### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 20

- 00057

- CV

Appellants, Clear Diamond, Inc. and Kyle Wartenbee // Cross

- Appellants, Rebeca Zapata, individually and as representative of the Estate of Flavio Zapata ; Estela Zapata ; and Sergio Z a p ata Montoya

v.
Appellee, Rebecca Zapata, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Flavio Zapata // Cross

- Appellee s , Clear Diamond, Inc. and Kyle Wartenbee

FROM THE 452ND DISTRICT COURT OF MCCULLOCH COUNTY NO. 2019013 , TH E HONORABLE ROBERT R . HOFMANN , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Clear Diam on d, Inc. and Kyl e Wartenbee (collectively, the Plaintiffs) appeal from

the trial court ’ s order denying their Texas Citizens Participation Act (T C P A) motion

, which

sought dism issa l of a motion for sanctions filed by Rebecca Zapata

. See Te x. Ci v. Pra c. & Rem.

Code §§ 27.00 1

- 0 11

. Rebecca Zapa ta , Estela Zapata, and Sergio Zapata Mon toya (collectively,

the Zapatas) cross

- appeal f rom the trial court ’ s order den ying their m otion s t o tr ansfer venue. 1

Because we conclude that Rebecca met her burden under t he TCPA to e stabl ish a prima facie

cas e and that the Plaintiff s met their burden to establish that ven ue is proper in the county in

which they fi led suit , w e affirm the tri a l court ’ s or der s

.

1 Be cau s e several of the parties s h ar e the same las t n ame of Zapata
, for clarity we will refer t o them by the ir first names wh en r efer ring to any of them individually

.2 BACKGROUND

T he dispute underlying th is interlocutory ap pe al and cr oss

- ap peal ar ises from a

c ollision that occ urred in C rockett County between two tracto r

- trailer s, one oper a ted by Flavio

Zap a ta and the other operated by Warten bee

. W hen the co l l isi on occurred

, Wartenbee ’ s tractor

trailer was carr y ing a ta nker fille d with l iqu i fi ed natural gas , and the two tracto r

- trailers ignited

upon impact. F lavio die d as a result of the collision.

T he Plaintiffs fi led suit against the Zapatas i n Mc Cull och Coun t y , asserting

claims for general negl igenc e and for negligent entrustment, hiring, traini ng, and su p erv is ion

.

T he P laintiffs allege that the tractor

- trailer operated by F lavio w as ow ne d by his wid ow , R ebe cca ,

alo ng with other fami ly mem b e rs, Estel a and Se rg io

, and that the collisi on occurre d because

Fl avio disr egarded a stop sign located at an intersection as W a rtenbee ent ered the intersection

. According to the Plaintiffs ’ allegat ion s, W artenb ee sustaine d pers onal i nj ur ies , and the tracto r

trailer oper a ted by W ar ten bee and its cargo, ow ne d by Clear Dia mon d, were destroyed.

In addi ti on , the Pl aintif

fs nam ed L oneso me Do ve Logi st ics , LLC a s a d efendant

in the ir suit. T he Plaintiffs a llege that C lear Diamond cont ra c t ed wit h Lon esome Dove to

dispatch a dri ver to transport th e tanker

, t hat L one s ome Dov e d i sp at c h ed Wartenbee t o conduct

th e tr an sp o rt , a nd that Lon esom e Dove was n egligen t in dis patching W artenbee in dange rous

weather condition s. The Plaintiffs allege th a t venue is proper in McCu lloch County be cause

McCulloc h County is the county of the pri ncipal office of Lonesome Dove and bec ause

the ir cl aim s a gains t the Zapatas “ a ri s [e] out of the s ame tra nsaction , occu rr e n ce, or series of

tr ansactions. ” S ee id. § § 15.002 (a) , .005.

In respon se to the suit, Rebecca filed a motion t o transfer venue, assert in g that

M c C ulloc h Co unty i s not a count y of p r oper venue and r e q uestin g t h a t the tr ia l cour t t rans fer the3

su it t o Webb Cou nty , where her late husband ’ s e state is being admin istered

. See id. § 15.031.

Speci fically, Rebecca argue s in her motion to transfer venue that th e P laintiff s cannot r e ly on

Lon es ome Dove ’ s p rincipal offic e to est a bl ish venu e in M cCu ll oc h C ou nty becaus e “ C le a r

Diamond, Inc . and Lon es om e D ove L o gistics, LLC are one entity f or the purpose of venue ” and

a “ plaintiff ca nnot sue in the county of its o wn resid enc e

. ” Te n days later, E stel a Zapata and

Se rg io Zapa ta Monto y a filed th eir own m ot io n to transfer v enu e , similarly asser ting that ve nu e is

i m p roper in McCulloch C oun ty beca use Clear Diam o nd and Lonesome Dove “ are essentially

one entity for purposes of the w reck. ” 2 The Plaintiffs and Lonesome Dove filed respo nses to the

motions to t ransf

er venue , disput ing th e Zapatas ’ assert io n tha t Cl ear Diamond and Lon esome

D ove are, in effect , one pla intiff

.

Af ter limited dis covery , Reb ecc a filed a motion for sanc tions ag ainst the Pla int iff s ,

c ontend ing that Clea r Diamond sued Lonesome Dove fo r the sol e purpo s e of “ m an ufactur [ing]

venue in M cCul lo ch County ” and that “ the so le basis of [Clear Diamond ’ s] venu e fact s against

L onesome D ove is the false claim that Chris Gre e n ( Clear Diamon d ’ s o w n f orema n) w as acti n g

as an agent for Lonesome Dove ” when he d ispa t che d Warte n bee. Rebecca requests t hat th e tr ial

court “ st rike the offending and f rivolous cl aims a ga i nst Lonesome Dove, and transfer this case

to We bb C ou nty , Texas. ” I n re s pons e , th e Pl aintiff s filed a motion to dismiss the motion for

sanc tions

, pu rsua nt t o the TCPA.

On January 14, 20 20, foll ow in g a hea ring

, t he tri al court sig ned o rde r s de nyi ng

the P lai ntiffs ’ T CPA motion to di s miss and denying the Zapata s ’ motion s to tra ns fer ven ue

. The

2 I n the alternative, the Z apa tas requ est e d a tran s fer o f venu e due t o “ inco nveni ence and in t h e i nterest of ju st ic e , ” und er Section 15.00 2(b). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.0 0 2( b)

. On a ppe al , t he Zap ata s do no t conte nd that the t rial c o urt er red i n den ying their mo tion s to transfer venue on that g rou nd. See id

. § 15.0 0 2( c ) ( decision to gran t or deny trans fe r under Sec tion 15.002(b) is not gr ounds for appeal).4

Plaintiffs filed a n otice of appeal from the trial court ’ s deni al of their TCPA motio n to dismis s

.

Se e id § 51.014(a)(12) (allowi ng for i nte rlocu tor y appeal fro m ord er d e nying TCPA mo tion to

dismiss). The Za p ata s filed a notice of cross

- appeal from the trial court ’ s denial of th eir motions

to transfer venue. See id. § 15.003 (a)

.

D ISCUSSION

I. Ap p e al of t he trial court ’ s d eni al of the Plai ntiff s ’ TCPA m otion to d i smiss

I n four iss ues, the Plaintif fs a s sert that the trial c o urt erred in denying their TCPA

motion to dismi ss

. 3 Because i t informs our analy s is of the issues, w e begin by summarizin g the

r elevant statutory provisions.

T C PA L e gal F ra mework

T he L eg is l ature enacted the TCPA t o “ en courage and s afeg ua rd t he constitu t i o n al

rights o f persons to pet it i o n, s peak f reel y, associate f

reel y , and other w ise parti cipa te in gove rnmen t

to the ma xi mum e x t ent per mitted by la w a n d, at th e s am e t ime

, pr otect the r igh ts o f a pe rson to

file meri to rio us lawsuits f or dem on stra ble injury

. ” I n re Pancha karla , 602 S.W.3d 536, 538

( Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curi a m ) ( quoti ng Tex. Civ. P rac. & Rem. Code § 27 .00 2 )

.

T o a c hieve this balance

, t h e T C PA all o w s for th e “ ex pedit ed co nsi dera t ion of any suit that

appe ars to stifle the de fendant ’ s communication on a matter of public concer n. ” Id. ( quoting

In re Lipsk

y , 460 S.W .3d 579 , 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding ) )

. T his exp edited consideration

3 The Leg is la tur e mos t r ecentl y ame n d ed t h e TCPA in 2 019

, and the amend ed versio n o f the statute appl ies to actions file d on or after Sep t ember 1, 2019

. 3 Se e Act of M ay 17, 2019, 8 6 th Leg., R.S., c h

. 3 78, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 68 4 ( cod ified at Tex . C i v. Prac. & Re m. Co de § § 27.0 0 1 , .00 3, .00 5

- .00 7, .007 5 , .009

- . 010). Be cause th e lawsui t underlying this a ppeal w as filed before September 1

, 2019, th e am endme nt s do not a pply , and a ll cita tions to the T C P A in
t his opinion are to the former version of the statute. See Crea tive O il & Gas, L LC v. L ona Hills Ranch, LLC , 591 S.W .3d 127, 129 (Te x. 2019)

.5

i s a cco mplished t hro u gh a moti o n

- to

- d i sm i s s procedure , whi ch i s initiated when a party file s “ a

m otion to dismiss th e legal action

. ” S ee Tex. C i v

. Pra c . & Rem. Co de § 27 .003

.

A ruling on a TCPA motion t o d ismiss in volves a “ t h ree

- st ep decisio nal process. ”

C reative O i l & G a s , L

L C v. Lona Hil l s R an ch, LLC

, 591 S.W

. 3d 127, 132 (Tex. 2019)

. Under

th e first step , the p art y mo ving for dism issal must show by a preponderance of the ev idence that

the TCPA applies to the “ legal act i on ” that i s the subject of the moti on to dism iss

. See Te x . Civ.

Pra c. & R e m . C ode § § 27. 00 3 (a) , .005(b) ; see In re Lipsky , 460 S.W.3d at 586

- 87 (stating that

movan t must show b y pr eponderance of evidence that nonmov ant ’ s c laim is based on, relates to,

or in respons e to mova nt ’ s exercise of right of free speec h, right to petition, righ t of association )

.

I f the m ovant satisfie s that burden

, the n u nder the sec o nd ste p , th e burde n shif ts to t h e

nonmo v ant to estab lish “ b y c l ea r and s p e ci fi c e v idenc e a prima fa c i e c ase fo r e ach e ssen tial

element o f the claim in ques tion

. ” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27 .0 05(c )

. Alter natively,

the nonm ovant ca n a voi d its b urden o f demonstra ting a p r i ma facie c ase entirely by showi ng

that one of the TCPA ’ s exe mptions app li es

. Se e id. § 2 7

. 010( a)(3) ; M o r rison v

. P r o

fanch ik

,

578 S.W. 3d 676, 680 (Tex. App.

— Austin 201 9, no p et.) (e xplainin g that “ [i] f an ac ti on fa lls

under a TCPA exemption

, the T CPA does no t apply and ma y n o t b e used t o dis m is s th e acti on ” )

. Finally, i f the TCPA a

pp l i es and t he nonmo va n t party s ati s f i e s i ts b u rd en of pr ese nt ing a

prim a fac i e case , t he burde n shift s b ack to t he mova nt to estab lish by a preponderance of the

evidenc e each es se n tial elemen t of a valid def ense to the nonmovant ’ s claim

. Tex. Civ . Prac

. &

Rem . Code § 27.0 05( d )

.

In det ermi ning whether a legal action should be dismissed under the TCPA, the

court must consider “ the pleadings and supporting and opp osing affidavi ts stat ing the facts on

which the lia bility or defense is based. ” Id. § 27.00 6( a)

. We revi ew a t rial court ’ s ru ling on a6

motio n to dism iss, including whether each party has carried i ts resp e ctive bu rden , by applying a

de novo standard of review

. Grant v

. P ivot Tech. Sols

. , Lt d

. , 556 S.W.3d 865, 887 (Tex. App.

—

Austin 2018, pet. de ni ed)

.

Here, a lthoug h t he tria l court di d n ot specify th e re ason for its decision to d e ny the

Pl a intiffs ’ TCPA motion to dismiss

, in this appeal, the Plai ntiffs have ch allenged al l potent ial

grounds raised b elow

. Tha t is, t he Plaintif fs a rgue that the t ri al court err ed i n denying their

TCP A motion to di smiss be cau se th e y met their burden to dem o nstr ate that the TCPA a pplies to

R e bec ca ’ s motion for sanc tion s and because Rebecca f ai le d to meet her burden t o es ta blish a
prima facie case for sanction s or, al te r natively

, t hat on e of the T CPA ’ s exe mp tio n s applies.

P rima F a cie C ase

Althou gh the parties dispute whether the TCPA applies to Rebecca ’ s motion for

sanction s , including wheth er the motion falls under the TCPA ’ s bodily

- injury exemption

, w e will

assum e without deci ding that the TCPA appl ie s and consider wheth er Rebecca failed to carry

her burden of “establish [ ing] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essent ial

element of her clai m

. ”

A p rima f

ac ie case “ r efers to evidence suffici en t as a matte r of law to establish a

g iven fact if it is n ot rebutted or contr adicted

. ” In re Lipsky , 460 S.W.3d at 59 0

. “ It is the

‘ minimum quantum of e vidence necessary to supp ort a rational inferenc e that th e allegation of

fact is tru e

. ’ ” Id

. (quoti ng In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.

, 136 S.W.3d 218 , 223 (Tex.

2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam ) ) . Although the trial court may consi der pleadings as

evidence under the TCPA, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Co de § 27.006(a )

, Serafine v. Blunt

,

466 S.W.3d 3 5 2

, 357 ( Tex . App.

— Austin 20 15 , no pe t.)

, and the nonmova nt may satisfy its7

prima facie burden using circumstantial evidence, the Act does require more than “mere notice

ple ading, ” In re L ipsky , 460 S.W .3d at 59 0

- 91 . Consequent ly, “clear and specific ev id enc e”

m eans tha t “the plaintiff must provide enough deta il to show the factual basis for its claim.”

Bedford v. Spassoff

, 520 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017)

. In determining whether the nonm ovant

has met this burd en, the court vie ws the evidence in the lig ht mo st f avora ble to the nonmovant.

War ner Bros. Entm’t, In c. v. Jones
, 5 38 S.W.3d 781, 801 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2017)

, aff’d

,

611 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2020)

.

Rebecca moved for sanc tions aga inst the Plain tiffs for filing groundles s or

f rivolous pleadings under C ha p ter 10 o f th e Civil Practi ce and Reme d ies Code an d Rule 1 3 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure

. To prevail on her motion for sa nctions, Rebecca must show that

(1) the Plaintiffs ’ pl eading was brough t for an improper p urpo se; (2) there were no grounds for

t he lega l ar gume nts advance d; or (3) the allegations and fact ual conte nt ions lack any evidentiary

support

. S ee Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem. Code § 10.001 ; Tex. R . Civ. P. 13

. To make thi s

determin ation, the trial court must objec tively ask whether the Plaintiff s and t heir cou nsel made a

r easonable in quiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim at the time the suit was filed. S ee
Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lovelace , 243 S.W.3 d 244

, 254 (Tex. App.

— Aust in 2007, no pet. )

.

In her motion for sanctions, R ebecc a allege s that the Plaintiffs fal sely claimed that

Ch ris Green was acting as an agent for Lonesome Dove when he dispatched Wartenbee during

dangerous conditions and that this allegation was made fo r the imp roper purpose of

“m anufactu ring ” ve nue in M cC ulloch County

, a county where venue ot herwise would not ex is t

in this case. In addition, Re becca alleges tha t Lonesome Dove’s sole owner and employee

, Kelly Green, has no k nowled ge of the dis patch or the accident and that Ch ris Green was acting

on be hal f of Clear Diam ond and not Lon e some Dove when he dis patched Wartenbee

.8 In support of h er response to the Plaintiffs ’ TCPA motion

, Rebecca att ached

exc er pts from Kelly Gr een’s depo sition and Wartenbee ’ s de posi t ion

. I n her deposition, Kelly

Gree n testifie d that Chris Gr een is her husband but th at she is Lonesome D ove’s sole owner and

only employee

. Kelly Green also st ated that she is “ prim arily res ponsibl e for operating

Lonesome Do ve ” and that “if Lones o me Dove ha d any a ctiv ity in relation to [Wartenbee’s ]

load, [she] w ould be the one who would have known about it .” I n hi s deposition testimony

,

Wartenbee state d that he was operating under the a uthority and license of MK Gas

, which he

un derstood to be the s ame compan y as Cle a r Di amond, when he transpo rt ed the liqu if ied gas ;

t hat Ch ris Green w as also transporting un der the aut h ority of MK Ga s ; and that Chris Green

gave Wartenbee the disp atch instructions that le d to the collision with Flavio

. Fin ally, Rebe cca

atta c hed d ocuments showing th at Chris Gr een w orks as “th e natural gas liqui ds foreman ” f o r

MK Gas

, and that

, according to Secretary of State filings, Clear Diamond o perates u nder the

assumed name “MK Transpor t.”

We conclude that Rebe cca ’ s factua l a lle gation s and evidence

, if uncon t r a dicted,

are suf ficient to support sanctions a gainst Loneso m e Dove. 4 More spec ifically, we con clude that

t he factual allegations and the evidence , viewed in the light most favorable to Rebec ca, sugges t

4 The Plaintiffs contest th e allegations made by Rebec ca in h er motion for sa nctions

. In thei r app ell ant s ’ b ri ef, the Plaintiffs outline evidence pre sented to the trial court that

, in t heir view , su p port s their clai m that Chris Green was acting as an agent for Lonesome Dove when he disp atched Wartenbee . Howe ver, t hi s evidence d oes not conclusively negate Re b e cc a ’ s cl aim that the suit against Lonesome Dove is groundless

, and we are not t asked with de c iding wh o should ul timately prevail on the mo tion for sanction s

. See Low v. He nry , 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2 007) ( im position of sanctions reviewed for abuse o f di scretion). Instead

, we must view the evidence in th e ligh t most favorable to Rebecca to d e termine whether she established a
pr ima facie case to pre vent her motion for sa nctions from being dismissed

. S ee D yk e v. Hall

, No. 03

- 18

- 00457

- CV, 2019 Tex. App

. LE XIS 9136, at *1 6 n

. 4 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 17, 201 9, no pet.) ( mem. op.)

. A pplying that s tandard, we conclude that R ebecca m et that b urden

.9

t hat C h ris Gr een was a cting as a n agent for Clear D i a mon d and not Lon esome Dove when he

d ispatched Wartenbee and that a reasonable i nvestigation by Clear Diamond would have

revealed this fact

. 5 In addition

, w e conclude that the allegat ions and the evide nce are suffici ent

to su pport a r ational inference th at the Plaintiffs m ade th ese allegations against Lones ome

Dov e for the imp roper p urpose of establ ishing venue in McCu lloch Co unty. See In r e Lipsky

,

460 S.W.3d at 59 0

.

Ass uming without deci ding tha t the Plai ntiffs met the ir bu rden to est ablish that

the TC PA applies to R e becca ’ s motion for s anction s a nd that Rebec c a failed to show th at an

exemption applies

, we conclude that Re becca met her b urden of establishin g a prima faci e cas e

for sanctions

. Conseq uently, we overrule t he Plai nt iffs ’ t hird issue on ap pe al. Because we can
uphold the trial court ’ s d enial of the P laintiffs ’ TCPA mot ion to dismiss on this ground alone , we

need not d ecide the Plaintiffs ’ remaining issue s , inc luding the ir contenti on s that th e TCPA

applies to t he motion for sancti ons because it con stitutes a “ legal action ” filed in r espon se to th e ir

e x ercise of the right to petit ion and that Rebecca failed to establis h a TCPA exemption

. See Tex.

R. App. P . 47 .1

.

5 Rebe cca also moved fo r sanctions on the g round that C lear D ia mond asserte d a claim for indemnit y against L on es ome Dove and tha t , as a matter of law, there is n o indemnity agreement betwee n Lonesome Do v e and Clear Diamond. When R ebe c ca filed h er motion for

san ctions, however, the Plaintiff s had already f iled an am en ded petition that removed the indemnity clai m f

r o m their suit, an d the y did no t r e l y on that aba ndoned indemnity claim in
argu ing that venu e is proper in Mc Cullo c h County

. Never the less, Rebecca arg ues that the inde mnity claim was f

ri volo us a nd th us s ti ll sanctionabl e , despite the fact t hat Clear D i amo nd is no long er p ursuing the c laim . Bec a u se we conclude that Rebecca has met her TCPA burd e n without considerin g this g round, we need not decide th is issue

.10

II. Cross

- a ppeal o f the trial court ’ s denial of the Zap atas ’ m ot io n s to t rans fe r v enue

On c r o s s

- a ppe a l

, the Z ap a tas assert tha t t he t r ial c o urt err ed i n den ying their

motion s to tran sfer venue

. As a pre l im inary ma t ter, we c onsider t h e Plaint iffs ’ a s sertion tha t we

lack appellate jurisdi ction to revi ew the merit s of th e tria l cou rt ’ s venue deter m i n at i o n

.

Appe llate Juri sdiction

The Plaint i f

fs argue that we lack jurisdiction over this cross

- a ppeal for two

reas on s

. Specifically

, t he Pla intiffs a rgue that we lac k appe llat e jurisdiction be cause the trial

court ’ s ord er de nying the Za pa tas ’ m oti ons to trans f e r v e nue i s n o t an appe al able orde r an d

because the Zap atas ’ notice of appeal was untimely.

Inte rlocutory orders g enerally are no t appea l abl e. Se e L e hmann v. H a r

- C on

Co rp ., 39 S .W.3d 19 1, 1 95 (Tex . 2 001 ) ( “ [T]he general rul e

. . . is that an appeal may only be

ta ken from a fina l judgm ent. ” )

. Cons equen tly, a s a gene r al r ule

, a part y may only ap pe al a ruling

on a mot i on to transfer venu e once a final ju dgment is signed

. Tex . Ci v

. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 1 5.0 64( a )

. Howe ve r, Sectio n 15.003 of the Civil Pract i ce and Remedies Code prov ides a l imi te d

right t o an int erl oc utory a ppea l from cer tain v enu e rul i ng s

. Te x. Civ. P ra c. & Rem

. C o de § 15.003

.

Under Sec tion 15. 0 0 3

, “ e ach pl a intiff mus t , independent ly o f ev e ry oth er pla int iff,

es ta bl ish pro per venue. ” Id. § 15.003 (a)

. If a plaint iff cannot in d ependently estab lish venue,

that plaintiff’s portion must be transferred . . . , unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he

satisfies the four criteria set out in subsection (a), not at issue in this case

. 6 Id. If the trial court

6 Spe cificall y, the p laintiff mu st e s tabl is h t ha t ( 1 ) joinde r of th a t plaintiff o r interventi o n i n the suit by t h a t pla intiff i s prope r und er the T exas Rul e s o f Civil P r ocedur e , (2) ma in t a i n ing

venue a s to t h at pla i ntiff i n the count y of s u it do es no t u nfairl y prejud ice anot her part y t o th e sui t , (3) t her e is an e ssentia l need to ha ve that plainti f f ’ s c laim trie d i n the c ounty in w hich the s uit is p endi ng , a nd (4) the c o unty in whic h t he su i t is pendin g is a fair a n d con ve nient venue for11

dete rmi n es that a pl a intiff d id or di d not ind ependently establish proper v en ue or , alternativ el y,

tha t the p laintiff di d o r did not esta b lish the four crite r ia

, “ [a] n interl o cuto ry a ppeal may be

taken. ” Id. § 15.003 ( b )

. I n a su it with multiple pl ai ntiff s , a tr ial c our t ’ s r u l ing that venu e i s

pro pe r in a parti cular c ounty for all pla int i ff s “ i s nece ssarily a dete rmination th at every plaintiff

‘ indepen d ent l y esta bl i s h[ed] proper v en ue ’ wit h i n t he meanin g of secti on 1 5 .00 3(b) (1)

. ” U nion

Pac. R .R. v . Sto uffer

, 420 S.W. 3d 233, 2 37 (Tex. Ap p.

— Da lla s 2013, pet. d i s m ’ d) (citin g Tex.

Civ . Pr a c. & R em . Co de § 15.003( a) ) ; see Jacks on v. Jac kson , No. 02

- 15

- 00 102

- C V , 2016 T ex

. App. LEXI S 104 44, at * 9 ( Te x. App.

— For t Wort h S e pt. 22, 201 6
, pet. denied) (mem. op .) ( “ In a

multi ple

- p laint if

f ca se, every or de r o n a moti on to transfe r venu e will nec essa r ily d e te rmin e

wh e ther each p laintiff d id or di d not inde pendently est a b lish pro pe r venue. ” ) ; Sham oun &

No r m a n, LLP v. Yar to In t ’ l G rp., L P
, 39 8 S .W. 3 d 272, 287 n. 18 ( Tex. App.

— Corpu s Chr isti

20 1 2

, pet. dism ’d ) ( con cl uding that “ inte r loc u t o ry app eals are avail able for ven ue determinations

in any ca se i n v olving m ultiple plain t iffs ” ) ; s ee a ls o Siemens Cor p. v. Ba r t ek

, No. 03

- 04

- 00613

-
CV, 2006 Tex. A pp. L EXIS 3533

, at * 11 (Tex . Ap p.

— Aust in Ap r. 28

, 2 0 06, no pet .) (me m . op.)

( reviewin g in t erl o c u to ry v enu e order in mul tiple

- p la intiff case , ci tin g Section 15.003 but without

anal yzi n g ap pella t e j uris diction ). Because t he su it u nd erly ing th is c ross

- appeal in volves mult iple

p la int iffs , we conc l u de that we h ave jurisd iction unde r S e cti on 15 .003 ( b ) t o co nsider a time l y

filed appeal f

rom the tria l cour t ’ s venu e d etermination

.

N ext , we co n si der t h e P laintiffs ’ altern ati v e a rgume nt t ha t we lack juri sdicti o n

over the cross

- appeal becau se th e Zap ata s ’ not ice of c ro ss

- appe al was u nt imely. Se e T e x

. R.

App. P. 26. 1( b) ( stating that in accelerated ap peal, not ice of appeal must be filed wi th in twent y

t h at pl ainti ff and al l person s a gains t whom t he su it is b ro u ght. Tex

. Civ. Pr ac. & R e m. Code § 1 5. 003( a )

.12

d a y s aft er d ate th at a ppealabl e j u dg ment o r order is si gned) ; i d. R. 28.1 (p roviding that ap peals

from in ter l oc ut ory o r ders are ac cele r ated ) ; s ee W hi s e n hun t v. Lippincot t , 474 S.W.3d 30

, 46

- 47

(Tex. App.

— Texarka na 2 015, no pet. ) ( dism issing cross

- appeal afte r c oncludin g that notice

o f i nte rlo cuto ry c ro ss

- a ppeal of order was u nti mely as calcu lated from date or der w as signe d ) ;

see al so In r e K.A.F.

, 160 S.W

. 3 d 9 23, 925 (Tex. 2005) ( “ [T]he la nguage of rule 26. 1(b) is

clear and contains no except io ns to the twent y

- d ay d eadline. ” ). The Plai n t if fs point out th a t o n

Sept ember 19, 2019, the trial court signe d a n o r de r (1) denying R ebe c ca ’ s motio n t o transf er

venu e t o the e xten t the m otion r eq u este d a transf er under the gene ra l venue provision

, and

(2 ) “ carr[ying] for w a r d for hea ring . . . Def en d a nt ’ s M ot ion to Transfer Ven ue Pa ragraph IV

r elating to Texas Civ il Pra c ti ce and Reme d i e s Co d e Se c tion 1 5. 002(b)

. ” The P lai nt iffs r eason

t h at beca u se the i s sue s ra ised b y th e Zapata s in th eir cross

- app eal conce r n only whet her t he trial

court ’s venue dete r mi n a ti on was proper und er the ge neral venue provision, Section 15 .002 (a)

,

the deadli ne f

or t h e Za p atas t o file the ir no ti ce o f cross

- app eal w a s t w en ty day s f rom the da y the

Se ptem ber 201 9 order was signed, which was Octobe r 9, 2 01 9

, and that the ir n otice w as not filed

un til January 20 20.

We disagree w ith t he Pla int iffs ’ conten tion tha t the trial court ’ s Se pt ember 2 0 19

order w as imm e diately a pp eal ab le

. In i ts Se pt em ber 2019 order , t he trial court spec i fica l ly

refrain ed from dis po sing of one of the two g r o u nds for transferr ing venu e rais e d by R e bec ca in

her m otion to tra nsf

er

. Be c ause the t r i a l court co u l d hav e later de cided t o gran t Rebecca ’ s

mo tion to transfer on that undispose d gro und

, we cannot, a s a pract i cal matter, co nc lu de that she

should have i m me diate ly appeal ed th e S eptember 2 019 partial ruling

. Moreover
, the S epte mb e r

20 19 ord er doe s n o t d ispo se o f any p art of th e mot i on to transfer venue f iled by Est e la Za pata

an d Sergio Zapata

, who are also cross

- app el lants and r ai se the same issue s on app e al

. O n13

January 14, 2020

, th e t rial court signed an o rde r den yi ng , in f ul l, both the m o t i o n s to t ransf er

v enue. The Z apat as fi led th eir notice of cross

- a p peal within twenty days of that dat e, making

t heir c r oss

- appeal t i m ely. W e c oncl ud e t h at w e ha v e j u r isd iction to consi der the me r its of the

Zap atas ’ c ross

- appeal.

Merits o f th e V en ue Chall

e nge

In genera l

, a pla intiff is allowed to cho os e v enue first, and that venue c hoice wi ll

n o t be dist ur

bed as l o ng as th e su it is in i ti al ly filed in a c ount y of pr o per ven ue. Uni o n Pac . R.R

. ,

420 S.W.3d at 239 ; Siem ens , 200 6 Tex. App. LEXI S 3533, a t *1 2

- 13 ; see I n re M a soni te ,

997 S. W.2d 1 94 , 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) ( “ The plai nt if f h as the fir st choice t o fi x

venue in a pr o per c oun ty; th is the plaintiff d o es by f ilin g the suit i n t he coun t y of his c hoice. ” )

.

The d efend ant , howev e r, may challe n ge that venue ch oice

, and a c ourt must “ transfer an act ion

to another county of prope r ve nue if . . . the county in w h ich th e a ction i s pe n di ng i s n ot a p roper

count y

. ” In r e T

ea m Rocket, L.P

. , 256 S .W.3d 257, 260 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceed i ng ) ( quo ting

T ex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15 .063(1) ) ; see Tex . R. Civ. P. 86 ( mot ion to transfer venue )

.

All venu e fa cts pr o perly plead e d by the pl aintiff shall be taken as tr u e u n l ess
specifically d e nied b y the defen da nt. Tex. R. Civ. P. 87( 3 )(a)

. If a defe n dant s pecific ally deni es

th e pleaded venue facts , the plain tif f m ust pr ese nt prima faci e proof of its ven ue facts. I d. T he

c ourt mus t d eci de t he challen ge ba s ed on the p l eadings and affida vits submitte d by the parti es

.

Id. A plaintiff satis fies its burd en of present ing prima facie proof when the venue facts are

p roperly plea d ed and an affi dav it, an d a n y d uly proved att achme n t s to the af fi d a v it, are f

ile d

f u ll y and specif

i c ally sett i ng for t h the facts supp o rtin g such a plead i ng

. Id

. If the plai n tiff fai ls

to meet i ts bu rden

, the tr ial c ourt must t ransfe r venue to t he county speci fied i n the defenda nt ’s14

mo tion i f the defe ndan t ha s pres en ted p rima facie e videnc e th at the c o unty requested is a pr ope r

venue. P ell egrini v. Six P ine s Exp l. , LL C

, N o . 0 3

- 18

- 00 7 7 4

- CV

, 2019 Tex. App. LEXI S 1 0133,

at *6 (Tex . App.

— Austin No v. 22 , 2019, no pet. ) (mem. op.) (ci ting In re Masoni t e , 997 S. W .2d

a t 197 )

.

In an inter locuto ry app ea l from a trial court ’s ruling on v enue , we “ determine

wheth er the tri al cour t ’ s ord e r is proper b ased on an in dep endent de t erminati on from the re cor d

an d no t un d er ei ther a n abuse of di s cret ion or substa ntial evid e nc e s ta ndar d. ” Id. (ci ting Tex.

C iv. Pr ac . & Re m . Code § 15.003 (c) (1) )

. If the re c ord contains a ny p robativ e evidence

su ppo rt ing venue i n the cou n ty of s uit, a tra n sfer is im p rope r even if th e p rep onde rance of th e

evide nce is t o th e c ontrary. Id.

In this ca se, th e Plaintiffs as sert t hat ve nu e is pr o per in McCullo ch County based

on t he general venue provisi ons found in Secti o n 1 5.002

. S u bse ct i on (a) of S ection 1 5 .002 sta tes ,

in re levant pa rt :

(a) E xcept a s other wise p rov id ed by thi s s ubchapter or Su bcha p t e r B or C, al l laws uits sha ll be brough t:

(1) in th e cou nty in whi ch all or a subst a ntia l part of the e vents o r omi ssio ns givin g ri se to the c laim occurred; [or ]

(2) i n t he c oun ty of the defend ant ’ s pri nci pal office in t his st ate, i f th e defenda nt is not a n a tura l p erso n

.

T ex. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Cod e § 15 .00 2 (a)

.

As pr eviously discussed , th e Plaintiff s pl eaded t hat venue is prop er in McCulloch

C oun t y be cause (1 ) under Section 15.002(a)

, McCullo ch County is the county of the pri nc ipal

of fice of Lonesome Dov e , se e i d

. , an d (2) under Sec tion 1 5.005, v e nu e is a l so proper in

McCulloch County a s t o the Zapatas beca use t he ir claims against th ose defend a nt s “ ari s [e] out of15

the same transactio n, occurre n ce, or series o f tr ans actions

, ” s e e id. § 1 5.00 5 ( “ In a suit i n w hich

t he pla in tiff h as est ablished proper venue ag a i nst a de fend ant, the court also ha s venue of all

de fenda nts in all claims o r actions ari s in g out of the s ame transac ti on, occurr enc e, or se ries

of transac tion s o r occurr en ce s. ”). I n add i ti on , the Pla intiffs an d Lone so me D ove each filed a

res pons e to the motions t o tr ansfer v enue , d enying the Zapata s ’ allegatio n s that C l ear Dia mo nd

and Loneso m e Dove are the s ame entity

. In sup port of their r esponse, the Pl aint iff s attached a n

affida v it b y H eath McBride, Preside nt of Cl ear Diamond , in wh ich he st ates that “ Cl ear Diamond

a nd Lonesom e D ove are not and have never been one entity ; and ne ither [ McB r ide] nor C lear

D iamond h a s eve r o wned any fin anci al interest in Lonesome Dove

. ” Sim ilarly, Lon esome Dove

a ttached an affidavit f

rom its owner and emp loy ee , Kel ly Gr e en , stating that L onesome Dove is

a limited lia bility compan y, in the busi n ess o f “ han dl i ng th e logistic s for diff er e nt t ruck

com panies

, ” wi th its pr i ncipa l pl ace of bu sin e ss in McCulloch County.

O n a pp e al, t he Zap a ta s assert t h at the t r ial co urt erred i n d e n ying t he ir m o tions to

transfer venue becau se the Plaintiffs failed to provide p rob a t iv e eviden ce t o su p port their venue

c hoi ce

. S pe cif

i c a lly , the Zapatas a r gue t hat ( 1) “ [the Plaintiff s] failed to su pport thei r ve nue cho ice

with prob ative evidence o f [L onesome Dove ’ s ] negligence, ” and (2 ) “ [t] h e Zap atas provided

conc lusive evide nce neg a t in g the pr o bati v e e vide n c e, if any , prov id e d by t he P l aintiffs to support

the ir ve nu e cho ice. ” Accor d i n g to t h e Za patas, “ the o n l y disput ed questions rele van t to wh e ther

Lonesome Dove ’ s place of busi ness i n McCu lloch C ou nty provides a valid basi s for ven u e i s

whethe r Ch r is G reen ( Ke ll y G reen ’ s h us band) disp a t che d Wartenb ee on Lones ome D ove ’ s

b ehalf such that L o n e s ome D ov e c ould b e l iable for his actions; an d

, if so, w hether he did so

in a ne g l igent manner. ”16 T he Zap atas ’ venue argument is , i n ef fect, t ha t t he Pla intiffs can n ot e s t abl i s h

ven ue because th ey ha ve n ot and c ann ot pres ent e videnc e of a v ia ble negl i gence cl aim agai n st

Lo n esom e D ove

. T he rules of procedure p resc ri be the s cope of the tria l court ’ s consideration

when ruling o n a mot io n to trans fer venu e

. I n re Re y nol d

s , 369 S.W. 3d 6 38, 648 (Te x. App.

—
Tyler 2012, no pe t. ) ; see Te x

. R. Civ. P. 86

, 87

. O n e s ign ifica nt li mit at ion p rovi ded by those

ru les is t h at t he trial c ourt may no t inqu ire into the mer its of a cause of ac tion

. In r e Rey nol d s ,

369 S .W.3 d at 64 8

. Rule 87 , in relevan t part, stat es :

[N] o p arty sh a ll eve r b e requ ire d for v enu e pu rpos es to support prim a f a c ie pr oof the e xistence of a c ause of a ctio n or p art thereof, and at t h e hearin g the plea dings of the pa rt ies sha ll b e take n as conc l u sive on thi s is sue o f exist ence of a cause of ac ti on.

T e x. R . C i v. P. 87( 3 )(a) (e m phasis add ed). C o ntrary to the Zapa tas ’ asser t ion

, t he Plaintiffs were

not ob l igat ed to support their venue c ho ice w ith prima fac ie proof as to t he m e ri ts o f their

underly i n g ne g ligenc e cl aim s aga inst Loneso me D ov e o r an y other d ef end an t

.

B ecause i t was u ncha llen ge d, we take a s tr ue the P lai nt iffs ’ allegatio n t hat

Lones ome Dove ’ s pr in cipal p la ce of business i s located in M cCulloch County. S ee id

. B a sed o n

t his und is pute d v en ue fact, whi ch i s al s o s uppor ted by a ffi davit s , we co nc lude that t he Plainti ffs

met their b urden to establish that the ir sui t i s maintaina ble aga inst Lonesom e Dove i n McCulloch

Co unty under the general v en ue provi sion

. F urthe r , by a p plic at ion of Sect i on 15.00 5, t he P lainti ffs

al so es tablishe d that venue is pr oper in Mc Culloch Cou nty as to the Zapatas

. The tr ial co urt17

di d no t err in denying the moti ons t o tra n s fer venue. 7 Th e Za pat a s ’ issu es on c r oss

- a ppea l

are o verr uled.

CONCLUSION

Having conclu d e d that the tri a l court did not e rr i n denying the Plaintiffs ’ TCP A

m otion to dismiss or the Zapatas ’ motion s to transfer ve nue, we affirm the order s of the tria l court.

__________ ______________________________ __ C hari L . K elly

, Justice

Before Chi ef Ju sti ce Byrne
, J us tices Baker and Kell y

Affirmed

F i le d: August 1 3, 2021

7 Ma n y o f the Z apatas ’ argume nts in their cross

- appeal over l ap with arguments made by Rebe cc a in h e r motion for san c t i on s , specifically, that the P laintiffs asserte d groundless claims against Lon e some Dove for t he p urpose of esta blishing venue

. A lthou gh we ha v e c on cluded that Rebecca established a prima facie case for sancti ons , as previ ou sly discussed

, w e expre ss no opinion on the ultimate issue of whether s anction s are warranted i n this cas e or wh ether tra nsf e r

o f the case to Webb C o u n ty would b e an appropri a te sa nc tion

.