210 December 14, 2017 No. 63

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Ben UNGER,

Mary Geddry, John Booker,

and Marie Bowers Stagg,

Petitioners,

v.

Ellen ROSENBLUM,

Attorney General, State of Oregon,

Respondent.

(S065159 (Control), S065160, S065163)

En Banc

On petitions to review ballot title filed July 28, 2017; considered and under advisement on September 26, 2017.

Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter, 

PC, Portland, filed the petition and reply and supplemental 

memoranda on behalf of petitioner Unger.

Ann B. Kneeland, Eugene, filed the petition and reply and 

supplemental memoranda on behalf of petitioners Geddry

and Booker.

Jill Gibson, Gibson Law Firm, LLC, Portland, filed the 

petition and reply and supplemental memoranda on behalf 

of petitioner Stagg.

Greg Wasson, pro se, Salem, filed the supplemental memorandum on behalf of amicus curiae himself.

Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

filed the answering memorandum on behalf of respondent. 

Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

filed the supplemental memorandum on behalf of respondent. Also on the answering and supplemental memoranda 

were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin 

Gutman, Solicitor General.

LANDAU, J.

The petitions to review the ballot title are dismissed.
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 211

Case Summary: The Secretary of State renumbered Initiative Petition 55 

(2016) as Initiative Petition 29 (2018), in accordance with a directive in a trial 

court judgment, and the Attorney General then certified a ballot title for IP 29 

(2018) based on an Appellate Commissioner order in a subsequent appeal of the 

trial court judgment. Petitioners later sought review of the legal sufficiency of the 

Attorney General’s certified ballot title for IP 29 (2018). Held: (1) The Court’s role 

in the ballot-title review process is limited to cases in which all relevant statutory 

requirements have been met; (2) in this case, the failure to comply with statutory 

requirements was substantial, because no one had filed a prospective petition for 

IP 29 (2018) or obtained 1,000 sponsorship signatures, and the Attorney General 

did not prepare a draft ballot title and no one was given an opportunity to comment on it; and (3) with the passage of the deadline for producing initiative petition signatures for the 2016 regular general election, IP 55 (2016) failed.

The petitions to review the ballot title are dismissed
212 Unger v. Rosenblum

LANDAU, J.

This case comes to us as a ballot title challenge. 

But, because of its unusual procedural posture, we asked the 

parties for briefing on our authority even to undertake it. In 

brief, the issue is this: Does the Oregon Supreme Court have 

authority to consider a ballot title challenge if the underlying initiative measure has not satisfied all the statutory 

prerequisites for obtaining a ballot title in the first place? 

For the reasons that we spell out in this opinion, the answer 

to that question is no. We therefore dismiss the ballot title 

challenge without addressing its merits.

I. OVERVIEW OF OREGON’S INITIATIVE PROCESS

We begin with an overview of the initiative process, 

to provide context for the facts of this case and our disposition of the issue we have mentioned. Article IV, section

1(2)(a), of the Oregon Constitution provides that the people 

of the state possess the power to “initiate” lawmaking independently of the legislature. That is, they have the power to 

propose statutes and amendments to the constitution, which 

will go into effect if approved by a sufficient number of voters

at a statewide election. Id.

The Oregon Constitution places a number of requirements and conditions on the exercise of the initiative power. 

First, a measure may not be submitted to a vote until supported by a petition signed by a specified number of qualified voters equal to a percentage of the total number of 

votes cast for all candidates for governor at the last election 

at which the governor was elected to a four-year term; the 

percentage depends on whether the measure is statutory or 

constitutional. Or Const, Art IV, § 1(2)(b), (c). Second, the 

petition must be filed with the Secretary of State “not less 

than four months before the election at which the proposed 

law or amendment to the Constitution is to be voted upon.” 

Id. at § 1(2)(e). Third, the petition must include the full text 

of the proposed amendment. Id. at § 1(2)(d). Fourth, it must 

“embrace one subject only and matters properly connected 

therewith.” Id.

The constitution also imposes limitations on the 

exercise of the initiative power when it is used to amend the 
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 213

constitution. Of relevance to this case, Article XVII, section 1,

provides that when two or more amendments are submitted 

to the voters in the same election, “they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately.” In 

Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 277, 959 P2d 49 (1998), 

this court held that separate-vote requirement of Article 

XVII, section 1, means that a single initiative measure cannot “effect two or more changes that are substantive and 

not closely related * ** because it would prevent the voters 

from expressing their opinions as to each proposed change 

separately.”

The constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to prescribe “[t]he manner of exercising” the initiative 

power by “general laws,” that is, by statutes. Or Const, Art 

IV, § 1(5). See generally Caruthers v. Kroger, 347 Or 660, 664, 

227 P3d 723 (2010) (“[T]he constitution empowers the legislature with the authority and responsibility of fleshing out 

the [initiative] process.”). Pursuant to that constitutional 

authority, the legislature enacted ORS chapter 250, which 

provides a comprehensive statutory process for placing proposed initiative petitions on the ballot and ensuring compliance with constitutional requirements and conditions. The 

legislature also authorized the Secretary of State to adopt 

administrative rules necessary to administer the state’s 

election laws, ORS 246.110 and ORS 246.150. It also more 

specifically authorized the secretary to adopt rules necessary to carry out specific provisions of ORS chapter 250. See, 

e.g., ORS 250.015(1); ORS 250.045(3); ORS 250.067(5).

In brief, the law requires that individuals who propose a statewide initiative measure, known as “chief petitioners,” file with the Secretary of State a “prospective petition,” which consists of the text of the proposed measure 

along with the signatures of at least 1,000 electors. ORS 

250.045(1). Once the secretary has received a prospective 

petition and verified the sponsorship signatures, the secretary forwards it to the Attorney General. ORS 250.065(2). 

The Attorney General then has five days in which to prepare 

a draft ballot title—that is, a three-part summary of the 

proposed measure and its major effects stated in the form of 

(1) a caption of no more than 15 words; (2) a “yes” and “no” 
214 Unger v. Rosenblum

vote result statement of no more than 25 words explaining 

the consequences of a “yes” and “no” vote; and (3) a summary 

of no more than 125 words. ORS 250.035(2). The secretary 

then provides notice of the public’s right to submit written 

comments on the draft ballot title. ORS 250.067(1). After 

receiving any comments, the secretary forwards them to the 

Attorney General. Id. The Attorney General then considers 

those comments and certifies either the original draft ballot 

title or a revised ballot title. ORS 250.067(2).

Electors who previously commented on the draft 

ballot title and who are dissatisfied with the certified ballot 

title may seek review in the Supreme Court. ORS 250.085(2). 

Any such electors are required to file a petition for judicial 

review within 10 business days of the Attorney General’s 

certification of the ballot title. ORS 250.085(3)(a). And the 

elector must notify the Secretary of State in writing the following business day that the petition has been filed. ORS 

250.085(4).

The Supreme Court reviews the Attorney General’s 

certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially 

complies with the statutory requirements as to its form and 

content. ORS 250.085(5). In conducting that review, the 

court is constrained not to consider any argument not previously submitted in written comments to the Secretary of 

State on the draft ballot title, unless the arguments concern 

wording in the ballot title that was added after that stage 

in the process. ORS 250.085(6). If the court determines that 

the challenged ballot title substantially complies with the 

statutory requirements, the court certifies the ballot title 

to the secretary. ORS 250.085(8). If the court determines 

that the challenged ballot title does not substantially comply, then the court refers the ballot title to the Attorney 

General for modification. Id. The final, certified ballot title 

then is placed on the cover of the initiative petition, which 

is required before chief petitioners may solicit signatures in 

support of the measure. ORS 250.045(6).

During the ballot title process, the Secretary of 

State reviews the prospective petition for compliance with 

the requirements of Article IV, section 1, and Article XVII, 

section 1, including that a proposed measure does not 
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 215

contain more than one amendment. OAR 165-014-0028(1). 

The secretary solicits comments from the public on those 

issues at the same time that the Attorney General is drafting the ballot title. OAR 165-014-0028(2), (3). Those comments are submitted during the same time for submitting 

comments on the Attorney General’s draft ballot title. OAR 

165-014-0028(3). After reviewing the comments, the secretary notifies the chief petitioners of the results of his or her 

review. OAR 165-014-0028(4). If the secretary determines 

that a proposed initiative measure does not satisfy constitutional requirements, he or she will not approve the cover 

and signature sheet that contains the certified ballot title 

and that enables chief petitioners to collect signatures in 

support of the proposed measure. OAR 165-014-0028(5). If 

an elector is dissatisfied with the secretary’s determination, 

judicial review is available in Marion County Circuit Court. 

ORS 246.910; OAR 165-014-0028(6).

Although an initiative petition may be filed at any 

time, once it has been filed, a number of deadlines come 

into play. Those deadlines are of two types. First, there is a 

sequence of deadlines that are defined from the date of the 

filing itself and from various stages in the process from that 

step forward. Once the Attorney General receives a copy 

of the prospective petition, for example, he or she has five 

business days in which to provide a draft ballot title. ORS 

250.065(3). Written comments on the draft must be delivered to the Secretary of State within 10 business days after 

that. ORS 250.067(1). The Attorney General then has 10 

business days to consider the comments and respond with a 

certified ballot title. ORS 250.067(2)(a). When the Attorney 

General certifies a ballot title, an elector seeking Supreme 

Court review must file a petition within 10 business days. 

ORS 250.085(3)(a).

Second, other deadlines are imposed by reference 

to the date of the regular general election. According to 

Article IV, section 1(4)(c), elections on initiative measures 

are held “at the regular general elections,” which are held 

biennially. Or Const, Art II, § 14. The deadline for filing a 

circulated initiative petition with the Secretary of State, 

together with the required number of supporting signatures, 
216 Unger v. Rosenblum

is “not less than four months before the election.” Or Const, 

Art IV, § 1(2)(e). In other words, regardless of when a prospective initiative petition is filed, the process must be

completed—the collection of 1,000 sponsorship signatures, 

the certification of a ballot title, the secretary’s certification 

as to constitutional requirements, and the collection of the 

required number of signatures on the circulating petition—

no later than four months before the next regular general 

election.1

II. FACTS

With that background in mind, we turn to the facts. 

Although undisputed, they are unfortunately somewhat 

complex. On September 22, 2015, chief petitioners Geddry 

and Booker filed a prospective initiative petition with the 

Secretary of State for inclusion on the November 2016 general election ballot. The secretary assigned the prospective 

petition an identification number, IP 55 (2016). The details 

of the measure itself are not relevant to this opinion; suffice 

it to say that, if adopted, it would have amended Article I 

of the state constitution to add, among other things, a new 

section declaring that certain local enactments are immune 

from state and federal preemption. IP 55 (2016) § 3. The chief 

petitioners collected the required 1,000 sponsorship signatures and submitted them to the secretary on February 9, 

2016.

The secretary verified the sponsorship signatures 

and then forwarded the text of IP 55 (2016) to the Attorney 

General for drafting of the ballot title. The Attorney General 

issued a draft ballot title on March 3, 2016.

At the same time, the secretary solicited comments 

on whether the text of IP 55 (2016) complied with the constitutional requirements for proposed initiative petitions. The 

Attorney General opined that the proposed initiative did not 

1 Other deadlines are similarly defined in terms of a specified number of 

days counted back from a regular general election. ORS 250.127(1) requires the 

filing of a financial impact estimate 99 days before the election. The statute then 

provides that the Secretary of State must certify the financial impact estimate no 

later than 90 days before the election. ORS 250.127(4). And the deadline for filing 

a petition to review the legal sufficiency of a financial impact statement is 85 days 

before the election. ORS 250.131(2).
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 217

comply with the constitutional procedural requirements of 

Article XVII, section 1. The Secretary of State agreed with 

the Attorney General and notified the chief petitioners that 

she would decline to issue a certified ballot title or approve 

the proposed initiative for circulation.

Chief petitioners Geddry and Booker initiated an 

action in Marion County Circuit Court, on May 31, 2016, 

requesting judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal 

to certify IP 55 (2016). On July 8, 2016, the deadline for submitting a petition with constitutionally required signatures 

for the November 2016 election passed. Four months later, 

the November 2016 election was held. Six months after that, 

on May 4, 2017, the trial court entered a general judgment 

declaring that IP 55 (2016) did, in fact, satisfy “all procedural constitutional requirements,” contrary to the determination of the secretary.

Of course, the problem was that both the constitutional deadline for submitting initiative petition signatures 

and the November 2016 election itself had already passed by 

that time. The trial court nevertheless ordered the Secretary 

of State simply to assign a new initiative petition number to 

IP 55 (2016) for the November 2018 election cycle and to 

certify that the measure complied with constitutional procedural requirements—in effect, to pick up where the measure 

would have been had the secretary certified the measure 

back in 2016, only now in the 2018 election cycle.

The Secretary of State appealed the trial court’s 

judgment, and that appeal currently is pending before the 

Court of Appeals in Geddry v. Richardson (A164828). The 

secretary also sought a stay of the trial court’s judgment. The 

Appellate Commissioner issued a stay, but he imposed several conditions. One of the conditions was that the Attorney 

General issue a certified ballot title, which any elector who 

had earlier submitted comments on IP 55 (2016) could challenge before this court.

The Secretary of State assigned a new number to 

IP 55 (2016). The measure is now known as IP 29 (2018). 

The text of IP 29 (2018) is the same as IP 55 (2016). No 
218 Unger v. Rosenblum

chief petitioner filed a new petition with the secretary.2 No 

one submitted 1,000 sponsorship signatures in support of 

the measure as a prospective petition. The Attorney General 

did not issue a draft ballot title for comment. No notice was 

sent out, and no new comments were received. The Attorney 

General simply certified, as instructed by the Appellate 

Commissioner, a ballot title for IP 29 (2018) on the basis of 

comments that had been submitted back in 2016.

Petitioners Unger and Stagg, who submitted comments on the Attorney General’s draft ballot title in 2016, 

along with chief petitioners Geddry and Booker, now seek 

review of the legal sufficiency of the certified ballot title for 

IP 29 (2018). In response, the Attorney General suggested 

that this ballot title proceeding was not properly before 

us, because the expiration of the deadline for submitting 

initiative petition signatures on IP 55 (2016) had passed, 

which, in effect, killed the measure and mooted any claims 

about its constitutional significance. We perceived an additional potential impediment to our review of the dispute 

concerning the adequacy of the ballot title for IP 29 (2018). 

Accordingly, we requested simultaneous briefing from the 

parties to address two questions:

“(1) The Supreme Court’s authority in ballot title 

review proceedings is limited. See Sizemore v. Myers, 327 

Or 71 (1998) (“[T]his court’s authority to review a ballot 

title extends only to those cases in which the statutory prerequisites to review have been satisfied.”). Have the statutory prerequisites to review been satisfied with respect to 

the proposed initiative petition that has been renumbered 

and designated as initiative petition (IP) 29 (2018)?

“(2) Does the disposition of the case currently pending 

before the Court of Appeals with respect to IP 55 (2016), 

Geddry v. Richardson (A164828), bear on this court’s 

authority to address IP 29 (2018)?

In response to those questions, the Secretary of 

State takes the position that this court lacks authority to 

2 In fact, the secretary’s database of filed initiatives and referenda lists IP 

29 (2018) as having been filed back in 2015, on the same date as the filing for 

IP 55 (2016). See http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elec/web_irr_search.record_detail?p_

reference=20180029..LSCYYY29 (last accessed December 7, 2017).
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 219

address the legal sufficiency of the ballot title for IP 29 

(2018), because none of the statutory prerequisites have 

been satisfied. The secretary points out that no new measure was filed and no sponsorships were gathered for a 2018 

initiative petition. Instead, the earlier measure, IP 55 (2016) 

was simply renumbered, in accordance with the trial court’s 

instruction. The secretary urges us to dismiss this ballot 

title proceeding. In the alternative, he suggests that we hold 

this proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of the 

Court of Appeals matter in Geddry v. Richardson (A164828).

Petitioner Unger likewise argues that, once the 

deadline for submitting signatures on a measure for a particular election has passed, that measure is dead. He contends that, if chief petitioners wish to place IP 29 (2018) on 

the ballot for the November 2018 election, they need to file 

a new petition, collect the required number of sponsorship 

signatures, and begin the process anew for the current twoyear election cycle. He asks us to dismiss this proceeding. 

Petitioner Stagg also argues that we lack authority to review 

the sufficiency of the ballot title for IP 29 (2018), because no 

such petition ever has been filed with the Secretary of State.

Chief petitioners Geddry and Booker contend that 

all statutory prerequisites have been satisfied to authorize 

this court to review the ballot title for IP 29 (2018). In so contending, however, they mention only the statutory provisions 

pertaining to Supreme Court review, namely, ORS 250.085. 

With respect to the second question, they acknowledge that 

this ballot title proceeding could become moot if the Court of 

Appeals were to reverse the trial court while this proceeding remained pending. But they contend that, in the meantime, this case is “ripe” for judicial review. And they vigorously oppose holding this case in abeyance until the Court of 

Appeals resolves Geddry v. Richardson (A164828), because 

doing so would “consume most or all of the time for gathering signatures in the 2018 election cycle, and thus amount 

to a sub silentio squashing of [IP 29 (2018)].”

III. ANALYSIS

This court has explained that the ballot-title review 

process is entirely a “creature of statute” and that the court’s 

role in that process is limited to cases in which all relevant 
220 Unger v. Rosenblum

statutory requirements have been met. Sizemore v. Myers, 

327 Or 71, 74, 957 P2d 577 (1998), is directly on point. In that 

case, an elector petitioned this court to review a ballot title 

that had been certified by the Attorney General. The problem 

was that the petitioner had failed to notify the Secretary of 

State of the petition in a timely manner, as required by statute. ORS 250.085(4). The chief petitioners intervened in the 

ballot title proceeding, arguing that it should be dismissed 

because of the petitioner’s failure to provide timely notice to 

the secretary. According to the intervenors, the failure to 

comply with the statutory notice requirement amounted to 

a jurisdictional defect that prevented the court from exercising authority to review the ballot title. Id. at 73-74.

This court concluded that the failure to comply with 

the statutory notice requirement was not, strictly speaking, 

“jurisdictional,” but it nevertheless required dismissal:

“Ballot title proceedings are entirely a creature of statute. A party’s right to review, the bases on which it can be 

obtained, the grounds on which an objection to a ballot title 

may be sustained, and the scope of this court’s authority to 

modify a ballot title are prescribed by statute. *** Thus, 

this court’s authority to review a ballot title extends only to 

those cases in which the statutory prerequisites to review 

have been satisfied.”

Id. at 74 (emphasis added). The “statutory arrangement” for 

obtaining a ballot title, the court emphasized, amounted to 

“limits on its authority.” Id. at 75. Because it was undisputed 

that the petitioner had failed to comply with one of the statutory prerequisites to ballot-title review, the court concluded, 

the ballot title proceeding had to be dismissed. Id.

To the same effect is Mabon v. Myers, 329 Or 1, 6, 

984 P2d 278 (1999). Citing its decision in Sizemore, the court 

again dismissed a ballot title proceeding when a petitioner 

failed to satisfy statutory notice requirements.

In a related vein, in Girard/Edelman v. Myers, 334 

Or 114, 45 P3d 934 (2002), the court refused to correct an 

error in a ballot title that the Attorney General identified, 

because no one had raised the error with the Secretary of 

State, as required by ORS 250.085(6). The court explained 

that, because no one had previously identified the error, “the 
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 221

authority” to address it “does not rest with this court.” Id. at 

117.

From the foregoing authorities this much is clear: 

If a petitioner fails to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for 

ballot-title review, this court lacks authority to proceed. The 

question remains, however, whether the statutory prerequisites for ballot-title review include any and all steps that precede this court’s review or are limited solely to those requirements and conditions that follow the Attorney General’s 

issuance of a certified ballot title. That is a question of statutory construction, which we resolve by examining the text 

of the relevant statutes in context, along with any pertinent 

legislative history, relevant case law, and other aids to construction. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 

(2009). Especially relevant to this proceeding is the principle that we do not consider the meaning of a statute in a vacuum; rather, we consider all relevant statutes together, so 

that they may be interpreted as a coherent, workable whole. 

Lane County v. LCDC, 325 Or 569, 578, 942 P2d 278 (1997) 

(“[W]e construe each part [of a statute] together with the 

other parts in an attempt to produce a harmonious whole.”).

With that principle in mind, the answer is straightforward. The various requirements set out in ORS chapter 

250 cannot be viewed in isolation. Each is expressly tied to 

a series of interlinked steps. As we have noted, for example, the timing of each statutory requirement for obtaining a ballot title is keyed to a prior step. Once the Attorney 

General receives a copy of the prospective petition, he or 

she has five business days in which to provide a draft ballot 

title. ORS 250.065(3). Written comments on the draft must 

be delivered to the Secretary of State within 10 business 

days after that. ORS 250.067(1). The Attorney General then 

has 10 business days after that to consider the comments 

and respond with a certified ballot title. ORS 250.067(2)(a). 

Once the Attorney General certifies a ballot title, an elector 

seeking Supreme Court review must file a petition within 10 

business days after that. ORS 250.085(3).

The various stages in the process are interconnected 

in other ways, as well. ORS 250.085(6), for instance, provides that this court cannot consider arguments asserted in 
222 Unger v. Rosenblum

a ballot title challenge that were not previously presented in 

writing to the Secretary of State pursuant to ORS 250.067. 

And, as we have noted, this court has concluded that a failure to comply with that early-stage requirement deprives 

this court of authority to review the legal sufficiency of the 

ballot title. Girard/Edelman, 334 Or at 117.

In sum, it is the entirety of the statutory process 

that is relevant to determining this court’s authority to 

engage in ballot title review, not the specific requirements 

of ORS 250.085 in isolation. As this court explained in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. City of Central Point, 341 Or 393, 399 

n 6, 144 P3d 914 (2006), referring to the significance of 

its decision in Sizemore, the requirements of ORS chapter 

250 “effectively imposed limits on the court’s authority—

created by the statutory scheme itself—to review ballot titles.” 

(Emphasis added.)

Whether that means that any failure to comply with 

statutory requirements—no matter how arguably trivial in 

that larger statutory scheme—we leave for another day. In 

this case, the failure to comply with statutory requirements 

was substantial. Although the Attorney General certified a 

ballot title, none of the statutorily required prerequisites to 

taking that action had been satisfied. No one filed a prospective petition for IP 29 (2018). No one obtained the required 

1,000 sponsorship signatures. The Attorney General did not 

prepare a draft ballot title for IP 29 (2018). No one was given 

the opportunity to comment on it. The Attorney General simply certified a ballot title for the measure, as instructed by 

the Appellate Commissioner. And petitioners and chief petitioners sought review of that certified ballot title. Given that 

this court’s authority to review the legal sufficiency of a ballot title “extends only to those cases in which the statutory 

prerequisites to review have been satisfied,” Sizemore, 327 

Or at 74, this court lacks authority to act on those petitions.

Chief petitioners Geddry and Booker insist that all 

statutorily required prerequisites have, in fact, been satisfied in that they filed a prospective petition for IP 55 (2016), 

obtained the requisite number of sponsorship signatures 

for that measure, and obtained a draft ballot title from the 
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 223

Attorney General on which public comments were received. 

Their argument, however, rests on the premise that it is of 

no moment that the constitutional deadline for supplying 

initiative petition signatures on that measure passed last 

year, as did the election itself in November 2016. As chief 

petitioners see it, IP 55 (2016) is in actuality the measure 

before us; it has simply been given a new number. According 

to chief petitioners, nothing in the law constrains them to 

complete the process within any particular two-year election cycle.

Chief petitioners are mistaken in their understanding of how the initiative process works. Taken together, the 

statutory and constitutional process that we have described 

contemplates that it must be completed by the prescribed 

deadlines in reference to each “regular general election.” In 

the phrasing common to this area, that is referred to as an 

“election cycle.” A measure filed in an election cycle must 

satisfy all statutory and constitutional requirements and be 

placed on the ballot in that election cycle. Thus, for example, if the proponents of a given measure fail to collect the 

required number of signatures by the constitutional deadline of four months before the next regular general election, 

Or Const, Art IV, § 1(2)(e), their measure effectively expires 

for failure to satisfy that particular requirement. If they 

wish to put their measure on the ballot at another election, 

they have to start over during the next election cycle.

That is certainly the way that this court has construed the law. It has concluded, for example, that challenges regarding the certification of a measure become 

moot once the election cycle for that measure has passed. 

On point in that regard is Kerr v. Bradbury, 340 Or 241, 

131 P3d 737 (2006). In that case, the Secretary of State had 

approved an initiative petition, but plaintiffs sought judicial 

review, asserting that it failed to comply with the “full-text” 

requirement of Article IV, section 1. The Marion County 

Circuit Court agreed with the secretary, but the Court of 

Appeals reversed. Kerr, 340 241. By the time that the case 

reached the Supreme Court, however, the regular general 

election had passed. The chief petitioners pressed the court 

to rule on the merits of the full-text issue anyway, but this 
224 Unger v. Rosenblum

court refused, concluding that, with the passage of the regular general election, the matter had become moot. Id. at 245.

The same thing happened in Dale v. Bradbury, 330 

Or 567, 10 P3d 944 (2000). In that case, the Court of Appeals 

determined that an initiative measure violated the separateamendment requirement of Article XVII, section 1, and 

consequently could not be circulated. See Dale v. Keisling, 

167 Or App 394, 999 P2d 1229 (2000). The chief petitioners 

sought review in this court. In the meantime, the deadline 

for submitting initiative petition signatures for that election 

cycle passed. This court dismissed the petition for review, 

because the case was moot.

That is also, it bears noting, the way that the 

Secretary of State has interpreted the law. The State 

Initiative and Referendum Manual—which the secretary 

adopted as an administrative rule, OAR 165-014-0005—

plainly provides:

“To ensure uniformity within a petition cycle and to avoid 

voter confusion only one petition cycle will be approved for 

circulation during a two year period. Approval to circulate 

for the 2018 cycle will not be given until after July 8, 2016, 

the deadline to submit signatures for the 2016 General 

Election.”

Id. at 3. The Manual goes on to state that, “[i]f the filing 

deadline has passed and chief petitioners failed to submit 

enough valid signatures, the petition is void.” Id. at 14.

Interpreting the law in that way only makes sense. 

In fact, a number of anomalies would attend reading the law 

as chief petitioners propose. Take this case, for example, in 

which the Attorney General certified a ballot title for IP 29 

(2018) based on comments that had been submitted concerning IP 55 (2016), which had been circulated the year before. 

In fact, no one has yet had an opportunity to comment on 

IP 29 (2018). Moreover, the process of simply renumbering the measure and certifying it on the basis of comments 

from the last election cycle precludes any electors who have 

more recently become eligible to vote during the intervening period from participating in the process. Likewise, it 

forecloses anyone from taking into account any intervening 

changed circumstances or modifications to relevant law. We 
Cite as 362 Or 210 (2017) 225

find it highly unlikely that the legislature and the framers 

of Article IV, section 1, intended the law to work like that.

Chief petitioners have not cited any rule, statute, 

or constitutional provision suggesting that proponents of a 

given measure have an indefinite amount of time to complete the initiative process, and we are aware of none. In 

fact, the tightly crafted, interconnected series of deadlines 

that we have described strongly declares the contrary to be 

the case. Thus, to the extent that chief petitioners contend 

that they have fully complied with all statutory prerequisites to ballot title review based on their efforts with respect 

to IP 55 (2016), that contention is unavailing, because, with 

the passage of the deadline for producing initiative petition 

signatures for the 2016 regular general election, that measure failed.

It could be argued that our decision in this case 

necessarily means that the trial court erred in ordering the 

Secretary of State to assign a new initiative petition number to IP 55 (2016) and approve the renumbered measure 

for circulation, long after the deadline passed for submitting signatures for the 2016 election cycle, which effectively 

determines the issues currently pending before the Court 

of Appeals in Geddry v. Richardson (A164828). That may 

be. But, as this court explained in Crew/Garcia v. Myers, 

336 Or 635, 638 n 3, 89 P3d 1181 (2004), “it is this court’s 

obligation to assure itself in each case that it in fact has the 

authority to proceed.” In this case, for the reasons that we 

have given, we do not have authority to proceed. 

In short, although the Attorney General issued a 

certified ballot title, the fact remains that a number of statutory prerequisites to this court’s review of the legal sufficiency of that ballot title have not been satisfied. We therefore lack authority to proceed.

The petitions to review the ballot title are dismissed.