III 

10 

The Newport Papers 

Ninth In the Series 

JamesJ. Tritten 

and 

Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

NEWPORT. RHODE ISLAND 
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Newport, Rhode Island 

CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES 

Newport Paper Number Nine 

December 1995 

"The Newport Papers" series is a vehicle for distribution of substantial work by 

members of the Naval War College's teaching and research faculty and students 

as well as members of the international security community. Papers are drawn 

generally from manuscripts not scheduled for publication either as articles in the 

Naval War College Review or as boks from the Naval War College Pres but that 

nonetheles merit extensive distribution. Candidates are considered by an editorial 

board under the auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. 

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necessarily those of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. 

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distribution should be directed to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College, 

686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207. Telephone (401) 

841-2236, and fax (401) 841-3579, or DSN exchange 948. 

President, Naval War College 

Rear Admiral J. R. Stark. U.S. Navy 

Dean oCNaval Warfare Studies 

Profesr Robert S. Wood 

Naval War College Pres 

Editor: Profesr Thomas B. Grasy 

As

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer 

iate Editor: Patricia A. Goch 

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Publication: Gina Vieira 

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Patricia A. Goodrich, asiate editor of Naval War College Press, perfonned 

the principal editing, validation, and proofreading of Newport Paper Number 

Nine. 
� 

I 

A Doctrine Reader 

The Navies of 

United States, Great Britain 

France, Italy, and Spain 

1 James J. Tritten 1 and 

I Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 

j I I 
Contents 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rear Admiral J. R. Stark. U.S. Navy 

l Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy 

James J. Tritten 

H. Navy and Military Doctrine in France 

James J. Tritten 

HI. Doctrine in the Spanish Navy . 

James J. Tritten 

[v. The History of Italian Naval Doctrine. 

Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 

V. "Revolutions in Military Affairs," 

Paradigm Shifts and Doctrine 

James J. Tritten 

vii 

1 

37 

77 

91 

125 

About Dr. James J. Tritten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 

About Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) . . . . . . . 153 
Introduction 

In March 1993. the United States Navy and Marine Corps established the 

Naval Doctrine Command as the primary authority for the development of naval 

concepts and integrated naval doctrine. It has several specific roles-serving 

as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy 

service-unique doctrine. providing a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in 

joint and combined doctrine development. and ensuring that naval and joint 

doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations. 

exercises. and war games. 

Although this was the first time the sea services had established a formal 

command to prepare and publish multi-service naval doctrine, it was not the 

first time that either service. or navies in general. had formal written doctrine. 

In the minds of most serving officers, however, doctrine was something new 

for the fleet. Newport Paper Number Nine is the first of two publications in this 

series which will present the story of naval doctrine's history and theory for use 

in war colleges, command and staff colleges. profesional schools, and other 

centers of excellence. The major message of these pages is that naval and navy 

doctrine is not new and there is value today in reviewing the lessons of past 

doctrinal development experiences. 

Under the leadership of the Naval Doctrine Command's first commander, 

Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis. U.S. Navy, the Command set out to examine 

history to learn the lessons of naval doctrine development from the past. This 

effort was not an attempt to publish history, as such. Instead. it was directed 

primarily as a study of history from the perspective of doctrine-a term 

generally not found in the index pages of naval historical studies. Our own navy 

and four European navies were selected for in-depth analysis. primarily because 

the history of these navies is well-documented and it was relatively easy to fmd 

the evidence of past doctrinal development once researchers became familiar 

with the concept. 

Newport Paper Number Nine contains the results of research conducted on 

the navies of the United States, Great Britain. France, Italy. and Spain. Each 

has a unique story to tell, and each story has value for us today. This paper 

concludes with an interpretive essay on the relationship of doctrine to technology. particularly revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). It questions the ground 

forces-oriented RMA paradigm and makes a strong case for the uniqueness of 

naval warfare. 
A forthcoming Newport Paper. which continues with two additional interpretive essays on the theory of military and naval doctrine and two essays that 

express the need for doctrine. takes the lessons learned from all these studies 

and provides the u.s. Navy and Marine Corps with the issues that must be 

addressed in naval doctrine publications of today. 

We at the Naval War College are pleased to assist the Naval Doctrine 

Command through original research. doctrinal development. instruction on 

doctrine and its history, and publication of materials such as these which can 

be used as readings to support teaching. The formation and use of doctrine must 

be a dynamic and interactive process involving active debate and discusion of 

issues on the pages of our professional journals. We in Newport are committed 

to supporting that professional dialogue and await your contributions . 

. R. Stark 

Rear Admiral. U.S. Navy 

President. Naval War College 

viii 
Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy 

James J. Tritten 

THE u.s. NAVY was characterized in a recent RAND Corporation study 

as "the supra-national institution that has inherited the British navy's 

throne to naval supremacy."t Given the legacy of traditions that have pased 

from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy, one cannot consider naval doctrine in 

the U.S. Navy without first conducting an analysis of how naval doctrine 

evolved in Great Britain.2 This paper reviews and analyzes doctrine in the 

British navy. It concludes with an asssment of the doctrinal process in the 

Royal Navy and with potential lessons for the U.S. Navy today. 

First Stirrings: The Navy Royal and Private Enterprise 

The Royal Navy's entree into the world of written doctrine commenced with 

King Henry Vil, who took a great interest in the development and enhancement 

of a fighting "Navy Royal" in addition to a merchant fleet.3 Henry was aware 

of the Spaniard Alonso de Chaves' first written substantive naval doctrinal 

work, Quatri partitu en cosmografia practica, also known as Espejo de 

navegantes [Seaman's Glas], published in 1538.4 Henry isued a set of written 

fighting instructions to develop the combat performance of his fleet. Based upon 

the Spanish model, they improved upon use of the artillery concept and the 

taking of the weather gauge (or upwind side) during battle.5 This doctrinal 

principle endured until the end of the age of sail. Henry's instructions were 

reisued in 1544 and provided for the integration of sailing ships and rowed 

galleass in a combined arms battle fleet. 

During the reign of Henry VI, the embryonic navy developed the concept 

of the "capital ship" with smaller supporting ships and auxiliaries and a 

shipbuilding base. During the reign of subsequent monarchs, the navy acquired 

slowly many of the characteristics of a modem composite fleet-one designed 

to perform a variety of tasks and command local waters. This fleet was the tool 

that allowed England to enter the international conflicts of the sixteenth century. 

The development of the "Navy Royal" was enhanced by the experiences of 

English privateers and semi-pirates, who experimented with the use of artillery 

at sea to engage larger ships and convoy escorts. In subsequent engagements 
The Newport Papers 

the naval broadside was perfected. There were signs that an infonnal line ahead 

was developing into doctrine as early as the Anada battle ( 1588), but in 

general, coherent naval doctrine had to await the fonnation of a truly modem 

fleet during the Commonwealth. Ordinarily, commanders of this era did not act 

as components of an integrated fleet but rather as individual entrepreneurs 

whose primary motivation was the pursuit of prize money. 

Anglo-Dutch Wars 

The anny-dominated English Commonwealth government followed the 

Dutch lead in mandating escons for merchant ships. The Convoy Act of 1650 

established a requirement for naval protection of shipping, which eventually 

resulted in confrontation with French and Moslem privateers and Holland. 

Many of the naval engagements during the subsequent Anglo-Dutch Wars 

( 1652-1674) were fought against Dutch convoys. 

Three of Oliver Cromwell's best anny colonels were asked to serve as 

seagoing generals to lead the navy. Cromwell distrusted the monarchist tendencies of naval officers and, of course, he himself was of the anny. The mas

ing 

of so many canons at sea allowed for new tactical opportunities, and they were 

recognized in revisions to the tactical procedures of the day. 6 Early cannon were 

notoriously inaccurate, hence the earliest doctrine was to amas offensive 

flrepower close together in line ahead so that a devastating broadside could be 

delivered. If artillery became the "king of battle" ashore, the broadside became 

the sine qua non of battle afloat; and just as flrepower bred linear tactics ashore, 

it led to similar developments at sea. 

In addition to tactical improvement, the seagoing generals recognized also 

the need to improve battle management. They provided some degre of order 

to the general chaos of early privateering sailing ship tactics, which was brought 

about by, essentially, "mimicking the leader," whereby captains watched and 

confonned to the maneuvers of the leader (e.g., if he closed to engage, they all 

did). The English seagoing generals developed well-structured plans for 

managing as many as a hundred ships in battle, many of them privateers, and 

they saw the need to experiment with tactics and the overall battle plan before 

engaging in combat. The context for most battles was defense of and attack on 

convoys. 

This period also marked the introduction of a new professional officer corps 

in England and a centralized organization for the administration of the fleet. 

Cromwell's refonn effons, which were supported by England's gentlemen, 

would result in an emphasis upon maritime forces rather than the already 

2 
Tritten * Great Britain 

powerful any.' Local seagoing commanders began in 1636 to issue written 

instructions for their subordinates.8 Parliament is

ued comprehensive articles 

of war in 1652, and in 1653 the first comprehensive written doctrine was 

promulgated by a fleet commander. This written doctrine combined both sailing 

instructions and fighting instructions, in separate but companion volumes. The 

doctrine on fighting instructions was much shorter than the sailing doctrine. 

Fighting instructions cannot be studied without considering sailing instructions. The fighting instructions attempted to mas

 firepower. The commander 

now had a different command and control problem than previously, since his 

captains would no longer simply mimic his behavior-they were required to 

place their ships in precise positions, which required a system of communications. However, the signal bo

k was incomplete by itself, since, if the captain 

merely acted upon receipt of orders, he might fail to take advantage of a tactical 

opportunity in the absence of a signal or when signals could not be sent or seen. 

Doctrinal fighting instructions thus informed the commander how to make 

decisions in the absence of other more tactical directives. 

The new standing orders were immediately put to the test during three 

Anglo-Dutch Wars in which: 

• Strategically, England essentially replaced the Dutch at sea throughout the 

world. 

• Operationally, England executed a series of campaigns including several 

devastating convoy battles, blockades, and bombardments of the Dutch 

shoreline. 

• The seagoing generals more then held their own against the Dutch fleet, 

led by the greatest admirals of the world. 

The English success was generally due to the massing of superior firepower 

and refusing to let the Dutch close for boarding. The defeated Dutch, on the 

other hand, continued to rely on the milie and had not yet accepted the primacy 

of artillery. 

The Cromwell-era fighting instructions and other reforms were not 

repUdiated with the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the return of the 

monarchy under Charles II had a beneficial effect upon the politically untainted 

fleet, which was now commissioned the Royal Navy and was provided with a 

new benefactor, at the direct expense of the Army. The Royal Navy of this era 

may have had its origins in the need to protect convoys, but with the combatproven potential of artillery and mas

ing, doctrine began to shift to the offensive 

form of warfare. Simply put, the fleet could be used for other than defensive 

tasks. 

3 
The Newport Papers 

Doctrinal sailing and fighting instructions were isued in various fonns by 

several different fleet commanders. The instructions were flexible, ised as 

guidance that was unlikely to be followed scrupulously in the heat of battle. 

Revisions to the fighting instructions and new instructions reflecting combat 

lessons were issued repeatedly during the wars (in 1654, 1655, 166, 1672), 

and for the first time as an integrated whole in 1672-1673.9 These revised 

fighting instructions allowed for tactical flexibility on the part of the local 

commander-to include milie tactics and the breaking of the line. Frequently 

overlooked, but important, was the function of both fighting and sailing 

instructions for ensuring that commanders acted more as components of an 

integrated fleet having political aims rather than as entrepreneurs whose 

motivation was the pursuit of prize money. 

Commanders in Chief Sailing and Fighting Instructions 

Following the Anglo-Dutch Wars, newly revised fighting instructions were 

issued in 1678, 1688, 1690, 1691, 1695, 1702, and 1703. Many of these 

revisions allowed for additional initiative on the part of the local commander. 

The first fleet-wide sailing and fighting instructions were isued during the reign 

of William and Mary (1689-1702). Although the actual date of their publication 

is not known precisely, the instructions followed generally those previously 

isued in 1672-1673. 

During the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the French 

managed to unite their Toulon and Brest fleets into one fighting unit. The 

numerically inferior English elected initially to maintain a Mfleet-in-being" until 

detached units could return to bolster their defense. The concept of a fleet-inbeing called for a numerically inferior force to remain in port from which it 

would threaten to sortie. Since it did not sek engagement, the effectiveness of 

the concept would depend upon the enemy's perception of its combat 

capability-it served more as a deterrent than a true fighting force. If the 

fleet-in-being could deter the French from invading England, then it would be 

a succesful use of asts. The Crown, however, disagreed with the concept, 

and a combined English and Dutch fleet sortied under Admiral Lord Herbert 

Torrington, who was promptly defeated at the Battle off Beachy Head 

(Beveziers) in 1690 by Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Fortunately for the English, the French were unable to capitalize upon 

their tactical victory. 

Following succes of a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet at the 1704 Battle of 

Malaga, using the line-ahead formation, the English attitude toward doctrine 

4 
Tritten * Great Britain 

may have split into two camps. 10 The first camp emphasized the ability of the 

line ahead to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on the enemy. Malaga 

had demonstrated that victory was possible with a well-disciplined battle line, 

and it naturally followed that defeat would result when this doctrine was not 

followed. This first group is referred to by some historians as doctrinal "formalists." The second group placed more emphasis on independent maneuver 

and is referred to as the "meleeists." The maneuver-oriented melee doctrine 

attracted some of the more dashing English commanders, who did not want to 

be as bound by rules and had the skills to master the freedom of maneuver 

warfare. 

The first version of what eventually came to be known as the Permanent 

Sailing and Fighting Instructions was issued during the reign of Queen Anne 

(1702-1714), probably about the time that the Act of Union created Great 

Britain. The various instructions issued by the fleet commanders in chief, and 

after 1799 by the Admiralty, gradually became known as Sailing and Fighting 

Instructionsfor Her Majesty's Fleet. These instructions were authoritative but 

not binding on the admirals in the fleet. Although most of the fighting instructions were printed by the Admiralty for use by the fleet commander in chief, 

they became regulatory only when signed by the fleet admiral and issued to 

subordinates. Copies of the instructions were made available to all admirals 

when they hoisted their flags. Tactical orders based upon the instructions were 

mandatory for the individual ship captains who were in receipt of signals drawn 

from the instructions. 

In 1714, a private publisher produced an unofficial bok that enhanced the 

presentation, and presumably the comprehensibility, of the signals portion of 

the formal fighting instructions. Jonathan Greenwood's The Sailing and Fighting Instructions, or Signals as They Are Observed in the Royal Navy of Great 

Britain even added signals not currently in use by the fleet. This unofficial 

publication was adopted by at least one Mediterranean fleet commander. 

Private publications of a doctrinal nature had appeared earlier in Britain. For 

example, The Seaman's Vade-Mecum and Defensive War at Sea (1700) 

developed recommendations for the defense of merchant shipping, including 

convoys. Convoy defense doctrine in this era was quite sophisticated; it was 

understood that the role of the escort was to sacrifice itself, if necesry, to allow 

the merchants to escape. Parliament pasd the Cruisers and Convoys Act in 

1708, resulting in instructions for the proper interaction of merchants and 

commanders of warships. 

During the first part of the eighteenth century, the commanders in chief's 

fighting instructions were not routinely revised, presumably because none of 

5 
The Newport Papers 

the maritime campaigns lasted long enough to warrant such reconsideration. 

Hence, there were no major technological breakthroughs. On the other hand, 

additional instructions, also doctrinal in nature, were isued by the fleet commanders, flrst in 1678 and regularly after 1710. These additional instructions 

were as important as the main flghting instructions but were is

ued by local 

commanders who were then held accountable for their use. IT validated by 

combat success, additional instructions could lead to additional deviations. 

Unfortunately, when the additional instructions were not validated in combat, 

and the flghting instructions provided an alternative course of action, they might 

also provide justification for punishment by court-martial. 

Developments during the Wars against the French 

Monarchy 

Courts-martial for combat failure while not adhering to the existing flghting 

instructions were an ever-present threat to the commander in the Royal Navy 

during the long years of war with the French. There was an infamous case of 

doctrinaire adherence to "keeping the line" above all costs at the disastrous 

February 1744 battle off Toulon. Admiral Thomas Mathews, maneuvering in 

what was virtually a line abreast, had expected his subordinate, Vice Admiral 

Richard Lestock, to use common sense and engage the enemy when Mathews 

signaled an attack. Lestock, "confused" by Mathews' continued flying of the 

signal for line ahead, maintained his station in line ahead and failed to join the 

engagement quickly. Mathews had him arested. 

Complicating the problem was Admiral Mathews' failure to get his fleet into 

proper station on the previous night. Mathews had in fact isued the proper 

orders, but his subordinates had failed to execute them, and the fleet became 

further dispersed. The next day, Vice Admiral Lestock ignored some of 

Mathews' instructions to increase sail and get into line-ahead position more 

quickly; indeed he actually shortened sail on two occasions. Mathews and 

Lestock were not on the best of terms before the battle, hence the failures at 

Toulon are a bit more complex than whether or not offlcers adhered blindly to 

doctrine in lieu of common sense. 

At the court-martial, Lestock was exonerated because he had followed his 

commander's primary signal (line ahead) during an extremely confusing 

engagement of changing and conflicting signals and maneuvers. Mathews was 

cashiered instead-due primarily to the escape of the Franco-Spanish fleet 

under Admiral La Bruyere de Court. Four captains who had exercised initiative 

6 
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under conflicting signals and maneuvers, therein deviating from the standard 

and additional instructions, were also cashiered. 

The scandal of Toulon provoked reform, and new instructions for the 

Mediterranean fleet were prepared to alleviate future confusion. Mutual support 

was to take precedence over maintenance of the battle line. Abandonment of 

the line ahead in favor of the general chase was sanctioned when the enemy 

fleet was markedly inferior, disabled, or "on the run." Of course, if the admiral 

gave signal for the general chase and failed, he would still be subject to close 

after-action scrutiny by a court-martial. 

During the First Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747, Admiral Baron George 

Anson took advantage of existing loopholes in the fighting instructions regarding maintenance of the line ahead. Even though he used the general chase, he 

avoided court-martial because he defeated the French and captured numerous 

convoy merchants. Admiral Sir Edward Hawke ordered a general chase in the 

succesful Second Battle off Cape Finisterre ( 1747). New additional instructions followed, further refining and clarifying the doctrine contained in the 

fighting instructions. 

As a result of Parliament intervention, joint doctrine developed extensively 

during the Seven Years ' War ( 1756-1763). William Pitt, Secretary of State and 

leader of the House of Commons, ordered his generals and admirals to 

cooperate, which they did with remarkable success. Elaborate written doctrine 

was prepared for the transport, protection, disembarkment, and support for 

ground troops, and it was used successfully in the captures of Louisbourg 

(1758), Quebec (1759), and Belle Isle (1761). This followed the disastrous 

performance in Admiral Edward Vernon's and General Wentworth's abortive 

amphibious operations against Cartagena (1740- 1 741). 

There was also additional doctrine developed for blockading and observation 

squadrons as well as for the interdiction of ships undertaking to leave a port. 

Much of this doctrinal development was published in the form of private signal 

boks for which there was no official commander in chief or Admiralty 

sanction. The succesful telegraph signals system that later supported Admiral 

Lord Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar had its birth in the privately published 

doctrinal and signal development that took place during this era. 

In a celebrated Seven Years' War episode of failure that was tied to the 

fighting instructions, the British in 1756 failed to engage fully a French fleet 

off Minorca that was supporting the landing of a ground force, and which 

resulted in the eventual loss of the garn. The British admiral, Sir John Byng, 

was eventually shot for his performance during this episode, but not for failing 

to follow the existing fighting instructions, although that certainly was a major 

7 
The Newport Papers 

element of the prosecution's case. I I Byng had in fact deviated from the fighting 

instructions in his plan of attack at Minorca. However, he was shot simply 

because he failed to gain a victory when one was needed-a British force in 

America, under the command of General Edward Braddock, had just suffered 

a major loss to the French and Indians. The second major defeat, at Minorca, 

threatened the British government, which at the time also was sensitive to 

charges that it had not provided Byng with enough ships. 

Simply put, a scapegoat was needed. Braddock had ben killed in Pennsylvania, and Byng was available. The court-martial found Byng guilty of failing 

to "do his utmost" either to defeat the French fleet or relieve the garrison on 

Minorca; a law of 1749 mandated the death penalty for admirals who failed to 

try hard enough. A review of the tactical situation, however, can lead one to the 

conclusion that neither defeat of the enemy fleet nor relief of the Minorca 

garn was posible and that even had Byng fully engaged the French, and 

had his plan been properly executed by his captains, victory was by no means 

certain. In fact, compounding the difficulties he had in signaling intentions from 

the rear of the fonnation were signal boks that did not contain provisions for 

exactly what he intended. Byng further complicated the matter, like Mathews 

at Toulon, by continuing to fly the line-ahead flag while simultaneously 

signaling to engage and maneuvering for a nearly line-abreast attack against a 

well-fonned enemy line. 

The shooting of Byng had major repercusions throughout the Royal Navy. 

It did not, however, make the fighting instructions dogmatic; it had the opposite 

effect. Admiral Hawke's victory at Quiberon Bay (1759) was due in part to his 

courageous decision to initiate a chase before properly fonning into a battle 

line. This victory had strategic implications; the loss of their escort force ended 

French plans to transport ground forces from Quebec to Europe for an invasion 

of England. Concurrent with the French los in 1759 at the Battle of Lagos 

(again due to a general chase rather than line ahead) and the loss of Quebec in 

that same year, the result of Quiberon was a shift in the war's focus from 

contesting control of the seas to applying real power from the sea to the shore. 

Common sense was introduced into subsequent courts-martial that concerned failure to follow doctrine. Admiral Augustus Keppel was exonerated for 

failing to follow the fighting instructions: he did not "waste" time to fonn a 

battle line (directly engaging Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers) and 

failed to "do his utmost" (the fleets pas each other on opposite tracks at the 

Battle of Ushant in 1778 where Keppel was defeated). 

Another private doctrinal bok, Naval Evolutions: Or a System of Sea 

Discipline (1762), was published by Lieutenant Charles O'Bryen, Royal Navy. 

8 
Tritten * Great Britain 

This bok was based largely on Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou 

traite des evolutions navales (1697). Although the translation of the French 

extracts was poor, and the experiences of the recent Seven Years' War tended 

to discount much of the doctrine, it signaled a growing desire by fleet officers 

to have a tactical manual in bok format. 

The publication of then-Captain Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de 

Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux in 1763 was 

noticed not only in Paris but also in London. Within four years, it had been 

privately translated into English-probably by Charles or Christopher 

O'Bryen. Like O'Bryen's earlier work, only sections were translated, and the 

quality of the translation was por. The translation of Morogues' work included 

an additional section on fighting at sea, probably written by one of the seagoing 

O'Bryen family. 

A movement commenced to capitalize on these privately published doctrinal 

boks by officially revising the fighting instructions. However, no one on active 

duty was willing to take on the commanders in chief; hence the standing fighting 

instructions were allowed to languish "as is," and local commanders continued 

to issue and revise additional instructions. These additional instructions indicated a growth in doctrine that capitalized upon the lessons of the Seven Years' 

War. Finally, the Admiralty itself issued a supplement to the standing fighting 

instructions codifying local practice, thus avoiding a debate over existing 

-articles versus established procedures in the fleet. Left unsettled was the 

proliferation of tactical doctrine and sailing and fighting instructions by both 

the commanders in chief and private individuals-all in use by commanders at 

sea. 

During the opening days of the American War of Independence, Admiral 

Lord Richard Howe, commander of the British fleet in North America, published his own quite sophisticated signals bo

k. Unlike the standing fighting 

instructions provided by the Admiralty, Howe's Instructions/or the Conduct 

0/ the Ships 0/ War, Explanatory of, and Relative to the Signals contained in 

the Signal-Book Herewith Delivered (1776) consisted of standing orders, 

explanations of tactical ideas, and standardized signaling evolutions. Howe 

adopted some innovative maneuvers for the execution of the battle line. He 

issued additional instructions the next year with further emphasis on the role of 

the individual commanding officer. 

Taken as a whole, the system of fighting instructions by that time in force 

off North America was so complex that an extensive period of instruction and 

exercises would have be

n required before the fleet could respond to the 

directions of its commander. There is evidence that Howe held regular meetings 

9 
The Newport Papers 

of his admirals and captains so that he could explain his doctrine, and also that 

he exercised them regularly as well. Howe issued additional instructions in 1778 

that formed the basis of a reconnaissance system later adopted by Nelson before 

Trafalgar. By the end ofhis service in North America in 1778, Howe had created 

the system of instructions and signals that he would subsequently use while in 

command of the Channel Fleet. 

A Set of Signals for a Fleet on a Plan Entirely New (1777), by Lieutenant 

Sir Charles Henry Knowles, another privately published bok, used the best 

parts of Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux and 

provided for actions by fleets or separate divisions. In his subsequent Fighting 

and Sailing Instructions, published in 1798, although written in 1780, Knowles 

expanded upon individual ship engagements to a degree that foreshadowed 

Nelson. 

Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, chief of staff of the Channel Fleet, 

embarked singlehandedly in 1779 on the most ambitious tactical reforms ever 

undertaken by any one officer in history. During a twenty-seven-month period, 

he issued more signal boks and fighting instructions than anyone before or 

after him. Many of the instructions were influenced by Howe; one was an exact 

copy of a signal bok used by the French. It was, however, not their centralized 

version but rather a separate system adopted by Rear Admiral Fran�ois Joseph 

Paul, Comte de Gras-Tilly (an officer to whom the Untied States owes a great 

debt). Kempenfelt blended the best of Howe and the French into a system of 

instructions and signals that allowed for greater control over a larger fleet in 

fighting a well-disciplined opponent. 

Innovations were generally confmed to the Channel Fleet. Despite Howe's 

earlier efforts in North America, officers subsequently asigned to those waters 

and to the West and East Indies generally reverted to the combat-proven fighting 

instructions and supplemental instructions that were issued. Natural conservatism as well as primitive communications hampered transmission of new 

ideas from Europe to the far-flung reaches of the empire. Also, the commanders 

in those distant stations had their own ideas about how to defeat the French, and 

the Channel Fleet had yet to prove the value of its innovations in major combat. 

Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney was a commander who was willing 

to test the waters with new doctrine. Departing European waters with a 

considerable portion of the Channel Fleet, Rodney seized the opportunity to 

attack a Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron at the Battle of Cape St. 

Vincent, also known as the "Moonlight Battle" and the Battle of Santa Maria 

(1780). Rodney used the new freedom to his advantage-he signaled a general 

chase instead of maintaining the battle line. After his arrival in Caribbean 

10 
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waters, Rodney met a French squadron at Martinique (1780), but he failed to 

bring on a successful engagement. Rodney censured his captains for failing to 

break tradition and execute a melie, and he subsequently drilled them in his 

doctrine. 

A series of doctrinal issues being debated at the time included: 

• Should the admiral ride in the van, at the center, or outside the line? 

• Should he sail in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a fast frigate? 

Shifting the flag to a frigate had ben tried by Lord Howe off Rhode Island in 

1778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did the same off Martinique in 1780. 

Following de Grasse's capture at the Saints (1782), French doctrine changed to 

require that commanders in chief fight from frigates. Generally, the British 

ended their experimentation by allocating a place for the admiral to occupy in 

a heavily anned ship at the center. 

The new doctrine of giving precedence to local instructions was not 

foolproof; the defeat of Admiral Lord Thomas Graves at the Battle off the 

Virginia Capes (1781) can be explained in part by the lack of clarity in local 

doctrine. Graves had only recently taken command of the North America station 

and had yet to hold a meeting with his commanders to explain his views on 

doctrine and signals. Furthennore, ships of the West Indies and North American 

squadrons had been using different signal boks. When Admiral Samuel 

Viscount Hood failed to use common sense and engage de Grasse despite 

confusing signals, he knew the defense of his actions rested in his strict 

adherence to the precise signals flown by Graves. This all sounds remarkably 

like Mathews and Lestock at Toulon and very unlike what would take place at 

Trafalgar. Graves' failure to attack Admiral de Gras until the French had 

sortied from their anchorage was something else that would not be repeated by 

Nelson, at the Nile. 

John Clerk of Elden, a retired merchant from Edinburgh, analyzed the naval 

tactical issues of the day and wrote an Esay on Naval Tactics in 1782. This 

essay pointed out the superiority of the French system in particular respects and 

recommended concentrating strength against weakness-specifically against 

only a portion of the enemy's line. In fact, this tactic was used by Rodney in 

his successful and very significant victory in the Battle of the Saints that same 

year, resulting in the capture and disgrace of de Gras

. Rodney failed to exploit 

the victory fully, indicating that even innovative commanders were still somewhat conservative. Discipline was still so great at this time that, although some 

of his advance ships were in a position to fire on French ships being chased at 

the Battle of the Saints, Hood denied permission to fire, since he had not been 

granted pennission to do so by his own senior, Admiral Rodney. 12 

11 
The Newport Papers 

Although Clerk claimed credit for influencing Rodney's action, in point of 

fact Rodney did not plan to break the line, nor was such a maneuver new. 

Nevertheless, the victory at the Saints was the Royal Navy's major success 

during this phase of the long war with France, and after that, Rodney's supposed 

action and Clerk's bok took on a life of their own. Clerk was well connected 

socially in higher naval circles and had access to the evidence presented at the 

various courts-martial resulting from important battles. His analysis and logic 

were sound. Independently wealthy and with no official connections to the 

Admiralty, Clerk was able to write his own views without fear of reprisal or 

[mancial ruin. Although Clerk's bok was a direct attack on the fighting 

instructions, it had an influence on British naval thinking. 13 It was decidedly 

offensive in its orientation. One of the commanders who favored it was Admiral 

Lord Horatio Nelson, who reportedly had his chaplain read it to him. 

The loss of the North American colonies and Howe's asignment to the 

Admiralty from 1783-1788 stimulated further doctrinal reform in the Royal 

Navy. A number of fighting and additional instructions were issued and 

reissued. Captain Jacques Bourde de Villehuet's 1765 Le manoeuvrier ou essai 

sur La theorie et La pratique des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales 

and Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier's 1787 L 'art de La guerre sur mer, 

ou tactique navale were fully and accurately translated into English in 1787-

1788. The latter is one of the most masterful boks on tactics written during the 

age of sail, and it challenged fully the dogma of the line ahead. 

Doctrine during Wars against the French Republic 

The privately published Signal Bookfor the Ships of War (1790) was issued 

to the Channel Fleet, thus capping Howe's long proces of doctrinal reform. 

Howe experimented with this revised doctrine and signals during the summer 

of 1790 Channel Fleet exercises. By the end of that year, Howe retired, and the 

mantle of doctrinal reform fell to the new commander, Lord Hood. Hood was 

more interested in fleet discipline and station-keeping than in doctrinal reform. 

He held exercises in 1792 to drill his captains in accordance with his version 

of doctrine and signals, which did not include many of the innovations permitted 

by his predecessor. 

With the outbreak of war with France in 1793, Howe was recalled and once 

again took command of the Chanel Fleet. By now Howe had lost some of his 

enthusiasm for reform and agreed that until his captains could perform basic 

tasks in accordance with standing doctrine, there would be no need to grant 

them a freer hand. Howe led a well-disciplined and recently exercised Channel 

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Fleet against the Brest fleet of Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret 

de Joyeuse, in the Battle of the First of June, 1794.14 Villaret de Joyeuse had 

ben a lieutenant at the time of the French Revolution (1789), as were his fellow 

flag officers. Most of the French captains had ben very junior officers, captains 

or mates of merchant ships, and a few of them had ben enlisted men. The 

perfonnance of the Brest fleet against the well-trained British and their able 

commander speaks well of Villaret de Joyeuse's leadership abilities and the 

value of fighting spirit in combat. 

The "Glorious First of June" was fought continuously over five days and 

four nights. Howe employed the new idea of separating an advance squadron 

from the main battle fleet, which could provide intelligence and act as a tactical 

reserve. Whereas at that time the preferred method for breaking the line was to 

concentrate mas upon a single vulnerable point, at the Battle of the First of 

June, Lord Howe had his whole fleet cut through the line simultaneously at all 

points, cutting between the sterns and bows of the nearest enemy ships. The 

tactic allowed the British to engage on the lee side, on which the French had 

neither loaded nor fully manned their guns. The tactic also was a hedge against 

the French escaping to leeward. Howe deserves credit as an innovative tactician, 

a signals specialist, and a successful commander in battle who never lost sight 

of the need to defeat the enemy fleet. 

At the battle's end, Howe was triumphant with a victory unparalleled in the 

past one hundred years. Six French ships of the line were carried off to Spithead; 

one had ben sunk. and the melie had allowed superior British gunnery to wreak 

havoc among the survivors. On the other hand, the French convoy of 130 ships 

bringing supplies from America had been allowed to escape and enter port; 

indeed, not a single British ship appears even to have laid eyes on the convoy. 

Furthennore, Howe failed to exploit fully the victory, as had Rodney at the 

Saints, but with more excuse-the length of the battle, Howe's age (then 68), 

and damage to the British fleet inflicted by the French. 

This British success was followed by the fonnation of a combined AngloPortuguese fleet. Howe's Ordersfor Combined Fleet essentially envisioned the 

new squadron as a separate maneuver unit. Given his recent success with the 

disciplined Channel Fleet, it is no wonder that Howe did not attempt to integrate 

fully the Portuguese. There was from 1793 to 1795 a fennent of tactical and 

signaling developments comparable to that during the American War of Independence. It culminated in January 1796 with the issuance by Sir John Jervis, 

commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, of a Secret Instruction containing 

innovative tactical options. Jervis planned to unleash his captains in a general 

melee once he had broken the enemy line and its ships had become separated 

13 
The Newport Papers 

and disorganized. Jervis also adopted the advance squadron concept used by 

Howe at the Glorious First of June. 

Jervis' faith in the superiority of his captains was warted. The next period 

of British tactical successes was due in part to the bold actions of some leading 

and extremely confident local commanders. Rear Admiral Sir William 

Cornwallis, commander of a small squadron attacked by the Brest fleet off 

Belle-tIe (1795), fought on the offensive and succeeded in convincing the 

French that additional ships were en route. Then-Captain Horatio Nelson 

showed his aggressive fighting spirit during a series of minor engagements in 

the Mediterranean that same year. These battles were not of themselves important, but they began to establish Nelson as a commander who sought to exploit 

immediate tactical victories. 

At the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797), where his well-trained Mediterranean Fleet attacked a Spanish force having nearly twice the firepower, Jervis 

demonstrated superior seamanship, innovation, and good judgment in separating the convoy from its escorts. Seeing an opportunity to deviate from the battle 

line, Jervis signaled to his flag officers (who included Nelson, a commodore) 

and captains to form whatever formations they wished in order to exploit their 

tactical advantage. Nelson, who had anticipated this signal, captured two ships 

and boldly engaged the flagship, which had nearly twice as many guns and was 

the most powerful ship afloat. Jervis chose not to report that Nelson's success 

in taking advantage of an excellent tactical opportunity had been due to his 

exceeding his signaled authority, thus disobeying orders. 15 

The authorship of another privately published doctrinal bok, A System of 

Naval Tactics, which appeared in 1797, is attributed to D. Steel. 16 Much of the 

document was a reworking of works by Pere Paul Hoste and Bourde de 

Villehuet. The section of the bok that dealt with the Royal Navy was a more 

readable version of Howe's fighting and sailing instructions without any 

reference to engaging the enemy. Apparently the security of one's fighting 

instructions was becoming a concern. In 1798 Parliament got into the act of 

naval doctrine again, pasing a law that made convoying compUlsory. 

In late 1797, Britain secured one of its most notable victories of the era. 

Admiral Adam Duncan, first Viscount of Duncan, employed extremely aggressive tactics and an offensive fighting spirit in thoroughly defeating a Dutch fleet 

at the Battle of Camperdown. Duncan made good use of tactical signals to 

outsail the Dutch and bring his superior firepower to bear as rapidly as possible. 

Because of the fast tempo of the battle and the inferiority of their ships, the 

Dutch were overwhelmed before they could escape to leeward into coastal 

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waters. Duncan's attack, in columns of two, splitting the Dutch line from the 

weather side, was to be repeated by Nelson at Trafalgar. 

In 1799, the responsibility for the publication of the fighting instructions 

went to the Admiralty, where it remained until 1914 when it reverted back to 

the fleet commanders in chief. The doctrine published in the Signal Bookfor 

Ships of War, 1799, continued to stress the line ahead, despite current practice 

in the fleet and combat successes with the meLee. These fighting instructions 

were mandatory for the fleet, although the cunning Nelson was able to justify 

deviations when circumstances and his personal views conflicted with them. 

The Nelson "Touch" 

Rear Admiral Nelson's victory over the French at the Battle of the Nile 

(1798) gave the British their greatest victory in over one hundred years. Not 

on1y did Nelson benefit from major errors committed by the French commander, Admiral Fran�ois Paul Brueys d' Aiguilliers, who tried to fight on the 

defensive, but he exhibited true genius in a daring night attack of a rapid tempo 

that overwhelmed his opponent. Vice Admiral Nelson's next victory was over 

the Danish at Copenhagen (1801), where he was pitted against a maldeployed 

stationary fleet and fortifications operating under a defensive doctrine. Although he was in range of their shore batteries the night before the battle, Nelson 

held a dinner party aboard his flagship. His detailed and written orders, outlining 

the plan of attack in accordance with the newly issued Admiralty day signal 

bok, were given to each of his captains. 

The plethora of newly issued signal boks was not universally popular in the 

fleet, since the boks did not allow communication of complex ideas. Sir Home 

Popham, an officer who would later rise to the rank of admiral, created an 

inovative and unofficial system of telegraphic signals that made use of 

numbers and later letters to substitute for words and phrases that combined to 

make sentences. This new system gave the admiral a powerful tool. Popham's 

model became an instant success in the fleet, although he was wise enough to 

disclaim it as a mere adjunct to the official system and thus avoid a fonnal 

confrontation with the Admiralty. Nelson fonnally adopted Popham's system 

of signals in 1803 and made full use of it off Toulon in the subsequently renewed 

war with France. 

A series of minor engagements followed the renewal of warfare, but the 

major concern in Britain was invasion. By a series of fleet maneuvers, the Royal 

Navy deterred any invasion of the British Isles. With over 150,00

 troops 

asmbled with a transport fleet that was unable to sail acros the Channel due 

15 
The Newport Papers 

to the presence of the Royal Navy, Napoleon had to abandon his plan. The 

French fleet was unable to mas

 in sufficient numbers to meet the challenge. 

The most celebrated of all battles in the age of sail, Trafalgar (1805), pitted 

a well-equipped fleet and combat-experienced commanders against the combined Franco-Spanish fleet, which had neither adequate training nor well-fitted 

ships. 17 Nelson imbued his spirit of the offensive into every one of his captains. 

His written plan of attack made his objectives very clear-complete destruction, 

not taking ships for the prize money. 

Nelson intended to form into two parallel columns in line ahead, with himself 

and his second in command leading the charge (in violation of Admiralty 

doctrine), and then to close boldly the combined fleet as rapidly as possible, 

making it more difficult to be hit and minimizing the time British ships would 

be exposed to defensive fire. A rapid attack would also minimize the chances 

that the combined fleet could escape to leeward. Nelson also planed to conceal 

the points of his main attack until the last posible minute. Once his two 

squadrons broke through the enemy line, the aim was to concentrate offensive 

strength against the weakness of the split enemy fleet. Nelson improved upon 

this French concept of strength against weakness with another French concept, 

the pe[otoTlS, asigning specific tasks for specific portions of the fleet. This was 

a replacement of the now-centralized formalist doctrine of maintaining the line 

Nelson envisioned, not with just a signal for general chase but in fact with a 

new local doctrine of guerre d outrance (war to the extreme). Based upon his 

previous battle experience against the French, Nelson felt that he could go 

beyond the general chase authority granted in the fighting instructions. This 

would not be posible against all enemies, but it was appropriate at this time 

and place. 

The selection of the time and place of his attack was facilitated by a superior 

reconnaissance plan aided by Popham's new signalling system. Nelson also 

used an advance squadron that could, if necessary, engage the enemy until such 

time as the main battle fleet arrived. 

Nelson generally followed his battle plan and, although both sides fought 

bravely, the resulting melie was a rout of the combined fleet. The reasons for 

victory were, the superiority of artillery and gunnery by the British, �eir 

superiority at maneuver and mutual support, and the generally inferior condition 

of the combined fleet. The British fleet never formed properly into two columns 

in line ahead; proper formation was subordinated to the offensive spirit and 

tempo; keeping the battle line was no longer all-important. Spe allowed the 

British to survive the charge directly into the teeth of an enemy, who had in 

effect "crossed Nelson's T." 

16 
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Doctrine, of course, was used by Nelson, but often in a non-written fonn, 

reflecting his decentralized philosophy of command and control that peaked at 

Trafalgar. As Nelson's experience grew, in lieu of fonnal signals and tight 

control during battle, he relied on, a series of meetings with his commanders 

before the coming battle. In these discusions he communicated his perception 

of the alternative courses the battle might take and the basic actions that were 

to be expected. 1 8 His famous line from his pre-battle memorandum-"No 

captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy" -is 

typical of a doctrinal style that matched his personal abilities as a charismatic 

leader, abilities atypical of commanders in the age of sail. 19 

Nelson's success was due in part to his style of doctrine-unwritten but clear 

in the minds of his subordinate commanders. It proved extremely effective. 20 

Whereas Nelson's signal to fonn into two columns, flown at the beginning of 

the Trafalgar battle, might be misinterpreted today as precise instructions to be 

followed to the letter, his captains knew how to interpret it properly. They 

continued to close the enemy at all possible sped, while simultaneously 

attempting to fonn into two columns in "irregular line-ahead." This was not the 

type of behavior witnessed at Toulon (1744) or off the Virginia Capes (178 1). 

Nelson 's decision-making process was more intuitive than analytic, but this 

should not imply that he improvised in the middle of the battle. On the contrary, 

he planned his battles using both his intuitive and analytic skills. Nelson was 

convinced that, with the proper attitude and sufficiently equipped and trained 

force, one need only wade into the enemy. This had been the essence of Jervis' 

Secret Instruction of 1796. Indeed, none of the maneuvers that Nelson 

employed at Trafalgar were new; all had been anticipated by Villeneuve. On 

the other hand, Nelson did not give his subordinates an entirely free hand. 

There is more to Nelson's success than good doctrine and well-trained forces. 

There is the intangible factor of Nelson's own charismatic personality, which 

inspired men to greatness. Where others sought to use the signal bok to bring 

order to the battle space, Nelson strove for chaos-within the bounds of 

capabilities and shaped by his personal doctrine. Nelson is thus an aberration 

who escaped successfully the confinement of the era's paradigm and embraced 

the "fog of war" as an ally. 

The Admiralty signal boks and fighting instructions issued by Admiral 

Popham after Trafalgar made use of the tactical innovations initiated by Nelson 

at the Nile and Trafalgar, but their authors never understood the conditions that 

made such innovations posible. Nelson's successors attempted to emulate the 

"Nelson Touch" with their own doctrinal writings, but they could not possibly 

17 
The Newport Papers 

capture the essence of his brilliance in any signal bok. Simply pu� the style of 

warfare practiced at Trafalgar was the correct style for a particular set of 

circumstances and a uniquely charismatic leader, one whose esence could 

never be "bottled," The myth of the "Nelson Touch" and the attempt to duplicate 

it is one of the major themes around which one can study later developments 

in the Royal Navy. 

The End of the Age of Sail 

Written doctrine in the form of fighting instructions gradually fell into disuse. 

When faced with an enemy that did not use rigid and effective tactics based 

upon sound doctrine, there was no need for the Royal Navy to do so either. If 

defenses were not skillfully prepared, there was no need for skillfully prepared 

offenses. The attacker needed merely to be unleashed and pointed in the right 

direction, 

In 1809, in what would prove to be one of a long string of amphibious 

failures, the British mounted the largest (to date) invasion of the Dutch coast. 

Designed to put pressure on Napoleon's rear and thus support the Austrian 

allies, the assault on Walcheren Island involved some forty thousand troops, 

four hundred transports and almost two hundred naval escorts. The force was 

evacuated eventually, and the operation stands as a case of mismatched political 

objectives and military operations and of por planning for a joint operation. 

The last major British naval victory in the age of sail was the controversial 

Battle of Navarino (1 827).21 A mere twelve years after Waterloo, Navarino saw 

the French, British, and Russians allied for one battle against three Turkish, 

Egyptian, and Tunisian squadrons. The three European squadrons fought on 

the offensive against Muslim ships that, under Admiral Ibrahim Pasha, were 

anchored in a defensive formation. The battle resulted in total annihilation of 

the Turkish fleet and the liberation of Greece. Unfortunately, Vice Admiral Sir 

Edward Codrington's victory so embarrassed the Turks that it became 

diplomatically expedient that he be recalled home; his career was ruined. 

During the long wars with the Continental powers in Europe, British naval 

doctrine was, primarily, to engage the enemy fleet-to either destroy it (to sink 

a wooden warship was exceedingly difficult) or to capture enemy ships as 

prizes. Britain essentially sought general command of the seas via warfare of 

annihilation. If required to defend a convoy or a landing force, naval doctrine 

called for the escort force to engage offensively the enemy fleet, posing a threat 

rather than adopting a defensive position. If tasked to neutralize a threat of 

invasion, the fleet would engage offensively the enemy fleet posing a threat. 

18 
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And to eliminate the source of power of a maritime nation, doctrine called for 

the destruction of the enemy fleet ftrst and only then exploitation of command 

of the sea by attacking merchant shipping. 

The primary tactics of the Royal Navy were to attack on the offensive from 

the windward side and then attempt to breach the ship's hull, kill the crew with 

aimed gunftre and-only if necessary-engage in close combat. In general, 

formal doctrine called for the strict maintenance of the line ahead, with 

deviations tacitly approved after the fact when commanders were successful. 

Between Toulon (1744) and the Saints ( 1782), the British fought thirteen battles 

to a draw, using linear tactics, while they obtained six victories by abandoning 

the line-clear evidence of the need to ensure that successful fleet lessons 

learned are accepted as new doctrine. 

The Admiralty was not oblivious to these statistics. The issue was that if one 

formed the line ahead, one would be more likely to avoid defeat than if one 

abandoned the line. Hence the line ahead gave the commander his best guarantee of not failing, even though he might not succeed. The personality of many 

of England's leading commanders was such that they felt their individual 

initiative, skill, and spirit allowed them to abandon the safety of the conservative 

formalist school of doctrine in favor of the melie. 

The Age of the Ironclad 

Although maritime technology advanced in the form of steam and the screw 

propeller, it was some time before the Royal Navy took the next step, that of 

ironclads. The simple reason appears to be that the role of oceanic policeman 

against lower technology forces could be carried out with the old wooden ships 

of sail. Even when the Navy adopted the new technologies, the absence of 

continuous warfare put tactical and doctrinal innovation into the schoolhouse 

and not the active fleet. Small detached units were left to improvise their own 

local doctrine, which they did successfully. Technological improvements now 

allowed more certainty (contrasted to the uncertainty of sailing via wind power) 

and more distant control (via signals) as this era progresed. The improved 

signalling capabilities may have played a role in the downfall of doctrinal 

development-after all, why take local initiative when the admiral (later the 

Admiralty) will send orders directly? 

With the formation of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 

Studies (or RUSI) in 1 83 1, an unofficial forum was created for the discusion 

of military issues. RUSI began publishing a journal in 1 859, creating a vehicle 

for the publication of new ideas. Journals and societies such as these flourished 

19 
The Newport Papers 

throughout the world, and they provided an arena for doctrinal development 

not under the thumb of official Navy bureaucracy.22 Similarly, the Naval 

Records Society (founded 1893) allowed scholars to research documents from 

Royal Navy history. Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou traite des 

evolutions navales (1 697) was again (hut this time fully) translated into English, 

in 1834, by Captain J.D. Boswall, Royal Navy. 

In 1843 and 1846, Captain C.R. Moorsom, Royal Navy, published two brief 

works on naval tactics, which included a section on the actions between 

steamships. Moorsom was later promoted to vice admiral; since he had not ben 

to sea since the 1820s,23 his subsequent Organization and Maneuvers of Steam 

Fleets (1856) built on these early ideas. Although his recommendations were, 

as far as is known, never employed in practice, a modification was included to 

subsequent versions of the general signal bok. The 1857 French Ministry of 

Marine's Tactique navale, for both sail and steamships, was translated in 1859 

for the benefit of Royal Navy officers. Additional privately published boks, 

such as Sir Howard Douglas' Naval Warfare with Steam (1859), appeared on 

steamers in combat, but no changes were made in Admiralty fighting instructions. On the other hand, the Battle of Lissa ( 1866) gave primacy to development of the ram rather than the gun. 

The impact of the ironclad was to raise once again the specter of invasion by 

France.24 It was claimed that steam had "bridged the Channel" and that thirty 

thousand Frenchmen could rush across in a single night. The result of this 

technological innovation was a shift in strategy rather than doctrine. No longer 

would the Royal Navy alone be sufficient for defense of the realm, but a sizeable 

portion of the standing anny would have to garrison the coastline as well. 

Doctrinal development continued under the auspices of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby. While in command of the British Flying Squadron ( 1869-

187 1), he experimented with tactics under steam. Hornby appears to have been 

the first flag officer to arrange for the ironclads of the Chanel Squadron (which 

he commanded from 1872- 1 875) to act as pelotons, or separate tactical groups. 

The Admiralty approved of his concepts in 1874 and incorporated them into its 

signal book of 1 879. Unofficial writings on naval doctrine continued to 

be sponsored by various professional associations that offered prizes as 

inducements for creative thinking and writing. It is of some small note that after 

the Royal Navy swept the seas of its enemies, it turned to scientific research 

and pursuit of discoveries.25 This parallels somewhat the more recent shift in 

the U.S. Navy to military operations other than war-which include environmental concerns. 

20 
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The next major expression of formal doctrinal thought was introduced in the 

writings of Vice Admiral Philip Colomb. The older of two brothers (both of 

whom wrote about naval matters), Philip retired from active service and took 

a position as an instructor at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. While a 

commander, Philip had studied the results of the Battle of Lis and nearly, but 

not totally, embraced the primacy of the ram over the gun. His later research 

efforts and writing concentrated on the science of naval tactics. Philip's 

approach was inductive, with due credit given reasoning, experience, and 

history. Philip Colomb's major contribution was Naval Warfare: Its Ruling 

Principles and Practice Historically Treated, first published in 1 891. 

Naval Warfare is more than a doctrinal bok. It contains rich discussions 

about strategy, is unabashedly pro-Navy, and parallels the work done in the 

United States by Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (which generally eclipsed 

Colomb's efforts). Within the pages of Naval Warfare one can fmd the doctrinal 

concepts of decisive battle, blockade, and fleets-in-being as means to asure 

command of the sea and, thereby, defense of the homeland, defense of sea lines 

of communications, and the ability to move the army overseas for offensive 

action. Colomb followed this work with his shorter Esays on Naval Defence 

( 1 896), reprinting a series of chapters, articles, and lectures at RUSI. 

Colomb's and Mahan's writings in favor of warfare by annihilation, the 

decisive battle, and an offensive doctrine met with favor among those of the 

material school, like Admiral Lord John Fisher, who favored the expansion of 

the Royal Navy and development of the dreadnought. These writings may not 

have been official Admiralty doctrine, but they were certainly internalized by 

the officer corps and accepted as unofficial doctrine representing the preferred 

views about war. To put it simply, for the material school, war was reduced to 

a technical problem with mathematical and mechanical solutions; war should 

be fought on the offensive with superior weapons, since the new likely enemy 

(Germany) would have at least technological parity and maybe technological 

superiority. 

No recounting of doctrinal development in the Royal Navy during the 

Victorian-era would be complete without mention of Vice Admiral Sir 

George Tryon, Royal Navy, and the loss of Victoria after her collision with 

Camperdown in 1 893. Tryon had been an advocate of independent steaming 

and command initiative instead of orchestrated maneuvering by pelotons in 

accordance with signal boks. With the blame for the collision attributed to his 

unorthodox ideas, it was inevitable that Tryon's reform efforts would also fmd 

a watery grave.26 

21 
The Newport Papers 

When Japan decided to create a Western navy, it chose to model its fleet and 

doctrine on those of the British. In their first major fleet engagement, at the 

battle of the Yalu (1894), the Japanese employed aggresive British tactics in 

ships, maximizing spe

d over armor and guns, and they decisively defeated the 

Chinese. On the other hand, the Japanese did not charge, or ram, or se

k a melie. 

About this time the l00th anniversary of the British victory at Trafalgar 

occurred. A great celebration was held, and the myth of the "Nelson touch" was 

perpetuated. What was the "touch," however? Did it arise from the "band of 

brothers," the myth of the offense, the undisciplined melie, or the charismatic 

personality of Nelson himself? With the rapid development of new technology, 

bright naval officers looked for bureaucratic success. Also, having no enemies 

at sea, they turned to warfare ashore for glory. Indeed, one of the more important 

of the First Sea Lords of this era, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, earned a Victoria 

Cross for his fighting ashore in the Sudan in 1884.27 

Doctrinal development in the Navy stagnated, and it was then that the myth 

of Nelson, carefully cultivated and perpetuated by Admiral Fisher, provided the 

new unwritten doctrine for warfare at sea. This unwritten doctrine included 

official adherence to stagnant fighting instructions, with the tacit implication 

that one could do no wrong if one aggresively engaged the enemy. Thus the 

Royal Navy simultaneously embraced, with its head, the formalism of the 

fighting instructions enforced by modem signals, as well as, with its heart and 

soul, the aggressive and relatively unconstrained spirit of Nelson. 

The next major British thinker about naval doctrine was Sir Julian Stafford 

Corbett.28 His historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days 

of sail are clasics: Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 (1905), Signals and 

Instructions, 1776-1794 ( 1908), and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 

( 19 1 1). To truly understand Corbett, one must see him as advocating the 

antitheses of the conventional wisdom of the time and knowing that he was 

doing it. Simply put, Corbett argued against the mindless embrace of the 

offensive, wars of annihilation, and the "Nelson touch," in favor of cool, 

historically based analyses to investigate all forms of warfare and set maritime 

operations into the context of the war as a whole. 

Sir Winston Churchill noted that when he came to the Admiralty in 191 1, he 

found that there was not a single moment in the carer of an officer where he 

was obligated to read boks on naval warfare, let alone be examined on them. 

Hence, he organized the Naval War StatIto study the les of history and apply 

them to naval war plan strategy. Corbett used history to devise permanent 

"principles of maritime warfare." 1Dese efforts, however, were largely discounted 

22 
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by serving officers who felt that technology had invalidated the lessons of the 

age of sail and who were otherwise captured by the spirit of Nelson. 

While Corbett served as a lecturer at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, 

he published his more mainstream doctrinal thoughts in a series of clasified 

boklets known as "The Gren Pamphlet," or more properly, the Strategic 

Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on Naval History. Although these 

predate Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, the doctrinal materials contained 

in "The Gren Pamphlet" are more concise and specifically addresd to a navy 

audience. Written as it was by an appointed lecturer in Fisher's navy, this 

boklet came close to being written doctrine, even if it was not endorsed 

officially by Fisher himself. Indeed, other than the fighting instructions, there 

were no doctrinal documents.29 

Corbett's writings are in fact doctrinal, and, although they were not appreciated by officers who were obses

 with the centrality of offense, anihilation, and the decisive battle, they remain of interest today. The army officer, 

who was included in his audience, was far too preoccupied with mobilization 

rates, short war, offensive doctrines, and rail timetables to understand the 

important role to be played by sea power.3O It is simply that there is far more 

to naval warfare than seeking out and destroying an enemy fleet. Corbett 

attempted to explain how initiative can be part of the defensive form of warfare 

(the role that the fleet-in-being first employed in 1690), and that because of 

technological innovations, surprise no longer meant escape but could now spell 

disaster.31 

It is also true that sea power alone is not enough. Corbett attached importance 

to joint operations. The post-Fisher Admiralty generally ignored Corbett's 

theses and went so far as to put a disclaimer on his subsequent documentation 

of the Royal Navy's performance during World War 1.32 Despite his problems 

in "selling" his doctrinal message, there is a great deal of value in Corbett's 

writings for any naval service making its operations more integrated with 

political objectives and in concert with other services. 

World War I 

Britain's naval doctrine prior to World War I stresed combined arms and 

was practiced in frequent battle maneuvers.33 A good deal of flexibility was 

demonstrated by the fleet during the war, but upon occasion battle squadrons 

were tied to synchronized movements en mase, as they had been in the 

eighteenth century. September 1914 marked a return to commanders in chief 

having overall cognizance over the fighting instructions. New instructions, 

23 
The Newport Papers 

some hundred pages in length. entitled Grand Fleet Battle Orders. were issued 

over the signature of Admiral Earl John Jellicoe.34 These fighting instructions 

attempted to provide guidance for all eventualities and offered the unit commander very little opportunity for initiative. They were reissued several times 

during the war by Jellicoe and by his successor. Admiral Sir David Beatty.35 

Open discusions on doctrine became more difficult during the World War 

I era. Discusions now took place within the Naval War Staff and involved all 

of the isues that one would have expected: the proper method to meet the 

challenge of an invasion. commerce protection. amphibious warfare. and fleet 

engagements. Churchill was dissatisfied with anything that reeked of pasive 

defense. but he had no specific doctrine for how his preferred offensive was to 

be carried out. His offhanded political direction often distressed the Admiralty. 

In one such case. Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock found himself 

facing a superior force commanded by Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee.36 

Although his mobilized reservist crews lacked training. Cradock sought an 

engagement against the Germans; he was promptly defeated at the battle of 

Coronel (19 14). Churchill did not respond to Cradock's cable. which implied 

he would engage a superior force. nor did he dispatch sufficient forces for 

Cradock to deal with the threat. The Admiralty attempted to salvage the 

situation at the last minute. but it was left to a relief effort at the battle of the 

Falklands (19 14) to redres the loss. 

Cradock's decision to engage the Germans was probably influenced by 

public opinion that demanded something be done about German Navy raiders 

as well as by the ongoing court-martial of one of his colleagues who failed to 

engage a marginally superior enemy force. If the Nelsonian legacy of aggressiveness. as informal doctrine or new strategic culture. could ever be carried 

too far. it probably was at Coronel. 37 Far better to have masd sufficient forces 

to have dealt with von Spe than to have suffered a humiliating defeat in the 

first major sea battle since Trafalgar. The "cult of the offensive" can be 

disastrous for naval forces-the defense is an honorable alternative when 

appropriate. and at Coronel it would have ben. 

The pre-war Frenchjeune ecole and the new technologies allowing impressive amounts of firepower to be mas

ed in smaller. swift. expendable forces 

had an impact on the employment of the Channel Fleet during the war. When 

faced with the humiliating los of thre cruisers only six weeks after the 

outbreak of the war (all of which were sunk within one hour by the same 

submarine) as well as the ever-present threat of the High Seas Fleet in mortal 

combat. the Royal Navy wisely chose a distant. vice close. blockade. Simply 

put. navies could not allow their principal fighting machines to be whittled away 

24 
Tritten * Great Britain 

by throw-away strike forces. Esentially, the Royal Navy was replicating the 

fleet-in-being strategy first employed by Admiral Lord Herbert Torrington in 

1690. 

In the long-awaited clash between Jellicoe's Grand Fleet and Vice Admiral 

Reinhard Scheer High Seas Fleet off Jutland (1916), the Royal Navy paid the 

price for not having instilled initiative in the minds of its admirals. When Scheer 

executed the gejechtskehrtwendung (or, battle tum-away together), independently acting battle squadrons trained to seize the initiative might have taken 

advantage and turned the battle into a decisive victory for England. Jutland was, 

therefore, a strategic-level success for the allies, but Jellicoe is forever doomed 

to be second-guessed for having failed to send the High Seas Fleet to the bottom. 

Jellicoe, of course, was operating within approved doctrine when he turned his 

fleet away from torpedo threats and declined a night engagement. 

On the other hand, after years of concentration on decisive fleet engagements, the Royal Navy fell somewhat short in their doctrine for amphibious 

operations. While a landing in Gennan East Africa was neutralized, the disastrous attempt at Gallipoli resulted in a Royal Commission of investigation. 

The analysis did not really get to the heart of the matter, however, and it was 

not until after the beginning phase of the next world war that amphibious 

doctrine was no longer discredited but mastered. 

Despite years of unofficial doctrinal writings on the proper method of 

safeguarding the sea lines of communication, the Navy failed absolutely to 

organize and maintain convoys for its vital shipments coming by sea. Parliament had been the driving force behind convoys as early as 1650, 1708, 1792, 

1798, and 1 803, and it now fell to the political leadership to force the Navy to 

adopt convoys-three years after the commencement of hostilities. 38 An internal study by younger officers in the Admiralty came to the correct conclusions 

but failed to convince their seniors.39 They did convince Admiral William S. 

Sims, U.S. Navy, who had been sent to Britain to study ways in which the U.S. 

Navy might be employed as part of the Grand Fleet. Sims, in tum, had the 

opportunity to present his views on the value of convoys to Prime Minister 

Lloyd George. The prime minister forced the change.40 

Initiative was not defunct in the Royal Navy. The old spirit of Nelson lived 

in the operation of submarines, Q-ships, and the flotilla craft of the Dover Patrol. 

These commands, however, were held primarily by junior officers; for the most 

part, the navy's senior leadership had lost the lessons of history and relapsed 

into conservatism. 

25 
The Newport Papers 

The Interwar Years 

Attempts to influence doctrine in the Royal Navy were also undertaken by 

an outspoken insider, a critical officer who managed to remain upwardly 

mobile-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.

4l Richmond was a friend and confidant of Corbett, and as As

istant Director of Operations on the Naval War 

Staff, he established his bone fu:ks as a serious scholar and then led the "young 

Turks" reform movement prior to World War I. Richmond also challenged the 

decisive battle orthodoxy of the navy and managed to remain in active service 

until an enforced retirement in 1931. Richmond did not change the battleshipdominated doctrine of the day (nor, for that matter, did the opening days of 

World War m, but he left as his legacy the Naval Society and its journal, The 

Naval Review, founded in 1912.

42 One could write in the pages of this journal 

the most heretical of articles, since authorship need not be disclosed and 

distribution was restricted. The lessons of the Royal Navy's difficulty in 

abandoning the battleship-dominated decisive engagement doctrine betoken 

that sound doctrinal development must contain a forum for free and open 

discussion that is external to official channels. 

Within the Royal Navy, a study of the combat experiences in the past war 

was undertaken at all levels of staff and at the appropriate training and 

educational institutions.43 Indeed, although many have argued that the navy was 

obsessed with refighting the Battle of Jutland, there is good evidence of tactical 

innovation.44 Some of this effort realized the desired effect, that of revisiting 

certain established doctrinal principles such as the avoidance of night actions. 

The Grand Fleet Battle Orders were duly revised in 1924 and 1928- 1929. 

The fleet experimented with alternative doctrines for war at sea during the 

interwar years.

45 Combined arms were used in an exercise off Bombay in 1 924, 

and Admiral Sir A. Ernie M. Chatfield used aircraft for the long-range strikes 

in fleet maneuvers in the early 1 930s. Blind faith was placed in the improved 

anti-aircraft guns (hence self-defense fighters were not sought in great numbers) 

and in the Asdic detection system for fmding submarines. 

The new fighting instructions continued to emphasize surface engagements 

and convoys. Although the global system of naval intelligence and the similar 

global system of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) had been kept active from 

its World War I days, the Navy awaited German actions at sea before 

implementing the convoy system after the outbreak of war in 1939.46 Convoy 

duty was seen as an attrition-oriented defensive style of warfare during an era 

when the culture of the navy emphasized the offensive and an

lation warfare. 

26 
Tritten * Great Britain 

Of the asumed possible enemies, the navy concentrated its planning against 

Japan and the reinforcement and relief of Singapore. A sound doctrine for war 

was developed in this area of operations, one that made full use of Dominion 

resources, distant water offensive mine laying, and minesweeping. Fleet exercises in the Mediterranean were models for planned engagements in Southeast 

Asia.47 

Of the criticism that can be ascribed to the British armed forces during the 

interwar years, the Royal Navy may claim the least blame, given the greater 

succes that it had in the initial stages of the next war.48 Compared to the Royal 

Air Force's (RAP} shortsightedness in regard to strategic bombing and the 

army's noncentralized doctrine and approach to training, the navy did 

remarkably well in preparing for World War 11.49 All of the services, however, 

had porly developed joint military doctrine and planning. 50 

World War II 

Prior to the war, the navy was often criticized for relying more on new 

technology as the solution to combat problems than on thinking through better 

ways to fight. 51 Yet in subsequent battles, these new technologies would prove 

critical. In many ways, the navy demonstrated far more success than the army, 

due in part to a systematic approach to doctrine and training. 

In 1939, a new set of Fighting Instructions, again stressing battle fleet 

concepts, was issued by the commanders of the Home and Mediterranean fleets, 

with a preface stating that they were not mandatory. 52 On the other hand, the 

disaster of the small squadron that initially met the German surface raider 

Bismarck can be attributed in part to strict conformance with those fighting 

instructions. Local commanders never again repeated that error, and most 

subsequent naval operations were conducted using the fighting instructions as 

a guide-not as compulsory directions. Perhaps it was the assimilation of 

aircraft into fleet operations that fmally ended the navy's reliance upon the 

fighting instructions that had ben born in the age of sail. In general, Royal 

Navy commanders fought surface engagements on the offensive and with a 

great deal of flexibility. 

The introduction of aircraft into the Royal Navy is a story fraught with 

important doctrinal lessons. 53 One cannot fault the Admiralty for not recognizing the potential of the airplane when it was first proposed-most military 

services were similarly blind. Doctrinal development for fleet aviation was 

shaped disastrously by a decision during World War I that the naval wing of 

the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) form the first line of defense against German 

27 
The Newport Papers 

Zeppelin attacks. Although individual aviators fought bravely, it set the tone 

for fleet aviation to perfonn auxiliary and defensive duties. 

The los of the Fleet Air An to the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the 

interwar years is a story that has ben well told elsewhere. 54 The transfer led to 

air power doctrine being developed by another service, whose preocupation 

was not maritime operations. Fleet officers relied on a small cadre of aviation 

officers to help them understand how to integrate their low-perfonnance 

airplanes into battleship-dominated navy doctrine.ss The culmination of these 

efforts was the successful combined-an Battle of Cape Matapan (1941), in 

which aircraft were used as long-range strike asts (predating the same role of 

the U.S. Navy at the Battle of the Coral Sea). 

At the last major fleet-versus-fleet battle of the Royal Navy, off Cape 

Matapan, Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham demonstrated the requisite 

initiative and decisiveness to qualify him to be heir to the Nelson mantle. S6 

Cungham had the advantage of air cover, radar, and Ultra. The Italians had 

the advantage of speed, and they managed to avoid a total rout in their first and 

last attempt to challenge control of the Mediterranean during World War n. 

Perhaps due to a series of prewar exercises that experimented with naval aircraft 

as strike platfonns, Cuningham managed to master combined operations and 

made good use of his assets. Upon recognizing the value of air power, the 

Mediterranean Fleet changed its standard tactical fonnation from the battle line 

to an antiaircraft circular fonnation. 

Following Matapan, the influx of new Lend-Lease aircraft and pilots trained 

in the United States resulted in the British Pacific Fleet's (BPF) wholesale 

adoption of American naval doctrine. The BPF was molded into an American 

fast carrier task force that operated in support of amphibious landings, ground 

forces ashore, and in independent strikes against land targets. Because they 

lacked a similar logistical train and differed in the complement of the air wing, 

the BPF generally operated in its own area of operations rather than as an 

integrated player in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It had taken nearly forty years and 

two world wars for doctrine in the Royal Navy to shift its prime focus from the 

battleship to the aircraft carrier. 

Not all transfer of doctrinal infonnation flowed from the U.S. to Great 

Britain, however. In the area of antisubmarine patrols, it would take the 

U.S. Navy its own trial by fire to conclude that offensive antisubmarine 

operations were not the most effective way to ensure that convoys reached their 

destination. S7 In an interesting contrast to its preoccupation with the destruction 

of surface raiders with offensively oriented hunting groups, the Royal Navy 

published the defensive Atlantic Convoy Instructions in 1941 and 1 942, which 

28 
Tritten * Great Britain 

set forth the doctrinal principles for the safe arrival of convoys via escorts and 

for attrition warfare. These instructions were fmally accepted by the u.s. Navy 

as well as other allied navies. Of note is the late date of publication, there being 

no established written doctrine prior to that. 

Doctrinal Development during the Cold War58 

Imediately after the war, some purely national doctrinal publications were 

produced that capitalized upon the knowledge gained during the war.S9 

Cooperation between the allied navies during World War II had set the stage 

for drawing to a close the uniquely British way of war at sea, replacing it with 

allied doctrine. By the end of the war, the Royal Navy had shifted its primary 

striking and sea control force to the aircraft carrier, and the u.s. Navy had 

begrudgingly accepted (but only temporarily) the value of convoys. Naval 

planning shifted from a national function to an allied response, and doctrine 

had to be accepted by all of the nations participating at sea in the North Atlantic 

Alliance. The new Atlantic Striking Fleet would fulfill the role previously 

played by the Grand Fleet and Home Fleet of the two previous world wars. 

British ships operated within standing naval forces in the Atlantic, in the 

Channel, and in the Mediterranean. An alliance "concept of maritime operations" set the tone for subordinate standardized allied tactical pUblications 

(ATPs) and other similar manuals. 

In the 1950s, the British and Americans once again debated maritime 

doctrine,c)() including the proper way to ensure that North American materials 

and supplies arrived in Europe in the event of war. The Americans wanted to 

fight NATO's navy forces on the offensive. The British remembered the lessons 

of two world wars. Finally, the Royal Navy published a defmitive Naval Staff 

History study on the value of convoys: The Defeat of the Enemy Attack upon 

Shipping. 1939-1945: A Study in Policy and Questions ( 1957), which settled 

the matter.61 Other doctrinal debates occurred over the role of aircraft carriers 

and amphibious warfare. 

With the residual responsibilities of the Empire, the Royal Navy maintained 

a capability for limited overseas crisis response (warm wars) and peacetime 

presence outside of the NATO context. Attention was paid to amphibious 

warfare and as

ult by helicopter from the sea. Over time, the naval out -of-area 

presence was reduced, to be increased only during actual combat operations, 

such as during the Falklands War. Obviously, combat experience during 

national emergencies benefited the NATO alliance in the form of doctrinal 

lessons learned.62 

29 
The Newport Papers 

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Royal Navy similarly followed 

allied and American doctrine, although the British made it clear from time to 

time that a national decision on release might precede that made by the Alliance. 

Initial planning centered on allied nuclear use, whose primary purpose was 

ashore. On the other hand, when Americans appeared to become preoccupied 

with ballistic missile submarines off their own shores, it was British efforts that 

pushed the U.S. Navy into an offensive doctrine that would catch these 

submarines before they left home waters. 

The close integration of the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the Cold War 

era, especially with the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, continues in the present 

era. As with the doctrinal renaissance in the U.S . Navy, there is a similar effort 

by the British to once again look at centralized navy doctrine.63 This developmental effort is taking place in a doctrinal void within the context of the United 

Nations, NATO, and the Western European Union-sanctioned maritime operations in the Mediterranean. Efforts are being made within European nations to 

fill that void, and it would appear that the doctrinal renaissance will occur on 

both sides of the Atlantic. 

T

his brief overview of the development of doctrine in the Royal Navy 

demonstrates that there is a consistent history of more than four hundred 

fifty years of combat doctrine in that service. Doctrine in the Royal Navy has 

existed in every conceivable form-from formal written centralized fighting 

instructions to additional written and verbal instructions by regional fleet 

commanders in chief and local squadron commanders. While doctrine has 

helped the Royal Navy win in tactical combat, from time to time it has also been 

the source of major problems. 

The Royal Navy has emphasized development in tactical doctrine, which has 

contributed partly to the long years of successful combat by the fleet. That is 

not to say that strategic and operational-level military doctrine have ben totally 

overlooked, but that the Royal Navy, like the French Navy, has primarily 

devoted its attention to the development of service-unique doctrine at the 

tactical level of warfare. This is somewhat surprising, since Britain was involved in global conventional war and numerous major regional contingencies 

against France and other nations for many years. The Royal Navy did not have 

a coherent doctrine at all levels of warfare. Only in more recent times has it 

given preeminent attention to strategic and operational-level multinational 

doctrine, specifically NATO doctrine, and even more recently to unilateral joint 

30 
Tritten * Great Britain 

doctrine. Due in part to these higher level doctrinal deficiencies, fighting at the 

strategic and operational levels of warfare was affected unfavorably as well. 

Perhaps because doctrine focused on the tactical level of warfare, it was often 

isued by the fleet commander in chief rather than the Admiralty. Even 

Admiralty-isued doctrine generally could be modified by the fleet commander-thus there appears to have be

n some recognition that doctrine for a 

worldwide fleet might vary due to different locations, asumed enemies, and 

preferences for combat as intended by the local commander. The focus on 

tactical-level doctrine also resulted in less than full development of doctrine for 

more complex multinational operations. 

It was a perceived void in multinational doctrinal development that in some 

measure caused the u.s. Navy to challenge the doctrinal leadership of the Royal 

Navy during the early days of the NATO alliance. The U.S. Navy did not win 

all these bureaucratic battles, however, and British views drove NATO concepts 

in a number of key areas-especially with favor toward convoy defense rather 

than offensive operations against attack submarines using hunter-killer groups. 

Independent British doctrine continues, in addition to NATO navy doctrine, to 

govern nationally mandated operations taken outside of the multinational 

environment. 

The naval doctrine adopted by the British has ben shaped by the nature of 

their government, geographic position, the asumed threat, the overall strategy 

being pursued, the seafaring character of their people, their unique strategic 

culture, and oftentimes, but not always, the lesons learned from history. During 

the twentieth century, doctrine has been implemented more succesfully in the 

Navy than in the Army-leading to the conclusion that the higher competence 

shown by the fleet can be attributed to the Royal Navy's better understanding 

of and adherence to doctrine. 

There have also ben important negative lesns learned from British naval 

doctrinal development. The ever-present search for the heir to the throne of 

Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson led to the myth that superior combat performance 

is primarily a result of an aggresive and offensive doctrine oriented towards 

naval warfare of anlation (decisive battles)-when history has shown 

clearly the need for the wise commander to select the defense and attrition 

warfare when it is most appropriate. As long as the u.s. Navy continues to view 

its rots as being those of the Royal Navy, American officers will need to come 

to grips with both the positive and the negative aspects of the heritage of Great 

Britain's doctrine-including overemphasis on the offensive. 

Nelson's "touch" included his charismatic personality, audacity, and boldness in the face of the enemy, pre-battle meetings with his "band of brothers" 

31 
The Newport Papers 

to share the commander's intent, and also (and Nelson knew this at the time) 

an enemy who was not on par with his own fmely honed forces. Nelson deserves 

all of the credit that he earned, but as time has pas

d, we have forgotten the 

effects of the Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte on the French Navy. Naval 

doctrine based upon the mindless "cult of the offensive" will doom a fleet just 

as it doomed millions of soldiers in the trenches during World War I. 

Perhaps the greatest lesn to be learned from the British experience is how 

difficult it is to change doctrine. The battleship's reign survived through World 

War I, the long interwar years, and the initial stages of World War ll. From 

British naval history, it should be obvious that a system is needed to ensure that 

success in the fleet resulting from actions taken outside of established doctrine 

produces timely changes in the established orthodoxy. It will take the dedicated 

officer much time and effort to apply both the positive and negative lesns of 

the history of doctrine in the Royal Navy to the issues facing navies today. We 

dare not ignore history. 

32 
Notes 

1. Carl H. Builder, The Anny in the Strlltegic Plllnning Process: J.Vho Shllll Bell the Cllt? 

(Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center), R-351 3-A, p. 46. Prepared 

for the U.S. Army, April 1 987. An expanded version of this study was published as The M/lSks 

of Wllr: Amerieln Militllry Styles in Strlltegy Ilnd A nillysis (Baltimore, Md. and London: The 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 989), p. 32. 

2. This opinion was shared by one of the first U.S. Navy officers to formally advocate 

naval doctrine. See Dudley, W. Knox (Lieutenant Commander, USN), "The Role of 

Doctrine in Naval Warfare, ' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March-April 191 5, pp. 344-5. 

3. The age of sail and other sections of this paper are based heavily upon S.S. Robison 

(Rear Admiral, USN, Retired), A History ofNllvll1 Tlleticsftom 1530 to 1 930 (Annapolis, Md. : 

Naval Institute Press, 1 942); E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, USN), eds., 

Sell Power: A Nilvill History (Englewood Cliffi, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960); John Creswell, 

Bn'tish Admirills of the Eighteenth Century: Tilctics in &ttle (London: George Al

en & Unwin, 

Ltd., 1 972); Clark G. Reynolds, Commllnd of the Sell: The History Ilnd Strlltegy of Milritime 

Empires (New York: Wiliam Morrow & Co., 1 974); Helmut Pemsel, A History of Wllr Ilt 

Sell: An A tl/lS Ilnd Chronology ofConjlict Ilt Sellfrom Ellr/iest Times to the Present, trans. i.G.D.G. 

Smith (Major) (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 977) [translation of Von Slllllmis bis 

Okinllwll, first published in 1 975] ; Brian Tunstal, Nilvill Wllifllre in the Age of Sllil: The Evolution 

of Fighting Tilctics, 1 650-1815, Dr. Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute 

Press, 1 990); and Geoffrey Til, Milritime Strlltegy Ilnd the Nuc/ellr Age, 2nd ed. (New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1 984), pp. 23-4, 39-49. 

4. Alonson de Chaves, Qulltri partitu en cosmografia prlletiel

, also known as Espejo de 

navegantes (Madri: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Navar, 1 983 [original version written from 

1 520 to 1 538]. 

5. "Traditional tactics, 1 530: • A book of orders for the war .. .' written by Thomas Audley 

at the command of Henry VIII, el 1 530," inJohn B. Hattendorf et al., British Nilvill Documents: 

1204-1 960 (Hants, UK: Scolar Press [for the Navy Records Society] , 1 993), pp. 83-4. There 

is some evidence of a previous doctrinal publication, the British Blllck Book, issued in the age 

of oars. See Wilam Ledyard Rodgers (Vice Admiral, USN, Retired), Nilvill Wllifllre under 

Oars: 4th to 1 6th Centuries-A Study of Strategy, Tlletics and Ship Design (Annapolis, Md. : 

Naval Institute Press, 1 939), p . 105. 

6. The numbers of cannon at sea during major fleet engagements is an often overlooked 

point. For example, at the Battle of Trafalgar (1 805) , the gun power of Admiral Lord Horatio 

Nelson's fleet exceeded that massed by Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo (1 815) by a factor 

of six. See John Keegan, The Price of A dmirillty: The Evolution of Nilval Waif are (New York: 

Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988), p. 47 

7. Stephen Wentworth RoskilJ (Captain, RN, Retired), The Strategy of Sea Power: Its 

Development Ilnd Appliclltion [based upon the Lees-Knowles Lectures delivered at Cambridge 

University, 1961] (London: Collins, 1 962), p. 39. 

8. "Fighting instructions, 1 636," in Hattendorf et a1. , British Nilvill Documents, pp. 1 60-1. 

9. Historians are constantly refining these dates as they discover additional materials. 

These dates serve to ilustrate the point that doctrinal development was on-going and 

constant. 

1 0. Such a formal division of opinion into two schools of doctrinal thought is not clearly 

documented in history. On the other hand, from a review of history, it is reasonably clear 

that there were often two relatively distinct views on doctrine as demonstrated by fleet 

engagements and courts-martial. Historians have provided names to two "schools" which 

may not have existed in fact, but probably did exist in spirit. 

1 1 . Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, p. 45. 

12. Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain, USN), The Injluence of Sell Power upon History, 

1 660-1 783 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890), p. 356. 

13. John Clerk of Elden's book was republished with additional materials and notes by 

senior naval officers. For example, see John Clerk, Esq. of Elden, An Esslly on Navill Tilctics, 

Systemlltieli Ilnd Historiell with Expillnatory Pilltes, in Four Pllrts, 3rd. ed. , with notes by [Admiral 
The Newport Papers 

George Brydges] Lord Rodney and an introduction by a naval officer (Edinburgh, Scodand: 

Adam Black, 1 827) . 

1 4. This battle is known simply by its date since, unlike most batdes fought in the littoral 

during the age of sail, it occurred well out to sea, some 400 miles off the coast of Europe. 

15. Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain, USN), The Lifo of Nelson: The Embodiment oj the Sea 

Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1 897 [1943 reprint] , p. 239; and 

Admiral of the Fleet of the Italian Navy Giuseppe Fioravanzo, A History oj Naval Tactical 

Thought (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 979) [original manuscript prepared in 1 956], 

p . 96. 

16. "Naval tactics, 1851 : Captain Alexander Milne, a Lord of the Admiralty, to 

Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, Commander in Chief Mediterranean, 4 October 1 851," 

in Hattendorf e t al . , British Naval Documents, p. 629, n.2. 

17. Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, pp. 37-8. 

1 8. Mahan, The Life of Nelson, pp. 294, 297. 

19. "Trafalgar: the order of battle, 1 805," in Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents, 

p . 425. 

20. Michael A. Palmer, "Lord Nelson: Master of Command," Naval War Col/ege Review, 

Winter 1 988, pp. 105-16. I am indebted to Michael A. Palmer for additional analysis which 

will be found in the prologue, "A Regular Confusion," to his forthcoming book: Command 

at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century, draft dated February 1 994. 

21 . William Koenig, "Navarino," Epic Sea Battles, S.L. Mayer, ed. (Secaucus, N.].: 

Chartwell Books, Inc., 1 975) , pp . 62-83. 

22. The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) annual essay contest 

for a Gold Medal often results in follow-on publications of a doctrinal nature by j unior 

officers. For example, see Lieutenant Charles Campbell, RN, Essay on Tactics in an Action on 

the Open Sea with Existing Weapons (London: Harrison, 1 880). 

23. Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, The British Assault on Finland, 1 854-1 855: A 

Forgotten Naval War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 988), p. 80. 

24. Norman H. Gibbs, "The Origins of Imperial Defence," Maritime Strategy and the 

Balance oj Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, John B. Hattendorf and Roberr 

S . Jordan, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 989) , p. 25 . 

25. Gwyn Prins and Robbie Stamp, Top Guns & Toxic Hlhales: The Environment & Global 

Security (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd.), pp. 1 46, 1 50-1 . 

26. Andrew Gordon, Conflict of Style: Jutland and British Naval Command, draft manuscript 

circa November 1 994, chapters II, 13, and 16. 

27. Arthur ]. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher 

Era, 1 904-1919, Volume I: The Road to War, 1 904- 1914 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 

1961), p. 212. 

28. See Donald M. Schurman, "Julian Corbett's Influence on the Royal Navy's Perception of Its Maritime Function," Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings oj a Coriference on the 

RAN) 

Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, James Goldrick (Commander, 

and John B. Hattendorf, eds. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1 993), pp. 

51-63 . 

29. In his introduction to a recendy re-issued version of Some Principles oj Maritime Strategy, 

Eric ]. Grove argues the case for Corbett's influence on the Royal Navy, including assistance 

in the drafting of the 1914 Grand Fleet Battle Tactics. See Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles 

of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 988), p. xli. 

30. Barry D. Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian S. Corbett," Maritime Strategy 

and the Balance of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., p . 111 . 

31. An opinion shared by Knox in "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare, " pp. 328-9. 

32. "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have given the Author access to official 

documents in the preparation of this work, but they are in no way responsible for his reading 

or presentation of the facts as stated, " disclaimer found opposite tide page of Sir Julian Stafford 

Corbett, Naval Operations: History of the Great War Based on Qfal Documents (London: 

Longmans, Green and Co., 1920). 

34 
Tritten * Great Britain 

33. Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the first World war, " Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The 

First World War, Alan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds . (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for 

the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1 988), pp. 31-79. 

34. Roski11, The Strategy if Sea Power, pp. 1 01-42 is the basis of the section on World 

War I. 

35. Stephen Wentworth Roski11 (Captain, RN, Retired), Naval Policy between the Wars, 

Volume I: The Period of A nglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1 968), p. 

533. 

36. William Koenig, "Coronel and Falkland," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed. , pp. 1 44-59. 

37. The search for an heir to Nelson within the Royal Navy can be seen in books such 

as John Horsfield, The Art if Leadership in War: The Royal Navy from the Age if Nelson to the 

End if World War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1 980). A similar search in the U.S. 

Navy is evidenced by Charles Benedict Davenport, Naval Ofcers: Their Heredity and 

Development (Washington, D.C. : The Carnegie Institution, 1919). 

38. See Owen Rutter, Red Ensign: A History if Convoy (London: Robert Hale, Ltd. , 

1 943). 

39. "The adoption of convoy, 1917: ' Some suggestions for Anti-Submarine Warfare' by 

Major Maurice Hankey, R.M.A., Secretary of the War Cabinet, 13 February 1917," in 

Hattendorf et aI., British Naval Documents, pp. 761-6. 

40. See especially Peter Baron Hill-Norton (Admiral of the Fleet, RN, Retired) and 

John Dekker, Sea Power: A Story if Warships and Naviesfrom Dreadnoughts to Nuclear Submarines (London: Faber and Faber, 1 982), pp. 1 18-9, 1 70. The authors make the case that aversion 

to convoying was alive and well in the Royal Navy at the time of the writing. 

41. See also Daniel A. Baugh, "Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the Objects of Sea 

Power" in Mahan Is Not Enough, Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds., pp. 1 3-49. 

42. James Goldrick, (Commander, RAN), "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable 

Obj ect: The Naval Review, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 191 1-1931" in Mahan 

Is Not Enough, Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds., pp. 83-1 02. 

43. Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p. 533. 

44. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "'The Best Laid Plans': The Development of British Battle-Fleet 

Tactics, 1919-1942," The International History Review, November 1 992, pp. 661 -700. 

45. Credit should be given for the use of carrier-based aircraft as long-range strike assets 

in the Mediterranean Fleet exercise of July 1 928. The attacks, however, were against 

"enemy" aircraft carriers and not against the main battle flee£. Similarly, Combined Staff 

exercises and planning during the interwar years included air strikes from the sea against the 

shore. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Su"'ey (London: 

Jane's Publishing Co. , 1 979), pp. 162-3, 1 66. 

46. Marc Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War, 

1 939-45," in Maritime Strategy and the Balatue if Power, Hattendorf and Jordan eds., p. 244; 

and "The protection of trade, 1 937: Memorandum for the Committee of Imperial Defence 

by the Chiefs of SuffSub-Committee, 2 February 1 937," in Hattendorf et al., British Naval 

Documents, pp. 781-7. 

47. Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p. 538. 

48. B rian Bond and Williamson Murray, "The British Armed Forces, 1918-39," Military 

Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period, Alan R. Milett and Wilamson Murray, eds. 

(Boston: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1 988), pp. 98-1 30. 

49. For an extremely well-developed case study of the difficulty in changing doctrine, 

see Harold R. Winton, To Change an Anny: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Annored 

Doctrine, 1927- 1938 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1 988), especially pp. 238-40. 

50. See especialy Barry R. Posen, The Sourres if Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 

Gennany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1 984), pp. 1 59-63. 

51. Williamson Murray, "British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War, " in 

Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War, Alan R. Millett and Williamson 

Murray, eds. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio Stale University, 

1 988), p. 1 1 4. 

35 
The Newport Papers 

52. Roskil, The Strategy of Sea Power, pp. 170, 247-8, is the basis of the section on World 

War II. 

53. See James J. Tritten, "Introduction of Aircraft Carrien into the Royal Navy: Lessons 

for the Development of Naval Doctrine," The Naval Review, July 1994, pp. 260-7; and 

Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, "The Introduction of Carrier 

Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Ro;yal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, 

Organizations, and the Problem of Decision,' draft report prepared for the Director, Net 

Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1994, pro llG-63. 

54. Geoffrey Til, "Airpower and the Battleship in the 1920 s," in Technical Change and 

British Naval Policy, 1860-1939, Bryan Ranft, ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishen, 

Inc., 1977), pp. 108-22; and Bernard Acworth (Captain, RN), The Navies of Today and 

Tomorrow, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1930), especially chapter 14. 

55. "Functions of fleet aircraft, 1936: Admiralty Memorandum on Fleet Air Arm tactics 

and equipment, December 1936," Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents, pp. 948-9. 

56. Wilam Koenig, "Matapan," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed., pp. 1 82-97; and Martin 

Stephen, "The Battle ofMatapan," in Sea Battles in Close- Up: World War 2, Eric Grove, ed. 

(Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 48-69. 

57. Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War, 1 939-45" 

in Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., pp. 251-4; and Eliot 

A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Miifortunes: The Anatomy of FailurE' in War (New York: 

The Free Press, 1990), pp. 59-94. 

58. Eric ]. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War 11 (Annapolis, 

Md.: 1987); and Eric Grove and Geoffrey Til

, "Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the 

Era of Massive Retaliation, 1 945-60" and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Anglo-American Maritime 

Strategy in the Era of Flexible Response, 1960-80," both in Maritime Strategy and the Balance 

of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., pp. 271-303, 304-29. 

59. For example, two manuals were published immediately after the war: Naval Control 

of Shipping in War (1948) and Naval War Manual, B.R. 1806 (1 947). 

60. These debates should also be seen in the context of Britain attempting to reestablish 

its role in the world as a global and fint-ranking power. Many of the doctrinal debates 

revolved around command. For evidence of the depth of these debates, see the declassified 

papen of Admiral Arleigh Burke found in the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical 

Center. One such example is an undated/osition paper, " United States/United Kingdom 

Differences of Opinion." I am indebte to Captain Peter Swartz, USN (Retired) for 

providing me with a copy of this paper. 

61. Naval Staff History [Commander F. Barley and Lieutenant Commander D.W. 

Waten], Second World War, The Defeat of the Enemy AttiJCk upon Shipping, 1939-1945: A 

Study in Policy and Operations, Vol. IA (Text and Appendices) B.R. 1 376(51) (1A), and Vol. 

IB (plans and Tables) B.R. 1 376(51) (lB) (London: Admiralty Historical Section, 1957) 

[declassified]). See also "The anti-submarine war, 1 939-45: Appendix 3 of the Report of the 

Maritime Air Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1950," in Hattendorf et 

aI., British Naval Documents pp. 873-5. 

62. De artment of the Navy, Lessons of the Falklands, Summary Report, February 1 983. 

63. "The Practical Application of Maritime Doctrine," fint draft, 22 April 1 994; "The 

Foundation of British Maritime Doctrine," second draft, 23 September 1994. 

The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those 

of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. The author is indebted 

for comments by Eric Grove, Department of Politics, Univenity of Hull; Professor Geoffrey 

Til, Department of History and International Main, Royal Naval College, Greenwich; 

Professor Michael Palmer, East Carolina U nivenity; and Commander James Goldrick, RAN. 

36 
Navy and Military Doctrine in France 

James J. Tritten 

If N A MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY fought some years ago, inlL digenous ground forces converged on a narrow peninsula in the southern 

part of their country, where they cut off part of the army of a foreign occupation. 

The foreign commander had planned to disrupt indigenous transportation from 

a small seaport, anticipating additional support or, if necessary, evacuation by 

sea. His navy was one of the best in the world; the invaded country, which had 

essentially no navy of its own, had sought asistance from France, a major sea 

power. 

France, which had already provided the indigenous forces with combat-experienced ground officers and modern military equipment, now landed a major 

ground force in the northern part of the country, while her fleet sailed in support 

from a forward-deployed location. The French naval commander detached a 

small portion of his fleet to land additional troops and also to blockade the 

occupied seaport. When the enemy navy forces arrived, they were surprised to 

fmd the numerically superior French. The enemy admiral, who had asumed 

command only recently, was without benefit of having met with his subordinates to outline his personal doctrine or to conduct work-up exercises. 

The French fleet commander, operating within an established navy doctrine, 

knew that if he remained in a defensive posture near the seaport, he would doom 

another French squadron that was due to arrive son with additional troops, 

artillery, and other supplies. In keeping with his main objective, the French 

commander seized the initiative and tactically maneuvered his forces to meet 

the enemy fleet far enough out to sea to permit the safe arrival of the French 

resupply squadron. The enemy met the French challenge but was unable to gain 

an advantage. The French fleet commander engaged the enemy but husbanded 

his own asts without a serious decisive engagement, keeping the enemy fleet 

"in play" for four days. 

Ships from the French resupply squadron landed their troops and equipment 

safely and then sailed north. embarked coalition ground forces. and brought 

them to the area of the occupied seaport. Coalition forces mased around the 

seaport and engaged in bloody but ultimately successful warfare against an 

entrenched enemy. The enemy capitulated in the face of the repeated asults 
The Newport Papers 

and no possible escape or hope for reinforcement. The French fleet maintained 

station and provided security for the victorious coalition forces by deterring a 

second. belated attempt by the enemy to reinforce. resupply. or evacuate forces 

at the seaport. 

The above actions were taken by the French. British (the enemy). and 

Americans (indigenous forces) off the Virginia Capes and at Yorktown in 1 781. 

The United States owes the French Navy a great deal for this military victory 

over Great Britain. which resulted in the independence of the United States. It 

is appropriate. therefore. to review the legacy of the defensive navy and the 

French military doctrine employed during these decisive battles; perhaps there 

is something from which naval forces today can benefit. I 

Doctrine of the plume 

Although most histories of French naval thought begin with the seventeenth 

century. there is at least some record of prior activity. 2 Gilles de Rome. an 

advisor to King Philip IV (the Fair) who ruled from 1285 to 1 3 14. proposed 

some novel tactical ideas in a bok entitled De regimine principum. A much 

later record is the bok Debat sur Ie heraut d 'armes (1455). which responds to 

English claims to control of the seas. A few decades later. Philippe de Cleves 

published his Instructions sur Ie jait de Ia guerre. which addressed the potential 

of the tempo of artillery fire to dominate tactics in the same way that speed 

affects strategy. and he recommended maneuvering to haras the enemy and 

repel his attack. In 1516 (or 1520). Antoine de Conflans published Lesjaisz de 

Ia marine et de 1a navigaie. During the reign of Henry II. from 1 547 to 1 559. 

there appeared Stoionomie (or Traite contenant Ia maniere de dresser, fournir, 

equiper et entretenir en tout temps en bon ordre une armee de mer consacree 

aux galeres). It was. however. with the final expulsion of England from the 

Continent that France began to address the development of its navy in earnest. 

The events ashore that influenced the development of French Navy doctrine 

cannot be overlooked. During the Thirty Years' War (16 18- 1 648). in which 

France became the dominant power on the continent of Europe. Marshal Henri 

de la Tour d' Auvergne. Vicomte de Turenne. forced the withdrawal of Holy 

Roman Empire forces from Freiburg and then chose not to exploit the victory 

with a pursuit. In a subsequent encounter, Turenne maneuvered William 

Frederick, the Great Elector of Brandenburg. out of Alsace without engaging 

him in battle.3 Thus the inception of elements of a maneuver warfare philosophy 

in Europe are found in the French military-and later in navy doctrine. 

38 
Tritten * France 

Anand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, the all-powerful Chief 

Minister, beginning in 1 624, was the founder of the pennanent navy of France 

and author of a seminal doctrinal bok-Testament politique.4 In 1 626 he 

arranged for himself an appointment as Grand Maitre, chef et surintendant 

general de Ja navigation et commerce de France. Richelieu organized a 

centralized navy from the surviving remnants of feudal France-four independent admiralties whose admirals rarely went to sea. Richelieu's efforts 

created a strong corps of administrative officers, the plume (the pen), who had 

more power and influence than the actual body of warfighting seamen-the 

epee, or the sword. The friction between these two types of officers constitutes 

a theme for the study of French Navy doctrine.s 

France was one of the first modern sea powers to examine fonnally past sea 

battles to garner lessons learned. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, under Louis XIV, 

instituted a naval program that took advantage of what the Royal Navy had 

learned in its wars with the Dutch (1652-1674). The French quickly changed 

their preferred tactical fonnations to capitalize on the lessons learned by the 

English in combat. 

Credit for doctrinal development in the French Navy belongs to Admiral 

Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Tourville proved his charismatic combat leadership against the combined English and Dutch fleets at 

Beveziers (Beachy Head) in 1690 and against the large multinational Smyrna 

convoy in 1 693.6 He was the impetus behind the development of the French 

Navy into a modern fighting force. Tourville drilled his fleet into a disciplined 

fonnation that responded to his command. His Signals and Instructions, issued 

before Beveziers, was the first such written French Navy doctrine, and it was 

credited, in part, for his victories. These instructions were reissued and revised 

between 1 691 and 1 693. 

The French sailing and fighting instructions, signals, and orders of sailing 

issued by Tourville were superior to those of the English in the area of fleet 

organization and signalling. A strength of the French system was to issue 

separate boks for fighting and sailing instructions; in this way, advances in 

one area were not held hostage to the other. Tourville's instructions of 1690 

included an innovative pocket-sized signal bok with an index. English and 

British commanders laler copied and employed successfully some of the French 

sailing fonnations of this era. 

The War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) exhausted the French 

treasury, leaving a dearth of resources available for the fleet and for doctrinal 

development. General respect for the fleet also declined tremendously 

39 
The Newport Papers 

following its defeat at the Battle of La Hougue in 1692 and the subsequent 

slaying of its survivors in full view of the French Anny watching from the shore. 

Because they were unable to invade England, the French chose guerre de 

course-commerce warfare-as their strategy for fleet employment. Guerre 

de course had ben favored by two successive ministers of the navy under Louis 

XIV and Louis XV. It also had ben the subject of an influential pamphlet, 

Memoire de 1a course (also known as Memoire sur 1a caprerie), by the famous 

engineer Sebastien Le Prestre, Marquis de Vauban. Vauban, a Marshal of 

France (a reward for his work with coastal and northeastern frontier fortifications), advocated sending small squadrons to raid the rich commercial sea lines 

of communication as a way to replenish the national treasury. His recommendations were highly influential due to his stature in France.

7 Vauban's vision, 

however, included neither control of the seas nor contesting control of them. 

To a large degre, war at sea was turned over to privateers, such as the famous 

Jean Bart, who operated succesfully under Vauban's doctrine of guerre de 

course. 

Pere Paul Hoste, a professor of mathematics at the Royal Naval College at 

Toulon and a Jesuit priest with twelve years of sea duty and service as a chaplain 

to Tourville, was influenced by the latter to write the first major French 

scholarly bok on naval tactics, L 'Art des armees navales ou traite des 

evolutions navales ( 1697).8 This work codified such geometric fleet formations 

as the line ahead, the line abreast, and the line of bearing. Although Hoste's 

emphasis was on precision and control, his bok also demonstrated to the officer 

corps what was possible with strict control of limited asts. Hoste addressed 

the respective advantages of fighting from windward and leeward and the 

question of whether a fleet of inferior strength should or could fight, and he 

tried to compare the doctrine of warfare at sea to that of warfare ashore. Hoste 

praised Tourville for his ability to prevent engagements. The Art of Evolutions 

was republished in 1727 and was still being used as a text toward the end of the 

eighteenth century; it was translated into Dutch, Greek, and twice into 

English-being published in London in 1762 and 1 834. 

Although these early French doctrinal efforts reduced the chaos of battle and 

allowed the fleet to fight as a disciplined whole, the administrative officers, the 

plume, biased navy doctrinal development in favor of the more controllable 

defensive. Warfare ashore was influenced by the maneuver warfare philosophy 

and the science of fortifications advanced by Vauban. Warfare at sea was made 

similarly geometric and precise; chance would be eliminated by control. Fighting seamen, those of the epe

, held an opposing view. In this aspect of the 

40 
Tritten * France 

standing tension between these two types of officers during this period, the 

plume was generally dominant. 

Defense and control, rather than offense and the milie (or close engagement 

at discretion) were stresed, although Hoste did address breaking the enemy's 

line. The English maintained a strict battle line; their perfonnance against the 

combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Malaga in 1704 reaffmned the defensive 

doctrine favoring control, as advocated by Hoste. Facing an economic crisis 

and invasion from the northeast, France laid up its larger ships and returned to 

guerre de course. In a larger sense, guerre de course was a fonn of attrition 

warfare in which pain was to be applied over time rather than in one decisive 

battle, i.e., a war of an

lation. In attrition warfare, a major engagement is not 

sought. 

Although unintentional, these early doctrinal endeavors precluded the initiative of the individual commanders and their ability to se

k to profit from 

unexpected opportunities. The French Navy continued to use Tourville's signal 

bok and doctrine until the Seven Years' War (1756- 1763). During that 

conflict, individual fleet commanders began to isue their own local instructions 

to supplement the centralized doctrine. 

French Navy commanders sailing on the offensive against a convoy were 

obligated to capture merchants rather than attempt to sink enemy warships. In 

a major convoy action in October 1707, a French squadron of privateers under 

Rene Duguay-Trouin ignored this doctrinal principle and concentrated its attack 

on the five defending British escorts under Commodore Richard Edwards. 

Although Rene Duguay-Trouin succeeded in sinking a major escort and capturing thre

 of the remaining four, the tactical victory was not complemented 

by achievement of the overall objective. The French only took about ten percent 

of the convoy-some twelve ships. 

In the Battle off Toulon (1744), a French fleet, under Admiral La Bruyere 

de Court, successfully escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Jose Navarro 

through a blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court, 

under orders not to fire unles attacked, offered to intennix his ships amongst 

the Spanish. Navarro refused, and although the subsequent tactical engagement 

was indecisive, the Spanish squadron . made its way to Cartagena, where 

Navarro was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. The elderly 

(seventy-eight years old) de Court, on the other hand, was relieved of command 

for leaving the deck with only superficial wounds. 

French Navy doctrine also addres defensive interactions with merchantmen. Convoy escort commanders were subject to severe penalties for 

deserting the convoy that they were to protect, and merchant shipmasters could 

41 
The Newport Papers 

be fmed heavily for refusing to sail in convoy. If a friendly convoy could be 

protected with a maneuver rather than ftrepower. this would be done. In battles 

where the French Navy fought to defend convoys. escort commanders and 

captains often fought gallantly. For example. during the Second Battle off Cape 

Finisterre (1747). a signiftcantly smaller escort force under Commodore 

Desherbiers. Marquis de Utenduere. was defeated by Rear Admiral Edward 

Hawke's attack, but his convoy of 250 merchants escaped. The French escort 

under Utenduere damaged the British to such a degree that they could not 

pursue the merchants. Utenduere thus distinguished himself as an inspirational 

combat leader against one of the most aggressive and succesful of English 

commanders, even though he did not follow French Navy doctrine precisely. 

Unfortunately. Utenduere's force was France's last combat-experienced convoy escort squadron. and its los

 diminished France's ability to ensure further 

safe delivery of seabome shipments. Hence. Utenduere's selection of aggressive tactics not in confonnance with doctrine suggests that such departures are 

not necesarily in the best interests of the nation as a whole. however stirring 

their accounts in history boks. 

In an interesting interpretation of intemational law. a defensive alliance with 

Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter's War of 

Jenkins's Ear (1739-1743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two 

ships operated essentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division 

of Spanish ships to North American waters. This masing of forces, and the 

presence of French warships within them. deterred a British attack. Otherwise 

during this war. France claimed the rights and privileges of a neutral. although 

cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets was extensive 

enough over the years to lead eventually to the development of multinational 

naval doctrine. 

The French fleet at Minorca in 1756 operated in accordance with a defensive 

doctrine for maritime support of ground forces wherein the object of the tactical 

action between fleets was to protect the beachhead and not necessarily to sink 

enemy ships. The French victory under Lieutenant-General Roland-Michel 

Barrin. Marquis de La Galissonniere. was not only a great triumph but resulted 

in major problems that plagued the defeated Royal Navy commander. As a 

result of a campaign for Minorca. 150 transports landed successfully some 

15,00 trops who eventually took the island. Unfortunately. the subsequent 

disaster at Quiberon Bay (1759) once again ended France's dreams to invade 

England and forced her to ftght the remainder of the Seven Years' War at sea, 

off her own shores, on the defensive. 

42 
Trinen * France 

Doctrine of the epee 

Under Louis XV's Minister of Marine, Etienne Fran�is, Duc de Choiseul, 

naval doctrine was removed from the province of the plume and brought directly 

under the control of the epee. After asuming the ministry in 176 1, Choiseul 

isued formal fighting instructions and created a training squadron as well as a 

marine corps modeled after the British. Despite his many reform efforts and 

excellent theories, Choiseul served a reluctant sovereign who had competing 

fmancial and political needs and chose not to bolster the fleet.9 In the absence 

of a vast overseas empire, France turned her attention inward, sentencing her 

fleet to become a force for coastal defense and war by attrition. Raiding was 

once again turned over to privateers. 

The two leading figures in the reforms instituted under Choiseul were 

Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues, and Jean Fran�ois de 

Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavillon. 10 Neither of these officers altered the fundamentally defensive nature of French Navy doctrine of war by attrition, and 

both sought to minimize risk. Morogues believed also that combat at sea would 

hardly be decisive in the overall war effort. France's particular geographical 

position made this true at the time. Morogues' bias, however, tended to drive 

naval doctrine further towards the defensive and escape as an honorable 

alternative to battle. 

Morogues put together a textbok for cadets of the academy at Brest. 

Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux (1763), which was 

published after the end of the Seven Years' War, contained the ideas that had 

ben circulating among the officer corps for some time. Although modeled 

somewhat upon Hoste's work, Morogues wrote as a naval officer for naval 

officers, and his tactical ideas tended to be more practical than theoretical. 

Morogues' signalling system was far more complete than any other in practice. 

Interestingly, he accepted the role of elan, bravery, and experience as necessary 

ingredients for success when a smaller force faced a larger one. He even 

accepted the concept of outflanking and breaking the enemy battle line, although only in special cases where one had a superior force or where it was 

necessary to seize easy targets or to exploit a break in the line created by the 

enemy. 

Morogues' combat experiences at Quiberon Bay ( 1759) reinforced his strong 

bias in favor of the defensive form of warfare and control and his belief in the 

futility of actions between forces of equal strength. Morogues argued that one 

should mas strength against weakness. Unfortunately, for a variety of political, 

economic, and cultural reasons, French governments did not normally envision 

43 
The Newport Papers 

supporting a fleet that would be able to face the Royal Navy on an equal basis, 

regularly. 

Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux was published 

privately and was not in confonnance with the official French Navy signal bok. 

Though it was reprinted once, translated by the British, and published in 

Holland in 1779, it is difficult to establish how much impact it had on combat 

in the French fleet. Yet Morogues' bo

k must have had influence there; it was 

a textbok at the academy, was widely read, and reinforced an emerging 

appreciation for innovation during battle and the idea that control and defense 

were the answers to British offensive power. 

Captain Jacques Bourde de Villehuet, an officer in the service of the French 

East India Company, wrote I.e manoeuvrier ou essai sur la thiorie et la pratique 

des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales in 1765. This bok included 

sections on the preparation of the crew for battle, boarding tactics, engaging 

enemy ships, and shifting from sailing formations used during transit to those 

employed in battle. 11 It was published in several editions and was translated 

into English and Dutch. Another 1765 publication, Ordonnance du roi, also 

emphasized control in reference to local freedom of action. 

The second leading figure during the Choiseul reforms was Jean Fran�ois 

du Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavilion. Pavilion developed a set of signals that was 

accepted by the French Navy following two meetings of flag officers. one in 

1773 and the other in 1775. The signals were given trial during fleet exercises, 

published in 1776. and authorized for fleet use in 1778. But. individual commanders apparently were given the option to adopt them or not, as in the Royal 

Navy. 

French Navy doctrine formula was to "exercise rigid tactical control over 

their fleets throughout the whole action by means of an excellent system of 

signals. The French used one particular flag to represent each digit. and by 

hoisting combinations of flags could quickly indicate any signal in the numbered signal bo

k. "12 The French made a science of naval warfare. creating an 

incredibly complex system of manuals and accompanying signal boks that 

were retained until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Unfortunately. the 

direction of the battle signals available was not towards the actual defeat of the 

enemy fleet. 

The French victory under the command of Admiral Louis Guillouet. Comte 

d'Orvilliers, at Ushant (1778) over Admiral Augustus Keppel. provides an 

excellent opportunity to review the effectiveness of existing doctrine in 

both navies. Keppel operated under the centralized Royal Navy fighting 

instructions, supplemented by his own. D 'Orvilliers used instructions prepared 

44 
Tritten * France 

and influenced by his chief of staff, the Chevalier du Pavilion. Keppel engaged 

d'Orvilliers without first having properly fonned a battle line, and the resulting 

attack was ragged. The French fought generally on the defensive, and their 

im

ediate objective was to impair enemy mobility by damaging masts and sails 

rather than taking prizes. D'Orvilliers achieved this, generally getting the better 

of the British. Keppel and one of his subordinates were court-martialed after 

the battle for, essentially, failing to do their utmost, but both were found 

inocent. The same complaint could have ben lodged against d'Orvilliers, 

since French mobility was impaired to a much lesser extent, but the French 

seemed less inclined than the British to initiate legal proceedings following lost 

or indecisive battles. 

A combined French and Spanish fleet operated during 1 779 to gain control 

of the English Channel. Overall command was exercised by d 'Orvilliers, who 

issued a newly revised set of signals and instructions for use in both fleets-in 

effect, multinational navy doctrine. Although the fleets had not operated 

together previously, some Spanish ships were eventually able to act successfully as integral parts of French squadrons in addition to forming their own 

national squadron of observation, which would join the battle once the enemy 

was engaged. Other attempts to combine assets, such as in the Caribbean, were 

less successful. 

French naval command was, at times, given to anny officers. Jean-Baptiste 

Charles Henri Hector Theodat, Comte d 'Estaing, an infantry officer during the 

Seven Years' War, was promoted to lieutenant-general, and he was subsequently and simultaneously appointed governor-general of San Domingo and 

the first Chef d'Escadre des Anees Navales (commodore). At the Battle of 

Grenada (1779), his opponent, Vice Admiral the Honorable John Byron, failed 

in an offensive attack, leaving himself vulnerable to counterattack or destruction of his convoy. The Comte d'Estaing, in tum, failed to use his superiority 

and seize upon the opportunity, being content to have prevented the British from 

landing troops. Regular French Navy officers, such as then-Captain Pierre 

Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez, criticized this decision and the resulting 

inaction. 

Failure to capitalize on their superior ability to control their forces and order 

them to respond promptly to signals was demonstrated during Commodore 

Destouches ' victory over Admiral Mariott Arbuthnot off the Virginia Capes in 

March 1 78 1. Destouches blunted a British attack on his ships, broke off, and 

withdrew from the shores of Virginia rather than exploit fully the victory or 

land troops destined to support Major General Marie Paul Roch Yves Gilbert 

Motier, Marquis de Lafayette. Destouches was subsequently criticized at court, 

45 
The Newport Papers 

and by some of his officers. At the end of the battle, Arbuthnot's forces 

remained between the French ships and Virginia. 

The same criticism could have been levied against Rear Admiral Fran�ois 

Joseph Paul, Comte de Gras-Tilly (another former army officer), who 

maneuvered boldly from the Caribbean to the Virginia Capes (September 

178 1), but in his subsequent victory over Admiral Lord Thomas Graves, failed 

to act in a daring maner during the first day of the Battle of the Saints (1 782). 

Of course, Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney's failure to exploit the 

victory over de Gras on the second day of the battle is the subject of 

controversy and proof that this problem was not limited to only one navy. 

Despite his subsequent humiliation due to his los and capture at the Battle 

of the Saints, Admiral de Gras is remembered by a grateful America for his 

support and success off the Virginia Capes and its resulting impact on coalition 

military operations ashore at Yorktown. 

The one French Navy officer in whom both sides acknowledged an innovative, offensive fighting spirit was Pierre Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez. 

Then-Commodore Suffren engaged in a series of five battles against Admiral 

Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies between 1782 and 1783. Suffren, admired 

as one of the greatest tactical innovators of naval history, is generally credited 

as the first to order his captains to attempt to break the enemy's battle line-although in fact this had been done earlier by de Gras

, under whom the Balli 

de Suffren had served. Suffren issued both written and verbal plans before each 

battle-sometimes exhorting his captains to do the best that they could under 

the circumstances. His personality, however, lacked the magnetism of Admiral 

Lord Horatio Nelson, nor did he command the devotion of his men as did 

Tourville. When necessary, Suffren replaced less effective captains with those 

who were bolder, but there is also no indication that he devoted a great deal of 

time to the preparation of formal standing fighting instructions. 

Because his Indian Ocean squadron was of limited size and was essentially 

on its own without the ability to count on reinforcements or replacements of its 

battle loss, Suffren was forced to be content with the immediate tactical 

victory. Hence, he was compelled to forgo the exploitation phase of battle in 

order to conserve asts. 13 Upon returning to France, Suffren was promoted, 

rightly, to vice admiral, but one should recall that he never commanded a great 

battle fleet. 

With its major victories over the British at Ushant and in the American War 

of Independence, France rested comfortably on the success of its naval doctrine 

and signals. Essentially, Pavilion's system seemed vindicated, and new 

doctrinal development now slowed considerably. All subsequent signal boks 

46 
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were further adaptations of the existing system. Naval commis

ions were 

fonned to study the question of signals, and they reported that there was no 

need for further development. Two tactical boks that appeared in 1787, 

Memoire sur la tactique navale by Commodore Verdun de la Crenne and 

Tactique navale by Captain Buor de la Charouliere, advanced no new ideas in 

doctrine. 

There were a few exceptions to this general rule, such as L 'art de la guerre 

sur mer, ou tactique navale (1787) by Chef de Division (commodore) Iurien, 

Vicomte de Grenier, a short bok about navy tactics that did advance some new 

concepts. 14 This succinct work is based upon combat experience and is very 

much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed masing strength 

against weakness, much as had Morogues. He exposed the weaknesses of the 

French line-ahead battle plan, attributing its successes to British ineptitude 

rather than to the virtue of this fonnation. Despite some rather innovative 

suggestions for tactical disposition of the fleet, L 'art de la guerre sur mer, ou 

tactique navale was still esntially biased toward defense and wars of attrition. 

Although this bok was written by a serving admiral, it had little impact on the 

French Navy. It was translated within a year into English, into Dutch in 1 799, 

and it was apparently used by the Spanish. 

Another exception that advanced new ideas in doctrine was Tactique navale, 

ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les signaux et sur les mouvements de guerre 

(1788) by Admiral Clause Fran90is, Comte d' Amblimont. Tactique navale was 

also based upon combat experience but stressed innovation; d' Amblimont 

promoted breaking the fleet into separate pelotons, or tactical groups, with 

different functions. Subsequently Nelson used this device successfully at 

Trafalgar ( 1 805). Tactique navale advocated the unrestricted offensive, but this 

opinion was not shared by the fleet officers. 

Generally, French Navy doctrine during the years of war with Great Britain 

was such that the objective of an engagement with enemy ships was to cripple 

their mobility. IS Although this doctrine would result perhaps in fewer shots per 

engagement, it usually would not result in the elimination of the subsequent 

threat. British warships were neither taken prize nor sunk, thus allowing their 

subsequent refitting and eventual return to battle. According to French doctrine, 

the ultimate purpose of naval warfare was not necessarily to engage enemy 

ships. Indeed, a leeward escape to fight another day was an honorable alternative to battle. The overall strategy was to expand control over new areas of the 

globe rather than to contest other European powers in battles at sea. There were 

obvious exceptions to the rule, and in fact some British commanders used the 

French model rather than attempt to capture or destroy the enemy. 

47 
The Newport Papers 

French tactics were nonnally to fight on the leeward side and fire their 

canon on the upswell so as to maximize "mobility kills" by damage to masts 

and rigging rather than attempt to sink the ship by aiming at the hull. For the 

most part, except when led by Suffren, the French Navy fought from the 

defensive when engaging an enemy fleet of equal strength. The French Navy 

thus adopted a doctrine of battle avoidance and war by attrition. When coupled 

with their generally better built ships, sound training, and a well-fonned tactical 

line, the French frequently bettered the more offensive Royal Navy who sought 

the decisive engagement. As discussed above, these succes included: Beachy 

Head (B6veziers) in 1 690; the Second Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747; 

Minorca in 1 756; Ushant in 1 778; and the Virginia Capes in September 1 781. 

French naval writings during the years of war with Britain included many of 

the sophisticated doctrinal isues that were being debated in all navies. One 

issue was the question of correct placement of the fleet commander. Should the 

admiral ride in the van, at the center, in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a 

fast frigate? Shifting the flag to a frigate had ben tried by British Admiral Lord 

Richard Howe off Rhode Island in 1778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did 

the same off Martinique in 1780. Following the capture of de Gras at the 

Saints (1782), French Navy doctrine was changed to require that commanders 

in chief fight from frigates; a flag officer embarked in a frigate could see better 

and his signals could be sen better. Fighting from a frigate resembled the 

placement of the general officer overlooking the battlefield. The policy was 

later abandoned by the new government. 

Although naval doctrine under the French monarchy was extremely 

thorough, it was biased by factors beyond the control of naval officers. Technology remained essentially the same during this era, and the major modifications to doctrine were based upon geography, strategic culture, available 

resources, and government policy. The impending change in the type of 

government was to have a dramatic impact on naval doctrine, including the loss 

of rich tradition and lessons learned by monarchist navy officers who had paid 

for their lessons in blood. 

Doctrinal Collapse with the First Republic 

As the French became preoccupied internally with their own revolution in 

1789 and its aftennath, neither the aristocratic officer corps (Ie grand corps) nor 

the new Republican leadership was overly concerned with advancing the fmer 

points of naval doctrine. Many of the good ideas proposed by Grenier and 

d' Amblimont had simply arrived at the wrong time, and many of the valuable 

48 
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lessons were lost on the guillotine. Instead, the navy of the Republic went to 

war in 1793 using the basic naval doctrine of the ancien regime against the 

British, who had been experimenting and exercising their new tactical doctrine, 

based in part on the inovations advanced in the dying days of the French 

monarchy. Similarly, doctrinal development ashore stagnated, and the French 

Army preserved the same drill regulations until 183 1. Even Napoleon 

Bonaparte's army used the regulations of 1 791.16 

What the navy of the Republic lacked in doctrinal development, it made up 

for in spirit. The Battle of the Thirteenth Prairial in 1 794 (known in Britain as 

the Glorious First of June) was one of the greatest convoy battles in naval 

history. Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret de Joyeuse, commanded the Brest fleet in an engagement some four hundred miles out to sea. 

Villaret de Joyeuse's objective was to ensure the safe arrival of a 1 30-ship 

convoy with supplies from America. The loss of the Brest fleet was an 

acceptable price to pay for the safe arrival of this convoy. To his credit, Villaret 

de Joyeuse accepted combat against the well-trained and recently exercised 

Channel Fleet under Lord Howe, one of the most skillful tacticians then in 

command. Although the Brest fleet was severely mauled during the battle, it 

succeeded in the overall objective and gave an extremely good accounting of 

itself. Despite his losses and his being of noble birth, Villaret de Joyeuse was 

neither court-martialed nor guillotined. 17 

On the other hand, in one of his subsequent engagements with the British, 

Villaret de Joyeuse, with the bulk of the Brest fleet off Belle lie in 1 795, failed 

to capitalize on a clear advantage over a British squadron. He allowed himself 

to be bluffed by the British commander, Rear Admiral Sir William Cornwallis. 

Within one week, Villa ret de Joyeuse suffered a humiliating defeat, the 

debandade de Groix off the tie de Groix. Clearly the French Navy was to pay 

a heavy price for the loss of an institutional ability to advance how it would 

fight in war. This era marks the low point of the French Navy. 

By the end of 1795, the Committee of Public Safety resolved that the navy 

would henceforth send out only small divisions, whose goals would be guerre 

de course and raiding distant colonies. With this official government policy 

accepted subsequently even by Napoleon, doctrinal development could not help 

being affected. Navy reforms were initiated under a former royalist lieutenant, 

now Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Jean Fran�ois Truguet. But all reforms 

were within the context of the asumed role of raiding-not major fleet 

engagements. 

49 
The Newport Papers 

The Napoleonic Era 

Much has been written about the French loss at the Battle of Aboukir Bay, 

also known as the Battle of the Nile ( 1798). Suffice it to say that Vice Admiral 

Fran�ois Paul Brueys d' Aigai1liers demonstrated that he did not know how to 

fight at anchor, thus indicating a basic failure in doctrinal understanding and 

development. In his correspondence with Napoleon, Brueys expresed indecision over whether to fight at anchor or under sail if attacked. Brueys' ships 

could have formed into a stronger defensive position and amas firepower 

against the attack; anchored closer together; loaded their guns on both sides; 

and opened fire at maximum rather than minimum range. His captains lacked 

necessary experience and there was no doctrine to addres these tactical issues. 

In 1 802, a former naval officer, Audibert Ramatuelle, published a major bok 

on naval tactics, Cours eLementaire de tactique navale, didii a Bonaparte.IS 

To his credit, Ramatuelle analyzed Nelson's succes at Aboukir. Unfortunately, 

he did not take advantage of the lesns of the d 'Orvilliers at Ushant and Suffren 

in the East Indies or the writings of Grenier and d' Amblimont (although he did 

embrace d' Amblimont's concept of the peloton). Ramatuelle stated that the 

central point of war was to hold land rather than to capture enemy ships; this 

reflected the strategic culture of France and its inability to come to grips with 

how to defeat Great Britain. Napoleon saw victory as a result of defeating the 

enemy's army rather than defeating the enemy 's center of gravity. 

A major result of the French Revolution was that it showed that men could 

be motivated to fight for an idea and that such men could be fielded into armies 

in numbers never before sen. With such numbers, commanders now had new 

tactical, operational, and strategic opportunities.I9 Although this was obvious 

in warfare ashore, it was not so clear at sea. 

Napoleon's expertise in naval matters certainly is subject to question. His 

ill-fated plan to invade England in 1 801 would probably have proved disastrous 

if attempted. There had ben no serious doctrinal development for such an 

undertaking, since there had been no effort even to build a force that could 

contest the Royal Navy for control of the Channel. Even the types of craft 

selected for the invasion crossing were not the most seaworthy. The subsequent 

expedition to San Domingo was a success from the perspective of the navy 

covering force, but a military disaster ashore. When Napoleon became aware 

of the crude submarine that had been designed by the American Robert Fulton, 

his admirals dismissed it as uncivilized. 

By August 1805, however, Napoleon apparently had learned what was 

required. He ordered his various fleets to sea and instructed them to join together 

50 
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but to avoid combat until they had mas

-keeping in mind the ultimate 

objective. The renewed plans to invade England were frustrated by Vice 

Admiral Pierre Charles lean-Baptiste Silvestre, Comte de Villeneuve, who was 

commanding the largest fleet that was to support the transport force. Villeneuve 

had ben engaged in extensive operations in which he sought to avoid engaging 

the British while he sought union with the rest of the French fleet. The British 

had maneuvered a large force in the Chanel, and because Villeneuve felt that 

he could not possibly succeed in contesting control there, he was les than timely 

in his response to support the Grande Anee. When presented with false 

information about the location and strength of the British, Villeneuve abandoned the field and sailed to Cadiz. Without naval support, Napoleon turned 

his back to the sea and his attention to Continental enemies. 

To understand the subsequent actions of the combined Franco-Spanish Fleet 

at the Battle of Trafalgar (1 805), we must keep in mind the objective of its 

commander. Villeneuve was under orders to sortie from Cadiz, join with ships 

at Cartagena, and transport embarked troops to support an attack on NaplesNapoleon having now abandoned his invasion of England. Villeneuve knew 

that Nelson awaited him, but nothing in his order said that he was to engage or 

defeat the British fleet. Nelson was viewed as an obstacle to be overcome rather 

than an object with which he had to deal. 

Villeneuve was a brave man, but he also understood the limitations of the 

combined fleet in training and the quality of its ships.2

o His misgivings were 

shared by officers in both fleets, as they met in a pre-battle council of war. 

Villeneuve, who held the advantage of being able to observe Nelson's blockading, chose to emerge from the harbor when a squadron of British ships were 

detached for logistical duties. The combined fleet commander thought, incorrectly, he had the numerical advantage over Nelson and had even organized a 

separate squadron of observation from what he believed to be his excess. 

Villeneuve's final instructions, isued on the day of the battle, foretold accurately Nelson's tactics but did not provide advice on how to combat them.21 In short, 

French Navy doctrine did not have constructive guidance to offer him. 

Once at sea, Villeneuve failed to provide for tactical reconnaisnce and 

gained esentially no significant information on Nelson's actual strength until 

the morning of the battle when he hastily reintegrated the observation squadron 

into the main fleet. A series of porly executed signals and mis opportunities 

doomed the combined fleet to fight on the defensive. Villeneuve even issued a 

general signal: "Every ship which by her present position was not engaging [is] 

to take any such steps as would bring her as promptly as posible into action. "2

2 

In the hands of Nelson's captains, such a signal would have had meaning. For 

51 
The Newport Papers 

the combined fleet, the lack of combined doctrine, training, and sound ships 

made the signal only an interesting footnote to history. The footnote is all the 

more curious because, since the signal was addressed to no one in particular, 

neither the French nor Spanish captains took any action based upon it. There is 

no question, however, of the bravery of the men of the combined fleet who 

fought at Trafalgar with honor. 

The End of the Age of Sail 

Following the defeat at Trafalgar, Napoleon ordered the fleet to resume 

guerre de course and overseas raiding. Privateers supplemented the standing 

fleet initially, which did attempt to engage the British in distant operations being 

fought over colonies and which also occasionally fought the Royal Navy in 

home waters. A few tactical-level defensive victories did little to stem the tide 

of ruin under Napoleon. Sailors from the Brest fleet were landed to serve with 

the army, and even commerce-raiding efforts were unsuccessful. Despite 

Napoleon's dismissal of the Battle of Trafalgar, he ordered the following words 

to be painted prominently aboard surviving French men-of-war: "France expects that every man will do his duty.,,23 

The French introduced their own version of the British telegraph system in 

1813 as a supplement to the official signal bok. In 1 8 15, a French Navy 

lieutenant, the Chevalier de la Rouvraye, published the Traiti sur I 'art des 

combats de mer, advocating a true offensive spirit and stressing the responsibilities of the individual captain to carry on the battle even if outnumbered. 

Unfortunately, the bok arrived in an era when the new governments questioned 

even the need for a navy. In 1 8 19, the newly restored monarchy published a 

new signal bok reinstating the traditional signals of Pavilion and Morogues. 

In that same year, Father de Pradt published an Appel a La nationfranfaise au 

sujet de sa marine, in which he concluded that the downfall of the French empire 

was due to wasting resources on the navy. In 1 8 19 the government decided to 

support a navy-but the overall employment of the fleet would be guerre de 

course. 

In 1 821, a French artillery officer, General Henri Joseph Paixhans, wrote 

Idies pour Ie blindage du baneries jlonantes, advocating modem ironclads 

mounting only a few large guns. In 1 822, he wrote Nouvelle force maritime, 

which recommended the quick building of a modem steam navy that would 

render Britain's existing fleet irrelevant. In the Journal des sciences militaires, 

a series of articles by a naval commander, Jacques Merigon de Montgery, 

proposed ships of iron with watertight compartments as well as the use of mines, 

52 
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torpedoes, and submarines. These ideas were well ahead of their time, and they 

had no effect on fleet building programs. 

Some twelve years after Waterloo, a French squadron fought side-by-side 

with British and Russian squadrons in an overwhelming and decisive defeat 

of the Turks at Navarino ( 1 827). The Turkish fleet, commanded by 

Admiral Ibrahim Pasha (with the advise of a group of French Navy officers 

led by Captain Jean-Marie Letellier) was anchored in fixed, semicircular 

defensive formation. The Europeans fought a mobile offensive under written 

orders that were identical to Nelson's at Trafalgar, and at the end of the battle, 

sixty Turkish ships had ben destroyed without the los of a single European 

ship. 

Rear Admiral Jean Baptiste Grivel explained his concepts for fleet doctrine 

in his 1 832 Considerations navales en reponse d la brochure de Monsieur de 

Pradt. Gri vel was one of the first to attempt to deal with the overall concept of 

maritime power. His recommendations, however, followed existing government policies-guerre de course. Grivel stated that this would strike at the heart 

of British power. It was a doctrine of necessity, since it was clearly foolhardy 

to meet the Royal Navy head-on in a decisive battle. Then-Lieutenant LouisNarcisse Chopart prepared a tactical textbo

k for sailing ships in 1 839, which 

was translated into English in 1 859 and used at the U.S. Naval Academy. 

The French military, in general, has always considered elan to be one of its 

national strengths and incorporated fighting spirit into its military and naval 

doctrine. The wars of the age of sail, however, indicated that spirit alone will 

not compensate for material and training deficiencies. Early doctrinal decisions 

to fight at sea reflected disdain for the crude broadside employed by the British; 

unfortunately, the alternative method of more specific attacks and attempts at 

mobility kills did not always yield the desired results. On the other hand, a 

doctrine that included escape as an option allowed for some advantages over 

the British, whose formal doctrine was biased in favor of avoiding defeat. 

Doctrine in the Age of hmovation and the Ironclad 

The pioneering work of Stanislas Dupuy de LOme in the 1 840s served to 

introduce the ironclad into the world's navies. The first screw-driven ship of 

the line participated in the multinational naval operations in the Black Sea 

during the Crimean War (1853- 1 856). This war also stimulated French 

development of rifled artillery. Naval attention returned to fleet engagements, 

due to the Peace of Paris which outlawed privateering, thereby turning French 

53 
The Newport Papers 

Navy emphasis away from guerre de course. After much effort. La Gloire. an 

open-ocean steam battleship. was launched in 1 859. 

Admiral Louis Bouet-Wittaumez wrote a series of publications that 

pioneered advances in French Navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer 

( 1 855) was attached to a project de tactique navale-outlining provisional 

tactics for screw-propelled steamships. This doctrine included ensuring a 

superior force with a combined effort at the decisive point. Bouet-Willaumez 

annexed to his bok a plan of attack with eight main orders. 

Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the Ministry of Marine under 

the doctrinal title. Provisory tactics ( 1 857). The Ministry also published Tactique navale that same year. outlining doctrine for ships of sail and steam. 

Tactique navale was an official naval doctrinal publication whose contents 

junior officers were expected to master for promotion examinations. BouetWillaumez's new doctrine was tested in the fleet. reviewed by the Ministry of 

Marine. and officially sanctioned in a new signal bok in 1861. Admiral 

Bouet-Willaumez was well-experienced with the fleet-he finished his service 

as commander in chief. 

These early doctrinal writings followed. rather than led. the introduction of 

new technologies. They were paralleled by the Second Empire, under Napoleon 

il; the emperor kept his naval programs in check so as not to irritate the British, 

who dominated at sea. In 1 863 an experimental submarine was developed but 

abandoned due to technical difficulties. In 1 864 Rusian Admiral Gregoire 

Boutakov published a bok on naval tactics which was translated by a French 

Navy officer and then published by the French Ministry of Marine for domestic 

use under the title Nouvelle bases de tactique navale. In 1 866 the Revue 

Maritime et Coloniale provided an unofficial forum for the discusion of new 

doctrine and other naval matters outside of official circles. 

Bouet-Willaumez's writings, such as his Tactique supplementaire d l 'usage 

d 'une flotte cuirassee ( 1 865), had an impact outside of the French Navy. 24 

Similarly, the offensive tactics of Austrian Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff in 1 866 off the island of Lissa (now Vis) in the Adriatic, in the first battle 

between annored fleets, had an impact on the doctrinal development of the 

French Navy. Admiral Jurien de la Graviere took command of the squadron of 

evolution (charged with tactical development) in 1 868, and after studying the 

Lissa battle he embraced the ram, the milie, as well as the "charge" employed 

by Nelson at Trafalgar and by Tegetthoff at Lissa. There was a worldwide 

debate as to which was supreme, the ram or the gun, with virtually every major 

navy embracing the ram. 

54 
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Naval operations in support of other overseas major regional contingencies 

generally followed the pattern of the Crimean War.2S The navy's role was to 

transport troops to foreign locations, ensure their resupply, and participate in 

blockades and attacks on fortifications. With no enemy at sea and operations 

confmed to the littoral, there was little glory in duty at sea, although the French 

fleet in 1 870 was the second most powerful in the world. Defeat during the 

Franco-Prussian War ( 1870- 1 87 1 ), in which sailors again served ashore as 

ground forces and received national recognition for their efforts, turned French 

military concerns back toward land warfare. After all, how could the fleet obtain 

the return of the lost provinces? 

La grande guerre versus jeune ecole 

French doctrinal development during the mid-to-late 1 800s continued to 

include the peloton and to form tactical groups as parts of larger fleets. In the 

1 890s, France led the world in the development of the submarine as a practical 

weapon of war. The naval ministry supported research into alternative methods 

of contesting British domination of the seas. The French submarine Narval was 

launched in 1 899, whereas the British Admiralty did not place orders for 

submarines until 1901. On the other hand, although the submarine received 

development in France, its full potential was not recognized. At ftrst it was 

thought of as a submerging torpedo boat suitable for coastal defense. French 

Navy matters turned to expansion of the empire and to military operations other 

than war. 

French naval thought flourished again at the end of the ninetenth and 

beginning of the twentieth centuries.26 After years of defeat by the British, the 

legacy of a defensive navy doctrine, and preference for guerre tk course and 

attrition warfare over warfare of anlation and decisive battle, the French 

Navy considered some different ideas. Its Ecole superieure tk guerre tk La 

Marine-the French Naval War College-was founded in 1 895. La grande 

guerre concept, favoring the decisive battle and deep-sea warfare (guerre tk 

haute mer) in order to achieve command of the sea, was the centerpiece of a 

number of French Navy offtcers' writings in the late nineteenth and early 

twentieth centuries. 

Writings that supported La grande guerre included: Admiral Jurien de la 

Graviere, "La marine aujourdhui," Journal o/the RUSI (Royal United Services 

Institute for Defence Studies), 1 874; Vice Admiral Gabriel Darieus, La guerre 

sur mer (1907);

27 and then-Commander Rene Daveluy, Etutk sur La strategie 

navale (1905), Lefons de La guerre ruso-japonaise, La Iutte pour I ' empire tk 

55 
The Newport Papers 

/a mer (1906) and L' esprit de /a guerre navale in thre volumes (1909- 1910).28 

These writings paralleled those of the American Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer 

Mahan. Although they were not official doctrine, they fonned a point of 

departure for official debates over navy doctrine and programg. The 

mainstream of thought by the French naval officer corps supported concepts 

found in these writings. 

The Naval Banle: Studies of the Tactical Factors (1910), by Lieutenant 

Adrien Edouard Baudry, was translated into English for use by American and 

Royal Navy officers. Indeed, the writings of Dareus, Daveluy, and Baudry 

were provided to ships' libraries by the U.S. Navy Department. Unfortunately, 

thought about /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer found a skeptical 

audience following the defeat of France in 1 870- 1 871 in a war wherein sea 

power was clearly secondary. 

An alternative view was championed by another group of officers and 

civilian thinkers whose movement became known as the jeune ecole. These 

were, primarily, Vice Admiral Baron Richild Grivel (son of Rear Admiral Jean 

Baptiste Grivel), De /a guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles inventions, 

etude historique et strategique ( 1 869); Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile 

Aube, La guerre maritime et les portsfranfais ( 1 882), A terre et a bord, notes 

d'un marin (1884). and De /a guerre navale (1 885); the journalist Gabriel 

Channes, La reforme de /a marine (1 886); Commander Gabriel Fontin (pseudonym H. Montechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseudonym Commandant 

Z). &sai de strategie navale ( 1 893). The jeune ecole did not represent 

mainstream naval thought and should be interpreted as a temporary sidetrack 

resulting from the introduction of, and opportunities afforded by, new technologies in an austere fISCal environment. 

The jeune ecole argued that capital ships were becoming vulnerable with 

advances in technology and that a well-designed fleet of inexpensive commerce 

raiders could strike at the heart of British (an asumed enemy) prosperity and 

cause British shippers and manufacturers to demand peace from their government. Coastal defenses should also be emphasized. Pertinent historical navy 

battles were offered to prove the inadvisability of contesting a superior force at 

sea in /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer. Grivel in particular argued 

that naval battles at sea were rarely decisive for the overall war ef as were 

many ground battles. 

The jeune ecole must also be understood in the context of the political and 

economic situation at the time. French governments lacked the political imperative to devote significant resources to the fleet. Profes

ional officers like Aube 

and Grivel were trying to develop concepts of operations based upon these 

56 
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political and fISCal realities?9 Grivel understood especially that his government 

would be unwilling to compete with the British in naval force structure and was 

looking for an alternative theory for support for the fleet. 30 Naturally governments were attracted to doctrinal developments that promised the required 

political objectives at low cost. 

The doctrine of thejeune ecole was offensive (at the tactical level), but the 

asiated force structure was much less capable than that required for guerre 

de haute mer. The new high-spe torpedo boat epitomized the type of ship 

conceived of by thejeune ecole. As Minister of Marine, Aube argued that these 

torpedo boats could sortie from port and attack British ships in their own 

harbors, thus making squadron engagements between main battle forces more 

successful. These smaller ships were to be used as well in coastal defense 

(guerre de cote)-indeed defense of France from blockade by the Royal Navy 

was the major objective of fleet engagements. Aube also had great hopes for 

guerre de course both to scatter the Royal Navy, making possible squadronsized engagements near France, and to strike at the basis of British power. 

Essentially Aube argued that France should take advantage of new technologies 

and that the fleet's doctrine should be based upon a division of labor.31 

With such a force, an offensive capability at the operational or strategic levels 

of warfare was impossible. If France were to fight a war of revenge against 

Germany (another assumed enemy), it would be fought primarily on land. 

France began to build torpedo boats and a system of bases on the northern and 

southern shores of the western Mediterranean. Admiral Aube's vision was that 

of a far-flung network of French bases, all linked by the Panama Canal being 

built by French engineers.32 Since the French Navy had ben the administrator 

of most overseas colonies, the views of the jeune ecole were thus entirely 

consistent with existing government policy. At the height of the influence of 

the jeune ecole, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Rusia abandoned 

their battleship-building programs and even the British Admiralty appeared 

embarrased by its continued development of large surface vessels. 

During the thirty years between 1 871 and 1901, France had thirty ministers 

of marine. With such changes in government, consensus on a coherent naval 

program was extremely difficult, as was agrement on "how to fight" doctrine. 

After some thirty years of debate, wild oscillations in government policies, and 

a shift in the threat from the British to the Germans, Italians, or Rusians, the 

French government settled on the need to contest command of the sea by 

engaging an enemy battle fleet and then conducting operations against the 

enemy shoreline. 

57 
The Newport Papers 

France's need for a high seas fleet was validated by its embarment during 

the Fashoda Incident (1898), the Gennan naval building program, the unreliability and vulnerability of the les

 expensive forces demonstrated in fleet 

maneuvers, and the experiences of Rus

ia and Japan in the Battle of Tsushima 

(1905). In addition, the low-cost option was coupled entirely to a single scenario 

that fell apart in the face of a multitude of posible enemies and misions. Vice 

Admiral Fran�ois-Emest Fournier disnted from this approach in La flotte 

necessaire: ses avantages strategiques, tactiques et economiques (1896), arguing that the battleship itself need not be built to obtain sea control, but that larger 

torpedo boats and armored cruisers would suffice. Ofcial naval doctrine son 

returned under the influence of Admiral Gabriel Darrieus and professional 

officers attached to the tcok superieure de guerre de Ia Marine, but the ideas 

of the jeune ecole surfaced in France and in other nations from time to time. 

Certain government ministers were weary of the years of debate and the 

impotence of the nation; hence the Ministry of Marine ordered the wholesale 

retirement of active flag officers. This second "decapitation" of the navy's 

leadership had a disastrous effect. Future admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex 

lamented in 1908 that the navy lacked a general staff dedicated to the development of defLnitive navy doctrine. 33 

The new Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Augustin Boue de Lapeyrere, in 

1909, ordered a new building program that was to be completed in 1919.34 

Unfortunately, in its desire to save money and in its preoccupation with a 

vulnerable border with Gennany, the French government failed to pay suffiranking 

cient attention to its navy prior to World War I; the French fleet slipped in world 

from second to fifth place.3$ How much of this situation was due to the 

debate over doctrine is open to speculation. 

Twentieth Century World Wars 

During the First World War, the fleet's initial primary task was to maintain 

the sea lines of communication (SLOes) with Algeria and then to patrol French 

maritime frontiers. The SLOes were the vehicle that would enable a half-million 

colonial soldiers and two hundred thousand workers to asist France in her hour 

of need. Hence the navy's contributions were strategic in nature, although it did 

not engage in decisive battle with the Gennan High Seas Fleet. Without a major 

guerre de haute mer role, there was no way to validate prewar decisive-battle 

doctrinal development from actual performance in combat. Due to the French 

Navy's lack of compatibility with the Royal Navy and inability to operate with 

the Grand and other allied fleets, the Mediterranean theater was split into 

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national zones of responsibility, with the French Navy asigned the lion's 

share.36 The resulting over-commitment of naval resources to the Mediterranean theater was a direct result of the inability to fonn an allied fleet, although 

the French Navy did operate with the British in the Dardanelles. As in previous 

wars, a naval brigade, the Brigade desfusiliers marins, fought ashore. 

Following World War I, the French Navy became influenced by the 

writings of Admiral Raoul Castex, whose influence endures today. His fivevolume Theories stratigiques is perhaps the most complete theoretical survey 

of maritime strategy ever.37 A sixth volume, Melanges strategiques, was 

published in 1976 after his death. Castex completed an additional eighteen 

major works and more than fifty journal articles. His Les idees militaires de La 

marine du XVIe sieck: De Ruyter a Suffren (191 1) makes major contributions with respect to the differences between official doctrine and actual tactical 

practices. The esence of Castex's work can be found in a summary of some 

2,60 pages of original text in French, translated into 428 pages of English in 

Strategic Theories.38 His conclusions were that decisive naval battles were rare 

in history and that the enemy fleet was not always the main object of an 

operation or battle. Castex believed that naval doctrine should be offensive and 

oriented toward a decisive battle. Suffren was Castex's professional role 

model-standing doctrine should be abandoned if warranted by the tactical 

situation. 39 

On the other hand, Castex recognized that his task was to provide doctrine 

for a second-ranking navy, one that would never hope to challenge the British. 

Thus he fonnulated the concept of Laforce organisee, a main force that could 

be mustered for a limited counteroffensive against a superior enemy. There is 

some similarity between this concept and some of the ideas of Julian Corbett 

in Britain.40 Castex gave significant attention to commerce raiding, raids, 

blockade, mine, and amphibious warfare. The centerpiece of his writings is 

strategic manoeuvre, not battle. Castex wrestled with the influences of technology on doctrine but concluded that the aircraft did not signal the end of the 

surface ship. In the final analysis, Castex is a blend of La grande guerre and the 

jeune ecole. 

Castex's writings appear to have had only modest direct impact on the 

behavior of French governments.41 On the other hand, his writings played the 

same role as did those of Admiral Mahan in the United States and elsewhere in 

the world-they were used as textboks and points of departure for internal 

government position papers-and Castex is credited with saving the battleship. 

One can also trace ideas from Theories strategiques to the creation of the new 

College des Mutes etudes de defense nationale in 1936. The existing Ecok de 

59 
guerre navale was supplemented by the Centre des Mutes etudes navales. 

Theories strategiques was translated into Japanese and, for the Argentine 

Navy, into Spanish. Various sections were translated into Serbo-Croatian, 

Greek, and Russian. It has ben widely used in Latin America and Mediterranean countries. In 1 943, the renowned American strategic thinker, Bernard 

Brodie, recognized Castex in hisA Layman 's Guide to Naval Strategy by stating 

that .. the underlying value of the teachings of men like Mahan, Corbett, and 

Castex is still largely intact...42 

A few other French Navy officers had some influence during World War I 

and the interwar years. Rear Admiral Jean-Baptiste Degouy wrote a series of 

articles and boks which, although illogical, nonetheles demonstrated a fundamental failure of the naval officer corps to come to grips with the issue of 

offensive versus defensive warfare. Others wrote articles and boks in which 

the failure of the battleship to obtain a decisive victory at Jutland was, incorrectly, attributed to the submarine and concepts previously advocated by the 

jeune ecole. 

French Navy policy during the interwar years was also influenced by 

Admiral Rene Daveluy, who, along with Naval Minister George Leygues 

(minister from 1 925 to 1933), became concerned with coastal defense and 

implementing the various naval arms control treaties that would make largescale battles at sea obsolete. On the other hand, for the first time since the Second 

Empire, France had a coherent navy policy and doctrine.43 Daveluy wrote Les 

enseignements maritimes de la guerre anti-germanique (19 19), which pulled 

no punches and admitted that the battleship had failed to deliver as expected in 

the previous war. This bok, however, had no real influence in France. Eventually Daveluy advocated an all-submarine fleet and a policy of "sea denial" 

rather than sea control-but his recommendations were ignored. 

It was not until 1 938, under Fleet Admiral Fran�ois Darlan, that a naval 

construction program began in earnest. That program, however, paid insufficient attention to naval aviation, antiair warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. 

France had over-committed herself with the promise to defend overseas posses

ions. Honor prevailed, and resources that could have ben devoted to a 

defense of France herself were squandered on naval forces that neither saved 

colonies nor contributed to protection of the homeland. 

The French Navy participated in a number of brief operations with the Royal 

Navy in the very early days of World War ll. Those forces of the French Navy 

(the fourth largest in the world at the time) that remained loyal to the Vichy 

government were never put into a position where they would engage in major 

combat actions against their former allies.44 Hence there was generally no 

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opportunity on either side to validate the prewar navy doctrine developed from 

the thoughts and writings of Castex on general warfare. In 1940, the French 

force de raid at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), Algeria, refused to sortie to allied, 

neutral, or Caribbean ports, and Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul rejected an 

ultimatum since it would have contravened the conditions of the armistice with 

Germany. His force was dealt with effectively in port by the British Force H 

under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. The Frenchforce X at Alexandria, 

Egypt, under Vice Admiral Rene Godfroy, was demilitarized, and elements in 

the West Indies remained out of the war. Vichy forces fought off a British and 

Fre French invasion of Dakar later that same year. In short, the French fleet 

was dismantled.4S 

The value of the French Navy, however, can be measured by the efforts of 

former allies to ensure that the fleet remained out of Axis hands. These efforts 

must have been due to a healthy respect for French Navy capabilities, which 

were, in part, a measure of French Navy doctrine. During the years of the Vichy 

government, all doctrinal development ground to a halt. The French general 

staff forbade the updating of doctrinal manuals, fearing that changes would be 

interpreted by the Germans as being directed at them. This forced doctrinal 

development to be done in secrecy. The fleet performed no major training 

exercises, nor was it integrated into either the Italian or German force structure. 

Germany negotiated for the use of the French Navy for some time, but the bulk 

of the remaining French fleet at Toulon was scuttled at the end of 1942 when 

the Germans tried to seize it. 

French forces that escaped the German occupation and chose to continue the 

war operated outside normal political control. Eventually, most of the Fighting 

Free French forces operated with the permision of General Charles de Gaulle 

but under the operational control and as an integral part of allied forces. Their 

experiences while operating with foreign forces was to forever alter French 

military and naval doctrine. Eventually French Navy forces participated in 

integrated convoy escorting and amphibious asaults. Fighting Free French 

forces operated at the same level of combat efficiency as their allies. 

Doctrine during the Cold War 

Fre French Navy forces had been quick to adapt to allied naval doctrine 

during the war, but where there was a choice between allies, the French were 

usually more likely to accept the American way of war rather than the British 

way. Simply put, the bitter aftertaste of Mers-el-Kebir was to last many years. 

For example, following World War II France turned a good deal of its attention 

61 
The Newport Papers 

to the recovery and defense of overseas colonies. Most of this effort did not 

require forces for fleet-versus-fleet interaction, yet the French concepts for 

operations from the sea, using aircraft carers, were based upon American 

doctrine rather than the extensive British history. 

One of the more interesting authors on naval matters during the 1950s was 

Vice Admiral Pierre Barjot. Admiral Barjot embraced the American method of 

antisubmarine defense (offensive striking forces) and not the British (convoys). 

Admiral Barjot wrote a number of substantive documents that were strategic, 

doctrinal, and program

atic in nature.46 An unabashed supporter of aircraft 

carriers and naval aviation, Barjot authored Vers la marine de l 'age atomique 

(1955) and Histoire de la guerre aeronavale (196 1 ).47 Admiral Adolphe 

Lepotier prepared some excellent articles for publication in the Revue de la 

defense nationale as well as two boks, Mer contre Terre and La guerre dans 

les trois dimensions. Unfortunately, these works were never followed up with 

additional in-depth strategic thought. 

On the other hand, France developed her own doctrine for naval diplomacy. 

Rather than having large numbers of overseas-stationed combat forces as the 

Americans did, or the "swing-through" doctrine of the Royal Navy, the French 

often achieved the same political purpose with station ships of limited combat 

potential. Although France still maintains the limited ability to intervene 

overseas, the formal Force Amphihie d'Intervention was disbanded in 1 969.48 

France was an original member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

and even though it did not routinely participate in its military command 

structure during most of the Cold War, the French Navy developed into a serious 

combat force with the most modem implements of war. Technological innovation continued, with France leading the West in development of surface-to-surface cruise mis

iles. France did not attempt to challenge the superpower navies 

of the United States or the Soviet Union but rested comfortably with its status, 

which was equivalent esntially to that of Great Britain. French Navy doctrine 

was developed for interactions against fleets of minor powers or to deny a major 

power the full use of its fleet. 

The commitment by various governments to maintain a navy portion of the 

force defrappe limited France's development of conventional warfighting 

capability.49 A lack of resources precluded both a nuclear and a serious 

conventional warfighting capability. The French recognized that nuclear warfighting at sea might be required if nuclear weapons had already been used 

ashore. The only major role for conventional naval forces might be to sweep 

the seas ahead of a misile-firing submarine to ensure that it would get to its 

launch position unaffected by enemy antisubmarine forces. so The aircraft 

62 
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carier represented a pre-strategic but nuclear-capable force that pennitted 

some operational flexibility. 

Admiral Marcel Duval's new courses at the Ecole superieure de guerre de 

Ia Marine enhanced doctrinal development. Then-Commander Michel Tripier 

completed the "Fondements et principes de strategie maritime" (1977), but this 

paper was circulated within only navy circles until an extract appeared in 1990 

in the journal Stratigique.51 Rear Admiral Hubert Moineville, French Navy 

(Retired), published an excellent bok, La guerre navale ( 1982), which was 

translated into English.52 Although most of the bok is devoted to overall 

military strategy, the last thre chapters deal with choices to be made in advance 

of naval actions and the problems in conducting them. La guerre navale 

examines many of the doctrinal isues that were being debated during the Cold 

War, among them the issue of using conventional, or general purpose, forces 

to ensure the combat stability of nuclear missile submarines. 

Admiral Moineville correctly concludes that the introduction of long-range 

nuclear-armed misiles into navies has altered fundamentally the role of flrstrank navies. For example, he reasons that the threat of using nuclear weapons 

is now inherent in grand-scale naval warfare. His analysis of nuclear naval 

warfare was in keeping with the thinking of most admirals and navies-nuclear 

war at sea must be deterred because one weapon detonation would result in the 

loss of a ship, if not an entire fonnation. 

Old French patterns of interest in guerre de course can be found in 

Moineville's appreciation for the economic vulnerability (especially with 

respect to oil) of modem nations. In general, Moineville appreciates the 

widening political role of naval forces but, like most naval officers, fails to get 

into the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons when used against shore targets. 

In 198 1 Admiral Pierre Lacost published Strategies navales du present, 

which was well received in France. A more recent work outlining the history 

of naval thought in France and elsewhere is L 'evolution de Ia pensee navale, 

edited by Herve Coutau-Begarie (1990- 1993). Although not on doctrine directly, L 'evolution de Ia pensee navale provides an excellent source of doctrinal 

history and should be translated into English for the wider audience that it 

deserves. Finally, Vice Admiral Michel Tripier completed Ie Royaume 

d 'Archimede in 1993, just prior to his untimely death.53 

Military Doctrine in the French Any 

The French model would not be complete without an analysis of doctrine in 

the French Anny.S4 The Belgian-invented and French-developed Montigny 

63 
The Newport Papers 

mitrailleuse (machine gun) was introduced by the French Anny during the 

Franco-Prusian War of 1 870- 1 871.55 Although the mitrailleuse increased the 

effective firepower on the battlefield over the rifle by an order of magnitude, 

its introduction failed to turn the tide of that war in favor of the French. The 

reasons were that the French Anny guarded their new capability to well and 

were caught up on the technical details of development; it failed to devise an 

effective doctrine for the new weapon or to test various tactics. Furthermore, 

the mitrailleuse was asigned to artillery units, where it was viewed as only a 

rather short-range weapon that was extremely vulnerable to counter-battery 

fire. Although the introduction of the mitrailleuse alone might have swung the 

war in favor of France, its operational employment was disastrously ineffective. 

The machine gun, however, was rapidly asimilated into the German and 

Rusian ground forces. 

At the outbreak of World War I, the French Army was committed to the 

defense of France, which would occur via a decisive engagement fought under 

an offensive doctrine. The moral superiority of the offensive would yield an 

eian that would be decisive. The defense of France would be achieved by a 

clash against the German armed forces fought on foreign soil. An offensive war 

of an

lation was thought to be short, cheap, and more effective than the 

defensive, but a correct analysis of the technology available at the time would 

have concluded that the defensive was the proper doctrine to follow. (In 

fairness, the same criticism can be made of the Union army during the American 

Civi! War.)56 

When the war did not develop as planned, and the defense of France required 

a defensive doctrine, the army proved incapable of adapting, and millions of 

men died in military operations that had no significant political purpose. The 

French Any had a virtually inexhaustible supply of trops that it could throw 

into mindless attacks-a by-product of the French Revolution.

57 This same 

army was governed by a doctrine that did not allow for individual judgment to 

resolve crucial questions and asumed that preplanned violence was enough to 

overcome the enemy. 58 

The conduct of the First World War on the ground has led some scholars to 

conclude that "military professionals ... usually incline toward the offensive. �9 

There is the obvious need to motivate troops in the face of obstacles.60 When 

the political leadership of a nation asumes that the military is an acceptable 

tool to obtain decisive political results, the military themselves will probably 

be forced to favor an offensive doctrine from which decisive and positive results 

will be obtained.61 Perhaps another lesson from World War I is that eian can 

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and should be exhibited at the tactical level of warfare, but it need not exclude 

fighting on the operational and strategic defensive. 

The catastrophic and unexpected failure of the French Anny in the early days 

of World War n can be attributed, in great part, to their strategy, and doctrine 

for war.62 In general, the strategy and doctrine were compatible, but the French 

Anny doctrine was based upon a fatally flawed strategy, and the strategy was 

based upon an obsolete operational concept. Simply put, the French Anny 

attempted to fight an attrition-styled war based upon defense, firepower, 

centralization, and control in a series of sequential, methodical battles, while 

the Gennan Any had adopted a maneuver warfare doctrine of one continuous 

battle that made the French response inadequate and self-defeating. Unfortunately, due to the nature of French An

y doctrine, there was no alternative. 

When the need for change was recognized after defeats in the first phase of the 

war, it was, simply, too late. Es

ntially, France created an anny that could not cope with the unexpected 

or respond to limited threats. One of the very few officers who dared to criticize 

the overall plan for defense, General Charles de Gaulle, found his opinions 

subsumed by political necessity. French military doctrine in the interwar years 

became too pedantic and too theoretical; it was impractical, more suited for the 

clasroom than the battlefield. Yet in the clasroom, officers were rewarded for 

repeating huge quantities of rote data rather than for innovation. 

The French Any had in fact changed its doctrine from that of the annihilation-based approach ofW orld War I to that of attrition, but did not do so quickly 

or thoroughly enough. Technological developments in France were not viewed 

as "revolutions in military affairs" but rather as minor modifications on the 

existing consensus. Perhaps because the Gennan Anny had to divest itself of 

equipment following World War I, it was better able to view the essence of the 

new technological opportunities. 

French Air Force doctrine was similarly deficient. Not only had the Air Force 

failed to prepare a correct doctrine for the war, it overlooked significant voids 

for employing existing forces in the war for which the anny prepared. France 

simply did not have the right type or a sufficient number of aircraft to contest 

local air superiority. During the interwar years, the air force and anny had 

engaged 

an

in a bitter struggle over whether the proper role for aviation was 

lation by independent strategic bombing or by cooperating tactically with 

the land forces engaged in attrition warfare. The result of this struggle was a 

compromise force that was supposed to do both, but could do neither. 

Blame for the fall of France can be laid at the feet of the political leadership 

for its improper preparation of the anny (por high command structure, tenns 

65 
The Newport Papers 

of service, and the size of the active duty officer and non-comrnisioned officer 

corps), although the officer corps as well deserves censure. The military 

leadership of France was more concerned with bureaucratic details than with 

the development of strategy and doctrine and with asking hard questions. 

E

ven this brief review of over three hundred years of French Navy and 

military doctrine in France reveals a treasure trove of lesns that should 

have ben learned. As the Royal Navy has, so the French Navy has emphasized 

the development of tactical-level service-unique doctrine. That is not to say that 

other forms of military doctrine have ben ignored, but this is clearly where the 

emphasis has ben. There are many interesting lesns to be learned also by 

contrasting the differences as well as noting the similarities between French 

and British navy doctrine. 

Contrasting French and British navy doctrine is somewhat unfair-an unfairness compounded if we rely upon only traditional English language sources 

that stres

 Britain's offensive victories. The French monarchy had a sophisticated concept of attrition warfare and defensive doctrine for its fleet. The Royal 

French fleet achieved levels of success that were appropriate for France's 

geography, strategic culture, overall strategy, and available resources. The fact 

that the French naval doctrine would not have ben appropriate for the Royal 

Navy of Great Britain is immaterial and misleading. 

Quite frankly, the hubris displayed by many American officers and scholars 

in rebuffmg French Navy doctrine because of the lack of combat victories by 

the French Navy during the Revolution or under Napoleon is shocking. We 

should be looking for the lesns of doctrinal development and not prejudging 

its value based upon what happened ashore or the actions taken by anny officers 

or governments who set policies for the navy. To disregard the les

ns of the 

French Navy based upon such reasons is extremely por scholarship and 

considerably shortsighted. In the words of a well-respected scholar, "France 

has had little just cause to be ashamed of her navy: the navy may have had some 

just cause to be ashamed of France . ..63 

When the Comte de Gras came to the aid of an embryonic United States 

fighting for independence. his decisions off the Virginia Capes in 1 781 were 

shaped by a defensive doctrine that gave primary importance to the protection 

and support of actions ashore rather than the taking of enemy ships as prizes. 

It is because of those decisions and actions that de Gras supported succesfully General George Washington and earned that officer's praise. America 

remembers the strategic and operational-level vision of Admiral de Gras, a 

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fonner anny officer, rather than his modest tactical abilities at sea, defeat at the 

Battle of the Saints, and eventual humiliation. 

A review of French Navy doctrine practiced by a variety of commanders 

reveals the strengths and weaknes of defensive doctrine and warfare by 

attrition. Reviews of French An

y warfare of both anlation and attrition, 

and offensive and defensive doctrine, also demonstrate the inherent weaknesses 

and strengths of these four methods. These positive and negative lessons have 

value today-most importantly, that there is no one correct military doctrine 

for all times and all places. French soldiers have paid heavily for their search 

for the one correct doctrine that could ensure victory-"a cult of the correct 

military doctrine." The search for such enduring and eternal principles can 

discourage the adaptability and flexibility that is required in succesful doctrine. 

Doctrinal rigidity can also impede appreciation of potential technological 

improvements.64 

Unlike doctrinal development ashore, France had few such major doctrinal 

debates at sea-there was general consensus on the defensive doctrine and 

guerre de course-although doctrine continued to evolve, even while technology remained relatively constant. Even with a defensive doctrine, at times 

France was able to meet Britain as an equal at sea, while devoting her primary 

attention to events ashore. The defensive doctrine andguerre de course warfare 

of attrition employed by the navy often allowed significant victories at minimal 

cost-a conservation of effort at sea. This was highlighted in the years 1780-

1782 with convoy victories and Suffren's operations in the Indian Ocean. 

France also deserves credit for pioneering work on succesful multinational 

naval doctrine, major innovation in fleet organization as an aid to unity in action, 

as well as for accepting the concept of fighting spirit, elan, as part of combat 

potential. Clausewitz noted the valuable contribution of elan to the Grande 

Anee of Napoleon Bonaparte; however, the unfortunate consequence of the 

concept of elan was an unwarted faith by French governments that superiority in spirit would make up for material and training deficiencies. Furthermore, the history of French military doctrine reveals the dangerous 

consequences if elan, as a concept to motivate warriors, is transferred from the 

tactical level of war, where it belongs, to the operational and strategic levels or 

to programming, where it does not. 

One of the more interesting differences between French naval and military 

doctrine was their treatment of elan. The navy fully accepted the fighting spirit 

as part of a defensive doctrine that would lead to strategic level victory, while 

anny general officers, especially prior to World War I, asumed that a defensive 

doctrine would signal moral weaknes and lead to strategic defeat. Naval history 

67 
The Newport Papers 

suggests that fighting spirit and initiative can be an integral part of a defensive 

doctrine-meaning that these tenns do not necesly need to be synonymous 

with offensive warfare. That the individual field commander ashore was often not granted the degre

 

of judgment accorded the commander at sea is another significant difference 

between the French land and sea forces. To some extent, this can be explained 

by the lack of modem long-range communications systems, but perhaps it was 

due also to the lack of familiarity with warfare at sea by the governments ashore, 

which resulted apparently in far les oversight and fewer courts-martial of naval 

officers by French governments than were suffered by officers in the Royal 

Navy. 

The brutal effects wrought on doctrine by the changing governments in 

France following the Revolution or during and after World War n may still be 

instructive today. During the drastic changes in French governments, the officer 

corps, in general, suffered greatly. When the corporate memory of an officer 

corps is lost, the potential arises for both wholesale change (as during and after 

World War m and a period of danger. During the first years of the Republic 

and Napoleon, the French Navy fought without benefit of the experience gained 

by its royalist warriors-experiences that had yet to be reflected in official 

written doctrine. Had the French monarchy not ben overthrown and its military 

leadership not decapitated, subsequent naval battles against the British might 

have ended quite differently. A lesn worth leaming here is that military 

services should bridge drastic changes in governments as well as wholesale 

doctrinal modification. 

On the other hand, the spe

d with which great changes occurred in navy 

doctrine during and after World War n were probably possible only because of 

government changes brought about by that war. Although the changes in 

government resulted in masive los of corporate military knowledge, the 

ability to rapidly substitute new ideas also unfolded. Today, when we witness 

the wholesale release of combat-proven officers into civilian life, we risk losing 

the corporate knowledge of how to fight unless we take the time to document 

that knowledge in formal written doctrine, but we also have the opportunity for 

major doctrinal change. It is well to note that doctrinal change is most easily 

feasible when there is a change in a government or during events that lead to 

masive disruption of an officer corps. 

Without combat to stimulate doctrinal development, we must tum to other 

sources for such kindling. One source of doctrinal stimulation is new technology. Generally, new technologies are often thought to lead automatically to 

improvements in combat potential. The jeune ecole, however, teaches us that 

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unles the full implications of new technologies are explained to governments, 

there is a good chance that governments will seize the opportunity to reduce 

force structure (and therefore capability), resulting in impaired military services. Today we face similar challenges. 

Force structure reductions may nonetheles come about if governments are 

told that a new technology also allows attainment of political objectives at 

reduced cost. In short, before revealing new technologies to government, 

military specialists ought to well understand the potential negative consequences. On the other hand, many of the officers of the jeune ecole have earned an 

unfair reputation for being short-sighted when, perhaps, they were trying to do 

the best that they could under the reality of their political and fiscal circumstances. 

The governments of France have generally issued specific orders for the 

overall missions of their fleets. Navy missions rarely, if ever, have included the 

enemy fleet as the main objective. As at Trafalgar, the enemy fleet was an 

obstacle to be overcome, not an objective. One problem of such a system is that 

it asumes that the top governmental leadership understands what fleet missions 

should be. Generally, however, governments consist of "landlubbers" with no 

real knowledge of fighting at sea. Whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure that 

the fleet is properly tasked? 

The history of the French Navy is one of mismanagement by governments 

who could have known better. If the navy itself does not educate its government, 

then who will? If it is the role of the navy to educate its governments, then there 

may be a need for officers who are skilled in administrative tasks and 

bureaucratic maneuvering within the shore establishment and at the headquarters level. There is a rich history of such officers in the French Navy, but 

there is no clear-cut answer as to which efforts were more succesful in doctrinal 

development, those of the administrative officer or those of the warfighter. 

Perhaps it would be more correct to view the relationship between administrative and combat officers as a partnership that makes a complete whole. Clearly, 

doctrine must be acceptable to those at sea, but there is a long history of superior 

warriors who departed the field of battle without leaving behind a legacy of 

doctrine or even lesons that were worthy of their triumphs. 

The French and British navies operated under formal doctrine during 

the better part of their histories. They faced similar concerns but used 

different approaches in their attempts to solve doctrinal issues. By comparing and contrasting the history of doctrine in these two great navies, we can 

examine doctrinal isues that all navies undoubtedly need to addres, regardless 

of the technologies involved or the government being served. Simply put, a 

69 
The Newport Papers 

comparative approach to the history of naval doctrine yields the process 

common to both. 

70 
Notes 

1. I have drawn heavily upon Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain, USN) , The Influence cif 

Sea Power upon History, 1 660- 1 783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 890), pp. 1 89, 252, 263, 353, 

449-{)7; Alfred Thayer Mahan (Capt:ain, USN), The Influence of Sea Power upon the French 

Revolution and Empire, 1 793-1812 (New York: Greenwood Pres

, 1 968) [reprint of Little, 

Brown edition of 1 892], vol. I, pp. 35-69, 160, 1 79; S.S. Robison (Rear Admiral, USN, 

Retired), A History cifNaval Tacticsfrom 1530 to 1 930 (Annapolis, Md. : U.S. Naval Institute, 

1 942); E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, USN), eds., Sea Power: A Naval 

History (Englewood Cliffi, N.].: Prentice-Hal, 1 960) ; Ernest H. Jenkins, A History cif the 

French Navy: From Its Beginnings to the Present Day (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1973); 

Clark G. Reynolds, Command cif the Sea: The History and Strategy cif Maritime Empires (New 

York: Wilam Morrow & Co., 1 974); Helmut Pemsel, A History cif War at Sea: An Atlas and 

Chronology cif Conflict at Sea from Earliest Times to the Present, trans. G.D.G. Smith (Annapolis, 

Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 977) [translation of Von Salamis bis Okinawa, first published in 

1 975]; Geoffrey Til, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (New Yarlc:: St. Martin's 

Press, 1 984), pp. 23, 34-38, 49-51; Brian Tunstal, Naval Warfare in the Age cif Sail: The 

Evolution cifFighting Tactics, 1 650-1815, Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute 

Press, 1 990); and Raoul Victor Patrice Castex (Admiral, French Navy), Strategic Theories, 

edited with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 

1 994) . 

2. Herve Coutau-Begarie, "Reflexions sur l'ecole fran�aise de strategie navale," in 

L'evolution de la pensee navale [I}, Herve Coutau-Begarie, ed. (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes 

de Defense nationale (FEDN), 1 990), pp. 31-56. 

3. Hans Delbri

clc:, History cif the Art of War, Volume IV: The Dawn cif Modem Warfare, 

trans. Walter ]. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and London: Univ. of Nebraslc:a Press, 1 985), 

pp. 335-7 [original German version published in 1920] . 

4. See Hubert Granier, "La pensee navale fran�aise dans la premiere moitie du xvne 

siecle (1600-1661 )," in L'evolution de la penste navale [II), Coutau-Begarie, ed. (1992), pp. 

52-3. I am indebted to Herve Coutau-Begarie for the information on Testament politique. 

5. The distinction between the plume and the epee was also illustrated by the social or 

class distinction between these officers. Although not always the case, the administrative 

officers were often noblemen, also known as the rouges or the grand aJrps. The warfighters 

were often, but not always, of non-noble birth and were referred to as the bleues or the petits 

aJrps. See Ronald Chalmers Hood III, Royal Rtpublicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between 

the Worl9 Wan (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1 985), pp. 1 4-5, 1 9-20. 

6. Etienne Tailemite, "Le chef charismatique: une alchinie mysterieuse," Cols Bleus, 

12 March 1 994, pp. 7-8; Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville was 

also the commander at the disastrous Battle of La Hougue (1692) , also mown as the Battle 

of Barfleur. Due to his failure to pursue a defeated enemy and exploit the victory at the 

previous Battle ofBeveziers (1690), Tourvil

e y have been under some degree of scrutiny 

by the Ic:ing. Mortification may have compelled him to launch his desperate attack, which 

had disastrous results. On the other hand, French sources emphasize the poor weather, 

conditions aboard Tourvile's ships, and poor coordination as reasons for the failure to exploit 

the tactical victory. Although Tourville was in command during the attaclc: against the Smyrna 

convoy (1693), blame for the failure to exploit the victory can be laid direcdy at the feet of 

a subordinate who alowed most of the convoy to escape while maintaining the battle line 

and awaiting his commander's arrival. 

7. Henry GuerIac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," Makm cifModem Strategy: 

Military Thoughtfrom Machiavelli to Hitler, Edward Mead Earle, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton 

Univ. Press, 1943), pp. 26-8. 

8. For four excellent reviews of Pere Paul Hoste's contributions, see Robison, pp. 

215-24; John Creswell, British Admirals cif the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle (London: 

George Alen & Unwin, Ltd. , 1 972), pp. 41-9; Michel Depeyre, "Le Pere Paul Hoste 

fondateur de la pensee navale moderne," in L 'evolution de la pensee navale [I}, Coutau-Begarie, 

ed. (1990), pp. 57-77; and Gabriel Darrieus, "Les Livres des tactique fran�ais du Pere Hoste 
The Newport Papers 

au XIXe siec1e," in L'htolution de 14 pensee navale {III], Coutau-Begarie, ed. (1 993), pp. 209-31. 

Of these four, Depeyre is the most controversial because he argues that Hoste was not totaly 

devoid of an appreciation for the offensive and his tactics were not mere formations of 

maneuver. 

9. Claude Farere, Histoire de 14 Marine Fra/lfilise (paris: Flamon, 1 962), p. 237. 

10. Hubert Granier (Contre-amiral, French Navy), "La pensee navale franpise au xvme 

siecle jusqu'i la guerre d'amerique," in L'b>olution de 14 pensee navale [II], Coutau-Begarie, 

ed. (1 993), pp. 33-56; and for additional information on Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, 

Vicomte de Morogues, see Robison, pp. 257--62. 

11. For additional information on Captain Jacques Bourde de Vilehuet, see Robison, 

pp. 262-4; and Granier, "La pensee navale franpise au xvme siecie jusqu'i la guerre 

d'amerique," pp. 33-56. 

12. Brian Tunstal, The Realities of Naval History (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 

1 936), p. 139. 

1 3. Giuseppe Fioravanzo (Admiral of the Fleet of the Italian Navy), A History of Naval 

Tactical Thought (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 979), pp. 91-3 [original manuscript 

prepared in 1 956]. 

1 4. Fran�ois Caron (Capitaine de vaisseau, French Navy), "Le vicomte de Grenier, 

heritier de Bigot de Morogues ou fils spirituel de Sufien?" in L'evolution de la tNnsee navale 

[II

], Coutau-Begarie, ed. (1993), pp. 57-83. 

1 5. This point has been made, and refuted, over the years. For a more in-depth 

substantiation with citations from French publications, see Robison, pp. 530-5 . 

1 6. Delbrick, History of the Art of War, Volume I: Waifare in Antiquity, trans. Renfroe, p. 

40. 

17. Louis Thomas (Rear Admiral) , Comte de Villaret de Joyeuse, had apparently been 

told by Maximilian Robespierre that he would lose his head ifhe lost the convoy. His survival 

may have been due also in part to his absence from the center of aU such activities. 

18. For additional information on Audibert RamatueUe, see Robison, pp. 453-5. 

19. Delbrick, History of the Art of War, Volume IV: The Dawn of Modem Waifare, trans. 

Renfroe, pp. 390, 398, 402, 414. 

20. See especialy John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Waif.!re 

(New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988), pp. 37-8. 

21. Pierre Charles Jean-Baptiste Silvestre (Vice-Adm ral), Comte de Villeneuve's instructions on the eve of the battle can be found, with analysis, in Adrien Edouard Baudry 

(Lieutenant, French Navy), The Naval Battle: Studies of the Tactical Factors (London: Hugh 

Rees, Ltd., 1914), pp. 228-32 [original French version in 1910]. Villeneuve desired to avoid 

the enemy so that he might reach his destination. 

22. Tunstal, p. 256. 

23. John D. Harbron, Trqfa!gar and the Spanish Navy (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute 

Press, 1 988), p. 16. 

24. Fioravanzo, p. 1 36. 

25. French squadrons fought alongside the British in the Crimea, against the Boxers, and 

aga nst Chinese nationalists. 

26. This section is also based upon Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Sea 

Power," Makers of Modem Strategy, Earle, ed., pp. 446--56; and Ropp' s classic, The rNvtlopment 

ofa Modem Mwy: French Navy Policy, 1871- 1 904, Stephen S. Roberts, ed. (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 1987) [revised version of original written in 1937]. 

27. For an interesting analysis of the contributions of Admiral Gabriel Dameus, see Henri 

Darrieus and Bernard Estival, "Darrieus et la renaissance d'dune pensee maritime en France 

avant la Premiere guerre mondiale," in L'evolution de 14 tNnset navale [I], Coutau-Begarie, ed. 

(1990), pp. 89--1 17. Darrieus ' War on the Sea was translated into English and published by 

the U.S. Naval Institute in 1908. This book resulted from a series oflectures delivered at the 

French Naval War CoUege. Darrieus was so highly regarded in Germany that the French 

Navy General Staff eventually prohibited his publishing under the concern that he was 

helping the enemy. The original title of La guerre sur mer was La doctrine. I am indebted to 

Herve Coutau-Begarie for this point. 

72 
Tritten * France 

28. Then-Commander Rene Daveluy's The Genius of Naval Waifa� Wa! translated into 

English and published by the U.S. Naval Institute. 

29. Coutau-Begarie, "Reflexions sur I'ecole fran�aise de strategie navale," in L'bolution 

de la pensee navale (I), Coutau-Be�rie, ed. (1990), p. 44. 

30. See Etienne Tail

emite, • Un theoricien meconnu de la guerre maritime: L'amiral 

Richild Grivel, " in L'bolution de la pensee navale [II], Coutau-Begarie, ed. (1992), p. 97. 

31. Romeo Bemotti (Admiral, Italian Navy), La guer

a maritima, studio critico sul/'impiego 

dei mezzi nella guera mondiale (Florence: Editoris Carpigiani Zipoli, 1 923), p. 24, cited in 

Herve Coutau-Begarie, "Reflexions sur I' ecole fran�aise de strategie navale," in L'evolution 

de la pensee navale [I], Coutau-Begarie, ed. (1990), p. 46. 

32. Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile Aube's colonial view must be supplemented 

by that of Admiral Baron Richild Grivel, who first developed a French global view of naval 

warfare. The navy generaly took on the mission civilisatrice outside of North Africa. Admiral 

Amedee Courbet became a national hero foUowing his conquest oflndochina and the colony 

became }mown a! the "admirals' preserve." See Hood, Royal Republicans p. 10. 

33. Etienne Tailemite, L'histoi� ignorte de la marinefratlfilise (paris: Librairie Academique 

Perrin, 1 988), p. 1 12; citing Raoul Victor Patrice Castex, Ie Grand Etat-Major naval (paris: 

1 909), p. 1 99. 

34. Dougla! Porch, "The French Army in the First World War," Military Effectiveness, 

Volume I: The First World War, in Allan R. Milett and Williamson Murray, eds. (Boston: 

Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio State Univ., 1 988), pp. 204-5. 

35. TaiUemite, L'histoi� ignorte de la marine fratlfilise, pp. 390-l . 

36. Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediteranean, 1914-19 1 8 (Annapolis, Md. : 

Naval Institute Press), 1 987. 

37. R.aoul Victor Patrice Castex (Admiral, French Navy), Theories strategiques, in 5 vok 

(Paris: Societe d'Editions Geographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales, 1 929-1935). 

38. Ca!tex, Strategic Theories, Kiesling, ed .. 

39. Tailemite, L'histoi� ignoree de la marine fratlfilise, p. 216. 

40. Castex had Julian Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (191 1) translated in 

1 932. See Herve Coutau-Begarie, "Corbett and Richmond in France," Mahan I.s Not Enough: 

The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and A dmiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 

James Goldrick (Commander, RAN) and John B. Hattendorf, eds. (Newport, R.I.: Naval 

War College Press, 1 993) , p. 284. 

41 . Students at the Ecole de guerre navale were stil

 educated in traditional French naval 

doctrine ofguerre de course, whereas students from foreign nations flocked to the Ecole superieure 

de guerre to study the latest developments in the art of war ashore. See Ronald Chalmers 

Hood III, Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars (Baton Rouge, 

La: Louisiana State Univ. Press), 1 985, pp. 83-4, 1 43-6. 

42. Bernard Brodie, A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 

1943), p. x. On the other hand, one must note the conspicuous absence of Castex (as well 

as Mahan and Corbett) from a French publication of notable maritime personalities. See Jean 

Riverain, Dictionnaire des marins c;Jebres des temps lointains a nos jours (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 

1 967). , 

43. Etienne Tail

emite, L'histoire ignorte de la marine fratlfilise (paris: Librairie Academique 

Perrin, 1 988), pp. 408-9. 

44. This section is based upon Ronald Chalmers Hood III, "Bitter Victory: French 

Military Effectiveness during the Second World War," in Military Effectiveness, Volume III: 

The Second World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio State Univ., 

1 988), pp. 221-55. 

45. The history of the French Navy in World War II can be found in a series of books 

readily available in English. These include: Rear Admiral Paul Auphan, French Navy (Ret.) 

and Jacques Mordal [pseud.], The French Navy in World War II, trans. Captain A.C.J. Sabalot, 

USN (Ret.) (Annapolis, Md. : U.S. Naval Institute, 1 959) (Admiral Auphan served as Chief 

of Naval Operations and Minister of Marine during the Vichy regime); Henri Le Masson, 

Navies of the Second World War: The French Nary, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & 

73 
The Newport Papers 

Co., 1969) (more oriented towards hardware); and Charles W. Koburger,Jr., FrallCo-Aml'rican 

Naval Relations, 1 940- 1 945 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994). 

46. Translations of comments by Vice Admiral Pierre Barjot during the 1950s can be 

found in declassified issues of the ONI (Ofe of Naval Intelligma) Review. Many of these can 

be found in the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical Center. For example, in a series 

of translations entided "The Postwar French Navy," ONI Review, May 1954, p. 195, Admiral 

Barjot discussed the American and British methods of antisubmarine defense. I am indebted 

to Captain Peter Swartz, USN (Ret.) for providing me with copies of materials he gathered 

for his own research. 

47. A section of Vm Ia marine de I'lige atomique (pari�: Aimont Dumont, 1955) discussed 

French naval doctrine (pp. 43-58). In general, this book favors the U.S. Navy as a model 

for the French Navy. 

48. A discussion of the "Force of Manoeuvre " can be found in Joffre A. Heineck, "French 

Naval Development under Charles de Gaulle," unpublished thesis, Newport, R.I.: Naval 

War College, 14 April 1969. 

49. There are only a few writings about nuclear strategy and doctrine by French military 

officers. The one major exception is the important writings of General Pierre M. Gallois, 

such as, his The BalallCl' of Ter

r: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, trans. Richard Howard (Boston: 

Houghton Miffin, 1961). 

50. James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979: Politiarl Appliartions of Limited Naval 

Force, 2nd ed., (London: The Macmilan Press, Ltd., 1981), p. 138. 

51. Commander Michel Tripier, "Les missions navales,' Strategique, April 1990. 

52. Hubert Moinevile (Rear-Admiral, French Navy, Ret.), Naval Waifare Today and 

Tomorrow, trans. P.R. Compton-Hall (Commander, RN, Ret.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 

Publisher, Ltd. , 1983). 

53. Michel Tripier (Vice Admiral, French Navy), Le Royaume d'Archimtde (paris: 

Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense nationale (FEDN), March 1993). 

54. This opinion was not shared by one of the first officers in the U.S. Navy to recognize 

the need for naval doctrine. See Dudley W. Knox (Lieutenant Commander, USN), "The 

Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Prouedings, March-April 1915, p. 

337. 

55. This section is based upon: Generalrnajor Frederick Wilam von Mellenthin and 

R.H.S. Stolfi with Colonel E. Sobik, NA TO under A ttack: Why the Western AlliallCl' can Fight 

Outnumbered and WIn in Central Europe without Nuclear Weapons (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. 

Press, 1984), pp. 12-6. 

56. I am indebted to Major General I. B. Holley, Jr. (USAFR, Ret.), for raising this 

point during his lecture, "Doctrine: The What, the Why, and the How," delivered at the 

Air Force Doctrine Center, Lap,gley Air Force Base: 1 June 1994. 

57. Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," 

in Makm of Modem Strate�, p. 229. 

58. Michael Howard, • Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," Makm 

of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton 

Univ. Press, 1986), p. 520, documents two famous lectures to the officers of the general staff 

by Colonel Fran�ois-Jules-Louis Loyzeau de Grandmaison, director of military operations 

[subsequendy published as Deux con erellCl's jaites aux officers d ! 'etat major de I' armee (191 1)] and 

the Regulations for the Conduct of Major Formations of October 1913, influenced by de 

Grandmaison, which declared the attack and the offensive as French Army doctrine. On the 

other hand, Howard wrote earlier that these speeches were not so much doctrine as they 

were echoes of the national mood. See his article "Men against Fire," InternatiotUli Security, 

Summer 1984, p. 57. See also, Gideon Y. Akavia, Decisive VICtory and Correct Doctrine: Cults 

Arms 

in French Military Thought before 1914 (Stanford, Cali£: Center for International Security and 

Control, Stanford Univ., November 1993), pp. 43-3. 

59. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Ofnsive: Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 

(Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984) '1' 199; and Stephen Van Evera, "The 

Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First Worl War," International Security, Summer 

1984, pp. 58-107. 

74 
Tritten * France 

60. Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," p. 526, cautions 

the reader not to draw too close a correlation between the doctrine of the offensive and the 

terrible losses incurred during World War I. 

61. Akavia, ecisive VICtOry and Correct Doctrine, pp. 1-6, 65-69. 

62. This section is based upon: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, 

Britain, and Germany between the World Wall (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Pres, 1 984), pp. 

105-40, 220-44; Robert Alan Doughty (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Anny), The Seeds of 

isaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1 939 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon 

Books, 1985); his subsequent The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1 940 (Hamden, 

Conn.: Archon Books, 1 990) , pp. 1 9-32, 321-32; and his chapter, "The French Aned 

Forces, 1918-40," in Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period, Mil

ett and 

Williamson, eds. , pp. 39-69; Ji

p D. Shutler, (Lieutenant General, USMC, Ret.), 

"Thinking about Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1987. pp. 22-23; and Eliot A. 

Cohen and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The 

Free Press, 1990). pp. 197-230. 

63. Jenkins, A History of the French Navy, p. 344. 

64. David Jablonsky, (Colonel, USA. Ret.), "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution 

in Military Affairs," Parametm, Autumn 1994. p. 33. 

The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of 

the U.S. government, Department of Defense. or the U.S. Navy. The author would like 

also to acknowledge the contributions of Herve Coutau-Begarie; Professor Andre Delaporte, 

fonner Chef de la Section Historique du Service Historique de la Marine; Commander 

Charles Al

en. U.S. Navy; and the research and translation services of Lawrence Holder of 

the Naval Doctrine Command. The author is indebted to Captain Alain Delbury, French 

Navy, French Military Mission to the Supreme Aled Commander, Atlantic, for his assistance 

in obtaining source materials and for comments on this paper. 

75 

Doctrine in the Spanish Navy 

James J. Tritten 

THE FIRST WRITfEN NAVY DOCTRINE was is

ued in Spain in the year 

1270 by the king of Castile. I Ten laws fonned the legal code of maritime 

warfare, the first of which stated that warfare at sea and warfare ashore are 

different and that each requires its own type of individual. The code also 

recognized two basic forms of naval warfare-that between major fleets and 

that between only a few ships. The second law discussed the types of men 

required for maritime warfare. The third through the sixth dealt with the 

necesry qualifications and selection of admirals, ships' captains, navigators, 

and other officers. The seventh law considered what types of ships are to be 

employed for warfare at sea, and the eighth drew a comparison between the 

support requirements of ships and horses. The ninth law stated that ships must 

be supplied in order to fight, and it established what stores warships were to 

carry. The last law readdressed the differences between land and sea warfare; 

it also explained how to divide the profits of victory. 

Early Years-Close Aboard Battle 

The union of Castile and Aragon in 1479 fonned the embryonic modem state 

of Spain. The next substantive work of navy doctrine was written by Alonso de 

Chaves between 1 520 and 1 538, during the reign of Carlos I (and during two 

wars with France-1521-1529 and 1 535-1538).

2 De Chaves advanced the 

concepts of squadron fonnations, the use of artillery, and the taking of the 

weather gauge (i.e., the upwind side) during battle. This is the earliest written 

record that we have of fighting fonnations and tactical principles. De Chaves' 

work was adopted and modified by King Henry VI

 of England and became 

the first written navy doctrine issued in Britain.3 

De Chaves argued that when two fleets meet, one fonnation is usually better 

than the other. With this in mind, he recommended battle fonnations that would 

maximize combat potential. His concept called for close-order engagement 

based upon galley tactics. But de Chaves failed to take into account the 

uncertainty of seamanship with ships of sail and asumed mistakenly that 
The Newport Papers 

relative positions could be maintained easily. In other words, navy doctrine 

failed to account for the new technological environment. 4 

The navy was fmally separated from the army in 1 586, and from the 

mid-sixteenth through the sevententh centuries Spain maintained divisions and 

squadrons of naval forces in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific. 

In addition to operational missions, the divisions performed administrative and 

logistical functions. The Capitan General de la Mar Oceano held overall 

command of the Atlantic division, an ocean-going fleet of thre subordinate 

squadrons based at Vizcaya, Guiplizcoa, and Portugal, as well as the Guard of 

the Straits of Gibraltar. The Atlantic division also included an independent 

squadron at Dunquerque (which maintained station in los Paises Bajos [the low 

countries]) and an independent Armada de Barlovento based in the Antilles. 

The Capitan General de la Mar commanded the Mediterranean division, which 

consisted of subordinate squadrons in Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Genoa. The 

Pacific division consisted of the Armada de Peru (also known as the Armada 

del Mar del Sur) as well as task groups of various sizes that were deployed to 

the Philippines. 

From 1568 to 1648 Spain and England fought the Eighty Years' War (otherwise 

known as the Dutch War of Independence), largely over control of Holland. In 

1588, the one hundred thirty ships of the Spanish Armada, man by 30,00 men 

(two-thirds of whom were soldiers), atpted to invade England. The concept of 

operations for the Armada was to fight a close-in battle at sea, which would enable 

the Spanish to use their superiority to board enemy ships. After al Philip II's 

brother, Don John of Austria, had used this same galley-oriented doctrine to win 

at the recent Battle of Lepanto (1571), as had Philip's own forces, who achieved 

succes over the French in the Battle of Punta Delgada in the Azores (1582). The 

overall tactical obi:tives in these bates were to select an opponent and board in 

a general milie. The battle of 1582 in the Azores, under the command of 

Captain-General Don Alvaro de Bazan. Marques de Santa Cruz, reinforced the 

need for sailing ships that could engage in distant water combat. The undefeated 

Santa Cruz plan the Armada and would have ben its commander had he not 

died (in 1588).6 Copies of the instructions that SantaCruz ised at sea in July 1587 

to govern the fight near the island of San Miguel in the Azores are housed in the 

national archives at Simancas.7 The instructions to the Armada from Philip II in 

April 1588 are also stored there. 8 

The English recognized that the sailing skills of the Spanish, the size of their 

forces, and their tactics gave them the advantage. The ships of England therefore 

kept their distance and used long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the defensive 

galley-oriented formations of the Armada. The English held a logistical 

78 
Tritten * Spain 

advantage, being close to their ports for reprovisioning, and while the 

Spanish commander, Don Alonso Perez de Guzman, Duke of Medina 

S idonia recognized this, his written sailing orders made clear that he 

expected Spain's religious and moral superiority to overcome that 

advantage.9 The previous destruction of twenty-three merchant ships at 

Cadiz in 1 587 and the failure of the Annada in 1 588 began a major naval 

decline in Spain. As a result of a combined Anglo-Dutch effort in 1 596, 

Cadiz was occupied and the Spanish fleet again neutralized. 

Combat instructions used by the fleets of the sixteenth and seventeenth 

centuries were modified to abandon galley concepts. These changes were 

contained in various boks and instructions isued by local commanders 

throughout these years. The fundamental source of navy doctrine through the 

eighteenth century was Bernardino de Mendoza's Theorica y practica de 

guerra ( 1 596). It contained the basic fundamentals of theories of war, including 

warfare at sea, for the Spanish. 

During the Eighty Years' War, Spain battled France (1635- 1 659) and 

suffered naval defeat at the hands of the French embryonic fleet. The Spanish 

battled the Dutch throughout the Eighty Years' War, but it was the Battle of the 

Downs ( 1639) that conflnd Spain's naval eclipse. The consequences of a 

subsequent Anglo-Spanish War (1654- 1659) were also unfortunate for Spain. 

After years of war with England, Spain found it essential to devise a method 

that would ensure the security of treasure ships, and in the mid-sixteenth 

century it introduced the concept of convoy escorts. 10 These escort ships were 

essentially armed merchantmen, and although they were stable gun platfonns 

because of the large cargo capacity of their hulls, they lacked maneuverability, 

even with improved designs. 

Command of Spanish ships of the line was divided: one officer was in charge 

of the soldiers at sea, and another com

ded the ship's company. This system of 

dual command lasted for nearly a hWldred years. The comd and mang 

policy reflected a naval doctrine that called for a warship to be both a platfonn for 

smal-arms shog by trops as well as a platform for artilery fire by seamen. 

This result was that Spanish crews were generally half of marines and half of 

seamen-consequently they could do the job of neither kind of platform very well. 

French Influence 

In 1700, under Philip V (the fll'St Bourbon king, a Frenchman and a descendent 

of Louis XIV), a true national navy, the Armada Real, was organized in Spain. 

Early on, during the War of the Spanish Succession ( 1701- 1 7 14), this new 

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national navy did not have a particularly succesful record. A Spanish treasure 

fleet escorted by a French squadron under Admiral Chiteaurenault was attacked 

succesfully in port at Vigo in 1 702 by the Dutch and the English. The 

engagement of the Dutch and English against the combined Franco-Spanish 

fleet off Malaga in 1704 reaffmned the defensive control-oriented doctrine 

advocated by the French naval theorist Pere Paul Hoste, II who influenced 

Spanish Navy doctrine until the early ninetenth century. 12 Spain could not 

prevent an army from landing in Catalonia, and Madrid was subsequently 

captured. The War of the Spanish Succes

ion at sea was largely a guerre de 

course; both sides lost some 1 ,500 merchantmen. 

The Bourbon rule in Spain instilled many bureaucratic and administrative 

refonns in addition to the creation of a national navy. There was the important 

provision in 1717 that midshipmen would serve as the Royal Company of 

Marine Guards. This young national fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral 

Antonio Gaztaieta y de lturbalzaga, was virtually destroyed by British 

Admiral George Byng at the Battle of Cape Pasro (17 1 8) (also known as the 

Battle of Mesina). The defeat at Pas, a battle that was initiated just prior 

to the formal declaration of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), 

resulted in Spain's further los of control of the Mediterranean Sea and the 

subsequent inability to defend her coastline from disastrous English raiding 

attacks. Although the defeat of the escorting force at Cape Pasro did not 

interfere with the ar

val of the 340 transports with 33,00 trops that recaptured 

Sicily, it did affect Spain's ability to support a distant army. The defeat at Cape 

Pas and the end of the wars with the Quadruple Alliance resulted in a 

resurgence in Spanish naval construction. 

Founding a Modem Navy 

Admiral Gaztafieta, who had fought at Paso, was the father of modern 

Spanish Navy shipbuilding methods. He wrote Proporciones de las medidas 

mas esenciales ... para lajtibrica de los navios y fragatas de guerra, que pueden 

montar desde ochenta canones hace diez . . . (1720), an excellent bok on 

warship design. Gaztafieta also served as the First Director of Naval Construction. Spanish fleet construction shifted to warships designed to provide convoy 

escorts rather than fight decisive engagements against an enemy battle fleet. 

Francisco Cornejo's Instrucciones y ordenes (1732) furnished naval doctrine 

and planning for an amphibious operation at Oran between June and November 

1732. A Spanish fleet of some fifty escorts and five hundred transports brought 

80 
Tritten * Spain 

an any of 30,00 men who captured a large fortified city being defended by 

Bey Has. 

Jose Patmo, the father of the modern Spanish Navy, was Intendent and later 

Minister of the Navy-one of the Bourbons' better appointments. His early 

service to the crown was with the any as an administrator. Patmo's main task 

was to rebuild the navy and develop shipyard locations that could be defended, 

thereby making them safer and less vulnerable to British attack from the sea. 

Under Patmo the fleet expanded its capabilities with ships of the line that were 

designed for decisive sea battle. At the time of his death in 1736, Spain 

possessed a profesional fleet of considerable strength. 13 

In an interesting interpretation of international law , a defensive alliance with 

Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter's War of 

Jenkins's Ear (1739- 1 743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two 

ships operated esentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division 

of Spanish ships to North American waters, deterring a British attack on the 

Spanish. Otherwise during this war France claimed the rights and privileges of 

a neutral. Cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets over 

the years led eventually, however, to the development of multinational navy 

doctrine. 

The worst defeat the British suffered at the hands of the Spanish in the 

eighteenth century was the abortive amphibious invasion of Cartagena de 

Indias, led by Admiral Edward Vernon and General Wentworth between 1740 

and 1741. The defending Spanish naval commanders-Vice Admiral Bias de 

Lezo and General Sebastian Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada-fought with 

6,00 sailors and trops in their defended fortifications against 30,00 troops 

and 120 ships. Admiral de Lezo, a Basque, fought with courage and tenacity. 

He had served at Oran in 1732 and put his knowledge into practice in the 

subsequent defense of Cartagena; he fought the English at the outer fortifications and refused to surrender. His personal presence was reminiscent of 

Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson; Admiral de Lezo fought with one leg, one arm, 

and one eye. He had lost the leg fighting at Velez-Malaga in 1 704 and his eye 

at Toulon. 14 

The Spanish Navy again demonstrated its strength against the English during 

the War of the Austrian Succesion ( 1740- 1748), in actions off Cape Sicie 

(1744), near Toulon. In that battle, a French fleet under Admiral La Bruyere de 

Court escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Juan Jose Navarro through a 

blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court, who was 

under orders not to fire unles attacked, offered to mix his ships amongst the 

Spanish. Navarro refused and, although the subsequent tactical engagement was 

81 
The Newport Papers 

indecisive, the Spanish squadron made its way to Cartagena, where Navarro 

was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. Spain remained neutral 

during the Seven Years • War (1756- 1763), although she took advantage of the 

opportunity to recapture Minorca from the British. 

In 1759 Carlos il took the throne and ushered in another era of administrative reform. In 1776, then-Lieutenant Jose de Mazar

o Salazar wrote a tactical 

treatise for junior officers. IS Rudimentos de tdctica naval para instruccion de 

los oficiales subalternos de marina contained only minimal sections on how to 

actually fight an enemy, but it did introduce inovative methods for breaking 

the line and using ftreShips. Mazarredo later wrote a signal bo

k that bore the 

strong influence of French works by Jean Fran�ois de Cheyron, Chevalier du 

Pavilion. This signal bok was prepared for use in combined operations of the 

Franco-Spanish fleets; it was far simpler than the French bok that was actually 

used. The close cooperation between the French and the Spanish fleets was no 

doubt a result of common Bourbon rule. 

A combined Franco-Spanish fleet in 1779, during the American War of 

Independence, prompted the isuance of French Navy doctrine for both fleets. 

Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers, was given overall command, and 

he prepared a revised instruction and signal bo

k to be used by both fleets. 

Spanish ships were integrated within the French fleet as well as maintained as 

a national force in a separate Squadron of Observation that would join the battle 

once the enemy was engaged. 

Under the command of Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney, a considerable portion of the British Chan

el Fleet seized the opportunity to attack a 

Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron under the command of Admiral 

Langara, at the Battle of Cape of Santa Maria <also known as the "Moonlight 

Battle," or the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 1780). British convoys were lost in 

subsequent strikes by the combined fleet, and in 1780 and 178 1 Admiral of the 

Fleet Luis C6rdoba y C6rdoba inflicted two of the most destructive attacks on 

English convoys. In the 1780 victory by a combined fleet under Spanish 

command, fifty-five British ships, 3,00 sailors, and weapons and supplies 

bound for Jamaica were captured. Between 1779 and 1782, Spain unsuccesfully engaged in a siege and an amphibious campaign against the British at 

Gibraltar. On the other hand, between 1779 and 1782 Carlos il supported the 

American and Spanish forces, capturing eastern Florida < 1780) and the 

Bahamas (178 1). In 1 782 the Spanish once again recaptured the naval base at 

Minorca from a British garn. 

Spanish Navy doctrine was now influenced by two additional French 

theoretical works. 16 The fll'St was L 'art de la guerre sur mer, ou tactique navale 

82 
Tritten * Spain 

(1787) by Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier. This succinct work was 

very much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed masing 

strength against weakness. Despite some rather innovative suggestions for 

tactical disposition of the fleet, he was essentially biased in favor of defense 

and wars of attrition. Admiral Clause Fran�ois, Comte d'Amblimont, wrote in 

1788 an influential bok, Tactique navale, ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les 

signaux et sur les mouvemens de guerre, which also emphasized innovation. 

D' Amblimont advanced the idea of breaking the fleet into separate pelotons, 

or tactical groups, with different functions. 

Toward the end of his reign (1759- 1788), Carlos il ordered the fonnation 

of "working-up squadrons" to train crews in navigational exercises and tactics. 

Retired senior officers with proven combat experience provided their services 

to the two squadrons that were eventually fonned. Because of the humiliation 

he had sufered at the hands of the Royal Navy in 1744 while King of Naples, 

Carlos il now gave a great deal of support to the Spanish Navy. In 1785 the 

navy was officially christened IA Armada Espanola (a title it retains today 

despite the subsequent frequent changes of government). In 1793 navy regulations were is

ued to prepare ships for battle-a battle that was to occur 

immediately; 17 France declared war on Spain in 1793. By 1 795 the two nations 

had made peace with each other, but one year later Spain and France were once 

again at war, with Britain. 

Development during the French Revolution 

While they had excellent signal boks and tactical manuals, the Spanish fleet 

during this era was not well trained and was wanting in men and supplies. As 

a consequence, an escort under the command of Vice Admiral Don Jose de 

Cordoba y Cordoba, accompanying an extremely valuable convoy, suffered a 

crushing defeat against the well-trained British Mediterranean Fleet at 

the Battle of Cape st. Vincent (1797). The British had benefited from the 

experiences of frequent combat against the French and were thus fighting at the 

height of their combat potential. Fortunately for Spain, the British commander 

at Cape St. Vincent, Rear Admiral John Jervis, did not understand the value of 

the convoy to the Spanish economy and concentrated his attack on their 

warships rather than on the capture of their transports. 1

8 

Admiral Jose de Cordoba's report following his defeat at Cape St. Vincent, 

which was published in the Gaceta de Madrid ( 1797), indicates that he was 

quite unprepared for command and battle fleet maneuver. During this era, 

the Spanish Navy was inundated with officers who had little experience in 

83 
The Newport Papers 

aggresive sea duty. This was in direct contrast to the leadership and command 

qualities of the Royal Navy officers, whose practical knowledge drew from 

longer periods at sea and longer periods of combat engagement. 19 Undermanned ships with crews that lacked camaraderie compounded Spain's 

problems. 

Jose de Mazaro Salazar, whose next publication was Advertencias para 

caso de combale (1797), achieved a fme combat record and eventually rose to 

the rank of vice admiral. He was never defeated at sea, but because he publicly 

expres concern over the condition of the fleet and its lack of combat 

capability, he was never entrusted with major fleet command at a critical 

moment during Spain's history. Mazarredo also criticized the Spanish method 

of manning ships, which denied interchangeability of tasks among crew members by devoting a large part of the crew to one task (marines shooting small 

arms) and the other crew members to another task (sailors mang long-range 

cannon). Mazaro also had the audacity to question Spanish foreign policy. 20 

Commodore Cosme Damian Churruca y Elorza was another fme combat 

officer and superb seaman. He wrote Instruccion sobre punteriLJS para el uso 

de los baxales del Rey, a publication that attempted to deal with the problems 

of naval artillery, advanced mathematics, and navigation. He served as a 

consultant on seamanship to the French Navy, and had he not died at Trafalgar, 

he certainly would have ben destined for higher leadership in the navy. 

Tratado de seflales de dia y noelle, e hipotesis de ataques y defensas, 

dispuesto por el &tado Mayor de Marina para auxiliar II instruccion de este 

ramo (1804) is one of the most sophisticated tactical and signalling boks ever 

produced. This official navy doctrine bo

k excelled in its analysis of battle 

tactics and clearly put the offensive ftrst. An extremely complex signalling 

system allowed the commander to indicate some 576 signals by flag. The bok 

also includes a translation of two of the major doctrinal ftghting and signalling 

works published by British Admiral Lord Richard Howe as well as summaries 

of the extremely inovative works of Grenier and d' Amblimont. 

Napoleonic Era 

During the Napoleonic Wars (1803- 1815), Spain again fought the British, 

and at times Spain also fought the French. At the Battle of Trafalgar (1 805), the 

Spanish and French fleets operated as a combined force, although in separate 

national squadrons. Prior to the battle these two navies had not exercised as a 

combined fleet and therefore had not attempted to tack thirty-three warships 

from south to north, a maneuver made all the more awkward by light winds that 

84 
Tritten * Spain 

prevented the fonnation of a solid defensive battle line?l Admiral Don Federico 

Gravina, perhaps more pliant and diplomatic than the cantankerous Mazarredo 

(who probably would have made a more effective commander), was unable to 

override the defensive doctrine of the French Navy and put into practice the 

new offensive Spanish doctrine outlined in Tratado tk seflales.22 Mazarredo 

certainly would have objected to his ships being maned with crews that were 

combined of marines and other infantrymen, which resulted in a close-aboard 

battle rather than engagement of the British at a distance. The bravery of the 

Spanish officers and men at Trafalgar canot be questioned, and we can only 

speculate on what the outcome might have been had the Spanish fleet operated 

under their new navy doctrine and under a proven combat leader such as 

Mazaredo. Given Gravina's role as a diplomat in France prior to Trafalgar, his 

selection as the commander of the Spanish fleet is understandable. The disaster 

at Trafalgar, however, resulted in another major decline in Spanish naval 

preparednes. 

The imediate threat was from the French forces that crossed the border in 

1 808. As with France's preocupation with the Gennans later in the nineteenth 

century, neither the French nor the Spanish fleets could affect the outcome of 

more important threats from acros the border. cadiz, from which the combined 

fleet sailed, became the hotbed of resistance to French ocupation forces and 

the seat of the government in exile. The Bourbon king abdicated in 1 808 and 

was replaced by Joseph Napoleon-Bonaparte's brother. By the next year, 

France had conquered most of Spain. 

With the los of her overseas colonies, Spain faced the immediate need to 

resolve the problem of lost income. Using her limited naval forces, Spain 

attempted to pacify her American colonies during the Spanish-American wars 

of independence (18 10-1824) but was unable even to protect them from 

privateers. Her weakened navy proved incapable of supporting such a major 

undertaking.23 Great Britain, which used its fleet to thwart Spain's attempt to 

regain the colonies, thus secured for itself a favorable trade status. The newly 

independent Latin American republics secured the services of foreign seamen 

who successfully defended their new status. 

Napoleon was defeated in 1 8 1 4, and the Bourbon monarchy was reinstated. 

Civil unrest in Spain followed and resulted in another French invasion to quell 

the unrest. Spain turned increasingly inward during the nineteenth century and 

underto

k to set up a constitution to addres various uprisings and separatist 

movements; the first Spanish Republic was proclaimed by 1 873. During this 

era, which introduced the ironclad, there could hardly have been consistent 

advancement in navy doctrine. 

85 
The Newport Papers 

The Spanish Navy followed the doctrine advocated by Mazaredo and 

contained in Tratado de senales until Lobo Malagamba prepared a revised text 

on naval tactics in 1 862.24 This first such doctrine for Spanish Navy steam ships 

was the basic doctrine for fleet employment during the campaign in the Pacific 

in 1 866 against Chile and Peru, under the command of Rear Admiral Mendez 

Nunez.25 

The next two doctrinal publications were written by Federico Ardois in 

1 884-Cuaderno de evoluciones and COdigo de escuadra. These two publications governed fleet actions during the Spanish-American War (1 898) and were 

kept as the basic doctrine for the fleet (with modifications in 1929 and 1935) 

until the end of World War II. The absence of continuous combat (it was also 

true for the British Navy) appears to have discouraged naval thought. 

The Spanish-American War 

Spain's major combat at sea following Trafalgar was the war with the United 

States in 1 898. Two major maritime campaigns were fought in the SpanishAmerican War. In the Philippines Campaign, Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo 

recognized the inferiority of his forces and planned to fight at anchor, supplementing his naval guns with artillery from shore batteries. The crew's 

inadequate practice in gunnery, the ships' anchorage beyond the range of most 

shore batteries, and a surprise attack at night by Admiral George Dewey, U.S. 

Navy, made the Battle of Manila Bay a one-sided contest-though Dewey 

himself congratulated Montojo for the bravery of the Spanish sailors. Responsibility for the debacle can be as

igned to the government that sent the illprepared forces and to the colonial leaders in Manila who would not allow a 

retreat. Montojo's error was primarily in allowing the Americans to enter the 

bay unopposed, much the same as had the Turks at the Battle of Navarino 

(1 827). Had Montojo fought at the outer part of the bay, he might have 

succeeded in forcing the Americans to blockade rather than engage. Montojo 

was court-martialed but exonerated-due partially to the support that he 

received from Admiral Dewey!26 

The Caribbean campaign was more interesting and controversial, starting 

with the recommendations of Admiral Pascual Cervera, who recognized that 

the offensive strikes and blockade ordered by the government were beyond the 

capability of his small fleet. Cervera believed that his forces were capable of 

merely defending the homeland. Despite this, he was ordered, and at least 

attempted, to defend Puerto Rico. Cervera outmaneuvered the American fleet 

and managed to enter the harbor at Santiago, Cuba, where he maintained a 

86 
Tritten * Spain 

fleet-in-being. The Americans eventually drew out the fleet as a result of joint 

actions taken ashore and at sea. and Cervera was defeated in the resulting 

battle.27 

The Twentieth Century 

Spain remained neutral during the First World War. Spanish naval actions 

during the Civil War (1936- 1939) consisted primarily of blockading and 

breaking blockades. After years of constitutional and governmental upheaval, 

some degree of stability arrived with the rule of General Francisco Franco, who 

maintained Spanish neutrality during the Second World War. After 1945, the 

navy accepted an American light aircraft carer into her fleet. Spain undertook 

a major revision in navy doctrine in 196 with efforts by the National War 

College faculty and an ad hoc group of senior officers.28 Most of their work 

appears to have been programatic in nature-deftning future navy requirements rather than basic battle doctrine. With Franco's death on 20 November 

1975, a constitutional Bourbon monarchy was restored. While Spain entered 

into NATO in 1982 and adopted Alliance navy doctrine, there remain a few 

national concerns that are outside NATO's area of operations and for which 

Spain must maintain her own separate concepts of operations, such as defense 

of North African territories. 

Establishing doctrine was easy for the Spanish Navy. The predominance of 

Catholicism in the nation may be an explanation for why the average officer 

accepted easily the concept of doctrine. Indeed, profesional writings in the 

United States have noted this parallel between doctrine and religion.29 As in 

other navies, doctrine was not the province of just the waror; it often involved 

participation of those outside the navy. Perhaps the most important lessons to 

be learned from Spain's experiences with written navy doctrine are: 

• It took a very long time to change doctrine in the Spanish Navy, that is, to 

shift from close-aboard battle to long-range artillery engagements and to update 

basic steamship doctrine, which remained unchanged until the end of World 

War n. 

• Doctrinal development moved along an oblique path, due to the frequent 

changes in Spain's government as it gradually became a modem nation. 

• Close doctrinal cooperation between France and Spain during the age of 

sail was a disaster for true Spanish interests-a result of political rather than 

military considerations. 

• Successful in

ovation was virtually imposible without a champion at 

court. 

87 
The Newport Papers 

• Doctrinal innovation does not build and develop without frequent combat. 

• And, fmally, for reasons of history, officers of the Spanish Navy take for 

granted that there will always be written navy doctrine. 

88 
Notes 

The age of sail and other sections of this parer are based heavily upon: S.S. Robison, ( Rear 

Admiral, USN, Retired), A History ofNava Tactics From 1 530 to 1 930, (Anapolis, Md: U.S. 

Naval Institute, 1 942); E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, USN), eds., Sea 

Power: A Naval Histo'}' (Englewood Cliffi, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 960); Clark G. 

Reynolds, Command oj the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: 

Wil

am Morrow & Co., 1 974); Helmut Pemsel, A History of War at Sea: An A tlAs and 

Chronology of Conflict at Sea from Ear/iesl Times to the Present, trans. Major i.G.D.G Smith 

(Anapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1 977) [translation of Von Saidmis bis Okin4UJa, first 

published in 1975]; Brian Tunstal, Naval Waifare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting 

Tactics, 1 650-1815, Dr. Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1 990). 

1. Rey de Castila Don Alfonso X el Sabio, T{tulo XXIV, De id guerra que se jaa por id 

mar [Of the War That Is Made on the Sea] (Maguncia, Spain: His Majesty's Royal Council 

for the Indies, 1610). Original version published in 1 270. I am indebted to Dr. Mike Johnson 

of the Center for Naval Analyses for his translation and synopsis of this document in a 

memorandum dated 9 June 1994. 

2. Alonso de Chaves, QuAtri partitu en wsmografia practiaJ, also known as Espejo de 

navegantes (Madrid: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 1 983). Originally written between 

1 520 and 1 538; also, Wilam Ledyard Rodgers, (Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired), Naval 

Waiftlrt under Oars: 41h 10 1 61h Centurie�A Study of Strategy, Tactics and Ship Design 

(Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1939), pp. 1 43-

. 

3. Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The Hislory and Slralegy of Maritime Empires 

(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), pp. 1 37-8. 

4. S.S. Robison (Rear Admiral U.S. Navy, Retired), A Hislory of Naval Tacticsfrom 1 530 

to 1 930 (Anapolis, Md. : U.S. Naval Institute, 1 942), pp. 34-6. 

5. Rogers, pp. 240-335; E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, US. 

Navy), eds. , Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood Cliffi, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 960), 

pp. 27-31; and Reynolds, pp. 1 42-4. 

6. Peter Padfield, Armada: A Celebration of lhe Four Hundredth Anniver!ary of the Dejeat of 

the Spanish Ar;mada, 1 588-1 988 (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 988), pp. 17, 42. 

7. Don Alvaro de Bazan, Marques de Santa Cruz, EI Marques de Sanla Cruz, a los capitanes 

y maestres de los navios de id armada de su cargo: lnstruc

ones y normas de wmportamiento en la mar 

durante la navegaci6n y campa uly 1 587, Archivo General de Simancas. 

8. "Battle tactics, 1 588: philip II's instructions to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, April 

1 588 (Spanish)," in John B. Hattendorf et al., British Naval Documents: 1204- 1960 (Hants, 

U.K.: Scolar Press [for the Navy Records Society], 1 993), pp. 86-7. 

9. Padfield, pp. 47-8. 

10. Flotas de Nueva Espana (Mexico) and Tierra Firme (Colombia and Venezuela) 

escorted by the Armada de la guarda de la carrera de indias. See Pidn de wmbate de un gale6n 

de la armada de guarda de id carrera de indias, 1 650 (Madrid: Museo Naval). 

1 1 . Pere Paul Hoste, L'Art des armees navales ou Irailf des evolutions navales (1697). 

12. Jose Ignacio Gonzalez-Aler Hierro (Rear Admiral, Spanish Navy), "La clctica," in 

Espana y el Mar en el siglo de Carlos llI, 1 989, p. 77. 

13. John D. Harnron, Tr.yalgar and the Spanish Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 1 988), p. 35. 

1 4. Ibid. , pp. 1 08-9; and P[hilip] H [oward] Colomb, (Vice Admiral, Royal Navy), Naval 

Waiftlrt: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 382-96. (The original version was published in 1 891 with revisions 

in 1 899 and 1 985). 

15. Brian Tunstal, Naval WaiftJre in the Age oj Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactic.s, 

1 650-1815, Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 990), p. 1 44. 

1 6. Gonzalez-Aler, pp. 82-3. 

17. Ordenanzas generales de id armada naval, 1 793 (Ibarra, Spain). 
The Newport Papers 

18. Harbron, pp. 43-4. 

19. Lieutenant Colonel lose Cuevas Fernandez (of the Spanish Marine Infantry), "About 

Trafalgar," Revista General de 14 Marina, September 1 947, cited in Harbron, p. 85. 

20. Harbron, pp. 98-1 02. 

21 . [bid., pp. 115-21. 

22. Objections to the French plan were voiced by senior Spanish Navy officers prior to 

the battle. See Harbron, pp. 1 3 1-2. 

23. Reynolds, p. 359; and Robert L. Scheina, LAtin America: A Naval History. 1810-1987 

(Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 987) , pp. 1-8. 

24. This section is drawn primarily from materials provided to the author by Rear 

Admiral Jose Ignacio Gonzilez-Aler Hierro, Spanish Navy, Director of the Museo Naval 

(Madrid) in a letter dated 9 May 1 994. 

25. Scheina, pp. 29-3 1 . 

26. Wilam Koenig, "Manila Bay," in Epic Sea Battles, S.L. Mayer, ed. (Secaucus, N.J.: 

Chartwell Books, Inc., 1 975) , pp. 102-19. 

27. Potter and Nimitz, pp. 366-77; Joseph G. Dawson III, "Wilam T. Sampson and 

Santiago: Blockade, Victory, and Controversy," in Crucible iEmpirt: The Spanish-American 

War & Its Aftermath, James C. Bradford, ed., (Annapolis, M .: Naval Institute Pres, 1 993) , 

pp. 54-5, 60-2; Harold D. Langley, "Winfield S. Schley and Santiago: A New Look at an 

Old Controversy," in Crucible Empirt pp. 80-

1; and Graham A. Cosmas, "Joint Operations 

in the Spanish-American War," in Crucible tifEmpirt, pp. 108-10. 

28. Interview with Rear Admiral Jose Alejandro Artal, Spanish Navy, former Head, 

Spanish Military Mission to SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), Norfolk, 

Va.: 2 June 1994. 

29. Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, U.S. Air Force, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New 

View of Doctrine," Air University Review, January-February 1 982, pp. 40-1. 

The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of 

the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. The author is indebted to 

Rear Admiral Jose Ignacio Gonzalez-Aler Hierro, Spanish Navy, Director of the Museo 

Naval in Madrid, Spain and Captain Jaime Goyanes, Spanish Navy, at the Spanish Military 

Mission to SACLANT (Supreme Aled Commander, Atlantic), Norfolk, Virginia, for their 

assistance and input to this paper. The author is also indebted to Dr. MichaelJ ohnson at the 

Center for Naval Analyses and to Petty Officer Damaso Medel of the Naval Doctrine 

Command for their asistance in translations. 

90 
The History of Italian Naval Doctrine 

Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 

MILITARY DOCfRINE AND NAVAL DOCTRINE are tenns used only 

rarely by Italian authors. and when used, they often mean military art, 

naval art, and sometimes, strategy. To consider, therefore, what is meant by 

military or naval doctrine in Italy. it is necessary to address first these concepts 

of military and naval art and strategy. 

To Italians, art is the combination of techniques or methods used to achieve 

goals (for example in a profesion or in a business). Military art, therefore, is 

the complex of knowledge, techniques, and methods acquired through study or 

experience and used to prepare the military instrument. The purpose is to obtain 

a sound decision-making instrument and an effective combat leadership. The 

goal is victory. 

Lieutenant General Raimondo Montecuccoli, an Italian, fought for the 

Austrian Hapsburg empire in the seventeenth century. He won more than forty 

battles and wrote extensively on military art. His major work was Trattato della 

guerra (Treatise on War). The quality and originality of his thoughts deserve 

to be mentioned, as they have a dignity equal to that of Clausewitz.1 The military 

art of Montecuccoli is the art of fighting well to win. 

Another interesting definition of military art has been proposed by Rear 

Admiral Luigi Fincati in his bok Military Aphorisms (1 882). Military art for 

him was "the complex of knowledge and capacities needed to coordinate, move, 

and lead a group of armed men against the other side, obtaining the best from 

each element and maintaining the group's cohesion at the same time . .. 2 

According to Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo, in his A History of Naval 

Tactical Thought ( 1956), military art is a combination of strategy and tactics, 

wherein strategy is defmed as "the art of conducting war" and tactics as "the 

art of fighting war ... 3 This latter definition of military art, which sems incomplete and exces

ively general, shows how difficult it is to circumscribe the 

meanings of some words. In Italian usage, the tenn doctrine has also meant 

tactics when referring to tactical-level doctrine. 

Strategy in Italy is generally understo as the concept of using the battle 

for the purposes of war, or using military means in support of politics. Today's 

military strategy is usually defmed as the element of general strategy that 
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specifies the way the military should act to achieve the objectives of national 

military politics, an alliance, or a coalition. 

The tenn military politics is commonly used to denote a distinct component 

of general politics. It is based on the nation's historical and social background 

and is driven by a current situation and the resources available. Military politics 

establishes the general objectives to be achieved by the military to fulfill the 

needs of the country, asiated international institutions, or alliances. It must 

operate to preserve, support, and integrate the overseas policies where and when 

relationships have been established. 

According to current Italian interpretations, the tenn doctrine is the whole 

of notions or principles, organically elaborated and ordered, to be considered 

either as an object to study or as a standard for theory and practice, or the whole 

of knowledge acquired and coordinated through study, which forms the culture 

of a person or of an organization. Doctrine, therefore, can be either fmnly 

prescriptive, as in religion or in a political ideology, or basically descriptive. 

As a complex of principles, military doctrine may deal with more than one area. 

It is therefore acceptable that this tenn be used as a substitute for military 

politics, strategy, or tactics. 

In Italy, therefore, the tenn military doctrine is controversial and allows 

several interpretations. Many writers believe it should be mainly descriptive, 

leaving the necessary freom of action to deal with particular events or 

exceptional situations. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to consider 

military doctrine as the collection of rules and principles that specify how to 

conduct military operations with the aim of fulfilling strategic objectives. 

Doctrine takes into account the lesns of history, the decisions in military 

politics, and the strategies chosen to deal with crises, conflicts, and so on. This 

definition places military doctrine on a level of hierarchy that stands below 

military politics and strategy, and above tactics. 

Doctrine is closely connected to military art. A graphical representation 

could be a circle wherein lie military politics, military strategy, military 

doctrine, naval doctrine, and tactics, connected sequentially but also linked with 

one another by lines indicating reciprocal influence and dependence. 

Synonymous with naval thought, doctrine includes the preparation of asts and 

their plan use in war or in emergencies. Doctrine impacts on the navy's 

organization and administration, training of personl, naval strategies and 

tactics, and the procurement of anments. Hence, the core of naval doctrine 

is the set of principles (as well as beliefs and values) that guides a naval 

organization in war or in carrying out other maritime operations in peacetime 

or during crises. These rules indicate what the navy must be, who or what it 

92 
Donolo * Italy 

must represent, how it must behave, and for what future contingencies it must 

prepare itself. It must also consider all fonns of cooperation with other services 

and allied nations, all possible misions, as well as asiated specialized 

doctrine for cooperation with air forces and doctrine when operating under 

NATO or United Nations Organization auspices. 

Naval doctrine, therefore, represents the essential link between strategy and 

tactics: if there is no doctrine, strategy cannot be translated into tactical actions. 

Doctrine generally has a long lifetime, while strategy and tactics are more 

dynamic. Naval doctrine is also subordinate to military doctrine and must be a 

guide and reference point for the navy on all occasions and for all undertakings. 

In reconstructing the history of naval doctrine in Italy, it is well to bear in 

mind that, while military literature on land operations boasts a very rich ancient 

bibliography, there is little treatment of naval doctrine. This lack of doctrinal 

literature probably resulted because events at sea were not suitable to academic 

inquiry, and naval operations were often sen as complementary and paralleling 

those ashore. With this in mind, we will undertake to ascertain the navy's actual 

doctrine through observations of its behavior and from examples of the literature that codified the doctrine. 

Early Italian Navies 

Some of the greatest medieval battles were fought in the Mediterranean by 

the maritime republics of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice. A fourth republic, Amalfi, 

had a merchant navy tradition. The maritime tradition established by these 

republics has been kept alive, and their coats of anns have ben carried on the 

Italian Navy flag since the republic was established in 1 946. 

The battle of Meloria in 1284 (between the Pisans and the Genoese), Curzola 

in 1298 (between the Venetians and the Genoese), and Bosphor and Loiera in 

1 352 (between the Genoese and a coalition led by the Venetians) provide 

examples wherein tactical art was written "at sea" by successful admirals in the 

age of oar. Fireanns were used aboard ships at the Battle of Zierikzee in 1304, 

where the Genoese admiral, Ranieri Grimaldi, defeated the Flemish. 

At the Battle of Curzola, Genoese Admiral Lamba Doria's superior tactics 

resulted in the defeat of the numerically more powerful Venetian fleet. The 

admiral's tactics were, essentially, to close in on the enemy quickly, break 

through their defensive formation, concentrate his force against only a part of 

the enemy line, and then commit his reserves at the height of battle. Reserves 

were considered so important that they were maintained even at the expense of 

a reduction in main forces. The Genoese were the unbeaten masters in applying 

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this doctrine. Their attacks were always carned out at the right moment, in a 

very decisive way, and using stratagems such as hiding the reserves. 

Written fighting instructions were ised ocionaly by various naval commanders operating in Renais

 Venice. The earliest of these efforts was the 

Orders and Signals of the Venetian Fleet in 1365.4 These orders included specific 

operational fonnations as well as signals to indicate the fleet commander's intent 

By the time the Battle of Lepanto (1571) occurred, the primarily unwritten 

doctrine and tactics of galley warfare in the Mediterranean had ben perfected 

to the degre that each side could have been considered a master of the naval 

art. Indeed, the battle was fought much the same as a joust between knights, 

with all of the fonnalities accorded gentlemen under an. Although the 

Christian commander at Lepanto, Don John of Austria, was Spanish, many 

ships were from Italian city-states, the largest contribution coming from Venice. 

The Christian fleet numbered well in exces of two hundred galleys, galleass, 

and subsidiary ships of sail, and the Turkish fleet had roughly the same strength. 

The Christians, who held superiority in numbers of canon (roughly 2.4: 1), 

fought as an integrated multinational force. Overall political objectives were 

set by Pope Pius V and Philip II of Spain. 

Before sailing, each Christian captain received written orders from CaptainGeneral Don John outlining specific cruising and battle stations. The overal

 tactical 

objectives were to select an opponent, ram, and then board in a general milie. The 

Turkish commander in chief, Ali Pasha, fought a brave hattie but in the end lost 

his life, and his force was defeated. In part, this was due to Christian superior 

firepower, technology (ship construction, providing protection for the crew, and 

personal armor), new ship design (galleas), favorable winds, and doctrineftatics (gal

eas placed ahead of the galeys and cann used more frely and at 

point blank range). Lepanto signaled the virtual end to traditional galley tactics 

and the age of oared ships, and the superior ships of sail were ushered in. 

The general concepts of doctrine were rarely described by the admirals or 

routinely codified on paper during medieval times. Doctrine at that time was 

deduced from events that happened at sea. One significant exception to this rule 

was Pantero Pantera, who was an academic and a ship commander of the 

Pontiffs navy. His L 'armata navale (The Naval Fleet), in two volumes (1614), 

managed to condense all that was known about the art of warfare at sea. � 

Pre-Unitary Navies: 1 750- 1 861 

During most of this period, pre-unitary navies carried out independent 

campaigns and rarely fought as a single fleet. It is important to examine their 

94 
DonalD * Italy 

histories separately, up to the birth of the Italian Navy after the establishment 

of the Kingdom of Italy in 1 861. 

Among the navies of the Italian peninsula, those of Naples and the Kingdom 

of Sardinia were most significant, although they were minor in comparison to 

great oceanic navies such as those of England, France, and Holland. Most of 

the time, the navies of the Italian peninsula were used in cooperation with the 

British or French fleets to counter piracy in North Africa or contain wars in 

progres in the Mediterranean. Warfare at sea consisted primarily of combat 

involving single ships or squadrons, naval blockades, and off-shore bombardments. 

The frequent foreign invasions and the ever-present political instability in 

the numerous states affected the preparednes of the fleets. Navy personnel. 

especially the officer corps, were often recruited from the army. from other 

Italian states, or from foreign nations. A truly national consciousnes of a 

national navy would have to await unification. 

Neapoli.lan Navy. The history of Naples is intertwined with that of Spain. hence 

Neapolitan Navy doctrine has a strong Spanish influence. In the mid- 1 700s. 

the situation in the fledgling Kingdom of Naples's navy was anything but good. 

It was not well organized. and it had no recognized doctrine for the employment 

of its forces. The arrival of the British adventurer, Admiral John Edward Acton, 

in 1 779 marked a clear turning point. Acton. who was summoned by Bourbon 

King Charles m. had served previously in the French Navy and with Tuscan 

naval forces. He started a thorough renewal program with the objective of 

providing the navy with more wide-ranging international experience. Acton 

brought experienced foreign officers and skillful engineers to Naples. and he 

sent Neapolitan officers and technicians to other countries to be trained. Several 

Neapolitan officers embarked on Spanish and French ships and took part in the 

American War of Independence. 

Acton's concept of naval force employment went beyond coastal defense; it 

counseled an active role in distant-water multinational operations. Neapolitan 

ships were active and successful during the hostilities between Spain and 

Algeria in 1 784 as well as in other circumstances. In a few years, the Neapolitan 

fleet reached the level of capability needed for the political role to which the 

Kingdom of Naples aspired. At that time Naples was the major coastal state in 

Italy. 

With the outbreak of the French Revolution, Naples fought bravely with 

Britain to defend Toulon. In 1 795 the Neapolitan Navy fought at Capo Noli 

with a British squadron commanded by Admiral Lord William Hotham. against 

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the French fleet led by Rear Admiral Pierre Martin. One British ship was 

commanded by Horatio Nelson and a Neapolitan frigate was commanded by 

Admiral Francesco Caracciolo. 

Naples was subsequently conquered, and King Ferdinand IV escaped to 

Palenno, Sicily, on board one of Nelson's warships, escorted by a Neapolitan 

naval division commanded by Admiral Caracciolo. The remainder of the fleet 

was burned to prevent its capture. After this mission, Caracciolo returned to 

Naples. He was disappointed by the surrender of his king and turned against 

the British. Caracciolo was eventually captured by Nelson, court-martialled, 

condemned, and hanged on board the Neapolitan corvette Minerva that he once 

commanded when he held the rank of commander. 

Despite various contrasting evaluations, Caracciolo is considered a patriot 

by many. This episode reveals how the doctrines of the Royal Navy and the 

Neapolitan Navy differ in duty and loyalty. Nelson was governed by his duty 

as a cotnmander to maintain absolute loyalty to his sovereign under all conditions and in all situations. Caracciolo, however, could no longer be inspired 

with duty and loyalty toward a sovereign who had abandoned the capital under 

foreign threat; Caracciolo felt that supporting the new ideals of liberty , equality, 

freedom and justice was his first duty as a citizen and as a soldier. 

This sense of perceiving and interpreting is found again in the history of the 

Neapolitan and Italian navies. In this period, the old Neapolitan Navy was 

divided in two-fighting each other. A small Neapolitan Navy was allied to the 

French, while the larger Sicilian Navy was allied to Britain. The conduct of the 

Neapolitan Navy was very aggresive and they showed determination against 

a far more powerful British fleet. 

In 1 8 14, an interesting bok by Giulio Roc

o (who had served in the Spanish 

Navy), titled Riflessioni suI potere marittimo (Considerations on Maritime 

Power), was printed in Naples. Considerations on Maritime Power introduced 

the tenn maritime power, which was nearly unheard of at that time. The bok 

defmed the tenn's most important elements and the relationships between those 

elements. 

After the defeat of Napoleon in Rusia, the Bourbons returned to Naples 

( 1 8 15) and once again the navy was reorganized. Maritime responsibilities were 

shared between thre

 maritime areas (Naples, Palermo, and Mesina) and new 

doctrine was established. Admiral Acton's doctrine was updated with the 

publication of the Regulations of the Royal Navy, which was also influenced 

by French and Spanish doctrine. 

For example, as contained in earlier Spanish doctrine, some Neapolitan 

officers (vesl officers) were tasked to fight, while others, known as pilots, 

96 
Donolo * Italy 

were responsible for seamanship. Vessel officers were predominantly of noble 

origin, while the pilots came from all clas. Enlisted specializations were 

similarly split into artillery canoneers, whose duty included vigilance over 

the ship, and sailors who handled the sails and other seamanship duties. The 

Neapolitan Navy had a fleet with good material condition, but one that was 

not particularly useful because of the por level of training for officers and 

crews. Military and patriotic spirit were lacking, and the canoneers were not 

convinced either of the sailors' good will toward them or of their own good 

chances 

During 

for survival. 

the periods 1 820- 1 830, the Neapolitan Navy became aware of the 

new technical pos

ibilities in propUlsion. In the 1830s the Kingdom of the Two 

Sicilies (Naples and Sicily) built many steamships of excellent quality. In 1 825 

Neapolitan ships had cared out a bombardment against Tripoli to convince 

the Bey of Tripoli to suspend his piracy activities. A similar operation was 

carried out in 1 833, in conjunction with Sardinian ships, against Tunisia. 

The Neapolitan Navy did not normally deploy outside their national waters. 

The government feared that crews could be contaminated by liberal thinking, 

and given the 1 820 revolt in Naples as well as elsewhere in Italy, its fears were 

probably justified. One exception to this rule was its deployment of ships to 

Brazil and to the Rio della Plata in 1843. 

In 1 848 the Neapolitan Navy deployed with some sections of the army to 

the Adriatic Sea where they joined Sardinian and Venetian ships to defend a 

new republican government in Venice against Austria. This campaign was led 

by Admiral Raffaele de Cosa. Later, after facing a revolt in Naples, the king 

withdrew his ships and troops and sent them to attack republican secesionists 

in Sicily. This withdrawal created severe problems of conscience for Admiral 

de Cosa, who was tom between obedience to the king's orders and his desire 

to participate in events that were crucial to the independence and unity of Italy. 

De Cosa resigned from the navy in a situation similar to that faced by 

Francesco Caracciolo. 

The Neapolitan Navy operated for the last time in 1 860 in an unsuccesful 

opposition to the landing in Sicily of General Giuseppe Garibaldi and his corps 

of volunters. The navy also supported the abortive attempt to retake the island. 

During the conquest of Sicily, Garibaldi set up a small but aggresively trained 

Sicilian navy. It created its own regulations and was equipped with crews and 

ships that were mostly from the merchant navy. The Sicilian Navy captured 

Neapolitan ships and supported landing operations which resulted in the eventual capture of Naples. 

97 
Sardinian-Piedmontese Navy. The island of Sardinia also has a mixed heritage, 

with Spanish ancestry. Piedmont is located near the French border in the region 

of Turin. These two regions were once combined as the Kingdom of Sardinia. 

The establishment of a Sardinian-Piedmontese navy, or Sardinian navy, took 

place sometime after the founding of the Kingdom of Sardinia under the 

leadership of Savoy (part of Piedmont). It was originally a small navy with light 

units, dedicated mainly to battle with the pirates infesting the coasts of Sardinia. 

By 1 764, this navy had grown to include frigates that could be operated at a 

considerable distance from the shoreline. Crews were composed mainly of 

Ligurians (Genoa's region). The service was managed in the British custom, 

and commands were given in French. This small navy also had a naval infantry 

that was used more to defend coastal areas than for offensive tasks. 

Sardinia defended itself succesfully against French attacks under Napoleon. 

In 1 796, the king, Carlo Emanuele IV of Piedmont, escaped to and obtained 

refuge in Sardinia. The navy continued its primary activity of coastal defense 

and actions against pirates-but now in cooperation with the British. Napoleon 

could not tolerate having Sardinian ports available to the British and attempted, 

unsuccesfully, to prevent their use of Sardinian waters. 

After the Napoleonic wars (Vienna Conference, 1815), Sardinia reclaimed 

Piedmont and acquired Liguria. The Sardinian Navy became better regulated, 

and a new navy commander, Admiral Giorgio des Geneys, established two 

naval infantry regiments that included their own organic artillery. The maritime 

areas of Genoa, Villafranca, and Cagliari, and a marine school (18 1 6) were 

established as well. The number of ships was increased, and the Sardinian Navy 

became a particularly efficient instrument. Ships were used for diplomacy and 

to support a coup at Tripoli (1822). 

In 1 826 Admiral des Geneys published a new set of regulations concerning 

service, discipline, uniforms and artillery, and the administrative regulations 

were enacted in 1 830. All regulations were in French; the Italian language 

became obligatory later. 

During the Grek War of Independence (182 1 - 1830), the Sardinian Navy 

was used to protect the merchant traffic of Sardinia and its consulates in the 

Mediterranean. From 1 834, Sardinian warships operated in South American 

waters, especially off Brazil and in the Mar del Plata. Cruises to the Pacific 

were made via Cape Hom. 

In 1 837 steam propulsion was introduced, starting with merchant ships and 

corvettes. In March 1 840, the Sardinian Navy was reorganized once again, and 

a general staff of the combined forces was introduced. A solid merchant fleet 

98 
DoIlOIo * Italy 

developed gradually alongside the navy. and Giuseppe Garibaldi was one of 

the captains of this merchant fleet. 

After the Milan uprising in 1848. King Carlo Alberto declared war against 

Austria. Sardinian naval infantry tok part in the land campaign. while a 

squadron under Admiral Giuseppe Albini was sent to the Adriatic and joined 

the Neapolitan fleet in support of the new Republic of Venice. On 15 April 

1848. Sardinian ships hoisted for the ftrst time the Italian tricolor flag with the 

I 

I 

." " .. ·.V 

Q 

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" \ 

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Joseph R. Nunes. Jr. 
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Savoy's coat of an. The Sardinian squadron was involved in actions against 

the forts and in blockades of Trieste and in action along the Venetian coast. 

Following the Anstice, the Sardinian Navy coperated extensively with the 

French and the British. 

In 1855, the Kingdom of Sardinia participated with France and Great Britain 

in the Crimean War against Rusia. A IS,OOman expeditionary corps was sent 

by sea to the Crimean peninsula. The Sardinian Navy, in cooperation with the 

British, sustained the main logistic effort, asuring the continuous flow of 

supplies from Italy and managing merchant ships' requisition and hire. Its 

integration with the allied naval forces was outstanding, and the experience 

acquired was extremely important five years later when the Sardinian Navy 

became the core of the Italian Navy. 

Venetian Navy. The Venetian Navy was famous for its rigorous regulations, 

healthy administrative principles, and the close relationships between its Superintendents and the Senate of the Republic. In wartime, the Republic selected 

a Captain General to whom absolute power was given. When the war was over, 

the Captain General was not to return directly to the city of Venice itself; he 

was to berth his ships in some other port and travel from there to Venice in 

civilian clothes. There, his action was judged by the Senate. 

Trade relations with the East, which once constituted the fortune of the 

Venetian Republic, were reduced greatly after the discovery of America, when 

trading interests switched from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. 

The Venetian Navy, which had maintained absolute dominion of the Adriatic 

Sea and part of the Mediterranean for centuries, became a modest one, operating 

in a limited number of areas after the los

 of foreign bases. By the middle 1700s, 

Venice had become an advocate of peace and neutrality. Yet the Venetian Navy 

still held some military power and could not be ignored. On the other hand, it 

lacked the spiritual and political energy neces

 for a warfighting force. 

In 1749 the Republic conceived a league with the Knights of Malta's naval 

forces, those of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the Pontiff's fleet to 

counter the threat of North African piracy. In 1767 Venice tok the initiative 

and sent a naval squadron under Admiral Angelo Erno, which landed in Algeria 

and forced the Bey of Algiers to take action. In 1784 Venice sent Admiral Emo 

again to North Africa, where he bombarded the port of Susa, set a naval 

blockade at Tunis and Susa, and then monitored from Malta the pirates' 

activities. Admiral Erno's transport of heavy canons through shoal waters 

deserves mention. Cannons were off-loaded on special rafts; thus he surprised 

the enemy and created a tactic that since then has ben copied by many others. 

100 
Donolo * Italy 

After Napoleon's conquest of Venice in 1797, many of the best ships and 

crews of the Venetian Navy were incorporated directly into the French Navy. 

When Napoleon was defeated, Venice was turned over to Austria and its navy 

became the Imperial Royal Venetian Navy. In 1 848, the Venetians rose up 

against Austria and proclaimed a short-lived republic. Many of the Imperial 

Royal Venetian Navy ships stationed at Venice, whose crews were mostly of 

Italian origin, chose to side with the new republic. The biggest part of the fleet 

was stationed at Pola (on the Istrian Peninsula) and remained loyal to Austria. 

The Venetian Republic was reincorporated into Austria in 1 849 and remained 

within the Austrian empire until its cession to Italy in 1866. 

Other Pre-Unification Navies. There were many other states in pre-unification 

Italy that had navies. Two of them are covered here-the navies of the Pontiff 

and that of Tuscany-although their influence on Italian Navy doctrine is 

negligible. 

The main objective of the Pontiff's navy was to take an active part in the 

struggle against the non-believers, the Moslems. The Vatican navy was 

particularly active in the sixteenth century when it participated, with a large 

number of ships, in all important naval encounters of that period-including 

Lepanto (1 57 1). It also cooperated with navies belonging to several knightly 

military orders. When Napoleon conquered Rome in 1 808, the Pontiff' s 

navy was disbanded; and in 1 860 all papal ships were incorporated by the 

Italian Navy, when the papal port city of Ancona became part of the 

Kingdom of Italy. 

The Tuscan Navy, inheritor of the medieval Pisan Republic Navy, decayed 

progressively over the years due to the constant reduction of budget. Despite 

this, Tuscan ships participated, along with the Venetians, in battles against the 

Turks. Its last major combat was during a war over Corfu ( 1715- 17 1 8). From 

the mid- 1700s, the Tuscans limited their naval operations to defense against 

the Turkish and the North African pirates infesting the Tuscan coasts. In 1775, 

a Tuscan squadron operating off North Africa was under the command of John 

Acton, who later went on to serve with the Neapolitan Navy. 

Due to the limited number of ships available, the Granducato of Tuscany 

eventually needed the help of other Italian states to protect his trade lines along 

the North African coast. Generally, it was the Kingdom of Naples that supported 

this suppresion. In the ninetenth century the Tuscan Navy was reduced to 

even more modest dimensions. 

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The Birth of the Italian Navy: 1 861- 1 882 

The official date of the birth of the Italian Navy is 17 March 1 861. when the 

Sardinian. Neapolitan. and Tuscan navies. and a few remaining ships from the 

Pontiffs navy. joined together. The intent of the new Kingdom of Italy was to 

create a navy appropriate for the international role the government wanted to 

fulfill. This became evident when Camillo Benso di Cavour. the first prime 

minister. stated that "it is the duty of a state located in the middle of the 

Mediterranean to create [the basis for] the widest development of its naval 

resources. taking advantage of the elements of force of its own provinces." 

But Italian naval policy was strongly conditioned by the prevalent land 

mentality of the politicians. The ships belonging to the kingdom were extremely 

diverse. with crews of different cultures and no common doctrine. From the 

doctrinal point of view. an autonomous Italian idea was slow to emerge. Even 

the recent events of the American Civil War were not well known. and the 

technological inovations adopted in those circumstances received only minimal attention. On the other hand. the tactics of French Admiral Luis Bouet-Willaumez and Rus

ian Grigorij Boutakov were followed closely. 

Bouet-Willaumez wrote a series of publications that pioneered advances in 

navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer ( 1855). attached to a Project de 

tactique navale. outlined provisional tactics for screw-propelled steamships. 

Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the French Ministry of Marine 

in the form of their own doctrinal boks. They were published in 1 857. outlining 

doctrine for ships of sail and steam. These French ministry doctrinal works and 

Bouet-Willaumez's other writings. especially his Tactique supplementaire: d 

[ 'usage d'uneflotte cuirasee (1865). were adopted by the Italian Navy in 1 866 

as the Regolamento di tatca (Tactical Regulations).6 This doctrine paralleled 

a government decision in 1 863 to shift from sail to steam and ironclads. 

The tactical principles of French doctrine were applied. at least theoretically. 

in the famous and instructive Battle of Lissa ( 1 866). They included principles 

of war-rules for combat-and movements of war-maneuvers to be executed 

by the main body and the flanks of the steam-propelled fleet to gain advantageous positions for combat. The general strategy for employment of the 

fleet at sea was to form up with the French. Spanish. or British against a common 

foe. Yet in its first battle. the Italian Navy fought alone. 

In 1 866. the Italian fleet. under Admiral Count Carlo Pellion di Persano. met 

an Austrian force. commanded by Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. off 

the island of Lis (now Vis) in the Adriatic in the first battle between anored 

fleets. Persano's objective was to cover an abortive landing operation. Upon 

102 
Donolo * Italy 

sighting the Austrian fleet, the Italians sortied their ironclads from the landing 

area to engage the enemy. Tegetthoff committed both his ironclads and wooden 

ships and scored a resounding defeat of the Italians. preventing the seizure of 

the island and driving off the Italian fleet. 

Persano's fleet had twice the combat potential of the Austrians. Persano, 

however, had neither conducted practice drills nor met with his captains to 

discus how best to employ an ironclad fleet in conformance with the new 

doctrine. Instead, he asumed that the standing instructions and the new tactical 

doctrine were all that were needed and would be followed. The result was a 

disastrous melie. The embryonic Italian Navy had not yet had the time to 

exercise its new doctrine or formulate a national officer corps. It certainly had 

not had the years of experience that Horatio Nelson could count on when he 

trusted his "band of brothers" to carry out his standing orders. 

In what has been described as one of the most unfortunate ideas that an 

admiral could have ever conceived, Persano changed his flagship while his 

battle line was still forming and did not inform anyone; due to a squall. his 

subordinates did not se it. Unfortunately, Tegetthoff observed the slow-down 

of ships and a break in the line. He aggresively maneuvered his force to take 

advantage. After the presumed flagship was sunk. one of Persano's subordinates signalled for chase and fre

om of maneuver, but that signal was 

cancelled by Persano who, in doing so, made it known that he was aboard 

another ship. 

The lesns of the Battle of Lissa weighed heavily upon the Italian Navy for 

many years hence. Although most analysts have demonstrated how this battle 

mistakenly influenced warship construction for the next thirty years (a resurrection of the ram), it was also to have a dramatic impact on understanding the 

importance of doctrine. Persano formed his fleet to maximize the performance 

of their guns, rather than the ram. but then spoiled the plan with his decision to 

shift flags. The Italians failed to take advantage of their superiority in combat 

potential or their formation's superiority over that of the Austrians (who were 

formed to maximize ramming). 

The defeat must be imputed primarily to the lack of understanding between 

himself. 

Admiral Persano and his commanders and to the modest qualities of the admiral 

Persano did not take advantage of the greater flexibility of his line 

formation against Admiral Tegetthoff's wedge. Furthermore, after losing two 

ships, he did not counterattack despite the fact that he still outnumbered the 

Austrians. Austria used older and less well-armed ships, but the strong personality of Admiral Tegetthoff fixed trust in his crews and commanders, leading 

them to succes

. 

1 03 
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The negative results of the Battle of Lis had serious political and moral 

repercusions for the navy. The battle, however, increased the public's and 

politicians' awarenes

 of conditions in the navy. Political leaders began to 

understand the importance of sea control and its relationship with land operations. They began to realize that the transport of tro

ps and coastline defense 

were not the only roles that navies played in influencing land operations directly 

and strategicaly. 

The Battle of Lis also marked the starting point of new naval thought. The 

Rivista Marittima (Naval Journal), born in 1 868, became an important vehicle 

for the discusion of new doctrine and strategy. Its writings captured the 

attention of the public and Parliament. It demonstrated the importance of the 

navy. It proposed new fleet asts and organizational reforms as a consequence 

of the lesons learned from the defeat at Lissa and of new technological 

innovations. It was recognized that many of the ships that had fought at Lissa 

lost in one-against-one battles, so shipbuilding concepts shifted toward larger 

ships. 

The follow-on debates on the pages of this journal helped to obtain the funds 

necessary to achieve qualitative and numerical levels comparable to those of 

both the Spanish and Austrian maritime forces. Despite some disagreements, 

from there on, the navy was considered an indispensable instrument in the 

conduct of solid foreign policy, ruling the colonies and asuring territorial 

defense. 

The total renovation of the fleet was conceived and committed with a 

ten-year plan. In 1 869 and in 1871, the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral 

Augusto Riboty, presented an Organic Plan/or the Navy to the Parliament. In 

1 870, plang started for new battleships as well. These included the first 

warships with revolving towers and 450m

 caliber naval artillery; they were 

considered by many, especially the French, to be the most powerful ships of 

the time. 

Italian Navy units stationed in the Red Sea from 1 879 on, sometimes for very 

extended periods, carried out naval diplomacy misions in support of Italian 

colonies. The ships also carried out operations in direct and indirect support of 

the army, using arms and providing logistic sustainment, especially during the 

occupation of Eritrea (1882- 1 890). 

In 1 881 the navy was debated again. The debate, involving both offtcers and 

Parliament, was about building battle cruisers instead of battleships. Numerous 

boards on the subject expres different views. The new technologies had 

introduced many innovations, which gave rise to numerous questions about how 

to proceed. Old prejudices slowed down inovations. Despite the positive 

104 
Donolo * Italy 

results obtained with the new warships, many people believed that the navy was 

to ambitious; they argued for a fleet of smaller units. 

The supporters of large ships used examples from the British and American 

navies' experiences as amunition against the idea that large ships were to 

slow or awkward in modem combat. Big ship supporters also had to refute the 

idea that the combat potential of a small number of large ships could be obtained 

equally by adding together the tonnage of a large number of small ships. Such 

an approach provides only equivalent tonnage and has no bearing on combat 

potential. This discusion was useful to defme criteria for shipbuilding and to 

start considering political-military objectives, given fmancial posibilities. 

Under Minister of the Navy Ferdinand Acton ( 1 880- 1883), Italian naval 

shipbuilding programs and doctrine were strongly influenced by the French 

jeune ecole. Italian ship procurement shifted to fast, lightly armored ships. The 

navy supported coastal fortifications and mine fields in conjunction with small 

well-armed naval units in defense of the coast. A few large battleships were 

also maintained, not to contest command of the western Mediterranean but to 

act rather as a mobile fleet-in-being. If actually used in combat, they would act 

primarily as coastal defenders, breaking up enemy formations that attempted a 

landing, or engaging in shore bombardment. 

Acton's program was opposed by Admiral Simone Pacoret de Saint Bon and 

Admiral Benedetto Brin. Each wrote boks in 1 88 1, La questione delle navi 

(The Question of the Ships) by Saint Bon, and La nostra Marina Militare (Our 

Military Navy) by Brin, which sought to argue the case for large capital ships 

and the decisive battle. 

The role of the navy during the occupation of Somalia was to support the 

initial invasion and subsequent diplomatic and military actions. During this 

period, the navy gained vast experience in distant operations. Numerous 

diplomatic misions outweighed efforts to limit the navy to the defense of 

maritime boundaries, and naval expeditions in the Far East and in South 

America supported this expanded role. Some twenty-one circumnavigations 

around the world also contributed to developing the navy's views and to 

supporting a greater role for the navy. 

People became more aware of the ne for harmonizing the basic preparation 

of naval officers. The two existing naval schols at Genoa and Naples were 

unified to form a single naval academy in Livorno, between 1 878 and 188 1. In 

the meanwhile, some profound changes were occurring in the international 

situation. The French conquest of Tunisia in 188 1 affected Italian interests and 

drew Italy out of isolation. France, rather than Austria, became the asumed 

enemy. A costly arms competition with France overtaxed Italian resources and 

lOS 
The Newport Papers 

left its navy with an excellent theory of naval construction but inadequate assets 

in the water. 

From 1 882 to World War I 

In 1 882 Italy signed the Triple Alliance Treaty with Gennany and AustriaHungary. The main objective of this treaty was the defense of the coastal 

regions. The French threat was asumed to be an initial strike at the Italian fleet, 

bombardment of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian coasts, then neutralization of the 

railways followed by an amphibious landing which would cut Italy in two and 

outflank the land front. The Treaty was renewed in 1 891. 

Admiral Giovanni Bettolo, Minister of the Navy at the tum of the century, 

succeeded in starting a new shipbuilding program. His plan consisted of 

building small, fast, annored ships carrying large caliber artillery, as well as 

new torpedo units. 

One of the more important naval theorists of the 1 880s and 1 890s was 

Commander Domenico Bonamico. Bonamico first attained prominence with 

the publication of La difesa marittima dell 'Italia (Maritime Defense of Italy) 

in 1 881. In this first work, Bonamico argued that navies were as important as 

land forces for the defense of Italy. Bonamico's ideas evolved with the publication of a subsequent bo

k, La situazione navale mediterranea (The Naval 

Situation in the Mediterranean). In this later bok, Bonamico aimed to develop 

a new regional organization able to control the vital points of the Mediterranean 

and thereby prevent general European wars. 

Bonamico's major work was II problema marittimo dell 'ItaUa (The 

Maritime Problem of ltaly) in 1 899. Bonamico accepted the increased role for 

the navy in the defense of the national coastline. He outlined the fleet's main 

tasks as cooperation with the anny, control over the Tyrrhenian Sea, prevention 

of attacks from the sea, and monitoring the mainland and island coastal areas. 

Additional duties were the protection of coastal cities and installations against 

naval bombardments, the defense of maritime trade, and the safety of the 

colonies. Following his prescriptions, Italy established a series of fortified naval 

bases on its own soil, from which the fleet-in-being would maintain its vigil. 

In another major work, II potere marittimo (Maritime Power). Bonamico 

detailed the movement and dynamics of maritime power. Using historical case 

studies from the age of sail, he introduced the basic principles of war at sea. 

Bonamico argued that the military importance and influence of navies was no 

less than ever before. Bonamico states that: .. the entity and the character of a 

fleet must depend, first of all, on the objectives that the nations wish to achieve." 

106 
Donolo * Italy 

Bonamico pointed out that while French strategy had to be essentially against 

Britain, Italian strategy should be based on defense against maritime invasions. 

Without having attained succes in defense against maritime invasions, success 

in other mission areas was irlevant. 

By the end of the ninetenth century, the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer 

Mahan in the United States, Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, and Major Charles 

E. Callwell in Britain had also added to the knowledge of naval war in the age 

of sail. Bonamico, Mahan, Colomb, and Call well collected lesns of maritime 

history and recorded the naval doctrines of the time. These authors had a 

resounding effect on the Italian Navy. Bonamico even wrote a bok about 

Mahan and Callwell.7 Mahan and Bonamico are considered to be, in Italy, the 

most important philosophers of naval theory because of their ability to learn the 

proper lessons of naval history. 

Another significant author at the century's end was Commander Augusto 

Vittorio Vecchj, also known as Jack La Bolina. Veechfs bok. Storia generale 

della Marina Militare (General History of the Military Navy) in 1 892, documented the history of the Italian Navy, an essential step in the formulation of 

doctrine. Between 1 898 and 1902, Camillo Manfroni wrote a complete history 

of medieval Italian navies from the middle of the ftrst millennium to the Battle 

of Lepanto. Manfroni developed historical information on construction techniques, naval customs, crew composition, armaments, and the nature of expeditions and the organization of the fleets. 

Italian naval doctrinal thought received a further impulse from Lieutenant 

Giovan Seehi. Seehi, an instructor at the Naval Academy, published his 

Elementi di arte militare mlrittiml (Elements of Military Maritime Art) in two 

volumes between 1903 and 1906. In addition to a standard and orthodox 

treatment of naval strategy, emphasizing war at sea and the deeisive battle, 

Sechi's bok expres an interest in combined operations and the role of 

logistics. 

Seehi emphasized principles of naval strategy based on a clear definition of 

objectives, followed by a deduction of the operations that are posible, given 

the capability of the fleet He completed a theoretical treatment indicating which 

situations required temporary and which the absolute control of the sea. Seehi 

argued that strategic succes, not tactical, could be pursued with two possible 

altematives: a strategic offensive war or a strategic defensive war. Unusually, 

he interpreted the concept of fleet-in-being as an option that maintained naval 

forces deployed at sea rather than in port. Seehi, who influenced the Italian 

govemment to obtain fast dreadnoughts, was promoted eventually to admiral 

and served as Chief of Staff of the Navy after World War I. 

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The Newport Papers 

Two additional boks, Stona delle evolutioni navali (History of Naval 

Evolutions) in 1899 and Tat nelle grandi battaglie navali (Tactics in the 

Great Naval Battles) in 1 898 by Rear Admiral G. Gavotti, were mostly descriptive but again fonned the basis of an understanding of how navies fought so 

that doctrine could be fonnulated by the navy. Lieutenant Lamberto Vanutelli 

attempted to analyze night combat between ironclads and torpedo boats.8 

Lieutenant Romeo Bemotti published a series of articles in Rivista Marittima 

which addressed doctrinal issues being debated in the fleet. His bok, 

Fondamenti di tattica navale (Fundamentals of Naval Tactics) in 1910, was 

translated into English and published by the U.s. Naval Institute.9 This bok 

addreses both elements of maneuvering as well as specific tactical maneuvers 

and the conduct of battle as a whole. Bemotti argued that "war is decided by 

means of a decisive battle." He also addres the dividing of fleets into 

principal and flying squadrons (whose job it was to execute an envelopment 

maneuver, or crossing the "'), the proper distance for engagements as being 

that which allows the employment of all the fleet's asts, tactical versus 

strategic victory, and warfare of anlation versus attrition. Bemotti did not 

develop historical examples for his doctrinal and tactical discusions but rather 

asumed the reader already knew these. 

The writings of foreign naval scholars also received attention in Italy. The 

pro-jeune ecole bok, &sai de strategie navale (1893), by French Commander 

Gabriel Fontin (pseudonym H. Monrechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseudonym Commandant Z), was translated into Italian. Sir Julian Stafford 

Corbett's historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days of sail, 

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (191 1), was also studied in Italy. Rusian 

Admiral Stephan O. Makarov wrote a bok, Rasuz.Jukniia po voprosam 

morskoi taktiki (Discusion of Questions in Naval Tactics) in 1 898, which was 

translated into Italian. 

At the beginning of the new century, the Triple Alliance had begun to weaken 

and appeared somewhat unreliable. Rivalry and disagreement arose with 

Austria. By the end of 1905, Austria was again a potential adversary, stimulating an Italian-French reconciliation. The navy was encouraged to strengthen 

coastal defenses around Venice and to improve the support capability of the 

port of Brindisi. Joint exercises with the land forces were intensified. More 

attention was given to increasing the combat potential of the fleet. The lesns 

learned from the Battle of Tsushima (1905) led to the construction of dreadnoughts and other fleet modernization efforts. 

There were still many disagrements in the country and controversies over 

the utility of the fleet and expenses needed to improve it. Building was started 

108 
Donoln * Italy 

on coastal anoted ships and lightweight submarines designed to operate in the 

Adriatic. Naval strategic thought was inspired by Admirals Bettolo (Chief of 

Staff from 1907 to 19 1 1) and Thaon di Revel (Chief of Stafffrom 1913 to 1915 

and from 1917 to 19 19). The navy budget was increased in 1909 and in 191 1, 

allowing the acquisition of new fleet units. 

In the meanwhile, the training of officers was becoming much more appropriate to the level of technological and doctrinal progres

 in the navy. The 

School of Naval Warfare was established at La Spezia in 1908 and was 

transferred after World War I to its present location in Livomo with the new 

name of Institute of Maritime Warfare. The school was the location of official 

naval doctrine development. 

Around 1910, Italian naval preparation begin to consider the difficulties 

asiated with warfare in the Adriatic. The Adriatic's geography was a 

challenging factor. 

• Its shallow waters facilitated minelaying but hampered the employment of 

submarines. 

• Well-protected enemy coasts were close by. 

• The Austrian fleet could move with relative safety through the islands of 

the Dalmatian coast. 

• Italy lacked bases between Venice and Brindisi. 

• The low national coastline made defense difficult. 

The mainstream of the Italian Navy concluded that a potential war with Austria, 

therefore, had to be fought on the offensive at sea. Results of the analysis fueled 

additional debates between the proponents of battleships and those who desired 

to reinforce the coastal defenses. 

In the meanwhile, the Italian Navy saw extensive service in the war with 

Turkey (191 1- 1912). The main Italian flotilla was under the command of the 

Duke of Abruzzi. The navy supported the successful landings of troops and 

tok much territory. Coastal towns were shelled and blockades were maintained. Successful amphibious landings were made in Tripolitania, Cirenaica, 

and some of the Dodecanese Islands. 

After the war, the navy began to plan for amphibious landings along the 

Adriatic coastline. Plans were made and assets prepared to carry them out, 

taking into account the experience gained with the successful conquest of 

Tripoli during the 191 1 war against Turkey. At Tripoli, new doctrine was 

developed that required the support of sailors specially trained as land fighters. 

These seagoing soldiers prepared the way for the follow-on landing of regular 

army troops, which were to be transported to the objective by the navy. 

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The Newport Papers 

Also during the war against Turkey, aircraft were used by Italy for military 

purposes (in Libya) for the first time in history. Chief of Staf Admiral di Revel 

realized the importance of aircraft in naval war and directed the Navy General 

Staff to study and develop this element. Additional articles on the subject of 

naval operational art by then-Commander Bernotti appeared around this time, 

and some of them were translated into English and published in the u.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings. 10 

World War I 

The Italian Navy's situation before World War I, with its commitments to 

the defense of Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, appeared to be anything but 

easy. The opinion was that the navy was far from prepared to support Italian 

foreign policy. When hostilities broke out involving Austria, Italy's position 

was not initially clear. The navy began preparation to fight in the Adriatic. 

Training was intensified, the defense of ports increased. Light units prepared 

to sortie and plans for landings on the eastern Adriatic coast were reviewed. 

Landings on the coast in support of the Italian Army were intended to distract 

the Austrian forces from the northern theater. 

At the beginning of 1915 a sound plan for operations in the Adriatic was 

drawn up. It required Italy to maintain an offensive posture with its larger ships 

against a more prudent Austrian Navy, and asumed that the enemy would use 

mines and submarines. The Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary 

officially ended in May 1915. A new agreement between Italy and the Entente 

(France and the United Kingdom) was signed on 10 May 19 15, and Italy entered 

the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The combined naval asts of 

the Entente and Italy allowed them to dominate the Adriatic instead of just 

preventing Austrian transits through the Strait of Otranto. 

The contribution the Italian Navy gave to the war effort was important. The 

strategic objectives of the navy's employment were: 

• To cut off Austria from the rest of the world by interrupting its sea lines of 

communication. 

• To protect the maritime flow of friendly supplies to and from Albania and 

in the Mediterranean. 

• To prevent enemy naval operations along the coast. 

• To provide naval support in the Northern Adriatic to Italian land operations. 

Since the Adriatic is esntially a narrow gulf, clashes between large naval 

formations were unlikely and did not take place. During the Italian Army's 

withdrawal to the Piave River in December 1917, Lieutenant Commander Luigi 

1 10 
Donolo * Italy 

Rizzo sunk the Austrian battleship Wien inside the port of Trieste, using two 

motor torpedo boats. He pioneered a new form of attack in ports against major 

units that refused to fight at sea. 

Italian destroyers and motor torpedo boats struck against the Austrian fleet 

at Porto Buso, Trieste, Parenzo, Fasano, and Buccari. Asult teams attacked 

enemy naval forces twice at Pola. During the latter of these two actions the 

Austrian battleship Viribus Unitis was sunk by a slow-spe, two-seat, manned 

torpedo called a mignat. The Italian Navy also was instrumental in the 

withdrawal operation of about 1 12,00 soldiers of the Serbian Army and 10,00

 

horses from Vlore (in Albania) to CorfU (Gre

ce), and later the transportation 

of an allied expeditionary corps consisting of 97,00 men from Italian harbors 

to Vlore. 

A 66-kilometer-long antisubmarine barrier made of nets was laid down in 

the Strait of Otranto to prevent the transit of Austrian submarines to the 

Mediterranean. This measure was extremely effective and the Austrians tried 

to destroy the barrier. Initial Austrian attempts to break through the Otranto 

Strait barrier ended with a naval clash against Italian and Allied units based in 

Brindisi. The Italians used their motor torpedo boats effectively, hindering the 

Austrian effort. During a second attempt, on 10 June 1918, near the island of 

Premuda, the Austrian battleship Svent Iv stan was sunk by a motor torpedo boat 

from a section commanded by Lieutenant Commander Luigi Rizzo. Rizzo 

became a national hero, and this date was chosen as Italian Navy Day. 

The Italian Navy also gave a valuable contribution to the development of 

maritime aviation. In 1914 a special aviation organization operated at sea, and 

later, two seaplane support ships were built. During the war Italy used six 

hundred and fifty seaplanes and twelve airships for bombardment, aerial search, 

and blockade operations. The navy's aircraft were also used against ships, but 

with no significant results. 

During the First World War, Italian naval employment was tempered by a 

fear of risking their fleet on unfavorable terms against the Austro-Hungarian 

fleet.ll The navy developed an excellent doctrine for the use of their torpedo 

boats and achieved remarkable results at very low cost. The Italian Navy took 

no part in Allied convoy efforts and refused to put its fleet under a Mediterranean multinational command. It did, however, form combined units with the 

French. In the closing days of the war, Italian naval forces executed a succesful 

amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic. 

Now-Captain Bernotti continued his writings in Rivista Marittima during the 

war and his work was again translated into English and appeared in the u.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings.

12 

111 
The Newport Papers 

Interwar Years 

At the end of World War I, Italy, like many other nations, faced very difficult 

fmancial conditions. The difference between pre-war doctrine and on-the-field 

results was debated, and opinions fell initially into two main camps. One 

opinion was that the lesns of the jeune ecole had be

n validated by the war. 

Large capital ships had proven vulnerable to small vesls. Now-Admiral 

Bernotti accepted that Italy should take advantage of new technologies afforded 

by the [eune ecole and that fleet doctrine should be based upon a division of 

labor. 1 Bemotti wrote that war "had several fonns: guerrilla, military and 

commercial blockade, trop transport, coastal actions, combined operations 

with the Army." He also noted that during the past war, the main battle fleets 

had been almost inert, while escorts and submarines operated frely. The other 

school asrted that the mere presence of the armored battle squadrons as a 

deterrent to other main fleet units had allowed the smaller vesls more freedom 

of action. German Admiral Reinhardt Scheer's statement that .. the force of 

bigger armored ships was the handle of the dagger and the blade was the 

submarine force" was appreciated in Italy as well. 

Several Italian military experts supported the so-called "underwater revolution," which emphasized the role of submarines, considering them to be a 

decisive weapon. These experts were countered by others who believed that the 

submarines' succes in World War I was due to the lack of preparation of 

surface ships and their low speed. They also considered submarines to be 

unsuitable for night or defensive operations. 

Eventually two main theories emerged on the type of surface naval units to 

be built. One, which we will call the "naval tradition," supported the concept 

of a kernel of traditional warships with large caliber guns and robust self-·defenses. Despite their self-defense capabilities, additional antiair and antisubmarine 

protection would be provided by escort ships. The other theory, which may be 

called the "naval compromise," highlighted the role of quick, light, and heavily 

armed cruisers against primarily non-first-level navies. Their employment was, 

however, limited to offensive operations and required aircraft carriers for 

support. 

During this era, Commander Oscar di Giamberardino wrote extensively 

about these isues. Although di Giamberardino recognized the need to prepare 

for both offense and defense, he was primarily a supporter of the offensive 

form of warfare, i.e., destruction of the enemy fleet and forcing the enemy 

to fight in decisive combat. He recognized the usefulnes of a small fleet of 

asult vesls, such as in commando-type operations, but considered them 

1 12 
Donolo * Italy 

non-decisive. The most important of di Giamberardino's works was L 'arte 

della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) in 1937, in two volumes. Its 

theories influenced many politicians and military men, and di Giamberardino 

was eventually promoted to admiral. 

Even more influential were the writings of Commander Giuseppe Fioravanzo. 1n a 1925 article in Rivista Marittima, he postulated the need for what would 

eventually become command ships (LCC) in the u.S. Navy. Fioravanzo also 

wrote fA guerra sui mare e Ia guerra integrale (War on the Sea and War as a 

Whole), in two volumes (1930- 193 1). Fioravanzo examined the relationship 

between politics, strategy, and maritime power, and he became a supporter of 

the defensive form of warfare. He defmed the defensive in terms of an 

operational-level strategy used to protect the sea lines of communications by 

means of a navy employed on the tactical offensive. 

Fioravanzo felt that the most important characteristic of a military unit 

designed to operate in a relatively small sea, such as the Mediterranean, had to 

be invulnerability. On the other hand, the most important quality of forces 

designed to operate in the open oceans had to be autonomy. Fioravanzo's 

conclusion was that in narow-sea areas light cruiser types were the worst 

option, as they were "not small enough to be naturally immune, but not big 

enough to be artificially immunized." 

In 1922, Admiral Bemotti was asked to reestablish the Instituto di Guerra 

Marittima (Naval War College) in Livorno. He wrote a series of important 

boks, including Fondamenti di strategia navale (Fundamentals of Naval 

Strategy) and II potere marittimo nella grande guerra (Maritime Power in the 

Great War) in 1920; and fA guerra maritima (The Naval War): studio critico 

sull 'impiego dei mezzi nella guerra mondiale in 1923. Fondamenti di politica 

navale (Bases of Naval Politics) was published in 1927. 

In The Naval War, Bernotti discuss how the navy should be linked to 

politics, the general naval policies of various nations, the maritime character of 

the World War, and new strategic posibilities. He believed that sea lines of 

communication had to be defended with methods other than those used during 

World War I, and he advocated a mixed system of direct protection, including 

antisubmarine and antiair capabilities, and indirect protection. The latter was 

to be achieved by means of offensive actions against enemy forces in port and 

at sea. 

Bernotti shifted his favor to large warships, but he warned that the type of 

ships available in the late 1920s were no longer adequate and could create 

unrealistic illusions, hiding real and urgent problems. Admiral Bernotti supported the need for aircraft car

ers, recognizing that even ifItaly was in a central 

1 13 
'I'M Newport Papers 

position in the Mediterranean, "a naval force needing aircraft at any time had 

to include units capable of transporting a relevant number of aircraft." 

Bernotti rejected the construction of a ship-half as an aircraft carrier and 

half as a light cruiser-as a compromise solution to the need proposed at that 

time for naval air power. Admiral Bernotti's thoughts stimulated debates with 

the air force over the control of naval aviation and conflicted with the views of 

Admirals di Giamberardino, Angelo Iachino, and Virgilio Spigai, who were 

against the construction of aircraft carriers. In the end it was Fioravanzo's 

theory of defense that influenced the navy's leaders and resulted in the actual 

employment of the fleet during the next war. 

The theories of General Giulio Doubet received attention as well. Because 

airplanes appeared to be so capable, he ased that in future wars the greatest 

effort would be sustained in the air. Doubet's doctrine considered the sea to be 

just a space to be flown over. He suggested that the air force would lead 

offensive action, and that the navy and anny would intervene a posteriori to 

exploit the results of the air battle. In Doubet's opinion, cooperation between 

the armed forces was not neces, since the action carried out by "one head 

only" was better. Those who supported Doubet's air theories thought that a 

naval war could be won by aircraft alone. Air power advocates held the view 

that surface ships could not be defended succesfully from air attack. It would 

become evident that the sea allowed surprise air bombardment misions against 

land targets, and fleets would be unsafe when in port. 

In 1923, the Regia Aeronautica was established, and all the aircraft were put 

under the control of this new service. The consequences were that for many 

years air doctrine in support of maritime operations was inadequate, and the 

effectivenes of airborne asts in naval warfare was reduced, with grave 

consequences. 

Most Italian strategic decisions were made without consideration of the naval 

elements. This problem was typified by the experiences of war in Ethiopia 

(1935- 1936), which was fought to enlarge the empire, but without consideration of the increased vulnerability at sea. Italy now had to use the sea and was 

pitted against the strongest maritime nations of the world. Italy's succesful 

participation in the Spanish Civil War from 1936- 1939 created false illusions 

of Italian naval strength; success had actually resulted from the enemy's 

weaknes. 

Italian naval thought between the two world wars developed doctrine based 

on a strategy that called for little more than interference with a superior fleet or 

convoys in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was especially suited to light 

and swift forces built by Italy, which would quickly sortie from bases and strike 

1 14 
Donolo * Italy 

at a fleet offshore. The fleet would naturally retain a role for coastal defense. 

Another logical role for the Italian Navy was safeguarding the sea lines of 

communication to North Mrica. 

In 1940 Admiral Guido Po, historian of the navy, wrote La guerra sui mari 

(War at Sea), which stated that current Italian naval strategy was based on: 

• The offensive use of warships and extensive use of submarine packs. 

• The exploitation of Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean to 

disrupt the enemy's communication lines. 

• Seeking the maximum coperation with the Regia Aeronautica to overcome the lack of aircraft carriers. 

The Italian Navy did not completely follow this doctrine in the next war. 

Before World War II, Italian naval plans were to keep forces together to 

maximize combat effectivenes against the presumed enemy, France. Due to 

the preponderance of French naval power in the Mediterranean, Italian doctrine 

was defensive, consciously avoiding doctrine for distant operations or even 

guerre de course.

14 More difficult to understand was the lack of doctrinal 

development for counterblockade techniques, night operations, or even convoy 

defense. 

World War II 

Italian Navy units that fought during the war were conditioned by interwarera doctrine. For example. cruisers were capable of very high spe

, since 

spe

 rather than armor was believed to be the best weapon to use against 

numerically and technically superior navies. Despite doctrinal debates on the 

wlnerability of surface ships and the theories of air power, the navy entered 

the war without its own aviation forces, aircraft carriers, and many of the latest 

technical improvements that might have aided air defense. Night-fighting 

equipment and radar were not introduced into the fleet until after their lack was 

felt in actual combat. 

Pre-war doctrinal development and training proved to be inadequate. There 

was no doctrine for joint actions with the Regia Aeronautica. and insufficient 

attention had ben given to the management of maritime shipping and its 

protection, the doctrine for night fighting, and the role of aircraft in war at sea. 

The lack of aircraft carriers and inadequate cooperation by the Regia 

Aeronautica in maritime misions afflicted the navy throughout the war. 

Fascist government policy was ambitious, and it overestimated the level of 

military preparednes. The Italian military was told by Benito Muslini in 

March 1940 to plan for an air-naval offensive in the Mediterranean; a ground 

1 15 
The Newport Papers 

offensive in Yugoslavia, while the any maintained a defensive posture in 

Albania, Libya, and the Aegean; and a wait-and-se attitude on the French 

border. In April 1940, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Domenico 

Cavagnari, summarized the navy's key shortfalls to the head of the government. 

Cavagnari believed that the only posible strategy was defensive, but his 

recommendations were made to an Italian Supreme Command dominated by 

Muslini and the anny, neither of whom understood naval warfare. 

Concepts for initial operations in the Mediterranean were released by the 

Chief of Staff on 29 May 1940, about two weeks prior to Muslini's declaration of war. This initial guidance directed the navy to maintain a defensive 

attitude but to exploit opportunities for medium-sized clashes. The navy was to 

prepare to defend itself and act as a fleet-in-being. In fact, no decisive clash 

occurred during the war, although there was a series of minor engagements 

throughout. 

Muslini asumed that the resupply of Libya would not become an issue 

and mistakenly predicted a short war. Hence, more than two hundred ships of 

the merchant fleet were located and captured outside the Mediterranean at the 

beginning of hostilities. 

The command organization of the Italian forces included a Chief of General 

Staff and three high commands for each of the three anned forces. These high 

commands were headed by the respective service chiefs of staff. Strategic-level 

tasks were isued by the Chief of the General Staff. Centralized strategy and 

doctrine were oriented toward the centralization of responsibilities. Supermarina, the high command of the navy, converted these strategic-level directives into orders and forwarded them to subordinate naval commands. These 

Supennarina orders were very detailed, leaving little freedom of action to local 

commanders. The tactical commander was given only limited decision-making 

authority. 

After the brief conflict with France and the removal of the threat of the 

Toulon fleet (i.e., the French fleet}, the Italian Navy was tasked with interdicting 

British ships resupplying Malta and Alexandria; preventing the masing of the 

British fleet; and attacking the British in port. The navy was also told to protect 

Italian shipping going to North Africa. Due to the limited capacities of North 

African ports, the navy had to fonn numerous small convoys instead of a few 

big ones; more than 1,200 convoys were fonned in one thirty-six-month period. 

The need to protect its own convoys drained resources and limited the Italian 

fleet's freedom of action against the British. Navy tasking was eventually 

modified to require offensive operations in only the central Mediterranean. 

1 16 
Donolo * Italy 

Raids against British convoys to Malta produced a number of important 

clashes between the British and Italian fleets. is The most memorable are: Punta 

Stilo (9 July 1940); Cape Teulada (27 November 1942); Chanel of Sicily (10 

January 1942); Sydra (17 December 194 1); and operations "Mid-June" ( 12- 16 

June 1942) and "Mid-August" ( 1 1-14 August 1942). 

When Germany strongly suggested to Italy that it sortie a fleet to disrupt 

British sea lines of communication to North Mrica, the Italians complied. The 

resulting Battle of Cape Matapan (28 March 194 1) was an unequal match 

between the British (who had radar, air support, and "Ultra" cryptanalysis data) , 

and the Italians (who had none of these). 16 Admiral Angelo Iachino, Commander in Chief Afloat, paid heavily for his fleet's inability to fight at night and 

for its lack of proper weapons-a price that arose from the positions that he 

himself had adopted in programming debates prior to the war. Although the 

severe los suffered at Matapan are traditionally imputed to the lack of radar 

and suitable doctrine for night fighting, the lack of information and of a clearly 

stated mission are to blame as well. 

Both opponents used the strategy of attacking the enemy in port. The British 

used shipbome planes at Taranto ( 12 November 1940). The Italian Navy was 

succesful using asult vesls at Souda Bay (27 March 194 1), midget submarines at Alexandria ( 19 November 1941), and in later attacks at Gibraltar, 

Haifa, and Malta. Forces were trained during the 1930s for the now welldeveloped doctrine for raids by as

ult. During the war, Italy also employed 

naval forces outside of the Mediterranean. Italian Navy submarines operated in 

the mid-Atlantic during the war, and they achieved a high degree of combat 

succes, perhaps in excess of that of the average German V-boat. The German 

high command requested asistance for naval operations on the Black Sea 

against the Soviet Vnion and the Italian Navy obliged. Additional units fought 

against the Soviets on Lake Ladoga. 

By the end of 1942, the strategic conduct of war became solely defensive, 

but the effort to maintain the sea lines of communication with Tunisia continued. On 10 July 1943, the Allies landed in Sicily. As this phase of the war 

approached an end, Italy attempted to maintain what was left of its fleet for use 

in diplomatic negotiations. This decision disappointed many crews and commanders who wanted to prove their worth in combat. When the armistice was 

declared (8 September 1943), 65 percent of the remaining Italian fleet was 

moved to Malta in accordance with the orders of the new government; the rest 

were scuttled, disabled by the crews, or taken over by the Germans. 

War against Germany was declared by Italy on 13 October 1943. Its ships 

began to coperate with the Allies for escort operations, withdrawal of Italian 

1 17 
The Newport Papers 

soldiers from the Balkans, and for special misions. The San Marco Naval 

Infantry Regiment had an active role in the struggle for the liberation of the 

peninsula. Many cadets from the Naval Academy fought under the command 

of the Italian Corps of Liberation. 

Not everyone had originally supported Italy's 1940 entry into the war, but 

everyone in the navy did his job, nonetheles, even when all was lost. On 8 

September 1943, each individual had the opportunity to choose on which side 

to fight. Some went with the ships to Malta, and some decided to stay or to 

move to the North because they believed their duty was to continue the war 

supporting the Gennans. Such complications for naval personnel, rare in many 

navies, appear to be frequent in the history of Italy. 

There have ben many asments of Italy's perfonnance during the war. 

According to Admiral Iachino, commander of naval forces from 1940 to 1943, 

Italy found itself fighting a modem war with an obsolete naval organization. I? 

In 1956, retired Admiral Bernotti clearly and concisely evaluated Italian 

naval perfonnance in the Second World War in 1 principi della guerra nel 

secondo conflitto mondiale (The Principles of War in the Second World War). 

He affmned that the lessons learned from history emphasized that war presupposes risk and that the neces

 aggresive attitude consists of both the will 

and the capability to act. In Bernotti's opinion, the policy of avoiding battle 

with superior forces Was flawed. Bemotti also argued that centralized commands should not expect automatic and pas

ive obedience to orders but should 

encourage initiative and ingenuity by subordinates in combat. 

Italian naval doctrine in World War II can also be criticized because it did 

not acknowledge that when a defensive posture is applied, it must be pursued 

to the end. Cooperation between the anned forces Was not efficient, due to the 

absence of joint doctrine. Furthennore, doctrine did not provide for an asment of risk that considered the advantages that can be gained even from lost 

battles when the behavior of the forces has ben admirable. The gallant behavior 

of officers and crews, even in defeat, must be mentioned because it led directly 

to some of the Italian succes. 

Italian Navy doctrine in World War II was probably proper for the conditions 

at the time. The problems that beset the fleet were beyond the navy's ability to 

correct. Given the resources provided, the overall strategy of the war effort, 

individual service and overall strategic culture, geography and demographics, 

and the type of government, the Italian Navy performed about as well as could 

be expected. Italy had ben a unified nation for about only a hundred years, and 

its navy's performance against the Royal Navy during the war, despite serious 

handicaps, speaks well of its combat effectivenes. 18 

118 
Donato * Italy 

After World War IT 

At the end of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s, the tasks of the 

navy were defmed as .. the defense of the Adriatic and Ionian maritime fronts 

against Yugoslavia." Italy's naval role changed over the years as it adhered to 

the North Atlantic Treaty, the European Economic Community, and the 

Western European Union, and due to its strategic position in the Mediterranean. 

Italy became the link between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. 

Although Italy had become a medium-sized power, it had first-clas responsibilities and duties. 

NATO's southern flank was generally considered les vulnerable to direct 

Soviet aggression, but the likelihood of an air-naval threat in the Mediterranean 

placed a great deal of responsibility on the Italian Navy and imposed the need 

for adequate numerical and qualitative strength. When Italy first joined NATO, 

its tasks were .. the protection of merchant and military shipping, coastal 

defense, and mine countermeasures operations." Over time, the navy's main 

tasks shifted to providing support to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, contributing to the 

maintenance of sea control and to the protection of the sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean. 

The General Staff of the Navy published a white paper in 1973 entitled 

Prospettive e orientamenti di massima della Marina Militare per il periodo 

1 974-1984 (Principal Perspectives and Orientations for the Military Navy in 

the Period 1974- 1984). The white paper defmed the navy's misions and tasks: 

• A credible and continuous presence. 

• The protection of trade. 

• Offensive operations wherever required. 

• The direct and indirect participation in the protection of the allied naval 

deterrent. 

• Limited-scope immediate reaction with amphibious forces. 

It further outlined fleet improvements that would be required if the navy were 

to be expected to carry out autonomous missions. This document was very 

important because it represented the first exhaustive official statement on the 

naval situation since the end of World War II. 

In the post-World War II period, most commentary on the navy derived from 

unofficial sources. The lack of forceful personalities able to express their ideas 

on naval policy and doctrine was felt strongly. Old writers like Admirals 

Bernotti, Fioravanzo, and di Giamberardino continued to expres ideas based 

on their experiences in war and how they applied in the new international 

situation. 

1 19 
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Admiral di Giamberardino wrote a short piece entitled Il prossimo eonfUtto mondiale (The Next World Conflict) in 1 947. He also updated his 

classic L 'arte della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) . In the revised 

version, di Giamberardino stated that "doctrinal preparation in the world war 

turned out to be in part erroneous and lacking." He explored the relations 

between politics and the art of war, and defmed the way in which strategic 

maneuver and the employment criteria for naval air forces should be conceived. 

Admiral Bemotti retired in 1 940 but continued to write on tactics and 

doctrine for many years. His later works included 1A Guerra sui mari 1939-

1941 (The War at Sea 1939- 1941) in 1947. He published several articles 

defming a new naval strategy for the Mediterranean and supported emerging 

NATO strategies. In 1956, Admiral Bemotti wrote a fmal piece for the U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings in which he attacked the fonner fascist regime in 

Italy during World War 11. 1

9 This article criticizes the Regia Aeronautica for 

its overly optimistic claims and overriding influence. Bemotti's Cinquanta anni 

nella marina militare (Fifty Years in the Military Navy), in 1971, was extremely 

well received. 

In 1 956 Admiral Fioravanzo wrote the Storia del pensiero tameo navale (A 

History of Naval Tactical Thought) in which he discussed the appropriate 

doctrine for the new international situation in which the use of nuclear 

weapons was possible. The bok is a concise work that summarizes naval 

tactics, tactical concepts (doctrine) , and provides illustrative battles in the 

age of oared ships, the age of sail, the age of the screw propeller, and the 

age of naval aviation. It was translated into English and published by the 

U.S. Naval Institute in 1 979.

21 

Fioravanzo also wrote that the disanament policies of the interwar years 

stimulated scholars and engineers to fmd legal technological improvements to 

warships, resulting primarily in increased spe and weaponry. Because of the 

inevitable security leaks and the resulting exchange of infonnation on technological progres

, retaining superiority in any one area became imposible. 

Fioravanzo advocated a compromise between spe, weaponry, and armor. 

Admiral Fioravanzo co-authored The Italian Navy in World War II, which was 

published in 1957 by the U.S. Naval Institute. 

Another post-war author was Admiral Virgilio Spigai, who became Chief 

of Staff of the Navy in 1 968 . Spigai documented the Italian Navy's 

shortcomings in relation to its tasks in Il problema navale Italiano (The 

Italian Naval Problem) , in 1 963 . He always worked to have the navy's 

problems expressed in terms of the broader issues of global naval strategy 

1 20 
Donolo * Italy 

and developments. Spigai dedicated himself to convincing the politicians that 

Italy, a nation that was deeply involved with the sea for its economy and 

security, needed a strong navy. 

Other writers, many of whom were civilians, wrote also on naval matters, 

but their approach was more historical than doctrinal. These writers included 

Commander Marc'Antonio Bragadin, Admiral Angelo Iachino, Mr. Franco 

Micali Baratelli, Professor Virgilio Ilarl, Profesr Alberto Santoni, Dr. Giorgio 

Giorgerini, Commander Ezio Ferrante, Professor Carlo Maria Santoro, and 

many others. 

Italy, according to the current Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Angelo 

Mariani, will be called to a more active participation in international affairs and 

must reconsider the relationships between foreign policy and military 

capabilities. Italian Navy units have contributed to multinational operations in 

Lebanon (1981-1984), the Persian Gulf ( 1987-1991), Somalia (1992- 1994), 

and the Adriatic ( 1992-ongoing). 

Even if it will maintain a limited numerical level, the Italian "naval 

instrument" must be able to support a maritime-oriented policy no longer 

dedicated to the defense of the national boundaries. According to this vision, 

Sir Julian Corbett's joint strategic concept is considered more important than 

the one, typically naval, expressed by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. 

O

ne of the most important outcomes of this research is the conclusion that 

rmding a word that equals the term doctrine in other countries is very 

difficult. When looking for parallels, it is necesry to explore the full range of 

posible topics that are sometimes referred to as strategy, operational art, tactics, 

military art, and naval art and science, etc. Whereas in the U.S., doctrine is 

generally considered guidance, in many other nations doctrine is more directive 

in nature. Hence, there are problems in rmding parallel meanings. These 

problems must be overcome before any meaningful discus

ions on doctrine can 

take place. 

Second, because the doctrine of many navies was not written, in order to 

uncover past doctrine, it is necessary to ascertain behavior by reviewing navy 

and military history. This does not mean that doctrine did not exist-on the 

contrary, naval doctrine always existed but not necesrily in the form most 

recognizable by those more familiar with land armies. 

Third, the difficulties in building a true national Italian Navy doctrine can 

be compared to curnt efforts to build multinational navy doctrine. Italy 

attempted to integrate a number of national fleets and found that integrating the 

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The Newport Papers 

traditions and doctrines of the Sardinian and Neapolitan navies appeared to be 

the best solution. 

Next, it sems that the influence of doctrine in foreign navies was strong in 

the case ofltaly. Similarly, there has ben a great deal of interest in Italian naval 

doctrine in the United States-evidenced by the frequent translation of many 

important theoretical works by the U.S. Naval Institute. All of these theoretical 

works that were translated were written by serving or retired uniformed officers. 

Apparently, in Italy, writing theoretical works on naval warfare is not an 

impediment to promotion. Civilians do not appear to have had nearly the impact 

that they do in other nations. 

Fifth, there appears to have ben a great deal of doctrinal inovation in the 

Italian Navy. Whereas in other navies, the age of sail shifted emphasis from the 

improvement of combat capability to the procurement of new hardware, the 

Italian Navy has a tradition of continuing to look for improvements to combat 

potential by attempting to fight better with the technologies that have ben made 

available. 

Sixth, the Italian case study is important because there is no tradition of 

superpower status for unified Italy. France, Spain, and Britain all enjoyed 

superpower status at one time, whereas modem Italy has only attempted to be 

a dominant regional power. Hence, the Italian Navy is an excellent case study 

for the concept of a medium-power navy. Medium power does not mean les 

than first clas, rather it only refers to the desire to "tty to create and keep under 

national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions 

whose outcomes will be the preservation of its vital interests ... 21 Italy's naval 

strategies, art, doctrine, etc., appear to have ben in conformance with its 

national self-identity. 

Finally, Italy has a strong tradition in the analysis of past wars and lesns 

learned. Needles to say, although the navy may have learned the proper 

lesns, they do not appear to have discovered the "magic elixir" to explain 

those lesons to politicians who are unfamiliar with the sea environment. 

122 
Donolo * Italy 

Notes 

1. Gunther E. Rotherberg, "Maurice of Nasu, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo 

Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century, " in Makers of 

Modem Strategy: From Machiavelli to tht Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton 

University Press, 1 986), pp. 5�3. 

2. Luigi Fincati, (Admiral, ITN), Military Aphorisms (Rome: Tipografia del Senato di 

Forzani e C., 1 882), p. 14. 

3. Giuseppe Fioravanzo (Admiral of the Fleet of the Italian Navy, Retired), A History 

of Naval Tactical Thought (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Pres, 1 979), p. 3. [original 

manuscript prepared in 1 956]. 

4. S. S. Robison (Rear Admiral, USN, Retired), A History of Naval Tacticsfrom 1 530 to 

1 930 (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1942), pp. 1 0-1t. 

5. Clark Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires 

(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), p. 1 37. 

6. Fioravanzo, p. 1 36. 

7. Domenico Bonarnico (Commander, ITN), "Mahan e Callwell," appearing in several 

issues of Rivista Marittima between 1 897-1 898. 

8. Robison, p. 807. 

9. Romeo Bernotti (Commander, ITN) The Fundamentals of Naval Tactics, trans. 

Lieutenant H.P. Mc intosh, USN (Retired) (Annapolis, Md. : U.S. Naval Institute, 1912). 

This book initialy appeared in English as four separate articles in the U.S. Naval Institute 

ProCl!edings in late 191 1 and early 1912. 

1 0. Romeo Bernotti (Commander, ITN), "Concentration of Fire and the Numerical 

Strength of a Division," trans. Lieutenant Gunior grade) e .C. Gill, USN and Dr. Allan F. 

Westcott, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, no. I SO, 1914, pp. 403-12. 

11. John Gooch, "Italy during the First World War," Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The 

First World War, Alan R. Milet and Wilamson Murray, eds. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for 

the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1 988), pp. 1 57-89. 

12. Romeo Bernotti (Capitano di Fregata, ITN), "Forecasts and Reality in the Naval 

War," trans. Dr. Alan F. Westcott, Proceedings, February 1918, pp. 31 7-29. 

13. Romeo Bernotti (Admiral, ITN), LJ guerra marittima (The Naval War) : studio critico 

sull'impiego dei mezzi nella guerra mondiale (Florence: Editoris Carpigiani Zipoli, 1 923), p. 24, 

cited in Herve Coutau-Begarie, "Reflexions sur l'ecole fran�aise de strategie navale," in 

L'evolution de la pensee navale [I}, Herve Coutau-Begarie, ed. (paris: Fondation pour les Etudes 

de Defense Nationale [FEDN], 1 990) , p. 46. 

1 4. Marc'Antonio Bragadin (Commander. ITN), The Italian Navy in World War II, trans. 

Gale Hoflinan (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute. 1 957), p. 7. 

15. Eric Grove, "Malta Striking Forces." and "Sirte," Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 

2, vol. 2 (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 53-74 and 98-1 15; and James 

Sadkovich. The Italian Navy in World War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994) . 

16. Wil Koenig, "Matapan," Epic Sea Battles, S.L. Mayer, ed. (Secaucus, NJ.: Chartwell 

Books, Inc., 1975), pp. 182-97; and Martin Stephen, "The Battle of Matapan." Sea Battles in 

Close-up: World War 2, Eric Grove. ed (Anapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Pres. 1991 ), pp. 48-69. 

17. Angelo Iachino (Admiral. ITN). Tramonto di una grande mariIUJ (The Decline of a 

Great Navy) (Milan, Italy: I Record di Mondadori. 1 959), p. 92. 

18. Sadkovich, pp. xvi-xvii, 349. 

1 9. Romeo Bernotti (Admiral, ITN, Retired), "Italian Naval Policy under Fascism." 

Proceedings, July 1 956, pp. 722-3t . 

20. See Fioravanzo. 

21 . JR. Hill (Rear Admiral, RN. Retired), Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 986) , p. 31 . 

The views expressed are those of the author. The author would like to acknowledge the 

assistance of Commander Fernando Cerutti, Italian Navy, and the preparation of additional 

materials edited by Dr. James J Tritten of the Naval Doctrine Command. 

"Revolutions in Military Af

airs," 

Paradigm Shifts, and Doctrine 

James J. Tritten 

THE u.s. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS established the Naval Doctrine 

Command, which is charged with the preparation of multiservice naval 

doctrine, navy service-unique doctrine, and multiservice input to joint and 

multinational doctrine. As part of that process, new concepts for the use of na val 

power are being addressed in the context of what many claim to be an ongoing 

"revolution in military affairs" today. 

This paper describes the role that military-including naval-doctrine could 

play in such a revolution in military affairs and asociated paradigm shifts. It 

also looks at lessons from historical shifts in past paradigms and "revolutions 

in military affairs." This study suggests that we need a theory of "revolutions 

in military affairs" and paradigm shifts. The military today is being asked to 

embrace a new revolution in military affairs, or at least a new paradigm of 

warfare, and cannot do so without understanding how major changes in warfare 

occur. It is also suggested here that "maneuver" warfare is a new paradigm that 

needs to be managed once we have developed appropriate theory. This essay 

is intended to be suggestive rather than prescriptive, but it questions the basic 

as

umption that technology leads doctrine in a "revolution in military affairs." 

Revolutions in Military Affairs 

A revolution in military affairs is a fundamental shift in military strategy, 

doctrine, and tactics, which occurs generally, but not always, because of a 

change in technology. With a revolution in military affairs comes the need to 

reconsider all existing military theory and a transition to a new process of 

warfare. New types of military formations have caused new types of military 

organizations, tactics, doctrine, and military strategy. Heavily armored, 

mounted knights disappeared from the battlefield as a new branch of trops and 

artillery appeared. This kind of example is common in history. 

At sea, the introduction of firearms resulted in a fundamental shift in the form 

of combat, from raming, boarding, and hand-to-hand fighting as the decisive 
The Newport Papers 

form, to that of stand-off destruction by artillery. This shift from close to distant 

combat was not well recognized initially. During the defeat of the Spanish 

Anada (1588), the Spanish concept of combat operations remained a close-in 

battle by boarding enemy ships in a general milie. The English recognized the 

Spanish sailing skills, numbers, and close-in tactical abilities and kept their 

distance, using long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the Anada. 

The introduction of artillery on warships changed both the design of ships 

and how they would be used in battle. Eventually navies learned how to mas 

their firepower in the maritime battle space and introduced the line of battlesimilar to lines of battle found ashore. Today we still see surface ships using 

firepower to engage distant opponents, although with new technologies and 

without formal lines of battle. 

The shift of paradigms to distant battle with artillery did not occur overnight. 

Boarding and hand-to-hand combat, which were initially considered a complement to artillery, lasted for many years. Although boarding and hand-to-hand 

combat may occur ocionally today, they will never again determine the 

outcome of a fleet engagement. Ramg also died out, although it resurfaced 

for a short time following its success at the Battle of Lis

 (1 866). 

The subsequent development of rifled firearms and machine guns contributed to a new revolution in military affairs ashore-the demise of lines of 

battle in ground warfare and their replacement by the infantry skinh and 

forms of maneuver warfare. The new weaponry increased the spatial and 

temporal scope of combat, requiring better logistics support and planning. 

Imperial Germany attempted to master this new revolution in military affairs 

with its domination of Europe via the Schlieffen plan and short wars with quick 

decisive battles. Rather than a quick war of anlation, however, Germany 

fought an extended war of attrition from 1914 to 1918. 

At sea, the introduction of rifled artillery, steam propUlsion, annor, and 

modem communications systems all contributed to new combat uses for the 

fleet-but they did not constitute a revolution in military affairs. New forms of 

warships appeared that had combat potential far exceeding their nominal 

tonnage-giving rise to the French jeu� ecole (new school) theory of less 

capable forces. New designs of ships, such as HMS Dreadnought, could make 

entire national fleets obsolete. Steam power and radio allowed many ships to 

asmble temporarily for decisive engagements. Navies were les at the mercy 

of the wind and could steam more autonomously to meet temporal commitments. Also, steam-powered transportation could affect the maneuver of 

strategic-level formations of ground forces. 1 

126 
Trinen * Revolutions 

Navies, however, despite all the infusion of technology, thought they were 

still about "slugging it out" with an enemy line of battle in artillery duels. The 

battle of Jutland (1916) became the model to be studied at naval war colleges 

throughout the interwar years, because fundamentally war at sea semed not to 

have changed. Therefore, for every revolution in military affairs ashore, there 

is not necessarily a parallel at sea. 

The marriage of airplanes, tanks, and mobile artillery gave rise to another 

shore-based revolution in military affairs. The blitzkrieg, a form of maneuver 

warfare that doomed positional warfare, gave rise to the theory that rapid 

annihilation warfare could again be practiced ashore. Although Nazi Germany 

succeeded initially, and in many cases continued to do so at the operational and 

tactical levels of warfare throughout the war, Germany was unable to win an 

extended war of attrition. 

By the end of World War n, allied military forces were engaged in multiple, 

simultaneous, strategic-level combat actions in more than one theater of a global 

war. One of the most successful examples of blitzkrieg was the August 1945 

Soviet Manchurian Campaign of anlation, which achieved the unheard of 

sustained rate of advance of up to fifty kilometers a day, and on individual days 

between ninety and one hundred kilometers a day.

2 This campaign became a 

model for the type of maneuver blitzkrieg warfare that the West anticipated 

would be waged by the Warsaw Pact against NATO. 

At sea, there was a revolution in military affairs that paralleled, although not 

exactly, the blitzkrieg. The development comparable to the blitzkrieg was the 

mobile fast carrier task force and its accompanying logistics train. Such forces 

were able to roam the oceans, virtually at will, in search of enemy battle fleets 

that could be engaged at vast distances from one's own fleet. Alternatively, 

naval task groups could be formed to attack enemy shore installations, using 

their own form of maneuver warfare which bypassed strong points. The battle 

line, with surface ships "slugging it out," fmally died at Surigao Strait during 

the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1 944), and naval artillery generally yielded 

to the airplane and the missile. Naval warfare had fmally changed from the basic 

battle line artillery duel to a more complex form of combined arms warfare. 

The most recent revolution in military affairs occurred when nuclear 

warheads were married to intercontinental delivery systems. Due to the masive 

accumulation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s, the main and decisive 

arm of warfare shifted from ground forces to nuclear forces. In the U.S., 

the Eisenhower administration used the arrival of nuclear weapons as 

justification for the "New Lo

k" -a masive downsizing of conventional warfighting capabilities. Similarly, NATO chose not to field a credible conventional 

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warfighting force capable of defeating the Warsaw Pact, opting instead to use 

nuclear weapons as a substitute. 

The postwar revolution in military affairs also caused nations to revaluate 

military theory. Some theorists said that nuclear warfare could not posibly be 

war in the Clausewitzian sense-there could never be a political purpose to it. 

Others questioned the need for war termination strategy, since nuclear warfare 

would be ir

tional and therefore devoid of theory. Many disagre and argued 

that all wars in the future between nuclear powers would automatically be 

nuclear wars. Hence, policies, strategy, and doctrine were required for the 

continued deterrence of nuclear weapons during the initial conventional phase 

of future war. 

A tremendous amount of literature was generated in the former Soviet Union 

over the concept of a revolution in military affairs, which had occurred at the 

end of World War n. Their army was large and needed to be modified 

significantly to fight under the new technological conditions. In 1946, for 

example, there were still over one million horses in the Soviet armed forces. 

The term "revolution in military affairs" was selected as a Communist Party 

slogan that would explain the changes in warfare that would be required in the 

nuclear age.3 A series of pamphlets was prepared by the Soviet armed forces 

from the 1960s into the 1980s to explain how the revolution in military affairs 

affected each branch of service and combat arms. 

In addition to the nuclear revolution in military afairs, the Soviet military 

argued that there was an on-going fmal stage of the latest "revolution in military 

affairs," which was being caused by the introduction of radio-electronics and 

cybernetics. During their last years, the military of the USSR worried that 

advancements in technology would permit conventional ordnance to perform 

tasks asigned previously to nuclear weapons, resulting in a new revolution in 

military affairs. 

There has been substantial discusion recently over a revolution in military 

affairs, with emphasis on the technical aspects of it.4 For example, a shift in 

paradigms ocur with the introduction of stealth technology into the air 

combat environment. Stealth allowed a shift from active to pasive defense of 

individual aircraft. Due to increased costs and fewer platforms, stealth drove 

the need for even greater precision in delivered ordnance. With the capability 

to deliver conventional ordnance safely and with increasing accuracy, we might 

be able to usher in a counter-revolution in military affairs, whereby nuclear 

weapons could be replaced with modern conventional ordnance, some of which 

could be delivered via unmaned systems. Such capabilities could result in 

128 
Tritten * Revolutions 

major shifts in doctrine, drastic shifts in military organizational development, 

and parallel shifts in programmatics. 

The Basic Model of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" 

The general, or basic, model for the "revolution" is that new technological 

opportunities must parallel organizational and doctrinal development. One 

common approach in the thinking is for industry, or the research community, 

to present new technological opportunities to the military, who will then 

consider development of new capabilities and a doctrine for their employment. S 

From these technological opportunities, major shifts have occurred in the very 

nature and theory of warfare, requiring new strategy, doctrine, and tactics. 

An example of technology that led a paradigm shift and a revolution in 

military affairs was the introduction of artillery at sea. Naval artillery changed 

the fundamental nature of war at sea from close to distant battle. Eventually 

profesional navies were needed to master its potential, which resulted in the 

demise of the privateer. The end of privateering and the dual use of commercial 

ships as warships was a major paradigm shift for naval warfare.6 All of these 

events were caused by the opportunities that technology afforded. 

Revolutions in military affairs usually cause changes in a military organization. In antiquity, the basic branches of combat forces included the infantry, 

chariot troops, elephant trops, and cavalry.7 The infantry eventually learned 

how to defeat chariots and elephant trops, and these exotic formations disappeared from armies. Cavalry, although not as numerous as infantry, was the 

decisive branch. With time, cavalry became a supporting arm, eventually being 

replaced by new trops-armor. Further, the marriage of tanks, aviation, and 

mobile infantry led to other types of ground force units being formed which 

capitalized on the doctrine of blitz./crieg warfare.8 We now have mechanized 

infantry and aircraft in close support of armor. 

As mariners mastered the revolution in military affairs that added artillery 

to ancient sail, navies were able to take on other misions, and fleets were son 

reorganized accordingly under national command and controt.9 Parts of fleets 

remained subordinate to the desires of European ground force commanders in 

need of support on their maritime flanks. Other naval forces, including ground 

forces, were organized into distant-water expeditionary forces. Some units were 

dedicated to the interdiction of the sea lines of comunication and others for 

the protection of the sea lines. Main battle fleets were retained to deal with their 

enemy counterparts. 

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With the introduction of long-range ballistic misiles and nuclear weapons, 

some nations fonned new and independent military services to field these 

weapons. Where new services were not created, the operational chain of 

command for nuclear weapons release was distinct and separate from that of 

conventional warfighting, and new clas

 of weapon systems were produced 

to car

 the new weapons. For the first time, navies were capable of direct attack 

on the centers of gravity of continental powers and determining decisively the 

outcome of a global war. 

Inadequate Doctrinal Development Can Stifle A 

"Revolution in Military Affairs" 

Case studies demonstrate that many opportunities for a revolution in military 

affairs have ben lost when technologies were available but military doctrinal 

development lagged behind. This suggests a rather strong relationship between 

the need for both technology and parallel doctrine development. For example, 

we have the case of the French Anny failing to adapt to the Belgian-invented 

and French-developed Montigny mitrailleuse (machine gun), first introduced 

during the Franco-Prusian War of 1 870- 1 87 1 .10 Although the mitrailleuse 

increased the effective firepower on the battlefield by an order of magnitude 

and might have swung the war in favor of France, its introduction during this 

war failed to tum the tide because its initial operational employment was judged 

ineffective. II On the other hand, the machine gun was rapidly asimilated into 

the Gennan and Rusian ground forces, and it was the Gennans who developed 

new and successful military doctrine by capitalizing on the technological 

opportunities presented by the gun. 

The blending of the tank, aircraft, mobile artillery, and the radio into a 

powerful tool for "maneuver" blitzkrieg warfare-or the fast carer task force 

counterpart at sea-is a similar story. Yet it was not the individual technological 

opportunities afforded by any one specific weapon system that constituted a 

revolution in military affairs; the revolution in military affairs occurred when 

someone put together all of the pieces. Synthesis of how to use individual 

components occurred during doctrinal development. 

Paradigm Shifts 

There have also ben les dramatic but nonetheles significant examples of 

major changes in warfare that do not meet the full criteria of a revolution in 

1 30 
Tritten * Revolutions 

military af

airs. These major changes in how we go to war are described more 

correctly as paradigm shifts and will be considered next. For the purposes of 

this paper, a paradigm shift is an important change in military policy, programmatics, strategy, doctrine, or tactics, which is important but does not fundamentally alter the nature of warfare. 

Some examples of paradigm shifts are related to a concurrent revolution in 

military affairs. For example, with the advent of modem aircraft with extremely 

accurate delivery systems, air forces no longer needed the capability or doctrine 

for mas bomber formations attacking enemy cities as was done in World 

War n. This paradigm shift in strategic bombardment was not significant 

enough to be a revolution in military affairs, but it nonetheless was important. 

The bomber paradigm shift was due both to improved conventional delivery 

systems-creating the capability for precision strikes by single aircraft-and 

the understanding that strategic bombing would be carried out using nuclear 

weapons that did not need to be delivered so accurately. 

With the nuclear revolution in military afairs, some nations chose to forgo 

the manned bomber altogether and to rely instead on new long-range missile 

systems. Forgoing manned bombers required new strategic-level doctrine for 

the completion of strategic-level tasks. This paradigm shift was the result of 

both the nuclear revolution in military affairs and the qualitative improvements 

in antiaircraft defenses. 

Nuclear propUlsion, a by-product of the nuclear revolution in military affairs, 

resulted in new opportunities for endurance and stealth, making it posible for 

submarines to deploy long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. In tum, this 

resulted in a major paradigm shift whereby navies were able to influence 

directly the outcome of general wars through strikes and the threat of strikes by 

the decisive weapons of war. 

The nuclear revolution in military affairs spawned other shifts in existing 

paradigms, such as how best to defend Europe, achieve strategic objectives 

against distant centers of gravity, and fight tactical engagements at sea. The 

Soviet Union, and subsequently NATO, considered the nuclear revolution in 

military affairs so succesful that it permitted the attainment of strategic tasks 

at a fraction of the previous cost-maximizing the benefit-cost ratio. Benefit 

and cost analysis dominated Western programg during the Cold War. Along 

with the multitude of fundamental changes caused by the end of the Cold War 

was yet another that made affordability as important as military capability. 

Yet nations that faced severe budgetary restrictions have managed to be 

innovative and produce prototypes of new and sophisticated hardware-interwar Germany being the clas

ic case in point. Doctrinal and technological 

131 
The Newport Papers 

inovation continued in the U.S. even during the Great Depresion. In other 

words, affordability need not stifle creativity. There is no reason that efforts to 

increase efficiency cannot be part of a current revolution in military affairs or 

a paradigm shift undertaken during time of severe fiscal austerity. 

Other major postwar paradigm shifts, such as the mas introduction of the 

jet engine into air forces, were not necesly by-products of the nuclear 

"revolution in military affairs" and are not sufficiently significant to constitute 

their own "revolution in military affairs." For example, the jet engine resulted 

in increased aircraft spe requiring reduction in decision time for the man-inthe-loop. This paradigm shift has had an enormous impact on aviation, but is 

insufficient to be termed a "revolution in military affairs." 

Recent Naval Paradigm Shifts 

With the end of the Cold War and asiated reductions in military expenditures has come a shift in the paradigm of fleet versus fleet being replaced by 

fleet versus shore. The most important mes

ge contained in ..... From the Sea" 

was that the U.S. Navy is now focused on naval operations in the context of a 

joint task force involved in a major regional contingency rather than as a 

semi-independent force engaged in global conventional war. 12 With this 

paradigm shift, the Navy moved its focus from fleet engagements to power 

projection ashore, and the Naval Doctrine Command was founded to explore 

fully the implications of this move. 

In 1994 the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published their initial centralized 

multiservice doctrinal publication, Naval Waifare, NDP- IP This document 

serves as an overview and introduction to the more substantive follow-on 

doctrinal pUblications that addres naval intelligence, operations, logistics, 

planning, and command and control. Of note is the naval services' embrace of 

the thre levels of warfare, the concepts of center of gravity and critical 

vulnerability, and the principles of war-none of which are doctrine, but all of 

which are major statements of policy. 

The doctrine in Naval Waifare establishes that naval forces will be organized 

by task and will favor offensive and maneuver warfare. The document reviews 

the historical and curnt roles, misions, and functions of the naval services 

and highlights inherent operational capabilities emphasized under current conditions. Naval Waifare also commits the naval services to full partnership in 

joint and multinational operations. This commitment to jointnes and multinational operations is another example of a major paradigm shift. 

1 32 
Tritten * Revolutions 

Likewise, the fundamental consideration in procurement has been 

revolutionized. When the new attack submarine was first developed as an 

alternative to the SeawoifSSN 2 1, program

atic directives made it clear that 

capability was important, but cost was more important. Similarly, naval 

aviation's stealth aircraft was doomed, in part, by the budget cutter's ax because 

of this new paradigm, regardles of the capability that the A- 12 would have 

brought to the fleet. This consideration is now paramount. and the Clinton 

administration has made it clear that we need to fre resources if we are to build 

the "next Navy.,,

14 

Problems with the Existing Model of 

"Revolutions in Military Affairs" 

Examination of historical examples suggests that the model of technology 

leading a revolution in military affairs is inadequate. In some cases, a new 

technology has not ben recognized immediately as having caused a revolution 

in military affairs or given rise to the need for new doctrine. The failure of 

cavalry and infantry to adapt to the firearm during the Renaissance is perhaps 

the clasic case in point.1.5 The firearm was not initially recognized as having 

caused a revolution in military affairs; it took about four centuries for these 

weapons to become so perfected that the transformation was complete. 16 

During the Middle Ages, foot soldiers gradually lost their ability to fight as 

cohesive units and were upstaged by men on horseback. The Swis Confederation discovered, however, that infantry could counter the men on horseback by 

improving tactical formations alone. In short, a doctrinal solution was found to 

counter the threat of the mounted knight. 

The knight was countered by infantry squares, resembling the old 

Macedonian phalanx, armed with an equally old technology-very long pikes 

or spears-which permitted the foot soldier to withstand the charge of a 

mounted horse. Having ben kept at bay, the horse was attacked with hand 

weapons, resulting in the dismounting of the knight who then lay helpless on 

the ground. 17 These changes in tactical doctrine unseated the knight, although 

this les

n has ben lost and folklore persists that the demise of the man on 

horseback was due to the invention of the ftrean. 

A lesn learned from studying the age of knights is that improved military 

doctrine does not necesrily need to have a technological push-pull. Combat 

potential can be improved by perfecting how to fight with existing, or even 

antiquated, skills and procedures. Eventually, however, the scope of the 

1 33 
The Newport Papers 

flrearm's capabilities came to be understood, and the fundamental nature of 

warfare changed, resulting in a revolution in military affairs. 

Paradigm shifts, however, do not necesly have to result from technologies developed at that time-the knight was defeated by the infantry's use 

of old techniques and weaponry. Similarly, it was the use of unsophisticated 

contact mines that caused the u.S. Navy to focus again on mine warfare-a 

paradigm shift for the U.S. Navy to again be seriously concerned with a les

er 

technological threat. And the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) explored the 

use of optical sighting of incoming delivery systems. 

Are there other capabilities and mature technologies that could be resurrected 

and used in modem warfare? Might not some of these "obsolete" methods of 

warfare result in a new revolution in military afairs? If the threat from non-state 

armed groups continues to develop, what good will existing theories of warfare 

be? Is this not a revolution in military affairs? 

Even if one were to accept the leading role of technology in a revolution in 

military affairs, emerging technologies do not necessarily need to be developed 

from independent original research funded by every service. The Navy and 

Marine Corps can and should borrow liberally from technologies developed by 

others, such as those developed by one combat arm for use by another-or 

borrowed by one nation from another. All services should look at doctrine 

developed by other types of forces for similar problems. Advocates of a current 

revolution in military affairs appear to suggest major new research programs, 

even though existing knowledge might be sufflcient if applied in an inovative 

maner. 

For example, modem stealth bomber doctrine could capitalize on the 

doctrine for the employment of equally covert submarines searching for and 

attacking important defended targets. Similarly, modem submarines plang 

to operate in closer proximity to underwater terrain might learn from the 

doctrine and technological needs of infantry. When Karl von Clausewitz stated 

that the means of protecting long lines of communication were very limited, he 

considered a standard solution to this dilemma at sea-the convoy-only a 

special means to be employed ashore. 18 Perhaps Clausewitz might have learned 

something from studying naval models. In short, rather than focusing attention 

on emerging technology in the research labs, military services might better 

beneflt from fleld technology deployed elsewhere. 

By focusing on unexploited technologies, nations might skip entire development cycles, thus avoiding the need to develop their own revolution in military 

affairs technology base. For example, there was some degre of borrowing of 

American technology that stimulated the Soviet revolution in military affairs 

134 
Tritten * Revolutions 

brought on by the marage of long-range delivery systems and nuclear warheads. 

On the other hand, it is not clear that a military can advance from one basic 

form of warfare without fIrst pasing through the next stage. Could navies have 

moved from boarding and close-in battle directly to fast carer battle groups 

without fll'St having pas through the artillery stage? Can navies move from 

technology-based warfare directly into a fourth generation of idea-based warfare without fll'St mastering maneuver warfare?19 

An underlying asumption about revolutions in military afairs and paradigm 

shifts is that nations will undertake actions to capitalize upon new technologies. 

Hence, if the technology "genie" gets out of the bottle, we need a technology 

"fIx." A more detailed study of technological opportunities that have been 

known to nations strongly indicates alternative models of national behavior. 

For example, by the mid- 1930s, the Imperial Japanese Navy (UN) recognized that, despite all of the technological and industrial efforts being made to 

upgrade the fleet, its projected capabilities would not be suffIcient to meet the 

rapidly improving U.S. Navy in a decisive battle at sea-both sides preferred 

doctrine for war at sea. The UN, therefore, gave impetus to the development of 

night tactics and eventually formed specialized night combat groups (yasengun) 

that could weaken the U.S. PacifIc Fleet to such a degree that, subsequent to 

night battle between main fleets, daylight battle would be an asured victory 

for the Japanese.20 

Thus a technological threat was met with a doctrinal, not a technological, 

solution that theoretically negated the new technologies. In fact the UN fought 

exceptionally well at night during World War n, frequently bettering the U.S. 

Navy, until the U.S. PacifIc Fleet mastered radar. This prowess, however, was 

insufficient to offset the advantages that the Allied powers brought to the war 

in the Pacific. 

For another example, as the United States developed new technologies that 

could be used to enhance long-range nuclear misiles, the preferred solution of 

the Soviet Union was to ban the new technology with an arms control agreement. The Soviets displayed similar behavior as the U.S. explored sm. Most, 

but not all, nations have agre to keep the chemical and biological warfare 

"genie" in the bottle. and they have not used such weapons. 

Another model for responding to new technologies is to ignore them. Nations 

with the clear ability to participate in a revolution in military affairs have not 

always chosen to do so. Sweden, for instance, has yet to develop its own nuclear 

weapons, although it clearly has the potential to become a nuclear power?) 

135 
The Newport Papers 

There are also examples of revolutions in military affairs that probably have 

no foundation in new technologies. For example. Napoleon Bonaparte caused 

a major paradigm shift in ground warfare when he succesfully mobilized 

citizens to fight for ideas and not money. 22 The shift to mas armies caused a 

shift in the basic object of warfare ashore from seizure of territory to defeat of 

the enemy army. Under this paradigm. both sides in World War II considered 

certain parts of the enemy economic base as legitimate military targets due to 

whole nations generally being mobilized for war. 

Did technology play a role in causing this major paradigm shift in warfare. 

a shift to considering the entire nation as being in arms. or did technology merely 

react to a new vision for warfare? Certainly. modem industrial capability was 

required for such an effort. as technology allowed for attacking the full breadth 

and depth of an enemy nation and population. While some consider the nation 

in arms as a legitimate revolution in military affairs. it is not at all certain that 

the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was caused by technology. 

There are cases where technology has ben given the opportunity to lead the 

way in developing new fonns of warfare. but introduction of the new technology was hampered because it was developed outside of the government, without 

an internal advocate. In such cases. where a new vision of a future battle space 

is advocated by someone "outside the system." asiated technology development is often opposed by those in the government. When there is an absence of 

an internal constituency for systems for which a doctrinal or other need has not 

ben established. paradigm shifts and revolutions in military affairs take longer 

to ocur. 

For instance. the technological opportunities afforded by the development 

of the light-weight radial aircraft engine were not appreciated by the Royal 

Navy during the interwar years. Because of this. Great Britain. and the Fleet 

Air An in particular. were found wanting early in World War n. Indeed. it 

was not until late in the war that the Royal Navy changed its concepts of 

operation to center around the aircraft car

er. altering the paradigm of warfare 

at sea. 

On the other hand. the U.S. Navy capitalized on the development of the 

light-weight radial aircraft engine. and interwar peacetime doctrinal development for car

er warfare outpaced all other nations.23 In the 1920s and 1930s. 

the U.S Navy laid the basis for a doctrinal change from decisive battle centered 

around the battleship to the ability to engage the enemy battle fleet as well as 

influence the shore with the aircraft carer. This change was permitted by the 

development of the radial aircraft engine and of new concepts of operations by 

a group of heretical officers who believed in the potential of naval aviation.24 

1 36 
Tritten * Revolutions 

Paralleling the technological inovation was a series of organizational 

developments that permitted the upward mobility of aviation officers into 

command positions during World War II. Similarly, the Bureau of Aeronautics 

was created to sponsor conceptual and technological development. These 

organizational changes facilitated fleet experimentation with the new technology. Fleet exercises were paralleled by the development of concepts of operations that were tested at the Naval War College. Hence, when the main battle 

fleet was sunk on 7 December 1941, the U.S. Navy was able to respond quickly 

to the requirements of war with a new Pacific Fleet centered around the aircraft 

carrier. This reconstituted force was able to use the airplane as its main striking 

arm because of the pioneering work that was done between the wars by a few 

believers in naval aviation. The revolution in military affairs at sea that 

paralleled the blitzkrieg was inculcated into the U.S. Navy. 

It is worthwhile to take note here that doctrinal rigidity can have a marked 

negative influence on a military service's appreciation of the new warfighting 

opportunities that may be afforded by a revolution in military affairs.23 An 

organization can overcome the tendency to ignore new ideas if its focus is a 

shared vision to create improvement. The relationship between doctrine and 

new technologies and how it might lead to a revolution in military affairs is a 

critically important topic for investigation. 

The Need for a Theory of 

"Revolutions in Military Affairs" and Paradigm Shifts 

Since revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts do not happen 

instantaneously, theory is needed to help them reach fruition. Although it 

perhaps no longer takes centuries to understand and shape current or future 

revolutions in military affairs. it does probably take decades. At a minimum. a 

theory of revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts should as the 

integration of anticipated different and emerging technological opportunities 

into existing bureaucratic organizations. Military services should understand 

the general method by which they change and the role that various groups and 

organizations play in causing succesful change. 

New theory will need to address cases where new technologies are 

countered by doctrinal solutions alone-absent a revolution in military 

affairs or even a major paradigm shift. A theory of change in military 

services must also address the many cases where they benefit from new and 

visionary approaches to warfare by gifted specialists, contributing to a 

1 37 

! 

I 

! 

! I 

I I 

l 

I 

I 

f 

r 

I 

I 
11Ie Newport Papers 

revolution in military afairs or paradigm shift. A theory will also have to make 

use of case studies of failed paradigm shifts as well as succesful revolutions 

in military afairs. 

Among the last, a very interesting case study is that of the interwar development of the dirigible. The Navy first developed concepts for warfare in the 

Paciftc under the then-revolutionary organization of a joint Any-Navy warplanning staf

. The story of the brilliant work done in developing War Plan 

Orange and the subsequent Rainbow Plans is well known. As part of that overall 

effort, the Navy recognized the need for long-range reconnaissance and surveillance of Japanese home waters. The inadequate technology of the timedirigibles with on-board fighters-however, did not meet the needs of the fleet. 

Fulfilling the requirement for distant surveillance had to await the development 

of long-range patrol aircraft, subsurface, and space as

ts. 

The excellent ideas developed by Major Earl H. Ellis, U.S. Marine Corps, 

for expeditionary amphibious operations across the Pacific in support of War 

Plan Orange languished on the shelf until the intervention of Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, General John Rusell. General Rusell retired senior 

offtcers who were unwilling to make the shift to amphibious warfare. The 

Marine Corps needed only to borrow the technology from Japan that permitted the development of modem amphibious landing craft and ships.26 

This case represents both a failure to change the paradigm and a subsequent 

success. 

Another case study of a changed paradigm involves the World War II U.S. 

Navy submarine service. Although a group of submarine officers explored 

alternative concepts of operations for their combat arm prior to the outbreak of 

war, submariners in general entered the war prepared to be integrated with the 

battle fleet; to be used against combatants; and with a doctrine that asumed 

their antisubmarine adversary would be able to sink them if he attacked. 27 

During the initial period of the war in the Pacific, these thre conditions 

changed. The submarine operated independently on long and distant patrols, 

and the targets for submarine attack shifted to merchant ships that generally did 

not fight back. Finally, submariners learned that enemy antisubmarine 

capabilities were not as good as expected, and that their own ships sto up 

well to attack. The sum of these thre major changes was that the submarine 

could be used in a manr not necessarily well exercised before the warboldly, on the surface at night, with immediate re-attacks rather than attack 

and hide. The submarine service offtcer corps went through a catharsis 

during the war, and comanding offtcers who were unable to adapt to the 

bold, new wartime paradigm were reasigned. 

1 38 
Tritten * Revolutions 

In general, the three major concepts in a paradigm shift are: 

• The idea 

• The messenger 

• A senior officer who permits its development. 

The first American to understand that the striking power of aircraft at sea 

could equal that of the battleship was Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin, 

U.S. Navy. Like Ellis, Mustin needed senior flag and general officers within 

the established organization to protect his new ideas and allow them to grow.28 

Mustin found his protector in the form of Rear Admiral William Moffett, U.S. 

Navy, just as Ellis had found General John Rusell for amphibious operations. 

The experiences of Spanish Vice Admiral Jose de Mazarredo Salazar 

strongly suggest that just having the good idea is not enough. De Mazarredo 

was the author of excellent doctrinal works and many good recommendations for improving the Spanish fleet prior to the defeat at Trafalgar ( 1 805). 

Although de Mazarredo was never defeated at sea and thus had the 

credibility of a proven warrior, his outspoken criticism of the state of the 

fleet and its lack of combat preparedness, as well as his audacity in questioning Spanish foreign policy, doomed all of his good ideas to the history 

books. He therefore did not cause any actual improvement in the combat 

potential of the Spanish navy. 

29 

Even with gifted personnel in the various levels of the bureaucracy, the 

organizational climate within the bureaucracy itself can doom good doctrinal 

development and therefore advancements in revolutions in military affairs or 

changes to paradigms. For example, the distinctly secondary place afforded to 

the UN led directly to the lack of sound warfare capabilities development. 

Coupled with a number of missed opportunities, this lack of good doctrinal 

development eventually led to the defeat of Japan in World War 11.30 Had the 

UN, or similarly the Royal Navy in the case of carrier aircraft development, 

ben allowed to pursue what warfare specialists knew were important mission 

areas, the performance of these services during World War II would have ben 

better. 

Relationship of Military Doctrine to "Revolutions in 

Military Affairs" and Paradigm Shifts 

The basic model of a revolution in military affairs, which gives a leading 

role to technology, is incomplete. Revolutions in military affairs and paradigm 

shifts are not wholly responsive to technology-they can also be stimulated by 

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The Newport Papers 

doctrinal development New doctrinal concepts can create a can start a cycle 

during which doctrine pulls the future development of technology. Advances 

in technology then result in subsequent alterations to organization and to 

doctrine. 

In such an alternative case, military leaders ftrst outline a vision, concepts, 

or doctrine for warfare and then refme the vision in tenns of capabilities 

desired-a concept-based requirements system. The role of industry under this 

approach to a revolution in military afairs is to respond to these visions, 

concepts, and doctrinal development. President Ronald Reagan's visionary 

speech on the SOl is a clasic example of such an approach. Unfortunately, a 

leader's vision is often thwarted by the bureaucracy's failure to exploit emerging technologies. Hence, there must be a theory for translating leaders' visions 

into change within large organizations. Military services should draw upon the 

excellent work that has ben done by busines schools and management 

consulting ftnns in their investigations of "learning organizations" and the 

special skills required of leaders in such organizations. 31 

A good example of military doctrine leading technology was shown by the 

Japanese during the interwar years. The UN's doctrine called for deep ocean 

battles, preferably in a short war of anlation, and the UN generally insisted 

on technological superiority in each weapon system that it produced. This 

resulted in a search for new technological opportunities to car out the 

preferred vision of the future battle space. As a result of their doctrine's leading 

role, the UN ftelded the Yamato-clas super-battleship and the Mitsubishi Zero 

ftghter-two of the numerous examples of good doctrine that led to the ftelded 

technology that was useful in war.32 This is esntially the same model for the 

relationship between doctrine and technology that has governed U.S. Navy 

programming since World War II. 

The U.S. Army also appears to accept this exact model of doctrine that leads 

revolutions in military affairs. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) recently issued a new pamphlet, Force XXI Operations, TRADOC 

Pamphlet 525-5, which attempts to shape the on-going revolution in military 

affairs with a visionary statement of the future battle space.33 Following this 

pamphlet is one that is more authoritative, with an introduction signed by the 

Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. 34 

These examples are intended to show that the rudimentary, albeit popular, 

model of a revolution in military affairs is flawed in its fundamental asumption 

that doctrine depends upon technology as its major input and output. For 

example, the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was certainly more a 

product of political, social, and economic conditions than of a speciftc military 

140 
Tritten * Revolutions 

technology. Hence, we need to look at these other factors that impact on doctrine 

in order to understand how doctrine influences revolutions in military affairs 

and paradigm shifts. 

How Doctrinal Inputs Influence "Revolutions in 

Military Mfairs" and Paradigm Shifts 

A review of where doctrine originates, or what influences doctrine, informs 

us that technology is merely one of many possible inputs.3.1 Others include 

current policy, available resources, current strategy and campaigns, current 

doctrine, threats, history and lesons learned, strategic culture, geography and 

demographics, and forms of government. If doctrine follows merely the push 

or pull of new technology, then it misses the opportunity to develop new 

concepts of combat operations-and new doctrine-based upon all other 

inputs. Let us consider some good examples of factors other than technology 

that have recently changed doctrine. 

First, nations often make major changes to doctrine and organization after 

reviewing newly published policy and strategy, without giving consideration 

to new technology. This is what happened when the U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps founded the Naval Doctrine Command (NOe) after publishing their 

major white paper, ..... From the Sea." The United States shifted its interests in 

the world from a primary focus on containment of communism and the USSR 

to more diverse and regional interests. With this change in interests came 

alterations in the focus on different types of warfare. Similarly, the U.S. Navy 

changed its orientation from open-ocean deep water operations to joint operations in the littoral and maneuver warfare. With changes to policy alone came 

new doctrine and organization, such as NOe, and interest in new technologies 

to support new warfare interests. If there is an on-going revolution in military 

affairs, it will be affected by the current interests of the U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps in maneuver warfare doctrine. 

Normally, when a new technology is introduced into the military, an existing 

organization acts as its sponsor. Later, as the technology is refined and a 

doctrine is formulated, a separate organization is created, whose central identity 

is the new technology. This occurred with the creation and evolution of offices 

within the U.S. Navy that were responsible for aviation during the interwar 

years. These new offices evaluated the new aviation technologies within the 

framework of the doctrine for their intended use in the fleet. 36 

14 1 
The Newport Papers 

In cases where a doctrinal concept precedes a demonstrated technology, it 

may occur that an organization will manage both doctrine and technology 

development. A good example is the Strategic Defense Initiatives Office 

(SOlO), which was charged with developing the doctrine for war in space in the 

absence of an organization dedicated to this purpose. Today, we se a series of 

doctrine organizations, centers, and commands created by the anned forces, all 

charged with improving how to fight. None of these new organizations came 

into being to manage new technology; all have the license to develop new 

doctrinal concepts to shape the development of new technology. 

Second, there is ample evidence that nations make major changes in doctrine 

after understanding the latest decisions in resources to be made available to the 

military services-resource decisions that are not dependent upon new technologies. The 1993 changes in U.S. Anny doctrine from the AirLand Battle 

version ofFM 100_537 were a direct result of a drastic change in the amount of 

resources that were going to be allocated to the Anned Forces, and not due to 

technological opportunities. Correspondingly, the U.S. Air Force is exploring 

the concept of maneuver warfare as a result of similar budget decisions.38 

Hence, budgetary reasons have caused these two services to change their 

doctrine, and this new doctrine influences their view on any on-going revolution 

in military affairs. Very simply, if we canot afford ample new technology, 

must we also postpone any on-going revolution in military affairs? 

Third, another "trigger" for changes to doctrine is newly published military 

doctrine and campaign concepts, some of which result from existing, not new, 

technology. As the Naval Doctrine Command publishes its multiservice 

doctrine for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it will have a direct impact on 

service-unique doctrine issued by each of those military services. A case in 

point is the maneuver warfare doctrine found in Naval Warfare, NDP- l. First 

adopted as part of the multiservice naval doctrine, the concept of maneuver 

warfare will next find itself articulated in doctrine for the U.S. Navy. 

Similarly, new joint doctrine will impact on multiservice naval doctrine. As 

joint campaign concepts are developed by the new U.S. Atlantic Command 

(USACOM), they will affect all forms of joint, multiservice, and service-specific 

military doctrine. The doctrine of the U.S. Air Force has be

n influenced 

directly by the exploration of maneuver warfare concepts by the U.S. Anny. 

Should the U.S. Any succe in developing its vision for mobile strike forces, 

such new doctrine would obviously again affect air power doctrine. Hence, 

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doctrine from outside one military service can have an enonnous effect on the 

desire for a revolution in military afairs. 

As long as the services have primary control over programatics, they will 

retain the development of programatic doctrine, i.e., doctrine that supports 

programg and is not necesly reflective of how they will actually fight. 

Operational combat doctrine, however, is the province of joint doctrine. For 

example, the U.S. Marine Corps has fully embraced maneuver warfare doctrine, 

but such doctrine is not yet a part of joint or multinational doctrine for actual 

warfighting. If only the services embrace a revolution in military affairs, we 

will not necesly se a change to operational combat doctrine. 

Recent attempts to make the chainan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more 

directly responsible for a military programatic input to the annual budgetary 

debate constitutes a major change in U.S. defense practices and will enhance 

the influence of joint doctrine. Efforts being made by Admiral William Owens, 

vice chain

an, include an enhanced role for the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) to set overall military programming priorities.39 Until now, in 

the programmatic world, service doctrine has be

n dominant. If joint doctrine 

is to predominate over service doctrine, then major changes in joint doctrine 

must address future, not just current, warfare concepts. 

Fourth, a major cause of revised military doctrine can issue from reviews of 

actual and emerging threats, especially those not foresen during earlier 

programatic deliberations. Before any war, there is an anticipated enemy for 

which military doctrine is designed. When the intelligence community misrepresents the capabilities of the enemy, it is likely that prewar doctrine will be 

deficient. Naturally there are difficulties with capabilities versus intentions 

estimates. Hence, it is likely that the correct doctrine for actual warfighting 

depends largely on accurate intelligence (along with a solid understanding of 

the capabilities and intentions of one's own forces). It follows, then, that 

opportunities will be lost for revolutions in military affairs unless the military 

services fully back programg in support of intelligence. 

Today, the expected enemy has changed dramatically. The U.S. no longer 

faces the Soviet Union and cannot treat all other threats as les

r included cases. 

The threat challenge is complicated, as is the challenge to attempt to model the 

behavior of the wide diversity of potential actors with whom the U.S. will have 

to interact in the future. In the past, American defense planers had the luxury 

of a well-developed concept of operations by the expected enemy and the 

benefit of campaigns and operations planned by a long-standing alliance 

structure. Today, they lack the internal resources to predict accurately the 

143 
The Newport Papers 

behavior of every potentiaJ enemy. Military commanders will have to deal 

increasingly with non-governmental organizations, including private volunteer 

organizations and an aggresive and technologically sophisticated media not 

dependent upon government for information. In such an environment, will 

doctrine by based on old familiar threats. generic new threats, or threats based 

on someone's estimate of the "most likely" future threats? Is it safe to ase 

that the real new revolution in military affairs will allow Americans to plan to 

be able to do almost anything militarily that they want to do against a Third 

World enemy? 

A fifth maner in which doctrine changes is by reviewing the lessons of 

history. For instance, the doctrine for military planning was changed in many 

nations of the world once they reviewed the victories of Prus

ia in the Seven 

Weeks War ( 1 866) against Italy, Austria, Hanover, and Bohemia, and in the 

Franco-German War ( 1 870- 1 87 1). Dramatic and rapid campaigns of annihilation brought about intense anaJyses of the Prus

ian victories with a consensus 

that the General Staff had ben. to a large degre, responsible.40 This in tum 

led to a worldwide imitation of the Prusian General Staff-a major paradigm 

shift. 

Although one might asume that all nations review their military history 

before doctrinal development, in fact, doctrine has ben developed prior to such 

studies. When nations start up new doctrine centers and commands, they have 

the opportunity to take a comprehensive look at previous military history and 

extract the lesns of past attempts at doctrinal development. When full appreciation of prior lessons is available to current doctrine writers, this can lead 

to a new vision of how best to create concepts of warfare which, in tum, can 

stimulate a "revolution in military affairs." 

Sixth, one would expect doctrine writers to make full use of the prior studies 

of nations' strategic cultures before preparing their doctrine. In recent times, 

we have witnessed newly emerging nations created out of old nations, wherein 

the strategic culture of that new nation does not necesly reflect imediate 

history. In such cases, because of the changes in population, geography (borders). or government, the new nation has the opportunity to make significant 

doctrinal changes. Even modifications in government alone have afforded 

nations the opportunity to embody major doctrinal changes. An excellent 

example of this is the change in navy doctrine that France incorporated 

following the replacement of the Vichy regime by the Fourth Republic.41 

144 
Trinen * Revolutions 

In the days when the Soviet Union faced NATO and saw itself essentially encircled by imperialism, its military doctrine was appropriate for 

its high-technology adversary. Today, Rusia can afford to develop a series 

of parallel military doctrines, making the as

umption they are technologically 

inferior in the western theater of military operations but superior in the 

southern theater.42 This change in threat has nurtured new doctrine, perhaps a 

doctrinal revolution similar to that proposed above. 

Fonnal navy doctrine encountered a setback with the introduction of new 

technologies and the end of the Anglo-Franco wars during the age of sail. 

Doctrine was developed and refmed frequently during the wars between Britain 

and France over hundreds of years. During the age of sail, there were long 

periods of warfare with esntially the same technology. Hence, improvements 

to navy warfare occured via other avenues of advancement. Additionally, 

modem recruitment techniques had yet to be discovered, hence, improvements 

in personnel and leadership was not yet the method for improving combat 

potential. Advances in the naval art had to arise from doctrine. Debates over 

doctrine and the existence of written doctrine was nonnal practice. As navy 

doctrine advanced, so did combat potential. 43 

Since the early part of the nineteenth century, two events have had a profound 

effect on the nature of navy doctrine: technology and the frequency and 

participants of war. From the time that the ironclad was introduced, navy 

technology has changed so quickly and so often that navies have seldom had 

the time to deal with doctrinal isues for forces on hand. By the time of the 

Battle of Lis (1866), between Italy and Austria, warship designs were 

advancing before navy doctrine could be reevaluated and rewritten. Navies 

turned more of their attention to dealing with improvements to naval art and 

combat potential by improving technologies and programming rather than 

learning to fight "smarter." 

Many non-technological factors that often result in new concepts for 

military doctrine can have major impacts on revolutions in military 

affairs. All of these issues must be considered by doctrine commands and 

centers if there is to be a true doctrinal renaissance that makes pos

ible a 

revolution in military affairs. As navies become more comfortable with the 

concept of centralized written doctrine, they will have many opportunities to 

develop new doctrinal concepts with ideas that originate outside the realm of 

technology. 

145 
The Newport Papers 

More often than we would like to admit, there has been no accepted military 

doctrine for the use of newly introduced technologies. Increasingly, therefore, 

improvements to combat potential were attributed to effective programming 

skills rather than skills that as warfighting doctrine. Today, the focus should 

shift from introducing new technologies to other, less expensive, methods of 

improving combat potential, namely. navy doctrine as a force builder. The 

continued search for "silver bullets" in new technology threatens to distract 

profesional officers from perfectly good solutions that may make possible 

advances in the next revolution in military affairs. 

The difficulty in changing paradigms. doctrine, and recognizing revolutions 

in military affairs can best be studied in the detailed and fully developed case 

studies that result from specific lesns learned. For example. Stephen Rosen's 

Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. is an excellent 

examination of change in military organizations.44 It contains a number of cases 

that provide the military doctrine supervisor with a quick overview of the 

problems of change during peacetime as well as during war. 

To get to the heart of change, however, more in-depth, bok-length individual case studies should be consulted. One such study of an organization's 

attempt to come to grips with a new technology is Harold R. Winton's To 

Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored 

Doctrine, 1927-1938.45 After studying such cases, one can more easily accept 

the need for recommendations contained therein, such as, support at the top, a 

mechanism for the building of consensus, and a "learning organizational" 

climate that accepts rational analysis as the basis for doctrine and force 

structure. 

In learning organizations, individuals "continually expand their capacity to 

create 

thinking 

the results they truly desire, [it is] where new and expansive patterns of 

are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people 

are continually learning how to learn together." Learning organizations also 

have a shared vision of the future-indeed a shared vision is one of the five 

cornerstones neces for such organizations.46 The German Army was a 

"learning organization" during World War I when it as recent combat 

experience and then made changes to their doctrine as the war progres. An 

untold story is how the U.S. Navy learned from its combat experience and 

changed its doctrine during World War JI'7 -the German Army is not the only 

military "learning organization" that has existed. 

Whether or not there is a curnt and on-going revolution in military affairs 

is still being debated. What the next paradigm will be has yet to be decided. We 

do know, however, that revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts will 

146 
Tritten * Revolutions 

ocur. We need to manage these changes and create proces and organizations 

to deal with these issues; Naval Doctrine Command is an organization that is 

concerned with managing change. Good doctrinal development can create 

revolutions in military affairs. 

It is time for the Navy to become a learning organization that holds a shared 

vision of the future as well as a shared vision of continued improvement. 

Leadership in such an organization is similar to that required of proces 

designers, stewards of the vision, and teachers who foster learning. This new 

type of leader is charged with building an organization "where people continually expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and 

improve shared mental models . ..48 

For the next paradigm we must question if it will be a logical outgrowth of 

the ongoing revolution in military affairs, recognizing the importance of affordability or the opportunities permitted by stealth. Will this paradigm result from 

new technological opportunities, such as unmanned air and subsurface 

vehicles? Unmanned systems allow distant decision making, reduced costs, and 

subsequent changes in cost versus risk calculations. Will a new paradigm be 

oriented on sped-hypersonic vehicles? Increased speed will again reduce 

decision times and make fundamental changes in basing requirements. Increased range supports the more grandiose theories of air power once advocated 

by Alexander DeSeversky and Billy Mitchell. On the other hand, is the new 

warfare paradigm framed by ideas and the information explosion? It is very 

likely that fourth generation warfare, idea-driven or information-based warfare, 

is indeed a major paradigm shift away from warfare based upon technologies. 

Whatever the new paradigm, one must not overlook the leading role that 

doctrine can play to stimulate technological development. 

The model for doctrinal development in support of paradigm shifts and 

revolutions in military affairs instructs that the fIrst step is to communicate a 

vision of the future battle space, then develop concepts for operations, and then, 

after testing those operations by interactions with the fleet and analytic community, develop prototype doctrine. Approved doctrine can result in hardware 

and software requirements as well as direct improvements to combat potential, 

irrespective of technological change. 

The introduction of new ideas into the military and the management of 

change to a new paradigm are dimcult tasks requiring both combat leadership 

skills and experience as well as the administrative and bureaucratic skills of the 

Washington "in-fIghter." Critical thinking, the temperament of combat-experienced leaders, and the administrative competence are needed to ensure that 

the most promising ideas are accepted and implemented by the Navy. 

147 
The Newport Papers 

Notes 

1. During World War I, France transported by sea a half-milon colonial soldien and 

two hundred thousand worken to aid her in her hour of need. This was in addition to two 

milon U.S. troops received by sea from North America. 

2. P. A. Zhilin (General-Lieutenant), ed., 1M History of Military Art (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed to press 23 January 1 986), translated inJPRS-UMA-87-()(}4-L (Washington: 27 

March 1 987), p. 233; and V. Larionov et al., World War 11: Decisive Battle of the Soviet Anny 

(Moscow: Progres Publishen, 1 984), p. 5 10. 

3. Haret Fast Scott and Wilam F. Scott, 1M Anned Forces of the USSR, 3rd ed. 

(Boulder: Westview Pres, 1984), p. 48. 

4. DavidJablonsJer, (Colonel, USA, Retired), "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Af

, ' Parameters, Autumn 1 994, .pp. 1 8-36. In April 1994, the U.S. Army 

War College and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSt) hosted a conference, "The Revolution 

in Military Afn: Defining an Army for the 21st Century. " A number of p en presented 

at this conference have now appeared as SSI monogra hs. For eX2mple, see Jettry R. Cooper, 

Arwther Vuw of the Revolution in Military Affairs, 15 July 1994; Paul Bracken and Raol Henri 

Alcala, Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Anny, 22 July 1994; and Stephen 

Metz and J�es Kievit, 1M Revolution i� Military Affairs and Conflicts Short of War, 25 July 

1994; al published by the U.S. Govt. Pont. Off., 1994. 

5. Philip D. Shuder (Lieutenant General, USMC, Retired), "Thinking about Warfare," 

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1 987, pp. 18-20;John W. Bodnar (Captain, USNR), "The 

Military Technical Revolution: From Hardware to Information," Naval War College Review, 

Summer 1993, pp. 7-21; Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," 1M Washington Quarterly, 

Autumn 1 993, p. 1 59; and James R. FitzSimonds (Commander, USN) and Jan M. van Tol 

(Commander, USN), "Revolutions in Military Main," Joint Force Quart , Spring 1 994, 

pp. 24-31 . 

6. The parallel ashore to privateering was the condottieri. Originating in Italy during the 

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the condottieri was a mixture of entrepreneun and warrion. 

They eventual

y spread to France, Spain, Alsace, and Switzerland. Their ultimate demise 

came about with the formation of standing mercenary armies and was not due to technology. 

See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. 0.]. Matthijs Jolles (New York: The Modem 

Library, 1 943), p. 577; and Hans Delbrick, History of the Art of War, Volume 11: Medieval 

Waifare, trans. WalterJ. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 

1 985), pp. 506-8 [original German venion published in 1 923] ; and History of the Art of War, 

Volume IV: The Dawn of Modem Waifare, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and 

London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1 985), pp. 1 6-7, 224 [original German venion published 

in 1 930]. 

7. Zhilin, pp. 6-7. 

8. K. V. Zababashlcin (General-Major), "The Structure and O anization of Formations, Units and Subunits of the Armed Forces," in N. A. Lomov (General-Major), ed. , 

Scientifo-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed 

to press 15 November 1972), translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air 

Force, Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1 980, pp. 1 B-5. 

9. F. F. Gayvoronskiy (General-Colonel), ed. , 1M Evolution of Military Art: Stages, 

Tendencies, Principles (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed to press 4 May 1 987), translated in 

JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1 989, p. 32. 

10. Frederick Wilam von Mellenthin (Generalmajor) and R.H.S. Stolfi with E. Sobik 

(Colonel), NA TO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance can Fight Outnumbered and Win in 

Central Europe without Nuclear Weapons (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1 984), pp. 12-6. 

The Garling gun-introduced in 1862-worked on different principles. 

11. The reason for its Wlure on the batdefield was primarily that the French Army 

guarded their new capability too well and they were caught up on the technical details of 

development. They failed to devise an effective doctrine for the new weapon or to test 

various tactics. Furthermore, the mitrailleuse was as

igned to artilery units where it was viewed 

as a rather short-range weapon that was extremely vulnerable to counter-battery fire. 
TriNen * Revolutions 

12. Department of the Navy, White Paper, ..... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service 

for the 21st Century" (Washington: U.S. Gov't Print. Off., 28 March 1994). 

13. Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Wa!fOrr, NDP (Naval Doctrine Publication)-1 

(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 28 March 1994). 

1 4. John H. Dalton, "A Vision of the Navy After Next," remarks as delivered by the 

Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Washington, 

D.C., 30 March 1994. For the concept of a military after next, see Bracken, "The Military 

Mter Next," p. 1 57. 

15. Hans Delbriick, History of the Art of War, Volume II: The Barbarian Invasions, trans. 

Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1 985), p. 

411 [original German version published in 1921]; History of the Art of War, Volume ll

: Medieval 

Waifarr, pp. 327, 468, 635, 650-6; and History of the Art of War, Volume IV: The Dawn of 

Modem Waifarr, pp. 41, 126. 

1 6. Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy (Marshal of the Soviet Union), ed., Soviet Military 

Strategy, 3rd ed., with an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott, ed. (New York: 

Crane Russak, 1980), 1st raper ed., p. 229. 

17. Richard A. Gabrie and Karen S. Metz, A Short History of War; The Evolution of Waifarr 

and Weapons, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, no. 5 (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: 

U.S. Any War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 30 June 1 992), pp. 50, 70-1. 

18. Clausewitz, pp. 306, 493, 545. 

19. William S. Lind, Keith Nightingale (Colonel, USA), John F. Schmitt (Captain, 

USMC), Joseph W. Sutton (Colonel, USA) and Gary I. Wilson (Colonel, USMC), "The 

Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 

pp. 22-6; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1 991); 

Antulio J. Echevarria (Captain, USA) andJohn M. Shaw (Captain, USA), "The New Military 

Revolution: Post-Industrial Change," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 70-9; Robert J. 

Bunker, "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, 

pp. 20-30; Wilam S. Lind,John F. Schmitt (Major, USMCR), and Gary I. Wilson (Colonel, 

USMCR), "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," Marine Corps Gazette, December 

1994, pp. 34-7. 

20. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics and Technology 

in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1 887-194 1, August 1994 draft book manuscript, chapter 8. 

21. Terrence R. Fehner, "National Responses to Technological Innovations in Weapons 

Systems, 1815 to the Present," History Associates, Inc., Germantown, Md. : 7 January 1986. 

22. B. V. Panov, V.N. Kiselev, 1.1. Kartavtsev etal., The History ofMi/itaryAtts: A Textbook 

for Military Academies oj the Soviet Armed Forces (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), translated in 

JPR5-UMA-85--O9-L (Washington: 21 March 1985), pr.

. 2-3. 

23. For additional information, see James J. Tritten, ' Introduction of Aircraft Carriers 

into the Royal Navy: Lessons for the Development of Naval Doctrine," The Naval Review, 

July 1994, pp. 260-7; and Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, 

"The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy: MilitaryTechnical Revolutions, Organizations, and the Problem of Decision," draft report prepared 

for the Director, Net Asessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1 994. 

24. Charles M. Melhorn, (Commander, USN, Retired), Two-Block Fox; The Rise of the 

Airmift Carrier, 191 1- 1 929 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 974). 

25. Jablonsky, p. 33. 

26. Japanese" amphibious warfare doctrine developed in paralel with that of the U.S. 

Marine Corps. The Japanese Any was in a different position vis-a-vis the navy than in the 

United States and was able to secure earlier cooperation in the development oflanding craft. 

The Shinshu Maru, the world's first ship specifically designed for amphibious operations-a 

prototype for what would later become the landing ship dock-was laid down in 1933 and 

completed in 1934-years before anything similar in the U.S. Japanese amphibious landing 

ships were observed by a U.S. Marine Corps officer stationed in the Far East, and his reports 

led eventually to the building of similar craft and ships in the U.S. See Evans and Peattie, 

chapter 14. 

149 
The Newport Papers 

27. Dean Alrd, "The U.S. Navy Prepares for War," presented at the World War II in 

the Pacific Conference, Alexandria, Va.: 10 August 1 994. 

28. Stephen Peter Rosen, WInning the Next War: Innovation and t� Modem Military 

(Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell Univ. Pres, 1 991), pp. 70, 82-5. 

29. John D. Harbron, Trqfalgar and the Spanish Navy (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute 

Pres, 1988), pp. 98-102. 

30. Evans and Peattie. 

31. Peter M. Senge, ThL Fifth Discipline: ThL Art and Practia oj t� Learning Organization 

(New York: Doubleday, 1 990), pp. 339-63. 

32. Evans and Peattie, chapter 17. 

33. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRAnOC), Fotu! XXI Operations: A 

Conapt Jor t� Evolution oj Full-Dimensiort41 Operations Jor t� Strat� Anny oj t� Early 

Twenty-First Century, TRAnOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRAnOC, 1 August 

1994) [with 8 September 1 994 errata], pp. 1-3, 3-20, 4-2. 

34. Department of the Army, Congressional Activities Division, Anny Focus 94: Fotu! 

XXI (Washington: September 1 994), p. 18. 

35. These ideas were first developed in James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives for Military 

Doctrine Development," Naval War College RMew, Spring 1995, pp. 26-31. 

36. I[rving] B [rinton] Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation oJt� Aerial Weapon by 

the United States During World War I: A Study in t� Rtlationship oj Technological Advance, 

Military Doctrine, and the Development oj Weapons (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1 983, 

for the Office of Air Force History), p. 19 [originaly published in 1953 by Yale Univ. Press]. 

37. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 1 00-5, Operations 

(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 14 June 1 993). 

38. Martin van Creveld, with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and 

Maneuver Waifare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Pres, July 1994), p. 268. 

39. Wilam A. Owens (Admiral, USN), ''JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] : Harnessing the Revolution in Military AfWrs," joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1 994, pp. 

55-7; John Boatman, "The Jane's Interview" (with Vice Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of 

Staff Admiral William A. Owens, USN),jane 's Defence Weekly, 23 July 1 994, p. 32; address 

by Admiral William A. Owens, USN, to the Military Operations Research Society JROC 

[Joint Requirements Oversight Council] Process Workshop, Arlington, Va. : 17 October 

1994; Vincent C. Thomas,Jr. , interview with Joint ChiefS of Staff Vice Chairman Admiral 

Wilam A. Owens, USN, ' The Necessary Elements of Warfighting, " Sea Power, December 

1994, pp. 9-13. 

40. John E. Tashjean, "A Military Aspect of Circulation of Elites," Cahiers Vi!fredo Pareto, 

no. II, 1967, p. 71 . 

41. For additional information, see "Navy and Military Doctrine in France," in this 

volume, pp. 37-75. 

42. A Savelyev, vice president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, 

"Does Russia Need a 'Potential Enemy'?" Krasrt4ya zvezda (Moscow) in Russian, 19 March 

1992, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-1oo), 22 May 1992, p,p. 33-5. 

43. For further details see James J. Tritten, ' Lessons and Conclusions from the History 

of Navy and Military Doctrinal Development," NDC Technical Report 3-00-007, Norfolk, 

Va.: Naval Doctrine Command, January 1995, p. 9. 

44. See Rosen. 

45. Harold R. Winton, To Change an Anny: General Sir john Burnett-Stuart and British 

Annored Doctrine, 1 92 7-1938 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1 988). Another good 

example is James S. Corum, ThL Roots oJBlitzkrieg: Hans von Steckt and Gennan Military ReJonn 

(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1 992). 

46. Senge, pp. 3, 9, 205-32. 

47. Admiral W.H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, doctrinal War Instructions: United 

States Navy, 1 934, F.T.P. 1 43 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., signed 28 March 1 934; 

these instructions governed fleet actions during the initial stage of World War II, and stressed 

the future of joint warfare. F.T.P. 1 43 revised an earlier version that drew upon the lessons 

of World War I. During World War II, Admiral E[rnest] J. King, Commander in Chief, 

1 50 
Tritten * Revolutions 

United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, isued revised War Instructions: United 

States Navy, 1944, F.T.P. 143 (A) (Washington: U.S. GOvt. Print. Off., 1 November 1 944). 

This and other doctrinal publications made ful use of the lesns of the early stages of the 

war. Immediately following World War II, the U.S. Navy convened a Tactical Publications 

Panel, which consolidated doctrinal publications and resulted in the Chief of Naval 

erations' Principks and Applications of Naval Waifarr: United States Fleets, 1947, USF-l 

(Washington: Off. of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947), signed by Admiral of the 

Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN. USF-l was applicable to both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets 

and made ful use of lesons from al stages of the war. 

48. Senge, p. 340. See also Bracken, "The Military After Next," p. 171, for a discussion 

of the need for "organizational learning"; and Peter M. Senge et al., The Fifth Discipline 

Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Leaming Organization (New York: Doubleday, 

1994). 

The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those 

of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. 

15 1 
About James J. Tritten 

Dr. Tritten serves as a special advisor to the commander of the Naval 

Doctrine Command, Norfolk, Virginia-an organization created in 1993. He 

holds advanced degre from the University of Southern California and fonnerly served as a faculty member and chairman of the National Security Affairs 

Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tritten's publications have 

won him a number of awards, including the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for 

Literary Achievement from the Navy League of the United States, two awards 

from the U.S. Naval Institute, and the George Washington Honor Medal from 

the Freom's Foundation. His two most recent boks address our new 

regionally focused national security strategy. Dr. Tritten retired from active 

duty 

As

with the U.S. Navy in 1989 after serving as the Asistant Director of Net 

ment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a joint strategic planer 

in the Ofce of the Chief of Naval Operations, and previously in the fleet as a 

carrier-based naval aviator. 

Dr. Tritten's current research interests include the theory and history of naval 

doctrine, the concept of maneuver warfare, and combat leadership for the sea 

services. Some of his most recent publications include: "Let's Put 'War' Back 

into Warfighting," Strategic Review, Winter 1995; "Operations interannees: 

I'Historie a la lumiere de la doctrine moderne," Cols Bleus, January 1995; 

"Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," Naval War College Review, Spring 

1995; and "Maneuver Warfare at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 

September 1995. 
About Vice Admiral Luigi Oonolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 

Luigi Donolo was born on 21 September 1 935 in Santo Stefano Magra (La 

Spezia). He completed the normal course at the Italian Naval Academy in 1 958. 

Admiral Donolo specialized in antisubmarine warfare and is qualified as a 

raider-frogman. He attended the first course for senior staff officers at the Italian 

Naval War College in Livorno, where he was later as

igned as a teacher and 

director of courses. 

Admiral Donolo commanded several minesweepers, the frigates Umbeno 

Grosso, Carlo Bergamini, and Perseo, as well as the 5th Frigate Squadron. He 

also commanded in 1993 and 1994 the Italian naval group in Lebanon for the 

protection of the Italian trops ashore. Other asignments included duty as Chief 

of Staff of Maritime District of the southern Tyrrhenian Sea, Deputy Chief of 

Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Italian Fleet, commander of the 

prestigious group "Teseo Tesei" (a naval division of raiders, frogmen, and 

divers), and commander of the Italian Naval War College. 

In addition to numerous esys, he is the author of "War Gaming," in 

Simulation (1989), edited by Franco Angeli, and "The Problems of Security in 

Europe from 1 990- 1992" (Italian Naval War College, 1992). Admiral Donolo 

has lectured in Italy and abroad. He addressed the symposium at Georgetown 

University (Washington, D.C.) in March 1994 on the "Role of International 

Navies after the Cold War," and he also addres the "Twelfth International 

Seapower Symposium" at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 

November 1993. 

On 30 December 1994, Vice Admiral Luigi Oonolo retired from the Italian 

Navy.