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S. HRG. 111–1245 

PROTECTING AMERICA’S 

WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 28, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

BETTINA POIRIER, Staff Director 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JULY 28, 2010 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 1 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 2 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ................ 21 

Udall, Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ............................ 23 

WITNESSES 

Dougherty, Cynthia C., Director, Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water, 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .............................................................. 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 37 

Grumbles, Benjamin H., Director, Arizona Department of Environmental 

Quality .................................................................................................................. 50 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 58 

Orum, Paul, Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition, Independent Consultant to Center for American Progress .................................................................. 59 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 74 

Perea, Carlos, Chief Executive Officer, MIOX Corporation ................................. 79 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81 

Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe ............................. 92 

Sivin, Darius D., Ph.D., Legislative Representative, International Union, 

United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 

America (UAW) .................................................................................................... 94 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 129 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Letter from the National Association of Clean Water Agencies to Senators 

Boxer and Inhofe, August 3, 2010 ...................................................................... 138 

(1) 

PROTECTING AMERICA’S WATER TREATMENT 

FACILITIES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC. 

The full Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg 

(Acting Chairman of the full Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Lautenberg, Inhofe, Cardin, and Udall. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, everyone, for being here to examine the security at our Nation’s water treatment facilities. 

Five years ago a train crashed in South Carolina, causing a release of chlorine gas that killed 9 people and sent 58 others to hospitals. The fact is, chlorine gas is a deadly substance. And yet it 

is currently used at about 2,600 drinking water and wastewater 

treatment plants across the country. That makes these water facilities and the trains carrying chlorine to them attractive targets for 

terrorists. Yet, current law does not provide adequate regulatory 

authority or resources for securing water treatment plants and reducing their use of lethal chemicals. 

Now this morning the Senate Homeland Security Committee reported out a bill that merely extends existing minimal protections 

against attacks on chemical facilities, not water facilities. And that 

leaves it up to this Committee to address what both the EPA and 

the Department of Homeland Security have called a serious gap in 

our country’s defenses—the lack of protections against an attack on 

water treatment facilities. 

Millions of Americans are at risk because so many drinking and 

wastewater treatment plants use chlorine gas and other lethal 

chemicals. In fact, an attack on one or more of the more than 700 

facilities would put up to 100,000 people at risk. And based on information compiled by the EPA, just a single attack at one of the 

15 highest risk plants could put more than 1 million Americans at 

risk. And we cannot forget the pilots who trained Mohammed Atta, 

the kingpin of the September 11th attacks, said that he had shown 

a keen interest in chemical plants and water reservoirs. 

So, we have to do everything possible to keep Americans safe 

from future terrorist attacks. And that is why I have introduced 

the Senate Secure Water Facilities Act. This bill would require 

water treatment plants to assess vulnerability to attack and make 
2 

a plan to address these vulnerabilities and develop a system for responding to an emergency. It also requires plants to consider safer 

ways of doing business and in many circumstances implement 

those safer alternatives. 

Now, we know that many facilities could adopt safer chemicals 

and processes because more than 500 drinking water and wastewater plants across the country already stopped using deadly substances and dangerous methods. These changes have made more 

than 40 million Americans safer. 

Now, my bill encourages more of our country’s water plants to 

join this effort. But it does not propose a one size fits all approach. 

It takes into account the situation on the ground at each plant and 

provides States with flexibility to make the right choices for their 

specific situations. It zeros in on plants where it is clear that 

switching to safer chemicals and safer methods is cost effective and 

completely feasible. And it helps facilities offset the costs of reducing these securities by providing Federal grants. 

I first introduced chemical security legislation in 1999, before the 

September 11th attacks, and once again in 2005 with then-Senator 

Obama. The legislation that I have introduced this year reflects the 

principles of President Obama’s administration. It has also been 

endorsed by a diverse array of more than 100 environmental, 

health, labor, and business groups. 

Now, it has been almost 9 years since the September 11th attacks. And if we learned one thing on that fateful day it is this: 

we dare not become complacent, and we cannot let our guard down. 

I look forward today to hearing from our witnesses about the 

state of security at water treatment facilities and how we can better protect Americans from a future terrorist attack. 

Once again, I thank all of you for being here. And I am pleased 

to introduce, to call on my Ranking Member here, Senator Inhofe, 

for his opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me clarify something first. I am not blaming anyone, but this 

hearing is not a hearing on your legislation. Is that correct? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is true, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. That is fine because, you know when I had 

the notice of the hearing this is supposed to be a general oversight 

hearing for water security. That sounds good to me. 

And I thank you for holding the oversight hearing on the water 

security and look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the 

steps that the EPA and the States have been taking since we 

passed the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. We both remember that well. I 

know that many of our facilities are much safer as a result of our 

actions here. But there is still more that can be done. I think we 

can agree on that. 

As I noted in our December drinking water oversight hearing, 

there is one thing that everyone in this room can agree on, and 

that is having clean, safe, affordable water is a national priority. 

My message has always been that chemical security and water security are issues of security, not environmental protection. 
3 

Yet whenever we discuss these issues in this Committee, we 

focus on inherently safer technology, or IST. IST is an environmental and an engineering concept, not a security concept. Environmental activists have been promoting the concept of IST for 

years because it would allow them to eliminate the use of chemicals that they do not like. 

IST dates back more than a decade when Greenpeace and other 

groups were seeking bans on chlorine, which was the chemical used 

to purify water that has been hailed by the CDC as one of the 

greatest public health achievements of the 20th century. Only after 

9/11 did environmental groups decide to play upon the fears of the 

Nation and repackage IST as a panacea to all of our security problems. 

I would like to share with you this excellent clarification of IST 

from Stephen Poorman. He was at the Homeland Security hearing 

on chemical security in March. And this is a quote from Stephen 

Poorman. He said ‘‘ IST is premised on the belief that if a particular chemical process hazard can be reduced, the overall risk associated with that process will also be reduced. It is an elegant concept, but the reality is almost never that simple. A reduction of 

hazard will reduce overall risk if and only if that hazard is not displaced to another time or location or result in the creation of some 

new hazard.’’ That was the end of the quote. 

I think this is especially important to understand when it comes 

to water security. Both Homeland Security and the Government Affairs Committee and the EPW have heard again and again from 

multiple security and chemical experts that IST should not be federally mandated. And I encourage my colleagues to revisit these 

hearings, including the one that was on June 21, 2006, that was 

focused entirely on the effectiveness of IST. 

I was pleased to see the Homeland Security Committee approve 

the reauthorization of the current CFATS Program without mandatory IST. Their willingness to find compromise and a bipartisan 

path for it is something I hope we can emulate in this Committee, 

such as we did with Senator Cardin’s bill just last week. 

The current security bill before this Committee, S. 3598, takes a 

vastly different, more controversial approach. I hope that we will 

take time and work in a bipartisan way to find a path forward on 

water security that would gain support from security experts and 

water utilities, not just environmental groups and unions, and have 

a chance of making a real difference in securing water facilities. 

Senator Lautenberg, I know our staffs have been working together on other legislation. I hope we can do the same as we move 

down this path. No matter what we do, security for water facilities 

must focus first on ensuring that utilities can effectively meet the 

many requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean 

Water Act and protect the health and the environment. 

The individual utilities know their water best, and by mandating 

IST the Federal Government would make it impossible for facilities 

to decide for themselves what the best course of action is to meet 

the health and environmental mandates of the Safe Drinking 

Water Act and the Clean Water Act. Nobody cares more about the 

security of their communities than the people who live there. We 
4 

need to empower them to make the best decisions, not assume— 

as we often do around here—that Washington knows best. 

Finally, I know, Mr. Chairman, that you share my desire to get 

S. 1005, the Water Infrastructure Financing Act, to the floor. I still 

believe that the most effective way to improve our Nation’s water 

facilities is by reauthorizing the State Revolving Loan Fund Programs, both drinking water and wastewater. We cannot expect our 

communities to continue to provide safe and clean water if they do 

not have the resources to meet those needs. 

I have three documents I want to enter as a part of the record. 

They would be a letter from the Association of Metropolitan Water 

Agencies, a second letter from the American Water Works Association, then a letter from 25 different organizations expressing opposition to federally mandated IST. I ask unanimous consent these be 

made a part of the record. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Without objection. Certainly. 

[The referenced information follows:] 
5 

July 27, 20!0 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chairman 

The Honorable James Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 205!0 

RE: Hearing on "Protecting America's Water Treatment Facilities" 

Dear Chairman Boxer and Ranking Member Inhofe, 

As the Environment and Public Works Committee holds an important hearing on 

the security of the nation's drinking water and wastewater facilities, the Association 

of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMW A) believes it is important for the 

Committee to understand the factors that drinking water systems must consider 

when selecting chemicals to use during the water disinfection process. The 

Association would also like to offer some thoughts on S. 3598, the "Secure Water 

Facilities Act." 

As part of the drinking water treatment process, EPA regulations require water 

utilities to use chlorine (often in the form of liquefied gas or sodium hypochlorite) 

to kill harmful bacteria and viruses. When deciding which fonn of chlorine to use, 

individual utilities must consider not only how to best protect the communities they 

serve from manmade threats, but also climate, plant location, cost, ambient water 

quality, available technology, safety, and compliance with the Safe Drinking Water 

Act (SDWA). Because of these multiple factors, any suggestion that all drinking 

water utilities could properly disinfect their water supplies with a particular fonn of 

chlorine is simply false. 

Nevertheless, many water systems currently use processes that may meet one's 

definition of a so-called "inherently safer technology" ("1ST"). According to an 

infonnal survey of large drinking water utilities conducted by AMWA in 2008, 

about sixty-five percent of survey respondents had considered adopting an alternate 

disinfectant to gaseous chlorine within the previous five years, and about forty-six 

percent actually began using an alternate at one or more water treatment facilities. 

This clearly shows that drinking water systems are willing to implement "ISTs" 

when they arc able to do so without compromising public health or safety. 

However, not all water systems can adopt "!ST." For example, in 2008 an official 

from a drinking water utility in California testified before the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee that, if his utility were to replace gaseous chlorine with 

sodium hypochlorite as its primary disinfectant, it would require seventy separate 

five-thousand gallon shipments of sodium hypochlorite each week. Similarly, the 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS 

Oi:me VanDe Hei 

Leaders in Water Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 1520 l st~et, NVV. Suite 500, WashmgtorL OC 20006 • p 202 33i 2820 f 202 7B5 1345 • www.:m1Wa net 
6 

July 27, 2010 

Page2 

utility would have to hold the equivalent of280 of these five-thousand gallon tanks on-site at the water 

treatment facility to maintain a 30-day backup supply necessary to continue water disinfection in the event of a 

supply chain disruption. The utility testified that the risks inherent with coordinating these shipments through 

local neighborhoods, protecting dozens of trucks against sabotage or attack, and ensuring that sodium 

hypochlorite supplies were used before their quality degraded outweighed the benefits of replacing gaseous 

chlorine. So while drinking water systems frequently consider "IST," Congress should not believe it is a 

panacea that is feasible or advisable for every water system in every situation. 

Water Security Legislative Background 

As you know, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks Congress passed the Public Health Protection and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of2002. This law added a new Section 1433 to SDWA, which 

required all drinking water utilities serving more than 3,300 people to prepare vulnerability assessments and 

emergency response plans to identify weaknesses in their security posture and prepare for security-related 

incidents. EPA officials have testified before Congress that all of the nation's largest drinking water systems 

have successfully complied with this requirement. 

In 2006, in light of these existing security requirements, subsequent unilateral measures taken by drinking water 

utilities (such as security enhancements, increased training, and chemical reduction and substitution when 

feasible), and the inherent differences between water systems and chemical facilities, Congress exempted the 

water sector from duplicative regulation through the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS) program. Today, however, the Obama Administration believes that this exemption represents a 

regulatory "security gap" for the water sector, and has encouraged Congress to streamline a new EPA-based 

water and wastewater security program with the requirements of CF A TS. 

As the Senate made plans to proceed with water security legislation, AMW A was pleased to have the 

opportunity to work with Sen. Frank Lautenberg as he formulated S. 3598. As introduced, the bill is similar to 

Titles II and Ill of H.R. 2868, chemical and water facility security legislation that the House of Representatives 

approved last year. Importantly, S. 3598 includes no statutory requirement that a water utility implement an 

"IST" if any state or federal entity finds it to be feasible. 

However, unlike the process of formulating H.R. 2868 in the House- where the Energy and Commerce 

Committee had an opportunity to reshape CFATS legislation first approved by the Homeland Security 

Committee to meet the needs of the water sector-S. 3598 was introduced before the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee approved a bill to define the scope of new CFA TS regulations. In fact, 

the Senate Homeland Security Committee is scheduled to meet to markup CFA TS legislation on the same day 

as the Environment and Public Works Committee's hearing on water security. Therefore, until there is an 

opportunity to carefully review any legislation approved by that panel it will remain unclear whether Sen. 

Lautenberg's bill represents an accurate reflection of the new CFATS rules that the full Senate may consider, or 

a measure that would impose much more onerous security regulations on public water and wastewater systems 

than might be placed on private chemical manufacturers thereby failing to achieve the Administration's goal 

of reasonably streamlining the physical security requirements that apply to water, wastewater, and chemical 

facilities. Moreover, the fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security appropriations bill approved just two weeks ago 

by the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee included a one-year extension of the current CFA TS -

further inviting confusion as to which security framework the water and wastewater security legislation should 

seek to replicate. 

Leaders in Water Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 1620 I Street, NW. Swte 5CO. Washington. DC 20008 • p 202 331 2820 f 202 7$5 1845 • wWI'.'.amwa net 
7 

July 27,2010 

Page3 

For this reason, AMW A believes that it is premature for the Environment and Public Works Committee to 

consider water and wastewater facility security legislation before it has had an opp01tunity to analyze any final 

CFATS reauthorization bill approved by the Senate Homeland Security Committee. Similarly, until we fully 

understand what CFA TS legislation is approved by the Homeland Security Committee, AMW A will take no 

position on S. 3598. 

Nevertheless, in addition to preserving the ability of local water system experts to choose the most appropriate 

water disinfection method, AMW A has several other suggestions that it hopes the Committee will consider in 

shaping water security legislation: 

Sensitive Information Protection 

The Committee must continue the protection of utility vulnerability assessments against public disclosure under 

the Freedom of Information Act or similar state or local laws. Currently, Section 1433 of SOW A bars this 

disclosure and allows judges to impose a criminal penalty of up to one year in prison and a fine of $100,000 

against individuals found to have unlawfully shared this sensitive information. These protections are critical 

because any information leak that puts a utility's security plans in the public domain would provide terrorists 

and criminals with a step-by-step guide of how to compromise a utility's security measures. Such an outcome 

could put millions of community residents at permanent risk, so it is crucial that Congress maintains these 

protections and penalties going forward. 

Moreover, whileS. 3598 would require EPA to conduct a rulemaking process to facilitate the sharing of some 

security information with outside groups such as first responders, the bill must not tie EPA's hands with 

preconditions that grant certain groups a statutory right to posses their own copies of sensitive utility security 

documents. Such entitlements would be inconsistent with our shared goal of ensuring the strongest protections 

for this sensitive information, and should be rejected by this Committee. 

Avoiding Unreasonable Regulatory Burdens 

Water security legislation must not require utilities to begin security planning from scratch when they already 

have robust security reviews and procedures in place. For example, any requirement that directs water systems 

to periodically update vulnerability assessments should make clear that utilities may follow recognized industry 

guidelines when completing this task. The water industry has developed widely used tools for the completion of 

VAs since enactment of the Bioterrorism Act in 2002, so new legislation should allow water systems to use 

these well-vetted processes when assessing their risks. 

The new water legislation should also extend to water systems important legal protections that Congress may 

provide to chemical facilities as part of a new CFATS. For example, H.R. 2868 as passed by the House would 

prohibit individual citizens or organizations from suing chemical facilities for alleged non-compliance with 

requirements of the CFATS regulations. Instead, the bill included "citizen petition" provisions directing DHS to 

establish a process through which individuals can report alleged CFATS violations to the Department for 

investigation. Unfortunately, the House bill did not extend similar protections to water and wastewater 

facilities, resulting in an irrational situation where individuals may file lawsuits intended to influence chemical 

selection at public water systems, but not at private chemical facilities. 

S. 3598 duplicates this mistake, which could be easily solved by specifying that existing citizen suit provisions 

in SDWA do not apply to a utility's choice of disinfectant chemicals. This would maintain the ability of 

Leaders in Water Association of MetropoH!an Wa!er Agencies 1510 1 Street, NVi. Swte 500 \Nashington. DC 20006 • p 202 331 2820 f702 785 1845 • ww\'.'.amw!J net 
8 

July 27,2010 

Page4 

individuals to tile suit against water systems that are out of compliance with a drinking water contaminant 

standard, consistent with the original intent of SDW A, but would not allow virtually unlimited lawsuits against 

any water utility that does not choose to implement an "!ST." AMWA would be happy to work with the 

Committee to develop language that meets these objectives. 

Finally, as approved by the House H.R. 2868 would require EPA to place water systems in one of four riskbased tiers, with facilities in higher tiers required to meet more strict security standards. EPA would tier 

facilities based on the potential consequences of an attack on the water facility or contamination of the water 

supply. Under these criteria, water systems that serve large populations (and therefore may hold larger amounts 

of treatment chemicals) would likely be assigned to higher-risk tiers, because of the more significant potential 

consequences of an attack. But these same large systems could possibly be reassigned to lower-risk tiers if they 

begin to use less hazardous chemicals that would result in fewer off-site consequences in the event of an 

incident. 

However, S. 3598 as introduced eliminates this incentive for large water systems to use less hazardous 

chemicals because it requires EPA to take into account both the size of the population served by the water 

system and the treatment facility's proximity to population centers when initially assigning systems to a tier. A 

likely result is that, at a minimum, more than 400 drinking water systems across the country classified by EPA 

as "very large" (each serving more than 100,000 people) will automatically be defined as high-risk, no matter 

which disinfectant chemicals they use or what other security measures they have put in place. Moreover, a 

significant portion of the nation's nearly 4,000 drinking water systems serving between 10,000 and 100,000 

people could also be pulled into the high-risk tier. This would further reduce the incentive for many water 

systems to take steps to be assigned to a lower tier and increase the workload of EPA and primacy state agencies 

that must ensure compliance with elevated requirements of the highest tiers. Again, AMW A would be happy to 

work with the Committee to solve this problem at the appropriate time. 

Working Together for Practical Water Facility Security 

I want to reiterate that AMW A's willingness to cooperate with the Committee to close the so-called "security 

gap" that the Administration believes is present in the regulation of water and wastewater systems. But this gap 

can only be closed with the full knowledge of the updated CFATS legislation that the Senate may consider for 

private chemical facilities. When the contents of this bill are clear, I hope we can all agree on a path forward 

that allows local water system experts to make drinking water disinfection decisions on a localized, case-by-case 

basis to most effectively protect public health. 

Sincerely, 

L. u. A. ;t.k· 

Diane VanDeHei 

Executive Director 

cc: Environment and Public Works Committee Members 

Leaders in Water Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies "620 I Str<:>t't NW. Suite 500. 'Nashmgton. DC 20008 • p 202 331.2820 f 202 785 1845 • W'NW sm,va.net 
Drinking Water Treatment Chlorine Equivalents 

One Week's Chlorine Needs for a Large Treatment Plant 

Current Practice: 

Chlorine Gas 

One 90-ton 

railcar 

Alternatives presented for 

one week's chlorine supply 

for a large water treatment 

plant operaflng at 615 

million gallons per day 

under typical conditions. 

Alternative: 

Delivered Bleach (5.25%) 

Seventy 5,000 gallon trailers 

Alternative: On-S

Generated Bleac

2. 7 million gal. 

softened water 

2.4 megawatts 24,000 

electricity diese

Attachment to Congressional testimony of Metropolitan Water District of Southern California/Association of Metropolitan Water Age
10 

The Authoritative Resource on Safe Water sM 

July 28, 2010 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chair 

The Honorable James M. lnhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

The Honorable Frank R. Laufenberg 

Chair, Subcommittee on Superfund, Toxics and Environmental Health 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Chairs and Ranking Member, 

Government Affairs Office 

1300 Eye Street NW 

Suite 701W 

Washington, DC 20005-3314 

T 202.628.8303 

F 202.628.2846 

WI/!NJ.av.ma.org 

Advocacy 

Communications 

Conferences 

Education and Training 

Science and Technology 

Sections 

As the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works addresses the issue of chemical 

security at our nation's drinking water utilities, the American Water Works Association (AWWA) 

would like to thank you for meeting with us in the development of this legislation, and to share 

our thoughts about ways in which the bill could be even further improved. We would appreciate 

this letter being included in the Committee's hearing record on this bill. 

AWWA agrees that performing vulnerability assessments and updating them regularly is a 

critical component of water security. In that light, we have partnered with the American Society 

of Mechanical Engineers to develop a standard for vulnerability assessments for water utilities 

that received approval this summer from the American National Standards Institute. Copies of 

this standard have been provided to Senate staff. 

We urge the committee, in considering chemical facility security legislation, to consider water 

utilities that use this standard, called ANSI/ASME-ITI/AWWA J100-10 Risk Analysis and 

Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP®) Standard for Risk and Resilience 

Management of Water and Wastewater Systems, to be in compliance with legal requirements 

for vulnerability assessments. Utilizing this standard would provide both regulators and the 

regulated community with clear-cut and sound direction in this aspect of security legislation. 

State regulators are strapped for resources, and this tool would assist them in that regard. 

Citation of this standard would also help utilities get an early start on compliance and provide 

them with clear-cut direction on how to conduct vulnerability assessments. 

In the realm of methods to reduce the consequences of an intentional chemical release, we also 

urge the committee to cite in legislation the use of another tool we have developed, titled, 
11 

"Selecting Disinfectants in a Security-Conscious Environment." This tool objectively weighs the 

risks and benefits from different disinfection techniques, taking into account public health 

protection and security. Again, this would provide water utilities with early and clear-cut 

direction on how to assess different chemicals and processes needed to provide safe drinking 

water to the public, taking in account other public safety needs. 

AWVVA strongly believes the best approach to the issue of reducing the consequences of an 

intentional release is to require local officials to make an informed decision concerning 

disinfectant chemicals and processes after a full analysis. Drinking water utilities tailor their 

treatment and distribution processes according to regulatory obligations (such as the federal 

requirement to use chlorine in some form and to achieve certain levels of disinfection), to critical 

variations in source water characteristics (such as temperatures, pH, pathogens, etc.), and to 

other local factors (such as delivery options for disinfectant chemicals, the need to maintain 

reserve supplies in the event of supply interruption, spatial limitations at the plant site, local 

ambient temperatures that affect the "shelf life" of chemicals and the attendant chemical 

degradation and breakdown products, etc.). Another issue that may be of concern to the 

Committee is the "energy profile" of disinfection alternatives. For example, many alternatives 

require significantly greater electricity inputs, compared to gaseous chlorine, and would thus 

work contrary to efforts to reduce the utility's carbon footprint. All of these factors and others 

must be taken into account in selecting disinfectant processes. 

Attached is a summary of some case studies we have compiled that describes how some 

drinking water utilities reached the decision to stay with gaseous chlorine, how some decided to 

convert to sodium hypochlorite, and how some decided to convert to on-site generated sodium 

hypochlorite systems. 

We want to emphasize that many utilities can change disinfection processes without 

compromising the safety of the community drinking water supply. Indeed, many have already 

done so. But where that has been done, it has been done as an informed local decision after 

careful study and full consideration of many important local factors, such as those identified 

above. Local officials are in the best position to evaluate these factors and to weigh the risks, 

feasibility, and full range of consequences associated with the available disinfection processes. 

So while having the state approve this decision is better than having EPA do it, we think the 

decision is so dependent on local factors and so critical to water safety, that it is vastly better to 

require an informed local decision. 

We applaud Senator Lautenberg's concern over chemical facility security as shown by his 

introduction of S.3598 and S.3599. We believeS. 3598, the Secure Water Facilities Act, could 

be improved in certain aspects: 

Sensitive Information Must be Better Protected 

Disclosure of sensitive information under S. 3598 would be approximately equivalent to a Class 

A misdemeanor, meaning those found guilty of such a crime would face not more than one year 

in prison and a fine up to $10,000. AWVVA believes it would be more appropriate to consider 

such a disclosure as tampering with a water system, consistent with the provisions of 42 USC 

300i-1, as amended by the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. This would mean that conviction would result 

in imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000 for 

such tampering, or not more than $100,000 for attempting or threatening such actions. This 

would provide an appropriate level of deterrence to such dangerous disclosures. 
12 

Outsider Participation is Not Appropriate 

We agree that supervisory and non-supervisory employees should be included in the 

development of vulnerability assessments and site security plans because of their hands-on, 

working knowledge of a facility's operation. However, we do not agree with specific inclusion in 

these processes of employee bargaining agents that may not themselves be employees of the 

utility. As mentioned earlier, very sensitive information is involved. Therefore, access to this 

information must be restricted to as few people as necessary, and only to those for whom there 

is a direct "need to know." Many entities, including AIJVINA, have significant expertise, tools and 

guidance in the area of security and preparedness, and make these accessible to utilities and 

their employees. However, we do not seek- and cannot support provisions- to mandate the 

participation of specific types of organizations and/or their representatives from outside the 

utility itself. If employee safety is a concern with regard to this issue, we note that water utilities 

already must comply with extensive regulations for employee safety and training under the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Clean Air Act. 

We thank the Committee for the opportunity to comment and we offer the expertise of our 

membership as the Committee's work continues. AIJVINA is an international non-profit, scientific 

and educational society dedicated to the improvement of drinking water quality and supply. Our 

56,000 members include more than 4,600 utilities that supply roughly 80 percent of the 

American people with safe drinking water. Many of our utility members also provide sewer and 

sanitation services. 

Sincerely, 

1~~ 

Tom Curtis 

Deputy Executive Director for Government Affairs 
13 

Decision Drivers for Selection of Disinfection Methods 

Drinking water utilities across the United State are evaluating their choices of disinfectants in light 

of contemporary security concerns and water quality management requirements. Some have 

decided to change the disinfectant or disinfection treatment method, but for many utilities, 

gaseous chlorine remains the only viable disinfection that provides sufficient public health 

protection. 

AWWA collected disinfection selection case study information from the following six water utilities: 

• Austin Water Utility, Austin, TX 

• City of Boulder, CO 

• Greater Cincinnati Water Works (GCWW), Cincinnati, OH 

• Denver Water, Denver, CO 

• Phoenix Water Services Division, Phoenix, AZ 

• Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA 

Figure 1 shows the map of the United States with the geographical locations of all the case study 

utilities identified. As can be seen from the map, the case study utilities include representatives 

from a broad range of geographical regions. 

Austin, TX 

Figure 1: Map of the United States with the Case Study Utilities Identified 

Disinfection Selection Case Studies Summary 

Developed for AWWA by Damon S. Williams Associates, LLC 

Page 1 of 4 
14 

Greater Cincinnati Water Works, Denver Water1 and Phoenix Water Services Division have 

decided to continue using chlorine gas at their water treatment plants 

The common decision drivers for maintaining chlorine gas disinfection for all of these utitities 

included: 

o There are fewer water quality concerns when using chlorine gas disinfection compared 

to using hypochlorite-based methods, namely the stability of the disinfectant and 

formation of degradates such as perchlorate, chlorite, bromate etc. 

o Significantly tower tlfe~cyde costs of chlorine gas systems over other disinfection 

methods 

o Higher system retlability of chlorine gas systems 

o Ease of operations and maintenance of chlorine gas systems 

o Utility personnel experience and familiarity with chlorine gas systems 

Phoenix plans to implement double containment of both 150-lb and 1-ton chlorine gas cylinders 

at all facilities in order to minimize the risk of chemical exposure to the public 

Denver has decided to delay chlorine infrastructure projects in the short term in order to better 

understand the development of new Federal and State regulations related to chemical security 

and the corresponding impacts at their water treatment plants 

Decision to Convert to Bulk Sodium Hypochlorite 

The City of Boulder and Santa Clara Valley Water District have converted to bulk sodium 

hypochlorite at their water treatment plants 

The decision drivers for conversion to bulk sodium hypochlorite for the City of Boulder included: 

o Risk reduction compared to chlorine gas systems 

o Better system reliability compared to OSG systems 

o Less operational complexity compared to OSG systems 

o Lower initial capital costs, but similar life cycle costs compared to OSG systems 

The decision drivers for the conversion to bulk sodium hypochlorite for Santa Clara Valley Water 

District were: 

o Significant improvements were needed to the pre-existing chlorine gas systems for 

compliance with the Toxic Gas Ordinance 

o Construction costs for the chlorine gas system improvements were higher than 

construction costs of new bulk sodium hypochlorite systems 

o Lower safety risks, environmental issues, and political issues associated with bulk sodium 

hypochlorite 

o Bulk sodium hypochlorite allows simpler operational training requirements, reliability of 

chemical supply and less vulnerability to interruption 

Decision to Convert to On-site Generated (OSG) Sodium Hypochlorite Systems 

• Austin Water Utility has decided to implement OSG at their future planned WTP, and convert 

their existing WTPs from chlorine gas to OSG in future 

• The decision drivers for the implementation of OSG for Austin Water Utility included: 

o Low risk of OSG systems 

o Public perception 

o Environmental sensitivity 

o Chemical cost stability of NSF solar salt 

o Costs associated with maintenance of scrubber equipment for chlorine gas, and costs 

associated with testing and certifying chlorine gas bulk storage tanks 

Disinfection Selection Case Studies Summary 

Developed for AWWA by Damon S. Williams Associates, LLC 

Page 2 of 4 
15 

Background 

The Department of Homeland Security implemented the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS) in April, 2007. The law established a federal security program for facilities manufacturing, 

using, or storing potentiaHy hazardous chemicals, including chlorine gas. Drinking water and 

wastewater utilities are currently exempt from this taw, but a revision and extension of the broader 

chemical security program may end that exception. 

American Water Works Association (AWWA) strongly believes that the choice of chemicals or 

processes for disinfection at water utilities should remain a local decision because the choice of 

disinfectants is based on local water chemistry, local environmentat factors, targeted pathogens, 

plant worker safety, and similar factors. In 2009, AWWA published a Water Industry Technical 

Action Fund (WITAF) report entitled ••selecting Disinfectants in a Security-Conscious Environment" 

to help utilities make appropriate disinfection choices. 

The objective of the current project is to develop case studies documenting water utilities' 

processes and outcomes for selecting disinfection processes. These case study summaries illustrate 

the unique, site-specific considerations that underlie achieving the goals and meeting the 

disinfection needs of each water system. 

Case Study Overview 

A concise yet comprehensive questionnaire was prepared for collecting relevant and consistent 

information from the participating case study drinking water utilities. The questionnaire was 

developed following the examples in AWWA's "Selecting Disinfectants in a Security-Conscious 

Environment" report, and had a broad but flexible framework to capture the nuances of each 

utitity's disinfection selection process. 

A list of water utilities for case studies was developed representing an appropriate cross-section of 

the water utility community by geographic location, size, and disinfection selection (e.g. gas 

chlorine versus bulk hypochlorite versus on-site generated hypochlorite). Appropriate decision 

makers at each of the selected utilities were contacted and information was collected for the 

completion of the questionnaires. 

The information collected from each of the water utilities through the questionnaire has been 

distitled into the following 2-3 page summaries. In the preparation of the summaries, effort was 

made to present similar level of detail across all the case studies in documenting the key decision 

drivers that led to the selection of the disinfection method. 

Disinfection Selection Case Studies Summary 

Developed for AWWA by Damon S. Williams Associates, LLC 

Page 3 of 4 
16 

Case Study Utilities: Water System Information 

Table 1 summarizes the water system information of all the case study utilities. The case study 

included drinking water utilities ranging in size from Boulder, Colorado, serving a population of 

113,000, to very large water whole-sellers, such as Santa Clara Valley Water District, serving a population of 1.8 Million people. Some of the case study utilities use surface water as source 

water, while some others use both surface water and ground water. In addition to disinfection 

within distribution systems, two utilities (Cincinnati and Phoenix) disinfect water at various 

distribution system locations. 

Po ange) 

Source Waters 

Surface Water Only Four 

AU 

Two (Cincinnati, Phoenix) 

Remote Disinfection Facilities ---'--_!_l::l_o (Cincinnati, Phoenix) 

Case Study Utilities: Disinfection Methods 

The case study utilities were selected such that they included representatives using all different 

forms of chlorine disinfection methods chlorine gas, bulk sodium hypochlorite, on-site generated 

sodium hypochlorite (OSG), and calcium hypochlorite tablet feeder. Table 2 summarizes the 

disinfection methods used by case study utilities at both their water treatment plants as well as 

remote disinfection facilities. 

Utility Name 

Austin Water Utility 

City of Boulder 

Greater Cincinnati 

Water Works 

Denver Water 

Phoenix Water 

Services Division 

Santa Clara Valley 

Water District 

Chlorine Gas 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Bulk Sodium 

Hypochlorite 

X 

X 

X 

Disinfection Selection Case Studies Summary 

Developed for AWWA by Damon S. Williams Associates, LLC 

Generated 

Sodium 

Hypochlorite 

(OSG) 

X planned) 

X 

Calcium 

Hypochlorite 

X 

Page 4 of 4 
17 

July 28,2010 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chairman 

U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

410 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510-6175 

The Honorable James M. lnhofe 

Ranking Member 

U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

456 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510-6175 

Re: Opposition to Facility Security Legislation that Includes Inherently Safer Technology 

(1ST) Provisions 

Dear Senators Boxer and lnhofe: 

As representatives of American agriculture, food processing, energy, forest products, 

manufacturing, chemistry, medicine, transportation, third party warehousing, building materials 

and other businesses and local city services that make up our national infrastructure, we write 

today to express our opposition to any facility security legislation that includes inherently safer 

technology (1ST) provisions. 

We caution against adding 1ST provisions to facility security legislation as debate on the issue 

continues and believe the federal government should not be making process decisions for 

chemical facilities. The government does not possess the sufficient expertise to implement such 

broad direct engineering and business decisions for our nation's diverse chemical facilities. 1ST 

provisions may result in simply transferring risk to other points along the supply chain instead of 

reducing risks as intended, while hampering security in the process. Furthermore, there is no 

objective manner in which to judge whether one process is inherently safer than another. 1ST is 

an engineering philosophy, not a specific technique. Since 1ST cannot be measured, it is 

generally not suitable for regulation. 

1ST mandates will also impose significant financial hardship on businesses across the country 

that are already facing challenges due to the current economic recession. In addition to the fact 

that mandated chemical switching may not reduce risk, some estimates indicate that the process 

changes imposed by such mandates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars per facility. Such 

additional operating expenses would be too much tor many facilities to bear, particularly given 

the current financial environment, and would likely drive American jobs overseas, or adversely 

affect the ability of chemical products to downstream users. 
18 

Our organizations strongly support reauthorizing the current Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) without any additional provisions. This program is an important step to 

keeping our country safe from terrorist attacks. By not adding additional burdensome 

provisions, such as 1ST, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will have the time it 

needs to fully implement the current program, which will significantly strengthen our national 

security without undermining our economy. 

Thank you for considering our views on facility security. We stand ready and willing to work 

with Congress towards the implementation of sound, responsible, effective chemical facility 

security policy. 

Sincerely, 

Agricultural Retailers Association 

American Coatings Association 

American Forest and Paper Association 

American Frozen Food Institute 

American Gas Association 

American Meat Institute 

American Petroleum Institute 

Association of Oil Pipe Lines 

Crop Life America 

Institute of Makers of Explosives 

International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses 

International Warehouse Logistics Association 

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America 

National Agricultural Aviation Association 

National Association of Chemical Distributors 

National Association of Manufacturers 

National Mining Association 

National Oilseed Processors Association 
19 

National Pest Management Association 

National Petrochemical and Refiners Association 

Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Association 

Petroleum Marketers Association of America 

Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates 

The Fertilizer Institute 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

cc: Members of U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
20 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this oversight hearing on water security. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the steps that EPA and the 

States have taken since we passed the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. I know that many 

of our facilities are much safer as a result of our actions here, but there is still more 

that can be done. As I noted in our December drinking water oversight hearing, 

there is one thing that everyone in this room can agree on—that having clean, safe, 

affordable water is a national priority. 

My message has always been that chemical security and water security are issues 

of security, not environmental protection. Yet whenever we discuss these issues in 

this Committee we focus on ‘‘inherently safer technology,’’ or IST. IST is an environmental and engineering concept, not a security concept. Environmental activists 

have been promoting the concept of IST for years because it would allow them to 

eliminate the use of chemicals they don’t like. IST dates back more than a decade 

to when Greenpeace and other groups were seeking bans on chlorine—the chemical 

used to purify water that has been hailed by the CDC as one of the greatest public 

health achievements of the 20th century. Only after 9/11 did environmental groups 

decide to play upon the fears of the Nation and repackage IST as a panacea to all 

of our security problems. 

I would like to share with you this excellent clarification of IST from Stephen 

Poorman at the Homeland Security hearing on chemical security in March. ‘‘[IST] 

is premised on the belief that, if a particular chemical process hazard can be reduced, the overall risk associated with that process will also be reduced . . . it is an 

elegant concept, but the reality is almost never that simple. A reduction in hazard 

will reduce overall risk if, and only if, that hazard is not displaced to another time 

or location, or result in the creation of some new hazard.’’ I think this is especially 

important to understand when it comes to water security. 

Both the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee and EPW have 

heard again and again from multiple security and chemical experts that IST should 

not be federally mandated, and I encourage my colleagues to revisit these hearings 

including the June 21, 2006, hearing that was focused entirely on the effectiveness 

of IST. 

I was pleased to see the Homeland Security Committee this morning unanimously 

approve a reauthorization of the current CFATS program without mandatory IST. 

Their willingness to find compromise and a bipartisan path forward is something 

I hope we can emulate in this Committee. The current security bill before this Committee, S. 3598, takes a vastly different, more controversial approach. I hope that 

we will take time and work in a bipartisan way to find a path forward on water 

security that would gain support from security experts and water utilities, not just 

environmental groups and unions, and have a chance of making a real difference 

in securing water facilities. Senator Lautenberg, I know our staffs have worked together on other legislation, and I hope that we can work together to find a path 

forward here. 

No matter what we do, security for water facilities must focus first on ensuring 

that utilities can effectively meet the many requirements of the Safe Drinking 

Water Act (SDWA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA) and protect the health and the 

environment. Individual utilities know their water best, and by mandating IST the 

Federal Government would make it impossible for facilities to decide for themselves 

what the best course of action is to meet the health and environmental mandates 

of the SDWA and CWA. 

Nobody cares more about the security of their communities than the people who 

live there. We need to empower them to make the best decisions, not assume Washington knows best. 

Finally, I know Chairman Boxer shares my desire to get S. 1005, the ‘‘Water Infrastructure Financing Act,’’ on the floor. I still believe the most effective way to improve our Nation’s water facilities is by reauthorizing the State Revolving Loan 

Fund programs, both for drinking and waste water. We cannot expect our communities to continue to provide safe and clean water if they do not have the resources 

to meet their infrastructure needs. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much. 

We are joined by Senator Cardin and Senator Udall. 
21 

Senator Cardin, take 5 minutes to make your statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 

holding this hearing. I think this is an extremely important hearing. 

I want to underscore the point that Senator Inhofe made, and 

that is that we depend upon clean and safe water for our way of 

life. And we have not paid sufficient attention to the water infrastructure in this Nation. 

Now this Committee, on a very bipartisan basis, early this session passed legislation to reauthorize the State Revolving Fund. 

And I agree with Senator Inhofe that it is critically important that 

we get the reauthorization done. Many jurisdictions are depending 

upon the predictability of Federal funding in order to upgrade their 

water system. 

The American Society of Civil Engineers has given America’s 

water infrastructure a D¥. So, we start off with an infrastructure 

that is badly out of date. In my own State of Maryland, I refer to, 

frequently, the water main breaks that we have had where River 

Road, not very far from here, turned into a river. And thank goodness no one was killed due to the fast response of the first responders. We have had major water main breaks in Baltimore where we 

flooded out communities. Dundalk, Maryland, not far from downtown Baltimore, was totally flooded by a water main break. 

The point is that our aging infrastructure is beyond its useful 

life, and we need to give our local governments the tools they need 

by permanently reauthorizing these Revolving Funds to do that. 

Today’s hearing is dealing with another very important part of 

safe water. The House has passed the Chemical and Water Security Act which closed loopholes and provided additional funding to 

change to safer technologies. I applaud Senator Lautenberg’s leadership in this area. He has introduced legislation that would close 

the loopholes and provide for the ability to change to safer technologies in our water treatment facility plants. And I think that it 

is extremely important that we consider such legislation. 

Let me just point out that in Baltimore the Back River Wastewater Treatment Facility Plant has switched from the chlorine gas, 

the very dangerous technology, to liquid bleach, relieving nearly 1.5 

million people in danger of chlorine gas exposure. The city would 

like to convert another facility to liquid bleach but does not have 

the resources to do it. 

So, I think we need to work with our local governments, with our 

water managers, water treatment managers, to come up with a 

strategy that not only uses safer technologies, that we in Congress 

close the loopholes but that we work to dramatically improve the 

water infrastructure so that the reliability of clean and safe water 

that our constituents depend upon is a reality in this Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, with your consent, I will put my entire statement 

in the record, and I will apologize early to the witnesses. I have a 

conflict, but I am very much interested in their testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 
22 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

We rely on clean and safe water every day for our most basic household needs; 

so do our manufacturers and our farmers, our hospitals and our schools. The water 

infrastructure that treats and delivers clean drinking water, the infrastructure that 

carries away and treats our wastewater is critical to our health and to our security. 

That infrastructure is at a tipping point. 

In many places—if not most places—it has long outlived its 50-year life span. The 

American Society of Civil Engineers has given America’s water infrastructure a 

‘‘D¥’’ in its most recent report. 

We have been made painfully aware of this failure in my home State of Maryland. 

There have been hundreds of water main breaks, large and small, across Maryland 

over the last year alone. 

We’ve seen River Road in Bethesda turned into a literal river. In October 2009 

a thousand basements in Dundalk, Maryland, were under water. On March 6, 2010, 

thousands more homes and businesses along a major thoroughfare in Baltimore 

County were left without water. 

But the physical condition of the infrastructure is not its only challenge. Both because of the chemicals used to treat our water and because of the importance of this 

infrastructure to our health, water infrastructure and treatment facilities make inviting targets for terrorists. 

There are steps we can take to address this vulnerability. For instance, many 

treatment works do not need to use such dangerous disinfectant processes and 

chemicals like chlorine gas. And in fact, since the terrorist attacks in 2001 many 

treatment plants have switched to safer disinfection alternatives like liquid bleach 

or ultraviolet light. 

In my own State of Maryland dozens of treatment facilities have already converted from chlorine gas to safer alternatives. The Back River Wastewater Treatment Facility in Baltimore, for example, switched to liquid bleach, relieving nearly 

1.5 million people from danger of chlorine gas exposure. 

The city would like to convert another facility to liquid bleach but is struggling 

to find the resources to make those changes. That struggle is magnified by the demands of a decaying infrastructure system that requires significant investment to 

ensure the continued delivery of clean water. 

Last year, as Chairman of the Water and Wildlife Subcommittee, I worked with 

Chairman Boxer and Ranking Members Inhofe and Crapo to introduce the Water 

Infrastructure Financing Act. That bill would help address the overwhelming needs 

of our Nation’s drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. It significantly increases the authorizations for clean water and drinking water. It would also broaden the types of projects that are eligible for funding to include projects that increase 

water treatment facility security. 

While funding eligibility is important, it is not enough to address the security concerns posed by water treatment facilities. We need better ground rules for when and 

where such changes are necessary. 

When Congress passed the Chemical Security Act in 2006 several classes of facilities—including drinking water and wastewater facilities—were exempted from a 

chemical facility security program rules and requirements. That exemption is a serious gap in our security and must be fixed. 

The Chemical and Water Security Act passed by the House of Representatives 

last November closed this loophole and provides additional funding to change to 

safer technologies. The Senate must act to do the same. Senator Lautenberg introduced legislation that would build on the House passed bill. I commend him for his 

efforts. 

We know that an increased investment in infrastructure has benefits beyond the 

quality of our water and the safety of our communities, additional benefits that are 

particularly important in these economic times. With investment in water infrastructure we can create thousands of new, desperately needed jobs. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the scope of the security 

risks and gaps left by current laws and their ideas on current legislative proposals. 

We have a lot of work ahead of us to address this serious issue. I look forward 

to a healthy and open minded debate and working together to making our water 

systems and Nation safer. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Udall. 
23 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to echo 

what Senator Cardin said. This is a very important hearing. I will 

try to keep my opening statement short and put most of it in the 

record. 

But I do want to comment on the look for safer alternatives. I 

think that that is very important, and especially when it comes to 

chlorine gas. It is a very toxic and dangerous chemical. We need 

to find better ways. And we have; this hearing will raise awareness 

that safer alternatives to chlorine gas exist, and they may be as effective as treating water and at a reasonable cost. 

We have today a witness with us from Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mr. Carlos Perea of MIOX, a fast growing company in Albuquerque. MIOX uses a technology originally developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory to purify water using salt, water, and 

electric power. Utilities across the country have adopted this technology with great success. 

However, many water utilities and their workers and communities are still vulnerable. When we consider legislation to improve 

security at these facilities, we must ensure that we focus on the 

root of the problem, the toxic chemicals themselves. 

Any legislation should provide a mechanism for utilities to get informed about and consider the adoption of safer alternatives when 

feasible and affordable. We should not pick winners and losers, but 

instead create a technology-neutral process that will lead to reduced risk and more security. 

I also may not be able to hear all of the witnesses, but I know 

that Mr. Perea will fully inform the panel. I would ask the Chairman’s permission to put my full statement in the record and look 

forward to hearing from some of the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership and 

dedication in this area, too, and I know the legislation that you 

have sponsored in many of these areas. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Udall was not received at 

time of print.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you for being with us, even for this 

short time. 

The record will be kept open so that any questions that you want 

to submit will be accepted, and we will look for a fast turnaround 

from those from whom we make an inquiry. 

I want to say to Senator Inhofe that we—this oversight hearing 

is being done to get a better understanding of what the problems 

are. 

Senator INHOFE. And I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I only 

wanted to say that when the notice came out we always predicate 

the witnesses we have on what we think the subject is going to be. 

That is why I wanted the clarification that it is not one on your 

particular legislation. That is good. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. All right. 

And now we would like to hear from Ms. Cynthia Dougherty, the 

Director of the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water at 
24 

EPA. In that role she is in charge of EPA’s program for securing 

the Nation’s water facilities. 

Ms. Dougherty, we welcome you and ask you to begin your testimony. We ask you to try to keep it to 5 minutes so we will have 

some time for questions. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA C. DOUGHERTY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF GROUND WATER AND DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

and Senator Udall. I am Cynthia Dougherty, the Director of the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. I welcome this opportunity to discuss 

EPA’s efforts to promote security and resiliency in the water sector 

with an emphasis on our role in addressing chemical security. 

I understand that this Committee and others in Congress are in 

the process of considering chemical security legislation. To inform 

these deliberations the Administration has developed a set of guiding principles. 

First, the Administration supports permanent chemical facility 

authorities. Second, covered facilities that use substances of concern above threshold release levels should be required to assess inherently safer technology. Further, the appropriate regulatory 

agency should be authorized to require the highest risk facilities to 

implement IST under certain conditions and circumstances. 

Third, the existing security gap for wastewater and drinking 

water facilities should be closed with EPA having the authority to 

regulate chemical security at such water facilities while recognizing 

their essential public health and environmental missions. 

The water sector infrastructure is vulnerable to a wide range of 

threats and hazards. Serious health impacts could result from the 

introduction of contaminants into a drinking water system. And 

any denial of drinking water or wastewater services could have a 

major adverse effect on public health. 

The economic impacts of a terrorist attack or natural disaster on 

drinking water or wastewater utilities could be significant for businesses and infrastructure in a community. Simply put, the loss of 

water services could undermine the viability of just about any community. 

EPA has worked over the last several years to support the water 

sector in improving security and resiliency, and I am pleased to report that the sector has taken its charge seriously. EPA has been 

entrusted with important responsibilities for coordinating the protection of the water sector through congressional authorization 

under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and through Homeland Security Presidential Directives. 

Promoting the security and preparedness of the Nation’s water 

infrastructure remains a priority for the agency in a post-9/11 and 

post-Hurricane Katrina world. In working with the water sector we 

have emphasized a multi-layered approach to security consisting of 

prevention, detection, response, and recovery so that we can assist 
25 

water facilities in avoiding incidents, and should an incident occur, 

in quickly identifying and recovering from such events. 

We have worked closely with the water sector to assess and reduce the risks associated with hazardous chemicals. To this end, 

EPA and industry associations—often in partnership—have developed tools, training, and technical assistance to help water utilities 

identify and mitigate those risks. For example, EPA has developed 

software tools that assist water systems with assessing 

vulnerabilities, including chemical storage and handling. 

In conclusion, over the past several years we have made progress 

in ensuring the security of our Nation’s drinking water and wastewater systems. We have produced a broad array of tools, training, 

and other assistance that the water sector uses to assess its 

vulnerabilities, reduce risk, and prepare for emergencies including 

chemical theft and release. 

In developing these tools we have worked effectively with our 

partners within the sector and reached out to build new relationships beyond the sector to ensure that water utilities can be prepared to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from intentional 

incidents and natural disasters. 

We look forward to continuing to work with members of the Committee on legislation that ensures the security of drinking water 

and wastewater facilities while supporting their critical mission for 

public health and environmental protection. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about our role in 

water security. I would be happy to answer any questions you 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dougherty follows:] 
26 

Introduction 

TESTIMONY OF 

CYNTHIA C. DOUGHERTY 

DIRECTOR 

OFFICE OF GROUND WATER AND DRINKING WATER 

OFFICE OF WATER 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

July 28, 2010 

Good morning Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member lnhofe, and Members of the Committee. I am 

Cynthia Dougherty, Director of the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water at the United States 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I welcome this opportunity to discuss EPA's efforts to promote 

security and resiliency in the Water Sector with an emphasis on our role in addressing chemical security. 

It is important to note that the Administration has developed a set of guiding principles for the 

reauthorization of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and for addressing the 

chemical security of our nation's wastewater and drinking water treatment facilities. These principles are: 

1. The Administration supports permanent chemical facility security authorities. 

2. CFATS reauthorization presents an opportunity to promote the consideration and adoption of 

inherently safer technologies (1ST) among high risk chemical facilities. We look forward to working 

with this Committee and others on this important matter. 
27 

3. CFATS reauthorization also presents an opportunity to close the existing security gap for 

wastewater and drinking water treatment facilities by addressing the statutory exemption of these 

facilities from CFATS. The Administration supports closing this gap. 

S. 3598, the Secure Water Facilities Act, would close this gap. EPA supports the general structure 

and approach of this bill. In my remarks, I will offer some comments on this bill, as well as how EPA would 

coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in addressing chemical security at water and 

wastewater facilities. 

EPA has worked over the last several years to support the Water Sector in improving security and 

resiliency, and I am pleased to report that the sector has taken its charge seriously. EPA has been 

entrusted with important responsibilities for coordinating the protection of the Water Sector through 

Congressional authorization under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act), and through Presidential mandates under Homeland Security 

Presidential Directives (HSPD) 7, 9 and 10. HSPD 22 (the domestic chemical defense) also applies to 

water protection. 

Promoting the security and preparedness of the Nation's water infrastructure remains a priority of 

the Agency in a post-9111 and post-hurricane Katrina world. A loss of water service can seriously 

jeopardize the public health, economic vitality, and general viability of a community. In working with the 

Water Sector, we have emphasized a multi-layered approach to security consisting of prevention, 

detection, response, and recovery so that we can assist water facilities in avoiding incidents and, should an 

incident occur, in quickly identifying and recovering from such events. 

Risks to the Water Sector 

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Water Sector infrastructure is vulnerable to a range of threats and hazards, including improvised 

explosive devices, hazardous material releases, chemical, biological, or radiological contamination in 

drinking water distribution systems, cyber attacks, and natural disasters. The Water Sector is also 

vulnerable to disruptions to other infrastructure sectors, such as electric power, which can have cascading 

effects on the water supply as well as wastewater collection and treatment. 

Drinking water contamination or the denial of drinking water and wastewater services can have farreaching negative public health, economic, and psychological impacts. Serious health impacts could result 

from the introduction of contaminants into a drinking water system, which could pose a public health hazard 

from ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through the skin. Further, any denial of drinking water or 

wastewater service could pose significant health effects from the lack of potable water or the inability to 

treat wastewater. The loss of drinking water also would result in the loss of water for fire fighting purposes. 

The economic impacts of a temcrist attack or natural disaster on drinking water or wastewater utilities could 

be significant for businesses and infrastructure in a community or region. Simply put, the loss of water 

services would undermine the viability of just about any community. 

Even if an attempt to contaminate a drinking water utility did not result in fatalities or large numbers 

of casualties, terrorists stiJl could inflict harm by promoting fear and panic in the impacted community and in 

concerned communities across the Nation. Restoring public confidence after a contamination event, even 

with appropriate decontamination, could require significant effort. A prolonged water incident could affect 

the Federal, State, and local governments' ability to maintain order, deliver minimum essential public 

services, ensure public heath and safety, and carry out national security missions. 

Implementation of Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act 

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Existing statutory requirements address chemical security at drinking water systems to a degree. 

Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (added by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002) required each 

community water system providing drinking water to more than 3,300 persons to conduct a vulnerability 

assessment, certify its completion, and submit a copy of the assessment to EPA. These vulnerability 

assessments addressed security at water systems comprehensively, from water collection to treatment and 

distribution, and they specifically included the use, storage, or handling of chemicals. In addition, Section 

1433 required each water system to prepare or revise an emergency response plan that incorporates the 

findings of the vulnerability assessment and to certify to EPA that the system has completed such a plan. 

Since 2003, EPA has received 100% of the vulnerability assessments and emergency response 

plan certifications from large and medium community water systems serving more than 50,000 people. 

Over 99% of small community water systems serving between 3,300 and 50,000 people have submitted 

their vulnerability assessments and emergency response plan certifications. EPA reviewed the vulnerability 

assessments to ensure compliance with Bioterrorism Act, and where necessary provided technical 

assistance to individual drinking water systems to bring these systems into compliance. EPA also initiated 

some enforcement actions against non-compliant systems. 

EPA's Role in Chemical Security for Drinking Water and Wastewater Utilities 

EPA's current approach for addressing chemical security in the Water Sector involves a longstanding effort to promote the voluntary adoption of countermeasures by water facilities. Before I discuss 

some of these activities, however, I would like to take a step back to consider the broader implications of 

chemical security for the Water Sector. It is important for us to acknowledge in this discussion that the 

primary purpose of drinking water systems is the provision of safe drinking water, while that of wastewater 

systems is the protection of water bodies. In fact, the effective treatment of drinking water to control 

4 
30 

infectious diseases like typhoid and cholera has been hailed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention as one of the greatest public health achievements of the twentieth century. 

Therefore, authorizing language should allow for a consideration of this essential public health and 

environmental mission, particularly with respect to any provision which may require a facility to consider 

alternative water treatment processes. In other words, chemical security regulations when applied to the 

Water Sector should enable a reasoned balance of multiple, important factors so that we can achieve the 

joint policy goals of protecting public health and the environment while enhancing security. Such factors 

include: efficacy of treatment in meeting public health and environmental requirements, security concerns, 

reliability of treatment, source water characteristics, feasibility, and operator safety. 

Tools and Technical Assistance 

EPA has worked closely with the Water Sector to assess and reduce the risks associated with 

hazardous chemicals. To this end, EPA and industry associations, often in partnership, have developed 

tools, training and technical assistance to help water utilities identify and mitigate those risks. A few 

examples of our efforts are as follows: 

1. We developed tools that assist water systems with assessing vulnerabilities, including chemical 

storage and handling. Examples of the tools include: 

• The Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool (VSA PM)- a recently updated software package that 

supports water and wastewater utility vulnerability assessments using a qualitative risk 

assessment methodology; 

• The Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems- a 

manual specifically designed to help small water systems conduct vulnerability assessments; 

and 

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• The Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Very Small (<3,300) Systems, which 

assists these systems in assessing their critical components and identifying security measures 

that should be implemented. 

2. As required by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, EPA created a document to "provide baseline 

information to community water systems ... regarding which kinds of terrorist attacks or other 

intentional acts are the probable threats to: (A) substantially disrupt the ability of the system to 

provide a safe and reliable supply of drinking water; or (B) otherwise present significant public 

health concerns." The baseline threat document addressed vulnerabilities related to the use, 

transfer and storage of chemicals, including the evaluation of different disinfection options. EPA 

provided this document to drinking water facilities to assist them in conducting their vulnerability 

assessments. 

3. The National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA) has worked with the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and EPA to create a Chlorine Gas Decision Tool for Water and 

Wastewater Utilities. The Tool is designed to provide utilities with a user-friendly, but thorough, 

means of evaluating alternatives to chlorine gas disinfection. 

4. EPA created a series of Security Product Guides that assist water facilities with making 

enhancements to reduce risks and protect against man-made and naturally occurring events. 

These guides provide recommendations for improving physical security, such as the use of 

barriers, placement and security of aboveground equipment, selection of fencing materials, and the 

use of visual surveillance monitoring systems, all of which can help to secure hazardous chemicals 

used by water facilities. 

5. EPA funded a cooperative agreement with the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American 

Water Works Association, and the Water Environmental Federation to develop Voluntary Physical 

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32 

Security Standards for drinking water and wastewater systems. Complete{j in Decemllet 2006, 

these voluntary standards address storage of hazardous or toxic chemicals, illcltJding chlorine and 

ammonia gas. 

6. Together with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, EPA developed ALOHA 

(Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) and RMP*Comp- software tools that many water 

utilities and other facilities use to model the dispersion of hazardous substances. DHS uses 

RMP*Comp in its Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. 

Risk Management Plans 

In addition to the above activities, EPA's Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions (40 CFR 68.1-

.220), developed under the authority of the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), require utility processes 

containing certain levels of specific hazardous substances to implement an accident prevention program, 

conduct a hazard assessment, prepare and implement an emergency response plan, and submit to EPA a 

summary report known as a risk management plan (RMP). The RMP must describe the facility's accidental 

release prevention and emergency response policies, the regulated substances handled at the facility, the 

worst-case release scenario(s) and alternative release scenario(s), the 5-year accident history of the 

facility, the Emergency Response Plan, and planned changes to improve safety at the facility (see 40 CFR 

Part 68). Hazardous chemicals of most relevance to the Water Sector, including gaseous chlorine, 

ammonia, sulfur dioxide, and chlorine dioxide, trigger RMP regulatory requirements if they exceed certain 

threshold quantities. 

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33 

Secure Water Facilities Act 

While the focus of my discussion will be on the chemical security provisions of the bill, it is 

important to underscore that the bill also addresses water security risks in general. The bill, for example, 

requires all drinking water facilities serving over 3,300 people and all wastewater facilities with a design 

capacity of more than 2.5 million gallons per day to update their vulnerability assessments and emergency 

response plans at least once every five years. Under the bill, these assessments and plans are not limited 

to chemical security, but cover the full array of potential water system vulnerabilities, from pipes and 

constructed conveyances to storage facilities and electronic systems. As such, the bill provides statutory 

authority for EPA to continue to promote the risk reduction goals of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. 

Considerations on the Bill 

As we have stated to Congress before, we believe that there is a critical gap in the U.S. chemical 

security regulatory framework-namely, the exemption of drinking water and wastewater treatment 

facilities. We need to work with Congress to close this gap in order to secure substances of concern at 

these facilities and to protect the communities they serve. Drinking water and wastewater treatment 

facilities that meet CFATS thresholds for chemicals of interest should be regulated. We do, however, 

recognize the unique public health and environmental requirements and responsibilities of such facilities. 

For example, we understand that a "cease operations" order that might be appropriate for another facility 

underCFATS would have significant public health and environmental consequences when applied to a 

water facility. 

The Administration has established the following policy principles in regards to regulating security 

at water sector facilities: 

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34 

• EPA should be the lead agency for chemical security for both drinking water and wastewater 

systems, with DHS supporting EPA's efforts. 

• To address chemical security in the water sector, EPA would utilize, with modifications as 

appropriate given statutory requirements and the uniqueness of the sector, DHS' existing risk 

assessment tools and performance standards for chemical facilities. 

• DHS should be responsible for ensuring consistency of high-risk chemical facility security across all 

18 critical infrastructure sectors. 

The Administration supports, where possible, using safer technology, such as less toxic chemicals, 

to enhance the security of the nation's high-risk chemical facilities. However, we must recognize that risk 

management requires balancing threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences with the cost to mitigate risk. 

Similarly, the potential public health and environmental consequences of alternative chemicals must be 

considered with respect to the use of safer technology. In this context, the Administration has established 

the following policy principles in regards to 1ST at high-risk chemical facilities: 

• The Administration supports consistency of 1ST approaches for facilities regardless of sector. 

• The Administration believes that all high-risk chemical facilities, Tiers 1-4, should assess 1ST 

methods and report the assessment in the facilities' site security plans. Further, the appropriate 

regulatory entity should have the authority to require facilities posing the highest degree of risk 

(Tiers 1 and 2) to implement 1ST method(s) if such methods enhance overall security, are feasible, 

and, in the case of water sector facilities, consider public health and environmental requirements. 

• For Tier 3 and 4 facilities, the appropriate regulatory entity should review the 1ST assessment 

contained in the site security plan. The entity should be authorized to provide recommendations on 

implementing 1ST, but it would not require facilities to implement the 1ST methods. 

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35 

• The Administration believes that flexibility and staggered implementation would be required in 

implementing this new 1ST policy. DHS, in coordination with EPA, would develop an 1ST 

implementation plan for timing and phase-in at water facilities designated as high-risk chemical 

facilities. DHS would develop an 1ST implementation plan for high-risk chemical facilities in all 

other applicable sectors. 

In addition to articulating these principles, I also would like to comment on several aspects of the 

bill that have significant relevance to its successful implementation. The first issue pertains to resources. 

Passage of the bill would impose new resource demands on both EPA and most of the states. 

The second comment concerns the division of regulatory labor between EPA and the states. 

Consistent with S. 3598, EPA supports authority for the states to implement tertain provisions, including a 

prominent role in 1ST determinations and auditing/inspections. This approach would leverage long 

established EPA-state relationships under the drinking water and wastewater programs, as well as the 

states' expertise and familiarity with individual water facilities. 

Finally, the Administration supports maintaining the Department of Homeland Security's current 

Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) regime for protecting sensitive information relating to 

chemical facility security. This regime is similar to, but distinct from, other sensitive but unclassified 

information protection programs. 

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CONCLUSION 

Over the past several years, we have made progress in strengthening the security of our nation's 

drinking water and wastewater systems. We have produced a broad array of tools and assistance that the 

Water Sector is using to assess its vulnerabilities, reduce risk, and prepare for emergencies, including 

chemical theft and release. In developing these tools, we have worked effectively with our partners within 

the sector, and also reached out to build new relationships beyond the sector, to ensure that water utilities 

can be prepared to prevent, detect, respond and recover from intentional incidents and natural disasters. 

We look forward to continuing to work with members of the Committee on legislation that 

strengthens the security of drinking water and wastewater facilities while supporting the critical mission of 

these facilities for public health protection. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about our role in water security. I would be happy to 

answer any questions you may have. 

11 
37 

Hearing titled: "Protecting America's Water Treatment Facilities" 

U.S. Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

July 28, 2010 

Senator James M. lnbofe 

Cynthia Dougherty's Responses to 

Questions for the Record 

I. Nobody cares more about the security of tlteir communities titan tlte people 111ho live tit ere, 

and nobody knoll's more about tlteir 111ater titan the people wlto treat it. Wltat is EPA doing to 

encourage water systems to make security a part of everyday decisions at 111ater facilities? 

Promoting the security of the nation's water infrastructure has been an important undertaking of 

the Agency in a post-September II world. Given the largely voluntary basis of the water 

security program, EPA and the water sector have strived to incorporate security concerns into 

common industry practices to ensure that security complements other critical activities and is a 

part of everyday decision making at water facilities. The fact that our notion of security has 

evolved since 9/11 from an exclusive focus on terrorism to an all-hazards approach has assisted 

with this integration effort. The 2005 hurricane season, the 2008 floods in the Midwest, and other 

events speak directly to the need to adopt an all-hazards approach-an approach which promises 

multiple benefits to utilities. Consequently, most of EPA's and our partners' programs take an 

all-hazards approach. 

In our effort to instill an all-hazards approach within the water sector, EPA, often in partnership 

with the sector, has undertaken several projects within the water security program. One such 

priority effort involves defining and disseminating best security practices. A water sector 

working group in 2008 recommended I 0 features which constitute a protective program 1

• EPA 

has developed numerous tools and nationwide training sessions so that water systems can 

integrate these features into business-as-usual planning. 

As a result of EPA's and our partners' efforts, water system owners and operators have 

implemented numerous protective enhancements into their standard practices. These 

enhancements include: (I) improving control of access to utilities; (2) expanding physical 

barriers against vulnerabilities by installing equipment such as backflow prevention devices in 

pipes and locks on fire hydrants and manholes; (3) increasing control over access, delivery, and 

storage of chemicals; and (4) hardening cyber network control systems by installing virusdetection software and firewalls, and in some cases by taking control systems offline. 

Water sector utilities have also increased their ability to respond to all hazards by: (I) planning 

for operator and customer protection against influenza pandemics; (2) establishing mutual aid 

and assistance through Water and Wastewater Agency Response Networks (WARNs); (3) 

participating in research and development (R&D) programs to improve protection capabilities; 

(4) improving outreach to the public health sector; (5) enhancing communications with both 

1 http:/lcfj>ub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/features.cfm 
38 

customers and consumers; and (6) organizing the Water Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (WateriSAC) for effective communication strategy for warnings and alerts. 

We believe there is a critical gap in the U.S. chemical security regulatory framework-namely, 

drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities are exempt from regulation under the 

Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards (CFATS). We need to work with Congress to close 

this gap in order to secure substances of concern at these facilities and to protect the communities 

they serve. Drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities that possess any substance of 

concern at or above threshold quantities2 should be regulated. While many drinking water and 

wastewater facilities likely have adopted measures to address the security risks of substances of 

concern, the adequacy and consistency with which these facilities have implemented protective 

measures cannot be effectively gauged or ensured absent a regulatory program. In sum, to 

ensure adequacy and consistency in the protection of chemical facilities possessing certain 

substances of concern, there is a need to apply the requirements under Section 550 of the· 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of2007 and CFATS equally to the water 

sector, and it is the Administration's position that EPA have this regulatory responsibility. 

2. I was i11trigued by Mr. Grumbles' testimony regarding Arizona incorporating safety 

information into its "sanitary surveys." Are yo11 aware of other states that have done this? 

Although security is not explicitly defined as an element to be evaluated in a sanitary survey, 

EPA does have guidance to assist states that choose to incorporate security provisions into their 

sanitary survey activities. The "Leamer's Guide to Security Considerations for Small Systems" 

was developed to identifY ang e_~J!P_n_l:llJlj!>.I: security ~onsig~.ll.tiQns f()Ij~ectof§JQ evalw!!e_,__ 

The guide provides suggested assessment criteria for many aspects of physical security for public 

water systems, including criteria to help determine whether the system ensures that chemicals 

used in the treatment process are properly protected and stored. Although not as thorough as 

reviews conducted for vulnerability assessments, the guide can enable users to do a preliminary 

evaluation of security concerns. 

Sanitary surveys are conducted by states. Under National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 

states are required to conduct sanitary surveys at each public water system at least every 3 to 5 

years, depending on a system's type and size. EPA regulations define minimum required 

elements of sanitary surveys, but states can include any additional steps they choose. EPA does 

not have information regarding activities states may take beyond the minimum requirements. 

3. As you begin preparing tlze next clean water and safe drinking water needs surveys, ltave 

there been any ways to encourage otlter states to incorporate safety information practices, 

similar to wlzat Arizona lias done, into their data gathering? 

EPA's 2003 Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey was the first assessment following the 

attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Agency included in the survey specific questions 

regarding infrastructure investment needs related to security. EPA included these questions in 

the 2007 Survey, and we plan to include them in our upcoming 2011 Survey. 

2 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixa-chemicalofinterestlist.pdf 

2 
39 

Infrastructure projects in the 2007 Survey, that were specifically listed as security needs, 

accounted for $422.0 million for the 20-year period of2007 to 2026. However, as discussed in 

the 2007 Report to Congress, the total cost that systems incur to protect their infrastructure is far 

greater than the needs reported in the Survey. The needs identified in the Survey are only for 

investments in infrastructure; they do not include operation and maintenance costs. 

Furthermore, infrastructure needs related to security are now typically incorporated into the 

construction costs of projects, rather than being considered separately. The majority of 

infrastructure investment needs related to security are, therefore, mostly "hidden" in the other 

infrastructure needs reported in our Survey. Even where security needs can be specifically 

identified, many systems chose not to break out those needs separately due to security concerns 

of reporting vulnerabilities. 

EPA has not tracked security infrastructure costs separately from other infrastructure needs in the 

Clean Water Needs Survey. In general, EPA believes that most capital security costs are 

included in broader capital cost categories captured by this survey, such as secondary and 

advanced wastewater treatment plant infrastructure needs. 

4. Tltere was a lot of discussion abo11t tile "security gap" tltat exists beiiVeen water facilities 

and reg11lar cltemicalfacilities. Please provide EPA's 11nderstanding of tile nat11re oftlte 

"gap" and wltetller it is feasible to narrow or close tlte gap. 

As noted, we believe there is a critical gap in the U.S. chemical security regulatory frameworknamely, the exemption of drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. We need to work 

with Congress to close this gap in order to secure substances of concern at these facilities and to 

protect the communities they serve. 'Drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities that 

possess any chemical at or above threshold quantities3 should be regulated. 

As you know, Section 550 of the 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act required the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue regulations for the security of chemical 

facilities, including risk-based performance standards, vulnerability assessments, site security 

plans, and related requirements. However, this Act prohibits DHS from applying these 

regulations to drinking water and wastewater facilities. 

EPA and DHS data indicate that a significant number of drinking water and wastewater 

treatment facilities use chemicals of interest above the threshold defined under the Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations. Due to their statutory exemption, these 

facilities are not regulated under CF ATS, while chemical facilities using the same quantities of 

the same chemicals would be regulated under CF ATS. This discrepancy is the "security gap." 

While many drinking water and wastewater facilities likely have adopted measures to address the 

security risks of chemical of interest, the adequacy and consistency with which these facilities 

have implemented protective measures cannot be effectively gauged or ensured absent a 

regulatory program. That is, the need to ensure adequacy and consistency in the protection of 

chemicals of interest at certain chemical facilities, as codified in Section 550 of the 2007 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act, applies equally to the water sector. 

1 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixa·chemicalotinterestlist.pdf 

3 
40 

5. LIISI year EPA received $52.6 million for Homeland Security activities in FYJO. Wltat did 

EPA do to ensure greater water security witll tllis money? 

As the sector lead for water and wastewater infrastructure security, EPA works to assist the water 

sector in preventing, detecting, responding to, and recovering from incidents whether natural or 

manmade. Ofthe $52.6 million cited in the question, EPA received about $30 million for its 

water security program. 

EPA has used this funding to fulfill the Agency's responsibilities and commitments under the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)4

, as defined within the Water Sector Specific 

Plan5

• Efforts to protect the nation's critical water infrastructure include water sector-specific 

agency responsibilities, such as providing tools and training to the water sector, and continued 

support for the Water Security Initiative {WSI) pilot programs and the Water Laboratory 

Alliance. 

This year, EPA fully funded the final two of five total pilots in the WSI program. Results from 

these pilots will be used to develop a voluntary national outreach program to encourage adoption 

of effective contamination warning systems. EPA has already developed guidance materials 

based on lessons learned from this project, which we have disseminated to the water sector on an 

aggressive schedule. 

In 2010, EPA's Water Laboratory Alliance (WLA) completed integration of the 11 Regional 

Laboratory Response Plans into a single National Plan, a critical step towards establishing a 

laboratory network necessary to support the sort of sampling and analysis envisioned under the 

WSI program:-In addition, EPA-continued to support the-regional-laboratory networks-by--

providing access to supplemental analytical capacity and coordinating and standardizing data 

reporting systems and analytical methods. 

An important role of EPA's water security program is to ensure that water sector utilities have 

tools and information to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, other 

intentional acts, and natural disasters. In FY20 10, EPA supported preventive and preparedness 

work in collaboration with states' homeland security and water sector officials and DHS. 

Among other things, activities in this arena included: 

• Providing technical assistance to water utilities through webinars, tabletop exercises, and 

training. Over the last four years, we have reached more than 10,000 utilities. Recently, we 

have focused our training on the Incident Command System {ICS) to promote the 

integration of water utilities into the response structure. 

• Working on an update to a risk assessment software program, the Vulnerability Self· 

Assessment Tool, which enables utilities to identify and prioritize the risks associated with 

an array of natural and manmade hazards. 

4 http://www.dhs.gov/fileslprogramsleditorial_ 0827 .shtm 

' http://www.epa.gov/safewaterlwatersecurity/pubslplan _security_ watersectorspecificplan.pdf 

4 
41 

• Working in partnership with the American Water Works Association to support the 

establishment of mutual aid agreements among utilities to expedite the rapid deployment of 

emergency support to improve recovery times. 

6. I am very concerned about tile subjectivity of many of tire assumptions inherent in ISTspecifically tile presumption tlrat if you are nsing a "less ltazardons clremicaf" to treat your 

drinking water, tire overall risk is reduced. Tit is assumption sets utilities up to potentially sltift 

risk from lite utility to another source, suclt as increased delivery trucks carrying concentrated 

hleaclt. Can EPA ensure that utilities making moves to different cllemicals are not simply 

slrifting risk from one area oftlte community to anotlter or from one risk, s11ch as chemical 

explosion to another, suclt.as risk of increased ltealtlr concerns? 

These are important concerns. EPA, in coordination with DHS and States, can work to ensure 

that chemical security regulations when applied to the Water Sector achieve the joint policy 

goals of protecting public health and the environment while enhancing security. 

Currently, States must approve changes in disinfection practices by water utilities to ensure that 

adequate public health protection is maintained. H.R. 2868 and S. 3598 would require a covered 

water system, when assessing methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an 

intentional act, to consider the security, public health, and environmental mission of the system. 

EPA believes that this inclusion of public health as a consideration in the assessment, along with 

the continued state role in approving disinfection changes, will help protect public health. 

Further, EPA, DHS, and States can work in partnership to ensure that implementation of IST6 at 

a water utility wouldnofincrease the poteniiiifnsks of an intentional act or aCcrdenfoccurriiig--

outside the utility. An analysis of the potential for increased risk offsite would be an appropriate 

factor for consideration if a regulatory agency were in a position to require a utility to implement 

IST. S. 3598 includes this type of analysis and would require EPA to account for offsite risk 

shifting as part of the process of determining whether to require methods to reduce 

consequences. 

7. How will EPA ensure til is risk slzifting does not l1appe11? 

As stated above, H.R. 2868 and S. 3598 would require consideration of the public health and 

environmental mission of a water system, in addition to security, in an assessment of methods to 

reduce consequences. Accordingly, this assessment should address effectiveness, reliability, 

cost, disinfection by-products, O&M requirements, safety, and other factors. EPA believes that a 

rigorous assessment of these factors, in conjunction with the continuing role of States in 

approving disinfection changes to make sure that public health protection is maintained, can 

ensure that the implementation of methods to reduce consequences does not increase public 

health risk. 

6Chemlcal and water security bills in the 111 01 Congress have used the term "methods to reduce consequences of a 

chemical release from an intentional act" rather than "inherently safer technology" (1ST). We understand the tenns 

to be synonyms. More details are provided in the response to question 8. 

5 
42 

Under S. 3598, if a state makes a determination to require a covered water or wastewater system 

to implement a method to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act, 

the system may appeal the determination. As part of the appeal, the system may request a 

determination of whether implementation of the method to reduce consequences would 

significantly increase the potential consequences of an intentional act occurring outside the 

system. EPA, in consultation with DHS, would quantitY whether there would be a significant 

increase in offsite consequences. 

If a determination is made that implementation of a method to reduce consequences would result 

in a significant increase in the potential consequences of an intentional act occurring outside the 

system, the state must consider this determination when making a final decision on whether to 

require the system to implement the method to reduce consequences. 

EPA believes that incorporating an analysis of potential increases in offsite consequences into 

the process of determining whether to require a system to implement a method to reduce 

consequences, as S. 3598 does, can be effective in mitigating risk shifting. 

8. At tile hearing, I asked yo11 to deji11e tile term "inl1ere11tly safer technology." You said til at 

EPA had 110t defined "i11herently safer teclmology" but til at yo11 agreed witiltile deji11itions in 

Sen. Laufenberg's bill and tl1e House-passed C!lemica/ Sec11rity bill. Neitller oft/lOse bills uses 

the terms "inherently safer tecllno/ogy." Please explain what deji11ition or sectiorrs you JVere 

agreeing wit/1 at oltr llearing and wllat sectio11s you think define "inherently safer 

technology". 

My testimony referred to the definition of the term "method to reduce the consequences of a 

chemical release from an intentional act" as used inS. 3598, Title I, section 1433(k)(l) and Title 

II, section 32l(k)(l) and in H.R. 2868, Title II, section 1433(g)(l) and Title III, section 

222(b)(3). These bills use this term rather than "inherently safer technology". 

All sections cited above define this term as follows: 

"a measure at a covered water system [or treatment works] that reduces or eliminates the 

potential consequences of a release of a substance of concern from an intentional act, such as-

(i) the elimination of or a reduction in the amount [or quantity] of a substance of concern 

possessed or planned to be possessed by a water system [or treatment works] through the use of 

alternate substances, formulations. or processes; (ii) the modification of pressures, 

temperatures, or concentrations of a substance of concern; and (iii) the reduction or elimination 

of onsite handling of a substance of concern through the improvement of inventory control or 

chemical use efficiency." 

The actual methods to reduce consequences that a facility could consider would, of course, be 

case specific. 

9. I am aJVare of several concerns tit at stem from 011site generation of and 11se of llypocllforite 

disinfection. I understand excess llydrogen gas is om byprod11ct of the onsite gmeration 

process. Also, llypoclllorite solutions can contai11 impurities suclt as bromate, ell/orate, 

6 
43 

clllorite and even percltlorate. Is EPA doing any studies or working witlt research institutions 

on dealing witlt tlte potential problems created by ltypocltlorite use or generation? 

EPA continues to work v.ith research foundations, water utility associations, and standards 

setting bodies to address concerns with the use of hypochlorite and other disinfectants, including 

the formation of disinfection byproducts. 

All disinfection processes have advantages and disadvantages, many of which are site-specific in 

magnitude. Consequently, EPA believes that disinfectant selection by a utility should be sitespecific, and that no single disinfectant is appropriate for all utilities. 

Onsite generation of hypochlorite does produce hydrogen gas as a byproduct, albeit at low levels 

that are typically vented to the atmosphere and are not considered a problem. 

Hypochlorite solutions may contain bromate if bromide is present in the salt used to manufacture 

it. For water systems that purchase bulk hypochlorite solutions, ANSIINSF Standard 60 certifies 

that if the hypochlorite application does not exceed a specified maximum usage level, then the 

bromate level from hypochlorite in the treated water will not exceed one half of the maximum 

contaminant level for bromate. For hypochlorite generated onsite, water systems may need to 

purchase salt with low bromide levels. However, a quantitative correlation between the amount 

of bromide present in salt used for on-site generation and resulting bromate formation in 

hypochlorite has not been established. 

Sodium hypochlorite degrades over time. Generally, higher concentrations of hypochlorite and 

higher storage tempeiatuiesresuTt-in more rapid degradation, as well as increased levels-of . 

chlorate as a degradation byproduct. Hypochlorite degradation is usually more of a concern with 

the purchase of bulk hypochlorite solutions, which are more concentrated and stored longer than 

hypochlorite generated onsite. 

For utilities that routinely use their sodium hypochlorite within 45 days of manufacture, the level 

of perchlorate is likely to be negligible, unless there is some contamination of the original 

ingredients. To minimize the perchlorate risk, sodium hypochlorite should be stored in the dark, 

at cool temperatures, diluted if possible, and used within a few weeks of manufacture. 

ANSIINSF Standard 60 is expected to be revised in the near future to set a limit for perchlorate 

in bulk hypochlorite solutions. Perchlorate has not b.een identified as a contaminant in the onsite 

generation of hypochlorite, where the lower concentration of hypochlorite and shorter storage 

time would mitigate perchlorate formation. 

10. Does EPA It ave any guidance for facilities tltat use ollSite ge11eration to help mitigate tlu 

problems oft/lese and otlter impurities? 

EPA has not published guidance for water systems that specifically addresses the use of onsite 

generation of hypochlorite. However, ~he American Water Works Association has published a 

decision-making guide for disinfectant selection by utilities that addresses onsite generation of 

hypochlorite. Further, EPA and other water sector organizations have published guidance on the 

use of hypochlorite generally, which is relevant to the onsite generation of hypochlorite. 

7 
44 

11. Cllange in disinfection products can result in leeching of lead in water li11es, such as wlrat 

ltappened in Wasltington, DC several years ago. How call we eJJsure tllat systems tltat are 

co11sidering switcili11g disinfection products e1zsure tlmt the water lines are not going to have 

similar problems? · 

EPA published revisions to the lead and copper rule in the October 10, 2007 Federal Register. 

Among the revisions in this final rule was a requirement that systems notify the State and receive 

approval prior to any long-term treatment change. The final rule language lists examples of 

long-term treatment changes, such as switching secondary disinfectants. In addition, EPA also 

published "Simultaneous Compliance Guidance Manual for the Long Term 2 and Stage 2 

Disinfection Byproduct Rules in March 2007." This guidance document provides information 

for systems to evaluate the potential impact of switching secondary disinfectants on their 

corrosion control process. 

12. Does EPA have any data on how much security upgrades to water treatment facilities cost? 

If so, please share tltal with this committee. 

EPA has compiled data on the cost of physical security upgrades to water treatment facilities 

through a number of sources, including EPA's Security Product Guides, EPA's Water Security 

Initiative pilots, and the Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey. Security upgrade costs 

vary widely depending on the type and magnitude of enhancements, and can encompass a very 

wide range of equipment. In response to this question, EPA could provide more specific cost 

data for security upgrades dependingQ!l \Vllat -~pecific sorts of upgrades were of interest. 

13. Does EPA have any data 011 /tow much it costs to switclttreatmelll teclmologies? If so, 

please share with tllis committee? 

EPA has analyzed the costs of implementing a wide range of treatment technologies to enhance 

disinfection processes, such as membranes, UV, ozone, chlorine dioxide, total organic carbon 

removal, and others. These costs vary widely depending on system size and site specific 

circumstances. EPA would be glad to provide more specific cost data upon request. 

However, EPA has not done a cost analysis of switching disinfection practices specifically in the 

context of 1ST (or methods to reduce consequences). For example, EPA has not analyzed the 

cost of switching from gas chlorine to hypochlorite {either purchasing a bulk solution or onsite 

generation). 

14. As yo11 stated ill our lteari11g, EPA does not keep a record of how muclt a Vlllllerability 

assessme11t costs a treatment works to complete. /11 ligltt oft/tis, /tow can you be cotifidetlt 

$300,000,000 would be enouglt to e11sure all large water systems could update litem on a 

regular basis and successfttlly ma11age oversigltt and etlforcement at EPA and at tlte state 

level? 

EPA has not done an analysis of the projected costs of compliance with proposed legislation. 

Such an analysis would be done as part of the development of a regulation pursuant to enactment 

8 
45 

of the legislation. Further, the costs would depend on specifics of the regulation, such as criteria 

for assigning systems to risk tiers and options for meeting risk-based performance standards. 

Consequently, EPA does not have a position on whether $300,000,000 would be sufficient to 

cover all costs of compliance with proposed legislation. 

9 
46 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Ms. Dougherty. 

I want to just review a couple of things. In your testimony, you 

said that current chemical security laws do not adequately address 

the risk of attack on water facilities. I do not know whether you 

have had a chance to look at the Secure Water Facilities Act, which 

we think is much more effective in closing the gap and addressing 

these risks. 

Are these areas of coverage taking care of the problems that 

seem to be—that have remained open over a period of time? Can 

we address these risks in the form that we are proposing here? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Yes. I think your legislation would close that 

gap, which is a priority for this Administration. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Some have argued that companies—and 

not regulatory agencies—should decide whether a facility should 

use safer technology. Which might be a better approach, a voluntary or regulatory approach to protect the public from the consequences of an attack? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. The Administration supports the approach in 

your bill which would provide the Government the authority to require safer alternatives for the highest risk facilities, balancing security, public health, and their environmental mission. And for the 

drinking water and wastewater facilities, that would be done really 

at the State level. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. As I noted, over 500 water facilities in 47 

States have already replaced extremely hazardous substances with 

safer and more secure chemicals in their processes. We have heard 

from the opponents that moving to a safer technology does not necessarily make sense for all facilities, and we are not proposing a 

one size fits all. The standards that we proposed, we believe can 

provide the latitude as well as the coverage that we need. 

Do you think that the approach that we have taken is one that 

can take care of our needs without imposing heavier burdens on 

those who do not have this kind of a responsibility but have other 

ways of dealing with it? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. I think the approach in your bill provides factors for water systems and if necessary the State to assess that allows for an understanding of the uniqueness of each system and 

would allow for them to look at safer alternatives while still making sure that they meet that public health or environmental protection requirement. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, we have tried to make certain that we 

work to cure the problem that we know is rampant in terms of a 

lack of the security for these facilities and how important it is that 

we try to cover these bases. And we know that there are lots of enemies out there that see the targets, water supply systems, as the 

kind of target that brings enormous damage. 

Now, if the facility is required to switch to a safer alternative we 

want to make sure that there is no risk shifting where a plant simply moves the risk to another facility. Could EPA work with the 

Department of Homeland Security to reduce overall risk and prevent the risk from being shifted offsite? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Yes, EPA could, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, look to make sure that there is no 

offsite risk shifting in a decision that is made. 
47 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Ms. Dougherty. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Dougherty, let me start off with the vulnerability assessments. Do you see a benefit in routinely updating these assessments? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. One of the things that we have done over the 

past several years with the water sector is look at what the future 

should be for an active and effective security program at a water— 

a wastewater system. And one of the things that we together identified in doing that was that vulnerability assessments need to be 

updated over time so that the system understands what they need 

to be protecting against. 

Senator INHOFE. And how often do you think they should be updated? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Three to 5 years, probably. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Or if something major changes in terms of the 

system, in terms of how, what treatment they are using or what 

else might be happening around that system. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. Does the EPA keep a record as to the cost 

of these assessments? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. We have not done that. No. 

Senator INHOFE. Do current vulnerability assessments require 

systems to examine how they handle chemicals onsite and look at 

how systems can handle their chemicals more safely? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Yes. When the original Bioterrorism Bill was 

passed in 2002 there was a requirement for systems to do one-time 

vulnerability assessments, and those assessments included chemical safety and handling. 

Senator INHOFE. And do you believe that if the inherently safer 

technology were to be mandated, do you have—does EPA and the 

agencies have the resources to carry out that mandate? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. I would say that when you look at the bills that 

are under consideration there are authorizations for EPA and the 

States to carry out the requirements, and those authorizations 

would be sufficient for us to do it. But we do not have the resources 

today. 

Senator INHOFE. Just to help me out a little bit and for the 

record, define inherently safer technology. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Well, I think in—we have not defined inherently safer technology specifically, but it is defined in both the 

House Bill that has been passed as well as Senator Lautenberg’s 

bill, and we think that definition is fine, and it is not so prescriptive and provides the ability of systems to look at a number of different factors. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I do want to look at that because I see, 

well, first of all, Senator Lautenberg and I both want to accomplish 

the same thing. I said that in my opening statement, and I mean 

it. But there are some problems here. One, that term has been so 

vague. In the past we have looked at that, and the fear the people 

have is that it is not well enough defined so that people have a concern that they would be, they put their own worst case definition 

on it, which is just human nature. 
48 

And the other problem is just a basic difference is, and I think 

that certainly Senator Lautenberg mentioned it in his question to 

you or reaffirm his position and that is, in asking the question is 

the bureaucracy in better shape than the companies themselves to 

do this. And I think that this is another reason why there is often 

disagreement on IST. 

I can remember, gosh, it was about 3 or 4 years ago, we went 

through this for a long period of time trying to do this, and those 

are the two problems that I had at that time. I was really watching 

this closely as the time goes by. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Yes, I would just add that the way that the 

bills are set up and the way that we would envision this happening 

is that the systems would do the assessment of the methods to reduce a release of a chemical of concern and that I would expect, 

given the experience that we have had with the water sector over 

time, that the systems would do a fine job of doing that and most 

likely reach the conclusions that they need to reach of themselves. 

But it is important to have a Government layer in terms of oversight and consistency related to national security decisions. And 

these are national security decisions when you are looking at what 

to do about the chemicals of concern here. 

So, it would be important to make sure that there is still a Government check and a Government review and approval or decision 

to require IST for those highest risk contaminants. 

Senator INHOFE. But when you say the systems would be responsible for making this assessment and determining what needs to be 

done about it, and you do not see that this could be, you think 

that—you already said that resources would be adequate in the 

event that this system—— 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. If it was appropriated, yes. 

Senator INHOFE. If appropriated, yes. Because what I do not 

want to do is be looking at another unfunded mandate. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Yes, I agree. 

Senator INHOFE. You know, those of us who served some time at 

the local government level, I used to say when I was Mayor of 

Tulsa that our problems were not prostitution and crime in the 

street and all that; the problems were unfunded mandates. And 

that is what we are going to try to avoid. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Dougherty, your testimony discussed how EPA has been 

working with water utilities since 2002 and before on security. But 

most of the discussion relates to physical security. What efforts has 

EPA taken to educate both large and small drinking water utilities 

about the options for safer alternatives to chlorine gas water treatment, and what has been the impact of those efforts? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. We have done some work over the last several 

years with the water sector to develop schools and training that 

help them assess and mitigate the risk from hazardous chemicals. 

So, the risk assessment tools that we have developed to address 

vulnerabilities include chemical storage and handling, and we have 

developed a software tool which models the dispersion and health 
49 

effects of hazardous substances which DHS actually uses in its 

CFATS Program. 

We also have partnered with the National Association of Clean 

Water Agencies and DHS to create a chlorine gas decision tool to 

help utilities evaluate their disinfection methods in light of security 

and public health concerns. And we have worked with the Water 

Sector Coordinating Council over time with DHS to talk about 

emerging threats related to hazardous chemicals and make sure 

that information is available to people. 

Senator UDALL. Now, on the second panel, Mr. Carlos Perea is 

testifying about a technology developed in New Mexico that is an 

alternative to chlorine gas and concentrated liquid chlorine. Their 

process generates a diluted chlorine solution onsite for water purification, and it is my understanding that several other businesses 

offer competing technologies as well. 

Does the EPA consider this a viable alternative that eliminates 

the security risks caused by chlorine gas stored under high pressure? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. It can be if the circumstances are right for the 

system to use it. And the particular approach that you are talking 

about has been approved for providing disinfection under our rules 

in terms of disinfection. 

Senator UDALL. Great. 

Yesterday, our Committee received a letter from the American 

Metropolitan Water Association which raised some concerns for legislation that pushes utilities to adopt safer alternatives. Have you 

had an opportunity to see that letter, and if so do you have any 

response to the concerns they raised? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. I just know that it got waved at me. 

Senator UDALL. OK. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. I would have to look at it. 

Senator UDALL. OK. Well, we will give you an opportunity in the 

subsequent questions that are submitted to respond to them. 

Then your testimony notes that EPA supports the general structure and approach of Senator Lautenberg’s legislation and the Secure Water Facilities Act which would require water utilities to 

consider the viability of safer alternatives at their facilities. Could 

you provide some more detail into how EPA would participate in 

that process, especially in terms of educating and informing utilities about the alternatives available to them? 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. I think we would work with the sector in terms 

of making sure that we have identified the different alternatives 

that exist and provide information in terms of approaches that they 

could take in terms of looking at those different alternatives. 

Senator UDALL. Great. And thank you. We look forward to your 

answer on the letter. 

Thank you. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Ms. Dougherty. We 

will keep the record open for approximately 10 days and ask that 

if any inquiries come in that your response is prompt. 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Certainly. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 
50 

Ms. DOUGHERTY. Thank you so much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And now I would like to call Mr. Ben 

Grumbles, who is the Director of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, Mr. Paul Orum of the Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition and an independent consultant to the Center for 

American Progress, Mr. Carlos Perea, President and Chief Executive Officer of the MIOX Corporation, and Mr. Darius Sivin, International Representative of the United Automobile, Aerospace and 

Agricultural Implement Workers of America. 

We thank each one of your for being here, and Mr. Grumbles, if 

you would please start your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN H. GRUMBLES, DIRECTOR, 

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Lautenberg, Senator Inhofe, Senator Udall, it is a real 

honor to be before the Committee, to be back before the Committee. 

I was a former Assistant Administrator for Water at EPA and now 

am delighted to be the Director of Arizona’s Department of Environmental Quality. 

And on behalf of Governor Brewer, I want to thank you for giving us and the citizens of Arizona a chance to provide some practical insights and thoughts about the goal we all share of ensuring 

water is cleaner, safer, and more secure. 

I want to highlight some of our experiences over the years, particularly at the national level but at the State level as well, in the 

post-9/11 era I had the opportunity to see a lot of great work being 

done, funding through Congress, support through Congress and 

EPA, vulnerability assessments, increased tools, and technical assistance and training. And I think the Nation—as I am sure you 

would agree—has made significant progress. We are safer but not 

safe enough. 

I want to thank you for having this hearing that brings together 

water and wastewater interests together in the same room to talk 

about a common goal and to raise real issues, practical considerations, and how to get to that goal together and as quickly as possible. 

I wanted to share with you that one of the key messages I think 

from an Arizona perspective, and water and wastewater utilities, 

and also I know other utilities across the country, is that bipartisan, bicameral efforts to strengthen our Nation’s water security 

should not get wrapped around the axle of inherently safer technology. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I laud your efforts to force the discussion 

on considering safer technologies. I think it is very important, however, to keep in mind that how we get there is the key question. 

We all support the concept, but asking how it is going to be implemented and by whom is the key one. 

I think it is important to recognize that inherently safer is not 

always inherently smarter, particularly coming from the West now, 

an arid area. The heat, the climatic considerations, the realization 

that in every watershed the chemistry of the water is a little bit 

different, means that it is at the local level that the best decisionmaking is made. 
51 

So, one of the key points I wanted to emphasize is that the city 

of Phoenix did a study in 2003 asking this key question about what 

disinfectant to use. I know the American Water Works Association 

has done some good work looking at different cities across the 

country, weighing the costs and the benefits to ensure that the Safe 

Drinking Water Act requirements are being met, that public health 

is being protected, and that it is being done safely. 

The city of Phoenix determined that it made sense to change 

some of its practices on the use of gaseous chlorine including to embrace double containment—having a can within a can—and to reconsider railcar delivery and storage in a move toward smaller, 

manageable quantities. 

There were significant considerations against moving away from 

gaseous chlorine, including considerations about the cost, but not 

just the cost, because that is not the driver when you are talking 

about environmental and public health statutes. The drivers include looking at the life cycle analysis, the ability for chlorine residuals to remain in the system, looking at the potential, that if 

you moved to hypochlorite there might be in certain environments 

the production of a dangerous by-product such as perchlorate or 

bromate formed that must now be managed. These are all worth 

reviewing and all worth keeping in mind as you continue to consider legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just emphasize three things. One 

is please keep in mind that inherently safer technology—that the 

choice of what disinfectant methodology to use—should be primarily a local decision. 

The second one is that the role of the States is critically important. I truly understand the role, the need for a strong presence 

from EPA and DHS when it comes to coordination, national standards but neighborhood solutions. States are in a better position not 

to take over the whole issue but to help make the right decision, 

coordinating with local water and wastewater utilities. 

The third one, as I know you recognize, this takes money. And 

an excellent role for the Federal Government, Mr. Chairman, is to 

ensure that adequate funding is available to continue to advance 

the technology, the science, the expertise on this critically important issue to strengthen the security of our water throughout the 

country. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grumbles follows:] 
52 

Testimony of 

Benjamin H. Grumbles, Director 

Arizona Department of Environmental Quality 

Before the 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 

July 28,2010 

Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. I'm 

Benjamin H. Grumbles, Director of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality 

and former U.S. EPA Assistant Administrator for Water from 2004 to 2008. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on efforts to promote increased security in the 

Water Sector, especially focusing on chemical security at drinking water and wastewater 

facilities, as well as potential impacts of these efforts. Governor Jan Brewer and the 

citizens of Arizona also appreciate the opportunity to suggest to Congress ways to 

continue a successful national collaboration that also focuses on local and regional 

differences and avoids costly or risky Federal mandates. 

As a national water official during most ofthe post-9/11 era, I became aware of the many 

steps EPA, state agencies, local governments and industry associations were taking, and 

continue to take to develop tools, training and technical assistance to help water and 

wastewater utilities identify and mitigate risks associated with chemical security. With 

the enactment of the Public Health Protection and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 and Presidential mandates under Homeland Security Presidential 

Directives, EPA has worked to improve water security and preparedness and the water 

community has taken these new roles seriously. As a result, over the past decade, the 

nation has made great progress in improving the security and resiliency of the nation's 

water infrastructure, but we can't claim victory yet. We are safer but still not safe 

enough. 
53 

Existing statutory requirements address chemical security at drinking water systems to 

some degree. Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act required each community 

water system to conduct a vulnerability assessment, certify its completion, and submit a 

copy to EPA. These comprehensive vulnerability assessments addressed security at 

water systems from collection, to treatment, to distribution including the use, storage and 

handling of chemicals. Section 1433 also required the preparation or revision of 

emergency response plans that incorporate the findings ofthe assessments. 

Since 2002, state agencies have received funding from EPA to support enhanced security 

related efforts. In Arizona, our Drinking Water program has used this funding to expand 

upon its existing security measures by incorporating new security, emergency 

preparedness and response initiatives into the core program. Examples of new and 

enhanced security initiatives include: establishing a security specialist position within the 

State's drinking water program, providing security-related training and technical 

assistance to public water systems, facilitating communications between the facilities and 

the emergency response agencies and conducting emergency response training exercises 

for facility operators. 

Legislation passed last year in the House and under consideration in the Senate would 

expand the scope of current security legislation to both water and wastewater utilities. A 

key provision in the House bill is a requirement for utilities to assess treatment methods 

to consider "inherently safer technologies" or ISTs. While there isn't a single definition, 

the main focus ofiST is minimizing quantities of hazardous materials by substituting 

safer materials and processes when and where possible. On its face, few would argue 

with the goal of IST. Perhaps the question is how should it be implemented and by 

whom? 

The primary purpose of drinking water systems is the delivery of safe drinking water. 

The primary purpose of wastewater treatment systems is the safe and efficient collection, 

treatment, disposal and increasingly beneficial reuse of municipal, domestic, commercial 

and industrial wastewater. Efforts to craft Water Sector security legislation must 
54 

recognize the essential public health objectives of these facilities, and the impact any new 

requirements to consider and implement alternate treatment processes may have on 

accomplishing these important objectives. Tn other words, any chemical security 

regulations aimed at the Water Sector needs to balance the primary goal of protecting 

public health with enhancing security and public safety. We can't afford to sacrifice 

public health in the name of chemical safety. 

To that end, reconciling new security rules with the public health requirements of the 

SDWA and CWA is an ambitious, but necessary role for the government. However, 

decisions on the chemical use at individual facilities are best made by the utility experts 

at the local level. As a result, any future regulations must maintain flexibility for utilities 

to make these decisions based on a well-reasoned assessment of various factors 

including: meeting public health and environmental requirements, maintaining reliability 

of treatment, accounting for local water chemistry and environmental characteristics, 

ensuring plant worker safety and, of course, addressing security concerns. 

Even without legislation, utilities across the nation are evaluating the use of disinfectants 

in light of security concerns and new water quality requirements like the Stage 1/Stage 2 

Disinfectants/Disinfection Byproducts Rules, the Ground Water Rule and the Enhanced 

Surface Water Treatment Rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act and surface water 

discharge requirements under the Clean Water Act permitting program. While some 

utilities have completed a risk assessment and decided to change disinfection methods, 

for others, chlorine gas remains the only viable form of disinfection to provide sufficient 

public health protection. Treatment methods will continue to improve but we risk 

making dangerous trade-offs if we force chlorine substitutes upon community water and 

wastewater systems without a careful evaluation of local and regional factors. 

I'd like to highlight the City of Phoenix Water Services Department's disinfection 

alternatives evaluation in an effort to underscore the unique, site-specific considerations 

that underlie achieving the goal of safe drinking water and meeting the disinfection needs 

of a public water system. 
55 

The Phoenix Water Services Department serves drinking water to a population of 1.6 

million customers using both surface water, from the Colorado, Verde and Salt Rivers, 

and groundwater in its production of drinking water. Prior to an alternative disinfection 

study in 2003, Phoenix used gaseous chlorine at all five surface water treatment plants. 

The two largest facilities stored chlorine, on-site, in 17-ton railcars. The City also has 78 

remote disinfection facilities including well sites, booster pump stations and reservoirs. 

Prior to the study, the disinfection methods at these remote sites was varied and included 

on-site generation and storage of sodium hypochlorite, chlorine gas, calcium hypochlorite 

tablet feeders and bulk sodium hypochlorite storage and feed systems. 

The 2003 study identified a number of operational issues with the alternative disinfection 

methods at the remote facilities. With on-site generation of bulk hypochlorite, for 

example, if the chemical is not produced and managed properly, the potential exists for 

introduction of contaminants, namely bromate, perchlorate, and chlorate. In addition, 

hypochlorite products degrade quickly in the desert heat making disinfectant residuals 

hard to control and consistently meet the SDWA requirements. As part of the 2003 

study, Phoenix also found many of these alternative methods were operator and 

maintenance intensive. 

Through this study, the City of Phoenix was able to evaluate the social, environmental, 

and financial costs of the various disinfection alternatives to make a balanced, wellinformed decision. As a result of the study, the City continues to use chlorine gas at its 

surface water plants, but has replaced the railcars with 1-ton containers and will be 

installing double containment at all facilities, minimizing the risk of chemical exposure to 

the public. The City will also be converting to chlorine gas with double contaimnent at 

several remote disinfection facilities. 

While I'm talking about my home state, in the arid southwest, I cannot stress enough that 

every drop of water is worth using and reusing. I imagine this is true in other western 

states where water is so precious. In Arizona, I am co-chairing a large stakeholder 
56 

effort, convened by Governor Brewer, to enhance the sustainability of water by 

increasing reuse, recycling and conservation of water and to support continued economic 

development while protecting Arizona's water supplies and natural environment. While 

recognizing the need to safeguard the public, I would encourage those considering future 

water security legislation to be mindful of possible unintended consequences especially 

on efforts to conserve, reclaim or reuse water. 

In closing, I'd like to reiterate that as a nation we've made great progress in securing our 

water infrastructure but there is still more to be done. 

Congress should provide direction, but not broadly dictate technology or methods. Those 

decisions should be made by the local utilities which have the necessary expertise and the 

knowledge of their systems. They are in the best position to make fact-based, risk-based 

decisions on, what I like to call, "inherently smarter technologies" that will protect both 

public health and safety. 

Security-related decisions need to be made in close consultation with state agencies 

responsible for regulating both water and wastewater facilities. I am not advocating that 

states take on all the roles and responsibilities associated with water security but, rather 

that they have an appropriate role, commensurate with their current responsibilities, for 

overseeing the implementation of these programs. In addition, states, such as Arizona, 

have well-developed, ongoing relationships with both the water and wastewater utilities 

as well as EPA. We are using existing processes, like state "sanitary surveys", done every 

three years for each facility, to imbed, or institutionalize security considerations into 

source-to-tap risk assessments and other analyses. That should be allowed to continue. 

Lastly, adequate resources should be dedicated and available to the states to assist utilities 

and operators in making these important decisions that affect both public health and 

safety. Federal funds are critical to strengthening the science, technology, and expertise 

in the war against terrorism on the waterfront, as well as the homeland. 
57 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I would be glad to answer to any 

questions that members might have. 
58 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

July 28, 2010 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Benjamin Grumbles 

Questions from: Senator James M. Inhofe 

1. What are the most important issues that we should consider as we look for ways to 

encourage greater security in water systems? 

I believe tools are already be in place for greater security in water systems and the industry 

supports the concept of greater security, the real question comes back to how we go about 

achieving greater security, who carries it out and is there funding to support these efforts. There 

also needs to be a balance in the regulations so that public health is not sacrificed in the name of 

chemical safety. 

Existing rules require system vulnerability assessments and development of emergency response 

plans. These efforts help to ensure chemical security at our state's wastewater/drinking water 

facilities. It also underscores that decision-making regarding water security is best handled at the 

local level where unique, site-specific local and regional factors can be fully weighed and sound 

decisions made regarding what is best for a particular system. Secondly, states need to be 

supported in their role of assisting local water and wastewater utilities in making these decisions. 

Lastly, there needs to be adequate funding available to continue to advance the technology, the 

science and the expertise on these issues. State and local governments are not able to fund 

research and must look to the federal government for continued investment in this area. This is 

necessary in order to protect our citizens as the war on terrorism continues to threaten this 

nation. 

2. Thank you for sharing Phoenix's experience with looking at alternative disinfection 

options. Are you aware of other water facilities that have done similar disinfection 

options analyses without a mandate from the Federal Government? 

Many communities across the country have stepped up to do more security work and planning, 

even though the Federal Government has not directed them to do so. National trade associations 

such as AWWA, WEF, NACWA, and AMWA are better positioned to give the names of specific 

communities and their voluntary efforts to strengthen security systems. 

Our experience in Arizona suggests that the majority of public water systems, both municipal and 

private/for-profit, are continuously analyzing disinfection options for a variety of reasons. Recent 

rules such as the Stage 1/Stage 2 Disinfectants/Disinfection Byproducts Rules, the Ground Water 

Rule and the Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act have 

certainly resulted in some analyses. But other reasons such as operational costs and population 

shifts (e.g., has new development or a school been constructed next to a well/treatment facility), 

as well as local or regional factors, underscore the need for continual research and investigation 

into what works best for a particular system in a particular environment. 

3. Is there anything else you would like to add for the record? 

In Arizona, there has been tremendous response to agency-sponsored outreach on conducting 

water vulnerability assessments and emergency preparedness and response trainings. This was 

made possible, post-9/11, through EPA funding to support enhanced security efforts. I believe 

this is a tangible benefit that can be gained from continued federal support for these types of "onthe-ground" outreach efforts. 
59 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Orum. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL ORUM, BLUE GREEN CHEMICAL SECURITY COALITION, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT TO CENTER 

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. ORUM. Good afternoon. I am Paul Orum, consultant to public 

interest organizations on chemical safety and security. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on behalf of 

the Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition and to present findings 

from survey reports that show leading water utilities reducing 

their vulnerability to accidents and terrorism. 

I want to stress the following. First, many agencies and organizations have warned that an intentional release of industrial chemicals could harm thousands of Americans. The Homeland Security 

Council uses 17,000 deaths in a planning scenario; an insurance industry estimate points to $7 billion in potential damages; EPA figures show some 800 wastewater and drinking water facilities each 

with 10,000 or more people living in its vulnerability zone. And 

more than 20 Federal agencies and non-governmental organizations have warned about the problem. 

Second, there are solutions. Safer and more secure chemicals and 

processes are widely used and can remove dangers to employees 

and communities. Four surveys that I have conducted through the 

Center for American Progress show more than 600 chemical facilities across 20 industries already using an option that avoids the 

possibility of a catastrophic chemical release, and the water sector, 

in particular, has many converted facilities. 

At least 554 drinking water and wastewater facilities in 47 

States have replaced extremely hazardous substances with safer 

and more secure chemicals or processes, in the process taking more 

than 40 million Americans out of the danger of a toxic gas plume 

from those facilities. 

Now, two caveats. These conversions took place over 10 years. At 

this rate, without legislation to push the process it would take a 

half-century to convert the approximately 2,500 remaining water 

and wastewater plants that still report large amounts of chlorine 

gas. Also, legislation is needed to encourage converting the highest 

hazard facilities to set priorities. Otherwise, these highest hazards 

could remain around for half a century. 

The drinking water facilities typically went from chlorine gas to 

chlorine bleach, from chlorine to chlorine, whether generated onsite 

or brought in in bulk. Some wastewater plants also went to liquid 

bleach. Others converted to ultraviolet light. 

The third general area is the facilities that use safer and more 

secure chemicals and processes avoid certain costs and dangers and 

requirements. Survey respondents reported avoided costs including 

regulatory compliance, personal protective equipment they did not 

have to buy, chemical security they did not have to install, emergency planning and potential liability, among more than 20 types 

of avoided costs. 

One-third of converted facilities anticipated saving money as a 

result. And this is because gates and guards always cost money 

while upgrading technology sometimes saves money by modern-
60 

izing facilities. And the avoided security costs for those converted 

facilities will be roughly $3.1 billion over 10 years. 

Now, it only makes sense for facilities to consider safer options 

before assuming security costs that can be avoided and before imposing costs and dangers on Government agencies and the public. 

In many cases, even where facilities do not save money alternatives 

to remove extremely hazardous substances are also cost effective. 

Finally, this is a mature issue. There have been bills for 10 years 

since your original bill in 1999. The current bills before the Committee are the result of significant compromise and include certain 

principles that we support. They build on current laws, they protect drinking water and wastewater standards, and they preserve 

State programs in collaboration with local utilities. 

Importantly, they provide each facility the flexibility to conduct 

its own assessment suitable to its own circumstances. Knowledge 

of solutions is dispersed, Government policy should cultivate those 

solutions, and we see this proposed legislation as a process to generate those solutions. 

More than 100 labor and public interest organizations urge the 

Senate and the Committee to act before the current program expires on October 4th. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Orum follows:] 
61 

Testimony of Paul Orum 

Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition/ 

Independent Consultant to Center for American Progress 

Before the 

Committee on Ji:nvironment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

July 28, 2010 

Good afternoon, I am Paul Orum, consultant to public interest organizations 

on chemical safety and security. Thank you for the opportunity to testifY on 

behalf of the blue-green chemical security coalition and to present findings 

from survey reports that show how leading water utilities are reducing their 

vulnerability to accidents and terrorism. 

I also served on the advisory Water Security Working Group to EPA's 

National Drinking Water Advisory Panel, and on a Government 

Accountability Office experts' panel on how federal funds should be spent to 

improve security at wastewater facilities.; I formerly directed the Working 

Group on Community Right-to-Know, an affiliation of public interest 

organizations concerned with government information policy. 

I wish to stress the following: 

1. Many parties have warned about security of industrial chemicals. 

Many agencies and organizations have warned that an intentional release of 

industrial chemicals could harm thousands of Americans. 

• The Homeland Security Council uses 17,500 deaths in a planning 

scem1rio for a terrorist attack on a large chlorine tank in an urban 

area." 

• An insurance industry estimate points to more than $7 billion in 

damages from a major urban release of chlorine gas. iii 

• Environmental Protection Agency figures show some 800 water and 

wastewater facilities with I 0,000 or more people living within the 

vulnerability zone of a toxic gas release. iv 
62 

B More than 20 federal agencies, industry associations, labor unions, 

think tanks, public interest groups, and independent observers warned 

about the problem. These include: the Department of Homeland 

Security; Department of Justice; Environmental Protection Agency; 

Government Accountability Office; Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry; Congressional Budget Office; National Academy of 

Sciences; Army Surgeon General; Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory; Brookings Institute; Rand Corporation; ·center for 

Strategic and International Studies; Partnership for a Secure America; 

American Chemistry Council; Association of American Railroads; 

United Steelworkers; Teamsters Union; Risk Management Solutions 

(insurance industry); Environmental Defense; U.S. Public Interest 

Research Group; Greenpeace; Working Group on Community Rightto-Know, and Center for American Progress, doubtless among others.v 

The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico reminds us that worst-case releases do 

happen. Congress should heed warnings about chemical security, and act to 

protect people, property, and the environment. 

2. Safer, more secure chemicals and processes are widely used and can 

remove dangers to employees and communities. 

In four survey reports, the Center for American Progress identified more 

than 630 chemical facilities across 20 industries that are already using a 

chemical or process that avoids the possibility of a catastrophic chemical 

release. vi The water sector in particular has many converted facilities. 

Findings include: 

• At least 554 drinking water and wastewater facilities in 47 states have 

replaced extremely hazardous substances with safer and more secure 

chemicals or processes (please see attached map). These changes 

removed 40 million Americans from the danger of a toxic gas plume 

from these facilities. 

o These conversions took place over ten years. At this rate, it 

would take about a half-century to convert the 2,500 remaining 

water and wastewater facilities that still report large amounts 

f hl · vii o c orme gas. 

2 
63 

o There is also no pnonty for converting the highest hazard 

facilities (arguably the 35 that still use chlorine gas by the 

railcar), which could leave in place the greatest chemical 

hazards for a half-century. 

Of the 554 facilities, 235 drinking water facilities typically switched from 

gaseous chlorine to liquid bleach. Of the 315 converted wastt?water facilities, 

approximately 140 switched to ultraviolet light and 175 switched to liquid 

bleach. Some wastewater plants also replaced anhydrous sulfur dioxide, used 

for dechlorination, with sodium bisulfite. (Four of the facilities treat both 

drinking water and wastewater.) 

Some bleach plants that supply water utilities also use production methods 

that never store or transport chlorine gas. viii Other companies provide 

technologies that eliminate storage and shipment of chlorine gas by 

generating liquid bleach on-site.ix 

3. Facilities that use safer, more secure chemicals and processes avoid 

costs, dangers, and regulatory requirements. 

When facilities remove chemical hazards they avoid costs such as potential 

liability and chemical security regulations. 

• Survey respondents reported costs avoided with safer alternatives that 

include regulatory compliance, personal protective equipment, chemical 

security, hazmat training, emergency planning, hazard communication, 

and potential liability, among more than 20 types of avoided costs.x 

• One-third of converted facilities anticipated saving money as a result. xi 

Conventional security always costs money, while upgrading technology 

sometimes saves money. Physical site security, however important, 

cannot assure protection, address supply chain risk, or modernize 

facilities. 

• The Department of Homeland Security estimates regulatory compliance 

costs under the current interim Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) to be $12.5 billion for 5,000 facilities over ten 

years.xii At that rate, if2,500 water and wastewater facilities bear similar 

costs, and half (1,250) drop out of the program by converting to safer 

and more secure options, then the avoided costs of compliance for those 

3 
64 

1,250 converted water facilities will be roughly $3.125 billion over ten 

years. 

It only makes sense for facilities to consider such options, before assuming 

security costs that can be avoided and before imposing costs and dangers on 

government agencies, employees, emergency responders, and the public. 

Even where facilities don't save money, alternatives that remove extremely 

hazardous substances are often cost effective. 

• Of 195 converted facilities that provided general cost information, 49 

percent reported the changes cost less than $100,000, and 87 percent 

reported conversion costs below $l,OOO,OOO.xiii 

• Of 20 big city water and wastewater facilities that converted, the highest 

cost per customer served was $1.50 per year in construction and 

operating costs-the price of a small bag of potato chips-and most 

spent well less than that amounCiv The U.S. Government Accountability 

Office found a similar range of costs for converting large wastewater 

utilities.xv 

4. The Senate should act without further delay. 

Current interim CF A TS standards exempt water and wastewater facilities 

and do not utilize smart securiry--the cost effective alternatives that can 

remove unnecessary chemical hazards. 

I am submitting with my testimony a letter signed by more than 100 labor 

and public health organizations in support of chemical security legislation 

H.R.2868, S.3598, and S.3599. These groups support disaster prevention 

policies including safer and more secure technologies, employee 

participation, and government accountability. 

This proposed legislation builds on current laws, and protects current 

drinking water and wastewater programs and standards, including state 

primacy and collaboration with local utilities. It provides each facility the 

flexibility to conduct its own assessment suitable to its activities and 

circumstances. Knowledge of solutions is dispersed. The proposed 

legislation makes use of those solutions. 

4 
65 

The bill also utilizes computer software and tools to assist smaller (tier 3 and 

tier 4) facilities with compliance, an innovation that should reduce 

compliance costs for covered facilities. 

There are also elements we urge the Committee to improve. Among these 

are: improving government accountability and public confidence by making 

public non-sensitive information on the compliance and implementation of 

security standards; ensuring integrity of assessments by removing the 

exclusion from the requirement to correct deficient assessments; and, 

removing criminal penalties for disclosure of protected information in the 

absence of such penalties for non-compliance and endangerment. 

Congress can significantly improve the safety and security of people who 

work in and live near water utilities that use extremely hazardous 

substances. This is a mature issue-Senator Lautenberg first offered 

legislation in 1999-and current proposed bills are the result of a long 

process involving significant compromise. We urge the Committee and 

Senate to act before the temporary interim program expires October 4. 

Attachments: 

Map of 554 converted water and wastewater facilities. 

Blue-green chemical security coalition letter, July 2010. 

i Wastewater Facilities: Experts' Views on How Federal Funds Should Be Spent to 

Improve Security, Government Accountability Office, GA0-05-165, January 2005. 

ii National Planning Scenario 8: Chemical Attack-Chlorine Tank Explosion, Homeland 

Security Council in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, 2005. 

iii Catastrophe, Injury, and Insurance: The Impact of Catastrophes on Workers 

Compensation, Life, and Health Insurance, Risk Management Solutions, Inc., 2004. 

•v Risk Management Planning program figures provided by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, July l, 

2010. 

v Reports and statements warning about chemical terrorism include: 

• Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat, Partnership 

for a Secure America, September 2008. 

• Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Association of American Railroads, 

June 13,2006. 

• Homeland Security Committee Urged to Consider Safer Chemicals; Chemical 

Companies Should Stop Manufacturing Extremely Dangerous Chemicals, 

Association of American Railroads, 2008. 

5 
66 

• Catastrophe, Injury, and Insurance: The Impact of Catastrophes on Workers 

Compensation, Life, and Health Insurance, Risk Management Solutions, Inc., 2004. 

• Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical "Chemical" Infrastructure, 

Laurence Livermore National Laboratory, December 20, 2004. 

• Testimony of Dr. Jay Boris before the City Council of the District of Columbia, U.S. 

Naval Research Laboratory, October 6, 2003. 

• A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities, National Institute 

·of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, November 2002. 

• Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

September 2002. 

• Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but 

the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown, U.S. General Accounting Office, 

GA0-03-439, March 14,2003. 

• Homeland Security and the Private Sector, Congressional Budget Office, December 

2004. 

• Statement by the Department of Homeland Security on Continued Al-Qaeda Threats, 

Department of Homeland Security, November 21,2003. 

• Industrial Chemicals and Terrorism: Human Health Threat Analysis, Mitigation and 

Prevention, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 1999; and, Terrorist 

Use of Expedient Chemical Agents: Health Risk Assessment and Las Vegas Case 

Study, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, undated. 

• Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant, Army Surgeon General reported in 

Washington Post, March 12,2002. 

• The Terrorist Threat in America, Chemical Manufacturers Association (American 

Chemistry Council), April 1998. 

• PACE International Union Survey: Workplace Incident Prevention and Response 

Since 9/11, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International 

Union (PACE), October 27, 2004. 

• America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us From 

Terrorism, Stephen Flynn, 2004. 

• Protecting the American Homeland, Brookings Institution, March 2002. 

• Toxic Warfare, RAND Corporation, 2002. 

• News Release: Chemical Facilities Vulnerable, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, December 23, 2003. 

• Eliminating Hometown Hazards: Cutting Chemical Risks at Wastewater Treatment 

Facilities, Environmental Defense, December 2003. 

• The Safe Hometowns Guide, The Safe Hometowns Initiative, 2002. 

• Needless Risk: Oil Refineries and Hazard Reduction, U.S. PIRG Education Fund, 

August 2005. 

• Unnecessary Dangers: Emergency Chemical Release Hazards at Power Plants, 

Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, July 21,2004. 

• Chemical Plants Remain Vulnerable to Terrorists: A Call to Action, United 

Steelworkers of America, undated. 

• High Alert: Workers Warn of Security Gaps on Nation's Railroads, International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2005. 

6 
67 

• Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering 

Terrorism, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 2002. 

• Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting people and Reducing 

Vulnerabilities, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 2006. 

vi These survey reports by the Center for American Progress are: 

• Preventing Toxic Terrorism: How Some Chemical Facilities are Removing 

Danger to American Communities (2006) 

• Toxic Trains. and the Terrorist Threat: How Water Utilities Can Get Chlorine Gas 

off the Rails and Out of American Communities (2007) 

• Chemical Security 101: What You Don't Have Can't leak, or Be Blown Up by 

Terrorists (2008) 

• Safer Chemicals Create a More Secure America: We Can Diminish the Security 

Threat from Chemical Plants (2010). 

vii Approximate number of drinking water and wastewater facilities that report an 

extremely hazardous substance under the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk 

Management Planning program. 

viii Companies operating or constructing bleach plants that do not store chlorine gas 

include Bleach Tech, Odyssey Manufacturing, K2Pure Solutions, Kuehne Chemical, and 

Clorox. 

ix Companies that provide technologies for generating chlorine bleach on-site include 

MIOX Corporation, U.S. Filter, Severn Trent Services, and Electrolytic Technologies. 

'Preventing Toxic Terrorism, Center for American Progress, 2006, Page 9. 

"'.Preventing Toxic Terrorism, Center for American Progress, 2006, Page 8. 

xu Regulatory Assessment, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Interim Final 

Rule, Department of Homeland Security, DHS-2006-0073, April l 2007, Table 4. 

xiii Preventing Toxic Terrorism, Center for American Progress, 2006, Page 8. 

x•v Toxic Trains and the Terrorist Threat, Center for American Progress, Apri\2007, 

Pages 12-13. 

xv Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades but Further 

Improvements to Key System Components May Be Limited by Costs and Other 

Constraints, Government, GA0-06-390, March 2006. 

7 
Protecting Americans from Toxic Terrorism 

Water Utilities No Longer Use Extremely Hazardous Substances 

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69 

AFL-CIO- American Federation of Teachers Communications Workers of America (CWA) 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters -International Chemical Workers Union Councii/UFCW 

United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (lJAW) 

United Food and Commercial Workers- United Steel Workers (USW) 

Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 

Advocates for Environmental Human Rights- Beyond Pesticides- BlueGreen Alliance 

Breast Cancer Fund- Center for Environmental Health -Center for Health, Environment, and Justice 

Center for International Environmental Law- Clean Air Council- Clean Water Action 

Clean Production Action- Ecology Center- Environment America- Environmental Defense Fund 

Environmental Working Group- Friends of the Earth- Greenpeace -Institute for Agriculture and 

Trade Policy- League of Conservation Voters- OMB Watch - Physicians for Social ResponsibilitySierra Club- U.S. Public Interest Research Group 

Alaska Community Action on Toxics- Arizona PIRG- Citizens for a £lean Environment, Inc. 

Clean New York- Clean Water Action-Massachusetts- Connecticut Coalition for Environmental Justice 

Connecticut Council on Occupational Safety and Health- Deep South Center for Environmental Justice 

Don't Waste Arizona- Ecological Conservation Organization (AR)- Empire State Consumer Project 

Environmental Health Food- Environmental Health Strategy Center 

Environmental Justice Action Group ofWNY- Environment Illinois- Environment Massachusetts 

Environment Texas- Farmworker Association of Florida- Galveston Houston Association for Smog 

Prevention and Mothers for Clean Air (GHASP!MfCA)- Global Community Monitor 

Glynn Environmental Coalition -Great Neck Breast Cancer Coalition - Green Action 

Green Decade-Newton Chapter- Green Education and Legal Fund, Inc. 

Greenwich Citizens Committee- Healthy Building Network- Healthy Schools Network 

Huntington Breast Cancer Action Coalition, Inc. -Illinois PIRG -Indiana Toxics Action 

International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal- Kentucky Environmentall<"oundation 

Kristen Breitweiser, 9/ll Widow- Louisiana Bucket Brigade- Maine Labor Group on Health 

Maine Women's Lobby- Maryland PIRG- Massachusetts Breast Cancer Coalition 

Massachusetts Green Jobs Coalition- Massachusetts Interfaith Power and Light- Massachusetts PIRG 

Michigan Environmental Council- Moms Rising- Natural Resources Council of Maine 

New Jersey Environmental Federation- New Jersey PIRG- NJ Work Environment Council 

New York PIRG - Oregon PIRG- Oregon Toxics AUiance- People's Settlement Association 

Prevention Is The Cure, Inc. - Protect All Children's Environment- Public Citizen-Texas 

Science and Environmental Healtb Network- Sciencecorps- Second Look- Somerville Climate Action 

Students for a Just and Stable Future- Texas Campaign for the Environment- Texans for Public Justice 

Texas PIRG Urban Health Environment and Learning Project- Vermont PIRG 

Veterans for Peace/Smedley Butler Brigade- Washington Toxics Coalition 

Women's Voices for tbe Earth- Worksafe Inc. 

July 2010 

Dear Senator, 

On November 6, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Chemical and Water 

Security Act of 2009 (H.R.2868) a comprehensive chemical security bill. On July 15, Senator 

Fmnk Lautenberg introduced the Secure Chemical Facilities Act (S.3599) and the Secure 

Water Facilities Act (S.3598). The undersigned organizations support this legislation 

and urge the U.S. Senate to pass it before the interim law expires on October 4, 2010. 

Chemical plants and other chemical facilities remain one of the most vulnerable sectors of 

America's infrastructure to terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

has identified approximately 5,000 "high-risk" U.S. chemical facilities. In 2004, the 

Homeland Security Council planning scenario projected that an attack on a chemical facility 
70 

would kill 17,500 people and send an additional I 00,000 people to the hospital. A December 

2009 Congressional Research Service review of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) data shows that 91 chemical facilities each put I million or more people at dsk. 

The current interim statute enacted as a dder to the 2007 Homeland Secudty appropriations 

bill temporarily authodzed the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) to give 

Congress time to enact comprehensive legislation. As a security program CF ATS was 

intended only as an interim stop gap measure. It fails to pro.tect the millions of Americans at 

risk by eliminating preventable catastrophic hazards. 

The interim statute: 

• Prohibits the DHS from requiring any specific "security measure" whatsoever. 

• Fails to develop the commonsense use of smart security or safer and more secure 

chemical processes that can cost-effectively prevent terrorists from triggering 

chemical disasters. 

• Explicitly exempts thousands of chemical and port facilities, including 

approximately 2,400 water treatment facilities and 400-600 port facilities 

including many oil refineries. 

• Fails to involve knowledgeable employees in the development of vulnerability 

assessments and security plans, or protect employees from excessive background 

cheeks. 

• Denies the public the information needed to ensure an effective, accountable 

program. 

On February 4th Senator Collins (R-ME) introduced a bill (S. 2996) that would do nothing 

but extend this inadequate and flawed law for five more years. We strongly opposeS. 2996 

and any further delay in comprehensive chemical security legislation. 

In their March 3m testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, both the DHS and the EPA called comprehensive legislation that requires high 

risk facilities to "assess" safer chemical processes and conditionally requires the highest risk 

plants to use safer chemical processes where feasible. In addition, they urged Congress to 

eliminate the gap in security for water treatment facilities and to modifY the exemption for 

port facilities now regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act to ensure 

consistency with CF A TS. 

To correct the flaws in the interim law and enact comprehensive legislation, we urge you to 

support Senator Lautenberg's comprehensive chemical security legislation in the 

Senate as a companion to H.R. 2868. H.R. 2868 is a compromise that builds seamlessly on 

CFATS. It maintains the DHS as the lead agency regulating privately owned chemical plants, 

including port facilities, and authorizes the EPA as the lead agency regulating publicly 

owned water and wastewater treatment facilities and provides funding for publicly owned 

water facilities to adopt the most protective security measures. 
71 

In addition, the Secure Chemical Facilities Act (S.3599) and the Secure Water Facilities Act 

(S.3598) will: 

• Require high risk facilities to assess safer chemical processes and conditionally 

requires the highest risk plants (approximately 107) to use safer chemical 

processes where feasible and commercially available and includes a technical 

appeals process to challenge DHS decisions; 

• Provide up to $100 million in the first year to assist privately owned plants to use 

safer and more secure processes, $125 million for drinking water facilities and an 

unspecified portion of$200 million for wastewater facilities to use safer more 

secure processes; 

• Involve plant employees in the development of security plans and provide 

protections for whistleblowers and limits back ground check abuses; 

• Preserve state authority to establish stronger security standards; 

Passing comprehensive legislation this year is vital to our national security. Since 1999, 

more than 500 facilities have used smart security to eliminate these risks to more than 40 

million Americans. In a March 2006 floor statement, then Senator Obama said, "by 

employing safer technologies, we can reduce the attractiveness of chemical plants as a 

target...Each one of these methods reduces the danger that chemical plants pose to our 

communities and makes them less appealing targets for terrorists." In November 2009, the 

Clorox Company announced plans to convert all seven of its U.S. facilities to eliminate the 

bulk use of chlorine gas and inherent risks to nearby communities. 

The Association of American Railroads issued a statement in 2008 saying, "It's time for the 

big chemical companies to do their part to help protect America. They should stop 

manufacturing dangerous chemicals when safer substitutes are available. And if they won't 

do it, Congress should do it for them ... " 

Disaster prevention is a defining policy in this legislation which has taken on new 

urgency following the BP oil blow out in the Gulf of Mexico and renewed threats of 

terrorism. To truly protect employees and surrounding communities, a comprehensive 

law should: 

• Use smart security to prevent the catastrophic consequences of an attack by 

implementing cost-effective safer and more secure chemicals and processes at all of 

the highest risk facilities. 

• Include all categories of facilities such as port facilities and water treatment plants. 

• Involve plant employees in developing plant security programs, including 

participation in workplace inspections, and provide employees with both an appeals 

and a waiver procedure to protect against excessive background checks. 

• Allow citizen suits against chemical facilities and government agencies to enforce the 

law. 

• Ensure greater accountability through the disclosure of non-sensitive information on 

compliance and implementation of security standards. 

• Allow states to set more protective security standards. 
72 

We look forward to working with you and your staff on this urgently needed legislation. 

Sincerely, 

Nathalie Walker & Monique Harden 

Advocates for Environmental 

Human Rights 

Tom Trotter 

AFL-CIO 

Pamela K. Miller 

Alaska Community Action on 

Toxics 

Tor Cowan 

American Federation of Teachers 

Diane Brown 

Arizona PIRG 

Jay Feldman 

Beyond Pestiddes 

Yvette Pena Lopes 

Blue Green Alliance 

Gretchen Lee 

Breast Cancer Fund 

Judy Levin 

Center for Environmental Health 

Lois Gibbs 

Mike Schade 

Center for Health, Environment, 

and Justice 

Daryl Ditz 

Center for International 

Environmentall,aw 

Cynthia A Wilson 

Citizens for a Clean 'Environment, 

Inc. 

Eric Cheung 

Clean Air Council 

Kathy Curtis 

Clean New York 

Mark Rossi 

Clean Production Action 

Lynn Thorp 

Clean Water Action 

CindyLuppi 

Clean Water ActionMassachusetts 

Dave LeGrande 

Communications Workers of 

America (CWA) 

Mark A. Mitchell 

Connecticut Coalition for 

Environmental Justice 

Mike Fitts 

Connecticut Council on 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Dr. Beverly H. Wright 

Deep South Center for 

Environmental Justice 

Stephen Brittle 

Don't Waste Arizona 

Rob Fisher 

Ecological Conservation 

Organization (AR) 

Tracey Easthope 

Ecology Center 

Judy Braiman 

Empire State Consumer Project 

AnnaAurilio 

Environment America 

Richard Denison 

Environmental Defense Fund 

Judy Robinson 

Environmental Health F'und 

Michael Belliveau 

Environmentalllealth Strategy 

Center 

Judith M. Anderson 

Environmental .Justice Action 

GroupofWNY 

Ja'>on Rano 

Environmental Working Group 

Max Muller 

Environment Illinois 

Ben Wright 

Environment Massachusetts 

Luke Metzger 

Environment Texas 

Jeannie Economos 

Farmworker Association of 

Florida 

Fred Millar 

Friends of the Earth 

MatthewS. Tejada 

Galveston Houston Association 

for Smog Prevention and Mothers 

for Clean Air (GIIASP/MK:A) 

Denny Larson 

Global Community Monitor 

Daniel Parshley 

Glynn Environmental Coalition 

Laura Weinberg 

Great Neck Breast Cancer 

Coalition 

Bradley Angel 

Green Action 

Marcia Cooper 

Green Decade-Newton Chapter 

Mark A. Dunlea 

Green Education and Legal Fund, 

Inc. 

Rick Hind 

Greenpeacc 

Tracy Frisch 

Greenwich Citizens Committee 

(NY) 

Bill Walsh 

Healthy Building Network 

Claire Barnett 

Healthy Schools Network 
73 

Karen Joy Miller 

Huntington Breast Cancer Action 

Coalition, Inc. 

Brian Imus 

Illinois PIRG 

Lin Kaatz Chary 

Indiana Toxics Action 

Kathleen Schuler 

Institute for Agriculture and 

Trade Policy 

LaMont Byrd 

International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters 

ShanaOrtman 

International Campaign for 

Justice in Bhopal 

John Morawetz 

International Chemical Workers 

Union Council/llf'CW 

Elizabeth Crowe 

Kentucky Environmental 

Foundation 

Tieman Sittenfeld 

League of Conservation Voters 

Anne Rolfes 

Louisiana Bucket Brigade 

Peter Crockett 

Maine Labor Group on Health 

Sarah Standiford 

Maine Women's Lobby 

Johanna E. Neuman 

Maryland PIRG 

Dehorah Shields J.D., MPH 

Massachusetts Breast Cancer 

Coalition 

~1assachusetts Green ,Jobs 

Coalition (MAGJC) 

Massachusetts Interfaith Power 

and Light 

Janet Domenitz 

Massachusetts PIRG 

Chris Kolb 

Michigan Environmental Council 

Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner 

Moms Rising 

Matt Prindiville 

Natural Resources Council of 

Maine 

Amy Goldsmith 

New Jersey Environmental 

Federation 

Allison Cairo 

New Jersey PIRG 

Rick Engler 

NJ Work Environment Council 

Russ Haven 

New York PIRG 

Briao Turnbaugh 

OMBWatch 

Dave Rosenfeld 

Oregon PJRG 

Dona Hippert 

Oregon Toxics Alliance 

Keith Lake 

People's Settlement Association 

Kristen Welker-Hood 

Physicians for Social 

Responsibility 

Karen Joy Miller 

Prevention Is The Cure, Inc. 

Elizabeth O'Neal 

Protect All Children's 

Environment 

Tom Smith 

Public Citizen Texas 

Ted Schettler 

Science and Environmental 

Health Network 

Kathleen Bums 

Sciencecorps 

Deborah E. Moore, Ph.D 

Second Look 

Bill Borwegen 

Service Employees International 

Union (SEW) 

Ed Hopkins 

Sierra Club 

Maureen Barillaro 

Somerville Climate Action 

Students for a Just and Stable 

Future 

Craig McDonald 

Texans for Public .Justice 

Robin Scheider 

Texas Campaign for the 

Environment 

Melissa Cubria 

Texas PIRG 

Elizabeth Hitchcock 

U.S. Public Interest Research 

Group (U.S. PIRG) 

Barbara Somson 

llnited Automobile, Aero..frlpace 

and Agricultural Implement 

Workers of A me rica 

Holly Hart 

United Steelworkers (IJSW) 

Jo Deutsch 

United Food and Commercial 

Workers 

Brenda Gunther 

Urban llealth Environment and 

Learning Project (UHELP) 

Charity Carbine 

Vermont PlRG 

Pat Scanlon 

Veterans for Peace/Smedley 

Butler Brigade 

Laurie Valeriano 

Washington Toxics Coalition 

Erin Switalski 

\Vomen's Voices for the Earth 

Gail Bateson 

Worksafe, Inc. 

Kristin Breitweiser 

9/11 Widow 

Bettie D. Kettell, RN 

Durham, ME 
74 

Responses of Paul Orum 

Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition/ 

Independent Consultant to Center for American Progress 

to 

Follow-up Questions from Senator James Inhofe 

Concerning Protecting America's Water Treatment Facilities 

September 13, 2010 

The questions and answers below expand upon testimony provided July 28, 

20 l 0 before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. 

l. How many water utilities are represented within the Blue Green 

Chemical Security Coalition? 

The Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition does not represent water 

utilities. However, a number of the unions in the coalition represent workers 

at one or more water utilities. These workers could be hurt "first and worst" 

in the event of a major chemical release. These unions include: United 

Steelworkers; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 

Employees; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Service Employees 

International Union; United Food and Commercial Workers; 

Communications Workers of America; and United Auto Workers. Other 

unions such as the American Federation of Teachers are involved in 

chemical security because they represent teachers in schools that are located 

within range of a toxic gas release from a water utility or industrial facility. 

Most of the other organizations involved in the coalition similarly represent 

people who live within vulnerability zones of hazardous chemical facilities. 

2. Have the water facilities you mentioned that have already switched to 

safer processes been able to do so on their own without any help from 

the government? 

Our surveys have not inquired into the specific sources of funding that 

utilities used to convert off bulk chlorine gas. Presumably, some portion 

converted without federal support, but it is difficult to determine the extent 

of federal assistance. For example State Revolving Loan Fund programs for 

wastewater and drinking water support improvements that upgrade 
75 

infrastructure. Security improvements, including the removal of gaseous 

chlorine, are typically incorporated into capital costs of such infrastructure 

improvements rather than being considered separately. 1 

What has been missing is a strategic approach to address first the highest 

hazard water utilities. A federal presence can set a national security priority 

for converting the remaining water utilities that still use bulk toxic inhalation 

hazard chemicals. This is a legitimate role that the federal government can 

perform. 

A GAO experts' panel ranked replacement of gaseous chemicals with less 

hazardous alternatives as the highest federal security funding priority at 

water utilities? This panel identified direct federal grants and cost-shared 

grants as the most effective way to distribute funds. The panel also identified 

characteristics of utilities that could be used to set funding priorities, 

including serving critical infrastructure, using large amounts of gaseous 

chemicals, and serving large populations. 

3. You mention situations "where facilities don't save money" when 

switching to different chemical disinfectants. In what circumstances 

would this occur? 

Conversion costs vary widely. Cost factors include the size and 

characteristics of the facility, and whether the change is part of a larger 

facilities upgrade (e.g., replacing an undersized building at a utility that has a 

growing service population). Factors include the disinfectant method 

selected, construction and capital costs, chemical costs, and cost savings on 

elements such as regulatory compliance, training, operations, safety devices 

and security measures, emergency preparedness, and, potentially, on liability 

associated with a major chemical release. 

Proposed federal security legislation would require water utilities to assess 

conversion costs, including avoided costs and liabilities. These assessments 

will help each utility to make informed decisions, in particular by thoroughly 

identifying avoided costs that may otherwise go unrecognized. In our 

1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and 

Assessment, Fourth Report to Congress," February 2009, EPA 816-R-09-001, Page 13. 2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Wastewater Facilities: Experts' Views on How 

Federal Funds Should Be Spent to Improve Security," January 2005, GA0-05-165. 
76 

surveys we have found that chemical facilities may have general 

construction and chemical cost information, but tend not to have ready 

information or analysis of costs avoided with safer alternatives. 

4. In your written testimony, you say that "of 195 converted facilities 

that provided general cost information, 49 percent reported the changes 

cost less than $100,000, and 87 percent reported conversion costs below 

$1,000,000." Is it safe to assume then that 13 percent reported 

conversion costs over $1,000,000? What was the maximum conversion 

cost reported? 

Yes, about 13 percent reported conversion costs over $1,000,000. However, 

facilities that reported larger costs also generally reported that the costs were 

part of larger facility upgrades (an opportune time for switching to safer 

operations). Two facilities reported costs over $20 million. Flat glass 

manufacturer PPG Industries, Fresno, Calif., spent $40 million to upgrade its 

combustion system, realizing improved product quality and process 

efficiency. Detergent manufacturer Proctor and Gamble, Pineville, La., spent 

$50 million while installing equipment on-site that removed the cost and 

danger of having another company make and ship oleum to the site. These 

facilities upgraded their processes for many reasons, including improved 

industrial efficiency and productivity. Reduced vulnerability to an accidental 

or deliberate release of gaseous chemicals was only one benefit of the 

changes. 

5. You also state that "of 20 big city water and wastewater facilities that 

converted, the highest cost per customer served was $1.50 per year in 

construction and operating costs." Will this cost per customer increase 

for smaller water and wastewater facilities? 

As noted, conversion costs vary widely and facility size is only one factor. 

However, cost savings may be more available to smaller facilities. This is 

because avoided costs such as regulatory compliance tend to comprise a 

larger proportion of overall utility costs at smaller utilities. For example, by 

converting a utility may avoid costs of complying with EPA Risk 

Management Planning, OSHA Process Safety Management, and future 

chemical security requirements. Larger utilities tend to more readily absorb 

such costs within existing compliance programs and staff. 
77 

Proposed legislation (S.3598) includes "tools, methodologies, or computer 

software" to assist lower-tier water utilities (typically smaller facilities). 

These resources are intended to reduce the costs to utilities of preparing 

vulnerability assessments and site security plans. 

6. If switching away from gaseous chlorine were to create a potential 

health problem for a utility, should they be forced to switch? 

Proposed legislation (S.3598) adequately addresses this issue by requiring 

utilities to substantiate the problem using a reasonable standard. It requires a 

utility to substantiate any health hazard of converting in the site security plan 

submitted to the State and Administrator, and sets a standard for such claims 

as the inability to comply with drinking water or wastewater requirements of 

the State or political subdivision in which the utility is located. 

The proposal would require the utility in preparing an assessment of 

methods to reduce consequences to "take into consideration factors 

appropriate to the security, public health, and environmental mission of the 

covered water system". This includes assessing how each method could, if 

applied, "affect the presence of contaminants in treated water, human health, 

or the environment". 

The proposal also includes a realistic standard: "Before making a 

determination to require implementation of a method to reduce 

consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act ... the State or the 

Administrator, as applicable, shall take into consideration factors 

appropriate to the security, public health, and environmental missions of 

covered water systems, including an examination of whether the applicable 

method to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional 

act ... would not render the covered water system unable to comply with other 

requirements of this act or drinking water standards established by the State 

or political subdivision in which the covered water system is located" 

[emphasis added]. There is parallel language for wastewater treatment 

works, and a full appeals process. 

7. Onsite generation uses a lot of electricity, protecting hypochlorite 

from degrading in hot climates often requires refrigeration, and 

transporting by truck, as is often done with bleach shipments, uses more 
78 

fuel than shipping by rail. Have you or any of your colleagues done any 

studies on the effects of chemical switching on carbon footprints? 

I am not aware of any specific studies. However, chemical disinfection 

accounts for a tiny portion of energy used at a typical drinking water utility. 

A report by the Electric Power Research Institute indicates that a typical 

surface water treatment plant consumes about 1,406 kWh per million gallons 

of treated water, of which chlorine disinfection accounts for only 0.20 kWh 

(0.00014 percent)- or about one ten-thousandth of energy used.3 Chlorine 

disinfection accounts for an even tinier portion of energy used in 

groundwater production. Actual energy use is highly variable by location, 

depending primarily on the amount of water pumping. 

Wastewater disinfection may be more energy intensive, and may more 

commonly include treatment with ultraviolet light. A study prepared for 

Pacific Gas and Electric compared the energy intensity of 

chlorine/hypochlorite processes to ultraviolet light, stating that "[ o ]n a 

global energy basis, it appears that UV disinfection can be competitive with 

chlorine/hypochlorite disinfection and dechlorination."4 

Producing chlorine is energy intensive regardless of production location, and 

energy use is similar for producing chlorine gas or hypochlorite. Water 

utility pumping and flow equipment are also quite similar for chlorine gas 

and purchased hypochlorite in terms of energy use. Transportation energy 

use varies by material, distance, mode, and whether the disinfectant is 

generated on-site. One utility reported that energy use fell with hypochlorite 

since the utility no longer had to power chlorine gas evaporators to heat and 

convert chlorine gas that had been liquefied by pressure for shipping.5 

Energy used for emergency response and recovery is presumably much 

greater for chlorine gas than for hypochlorite in the event of a major release. 

3 Electric Power Research Institute, '"Water & Sustainability (Volume 4): U.S. Electricity 

Consumption for Water Supply & Treatment- The Next Half Century," March 2002, Figure 2-1. 4 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, "Energy Benchmarking Secondary Wastewater Treatment 

and Ultraviolet Disinfection Processes at Various Municipal Wastewater Treatment Facilities," 

2001. 

5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Securing Wastewater Facilities: Costs of 

Vulnerability Assessments, Risk Management Plans, and Alternative Disinfection Methods Vary 

Widely," March 2007, GA0-07-480. 
79 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Perea. 

STATEMENT OF CARLOS PEREA, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

MIOX CORPORATION 

Mr. PEREA. Senator Lautenberg, good afternoon. 

My name is Carlos Perea. I am the CEO of MIOX Corporation. 

We are a company that has been solving water quality issues for 

approximately 20 years. Our products are used in U.S. Naval ships 

as well as some of the top resorts and hotels around the world. 

But the majority of our experience has been in serving the needs 

of the municipal drinking water facilities around the country, and 

our systems are used by hundreds of facilities in 45 States. I actually brought a small example of the technology and the small purifier pen which is standard issue for U.S. Marines for drinking 

water. 

It is an honor to be a part of this discussion regarding the safety 

and security of our Nation’s water treatment facilities. I have three 

simple messages for this Committee and welcome any questions. 

The first is, please know there are well-tested solutions that can 

virtually eliminate the safety and security issues of concern. Second, these solutions do not have to cost more money and do not 

have to add burden to the treatment facilities and the communities. And third, without responsible legislation the rate of change 

will continue to be slow, and the majority of our communities will 

be vulnerable to accidents, or worse, to deliberate acts of terrorism 

for years to come. 

We have all read about and heard about the risks to large urban 

facilities and communities, that as many as 6 times the number of 

people who died in the horrific acts of 9/11 could be affected in the 

event of a gaseous chlorine spill in an urban area. 

However, I want to talk more about the dangers to our small 

rural communities. I believe these are the ones that we should be 

concerned about, both given their numbers and the likelihood they 

may not be as well resourced with the same safety and security 

precautions as larger cities. 

I believe the best way to deal with these risks are to eliminate 

the need to store and transport these chemicals altogether, and 

this is entirely possible with a well-proven approach. As was mentioned earlier, MIOX is part of a larger industry segment called onsite generation of disinfection chemicals. 

MIOX, along with others, has the ability to take ordinary salt, 

power, and water and to convert it into a chlorine base that is very 

powerful and effective but yet very dilute and safe and can be used 

as a complete alternative to gas and chlorine systems, including 

commercial strength bleach. The process uses electrolysis, and the 

only by-product is hydrogen gas that is easily vented. 

This approach has several benefits. First, it is completely compliant with EPA drinking water standards. Second, it eliminates the 

need to store and transport chemicals altogether. Third—and importantly—it saves money and can often achieve 50 percent cost 

savings or more over the life of the equipment. It is more environmentally responsible. It reduces the number of truckloads of chemi-
80 

cals that must be delivered. And it eliminates the need to decontaminate used containers. 

But most importantly it is very simple for the users to adopt, and 

existing systems can be retrofitted with no downtime and minimal 

training. This approach is used in over 5,000 installations, many 

of which have been in service for 10 years or more, some of which 

are very small communities of 2,000 or less. 

To give you three brief examples. The city of Santa Fe has been 

using MIOX systems since 1998 and has published reports of better 

overall water quality and lower operational costs. In the last several months Lakehaven Utility in Washington decided to switch 

from both gas and liquid chlorine for safety benefits. They also 

found they were able to save over $850,000 over the projected life 

of the project. 

But the most compelling example that I would like to share with 

you is from Apple Valley, California, that switched over 10 years 

ago due to safety concerns from caustic liquid bleach. 

To quote one of their operators, these are the folks who are actually working with the chemicals day in and day out; before switching to onsite generation in Apple Valley we literally had to employ 

a shower at every site. Transferring the liquid bleach was a slippery mess—we had to get geared up in full facials, goggles, aprons, 

the works every time. When we switched to onsite and were given 

the proper training, the installation was problem free, we didn’t 

need any special protective equipment or gear, it was easy to get 

the salt, it was totally safe, and we saw huge cost savings. 

So, if these systems are safer and they can save money, why 

would all communities not follow these examples? And why should 

we consider additional regulations? I believe there are many reasons. Many of these communities are working hard to meet EPA 

drinking water standards. However, they have no clear signal on 

how much they need to focus on overall safety and risk. 

Some communities have tried new approaches only after an accident or a near miss with hazardous chemicals. Others have adopted because they are proactive and want to save money or want to 

be more environmentally responsible. But the majority are not likely to change, at least not very quickly, unless they are prompted. 

They may just be too busy with day to day operations or other priorities. 

Whatever the reasons, I believe it is time to take steps to make 

our communities safe from these toxic chemicals. If we can make 

them safer and reduce operational costs, why wouldn’t we? I hope 

it does not take a tragic accident or deliberate act of terrorism for 

us to help the rest of the Nation’s communities and drinking water 

systems take notice. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perea follows:] 
81 

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

July 28, 2010 

"Protecting America's Water Treatment Facilities" 

Testimony of: 

Carlos Perea, 

MIOX Corporation 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Introduction 

Chairman Barbara Boxer, Ranking Member James Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Carlos Perea, and I am the CEO of 

MIOX Corporation, a company that has been solving water quality issues for approximately 20 

years. Based in Albuquerque, New Mexico, MIOX manufactures on-site generators (OSGs) for 

water disinfection. Using just ordinary food grade quality salt, power, and water to produce a 

very powerful and effective, but very safe, chemical alternative to gas chlorine and commercial 

strength bleach, OSGs eliminate the security and safety hazards associated with transporting, 

handling, and storing potentially dangerous chemicals. With more than 1 ,500 OSG installations 

in hundreds of U.S. communities and over 30 countries, MIOX systems are treating more than 

6.5 billion gallons of water per day, serving millions of people worldwide, including a recent 

series of cost-effective, easy-to-install OSG systems in the poverty-stricken state of Chiapas, 

Mexico, where poor water quality had been a staggering source of illness and death. On-site 

generation is safely used for potable water, wastewater and reuse, commercial swimming pools, 

on board military and cruise ships, cooling towers, food processing, the beverage industry, other 

commercial and industrial applications. MIOX technology was developed under a government 

contract at Los Alamos National Labs to create a portable water disinfection unit for use in any 

remote location. In addition, the technology was designed to achieve purification standards of 

Type II, highly contaminated water as defined by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
82 

Over the years, our science and technology teams have worked with numerous agencies to 

promote safe water treatment around the world in both remote and populated areas. These groups 

include the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the World Health Organization 

(WHO) and other internationally-recognized scientists from institutions and universities. The 

hand-held purifier development is one of DARPA's success stories, and continues to serve our 

men and women in uniform. 

Although MIOX is just one of many companies that have been manufacturing on-site generators 

since their inception in the 1970s, it is my privilege to be here today to share with you, on behalf 

of the industry, how on-site generation is a safe, economical, and effective water disinfection 

method that can significantly reduce security and safety risks at American water treatment 

facilities. OSG is a well-tested solution that can virtually eliminate the safety and security issues 

of concern. It does not have to cost more money or add burden to the treatment facilities and 

communities, and is fully compliant with current drinking water regulations. 

But despite these compelling reasons to switch to on-site generation - a proven, affordable, 

readily available option- not all communities are adopting OSG, instead continuing to use 

traditional, more dangerous technologies. Some communities only adopt safer approaches after 

an accident or close call with the storage or transport of their hazardous chemicals, while others 

prefer a proactive stance, switching for safety, security, or environmental reasons. But most are 

not likely to change, at least not until they are prompted, despite the competitive cost 

comparisons to traditional forms of chlorination. They may not realize how easy it is to change, 

or how much they could save in operations costs. Or, more likely they are just too busy with day 

to day operations and other priorities. While many US communities are working hard to meet 

EPA drinking water standards, they may not have a clear understanding of how best to address 

risks and overall safety. Without responsible legislation, the rate of change will continue to be 

slow, leaving the majority of our communities vulnerable to accidents, or, worse, to deliberate 

acts of terrorism for years and decades to come. 

The Basics of Water Disinfection 

Chemical disinfection of public drinking water supplies, started in the United States in 1908 with 

the use of chlorine, has been heralded by the US CDC as one of the 10 great public health 

2 
83 

improvements of the twentieth century to control infectious diseases. This global water treatment 

practice is one component of the multi-barrier approach to water treatment that also includes 

source water protection, sedimentation, filtration, and maintaining the integrity of the distribution 

system. i 

Disinfection of public water supplies as well as reused water and wastewater discharged to 

streams and lakes is required in the United States under provisions of the Safe Drinking Water 

Act and Clean Water Act. Some states have imposed additional requirements for disinfection. 

Disinfectant selection is central to the design and operation of drinking water, wastewater, and 

reuse systems. Our understanding of methods to safely deliver chlorine has significantly 

improved since 1908, when chlorine gas was the only option available. 

Chlorine gas, bulk bleach (hypochlorite), and chloramines are commonly used to chlorinate 

water systems, but each of these technologies involves at least one hazardous chemical. The EPA 

and DHS are promoting safer chlorination alternatives to minimize the risks associated with 

hazardous chemicals during transport, storage, and use. Classified as an inherently safer 

technology, on-site generation significantly minimizes risks and satisfies the EPA distribution 

system chlorine residual requirement. 

Gas Chlorination Imposes National Security and Safety Risks 

While chlorine gas has been used successfully for over 100 years to eliminate diseases in 

drinking water, it is a pressurized poisonous gas that causes serious injury and even death upon 

inhalation. In fact, chlorine gas was used as a chemical weapon during World War I and is 

heavily regulated by the EPA. Moreover, it is a potential terrorist target for release or theft of 

small cylinders. Worst case scenario risk assessments performed by utilities indicate that 

millions of people could perish if large quantities of gas were released in an urban area. 

Although the safety record for chlorine gas is admirable considering its rate of use, tragedies 

continue to occur daily with accidents at water treatment facilities, train or tanker truck wrecks, 

and other disasters that cause additional loss oflife due to the toxic nature of the chemical. 

Fundamentals of On-Site Generation 

With OSG, chlorine-based disinfectant is generated on site, on demand, using just salt, water and 

power, replacing the need to purchase, transport and store dangerous chemicals. Creating 

3 
84 

disinfectant on site is cost effective and environmentally responsible, cutting back transportation 

requirements by up to 80%, reducing carbon emissions and fuel consumption, and eliminating 

the storage and disposal of chemical containers. 

With an OSG system, a brine -salt and water - solution is passed through an electrical current to 

produce hypochlorite, or bleach, via electrolysis. The low-concentration disinfectant (::0: 0.8%) is 

collected in a storage tank and metered into the water stream on-demand. While on-site 

generators are also used industrially and commercially to provide disinfection for swimming 

pools, cooling towers, and sanitation for clean-in-place operations, the largest application of 

OSG technology is municipal drinking water disinfection. Many water municipalities are moving 

away from more traditional chlorine delivery systems such as chlorine gas, concentrated sodium 

hypochlorite, and bulk calcium hypochlorite, and turning instead to OSG systems as a safer, 

more cost-effective disinfection method that also has less environmental impact. For example, it 

is estimated that it takes one delivery of salt to produce the same amount of chlorine as five 

deliveries of 12.5% sodium hypochlorite bulk bleach- solution. Using OSG reduces the 

carbon footprint of the plant because less fossil fuel is needed to supply the plant with 

disinfectant. 

On-site generation is simple to adopt; systems can be retrofitted with no downtime to the plant 

operations and minimal training. 

On-Site Generation (OSG) is an Inherently Safer Technology 

One of the biggest driving forces behind OSG systems is the need to provide safer technology 

and safer storage to communities throughout the world, without compromising production or 

quality. Since many water treatment facilities are located adjacent to day care centers, schools, 

subdivisions and businesses, safety is an important consideration. The OSG process used by 

MIOX and other companies eliminates the transportation, handling, and storage of hazardous 

water disinfection chemicals like chlorine gas and delivered concentrated bleach. 

Many utilities have converted to purchasing bulk quantities of sodium hypochlorite in an effort 

to mitigate this hazard. In general, bulk sodium hypochlorite is considered to be safer, but it still 

poses the potential for a toxic release, particularly when spilled or inadvertently combined with 

other chemicals. Exposure to a heat source can cause spontaneous ignition. 

4 
85 

In contrast to alternative disinfection methods, the safe on-site generation of hypochlorite uses 

only salt, water, and power as feed stocks. Neither the salt nor the hypochlorite produced is 

classified as hazardous by the regulatory agencies. On-site generation for municipal water 

treatment has an excellent safety record, with approximately 6,000 units, from a variety of 

manufacturers, installed worldwide. 

Apple Valley, California, converted to OSG in 1996 after concerns with the hazards of caustic 

12.5% bulk bleach drove them to seek a safer alternative. "Before switching to on-site 

generation," reported Mark Beppu, Control and Instrumentation Technician at Apple Valley, "we 

literally had to have a portable shower at every site. Transferring the liquid bleach with a tube 

was a slippery mess and we were all geared up in full face shields, goggles, aprons - the works -

every time. When we switched to on-site, we were given proper training, installation was 

problem-free, and we didn't need any special equipment or gear. The salt was easy to get, totally 

safe, and we saw a huge cost savings. The run times vary by location, but a typical unit runs 

about 2.5-3 hours a day and makes a bunch of disinfectant." 

Improved Operator Safety 

In addition to the broad-range security risks posed by gas chlorination, they also pose a variety of 

hazards to the operator. Chlorine gas is probably the most hazardous source of chlorine used by 

water treatments plants; it is toxic and the use of chlorine gas cylinders also poses a pressure 

hazard. Industrial strength bleach used for water disinfection is a 12.5 percent-by-weight 

solution, which is caustic. OSG systems use only water and salt and produce nonhazardous 

oxidant solutions with a chlorine content that typically contains less than 0.8 percent free 

available chlorine. Treatment plants that use OSG systems typically have to face less oversight 

from state health agencies, provide less safety training for operators, and have less of an 

insurance issue compared to those using traditional forms of chlorine. 

On-Site Generation is Cost-Effective 

Because it is unnecessary to continuously purchase expensive chlorine chemicals, on-site 

generators typically produce chlorine at a much lower cost than traditional delivery methods. 

Additional savings are also realized by decreased safety -related and transportation costs, 

5 
86 

including possible lower insurance premiums. Although OSG systems may present a significant 

up-front capital equipment cost, many water plants realize a return on their investment in OSG 

equipment within two to three years. 

Recently, the Lakehaven Utility District, located between Seattle and Tacoma, installed a new 

MIOX on-site generator, replacing the gas chlorine and bulk bleach currently employed. The 

Lakehaven Board of Commissioners voted to upgrade the facility to a MIOX on-site generator 

based on safety and cost efficiencies. A capital lease program allowed Lakehaven to improve 

their facility at less cost to the utility than a capital equipment purchase or the monthly cost of 

chemicals. 

"Switching to MIOX was a carefully considered decision," said Chris McCalib, wastewater 

operations manager, Lakehaven Utility District. "We knew we needed to address the potential 

costs and complications associated with process safety management if we were to continue to use 

gaseous chlorine. At the same time, we had microbiological issues that we needed to address, 

particularly filamentous bacteria in the secondary treatment system. It made sense to go with onsite generation for safety and cost benefits, and after careful scrutiny and evaluation, we chose 

MIOX because of their excellent safety record and the superior effectiveness ... " 

Cost Comparison with Other Chlorine Technologies The cost of operating an on-site generation 

system depends on the cost of salt and power. In general, the lifecycle cost of on-site generation 

is very competitive with chlorine gas alternatives, and is typically less than delivered 

hypochlorite and the advanced disinfection technologies of chlorine dioxide, ozone and UV. 

Maintenance needs are nominal, particularly for systems using good quality salt. In addition, the 

elimination of hazardous chemicals translates into reductions in regulatory paperwork, safety 

training requirements, safety inspections, and liability exposure. 

Transportation Costs The cost of freight significantly impacts the daily costs of chemical 

disinfectants. Given that the OSG process only utilizes salt, power and water, the freight costs 

are far less. Many more deliveries of bulk bleach are required for the same chlorine equivalent 

generated by a single delivery of salt 

6 
87 

As fuel costs rise, this variable becomes even more influential. Rises in the cost of fuel and 

subsequent rises in freight equate to a significant increase in the cost of bulk bleach. 

High Quality Chemicals 

Since hypochlorite quality degrades during time in storage, older hypochlorite contains 

progressively less free available chlorine, becoming less effective. Degradation of the product 

can become an issue in areas that are required to have 30-day or higher supplies of disinfectant 

chemicals on hand. OSG systems, on the other hand, typically produce only a two- to three-day 

supply of chlorine at a time, thus providing a potent disinfectant. Salt does not decompose, so 

that long-term requirements can be met by storing enough salt to comply with regulations. This 

is especially important for smaller, rural communities that purchase larger quantities of bulk 

bleach to save money up front, then find that the degradation of the product in storage is only a 

percentage of its original strength. This can create problems with dosing to meet regulations and 

is avoided when fresh OSG solutions are used. 

On-Site Generation is a Proven Disinfection Method 

On-site generation is not a new and innovative technology; it has been disinfecting water for 

decades. Collectively, OSG providers, including MIOX, have well over 5,000 installations 

worldwide, including many systems that have been employed for over l 0 years. For example, 

City of Bloottifield, New Mexico 

Commissioned 1998, 2. 7 MGD 

The water treatment plant for the City of Bloomfield, New Mexico, with a population of 

just over 6,000, had been disinfecting their water using gas chlorine stored in !-ton 

cylinders, then injected into the water stream to disinfect. OSHA requires submittal of a 

Process Safety Management (PSM) plan for over 1,500 pounds of chlorine stored on-site, 

while EPA requires a Risk Management Plan (RMP) for 2,500 pounds stored on-site. 

Since the MIOX solution produces disinfectant as needed, and the concentration is so 

dilute, regulatory paperwork was reduced or eliminated. 

7 
88 

Cedar Knox Rural Water Project, Nebraska 

Commissioned 2000, 300,000 -700,000 gallons per day 

Before 2000, the rural community of Cedar Knox with just over I ,000 residents- had 

been using gas chlorine to treat its water system. Operators had to transport !50-pound 

chlorine gas cylinders from the office-warehouse building 45 miles to the treatment plant 

via pick-up truck. The last 8'1, miles were over graveled country roads that could be 

difficult to travel, especially in inclement weather. By switching to on-site generation, 

employees only had to transport harmless food-quality grade salt, without the safety and 

security concerns associated with having hazardous chemicals at the plant. 

City of Las Vegas, New Mexico 

Commissioned 2000, 3.5 MGD 

Situated 65 miles east of Santa Fe with a population of approximately 14,000. Las Vegas, 

NM required two one-ton chlorine gas cylinders totaling 4,000 pounds, putting them 

above the EPA limits for a Risk Management Program. Changing out the cylinders 

required two operators with full gas masks and air tanks and another person outside the 

chlorine room on standby. A fourth person would wait by the phone for a quicker 

response in the event of an accident. In contrast, on-site generation involves no hazardous 

chemicals whatsoever. According to the operators, "The safety aspect alone ofMIOX 

would pretty much sell anybody." 

City of Crossville, Tennessee 

Commissioned 2000, 3.5 MGD 

The City of Crossville, Tennessee, located 110 miles east of Nashville, operates two 

water treatment plants that serve the City's community of 11,500. In 1999, Crossville 

began investigating water disinfection methods in an effort to improve the safety of their 

plants, reduce the potential liability involved with using and storing gas chlorine, a 

hazardous and regulated chemical, and reduce disinfection byproducts (DBPs). Between 

the inherent safety risks involved with transportation of gas chlorine and stricter 

regulations imposed by the Risk Management Program and the Disinfection Byproducts 

Regulations, a section of the Safe Drinking Water Act, chlorine gas was no longer an 

8 
89 

attractive water disinfection method. 

Since 2000, MIOX reduced operational costs for the City of Crossville while eliminating 

the safety and liability issues involved with using chlorine gas. Crossville has recently 

upgraded to newer, more efficient MIOX OSG systems that have been running 

successfully since January 2009. 

North Table Mountain, Colorado 

Commissioned 2000, 5 MGD 

North Table Mountain, with approximately I 0,000 residents, was concerned both with 

public safety and plant personnel safety. An accidental release of chlorine gas meant 

possible harm to an operator or nearby residents, including large new subdivisions and a 

lake area across the street that is a popular destination for boaters and fishers. With onsite generation, the site no longer uses. produces, stores, or transports any hazardous 

materials. Liability has been reduced, the plant no longer has to maintain a Risk 

Management Program or file reports with the local fire department, and the operators no 

longer need to attend HAZMAT training or use safety equipment. 

Sangre de Cristo Water Company, Santa Fe, New Mexico 

Commissioned 1998-2002, 3.5 MGD 

Capital of New Mexico and cultural hotspot, Santa Fe wanted to help secure the safety of 

their community and tourists by eliminating chlorine gas. The treatment plant stored 3 

tons of chlorine gas at the plant. One well field stored 1-ton cylinders at the site, while 

five others had 150-lb. cylinders stored around the city in residential areas and 

commercial districts. Delivery trucks traveled up a very narrow residential road to the 

plant, which is above a heavily-touristed area. By switching to on-site generation in 

1998, Santa Fe eliminated the need to transport, store, or handle chlorine gas, and is not 

required to develop an EPA Risk Management Plan or an OSHA Process Safety 

Management plan, and is no longer required to conduct HAZMA T training. 

Summary 

9 
90 

Today, we need to protect America's water treatment facilities. On-site generation is a proven 

method to do just that, economically and fully in compliance with current drinking water 

regulations. I believe the risks are real and are much more widespread than is often reported. 

We have all read about findings from the Department of Homeland Security that estimate how a 

single major chlorine gas spill in a urban area could kill 17,500 people, or about 6 times as many 

that died in the horrific attacks of September II. Or another study done by a major insurance 

company that a rail spill of chlorine could cause over $7 billion in damages, a catastrophe that 

would be in the unfortunate league of the current Gulf oil spill crisis. 

While these figures are alarming, the reality is that this dangerous situation is not limited to 

urban areas and mass scale events. It is the smaller, rural communities that also have real danger 

from these toxic chemicals that are transported and stored as part oftoday's water treatment 

processes. In many respects, these smaller communities probably pose more of a danger given 

their numbers and the likelihood that they may not be resourced to take the same safety and 

security precautions as larger cities. 

The best way to deal with these potential risks is to eliminate the need to store and transport 

these dangerous chemicals all together. 

This approach: 

a) Is completely compliant with existing EPA drinking water standards; 

b) eliminates the need to store and transport hazardous chemicals altogether; 

c) saves money, typically achieving cost savings of 50% or more over the life of the 

equipment; 

d) is more environmentally responsible as one truckload of salt equals 5 trucks of 

delivered chemical and it eliminates the need to decontaminate used containers; 

e) is simple for existing users to adopt as systems can be retrofitted with no downtime 

and minimal training. 

Moreover this approach is well tested with approximately 6,000 existing installations, many of 

which have been in service for I 0 years or more and many of which are very small communities 

of 2,000 residents or less. 

10 
91 

So, if these systems are safer and can save money, why aren't all communities following these 

examples and why should we consider additional regulations? I believe there are many reasons. 

Many of these communities are working hard to meet EPA drinking water standards. However, 

they have no clear signal on how much they need to focus on overall safety and risk. Some 

communities have only adopted these approaches after an accident or near miss with their 

hazardous chemicals. Others have adopted because they are proactive and want to take steps to 

be safer, lower cost and more environmentally responsible. But most are not likely to change, at 

least not until they are prompted. They may not realize how easy it is to change, or how much 

they could save in operations costs. Or, more likely they are just too busy with day to day 

operations and other priorities. 

Whatever the reasons, I believe it is time we take steps to make our communities safe from these 

toxic chemicals. If we can make them safer and reduce their operational costs, why wouldn't 

we? I hope it doesn't take a tragic accident or deliberate act of terrorism for us to help the rest of 

the nation's communities and drinking water systems to take notice. Thank you for your 

consideration on this critical public concern. 

'Source: www.awwa.org 

11 
92 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

July 28, 2010 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Perea 

Questions from: 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

1. I am aware of several concerns that stem from on site generation of and use of 

hypochlorite disinfection. I understand excess hydrogen gas is one byproduct ofthe 

onsite generation process. Also, hypochlorite solutions can contain impurities such 

as bromate, chlorate, chlorite and even perchlorate. Is MIOX doing any studies or 

working with research institutions on dealing with the potential problems created 

by hypochlorite use or generation? 

For the record, in response to Senator lnhofe's questions. 

1. On site generation of hypochlorite is much safer than the storage and transportation 

of traditional chemicals. Yes, hydrogen gas is a by-product of the process of using on site 

generation systems such as MIOX equipment. However, this is at very low levels and is 

safely vented to the atmosphere. MIOX and other producers design equipment with 

safe operations in mind. In the case of MIOX we have hired an outside, third party 

expert agency, The Hydrogen Safety Council, the same group that performs hydrogen 

safety for NASA, to certify our designs as safe. See the attachment for details. 

Moreover, these systems have been installed and in use in many US EPA regulated 

public drinking water facilities for over 14 years with excellent safety records and a 

history of cost savings and improved performance. 

2. On site generated hypochlorite is actually much less likely introduce impurities or 

unwanted by products into the public drinking water including formation of perchlorate 

and chlorates. On site generation is the same basic chemical as delivered commercial 

bleach or chlorine. However, because it is freshly made there is less chance of the 

unwanted by products that form with chemical aging and exposure to heat and the 

environment. This has been studied in conjunction with leading academic researchers as 

well as with industry experts at Southern Nevada Water Authority. We have also 

submitted plans for additional NSF funded research to understand how to optimize this 

process. 
93 

IQii IYIRIIEI 

lU.J SIFEll LLC Douglas M. Rode, P.E. 

Principal & Managing Director 

HYDROGEN SAFETY IN MIOX ON-SITE GENERA TORS 

MIOX Corporation is the safety leader for hydrogen mitigation for on-site generation 

technologies. Their designs use liquid barrier hydrogen ventilation systems to confine 

hydrogen to piping systems and eliminate accumulation of hydrogen gas in large 

spaces, such as the oxidant storage tanks. They offer hydrogen dilution air systems for 

any size system, and the dilution air systems are standard equipment on the larger 

generators. Their latest generation of product offerings utilizes a common blower for 

power supply cooling and hydrogen dilution air, offering their customers greater safety 

at reduced costs. 

Their designs utilize compact, small volume cells that minimize hydrogen gas 

accumulation. Their cells are designed for low rupture pressures to avoid energetic 

rupture of the cell in the event of a detonation in the cell. Indeed, their safety record in 

this regard is excellent. To further protect operators from an abnormal cell rupture, 

cabinet designs in their larger systems have been designed and tested to contain a cell 

in the event of a detonation. 

Dilution air systems from MIOX are based on a dual blower design for redundancy and 

safety. ftJr dilution flows are based on a ratio of 100 parts air to each part of hydrogen 

produced in the generator. As such, hydrogen concentration is maintained at a 

maximum level of 25 % of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of hydrogen (4.1%). Controls 

are fully Integrated with the on-site generators to ensure safe shutdown In the event that 

dilution airflow is not detected in the ductwork at the discharge from the facility. 

Hydrogen gas detectors are offered to provide a positive indication of hydrogen leaks 

from the system. These systems can be interlocked to the on-site generators to ensure 

safe shutdown in an abnormal condition. 

MIOX Corporation is among the first companies to have one of their key technical 

staffers (Director of Engineering) trained as a hydrogen safety specialist. Hydrogen 

Safety, LLC, who is an independent third party engineering consultant on hydrogen 

risks, has reviewed many of the company's designs, contract documentation, and 

labeling information to provide for personnel safety and system integrity. 

Submitted By: 

March 16,2007 

Hydrogen Sarety, LLC 66 Cedar Stree~ Suite 301, Newington, CT 06111·2646 USA 

Phone:660.594-7163 Fax: 86D-594·7184 Ema~: d.rode@hydrogensafety.com Web: www.hydrogensafety.com 
94 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Sivin. 

STATEMENT OF DARIUS D. SIVIN, PH.D., LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT 

WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) 

Mr. SIVIN. Senator Lautenberg, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. 

I am Dr. Darius Sivin, Legislative Representative for the International Union UAW. We represent over 1 million active and retired workers. Before serving as a Legislative Representative I 

worked as an industrial hygienist at the UAW where one of my responsibilities was facility visits and worker training related to 

chemical safety. 

Although this is not a legislative hearing I would like to begin 

by urging the Committee to mark up and quickly approve S. 3598, 

the Secure Water Facilities Act, and to make the improvements 

identified in this testimony. 

The UAW appreciates the opportunity to testify at this hearing 

on protecting America’s water treatment facilities. We are greatly 

concerned about the security of toxic inhalation chemicals at these 

facilities because our members get hurt first and worst in any attack. 

We represent workers at the Detroit Wastewater Facility which 

uses railcars of chlorine gas. The fact that Detroit has recently 

been a terrorist target last Christmas increases our concern for the 

more than 2 million people—including many of our members—who 

live and work in the vulnerability zone of the Detroit Wastewater 

Facility. 

We are encouraged that 11 wastewater treatment facilities in 

Michigan have already converted from chlorine gas to ultraviolet or 

liquid chlorine bleach. It is likely that the Detroit facility can do 

the same. 

We believe that water facility chemical security legislation will 

create jobs, and this belief is supported by a recent report by Management Information Services. It is hard to imagine otherwise 

given that the legislation requires public facilities to invest in security, and this requirement is accompanied by funds to help defray 

the costs. Moreover, water facilities cannot be closed or moved far 

away without being replaced locally. Every community needs drinking water and wastewater treatment. 

I want to emphasize that assessment and implementation of 

methods to reduce the consequences of attack are important security measures. They are security measures. Government agencies 

should be able to require a facility to implement its own plans to 

reduce the potential consequences of an attack. The bipartisan 

Partnership for a Secure America has stated the development of inherently safer, economically beneficial, and efficient technology 

should be prioritized. 

In a 2007 piece titled The Next Attack, Dr. Stephen Flynn, President of the Center for National Policy and a former Fellow of the 

Senate Foreign Relations, said the following. Public water filtration 

plants use large quantities of chlorine, one of the gases used as a 
95 

weapon during World War I, lethal for anyone caught downwind, 

potentially placing tens of thousands of people at risk. This risk 

could be alleviated by replacing chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, 

the active ingredient in household bleach. 

We fully agree with these security experts that methods to reduce the consequences of an attack are important security measures. We are pleased that your bill, S. 3598, provides for assessment and appropriately conditional implementation of methods to 

reduce the consequences of an attack. 

We believe that vulnerability assessments and site security plans 

can benefit from workers’ direct and current knowledge and experience of facility operations. Moreover, union staff that enters multiple facilities in the course of their work can bring the best nonproprietary ideas from one facility to another. For that reason, we 

are pleased that S. 3598 provides for including workers and their 

representatives in the development of vulnerability assessments 

and site security plans. 

We favor a statutory requirement for facilities to provide copies 

of vulnerability assessments and site security plans submitted to 

Government agencies to the very employees and representatives 

who participated in developing them. Without such a requirement 

the minority of employers who are unscrupulous could change the 

assessment prior to submitting it. 

Water facility security legislation must also include language requiring employees to be trained in methods to reduce the consequences of attack. In my written testimony I have identified a 

number of ways in which we believe that the information and accountability in the legislation can be expanded. Let me just add 

that we do not think that there should be criminal prosecutions for 

sharing what may or may not be protected information. 

In conclusion, even though this is not a legislative hearing we 

urge the full Committee to mark up and quickly approve S. 3598, 

the Secure Water Facilities Act, and make the following improvements: Require employees to be trained in methods to reduce the 

consequences of attack, require employers to provide copies of vulnerability assessments and site security plans to those who participated in development of them, expand public disclosure of information, and eliminate criminal penalties for disclosing information 

about vulnerability in the absence of criminal penalties for noncompliant employers. 

We look forward to working with this Committee to make this 

happen. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sivin follows:] 
96 

TESTIMONY OF 

DARIUS D. SIVIN, PHD 

LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW 

on the subject of 

PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES 

before the 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

July 28, 201 0 
97 

Senator Boxer. Senator lnhofe, Members of the Committee. thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today. I am Dr. Darius Sivin, a Legislative Representative for the 

International Union. United Automobile. Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of 

America (UAW). The UAW represents over one million active and retired workers. I 

have been serving as a legislative representative for the UAW since November, 2007. 

Previously, I worked in the UAW Health and Safety Department as an industrial 

hygienist. In that capacity, one of my responsibilities was to participate in facility visits 

and worker training related to chemical safety. 

Although this is not a legislative hearing. I would like to begin by urging the Committee 

to mark up and quickly approve S.3598, the Secure Water Facilities Act and to make 

the improvements that will be identified in this testimony. 

UAW's Interest in Securitv of Water Facilities 

The UAW appreciates the opportunity to testify at this hearing on "Protecting America's 

Water Treatment Facilities." The security of toxic inhalation chemicals at these facilities 

is an issue of great concern to us because our members will get hurt first and worst in 

the case of an attack. We represent workers at the Detroit wastewater facility, which 

uses rail cars of chlorine gas. Because so many of our members live and work in the 

vulnerabilify·z-onen":>ftfieUefroifWastewafeffacilify; WliicniflCITlaes over2miiiT6nj'ieopTEf, 

we are concerned about the fact that Detroit has been a terrorist target as recently as 

last Christmas. We are encouraged by the fact that eleven wastewater treatment 

facilities in Michigan have already converted from chlorine gas to ultraviolet light or 

liquid chlorine bleach. It is likely that the Detroit facility can do the same. 

Water Facilities Should be Covered by Chemical Security Legislation 

The UAW and more than 100 coalition partners who recently signed a letter endorsing 

S.3598, the Secure Water Facilities Act. believe that water facilities should be covered 

by security legislation. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office reported that two 

thirds of large U.S. wastewater facilities use a disinfectant other than chlorine gas or 

plan to switch away from chlorine gas 1

. An April, 2007 report by The Center for 

American Progress (CAP) indicated that. between 1999 and 2007, at least six drinking 

water and 19 wastewater facilities that had previously used chlorine gas by the rail car 

switched to a less hazardous disinfectant. such as liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. As a 

result. about 26 million people in nearby communities and millions more along rail 

delivery routes were no longer threatened by chlorine gas from these facilities. CAP 

reported that the cost of converting from the use of chlorine gas was typically no more 

than $1.50 per ratepayer per year and often much less. According to the same report. 

1 Government Accountability Office. (GAO. 2006). Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made 

Important Upgrades. but Further improvements to Key System Components May be Limited by Costs and 

Other Constraints. Washington DC: GAO http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06390.pdf (Accessed July 23, 

2010) 

2 
98 

24 drinking water and 13 wastewater facilities still used rail shipments of chlorine gas, 

posing a potential danger to more than 25 million Americans living nearby, and millions 

more near railways that deliver the chlorine gas2

. In our judgment, the low cost of 

conversion and the large number of people who would be protected by eliminating the 

possibility of chlorine gas releases argue strongly for security legislation covering 

drinking water and wastewater facilities. 

Water Facility Chemical Security Legislation Will Create Jobs 

According to a recent report by Management Information Services, lnc.3

, water facility 

security legislation will create jobs. It is hard to imagine that requiring public facilities to 

invest in security would do otherwise, especially when this requirement is accompanied by 

funds to help defray the cost. Moreover, the nature of water services is such that facilities 

cannot be closed or moved far away without being replaced locally. Every community 

needs drinking and wastewater treatment. 

Assessment and Implementation of Methods to Reduce the Consequences of an Attack are 

Important Security Measures 

We believe that government agencies should have the authority to require a facility to 

implement its own plans to reduce the potential consequences of an attack. The 

bipartisa_rLPartner_sbip_fQLaSec.ure_America~iESA). ... who.se_adllis.Qfy_.boarcLincludes. 

Howard Baker, Warren Rudman, Zbigniew Brzezhinski and other prominent Democrats 

and Republicans known for their national security expertise, has called for the use of 

safer and more secure technologies to reduce the consequences of a terrorist attack as 

a national security priority. In a report4 entitled Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to 

Reduce The Chemical Terror Threat (which we have submitted for the record), PSA has 

stated: 

[l]t is essential to reduce the risk that terrorists could attack an industrial 

chemical facility as a means to cause the release of a plume of toxic vapor and 

inflict mass casualties, or to inflict economic damage by destroying a key 

element of the nation's critical infrastructure. 

PSA also stated that "the development of inherently safer, economically beneficial, and 

efficient technology should be prioritized." 

2 Orum P. (2007). Toxic Trains and the Terrorist Threat 

How Water Utilities Can Get Chlorine Gas Off the Rails and Out of American Communities. Washington 

DC: Center for American Progress. 

http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2007/04/chemical security reporthtml (Accessed July 23, 2010) 1 Management Information Services, Inc. (MISI2010). Economic and Employment Benefits of the 

Chemical and Water Security Act OF 2009 (H.R. 2868). Prepared for 

Greenpeace, Inc. 4 Kosal ME (2008). Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat. Washington 

DC: Partnership for a Secure America. 

3 
99 

In his 2007 piece entitled, "The Next Attack5," Dr. Stephen Flynn6 said the following: 

[P]ublic water-filtration plants ... use large quantities of chlorine. Chlorine was one of 

the gases used as a weapon along the western front during World War I, and was 

lethal for anyone caught downwind. It is often transported under pressure in liquid 

form by tanker trucks, which must drive through city streets to reach the treatment 

facilities. Then it is stored in tanks adjacent to plants that may be close to residential 

neighborhoods, potentially placing tens of thousands of people at risk. This risk 

could be alleviated by replacing chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, the active 

ingredient in household bleach. 

We fully agree with these security experts that these methods to reduce the consequences 

of an attack are important security measures. We are pleased that S. 3598 provides for 

assessment and appropriately conditional implementation of methods to reduce the 

consequences of an attack. 

Worker Participation and Training 

We believe that vulnerability assessments and security plans can benefit from workers' 

direct and current knowledge and experience of facility operations, and from the knowledge 

of union staff, who enter multiple facilities in the course of their work and can bring the best 

non-.proprietar~ddeas from one facility. to another..-lncluding- workers and ~~----~ 

representatives in this process will enhance security and protect against attacks at water 

facilities. For these reasons, we favor granting employees and their representatives the right 

to participate in vulnerability assessments and site security plans, including participation in 

assessment and implementation of methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical 

release from an intentional act. We are pleased that S.3598 provides for such 

participation. 

Water facility security legislation must include language requiring employees to be trained in 

methods to reduce the consequences of a terrorist attack. We believe such training will 

make employees very valuable partners in reducing facility vulnerability. 

We favor a statutory requirement for facilities to provide copies of the vulnerability 

assessments and site security plans submitted to government agencies to the employees 

and representatives who participated in developing them. Such language was included in 

the version of H.R. 2868 as approved by the House Committee on Homeland Security. It is 

not enough merely to direct the EPA Administrator to provide procedures for sharing 

portions of a vulnerability assessment and site security plan relating to the roles and 

responsibilities of employees. Such language lacks a clear requirement that the assessment 

of methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act must 

5 Flynn S (2007). The Next Attack. Washington Monthly. 

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0703.flynn.html (Accessed July23, 2010) 6 Dr. Flynn is President of the Center for National Policy. He serves as a member of the bipartisan 

National Security Preparedness Group, co-chaired by former 9/11 commissioners, Governor Tom Kean 

and Congressman Lee Hamilton. He served as the lead policy advisor on homeland security for the 

presidential transition team. Before that, he spent a decade as a senior fellow for National Security 

Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

4 
100 

be shared with employees and/or employee representatives who participated in their 

creation. This would allow an unscrupulous employer to change the assessment prior to 

submitting it. Those who had participated in the assessment would have no way to know 

this. Moreover, the right to ongoing possession of these documents at the facility site is 

necessary in order to hold the employer accountable for its security commitments. 

Information and Accountability 

In order for a water facility security program to be successful, citizens must be able to get 

enough information to determine whether their security is adequately protected. In addition, 

it is necessary to have procedures by which citizens can hold the government accountable. 

Excessive secrecy does not increase security. Instead, it simply provides cover for officials 

who may be failing to live up to their responsibilities. While we agree that information 

concerning specific vulnerabilities of specific facilities should not be disclosed, it is still 

important to provide the public with enough information to make an evaluation as to whether 

the government is adequately carrying out its duties. Good security legislation would 

require government agencies to disclose what kinds of enforcement activity they are 

engaging in. The impact on security of such a duty to disclose could only be beneficial. 

Access to basic facility identification and regulatory status information should not be 

restricted. Such basic information will help develop public confidence in the security 

program by allowing people to know that the chemical facility and drinking water facility 

security programs are working as they should to keep us secure. 

We oppose criminal penalties for those who disclose protected information about the 

vulnerability of a water system. Our members should be able to communicate about 

pressing safety and security concerns, so long as their communication does not directly 

replicate materials in vulnerability assessments and security plans, or is derived from 

sources other than vulnerability assessments or security plans. It is particularly offensive to 

subject heroic whistleblowers to potential jail time, while the owners and operators of a 

facility who leave the employees and the public vulnerable by non-compliance are 

potentially subject only to civil penalties. Criminal penalties for disclosure of protected 

information have a chilling effect on employees and agency officials who have legitimate 

reasons for sharing information that may or may not be protected with others, such as first 

responders who have legitimate reasons for having the information. We believe that 

chemical facility legislation should not contain criminal penalties for disclosure of protected 

information. 

Many parties play a role in improving industrial practices, including regulatory agencies, 

academic institutions, state and local governments, employees and employee 

representatives, national laboratories, inventors, private sector safety and security experts, 

and vendors of alternate technologies. For this reason, information on alternative 

technologies should be made available to these parties to the maximum extent consistent 

with security and with intellectual property law. 

Conclusion 

We urge the full committee to mark up and quickly approve S.3598, the Secure Water 

Facilities Act and to make the improvements identified in this testimony including: 

5 
101 

requiring employees to be trained in methods to reduce the consequences of a 

terrorist attack, 

requiring employers to provide copies of vulnerability assessments and site security 

plans to the employees and representatives who participated in developing them, 

expanding public disclosure of information, 

and eliminating criminal penalties for disclosing information about vulnerability in the 

absence of criminal penalties for non-compliant employers. 

We look forward to working with this committee to make this happen. 

6 
102 

ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OF THE 

CHEMICAL AND WATER SECURITY ACT OF 2009 

(H.R. 2868) 

Prepared for 

Greenpeace, Inc. 

By 

Management Information Services, Inc. 

Washington, D.C. 

July 2010 
103 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 2 

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 6 

II. TITLE 1: CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY .............................................................. 7 

Ill. TITLE II: DRINKING WATER SECURITY ................................................................ 8 

IV. TITLE Ill: WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY ............................... 9 

V. EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES .................................................................................. 10 

VI. ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES .................................................... 17 

VII. REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 19 

APPENDIX: THE MIS! MODEL .................................................................................... 20 

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC ....................................................... 26 
104 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

There are roughly 12,000 geographically dispersed facilities in the U.S. that 

manufacture, consume, or store significant amounts of hazardous substances. 1 These 

substances represent a significant risk to the population and environment if accidentally 

leaked into the air, and the industries affected by chemical security vulnerabilities range 

across the spectrum of U.S. industries. The companies and industries involved span 

the economy and include chemical manufacturers, fertilizer and pesticide facilities, food 

manufacturing, pulp and paper manufactures, storage and distribution facilities, utilities, 

refineries, and water and wastewater treatment facilities. Not only are these facilities 

subject to an accidental release of chemicals that threaten the health and life of millions 

of Americans, but those located in densely populated areas are now also recognized as 

being potential targets for terrorist actions. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) have jurisdiction over hazardous substances and air and water quality, 

but do not have the power to require the reduction of these inherent risks to society to 

acceptable levels. A number of Congressional bills have been introduced over the last 

few years giving federal government agencies a leading role in protecting tl1~ QU\:llic. 

Ttie most recent is H.R. 2868, the Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009 which 

passed the House of Representatives November 6, 2009 and contains three Titles that 

direct DHS and EPA to formulate a new approach to chemical, water, and wastewater 

treatment facility security by providing operational funding and grant money to stimulate 

a greater private-sector response. This report summarizes the House-passed bill and 

the three Titles and estimates the economic and employment impacts of the bill on the 

U.S. economy for a ten year period. 

There are a number of methods that have been used over the last decade to 

create safer facilities, and almost all of the changes that have occurred were based on 

sound business decisions that did not affect the company's bottom line. Hundreds of 

chemical facilities have already transitioned to safer, more secure alternatives on their 

own. In many cases, facility owners experienced cost-savings after switching because 

of a: 

• Reduced requirement for physical security measures 

• Reduced regulatory reporting burden 

• Reduced liability and other insurance 

• Increase in process efficiency 

• Increase in production and product quality 

Decrease in worker-related health and safety costs 

1 There are 12,029 facilities according to EPA's Risk Management Program. 

2 
105 

Economic and employment impacts in the U.S. will occur because of 

expenditures related to the Congressional bill and the stimulus that the bill provides to 

covered facilities to conduct process changes or any other method that reduces or 

eliminates the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. Here we examined each of 

the Titles in detail and estimated the likely expenditures forecast through 2020- Table 

EX-1. 

Table EX-1 

Direct Annual Expenditures Attributable to H.R. 2868 

(millions of dollars) 

Title I 

Conversion grants 50 50 

DHS expenditures 233 233 

Private matching and other expenditure 50 50 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

50 50 

233 233 

50 50 

Total 425 375 325 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 

lTitle 2 

EPA/State government expenditures 

Conversion assistance 

Training grants 

Owner matching and other expenditure 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

Total 

lTitle3 

EPA/State government expenditures 

30 31 31 

125 128 130 

160 164 167 

25 25 25 

340 347 354 

32 

133 

172 

25 

362 

32 32 

133- 133 

172 172 

25 25 

362 362 

Conversion grants 150 150 150 150 150 150 

50 

25 

Assistance and training grants 50 50 50 50 50 

Owner matching and other expenditure 25 25 25 25 25 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

Total 225 225 225 225 225 225 

!Programmatic Total 990 947 904 920 920 920 

Source; Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

32 32 

133 .. 133 

172 172 

25 25 

362 362 

150 

50 

25 

225 

920 

150 

50 

25 

225 

920 

32 

133 

172 

25 

362 

32 

133 

172 

25 

362 

150 150 

50 50 

25 25 

225 225 

920 9201 

We estimated that, including the public-sector program and the private sector 

expenditures, the total chemical facilities program will cost an estimated $990 million in 

2011, decreasing to $904 million in 2013, but then staying at a level of $920 million from 

2014 through 2020. Using the MISI input-output model, we estimated that H.R. 2868 

will create a total gross sales impact of almost $2 billion in the first year of 2011 and 

account for 8,000 jobs-- Table EX-2. The economic impact is projected to stay close to 

the $1.9 to $1.8 billion estimate over the period through 2020 as a combination of 

government programs and private-sector expenditures continue to transform the 

3 
106 

facilities to safer configurations. The number of employees across the country working 

on these new economic activities (the gross employment impact) is forecast to remain 

at about 8,000 every year through 2020. 

Gross sales are defined as the added activity in the U.S. economy that results 

from the initial expenditure. Comparing the resultant gross sales to the initial direct 

expenditure provides a measurement of the impact multiplier. In this case, the multiplier 

is around 2.0 every year, meaning that for every dollar spent, the direct and indirect 

impacts across the economy totaled almost two dollars. Because the initiative affects a 

diverse mix of sectors in the economy, the resultant 2.0-multiplier is close to the national 

average. For instance it can be compared to a low multiplier, when there is additional 

demand for the real estate industry of 1.5, to a higher multiplier of 2.4 when there is 

additional demand for output in the primary metals industry. 

Table EX-2 

Economic and Employment Impacts Attributable to H.R. 2868 

I 2011! 2012! 20131 2o14l 2o1sl 2o1al 2o11l 2o1al 2019! 2o2ol 

Gross sales impact (million dollars) 1,953 1,870 1,779 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,812 1,810 1,808 1,807 

Gross employment impact (thousands) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 

Net employment impact (thousands) <1 <1 <1 <:'t- <1 "t 4- <1- 4 <1 

Source: Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

We also conducted a net jobs analysis by exammrng a scenario where 

expenditures allocated in a normal pattern throughout the U.S. economy were 

reprogrammed to pay for the H.R. 2868 initiative, keeping government and private 

expenditures at a net-zero dollar level. In this case, the change in net employment 

across the economy was not large enough to measure. The impacts were less than a 

net loss or net gain of fewer than 500 jobs across the country. While the impacts of 

H.R. 2868 will affect many companies and as many as 8,000 jobs in various industries, 

the net, economy-wide job impact will likely be close to zero. Under H.R. 2868, 

productivity advancements will be made in the facilities included in this study and the 

demand for labor will continue to decline as it would under baseline economic growth 

without the legislation, and it will decline no more so than in other industries over the 

2011-2020 period. After the facility conversions and upgrades, the industries affected 

will be in a more sustainable position and will be positioned to offer greater job security 

to their workforce. 

Some of the more detailed results of this study include identifying key industries 

that will be positively affected more than others, both in terms of increased gross sales 

and employment. These industries include, in order of positive economic impact over 

the 2011-2020 period: 

4 
107 

• Chemical products (about 14 percent of the economic impact) 

• State and local government (9 percent) 

• Federal government (9 percent) 

• Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services (6 

percent) 

• Water utilities (5 percent) 

• Waste management and remediation services (5 percent) 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

Across the U.S., roughly 12,000 facilities manufacture, consume, or store 

significant amounts of hazardous substances that represent a significant risk to the 

population and environment if accidentally leaked into the air according to EPA's Risk 

Management Program. The companies and industries involved span the economy and 

include chemical manufacturers, fertilizer and pesticide facilities, food manufacturing, 

pulp and paper manufactures, storage and distribution facilities, utilities, refineries, and 

water and wastewater treatment facilities. Not only are these facilities subject to an 

accidental release of chemicals that threaten the health and life of millions of 

Americans, but those in densely populated areas are now also recognized as being 

potential targets for terrorist actions. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) have had jurisdiction over hazardous substances and air and water 

quality, but do not have the power to require the reduction of these inherent risks to 

society to acceptable levels. Because of the lack of resources and a strong charter to 

improve the Nation's safety, a number of Congressional bills have been introduced over 

the last few years giving federal government agencies a leading role in protecting the 

public. The most recent is rt.R: 2868; tiTe Chemlcat and Water Security 7\ct of20U9, 

which passed the House of Representatives November 6, 2009 and contains three 

Titles that direct DHS and EPA to formulate a new approach to chemical, water, and 

wastewater treatment facility security by providing operational funding and grant money 

to stimulate a greater private-sector response. 

This report provides a summary of the House-passed bill and the three Titles and 

then, using publicly available information, descriptions, and analyses, estimates the 

economic and employment impacts of the bill on the U.S. economy for a ten year 

period. The analysis focuses on identifying key industries affected both directly and in 

the supply chain. 

6 
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II. TITLE 1: CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY 

Title I of H.R. 2868, The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009,2 amends 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002, providing more regulation of security practices at 

chemical facilities and government monetary grants to owners for conversion of their 

facilities to inherently safer facilities.3 

Some of the provisions of Title I that are most relevant to this assessment include 

those that: 

• Authorize the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to designate 

substances of concern and establish chemical safety thresholds 

• Direct the Secretary to maintain a list of chemical facilities segmented in four risk 

categories 

• Establish standards and procedures for security assessments and plans and 

require them, and conformance to them, by facility owners 

• Establish a program to award grants to eligible organizations to provide for 

training and education of employees and emergency responders 

• Require the owner or operator of a covered chemical facility to include in the site 

security plan an assessment of methods to reduce the consequences (MRC) of a 

terrorist attack on that facility and where appropriate implement MRC 

• Authorizes ~1 00 million in. grants in the first year to offset the costs of 

implementing MRC 

• Direct the Secretary to issue regulations to require covered chemical facilities to 

increase a wide range of personnel security measures 

• Authorize the Secretary to carry out the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism 

Standards until permanent rules take effect 

• Authorize appropriations to fund these activities 

'H.R. 2868, "Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009" was adopted by the House of Representatives 

November 6, 2009: a bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance security and protect 

against acts of terrorism against chemical facilities, to amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to enhance the 

security of public water systems, and to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to enhance the 

security of wastewater treatment works, and for other purposes, introduced June 15, 2009 in the 111 lh 

Congress. 

'Title I "amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to set forth provisions governing the regulation of 

security practices at chemical facilities." 

7 
110 

Ill. TITLE II: DRINKING WATER SECURITY 

Title II of H.R. 2868, the Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009, amends 

the Safe Drinking Water Act and expands the requirements for assessments by water 

systems covered under the act and their vulnerability to intentional acts of sabotage. 4 

"Covered water systems" are defined as community public systems that serve a 

population greater than 3,300 or that present a security risk. 

Some of the provisions of Title II that are most relevant to this assessment 

include those that: 

• Authorize the Administrator of the EPA to designate substances of concern in 

issuing water system security standards 

• Direct the Administrator of the EPA to issue regulations to establish tiered, 

risk-based performance standards for the security of covered water systems 

and requirements for the systems to conduct vulnerability assessments; 

develop site security and emergency response plans 

• Provide training to system and contractor employees and authorize $160M 

per year in training grants 

• Specify that EPA regulations must address the vulnerability of a water system 

to intentional acts and levels of risk; and require the Administrator to review 

and approve the vulnerability. assessments andsite. security plans otco.vered 

water systems, including an assessment of MRC, and where appropriate, to 

implement MRC in partnership with local and state authorities 

• Authorize the Administrator to award $30M in grants to states in implementing 

new regulations under this Act and for assessing and implementing methods 

to reduce the consequences of a release 

• Authorize $125 million in the first year in grants to help fund the 

implementation of MRC. 

'Title II "amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to revise and expand requirements for assessments by 

covered water systems of their vulnerability to intentional acts of sabotage." 

8 
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IV. TITLE Ill: WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY 

Title Ill of H.R. 2868, The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2009 

amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) requiring owners or 

operators of a wastewater treatment facilities that have a treatment capacity of at least 

2.5 million gallons per day or, at the discretion of the EPA Administrator, that presents a 

security risk to conduct and update a vulnerability assessment; develop and implement 

a site security plan; and develop an emergency response plan for the wastewater 

treatment works. 5 

Some of the provisions of Title Ill that are most relevant to this assessment 

include those that: 

• Authorize the Administrator of the EPA to designate substances of concern in 

issuing wastewater treatment system security standards 

• Direct the Administrator of EPA to issue regulations by December 31, 2010 

establishing risk-based standards for the security of the systems; and 

submissions of facility vulnerability assessments and implementation of site 

security plans, emergency response plans, and provisions of annual training 

to employees of the treatment facilities 

• Require the Administrator to provide a classification of four risk-based tiers of 

facilities, takingJnto. considere~tion theJe~cility §iZel,Mighi:>Oii119. poplllation, 

and the potential impact of intentional acts on the environment, infrastructure, 

and public health and safety; assign each covered facilities to one of such 

tiers; establish risk-based standards for site security plans and emergency 

response plans that reflect the level of risk associated with the risk-based tier 

assignment 

• Require a facility that possesses a chemical of concern in sufficient quantities 

to include an assessment of methods to reduce the consequences of an 

intentional chemical release (MRC), and where appropriate to implement the 

MRC in partnership with local and state authorities 

• Authorize the Administrator to provide grants to individual or multiple state or 

local government organizations to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a 

publicly owned facility, and to provide for security-related training of 

employees and emergency response related training 

• Authorizes $200 million a year in grants to enhance security at local facilities, 

including MRC. 

"Title Ill "amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act) to 

require each owner or operator of a treatment works that has a treatment capacity of at least 2.5 

million gallons per day or, in the discretion of the Administrator, that presents a security risk making 

coverage appropriate, to: ( 1) conduct and update a vulnerability assessment of its treatment works; (2) 

develop, periodically update, and implement a site security plan; and (3) develop and revise an 

emergency response plan for the treatment works." 

9 
112 

V. ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES 

The industries affected by chemical security vulnerabilities range across the 

spectrum of U.S. industries. In 2008, the Center for American Progress (CAP) identified 

101 highest-hazard facilities in the U.S. and identified commercially available, safer and 

more secure alternatives for nearly all of them.6 Table 1 breaks down these facilities by 

industry and North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. The first 

group in the table represents the 101 highest-hazard facilities. In addition, CAP 

identified a number of other industries of concern due to their use of chlorine, sulfur 

dioxide, and anhydrous ammonia, and those 23 facilities are classified at the bottom of 

Table 1. 

Table 1 

Dispersion of High-Hazard Facilities in the U.S. Economy 

I Top 101 

Drinking water & wastewater treatment 

Pulp and paper manufacturing 

Petroleum refining 

Bleach manufacturing 

Fertilizer manufacturing 

Other chemical manufacturing 

Rail transportation storage 

Chemical transportation (road) 

Chemical terminals (marine) 

Hazardous waste incinerators 

I Others of Concern 

Power plants 

Food processors 

Secondary aluminum smelters 

I Facilities I NAICS I Industry Title 

15 221 Utilities 

1 322 Paper manufacturing 

8 324 Petroleum & coal products manufacturing 

30 325 Chemical manufacturing 

1 325 Chemical manufacturing 

37 325 Chemical manufacturing 

2 482 Rail transportation 

3 484 Truck transportation 

2 488 Support activities for transportation 

2 562 Waste management & remediation services 

13 221 Utilities 

5 311 Food manufacturing 

5 331 Primary metal manufacturing 

Source: Center for American Progress. 2008 and Source: Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

Not only are the industries wide-ranging, but they are also geographically 

dispersed, and their locations range from California and Washington to New York and 

Florida. 

Identifying Critical Facilities 

When assessing the most critical facilities that need to evolve into safer facilities, 

it is import to triage the list. Each of H.R. 2868 Title's have their own method for 

classifying dangerous plants, but most would rely on the number of persons affected by 

a catastrophe. 

6

Paul Orum, Chemical Security 101: What You Don't Have Can't Leak, or Be Blown Up by Terrorists, 

Center for American Progress, November 2008. 

10 
113 

There are clear guidelines for Title I regulated facilities, since they are classified 

in tiers. MISI's best current estimates, based on Department of Homeland Security 

classifications of "Final Tiering" and "Awaiting Final Tiering" facilities, are that there will 

be: 

• 229 facilities classified as Tier 1 facilities 

• 575 facilities classified as Tier 2 

• 1 ,276 facilities classified as Tier 3 

• 3,739 facilities classified as Tier 4 

H.R. 2868 would also add 400 to 600 port facilities currently regulated under the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act and likely to be contained in EPA's Risk 

Management Plan data base. It is not known which risk tier these facilities would be 

assigned to but some will eventually be classified as Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. 

According to current EPA sources, there are only 1 ,554 drinking water facilities 

out of 9,000 medium and large sized community water systems that may be required to 

assess MRC. These Title II Tier 1 and 2 facilities will likely be classified based on the 

affected population. For our analysis, we anticipate that the population number is fixed 

at 100,000, which results in 45 facilities classified as Tier 1 and Tier 2. 

Finally, according to EPA sources, the universe of eligible Title Ill wastewater 

treatment facilities will include 1,800 systems with a capacity of over 2.5 million gallons 

a day, but only 871 of them may be required to assess MRC. Tier I and II facilities will 

likely be classified based on the affected population. For our analysis, we anticipate 

that the population number is fixed at 100,000, which results in 28 facilities classified as 

Tier 1 and Tier 2. 

Risk Reduction Methods 

There are a number of methods that have been used over the last decade to 

create safer facilities. Hundreds of facilities have already made this move, particularly 

since 2001. Almost all of the changes that have occurred were based on sound 

business decisions that did not affect the company's bottom line. Given the time, 

companies typically waited for the next round of plant upgrades or other corporate 

planned events to also incorporate safety-related changes. There have been a number 

of options employed thus far and each facility and company had unique circumstances 

that led them to choose the best technique for reducing chemical hazards. These 

choices included: 

• Raw material changes where other substances are used, or solids 

and liquid forms used in place of gaseous versions 

• Process changes so that high-technology solutions reduce or 

replace the need for chemical inputs 

• Just-in-time delivery or just-in-time on-site creation of chemicals, so 

that hazardous inventories are reduced 

11 
114 

• Hardened and more secure storage 

• Combining plants so that only one facility needs to be secured or 

moving plants to less densely populated areas 

It must be noted that the last option of combining facilities or moving them to 

other locations is not necessarily a preferred solution. Because of the continuing nature 

of the risk presented, this may not be an eligible option that can be employed in the 

future. 

Conversion Costs 

Hundreds of facilities no longer represent a threat because of a switch to less 

hazardous substances or a change in the process. Almost all these conversions were 

made voluntarily b¥ companies. CAP documented 284 of these transitions in their 2006 

survey and report. On the survey question of final costs, the results were mixed and 

almost neutral. Out of the 226 respondents: 34 percent of the companies reported that 

they expected cost savings or improved profitability, 45 percent responded they did not 

expect cost savings, and just over one-fifth expected little change in costs. 

On another survey question, 195 facilities reported their cost of switching to less 

hazardous suostemces or a change in the process~ and responses were provided in five 

ranges of dollars spent to implement the change. These are represented in Figure 1 

and show that 95 facilities reported spending less than $100,000, 75 additional facilities 

reported spending up to $1 million, 20 additional facilities reported spending up to $10 

million, three additional facilities reported spending up to $20 million, and finally, two 

reported spending over $20 million. While this is not an unbiased sample because it 

represents not only past volunteer organizational actions but also volunteer responses 

to the survey, it nonetheless provides an idea of typical conversion costs in a spectrum 

of industries. Of these self-reported actions, 87 percent cost less than $1 million. 

Making some assumptions about the distribution of the costs, we can estimate that the 

median conversion cost for this group of facilities was roughly around $125,000. 

Making another heroic assumption about the two very expensive outliers, we can also 

estimate that the average cost of the changes to these facilities might have been around 

$1.25 million. These estimates are fraught with caveats, but without actual, definitive 

reported, and verifiable information, they give us an idea of what relative magnitude 

future conversions may cost. 

'Paul Orum, Preventing Toxic Terrorism: How Some Chemical Facilities are Removing Danger to 

American Communities, Center for American Progress, April 2006. 

12 
115 

Figure 1 

Costs to Convert to Safer Facility 

100 

Ill 80 

Ql 

E 

'ij 60 .! 

.... 

0 

... 

Ql 40 .Q 

E 

::l 

c:: 20 

0 

<100,000 <1,000,000 <10,000,000 <20,000,000 >20,000,000 

cost in dollars 

Source: Center for American Progress, 2006 and Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

Clearly, typical costs will vary by chemical, industry, facility size, conversion 

option chosen, etc. For instance, the conversion costs for a petroleum refinery to switch 

from hydrofluoric acid to the less dangers sulfuric acid may be between $20 and $30 

million according to one estimate and between $7 and $30 million according to the U.S 

PIRG.8 (A majority of 98 refineries already use safer alternatives, but as many as 50 

still use the most hazardous form of hydrofluoric acid.) Other processes can be 

changed to safer alternatives for less than $100,000. 

Annual Expenditures 

Economic and employment impacts in the U.S. will occur because of direct 

expenditures related to the Congressional bill and the stimulus that the bill provides to 

organizations with covered facilities to conduct process changes or implement other 

methods to reduce or eliminate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. 

For this analysis, each of the Titles was examined in detail and direct 

expenditures documented or estimated-- see Table 2. 

• See Washington Monthly article, "The Next Attack", by David Flynn, July 3, 2007 and U.S. PIRG 

Education Fund (2005). 

13 
116 

Table 2 

Direct Annual Expenditures Attributable to H.R. 28689 

(millions of dollars) 

Title I 

Conversion grants 

DHS expenditures 

Private matching and other expenditure 100 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

Total 425 375 325 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 

lntle 2 

EPA/State government expenditures 30 31 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 

Conversion assistance 125 128 130 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 

Training grants 160 164 167 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 

Owner matching and other expenditure 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

Total 340 347 354 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 

{Title 3-

EPA/State government expenditures 

Conversion grants 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 

Assistance and training grants 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 

Owner matching and other expenditure 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 

UMRA intergovernmental costs 

UMRA private sector costs 

Total 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 

IProarammatic Total g9o 947 904 920 920 920 920 920 920 9201 

Source: Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

Title I expenditures will include $100 million in grants to facilities to fund 

conversions to safer technologies in 2011, $75 million in 2012, and $50 million in 2013 

through 2020. These levels include $3 million for designated farm suppliers. The 

remainder of the appropriated budget will be used by DHS for internal programs and to 

conduct facility employee and first-responder training. This level is at $225 million until 

2014 when the anticipated level rises to $233 million, remaining at that level through 

2020. Our assumption is that DHS will provide a grant program that includes a dollar9

Note that the years listed are fiscal years due to federal government budget conventions and are Budget 

Authorized levels. The dollar expenditures for 2011-2014 are in current dollars due to federal government 

budget conventions. The dollar expenditures for 2015-2020 but are in constant FY 2014 dollars for 

economic modeling and projection purposes. Because most of the government-supplied budget 

expenditures levels are straight-lined during 2011-2014 and a negligible level of annual inflation is 

expected by CBO, the error inherent in comparing the 2011-2014 dollar values with future values in 

minimal. 

14 
117 

matching program and that facility owners will contribute to continued facility 

conversions without government subsidy. We assume here that private funds will equal 

the level of the grant money available in 2011-2014 and that, based on the results of the 

conversion cost study expenditures will remain at 2014 levels through 2020. To 

account for that, private funding is forecast to continue at a level of $50 million per year 

unti12020. 

Two other expenditure categories remain: The impact on intergovernmental and 

private-sector organizations covered under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) determined that because the cost of 

some of the mandates would depend on future regulatory actions, the impacts could not 

be estimated and that, therefore, CBO could not determine whether the costs would 

exceed the annual thresholds established in UMRA: $69 million for inter~overnmental 

organizations and $139 million for private sector organizations in 2009.1 In keeping 

with this CBO finding, here we made no estimates for those costs. 

Title II expenditures in 2011 will include $30 million programmatic expenditures 

for EPA for state governments, $125 million to fund conversions to safer technologies, 

and $160 million for training, to prepare assessments and security plans, and implement 

security enhancements. These levels would increase every year, from $315 million in 

2011 to $328 million in 2014. For this analysis, we assumed that these expenditures 

would continue at liTe· 20t4fanding level througtr 2020: Taktrrg trrto cons1derafi0rr tnaf 

most of the conversions will be less expensive compared to Title I facility changes, and 

that there may only be around 45 Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities, we estimate that between 

cost-sharing programs and other conversions performed voluntarily that as much as $25 

million will be spent by organizations every year over the period. Again, the CBO 

choose not to estimate the UMRA-related costs, so they are not estimated here. 

Title Ill expenditures will include $200 million each year for 2011 through 2014 

and organizations are expecting that to include $150 million for conversion grants and 

$50 million for grants to support assessments, worker training, and other security 

enhancements. It is also assumed that these expenditures continue out to 2020. 

Taking into consideration that most of the conversions will be moderately to less 

expensive compared to Title I facility changes, and that there may only be around 28 

Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities, we estimate that between cost-sharing programs and other 

conversions performed ·voluntarily that as much as $25 million will be spent by 

organizations every year over the period. Again, the CBO choose not to estimate the 

UMRA-related costs, so they are not estimated here. 

10See Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate of H.R. 2868 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 

2009, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security on June 23, 2009," July 9, 

2009; Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate of H.R. 2868 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 

2009 as ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on October 22, 2009, 

October 23, 2009. 

15 
118 

Combining the public-sectors programs and the private sector expenditures, the 

total chemical facilities program will cost an estimated $990 million in 2011, decreasing 

to $904 million in 2013, but then staying at a level of $920 million from 2014 through 

2020. 

16 
119 

VI. ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS 

The expenditures estimated and detailed in Table 2, were classified into industrylevel expenditures and applied to the MIS! 70-order input-output model which translates 

direct expenditures into per unit output requirements from 70 supporting industries in 

the economy.11 The model is based on extensive proprietary and non-proprietary 

databases, including those from the Bureau of the Census, Department of Labor, the 

Bureau of Economic Analysis, and economic forecasting databases for the U.S and 

most states. The national and regional versions of the MISI input-output model have 

been used for numerous studies of energy and environmental projects, economic 

initiatives, proposed legislation and numerous government programs (NASA, DOD, 

DOE, etc.) and has been validated over three decades of use. This application of 

assessing the industrial-level economic and employment impacts of federal legislation 

represents one of the classic and best uses of the input-output model. 

Applying the model over the 2011-2020 period, we estimate that H.R. 2868 will 

create a total gross sales impact of almost $2 billion in the first year of 2011 and 

account for about 8,000 jobs- Table 3. The economic impact is projected to stay close 

to the $1.9 to $1.8 billion estimate over the entire period as a combination of 

government programs and private-sector expenditures continue to transform the 

facilities tcr safer environments.· The gross jobs impact attributable to~ the legistative 

initiative is forecast to stay at around 8,000 every year through 2020. 

Gross sales are defined as the added activity in the U.S. economy that results 

from the initial expenditure. Comparing the resultant gross sales to the initial direct 

expenditure provides a measurement of the impact multiplier. In this case, the multiplier 

is around 2.0 every year, meaning that for every dollar spent, the direct and indirect 

impacts across the economy totaled almost two dollars. Because the initiative affects a 

diverse mix of sectors in the economy, the resultant 2.0-multiplier is close to the national 

average. For instance it can be compared to a low multiplier, when there is additional 

demand for the real estate industry of 1.5, to a higher multiplier of 2.4 when there is 

additional demand for output in the primary metals industry. 

Table 3 

Economic and Employment Impacts Attributable to H.R. 2868 

Gross sales impact (million dollars) 

Gross employment impact (thousands) 

Net employment impact (thousands) 

I 20111 20121 2o13l 2o14l 2o1sl 2o1sl 20111 201sl 20191 2o2ol 

1,953 1,870 1,779 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,812 1,810 1,808 1,807 

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 

<1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 

Source: Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

11See the Appendix for a full description of the model and other applications for its use at ASES (2009) 

and Bezdek and Wendling (2005). 

17 
120 

During the course of the research we also projected a net jobs analysis. Here, 

we examined a scenario where expenditures allocated in a normal pattern throughout 

the economy were reprogrammed to pay for the H.R. 2868 initiative, keeping 

government and private expenditures at a net-zero dollar level. In this case, the change 

in net employment across the economy was not large enough to measure. The impacts 

were less than a net loss or net gain of 500 employees across the country. While the 

implications of H.R. 2868 will affect many companies and as many as 8,000 jobs in 

various industries, the net impact is close to zero. What we do expect to see under 

H.R. 2868 is that productivity advancements will be made in the facilities included in this 

study and the demand for labor will continue to decline, but no more so than in other 

industries. After the facility conversions and upgrades, the industries affected will be in 

a more sustainable position and will be positioned to offer greater job security to their 

workforce. 

Some of the more detailed results of this study include identifying key industries 

that will be positively affected more than others, both in terms of contributions to 

increased gross sales and to employment. These industries include, in order of positive 

impact over the 2011-2020 period: 

• Chemical products (about 14 percent of the economic impact) 

• State and local government {9 percent) 

• Federal government (9 percent) 

• Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services (6 

percent) 

• Water utilities (5 percent) 

• Waste management and remediation services (5 percent) 

In summary, the analysis suggests that H.R. 2868 will have a slight positive 

impact on the U.S. economy and a small increase in net employment nationwide. In 

addition, the legislation will place thousands of employees and millions of U.S. residents 

in a vastly safer environment. 

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121 

VII. REFERENCES 

American Solar Energy Society. Green Collar Jobs in the U.S. and Colorado, by Roger 

Bezdek, 2009. 

Bezdek, Roger H. and Wendling, Robert M. Fuel Efficiency and the Economy, 

American Scientist, Vol. 93, No.2, March-April 2005. 

Center for America Progress. Chemical Security 101- What You Don't Have Can't 

Leak, or Be Blown Up by Terrorists, by Paul Orum, November 2008. 

---=--· Preventing Toxic Terrorism- How Some Chemical Facilities are 

Removing Danger to American Communities_, by Paul Orum, April 2006. 

---=-:--:---,· Toxic Trains and the Terrorist Threat- How Water Utilities Can Get 

Chlorine Gas Off the Rails and Out of American Communities_, by Paul Orum, 

April2007. 

Congressional Budget Office. H.R. 2868- Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009 

Cost Estimate. October 23, 2009. 

Congressional Research Service. Chemical Facility Security: Reauthorization, Policy 

issues, and Options for Congress, by Dana A. Shea, November 10, 2009. 

Library of Congress. Summary of H.R. 2868, November 6, 2009. 

U.N. Environment Programme. Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative. Why Clean 

Energy Public Investment Makes Economic Sense- The Evidence Base, by 

Management Information Services, Inc., 2009. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Homeland Security. DHS Is Taking Steps to 

Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed, 

GA0-06-150, January 2006. 

U.S. House of Representatives. "Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009", June 2009 

(H.R. 2868) as adopted by the House on November 6, 2009. 

_____ . Committee on Energy and Commerce. Drinking Water System 

Security Act of 2009, Report 111-313, October 23, 2009. 

----..,..-· Homeland Security Committee Summary. Section by Section 

Analysis of H.R. 2868 - The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009, June 

2009. 

U.S. PIRG Education Fund. Needless Risk: Oil Refineries and Hazard Reduction, by 

Meghan Purvis and Margaret Herman, August 2005. 

19 
122 

I 

APPENDIX 

THE MISI MODEL 

The economic and employment effects of H.R. 2868 were estimated using the 

Management Information Services, Inc. model, data base, and information system. A 

simplified version of the MIS I model as applied in this study is shown below. 

Use of the MIS I Model to Estimate Economic and Employment Impacts 

Leqislative Initiative Components I 

\1 

Direct Production 

Re uirements by Industry 

\I \I 

Direct U.S. Indirect U.S. 

Production Production 

Requirements Requirements State Economic Structure 

\I \I \I 

Chanqe in U.S. Sales by lndustrv I· e in State Sales b 

\1 

Change in U.S. Employment 

by Industry 

Change in U.S. " Employment 

By Occupation 

Source: Management Information Services, Inc., 2010. 

20 
123 

The first step in the MIS I model involves the estimation of the direct requirements 

of the government initiative including grants, subsidies, and expenditures by other 

government programs. Additional direct requirements are included based upon 

estimates of industry investments. 

The MISI model translates the direct expenditures into per unit output 

requirements from every supporting industry in the economy. While the MISI model 

contains 490 commodities and industries, in the work conducted here a 70-order 

industry scheme is used -- the 70-order industries are listed below 

Second, the direct output requirements of every supporting industry affected as a 

result of the government initiative are estimated, and they reflect the production and 

technology requirements implied by the initiative. These direct requirements show, 

proportionately, how much an industry must purchase from every other industry to 

produce one unit of output. Direct requirements, however, give rise to subsequent 

rounds of indirect and induced requirements as additional purchases are made by 

industries and consumers. 

The sum of the direct, indirect, and induced requirements represents the total 

output requirements from an industry necessary to produce one unit of output based on 

the government initiative. Economic input-output (1-0) techniques allow the 

computation oflhe clfrecras wen as tne indirect production requirements, anatfiese total 

requirements are represented by the "inverse" equations in the model. The ratio of the 

total requirements to the direct requirements is called the input-output multiplier. 

Thus, in the third step in the modeling sequence the direct industry output 

requirements are converted into total output requirements from every industry by means 

of the input-output inverse equations. These equations show not only the direct 

requirements, but also the second, third, fourth, nth round indirect industry and service 

sector requirements resulting from the government initiatives and the private-sector 

investment. 

Next, the total output requirements from each industry are used to compute sales 

volumes, value added (including profits and taxes) for each industry. Then, using data 

on manhours, labor requirements, and productivity, employment requirements within 

each industry are estimated. This allows computation of the total number of jobs 

created within each industry. 

21 
124 

Industry 

Code 

111CA 

113FF 

211 

212 

213 

22 

23 

311FT 

313TT 

315AL 

321 

322 

323 

324 

325 

326 

327 

331 

332 

333 

334 

335 

3361MV 

33640T 

337 

339 

42 

44RT 

481 

482 

483 

484 

485 

486 

4870S 

493 

U.S. Input-Output Industry Codes and Titles, 70-0rder 

I Industry Title 

Farms 

Forestry, fishing, and related activities 

Oil and gas extraction 

Mining, except oil and gas 

Support activities for mining 

Utilities 

Construction 

Food and beverage and tobacco products 

Textile mills and textile product mills 

Apparel and leather and allied products 

Wood products 

Paper products 

Printing and related support activities 

Petroleum and coal products 

Chemical products 

Plastics and rubber products 

f\16f1inetallic mineral products 

Primary metals 

Fabricated metal products 

Machinery 

Computer and electronic products 

Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 

Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 

Other transportation equipment 

Furniture and related products 

Miscellaneous manufacturing 

Wholesale trade 

Retail trade 

Air transportation 

Rail transportation 

Water transportation 

Truck transportation 

Transit and ground passenger transportation 

Pipeline transportation 

Other transportation and support activities 

Warehousing and storage 

22 

I NAICS Code 

111,112 

113-115 

211 

212 

213 

22 

23 

311,312 

313,314 

315,316 

321 

322 

323 

324 

325 

326 

327 

331 

332 

333 

334 

335 

3361-3363 

3364-3369 

337 

339 

42 

44,45 

481 

482 

483 

484 

485 

486 

487-492 

493 
125 

U.S. Input-Output Industry Codes and Titles, 70-0rder (continued) 

Industry 

Code 

511 

512 

513 

514 

521CI 

523 

524 

525 

531 

532RL 

5411 

54120P 

5415 

55 

561 

562 

61 

621 

622HO 

624 

711AS 

713 

721 

722 

81 

GFE 

GFG 

GSLE 

GSLG 

S004 

\Industry Title 

Publishing industries (includes software) 

Motion picture and sound recording industries 

Broadcasting and telecommunications 

Information and data processing services 

Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and 

related activities 

Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 

Insurance carriers and related activities 

Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 

Real estate 

Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible 

assets 

legal services 

Miscellaneous professional, scientific and technical 

services 

Computer systems design and related services 

Management of companies and enterprises 

Administrative ancfsl.lpport services ·· 

Waste management and remediation services 

Educational services 

Ambulatory health care services 

Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities 

Social assistance 

Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related 

activities 

Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries 

Accommodation 

Food services and drinking places 

Other services, except government 

Federal government enterprises 

Federal general government 

State and local government enterprises 

State and local general government 

Inventory valuation adjustment 

Notes: n/a - Not applicable 

I NAICS Code 

511 

512 

513 

514 

521,522 

523 

524 

525 

531 

532,533 

5411 

5412-5414, 5416-

5419 

5415 

55 

5EIT 

562 

61 

621 

622,623 

624 

711,712 

713 

721 

722 

81 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

Source: Management Information Services, Inc. and U.S. Department of Commerce, 

Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010. 

23 
126 

Utilizing the modeling approach outlined above, the MISI model allows estimation 

of the effects on employment, personal income, corporate sales and profits, and 

government tax revenues in the U.S. and in each state. Estimates can then be 

developed for detailed industries and occupations. 

The MISI model and data base permit economic impacts to be estimated for any 

region composed of one or more counties and for any industry in the national 1-0 table. 

MISI can estimate the impacts of project and program expenditures by industry on 

regional output (gross receipts or sales), earnings (the sum of wages and salaries, 

proprietors' income, and other labor income, less employer contributions to private 

pension and welfare funds), and employment. 

For the MSAs there may be further interest in estimating the impact on 

requirements for specific occupations. This can be accomplished using the MISI 

occupation-by-industry matrix, the coefficients of which show the percent distribution of 

occupational employment among all industries. The 500-by-800 matrix was developed 

from the Current Population Survey, and was modified to conform to the available data. 

The methodology employed is state-of-the-art and credible, and has been used 

by MIS I over past three decades in many studies of energy and environmental projects, 

economic initiatives, proposed legislation, government programs, etc. 

Databases and Data Sources 

MIS! maintains extensive proprietary and nonproprietary databases on the U.S. 

economy, the state economies, on the Metropolitan Statistical Areas within the states, 

and on counties in the states. The major public sources of the nonproprietary data 

include: 

• The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Commerce 

Department 

• The Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Commerce Department 

• The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Labor Department 

• The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Energy 

Department 

In addition: 

• MIS! has proprietary economic forecasting databases for the U.S. 

and for most states, developed and utilized over the past three 

decades. 

• MISI staff has developed extensive technology-, program-, 

environmental-, and state-specific economic and statistical 

databases and satellite models. 

24 
127 

Thus, the direct, indirect, and effects of the original government program on the 

national and state economies can be disaggregated into the impact on: 

• Industry sales (490 4-digit NAICS industries) 

• Jobs (800 occupations and skills) 

• Corporate profits 

• Federal, state, and local government tax revenues 

• Employment and unemployment (by industry and occupation) 

• Net growth or displacement of new businesses 

• Major economic, technological, social, and environmental 

parameters and externalities 

MIS! derives these estimates using quantitative models and databases it has online and which have been used by MIS! in many other analogous disaggregate regional, 

economic, technological, and environmental studies. These models and data are 

unique and proprietary and give MIS! substantial estimation capabilities in this area. 

These models include: 

• The U.S. Commerce Department's national input-output model 

• A modified version of the Commerce Department's regional 

econometricJorecasting modeL 

• A modified version of the Regional Input-Output Modeling System 

(RIMS) supplemented with the Census Bureau/BLS industryoccupation matrix - adapted to state and sub-state economies by 

MIS I. 

• A modified version of the Energy Externalities Simulation (EES) 

model developed by MISI. 

Use of these proprietary models and the associated databases permitted MIS I to 

develop estimates of the economic, employment, and occupational impacts of various 

programs or technology development scenarios. 

25 
128 

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. 

Management Information Services, Inc. is an economic research and 

management consulting firm with expertise on a wide range of complex issues, 

including energy, electricity, and the environment. The MISI staff offers expertise in 

economics, employment, engineering, and finance, and includes former senior officials 

from private industry, federal and state government, and academia. Over the past two 

decades MISI has conducted extensive proprietary research, and since 1985 has 

assisted hundreds of clients, including Fortune 500 companies, nonprofit organizations 

and foundations, academic and research institutions, and state and federal government 

agencies including the White House, the National Academy of Sciences, the U.S. 

Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Energy 

Information Administration, the Department of Defense, NASA, and the U.S. General 

Services Administration. 

For more information, please visit the MISI web site at http://www.misi-net.com. 

26 
129 

Responses to Follow-Up Questions for Darius Sivin 

from Senator James M. lnhofe 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing July 28, 2010 

I. How many of your members work at water utilities? 

We represent a bargaining unit of 100 workers at the Detroit wastewater facility. Moreover 

tens of thousands of our active and retired members and their dependents are among the two 

million people who live in the vulnerability zone ofthe facility. A successful terrorist attack 

on the facility could not only cause our members and their dependents physical harm but it 

could wreak economic havoc causing temporary or permanent loss of employment. 

2. Your testimony referenced a 2010 report by Management Information Services that 

concluded security legislation would create jobs. However, the report acknowledges that 

it used "heroic assumptions"to determine what a past conversion "might" have cost. The 

authors of the report acknowledged thattheireslimatesfor future cost "are fraught with 

caveats". and that their estimates are not based on "actual, definitive reported, and 

verifiable information ... "An accurate assessment would need to model costs at the 

individual plant level. Are you aware of any studies that have done actual cos/ modeling 

at an individual plant level and used actual, reported and verifiable information? 

I am not aware of a study of the effects on employment that used actual cost modeling at an 

individual plant level. However, lack ofinfonnation is one of the deficits that proposed 

chemical security legislation is intended to address, by requiring water utilities to 

generate such information in when assessing methods to reduce consequences of a 

chemical release from an intentional act. In addition, the table below, which contains 

individual plant cost estimates, is from a 2006 GAO report entitled Securing Wastewater 

Facilities: Costs of Vulnerability Assessments, Risk Management Plans, and Alternative 

Disinfection Methods Vary Widely. 

Table 1: Reported and Planned Disinfection Conversion Costs for Large Waetawatar Treabnent Facilities 

Facility name Facility location Conversion year 

Chambers Creek University Place. 2002 

Wash. 

Blue Plains Washington, D.C. 2003 

Northeast Philadelphia, Pa. 2003 

Back River Baltimore, Md. 2004 

Essex and Union Elizabeth. N.J. 2004 

Chesapeake· Virginia Beach, Va. 2004 

Elizabelh 

Nanaemond Suffolk, Va. 2004 

-IFacility size (In 

millions of gallons Disinfection 

trsatad per day)' method 

Ultraviolet light 

19 

Sodium 

307 hypochlorite 

Sodium 

190 hypochlorite 

Sodium 

150 hypochlorite 

Sodium 

65 hypochlorite 

Sodium 

21 hypochlorite 

Sodium 

17 hypochlorite 

Reported or 

planned 

conversion costb 

(lndoUars) 

$3,900.608 

12,980,726 

2,600,000 

3,300,000 

775.000 

1,225.000 

1,650,740 
130 

Responses to Follow-Up Questions for Darius Sivin 

from Senator James M. Inhofe 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing July 28,2010 

Columbia Portland, Ore. 2005 Sodium 

Boulevard 143 hypochlorite 4,660,490 

Valley Creek Beaeamer, Ala. 2005 46 Ullraviolet light 3,561,272 

Dry Creek Fort Wrigh~ Ky. 2005 Sodium 

36 hypochlorite 646,922 

Southern Regional Boynton Beach, 2005 Sodium 

Fla. 22 hypochlorite • 2,592,800 

Burbank Burbank. Calif. 2005 Sodium 

9 hypochlorite 2,500,000 

Southeast Philadelphia, Pa. 2006 Sodium 

90 hypochlorite 1,920,000 

Paplllon Omaha, Neb. 2005 Sodium 

62 hypochlorite 3,000,000 

: FacHif!GS tluit pl!ift~'i!i!ftve:rt'fri>l!i chli)lln•~-

Metro Central Denver, Colo. 2007 Sodium 

130 hypochlorite 13,135,000 

Fort Wayne Fort Wayne, Ind. 2007 Sodium 

43 hypochlorite 1,791,417 

Everett EvereH, Wash. 2007 Sodium 

18 hypochlorite 2,562,480 

South Cenlral Delray Beech, Fla. 2007 Sodium 

18 hypochlorite • 2,454.700 

MiD Creek Cincinnati, Ohio 2008 Sodium 

120 hypochlorite 3,085,000 

Western Branch laurel. Md. 2008 20 Ultraviolet light 4,000,000 

South Treatment Renton, Wash. 2009 Sodium 

Plant 75 hypochlorite 2,575,000 

Hartford Hartford, Ccnn. 2009 51 Ullravlolet tight 10,892,000 

Eugene-Springfield Eugene, Ore. 2009 Sodium 

38 hypochlorite 4.498.000 

-2-
131 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you to each one of you for your testimony. 

We are going to defer for the moment to Senator Udall from New 

Mexico because Mr. Perea is here. 

Please. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

the courtesy. It is really appreciated. 

Mr. Perea, your testimony notes that your company was founded 

as a spin-off from Los Alamos National Lab, which is a great example of the jobs and technological advancements that the labs create. 

I want to applaud you and the labs on that. I do not have a question right now, but I may come back to that. 

Your testimony notes that the main obstacle for municipal utilities considering onsite disinfectant technologies is the lack of information and reason to consider alternatives. Could you expand on 

that and describe how the process in Senator Lautenberg’s legislation could inform utilities’ decisionmaking? 

Mr. PEREA. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

The question, I believe, is how would this legislation help promote adoptive technologies such as MIOX and inherently safer 

technologies? Is that the nature of the question? 

Senator UDALL. That is right. 

Mr. PEREA. Yes. As you know, utilities are not driven by profit 

motives. It is actually, ironically, much easier for us, and as a business we have turned more of our attention to the private sector. 

Utilities are constantly dealing with shifting priorities and compliance. Our experience—my experience personally—has been that 

some of these utilities have safety of their workers and safety of 

the communities at the forefront of any of their decisionmaking, 

where others, they have not had an accident, they have not had an 

issue, and quite frankly their focus and attention is elsewhere in 

terms of water compliance. 

Senator UDALL. One of the objections we hear is that safer alternatives may be more expensive. New Mexico has many rural areas 

and towns that do not have a lot of financial resources, but several 

of them have adopted your alternative, including Las Vegas, New 

Mexico, and Bloomfield. How did these communities end up deciding to use an onsite purification technology, and how do the costs 

compare to the traditional chlorine process? 

Mr. PEREA. Yes, Senator. The communities that have adopted 

MIOX systems or competing alternatives typically have a longer 

range horizon in mind when they consider costs. Typically they are 

paying for gas chemical or liquid chemical on a monthly basis on 

some type of contract. To adopt a technology like MIOX the user 

will end up buying a piece of capital equipment, which then allows 

them to have a much lower operational cost on the monthly basis. 

The equipment typically pays for itself, versus a liquid system, 

inside of 2 years, and often over a gas system inside of several 

years more than that. So, the Lakehaven example is very common. 

I do not know the exact percentage in that case, but I am sure it 

is 30, 40, or maybe even as much as 50 percent cost savings over 

the life of the equipment. 

Senator UDALL. You heard me ask, I think, the EPA about the 

letter received from the American Metropolitan Water Association 
132 

which raised some concerns with the legislation that pushes utilities to adopt safer alternatives. Have you had an opportunity to see 

that letter, and if so, what is your response to any concerns they 

raised? 

Mr. PEREA. Unfortunately, I also am aware of the letter, but 

have not read it in detail. Nor do I have a specific response to it. 

Senator UDALL. Could you just tell us briefly about the spin-off 

and how that happened, MIOX from Los Alamos? 

Mr. PEREA. Yes, of course. The origins of the technology in the 

company pre-date my involvement, which is approximately 5 of the 

20 years. But my understanding in talking to the original founders 

of the company, the original contract was specifically for this same 

exact issue for the U.S. military looking to get rid of gas chlorine 

in the field. That was the origin of the technology and the original 

SBIR. And it is indeed used today for that specific purpose as well. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. Once again, I applaud that spin-off. 

And Chairman Lautenberg, I want to thank you for your courtesies very much, and the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe, for 

that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We are happy to provide it. You are very 

helpful in all matters, and we were glad to accommodate you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. In fact, we were saying, we were talking briefly, 

how much we like New Mexico and the time we have spent there. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator UDALL. I will stay here for that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I skied in Taos. 

Senator UDALL. Come back. Come back. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I have a very important question—the 

most important question to be asked today—of Ben Grumbles. Do 

you realize how many years you and I have been working together? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Yes, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. No further questions. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRUMBLES. And it has been a pleasure, and it dates back 

decades. 

Senator INHOFE. It dates back to 1987, and you were on the 

Committee. You could not have been more than 15 years old then, 

but that was 24 years ago. And I have enjoyed working with you 

all of these years. 

I thank you for coming to share your experiences on both the national level and on the State level. And the second question I want 

to ask is which do you like better, Washington, DC, or Arizona? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Can I submit that for the record? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRUMBLES. I love Washington, DC. Arizona is a wonderful 

place to live and work and play and visit. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. It is kind of hot. 

I was intrigued to hear that Arizona has incorporated safety information into its sanitary service surveys. Are you the only State 

that is doing that? 
133 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Absolutely not. And Senator Lautenberg, I think 

it is an excellent point. Everyone should look for ways to embed, 

to institutionalize security into Safe Drinking Water Act as well as 

Clean Water Act practices and procedures. 

The State of Arizona, like many other States, is looking for opportunities to embed security considerations so that when the State 

agency is doing its source to tap risk assessments at individual 

water facilities, they look at security-related aspects of it. And I 

think that is something that the Congress should continue to encourage and EPA encourage. 

Senator INHOFE. Have you learned some lessons from that that 

you can share with some of the other States? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Well, one of the lessons that we learned is that 

it is not just about the treatment methodology at the plant. It is 

also looking at the entire system—the water system, the water 

lines, the sewers, the whole lifeblood, and so always one of the 

greatest risks of some type of act or intentional act is not just at 

the plant itself but also in the water lines, the drinking water lines 

or the sewer lines. And that is an important part to keep in mind. 

The other is to look at the specific pros and cons of the different 

types of treatment practices and methodologies. We, in Arizona, 

particularly based on the Phoenix study, really want to be asking 

those questions. How well do substitutes to gaseous chlorine work? 

Do they meet the Safe Drinking Water Act or Clean Water Act requirements? Does the heat of certain areas of the country change 

the dynamics? And I think those are important that we learn in 

the sanitary surveys as well. 

Senator INHOFE. And which is one of the arguments you would 

use when doing this on a local level. Now, you are closer to the 

water facilities because you are at that level. Do you think that 

they would make the appropriate security upgrades if they had the 

resources to do it? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. I think that well-trained local water utility officials are in the best positions to make those decisions. They should 

be subject to oversight or regulation, absolutely. Some of the utilities, some of the communities in the State of Arizona, are moving 

away from gaseous chlorine. It is what fits the local watershed and 

the local community’s needs. And I think that is a good way to go 

I think at the national level and at the State level, though there 

should be oversight and support to help those local experts make 

those decisions with the most information available. 

Senator INHOFE. Are there any other barriers other than money 

that would prevent upgrades in security? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. I think—this does not directly answer the question—but I think particularly in the Southwest or in other parts of 

the country that are looking at the water quantity, water quality 

challenge, every decision about what treatment methodology to use 

you should be asking not just what is the safest methodology at the 

local level but also what is going to also provide for a product that 

can be more effectively reclaimed and reused. 

So, ensuring that there are not unintended consequences to 

changing your treatment practices, I think, is an important one 

that the water security arena needs to take into account and other 

environmental regulations is a change in practice at a utility going 
134 

to make it more difficult to reclaim that water and to reuse it 

downstream and other approaches because water is increasingly 

scarce in some parts of the country. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, next time you are here in Washington 

come by, and we can visit. You probably noticed a few minutes ago 

Ruth Van Mark who was with me 20-some years ago when you 

were still with me; she is still in probation, but she is still with me. 

So, I look forward to having a chance to visit with you. 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Thank you very much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Inhofe and I have an interesting relationship. It is with 

respect and admiration and disagreement. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We have overcome the disagreement side 

to have, generally, a good opportunity for an exchange of views and 

differences of opinion. And they are widely respected. 

So, Mr. Grumbles, how tough was it to get away from Senator 

Inhofe? 

[Laugher.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Oh, I am sorry. 

[Laugher.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Anyway, one of the things that we talk 

about, and you note in your testimony, how scarce water is in Arizona. So, therefore, virtually every drop has to have a quality about 

it that is safe while being readily available. 

Is it fair to say that if there is an inherently safer technology 

that there would be an urgency to getting it in place before a system is interrupted and dangerous, obviously, for the communities 

that do tend to cluster, I think, near the water supply? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Well, Senator, I think the goal of inherently safer 

is right on. The key is how is that implemented and at the local 

level what options are available that are safer and also practical, 

affordable, and doable? 

I know one of the—some of the communities across the country— 

and I can say specifically in Arizona—are weighing whether to 

move to alternatives to gaseous chlorine such as onsite generation 

of hypochlorite. And one of the questions is how much—what is the 

energy footprint of that? It can require more energy to generate hypochlorite onsite. That does not mean that it will not be the method chosen. 

But it can be, as I am learning in Arizona, the energy-water 

nexus is so important that the utilities practitioners, the officials 

there, need to be asking what is safer, what meets the Safe Drinking Water Act or Clean Water Act mandates, and what also, what 

can our ratepayers afford? And energy is increasingly expensive. 

So, you have to look at that part of the equation as well. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Oh, I am sure that is so. But I think wherever possible effectiveness and costs, all of these things have to be 

taken into consideration. But even beyond those factors are, what 

is the security? What are the protections that we have? There, 

again, people in your State are so committed to preserving water 

supplies that disruptions would be—— 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Well, and the concept of vulnerability assessments and updating those is critically important because we, as a 
135 

State, are vulnerable. Our future sustainability is at stake if we do 

not have clean and safe water supplies. So, I support you in your 

efforts, your goal of bringing people together to find practical and 

meaningful progress. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We are going to try. 

Mr. Perea, the Act, the bill that we have developed, gives States 

authority to require utilities to implement safer technology when it 

is cost effective, feasible, and allows continued compliance with 

water quality standards. Might there be jobs created by requiring 

these changes and making more jobs available if they are, if the 

water supply is available and we know that it is clean and safe? 

Mr. PEREA. Yes, Senator, I think it is a complex question with 

a lot of implications. I think as community water systems look to 

make upgrades, whether it be for water quality reasons or safety 

and security measures, it requires a level of training, a level of upgrading, if you will, and there is a stimulation effect in that, including the providers of equipment, whether it be onsite systems 

or other technologies or equipment or services that are used to provide those. So, I do believe there is a positive economic effect. It 

does entail change. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Over 500 water facilities have switched to 

safer methods, but at least 2,600 water facilities still use large 

amounts of chlorine gas and other toxic gaseous chemicals. Why 

have so few facilities converted to safer technology, do you think? 

Mr. PEREA. I am speculating, obviously, since I have not surveyed these. But I think that the rate of change in utilities and 

public drinking water systems can be slow and is often driven by 

compliance, not by innovation certainly and not by cost savings or 

other motivations. 

My experience has been that those that have had near accidents—or near misses rather—with their chemicals have been 

amongst the first to look seriously. And I think those who have 

looked seriously have found that there are cost savings that can be 

realized. And most often when communities get to that stage there 

is a very high rate of conversion to safer alternatives. But I do not 

think it is on most communities’ radar screens. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Orum, what do you think about that? 

Mr. ORUM. I have spoken with many facilities that have converted, and almost always they are very proud of what they have 

achieved and very relieved that the chlorine gas is no longer there. 

On the other side, though, sometimes facilities have used chlorine gas for a long time without an incident. And these are low 

probability-high consequence events that are very hard for facilities 

to make a priority before they happen. 

One facility told me that they have used chlorine gas since 1915 

without an incident. They were bringing it in by rail. Unfortunately, current regulations encourage that shifting of risk onto the 

rails. There are about 35 water utilities that still use chlorine gas 

by rail. And so our laws also encourage and perpetuate hazards in 

cases where they really do not need to exist. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Grumbles, in your written testimony 

you say that decisions on these chemicals at individual sites are 

best made by utility experts, that Congress should simply ‘‘provide 

direction.’ Do I understand correctly? Because that sounds like the 
136 

same voluntary approach that has allowed 2,600 facilities to continue to use lethal chlorine gas when safer alternatives are available. 

Why should States not be able to require utilities to take reasonable, cost effective steps to protect communities who are near water 

facilities? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Senator, I think Congress should provide direction and support for a range of different strategies and tactics to 

move beyond the status quo to increase the security of water and 

wastewater systems. 

When it comes to mandating inherently safer technologies I 

think it should be made primarily by the utility, and I think at the 

State level. I think that is preferred to the Federal level, making 

a choice or review of what size fits, and I think that it gets very 

difficult and complex, and there can be tradeoffs that are lost in 

the mix when it is decided ultimately at the Federal level what a 

particular utility should do. 

I think the key is to emphasize focus on the local level decision, 

but hold them accountable and make sure that they are looking at 

the range of factors. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. At what point does risk take over other 

parts of the decisionmaking? Is there a point in time, a vulnerability age of the structure, et cetera? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. I think these are questions that are all about 

risk and risk management. I think it is important not to be taking 

tools off the table necessarily from the Federal level, but to be encouraging cleaner and safer practices and approaches that result in 

cleaner and safer product, the water. 

I think that the progress that has been made since the 2002 Bioterrorism Act—one of the real steps that I know you should be 

proud of is that local utilities and those in the water sector are taking it very seriously and training themselves and getting EPA and 

DHS support for ways to better identify and characterize the risks 

and to manage them. 

And when it comes to what choice of chemicals or treatment 

practices I think it needs to be very careful that it is done on a 

local and regional basis. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But the State agencies have an important 

role to play in this decision? 

Mr. GRUMBLES. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Orum, opponents have argued that 

switching to safer alternatives could be too costly, even though 

studies found the annual costs to be less than $1.50 per customer. 

Now, what is a bigger threat to our society, requiring cost effective 

safer alternatives or release of chlorine gas which is so lethal? 

Mr. ORUM. I do not know of any macro studies comparing the 

cost of prevention to response, but I think it is safe to say that 

$1.50 per customer per year, which is the upper end of converting 

a big city water utility off chlorine gas, is a much better deal than 

$7 billion in damages, which the insurance industry says could result from a worst case release. Certainly, just look at the Gulf oil 

spill where billions are being spent to clean up a problem that 

could have been prevented for a fraction of the cost. 
137 

The Association of American Railroads always reminds us that 

toxic inhalation hazard chemicals account for one-quarter of 1 percent of their cargo, yet are the bulk of their liability costs and potentially ruinous liability. And 35 or so water utilities, as I noted, 

still use chlorine gas by the railcar. 

Dr. Sivin mentioned a report by Management Information Services showing 8,000 jobs created as a result of the House Bill. Clorox 

plans to eliminate all of its bulk chlorine use at all of its bleach 

plants around the country at no loss of jobs. In comparison New 

York City spent almost—said it had almost $94 billion worth of 

economic cost in the first year alone after 9/11. I think it really just 

boils down to an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Dr. Sivin, what, how about the people who 

are manning these stations and are concerned about or connected 

with the transportation of chlorine gas? What are they saying? 

They do not want their jobs at risk but nor do they want their lives 

at risk with their families. Can an inherently safer technology provide the security for them and maintain it? Is there a job shift at 

all that takes place with any of these facilities, to your knowledge, 

that have made the change? 

Mr. SIVIN. No, we do not, we have not seen one. In general, when 

a facility invests, we invest in place. It tends to protect jobs. Bringing new investment into a facility tends to provide job security to 

its employees. 

We also think, in the case of water treatment facilities, as I mentioned, there is not much risk of a job loss because a water treatment facility is attached to a community. It cannot go elsewhere. 

They tend to be public facilities. They tend to be tax supported. 

Where is a water treatment facility going to go? And if one went 

somewhere else, that community would have to create new jobs by 

bringing in a new one. 

It is not—we simply do not perceive that as much of a risk, and 

even if the argument is that they would have to spend money on 

something else, first of all, as Mr. Orum pointed out, in most cases 

it is not much less money and in some cases there is actually a 

long-term savings, so there is actually more money available to expand, hire more employees, whatever the case may be. And there 

is also Federal assistance in the various pieces of legislation out 

there to assist facilities. 

So, we think all of that information together supports the conclusion of MISI that it is likely to add jobs. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I want to say thank you to each of 

you for your contribution as we conduct our research on where to 

go, what to add to our legislation or change, we will come up with 

something that we would be happy to have your testimony or suggestions on. 

If there are questions by any member of this Committee who 

have yet to ask them and they submit the question to you in writing, we would ask for as quick a response as you can give us. And 

we thank you. 

This Committee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 
138 

JeffTheermao 

David R- Williams 

Su<anneCGoss 

JuHusCiaccia,Jr, 

KevlnLShafer 

Ken Kirk 

August 3, 2010 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer, Chairman 

The Honorable james Inhofe, Ranking Member 

Committee on Environmem and Publk Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Boxer and Ranking Member Inhofe: 

On behalf of the National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA), the leading 

advocacy organization representing the nation's municipal wastewater treatment 

agencies. I would like to offer comments on the "Secure Watet· Facilities Act" (S. 3598) and 

security issues generally at wastewater urilities. I would like for this letter to be included 

as part of the record for the Committee's July zgrh hearing "ProtectmgAmer"ica's Water 

Treatment Facilitzes." 

First, let me say chat NACWA understands policy-makers' interest in dosing the 

perceived gap that exists in the federal government's security-related oversight programs 

of facilities that maimain chemicals of concern and that could potentta!ly be the target 

of terrorist attacks. While Congress exempted publidy~O\vned treatment works 

(POT\Vs) and community water systems (CWS) when it creared the Chemical Facilities 

Anti~Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program in 2006, concerns have since been raised 

that these facilities should comply with federal security standards to e-nsure that our 

water and wastewater treatment capabilities cannot be compromised. While NACWA 

supports this overaJI policy objective, it is cricical to recognize that any such program 

must be balanced with the requirements of the Clean Water Act and key site-specific 

considerations. 

As Congress began the process of drafting legislation last year, a critical consideration 

from our mcmbcrs' perspective was to ensure that any security program for drinking 

water and wastewater utilities follow similar guidelines to each other and have Federal 

oversight responsihilities provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

For these reasons, we were pleased that legislation pa....:;sed by the House, the Chemical and 

Wolter Security Act of2009 (H.R. 2868), reflected this policy priority. 

A second important consideration was whether POT\Vs would be required to switch to 

"inherently safer technologies" (IST). NACWA does not support a federal mandate ro 

require implementation ofiST and we certainly would not support the emergence of 

leg1slatiou that places an IST requirement on the water sector and not on the chemtcal 

sector. Given the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee 

ordered to be reported CFATS reauthorization legislation that does not contain an IST 

requirement for the chemical sector, NACWA will not support legislation that imposes 

any IST requirement on the water sector. 
139 

NACWA Letter to EPW on Safe Water Act 

August 3, 2009 

Page 2 of3 

NACWA believes that the choice of treatment method for disinfection purposes must remain a 

local decision. As part of the wastewater treatment process. EPA regulations require that 

treated effluent meet strictly enforced discharge requirements. To meet these requirements, 

utilities undertake an extensive evaluanon of disinfection methods based on local factors and 

indlvidual permit specifications. When deciding which treatment method ro utilize, factors 

such as climate, physical limitation of plant location, cost, safety and compliance wirh the 

Clean Water Act (CWA) are considered. Based on this wide variety offactors, use of an 1ST 

approach may net be possible for all wastewater utilities. However, an informal survey of 

NACWA members conducted in 2009, shows that clean water agencies are using IST when local 

factors enable them to do so. In fact, 66% of sutvey respondents indicated they no longer use 

gaseous chlorine in their disinfection process, Of the 33% that continue to utilize gaseous 

chlorine, 20% plan to switch ro another disinfectant within a one to two year time frame. We do 

noc believe an IST mandate is necessary, rather we believe that decisions regarding IST should 

reside within the local community. 

The nation's wastewater utilities rake their security responsibilities with the utmost 

seriousness. As a new federal security program is being discussed, it is important to have an 

understanding of the measures already being implemented by the nation's dean water utilities. 

POTWs have fiduciary responsibilities to the public and, as such, most facilities have already 

implemented measures to protect against intentional acts after the 9/11 att,Kk occurred. A 

2007 survey found that an overwhelming number of clean water agencies have implemented 

significant security enhancements, For example. the survey found a large majority of utilities 

installed tencing (88%), gates (65%) and warning signage (64%) to reduce unauthorized access to 

the1r facilities. In addition, 85% of utilities reported that systems such as manual locks, 

electronic access controls, and visitor restrictions are in place to further reduce unauthorized 

In addition, as was noted in testimony befOre the committee on july 28,2010, NACWA 

participates in a water senor-wide council on security issues that has developed a suite of 

security-related standards for water and wastewater utilities to follow as well as tools for 

assessing vulnerabilities and for making necessary security upgrades, Vulnerability 

Assessments (VAs), Site Security Plans (SSPs) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) are rools 

that many POTWs already have in place. 

A further policy consideration is access to critical security donnnents. In order to create the 

most effective VAs, SSPs and ERPs it is obviously importam that supervisory and nonsupervisory employees be included in this process. However, NACWA does not believe it is 

appropriate to require outside collective bargaining agents access ro these sensitive documents. 

Protecting these documents is of critical irnportance as any information leaked will expose a 

urility's vulnerabilities by providing a road map for individual(s) imending to do harm. 

Limiting access is a prudent course of action if the intent is to safeguard communi til's to the 

maximum e.xtcnt practicable. 

Finally, NACWA believes that any legislation should provide funding to help utilities meet 

federal security requirements. Costs borne by wastewater utilities in conducting VAs, SSPs and 

ERPs could be extensive depending on the size of the system. Before raking these potenrial new 

requirements into account, utilities already face significant financial challenges. The recent 
140 

Æ 

NACWA Letter to EPW on Safe Water Act 

August 3, 2009 

Page3 of3 

EPA Clean tVatersheds Needs Sun·ey indicates that the rota! clean water infrasrrucrure needs for 

the nation are $298.1 billion. To meet this backlog) utiiiries are raising their rates significantly. 

ln fact, NACWA's 2009 rare index survey shows that sewer rates increased by 9 percent during 

that year. In looking ahead, the index projects a 34 percent increase from 2008levels over the 

next few years with double digit annual increases very likely. For these rcasons 1 it is important 

that Congress provides funding to assist POTWs in meeting additional security-related federal 

mandates 

NACWA looks forward to working with the committee and providing input into this 

important discussion on ensuring the nation's dean water assets are protected by responsible 

and sound national policy. If you would like to discuss these comments further, please do not 

hesitate to contact John Krohn, NACWA Legislative Manager at 202·833-4655 ot via email at 

jkrohn@nacwa.org. 

Ken Kirk 

Executive Director 

CC: Members of the Environment and Public Works Committee