1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s HO US E v . BELL, WARDE N
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–8 99 0. Ar g u ed Janu a r y11, 2006—D ec ided Ju ne 12, 200 6 A Tennes s ee j ury conv ict e d pet i t i oner Hous e of Ca rolyn Mun c ey’s mu r deran d sen t en c e d h i m to death

. Th e State’s c a se in c l u d ed ev iden c e th at FBI tes t i n gsh ow ingsemenc o n s iste nt (or so it seemed) with Hous e’s on Mrs

. Munce y’s c l ot hing a n d sma l l b l oods ta ins cons is t e n t wit hherb l ood b u tnotHous e’s on his j e a n s
. In t h es e nt encingpha s e, t h e j ury found , inter alia, the ag g r av atin gfac t orth atth e mu r d erw a s c o mmitted w h ile Hou s e w a s c o mmittin g , atte mptin gto c o mmit, or fleeing from the commissio nof rape orkidn apin g
. In affir m in g , th e Sta t e Su pr em e Cou r tdesc ribed th e ev iden c eas c i r cumst an tial bu t str o n g . Hou s e w a s den i ed s tate po stc o n v ic tionr e lief. Su bsequ e n t ly , t h e Federa l Dis t rictCourtdenied hab e a s relief, deeming Hous e’s
c l aims pr oc ed u r a llydefau l ted an d g r an tin gth e Stat e su mmar y ju dg men tonmostof h i s c l aims. Ital so fou n d , aftera nev iden tiar y h e ar in gat w h ic hHou s e attac ked th e blood an d semenev iden c ean d pr esen ted oth e rev iden c e , inc l u d in ga pu tativ ec o n f ession , su g g e stin g th at M r . M u nc eyc o mmittedth e c r i me, th at Hou s e did n o t fallw i th in t h e “ a c t u a l innocen c e” exce pt ion t oprocedura l defa ult recog n ized in Schlup v. De lo , 513 U. S. 298, an d Sawyerv. Whitley, 5 05 U. S. 333

. The S i xt h Circ uitult i mat e ly a ffirmed. Held: 1

. Beca us e Hous e ha s ma de t h e s t ringent s h owing req u i r ed b yt h e ac tu al-in n o c e nc e ex c e ption , h i s feder al h abeas ac tion m a ypr oc eed. Pp. 16–3 4. (a) To imple m en t th e g e n e ral pr in c i ple th at “c om ityan d fin a lity ‘mu s t y i eld to th e imper a t iv eof correct ing afunda m ent a l ly unj us tin

ca rcera t i on,’ ” Mur r ayv. Carrie r, 477 U. S. 478, 4 95, t h is Cou r th a s ruled t h a tpris oners a s s e rt ing inno cence a s a ga t e wa y t odefa ult e d
c l aims mu ste s tabli s hth at, i nligh tof n e wev iden c e , “it is mor elikely2 HO USE v. BELL Sy llabu s th ann o t th at n or e ason able ju r o rw o u l d hav efou n dpetition erg u ilty bey o n da r e as on able dou b t.” Schlup, 513 U. S, at 327. Sev e r a l fea

t ures of Schlup ’s stan d a r dbeare m ph as is h e r e
. Fir s t, w h ile th e g atew a yc l aim r e qu ir es “n e wr e liable ev iden c e
. . . n o tpr esen ted a t trial,” id., at 324, th e h abe as c o u r tmu stasse ss th e lik elyimpac to f “ ‘all the evide nce’ ” on r e ason able ju r o r s , id., at 329. Se c o n d , r ath er th anr e qu ir ingabsolu t e c e r tain t yabou t g u ilt orin n o cen c e , a peti

tion er ’s bu r d enat th e g atew a ystag e is to demon s tr at e th at mor e likely t h a nn o t , in lightof t h e new e v i d ence, no rea s onab l e j uror w o u l d fin dh i m g u iltybey o n da r e ason ab le dou bt. Fin a lly , th is stan

dar dis “byn omean s equ iv a len tto th e stan dar dof Jack sonv. Vir

ginia, 443 U. S. 307,” w h i c hg o v e rn s in su ffic i en t ev iden ce c l aims, id., at 33 0. Rath er , bec a u s e a Schlup claim involves ev iden c eth e tr ial jury did not have before it, the inqu iry re quires the federal court to
a s s e s s how rea s onab le j urors would rea c tt ot h e overa ll, newly s u p plemented record. See ibid. Con t r a r yto th e State’s ar g u men t s, th e standard of review in two p r ovisio ns of t h e Ant i t e rroris ma n d Effec

tiv eD e athPen a ltyAc t of 199 6, 28 U. S. C. §§2244(b) (2)(B)(ii) an d 2254(e)(2), is inapplicable h e re. In addition, because the standard does n o t add r ess a “d istr i c t c o u r t ’s in depen d en t ju dg men tas t o w h e th err e ason able dou b t e x ists,” Schlup, supra, at 3 2 9 , a r u lin gin Hous e’s favor does notrequire t h e s h ow ing of clea r er ror a s t ot h e Dis t rictCourt ’s s p ecific findings

. Itis with t h es e principles in min d th at th e ev id en c edev e loped inHo us e’s federa l hab e as proceedings sh ou ld be ev alu ated. Pp. 16–20. (b ) In directcont ra dict ion of evidence pres ent e d at t r ia l, DNA testing has established th at semen onMrs. Muncey’s clothing came fr om h e rh u s ban d, n o t Hou s e. Wh ile th e Sta t e c l ai ms t h at th e ev i

dence is imma t e ria lsince neit her s e xua lcont a c tnor mot ive were elements of the offense at the guilt phase, this Court considers the new dis c los ure of cent ra l import a nce. This ca s eis aboutwho com

mitted th e c r i me, so motiv e is key , an d th e pr osec u t ionat th e g u ilt ph ase r efer r e d to ev iden c e at th e sc en e s u g g e stin gth at Hou s e c o m mitted, or atte mpted to commit, an indignity on Mrs. Munce y. Apart from proving motive, this w a s the only forensic evidenceat the scene t h a twould link Hous e t o t h e murder. Law a n d s o ciet ydema nd a c countability fo r a sexual offe nse, so the evi d ence was also likely a f a c t o r in pers ua ding t h e j u rynott olethim go free. Ats e nt encing,
mor eov er , th e ju r yc o nc lu ded th at th e mu r d erw a s c o m m itted inth e c o u r s e of a r a pe orkidn api n g
. A ju r yac tin gw i th ou t th e as su mption t h a tt h e s e men could have c o me from Hous e would have found itnec essar yto establishsome dif f er en t motiv e , or , if th e same motiv e , an in ten tfarmore spec u l ativ e
. Pp. 20–2 2. (c) The e v iden t i a r y dis a rra ys urrou n ding t h e ot her fore n s i c evi

-3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s den c e , th e bloodsta i n s onHou s e’s pan t s, t a kentog e th erw i thth e tes

timon yof an Assi st an t Ch ief M e dic a l Examin erforth e State of Ten

nessee, would prevent reasonable juro rs from placing significant reli

ance on the blood evidence. Th e medical examiner who testified believ e s th e b l ood onth e jean s mu st h av ec o me fr om th e au topsy samp les. In a ddition , a v i alan d a qu ar te rof au topsyb l ood is u n a c c o u n t ed for ; th e blood w a s tr an spor ted to th e FBI tog e t h erw i thth e pants in conditions that co uld have caused the vials to spill; som e b l ood did s p ill a tlea s tonce duri ng t h e b l ood’s j o urney fr om Tennes

s ee a u t h orit ies t hrough FBI ha nds t o a defens e expert ; t h e pa nts
w e r estor ed i na plasticba gbear in ga la r g e bloodstainan d a labe l fr om a Ten n e ssee Bu r e auof In v e stig ation ag en t; an d th e boxc o n tain

ing the blood samp les may have be en ope n ed before arriving at the FBI l ab. No n eof th is ev i d en c ew a s pr esen ted to th e tr ialju r y
. Whereas the bloodstains se emed stro ng evidence of Ho us e’s guiltat t r ia l, t h e record now ra is es s u b s ta nt ia l ques t i ons ab outt h e b l ood’ s or igin

. Pp. 22–28. (d) In the post-trial proceedi n g s, Hou s e presen ted tr ou bl in gev i

dence t h a tM r . M u n c ey co uld have b e en t h e murder er. Twowit

nes s e s des cribed aconfes sion b y Mr. Mu ncey ; t w o ot hers des crib e d
s u s p icious b e h avior (afight b e t w een t h e couple a n d Mr. Munce y’s a t

t e mptt ocons t ructafa ls e a libi) a r ound t h e t i me of t h e crime; a n d ot hers des crib e d ahis t ory of s p ous a l abus e
. Considered in isola t ion , a r e ason able j u r ymigh t w e l ldisr eg ar d th is ev iden c e , but inc o mbin a tionw i thth e ch allen g es to th e blood ev iden c ean d lac kof motiv ew i th
res p ectt oHou s e, evidencep o int i ng t oM r
. Mun c eylikely would rein

for c eoth e rdou bts as to Hou s e’s g u ilt. Pp. 28– 33. (e) The Assistant Chief Medical Examine rfurther testified that cert a i n inj uries dis c overed on Hous e a f t e r t h e crime likely did notre sult from involvement in the murd er. Cert a i n ot her evidence—Mrs

. Mun c ey’s da u ght er’s recolle ct ion of the night of the murder, and the Dis t rictCourt ’s finding a tt h e hab e a s proceeding t h a tHous e wa s not a c r e dible w i tn ess—mayfav o rth e State. Pp. 33–3 4. (f) While this is not a case o f conclusive e x oneration, and the is

s u e is clos e, this is t h e ra re ca s ewhere—ha dt h e j ury hea r d a ll t h e c o n f lic tin gtes t imon y

—it is mor elikelythann o t th at no r e ason abl e j uror viewin g t h e record a s awhole would la ck rea s onab le doub t

. P. 34.

2

. Hous e ha s nots h own fre e s t a n ding innocence t h a twould render his impris onmenta n d pla nned execut ion uncons t i t u t i ona lunder Herrerav. Col lins, 506 U. S. 39 0, inw h i c hth e Cou r ta s s u med w i th

outdeciding tha t“i n aca pita l ca s e a t ruly pers ua s ive demons t r a t i on of ‘a ct ua l inno cence ’ ma de a f t e r t r ia l would rendert h e ex ecut ion of a defendant unconstitutiona l, and warrant federal habeas relief if there4 HO USE v. BELL Sy llabu s

w e r en ostate av en u eopen to pr oc ess su c ha c l aim,” id., at 41 7. Th e t hres h old s h owing fo r s u ch arightwo uld b eext r a o rdina r ily high , a n d Hou s e h a s n o t satisf ied w h atev e rbu r d en a h y poth etic al fr eestan din g innocen c e cla i m would req u i r e. Heha s ca s tdoub ton his guilts u ffi

c i en t to s ati sf y Schlup ’s ga tewa y s t a n da r dfor ob ta ining federa l re

view, but given the closeness of the Schlup q u es tion here, his s h ow ing falls short of the threshol d implied in Herrera
. Pp. 34–36. 386 F. 3d 66 8, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

K ENNEDY , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which S TEVENS , S OUTER , G IN S B U R G , and B REYER , JJ., joined. R OBERTS , C. J., filed an opinion conc u rring in t h e j u dgmentin pa rta n d dis s e nt ing in pa rt , in which S CALIA an d T HOMAS , JJ., joined. ALITO , J., took n opar tinth e consideration or decision of th e case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt

NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 04–8 99 0
PAUL GR E G ORY HOUSE, P E TI TIONE R v. RICKY BELL, WARDE N
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e12, 2006 ] J USTICE K E NNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. Some 20 years ago in rural Tennessee, Carol y n Munce y was murde r ed. A jur yconvictedpetitioner Paul Grego ry House of th e crime an d sentenced him to dea t h, but ne w revelations cast doubt on the jury’s verdict. House, pro

testing his innocence, seeks access to federal court to pursue habeas corpus relief basedon constitu tional claims that are procedurally barred un der state l a w. Out of respect forthe finality of state-c o urt judgm e nts federal habeas courts, as a ge neral rule, are closed to claims that state court s would consider defaulted. In c e rtain excep

tional cases involving a compellin g claim of actual inno

cence, however, the state procedural default r u le is not a bar to a federal habeas corpus petition. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 31 9–322 (199 5). After careful revi ew of the full record, we conclude that House has made the stringent s h owing req u ired by thi s exception; and we hol d that his federal habeas action may proceed. I We begin with the f a cts surrou n ding Mrs. Muncey’s disappearance, the discovery of her body, and House’s2 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt arrest. Aro und 3 p.m. on Sunday, July 14, 19 85, two loca l residents found her body concealed amid bru s h and tree branches on an emba nkment ro ughly 100 yards up the road from her driveway. Mrs. Muncey had been seen last on the evening before, when, around 8 p.m., she and her two children—Lora Muncey, age 10, and Matthe w Muncey, a g e 8—visit e d their n e ighbor, Pam Lutt rell. Accordin g t o Luttrell, Mrs. Munc ey mentioned her hus

band, Willi am Hubert Muncey, Jr., known in the commu

nity as “Little Hube” and to his f a mily as “ B ubbie.” As Luttrell rec o unted Mrs. Muncey’s comment, Mr. Muncey “had gone to dig a grave, and h e hadn’t co me back, b u t that was a ll right, because [Mrs. Muncey] was going to make him take her fi shing the next day,” App. 11–12

. Mrs. Munc ey returnedhome, and some time later, before 11:00 p.m. at the latest, Lutt rell “heard a carrev its motor as it wentd o wn the roa d ,” something Mr. Muncey custo m arily did when he drove by on his way home. Record, Addendum 4, 5 Tr. of Evidence inNo. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un

ion County, Tenn.) 641–642 (hereinafter Tr.). Luttrell then went t o bed. Around 1 a. m., Lora an d Matthe w returned to Lutt rell’s home, this time with t h eir father, Mr. Munc ey, who said his wife was missing. Muncey asked Luttrell to watchth e children w h ile he searched fo r h i s wife. After he left, Luttrell talked with Lo ra. Accor d ing to Lutt r e ll: “[Lora] saidshe heard a horn blow, she tho u ght she heard a horn blow, and somebody asked if Bubbie was home, and her mama, you know, told them—no. An d then she s a id she did n ’ tk n ow if she went backto sleep or n o t, but then s h e heard he r mama going down the steps crying and I am not sure if that is when she told me that she heard her mama say—oh God, no, not me, or if she told me that th e next day, but I do know that she said she heard her mother goi n g down3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt the steps crying.” App. 14–15. While Lora was tal k ing, Lu t trell recalled, “Matt kep t butting in, you know, on us talki n g, and he said—sister they said daddy hada wreck, they said daddy hada wrec k .” Id. , at 13. At House’s trial, Lor arepeated her accou n t of th e night’s eve n ts, this ti me referring to the “wrec k” her brother had mentioned. To assist i nundersta n ding Lora’s account, it should be n o ted that Mrs. Muncey’s father-in

law—Little Hube’s fa ther—was sometimes called “Big Hube.” Lora and her b r other called him “Pa wPaw.” We refer to him as Mr. Muncey, Sr

. Accor d ing to Lora, Mr

. Muncey, Sr. had a deep voice, as do es petitione rHouse. Lora testified that aft e r leaving Luttrell’s h o use with her mother, she and her brother “ w ent to bed.” Id. , at 18. Later, she heard someone, or perhaps two different people, ask for her mother. Lora’s a ccountof the events after she went to bed was as follows: “Q Laura [sic] , at some poi n t after yougot back ho me and you we nt to bed, di d anything happen tha tcaused your mother to be upset or did you hear anything? “A Well, it s o unded like PawPaw said—wh e re’s daddy at, a n d she said digging a grave. “Q Oka y
. Do you know if it was Pa wPaw orn o t, or did it sound like PawPa w? “A It just sounded like PawPaw. “Q And your m o ther told him what? “A That he wa s digging a grave. “Q Had you ever heard that voice before that sai d that? “A I don’t remember. “Q After that, at some poin t later, did you hear any

thing else that caused your mother to be upset? “A Well, they said that da ddy ha d a wrec kdo wnthe road and she started cr ying—next to the creek.4 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt “Q Your mother started crying. What was it that they said? “A That daddy had a wreck. “Q Did they sa y where? “A Down there next to the creek.” Id. , at 18–19. Lora did n o t describe hearin g a n y stru ggle

. Some ti me later, Lora and her brother leftthe house to l ookfor their mother, but no one a n swered when they k n ock e d at the Luttrells’ h o me, and another neighbor, Mike Clinton, said he had not seen her. After the children returned home, according t o Lora, her father came home and “fixed him a bologna sandwich an d he took a bit of it an d he says

— sissy, where is mommy at, and I said—she ain’t been here for a little while.” Id. , at 20. Lora recalled that Mr. Muncey we nt outside and, not seei ng his wife, returned to take Lora and Matthew to th e Luttrells’ so that he could lookfurther. The next afternoon Billy Ray Hen s ley, the victim’s firs t cousin, hea r d of Mrs. Muncey’s disappearance and went to lookfor Mr. Muncey. As he approached the Munceys’ street, Hen s ley allegedly “sawMr . House co me out fro m under a bank, wiping his hands on a black ra g.” Id. , at 3 2

. Just when and where Hensley sa w House, and how well he could h a ve observed him, w e re disputed at House’s trial. Hensley admitted on cross-examination that he could not h a ve seen House “walking up or climbing up” the embankment, id. , at 39; rather, he saw House, in “[j]ust a glance,” id. , at 40, “appear out of nowhere,” “next to th e embankment,” id. , at 39. On the Munceys’street, opposi te the area where Hensl e y said he saw House, a white Ply

mouth was parked nea ra sawmill. Another witness, Billy Hank ins, whom the de fense ca lled, claimed that around the same t i me he saw a “boy” walkingdown the st r eet away from the park ed Plymouth and toward the Munceys’ home. This witness, however, put the “boy” on the side of5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt the street with the parked car and t h e Munceys’ drivewa y , not the side with the embankment. Hensley, after turning onto the Munceys’ stre et, contin

ued down the road a n d turned into their drivewa y
. “I pulled up in the drive w ay where I could see up towar d Little Hube’s house,” Hensley testified, “and I seen Little Hube’s ca r wasn’t there, and I backed out in the road, an d come back [the other way].” Id. , at 32. As he traveled up the road, Hensley saw House t r aveling in the opposite direction in the white Plymouth. House “flagged [Hensley] down” thro ugh his windshield, ibid. , and the two ca rs m e t about 300 f eet up the road fr om the Munceys’ drivewa y
. Accordin g to Hensley, Hous e sai dhe had heard Mrs. Muncey wa s missing and was looking for h e r husband. Id. , at 33. Though Ho use had only recently moved to the area, he was acquainted with the Munceys, had attended a dance withthem, and had visited their home. He later told law enforcement officials h econsideredboth of the Munceys his friends. Accordin g to Hensley, House said he had heard that Mrs. M uncey’s hus band, who was an alco

holic, was elsewhere “getting drun k.” Ibid

. As Hensley drove off, he “got to think i ng to [him]self— he’s hunting Little Hu be, and Little Hube drunk—w ha t would he be doing off that bank

. . . .” Ibid

. His suspicion aroused, Hensley later returnedto the Munceys’ str eet with afriend named Ja ck Ad kins. The two ch ecked differ

ent spots on the embankment, an d though Hensley saw nothing wh ere he looked, Adkins found Mrs. M uncey. Her body lay across from t h e sawmill near the corner where House’ s car had been park ed, dumped in the woods a short way down the bank lea d ing toward a creek. Around midnight, Dr. Alex Cara bia, a practicing pa

thologist and county medical examiner, performed an autopsy. Dr. Carabia put the time of death b e tween 9 and 11 p.m. Mrs. Muncey had a bla c k eye, both her hand s were bloods t ained up to the wrists, and she h a d bruises on6 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt her legs and neck. Dr . Car abia described the bruises a s consistent with a “ tra umatic orig in,” i.e. , a fight or a fa ll on hard objects. 7 id. , at 985–986. Based on the neck bruises and other injuries, he conc luded Mrs. Muncey had been chok ed, but he ruled this out as the cause of death. The cause of death, i nDr. Cara bia’s view, was a severe blow to the left forehead thatinflicted both a laceration penetrating to the bone and, inside the skull, a severe right-side hemorrhage, likely ca used by Mrs. Muncey’s brain slamming into t h e skull opposite the i m pact. Dr. Carabia described this head injury as con s istent either with receiv ing a blow from a fist or other instrument or with stri king some object. The county sheriff, informed about Hensley’s earlier encounter with House, questioned House sh ortly after the body was found. That evening, House answered further questions during a voluntary interview a tth e local jail. Special Agent Ray Presnell of the Tennesse e Bureau o f Investigation (TBI) pre p areda statement of House’s an

swers, which House sign ed. Ask e d to describehis where

abouts on the previous evening, House claimed—falsel y, as it turned out—that he spent the entire evening with his girlfriend, Donna Turner, at her trailer. Asked wheth e r he was we aring the s a me pants he had worn the night before, House replied—again, falsely—that he was. House was on probation at the time, having recen t ly been re

leased on parole follow i ng a sente n ce of five years to life for aggravated sexual assault in Utah. House had scratches o nhis arms and hands , and a kn uckle on hi s right ring finger was bruised. He attributed t h e scratches to Turner’s cats and t h e fingerinjury to recent constr uc tion work tearing down a shed. The next day House gave a similar s t atement to a different TBI agent, Charles Scott. In fact House had not been at Turner’s home. Afte r initially su pporting House’s alib i , Turner informed au

-7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt thorities that House left her traile r around 10 :30 or 10:45 p.m. to go for a walk. Accordin gto Turner’s trial testi

mony, Hous e returned l a ter—she w a s not sure when—hot and panting, missing his shirt a n d his shoes. House, Turner test ified, told her that while he was w a lking on the road near her home, a vehicle pulled up beside him, and somebody inside “called him some names and then th ey told him h edidn’t belong here anymore.” App. 89. House said he tried to ignore the taunts and keep walking, bu t the vehicle pulled in behind him, and “one of them got out and grabbe d him by the shoulder

. . . and [House] swung around with his right hand” and “hit somet h ing.” Ibi d

. Accordin g t o Turner, House said “he took off down th e bank and started runn ing and he said that he—he said i t seemed for e ver where he was running. And he said they fired two shots at him while he took off down the bank . . . .” Ibid

. House cla i med the assailants “grabbed ahol d of his shirt,” whichT u rner remembered as “a blue tan k top, trimmed in yellow,” and “t hey tore it to where it wouldn’t stay on him and he sai d—I just throwed it off when I was running.” Id. , at 91. Turner, noticing House’s bruised kn uckle, aske d how he h u rt it, and House told her “that’s whe r e he hit.” Id. , at 90. Turner testified that s h e “thought m a ybe my ex-husband had something to do wi th it.” Ibid

. Although the white Plymouth Ho use drove the next day belonged to Turner, Turner insis t ed House had not used the car tha tnight. No fore nsic evidence connected the ca r to the crim e ; law enforcement off i cials inspected a whit e towel coveri ng the driv er seat andconcluded i twas clean. Turner’s t r ailer was located ju st u n der two m iles by road, through hilly terrain, from the Muncey residence. Law enforcement offic e rs also qu estioned th e victim’ s husband. Though Mrs. Muncey’s comments to Luttre ll gave no indication she knew this, Mr. Munce yhad spent the evening at a we ek ly dance at a recreation center8 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt roughly a mile and a half from his home. In his statemen t to law enforcement—a statem ent House’s trial counsel claims he never saw—Mr. Mun c ey admitted leaving the dance early, but said it was onlyfor a brief trip to th e pack age store to buy beer. He also stated th at he and h i s wife had had sexual relations Saturday morni n g. Late in the evening on Monday, Ju ly 15—two days afte r the murde r—law enf o rcement officers visit e d Turner’s trailer. W i th Turner’s consent, Agent Scot t seized th e pants Hous e was wearing the night Mrs. M uncey disa p peared. Th e heavily soiled pants were sitting in a laundry hamper; ye ars later, A g ent S c ottr e called noticing “ r eddis h brown stain s ” he “suspected” were blood. Id. , at 274–275

. Around 4 p.m. the next day, tw o local lawenforcement officers set out for the Federal Bureau of Inv e stigation in Washington, D. C., wi th House’s pants, blood samples from the autopsy, and other evidence pack ed together in a box. They arrived at 2 : 00 a.m. the next morning. On July 17, after initial FBI testing revealed human blood on th e pants, House was arrested. II The State of Tenness ee charged House wi th capita l murder. At House’ s trial, the State presented testimony by Luttrell, Hensley, Adkins, Lo ra Muncey, Dr. Carabi a, the sheriff, and other law enforce ment officials. Through TBI Agents Presnell and Scott, th e jury learned of House’s false statements. Central to th e State’s c a se, however,
was what the FBI testing showed—that sem e n consistent (or so it seemed) with House’ s was present on Mrs. Muncey’s n i ghtgown a n d panties, and that small blood

stains consistent with Mr s. Muncey’s blood but not House’s appeared on the jeans bel o nging to Ho use. Regarding the sem e n, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee, a serologist, testified that the source was a “secr e tor,” mean

ing someon e who “secrete[s] the ABO blood group sub

-9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt stances in other body fluids, such a s semen an d saliva”—a characterist ic shared by 80 perc ent of the population, including House. Id. , at 55. AgentBigbee furt her testified that the source of sem e n on the go wn was blood-type A, House’ s own blood type. As to the semen onthe panties, Agent Bigbee found only the H blood-group substance, which Aa n d B blood-type secre tors secret e along with substances A and B, a n d which O-ty pe secr etors secrete exclusively. Agent Bigbee explained, ho wever—using science an amicush e re sharply disputes, see Brief f o r Innocence Project, In c., as Amicus Cu riae24–26—th at House’s A a n tigens could have “degraded” into H, App. 57– 58. Agent Bigbee thus concluded that both semen deposi ts could have come from House, though he ack n owledged that tha t the H antigen could have com e from Mrs. Muncey herself if she was a secretor—something he “was not able to determine,” id. , at 58—and that, while Mr. Muncey wa s himself blood-type A (as was his wife), Agent Bigbee was again “not able to determine his secretor status,” id. , at 57. Agent Bigbee ack n owledged on cross

examination that “a sa liva sample” would have sufficed t o determine whether Mr. Muncey was a secretor; the State did not pro vide such asample, though it did provide sam

ples of Mr. Muncey’ s blood. Id. , at 62. As for the blood, Agen t Bigbee explained that “spots of blood” appeared “on the left outside leg, the right botto m cuff, on the left thigh and in the right inside pocket and on the lower p o cket on th e outside.” Id. , at 48. Agent Bigb ee determined that the blood’s source was type A (the typ e shared by House, the victim, and Mr. Muncey). He also successfully tested for the enzyme phosphoglucomutase and the blood serum h a ptoglobin, both of whi c h “are fou n d in all humans” and carry “slight chemical differences” th at vary genetically and “can be grouped to differentia te between two individual s if thosetypes are diff erent.” Id. , at 49–50. Based on t h ese chemi c al traces and on the A10 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt blood type, Agent Bigbee determ ined that on ly some 6.75 percent of the population ca rr y similar blood, that the blood was “ c onsistent” with Mrs. Muncey’s (a s determined by testing autopsy sa mples), andthat i t was “impossible” that the blood came from House. Id. , at 48–52. A different FBI expert, Special Agent Chester Blythe, testified about fiber analysis performed on Mrs. Muncey’s clothes and on House’s pants. Although Agent Blythe found blue jean fibers on Mrs. Mun c ey’s nigh tgown, brass

ier, hous ecoat, and p anties, andin fingern a il scrapings taken from her body (s craping s th at also contained trace, unidentifiable amount s of blood), he acknowl e dged that, as the prosecutor put it in questionin gthe witness, “blue jean material is common material,” so “this doesn’t mean tha t the fibers t hat were a ll over the victim ’ s cl othing wer e nec e s s arily f rom [H ous e ’ s ] pair of b lue j e an s.” 6Tr. 86 4–8 6 5

. On House’s pants, though cotton garments both transfer and retain fibers readi l y, Agent Blythe found neither hai r nor fiber consistent with th e victim’s hair or clothing. In the defense case House call ed Hankins, Clinton, and Turner, as well as House’s mother, who testified that House had talked to her by telephone around 9:30 p.m. o n the night of the murder and that he had not used her ca r that evening. House also called the victim’ s brother, Ricky Green, as a witness. Green testifie d tha tonJul y 2, ro ughl y two weeks before the murder, Mr s. Muncey c a lled him and “said her and Little Hu be had beeninto it and she said sh e was wantin g to leave L i ttle Hube, she said she was want

ing to get out—out of it, and she was scared.” 7 id. , at 1088. Green recalled that at Christmastime in 1982 he had seen Mr. Muncey s trike M r s. Muncey after returnin g home drunk. As Turner i n formed the jury, House’s shoes were foun d several months after the crime ina fi eld nea rher home. Turner delivered them to authorities. Though the jury did not learn of this fact (and House’s counsel claims he did11 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt not either), the State tested the shoes for bloo d and found
none. Hous e’s shirt wa s not found. The State’ s closing argument suggested that on the night of her murder, M r s. Muncey “was deceived

. . . . Sh e had been told [her husband] had had an accident.” 9 id. , at 1226. The prosecutor emphasized the FBI’s blood analysis, n o ting that “after runn ing many, many, many tests,” Agen t Bigbee: “was able to tell you that the blood on the defendant’s blue jeans was not his own blood, could not be his own blood. He told you that the blood on the b l ue jeans was consistent with ev ery chara c t e ristic in every re spect of the deceased’s, Carolyn Muncey’s, and that ninety-thre e (93%) pe rcent of th e white population would not have that b l ood type.

. . . He can’t tell you one hundred (100%) pe rcent for ce rtain that it was her blood. But folks, he ca n sure give you a pretty good— a pretty good indication.” Id. , at 1235–1236. In the State’s rebuttal, after defense counsel questioned House’s motive “to go over and kill a woman t hat he barely knew[,] [w]ho was still dressed, still clad in her clothes,” Id. , at 1274 , the prosecutor refe rred obliquely to the semen stains. While explai ning that l e gally “it does not ma ke any difference under God’s heaven, what the motive was,” App. 106, the prosecutor told the jury, “you may have a n idea why he did it,” ibid.: “The evidence at the scene which seemed to suggest that he wa s subjecting this lady to some ki nd of in

dignity, wh y would you get a ladyout of her house, late at nigh t, in her nigh t clothes, under the t r ick tha t her husband has had a wreck down by the creek?

. . . Well, it is because eit h er you don’t wan th e r to tell what indignities you have subjected her to, or she is unwilling and fights a g ainst you, against being sub

jected to th ose indignit ies. In other words, it is either12 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt to keep her from telling what you h a ve done to her, or it is that y o u are tryi n g to get h e r to do something that she nor any moth er on that road would want to do with Mr. House, under those conditions, and you kill her because of her resistance. That is what the evidence at the scene suggests about motive.” Id. , at 106–107. In addition the government suggested the blackrag Hensley said he saw in House’s hands was in fact the missing blue tank top, retrieved b yHouse fro m the crim e scene. And the prosecution reiterated the importance of the blood. “[D]efense counsel,” he said, “does not start out discussing the fact tha this client had blood on his jeans on the night that Carolyn Muncey was killed.

. . . He doesn’t start with the fact that nothing that the defense has in

troduced inthis case e x plains wh at blood is doing on his jeans, all over his jeans, that is scientificall y , completely different from his blood.” Id. , at 104–105. T h e jury found House guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial advanced to the sentencing phase. As aggra

vating fact ors to support a capital sentence, the State sought to prove: (1) that House had previo usly been con

victed of a felony involving the use or threat of violence ; (2) that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in tha tit involve dtortu re ordepravit y of mind; and (3) that th e murder was committed while House was committing, attemptin gto comm it, or fleeing from th e commissionof, rape or k i dnaping. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§39–2–203 (i)(2), (5), (7) (1982) (repealed 19 89); compare §§39–13–20 4(i)(2), (5), (7) (2003). After presenting evi

dence of House’s pa role status and aggravated sexual assault conviction, the State rested. As mitigation, the defense offered testimony from House’s father and mother, as well as evidence, presented through Hou s e’s mother, that House attempted s u icide after the guilt-ph a se verdict.13 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Before the attempt Ho use wro te his mother a letter pro

fessing his i nnocence. In closing the State urged the jury to find all three aggra v ating factors an d impose death. As to the kidna p ing or rape factor, the prosecution suggested Mrs. Muncey was “decoy[ed] or entic[ed] .

. . away from her family, and confin[ed] her against her will because you know tha t as she was being beaten to death.” 10 Tr. 141 0. “We als o think , ” the prosecutor added, “the proof s h ows strong evidence of attempted sexual mol e station of t h e victim to accompany the taking away and murdering her.” Id. , at 1410–1411. Later the prosecutor argued, “I think the proof shows in the rec o rd that it is more likely than not that having been through th e process befor e and having been convic ted of a crime invo lvin g the threat of viol ence, or violence to another person, aggravated sexual assault, that the defendant ca nnot benefi t from the type of reha

bilitation th at correctio ndepartments can provide.” Id. , at 1413. The jury unanimously found all thre e aggra v ati n g factors andconcluded “there are no mitigating circum

stances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutor y aggra v atingcircumstan c e or cir c u m stances.” Id. , at1454. The juryre commended a death se ntence, whi c h the t r ial judge imposed. III The Tennes s ee Supreme Court affirmed House’ s convic

tion and sentence, describing the evidence against House as “circumstantial” but “quite strong.” Sta t ev. House , 7 43 S. W. 2d 1 4 1 , 143, 1 44 (198 7). Two month sla ter, in a s t a t e trial court, House filed a pro sepetition for postconviction relief, arguing he recei v ed ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The court appoin ted counsel, who amended the petition to raise other issues, including achallenge to certain jur yinstructio n s. At a hearing before the same judge who conducted t h e trial, Ho use’s counsel offered no14 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt proof beyond the tria ltranscript

. The trial court dis

missed the petition, deeming House’s trial counsel ade

quate and o v erruling House’s other objections. Onappeal House’s att o rney renewed only t h e jury-ins tructions a r gument. In an unpub lished opini o n the Ten n essee Cou r t of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and both the Tenness ee Supreme C o urt and t h is Court, Housev. T e nness ee , 4 9 8 U. S. 912 (1990), denied review. House filed a second po stconviction petition in state co ur t reasse rtin g his ineffe ctiv e - assi stance clai mand see ki n g inves ti g a tiv e an d/o re xpe rt assis t an ce. After e x t e n s i v e litigation regarding w h ether House’s claims were proce

durally defaulted the Tennessee Supreme Court held that House’s claims were barred und er a state st atute provid

ing that claims not raised in priorpostconvict i on proceed

ings are presumptively waived, Tenn. Code Ann. §40–30– 112 (1990) (repealed 1995), and that courts may not con

sider groun d s for relief “whi c h th e court fin d s should be excluded because they have b een waived o rpreviously determined,” §40–30–1 11 (repealed 1995). See Housev. Sta t e , 911 S. W. 2d 705 (Tenn. 19 95). This Court denied certiorari. Housev. Te nnesse e , 51 7 U. S. 1193 (1996). House next sought fed e ral habeas relief, asserting nu

merous cla i ms of inef fective assi stance of c o unseland prosecutorial miscond u ct. Th e United States District Court for t h e Eastern Districtof Tennessee, though deem

ing House’s claims procedurally defaulted and grantin g summary j u dgment to the State on the majority of House’s claims, hel dan eviden tiary hearing to determine whether House fell within th e “actual innocence” exception t o procedural default that this Court recognized as to sub

stantive offenses in Schlup and as to death sentences i n Sawyer v. Whitl e y, 505 U. S. 333 (1992). Presenting evi

dence we describe in greater detail below, House attacke d the semen and blood evidence us ed at his t r ial and pre

sented other evidence, includinga puta tiv e confession,15 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt suggesting that Mr. Muncey, not House, committed the murder. The DistrictCourt nevertheless d e nied rel i ef , holding that House had neither demonstrated actua l innocence of the murder under Schlup nor established that he was ineligibl e f o r the death penalty under Sawyer

. The Court of Appeals for the Six t h Circui t granted a certificate of appealabil i ty under 28 U. S. C. §2253(c) as to all claims in the habeas petition. On the merits a divide d panel affirmed, but its opinion was with drawn and the case takenen banc. A divided en banc court certifi ed state-law questions to the Tenn essee Supreme Court. Housev. Bell , 311 F. 3d 767 (CA6 2002). Concluding th at House had made a compelling showing of actual inno

cence, and recognizing that in Her r erav. Colli ns, 506 U. S. 390 (1993), this Court a ssumed without deciding that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warran tfederal habeas relief if the r e were no state avenue opento p r ocess such a claim,” id. , at 417, th e six-judge majority certified ques

tions to the State Su preme Court, 311 F. 3d, at 777–778. The questions sought “to ascertain whether there remains a ‘state avenue open to process such a claim’ in this case.” Id. , at 768

. Four di ssenting judges argued the court should have reached the merits, rather th an certifyi n g questions t o the state court; the s e judges asserted that House could not obtain relief under Schlu p , let alon e Sawyer and Herrera

. 311 F. 3d, at 780–78 1 (B oggs, J., di s senting )

. A fifth di s s e nt er expl ai ned that whil eh ea gr e e d with the majority thatHouse “presents a strong claim for habeas reli ef, at least at the sentencing phase of the case, ” he objected to the certif i cationof questions to the Tennes

see high court. Id. , at 787 (opinion of Gilman, J.). Th is Court denied certiorari. Bell v. House , 539 U. S. 937 (2003). The State urged the Tennessee Supreme Court not to16 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt answer the Court of Appeals’ cert ified questions, and the state court did not do so. The case returned t o the United States Court of Appea l s for the S i xth Cir c uit

. This time an eight-judge majority affirme dthe Dist rict Cour t’s denial of habeas relief. 386 F. 3d 6 68 (2004). Six dissent

ers argued that House not only h a d met the actual inno

cence standard for overcoming pro c edural default but also was entitled to immediate release under H e rrera
. 386 F. 3d, at 70 8 (Merritt, J., dissenti n g). A seve nth dissenter (the same j u dge who wrote separ a tely in the previous e n banc decision) described the case as “a real -life murder mystery, anauthentic ‘who-d one-it’where the wrong man may be executed.” Id. , at 709 (opi nion of Gil m an, J.). He concluded such grave uncertain ty necessitated relief in t h e form of a new trial for House. Id. , at 710. We granted certiorari , 545 U. S. ___ (2005) , and now
reverse. IV As a general rule, claims forfeited under sta t e law ma y support federal habeas relief onlyif the pris oner demon

strates cau s e for the default and prejudice f r om the as

serted erro r. See Mu rrayv. Ca r r ier, 477 U. S. 478, 48 5 (1986); Englev. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982); Wain

wrigh tv. S y kes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 ( 1977). The rule is bas edon the comity and respect that must be accorded to statecourt judg ments. See, e.g. , Engle , supr a , at 126–12 9; Wain wri ght , supr a , at 89–90. The bar is n o t, however, unqualified. In an effort to “balan ce the societal interests in finality, comity, and conserv a tion of scarce judici al resources with the individual in terest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case,” Schlup , 513 U. S., at 324, the Court has recognized a miscarri a g e-of-justice exception.

“ ‘[I]n appropriate cases,’ ” the Court has said, “the p r inci

ples of comity and f i nality thatinform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative of co r -17 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt recting a fundamentally unjust incarceratio n ,’ ” Carrier , supra , at 49 5 (quoting Engle , su pr a , at 135). In Schlup , the Court adopted a specific rule to imple

ment this general prin ciple. It h e ld that prisoners ass e rt

ing innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish th at, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not th at no reasonable juror would have found peti

tioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513 U. S., at 327. This formulation, Schlup explains, “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘e xtraordi nary,’ while still provid

ing petition er a mean i n gful avenue by which to avoid a manifest in justice.” Ib id. (quoting McCleskeyv. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 494 (1991)). In the u s ual case the presumed guilt of a pr isoner convicted in stat e court cou n sels against federal review of defaulted claims. Yet a petition sup

ported by a convincing Schlup gat e way showing “raise[s ] sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidence in the resultof the trialwithout th e assurance that that trial was untaintedby constitut i onal error” ; hence, “a re view of the merits of th e constitutional claims” is justified. 513 U. S., at 317. For purposes of this c a se several features of the Schlup standard be ar emphasis. First, although “[t]o be credible” a gatewa y c l aim requires “new reliable evidence—whethe r it be exculpatory scientificevidence, trustw o rthy eyewit

ness accounts, or criti cal physicalevidence—t hat was n o t presented at trial,” id. , at 324, the habeas cou rt’s analysi s is not limit ed to such evidence. T h ere is no di spute in th is case that House has presented some new reli able eviden ce; the State has conceded as much, see infra , at 20–21. In addition, because the DistrictCo urt held anevidentiar y hearing in this case, a n d because the State does n o t chal

lenge the court’s decision to do so, we have n o occasion to elaborate on Schlup ’s observation that whenconsidering an actual-innocence claim in the context of a request for an evidentiary hearing , the Distri ct Cour t need not “test18 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt the new evi d ence by a standard a ppropriate for deciding a motion for summary j u dgment,” but rather may “consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affi ants bear on the probable rel i ab ility of th a t evidence.” 513 U. S., a t331–332. Our re view in this case addresses the merits of the Schlup inquiry, based on a fully developed record, and wi th respect to that inquiry Schlup ma kes plain that the ha beas court must conside r
“ ‘ a ll the evidence,’ ” old and new, i n criminating and excul

patory, wit h out regardto whet her it would n e cessarily be admitted under “rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” See id. , at 327–328 (quoting Friendly, Is Inno

cence Irrelevant? Collateral Atta ck on Cri m inal Jud g ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). Based on t h is total record, the court must make “a probabi listic deter

mination ab out what reasonabl e, properly instructed jurors woul d do.” 513 U. S., at 32 9. The court’s function is not to make an indep e ndent factual determi nation about what likely occurred, b u t ratherto assess the l i kely impact of the evidence on reas onable jurors. Ibid

. Second, it bears repeating that the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the “ ‘ext raordi

nary’ ” case. Id. , at 32 7 (quoting Zant, su pra , at 494); see also 513 U. S., at 324 (emphasizin g that “in the vast ma

jority of ca ses, claims of actual innocence are rarely suc

cessful”). Atthe same time, though , the Schlup standard does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. A petitioner’s burden at the gatewa y stage is to demonstrate that more likely thannot, in ligh t of the new evidence, n o reasonabl e juror would find him guilty beyo nd a reasonable do ubt—or, to remove the dou

ble negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt

. Finally, as the Schlup decision explains, the gateway actual-innocence standard is “by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackso nv. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),”19 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt which gove rns claims of insufficient evidence. Id., at 330. When confronted with a challenge based on trial evidence, courts presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes reasonably so long as suffi cient evidence supports the verdict. B e cause a Schlup claim involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to assess how re asonable jurors would react to the over all, newly supplemented record. See ibid. I f new evidence so requires, this may include consideration of “the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial.” Ibid.;see also ibid. (noting that “[i]n such a case, the habeas court ma y have to make so me credibility assessment s ”). As an initial matter, t h e State ar gues that t h e Antiter

rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, has replaced the Schlup sta n dard witha stricter testbased on Sawyer , which permits consideration of successi ve, abusi ve, or de fa ulted sentencing-related claims only if the petiti oner “show[ s] by clear and convin c ing eviden c ethat, but f o r a constit u tional erro r, no reason able juro r would have foundthe petitionere ligible fort h e death penal t y unde rth e applicable state law,” 505 U. S., a t 336. One AEDPA provi s ion establi s hes a simil a r s t anda rd for secon do rsuc c essive petiti ons in volvin g no retroactivel y applicab le new law, 2 8U. S. C. §2244(b)(2 )(B)(ii); another sets it as a threshold fo r obtainin g an evidenti ary h e a r i n g on claims the petitioner failed to develop in state cour t, §2254(e)(2). Neither provision addresses the type of peti

tion at issue here—a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defau l ted claims based on a showing of actual innocence. Thu s , the stan dard of rev i ew in thes e provisions i s inapplicab le. Cf. Loncharv. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 324 (1996) (“[D]ismissal of a firstfederal habea s petition is a particu larl y serious matter”). The State a l so argues that the District Court’s findings in this case tie our ha nds, preclu ding a ruling in House’s20 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt favor absent a showin g of clear error as to the Dist ri ct Court’s spe c ific determinations. T h is view overstates the effect of the Distric t Court’s ru ling. Deference is given to a trial court’s assessment of evid ence presented to it in the first instan ce. Yet the Schlup inq u iry, we repeat, requir es a holistic ju dgment about “ ‘ a ll the evidence,’ ” 513 U. S., a t 328 (quoting Friendly, supra , at 1 60), and its likely effect
on reasonab le jurors applying the reasonable-doubt stan

dard. As a general r u le, the inquiry does not turn on discrete findings regar d ing di sput ed points of fact, an d “[i]t is not the district court’ s independent judgment as to whether re asonable d o ubt exists that the standard a d

dresses,” 513 U. S., at 329. Here, although the District Court atten t ively managed complex proceedings, carefull y reviewed t h e extensive record, a n d dre wce rtain concl u sions aboutthe evidence, the court did notc l early appl y Schlup ’s p r edictive standard rega rding whet her reason

able jurors would have reasonabl e doubt. As we shal l explain, moreover, we are uncerta in about th e basis for some of the District C o urt’s concl u sions—a consideration that weake n s our relia nce on its determinations. With this backg r ound in mind we turn to the evidence developed i nHouse’s federal habea s proceedings. DNA E v ide n ce First, in di rect cont ra diction of evidence pre s ented at trial, DNA testing has established that the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s nightgown a n d panties came from her husban d, Mr. Munce y , not from House. The State, though conced

ing this poi n t, insists this ne w evidence is immaterial. At the guilt phase at least , neither sexual contact nor motive were eleme n ts of the offense, so in the State’ s view the evidence, o rlackof evidence, of s e xual assault or sexual advance is of no consequence. We disagree. In fact we consider the new disclosure of central importance. From beginning to endthe case is about who committe d21 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt the crime. When identity is in question, motive is k e y
. The point, indeed, was not lost onthe prosecution, for it introduced the evidence and reli ed on it inthe finalguiltphase closi n g argume nt. Referring to “evi dence at the scene,” the prosecutor suggested that House committed, or attempted to commit, some “indignity” on Mrs. Muncey that neither she “nor a n y mother on that road would wa nt to do wi th Mr. House.” 9 Tr. 1302 –1303. Particularly in a case lik e this where the proof was, as the State Supreme Court observed, circum stantial, Statev. Hous e , 743 S. W

. 2d, at 143, 144, we think a ju ry would have given thi s evidence great weight. Quite apart from providing proof of motive, it was the only forensicevi d ence at the scenethat would link House to the murder. Law and society, as they ought to do, demand account

ability when a sexual offense has been committed, so not only did th is evidence link House to the cri me; it likely was a fac t or in persua ding the ju ry not to let him go f r ee. At sentenci ng, moreover, the jury came to th e unanimou s conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murde r was committed in the course of a rape or kidnaping. The alleged sexual motivation rela tes to both those determina

tions. This is particularly so giventhat, at th e sentencin g phase, the jury was a dvised that House ha d a previous conviction for sexual as sault. A jury informed that fluids on Mr s. Muncey’s garments could have come from House might have found that House trekked the nearly t w o miles to the victim’s home and lured her away in order to co mmit a sexual offense. By contrast a jury ac tingwithout t h e assumption that the semen coul d have com e from Hou s e would have found i t necessary to establish some different motive, or, if the same motive, an intent far more speculative. When the only direct evidence of sexual assa ult drops out of the case , so, too, does a central theme in the State’s na rrative link

ing House to the c r i me. In that light, furthermor e ,22 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt House’ s odd evening walkand his false s t atements to authorities, while still potentiall y incrimin a ting, might appear less suspicious. Bloodst ains The other relevant forensic evidence is the blood on House’s pants, which appears i nsmall, even minute, stains in scattered places. As the prosecutor told the jury, they were stains that, due to their small size, “you or I might not d e tect[,] [m]i ght not see, but which the FBI lab was able to find on[House’s] jean s.” App. 11. The stain s appear inside the right pocket, o u tside that pocket, near the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on the seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, including inside the pants. Due to testing by the FBI, cuttings no w appear on the pants in several places where stains evi

dently were found. (The cu tting s were destroyed in th e testing pro c ess, and defense experts were un able to repli

cate the tests.) At tria l , the gover n ment argu ed “nothing that the defense has introduced in this case explains wha t blood is doi n g on his jeans, all over [House’s] jeans, that is scientificall y , completely different from his bl ood.” Id. , at 105. House, though n o t disputin g at this point that the blood is Mrs. Muncey’s , now pres ents an alternative ex

planation that, if credited, would undermine the probative value of theblood evide n ce. During House’s habea s proceedings, Dr. Cleland Blake , an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner forthe State of Tennessee and a cons ultant in forensic pathology to the TBI for 22 years, testified that the blood onHouse’s pants was chemically too degraded, and too similar to blood collected during the autopsy, to have come from Mrs. Muncey’ s body on the night of the crime. The blo o d sam

ples collected during th e autopsy w e re placed in test tubes without pre s ervative. Under su chconditions, according t o Dr. Bla k e, “yo uwill h ave e n zyme de grada tio n. Yo u wil l23 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt havediffe re nt blood group degradation, bloo d mark er de g ra da tion.” Reco rd, Do c. 27 5, p. 80 (he r eina fte rR27 5 :8 0). The proble m of decay, moreover, would have beencom pounded by the body’ s long exposure to the elem ents, sitting outs ide for the better par tof a sum m er day. In contrast, if blood is preserved on c l oth, “it wil lstay there for years,” ibid.; indeed, Dr. Blak e said he deliberatel y places blooddrops on gauze duri ng autopsies to preserve it for later testing. The blood onHouse’ s pants, judging by Agent Bigbee’ s tests , showed “similardeterioration, break d own of certain of the named numbered enzymes” as in the auto p sy sample s. Id. , at 11 0. “[I]f the victim’s blo o d had spilledon the jea n s while th e victim was alive an d this blood had dried,” Dr. Bla k e stated, “the deterioration would not have occurred,” ibid. , and “you would expect [the bloodon the jeans ] to be different than what was in the tube,” id. , at 113. Dr. Bla k e thus concluded the blood on the jea n s came from the autopsy samples, not fro m Mrs. Muncey’s live (or recently killed) body. Other evidence confirms that blooddid in fact spill from the vials. It appears the vials passed from Dr. Ca rabia, who perfor med the autopsy, into the hands of two local law enforcement officers, who tra nsported it to the FBI, where Agent Bigbee performed the enzyme tests. The blood was contained in four vials, evidently with neither preservativ e nor a pro p er seal. The vials, in turn, wer e stored in astyrofoam box, but no thing indicates the b o x was kept co ol. Rather, in whatan evidence protocol expert at the habeas hearing described as a violation of proper procedure, the styrofoam box was pack ed in the sam e cardboard box as other evidence including House’s pants (apparently in a pa per bag) and other clothing (in separate bags). The cardboard b o x was the ncarried inthe officers’
car while they made the 10-hour journey fro m Tennessee to the FBI lab. Dr. Bl ake stated that blood vials in h o t conditions (such as a car trun kin the summer) could blow24 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt open; and in fact, by the time the blood reached the FBI it had hemolyzed, or spoiled, due to heat exposure. By th e time the bl ood passedfrom the FBI to a d e fenseexpe rt, roughly a vial and a h a lf were empty, thou gh Agent Bigbee testified he used at most a quarter of one vial. Blood, moreover, had seeped o n to one cor n er of the s t yrofoam box and onto packing gauze inside the box below the vials. In addition, although t h e pants apparently were pac k

aged initially in a paper bag and FBI records suggest the y arrived at t h e FBI in one, the record does notcontain the paper bag but does c o ntain a pl astic bag with a lab e l listing the pants and Agent Scott’s name—and the plas tic bag has blood on it. The blood appears in a forked strea k roughly five inches long and two inches wide runnin g down the bag’ s outside front. Though testing by House’ s expert confirmed the stain was blood, the expert could not determine the blood’s source. Speculations about when and how th e blood got there add t o the confusion regarding the origins of the stain s on House’ s pants. Faced with these indications of, at best, po or evidence control, the State atte mpted to establish at the habeas hearing that all bl ood s p illage occurred after Agent Bigbee examined the pants. Were that the case, of course, then blood woul d have been detected on the pants before a n y spill—which would tend to undermine Dr. Blake’s analysis and support using the bloodstain s to infer House’s gui l t. In support of this theory the Stat e put on testimony by a blood spatter expert who believ e d the “majority” of the stains were “transfer stains,” that is, stains resulting from “wip[ing] a cross the surface of t h e pants” rather tha n seeping or s p illage. App. 293–294. R e g a r di n g th e s p i l l a g e in the styro f oam bo x, the expert noted that ye llow “Te nne s see Crime Labo rato ry” tape ru nni ng a r ou nd the bo x an d do wn all fo ur side s did not line up when the bloodstains o n the box ’ s co rne rwe re a ligne d. The infe ren c e was t h a t t h e FBI re ceive dthe box from Tenne ssee autho rities, opene dit,25 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt and re seale dit befo re the spil la geoccu r r ed

. Reinfo rci n g this theo ry , Age n t Bi gb ee tes tifie d t h at he observ e d n o blood spillage in the styro f oa m boxan d th atha d h e de

tecte dsu chsigns of e vide n ceco n t ami n a tion, FBIpoli cy woul d h ave requi r e dim media t e re t u rnof the e vide n ce
. In responseHouse argued that even assumin gthe tape alignment showed spillage occurring after FBI testing, spillage onone or more earlier occasions was likely. In fact even th e State’s sp atter expertdeclined to suggest th e blood in th e box and on the packing gauze accounted for the full vial and a quarter missing. And whenthe defense expert opened the box and discovered the spills, the bul k of the blood-caked ga uze was located around and under

neath the half-full vial, which was also located near the stained corner. No gauze immediately surrounding the completely empty vial was stained. The tap e , moreover, circled the box in two layers, one underneath the other, and in one spot the un derlying la yer stops cleanly at th e lid’s edge, as if cut with a razor, and does not continue onto the bo dy of the bo x below. InHouse’ s view this clean cut sug g est s the double layers could not have resulted simply from wrappin gthe tape around twic e , as the spat

ter expert c l aimed; rather, someone possess i n g Tennessee Crime Lab tape—per haps the officers tran s porting th e blood and pants—must have cu t th e box open and resealed it, possibly creating anopportunity for spillage. Support

ing the same inference, a label on the box’s lid lists both blood and vaginal secretions as the box’s contents, though Agent Bigb ee’s records show the vaginal fluids arrived at the FBI in a separate envelope. Finally, crossexamination revealed that Ag ent Bigbee’s practice did not always ma tch the letter of F B I policy. Al though Mr s. Muncey’s b r a and housecoat were packed together in a single bag, creating, a c cording to Agent Bigb ee, a risk o f “cross conta m ination,” id. , at 286, he did not return them; nor did he note the discrepancy b e tween the “[b]lood and26 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt [v]aginal secretions” label and the styrofoam box’s actual contents, though he insisted his customary pr actice was to match labels with cont ents immediately upon opening an evidence bo x. Id. , at 287. The State challenged Dr. Bla k e’s scientific conclusions, and to do s o it called Agent Bigb ee as a wit n ess. Agen t Bigbee defended the te stimony he had given at the trial. To begin with, he suggested Dr. Blake had misconstrued the term “inc” in Agen t Bigbee’ s t r ial report, interpretin g it to mean “incomplete” when itin fact mea n t “inconcl u sive.” Id. , at 254–256, 282. Dr. Blake, however, replied “[s]ame difference” wh en asked whether his opinion woul d change if “i nc” meant “inconclusive.” Id. , at 256; see als o 6 Tr. 906 ( B igbee trial testimony) (“You will notice I have INC writ t en under th e transparent, that is the symbol that I use to meanthe test was incomplete”). Agent Bigbee further asserted that, whereas Dr. Blake (in Bigbee’s view) const r ued the results to mean the enzyme was n o t present at all, in fact the results indicated only that Bigbee could n o t identify the mark er type on whatever en

zymes were present. App. 282. Yet the State did not cross-examine Dr. Blake on this point, nor did the District Court resolve the disp ute one wa y or the oth e r, so on th is record it seems possible that Dr. Blake meant only t o suggest the blood was too degrad ed to perm it conclusiv e typing. The State, moreover, does not ask us to question Dr. Blake’s basic premise aboutthe durability of blood chemicals deposited on cotton—a premise Agent Bigbee appeared to accept as agene ral matter. Given the record as it stand s, then, we cannot say Dr. Blake’s conclusions have been discredited; if other o bjections might be ad

duced, theymust await further pr oceedings. At the least, the record before us contai ns credible testimony sugg est

ing that th e missing enzyme markers are ge nerally better preserved o ncloth tha nin poorly kept test tu bes, and th at principle could support House’s spillage t h eory for the27 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt blood’ s origi n
. In this Court, as a fur t her attac kon House’s showing, the State s u ggests tha t , given th e spatter expert ’s test i

mony, House’s theory would require a jury to surmise that Tennessee officials donned the pants and deliberately spread blood over the m
. We disagree. This should bea matter for t h e trier of fact to consider in the first instance, but we cannote a line of argu ment that could refute th e State’s posi tion. It is correct thatthe State’s spatter ex

pert opined that the stains resulte dfrom wiping or smear

ing rather than direct s p illage; and she further stated that the distribution of stai ns in some spots suggests the pants were “folded in some manner or creased in some mann er” when the tr ansfers occurred, id. , a t296. While the expert described this pattern, at leas t with respect to stains on the lap of t h e pants, a s “consistent” with the pants being worn atth e time of t h e staining, ibid. , her testimony, as we understand it, does not refu te the hypothesis that the packa ging of the pants for transport was what cause d them to be folded or creased. It seems permi ssible, more

over, to conclude that the small siz e and wide distribution of stains—inside the right pock e t , outside that pock et, near the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on the seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, includ

ing inside the pants—fits as well with spillage in transport as with wiping and s m earing from bloody objects at the crime scene , as the State proposes. (As has be en noted, n o blood was found on House’ s shoes. ) The Distric tCourt dis c ounted Dr . Blake’s opinion, not on account of Blake’s substantive approach, b u t based on testimony from AgentScottindicating he saw, as th e District Co urt put it, “what appea r ed to be bloodstains on Mr. House’s blue jeans when the jeans were removed from the laundry hamper at Ms. Turne r ’s trailer.” Id. , at 348

. This inference seems at least open to quest ion, however. Agent Scott stated only thathe “saw reddi sh brownish28 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt stains [he] suspected to be blood”; he admitted that he “didn’t thoroughly examine the b l ue jeans a tthat time.” R276:113–114. The pants were in fact extens ively soiled with mud and reddish stains, onlysmall portions of which are blood. In sum, considering “ ‘ a ll the evidence,’ ” Schlup , 513 U. S., at 328 (quoting Friendly, 3 8U. Chi. L. Rev., at 16 0), on this issue, we think the evidentiary disarra y surround

ing the blood, taken togetherwit hDr. Blake’s testimon y and the limited rebuttal of it in the present r e cord, would prevent reasonable jur o rs from pl acing significant reliance on the bloo d evidence. We now k n ow, though the trial jury did not, th at an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner be

lieves the blood on House’ s jeans must have come from autopsy sa mples; that a vial an d a quarter of autops y blood is unaccounted for; that the blood was tr ansported to the FBI tog e ther with the pants in conditions that coul d have caused vials to spill; that the blood did in deed spill at least once during its journey from Tenness ee authoriti es through FBI hands to a defense expert; that the pa nts were stored in a plastic bag bearing both a large blood stain and alabel with TBI Agent Scott’s na me; and th at the styrofoam box con t aining the blood sam p les may well have been opened bef o re it arrived at the FBI lab. Thu s , whereas the blo o dstai n s, emphas ized by theprosecution, seemed stro ng evidence of House’ s guilt at trial, the record now raises substantial questions ab out the blood’s origin. A Different Suspect Were House’s challenge to the S t a t e’s case limited to th e questions h e has raised about th e blood an d semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution might well suffice to bar relief. There is, howeve r, more; for in the post-trial proceedings House pre s ented troubling evidence that M r
. Muncey, th e victim’s h u sband, himself could have been the murderer.29 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt At trial, as has beenn o ted, the ju ry heard th at roughl y two weeks before the murder Mr s. Muncey’s brother re

ceived a frightened phone call from his sister indicating that she an d Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she wa s scared, and that she w anted to leave him. The jury also learned that the broth e r once saw Mr. Mun c ey “smac[ k]” the vi cti m
. 7 Tr. 1 0 8 7–108 8. House no w h a s produce d evide n ce fro mmul tiple sources s u gges tin g tha tMr. Mun c e y regularly abused his wife

. For exam ple, o n e witness— Kathy Park e r , a lifelong arearesidentwho denied any animosity tow a rds Mr

. Munc ey—r ec alled that Mr s. Munc e y “was con s ta ntl y wi th bl ack e y es an d bu ste d m o uth

. ” App. 235. I na d d i t i o nH a z e lM i l l e r , w h o i s Ka t h yP a r k e r ’ s mother and a lif elong acquaint ance of Mr. Muncey, testi

fied at the habeas hea r ing that two or three months before the victim’s death Mr. Muncey ca me to Miller’s home an d “tried to get my daughter [Parke r] to go out with him,” R 2 74 : 4 7. (P ark e r h a d d a t e d Mr. Mu nc ey at a g e 14

. ) Ac

cordin g to Miller, M u nce y s a id “[h]e was upset w i thhis wife , tha tthey ha d h a d a n a r gum e nt and he said he was goin g to ge t ri d of th atwom a n onewa y o rthe othe r. ” Ap p
. 236. Another witness—Mary Atkins, also an area native wh o “grew up” with Mr. Muncey an d professed no hard feel

ings, R274:10, 16—claims she sa w Mr. Mu ncey “back

han[d]” Mrs. Muncey on the very night of the murder. App. 226, 2 28. Atkins recalled that during a break in th e recreation center dance, she saw Mr. Muncey and his wife arguing in the parkinglot. Mr. Muncey “grab b ed her and he just backhanded h e r.” Id. , a t228. After that, M r s. Muncey “left walking. ” Id. , at 229. There was also testi

mony from Atk i ns’ mother, named Artie Lawson. A selfdescribed “good friend” of Mr. Muncey, id. , at 231, Lawson said Mr. Muncey visited her the morning after the mur

der, before the body w a s found. Accordin g t o Lawson, Mr

. Muncey as ked her to tell anyone who inquired not only30 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt that she had been at the dance the evening before and had seen him, b u t also that he had breakfasted at her home a t 6 o’clock th at morning. Lawson had not in fact been at the dance, nor had Mr. Muncey been with her so early. Of most importance is the testimony of Kathy Par k er and her sister Penny Letner. They testified at the habea s hearing tha t , around th e time of House’s trial, Mr. Mun c ey had confessed to the c r i me. Parke rrecalled t hat she and “some family members and some friends [were] sitting around drinking” at Parker’s trailer whenMr. Muncey “just wal k e din and sit down.” R27 4 :37. Muncey, who had evidently been drinking heavily, began “ram b ling off .

. . [t]alking a b out what happened to his wife and how it happened and he didn’t mean to do it.” Ibid

. Accordin g t o Parker, Mr. Muncey “said they had been int o [an] argu

ment and h e slapped h e r and she f e ll andhit her head an d it killed her and he di dn’t mean for it to hap pen.” Id. , at 38. Parker said she “freaked out and run him off.” Ibid

. Let n ersimi larl y re calle d tha ta t so me poi n tei the r “d ur ing [House ’s] tri a l o r just befo re,” id. , a t 30, Mr. M u n c ey intruded on a gathering at Pa rke r ’s home. Ap pea rin g “p re tt y wellbliste re d, ” Mun c ey “w en t to c rying a n d w a s talking abo ut his wife and her death and h e was sayi ng that he di dn’t mean to do it.” App. 232. “[D]idn’t meanto do what[?],” Letner as ked, R274:33, at which point Mr. Muncey explained: “[S]he was ‘bitching hi m out’ beca use he didn’t take her fishing that night, that he went to the dance in

s t e a d

. H e s a i dw h e nh e c o m e h o m e t h a ts h e w a s s t i l l on him pretty heavily ‘bitching him out’ again and that he sm acked her and that s h e fell and hit her head. He s a id I didn’t mean to do it, but I ha d to get rid of her, because I didn’t want to be charged with murder.” App. 232–233. Letner, wh o was then 19 years old with a s m all child,31 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt said Mr. Muncey’s statement “scared [her] qui te badly,” so she “got out of there immediately.” Id. , at 233. Aske d whether she reported the inci dent to the authorities, Letner stated, “I was frightened, you k n ow.
. . . I figure d me being 19 year old they wouldn’t listen to anything I had to say.” R274:31. Parker, on the other h and, claimed she (Parker) in fact went to the Sherriff’s Dep a rtment, bu t no one woul d listen: “I tried to speak to the Sheriff but he was real busy. H e s e n tm e t o ad e p u t y
. T h e d e p u t yt o l dm e t o g o u p stairs to th e courtroom and talk to this gu y, I can’ t remember his name. I never did really get t o talk to anybody.” App. 234. Parkersaid she did notdiscuss the matter fu rt her because “[t]hey had it all signed, sealed and delivered. We didn ’t know anything to do until we heard that th ey reopened [House’s] trial.” R274:45. Parker’s mother, Hazel Miller, confirmed she had driven Park er to the courthouse, where Parker “we nt to talk to some of the people about this case.” App. 237. Other testi m ony suggests Mr. Muncey had the opportu

nity to commit the crime. Accord ing to Dennis Wallace, a local law enforcement official who provided security at th e dance on t h e night of the murde r , Mr. Muncey left the dance “around 10:00, 10:30, 9:30 to 10:30.” R274:56–57. Although Mr. Munce ytold law enforcement officials just after the murder that he left the dance only briefly and returned, Wallace could not recall seeing him back th ere again. Later that evening, Wal l ace responded to Mr. Muncey’s report that his wife was missing. Muncey de

nied he and his wife ha d been “a fussing or a fighting”; h e claimed his wife had b een “kidnapped.” Id. , at 58. Wa l

lace did not recall seeing any blood, disarray, or k n ock e dover furnit ure, although he admitted he “didn’t pa y to o much atten t ion” to wh ether the floor appeared especially32 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt clean. According to Wa llace, Mr. Muncey said “let’s search for her” an d then led Wallace outto search “ i n the weeds” around the home and the driveway (not out on the road where the body was found). Id. , at 58, 60, 63. In the habeas proceedings, then, two different witnesse s (Parker an d Letner) described a confession by Mr. Muncey; t w o more (Atkins and L a wson) described susp i

cious behavior (a fight and an at tempt to constructa fals e alibi) arou nd the time of the crime; and still other wit

nesses desc ribed a history of abuse. As to Par k er and Letne r , the Distri ct Cour t not e d that it was “not impressed with the allegations of individuals who wait overt e n years to come forw ard with th eir evidence,” especially considering that “there was no physical evi

dence in the Munceys’ kitchento corrob o rate [Mr. Muncey’s] alleged confession tha the killed [his wife] there.” App. 348. Parker and Letner, however, did at

tempt to explain their dela y coming forward, and the record indicates no reason why these two women, bot h lifelong acquaintances of Mr. Mun c ey, would have wante d either to frame him orto help House. Furthermore, the record includes at least so me independent support for th e statements Park er and Letner attributed to Mr. Muncey. The supposed explanation for the f a tal fight—that his wife was complaining about going fishing—fits with Mrs

. Muncey’s s t atement to Luttrell earlier that evening that her husband’s absence was “all right, because she was going to m a ke him ta ke he r fishing the nextday,” id. , at 11–12. An d Dr. Blake testified, i nonly partial contradic

tion of Dr. Carabia, that Mrs. Muncey’s h e ad injury re sulted from “a surface with an edge” or “a hard surfac e with acorn er,” not from a fist. R275:72. (Dr. Carabia h a d said either a fist or so me other object could have been th e cause.) Mr. Muncey testified at the habeas hearin g, and the District Court did not question hi s credibility. Though Mr.33 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Muncey said he seeme dto remember visiting Lawson the day after the murder, he denied either killing his wife or confessing to doing so. Yet M r . Muncey a l so claimed , contrar yto Constable Wallace’s testimony and to his own prior state m ent, that he left the dance on th e night of the crime only when it ended at midnight. Mr. M uncey, more over, denied ever hitting Mrs. Mu ncey; the State itself had to impeach him with a prior state m ent on this point. It bears emphasis, fi nally, that Parker’s a n d Letner’s testimony is not comp arable to the sort of eleventh-hour affidavit vo uching for a defendant and incriminating a conveniently absent s u spect that Justice O’Connor de

scribed in her concurring opinionin Her rer aas “unfortu

nate” and “not uncommon” in ca pital cases, 506 U. S., at 423; nor was the conf ession Parker and Letner described induced under pressure of interrogation. The confession evidence he re involves an alleged spontaneou s statement recounted by two eyew itnesses with no evident motive to lie. For thi s reason it has more probative value than, for example, incriminatingtestimony from inmates, suspects, or friends or relations of the accused. Th ee vi d e n c ep o i n ti n gt oM r
. M u n c e y i sb yn om e a n s con c lusive. If conside r ed in isol ation , a re asonable ju ry migh t well dis r eg ar d it

. In combin ation , howe ver , wi th t h e challe nges to the blood evide n ceand the lackof motive with respe c t to Hou s e, the evi d en ce poin tin g to Mr. Mun c ey likel y wo uld rein force o t her doub ts as toHouse ’ s guilt. Othe r Evid e n ce Certain other details were presented at the habeas hearing. First, Dr. Blake, in addition to testifying abo u t the blood e vidence and the victim’ s head inju ry, examined photograph s of House’s bruises and scra tch es and con

cluded, based on 35 years’ expe rience monitoring the developmen t and healing of bruises, that they were too old to have res u lted from the crime. In addition Dr. Blake34 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt claimed that the injury on Hou s e’s right knuc kle w a s indicative of “[g]etting mashed”; it was not consistent with striking someone. R2 75:63. (Th a t of cours e would als o eliminatethe explana tion that the injury came from t h e blow House supposedly told Turner he gave to his uniden

tified assail ant.) The victim’s daughter, Lora Muncey (now Lora Tharp), also testifi e d at the h abeas hearing. She r e peated her recollectionof hearinga man wit ha deep v o ice like her grandfather’s and a s t atement th at her fath er had had a wreckdown by the c r eek

. She alsodenie dseeing a n y signs of struggle or he aring a fight betweenher parents, though she also said she could not recall her parents ever fighting ph ysically. T h e District Court foun d her c r edible, and this testimony cert ainly cuts in favor of the State. Finally, House hims elf testified atthe habea s proceed

ings. He essentially r e peated the story he allegedly tol d Turner about getting attac k ed on the road. The Distric t Court found, however, based on House’s demea n or, that he “was not a credible witness.” App. 329. Conclusion This is nota case of c o nclusive exoneration. Some as

pects of the State’ s evidence—Lora Muncey’ s memory of a deep voice, House’ s bi zarre evening walk , his lieto la w enforcemen t , his appea r ance near the body, and the blood on his pants—still support an inference of guilt. Yet the central forensic proof connecti ng House to the crime—the blood and t h e semen—has beencalled into q u estion, an d House has put forward substantial evidence pointing to a different suspect. Acco rdingly, an d although the issue is close, we conclude that this is the rare case where—had the juryheard all the conflictingtestimony—it is mor e likely than not that no reaso nable juror viewi n g the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt.35 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt V In addition to his gateway claim under Schlup , House argues that he has shown freestan d ing innocence and tha t as a resulthis impris onment an d planned execution are unconstitutional. In H e rrera , de cided three years before Schlup , the Courtassumed with out deciding tha t“in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warran tfederal habeas relief if the r e were no state avenue opento p r ocess such a claim.” 506 U. S., at 41 7; see also id

. , at 419 (O’Connor, J ., concurring) (“I cannot disagree with the fundamental leg a l principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent wit h the Constit u tion”). “[ T]he threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high, ” the Court explained, and petitioner’ s evidence there fell “far short of that whic h would have to be made in order to triggerthe sort of co nstituti onal claim whi c h we have assumed, arguendo , to exist.” Id. , at 417, 418–419; see also id. , at 427 (O’Connor, J., c o ncurring) (noting that because “[ p]etitioner has failedto make a persuasiv e showing of actual innocence,” “the Court has no reason to pass on, an d appropriately reserves, the quest ion whethe r federal courts may en tertain convincing clai ms of actual innocence”). House ur ges the Court to answer the ques

tion left open in H e rreraand hold not only th at freestand

ing innocence claims are poss ib le but a l so that he h a s established one. We decline to resolve this issue. We concl u de here, much as in He rre ra , that whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this peti

tioner has not satisfied it. To b e sure, Ho use has cast considerable doubt on his guilt—doubt sufficient to satisfy Schlup ’s ga teway stan dard for o b taining federal review despite a s t ate procedural defaul t. In Herr era , howev e r, the Court described t h e threshold for an y hypothetica l36 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of t h eCourt freestanding innocence claim as “extraordi narily high.” 506 U. S., a t417. The sequence of the Court’s decisions i n H

e rreraand Schlup —first leaving unresolved the status of freestanding claims a n d then establishing the gatewa y standard—i m plies at the least tha t He rre rarequires mor e convincing proof of in nocence than Schlup

. It follow s , given the closeness o f the Schlup question here, th at House’ s showing falls short of t h e threshol d implied i n H

e rrera
. * * * House has satisfied the gateway standard s e t forth in Schlup and may proceed on rem and withprocedural ly defaulted constitutional claims. The judgment of the Court of Ap peals is rev e rsed, and the case is r e manded for further proc eedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so orde red.
J USTICE ALITO tookno part in the consi d eration or decision of t h is case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 04–8 99 0
PAUL GR E G ORY HOUSE, P E TI TIONE R v. RICKY BELL, WARDE N
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e12, 2006 ] C HIEF J U S TICE R OBER TS , with whom J US TICE S CALI A and J USTI C E T HOMAS join, concurring in the judgment i n part and di ssenting in part. To overcome the procedural hurdle that Paul House created by failing to p r operly present his constitutional claims to a Tennessee c o urt, he must demonstrate that the constitutional violation s he alleges “ha[ve] probably re

sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” such thatafederal co urt’s refusal to hear t h e defaulted claims would be a “miscarriage of justice.” Schlupv. De lo , 513 U. S. 2 98, 3 2 6 , 32 7 (19 9 5 ) (i n t e rn al qu o t ation m a rks omitte d). To mak e the requisitesho wing of actual inno

ce nce, House must produce “ne w re lia ble evid en ce”and “m us t s h o wth at it i s mo re li ke l y th an no t th at no reas o n ableju ro r woul d h ave convi c te d hi m in the li ght of the ne w evide n ce.” Id

. , at 324 , 3 27 (e m p h a si s adde d). The que s tio n is no t whe the r Hou s e was preju di c e d a this trial b e cau s e the ju ro r swe renot a w a r e o f the n e w e vi d e n c e , bu twhe th e r a l l the e vidence, considere dto ge the r , pro v es that Ho use was actual l y in n o ce n t , so th at no reas o nab le ju ro r wo ul d vo te to c o nvic t hi m. C o n s id erin g al lth e evid en ce, a n dgivi ng due
re ga r dto th e Dis tri c tCo urt ’ s fi n din gs o nwh eth e r Hou s e’s
ne w eviden ce wa s rel i ab le, I do no t fin dit prob able th a tno rea s o nab le j u r o rwo ul d vo te t oco nvic t hi m, a n d a c co rdin gl y I disse n t

.2 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. Be ca use I do not thin k th a tHou s e has s a tis f ie d the a c tu al inno ce n c e s t an da rd se t forth i n Schlup , I do not believe that he has met the higher threshold for a freesta nding inno

cence claim, assuming such a clai m exists. See Herrera v. Co ll in s, 5 0 6U. S. 39 0, 4 17 (1 993 ). I t h e r e f o r e c o n c u r i n t h e judgment with respec t to the Co urt’s dispos ition of that separate claim. I In Schlup , we stated that a habeas petitioner attempt

ing to present a defaulted cl aim to a federal court must present “new reli a ble e vidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworth y eyewitness accounts, or critical ph ysical evid ence—thatwas not presented at trial.” 513 U. S., at 32 4 (emphasis added). Implicit in the requiremen tthat a habeas pet i tioner present reliab l e evidence is the expectation that a factfinder will asses s reliability. The new evidence at issue in Schlup had not been subjected to such an assessment—the claim in Schlup was for an evidentiary he aring—and this Court specifically recognized that the “new statements may, of course, be unreliable.” Id. , at 331

. The Cour t stated that the District Court, as t h e “reviewing tribunal,” was tasked with assessing the “probative fo rce” of the petitioner’s new evidence of innocence, and “may h a ve to make some credi

bility asses s ments.” Id. , at 327– 328, 330. Indeed, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of re manding th e case to the Court of Appeals “with instructions to remand to the Dist rict Cour t,” so t hat th e District Court coul d consider how the “likely credibility of the aff i ants” bears upon the “probable reli ability” of the new evidence. Id. , at 332. In short, the new evidenceis not simply taken at face value; its reliability has to be tested. Critical to the Court’s conclusionhere that House has sufficiently demonstrated his innoc e nce are three pieces o f new evidence presented to the Di strict Cour t: DNA evi

-3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. dence showing that the semen on Carolyn Muncey’ s cloth

ing was from her husband, Hu bert Muncey, not from House; testimony from new witnesses implicating Mr. Muncey in the murder; and evidence indicating that Mr s. Muncey’ s blood spill ed from te st tubes contai ning autopsy samples in an evidence container. To determi n e whether it should open its door to House’ s defaulted constitutional claims, the District C o urt considered this evidence in a comprehensive evidentiary hearing. As House presented his new evidence, and as the State rebutted it, the District Court observed the witnesses’dem e anor, examined physi

cal evidence, and mad e findings about whether House’s new evidence was in fact reliable. This factfinding role is familiar to a district co urt. “T he trial judge’s major role i s the determination of fact, and wit hexperience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.” Andersonv. Bessemer Cit y, 470 U. S. 5 64, 5 74 (1 98 5). The State did not contest House’ s new DNA evidence excluding him as the source of the semen on Mr s. Muncey’s cl othing, but it s tronglycontested the new te s timony implicating Mr. Muncey , and it insis t ed that th e blood spilla ge occurred afterthe FBI tested House’ s jeans and deter m ined that theywe re stained withMr s. Muncey’s blood. At the evid entiary hearing, sisters KathyP a rker a n d Penny Letner testified that 14 years earlier, either durin g or around the time of House’s trial, th ey heard Mr. Muncey drunkenly co nfess to having accidentally killed his wife wh en he struc kherin th eir home during an a r gument, ca using her to fall and hit her head. Record, Doc. 274, pp. 28–29, 30, 37–38. Schlu p provided guidance on how a district court s h ould a ssess this type of new evi

dence: The court “ma yconsider how the timing of the submissionand the likely credibi lity of the affiants bear on the probable reliabi lity of that evidence,” and it “mus t assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence4 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. in connection with the evidence of guilt addu ced at trial. ” 513 U. S., at 332. Consistent with this guidance, the DistrictCo urt conclud e d that the sisters’ tes t imony was not credible. The cour t noted tha tit was “n ot impresse d with the allegations of individuals who wait ov er ten years to come for w ard.” App. 348. It also consid ered how the new testimony fit wit h in the larger web of evidence, ob

serving tha tMr. Munc ey’s a lleged confession contradicte d the testimo n y of the Munceys’“very credible” daughter, Lora Tharp, who consistently testified that she did no t hear a fight in the house that night, but instead heard a man with a deep voice who lured her moth er from th e house by saying that Mr. Muncey had been in a wrec k near the creek

. Id. , at 323, 348. The District Court en gaged in a similar rel i ability in

quiry with regard to House’s new evidence of blood spill

age. At the evidentiary hear ing, House conceded that FBI testing showed that his jeans were stained with M r s. Muncey’ s blood, but h e set ou t t o prove that the bloo d spilled from test tub e s containing autopsy samples, and that it did s o before the jeans were tested by th e FBI. Th e DistrictCo urt summa rized the t e stimony of the va rious witnesses who handled the evi d ence and their recoll ec tions about bloodstains and spillage; it acknowledged th at House’s ex pert, Dr. C l eland Blake, disagre e d with F B I Agent PaulBigbee about how to interpret t h e results of Agent Bi gb ee’s genetic marker an alysis summary; and it summarized the testimony of th e State’ s blood spatte r expert, Pau l ette Sutton

. Id., at 33 9–347. After reviewing all the evidence, the District Court stated: “Based upo n the evidence introduced during th e evidentiary hearing . .

. the court concludes that the spillage occurred af terth e FBI crime laboratory received and tested th e evidence.” Id. , at 348 (emphasis a dded). Normally, an appellate cou rt rev i ews a dist rict court’s factual findings only for clear error. See Fed. Rule Civ.5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. Proc. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside u n less clearl y erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportu

nity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of th e witnesses”); Besse mer Cit y, su p ra , a t57 4 (cle a rl y e rroneo u s stan da rd applie s “e ve n when the di stri ct co u rt’s fi n din gs do not re s t on cre dib ili ty dete rmin a tio ns, bu t a r e base d i n s t e a d
o n p hy s ic alo r do cu m e nt ary evid en ceorinf e r e n c e s from o th e r f a c t s ” )

. The Sixth Circuit deferred to the District Court’s fa ctual findings, 386 F. 3d 668, 684 (2004), and Schlup didnot purport to alter—but instead reaffirmed and highlighted—the district co u rt’s criticalrole as fac t

finder. Yet the majority asserts t hat the clear error stan

dard “overs tates the ef fect of the District Co urt’s ruling , ” and then dismisses the Distri ct Co urt’s reliability findings because it i s “uncertain about” them, while s t opping short of identifying clear error. An te , at 20. Thi s is a sharp departure f r om the guidance in Schlup

. In Schlup , we contras t ed a distri ctcourt ’ s role in assess

ing the rel i ability of new evidence of inn o cence with a district court’s role in deciding a summary ju dgme nt motion. 513 U. S., at 3 32. We explained that, in the latte r situation, the district court does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuin e factual issue for trial. Ibid. A ssessing the reliability of new evidence, on the other hand, is a typical factfinding role, requiring c r ed ibili ty determinations and a weighing of the “p robative force” of the newevidence in light of “the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Ibid. We found it “obviou[s]” that a habeas court co nducting a n actual innocence inqui ry must do more than simply check whether th ere are genuine factual issues fortrial. Ibid. The point of the actual innocence i nquiry is for the federal habeas cou rt to satisfy itself that it should suspend the normal procedural default rule, disregard th e importan t judicial interests of fi nality and comity, and allow a sta t e6 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. prisoner to present his defaulte d constitutional claims to a federal court. See McCleske yv. Za nt, 4 9 9U

. S

. 46 7, 4 90– 4 9 1 (1 99 1)

. The majority surprisingly states that this guidance i s inapplicable here beca use this case involves a“fully devel

oped record,” while the district court in Schlup had de

clined to conduct an evidentiary hearing. An te , at 17–18. But the gui d ance is clearly applica b le: The point in Schlu p was not simply that a hearing was required, but why— because the district cou rt had to as sess the probative force of the petitioner’ s newly presented evidence, by engaging in factfinding rather than performing a su mmary judg

ment-type i nquiry. 51 3 U. S., at 331–332. That is pre

cisely whatthe Dist ric tCourtdidhere. In a ddition to a “fully developed record,” we hav e the District Court ’ s factual findings about the reliabil i t y of the new evidence in that record, factual findings which the majority disr e gards wi thout finding c l ear error. The majority essentially disregard s the District Court ’ s role inassessing the r e liabil i ty of House’ s ne w evidence. With regar dto the sis t ers’ testim ony, the m a jority cas t s aside the District Cour t’s determi nation that their state

ments came too late and were too inconsistent with credi

ble record evidence to be re l i able, instead observing that the women had no obvious reason to lie, that a few aspects of their testimony have record support, and that th ey recounted an uncoerced confession. Ante , at 32–33. As for the DistrictCourt’s express fi ndin g that the autopsy blood spilled after the FBI tested House’s jeans, the majority points to Dr. Blake’s t e stimony that blood enzymes “are generally better preserved on cl oth,” and even conjures up its own theory in an attempt to refute Ms. Sutton’s expert testimony that the pa ttern of some bloodstains was consis

tent with blood beingtransferre d while the pants were being worn. Ante , at 27 (“This should be a matter for th e trier of factto consider in the first instance, but we ca n7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. note a l i ne of argument that could refute the State’s posi

tion .

. . [Ms. Sutton’s] testimony .

. . does not refute the hypothesis that the packagin g of the pants for transpor t was what caused them to be folded or creased”); see App. 296. The majority’ s assessment of House’ s new evidence is precisely the summary judgment-type inquiry Schlup sai d was inappropriate. 51 3 U. S., a t3 32. By casting aside th e District Court’s fac t ua l determ inations made after a com

prehensive evidentiary hearing, the majority has do ne little more than reiterate the factual disputes presented below. Wit n esses do not testif y in our courtro om, and it is not our rol e to make credib ility findings and constru ct theories of the possib l e ways in which Mrs. Muncey’ s blood could have been spattered and wiped on House’s jeans. The Distric tCourt didnot painstakingly con d uct an evi

dentiary hearing to compile a rec o rd for us to sort through transcript by transcript and pho t ograph by photograp h , assessing f o r ourselves the reliability of what we see. Schlup ma de abundantly clear that reliabilit y determina

tions were essential, but we re f o r the dist rict court t o make. 513 U. S., at 33 1–332. We are to defer to the better situated District Cour ton re liability, unless we determine that its findings are clearly erroneous. We are not con

cerned with“the distric tcourt ’ s independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exis ts,” id., at 329, but th e District Co urt here made basicf a ctual findings about the reliability of House’s new evid ence; it did not offer its personal op inion ab out whether it doubted House’s guilt

. Schlup ma kes clear that those findings are controlling unless clearl y erroneou s. I have found no clear error in the District Co urt’s reli

ability findings. Not h a ving observed Ms. Pa rker and M s
. Letner testify, I would defer to the District Co urt’s deter

mination that they are not credible, and the evidence in the record undermining the tale of an accidental killin g8 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. during a fight in the M uncey home convinces me that thi s credibility finding is not clearly erroneous. Dr. Alex Cara

bia, who performed the autopsy, testified t o injuries far more severe than a bu mp on the head: Mrs. Muncey ha d bruises on the front and back of h e r neck, on both thighs , on her lower righ t leg and left kn ee, and her hands we re bloodstained up to the wrists; her injuries were consistent with a struggle and traumatic strangulati o n. Recor d , Addendum 4, 7 Tr. of Evidence inNo. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un

ion County, Tenn.) 984–987 (hereinafter Tr.) And, of course, Lora Tharp has consis tently recalled a deep-voiced visitor arri ving late atnight to tell Mrs. Muncey that h e r husband was in a wreck near the creek. App. 19, 270. I also find abundant evidence in the record to support the District Court’s fin d ing that b l ood spilledwithin the evidence container after the FBI received and tested House’ s jeans. Agent Bigbee testified that there was no leakage in the items submitted to him for testing. Id. , at 277. The majority’s e n tire analysis on this point assumes the agent flatly lied, t h ough there was no a ttackon hi s credibility below. Moreover, Ms. Sutton de termined, in her expert opinion, that the wide distribution of stain s “front and back, top to botto m,” the fact that some blood

stains were mixed with mud, and the presence of blood

stains inside the pock et and inside the fly, showed that the blood was spattered and wiped—not spilled

—on House’s jeans. Id. , at 291–293, 295; id. , at 293 (“[I]f a tube of blood had spilled on these pa nts, the stai n should have been ina localized area”); id. , at 294 (“The stains also .

. . either originate on the inside and don’ t so akout or on the outside and are notsoaking to the ins i de. That, of c o urse, woul d be what you would see with a spill”). It is al so w o rth noting that the b l ood eviden tly spilled inside the evidence container wh en the jeans were pr o tected inside a plastic zip lock bag, as shown by the pres

ence of ab l oodstain o nthe outsi d e of that bag. See Re

-9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. cord, Plt. Exh. 10–6. House’s expert tested the exterio r and interior of that plastic bag for bloodsta i ns using a n “extremely sensitive” test, and only the exte rior of the bag tested positive for blood. Id., Doc. 274, at 95–96. The evidence in the record indicates that the jeans were placed in the plastic bag af tertheyarri ved atthe FBI: FBI r e cords showthat the j e ans arrived there in a paperbag, and the pla s tic bag has FBI markings on it. Id. , Adden

dum 2, Tria l Exh. 31, p. 36; id. , Plt. Exh. 10–6. The blood

stain on the outside of the pla s ti cbag there f ore furthe r supports t h e DistrictCourt’s co nclusion that the blood spilled after the evidence was rec e ived and tested by th e FBI, and not en route when the jeans were ina paper bag. I suppose i tis theoret ically possible that the jeans wer e contaminated by spilla ge before a rriving at the FBI, tha t Agent Bigbee either fa iled to no te or lied about such spil l

age, and th at the F B I then trans ferred the j e ans into a plastic bag and put them back i n side the evidence con

tainer withthe spilled blood stillsloshing around suffi

ciently to contaminate the outside of the plastic bag as extensively as it di d. This sort of unbridled speculati o n can theoretically defeat any inco nvenient fact, but doe s not suffice t o convince me t hat the Distri ct Court’s factua l finding—th at the blo o d spilled after F B I testing—wa s clearly erroneous. Moreover, the yellow “Tennesse e Crime Lab” tape placed around the container on allfour sides does not lin e up when the bloodstained corners of the cont ainer and it s lid are aligned, showing that the blood did not spill until sometime after the container was received and opened at its first destination—the FBI. See id., Respondent’s Exh. 24; id., Doc. 276, pp. 190–191 (testimony of Paulette Sut

ton). The majority po ints out that on one side of the con

tainer, the first of tw o layers of tape appears to begin cleanly at the lid’s edge, and from this concludes that th e container must have been cut op en and res e aled by Ten

-10 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. nessee authorities en route to the FBI. Ant e , at 25; see Record, Respondent’s Exh. 23d. Even if t h e majorit y ’s deduction from a photograph of the container were true, it would show only that Tennessee a u thorities had reason to open the container once it was sealed to take something out or pu t s o mething in, perhaps back a t the crime lab i n Union County. Bu t even if the container had been opened before its arrival at th e FBI, the majority re cognizes that it was resealed with “ T ennessee Crime Lab” tape, and t h e second layer of tape aligns only when the bloodstains on the contain e r and its lid do not. An t e, a t24–2 5. Of cours e , the DistrictCourt—wh ich concluded that the blood was spilled after testing a tthe FBI la boratory—h ad before it the box itself with th e tape as the witnesses testified on the point, and not—like this Cour t—simply a photograp h

. See Bessem er City , 470 U. S., at 5 74 (district court’s find

ings about physical evidence are reviewed for clear error). House’s theory that th e blood on his jeans was trans

ferred there from theautopsy samples is based on Dr. Blake’s rea d ing of Agent Bigbee’s enzyme marker analys is summary. After reading the summary, Dr . Blake con

cluded that the enzy mes inthebloodstain s on Hous e’ s jeans and the enzymes in the autopsy samples had dete

riorated to the same extent. Record, Doc. 275, p. 110. In particular, he noted that the GL O1 enzyme showed “in

complete penetration” on both the autopsy blood and the jeans, and because enz y mes are better preserved on cloth, the enzyme should have been present on the jeans. Id. , a t 116. But Agent Bigb ee disputedDr. Blake’s reading of what was, after all, A g ent Bigbee ’s own s t ud y. He testi

fied that “ ‘inc’ ” on hi s chart meant “inconclusive,” not “incomplete penetration,” and that the term “ i nconclusive” meant that the enzyme was present, but could not be grouped into an AB O bloodtype. Id., Doc. 276, at 14 0. While pointing out th at his summary show ed different levels of en zymes in the two samples, Agent Bigbee als o11 Cite as: 54 7 U

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Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. noted that many different fa ctors—such as heat, dirt, or bacteria in a clothes hamper—could cause enzymes to degrade on cloth. Id. , at 139, 167–170. Considering how House’s new blood spillage eviden ce fits within the record as a whole, I can see n o clea r error in the District Court’ s express finding that the blood spilled in the evidence container afterthe FBI found Mrs. Muncey’ s blood on House’s jeans. The District Court attentively presided overa complex evidentiary hearing, often questioning witn esses exten

sively duri ng the p r esentation of critical ev idence. See, e.g., id., Do c. 275, at 1 10–115. The court co ncisely sum

marized the evidence presented, then dutifully made findings about the reli ability of the testimony it heard and the evidence it observed. Weare poorly equipped to sec

ond-guess the Distric tCourt’s r e liability findings and should defer to them, consistent with the guidance w e provided in Schlup

. II With due r e gard to the District Court’s reliability find

ings, this case invites a straightforwar dapplication of the legal standard adopte d in Schlup

. A pe ti ti one r doe s n o t pa ss th ro u gh the Sc hl up g a t e way if itis “ m or e li k e ly th an not th a tth ere i s any juror who , a c tin g re aso nab l y , wo ul d hav efound th e petitionerguilty beyo n dar e ason ab l edo ubt

. ” 513 U. S., at 3 33 (O’Co nno r, J

. , co n c u rri n g ) (em p h a si s ad de d)

. The majority states that if House had presented just one of his thre e k e y pieces of eviden ce—or even two of the three—he would not pass through the Schlup gatewa y. See ante , at 28 (“Were House’s c hallenge to the State’s case limited to the ques t ions he has raised about the blood and semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution might well suffice to b a r relief”); ante , at 33 (“If considered in isolation , a reasonable jury mi ght well disregard [th e12 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. evidence pointing to M r . Muncey]. In combi nation, how

ever, with the challen g es to the blood evide n ce and the lack of motive with respect to House, the evid ence pointi ng to Mr. Mu ncey likelywould rein force other doubts as to House’s gu ilt”). Ac cording to th e majority, House has picked the trifecta of e vidence tha tplaces co nviction out

side the realm of choices anyjuror, acting reasonabl y, would make. Becaus e the case against House remain s substantiall y unaltered from the case presented to the jury, I disagree. At trial, th e State pre s ented its story about what hap

pened on the night of Mrs. M uncey’ s murder. The Munceys’ daughter heard a d eep-voiced perpetrator arri ve at the Mun c ey home late at nigh t and tell Mrs. Muncey that her husband had been in a wreck ne ar the creek. App. 19. Ms. Tharp relayed her testimony again at the evidentiary hearing, a n d th e District Courtdetermined that she wa s a “very c r e dible witness.” Id., at270, 323. When polic e question e d Hous e after witnesses reporte d seeing him emerge from the embankment near Mrs. Muncey’ s body shortly before it was discovered, he to ld two different officers that he never left Donna Turner’s trailer the previous evening, even recounting the series of television programs he watchedbefore going t o bed. 7 Tr

. 963–965, 1 031–1032. He had worked to concoct an alibi we now kn ow was a lie. On the day Mrs. M u ncey’s bod y was found, Bill Breeding, a crim i nal investi g ator at th e Union County Sheriff’s Office, observed House at the local jail and not i ced that he had abrasi o ns “across his knuckles and about his hands,” two or three bruises on his right arm, scratc hes on his chest, and his right ring finger w a s red and swollen. 6 id

. , at 801–802. The interviewin g officers not i ced similarinjuries. App. 78–80; 7 Tr. 974– 975. House told them that his finger was swol len because he fel loff a porch, and the scratches and bruises w e re from tearing down a b u ilding, and from a cat. Ibid. Ms.13 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. Turner initially confirmed House’s alibi, but she changed her story when police warned her that coveri ng up a ho mi

cide was a serious offense. Id. , at 1063. Ms. Turner the n told police that House had in fact left her house that night between 10: 30 and 10:4 5 p.m. Id. , at 1062–1063. He came back some time later panting an d sweating, shirtless and shoeless, a n d with va rious injuri es. App. 8 8–91; 8 Tr. 1154–1155.

Also on the day the body was found, Sheriff Earl Loy asked Hous e if he was wearing th e same clot hes he wore the night before. 6 id., at 845. House “hes itated,” then stated that he had changed his shirt, but not his jeans

. Ibid. In other words, he specifically tried to conceal fro m the police that he had worn o t her jeans the night before, for reasons that were to beco me clear. Ms . Turner re

vealed that House’s sta t ement that he had not changed his jeans was a lie, and police retrieved House’s dirty jea n s from Ms. Turner’ s hamper. Ibid. Of course , FBI testin g revealed that House’s jeans w e re stained with M r s. Muncey’s b l ood, and t h e DistrictCourt det e rmined that House’s new evidence of blood spi llage did not undermine those test results. App. 348. If in fact Mrs. Muncey’s blood only got on Ho use’ s jeans from later evidentiary spillage, House would have had no reason to lie to try to k eep the existence of the concealed jeans from the police. Through Ms. Turner’s testimony at trial, the jury also heard House’s story about what happened that night. He left Ms. Tur n er’s trailer late at night to go for a walk. Id. , at 86. When he ret u rned some time later—panting , sweating, and missing his shirt and shoes—he told h e r that some men ina truck tried to kill him. Id. , at 88–9 1. When Ms. Turner as ked House about his injuries, he attributed t h em to fighting with hi s assailants. Id. , at 90; 8 Tr. 1154–1155. Ho use retold this story to the District Court, sayi ng that he initially li ed to polic e because he was on parole and did not want to draw atten t ion to him

-14 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. self. Record, Doc. 276 , at 99, 108–109. In other words, having nothing to hide and fa cing a murder charge, Hou s e lied—and when he was caught i nthe lie, h e said he li ed not to escape the murder charge, but solely t o avoid unex

plained difficulties with his pa role officer. The jury r e jected House’s story about the night’s eve n ts, and the District Court “consid ered Mr. House’s demeanor and found that he was not a credible witness.” App. 329. The jury al so heard House’s attempt to implicate Mr. Muncey in his wife’s murder b ycalling Mrs. Muncey’s brother, Ri cky G r een, as a witne ss. Mr. G r een testified that t w o we eks before the murder, his sister called him to say that she and Mr. Muncey had been figh ting, that she wanted to l e ave him, a n d thatshe was scared. 7 Tr. 1088. Mr. Green also testif ied that the Munceys had marital problems, and that he had previously seen Mr. Muncey hit his wife. Id. , at 1087. The ju ry rejected Hou s e’s attempt to implicate Mr. Muncey, and the District Court was not persuaded by House’s attempt to supplement this eviden ce at the evidentiary hearing, finding that his new witnesses were not credible. App. 348. Noticeably absent from the State’s story about wha t happened to Mrs. Mu ncey on the night of h e r death was much mention of the s e men found on Mrs. Mu ncey’s cloth

ing. House’s single victory at the evidentiary hearing wa s new DNA e vidence pro ving thatt h e semen was deposited by Mr. Muncey. The majority identifies the semen evi

dence as “[c]entral to the State’s case” against House, an te , at 8, but House’s jury would prob ably be quite surprise d by this cha r acterizatio n
. At trial , Agent Bigb ee testified that from the semen s t ains onMrs. Muncey’s clothing, he could determine that the man who deposited the semen had type A blood, and was a secre tor. App. 5 4–56. Agen t Bigbee also testified t hat House and Mr. Muncey both have type A blood, that House is a secretor, and th a t “[t]here is an eighty(80%) pe r cent chance that [Mr.15 Cite as: 54 7 U

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Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. Muncey] is a secretor.” Id., at 55–56; 6 Tr. 95 2 (emphasis added). M o reover, Agent Bigbee informed the jury that because 40 percent of people have type A blood, and 80 percent of those peopl eare secretors, the se men on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing could have bee ndeposited by roughl y one out of every three males. Id. , at 957. The jury wa s also informed several times bythe defense that M r s. Muncey’s body was found fully clothed. See, e.g., 4 id., at 628; 9 id. , a t1274. The majority describe s House’s sexual motive as “a central theme in the S t ate’s narra tive linking House to the crime,” and states that without t h e semen evidence, “a jury .

. . would have found it necessary to est ablish s o me different motive, or, if the sa me motive, an intent far more speculative.” Ante , at 21. The State, however, consi s tently direc t ed the jury ’s attention awayfrom motive, and sexual motive was far from a “central theme” of the State’s case—presumably beca use of the highly ambiguous nature of the semen evidence recounted above. The Tennesse e Supreme Court did no t mention that evidence in catalog

ing the “[p]articularl y incriminating” or “[d]amagin g” evidence against House. App. 135. The State did not mention th e semenevidence in it s opening s t atement to the jury, in stead focusing on premeditation. 4 Tr. 613 – 615. The defense us ed its openi n g statement to expose lack of motive as a we akness in the State’s case. Id. , at 628. After the State’s equivocal p r esentation of the semen evidence through Age n t Bigbee’s testimony at trial, the State againmade no reference to the semen evidence or to a motive in its closing argument, prompting th e defense to again highlight this omission. 9 id. , at 1274 (“[W]hy was Carolyn Mu ncey killed? We don’ t know. Is it important to have some motive? In your minds? What motive did Paul Gregory Ho use have to go over an d kill a woman that he barely kne w? Who was still dressed, still clad in h e r clothes”).16 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. In rebuttal, the State disclaimed any res p onsibility to prove motive, again shifting the jur y ’s focus to premeditation: “The law says that if you take another person’s life, you beat th em, you strangle them, and then you don’t succeed, and then you kill them by giving them multi

ple blows to the head, and one massive blow to th e head, and that that causes th eir brains to cras h against the other side of their skull, and caus ed such severe bleeding inside the skull i t self, that you die— that it doe s not make any difference under God’s heaven, wh at the moti ve was. T hat is wha tthe law is. The la w is that if motive is s h own, it ca n be con

sidered by the jury as evidence of guilt. But the law is that if you prove that a killing was done, beyond a reasonable doubt, by aperson, and that he premedi

tated it, he planned it, it is not necessary for the jury to conclude why he did it.” App. 10 6. As a fol l ow-up to this explanation, when the trial was almost over and only in response to the defense’ s consis

tent prod ding, the Sta t e made its first andonly reference to a possib l e motive, followed i mmediately by another disclaimer: “Now, you may have an idea why he did it. The evi

dence at the scenewhich seemedto suggest that he was subjecting this lady to some kind of indignity, why would you get a lady out of her house, late at night, in her night clothes, under the trick t hat her husband has had a wre ck do wn by the creek? .

. . Why is it that yo u choke her? Why is it that you re peatedly beat her? Why is it t hat she has scrapes allover her body? Well, it is because either you don’t wan ther to tell what in dignities you have subjected her to , or she is unwillingand fights against you, against being sub

jected to th ose indignities.

. . . That is what the evi

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Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. dence at th e scene suggests about motive. But motive is not an element of the crime. It is something that you can consider, or i g nore
. Whatever you prefer. The issue i s not motive. The is su e is premeditation.” Id. , at 106–107. It is on this “obliqu[e]” reference to the semen evidenc e during the State’s closing argument that the majori ty bases its as sertion that House’s sexual motive was a “cen

tral theme in the State’s narra tive.” Ante , at 11, 21. Although it is possib l e that one or even some j u rors might have entertained doubt about House’s guiltabsent the clearest evidence of motive, I do not find it more likely than not th at eve r yjuror would h a ve done so, and that is the legal standard under Schlup

. The majority aphoristi

cally states that “[w]h e n identity is in questi o n, motive i s ke y.” An te , at 21. Not at all. Sometimes, when identity is in question, alibi is key

. Here, House came u p with one

— and it fella p art, later admitted to be fabricat ed when hi s girlfriend w o uld not lie to p r otect him. Sc rat c hes from a cat, indeed. Surely a reasonabl e juror would give the fact that analibi had been made up an d discredite d significan t weight. People facing a murd er charge, who are innocen t , do not make up a story out of concern that th e truth migh t somehow disturb their parole o fficer. An d p eople do not lie to the p o lice about which jeans they were wearing th e night of a murder, if they have no reason to believe the jeans would be stained withthe blood shed by the victi m in her last desperate struggle to live. In Schlup , we made clear that the standard we adopted requires a “stronger sh owing than that needed to establis h prejudice.” 513 U. S., a t327. In other words, House must show more than just a “reasonable probability that .

. . th e factfinder would have had a reas onable doub t respecting guilt.” S t ri ck la n d v. Was h ington, 4 66 U. S. 66 8 , 695 (1 98 4). H o u s e m u s tpresent such compelli ng evidence of innocenc e18 HO USE v. BELL Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. that it beco mes more li kely t han n o t that no s i ngle juror, acting reasonably, would vote to convict him. Schlup , supra , a t3 29. The majority’s conclusion is that gi ven the sisters’ testimony (if believed), an d Dr. Blake’s rebutte d testimony about how to inte rpret Agent Bigb ee’s enzyme marker ana lysis summary (if acce pted), comb ined with t h e revelation that the semen onMrs. Muncey’s clothing was deposited by her husba nd (whichthe jurors knew was ju st as likely as the semenhaving been depositedby House), no reasonable juror would vote to convict Ho use. Ante , at 34. Given the District Cou rt’s rel i ability fin d ings abou t the first two pieces of e vidence, the evidence before us no w is not substantially different from that considered by House’s jury. I therefore find it m o re likely than not tha t in light of this new evidence, at least one juror, actin g reasonably, would vote to convi ct House. Th e evidence as a whole certainly does not establis h that Hou s e is actuall y innocent of the crime of murdering CarolynMuncey, and accordingly I dissent.