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FILED

OCT 26 2016

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1002-KuKiTa 

)

WILLIAM ROBERT NORRIE, ) Bk. No. 2:13-bk-25751-BR

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

WILLIAM ROBERT NORRIE, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

MARK BLISS; JOHN M. PULOS; )

KELLY T. MALLEN, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Submitted Without Oral Argument

on September 22, 2016

Filed – October 26, 2016

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Appellant William Robert Norrie pro se on brief; 

Paul R. Burns on brief for appellees.

 

Before: KURTZ, KIRSCHER and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

*This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the course of several months, Chapter 71 debtor William

Robert Norrie filed a counseled motion seeking relief from the

bankruptcy court’s contempt orders and four pro se motions also

seeking relief from the contempt orders. Norrie appealed from

some of the contempt orders, but that appeal was dismissed for

lack of prosecution. The bankruptcy court denied all of the

motions for relief from the contempt orders, but Norrie only

appealed the denial of the fourth pro se motion.

Because the contempt orders and the denials of the first

three pro se motions are all final and nonappealable, we lack

jurisdiction to review in this appeal those arguments Norrie

could have made or did make in the original contempt proceedings

or in support of the first three pro se motions.

There is only one argument of Norrie’s we can address.

Norrie claims that the bankruptcy court should have granted his

fourth pro se motion for relief on the ground that the contempt

orders are void because he no longer can purge his contempt (and

hence the contempt orders have become criminal and punitive in

nature rather than coercive). However, in denying Norrie’s

fourth pro se motion, the bankruptcy court implicitly found that

Norrie still had the ability to purge his contempt and that he

had not done everything he could to purge his contempt.

1Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. All "Local Rule" references are to

the Local Bankruptcy Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California.

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That finding was not clearly erroneous, so we AFFIRM.

FACTS

Most of the long and tortuous history of Norrie’s bankruptcy

case (and the seven other bankruptcy cases commenced by or

against Norrie and his affiliated entities) is not directly

relevant to this appeal. That history has been set forth in more

detail in the memorandum decisions this panel has issued in

Norrie’s other appeals and in other court documents. See Norrie

v. Mallen (In re Norrie), 2016 WL 4009979 (Mem. Dec.) (9th Cir.

BAP July 21, 2016); Bliss v. Norrie (In re Norrie), 2016 WL

373868 (Mem. Dec.) (9th Cir. BAP Jan. 29, 2016).

In terms of general bankruptcy background, it suffices to

say that Norrie commenced his current chapter 7 bankruptcy case

in June 2013 and that the bankruptcy court entered a default

judgment in July 2014 denying Norrie a discharge. The default

judgment resulted from terminating sanctions the bankruptcy court

imposed against Norrie based on his violation of discovery orders

in the discharge objection adversary proceeding filed against

Norrie.2

This appeal in large part concerns the court’s orders

seeking to compel Norrie to submit to examination and to produce

documents under Rule 2004 and Norrie’s failure to do so. The

relevant train of events began when one of Norrie’s creditors,

2The excerpts of record the parties provided omitted many

relevant documents and transcripts. To overcome this impediment,

we have reviewed the bankruptcy court’s electronic case docket

and its adversary proceeding dockets. We can and do take

judicial notice of their contents and the imaged documents

attached thereto. Heers v. Parsons (In re Heers), 529 B.R. 734,

738 n.3 (9th Cir. BAP 2015).

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Mark Bliss, filed a motion in May 2014 for an order granting

leave under Rule 2004 to examine Norrie and to request that

Norrie produce documents responsive to Bliss’ 88 categories of

documents requested. According to Bliss, this discovery was

necessary in order to help ascertain the true state of Norrie’s

assets, liabilities and financial condition.

Norrie filed an opposition to the motion, in which he argued

that he was in the process of objecting to Bliss’ claim and that

Bliss should not be permitted to conduct discovery under

Rule 2004 unless and until Norrie’s claim objection was

overruled. Norrie further asserted that Bliss’ document

requests related to the then-pending objection to discharge

litigation brought by other creditors as well as to the chapter 7

trustee’s fraudulent transfer litigation seeking to recover for

the benefit of the estate a parcel of real property located in

Venice Beach, California. In addition to these general

objections, Norrie further raised specific objections to certain

categories of document requests based on relevance, alleged

improper purpose, and a claimed privilege of financial privacy.

After a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order on

July 10, 2014, granting Bliss’ Rule 2004 motion in its entirety. 

The Rule 2004 order required Norrie to produce the requested

documents by July 17, 2014, and to appear for examination

(deposition) on July 24, 2014.

When Norrie failed to comply with the Rule 2004 order, Bliss

filed a motion for an order to show cause re contempt. According

to Bliss, Norrie defied the Rule 2004 order by not attending his

examination as directed and by not producing the requested

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documents. Instead of producing the requested documents,

Norrie’s counsel resent responses to document production requests

previously sought by the chapter 7 trustee, which Bliss

maintained were not adequate or appropriate responses to his

document requests.

In August 2014, the bankruptcy court entered the order to

show cause re contempt as requested by Bliss. In response to the

order to show cause, Norrie argued that the proposed contempt

sanctions – which consisted of a proposed $17,350 attorney’s fees

award and a new order (again) requiring Norrie to appear for

examination and produce documents by dates certain – were neither

coercive nor compensatory in nature but rather were punitive and

hence constituted an improper attempt by the bankruptcy court to

impose criminal contempt sanctions.

In addition, Norrie argued: (1) that the Rule 2004 order was

not specific and definite enough to be enforced; (2) that he was

prepared to purge his contempt by arranging for a new examination

date; (3) that Bliss should have initiated meet and confer

proceedings before bringing his motion for contempt; (4) that he

could not attend the examination as originally scheduled because

his son was ill; and (5) that the order to show cause was

improperly served.

After holding a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an

order on October 15, 2014 finding Norrie in contempt of the

court’s Rule 2004 order. To purge this contempt, the court

directed Norrie to produce the documents Bliss requested by no

later than October 17, to appear for examination (deposition) on

October 24 and to pay $17,350 in attorney’s fees to Bliss. 

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Norrie did not appeal the October 2014 contempt order, nor

did he comply with the order’s terms. Bliss then filed a new

motion for an order to show cause re contempt. Bliss asserted

that Norrie had willfully refused to comply with both the

bankruptcy court’s July 2014 Rule 2004 order and the court’s

October 2014 contempt order, and, consequently, Bliss requested

that the court again find Norrie in contempt. Bliss further

requested roughly $15,000 in additional compensatory sanctions

and that the court order Norrie remanded into the custody of the

U.S. Marshal’s service until he purged his contempt by producing

all documents requested and by appearing for and answering all

questions asked of him at his Rule 2004 examination.

By way of response, Norrie, through new counsel, reiterated

his claim that Bliss was not really his creditor but,

nonetheless, proposed to purge his contempt by producing the

requested documents on December 1, 2014, and by appearing for

examination on December 5, 2014, or on any other date agreeable

to both parties.

Bliss filed a reply in which he, in essence, asserted that

Norrie’s promise to purge his contempt and proposal for complying

with his discovery obligations under Rule 2004 were not credible

in light of the prior conduct of Norrie and his counsel.

On December 2, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued the order

to show cause re contempt as requested by Bliss, and set a

hearing date of February 3, 2015. The court’s order specifically

required Norrie to appear at this hearing.

Meanwhile, a different creditor – Kelly Mallen – sought and

obtained a separate order to show cause re contempt against

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Norrie.3 According to Mallen, the bankruptcy court had ordered

Norrie to reimburse Mallen $7,525.00 on account of attorney’s

fees he had incurred in obtaining an order expunging a lis

pendens, which Norrie had recorded against real property on

Pacific Avenue in Manhattan Beach, California. Mallen claimed

that Norrie had willfully violated the bankruptcy court’s

sanctions order by not paying the attorney’s fees award. He

further claimed that he should be awarded another $7,875 in

attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the motion for the order to

show cause and that the court should order Norrie remanded into

custody until Norrie purged his contempt by paying his attorney’s

fees in the aggregate amount of $15,400. Mallen alleged that

Norrie was financially capable of paying the attorney’s fees but

had chosen instead to ignore the court’s prior sanctions order. 

Mallen supported this allegation by pointing to the amounts

Norrie had stipulated to pay to his ex-wife in child support and

spousal support and to the amounts Norrie had expended in

litigating against Mallen and others.

In response, Norrie denied Mallen’s allegation regarding his

financial ability to satisfy the sanctions award. Norrie further

asserted that a finding of contempt should not be made for what

amounted to a failure to satisfy a money judgment. As Norrie

pointed out, the ordinary consequence for nonpayment of a

3Sometimes, the papers filed on behalf Mallen indicated that

another creditor, John Pulos, was participating jointly in the

Mallen initiated contempt proceedings. At other times, the

papers indicated that Mallen was acting alone. Whether Mallen

was acting alone or in concert with Pulos does not alter our

analysis or our resolution of this appeal, and we only refer to

Mallen herein for ease of reference.

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judgment debt is enforcement of the judgment by writ of execution

and other judgment enforcement remedies.

The bankruptcy court set the Mallen initiated contempt

proceedings for hearing on the same date as the hearing on the

Bliss initiated contempt proceedings – February 3, 2015. The

court’s order explicitly required the attendance of both Norrie

and his counsel at the hearing.

Norrie filed responses to both orders to show cause. Norrie

claimed that the contempt sanctions sought were punitive in

nature, rather than coercive or compensatory. With respect to

the Mallen initiated contempt proceedings, Norrie reiterated his

contention that a finding of contempt should not flow from what

amounted to nonpayment of a money judgment.

At the February 3, 2015, hearing on both orders to show

cause, the court noted that Norrie had failed to appear as

ordered and that his failure to appear was cause for issuance of

an arrest warrant in and of itself. Norrie’s counsel of record,

who did appear, argued that he and Norrie thought that his

counsel’s appearance would be sufficient regardless of what the

order said. But the court rejected that argument based on the

order’s plain language.

With respect to the Mallen initiated contempt proceedings,

the court held that the monetary sanctions requested were meant

to compensate Mallen for attorney’s fees incurred and, hence,

qualified as civil contempt sanctions. On the other hand, the

court explained, regardless of whether nonpayment of the prior

sanctions award was akin to nonpayment of a money judgment, the

court would not incarcerate Norrie based on his failure to pay. 

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As for the Bliss initiated contempt proceedings, the court

indicated that, if Norrie had appeared at the hearing as ordered,

it merely would have ordered him (again) to comply with the

Rule 2004 discovery order and the October 2014 contempt order. 

Even so, because Norrie failed to appear for the hearing, the

court stated that it was prepared to order Norrie incarcerated

until he fully complied with the Rule 2004 discovery requests.

After the hearing, the court issued three orders. The first

order held Norrie in contempt for failing to pay Mallen the prior

sanctions imposed and awarded Mallen additional attorney’s fees

in the aggregate amount of $15,400. The second order held Norrie

in contempt for willfully failing to comply with Bliss’ Rule 2004

discovery requests and awarded Bliss additional attorney’s fees

of $14,695. The third order provided for Norrie’s arrest by

federal marshals and for him to remain in custody until he fully

complied with Bliss’ Rule 2004 discovery requests.

Norrie filed an appeal from the February 2015 contempt

orders, but that appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

In March 2015, Norrie filed a motion effectively seeking to

alter the terms of the February contempt orders to permit him an

opportunity to purge his contempt without first being

incarcerated. Norrie admitted that he left the country shortly

before the February 3, 2015, contempt hearings but nonetheless

contended that he was not a fugitive and did not flee the country

in order to evade his required appearance. According to Norrie,

he left the country only in order to be in England to address

health issues involving his parents. Norrie also reiterated

that, before the February 3 hearings occurred, he was under the

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(mistaken) impression that his counsel’s appearance would

suffice. Additionally, Norrie proposed to purge his contempt, if

the court permitted him to do so and if it rescinded the warrant

for his arrest, by having his attorney forward to Bliss the

documents requested and by appearing in the United States for his

Rule 2004 examination on a mutually agreed upon date. 

Alternately, he proposed appearing in England in person, by video

or by telephone conference. According to Norrie, the contempt

orders as currently worded were punitive and criminal in nature

because they unnecessarily required his incarceration before he

could carry out his latest promise to comply.

In response, Bliss and Mallen pointed out that no documents

had yet been produced as ordered by the court, even though Norrie

had the capability of complying with the document requests

through his counsel of record. They also pointed out that Norrie

had promised on a number of prior occasions that he would comply

with the Rule 2004 discovery requests but had not done so. As an

alternative to Norrie’s proposal for purging his contempt without

incarceration, Bliss and Mallen suggested that Norrie should

immediately turn over, without objection, all documents

responsive to Bliss’ document requests and that Norrie should

return to the United States and voluntarily surrender to federal

marshals. Bliss and Mallen further proposed expedited procedures

for convening Norrie’s Rule 2004 examination so that Norrie’s

time in custody could be minimized if he properly cooperated in

the Rule 2004 examination process. In essence, Bliss and Mallen

contended that withdrawing the coercive incarceration sanction

before Norrie fully complied with the Rule 2004 discovery

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requests would only encourage Norrie to continue his pattern of

noncompliance with the bankruptcy court’s orders. 

At the hearing on Norrie’s motion seeking to alter the terms

of the bankruptcy court’s February contempt orders, the

bankruptcy court denied Norrie’s motion without prejudice. The

bankruptcy court specifically declined to modify its prior

contempt orders so as to postpone or remove the provision for

Norrie’s arrest and incarceration. After carefully and

thoughtfully considering the issue of Norrie’s compliance, the

court expressed the belief that, given Norrie’s past conduct,

Norrie would not comply with the Rule 2004 discovery requests –

particularly the production of documents – in the absence of

incarceration. On the other hand, the court expressed a

willingness to revisit the issue of whether incarceration was

necessary if Norrie fully complied with the document requests. 

The bankruptcy court entered an order in April 2015 denying

Norrie’s motion to modify the terms of the February contempt

orders. The order specified that Norrie could not set a hearing

on a further motion of this type before he fully complied,

without objection, to all of Bliss’ 88 categories of document

requests. The order also specified that “Debtor Norrie remains a

disentitled fugitive, subject to arrest and remand to the Federal

Marshal.” Norrie did not appeal this order.4

4This was not the first time the bankruptcy court declared

Norrie to be a disentitled fugitive. On March 12, 2015, the

bankruptcy court entered an order denying Norrie’s motion for

sanctions against Mallen and his counsel Paul Burns because, as

the court put it, Norrie had fled the country to evade the

(continued...)

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Between August and December, 2015, Norrie filed, in pro per,

four additional motions seeking to modify or vacate the February

2015 contempt orders and the bankruptcy court’s April 2015 order

stating that he was a disentitled fugitive and restricting him

from seeking modification of the contempt orders without first

fully complying with Bliss’ 88 document requests. The arguments

in Norrie’s August through December pro se motions are in large

part duplicative of each other and also duplicative of the

arguments he raised during the contempt proceedings. For

instance, Norrie repeatedly claims that neither Bliss nor Mallen

are his creditors, that they are defrauding the court by claiming

to be his creditors and that they should not be permitted to

continue to seek discovery under Rule 2004 because they are not

his creditors. Norrie also argued that he does not meet the

requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2466 to qualify as a disentitled

fugitive.

Norrie additionally renewed his argument that the contempt

sanctions imposed – particularly the sanction providing for his

incarceration – are criminal rather than civil in nature. In his

October and December, 2015, pro se motions, he sets forth new

grounds for this argument. In essence, Norrie claimed that he no

longer had the funds to pay an attorney to collect and deliver

the responsive documents to Bliss and that he has no one else to

do this for him. Consequently, Norrie explained, if he is

4(...continued)

February 2015 contempt orders and that, under the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine, Norrie’s status as a fugitive precluded

him from pursuing the sanctions motion against Mallen and Burns.

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arrested the moment he returns to the United States, there is no

way that he can produce the documents requested and, hence, no

way he can purge his contempt – which renders the incarceration

sanction punitive and criminal in nature. As Norrie put it:

“Given the fact that 75% of the 88 categories [of documents

requested] either cannot be produced prior to . . . arrest . . .

or cannot be produced at all, it is physically impossible for

Norrie to purge the contempt as the ruling currently stands.” 

Motion for hearing to determine purging of contempt, etc.

(Oct. 13, 2015) at p. 5 of 27; see also id. at 8 of 27.

No responses were filed to the first three of Norrie’s pro

se motions, and the court denied all three of these motions

without holding a hearing. In its orders denying these motions,

the bankruptcy court merely stated that Norrie had failed to

demonstrate good cause in support of the motions.

In December 2015, Mallen and Bliss filed a joint opposition

to Norrie’s fourth pro se motion. According to Mallen and Bliss,

Norrie’s fourth pro se motion did not offer any legitimate

explanation why, after roughly 17 months of being under court

order to produce documents, Norrie had not produced a single

document responsive to Bliss’ 88 document requests. Mallen and

Bliss further asserted that their counsel remained ready, willing

and able to receive any documents Norrie produced in response to

Bliss’ document requests, and counsel pledged to promptly report

to the court the status of any such production, in accordance

with the bankruptcy court’s April 2015 order on Norrie’s first

(counseled) motion seeking to modify the February contempt

orders.

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On December 18, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered an order

denying Norrie’s fourth pro se motion seeking to vacate or modify 

the court’s February 2015 contempt orders and its April 2015

order. Norrie timely appealed the December 18, 2015 order.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). To the extent we have jurisdiction

over this appeal, that jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. What is the permissible scope of this appeal?

2. Does the bankruptcy court’s incarceration sanction qualify

as a criminal contempt sanction or a civil contempt

sanction?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The issue regarding the permissible scope of this appeal

requires us to examine our jurisdiction, which we review de novo.

See Wolkowitz v. Beverly (In re Beverly), 374 B.R. 221, 230 (9th

Cir. BAP 2007), aff'd in part & dismissed in part, 551 F.3d 1092

(9th Cir. 2008).

The issue regarding whether the bankruptcy court’s

incarceration sanction qualifies as civil or criminal hinges on

the correctness of the bankruptcy court’s determination that

Norrie has the ability to purge his contempt by producing the

documents requested. That determination was a finding of fact,

which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. SEC v.

Elmas Trading Corp., 824 F.2d 732, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1987).

A factual finding is not clearly erroneous unless it is

illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. Retz

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v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

Before we conduct any review of the bankruptcy court’s

December 18, 2015 order denying Norrie’s fourth pro se motion, we 

first must ascertain what effect – if any – Norrie’s failure to

file (or perfect) appeals from the court’s other contempt-related

orders has on our jurisdiction. We have an independent duty to

consider the extent of our jurisdiction even when the parties

have not raised the issue. See Couch v. Telescope, Inc.,

611 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2010).

Norrie stated in his fourth pro se motion that the motion

was procedurally based on Civil Rule 60(b), which is made

applicable in bankruptcy contested matters by Rule 9024. How

(and whether) we address the denial of Norrie’s Civil Rule 60(b)

motion depends in part on whether the bankruptcy court’s February

2015 contempt orders were final orders. If they were not final,

the bankruptcy court’s denial of relief under Civil Rule 60(b)

was appropriate for the simple reason that Civil Rule 60(b), on

its face, only applies to final judgments and orders. 

In any event, we hold that the bankruptcy court’s contempt

orders do qualify as final orders. In order to explain how we 

reach this holding, we must describe the difference between

criminal and civil contempt sanctions – particularly in the

bankruptcy context.

As first decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 

Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1192-95 (9th

Cir. 2003), bankruptcy courts have no authority to impose

significant criminal contempt sanctions; under § 105(a), they

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only may impose civil contempt sanctions. Dyer also described

the difference between compensatory civil contempt sanctions and

criminal contempt fines:

Civil penalties must either be compensatory or designed

to coerce compliance. In contrast, a flat

unconditional fine totaling even as little as $50 could

be criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent

opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through

compliance, and the fine is not compensatory. This is

so regardless of whether the non-compensatory fine is

payable to the court or to the complainant. Whether

the fine is payable to the complainant may, however, be

one relevant factor in determining whether the fine is

compensatory or punitive.

In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). On this record, the attorney’s fees awards that

the bankruptcy court granted all qualify as compensatory civil

contempt sanctions. The bankruptcy court repeatedly stated in 

its rulings that the monetary sanctions it was awarding were

meant to compensate Bliss and Mallen for the attorney’s fees they

incurred in enforcing the bankruptcy court’s orders.

As for the incarceration sanction, incarceration can be a

civil contempt sanction, but only if the contemnor can purge the

contempt and thereby free himself from custody by complying with

the court’s orders. In other words, a “civil contemnor ‘carries

the keys of his prison in his own pocket’ because civil contempt

is ‘intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what

he had refused to do.’” Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101,

1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range

Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)); see also United States v. United

Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947) (holding that

civil contempt sanctions only may be imposed for two purposes:

either to coerce compliance or to compensate the other side for

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losses sustained as a result of the contempt).

Here, the bankruptcy court imposed the incarceration

sanction as a civil contempt sanction. The patent purpose of the

sanction was to coerce Norrie to comply with Bliss’ Rule 2004

discovery requests, and the February 2015 contempt orders

contained a provision indicating that the incarceration only

would last until Norrie purged himself of the contempt by

complying with the Rule 2004 discovery requests. Because the

contempt orders afforded Norrie with the means to prevent or

limit his incarceration, the incarceration sanction imposed

against Norrie was civil in nature. See United Mine Workers of

Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994).

Civil contempt orders typically are considered interlocutory

– not final – until the conclusion of the underlying litigation.

Elmas Trading Corp., 824 F.2d at 732. In the bankruptcy context,

however, when a civil contempt order is entered as a stand-alone

matter and not as part of another pending adversary proceeding or

contested matter, then the contempt order ordinarily is treated

as final upon entry. Stasz v. Gonzalez (In re Stasz), 387 B.R.

271, 276 (9th Cir. BAP 2008). Stasz explained that a civil

contempt order entered as a stand-alone matter in a bankruptcy

case needed to be considered final and immediately appealable

upon entry because there was no other clear time at which such a

contempt order could or would become final. Id. 

 Here, as in Stasz, the debtor violated orders requiring 

examination and the production of documents pursuant to

Rule 2004. Id. at 273-74. By its very nature, discovery

conducted under Rule 2004 is a stand-alone matter. See

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In re Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932, 943 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Clark v.

Farris-Ellison (In re Farris-Ellison), 2015 WL 5306600, at *3

(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2015). Accordingly, we consider the

contempt orders entered against Norrie to enforce the bankruptcy

court’s Rule 2004 order to have been final and immediately

appealable.

Having concluded that the contempt orders were final, we

next consider the scope of our appellate review. Norrie filed

this appeal after the denial of his fourth pro se motion seeking

to modify or set aside the February 2015 contempt orders and the

April 2015 order denying Norrie’s counseled motion to modify the

contempt orders. Norrie’s appeal from the February 2015 contempt

orders was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and Norrie did not

appeal the April 2015 order. Nor did he appeal any of the orders

denying his first three pro se motions.

Because the contempt orders and the orders denying the first

three pro se motions are all now final and nonappealable,

Norrie’s attempt to argue in this appeal matters that were or

should have been raised in the original contempt proceedings or

in support of his first three pro se motions constitutes an

impermissible collateral attack on the prior, final orders. See

Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Needler (In re Grantham Bros.),

922 F.2d 1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting as frivolous

appellant’s attempted collateral attack of bankruptcy court’s

final, non-appealable sale order); Alakozai v. Citizens Equity

First Credit Union (In re Alakozai), 499 B.R. 698, 704 (9th Cir.

BAP 2013) (“A final order of a federal court may not be

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collaterally attacked.”).5

Put another way, the denials of the first three pro se

motions all were separately appealable final post-judgment

orders. See Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir.

2004); TAAG Linhas Aereas de Angola v. Transamerica Airlines,

Inc., 915 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990). Norries’ failure to

timely appeal those orders deprives this Panel of jurisdiction to

review those denials and the issues addressed therein. A timely

filed notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder

v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978); Slimick v.

Silva (In re Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 306 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Slimick is particularly instructive. In Slimick, the bankruptcy

court entered an order sustaining the bankruptcy trustee’s

exemption claim objection. Id. at 305. After the time for

filing an appeal from that order had run, the Slimicks filed a

motion requesting that the bankruptcy court enter written

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. Several months

later, the bankruptcy court entered written findings and

conclusions and also entered a judgment disallowing the Slimicks’

exemption claim. Id. at 305-06. The Slimicks timely appealed

the subsequent judgment but not the prior order. Id. On appeal,

the Ninth Circuit held that the Slimicks’ appeal was untimely and

that the entry of the subsequent judgment did not “constitute a

second final disposition” that would start over the appeal

5In light of our conclusion that the contempt order and the

orders denying the first 3 pro se motions are final and

nonappealable, we need not address the impact, if any, of the

order denying the counseled motion in this appeal.

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period, nor did it extend the original appeal period, which ran

when the bankruptcy court entered its original order disallowing

the exemption claim. Id. at 306-07.

Here, Norrie could not extend the time to appeal the

contempt orders or the orders denying his first three pro se

motions by filing and obtaining a ruling on his fourth pro se

motion. To hold otherwise would undermine the mandatory and

jurisdictional nature of the appeal filing deadline. Thus, the

issues raised and determined by the bankruptcy court’s contempt

orders and its denial of Norrie’s first three pro se motions are

beyond the permissible scope of this appeal.

Our holding regarding the limited permissible scope of this

appeal is consistent with United States v. Wheeler, 952 F.2d 326,

327 (9th Cir. 1991). The Wheeler court held that the denial of a

motion seeking to vacate a contempt order is “nonappealable” when

the motion to vacate is premised on grounds that existed at the

time of entry of the contempt order and the contemnor did not

timely appeal the contempt order. As Wheeler explained, to hold

otherwise would enable the contemnor to indefinitely extend the

appeal period as to issues that could have and should have been

addressed in the original contempt proceedings or in an appeal

following the contempt proceedings. Id.

In sum, to the extent Norrie did raise or could have raised

his arguments against the contempt orders in the initial contempt

proceedings or in support of his first three pro se motions, we

cannot address those arguments in this appeal from the denial of

his fourth pro se motion.

Many of Norrie’s pro se arguments should have been asserted,

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if at all, in response to the original contempt motion. For

example, in his third and fourth pro se motions, Norrie goes

through the 88 categories of documents set forth in the original

document requests and asserts that documents responsive to 26 of

the categories requested do not exist, documents responsive to 9

of the categories requested are not within his possession or

control, documents responsive to 28 of the categories requested

might be in storage in Los Angeles, documents responsive to 2 of

the categories requested should not have to be produced because

the requests are subject to “legitimate objection” and documents

responsive to 23 of the categories requested are not subject to

any impediment that would prevent Norrie from producing them –

even though he has not actually produced them.

Even if we were to assume that Norrie’s assertions regarding

the document categories are truthful and accurate, and even if we

were to assume that these assertions partly mitigate the

bankruptcy court’s contempt finding (which they do not), it

simply is much too little – and much too late – an effort on

Norrie’s part to comply with the bankruptcy court’s original

order requiring Norrie to produce documents. Nothing in our

review of the entire record indicates why Norrie could not have

provided this same information (and produced whatever documents

were available to him) years ago – at the time the bankruptcy

court entered its original Rule 2004 order – or at any time

thereafter.

In any event, for purposes of this appeal, we cannot

consider Norrie’s assertions addressing the individual categories

of documents he was directed to produce because that issue (and

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virtually all of the other issues set forth in his fourth pro se

motion) are beyond the permissible scope of this appeal. As we

explained above, we lack jurisdiction over these issues because

Norrie did not file (or perfect) appeals from the contempt orders

or from the orders denying Norrie’s first three pro se motions. 

We only can address the merits of one argument raised by

Norrie on appeal. Norrie contends on appeal that the bankruptcy

court erred by not granting his fourth pro se motion because

there is no longer any way for Norrie to purge his contempt. 

According to Norrie, even if the incarceration sanction

originally was intended to be coercive rather than punitive, his

inability to purge the contempt by producing all of the documents

requested caused the incarceration sanction to change into a

purely punitive criminal contempt sanction. Norrie correctly

points out that civil contempt sanctions providing for 

incarceration can become criminal in nature when the contemnor no

longer has the ability to purge the contempt. See Elmas Trading

Corp., 824 F.2d at 732–33. Norrie additionally points out that

bankruptcy courts do not have authority to impose criminal

contempt sanctions. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192-95.

For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding

that bankruptcy court issuance of a coercive civil contempt

sanction that later becomes criminal (because it no longer can be

purged) is a jurisdictional defect and is the type of

jurisdictional defect that could render the court’s contempt

order void. But see United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,

559 U.S. 260, 271–72 (2010) (indicating that a jurisdictional

defect only is sufficient to justify Civil Rule 60(b)(4) relief

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from a void judgment in “the exceptional case in which the court

that rendered judgment lacked even an ‘arguable basis’ for

jurisdiction.”).

Even if we make these assumptions, Norrie’s argument does

not justify reversal of the bankruptcy court’s denial of Norrie’s

fourth pro se motion. In denying Norrie’s fourth pro se motion,

the bankruptcy court did not explicitly find that Norrie still

had the ability to produce the requested documents and purge his

contempt, but that finding is implicit based on the entirety of

the record and on the comments the bankruptcy court made at the

time of the hearing on Norrie’s first (counseled) motion seeking

to modify the contempt orders. At that time, after thoughtfully

considering Norrie’s contentions, the bankruptcy court stated

that Norrie had “virtually zero” credibility on the Rule 2004

order compliance issue. The bankruptcy court indicated that

Norrie only could recover some amount of credibility by actually

producing some of the requested documents. The bankruptcy court

further indicated that it might be willing to revisit the issue

regarding the purge provision of the contempt orders once Norrie

actually had produced the documents as requested.

In support of his inability to purge argument, Norrie

asserted in his appeal brief and in his fourth pro se motion that

he cannot gather together and produce some of the documents

requested while in England and that, if he returns to the United

States, he immediately will be taken into custody, which also

will prevent him from gathering together and producing some of

the documents. Norrie also asserted that documents responsive to

some of the document requests do not exist and that others are

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not within his possession or control. Notwithstanding Norrie’s

assertions, the alleged state of affairs regarding Norrie’s

efforts and ability to purge his contempt did not change

drastically from the time of his first (counseled) motion seeking

to modify the contempt orders to the time of Norrie’s fourth pro

se motion. More importantly, nothing had changed to increase

Norrie’s credibility regarding the extent of his efforts to

comply with the document requests. 

Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the

bankruptcy court’s implicit finding – that Norrie still had the

ability to purge his contempt at the time of the denial of

Norrie’s fourth pro se motion – was clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

court’s order denying Norrie’s fourth pro se motion.

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