U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–757PDF 2018

BREXIT: A NEGOTIATION UPDATE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 6, 2017

Serial No. 115–100

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The 

Heritage Foundation ............................................................................................ 6

Ms. Marjorie Chorlins, vice president for European Affairs, Executive Director 

of U.S.-U.K. Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce ............................ 16

Thomas Wright, Ph.D., director, Center on the United States and Europe, 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 9

Ms. Marjorie Chorlins: Prepared statement .......................................................... 19

Thomas Wright, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 30

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

Questions submitted for the record from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, 

to Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. ........................................................................................ 50

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois ............................................. 51

(1)

BREXIT: A NEGOTIATION UPDATE 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order this hearing of the Europe, 

Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee. 

The topic for this afternoon’s hearing is the United Kingdom’s 

exit from the European Union and to understand better where 

those negotiations currently stand. 

The Brexit vote represents a self-determination of the British 

people. It reflects an inherent desire of people to control their own 

destiny rather than be under the domination of another country or 

another group of countries. 

Around the world, populations are increasingly seeking to exercise their right of self-determination. When done peacefully 

through the ballot box, such as what happened in the United Kingdom and, I might add, in the United Kingdom as happened to Scotland, I believe the world would be a much better place if people 

were allowed to make that choice in that peaceful manner. 

After 40 years of membership in the EU and its predecessor organizations, the British people voted last year by a clear margin to 

end that membership. 

It has set the U.K. on a course which I guess would be on 

March—in March 2019 for exit. Between now and that date, a wide 

variety of issues remain to be resolved. 

Many speculate that the major pieces of the transition must be 

set far ahead of that date in order to allow industry and business 

to adapt to the new rules. 

Both sets of negotiation and the negotiating teams appear to be 

dedicated to approaching their task with good will. But the breadth 

and complexity of the challenges would be imposing on any group 

of people trying to find those type of solutions. 

While I have great sympathy for those in Britain who want to 

return political power from Brussels to London and believe that the 

EU countries—there probably are other EU countries who want to 

follow their lead. 

But whatever decision people make in terms of their own self-determination, clearly, Americans have friends on both sides of this 

2

issue and are inclined to support people who are longing for their 

freedom as—and representative government. 

As my colleagues and I get into this discussion with the panelists, I especially want to talk about Ireland and learn what 

progress has been made to ensure there will be no hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 

The return to a hard border, I fear, would be a needless blow to 

the peace process that has achieved so much in that part of the 

world over the last few decades. 

The United States is, of course, not a party to the Brexit negotiations. But we do have a keen interest in what the outcome of those 

negotiations will come up with. 

I hope to learn from our witnesses how the United States Congress can play a positive and constructive role as both sides work 

to establish a new relationship. 

I also want to recognize that several members of the Irish Parliament are with us today and we welcome you. And let me just 

say this. I have a special place in my heart for Ireland. 

I learned all about the real political facts of life from the greatest 

Irish American President, Ronald Reagan, who—with whom I 

spoke and met and worked with for 71⁄2 years of my life in the 

White House. So it is a pleasure to have you here with us. 

And let us also note—my staff didn’t put this in my notes—but 

let us also note that the Irish were really beside the Americans, 

were the first ones to strike a blow for self-determination and we 

are happy that their British—their former British landlords now 

have learned a lesson and are now establishing early self-determination in Europe. 

So welcome aboard. And thanks to our witnesses. And without 

objection, all the members will have 5 legislative days to submit 

any written questions for you. 

I would appreciate if you would basically limit your testimony to 

5 minutes each and then open up for the members to ask what 

questions they have and we could have a dialogue. 

With that said, I recognize my ranking member, Mr. Meeks, and 

who we worked together very well and this shows you just how 

people can work together with various different points of view. I 

would say enough for my Irish parliamentarians over there. 

Mr. MEEKS. Indeed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

you also for calling this timely conversation on the Brexit negotiations. 

To be honest, I see the Brexit process as a lose-lose-lose situation. The UK, the EU, and the United States—in other words, the 

West, will take an economic and political hit. 

Of course, there may be small pockets of economic winners joined 

by cultural elites who will benefit. The vote did reflect real grievances with the status quo. 

America, meanwhile, is losing its closest ideological ally in the 

European Union and the influence that came with it in Great Britain. 

Many remain to believe that Brexit negotiations will be simple—

that the EU would succumb to the British demands and a global 

Britain will emerge, ready to strike trade deals and still be able to 

set rules and standards at home. 

3

In the past weeks, though, reality is beginning to bite. More specifically, the Northern Island question—something my colleagues 

on both sides of the aisle care deeply about, is unresolved. 

The Good Friday agreement, a delicate consensus that we helped 

foster, is at risk. The essential question for the Irish Government, 

and they have been—and they have the backing of the EU with 

their veto just as every member state does, and this is just one example of the similarly countless hurdles in the negotiations that 

must end in March 2019. That is, unless there is a transition period on extension as agreed upon. 

The March 2019 deadline was imposed by the UK when it triggered Article 50, thereby starting the 2-year clock. 

Other red lines were perhaps prematurely set early such as the 

refusal to entertain the customs union as an option, done without 

considering the economic consequences. 

Must of the Prime Minister’s government, including the Prime 

Minister herself, campaigned to remain. These questions are all related or complicated and the EU is negotiating from a unified position with a weak partner government. Not sure about what it 

wants. 

In the realm of bilateral U.S.-U.K. trade, we learned in our February hearing that there is not much to gain nor is it clear when 

we could even start negotiating, given the practical constraints. 

The potential gains are either not there, already exhausted, or 

protected. In reality, the U.K. would be coming to American negotiators looking for a deal, any deal. In our negotiations, we look to 

extract the best deal for America. 

So what does this mean for the special relationship? Reckless 

hateful tweets from our Presidential—from our President aside, 

and with the help of delicious British imports we will carry on. 

Our histories and our political ties are stronger than that. We 

will continue to work closely with the U.K. and NATO and encourage the U.K. to continue to support sanctions in the Kremlin. 

In the Brexit negotiations, as highlighted by Prime Minister May 

in Philadelphia, our close relationship with a strong EU is in both 

America’s and the U.K.’s interest. 

In that spirit, I hope the U.K. and the EU remain very close 

partners that we, the United States, can count on and cooperate 

with. 

I encourage both sides to avoid the cliff edge no-deal scenario. 

Come back to reality and compromise where possible. There are 

forces driving Brexit that would like to see the Transatlantic relationship unravel. 

But we need each other today more than ever to protect the values we fought for together in the 20th century. It is more important now that the West stays together and does not allow us to be 

divided for it is our values today in a collective way that can lead 

the rest in a world that is more interconnected and globalized than 

ever, and we may want or think that globalization—some may like 

it and some may not. 

But globalization is here and I think that we need to utilize it 

to bring us closer together, set standards together, and lead together from the west so that others can follow. 

And with that, I yield back. 

4

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thanks very much, and I guess you can see 

where there is a difference between Republicans and Democrats on 

this. Just glad that the French decided to side with self-determination for our side rather than back up the British. 

Ms. Kelly, please feel free. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing on 

the developments of the Brexit negotiations. 

Given the issues earlier this week and the negotiations, it is a 

particularly relevant time for this hearing. Time is passing quickly 

and pressure is building to get a deal done by March 2019, as you 

have already heard. 

For the United States, there are important trade, national security, and foreign policy implications for the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. 

The promises by the lead camp are likely to be broken with 

agreements to the European court of justice and the costs of leaving likely difficult pills to swallow. 

While the U.S.-U.K. relationship is likely to change following the 

exit from the EU, the bond between our two nations will endure. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about Brexit 

and the best way for Congress to plan for the future. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes. Well, thank you. I want to thank the chairman 

and the ranking member. 

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge a few dignitaries with 

some elected officials from the Republic of Ireland who are here 

this week in Washington for meetings and specifically this hearing. 

So Senator Billy Lawless, Deputy Darragh O’Brien and Deputy 

Sean Barrett, you are—you are welcome here at any time in the 

halls of Congress. 

As perhaps the chairman and ranking member may now, and 

certainly Chairman Royce will remember, last—in 2016 about a 

month or two before the Brexit vote in June 2016, I went to Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel and I said I would really 

like to—for us in the Foreign Affairs Committee to hold a hearing 

on Brexit. 

And I think I have been pestering them every month or so since 

then because at the time I thought there was a much higher possibility of a vote for Brexit than was commonly thought in the mainstream media either in the U.K. or the U.S. And sure enough, by 

52-48 Brexit ended up happening—one of—a couple very interesting and surprising election results in that year. 

One of the reasons why I was so concerned about Brexit was the 

impact, obviously, on the U.S.-U.K. relationship, a very important 

relationship. Losing the U.K. as a voice at the Ryder EU table, 

which I believe would hurt U.S. influence, but also and especially 

the unintended consequence it would have on the peace process in 

Northern Ireland. 

One of the great achievements of American, Irish, and British 

foreign policy, one of the few achievements in foreign policy peace 

processes in my lifetime has been the Northern Ireland peace process, and both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill can be 

proud of that because we played a leading role in pushing our own 

5

U.S. administration at the Presidential level to get diplomatically 

involved. 

It was at the urging of Republican Congressman Pete King and 

Democratic Congressman Richard Neal and Joe Crowley and a 

number of others who have retired that President Clinton gave a 

visa to Gerry Adams, brought Sinn Fein into a political process. 

At first it was controversial but the British eventually saw the 

wisdom in that. We ended up having a cease fire and, sure enough, 

especially through the good work of George Mitchell and the support of Dublin and London, were able to reach the Good Friday 

agreement. 

But now because of Brexit, what for 20 years has been a seamless border, I have crossed it by accident—you can literally be driving along the road and not realize that you have crossed the border 

in fact a couple times—now that is suddenly all at risk, and as you 

may have noticed just recently as this week, you saw the—apparently, British Prime Minister Theresa May had reached an agreement only an hour later to reverse that and here we are. 

So when I ask my questions I am going to focus specifically on 

the border issue. There are a number of very important aspects of 

Brexit, specifically for the United States. 

And so, again, we will commend the leadership of the subcommittee for holding this hearing and I thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you, and welcome aboard. 

And a new welcome aboard, of course, was John Curtis. Do you 

have an opening statement for us today? 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just briefly I do, and would like to mention due to other commitments I won’t be able to answer my questions in person but would 

like to submit those and look forward to hearing from you. 

However, I would want to make sure that I express my appreciation for me and my constituents in Utah for the great relationship 

that we have with the United Kingdom for the many years of history of that relationship for the mutually beneficial things that flow 

from that relationship and look forward to maintaining that. 

In addition, hoping that as this Brexit moves forward it can be 

done as gracefully as possible so that we can enjoy that same relationship with others in the European Union, and thank you for 

being here today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will now introduce our panelists and, again, 

thank you to each and every one of you today and, as I say, if you 

could put it down to about 5 minutes then we can all have a nice 

dialogue about the points that you’ve made. 

So, first, what I will do is I will introduce all of you and then 

we will go one by one. 

First we have Nile Gardiner, and he’s the director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation, 

and don’t let anybody every suggest because I love the Irish, as my 

boss, Ronald Reagan, did, that we didn’t also love Margaret 

Thatcher. So on the record there. 

Dr. Gardiner is an expert on USA-U.K. relationships and previously served as an aide to Lady Thatcher from 2000 to 2002. He 

earned a doctorate in history from Yale and holds degrees from Oxford University as well. 

6

And Marjorie Chorlins—all right—as vice president for European 

Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the executive director of the U.S.-U.K. Business Council. 

She has worked in both the private and public sectors with increasing seniority. She served as a deputy assistant secretary within the Commerce Department and held senior positions with Motorola as well. 

She is a graduate of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Wellesley College. 

Finally, we have with us Thomas Wright. He is the director of 

the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institute. 

Previously, he was executive director at the Chicago Council on 

Global Affairs, a lecturer at the University of Chicago and a senior 

researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security. 

He has earned a doctorate from Georgetown University and other 

degrees from Cambridge University and the University in Dublin. 

Your full written statements will be made part of the record and 

so Mr. Gardiner, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF NILE GARDINER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. GARDINER. Yes. Thank you. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking 

Member Meeks, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee. 

For reasons of time, I will be summarizing parts of my written 

statement. Today’s hearing takes place at a crucially important moment for the United Kingdom, America’s closest friend and ally. 

On June 23rd, 2016, 17.4 million Britons voted to leave the European Union in a historic referendum with nearly 52 percent of the 

vote. Turnout was over 72 percent of the electorate. 

A majority of the British people voted to retake control of Britain’s borders, laws, trade, and destiny with an emphatic declaration of national sovereignty and self-determination. 

On March 29th, 2019, Great Britain will leave the European 

Union and, for the first time in nearly half a century, it will be free 

to negotiate its own free trade deals and fully shape its own path. 

Brexit offers the British people an opportunity to forge a new future as a truly global outward-looking, innovative, and prosperous 

world power, a standard bearer of economic freedom and liberty. 

Despite the dire warnings presented by opponents of Brexit in 

what was dubbed Project Fear, Britain has thrived since the Brexit 

referendum with growing inward investment into the U.K., falling 

unemployment, and a soaring stock market. 

The British Government is presently negotiating a post-Brexit 

arrangement with 27 other members of the European Union who 

are represented by the European Commission. 

The talks, which began in June this year, have already gone 

through several rounds with the seventh due to take place later 

this month. 

The negotiations are highly complex and have at times been 

tense, especially over the EU’s financial demands, which have been 

7

rightly criticized in the U.K. in some quarters as excessive and 

even extortionate. 

The European Commission’s extremely aggressive approach is 

driven by several factors, including the desire to extract as much 

money as possible from the British people before they are freed 

from the shackles of the EU combined with the deep-seated hostility toward Brexit among EU officials who see it as a direct challenge to the European project. 

The European Commission has taken the wrong lessons from 

Britain’s EU exit. Brexit sent a clear message that Europe needs 

greater sovereignty, decentralization of power and increased political accountability. 

This should be a moment for humility rather than arrogance 

from European Union officials. Yet, the response of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has been to double down 

and call for even greater powers for Brussels. 

His recent State of the Union address before the European Parliament was a delusional rallying cry for a Federal Europe at a 

time when voters across Europe are increasingly opting for a very 

different vision. 

The EU’s unelected and unaccountable ruling elites fear that 

Britain’s exit will encourage other countries in the EU to go down 

the same path as the U.K. 

They believe that the terms of Britain’s exit must be severe and 

harsh in order to act as a deterrent and as a warning to others that 

there are major risks and consequences for going down the same 

path. 

The European Commission’s demand for a vast Brexit bill before 

trade talks can even begin are, in my view, mean spirited, unrealistic, and insulting. 

Additionally, they are potentially an insurmountable stumbling 

block to any agreement being reached between London and Brussels. 

If the EU continues to insist on making demands that are onerous and unacceptable, the United Kingdom should be prepared to 

walk away from talks with Brussels and pursue a no-deal option 

whereby Great Britain trades with the European Union under 

World Trade Organization rules. 

This would be a far better course than accepting terms which are 

unpalatable to the British people. Britain is a global economic 

power, but now it conducts more business with the rest of the 

world than it does with the EU. 

While a genuine free trade deal with the EU would be ideal, 

Britain can thrive and prosper if necessary without one. Britain’s 

a huge export market for European producers and goods and services will continue to flow between the U.K. and EU regardless of 

whether a formal agreement is in place. 

To be a truly sovereign nation, Britain must be outside of the EU 

single market, customs union, and the jurisdiction of the European 

Court of Justice. These should be clear red lines for the Brexit negotiations. 

The United States has a major strategic interest in the long-term 

success of Brexit as well as an enduring transatlantic alliance 

8

which has remained the foundation of post-war U.S. global leadership. 

An independent Britain will be a stronger ally for America than 

one submerged within an increasingly Federal Europe. 

Britain in the Brexit era is a powerful force on the world stage, 

playing a leading role in bolstering NATO’s eastern flank in the 

Baltic States, acting as the second biggest contributor to U.S.-led 

operations against ISIS, and preparing to launch two world-class 

air craft carriers, far from retreating to isolationism. 

Brexit Britain is emerging as a growing force to be reckoned with 

across the globe. Brexit will only strengthen the transatlantic alliance rather than weaken it, leading to a more self-confident Britain 

that is better able to stand with the United States. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before you 

today. In conclusion, Britain’s decision to leave the EU should be 

a cause for celebration here in America, and as Britain’s foreign 

secretary, Boris Johnson, noted in his speech to the Conservative 

Party Conference in Manchester recently, it is time to let the British Lion roar again on the world stage, a formidable force for freedom alongside the American eagle. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gardiner follows:]

9


27757a-1.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Brexit: A Negotiation Update 

Testimony of Dr. Nile Gardiner 

Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom 

The Heritage Foundation 

Testimony before 

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Hearing: 

Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

December 6, 2017 
10


27757a-2.eps

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished 

Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee. 

Today's hearing takes place at a crucially important time for the United 

Kingdom, America's closest friend and ally. On June 23, 2016, 17.4 million 

Britons voted to leave the European Union in a historic referendum, with 

nearly 52 percent of the vote. Turnout was over 72 percent of the electorate. 

A majority ofthe British people voted to retake control of Britain's borders, 

laws, trade and destiny, with an emphatic declaration of national sovereignty 

and self-determination. 

On March 29,2019, Great Britain will leave the European Union, and for 

the first time in nearly half a century it will be free to negotiate its own free 

trade deals and fully shape its own path. Brexit offers the British people an 

opportunity to forge a new future as a truly global, outward-looking, 

i1movative and prosperous world power, a standard bearer of economic 

freedom and liberty. 

Despite the dire wamings presented by opponents ofBrexit in what was 

dubbed "Project Fear," Britain has thrived since the Brexit referendum, with 

growing inward investment into the UK, falling tmemployment, and a 

soaring stock market. There has been no exodus of foreign banks or a flight 

of international talent as critics of Brexit had warned. In the Brexit era, the 

City ofLondon looks to maintain its dominance of European and global 

financial markets and Britain will continue to attract some of the best talent 

in the world. According to Dr. Liam Fox, the UK. Intemational Trade 

Secretary, the UK "attracted more foreign direct investment projects than 

ever before in the year 2016 to 2017, with more than 2,200 projects 

recorded." 

The Brexit Negotiations 

The British Govemment team, led by Brexit Secretary David Davis, are 

presently negotiating a post-Brexit arrangement with the 27 other members 

of the European Union. The EU's Executive Branch, the European 

Cmrunission, is heading the negotiations on the European side. The 

European Chief Negotiator is Michel Bamier, a fom1er French govenm1ent 

minister. 
11


27757a-3.eps

The talks, which began in Jtme this year, have already gone through several 

rounds, with a seventh due to take place later this month. Key issues of 

discussion between the two sides include: European Commission demands 

for a "divorce settlement" from Britain, with an extraordinary figure of 60 

billion Euros ($70 billion) cited by Brussels; the future status ofEU citizens 

in Britain; and the question of a "hard border" in Northern Ireland. 

The negotiations are highly complex, and have at times been tense, 

especially over the EU's financial demands, which have been attacked in the 

UK as excessive and even extortionate. The European Conmrission's 

extremely aggressive approach is driven by several factors, including a 

desire to ruthlessly extract as much money as possible from the British 

people before they are freed from the shackles of the EU, combined with a 

deep-seated hostility towards Brexit among EU officials who see it as a 

direct challenge to the European Project. 

The European Commission has taken the wrong lessons from Britain's EU 

exit. Brexit sent a clear message that Europe needs greater sovereignty, 

decentralization of power and increased political accountability. This should 

be a moment for humility rather than arrogance from European Union 

officials. 

Yet the response of European Commission President Jean Claude Jtmcker 

has been to double down and call for even greater powers for Brussels, with 

his recent appeal for a "fully fledged European defense union," while 

waming Britain it would "regret" its decision to leave the European club. 

Mr. Juncker's September 2017 "State of the Union" address before the 

European Parliament was a delusional rallying cry for a federal Europe at a 

time when voters across Europe are increasingly opting for a very different 

VISIOn. 

The EU's unelected and unaccountable ruling elites fear that Britain's exit 

will encourage other countries in the European Union to go down the same 

path as the UK, potentially lillraveling the bloc altogether. They believe that 

the terms ofBritain's exit must be severe and harsh in order to act as a 

deterrent and a waming to others that there are major risks and consequences 

for going down the san1e path. 

2 
12


27757a-4.eps

In contrast, British officials have made it abundantly clear that the United 

Kingdom does not seek to break up the European Union, and wishes to have 

a close and friendly relationship with its European neighbours after leaving 

the EU. The British govenm1ent has argued strongly that it is in the interests 

of both sides to have a forward-looking trade deal that enhances investment 

and trade opporttmities on both sides of the charmel. 

However, the European Conm1ission's demand for a vast "Brexit bill" 

before trade talks can even begin are mean-spirited, unrealistic, and 

insulting. Additionally, they are a potentially insurmountable stwnbling 

block to any agreement being reached between London and Brussels. In the 

words of Sir James Dyson, a leading British entrepreneur and pron1inent 

supporter ofBrexit within Britain's business community, the EU's monetary 

demands are "outrageous," and should be rejected. 

Press reports suggest that the British govenm1ent may be prepared to 

concede a payment between £40 billion and £50 billion to the EU as a 

"divorce" settlement. This figure has not yet been confirmed by Downing 

Street and should be viewed as speculation at this time. The British 

govemment had formally offered a tlgure of £20 billion in September, which 

was rebuffed by the European Commission. 

If the EU continues to insist on making demands that are onerous and 

unacceptable, the United Kingdom should be prepared to walk away from 

talks with Brussels and pursue a "no deal" option, whereby Great Britain 

trades with the European Union under World Trade Organisation (WTO) 

rules. This would be a better course than accepting terms which are 

unpalatable to the British people. Britain is a global economic power that 

now conducts more business with the rest ofthe world than it does with the 

EU. While a genuine free trade deal with the EU would be ideal, Britain can 

thrive and prosper if necessary without one. Britain is a huge export market 

for European producers, and goods and services will continue to tlow 

between the UK and EU regardless of whether a formal agreement is in 

place. 

It is also essential that Britain does not bow to demands for the European 

Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU's highest court, to retain the power to rule on 

the rights of EU citizens living in the UK following Brexit. This would be a 

violation of Britain's national sovereignty. UK courts must not be subject to 

the authority of a supranational European court. To be a tmly sovereign 

3 
13


27757a-5.eps

nation, Britain must be outside of the single market, customs tmion and the 

ECJ. This should be a clear red line for the Brexit negotiations. 

The Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship 

The United States is not party to the negotiations between the European 

Union and the United Kingdom. But it does have a major strategic interest in 

the long-tem1 success ofBrexit, as well as in an enduring transatlantic 

alliance, which has remained the foundation of post-war US global 

leadership. 

It is in America's interests to have a robust, powerful Special Relationship 

with Great Britain, one that will only be enhanced with the UK outside of 

the European Union. A strong independent Britain will be a better ally than 

one subsumed into an increasingly federal Europe. 

Britain in the Brexit era is a robust force on the world stage, playing a 

leading role in strengthening NATO's eastern flank in the Baltic States, 

acting as the second biggest contributor to US-led operations against ISIS, 

and preparing to launch two world-class aircraft carriers. Far from retreating 

into isolationism, Brexit Britain is emerging as a growing force to be 

reckoned with across the globe. 

While building an even stronger partnership with the UK, the United States 

will continue to strengthen ties with key allies in Europe. Regardless ofthe 

future of the European Union, alliance building with European capitals must 

and will be a strategic priority for Washington as it confronts an array of 

threats to the free world: from a resurgent Russia to the growing menace of 

Kim Jong-un's North Korea and the looming threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. 

Brexit will only strengthen the transatlantic alliance rather than weaken it, 

leading to a more self-confident Britain that is better able to stand with the 

United States. 

The Importance of a US-UK Free Trade Deal 

The United States should also seize upon Brexit as a tremendous opportunity 

to negotiate and sign a historic free trade agreement with the United 

Kingdom-a deal that would advance prosperity on both sides of the 

Atlantic. Significantly, the United States already has in place 20 Free Trade 

Agreements - with nations from Chile to Singapore. In contrast, the UK. has 

4 
14


27757a-6.eps

not been allowed to negotiate a single trade deal on its own since it joined 

the European Economic Community (now EU) in 1973. 

Both the United States and the United Kingdom have much to gain from a 

free trade deal between the world's largest and fifth largest economies. US 

and British negotiators should seek to agree on a trade deal that further 

advances economic opportmrity, ideally with an agreement that eliminates 

all tariffbarriers between the two countries. 

Britain is the biggest direct foreign investor in the US and British companies 

employ over a million American workers. More than 1.25 million Britons 

are employed by US affiliates in the United Kingdom. As the Congressional 

Research Service notes, Britain is America's largest services trading partner, 

and the $5 trillion ofU.S. corporate assets in the U.K. represents 22 percent 

of total U.S. overseas corporate assets. 

A US-UK free trade deal will be a powerful force generator for economic 

liberty and prosperity. It will also be a dynamic symbol of the enduring ties 

that bind the two greatest forces for freedom in the world. Indeed, the 

Special Relationship will be one ofthe biggest beneficiaries ofBrexit. And 

this is good news for Britain, America, and the free world. 

Significantly, Britain is far more likely to get a trade deal with the United 

States before the supranational European Union does. The proposed US-EU 

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is, to all intents and 

purposes, dead in the water and has little prospect of being negotiated in the 

next few years. 

America's Interest in a Successful Brexit 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before you today. In 

conclusion, Britain's decision to leave the EU should be a cause for 

celebration here in America. Brexit embodies the very principles and ideals 

the American people hold dear to their hearts: self-determination, limited 

government, democratic accountability, and economic liberty. A tndy free 

and powerful Great Britain is good for the United States. 

Brexit will strengthen the Anglo-American Special Relationship, the most 

important bilateral partnership in the world. Both the Executive Branch and 

5 
15


27757a-7.eps

Congress should give their full encouragement to the people of the United 

Kingdom as they forge a new path outside of the European Union. 

As Britain's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson noted in his speech to the 

Conservative Party Conference in Manchester, it is time to let the British 

Lion "roar" again on the world stage, a formidable force for freedom 

alongside the American Eagle. 

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization 

recognized as exempt under section 50 I (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Tt is 

privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it 

perform any government or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. 

During 2016, it had hundreds of thousands of individual, foundation, and corporate 

supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2016 income came from the following 

sources: 

Individuals 75.3% 

Foundations 20.3% 

Corporations 1.8% 

Program revenue and other income 2.6% 

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.0% of its 2016 

income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited annually by the national 

accounting firm ofRSM US, LLP. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own 

independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an 

institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 

6 
16

STATEMENT OF MS. MARJORIE CHORLINS, VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF U.S.-

U.K. BUSINESS COUNCIL, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Ms. CHORLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

very much for the opportunity to testify today on the economic impact of Brexit and how we can strengthen relationship between the 

U.S. and the U.K. 

The Chamber established the U.S.-U.K. Business Council to provide a platform for American businesses to be heard as the U.K. 

resets its relationship with the EU. 

Our members are eager to deepen our bilateral relationship after 

Brexit takes place, up to and including negotiation of a free trade 

agreement when the time is right. 

The Council has provided inputs to Brussels and London on several issues, including the future of U.K.-EU economic relations, the 

urgent need for an early agreement on a transition period, and the 

dangers of a no-deal Brexit. 

Today’s hearing is another useful opportunity to ensure American investors’ voices are heard. The longstanding special relationship between the U.S. and U.K. is built on deep and abiding economic and security ties. 

The durability of this alliance derives from our shared commitment to rule of law, democratic norms, and free enterprise. 

American companies have long looked to the U.K. as a safe and 

certain market. Even though the U.S. has no direct role in the negotiations between the U.K. and EU, we have a responsibility to 

advocate for a minimally disruptive outcome. 

If Brexit is mismanaged or if the U.K. crashes out of the EU 

without an agreement, the economic consequences would be substantial. 

As had been noted, to date progress in these complicated divorce 

proceedings has been limited, especially on the three primary 

issues of citizens’ rights, border in Ireland, and the U.K.’s financial 

obligations. 

European leaders do acknowledge that some progress is made, 

but as of today they believe momentum is not yet sufficient to move 

to discussion of the future relationship. 

Our hope is that they will finally agree to move forward with 

that broader discussion at the European Council meeting later this 

month. 

Still, that leaves less than a year to negotiate and ratify the final 

terms of the U.K.’s exit and to outline the terms of their future relationship. The clock is ticking, and time is running short. 

Bilateral economic ties between the U.S. and U.K. are significant. We are each other’s single largest foreign investors, and more 

than 2.5 million jobs depend directly on those investments. 

U.S. companies have invested approximately $600 billion in the 

U.K., which represents nearly a quarter of U.S. investment in Europe and approximately 12 percent of all U.S. foreign investment 

worldwide. 

British companies have invested more than $480 billion here. 

One point one million Americans work for these companies. 

17

Every American state has jobs that are connected to or originated from an investment by a U.K. company. These are high quality and high-paying jobs. 

The U.K. is our fourth largest export destination. U.S. goods and services exports to the U.K. exceeded $120 billion in 2016, building 

a $15 billion trade surplus. 

Over 42,000 American firms directly export to the U.K. and more 

than 7,500 American companies have operations there. Given the 

depth of our existing relationship, the Brexit negotiations and follow-on U.K.-EU talks matter deeply for American business. 

It is important to underline that much of the U.S. investment in 

the U.K. was made with an eye toward accessing the much larger 

EU single market. 

A future U.K.-EU trade agreement will almost certainly not replicate the economic advantages of Britain’s current membership in 

the single market. 

For example, financial services firms are likely to lose their 

passporting rights to operate in all EU jurisdictions from their U.K. 

headquarters. Changes in the regulatory space also are anticipated. 

Divergences between the U.K. and EU rules will make compliance more difficult and expensive for U.S. companies with interests 

across Europe. 

Digital privacy compliance mechanisms would also be in legal 

jeopardy if the EU and U.K. do not negotiate an agreement on data 

flows. 

This will affect every American company that does business on 

either side of the English Channel. A no deal Brexit with no negotiated outcome governing the future terms of trade regulation or 

the movement of labor would be a disaster for U.S. companies. The 

consequences will be immediate and severe. 

For trade, implementing the so-called ‘‘WTO option’’ would likely 

lead to sizeable losses in two-way trade and investment. The WTO 

has not liberalized international trade in services to nearly the 

same degree as the EU. 

Services represent an outsized share of U.S. companies’ investment in and exports from Britain. So a lack of regulatory certainty 

would be particularly damaging. 

How many jobs will leave Britain and where they may end up 

is among the most difficult changes to predict. Many companies are 

understandably waiting for further clarity before green lighting 

any new investments in the U.K. 

American investors have developed worst case contingency plans, 

which they may be forced to execute if clarity isn’t forthcoming 

quickly. 

Even as the Brexit negotiations play out, the U.K. is and will remain a vital economic partner for the United States. The U.K. has 

a talented English-speaking and tech savvy workforce. 

Its government has traditionally preferred a regulatory model 

that rewards innovation and encourages competition, much like the 

American model. 

The U.K. has been a consistent advocate for the digital economy, 

ensuring regulatory decisions are fact based and rely on sound 

science and has supported a predictable and transparent business 

climate. 

18

While we will miss that voice in Brussels, the U.K.’s departure 

creates opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen our bilateral ties, 

up to and including a possible free trade agreement when the time 

is right. 

Any commercially meaningful U.S.-U.K. agreement should focus 

heavily on the services sector and also on setting global standards 

in important areas such as digital trade, regulatory cooperation, investment protection, promoting trade opportunities for small and 

medium sized enterprises, competition, and treatment of stateowned enterprises. 

While traditional market access barriers are low between the 

U.S. and U.K., removing all tariffs would still yield significant benefits. 

This is especially true for small companies for which a 5 percent 

tariff or an extra customs form may be the difference between a 

profitable sale and a missed opportunity. 

In closing, even as we pursue closer U.S.-U.K. ties, strengthening 

our ties with the rest of Europe also must remain a priority. 

The U.S. has promoted a more integrated European market for 

the past seven decades. This has proven tremendously successful 

for the transatlantic alliance and for American companies that do 

business in Europe. 

With that in mind, we must ultimately endeavor to deepen trade 

and investment ties with both Britain and the EU in the years 

ahead. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chorlins follows:]

19


27757b-1.eps

ON: The Challenges of Brexit and the Opportunities of an 

Expanded U.S.-UK Economic Relationship 

TO: U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

BY: Marjorie Chorlins 

Vice President, European Affairs 

Executive Director, U.S.-UK Business Council 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

DATE: December 6, 2017 

1615 H Street NW I Washington, DC I 20062 

The Chamber's mission is to advance human progress through an economic, 

fJDlitical. and social system baserl on individual freedom, 

incentive, Jnitiat1ve, opportunity, and responsibility, 

0 
20


27757b-2.eps

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business federation 

representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, 

and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. The 

Chamber is dedicated to promoting, protecting, and defending America's free 

enterprise system. 

More than 96% of Chamber member companies have fewer than 100 

employees, and many of the nation's largest companies are also active members. 

We are therefore cognizant not only of the challenges facing smaller businesses, 

but also those facing the business community at large. 

Besides representing a cross-section of the American business conununity 

with respect to the number of employees, major classifications of American 

business-e.g., manufacturing, retailing, services, construction, wholesalers, and 

finance-are represented. The Chamber has membership in all 50 states. 

The Chamber's international reach is substantial as well. We believe that 

global interdependence provides opportunities, not threats. In addition to the 

American Chambers of Commerce abroad, an increasing number of our members 

engage in the export and import of both goods and services and have ongoing 

investment activities. The Chamber favors strengthened international 

competitiveness and opposes artificial U.S. and foreign barriers to international 

business. 
21


27757b-3.eps

Introduction 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distin6'llished members of the subcommittee. My 

name is Marjorie Chorlins, and I serve as Vice President for European Mfairs at the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce and Executive Director of the Chamber's U.S.-UK Business Council. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the economic impacts of Brexit and opportunities to 

strellb>then the economic relationship between the U.S and the United Kingdom. 

The Chamber established the U.S.-UK Business Council to provide a platform for 

American businesses to be heard as the UK resets its relationship with the EU and its position in 

the global economy. We have provided input to Brussels and London on our priorities for future 

UK-EU economic relations; the urgent need for a transition period to give business and 

governments the time needed to adjust to the new circumstances; and the dangers of a ''no deal" 

Brexit. These reports are appended to our written testimony, and 1 appreciate their inclusion in 

the record. 

The longstanding 'special relationship' between the United States and the United 

Kingdom is built on deep and abiding economic, foreign policy, and security ties. The durability 

of this alliance derives from the two countries' shared commitment to rule of law, democratic 

nonns, and free enterprise. American companies have looked to the UK as a safe and certain 

market in an increasing! y uncertain world. 

Brexit has the potential to disrupt the geopolitical and strategic relationship between key 

American allies in Europe. We are encouraged that both the EU and the UK have consistently 

stressed the need for continued intelligence sharing and security cooperation, even after the UK 

leaves the EU. A fractured and distracted Europe is in no one's best interest, particularly at a 

time when we face significant threats to our shared security and joint prosperity. 

Similarly, lf Brexit is mismanaged, or if the UK crashes out of the EU without an 

agreement on their future relationship, the economic consequences would be substantial, and 

thousands of U.S. finns and their employees would be directly affected. 

The Depth of the U.S.-UK Special Economic Relationship 

Brexit matters because the economic ties U.S. and the UK are deep and enduring. We are 

each other's single largest foreign investors, and more than 2.5 million jobs depend directly on 

those investments. Two-way trade totals more than $235 billion annually. 

U.S. companies have invested approximately $600 billion in the UK, which represents 

nearly a quarter of U.S. investment in Europe, and approximately 12% of all U.S. foreign 

investment worldwide. This investment directly employs nearly 1.4 million Britons and millions 

more indirectly. 

Similarly, the United States has greatly benefitted from British investment across the 

country. More than 1.1 million Americans work for British companies in the U.S., and British 

2 
22


27757b-4.eps

companies have invested more than $480 billion here. This accounts for more than 15% of all 

foreign investment into the U.S. 

Every American state has jobs that are connected to, or originated from, an investment by 

a UK company. California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, and lllinois are the five states with 

the most employment by British firms. American jobs supported by British investment are high 

quality and highly paid-in manufacturing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, information technology, 

and financial services, among other sectors. 

Mr. Chairman, according to the British Embassy, UK companies directly employ more 

than 98,000 people in California, and California's exports to the UK. support an additional 

105,000 jobs. Mr. Ranking Member, New York has over 103,000 employees of British firms, 

while New York exports to the UK support an additional 81,000 jobs. 

In tenns of trade, the UK is our 4th largest export destination, and our 7th largest trading 

partner overall for goods and services. U.S. goods and services exports to the UK total about 

$121 billion, yielding a $15 billion U.S. trade surplus. Today, over 42,000 American tinns 

directly export to the UK, and more than 7,500 American companies have operations in the UK. 

It is also worth comparing U.S. investments in the UK with investments in other 

countries. Of note, as of2016, U.S. companies had invested only 13% as much in China as they 

have in the United Kingdom. 

Obviously, it is in our national interest to build on this solid foundation and work to 

further strengthen our commercial relationship, up to and including negotiation of a bilateral free 

trade agreement when the time is right. 

Brexit: Where Are We and What's Next? 

In March 2017, the UK started a two-year countdown clock to exiting the European 

Union. As the subcommittee knows, this complicated "divorce" proceeding is politically 

sensitive on both sides of the English Channel. The level of complexity in unwinding more than 

40 years of economic, strategic, and political union should not be underestimated. Pursuant to the 

terms of Article 50 of the European Union treaties, Britain will no longer be a member of the 

European Union as of March 29, 2019. Were the UK to arrive at that date without agreement on 

at least the framework of the new UK-EU trade relationship, the disruption in UK-EU ties-and 

the attendant effects on U.S. companies-would be devastating. 

With that in mind, we have called on negotiators to agree to a transition period of no less 

than three years during which the UK would continue to operate under EU rules while the two 

sides negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement. 

To date, progress at the negotiating table has been limited. The Europeans have identified 

three areas where "sufficient progress" must be made before negotiations can commence on the 

future UK-EU trade relationship. These areas include treatment of EU citizens living and 

working in the UK and vice versa; how to manage the border between Northern Ireland and the 
23


27757b-5.eps

rest oflreland once the UK exits; and agreement on the UK's financial obligations in light of 

previously agreed spending commitments. 

In October, the European Council, comprised ofEU heads of state and government, noted 

that while some progress has been made on each of these issues, it is not yet suf1icient to move to 

the second phase of negotiations. 1 European leaders did, however, instruct the European 

Commission to begin internal preparations for discussions towards a future trade agreement with 

the UK. Our hope is that the Council will agree to move forward with this broader discussion at 

its meeting later this month, on December 14-15. It seems like a potential compromise may be 

within reach, but the deal has not yet been finalized. 

Still, even if the UK and the EU agree to move on to the trade talks later this month, that 

would give the two sides less than a year to negotiate the final terms of the UK' s exit and to 

outline the terms of their future relationship, including security cooperation, research and 

development, trade, investment, and regulatory cooperation. The negotiating window is narrow 

given the amount of time it will take to have the agreement ratified. 

Why Does Brexit Matter to the U.S. Business Community? 

Given the extent of our existing relationships, Brexit matters deep! y for American 

business. It is important to underline that much of the U.S. investment in the UK was made so 

companies could seamlessly access the much larger EU Single Market 

A future UK-EU trade agreement will almost certainly not replicate the economic 

advantages of Britain's current membership in the Single Market. For example, financial services 

firms are likely to lose their "passporting" rights to operate in all EU jurisdictions from their UK 

European headquarters. This would similarly affect companies whose headquarters are in other 

EU member states in tenns of their ability to do business in the UK. 

Changes in the regulatory space are also anticipated. Since the UK does not have its own 

fully-functioning regulatory agencies covering important sectors like pharmaceuticals or 

aviation, it will likely remain reliant on, and subject to, EU rules for at least the foreseeable 

future. Once outside the EU, the UK will need to develop its own regulatory regimes and hire 

and train new regulators. A lack of clarity as this shift occurs is among the most important 

concerns of many companies. 

Digital privacy compliance mechanisms could also be in legal jeopardy if the EU and UK 

do not negotiate an agreement on data flows or if, for example, the UK no longer qualifies for 

data transfers under the rules of the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield arrangement. This will negatively 

affect every American company that does business on either side of the English Channel, and 

costs will rise for consumers who use the goods and services that these companies provide. 

1 European Council Conclusions. October 20. 2017. bJ.ill;VWW>LCOI1silium.\;_1JIOpa.el!!en/pre~.§!pressrele~ses/20 1 7/ I 0/20/euco-art50-conch1s1ons/ 

4 
24


27757b-6.eps

In the case of aviation, once Brexit occurs, the UK will need to have in place revised 

Open Skies aviation agreements with both the United States and with the EU. Otherwise, t1ights 

stop on day one-until a new agreement can be negotiated. We understand the U.S. government 

and UK government are already negotiating to maintain this access moving forward, which is an 

important step in the right direction. 

The prospect of a "no deal" Brexit, with no negotiated outcome governing the future 

tenns of trade, regulatory oversight, or the movement oflabor, would be a disaster for U.S. 

companies. If no exit agreement is reached, the consequences will be both immediate and severe. 

For trade, implementing the so-called default World Trade Organization (WTO) option 

would likely lead to sizeable losses in two-way trade and investment. Of note, the WTO has not 

liberalized international trade in services to nearly the same degree as the Single Market. That 

matters in an economy like Britain's where more than 80% of jobs and GDP are in the services 

sector. Since services represent an outsized share of U.S. companies' investment and exports 

from Britain, a lack of equivalent market access would be particularly damaging in this area. 

On goods, WTO-level tariff increases will lead to rising costs for businesses and 

consumers on a range of everyday necessities, such as food and medicine. 

Additionally, the UK's independent membership in the WTO is contingent on all WTO 

members signing up to its revised tariff schedules and tariff-rate quotas as agreed with the EU. A 

wide range of agricultural exporters including the U.S., Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and New 

Zealand have already objected to the EU and UK's initial offer on the latter. 

Additional costs also will be incurred by major delays at the border. In fact, the UK's 

customs authority estimates indicate that customs declarations at ports like Dover will increase 

fivefold, from 55 million annually to over 255 million per year2 It is difficult to imagine how 

Britain's ports or the Channel Tunnel will be able to handle the dramatically increased traffic and 

customs requirements as the UK exits the EU. There is also a lack of skilled talent to fill the 

dozens of additional customs clearance positions which will be needed post-Brexit. Significant 

delays at the border would directly harm U.S. manufacturers that depend on seamless supply 

chains that often require multiple border crossings tram Europe into the UK and vice versa. 

Consumers will also face increased costs. Pallets, containers, and crates that carry 

automotive parts, tresh truit and vegetables, and fast-moving consumer goods will be subject to 

taritl's not applied today, which will raise costs on essentials in Britain and beyond. This will 

directly impact the bottom line for U.S. firms in the manufacturing, retail, and logistics sectors. 

How Could Brexit Impact Jobs and Investment? 

'HMRC ChicfWams post-Brexit Border and Tax Checks Could Cost up to £800 million. The Guardian. 

5 
25


27757b-7.eps

The tremendous uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the UK's future relationship with the 

EU is already having a negative effect on the business climate. A study in October revealed that 

fully 82% of foreign businesses operating in Britain, including American ones, are either "not 

very" or ''not at all confident" that a positive outcome for the UK can be achieved in the Brexit 

negotiations. Similarly, 55% of these companies think Brexit will have a negative impact on their 

future investments in the UK. 

Without knowing the terms of the future UK-EU relationship, it is difilcult to quantify 

the potential jobs impact. What we do know is that for U.S. financial services firms with 

European headquarters in London, losing passporting rights will require them to shift at least 

some positions to other EU member states. Other firms are awaiting further clarity before greenlighting new investments in the UK. American investors also have developed worst case 

contingency plans, which they may be forced to execute if clarity isn't forthcoming soon. All of 

these developments have potential job impacts. 

How Can the U.S. Strengthen Ties to a Post-Brexit United Kingdom? 

Regardless of the future of UK-EU relations, the UK is and will remain a vital economic 

partner for the United States. The UK has a talented, English-speaking, and tech-savvy 

workforce. Its government has traditionally preferred a regulatory model that rewards innovation 

and encourages competition-much like the American model. The UK has been one of the most 

forward-leaning voices in Europe on key issues such as promoting the digital economy, ensuring 

regulatory decisions are fact-based and rest on sound science, and supporting a predictable and 

transparent business climate. 

It is essential that we build on our existing relationship, and we should explore all options 

including a possible bilateral free trade agreement with the UK when the time is right. To that 

end, we appreciate, the preliminary work being done under the auspices of a newly-formed U.S.-

UK Trade and Investment Working Group. 

For now, the focus of the business community must be on the UK-EU negotiations At 

present, the UK is still subject to the EU's Common Commercial Policy, making it unable to 

negotiate its own bilateral trade agreements. Secondly, the UK government's limited trade 

negotiating resources are largely focused on the EU discussions. Lastly, it is impossible to gauge 

the potential tenns of a bilateral U.S.-UK agreement until we know what the UK and EU have 

agreed in terms of market access and regulatory oversight. It's possible the EU will seek 

commitments that limit what the UK can do with third countries in the future. 

What we do know already is that any commercially meaningful U.S.-UK agreement 

should focus heavily on the services sector and on setting global standards in important areas like 

digital trade, regulatory cooperation, investment protection, creating opportunities for small and 

medium-sized enterprises, competition, and treatment of state-owned enterprises. 

While traditional market access barriers are low between the U.S. and UK, removing all 

tariffs would still yield significant benefits. This is especially true for small companies for which 

6 
26


27757b-8.eps

a 5% tariff or an extra customs form may be the ditierence between a profitable sale and a 

missed opportunity. 

Finally, it is important to underline that even as the U.S. moves to expand its trade and 

investment ties with the UK post-Brexit, strenb>thening our economic ties with the rest of Europe 

must remain a top priority. For over 70 years, the United States has actively pursued a more 

integrated Europe and this has proven benetlcial in both national security and commercial terms. 

With that in mind, we should endeavor to deepen our trade and investment ties with both Britain 

and the EU in the years ahead. 

Conclusion 

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. The U.S. 

business community is eager to be heard during the Brexit negotiations, and to play a productive 

role in deepening the 'special relationship' between our two countries. The Chamber and its 

members look forward to working closely with the Congress to achieve these goals. 

7 
27


27757b-9.eps

Attachments to Testimony 

I would like to submit the following with my statement: 

I) Priorities for a New iii I-UK ~·conomic Partnership 

https:/iwww.uschamber.com/reporl/priorities-new-eu-uk-economic·partnership 

2) lhe Future ofUK-D_! Relations: Priorities of the US. Business Community 

https J~yyyy w .r~cha rnbe1:,~om/ repgrt/the-futurc-uk -eu-rel ati 011 s:mi9Ii1i es-llM?.l.l~b_usin <;Jill.: 

community 

3) Tmvard a New UK-EU Relationship: The Importance of Transitional Arrangements 

lillp.Q;iLI:'LWW. usclli!Jpbec,..'"-Qmif..WOrt/toward-n cw-uk -c)J-rela ti onshi p-the-iln portaJ:l..£1'.: 

translti onaJ -arrange1nents 

4) Brexit: Deal or No Deal? Business Stresses Needfor Negotiated Agreement 

5) Business Needs· Clear Progressfhmz Brexil Negotia!Ors 

6) US-UK Business Council Welcomes PM May's rates! Remarks on Brexil 

7) Brexit Begins: Business Seeks Open Mind~, Clarity on Way Forward 

8) 7 Things the US. Business Community Wantsfrom the Brexit Negotiations 

9) The Challenges ofBrexit and the Case for a US.-UK Trade Agreement 

bttps://www.trschamber com/above-the-f<Jld/the-challenges-brexit-and-the-case-us-uktradc-agrcement 

8 
28

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And Dr. Wright. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS WRIGHT, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER 

ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you. 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify in front 

of this committee. 

We are gathered here at a crucial moment in the history of postwar Europe. The U.K.’s decision to exit the EU I think is the most 

significant and important decision it has taken since the end of the 

Cold War. It raises fundamental questions about Europe’s future 

and the United States has a vital interest in how these questions 

are resolved. 

In my written testimony, I provide my analysis of where the negotiations stand and where I think they are likely to end up. 

I believe there will eventually be a deal largely along the lines 

laid out by the EU side and I am happy to elaborate that in the 

questions. 

But I would like to use the time allotted to me to speak now 

about American interests in U.S. policy in the Brexit process. 

In my view, if Brexit is going to occur, the United States has a 

vital interest in a Brexit that produces as strong and as prosperous 

a U.K. as possible and as strong and as prosperous an EU as possible, working closely with each other and with America. 

This should be the organizing principle of U.S. policy toward 

Brexit. We should actively consider any steps that can facilitate 

this outcome and we should oppose any steps that undermine it. 

With that in mind, I am concerned by the current policy pursued 

by the Trump administration. The Trump administration has supported Brexit rhetorically put in practice it has done the U.K. few 

favors. 

Just two quick examples—in a major speech on U.S.-U.K. relations in November, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross 

made it clear that if the U.K. wanted a free trade agreement with 

the U.S., the U.K. would have to choose between the United States 

and the EU. The U.K. would have to choose U.S. regulatory standards and diverge from those of the EU. 

Secretary Ross’ logic is clear. The U.K. is in a weak position and 

needs trade deals with third parties so the United States can afford 

to take a maximist position in negotiations. 

Second example—at the World Trade Organization in October, 

the Trump administration sided with Brazil and other countries to 

oppose a deal already reached between the U.K. and the EU to divide agricultural import quotas between then, greatly complicating 

Britain’s diplomacy. 

More generally, the Trump administration has pursued a very 

passive approach to the negotiations. It sees it purely as an internal issue and has not identified any U.S. equities including maintaining the Good Friday agreement, preserving security cooperation 

between the U.K. and EU 27, or ensuring there is a negotiated settlement between the parties. 

29

On the contrary, it has given the impression that the U.K. and 

the EU’s problems may present the United States with immediate 

opportunities. 

I am in favor of closer economic ties between the U.S. and the 

U.K. But at this time, I do not believe that Washington and London should pursue a bilateral FTA along the lines of that proposed 

by Secretary Ross and the Trump administration. 

There are very few tariffs between the U.S. and U.K. so any FTA 

would have to focus primarily on regulatory standards. 

The Trump administration’s current policy is to use all of the leverage at its disposal including the threat of tariffs to compel the 

U.K. to diverge from the EU regulations and adopt ours. 

That, I think, has two problems. The first is that the negotiations 

are unlikely to succeed on these terms and will alienate much of 

the U.K. population. I can expand more on that later. 

The second and I think even more critical problem is that in the 

unlikely event that they do succeed on the terms set by Secretary 

Ross, they will by definition reduce the U.K.’s trade access to the 

EU. The more the U.K. diverges from the EU regulatory standards 

the less assess they will have to the single market. 

The next effect of this will be to damage the economy of the U.K. 

and the EU, which will also damage U.S. economic and strategic 

interests. 

It should be noted that closer economic ties between the U.K. 

and the EU is, as close as possible, is the official position of the 

U.K. Government, which is seeking a comprehensive trade deal. 

They should be free to do so without being pressured and by the 

United States. 

And more generally, the U.S. should make it clear to the U.K. 

and the EU that it favors a negotiated agreement. We can live with 

almost any deal acceptable to both parties but a Brexit without a 

deal would not be in our interests. 

The United States—finally, as I am running out of time, I would 

like to say a word about Northern Ireland. We are approaching the 

20th anniversary of the Good Friday agreement, an agreement, as 

members have noted, that many Americans on both sides of the 

aisle have helped to bring about and sustain. 

It is absolutely necessary for the United States to remain engaged on preserving the peace in Northern Ireland. I elaborate 

this—on this in my written testimony but suffice to say here that 

this peace I think is threatened by the current state of the negotiations. 

If there is not a special—a consideration for Northern Ireland to 

ensure that there is an open border I think it does put the Good 

Friday agreement at risk. 

As a first step, the Trump administration should immediately reinstate the position of special envoy for Northern Ireland, which I 

understand was abolished by Secretary Tillerson along with other 

envoys and prioritize and preserving—and preserving the Good Friday agreement should also be in issue in relations with the U.K. 

and the EU. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]

30


27757c-1.eps

Brexit: i\ Negotiation C pdate 

Testin1ony by 

Dr. Thomas \\'right 

Director, Center for the U.S. and Europe, and Senior Fellow 

The Brooking;s Institution 

llearing; by d1e 

Subcommittee on Europe, Europe and Emerging Threats 

of the 

Cornrnittcc on Foreign Affairs 

L.: .S. House of Represent~1tives 

December 6, 2017 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking :V!ember Meeks, and distin;,'llished Members; thank you for the 

opportunity to tcsti(v before your conunittcc. 

\\!c arc gathered here at a cmcial moment in the history of post-war Europe. The United Kingdom's 

(CK) decision to exit the European Union (FL~ is the tnost itnportant and significant decision it has 

taken since d1e end of the Cold War. It raises fundamental questions about Europe's future. 'l'he 

Cnited States has a vital interest in how these questions me resolved. 

\ify tcstirnony is in four parts: 

I. A st:-ttus upd~1te on the Brexit negotiations 

TT. The geopolitical effects ofBrexit 

Ill. The 'l'mmp administration's approach to Brexit 

IV. L.:S interests and policy recommendations 

1: A Status Update on Brexit Negotiations 

The CK government invoked i\rticle SO of the EU treaties on March 29, 2017. This set in motion a 

t\vo-ye;.lt negoti~ttion <m the tern1s of Brit~tin's exit from the Ell. Regardless of \vhether or not c1n 

agreement is reached, and barring an unexpected political sea change, Britain w1ll fonnally exit on 

_\larch 29, 20 19. 

The range of possible outcomes to the negotiations is bound by two politic1l realities: 

The CK government has made it cle;1r it intends to leave the EU Single :Vbrket ,md the Customs 

Cnion, \vhich provides for the free tnovctncnt of goods, people, services, and capital and a 

common tariffs to the rest of the world. This has become a politic1l imperative, particub1rly for 

the Consen.,.ative Party. 

• 'lhe EU has made it clear d1at if d1e UJ..:.leaves d1e Sing;le Market and Customs Union, it will 

lose access to both. The L:K cannot have a bespoke agreement whereby it cherry picks which 

reb'1llations it will follow and the access it prefers. On this, the EC is unvielding. 

The L.: h government had hoped that the fact that the Ell 27 (the 27 countries that will remain in the 

EU after Britain leaves) has a trade surplus with the UK would cause them to make concessions in 
31


27757c-2.eps

the negotitttion, but it h;ts not. lnste;td of potenti;tl n<irtO\V econon1ic gains, the EU has prioritized 

political issues such as the integrity of the Single Market and the unity of the 27 in much the same 

\Vtty that the UK htts privileged politicttl gottls, such as controlling borders, over CDP gro\vth. 

The CK has emerged as the weaker party in the negotiations. Tt is signiEcantly smaller than the EC 

27 and it has more at stalce. It was also not prepared for the enormous complexity of the challenge, 

meaning that it had no clear plan, nor the technical resources to meet that challenge. By contrast, the 

EU 27 is united around a single set of objectives. 

The effect of the disp;trity has been notice;tble. The CK_ governn1ent has made, ttnd continues to 

rnake, significant concessions to the EC in pursuit of a deal. 1l1e negotiations arc in t\:vo phases. 

Phrtse 1 requires 'tgreement on three issues-the fin,tncial settlen1ent for exiting, citizens' rights for 

LU-27 citizens in the lK and UK citiooens in the EU-27, and preserving the peace in '\orthern 

Ireland. The CK government has acceded to the FC's demands on the tirst two .. '\t the time of 

writing;, agreement is also close on ti1e matter of ti1e lrish border, which has been delayed because of 

the opposition of the Democratic Unionist Party, which has a contldence and supply agreement 

\Vith Theresa 1\-'Lty's governn1ent, providing it\vith crucirtl support to maintain rt governing majority 

in Parliarnent. 

There is no reason to believe this dynamic will change in Phase TT which deals w1th the fi.rturc 

relationship and the transition period. The most likely outcome is a political declaration endorsing a 

Canada-style free trade agrccrncnt that would significantly reduce L' I<- access to tl1c EU rnarkct and 

an association agreement covering political and security affairs. i\ Canada-style free trade agreement 

will take several additional years to agree to and will require ratilication in each member state, 

including by refercndurn in sorne cases. Tn the intervening period, the UK rnay be subject to a 

transition period, the details of which will he negotiated, whereby it has to abide by all, or nearly all, 

of the FU's n1les \Vithout any formal influence. 

Two other outcomes arc possible by J\-!arch 29 2019. "!'here could be a brealcdown of negotiations 

and exit "~thout any deal. In my view, this would only occur if hardliners in the Conservative Party 

bring down Theresa J\lay as Prirnc _\linister because they arc d1ssatisficd with the concessions she 

makes. The other outcotne is that the CK_ government could ch;mge its position ;md either agree to 

stay in the Single Market and Customs lnion or to reverse Brexit entirely. _\ly assessment is that this 

is the least likely outcotne and it\vould only occur after a change in goven1tncnt. 

II: The Geopolitical Consequences of Brexit 

Cltimately, the CK and the Ell 27 are wealthy and capable countries that should be able to deal with 

the costs and challenges of Brexit. llowevcr, in ti1e intervening period between now and then, Brcxit 

is likely to have several deleterious ellects on the Europe;m order. 

Drexit 1s likely to damage the CK and the Ell economically 

The L: _h_ is ternlin,tting its 'tccess to the \-vorld's hrgest econon1ic bloc ,md is proposing to en1bark on 

trade talks around the world at a time when protectionist sentiment is at a post-Cold \var high. Tt is 

hard to in1agine any scenario in \-vhich the Ul'-- has greater access to g-lobal markets than it does no\-v. 

London Wlll be diminished as a linarlClal center because it will lose the ability to provide some 

finttnci,tl services for the EU. Some advocates of Brexit <Lrgue th;tt it can n1ake up some of this lost 

ground with a progran1 of deregulation but it is unlikely tint ti1is approach would secure sufficient 

don1estic support or th;tt it \vould be consistent \-vith tern1s negotiated \vith the EU to n1<tint<Lin 

2 
32


27757c-3.eps

nlttrket access. Indeed, the converse is also possible-le;tving the EC \vould ttllo\v tt future L,ibour 

government led by Jeremy Corbyn to increase regulations beyond what 1s allowed by the EU. 

Brexit will also damage the F C. The FU enjoys a trade surplus with the UK. A hard Brcxit will 

almost certainly hit EU exports, though some FU countries will be atTected more than others. 

Individual Europe1m cities may pick up some investment from the relative decline of the City of 

T £mdon but none of them enjoy its inherent advantages. The result is likely to be that the F.U 

cannot fully replace the City of London and is diminished as a financial power. Finally, the UK has 

pushed the EU in a market-friendly direction over the past four decades. \Vithout the CK, the 

intern;tl baLmce of po\ver n1<iY shift in <l protectionist direction <ind to\Vttrds <l more "soci;d 

capitalism" model than has been the case with the UK at the table. 

Brexit will chanve dynamics inside the El 

Tt is possible that without the UK the F.U 27 will be free to pursue a new round of political and 

econornic integration. This appears to be the view of France's president En1tnanuel !vlacron. 

However, it is also true that the CK was not the only obstacle to more integration. The Ell 27 is 

deeply divided in \vhat forn1 tl1ture integration should trJ(e, particularly on Eurozone govern;lnce 

and migration. 'v!orcovcr, with the departure of the cr-.:, we arc hkcly to sec a greater structural 

tension bet\veen the Eurozone 19 ;.u1d the rest<£ the Ell 27. Crertter integrrttion \vill occur \vi thin 

the Eurozone, reducing the influence of non-Furozonc metnbcr states. As long as the CK \Vas 

member of the FC, it was dift!cult to sidestep. \\/ithout the weight of the UK, non-Furozone 

member states may be further marginali~ed. The UK's departure also shifts the balance of power 

within the Ell and heightens concerns about the extent of c;ennan int1uence over the European 

project. 

Brexit puts the Cood 11riday Avreement (C i'A) at risk 

'(orthem Trcland's fuh1re has emerged as one of the most difficult issues in the Brcxit negotiations. 

The LU 27 argues that there is no way for the u..:. to leave the Single _\L!rket and Customs lnion 

widwut d1e imposition of a "hard border" between '-.orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 

London insists it has no intention of itnposing a h:-trd border under any circumst:-tnces so the issue is 

rnuch ado about nothing. llowcver, given the terrns of its lcavmg the EU and its prcsurncd new role 

as a "third countryn it could be compelled to even if it has no desire to do so. If the UK_ govemtnent 

simply kept the border open with no tr,Jde deli or a deal short of its current access to the Single 

'v!arkct, it would be in violation of the W'orld Trade Organi7.ation's Most Favored '(atlon clause and 

\vould be subject to legal ~1ction. 'l'he closer the issue is exan1ined the n1ore complicated it becon1es. 

:\recent sh1dy by the Ell Comtmssion and the UK government identified 1+2 areas of cross-border 

activities, from health care to agriculhtre, that would be detrimentally impacted by Drexit. The net 

effect of a hard Brexit could be the reimposition of a hard border, an end to most of the cross 

border cooperation provided for under the c;FA, and the erosion of the hard won peace. 

Brcxit could hurt the Transatlantic ,\lliancc 

By \Veakening the L:K_ ~tnd the EU, Brexit din1inishes the trans~tthntic con1munity at ~l tin1e \vhen it 

is facing tnajor challenges t-fom a revisionist Russia, a more assertive and tnercantilist China, the 

unraveling of regional order in ilie Middle Last, and d1e persistent d1reat of terrorism. Europe has 

been a key ally in maintaining the postwar intemational order but now it is likely to have much 

n;trto\ver ttnd n1ore natiorulistic understandings of its interest. Individuttl states, including the CK, 

may be increasingly receptive to accommodating China. They may be less willing to send troops to 

3 
33


27757c-4.eps

address con1mon threats. _./\nd, there n1t1y be <l "\Veakening of forn1tll cooperation on politictJ ,tnd 

security affairs which currently takes place under the auspices of tl1e EC. 

III: The Trump Administration's Approach to Brexit 

The Tmmp :\dministration has supported Brexit rhetorically but in practice it has done the CK t·ew 

favors. Instead, the 'hump Administration appears to be pursuing a predatory policy, designed to 

take immediate economic advantage of the dislocations and vulnerabilities created tor the UK by the 

Brexit process. 

In a major speech on US-UK relations on November 6 2017, the CS Secretary of Commerce, 

\\!ilbur Ross, made it clear that if it wanted a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, the CK 

would have to choose between it and the Ell. He said that the L.:K must accept US regulatory 

standards and diverge from lliose of tl1e Ell. US regulatory standards, particularly on agricultural 

products, are politically controversial in the UK. :\nd, diverging from EC regulations will, by 

definition, weaken the trading relationship between tl1e L.:K and tl1e Ell. But Secretary Ross's logic is 

clem: the UK is in a weak position and needs trade deals with third parties so the United St:ltes can 

take a n1;L'{imalist [)OSition in negotiations. 

This apprmch has also manifested itself in L.:S actions at the World Trade Organization. ln October 

2017. the Tmmp Administration sided with Argentina. nra,il. and other countries to oppose a deal 

reached betvveen the UK and the EU to divide agriculhrral import quotas between them. The Tmmp 

administration is demanding that the L.:K unilaterally open up its agricultural markets, providing the 

rest of the \v'TO with simihr access to the EU, before any trade deals are negotiated and agreed. 

The Trurnp Adrninistration also proposed tariffs of 22() 0,;) on Bornbardier, a Canadian aerospace 

company that employs over ~000 people inl'\orthern Ireland. 'l'he L' K government has accused the 

Tmmp .'\dministration of protectionism and, ironically. the EU has backed the UK position. Settmg 

aside the rights and wrongs of this particular case, it is highly likely that after Brexit the 'l'mmp 

Administration will lean more heavily on the L.: K to bend to its will in trade disputes, using its 

greater size as leverage. 

'v!ore genemlly, the Trump Administration has adopted a very passive approach to the negotiations. 

It sees it rurely :-ts {U1 intern:-J UK/EL: issue. lt h:-ts not identified any L:S equities, such <lS 

maintaining the Good Friday :\greement, preserving security cooperation between the CK and the 

LU 27, or ensuring there is a negotirtted agreen1ent bet\veen the [)<trties. On the contrary, it has 

given the impress10n that Europe's problems may present the US "~th oppommities. 

IV: U.S. Interests and Policy Recommendations 

In my vie"\v, ifl3rexit is going to occur, the US has a vit;tl interest in a l3res:it that produces as strong 

and prosperous a CK as possible and as strong and prosperous an EU as possible, working closely 

with each other and with :\merica. Th1s should be the organi7.ing principle of CS policy toward 

Brexit. \Ve should actively consider any sters thrlt can facilitrlte this outcome rmd "\Ve should orrose 

any that undennine it. 

lam in favor of closer economic tics between the L.:S and the UK but, at tl1is time, l do not believe 

\\!ashinb'i'on ;md London should pursue a bil<~ter<~l I'Ti\ .1long the lines of th<~t proposed by the 

Trump administration. T11ere arc very few tariffs between tl1e US and tl1e UK so any FTA would 

h;tve to focus prin1arily on rebrubtory standards. The Trun1p <tdn1inistration's current policy seen1s to 

4 
34


27757c-5.eps

be to use all of its leverage, including the threc1t of tariffs, to compel the CK to diverge from EC 

regulations and adopt ours. Tlus has two problems. 

The first problem is that such negotiations arc unlikely to succeed and could alienate much of the 

CK population. For instance, the Trutnp adtninistration's ~-ocus on agricultural standards in July 

talks with d1e UK caused a split in the l K cabinet <llld resulted in a statement by d1e Trade Secretary 

Liam Fox that the FTi\ \vould focus on senrices, not agriculh1re. Ho\vever, harmoni?.ing regulations 

on senices, such as d1e financial industry or health, is likely to prove to be even more difficult and 

controversial. ]\'!can while, the US mamtains dnt d1e FTA must include UK agreement to accept US 

agricultue1l sM1dards. The long-term health of the US-CK alli;mce is best-serwd by ensuring that 

any FT.'\ enjoys enduring and broad based support in both countries. Otherwise, it will not be 

ratified and will only succeed in injecting distrust ;md disharmony into the relationship. 

The second problem is that in the unlikely event that the negotiations do succeed on the terms set 

by Secretary Ross they will, by definition, reduce the UK's trade access to the EU. The more the lK 

diverges from EU regulatory standords, the less access they will have to the Single Morket. The net 

effect of this would be to d;muge the economy of the CK and the EU, which would also d;muge 

CS cconornic and strategic interests over the n1cchurn and long tcnn. 

America's long-tcnn national interest is to facilitate as close an cconotnic relationship as possible 

between the UK and the EU, to the extent desired by both parties. This, it should be noted, is also 

the official position of the UK govenunent, which is seeking a comprehensive trade deal wid1 the 

EU. If the UK government decides to diverge from EU regulations and reduce its access to the 

Single 1'vlarket, it is free to do so of its own accord but it should be pressured to do so by the Trump 

Administration. Forcing the CK to choose between the US and the Ell undcm1incs the prospect of 

a smooth and mutually beneiicial Brexit. '!he UK is not an easy mark. lt is America's closest ally ;md 

should be treated as such. 

_'vlore generally, the lS should make it clear to the lK and d1e EU that it favors a negotiated 

agreement. \ve can live with almost any deal acceptable to both porries but Drexit without a deal 

would not be in our interests. _i\ U l(_ exit without a deal could int1ict signitlcant dan1agc on the L: I<. 

;md EU economies, tmd hence on the global econotny. lt\vcmld so\v the seeds of discord in Europe 

and \vould inhibit cooperation on issues of vital interest to the US. 

After an ag;reement is reached, the US should engage with the u..:. and explore ways of deepening 

economic ties bet\veen the hvo countries in a \vay that does not jeopardi;:;;e the UK's core econotnic 

interest in maintaining a close trading relationship with the Ell. If this takes the fonn of trade talks, 

it may make sense to pursue this on a trilateral basis, by rev-italLing the Transadantic Trade and 

Investment Partnership (TTIP) vv~th the Ell ;md expanding it to include the UK. i\s ;1 side note, if 

there is a rcv1tali~ation of a transatlantiC trade deal along tl1e lines ofTTIP, it would not make sense 

for the CK to adapt to CS regulatory standards, while these arc being renegotiated by the US. 

The CS should also increase its d1plomatic engagement with the FU after Britain leaves. The EC is a 

vital partner of the lnited States in using; and deploying economic power, such as sanctions. '-A'lO, 

by contrast, has no economic capability. The stability and success of d1e Eurowne is also closely 

linked to the stttbility of the global econon1y ttnd is a key pttrt of preYenting <l nev fin;tnci;tl crisis. 

And, d1e EU plays an important role in upholding democracy and human rights in Europe, 

including ttgainst Russi;m interference. 

5 
35


27757c-6.eps

Finally, as we arc approaching the 20'h anniversary of the GFA, an agreement many Americans on 

both sides of the aisle helped to bring about and sustttin, it is absolutely necessary for the US to 

remain engaged on preserving the peace in '>orthcrn Trcland. As a first step, the Tmmp 

:\dministration should immediately reinstate the position of Special Envoy for Northern Treland. 

Prioritizing and preserving dre GliA should also be an issue in relations with the UK and the EU. 

END 

6 
36

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you all very much for your testimony, 

and let’s just—what I am going to do is I am going to make sure 

my colleagues—you know what I am going to do? 

I know that you have a special place in your heart for Ireland, 

just from what you’ve said, so I am going to give you a chance to 

talk about the Irish part of this right now before we ask the rest 

of our questions. You can be the lead off guy. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. You are very gracious and thank the indulgence of my colleagues. 

Dr. Wright, I wanted to follow up and actually this is a perfect 

segue because you just completed on this. I noticed in your written 

testimony you mentioned the recent study by the U.K. Government 

and the EU Commission which identified—and this was, frankly, 

a higher number than even I expected—the U.K. Government EU 

Commission report identified a 142 areas of cross-border activities, 

from health care to agriculture, which I was familiar with. There 

are 142 areas, all of which would be detrimentally impacted by 

Brexit. 

Could you expand on the findings of the report specifically as it 

relates to the border communities, whether they are—regardless of 

which side of the border they currently sit on? 

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. The study showed that the cross-border cooperation that was provided for under the Good Friday agreement 

really rests on regulatory alignment between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 

So the fact that they have the same regulations on agriculture, 

on health, on these wide array of issues, means that that they are 

able to cooperate on these issues, and in the aggregate this really, 

I think, has had a very progressive impact in terms of the peace 

process. It has built trust across the two communities and across 

the border. If there is significant divergence in regulations all of 

those areas of cooperation, my understanding is, either come to an 

end or are significantly reduced. 

And so the Irish Government and the EU 27 and the British 

Government I think are concerned by the broader impact of Brexit 

on Northern Ireland separately than the border issue which, of 

course, is also a very severe issue with major implications. 

Mr. BOYLE. I’ll just share one specific anecdote that I just heard 

the other day that crystalizes part of what you’re talking about. 

The Irish Government funds a world class cancer research center 

and in order to reach the northern counties it decided to situate it 

in Derry, even though Derry is in fact not a part of the Republic 

of Ireland. 

But just geographically, in order to reach that part of the Republic of Ireland and the counties in Northern Ireland that are part 

of the U.K. decided that that would geographically be the smartest 

place to put it as that’s a big population center. 

Now they are concerned what happens if you have different regulations regulating health and the research that goes into cancer, 

what that will do for pharmaceuticals. Essentially, it creates a 

massive headache. 

With the breakdown of talks on Monday where one moment Financial Times is reporting breakthrough deal and the BBC reporting the same thing, and then about an hour later, not so fast. 

37

This week has, obviously, been tumultuous—probably the most 

tumultuous on the border issue. Again, Dr. Wright, if you could discuss the various political issues at play. 

I have had a number of colleagues come up to me asking me so 

what exactly is this about, and if you could elaborate on the issues 

that have prevented an agreed-upon solution to prevent a hard border, even though it seems to be something that Washington, London, Dublin, nationalists, and unionists all agree on and yet in 

practice difficult to achieve. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. Thank you. 

The British Government, after Brexit, made it clear that Brexit 

meant leaving the single market and the customs union. So it 

would leave and the market that allowed for free movement of 

good, capital, services, and people and the common tariff area. 

It is widely believed that if Britain leaves the customs union and 

the single market that there will have to be a customs border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland—that without 

it there would be too—there will be danger of smuggling. There 

will be all sorts of problems that would arise. 

And so in order to prevent a hard border from happening, either 

the U.K. has to remain inside the single market and customs union 

as a whole or there needs to be what the diplomats I understand 

call—called regulatory alignment whereby Northern Ireland chooses to maintain the regulations of the single market and customs 

union so there would be no gap with the Republic of Ireland and 

there could be an open border. 

And that position is unacceptable to the Democratic Unionist 

Party, which is providing support through a competence and supply 

agreement with Theresa May’s government. 

So they are unable to get that through without their support and 

as a result we are at a deadlock because the EU 27 including the 

Irish Government is very strongly of the view there is going to be 

a hard border. The DUP is opposed to the proposed solution. 

The British Government also says it doesn’t want a hard border. 

But it finds itself unable, I think, to support the solution that was 

identified. 

Mr. BOYLE. Finally, I just want to ask about the special envoys. 

They are not specifically related to Brexit but, obviously, this is an 

area where a special envoy could help. 

Could you speak a bit about the importance of the U.S. maintaining a special envoy, something that was supported by the Bush administration, obviously created under the Clinton administration. 

That was the formal official role that George Mitchell had, something that has happened for the previous 20 years. And also, if you 

could address perhaps a perception by some in Washington who 

maybe aren’t intimately involved in this issue who just assume oh, 

that’s—that’s all well and good, right? 

Didn’t they achieve peace and everyone lives happily ever after 

and maybe doesn’t quite recognize them. Unfortunately, reality is 

not necessarily as rosy as that picture. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. Very briefly, you know, the U.S. has had a crucial role in the Northern Ireland peace process from the very beginning, and I think that’s been critical to its success. 

38

Secretary Tillerson abolished this position along with other special envoys. I think it made sense if this hadn’t been happening because even though there are problems with the governance in Belfast. But with Brexit, I think it is particularly important to have 

U.S. engagement. 

I would just raise one other issues as well that I didn’t have in 

my written testimony. But I think there is also a role for a nongovernmental involvement by the former diplomats and political 

leaders who have been involved in Northern Ireland. 

For instance, the Irish Government and EU, the U.K. could agree 

to set up an international commission led by an American that 

would try to identify solutions to the—to Brexit that uphold the 

Good Friday agreement. 

They may be seen as more independently minded than the Irish 

Government is by the unionist community. So I think there are 

imaginative ways that we could proceed here. 

But simply having no engagement whatsoever and treating it 

purely as an internal issue with no role for the United States I 

think is regrettable. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, because, obviously, as we saw throughout the 

’70s and ’80s, the British Government is not going to be perceived 

as a neutral arbiter by the nationalist community and the Irish 

Government in Dublin is not going to be perceived as a neutral arbiter by the unionist community, hence, the positive role that the 

U.S. can play, having a strong relationship with all sides. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And yes, we are friends with both our British 

friends and our Irish friends, which makes us the perfect in between. 

Let me just note there will always be a logical explanation of 

why we need to give all of our rights to make our own decisions 

away to some central government, maybe even some global government, and that led to some real problems even at the level that 

Great Britain had given up certain rights, as Mr. Gardiner had 

mentioned. The centralization and the bureaucracy that it spawned 

was not necessarily, or at least the British people obviously did not 

think it was in their interests. 

Maybe you can tell us, Mr. Gardiner, what—your analysis of 

where the British people are at in all of this. Obviously, they voted 

by very recognizable majority that they wanted to separate from 

Brussels. What was their reason and tell us going from there. 

Mr. GARDINER. Well, thank you very much for the question, and 

a very important question. 

I think the reasons for Brexit are multiple. Primarily, the British 

people voted to leave the European Union to reestablish their own 

full sovereignty as a sovereign nation state, to take back control of 

British laws, Britain’s borders, Britain’s destiny as a free country, 

and I think the issue of self-determination was absolutely the heart 

of Brexit. 

It was also, I think, a desire on the part of the British people 

to be able to really take full control of their own border, decide who 

comes into the country. 

At the moment, Britain does not have that full control in terms 

of people coming in from the European Union. 

39

But this was also, I think, a rejection of the European Union ruling elite seen as increasingly unaccountable, aloof, undemocratic. 

It is not just in Britain I think that you have this momentum. 

You see it all over Europe in many European countries and the reality is that the European project today is viewed by I would say 

the majority of the British people as outdated. 

It hasn’t moved with the times. It is seen as a hugely centralized 

entity, a supranational entity that tramples upon the rights of individual nation states. 

And so national sovereignty is fundamentally important to the 

British people and I believe that the U.S. Government actually 

fully understands that and I think the support given by the present 

U.S. administration for the British Government over Brexit has 

been very much welcomed by the British side and it is good that, 

you know, the White House supports Brexit and views Brexit as a 

powerful force that will strengthen the special relationship actually 

which indeed it will do. 

But at the end of the day, Brexit was all about the desire on the 

part of the British people to once again be a truly free sovereign 

people. Those are universal extremely powerful principles. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. Is this same spirit not identified 

in several other areas in Europe where we have in Spain you have 

people who want to have their own government and you have various peoples now throughout the world actually that are suggesting 

that the right of self-determination is not something that just no 

longer exists in the souls of human beings in this modern age. 

Let me just note that I believe that that same type of desire for 

a group of people to control their own destiny and not to be controlled by even a group of nations or a group of other people is 

just—it is part of what America was all about in the beginning and 

that—that spirit is still around in different parts of the world 

today. 

And the more you have centralization I know that that’s a different way of looking at government. The more centralized your 

government and distant is it, the more likely that those people 

holding power will be arrogant and less responsive than if you have 

someone in your local community or your state or even in your own 

country handling those same type of governmental decision making. 

And could you, okay—could you please let us know what the 

trade is like between the United States and the EU versus the 

United States and just Great Britain? 

Ms. CHORLINS. Certainly. The U.K., as I mentioned, is the U.S.’s 

fourth largest export destination and our seventh largest trading 

partner overall. 

The EU is our single largest trading partner if you look at it as 

a unified market. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, does that include Great Britain? 

Ms. CHORLINS. Yes, it does. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So how much—I am trying to see how 

much of that trade thing is Great Britain and the two entities as 

compared to one another? 

Ms. CHORLINS. I don’t have specific facts at my disposal but I am 

happy to provide that in my written answers to the subcommittee. 

40

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’d like to—please do, because when we are 

trying to figure out the economic, you know, impact of this, exactly 

whether or not the EU is in itself absent of Great Britain is—dominates or whether Great Britain is actually a major force in this. We 

need to know. Dr. Gardiner already has mentioned that the stock 

market in Great Britain is soaring. Is that correct? 

Mr. GARDINER. Well, it has soared since the Brexit referendum 

and I’d say that, you know, Britain is doing extremely well in the 

Brexit era, including in terms of foreign direct investment, which 

has risen significantly over the past year and tens of thousands of 

new jobs have been created in the U.K. since the Brexit referendum. 

It is significant that Google, actually, is building a brand new 

European headquarters in London at the cost of $1 billion, employing 7,000 people. 

It is a sign of U.S. confidence in Great Britain and the United 

States has invested in the U.K. about $5 trillion worth of corporate 

assets. That’s 22 percent of America’s total overseas corporate assets invested. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, I find that predictions of gloom and 

doom when someone is trying to make political determinations usually are absolutely wrong—I mean, just totally wrong. 

And we had—don’t want to rub it in too much but the fact is that 

we were going to face a major economic crisis and the stock market 

was going to the bottom if our current President was elected and 

it has had—and we have seen just the opposite. 

And so when trying to determine what economic viability is we 

should actually look at the figures, figure out what is—and let me 

ask Dr. Wright. 

So what do you predict in terms of economically this—a separate 

entity with Great Britain? Is this going to be a positive economic 

force for both Britain, maybe even Europe, or is this going to be 

a negative force? 

Mr. WRIGHT. I think it is negative for both the U.K. and the EU 

Brexit, I think, will damage the U.K. in several respects. 

The first is that the proposal by the British Government is to engage on this global economic diplomacy to secure trade deals with 

all sorts of countries including the U.S. They are doing so at a time 

when protectionist sentiment is at post-Cold War high. So it is extremely difficult to negotiate trade deals in that environment. 

The city of London, which is probably Britain’s most important 

services economy I think will lose much of its ability to do business 

for the EU because of the lack of what’s called passporting rights 

that it enjoys under the single market. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you’re predicting a, for——

Mr. WRIGHT. There will, I think, be something of a—something 

of a decline. The other—the other—I don’t know how large it will 

be but I think it will—it will damage the British economy overall. 

And the final point is that it is often said that Britain can deregulate if it leaves the single market and reduces the number of 

regulations. 

The opposite is also possible. If Jeremy Corbyn were to be elected 

Prime Minister, he will be free to massively increase U.S. regulaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Mar 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\120617\27757 SHIRL
41

tion beyond that which is enjoyed—which is imposed by the EU at 

the moment. 

So you could easily see the arrow going the other direction as 

well. So I think it is quite risky. That being said, they have decided 

to leave, which is why I have argued for as close an economic relationship between the U.K. and the EU and between the U.S. and 

the U.K. and the EU. 

So I think it is important to make sure that this works if this 

is what they want to do. But I don’t think we should believe that 

there is enormous economic opportunities out there that have not 

been availed of to date. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And Dr. Gardiner, you’re not—you’re pretty 

optimistic as compared to pessimistic? 

Mr. GARDINER. Yes. Actually, I mean, just in response to Dr. 

Wright’s comments, I would say that there is no evidence whatsoever of any flight of capital out of the city of London since the 

Brexit referendum. In fact, quite the opposite is happening. 

And as we saw, when Britain decided not to be part of the European single currency, the city of London, the world’s biggest financial center, thrived and prospered outside of the single currency 

and I think we are going to see the same thing with Britain outside 

of the—outside of the European Union, freed of the immense regulatory burdens that exist within the EU. 

And so there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that Britain’s 

economy or the city of London will suffer as a result of being outside of the European Union. Not one U.S. investment bank, for example, has decided to close its offices in London and relocate elsewhere in Europe. 

So American confidence and global confidence in the U.K. is extremely high and already Britain is beginning to enter into trade 

discussions—negotiations with over 70 countries across the world. 

And so there is every reason to believe there will be a highly successful U.S.-U.K. free trade deal and trade agreements between the 

United Kingdom, the world’s fifth largest economy, and nations 

across the—across the globe. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you, and we will wait and see 

what happens and then we will—some—one of you guys are going 

to have to buy the round of drinks for whoever—whoever was right 

on this one. 

Ms. CHORLINS. Mr. Chairman, I would just note that while it is 

the case that jobs may not yet have moved from American companies who are present in the U.K., it is very much the case that 

American companies have significant contingency plans in place 

and some of them have in fact announced their decision to move 

some part of their employee base from the U.K. to the continent because of this uncertainty about the relationship in the future. 

That’s just the practical reality. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So when—we will wait and see if Britain has 

a market that will attract more companies back. Then it is making 

its own decisions as compared to whether it is making its economic 

decisions with all those other countries being involved and setting 

the policy that Great Britain will have just like everybody else. 

So with that said, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

42

I was going to ask that very same question because I know in 

our—talking to some of our—coming from New York, my financial 

services community where we have got, you know, huge trade in 

financial service and in services that they are talking about contingency plans now as to whether they move. 

Some, of course, coming back to New York and staying there but 

others are looking at some other European cities because they also 

want that connection with the EU because they are, you know, as 

you said, collectively part of our largest trading bloc collectively 

and they are trying to figure out how they will continue with both 

because they are significant—it is significant for both the EU and 

the U.K. 

I am just—one of my concerns, of course, is I think that the unity 

of the EU and setting rules collectively together, working together, 

and we have been looking at standards even with the United 

States. 

It helps us with global trade and the economies all of over the 

place. The lack of that is why I started out in my statement of loselose-lose. 

I see there is opportunities for each and every one of us to lose 

in that regards if we don’t figure out how to make sure that we 

are working on doing this thing collectively, which is why—and I’ll 

start with you, Dr. Wright. 

I didn’t, you know, try to figure out why then would Prime Minister May commit to bringing the U.K. outside of the custom union 

and single market, thereby having a hard Brexit early in the negotiations since, certainly, it would make sense for Britain to remain 

within the customs union, I think, similarly like Turkey has, considering how much trade the U.K. and the EU. does. 

So, I mean, can you give me any—fathom of the reasons why or 

difficulties that are——

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, absolutely. 

I think that the—it is a terrific question. I think the short answer is that to remain part of the single market, which would allow 

them to essentially continue to trade in the financial services sector 

and all of its other service industries, would have meant accepting 

the free movement of peoples because there are four freedoms to 

the single market—goods, services, capital, and people. 

And the EU has said that those are indivisible. You cannot cherry pick and say we are going to take three of the four. 

The U.K., I think, would like to cherry pick and would like to 

take some of those and keep their access on those but reject the 

others and the EU has rejected that because the integrity of the 

single market is of vital importance to them and as a result Theresa May’s—Theresa May’s government has said it is leaving the 

single markets and customs union. 

I would be interested in Nile’s view on that, too. I am not sure 

we’d probably disagree much on the diagnosis of why that’s the 

case. But I think that’s the nub of the—of the disagreement. 

Mr. GARDINER. Yes, that’s an excellent question. 

So I think Dr. Wright has made some very good points. It would 

be really impossible for the United Kingdom to remain inside the 

customs union and the single market if it is to become a truly sovereign nation. 

43

If Britain remains inside the customs union it would not be able 

to negotiate its own free trade agreements and this—this is a big 

part of Brexit, the idea of Britain being a truly global actor free to 

negotiate its own free trade deals all over the world including with 

the United States. 

As a member of the—as a member of the customs union, Britain 

would not be able to that. As a member of the single market, Britain, as Dr. Wright mentioned, would not be able to control its borders. 

It would have no say really over who comes in from the rest of 

Europe. And so fundamentally important issues. 

And so the British view to retake control and reasserts its sovereignty. And so remaining in the single market and the customs 

union would be impossible if it was to honor those commitments. 

Mr. MEEKS. It sounds to me that you’re talking about part of the 

issue with Brexit has more—has also to do with migration and the 

problems that was taking place on the European continent as opposed to talking about, as Mrs. Chorlins is talking about, the integration of markets where we can do trade and collectively there is 

the free flow of business going across these borders. Is that not correct? 

Mr. GARDINER. I think certainly that’s—the issue of border control and immigration was an important factor in the Brexit—in the 

Brexit referendum—a major issue. 

But I do believe that Britain is in a position to negotiate a strong 

free trade agreement with the European Union. Britain should continue to be able to have that access to European markets. 

It is in the interest of the United Kingdom and the EU to reach 

an agreement that is good for both sides. After all, a huge amount 

of exports from the EU go into the U.K. 

You look, for example, at the German car market. About one in 

every four or five German cars goes to Britain. And so it is Germany’s interest to strike a good—a good deal. 

And I think that a free trade agreement between both sides actually would be in the interest of both Britain and the—and the European Union. 

Mr. MEEKS. Except I have found that, you know, sometimes initially it is thought that the EU would just accept whatever the 

U.K. said in this. 

U.K. would be able to dominate that discussion and the U.K. I 

think is finding out now that the EU is not just going to give them 

whatever they want. That is not what the realities are starting to 

show, and as a result, there is going to be a give and take. 

And I know in talking to some of our companies in the United 

States as a result because one of the things that business does not 

like—and I’ll ask Mrs. Chorlins—is uncertainty where you don’t 

know, because they have to plan for five and 10 and 15 years down 

the road. 

They can’t move, you know, just with—on whim with an uncertainty. So I think that would have—that’s going to affect overall 

how we determine and where we negotiate free trade agreements. 

In fact, Mrs. Chorlins, you said that we will want to do something with the U.K. when the time was right. That was an important piece—when the time is right. When would that be? 

44

I mean, I understand from the agreement with the—with Brexit 

and that you can’t negotiate anything until at least after 2 years 

after the deal is done. 

So how far down the road is it and how does that affect the 

thinking of our American companies as to how they are going to 

do business or where they are going to do business, whether it is 

in the EU or the U.K. or anyplace else and try to do a deal. 

Ms. CHORLINS. Mr. Ranking Member, I think you touched on a 

very important point about the need for certainty and that’s why 

the business community has been as active in pursuing or following 

these negations. 

As far as when the U.S. and U.K. could actually negotiate a 

trade agreement between themselves, that’s driven largely by when 

the EU and U.K. complete their negotiations. 

Until we know what the U.K.’s relationship will look like with 

the EU, it will be impossible really for us to know what the right 

terms should be for a U.K.-U.S. negotiation. 

So the timing really is largely driven by the pace at which the 

U.K. and the EU negotiate their own future trade arrangement. 

But you’re absolutely right, certainty is something that the business community is eagerly looking for in this process, and we have 

gone out of our way to make clear to both the U.K. and the EU 

governments that uncertainty about the way forward is going to 

have a detrimental economic effect. 

Mr. MEEKS. And then, you know, because it becomes important, 

you know, to me still once Brexit is done that the EU and the U.K. 

still have relationships. 

But my question is how will the U.K. be able to maintain a friction-free trade with the EU’s internal market after leaving it because it rules out the European court of justice jurisdiction and 

continued regulatory alignments. 

So how is that going to work? 

Ms. CHORLINS. Mr. Ranking Member, I think you’ve put your finger on what is the I don’t know how many billion euro question. 

But the real issue is, indeed, how do you structure a relationship 

that minimizes the friction when you have to thrash out issues 

such as the Irish border where we risk serious delays if a border 

is reimposed and there is real economic cost associated with that. 

I think that we have yet to see from either the U.K. or the EU 

clear indications of what their thinking is about the future relationship between those two. 

Clearly, both sides want to sustain a strong relationship. They 

need each other. But how that works in practical terms is very 

much an open question and one that both sides are working 

through in very real time. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Wright, do you want to add anything? Dr. 

Wright. Excuse me. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes. There is no way, I think, for the U.K. to have 

as much access as it currently does if it leaves to single market and 

the customs union. It is just impossible. 

Any deal that they do will be significantly less in terms of access. 

A deal will not be agreed by March 2019. By March 2019, they propose only to have a broad political statement about what the deal 

would look like. 

45

It would then take many years for the trade deal to be negotiated. It has to be ratified by every single country in the EU including several by referendum. 

So during that period of time there will be a transition deal 

under which it almost looks certain that Britain will have to abide 

by all of the rules of the single market and customs union without 

any influence or votes. And so there is a problem about how that 

deal would be structured. 

I think that—I very much agree with you. I think that is why 

remaining in the customs union and the single market would be a 

better choice for the U.K. 

But this government has decided not to do that. Interestingly, it 

was not necessarily a key part of the referendum campaign. Some 

people said that. Some people did not. 

And so there wasn’t a unified position on it in advance. But I 

think therein lies the risk for the U.S. economy because the U.S. 

really needs a strong U.K. and a strong EU. It was mentioned a 

number of times in this but the U.S. actually does benefit from the 

EU. 

If there is a Eurozone crisis or a breakup of the Eurozone, that 

will cause a global financial crisis. The EU is a vital partner of the 

U.S. and economic security like sanctions that isn’t a part of NATO 

or any other military organization. 

You know, so it has all of these—it has all of these benefits for 

the U.S. So I think moving the lose-lose-lose to a win-win I think 

is a major challenge. 

Mr. MEEKS. And the way we do things today when you’re talking 

about trade I think Mrs. Chorlins talked about it—data flows, 

which is important and how that’s worked, and supply chain. 

You know, as we are talking about trade now, supply chain is 

important. This is the way it develops. We no longer, you know, the 

economy and trade we did it in the 19th and 20th century. 

This is the 21st century. Globalization is here. Things go faster 

in speed than ever imagined before and there is interconnectedness 

that depends upon our strength and if there is a part of the chain 

that is weak then it could hurt and be devastating to everybody as 

we saw what took place when we had the financial crisis in the 

United States in 2008. 

It affected everybody and not just the United States, and that’s 

why this is so important to all of us, whether you come from—

whether you’re part of the EU or now a part of the U.K. and, of 

course, the United States and why I feel that we have got to make 

sure that there is, and we tell them this so that can be a win-winwin because if we don’t, we all will be victimized and lose from it. 

And I yield back to you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much and thank you, 

Mr. Meeks. I think we have had a very worthwhile discussion. I am 

going to wait and see which one of you two guys in particular—she 

was right there in the middle of all the facts but you guys had 

your—have your opinions on this. This isn’t a safe seat or this is 

so we will watch and see. 

Let me just note that I am really proud that the United States 

led the way on this whole idea of self-determination. I think that 

our Declaration of Independence says it all. Government only deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Mar 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\120617\27757 SHIRL
46

rives its powers from the consent of the governed and people have 

a right and must declare their right to control their own destiny, 

and we declared that in our Declaration of Independence. 

That spirit, I think, is alive today and not just in Great Britain 

but in other areas of the world where people are no longer accepting the domination of other groups of people. And I think that 

when you have a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies are always arrogant, even if they are local bureaucracies, but they become ever 

more arrogant and ineffective as far away from those people who 

they are regulating as they go. 

The farther away they go, the more arrogant it is, and I think 

of the people I know in Great Britain who talked about Brussels 

had a deep-seated just antagonistic relationship with Brussels—

people over there who they don’t know who they are and maybe 

don’t even like people in Britain are making decisions for them, 

economic decisions that affected their lives. 

I think that whole spirit—I know there are a lot of people who 

think the spirit of nationalism is a negative force in this world. I 

think that those—the greatest sins that have been committed 

against the people on this planet, the human race, have been done 

so by some not nationalistic enterprise but instead by some global 

vision of whether it is radical Islamic global world or whether it is 

some sort of communist world—some ideal that they were going to 

superimpose and that all the different things would then disappear 

because you’d have a centralized government or based on benevolence and the benevolence of those people would just come out naturally. I don’t think so. I don’t think that’s what government—I 

don’t think that’s what happens. I don’t think that’s what actually 

history will record, as the bigger the government gets and the further away and the more it is going to control our lives for the benefit of all, the more people get stepped on and the less progress 

there is. 

This is especially true, I believe, in this modern age, and the fact 

is today smaller entities of government, whether it is Great Britain 

as compared to all of Europe or whether it is Singapore, whether 

it is—whatever entities are there, you can do now—you’ve got global communications and global transfers of wealth in one form or 

another in order to do business, and that didn’t happen in the 

years before. Maybe you needed a bigger government at that time. 

But now you can have small entities that are communicating with 

big entities all over the world. 

I’ll be waiting to see whether or not, once this thing is—all these 

things are settled—whether or not more people will be trying to invest in Europe or whether more people will go to Great Britain 

that is a—that is now separated from the EU. That will be a very 

important historic occasion and it is ours to see what happens with 

this. 

So thank you for leading our discussion today. Thank you, Gregory, for your major—he always contributes. It is always right to the 

matter. We disagree on some things. But he is really a genius and 

we love him. 

So with that said, thank you all. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

48

f


27757n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

November 29, 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfiJily requested to attend an OPEN hearing ofthe Committee on Foreign Affairs to 

be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats in Room 2200 of the Raybum 

House Office Building (and available live on tbe Committee website at 

http•/1\\~nv.ForergnAffairs.housc.gov)• 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. December 6, 2017 

Z.CJO p.m. 

Brcxit A Negotiation Update 

Nile Gardiner. Ph.D. 

Director 

Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom 

T11e Heritage Foundation 

Ms. Marjorie Chorlins 

Vice President for European Affairs. and 

Executive Director of the U.S.-U.K. Business Cmmcil 

U.S. ChamberofCommerce 

Thomas Wright. Ph.D. 

Director 

Center on the United States and Europe 

Brookings Institution 

By Direction of the Chairman 
49

f


27757m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OI' SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ E_'"_''"=-'P--'e,_E_u_,·a_s,_·a,'--a-u_d_E_m_er_::y_in.::g_1_1u_·e_at_s ____ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date December 6, 2017 Room, _ ___:2:.:2:::0.::0_:RR=O='B'-----

Starting Time 2:30 pnt Ending Time 3:56 pnt 

Recesses b_o_l (____to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) (____to __ )( __ to_) ( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Rep. Roltrabaclter 

Check all of the following that app(v: 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Brexit: A Neogtiatiun Update 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Meek\·, Rep. Curtis, Rep. Kelly 

Electronically Record~ taped) [ZJ 

Stenographic Record LLJ 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* if they are not members of fit!/ committee.) 

Rep. Boyle 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements suhmiltedfarthe record) 

Attached 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_: _56--'p'--n_l_ 
50

[NOTE: Responses to these questions were not received prior to printing.]

f


27757d.eps

For Mr. Gardiner: 

Questions for the Record 

Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Subcommittee on Europe_ Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

'Brexil: A Negolialion Updale" 

December 6. 2017 

I. The United Kingdom (UK) Territory of Gibraltar is one of America's strongest allies in the 

Mediterranean region. After the Brexit vote, the Spanish Foreign Minister expressed Spain's 

intention to use the vote to exert pressure on Gibraltar, related to Spain· s ongoing challenge to 

Gibraltar's sovereignty as a UK territory. European Union (EU) officials have confim1ed that 

once UK leaves the EU on March 29, 2019, Gibraltar will not enjoy the same protection with the 

transition period as the rest of the UK. T11is could cause Gibraltar to drop out of the single market 

and the customs union immediately. How concerned should the U.S. goverll.Lllent be, post-Brexit, 

about the well-being of Gibraltar and its continued strength as a U.S. ally? 

2. 11lfoughout the course of the Brexit process, what can the U.S. govefll.Lllent do to reaffirm our 

continuing alliance with Gibraltar and our longstanding strategic relationship with them? 
51

[NOTE: Responses to these questions were not received prior to printing.]

Æ


27757e.eps

Questions for the Record -Rep. Robin Kelly 

EE&ET Subcommittee Hearing, Brexit: A Negotiation Update 

December 6, 2017 

1. How do you predict the issue ofland borders will end with Ireland and Spain° What U.S. 

interests are at stake should there be a hard Brexit? 

2. Following Brexit, the UK will have to rapidly reach trade deals with dozens of countries 

following the EU. How do you expect the United Kingdom to make themselves more 

attractive to businesses if they no longer offer a gateway to the European Union market? 

What are possible hurdles to US-UK trade deals?