance 

51
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

Appendix B: Comments on Author’s Visit to the Pakistan Institute of 

Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and Chashma Nuclear 

Power Plant (CHASNUPP), November 2003 

Physical Protection 

Through the courtesy of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the author was able to visit 

two important nuclear facilities of Pakistan, PINSTECH (Figure 6) and CHASNUPP (Figure 7). 

PINSTECH is located 20 minutes from Islamabad, while CHASNUPP is located 280 km south 

of Islamabad, a four hour drive, on the left bank of river Indus. The two facilities are totally 

different from each other: one has a 10 MW research reactor,31 and the other a much larger 300 

MWe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).32 The purpose of the visits was to develop some

understanding of the physical protection and related matters employed at these facilities. A 

secondary purpose was to understand the operation of a nuclear facility and the general safety 

measures adopted. It needs to be clarified at the outset that this section will not present a 

complete picture of the physical protection measures, but presents those elements of protection 

of which the author became aware through observation or information provided.33

The broad concept of security employed by the facility is a layered approach. The first layer is

the site perimeter, followed by the second layer of security for the “protected areas.” The third is 

the security of the “vital areas.” Access control and security increases progressively from the 

outer to the inner sanctums. All three levels of security are designed to defeat the assessed threat.

The author was informed that the threat assessment of all nuclear installations (military and nonmilitary) are presently under review, and the present physical protection measures will be 

modified to meet the new threat assessment. 

The outer perimeter of a plant or site is manned by a different type of security force than the 

force deployed to man the “protected” and the “vital areas.” The overall security is under the 

command of a site/plant security officer, who does not come under the plant management team

leader, but rather a higher security headquarters. 

The outer perimeter resembles the design used for sensitive nonnuclear military installations, 

with barbed wire fences, walls, watchtowers, security lights, communication (line plus radio), 

and armed sentries at the points of likely access or ingress. Access through the outer perimeter is 

allowed through designated entry points with the presentation of appropriate entry passes. 

At the next level, the “protected areas,” there is a more intrusive and more aggressive level of

control. Authorized personnel are allowed access to a smaller area within the protected area. This

 

31 The open nuclear research reactor at PINSTECH was initially rated at 5 MW, but was later upgraded to 10 MW. 

The PINSTECH reactor was established in the late fifties, as a part of the “Atoms for Peace” initiative of the U.S. 32 CHASNUPP, Pakistan’s second power reactor, was constructed with the help of the People’s Republic of China 

and inaugurated in March 2001, 30 years after the first nuclear power plant was established in Karachi. From the 

investigation of the proposed site to the pre-operation audit, the IAEA has been involved. This was in addition to the 

independent reviews and surveillance during the phases of construction, equipment manufacture, equipment 

installation and commissioning by Pakistan’s nuclear regulatory authority. 33 Not wanting to compromise the security of the sites visited, the author has kept his observations general and to

principles of security with no details on the actual deployment of security assets. 

52 
Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons 

area is monitored by security cameras, utilizes access controls, and requires sign-in procedures. 

The highest level of security is in the “vital area” where access is limited only to the specified

components of the vital area where an individual works. Here entry is controlled by magnetic 

cards, keypad-operated door locks, signing in, etc. The vital area is constantly monitored by 

closed circuit TV cameras and through the physical presence of security personal. The broader 

concept as the author was informed is “defense in depth,” with multiple checks and procedures,

to defeat a determined threat. 

In a nuclear power plant the typical “vital areas,” as the author noted, are the reactor area, the 

main control room and the fuel storage areas. Intrusion alarms are installed both in the

“protected” and the “vital areas.” In areas where nuclear material handling is part of the task, 

radiation dosimeters are used that assess any radioactive dose received, electronically record a

person’s personal details, and his time of entry and exit. 

Safety, Protection, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials 

Both of the sites conform to international safety standards. Safety and quality, the author was 

informed, were the most important considerations in the design of the plant. CHASNUPP is in 

accordance with the latest codes and standards, verified through reviews by national and 

international experts. A visit to the plant by the author, especially a visit to the central control 

room, gave some idea of the multiple redundancies built into the plant design to assure total 

safety. Predetermined SOPs add to the safety culture practiced at Pakistan’s nuclear installations

and sites. 

Both of the installations are under IAEA safeguards and are therefore subject to stringent checks 

and controls. The IAEA physically controls fresh fuel, its usage, and spent fuel and its disposal. 

It monitors fuel locations, movement, and usage through surveillance equipment and seals. 

Movement of fuel for the reactor from within country or from abroad is also monitored by the 

IAEA.34

In addition to the physical checks and monitoring, an elaborate system of documentation for 

fresh and spent fuel down to a milligram exists. Movement of radioisotopes used in nuclear 

medicine, shipped from PINSTECH to various hospitals in Pakistan, is controlled with great 

accountability. The author was able to review some of the accounting documents at 

CHASNUPP. 

Contract persons and outside visitors undergo a detailed review by the security system before

and during their visit to the nuclear power plant. No contract person or visitor is allowed 

independent access even within the outer perimeter. 

Personnel Security 

Personnel security is taken seriously. All personnel, technical, nontechnical or those connected 

with security, go through a series of background checks on induction. Those seconded from other

 

34 The fuel used in the CHASNUPP reactor is UO2 (Uranium Dioxide), enriched to between 2.4 to 3.4 % Uranium235. The spent fuel contains about 1% Plutonium-239. 

53
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

departments like the Army to a nuclear project like CHASNUPP undergo a fresh background 

security check and are subjected to an annual review. In addition, managers routinely monitor the 

behavior of subordinates for any unusual conduct. If any unusual behavior is observed, both the 

management and security get involved to resolve the anomaly. 

The officer in charge of security informed the author that studies are underway for the creation of 

a dedicated force that will be responsible for the security of both the military and nonmilitary

installations. He also informed the author that technology, like motion sensors, day/night video 

cameras with motion detection, infrared sensors, and the like are being considered for 

installation.

Figure 6. PINSTECH Reactor, November 2003

Figure 7. Author visiting CHASNUPP Control Room, November 2003

54 
About the Author 

Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani (Retired) was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1961 

and retired in 1998. He held a variety of command and staff assignments, including the 

command of an armored division. While serving in an armored regiment, he fought in the 1965 

Indo-Pakistan war and again saw action on the western front in the 1971 war. He served as 

Pakistan’s Defense and Military Attaché in Washington, DC, from 1977 to 1982, and as 

President Zia-ul-Haq’s Military Secretary from 1982 to 1986. He also served as chairman and 

chief executive of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board, the largest defense industrial complex 

of Pakistan, during 1992 to 1998. Presently, as part of a group of Indians and Pakistanis, he is 

working toward peace in South Asia. Before 9/11 he was involved with a UN-sponsored 

initiative to develop a peaceful solution of the Afghanistan conflict. 

He specializes in military strategy, defense production, and international security issues. He is 

the author of the book India and Pakistan – The Cost of Conflict and the Benefits of Peace,

published in 2000 by Johns Hopkins University and reprinted by the Oxford University Press in 

2001. In 2000, he undertook a study for the Pakistan Army titled “Pakistan’s Security 

Imperatives Year 2000 and Beyond.” He has spoken in a variety of international forums on 

defense, security, and foreign policy. From November 1999 to January 2000, General Durrani 

was concurrently a visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 

Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC and a visiting fellow at the Foreign Policy 

Research Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Presently he is a Council Member of the 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 

He was educated at Burn Hall School, Government College Abbottabad, and the Pakistan 

Military Academy in Kakul. 

Distribution 

350 MS 1371 CMC Library, 6929 

1 MS 9018 Central Technical Files, 8945-1 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 9616