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REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN: 

OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 16, 2016 

Serial No. 114–108 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

ART ARTHUR, Subcommittee on National Security Staff Director 

SANG YI, Counsel 

WILLIE MARX, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 16, 2016 ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 2 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 4 

Ms. Christine S. Abizaid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense, Accompanied by Howard Strickley, Program Director, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division, U.S. Department of Defense, and Randy 

Brown, Director, Air Force Civil Engineering Center, U.S. Department of 

Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 46 

APPENDIX 

Statement of Chairman Jason Chaffetz ................................................................. 98 

Opening Statement of ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings ............................. 103 

Written Statement submitted by Rep. Gerald E. Connolly .................................. 111 

March 2016 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 16– 

22 Inspection Report titled, ‘‘Department of Defense Reconstruction 

Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 

through September 2015,’’ Submitted by Chairman Chaffetz .......................... 114 


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REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN: 

OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 

Wednesday, March 16, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in Room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Massie, DeSantis, Buck, Walker, Hice, 

Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Lynch, Cooper, Connolly, 

Kelly, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. 

And without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess 

at any time. 

We have an important hearing today, always good to be talking 

about this topic. We have had a number of hearings on this. We 

do appreciate all the panel members that are going to be here. I 

do have an opening statement, but in the essence of time, I am 

going to simply submit that for the record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I am sure Mr. Cummings has an opening statement that we will submit to the record as well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The United States of America has put a lot 

of time, effort, money, and blood into making the world a better 

place, and there is a lot of good work that has gone on, but there 

is also something different we do in the United States, and that is 

we are self-critical. We go back, we look, and we determine what 

has gone right and what is not going so right. And so today, we 

are going to have such a discussion, and it will be a good, vibrant 

discussion. 

So I would like to actually recognize the panel and then we will 

swear you in and we will get right off to the statements. 

Mr. John Sopko is the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. Ms. Christine Abizaid is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, the 

United States Department of Defense. It is my understanding that 

you will give the one opening statement on behalf of the Department of Defense and that the rest of the panel will all participate 

in answering of the questions. 

We also welcome Mr. Howard Strickley, programs director for the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division at 


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the United States Department of Defense; and Mr. Randy Brown, 

director of the Air Force Civil Engineering Center at the United 

States Department of Defense. 

We welcome you all. We thank you for being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before 

they testify. If you will please rise and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. You may be seated. And let the 

record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

I think you all have experience here. In order to allow time for 

discussion, we would appreciate your limiting testimony to no more 

than 20 minutes, or 5, whatever suits you best. I am just trying 

to make sure that we are—based on some of our hearings, that 

would be record time. But we will give you great latitude here. We 

would love to hear proactively your perspective. 

Mr. Sopko, you are now recognized. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF JOHN SOPKO 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you very much. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking 

Member Cummings, and members of the committee, it is a pleasure, as always, to testify before this committee and to testify about 

SIGAR’s inspections of facilities and infrastructure built and renovated by the Department of Defense in Afghanistan. SIGAR has 

issued 37 inspection reports examining 45 DOD reconstruction 

projects in Afghanistan with a combined value of approximately 

$1.1 billion. 

Although these projects do not constitute a representative statistical sample of all DOD projects, they do provide us a valuable insight into the challenges facing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. And I would like to focus on five key takeaways from our 

work. 

First, my inspection team found that some of the projects were 

well-built and met contract requirements and technical specifications. However, most did not. 

Secondly, we at SIGAR understand that reconstruction is difficult in Afghanistan. We also recognize that DOD and its components have taken steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 

of reconstruction projects. For example, DOD has generally been 

responsive to the recommendations in our inspection reports and 

has implemented 79 of the 100 recommendations we’ve made. 

Thirdly, despite these efforts, many of the projects we inspected 

had significant deficiencies caused in part by common and recurring problems such as unqualified contractors, poor workmanship, 

and inadequate oversight by DOD officials. 

Fourthly, despite these problems, many contractors were still 

paid the full contract amount and not held accountable for their 

shoddy workmanship. 

Fifth, we continue to be concerned—and I think this is an important point—we continue to be concerned about the Afghan Government’s ability to sustain the numerous facilities DOD has built or 

transferred for it. Although we’re not focusing on other agencies, 

we’re also concerned about the buildings that USAID has built for 


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the Afghan Government and transferred to it, as well as the State 

Department. 

Looking at just the base transfers alone, DOD has donated 391 

former U.S. military bases worth approximately $858 million to the 

Afghan Government since 2010. They all have to be maintained. 

The Afghan Government has proven itself unable to operate and 

maintain its facilities on a wide scale. For Afghan security forces 

facilities in particular, DOD is still spending millions of dollars 

each year in operation and maintenance services at many of them 

because the Afghans cannot do so themselves. 

In light of these concerns, I was troubled to learn during my 

most recent trip to Afghanistan that our ongoing inspection of the 

new Ministry of Interior headquarters complex in Kabul uncovered 

extensive renovations being made to the headquarters building 

after it was supposed to have been completed, including installing 

dropped ceilings, tearing out recently poured concrete floors, tearing out electrical fixtures, and then replacing some of those floors 

with marble flooring in certain VIP and VVIP offices. 

It appears DOD has contracted for these and other ‘‘enhancements’’ which are, according to the Statement of Work, ‘‘to improve 

the aesthetics of the internal finishes.’’ These enhancements are 

not only more costly and require more expertise to maintain but 

also replace features the Army Corps of Engineers originally constructed in accordance with DOD’s own contingency construction 

standards issued in 2009. 

Examples like this, combined with the Afghan Government’s existing inability to operate and maintain its facilities, means the 

U.S. taxpayer will continue to expend funds indefinitely to sustain 

some of the facilities DOD has built. 

And in conclusion, to enhance the administration and oversight 

of its reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, DOD should continue 

to improve its project planning and design process, guarantee contractors are qualified and capable, and conduct the oversight needed to ensure that facilities are built correctly and contracts are held 

accountable. 

DOD should also continue to work with the Afghan Government 

to enhance its ability to operate, maintain, and sustain its facilities. 

SIGAR will continue to work with DOD and Congress as it continues to oversee the critical work the United States and its coalition partners are undertaking, and we thank you for the opportunity to testify today about those efforts. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. And I appreciate 

the diligent work that you and your team do in a very, very difficult place. 

And, Ms. Abizaid, I can’t thank enough the men and women who 

actually serve in the military, again, very difficult conditions at 

best. We know how difficult it is. But we would appreciate the Department of Defense’s perspective, and so we will now recognize 

you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE S. ABIZAID 

Ms. ABIZAID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you move that mic—just bring it right 

on down there. 

Ms. ABIZAID. How’s that? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes, much better. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Is that —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Thank you, sir. Chairman Chaffetz, members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of 

Defense infrastructure projects in Afghanistan and for your attention to our mission there. 

I’m honored to have the opportunity to update you, alongside my 

colleagues who are present here today. All of us take seriously our 

responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. 

You have my longer statement for the record, so I will focus my 

remarks on a couple of key points this morning. 

Over the previous 14 plus years, U.S. forces have worked with 

our international partners to improve security and stability in Afghanistan. We are forever grateful to and honor the 2,236 U.S. 

service members who have lost their lives while serving in Afghanistan, the over 20,000 military personnel who have been wounded, 

and the thousands of families who have sacrificed for this important mission, a mission that is fundamentally about preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven from which terrorists can plan attacks against the United States homeland, U.S. 

interests abroad, or our international partners. 

Currently, DOD is conducting two complementary missions in Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission against the remnants of al 

Qaeda and other extremist groups that threaten the United States; 

and a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission with Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, known as Resolute Support. 

The era characterized by large investments in infrastructure 

projects, which coincided primarily with the U.S. troop surge, largely concluded more than a year ago. At the height of our combat 

mission, annual appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces 

Fund (ASFF), the Commanders Emergency Response Program 

(CERP), and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) reached 

about $12 billion. This fiscal year those appropriations are down. 

Congress appropriated $5 million for CERP and $3.7 billion for 

ASFF. One percent of this funding is currently allocated for infrastructure, and we have not requested any further funds for AIF 

since 2014. 

Now, over the last 10 years DOD completed over $9 billion in infrastructure projects for the Ministries of Defense and Interior and 


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their forces, including more than 1,000 projects supporting basing 

requirements for the ANA, the Afghan National Army, and the Afghan National Police. Development of this basing footprint has 

been crucial to enabling the Afghan forces to assume full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan so that the United States and 

the coalition can end its combat mission. 

On a smaller scale, DOD also executed projects through AIF primarily to address the lack of electricity that is impeding Afghanistan’s economic growth, and CERP, which local commanders use to 

address urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs such as repairing village wells or building security walls around schools. 

And for each source of funds, the Department developed guidance 

on how projects were to be approved and managed. Generally, 

smaller-scale projects were approved in theater. In accordance with 

congressional requirements, many of the larger projects were approved at the highest levels of the Department and notified to the 

appropriate congressional oversight committees. Once approved, 

projects were managed by executing agencies in theater with oversight provided by various offices, working groups, and councils 

within the Department of Defense. 

Now, this is not to say that all projects were problem-free. Afghanistan is a war-torn country with an active insurgency, a history of corruption, poor transportation infrastructure, and little 

production and manufacturing capacity. Infrastructure development in this environment is challenging, and we have learned 

many lessons over the last 14 plus years. 

Now, as my colleagues can describe, we work closely with contractors to manage problems and control costs. We’re also successfully using trained Afghan quality assurance personnel to conduct 

onsite inspections and tests at locations that U.S. personnel cannot 

regularly visit. I understand SIGAR does the same with its inspections in the current environment. 

Now, in some cases, projects have failed. For example, SIGAR recently published a report about an Afghan police training facility 

constructed in 2012 that cost nearly $500,000. The walls dissolved 

in the rain. That is simply unacceptable. 

We appreciate the efforts of the inspectors general to shine a 

light on these problems so we can take corrective action. We have 

worked closely with auditors on more than 500 audit reports and 

oversight projects since 2008 and have taken action to improve the 

execution of our reconstruction efforts. In a recent compilation of 

SIGAR’s past reports on infrastructure, SIGAR noted that DOD addressed 90 percent of its recommendations. 

Now, no one in DOD is satisfied with a failed project. It hurts 

the mission, it undermines the confidence in the Department, and 

it wastes taxpayer funds. Fortunately, failure is rare. Due to DOD 

personnel in theater who continue to work tirelessly and often at 

great personal risk, the vast majority of infrastructure projects 

were completed successfully and used as intended to the benefit of 

the Afghan people and to long-term U.S. interests. Notwithstanding some mistakes, overall, I’d characterize it DOD’s infrastructure programs, particularly those that have focused on Afghanistan’s core security needs, as highly successful and critical to 


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the Afghan Government’s ability to provide security across Afghanistan. 

I do want to stress that we are committed to ensuring U.S. taxpayer funds are used efficiently and invested wisely. The American 

people have made a generous and important contribution to the 

ANDSF and the future of Afghanistan, and the support has been 

key in enabling the United States to step out of a large-scale combat role as Afghans increasingly defend their country. 

In closing, I want to again thank the committee for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to develop necessary infrastructure in 

support of our mission and to ensure that we are doing so responsibly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To try to comprehend the scope of the spending that’s gone on 

in the U.S. money, I think the inspector general had said—was it 

$110 billion from 2002 to 2013? Is that defense money or is that 

all of the aid that has gone into Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s all reconstruction money. 

Mr. MICA. So —— 

Mr. SOPKO. DOD has the bulk of that. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. 

Ms. ABIZAID. The DOD money is about $60 billion over that time 

period. 

Mr. MICA. So about half. I was told that the budget for the entire 

Afghan Government is about $5 billion a year. Is that right? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I think that’s generally accurate, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. And then I’m also told that there’s other money 

coming in. Is it NATO money or European money, aid money? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So, sir, the —— 

Mr. MICA. On top of that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The budget for the Afghan National Security 

Force’s —— 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—total is about $5 billion. There is international 

funds to the tune of about $1 billion that is coming in. The Afghan 

Government pays about $500 million and the United States —— 

Mr. MICA. So —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—pays the rest. 

Mr. MICA.—we are talking billions on top of billions, right? Was 

it you, sir, that told me—I am trying to remember who it was— 

that the Afghans did not have the ability to absorb or steal any 

more money? 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, I don’t know if I said they didn’t have 

the capacity to steal —— 

Mr. MICA. Because I—well —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—but I think they had the—it’s the capacity to use 

—— 

Mr. MICA. I was told by a representative—I am pretty sure it 

was out of your office and I think we have it on the record because 

I went back and said did you say absorb or steal? Because I know 

when I went there I had been informed of, all the way up to the 

presidency, what money was being stolen. But is that still the case? 

They don’t have the ability to absorb or misappropriate any more 

money? 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, absorption is a problem. We spent a 

lot of money there, gave them a lot of money, and they’re not able 

to spend it either. 

Mr. MICA. And then—okay. 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Another thing, too, is I am told that the Taliban now 

are starting to control more areas, and I read where your area of 

being able to conduct oversight has shrunken, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 


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Mr. MICA. So even where we have projects ongoing or we have 

had projects, you don’t have the ability to go in and see what is 

going on, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s correct. And it’s not just us, it’s everybody in 

Afghanistan working for the U.S. Government. 

Mr. MICA. When I was there, I was taken to Helmand Province. 

I went to half a dozen provinces or whatever around the country, 

and I remember the troops telling me look at the school, Mr. Mica. 

The school they paid 5, 10 times. It is the joke of the community 

of how the United States got ripped off, and that is what you have 

seen in some of these projects, sir? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. You report to both the Secretary of Defense and 

also the Secretary of State on what you have seen, the abuses, et 

cetera? Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s correct —— 

Mr. MICA. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO.—and Congress. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And then I see that Mrs. Clinton was the Secretary of State from—well, until 2013, and you reported not only 

to the DOD Secretary but to her. Some of the biggest abuses were 

in USAID money that I saw. Is that under Secretary of State or 

is it under DOD? 

Mr. SOPKO. USAID is a separate entity I think —— 

Mr. MICA. But is it under State or is it under DOD? 

Mr. SOPKO. It’s a separate entity. It’s a—has an administrator —— Mr. MICA. So no one—you did not report to her about those 

abuses, the Secretary —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Well —— 

Mr. MICA.—of State at the time? 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, we file our reports with Secretary of 

State, Secretary —— 

Mr. MICA. So she has had —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—of Defense —— 

Mr. MICA. She had those reports. And are they required to reply 

or they do reply? Now, you just told me you replied on 90 percent 

or something. Do we have a record of what came out of State? 

Mr. SOPKO. On all of our reports to go to State Department, we 

would —— 

Mr. MICA. Can you —— 

Mr. SOPKO. We do. We do. 

Mr. MICA.—supply us with copies of the responses? Because it 

appears a lot of money was wasted and not attended to on some 

of these projects not only under DOD but under the State Department. And I want to see and have in the record the response from 

DOD and State and what steps were taken. Can you provide the 

committee with that? 

Mr. SOPKO. We definitely can do that, sir. 

Mr. MICA. All right. And then lastly, Mr. Chairman, I am very 

concerned about idle assets. You know, our Federal Government 

should stop—I have always said should stop sitting on its assets, 

and we have assets over there that you have identified not only the 

ones you are spending money on that you describe and renovations 


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that are unnecessary or unwarranted and costly but also assets 

that we have that are sitting idle that we have transferred over to 

them. And if you could give us a list of those for the record, I appreciate that, and yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses here today. Mr. Sopko, good to see you again. 

I have got a couple of quick questions. Any of our panel members, have you been dealing at all with the Kunduz situation where 

we accidentally attacked that hospital in a firefight? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I’m generally familiar with it. It is an investigation that’s happening in the military chain of command. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. So here is what I am worrying about. This is 

just the interplay between hospital construction and we are doing 

a bit of that. You know, the chairman and I have been to Afghanistan way too many times, and oftentimes, the hospitals look like 

every other building not only in Kabul but, you know, Kandahar 

and in Kunduz. And I was wondering, as we are doing this, it is 

not really reconstruction. We are doing construction. It says Afghan 

rebuilding or reconstruction, but in many cases there is nothing to 

reconstruct; we are constructing. 

And I am just wondering on the hospital construction piece, are 

we building in structural components that would clearly identify 

those as hospitals so we don’t have that accident happen again? I 

realize that we have very unreliable power sources, so lighting and 

things like that that would be obvious to us in the United States, 

they don’t have those resources there on a consistent basis. But it 

at least appears among some of the reports that the hospital was 

indistinguishable. I know the coordinates were provided, but visibly, visually I guess the hospital was indistinguishable from some 

of the adjacent buildings, and I am just wondering if we are curing 

that defect within our protocol for hospital construction. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, we haven’t yet finalized the details of what the 

reconstruction of the building that was mistakenly struck will entail. I would say that I would fully expect that at the time that we 

do decide to reconstruct a clinic if that’s in fact the case —— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, I am not talking about that one. I am talking 

about we are doing a bunch of other hospitals, and so, obviously, 

that opportunity presents itself with every hospital. And I am just 

wondering—and we have got a bunch of them in the report today, 

a bunch of hospital and clinic reconstruction. Are we distinguishing 

these buildings from other buildings so this doesn’t happen again? 

That is all I am asking. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I will take that for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

Ms. ABIZAID. I would say that I am not aware of significant DOD 

projects that are currently underway other than the rebuild in 

Kunduz that include hospitals. The ones that were—the clinics that 

were constructed in the past I’ll need to check for the record to 

make sure that we did do due diligence on the distinguishing feature. 

Mr. LYNCH. I know in Iraq, you know, your counterpart Mr. 

Sopko had, you know, the Red Cross or the Red Crescent on the 


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roof of these, the helipads, things like that, that clearly identified 

the buildings were hospitals, and I am just wondering —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, if I could add to what the assistant 

secretary said, and this is an issue I think Congress should address. DOD has been very good on having accurate geospatial coordinates for the buildings they’ve built. We have been publicly 

critical of USAID for having a rather sloppy and flippant attitude 

to geospatial. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO. And we have issued—and I’m happy to provide to 

you—a number of critical letters to USAID administrators to make 

certain that geospatial coordinates are accurate. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t know if you read about it. We did a survey. 

We found out some of the coordinates were in the Mediterranean 

—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO.—some were in Turkmenistan and elsewhere. I think 

you’re onto a good point. I can’t tell you about any —— 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. 

Mr. SOPKO.—crescent signals, but you need good geospatial coordinates. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO. DOD has done a good job at that. AID has been less 

than —— 

Mr. LYNCH. I just spent 4 minutes on my quick question, so let 

me just jump on the fact that these contractors are being paid in 

full, in the United States, of course, we have a different format 

where we get a performance bond and we hold that back, and if 

they don’t perform properly, we cash in on that bond. We also do 

retention, 10 percent of the contract price. They don’t get that until 

we go in there and reaffirm at the end that they have performed 

their contract. Are we doing any of that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. My understanding is that, yes, we are in fact doing 

that. Let me turn it to my colleagues. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, sir. We do use the same FAR procedures in 

Afghanistan as we use in the United States or elsewhere in the 

world. The difference is when we contract with these small Afghan 

firms, we’re trying to build construction capacity in the country. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. We’re trying to help them learn how to do responsible construction management. And if we hold much money 

from them, they will financially fail. They just do not have the resources in their company to—for us to withhold much. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. That is —— 

Mr. STRICKLEY. So where we can, we do, but it’s project-dependent. 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Thank you very much. I see my time has 

expired. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman 

from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 


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The easiest thing in the world is to spend other people’s money, 

and unfortunately, we have seen over and over and over and over 

again that there apparently are no fiscal conservatives at the Pentagon. They can say they are good stewards of the public’s money, 

but actions speak much louder than words. And Mr. Sopko’s 30- 

something reports have listed hundreds of examples of just ridiculous waste. I mean, I have got in front of me an NPR report with 

$770 million on aircraft for Afghanistan that the military can’t use, 

a report that was in all kinds of papers, $34 million on a white elephant headquarters that will never be used. 

In fact, in the NPR report Mr. Sopko is quoted as saying ‘‘the 

joke in my office is we will eventually see a base where on one side 

of the base they are destroying it while on the other side they are 

building it, and then they will probably meet in the middle.’’ It is 

really sad. One organization that looked at this found $17 billion 

in waste. 

There has been so much waste in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know 

that a few days ago I think a Senate committee got very upset 

about a hearing about $6 million spent on nine blond goats from 

Italy. Are you familiar with the blond goats, Mr. Sopko? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, unfortunately, I am. And it was a program by 

the Task Force for Business Stabilization. It was basically an attempt to rebuild or build a cashmere market, and as far as we 

know, it was a failure. They did import goats. They sent a team 

actually to Mongolia to try to bring back Mongolian goat semen. 

We’re still tracking that down. 

As far as we know—we talked to a subject matter expert who 

said they tried to do that they needed to be done in 20 years in 

a 2-year period, and it was a total failure. We will be issuing a report on that in more detail, but the problem is there were no 

metrics and what type of metrics they had they didn’t even follow. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, it is just really sad, and the American people 

are disgusted about this. I represent a very pro-military district, 

but I will tell you that I have been here a long time, and I voted 

for the first war in Iraq because I heard about Saddam Hussein’s 

elite troops and how great a threat they were, and then I saw those 

same elite troops surrendering to CNN camera crews and empty 

tanks. So realized then the threat had been greatly exaggerated. 

So I became very skeptical about the second Iraq war, and so 

they called me down to a little room at the White house with 

Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet, the head of the CIA. Lawrence 

Lindsey, the President’s economic advisor had said that day or the 

day before that a war with Iraq would cost us $200 billion. He was 

fired. I asked about that. Condoleezza Rice said, oh, no, it wouldn’t 

cost us anything like that. It will be $50 or $60 billion and we get 

some of that back from our allies. 

My point is all of these actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there 

has been so much waste, it is just unbelievable, and yet we are still 

doing it after 15 years. And this estimate of $50 or $60 billion by 

Condoleezza Rice and then we end up spending trillions. And it is 

just really, really sad. 

I end up voting against the second war in Iraq, and it was probably the most unpopular vote I have ever done for 3 or 4 years, but 

what was the most unpopular vote has, over the years, turned into 


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the most popular vote I have ever done because the American people are just fed up with this waste, and they are just feeling like 

we are long past the time when we need to stop trying to run the 

whole world and we start putting our own people in our own country first once again. 

And I just want to say again, Mr. Sopko, I am very grateful and 

thankful for the work that you have done over there pointing out 

this so hopefully we won’t keep doing these types of things in the 

future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. 

Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Lynch actually was starting a line of questioning I was interested in, so I would like to just yield to him. 

Mr. LYNCH. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Sopko, I want to talk about Afghan defense force training. 

There are a lot of reports both in the press and from your office 

that the reliability of the data that we are getting from the Afghan 

Government relative to the amount of security forces they have on 

hand, especially in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces are not reliable. There is one report that says that up to 40 percent of the people we are paying in the Afghan defense forces are ghost employees; they do not exist. And so the commanders on the ground there 

are basically taking that money for themselves. There aren’t really 

people there to be paid. And I just wonder if your own investigation 

supports that premise. 

Mr. SOPKO. That figure I believe of 40 percent was quoted by, I 

believe, a parliamentarian, an Afghan parliamentarian or a provincial director I think down in Helmand Province, so we have not 

been able to corroborate that. 

The concern we have is we’ve seen ghost schools, we’ve seen 

ghost teachers, we’ve seen ghost clinics, ghost doctors, ghost civil 

servants, and we have heard of ghost soldiers. We actually heard 

part of the problem in Helmand and part of the problem in Kunduz 

were the units may not have been as fulsome as we expected. Our 

concern is we don’t really have the capability of verifying that anymore because we don’t have the troops underground, we don’t have 

the people. We’re using anecdotal information. And that is a concern I think we all have, particularly based upon the history in Afghanistan. 

And our concerns have been confirmed by the Ghani government. 

They’ve done a number of studies at least on the teachers and the 

clinics, and they’re finding the same things that we are finding. 

But so far we haven’t been able to do that. 

Mr. LYNCH. Now, Ms. Abizaid, do you have anything on that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir, I’d just like to respond briefly. I fully acknowledge that there are reports of ghost soldiers and sort of the 

volume of ghost soldier—the ghost soldier problem is something 

that we desperately want to get our arms around. I think the 40 

percent figure is actually overrated, but, sir —— 

Mr. LYNCH. Let me just —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—we are —— 


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Mr. LYNCH. Let me just suggest something. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. We don’t have to count every single soldier, 

but, look, just take a unit down in Helmand Province or in 

Kandahar or Nangarhar, whatever we want to do, and just do some 

samples. We have got payroll requests, and, you are right, we don’t 

have the resources anymore to do this, you know, full-spectrum 

analysis of what they are doing, but you can certainly pick two or 

three units where we are getting requests for funding and then fly 

in there on payday and see who picks up their checks, who is picking up their pay. And all you need to do is do two or three of those 

and we will have a good sample of what is going on and we might 

nip that in the bud if they know we are going to do that on occasion. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir. And we’ll take that back to the field. 

I did want to say that we are instituting new systems and processes to increase the accountability and our visibility into the soldiers that are getting paid through an integrated pay-and-personnel system and through the issuance of biometric ID cards for 

the Afghan National Army. These are really important systems to 

address the kind of accountability that we’re talking about, make 

sure the people that are supposed to be getting paid are getting 

paid. 

And for—you know, to the example that you raised about increasing our visibility into specific units, we actually have pretty 

good visibility now into the units in Helmand and the kind of roles 

that they are keeping, and we have noted a significant degree of 

absence from rolls, attrition rates that are higher than we would 

have expected. Our engagement with the Afghan National Security 

Forces and the Ministries of Defense and Interior have enabled 

greater insight as we work to rebuild and reconstitute that force 

in Helmand that is in the midst of a fight. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should look 

at? Members of Congress will be going over to Afghanistan fairly 

soon. Any areas that you think we should look at more closely 

while we are there? 

Mr. SOPKO. Security is number one. Verify to yourself as best as 

you can that the ANDSF has the capabilities, the Afghan security 

forces have those capabilities. The second thing, Congressman 

Lynch, is get outside of the embassy, get outside of the command 

structure and talk to some of the people, talk to some of the soldiers privately, talk to some of the people in the NGO community 

privately and to get their assessment. Every time I go there, I try 

to do that. Every time I go there, I try to meet with Afghan soldiers 

—— Mr. LYNCH. And so do we. I have to give the chairman great 

credit. We get outside the wire every time we go. 

Mr. SOPKO. Then you get the true picture. You don’t get the 

happy talk —— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO.—that you’ll find in the embassy. 

And the other thing is, Congressman, I’ve been going there now 

4 years. Every time I go, I’m told we’re winning and every time I 

go I can see less of the country. 


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Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. It’s so bad now I can’t even drive from the airport, 

and no American civilian can drive from the airport to the embassy. We have to fly. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. 

Mr. SOPKO. Last time I was there, I wanted to go across the 

street to do an inquiry, and I was told I was going to have to helo 

across the street —— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO.—at the cost of $60,000. Now, if that’s winning, what 

is losing —— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO.—in Afghanistan? 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, I would just in closing that if they are advising 

you not to drive from the airport the embassy, you should not 

drive. We have done that drive many times. That is not a good situation, so you continue to fly, sir. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I would now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the 

panel for being here. 

Mr. Sopko, for the past two Congresses, as you know, the House 

has passed multiple amendments to limit funding or reduce funding for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, some of my amendments as well. Unfortunately, these bipartisan amendments don’t 

get through and into the spending packages because of the insistence by DOD that additional funding sources are needed to finish 

the projects. 

I understand that we look to our commanders in the field. We 

want their guidance. We want to know what they think is necessary to finish the important job that they are doing, but should 

DOD also fully analyze the costs of particular projects and whether 

the Afghans will be able to maintain these projects before we allocate additional resources? 

Mr. SOPKO. I agree wholeheartedly with that. They should. 

Mr. WALBERG. That is just expected. 

Ms. Abizaid? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, with respect to Afghanistan Infrastructure 

Funds, I would note that this—most of the DOD funds associated 

with that, first, we are no longer requesting funds and haven’t 

since 2014. We do want some funds to be able to complete ongoing 

projects. Those projects are being turned over to a self-sufficient Afghan entity known as DABS, which has actually been quite successful in generating revenues and actually being able to sustain 

many of the projects that we’ve undertaken in coordination with 

—— Mr. WALBERG. Do you anticipate asking for additional reallocated 

funds for these projects? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Not at this time. We are trying to use portions of 

ASIF to finish out the projects. 

Mr. WALBERG. You are confident you have enough funding? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Once the projects are complete, we do not expect 

any additional funds. 


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Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Sopko, as a general matter, did DOD conduct 

any risk-based analysis or feasibility studies before undertaking 

any of the construction projects that SIGAR inspected? 

Mr. SOPKO. I am not aware of that. I’m not saying they didn’t. 

I don’t think they did, but I’m not absolutely certain. I would have 

to —— 

Mr. WALBERG. Ms. Abizaid, could you answer that? Did any feasibility studies to deal with the taxpayer funds? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Let me deferred to my colleagues in the engineering. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. I can give you an example, sir, of an AIF project 

—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You can move the microphone right up 

under your—there we go. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, thank you. I can give you an example of a 

project that we started to do in Helmand Province with AIF funding at the Dahla Dam that would have been about $150 million, 

$175 million project. And as we got further into the design, we 

eventually canceled the project because we did not think we would 

be able to execute it in a responsible fashion. 

It’s an existing dam. We were going to increase its capacity, and 

we were concerned because of a security situation in that region 

that we—once we started construction, we might—or our contractor 

might be forced off the site, and that would have been a catastrophic situation. 

Mr. WALBERG. Has this then produced additional effort to do feasibility studies and risk analysis before you even begin the engineering and the expensive process? 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, sir. I think we do, especially on those large 

AIF infrastructure projects. We routinely did analysis of the ability 

to execute the project. So most of them we’re doing now are electrical transmission lines, and we think we are able to complete 

those in a reasonable time and a reasonable manner. And so we 

proceeded on —— 

Mr. WALBERG. Well, you know, we would all, all I think feel better if we knew that the process began first with a risk analysis, 

feasibility study before we invested. 

Mr. Sopko, do you believe that the Afghan Government is prepared to take over full responsibility, operation, and maintenance 

of DOD-constructed facilities in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. If the question is are they capable, no, they are not 

capable at this point. They can’t—they don’t have the technical capability and they don’t have the financial capability so we’re going 

to have to support them. 

I mean, just to go back to a question one of your colleagues 

asked, Congressman, they raise approximately $2 billion in revenue. The cost of the entire Afghan National Security Forces is $5 

billion approximately. The cost of the rest of the government we’ve 

given them is another $4 billion, $3-$4 billion. So there’s a delta 

there. They can raise $2 billion. It’s $8-$10 billion to support the 

government. That delta is provided by the U.S. taxpayer and the 

coalition taxpayers. So from a financial point of view, they cannot 

maintain. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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A good question to ask is how much money are we now giving 

to the Afghan Government to do O&M for all the buildings we 

just—we give them or build for them? And that’s a significant 

amount. And remember, every dollar of O&M, overhead and maintenance that the Afghans spend is one less dollar they can spend 

for hiring a trooper, for buying bullets, for guns, or whatever. So 

we’ve got to realize we’re stuck now of having built an Afghan infrastructure that the Afghans cannot afford. 

Mr. WALBERG. I appreciate that. That is a question that we need 

to keep asking, especially in context of how long we continue to put 

ourselves in harm’s way. That includes our taxpayer funding as 

well. So thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sopko, welcome back. I have to say, listening to this and 

reading your report, you know, there is a French expression plus 

ca change, plus c’est la meme chose, you know, the more things 

change, the more they stay the same, echoes of Vietnam, echoes of 

other large investments both by DOD and AID and the same old 

story, can’t keep track of it, billions wasted, had to, you know, demolish it. 

I am looking at your report, for example. Your report, inter alia, 

on the inspection of six Afghan National Police district facilities in 

Helmand and Kandahar Provinces in 2010, one of the findings in 

that report was there was poor contractor performance to say the 

least. One of your report’s recommendations was to ensure that 

identified construction deficiencies of future projects be paid for by 

the responsible contractor instead of the U.S. Government. By the 

way, was that recommendation accepted? 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, I’d have to check on that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. In 2015, your inspection report for the 

Afghan special police training centers dry fire range found that the 

regional contracting center failed to hold the contractor accountable 

for correcting deficiencies in construction before the contract warranty expired. The Afghan Government had to demolish the facility 

and rebuild it using Afghan money. Is that correct, Mr. Sopko? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Help us understand how that we could arrive at 

that state of affairs. I mean, I listen to you talk about, you know, 

if that is winning, what would losing be? I have got to helicopter 

across the street. How in the world—if that is the security situation, how can we with a straight face say there is actually sufficient oversight on any investment we are making in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. It is difficult. I mean, I wish I could cite some French 

back to you, sir, but it’s—there’s probably a phrase of that. I mean, 

we are in a situation now where we have built too much too fast 

with too little oversight. And I feel like the detective that shows up 

and the body is not only gone from the murder scene, the chalk 

outline has now disappeared and I am trying to find somebody accountable. 


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Now, the good thing is you have a good team over in Afghanistan 

with the CSTC–A and with Commander Campbell, a new commander there, who really are taking this seriously and they’re trying to put conditions on it. The other good thing is the National 

Unity Government under President Ghani really wants to change 

things. So that is the positive side of this. And you have, under the 

Assistant Secretary Abizaid, a good team here that recognizes it. 

But we’ve got 15 years of real problems. We have 15 years of not 

applying the metrics, sir, that you and I had a long conversation 

about. We didn’t apply metrics. And to this day I still have not 

heard back from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and 

USAID to give me their top 10 successes and why. Give me your 

successful programs and why. Give me your failures and why. If 

anything, right now, you need to rack and stack what worked and 

what didn’t in Afghanistan —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Absolutely. 

Mr. SOPKO.—and nobody is able to say that to me. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You know, in terms of when in doubt, it seems 

to me—echoing Mr. Duncan’s comments—I would rather pull the 

plug and not make the risk of an investment than to expend U.S. 

taxpayer dollars on a failing enterprise that has to be demolished. 

I mean, I don’t know what good is done by that investment other 

than, I suppose, some people can pocket some money and some people can be on the payroll. But the damage done both to our prestige, you know, the symbolism of that failed investment and the 

taxpayer here to me outweighs the risk of making an investment. 

Ms. Abizaid, do you want to comment on that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir. I appreciate your concerns, and I also appreciate Mr. Sopko acknowledging all that we have done, especially 

in recent years as the mission has changed to scope the mission appropriately going forward. 

I agree with you. I think that the melting walls on an Afghan 

firing range are—is an unacceptable situation to have found ourselves in. I would also say that that is one project but not representative of the thousands of projects that we’ve undertaken in 

Afghanistan. You know, some of the successes that I can cite are 

having built a basing structure for a new Afghan National Security 

Force from which they’re fighting a live counterinsurgency right 

now and, you know, with some problems but also some successes. 

And so, you know, as we look to carry less and less burden ourselves both in dollars and American blood, we are trying to shift 

responsibility as much as possible to the Afghan Government. I 

think over the last year we’ve seen good success in that, and the 

program now is to find the right balance in terms of what we ask 

them to do, what we enable them to do, how we can build their 

own capacity, and what’s going to fall to us to address our core national security interests. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I appreciate that, but let me just echo what Mr. 

Sopko said. If we are that confident that, yes, there are some failures we can point to put there are also some successes, then it 

ought not to be that difficult for Secretary Carter to respond to Mr. 

Sopko’s request, which I certainly bless. Give us the top 10. You 

know, help us understand what lessons were learned from these 


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successes. If you want to throw in some failures, that would be welcome, too, so that we are not repeating. 

And that is why I began by saying plus ca change. Nothing 

changes in decades of these kinds of investments. Do we ever learn 

from our experience in investing in, you know, very difficult circumstances where corruption is rampant, where government is inefficient, in the case of the previous government, frankly, of questionable intent in a lot of cases? And a lot hinges on that. 

And what is the price we have paid? A deteriorating security— 

a badly deteriorating security situation and a lot of wasted dollars, 

and that is not without consequence. If I were the Taliban, I would 

point to that. If you want to throw your lot in with those people, 

let me take you to this demolished police training facility or whatever. And so it is not without consequences beyond even dollars. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I am now going to recognize myself. 

Mr. Sopko, let’s go to 60,000 feet here for a second. Give us the 

big numbers and dollars spent. And I want our colleagues and everybody to understand the numbers that we are going to talk about 

here have nothing to do with the war fight, okay? They don’t have 

anything to do with our fighting, the men and women, feeding 

them, housing them, tanks, airplanes, whatever else we need to 

fight the war. This is the construction part of the aid that we are 

giving them. How much money have we spent in just Afghanistan? 

It is north of $100 billion, is it not? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It’s actually $113 billion. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So of the $113 billion that has been spent, 

how much if it has been appropriated but not yet allocated or not 

yet spent? 

Mr. SOPKO. We have approximately—let me get that figure. I 

think it’s $11.45 billion in the pipeline as of the end of 2015, so $11 

billion is in the pipeline. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So $11 billion in the pipeline. So to the 

three representatives from the Department of Defense, how much 

is enough? How much more money does it take from the United 

States taxpayers, from the men and women who actually do the 

jobs and make the money and pay their taxes, how much more 

money do we have to pour into Afghanistan for just the reconstruction? Or is this just going to go on in perpetuity with no end? How 

much more do you need? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I think we are around a steady-state amount 

of about $3.4 billion, $3.5 billion. That might go up given some Afghan security —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So if you have 4 billion more dollars, you 

are going to be fine? 

Ms. ABIZAID. In the next year, sir, the cost to sustain the Afghan 

National Security Forces is about $3.4 billion, $3.5 billion —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Annually? 

Ms. ABIZAID.—a year. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That is just to continue to stand up the Afghan Government? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That’s —— 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. And that would come from this fund is 

what you want? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That’s right, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So yesterday and tomorrow, we are having 

a hearing about Flint and water. I just don’t understand how we 

pour $100 billion into Afghanistan and we have got people who 

can’t turn on a faucet in Michigan and drink the water. And so we 

are in tough financial straits in our own country. We are $19 trillion, trillion in debt. And it sounds to me like we have got some 

$7 billion that is sitting on the sidelines that has already been appropriated. This is not new money. It has already been set aside 

that you don’t need next year, correct? Is that accurate? If you have 

$11 billion that has been appropriated but not yet allocated and 

you need less than $4 billion a year to stand up the Afghan Government, what are you doing with the other $8 billion? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, that is total appropriation. The part that is for 

DOD is the $3.5 billion. The $11 billion is total U.S. Government, 

and that is State, AID, and other agencies. 

Mr. SOPKO. Chairman, the $3.45 billion is just supporting the Afghan military and police. You’ve still got to pay for the rest of the 

Afghan Government, okay, the teachers, the health clinics, the 

roads, and everything else. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. How much does that cost? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, as I said before, that’s about $8-$10 billion 

total, subtract out the $5 billion, $4 billion for the police. So we’re 

talking about $6 billion. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So help me with the math here. What is 

the annual expenditure the American Government needs to spend 

in—or that the military and the State Department and everybody 

else wants to spend every year? 

Mr. SOPKO. I’d go back to —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. This is just the reconstruction, no fighting. 

Mr. SOPKO. Reconstruction. I’d go back to the figure I told you. The Afghans raise about $2 billion in legal taxes —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. SOPKO.—legal taxes. They do illegally tax our contractors, but let’s just say legal taxes. It costs about $4-$5 billion for the 

military. So we’ve got a $3 billion delta. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. And then another $3-$4 billion above that. So it’s $7 

billion that somebody has to pay. Up to now, it’s the U.S. taxpayers 

and the coalition per year. Per year I’m talking about. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And what percentage is the United States 

paying versus the rest of the world? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, for the Afghan National Security Forces we’re 

talking about $1 billion from the rest of the world. The development aid I think—I would need to check with State, but I think 

they’re shooting for $1 billion as well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, sorry, Mr. Sopko, help me get the top 

line number here. How much money are we putting in and how 

much is the rest of the world putting in, DOD plus State Department, USAID, all that? 

Mr. SOPKO. It sounds like the rest of our coalition is giving about 

$2 billion and we’re picking up the other $6-$7 billion. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. And how much—is there any extra money 

just floating around because, Mr. Sopko, last time we talked about, 

it was nearly $20 billion. We were doing more projects in Afghanistan than we ever were in the history of Afghanistan, correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. I mean, actually, the amount of money we’re 

spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan is more we’re paying for 

reconstruction in any other country in the United States and I 

think we’ve ever done anywhere. I mean, it’s more than we spent 

on the entire Marshall Plan for Europe after the war. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, so $60 billion total in terms of ASIF, the fund 

that supports the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces. 

They’re—at its height it was about $10 billion a year appropriation. 

We have worked very hard as our mission has changed to move 

away from building up the ANDSF and the costly experiences associated with that and getting it to a better steady-state level at the 

$3.5 billion rate that we are currently at. 

As a means of increasing the efficiency of our investment in Afghanistan, we are looking to slope that cost of the force down. Security costs are very high both for the Afghan Government and for 

ourselves, and so one of the keys here is reducing violence levels 

in Afghanistan in a reasonable amount of time. And the ANDSF 

is going to —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, We have been at it for 14 years, so 

where are we at? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The Afghan Government has been in full lead for 

security responsibility over the last year. They had mixed success, 

but there was success, and they are—we expect them to continue 

to develop and improve your —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You can’t drive from the airport to the embassy. I have driven that. It is not a long distance. But you can’t 

do that today. So are you telling me it is more secure or less secure? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The international presence is certainly under threat 

in Afghanistan. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes, it is less —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—that is what —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—secure. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—we’re trying to do to protect ourselves. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. With indulgence here from the rest of the 

committee, I have a couple other questions. You know what, let me 

go back. I will have to ask a second round, but let me ask one other 

really quick question. 

How many people do we have in Afghanistan? I want to know 

how many DOD personnel and contractors do we have there, not 

just so-called boots on the ground but I think this boots on the 

ground is a facade because really when you go and you hire thousands or hundreds of—I don’t know what the number is—of contractors, I don’t know how those aren’t human beings as well. How 

many people does the Department of Defense have on the ground 

in Afghanistan? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I’ll have to get back to you on the full number, 

but you’re right, our contractor-to-boots-on-the-ground ratio is high. 

I think it’s at about four to one, but I’ll have to confirm that for 

the—and get it back to you for the record. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. You have got a lot of staff sitting behind 

you, so if somebody could work on that number before the end of 

this hearing, that would be really helpful. 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, I think I can give that number to you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. SOPKO. Our best guesstimate—and again, it changes every 

day—is 39,609 total contractors. It’s not just for DOD; it’s also for 

AID and State. Fourteen thousand two hundred and twenty-two 

approximately are U.S. citizens or 36 percent. So we’ve got about 

40,000 contractors. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And how many employees or—whether 

they be military, USAID, State Department? 

Mr. SOPKO. I’ll have to get back to you on that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. A lot of staff back there. 

Ms. ABIZAID. We’re working on it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Bust out those smartphones. We are going 

to come up with this number before we leave this hearing. 

Now, let’s recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, for 

5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Today, SIGAR released a report looking back at 6 years of DOD 

reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Reports such as these, as 

well as those by various inspectors general and GAO, are critical 

to our ability to learn lessons from problems today and improve our 

efforts in the future. In fact, although U.S. forces in Afghanistan 

were critical about parts of SIGAR’s report in their comments, they 

highlighted, ‘‘the value of this report lies in consolidating lessons 

which may benefit organizations charged with construction efforts 

in similar environments. 

Mr. Sopko, how else would you suggest DOD ensure lessons such 

as these are incorporated into their mission? And I have a cold. Excuse me. 

Mr. SOPKO. I think the—I think what I recommended is take 

those lessons and apply them for every new contract, but I think 

the best thing to do right now is to do a thorough, complete assessment of the needs for any new construction, and that has been 

done in the past and I’m just saying we should do it now. It’s probably a good time to do that again. General Dunford did that, and 

we actually commended him when he was commander of ASIF for 

saving close to half-a-billion dollars by canceling programs. So I 

think that’s the way to do it. Now is the time to do an assessment, 

and not only DOD. AID and State should do it, too, and that’s a 

way to incorporate that. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Ma’am, can I just address —— 

Ms. KELLY. Sure. 

Ms. ABIZAID. —through the help of inspectors general, including 

Mr. Sopko, we have learned quite a few lessons through—in our 14 

plus years in Afghanistan. You know, some of the lessons that we 

have learned specifically about reconstruction and infrastructure 

projects include having a continual review of the projects at hand 

so if they are unneeded we can actually stop construction on those 

projects and return taxpayer money, working closely with the inspectors general to identify problems to take corrective action, as 


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we have done in 90 percent of the recommendations that we heard 

from this report, including engineering experts on the front end of 

projects so we make sure that we’re not only undertaking a project 

that’s needed but building it right the first time around. That’s 

been something that I think we’ve done increasingly well over time. 

And balance the need for urgency in a contingency war environment with the kind of analysis that’s going to be appropriate in 

that environment. And so, you know, these are some of the lessons. 

There are many others that we’ve learned through cooperation with 

the inspector general. 

Ms. KELLY. You kind of answered—I was going to ask you questions about that, but I wanted to give Mr. Brown and Mr. Strickley 

a chance to describe how their experiences in Iraq have impacted 

contracting efforts in Afghanistan. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, ma’am. I appreciate that question. So the 

Corps of Engineers has done an extensive lessons-learned study of 

our experiences in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, and we have just 

published a special study of the Corps of Engineers’ experiences in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Army Center for Lessons 

Learned is adopting this, and it will be incorporated into Army engineer training in the future and it will become a part of—it is a 

part of how we organize ourselves and manage our work in Afghanistan now, and we will apply it to other contingency operations in 

the future. 

One of the things that Ms. Abizaid said that we—that is a huge 

lesson for us is that we were probably overly optimistic at the beginning in Afghanistan with how rapidly we could build things. 

And lots of things from the security situation to the border problems with Pakistan conspired against us. So we had good intentions when we awarded contracts, you know, 6, 7 years ago, and 

then the contractors, through no fault of their own and no lack of 

effort on their own, they just could not achieve the schedules that 

we set out for. So that was a huge lesson learned for us is —— 

Ms. KELLY. Can I add —— 

Mr. STRICKLEY.—be a little more skeptical. 

Ms. KELLY. Being overly optimistic, how much money did that 

cost being overly optimistic? 

Mr. STRICKLEY. I couldn’t begin to estimate that. I don’t know. 

In many cases what happened was the contractor was just unable 

to perform, so the buildings were not delivered when we wanted 

them to be delivered. So in some cases you see that facilities were 

completed and then never used. Well, that’s part of the—what 

caused that. The Corps of Engineers simply was not able to do 

the—complete the construction in the time that we wanted to. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, ma’am, I just would like to address, in addition 

to what the Corps has already mentioned, a couple other things. I 

think for us some of the lessons learned that were critical what is 

that we need to adapt the facilities to the local needs, and so looking at what is available in the local market that can be sustained 

over time. 

So sometimes we may look at bringing in a U.S. construction 

technique or design and put it into a country where maybe those 

materials aren’t available in that country or its—it will be very difVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:05 Feb 16, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\23443.TXT APRIL

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ficult to sustain. So while we are sure that we used the right 

standards for safety, we’ve learned that we need to adjust what we 

do, especially with the finishes, to make sure that that’s sustainable over time. 

Also, there’s a code that we use, the Unified Facilities Code that 

all of DOD uses that we’ve recently just in late ’13 have released 

that. And that addresses the kinds of things that we need to consider when we go into contingency operations. 

For us within AFCEC we’ve also updated what we call our playbooks, which is our internal processes, so that both from a contingency perspective and work we do for military construction, we’ve 

bounced those lessons learned off each other so that we understand 

from a standards perspective what we should be doing and also 

what we’ve learned from these contingency operations to make sure 

that in the future, as we support the military, that we’ve captured 

those lessons learned, they’re in our processes, and they’ll be there 

when the next folks are called upon to do something like this. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. I know my time is up. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Massie, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MASSIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sopko, did you testified that $113 billion has been spent in 

Afghanistan since 2002? 

Mr. SOPKO. For reconstruction only. 

Mr. MASSIE. On reconstruction. And this includes building the 

Afghan National Security Forces, to promoting good governance 

and engaging in counter narcotics? 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. MASSIE. All right. 

Mr. SOPKO. Among other things, yes. 

Mr. MASSIE. So let’s talk a little bit about the counter narcotics 

side of this. Has opiate production gone up or down since 2002 in 

Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. It’s one of the most popular crops. It’s been a success, 

yes. Opium production is up. 

Mr. MASSIE. And what percent of the world’s supply of non-pharmaceutical opiates come from Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think, sir, it’s 80 to 90 percent. 

Mr. MASSIE. That is what I hear, too, from the United Nations 

Office of Drugs and Crime. They say about 90 percent of the world 

opiates, non-pharmaceutical opiates. So how much of this $113 billion have we spent on counter narcotics efforts there? 

Mr. SOPKO. Approximately $8.4 billion. That’s billion with a B. 

Mr. MASSIE. And how much has opiate production gone up since 

2002 or since some benchmark that you can —— 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t have the exact number, but I think they’re 

producing well more now than they did during the Taliban years, 

and it has been the only successful export from Afghanistan for the 

15 years we’ve been there. 

Mr. MASSIE. Ms. Abizaid, is this consistent with what you know 

about opiate production in Afghanistan? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I’d need to check and get back to you on how numbers today compare to 2002. I know over the last year, mostly due 


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to weather, there was a decrease in the poppy crop. I think that 

the weather patterns this year mean that that’ll likely increase. 

But whether it’s a full increase since 2002, I’d need to take that 

for the record, sir. 

Mr. MASSIE. So I have read reports that opiate production has 

as much as tripled since we invaded Afghanistan in that country. 

How much do you think it has gone up, Ms. Abizaid? Has it gone 

up or down? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I’ll need to take that for the record. I don’t have 

an impression that it has tripled, but that is not something that 

I follow on a daily basis as part of my portfolio, so I’ll check with 

those that do. 

Mr. MASSIE. So the counter narcotics effort is not within the 

DOD? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir, it is within the DOD —— 

Mr. MASSIE. How do you measure success if you don’t know —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, the counter narcotics money that the Department of Defense has been in Afghanistan has primarily been to 

support the special mission wing, which is an Afghan aviation program. That’s actually one of the most successful programs in Afghanistan. Now, whether that’s affected the overall levels of opiates 

and poppy cultivation, I don’t have those numbers for you. I will 

say that reporting standards have increased widely over the last, 

you know, 14 plus years in Afghanistan as more and more credible 

sources have come in. So whether in 2002 that were accurate figures are not is something I just can’t speak to, sir. 

Mr. MASSIE. Would you testify today that opiate production has 

gone up since you started the counter narcotics effort or that it has 

gone down? This is a very simple —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. I understand, sir. I don’t—I’m sorry. I don’t have 

the answer for you. 

Mr. MASSIE. You don’t know if it has gone up or down? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I am sorry, I do not. 

Mr. MASSIE. How can you account for—I mean, I trust you have 

had a lot of activity because you have spent $8 billion there, but 

what about progress? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The progress that DOD has made in the use of its 

counter narcotics funds are represented by the success of the special mission wing, which is an Afghan aviation program. The total 

levels of opiate production, I will ask my staff to engage and get 

that answer and I will try and have that before the end of the 

hearing as well, sir. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, can I just add —— 

Mr. MASSIE. Yes, please, Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. SOPKO. I think what you’re focusing on is so important. We 

tend to focus on inputs. That’s the amount of money we spend, and 

outputs, you know, we bought a whole bunch of airplanes and we 

have a nice special mission wing, but we never looked the issue 

that you’re looking at. What is the outcome? The outcome, sir is 

that opium production is higher today. Two thousand and fourteen 

was the highest production year in Afghanistan. So if you look at 

any metrics for success or failure—and I’ve been doing counter narcotics—I did it for Sam Nunn when I was on his committee. For 

15 years I looked at counter narcotics activities in the United 


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States. You look at arrests, you look at seizures, you look at 

amount of crops underproduction, hectares under production, you 

look at the number of addicts. 

If you look at every one of those metrics, we have failed. The arrests are down, seizures are down, production is up, hectares under 

production is up, the amount of money being gained, and more important for Afghanistan, the amount of money going to the insurgency has increased since we’ve been there. 

So, sir, to you—and I’m just a simple country lawyer—I don’t 

think we’ve succeeded in Afghanistan. I make this statement like 

I did before about winning. If this is winning, what is losing the 

drug war? 

Mr. MASSIE. Just to close out here and to summarize what I am 

hearing, the war on drugs in Afghanistan, to the extent there is a 

war on drugs, has been a failure. We have spent $8 billion over 

there. Production is the highest it has ever been. And here in the 

United States we have a heroin epidemic. I think these two things 

might be related. 

And, you know, next week we are going to have a hearing in this 

exact committee to talk about the heroin epidemic. I think it is 

time to reevaluate our strategy and our tactics in the war on drugs 

in Afghanistan. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. He makes a good 

point. And I would also add to that that this is how the insurgency 

is funded, right, is it not? I mean, this is where they get their 

money, their assets to fight and kill and take down America, correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. It’s one of the sources. There are 

other sources. And I would note, Congressman, Mr. Chairman, is 

that a lot of the activities we’re seeing, the fighting we’re seeing 

in Helmand and up in the Kunduz area is drug-related. These are 

terrorists groups fighting over the drugs and these are local police 

and local Afghan officials fighting over drug control. 

Ashraf Ghani warned us before he was President if we didn’t do 

something and if the Afghans didn’t do something, his country 

would become a narco terrorist state. And I think his prediction is 

coming true. 

Mr. MASSIE. Department of Defense, you want to add anything 

to that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I’d only say that we absolutely acknowledge 

that narcotics trafficking is a major funder of the insurgency. 

Counterinsurgency operations that go against insurgent strongholds do so and try and address some of those smuggling routes, 

some of that poppy cultivation, but it is a serious problem and it’s 

one that we are very focused on, which is why we funded the special mission wing to engage in both counterterrorism and counter 

narcotics missions. 

I will acknowledge and do have information from my staff that 

counter narcotics—that poppy cultivation has generally gone up 

over the last 10 years. We’ll get more specifics for you, sir. And 

while it has fluctuated year by year, again, often weather-dependent, I would not claim that we have significantly degraded the kind 

of funding that comes from those illegal substances. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs. MALONEY. This is one of the most depressing hearings I 

have ever sat through. It is just terrible what we are hearing. And 

I think at the very least you can start a policy that you don’t build 

any more buildings unless you have proof that they can operate 

them and maintain them. That is ridiculous that you have to build 

a building and then operate and maintain it for additional cost. 

That is insanity to continue doing that. I don’t see why we don’t 

immediately stop that process. 

And Mr. Sopko’s statement that he’s trying to get a list of what 

works and what doesn’t and can’t even achieve that, I think Mr. 

Chairman or some of us should write a letter to support your efforts, and if they can’t still give you that list, we should legislate 

it, put the force of law that they have got to give you this information. And it seems to be a lesson in mismanagement. 

And my first question is to Mr. Brown from DOD. And I would 

like you to briefly explain the difference between a cost plus fixed 

fee and a firm fixed price contract. And I note an IG report of the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense, the Air Force Civil Engineers Center 

awarded a $48 million cost plus fixed fee contract to construct the 

building by 2010, and it ended up after 14 contract modifications, 

the cost was more than double at $107 million. Is that right, Mr. 

Brown? It is almost unbelievable. 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, it is. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And then you go back with a firm fixed price and 

they are able to complete it on time ahead of schedule for $47 million. So just from that one example, it looks like we should be going 

with a firm fixed price contract and stop the cost plus fixed fee. But 

your comments on it, please, Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. I’d be happy to. Yes, cost plus fixed fee is usually 

used when you have risks that you just don’t feel that you can 

bound them properly, right, so if you can’t guarantee what the material pipeline may look like. So it’s a shared risk between those 

who hold the contract and those who you contract with. 

When we go into a firm fixed price contract, that is where we’re 

much more comfortable that we can set a price and it can be delivered for that price, that there is appropriate risk being carried by 

both the government and by the contractor. 

I will say, as we looked back over the history of the work we did 

in Afghanistan, we saw early on—I think as respective to what was 

the status of the affairs early on—that we used a fair amount of 

cost plus fixed fee contracts early when we were early involved. 

But from about ’11, ’12 on, we switched most of our work to firm 

fixed price because at that point we felt we could better guarantee 

the price and hold the contractor to that. 

In the case of the headquarters, let me just kind of walk back 

through what happened there. That was a cost plus fixed fee —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Yes, I read that so —— 

Mr. BROWN. Okay. 

Mrs. MALONEY.—I just wanted to get to your comments. 

So I just would like to go to Mr. Sopko. You know, do you believe 

that one contract type is better than another? And do you believe 


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that the cost overruns and other issues associated with this project 

could have been prevented by just using a firm fixed price contract? 

Mr. SOPKO. Absolutely. I would never use a cost plus contract in 

Afghanistan. You’re basically asking for the American taxpayer to 

end up getting fleeced, and that’s what you had here. I mean, there 

is no risk. And I take umbrage with the colleague that somehow 

we’re sharing risk in a cost plus contract. The only person sharing 

the risk is the U.S. taxpayer. The contractor doesn’t have to do 

anything. He’s going to get the additional funding, and that’s what 

you see here, 5 additional years to do the contract and a cost overrun of hundreds of millions of dollars. So I would never use a costplus contract in a place like Afghanistan. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, why don’t we stop that policy right now? 

I would like to ask Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should do 

now with these out-of-control costs? 

Mr. SOPKO. As I said before, I think we need to reassess what 

we’ve done up to now, and by ‘‘we’’ I mean not SIGAR. We’re going 

to do our own lessons learned on this. I think that each agency has 

to do it, rack and stack what’s worked, what hasn’t, and what do 

we need to do in Afghanistan. But we have to prioritize. 

Now, we have talked about promising a decade of transition. 

That means at least for the next 10 years the billions of dollars 

that the chairman has been trying to figure out with us that we’re 

going to spend, we’ve promised 10 more years of this. The other 

thing you have to consider if we stop funding the Afghan Government, it will collapse and the bad guys will take over. 

So we’re between a rock and a hard spot, but you really need, 

from a policy point of view, make a decision and go forward on 

that. But I think we need to start by doing racking and stacking 

and prioritizing what the Afghans really need. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Ma’am, with respect to that prioritization, I do 

think that we are engaged in that. If you look at the amount of 

money we are going to be spending on infrastructure projects in the 

next year, it’s 1 percent of the total request, which the total request 

is already quite a bit lower than it was. And it is on those priority 

efforts that are about increasing Afghan National Security Force 

capability in ways that we don’t have to it expand U.S. resources 

to make up for. 

So in particular, they have a fixed wing aircraft that needs infrastructure, storage for munitions. We’re spending money on that. 

We’re not spending money on building schools or large-scale new 

builds. We are mostly in a place where 95 percent of the infrastructure build is over, and we are prioritizing our efforts to sustain and 

to have very clear objectives in what new projects we seek to undertake. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. My time is expired. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If the gentlewoman would yield, I wish 

what you said was true, but it is not because when we look at the 

American taxpayer dollars, you are a portion of it. Then, you go 

over to the USAID, you go to State Department, you go to the others, you start to quickly realize that all these other spends on 

building, you know, goat farms and other things like that, we are 

spending money on all those things. 


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And if the Department of Defense was just focused on helping secure Afghanistan, I think that that would be a different equation, 

but it is not. And I will come back to it. 

But let’s recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sopko, you made, to me, a powerful statement. Earlier you 

said in regard to the reconstruction that we built too much too fast 

with too little oversight. And unfortunately, it appears that that is 

a nagging, negative principle that it seems as though, at least 

many feel the pain that that is a principle our entire government 

right now seems to embrace. At least many people feel that way. 

But within the context of that statement, we built too much too 

fast, too little oversight, how many infrastructure projects in Afghanistan are currently in development? 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, I wouldn’t have that number. I will try 

to find it. But the problem we have is—and this is something we’ve 

pointed out for a few years—we don’t even know what we built in 

Afghanistan —— 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO.—so I can’t tell you how many are under —— 

Mr. HICE. That is just what I was saying. We don’t know what 

we have built. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Congressman —— 

Mr. HICE. We don’t know what is under construction right now, 

we don’t know what we have done —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, we do know what’s under construction now. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. What is under —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. I mentioned the munitions storage facility for the 

A–29. We also have —— 

Mr. HICE. How many? I don’t need the details, just how many 

projects? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I would say it’s a handful, sir. I can get the details 

for you on the specifics. But as I mentioned, it’s 1 percent of the 

planned budget, and we’re not talking about very many new builds 

at all. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Please, if you would get that to me, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. HICE. So it seems again that the overarching problem here 

is lack of oversight. Where there has been oversight—is it fair to 

say where there has been oversight, we have had a better outcome? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That is absolutely fair to say, sir. 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s correct. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So what are we doing to ensure accountability 

to the American taxpayer that there will be oversight on these current projects and future? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So we have increased oversight over the years. I 

think that if you look at the scope of Mr. Sopko’s most recent report, it’s relating projects that were from 2009 and some current 

projects. I think you even see in that report the kind of improvement that we’ve done in terms of processes and procedures for 

oversight. There’s oversight that happens in the field through 

CSTC–A. There’s also oversight that happens in the Department. 

Mr. HICE. How many —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. But my colleagues —— 


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Mr. HICE.—of these things that you are describing, how long 

have those been in place? 

Ms. ABIZAID. They have increased over time. For instance, in the 

Department we have an Afghanistan Resources and Oversight 

Council that is co-chaired by me, comptroller, and one of my colleagues from AT&L. That’s been in place for since, I think, 2013. 

And we have to approve projects that are above a certain dollar 

amount to make sure that it’s consistent with our policy —— 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—our strategy. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Excuse me for interrupting. I just have a 

couple more questions. So with that, I mean, time is going to be 

the test to confirm whether or not these new programs being implemented will provide the accountability needed. 

But of the projects that have already been built that failed to 

meet our requirements, did I hear correctly that those contractors 

were paid in full? I believe that was mentioned earlier. 

Ms. ABIZAID. I don’t —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Many of them. I said that. That’s what we’ve been 

—— 

Ms. ABIZAID. Not all of them, sir. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Not all of them, but many of them were paid 

in full for inadequate jobs, so again, taxpayer dollars wasted. How 

many of those projects—both the ones that were completed properly and improperly, how many are currently occupied 

percentagewise or are they all occupied? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So, sir, of the projects that were specifically for the 

MOI and MOD, which I think Mr. Sopko in his report listed 27 of 

them, 26 of those are currently occupied and currently being used 

by the Afghan National Security Forces. One of them was canceled 

actually by the Department of Defense and saving, I think, up to 

about $10 million in taxpayer —— 

Mr. HICE. I thought I heard earlier that there were several buildings that were built that were not occupied. Again, part of the ‘‘we 

built too much too fast.’’ 

Mr. SOPKO. Oh, yes. And remember, the universe—we only 

looked at a few of these buildings. What you really need to do is 

ask the Department of Defense to tell you of all the buildings built 

they’ve —— 

Mr. HICE. Can I ask that —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—how many are occupied —— 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO.—how many are being used for the purpose that they 

—— 

Mr. HICE. Can I ask that we get that number? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir. We’ll get that to you —— 

Mr. HICE. I mean, it is stunning to me that—amazing at least 

that we don’t even know what all we have built. 

Ms. ABIZAID. So, sir, I —— 

Mr. HICE. How can we know what is occupied if we don’t even 

know what we have built? 

Ms. ABIZAID. For those projects that we’ve built for the Afghan 

military, I think we do know and have good record of what was 

built. I think where there is less certainty is—are those projects 


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that are—that were directed under the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program, which is an appropriation that’s gone down 

over time and has been managed by individual units in the field, 

captains, colonels depending on the size of the unit to undertake 

immediate-need projects like building a well, like walls for a school. 

And so I think that our records on that go to the amount of appropriation that was given to a particular unit, not necessarily all 

specific projects. But we have good data on that and we’ll certainly 

get it to you as a question for the record, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sopko, first of all, welcome back. It is good to see you again. 

One of the largest infrastructure projects in Afghanistan was the 

new Ministry of Defense headquarters, which has been dubbed a 

mini-Pentagon. This project cost about $200 million with a significant portion of that coming from U.S. taxpayers. In your report you 

say this project took almost 5 years longer to complete than anticipated and cost more than three times the original estimate. You 

found that one of the key reasons for this delay was security issues. 

In fact, there were multiple reports of suicide bomb attacks at or 

near the site during construction, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You indicated that the headquarters building is 

well-built but it has some issues that need to be assessed relating 

to its ability to withstand earthquakes. At the time of your report, 

you were still waiting for documents to close out these recommendations. Has the DOD provided you with the information 

you need to close out those recommendations? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, to close out the recommendations, but we never 

received the assessments that they did. We said they should do assessments, but we have not received those assessments prior to 

issuing that report. We still haven’t received those assessments. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And do you have any idea when you might get 

them? 

Mr. SOPKO. We have no idea. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Have you been pressing them for them? 

Mr. SOPKO. We’ve asked repeatedly, but we couldn’t hold the report any longer. We held it for a long time to get those assessments. We still have not gotten written assessments. Our concern 

is the assessments aren’t in writing; they were oral. That’s a concern we have maybe because we’re suspicious, but we still haven’t 

gotten written assessments. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why would you be suspicious? 

Mr. SOPKO. Oh, I’ve been doing this for 20-some years, sir. After 

a while, I get suspicious when I ask for something that’s pretty 

simple to get and I don’t get it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, we are very familiar with that concept. 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You also noted that as of January 7, 2016, the 

building was not fully occupied. Is that right? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you know if it is fully occupied now? 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t know. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, it is. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. It is? 

Ms. ABIZAID. At 90 percent occupancy, I believe. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ninety percent? As of when? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That is the update I got from the field over the last 

2 weeks, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

So let me turn to Mr. Brown. The project was managed by the 

Air Force Civil Engineer Center. Mr. Brown, how did the security 

situation in Afghanistan impact the budget and construction costs 

of the headquarters building? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. I’d say there were probably two contributing factors there. One was the security you mentioned with the 

general security around the area. And we saw that that impacted 

us both in dollars and in time. The other thing is the proximity of 

that facility to the presidential compound, and so we—when we 

would see that there would be delays and there were fairly extensive delays whenever the President would be moving, we would 

have to clear the work area of all the workers until the President— 

Afghanistan President was back in place or had left the compound. 

And so that cost us about 10 months and about —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Whoa, whoa, whoa, the President moving around 

cost you 10 months? Is that what you just said? 

Mr. BROWN. Well, cumulative over the whole time. I’m talking —— Mr. CUMMINGS. What? 

Mr. BROWN. Cumulative—the cumulative impact of that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Mr. BROWN. Of having to clear the work area of all the workers 

and then bring them back on once we were allowed to bring the 

workers back on the worksite. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Had that been anticipated? 

Mr. BROWN. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Mr. BROWN. I don’t think we understood that we were going to 

have to clear the work area as the head of government moved 

around. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what were some of the other factors that led 

to the delays and increased costs? 

Mr. BROWN. Probably the biggest factor was that when we went 

to start the project, the area that we were going to work in was 

in the control of the Afghan National Army. It took about 14 

months for us actually secure it to get access to that area. So from 

the beginning the project was delayed because we could not get access to there to begin to do the construction work. That was the 

largest single delay that we had. 

I mentioned the security issues in there. The other one we talked 

a little bit earlier. When we were into the project and we decided 

that, amongst all of the folks, including the in-country leadership, 

that we should convert this from a cost plus contract to a fixed 

price contract, we actually stopped. That took about 7 months to 

do that conversion while we did that. So that added to that also. 


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So between the three things I’ve mentioned, security, the ability to 

get access to the property, and then the conversion from a cost-plus 

contract to a fixed price contract, that—that equated to about 27 

months. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So are you confident in the structural integrity 

of the building and its ability to withstand earthquake and terrorist attacks? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, we are. I will say that with respect to the concerns that were raised, we appreciate that we—we did provide information to CSTC–A to address the concerns. With respect to the 

seismic joints, we—we’ve gone back and that was part of our assessment to make sure that those were installed correctly, that 

those were designed correctly. Again, we use U.S. standards for 

that, so these are built to U.S. code so that we are assured that 

we are building something that is seismically sound, and they are. 

And so we are confident of that. 

We are in large part, not only through our assessment because 

just in this last October there was a 7.5 earthquake in the general 

area. There was inspections done after the earthquake. That building held up very, very well. Only minor superficial damage was 

done to it. So we believe that the building is constructed properly 

and it has been turned over and is in use, as was mentioned earlier 

today. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Abizaid, this facility has cutting-edge communications security equipment, including security cameras, key 

cards access, computers, and x-ray scanners. How will these features improve operations and security for the Afghanistan National 

Defense and Security Forces? 

Ms. ABIZAID. To the extent that those features make, one, the 

ministry more secure, and two, the ministry able to connect more 

effectively with the units outside of Kabul, we think that those are 

important features of any kind of headquarters element, including 

the Pentagon. So we do think that it is important to have a fully 

functioning building for the Ministry of Defense so we can have the 

kind of leadership over its security forces that are important for 

their effective function. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you believe investing in projects like the new 

headquarters furthers our national security goals, and if so, explain 

that. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, yes, I do. The need for the Afghan Ministry of 

Defense to have a secure building in a secure location and be able 

to effectively communicate with their forces has been an important 

feature for just making sure that that minister functions and increasingly on its own so that we’re not taking the slack and doing 

the work for them ourselves, which has features of enabling dependence as opposed to enabling independence. So I do think it’s 

an important part of what we do. 

I think to do it well is very important. I know that there were 

some—the cost overruns are a feature of the security environment 

unfortunately in Afghanistan. They’re also feature of bad contracting on the—in the early part of the contracts, maybe some 

underestimates about how much this was going to cost, and so 

while I think these investments are important, it’s also important 

that we do them right. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize myself here. 

Mr. Sopko, tell me about the Kabul Bank. I had asked you previously about the Kabul Bank. Is there any sort of update on that? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, there is. And I know, Mr. Chairman, you’ve 

been very interested in this, and I know the ranking member has 

been very interested, and I think it’s because of your interest that 

I actually have some good news to report. We have been working 

with the new Unity Government, the National Unity Government, 

and on my recent trip to Afghanistan on February 22 I met with 

President Ghani about the Kabul Bank and other matters. 

The President indicated he wanted SIGAR to work with his new 

task force that he is creating to find the assets. And so he is giving 

us complete access to all relevant bank and financial records, as 

well as other individuals. So this is a tremendous breakthrough. It 

should have been done years ago, but President Ghani has focused 

on this, so we are very happy about that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Great. 

Mr. SOPKO. We have no guarantee we’re going to get the money. 

It should have been done, like I say, 5 years ago, but the President 

is very eager for us to help him and recover the assets for the Afghan people. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Very good. Thank you. 

Somebody from the Department of Defense, what is the Task 

Force for Business and Stability Operations? What does that do 

and why is the Department of Defense doing it? 

Ms. ABIZAID. We are not any more, sir. The Task Force for Stability—for Business and Stability Operations closed its doors in— 

at the end of 2014, and we are no longer engaged in the kind of 

business that TFBSO did. 

The reason TFBSO was stood up was as part of our counterinsurgency mission. Commanders in the field felt that there was a high 

demand for DOD to be able to invest in economic development in 

a way that would complement those efforts of State and USAID. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. And that was the theory behind the case, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Look, I believe in our United States military. I think that they can do anything if they are given the mission and the tools to do it. But I worry that we ask the Department 

of Defense to go in and do things that is not core to their mission. 

We are great war fighters at the Department of Defense, but to go 

in and start doing business operations is maybe a bridge too far. 

Of all the projects you have on your plate, of all the projects moving forward, what is not related to military or the building up of 

security forces in Afghanistan? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So with the closing of TFBSO, I think that the 

projects that I’m most aware of are those that are associated with 

the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and those are about infrastructure projects associated with the electric grid and completing 

power transmission lines, for instance. Those are projects we undertook starting several years ago, and we’re just trying to finish 

out those projects. And they’re projects that we do in coordination 

with USAID given the security environment and the expertise that 

the Corps of Engineers brings to the table. 


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I think, sir, also just one addendum. We are also doing—continuing to do work on the Kajaki Dam, which is also a core competency of the Corps of Engineers. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you have a list of everything that you 

have built? I understand that the CERP funds are very difficult at 

that level, but do you have a list of things that you have actually 

built? 

Ms. ABIZAID. We do have a list, sir. I can get that for you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Sopko, do you have that list? No. And 

what we’re talking about, I think, is the CERP. CERP is the big— 

is the black hole. We built a lot, and it’s not just digging ditches. 

We built schools, clinics, and a bunch of other things, and we don’t 

really have that central database. We don’t have a central database. Nobody does of all the work that was done in Afghanistan. 

GAO has found that, and we have repeatedly found that, and we 

have made recommendations there should be a central database of 

all reconstruction projects. 

And I think my colleague even agrees. With the exception of 

CERP, they have a pretty good idea, but the CERP funds, we have 

no idea what we have built. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. How much money did we spend there? 

Mr. SOPKO. Billions, I think. I can get the exact number. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. 

Mr. SOPKO. CERP was a rather large program. 

Ms. ABIZAID. CERP has changed over time. It looks like it’s at $2.2 billion over the course of the campaign, which is much different than ASIF or the other funds. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You made an assertion that we have—you 

said, ‘‘we have increased oversight.’’ Really? How do you make that 

case because it doesn’t seem like that is the case. What is the metric you used to come to that conclusion that you have increased 

oversight? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Well, sir, I talked earlier about some of the lessons 

learned that we have undertaken to increase the kind of oversight 

that we have provided for various projects. I think in the field, 

given the volume of projects that we’re undertaking, we have better 

oversight and we have a more competent Afghan partner who’s 

grown their capability over several years. 

I don’t know if my colleagues from the engineering world would 

be able to tell in more specifics how they have done that with specific projects. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, sir. So for the construction projects, 

they’re—when we arrived there in 2002, there was almost no construction industry in Afghanistan in the sense that we would think 

about construction contracting, and there was very little engineering—construction engineering capability. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let me ask you a simple question. Do you 

have a picture of every project that we have ever done? 

Mr. STRICKLEY. I suspect the Corps of Engineers has a picture 

of every project we’ve built, yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That is one thing I have been asking for for 

years, more, quite frankly, from the State Department. It just 

seems that in today’s digital world we can take a picture. That is 

at least some oversight that we actually built something. 


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The concern is the drawdown of the forces and the ability to even 

get outside the walls is greatly diminished. Mr. Sopko, perhaps you 

can give perspective here as I wrap up this line of questioning. 

Mr. SOPKO. It’s harder to do oversight now. We have the largest 

oversight presence of any of the IGs or the GAO, but it’s a security 

situation we’re dealing with. 

Now, we haven’t just given up and walked away. We have come 

up with some innovative techniques, and one of them is using a 

number of Afghan civilian organizations and vetting them to get 

out and take a look at schools and clinics, and then we doublecheck that. And that’s how we’re getting out to do it. But it’s extremely difficult because of the security situation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. Let’s now recognize Mr. Carter of 

Georgia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Abizaid—I am sorry—the report that was released today by 

SIGAR points to many issues about contractor performance in Afghanistan. And would you agree that the poor contractor performance has hindered the Department of Defense’s rebuilding efforts? 

Ms. ABIZAID. In some ways, yes, it has. Again, I would just say 

that Mr. Sopko’s report details 44 projects, which is among over 

1,000 that we’ve actually undertaken in the country. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Let me ask you something. On these projects, 

are there any provisions in your reconstruction contracts that require the contractor to complete the project before they are paid? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Let me turn to my colleague —— 

Mr. CARTER. Sure. Sure. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—in engineering. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes. Yes, sir. We use the exact same Federal Acquisition Regulations to do contracting in Afghanistan that we 

would use in the United States. So they are paid—the contractors 

are paid based on placement. Every month, every 2 months they 

send us an invoice, we confirm they’ve done the work, and if they 

have, then we pay them —— 

Mr. CARTER. So it is not the —— 

Mr. STRICKLEY.—for the work performed. 

Mr. CARTER.—complete project, it is just that portion of the 

project that you are paying for? 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes. Yes, sir. We pay them progress. As they 

make progress, we pay them, same as we would here —— 

Mr. CARTER. Do you ever hold back any in anticipation of, you 

know, you have got to complete this project, not this portion of the 

project but this project has got to be completed before you get the 

last check? 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Yes, sir, absolutely. And so when a contractor 

falls behind schedule, the FAR, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 

allows us to withhold up to 10 percent of the value of the project 

until they either catch up their schedule or they finish. 

But, as I said earlier, many of these firms that we’re contracting 

with in Afghanistan are very small businesses. We’re trying to 

build an industry there. If we withhold much of a payment from 

them, they will simply fail as a business. They do not—they don’t 

have the capital to carry the projects, and when they fall behind, 


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they won’t pay their subcontractors, and then we have security 

problems on the jobsite if the subcontractors —— 

Mr. CARTER. And I am understanding of that and I am appreciative of that, but at the same time, this is interfering with the 

Department of Defense’s rebuilding efforts. I mean, that has been 

acknowledged. We have got to do something. I mean, you know, we 

are getting reports that we are continuing to contract with firms 

that aren’t finishing the work. 

Mr. STRICKLEY. The firms in Afghanistan that we do business 

with have gotten better and better over the years. We’ve literally 

had hundreds of Afghan construction firms perform satisfactorily 

on our projects. We’ve completed about 1,200 projects for DOD in 

Afghanistan, and we’ve literally done business with hundreds of 

small Afghan firms. So we’ve created a credible construction capacity there, and they are performing quite well. 

Security obviously is not within the control of the construction 

contractors, so as workers are driven off the site or if we can’t get 

material to the site, there’s little we can do about that. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Mr. Sopko, let me ask you. Let me ask you 

your opinion of the oversight that the Department of Defense does 

on these projects. Do you think that it is adequate? 

Mr. SOPKO. No. No, it is not. Part of it is because of security. It’s 

not adequate. We have seen time and time again, and even on recent projects, somebody can’t get out and check and see if the 

project was finished, you know, and it was completed in a proper 

manner. 

Mr. CARTER. Yet they are continuing to pay them? 

Mr. SOPKO. Of course. If no one goes out and kicks the tires, you 

make the payment. So, no. And again —— 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. You all have got me confused here. Okay. I 

have got somebody telling me, yes, we were doing good and we are 

doing better and then I got somebody else telling me, no —— 

Mr. STRICKLEY. Sir, we employ—right now, we have 30—I think 

we have 39 projects still under construction in Afghanistan. We 

employ about 200 Afghan engineers who are capable of visiting all 

of those project sites and do on a regular basis. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. I am sorry to interrupt you but I want to get 

back to Mr. Sopko. I have got a report that the Ministry of Defense 

building took 5 years, 5—1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years times the original budget to complete, yet it is still not fully complete. Is that true? Mr. 

Sopko, is that —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, yes, I think the construction is completed as 

a—when we ended it, I don’t think it was fully occupied. I think 

it’s finished but it’s not fully occupied. 

Mr. CARTER. Five years? 

Ms. ABIZAID. It’s now complete and fully occupied. Mr. Brown’s 

organization took care of that construction. 

Mr. BROWN. It was complete last summer and turned over to the 

CSTC–A and has been —— 

Mr. CARTER. But I am correct, 5 years? 

Mr. BROWN. Approximately 5 years, yes. And we kind of went 

through —— 

Mr. CARTER. Is that acceptable? 

Mr. BROWN. No, it is not. 


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Mr. CARTER. Then what can we do to make it—what can we do 

to improve? I mean—and out of all due respect, I don’t need to hear 

just, oh, it is security concerns. 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, this is—I mean, Congressman, this is 

in the most secure location in Afghanistan. This isn’t downtown 

Kabul. You can see the building from our embassy. This is a thing 

that was done recently. Now, we have MOI. You can see that from 

the airport. 

And so if the security situation is bad, and I recognize there are 

security problems, if they can’t do it under time and on budget 

there, what do you expect if they’re doing something in Kajaki 

where no American can get to? And that was one of the things that 

they’re still working on, the Kajaki Dam. We have been trying to 

finish the Kajaki Dam since 1950. It is the longest public works 

projects in the history of the United States. It makes the Big Dig 

look like a real short dig. 

Now, we are putting money and money in it. I heard somebody 

refer to dams the—use decided to go on budget because we couldn’t 

do the product—project ourselves. So we gave it to the Afghans to 

do it. But there’s no Americans checking to see if they’re doing it. 

Last time we heard, the turbine parts had been sitting out there 

for years and been rusting in a bone yard. They don’t fit. They 

don’t work together. But I was assured by USAID it’s going to be 

completed in my lifetime. 

Mr. CARTER. You know, maybe what we ought to do is just get 

some helicopters and get money and just, you know, drop it over 

the country. I mean, seriously. This is totally unacceptable. 

Mr. SOPKO. Kajaki Dam is now totally surrounded by the insurgents, and even when we finish Kajaki Dam, sir, most of the—I 

wouldn’t say most, probably a good percentage of electricity is 

going to be diverted to the insurgents. So we are basically paying 

for a power plant for the insurgents. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Sopko, thank you, but I will be quite honest 

with you, I could have gone all day without hearing this. This is 

really disappointing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And it is about time we get 

USAID and the State Department back up here because so much 

of the waste, fraud, the abuse is found within their organizations. 

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Absolutely. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I would now recognize the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Well, I don’t mean to belabor the point, Mr. Sopko, but 

I have the transcript from 4/29/15, and we had you in and I was 

asking at that time what the amount was you had cited they 

couldn’t absorb or—and I said steal, but here is my words there. 

I believe the amount was $20 billion in Afghanistan money that 

was backed up. They had neither the ability or capacity to spend 

or steal. I think it was—was that an accurate statement? I was 

asking that. 

Mr. Sopko, I think you are correct. It is about—actually it is more than $20 billion right now that has been appropriated, authorized, but not yet spent. And I guess in a subcommittee hearing 

on April 3, 2014, I had asked you for information on a list of AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:05 Feb 16, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\23443.TXT APRIL

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ghan nationals who you found were held criminally accountable for 

some of the theft, and you provided a response to me at that point. 

You also said as of March 31, 2014, $18 billion remained to be 

spent. It was either backed up and couldn’t be absorbed or if you 

want to attribute the stolen to me, I will say that. What is the 

amount now, would you estimate? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think that it’s down to 11—approximately $11 billion. 

Mr. MICA. But they still can’t absorb or, I believe, they can’t absorb that money. They don’t have the capacity to absorb it. So the 

good news is some of that has been cut off. We are not giving them 

more. 

Then, I went into prosecutions. Did DOD or State go after money 

that was defrauded or criminally expended? Are there any instances? I mean, there’s a lot of fraud, waste, and abuse going on, 

but we could go after fraud and criminal action, and that has been 

cited. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, DOD doesn’t actually prosecute cases —— 

Mr. MICA. Okay. But have there —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—nor do we—we —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, sir, we have. 

Mr. SOPKO.—investigate them and then turn them over to —— 

Mr. MICA. Can you give us cases? 

Ms. ABIZAID. There are examples of us holding to account those 

that we have evidence of fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Mr. MICA. But I want to know —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. I think—and that’s been enabled by Mr. Sopko’s 

—— 

Mr. MICA.—how many criminally have been held accountable in 

United States courts? And then you outline some of the difficulty 

in prosecuting within Afghan courts. Can anyone give me a number, 10, 20, 30? I can tell you over 140 in New York on the Sandy 

project. 

Ms. ABIZAID. I can get that for the record, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. I want that in the record and the response. I 

follow up on these things. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Then, you went on to cite in your letter to me 

that one of the difficulties was prosecuting in Afghan courts, right? 

And you actually got one person in to testify, I guess an American 

law enforcement person in a case there. But at that time, 2014, we 

didn’t have an extradition treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with 110 countries. Who negotiates the extradition 

treaty, the Secretary of State? 

Mr. SOPKO. I believe it’s —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. The State Department. 

Mr. SOPKO.—State Department. 

Mr. MICA. So we never—do we have one now in place? 

Mr. SOPKO. No. 

Mr. MICA. We still do not have an extradition treaty so we can’t 

go after them there. 

Then, there was another handicap you cited, the Afghan First 

Initiative. U.S. contractors were restricted so they are giving the 

stuff to Afghan contractors who we really couldn’t monitor or go 


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after criminally. Is that still in place, this Afghan First requirement? 

Mr. SOPKO. I believe so. I mean —— 

Mr. MICA. Do you know? 

Ms. ABIZAID. No, I’m not—I do not think it is still in place. The 

Department —— 

Mr. MICA. Well, that would be good to know because we have no 

recourse. 

Any percentage of what you think has been wasteful or—you 

don’t like me to use stolen, but —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Again, I —— 

Mr. MICA.—fraud? 

Mr. SOPKO. Billions, sir —— 

Mr. MICA. I mean, $10 billion —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—billions, just billions. 

Mr. MICA. Billions and—yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. And we have not been able to go after them or, if we 

have, it has been, well, limited both in Afghan courts or U.S. 

courts. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, Mr. Mica, can I just add —— 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO.—we have—SIGAR has worked very closely with the 

National Unity Government and the President and his people. 

Mr. MICA. And you got one person to —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, since then. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. Since then, we actually uncovered a scheme to defraud a billion-dollar contract that was going to be issued by the 

Afghan Government. It was U.S. money. And we brought that to 

the President’s attention and he did something. He fired generals, 

he opened an investigation on it. So this is —— 

Mr. MICA. And —— 

Mr. SOPKO.—the difference with this new government versus the 

old government. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Well, again, an extradition treaty would probably help, too. That sounds like there is still going to be spending 

money. Maybe we could request that or Secretary of State to do 

that. 

Finally, what does it look like as total assets left behind value? 

Since we don’t have an inventory of the projects, which is astounding, is there any guesstimate as to our—I know we are leaving billions behind, but is it—and we spent $110—I would have another 

question, Mr. Chairman, if you—and then I am very concerned 

about in Iraq, you know, we spent a billion, gazillion dollars training these guys and then they cut and run. Has anyone done an 

evaluation of our programs there? And do they have the ability either as a police or defense force to hold things together? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I would say that the Afghan National Security 

Forces are actually one of the most nationalist institutions in Afghanistan, and we’ve actually seen them fight very well over the 

last year —— 

Mr. MICA. Well —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—obviously with some challenges. 


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Mr. MICA. But that is not a good answer because I am the best 

Representative in the 7th Congressional District. I am the only 

one. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. ABIZAID. I understand, sir. I would say that what we have 

seen is a strong ANDSF —— 

Mr. MICA. Yes, but —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—and a strong commitment to defending their country. How are they compared to Iraqi security forces is not something that I have an answer for you. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Well, again, and then the assets, the amount, 

maybe somebody could calculate what we are leaving behind. I 

know some things, it costs you more to take the asset out, but 

there are some infrastructure that you can’t remove that we are 

leaving behind that they can’t maintain or where they have taken 

control of where we are spending more money to renovate it that 

we don’t need to spend. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, we are engaged in a dialogue with the Afghans 

about excess infrastructure that we do not think that they need 

and they think—we think that they should divest of. 

Mr. MICA. For the record —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. And we will —— 

Mr. MICA.—staff can get that —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. We will give you a list of —— 

Mr. MICA.—in the record, yes. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—that information for the record, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And then maybe we will have an inventory, too. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman —— 

Mr. MICA. Don’t feel bad, though, because we don’t have inventory of the public assets, the property that we have in our own 

agencies in the United States, let alone some place that is under 

attack. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, just so you know, this week my Special Projects Unit just issued a report that partially answers your 

question. It discussed that between January 2010 and October 

2015 DOD transferred or closed 616 of 715 bases in Afghanistan, 

and the value the DOD put on it was $851 million, and that consists of 11,900 —— 

Mr. MICA. And that is bases so —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Bases and excess property —— 

Mr. MICA. We have got lots of USAID that—tens of billions —— 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. MICA.—going in to a country that only has a $5 billion annual budget. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just a few questions. Speaking of training, Ms. 

Abizaid, some of the construction projects have been constructed as 

training facilities, is that right? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And they were to house the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. Are the Afghan soldiers and 


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police being trained in the facilities that were constructed with 

U.S. dollars? 

Ms. ABIZAID. That’s right, sir, yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I mean, and how is that going? Is it adequate for 

what they are trying to accomplish? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The training —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you know? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The training effort that’s ongoing is extensive. It is 

one that happens in the midst of a counterinsurgency fight. But my 

understanding is that, yes, the training that they’re—that is ongoing, some of which we advise but don’t do ourselves because Afghans are now doing it for themselves is going generally well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Sopko, one of the facilities that you inspected was the Qala-i-Muslim medical clinic in Kabul Province? 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Which was built with funds from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Your report concluded 

that the clinic was serving the community well, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And why did you say that? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, it had met its contract requirement to build it, 

it was well-built, it was being used as intended. So it was a success 

story. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, in fact, you found that in 2013 clinic records 

that showed over 1,500 outpatient consultations, 63 prenatal patients, and 63 newborn deliveries since the clinic opened in 2011, 

is that right? 

Mr. SOPKO. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you also found that the Ministry of Public 

health was sustaining the facility and inspectors noted clean floors, 

well-kept bedding, working heating and electrical systems and a 

well-stocked pharmacy. Would you call this a success story? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, it is a success. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that is one of the exceptions, I take it? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just listening to today. 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I would disagree a little bit with it being one 

of the exceptions, that a success is an exception to the rule. It 

might be an exception in the world of Mr. Sopko’s 44 projects that 

he reviewed, but we’ve undertaken thousands and we do have 

other successes. And we’re happy to answer Mr. Sopko’s questions 

about those. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are there are a number of medical facilities? 

Ms. ABIZAID. We have constructed some clinics and some medical 

facilities over the years, usually through CERP funds, but that is 

more now the business of USAID and the State Department. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, going back to this particular clinic, I think 

I would conclude that it’s a success story. According to USAID, the 

percentage of women in Afghanistan receiving prenatal care has increased from 16 percent in 2002 to 60 percent in 2010, and this has 

coincided with an infant mortality rate that has decreased by 53 

percent. That is significant. 


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Ms. ABIZAID. That’s right, sir. Life expectancy and generally 

quality of life in Afghanistan has improved quite a bit over the last 

14 years. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you would attribute that to our efforts? 

Ms. ABIZAID. To U.S. Government and coalition efforts, yes, I 

would. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And why do you say that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The amount of enabling capacity we’ve built for the 

Afghans, the amount of skills that we have developed within the 

Afghan workforce has been significant in terms of increasing literacy rates, increasing the amount of women that are in the workforce, increasing the amount of girls that go to school, education is 

much better, Afghan security forces exist in a way that they didn’t 

previously so they can provide for the security of the Afghan people. So in large part, Afghanistan is a much better country than 

it was when under Taliban rule and when we got there originally. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So do you know what the life expectancy was? 

Do you have any comparison numbers? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I—comparison numbers exist. I don’t have them 

with me, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Just a couple of questions here as we wrap 

up. 

Ms. Abizaid, if the SIGAR is asking for the top 10 projects, is 

that something you can get for him? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes, it is. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. When? By when? When is a good reasonable time to get him that? 

Ms. ABIZAID. We will get it to him in a matter of a month. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. Fair enough. 

You mentioned biometric IDs. Explain to me how you are doing 

biometric IDs. 

Ms. ABIZAID. So we have instituted a biometric ID card system 

for the Ministry of Defense and the Afghan National Army. It’ll 

likely be extended to the Afghan National Police. But this is an ID 

card much like DOD civilians, DOD military have that have critical 

biodata about individual soldiers and is what is going to be a key 

piece of requiring that we pay who has the ID and, you know, increases the accountability of our paying personnel system. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You can go ahead and leave that microphone on because I am going to keep asking you a few more questions. When you say biometric information, what would that include? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So it includes a number of things. I mean, I think 

date of birth, you know, ethnicity. I think that there is a particular—like Social Security number that is associated with each— 

the details of the biometric ID card I can certainly get to you —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will it include a picture? 

Ms. ABIZAID. It does include a picture, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you take fingerprints? I mean —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. I’m not —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—our own government here, I mean, the 

FAA can’t seem to do this so I am just fascinated that you think 


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you can actually execute this. It is not like they can go to a local 

Kinko’s and get a picture taken and then go get a real ID. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, I think they will be issued as part of the inprocessing and the recruitment and training aspect of when—of the 

intake —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But don’t most people get paid through a 

hawala system? I mean they are not going to a Wells Fargo bank 

or Bank of America to go cash their checks. 

Ms. ABIZAID. That’s a system that we’re changing, sir. I mean, 

there was a culture of trusted agents in far provinces where banks 

were not available, where Afghan soldiers would have to rely on 

them and often get skimped in terms of their monthly pay —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Where —— 

Ms. ABIZAID.—but we’ve actually moved to a mobile money system, which has had significant success and it’s—it connects soldiers 

to actual bank accounts, and they can see on their phone what 

their balance is and how much they have—they are due for —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. We are fascinated with the—and, 

Mr. Sopko, I hope you can help follow up on this because I think 

that is laudable but I think it is—I can’t imagine that you can actually pull that off. I think that is probably the standard we should 

get to, but we have a hard time executing that here in the United 

States with an awful lot of infrastructure. In a place like Afghanistan I have a hard time believing that they can actually execute 

on that. But more luck to you but I don’t know how much it is 

going to cost. I mean, we are dealing right now with the homeland 

security that has a very difficult time with this at best. And, Mr. 

Sopko, if you can follow up on that, that would be great. 

Mr. SOPKO. We will. We’ve monitored it. And actually, in support 

of the assistant secretary, it is an improvement. We’re at least having unique identity cards —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Great. 

Mr. SOPKO.—but, you know, this is 15 years into this we’re finally getting that. And we’re asking for people, when they leave, 

to give their identity cards back, and we hadn’t been doing that. 

We’ve issued a number of reports on it, but we are glad to see 

CSTC–A is moving out on that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Great. 

Mr. SOPKO. It’s an improvement. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Very good. Mr. Sopko, we have talked 

about this in the past, but the $100 billion plus, how much do you 

actually think got to Afghanistan? How much has been siphoned 

off? How much can we actually point to and verify? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, as before, I’m in an awkward spot. I 

can’t give you an answer. All I know is billions have been wasted 

or stolen. But I can’t tell you the exact number. We don’t even have 

a number of all the projects and then know where they’re located, 

so it’s very difficult for us to do that. No one can. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. How much—and tell me about—you have 

cited, Ms. Abizaid, about the fixed wing. Explain that project and 

why you think it is a success. And how much did we spend on it? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So we are in the process of delivering fixed wing 

platforms for close air support for the Afghans to have as an organic capability. They are—they have four A–29s, Super Tucanos 


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they’re called, and we will eventually build to 20. This has been a 

critical piece in enabling the Afghans to independently fight the 

counterinsurgency fight and one where the burden on U.S.—the 

U.S. assets has been—will be significantly decreased as they increase their capacity for their own close air support missions and 

aerial fires missions. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. So I want to try to tackle this one 

again. How many people do we have working for the United States 

in Afghanistan? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So, sir, my crack staff did get the answers for you. 

So we will confirm these for the record, but what we could find out 

in the time allotted, we have 9,800 troops in Afghanistan, 11,542 

U.S. contractors. There are more third-country nationals and Afghan contractors that the United States is spending money on. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And that’s just for the Department of Defense? 

Ms. ABIZAID. This is for the Department of Defense, sir. I don’t 

have —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Ms. ABIZAID.—other numbers. And then in terms of civilian manning, we’re talking about 290 now but I think that the requirement 

for civilian manning will likely increase as our military footprint 

decreases. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, Mr. Sopko, when you cite nearly 

40,000 contractors, is that in addition to her 11,000 or does that 

include—when you say 40,000, it includes the Department of Defense? 

Mr. SOPKO. That would include. That would include. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So we have just less than 10,000 troops. In 

addition to that, we have roughly 40,000 contractors, correct, for 

—— 

Mr. SOPKO. That’s our best estimate. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—a grand total of just less than 50,000 people, correct? 

Ms. ABIZAID. In terms of U.S. citizens or contractors that work 

for the United States? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. It’s a different number, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. We are paying close to 50,000 people 

to be there, correct? Between contractors and troops, some of them 

are Americans, some of them are not Americans, it is roughly 

50,000 people —— 

Ms. ABIZAID. I think that’s a good rough —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—to keep our mission moving? 

Ms. ABIZAID.—estimate, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. All right. Listen, thank you so much. 

There are a lot of good people in very difficult, dangerous situations. They are away from their family. I have been there several 

times. I need to go back again. But it is a difficult mission, but it 

is also a vital mission, and I cannot thank the men and women 

enough who are putting their lives on the line to do this. 

So we thank the four of you for your dedication and your patriotism and your commitment to the country. This is a valuable exercise. A lot of work goes into these reports and the analysis, and I 


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don’t want to do think that it just goes up on some shelf. It is very, 

very helpful as we try to figure out from our component or our vantage point, you know, what it is we should do or where we should 

go next. 

So thank you again very much for that, and the committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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