The Honorable Gary Feinerman of the Northern District



of Illinois, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3446

HOME FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:10-cv-0999—Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 9, 2012—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 2012

Before FLAUM and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

FEINERMAN, District Judge.



HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This case concerns a title

insurance policy covering a construction project. The

plaintiff is the insured party, Home Federal Savings

Bank, which agreed to lend up to $95.5 million to finance
2 No. 11-3446

the construction of a new ethanol production plant. When

the developer of the plant ran into serious trouble

finishing the project, the bank did not disburse the final

$8 million of the loan amount. The developer defaulted

on the debt to the bank and fired its general contractor,

which then filed a mechanic’s lien on the property to

recover $6 million allegedly owed it. When the bank

sought to foreclose on its mortgage, the general contractor counterclaimed, asserting that its lien had

priority over, or at least parity with, the bank’s mortgage. The plaintiff bank tendered its defense to the defendant title insurer under a policy that required the

insurer to defend the bank against a “claim . . . alleging

a defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured

against by this policy.” The policy contained an exclusion

from coverage for claims “created, suffered, assumed, or

agreed to” by the insured. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the

title insurer. We reverse and remand. The undisputed

facts show that the title insurer breached its

duty to defend the bank on the contractor’s claim that

its mechanic’s lien had priority over or parity with

the mortgage.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The material facts are not in dispute. The case arises

from a construction project that fell apart in 2008. The

developer was Altra, Indiana, LLC, which in 2006

obtained a construction loan commitment for up to

$95.5 million from plaintiff Home Federal Savings
No. 11-3446 3

The Mechanic’s Lien Endorsement provided: 1

Anything contained in said policy to the contrary notwithstanding, the Company insures against loss or damage

incurred by the insured by reason of the enforcement or

attempted enforcement of any statutory lien for labor or

material arising from construction contracted for and/or

commenced on the land prior to, at, or subsequent to

the effective date of said policy, and any extension of said

date, as having priority over, or sharing on a parity with,

the lien of the insured mortgage for that portion of the

proceeds of the loan secured thereby advanced for the

purpose of paying the costs of the acquisition of the

(continued...)

Bank to finance the construction of an ethanol plant in

Cloverdale, Indiana. The loan was to be disbursed in

installments. To secure its loan, Home Federal had a

mortgage on the property. To protect its security from

conflicting claims of ownership or prior mortgages or

liens, Home Federal purchased title insurance from

defendant Ticor Title Insurance Company. Under the

policy, Ticor performed a title search after each disbursement Home Federal made, insuring against any loss

the bank might incur due to “Lack of priority of the lien

of the insured mortgage over any statutory lien for services, labor or material.”

Home Federal also paid an extra premium for a mechanic’s lien endorsement to insure against “enforcement

or attempted enforcement” of a mechanic’s lien claim

“having priority over or sharing on a parity

with” the mortgage. The policy obligated Ticor to 1
4 No. 11-3446

(...continued)

land and the development of and the construction of

improvements on the land, including by [sic] not limited

to the cost of labor or materials incurred therewith. At the

time of each disbursement of the proceeds of the loan, the

title must be searched by Royal Title Services, Inc., down

to such time, for possible liens or objections intervening between the date hereof and the date of such

disbursement.

This endorsement is made a part of the policy or commitment and is subject to all the terms and provisions

thereof and of any prior endorsements thereto. Except to

the extent expressly stated, it neither modifies any of the

terms and provisions of the policy or commitment and

prior endorsements, if any nor does it extend the effective

date of the policy or commitment and prior endorsements

or increase the face amount thereof.

defend Home Federal “in litigation in which any third

party asserts a claim . . . alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured against by this policy,”

and insured Home Federal to the extent of the amount

already disbursed to Altra, up to the $95.5 million total

of the loan.

When Home Federal distributed additional funds

as construction proceeded, it would secure lien waivers

from each contractor paid with the funds and ask Ticor

to update the policy, which Ticor did after performing

a new title search and receiving the contractors’ lien
No. 11-3446 5

AgStar Financial Services, Inc. acted as Home Federal’s loan 2

servicer. Likewise, Royal Title Services, Inc. issued Home

Federal’s policy, which was underwritten by Ticor, and Royal

prepared each title search and update. For convenience, we

refer to Agstar and Home Federal collectively as “Home

Federal,” and to Royal and Ticor as “Ticor.”

waivers from Home Federal. This case centers on

2

two policy updates made in September 2008. On

September 24, 2008, Ticor issued Update 15 pursuant to

Home Federal’s request. Update 15 revealed no

defects, liens, or encumbrances on the estate that are

relevant to the case. At that point, more than $87 million

of the loan proceeds had been disbursed and accounted

for by lien waivers. A serious dispute then arose

between Altra and the project’s general contractor,

F.A. Wilhelm Construction Co. (“Wilhelm”). Altra fired

Wilhelm on September 26. That same day, Wilhelm filed

a mechanic’s lien on the property claiming it was owed

$6 million for work on the project.

Suspecting that such a lien had been filed, Home

Federal requested on October 27 that Ticor perform a

title search. Ticor’s October 30 update disclosed

Wilhelm’s lien and made it an express exception from

coverage. Cue the litigation.

First, in January 2009, Home Federal filed suit against

Altra in state court to recover the $96 million then

due under the loan and to foreclose Home Federal’s

mortgage on the plant property. Home Federal named

Wilhelm as a defendant because of its mechanic’s lien.
6 No. 11-3446

The following month, Wilhelm answered and filed a

counterclaim against Home Federal and a cross-claim

against Altra seeking to foreclose on its $6 million mechanic’s lien. Wilhelm asserted that it was entitled to

enforce its lien against the entire property, claiming

priority over Home Federal’s mortgage. Ticor itself acknowledged that Wilhelm was seeking a judgment determining that its lien was prior to and superior to

the interest of the Agstar/Home Federal mortgage.

On April 3, 2009, Home Federal tendered the defense

of Wilhelm’s mechanic’s lien to Ticor, seeking defense

in the suit and indemnity for any loss should Wilhelm

prevail. After conducting an investigation, Ticor denied

Home Federal’s request for defense and indemnification. Left to fend for itself in state court, Home

Federal moved for summary judgment against Wilhelm,

asserting the priority of its mortgage over the mechanic’s

lien. Home Federal eventually reached a settlement by

paying Wilhelm $1.8 million on its counterclaim, with

no contribution from Ticor.

Home Federal then filed this suit in federal court

alleging that Ticor acted in bad faith and breached its

duties to defend against Wilhelm’s counterclaim and

to indemnify Home Federal for the settlement and

attorney fees. On cross-motions for summary judgment,

the district court granted summary judgment for Ticor.

Home Fed. Sav. Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-0999-

JMS-TAB, 2011 WL 4479080 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2011).

The court relied on a policy exclusion for any “Defects,

liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters . . .
No. 11-3446 7

created, suffered, assumed or agreed to or by the Insured

claimant.” The court found that the exclusion applied

because Home Federal withheld disbursement of the funds

that could have satisfied Wilhelm’s claim. The district

court also noted that since all $87 million in disbursements

Home Federal made had been fully accounted for with

waivers of mechanic’s liens, “Home Federal seeks to

obtain a windfall — avoiding more than $6 million [in]

construction bills without having risked any of its own

funds.” 2011 WL 4479080, at *6. Home Federal has appealed.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s decision on crossmotions for summary judgment. E.g., Exelon Generation

Co. v. Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 676 F.3d 566,

570 (7th Cir. 2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction is based

on diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and

the parties agree that Indiana law applies to interpretation of the insurance policy. In Indiana, the meaning

of an insurance policy is a matter of law, and in general

the same rules of construction apply to insurance

policies as to other contracts. See Commercial Union Ins.

v. Moore, 663 N.E.2d 179, 180 (Ind. App. 1996). Any ambiguity in the policy will be construed strictly against the

insurer, particularly where the scope of a coverage exclusion is at issue. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc.,

964 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 2012). An insurer’s duty to

defend an insured is broader than its duty to indemnify,
8 No. 11-3446

The district court’s opinion seems to have reversed or at 3

least confused this logic, addressing first the “Duty to Indemnify,” finding none, and then stating in a one-sentence discussion under the heading “Duty to Defend”: “Because, for

reasons expressed above, Ticor had no duty to indemnify

Home Federal with respect to the Wilhelm claim, it necessarily

had no duty to indemnify [sic] Home Federal either.” 2011 WL

4479080, at *6, citing Ace Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Empire Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., 580 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (applying

Indiana law and stating correctly that if insurer had no duty

to defend, it necessarily had no duty to indemnify).

so if an insurer has no duty to defend its insured in a suit,

it necessarily does not have a duty to indemnify the

insured for any liability incurred thereby. See Trisler v.

Indiana Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. App. 1991).3

The decisive issue here is the duty to defend. Where

an insurer elects not to defend its insured, “Such a

course is taken at the insurer’s peril because the insurer

will be bound at least to the matters necessarily determined in the lawsuit.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. T.B.

ex rel. Bruce, 762 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ind. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and emphasis omitted); Frankenmuth

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 690 N.E.2d 675, 678-79 (Ind.

1997). We address first Ticor’s argument that the

Wilhelm counterclaim did not trigger the duty to

defend because it did not actually seek priority over

or parity with the Home Federal mortgage. We turn

then to the basis for the district court’s decision, the

policy exclusion for liens created, suffered, assumed

or agreed to or by the insured.
No. 11-3446 9

A. Wilhelm Sought Priority or Parity

The policy’s “Defense and Prosecution” clause required Ticor to “provide for the defense of an insured

in litigation in which any third party asserts a claim

adverse to the title or interest as insured, but only as to

those stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or

encumbrance or other matter insured against by this

policy.” Under the mechanic’s lien endorsement, one

matter insured against was any litigation in which a

third party claimed its mechanic’s lien had priority over

or parity with Home Federal’s mortgage on the property:

the Company Insures against loss or damage incurred

by the insured by reason of the enforcement or attempted enforcement of any statutory lien for labor

or material arising from construction contracted for

and/or commenced on the land prior to, at, or subsequent

to the effective date of said policy, and any extension of

said date, as having priority over, or sharing on a

parity with, the lien of the insured mortgage for that

portion of the proceeds of the loan secured thereby . . . .

(Emphases added.) Two things are important about this

clause. First, it confirmed that Ticor must defend

and indemnify Home Federal against enforcement or

attempted enforcement of a claim asserting priority over

or parity with the mortgage. Second, the covered

claims were not limited to those that arose prior to the

effective date of the policy, as extended by updated

endorsements. Rather, the mechanic’s lien endorsement

covered any claim “arising from construction contracted

for and/or commenced on the land prior to, at, or subse-
10 No. 11-3446

Many title insurance policies insure only against mechanic’s 4

liens arising before the endorsement date and for which labor or

materials have already been furnished. See Joyce Palomar,

Title Insurance Law § 9:9 (stating that American Land and Title

Association (ALTA) Construction Loan Policy Endorsement

A “does not insure the priority of the mortgage lien over

mechanics’ liens resulting from work performed or materials

supplied subsequent to the endorsement date”). So why would

Ticor insure Home Federal against liens arising after the

effective date of the latest update? The answer probably lies

in Indiana construction law, which gives commercial construction mortgages priority over all later recorded mechanic’s

liens. See Ind. Code § 32-28-3-5(d); see also Palomar, supra,

§ 9:9 & n.6 (“in states where statutes give the construction

mortgage lien priority over all mechanics’ liens, regardless of

whether the insured lender made all disbursements obligatory

under the mortgage documents,” the standard endorsement

covers any “loss or damage sustained by reason of lack of

priority of the lien . . . over any statutory lien for services,

labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished”). This

means that Ticor could safely insure Home Federal against

any loss incurred due to the enforcement of a later-recorded

mechanic’s lien because the risk of successful enforcement

was close to zero. The risk of attempted enforcement of such

a lien was not zero, however, for even a frivolous claim

counts as an “attempt.” As we shall see, Ticor’s refusal to

defend its insured against one such apparently futile

(continued...)

quent to the effective date.” While the policy “insure[d]

only to the extent of the amount actually disbursed,”

that clause limited the “amount” of recovery, not the

temporal scope of covered claims.4
No. 11-3446 11

(...continued)

attempt was a breach of its duties under the mechanic’s

lien endorsement.

Wilhelm’s original counterclaim stated that Wilhelm

was “entitled to enforce its mechanic’s lien claim . . .

against the entire land . . . without impairment by mortgage foreclosure.” Dkt. 44-3 at 17, ¶ 10. That counterclaim was unambiguously within the scope of Ticor’s

duty to defend, and Ticor quickly understood as much.

A letter from Ticor’s claim counsel to an attorney for

Home Federal said, based on the original counterclaim:

“Wilhelm is seeking a judgment determining that its

Lien is prior to and superior to the interest of the Agstar

[i.e., Home Federal] Mortgage against the subject property.” Dkt. 44-3 at 32.

Yet Ticor now contends on appeal that the Wilhelm

counterclaim was not an “attempted enforcement” of a

statutory lien asserting “priority over, or sharing on a

parity with, the lien of the insured mortgage.” It offers

two reasons, but both suffer from the same underlying

mistake. (The district court did not base its decision

on these arguments by Ticor.) First, Ticor asserts that

“Wilhelm did not allege priority over the Mortgage”

because it simply “mirrored the statute” that “provides

a right of removal to a lien claimant within 90 days if

the land is encumbered by a mortgage.” Ticor Br. 15,

citing Ind. Code § 32-28-3-2. According to Ticor,

this was the “wrong” statute, so “no defense was required.” Id. The undisputed facts show that this argu-
12 No. 11-3446

ment is frivolous. The duty to defend depends on what

the claimant alleges, not the ultimate merit or lack of

merit of the claim. E.g., Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank v.

Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 634 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (Ind.

App. 1993). The original counterclaim plainly asserted

priority over the Home Federal mortgage. That is how

Ticor understood it at the time. Even if there had been

any ambiguity then, Wilhelm’s amended counterclaim

was even more explicit, offering several theories for

barring Home Federal from enforcing its mortgage

with priority over Wilhelm’s mechanic’s lien. Dkt. 44-4

at 14-16.

Second, Ticor argues, because the applicable Indiana

statute gives priority to a commercial construction mortgage over all later-recorded mechanic’s liens, see Ind.

Code § 32-28-3-5(d), “the Wilhelm Lien could not attain

priority over or stand in parity with the Mortgage.” Ticor

Br. 16. Ticor compliments Home Federal’s efforts in

the state court foreclosure case, saying it “properly

argued that the Wilhelm Lien was inferior to the Mortgage” in its motion for summary judgment against Wilhelm, correctly identifying the statutory authority and

supporting case law. Id. In other words, Ticor argues

that it had no duty to defend Home Federal from Wilhelm’s counterclaim because Wilhelm didn’t have

a prayer of prevailing. Home Federal could take care

of itself.

That argument also runs flatly contrary to the most

basic principle of an insurer’s duty to defend. Under the

policy, Ticor had a duty to defend against any claim
No. 11-3446 13

“attempt[ing]” to enforce a lien as having priority over

or parity with the mortgage. Wilhelm’s counterclaim

plainly did so, even if it might have been a sure loser. “It

is the nature of the claim, not its merit, which establishes

the insurer’s duty to defend.” Terre Haute First Nat’l

Bank, 634 N.E.2d at 1339, quoting Trisler v. Indiana Ins. Co.,

575 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. App. 1991). An “insurance

company has a contractual duty to defend unfounded,

false and fraudulent suits based upon risks it has insured.” Davidson v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502,

505 (Ind. App. 1991), citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.

Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. App. 1980). Wilhelm’s

counterclaim presented a risk that Home Federal’s

policy specifically insured against — a statutory lien

seeking priority over or parity with the mortgage. Wilhelm’s claim might have been weak, even hopeless, but

that lack of merit could not absolve Ticor of its duty

to defend against the attempted enforcement of a mechanic’s lien with priority over the mortgage.

Ticor tries to avoid these principles by quoting

Mallon, where the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote: “when

the underlying factual basis of the complaint, even

if proved true, would not result in liability under the

insurance policy, the insurance company can properly

refuse to defend.” 409 N.E.2d at 1105, citing 7C J. A.

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4683, at 50 (W. F.

Berdal ed., 1979). Mallon is perfectly consistent with the

principles we rely on above. As noted, the Mallon

court stated the general point that the duty to defend

applies to “unfounded, false or fraudulent suits based

upon risks it has insured.” Id. The Mallon court based
14 No. 11-3446

its decision, however, not on the merits of the

underlying claim but on policy exclusions that would

have applied even if the underlying claim had been

valid. Id. The court did not suggest that an insurer is

entitled to ignore the relief the claimant actually seeks

against its insured and to refuse to defend on the

theory that the claimant cannot possibly prevail as a

matter of law. Wilhelm’s counterclaim sought to enforce

a lien as having priority over or parity with Home Federal’s insured interest in the plant’s mortgage. Unless a

coverage exclusion applied, Ticor breached its duty

to defend under the policy.

B. The “Created or Suffered” Exclusion

The only relevant exclusion, the parties agree, excludes

from coverage claims “created, suffered, assumed or

agreed to or by the Insured claimant.” Coverage exclusions are construed strictly against the insurer, and the

insurer bears the burden of showing that an exclusion

applies. See Hoosier Ins. Co. v. Audiology Found. of America,

745 N.E.2d 300, 309 (Ind. App. 2001). The “created or

suffered” exclusion is a standard one in title insurance

contracts, and it is apparently “[o]ne of the most litigated” clauses in the field. Palomar, Title Insurance Law

§ 6:10.

From Ticor’s brief, we can discern three separate arguments in support of its assertion that the “created or

suffered” exclusion applies. First, Ticor contends that

Home Federal “created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to

the Wilhelm Lien” because “Home Federal made the
No. 11-3446 15

conscious decision not to distribute the remaining loan

funds and chose not to pay Wilhelm.” Ticor Br. 21. Although Ticor has identified no factual evidence that Home

Federal’s decision to withhold the final loan disbursement

to its borrower (Altra) was the cause of Wilhelm’s claim

(i.e., the reason it was not paid), we will assume that

underlying fact for the sake of addressing Ticor’s legal

argument, which we reject.

At least one judicial decision supports Ticor’s assumption that but-for causation is sufficient to satisfy the

“created or suffered” exclusion. See First American Title

Ins. Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 187 P.3d 1107, 1113

(Ariz. 2008) (“we conclude that the exclusion . . . applies

whenever the insured intended the act causing the

defect, not only when the insured intended the defect

or when the insured engaged in misconduct”). But the

overwhelming weight of authority is to the contrary. As

a number of federal courts have recognized, the “created

or suffered” language is intended to protect the insurer

from liability for matters caused by the insured’s

own intentional misconduct, breach of duty, or otherwise inequitable dealings:

The cases discussing the applicability of the ‘created

or suffered’ exclusion generally have stated that the

insurer can escape liability only if it is established

that the defect, lien or encumbrance resulted from

some intentional misconduct or inequitable dealings

by the insured or the insured either expressly or

impliedly assumed or agreed to the defects or encumbrances in the course of purchasing the property
16 No. 11-3446

involved. The courts have not permitted the insurer

to avoid liability if the insured was innocent of any

conduct causing the loss or was simply negligent

in bringing about the loss.

Brown v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 634 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 n.8

(8th Cir. 1980) (Missouri law); accord, Chicago Title Ins. Co.

v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 1995)

(Minnesota law); American Title Ins. Co. v. East West Fin.,

16 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 1994) (Rhode Island law);

American Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 793

F.2d 780, 784-865(6th Cir. 1986) (Tennessee law); Fifth

Third Mortg. Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 2d 476,

484-85 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (Ohio law); Mid-South Title

Ins. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 840 F. Supp. 522, 529-30

(W.D. Tenn. 1993) (Tennessee law). Neither this court

nor any Indiana state court has defined the “created or

suffered” exclusion, but the clear majority view among

courts of other jurisdictions is that the exclusion

applies only to intentional misconduct, breach of duty, or

otherwise inequitable dealings by the insured. We

predict that Indiana courts would adopt that view as well.

Ticor has not argued that Wilhelm’s lien resulted from

“deliberate, dishonest,” or “illegal” dealings by Home

Federal. See Chicago Title Ins. Co., 53 F.3d at 907, quoting

Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Title Insurance: Exclusion of

Liability for Defects, Liens, or Encumbrances Created, Suffered,

Assumed, or Agreed to by the Insured, 87 A.L.R.3d 515,

520 (1978). No evidence would support a finding that

this decision was intentional misconduct.

Ticor argues instead that Home Federal breached a duty

to Ticor to distribute the entirety of the loan proceeds,
No. 11-3446 17

In Bankers Trust, the default came before the final disburse- 5

ment. 594 F.2d at 234. In Brown, the default came after the bank

had disbursed the whole of its loan commitment, but the

developer continued to work on the project after the default.

634 F.3d at 1105-06. Cost overruns, combined with a delay

between the disbursement and the endorsement, resulted in the

post-default work going uncompensated. Id. at 1107-08.

citing two cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, Brown

v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 634 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1980), and

Bankers Trust Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 594 F.2d

231 (10th Cir. 1979). Both Brown and Bankers Trust

reflect the understanding of the “created or suffered”

exclusion we adopted above — that it is limited to situations in which the claim arises due to the intentional

misconduct, breach of duty, or inequitable dealings by

the insured. In each case, a bank financed a construction

project with a loan secured by a first lien mortgage on

the property. Each bank purchased title insurance,

and each policy included both a mechanic’s lien endorsement and a “created or suffered” exclusion similar to

the ones in this case. And in each case, the developer

defaulted. After foreclosure proceedings were com- 5

menced, unpaid contractors filed mechanic’s liens

against the properties. In Bankers Trust, the contractors

prevailed, and the bank sought indemnification from

its insurer, which refused on account of the “created or

suffered” exclusion. For the same reason, the insurer

in Brown denied defense to its insured, which ultimately

settled with the contractors. Each bank sued on the

title insurance policy, and each insurer prevailed on
18 No. 11-3446

appeal. In Bankers Trust, the Tenth Circuit held: “Where,

as here, work was performed and payment was not

made up to the amount of the lender’s loan commitment, the resulting mechanics’ liens must be considered

to have been created or suffered by the insured.” 594

F.2d at 234 (emphasis omitted). In Brown, the Eighth

Circuit likewise held that the mechanic’s liens were

“created or suffered by” the bank due to its “failure

to furnish . . . the funds necessary to cover the improvements made.” 634 F.2d at 1110.

Ticor contends that these cases are indistinguishable,

and the district court granted summary judgment on

the strength of their authority. That approach overlooks

a factual difference that the Bankers Trust court called

“critical,” and that the Brown court also relied upon:

these cases involved breaches of a duty because the

insured banks had each agreed to make adequate funds

available to pay the developers and their contractors. The

parties in Bankers Trust and Brown had negotiated “disbursement agreements” whereby the title insurers assumed responsibility for both (a) securing lien waivers

from potential claimants and, more important, (b) actually

disbursing the loan funds to the various contractors

as construction progressed. Both circuit courts concluded that the disbursement agreements “clearly contemplated that adequate funds were to be made available

to [the insurer] in order to satisfy claims.” Bankers

Trust, 594 F.2d at 233; see Brown, 634 F.2d at 1110 (“the

parties contemplated that [the bank] would provide

adequate funds to pay for work completed prior to the
No. 11-3446 19

default”). By requiring the insurers themselves to

disburse funds, and to do so only after receiving lien

waivers from contractors, the disbursement agreements

presupposed an obligation on the part of the banks to

make sufficient funds available. The disbursement agreements were “critical.” Bankers Trust, 594 F.2d at 232.

In this case, there was no disbursement agreement,

and it was Home Federal rather than Ticor that both

secured lien waivers and disbursed the funds when due

under the loan agreement. Unlike in Bankers Trust and

Brown, nothing in the insurance policy or the course of

dealings indicates that Home Federal was bound to

disburse the entirety of its loan commitment to Altra

even if Altra was in default. In both Bankers Trust and

Brown, the bank, the title insurer, and the developer and

its contractors were involved in one complex business

relationship: the bank put up the loan, and the title

insurer performed title searches, secured lien waivers,

and released funds to the developer and contractors

for construction already performed. Here, there were

instead two bilateral contractual relationships — one

between Home Federal and Altra, and another between

Home Federal and Ticor. The title insurance policy provided: “At the time of each disbursement of the proceeds

of the loan, title must be searched . . . for possible liens”

filed up to “the date of such disbursement.” The policy

did not require Ticor to perform a title search prior to any

disbursement, as the disbursement agreements did in

Bankers Trust and Brown. And it did not entrust the title

insurer with the responsibility to disburse the funds. That
20 No. 11-3446

responsibility remained with Home Federal. In the

absence of any indication from the insurance policy that

Home Federal would continue funding the development after a default by its borrower (Altra), Home Federal

owed no duty to Ticor to disburse the entire amount of

the loan commitment to Altra to pay its contractors.

Because of the Indiana statute giving strong priority to

the construction lender’s mortgage, it should have

taken little trouble or expense for Ticor to honor the

promise of its mechanic’s lien endorsement by defending against the Wilhelm counterclaim.

Our reasoning here tracks that of the court in Mid-South

Title, which distinguished Bankers Trust and Brown on

precisely this basis. Where the developer defaulted on

the construction loan and there was no disbursement

agreement, the lender had no obligation to continue

lending good money after bad:

The fact that committed funds under the loan agreement remained undisbursed has no bearing on the

potential or actual lien losses under the title policy

unless or until an actual or implied duty arises

between the parties to the title policy to provide the

funds. In Bankers Trust and Brown, this duty was

impliedly created by the disbursement agreement.

However, absent a contractual relationship ancillary

to the insurance contract at issue, there was no

implied duty between these parties that all committed

loan funds must have been expended. Here no

such agreement existed.
No. 11-3446 21

Ticor seeks to distinguish Mid-South Title on the theory that 6

Indiana law provides greater protection to a construction lender

than Tennessee law. This argument echoes the mistaken

argument, discussed above, that Ticor owed no duty to defend

or indemnify here because the Wilhelm counterclaim was

doomed on the merits.

840 F. Supp. at 528. This case is distinguishable from

Brown and Bankers Trust on exactly the same grounds.6

Ticor’s final argument is that the “created or suffered”

exclusion applies because Home Federal is seeking to

obtain an inequitable windfall by first refusing to

pay Wilhelm and then seeking to recover on the title

insurance policy. We disagree. Home Federal had no

duty to pay Wilhelm directly. Both companies had contracts with Altra but not with each other, and Altra

had defaulted on both. Home Federal paid an extra

premium for the mechanic’s lien endorsement, which

specifically insured against “attempted enforcement of

any [mechanic’s] lien . . . arising from construction contracted for and/or commenced . . . prior to, at, or subsequent

to the effective date of said policy, and any extension

of said date.” This provision covered not just the risk of

an unknown prior lien (against which all title

insurance policies insure), but the risk that a mechanic’s

lien seeking seniority would be filed after the effective

date of the policy, even if the effort to seek seniority

was a sure loser. Wilhelm’s lien was of just this variety,

filed for work performed after the latest update. If

Wilhelm had established priority of its lien over the

mortgage, it would have impaired Home Federal’s
22 No. 11-3446

security interest in the mortgage and reduced the amount

of its recovery from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale

by $6 million. However dim Wilhelm’s prospects of

success, that was precisely what Home Federal had

insured against in the mechanic’s lien endorsement. Ticor

denied Home Federal’s request for a defense, saying,

effectively, “Handle this yourself — it’s a slam dunk.”

Home Federal defended its position but eventually

chose to settle with Wilhelm rather than risk paying

for litigation and possibly losing priority of its security

interest. Bearing those costs is a risk against which

Home Federal had already insured through its policy

with Ticor by paying for the mechanic’s lien endorsement. As we see the case, Home Federal was seeking

only the peace of mind it had paid for, not a windfall.

The district court should have granted Home Federal’s

motion for summary judgment and denied Ticor’s.

Having erroneously abandoned its insured against

the Wilhelm counterclaim, Ticor is of course precluded

from arguing that it was under no duty to indemnify

Home Federal for liability it incurred as a consequence

of that litigation. See Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams,

690 N.E.2d 675, 678-79 (Ind. 1997). We must remand the

case for further proceedings on the issue of damages,

which Home Federal’s motion for summary judgment

did not address. An insurer that refuses to defend its

insured does so “at its peril,” and where it breaches its

duty to defend, “an insurer is ordinarily bound by the

result of litigation to which its insured is a party, so long

as the insurer had notice and the opportunity to control

the proceedings.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. T.B. ex rel.

Bruce, 762 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ind. 2002), quoting Liberty
No. 11-3446 23

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metzler, 586 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. App.

1992). Where the insured elects to settle the third-party’s

claim, the settlement is binding on the insurer so long

as the claim was within the policy’s coverage and the

settlement was reasonable and made in good faith. See

Midwestern Indem. Co. v. Laikin, 119 F. Supp. 2d 831, 842

(S.D. Ind. 2000) (interpreting Indiana law as supporting

rule that a “consent judgment . . . bind[s] the insurer

on issues of its insured’s liability and the extent of the

injured parties’ damages, so long as (1) the coverage is

eventually shown, and so long as the consent judgment

(2) is not the product of bad faith or collusion and (3) falls

somewhere within a broad range of reasonable resolutions

of the underlying dispute”); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Young, 852

N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind. App. 2006) (endorsing Laikin’s approach); see also 7C Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice

§ 4714, at 531 (“A settlement made by the insured of a

pending action must be reasonable; and the court will

examine the merits of the claim to determine that question.”).

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and

REMANDED with instructions (a) to enter summary judgment for plaintiff Home Federal on the issue of liability on

its claim that defendant Ticor breached its duty to

defend under the policy and on defendant’s counterclaim

for a declaratory judgment, and (b) to conduct further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

9-6-12