1

THE CHEKINOV-BOGDANOV 

COMMENTARIES OF 2010-2017: 

WHAT DID THEY TEACH US ABOUT 

RUSSIA’S NEW WAY OF WAR? 

Author: Timothy Thomas

November 2020

Sponsor: USEUCOM ECJ6

Dept. No: N251

Contract No.: W56KGU18-D-0004-S120

Project No.: 0720S120-J6

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Introduction

From 2010 to 2017 Russian Colonel (reserves) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General 

(retired) S. A. Bogdanov wrote 13 interesting articles in the journal Military Thought (nine of them 

are summarized below) that had a major impact on how Western analysts understood Russian 

military affairs and way of war. Though the authors have not written publicly since 2017, their 

impact continues to be felt as the West grapples with how to confront Russian activities across all 

domains. Asymmetric and indirect actions, the initial period of war, deterrence, military art, 

forecasting, strategy, new generation warfare, and other topics were discussed, ending with an 

article in 2017 discussing war in the 21st century. Numerous aspects of these themes remain under 

discussion in Russia.

Their analysis offered some interesting details, such as the following:

• They wrote intensely on new generation warfare (a focus on weapons) in 2013 

yet by 2017 they had completely abandoned the concept in favor of new-type 

warfare (a focus on military, nonmilitary, and other types of fighting)

• They warned on several occasions of the need before conflict begins to mislead 

or bribe opponents, to conduct sabotage operations, and to utilize cunning and 

indirect actions to surprise adversaries

• They stated that the use of psychological (ultrasonic) and climate/geological 

(magnetic storms, tsunamis, earthquake) weapons were under consideration

• They specifically said administration and control systems should be targeted if

war begins, to include dams and nuclear, chemical, and oil and gas facilities

• They forecast that future war would begin with electronic warfare operations 

and blend with a strategic aerospace operation, augmented with cruise missile 

launches and space-based strike weapons and reconnaissance units (such as 

remotely piloted vehicles and robots)

• They examined various elements of strategy, to include its main issues, nature, 

regularities, principles, content, and tasks

• They noted that 21st century war includes traditional war, noncontact war, 

information warfare, network-centric warfare, hybrid warfare (what the U.S. is 

doing), cold war, and environmental warfare. New-type war was imbedded in 

the discussion of cold war and mentioned 12 times by name. New-generation 

war was not noted.

Unfortunately, since 2017 authors Chekinov and Bogdanov have published neither as a pair nor 

individually. In effect they have disappeared from public view with no explanation as to why. This 

includes, in addition to the journal Military Thought, articles in the popular publications Army 

Journal and the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, which together are the three most 

popular Russian military journals for Army-related material. Their commentary has been missed 

for the rich discussions of warfare that they offered.

The analysis that follows intends to keep the focus on these important works and directs 

attention to the theme of each of the nine articles selected and the sections indicating new or 
3

different forms and methods of warfare. The titles of each article (to include the four not examined) 

and the date of their publication in Military Thought are listed at Appendix One. Important 

quotations found in the nine articles but not used in the writeup are to be found at Appendix Two.

2010: Asymmetric Actions

In their conclusion to this article, the authors made a dramatic statement about the targets 

of future warfare. Specifically, strategically important targets that, if destroyed, lead to 

unacceptable damage to an opponent include:

Top government administration and military control systems; major manufacturing 

fuel, and energy enterprises (steel and engineering plants, oil refineries, defense 

industry enterprises, electronic power plants and substations, oil and gas 

production, accumulation and storage facilities, life support facilities, and so on); 

vitally important transportation facilities across the adversary’s entire territory 

(railroad hubs, bridges, strategic ports, airports, tunnels, and so on); potentially 

dangerous objectives (hydroelectric power dams and hydroelectric power 

complexes, processing units of chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, storages 

of strong poisons, and so on).0F

1

They stated that military measures protecting Russia’s national interests will combine direct or 

symmetrical actions (such as conducting operations) with asymmetrical actions to inflict 

unacceptable damage to an opponent in nonmilitary security areas. 1F

2 The latter is not intended to 

be a benign statement. It is hard to imagine a more critical set of infrastructure targets that could 

be listed, save banking. 

An asymmetrical approach to military security was stated to be “a combination of forms 

and methods of using forces and means that depend on the adversaries’ unequal potentialities and 

allow confrontation or a direct armed clash with a potential adversary to be avoided (or their 

consequences mitigated).”2F

3 Asymmetrical actions may include: measures making the opponent 

apprehensive of Russia’s intentions; a demonstration of the readiness and potential of forces in a 

strategic area; and actions designed to deter through the implied guaranteed destruction of 

vulnerable military and other targets.3 F

4

The authors blamed globalization and the West’s need to spread democracy and protect the 

weak as the rational for the increase in military conflicts.4F

5 Now indirect action strategies, such as 

non-contact warfare, electronic and fire, aerospace, and anti-satellite operations have increased the 

forms and methods of using such strategies. Indirect actions have surpassed “power strategies” as 

ways to dominate battlegrounds. Now it is important to mislead, surprise, intimidate, bride, or use 

 1 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetrical Actions to Maintain Russia’s Military Security,” Voyennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, p. 22. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 21.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 14.
4

other means to attain success. Finally, the authors stated that information confrontation is playing

a major role in disorganizing military control and state administrations.5F

6

2011: Indirect Actions and their Effect on War’s Character

In hindsight it is not surprising that the authors would follow-up their article on 

asymmetrical measures with a discussion of indirect ones. However, the focus of this article was 

very odd, in that the indirect operations discussed involved information, climate, and psychological 

issues. Nonmilitary issues were discussed as well, but later articles were much more interesting on 

that topic. Many paragraphs from the 2010 asymmetric article appeared verbatim in this one. 

Therefore, this article offered little new substance about topics for which Western analysts are 

accustomed, but it did offer interesting discussions on “causing” weather and disasters or 

psychologically oriented topics. 

Information technologies (IT) are a major method of ensuring the information and military 

security of a state when rivalries exist in political, economic, and military affairs. IT can, the 

authors note, pursue the same goals as can military interference, economic expansion, and other 

aggressive actions. Time shows that states which cannot secure a nations’ information security risk 

losing their political sovereignty, economic independence, or role of world or regional leader.6 F

7

 

Information’s impact has been so great that now it can tackle strategic tasks such as disorganizing 

an opponent, creating a desired public opinion, organizing antigovernment protests, and other 

undertakings.7F

8 The authors then noted that the US military and intelligence services worked on 

devising methods to psychologically manipulate individuals, social institutions, and others with 

“color revolutions” (the overthrow of governments in Georgie, Ukraine, and elsewhere) being but 

one example. 

Finally, the authors discussed how the U.S. had developed a High Frequency Active 

Auroral Research Program (HAARP), which the authors state emits radio emanations that can 

penetrate underground and into masses of water, find bunkers, or put out of commission ballistic 

missiles and submarine control systems. Others believe HAARP can manipulate weather and cause 

disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.) or create artificial magnetic storms that will affect 

navigation systems and the psychological condition of humans.8F

9

2012: Strategic Deterrence in Contemporary Times

Russia has two terms for deterrence, sderzhivanie and ustrashenie. The former, used most 

often by the military, works to contain opponents while the latter works to scare them. The 

military uses the former much more often than the latter. The authors defined deterrence in this 

work as follows:

 6 Ibid., p. 20.

7 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Influence of the Indirect Approach on the Nature of Modern Warfare,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, p. 10.

8 Ibid., p. 6

9 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
5

Deterrence is understood as a combination of the state’s coordinated political, 

diplomatic, economic, military, nonmilitary, and other measures taken to convince 

a potential aggressor of the futility of military action he wants to undertake to 

achieve his political goals because of retaliation that could be too much for him to 

accept.9F

10

The purpose of deterrence is to show an opponent that if conflict erupts he cannot achieve 

his political objective through military actions. It is designed to show resolve in defending friendly 

interests. Many analysts consider Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demonstration of military 

might in March 2019, when he showed videos of several high-technology weapons under 

development or in the final stages of completion, as a means of deterrence. 

The development of high-technology nonnuclear weapons that can fulfill strategic tasks

has helped introduce the term “strategic deterrence” into the lexicon. The term includes a state’s 

ability to show its readiness to use both nuclear and conventional forces, and its ability and resolve 

to conduct special, asymmetric, indirect, and other operations.10F

11 Strategic deterrence frequently 

involves a show of force which, in peacetime, deters aggression or attempts to pressure Russia. In 

wartime strategic deterrence aims to prevent aggressors from using nuclear or other weapons of 

mass destruction and to limit the scale and intensity of military operations.11F

12 The authors discussed 

global and regional deterrence as well. Global deterrence involves the threatening massive use of 

strategic conventional and nuclear weapons, whereas regional deterrence involves the threat of 

conventional and, in contingencies, nonstrategic nuclear weapons.1 2F

13

2012: Initial Periods of War

Chekinov and Bogdanov mentioned the tern new-generation warfare (NGW) in this article, 

a year before they wrote extensively on the topic (see 2013 discussion below). In NGWs, 

preparations will differ in that the side desiring to aggress engages, sometimes before the start of 

operations, in a campaign to conceal both the arming of its Armed Forces (AF) and the nature of 

their special preparations.13F

14 The initial period of war (IPW) will be decisive for wars. It will be 

comprised of subversion and provocations, bribing that causes chaos, and information operations 

that include information and psychological attacks, electronic and fire operations, and aerospace 

operations.14 F

15

The authors stressed the close integration of the IPW with information planning. The 

authors defined the initial period of war as follows:

 10 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Strategic Deterrence and Russia’s National Security Today,” Voennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2012, p. 12. 11 Ibid., p. 14. 12 Ibid., p. 19. 13 Ibid., p. 17. 14 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and their Influence on a Country’s Preparations for 

Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 2012, p. 23. 15 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
6

The initial period of war is interpreted in military history as the time when the 

warring states conducted military operations involving groups of their armed forces 

deployed before the start of the war to achieve their short-range strategic objectives 

or to create favorable conditions for committing their main forces and continuing 

with more operations.15 F

16

Information planning assists in the ability “to create favorable conditions” in different ways. For 

example, a long time before aggression materializes, a nation’s economy must prepare the AF to 

fight off opponents, offering the nation the weaponry it requires. On the one hand Chekinov and 

Bogdanov added that a wide-scale targeted information and reconnaissance operation helps 

mislead an opponent about Russia’s readiness.16F

17 On the other hand, measures that might be 

included in a special information campaign to prepare Russia’s population for potential conflict 

included the following:

• Broadcasts of information on various communications channels about intensive 

and wide-ranging preparation of the Russian economy and public for war

• Mobilization of reservists in many age brackets

• Relocation of army units on high alert and the deployment of reserves from the 

heartland

• Development of false activities designed to be captured by adversary 

reconnaissance 

• A broad campaign (launched simultaneously) to inform the public about the 

adversary’s destructive intentions.17F

18

A nation’s goals in a future war will only be achieved, Chekinov and Bogdaov noted, with 

the attainment of information superiority over an opponent. This requires management of the mass 

media, protection of national information sources, and attacks against an opponent’s control 

systems. The authors ended their article noting that in the IPW, goals will be accomplished through 

employing “military, economic, and IT measures in combination with efficient psychological 

information campaigns.”1 8F

19

2013: New Generation Warfare

Of all the articles that Chekinov and Bogdanov co-authored, this one received the most 

attention in the West. It revealed both Russian paranoia over how military affairs were developing, 

since many of the systems mentioned were fielded in the U.S. and only under development in 

Russia; and Russia’s plan to confront these changes. Perhaps the article’s point of paramount 

importance was that a new-generation war (NGW) will be “fought by the rules and customs of the 

side that is best prepared to put the recent breakthroughs in warfare economics and technologies 

 16 Ibid., p. 16. 17 Ibid., p. 24. 18 Ibid., p. 26. 19 Ibid., p. 27.
7

to a practical test.”19 F

20 As Russia continues to act with impunity, the West should seriously consider 

how a war might appear that is fought by Russia’s rules and customs, especially its focus on using 

asymmetric means it says will be used “extensively.”

Of initial interest were the author’s reference to Vladimir Slipchenko’s 1990s book on 

sixth-generation warfare, with the main objective of such warfare to “destroy the enemy’s 

economic potential” and “keeping the man outside of the battlespace is what makes future wars 

and armed struggle cardinally different.”20 F

21 Many of the points that Chekinov and Bogdanov 

developed tended to follow and support Slipchenko’s contentions. For example, the authors stated 

that “defeating the enemy’s main forces and destroying the economic potential of the country 

attacked, and also overrunning its territory” are the objectives of NGW’s fought in a networkcentric environment (the latter defined as a concept of control over combat operations).21 F

22

Regarding the use of ground troops, the authors noted the following:

It is very probable that an attacker will achieve his political and military goals in a 

NGW before he deploys his ground forces. The aggressor will, most likely, send 

them into enemy territory only after he as assured himself that his missile and air 

strikes, long-range artillery fire, and weapons based on new physical principles 

have wiped out a majority of the defending units, destroyed government and 

military control centers, key military, industrial, and economic targets, and wrecked 

the stability of the defending country’s government administration system.22F

23

Chekinov and Bogdanov offered a list of some of the U.S.’s lessons learned during the 

Gulf War conflict of the 1990s, which included:

• Technological superiority cancelled an opponent’s numerical advantage

• An electronic operation launched in parallel with an aerial offensive and seabased cruise missiles began the “first war of a new age”

• There were no clear dividing lines between the opponent’s forces and flanks 

were exposed, etc.

• Orbiting satellites played a special role in the war.23F

24

These points demonstrated to Chekinov and Bogdanov that the nature and development of warfare

had changed and that changes were required in how Russia would approach future conflict. The 

authors then ventured “their own viewpoint on the character and content of a NGW:”

 20 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “On the Nature and Content of Wars of a New Generation,” Voennaya Mysl’ 

(Military Thought), No. 10 2013, p. 22. 21 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 22 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 23 Ibid., p. 22. 24 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
8

As we see it, the introduction of the latest information technologies to develop 

effective modern weapons, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communication 

capabilities, and automated control systems has altered significantly the patterns of 

manpower employment and the conduct of military operations, and is going to have 

a decisive impact on the development of new patterns [of conflict].24F

25

Further, the authors listed in bold print ten important aspects of NGW:

• NGW will be dominated by information and psychological warfare seeking to 

achieve superiority

• Asymmetric actions will be used extensively to level off the enemy’s 

superiority in armed struggles25 F

26

• Aggressors will make efforts to involve all public institutions in the country it 

attacks, such as the mass media, religious organizations, public movements, 

nongovernmental organizations, and so on26F

27

• Attackers will plan for NGWs and take measures to conceal preparations27 F

28

• Decisive battles in NGWs will rage in the information environment28F

29

• Aggressors may use nonlethal NGW genetically engineered biological weapons 

that affect the human psyche and moods

• The military phase will be preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and 

subversive missions

• The attack will begin with an aerospace operation of several days29 F

30

• During the aerospace operation, defenders must anticipate attacks from enemy 

military robots30 F

31

• Theorists name overwhelming superior of either side in military technologies 

as a hallmark of NGWs31F

32

The authors stressed on several occasions that the only way for strategic operations to 

achieve their goals in NGW would be through one side gain information superiority over the 

other.32F

33 They also (as they later reiterated in 2015) offered their interpretation of what the opening 

(most critical) and closing periods of warfare would look like. The 2015 discussion (see article 

below on forecasting) included the duration of the opening and closing periods.

2015: 21st Century Military Art

 25 Ibid., p. 17. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 18. 28 Ibid., p. 19. 29 Ibid., p. 20. 30 Ibid., p. 21. 31 Ibid., p. 22. 32 Ibid., p. 23. 33 Ibid., p. 19.
9

Military art was defined as the theory and practice of preparing and conducting armed 

struggle, whether on land, sea, or space. It encompasses the basic means of organizing, conducting, 

and supporting operations and combat actions, and organizing control over them.33F

34 It has been 

developing under the influence of new military-political and economic situations that has 

emphasized nonmilitary and indirect actions. Military art will continue to study the nature of wars, 

their regularities and principles of conduct, the forms and methods of armed struggle, and the 

development and preparation of the Armed Forces.34 F

35 The creation of high-precision weapons 

based on new physical principles will result in the emergence of more efficient forms and methods 

of warfare that will influence the development of military art.35 F

36

A very interesting observation was that with remote noncontact impact on an adversary 

now becoming the chief method for attaining objectives using advanced information technologies, 

“differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels will be obliterated, as will be the 

difference between offensive and defensive activities.”36F

37 Further, “the evolution of military art 

will apparently proceed along the line of the blanket introduction of information technologies.”37F

38

This will require enhanced stability and interference “immunity” in systems and control 

facilities.38F

39

Chekinov and Bogdanov ended this article noting the importance of ruse, cunning, and 

indirect actions that can mislead opponents, conceal operations, and thus surprise adversaries. 

Research on the use of nonmilitary actions were also stressed.39 F

40 In conclusion, 21st century military 

art will include all its constituent and interacting theories, other forms and methods of struggle 

(above all nonmilitary and indirect actions), and military stratagems and surprise. 40F

41

2015: Forecasting Future War

In this important article, Chekinov and Bogdanov noted that forecasting helps avoid errors 

in future planning through the identification of principal avenues for promoting military art. Future 

war success will require the skillful combination of military, nonmilitary, and special nonviolent 

measures that include a blend of political, economic, information, technological, and 

environmental measures. Information superiority will be the primary avenue through which to take 

advantage of opponents.41F

42 It was noted that a special operation (the special nonviolent measure 

mentioned earlier?) would be developed to mislead and misinform military and political leaders 

 34 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Problems and 

Judgements,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2015, p. 33. 35 Ibid., p. 34. 36 Ibid., p. 38. 37 Ibid., p. 40. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 41. 40 Ibid., p. 42. 41 Ibid., p. 43. 42 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Predicting the Nature and Content of Future Wars: Problems and 

Opinions,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2015, p. 44.
10

of the other side through employing actions to influence the behavior of the personnel of the Armed 

Forces and the population of an adversary. 42F

43

The authors offered their prescription as to how war would unfold and what their 

distinctions would be. Regarding the former, they wrote that future war would begin with 

electronic warfare operations that will be blended with a strategic operation of the Armed Forces 

that includes an aerospace operation. These operations will be augmented with cruise missile 

launches from space, air, land, and sea; and with space-based strike weapons and reconnaissance

units (such as remotely piloted vehicles and robots) that deliver strikes and fires at detected targets. 

The primary task will be to win superiority in all realms, to include the information environment.43F

44

About distinctions, the following were listed as the primary ones:

• Weapons will be designed with new technological principles, such as highprecision weapons and the weaponry listed as starting future conflicts

• Nuclear weapons will be less significant, with strategic and political objectives

now attained with high-precision weapons, weapons based on new physical 

principles, and other conventional weapons

• Strategic operations will be the principal form of strategic task fulfillment

• A unified system to collect and process information that integrates space, aerial, 

and ground reconnaissance capabilities will be used for target allocation and 

designation in real time.44F

45

Other important factors listed in the article were the following:

• Speed, synchronization, and concurrency will be the decisive factors behind the 

success of a military operations45F

46

• Future wars will be changed by space-based attack weapons, orbiting battle 

space stations, new weapons of improved destructive power, range, accuracy, 

and rate of fire46F

47

• Leaders must abandon the rigid canons of military art and entrenched 

stereotypes are to be avoided47F

48

• Adjustments will be made to the laws and rules of warfare4 8F

49

• Future war will be wars of surprises, to include new types of weapons, 

technologies, and employment forms and methods. This included infrasonic 

strikes against an opponent’s forces.4 9F

50

 43 Ibid., p. 45. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., p. 47. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 44. 48 Ibid., p. 42. 49 Ibid., p. 46-47. 50 Ibid., p. 46.
11

• The opening period of conflict will last approximately a month, depending on 

specific factors50 F

51

• The closing period of conflict will be as short as possible.51F

52

2016: Military Strategy

Chekinov and Bogdanov offered a lengthy (and at times difficult to follow) discussion of 

military strategy and its requirement to adapt to new 21st century circumstances. The last decade, 

in their opinion, has witnessed a new type of warfare, namely those of controlled chaos. They 

stated that the sphere of military strategy now encompasses all aspects of military state activity 

and that military strategy cannot be viewed in isolation from the general processes of the state. Not 

only has there been an expansion in the forms of an Armed Forces employment but also in all the 

structures of a state’s military organization. There are new methods of warfare and a 

transformation in the content of armed struggle using nonmilitary measures and indirect and 

asymmetric actions that can affect the outcome of a confrontation.52 F

53 As stated by Alexander 

Svechin decades ago, these new strategic components indicates that, as always, each conflict has 

a logic all its own.

The authors listed several subtopics of strategy.53 F

54 For purposes of this discussion, six of 

them are developed below: main issues, nature, regularities, principles, content, and tasks (in the 

discussion of each that follows, some items are repeated due to their insertion into various subtopic 

areas).

The main issues of military strategy were stated to be:

• The nature of today’s warfare and ways of preventing it by military means

• The goals and tasks of the Armed Forces in war and military activity on a 

strategic scale

• The necessary resources to conduct those wars

• The content, methods, and conditions of preparing and waging war on the whole 

and various forms of strategic actions

• Strategic planning for the AF’s employment in warfare and strategic operations

• Fundamentals of the strategic, moral, and psychological and logistical support 

of the AF’s actions

• Leadership of the AFs in peace-and wartime

• Strategic requirements to be worked out for the AF’s buildup, preparation of 

the economy, the public and territory for war

 51 Ibid., p. 47. 52 Ibid., p. 48. 53 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Military Strategy: A Look into the Future,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 11 2026, pp. 3-5. 54 The authors listed the following terms which preceded the words “of military strategy:” definition, sphere, 

purpose, elements, theory, content, nature, regularities, role, principles, subject, framework, goal, and tasks.
12

• Strategic opinions of leading states and coalitions, their ability to prepare, 

unleash, and conduct wars and combat actions on a strategic scale.54 F

55

The nature of military strategy includes specific categories which are being elaborated and 

perfected. New categories of study include asymmetric methods of warfare, remote noncontact 

impact on an adversary, the military strategic balance, defense sufficiency, strategic deterrence, 

and strategic warning, among others. Categories are a way to express a scientific understanding of 

an entire military strategic activity.5 5F

56 Regularities of military strategy include changes in the nature 

of modern warfare, improvements in armament and hardware, the development of AF forms, 

progress in fighting methods, and building up a new-look military state organization. Regularities 

affect the formation of principles, the latter being the general rules of military activity by the state 

and its leadership to solve strategic objectives. 

Principles depend on the objective and subjective factors of an economic, political, 

informational, and military nature.56F

57 Principles are created both by military theoretical research 

and by the general practice of military activity. The actions of commanders, staffs, and their 

subordinates discover or uncover principles, which are not cast-iron rules that stay unchanged for 

ever.57 F

58 Peacetime principles of military strategy that regulate the preparation of military actions 

include strategic deterrence; the anticipation of the military, political, and strategic situation; the 

identification of military threats; the correspondence of strategic goals and tasks to political 

objectives; the preparation of the state for defense; the timely buildup of strategic reserves; and the 

prevention of war. Fighting principles of military strategy include unexpected, resolute, and 

continuous strategic actions; asymmetric actions; the coordinated use of cross-service groupings 

of troops; firm and continuous leadership of the AF; seizure and keeping of the strategic initiative, 

and preventive actions. The principles of military strategy serve as the initial theoretical guide for 

decision-making by state and military leaders.5 8F

59

The content of military strategy include the following elements: the discovery and 

assessment of views and opportunities of leading states and coalitions to prepare, unleash, and 

conduct war on a strategic scale; the revelation of the nature of future warfare, to include its 

nonviolent, indirect, and asymmetric aspects; the tasks of the AF in wartime; the methods, forms, 

and conditions for war’s preparation and conduct; the AF’s strategic planning; command and 

control of the AF; strategic, moral and psychological, and logistical support of the AF; and military 

requirements for building up the AF. This “content” will change with the appearance of threats 

and dangers and with the emergence of new science and technology results.59F

60 Indirect actions can 

affect the content of strategy and military art, to include the use of political isolation, economic 

sanctions, blockades, intimidations, and introducing the pretext of human rights protections.60 F

61

 55 Chekinov and Bogdanov, “Military Strategy...” p. 4. 56 Ibid., p. 6. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 7. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., p. 10. 61 Ibid., p. 12.
13

Tasks of military strategy include working out suggestions for the preparation of strategic 

sectors and protecting the country against enemy threats. Changing geostrategic conditions require 

research into the nature of war, preparation of the state for defense, developing AF requirements 

for protecting national interests, strategic planning for new conditions, developing new methods 

and forms of actions, organizing logistical support, and command and control of the AF in an 

integrated information environment.61F

62 Tasks are also defined in regard to objective and subjective 

factors, to include the following: general laws of war and materialist dialectics; policies of the state 

in improving national defense; the demands of Military Doctrine; the presence of threats and 

dangers in regard to the use of military force by other states; the qualitative characteristics of 

weapons; the preparation of military activity and the experiences of war; and the state’s ability to 

prepare for defense.62 F

63

Finally, it will be necessary for the military to consider various types of nonmilitary 

activities in peacetime, such as increasing the number of allies, neutralizing potential threats, and 

strengthening strategic stability. Wartime nonmilitary actions include intimidating adversaries and 

imposing ones will on the latter, undermining their economic might and weakening the opposing 

state, and destabilizing the social situation therein.63 F

64

2017: Understanding War in the 21st Century

This article, the last that Chekinov and Bogdanov published together in the open press, did 

not mention NGWs at all, which was a strange development based on the huge impact their 2013 

NGW article had produced on militaries in Europe and in the U.S.. Entire studies in the latter were 

devoted to revealing the essence of NGWs. But by 2017 references to NGW had all but 

disappeared, not just in the publications of Chekinov and Bogdanov but throughout the AF. 

Perhaps this was because General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov had brought up the “new-type” 

warfare concept in 2013 and the authors (and others) were just following his lead.64F

65 

Instead, the authors discussed several categories of war that they saw developing, which 

were traditional war, noncontact war, information warfare, network-centric warfare, hybrid 

warfare, cold war, and environmental warfare.65 F

66 Only two of these types received the attention 

and space in their article indicating current importance, those being traditional war and cold war. 

The authors wrote that the latter term encompasses “new-type” warfare, and they stated that this 

is the type of war underway now. They noted that war today is more designable and controllable 

than spontaneous and uncontrollable, as it was in the past. However, while the weight of 

nonmilitary measures, especially information ones, has increased sharply, war’s main content 

remains a resort to armed force and violent actions.66F

67

 62 Ibid., p. 11. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 65 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content of ‘War’ in the 21st Century,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2017, p. 43. 66 Ibid., p. 33. 67 Ibid., p. 43.
14

The authors mentioned the term new-type 12 times in their discussion of cold war. 

Chekinov and Bogdanov wrote that the West began new-type warfare after World War II, using

nonmilitary methods to try and control Russia. The methods included political pressure, 

information sabotage, the exploitation of humanitarian issues, secret service activity, and unfair 

and cunning diplomacy. 67F

68 They believe the U.S. is still implementing this concept today and that 

new-type war appears peaceful, but it surpasses traditional war in efficiency. Clear boundaries 

between military and peaceful methods have disappeared. New-type war is not even perceived as 

war. It does what it can to split societies with the use of fifth columns or inducing rioters to betray 

their country.68 F

69 The authors concluded their discussion of new-type warfare noting the following:

We have been witnessing an extensive debate about the need to revise the essence 

and content of war necessitated by the appearance of views that not only the role of 

military capabilities have been diminishing, but that these are no longer any good 

for achieving relevant objectives.69F

70

Conclusions

The breadth of the Chekinov-Bogdanov commentaries offer much ground for the 

consideration of analysts regarding Russia’s new way of war. Targets and goals were described, 

which included key infrastructure facilities (dams, nuclear power plants, and other infrastructure 

facilities). The initial period of war (IPW) discussion was extensive and appeared in several 

articles. It was clear that before future conflicts begin, it will be important to mislead, surprise, 

intimidate, bride, or use other means to confuse opponents as part of the IPW. Subversion and 

provocative measures are expected to be active, which could include the use of military or 

nonmilitary assets. Some initial actions might include indirect actions, such as attempts to induce 

climate change or to utilize infrasonic or electromagnetic energy to harm or destroy humans or 

equipment, respectively. Deterrence concepts could be used in the IPW that involve a show of 

force which, in peacetime, deters aggression or attempts to pressure opponents. Such efforts can 

now be strategic in nature due to the development of information technologies that can reach 

populations or organizations anywhere on the globe. With so many important components, many 

Russian military analysts rightly consider the IPW to be the decisive factor in determining winners 

and losers in future conflicts. 

There was an extended discussion of new weaponry and its role in a NGW. Yet perhaps 

the main point of interest was that a NGW will be “fought by the rules and customs of the side that 

is best prepared to put the recent breakthroughs in warfare economics and technologies to a 

practical test.” To accomplish many of the goals of NGW, military art will undergo significant 

changes, especially the contention that “differences between strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels will be obliterated, as will be the difference between offensive and defensive activities.” 

The reminder is that weaponry based on new physical principles is allowing Russian theorists to 

 68 Ibid., p. 40. 69 Ibid., p. 41. 70 Ibid., p. 42.
15

contemplate planetary war, a new addition to the traditional components of military art of strategy, 

operational art, and tactics. For Russia’s new way of war to be successful, forecasting will require 

the ability to spot new trends. It will also require the skillful combination of military, nonmilitary, 

and special nonviolent measures that blend political, economic, information, technological, and 

environmental measures. Information superiority will be the primary avenue through which to take 

advantage of opponents in these circumstances. Further, military strategy cannot be viewed in 

isolation from the general processes of state activity any longer. New methods of warfare will 

include nonmilitary measures and indirect and asymmetric actions to a greater degree than ever 

before, with the capability to affect the outcome of a confrontation. Finally, the authors made clear 

that the boundaries between military and peaceful methods in 21st century warfare have 

disappeared. A “new-type” of warfare has evolved that even surpasses NGW and, for many, is not 

even perceived as war. It does what it can to split societies with the use of fifth columns or inducing 

rioters to betray their country.

In summary, the works of Chekinov and Bogdanov have provided Western analysts with a 

basic overview until late 2017 of the basic thinking behind how Russia might intend to go to war 

and with what capabilities. The discussion of these two authors will be missed. While other pairs 

of officers have produced similar rich discussions of warfare (Kiselev and Vorobyev naturally 

come to mind immediately in regard to tactical issues) rarely have the discussions focused on the 

overarching parameters of strategic warfare (IPW, strategy, war types, etc.) as did the commentary 

of these two men.
16

APPENDIX ONE: ARTICLES BY CHEKINOV AND BOGDANOV IN THE RUSSIAN 

PUBLICATION MILITARY THOUGHT (MT)

The list of articles below initially includes a few separate items that Chekinov and Bogdaov wrote 

either alone or in conjunction with other analysts. Those articles are followed by the ones the pair 

wrote together.

Individual or in conjunction with other authors:

MT No. 5 2003 Bogdanov: Features of the Initial Period of War: Past and Future

MT No. 3 2009 V. N. Gorbunov and Bogdanov: On the Character of Armed Conflict in the 21st

Century

MT No. 7 2010 Chekinov: Forecasting Trends in Military Art at the Beginning of the 21st

Century

Twelve articles the pair wrote together:

MT No. 3 2010 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Asymmetric Actions in Support of the Military 

Security of Russia

MT No. 6 2011 Chekinov and Bogdanov: The Influence of Indirect Actions [the Indirect 

Approach] on the Character of Modern War

MT No. 3 2012 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Strategic Deterrence and the National Security of 

Russia in Contemporary Times

MT No. 8 2012 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Modern Views on the System of Knowledge in 

Military Science

MT No. 11 2012 Chekinov and Bogdanov: The Initial Period of War and Its Impact on the 

Preparation of the Country for a Future War

MT No. 10 2013 Chekinov and Bogdanov: The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War 

MT No. 8 2014 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Military Futurology: Its Origin, Development, Role, 

and Place in the System of Military Science

MT No. 1 2015 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Military Art in the Early Part of the 21st Century: 

Problems and Opinions

MT No. 10 2015 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Forecasting the Character and Content of Future War: 

Problems and Opinions

MT No. 11 2015 Chekinov and Bogdanov: The Development of Contemporary Military Art from 

the Perspective of Military Systematology

MT No. 6 2016 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Features for Supporting the Military Security of Russia 

in the 21st Century in Conditions of Globalization
17

MT No. 11 2016 Chekinov and Bogdanov: Military Strategy: A Look to the Future

MT No. 1 2017 Chekinov and Bogdanov: The Essence and Content of Understanding War in the 

21st Century
18

APPENDIX TWO: IMPORTANT QUOTATIONS OF EACH ARTICLE NOT USED IN 

THIS SUMMARY BUT WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION

Asymmetric Actions: To prevent and restrain aggression by any country (or a coalition of countries) 

and maintain the Russian Federation’s military security, it makes sense to take asymmetrical 

measures of a systemic and comprehensive nature combining political, diplomatic, information, 

economic, military, and other efforts. As President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin said 

“...Our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, and less 

costly.” An asymmetrical approach to military security maintenance is, therefore, a combination 

of forms and methods of using forces and means that depend on the adversaries’ unequal 

potentialities and allow confrontation (or a direct armed clash) with a potential adversary to be 

avoided (or their consequences mitigated). 70 F

71

Indirect Actions: At present there are dozens if not hundreds of methodologies for psychological 

manipulation and impact. The more efficient of them are capable of metaprogramming—installing 

program filters that force the client to perceive the world in a way desired by the programmers. 

The individual, social institution, corporation, or state subjected to metaprogramming can be safely 

left to their own devices if the “route” they follow is adjusted operationally and tactically. This is 

no longer a social entity, but a controllable cell of the global web. Since the web possesses intellect 

operating within the limits and in the direction set by the metaprogram, this type of network can 

be called a “thinking web.”71F

72

Strategic Deterrence: Like deterrence by force, information rivalry has become a key component 

of modern geopolitics. This trend is most dangerous not so much because it has to do with weapons 

as it does with the possible results of reflexive control by the opponent through the development 

of the theory and practice of information rivalry.72 F

73

Initial Periods of War: It may be assumed from the way the U.S. AFs and those of its allies have 

conducted war in recent decades that a NGW will mostly be fought in the IPW on a large scale 

and at a fast rate. Conducted in a network-centric environment, powerful strikes are delivered by

missiles and warplanes. The scale and persistence of military operations will grow as the attacker 

seeks to achieve the most tangible results that can be decisive for achieving the objectives of the 

war within the shortest possible time at a minimum loss of life and inventory for the attacker.73 F

74

NGW: Intensive fire strikes against seats of national and military power, and also military and 

industrial objectives by all arms of service, and the employment of military space-based systems, 

electronic warfare forces and weapons, electromagnetic, information, infrasound, and 

psychotronic effects, corrosive chemical and biological formulations in new-generation wars will 

erode, to the greatest extent possible, the capabilities of the adversary’s troops and civilian 

population to resist.74F

75

 71 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Military Strategy...” 2010, pp. 20-21. 72 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Influence of the Indirect Approach...” 2011, p. 11. 73 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Strategic Deterrence...” 2011, p. 20. 74 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War...” 2012, p. 25. 75 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “On the Nature and Content of Wars of a New Generation,” 2013, p. 15.
19

Forecasting: Forecasts of the possible content of future warfare involving the use of arms suggest 

that it will be conducted with the use of unconventional arms causing earthquakes, typhoons, 

sustained heavy downpours [author’s note: almost this exact wording was in the 2013 article on 

new-generation warfare] leading to the erosion of the economies and the intensification of 

sociopsychological tensions in the warring countries. These unconventional arms will certainly set 

off the development of new forms and methods for the conduct of military operations and changes 

in the pattern of military operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.75 F

76

Art of War: In modern conditions information impact capabilities have reached so high a level of 

development that they are now up to addressing strategic tasks. A strategic information standoff is 

important for disorganizing military and state governance and systems of military aerospace 

defense, deluding the adversary, creating the desired public opinion, organizing antigovernment 

demonstrations, and conducting other events aimed at reducing the opposing sides’ determination 

to resist.76F

77

Military Strategy: As for the interconnection between military strategy and military doctrine, it 

would be pertinent to stress here that the results of research into military strategy are a basis for 

shaping and furthering the military technological part of military doctrine. Conclusions and 

proposals of military strategy that fully conform to the conditions of the given historical stage and 

have been approved by the state’s top military and political leadership become doctrinal views and 

take on the force of law in the area of organizing the country’s defense, first and foremost, the 

development, preparation, and use of the AF. In its turn, further development of military strategy 

proceeds in accordance with those tasks and trends that are recognized as the most topical in the 

content of military doctrine.77F

78

21st Century War: When writing about traditional war, the authors stated the following: The change 

in the essence and content of traditional war is currently assumed to be conditioned, on the one 

hand, by a considerably wider range of confrontation methods employed, thanks to including in 

their list all nonmilitary measures and changes in the order and sequence of using military and 

nonmilitary means throughout the war...confrontation in these areas is merely to enhance the 

effect of activity in an armed struggle or to create the most favorable conditions for using armed 

struggle capabilities.78 F

79

 76 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Predicting the Nature and Content of Future Wars...” 2015, p. 443. 77 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning...,” 2015, p. 42. 78 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Military Strategy...” 2016, p. 14. 79 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Evolution of the Essence and Content of ‘War’...” 2017, p. 35.