FIFTH DIVISION                                             September 27, 1996No. 1-94-3261THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF         )ILLINOIS,                          )                                   )    Appeal from the Circuit          Plaintiff-Appellee,      )    Court of Cook County.                                   )     v.                            )                                       )JEROME D. SCHRAM,                  )    Honorable                                   )    Themis Karnezis,                                   )    Judge Presiding.          Defendant-Appellant.     )     JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:     The defendant, Jerome Schram, was indicted in February 1994with six counts of forgery.  The indictments alleged that withthe intent to defraud, the defendant made, altered and deliveredmotor fuel distributor licenses, gasoline tax ordinancecertificates of registration, new account applications, businessapplications and tax exemption authorizations in violation of 720ILCS 5/17-3(A)(1) (West 1994).  Schram filed a motion to dismissthe charges, claiming that his prosecution for forgery wasprecluded because it would constitute double jeopardy under 720ILCS 5/3-4 (West 1994) in light of an earlier indictment; thatthe forgery action should have been brought at the time of thatearlier indictment based on the compulsory joinder statute (720ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 1994)); that the indictment was insufficientto state the offense of forgery; and that his due process rightshad been violated based on alleged prosecutorial misconductbefore the grand jury and on an alleged two-year delay in seekingthis indictment.  The trial court denied Schram's motion todismiss, and Schram appeals from that order pursuant to IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 604(f) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)).     The facts are undisputed.  On May 11, 1992, the State soughta grand jury indictment against Schram for alleged violations ofthe Illinois Motor Fuel Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1992, ch. 120,par. 431 et seq. now at 35 ILCS 505 et seq. (West 1994))(hereinafter referred to as the "IMFTA"), which provides criminalpenalties for the nonpayment of taxes in various transactionsinvolving the purchase and sale of motor fuel and for the sale ordistribution of motor fuel without a license.  Pursuant to thatstatute, indictments were returned against Schram which allegedthat between September and December of 1991, in violation of theIMFTA, Schram failed to file motor fuel tax returns, failed toremit motor fuel tax payments, and distributed motor fuel withouta license.  The trial court granted Schram's motion to dismissthose indictments, stating that they failed to allege illegalconduct with sufficient specificity, that they were "drafted in asomewhat sloppy fashion," and that they "would not give [thedefendant] an opportunity to defend or to be freed from doublejeopardy."  The trial court indicated that these insufficienciescould be "cleaned-up" and that the defendant could be re-indictedunder the IMFTA.  The State chose not to appeal the order ofdismissal and did not attempt to correct the deficiencies inorder to re-indict Schram under the IMFTA.     On February 22, 1994, the State appeared before anothergrand jury seeking to indict Schram for forgery in violation of720 ILCS 5/17-3(A)(1) (West 1994), which provides that a personcommits forgery when "with the intent to defraud, he knowingly*** [m]akes or alters any document apparently capable ofdefrauding another."  Testimony before the grand jury allegedthat Schram tendered forged documents to Tropicana Energy Companyand to Martin Oil Company purporting to show Schram's officialauthorization to purchase several tanker loads of gasoline andthat Schram presented those documents in order to avoid thepayment of motor fuel transaction taxes.  In particular, theState alleged that Schram made, altered and delivered forgeddocuments including a federal registration for gasoline tax withan identification number which had never been issued to Schram;an Illinois Motor Fuel Distributor's license which was neverissued by the Illinois Department of Revenue and which was signedby a director of the Department of Revenue who was not employedby that department when that license was purportedly issued; aCook County Gasoline Tax Ordinance Certificate of Registrationnever issued by Cook County to Schram; a business application andtax exemption authorization bearing a State of Illinois MotorFuel Number never issued by the State to Schram; and state andcounty tax numbers never issued by those entities to Schram.  Thegrand jury testimony regarding the alleged forgeries alsorevealed that prior to the IMFTA indictments, the IllinoisDepartment of Revenue agents investigating Schram knew of thetransactions and documents which formed the basis for the instantforgery indictments.     In his motion to dismiss the forgery indictments, Schramurged the following five contentions of error:  (1) that hisprosecution for forgery was barred under double jeopardyprinciples pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 1994) in light of theMay 1992 indictment under the IMFTA; (2) that his prosecution wasbarred by section 3-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961, thecompulsory joinder statute (720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 1994)), whichhe alleged required that the current forgery indictments beprosecuted with the May 1992 IMFTA indictments in a singleaction; (3) that the current indictment was insufficient to statethe offense of forgery; (4) that his due process rights wereviolated by prejudicial prosecutorial statements before the grandjury regarding the May 1992 indictment; and (5) that his dueprocess rights were violated by the State's two-year delay sincethe May 1992 indictment in prosecuting the current allegations.     The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss theforgery indictments.  With respect to Schram's double jeopardyclaim, the court stated that because the May 1992 indictment wasterminated by a dismissal, it was not a "conviction or anacquittal" under the former jeopardy statute and therefore couldnot serve as the basis of a double jeopardy defense in theinstant action.  With respect to Schram's compulsory joinderclaim, the trial court stated that the IMFTA indictment was basedon different acts and required different proofs than does theforgery indictment, that "the court does not *** view thedismissal [of the May 1992 indictment] as a prosecution" underthe compulsory joinder statute, and that therefore Schram'scompulsory joinder claim must fail.  With respect to Schram'scontention that the current indictments were insufficient tostate the offense of forgery, the trial court stated that theindictment was sufficient to advise the defendant of the chargesagainst him.  Finally, with respect to Schram's due processarguments, the trial court stated that Schram failed to show thatthe two-year delay in obtaining the forgery indictmentsprejudiced him.     On appeal, Schram advances the same five arguments that hepresented to the trial court in his motion to dismiss, andcontends that on each of those five bases the court erred indenying his motion.  In his jurisdictional statement, thedefendant purports to predicate the jurisdiction of this courtupon Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)),which the state purports to concede in its jurisdictionalstatement.  Rule 604(f) provides that a criminal defendant "mayappeal to the Appellate Court the denial of a motion to dismiss acriminal proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy" (emphasisadded).  Although the State does not contest appellatejurisdiction, jurisdiction cannot be waived or stipulated to bythe parties.  (Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Smith, 266Ill. App. 3d 705, 639 N.E.2d 627 (1994)), and this court has aduty to examine matters pertaining to its jurisdiction suasponte.  Almgren v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center,162 Ill. 2d 205, 642 N.E.2d 1264 (1994); Ferguson v. RiversideMedical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436, 490 N.E.2d 1252 (1985). Therefore, we must determine whether jurisdiction under Rule604(f) will properly vest jurisdiction in this court with respectto each of the five contentions on appeal, as opposed to vestingjurisdiction solely with respect to those contentions pertainingto former jeopardy.     Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review nonfinaljudgments, orders and decrees absent statutory exceptions. Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371(1958); People v. Culhane, 34 Ill. App. 3d 158, 340 N.E.2d 63(1975).  Ordinarily, a trial court's order denying a defendant'smotion to dismiss criminal charges is a nonfinal and therefore anonappealable order, except to the extent specifically providedunder applicable statutory exceptions.  People v. Miller, 35 Ill.2d 62, 219 N.E.2d 475 (1966); People v. Culhane.  Supreme CourtRule 604 contains such statutory exceptions, and the only part ofthat rule applicable in the instant case is Rule 604(f), whichpermits a defendant to appeal from the denial of a motion todismiss a criminal proceeding where that motion was based onformer jeopardy principles.  See, e.g., People v. Thomann, 197Ill. App. 3d 516, 554 N.E.2d 755 (1990); People v. Hogan, 186Ill. App. 3d 267, 542 N.E.2d 178 (1989).     However, the scope of review of an order in a 604(f) appealis limited to a former jeopardy analysis, and does not extend toa review of alleged errors which could not independently form thebasis for appellate jurisdiction under 604(f).  People v. Stefan,208 Ill. App. 3d 205, 567 N.E.2d 18 (1991), rev'd on othergrounds, 146 Ill. 2d 324, 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992).  In Stefan, thedefendant appealed from an order denying his motion to dismiss anindictment pursuant to Rule 604(f).  The defendant urged that thetrial court erred in denying his motion because the indictmentwas barred on double jeopardy grounds, and because it did notplead the offenses charged with sufficient specificity.  TheStefan court held that Rule 604 did not confer appellatejurisdiction over the defendant's allegation of error regardingthe vagueness of the indictment, but, rather, that it confinedreview on appeal to defendant's double jeopardy contentions.  Thecourt in Stefan stated:     "Regarding the second contention, we note that Supreme     Court Rule 604 [citation] does not permit interlocutory     appeals from an order denying the motion to dismiss on     grounds of vagueness or an order overruling a     defendant's objections to an amended bill of     particulars.  Thus, the second argument is improperly     before us and will not be addressed on appeal."  208     Ill. App. 3d at 206-07, 567 N.E.2d at 19.     We note that while Stefan was reversed on its substantiveholding which affirmed the trial court's denial of thedefendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, itsrestriction of the issues to be considered on appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 604(f) remained unchallenged.  See by analogyPeople v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 142 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 492N.E.2d 1003 (1986) (scope of review in interlocutory appealbrought under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 concerning thedenial of a request for an injunction does not encompassallegations of error not narrowly bearing on that denial). Accord Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 Ill. App. 3d 959, 614N.E.2d 1312 (1993) (controverted facts or the merits of the caseare not decided on an interlocutory appeal brought pursuant toRule 307); Lindsey v. Board of Education, 127 Ill. App. 3d 413,468 N.E.2d 1019 (1984) (appeals permitted by Rule 307 do not openthe door to a general review of other issues in the underlyingcase).  Thus, as in the foregoing cases, we lack jurisdiction toreview Schram's contentions regarding due process or failure tostate the offense of forgery, and must confine our review solelyto those contentions concerning former jeopardy.     We now address Schram's contention that the trial courterred in its failure to dismiss the present forgery indictmentson double jeopardy grounds as set forth in 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(West 1994) in light of the earlier May 1992 IMFTA indictments. That contention is without merit.  Section 3-4(b) of the CriminalCode provides in relevant part as follows:     "Effect of former prosecution *** (b) A prosecution is     barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a     different offense, or for the same offense based upon     different facts, if such former prosecution:  (1)     Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and     the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which     the defendant could have been convicted on the former     prosecution; or was for an offense with which the     defendant should have been charged on the former     prosecution, as provided in Section 3-3 of the Code     ***."  720 ILCS 5/3-4(b) (West 1994) (emphasis added).     The defendant contends that the dismissal of the IMFTAindictments against him constituted an "acquittal" under section3-4(b), and that therefore, the forgery indictments against himmust be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds.  Schram hasmischaracterized the dismissal of the IMFTA indictments as an"acquittal" under 3-4(b).  Ordinarily, in order for doublejeopardy to attach,      "'there must be a valid indictment ***.  So, where the     indictment or information is so defective in form or     substance that it will not support a conviction, it     cannot form the basis of proceedings which will put the     accused in jeopardy and bar another prosecution.'"      People v. King, 21 Ill. App. 3d 256, 314 N.E.2d 694     (1974) (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law � 246 (1961)).A court's dismissal of charges against a defendant due to thetechnical insufficiency of the indictment is not tantamount to anacquittal for purposes of double jeopardy.  People v. Baze, 43Ill. 2d 298, 253 N.E.2d 392 (1969); People v. King (a defendantcannot succeed on a double jeopardy claim where the indictment isso defective in form or substance that it will not support aconviction).  See 720 ILCS 5/2-1 (West 1994) ("acquittal" definedas "a verdict or finding of not guilty of an offense, rendered bya legally constituted jury or by a court of competentjurisdiction").     In the instant case, the dismissal of the IMFTA indictmentsdid not constitute an acquittal because that dismissal was basedupon the technical insufficiency of the indictments.  As noted,the trial court dismissed the IMFTA indictments because thecharges were enumerated in a "sloppy" and unspecific fashion,stating that the charges should be "cleaned up" before re-indictment.  Hence, those charges were dismissed because they didnot technically suffice to state an offense against Schram underthe IMFTA.  Because those indictments were dismissed due totechnical insufficiencies, they do not constitute an "acquittal"under section 3-4(b).  People v. Baze; People v. King.     We also reject Schram's contention that since the Statechose not to appeal or to re-indict the defendant for violationsof the IMFTA following that dismissal, the State must havetherefore viewed the dismissal as an "acquittal" under section 3-4(b).  We first note that we cannot speculate as to the State'ssubjective motive for electing not to appeal or to re-indict thedefendant on the IMFTA charges.  Moreover, the viewpoint of theprosecution is immaterial to the determination of whether anacquittal existed for purposes of a double jeopardy bar, as thatdetermination is made on the basis of the nature of theindictment and its ultimate disposition.  See generally People v.Baze; People v. King.     In support of his contention that the dismissal of the IMFTAindictments constituted an "acquittal," the defendant refers tothe holding in the case of People v. Hiatt, 229 Ill. App. 3d1094, 595 N.E.2d 733 (1992).  In Hiatt, the police recoveredpornographic videotapes and photographs of a minor from thedefendant's home.  The defendant was charged with childpornography for his alleged pornographic videotaping of a minor. Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of those charges.  Thedefendant was then re-indicted for child pornography forpossession of one of the videotapes recovered during the policesearch of his home.  That indictment was dismissed on doublejeopardy grounds.  The defendant was again re-indicted for childpornography based upon his possession of the photographsrecovered in the same police search.  The defendant filed amotion to dismiss that indictment, contending that it was barredon double jeopardy and compulsory joinder grounds because thedismissal of the previous indictment constituted an acquittalunder section 3-4(b) and because the State knew of thephotographs at the time of the previous indictment.  The trialcourt granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the thirdindictment concerning the photographs.  In agreeing that theprior dismissal constituted an acquittal under section 3-4(b),the Hiatt court stated that     "an acquittal may occur even though the question of     guilt or innocence has never been submitted to the     trier of fact such as when a defendant is discharged on     speedy trial grounds."  Hiatt, 229 Ill. App. 3d at     1098, 595 N.E.2d at 736.     Defendant's reliance upon the decision in Hiatt isunwarranted.  In Hiatt, the dismissal of the second indictmentregarding the videotape on double jeopardy grounds wassubstantive, on the merits, and would preclude any possibility ofa cure.  Moreover, the dismissal of the third indictment againstthe defendant regarding possession of the photographs waseffectively based on double jeopardy principles emanating fromthe defendant's original acquittal by the jury of the sameoffense.  Here, the dismissal of the IMFTA indictments was basedon technical procedural grounds, and did not purport to be asubstantive disposition on the merits.  The dismissal in thiscase did not purport to preclude reindictment if those proceduralinfirmities were cured.  Therefore, under the reasoning of thecourts in People v. Baze and People v. King, as set forth above,that dismissal does not constitute an acquittal under section 3-4(b).     In addition to the fact that the defendant's double jeopardydefense must fail because there was no previous acquittal, itmust also fail because none of the other elements required underthe provisions of section 3-4(b) are met as well.  As noted,section 3-4(b) provides that a subsequent prosecution will bebarred if that prosecution is "for an offense of which thedefendant could have been convicted on the former prosecution" oris "for an offense with which the defendant should have beencharged on the former prosecution, as provided in Section 3-3 ofthis Code."  With respect to whether the defendant could havebeen convicted of the subsequent charges in the formerprosecution, the court in People v. Mueller, in clarifying themeaning of that requirement in section 3-4(b), stated that thisissue is resolved by determining whether the subsequent chargesare a lesser included offense of the former charges.  In theinstant case, none of the parties have urged that forgery is alesser included offense of an offense under the IMFTA, nor wouldthere have been any merit to such a contention had one been made. The rule is clear that a lesser included offense for purposes ofdouble jeopardy is one in which the lesser offense is a necessaryelement of the greater offense.  People v. Mueller.  See alsoUnited States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 125 L. Ed.2d 556 (1993); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 65 L. Ed. 2d228, 100 S. Ct. 2260 (1980); Blockburger v. United States, 284U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932) (determination ofwhether later prosecution barred on double jeopardy groundsfocuses on the statutory elements of the offenses charged and onwhether each provision requires proof of a fact which the otherdoes not).  It is manifest on its face and requires no extendeddiscussion to note that the proofs required to establish aviolation of the IMFTA for the nonpayment of motor fuel taxes andfor the failure to obtain a license to distribute motor fuel arewholly different and apart from the proofs required under theforgery statute to show the alteration and delivery of a documentcapable of defrauding another and the intent to defraud.     Likewise, the second indictment in this case is not subjectto the compulsory joinder provisions of section 3-4(b) whichwould have required that this action be joined with the earlierIMFTA indictments which were dismissed.  Schram contends that thetrial court misinterpreted and misapplied section 3-3 of thecompulsory joinder statute.  We disagree.  Section 3-3 providesas follows:     "Multiple Prosecutions for Same Act.  (a) When the same     conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of     more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted     for each such offense.  (b) If the several offenses are     known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of     commencing the prosecution and are within the     jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted     in a single prosecution *** if they are based on the     same act."  720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 1994) (Emphasis     added).Pursuant to this language, defendant would urge that the IMFTAand forgery indictments are so interrelated that they are "basedon the same act" under section 3-3(b), and additionally, thatbecause the prosecution had knowledge of the acts which formedthe basis of the forgery charges prior to the IMFTA indictments,the forgery indictments should have been dismissed because theState failed to prosecute all charges in a single action.     The case of People v. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 488 N.E.2d523 (1986) is in point.  In that case, the defendant killed twoindividuals, hid their bodies and later deposited them in ariver.  The defendant was charged with murder, pleaded self-defense, and was acquitted.  The State later charged him withhomicidal concealment and after he was convicted, he appealed oncompulsory joinder and former jeopardy grounds.  Although theprosecution had full knowledge of both offenses prior to theprosecution of either one, the Mueller court affirmed.  Inholding that the murder and concealment charges were not "basedon the same act" under section 3-3, that court stated     "The fact that the shootings and the acts of     concealment were related is irrelevant.  There is no     requirement of joinder where multiple offenses arise     from a series of related acts.  [Citations.]  'Section     3-3 is not intended to cover the situation in which     several offenses *** arise from a series of acts which     are closely related with respect to the offender's     single purpose or plan.'  [Citation.]  Indeed, the     drafters considered and rejected an earlier version of     section 3-3(b) which would have required a single     prosecution when multiple offenses arose from the same     'conduct.' [Citation.]  The term 'conduct' could, of     course, refer to a series of acts.  [Citation].  The     purpose of this section as enacted was to preclude     successive prosecutions where more than one person was     injured by a single act of the accused, such as setting     off an explosive.  [Citation.]"  Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d     at 385-86, 488 N.E.2d at 526.See also People v. Astorga, 245 Ill. App. 3d 124, 613 N.E.2d 779(1993) (where drugs and electronic scale possibly used in cocainesales found during same search, section 3-3(b) did not barseparate indictments for possession of illegal drugs and ofstolen scale because not same conduct); People v. Thomann, 197Ill. App. 3d 516, 554 N.E.2d 755 (1990) (where defendant chargedwith offense of possession and dissemination of videotaped childpornography, and later with offense of possession ofadvertisement containing child pornography, 3-3(b) did notmandate that all child pornography charges be prosecuted insingle prosecution because the acts were separate and distinct).     As in Mueller, Astorga, and Thomann, the IMFTA charges andthe forgery offenses here were not "based on the same act" undersection 3-3(b), but, rather, involved distinct offenses basedupon different conduct in which Schram engaged in order toachieve his alleged overall goal of motor fuel tax evasion.  TheIMFTA indictments accused Schram of failing to file motor fueltax returns, failing to pay motor fuel taxes and failing toobtain a license before distributing motor fuel.  By contrast,the forgery indictments at issue on appeal charge the defendantwith making, altering and delivering several falsified licensesand registrations.  Whereas the IMFTA charges were based onSchram's alleged failure to pay taxes, to file returns, or toobtain a license for the distribution of motor fuel, the forgerycharges are based on his alleged active misrepresentation of hisauthority to purchase motor fuel in order to effectuate hisoverall plan to evade his obligation to pay motor fuel taxes.  Asin Mueller, Astorga, and Thomann, the fact that the two sets ofcharges pertain to a related subject, namely, the nonpayment ofgasoline taxes, is insufficient to require joinder under Illinoislaw.     The defendant's reliance on the cases of People v.Mullenhoff, 33 Ill. 2d 445, 211 N.E.2d 744 (1965) and People v.Mitsakopoulos, 171 Ill. App. 3d 198, 524 N.E.2d 1183 (1988) ismisplaced.  In Mullenhoff, the defendant was charged andacquitted of attempt to commit deviate sexual assault and wassubsequently charged and convicted of attempt to commit rapebased on the identical occurrence and conduct.  The Mullenhoffcourt concluded that the compulsory joinder statute under section3-3(b) mandated joinder and therefore barred the subsequentattempt rape prosecution because "both offenses were based on theidentical conduct of the defendant, and this conduct was known tothe prosecuting officer at the commencement of the prosecution." Mullenhoff, 33 Ill. 2d at 449, 211 N.E.2d at 746.  InMitsakopoulos, the defendant was initially charged with forgeryof a check, and subsequently was charged with theft by exertingunauthorized control over the proceeds of that same check.  TheMitsakopoulos court found that section 3-3(b) barred the separatetheft prosecution, because the evidence for both the theft andforgery charges was the same, involved precisely the sameconduct, and because the prosecution knew of both offenses priorto the prosecution of either charge.     As already noted, unlike the circumstances before the courtsin Mullenhoff and Mitsakopoulos, here there was no single actforming a common basis for the IMFTA and forgery charges.  Asalready noted, Schram's presentation of falsified documentsformed the basis for the forgery charges, whereas his failure topay taxes, to file returns and to obtain a fuel distributionlicense formed the basis for the IMFTA charges.  Moreover, unlikeMitsakopoulos, the evidence required to prove forgery, i.e. theforged documents, is not the same as that required to prove thenonpayment of motor fuel taxes.  Thus, Schram's alleged officialdocument forgeries stand independently from his alleged IMFTAfailures, thus rendering section 3-3(b) inapplicable as a bar tothe forgery indictments in the instant case.     In addition to arguing the violation of the compulsoryjoinder statute as a basis for its double jeopardy contentions,the defendant also appears to argue the violation of thecompulsory joinder statute as a wholly independent ground.  Tothe extent that the defendant makes a compulsory joinder argumenton grounds independent of the double jeopardy statute, it wouldmore than likely be jurisdictionally barred under Supreme CourtRule 604(f).  As already discussed, Rule 604(f) provides that acriminal defendant "may appeal to the Appellate Court the denialof a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on grounds of formerjeopardy"  (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)) (emphasis added).  See Peoplev. Stefan.  However, even if we were to independently entertain acompulsory joinder argument under section 3-3(b), the samefactors discussed above which preclude compulsory joinder undersection 3-4(b) would also extend to preclude compulsory joinderin an independent application of section 3-3(b).     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Courtof Cook County is affirmed.     McNULTY, P.J., and COUSINS, Jr., J., concur.