Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing

— 1 —

The Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing showcase the 

tremendous talent, creativity and expertise 

within the defense acquisition workforce 

and throughout the larger community of stakeholders 

with whom we work. Designed to influence the public 

dialogue about Army acquisition through critical 

thinking and writing, the thoughtful and insightful 

articles, essays and opinion pieces that were submitted 

have been instrumental in shaping our message and 

driving the discussion, both internally to the Army 

and DOD and externally to our many audiences.

No one would be more proud of the competition’s 

success than Maj. Gen. Greene. He was an inspirational leader and a scholar who loved the acquisition 

profession and the Soldiers we serve. I recall vividly his 

daily walkabout when, in a loud and boisterous voice, 

he’d ask, “What have you done for the Army today?” 

This was an opportunity for members of the workforce 

to discuss what was happening in their programs or, 

at times, in their lives, and get his advice and counsel. 

It was also an opportunity to discuss the latest news 

about the Boston Red Sox, the New England Patriots or the Boston Bruins, his favorite sports teams.

In 2012, upon his assumption of duties as the deputy for acquisition and systems management in the 

Pentagon, he wrote a letter to the workforce that is 

as relevant today as it was then. “Our challenge is to 

prepare for the future,” Harry wrote. “We support 

the current fight, but can’t let the day-to-day challenges prevent us from looking down the road.” He 

instructed his professionals to act “as leaders, not as 

managers,” and to “make the hard calls, as the Army 

expects of us.” Characteristically, Harry wrote, “I love 

my job. You must have passion to do this business right. 

Stay positive. Things are never as bad as they seem.”

We miss the comfort of Harry’s leadership and 

guidance. His loss on Aug. 5, 2014, while serving 

as the deputy commanding general of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, 

is still painful. These awards help us to honor 

Harry’s 34 years of distinguished service and his 

ultimate sacrifice. Through them, we also remember that his contributions to Army acquisition and 

our acquisition professionals will be everlasting.

This special supplement of Army AL&T magazine 

includes the 2016 winning authors and those who 

received honorable mentions in four categories: 

Acquisition Reform/Better Buying Power; Future 

Operations; Innovation; and Lessons Learned. Let me 

extend my sincere thanks to all who have participated in this annual competition, and to their families 

and teammates who supported them in their writings. I also want to thank our outstanding judges for 

their expertise, time and energy in making this third 

competition successful. My congratulations to all.

No One Would 

Be More Proud

The namesake of the Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for 

Acquisition Writing cherished the talent, creativity and expertise 

of the defense acquisition workforce.

by Lt. Gen. Michael E. Williamson
— 2 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Acquisition Reform/

Better Buying Power

Winner: User Requirements: An Enduring

Conversation

Author: Mr. David M. Riel is professor of acquisition 

management for Defense Acquisition University’s 

(DAU) Midwest Region, teaching and consulting 

in the areas of program management and production, quality and manufacturing. After a 20-year 

U.S. Air Force career and several years working in 

the defense industry, Riel is part of the DAU team 

providing mission assistance to program offices and 

teaching the next generation of DOD acquisition 

professionals the ins and outs of defense acquisition.

Abstract: As the design for a weapon system matures, 

an enduring conversation needs to take place between 

the acquirer and the warfighter, carefully explaining 

the producibility, maintainability, reliability and 

subsequent cost impacts of each additional mile of 

range, or mile per hour of speed desired. In short, the 

conversation needs to take change from “Can this 

be done?” to “At what additional cost can this be 

done?” Policy changes introduced by the January 2015 

update to DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System, and the Better Buying Power 

initiatives have created a pathway to this meaningful, 

continuous dialogue, but it will take culture change 

and relationship building between the acquisition and 

user communities to make the conversation enduring. 

While policy and methodology for top-level affordability are being institutionalized via such initiatives 

as Configuration Steering Boards and the U.S. Air 

Force’s “Bending the Cost Curve,” small, incremental 

affordability tradeoff decisions throughout the detailed 

design phase need to be consistently and persistently 

pursued. The opportunity management process as 

defined in the June 2105 DOD Risk, Issue and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition 

Programs can be expanded to include Requirements 

Tradeoffs Opportunity Management Reviews, where 

requirement tradeoffs are further characterized and 

tracked. These Requirements Tradeoffs Opportunity Management Reviews should become integral in 

driving an affordability culture for defense acquisitions.

Honorable Mention: How Important is Getting It Right the First Time? A Case in Applying Agile Acquisition Management

Author: Mr. Joe Novick is the product manager for the 

Next Generation Personnel Decontamination System 

and the deputy product manager for the Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection Program in the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 

Defense. He holds a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry 

from the University of Virginia. He is Level III certified in program management and systems engineering.

Abstract: How important is getting it right the first 

time? For systems where evolutionary improvements 

and modernization are not logistically or economically 

feasible, like a new satellite or a Food and Drug Administration-approved vaccine, “getting it right” may 

be paramount. But in many DOD systems, program 

managers and stakeholders should instead ask: How 

right does it need to be the first time? As warfare 

6

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing

The winners and honorable mentions are:
— 3 —

environments and adversaries change, the definition 

of “getting it right” changes, too. Additionally, human 

nature is not about perfection; our society thrives on 

lessons learned. In acquisition, we spend far too much 

time and resources focusing on absolutely meeting all 

requirements in our capability documents. We should 

be coordinating more closely with the user community throughout the acquisition process to focus on 

meeting the most critical requirements and making 

key tradeoffs that can be addressed after production. 

Additionally, as programs progress, the priorities of 

requirements may change based on performance data, 

intelligence information and threat information.

Category: Future Operations

Winner: Future Conflict: Adapting Better and

Faster than an Adversary

Author: Maj. Hassan M. Kamara is an assistant 

product manager assigned to the Lower Tier Project Office in the Program Executive Office (PEO) 

for Missiles and Space. He has served on the U.S. 

Forces Korea Joint Staff (J-3), and prior to that he 

commanded a Stryker infantry company at Fort 

Bliss, Texas, and an armor company in Iraq. He 

holds a B.A. in political science from Arizona 

State University and an M.A. in security studies 

and a certificate in defense procurement and contracting from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. 

Kamara is also an honor graduate of the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course.

Abstract: The problem of wartime adaptation has 

been an enduring challenge for militaries. The U.S. 

Army cannot predict future wars with certainty, so it 

should ensure that it can rapidly adapt to the changing realities—such as technological surprise—that are 

inherent in war. Moreover, as the potential for U.S. 

involvement in future conflicts with a major power 

grows, the following question emerges: How can the 

U.S. Army technologically adapt better and faster 

than a peer or near-peer adversary in a future conflict? 

This paper analyzes the process of wartime adaptation 

to highlight how the Army can adapt faster than a 

peer or near-peer adversary in a future conflict.

Honorable Mention: Expeditionary Situational Awareness at the Tip of the Spear, Preparing 

for Future Operations Through Innovation

Author: Lt. Col. James Howell is an acquisition 

officer assigned to the Pentagon as a Department of 

the Army System Coordinator (DASC) for Defensive 

Cyber and the Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit 

Program. Previously, he served as the DASC for the 

Warfighter Information Network – Tactical Increment 

1. He also served with the 82nd Signal Battalion, 

the Red Devils, the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute 

Infantry Regiment and with the 3rd Brigade Combat 

Team, 82nd Airborne Division supporting numerous exercises and missions in Baghdad and Tikrit.

Abstract: Sun Tzu, a Chinese general, military 

strategist and philosopher, presented a profound 

principle more than 2,500 years ago, describing the 

power and importance of information dominance 

prior to and during combat operations. In “The Art 

of War,” he wrote, “If you know the enemy and know 

yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 

battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for 

every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If 

you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will 

succumb in every battle.” In essence, information 

is power and overmatch. To support this level of 

understanding, U.S. forces require the most advanced 

mission command, communications and situational 

awareness processes and capabilities available as we 

meet with and engage our nation’s enemies. Today’s mission command network technologies are 

helping to provide this level of understanding.

Category: Innovation

Winner: Culture: The Foundation of Innovation

Author: Maj. Andrew Miller, a basic branch infantry officer, is the Nett Warrior Fielding and 

Training assistant product manager in Project 

Manager Soldier Warrior within PEO Soldier.

Abstract: Innovation is a strategic priority for the 

Army acquisition community. Unfortunately, our 

attempts to innovate are hampered by an incorrect 

understanding of the nature of innovation. On the 
— 4 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

whole, we tend to associate innovation with technology. Instead, we should focus our efforts to innovate 

on organizational culture. Culture is the foundation 

of innovation and is a prerequisite of incorporating 

technology. Armed with a culture of innovation, our 

organizations will break free from the status quo 

and position themselves to develop and integrate 

technology. Unfortunately, innovative cultures take 

effort to create and even more to maintain. Four 

key actions, which, if coordinated, generally lead 

to success: empower, vigorously evaluate assumptions, prioritize product over process, and advocate.

Honorable Mention: Inspiring Innovation by 

Changing My Vantage Point on the Battlefield

Author: Lt. Col. Rachael Hoagland is currently a 

Training with Industry (TWI) fellow at Amazon.

com. She has held assistant project management 

jobs in the U.S. Special Operations Command and 

Project Manager Tactical Radios within PEO Command, Control and Communications – Tactical. 

Prior to entering the Acquisition Corps, she taught 

at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and 

held several roles as a military intelligence officer.

Abstract: Changing one’s vantage point on the battlefield can provide a competitive advantage over an 

adversary by providing a unique view on how the 

enemy is organized, what weapon systems it is using 

and what decisions it might make. As an active-duty 

Army acquisition officer working at Amazon.com in 

the TWI program for the year, I am changing my vantage point on the battlefield. This experience is helping 

me gain a competitive advantage on how to stimulate 

innovation for the future of the Army. Amazon’s agile 

project management style saves time by giving teams 

the ability to make decisions in the moment. Eliminating management control allows teams to shift project 

focus and priorities as needed. To move fast, you must 

empower your people to make decisions; to ensure 

that they make the right decisions, you need to put 

in place a set of core values that everyone internalizes, 

and reinforce those values in all your training so the 

right decision at the right time becomes the norm.

Category: Lessons Learned

Winner: Robots and Deal Makers: Lessons 

Learned from an Acquisition Officer 

Serving as a Legislative Liaison

Author: Lt. Col. Patrick “Josh” Baker is an Army 

Acquisition Corps member, and is Level III certified in program management. He holds an MBA in 

systems acquisition management from the Naval 

Postgraduate School. He served 2 1/2 years as the 

Army aviation programs legislative liaison in the 

Office of the Chief Legislative Liaison. He is currently serving as a TWI fellow at General Dynamics.

Abstract: Engaging members of Congress and their 

staffs can be an intimidating and mysterious venture. 

Acquisition professionals must choose how they approach Capitol Hill: as a robot or a deal maker. The 

paper offers practical recommendations that can 

produce successful results for acquisition professionals as they interact with Congress. The goal is 

for acquisition professionals to leverage their ability 

to manage trade space, negotiations and emotional 

intellect to be a deal maker who emboldens programs.

Honorable Mention: A BIT* of Advice

*Built-In Test

Author: Lt. Col. Steven Van Riper and contributing 

authors Mr. Jim Griffin and Mr. Eugene Buckner. 

Van Riper is the program director for an Acquisition 

Category II program within Special Operations Forces 

acquisition, technology and logistics; Griffin is the 

deputy program director; and Buckner is the senior 

systems engineer in the U.S. Special Operations 

Command’s Program Executive Office Rotary Wing.

Abstract: Reliance on built-in test (BIT) to monitor 

system performance is now commonplace in all categories of systems. BIT augments human monitoring of 

systems, performing automated and directed diagnostics 

and prognostics. BIT planning, development, testing and final implementation are evaluated as critical 

operational issues influencing overall system suitability 

and effectiveness. Differentiation between informational 

or actionable BIT, early activation of BIT functionality and BIT customization can mitigate common 

risks associated with system-level BIT management.
— 5 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards 

for Acquisition Writing Distinguished Judges

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Armbruster Jr. (USA, Ret.), 

Defense Acquisition University (DAU) faculty 

member and former commander, U.S. Army Test and 

Evaluation Command (ATEC)

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Cartwright (USA, Ret.), DAU 

faculty member and former program manager, Future 

Combat Systems

Professor John T. Dillard, academic area chair for 

acquisition, Graduate School of Business and Public 

Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Professor Raymond D. Jones, Graduate School of 

Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Ms. Mary Miller, then deputy assistant secretary of 

the Army for research and technology

Maj. Gen. Roger A. Nadeau (USA, Ret.), senior vice 

president, American Business Development Group, 

and former commanding general (CG), ATEC

Col. Kurt A. McNeely (USA, Ret.), chief, Warfighter 

Central, Enterprise and Systems Integration Center, 

U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and 

Engineering Center

Mr. Kris Osborn, managing editor, Scout Warrior

Maj. Gen. Dana J.H. Pittard (USA, Ret.), vice president, Defense Programs, Allison Transmission

Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry (USA, Ret.), Association 

of the United States Army (AUSA) senior fellow and 

former Army inspector general

Gen. Louis C. Wagner (USA, Ret.), AUSA senior fellow and former CG, U.S. Army Materiel Command

Lt. Gen. Joseph L. Yakovac (USA, Ret.), senior 

counselor, The Cohen Group, and former ASA(ALT) 

military deputy and director, Army Acquisition Corps
— 6 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Acquisition Reform/

Better Buying Power

WINNER 

User Requirements: An Enduring

Conversation 

By Mr. David M. Riel

Defense Acquisition 

University – Midwest Region

Staring at the Cabinet Shop’s 

quality deficiency report as a 

senior manufacturing manager 

for one of our defense industry 

partners, the spike in quality issues led me to reach 

for my phone and request an audience with the shop 

lead, Bobby. As Bobby explained, the new aluminum 

honeycomb sheets, specifically procured from Germany for their lightweight adhesive and thin-walled 

siding, were causing the guys “fits.” Their conventional handling techniques were proving inadequate to 

compensate for the material’s delicacy. Further investigation revealed a host of other costly design decisions 

made to meet the weight reduction requirements for 

the new VH-71 Presidential helicopter. In addition to 

the thin-walled aluminum honeycomb sheets, cabinet 

attachments were being milled using long-spindled 

1⁄8 inch tooling versus the standard 1⁄4 inch tooling 

typical for these applications. Also, painters were 

masking the backside of every bracket used to hold 

the fiberglass soffits onto the interior sides in order to 

avoid the weight of any paint overspray. In short, our 

design engineers were in hot pursuit of the reduced 

weight requirements imposed by the prime in order 

to meet the user’s range requirements. Many of these 

manufacturing impediments were not difficult, such 

as the milling and painting operations, but the added 

man-hours from deburring and masking operations 

were proving pricey. Ultimately, in accordance with 

President Obama’s campaign promise to eliminate the 

costly VH-71 program, the one-time $6.2B program, which had ballooned to $13B, was canceled. 

Similar weight reduction requirements, driven by its 

range Key Performance Parameter (KPP), drove design 

decisions on the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) 

program that were costly at the time and still plague 

the aircraft with higher maintenance costs. As each 

airframe enters depot maintenance, any corrosion 

being removed typically requires the prime contractor’s 

engineers to individually disposition each repair, increasing both the time and cost of depot maintenance. 

These two examples reflect a necessary, persistent boost 

to the acquisition and user community conversation from “can this be done?” to “at what additional 

cost can this be done?” As the design for each of our 

weapon systems matures, an enduring conversation 

needs to occur between the acquirer and the warfighter, 

carefully explaining the producibility, maintainability, 

reliability and subsequent cost impacts of each additional mile of range, or mile per hour of speed desired. 

Recent policy changes introduced by the January 2015 

update to DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System, and the Better Buying Power 

initiatives have created a pathway to this meaningful, 

continuous dialogue, but it will take culture change 

and relationship building between the acquisition and 

user communities to make the conversation enduring. DoDI 5000.02 calls for a “systems engineering 

tradeoff analysis showing how cost and capability vary 

as a function of major design parameters” in order to 

“support the assessment of refined KPPs/KSAs in the 

CDD” as part of the Capability Development Document - Validation (CDD-V) decision point. While 

this required systems engineering tradeoff analysis is a 

necessary early step in understanding the cost implications of major design parameters, the devil is often in 

the details as the program matures from a preliminary 

design to a detailed design. For major programs, DoD 

5000.02 also requires that “program managers, in consultation with the PEO, and the requirements sponsor, 

will, on at least an annual basis, identify and propose 

to the CSB (Configuration Steering Board) a set of 

recommended requirements changes to include descoping options that reduce program cost and/or moderate 

requirements and changes needed to respond to any 

threat developments.” While the program managers’ efforts in bringing tradeoffs before the CSB is also a step 

in the right direction, reducing costly design decisions 

by capitalizing on the effects of many small changes, 

will be difficult to achieve in a once yearly forum.

Similarly, Better Buying Power Initiatives have promoted “should cost” and the enforcement of affordability 
— 7 —

caps since BBP 1.0 was initiated in September 2010. 

Yet, as BBP 1.0 alludes, “Affordability means conducting a program at a cost constrained by the maximum 

resources the Department can allocate for that capability,” which may very well not create the conversation 

of whether or not the extra 50 miles of range are worth 

the added 10% cost, only that the cost for those miles 

fits within the maximum allowable affordability cap. 

Likewise, “should cost” pursuits have been focused on 

acquisition-specific practices, such as GFE break-out, 

increased competition, and multi-year contracting. In 

2015, the Air Force announced their “Bending the 

Cost Curve” initiative, featuring a cost-capability analysis program, which also offers cost-savings opportunities. However, this initiative also only promotes the 

conversation during the pre-EMD contract award stage. 

All of these cost savings initiatives offer valuable 

contributions to reducing the cost and increasing 

the affordability of our weapon system programs. 

But what about after the development contract is 

signed? What about during the detailed development of the system when decisions are made to chase 

performance requirements (e.g., weight savings) 

to achieve already-solidified user requirements?

Requirements Tradeoffs 

Opportunity Management Reviews

Two new decision points in the Defense Acquisition 

System (DAS) framework, the Capability Development 

Document – Validation (CDD-V) and the Development Request for Proposal Release Decision (DRFPRD), are designed to ensure solidified, affordable 

user requirements are established prior to Milestone B, 

which they do very well. However, the conversation on 

requirements must not stop there. After the Milestone 

B decision and the Post-Milestone B contract is awarded, as the weapon system design is progressing, discoveries are made that can greatly impact the producibility 

and life cycle cost of the program. By providing a consistent avenue for a requirements review by the systems 

engineering community, the user community can be 

provided with a better understanding of the optional 

short and long-term cost avoidance and/or savings potential that may become evident as the design matures. 

Perhaps the F-22 ATF user community would have 

reconsidered the requirement for the M61A2 20-mm 

Gun System, which weighs 378 lbs empty (plus another ~100lbs for the 480 rounds of 20-mm ammunition), 

if they had a better understanding of overall life cycle 

impact of the design decisions made in order to reduce 

weight elsewhere to accommodate the gun, which is 

likely unnecessary for combat due to the integrated 

capabilities of advanced air-to-air missiles (AIM-120 

AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder), stealth, advanced 

avionics, and supercruise. A systematic process for 

documenting and pursuing such initiatives is essential. 

The first step would be to define the opportunity using 

solid “tradeoff – benefit” statements adapted from 

practices promoted in the risk management section 

of the June 2015 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity 

Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Program 

(RIO Guide). Next, the RIO Guide’s opportunity 

management process can be expanded to include 

requirement tradeoffs in order to further characterize 

and track these tradeoffs. Opportunities are defined 

in the June 2015 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity 

Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Program, as the “potential future benefits to the program’s 

cost, schedule, and/or performance baseline, usually 

achieved through reallocation of resources ... support 

Better Buying Power initiatives to achieve “shouldcost” as well as “will-cost” objectives.” Therefore, while 

more geared towards investing financially today to gain 

future benefits, applying incremental requirements 

tradeoffs today to alleviate current risks and achieve future benefits is certainly within the spirit of the process. 

The RIO Guide also elucidates to “not ignore small 

improvements”, which can add up and prove essential 

to the cost avoidance or savings in the requirements 

tradeoff process. Using the concepts in the RIO Guide 

for registry development, requirement tradeoff opportunities (RTOs) can be captured and tracked using the 

handling options outline in the RIO Guide – pursue, 

reevaluate or reject. Also, using a similar methodology 

found in the RIO Guide, a Requirement Tradeoff Opportunity Register should be established that describes 

the RTO; the likelihood of the user community reducing or eliminating the requirement; its negative impact 

on performance; and its positive impact on producibility, reliability, maintainability and life cycle costs. 

EXAMPLE 1: The opportunity for the removal of 

the air-to-air gun for the F-22 ATF represented a 

major requirement change with significant benefits 

had it been pursued during its early post-Milestone B 
— 8 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

development in 1992. (Note: All financial amounts 

and requirement trade information are for illustrative 

purposes only and do not represent actual figures).

Step one: Develop a “tradeoff – benefit” statement 

that captures the requirements tradeoff opportunity.

1. If the requirement for an air-to-air gun (i.e., 

M61A2 20-mm Gun System) is removed and 

its weight savings of approximately 478 lb is 

achieved, then individual components/parts can 

be designed heavier, enhancing producibility, 

maintainability and reliability, and resulting in 

an overall life cycle cost reduction of $1.15B.

Step two: Document opportunity in a Requirement 

Tradeoff Opportunity Register (see table below). 

EXAMPLE 2: The following example from the canceled VH-71 Presidential Helicopter program demonstrates how an extensive weight reduction program can 

incrementally affect the overall life cycle cost. The reduction of the range requirement for the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter provides the opportunity to increase 

the weight of specific parts of the aircraft’s interior 

resulting in small, yet compounding, cost savings when 

applied across the program. Each incremental cost/benefit analysis can be managed independent of the others; 

however, their cumulative effect on range needs to be 

comprehended. (Note: This example assumes that the 

range threshold was the determinant factor in weight 

reduction emphasis. Other possible explanations and 

potential tradeoffs include equipment and gear.) 

Step one: Develop a “tradeoff – benefit” statement that 

captures the requirements tradeoff opportunity (Range 

reduction and interior weight figures are for illustrative 

purposes only).

1. If the threshold requirement for range was 

reduced by 25 miles and the weight of the 

interior could be designed 25 lb. heavier, then 

individual components/parts can be designed 

heavier; thus, enhancing producibility, maintainability and reliability and resulting in an 

overall life cycle cost reduction of $2.5M.

Step two: Document opportunity in a Requirement 

Tradeoff Opportunity Register (see table on page 9). 

Conclusion

While the latest DoD 5000.02 and the Better Buying Power initiatives take steps towards ensuring 

each requirement is carefully vetted to ensure overall 

affordability, a more methodical, recurring process 

must be applied to stimulate an enduring conversation between the acquisition and user communities 

throughout the development of the program. The 

requirements tradeoff opportunity process should 

become integral in driving an affordability culture 

for defense acquisitions. The continuing analysis of 

the impact of each additional mile per hour or mile 

of range will give the user community a better understanding of the life cycle costs driven by those requirements, allowing for better (albeit tough) decisions to 

be made as the defense budget continues to shrink. 

Money saved by developing more affordable systems 

through the RTO process can then be invested in 

other critical needs for the U.S Army, ensuring that 

the Soldier is getting their best bang for the buck.

Opportunity 1A Remove M61A2 20 mm Gun System 

resulting in approx. 478 lb weight 

savings

Performance Cost No gun for close air-to-air engagements

Likelihood Low

Positive Impact High

Producibility Increased weight across multiple components at no cost to range results in many 

producibility advantages

Maintainability Airframe edge distance and thickness 

dimensions more forgiving for standard 

blending operations in depot maintenance

Reliability Weight savings allows for added redundancy in critical components

Life Cycle Cost Gun cost = $1M/aircraft + $2M lifetime 

repair/replacement. Producibility = 

$250,000/aircraft; Maintainability = 

$2M/aircraft; Reliability = $500K/aircraft. 

Total (Lifetime) = $1.158

Schedule Positive, but small for RDT&E and 

production. 4 month reduction in PDM 

in O&M Schedule

Handling Strategy Reevaluate: Multiple opinions on gun 

utility in modern combat scenarios. Await 

CDD modification. Needed by April 

1993 for effective implementation

Expected Closure Dec-92
— 9 —

__________________________________

David M. Riel is professor of acquisition management for Defense Acquisition University’s Midwest region, teaching and 

consulting in the areas of program management and production, quality and manufacturing. After a 20-year U.S. Air 

Force career and several years working in the defense industry, Riel is part of the DAU team providing mission assistance to 

program offices and teaching the next generation of DOD acquisition professionals the ins and outs of defense acquisition.

Opportunity 1A- increase aluminum honeycomb wall thickness by 3 mm

1B- Use standard 1/4 inch 

end mill for bracketry versus 

long-spindled 1/8 end mill

1C- Do not mask soffet brackets 

during paint operations

Performance Cost Interior weight increase of 5 lb resulting in range 

decrease of 5 miles

Interior weight increase of 2 lb, 

resulting in range decrease of 

2 miles

Interior weight increase of 0.25 lb 

resulting in range decrease of 0.25 

miles

Likelihood Mod High High

Positive Impact Mod Mod Low

Producibility Increased thickness to standard aircraft honeycomb allows for normal handling procedures and 

less quality issues

Use of standard 1/4 inch end 

milling reduces tool breakage, 

scrap and deburring activities

Reduces paint operations manhours by 20 man-hours/aircraft for 

masking and de-masking operations

Maintainability Increased thickness to standard aircraft honeycomb translates to easier handling techniques 

in maintenance and more readily available spare 

materials, likely increasing spares availability 

and decreasing logistic delay times (i.e., lower 

MTTR)

None None

Reliability Increased thickness to standard aircraft honeycomb translates to less in-use damage

Increased thickness and more 

rounded corners translate to 

reduce fatigue cracking

At three spares per aircraft lifetime, 

reduces man-hours by 60 manhours/aircraft

Life Cycle Cost Producibility = $220K/aircraft material + 20% 

less scrap rate = $240K/aircraft; Maintainability = 

$50K/aircraft; Reliability = $100K/aircraft; Total 

(Lifetime) = $10.9M

Producibility = $30K/aircraft 

Reliability = $100/K aircraft 

Total (Lifetime) = $3.6M

Producibility = $1K/aircraft 

Reliability = $3K/aircraft 

Total (Lifetime) = $112K

Schedule Positive, but small for RDT&E, production and 

O&M

Positive, but small for production. Positive, but small for production

Handling Strategy Pursue upon CDD modification—Small impact 

to range reaps significant benefits in producibility, maintainability and reliability. Needed by May 

2017 for effective implementation

Pursue upon CDD modification—Small impact to range 

reaps significant benefits in 

producibility and reliability. 

Needed by May 2017 for effective implementation

Pursue upon CDD modification—

Small impact to range reaps significant benefits in producibility and 

reliability. Needed by May 2017 for 

effective implementation

Expected Closure Mar-17 Apr-17 Mar-17
— 10 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

HONORABLE MENTION

How Important is Getting It Right 

the First Time? A Case in Applying 

Agile Acquisition Management

By Mr. Joe Novick

Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense

How important is getting it 

right the first time? For systems where evolutionary improvements and modernization are not logistically 

or economically feasible like a new satellite or a 

Food and Drug Administration approved vaccine, “getting it right” may be paramount. But in 

many Department of Defense (DOD) systems, 

program managers and stakeholders should instead 

ask: How right does it need to be the first time? 

As warfare environments and adversaries change, the 

definition of “getting it right” changes too. Additionally, human nature is not about perfection; our 

society thrives on lessons learned. In acquisition, we 

spend far too much time and resources focusing on 

absolutely meeting all requirements in our capability documents. We should be coordinating more 

closely with the user community throughout the 

acquisition process to focus on meeting the most 

critical requirements and making key tradeoffs that 

can be addressed after production. Additionally, as 

programs progress, the priorities of requirements 

may change based on performance data, intelligence information, and threat information. 

Last year in my essay, Embracing Requirements Creep 

and Making Defense Acquisition Agile to Address 

a Changing World, I described a path forward for 

the DOD to adopt an agile program management 

strategy in order to embrace requirements creep that 

aligned with principles in Better Buying Power (BBP). 

By embracing requirements creep, acquisition programs would adapt to new threats, new battlefields, 

and a wider range of enemy tactics and operations. I 

argued that in order to allow acquisition programs 

to be more agile, the acquisition and requirements 

processes would have to become less rigid by developing a better mechanism to allow for tradeoffs between 

the users and program management offices. Additionally, acquisition leaders and stakeholders would have 

to take more risks in the initial acquisition and shift 

some research and development investments after Full 

Rate Production (FRP) to focus on threat adaptation. 

Throughout this essay, I will examine a case that 

illustrates the implementation of the agile acquisition concept. The defense acquisition community 

ought to focus on system planning that incorporates 

product improvements from the onset of the program. This agile approach will accelerate new capabilities to the Warfighter in the field that can evolve 

as global circumstances and requirements change. 

Making Acquisition Agile While 

Considering New Requirements

Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP), 

an Acquisition Category III chemical and biological defense program, is an interesting case study 

for agile acquisition for several reasons. First, the 

Services levied new requirements on the program 

during the staffing of the Capabilities Production 

Document (CPD). Second, the JECP, as a family of 

systems, moved forward to multiple programmatic 

milestones based on each system’s maturity. Third, 

the use of common subsystems, components, and 

materials across all systems allows for rapid configuration modifications and modularity while reducing costs. Fourth, the program manager leveraged 

the extensive testing on those common subsystems, 

components, and materials from the initial acquisition cycle to minimize future testing of new configurations. Finally, the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program (CBDP) invested in research and 

development funds for JECP after the FRP decision.

While JECP used agile concepts, it was limited 

in its application of agile acquisition due to 

the rigidity of the existing acquisition and requirements generation processes. Additionally, sequestration and its impacts on the two year 

budgeting cycle forced the schedule to the right. 

At JECP’s program initiation, the Services required 

a lightweight and transportable capability to provide 

a toxic free area in a wide array of mission sets. This 

would allow Warfighters to continue operations in 

a chemical or biological contaminated environment 

unencumbered by the burden of individual protective equipment. For those of you who have tried 
— 11 —

using a computer while wearing protective gloves 

or sleeping in a gas mask, I hope you can appreciate 

such a capability. JECP took on a family of systems 

acquisition approach to address multiple capabilities 

across the Joint Services. Throughout the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 

Phase, the JECP systems, subsystems, components, 

and materials went through rigorous chemical and 

biological agent challenge testing as well as durability, 

logistics, military standard, and operational testing.

Upon approaching Milestone C – Low Rate Initial 

Production (LRIP), several Services recognized that 

the materials and subsystems in JECP could be 

applied to different mission sets and required new 

systems that were not developed in EMD. Additionally, the Services determined that several systems 

developed in EMD systems were no longer needed 

due to changing warfare environments. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), with concurrence 

from the program stakeholders, recognized these 

changes and decided to move forward with the 

lowest risk capabilities to FRP first. The product 

manager would address the higher risk systems when 

additional research and development funds became 

available. This plan allowed for a new capability 

to move forward into production without being 

held back by higher risk or slower acquisitions. 

Through the Program Objective Memorandum 

(POM) process, the program secured Research, 

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds 

to address the additional Warfighter requirements 

after the FRP decision. The financial investment 

of the MDA and the CBDP in such funds was the 

crucial step that allowed the Product Manager to 

consider an agile approach. Without the post-FRP 

funds, the program manager would have to make a 

decision to either slow down the initial acquisition 

to allow the development of the new requirements 

to catch up or not address the new requirements. 

Agile acquisition is proving to be successful in JECP. 

The Program Management Office projects a ~75% 

RDT&E cost savings and a ~50% schedule savings to 

address the new requirements when compared to full 

second increment or new program of record. JECP’s 

agile acquisition approach accounts for useful new 

ways to use proven technologies, leverage component and subsystem developmental test data, modify 

existing logistics products such as technical manuals 

and training materials, and limit bureaucratic road 

bumps such as new capabilities documents. Additionally, the CBDP provided the JECP program 

with Operational Systems Development funding 

to address key objective requirements and continuous improvements that will expand the Warfighters’ 

capabilities in a wider range of threat environments. 

Such a funding line allows for the program manager 

to focus on addressing changing battlefield threats 

and design for different concepts of operations 

without being held back by costly and time-consuming and costly options like developing multiple 

increments or new, full-blown programs of record. 

Changing Our Approach

The concept of preplanned product improvements is 

not new to defense acquisition. The general approach 

in recent years, however, seems to go in the direction 

of getting a 100% solution in non-urgent need situations. We should have processes that acknowledge the 

certainty of changing requirements so that product 

improvements are built into the acquisition plan. 

In other words, we should embrace requirements 

creep as an expectation and incorporate RDT&E 

dollars after FRP in our initial acquisition planning. 

In his article, Better Buying Power Principles – What 

Are They?, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, 

identifies his top principle for BBP 3.0: “Principle 1: 

Continuous improvement will be more effective than 

radical change.” He goes on to say, “It’s the reason 

there have been three editions of BBP.” By adopting 

agile acquisition, the DOD can realize significant 

cost and schedule savings to improve existing systems, use technologies for multiple applications, and 

provide new capabilities to the Warfighter faster. It 

offers a pathway for continuous improvement. 

The acquisition community must think differently than it does now. It needs to ask fundamental 

questions like “How right does this capability need 

to be the first time?” and “How can we best deliver new capabilities knowing they will require improvements down the road?” Programs like JECP 

are examples where the DOD can afford to field 

capabilities that plan for product improvements. 

Program managers need to have the reassurance 

that RDT&E funding will be available after FRP 

so they can confidently make tradeoffs in design 

and development, and then be capable of meeting 
— 12 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

100% of the requirements in the future. If defense 

acquisition improves its ability to adapt to changing 

battlefields, the Warfighter will have new and better 

equipment faster, thereby improving operations. 

The last JECP off the production line 

will be better than the first.

____________

References:

Kendall, F. (2015). Better Buying Power Principles – What 

Are They? Defense ARJ and Defense AT&L Publications 

Website. Retrieved from http://dau.dodlive.mil/2015/12/28/

better-buying-power-principles-what-are-they/

Novick, J. (2016). Embracing Requirements Creep 

and Making Defense Acquisition Agile to Address a 

Changing World. Army AL&T January-March 2016. 

Retrieved from http://asc.army.mil/web/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2015MGGreeneAwards-JFM16-Jan7.pdf 

__________________________________

Mr. Joe Novick is the product manager for the Next Generation Personnel Decontamination System and the deputy product manager for the Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection 

Program in the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense. He holds a bachelor’s degree in 

biochemistry from the University of Virginia. He is Level III 

certified in program management and systems engineering.

Category: Future Operations

WINNER

Future Conflict: Adapting Better 

and Faster Than an Adversary

By Maj. Hassan M. Kamara

Program Executive Office 

for Missiles and Space

“There are no crystal balls that can predict the 

demands of future armed conflict. That is 

why I believe our ability to learn and adapt 

rapidly is an institutional imperative.” 

—Gen. Martin E. Dempsey 

(U.S. Army, Retired Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

A. Introduction

This paper studies how the U.S. Army can technologically adapt better and faster than a peer or near-peer 

adversary in a future conflict. The Army cannot predict 

future wars with certainty, thus it should ensure that 

it can rapidly adapt to the changing realities inherent 

in war. The need for this study is underscored in part 

by the 2015 National Military Strategy of the United 

States, which states that the potential for U.S. “involvement in interstate war with a major power” is 

growing, and mandates that the U.S. military “be 

able to rapidly adapt to new threats.”1

 Technology alone will not suffice to defeat an adversary in a 

future conflict, but it is vital to doing so. According 

to Sir Michael Howard, technology is but one of 

the dimensions in which war has been conducted 

in the past—the others being operational, logistical 

and social—“but technology, as an independent and 

significant dimension” cannot be disregarded.2

 

So how can the Army technologically adapt better and 

faster than a peer or near-peer adversary in a future 

conflict? The Army can technologically adapt better 

and faster than a peer or near-peer adversary in a 

future conflict by manipulating the process of wartime 

adaptation. The study uses John Boyd’s OODA framework for fast, dynamic transitions—Observe, Orient, 

Decide and Act (OODA)—as a lens to analyze the 

process of wartime adaptation and highlight ways the 

Army can manipulate this process for faster evolution. 

This study is relevant because U.S. technological superiority in a potential conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary is not guaranteed. In a 2015 statement underscoring the need for greater Research and Development 

investment, the acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for Acquisition Logistics and Technology [ASA(ALT)] 

the Honorable Katrina McFarland voiced concern that 

U.S. “technological superiority is not assured.”3

 In a 

RAND study, Roger Cliff examined China’s military 

and technological growth, and warned that “the U.S. 
— 13 —

military, including the U.S. Air force must prepare for 

the possibility of conflict...with a Chinese military 

that by 2020 will be significantly more advanced than 

it is at present.”4

 It is highly possible that in a future 

conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary—despite 

current peacetime innovation efforts—the Army could 

realize it lacks technological superiority, and will have 

to rapidly adapt to regain a technological edge, or 

mitigate an adversary’s technical advantages. Such 

was the case with tank technology during Operation 

Overlord in World War II. According to General of 

the Army Omar Bradley, the Army had to adapt both 

tactics and capabilities to compensate for the technological inferiority of its main battle tank—the U.S. M4 

Sherman tank—relative to German tanks.5

 According 

to Bradley, the 50-ton German, Mark V Panther tank 

with its “long-barreled high-velocity 75mm gun...

and its tapered hull was more than a match for our 

Shermans.”6

 This was because the Sherman’s 75-mm 

gun was ineffective against the heavy frontal plate 

of the Panther tanks, so according to Bradley it was 

“only by swarming around the panzers to hit them 

on the flank, could our Shermans knock the enemy 

out.”7

 Bradley wrote that the Army adapted by designing and fielding 76-mm guns on its M4 Sherman 

tanks, as well as dual use long-rifled 90mm guns.8

B. Concepts

A brief discussion of military adaptation in war, 

peacetime innovation, and the OODA framework 

is essential to understanding the ensuing analysis. 

Military adaptation is transformation that occurs 

amidst war, typically in response to the actions and 

capabilities of an adversary relative to one’s operational objectives. Military adaptation differs from the 

generally slower-paced innovation that occurs during 

peacetime. Williamson Murray similarly characterized 

and distinguished military adaptation and peacetime 

innovation; he wrote that “while there are similarities 

between the processes of innovation and adaptation, 

the environments in which they occur are radically 

different.”9

 Murray explained that while peacetime 

innovation enjoys the luxury of time to consider transformational objectives and challenges, and 

gradually evolve, wartime adaptation sees less time 

for transformation due to the “the terrible pressures 

of war as well as an interactive, adaptive opponent 

who is trying to kill us.”10 Wartime adaptation is 

an enduring challenge for militaries. According to 

Williamson Murray “the problem of adaptation in war 

represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront.”11

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act, commonly 

referred to as the “OODA loop” are interrelated 

actions of a construct for dynamic and fast transitions that can disorient an adversary. According to 

John Boyd, “without OODA loops...and without 

the ability to get inside other OODA loops (or other 

environments), we will find it impossible to comFIGURE 1 The OODA “loop” sketch12
— 14 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

prehend, shape, adapt to and in turn be shaped by 

an unfolding evolving reality that is uncertain, ever 

changing, and unpredictable.” War is such a reality, which makes the application of OODA to the 

challenge of wartime adaptation particularly apt. 13

The OODA is not always a neatly sequenced loop 

or cycle. It can be compressed with increased understanding of an environment or situation—resulting 

in direct transitions between observation and action 

(see Figure 2). According to Robert Coram, “understanding the OODA Loop enables a commander 

to compress time—that is time between observing 

a situation and taking an action.”14 This ability to 

compress time is invaluable in wartime adaptation.

C. Wartime Adaptation and the OODA

The components of the OODA construct correlate 

to the process of wartime adaptation—reference 

Figure 2—which makes OODA an excellent tool 

for analyzing wartime adaptation. There is a sensing 

and learning component to the wartime adaptation 

process that correlates to the Observe and Orient 

components of the OODA construct. The acquisition cycle, and the capability fielding and integration 

aspects of the wartime adaptation process respectively correlate to the Decide, and Act components 

of the OODA construct. This fundamental correlation facilitates the ensuing analysis of wartime 

adaptation using the OODA construct, and underscores the OODA’s applicability to comprehending 

and enhancing the wartime adaptation process.

1. OBSERVE: The Army can adapt faster than an 

adversary by improving its ability to rapidly record 

and analyze data from military operations to foster 

learning. Faster technological adaptation during 

war requires optimizing the Army’s ability to gather 

equipment performance data and war-fighter experiences during combat operations. The U.S. Navy 

understood this imperative in World War II. According to Stephen Peter Rosen, the Navy understood that 

“scientists also needed to be in the field to measure 

the combat performance of new equipment and to 

refine and adjust the new technology and operating 

practices developed for it...[so] it sent 464 scientists 

to field commands to help...develop antisubmarine warfare and tactics, and to refine the electronic 

warfare capabilities of the Army and Air forces.”15 

In lieu of prudently exposing the scientific community to military operations, commercially available 

telemetry technologies can be leveraged to help the 

Army gather data on equipment performance during 

ongoing operations to foster organizational learning. 

FIGURE 2 Wartime adaptation within the OODA framework
— 15 —

2. ORIENT: The Army can adapt faster than an 

adversary by developing and enforcing mechanisms 

that promote organizational learning. The latter is a 

central component in the process of wartime adaptation, and requires taking what is being observed in 

military operations, and rapidly disseminating them to 

Army decision makers and defense industry partners 

to synthesize solutions. According to Meir Finkel, 

“an important factor in recoverability from technological and doctrinal surprise is the ability to derive lessons while the surprise is taking place...devising immediate solutions and 

circulating them throughout the Army.”16

Rapid wartime adaptation requires organizationally 

supported mechanisms for rapidly disseminating 

the lessons being learned from the ongoing fight.

3. DECIDE: The Army can adapt faster in wartime by 

studying, developing, and implementing alternatives 

to reduce acquisition cycle times. These alternatives 

should orient on some of the institutionally recognized contributors to long acquisition cycle times. In 

his work examining Department of Defense, and US 

Air Force efforts to reduce acquisition cycle times in 

the 80s and 90s, Ross T. McNutt highlighted some key 

contributors to slower acquisition cycle times as: lower 

prioritization of schedule relative to cost and performance by program managers, extensive pre-acquisition 

Milestone A review processes, poor transition of technology from the scientific, research and development 

community to the war-fighters, funding limitations 

based on funding processes, and little to no workforce training on acquisition cycle time reduction.17

Some alternatives to counter the above contributors 

to slower acquisition cycle times include greater 

emphasis on schedule as a variable, streamlining 

requirements in the review processes for milestone 

decisions, and utilizing mature and viable emerging 

technologies in concert with a modular open system 

architecture. Consistent with the latter, Dan Ward 

advocates taking advantage of existing, and mature 

emerging technologies during design, versus over-relying on longer development of immature technologies 

(specified as those at DoD and NASA’s Technology 

Readiness Level 6), to help reduce acquisition cycle 

times and cost, as well as deliver viable capabilities.18

Congress and the Defense industry are critical 

stakeholders in wartime adaptation. Consistent 

with the spirit of the 2016 Acquisition Agility Act, 

Congress can institute war-activated provisions 

that curtail the myriad of funding and bureaucratic 

regulations that slow the contracting and acquisition lifecycle process. The Army should also build 

industry partnerships that can rapidly produce 

the capability solutions vital to overcoming technological surprise, and operational challenges.

4. ACT: In terms of wartime adaptation, this aspect 

of the OODA construct deals with the rapid fielding, 

integration and sustainment of new capabilities into 

army operations. The Army can adapt faster than 

an adversary by improving its ability to rapidly field, 

integrate and sustain the paradigm-changing solutions 

generated in response to the lessons learned in ongoing operations. Adapting to German tanks wielding 

superior armor and guns, the U.S. Army in 1944 

introduced a new Hyper Velocity Armor-Piercing 

round (HVAP), but according to David Johnson, even 

by the spring of 1945 the HVAPs were still in short 

supply to forces in Europe; delaying its benefits to ongoing operations.19 This underscores the importance 

of rapidly fielding and integrating paradigm-changing capabilities to the wartime adaptation process.

D. Conclusion

This study—by framing the process of wartime 

adaptation within Boyd’s OODA construct—has 

highlighted how the U.S. Army can manipulate 

said process to evolve faster than a peer or near-peer 

adversary in a future conflict. Meanwhile, as the 

Army continues to innovate in largely peacetime 

conditions at home—despite fighting low-intensity conflicts overseas—ensuing studies should focus on ways to expedite the peacetime innovation 

process to deliver viable, low-cost capabilities.

____________

Endnotes

1 U.S. Government, The National Military Strategy of the United 

States 2015, The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security, June 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

2 Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, 2nd Edition, (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983)104-105.

3 Katrina G. McFarland, as quoted in “Official Shares DoD’s Technology Goals 

with Industry,” Terri Moon Clark, DoD News - Defense Media Activity, 5 

February, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604052.
— 16 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

4 Roger Cliff, “The Military Potential of China’s Commercial Technology,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001) http://www.rand.org/

content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2001/MR1292.pdf.

5 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, (New York: 

The Modern Library, 1999) 322-323. 

6 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, (New York: 

The Modern Library, 1999) 322-323.

7 Ibid.

8 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 323. 

9 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of 

Change, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 2. 

10 Ibid.

11 Williamson Murray, “Military Adaptation in War,” Institute for Defense Analysis, June 2009, www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/dod/ona_murray_adapt_in_war.pdf.

12 John R. Boyd, “The Essence of Winning and Losing,” edited by Chet 

Richards, and Chuck Spinney, August, 2010, http://pogoarchives.org/m/

dni/john_boyd_compendium/essence_of_winning_losing.pdf.

13 John R. Boyd, “The Essence of Winning and Losing,” edited by Chet 

Richards, and Chuck Spinney, August, 2010, http://pogoarchives.org/m/

dni/john_boyd_compendium/essence_of_winning_losing.pdf.

14 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot who changed the Art of War, 

(New York: Back Bay Books/Little Brown and Company, 2002) 336.

15 Stephen Peter Rosen, Innovation and the Modern Military: Winning 

the Next War, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) 230.

16 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal 

Surprise on the Battlefield, (CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 111.

17 Ross T. McNutt, “Reducing Acquisition Cycle Time: Creating a Fast 

and Responsive Acquisition System,” in Providing the Means of War: 

Perspectives on Defense Acquisition 1945-2000, edited by Shannon 

A. Brown, (Washington D.C: U.S. Army Center for Military History, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2005) pp317-336.

18 Dan Ward, F.I.R.E: How Fast Inexpensive Restrained and Elegant 

methods ignite innovation, (New York: Harper Business, 2014), 26-27.

19 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. 

Army, 1917-1945, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 197. 

__________________________________

Maj. Hassan M. Kamara is an assistant product manager 

assigned to the Lower Tier Project Office within the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Missiles and Space. He 

has served on the U.S. Forces Korea Joint Staff (J-3), and 

prior to that he commanded a Stryker infantry company 

at Fort Bliss, Texas, and an armor company in Iraq. He 

holds a B.A. in political science from Arizona State University and an M.A. in security studies and a certificate in 

defense procurement and contracting from the U.S. Naval 

Postgraduate School. Kamara is also an honor graduate of 

the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course.

HONORABLE MENTION

Expeditionary Situational Awareness at 

the Tip of the Spear: Preparing for Future Operations through Innovation

By Lt. Col. James Howell

Department of the Army 

System Coordinator (DASC) 

for Defensive Cyber and 

the Handheld, Manpack, 

Small Form Fit Program

The U.S. Army’s Global Response Force (GRF) remains ready to conduct joint forcible-entry airborne 

assaults with little or no warning. Flying out to seize 

an enemy airfield or port facility requires state-of-theart doctrine, cutting edge leaders, aggressive training, 

a tailored communications support package, adaptive 

logistics processes and functions, and rapidly deployable capabilities. The Army is providing the GRF 

with new highly-adaptable, scalable and tailorable 

expeditionary technologies, such as Enroute Mission 

Command (EMC), which provides inflight network 

connectivity, the Transportable Tactical Command 

Communications system (T2C2) as well as developing the new Two Channel Leader Radio which will 

support both early entry and tactical edge operations. 

Technologies like these enable an advanced mission command network and provide the situational 

Paratroopers from the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne 

Division successfully utilized Enroute Mission Command Capability 

(EMC2) during the Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) exercise at the National 

Training Center/Fort Irwin, Calif., August 5-6, 2015. 

(U.S. Army photo)
— 17 —

awareness required to rapidly seize an initiative and 

dominate our nation’s enemies on the battlefield. 

America’s Guard of Honor, the 82nd Airborne Division, is the Army’s GRF unit. The GRF must 

remain ready to adapt to unpredictable security 

environments, which requires operational flexibility 

and versatility. To prepare for its unique mission set 

in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders’ urgent operational needs, the GRF continually 

conducts readiness exercises, mission planning, and 

rehearsals, while staging combat power at Fort 

Bragg’s Pope Army Airfield in North Carolina. 

Joint Forces Make These Exercises 

Operationally Relevant 

After an initial call to duty, Commanders and support 

units immediately begin to plan an operation. Once 

on the tarmac at Pope Army Airfield, Jumpmasters 

load Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft in “chalk 

order.” Designing a chalk order supporting an airborne 

assault requires a great deal of planning and attention 

to detail. Planners must thoroughly examine the drop 

zone, understand and plan for potential enemy actions, 

and comprehend the command and control (C2) network, the mission and its players. Paratroopers with C2 

capabilities will be placed in specific positions in the 

chalk order to ensure they land close to command post 

assembly areas strategically placed on the drop zone. 

The C-17s quickly become airborne, assembling in 

assault formation. Then Commanders and the GRF 

staff use their EMC systems to conduct operational 

coordination and receive the latest intelligence, which 

they share with other aircraft in the formation. Paratroopers view full motion video from Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles of the evolving situation on the drop 

zone on large LED screens throughout the aircraft. 

Amid the hum of the C-17s, Commanders and Paratroopers leverage mission command functions and 

plane-to-plane and plane-to-ground communications 

for a common operating picture shared throughout 

the entire brigade and with the rest of the Joint and 

coalition forces that may be supporting the operation. 

Paratroopers stand in their chalk lines in the aircraft 

as the assault force arrives at the drop-zone armed 

not only with weapons, but with night vision goggles, radios and early entry network communications 

equipment. One at a time over the drop-zone, they 

hand their static lines to the Jumpmaster controlling 

the door and then jump. The assault force may 

hear gunfire on the drop zone as they keep a sharp 

lookout for fellow jumpers, but they know what to 

expect, having already seen video of the battlespace 

below and having received mission updates from the 

Commander through the EMC back on the plane. 

Once on the drop zone, troops immediately place 

weapons into operation and move quickly to their 

Paratroopers from the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne 

Division successfully utilized Enroute Mission Command Capability 

(EMC2) during the Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) exercise at the National 

Training Center/Fort Irwin, Calif., Aug. 5-6, 2015. EMC2 provides 

inflight network communications, situational awareness and mission 

command capabilities to Global Response Force Commanders and Paratroopers, giving them a comprehensive understanding of the potential 

challenges waiting for them on the drop zone. (U.S. Army photo)

Paratroopers prepare to jump during the large-scale joint Army/Air Force 

Joint Forcible Entry exercise in December 2015, where Soldiers successfully employed Enroute Mission Command capability (EMC), while en 

route from Fort Bragg, N.C., to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. This network 

communications capability enabled the unit to obtain the inflight 

mission command and plane-to-plane, plane-to-ground communications 

needed for a successful parachute assault. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Lisa 

Beum, 1st BCT, 82nd ABN DIV, PAO)
— 18 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

pre-designated command post sites. Paratroopers 

establish a communications link for accountability 

on their software defined Rifleman Radios, which 

also provide situational awareness and input into 

mission command systems and the common operational picture. Accountability following an airborne 

operation is critical to the assault forces, as the units 

begin to mass combat power to seize the objective. 

Soon the Army will employ the Two Channel Leader Radio which will significantly enhance the GRF’s 

ability to C2 to the tactical edge of the battlespace. 

The Airborne Assault, Seizing the Initiative, 

and Dominating the Enemy 

Paratroopers, following the initial airborne assault, 

seizing the initiative, and dominating the enemy on 

the battlefield, will soon be able to establish an initial 

command post with communications enabled by the 

Transportable Tactical Command Communications 

(T2C2) “jumpable” Lite and “air droppable” Heavy 

systems. Utilizing an inflatable antenna, T2C2 enables 

network connectivity, via satellite to the Army’s tactical 

communications network, Warfighter Information 

Network– Tactical (WIN-T). These early entry forces 

can obtain the advanced situational awareness and mission command capabilities needed to conduct an early 

entry operation and set the stage for follow-on forces, 

with the scalable buildup of additional network infrastructure. In later operations, T2C2 will extend the 

Army’s network to the tactical edge by enabling command post/forward operating base communications. 

Once the airfield is secured, giant C-130 and C-17 

aircraft scream in to deliver larger equipment so the 

unit can set up the Army’s mobile tactical WIN-T 

network. This high capacity satellite and line-of-sight 

network provides advanced mission command, voice, 

video and data capability, both at the halt in a command post, and on the move in network-equipped 

vehicles. As the supply planes fly in, the unit builds 

up the network with WIN-T as well as Joint Capabilities Release/Blue Force Tracking 2 capability, 

enabling situational awareness of friendly forces and 

digital command and control down to the platoon 

and squad levels. These two capabilities complement 

one another across the Brigade Combat Team (BCT); 

even though some echelons may not be connected to 

the WIN-T network, having both capabilities enables 

the entire BCT to stay connected and operationally informed. Additionally, the Army will soon be 

fielding Wi-Fi capability to improve command post 

agility during maneuver, cutting command post 

set up and tear down times from hours to minutes 

and reducing interruption of situational awareness.

The GRF represents “the tip of the spear,” our first 

national large-scale combat ready BCT. The U.S. 

Joint Forces, the Department of Defense and the 

Army Staff are continually working to ensure this 

force presents the most lethal, trained, and equipped 

unit possible, whether they are supporting combat or 

The Army will use two sizes of the inflatable satellite antenna for the 

Low Rate Initial Production of Transportable Tactical Command 

Communications (T2C2) Lite (v1) and T2C2 Heavy (v2). During 

Joint Forcible Entry operations at Network Integration Evaluation 16.1 

in October 2015, the 82nd Airborne Division successfully utilized the 

capability to provide early entry network communications during the 

mission. (Photo by Jett Loe, Sun-News) 

Because the T2C2 solution is inflatable, it can provide a larger dish size 

with increased capability and bandwidth efficiency in a smaller package. 

The Army will use two sizes of the inflatable satellite antenna for the Low 

Rate Initial Production of Transportable Tactical Command Communications (T2C2) Lite (v1) and T2C2 Heavy (v2). 

(U.S. Army photo) 
— 19 —

humanitarian operations. Joint forces are constantly 

evaluating, testing, training and evolving the GRF. 

The Army frequently conducts analysis to ensure 

the latest and best Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy 

(DOTMLPF-P) is employed as the GRF prepares 

to meet, engage and destroy our nation’s enemies.

“If You Know the Enemy and Know 

Yourself, You Need Not Fear the 

Result of a Hundred Battles”

In “The Art of War” Sun Tzu writes, “If you know 

the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 

result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself 

but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will 

also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy 

nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” In 

essence, information is power and overmatch. U.S. 

forces require the most advanced mission command, communications and situational awareness 

possible as we meet with and engage our nation’s 

enemies. Programs like EMC, T2C2, the Rifleman 

and Leader Radio will provide these new and emerging expeditionary network technologies. As the tip 

of the spear combat force, it is imperative the GRF 

know itself, its mission and the enemy that it faces 

head-on in battle. Today’s mission command network technologies are helping to provide that view.

__________________________________

Lt. Col. James Howell is an acquisition officer assigned to the Pentagon as a DASC for Defensive Cyber 

and the Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit Program. 

Previously, he served as the DASC for the Warfighter 

Information Network – Tactical Increment 1. He also 

served with the 82nd Signal Battalion, with the Red 

Devils, the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd 

Airborne Division, supporting numerous GRF exercises 

and real-world missions in Baghdad and Tikrit, Iraq.

Lt. Col. Mark Henderson, product manager for Warfighter Information 

Network - Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 1, works with his EMC2 Team 

onboard a C-17 aircraft in flight during a Joint Forcible Entry exercise in 

December 2015. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Lisa Beum, 1st BCT, 82nd 

ABN DIV, PAO)

EMC2 provides inflight network communications and mission command to increase the situational awareness of the Global Response Force. 

In this photo, a Soldier prepares for an EMC2 demonstration on May 

14, 2015, at Pope Army Airfield, Fort Bragg, N.C. (U.S. Army photo by 

Amy Walker, PEO C3T)
— 20 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Innovation

WINNER

Culture: The Foundation of Innovation

By Maj. Andrew Miller

PEO Soldier

The story of Uber versus the Taxi 

Cab Commissions is a modern 

parable that teaches the universal 

truth of innovation. The powerful 

and proud taxi companies are 

offered the opportunity to embrace technology and 

lead their industry into the digital age. However, they 

are willfully blind to the inevitable and scoff at the 

thought of deviating from the status quo. Meanwhile, 

the meek but agile upstart, Uber, sees the writing on 

the wall. Using commonly available technology, Uber 

positions themselves to take advantage of the proliferation of smart phones. As a result, Uber rendered 

the taxis’ business model obsolete. Even now, in the 

ruins of their ivory tower, the taxis refuse to see the 

faults in their system. Instead of altering their model 

to take advantage of technology, they work to shoehorn digital capabilities into their existing structure. 

The Army Acquisition Community is the Taxi Cab 

Commissions and we must learn from this parable. We lust for innovation, but when a technological opportunity emerges, we put the onus on it 

to conform to our rigid structure. The predictable 

result is a poor track record of effective technological integration. As a community, if we do not take 

steps to address our addiction to the status quo, we 

will be dethroned by our more agile enemies. 

The Army Acquisition Community knows it needs 

to innovate. Pick up a professional journal or listen 

to a senior leader panel and you are bombarded with 

the concept. Unfortunately, this strategic emphasis 

on innovation is doing little to improve our ability 

to leverage emerging technology. One of the major factors in why this initiative does not live up to 

expectations is how we define innovation itself. In 

most discussions, we either gloss over the specifics of 

innovation or equivocate it with technology. These 

two narrow views ignore innovation’s most important factor: organizational culture. We need to shift 

focus away from chasing the elusive technological 

home runs and instead focus on building innovative cultures within our organizations. When we do 

this, the roadblocks to innovation will dissolve and 

technological integration will take care of itself. 

The two main aspects of innovation, culture and 

technology, are sequentially related. A culture that 

encourages innovation is a critical prerequisite to 

successful technological innovation. This cultural 

factor is why organizations that cling to status quo 

reject even the most revolutionary technologies; it 

is also why organizations with cultures that enable 

innovation tend to seek out new opportunities and 

continuously evolve to take advantage of them. 

Unfortunately, a culture of innovation is not easy to 

create and takes deliberate effort to maintain. Effective 

innovation requires organizations to manage the tug 

of war between the comfort of the status quo and the 

uncertainty of constantly changing environments. It 

is a daily grind that requires risk, trust, openness and 

hard work. Nevertheless, it is a grind that pays off 

for the warfighter. Organizations that do not fend 

off the encroachment of the status quo eventually get 

consumed by it. In the Army acquisition world, this 

status quo can take many forms, but it often looks 

like creeping bureaucracy and aversion to risk.

The fact that the status quo of bureaucracy stifles innovation is not news to acquisition professionals. Most of 

us can point to instances where the process trumped 

common sense, obstructed collaboration, or caused 

us to accept a materiel solution that short-changed 

Soldiers. Our failure comes when we feel powerless 

to affect change and, therefore, offer minimal defense. 

Like a castle under siege, we pull up our gates and 

protect the area we control. Regrettably, this tactic 

never works. Given enough time, the invader erodes 

defenses and storms the castle. When this happens 

in the acquisition world, we accept the limitations 

of the system and give up on trying to innovate. 

The good news is that yielding to the status quo is 

not inevitable. Instead of waiting to be consumed, we 

can go on the offense and take back the acquisition 

system. Through deliberate action, we can implement 

a culture that allows us to experiment with emerging 

technology, confront problems and continually modify 
— 21 —

our organizations. Once this cultural foundation is in 

place, product-focused innovations will come naturally. 

There is no golden path to an innovative culture. 

However, there are four key actions, which, if coordinated, generally lead to success. Those actions are: 

empower, vigorously evaluate assumptions, prioritize product over process, and ADVOCATE!

Empower

The single most important action in building an 

innovative culture is empowerment. Empowerment is 

inherent in the other actions because subordinates that 

are given a vision, clear boundaries, and the authority 

to operate will take care of everything else. All too often, we as leaders focus on being personally innovative, 

when, instead, we should focus on how we can better 

empower our subordinates to innovate. The Army 

realized this and introduced the concept of mission 

command. Put simply, mission command is about 

empowering. It stresses clear objectives, latitude to operate and accepting prudent risk. Mission Command 

was written with tactical leaders in mind. However, 

its principles are universal and apply in the program 

offices as well as the front line. It is amazing what subordinates can accomplish when they are empowered to 

influence the organizations’ direction, know that risk 

taking is encouraged and trust that failure is permitted. 

Vigorously Evaluate Assumptions 

Evaluating assumptions can be one of the most 

difficult aspects of building an innovative culture. 

Because environments are constantly changing, this 

technique often directs organizations away from 

the perceived safety of the status quo. Innovation 

is built on identifying emerging trends and having 

the flexibility to adapt to them. Critically analyzing the status quo to identify these opportunities 

introduces risk and generates additional work. Despite this, it is a vital component of innovation. 

When we look at options, we are quick to point to 

the risk associated with a new endeavor. However, 

we often overlook the risk of maintaining the status 

quo. We can avoid the fate of the Taxi Cab Commissions by deliberately and continually evaluating 

our environment to look for emerging trends or 

changing requirements. Success comes to those who 

can identify the inevitable and re-shape their organization to take advantage of the new opportunities. 

Another aspect of evaluating assumptions is called 

“Don’t build on bad.” Very rarely is Army equipment 

built from scratch. Almost every everything has 

to interface with another product, is governed by 

MIL-STDs, or contains decades of “this is how we 

have always done it” baggage. While in most cases 

these standards and interfaces are absolutely necessary, 

over time they become obsolete and hinder innovation. 

The key to removing these constraints is to never accept 

them at face value. Always question their relevance and, 

when they no longer make sense, work to change them. 

Prioritize Product Over Process

The Army is the biggest bureaucracy in the Department 

of Defense, which is the biggest bureaucracy in the 

federal government, which is the biggest bureaucracy 

in the world. Put more simply, we have a lot of rules. 

These rules and processes help provide consistency and 

reduce risk. However, they also smother innovation. 

Our process-dominated culture shifts the overall focus 

away from product success in favor of intermediate 

process wins. We treat the process as a conveyor belt. 

Once it is started, you cannot slow down or step off: 

to do so is failure. This “forward at all costs” mentality 

drives us to a myopic view whose horizon is the next 

hurdle. Once milestones become our sole metrics, we 

define success, not by the whole of our product, but 

by its individual block checks. Our culture makes 

it so that any baseline deviation equates to failure. 

Our culture also de-incentivizes us from confronting 

difficult issues. If our goal was truly to produce the 

best equipment possible, we would address issues 

head on. However, we tend to sidestep difficult issues 

because we are worried that they will affect our march 

to “Milestone C.” This is how products that are no 

longer relevant, or that only partially meet the needs 

of the warfighter, end up in the field. With our current 

culture, it is no wonder we struggle to innovate. The 

unrelenting drive forward prevents us from incorporating overlooked opportunities, addressing incorrect 

assumptions, or adapting to evolving environments.

As a community, we need to fight back against the 

culture that prioritizes short term process. We have 

to stop viewing the acquisition system as a one way 

street with a clear road map from product initiation 

to sustainment. In the real world, things ebb and 
— 22 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

flow and not all opportunities pan out. We must 

empower our project managers and encourage them 

to experiment without risking the stigma of failure. 

As leaders, we need to have the courage to address 

issues, even in the face of personal risk, and we must 

reward subordinates who are willing to do the same. 

Advocate

Of all the actions required to implement an innovative 

culture, advocating should be the easiest. You simply 

identify something that does not make sense and you 

work to change it. The challenge lies in building the 

persistence and passion to continue when the status 

quo seems insurmountable. At the end of the day, the 

motivation is simple. You should never accept anything 

but the best for our Soldiers. There are many short 

term reasons that we compromise on aspects of a materiel solution. However, at the end of the day, a short 

term compromise that doesn’t get worked out becomes 

a long term inefficiency. It is up to us to push these 

issues past the programmatics and politics of the day.

Conclusion

Our acquisition system needs improvement, but it 

is not broken. As long as the workforce consists of 

hard working and passionate professionals, we have 

the tools to succeed. Taken as a whole, the acquisition system seems massive and impervious to change. 

However, this is not the case. The acquisition system 

is not a tightly controlled autocracy. Instead, it is a 

mesh network made up of hundreds of individual 

organizations and thousands of departments within 

those organizations. Each one of these elements is 

staffed and led by individuals who possess a degree 

of control and influence. Every person in the workforce has the power to shape the culture to be more 

innovative. As a whole, if we focus on the cultural 

foundational of innovation and not the technological end state, we can break free from the grip of the 

status quo and ensure that we deliver equipment 

that exceeds the operational force’s expectations. 

__________________________________

Maj. Andrew Miller, a basic branch infantry officer, is the 

Nett Warrior Fielding and Training assistant product manager in Project Manager Soldier Warrior within PEO Soldier.

HONORABLE MENTION

Inspiring Innovation by Changing 

My Vantage Point on the Battlefield

By Lt. Col. Rachael Hoagland

Training with Industry 

fellow at Amazon.com

Changing one’s vantage point 

on the battlefield can give one a 

competitive advantage over the 

adversary by providing a unique 

view on how the enemy is organized, what weapon 

systems they are using, and what decisions they might 

make. As an active duty Army Acquisition Officer 

working at Amazon.com in the Training with Industry (TWI) program for the year, I am changing my 

vantage point on the battlefield. I am stepping outside of my comfort zone, putting on civilian clothes, 

and showing up to an Amazon Web Services office 

in downtown Seattle. This experience is helping me 

gain a competitive advantage on how to stimulate 

innovation for the future of the Army. In changing my 

vantage point I am learning new ways to inspire future 

acquisition teams by studying how Amazon organizes 

project teams, what systems and technologies Amazonians use to execute programs and products, as well as 

learning about the decision making processes they use. 

After a short two months of observation, I see Amazon 

as a matrix organization. Teams are intentionally kept 

small, forcing project managers and team members to 

work across teams to complete the mission. At first, I 

was shocked to see such a large company be successful with small matrixed teams and I struggled to get 

my head around how they make it work. It did not 

take long to notice that there was a common theme 

among the teams; a set of core values. Much like the 

seven Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless 

service, honor, integrity, and personal courage, Amazon has its own set of values or leadership principles. 

Amazon has 14 leadership principles: customer obsession, ownership, bias for action, invent and simplify, 

learn and be curious, earn trust, frugality, think big, 

dive deep, have backbone, disagree and commit, are 

right a lot, hire and develop the best, insist on highest 

standards, and deliver results. These 14 leadership 
— 23 —

principles are the thread that ties all the small teams 

together and gives each the ability to make quick 

changes to support the company’s rapid growth. 

Amazon uses a mixture of typical technologies, such as 

Microsoft Office, along with proprietary tools to support their teams. The tools themselves are useful and 

certainly support the teams’ needs, although they are 

not as impressive as the guidance for how to use them 

within the Amazon environment. For example, access 

to Amazon’s internal network means world class training at your fingertips. Amazon Broadcast has thousands 

of prerecorded brown bags, learning series, leadership 

courses, tech talks, and so on. They also have an internal training console, similar to Defense Acquisition 

University, but covering a much wider set of topics. 

All training is tailored to the “Amazon way,” teaching 

business and leadership consistent with the company’s 

vision. There are also opportunities to attend lectures, 

brown bag meetings, and discussion panels in person. 

I attended ProdCon, which was a full day of lectures 

and panel discussions on project management. A 

few of the topics covered were: Types of Product 

Management at Amazon; The Journey of a Feature: 

From Idea to Roadmap to Release; Best Practices in 

Internationalization; Agile at Amazon – How Do 

You Scrum; Matrix Leadership & Influencing without Authority; Working with Tech Teams; Deliver 

Results – Measuring How Your Product is Doing; 

and Writing Good Requirement Documents. As 

an Army project manager I found listening to VPs 

and directors talk about how they conduct business 

extremely informative and perspective broadening. 

I would love to see the Army adopt something similar where we replace Amazon VPs with leaders from 

each program executive office (PEO) covering similar topics. This would not be a particularly difficult 

stretch, as there are plenty of business practices at 

Amazon that already closely parallel Army Practices. 

For example, the concept of working backwards. 

Working backwards is the decision making process 

Amazon uses when deciding to launch a new product 

or feature, and is very similar to the Army’s concept 

of backwards planning, with one big difference; no 

PowerPoint. Amazon has all but forbidden PowerPoint 

because of its spare approach; they have replaced it 

with detailed press releases, often 10 or more pages 

long. When starting the working backwards process, 

you start with writing a 6 to 10 page press release. In 

keeping with the working backwards process, the 

composing of a 6 to 10 page press release comes 

first. The initial press release is meant to simulate an 

actual launch where you are informing the public of 

a new product. Amazon believes strongly that spending the time writing such detailed releases will help 

determine if the product is worth the investment. 

Amazon’s project management style is best described as 

agile. This style saves time by giving teams the ability 

to make decisions in the moment, because they do not 

have to get approval from management. This lack of 

management control also allows teams to shift project 

focus, and priorities as needed. For an outsider used 

to a hierarchal organization, Amazon’s agile style at 

first appeared chaotic. With everyone empowered to 

make decisions, shift project focus, and shift priorities, figuring out how anything got done or how 

risks were managed was difficult at best. After much 

confusion, I sat back and let my Amazon training 

and the leadership principle sink in, and suddenly 

the chaos turned into deliberate, organized chaos and 

everything began to makes sense. To move fast you 

must empower your people to make decisions; to 

ensure they make the right decisions you need to put 

in place a set of core values that everyone internalizes, 

and reinforce those values in all your training so the 

right decision at the right time becomes the norm.

__________________________________

Lt. Col. Rachael Hoagland is currently a TWI fellow at 

Amazon.com. She has held assistant project management jobs 

in U.S. Special Operations Command and Project Manager Tactical Radios within PEO Command, Control and 

Communications – Tactical. Prior to entering the Acquisition 

Corps, she taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West 

Point and held several roles as a military intelligence officer.
— 24 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Lessons Learned

WINNER

Robots and Deal Makers: Lessons 

Learned from an Acquisition Officer Serving as a Legislative Liaison

Lt. Col. Patrick “Josh” Baker

Training with Industry (TWI) 

fellow at General Dynamics Corp.

Life in the Acquisition Corps 

offers opportunities for exposure 

to countless processes, institutions and most importantly, 

people. Having the opportunity to serve as one of 

only two Acquisition officers in the Office of the Chief 

for Legislative Liaison, I observed how the people 

and the personalities in our Army Acquisition Corps 

can either hinder or help programs on Capitol Hill. I 

have seen firsthand a behavioral phenomenon of the 

individuals that are sent to the Hill. The behaviors 

are bimodal and distinct and fall into two categories 

when engaging Congress: Robot or Deal Maker. 

We all know that “toeing” the Army party line of 

directives and initiatives is how we conduct business. Deviating from the Army plan is dangerous in 

many ways, both with potential legislative impacts 

and internal threat to career progression. Army 

directives, initiatives and protocol are established to 

avoid potential legislative impacts and outline the 

parameters for success within your program and 

career. However, I argue that there are creative ways 

to stay within the confines of Army intent and garner Congressional “buy in” without taking a binary 

robotic approach when delivering the Army’s message. 

The Robots

We can’t deny that there are some dry, awkward personalities in the Army and that’s ok. Everyone brings a 

skill set to the team. Unfortunately, these types typically do not bode well and are usually not well received 

since many on the Hill do not have military experience. 

They are civilians that operate in a civilian based discourse community. They are intellectuals. In fact, I encourage you to research the average education levels of 

Hill staffers. You will find a highly educated work force.

So why does this matter, and what’s the deal with 

the robots? Well, you can’t send a robot that is programmed with one line of binary responses to convey 

and discuss complex issues. You know, sort of like 

the old TV show “Lost in Space”...Danger Will 

Robinson!!!...Danger!!!...THIS IS THE ARMY 

PLAN!! Believe it or not, we as an Army do that 

regularly on the Hill. All too often, I witnessed Army 

Staff officers brief rooms full of twenty something 

millennials on Army programs with PowerPoint 

slides, a million acronyms and little ability or desire 

to discuss dynamics outside of “the Army plan” in 

a relatable fashion. They were preprogrammed with 

one robotic response: it’s the Army plan, or nothing. 

Dialogue matters and nothing aggravates the Hill 

more than an Army representative that can’t provide 

feedback in an informative and digestible format. The 

Hill understands we have to “carry the Army message” but they need to know if there are options. The 

Hill is balancing strategic security requirements, fiscal 

limitations, partisan politics and constituent based 

implications. Their “planning calculus” doesn’t match 

ours. So how do you avoid becoming a robot? (Although I’m sure some of our friends in the engineering 

community would love to become a cyborg...but 

that’s another story). Below are some simple recommendations to avoid the aforementioned pit falls.

1. Break the issue down in to simple, digestible bites 

that a civilian off the street would understand. 

Take the time to learn the background of who 

you are going to brief. The Legislative Liaison 

should arm you with this information. It will 

help you gauge how much you can turn up the 

“military mumbo jumbo” rheostat during your 

engagement. If a Member or Staff has previous 

military experience you can use more shop talk. 

Otherwise, throttle down the “Pentagonese.” 

2. Keep it clean, concise and to the point, especially 

with members of Congress. Their time is limited 

and your program or issue is one of many they 

will manage in a day’s work. Leave them with 

something they will understand and remember. 

After all, their follow-on meeting could be with 

the American Chestnut Foundation. (Yes, that 
— 25 —

does exist, and yes, I had to sit in a briefing from 

them.) The point is they hear from a wide range 

of groups in a daily period and you are just one.

3. “This is the Army’s plan and this is what we 

are going to do” will get you NOWHERE 

on the Hill. As a matter of fact it will more 

than likely blow up in your face. A better approach is to say “here is the plan the Army is 

considering implementing based off of X, Y, 

and Z.” Honestly helping them understand 

the rationale of the Army plan will resonate.

4. Remove “Hooah” from your lexicon. Remember, 

the Hill cares about strategic capability at the 

end of the day. False motivation doesn’t work.

5. Dump your ego and rank in the Potomac when 

heading to the Hill. Folks on the Hill are highly 

respectful to Military officials and DoD representatives. Never lose sight of the fact that we 

answer to them. Trying to leverage your rank, 

position or authority is never a good move.

6. Do not brief off of PowerPoint slides. You 

can leave a briefing packet with them 

but do your best to have a normal conversation during the engagement. 

7. Realize that many staff, especially Defense 

Committee Professional Staff Members, have 

longevity on programs. They track programs 

over time and know all of the historical issues. 

Be prepared and be aware of their intimacy with 

programs by avoiding prescriptive briefings 

that could insult their expertise on the issue. 

8. They actually want to help. You’d be surprised how 

energized Member offices and Defense Committees are at helping the Services. Know your “ask” 

before walking in the door and be confident in 

delivery. Failure to ask is failure to prepare. Also, 

inform professional staff members of critical 

program issues early. Bad news definitely does not 

get better with time when Congress is concerned.

9. Do not be afraid to provide “your opinion” on 

potential impacts to the program if asked. Remember, they know you support the Army plan 

but they desire to understand issues holistically.

10. Strive to conduct informal engagements on 

the Hill- i.e., have lunch or coffee with the 

Staff Member if able. Relationships are paramount on Capitol Hill. The most insightful 

engagements I witnessed occurred during meals. 

OCLL or SAFM-BUL will pick up the tab!

11. Remain politically agnostic and professional. 

Defense issues historically receive non-partisan 

support. That is the reason why the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has 

been enacted into law for over 50 years.

12. Don’t take it personally. The Hill will disagree on 

issues and programs regardless of how fantastic 

the plan or substantiation. A personal friend on 

the Hill stated “the truth don’t matter much up 

here.” A true statement in itself. Members will 

tell you in person that they absolutely agree on 

the tenets of your plan but ultimately vote/mark 

against it for political reasons. One of the biggest challenges I experienced with Army briefers 

was that they became emotionally compromised 

when the Hill didn’t support their program. 

The Deal Makers

The goal is to be a “Deal Maker.” One that is respected, well received, and that will be welcomed back 

in the future. Members of Congress like to broker 

deals and to never be backed into a corner. Guess 

what, your experience as an acquisition professional 

has equipped you well in this domain. You understand trade space and negotiations. You operate in 

a civilian environment and you’re not intimidated 

by intellectuals. Some of the best engagements over 

controversial issues were executed by acquisition 

professionals that found ways to work with Congress. 

The “Deal Makers” listen to the questions, which are 

often leading, issues and concerns of Member offices and find ways to execute strategies that will keep 

the Hill satisfied. It sounds dirty, but it is reality. 

I can’t stress enough the importance of really listening 

to the questions the Hill is asking. It doesn’t take a 

DAWIA Level III certified acquisition ninja to ascertain the Hill’s intent on a program by the context of a 

question. For instance, this notion transpired early in 

the Army’s sales pitch of the “Aviation Restructuring 

Initiative.” Key Member Offices and Staff were asking 
— 26 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

“what if the Army doesn’t get what it wants” with the 

plan. Robots were slamming their fists on tables saying 

“this is the Army’s plan, and this is what we are going 

to do.” Whereas an Acquisition Corps deal maker 

listened to the question and altered a contracting 

strategy to prepare for the Army’s plan not executing 

as originally designed. The Army ended up changing 

its baseline plan following the Commission on the 

Future of the Army that was mandated by Congress. 

The point is to leverage the interpersonal and dynamic 

abilities you already have as an acquisition professional 

when you approach the Hill. You can negotiate, you 

understand trade space, and you know how to work 

within a complex world of “nay sayers” and unobjective robots. With that, here are a few pointers on 

leveraging your acquisition ninja skills on the hill.

1. Develop and sustain relationships with key 

Member and Defense committee staff offices. 

Relationships lead to mutual trust and confidence. NEVER, NEVER, NEVER compromise 

someone’s trust by leaking privy information. 

All it takes is for you to burn one relationship to destroy your reputation on the Hill.

2. Never feel like you have to know everything 

about your program. The Hill understands that 

program management is not an easy gig. If you 

don’t know the answer to a question, admit it and 

say you’ll get back with them. Take your subject 

matter expert with you to help field questions. 

That doesn’t necessarily mean the second in 

command of your organization. I’ve seen where 

mid-grade captains and NCOs have provided 

the best feedback during Hill engagements. 

3. Showcase your programs. Encourage and actively 

support Congressional visits to your Primes and 

PEOs. Congressional travel is an exceptional 

opportunity to foster relationships as well as 

showcase your program in a “captured” environment. All too often organizations dread Congressional visits. They do require a tremendous 

amount of work but they can pay off tenfold. Oh, 

and please limit the “death by PowerPoint” when 

they visit. They enjoy show and tell, meeting 

with Soldiers and the incredible teams you have 

working programs. Make a human connection.

4. Team with your Prime. After all, nearly all Prime 

Defense Contractors have a lobbying arm. They 

have unbelievable access to Members and Member offices. If your message matches theirs your 

case is hard to beat. Conversely, it’s never a good 

situation if the Hill receives mixed messages. 

That includes mixed messages from within the 

Pentagon and between a PM and their Prime.

5. Take the time to understand their point of view 

and acknowledge it! All too often Members and 

Staff discuss their concerns or point of view in 

meetings and Army briefers fail to acknowledge 

their understanding of the differing point of view. 

It’s common courtesy and helps in the teaming 

process to take their position in consideration. 

After all, their position could/will more than 

likely be imposed on your program regardless.

I encourage you to take pride in the education, skill 

sets and interpersonal experiences the Acquisition 

Corps has instilled in you to position you for success on the Hill. Those strong suits are footing to 

ensure you are a “deal maker” on the Hill. Interacting with the Hill can appear to be an intimidating 

and mysterious venture. With adequate education 

and preparation you will find that it is no different 

than operating within the acquisition process.

I’m Lt. Col. Josh Baker and I approve this message.

__________________________________

Lt. Col. Patrick “Josh” Baker is an Army Acquisition Corps member, and is Level III certified in 

program management. He holds an MBA in systems 

acquisition management from the Naval Postgraduate 

School. He served for more than two years as the Army 

Aviation Programs legislative liaison and is currently 

serving as a TWI fellow at General Dynamics Corp.
— 27 —

HONORABLE MENTION

A BIT* of Advice 

*Built-In Test 

By Lt. Col. Steven G. Van Riper 

Special Operations Forces 

Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (SOF AT&L)

Contributing authors: Mr. 

Jim Griffin, SOF AT&L, and 

Mr. Eugene Buckner, Program Executive Office Rotary Wing (PEO-RW). 

“SYSTEM FAIL message on the primary display, running Initiated Built-In Test (IBIT) to fault isolate”

About one minute later, “IBIT complete, no faults.” 

“OK, check the data log.”

“Three faults noted, do you want me to perform a re-boot?”

“OK, so the operational BIT flags at least three faults, 

IBIT does not detect the same faults, but we expect a 

reboot to result in a fully useable system, these BIT 

inconsistencies really reduce my confidence...”

Similar dialogue occurred in the final weeks prior of 

completion to qualification testing of an ACAT II 

system. Was the BIT logic not working right (in this 

case there were over 6,000 discrete and interdependent 

BIT checks)? Was there a bona fide hardware fault? Or 

was there a false positive attributable to an incorrect 

BIT threshold or persistence level? Concern continued to mount until testing was suspended to allow 

Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) to ensure the 

Combined Test Team, the Engineering Team, and the 

Program Management Office understood risks associated with these and other anomalous BIT indications.

Although entire books have been written to examine 

BIT technology, implementation, and interpretation, 

we will focus on three primary lessons that can be 

learned based on the BIT experiences of an ACAT II 

USSOCOM program management team: 1) Walk 

through the BIT requirement with the end-user 

and differentiate between informational or actionable BIT, 2) Activate BIT functionality as early as 

possible, and, 3) Build in BIT customization.

Differentiate Between Informational 

and Actionable BIT

Soldier: “BIT says we just had a short spike 

above 65% processor utilization.”

Team Leader: “I don’t know what that really means, stay focused on the mission.” 

OR

Soldier: “BIT indicates constant processor loading above 80%.” 

Team Leader: “Got it, monitor system temperature and check to see if we have any unnecessary apps running in the background.”

Let’s start with one of the most used acquisition 

clichés: “It all starts with a requirement - preferably a 

validated requirement.” What is the BIT requirement 

for your program? Is it written with great precision 

or does it allow for interpretation? Regardless of 

specificity or ambiguity, analysis of the requirement must include determination of Informational 

or Actionable BIT. As illustrated in the dialogue 

above, acknowledging a user focused actionable 

BIT differs greatly from response to trivial data.

System complexity, mission assurance criteria, and 

safety requirements drive BIT integration and implementation. BIT must be considered during all 

phases of development and checked through Integrated Product/Process Team and Working Groups 

that include the end user. Maintainers and logisticians must also be included to ensure the BIT is 

properly nested in the sustainment strategy. Primary 

considerations in this area should include levels of 

maintenance (unit, depot, etc.), isolation levels, and 

required test equipment to support BIT analysis.

Engineers, Testers, and Users! Oh My!

Do engineers, testers, and users have different BIT 

expectations? YES. Does a user care if inter-processor messaging is delayed by one nanosecond with no 

observable effect on system performance? No, but 

an engineer will take note of it when optimizing 

message handling protocol. Does a user care if embedded guidance figures of merit fluctuate during 

travel over rough terrain? No, but a tester will record 
— 28 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

it in the Position, Navigation, and Timing section of 

a DT or QT report. Data from these events should 

be logged but should not be elevated to a fault status 

unless they result in degraded system performance. 

Simply put, in the vast majority of systems, users 

can’t re-code software or perform hardware optimization but they can change Line Repairable Units 

or downloaded Health and Usage Monitoring data 

and run diagnostics. You must make every effort 

to ensure the BIT allows the user to complete relevant tasks and maximize system utilization.

Activate BIT Functionality Early and Test

“That BIT output does not make sense given the 

Fault Isolation Procedure we just used, we need 

to call the Field Service Representative...”

After the program management team has carefully analyzed your BIT requirements and delineated 

between informational and actionable BIT, work 

with your user to activate BIT functionality as early 

as possible and allocate resources for testing. The 

opposite of this approach is what is commonly referred to as ‘masking.’ This masking isolates BIT 

functions, not allowing the algorithms to interact 

with the mission or operational code in a system. 

The ACAT II that is the basis for this article used this 

masking technique due to cost, schedule, and performance pressure. As might be expected, when the BIT 

was unmasked the system became unusable. Dozens 

of faults were present as soon as the system initialized. 

The program was forced to suspend developmental testing, conduct lengthy technical interchange 

meetings, deploy multiple software version revisions, 

and absorb significant schedule revisions. Even now, 

over 24 months after the BIT was unmasked, BIT 

effectiveness and reliability are still being refined.

It is likely that at the same time you are preparing 

to evaluate prototype systems, your logistics team is 

working to develop training material for maintainers that include Fault Isolation Procedures (FIPs). 

Full activation of BIT will allow verification and 

validation of the training materials and FIPs while 

allowing the program management team to assess if 

your BIT implementation matches the maintenance 

and sustainment strategy. If your BIT algorithm 

includes an embedded maintenance system, treat this 

as an integrated function so it is not inadvertently 

excluded from testing, verification, and validation. 

In other words, enable BIT as soon as possible to 

reveal persistence and threshold issues, allow users 

to ‘wring-out’ performance, and allow maintainers time to become familiar with FIPs associated 

with the BIT. Do not be seduced by claims that 

masking BIT operation is a low risk action that 

will allow you to better assess system behavior. An 

effective and reliable BIT is an integral part of the 

system’s performance that cannot be overlooked.

Build in BIT Customization

“I have used this system on two deployments and know 

that fault does not affect system performance...”

Will your system mature quickly (e.g., frequent direct 

interaction with the user, an aircraft flight control 

system, or a logistics management program) or will 

it age slowly (e.g., a passive guidance system used 

only if the tactical situation prevents use of active 

guidance system)? Will the BIT algorithms, persistence levels, and threshold values ever change? 

Is your software architecture reliant on monolithic 

or modular code? Do your software and hardware 

partitions allow for scalability? Your answers to these 

questions will inform your BIT customization strategy. 

One can imagine the scenario surrounding the quote 

at the beginning of this section. An experienced user 

knows what the system is supposed to do, how it works, 

and most importantly, when something is wrong. This 

user has gained system familiarity though tried and 

true ‘blue-collar’ learning. He or she did not need to 

study use case optimization or Failure Modes, Effects, 

or Criticality Analysis charts. This is the user you, your 

engineers, and your logisticians want to meet to hear 

an unfiltered assessment of system performance. 

The question then becomes: Can the program management office help the user? Pre-Planned Product 

Improvements (P3I) or well defined technology roadmaps are of little use if the hardware and software don’t 

include provisions allowing for changes to compensate 

for user habits and system maturation. BIT customization can address both of these areas and can pay a very 

healthy return on investment for your stakeholders.

What about cost? All of this sounds expensive and in 
— 29 —

most cases it is. Certainly Program Managers have 

to carefully balance what occurs during P3I activities to control cost. Division of funding for either 

BIT customization (or improvement) or a shiny new 

‘something’ requires due diligence. One technique is 

early allocation of a percent of your total budget to 

cover developmental non-recurring engineering efforts 

focused on BIT customization. Include BIT maintenance in as part of your customization. Maintenance 

may include removal of unneeded BIT or scaling 

existing BIT to compensate for user familiarity and/

or system maturation. Take into low level system 

architecture and hardware and software performance 

improvements when planning your effort. Does 

your system’s BIT work the way you advertised? Be 

careful - any ‘lift’ your program will experience by 

integrating the latest gadget in your system may be 

overshadowed by the negative consequences surrounding degraded usability or waning user support. 

Summary

Developing, implementing, and maintaining BIT can quickly snowball and become 

the pacing tasks for your program.

• Proactively manage BIT efforts by understanding user requirements, system 

behavior, and opportunities to customize BIT based on system maturation.

• Carefully consider the requests of engineers and testers who will be using the system for a few years against users who may 

be ‘married’ to the system for decades.

• Ensure your BIT is nested in the overall sustainment strategy, enabling quick fault isolation.

Suitable and effective BIT is essential, enabling 

users to employ systems to their full potential.

__________________________________

A BIT* of Advice was compiled by a Special Operations 

Forces acquisition, technology and logistics team responsible 

for the development, testing and fielding of an ACAT II 

joint program: Lt. Col. Steven Van Riper and contributing authors Mr. Jim Griffin and Mr. Eugene Buckner. 

Van Riper is the program director for an ACAT II program 

within SOF AT&L, Griffin is the deputy program director, 

and Buckner is the senior systems engineer within PEO-RW.