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S. HRG. 115–73 

HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION 

OF COURTNEY SIMMONS ELWOOD TO BE 

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

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(III) 

CONTENTS 

APRIL 26, 2017 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia .............. 3 

WITNESSES 

Kaine, Hon. Tim, a U.S. Senator from Virginia .................................................... 4 

Elwood, Courtney, nominated to be General Counsel .......................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 9 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 32 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 49 

Follow up Questions for Mrs. Elwood from Senators Wyden and Heinrich ....... 68 

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(1) 

HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION 

OF COURTNEY SIMMONS ELWOOD TO BE 

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in Room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr (presiding), Warner, 

Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call the hearing to order. I’d like to 

welcome our witness today, Mrs. Courtney Elwood, President 

Trump’s nominee to be the next General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Courtney, congratulations on your nomination. 

And I’d like to recognize your husband John—John, wave your 

hand there. 

[Mr. Elwood waves.] 

Thank you John for the support you give to Courtney. 

Courtney, you’ve served the country with distinction in your previous posts at the White House and the Department of Justice, and 

we appreciate your continued willingness to serve. 

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee 

to consider Mrs. Elwood’s qualifications and to allow for thoughtful 

deliberation by our members. She’s already provided substantive 

written questions—answers to more than 90 questions presented 

by the committee and its members. Today, of course, members will 

be able to ask additional questions and to hear from Mrs. Elwood 

in this open session. 

Courtney comes in front of the committee with a distinguished 

legal career. After graduating Yale Law School in 1994, Courtney 

clerked for the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after which she went to clerk for Chief Justice William 

Rehnquist of the Supreme Court. Courtney then took a job as an 

associate with the firm of Kellogg Hansen, where she is now a 

partner. 

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2 

In January 2001, she left the firm to serve as Associate Counsel 

to the President, rising through the ranks to Deputy Counsel to the 

Vice President and then Deputy Chief of Staff and Counselor to the 

Attorney General. During the extremely difficult time in the days 

and weeks and months after 9/11, Mrs. Elwood provided sound 

legal counsel to our Nation’s leaders as they considered what tools 

the intelligence community needed to combat terrorism and to secure our Nation. 

Mrs. Elwood, you’ve been asked to serve as the chief legal officer 

of the Central Intelligence Agency at a time when the Agency and 

the intelligence community as a whole face complex legal questions 

and a host of challenging priorities. The CIA’s General Counsel 

must provide sound and timely legal advice to the Director and 

must manage an office responsible for legal oversight and compliance at the world’s premier intelligence agency. 

But, more than that, the CIA General Counsel maintains a vital 

public trust. Part of your job will be to ensure for the American 

people that above all the Agency operates lawfully, ethically, and 

morally. Since you left government service, the nature and number 

of challenges and threats the intelligence community is tracking 

have multiplied significantly. While Americans continue to engage 

in robust debate about which intelligence authorities are right, appropriate, and lawful, I expect you to ensure that the Agency operates within the bounds of the law and to ensure that the Office of 

General Counsel is positioned to provide the best legal advice possible to Director Pompeo and to the Agency as a whole. 

This committee has received letters of support from your current 

and former colleagues and a letter of support signed by those that 

have served in both Democrat and Republican administrations. 

Your former colleagues praised your acumen, integrity, and judgment, and—and I quote—‘‘deep respect for the rule of law.’’ 

Jack Goldsmith, a professor at the Harvard Law School who has 

known you since you were a law student at Yale, referred to you 

as ‘‘a superb, independent-minded lawyer.’’ A letter from the D.C. 

Bar Association Committee on National Security Law, Policy, and 

Practices highlighted your deep-seated commitment to the rule of 

law and to our democratic principles. And your colleague Ben Powell, former General Counsel to the DNI, had this to say: ‘‘She’s simply one of the finest lawyers and persons I’ve ever worked with in 

my career.’’ 

After meeting you, it’s easy to see how you’ve garnered such 

widespread, consistent accolades. I know that your strong moral 

compass and sharp legal mind will serve you well as the General 

Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

As I mentioned to Director Pompeo during his nomination hearing, I can assure you that this committee will continue to faithfully 

follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight over 

the intelligence community, its operations, and its activities. We’ll 

ask difficult questions, probing questions, of you and your staff, 

and we expect honest, complete, and, more importantly, timely responses. 

I look forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring its 

consideration without delay. Thank you again for being here and 

for your service to the country. I look forward to your testimony. 

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3 

I now recognize the Vice Chairman for any opening statements 

he might make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mrs. Elwood. Again, congratulations on your nomination to serve as General Counsel of the CIA. I see John as well, 

although I do have to question to a degree your legal judgment by 

bringing my friend Tim Kaine as an introducing factor, but I will 

overlook that. 

[Laughter.] 

Obviously, this position is tremendous responsibility, one that requires a careful review of the qualifications and character of the individual nominated. I echo a lot of the comments that the Chairman has made. 

If confirmed, you’ll be sitting at a critical intersection between intelligence and policymaking. As the CIA’s top legal officer, the Director will turn to you to make judgments on whether a contemplated activity is legal or not. This job requires a leader with 

unimpeachable integrity and unwavering commitment to the Constitution and laws of the United States, who will apply both sound 

legal analysis and good judgment to the task of providing counsel 

to the agency. 

During our conversation when we had a chance to visit, you and 

I agreed that politics has no place in the CIA General Counsel’s Office. We discussed the need to follow the law, including the Army 

Field Manual, to ensure that torture does not tarnish the reputation of the intelligence community or this country again. 

Mrs. Elwood, during my questions I will again want your public 

assurance today that you will always seek to provide unbiased, unvarnished, and timely legal counsel to the Director of the CIA, even 

when doing so might be inconvenient or uncomfortable. 

Obviously, there will be a number of challenges that will require 

that kind of legal judgment going forward. Those challenges will include making sure we continue to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans; the increasing use and relevance of vast 

amounts of public information creates a significant challenge and 

opportunity for the whole CIA and the whole IC. We’ve got to always make sure that we are protecting the privacy and civil liberties of United States citizens as we take on these new tools moving forward. 

An issue I know a number of us on the committee have been very 

concerned about and I think will come back again is encryption. 

Again, related to privacy concerns, the intelligence community 

needs to find ways to access the communications of our adversaries 

while protecting privacy rights and American commercial ingenuity. I believe we cannot tie the hands of our technology leaders 

by unilaterally disarming them with possible security loopholes. 

An area again that this committee has looked on is informationsharing. The rapid change of information technology enables significant sharing of classified information and we must work to find 

ways to have the appropriate level of sharing. 

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4 

Finally, a subject that has had a lot of the attention of the committee recently. Chairman Burr and I have committed to conduct 

a review of the intelligence supporting the intelligence community’s 

assessment that Russia, at the direction of President Vladimir 

Putin, sought to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It’s 

important that all Americans fully understand the extent of Russia’s involvement. 

It is vital that the CIA, pursuant to your legal guidance, support 

our investigation to the maximum extent possible and allow this 

committee to follow the facts wherever they may lead. This is a 

charge I take seriously, all the members of the committee take seriously, on behalf of the American people, and we will continue to 

pursue this both thoroughly and expeditiously. 

I will again during my questions ask you to commit to me and 

all members of the committee that you will fully cooperate with 

this review and that you will do all you can to ensure that we’re 

provided the information we will require to conduct it. 

With that, again thank you for being here, Mrs. Elwood, and I 

look forward to today’s hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

I’d like to at this time recognize our colleague the distinguished 

Senator from Virginia Tim Kaine, who will introduce Mrs. Elwood. 

Senator Kaine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

VIRGINIA 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Vice Chair, and members 

of the committee. This is an honor. One of my favorite things to 

do in the Senate is bring talented Virginians before the body who 

are committed to public service and Mrs. Elwood is such an individual. 

I’m just going to warn you, doing this in front of my senior Senator and also the only Alexandria native in the Senate, Senator 

King from Maine, makes me feel a little bit nervous. Some of you 

need to know that, the non-Virginians here need to know, that 

Mrs. Elwood lives down the street from Senator Warner. On that 

score, Mark, will you take your Christmas lights down? 

[Laughter.] 

That was a joke. Actually, she has trick or treated at Senator 

Warner’s house and the first test of her discretion as an intel professional will be not revealing costumes that she’s seen over the 

years. 

[Laughter.] 

As I said, it’s always rewarding. I know all of us feel this way 

about our states, that we have deep talent pools of wonderful people who are public servants, and public servants often don’t get the 

thanks that they deserve. They don’t get the appreciation they deserve. But bringing somebody before this committee or others who 

is willing to serve in a really important position does give me a real 

sense of pride. 

I think that people who arrive here are the creatures of their experience. So frequently that experience begins with an upbringing 

and lessons learned as kids through parents, teachers, grandLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

5 

parents, counselors, or other mentors. With Mrs. Elwood, that’s no 

exception. She had a foundation in family that really laid the 

groundwork for her public service career. 

Her father, the late General Edwin Simmons, served in World 

War II, Korea, and Vietnam as a United States Marine, and his 

legacy continues in the Marine Corps today. One of the buildings 

at Marine Corps University in Quantico is named after her dad. 

Her mother was a dedicated public servant as well, working and 

traveling the world in the Foreign Service before settling in Northern Virginia. 

Courtney’s been a path-breaker in her career. She was in the 

first class of a high school, Fairfax West Potomac High School, that 

was formed through the merger of two very competitive high 

schools and this first class had to create new traditions and bring 

together folks who had been, at least on the athletic fields, rivals 

before. Then she went to Washington and Lee for undergrad, where 

she was in the second class of women and people used to say she 

must be a feminist because she raised her hand. So she’s been willing to be a path-breaker and has had encouragement from family 

and professors to do that. 

When Courtney finished at W&L, as was mentioned, she went to 

Yale Law School and she worked with our Senate colleagues, the 

younger Senators Bennet and Coons, who were at Yale Law School 

the same time as she was. 

She’s now worked in the legal profession for 20 years and the 

Chairman went through some of her experience, including public 

service experience serving as a clerk on the Fourth Circuit, serving 

in the very prestigious position as a clerk on the Supreme Court 

for Chief Justice Rehnquist, as counsel in the White House, the Office of Vice President, the Department of Justice. And I also know 

many of Courtney’s law partners in private practice well and it’s 

a private firm that is filled with people that are very public-spirited, Democrats and Republicans. They appreciate those who are 

public-spirited and I know Courtney has absorbed that lesson from 

them as well. 

Courtney will I know talk about her family. Her husband John 

is here. The two boys, ages 15 and 12, live in Alexandria. They’re 

in school today. 

But I’ll just conclude and say that so much of what we do depends upon the talent of the people that we bring into these very, 

very different positions. With Courtney Elwood you have somebody 

of a sterling professional background, but more importantly I think 

for purposes of this position, with a sterling reputation for integrity 

that is necessary in the CIA General Counsel position. It’s my 

honor to present her to the committee. 

As I said to the Chairman, I have a bill being marked up in the 

HELP Committee. Usually my bills actually go better when I’m not 

there, but I probably should at least go up to make sure that that’s 

okay. So I hope you’ll excuse me so I can head upstairs. 

Chairman BURR. Tim, thank you. You are excused. And if you 

would shepherd my bill through the markup. 

Senator KAINE. His is being marked up as well. 

Thank you so much. 

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6 

Senator KING. I was hoping we’d have a chance to question Senator Kaine. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HEINRICH. I would second that. 

Chairman BURR. I’d prefer to do that in closed session. 

[Laughter.] 

Mrs. Elwood, would you please stand and raise your right hand. 

[Witness stands.] 

Do you solemnly swear to give this committee the truth, the full 

truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Please be seated. 

STATEMENT OF COURTNEY SIMMONS ELWOOD, NOMINATED 

TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

Chairman BURR. Courtney, before we move to your statement I’d 

like to ask you to answer five questions that the committee poses 

to each nominee who appears before us. They require just a simple 

yes or no answer for the record. 

Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in any other 

venue when you’re invited? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from 

your office to appear before the committee and designated staff 

when invited? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other 

materials requested by the committee in order for us to carry out 

our oversight function and legislative responsibilities? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, consistent with the law. 

Chairman BURR. Will you both ensure that your office and your 

staff provide such materials to the committee when requested? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, consistent with the law. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the 

fullest extent possible all members of this committee of intelligence 

activities and covert action, rather than only the Chair and the 

Vice Chair? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Again, consistent with the law, yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much. We’ll now proceed to 

your opening statement, after which I’ll recognize members by seniority for up to five minutes of questions. 

Mrs. Elwood, welcome and the floor is yours. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you 

as the nominee to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 

Agency. I want to thank President Trump and Director Pompeo for 

their trust and confidence in me. 

I also want to thank Senator Kaine for that nice introduction. It 

was a great privilege and pleasure to meet not just one, but both, 

of my home State Senators as part of this process. 

I’d like to use this opportunity to tell you a little bit more about 

me and what I view as essential qualifications for a CIA General 

Counsel. I come from a national security family. As Senator Kaine 

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7 

alluded, my father devoted his life to the Marine Corps and to this 

country. He spent 36 years in uniform, seeing active combat in 

World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. There is little doubt that good 

intelligence kept him and his men alive during those years. He 

would later write about the remarkably good intelligence brought 

by bold foreign agents during his fight at the Chosin Reservoir. 

When dad returned home from Vietnam in 1971, he formed the 

Marine Corps’ history division, which he led for 24 years. He was 

a prolific author of military histories and he supported the work of 

many other military historians. He did so because he believed that 

there were lessons to be learned from the great achievements and 

the mistakes of U.S. warfare, mistakes that future generations 

must not forget. 

My mother in her own way was no less brave and tough than her 

Marine husband. She overcame poverty and more than her share 

of life’s adversities to have a career in the Foreign Service before 

she married and raised our family. 

The lessons around our kitchen table were about personal responsibility, honor and valor. We were taught to adhere to our 

principles even if it comes at great personal or professional sacrifice. We were taught there is a clear difference between right and 

wrong, and we heard stories about America’s place in this world as 

a force for good. 

If my parents were alive today, they would take great pride in 

my being considered for this position. It is thanks to them that I 

believe I have some of the necessary qualifications. 

Chairman Burr has spoken eloquently of the first prerequisite, 

unwavering integrity. In addressing Director Pompeo’s fitness for 

his position, Chairman Burr rightly observed that because the CIA 

is an agency that works in the shadows, it requires a leader to be 

unwavering in integrity, who will ensure that the organization operates lawfully, ethically, and morally. I believe the same holds 

true for its General Counsel. 

I hope and believe that people who know me well would tell you 

that I’m a person of integrity. I certainly have lived my life with 

that goal at the forefront of my mind. 

A second prerequisite for the job is independence. There have 

been many times in my life where it would have been easier to go 

along to get along or to be for what’s going to happen, but I haven’t 

done so. When the law or circumstances have required, I have told 

clients and superiors things they didn’t want to hear. If I were not 

prepared to do the same in this position, I would not accept the 

challenge. And if confirmed for this position, I will tell the attorneys of the office that I expect the same from them. 

But these qualities, integrity and independence, are already embedded in the culture of the CIA. The intelligence community has 

placed among its core competencies for all senior officers, quote, 

‘‘the integrity and courage, moral, intellectual, and physical, to 

seek and speak the truth, to innovate and to change things for the 

better, regardless of personal or professional risk.’’ It would be an 

honor to join a community that quietly lives those values and to 

work side by side with the dedicated and skilled professionals who 

have labored in anonymity to keep this country safe. 

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8 

Of course, an effective General Counsel of the CIA must also 

have strong legal skills. You have heard my background in this respect. I have had the privilege of many great teachers, mentors, 

and role models, more than I could possibly thank. But today one 

stands above the rest: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. 

The Chief showed us it was possible to adhere to your principles 

without alienating those who hold other views. A prime example is 

that Justice William Brennan considered the Chief to be his best 

friend on the Court. The Chief built warm personal relationships 

with all of his colleagues through his modesty and humor, by being 

unfailingly civil and fair, by focusing on points of agreement over 

disagreement, and by listening and making accommodations where 

possible. I have tried to follow his example in all aspects of my life. 

Finally, and with your indulgence, I’d like to take a moment 

again to recognize my constant and shining example of all the attributes I’ve mentioned today, my husband of more than 20 years, 

John Elwood. 

There are also two other people whom I’d like to mention and 

who are dearest to our hearts, our two wonderful children. I hope 

that 50 years from now they will look back on my service to this 

country with pride. So that I could give you my undivided attention, they have remained in school today. 

With that, I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Elwood follows:] 

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9 

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Insert offset folio 1 here 25887.001

Statement for the Record of Courtney Simmons Elwood 

before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Aprll26, 2017 

Chairman Burr, Vice-Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee-It is an honor to 

appear before you today as the nominee to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 

Agency. 

· I want to thank President Trump and Director Pompeo for their trust and confidence in 

me. I also want to thank Senator Kaine for introducing me. It was a great privilege to meet not 

just one, but both, of my home-state Senators as part of this process. 

I would like to use this opportunity to tell you more about me and what I view as 

essential qualifications for a CIA General Counsel. 

I come from a national security family. My father devoted his life to the Marine Corps 

and to this country. He spent 36 years in uniform, seeing active combat in World War II, Korea, 

and Vietnam. There is little doubt that good inteUigence kept him and his men alive during 

those years. He would later write of the ''remarkably good intelligence" brought by bold foreign 

agents during his fight at the Chosin Reservoir. 

When Dad returned home from Vietnam in 1971, he formed the Marine Corps' history 

division, which he led for 24 years. He was a prolific author of military histories -and 

supported the work of many other military historians. He did so because he believed that there 

were lessons to be learned from the great achievements and the mistakes of U.S. warfare ... 

lessons that future generations must not forget. 

My mother, in her own way, was no less brave and tough than her Marine husband. She 

overcame poverty and more than her share of life's adversities to have a career in the Foreign 

Service before marrying and raising our family. 

The lessons around our kitchen table were about personal responsibility, honor, and 

valor. We were taught to adhere to our principles, even if it comes at great personal or 

professional sacrifice. We were taught there is a clear difference between right and wrong. 

And we heard stories about America's place in the world, as a force for good. 

If my parents were alive today, they would take great pride in my being considered for 

this position. Thanks to them, I believe that I have some of the necessary qualifications. 

Chairman Burr has spoken eloquently of the first prerequisite- unwavering integrity. In 

addressing Director Pompeo's fitness for his position, Chairman Burr rightly observed that 

because the CIA "is an agency that works in the shadows," it "requires a leader to be unwavering 

in integrity, who will ensure that the organization operates lawfully, ethically, and morally." I 

believe the same holds true for its General Counsel. 
10 

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Insert offset folio 2 here 25887.002

I hope and believe that people who know me well would tell you that I am person of 

integrity. I have certainly lived my life with that goal at the forefront of my mind. 

A second prerequisite for the job is independence. 

There have been times in my life where it would have been easier for me to go-along-toget-along, or to "be for what's going to happen." I have not done so. When the law or 

circumstances require, I have told clients and superiors things that they did not want to hear. 

If! were not prepared to do the same in this job, I would not accept the challenge. Arid, 

if confnmed for this position, I will tell the attorneys of the ~ffice that 1 expect the same from 

them. 

But these qualities -integrity and independence- are already embedded in the culture of 

the CIA. The Intelligence Community has placed among its core values for all senior officers 

"the integrity and courage (moral, intellectual, and physical) to seek and speak the truth, to 

innovate, and to change things for the better, regardless of personal or professional risk." [ICS 

601-S] 

It would be an honor to join a community that quietly lives those values, and to work 

side-by-side with the skilled and dedicated professionals who have labored in anonymity to keep 

this country safe. 

Of course, an effective General Counsel of the CIA must also have strong legal skills. 

·You have heard my background in this respect. I have had the privilege of many great teachers, 

mentors, and role models- more than I could possibly thank. 

But today one stands above the rest, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, for whom I 

clerked. 

The Chief showed us it was possible to adhere to yoi:u: principles without alienating those 

who hold different views. A prime example is that Justice William Brennan considered 

Rehnquist to be his best friend on the Court. The Chief built warm personal relationships with 

all of his colleagues through his m~esty and humor; by being unfailingly civil and fair; by 

focusing on points of agreement over disagreement; and by listening and making 

accommodations where possible. I have tried to follow his example in all parts of my life. 

Finally, with your indulgence, I'd like to take a moment to [again] recognize my constant 

and shining example of all the attributes I've mentioned today ... my husband of more than 20 

years, John Elwood. 

There are also two other people whom I'd like to m~ntion and who are dearest to my 

heart- our two wonderful children. I hope that SO years from now, they will look back at my 

service to this country with pride. So that I could give you my undivided attention, they have 

remairied in school today. 

So with that, I look forward to answering your questions. 
11 

Chairman BURR. Mrs. Elwood, thank you for that very fine statement, and I hope that the school is accommodating by letting your 

kids possibly watch this on TV. 

Mrs. Elwood, there’s been much discussion about the role of the 

Central Intelligence Agency and how it played into the detention 

and interrogation of terrorism subjects as part of the RDI program. 

Those detention facilities operated by the CIA have long since been 

closed and President Obama officially ended the program seven 

years ago. I think the debate space on this subject has become confused and I’m certain that the law is now very clear. 

Here’s my question: Do you agree that it would require a change 

in law for the CIA or any government agency to lawfully employ 

any interrogation techniques beyond those defined in the Army 

Field Manual? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. The intelligence community is at its strongest 

when operating with the full confidence that its activities are legal, 

moral, and ethical, and thereby in line with the public’s trust. I 

think it’s also safe to say that increasing judicial and Congressional 

oversight only increases that public trust. 

Do you believe that President Bush’s Terrorist Surveillance Program was strengthened when we brought it under FISA Court and 

Congressional oversight in 2007? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I agree. I believed at the time 

and I believe today that the legal foundation for what became 

known as the President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program was 

strengthened by bringing it under the then existing FISA provisions and the review of the FISA Court. 

Chairman BURR. Great. 

Before I turn to the Vice Chairman, I’d like to make one final 

comment in lieu of a question. You noted in your opening statement that a second prerequisite to the job is independence. I and 

many of my colleagues would agree wholeheartedly with that statement. Being an independent voice is not always easy and you’ll be 

asked repeatedly to speak truth to power when serving as the 

CIA’s General Counsel. I think you’ve displayed in your career the 

ability to be independent and I’m confident that you will continue 

to do so at the CIA. Thank you. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Elwood, again thank you for your very eloquent opening 

statement and our opportunity to visit. I’m going to revisit some of 

the things we talked about. Following up on the Chairman’s comments about rendition and the fact that the law is very clear in 

terms of the fact that the Army Field Manual applies to CIA interrogations, one of the things that during the confirmation process of 

Director Pompeo, he committed to reviewing parts of the classified 

committee study on rendition and interrogation that are relevant. 

Will you likewise commit to reading and reviewing those parts of 

that classified study that are relevant to the office of the General 

Counsel? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

12 

Vice Chairman WARNER. This committee is spending an awful lot 

of time, as you are aware and the press has made aware as well, 

on the Russia investigation. We have asked, the Chairman and I, 

and received in many ways unprecedented access and that has 

been the subject of some fairly extensive discussion. But the Chairman and I have worked through that with the Director of the CIA. 

But this is an ongoing process, so we’re going to need additional 

information. My question is: Can you commit to ensuring that this 

committee will be provided with all the information requested pursuant to our ongoing Russia investigation, and that you yourself 

will do everything within your power to make sure that this is 

done, including by making available all necessary materials, intelligence reports, CIA cables, products, and other materials requested as promptly as possible; and finally, to ensure the CIA personnel be made available for interviews as requested by this committee? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir, consistent with the law, I do make that 

commitment. As we expressed in our private conversation, I view 

the work that the committee is doing as being vitally important, 

and I’d like to commend your leadership on that. As an American 

and as a Virginian, I was very pleased by the leadership that you 

and the Chairman have shown on the investigation. It is very serious work. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, this will go to the heart of again 

independence. There have been times with Director Pompeo—and 

I understand he has equities as well. But it is absolutely critical 

that we follow the intelligence wherever it leads. Again, we’re going 

to need your help going forward. 

One other question I have—and I know fellow members of the 

committee have raised this at times. I think we may need a fresh 

look at the whole Gang of Eight and who’s briefed on what, when 

they’re not briefed, the timeliness of those briefings. Will you commit to making sure that those matters that are not involved in 

Gang of Eight covert action notification and other information regarding time-sensitive tactical matters, that you will commit to 

fully briefing the whole committee in as timely a manner as possible? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I have heard in my private conversations 

with you and others the frustration that you feel or that other 

members of the committee feel when they don’t get briefed in, and 

I do think that this is an opportunity at this time, with Director 

Pompeo and Director Coats having sat in the chairs that you sit 

in, to sort of revisit some of the practices of the past and to make 

sure that the full committees are briefed to the maximum extent 

possible consistent with obligations to protect the, in rare instances, exceptionally sensitive information. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I think the Chairman and I both would 

rather the committee hear all the information that we often have. 

So I think there have been times—and other members of this committee have brought this up—where under the frame of the Gang 

of Eight it becomes information that gets caught in that bucket and 

then never, at least so far, has been able to have been shared with 

other members. I think it is appropriate to have a fresh look at this 

issue. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

13 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, I certainly will follow the lead of Director 

Pompeo and Director Coats on this. I will note that Director Coats 

had commented that it’s often a conversation with the leadership 

on when they extend the briefing to the full committee, that he 

works or in the past the Director has worked with the Chair and 

the Vice Chair on timing of extending that. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. The more we can get all the members 

read in on more activities, I think the better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Elwood, it’s good to have you here. I was appreciative of 

your testimony and your desire to follow in the public service commitments that both your mother and your father had, very much 

in line with when I asked you, when we had a chance to visit, why 

would you take this job? This is a hard job at a hard time, and it’s 

good to have you step forward to do it. 

I’ve got several questions about, frankly, the Terrorist Surveillance Program and not very long to ask them. So if others want to 

further exhaust your answers, I’d ask you to keep these relatively 

brief. I notice in a number of questions you were asked to respond 

to it was about that program. 

Give me a sense: What were the jobs you had on 9/11 and then 

after, and then the rest of your service in the Bush Administration? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Leading up to 9/11, nobody, obviously, was anticipating, at least not at my level. My role in the Associate Counsel’s 

Office had nothing to do with national security, frankly. But we all 

became sort of focused on national security. We were in the White 

House on September 11th and immediately thereafter I and a couple members of my office were sent to the Senate and to the House 

to negotiate the Patriot Act. 

Senator BLUNT. Were you working then for the Justice Department or the Vice President? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. On September 11th I was working for the—I was 

Associate Counsel to the President, so I was in the Office of the 

President. And I stayed in that position until May 2002, when we 

had our first child. I returned to government service in January or 

February of 2003. I think it was January of 2003, to the Office of 

the Vice President, where I stayed until the beginning of 

Senator BLUNT. And then you were where? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Then I went with Judge Gonzales to the Attorney 

General’s front office. 

Senator BLUNT. And your job there was what? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I was Deputy Chief of Staff and Counselor to the 

Attorney General. As any staffer in your offices would tell you, it 

changes by the day, but by and large my portfolio fell under the 

Associate Attorney General’s portfolio, so it would be those components that fall in the Department of Justice under the Associate 

Attorney General, the Civil Division. In addition, I would monitor 

the Office of Legal Counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the 

Office of Legal Policy, among others. 

Senator BLUNT. What would you have known in that job or what 

did you know about the Terrorist Surveillance Program? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

14 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I learned—my work on—I learned and 

my work on the Terrorist Surveillance Program began in December 

of 2005, when the President publicly disclosed that aspect of the 

President’s surveillance program. 

Senator BLUNT. To the best of your knowledge, were you aware 

of it before that? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. No, sir. 

Senator BLUNT. Did you have a reason to have a reaction at the 

time to the critics of the program, critics like David Kris, who is 

a former Assistant Attorney General for National Security? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Interestingly enough, David and I are old friends 

and have known each other forever, and once he heard about it he 

kind of asked me, ‘‘So what are the legal authorities that support 

this?’’ And we had a conversation. I was aware of the public statements about the legal authorities supporting the program and we 

had a conversation and some communications about it, and ultimately he did not agree with all of the reasoning, but he recognized 

that, as I did, that these are complex issues on which reasonable 

people could disagree. 

Senator BLUNT. It would be fair to characterize him as a public 

critic of the program, wouldn’t it? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUNT. I notice he’s one of the people recommending you 

for this job? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. He very kindly sent a letter of support 

and actually organized a letter of support on my behalf. 

Senator BLUNT. Are there other people who were critics of that 

program who are included on that list? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I am quite confident that there are people that 

have signed the letter of support who did not think many of the 

things that occurred in the Bush Administration would be things 

that they would agree with. But I don’t know of any others who 

have publicly stated. 

Senator BLUNT. How do you think that experience of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and what happened when there was a 

disagreement, how do you think that would impact the way you 

would serve in this job? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. That’s a very interesting question. I think that my 

experience with respect to that important program and how it was 

handled initially and then through the reexamination of the legality of the program in 2004, we hope we learned from how things 

were handled initially and the intense secrecy around the program, 

even within the Executive Branch. I believe I would be more prepared or would be able to better advise the Director on how to ensure that programs that would necessarily be secret, if they should 

be disclosed are thoroughly thought through and recognizing that 

in some instances you’ll have to publicly justify how decisions are 

made on the front end on and on the back end. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to begin by saying I was really very pleased to meet 

you, have an opportunity to speak with you, and I very much respect your experience and your intellect. I’m going to put the quesLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

15 

tion that the Chairman asked you in a slightly, well, harsher view, 

but I think it’s a real view. During his campaign, President-elect 

Trump publicly called for U.S. forces to use torture in the war on 

terror. He said he’d re-institute waterboarding, which he called a 

minor form of torture, and bring back, quote, ‘‘a hell of a lot worse 

than waterboarding.’’ 

Now, this brought a lot of condemnation from our allies and our 

own intelligence and security professionals who did not believe that 

these President EITs were effective in producing operational intelligence. Director Pompeo said at one point early on that he would 

support the return of waterboarding. Gina Haspel said that she 

would. When I talked with both of them and asked hard questions, 

they had made very strong statements against it both in writing 

and before this committee. 

So let me ask you the same question I asked Director Pompeo 

in his confirmation hearing. If you were ordered by the President— 

excuse me. If the CIA were ordered by the President to restart the 

CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques that fall outside the 

Army Field Manual, would you do—what would you do? What 

would you do as General Counsel? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I absolutely would not follow that order. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But what would you do? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I would inform the President that that would be 

a violation of the law and I would ensure that the—I am confident 

that the Director would also impress upon the President that that 

would be an unlawful act. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So I would specifically take it as your responsibility as General Counsel to do so? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay, thank you. 

In your prehearing question you were asked, do you support the 

standards for detainee treatment specified in the Revised Army 

Field Manual on Interrogation, as required by Section 1045 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for FY16? Could you please 

here under oath reaffirm your commitment to fully comply with all 

governing interrogations, including the legal bar on the use of any 

interrogation method not listed in the Army Field Manual? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator Feinstein, I commit not only to ensuring 

that the CIA complies with the letter, but also the spirit of that 

law. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Thank you. That’s good. 

You informed me earlier this week that you had read the full 

500-page declassified executive summary of the Senate Intelligence 

Committee’s study on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. While some may continue to have differences of opinion, the 

Senate report is fact-based on documents, cables, emails, and to the 

best of my reading nothing in the report has been refuted. 

I think I mentioned to you, if the CIA had a problem with any 

of it we looked at that, we made some changes where we felt the 

CIA was correct, and where we felt they were wrong we so noted 

it. But their view is in that report. 

The full report is more than 6,700 pages, with nearly 38,000 footnotes. I believe it’s time to acknowledge truthfully what was done 

and then move forward with strength and resolve to make sure 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

16 

that a program like this never happens again. Would you commit 

to this committee that you will read the classified version of the report’s findings and conclusions if confirmed as General Counsel? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, Senator Feinstein. I’d be particularly interested in the parts of the report that address the General Counsel’s 

Office. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, but that’s just a small part of the 

report. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I’ll commit to the whole thing, but those are where 

my—that would be where my focus is. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It’s a long lead, but if you look at things like 

where the Agency has detailed 25 cases where they believed it was 

responsible for their apprehension, the report classified version details where the information actually came from that led to that. 

I think—I feel very strongly that the time is coming for this report to be declassified, that it should not be hidden, that people in 

government ought to read it, people in areas of responsibility ought 

to read it, and to shy away from it, because it is an official document now, I think is a mistake. As you know, President Obama did 

put it in his library, so at least it’s perpetuated there. 

Second question, use of contractors. This is one of the things that 

I have been most concerned with, not the least—it wasn’t lost on 

me the three big cases where materials disappeared and security 

was broken were done by contractors, including the largest one 

ever, Edward Snowden, and more recently Hal Martin. Previously 

when I was Chairman I worked with Director Panetta and he had 

agreed to a decrease of a certain percent every year in the number 

of contractors, and the number of contractors has gone down. 

Government contractors are only supposed to be used if they are 

performing tasks that are not an inherent governmental function. 

So intelligence collection clearly is inherently governmental as a 

function, and I think that we need to continue to reduce the number of contractors. 

The question I have for you is: Do you agree that intelligence 

work is clearly an inherently governmental function? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator Feinstein, you raise an excellent point. It 

does sound like a core government function to me, and I think you 

raise a very important issue with respect to the use of contractors. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I agree with that. 

My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Mrs. Elwood, welcome and congratulations to 

you and your family on this tremendous honor. 

I would—I know you’ve been asked about the Russia investigation by Senator Warner and I would just suggest that the same 

challenge that you and Director Pompeo will face and the importance of your integrity, your resilience, and your courage in withstanding outside pressure, the same sorts of characteristics I think 

are going to need to be demonstrated by this committee to maintain the bipartisan leadership that Chairman Burr and Senator 

Warner have provided, because there’s going to be an awful lot of 

people who are going to try to influence this committee and get us 

off track. So the same challenges to our integrity, resilience, and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

17 

courage to resist pressure from outside groups you’ll be having to 

demonstrate, we will as well. 

I wonder—you’ve been asked a lot about post-9/11 interrogation 

and other practices. It really is kind of amazing to me that here 

we are 16 years after 9/11, the Chairman mentioned 7 years, I 

think, since some of the practices that have been asked about have 

long since ended, where we continue to revisit these decisions 

which were made, I think, consistent with the appropriate legal authority at the time. 

I’m very troubled by the idea that you as the General Counsel 

and the lawyers in the administration will be telling intelligence officers you can do this, you can’t do that and if, consistent with legal 

authority that you identify, they do something, later on they’re 

going to be criticized, perhaps for political or other reasons, for 

doing what is legally authorized. 

So can you tell us, who is the final legal authority on the scope 

of activities of the Central Intelligence Agency? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Ultimately, under longstanding eighteenth century precedent the Attorney General is the ultimate determiner of 

the scope of legal authorities of a government agency. 

Senator CORNYN. And that’s because these cases don’t go to court 

typically, right? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Generally not. 

Senator CORNYN. There are of course exceptions, the Hamdan 

case and others, where there is the Supreme Court. But I think 

this is an area where people are somewhat confused. They think 

that this is black letter law and often it’s a matter of legal opinion 

by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Attorney General’s Office. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir, Senator. As I was alluding to in my conversations with David Kris, on many of these complex issues there 

is a range of reasonable interpretations and the Department of Justice or the lawyers being asked to provide an opinion give their 

best reading of the law, but it doesn’t mean that there can’t be another interpretation that is reasonable. But the Department of Justice ultimately gives its best reading of the law. 

Senator CORNYN. And just because somebody disagrees with the 

legal opinion doesn’t mean that the authorities that you’ve identified or that other lawyers in the administration identify as conferring that authority, it doesn’t mean that’s wrong either, does it? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. That’s true, yes, sir. 

Senator CORNYN. So I think this is—this is a real problem for the 

intelligence community, because, as I mentioned during Director 

Pompeo’s confirmation hearing, I like General Hayden’s book and 

concept of playing to the edge, but you’re going to be the one that 

draws that line of demarcation and identifies where that edge is. 

And if intelligence officers play to the edge in order to maintain our 

national security here in the United States, I don’t want them to 

be criticized later on or taken to court, publicly humiliated, or even 

forced to buy liability insurance for doing their job. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, Senator. As part of this process, in preparation for it, I reviewed the transcripts of some people who were nominated to this position, and I noted that some of the Senators were 

stressing the importance that the lawyers go to the legal limits. So 

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back not that many years ago, the lawyers were being criticized for 

being too conservative. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, post-9/11 we didn’t know as a Nation, certainly didn’t know as a government, whether there were going to 

be follow-on attacks. So you were under a tremendous—or the 

Agency and our intelligence officials were under tremendous pressure by members of Congress and others to go as far as you legally 

could, correct? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator CORNYN. And I guess it’s just human nature that in the 

safety and security and after the passage of years, when we don’t 

feel these imminent threats, then we somehow decide, well, maybe 

we didn’t have to go as far as we did. 

Well, I appreciate your answers to the questions and I, too, believe that you’re eminently qualified for this position. Thank you 

for your willingness to take it on. Thanks to your family for their 

support. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Elwood, thank you for our meeting as well. I join my colleagues in appreciating that. 

During his confirmation process, I asked Director Pompeo about 

what he considered to be the boundaries that apply to the surveillance of Americans. He said those boundaries are set by law. You 

are the nominee to be the General Counsel who, if confirmed, 

would advise the Director of those boundaries. Because the advice 

is classified and may not even be known to the committee, it’s critical that we get a sense of your views on the law prior to voting. 

So to me one of the most important legal matters facing the 

Agency is how it should handle large amounts of information on 

Americans who are not suspected of anything. I also asked Director 

Pompeo about this. He said he would consult with a lawyer and, 

so to speak, now the committee gets to ask the lawyer. 

You have written that the Attorney General Guidelines governing collection on 12333 would impose—and I quote here—‘‘stringent and detailed restrictions on big batches of information that include information on Americans.’’ I read the guidelines differently. 

The CIA can actually conduct searches of those batches looking for 

Americans—looking for information on Americans. 

So my question to you deals with the statement you gave us. 

What stringent restrictions specifically are you talking about? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, as you know, the Attorney General 

Guidelines are publicly available and they were recently revised. 

They are public. They’re not a secret. 

Senator WYDEN. I want to know what you consider to be stringent restrictions. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. There are numerous restrictions. It depends upon 

the particular information at issue. So there are, obviously, less 

stringent use and retention requirements with respect to publicly 

available information. But even there, if it’s U.S. person information, still the CIA’s use of it is restricted. Then there is—it’s a 30- 

page single-spaced document providing a framework—— 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

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Senator WYDEN. Give me an example? Because the way I read 

it, none of this changes the fact that the Agency can conduct 

searches looking for information on law-abiding Americans where 

there is no requirement that they’re suspected of anything. So I’d 

just like to hear you tell me, since you stated it in writing, what 

stringent restrictions would protect that law-abiding American? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Well, for example, Senator, before certain information is queried it has to—the standard that is applied would restrict—it is not simply—they can’t go and query anything they 

want. It has to be for, necessary to an authorized activity, so for 

the purpose of an authorized activity, and no further query with respect to publicly available information, can’t go any further than 

the necessary extent to further that purpose. 

Now, with respect to different categories of information that are 

collected under different authorities, 702 has a different query 

standard, as you know, than a bulk collection of information collected under 12333. And I don’t want to give the inarticulate—I 

don’t want to be inarticulate about the standards. I want to be precise. And they are spelled out in a public document. 

Senator WYDEN. None of this—and I’ll hold the record open for 

this. I’d like to just have you give me some concrete examples 

of—— 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I’m happy to do that. 

Senator WYDEN. But the point is the answer we’ve gotten this 

morning is none of what you have said changes the fact that the 

Agency can conduct searches looking for information on law-abiding Americans where there is no requirement that they’re suspected of anything. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, there has to be a link to an authorized 

activity of the CIA at a bare minimum, even to search publicly 

available information. There are more stringent requirements with 

respect to collections depending upon the type of information involved. So I don’t agree with you that there’s no restraint on it. 

Senator WYDEN. You get me the example of the stringent restrictions. 

Let me see if I can get one other question in very quickly. The 

Agency spied on the committee in 2014, searching our computers. 

They turned around and filed a crimes report with the Department 

of Justice against committee staffers. The Inspector General found 

there was no basis for the crimes report and it was based solely 

on inaccurate information provided by two attorneys from the CIA’s 

Office of General Counsel. 

You, if confirmed, would be supervising those attorneys. Do you 

think there ought to be any accountability? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I understand there was an accountability 

board convened that looked at that issue already—— 

Senator WYDEN. So—— 

Mrs. ELWOOD [continuing]. And exonerated the lawyers involved. 

Senator WYDEN. But do you believe, you, do you believe there 

should be any accountability when those lawyers, who would be 

under your supervision, provide inaccurate information? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I understand there was already an independent accountability board—— 

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Senator WYDEN. I’m not talking about the past thing. I want to 

hear about what you’d do going forward, inaccurate information. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Going forward, if there was a situation like that 

to arise again and if the facts presented themselves in a situation 

where the lawyers had not done something properly, absolutely I 

would insist on accountability and proceed accordingly. But that’s 

going forward. I’m not revisiting the past. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for joining us today, Mrs. Elwood. In reviewing your 

responses to committee questions, there was one theme that concerned me across your responses, and it’s that you repeatedly repeat some very similar verbiage. I want to get this right, but you 

said at one point that you have not, quote, ‘‘had personal experience with,’’ end quote, issues raised by the committee. You, quote, 

‘‘have not previously had the opportunity to consider,’’ end quote, 

issues raised by the committee; and that you have not—or that you 

have, quote, ‘‘not done the legal and factual research that would be 

required to properly answer,’’ end quote, important questions such 

as whether the CIA’s former enhanced interrogation techniques are 

consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act. 

As you know, in this role you will be the principal legal adviser 

to the CIA Director, and you will be responsible for overseeing the 

CIA’s Office of General Counsel. If confirmed, I hope that your lack 

of exposure to the important national security issues that we’ve 

raised will not encumber your ability to provide thorough, accurate, 

and effective legal advice to the CIA from day one. 

So I want to go from here—since you didn’t express strong opinions on some very specific questions that the committee has asked, 

I’d like to focus more broadly on the scope of authorities granted 

by covert action authorizations and by presidential memorandums 

of notification. As I’m sure you know, these authorizations spell out 

the strategic goals and approved activities of individual covert actions. 

Is it your view that the authorized covert actions of the CIA are 

bound by the text of those authorities and that the CIA may not 

read into those authorities activities that are not explicitly approved within there? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I assume that there is vigorous oversight 

by the General Counsel’s Office to ensure that the findings are 

written carefully and that the activities undertaken under the findings are consistent with the findings. Does that answer your question? 

Senator HEINRICH. What I’m saying is that it is my interpretation that those activities have to be explicitly authorized within either a covert action authorization or a presidential memorandum 

of notification. So is it your view that the authorized covert activities of the Agency are bound by the text of those authorities in 

terms of explicitly authorizing activities, or can the Agency just 

read into those authorizations? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I would interpret it as a statute, which is that it 

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tion be explicitly stated in the findings, but that it would have to 

be a proper interpretation of the findings. 

Senator HEINRICH. I’ll give you an example that concerns me. 

The September 17, 2001, memorandum of notification that authorized the CIA capture and detention program, for example, made no 

reference to interrogations or to coercive interrogation techniques, 

yet it was repeatedly cited by the Agency as the foundational authorization for that interrogation program. So just putting aside 

the bigger issues of whether the interrogation techniques themselves were in violation of any laws or treaty obligations, based on 

the lack of explicit authorization for those techniques in the MoN, 

do you believe that the use of those techniques was consistent with 

the approved authorities as written? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, I have neither looked at that particular 

MoN nor do I know anything beyond the executive summary of the 

Senate study to answer that question specifically. But I believe 

that it is fair reading of the—nobody has raised that that was not 

a fair reading of the notification. 

Senator HEINRICH. Well, I’m raising it. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Right. 

Senator HEINRICH. So whether or not you’ve reviewed it isn’t relevant to my underlying concern. When the committee receives a 

covert action finding or a MoN, we need to be confident that the 

Agency is not exceeding its approved authority. So if you can’t give 

us your view on the proper scope of covert action authorities as a 

basic principle, it’s difficult for me to be confident that under your 

legal guidance the Agency won’t engage in activities that go beyond 

that legal guidance. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. It is a common practice in my 20 years of legal 

experience and also my experience as a clerk to have a statute or 

a rule of law provided, and you’re not going to have a statute describe every possible activity to fall within the scope of the statute. 

But there could be a fair reading of the statute that would put 

things within the statute or without the statute. 

I would envision the same sort of legal analysis, legal analysis 

that I’ve been doing for more than 20 years, would apply in the 

context of a memorandum of notification. 

Senator HEINRICH. I’m going to yield back my time. I have exceeded it. We’re going to go to Senator King of Maine since we’re 

the only—— 

Senator CORNYN [presiding]. Since I’m the acting Chair, Senator 

King. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. I didn’t see you over there, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Mrs. Elwood, thank you very much. Welcome to the committee. 

You started your introductory by talking about your dad’s experience with military history and I want to commend to my colleagues 

I’m in the middle of H.R. McMaster’s book about Vietnam, ‘‘Dereliction of Duty,’’ which I find an extraordinary document with really 

important insights. I have to mention—you’ve given me an opportunity to mention what I think is a very important book that 

should be read by everybody, everyone up here. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

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Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. I understand that’s now being taught in 

the officers’ training course. 

Senator KING. I hope General McMaster is also rereading it himself, given his new position. 

In your answer to I think it was Chairman Burr’s, one of his 

opening questions, you said that you thought the 2007 law 

strengthened the legal basis for the Terrorist Surveillance Program. That implies—does that imply that you believe that there 

was a legal basis for it? In other words, does the President have 

inherent Article II power to do warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, the legal authorities underpinning the 

Terrorist Surveillance Program, as described in the public white 

paper I reviewed and then in the much longer, then-classified but 

largely declassified, opinion of OLC, did not rest entirely on the 

President’s Article II authorities, but also rested first on the authorities provided by the AUMF. 

Senator KING. The 2001 AUMF? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Let’s exclude that for a moment. Do you believe 

that the President has inherent authority under the Commanderin-Chief provision of Article II to order warrantless surveillance of 

American citizens, of American persons? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Under existing law, absolutely not. 

Senator KING. Thank you. And that gets to a more subtle question along these lines, which is reverse targeting under FISA. As 

I understand the way FISA is now interpreted, you can surveil foreign persons and there is incidental—there may be so-called ‘‘incidental-pickup’’—— 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Collection. 

Senator KING [continuing]. Collection on American persons. The 

question then is, does it take further interaction with the FISA 

Court in order to query the data that involves the U.S. persons? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. The FISA Court, as you know, sets out the parameters, sets out the framework for that type of querying, and then 

subsequently does not revisit it any time an individual query wants 

to be taking place. However—— 

Senator KING. But you see my question. The question is reverse 

targeting. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes. 

Senator KING. You can be going after a foreign person, you pick 

up an American person and that becomes the focus of the query. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Well, reverse targeting is prohibited expressly. 

Senator KING. And you don’t believe that that is a potential issue 

or problem because of that express prohibition? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I don’t, Senator, because I think that reverse targeting is with the intention of actually picking up a U.S. citizen’s 

or a U.S. person’s communication, by creating the fig leaf by targeting somebody at the side that they know they’re going to be 

communicating with. 

What we’re talking about with respect to incidental collection is 

just that, incidental. Those queries that are conducted with incidental, there’s multiple layers of oversight, the first being the one 

we discussed with the FISA Court setting the parameters for those. 

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23 

Senator KING. My understanding is the government has taken 

the position in the recent past under the prior administration that 

once that data is in the database then they can query about the 

U.S. person without further approval of anyone. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. No, not—well, without going back to the FISA 

Court. It would be—I think Director Brennan and perhaps Director 

Clapper as well said that that would be a big mistake, to require 

going back to the court again each time there needed to be a query 

of the—and we’re talking here about 702 collection. But there are 

multiple, multiple lawyers of oversight, including by the Department of Justice, the Office of the DNI in the Executive Branch. 

There is also—— 

Senator KING. All that oversight you just enunciated is all within 

the Executive Branch. I like having an independent body—— 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Right. 

Senator KING [continuing]. Called a court have a role in it. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Well, having a court do it in every warrant, or a 

warrant or an order on every one of those, would mean that far 

fewer of them are done. It could seriously hamper the operational 

impact. I’m looking forward to, if confirmed, getting an opportunity 

to see how these are implemented—— 

Senator KING. But you have to understand that this is a bootstrap operation, where you are in fact talking about the authorization of a warrantless examination of a U.S. person’s correspondence. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. If I might add, sir, there is more than just—there 

is an independent bipartisan board that also oversees these queries 

and has looked at it thoroughly and determined there was not a 

trace—that was their words—‘‘no trace of illegitimate activity’’ with 

respect to these sorts of queries. 

So it is layer upon layer upon layer already of existing oversight. 

And you’re right that you don’t have to go back to the FISA Court 

each time you want to query, but the FISA Court is involved in setting up the procedures from the front end and there are multiple 

lawyers of oversight on the back end. And while it may seem that 

the fox is guarding the henhouse, it’s not. This is serious oversight 

by the ODNI and by the Department of Justice, checking every single query every 60 days. 

Senator KING. I’m sure we’ll have further discussion on this. I 

understand your position and appreciate it. I still remain somewhat concerned that you end up with a trove of data that involves 

American citizens, that can then be queried without further intervention by the court, which to me is the essence of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

But we can follow up. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Absolutely. If I’m confirmed, I would really look 

forward to that discussion. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Senator CORNYN. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. It was good to get a chance to 

visit with you again. I appreciate it. I hope this has been helpful 

in getting information out, things that you’re passionate about. 

I always like to be able to remind people that for the folks that 

serve with the CIA, they don’t wear uniforms, they serve all around 

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the world, they don’t get parades, they don’t get recognition, no one 

sees them at restaurant and buys their meal to say thank you, because no one knows who they are. 

But would you pass on as you encounter these folks our gratitude. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator LANKFORD. As we try to do face to face as well. Any time 

I’m in Langley and I walk down the halls, I see people that are 

walking around the halls, they’re thinking about tucking their kids 

in at night and they’re thinking about all these critical things, but 

they’re also counting on having a really good counsel, because they 

deal with really hard issues, and they need great advice and sometimes they need it really fast. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you, Senator. You make a very valuable 

point about these men and women who labor in anonymity to keep 

this country safe. 

Senator LANKFORD. Well, grateful to be able to have you engaged. You’ve got a tremendous background in dealing with a lot 

of these hard legal issues. You’ve been around a lot of these hard 

conversations and been through it. So we’re glad to be able to have 

someone that can engage in that. 

I need to ask you one that your predecessor has also said is hard. 

Recently, in fact this week, Caroline Krass, who is the person you’d 

be replacing, had a speech and in her speech at Georgetown University Law School, of all the issues that she’s dealt with, she listed 

this. She said: ‘‘I think the hardest legal questions were those that 

surround cyber. It’s an evolving area of the law, trying to determine answers to questions like what constitutes a use of force, 

where are the measures to combat such a use of force.’’ 

They’re really difficult issues and they’re issues that we’re struggling with on this committee. They’re issues that this committee 

and other committees have complained about bitterly to the Administration, to say there seems to be no cyber doctrine, and we’re well 

behind the curve on dealing with a clear cyber doctrine issue. This 

is going to be an area we’re going to have to write a new statute, 

but it’s also an area you’re going to have to interpret a lot of the 

issues. 

So my question to you is a more general one than just trying to 

drive down into it. Will you be a part of helping craft a cyber doctrine and will you be willing to interact with this committee to say, 

this is an area that is too gray, I’m going to have to make a decision that puts the people at the CIA too vulnerable, we need a statute to clarify this and to be able to help us through that process 

so that we don’t put the good people at the CIA at risk in the future, but that we also don’t make everyone second-guess what can 

and can’t be done? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator, you raise a very, very important issue, 

and I would be delighted, if confirmed, to work with you on that. 

That’s an issue that other members have raised with me in our 

conversations as well. And I certainly respect Caroline Krass, who 

is a long-time friend. We went to law school together and she has 

been an adviser through this process, and I will look forward to 

working with her in the future to continue to advise me should I 

be confirmed in this role. 

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Senator LANKFORD. This is one of those ongoing issues. As you 

go through this process, when you get to that spot, just know this 

committee is thinking about cyber doctrine a lot and how we can 

actually get that established, how we work agency to agency, how 

we work through the whole of the United States Government on 

that, and what is needed legislatively to be able to help provide 

clarity on that. We look forward to that type of cooperation and direction we’re going to go. 

Tell me as well—we’ve talked a lot about protecting the American people. That’s the other side of this. The folks that work at 

the CIA are counting on having a really good counsel. The American people are also counting on having a really good lawyer in the 

middle of it that’s able to push back and to be able to say, no, that 

is something that violates constitutional rights and freedoms. 

You are in many ways the first line of that accountability. 

Though there’s good follow-up, there’s good tracking of it, and 

there’s good oversight through the process, the first line of that 

would be you. So there are a couple of things that we need, that 

I need to just be able to hear quickly from you. One is that you 

understand that you’re not only the CIA’s lawyer, but you’re the 

first line of defense for the American people in protecting their constitutional rights. The second part of that is protecting sources and 

methods worldwide that are also essential for their security and for 

national security as well. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, Senator. The client of the General Counsel of 

the CIA is the Agency as an institution and ultimately the United 

States, and it is important for the Agency to use the intelligencegathering tools that Congress has provided, but they must do so 

lawfully, protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties of all 

Americans. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BURR [presiding]. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Following up on Senator Lankford’s question, 

when the CIA is considering doing something of dubious legal authority and the Director and the men and women of the CIA look 

to you for guidance, I know, and you’ve actually stated, the American people generally have a right to make sure that this Agency 

is following the law, but the American people generally will have 

no ability or visibility into the process by which you counsel your 

client, the Agency. 

So the question that I have for you is: How will you engage this 

committee to ensure that there is oversight of this significant, but 

often secret, legal guidance that you will give the Agency? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Two points that I’d like to make in response to 

that, Senator Harris. The first is I will obviously provide the Director and the men and women of the Agency with my sound legal advice, but I will also provide them with my judgment. Sometimes 

things are legal, as you know, but unwise. 

Then, with respect to ensuring that this committee is aware, I 

have a legal obligation, as you know, under the National Security 

Act to make sure that this committee is informed of the legal basis 

that underpins any of the CIA’s intelligence activities, and I would 

fully and timely provide that legal advice and legal basis. 

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Senator HARRIS. How would you propose to do that? For example, would this be through a Congressional notification? Or how 

can we as a committee expect that you will reach out to us and notify and inform us of those decisions? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. There are a couple of different things. One is any 

time the committee requests information with respect to the legal 

basis, I have an obligation to respond. Then, secondly, there is a 

new provision within the National Security Act that requires a notification to the committee of any sort of novel or significant new 

legal interpretations under the law, and I would obviously comply 

with that as well. 

Senator HARRIS. Let’s talk a bit about what we—I’d like to hear 

about your interpretation of what becomes significant. In your 

questions for the record you mentioned that and indicated that you 

would give timely and complete information about the Agency’s significant intelligence activities and failures, subject to the limitations around protecting tradecraft and other sensitive information. 

Based on your experience, what circumstances would be considered significant and who would make the determination of significance? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Senator Harris, that’s an excellent question and I 

actually have not had firsthand experience with what is significant 

and what falls under significant. I obviously would look to past 

practice as well as, frankly, some common sense in determining 

whether something rises to the level of notification. 

Now, I know from just conversations I have had with Congressional affairs, and also reading about it in the history about it, the 

amount of notifications that this committee gets is extraordinary, 

multiple a day. So I assume from that that the threshold is fairly 

low on what is significant, but I don’t have any additional information to provide with respect to how I would define that. 

Senator HARRIS. What character of, for example, let’s talk about 

the Russia investigation. Would you agree that any information or 

developments as it relates to Russia’s role in the 2016 election 

would be considered significant? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. If something was new that the CIA had information about, I would imagine that would rise to the level of significant. 

Senator HARRIS. Well, they’ve already done it. The election is 

past. So it would not be new in terms of conduct. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. New information. 

Senator HARRIS. So you’re saying that if there’s any information, 

if it is not new you would not consider that significant in terms of 

sharing that with this committee? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Well, if it had already been shared, if it was just 

redundant. But I would examine it, obviously, on a case by case 

basis and based upon how the office has been doing it for many, 

many years and be consistent with that. 

Senator HARRIS. Are you willing to commit to this committee 

that if you come across information that relates to that incident of 

Russia tampering with the 2016 election and if you become aware 

that that information has not been shared with this committee, 

that you will share it with this committee because it is significant? 

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27 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I have no reason to think that it would not rise— 

that it would be insignificant. It sounds like something that would 

be significant, given the work that this committee is doing on that 

investigation. 

Senator HARRIS. And that means yes? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Sounds like it. 

Senator HARRIS. I’m going to hold you to that. I’m interpreting 

that as a yes. It sounds like the committee is as well. So thank you 

for that. 

The role of the General Counsel is obviously to provide legal advice to the Agency and the Director. Do you agree that the role of 

General Counsel requires providing an unbiased legal position on 

all matters relating to the CIA free from political considerations? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator HARRIS. And if confirmed, will you provide legal guidance even if it ran counter to the Administration’s policy or statements during the campaign or afterwards? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me say, Mrs. Elwood, that I very much appreciated the 

office meeting that we had, in which we went over many of the 

issues that have been raised here today, and I believe that you appear to have an extraordinary background for this very important 

post. 

I do want to get on the record a couple of issues that we discussed in my office. One is I referred to the fact that John Rizzo, 

CIA’s General Counsel during the Agency’s enhanced interrogation 

program, wrote in his autobiography that it was a big mistake that 

all members of the Intelligence Committees were not briefed on the 

program until 2006, which was four years after the program began. 

And indeed, the existence of the program for a time was concealed 

even from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. 

Do you agree with his view that it was a mistake for Congress 

not to have been briefed on this program? The Intelligence Committees, I should say. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. In a more timely way, yes, should have been 

briefed in a more timely way, the full committee. 

Senator COLLINS. Second, I want to follow up on an issue that 

several members have mentioned—Senator Lankford, Senator Harris, but in a more direct way. That is, in the private sector when 

you are counsel to a corporate entity, for example, it’s very clear 

where your loyalties lie and who your client is. I want to talk to 

you just a little bit more to flesh out what you’ve already been 

asked, by asking you, what is your understanding of who would be 

your primary client as General Counsel of the CIA? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. It’s a very good question, an important one for all 

of us government lawyers, if I become one again, to remember. The 

client for the General Counsel of the CIA is the Agency as an institution and ultimately the United States. Now, casually we think of 

the Director or the men and women at an agency as being the 

CIA’s client. That is only true in their official capacities. If their 

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28 

interests diverge with that of the Agency, that CIA lawyer can no 

longer represent them. 

I remember very well when I was in the counsel’s office thinking 

often and being reminded often that we did not represent the President, we represented the Office of the President. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Mrs. Elwood, congratulations on your well-deserved nomination. 

I want to speak briefly about Presidential Policy Directive 28. The 

Obama administration through PPD–28 and in other ways spoke 

about the need to consider and recognize the privacy rights of nonU.S. persons located outside of the United States. 

Do you agree that U.S. constitutional and privacy rights do not 

extend to non-U.S. persons located outside the United States? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. It is true that our Constitution—and of course 

we’re talking here about the Bill of Rights—protects the individual 

rights of United States citizens and individuals in the United 

States at large. And I am also not aware of any statutory law that 

extends broad privacy protections to foreigners abroad. 

Senator COTTON. Is it a controversial statement of law that the 

U.S. Constitution and statutes do not extend to non-U.S. persons 

located outside the United States? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. I don’t think people would find that controversial. 

Senator COTTON. I would agree. 

Do you think the CIA should take into account the privacy considerations of hostile intelligence services and would-be terrorists 

when conducting espionage overseas? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. No, sir. 

Senator COTTON. I agree. 

Can you commit to me that you will read the PCLOB’s PPD–28 

classified annex regarding the operational impacts on the intelligence community, once you have received your security clearance? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. I look forward to doing that if I’m confirmed. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I want to turn my attention to Section 702 now of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act. Director Pompeo stated in a speech 

a couple weeks ago at CSIS, quote: ‘‘CIA steals secrets from our adversaries, hostile entities, and terrorist organizations. We utilize 

the whole toolkit, fully employing the authorities and capabilities 

that Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch have provided 

to us, consistent with our American ideals.’’ End quote. 

Part of that toolkit is Section 702. Director of Intelligence Dan 

Coats recently called it his top legislative priority to have reauthorized before it expires at the end of the year. Would you please comment on the importance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act in general and Section 702 in particular to the CIA’s mission? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, Senator. I obviously have not had the access 

to the classified information on the benefits of 702, but I have spoken to and I have read the statements of those who have. And they 

have, with broad consensus, all concluded that it is a highly effective and valuable tool and it has disrupted—and it’s played a key 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

29 

role in disrupting specific terrorist threats that were aimed at the 

United States and abroad. 

Senator COTTON. Could you please describe some of the various 

layers of oversight and compliance that occur at the CIA General 

Counsel’s Office, as well as the Department of Justice and ODNI 

and here at this committee? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Well, there are many, many layers, as I was discussing with Senator King. With respect to inside the General 

Counsel’s Office at the CIA, CIA lawyers provide in-person training 

and they sit with the officers who are doing the querying. The CIA 

does not do the collection under the 702, but they do have the authority to do querying. 

Outside of the Agency—and the Agency’s querying is then audited by the Office of the DNI, as well as the DOJ, on a regular 

basis, and the General Counsel’s Office is involved in those audits. 

That same level of oversight occurs at the NSA with respect to 

ODNI and DOJ audits every 60 days, and indeed every single selector that is used under 702 is audited. Not a single one is missed. 

In addition to the Executive Branch oversight, there is of course 

the inspector generals of the agencies have oversight authority as 

well. Outside of the Executive Branch, there is a Congressional 

oversight through the committees. There is also the FISC provides 

oversight, like I said, in the standards and reviewing and getting 

reports on any mistakes that are made. 

Then there’s the fourth layer of oversight, which is related to the 

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which did a thorough 

and detailed review of the use of 702, established that it had been 

a highly effective tool in disrupting specific terrorist plots, and they 

also found, as I mentioned to Senator King, no trace of illegitimate 

activity or intentional misuse of the tool. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you for the answer and thank you for 

your willingness to come serve our country once again. And thanks 

to all the many men and women you will be leading in the Office 

of General Counsel, which I think is great. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton, thank you. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Two very quick follow-ups. One is, I think it’s important to note that we’ve done a lot of talking about the PCLOB. 

There’s only one member confirmed, and I hope that you will use 

your good offices to try to move that process along, because this is 

an important part of the overall scheme here and right now we 

don’t have a full complement of board members. 

Number two, I couldn’t help but notice when you answered the 

Chairman’s sort of five routine questions at the beginning, that you 

qualified them. When he said, will you keep the committee fully 

and currently informed, you said: I will, according to the law. I’ve 

never heard a witness use that. What’s your mental reservation 

here? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Right, consistent with the law. I’m just holding 

out—as you know, the statute provides that there are limits with 

respect to protection of sources and methods. So the Agency is obligated to provide information subject only to withholding specific 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

30 

operational details about sources and methods. That’s what I was 

referring to. 

Senator KING. So that’s what you were referring to? 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. I understand that. That is fine. I was hoping there 

wasn’t a broader—— 

Mrs. ELWOOD. There’s no broader principle I was alluding to. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator King. 

Let me note for the record that there have been some other witnesses that have qualified for I think the same reason. 

Senator Warner. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I would simply say, I know that this 

will go beyond kind of the focus of your job. This whole revisiting 

of how we’re all briefed, what falls into which bucket, I’m candidly 

not even fully sure I fully appreciate and understand, although I 

do think it would be very timely to revisit some of those principles, 

because I do feel like there are times when Gang of Eight information, which in my mind should normally be things in advance of 

presidential action that Congress needs to be notified, not necessarily information that is simply sequestered into this very discrete group without having the full benefit of the committee’s understanding, would be worthwhile to reexamine. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. If confirmed, Senator, I’d be very interested in 

digging into that and discussing it with you further. 

Chairman BURR. I thank all of my colleagues for your thorough 

questioning of our witness. 

Mrs. Elwood, thank you very much for, one, your willingness to 

serve; two, the expertise you bring to this nomination. I’ll work 

with the Vice Chairman as quickly as we can to have any posthearing questions presented to you. If you’d expedite those back to 

us, we’ll very quickly set up a confirmation hearing, and hopefully 

get your nomination to the floor. We need you at CIA yesterday. 

Thank you very much. 

Mrs. ELWOOD. Thank you for your time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE . 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES.SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A- BIOGRAPIDCAL INFORMATION 

1. NAME: Courtney Simmons Elwood 

2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTI!: June 6, 1968, Bethesda, MD 

3. MARITAL STATUS: Married 

4. SPOUSE'SNAME: [REDACTED]" 

S. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: n!a 

6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN: 

[INFORMATION REDACTED) 

7. EDUCATION SINCE IDGH SCHOOL: 

lNSTffiJTIQN DATESATIENDED DEGREER.ECEIVED DAIEOFDEGREE 

Washington and Lee University 

Yale Law School 

1986-!990 BachelorofArts 1990 

1991-1994 Juris Doctor 1994 

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, 

LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.) 

~ Position/Title ~ Dl!!!l§ 

Pier One Imports Sales Associate/Asst. Mgr. Alexandria, VA c. 8/1990-8/1991 

Old Town Gardens Pool Operator Alexandria, VA c. summer 1991 

U.S. Environmental Protection Program Analyst Washington, D.C. 8/1990-8/1991 

Office of Toxic Substances 
34 

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~ Position/Title Location ~ 

Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham Summer Associate Greenville, SC Summer 1992 

Bradley, Arant, Rose & White Summer Associate Birmingham, AL Summer 1992 

The Hon. Ellen Bree Burns Law Clerk Intern New Haven, cr Fall Term 1992 

U.S. District Court for tho 

District of Connecticut 

United States Attorney's Office Intern New Haven, cr Spring Term 1993 

District of Connecticut 

King & Spalding Sununer Associate Atlanta,GA Summer1993 

Shea & Gardner Summer Associate Washington, D.C. Summer 1993 

United States-Canada Free Trade Assistant to Panelist New Haven, cr 511993-12/1993 

Agreement Binational Panel 

In re Certain Softwood Lumber 

Products from Canada 

The Hon. J. Michael Luttig Law Clerk McLean, VA 6/1994-6/1995 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth Circuit 

The Hon. William H. Rehnqnist Law Clerk Washington, D.C. 711995-7/1996 

Supreme Court of the United States 

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Associate Washington, D.C. 9/1996-5/1999 

Evans & Figel, PLLC Partner 5/1999-1/2001 

Office of Counsel to the President Associate Counsel to the Washington, D.C. 112001-5/2002 

The Whlte House President 

Office of the Vice President Deputy Counsel to the Vice Washington, D.C. 1/2003-2/2005 

President 

Office of the Attorney General Counselor to the Attorney General Washington, D.C. 2/2005-10/2005 

U.S. Dept. of Justice Deputy Chief of Staff and Counselor 10/2005-6/2007 

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Partner Washington, D.C. 11/2007-present 

Evans & Figel, PLLC 

(as of3/1/2017 Kellogg, Hansen, 

Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC) 
35 

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9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERJENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR 

OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY 

PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8): 

Advisory Committee on Procedures, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 2012-present. 

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE 

ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9. . 

My work in the Office of the Counsel to the President and in the Office of the Attorney General included 

several matters related to the intelligence community and national security, starting with my presence at the 

WhiteHouse on September 11,2001. On that day and in the days that followed, I was assigned certain projects 

related to the attacks and to ongoing terrorist threats. Most notably, I was among the small number of White 

House staff members who worked with members of the intelligence and law-enforcement communities, 

alongside Members of Congress and their staffs, to draft legislation to ensure that law enforcement and the 

intelligence community had the tools needed in the fight agsinst terrorism. That legislation became the USA 

PATRIOT Act. At the Department of Justice, I worked on a variety of national-security related matters 

including matters involving the Inspector General's review of the FBI's use of National Security Letters; the 

renewal of the PATRIOT Act; legislation relating to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and terrorismrelated litigation including cases involving the constitutionality of national security programs and detention of 

enemy combatants and military commissions. 

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, 

HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY 

OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT): 

University Scholar, Washington & Lee University 

Oxford Scholar, Washington & Lee University 

Phi Eta Sigma 

Phi Beta Kappa 

Graduation with distinction, summa cum laude, Washington & Lee University 

Editor and Essays Editor, Yale Law Journal 

Honorary Inductee, Omicron Delta Kappa, National Leadership Honor Society 

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE 

LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CMC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, 

CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS): 

ORQANJZATION OFFICE HELD 

Alexandria Community Rowing Member 2010-present 
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ORGANIZATION OFFICE HELD 

Advisory Committee on Procedures, 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Member 2012-present 

the D.C. Circuit 

Army Navy Country Club Member 2009-2016 

District of Columbia Bar Active Member 12/1997-present 

Georgia Bar Inactive Member in Good Standing 11/1996-present 

Omicron Delta Kappa, 

National Leadership Honor Society 

Washington & Lee University Honorary Inductee 4/2015 

St. Paul's Church Member 2005-2012 

Yale Law School Association Member 2016-pr.Sent 

Executive Committee 

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST TilE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND 

PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTIIER PUBLISHED 

MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTIIORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU 

HA VE.MADE WITHIN TilE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR 

VIDEO.) IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT, 

TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? 

Unmasking the Rhetoric Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative Compromise, 44 Emory LJ. 117 (1995) 

A Guide to Researching Legislative Compromise and Special Interest Groups, 13 Legal Reference Serv. Q. 

Issue 4 (1 993) 

"Compensatory Damages." in Busi~ess and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts, 4th ed. (2016) (coauthor with Mark C. Hansen aod Ariela Migdal) 

Remarks at Chief Justice Rehnquist Memorial Service, June 15,2006 (available at ht!ps://www.c-

§!lan.org/video/?193011-1/chief-justice-rehnquist-memorial-service) 

I would be happy to provide a copy of any of these materials if asked. 

PART B- QUALIFICATIONS 

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN THE 

POSillON FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED): 

The General Counsel of the CIA should, of course, be an accomplished and experienced lawyer. She must also have 

the ability to counsel internal clients aod external partners on a wide variety oflcgal issuCl!---illld she must not simply respond 

to, but must anticipate issues. She must be able communicate clearly, and she must possess the leadership aod organizational 
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skills to supervise and manage a large office. Perhaps above all else, she must have a reputation for acting with integrity, 

good judgment, and common sense. I believe that I meet these qualifieations. 

Specifically, I believe that my experience practicing law for more than twenty years, both inside and outside of 

government, has provided me with the necessary skills and training to be an effective General Counsel of the CIA. In 

particular, my work as Associate Counsel to the President, Deputy Counsel to the Vioe President, and Deputy Chief of Staff 

and Counselor to the Attorney General is directly analogous to the wide-ranging responsibilities of the General Counsel. 

During my years in government, I bad a broad and dynamic portfolio of matters which spanned matters of legal policy, 

legislation, and litigation at both the trial and appellate levels, and included advising clients on ethics, contracts, and a wide 

variety of other issues, in addition to the national-security matters discussed above. Within the Office of the Attorney 

General (OAG) at the Department of Justice (DOJ), I bad primary oversight responsibility for seven DOJ components 

including the Office of the Solicitor General, the Civil Division, the Office ofLegal Counsel, and the Office ofLegal Policy. 

In addition, I supervised others in OAG and consulted on civil matters erising from five additional components. 

A key part of the role of General Counsel is representing the CIA in interagency discussions, including with the 

National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the DOJ, the State Department, as well as other agencies within the 

Intelligence Community. I have sigtiificant experience in the interagency process. At the White House and the Justice 

Department, I frequently handled issues that required coordination across ageocies and coordination between agencies and 

the White House. At times, my work also involved responding to requests from Congress. 

During my career in private practice and public service, I have developed strong professional relationships with 

individuals who would attest that I am forthright and principled, that I listen to and engage a variety of viewpoints, and that, 

above all, I have a deep respect for the rule of law. My experience both inside and outside government provides a solid 

foundation to serve as General Counsel of the CIA. 

PART C • POIJTICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

15. POLffiCAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION 

COMMl.TTEE, POLillCAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDMDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE 

LAST TEN YEARS): 

John Adams for Virginia- contribution of$250 (February 2017) 

Ed Gillespie for Governor- contribution of $2500 (January 20 17) 

Let's Grow Virginia PAC- contribution of$500 (June 2016) 

Marco Rubio for President -contribution of $500 (February 2016) 

Ed Gillespie for Senate-contribution of$1000 (March 2014) 

Ed Gillespie for Senate-contribution of$1000 (October 2014) 

McCain-Palin Victory 2008- contribution of$1000 (September2008) 

Republican National Committee- contribution of $1000 (September 2008) 

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE 

PUBLIC OFFICE): 

Not applicable. 
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17. FOREIGNAFFILIATIONS 

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND BARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION 

UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR 

A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENf IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT 

IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.) 

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, 

ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A 

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, 

PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP. . . 

To the best of my recollection, I have not represented a foreign government or an entity controlled by a 

foreign government. 

My husband, who is a partner at the law firm Vinson & Elkins, LLP, has not represented any foreign 

government. He has assisted in the representation of corporations that are owned at least in part by a foreign 

government. Because he is unsure if they are "controlled by a foreign government,» we have disclosed below 

theirnari:tes and descnoed his representation of two Chinese companies. 

MCC (Xiangtan) Heavy Industrial Equipment Co., LtdJCeri (Xiangtan) Heavy Industrial Equipment 

Co., Ltd. In 2016, my husband consulted on argnments for setting aside a default judgment in a civil 

case in State court in Virginia. My husband has had no contact with company officials. 

Sinovel Wind Group Co., Ltd.; Sinovel Wind Group (USA) Co., Ltd. Between 2013 and 2015, my 

husband was among a·group oflawyers who represented the. company in seeking to quash service of 

process in a criminal case in the U.S. District Court in Wisconsin. My husband participated in a 

handful of conference calls with company officials to discuss the case. 

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, 

WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED 

BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENf? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP. 

On occasion, attorneys at my law firm, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC (formerly 

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, PLLC), have represented a foreign government or an entity 

controlled by a foreign government, although such representations constitute a relatively small share of the 

firm's overall business. The firm has compiled a list of"Foreign Government and Foreign Government-Related 

Entity Clients," attached hereto as Exhibit 17B. To compile the list, the firm searched its client database, which 

includes data from 1993 to the present, and queried current partners. The list is believed to be reasonably 

comprehensive, but may not be absolutely complete given the limitations on available information and search 

abilities. In addition, although efforts were made to include entities controlled by a foreign government, a 

foreign government's control of an entity is often unclear or unknown. Therefore the list may not include some 

entities arguably controlled by a foreign government, and it may include entities that are owned in part by or 

affiliated with a foreign government, but not controlled by the government. 

Vinson & Elkins, LLP (V &E), my husband's firm, is an international law firm that has offices in Asia, 

Europe and the Middle East and that handles transactions, investments, projects, and disputes worldwide, 

including on behalf offoreign governments and entities controlled by foreign governments. As with Kellogg, 

Hansen, such representations constitute a relatively small share ofV&E's overall business. In response to 

Question 17 A, I have identified the instances where my husband personally worked on a particular matter for an 

entity that is owned, at least in part, by a foreign government. 
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C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 

WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS • 

. My husband and I may have indirectly received compensation through our law-fmn distributions for 

earnings based on the representations descn'bed in my response to 17B above. Apart from that, no. 

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS 

REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN 

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY,IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSEHA VE ENGAGED 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR 

MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE 

ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY. 

Since returning to my law finn from government service in 2007, a relatively small part of my practice 

has consisted of advising clients on legal matters involving federal agencies. I do not recall having appeared 

before any agency in that period, and I do not believe my work on the matters is known to the agencies. 

My husband met with federal government officials in 2010 and in 2014, at the U.S. Justice 

Department's Office of the Solicitor General after the Supreme Court of the United States called for the views 

of the United States in cases in which my husband was involved. Following that Office's ordinary practice, it 

invited lawyers fur both sides to present information about the cases to federal officials to assist the government 

in forming a position. Those two cases were Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rei. 

Carter,12-1497, andiron Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 09-1353. 

PART D- FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, 

INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS 

WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), 

WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSmON 

TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED. 

Under applicable statutes and regolations and the ethics pledge set forth in Executive Order 13770, if 

confmned, I will not personally and substantially participate in any particular matter in which I know I have a 

financial interest, in which I know a former client of mine is a party or represents a party, orin which I know 

Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC, is or represents a party, for specified periods where 

applicable and absent waiver or authorization where applicable. In addition, for as long as my spouse continues 

to work for Vinson & Elkins, LLP, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter 

that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 

unless I first obtain a written waiver. I also will not participate personally and substantially in any particular 

matter involving specific parties in which I know a client of my spouse is a party or represents a party, unless I 

am first authorized to participate pursuant to a waiver. In the process of reviewing my OGE 278e and preparing 

my Ethics Agreement, an agency ethics officer, in consultation with the Office of Government Ethics, has 
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determined that one of my investments might give rise to conflicts of interest. If confirmed, I intend to divest 

the potentially problematic interest, per my Ethics Agreement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 19. 

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT E!v!PLOYERS, 

FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 

EVENTTHATYOUARECONFIRMEDBYTHESENATE? IFNOT,PLEASEEXPLAIN. 

In the event I am confirmed, I intend to sever all business connections with Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, 

Figel & Frederick, PLLC (formerly, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, PLLC). I also intend to 

resign from my position as a Member of the Advisory Committee on Procedures, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

D.C. Circuit and from my position on the Executive Committee of the Yale Law School Association. Unless 

advised otherwise, I do not believe any other organizations and my connections with them are of the nature and 

extent so as to require severance in the event that I am confirmed. 

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU 

ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSffiON. 

PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME 

ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED 

IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL 

RELATIONSHIPS. 

If confirmed, I will withdraw from Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC, formerly known 

as Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, PLLC ("the finn"). I Cltpect I will receive a refund of my 

capital account and the final LLC distribution for 2016, which is a fJXed amount, in a Jwnp-swn payment. 

Additionally, I will receive the final2017 LLC distribution for non-contingency fee earnings, which will equal 

a pro rata amount of my 2016 non-contingency fee distribution based on my number of days at the firm in 2017 

prior to my withdrawal, less any amounts previously paid to me in advance on my 2017 distribution. For my 

2017 LLC distn"bution for contingency fee earnings, and subject to the conditions set forth in my Ethics 

Agreement, the firm· will also pay me a standard partner share of any fees received by the firm in four cases 

listed in the Ethics Agreement. As noted in my OGE 278e, I also plan to maintain my account in the firm's 

401(k) defined contribution plan, which is invested in a diversified mutual fund. 

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

I currently serve as the executor of an estate of a family member. 

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, 

WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERST ANDINGS,.OR OPTIONS 

TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION. 

None. 

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH 

SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR 
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EXPRESSION OF INfEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

Not applicable. 

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF TinS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED 

IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE 

INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE 

POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE 

POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE. 

My husband is employed as a partner at Vinson & Elkins, LLP. He has not represented, and given the 

nature of his work I do not anticipate that he will represent, any clients in any matters involving the Central 

Intelligence Agency. Further, in my Ethics Agreement, I agreed that, if confinned, I will not participate 

personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge would have a direct and predictable 

effect on the financial interests of Vinson & Elkins, LLP, unless l first obtain a written waiver pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 208(bXl). I also agreed that I will not personally and substaotially participate in any particular matter 

involving specific parties in which I know a client of my spouse is a party ox represents a party, unless I am 

first authorized to participate pursuant to 5 C.F .R. § 2635.502. 

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER 

ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN 

WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. 

NAME OF ENTITY POSITION DAJ'ESHELD SELF OR SPOUSE 

[ INFO:RMil.'l'ION :REP.AC'l'EP] 

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING $100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY 

YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES 

AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE 

GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR.KJ':IOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO 

BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OF!'ICIAL POSITION.) 

For several years, I have exchanged holiday gifts with some of my law partners. Some of the gifts I 

have received during the past five years likely exceeded $100 in value, and some of the gifts I have given have 

exceeded that value, too. All of these gifts were exchanged well before I was considered for the position for 

which I have been nominated and hence were not given because of any potential official position. My spouse 

and children have received no reportable gifts. 
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28. UST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS 

OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT 

ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF $1,000. (NOTE: THE 

INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE 

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT 

CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.) 

See Parts 2, 5, and 6 of my OGE 278e (copy attached as Exhibit 28). 

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABIUTIES) IN 

EXCESS OF $10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS 

RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR 

APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE 

DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY 

REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.) 

None. 

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL 

OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR 

OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE 

EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO 

ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST 

FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, 

ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING $200. (COPIES OF U.S. 

INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR 

SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.) 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S 

FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS? 

Yes. 

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX 

RETURNS. 

My husband and I have filed federal tax returns, and since 2013, we have filed State tax returns in 

Virginia, Illinois, and California. I have participated in composite returns filed by my law flr!II in several 

jurisdictions; in 2015,! participated in the firm's composite returns in Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 

New York, and New York City. My husband has participated in composite returns filed by his law firm in 

multiple jurisdictions. 
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34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, 

INVESTIGATI0:-1, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TfME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING 

THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING. 

No. 

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL 

CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN $200 WORTH OF SERVICES 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL WRISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE 

LlCENSED TO PRACTICE. 

See Exhibit 35. 

I am a member of the District of Columbia Bar and, as such, licensed to practice law in the District. 

am also an inactive member in good standing of the Georgia Bar. In addition, I have been admitted to practice 

before several courts on an ad hoc basis. 

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND 

DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, 

PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR A VOIDING ANY 

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. 

No. Most of our investments are in diversified mutual funds. In accordance with my Ethics Agreement, 

if confirmed, I sball divest my interests in an investment fund that is not a diversified mutual fund and might 

give rise to a conflict of interest, and I shall roll over proceeds into one or more diversified mutual funds or 

other non-conflicting assets. 

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS 

YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE Wml YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF 

GOVERi"'MENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS? 

Not applicable. 

PART E- ETHICAL MATTERS 

38. !IA VE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A D!SCIPLI)<ARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A 

BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEE" THE SUBJECT OF A 

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL 

STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THA1"1 A MINOR 

TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMF.D AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE f:\1 ANY INDICTMENT OR 

!NFORMA TION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLA T!ON? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 
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40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICfED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO 

CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? lF 

SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY 

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CML LmGATION? lF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No, not that I recall. 

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR 

OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR 

STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CML 

LmGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? lF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

Since leaving the Department of Justice in mid-2007, I have not been interviewed or asked to supply 

information as a witoess in connection with any congressional investigation, Federal or State agency 

proceeding, grand jury investigation, or criminal or civil litigation. As counsel on behalf of clients in private 

practice, I have provided infonnation in connection with civil litigation and other proceedings. 

Toward the end of my time at the Department of Justice, I was interviewed in connection with two 

investigations conducted jointly by the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of Professional 

Responsibility. Those investigations resulted in the reports identified below; a discussion of my minor 

involvement appears on the pages specified in parentheses. 

"An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel Actions in the Civil 

Rights Division," dated July 2, 2008 (pp. 50) 

"An Investigation of Allegations ofPoliticized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office 

of the Attorney General," dated July 28, 2008 (pp. 78, 111-13, 127). 

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER 

BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CML 

LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSmON TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? lF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN 

OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LmGATION THAT OCCURRED 

WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.) 

No. 

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. 

Not to my knowledge. I was interviewed as a witness in connection with the two investigations 

discussed in response to Question 42. 
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PART F- SECURITY INFORMATION 

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURflY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL. 

No. 

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY 

CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN. 

No. 

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE 

EXPLAIN. 

No. 

PARTG- ADDITIONALINFORMATION 

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE 

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE 

OVERSIGHT PROCESS. 

To better safeguard individual liberty, the powers of our federal government are checked, separated, and 

limited. These bedrock principles are embedded in our Constitution and codified in our statutes. The more 

robust the power, the more crucial it is to have the check to ensure that the constitutional system stays in 

balance. The relationship between the CIA and the congressional intelligence committees reflects this 

constitutional framework in practice. 

Specifically, the congressional oversight process serves as one check on the powers entrusted to the 

Nation's intelligence community- powers that are often exercised in secret and thus are not routinely 

accountable through other constitutional constraints. Congressional oversight of intelligence activities is also 

necessary for Congress to discharge its express power to legislate. In addition, congressional oversight 

provides the intelligence community with valuable feedback that improves the conduct and effectiveness of 

intelligence operations. 

To allow the Congress to discharge its duties and provide that important feedback, the Director of the 

CIA has the affmnative duty to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of 

intelligence activities and covert actions, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and any 

significant intelligence failure, to the extent consistent' with due regard for the protection from unauthorized 

disclosure of certain exceptionally sensitive matters. To the same extent, the Director must also furnish the 

congressional intelligence committees with any information concerning intelligence activities- including the 

legal basis under which the activity is being or was conducted -which is requested by either committee in 

order to carry out its responsibilities. The President also has a statctory obligation to ensure that the 

congressional intelligence committees are kept properly informed, including an obligation to ensure that any 
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illegal intelligence activity is reported promptly, along with any corrective action that has been or is planned in 

connection with such activity. The General Counsel of the CIA should assist in ensuring that these statutory 

obligations are met with respect to CIA activities. The CIA General Counsel should also play a key role in 

ensuring that the committees are furnished with the legal basis under which CIA intelligence activity is 

conducted, when requested, and has a separate statutory obligation to notifY the congressional intelligence 

committees of any significant legal interpretation of the U.S. Constitution or federal law affecting intelligence 

activities conducted hy the CIA. 

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF 

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 

As set forth in the Central Intelligcrice Act of 1949, the General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 

CIA. In that capacity, the General Counsel is the Director's legal adviser and performs such functions as the 

Director may presctibe to assist him in carrying out his duties as head of the Agency. I understand the 

responsibilities of the General Counsel would include (i} ensuring that accurate and timely legal advice and 

guidance on a wide range of topics is provided to the Director, Deputy Director, and to personnel throughout 

the Agency; (ii) ensuring that the CIA's views on legal issues are known to the appropriate entities within the 

eKecutive branch and, in particular, to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; (ili) ensuring that the 

Agency is properly represented in judicial proceedings where the CIA is a party or has an interest; and (iv) 

ensuring that the congressional intelligence committees are provided with information, as required by law, to 

perform their oversight responsibilities, including the responsibility to provide the legal basis under which 

intelligence activities are being or were conducted and to notifY the committees of any significant legal 

interpretation of the Constitution or federal law affecting CIA-conducted intelligence activities. The General 

Counsel is also responsible for the efficient management of the Office of the General Counsel and its 

personnel. 
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AFFIRMATION 

[SIGNATURE] 

~ame) 

( SI9NATURE] 

(ll\otary) 
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TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the General Counsel of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to 

appe~d testify before any duly constituted committee_ of the Senate. 

[ S~GNATURE] 

,:,1gnamre 
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Additional Prebearing Questions 

for 

Mrs. Courtney Elwood 

upon her selection to be 

the General Counsel of the 

Central Intelligence Agency 

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Keepmg the lnteUigence Committee hUy and Cu"ently Informed 

QUESTION!: 

Section SOl of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that the obligation to keep the 

congressional intelUgence committees fully and currently informed of all intelUgence 

activities applies to the Director of National Intelligence and to the heads of aU 

departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in 

intelUgence activities. 

a. What Is your understanding of the standard for meaningful compUance with this 

obligation of tbe Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the · 

congressional intelligence committees, Including aU their Members, fully and 

currently informed of intelUgence activities? 

To allow the Congress to discharge its constitutional duties and provide valuable 

feedback to the intelligence community, the Director of the CIA has the affirmative duty, 

under Section 502, to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 

informed" of the Agency's intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated 

intelligence activity and any significant intelligence failure; he must do so "consistent 

with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information 

relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive 

matters." 50 U.S.C. § 3092(a)(l). To the same extent, the Director must also "furnish 

the congressional intelligence committees with any information" concerning intelligence 

activities- "including the legal basis under which the activity is being or was conducted" 

-which is requested by either committee in order to carry out its responsibilities. SO 

U.S.C. § 3092(a)(2). 

I understand that standard to mean, in practice, that the congressional intelligence 

committees should receive accurate, timely, and complete information about the 

Agency's significant intelligence activities and failures, subject only to limitations 

necessary to protect specific operational details about sources, tradecraft, and other 

exceptionally sensitive information. Director Pompeo has committed that he will comply 

not only with the letter of the law, but also its spirit, which is to ensure that the 

Legislative Branch has the intelligence information it needs to perform its important 

constitutional function. I look forward to helping him meet that commitment, if 

confirmed. 

b. Under what circumstances Is it appropriate to brief the Chairman and Vice 

Chairman and not the full Committee membership? 

Under Section 503 of the National Security Act, a presidential finding or notification 

about a covert action "may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of 

the congressional inwlligencj: committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House 

of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other 

member or members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the 

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President," "[i]fthe President determines that it is essential to limit access" to the finding 

or notification in order "to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of 

the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(2), (d)(l). 

More generally, and with respect to the application of Section 502's obligation to protect 

"sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters," I would, if confirmed, 

look to Director Pompeo and Director ofNational Intelligence Coats, both former 

members of the congressional intelligence committees, for guidance and historical 

practice when considering the specific circumstances that might warrant limiting access . 

Director Coats recently told this committee, in response to questions, that limiting access 

for non-covert actions would be rare and often a matter of timing, and that, in his 

experience, the committee leadership has worked with the Executive Branch to determine 

when to expand access to the information in question. 

Priorities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

QUESTIONZ: 

Have you discussed with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency his speciftc 

expectations of you, if confirmed as General Counsel, and his expectations of the Office of 

the General Counsel as a whole? If so, please describe those expectations. 

Director Pompeo and I have discussed his expectations for me, if confirmed as General Counsel. 

He expects me to discharge ably the responsibilities as the CIA's chieflegal officer and to 

provide effective leadership within the Office of General Counsel (OGC). He also expects me to 

represent the Agency in interagency discussions, as appropriate, and to serve as a member of his 

management team, providing him with the benefit of my judgment and experience as well as 

legal advice. 

With respect to the Office as a whole, Director Pompeo has stressed the critical role of faithful 

adherence to the rule of law in achieving the CIA's mission. He has expressed his respect for 

and dedication to the hardworldng professionals in OGC as members of the CIA workforce. As 

he told this committee, he will defend and advocate for all CIA employees, will train and support 

them, and will hold them accountable and demand excellence from them. I am certain that he 

expects his General Counsel to do the same. 

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The Office of the General Counsel 

QUESTION3: 

Although the Attorney General, usually through the Oftice of Legal Counsel at the 

Department of Justice, Is responsible for the Issuance of legal opinions that are 

authoritative within the Executive Branch, what Is your understanding of the responsibility 

of the General Counsel of the Central Intelllgence Agency in ensuring that all activities of 

the Central Intelllgence Agency are undertaken in accordance with the Constitution, 

treaties, and laws of the United States? 

As set forth in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, the General Counsel-is 

the chief legal officer of the CIA. As such, she provides authoritative legal advice and guidance 

within the Agency. Assisted by other OGC lawyers, the General Counsel has the responsibility 

to ensure that all activities of the CIA are undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and 

U.S. law, including any applicable treaty obligations or principles of customary international law 

that have been implemented in a domestic statute. For non-self-executing treaties, I believe that, 

the General Counsel should inform the Director in the event that she concludes that CIA 

activities would be lawful as a matter ofU.S. domestic law, but would violate a treaty to which 

the United States is a party and would likely be considered unlawful by the international 

community. 

QUESTION4: 

The Oftice of the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency has a myriad of roles 

and responsib~ties. What are your expectations for the Oftice? 

My expectation is that the Office must and will continue to do high-caliber legal work in support 

of the critical mission of the Agency and in service to the men and women of the workforce. 

Above all else, the Office must ensure that all CIA activities are conducted in accordance with 

the Constitution and U.S.Iaw and ensure that the Agency's workforce receives the legal support 

and the legal services it needs. In addition, I expect OGC lawyers to be not merely reaetive but 

to anticipate issues, and to counsel on the benefits and risks associated with different courses of 

action. OGC lawyers should also provide their judgment, in addition to their legal analysis, but 

take care to distinguish between legal opinions and non-legal advice. 

a. Do you have any preliminary observations on its responsibilities, performan.ce, and 

effectiveness? 

As noted in my response to Question 3, I believe that OGC's core responsibility is to 

ensure that all activities of the CIA are undertaken in accordance with the Constitution 

and U.S. law. I have met only a sniall nurnberofOGC lawyers to date, andlhave been 

impressed by their dedication to the Agency and the pride they take in their work. If 

confirmed, I plan to make it a top priority to assess- and to work consistently to improve 

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- the performanc~ and effectiveness of the Office in discharging all of its responsibilities 

and in serving the Agency, its workforce, and ultimately the American people. 

b. If conftrmed, wm you seek to make changes in the numbers or qualifications of 

attomeys In the office, or in the operations of the office? 

At this time, I have not formed an opinion on the need to make changes in the number or 

qualifications of the attorneys in the Office, or in its operations. If confirmed, I would 

want to observe the operations of the Office for a period of time before reaching any 

conclusions about the need for staffing, organizational, or management changes. I would 

want to hear from OGC lawyers and from other CIA personnel. I also would need to 

evaluate the Office's work product, procedures, resources, and recordkeeping, all to 

assess what is working well and where improvements can be made. My evaluation 

would be guided by the Director's priorities and goals and would need to take into 

account the CIA's recent re-organization. 

c. What do you understand your responsibility to be to manage and oversee the legal 

work of the attorneys from the Office of the General Counsel who are assigned to 

the various components of the CIA and bow would you carry out this responsibility 

if conftrmed? 

The General Counsel is the chieflegal officer of the CIA. As such, she is responsible for 

managing and overseeing the leglil work of all OGC lawyers in the Agency, including · 

those attorneys who are assigned to the other components. To carry out this 

responsibility, I would, if confirmed, ensure that I and OGC's leadership team 

continually and effectively supervise the legal advice being provided by all OGC 

lawyers. I would review existing means for evaluating and managing the attorneys' 

work, and I would work to ensure that all attorneys are receiving the necessary training, · 

support, guidance, and supervision. 

QUESTIONS: 

Describe your understanding of the responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence 

and the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in reviewing, 

and providing legal advice on, the work of the Central Intelligence Agency, including 

covert actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Generally speaking, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) provides coordination and 

guidance on a range of activities that affect multiple intelligence community elements, including 

the CIA. The DNI has both an oversight and collaborative role with the Agency and its work, 

intended to ensure that the CIA's activities are integrated and responsive to the broader national 

security strategy. 

What this means in practice depends upon the particular work in question and the priorities and 

approach of each DNI. The recent responses provided by Director Coats and Director Pompeo in 

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response to questions from this committee provide further information about what they envision 

for their respective roles in connection with several subjects including the collection of foreign 

intelligence through hwnan sources; the coordination of relationships between elements of the 

intelligence community and the intelligence and security servi~ of foreign governments; the 

correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence related to national security; and covert 

action. (See, e.g., Director Coats's response to APQ 43 and Director Pompeo's responses to 

APQs 30-32.) 

It is my understanding that previous General Counsels of the CIA and Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI) have had- and have benefitted from - a close and synergetic 

worJcing relationship. If confirmed, I would hope to continue that practice and anticipate 

frequent interaction with the General Counsel of ODNI. · In particular, I would bring to his or her 

attention significant matters oflegal policy and interpretation concerning CIA activities, as well 

as legal issues that have broader implications for the intelligence community. 

QUEST~ON6: 

. . Explain your undentanding of the responsibility of the General Counsel of the Central 

Intelligence Agency to bring issues of legal significance to the attention of the Office of the 

General Counsel of the Director of National Intelligence and to the General Counsel Forum 

established by the Office. 

The General Counsel of the CIA and the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence both benefit from a close and collaborative pl'!lfessional relationship. If 

confirmed, I expect to bring to his or her attention significant matters oflegal policy and 

interpretation concerning CIA activities; as well as legal issues that have broader implications for 

the intelligence community. I would follow the guidance of the General Counsel of the ODNI 

on the use of the Gener8.t Counsel Forum. 

QUESTION7: 

Under what circumstances must covert action involving the use of force comply with 

treaties to which the United States is a party, including the United Nations Charter and the 

Geneva Conventions? 

Covert action, like all government activities, must comply with the Constitution and U.S. law, 

including any applicable treaty obligations or principles of customary internationallaw.that have 

been implemented in a domestic statute. Section 503(a)(S) of the National Security Act of 1947, 

as amended, provides that a covert action finding "may not authorize any action that would 

violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(S). By thiS 

language, Congress did not prohibit the President from authorizing a covert action that would 

violate a non-self-executing treaty or customary international law. However, I understand that, 

as a general matter, the United States complies with international law to the extent possible in the 

execution of covert action activities. 

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QUESTIONS: 

The National Security Act places limits on the activities that may be conducted as "covert 

actions." In particular, covert actions do not include "traditional .•. miHtary activities or 

routine support to such activities." SO U.S.C. Sec. 3093(e). What is your understanding of 

the definition oftraditional military activities? What Is your understanding of the 

definition of routine support to traditional military activities? What factors would you use 

In testing whether a proposed covert action involves traditional military activities or 

routine to support to such activities? Please provide one or two iliustrative examples. 

I have not previously had the opportunity to consider the definition of"traditional ... military 

activities" as used in Section 503(e) of the National Security Act. To determine whether a 

particular activity falls within its scope, I would look to the common meaning of the phrase and 

to past practice, and I would consult with the experts on the subject including, as appropriate, 

lawyers from the Department of Defense and other relevant agencies. The legislative history of 

Section 503( e) suggests at least four relevant considerations: whether the activity has customarily 

been considered a military activity; whether the activity is under the direction and control of a 

military commander; whether the activity is connected to hostilities involving U.S. military 

forces; and whether the U.S. government's role in the overall operation will be apparent or 

acknowledged publicly. SeeS. Rep. No.l02-85, at 44, 46-47 (1991); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 102-

166, at 29-30 (1991). 

Detainee Treatment Policy 

QUESTION9: 

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field 

Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, Issued in September 2006, and required by Section 

1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)? 

Director Pompeo gave the committee his full commitment that, during his tenure, the CIA will 

fully comply with laws governing interrogation, including the legal bar on the use of any 

interrogation method not listed in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. I support that commitment and 

Section I 045, which has provided a clear and accessible rule to government officers who are 

asked to participate in interrogations. 

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PiiSt PersonallnYOlvement in Relevant Matters 

QUESTION 10: 

Please describe your involvemeut, if any with regard to: 

a. The September 18, 2001, Authorizatlou of the Use of Military Foree; 

In September 2001, I was an Associate Counsel to the President in the Office of the 

Counsel to the President. I recall that our office was involved in drafting the 2001 

Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF), but I do not recall working on it. 

b. The October 16, 2003, Authorization of the Use of Military Foree; 

In October 2003, I was Deputy Counsel to the Vice President. I do not recall doing any 

work on the 2003 AUMF. 

c. Any legal analyses related to lethal operations or programs; 

I do not recall doing any work on legal analyses related to lethal operations or programs 

in any of the government positions that I held from 2001 to 2007. 

d. The September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification or any other covert action 

Findings or Memoranda of Notification; and 

I did not work on the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification or on any other 

covert action Findings or Memoranda ofNotification. 

e. Any other matters relevant to the authorities of the CIA. 

Immediately after September 11, 2001, I was among the small number ofWhite House 

staff members who worked with members of the intelligence and law-enforcement 

communities, alongside Members of COngress and their staffs, to draft legislation to 

ensure that law enforcement and the intelligence community had the tools needed in the 

fight against terrorism. That legislation became the USA PATRIOT Act. 

At the Justice Department, I worked on a program that I have since leamed is affiliated 

with the CIA. Becanse that affiliation remains classified, I cannot describe my 

involvement with that program here. 

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Chief of Mission Authority 

QUESTION 11: 

22 U.S.C. 3927 states that: "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a 

foreign country ••• shaD have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of an Government executive branch employees in that country •••• " Absent 

direction from the President, is the CIA obligated to cease intelligence activities that do not 

have the approval of the chief of mission? 

It is important for the CIA and the State Department to work together as partners. If confirmed, I 

will work with the Legal Adviser to anticipate and resolve any disagreement with the State 

Department over intelligence activities. Director Pompeo has also said that, if such a 

disagreement were to arise, he would seek to resolve the issue with the Secretary of State. In the 

extremely unlikely event that they were unable to resolve the issue, the Director would promptly 

seek further guidance from the President. · 

Surveillance 

QUESTION 12: 

Were you ever read into any of the components of the President's Surveillance Program 

(PSP), as defined in the Report on the President's Survelllance Program by the Offices of 

the lnspecton General of the Departments of Defense and Justice, the CIA and the NSA, 

July 10, 2009? H yes, please provide a date. 

I do not recall being read into the Terrorist Surveillance Program or any other aspect of the 

President's Surveillance Program (PSP). Please see my responses to Questions 13-16 for a 

description of my best recollection of my involvement in classified intelligence activities related 

tothePSP. 

QUESTION 13: 

Please describe any involvement you may have had with the PSP or its transition to FISA 

authorities. 

My work on the PSP began after the President publicly acknowledged one aspect of the program, 

commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (fSP). At that time in December 2005, 

I was working at the Justice Department as Deputy Chief of Staff to the Attorney General. 

Starting that month and continuing into 2006, Executive Branch officials made a series of public 

statements on the NSA activities described by the President. The Justice Department reviewed 

and in many instanCes drafted those statements. I recall being involved in reviewing at least 

some of those statements and discussing them with individuals inside and outside the 

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Department. As Deputy Chief of Staff, I was. involved, in particular, whenever the Attorney 

General made public statements about the TSP. The Department's Office of Legal Counsel 

(OLC) bad responsibility for describing the legal authorities that supported the TSP. I discussed 

with 0~ the analysis contained in the statements, but I did not do my own independent legal 

analysis. 

As descnbed in more detail below in response to Question 16, I supported the effort during that 

time period to transition the presidentially authorized TSP activities to the authority of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FlSA). Officials who were working closely on that 

transition would provide the Attorney General with periodic updates on their progress, and I 

recall participating in at least some of those discussions. In addition, I bad separate discussions 

with Department officials about the transition in an effort to keep the Attorney General fully 

informed. I also likely reviewed related materials such as orders or draft orders of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court, although I do not have a specific recollection of those materials 

today. ' 

During that time period, Department officisls were also working on obtaining orders from the 

FISA court to authorize collection of telephone call detail records pursuant to Section 215 of the 

PATRIOT Act. I was generally aware of this effort. I do not have a firm recollection of my 

involvement, but I believe it entailed a few discussions with individual(s) who were working 

closely on the matter. 

QUESTION 14: 

Did you have any involvement in the development of the Department of Justice's public 

defense of the PSP after its partial acknowledgment in December 2005? If yes, please detail 

that involvement. 

Please see my response to Question 13. 

QUESTION 15: 

On January 1!), 2006, the Department of Justice issued a White -Paper entitled "Legal 

Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the 

President." That White Paper stated that: "[t)he NSA activities are supported by the 

President's weD-recognized inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and 

sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy 

forces for intelligence purposes to detect and disrupt armed attacks on the United States." 

Do you beDeve that the program had a sufficient legal basis in the President's Article II 

authorities? If so, please elaborate. 

Please see my response to Question 16. 

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QUESITON 16: 

The White Paper also stated that the September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military 

Foree ~confirmed and supplemented the President's recognized authority under Article n 

of the Constitution to conduct such warrantless surveillance to prevent further 

catastrophic attacks on the homeland.". Do you beHeve that the AUMF authorized the 

program? If so, please elaborate. · 

The White Paper of January 19, 2006, was prepared by the Justice Department's Office ofLegal 

Counsel. I reviewed the paper and discussed it with its authors and others, but I did not do my 

own independent legal analysis. I recall thinking at the time that its analysis was thorough and 

carefully reasoned and that certain points were compelling. I also thought that the analysis of the 

FISA provisions presented a difficult question and that reasonable minds could reach different 

conclusions about it. I therefore supported the effort to transition the collection activities to be 

undertaken pursuant to FISA authority and orders of the FISA court. Later, after I left the 

Department, Congress modified relevant provisions ofFISA, including certain provisions 

interpreted in the White Paper, when it passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. 

The White Paper concluded thai the described NSA activitieS rested both on the President's 

inherent Article II authorities and on the authority granted by the Congress in the 2001 AUMF. 

I" have not analyzed the hypothetical question of whether, in the absence of the AUMF, the 

President's Article II powers alone would have provided a sufficient legal basis for the described 

NSA activities, consistent with the then-existing statutory framework in FISA. I therefore am 

not prepared to offer an opinion on that question. 

QUESTION 17: 

The White Paper stated that "[f]oreign intelligence collection, espedally in the midst of an 

armed conflict in which the adversary has already launched catastrophic attacks within the 

United States, fits squarely within the area of 'special needs, beyond the normal need for 

law enforcement' where the Fourth Amendment's touchstone of reasonableness can be 

satisfied without resort to a warrant." 

a. Do you believe that the NSA program violated the Fourth Amendment's warrant · 

requirement? 

Although, as rioted above, I did not conduct my own independent legal analysis of the 

issues analyZed in the White Paper, I thought its analysis of the Fourth Amendment's 

warrant requirement was solidly grounded in judicial precedent. As the Amendment's 

text makes clear and as the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, the ''ultimate touchstone 

of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.'" Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 

2482 (2014) (internal citation and quotation marks. omitted). When the TSP was initiated 

and the White Paper was written, a number of courts had recognized a foreign 

intelligence exception to the warrant requirement under appropriate circumstances. See, 

e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. 

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Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). Those decisions, and the Supreme Court precedent 

on which they were based, supported the White Paper's conclusion that, und.ei' the 

specific circumstances presented, the NSA activities were not subject to the Fourth 

· Amendm~t's warrant requirement. 

b. Under what clreumstances, If any, does national security allow for warrantless 

collection under the "special needs" doctrine when the collection would otherwise 

require a warrant? 

I have not done the legal research and analysis required to properly answer that question. 

That analysis would start with the fact that searches governed by the Fourth Amendment 

must always be reasonable- whether analyzed under a "special nec(ds" exception or not. 

Reasonableness, in turn, involves balancing" 'the degree to which [a search] intrudes 

upon an individual's privacy'" and" 'the degree to which it is needed for the promotion 

oflegitimate governmental interests.'" Samson v. California, 541 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) 

(quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)). Courts conducting this 

typ~ of balancing in national security cases have carefully considered both the privacy 

interests and the national security imperatives that are at stake. See, e.g., In re Terrorist 

Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 172-76 (2d Cir. 2008). As a 

result, any Fourth Amendment analysis is )righly contextual, and a fum and complete 

understanding of the facts is needed before one can reach a proper conclusion on the 

application of the Fourth Amendment: 

QUESTION 18: 

The CIA's minimization procedures with regard to Section 702 of FISA state: "CIA 

·personnel may query CIA electronic and data storage systems containing unmininlized 

communications acquired in accordance With section 702 of the Act. (REDACTED I Such 

queries must be reasonably designed to find and extract foreign inteUigence information. 

CIA will maintain records of all such queries, including but not Umlted to United States 

person names and identities, and NSD and ODNI will review CIA's queries for content." · 

What Is the role of the Office of the General Counsel in ensuring that queries are 

"reasonably designed to find and extract foreign inteUigence information" and identifying 

and reporting compHance incidents? 

I understand that the Office plays an important role in supporting the Agency's FISA compliance 

program. I am told that CIA attorneys conduct in-person training on the minimization 

procedures and are embedded with the operators to answer any question that may arise. OGC 

lawyers know to report any identified incident of noncompliance to ·the Department of Justice 

and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. OGC lawyers also participate in those 

agencies' frequent reviews of all of the CIA's U:.S. person queries of Section 702-acquired 

content to ensure that each query satisfies the. legal standard referenced in the question. By law, · 

any compliance incident is also reported to the Congress and to the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Office continues this important work. 

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QUESTION 19: 

What limitations !lnd reporting requirements apply to U.S. person queries of Section 702-

derlved metadata? 

As the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board explained in its July 2014 report, the CIA's 

current procedures prohibit CIA personnel from querying Section 702-derived metadata for an 

unauthorized purpose. See Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 

702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (July 2, 2014), at 58. The Board recommended 

that CIA revise its minimization procedures to require that a U.S.-person-metadata query be 

based on a statement of facts showing that it is reasonably likdy to return foreign intelligence 

information. Id. at 12, 139-40. I understand that the CIA plans to implement that 

recommendation .. 

QUESTION 20: 

Section 702 ofFISA prohibits "reverse targeting" of U.S. persons. Given that the CIA can 

both nominate foreign targets and conduct u.s. person queries intended to retnrn 

communications of or about U.S. persons, how should the omce of General Counsel guard 

against any instances of reverse targeting? 

As the question notes, Section 702 prohibits ''reverse targeting'' ofU.S. persons. I understand 

that OGC lawyers, in coordination with the CIA's FISA Program Office, provide in-person 

training on this prohibition. OCG lawyers also review and approve every CIA nomination and 

facilitate the Department of Justice's regular compliance reviews, which specifically look for 

indications of''reverse targeting." · 

These and other measures appear to be effective. After a thorough review, the Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Oversight Board saw "no trace" of any "illegitimate activity associated with the [702] 

program, or any attempt to intentionally circumvent legal limits." See Report on the Surveillance 

Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (July 2, 

2014) at 11. Still, Director Coats has committed.to review how Section 702 is being 

implemented to determine whether any changes should be made to further strengthen compliance 

and oversight, including with respect to the reverse targeting prohibition. 

QUESTION ll: 

Do you believe the CIA should be authorized to monitor U.S. persons' social media 

activities? If so, under what circumstances and subject to what limitations? 

With its focns on foreign intelligence, the role·ofthe CIA, with respect to U.S. persons, is and 

should be limited. The CIA may collect information that is publicly available concerning U.S. 

persons only ifit is done in the course of the CIA's duly authorized intelligence activities and in 

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fulfillment of the CIA's national security responsibilities, and only if the collection complies 

fully with the Constitution, federal statutes, and presidential directives. In particnlar, the CIA's 

collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons must comply 

with its recently revised and publicly available AttOrney General-approved guidelines, CIA 

Intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive 

Order 12333 (AttOrney General Guidelines). 

Like Director Pompeo, I think publicly available information, including public posts on social 

media, can provide important clues in identifying those _who seek to harm Americans here and 

abroad. I also agree with Director Pompeo that the FBI and other appropriate government 

agencies have a duty to use publicly available social-media activities as part of their lawfully 

conducted investigations or intelligence gathering, subject to applicable privacy and other legal 

restrictions and regulations. 

a. What specific: legal authorities would provide the basis for such monitoring? 

The National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949 authorize and direct the CIA 

Director to conduct intelligence activities by appropriate means, not to include police, 

subpoena, or law enforcement power or internal security functions. The President, 

through Executive Order 12333 and other Presidential directives, has given the CIA 

Director intelligence-related duties and responsibilities and has also placed important 

limitations on the CIA's intelligence activities. The Attorney General Guidelines, 

descnbed above, place further limitations on the collection, retention, and dissemination 

of information concerning U.S. persons. For example, the CIA may not collect 

information concerning U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities 

protected by the First Amendment. See Attorney General Guidelines § 3.3. Collectively, 

these and other rules are designed to keep the CIA's focus on, its foreign intelligence 

mission while also protecting privacy. 

QUESTION 22: 

What Hmitations apply to the CIA's collection, use and dissemination of information 

collected in bulk known to include U.S. person information? 

Pursuant to applicable law and the Attorney General Guidelines, the CIA is permitted in some 

instances to engage in "bulle" collection activities iri furtherance of its du1y authorized 

intelligence activities and in fulfillment of the CIA's national security responsibilities. "Bulk" 

collection activities are activities that, due to technical or operational considerations, acquire data 

withput the use of specific identifiers or terms (e.g., names, phone numbers, or email addresses). 

The recently revised and publicly available Attorney General Guidelines impose stringent and 

detailed restrictions on information collected m bulk, as well as unevaluated information, which 

is generally presumed to contain incidentally acquired information concerning U.S. persons. 

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QUESTION 23: 

In his responses to questions, Director Pompeo wrote, in the context of CIA collection of 

U.S. person information from foreigu entities, that "In very limited circumstances, · 

however, the manner in which a foreigu partner collected the information could be so 

miproper that it would not be appropriate for the CIA to receive, use, or further 

disseminate the information." What circumstances would prevent the CIA from receiving, 

using or disseminating that information? 

In response to further questions on this subject, Director Pompeo explained that, in the quoted 

sentence, he was "indicating that [he] could not rule out a circumstance in which the conduct of a 

foreign partner is so egregious that CIA would not receive the information." He went on to 

explain that "this would be a highly fact-specific determination" which would consider, among 

other things, the source of the information, the intent of the foreign partner, the nature of the 

information, and the scope of the information. Because the decision would be based on a 

consideration of all facts and circumstances and because I have not had personal experience with 

such a decision, I am unable to offer an opinion beyond what Director Pompeo has already said. 

QUESTION 24: 

Would the CIA's receipt of intelligence from a foreign entity, or its subsequent use or 

dissemination of that intelligence be restricted if it is known to include the communications 

of U.S. persons engaged in First Amendment-protected political activity, as opposed to 

those of suspected terrorists or foreign agents? 

Information about U.S. persons must be handled with great care, in full compliance with 

applicable law and procedures. As noted above, the recently revised Attorney General 

Guidelines place stringent and detailed restrictions on the CIA's retention, use, and 

dissemination of information concerning a U.S. person. I understand those restrictions apply no 

matter how the CIA received the information and no matter what the U.S. person may be saying 

in or doing with the collected communication. The Guidelines also prohibit the CIA from 

"collect[ing] or maintain[ing] information concerning U.S. persons solely for the purpose of 

monitoring (1) activities protected by the First Amendment or (2) the lawful exercise of other 

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Attorney General Guidelines § 

3 .3. The Guidelines also prohibit the CIA from requesting that a foreign entity undertake any 

activity that the Guidelines prohibit. Id. 

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QUESTION 25: 

Seetlon IV ("Proeesslng Raw SIGINT"), paragraph (C)(2) of the Procedures for the 

AvaUabllity or Dissemination of Raw Slgn~ls Intelligence Information by the National 

Security Agency Under Section 2.3 of ExecUtive Order 12333 states that, when raw signals 

Intelligence is shared with IC elements, queries for communications reasonably Hkely to be 

to, from, or about a U.S. person or a person located in the United States may be conducted 

for purposes of targeting that person if the Attorney General determines that the person is 

an agent of a foreign power or an officer or employee of a foreign power and the purpose of 

the selection is to acqnire significant foreign intelligence or cou~terlntelllgence information. 

a. What rules apply for a query of a U.S. person that is !!!!! for purposes of targeting 

that person? Is Attorney General approval required? 

I have not had experience with the CIA's implementation of the ProcedureS for the 

Availability or Dissemination of Raw Signals Intelligence Infonnation by the National 

Security Agency Under Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333, or the application of rules 

that apply to a query of shared raw SIGINT or of signals intelligence collected by the 

CIA designed to retrieve information concerning a U.S. person. 

I would note that the Attorney General Guidelines contain procedures that address 

querying under certain situations, and I understand that additional protections or 

enhanced safeguards may also be applied. If confirmed, I will consult with the 

appropriate experts at the Agency on these issues, and I will seek to ensore each query is 

conducted carefully, for authorized purposes, ab.d in full compliance with applicable legal 

requirements. 

b. Do the same rules related to queries of U.S. persons apply for signals intelligence 

collected by the CIA (as opposed to shared raw SIGINT) and is Attorney General 

approval required? If not, please describe those rules. 

Please see response to subpart (a). 

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Rellltions with Congress 

QUESTION Z6: 

The "Gang of Eight" provision in the National Security Act (Section 503(c)(Z)) applies to 

covert action. 

a. Are there circumstances in which th' "Gang of Eight" briefings ean apply to other 

than time-sensitive tactical matters? H so, please elaborate. 

Section 503 of the National Security Act provides that a presidential finding or 

notification about a covert action may be reported to only the chairmen and ranking 

lllin,ority members of the congressional intelligence corinn.ittees, the Speaker and · 

minority leader of the Hous'e of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the 

Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership as may be 

included by the President, "if the President determines that it is essential to limit access" 

to the finding or notification in order "to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 

interests of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(2). Thus the statutory language does 

not confine limiting access in this manner orily to circumstances involving "timesensitive tactical matters." However, as noted above, Director Coats has said that, based 

on his experience, limited notifications are often a matter of timing. 

b. Are there circumstances in which it ean be used to conceal from the full Committee 

ongoing programs or signitlcant legal analyses related to intelligence activities? If 

so, please elaborate. 

To invoke the so-called "Gang of Eight" provision, the President must determine that "it 

is essential to limit access" in order "to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 

interests of the United States." SO U.S.C. § 3093(c)(2) (emphasis added). That 

determination would be highly fact specific. It would not be proper to use the provision 

to withhold from the full committee information or legal analysis related to intelligence 

activities in the absence of such a determination. 

In addition, as noted in the response to subpart (c), the "due regard" language of Section 

502 of the National Security Act recognizes that, in other rare cases, it may be necessary 

to initially brief only the ''Gang of Eight'' or the leadership of the congressional 

intelligence committees. It would not be proper to use that provision to withhold from 

the full committee information unless the limited access was done for the "protection 

from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 

sources and methods and other exceptionally sensitive matters." 50 U.S.C. § 3092(a). 

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c. Are there circumstances in which the "Gang of Eight'' provision would apply to 

non-covert action. If so, what would be the statutory basis for such Hmlted 

notifications? · 

Section 503, by its terms, applies only to covert action. I understand that, in rare cases 

involving particularly sensitive non-covert· action matters, it may be necessary to initially 

brief only the "Gang of Eight" or the leadership of the congressional intelligence 

committees. The statutory basis for such limited notifications is found in the language of 

National Security Act's reporting provisions which specify that notifications be made 

"consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified 

information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods and other exceptionally 

sensitive matters." SO U.S.C. § 3092(a). In practice, if confirmed, I would look to 

Director Pompeo and Director Coats, both former members of the congressional 

intelligence committees, for guidance and historical practice. Director Coats recently 

told this committee that he expected limited initial notifications for non-covert actions 

would be rare. 

Lethal Authorities 

QUESTION 27: 

In his responses to questions, Director Pompeo stated that "when the United States knows 

in advance that the specific object of its (lethal) attack is an individual U.S. citizen, it 

proceeds on the assumption that constitutional rights- in particular, the Fifth 

Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 

unreasonable searches and seizures - attach to the U.S. citizen even while the individual is 

abroad. Those rights are considered in assessing whether it is lawful to target the 

individuaL" 

a. Please describe how the eonstitutional rights of U.S. citizens would be appHed in this 

context. 

The United States government must consider the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen 

before targeting him or her for lethal action. Because I have not had previous experience 

applying constitutional law in this context- where the United States is considering the 

use oflethal force against a U.S. citizen abroad- I cannot speak to the specific 

application of constitutional principles in that context. As this committee knows, the 

Justice Department has set forth in a white paper its detailed and authoritative framework 

for that constitutional analysis. I can assure you, if I am confirmed and presented with 

this issue, I would give the matter and the required legal analysis my utmost care and 

attention, including consultation with the Department of Justice. 

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b. Do these rights apply to non-eitizen U.S. persons overseas? 

Because I have not had previous experience with that issue, I have not done the necessary 

legal research and analysis required to answer that question properly. If I am confirmed 

and presented with this issue, I would again give the question my utmost care and 

attention and would seek the guidance of the Department of Justice. 

Trtinsptll'ency II1Ul Congressionlll Notljiclltlon 

QUESTION 28: 

What is the role of the Office of the General Counsel ~ ensuring that the CIA classiftcatlon 

decisions are consistent with Executive Order 13526? 

I understand that the Office of the General Counsel provides legal advice to CIA officers on the 

proper interpretation and application of Executive Order 13526, to ensure that CIA classification 

decisions are consistent with that Executive Order. The Office is also called upon to explain and 

defend the Agency's classification decisions in litigation. 

QUESTION 29: 

50 U.S.C. § 3349 requires notification of Congress in the event of an authorized disclosure 

to the press or the public of classified Information that has not otherwise been declassified. 

Based on the law, do you see any exceptions to this notification requirement? 

I have not had previous experience with 50 U.S.C. § 3349, and have not studied how it has been 

interpreted and applied. But subsection (d) appears to list four exceptions to the notification 

requirement. In addition, other exceptions may arise from other federal statutes or principles of 

law. 

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·April 21, 2017 

The Honorable Ron Wyden 

The Honorable Martin Heinrich 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

211 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senators Wyden and Heinrich: 

Thank you for your letter dated April 7, 2017. Please find 

enclosed my responses to your questions. 

I look forward to appearing before your committee on April 26, 2017. 

aincerely, 

C,9llrtneY) nwooa 

inclosure 
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Prehearlng Ouestkg for Ms. Courtnft Elwood WIOD her pmn!netlep to be 

General COI!JIRI of tbe Central lnhtJ!m!L'1! Apney 

5mter! Wy!len and Helprieh 

Detmtjon.lntmogqtio& Rfllllitlgn wulHWJUIII Ritthts 

1. Were you ever read into CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) 

Program? If yes, please provide the date. 

I did not work on. nor have knowledge of, classified a8pects of the CIA's RDI program. 

2. Please deserlbe any· involvement you had with the KDI program as part or the White 

House Coonsel's ofllee, the Oftlce of the Vice Preskleot, or at the Department of 

Justice. 

I did not work on, nor have knowledge of, the CIA's highly classified RDI program when 

I serv~ as an Associate Counsel to the President and as Deputy Counsel to the Vice 

President I also did not work on. nor have knowledge of, classified aspects of that 

program when I served in the Justice Department. Although I was therefore not privy to 

any connection between the classified program and proposed legislation, I did follow 

developments on the legislation that became the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and the 

Military Commissions Act of 2006, through periodic updates from the individuals at the 

, Department who were involved day-to-day on that legislation. 

3. In respouse to Committee questions, you stated that, at the Department of Justice, 

you worked on ·~ involving the CODStltutfonality or natioaal security ptograms 

and detention of enemy combatants and miHtary eoJJUDi&sions." Please detan those 

eases and any other involvement you may have had with regard to detention 

matters, as part of the White House Counsel's ofllee, the Ollice of the Vice 

President, or at the Department of Justice. 

Following September 11, 2001, the Justice Department was often litigating well over a 

hundred terrorism-related civil cases at any one time. Those court cases were assigned to 

different components within the Department, depending on the particular claims at issue 

and the stage of the litigation. Well before I arrived at the Department, the Attorney 

General had established a task force within the Department composed of representatives 

from different components to ensure that these cases were properly handled and 

coordinated. That task force was chaired by a lawyer fronl the Attorney General's Office 

and, in late 2005, I assumed that responsibility. Generally, my role was to convene 

weekly meetings of the task force where participants discussed significant developments 

in the court cases and to ensure that the Attorney General was kept informed of any 

matters that required his personal attention. As I recall, some of the cases involved 

federal court habeas challenges to the detention of enemy combatants held at · 

Guantanamo. With regard to my work, if any, on other detention matters, please see my 
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response to Question 2, which I incorporate by reference. In addition, I consulted with 

the Solicitor General and his Deputies on matters that required the Attorney General's 

involvement or were noteworthy for some other reason, including on significant natiolllll 

security cases that the Department was litigating in the U.S. Supreme Court or in the U.S. 

Courts of Appeal. 

4. Do you believe tllat any of the CIA's former enhanced Interrogation tedmiques are 

consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act? 

I was not involved in, nor bave I reviewed, tbe Justice Department's legal analysis of tbat 

question, and I bave not done the legal and factual research tbat would be required to 

properly answer it I would note tbat the law governing interrogation bas changed 

significantly in the past decade. Among other things, Section 1045 of the National . 

Defense Autbori.zation Act for F'l.Scal Year 2016 provides tbat no individual in U.S. 

custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach tbat is not 

authorized by and listed in tbe Army Field Manual. I fully support Director Pompeo's 

commitment to ensure that, during his tenure, the CIA fully complies with the law 

governing interrogation, including the legal bar on the use of any interrogation method 

not listed in the Army Field Manual. 

S. Do you believe tllat any of the CIA's former enhauced fnterrogatlon teclmiques are 

colllllstent with U.S. statutory prohibition on torture? 

Please see my response to Question 4. 

6. Do you believe tllat any of the CIA's former enhaDced interrogation tedmlques are 

CODSistent with the War Crimes Act? 

Please see my response to Question 4. 

7. Do you believe tllat any of the CIA's former enhanced Interrogation teelmlques are 

CODSistent with U.S. obBgatloas under the Convention Against Torture, Common 

Artlele 3 of the Geneva Convention aud other U.S. treaty obligations? 

Please see my response to Question 4. 

8. Have you read the declassified Exeeudve Sumn:iary of the CoDunittee•s Study of the 

CIA's Detention aud Interrogation Program? 

Yes. 

9. During bls eonftrmation process, Director Pompeo committed to reviewing parts of 

~classified Committee Study relevant to the position of the Director of the CIA 

and the Committee. wm you likewise commit to reviewing parts of the classified 

Study relevaut to the Otlke of the General Counsel? 

Yes, if confirmed. 

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10. In response to tbe Committee Study, tben-Direeto.r Bremum directed tbe General 

CoUDSel, working with the Exec:udve Director, to ''deveiop a formal mechaDfsm for 

trfaeriug systematic rel'iews of OLC opinions regardQlg oqolug covert action 

programs with tbe goal of ensuriDg that OLC'a legal analysis Ia CODflrmed or 

updated as warranted by material changes in facCs and dn:umstances.'' wm yon 

eom.mit to Implementing tbiB reform? 

I understand that the Office of the General Counsel implemented that reform in 2013. If 

confirmed, I commit to evaluating for myself th;U refoim and its implementalion. 

11. In responses to questioua asked during her confirmation process. former CIA 

General Comlsel Caroline Krass wrote: "In my view, CIA ollkera should not 

continUe to participate in tbe Interrogation of detaiDees In liaison custody when 

harsh or extnme interrogation teelmiques are used. For example, CIA' oflieers 

should not participate in any Interrogations when they witness, know or otherwise 

suspect a detainee has been tortured or mistreated, as their par1idpation could, 

depending upon tbe elreumstances, result in violatioua of law or aclmiDistrative 

restrietio1111." Do you agree? · 

Yes. 

12. The statutory proldbltion on interrogations not eonsisteDt with the Army Field 

Manual apply to any iudlvldnal "In tile custody or nnder tile effective control 

of an oMcer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or 

detained within a facility owned, operated, or controDed by a department or 

agency of the United States, iD any anned conflict." 

a. Please describe the factors that would Indicate wbetber a detainee was iD tile 

"effective control" of an oflieer, employee, or other agent of the United States 

Government. 

I have not previously bad the opportunity to consider this issue. To determine whether a 

detainee is in the "effective control" of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United 

Stares Government, I would begin by looking to the common meaning of the phraae and 

to past practice, and I would consult with the experts on the subject. I would also 

consider other statutes containing, and judicial decisions construing, the same or similar 

language. 

b. Please describe how you would deftne whether a detainee Ia "d~ed wltbln 

a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the 

United States." 

I have not previously bad the opportunity to consider this issue. To determine whether a 

detainee is "detained within a facility owned. operated. or controlled by a department or 

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agency of the United States," I would begin by looking to the common meaning of the 

terms and to past practice, and I would consult with the experts on the subject. I would 

also consider any other statutes containing, and judicial decisions construing, the same or 

similar language. 

13. To the extent that the CIA partidpates in any updates of the Army Field Manual, do 

you agree to oppose any tedmiques Ulat involve use or threat of force, as sdpulated 

in the National DefeDse Authorizadon Act for Ffscal Year 2016 (P.L 114-92)? 

Yes. 

14. The United States reeoptzes Its obllption, UDder the ConvenUou Apfnst Torture, 

not to "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to auother state where there 

are substantial grounds for beUeviag that he would be In danger of being subjected 

to torture." 

a. To wbat extent does U.S. compliance with this obligation depend ou "dlplomatfe 

assurances" prol'lcled by eountries to whk:h detainees may be extradited or 

rendered? 

I understand that diplomatic assurances have been a valuable tool for ensuring that 

detainees are treated humanely. I also understand that the decision to rely on a 

diplomatic assUl'!UlCC is assessed on a caso-by-case basis in light of all the relevant 

factors, including the practices of the country providing the assurances as well as that 

country's record of complying with similar assurances provided to the United States and 

other countries. 

b. Should those 8S8IJl"llllceS be conveyed in writing. so that a record of their provision 

and receipt Js estahUshed? 

As noted in R:SpO!lSe to subpart (a), the decision to rely on an assurance is assessed on a 

case-by-case basis, and I assume would entail considering the need for the assurance to 

be conveyed in writing. That consideration tDight depend on, among other things, the 

identity of the government providing the assurances and the~ of the situation to 

which the assurances relate. 

c. Should such 8SSUI'8llCeS be accepted from countries with established records of 

c:ommitdng torture? 

Under section 2242(a) of the Foreign Affairs Refonn and Restructuring Act of 1998, it is 

the stated policy of the United States "not to expel. extradite, or otherwise effect the 

involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 

believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to tortw:e. regardless of 

whether the person is physically present in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. 

The decision to rely an assurance would be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of all 

the relevant factors. · 

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d. What is the role of the omce of General Counsel iD eJJSill'iDg that "diplomatic 

BIISIIl'llllCeS" that detafnees will not be subjeci to tortnre are credible? 

I am not famil.iai: with the specific role that the Office of the General Counsel has played 

in connection with the decision to rely on diplomatic assurances. If confirmed, I will 

work to ~ure that the Office is providing the advice and support necessary to ensure 

that CIA officers fully and faithfully comply with applicable law. 

IS. In an August 6, 2015, letter to Seuators Wydeo, Heinrich and mrono, then-Director 

of the CIA Jobn Breuuan saki tbat, "Whiie we neither condone nor participate iD 

activities tbat violate human rights standards, we do maintain cooperative liaison 

reJatkmsbips with a variety ofiutelllgence and reanity services around the world, 

some of whose CODStituent endties have engaged iD human rights abuses." 

a. If a IJafson service were to nse CIA-provided resources to engage iD human righls 

abWJeS, would the CIA bear any legal responsibility? 

I have not previously bad the opportunity to consider that question. I imagine that the 

CIA's legal culpability, if any, would turn on the specific facts and applicable law. 

b. Would the CIA have a legal respoDSibllity to end 0r modify its relationsldp with a 

liaison service iD such a sceaarlo? 

I undentand that the CIA has developed policies and procedures, coordinated with the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, on handling relatioDsbips with foreign 

liaison services who are alleged to have participated in human rights violations. Director 

Brennan genCially described that procedure in his letter of August 6, 2015. Director 

Pompeo has further ~lained that, under his direction, each decision regarding the costs 

and benefits of worldng with a liaison service alleged to have engaged in human rights 

abuses will continue to be weighed on an individual, case-by-case basis, would consider 

the unique utility or specific access of the relationship and the risk of future potential 

human rights abuse. · 

16. l2 U.S.C. 3927 requires tbat ddefs of mission "shaD be kept fully and currently 

Informed with respect to aD activities and operations of the Government withiD tbat 

country," indudiDg the activities and operations of the CIA. As described iD the 

Executive Summary of the Committee Study of the CIA's Deteatloa and 

Interrogation Program, in two countries, U.S. ambassadors were Informed of plans . 

to estabUsh CIA detention sites iD the countries where they were serving only after 

the CIA bad already,entered iuto agreements with the countries to host the 

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detention sites. Did the failure to inform chiefs of mission prior to entering Into 

agreements with the host countries violate 22 U.S.C. 3927? 

It is important for the CIA and the State Department to work together as partners, both in 

Washington and in the field. Although l do not have all the facts needed to answer the 

specific question, I agree with Director Coats who stated in response to questions that it is 

critical for .the Chief of Mission to be informed of intelligence operations that may affect 

diplomatic relationships. · 

17.1n two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention fadUties 

were taking place, the CIA told local government oft'ldaJs not to infonn the U.S. 

ambassadors. Did the CIA's direction to local government ofl'ldals not to Inform. 

the U.S. chiefs of mission violate 22 U.S.C. 3927? 

Please see my response to Question 16. 

18. Wbat dill'erences, If any, exist with regard to CIA access to, queries of, and use, 

dfMemlnation and retention of U.S. person COIDIII1Il1kati colleetecl pursuant to 

Executive Order 12333 as compared to communications coiJected pursuant to 

Section 702? 

Infortniruon about U.S. persons must always be handled with great care. in full 

compliance with U.S. law and presidential directives. In both cases- whether the 

Communication was collected pursuant to Executive Order 12333 or pursuant to Section 

7CY2-specific restricti.ons govern the CIA's retention, use, and dissemination. The . 

requirements implementing E.O. 12333 are contained in the recently revised and publicly 

available Attomey General-approved guidelines, CIA Intelligence Activities: Procedures 

Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (Attorney General 

Guidelines). The Attorney General Guidelines also inCOlpOI'IIte Congress's specific 

instructions in Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 

regarding the protection of U.S. person communications. In addition, for U.S. person 

communications collected under Section 7CY2, further court-approved minimization 

procedures apply. 

19. Please describe the rules under which the CIA would approve requests for the 

IJJIJD!Isking of U.S. person Identities In dflosemlnated CIA products. 

The CIA's Attorney General Guidelines place stringent and detailed restrictions on the 

CIA's retention, usc, and dissemination of information concerning a U.S. person. I 

understand that, when the CIA disseminates information concerning a U.S. person 

outside the Intelli~ Community, the Attorney General Guidelines generally require 

the CIA. to the extent practicable, to remove any identifying information unless (1) the . 

6 
75 

Æ 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 46 here 25887.046

information is necessary, or it is reasonably believed that the information may become 

necessary, to understand, assess, or act on the information being disseminated and (2) the 

information fits within one of the !q!ecific categories listed in sections 7 and 8.2.1 of the 

Attorney General Guidelines. I understand that the same criteria would govern a followup request for additional information regarding the identity of a U.S. person. Additional 

protections or prohibitions may apply in some circumstances. For example, information 

collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act may be disseminated only 

pursuant to court-approved minimjzatjoo procedures. If confirmed, I look forward to 

learning about the application of these requirements in practice. 

20. On December 2, 2015, now-President Donald Trump stated tbe following: ''The 

other thing with tbe terrorlsCs Is you have to take out tbelr famlles, when you get 

these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their Hves, 

don't ldd yourself. When they say tbey don't care about their Uves, you have to take 

out their families.'' Do you agree that this would be a vioJation of U.S. and 

International law? 

The intentional targeting of persons not presenting a thmlt to the United States or 

its allies, or persons who are not otherwise lawful targets under existing law, would 

implicate a variety of laws. If confiniled, I will work to ensure ·that all activities of 

the CIA fully and faithfully comply with the Constitution and U.S.law. 

7