Supreme Cou rt
No. 20 2 0

- 121

- C.A. ( W3 / 1 8

- 464 A )

State :

v. : Joseph Corcoran

. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication i n the Rhode Island Reporter. Reader s are request e d t o n ot ify the O pinion Analy s t, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Teleph one (401) 222

- 3258 or Email: o pinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov , of any typo graphica l or othe r f ormal errors in or d er that corrections m a y b e m ade befor e the opinion is published. May 26, 2022- 1

- Supreme Cou rt
No. 20 2 0

- 121

- C.A. ( W3 / 1 8

- 464 A )

State :

v. : Joseph Corcoran

. :

P res ent: Suttell, C.J., Go ldb e rg , R obinson , Lynch P r ata , and Long, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Ju s t ice G oldberg , f

or the Court
. This case came before the Supreme
Court on April 5, 2022 , on appeal by the State of Rhode Island , seeking review of a Superior Court order granting a motion to suppress all statem ent s made t o po lice by the defen d ant , J ose ph C or cor a n
. The state argues that the trial justice erred in finding that the defendant was in custody at the scene of an auto mobile collision and, therefore , erroneously suppress ed the statement s that the defenda nt made to
the off icers at the time

. Additional ly, t he state avers that the right s the police
officer read to the defe nd ant at the time of his arrest and at the police station were sufficient to apprise the defendant o f his c onstitutio nal rights

— a n i ssu e th e t rial just ice did not reach

. For the reaso ns s et forth in this op inion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court

.- 2

- Facts and Travel During the evening of October 23, 2018, Westerly p olice officer Travis
Nichols arrived at th e s cene of an ac c id ent on R oute 78 eastb ound in Westerly , Rhode Island, w here he learned from a witness that defendant ’ s vehicle had struck a light p ole on the side of the r amp approach ing Route 78

. According to the
witness , after observing the coll ision , he checke d o n defendant and noticed that h e

s mell ed of alcohol; the wit ness s hared this information with Officer Nichols and
also identified defenda nt , who was standing outside of the driver ’ s
- side doo r of his
vehicle , as the driver of the veh icle that struck the l ight pole

. Af ter speaking with
the witne ss , O ffice r Nich ols approa c hed defendant and observed damage to the
passenger
- side front bumper , hood , and roof of defendant ’s vehicle, and that the
vehicle ’ s airbag s had de ployed

. The light pole was on the groun d

. Altho ugh
d efendant di d n ot a

pp ear injur ed and told the o ffice r tha t he was uninjured , t he fact
that the airbags deployed prompt ed Officer Nichols to request an ambul ance
. 1
While speaking with defendant , Officer N ichols noted the tell

- tale signs of
intoxication

. T he defendant ’ s ey es were bloodshot and watery ; his speec h was
slurre d ; and his brea t h sm elled of alc ohol

. At that point, Offic er Nichols ask ed
defen dant “ if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages [,] ” to which defe ndant

1 Off icer Nichols testified tha t it is a typic al

— and , we suggest, rather prude n t

— practice to have someone medically screened when airbags hav e deployed in a collision , re gardles s of whether the person appears i njured o r not

.- 3

-

replied , “ [ N ] o
. ” Officer Nichols then requeste d th at defendant move to th e fr ont of
his v e hicle , away f

r o m the driver ’s

- side door

. Before con ducting three field sobriety test s , O fficer Nichols testified, he informed defendant that he had “suspicions that [defendant] had been drinking, even t h ou gh he first sai d that he
hadn ’t , ” a nd he proceeded to “ ask [] [ def endant ] again if h e had b een drinking

. ”
The defendant then admitted that he had b een drinking and that he had consumed

“ two beers

. ” A “ backup ” polic e off icer , Officer Toscano , a rri ved at the sce ne ; and , while Officer Nich ols conduc t e d fiel d sobrie ty test s , which indicated that
defendant was impair ed , an ambul ance arrived and parked approximately ten feet
in front of defendant ’s vehicle on Route 78

. The emergenc y medical technicians a pproached defe nda nt, wh o remained

near O fficer Ni chols

. A t th at point , Officer Toscano approached Officer N ichols to report that , afte r the collision , the witness saw defendant t oss some thing into the
woods bordering the side of the road

. Of fic e r N ichols then asked d efen dan t if he
had thro w n anythin g i nt o the w oods, t o which defendant responded in the negative

. Officer Toscano inspected the area and retrieved a paper bag co ntaining three empty forty

- two

- ounce bottles of high

- alcohol

- content b eer
. 2 When O ff ic er

2 S tate ’ s Exhibi t 2 presente d at the hear ing on the motion to suppress in the Superior Court was a photograph of the empty be er bott l es from the paper bag that was thrown into the woods. Althou gh st at e ’ s Exh ibit 5, the Influence Report Form from the date of the arrest , states that he consumed tw o “ 40 oz ” beers , t he- 4

-

Nicho ls a gain asked defen dant if he had thrown the bag in to the wo ods , defendant responded , “ [Y] es
. ” At th at point, Officer Nichols testified , “ w hile Patrolman
Toscano stood by with the suspect , ” he retrieved a preliminary b reat h test from his patr ol ve hi c le an d asked defendant to tak e the test

. (Emp hasi s added.) The defendant agreed t o sub mit to the test, which registered at a level of 0.201

. He was plac ed under arrest “ for suspicion of DUI

. ”
After he a rrest ed d efendant and plac ed him in the police c r u iser , Officer
Nichol s r ea d defen d ant a “ Rights For Use A t Scene ” card, which provide d :

“ You are suspected of driving while under the influence of in toxicating liquor and/or drugs.

“ You have the righ t to remain sile nt. You do n ot have to ans wer any quest i ons o r g iv e statements . If you d o answers questions or give statemen ts, they can a nd will be used in evidence against you in court. You have the ri gh t to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attor ney, one will be provided for you.

“ You hav e the right t o be e x am in ed at your o wn ex pense immediately b y a ph ysic ian sele cted by you. You w ill be afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right

. ” 3

photog raph displays t hr ee bottles of “ Steel Reserve , ” each indicating “ 42 ounce ” o n the label.

3 Office r Nichols did not read the rev ers e si de of the “ Right s For Us e At Sce ne ” ca rd to defe ndan t , which is t itled “Constitut io nal R ights ” and provide s , i n f ull, that :- 5

-

Upon ar riving at the Westerly p olice s tation , Officer Nichols read defend ant the

“ Right s F or U se A t S tation /Hospital ” f orm, which provide d , in pertinent pa rt, that :

“ You a re und er arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *.

“ You have the right to remain sil ent . You do n ot have to ans wer any quest ions o r gi v e stat eme nts. If yo u do ans wer questions or give sta tement s, the y can and will be used in evidence against yo u in court. You have the right to an attorney . If you canno t afford an atto rney, one will be provided for y ou
. ”
After d efendant was a ll ow e d a co nfi dential phone c all , Of ficer Nichols filled

out an “ Influence Report Form ” while asking defendant a series of questions and
recordin g his answers

. The defendan t admitt ed that he had been o perating a

“ 1) Yo u ha ve t h e r ight to remain silent. You do not have to give a sta t ement or answer any qu estions.

“ 2) If you give up yo ur r ig ht to remain silen t, a ny t hing you say ca n and will be us ed ag ainst you in a Court of Law.

“ 3) Yo u have the rig ht to the pr esence of a lawye r an d to talk with a lawyer before and during a ny ques tion i ng.

“ 4) If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawye r will be app ointe d for you at no c ost to you b efo re an y qu estio ning.

“ 5) If you d o talk to the police, you c an stop at a ny time.

“ 6) Thes e ar e your Constitutional Rights, do you unders tand th e m? ”- 6

-

vehicle, that he had dr u nk two fo rty

- o un ce bottles o f beer , and that h e was un der

t he influence of alcohol

. The defendant also agreed to take additional chemical

test s
. The foregoing events led to defendant being char ged with driving under the
influence of alcoh ol , in violation o f G.L. 1956 § 31

- 27

- 2

. T he defendant fi le d a motio n to s uppress his roadside ad m issions that he had
been drinking , as to the amount of alcohol he had co nsumed , and that he tossed th e empty beer bottles in to the w oods ( the on
- the

- scene statements) , on the basis that
those statem ents were t h e produc t of a custodial i nterr ogation witho ut b e ing
ad vised of his rights u nd er M i randa v. A rizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966 )

. The defendant also sought to suppress the statements that were made and recorded in

t he I nfluen ce Report F orm at the p olice s tati on ( the re co rded s tate ments) , on th e basis that th e r ights car ds that Officer Nichols rea d to him did not fully and adequately inf

or m him of his right to have an attorney present during question ing or of his right to exe rcise thi s or oth er M iranda rights at an y poin t during t he interrogat ion

. Following a n e videntia ry hearing , at which Officer Nichols testified and
documents were admitte d , t he trial justice found that defendant was in custody at
the time he made the chal lenged ad missions b ec ause “ no reasona ble p e rso n would
feel as though h e was free to lea ve t he scene ” a fter defendant was relocated to the
roadside for further investigation and the officer expressed his disbelief about- 7

-

def endant ’ s statement that he had not been drinking

. As a r es ul t, t he trial j us ti ce suppressed the on
- the

- scene statements as products of a cust odia l interrogation in
the absence of the requisite Miranda warnings

. T he trial justi ce also found that

“ any further statements uttered, or writt en, by [defendant ] during this continued

c us to di al interroga tion, [ were ] in ad mi ssible as fru its of t he po is on ed tree

. ” Consequently , the trial justice gra nted defendant ’ s motion to suppress all statements made to the police on t he n ight of his arrest

. An order entered, and t he
state filed a timel y appeal

. Standar d o f Review

“ It is well sett le d that this Co ur t ‘ will reve r se a trial justice ’ s findings on a
motio n to suppres s only if (1) his or her fin dings concerning the challenged statements reveal clear error, and (2) our independent revie w of th e conclusions
draw n f rom the historic al facts es t ablish es th at t he defe ndant ’ s federal

c onstitutional rights were denied. ’ ” State v. Grayhurst , 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I.
2004 ) (quoting State v. Garcia , 743 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 2000 ) ). “With respec t to qu es tions of law and mixe d questions of l aw and fa ct involving constitutional
iss ues, however, this Court engages in a d e nov o review [

. ] ” State v. Jimenez , 33 A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011 ) (quoting Stat e v. Linde , 876 A.2d 1115, 1124 (R. I.
2005 )) ; see S tate v. P arra , 941 A. 2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2007 ) ( “ We * * * c ond uct a d e- 8

-

nov o review of the record and independently consider whether a defendant ’ s rights
have been violated

. ” )

. An alysis
The state con tends tha t the trial justic e cle arly erred in finding that

“ d ef end an t ’ s fre edo m of mov e ment was * * * cu rtailed in su ch a way prior to his

act ual arrest so as to constitute custody ” and erred in considering the officer ’ s suspicion of defendant ’ s intoxication as a factor in determini ng whether defe ndant
was in cust od y
.

“ Bo th the Uni te d Stat e s and the Rhode Island Const itu tio ns forbid the use of
a defendant ’ s involuntary c onfession. ” State v. Monteiro , 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I.
2007 )

. “ The F ifth Amendment [ to t he United Sta tes Constit u tion] provides : ‘ No
person * * * shall b e compelle d in any criminal c ase to be a witness ag ain st
himself [

. ] ’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984 ) (quoting U.S. Const. , A mend. V )

. “ I n accordanc e wit h the crucially important ho ld ing in M ir anda [,]
* * * before a confes s ion can be us ed at tr ial, the state must establi sh, by clear and

co nvincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right against sel f

- incrimination [

. ] ” Monteiro , 924 A.2d at 790

. To safe guard th i s r i g h t , “ p ri or to c ustodial interr og ation a su s pect must receive explicit warnings conce rni ng his constitutional privilege against self

incrimination and his right to counsel

. ” Grayhurst , 852 A. 2d at 513 (quoting State- 9

-

v . Am ado , 424 A .2d 1057, 10 61 (R.I. 1981 ) ) ; se e Miranda , 384 U .S. at 44 4 , 478

- 79

. H ow e ver, the warnings under Miranda , and e xcl usion of statements in violation thereof, are only required when a perso n is in custody and is undergoing interrogation by the police. E. g. , Sta te v . Edwards , 810 A.2d 226, 239 (R.I. 200 2 )

.

“ A bse nt a fo rmal arrest [ , ] ” E dw ards , 81 0 A.2d at 240 , a person is in custody

“ if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or
she w as not free to leave. ” Jimenez , 33 A. 3d at 732 (quot ing State v. Vie ira , 913
A.2 d 1015, 10 20 (R .I. 2 0 07 ) )

. “In maki ng this determination, a court may co nsi der the following factors: (1) the extent to whic h the person ’ s freedom is curtailed; (2) the degree of force employed by t he p olice; (3) the belief of a reasonable, in nocent
pers on in ide nt ic al circ um stanc es ; and (4 ) whether the person had the option o f n ot accompanying the police.” State v. Briggs , 756 A.2d 731, 737 (R.I. 2000 ) (quoting
State v. Diaz , 654 A.2d 1 195, 12 0 4 (R. I. 1 995 )) ; see Berkemer , 468 U .S. at 428 (recognizing that a pers o n is in cust ody w he n “de pr ived of his [or her] freedom of
action in any significant way ” ) (quoting Mir anda , 384 U.S. at 444 )

. Applying these factors to the present case, we are satis fied that the trial jus ti ce correctly determi ned that def end ant was in c u st ody w hen he made the
incriminatin g statements to Of fi cer N ic hol s a t the scene of the accid ent. We are
unmoved by the state ’ s averment , citing Be rkemer , 468 U.S. at 439 , and Terr y v. Ohio , 39 2 U.S

. 1 (19 68 ), that this case should be com pared to a n ordinary tr affic- 10

-

stop for suspicion of driving unde r the influe nce , or to a ca se where there was a jurisdictional issue underlying the defendant ’ s arrest , citing State ex rel. Town o f Little Compton v. Simmons , 87 A.3d 412 (R.I. 2014 )

. See S immons , 87 A .3d at 413 ( con sidering whether Little Compton poli ce officers a rrest ed th e d efen dant
i llegally in the T own of Tiverton or lawfu lly in the T own of Little Compton).
In the case at bar , the officer was called to the scene of a single

- vehicle
collision and was i nformed b y t he roadside witness that defe ndant c rashed into t h e ligh t p o le as he approached Route 78 from the on

- ramp and , in the witness ’ s opinion, smelled of al c ohol . Officer Nichols approached defendant , who was o ut of his vehicle, and observe d a light pole on the ground ; damage to the body of
defend ant ’ s vehic le ; a i r

ba gs t hat h ad deployed ; and d efendant ’ s bloodshot and

water y eyes, slurred spe ech, and alcohol

- t a inted breath. Beyond that point and
until defendant was informed of his arrest , a pol ice offic er a t all tim es remained
with defendant

. Although t here was no forc e e mp lo yed by the pol ice, defendant ’ s freedom of movement was curtaile d by th e watchful accompaniment of either
Officer Nichols or Officer Toscano throughout the investigation and inter roga ti on , wher eby defendant admitted to consuming the ubiq uitous “ two b e er s
. ”
Further more , in the context of these events, no fu rther restriction on defendant ’ s freedom and no amount of for ce w ere necessa ry to sa tisfy a factfinder that
defendant was in c u sto dy

. See U nited S tates v. Mittel

- Carey , 493 F.3d 36 , 40 (1 st- 11

-

Cir. 200 7 ) ( co n side ring , releva nt to the custody cal culus

— namely, the physical
control agents exerted over the defendant

— t hat the defend ant was escorte d by agents on the three occasion s he was pe rm itted to move to different areas in his
ho me ).
With res pect to the trial j ustic e ’ s finding that defendan t was in custody once he was relocated and then questioned a second time about alcohol consumption by

an o fficer who was armed with all the indicia of an individual who had been driving under the influence , we are of th e opinion that a factfin der could con clude
that no re a s o nable person would fee l free to leave . Although t he state contend s tha t O ff icer Nichols ’ s mere suspicion of defendant ’ s i ntoxication is not a factor to the custody det erminatio n , we deem this argu men t una vailing

. “ [A] n i n vestigating

o fficer ’ s unartic u l at ed plan has no bearing on whether a p erson is in custod y at a particular tim e .” Brig gs , 756 A.2d at 737 ( quoting Diaz , 654 A.2d at 1204

- 0 5 ).
However , “ [ t] he lack of any comm un ic ation concerning th e * * * investigation is

c rucial ” and f

actors into ho w a re asonable , innocent person would assess the

s ituation and his or her free dom to leave. Diaz , 654 A.2 d at 1205 (emphasis
added )

. Th is inquiry turns on whether the ob jective of th e investigation is
disc losed to a suspect , as the United States Supreme Court h as explained :

“ It is well settl ed, then, that a police off ic er ’ s subjective view that the ind ivid ual under questio ning is a suspect, if undisclos ed , does not bear u pon the que st ion whether the individ ual is in custody for purpo ses of Mi randa

. * * *- 12

- Save as they are co mmunicated or other wise manifested to the pers on b eing questioned , an officer ’ s e volv ing but unarticul ated suspicions do not affect t he o bjective circum stances of an interro gation or inter view, and thus cannot affec t the Mir

and a custody inquiry

. ” Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994 ) (emphasis added)

. I n fact , Officer Nich ol s ’ s suspici on that defendant had been dr in king wa s
art iculated to defendant an d , thus, w as not a mere sub jective opinion without
consequence to the custody deter mination

. After coming to a conclusion on
defe nd ant ’ s physica l s tate du e to the initial cir cumstan ces

— suc h as t he light po le

on the ground ; the witn ess ’ s statements ; t he de pl oyed airbags and damaged
vehicle ; and the appearance , s peech , and odor of alcohol

— O fficer Ni chols direct ed
defendant to move to a diffe rent lo cation

. He then informed de fenda nt o f the
officer ’ s belief that defendant ha d been untr uthful ab out dr inking a nd as ked him once again if h e had been drinking , followe d by failed field sobriety t e sts , further questi oning, a nd a preliminary breath test

. Once Officer Nichols communicated his suspicion to defendant, any reasonable person

— in noce nt or n ot

— w ou ld have

u n d ers too d , based on the obje c tive i ndicia , that he or she was being investigated
for the crime of driving under th e i nfluenc e and was not free t o le a ve
. See Diaz , 654 A.2 d at 1205

. I n addition, Officer Nichols made it clear in his test imony t h at
he would n ot have “ let [ defen dant ] wa l k away ” from the scene

. The state assigns error to the t rial justice ’ s failu re t o articulat e each of the
custodial fac to r s in her d etermination that “ no reasonable person would feel as- 13

-

though he was free t o leave the s cene
. ” H o wever, the se fac tors , discus sed supra ,

are designe d to direct the trial justice ’ s a t tention to the factual circumstances in a given case, which can include myriad situations

. Briggs , 756 A.2d at 737 ( listing
four f a ctors a court may consider in deter mi ning whether “ [a] person is seiz ed or
under arrest ” ) ; see Diaz , 654 A.2d at 12 0 4

. T he a nalysis , which the trial justice appropriately undertook , is wheth er , in the totality of the cir cumstan ces , “ a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not f r ee to leave

. ” Jimene z , 33
A. 3d a t 73 2 (quoting Vie ira , 913 A.2d a t 10 20 )

. A ccordingl y, the trial justice correctly granted defendan t ’ s moti on to suppress his on
- the

- scene statements

. Lastly, the state argues that the recorded statements made by d efen da nt at the poli ce station afte r his a rre st and recor ded in the Inf lu ence Report Form should not have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings given to def endant upon his arrest and a gain at the police s tation were sufficient to apprise defendant of hi s constitution al rights . Howe ver, t h e trial justice did not reach the issue of the
sufficie n cy of the warnings in the context of the questioning at the police station

. As discussed supra , t he tri al j ustice suppressed the recorded statements ma de by
defe nd ant at the p olice stati on as “ fru it s of the poisoned tree

. ” T he state’s

cont ention on appe a l that the post

- arrest Miranda war nings given to defendant by police officers wer e constitutionally suf ficient neither addres ses nor assigns error
to the trial j us tice’s reaso ns for suppressing th os e post

- arrest recorded statements

.- 14

-

There fo re, becaus e the trial ju stice did not address the issue of the sufficiency of th e Miranda warnings in the trial court in the fi r st instance , a nd
because the state failed to a ddr es s the trial justice ’ s decision to sup press the statements as fruit of the po isonous tree , t he issue of the sufficiency of the later

given Miranda warnings is not properly before this Court. See Barnes v. R h ode
Island Pub lic Transit Auth ority , 242 A.3d 32 , 36

- 37 (R.I. 2020 ) ( “[ S ]imply st ating an issue for appellate r eview, with out a meaningfu l disc ussio n thereof or legal briefing of the issues, do es not assist the Court in focusing on the leg a l questions
raised , and therefore constit utes a waiver o f that is sue
. ” ) (emphasis added) (quoting Fishe r v. Applebaum , 947 A.2d 248, 252 (R .I. 2008 )) ; s ee also Girard v.
Sorel , 85 R.I. 43, 44 , 125 A.2d 212, 212 (1956 ) (“ It is well settled that to br ing u p for review an alleged error in any * * * r uling m ade duri ng t ri al, sep arate reasons of appeal spec ifyin g each alleged e rroneo us action mu st appear in the reaso ns of appeal. ”). Ac cordingly , we decline to reach this issue and take no position on its

corre c tness. Conclusi on Based on the foregoing, we af firm the order o f the S uperi or Court. The papers i n thi s case ma y be re turn ed to the Supe rior Court.SU

- CMS

- 0 2 A (revised June 20 20 ) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE L icht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Joseph Corcoran

.
Case Number No. 2020

- 121

- C. A. (W3/18

- 464A) Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2022

Just ices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melanie Wilk Thunberg

Attorney(s) on Appeal For State:
Mariana E. Ormonde Department of Attorney General For Defendant: Nicholas J. Parrillo, Esq.