COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons 

JADE H. MILLER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1167-98-4 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 29, 1998 

A T & T CORPORATION 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Matthew H. Swyers; Koonz, McKenney, Johnson, 

DePaolis & Lightfoot, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (Joseph F. Giordano; Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, 

on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting 

on brief. 

 Jade H. Miller ("claimant") appeals a decision of the 

Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") denying her claim 

for payment of certain medical expenses. Claimant contends that 

the commission erred in finding that she failed to prove that her 

reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD") and related medical 

treatment were causally related to her April 3, 1995 compensable 

injury by accident. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence 

sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings are 

binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 In denying claimant's application, the commission made the 

following findings: 

 [T]here is no clear factual relationship 

between the accident on April 3, 1995 and the 

claimant's RSD and there is no definitive 

medical opinion linking them. Rather, Drs. 

[Daniel R.] Ignacio, [Ellen J.] LaBelle and 

others, who support the questionable 

diagnosis of RSD, state only that the 

claimant has RSD and needs treatment for her 

chronic pain. None of them opine directly 

that the claimant's RSD is related to her 

compensable injury. 

 On the other hand, Drs. [Albert C.] 

Casabona, [Ali G.] Ganjei and [Daniel J.] 

Freedenburg opined that the claimant does not 

have RSD. . . . 

 The present record before the Commission 

is one in which several practitioners who 

have treated the claimant believe that she 

has RSD. None of these practitioners have 

opined that the claimant's RSD is directly 

attributable to her work injury. The 

claimant's initial treating physician, as 

well as physicians to whom Dr. Casabona has 

referred the claimant, have opined that the 

claimant's difficulties are not related to 

RSD or to her work injury of 1995. 

 The commission's factual findings are amply supported by the 

medical records. Based upon the lack of any persuasive medical 

opinion establishing a causal connection between claimant's RSD 

and her compensable accident, the commission, as fact finder, was 

entitled to conclude that "the claimant has not established that 

her RSD is the result of her work injury on April 3, 1995, and 

that, therefore, treatment at Johns Hopkins University and other 

pain management centers are not the responsibility of this 

employer." "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but 
- 3 - 

is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing." 

Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 

S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991). 

 Based upon this record, we cannot find as a matter of law 

that claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof. 

Accordingly, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive 

upon us on appeal. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.