Table 28

Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Junior NCO (Army XXI)

Rank

Conscientiousness/Dependability
MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and Skill
General Cognitive Aptitude

Motivating and Leading Others

Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative
Need to Achieve and General Energy Level
Oral Communication Skill

Characteristic Level of Integrity and Discipline
Judgment and Decision Making Skill

In top tier of Army SME and Psychologist
Panels.

In top tier of one panel and in 2nd tier of the
other panel.

Common Task Knowledge and Skill

Fostering Adaptive Teamwork
Physical Fitness
Relating to and Supporting Others

In top tier of one panel and in 3rd tier for the
other panel.

Adaptability
Training Others

In 2nd tier of one panel and tied with other
KSAs for inclusion in 2nd tier.

Ethical Value System

General Self-Management Skill
Selfless Service Orientation

In 2nd tier of one panel (or tied for 2nd) and in
3rd tier of other panel.

Working Memory

Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures
Advanced Computer Skills

Basic Electronics Knowledge

Basic Math Facility

Basic Mechanical Knowledge

Concern for Soldier Quality of Life
Cultural Tolerance
Emotional Stability

In 3rd tier of both panels.

Knowledge Management
Knowledge of System Inter-relations
Military Presence

Perceptual Speed and Accuracy
Psychomotor Aptitude

Safety Consciousness

Self-Directed Learning Skill

Spatial Relations Aptitude

Writing Skill

52



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Table 12
Baseline Predictors of First Tour Performance

¢ Judgment and Decision Making. Reacts to new situations by applying learned principles and
experiences. Uses common sense and reason in determining actions in a situation.

¢ Adaptability. Responds adequately and effectively to changes in schedules and missions or
tasks. Performs well when the unexpected occurs.

¢ Ingenuity. Applies novel solutions to problems to get the job done when standard solutions
don’t work, Is able to “work outside the box” when required but does not do so in a way that
creates problems or turmoil.

« Basic Math. Knows and applies addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and simple
mathematical formulas.

e Reading. Understands written performance instructions, operator’s manuals, basic textbooks,
letters of instructions, written orders, and job directives.

¢ Writing. Communicates thoughts, ideas, and information successfully to others by writing.
Uses proper sentence structure including grammar, spelling, capitalization, and punctuation.

¢ Oral Communication. Conveys thoughts, ideas, and information to supervisors, other soldiers,
and civilians through speech. Is understood by others with whom the soldier must interact on the
job.

¢ Persuasiveness. Is able to get others to see his or her viewpoint and to convince others to react
and interact favorably.

¢ Stability. Maintains even and levelheaded behavior in stressful situations. Is able to effectively
perform the job under conditions of mental or emotional stress.

¢ Teamwork. Cooperates effectively with others to get the job done. Works well as a member of
a group in both formal and informal, job and non-job situations.

¢ Dependability and Autonomy. Is responsible and loyal to the unit and to the requirements of
the job. Can be expected to follow though on his or her duties or requirements with little or no
supervision. Is self-confident, self-sufficient, and comfortable when working alone.

* Moral Courage. Acts on own convictions despite the consequences. Does not succumb to peer
pressure to commit prohibited, harmful, or questionable acts.



Table C-4
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from
Decentralized Operations

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic - Decentralized Operations. Technological advances will increase
the physical dispersion between units and elements, and between supporting and supported units.
Elements can maintain friendly awareness without need for visual contact. Increased communications and
digital situational feeds will allow remote commanders to monitor the status of widely dispersed
elements. Employment of elements will be flatter and less hierarchical. Fewer troops should be employed
in a unit or mission. More autonomous, smaller elements will be used, particularly in combat support and
combat service support operations. Increased deployments and fewer available troops, coupled with
increased technology, will drive operations to a lower level. Platoons and companies will become focal
points for employment and operations.

Inferred Job Components — First Tour Soldiers

Teamwork: While it is not anticipated that the move towards decentralized operations will push
significant decision making down to skill level (SL)1, the AXXI feature of decentralized and more
independent small unit operations will highlight the requirement for teamwork among all members of
small teams. Cohesiveness and trust will be major requirements of teams. Even junior members of teams
will be involved in group dynamics and in implementing courses of action directed by small unit leaders.
While most small unit activities will still mostly carry out prescriptive instruction, there will be an
increase in situations that allow for group input and team participation in problem solving.

Dependability and Autonomy: Decentralized operations combined with smaller units and staffing will
increase the requirements of many SL1 soldiers to perform their specialty independently. While still
functioning as a member of a small team, there will be skills that some soldiers will bring to the team that
they alone possess. This will be particularly true of combat support and combat service support soldiers
that augment small combat teams.

Inferred Job Components - NCOs

Decision Making Proficiency: NCO and junior officer operational autonomy and responsibility will
increase. Many officer judgments and determinations will migrate to the NCO level, depending on the
situation. At the same time, the ability to accurately monitor low level unit situations will increase up the
chain of command and decision making may become a more shared activity. Situational knowledge may
become more widespread, but it may not be matched by incumbent experience to allow radically
decentralized decision making to very low levels. The result may be a change in the AOE decision
making model as it applies to NCOs. The greatest focus of altered decision making responsibilities will
likely be at SL3 and SL4.

Effort and Initiative: An increase in the number of decentralized and independent operations will
increase the probabilities that NCOs will directly control and command many of these operations.
Responsibilities for many independent actions will be given to NCOs. Officer supervision will be either
non-existent of increasingly remote. Greatest impact will be at SL3 and SL4 but there may be a migration
downwards of responsibility throughout the NCO ranks.

(table continues)

C-17



Table C-2 (continued)

Adherence to Regulations and Orders: Deployments, particularly for non-traditional missions, are
often earmarked by regulatory do’s and don’ts. Standard operating procedures (SOP) and rules of
engagement (ROE) are often imposed by decree without explanation for their necessity. Soldiers must
understand and abide by regulations and directives that may, to them, seem unnecessary or burdensome.
AOE-era regulations and orders were mostly of routine, administrative nature. Increased deployments will
generate more requirements to standardize performance through decree than were experienced in the
limited deployment Army of AOE.

Integrity and Self-Discipline: Unconventional missions can be frustrating and their locale oftentimes
brings young soldiers into contact with people and cultures that are alien or even hostile. Soldiers must
control their own anger and prejudices in their dealings with foreign nationals, other armies, and host
nations. Soldiers must be able to operate humanely in situations that are not governed by ROE and the
Rules of War. Limited deployments during AOE foreshadowed what will be a more widespread
requirement during AXXI.

Dependability and Autonomy: During deployments, many combat support and combat service support
soldiers will operate away from their units and from direct supervisory control. All soldiers will need to
operate without direct supervision on occasion.

Military Presence: Each soldier on a deployment represents the United States and the Army. Appearance
and conduct are always being evaluated and increased media coverage of deployments highlights soldier
appearance and deportment.

Inferred Job Components - NCOs

MOS/Occupation-Specific Job Task Performance: The diversity of potential assignments increases the
tasks that an NCO must be skilled on. Since many deployments are small unit operations, the increase in
collective performance impacts most heavily on SL3 and SL4. Many of these are train-up tasks or one-of-
a-kind that only apply to a specific deployment, but they still must be mastered.

Safety Practices: NCOs are directly responsible for the safety of operations. Deployments often involve
live munitions, vehicle operation in new terrain and conditions, new health or climate threats, and
fatigued and inexperienced soldiers operating under stress. Non-hostile injuries, casualties, and illness
habitually extract a bigger toll during deployments than do hostile activities.

Practical Problem Solving: Each new deployment presents unique problems. While many of these are
routine daily operational challenges, some situations could have a major impact. NCOs will be faced with
an increased demand on their ability to apply knowledge and experience in new situations. Because of the
decentralized nature of operations during many deployments, the greatest impact will probably be at SL3
and SL4.

Decision-Making: Unconventional missions increase the likelihood of decentralized missions and
unanticipated situations. Routine decisions can take on new implications in sensitive environments. The
ability to use common sense and reasoning in arriving at the correct course of action can be very
important. As with other deployment work demands, this requirement may be most pronounced at SL3
and SL4.

(table continues)

C-12



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

‘Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army

Human Resources Research Organization
Technical Review by

Michael G. Rumsey
Tonia S. Heffner

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Technical Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Technical Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
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and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Technical Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

Preceding Page's Blank


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There have been discussions among Department of Defense (DoD) and service
representatives to make other modifications to the ASVAB. For example, some stakeholders are
interested in deleting the two speeded subtests (Numerical Operations and Coding Speed). There
has also been some very limited discussion about introducing a test of computer literacy. To
date, none of these proposals for change have been adopted.

Enlisted Soldier Promotion Systems

An understanding of how the enlisted promotion system currently functions, particularly as
applied to those in the NCO ranks, is essential to consideration of future changes or supplements
to that system. Basic to the understanding of the enlisted promotion is that there are three
different types of systems: decentralized, semi-centralized, and centralized. In the decentralized
system all the promotions are controlled and administered within the soldier’s unit. The
decentralized system applies for promotion to Private (E2), Private First Class (E3), and
Specialist (E4). The semi-centralized system applies to soldiers being considered for Sergeant
(E5) and Staff Sergeant (E6) promotions. In the semi-centralized system, all promotion
procedures are conducted in the soldier’s unit but DA determines how many soldiers from each
MOS get promoted and when those promotions occur. In the centralized system, all promotion
procedures, as well as the authorization of promotions, occur at DA level. This system applies
for promotion to Sergeant First Class (E7), Master Sergeant (E8), and Sergeant Major (E9). For a
comprehensive overview of all of these systems, see Appendix D. The two promotion systems
that are most relevant to this study are the semi-centralized and centralized systems since they
address promotion of NCOs (E5 through E9) as opposed to the decentralized system, which
addresses junior-enlisted promotion.

The semi-centralized system uses the standard Promotion Point Worksheet (DA Form 3355)
forms that list predetermined promotion point factors. With a possible total of 800 points, the
worksheet covers six areas of performance: Duty Performance (200 points), Awards and
Decorations (50 points), Military Education (150 points), Civilian Education (100 points),
Military Training (100 points), and an Appearance before a Promotion Board (200 points). All
soldiers recommended for promotion must appear in front of a local promotion board. Board
members may ask questions and may review the soldiers’ records to make decisions regarding
point assignments on the worksheet. Cutoff scores are determined each month by Department of
Army Headquarters (HQDA [DA, 1999]).

In the centralized promotion system, all processing is done at HQDA level and promotion
evaluation is done by an Army-wide centralized board, based only on the soldier’s official
military records. Boards are constituted by the DCSPER on an as-needed basis. Each board is
headed by a general officer and is composed of both officer and NCO members. Records
available for board review include all administrative data on the soldier such as date and place of
birth, height and weight, dates of service, history of assignments, military schooling, promotion
records, and civilian schooling. Also available to the board is a record of awards and decorations,
Article 15s, court-martial records, letters of reprimand, course completion certificates and
transcripts, and the individual's evaluation reports (NCOER).

61



Table C-3
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from Diverse
Forces

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic: Diversity of Forces. Experimentation, change, innovation, and
inconsistency will mark the period of AXXI. Some units and soldiers will experience the very latest in
technology and capability while others will operate little different from the Army of the early 1990s.
Reliability of digital capability will be an issue throughout the period and the need for back-up to digital
functions will remain. Many innovations and technologies will be one-of-a-kind or temporary. More and
more units will fill unique niches in equipment, missions, training, and technology and there will be less
standardization in the force. Technology will change rapidly. Developmental testing and experimentation
will occur in operational units and must go hand in hand with training and mission preparedness.

Inferred Job Components ~ First Tour Soldiers

MOS/Occupation-Specific Job Requirements: Because of the diversity of units and equipment, more
and more learning of SL1 tasks will take place in units rather than in advanced individual training (AIT).
Some soldiers may have difficulty learning in this less structured environment. Overall, the number of
tasks to be learned in many MOS will increase as back-up skills are added for digital or automated
performance. In support of experimentation, skill level (SL)1 soldiers may have to learn tasks and
perform activities that are related only to the experiment being supported.

Adaptability: Soldier experiences during their first tour will be less predictable and more subject to
change as AXXI innovations are implemented and modified. New learning will be a constant.

Effort and Initiative: Change and inconsistency in equipment and procedures will be a characteristic of
many units during AXXI. Constant change motivates some soldiers and inhibits others. Compared with
their Army of Excellence (AOE) counterparts, AXXI SL1 soldiers will be required to perform more
diverse tasks under changing conditions. Even routine tasks can be more challenging as innovations are
tried out. Individual effort and persistence in performance, along with motivation to do the best job
possible, will be increasingly important.

Self-Development: Even at SL1, the responsibility for learning and perfecting new or changed tasks will
default to the individual soldier. Change and learning will be constant and not all changes will be
accompanied by formal training or New Equipment Training Team (NETT) assistance. Even where such
support is provided, task mastery will fall to the individual in many situations.

Inferred Job Components - NCOs

MOS/Occupation-Specific Job Requirements: The technical aspects of NCO jobs in AXXI will
become more complex due to the diversity of units, assignments, equipment, and organizations. The AOE
assumption of NCOs being technically and tactically proficient in their military occupational specialty
(MOS) may be more difficult to maintain due to the uniqueness of individual units. NCOs coming from
old assignments into the same job may be faced with totally unfamiliar equipment and operations.
Likewise, there may be no or even negative transfer from the old ways of doing things. On the other hand,
NCOs who have learned non-digital ways of doing things may be at an advantage when back-up skills are
required. But NCOs who are away from their skill job for 2 or 3 years on generic assignments (recruiting,
Reserve duty) may find themselves unfamiliar with what is going on in their MOS.

(table continues)



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¢ How performance measures should be aggregated into composites for validation
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U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (1997). Untitled briefing slides on mission, vision, etc.
[34 pages]. Available: http://www.momouth.army.mil/afcea.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (1997). Vision 2010. Pamphlet, Army Special
Operations Forces. Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (1998). Vision 2020. Pamphlet, Army Special
Operations Forces.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (1998). New Division Design Homepage.
Available: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/newdiv/index.html.

B-26



conflicting information. Each NCO must also have on record a full length, color, official
photograph in uniform with all authorized badges, tabs, awards, and decorations.

Centralized evaluation boards are supposed to consider the “whole soldier.” That is, no
single factor should be considered as overriding in determining qualification for promotion.
Factors that have been identified for consideration include:

e Scope and variety of assignments

¢ Estimate of potential for performance in the next higher grade

¢ Trends in efficiency

¢ Length of service and maturity

e Awards, decorations, and commendations

¢ Military and civilian education’

« Moral standards

« Integrity and character

¢ General physical condition

As noted, the procedures in selecting persons for promotion can vary with each board.

However, PERSCOM offers the following as an “example” of the procedure used by centralized
boards (PERSCOM, 1999). The panel members evaluate each file using a numerical system as
depicted in Figure D-1. Scores range from 1 to 6 with a ‘+’ or ‘—’ used to further amplify the
numerical ratings. Scoring is done independently and then averaged; no board consensus or

discussion of individual records is allowed, although individual panel members may request
additional information before voting if record discrepancies are discovered.

6+/- Exceptional Performer
5+/- Strong Performer
4+/- Solid Performer
3+/- Fully Qualified Performer
*
2+/- Weak Performer — Retain in Grade
1+/- Poor Performer — Refer for Qualitative Management Program (QMP)

*Fully qualified line

Figure D-1. Basic eligibility thresholds for semi-centralized enlisted promotions.

7 Soldiers must have completed their MOS advanced NCO course (ANCOC) to be eligible for promotion to E7.

D-7



Table C-7 (continued)

Adaptability and Ingenuity: Despite all the technology and information sources that are anticipated to
be available to Battle Force soldiers, they will not be automatons. Reacting, improvising, and revising
will be crucial parts of Battle Force operations. Things will still go wrong and equipment will fail during
mission but Battle Force soldiers still must perform effectively.

Communication: Conveying thoughts, ideas, conclusions, and recommendations will be a critical part of
Battle Force operations. While relaying of much information will be automated, the human ability to
communicate effectively will be, if anything, more vital to Battle Force operations. The ability of
individuals to organize, present, conduct, and respond to verbal and non-verbal communications will be
crucial.

Problem Solving and Decision Making: Near-perfect situational awareness, AI, automated planning,
and automated decision assistance paradigms should all be available and workable for the Battle Forces.
Still, soldiers will be required to apply human interpretations, apply sense and reason, and reach
conclusions. Battle Force members will consistently be required to apply human judgements in
confirming or overriding programmed or automated performance paths, all in very short periods of time
and under pressures that we have not yet defined.

Stability: Battle Force soldiers will be used in combat situations that we currently cannot forecast. They
may witness employment of weapons of mass destructions (WMD) including large-scale civilian
casualties. They may be deployed while the U.S. homeland (and their families) are under missile or
WMD threat or attack. They may be placed in situations that their training did not cover or be faced with
unanticipated equipment failures. Invariably they will be expected to operate in very small groups and
sometimes even alone. Battle Force elements can expect casualties that can destroy team nucleus. All
these factors will increase mental and emotional stress under conditions that we cannot yet anticipate.

Directing, Monitoring, Supervising: Because of the team nature of activities and the interactive
requirements, Battle Force members will all be responsible for monitoring the actions of each other. The
nature of supervision and directing will change from the Army model we know with AOE. Directing and
supervising in the Battle Force environment will be a more shared, collaborative effort rather than a sole
responsibility of those “in charge.” This function will likely extend beyond the immediate Battle Force
members to Battle Force teams made up of joint services or foreign national members.

Planning, Organizing, Coordinating, and Executing: As with monitoring and supervising, this will
become a team requirement, shared and participated in by many, unlike the AOE model where it is the
requirement of a few. Because of the short time to do planning and organizing under Battle Force
conditions, a totally new procedure to effectively accomplish this must be developed. While it may be
somewhat automated, it must still have a distinct human component. At present, we cannot surmise how
this future-planning model will operate.

Fitness: Fitness will likely have three components: physical, mental, and emotional. Physical fitness will
likely be in terms of stamina and endurance rather than AOE characteristics of strength and leg speed.
The ability to cycle, at will, between rest and activity may be increasingly important. Age, up to a point,
may be incidental and the average age of the Battle Force soldier will likely be mid-30s. Mental fitness
will include agility, comprehension, acuteness, and memory. Emotional fitness will probably require
stress resistance. ,

(table continues)



Table 37
Potential Innovative Measurement Methods

Self-Report
Standardized self-descriptions via inventory or questionnaire (paper-and-pencil, Internet, telephone)
Alternative methods for self-description
Forced choice or quasi-ipsative scaling (e.g., Assessment of Individual Motivation [AIM])
Unobtrusive or disguised self-report (the Conditional Reasoning Test)
Context-specific temperament/personality items
Biodata
Performance based standardized skills assessment
Noncomputerized standardized tests (e.g., ladder climbing for fire fighter applicants; physical
endurance tests).
Computerized tests (e.g., Project A psychomotor tests)
Situational judgment tests - Multiple choice format
Paper-and-pencil
Computer administered (text and perhaps still pictures)
Video portrayal
Interactive video/CD-ROM
Internet or phone delivered
Situational Judgment Test (SJT) - Free response
Oral response (e.g., situational interview; may be phone delivered)
Written response (includes essay test; might include automated scoring)
Standardized description of work/experience history
Accomplishment record
Structured questionnaire (e.g., the standard application blank)
Questionnaire checklist (i.e., a large a priori list of “experiences”)
Job Simulations
Assessment Centers
Full version
Mini assessment center
Delivery via phone, personal computer, or Internet
Mini training program (i.e., two days or less)
Job samples/simulations
High fidelity (e.g., airline cockpit)
Moderate fidelity (Project A hands-on, Air Force walk through; oral boards)
Low Fidelity (hypothetical “talk through”)
Prior or Current Performance
Assessment of prior performance using standardized appraisals
Giving rating scales to current or previous supervisors or co-workers
Portfolio assessment
Assessment of current performance
Peer or “other” descriptions (e.g., 360° feedback)
Scored performance on actual work tasks recorded via videotape or other device
Behavior description interview (Rater describes individual using open response or checklist.
An a priori scoring system developed through previous scaling research is applied)

67



HQ, TRADOC Joint Venture Directorate (Fort Monroe, Virginia). This TRADOC office
has the responsibility for coordination of the Army Experimentation Concept Plan
(AECP), including scheduled Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and Advanced
Warfighting Demonstrations (AWD). The deputy director explained Joint Venture’s role
in the AECP and its supporting AWE/AWD, vital components of the AXXI
implementation plan.

HQ, TRADOC Futures Training Directorate (Fort Monroe, Virginia). As coordinator of
TRADOC’s AXXI training initiatives and innovations, this Directorate provided vital
input to understanding AXXI. This site visit included discussions involving many facets
of the training development arena (e.g., collective training, individual training). More
than a dozen people, including contractors, officers, and TRADOC civilian staff,
provided input.

HQ, 4th Infantry Division (ID) (Fort Hood, Texas). The 4th ID has been designated the
Army’s “first digital division” and was the unit that conducted all of the AXXI
digitization AWEs starting in 1996. We interviewed staff NCOs and operators who had
actual experience in digital operations.

Digital Force Coordination Cell (DFCC) (Fort Hood, Texas). This group of officers,
NCOs, civilians, and contractors oversees all of the experimentation regarding
digitization at Fort Hood. They coordinate on many levels for AWE/AWD and are ina
unique position to experience and interpret trends resulting from operating in digital
environments. The director of the DFCC provided important insights into the issues
faced by digital units, including recruiting and training the most capable soldiers.

Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF) (Fort Hood, Texas). The CTSF trains
individuals and staffs to function digitally. They provide operator level instruction on
equipment and collective training on operating as a digital staff for staff officers and
NCOs. We interviewed two analysts from the contractor staff at CTSF who develop and
implement training for digital staffs and discussed the implications of operating in a
digital environment.

U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) (Fort Knox, Kentucky). A civilian
representative from the Program Analysis and Evaluation department provided input on
current and future recruiting initiatives and granted us access to numerous reports on
USAREC-sponsored studies of future issues.

USASMA. The staff at USASMA has proponency for much of the NCO educational
system (NCOES) direction and development. They also provide a measure of the “pulse”
of the NCO world and current thinking and expectations. Interviews were conducted
with key personnel.

The Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Lab (MMBL) (Fort Knox, Kentucky). The MMBL
is conducting a series of command and control (C2) reengineering experiments exploring
implications for future battle staffs in the digital age. These experiments should have
direct implications for the Strike Force concepts. During a site visit we were able to view
prototype C2 software and hardware and conduct interviews with contractor personnel
supporting the experiments.

25



References

Albright, M. (Secretary of State). (1999, April 6). A new NATO for a new century [16 pages]. A
Brookings National Issues Forum.

Available: http://www.brookings.edu/comm.transcripts/19990406.htm.

Alper, J. (1999, June 11). From bioweapons trenches, new tools for battling microbes. Science, 284
(5421), 1754-1755.

Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (1997). In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the
Information Age at Work. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Brand, S. (1997). Better to be part “‘phile” and part “phobe.” The Futurist. In K. Sale et al. (1997)
Information technology revolution: Boon or bane (pp. 10-15), Jan-Feb, 12.

Broad, W. J., & Miller, J. (1998, December 27). The world: Live ammo; The threat of germ
weapons is rising. Fear, too. New York Times on the Web [6 pages]. Week in Review Desk.

Broad, W. J., & Miller, J. (1999, January 28). Pentagon seeks command for emergencies in the U.S.
New York Times on the Web [5 pages]. National Desk.

Broder, D. S. (1999, February 17). Challenge from the young. The Washington Post. p. A17.

Brown, F. (LTG [Ret.]). (1997, November). Learning in Army XXI. Paper presented at the Army
Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next,
Leesburg, VA.

Buckley, E. (BG), & Echevarria, A. J. (LTC). (1998, March/April). Strategic preemption. Military
Review. Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Cohen, W. C. (1999, July 26). Preparing for a grave new world. The Washington Post, p. A19.

Dator, J. (1994). Surfing the tsunamis of change. Unpublished paper.
Available: http://www.soc.hawaii.edu/future/dator/other/STsunamis.html.

Day, J. C. (1996). Population projections of the United States by age, sex, race, and Hispanic
origin. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 25-1130. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.

Dede, C. (1995). Emerging educational trends and their impact on the youth cohort in 2010. In R.
Phillips & M. Thurman (Eds.), Future Soldiers and the Quality Imperative (pp. 159-202). Fort
Knox, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1999a). Army Afier Next insights [33 pages]. Presentation
slides. Available: http://www.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

A-21



Table 16 (continued)

Predictors of First Tour Job Performance

Self-Managed Learning Skill*. Has a clear overall goal of maintaining continuous learning
and training over one’s entire career. Is proficient at determining personal training needs,
planning education and training experiences to meet them, and evaluating one's own level of
mastery. Also includes utilizing efficient personal learning strategies (e.g., identifying specific
learning goals, organizing the content to be mastered, practicing the new skills in an appropriate
context).

Self-Management Skill*. Uses appropriate strategies to self-manage the full range of one’s
work and non-work responsibilities (e.g., assignments, personal finances, family). Such
strategies include stating both long and short-term goals, prioritizing goals, allocation of effort
and personal resources to goal priorities, self-assessment of degree of goal accomplishment, and
seeking help and advice from others when appropriate.

Basic Computer Skills*. Uses personal computers and software programs. Creates and
maintains computer files. Locates and uses information on the Internet and uses other Internet
functions including e-mail.

Selfless Service Orientation*. Commits to the greater good of the team or group. Puts
organizational goals ahead of individual goals as required.

Ethical Value System*. Possesses a moral compass. Follows patterns of behavior consistent
with Army Values.

*These predictors are only relevant for Army XXI.

32



distributed elsewhere, from outside the battle area (e.g., resupply) to space. All Battle Forces will
have tactical lift and attack helicopters, reconnaissance/intelligence units, plentiful unmanned
aerial vehicles, high speed vehicles, fire control platforms, and varied support units. All will be
highly nimble, with mobility in the battle space coming from both tactical airlift and the highway
speed of the combat vehicles.

Corps level command structures will manage Battle Forces. If Battle Forces are not able to
terminate a war decisively, they will operate to blunt and contain enemy activity, shaping the
battlespace for the success of decisive follow-on Campaign Force operations. A corps air and
missile defense command will protect the forces and their supporting functions from air attack
and long range rocket or missile strikes.

A Battle Force will have six Battle Units, each with six Battle Elements (see Figure C-2).
All forces will be linked digitally to sensors, supporting artillery, air defenders, air attack assets,
electronic warfare systems, and neighboring units (Eden, 1997). Within each Battle Unit there
will be a reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target assessment (RISTA) element with
UAVs, a command and information management element, and ground maneuver units. The
Battle Elements will be smaller than today’s company and will command six vehicle crews or
rifle squads. The command structure will be more networked, less hierarchical than today, with
the small teams having great independence of action. The combat branches will be integrated in
the Battle Elements at lower levels than before; for example, the crewed weapons will perform
multiple gunnery functions that reside today separately in air defense, field artillery, tank, and
infantry systems. Sensor and target designating systems will change fires so that almost all fire is
“direct” regardless of distance and terrain (Eden, 1997).

The Battle Force will conduct combat operations ranging from small-scale contingency
actions up through major theater wars. They will deploy into the battlespace, in part directly and
in part through intermediate staging bases, starting within as little as 48 hours after the
command, arriving ready and supplied to fight for two to three days. During that initial period,
the support pipeline will be established and support will start flowing. Operating in large
numbers of small teams, the Battle Force will move into positions throughout the entire expanse
of enemy military capability. Individual teams will fight in pulses of combat, after each of which
they will move and lay low while hordes of other small teams take their turns. Seen as a force,
the Battle Force will attack continuously from all directions to disrupt the enemy and destroy its
will to win. This dispersed, swarming attack is designed both for survival (massed forces will not
be survivable under enemy precision attack) and for giving the enemy targets that are too
numerous and elusive to deal with.

C-27



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Table C-2
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from Diverse
Missions and Frequent Deployments

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic: Diverse Missions and Frequent Deployments.

Diverse Missions: While no peer opponent is likely to emerge during the period, the number and
complexity of Army operations will likely increase. Regional conflicts, peacekeeping, peacemaking,
humanitarian missions, support to the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and coalition forces, anti-terrorism, and domestic assistance are all likely to occur during the era. While
some level of conflict will be inherent in all of these missions, much emphasis will be on logistics,
support, labor, construction, assistance, and population control. For warfighting units, their versatility and
deployability will result in assignments that are not always consistent with their warfighting roles. Each
non-traditional mission will be somewhat unique and there will be little carry-over and lessons learned
from preceding missions.

Deployments: Deployments will tend to be smaller size, for shorter periods of time (as compared with
20th century conflicts), but more frequent. The vast majority (up to 90%) of Army forces will be
continental United States (CONUS) based but soldier time spent away from his or her CONUS location
will increase as fewer troops respond to more missions. Participation by the Reserve Component (RC) in
deployments will increase but will not alleviate the deployment requirements of Active Army soldiers.

Inferred Job Components ~ First Tour Soldiers

MOS/Occupation-Job Specific Task Performance: The jobs of soldiers may be less MOS dependent
and more determined by the mission, area, or duty assigned. Discrepancies between mission trained for
and missions assigned may be most pronounced in warfighting units. As presaged by late AOE period
deployments, conditions of soldier job performance will be more varied and may change even within a
deployment as the situation matures. Performance generated by different missions creates not only new
individual and collective tasks but also new relationships and patterns of behavior that must be adopted.
New soldiers may have less time for on-the-job training (OJT) before being deployed.

Practical Problem Solving: Peacekeeping and unconventional missions generate many situations that are
not “in the book.” There is apt to be a disparity or time lag between doctrine and doctrinal tasks and field
applications; soldiers will increasingly have to operate in the absence of doctrine specific to their
situation.

Adaptability and Ingenuity: Non-traditional missions are earmarked by unforeseen conditions and
situations that do not have a prescribed procedure. Even at skill level (SL)1, soldiers will have to apply
non-standard solutions in new experiences.

Stability: Increased deployments, absence from home station, and unknown situations all increase the
mental and emotional stress under which inexperienced soldiers must operate. The very factor of their
inexperience can contribute to the uncertainties of the situation.

Effort and Initiative: Preparation for and conduct of deployments are intense periods of activity and
learning. Long hours, non-traditional tasks, extra requirements, and additional performance are the norm.
Soldiers have to work in an environment where many individual efforts go unrecognized and unrewarded.

(table continues)



staff on the conditions of the future era. The groups were instructed to carefully review the future
characteristics and job components that had been compiled. Suggestions were gathered from the
SMEs as to what revisions should be made to these materials and how the change might affect
the job components and predictors for that era.

On the second day of the workshop, project staff summarized the characteristics of each era
and the modifications that were made to job components. The panelists reviewed and discussed
the predictors of future performance and then completed several ranking exercises. As described
above, the Army SMEs chose and ranked the top 8 predictors for AXXI first tour soldiers and the
top 10 predictors for AXXI junior, mid-level, and senior NCOs, and AA2010 Battle Force
NCOs. In all, five ranking exercises were conducted.

Psychologist Panel

On July 13-14, 1999, an expert panel of 10 psychologists with knowledge of Army
requirements was assembled in a workshop format to review the AXXI and AA2010 job
components and make recommendations regarding the predictors that had been modified by the
Army SME Panel. While we relied on the Army SME Panel to revise the job components and
recommend relevant predictors from the AOE list, the psychologists (most were I/O specialists)
had particular expertise to recommend and rank the most important performance predictors with
respect to the future job components presented.

After comprehensive briefings on AXXI and AA2010, the Psychologist Panel chose and
ranked a first tier of predictors, based on importance, for each era using the ranking procedure
described above. For choosing a second tier, the procedure was modified slightly. Each
psychologist nominated predictors for the second tier—nominations were posted for all to see,
and a consensus vote was taken to determine the final second tier predictors. This step alleviated
having several predictors tied for inclusion in the second tier. Seven second tier predictors were
identified for first tour and five were identified for each NCO target group.

The ranking results were calculated and presented along with the results from the SME
Panel. The second day of the workshop opened with a discussion of the differences and
similarities in the ranking results between the two panels. The psychologists offered insights and
explanations as to these differences. Several project staffers recorded the discussion.

The final activity of the workshop began with a briefing on the current selection and
promotion systems. Project staff had prepared several items that the psychologists were asked to
comment upon based on their expertise and understanding of the current Army enlisted selection
and promotion systems. These items included (a) a list of criteria that can be used to evaluate
assessment instruments or technologies, (b) a list of factors that bear on the feasibility of
introducing changes to the Army’s selection and promotion systems, and (c) a summary of
innovative measurement methods that might be used to assess some of the critical future KSAs
identified in this research. The lists and summary were based on project staff expertise, literature
reviews, and phone interviews with assessment experts (they are described more thoroughly in
the Results section). Based on the input of the Psychologist Panel, these lists were revised and
finalized.

28



Table 33

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Subtests

Subtests

*Word Knowledge
*Paragraph Comprehension
* Arithmetic Reasoning
*Mathematics Knowledge
General Science

Auto and Shop Information
Mechanical Comprehension
Electronics Information
Numerical Operations
Coding Speed

*Denotes the four subtests that comprise the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

Table 34

Percentile Categories for the Armed Forces Qualification Test

Category Percentiles
I 93-99
I 65-92
THA 50-64
INB 31-49
Iv 10-30
Vv 1-9

Over the last 20 years or so, the basic content of the ASVAB has remained essentially
unchanged (Maier, 1993). In 1989 the computation of AFQT was changed to incorporate the
Mathematics Knowledge subtest in place of the Numerical Operations subtest. Other than this
minor change in the use of the ASVAB for selection, however, most R&D effort has been
directed at developing and implementing a computerized adaptive version of the test (CAT-
ASVAB). CAT-ASVAB is now operational at the Military Entrance Processing Stations
(MEPS). The paper-and-pencil examination is still being administered at the Mobile Examining
Team Sites (METS) and in the high school ASVAB testing program.

The Project A research program also developed and validated a number of tests that could
be used to supplement the ASVAB for enlistment screening. One of these tests, a measure of
spatial orientation (Assembling Objects), is being administered to applicants who take CAT-
ASVAB at the MEPS, but is not being used operationally.

60



The board identifies all soldiers who are “fully qualified” (averaged ranking of 3- or above).
Fully qualified soldiers are then rank-ordered based on their averaged numerical score into a
“best qualified” list. This is done separately for each MOS. HQDA determines the number of
soldiers, by grade, in each MOS, based on projected vacancies in that MOS. That number is
matched to the board-generated numerical scores. This, in effect, establishes a “cutoff,” although
this term is not used in the centralized system and cutoff scores are not published as they are in
the semi-centralized system. Promotion lists are established and promotions are made monthly
from the list based on MOS vacancy, rank, and budgetary considerations.

The board also identifies soldiers for the Qualitative Management Program (QMP) (see
Figure D-1). The QMP applies only to NCOs in grades E6 through E9 and is intended as a
mechanism of ridding the Army of NCOs whose performance or conduct has deteriorated. The
following are identified as criteria for invoking the QMP (1989, AR 601-280):

© Moral, professional, or ethical conduct incompatible with the NCO corps and the
professional Army ethic.

¢ Lack of potential to perform NCO duties in the current rank.

¢ Decline in efficiency and performance over a continuing period as reflected by NCOERs.

¢ Failure of an NCOES course.

¢ Inability to meet physical fitness standards.

¢ Failure to comply with the Army body composition (weight) program.

¢ Existence of reenlistment bar imposed by a field commander.

Soldiers selected for QMP have the right of appeal. Soldiers who do not appeal or lose their

appeal will be honorably retired in their current rank if otherwise eligible for retirement. Soldiers

with 17 years 9 months service at time of QMP notification may be retained until retirement
eligibility is reached.

Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report System (NCOER)*

Although not formally a part of the promotion system, the NCOER system plays a vital role
in determining promotions, particularly in the centralized system at grades E7 through E9.
Moreover, the NCOER system serves to define those skills and attributes which the Army has
designated as being critical to being an NCO. An understanding of the system and its emphasis
has a direct bearing on understanding the NCO promotion system.

The NCOER system applies to all NCOs starting with the rank of Corporal E4’ and
continuing though the ranks of Sergeant Major, including the Sergeant Major of the Army. It is a

® Information in this section is taken from AR 623-205 “Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reporting System.”
This regulation is under revision and the new regulation is due for release in October 1999. One of the anticipated

changes is that the Army Values will receive an added emphasis in the rating form. The Army Values are Loyalty,
Duty, Respect, Selfless-service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.

° The NCOER does not apply to Specialist E4; another distinction between the ranks of Specialist and Corporal.

D-8



Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997a, July 10). Transcript of a briefing on Army After Next [9
pages]. U.S. Army News Release.
Available: http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Jul1997/119970710aanbrf.html.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997b). The Army After Next project: Knowledge and speed,
emerging impressions [75 pages]. Presentation slides.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997c) Knowledge & speed. First annual report on the Army
After Next project. Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC. Available: http://www-

tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC. (1998c). Knowledge and speed: Battle force
and the U.S. Army of 2025. Second Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) project.
Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC. Available: http://www-

tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm (under Reports).

Dickenson, M. H., Lehmann, F-O., & Sane, S. P. (1999). Wing rotation and the aerodynamic basis
of insect flight. Science, 285, 18 June, 1954-1960.

Director, Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements. (1998). Technology Initiatives
Game 1998 Quicklook Report. Washington, DC: Author.
Available: http://www.hq.navy.mil/091/documents/act1txt.htm.

Druckman, D. & Bjork, R. A. (Eds.). (1994). Learning, remembering, believing: Chapter 2,
Summary. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Ericsson, K. A., & Charness, N. (1994). Expert performance. American Psychologist, 49, 725-747.
Escobar, G. (1999). Immigrants’ ranks tripled in 29 years. The Washington Post, 9 January, p. A-1.

Geary, D. C. (1996). International differences in mathematical achievement: Their nature, causes,
and consequences. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 5, 133-137.

Glennan, T. K., & Melmed, A. (1996). Fostering the Use of Educational Technology. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND.

Grissmer, D., Kirby, S. N., Berends, M., & Williamson, S. (1995). Our changing youth: A threat to
future recruiting? In R. L. Phillips & GEN M. R. Thurman (Eds.), Future Soldiers and the
Quality Imperative (pp. 203-245). Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

Halal, W. E., Kull, M. D., & Leffmann, A. (1997, November-December). Emerging technologies:
What’s ahead for 2001-2030. The Futurist, 20-28.

Havel, V. (1999). Kosovo and the end of the nation-state. New York Review of Books. 10 June,
XLVI (10), pp. 4, 6.

A-22



Forward Deployed Army XXI Forces

With forward deployed forces (e.g., in Europe and Korea), the U.S. will continue to make a
concrete display of its commitment to worldwide engagement and defense of allies. The Army
component of those forces, consisting of elements that are both forward stationed and forward
deployed for training, will be largely of AXXI vintage. In the strategic application, they will
provide sites and organization for staging and supply of the rapidly deploying AA2010 Battle
Forces. The size of the forward deployed Army is expected to be at least equal to today’s
(DCSDOC, 1998c), which is about 155,000 soldiers at any one time (Reimer, 1999).

Once warfare is launched, forward deployed joint forces and strategic fires will carry out a
synchronized theater-wide attack to create an information blackout by knocking out sensors,
power nodes, space-based lasers, information satellites, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
This attack will prepare the battle area for entry by disrupting enemy patterns of operation,
degrading enemy precision fires, and suppressing enemy air defenses. After operations by the
Battle Forces, forward deployed elements may supply some of the force for operations that end
battle and occupy territory to secure it.

Campaign Forces

Campaign Forces will follow Battle Forces into theater. If the Battle Forces have not forced
termination, Campaign Forces will be equipped for longer conflicts. These forces will be
designed to overcome extensive, hardened defenses. Consisting of AXXI legacy elements that
have AA2010 information capabilities, Campaign Forces will otherwise be equipped with
technologies that are evolved from today’s. Because they are heavy, Campaign Forces will
deploy slowly, require the largest part of the U.S. strategic lift, and need the largest of logistics
structures. To counter those disadvantages, Campaign Forces may include units that are already
forward deployed. The functions of occupying, controlling, and stabilizing land area are labor
intensive, so they will require the greater numbers in the Campaign Forces. Campaign Forces
will include Reserve Component units for long-term stability and support operations.

Homeland Defense Forces

Because terrorism within CONUS and cyberwar are expected to be two of future opponents’
major approaches to asymmetric warfare (Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999),
the mission of defending the U.S. on home ground will be active and urgent. Traditionally, the
Army has been a player in disaster relief. That work is likely to become more frequent and to
have new forms because the Army is the Executive Agent (EA) for the Department of Defense
Domestic Preparedness Program. The Army’s work in Homeland Defense will also include three
other major areas: (a) coordinating interagency bioterrorism defense systems; (b) developing and
testing a national missile defense system; and (c) helping “...to protect and reduce the
vulnerability of critical infrastructure including telecommunications, energy, banking and
finance, transportation, water, and emergency service facilities” (Strategic Planning, Concepts &
Doctrine Division, 1999, p. 12).

Perhaps even more so than today, the Army’s role in homeland defense will rely largely on
the Reserve Components. This work will involve providing domestic support to a host of federal,

C-30



Morris, R. F., Lackey, S. W., Mordica, G. J., I, & Hughes, J. P. (1994). Initial impressions
report: Changing the army. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S.
Army Combined Arms Command. Available: http://www.call.army.mil/call/exfor.

Mumma, N. (SGT). (1998). Special Forces fields joint base station. Army Link News.
Available: http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Oct1998.

Myers, S. L. (1999, February 21). Bomb. Missile. Bomb. Hey, it looks like a war. New York
Times, p. WK4.

Myers, S. L. (1998, December 27). Leader of Iraq strikes sees need for “strange missions.”
Louisville Courier Journal from the New York Times News Service, p. A7.

National Guard Bureau (ongoing). Available: http:/Awww.ngb.dtic.mil/search/.

National Research Council Committee on Modeling and Simulation (1997). Modeling and
simulation: Linking entertainment and defense. Washington, DC: Author.

NATO (1999). Partnership for peace: Information by country [2 pages].
Available: http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm.

NATO (1998, January 14). Action plan of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council for 1998-2000
[14 pages]. Press release. Available: http:/Awww.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-002e.htm.

NATO. (1997, July). The enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). NATO Fact Sheet
Nr. 9 [7 pages]. Available: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/epfp.htm.

Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (1998). Sailor 21: A research vision to
attract, retain, and utilize the 215t century sailor. San Diego, CA: Author.

Naylor, S. (1996). Army After Next news article. Army Times [3 pages]. Available: http:/www-
ariarmy.miV/aan2.htm.

NCO leadership and leader development across the army (1998). Listing of projects and POCs.
Alexandria, VA: HumRRO.

Nichiporuk, B., & Builder, C. H. (1995). Information technologies and the future of land
warfare. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Nickerson, R. (1997, November). The future of educational technology in retrospect. Paper
presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in
the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

O’Hanlon, M. (1998, August 9). America’s military, cut to the quick. Washington Post, p. C1.



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acknowledged that the world community “...is moving in a direction where there is a sense of co-
responsibility...for what happens inside [other nations] (p. 5).”

Just how this “sense of co-responsibility” will play out is unpredictable, but two opposite
scenarios can be imagined. At one end there could be an increase in internationally sponsored
military interventions against large-scale violators of human rights. One of the unknowns under
this scenario is how international law on the subject will develop. At the other end, the frequency
of crimes against humanity could decline if the punishment of perpetrators gains credibility.
Establishing that credibility is likely to require at least some application of military force. For
instance, in 1998-99, threats and an eventual application of force did not, for a long time, stop
Milosevic’s actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

Although it is impossible to predict an exact geopolitical scenario, one significant element of
the geopolitical future can be predicted with confidence: other countries and interests will work
to end the great imbalance in world power that now favors the U.S. (Huntington, 1999). Three
means to that end are readily identifiable: proliferation of weapons technology, terrorism, and
formation of coalitions against U.S. influence.

Proliferation of weapons technologies to other nations was news well before the Cox Report
to Congress in May 1999 (Laris, 1999; Slavin, 1999). China’s alleged intelligence collection
effort in the U.S. has raised questions about the security of the design of America’s miniaturized
nuclear warheads (Loeb, 1999a). In the mid-1990s, Iraq acquired sophisticated guidance devices
that had been salvaged from ballistic missiles in decommissioned Russian submarines (Hersh,
1999). Other possible sources and destinations of technology transfer abound, and Iraq’s program
of biological warfare operates now (mid 1999) free from the hindrance of international
inspection. Supporting potential enemies’ use of leaked technologies (e.g., for targeting) is an
abundance of open source intelligence (Loeb, 1999b); for example, the openness of much of the
military process alerts the world to the approach that they will face in a conflict with the U.S.
Anny (Scales, 1998b).

Some countries outside the Western sphere (e.g., North Korea) seek military technologies
for dealing with regional threats while many others seek them to remedy their weakness vis a vis
the more powerful. Such proliferation affects the U.S. in two ways. First, it shortens the time for
other countries to acquire ways to neutralize our advanced military capabilities. Second,
proliferation encourages conflicts between third and fourth parties that are not necessarily hostile
to the U.S. but that, together, threaten world peace (e.g., nuclear arms in India and Pakistan).

Dangerous as they are abroad, warlike events are unlikely to limit themselves to foreign soil.
At the intersection of geopolitics and proliferation lies a threat at home: terrorism. This issue has
a current and an enduring relevance: terrorism is on the rise now (Miller & Broad, 1998), and a
major justification for the very existence of government is that it keeps its citizens safe. Failing
to provide public safety, a government and its benefits may not survive.

In an interview on 22 January 1999, “President Clinton said ...that it is ‘highly likely’ that a
terrorist group will launch or threaten a germ or chemical attack on American soil within the next
few years” (Miller & Broad, 1999, p. 1). Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director

A-5



21ST CENTURY SOLDIERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS:
CRITICAL PREDICTORS OF PERFORMANCE

Introduction

In March 1997, Major General (MG) Dean, the Director of Military Personnel Management,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), directed the U.S. Army Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) to undertake a quick study to determine the
characteristics that enlistees will need to succeed in the 21st century Army. The quick study
involved a summarization of available information supplemented by a “target of opportunity”
data collection effort. The results of that effort were reported to MG Dean in January 1998
(Rumsey, 1998). MG Dean then asked ARI to conduct a more complete study to address this
issue. ARI responded with a two-phase program known as Soldier Characteristics for the 21st
Century (Soldier21).

The dual-phased Soldier21 project was to be a more comprehensive effort involving the
collection of new data. In May 1998, a contract effort was initiated to develop the methodology
(Phase I). At the same time another project, entitled 2/st Century Noncommissioned Officers
(NCO21), was initiated by ARI, again under the direction of MG Dean. To minimize research
and development (R&D) resources (time, dollars, and Army personnel) an approach was
developed that merged the data collection efforts for both Soldier21 and NCO21. This
methodology is described in a report by J. P. Campbell, Walker, and Knapp (1998). Background
summaries for the Soldier21 and NCO21 projects are provided below.

Soldier Characteristics for the 21st Century

Questions addressing the requirements that future soldiers will have to bring to the job have
been asked before. At the Army 2010 Conference, Rumsey (1995) addressed the question:
“.,. What attributes will the soldier of the future need” (p.123)? The study described in his paper
was an early step to the current effort, conducted prior to the Phase J piece described above. The
“future” in Rumsey’s study was described using one source, the 1994 version of Pamphlet 525-5,
Force XXI Operations (Department of the Army [DA], 1994). Six behavioral psychologists,
using this future description and soldier performance dimensions as reference material, rated the
importance of performance predictors (from a compiled list) for future first tour soldiers. The
five highest rated performance predictors were cognitive ability, integrity,
cooperativeness/teamwork, conscientiousness, and achievement motivation. However, probably
more important than these findings were the questions that the study raised, such as: How are
performance requirements changing, how will performance predictors be measured, and how
will the Army be able to meet the challenge of finding soldiers with suitable characteristics? The
current effort, Phase Il, attempts to find answers to some of these questions by providing more
complete and comprehensive descriptions of the conditions in which future soldiers will operate
and, hence, future performance dimensions.

During Phase II we have augmented and executed the methodological steps described in J.
P. Campbell et al. (1998). We have forecasted the anticipated job requirements of 21st century
soldiers (for the years 2000 through 2025) and identified the most important performance
predictors or knowledges, skills, and abilities (KSAs) needed by recruits to succeed in their jobs.



FOREWORD

In March 1997, Major General (MG) Dean, the Director of Military Personnel Management,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, directed the U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) to undertake a quick study to determine the characteristics
that enlistees will need to succeed in the 21st century Army. The quick study involved a
summarization of available information supplemented by a “target of opportunity” data
collection effort. The results of that effort were reported to MG Dean in January 1998. MG Dean
then asked ARI to conduct a more complete research investigation to address this issue. ARI
responded with a program known as Soldier Characteristics for the 21st Century (Soldier21).

This effort coincided with another project, entitled 21st Century Noncommissioned Officers
(NCO21), initiated by ARI under the sponsorship of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel. To minimize research and development resources (time, dollars, and Army personnel)
an approach was developed that merged the data collection efforts for both Soldier21 and
NCO21. Phase I of these projects was the development of a detailed research plan for identifying
characteristics required of future junior soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

This report summarizes the Phase II effort that augmented and executed the methodological
steps of the Phase I research plan. The goal of the Soldier21 and NCO21 projects was to conduct
a more comprehensive analysis of future conditions and future job demands in order to identify
critical performance predictors or knowledges, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that may eventually
be developed into selection (Soldier21) and promotion (NCO21) criteria. Anticipated job
requirements of 21st century soldiers and NCOs (for the years 2000 through 2025) were
forecasted and the most important KSAs needed for success in Army jobs were estimated.

The goal of the Selection and Assignment Research Unit of ARI is to conduct research,
studies, and analysis on the measurement of aptitudes and performance of individuals to improve
the Army's selection and classification, promotion, and reassignment of officers and enlisted
soldiers. This research was briefed to Army leaders at a major planning exercise and will
provide the foundation for ongoing and planned research to improve the selection and promotion
procedures for enlisted personnel.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Technical Director



Table C-2 (continued)

Adaptability and Ingenuity: NCOs who gained initial experience during the late years of the AOE may
find the missions and deployments of AXXI very different. Nontraditional missions, urban orientations,
new political realities, and ill-defined or rapidly changing threats can cause confusion and ambiguity.
NCOs may be faced with more nonroutine decision opportunities during some missions for which they
have no direct experience or preparation. Asymmetrical warfare means the opposition will not operate
under any predictable parameters. NCOs will be expected to apply novel solutions to get the job done
when standard solutions do not work. Yet solutions cannot create additional problems. Creative thinking
is required to accurately determine when the situation is changing. The greatest impact will be at SL3 and
SL4.

Stability: Deployments and non-doctrinal missions are, by their nature, unstable situations. NCOs
participating will be subjected to stresses caused by family separations and internal stresses because of the
leadership roles they occupy. Effective performance under these conditions can be difficult, but setting
the example of performance and effectiveness for younger soldiers in these conditions is paramount.

Cultural Tolerance: Increased deployments mean increased exposure to differing ethnicities and
cultures. Peace keeping and humanitarian missions will bring the Army into contact with different
peoples. Moreover, while the AOE tended to be insular, the nature of future deployments (joint, coalition,
host nation, NATO, UN, other government and non-government participation, civilian contractor
supported functions) will expose Army members to new relationships. NCOs at all levels must modify
their thinking and their behavior to adapt to these situations.

Oral Communications: Deployments and non-conventional missions are earmarked by uncertainty.
Communication up and down the chain of command is essential to minimize the impact on operational
requirements. NCOs are the vital cogs to accomplishing this. The ability to speak rationally and
convincingly and keep others informed is a paramount requirement during deployments.

Effort and Initiative: Preparation for and recovery from deployments are times of increased activity.
During the deployments themselves, activities can range from routine to unpredictable. Even more than
normal, NCOs must take independent action in identifying and completing actions that must be
accomplished to support the mission. These will tend to fall most heavily on SL3 and SL4 personnel.

Integrity and Self-Discipline: Deployments are often unstructured situations without the checks and
balances that exist in home-station operations. Supervision is often uneven and some personnel may have
opportunities for dishonest or unethical behavior, seemingly without risk of discovery. Accountability for
activities is less clear in deployed and unconventional missions. NCOs need to exhibit high ethical and
moral behavior both for the integrity of the Army and as an example for others.

Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures: Deployments are often one-of-a-kind missions
guided by special SOP, ROE, directives, prohibitions, and guidelines. In addition to “normal” guides,
NCOs are the backbone for knowing, interpreting, and enforcing these deployment-specific requirements
within the Army.

Self-Development: The uniqueness of deployments and one-of-kind missions that will earmark AXXI
means that understanding and learning will be a constant for NCOs. While NCOES and functional
courses will continue to play a crucial role in general NCO competencies, and pre-deployment training of
NCOs in situational exercises will be essential, neither of these will likely be totally sufficient in
preparing NCOs adequately for their deployment requirements. The truly effective NCOs will be those
that go beyond the mandated training. Moreover, increased deployments themselves may interfere with
normal NCO educational system (NCOES) attendance as well as resident civilian instruction. It will be
those NCOs who display initiative in self-development who are successful.

(table continues)

C-13



Table 17 (continued)

Predictors of NCO Job Performance

Self-Directed Learning Skill.” Has a clear overall goal of maintaining continuous learning and
training over one’s entire career. Is proficient at determining personal training needs, planning
education and training experiences to meet them, and evaluating one's own level of mastery.
Also includes utilizing efficient personal learning strategies (e.g., identifying specific learning
goals, organizing the content to be mastered, practicing the new skills in an appropriate context).

General Self-Management Skill.” Uses appropriate strategies to self-manage the full range of
one’s work and non-work responsibilities (e.g., assignments, personal finances, family). Such
strategies include stating both long- and short-term goals, prioritizing goals, allocation of effort
and personal resources to goal priorities, self-assessment of degree of goal accomplishment, and
seeking help and advice from others when appropriate.

Selfless Service Orientation.” Commits to the greater good of the team or group. Puts
organizational goals ahead of individual goals as required.

Ethical Value System.” Possesses a moral compass. Knows the basic values of the Army as an
organization. Follows patterns of behavior consistent with Army Values.

Concern for Soldier Quality of Life.” Is aware of subordinates’ and peers’ needs, constraints,
and values. Is sensitive to others’ priorities and interests, including on and off duty needs.

Fostering Adaptive Teamwork.” Organizes and orients team members to meet goals. Changes
organization and focus of group to meet changing missions and conditions.

Knowledge of System Inter-Relations.” Is capable of analyzing how goals and operations of
own unit are inter-related with other units and systems. Can see the larger strategic picture and
interpret how one’s own unit relates to it.

Knowledge Management.” Applies controls to the flow of digital information. Sorts, classifies,
combines, excludes, and presents information so that it is useable by others.

Knowledge of Battlefield Function Integration.‘ Can individually apply and effectively
integrate multiple battlefield functions such as direct and indirect fires, communications,
intelligence, and combat service support.

* This predictor was “Basic Computer Skills” for Army of Excellence NCOs.
> Predictor is relevant for both AXXI and AA2010 Battle Force NCOs, but not Army of

Excellence NCOs.

°Predictor is only relevant for AA2010 Battle Force NCOs.

35



The emphasis of the AA2010 process is not on prescribing or elaborating what the future
Amny will be and do in detail; that will be the job of Army policy makers, combat developers,
and training developers. Each of the pieces of this iterative, “spiral development” process has the
potential to surface issues that could reshape the process itself, the emerging picture of the future
Army, or the eventual product. The tentativeness of the emerging picture is acknowledged in
AA2010 writings, which note that the unique new military capabilities of the Army in 2025 will
require technological innovations that might or might not be achieved by then (DCSDOC,
1998c) and that the upcoming AA2010 studies of training, leader development, and soldiers’
capabilities will help to evaluate the feasibility of the emerging ideas for the military (DCSDOC,
1997b).

However, it is unlikely that today’s general enlistment standards of general aptitude, some
level of academic achievement, and a clean record will become obsolete. Moreover, AA2010 as
a whole will have a lot of overlap with AXXI. That overlap will come first from the inescapable
coexistence of old, current, and incoming technologies at any point in the Army’s history.
Second, AXXI elements will be an integral subset of the total AA2010 that have their own
specific roles. Given that the new era AA2010 Battle Forces is projected to comprise only one-
third of the force, many soldiers who were selected by AXXI standards will enter the AA2010
era well qualified and prepared.

Assumptions About AA2010

The AA2010 process outlined above is intended to convey the inherent uncertainties that
accompany any discussion of what AA2010 will look like. The AA2010 concept covers a wide
variety of activities and programs, most of which will evolve over time. For purposes of this
research, we assumed a description of AA2010 that was available in the early summer of 1999
and that is the material that is reflected in this appendix. In reality, the Army that exists in the
years 2010-2025 may or may not bear any resemblance to what is described here. While we had
little choice but to make assumptions about AA2010, the following should be kept in mind when
reviewing these DTLOMS descriptions.

« What is presented are not facts. Most are ideas, concepts, or propositions meant to
stimulate thought or to provide a basis to explore notions about the future. They are
presented here as assumptions, which, if they occur, would have certain presumed
impacts on soldier performance requirements.

¢ AA2010 efforts to date are very preliminary. Revision and innovation are an earmark of
AA2010 studies and change in concepts may occur very rapidly. Information presented
here reflects what was known as of the mid-1999 and is not necessarily current beyond
that date.

« The DTLOMS descriptions represent a distillation of information available about
AA2010. Because AA2010 work overlaps, this distillation sometimes involved
interpretation by project staff. We do not present this DTLOMS as the position of the
Future Battle Directorate or any other Army agency and we are solely responsible for the
interpretations presented. In particular, terminology is often a sensitive issue. This
description should not be cited as a source for names, phrases, and terms or used for
reference beyond the confines of the research that it supported.

C-24



Situational judgment tests (SJTs), both multiple-choice and free response formats, come
next on the list. SJTs are particularly useful for assessing higher level cognitive skills related to
judgment and decision-making. The more elaborate SJTs that are coming on the scene, such as
those using interactive video (CD-ROM or DVD), become fairly indistinguishable from job
sample simulations. More often, however, it is the other somewhat less extravagant delivery
methods that are being increasingly used (e.g., video and/or computer delivery). Note that the
well-researched and highly regarded situational interview (Latham, Saari, Pursell, & Campion,
1980) is included in this category.

Another set of self-report methods, this time focusing on the individual’s work history, is
listed next. This includes fairly traditional methods, including accomplishment records,
structured applications, and experience checklists, that have not been widely used in Army
enlisted assessment systems. Such methods provide a fairly simple alternative for capturing
relevant information, particularly for promotion systems. New methods for the automated
scoring of textual responses (e.g., accomplishment records, essay tests) may make some
assessment alternatives such as these more suitable for meeting large volume assessment needs.

The next series of items in Table 37 refer to various types of job simulations — assessment
centers, mini training programs, and job samples. Full-scale 1-2 day assessment centers are
becoming the exception rather than the rule according to our industry interviewees. Rather,
organizations are opting for streamlined assessment centers that include perhaps two or three
exercises, some of which might be delivered from a distance (e.g., by phone or the Internet).
Mini training programs refer to situations in which individuals are given limited job training and
assessed on the ability to successfully apply that training in realistic job samples. This model has
been used to select from among applicants for highly skilled occupations, such as air traffic
controllers. Job samples, ranging for low to high fidelity, can be used to assess ability to do the
job more or less directly. For selection and promotion, one must take care that the job samples do
not require behaviors that candidates have not had the opportunity to learn. It is also important to
assure that job samples adequately sample the domain of critical work behaviors.

The list concludes with methods that can be used to assess prior or current performance. It
includes various rating methods, the notion of portfolio assessment that is so popular now in
educational measurement, and scored performance on actual work activities.

Some Examples

Our telephone interviewees offered a number of specific examples of innovative assessment
operations. Several individuals mentioned computerized simulations, of varying levels of fidelity
and bandwidth. These included simulations for specific skills assessment (e.g., programmer,
plumber), judgment and decision making (with domain specific situations), and problem solving
(for domain specific, ill-structured problems). Specific methods included computerized
presentation of still pictures and written text and interactive CD-ROM based presentation of
problem situations in which test takers can click on icons, objects, or individuals to obtain closer
views or additional information. Another example was a high fidelity, virtual-based simulation of
situations or problems (e.g., a plumber facing frozen water pipes).

66



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75



Technical Report 1102

21* Century Soldiers and Noncommissioned
Officers: Critical Predictors of Performance

Laura A. Ford, Roy C. Campbell, John P. Campbell,
Deirdre J. Knapp, and Clinton B. Walker
Human Resources Research Organization

May 2000

United States Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

DEO QUALSTY INGPRCTED 4 20000802 223



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Today. p. 5A.

A-26



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Available: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/morris.doc.

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C-45



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Shalala, D. (1999, February 3). Radio interview on the Diane Rehm Show, WAMU 88.5-FM,
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Shanteau, J., & Stewart, T. (1992). Why study expert decision making? Some historical
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Military Review.



Army After 2010 DTLOMS

The AA2010 is the Army that is planned for the years from 2010 to 2025, succeeding
AXXI. This presentation summarizes the picture of AA2010 that informs the Soldier21/NCO21
project to date. Because the term “AA2010” has at least three distinct meanings, it needs some
explanation.

A common meaning of the expression “AA2010” is as a reference to the unique, “leap
ahead” forces and capabilities for warfare that will lead the Army into combat in the 2010-2025
era. Writings on AA2010 often describe only those new forces and capabilities, making it seem
as though they will be the entire Army after AXXI. In reality, the new components, called the
Battle Forces, will make up only about one third of the Army of that era. The second meaning of
“AA2010” is the total Army of the era, which will be a hybrid of forces and capabilities ranging
from legacy AOE elements through AXXI to the newest Battle Forces.

These first two senses of “AA2010” will be the products of the third sense, the current,
ongoing process for conducting studies to inform combat developments for the distant future. In
this third sense, “[AA2010’s] objective is to provide the Army’s leadership the raw materiel for a
vision of war, and thus of land-power’s role, in the 30-year future...” (Deputy Chief of Staff for
Doctrine [DCSDOC], 1997c, p. 8). This AA2010’s product includes issues and “ideas” that are
published in an annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in contrast with Force
XXI’s product of “concepts” as published in TRADOC PAM 525-5, and the doctrine of the
present Army (e.g., FM 100-5). Conceptually, this AA2010 helps to foretell the future by
providing promising new options for building that future. The proponent for this program is the
DCSDOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine and Command (TRADOC), with its Future Battle
Directorate (FBD) taking the lead.

The AA2010 program includes seminars, conferences, studies, idea teams, and war games
involving a host of cooperating commands and other players. In the first two years of activity,
the AA2010 process concentrated on military art and technology (i.e., the Doctrine,
Organization, and Materiel elements [DOM] of the DTLOMS framework). In 1999, the process
is expanding to include the three human domains of DTLOMS: Training, Leader Development,
and Soldiers [TLS]. Seminars of experts, coordinated by HQ TRADOC, are scheduled for each
of the six domains during the year. Major issues that the six domains will address are illustrated
in Figure C-1.4 The questions for the Quality People (i.e., soldiers) seminar overlap the issues of
this project.

In addition to the seminars, The Center for Strategic and International Studies has contracted
to examine issues related to military culture and to report back by the end of September 1999.
That study is important because the findings of the first two years of the AA2010 process could
entail some fundamental changes in the way soldiers relate to each other, to their commanders,
and to the Army.

* These imperatives and issues were initially identified in early 1999. As each domain was addressed, many of the
issues changed. The issues listed in Figure C-1 are intended to give some idea of the scope of the imperative rather
than to identify specific issues which might or might not be addressed.

C-22



Technical Report 1102

21° Century Soldiers and Noncommissioned
Officers: Critical Predictors of Performance

Laura A. Ford, Roy C. Campbell, John P. Campbell,
Deirdre J. Knapp, and Clinton B. Walker
Human Resources Research Organization

Selection and Assignment Research Unit
Michael G. Rumsey, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

May 2000
SN —_ —
Army Project Number Personnel Performance and
20262785A790 Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

iii



two-part system, consisting of a proceduralized, continuous counseling requirement (which
includes a written record but which is not a part of the soldier’s official records) and a formal
NCO Evaluation Report Form (DA Form 2166-7) which is an official record. NCOERs are done
continuously throughout a soldier’s NCO career. Reports must be submitted at least annually but
also when there is a change in the rater (each NCO has a pre-designated rater and senior rater) or
when the NCO is due to change raters, such as a pending reassignment. Raters must have been in
position for a minimum of 90 days to render an NCOER. Special “complete-the-record” reports
can also be submitted when the NCO is to be considered by a centralized promotion board, a
school selection board, or a Sergeant Major selection board, providing certain criteria are met.
Special NCOERs can also be submitted under adverse conditions such as when a relief-for-cause
occurs. However, certain adverse information is precluded from the NCOER including Article
15, court-martial, flagging action, letter of reprimand, or civil trial (although these are included in
other parts of the soldier’s official record). The rated NCO must be given a copy of his/her
NCOER. NCOERs may be appealed.

As noted, NCOERs are continuous and cumulative. The intent is that a pattern of
performance and evaluation be established over time (although the current system is only about
10 years old) and that no single NCOER, good or bad, be the criterion for decisions." The
following list describes the five major areas that are evaluated in the NCOER:

« Competence. The knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to be expert in the current
duty assignment and adequate in other assignments within the MOS. It includes reading,
writing, speaking and basic mathematics. It also includes sound judgment, ability to
weigh alternatives, form opinions, and make good decisions.

¢ Physical Fitness and Military Bearing. Physical fitness is both mental and physical. It
includes strength, endurance, stamina, flexibility, speed, agility, coordination, and
balance. Total fitness includes weight control, diet, nutrition, avoidance of tobacco
products, control of substance abuse, stress management, and physical training. Military
bearing consists of posture, dress, overall appearance, and the manner of physical
movement. Bearing also includes an outward display of confidence and enthusiasm. The
NCO’s current height and weight and latest APFT score are reported as part of this block.

« Leadership. Influencing others to accomplish the mission. It consists of applying the
leadership attributes of beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills.

« Training. Preparing individuals, units, and teams for duty performance. It involves the
teaching of Army doctrinal skills and knowledge.

« Responsibility and Accountability. Consists of the proper care, maintenance, use,
handling, and conservation of personnel, equipment, supplies, property, and funds.

1° Like most personnel evaluation systems, the NCOER suffers from inflation and a mid-range rating (“meets
standard”), which should apply to most NCOs probably puts those NCOs at a disadvantage. However, Army
leadership does have a feedback program in which excellence ratings have to be supported by quantifiable data as
part of the report.

D-9



Appendix B

Bibliography of Futures Information

2025 Support Office. (1996). 2025 Final Report: Executive Summary [42 pages]. Maxwell AFB,
AL: Air University. Available: http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/.

Acronym finder. (Updated often). 99,000+ acronyms emphasizing U.S. military by Mountain
Data Systems. Available: http://www.mtnds.com/af.

Acronyms. (1998). Listing of acronyms commonly used by the Defense Technical Information
Center (DTIC) [7 pages]. Available: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/dtic-acronyms.html.

Acronyms. (Updated periodically). Megaterms: military terms and acronyms, V4.1.
Available: http://www. vitrex net/~bandorm/megaterm/megaterm.htm.

Acronyms. Army Digitization Master Plan 96.
Available: http://www.ado.army.mil/admp/1196/aamp.htm.

Acronyms. Available: http://www.cascom.army.mil/reg_10-1/Appendix.

Adelman, L. (1997, November). Cognitively engineering technology for the Army after next.
Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational
Issues in the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

Adler, J. (1998, November 2). Tomorrow’s child. Newsweek, 54-64.

Alberts, D. S. (1996). The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies.
Washington, DC: NDU Press. Available: http://www.dodccrp.org/uchome.htm.

Albright, M. (Secretary of State). (1999, April 6). A new NATO for a new century [16 pages]. A
Brookings National Issues Forum.
Available: http://www.brookings.edu/comm.transcripts/19990406.htm.

Alper, J. (1999, June 11). From bioweapons trenches, new tools for battling microbes. Science,
284 (5421), 1754-1755.

Andrews, A. M. (1999). Letter inviting attendance at Army’s Technology and Material War
Game 26-30 July 1999. Undated; gathered on AAN web site 6 July 1999.

Andriole, S. (1998, June). MacroTrends in IT: Myths, realities and challenges. Paper presented
at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army
After Next — II, Leesburg, VA.

Army Battle Command System. (April, 1998). Executive Overview: A High Level Overview of
Digital Products Available to the First Digitized Force [54 pages}.



Table 15
Rank Order of Job Predictors/Requirements for NCOs

Mean Importance

Rank Job Performance Factors Rating (n=40)
1 Integrity and Discipline 4.40
2 Judgment and Decision Making 4.32
3.5 Training Others 4.28
3.5 Directing, Monitoring and Supervising Others 4.28
5 MOS Knowledge and Skill 4.27
6 Motivating Others 4.21
7 Oral Communication 4.20
8 Organizing, Coordinating, and Executing 4.17
9 Physical Fitness 4.15
10 Relating to and Leading Others 4.13
11 Safety Consciousness 4.00
12.5 Writing 3.97
12.5 Common Skills 3.97
14 Effort and Initiative 3.92
15.5 Regulations, Policies, and Procedures 3.87
15.5 Conflict Resolution 3.87
17 Military Presence 3.77
18 Adaptability 3.65
19 Information Gathering 3.62
20 Administrative Management 3.52
21 Cultural Understanding 3.45
22 Basic Math 3.27
23 Computer Skills 2.97
24 Multilingual 1.70

Note. MOS = military occupational specialty.

Analyzing Jobs, Missions, and Technology Indicative of Future Army Jobs

In order to define job requirements of the future, the step preceding identification of future
KSAs, we needed to learn as much as possible about the conditions in which future soldiers will
operate. One way to do this was to review and analyze futures era literature. But, as the review
of the literature proceeded, it became evident that there were many future characteristics,
particularly of the Army XXI era, that were being experienced in some MOS and units in the
current Army. The decision was not to do a specific job analysis of these chosen jobs but to use
them as a vehicle to explore trends that were likely to affect the entire Army in the future. By
necessity, this approach was limited to a very few jobs; time and other resources would not allow
a wide sampling. In the end, three MOS were selected: 95B (Military Police), 19D (Calvary
Scout), and 31U (Signal Support Systems Specialist). Consequently, we visited proponent school

23



can expect to be more active than before in disaster relief. Just how the counter-terrorism
program will play out remains to be seen, but it could be large and costly enough not to reach
national effectiveness until almost the midpoint of the 21st century.

The third means by which other nations may try to improve their power balance relative to
the U.S. is the formation of coalitions against U.S. influence. Given that the U.S. will make use
of both the major alliances (UN and NATO) and other ad hoc, situational coalitions that are
outside the UN and NATO (DCSDOC, 1998c), other countries can be expected to try to do the
same. Given also that there is a widespread distrust of the U.S.’s international exercise of its
power (Huntington, 1999), it is likely that challenges to U.S. positions will become more
common as the rest of the world, as individual countries and as coalitions, increases in power.

Physical Environment

The prospect of attacks on food crops raises the subject of the broader physical environment.
The real health and productivity of the home planet is a very complex and debatable subject, with
projections having to be based on numerous, arguable assumptions. On the pessimistic side of
the debate, some scholars believe that the earth cannot sustain even its present population over
the long run because we have used up so much of its non-renewable resources (W. Catton in The
Carrying Capacity Briefing Book 1997, as cited by McKibben, 1997). Regardless of the details,
unless the environmental costs of production can be greatly reduced, the demands of the
swelling, modernizing nations on the earth’s resources are likely to increase. “We are entering
the zone where the world may well begin to pinch” (McKibben, p. 34). The outcome will
probably be an unpredictable mixture of lowered standards of living and greater competition for
the resources. Often, that competition will involve military means.

U.S. Population

As for the population of the U.S., the Census Bureau (Day, 1996) predicts that it will
increase by about 23% from 1999 to 2025. The fastest growing segment of the U.S. population is
Hispanic, with half of all immigrants in the country today being Spanish speaking (Escobar,
1999). From their present 11.2% in the total population, Hispanics will increase to 17.6% in
2025. At present, 9.8% of the people living in the U.S. are immigrants. Specifics of future
immigration are hard to predict, but pockets of conflict elsewhere in the world will continue to
produce a flow of immigrants with unique language and cultural competencies.

One change in the U.S. population that has been in the news repeatedly is the growing
inequality in family income (i.e., the growing gap between the highest and lowest levels of
household income). Census data on that subject (Weinberg, 1996) do not seem to have, by
themselves, any clear implications for recruiting in the future era. The source of the growth in the
income gap is located almost entirely in the upper 20% of family incomes; the remaining 80%
have stayed in nearly the same relation to each other from the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s.
Families in the top 20% of the income range are not a prime recruiting market for the military.

The U.S. youth population will remain a special concern for the Army. Recruiting and
retention will be affected by the supply of young people (Table A-2), their propensity to enlist,

A-7



the world of our daily lives at a pace that will feel rapid. Which players or factors will have a
discernible impact on the work of soldiers? Here we can take only a short step toward answering
that question.

World Population

The population of the world has significant implications for the future Army. By 2025, the
world will contain between 7.9 and 9.1 billion humans, according to UN estimates (Microsoft,
1998). Most careful forecasts do not have the earth’s population leveling off until after it doubles
today’s size, and some such forecasts see vastly larger increases (McKibben, 1997). By 2025, an
estimated 62% of the world’s population will live in cities. Already by the year 2000, there will
be 24 cities in the world with over 10 million inhabitants (Dator, 1994). Since cities are centers
of industrial, economic, and political power, the ability to control them without destroying them
will be increasingly important to military and political success.

Some projections about the distribution of the world population are significant, particularly
its political control by the world’s civilizations' (Table A-1) and attitudes toward our Wester
civilization. Worldwide, Moslems are expected to increase their share of the human race from
18% in 1980 to 30% in 2025. They will contro] a broad expanse of the earth from northern
Africa east to the southern tip of the Philippines. The U.S. will continue to be heavily dependent
on imported fuel that originates mostly in the Islamic world (Osborne, 1991a).

Table A-1
Proportions of World Population Under the Political Control of Civilizations

Civilization

Year Western African Chinese Hindu Islamic
1900 44.3 0.4 19.3 0.3 4.2
1990 14.7 8.2 24.3 16.3 13.4
2025 10.1 14.4 21.0 16.9 19.2

Note. The Latin American civilization is predicted to hold steady from 1990 to 2025 at 9.2%. Other
civilizations having less than 9% in the 2025 projections are not included here (Excerpted from
Huntington [1996, p. 85], whose main sources were UN reports and the World Almanac).

Geopolitical Setting
By 2025, the geopolitical setting could take any of several very different forms, ranging
from chaos, through the replacement of nation states by other political entities, to a form similar

to today’s. Even among Army futurists, the set of possible scenarios differs (Metz, 1997; Orvis,
Nichiporuk, McDonald, Quigley, & Sastry, 1998).

' For a discussion of the concept and geopolitical significance of “civilizations,” see Huntington (1996).

A-2



types of forces. One of these forces, called the “Battle Force,” stood out because of the
revolutionary technological changes that will have to occur between now and 2010
(approximately) for the Battle Force to become reality. The other forces that will make up the
AA2010 are projected to be similar to current and AXXI forces (in terms of weapon systems and
organization). Therefore, we chose to concentrate effort on identifying the unique performance
requirements of the Battle Force. In studying AA2010 Battle Force plans, it appeared likely that
non-prior service personnel would not be considered for this force. Battle Force personnel will
more likely be selected from the ranks of experienced enlisted soldiers and NCOs. Consequently,
we identified performance requirements and predictors for only one AA2010 target group (as
opposed to three), the “Battle Force NCO.”

Report Organization

This report represents the findings of a 12-month effort that simultaneously addressed
requirements for Soldier21 and NCO21 research programs. The remaining discussions and data
are organized into three main sections and numerous appendixes:

¢ Methodology — The methodology for this project was developed in Phase I of the
Soldier21 study and is described in that final report (J. P. Campbell et al., 1998) and
executed during this effort, Phase IJ. Although predicting future job requirements,
especially as far into the future as 25 years, is a relatively untried process, the current
approach is based in part on the elements of strategic job analysis described by
Schneider and Konz (1989), and on the procedures for analyzing future jobs described
by Arvey, Salas, and Gialluca (1992); Fogli, Goldberg, and Landis (1994); Knapp,
Russell, and Campbell (1994); Knapp, Morath, Quaretti, and Ramos (1997); and
Rumsey et al. (1998).

¢ Results — This section includes a presentation of the most important KSA results for
current (AOE) target groups and future target groups: AOE and AXXI (first tour, junior
NCO, mid-level NCO, and senior NCO) and AA2010 (Battle Force NCO). The findings
are discussed in terms of input from military experts and psychologists who participated
on expert panels, changes in KSA importance from one target group to another and one
era to the next, existing assessment methods for KSAs, and possible application of
selection procedures used by non-Army organizations.

¢ Conclusions — This section summarizes the results, presents a discussion on the overall
implications of the findings, and suggests directions for future research and development
efforts.

¢ Appendixes — The project yielded an abundance of information that will be useful in
addressing future selection and promotion issues. The appendixes comprise the results of
the analyses of two future eras, including (a) a discussion of global issues and conditions
that may shape the Army of the future (2000-2025), (b) a comprehensive bibliography of
current futures literature, (c) descriptions of future characteristics and the effects on
Army job requirements, and (d) an overview of the current NCO promotion system.



The principal findings from each of the five comparisons are summarized below.

Army XXI (First Tour)

Both the SME and Psychologist Panels placed their highest priorities on General Cognitive
Aptitude and Conscientiousness/Dependability. This is consistent with the personnel selection
research literature which, over hundreds of validation studies, shows these two variables to be
the most valid predictors of general job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). It is also worth
noting that, while the Psychologist Panel members were well aware of this research literature, the
Army SMEs most likely were not, and yet they have the same top priorities. Reading Skill and
Working Memory were also highly ranked by both groups, but it is also true that the current
literature shows these two variables to be highly correlated with measures of General Cognitive
Aptitude (e.g., Kyllonen & Christal, 1988, 1990).

The Army SMEs emphasized Ethical Values, Selfless Service (i.e., the group over the
individual), and a lack of counterproductive behavior in the individual’s pre-Army experience
(Ability to Get a Security Clearance). They expressed great concern about the future mismatch
between the Army’s value system and the operative values of the potential applicant population.
The psychologists, on the other hand, emphasized two Big Five personality factors (Need for
Achievement/Energy Level and Emotional Stability), Self-Management Skill, and Oral
Communication Skill.

Finally, there was a slight tendency for the psychologists to rank the technical knowledge
and skill KSAs ahead of the perceptual speed and accuracy/psychomotor aptitudes and vice versa
for the Army SMEs. In general, the psychologists seemed to be more influenced by the forecasts
of technological change and requirements for independent action while the Army SMEs were
worried more about the values and basic abilities of the applicant population.

Army XXI (Junior NCO)

Recall that the number of NCO predictors rated by the panels was considerably larger than
the first tour list, in large part because they include many predictors that could be assessed on the
basis of performance as a first tour soldier. Even with these differences, as with first tour
soldiers, both panels ranked Conscientiousness/Dependability and General Cognitive Aptitude
highly. The psychologists, however, gave these predictors higher priority than did the SMEs.
MOS Specific Knowledge and Skill was also highly ranked by both panels, as was one facet of
leadership skill—Motivating and Leading Others. Finally, Characteristic Level of
Effort/Initiative and Need to Achieve/Energy Level were ranked in the top 10 by both groups. In
general, there was considerable agreement between the two panels’ top 10 lists.

With regard to differences between the two sets of judges, the Army SMEs gave more
emphasis to two predictors—Common Task Knowledge/Skill and Integrity/Discipline. They also
had Physical Fitness in their top 10 list, whereas this was not mentioned at all by the
psychologists. Psychologists gave more emphasis to Judgment and Decision Making Skill as
well as to team skills (i.e., Relating to and Supporting Others; Fostering Adaptive Team Work).
In summary, there seemed to be an overall tendency for the psychologists to see the AXXI junior
NCO as more of a supervisor and team leader than did the Army SMEs.

47



effective performance will be available. Nutrient patches and individual water purification kits
will sustain soldiers (and lighten loads) when necessary. These, and all other capabilities, will be
designed to permit the soldier to be extremely mobile and to endure for long periods of combat.

AA2010 Training

The vision of training for AA2010 is a work in very early progress. Some of the content of
training is implied in broad outline by available details on systems and doctrine. The references
to training delivery have few implications for selection or promotion, because the goal of
training is to make as many as possible ready to perform, not to try to screen people. However,
we may expect to see a significant change in the Army training dynamic in AA2010, particularly
as it affects the Battle Force. Entry training for the Battle Force is expected to be in the form of
apprenticeship, so large numbers of Battle Force NCOs will have responsibility for hands-on
training and mentoring. These NCOs, themselves, will need to be trained as effective mentors to
the apprentices, and their performance as trainers/ mentors will be a significant factor in their
suitability as Battle Force NCOs.

By the AA2010 era, distance learning is expected to be in wide use (Halal, Kull, & Leffman,
1997). The “University After Next” will be part of the split basing structure, where units can
access the knowledge resources of the schoolhouse without carrying them along (Meigs &
Fitzgerald, 1998). To shorten the time to prepare for deployment, units will regularly train for
world hot spots. This threat-oriented training will be conducted against opposing forces that are
tailored to the capabilities and doctrine of likely opponents. Warfighter simulations are expected
to represent all elements of the operational environment down to snipers in urban terrain and
hostile crowds. The simulations will monitor and diagnose group process, use knowledge
resources like those in the battlespace (e.g., biomedical and logistical monitoring), and practice
units in integrating remotely available knowledge with battlefield awareness. Battle Force
deployment will usually be too fast to permit train-up in live exercises, so deploying forces will
rely on simulation-based training for most preparation. However, a distinct advantage of
simulator training is that units that are geographically scattered will not need to be co-located to
train together. Distributed interactive simulations will allow simultaneous interactions at all
levels of widely dispersed individuals and forces.

However, while the technologies for distributed and simulated training will give training
great new powers and flexibility, they do raise questions: How well skills can transfer from
simulated settings to live ones; and will that transfer be variable among individuals? Johnson and
Stewart (1999) raised these questions by observing that people may differ markedly in their
ability to feel immersed (i.e., to experience “reality”) in virtual settings. Indeed, the question of
transfer from any simulations to the operational setting is persistent, but Johnson and Stewart’s
work focuses the question at a level that may be relevant for selecting and promoting soldiers.

Individual, computer-delivered training will be highly flexible as to time and place of
delivery. Knowledge resources will be abundantly available 24 hours a day at anyone’s computer
in the forms of courses, special interest groups, interactive archives/libraries, extended faculty,
and shared synthetic environments. Resources for self-development should be plentiful and
effective. However, availability is not in itself the whole solution. Time to access, apply, and

0-34



research areas of common interest dealing with technologies for immersion, networked
simulation, standards for interoperability, computer generated characters, and tools for creating
simulated environments. Modeling of human performance is an active area of development
whose great promise could emerge at a practical level in the future (Pew, 1997; Pew & Mavor,
1998).

Medical technologies seem to have brought the future into view most disturbingly, if not
most rapidly, with cloning, gene transplants, body part transplants, neural prostheses, and
cultivation of nerve cells (Service, 1999). Apparently safe drugs for prolonging people’s capacity
to work effectively between rests have been in hand for some years. We will not go into these
physiological/medical technologies further, other than to note that they could force a reappraisal
of values and practices regarding human life.

Although new technologies are an inspiration for the future Army, giving it unprecedented
capabilities, those technologies are likely to have a problematic impact. Rather than making jobs
easier, new technologies tend instead to make bosses and employees try to get more done. This
effect comes about in two ways: simplifying some tasks while upskilling many jobs (Dede,
1995). A couple of familiar examples illustrate this point: as word processing has enabled many
unskilled typists to produce good typed, formatted copy, secretarial positions have tended to be
replaced by more complex jobs such as administrative assistant.’ And as the former secretaries
have been upskilled, many professionals who relied on them have added formerly secretarial
activities to their own jobs. Similarly, truck driving used to be simpler job before it involved
computers, radios, built in lifts, and other “labor savers.” Whether the next generations of
technologies will have the same effect on job complexity remains to be seen.

Enthusiasts for advanced instructional technologies (e.g., Marquardt & Kearsley, 1999) are
optimistic about putting expertise into the hands of non-specialists in the field either in the form
of hand-held procedural guides (e.g., how-to videos, step-by-step diagnostics) or via links with
live experts. An unknown at this point is whether soldiers will be able to give up some of their
other responsibilities when they add using such expertise-in-a-box to their existing tasks. In order
for the benefits of new technologies to be realized in the future, enlisted jobs will need to be
designed with total work load in mind, not just the individual tasks that new technologies may
help with.

On reading the list of to-be-developed, leap-ahead technologies that the Army requires
(DCSDOC, 1998c, 1999a), a lay person could be excused for skepticism. Some of them sound
like science fiction, including structure-penetrating sensors for urban settings (“x-ray vision”),
ultrareliability, and high-speed ships that can offload Army materiel ashore without the benefit of
ports. Others sound like the sine qua non capabilities of the Army: low signature systems;
breakthroughs in materials to reduce weight and improve protective power; very high speed, all
terrain vehicles; unmanned, remotely-operated long-range precision fire and air defense systems;
and improvements both in fuels and in the energy efficiency of engines. Others sound

3 Thanks go to Dr. Juan Sanchez for drawing our attention to the upskilling effect of new technologies.



Table D-1
Promotion Eligibility Requirements, Without Waivers.
Promotion to TIS TMIG TIS TMIG
Grade: Primary Primary Secondary Secondary
E2 6 months N/A N/A N/A
E3 12 months 4 months N/A NIA
E4 26 months 4 months N/A N/A
ES 36 months 8 months 18 months 8 months
E6 84 months 10 months 48 months 10 months
E7 72 months* Varies Varies Varies
E8 96 months Varies Varies Varies
E9 120 months Varies Varies Varies

Note. TIS = time in service. TMIG; = time in grade; N/A = does not apply.

*The apparent anomaly in TIS between E2 and E6 reflects different regulatory requirements guiding the
different promotion systems.

Decentralized Promotion System

The soldier’s first exposure to the Army promotion system is the decentralized system that
applies to grades E2 — E4. This exposure starts almost as soon as soldiers enter the Army and is
applied while soldiers are still acquiring soldierization and MOS-specific skills. Most promotions
to E2 through E4 are so automatic that they are termed “advancements” rather than promotions.
That is, soldiers are expected to progress through these grades and it is the exceptional soldier (in
the pejorative application of the term exceptional) who does not. These advancements (or
precluding an individual from advancement) are all decided and administered within the soldier’s
unit. Likewise, selecting individual soldiers to be advanced ahead of their peers (through
waivers) is also done by the soldier’s immediate commander (usually delegated to the Captain
[03] level).?

One important aspect of the decentralized promotion system is the designation of individuals
to be Corporals. Strictly speaking, this is not a promotion but a conversion. Commanders can
convert Specialist E4 to the rank of Corporal E4 if the individual is occupying a position which is
authorized to be filled by an NCO (the option to do so rests with the commander; it is not
required). Although the pay grade (E4) is the same, Corporals wear a different insignia and are
NCOs. As such, they have certain authority and prestige that Specialists do not. Once converted,
Corporals generally retain that designation even when they no longer fill the NCO slot. In our
study, we included the position of Corporal E4 in the considerations for Junior NCO (along with

3 There are a variety of other programs that facilitate accelerated promotions in the grades E2 — E4. Many of these
are incentives and recognition during the soldier’s initial entry training period. For example, a soldier who
completes Ranger training can be advanced to Specialist E4 as soon as he completes 12 months time-in-service.

D-3



and making difficult tactical decisions on the spot. For communicating with host or coalition
nationals, soldiers will carry two-way language translation devices small enough to fit in the ear.

Real-time biomedical monitoring of individual Battle Force members will be based on a
combination of remote database information on personal characteristics and current indicators of
their workload, hydration, sleep, nutritional status, and stress. That information will be used both
to help sustain individuals and units and to help commanders in operational planning (Belenky,
1997).

Not only individuals, but also systems and supply stocks, will have embedded monitors for
tracking amounts, working conditions, and locations. The tactical internet will link all critical
components for automatically monitoring such conditions as individual vehicles’ fuel supply and
ammunition remaining and the location and physical condition of individual soldiers. This “total
knowledge network” will receive and supply information to all organizational levels to give
secure and reliable views of all human and material assets on the battlefield and elsewhere in the
system.

Information systems are not without problems. “The proliferation of chattering black boxes
on the knowledge-based battlefield will rapidly saturate the electromagnetic spectrum. If we add
to this the competition from the enemy’s digital traffic and his jamming efforts, the transmission
of vital tactical information could be crowded off the air or lost in the clutter” (Eden, 1997, p. 3).
On top of that, opponents will have hackers trying to foster chaos in the area of operations by
attacking regional commercial and government systems as well as our C4I assets. Much of the
Army’s global information assets will rely on commercially owned and operated facilities, which
may be available to adversaries as well.

Also recognized is the challenge of managing information. Several means of subduing the
information load are envisioned: providing information at the user’s option, providing
information automatically pre-digested into a usable form, and providing users with automated
job and decision aids. But at this point, “‘...exercising information dominance is a complex
activity that is still understood at only a rudimentary level” (DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 16).

Soldier Support

At the individual soldier level, capabilities will be revolutionary as well (Future Battle
Directorate, 1999). A soldier’s very light clothing will have diverse capabilities: low signature;
chameleon-like properties for camouflage; and protection against ballistic threats, chemical and
biological agents, heat, and cold. Visors on helmets will permit night vision, display tactical
information, and protect against laser light.

Soldiers’ physical capabilities will be enhanced with light mechanical assist prostheses and
back-pack rockets. Soldiers will prepare buildings for entry with remote robotic weapons
systems. Other robotic systems will also carry personal gear, evacuate the wounded, and provide
supplies. New power sources will eliminate dependence on batteries.

Complementing the biomedical monitors mentioned earlier, soldiers will carry light, highly
nutritional rations and a variety of medical agents for first aid and protection against disease.
When optimal biomedical conditions cannot be maintained, chemical agents that prolong

C-33



An interesting example of assessing current performance was based on semi-structured
group discussions of actual problems and issues faced by the organization. Videotapes of the
discussions are scored on dimensions of performance. A strategy for assessing prior performance
involved the use of a Career Achievement Record that is scored using behaviorally anchored
rating scales.

One interviewee provided an example of an innovative combination of methods. The
assessment begins with an interactive voice recording delivery of a biodata checklist via the
telephone. Using an automated process, responses to the checklist are then used to create a
structured interview that is given by a live interviewer via the telephone. The interview is used to
follow up on the endorsement of low base rate or high value items on the checklist.

Some of our interviewees also mentioned novel strategies for using assessment information.
These included the use of a neural-network modeled match of competency profile with job
competency requirement profiles and a Q-sort based match of applicant values with
organizational values.

Trends in Personnel Testing

We also asked our telephone interviewees to comment on trends they see in personnel
testing. One trend mentioned by several interviewees is the increased use of technology (e.g.,
computers, telephones, Internet) for the delivery of assessments. This trend is reflected in the list
of measurement methods provided in Table 37. There were also observations suggesting that
organizations are returning to basics, asking for shorter and cheaper assessments. This, along
with an apparent decreasing concern for adverse impact issues by many employers, is leading
some back to the use of multiple-choice tests and other traditional assessment methods that can
be easily administered using either paper-and-pencil methods or advanced technologies. This
trend may also reflect the realization that personality testing and moderate to high fidelity
simulations are not the panacea that people had hoped. Personality measures still tend to suffer
from applicant misrepresentation and simulations have not always shown the increases in
validity (and decreases in adverse impact) that would justify their continued use. Although this
certainly does not mean that no one is pursuing these methods, it does suggest a slowing of the
bandwagons.

Several interviewees also mentioned a shift in emphasis from selection to recruiting and
performance management. This appears to be at least in part a response to the dwindling pool of
qualified individuals in the work force. Another observation that has some relevance to the Army
was an increasing concern for testing individuals for whom English is a second language. Given
that the percentage of individuals in the applicant population for whom this is an issue is steadily
increasing, this is an important consideration for any future-oriented assessment system.

Developing Assessments for Future Jobs

A final question posed to our telephone interviewees asked whether they have been involved
in the development of assessments for jobs that do not currently exist. One person described an
effort to conduct a future-oriented job analysis for about 20 occupations in a single organization.
In a series of workshops, SMEs described anticipated changes to the target jobs and rated those

68



Final Staff Panel

The final workshop was conducted on July 28, 1999 to reconcile the differences between the
Anny SME and Psychologist Panels. The Staff Panel consisted of eight researchers from the
project staff and psychologists from ARI’s Selection and Assignment Research Unit. The
synthesis of the two sets of importance orderings from the Army SME Panel and the
Psychologist Panel was accomplished by establishing an algorithm for combining these two sets
of judgments. The following outlines the final rules for resolving panel differences.

There was no attempt to rank order all first tour KSAs or all NCO KSAs. Instead, a rank
ordering was generated only for the very highest priority subset. After that, KSAs were
prioritized in “blocks” as defined below. KSAs were not ordered by importance within blocks.

1. The highest priority subset comprised those KSAs that both panels had placed in the top
8 (First Tour) or top 10 (NCOs). This top tier ranged from three KSAs (Battle Force
NCO) to seven KSAs (Army XXI Junior NCO). The KSAs in this top tier were also
rank ordered by computing the average rank across both sets of judges.

2. The second block (KSAs are unranked within the block) was defined as all KSAs
placed in the top tier by one panel and the second tier by the other panel.

3. The third block was defined as all KSAs placed in the top tier by one panel and those
tied for inclusion in the second tier by the other panel.

4. The fourth block was defined as all KSAs placed in the top tier by one panel and in the
third tier by the other panel. The third tier always consists of those KSAs that were not
ranked in the top tier and were not nominated for the second tier.

5. The fifth block was defined as all KSAs placed in the second tier by both panels, but
not included in the ties for the last spot in the second tier. For example, if the frequency
counts for one panel’s NCO second tier nominations yielded two KSAs tied for the fifth
(i.e., last) spot, neither KSA was included in this fifth block.

6. The sixth block was defined as all KSAs nominated for the second tier by one panel and
tied for the last spot in the second tier nomination for the other group.

7. The seventh block was defined as all KSAs that were nominated for the second tier by
one panel (including all ties for the last spot) but were left in the third tier by the other

group.

8. The eighth and last block was defined as all KSAs that were not in the top tier or
nominated for the second tier by either panel.

The outcomes of this prioritization are presented in the next section.

29



Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997c) Knowledge & speed. First annual report on the Army
After Next project. Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC. Available: http://www-
tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

Dickenson, M. (1999). Interviewed by David Kestenbaum on National Public Radio, program
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Ford, L. A., Campbell, R. C., & Cobb, R. (1998). Analysis of emerging digital and back-up
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for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Future Battle Directorate. (1999). AAN soldier system [2 pages]. Unpublished paper

Hartzog, W., (GEN). (9 June 1998). News Briefing on the Army’s Redesign of Divisions. In
Transcript of news conference. [On-line]. Available:
http://www.tradon.army.mil/apao.newdiv/transcript.html.

Gay, M. (COL). (1998, June). The Army After Next. Paper presented at the Army Research
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C-44



A comparison between the rankings indicates a great deal of consistency in the SME
judgments about the critical KSAs now and in AXXI. Three of the top five or eight (depending
on the era) first tour KSAs were the same between the two eras (General Cognitive Aptitude,
Conscientiousness/Dependability, Reading Skill). The SMEs viewed Emotional Stability and
Psychomotor Aptitude as becoming somewhat less important in the AXXI era, and indicated that
personal characteristics (i.e., Selfless Service, Ethical Value System, and computer skills would
become much more important.

Although the rank ordering differed somewhat, the SMEs chose the same set of top 10
KSAs for junior NCOs in both eras (AOE and AXXI). This is remarkable, especially given that
the AXXI list of potential KSAs included several more items than the AOE list. There was
slightly less agreement for mid-level NCOs, with 8 of the 10 top KSAs being the same for both
eras. At the senior NCO level, 6 of the top 10 KSAs were the same for both eras. Adaptability,
Conscientiousness/Dependability, and Direct, Monitor, and Supervise Work fell the furthest out
of the first tier, being replaced by General Cognitive Aptitude, Concern for Soldier Quality of
Life, Self-Management Skill, and Advanced Computer Skills in the AXX] era.

Comparison of Panel KSA Rankings for each Future Target Group

As described previously, both the Army SME Panel and the Psychologist Panel reached a
consensus on the 8 most important KSAs for AXX! first tour performance and the 10 most
important KSAs for junior, mid-level, and senior AXXI NCOs and for the AA2010 Battle Force
NCOs. Within each top 8 or top 10, the KSAs were rank ordered in importance by averaging
rankings across judges within each panel.

The individuals in both panels also nominated a second set of KSAs as the next most
important. There were seven KSAs nominated by each judge for this “second tier” for first tour
performance and five KSAs nominated for the second tier for each of the four NCO target
groups. The Army SME Panel did not reach consensus on nominations for the second tier of
KSAs and the KSAs and nominations for the second tier were not rank ordered. The importance
ordering for the second tier was obtained simply from the frequency of nominations, which often
incorporated a number of ties. The Psychologist Panel determined both the first- and second-tier
KSAs through consensus discussions, but only rank ordered the first tier group.

The comparative results for the KSA importance orderings for each of the two panels are
shown in Tables 22 through 26, one table for each of the target groups. KSAs ranked in the top
eight (first tour) or top 10 (the four NCO groups) by one panel but not by the other are shown in
italics. For KSAs ranked in the top tier by both panels, any major differences in rank orderings
between the two groups are also indicated. For purposes of these tables, a change in rank of + 1.0
is considered no change.

41



Escobar, G. (1999). Immigrants’ ranks tripled in 29 years. The Washington Post, 9 January,
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97 P19B LL



Appendix C
Future Army Eras

The Soldier21/NCO21 study focuses on the knowledges, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that
will be necessary for soldiers to perform successfully in the Army of the future. This future is
defined by two eras. The first is the period from 2000 to 2010 and is commonly referred to as
Army XXI (AXXI). The second period runs from 2010 through 2025 and is referred to as Army
After 2010 (AA2010).! In concept and approach, these two eras are very different and as such
they are treated separately from each other throughout this study. In actuality, there will be
tremendous overlap between the two. Moreover, the AXXI era also has significant overlap with
the Army of Excellence (AOE), the current era, up until AXXI begins. Additionally, the
designation of temporal boundaries for the eras (such as 2000, 2010, and 2025) are artificial and
are not meant to indicate milestones or threshold events. In other words, the future is a
continuum. However, the designation of the eras as separate was a convenient way to
compartmentalize the study and is consistent with the Army’s approach to conducting activities
regarding these periods.

Future predictions are uncertain at best and the farther into the future, the more uncertain the
projection. This is certainly true for the description of AXXI and of AA2010. Changes in
budgets, national priorities, technologies, research and development, and Army internal and
external forces will all affect what we know now about the Army of the future. AA2010, being
more remote, is particularly vulnerable to these shaping occurrences. Moreover, AA2010 also
describes the process of futures work that involves a program of studies, wargames, specialty
franchises, and seminars that is generating future concepts and ideas. The quick pace of
discovery in the AA2010 program means major changes have evolved in a short period. Further
revisions are a certainty.

Content and Organization of this Appendix

The descriptions of AXXI and AA2010 that are contained in this appendix are general in
scope. They were used in the study to provide a background to typify the differences that can be
contemplated in the future eras. The frame of reference for comparison is generally the Army of
the 1990s (AOE) although some assumptions about AXXI are incorporated for comparison
purposes into AA2010. The general descriptions are organized around the Army’s functional
components of doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, material, and the soldier
(DTLOMS).? During the study, DTLOMS was used to derive the specific characteristics of each
era that were deemed to have the greatest impact on soldier and NCO performance. These
characteristics were then used to determine the performance components for soldiers and NCOs.
These job components are contained in tables that follow each era’s DTLOMS summary.
Because of inherent differences between AXXI and AA2010, their treatment and organization
will differ somewhat in this presentation. Each is explained within the segment for that era.

' The term “Army After 2010” was originally Army After Next or AAN,
? DTLOMS is the Army acronym that identifies all major force modernization areas required for warfighting
integration.



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e Self-Management Skill and, to some extent, Self-Directed Learning Skill, also receive
high priorities. While the Army already devotes considerable attention to the
development of self-management skills during the first tour of duty, the implications of
the current findings are that it will become critical at all levels in the future. There is also
an implication that a much higher level of such skills will be required. Developing fuller
specifications for what self-management might entail in the future is a worthwhile
research objective.

¢ Three general skills, Oral Communication, Judgment and Decision Making, and
Adaptability, are all given high priorities, although the pattern across the target groups is
not the same for each of the three. Oral Communication is ranked as highly important
from top to bottom, while Adaptability is given a high priority only for Battle Force
NCO. Incorporating assessments of Oral Communication Skill in the promotion systems
is probably a relatively simple matter compared to the specification and measurement of
Judgment/Decision Making and Adaptability. In this regard, and because of previous
ARI sponsored research, developing measurement methods for the adaptability construct
is farther along. However, given very high priorities for Judgment/Decision Making,
perhaps research on this construct as a KSA should also have a high priority.

«Finally, for senior-level NCOs, and particularly for Battle Force NCOs, critical KSAs
focus on management of information systems and having expert knowledge of how the
battlefield systems of the future will interact and be coordinated. Developing procedures
for assessing these KSAs must deal with the fact that the systems being talked about do
not yet exist. However, something reasonably similar may exist in one or more Army
units at some point not too long from now (or réasonable facsimiles may exist already).
One aspect of R&D on these KSAs is the premium to be placed on choosing the right
surrogate.

In sum, we think the outcome of the current project captures meaningful priorities and
points toward a number of very promising R&D objectives. When the project began, opinions
varied about what could be learned from this “judgment capturing” exercise. It may, in fact, have
exceeded expectations. Armed with this information, an understanding of the current selection
and promotion systems and the context within which they operate, and a toolkit of innovative
measurement methods to consider, Army researchers should be able to make well-reasoned
recommendations regarding how to best meet enlisted soldiers’ requirements, throughout the
ranks, in the 21st century.

71



James Woolsey has said that germ terrorism is “the single most dangerous threat to our national
security in the foreseeable future” (Broad & Miller, 1998, p. 2). The effect of a successful
biological attack can be imagined in terms of epidemics and plagues of the past.

In March 1998, a dozen Federal agencies conducted a war game to evaluate the impact of a
hypothetical germ attack. Overall, the impact would have been catastrophic; the supplies,
organization, and plans were not in place to assure a successful response (Miller & Broad, 1998).
The exercise provided momentum for the President to sign new directives to improve the
country’s ability to prevent NBC attack and to respond effectively if attacked. Also, he set up a
coordinator of government anti-terrorist activities. In the annual budget outlined in January 1999,
the administration has asked for about $2.8 billion to counter domestic terrorism and another $8
billion for protection of American installations abroad.

The proposed bioterrorism defense program (Shalala, 1999) calls for a dramatic expansion
of the infrastructure. Today, a few national-level centers fly teams to sites of emergencies. As a
response to bioterrorism, that mechanism is much too slow. Instead, this program will extend
into every major community in the country, rural and urban, involving hospitals, laboratories,
public health workers, and physicians. Among its responsibilities will be the surveillance,
tracking, diagnosis, and remediation of biological threats. In this specialized type of defense, the
military will be partners with civilian agencies. By July of 1999, the military was helping to train
early reaction teams in 120 cities around the country (Cohen, 1999).

The Secretary of Defense has approved creation of a joint service task force for civil support
that will develop a plan for supporting Federal agencies in domestic crises (Broad & Miller,
1999). This task force will report to the Justice Department, which is the lead agency for law
enforcement and for coordinating the domestic response to terrorism.

One form of biological terrorism that can be expected will be directed against food crops
(Rogers, Whitby, & Dando, 1999). Advances in genetics have made it possible to develop agents
that are effective against a wide variety of the world’s staple crops, including wheat and rice.
Because agents for such terrorism can be both developed and transported easily and
unobtrusively, they could be unleashed without exposing the attacking nation, organization, or
other party. One aspect of American farming practice makes the U.S. especially vulnerable to
such terrorism: American farmers tend to grow a very small variety of any given food crop. If
they were to diversify the varieties, then a single agent could harm less of the total national yield.

Homeland defense is one of the Army’s missions (DCSDOC, 1998c). Whether it would
involve a law enforcement role is to be resolved. The prospect of an emergency role for the
military in law enforcement has evoked concern among civil libertarians (Broad & Miller, 1999).
According to former Senator Sam Nunn, the Pentagon already has the power to carry out law
enforcement activities in the event of chemical or germ attacks. Without getting into the
complexities of the laws here, we can readily imagine the impetus for emergency curtailment of
civil liberties by noting that American citizens have readily given up some of our freedom from
searches in return for being safe from the demonstrated threat of terrorism while riding airliners.
At the least, the likelihood of terrorism in the continental U.S. (CONUS) means that the military

A-6



One difference between the first tour and NCO KSA sets is that, for NCO promotion
decisions, additional KSA information is potentially available. That is, various aspects of the
individual’s current and past Army performance could be assessed and serve as predictors of
future Army performance. In fact, Project A data showed that assessments of first tour
performance were valid predictors of junior NCO performance approximately 3-5 years later.
Corrected for unreliability, the correlations were in the .40 - .60 range (J. P. Campbell, Peterson,
& Johnson, 1994). Further, there was considerable convergent and divergent validity across the
major components of soldier performance. That is, a specific component of first tour
performance always correlated most highly with its closest counterpart among the NCO
performance dimensions.

As can be noted from looking at the KSA array for NCOs, some variables reflect general
traits that could only be assessed via standardized “tests” (e.g., General Cognitive Aptitude) and
some could only be measured by assessments of current or past performance (e.g., skills as a
trainer in the Army context). However, a large proportion of the potential NCO KSAs could be
measured either in a standardized testing environment or by systematic assessment of actual job
performance (e.g., testing Need to Achieve and General Energy Level using the Army’s
Assessment of Biographical Life Experiences [ABLE] versus using supervisor ratings to assess
Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative). As indicated by Project A data (J. P. Campbell &
Zook, 1991), these two variables have a substantial intercorrelation, but it is by no means perfect,
even if the two variables are corrected for attenuation due to unreliability of measurement.
Consequently, the pros and cons of using one versus the other in a promotion context must be
carefully evaluated.

Army SME Panel KSA Rankings for the Army of Excellence

Tables 18-21 present the KSA rankings for the AOE era which were provided by the Army
SME Panel. Although the focus of this research is on the predicted future KSAs, collection of
priority rankings of currently required KSAs from SMEs provided interesting comparisons
between current and future job requirements.

Note that the ranking exercise at the first tour level was a bit different between the two eras.
The SMEs picked the top five AOE KSAs and five second-tier KSAs by consensus, whereas
they picked the top eight AXXI KSAs by consensus and each participant nominated an
additional seven second-tier KSAs. Time limitations prevented us from requiring the Army SME
panelists to reach consensus on the second-tier KSAs for any group other than AOE first tour.

36



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B-19



Table C-2 (continued)

Team Building and Teamwork: Deployments and unconventional missions have organizational
implications. Existing branch-specific small unit groups such as sections, squads, and platoons may be
operationally replaced by ad hoc groups composed of different specialties and with members from
different services or organizations. Emphasis will be on rapidly assembling a mission specific team to
accomplish and task and then reassembling a different team for a different task in a short period of time.
NCOs will control many of these teams, both with and without officer supervision. But NCOs will have
the responsibility for making these groups function effectively.

Relating to and Supporting Others: Future deployments will be complex affairs with most units
maintaining a CONUS-based home station and perhaps an interim based logistical and administrative
staging area as well. All these locations must be staffed and NCOs will play an exceedingly important
role in providing manpower for this staffing. Unlike some AOE-era deployments, these positions will not
be filled by non-deployable soldiers, but will require specially trained, motivated, and experienced
personnel. This is particularly important in the case of home-station personnel who must interact with and
support family members of deployed soldiers.

Motivating and Leading Others: Non-traditional deployments often involve soldiers performing
missions that are not entirely consistent with what they perceive their Army jobs and roles to be. This is
particularly true of assistance and humanitarian missions supported by warfighting units. Ambiguous and
unpopular missions can affect soldier performance. NCOs throughout the chain need to exert positive
leadership in such situations.

Training Others: As deployments become more widespread, more and more pre-deployment training
packages and Combat Training Center support programs will be developed to prepare units for
deployments. But the implementation of these training programs and the effectiveness of their application
will be the responsibility of unit NCOs. The bulk of this training requirement will be at SL3 and SL4.

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work: Non-traditional missions involve a lot of non-doctrinal
performance and discovery learning. This in turn enhances the requirement for supervision, particularly at
the SL3 and SL4 NCO level. NCOs will need to ensure that they and their subordinates understand
deployment preparation requirements. In uncertain situations, it is critical that supervisors ensure
assignments are clearly understood.

Planning, Organizing, and Coordinating: Many activities within non-traditional missions will be given
to small units as objectives. It will be the responsibility of operational NCOs, primarily at SL3 and SL4,
to come up with detailed plans to meet those objectives and to coordinate resources and personnel. Along
with this will be the requirement to anticipate and avoid roadblocks to meeting assigned objectives.

Military Presence: Deployments heighten the physical visibility of the Army. Friendly and adverse
media alike use images of soldiers to enhance their presentations. The physical appearance and bearing of
soldiers is an NCO responsibility, accomplished both through supervision and example.

C-14



Table C-4 (continued)

Planning, Organizing, and Coordinating: While this has always been an NCO requirement, the AXXI
shift towards decentralization may bring about major changes in the levels at which this occurs. NCOs
may replace many officers in liaison positions, staff positions, and even command positions. NCOs will
likely become responsible for planning, organizing, and coordinating at a higher level and without officer
supervision. Interactions with other commands, government and non-government agencies, and joint
forces may become an NCO responsibility.

Oral Communication: As operations become decentralized and NCOs pick up more officer functions,
one area of emphasis will be the ability to coordinate, convince, and inform others by speaking. NCOs
will increasingly be called on to give informal and formal briefings. They must demonstrate an ability to
organize thoughts and ideas and present them logically, accurately, and relevantly.

Relating to and Supporting Others: NCO-led small groups will become the building blocks that
aggregate to form medium to large groups in decentralized operations. NCOs are key to team building
and team operation and these, in turn, are key to effective decentralized units and operations. The ability
to support the overall effort will be vital to successful AXXI decentralized and independent operations.
NCOs must have an awareness of the larger picture and direct all efforts towards accomplishing end
goals.

C-18



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (from... . toy

May 2000 Final 09/03/98 to 09/30/99
4, TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sa. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

21st Century Soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers: DASWO01-98-D-0047 (Delivery Order 0002)

Critical Predictors of Performance &b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
622785
6. AUTHOR(S) 5c. PROJECT NUMBER
A790
Ford, Laura A., Campbell, Roy C., Campbell, John P., Knapp, Deirdre J., 5d. TASK NUMBER
and Walker, Clinton B. (HumRRO) 1218
5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER
coz

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO)

66 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 400

Alexandria, VA 22314
‘9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. MONITOR ACRONYM
US. Anny Research Institute for the Behavioral ARI

and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue 11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600 Technical Report 1102

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:
Michael G. Rumsey, Contracting Officer’s Representative

14, ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

The goal of the Soldier21 and NCO21 projects was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of future conditions and future job
demands in order to identify critical performance predictors or knowledges, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that may eventually be
developed into selection (Soldier21) and promotion (NCO21) criteria. Three eras were examined: the Army of Excellence (1990-
2000), Army XXI (2000-2010), and the Army After 2010 (2010-2025). The specific objectives for Soldier21 were to (a) identify and
describe the nature and type of changes that are expected to occur in these eras, (b) forecast future job requirements and the critical
individual characteristics of soldiers who will perform proficiently, and (c) identify selection measures that might be used to assess
individual characteristics. For NCO21, the objectives were to (a) provide a description of forecasted conditions affecting future NCO
performance, (b) describe the future job requirements, and (c) provide a descriptive list of the main qualities needed for effective
noncommissioned officer performance. This report documents the methodology and findings of this effort.

15. SUBJECT TERMS.
first tour soldier; noncommissioned officer (NCO); selection criteria; promotion criteria; Army XXI; Army After Next; knowledges,
skills, and abilities (KSA); job analysis

| 19. LIMITATION OF | 20. NUMBER 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF PAGES {Nama and Talanhane Number)

ne

16. REPORT 17. ABSTRACT | 18. THIS PAGE
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 193 Michael G. Rumsey
(703) 617-8275



¢ Physical fitness, endurance, and agility will continue to be important aspects of
performance of all soldiers. Pure strength tasks will be reduced somewhat but ability to
withstand physical, mental, and emotional fatigue will become increasingly important.

¢ Lack of discipline and respect for authority in some segments of the recruitment
population compound job satisfaction, attrition, and retention issues.

Army XXI Characteristics and Job Components
for First Tour Soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers

Based on the study of the literature surrounding the AXXI DTLOMS summarized above,
coupled with the extensive field interviews described in the Methodology section of this report,
there were six characteristics that were identified as having the greatest potential for impact on
the job performance of soldiers and NCOs in the first 10 years of the AXXI era. The
characteristics identified were:

¢ Transition to Digital Operation and an Increase in Technologies
¢ Diverse Missions and Frequent Deployments

¢ Diversity of Forces

¢ Decentralized Operations

. Training

¢ Youth Population Changes and Recruitment

These characteristics (which are expanded on in Tables C-1 through C-6) were used to
analyze the expected impact that they would have on the performance of enlisted soldiers in the
AXXI era. This analysis included a review of existing job components primarily from the AOE
and an identification of changes that would be generated by the AXXI characteristics. In some
cases, new performance components were identified but the most general result was a more
specific AXX] definition appended to an existing AOE performance component.

In Tables C-1 through C-6, the six individual characteristics are explained, followed by the
inferred job demands for both first tour soldiers and NCOs generated by that characteristic.
Because different characteristics affect job components in different ways, many of the job
components are repeated under different characteristics. Readers should keep the following in
mind during the review of both the characteristics and the job components:

« This analysis focused on how soldier behaviors will have to change as a result of
digitization and other AXXI characteristics. Therefore, characteristics and job
components are meant to be Army-wide, not MOS-specific.

¢ The purpose of identifying Army-wide job components was to give expert panels (and
analysts) a frame of reference for identifying KSAs needed for soldier selection (first
tour) and for soldier promotion (NCO). The job components listed in Tables C-1 through
C-6 are based on interpretation of AXX] information available at the time, some of which
was presumptive. As AXXI unfolds, these job components are subject to refinement and
revision. Future changes could have an effect on the KSAs that were identified in this
study.

C-8



Miller, J., & Broad, W. J. (1999, January 22). Clinton describes terrorism threat for 21st century.
New York Times on the Web [5 pages]. Foreign Desk.

Miller, J., & Broad, W. J. (1998, April 26). Exercise finds U.S. unable to handle germ war threat.
New York Times-on the Web [5 pages]. Foreign Desk.

Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (1998). Sailor 21: A research vision to attract,
retain, and utilize the 21st century sailor. San Diego, CA: Author.

Orvis, B., Nichiporuk, B., McDonald, L. L., Quigley, D., & Sastry, N. (1998, June). Future
personnel resource management: Initial report. Paper presented at the Army Research
Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next — II.
Leesburg, VA.

Osborne, D. (Ed.). (1991a). Army 21: Domestic trends to the year 2015, forecasts for the United
States — Part I. Draft study prepared for TRADOC. Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service.

Pew, R. (1997, November). Human behavior modeling and simulation in support of the Army After
Next. Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and
Organizational Issues in the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

Pew, R. W., & Mavor, A. S. (Eds.). (1998). Modeling human and organizational behavior:
Application to military simulation. Washington, DC: National Research Council.

Popper, S. W., Wagner, C. S., & Larson, E. V. (1998). New Forces at Work: Industry Views
Critical Technologies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Quinones, M. A., & Ehrenstein, A. (1997). Training for a rapidly changing workplace:
Applications of psychological research. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.

Rehm, D. (1999). Wearable computers. Diane Rehm Show on WAMU, 88.5 FM, 29 June.

Rogers, P., Whitby, S., & Dando, M. (1999). Biological warfare against crops. Scientific American,
280 6, 70-75.

Scales, R. (MG). (1998a). The Army After Next project: Knowledge and speed. [34 pages].
Presentation slides.

Scales, R. (MG). (1998b). The army beyond 2010. [33 pages]. Presentation slides
Available: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/aan/.

Segal, D., & Verdugo, N. (1994). Demographic trends and personnel policies as determinants of the
racial composition of the volunteer Army (excerpt). Armed Forces & Society, 20, 629.

Service, R.F. (1999, April 23). Neurons and silicon get intimate. Science, 578-579.

A-24



however, to exploring the options that might be considered and issues associated with choosing
from among them. We begin this section by briefly reviewing the current Army enlisted
selection and promotion systems, then turn to a discussion of assessment method evaluation
criteria and factors affecting the feasibility of implementing various methods into these systems.
The remainder of the section discusses the results of our efforts to identify some of the more
innovative measurement methods that have started appearing in operational assessment systems
elsewhere and in the research literature.

Overview of Current Army Assessment Systems

A brief overview of the Army’s current selection and promotion systems is provided below.
This discussion does not include special purpose assessment systems, such as that for selection
into the Special Operations Forces.

Enlisted Entry-Level Selection

To be qualified for initial enlistment into the current Army, applicants must meet a number
of eligibility criteria, including:

e Age-Non-prior service individuals must be between 18 and 34 years to be eligible.

¢ Physical standards — Recruits must meet standards for height, weight, blood pressure,
vision and hearing, and test negative for drugs, alcohol, and the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).

¢ Moral standards — Individuals must undergo a recruiter interview, a police records
check, and an Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC).

¢  Trainability — As evaluated through a standardized cognitive test battery.

The U.S. military services all use the ASVAB to screen applicants. The ASVAB consists of
ten subtests (listed in Table 33) that reflect “subject areas which have shown validity through
prediction of training criteria...” (Eitelberg, Laurence, Waters, & Perelman, 1984). More
specifically, to be eligible to enlist, one must score within a standard range on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT), an aptitude composite of the ASVAB. The AFQT is a combination
of the Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Mathematics
Knowledge subtests. AFQT scores must fall within Test Categories I-IV (see Table 34), and
every effort is made to enlist individuals who score above the 50th percentile (Test Categories I-
THA). A high school diploma or equivalent is also required, depending on the Test Category in
which they score (DA, 1999).

The goal for the Army is to identify recruits who have a relatively high probability of doing
well (Eitelberg, 1988). “Applicants for enlistment in the modern military must be able to meet
the minimum standards that gauge their relative chances of success or failure in training as well
as their general capacity to stay out of trouble, follow orders, and complete a term of service”
Citelberg, p. 20).

59



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elements, in the Battle Forces, and in the AA2010-era support side. This prediction is an
inference from the few speculations on enlisted staffing in AA2010 that have appeared so far
(DCSDOC, 1997a, 1997b; Gay, 1998; Scales, 1998a, 1998b; Vollrath, 1997). Having three
parallel systems could be administratively complicated, but the alternative of rotating soldiers
freely among the three eras of capability and training (including remaining AOE elements) could
degrade unit performance. However, the separate career path, unique training, and stabilization
in units of Battle Force soldiers will increasingly differentiate them from the rest of the Army. At
the same time, the specialization and technical orientation of the non-deployed support troops
will make them less and less “green.” The non-deployed support side will be increasingly
civilianized, further changing that part of the force and its work environment. Homeland Defense
forces will have to work with a variety of civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations
that have their own cultures. The differences in the various Army components’ background and
work could strain the concept of the Army as a single institution with a set of common soldiering
skills, at least as we currently know it.

Non-Battle Force Soldiers

The AXXI-era legacy elements, which include the Forward Deployed Forces and the
Campaign Forces, will have a selection and promotion system much like the one described in
Appendix D, with modifications engendered by AXXI requirements. But soldiers in the
AA2010-era combat and non-combat sides of the force will differ from each other and from
today in significant ways.

Partly because of AA2010’s heavy reliance on civilian information and transportation
infrastructure, Army support work will be more civilianized and contracted out than before. In
the non-deployed support units, organizations will be flatter with leaders having a broader span
of control. Units will be plugged into integrated worldwide databases that will control
distribution directly from producers to users. Along with a low leader-to-led ratio, these units
will have uniformed troops who are relatively specialized.

Many support soldiers will need such advanced technical training that the Army will have to
compete for them on the job market through means like permitting enlistment at advanced ranks
(i.e., lateral entry), giving special pay for special skills, and relying heavily on technicians from
the Reserve Component. NCOs on the support side will function more as system managers and
integrators than today. Officers are expected to become more technologically specialized, which
may force NCOs to perform duties that officers formerly did (Winkler et al., 1998) and drive
some NCOs’ duties down to the junior enlisted. In the areas of transportation and information
technology, differences between civilian and military work may be less than today, so the
transfer of skills between the two sectors would be greater. A career for a support soldier could
well consist of service in the Reserve Component with a number of extended activations beyond
the annual ones for training.

Battle Force Soldiers

The Battle Forces are expected to make up only about one-third of the force from 2010 to
2025. Their enlisted ranks are expected to be built through a process that is more selective than
that for the AXXIJ-era forces. For deciding who will serve in the Battle Forces and how the small

C-36



“[e]ven if only a portion of these innovations are realized, their cumulative impact on change
within the future Army will be profound” (DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 30).

Two other major implications can be found in reviewing the set of macro conditions for the
future Army: recruiting is likely to be more difficult, while military operations are likely to
become more frequent. Our reasons for those conclusions will be given next.

In the future, it is likely that soldiers will spend more time away from home on military
operations than in previous eras because:

¢ The U.S. will continue to consider access to foreign energy resources for itself and its
allies to be a vital national interest.

¢ Competition among the nations for the earth’s resources will increase as the world’s
population increases, its demands for energy increase, and the environment degrades.

¢ Weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms, and advanced information technologies
will proliferate as countries upgrade their military capabilities.

¢ The world community is increasingly accepting co-responsibility for stopping crimes
against humanity even when a country commits crimes on its own residents.

« NATO has expanded its vital interests beyond defending the member nations.

¢ Nations, cultural and ethnic groups, and other parties will continue to press their claims
for recognition, redress, and influence both militarily and in the media. Other countries
will work to overcome the balance of world power that now favors the U.S. Those efforts
are likely to bring them into conflict with the U.S.

¢ The U.S. is planning to rely for support and justification of military action relatively less
on the large, slow acting alliances (the UN and NATO) and more on small, quick acting
transient coalitions. Other nations can be expected to try similar means of influence.

¢ Terrorist attacks on CONUS are expected, which will give the Army more work to do to
fulfill its mission of homeland defense.

It will probably be hard for the Army to find enough willing and able young persons to fill
the enlisted ranks despite the expected 17% increase in the absolute numbers of the youth
population by 2025, the large increase in the Hispanic subset of the youth population (Hispanics
have a higher than average propensity to enlist), the growing preparation of young persons in the
information technologies, and the likely increases in deployment. Recruiting will become more
difficult because:

¢ Civilian jobs in the high technology sectors are likely to be plentiful and attractive.

e The financial return on investment in education will remain high, so the proportion of
young persons continuing in school after high school is likely to hold or increase.

¢ Young persons will have fewer family role models with military experience as the
number of veterans declines and as further closures of military bases lower the profile of
the military in the neighborhoods.

A-19



Table 13
Baseline Performance Components and Predictors for NCOs

¢ Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Knowledge and Skill. Possesses sufficient technical
knowledge to perform effectively in own MOS. Keeps informed of the latest developments in
field. Shows competency in performing various job tasks.

e Safety Consciousness. Is alert to safety at all times. Follows safety guidelines and instructions
for weapons and equipment, as required. Monitors others to ensure compliance with standing
operating procedures (SOP) when using weapons or dangerous equipment.

¢ Oral Communication. Speaks in a clear, organized, logical manner. Pays attention to others
and responds in suitable manner. Keeps others informed as necessary. Presents competent,
understandable, and organized briefings and presentations.

¢ Writing. Prepares written materials that are organized, logical, accurate, and contain relevant
information. Uses language that is at an appropriate level for the audience. Uses correct
grammar, punctuation, and spelling. Produces written materials that require little or no editing.

¢ Computer Skills. Uses personal computers (non-specialized) and software programs. Creates
and maintains computer files. Locates and uses information on the world wide web (www) and
uses other Internet functions including e-mail.

e Effort and Initiative. Persists with high effort in completing work. Takes independent action
when necessary. Seeks out and willingly accepts responsibility, extra work, and challenging
assignments. Conducts own work carefully, completely, and accurately. Persists in carrying out
difficult assignments and follows through on assignments and responsibilities.

¢ Regulations, Policies, and Procedures. Follows prescribed procedures in carrying out duties
and assignments. Adheres to policies and regulations. Consults appropriate manuals or
regulations to ensure that proper procedure is followed. Accepts others’ authority and follows
orders. Observes the chain of command.

¢ Integrity and Discipline. Maintains high ethical standards. Behaves in a correct, moral, and
ethical manner. Provides an accurate accounting of information (i.e., does not intentionally
distort information). Demonstrates trustworthiness. Controls self-indulgence.

¢ Relating to and Leading Others. Treats others in a courteous, diplomatic, and tactful manner.
Provides help and assistance to others. Uses good judgment in dealing with subordinates (e.g.,
counsels and disciplines). Acts as a role model. Works effectively as a team member and as a
team leader.

e Motivating Others. Recognizes, encourages, and rewards effective job performance. Submits
paperwork necessary for awards, disciplinary actions, and performance reviews. Corrects
unacceptable conduct. Uses disciplinary actions constructively.

¢ Basic Math. Knows and applies addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and simple
mathematical formulas.

e Training Others. Evaluates and identifies training needs. Institutes formal or informal
programs to address training needs. Ensures that training opportunities are provided to soldiers.
Develops others by providing work experiences. Guides and assists subordinates on technical
matters. Demonstrates work task procedures.

(table continues)

19



analysis of data from field tests that used the variables specified by O*NET to analyze a sample
of OUs (Peterson et al., 1997).

The O*NET model of occupational information includes nine domains, or taxonomies of
variables, that can be used to describe an OU. One domain describes the major components of
the work content, three describe the context or conditions of work, and five describe different
taxonomies of individual differences that are potentially important for successful work
performance. All nine domains are listed in Table 10.

Table 10
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) Taxonomies

Descriptions of Work Content
1, Generalized work activities

Descriptions of Work Conditions and Context
2. Work context
3. Organizational context
4. Occupational values (potential rewards that an occupation could provide)

Individual Job Requirements

5. Basic and cross-functional skills
Work-relevant knowledge areas
Physical and cognitive abilities
Education, training, and experience areas
Work styles (i.e., personality dispositions)

yon n

Deriving the Baseline Performance Components and Predictors

The projects cited above produced a wide range of taxonomies and identified many potential
indicators and predictors of performance. Because each project addressed specific needs during
different time periods, there was a wide range of performance and predictor parameters. Project
staff were faced with the issue of culling out relevant outcomes and applying them to the
Soldier21/NCO21 requirements. This was accomplished through the following steps:

¢ Performance requirements and performance predictors were identified as being
applicable to first tour soldiers, to NCOs, or to both. In most cases, the original source
made this identification. However, for O*NET (which addresses a broad range of
objectives for the civilian labor force) this determination was made by project staff
familiar with both levels of enlisted performance.

e The goal for the Soldier21/NCO21 effort was to specify performance requirements or
predictors that were distinct, but at a similar level of specificity. There was great variety
in levels used throughout the different sources. For example, the O*NET model included
52 cognitive, spatial, psychomotor, and physical abilities, 33 knowledge domains, 42
general skills, 20 dimensions of work values, and 17 work styles. Categories from the
taxonomies that were too “high” (or too “low”) in the hierarchy were eliminated. Staff

15



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A-23



* Most AA2010 concepts have not been endorsed or approved by Army leadership.
Certainly nothing in this presentation has. Some parts of AA2010 as it is currently known
will undoubtedly be controversial and subject to far ranging debate. Nothing in the
DTLOMS description should be construed as being on one side or the other in any
emerging AA2010 debate.

The new capabilities that are projected for AA2010 between 2010 and 2025 could be fast or
slow in coming, because of the unpredictability of funding. Given that uncertainty, we are
asking, “What parts of the emerging vision of AA2010 seem to have implications for soldiers’
work in that era, whenever it may finally come into being?” As in the description of AXXI
above, the material bearing on that question is organized under the DTLOMS framework.
However, because of the way in which AA2010 information is unfolding, we have combined the
presentation of information pertaining to “doctrine” and “organization” and that of “leader
development” and “soldiers,” so that DTLOMS is presented in four sections instead of six.
Moreover, because the focus of the study was on the Battle Force, that element of AA2010 is
given more attention in the presentation. Information on the AXXI components of AA2010,
which would largely duplicate information presented elsewhere in this appendix, is not repeated
here.

AA2010 Doctrine and Organization

This section summarizes organization and doctrine for AA2010 relating to the conduct of
future military operations. Because elements of AA2010 doctrine call for execution by specific
components of the fighting force, we have combined the discussion of doctrine and organization.

Although AA2010 doctrine now is preliminary,’ in broad outlines it appears to be stable:
AA2010 “simply seeks to provide the Army of 2020 with the physical speed and agility to
complement the mental agility inherited from Force XXI” (DCSDOC, 1997c, p. 1).° In short,
AA2010 doctrine modernizes the Blitzkrieg by remedying its defects (especially logistics), vastly
expands the battle space in three dimensions, synchronizes the services in tightly joint effort, and
takes the application of information technologies to a new level. The complexity of information
age warfare is emphasized, with AA2010 staff papers (e.g., Biever & Echevarria, 1998) finding
that complexity all the way down to the individual soldier.

As in the past, the Army will have a variety of responsibilities: reassuring allies, deterring
possible adversaries, precluding crises, responding actively to threats to the U.S. and allies,
defending against attacks abroad and at home, and providing stability and support where needed
(DCSDOC, 1998c). As instability and conflict arise, the Army will be called on often to carry
out these responsibilities. Because enemies of the AA2010 era can be expected to have precision
fires and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), survival will require our forces to act in
dispersion and with great agility by means of Knowledge and Speed (DCSDOC, 1997c).

5 In mid-1999, revisions to FM 100-5 (published 1993) and FM 525-4 (published 1994) were in various stages of
preparation and not available for this project. So the account of AA2010 doctrine comes mostly from the Annual
Reports (DCSDOC, 1997c, 1998c).

° Delays in digitizing the existing force may push the complete attainment of the force’s mental agility out

into the era when AA2010 is undergoing combat development (GAO, 1998b).

C-25



Theater Joint
Expeditionary
Force (JEF)

XXX
Corp
Battle Force
Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit
Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle
Element Element Element Element Element} [Element

Figure C-2. Notional Battle Force structure.

To make tactical speed in the battle space practical, a variety of developments will shrink
the logistical tail and lighten the Battle Force. Levels of fuel, ordnance, and other supplies will
be tracked by automated on-board systems, which will be monitored at remote supply bases.
Resupply will be “just in time” and “just enough.” Fuels and ordnance will be of lighter, higher
energy materials, and armor and automotive components will be lightened similarly. From
sanctuary outside of theater there will be continuous aerial resupply, the materiel coming in part
from pre-positioned stocks on the ground and afloat. In the combat zone, small, mobile logistics
elements of the BF will receive supplies that are airlifted in and speed them by ground and
tactical lift to end users. New “brilliant munitions,” the successors of “smart bombs,” will
improve accuracy sufficiently to permit weapon systems to carry lighter loads of ordnance.
Finally, two developments will enable soldiers to carry less firepower: unmanned static fire
control systems will be seeded around the battle space and the dispersed ground elements will be
able to mass remote fires from unmanned ground or airborne platforms, or even from space.

In the 1999 war games, several notional configurations of Battle Force are being used, each
with unique systems and capabilities. Battle Forces come in a variety of forms and functions
(DCSDOC, 1999d), some emphasizing agility and indirect fires, others having direct fire
overmatch capabilities. Of special interest is a Battle Force that is designed for operations in
complex terrains. Up through the 1998 report on AA2010, military operations on urban terrain

C-28



« Fire support from very fast manned ground vehicles, attack helicopters, aircraft,
platforms in space, and remotely controlled fire control systems that are both static
(ground emplaced) and mobile.

¢ A family of small, very fast vehicles for command and control, scout and reconnaissance
functions, repair, salvage, and supply.

Individual and crew served weapons with capabilities for extreme accuracy in line-of-
sight (LOS), NLOS, all-weather, and all-light conditions engagements.

¢ Target acquisition will come in part from multi-spectrum (i.e., sight, sound, smell, other
radiation) arrays of ground sensors that are seeded in critical sites to detect enemy
presence and movement and that select the right method of engagement to match the
target. Ultra-smart munitions will carry capabilities for in-flight course adjustment. To
minimize fratricide, all systems will have identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) capabilities
built in.

Non-Lethal Technologies

In the AA2010 era, battlefields may host very large populations where enemies and non-
combatants will be mixed together and visibility will be limited. To protect friendly forces and to
reduce the likelihood of vast numbers of casualties and politically unsustainable prolonged wars,
forces will need methods of influence that are between non-violence and lethal violence. Non-
lethal technologies (NLT) (Morris, Morris, & Baines, 1995) offer such options. Under
development now, NLT will enable U.S. forces to distract, disorganize, and deter opposition
military and civilians with minimal injury to people and property. NLT may target persons or
material, have offensive or defensive functions, and have local or wide area effects. They will
require new systems, doctrine, training, and rules of engagement.

The exact technologies that will be developed for specific situations remain to be
determined, but outlines of NLT engagement can be glimpsed through some of the tools that are
under consideration: entangling, sticky, or anti-traction substances; obscurants; disorienting
noises; dazzling lights; holographic phantoms; water cannons; sedating agents; stun weapons;
voice morphing; engine killers,; filter cloggers; short-circuiting agents; computer viruses; soil
destabilizers; chemicals that corrode physical systems; anti-missile systems; mine field
neutralizers; and systems to detect and disrupt enemy electronics and fire control optics.

Information Systems

Information systems that make heavy use of commercial facilities will be central to
information dominance in AA2010. These systems will comprise a “robust, redundant,
reconstitutable” network of distributed elements. Individual soldiers will have total situational
awareness from a personal command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence (C41)
suite, which will link them in a tactical internet. Day or night, they will know their own locations
and the locations and identities of teammates, other friendly forces, enemy forces, and non-
combatants. A tiny, personal, powerful bio-computer will be voice activated and, to avoid
information overload, provide Battle Force soldiers automatic information management. Soldiers
will be equipped with automated aids for diagnosing and repairing systems, performing first aid,

C-32


Army Subject Matter Expert Panel

A panel of nine Army SMEs was assembled for a two-day workshop on May 26-27, 1999.
The panel comprised mainly active duty Army senior NCOs and officers who had participated in
the site visit interviews discussed above. There was at least one representative from each of the
following Army organizations: the Future Battle Directorate, USASMA, the Military Police
(MP) Center, TRADOC, the Signal Center, U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM),
DFCC, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and the Fort Knox U.S.
Army NCO Academy.

Participants were presented the future forecasts (DTLOMS, future characteristics, and
forecasted job requirements—see Appendix C). They were also supplied with the job component
and predictor lists that had been developed for the AOE. The objectives for the Army SME Panel
were to:

1. Revise descriptions of future characteristics and requisite job components according to
their knowledge and expertise regarding future conditions (Baseline lists, see Tables
11-13, were used as stimuli, starting points for defining future job components and
KSAs.)

2. Identify predicators using the AOE list as a starting point (or identify new ones) that
will be needed to accomplish the future job requirements.

3. Define the differences between junior, mid-level, and senior NCOs using the NCO job
components and predictors.

4. Verify that the job requirements and predictors are appropriate for each target group.
Rank order the predictors by importance for each target group.
Do all of the above for three eras: AOE, AXXI and AA2010.

The workshop began with a series of briefings to orient the panel to the project goals, the
future Army eras, and the goals of the workshop. After allowing the panel to study the job
components and predictors that had been identified for the AOE, each participant was provided a
packet of 3x5 inch index cards that had the predictors (with definitions) printed on them. Each
panel member was instructed to choose the most important predictors for the current AOE (eight
for first tour soldiers and 10 for each of the NCO target groups). Each panelist read their top
choices aloud as a staff facilitator recorded them on the whiteboard so all could see. The top
eight (10 for the NCO target groups) predictors receiving the most votes were designated as the
“first tier” (ties were broken by consensus). Each participant then individually ranked the first
tier predictors on a worksheet, listing the most important predictor as one, the second most
important as two, and so on.’ The SMEs were also asked to choose and record a second tier of
predictors (the “next” most important) from the predictor set (minus the first tier). The panel
members recorded their choices for the second tier on their worksheets.

The panel was then divided into two groups: an “AXXI group” and an “AA2010 group.”
Each group received written descriptions and an extensive briefing from a member of the project
° Consensus rankings for the “first tier” were calculated by multiplying the rank position by the number of votes at

each rank and dividing by the total number of voters (SMEs).

27



The threat of biological, chemical, and nuclear attack will be present, but much more so in urban
operations than in the dispersed battlespace.

The margins of safety/error in the Battle Forces will be minimal. To reduce the logistical
load, supply will be “just in time” and “just enough” (DCSDOC, 1997c). “...AA2010 leaders and
soldiers [will have] to operate within highly compressed planning and execution cycles. Less
time will exist to effect coordination or contingency planning. Soldiers at all levels will have to
make decisions more quickly and most likely with a less than optimum level of information...
[H]eightened levels of speed and mobility will change the relevant common picture of the battle
frequently and often dramatically. Data only moments old may prove perilous to the user... Even
small errors on such a battlefield can mean devastating fratricide or collateral damage” (Biever &
Echevarria, 1998, pp. 3-4). “The future battlespace will have few or no sanctuaries...”
(DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 8). “Blue attack must be quick and precise. Blue soldiers and leaders must
rely on ‘just in time’ planning information. Battle drills and teamwork must be superlative”
(Gay, 1998, p. 15). “In the [AA2010] concept, each team-member and each team is critical. If a
team-member fails, the team fails. If the team fails, the operation fails... AA2010 units must be
reusable after only minimal reconstitution. This means few casualties in operations... The small
(3-5 person) teams, the tip of the spear of [AA2010] operations, will be extremely sharp.
However, because the operational demands ... have the potential to exceed human capabilities,
the tip of the spear will be not only sharp but brittle. This becomes especially important when we
take into account not just one deployment but a series of deployments” (Belenky, 1997, pp.1, 3,
7). The expectation of “operating at the limits of human cognition” (Scales, 1998b) has given
rise to requirements for future development of a variety of automated systems for relieving the
cognitive load and improving decision making (DCSDOC, 1998c).

To counter the threats of precision fires and WMD, the Battle Forces will use dispersion,
maneuver, and concealment. But spreading out the troops will dilute the psychological support of
closeness to comrades and leaders above the team level. The extent to which situational
awareness, electronic communication, agility, and concealment can compensate for the isolation
of dispersion is not yet known. To counter stress, the Battle Forces will rely not only on systems
and tactics, but also on the cohesion of soldiers who have trained together for a long time and,
individually, have confidence in the wide variety of skills that they maintain.

Although high cohesion will be required in Battle Force teams to enable them to operate
well under stressful conditions, leaders will need to build and manage that cohesion so as to have
the intended results. Psychologists distinguish task cohesion from social cohesion. “Task
cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the
collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who
share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve their
goal” (MacCoun, 1993, p. 291).

Social cohesion in a team, in contrast, consists of members having bonds of friendship and
personal closeness. Research shows that task cohesion predicts group performance but that social
cohesion has an inverted U shaped relation to performance; moderate social cohesion is
associated with the best performance, while too much distance or closeness can interfere. Units
that are too strongly bonded socially may suffer from “groupthink,” be distracted from work by
socializing, reject the mission in favor of immediate group goals, and be susceptible to

C-38



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emerging impressions [75 pages]. Presentation slides.

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After Next project. Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC. Available: http://www-

tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC. (1998a, February 16-18). The Army After
Next project [35 pages]. Briefing given at the AUSA Winter Symposium.
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Dickenson, M. H., Lehmann, F-O., & Sane, S. P. (1999). Wing rotation and the aerodynamic
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Director, Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements. (1998). Technology
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B-7



Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next,
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Warning signs in the military. (1998, August 16). Editorial. Washington Post, C6.

Wass de Czege, H. (BG [Ret]). (undated). The human dimension of combat [19 pages].
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Wass de Czege, H. (BG [Ret]). (1997, November). Battle command of 2020 and beyond. Paper
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Wass de Czege, H. (BG [Ret.]), & Biever, J. (MAJ). (1998, January). Battle command and
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B-28



Table C-7
Army After 2010 Job Components for Battle Force NCOs

MOS/Occupation-Specific Technical Requirements: Battle Force soldiers will be multi-skilled, much
as Special Forces are today. As they mature within the Battle Force (possibly over a 20-year period) their
repertoire of expertise is expected to expand. Individual jobs will be measurably more complex. Each
individual will be more important to the system. Jobs will be less standardized and less proceduralized
with more individual innovation required. Jobs will require constant, career-long learning to keep up with
changing systems.

Common Skills: Battle Force war fighters will have a wide variety of skills that they share with other
Battle Force members but that are otherwise not common with the rest of the Army. At a certain level or
for certain functions, all Battle Force members will be interchangeable because of this common, shared
category of performance requirements. These common skills will likely cut across what we currently
understand as combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) but will also include
softer skills and probably also whole new areas of information processing and artificial intelligence (AI)
skills that we don’t know much about yet. Processing large amounts of information with speed, accuracy,
discipline, and discrimination will certainly be part of this common requirement.

Motivating and Leading Others: Leadership will take on a new definition within the Battle Force.
While there will continue to be persons who are “in charge” of missions and operations, the existing rank-
based structure and stricture of Army of Excellence (AOE) may not be operable. “Mission controllers”
may be designated based on the requirements and characteristics of the mission, along with the
qualifications of the personnel assigned. “Leadership” as a requirement will still be a critical part of Battle
Force operations but it will be expected that all Battle Force members will be capable of leading as
necessary. The Battle Force may not consist of traditional, permanent “leaders and led” members.

Team Building and Teamwork: The Battle Forces may or may not consist of permanent “unit”
assignments and staffing, but even if units and assignments are used, they will likely be very unlike the
existing concepts of “units.” The Battle Force will operate on the basis of teams, with units above the
team level organized ad hoc for missions or activities. Some of these may be very brief, lasting hours,
while others may last weeks or months. Battle Force members in non-deployed situations may be
physically remote, although telecommunication links among all Battle Force members will be
characteristic of the organization. The ability to rapidly assemble an effective group of individuals into a
team will be a necessity of operations.

Working With Others: The Battle Forces will be different from other Army elements in organization,
structure, duties, training, and other ways such as pay and possibly dress. Yet they must interact with
other elements, particularly Campaign Forces, and are dependent on other services and other nations in
achieving operational success. They cannot be allowed to become an insular or élitist organization. They
must be different without being apart.

Integrity and Self-Discipline: A force that is unique, equipped with the most up to date equipment,
powerful, exclusionary, and made up of long term members, must be guided by the highest principles and
a dedication to an external agenda. Battle Force members do not set policy; they carry out policy set
externally. Members must reflect high Army ideals and commitments, consistent with and supporting
national policy. The Battle Force must be self-monitoring to assure that the personal agenda that can arise
from social cohesion (e.g., militias, hazing) do not interfere with pursuit of the Army’s agenda, which is
supported by task cohesion.

(table continues)

C-40



Table 27

Most Important KSAs for First Tour Job Performance (Army XX)

Rank

General Cognitive Aptitude
Conscientiousness/Dependability

In top tier of Army SME and Psychologist
panels.

1

2.

3. Reading Skill

4. Working Memory

Emotional Stability

Need to Achieve and General Energy Level
Oral Communication Skill

In top tier of one panel and in 2nd tier of the
other panel.

In top tier of one panel and tied for inclusion in
2nd tier for the other panel.

Basic Computer Skills

Ethical Value System

Selfless Service Orientation
Perceptual Speed and Accuracy
Psychomotor Aptitude

Basic Math Skill
Self-Managed Learning Skill

In top tier of one panel and in 3rd tier for the
other panel.

In 2nd tier of one panel and tied with other
KSAs for inclusion in 2nd tier.

Basic Electronics Knowledge
Basic Mechanical Knowledge
Spatial Relations Aptitude

Writing Skill

In 2nd tier of one panel and in 3rd tier of the
other panel.

In 3rd tier of both panels.

51


Buckley, E. (BG), Frank, H., III (LTC), & Milton, A. (1997, March/April). Army After Next
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Center for Army Leadership (1999). SKA conference update. CAL Leadership Research &
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B-4



changes with regard to their expected timing (within 1, 5, or 10 years). There was an effort to
assure that changes to selection systems would not get too far ahead of the timing of the
anticipated changes. The process suggested fewer major job changes than had been expected by
organizational decision-makers.

We also spoke to the representative of a consulting firm whose clients often use the opening
of a new plant or office to try out new management structures. Jobs are defined based on
management’s vision of how the new plant will operate. Consultants then work with
management to infer KSAs based on these anticipated jobs. A significant problem that frequently
occurs with this process, however, is that the plant does not operate as intended (e.g., it is more
hierarchical than team-based). This can result in a mismatch in the types of employees who were
selected and the types of individuals who, in retrospect, would have been more successful in the
actual environment that was created.

Still another interviewee pointed out that, in industries that are rapidly changing (e.g.,
telecommunications, computers), it may be best to stick, inasmuch as possible, to assessments of
generic aptitudes (e.g., cognitive, psychomotor, communication) to avoid the problem of the
assessments becoming obsolete too fast.

There were several other examples provided. A distinct theme from our discussions,
however, was the need to be creative in obtaining informed speculations about future jobs and,
perhaps even more importantly, the caveat that all the speculations will not necessarily come
true.

69



staff. Project staff conducted a series of four workshops with 40 SMC students. All participants
were either at the rank of E9 or were on the promotion list for E9. Participants had a mean time-
in-service of 21 years and represented 21 different MOS. The objective was to update the
baseline lists we had developed to be relevant for the current AOE.

The USASMA workshop participants considered the requirements for first tour soldiers
separately from the NCO requirements. For first tour soldiers, participants were given both a list
of the baseline job requirements (components) and a list of baseline predictors (see Tables 11
and 12). Both job requirement and predictor lists included a description or definition as part of
the list. For NCO requirements, a single list of job performance requirements was provided (see
Table 13). To make the lists suitable for the current Army of Excellence, participants were
instructed to add, delete, or modify any of the existing items on their own. Then, proposed
changes were discussed by the group and an effort was made to get group consensus on changes
(although individual changes were accepted if group convergence could not be obtained). Care
was taken to ensure that proposed changes applied Army-wide and were not MOS specific.

Participants were also asked to provide an importance rating for each job requirement and
predictor using a 5-point scale. Mean importance ratings were calculated and used to obtain a
comparative ranking of the top job requirements and predictors. The rankings for first tour
requirements and predictors are in Table 14 and NCO job requirements/predictors are in Table
15. They were used as a guide during subsequent revisions to the job requirements and attributes
list.

Also, an important detail was raised during the importance rating exercise for the NCO job
requirements. Many participants pointed out that the singular category “NCO” was too broad to
be meaningful; that while most of the job requirements presented were relevant across NCO
skills levels, they varied in importance and significance at different stages in an NCO’s career.
This input resulted in the subsequent decision to define NCO performance domain into three
target groups, as discussed in the Introduction.

Project staff used the input from the USASMA workshops to develop lists of job
performance requirements and predictors applicable to the AOE era. The actual item changes
from the baseline lists were few. For first tour job requirements, participants suggested adding
“Vehicle Operation/Driving” and “Financial Management.” From the same list, they suggested
deleting “Computer Skills” and “Leadership” explaining that these were not responsibilities
currently associated with first tour soldiers. Suggestions for modifying the first tour predictor list
were to add “Discipline” and “Initiative” and to drop “Persuasiveness.” For the NCO list (which
included a combination of job requirements and predictors), even fewer revisions were specified:
add “Counseling” and delete “Multilingual.”

The USASMA workshop suggestions were carefully considered and discussed among the
project staff and the ARI staff. Although actual item changes were few, the input was used to
revise many of the content definitions associated with a job component or predictor term. For
example, it became apparent from the workshops that words such as discipline, initiative, and
counseling are important to the NCO community, so definitions were revised to ensure these
specific terms were included.

21



technological development entering the main stream. Results of the survey are excerpted in Table
A-3. They show that most of the technologies that are judged most likely to pay off are in
information (hardware and software), materials, and energy.

In a 1998 survey of business and industry leaders, RAND took more of a needs assessment
approach to future technologies (Popper et al., 1998). This survey is of interest because it reflects
areas of likely research and development (R&D) investment by private industry. In identifying
technologies that are currently critical in business/industry outside their own area of
specialization, the panelists picked these five areas most often: software, microelectronics and
telecommunications, materials, manufacturing technologies, and sensor and imaging
technologies. The criticality of software comes from the growing demand for it, the need for
more powerful programming tools (including natural language capabilities), and the shortage of
software engineers.

Table A-3
Selected Technologies Predicted to Enter the Mainstream by 2030

Technology Probability Year
Distance learning 78 2006
Computer sensory recognition 73 2007
Personal digital assistants 75 2008
Intelligent agents 79 2009
Expert systems 72 2010
Buckeyballs and buckeytubes 69 2011
Machine learning 67 2012
Optical computers 64 2014
Superconducting materials 56 2015
Sophisticated robots 64 2016
Energy efficiency 61 2016
Material composites 53 2016
Biochips 54 2017
Synthetic body parts 58 2019
Hydrogen energy 50 2020
Intelligent materials 57 2026
Fusion power 50 2026

Note. Cutoff for including here: Judged Probability > .49. For a description of each of the 85
technologies, see Halal et al. (1997, pp. 27-28).

In identifying breakthroughs that would make the most difference in their own industries or
firms, panelists identified a variety of software technologies (e.g., more efficient ways of

A-12



The “job” that served as the exemplar for determining future demands was that of the first
tour soldier. This job was defined as non-prior service personnel at skill level 1 (SL1) in the
grade of E2 through non-corporal E4 (Private through Specialist). A stipulation of the Soldier21
study was that findings were to be applicable to all soldiers in the future Army regardless of their
military occupational specialty (MOS). One aspect of our approach was to identify and analyze
existing Army groups or soldiers participating in missions that are indicative of future ones,
organizations that are testing or operating with future or advanced technologies, and proponents
that are training soldiers for jobs that will become more critical in the future.

The objectives for Soldier21 were threefold:

« Identify and describe the nature and type of changes that are expected to occur in the
21st century Army.

« Project future job requirements and the critical individual characteristics of soldiers who
will perform proficiently in the next century.

« Identify selection methods that might be used to assess individual characteristics.

The current effort identified the most important KSAs for the Army over the next 25 years.
Through further research, measures of these KSAs could be validated and integrated into the
Amny selection and promotion systems. However, the KSAs must be continuously updated and
refined as the future unfolds because the job requirements identified herein will undoubtedly
evolve and change. With this caveat, the use of the findings can lead to a 21st century Army that
will more likely be successful in selecting the most appropriate people.

21st Century Noncommissioned Officers

The Soldier21 project is related to, and integrated with, a parallel project that focuses on
noncommissioned officer (NCO) performance requirements for the same period, 2000-2025. The
battlefield of the future will require NCOs who can train forces and operate effectively in digital
environments with increased mission diversity, fewer soldiers, and organizational and social
changes. Accordingly, the future NCO promotion system will need new identification and
measurement procedures to evaluate the full scope of performance needed to successfully meet
job requirements.

Previous work on NCO21 issues has been documented by Rumsey, Busciglio, and
Simsarian (1997) and Rumsey, Webber, and Busciglio (1998). These efforts were exploratory in
nature, mainly concentrating on the methodological issues involved in the endeavor to identify
requirements for jobs that “...do not yet exist in their entirety and estimating how well
individuals with varying profiles on certain abilities and other characteristics are likely to meet
these future requirements” (Rumsey et al., 1997, p. 2). However, preliminary data collection
efforts did yield some interesting forecasts. In discussions with more than 100 NCOs and
officers, three future conditions emerged that may affect future job requirements: (a) increasingly
sophisticated technology, (b) continued downsizing of personnel, and (c) an increase in the
diversity and frequency of missions. These conditions, although not definitive, suggested
performance predictors such as cognitive aptitude, motivation, integrity, self-discipline, and
adaptability that were worth exploring as future NCO promotion criteria.



CONCLUSIONS

At this point, we must remember that the results of this project are projections about the
future, and the future is always, to some degree, uncertain. Another issue concerns whether the
result would be the same if the project were repeated with another sample of Army SMEs and
another sample of psychologists. That is, is there serious sampling error to contend with?
Unfortunately, there is no readily computable sample statistic that adequately reflects the desired
portrayal of KSA priorities. In lieu of being able to calculate the standard error of a set of
priorities, we would argue that, while there would most likely be some sample to sample
differences of variable placements in the overall picture of KSA priorities, the current results
show very meaningful patterns across target groups and across the two expert panels.
Consequently, it seems unlikely that another set of highly selected expert judgments would
produce a qualitatively or substantially different picture.

Given some confidence in the results, what are the overall implications for KSA assessment
for the target groups? We think the following should be considered:

¢ Consistently, very high priorities were ascribed to two major dispositional variables,
each of which can be assessed either within the context of personality/temperament
assessment or as “will-do” components of performance that the personnel system
rewards. The first variable is called conscientiousness or dependability from the trait
perspective and is labeled as personal discipline and integrity in the performance
domain. The second variable reflects achievement striving, initiative, energy and effort
and the same two measurement options apply. The measurement of these two variables
from either the trait or performance factor perspectives presents certain measurement
problems (e.g., response distortion, rater leniency). However, given their judged future
criticality both for first tour selection and for NCO promotion, they seem worthy of
significant future research investments. To a certain extent, the same can be said for
emotional stability, given its judged criticality for AA2010.

¢ In addition to the two KSAs discussed above, high priorities for NCO promotion are also
ascribed to prior performance factors having to do with MOS-Specific Knowledge and
Skill and several facets of leadership/supervision. It will not be an easy task to develop
assessment procedures for these variables and adapt them for use in NCO promotion
systems. However, given their perceived importance, these KSAs should not be ignored
and are deserving of considerable R&D attention.

¢ The generally high priority given to General Cognitive Aptitude implies that the judges
believe that, even for the more highly selected NCO levels, there is sufficient variability
in this KSA to warrant consideration for assessment as a promotion requirement.

¢ For first tour selection, trying to reduce the disparity between new recruit and Army
values and ethical principals is given a very high priority. Even if an individual’s value
orientation can be modified by training, the training outcome would be easier to achieve
if selection could be based in part on a values match. A number of large private sector
organizations believe this to be true and have developed instrumentation for assessing
the degree of such a person/organization match. A determination of the feasibility of
doing so in the Army context should be given careful consideration.

70



Appendix A

Factors that May Influence the Future Army: 2000 - 2025

This appendix is a review of literature on large scale conditions that are likely to have an
impact on the work of soldiers in the future. These conditions include the (a) officially identified
national interests, (b) world population, (c) geopolitical setting, (d) physical environment, (e)
population of the United States (U.S.) and its youth, (f) American public’s support for the
military, (g) media, and (h) advances in science and technology. Implications for the work of
future soldiers are drawn.

For this view of the global conditions, we have relied very little on the work of specialists in
futurism. Futurists are often unclear about distinctions among probabilities, possibilities,
conceivabilities, and desirabilities. Many futurists’ rhetoric inspires skepticism, while the more
sober futurists acknowledge that many important outcomes will be determined by complex
interactions of unpredictable forces. Because the predictions of futurists are too numerous to
summarize and evaluate, we have confined this review to macro influences on the Army whose
effect seems, at this point, to be likely.

U.S. National Interests

The Army is an instrument of national security policy that has the role of protecting vital
and important national interests. The vital interests (Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
[DCSDOC], 1997a) are:

¢ Deterring, reducing the threat of, and preventing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
attack on the U.S. and its allies;

¢ Preventing the rise of powerful, hostile hegemonies in Asia or Europe; and

¢ Maintaining continued unhindered access by the U.S. and our allies to global resources
that are essential to our economic health, including energy sources.

Important interests include:
¢ Preventing the development of a hostile hegemony in Persian Gulf;

¢ Maintaining the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China
Sea; and

¢ Combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and trans-national crime.

United States interests will remain worldwide and will cover many dimensions of the
strategic security environment (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994). The course
of geopolitics is in the hands of large numbers of players at many different levels, including
international organizations (e.g., Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], United
Nations[UN]), more than 180 nations, and many other mechanisms, groups, or areas (e.g., the
physical environment, world population, computer hackers, drug cartels, the International Islamic
Front, Kashmir). At the same time, advances in the sciences and technology will continue to alter

A-l



21st CENTURY SOLDIERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS: CRITICAL
PREDICTORS OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE

CONTENTS
Page
21st CENTURY SOLDIERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS: CRITICAL
PREDICTORS OF PERFORMANCE ......sssssssssssssssssseseesssessseesneceneesenecsneesscesssssnecsanecnnnsssasecennensons 1
Introduction 1

Soldier Characteristics for the 21st Century
21st Century Noncommissioned Officers.
Future Time Parameters
Report Organization......

METHODOLOGY

Establishing a Baseline Taxonomy
Project A/Building the Career Force
Synthetic Validation Project ........::ssseeeees
Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel.
Special Forces Job Analysis Project .............+.
Occupational Information Network ........sssecssecssessesessesseesnees 14
Deriving the Baseline Performance Components and Predictors

Updating the Baseline to the Current Army of Excellence.............

Analyzing Jobs, Missions, and Technology Indicative of Future Army Job

Determining the Most Important Future Performance Predictors
Army Subject Matter Expert Panel.......

Psychologist Panel 28
Final Staff Panel...
RESULTS wcecscssessscssessscssccsscssessssssccnscnscssesssesnessucsnessecssscesecssesuecessessusenuseaeaeaseenceseensessennecnneenneneets 30

Identification of Critical Knowledges, Skills, and Abilities
Army SME Panel KSA Rankings for the Army of Excellence...
Comparison of Panel KSA Rankings for each Future Target Grou;
Summary Comparison of Army SME and Psychologist KSA Rankings

Assessment Methods...........ssssssesessereeeeenenseneneees

Overview of Current Army Assessment System:
Measurement Evaluation Criteria and Implementation Feasibility Issue
Innovations in Measurement Methods.
Trends in Personnel Testing.............
Developing Assessments for Future Jobs

CONCLUSIONS.

REFERENCES ..cescssessssessssessessecscsesssssuecsesscsnssvcanenscuccnennensersesacscsncesssnsssessanensansnasncaenansenccacsseesesee 72

xi


Biever, J. (MAJ). (1998, June). The relationships between organizational design and
organizational effectiveness. Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on
Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next — II, Leesburg, VA.

Biever, J. (MAJ), & Echevarria, A. (LTC). (1998). Army After Next soldiers and their units. Fort
Monroe, VA: Future Battle Directorate, HQ TRADOC.

Bond, W. L. (BG). (1998, May 5). Army XXI and beyond. ADO presentation slides [8 pages].

Bond, W. L. (BG). (1998, May 20). Army digitization overview. ADO presentation slides
[19 pages].

Boyd, M., Meade, K., & Nichols, C. (1996, November-December). R&D in congress. Army
RD&A. 4-6.

Boyd, M., & Woodgerd, M. (1994). Force XXI operations. Military Review, 16-28.
Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Brand, S. (1997). Better to be part “phile” and part “phobe.” The Futurist. InK. Sale et al. (1997)
Information technology revolution: Boon or bane (pp. 10-15), Jan-Feb, 12.

Branson, R. K. (1999, August). Teaching-centered schooling has reached its upper limit: It
doesn’t get any better than this. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 7 4, 126-135.

Broad, W. J., & Miller, J. (1999, January 28). Pentagon seeks command for emergencies in the
U.S. New York Times on the Web [5 pages]. National Desk.

Broad, W. J., & Miller, J. (1998, December 27). The world: Live ammo; The threat of germ
weapons is rising. Fear, too. New York Times on the Web [6 pages]. Week in Review Desk.

Brockett, J., & Zhou, R. (1997). Forecasting and allocation of U.S. Army recruiting resources.
Military Operations Research, 3 3, 13-19.

Broder, D. S. (1999, February 17). Challenge from the young. The Washington Post. p. Al7.

Brostrom, N. (1998). How long before superintelligence? International Journal of Futures
Studies, 2. Available: http://www.systems.org.

Brown, F. (LTG [Ret.]). (1997, November). Learning in Army XXI. Paper presented at the Army
Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next,
Leesburg, VA.

Buckley, E. (BG). (1997). See DCSDOC, 1997b.

Buckley, E. (BG), & Echevarria, A. J. (LTC). (1998, March/April). Strategic preemption.
Military Review. Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

B-3



Latham, G. P., Saari, L. M., Pursell, E. D., & Campion, M. A. (1980). The situational interview.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 69, 442-431.

Maier, M. H. (1993). Military aptitude testing: The last fifty years (DMDC Technical Report 93-
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Peterson, N. G. (Ed.). (1987). Development and field test of the Trial Battery for Project A (ARI
Technical Report 739). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences.

Peterson, N. G., & Bownas, D. A. (1982). Skills, task structure, and performance acquisition. In
M. D. Dunnette and E. A. Fleishman (Eds.), Human performance and productivity (Vol. I).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Peterson, N. G., Mumford, M. D., Borman, W. C., Jeanneret, P. R., & Fleishman, E. A. (1995).
Development of a prototypic occupational information network (O*NET Content Model).
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Peterson, N. G., Mumford, M. D., Borman, W. C., Jeanneret, P. R., Fleishman, E. A., & Levin,
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Employment Security.

Peterson, N. G., Owens-Kurtz, C., Hoffman, R. G., Arabian, J. M., & Whetzel, D. L. (1990).
Army Synthetic Validation Project, Report of Phase II Results, Volume I (ARI Technical
Report 892). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Peterson, N. G., Smith, D., Hoffman, R. G., Pulakos, E. D., Reynolds, D., Potts, B. C., Oppler, S.
H., & Whetzel, D. L. (1993). Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel: Base period
final report. Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research.

Rumsey, M. G. (1995). The best they can be: Tomorrow’s soldiers, in R. L. Phillips & M. R.
Thurman (Eds.), Future soldiers and the quality imperative: The Army 2010 conference, pp.
123-158, Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Recruiting Command.

Rumsey, M G., Busciglio, H., & Simsarian, S. (1997). 21st century NCOs. Paper presented at the
9th Defense Analysis Seminar, Seoul, Korea.

Rumsey, M. G. (1998, January). 2/st century soldiers. Slide briefing presented to the Director of
Military Personnel Management (MG A. Dean), Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Rumsey, M. G., Webber, S. S., & Busciglio, H. (1998, April). Foretelling the future with
science: NCO jobs in the 21st century. Paper presented at the Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology Conference, Dallas, TX.

74


In reality, MOS projections are forecast and averaged over a fairly long period of time so
that large month-to-month variations within an MOS, such as in the preceding example, are rare.
However, differences between MOS can be striking. There is a wide variation in cutoff scores
each month by MOS. For MOS that are short NCOs, everyone may be promoted every month,
while MOS which are small and have little tumnover may go for months, without promoting
anyone. To assure some minimal level of qualification, DA has established a floor of 450 points
for promotion to E5 and 550 points for promotion to E6. But in overstrength MOS or in MOS
with little turnover, soldiers often have little control over their promotion chances.

Centralized Promotion System

The centralized promotion system affects all soldiers being considered for promotion to the
grades E7, E8, and E9.' In this system, all processing is done at HQDA level and promotion
evaluation is done by an Army-wide centralized board, based only on the soldier’s official
military records. Boards are constituted on an as-needed basis based on a Memorandum of
Instruction (MOI) issued by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). Because
each MOI is different, centralized promotion board procedures and criteria are harder to typify
than they are for the other two promotion systems. Each board is headed by a general officer and
boards contain both officer and NCO members. The NCO members must be senior to the soldiers
being considered by the board. Each board is divided into panels with a minimum of three voting
members on each panel,” assisted by a non-voting administrative NCO. There will usually be
around 9 to 11 panels that are organized by Career Management Field (CMF) with the make-up
of the panels reflecting overlapping and related CMF composition. Board members are
administered an oath.’ As noted, no individual appearances are allowed in front of the boards
although a soldier being considered may submit a letter to the board calling attention to any
matter the soldier feels warrants special attention. Letters are seen by voting members of the
panels.

Records available for board review include all administrative data on the soldier such as date
and place of birth, height and weight, dates of service, history of assignments, military schooling,
promotion records, and civilian schooling. Also available to the board is a record of awards and
decorations, Article 15s, courts-martial records, letters of reprimand, course completion
certificates and transcripts. A record of the individual's evaluation reports (NCOER) is also
available. Many records are provided in duplicate from different sources and it is the individual
NCO’s responsibility to see that all records are up-to-date, accurate, and do not contain

“The DCSPER MOI announces the actual TMIG calendar dates for both the primary and secondary zones of
consideration. Zones are open-ended at the senior end (e.g., “all E7 with a date of rank of 30 September 1998 and
earlier”), All NCOs who fall within that calendar range will have their records considered for promotion, even if
they have been considered before. There are no individual promotion recommendations, as such, from the field to
DA.

5 AR 600-8-19 establishes this number. Other sources identify the requirement for “at least four members.”

° Part of that oath is usually not to reveal the proceedings or the procedures of the board. As a result, in the past, the
procedures followed by centralized boards have been very speculative. Recently, PERSCOM has become more
open about the conduct of centralized boards and much information can be obtained from their Website. Much of
the information in this section comes from “Background on DA Enlisted Centralized Selection Boards,” dated April
1999, which was posted on the PERSCOM Website during the summer of 1999.

D-6



Shalala, D, (1999, February 3). Radio interview on the Diane Rehm Show, WAMU 88.5-FM,
0900-1000 and 2100-2200. (Tape in project file).

Shapiro, A. L. (1999). The control revolution. N.Y .: Public Affairs.
Slavin, B. (1999). Threats proliferate as the world goes ballistic. USA Today. March 19, p. 11A.

Stehlik, M. J. (MAJ). (1998). Personnel synchronization for the Army After Next. In R. S. Rudesill
(Ed.), The impact of high technology on the physiological and psychological dimensions of
warfare: An Army After Next conference. Atlanta, GA: Center for International Strategy,
Technology and Policy, 81-87.

Tenopyr, M. (1997, November). The Army Afier Next: Lessons learning in American business
personnel management. Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human
and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

Toffler, A., & Toffler, H. (1998, June-July). Preparing for conflict in the Information Age. The
Futurist, 26-29.

Toffler, A,. & Toffler, H. (1993). War and anti-war. NY: Warner Books.

Ulmer, W. (1998). Military leadership into the 21st century: Another “bridge too far?” Parameters,
Spring, 4-25. Available: http://www-carlisle.army.mil/usawe/Parameters/98Spring/ulmer.htm

US. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (1994). Force XXI operations, TRADOC Pamphlet
525-5. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters TRADOC.

Vollrath, F. E. (LTG). (1997, November). Human resources implications of AAN. Slides for
presentation at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues
in the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

Walker, C. B., White, L. A., & Schroyer, C. (1989, August). Implementing the U.S. Army’s
assessment of background and life experiences. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA.

Weinberg, D. H. (1996). A brief look at postwar U.S. income inequality. Current Population
Reports, P60-191. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.

Weltman, G. (1997, June). Human behavior in combat. Paper presented at the Army Research
Institute Conference on Human and Organizational Issues in the Army After Next — II,
Leesburg, VA.

Wilson, M. J., Greenlees, J. B., Hagerty, T., Hintze, D. W., & Lehnus, J. D. (1998). Youth attitude
tracking study 1997: Propensity and advertising report. CEDS/Y ATS, DASW01-96-C-0041,
Item #0008BA.

A-25



matter of time before persons with physical handicaps will sue to win non-deployed Army jobs
that have low physical demands (e.g., the increasing numbers of jobs in information
technologies). If the Army were to fill those jobs with contractors and civil servants, then the
impact on uniformed fitness standards might be negligible.

In the past, Army recruiting has fared better in times of high unemployment (Peter
Greenston, personal communication, July 1999), but rates of unemployment cannot be predicted
accurately past 2010. Currently, the demand for people to fill high tech jobs exceeds the supply
(Lane, 1998). Over the long run, the demand for information-intensive products and services is
likely to increase, which will further drive up the demand for the technically qualified. Industry
leaders are dubious that the American primary and secondary education system are equal to the
task of producing an adequately skilled work force for such jobs (Popper, Wagner, & Larson,
1998).

Civilian employers are now trying to reduce the shortfall by hiring foreign citizens in large
numbers and by lobbying Congress to ease immigration for the technically qualified. At the same
time, “[nJearly 47,000 Chinese students and another 11,000 scholars are studying and conducting
research in the USA” (Wiseman & Bezlova, 1999, p. 5A), and only a third of the students return
to China as soon as their studies are over. But the abundant supply of well educated information
technologists from India, the former Soviet Union, and east Asia could dwindle if the gap
between those economies and the U.S.’s shrinks.

Because many high technology positions in the future Army are likely to require special
security clearances, many foreign born persons may not qualify for them, and for those who may
qualify, the clearance process could take a long time. Thus the difficulty of recruiting Americans
with aptitudes and interests in information technologies is likely to increase in the future.

Historically, the makeup of the Active Army has been determined much more by Army
personnel policies (e.g., floors on recruiting females, incentives to enlist and re-enlist) than by
the makeup of the youth population (Segal & Verdugo, 1994). Those policies are driven by
dollars, which Congress controls. Congress could, then, overcome any imbalance or shortage in
the supply of qualified personnel by funding targeted incentives to enlist and reenlist. Just how
adequately Congress will fund military recruiting is unpredictable in the extreme.

Public Support for the Army

To keep those budgets flowing from Congress, it is essential for the Army to maintain the
legitimacy of the institution and the mission in the hearts and minds of the public. One source of
public support is the Army’s roots in veterans, civilian employees, and their families. In the
YATS (Lehnus & Lancaster, 1997), service-age youth report veterans as being their main source
of their perceptions of the military. Understandably, Army managers are worried over the decline
in the numbers of veterans, especially in the ranks of the House and Senate on Capitol Hill.

The shape of the Army’s personal connections with the populace is changing, too, owing to
downsizing and 700 domestic base closures (Vollrath, 1997). Civilian links and support will be
provided increasingly by citizen soldiers (Army Reservists and National Guard), Army civilian

A-10



REFERENCES

Belenky, G. (COL). (1997, November). Warfighter biomedical status monitoring in support of
AAN operations. Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and
Organizational Issues in the Army After Next, Leesburg, VA.

Biever, J. (MAJ), & Echevarria, A. (LTC). (1998). Army After Next soldiers and their units. Fort
Monroe, VA: Future Battle Directorate, HQ TRADOC.

Buckley, E. (BG). (1997). See DCSDOC, 1997b.

Campbell, R., Ford, L., Shaler, M., & Cobb, R. (1998). Issues and recommendations: training
the digital force (ARI Study Report 98-06), Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Department of the Army. (1998). Army Experimentation Campaign Plan Horse Blanket, Briefing
slides. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Department of the Army. (1997). Institutional leader training and education (TRADOC
Regulation 351-10). Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command.

Department of the Army. (1994). Force XXI operations (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5). Fort
Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1999b). Army After Next campaign plan [20 pages].
Presentation slides. Available: http:/Avww.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1999d). Army After Next hybrid force IIT [12 pages].
Presentation slides. Available: http://www.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC. (1998b, September 30) Army After Next
insights: Beyond knowledge and speed [41 pages]. Presentation slides.
Available: http://www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/BriefingsGiven/aanbasicbrief.ppt.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC. (1998c). Knowledge and speed: Battle force
and the U.S. Army of 2025. Second Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) project.
Fort Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC. Available: http://www-
tradoc.monroe.army.mil/dcsdoc/aan.htm (under Reports).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997a, July 10). Transcript of a briefing on Army After Next
[9 pages]. U.S. Army News Release.

Available: http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Jul1997/r19970710aanbrf.html.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1997b). The Army After Next project: Knowledge and speed,
emerging impressions [75 pages]. Presentation slides.

C-43



Appendix D

Advancements and Promotions for Enlisted Personnel (E2 — E9): An Overview’

An understanding of how the enlisted promotion system currently functions, particularly as
applied to those in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks, is essential to any consideration of
changes or supplements to that system. This appendix presents a basic overview of that system.
Although the emphasis is on NCOs, a minimal amount of information on promotion in the lower
enlisted grades (E2 — E4) is presented as well.

Historically, the American Army started out in 1775 with just three enlisted ranks: Private,
Corporal, and Sergeant. Unlike the officer corps whose structure has remained fairly stable
throughout history, the enlisted structure has almost continuously changed, reflecting at times not
only a rank hierarchy but a job hierarchy as well. During the Civil War, there were 29 enlisted
designations ranging from Sergeant Major to Enlisted Men of Ordnance. This plethora of enlisted
positions was retrenched post-Civil War, but by the end of World War I there were 128 different
enlisted designations with most titles determined by job assignment. Titles also determined pay
scales during World War I. In 1920, the “modern” enlisted system was adopted with the
establishment of seven enlisted grades. Also at that time, the concept of pay grades, which
applied across all Army jobs, was set with the establishment of six Army pay grades. In the
almost 80 years since, this rank system has endured, although not without constant refinement.
During World War II the concept of “technical sergeants” was introduced (which lasted in the
form of “specialists” until 1985 when all but the E4 Specialist was eliminated). In 1958, two new
grades (E8 and E9) were added to the structure and in 1978 the position of Sergeant Major of the
Army was created, although this later addition did not reflect a change in rank structure (Arms,
1999; U.S. Army Adjutant General, 1999).

Promotions play a vital role in Army functions and they fill a variety of needs both for the
Army and for the individual. Consider:

e The Army is an organization based on hierarchies of responsibility and authority. About
50% of the Army enlisted force are in the NCO ranks, in theory supervising the other
50% of the enlisted force (or a 1:1 leader to led ratio). In reality, the supervisory structure
is pyramidal, with most NCOs supervising other NCOs. Promotions are the essential
ingredient to make the Army as an organization work. One of the first things that a new
soldier learns about the Army is the recognition of the Army’s rank structure.

¢ Promotions provide incentives for performance and retention.

¢ Promotions fulfill a basic individual need for recognition. They convey authority and
responsibility. A significant aspect of the Army promotion system is that it is
accompanied by visual indication of status (insignia), worn by the holder and universally
recognized by others in the system; the effect of a promotion is immediate. Also by being

' Information for this appendix is taken primarily from AR 600-8-9 “Enlisted Promotions and Reductions” effective
1 December 1991, with changes. It is supplemented with information from the US Army Personnel Command
(PERSCOM) taken from their Website at http://www-perscom.army.mil.select

D-1



Table 29

Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Mid-Level NCO (Army XXI)

Rank

1. Judgment and Decision Making Skill

2. General Cognitive Aptitude

3. Directing, Monitoring and Supervising Others
4. Motivating and Leading Others
5
6.

Oral Communication Skill
Training Others

Characteristic Level of Integrity and Discipline
Conscientiousness/Dependability
MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and Skill

In top tier of Army SME and Psychologis
panels.

In top tier of one panel and in 2nd tier
of the other panel.

Adaptability

Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative
Common Task Knowledge and Skill

Need to Achieve and General Energy Level
Physical Fitness

Advanced Computer Skills
Concern for Soldier Quality of Life
Emotional Stability

Ethical Value System

General Self-Management Skill
Relating to and Supporting Others
Self-Directed Learning Skill
Selfless Service Orientation

In top tier of one panel and in 3rd tier for
the other panel.

In 2nd tier of one panel (or tied for 2nd)
and in 3rd tier of the other panel.

Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures
Basic Electronics Knowledge

Basic Math Facility

Basic Mechanical Knowledge
Cultural Tolerance

Fostering Adaptive Teamwork
Knowledge Management
Knowledge of System Inter-relations
Military Presence

Perceptual Speed and Accuracy
Psychomotor Aptitude

Safety Consciousness

Spatial Relations Aptitude

Working Memory

Writing Skill

In 3rd tier of both panels.

53



Battlefield Function Integration suggest that a real time awareness and understanding of multiple
battlefield functions was viewed as an important performance determinant.

In general, there is more disagreement here between the two panels than for any other of the
target groups. The Army SMEs tended to emphasize specific ability and technical skills while
the psychologists emphasized adaptability, emotional stability, energy level, dependability and
physical fitness. These are somewhat different views of the critical KSAs for the Battle Force
NCO. The Army SMEs seemed to be responding to changing technological requirements while
the psychologist judges seemed to emphasize the demands imposed by higher levels of mental
and physical stress. Given the breadth of change forecasted for the AA2010 period, these
perspectives were not necessarily in conflict.

Summary Comparison of Army SME and Psychologist KSA Rankings

Now that we have compared the Army SME and psychologist predictions about the critical
KSAs for each of the individual target groups, what can we conclude about their judgments
overall? For one thing, the Army SMEs worried a lot about whether the attitudes and values of
new recruits will match the Army’s values (e.g., place the group ahead of the individual). The
psychologists did not focus on these kinds of KSAs.

A consistent finding across all target groups is that both panels placed a very high emphasis
on General Cognitive Aptitude and Conscientiousness/Dependability. For the Army SMEs, the
priority for General Cognitive Aptitude decreases as the target group becomes more senior, but it
is reasserted for the Battle Force NCO. General Cognitive Aptitude was consistently given high
priority by the psychologists.

In general, the Army SMEs placed a higher priority on integrity and discipline (and a lack of
counterproductive behavior) while psychologists just as consistently emphasized high energy,
initiative, and achievement striving. With regard to the measurement of such variables, the SMEs
tended to emphasize KSAs that could be based on assessments of previous job performance. The
psychologists tended to emphasize stable traits that could be measured via standardized tests.

For NCOs, the Army SMEs also consistently gave high priorities to both MOS-specific task
and common task proficiency. They also tended to emphasize more of the consideration or
person centered components of prior leadership/supervisory performance while the psychologists
placed somewhat more emphasis on the initiating structure and directing components of the
leadership role. Unlike the psychologists, the Army SMEs also gave relatively high priority to
physical fitness and computer skills. The psychologists gave high priority to adaptability, but this
was seldom mentioned by the Army SMEs.

The least agreement between the two panels related to the identification of critical KSAs for
AA2010 Battle Force NCO performance. The psychologists emphasized adaptability, emotional
stability, energy level, and broader battlefield function knowledge. The SMEs placed more
emphasis on technical and cognitive skills, as well as specific components of leadership.

For AXXI and Battle Force NCOs, both panels placed a high priority on Judgment and
Decision Making and seemed to view it‘as distinct from General Cognitive Aptitude and
technical skill. This variable deserves close attention.

49



Table 5
NCO Supervisory/Leadership Dimensions from Project A

Planning Operations

1.

2. Directing/Leading Teams

3. Monitoring/Inspecting

4. Individual Leadership

5. Acting as a Model

6. Counseling

7. Communication with Subordinates, Peers, and Supervisors
8. Training Subordinates

9. Personnel Administration

Note. From “Improving the Selection, Classification, and Utilization of Army Enlisted Personnel: Final
Report on Project A,” by J. P. Campbell & L. M. Zook (Eds.), 1991, ARI Research Report 1597,
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Synthetic Validation Project

For purposes of validating the ASVAB, Project A analyzed a representative sample of Army
jobs (20 MOS out of approximately 270). These data provided the Army with a wealth of
information on the performance determinants for those 20 MOS. In a Project A follow-on effort,
the Army Synthetic Validation (SYNVAL) Project, the primary objectives were to utilize
Project A information to evaluate synthetic validation techniques for determining MOS-specific
composites for each MOS, and to evaluate alternative methods for setting minimum qualifying
scores on each of these composites (Wise et al., 1991).

The SYNVAL project provided two approaches to categorizing soldiers’ work. Both of
these taxonomies cover the proficiency side of soldiers’ work. One, the Task Category
Taxonomy, was developed based on information gathered using the Army Task Questionnaire.
Ninety-six task categories were divided into 17 dimensions. These dimensions were then
collapsed into four major dimensions. The two highest levels of this taxonomy are seen in
Table 6. The other taxonomy, the Job Activities Taxonomy, has 53 general activities grouped into
10 major categories (Peterson, Owens-Kurtz, Hoffman, Arabian, & Whetzel, 1990). The 10 job
activity categories that were identified are listed in Table 7.

ll



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Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Department of the Army. (1994). Force XXI operations (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5). Fort
Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Department of the Army. (1999, January). Enlisted promotions. In Promotions Branch
PERSCOM. Personnel Command. [On-line]. Available: http:/vww-
perscom.army.mil/select/probra_e.htm.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. (1998). Knowledge and speed: Battle force and the U.S.
Army of 2025, Second Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) Project. Fort Monroe,
VA: Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command. [On-line]. Available:http://www-
tradoc.monroe.army.mil/desdoc/aan.htm.

Eitelberg, M. J. (1988). Manpower for military operations. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources
Research Organization.

Eitelberg, M. J., Laurence, J. H., Waters, B. K., & Perelman, L. S. (1984). Screening for service:
Aptitude and education criteria for military entry. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources
Research Organization.

Fogli, L., Goldberg, E., & Landis, R. (1994). Future oriented job analysis: Bringing ‘I’ and ‘O’
together. Paper presented at the Society of O/O Psychology. Nashville, TN.

Hough, L. M. (1984). Jdentification and development of temperament and interest constructs and
inventories for predicting job performance of Army enlisted personnel. Minneapolis, MN:
Personnel Decisions Research Institute.

Hough, L. M. (1992). The “Big Five” personality variables - construct confusion: Description
versus prediction. Human Performance, 5, 139-155.

James, L. R. (1998). Measurement of relative motive strength via conditional reasoning.
Organizational Research Methods, 1, 131-163.

Knapp, D. J., Russell, T. L., & Campbell, J. P. (1994). Building a classification research
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Knapp, D. J., Morath, R., Quartetti, D. A., & Ramos, R. A. (1997). A strategic approach to the
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Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning is (little more than) working memory
capacity. Intelligence, 14, 389-433.

73



courses. This increase in common content reflects the recognition that much of the leadership
component of being an NCO transcends the specific job. Additionally, much of this standardized
instruction will be shared with comparable officer and warrant officer courses; again a
recognition of the migration of many traditional officer responsibilities to NCO level (DA,
1997).

Interactive multimedia will play a large role in the delivery of common core instruction
leading to a reduction of on-site attendance at NCOES courses. In addition, the development of
improved distributed learning courses will likely be used to ensure the standardization of Active
Army and Reserve Component NCOES instruction (TRADOC, 1998).

Army XXI Organization

Organizationally, AXXI will look very similar to AOE. Army doctrine, employment, and
command and control will continue to be centered on the basic organizational structure of the
Amny division.’ There will be 20 divisions in the force composition (10 of these will be Active
Army and 10 will belong to the National Guard). The division structures will continue to be
either heavy (mechanized and armor) or light (including airborne and air assault) forces.
Although the possibility exists of eliminating an additional Active Army division towards the
end of the AXXI era, the current active component composition of six heavy divisions and four
light divisions will remain viable through most of the period.

The organization of light divisions, already operating lean, will change very little during
AXXI. Army XXI heavy divisions will be very similar in physical organization to current heavy
divisions in that they will maintain three maneuver brigades, division artillery, a division support
command, an aviation brigade, and several separate battalions comprising the division base.
However, within those units, some significant changes will occur. Although the final structure
will be subject to refinements, the following highlight several areas where the new organization
(called Division XX]) will differ from the current heavy division:

¢ Overall, strength will be reduced by about 12%. Maneuver platforms (tanks and infantry
fighting vehicles) will be reduced by 25%. Maneuver battalions will consist of three
maneuver companies (vice four) and a total of 45 fighting systems as compared with 59
in AOE battalions.

« Maneuver battalions will lose their organic CSS resources. Maintenance, transportation,
and medical support will come from a Forward Support Company (FSC) out of the
division support command (DISCOM).

¢ Brigades will pick up an organic ground reconnaissance and surveillance capability
through the formation of a new Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT). The size of the
maneuver battalion scout platoons will be reduced to provide the assets for the BRT.

3 An Amny division is defined as a major administrative and tactical unit, which is comprised of the necessary arms
and services required for sustained combat. It is the yardstick by which Army combat strength is measured and
compared with other historical periods. Army divisions come in different types and vary in personnel from about
9,000 to about 15,000 soldiers with significant differences in equipment.

C-5



U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (ongoing). Home page, including links to all HQ
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Next) Available: http://www-tradoc.army.mil/.

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Pamphlet 525-66. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC.

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U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Venture Directorate. (1998). Army
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Van Hoose, D. (1996). Developing Civilian Leaders for Force XXI.
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presentation at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational
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Review. Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Wagner, R. (1997, November). Facilitating the development of advanced performance:
Implications of the study of practical intelligence. Paper presented at the Army Research

B-27



METHODOLOGY

The approach to both the Soldier21 and the NCO21 projects was very similar—generate
taxonomies of job performance requirements and predictors of performance (e.g., KSAs) for
the current AOE and two future eras (AXXI] and AA2010). Predictors were identified for five
target groups (first tour, junior NCO, mid-level NCO, senior NCO, and Battle Force NCO).
The designated performance domain was Army-wide components of the job, and the predictors
reguired of all soldiers and NCOs, regardless of MOS.

Due to time and resource limitations, conducting a comprehensive occupational analysis
of all current and future Army enlisted jobs (MOS) was out of the question. Furthermore,
descriptions of future jobs did not exist. As a reasonable alternative, we synthesized
taxonomies of future performance predictors by (a) identifying baseline performance
requirements and predictors, (b) determining current performance requirements and predictors,
and (c) augmenting current requirements with forecasts of future conditions and requirements.
This methodological approach is illustrated in Figure 1. Establishing baseline performance
taxonomies, particularly for specifying performance content, was accomplished by drawing
from a voluminous amount of existing occupational data, training content specifications,
criterion development research, task manuals, and “expert judgments.”

1970s and 80s 1990s 2000-2025 Most
Important
KSAS for:
Soldier
: [= Documentation > Publicati Selection
+ Job analysis \ ee " Army of | 7 A
“tod YN Baseline | + Interviews )) Eeetlence | * Interviews:
+ Analysis + Workshops

Noncommissioned
Officer Promotion

Figure 1. The basic methodological approach.

Forecasting future conditions began with an extensive review of futures literature at a
broad, global level of inquiry. The result of this research effort, entitled “Factors that May
Influence the Future Army: 2000-2025,” is presented in Appendix A. As more was learned
about the elements that would most directly affect first tour and NCO job requirements, the
focus was narrowed to Army doctrine and organization projections (Force XXI and AA2010
reports), types of missions (e.g., increased Operations Other Than War), plans for systems
development (e.g., Force XX1 Battle Command, Brigade and Below [FBCB2)), technological
advances (e.g., digital operations), and social culture (e.g., characteristics of future youth).
Several methods were used to obtain this information: literature and Internet searches, Army
publications, questionnaires, interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs), and workshops
featuring panels of experts (Army SMEs and psychologists). A substantial bibliography of



Winkler, J. D., Shukiar, H. J., Dewar, J. A., Lewis, M. W., Benjamin, B., Sollinger, J. M., Peters,
J.E., & Thie, H. J. (1998). Future leader development of army noncommissioned officers:
Workshop results. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Wiseman, P. & Bezlova, A. (1999, March 19). China, too, fears scientists spilling secrets. USA
Today. p. SA.

Worstine, D. (1998) Current NCO Initiatives. Presentation slides. ARI Occupational Analysis
Office, Common Task Project.

Wright, S. (1998). An appraisal of technologies of political control. Scientific and technological
options assessment document, working document. Luxembourg: Directorate General for
Research, European Parliament. Available: http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm.

Wright, S. (1998, November) The emergence of new sub-lethal alternatives to landmines. Paper
presented at the Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Anti- Personnel Landmines, Tokyo,
Japan. Available: http://www.minesactioncanada.com/documents/042.htm.

Wyly, M. (1998). Combat in the 21* century. The quality of troops will matter more than the
complexity of weapons. U.S. News & World Report, 80-82.

Zaccaro, S. (1997, November). Fostering military team adaptiveness in the Army After Next.
Paper presented at the Army Research Institute Conference on Human and Organizational
Issues in the Army After Next. Leesburg, VA.

Zey, M. G. (1998). Seizing the future: The dawn of the macroindustrial era, Second Edition.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

B-29



Army XXI (Mid-Level NCO)

For both panels, there was a major increase at the mid-level NCO in the number of top 10
KSAs that reflect assessment of prior leadership performance (i.e., Motivating and Leading
Others; Training Others; Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work). Judgment and Decision
Making Skill also took on a very high priority for both groups, as did Oral Communication Skill.

For Army SMEs, MOS Specific and Common Task Knowledge/Skill remained very critical
for the AXXI mid-level NCO as they were for the junior NCO, but not so for the psychologists.
The Army SMEs also viewed General Cognitive Aptitude as still being important at this level,
but considered it significantly less critical than the psychologists who retained it as the most
important predictor. Moreover, Physical Fitness was still in the Army SME top 10. KSAs
pertaining to effort, initiative, achievement, and conscientiousness were given a higher priority
by psychologists than KSAs pertaining to integrity, discipline, and values. Adaptability moved
into the top 10 for the Psychologist Panel.

Army XXI (Senior NCO)

Moving to the AXXI senior NCO target group, the two panels maintained a strong emphasis
on leadership KSAs (Motivating and Leading Others, Concern for Soldier Quality of Life), and
both General Cognitive Aptitude and Judgment/Decision Making Skill were highly ranked.

Relative to the mid-level NCO, the Army SMEs viewed Writing Skill, Self-Management,
and Advanced Computer Skills as more critical, but they still emphasized Level of Integrity and
Discipline. In contrast, the psychologists, still ranked Adaptability as highly critical; Need to
Achieve/Energy Level and Level of Effort/Initiative also remained high priorities for this panel.

In general, the Army SMEs seemed to see the AXXI senior NCO as more of a
leader/supervisor (Training Others) while the psychologists seemed to view this job as needing
advanced management knowledges and skills (Knowledge of System Interrelations; Directing,
Monitoring, and Supervising Work).

Army After 2010 Battle Force NCO

Recall that only one level of job was considered in the AA2010 era — the Battle Force NCO.
Both panels ranked General Cognitive Aptitude as well as Judgment and Decision Making Skill
very high for this group. Self-Management Skill was also seen as a very important KSA by both
panels.

For the Army SMEs, perceptual and spatial aptitudes became very critical, as well as
computer and information management skills. They also emphasized the motivating and training
aspects of leadership.

Besides General Cognitive Aptitude and Judgment/Decision Making, the major emphases
for the psychologists were on temperament/personality, physical fitness, and self-management
factors. The KSAs pertaining to information management and leadership were absent. However,
high Psychologist Panel rankings for Knowledge of System Inter-relations and Knowledge of

48



21st CENTURY SOLDIERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS: CRITICAL
PREDICTORS OF PERFORMANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

Soldier Characteristics for the 21st Century (Soldier21) and 21st Century Noncommissioned
Officers (NCO21) were two projects with similar goals: identify characteristics required of future
soldiers. Therefore, a methodology was executed that dovetailed data collection efforts to meet
the objectives of both projects. The specific objectives for Soldier21 were to (a) identify and
describe the nature and type of changes that are expected to occur in the 21st century Army, (b)
forecast future job requirements and the critical individual characteristics of soldiers who will
perform proficiently, and (c) identify selection measures that might be used to assess individual
characteristics. For NCO21, the objectives were to (a) provide a description of forecasted
conditions affecting future NCO performance, (b) describe the future job requirements, and (c)
provide a descriptive list of the main qualities needed for effective noncommissioned officer
(NCO) performance.

Procedure:

Taxonomies of future performance predictors were synthesized by (a) identifying baseline
performance requirements and predictors, (b) determining current performance requirements and
predictors, and (c) augmenting current requirements with forecasts of future conditions and
requirements. Establishing baseline taxonomies, particularly for specifying performance content,
was implemented by drawing from a voluminous amount of existing occupational data, training
content specifications, criterion development research, task manuals, and expert judgments.

Forecasting future conditions began with an extensive review of futures literature. As more
was leamed about the elements that would most directly affect soldier and NCO-level job
requirements, the focus was narrowed to future Army doctrine and organization projections,
types of missions, plans for systems development, technological advances, and social culture.
Several methods were used to obtain this information: literature and Internet searches, Army
publications, questionnaires, interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs), and workshops
featuring panels of experts (Army SMEs and psychologists). Two future eras were targeted for
study—Army XX] (AXXI) and the Army After 2010 (AA2010).

In order to analyze specific jobs, missions, and technologies that were indicative of the
future, a variety of Army organizations were visited. This provided first hand estimates of future
conditions that may influence job requirements and the knowledges, skills, and abilities (KSAs)
that will be required to fill future Army jobs.

vii



Battle Force combat units will function, the present day SOF are held out as a possible model.
That model includes these features (Sanders, Rumsey, & Brooks, 1997):

¢ high selection standards

e long, physically and mentally demanding training
¢ organization in small teams

¢ mixing of roles across ranks

¢ cross-training of team members

¢ career-long service once qualified

Like SOF, Battle Force soldiers will be multifunctional, but in a new sense: Battle Force
soldiers will be proficient on an increasing variety of systems, including weapons, information,
vehicular, and defensive ones (Jezior, 1998). The activities of Battle Force combat soldiers will
be more diverse, including operating and maintaining digital equipment, calling for fire, carrying
out selected engineering tasks, operating non-line of sight weapon systems and direct fire ones,
and mastering increasingly varied tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Battle Force teams will train and remain together for many years, ending up consisting of
older (viz., 30- and 40-year old), more mature members. Rules for promotion, pay and retention,
and retirement may well be different for Battle Force soldiers than for other AA2010 soldiers.
Rank and grade structure within Battle Force units may follow new, non-traditional models.

The most detailed projection of Battle Forces soldiers’ work is by Belenky (1997) from
whom the quotation below was taken.

AA2010 units will consist of small (3-5 person) teams, with each team controlling
massive firepower and a large volume of battle space. The teams will be engaged in
variable, often high, tempo operations. For a given operation, each team will engage
in 2-3 pulses of combat each day, with a typical operation lasting 5-7 days... The
tempo of operations will be rapid; teams must act in parallel with other teams, often
making decisions without consultation with other teams or with higher echelons of
command and control. In this they will be aided by a shared, detailed, and accurate
real-time picture of the battle space ...AA2010 units must be reusable after only
minimal reconstitution...across multiple pulses of combat and across multiple

deployments (pp 1-3).

For these units there will be a small span of control, a high leader-to-led ratio, and an
emphasis on doctrine and drill. Given that there will be large numbers of small teams, there will
have to be more soldiers with increased leadership roles.

Different sources agree on one point: operations in the Battle Forces will be highly stressful.
A number of factors will compound that stress (Belenky, 1997; Biever & Echevarria, 1998). For
one, Battle Forces will maintain a relentless tempo of operation to produce an early outcome.
Next, weaponry of that era will have advanced sufficiently in accuracy, rate of fire, range, and
destructiveness that, in some places, the deadly zone will be too lethal even to put soldiers into.



“Knowledge” has an absolute and a relative side. Absolutely, it means knowing all that we
need to know; relatively, it means having much better information than the enemy (“information
dominance”). A wide range of capabilities is implied, including these: giving commanders a
view of the location and condition of all of our human and material assets (“total asset
visibility”); giving forces a common, complete, accurate, and current picture of the battle
situation at the level they need to know it; knowing enemy locations, actions, forces, and
intentions; synchronizing the many parts of our joint and coalition forces; and denying an enemy
comparable knowledge. Knowledge will let us maintain advantages of position to initiate
surprise, standoff engagements instead of predictable force-on-force ones (DCSDOC, 1997c).

The complement to Knowledge, “Speed,” is required at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. The AA2010 vision calls for Battle Forces in a high state of readiness to deploy
themselves within days to anywhere in the world. Strategically, speed in deploying may preempt
an enemy attack and otherwise limit enemy options for action. Operationally and tactically,
speed is essential for survival; static or slow moving forces can no longer survive the punishment
of an enemy’s precision fire and WMD. Only by crossing “the deadly zone” at airborne speeds
can an attacking force arrive at the points of engagement in condition to engage successfully.
Between engagements, elements of the force will redeploy rapidly by air, and while on the
ground, battle elements will move rapidly in high-speed vehicles. Such operational and tactical
speed will have U.S. battle elements attack, move before the opponent can respond, then attack
again. By staying inside the enemy’s decision cycle, U.S. forces will frustrate enemy targeting
and keep the enemy on the defensive. As a matter of tempo, speed involves maintaining a
continuous pace of operations until each objective is achieved. Knowledge encourages speed by
permitting forces, with awareness of friendly and hostile locations, to avoid overmatch, and
make every move count (DCSDOC, 1997c).

Within the Army, “[t]he hybrid force of 2025 will be forged from a range of functions, force
structures, and capabilities spanning 20-25 years, from modernized AOE organizations to
AA2010 Battle Forces...” (DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 11). Although the Army is always a work in
progress, the gap in capabilities between the least and most modern elements of AA2010 will be
greater than today. This force will consist of a number of components, each with special
strengths and roles. Looking at the roles in a sequence of operations, from preparation through
decisive action to stability and support, the fighting force will consist of these components:

¢ Battle Forces

¢ Special Operations Forces (SOF)

¢ Forward deployed AXXI-era forces

¢ Campaign forces

¢ Homeland defense forces
Battle Forces

Operating as part of Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) and comprising about one-third of the
AA2010-era fighting force, Battle Forces will be smaller than a current division and larger than a

brigade. For agility, these early-entry forces will be designed to have a relatively light burden of
present-day functions like supply, intelligence, and fire control. Many of these functions will be

C-26



enlistment applicants, themselves. In order to be successful, changes to the system must address
the needs of each of these constituencies or at least not unduly conflict with those needs.
Otherwise, the resistance to change will be strong.

Although the Army’s promotion systems may not have as diverse a set of stakeholders as
the enlistment selection system, these systems have remained relatively unchanged for decades.
This fact in and of itself is likely to make those systems difficult to change in significant ways.
The principle of inertia is a strong one. Moreover, the Army’s promotion processes have been
plagued with administrative difficulties for some time. Such difficulties absorb the attention of
those tasked with running these systems and are likely to make them resistant to introducing
changes that might make things even more complicated. A clear implication of this situation is
that those involved in the current system should be part of any efforts to change the system, or
they can be expected to object to the changes. Moreover, if those who operate a system think it
will not work, chances are that it won’t.

Innovations in Measurement Methods

To further assist ARI in the consideration of how to translate the findings of this project into
R&D plans to support the selection and promotion of 21st century soldiers, the project team
developed a listing of potential methods for the assessment of individual characteristics
(predictor variables) that could be measured at the time of enlistment or promotion. The listing is
not meant to be comprehensive, but rather the emphasis is on experimental or new methods.
Relatively little attention is given to the well-known methods (e.g., personality and interest
inventories, paper-and-pencil tests of cognitive aptitudes). The following discussion attempts to
make a clear distinction between the construct, variables, or individual attributes to be measured
and the measurement operations used to make the assessment.

Table 37 shows the list of measurement methods that was generated. The list was initially
drafted by project staff based on our experience and prior knowledge of the literature,
supplemented by reviews of recent journals and professional conference programs. We then
conducted telephone interviews with I/O psychologists representing a broad range of industry,
federal government, and consulting organizations. A total of 13 individuals were interviewed.
Interviewees were given the opportunity to review and add to the initial draft of measurement
methods. The list was revised following the telephone interviews, and then was reviewed and
revised again based on input from the Psychologist Panel.

The self-report measurement methods topping the list have been used to assess
temperament/personality, as well as other characteristics such as work/life values, integrity,
motive strengths (e.g., need for achievement, risk aversion), and goal orientation. Efforts to
collect self-descriptive information that minimizes the extent to which respondents can
misrepresent themselves are listed next. The list includes the Army’s Assessment of Individual
Motivation (AIM) that is scheduled to be used as part of an operational test for selection
decisions involving applicants without a high school diploma starting October 1999. This section
of the list also includes the Conditional Reasoning Test, which uses items that appear to be
evaluating judgment skills to assess underlying personality characteristics (e.g., need for
achievement [James, 1998]).

65



Table 13 (continued)

Common Skills. Masters and performs technical common tasks designated for skill levels two
through four (SL2-4) including the functions of land navigation, field survival techniques, and
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection. Conducts dismounted field tactical offensive
and defensive operations at the squad and platoon level.

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work. Assigns and delegates tasks to subordinates
fairly for efficiency and effectiveness. Correctly evaluates subordinates’ strengths and
weaknesses so as to assign work properly. Sets goals, targets and criteria for work and
assignments. Ensures that assignments are clearly understood.

Organizing, Coordinating, and Executing. Plans and coordinates work to accomplish
objectives. Takes information into account when deciding on a course of action. Identifies
potential problems or sources of problems and develops sound solutions.

Judgment and Decision Making. Reacts to new situations by applying learned principles and
experiences. Uses common sense and reason in determining actions in a situation. Makes
reasoned and thoughtful decisions in the job context.

Cultural Adaptability. Demonstrates tolerance and understanding of other cultures and value
systems in dealing with soldiers and civilians in the job situation. Seeks to understand other
cultures’ beliefs and customs. Modifies own behavior to adapt to different cultural situations.

Adaptability. Modifies behavior or plans as necessary to reach goals. Is able to maintain
effectiveness in varying environments with various tasks, responsibilities, or people.
Demonstrates openness to change.

Military Presence. Presents a positive and professional image of self and the Army even when
off duty. Shows pride in being a soldier. Maintains proper military appearance. Acts as an
effective role model. Willingly represents the Army at community and social functions.

Information Gathering. Knows how to find information. Identifies essential information.

Multilingual. Speaks, reads, or understands more than one language. Has aptitude to lean new
languages.

Physical Fitness. Meets the Army standards for weight, physical fitness, and strength.
Maintains health and fitness to meet deployability and field requirements as well as the physical
demands of the daily job.

Conflict Resolution and Negotiation. Handles complaints, arbitrates disputes and resolves
grievances and conflicts, or otherwise negotiates with others.

Administrative Management. Keeps accurate, up-to-date, organized records. Processes
paperwork in a timely fashion.

Updating the Baseline to the Current Army of Excellence

While the sources discussed above provided a comprehensive array of job requirements and
predictors, some of those studies were dated and others did not have a specific Army-wide or
NCO orientation. It was therefore necessary to confirm and update the baseline lists. To do this,
a visit was arranged with the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) at Fort Bliss,
Texas where access to students at the Sergeants Major Course (SMC) was provided by Academy

20


Table 35
Evaluation Criteria for Assessment Instruments/Methods

10.
11.

12.

13.

15.

Discriminability — extent to which the measure has sufficient score range and variance (i.e.,,
does not suffer from ceiling and floor effects with respect to the applicant population).

Reliability — degree of reliability as measured by traditional psychometric methods such as
test-retest, internal consistency, or parallel forms reliability.

Criterion-Related Validity — the level of correlation between the predictor and measures of job
performance, training performance, and turnover.

Construct Validity — the amount of evidence existing to support the predictor as a measure of a
distinct construct (e.g., correlational studies, experimental studies, etc.).

Consequential Validity — extent to which use of the assessment does not have unintended
negative consequences.

Face Validity/Applicant Acceptance — extent to which the appearance and administration
methods of the predictor enhance or detract from its plausibility or acceptability to lay persons
as an appropriate test for the Army; includes consideration of whether the content of the
assessment might be viewed as an invasion of privacy.

Differential Validity — existence of significantly different criterion-related validity coefficients
between groups of legal or societal concern (i.e., race, sex).

Group Score Differences — extent to which there are mean and variance differences in scores
across groups defined by age, sex, race, or ethnic groups.

Test Fairness — degree to which slopes, intercepts, and standard errors of estimate differ across
groups of legal or societal concern (i.e., race, sex) when predictor scores are regressed on
important criteria (e.g., job performance, turnover, training).

Generality - extent to which predictor measures a fairly general or broad ability or construct.

Overall Usefulness for Predicting Army Criteria — extent to which predictor is likely to
contribute to the overall or individual prediction of criteria important to the Army (e.g., absence
without leave, drug use, attrition, unsuitability, job performance, and training).

Consistency/Robustness of Administration and Scoring — extent to which administration and
scoring is standardized; ease of administration and scoring, consistency of administration and
scoring across administrators and locations.

Resistance to Compromise — extent to which test content could be easily leaked to examiners or
test responses could be faked by examinees.

Operational Costs — costs associated with administration; frequency and difficulty of
developing alternate forms and the costs associated with this activity.

Utility — extent to which use of the assessment has an impact on performance that outweighs
the costs associated with its use.

63



¢ Many existing AOE job components are generic. For the AXXI] job component, the name
of the job component does not change but details are added to identify how that
component will be applied or changed. Therefore the job component descriptions are
more detailed than their counterparts in the original AOE list (see Tables 11 and 12).

Table C-1
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from Digital
Operations

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic - Transition to Digital Operations and an Increase in
Technologies. The hallmark of AXXI will be the phased introduction of information age operations based
on digital connections and supporting software. This will eventually affect all combat, combat support,
and combat service support operations and interactions. Command and control, operations, and planning,
from battalion through corps, will depend on digital links through the Army Battle Command System
(ABCS) and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below system (FBCB2) as the primary staff
tools. A tactical Internet will link all levels of command. At the troop level, there will be some embedded
“total” digital systems in the form of the M1A2SEP tank, the M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicle, and the
M109A5 Paladin howitzer. However almost all systems will have some facet of appended or add-on
digital link capability. Dismounted digital capability, in the form of Land Warrior, will evolve as
miniaturization, power, and durability issues are addressed late in the period. Maintenance, supply, and
medical functions will increasingly reflect information technology and automation. Many non-tactical
digital applications will be direct adaptations of commercial hardware and software.

Inferred Job Components ~ First Tour Soldiers

MOS/Occupation-Specific Technical Task Performance. Skill level (SL)1 job-specific requirements
will gradually increase in technological sophistication as digital interfaces are integrated into systems.
The number of procedural tasks to be learned will increase over AOE levels. Very few tasks will be
eliminated. Much Advanced Individual Training (AIT) learning will be limited to basic, generic skills and
in many MOS, specific skills will be learned on the job during the initial assignment. The rate of
technological sophistication will be very uneven among MOS during the period.

Common Task Performance. There will be small changes in the number and scope of common tasks
brought on by technological innovations. Widespread use of the precision lightweight global positioning
system receiver (PLGR), the single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), and possibly
the vehicular enhanced position location receiver system (EPLRS) will generate advanced technological
changes in some existing common tasks. Night vision enhancements may add some tasks. Although use
of computers will become widespread among SL1 soldiers, it is debatable whether computer skills per se
will become a common task requirement, at least until very late in the period.

Basic Computer Skills. The availability of commercial, non-job specific computers will become so wide
spread in the Army that all SL1 soldiers will be expected to possess basic operational skills. These will
include word processing, Internet use, e-mail, and familiarity with whatever changes evolve during the
period. In garrison/home station operations at least, all soldiers will likely have access to computers and
be expected to use them occasionally in routine communication, administrative, and training functions.

(table continues)

Cc-9



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Table 7
Job Activities Taxonomy from the Army Synthetic Validation Project

Leadership/Teamwork
Communication
Use Information
Perceptual Judgments
Problem Solving/Trouble Shooting
Operate Equipment
Adjust and Control
Drive
. Aiming
10. Physical Actions.
Note. From “Army Synthetic Validation Project, Report of Phase II Results, Volume I,” by N. G.
Peterson, C. Owens-Kurtz, R. G Hoffman, J. M., Arabian, & D. L. Whetzel, 1990, ARI Technical Report
892, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

PAI ARALNS

xe

Table 8
NCO Job Performance Categories from the Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel
Project

Demonstrating Technical Knowledge and Skill
Communicating Orally
Writing
Demonstrating Effort and Initiative
Following Regulations, Policies and Procedures
Demonstrating Integrity and Discipline
Relating and Cooperating with Others
Motivating Others
Planning and Providing for Training
10. Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work
11. Organizing, Coordinating, and Executing
12. Demonstrating Responsiveness
13. Representing
Note. From “Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel: Base Period Final Report,” N. G. Peterson,
D. Smith, R. G. Hoffman, E. D. Pulakos, D. Reynolds, B. C. Potts, S. H. Oppler, & D. L. Whetzel, 1993,
Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research.

PON AR AWN

Special Forces Job Analysis Project

One other system for categorizing job performance deserves examination—that coming out
of work on U.S. Army Special Forces (SF). In 1996, Russell et al. described a job analysis of the
SF job. The outcome included comprehensive lists and definitions of SF performance
determinants and performance definitions. Because many similarities have been drawn between
the SF and AA2010, the SF performance model was given close attention as a source of ideas for
the current study (Sanders, Rumsey, & Brooks, 1997). The SF job analysis identified 47
predictors that were categorized into six areas: (a) General (e.g., Judgment and Reasoning);

(b) Communication (e.g., Language Ability); (c) Interpersonal Skills, Motivation and Character

13



RESULTS

The results of applying the methodology previously described are provided in this section.
First we discuss the identification of critical KSAs for each of three eras: AOE, AXXI, and
AA2010 Battle Force NCOs. We contrast the future KSA priorities to the critical AOE KSAs
identified by the Army SME Panel. We also compare the predicted future critical KSAs
identified by the first two panels (the Army SMEs and the psychologists) and present a
consolidated portrayal of the future KSAs for the various target groups (AXXI first tour; AXXI
junior, mid-level, and senior NCOs; AA2010 Battle Force NCOs) put together by the third panel
(Staff Panel).

In order to assist the Army in making use of the future KSA priority information, the last
part of this section discusses issues related to assessment. The discussion begins with a review of
current Army enlisted selection and promotion systems, continues with a discussion of
considerations bearing on the usefulness and feasibility of new assessments that might be
incorporated into those systems, and ends with a summary of measurement approaches that
might be used to measure future critical KSAs.

Identification of Critical Knowledges, Skills, and Abilities

The potential KSAs that could be important predictors of performance are shown in Tables
16 and 17. Table 16 is the array of potential predictors of first tour soldier performance in both
the current Army (AOE) and the AXXI era. (Recall that first tour soldier requirements for
AA2010 were not investigated.) Table 17 is the array of potential predictors of NCO
performance in all three eras (AOE, AXXI, AA2010). These are the lists of KSAs from which
the Army SMEs and psychologists elected the most critical KSAs for each of the target groups.

KSAs that appear for the AOE era were developed based on previous research and the input
of the USASMA workshop participants described earlier. Some of the KSAs on the AXXI and
AA2010 lists were identified by the Army SME Panel prior to conducting the KSA ranking
exercises. These new KSAs were viewed as being potentially relevant to one or both future eras,
but not relevant for most AOE enlisted personnel.

In general, the KSAs in each array fell into the following categories:

¢ Cognitive, spatial, psychomotor, or physical aptitudes.

e General dimensions of knowledge and skill (e.g., oral communication skill).

e Army-specific knowledges and skills (e.g., MOS specific technical skill, leading and

motivating skill).

e Attitudes and values.

¢ Characteristic dispositional or behavioral tendencies (e.g., to be dependable or exhibit
high energy and effort).

30


Table C-6
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from
Characteristics of the Youth Population

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic - Youth Population and Recruiting. The new recruit requirements
for all services (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy) will remain right around 350,000 each year
during the AXXI era (200,000 active and 150,000 reserve components). Of this number, the Army will
Tequire accessions around 90,000 per year to meet active duty requirements. Potentially, there are about
16 million men and woman that fall in the 17 to 21 year old age group from which the services draw. But
the realities are far different. The services categorize the prime recruiting market as meeting the following
criteria: (a) graduated from high school, (b) non-college bound within 12 months of high school, (c) is not
and has not been in service, (d) is physically and morally fit, and (e) scores in the top half of mental
ability (Army Forces Qualification Test ([AFQT] Category I-IIIA). Applying these criteria reduces the
population cohort from which to draw to about 840,000 persons in the year 1999 (rising to about 940,000
in 2006). More importantly, the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey of high school seniors shows a steady
decline of people who want to serve in the military to about 18% of male youth and about 7% of females.
A strong economy, a rising minimum wage, increased post-high school choices, and a decreasing
identification with the military affect recruitment. When the services cannot fill their goals from the
existing prime recruiting market, the most likely course of action is to adjust the criteria.

Inferred Job Components ~ First Tour Soldiers

MOS/Occupation-Specific Job Requirements: Overall, it is anticipated that the technical difficulty of
jobs will increase during AXXI and the demands in some specialties will be significant. A decline in the
quality of incoming soldiers will probably not affect all jobs equally. High quality recruits will still
probably be steered towards high demand jobs. But jobs with lesser demands will likely experience the
acquisition of lower quality personnel. The alternative to not lowering standards would be to not fill
vacancies at all and this would create its own set of problems.

Adaptability and Ingenuity: While lower capability soldiers can be trained effectively on procedural
tasks, they are generally less effective in situations that do not have a prescribed solution or procedure.

Effort and Initiative: Young people traditionally do not have much of a record on which to base
judgment of future performance (e.g., work history). One opportunity that all 18-21 year olds have had is
to attend and graduate from high school. While high school education in itself does not predict ability,
graduation does demonstrate perseverance and effort in completing a minimally regimented requirement.
Lowering high school graduation requirements adds to the potential recruit population but focuses on
people who have already quit the only thing that has been so far required from them in life.

Dependability and Autonomy: While lower ability individuals can adequately perform most existing
SLI requirements, it is anticipated that they will need more guidance and supervision.

Self-Development: For self-development to work as a facet of AXXI training, it will depend on
individuals who are both motivated and capable of learning largely through use of non-instructor
mediated material. If large numbers of lower quality soldiers are introduced, self-development may not be
a viable learning pillar for SL1 or new concepts for self-development may have to be developed.

(table continues)

C-20



Project Staff Panel

The independent judgments of the Army SME and the Psychologist Panels needed to be
combined to make it easier to make decisions based on their judgments. The synthesis of the two
sets of importance orderings was accomplished by a working group of contractor and ARI staff.
As indicated in the Methodology section, this group developed a relatively simple set of decision
tules that were used to identify and rank order the very highest priority subset. After that, KSAs
were prioritized in “blocks.” KSAs were not ordered by importance within blocks.

Future KSA Priorities for First Tour Selection (Army XXI)

As indicated in Table 27, the strong consensus was that the first tour soldier in the future
Amy will be best selected on the basis of the general factor (General Cognitive Aptitude,
Reading Skill, Working Memory), basic temperament attributes (conscientiousness, emotional
stability, achievement orientation and energy), the match with the Army’s ethics and values, self-
management skills, and basic computer skills. The lowest priorities were given to basic technical
knowledges and skills, perhaps because the ASVAB already measures these variables.

In general, the first tour KSA importance rankings seem quite responsive to the projected
future changes in the Army’s environment and performance requirements. For the soldiers of the
future, a number of basic temperament characteristics, appropriate values, and self-management
skills take on considerable importance. Measures of these variables are also receiving increasing
attention in the private sector. However, vexing problems of potential response distortion in self-
reporting remain and will require additional research attention.

Future KSA Priorities for NCO Promotion Systems (Army XXI)

As shown in Tables 28-31, and comparatively in Table 32, there were distinctive features of
the NCO KSA priority rankings as a function of target groups and also as a function of the
forecasted changes in AA2010 performance requirements.

For the junior NCO, as for the first tour soldier, Conscientiousness/Dependability, General
Cognitive Aptitude, Need for Achievement and Energy Level, and Oral Communication Skill
were given very high priorities. MOS-Specific Knowledge and Skill, basic skills in Motivating
and Leading Others and first tour performance dimensions that assess Effort/Initiative and
Integrity/Discipline were also given very high priorities. To some degree these rankings present a
choice between measuring dependability and achievement striving with standardized “trait”
measures or assessing the same behaviors as part of current or past performance. The fact that
both kinds of potential measures were highly ranked emphasizes the priority given to them for
junior NCO promotion. In general, in addition to General Cognitive Aptitude, junior NCOs were
seen as needing high dependability and high energy, and should be highly rated on MOS-
Specific Knowledge and Skill. They should also have demonstrated foundational leadership
skills (Motivating and Leading Others) as a first tour soldier. The overall picture was of a
technically skilled individual who is committed to the Army and has the skills necessary for
beginning to take on leadership responsibilities.

50



psychologists reviewed and refined all of the performance and predictor definitions to
ensure the resulting levels of specificity were similar.

« Another requirement of the Soldier21/NCO21 project was that the KSAs have Army-
wide applicability. Hence, the specifications were reviewed for military relevancy. Since
most of the sources were military projects, this relevancy could largely be assumed.
However, some projects focused on MOS-specific dimensions, particularly in the case of
Special Forces job analysis. Only dimensions that were applicable Army-wide were
considered. At the same time, an Army SME on staff eliminated or updated
specifications that had been rendered obsolete by changes in the Army since the time of
the original projects.

¢ Performance descriptions and predictor definitions were reviewed for overlap and
redundancies. Different sources sometimes used different terms to describe what was
essentially the same specification. To avoid redundancy, the staff reviewed and
compared all definitions. This step eliminated some and resulted in others being merged.
The result was a “title” (e.g., Adaptability) and a “definition” (e.g., Responds adequately
and effectively to changes in schedules and missions or tasks. Performs well when the
unexpected occurs.) for each dimension. Many of these definitions were extracted from
the source material. However, the staff revised each definition to accurately address the
appropriate military level (first tour or NCO).

¢ Results were separated into job performance components and predictor sets. The
language of each specification was refined to describe either (a) a performance
component or, (b) a performance predictor.

¢ Composite lists were reviewed for completeness (i.e., to identify if there were any areas
of performance for first tour or NCOs that were not covered). At the same time,
knowledgeable staff also reviewed performance and predictor definitions to ensure that
they met some minimal judgment of criticality (i.¢., that they did not identify areas that
were trivial or incidental to the job domain).

¢ Finally, each descriptor was edited for uniformity in language, descriptive level, and
length.

This process was applied iteratively. The result was the baseline taxonomies of Army-wide
job performance components (Table 11) and potential predictors (Table 12) for first tour soldiers.
The NCO job components and predictors were combined in a single set (Table 13). Initial
reasoning for combining them was that potential NCO promotion criteria could be based on
current job performance, which would also serve as predictors of future performance. However,
job component and predictor sets were eventually separated for the future eras (AXXI and
AA2010) so that the first tour and NCO sets could be more easily compared. Separating them
also allowed the subsequent expert panel participants to consider potential predictors as a
separate activity from their consideration of performance requirements.



will be a characteristic of AXXI (LTC Gerhardt, personal communication, February 10,
1999).

¢ Many aspects of digital equipment will significantly improve during the AXXI period
including ruggedization, miniaturization, and user-friendly features such as voice
recognition/response. Keyboards and touchpads may be largely eliminated on tactical
platform applications. Increasingly sophisticated software updates and improvements to
existing capabilities should be a constant feature of all digital applications during the
AXXI period. However, true artificial intelligence (AI) applications to tactical military
computers will probably not occur during this era.

¢ Digital capability for dismounted soldiers (dubbed Land Warrior) will be fielded during
the period but operational applications will depend on the development of miniaturized,
lightweight, low power enhancements. For most of the AXXI era, the dismounted digital
capability will not match that available on fighting platforms (TRADOC, 1998).

¢ Passive lightweight automated battlefield identification systems should be perfected and
integrated on all tactical and support systems including dismounts. The likelihood of
fratricide should be significantly reduced.

¢ Smart tactical rockets will likely become operational during the period allowing “fire and
forget” destruction of enemy artillery, air defense, and maneuver systems without the
need for observed fire or to-target guidance. Overall, indirect fire delivery, accuracy, and
lethality will increase significantly (TRADOC, 1998).

e There will likely be significant development in robotics and unmanned aerial and ground
vehicles (UAV and UGV). These will generally be applied to high-risk tasks such as
mine clearing and surveillance of highly protected resources. However, general tactical
reconnaissance and surveillance will remain a human activity, although augmented
significantly by sensors (TRADOC, 1998).

Army XXI Soldiers

Soldiers will continue to be the mainstay of the AXXI operations. No systems or operations
will exist without soldiers. The “human dimension” of performance will be tantamount to any
changes in organization, leadership, training, or doctrine. Indeed it is this soldier dimension that
often drives changes in the other functions. Some issues that have been raised about early 21st
century soldiers include:

¢ The military services in the late 1990s are having problems meeting recruiting goals for
new service members. Failure to meet goals could result in lowering standards for
enlistment.

¢ Retention rates for soldiers after their first enlistment are about 33%. These rates have
been fairly stable in the past and are unlikely to change dramatically early in the AXXI
period.

¢ Many factors are affecting the current youth population including a strong economy,
increasing educational opportunities beyond high school, and a declining propensity to
enlist for military service. All these affect the quality and motivation of potential new
soldiers.

C7



their qualifications, and the availability of both civilian and Army jobs. Several factors should
help the Army with recruiting. First, while the size of the Army is likely not to grow, the
numbers of service age youth are predicted to grow by 17% out to 2025 (Day, 1996). Second, the
numbers of Hispanic youth, who have had the highest propensity to enlist of all youth in recent
years (Wilson, Greenlees, Hagerty, Hintze, & Lehnus, 1998), will grow from the present 13.7%
of the youth population to 21.7% in 2025. Lastly, the technical preparation of new accessions
should continue to improve as information technologies become more common at home and
school.

Table A-2
Changes in the U.S. Youth Population (17-24 Years) in 1999 and 2025 (From Day, 1996)
Race/Ethnic Group
Native
Year Total Hispanic White Black American Asian

1900 29,711 4,095 (13.8%) 19,890 (66.9%) 4,258 (14.3%) 271 (<1%) 1,198 (4%)
2025 34,859 7,541 (21.6%) 19,218 (55.1%) 5,316 (15.3%) | 353(1%) 2,432 (7%)

Note. Numbers are in thousands; resident population. These data are from the middle of three projections
in the source document. Percentages, in parentheses, are relative to the total.

In contrast, two serious influences could work against Army recruiting. The first is a
possible continuation of the recent increase in new high school graduates choosing to go on in
school. This trend has been abetted by the growth of other programs of support for college that
match or surpass the Army’s (Naomi Verdugo, personal communication, July 1999). The Active
Army has competition in recruiting from even the Army National Guard, which will offset young
persons’ college expenses if they take part in the Guard during their college years. The expected
growth in information intensive occupations along with the well publicized return on investment
from education make it likely that young persons’ pursuit of post-secondary education will not
decline.

More worrisome is the poor state of educational achievement in America’s youth: “...the
average level of attainment by pupils leaving school is the worst in the industrial world” (McRae,
1994, p. 42). This finding is supported not only by head-to-head comparisons of test scores
among nations (Geary, 1996; McRae), but also by foreign born students doing better in U.S.
schools than home students do, and by the decline in high school students’ scores on the SAT in
the 1980s. The youth population’s English language skills will decline, on the average, as the
proportion of young Americans with other primary languages grows (Day, 1996; Grissmer,
Kirby, Berends, & Williamson, 1995). Moreover, concerns about the psychological fitness for
service of tomorrow’s young persons extend to their stability, social adjustment, and
moral/ethical development (Stehlik, 1998; Vollrath, 1997).

A-8



develop a supporting motivational network, along with a means of evaluating effectiveness, are
all required.

As noted above under Materiel, a variety of very small, portable information resources is
expected to help Battle Force soldiers meet the informational and tactical challenges of the
complex battlefield (e.g., hand-held aids for diagnosing and repairing systems, giving emergency
medical care, and making tactical decisions). Training optimists (e.g., Marquardt & Kearsley,
1999) expect resources like these to put usable expertise in the hands of non-experts. The
expectation is that non-experts will be raised to useful levels of performance outside their own
specialties and that the complexity they can handle in their primary fields will be expanded as
well. While these knowledge resources will require training in their mechanics and in the
decision making involved in using them, they could give soldiers much more depth and breadth
of capabilities without much more training. However, even with very effective
information/knowledge tools, soldiers will need to be trained to manage information.
Information management skills will include being able to turn data into knowledge, to selectively
ignore information, to multi-task, to disambiguate and deconflict poor information, and to
recognize and recover from corrupted information. These skills will be needed in a wide variety
of enlisted occupations, not just the high paced Battle Force soldiers.

Also pertinent to individual training and learning is the high likelihood that the Battle Force
can expect to be the testbed for very new technologies. As potential opponents develop ways to
counter our advanced capabilities, the Battle Force will receive new tactics and technologies so
as to maintain a competitive edge. Such a flow of change will make career-long learning a
necessity for Battle Force enlisted soldiers. This prospect is not unique to the military; Marquardt
and Kearsley (1999, p. 28) quote with approval Shoshanna Zuboff’s observation that “learning is
the new form of labor. Continual learning is not only a prerequisite of employment but is a major
form of work...[t]here is a convergence between work and learning.”

AA2010 Soldiers and Leader Development

This section combines the DTLOMS topics of Quality Soldiers and Leader Development in
AA2010 because the total AA2010 is likely to consist of three large groups of enlisted soldiers
that differ enough in career paths and working conditions to require their own approaches.’ In
that the purpose of our study is concentrated on considerations for selection for entry into the
Amy and for promotion; we will deal here with issues in AA2010 that bear directly or indirectly
on soldiers’ qualifications. For several reasons, the information on enlisted soldiers that is
available at this writing is sparse. First, the first report on the AA2010 Imperatives on Quality
Soldiers and Leader Development and a study of military culture will appear after this project is
complete. Next, the AA2010 war games that have been reported to date have focused on
operational art at a level far above teams and individuals. Finally, work on designing the jobs of
enlisted soldiers in the Battle Forces will not take place for years.

Differing from today’s model of one general enlisted career path for the Active Army (with
small variations), AA2010 appears to entail three major career paths: in the AXXI legacy

7Tn some other contexts, the “S” in DTLOMS does not refer to the work or qualifications of soldiers; instead it
refers to “soldier support,” which is primarily materiel for the individual soldier. In our presentation, we have
included those “soldier support” considerations under the Material section.

C-35



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Huntington (1996) cites Henry Kissinger’s observation that world politics in the 21st
century will be dominated by six major powers: the U.S., Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and
probably India. In addition, the Islamic countries, which have not had much success to date in
putting together a single, joint program, will nevertheless be influential because of their strategic
locations, large populations, and oil resources. “In this new world, local politics is the politics of
ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced
by the clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996, p. 28). Huntington’s concept of civilizations is
important here, because the two most populous civilizations, the Islamic and Chinese, both have
an antipathy to Western culture, a resentment of Western influence, and a desire to establish their
own influence. Violence between Moslems and non-Moslems has occurred on-and-off almost
since the origin of Islam (Huntington, 1999).

Military writers appear to have adopted Huntington’s concept of “fault line conflicts” in
anticipating trouble spots. “Fault line conflicts occur between neighboring states from different
civilizations, between groups from different civilizations within a state, and between groups
which...are attempting to create new states out of the wreckage of old” (Huntington, 1996, p.
208). “Tensions will occur—primarily along fault lines. Security and stability will depend on
managing tensions to avoid wars” (DCSDOC, 1997b, p. 11). Most likely, the places inviting
military attention will be the west Pacific rim and west/southwest Asia. Sparks for war could
come from ethnic hostilities, conflicts of economic interests, rich-poor tensions, and attempts of
nations to enlarge their boundaries.

Whereas Orvis et al. (1998) propose a unique package of U.S. military forces for dealing
with each of their different geopolitical scenarios, Army planners expect the U.S. to face a
variety of threats that cut across scenarios. In the near term environment (roughly out to 2010),
the expected scenario includes regional competitors with industrial age forces, limited weapons
of mass destruction, selective precision in delivery, and a quasi-professional military that would
meet our force “asymmetrically” (DCSDOC, 1997a). Asymmetry refers to opposition forces not
trying to match our ways and means of war, but rather trying to equalize the military balance by
using other, partial approaches, such as terrorism, hostage taking, exploiting niche weapons (e.g.,
biologicals), knocking out our space assets, using human waves, or using limited nuclear

weaponry.

Out of the near term military environment, a different one will emerge. One or two major
competitors could arise who will also try to counter our capabilities asymmetrically, rather than
match them system-for-system. Such competitors will have a professionalized military, a
capability for mass precision delivery of weapons, and abundant weapons of mass destruction.
Off-the-shelf information technologies will probably be sufficient to keep their otherwise low-
technology forces effective in pursuing regional ambitions and posing a limited global threat.

With their precision delivery capabilities, major competitors will try to keep the U.S. from
achieving decisive outcomes quickly in wartime. They will rely most heavily on land power,
drawing on the advantages of large population, the strength of a defensive position, and the unity
of an ideology (Scales, 1998a). “When states from different civilizations are involved...cultural
differences sharpen the conflict” (Huntington, 1996, p. 208). Along with these possible maximal

A-3



committing atrocities (Miller, 1997). Two expected features of the Battle Forces could foster
social cohesion: selection into the Battle Forces by special standards (i.e., eliteness), and
stabilization of units for long duration. So Battle Force preparation must promote task cohesion
and discourage either extreme of social cohesion.

Application of Battle Force Characteristics to Job Requirements

In the AA2010 era, enlisted leaders’ jobs will be a mix of the old and the new. The
requirements to perform, teach, reward, counsel, discipline, motivate, and the like, will endure.
But two important aspects of AA2010 are likely to make enlisted leaders’ jobs different from
today’s: the likelihood of three different sets of working conditions for the enlisted ranks and the
pace of change. In the AXXI-era components of AA2010, the path up the enlisted ranks will be
as it is today: shaped like a pyramid, with jobs losing much of their specialization and gaining
leadership responsibilities in the upper ranks. Soldiers in AXXI units will work and fight much
like today, interacting face-to-face with their supervisors. Units will continue to be organized
hierarchically and career progression will follow more traditional patterns. In the Battle Forces,
several factors will work to reduce the distinctions between leaders and led—training and
working in small teams, career stabilization of units for prolonged training together, and maturity
in the Battle Force soldiers from retaining them in the combat forces into their 30s and 40s,
perhaps at a plateau of rank. In the small teams, tight unit cohesion and cross-training to take
charge and cover for downed team members will foster an ethos where everyone leads and rank
is not in the foreground. Battle Force soldiers will have strong institutional values and have
soldiers as their reference group.

It is on the Battle Force soldiers that we directed the analysis to try to specify job
requirements. The results are consolidated in Table C-7. We have used traditional or existing job
requirement titles in most cases but have identified those aspects of AA2010 characteristics that
will change or redefine the content of the requirement. In some cases, new performance
requirement titles are listed. Because some evidence points to a Battle Force model staffed by
soldiers taken from the existing Army (a Ja the SOF model) no first-tour or Army entry level job
components analysis was included. Whether the end result of Battle Force structure is a
traditional NCO structure or something totally new, the following should apply. However, these
job components lists come heavily caveated: As is the case with all AA2010 information, these
are very speculative and very preliminary. A constant and consistent updating should be a
requirement that earmarks all AA2010 data, and the information in Table C-7 is no exception.

C-39



Table 31

Most Important KSAs for Battle Force NCO (Army After 2010)

Rank

1, Judgment and Decision Making

2. General Cognitive Aptitude

3. Knowledge of Battlefield Function Integration

Emotional Stability
General Self-Management Skill
Self-Directed Learning Skill

Adaptability
Knowledge of System Inter-relations
Physical Fitness

Advanced Computer Skills
Conscientiousness/Dependability
Knowledge Management

Motivating and Leading Others

Need to Achieve and General Energy Level
Perceptual Speed and Accuracy

Spatial Relations Aptitude

Training Others

Characteristic Level of Integrity and Discipline
Selfless Service Orientation

Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative

Basic Electronics Knowledge

Concern for Soldier Quality of Life

Ethical Value System
MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and Skill
Oral Communication Skill

Psychomotor Aptitude

Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures
Basic Math Facility

Basic Mechanical Knowledge

Common Task Knowledge and Skill

Cultural Tolerance

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work
Fostering Adaptive Teamwork

Military Presence

Relating to and Supporting Others

Safety Consciousness

Working Memory

Writing Skill

In top tier of Army SME and Psychologist
panels.

In top tier of one panel and in 2nd tier
of the other panel.

In top tier of one panel and tied for inclusion
in 2nd tier for the other panel.

In top tier of one panel and in 3rd tier for
the other panel.

In 2nd tier of one panel and tied with other
KSAs for inclusion in 2nd tier.

In 2nd tier of one panel (or tied for 2nd)
and in 3rd tier of the other panel.

In 3rd tier of both panels.

55



threats, a full range of lesser military threats will continue to exist. Stability and support
operations (i.e., peacekeeping) will be necessary for a long time as local and regional conflicts

ignite.

Toffler and Toffler (1998) see the future sources of conflict as more complex and dynamic
than the largely religiously defined civilizations of Huntington. Both between “waves” (agrarian,
industrial, and information age) and within, the Tofflers see conflict arising in any or all of these
dimensions: cultural, religious, social, political, economic, and military. Surely these dimensions
are highly correlated, but there is the new possibility of military/political conflict cutting across
Huntington’s civilizational lines and waged by combinations of criminal cartels, non-
governmental organizations, ethnonationalists, militias, cults, international corporations, and
nation states (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997). The activities of such organizations as Columbian and
Mexican drug cartels, Russian mafias, Hamas, the International Islamic Front, and Aum
Shinrikyo, may, on a small scale, foreshadow that era of international relations. The durability of
the Columbian drug trade to date gives a clue to the intractability of a networked enemy. When
that era will emerge on a large scale is hard to predict, but much future conflict will not resemble
traditional military activity. In the future era, opponents will not necessarily have to win a war
with the U.S. to be successful; rather, a stalemate could attain their objectives. Already, reports
of attacks on U.S. government web sites are common; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
shut down its visitor tour in Washington in the summer of 1998 owing to threats of terrorism; the
ease of one person or one vehicle tying up rush hour traffic is manifest almost daily; and the
presence of large, vulnerable crowds at sporting events or urban settings is the other edge of the
sword for an open society.

For military actions in the future, the lineup of US. allies will probably vary. Late in the
20th century, major American military action was usually constrained by the political need to
win the approval of UN or NATO and the budgetary need to get other countries to help pay the
bill. Building approval and coordinated action within the large alliances has not been fast or easy.

A different, more flexible future is anticipated: “[AA2010] research indicates that while the
current multipolar international security system will continue largely intact, tomorrow’s world
will become increasingly complex, characterized by shifting balances within regions and the
prevalence of ad-hoc security structures, vice stable alliances” (DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 1). Army
writings on the future repeatedly refer to situational U.S. coalitions with a very small number of
nations to deal with problems of common interest or to gain overflight and staging privileges
(DCSDOC, 1998c). Such coalitions are a prerequisite for Army doctrine, which emphasizes
speed of action and preemption.

One current development could have a major impact on geopolitics and the activity of the
future Army: the new willingness of the larger world community to take action in response to
suspected violations of human rights that used to be considered the internal affairs of other
countries. Two current cases involve General Pinochet, former ruler of Chile, and Yugoslavia.
Vaclav Havel (1999, p. 4) writes “... in [today’s interconnected] world, the idol of state
sovereignty must inevitably dissolve.” In parallel, Secretary of State Albright (1999) has

A-4



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B-16



locations for each of these jobs (Fort McClellen, Alabama; Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Fort
Gordon, Georgia, respectively). We conducted workshops with more than 45 persons, including
incumbent and supervisory NCOs, civilians, and officers at the Directorate and General Officer
level. These MOS and their relevancy to future Army-wide performance requirements are
discussed below:

¢ MOS 95B (Military Police): This MOS reflects what Army forecasters see as the
missions of the future including peacekeeping, disaster assistance, population control,
counter-terrorism, and quasi-combat situations. Additionally, military police operate in
small groups, sometimes with minimal supervision and in non-hierarchical modes of
employment. These are characteristics that were identified for the future eras.

¢ MOS 19D (Cavalry Scout): Cavalry Scouts are combat soldiers who are given a wide
variety of missions. In their reconnaissance and surveillance role, they operate in small
groups, far removed from the main forces. They employ a variety of high tech
surveillance and reporting equipment and serve as enablers of a variety of combat
systems including direct and indirect fires, close air support, and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). Their potency lies in their versatility. As such, they too reflect many of
the characteristics of 21st century soldiers and NCOs.

« MOS 31U (Signal Support Systems Specialist): This MOS and related MOS 74B
(Information Systems Operator-Analyst) deal with operation and maintenance of high
tech signals, automation, and computer equipment. The 31U job involves installation,
employment, and maintenance of a wide variety of complex signal equipment including
commercial, off the shelf computers. The 74B is the computer network system
administrator. This is forecast to be one of the highest-demand MOS to ensure the proper
integration and maintenance of the Army’s digital equipment.

Besides examining this small sample of future-oriented MOS, we also profiled and
interviewed civilians, soldiers, NCOs, and officers who were developing future doctrine,
participating in peacekeeping missions, using advanced or experimental technology, or were
otherwise engaged in activities that gave them particular insights into future performance
requirements or KSAs. Below is a list of Army offices or units where individuals were
interviewed. A short synopsis explaining the relevance of each site visit is also provided. Before
each visit, we researched the mission of the unit or office. A set of interview questions was then
prepared that focused specifically on the activities of that site. For instance, questions developed
for senior NCOs and officers of the 2"* Armored Calvary Regiment, a unit that had recently
returned from a peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia, focused on the types of skills soldiers
needed to be successful in the mission and the characteristics of soldiers who performed best.
Using the questions as a guideline, informal discussion sessions, generally lasting several hours,
were conducted.

e Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (HQ, TRADOC), Future Battle
Directorate/Proponent for AA2010 (Fort Monroe, Virginia). This is the TRADOC staff
responsible for the development and progression of what the Army is headed towards in
the period 2010 — 2025. We made an on-site visit with the AA2010 staff in February
1999 and maintained a continuous liaison with them throughout the course of the study.
This facilitated an understanding of the AA2010 that would not have been possible
otherwise.

24



Table C-5
Army XXI Job Components for First Tour Soldiers and NCOs Resulting from Training

Army XXI (AXXI) Characteristic — Training. The reorganization and refocusing of the Army’s
training system based on AXXI initiatives started in the mid-1990s and will continue throughout the
AXXI era. There are three components to this training revolution that will directly affect solder job
performance.

Increasing Reliance on Technology. Training delivery of the future will take advantage of all current
technological initiatives and some just being developed. Distributed training, distance learning, Internet
training, computer-based instruction, and interactive media will be a few of technologies trainers and
trainees will use. Virtual, constructive, and live simulation links will become truly integrated allowing
unit and individual training to be conducted simultaneously at all levels. Virtual simulation will allow
learning and practice of many hands-on tasks realistically and risk-free.

Less Institutional Attendance. Much of the institutional role will focus on the development of distributed
training materials. More and more, the training location will shift to units as individual units become
more unique in equipment, organization, and mission. Initial entry training (IET) will focus on
soldierization and basic skill with specific SL1 task training shifted to units. Learning will become a
constant activity rather than a singular event in order to keep up with changing technology and emerging,
shifting doctrine.

Self-Development Training Will Change and Increase in Importance. Individually initiated training will
become an increasing requirement in career learning. Self-development resources will increase and

become more sophisticated technically, requiring new skills to access and use. The shift to self-
development focussed training will start at higher NCO levels but it will rapidly migrate downwards
eventually affecting all soldiers, even during their first tour. Complete integration of self-development,
unit, and institutional training will occur at some point, likely during the AXXI era or shortly thereafter.

Inferred Job Components — First Tour Soldiers

Self-Development: The increase in unit training requirements will push job specific self-development
requirements to lower levels, probably even down to the early years at skill level (SL)1 The individual
soldier will become increasingly responsible for much of his or her individual task learning. At the same
time, the availability of distributed learning and information assets will increase, including Internet-based
tutorials and classes. Virtual performance opportunities may exist for some tasks/jobs to allow non-
supervised practice of hands-on requirements.

Inferred Job Components - NCOs

Self-Development: The scope of NCO self-development requirements to keep up with job specific
technical and digitization requirements will increase several-fold. Additionally, NCO will be expected to
be increasingly proficient in general computer skills. Most of this will be through self-development
although the opportunities for self-development through technology will also become more available.
NCOs will be expected to be aware of and to push self-development opportunities for junior soldiers.

Training Others: As more and more skill learning is shifted to the unit, the role of the NCO as trainer
becomes even more important than it already is. Moreover, the complexity of the technology increases the
responsibility of NCO being the one to "know the answers." Training “packages” may be externally
developed but implementation and tailoring application will fall on unit NCOs. Innovations in training
technology will require NCOs to become knowledgeable about available technologies and to integrate
them in their training plans. Impacts of new or changed training requirements will be greatest at SL3 and
SL4.

C-19



Table C-7 (continued)

Security Clearance: The proliferation of systems for handling secure information will increase the
number of enlisted jobs requiring high, and compartment security clearances. In all likelihood, all Battle
Force members will require clearances. Whether these clearances need be higher, or more restrictive, than
present day SECRET remains to be seen, but the final result could impact selection into the Battle Force.

Self-Development: Battle Force soldiers will be subject to constant change including the application of
new technologies and innovations and refinements in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
External factors including political and cultural learning will be a constant requirement. Battle Force
members will be expected to keep themselves current, employing the latest distant, distributed learning
tools. They will have to know how to cope with the differences between live settings and the simulated
settings in which many of their skills have been acquired and practiced. Initiative and innovation in self-
development will be an expectation at the individual soldier level

Advanced Computer Skill: Although no one can accurately forecast the status of computer technology
in the AA2010 era, it is assumed that there will be levels of expertise above user or basic level. This will
include maintenance, troubleshooting, and whatever will be the 2010 equivalent of programming.
Because of their reliance on technology, and their requirement to operate remotely, independently, and
under harsh conditions, Battle Force soldiers will have to be higher order computer technicians as part of
their job.

Training Others: Because training for service in the Battle Force will be largely by apprenticeship, then
Battle Force NCOs will have a richer training responsibility than NCOs in previous eras. These NCOs
will need to be effective mentors to the apprentices. Although some aspects of this will be taught to the
trainers, some selection will be useful here, as not everyone is cut out to be a mentor/instructor.

C-42



CONTENTS (continued)

Table 21
Table 22
Table 23
Table 24
Table 25
Table 26
Table 27
Table 28
Table 29
Table 30
Table 31
Table 32

Table 33
Table 34
Table 35
Table 36

Table 37

Figure 1

Comparison of Top KSAs for Senior NCOs (AOE vs. AXX1) 40
Panel Comparison of Top KSAs for First Tour (AXX])...
Panel Comparison of Top KSAs for Junior NCOs (AXXI) . an
Panel Comparison of Top KSAs for Mid-Level NCOs (AXXI) ....:--sssseessssssesseeecssnnns 44

Panel Comparison of Top KSAs for Senior NCOs (AXXI) ....sssssessssssesssssesssneesesneeceny 45
Panel Comparison of Top KSAs for Battle Force NCOs (Army After 2010)... 46
Most Important KSAs for First Tour Job Performance (Army XX1) .....--+ssssssessssses 51
Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Junior NCO (Army XX1).......-sssssesecseesseeeey 52
Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Mid-Level NCO (Army XX)... 53

Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Senior NCO (Army XXI)
Most Important KSAs for Battle Force NCO (Army After 2010)

Comparison of KSA Importance Across NCO Target Groups for Army XX
and Army After 2010 .......sssssssssssessnssssnsecsnseenseesneeensessatsssseseresssensnecanenneseensenanesanten 56

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Subtests

Percentile Categories for the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

Evaluation Criteria for Assessment Instruments/Methods ..

Factors Bearing on Changes to Enlisted Personnel Selection and Promotion
Systems

Potential Innovative Measurement Methods

List of Figures

The basic methodological approach........ssssececssssesessteseesseesetsseeneesneaneeneeneeneensanesnettets 6

xiii



Army XXI DTLOMS

Army XXt1 is the period starting FY00 and running through approximately FY10. During the
review of the AXXI DTLOMS, the following general characteristics of AXXI should be kept in
mind.

¢ The foremost characteristic of AXXI is digitization, which includes information
processing and automation. Ultimately, many current manual activities ranging from
position location and reporting to status of fuel, maintenance, and ammunition supplies
will be done either by digital command or by predetermined automatic protocols. Before
the AXXI era is over, every soldier will be involved, in some way, with digitization. But
soldiers will not be involved equally, commonly, or sometimes even
knowingly.(Department of the Army [DA], 1994).

e Except for added emphasis on technology, AXXI will look very much like the current
Army (AOE) as it has evolved from about 1983 through the 1990s. The organization of
jobs into combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) functions will
continue (DA, 1994).

« Few new Army jobs will be created and few eliminated. The objectives of most military
occupational specialties (MOS) will change little, but the number of tasks will increase
and the scope and procedures for accomplishing individual tasks will likely change to
accommodate digitization (Ford, Campbell, & Cobb, 1998).

« AXXI milestones are based on “spiral development:” a continuous, iterative process of
testing new technology and modes of operation. This experimental approach means that
continual change will earmark AXXI (DA, 1998).

¢ The era will consist of the simultaneous development of differing capabilities, structures,
missions, skills, and requirements. A soldier’s job may range from 21st century- high-
tech to 20th century-low-tech depending on where he or she is assigned, all within the
same MOS. Unreliability of early AXXI technology will require soldiers to maintain
analog skills as back-up (Campbell, Ford, Cobb, & Shaler, 1998).

Army XXI Doctrine

Army XXI doctrine is largely an extension of AOE doctrine augmented by the potential
envisioned by the increased use of digital information technologies. Early 21st century missions
will become more diverse. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and stability and support
operations will increase in number and frequency as worldwide instability continues to mark the
first decade of the 21st century. Peacemaking and AOE-type land combat operations are a part of
these missions. A peer competitor to U.S. interests will likely not exist during the period but the
number and variety of threats will continue to increase.

Land combat in the early 21st century will not appear markedly different than that of the
AOE - the tanks, howitzers, helicopters and rifles used to apply combat power will be the same
or slightly improved (TRADOC, 1998). What will be significantly different will be how the
Army plans, coordinates, and executes the employment of those systems. Superior situational
awareness—a product of digitization—will yield more precise, effective, and efficient maneuver
and fires as well as precision employment of dynamic obstacles and other combat multipliers.

C2



Table C-1 (continued)

Inferred Job Components - NCO

MOS/Occupation-Specific Technical Task Performance. Higher skill level technical proficiency will
become increasing complex as the rate of technological advances accelerates during the period. Keeping
abreast with the latest changes in one’s job will become increasingly important and increasingly difficult.
NCOs will be expected to be up-to-date but the number of variations possible in digital applications
within many MOS will tax many of the more technical jobs. The cumulative nature of NCO tasks,
coupled with added information era tasks, could double the existing baseline task domain in some MOS.
A limited number of job assignments for staff NCOs, primarily at battalion and brigade, will require
detailed knowledge and skills associated with ABCS/FBCB2 operation and maintenance.

Common Task Performance. NCO common task aggregates will be gradual and changes will
incorporate technological advances learned at SL1 as described above. Computer operation will likely
become a common task, probably at SL2 or SL3.

Basic Computer Skills. The availability of commercial, non-job specific computers will become so wide
spread in the Army that all NCOs will be expected to possess computer operational skills. These will
include word processing, Internet use, e-mail, and familiarity with whatever changes evolve during the
period. In garrison/home station operations at least, all NCOs will likely have access to computers and be
expected to use them frequently in administration, training, and other supervisory and communication
functions.

Advanced Computer Skills. NCOs must become increasingly adept at installing and maintaining
computer systems. This will include commercial-off-the-shelf applications and Army specific systems.
They must possess a basic level of programming skill and must be able to troubleshoot hardware and
software problems. This requirement will initially start at SLS and SL4 but will migrate downward to
more duty positions at lower skill levels by the end of the era.

Practical Problem Solving and Decision-Making Proficiency. The spread of digitization will increase
the variations of applications. NCOs will increasingly be required to apply basic principles and goals to
solve problems presented by digitization, including the use of back-up skills when digital applications fail
or do not apply. NCOs will increasingly become information managers in the digital age. They will be
relied on to become the human interface that applies controls to the flow of digital information. They
must be able to sort, classify, combine, filter, and present information from digital sources so that it is
usable by others.

Adaptability and Ingenuity. NCOs will be faced with an increasing variety of technical environments.
Adaptability to rapid technical changes will be an increasing performance premium.

Writing. Computer communication, (e.g., e-mail), relies on written words and composition. Any
computer communication is not only a permanent record but can be instantly retransmitted to thousands
of recipients, inside and outside the Army chain. Increased NCO access to official or semi-official
communications channels will increase requirements for NCOs to write in an organized, logical, coherent,
responsible, and effective manner.

C-10



Table C-3 (continued)

Adaptability and Ingenuity: The number and nature of tasks will change during a soldier's career,
sometimes very rapidly. Skills applied in an NCO's last assignment may not be sufficient or appropriate
for the next assignment or mission. Old learning may interfere with new procedures and new training.
NCOs will have to be continuously adapting to new ways of doing things.

Self-Development: Self-development will take on a new role caused by the diversity in units and
equipment. The focus of self-development will shift from the long term, relatively structured AOE model
to one of short-term, unstructured learning in order to acquire new skills engendered by new assignments.
Learning paths for new skills will be less defined and NCOs will need to seek out learning resources from
peers, contractors, civilian sources, and even subordinates.

Effort and Initiative: In AXXI, an NCO's experience, training, and skill for previous assignments are
less likely to carry-over to the next assignment as more units transition to AXXI. Each assignment will be
anew experience, yet NCOs will still fill their roles as leaders, teachers, and authority figures.
Functioning in this environment will challenge NCOs and individual effort and initiative will never have
been as important as it will be under these conditions.

Training Others: Under conditions of rapid change and experimentation, the role of the NCO as trainer
takes on new meaning. NCOs must learn how to interact and utilize nonstandard resources such as
contractors, peer experiences, and after action results. The requirements of NCOs to function as the
primary unit training resource will not change but the conditions under which they develop and deliver
training will. This effect will impact greatest on SL3 and SL4 who bear the brunt of unit training

responsibilities.

C-16



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CONTENTS (continued)

APPENDIX A. Factors that May Influence the Future Army: 2000 - 2025........s+ssssneesee Al

Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8

Table 9

Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
Table 13
Table 14

Table 15
Table 16
Table 17
Table 18
Table 19
Table 20

B. Bibliography of Futures Information

C. Future Army Eras ou... eesessessesssssescessesesnssneneesenserssnseasensesesnseseeseneencensacenseenes C-1
D. Advancements and Promotions for Enlisted Personnel (E2 - E9):
AN OVEIVICW ....secsessessesseesesecseenesscsesscssesessecsencenseneeneenenseensersacensatensensatey D-1
List of Tables
Noncommissioned Officer Ranks, Grades, and Skill Levels.........ssscscseseesseseenseereeees 3

Army-Wide Performance Dimensions Identified in Project A...

Common Task Dimensions for Skill Level 1 from Project A .

NCO Army-Wide Performance Dimensions from Project A

NCO Supervisory/Leadership Dimensions from Project A. sees wll
Task Category Taxonomy from the Army Synthetic Validation Project ...........12
Job Activities Taxonomy from the Army Synthetic Validation Project... 13

NCO Job Performance Categories from the Expanding the Concept of Quality
in Personnel Project ...

Performance Categories from the Special Forces Job Analysis ..........sssssssssessesssssesses 14
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) Taxonomies ......sse-sssssessssessssseceenneeseens 15
Baseline Performance Components for First Tour Soldiers ..........sssessssecsssessssseesessnes 17
Baseline Predictors of First Tour Performance.........ssscsssseeesssessseeseeseeseenseanensennates 18
Baseline Performance Components and Predictors for NCOS ......+sssessssessssessssssesssnees 19
The Rank Order of AOE Job Requirements and Predictors of Performance for

First Tour Soldiers .......s.cssesssssssssesssessssseescesesseeseeenecnecscssnsnseesscansesnsnsenscnneansenesenetenee 22
Rank Order of Job Predictors/Requirements for NCOS.........ssssssessscsseseceneesenesentenens 23
KSA Definitions for First Tour Job Performance......ssssssssesseeeeeeensenmeesessnnnnsnnn dl

KSA Definitions for NCO Job Performance
Comparison of Top KSAs for First Tour (AOE vs. AXXI) ..
Comparison of Top KSAs for Junior NCOs (AOE vs. AXXI).
Comparison of Top KSAs for Mid-Level NCOs (AOE vs. AXXI) .

xii



Table 17
KSA Definitions for NCO Job Performance

Predictors of NCO Job Performance

¢ MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and Skill. Possesses the necessary technical
knowledge and skill to perform MOS/occupation-specific technical tasks. Stays informed of the
latest developments in field.

*« Common Task Knowledge and Skill. Possesses the necessary knowledge and skill to perform
common tasks at the appropriate skill level (e.g., land navigation, field survival techniques, and
NBC protection).

e Safety Consciousness. Follows safety guidelines and instructions. Monitors others to ensure
compliance.

¢ Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative. Demonstrates high effort in completing work.
Takes independent action when necessary. Seeks out and willingly accepts responsibility and
challenging assignments. Persists in carrying out difficult assignments and responsibilities.

e Relating to and Supporting Others. Treats others in a courteous, diplomatic, and tactful
manner. Provides help and assistance to others. Works effectively as a team member.

e Characteristic Level of Integrity and Discipline. Maintains high ethical standards. Does not
succumb to peer pressure to commit prohibited, harmful, or questionable acts. Demonstrates
trustworthiness and exercises effective self-control. Takes responsibility for decisions.

e Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures. Adheres to policies and follows
prescribed procedures in carrying out duties and assignments

¢ Military Presence. Presents a positive and professional image of self and the Army even when
off duty. Maintains proper military appearance.

e Physical Fitness. Meets Army standards for weight, physical fitness, and strength. Maintains
health and fitness to meet deployability and field requirements as well as the physical demands
of the daily job.

e Cultural Tolerance. Demonstrates tolerance and understanding of other cultures and value
systems. Knowledgeable about other cultures’ beliefs and customs.

e Advanced Computer Skills." Understands numerous computer systems and applications such
as Unix, NT, and Army specific systems. Can perform routine troubleshooting.

e Oral Communication Skill. Speaks in a clear, organized, and logical manner.

¢ Writing Skill. Communicates thoughts, ideas, and information successfully to others through
writing. Uses proper sentence structure including grammar, spelling, capitalization, and
punctuation.

e Judgment and Decision Making Skill. Reacts to new situations by applying learned principles
and experiences appropriately and effectively. Makes timely decisions even with incomplete
information.

« Adaptability. Can modify behavior or plans as necessary to reach goals. Is able to maintain
effectiveness in varying environments with various tasks, responsibilities, or people.

(table continues)

33



Hartzog, W. (GEN), & Diehl, J. (LTC). (1997, March/April). Building the 21 century heavy
division. Military Review. Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Hasenauer, H. (1997). Making the next “Bosnia” better. Soldiers.
Available: http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/jul97/tbosnia.html.

Hasenauer, H. (Undated). New CSA: Talking about the future. Soldiers. (Online).
Available: http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/soldiers.htm.

Havel, V. (1999). Kosovo and the end of the nation-state. New York Review of Books. 10 June,
XLVI (10), pp. 4, 6.

Hersh, S. M. (1999, April 5). Saddam’s best friend: How the CIA made it a lot easier for the Iraqi
leader to rearm. The New Yorker, 32-41.

Hiro, D. (1999, February 15). The cost of an Afghan victory. The Nation, 17-20.
Holzer, R. (1998, May). Atlantic command adds joint force test powers. Defense News, 18.

House, J. M. (COL). (1998, March/April). The enemy after next. Military Review [6 pages].
Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Hubbard, D. (SGM). (1998, January 30). Future NCO Corps: Charting a path for the future [30
pages]. Briefing to DCSOPS/DCSPER. Presentation slides.

Human Resources Directorate (1998, April-May). Human dimensions of readiness {52 pages].
Slides for presentation at the PERSCOM 1998 Personnel Leaders’ Meeting, Columbia, SC.

Available: http://www.perscom.army.mil/gendocs/pIm.htm.

Hunter, R. (1998). NATO in the 21" century: A strategic vision. Parameters, Summer, 15-29.
Available: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98summer.

Huntington, S. P. (1999). The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs, 78, 35-49.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of world order. New York:
Simon and Schuster.

Jafrate, G., Rutter, M., & Cannon, R. (1996, November-December) Army research consortia:
Concept for ‘other transaction’ assistance agreements. Army RD&A, 15-17.

Ignatieff, M. (1999, May 20). Human rights: The midlife crisis. The New York Review of Books,
58-62.

Information Operations Division, TRADOC HQ (1998). Force XXI CORPS Information
Superiority Mission Essential Task List (METL) [1 page].

B-12



Table 6
Task Category Taxonomy from the Army Synthetic Validation Project

1, Maintenance
- Mechanical Systems Maintenance
- Electrical and Electronic Systems Maintenance
2. General Operation
- Pack and Load
- Vehicle and Equipment Operations
- Construct/Assemble
- Technical Procedures
- Make Technical Drawings
3. Administrative
- Clerical
- Communication
- Analyze Information
- Applied Math and Data Processing
- Control Air Traffic
4. Combat
- Individual Combat
- Crew-served Weapons
- Give First Aid
- Identify Targets

- Supervision (this task dimension was not grouped in any of the four categories above)

Note. From “Army Synthetic Validity Project: Report of Phase III Results, Volume I,” by L. L. Wise, N.
G. Peterson, R. G., Hoffman, J. P Campbell, & J. M. Arabian, 1991, ARI Technical Report 922
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel

Following the initiation of Project A, Robert Sternberg (1985) began writing about and
discussing new kinds of predictors of job performance that he called Practical Intelligence and
Tacit Knowledge. A number of other conceptual developments, such as the work by Bandura
(1977) on self-efficacy, also suggested the need to examine whether the Project A predictors
were sufficiently comprehensive. ARI followed up its work on NCO performance in Project A
by developing and evaluating new predictors inspired by the work of Sternberg, Bandura, and
others. That project, ECQUIP, had as its target the general performance of NCOs, not specific
jobs (Peterson et al., 1993). The evaluation of new predictors required having a well-grounded
performance space to predict. To start, a literature review identified 281 performance
dimensions. Through statistical analyses of researchers’ judgments, critical incident workshops
with NCOs, NCOs’ dimension ratings, and retranslation exercises, the original 281 dimensions
were reduced to 13. The final job performance categories are listed in Table 8.

12



futures literature and other sources (e.g., websites) were compiled in this process. This
reference bibliography can be found in Appendix B.

In order to analyze specific jobs, missions, and technologies that were indicative of the
future, a variety of Army organizations were visited. This allowed us to get first hand estimates
of future conditions that may influence job requirements and the KSAs that will be required to
fill future Army jobs. Descriptions of all of these procedures and how they were applied are
presented in the following subsections:

¢ Establishing a Baseline Taxonomy
¢ Updating the Baseline: The Current Army of Excellence
« Analyzing Jobs, Missions, and Technology Indicative of the Future

¢ Determining the Most Important Future Performance Predictors
Establishing a Baseline Taxonomy

Baseline performance component and predictor taxonomies for this project were
synthesized from existing information on Army enlisted jobs from such ARI selection and
classification research projects as Project A/Building the Career Force (J. P. Campbell, 1987; J.
P. Campbell & Zook, 1991, 1996), the Synthetic Validation Project (Wise, Peterson, Hoffman,
Campbell, & Arabian, 1991), the Expanding the Concept of Quality in Personnel (ECQUIP)
Project (Anderson et al., 1995), the Special Forces Project (Russell, Crafts, Tagliareni,
McCloy, & Barkley, 1996), and previous NCO21 efforts (Rumsey et al., 1997; Rumsey et al.,
1998). Another effort that we utilized to build baseline taxonomies was the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) Work Context Taxonomies (Peterson, Mumford, Borman,
Jeanneret, & Fleishman, 1995; Peterson, Mumford, Borman, Jeanneret, Fleishman, & Levin,
1997). The most applicable findings from these studies are briefly discussed below.

Project A/Building the Career Force

Project A/Building the Career Force® was a large, personnel selection and classification
validation project that was conducted over a 9-year period starting in 1982. A primary goal of
the project was to develop a comprehensive set of performance measures for first tour soldiers,
using a representative sample of jobs (MOS) that could be used as criteria against which to
validate the existing predictors of performance (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
[ASVAB)]) and a battery of experimental predictors (J. P. Campbell, 1987). Some of the major
research issues addressed in Project A revolved around:

¢ How to define and measure job performance.

« How to identify predictor domains with the highest potential for adding selection and
classification validity to the existing ASVAB.

¢ How specific variables should be targeted to represent each critical domain for
predictor development.

3 Project A and Building the Career Force were a continuum of the same longitudinal study. The entire study is
referred to herein as “Project A.”



Findings:

The KSAs found to be potentially relevant for future selection (first tour soldiers) and
promotion (NCOs) purposes were identified for five target groups:

e For first tour soldiers of the AXXI, the four most important KSAs were (a) General
Cognitive Aptitude, (b) Conscientiousness/Dependability, (c) Reading Skill, and (d)
Working Memory.

For Junior NCOs of the AXXI, the four most important KSAs were
(a) Conscientiousness/Dependability, (b) MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and
Skill, (c) General Cognitive Aptitude, and (d) Motivating and Leading Others.

For Mid-level NCOs of the AXXI, the four most important KSAs were (a) Judgment and
Decision Making; (b) General Cognitive Aptitude; (c) Directing, Monitoring and
Supervising Others; and (d) Motivating and Leading Others.

For Senior NCOs of the AXXI, the four most important KSAs were (a) General
Cognitive Aptitude, (b) Motivating and Leading Others, (c) Judgment and Decision
Making, and (d) Concern for Soldier Quality of Life.

For Battle Force NCOs of the AA2010, the three most important KSAs were (a)
Judgment and Decision Making, (b) General Cognitive Aptitude, and (c) Knowledge of
Battlefield Function Integration.

One difference between KSAs for selection and KSAs for NCO promotion is that various
aspects of an individual’s current and past performance could be assessed and serve as predictors
of future performance.

The following are a few of the implications that should be considered for future research and
development (R&D):

High priorities were ascribed to two major dispositional variables: conscientiousness and
motivation. Judged as critical for both selection and NCO promotion, they seem worthy
of significant future research investments.

© The generally high priority given to General Cognitive Aptitude for all NCO target
groups implies that this KSA warrants consideration for assessment as a promotion
requirement.

e For first tour selection, trying to reduce the disparity between the values of new recruits
and those of the Army is given a very high priority. A number of large private sector
organizations have developed instrumentation for assessing the degree of such a
person/organization match. A determination of the feasibility of doing so in the Army
context should be given careful consideration.

Utilization of Findings:
This information has been provided to senior Army planners charged with the responsibility

of helping to prepare the Army for the demands of the 21" century. The next stage of the
research will be to build measures of those KSAs which show the most promise for augmenting

viii



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Steele, D. (1996, November). Countdown to the next century. Army. 16-23.

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Behavioral and Social Sciences.

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B-2



Measurement Evaluation Criteria and Implementation Feasibility Issues

Regardless of whether one is concerned with Army selection and promotion or some other
system, there are a variety of factors that should be considered when evaluating a given
assessment instrument (or assessment method) for possible implementation. Certainly these
factors, as well as factors that bear upon the feasibility of successful implementation, should be
considered early in the decision-making process—before much time and money is spent in R&D.

Table 35 lists 15 criteria that should be considered when evaluating the suitability of a
particular measurement instrument or method. The list was based on the Project A research
program (Peterson, 1987), and has been supplemented with input from the Psychologist Panel.
The criteria have to do with psychometric considerations (e.g., reliability, validity), operational
characteristics (e.g., administration and maintenance costs, resistance to compromise), and
effects of use (e.g., test fairness, utility). These are fairly standard considerations for selecting
among assessment methods, regardless of setting.

Table 36, in contrast, lists some of the operational, technical, and political issues bearing on
the feasibility of making changes to the Army’s assessment programs in particular. This list is
included because highly competent researchers who usually pay attention to the considerations in
Table 35, often neglect to give sufficient attention to the types of considerations listed in
Table 36. Waiting to turn one’s attention to some of these concerns until fairly late in the R&D
process can be a costly oversight.

The operational constraints on the Army’s assessment programs are driven first and
foremost by the large volume of individuals that must be assessed, both for initial entry into the
Army as well as for promotions. To enlist approximately 90,000 soldiers per year, the Army
screens several hundred thousand prospects. Moreover, at any time there are roughly 81,000
NCOs on the semi-centralized promotion list and 15,000 NCOs on the centralized promotion list.
About 33,000 enlisted persons are promoted into E5 to E9 positions each year.

The other most significant operational constraints derive largely from the high testing
volume. The large numbers of individuals who need to be evaluated for selection or promotion
(as well as other practical considerations) impose limits on the time that can be devoted to
testing. These conditions also constrain the administration and scoring costs that can be incurred
per individual and make it difficult to place limits on the number of locations where tests or other
assessments can be administered.

62



Table 11
Baseline Performance Components for First Tour Soldiers

Common Tasks. Masters and performs technical common tasks designated skill level (SL) 1
including land navigation, rifle and machinegun maintenance and proficiency, field survival
techniques, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection, and first aid.

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Technical Proficiency. Performs the entry-level

(SL 1) job-specific tasks required of his or her MOS. Demonstrates proficiency in skills taught in
Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for the job and learns, applies, and refines skills during on-
the-job-training (OJT) during his or her initial unit assignment.

Effort and Initiative. Does whatever is required to get the job done. Puts forth extra hours of
work or is able to overcome difficulties and adversities to get the job done.

Regulations and Orders. Follows written regulations, orders, unit standing operation
procedures (SOP), customs of the service, and instructions issued by superiors. Quickly reacts to
implement supervisors’ and superiors’ orders and directions.

Integrity. Adheres to honest and trustworthy behavior in both job related and personal matters.
Admits and takes responsibility for own actions. Does not try to avoid work assignments or
responsibilities. Is trustful with property of others.

Leadership. Performs in a leader role when required. Fills in when a noncommissioned officer
or a superior soldier is absent.

Military Appearance. Dresses properly and neatly in the specified uniform. Projects a positive
military image in all public appearances in uniform. Shows pride in the uniform, unit, and
service.

Physical Fitness. Meets the Army standards for weight, physical fitness, and strength.
Maintains health and fitness to meet deployability and field requirements as well as the physical
demands of the daily job.

Self-Development. Seeks to develop soldier, job, and personal skills by participating in study,
training, classes, reading, or education. Takes advantage of opportunities for self-improvement
offered by the Army and civilian sources.

Self-Control. Controls temper, anger, and inappropriate aggressiveness. Practices moderation in
personal habits and behaviors. Avoids behaviors that are self-destructive or dangerous to others.

Computer Skills. Uses personal computers (non-specialized) and software programs. Creates
and maintains computer files. Locates and utilizes information on the world wide web (www)
and uses other Internet functions including e-mail.



e Reserve Component (RC) positions will be designated as organic in each active division.
These will be in command and control (C2), staff, signal, aviation, and medical positions.
Around 500 positions will be designated as RC in each division.

The eventual impact of these changes on soldier requirements is only speculative at this
point. Reduced numbers of fighting platforms mean that crews will occupy the same (or even
increased) physical space with fewer platforms, increasing the isolation of individual crews and
small units. New missions will accompany the creation of the BRT, perhaps requiring new skills
of soldiers in these units. The removal of organic CSS will change the relationships of the
soldiers with the supported unit; they will no longer “belong to” the unit they support. Perhaps
the biggest unknown will be the RC/Active integration of individual soldier slots. Heretofore,
effective peacetime integration schemes for RC and Active soldiers/units have met with
frustration and eventual abandonment. The differences in requirements, culture, availability, and
training opportunities that inherently exist have not been overcome. This new effort will require
personal adjustments and redefinition of roles, and will be closely scrutinized in its eventual
implementation (Hartzog, 1998).

In addition to these changes with the heavy division, experimentation with various
command and control headquarters will continue throughout the period. A major impetus for this
experimentation is the notion that the division organization (both light and heavy) may be
outmoded as a means of deploying and employing forces for 21st century missions. The
perceived problem is not with the units that make up these divisions, but with the headquarters
element that controls and coordinates these units. One experiment being undertaken early in the
AXXI period will be the Strike Force headquarters. Strike Force headquarters will be smaller
than a division and will not have any organic fighting or supporting forces, instead accepting
tailored forces matched to the threat and mission. While the Strike Force headquarters will be
different and state of the art, the actual units it employs will be assigned as needed from available
resources. The Strike Force will employ a series of C2 nodes to “plug in” to subordinate units
and to reach back to supporting and national elements. Much has yet to be learned on how this
headquarters will operate and be staffed (Turner, 1999).

Army XXI Material

No revolutionary technological material breakthroughs (for example, in propulsion,
munitions, or protection) are foreseen for the first 10 years of the next century. This means that,
with a few exceptions, the equipment of AXXI will be upgraded with evolutionary versions of
current equipment in the fields of automotive, weapons, fuels, and armor, and that no major
totally new weapons systems are scheduled to be acquired. However, all major systems will be
outfitted with digital capabilities during this period. A few of these systems will be built-in
digital but most will be legacy systems (existing systems) that will be retrofitted with digital
communication capabilities (TRADOC, 1998).

The following highlight some of the major material issues for AXXI:

« The Army’s First Digital Division (at Fort Hood, Texas) will complete digitization for
two brigades by the end of fiscal year FY0S. A timetable for operational digitization of
the remainder of the Army is not forecast although continuous digital experimentation

C6



The goal for this phase of the NCO21 study was to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of
future conditions and future job demands in order to identify critical KSAs that may eventually be
developed into promotion criteria. Unlike the Soldier21 objective that focused on identifying KSAs
that would be used to select civilians with no prior job performance history, the NCO21 analysis
considered at least two types of performance predictors: (a) those that represent general aptitudes,
and (b) those that reflect performance in current or previous Army jobs.

Another difference that emerged between the Soldier21 and NCO21 efforts was the number
of target groups that were defined. In Soldier21, the job being examined was that of the first tour
soldier during approximately the first four years of service. But, NCO careers may span more
than 30 years, encompassing many levels of responsibility and skill (Table 1 illustrates the NCO
career span). It became apparent that the identification of job requirements for NCO as a single
entity was too broad and undefined. Consequently, we divided the NCO domain into three target
groups:

e Junior NCO. Junior NCOs are SL1 and SL2 personnel (Corporal E4 and E5). They
generally have between 4 and 7 years in service. They have a variety of jobs, with
increasing responsibility, but usually within a unit or organizational setting that
corresponds to their MOS.

¢ Mid-Level NCO. These are SL3 and SL4 soldiers (E6 and E7), with 7-15 years in service
(for some, this will be the limit of their advance). Their responsibilities include
increasingly more non-MOS-related assignments.

« Senior NCO. These SL5 soldiers (E8 and E9) have 15 or more years in service. Some
First Sergeant and Master Sergeants have assignments within their job categories, but
most have non-specific, leader assignments.

Table 1
Noncommissioned Officer Ranks, Grades, and Skill Levels
Rank Grade Skill Level (SL)

Corporal E4 SLI
Sergeant ES SL2
Staff Sergeant E6 SL3
Sergeant First Class E7 SL4
First Sergeant and Master Sergeant E8 SLS
Sergeant Major and Command Sergeant Major E9 SL5

With the additional requirement of examining several NCO target groups, the objectives of
this parallel project were to:

¢ Provide a description of forecasted conditions affecting future NCO performance.

¢ Describe the future job requirements.
' Although there are eight distinguishable ranks in the NCO field (as shown in Table 1), our three target groups were
a compromise between a single NCO grouping and eight groupings, which were considered too taxing for the

resources of this study. The three target groups are specific to this study only and do not reflect actual Army
application. For example, the Army defines “Senior NCO” as E7, E8, and E9.

3



forces. Anticipated advancements in force sustainment include increased automation for
identifying items of supply; phased, multi-location of logistics and support forces within
and outside the theater of deployment; and pinpoint distribution to ensure that the right
number of items get to the right place. The personnel impact is that support forces (those
commonly referred to as combat service support (CSS) soldiers) may likely face greater
changes and challenges in their jobs, especially in the fields of digitization and
information-based operations, than will combat and combat support (CS) soldiers. The
full impact of the logistical revolution will not be known until more experimentation is
conducted and more actual logistical automation programs are in place.

Army XXI Trainin.

Army soldier development follows a model in which training is categorized as either
institutional or unit. (There is a third component called se/f-development that currently plays a
minor role but which will likely increase dramatically in scope in the future.) It is anticipated that
Army XXI training will continue to follow the current model: Individual MOS-related training
will remain institutional; collective skills and individual skill sustainment, as well as new
equipment and mission-specific training, will remain a unit responsibility. While the training
model will not drastically change over the next 10 years, the way that training is delivered (e.g.,
simulations, distributed learning) will continue to evolve as technology increases the ability to
acquire and transmit information (TRADOC, 1999).

Army XX! institutional training will consist of much the same content as AOE institutional
training but the means of delivery will change. Training will be:

¢ delivered where and when it is needed through a network of access centers and
multimedia classrooms located at troop concentrations both in CONUS and in deployed
locations, and

¢ extended by distance learning applications coupled with hands-on and practice iterations
at soldier locations, conducted by unit supervisory and training personnel.

Unit training will likely increase its role in the training spectrum. The preferred method of
collective training in units is called “live training” in which soldiers operate the actual equipment
they will fight with, maneuvering on the ground and in the air and using real munitions.
However, opportunities for live training during the Army XXI period will likely decrease due to
budget constraints, deployments, and environmental considerations. All training will rely more
on training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADDS). High fidelity simulators and
virtual environments will become increasingly widespread as the means of conducting training
on simulated fighting platforms, CS entities, and CSS functions. High fidelity dismounted virtual
capability will become workable.

Army XXI Leader Development

Enlisted leader development in the early 21st century will continue to rely on the formal
NCO education system (NCOES). This consists of the primary leader development course
(PLDC) at the junior level; the basic and advanced NCO courses (BNCOC and ANCOC) at mid-
career; and the sergeant major course (SMC) at the highest level. While BNCOC and ANCOC
will continue to be MOS-specific, common core instruction will increase in most NCOES

C4



linked, at least indirectly, to maturity and experience, promotions bestow a mantle of
sagacity and influence which increases with each promotion level.

¢ Promotions are financially rewarding. An E2 makes more money than an E1. Other
tangible rewards such as housing, association, and privilege are also linked to the
promotion system. Rank conveys with it advantage and reward to the individual.

Basic to the understanding of the enlisted promotion is the understanding that there are three
different types of systems that guide promotions: decentralized, semi-centralized, and
centralized. In the decentralized system all the promotions are controlled and administered within
the soldier’s unit. These apply for promotion to Private (E2), Private First Class (E3), and
Specialist (E4). Semi-centralized promotions apply for soldiers being promoted to Sergeant (ES)
and to Staff Sergeant (E6). In the semi-centralized system, all promotion procedures are
conducted in the soldier’s unit but Department of the Army (DA) controls how many of soldiers
in each military occupational specialty (MOS) get promoted and when those promotions occur.
In the centralized system, all promotion procedures, as well as the authorization of promotions,
occur at DA level. This system applies for promotion to Sergeant First Class (E7), Master
Sergeant (E8), and Sergeant Major (E9). Each of these systems will be described in detail.

There are two additional concepts that are essential to understanding the promotion system.
The first of these are time-in-service (TIS) and time-in-grade (TMIG). Time-in-service is the
number of months that the soldier has been on active duty, and usually corresponds to the day the
soldier was ordered to travel to his or her initial entry training station. Time-in-grade is the
number of months that a soldier has held his or her present rank. Both of these are important
because they are the primary factor for determining eligibility for promotion. DA determines, and
announces, TIS and TMIG figures periodically for each Army rank. Table D-1 shows the current
TIS/TMIG requirements for eligibility for promotion to the grades indicated.

The second additional concept necessary to understand promotions is the idea of waivers.
Commanders can request waivers for any prerequisite to promotion, however the most common
waivers involve TIS and TMIG.? Waivers are a way of promoting deserving and exceptional
soldiers ahead of their peers and, generally, waiver authority is delegated to the commander at
the O5 (Lieutenant Colonel) level. The Army also applies a system known as primary and
secondary zone promotions to both the semi-centralized and centralized promotion systems.
Under this program, all soldiers can be considered for promotion at a point early in their career
when they pass through the secondary zone. Secondary zone promotion criteria are the same as
for primary zone, but the number to be selected and the promotion rates are established by DA
separately from the primary zone. Table D-1 shows the current eligibility threshold for semi-
centralized promotions in the secondary zone for E5 and E6. (Secondary zones for centralized
promotions are more variable and are announced with each board.) Again, the goal is to allow
some outstanding soldiers to advance ahead of their peers.

2 Generally, only a single waiver is allowed for a soldier. Waivers for TIS and TMIG are usually limited to one-half
of the DA specified time.

D-2



Table 14
The Rank Order of AOE Job Requirements and Predictors of Performance for First Tour
Soldiers

Mean Importance
Rank Job Performance Requirement Rating (n=40)
1.5 Physical Fitness 4.20
15 Common Tasks 4.20
3 MOS Technical Proficiency 4.10
4 Integrity 4.05
5 Regulations and Orders 3.80
6 Self-Control 3.50
7 Effort and Initiative 3.28
8 Military Appearance 3.13
9 Self-Development 3.00
10 Leadership 2.55
at Computer Skills 2.10
Mean Importance
Rank Predictor Rating (n=40)
1 Teamwork 4.10
2 Dependability and Autonomy 3.97
3 Moral Courage 3.79
4 Reading 3.74
5 Adaptability 3.69
6 Oral Communication 3.46
7 Judgment and Decision Making 3.44
8 Stability 3.37
9 Writing 3.28
10 Basic Math 3.08
ll Ingenuity 2.95
12 Persuasiveness 2.36

Note. MOS = military occupational specialty. The rating scale went from 0 to 5 where 0 was “Not at all
important,” 1 was “Much less important compared to most others,” 2 was “Less important compared to
most others,” 3 was “About the same importance as most others,” 4 was “More important compared to

most others,” and 5 was “Much more important compared to others.”

22



(MOUT) had been assigned to the Campaign Forces. Now, the likelihood that enemies will pull
their forces into cities as an asymmetrical tactic has inspired exploration of a notional Battle
Force that is specialized for urban warfare. Doctrine for MOUT by AA2010 is undergoing initial
development in wargames in FY99, where it is the subject of a franchise under the joint lead of
the Infantry Center and the Combined Arms Center (DCSDOC, 1999b). The early state of this
doctrine is suggested by the list of approaches that are under consideration for use in MOUT
(DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 19):

¢ Get there first to deny the enemy access
¢ Go around without engaging; bypass

¢ Surround without entering; lay siege

« Reduce by stand-off attack

e Seize by sending troops in

Each method has its own benefits and costs, and methods will be tailored to cases. At this
point, “An entirely new paradigm for urban warfare needs to be explored to supersede the
historical, manpower-intensive, time consuming operational framework that currently exists”
(DCSDOC, 1998¢, p. 19).

The complexity of urban warfare poses special dangers to friendly troops and the
concentration of population is a strong incentive to minimize destruction. Non-lethal
technologies (discussed below, under Materiel) are one category of tools that have important
applications in this setting. Without them, MOUT will create very large numbers of casualties
and prisoners of war, which the Battle Forces would have to deal with. New systems that will be
required for AA2010 to conduct MOUT are given in broad terms: “unmanned platforms, large
area nonlethal effects, brilliant maneuverable munitions, special urban assault platforms,
structure-penetrating sensors, and revolutionary combat engineers” (DCSDOC, 1998b). In cities,
enemies are expected to make use of asymmetric methods all the way from very old (e.g., booby
trapping, snipers) up to WMD.

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Special Operations Forces will have roles in all steps of the sequence of operations. Their
most prominent missions in peacetime are counter-proliferation, foreign internal defense, special
reconnaissance, and counterterrorism (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1997). Having SOF
on the ground around the world as “global scouts” before conflicts begin gives the U.S. a
resource for strategic assessment. In their forward locations, they are also a foundation for the
force projection capability of AA2010 that links doctrine with diplomacy. Under the Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, SOF “...have established military ties in at least
110 countries...[for] helping foreign armies fight drug traffickers, teaching counter-insurgency...,
and sharing U.S. military expertise in exchange for access to top foreign officials” (Priest,
1998a). In the AA2010 era, SOF will be involved relatively little in clandestine operations and
more in multilateral peace operations, small contingency operations, and foreign internal defense
(Buckley, 1997).

C-29



Sergeant E5) while we kept the position of Specialist E4 as part of the first tour soldier
description.

Semi-Centralized Promotion System

The semi-centralized promotion system is used for promotions in the grades of ES and E6. It
is “semi-centralized” in that the promotion selection authority is delegated to field grade
commanders in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel (05) or above. All promotion processing
including board appearance and promotion point calculation is done in the soldier’s unit.
However, DA determines the promotion point cutoff scores monthly for each MOS on the basis
of the scores reported by the field and the needs of the Army by grade and MOS. The DA
maintains centralized promotion standing lists and issues the orders for promotion.

To be eligible for promotion under the semi-centralized system, the soldier must meet TIS
and TMIG minimums for either the primary or secondary zone and receive the commander’s
favorable recommendation. Additionally, soldiers must have completed the Primary Leadership
Development Course (PLDC) of the NCO educational system (NCOES) for promotion to E5. To
be eligible for promotion to E6, an E5 must have successfully completed the applicable MOS
basic NCO course (BNCOC).

The semi-centralized system uses standard promotion scoring forms with predetermined
promotion point factors. The system is organized around the Promotion Point Worksheet (DA
Form 3355). This form was developed when there was a testing portion to soldier evaluation in
the framework of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) which existed into the early 1990s. At that
time the Promotion Points Worksheet was based on a possible 1000 points. After the demise of
the SQT, the same form was retained but the total possible points was changed to 800. Table D-2
illustrates how the 800 points are awarded.

Table D-2
Point Award Dispersion for Semi-Centralized Promotions

Points

a
Area Possible How Earned’
Duty Performance 200 Totally up to the commander. No specified Criteria
Awards and 50 A specified scale: 35 points for Soldier’s Medal; 20 points for Air
Decorations Medal; 15 points for CIB; 5 points for Parachutist Badge; 5 points

for Certificate of Achievement

Military Education 150 30 pts for first NCOES course; 3 pts per week for each additional
course; 30 pts for Ranger School; 2 pts per week for any training that
issues an official Certificate; 1 pt for each 5 credit hours of military
correspondence courses

Civilian Education 100 1 pt for each semester hour; CLEP, DANTES credits; 10 pts for GED

Military Training 100 50 points for qualifying Expert with assigned weapon; 50 points for
max score (300) on APFT
Board Appearance 200 Based on 6 criteria, averaged.

D-4



combat missions, a mix of inhabited and uninhabited aircraft will be used. The broad
assumptions about people in New World Vistas were that the Air Force would have an increased
tempo of operations, a smaller personnel force, and, owing to a robust job market in the private
sector, difficulty recruiting the best students in computer and information sciences. The lack of
models of the performance of individual humans was seen as limiting simulations of
engagements. Qualities such as “leadership, cohesion, experience, intelligence, and level of
training” were identified as components that such models should include. The great success of
simulators for lowering the life cycle costs (as opposed to initial capital costs) of transport
aircraft and improving pilots’ performance was noted, but simulators for high performance
aircraft were seen as needing development.

Because training is a very large budget item, training efficiency was identified as needing
improvement. New technologies in systems for selecting and classifying personnel were
identified as essential for improving the match between people’s aptitudes and the demands of
their jobs. In the chapter where “leap ahead” technologies were recommended for development,
several “human-related technology areas” were listed:

e Training, where selection and classification of persons were seen as improving training
and reducing its costs.

¢ Human/machine interaction, including such specifics as automatic language translation
and brain control of computers.

¢ Operational: “...a more detailed understanding of the human is needed.”

¢ Biological, where known chemical means of improving and prolonging effective
performance were recommended for further development and for research on identifying
and limiting their side effects.

There appear to be no further Air Force documents on the long-range future of human
resources. A committee of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board published a study on the 21st
Century Aerospace Force (U.S. Air Force, 1998) that did not deal with training, leadership, or
quality personnel, but that contained these observations about the future operating context that
are relevant to the Army:

¢ Military action may occur at any point on the spectrum of conflict and anywhere in the
world,

¢ The U.S. military will withdraw further from forward bases into a CONUS-based but
globally committed force,

¢ Reduced force size and personnel shortages will compound the Air Force’s problems
resulting from a continued high pace of operations, and

« “(AJ growing fraction of AF resources will go to provide services to others rather than to
the direct warfighting mission” (p. vii).

Although Borky et al. (1998) did not go into the manpower and personnel side of the Air
Force’s essential capabilities, they recommended that more attention be paid to human factors in
developing space systems. "[H]uman factors remains a perennially neglected discipline, with

A-16



The following factors are considered significant and likely AXXI doctrine for the
employment of forces (DA, 1994):

¢ Distributed Operations — Digitization leads to increased situational awareness, which is
defined as knowing where the enemy is, where all one’s own forces are, and the status of
neutral elements such as terrain, obstacles, and weather. With this increased awareness of
what the battlefield “looks” like, systems and people can be positioned and assigned
activities that will maximize the desired effects. Unlike AOE, which required positioning
to account for contingencies and unknown likelihoods, AXXI can accomplish the same
outcome with fewer resources. However, this will require empowerment of leaders and
soldiers at a lower level than was characteristic of AOE.

¢ Non-linear Operations — The doctrine that proved effective during the Desert Storm
Campaign in Southwest Asia organized battlefields into a linear fashion in which the
enemy was defeated in battles fought in close and deep encounters and in encounters
fought in the rear. These “locations” were relative to the friendly force being employed
as well as to the deployment characteristics of the enemy. This doctrine was effective for
massed friendly forces and an enemy that employed a traditional, predicted doctrine for
engagement. The AXXI doctrine, based primarily on the assumption of superior
battlefield knowledge, employs a concept of non-linear engagements. Instead of mass
“lines,” AXXI will involve many simultaneous and independent, yet coordinated, battles.
Operations and units will not necessarily be contiguous, as was the case in Desert Storm.
Digitization allows unprecedented dispersion between units, systems, and soldiers.

« Integrated Operations — Future operations will not be Army or even U.S. only forces. The
Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Space Command will in all likelihood be
employed as a unified force, down to very low levels. Reserve and National Guard
elements will make up a large proportion of the forces in all services. Coalitions and
treaty agreements, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United
Nations (UN), mean that most future operations will have increasing multi-national
flavor. Finally, national interests are not served solely by the uniformed services.
Governmental organizations (such as the State Department, Department of Justice,
Commerce Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency) and non-governmental
organizations (such as the Red Cross, humanitarian, religious, and business groups) will
be committed jointly with the Army to achieve national goals in military and quasi-
military operations.

¢ Force Projection — During much of the AOE era, over 50% of Army forces were
stationed in foreign (overseas) locations. Response to AOE threats was based on
anticipating those threats and stationing forces in those geographical areas where the
threats were deemed most likely or most potent. During the AXXI era, almost 90% of the
force will be based in the continental United States (CONUS) and will respond to
specific mission assignments by sending the appropriate sized and equipped force when
and where it is needed. Force missions will be forced entry, early entry, or deployment
forces depending on the mission and threat.

¢ The “logistical tail” has heretofore been an overwhelming obstacle to rapid, frequent, and
geographically extended deployments. The ability to operate successfully from CONUS
locations is dependent on AXXI advancements in logistics and support for deployed

C3



Young persons’ preparation in new technologies will segment the youth population in new
ways: by degrees of proficiency and interest, by types of user (users only versus users who also
modify and create the tools), by free/rebellious spirits versus more conventional users, and by
recreational versus serious users. So the pool of recruitable youth will have a much higher
average level of experience and comfort with information technologies than today’s, but that
experience and comfort will not be uniformly useful to the Army.

The willingness of the youth population to serve is another concern. In the 1990s, young
people’s propensity to enlist” declined, as measured by the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, also
known as YATS (Lehnus & Lancaster, 1997). In the 1996 survey, the major reasons reported
(i.e., each by 17% of respondents) for being less interested than before were “going to school”
and “other career plans.” Together, “dislike the military” and “just not interested” accounted for
another 17% of respondents who reported a decline in their own interest in enlisting. The major
reasons for being more interested were “money for college” (22%) and “training” (17%).

Predictions of propensity to enlist out to 2025 would have little signal and much noise, but
the present trend toward personal/vocational motives and away from the institutional appeal of
the military is notable. In parallel with the decline in propensity, participation in voting—a sign
of civic commitment that is much less effortful than enlisting—declined from 50% among 18 to
24 year olds in 1972 to 32% in 1996 (Broder, 1999).

The decline in propensity may be abetted by “The Control Revolution” (Shapiro, 1999), a
radical increase in individuals’ ability, enabled by the Internet, to choose the experiences that
they will have—where and when to work, what news to receive, what entertainment to receive,
what to invest in, whom to communicate and share experiences with, and much more. This
revolution can be seen as an instance of the demassification that the Tofflers (1993) proposed as
acore impact of the Information Age.

This revolution seems likely to have two effects that will work against Army recruiting.
First, it will tend to loosen individuals’ attachment to the community and to public institutions
like the Army. Second, a youth population which has grown up with such freedom may be
disinclined to volunteer to work in environments offering limited personal control. What can the
military offer a generation that will be able to be much of what it wants to be without the help of
mass social institutions other than information providers? If this power to tailor-make one’s own
experience, which Shapiro (1999) calls personalization, is available to significant numbers of
youth, but only in the middle and upper socio-economic strata (SES), will the military become a
vocation of choice only for the lower SES? If so, that inequality in opportunity could distance the
military from its citizen base of political power still further.

Finally, the physical suitability of the youth population is not assured. The poor fitness of
Army accessions has been a problem in entry-level Army training for some years (Walker,
White, & Schroyer, 1989). As for the Army’s physical standards, the trend of court decisions to
favor plaintiffs with various disabilities could pose a challenge (Tenopyr, 1997). It seems only a

? Propensity to enlist is defined as the percent of respondents reporting that they will definitely or probably enlist in
one of the services.

AD



¢ Provide a descriptive list of the main qualities (e.g., KSAs) needed for effective NCO
performance for each target group.

Future Time Parameters

The Army's current selection criteria for first tour enlisted personnel are based on job
analysis information that was gathered several years ago. In the meantime, the Army has
experienced a number of changes, particularly in mission emphasis. This means that, in a very
real sense, the future is already here. It is also true that forecasts of the future become especially
tenuous the further out those forecasts are targeted. Therefore, this report includes four time
horizons for identifying or forecasting job and person requirements for Army enlisted personnel:

¢ Baseline

« Army of Excellence (AOE)
e Army XX] (AXXI)

* Army After 2010 (AA2010)"

The "Baseline" is the name we gave to the performance information collected in Army
studies during the late 1970s through the 1980s. The Army's current selection system is based on
job analysis data collected during this time and therefore seemed to be the appropriate place to
start for the current research. The latter three terms refer to eras that the Army is currently
planning and developing.

The term “Army of Excellence” is used to describe the Army of the 1990s; an Army in
transition between the cold war missions and the emerging geopolitical, post-drawdown
missions. This Army is typified by having characteristics of both the “old” and the “new” in
missions, technologies, organizations, training, and personnel. The AOE roughly corresponds to
the period from Operation Desert Shield through about the year 2000. For this research, the AOE
was used simultaneously as an indicator of emerging trends and a “starting point” for identifying
performance requirements and predictors in the future eras.

The AXX]I corresponds to the period from about 2000-2010. AXXI involves the digitization
of the Army. It includes the production of new embedded systems and the upgrading of legacy
systems to include digitization capability. Diverse missions and forces, and changing doctrine,
different from those that characterized much of the AOE, also typify the AXX1].

Finally, the term “Army After 2010” is used to encompass the changes that will follow the
completion of digitization, approximately between the years 2010-2025. Although the most
speculative of the time periods, AA2010 is also unencumbered by restrictive evolutionary ties to
the existing Army. It is currently the focus of many independent visionary efforts and initiatives
within the Army to help define the expectations of that period.

The plans for AA2010 were evolving and changing during the course of this effort but one
characteristic that remained constant was the idea that the AA2010 will be a hybrid force
(Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, 1998). In other words, it will consist of several different

? This era was previously referred to as the Army After Next (AAN).

4



contradictory: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with self-defensive or evasive capabilities to
perform varied missions, but also, anti-UAV capabilities. And yet others have very uncertain
horizons of practicality, like nanotechnologies.

The extreme optimism that a lay person might see in this wish list changes abruptly when
one follows the media for a few months and goes to the web sites dealing with the Army of the
future and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Wearable computers,
which are in use in delivery services and on factory floors now, are rapidly gaining in power and
versatility (Rehm, 1999). Structure penetrating sensors? The Marsupial is a small, remotely
controlled vehicle that can crawl in confined spaces (e.g., inside buildings) and launch a smaller
vehicle on a tether for exploring still smaller spaces, all with the operator at a safe distance
(Jacobson, 1999). A DARPA contract is supporting its development. With a similar objective,
very small UAVs which can explore inside buildings could well result from basic research which
has discovered how insects dart and hover (Dickenson, Lehmann, & Sane, 1999). That work is
sponsored by DARPA and the Office of Naval Research. Now starting to appear in the literature
is DARPA-sponsored R&D on technologies to counter bioterrorism (Alper, 1999). In 1999,
DARPA also has projects underway on such Army-relevant technologies as situational
awareness systems, tactical sensors, ultra-lightweight materials, and hybrid electric power
systems with low signatures in the sound and thermal spectra.

In parallel with DARPA, the Army program is shaping future technologies through
influencing the Army’s investment in R&D. In FY98, for example, the Army’s strategic research
objectives supported Army After 2010‘ (AA2010)-sponsored projects on armor materials and
multifunctional microminiature sensors (DCSDOC, 1999a). On the 1999 schedule for the Army
is a technology seminar game on investing in R&D (DCSDOC, 1999c). Thus, many of the
Army’s technological needs are already beyond the wish-list stage.

The Other U.S. Services’ Vision of the Long Range Future

Resources for this project permitted only a preliminary review of the other services’ work on
the long range future that might shed light on Army soldiers’ work or qualifications. Here we
summarize the small literature on the topic that was readily available in Air Force and Navy
sources. The Air Force and Navy work has had two emphases: laying out broad assumptions and
identifying specific issues.

In 1995, the Air Force convened “...130 preeminent individuals from research, academia,
government, and industry...to search for the most advanced air and space ideas and project them
into the future” (McCall, 1995, p. i). That project, New World Vistas, produced 2000 pages of
monographs, including one volume on Human Systems and Biotechnology. One of the six
essential capabilities that was identified (along with such things as Global Awareness and Global
Mobility) was People.

The panel foresaw an increase in dependence on autonomous weapons and information
systems for Air Force operations and computer-driven operations at high tempo. For flying

‘The term “Army After 2010” was originally known as the Army After Next or AAN.

A-15



aFor Awards and Decorations, Military Education, and Civilian Education, only a few examples are
listed. In AR 600-8-19, a complete listing assigns points for all possibilities. The area of Military
Training is limited to Weapons Qualification and the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT).

For semi-centralized promotions, all recommended soldiers must appear before a locally
constituted promotion board. The board must consist of at least-three voting members and a
recorder (non-voting). Each board has a president who may elect to be a voting member or a non-
voting member. Board members may be all officer, all enlisted, or a mix, but all must be senior
to the soldiers appearing before the board. At least one voting member must be of the same
gender as the soldier being evaluated. All boards must have an ethnic mix, even if no minority
ethnic soldiers are appearing before the board, but no board may consist exclusively of minority
ethnic members. The board is permitted to use a question and answer format only; soldiers
cannot be required to perform hands-on tasks or to otherwise demonstrate performance.

A soldier who is recommended by his or her commander to appear before the promotion
board is considered, by virtue of that recommendation, to be fully qualified in his/her primary
MOS and board members are not allowed to raise issues of a soldier’s MOS qualification. It is up
to the board members if they want to review a soldier’s records, including the remainder of the
Promotion Point Worksheet. Each board member rates soldiers in six sub-areas:

personal appearance, bearing, and self-confidence,

¢ oral expression and conversational skill,

« knowledge of world affairs,

« awareness of military programs,

¢ knowledge of the Common Tasks Soldier’s Manual, and

« attitude.

Members are allowed a set amount of points in each sub-area with a maximum total of 200
points. Each member awards points independently; the recorder adds up the sub-area scores,
divides for an average and records the average points on another form for the soldier’s total
board points.

Each month, HQDA selects the cutoff cores for promotion to E5 and to E6. This is done
independently for each MOS and is based on projected vacancies for that MOS. The actual cutoff
number is determined by the promotion point scores submitted by all of the personnel service
companies in the field. In a simplified example, the process works like this: Suppose that there
were 100 projected vacancies in the grade of E5 in the month of January in MOS X. The DA
looks at the consolidated list of all eligible, recommended E4 soldiers in MOS X and counts off
100 soldiers. If the promotion points total of that 100th soldier is 512 points, that becomes the
cutoff for MOS X for the month of January. The MOS X soldier who was 101st on the list with
511 promotion points is not “next up” for February because the process starts fresh each month.
If, in February, there were only 50 MOS X vacancies projected, the cutoff for MOS X might rise
to, say, 600. As each month passes, there is an influx of new scores; if the soldier who had 511
points did nothing to change his score, he could be farther from promotion than ever.

D-5



¢ The preceding factors will combine to product a youth population with strong
occupational values but weak values for the Army as an institution and way of life.

« Young persons’ increasing control over their personal experience, via the Internet, will
further reduce the already low level of civic commitment in youth and also reduce the
numbers who want to experience the structured, selfless life of the military.

These conclusions are proposed as educated guesses; unforeseen events could change the
whole picture. Although repeated terrorist attacks on CONUS are predicted to occur in the future,
their likely impact on recruiting is unclear. Up to now, the Army’s involvement in peace
operations has been associated with a decline in young persons’ propensity to enlist. The Army
may find a way to market those activities to young people more successfully by 2025.

A-20



References

Department of the Army. (1991). Enlisted promotions and reductions (Army Regulation 600-8-
9). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Anns, L.R. (1999, February). A short history of the US Army noncommissioned officer US Army
Noncommissioned Officer Museum [On-line]. Available: http//bliss-
usasma.army.mil/museum/toc.html

USS. Army Adjutant General. (16 June 1999). Insignia of Grade Enlisted Personnel [On-line].
Available: http://www-persom.army.mil/select/egrades.htm

Department of the Army. (16 June 1999). Senior (Centralized) Enlisted Army Promotion System.
Personnel Command [On-line]. Available: http://www-perscom.army.mil/select/srprom.htm

Department of the Army. (April 1999). Background on DA Enlisted Centralized Selection
Boards. Personnel Command [On-line]. Available: http://www-
perscom.army.mil/red/bg_board.htm

Department of the Army. (1989). The qualitative management program (Army Regulation 601-
208). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army. (1987). Noncommissioned officer evaluation reporting system (Army
Regulation 623-205) Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army. (July 1999). Sergeant and Staff Sergeant Eligibles Trend Report
Personnel Command [On-line]. Available: http://www-persom.army.mil/enlist/ptrend.htm

Hall, Robert E. Sergeant Major of the Army. (1999). NCO-ER System Information March 1999
Issue. In Memorandum for Command Sergeants Major, U.S. Army [On-line]. Available:
http://www.hqda.army.mil/sma/0399nco.htm

Department of the Army. (April 1993). Lateral Appointments. In Regulatory Guidance Army
Regulation 600-200 Enlisted Personnel Management System. [On line] Available:
http://www-persom.army.mil/enlist/lat_apt.htm



General Accounting Office. (up through 1998). Web site leading to electronic copy of abstracts
and complete GAO reports. Available: http://www.gao.gov.

General Accounting Office. (1998a). Force Structure: Army’s Efforts to Improve Efficiency of
Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results. 98-65.

General Accounting Office. (1998b). Battlefield automation: acquisition issues facing the Army
Battle Command Brigade and Below Program, 98-140. Washington, DC: GAO

General Accounting Office. (1998c). Military attrition: DOD needs to better analyze reasons for
separation and improve recruiting systems, 98-117. Washington, DC: GAO.

General Accounting Office (1997). Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to preclude overuse
and misuse. (Letter report, 05/15/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-85).
Available: http://www. fas.org/irp/gao/nsi97085.htm.

Gertz, B. (1999). Military exchange with Beijing raises security concerns. The Washington
Times. 19 February, pp. Al, Al4.

Gilbert, D. (1996). Leader XXI Campaign Plan. Available: http:/Avww.cgsc.army.
mil/cgsc/milrev/96janfeb/gilb.htm.

Glennan, T. K., & Melmed, A. (1996). Fostering the Use of Educational Technology. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND.

Goedkoop, T. (COL). (1997, March/April). Task force XXI: An overview. Military Review.
Available: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.

Goedkoop, T. (COL). (1996, November). Forging task force XXI. Army. pp. 23-26.
Goff, J. (1998, January). Labor pains. CFO Magazine. Available: http://www.cfonet.com/.

Goodman, G. (1995, February). Special Forces: Warrior diplomats—not political warriors.
Armed Forces Journal, 42.

Gose, R. L., & Tartell, D. M. (1998). Impacts of digital war-fighting technologies on battle staff
Non-commissioned Officer performance requirements (draft Study Report). Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute [Appendices on diskette].

Graham, B., & Pianin, E. (1998, 13 August). Military readiness, morale show strain. Washington
Post, p. Al.

Graham, S. E. (1998a). The psychology of soldiers and training for the battlefield of 2025. In
R. S. Rudesill (Ed.), The impact of high technology on the physiological and psychological
dimensions of warfare: An Army After Next conference (pp. 24-28). Atlanta, GA: Center for
International Strategy, Technology and Policy.

B-10



For the mid-level NCO, the picture changed somewhat. Leadership skills took on a much
higher priority and included more facets of the leader/supervisor role (i.e., Directing, Monitoring,
Supervising; Training Others). Judgment and Decision Making Skill, or being able to
appropriately apply what you know to problems encountered on the job or in the field, became of
paramount importance, which was also consistent with the demands of the leadership role. As
portrayed in these priorities, the mid-level NCO positions will be the most face-to-face
leadership intensive positions in the Army and the future promotion system should be responsive
to these priorities.

As promotion progresses to higher NCO skill levels for AXXI, the dispositional and
performance factors pertaining to dependability, integrity, effort level, and initiative tended to
receive somewhat lower priorities. Most likely this was because the panelists believed that as the
pool of candidates for promotion becomes more and more selective as regards these variables,
there are no “low scorers” left.

The priorities for senior NCOs reflected a greater concer for broader management and staff
responsibilities with somewhat less emphasis on direct training and supervision. In addition to
high priorities for General Cognitive Aptitude and Judgment/Decision Making Skill, the more
specific information management and systems knowledge KSAs increased in importance. The
senior NCO must also be able to communicate effectively, both orally and in writing. However,
Oral Communication Skill was given a high priority at all NCO levels. In the view of the
panelists, assessment of this skill should be incorporated in all NCO promotion systems, from
top to bottom.

Among the KSAs that were given low priorities for AXXI NCOs, the panelists were most
consistent in placing Cultural Tolerance, Adherence to Regulations, and Military Presence in the
third tier. The basic technical knowledge domains (e.g., electronics, mechanics) were also placed
in the third tier.

Future KSA Priorities for Battle Force NCOs (AA2010)

Reflective of the forecasted changes in performance requirements, the KSA priorities for
this target group were significantly different from those for the AXXI NCOs. In addition to
Judgment/Decision Making Skill and General Cognitive Aptitude, which were critical for AXXI
NCOs as well, a broad knowledge of the functional integration of future battlefield systems,
information management, physical fitness, emotional stability, self-management skills, and
adaptability were given very high priorities. Traditional leadership skills and MOS specific
knowledge and skill were forecasted to become relatively less important. Battle Force NCOs
must function as generalists with broad skills and knowledge of battlefield systems in a stressful
and rapidly changing environment that requires emotional stability, physical fitness, and high
adaptability.

Assessment Methods
It was outside of the scope of this project to determine assessment methods that are the most

suitable for measuring critical AXXI and AA2010 KSAs and which make the most sense for
incorporating into future Army enlisted selection and promotion systems. Some effort was given,

58



Table 36
Factors Bearing on Changes to Enlisted Personnel Selection and Promotion Systems

Operational

¢ Large volume assessment
Limited assessment time

.
e Constant testing
e Dispersed assessment
¢ Limits on costs that can be paid for administration and scoring
¢ Service-specific entry testing feasible, but not desirable
Technical
¢ Difficulty gaining sufficient incremental validity over the Armed Services Vocational

Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)

¢ High false rejection rates unacceptable

¢ Impact of labor market conditions (what will have incremental validity over ASVAB,
how high the bar can be set for a predictor, pay for comparable jobs in civilian sector)

Political
¢ Different agendas/priorities across the services and the Department of Defense (DoD),
which affects support and/or participation in innovative entry testing efforts
e Limited personnel and funding to support validation research
e Stakeholder support (military, public, and applicants)
¢ Promotion system has not changed significantly for a very long time and is plagued by
administrative problems — will likely be considerable resistance to change

Although not a constraint on feasibility per se, the strong validity of the ASVAB for entry-
level selection makes it difficult for other methods to demonstrate sufficient incremental validity
to justify their implementation. Other technical constraints on the feasibility of implementing
another high quality measure into the Army’s entry-level selection system include the
unacceptability of high false rejection rates and the impact of labor market conditions. In today’s
tight labor market, many employers are dissuaded from using sophisticated applicant screening
procedures because they cannot afford to turn away anyone who might actually be able to
perform the job if given the chance to do so (SHRM, 1998), and this appears to be true with the
Army as well. False negatives are considered much worse than false positives in this
environment. Other labor market conditions that affect the utility of a selection process include
the extent to which the characteristics being selected for exist in the market (e.g., if the standard
for a given KSA is set relatively high, there may not be enough people in the target labor market
to meet that standard) and the extent to which the Army is competing with other employers that
might pay more for similar skill sets.

Political constraints on the introduction of changes to the Army’s selection and promotion
systems are formidable. These are mammoth systems that have many stakeholders both within
and outside the Army. Entry-level selection systems are operated in conjunction with the other
military services and DoD. Other interested parties include the public, Congress, and the

64



Table 2
Army-Wide Performance Dimensions Identified in Project A

Technical Knowledge and Skill

Effort

Following Regulations and Orders

Integrity

Leadership

Maintaining Assigned Equipment

Maintaining Living/Work Areas

Military Appearance

Physical Fitness

0. Self-Development

1. Self-Control

© Overall Effectiveness—used to obtain an overall judgment of soldier effectiveness
« NCO Potential—used to assess the likelihood that a soldier will be an effective NCO

eee ar au hon>

Note. From “Improving the Selection, Classification, and Utilization of Army Enlisted Personnel: Annual
Report, 1985 Fiscal Year,” by J. P. Campbell (Ed.), 1987, ARI Technical Report 746, Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Common task dimensions. In developing rating scales to address the common task domain, task
dimensions were formed by content analyzing tasks from the Skill Level 1 Common Task Soldier's
Manual (J. P. Campbell, 1987). Because the manual specified tasks that all first tour soldiers were
expected to be able to perform, it became the main source of Army-wide common task dimensions.
Table 3 shows the 13 dimensions or “common task areas” that were derived from this source.

Table 3
Common Task Dimensions for Skill Level 1 from Project A

See: Identifying Threat (armored vehicles, aircraft)
See: Estimating Range
Communicate: Send a Radio Message
Navigate: Using a Map
Navigate: Navigating in the Field
Shoot: Performing Operator Weapon Maintenance (e.g., M16 rifle)
Shoot: Engaging Target with Weapon (e.g., M16)
Combat Techniques: Moving Under Direct Fire
9. Combat Techniques: Clearing Fields of Fire
10. Combat Techniques: Camouflaging Self and Equipment
11. Survive: Protecting Against NBC Attack
12. Survive: Performing First Aid on Self and Other Casualties
13. Survive: Knowing and Applying the Customs and Laws of War
Note. From “Improving the Selection, Classification, and Utilization of Army Enlisted Personnel: Annual

Report, 1985 Fiscal Year,” by J. P. Campbell (Ed.), 1987, ARI Technical Report 746, Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

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serious long-term consequences. Poorly designed operator stations and other aspects of the
human/system interface impact everything from the effectiveness of system operation to training
requirements to morale...As long as this problem is ignored, a host of unnecessary costs, many
of them hidden, will continue to be paid” (p. 47).

The Navy is actively working toward the 21st century in the area of human resources. In
1998, it conducted a five-day technology initiatives game titled Manning and Training
Operational Naval Forces for 2015+ (Director, Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology
Requirements, 1998). Participants were members of the Navy’s personnel, training, and research
communities. This game followed two years of games in which “’people problems’...[did] not
get the attention they need” (Game’s Speaker Dr. Jim Andrews). The purpose of this game was
“to focus on the most neglected component—the human being” in order to identify requirements
in the time period 2015 and beyond and to recommend approaches to meeting the requirements.
The recommendations were intended to be one input into the Navy’s decisions on how to invest
its budget for science and technology. One of the valuable features of this game was the
inclusion of manpower/systems integration with manpower, personnel, and training.

Some major pieces of the context that the sponsors assumed for this game were as follows.

¢ The military threats to the U.S. will be unpredictable and diverse.

« Fewer forward bases will be available but the tempo of operations around the world will
remain high.

« At best, budgets will stay level.

« Reliance on technologies will increase as manning levels decline and the U.S. works to
maintain its advantages over potential adversaries.

e The U.S. will need to rely more on allies and partners in coalitions.

e The increasing demands on sailors and Marines could over-stress them and result in
failure to realize the capabilities of advanced technologies.

¢ The Navy’s spending does not reflect its rhetoric that “people are our first priority.”*

The game produced one overall conclusion—that there are no technological solutions to
most of the problems in the human resource domain—and identified the following more specific
needs, which are selected from a longer set:

« Ways to increase the pool of potential recruits without sacrificing sailors’ performance
through using new predictors of successful service to select interested volunteers.

¢ For use in initial entry testing, a diagnostic profile to identify the types and amounts of
training that individuals need.

« Programs of continuous on-the-job (i.e., onboard) training.

5 Every service exhibits this rhetoric (e.g., “Soldiers are our credentials”). The Army’s adherence to MANPRINT
procedures and its relative investment in science and technology (i.e., hard versus human) are indicators of the
relation between rhetoric and practice.

A-17



(e.g., Dependability); (d) Physical and Psychomotor (e.g., Physical Strength); (e) Interests (e.g.,
Interest in Skilled Trade); and (f) Conventional Army Experiences (e.g., General Soldiering
Proficiency). In addition, 26 SF performance category definitions were identified. The
performance categories are listed in Table 9.

Table 9
Performance Categories from the Special Forces Job Analysis

1. Teaching Others

2. Building and Maintaining Effective Relationships with Indigenous Populations
3. Handling Interpersonal Situations

4. Using and Enhancing Language Skills

5. Contributing to the Team Effort and Morale

6. Showing Initiative and Extra Effort

7. Displaying Honesty and Integrity

8. Planning and Preparing for Missions

9. Decision Making

10. Confronting Physical and Environmental Challenges

11. Navigating in the Field

12. Troubleshooting and Solving Problems

13. Being Safety Conscious

14. Administering First Aid and Treating Casualties

15. Managing Administrative Duties

16. Operating and Maintaining Direct-Fire Weapons

17. Employing Indirect Fire Weapons and Techniques

18. Employing Demolitions Techniques

19. Constructing for Mission-Related Requirements

20. Following Communication Procedures and Policies

21. Assembling and Operating Communication Equipment
22. Evaluating and Treating Medical Conditions and Injuries
23. Determining and Administering Medications and Dosages
24. Ensuring Standards of Health-Related Facilities, Conditions, and Procedures in the Field
25. Considering Subordinates

26. Providing Direction

Note. From “Job Analysis of Special Forces Jobs,” by T. L. Russell, J. L. Crafts, F. A. Tagliareni, R. A.
McCloy, & P. Barkley, 1996, ARI Research Note 96-76, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Occupational Information Network

The Occupational Information Network (O*NET) is the U.S. Department of Labor’s
electronic database of occupational information that will replace the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. The O*NET currently structures the world of work into 1,122 occupational units (OUs).
The development of a prototype model of OU information was the objective of a two-year
research and development project sponsored by the Utah Department of Employment Security.
The project published two reports: (a) the description of the specifications that were developed
for the occupational information used to describe each OU (Peterson et al., 1995), and (b) the



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producing it, natural language recognition, software that learns), hardware, materials (e.g., lighter
weight for energy efficiency), biotechnologies (e.g., culturing human tissue, genetic engineering
of crops), and energy. Significantly, panelists had few ideas for possible new energy
technologies.

The RAND panelists also spoke of technologies with the greatest public benefits, that is,
criticality to the economy as a whole. “One striking feature of the interviews was the infrequency
with which critical technologies for national defense were mentioned” (Popper et al., p. 66).
Defense applications of semiconductors and biotechnologies were seen largely as side benefits of
commercial work. Similarly, security of information and its infrastructure was a theme critical to
the overall economy that is critical also to defense. High-payoff technologies of the future tended
to be identified in more general terms. They included technologies in scale reduction, speeding
up the product development cycle, and in industrial efficiency.

One striking similarity in these two views of future technology and in the military list of
needed technologies (DCSDOC, 1998c) is that the technologies are tools, not improvements in
the human tool user. That is, the lists include no technologies to improve the intellectual
functioning of persons (e.g., their judgment, decision making, memory, or speed and accuracy of
information processing) without giving them tools. Distance learning, for example, is not a
technology for enabling people to learn things that humans are now incapable of learning.

The omission of technologies in education and training from these surveys may be an
accident of sampling or a sign of pessimism about trying to improve the performance of the tool
user. But several subject matter experts have expressed concern over the scant funding for R&D
in the human technologies (viz., leadership, training, and quality personnel) by the military
science and technology establishment (Brown, 1997; Ulmer, 1998; Weltman, 1997).

Technologies exist for improving human performance either beyond or more efficiently than
typical practices. A RAND report notes “[T]he concepts of learning and instruction that
[successful adopters of educational technologies] have used are not new. They have foundations
in the work of Dewey, in the progressive school movement, and in the modern findings of
cognitive scientists” (Glennan & Melmed, 1996, p. 94-95). Whether it is basic skills Johnson &
Layng, 1992), expertise (Ericsson & Charness, 1994), or work skills (Quinones & Ehrenstein,
1997), technologies for improving the performance of the human users of the hard technologies
exist, and newer ones are likely to emerge for use in the future. They just await sponsors and
users. In FY99, ARI has a small amount of funding to support basic research on accelerating
learning and improving retention, and the cognitive sciences surely have great potential for
improving human performance. In this domain, the urban legends surrounding new-age (and old
mystical) panaceas for improving human performance will persist, even though these approaches
have received scant support from two careful studies by the National Research Council
(Druckman & Bjork, 1994).

Explorations are underway for cooperation between the entertainment industry and the
military in the areas of modeling and simulation technology. In a special study for the National
Academy of Sciences, a panel of experts from industry and the military found significant

A-13



« 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) (Fort Polk, Louisiana). Elements of the 2nd
ACR had returned from a nine-month peacekeeping tour in Bosnia shortly before we
visited the unit in March 1999. The 2nd ACR also had participated as a force in the
mission in Haiti in 1997. Both of these experiences are indicative of AXXI type
missions. The visit afforded a series of interviews with officers and NCOs on all levels.
The visit provided insights not only on unit participation in such missions, but on the
preparations and post-mission operations as well.

¢ 4th Air Defense Artillery Battalion (ADA Bn), 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Texas).
The 4th ADA Bn is a combat support unit that has deployed several times in recent
years. We interviewed 15 experienced NCOs (E6 and higher). Discussion topics ranged
from technology and training to soldier discipline and recruiting (several interviewees
had completed recruiting assignments). The NCOs were forthcoming and candid about
the issues facing a unit frequently called upon to support combat and non-combat
missions.

A valuable outcome from the site visits was the extensive number of individual contacts
made. This was a significant requirement for the final step in our process of identifying the most
important KSAs for AXXI and AA2010. The make-up of the Army SME Panel, detailed in the
following subsection, came largely from individuals identified during these visits. All told, we
met with in excess of 100 persons during these visits. Their insights provided a depth of
understanding about the Army of the future that would have been unobtainable by literature
searches alone. Participants were uniformly helpful and only the magnitude of the participation
precludes crediting participants individually.‘

Once the site visits were complete, project staff analyzed the diverse and extensive
aggregation of data. The information was processed based on its relevancy to doctrine, training,
leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS). When added to the
information that had been gathered through literature searches and other methods, the
culmination was filtered, categorized, and refined into two products: (a) a description of
forecasted AXXI conditions, and (b) a description of forecasted AA2010 conditions. Depictions
of these eras are provided in Appendix C. The descriptions include forecasts of future DTLOMS
and inferences of Army-wide job components for each era.

Determining the Most Important Future Performance Predictors .

The final step in the methodology was to collect and summarize expert judgments regarding
the relative importance of future KSAs. The panels provided another layer of expert judgment in
identifying the most critical KSAs of future eras. More specifically, three panels were organized
to provide feedback on the accuracy of the future forecasts and the relative importance of
predictors that had been identified for future job requirements: an Army SME Panel, a
Psychologist Panel, and a Project Staff Panel. Tasks given to the panels included providing
feedback on the accuracy of the future forecasts, judging the relative importance of predictors
identified for future job requirements, and resolving differences between panels.

4 We are indebted to the organizations cited above. However, we must stress that any interpretations of information
provided and errors that might be present are solely the responsibility of the study staff. The contents of this study
do not reflect any endorsement or official sanction of the groups or organizations listed.

26



state, and local agencies in law enforcement, public health, and emergency relief. Details of
soldiers’ requirements under the expanded work load in Homeland Defense remain to be
developed. “At present, it seems clear that homeland defense operations will bear little
resemblance to traditional military operations” (DCSDOC, 1998c, p. 8). In 1999, a specialty
franchise on this topic is working to develop a vision of such operations.

AA2010 Materiel

Many physical systems have been conceptualized for AA2010—weapons, information,
vehicular, and others. At this point, these systems are notional and mostly not in the open
literature. In order for AA2010 to be able to execute its doctrine, numerous new technologies
will have to be developed and refined to the point of affordability and usefulness. Many of the
new systems will come out of the regular life-cycle development process. But also, in an effort to
keep a competitive edge, AA2010 may rush prototypes to the field to have their human
engineering soundness, their impact on the operators’ total job, and their connectivity with other
systems worked out in the field, while being operationally used. AA2010 soldiers will have a
major role in adapting their work lives to such untried systems and in inventing the necessary
training, techniques, and procedures.

In part, the capabilities of AA2010 will be advanced by civilian technologies that will arrive
regardless of military needs. But also, AA2010 planners are working to speed up the
development of other technologies that are unlikely to originate soon in the civilian sector. That
process is reviewed briefly in Appendix A, under Technology. Here we select systems from the
open AA2010 writings that give a sense of how the work of Battle Force soldiers may be
different from preceding generations.

Combat Systems

Battle Forces will rely on a host of to-be-developed, fast, low-signature systems like the
following:

« All-terrain, freeway-speed, long-range, armored combat vehicles that are 1/8 to 1/3 the
weight of today’s tanks. Their multi-spectrum target acquisition systems will control
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) for use in non-
line-of-site (NLOS) mode, as well as direct fire weapons.

¢ Tactical utility airlifters with speeds of several hundred knots, which will be the main
means of maneuver on the battlefield for the early entry Battle Forces. They will be able
to carry the armored combat vehicles between battle areas.

« Attack helicopters with capabilities akin to the traditional functions of armor and with
reconnaissance and acquisition capability as well.

¢ Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) ranging from model airplane size on up, having
various capabilities (e.g., testing for nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards,
communications relay; surveillance; psychological operations; delivering non-lethal
weapons; and engaging targets with on-board ordnance). A tiny “robotic fly” UAV will
be available for reconnoitering inside buildings (Dickenson, 1999).



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NCO Performance Dimensions

Also developed in Project A were Army-wide job performance measures to assess second-
tour soldiers (see Table 4). These measures, which were applicable to NCOs, were developed to
describe the major differences between entry-level and higher level performance content. Since
NCOs are responsible for performing tasks of all lower skill levels, as well as those at their
current skill level, job analyses for first tour soldiers were used as a starting point and additional
information was gathered to augment the NCO changes. In performance areas with the same
general content, the major differences between first tour and NCO responsibilities were that
difficulty and complexity increased at the NCO level. Dimensions new to the NCO level were
supervisory and leadership responsibilities. Table 5 illustrates nine supervisory/leadership
dimensions that resulted from a synthesis of expert judgments and cluster analysis (J. P.
Campbell & Zook, 1991).

Table 4
NCO Army-Wide Performance Dimensions from Project A

Displaying Technical Knowledge and Skill

Displaying Effort, Conscientiousness, and Responsibility

Organizing, Supervising, Monitoring, and Correcting Subordinates
Training and Developing

Showing Consideration and Concern for Subordinates

Following Regulations/Orders and Displaying Proper Respect for Authority
Maintaining Own Equipment

Displaying Honesty and Integrity

9. Maintaining Proper Physical Fitness

10. Developing Own Job/Soldiering Skills

11. Maintaining Proper Military Appearance

12. Controlling Own Behavior Related to Personal Finances, Drugs/Alcohol, and Aggressive Acts

SPAAYPYNS

Note. From “Improving the Selection, Classification, and Utilization of Army Enlisted Personnel: Final
Report on Project A,” by J. P. Campbell & L. M. Zook (Eds.), 1991, ARI Research Report 1597,
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

10



Table 30

Most Important KSAs for Promotion to Senior NCO (Army XXI)

Rank

General Cognitive Aptitude
Motivating and Leading Others
Judgment and Decision Making
Concern for Soldier Quality of Life
Oral Communication Skill

1
2.
3.
4

5.

In top tier of Army SME and Psychologist
panels.

Characteristic Level of Effort and Initiative
Characteristic Level of Integrity and Discipline
Writing Skill

In top tier of one panel and in 2nd tier
of the other panel.

Adaptability
Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work .
Knowledge of System Inter-relations

In top tier of one panel and tied for
inclusion in 2nd tier for the other panel.

Need to Achieve and General Energy Level

Advanced Computer Skills
General Self-Management Skill

In top tier of one panel and in 3rd tier for
the other panel.

Training Others

Ethical Value System

In 2nd tier for both panels.

Emotional Stability

In 2nd tier of one panel and tied with
other KSAs for inclusion in 2nd tier.

Conscientiousness/Dependability

Fostering Adaptive Teamwork
Knowledge Management

In 2nd tier of one panel (or tied for 2nd)

Military Presence

and in 3rd tier of the other panel.

Physical Fitness

Relating to and Supporting Others
Self-Directed Learning Skill
Spatial Relations Aptitude

Adherence to Regulations, Policies, and Procedures
Basic Electronics Knowledge

Basic Math Facility

Basic Mechanical Knowledge

Common Task Knowledge and Skill

Cultural Tolerance

MOS/Occupation-Specific Knowledge and Skill
Perceptual Speed and Accuracy

Psychomotor Aptitude

Safety Consciousness

Selfless Service Orientation

Working Memory

In 3rd tier of both panels.

54



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B-22



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B-6



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current selection and promotion procedures and to evaluate the effectiveness of these tools.
Recommendations regarding how to best meet 21st century mission and job demands through
improved soldier assessment will follow.



career employees (e.g., Army Research Institute [ARI] researchers), and contractors. In the Army
of the future, a heavy reliance on contractors is anticipated, but the size of the Reserve
Component is a more political issue. Although its ties will be fewer in the neighborhoods, the
Amy is likely to be in the news often, as conflicts surface worldwide, humanitarian relief
missions recur, and homeland defense becomes more visible. That publicity may help or hurt,
depending on the Recruiting Command’s skill in marketing the Army’s future activities to young
people.

The Media

The media will be a macro condition affecting the work of soldiers. Already they seem to be
everywhere, and their coverage of the world will surely increase. Other countries and interest
groups will use the media to seek international support, so foreign interpretations of the news
will reach U.S. audiences increasingly. The media’s willingness and ability to show the human
costs of war may have contributed to the current American reluctance to risk casualties, and the
after-action coverage of the environmental impact of NATO’s air campaign in the Balkans could
further discourage the world community from using destructive means. Military operations and
the instigations for them will be more public than before, and the public’s opinions on them, as
currently and expertly polled, will be daily news. Soldiers at all levels will thus operate under the
watch of the media and under commanders who are keenly aware of that scrutiny.

Technology

Another macro condition is technology. According to the Tofflers (1993), the impact of
information technologies alone is sufficient to be creating a new era of human history. This era,
they say, stratifies the existing nations into the agricultural, the industrial, and the information-
based. The advanced economies are not expected to threaten each other militarily in the near
term, partly because they are so economically interdependent. A concern for the economic
impact of war appears in military writings: “...[G]iven the world political situation, it may not be
possible or permissible to destroy an opponent’s electronic deadly zone completely. Such a
comprehensive strike might, for example, affect the world’s economy in an undesirable way”
(Buckley & Echevarria, 1998, p. 4).

At home, seeing our lives rapidly immersed in and dependent on information technologies,
we imagine that all technologies will expand rapidly. That impression may be exaggerated
because information technologies are more prevalent; many other sectors of technology are not
moving as fast (McRae, 1994). But the pace of change also makes the future hard to see, because
now any given future date is separated from us by a growing number of “technology event
horizons” (Brand, 1997).

The invisibility of the future does not stop futurists from predicting it. A panel of futurists,
under the sponsorship of the George Washington University Forecast of Emerging Technologies,
recently made predictions of the most likely technological advances from 2001 to 2030 (Halal,
Kull, & Leffman, 1997). Using environmental scanning and trend analysis, the project identified
85 emerging technologies for evaluation. In Delphi surveys, “about 45” (p. 28) “...prominent
futurists, forecasters, and technical experts...” (p. 21) estimated the probability and date of each

A-ll



Table 16
KSA Definitions for First Tour Job Performance

Predictors of First Tour Job Performance

¢ Writing Skill. Communicates thoughts, ideas, and information successfully to others through
writing. Uses proper sentence structure including grammar, spelling, capitalization, and
punctuation.

¢ Oral Communication Skill. Speaks in a clear, organized, and logical manner.

¢ Reading Skill. Understands written instructions, operator’s manuals, basic textbooks, letters of
instructions, written orders, and job directives.

¢ Basic Math Skill. Knows and applies addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and simple
mathematical formulas.

¢ Basic Electronics Knowledge. Knows general information regarding electronics principles and
electronics equipment operation and repair.

¢ Basic Mechanical Knowledge. Knows general information regarding mechanical principles,
tools, and mechanical equipment operation and repair.

e Spatial Relations Aptitude. Has the ability to mentally visualize the relative positions of
objects in three-dimensional space, and how they will be positioned if they are moved in
different ways.

¢ Working Memory. Has the ability to maintain information in memory for short periods of time
and to retrieve it accurately.

* General Cognitive Aptitude. Has the overall capacity to understand and interpret information
that is being presented, the ability to identify and solve problems, and the capability to leam new
things quickly and efficiently.

« Perceptual Speed and Accuracy. Has the ability to recognize and interpret visual information
quickly and accurately.

¢ Psychomotor Aptitude. Has the ability to coordinate the simultaneous movements of one’s
limbs (arms, legs), to operate multiple controls simultaneously, and to make precise control
adjustments that involve eye-hand coordination.

e Conscientiousness/Dependability. Has the tendency to be trustworthy, reliable, planful, and
accountable. Respects the value of discipline. Does not shy away from responsibility.

¢ Emotional Stability. Has the tendency to act rationally, to display a generally calm and even
mood, and to maintain composure and not be overly distraught by stressful situations.

e Need to Achieve and General Energy Level. Has confidence in own abilities, seeks and
enjoys positions of leadership and influence, is typically enthusiastic and energetic, sets high
standards, and strives for accomplishment and recognition.

(table continues)

31



Table C-6 (continued)

Physical Fitness: The general health and physical fitness of the youth population has been declining
through the 1990s and this trend will likely continue through AXXI. As the pool of likely recruits shrinks,
the Army will be to be less able to discriminate on the basis of physical abilities and still meet manpower
requirements. Physical fitness can be improved during Army service but this requires time and training
and commitment to a program. Another option is to reevaluate which specialties need what kind of
physical traits to support AXXI characteristics and to select, assign, and train accordingly.

Inferred Job Components - NCOs

MOS/Occupation-Job Specific‘ Technical Requirements: As the number of lower quality recruits
increases, many of these will eventually become the NCOs of the future. Through training, education,
maturation, selection, assignment, and mentoring, most of the lower quality soldiers who are retained can
become productive, quality NCOs. But, for most Army jobs, their development will have to be a more
deliberate process and the disparity between very high quality NCOs and "average" NCOs may increase.

Cultural Tolerance: The U.S. Hispanic youth population will increase to 20-25% of the total youth
population by 2010. Urban youth will predominate. Generation differences will be magnified as youth
culture is increasingly media responsive. The AXXI Army will remain a traditional, conservative, male-
dominated organization, but acceptance and accommodation of differences in U.S. youth culture will be
an important aspect of NCO jobs.

Motivating and Leading Others: Many of the low quality recruits will reflect the lesser socioeconomic
strata of the U.S. population. They will reflect youth that do not have the life and lifestyle choices
available to other socioeconomic groups. Increasingly, NCOs will have to rebuild and motivate
individuals making up for societal shortcomings. The NCO as role model will be a significant part of the
job. This will affect junior NCOs (SL2/SL3) the most. Instilling Army values and ethics will be an
increasing challenge.

Training Others: "Trainability” is directly related to AFQT scores. As the overall trainability of
incoming soldiers declines, and as AXXI sees a shift of SLI training from institution to unit, the role of
the NCO as trainer becomes more acute. Success in training may be harder to achieve and more time in
reinforcement and one-on-one training may be required. NCOs may have to be more adaptable and
proficient in understanding and applying different training strategies and training methods to match
different ability groups. Greatest impact will be at SL2 through SL4. Because of greater need to spend
more time in training situations, the training burden will increase at all NCO levels.



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Available: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/morris.doc.



¢ Ways to train sailors to have combat mores and culture rather than a technocratic one.
¢ Job design and an occupational classification system that produce more generalists.
¢ More flexible career paths, to include lateral transfer into/out of the reserves.

Proficiency pay, not promotion, as the main reward; career paths permitting the proficient
to remain at a stable rank, rather than having only an up-or-out choice.

« Ways to accommodate the expected cultural, experiential, and educational diversity
(including gender integration).

¢ Models of human behavior and cognition.
« Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

¢ Cognitive aids (e.g., intelligent agents, reasoning systems, mission tailorable decision
support tools, interactive technical manuals, round-the-clock reach-back technical
support).

¢ Software and demonstration protocols for skill databases and knowledge inventories.

e Antidotes to physical and psychological stress.

In addition, panelists identified clusters of technologies that bridge the traditional
separations of manpower, personnel, training, and human/systems integration. These included
human-centric warfare models and interactive (between humans and machines) thinking, among
others. After this technology initiatives game, Navy Personnel Research and Development

Center (NPRDC)‘ developed a research program for the next decade (NPRDC, 1998). It amounts
to a comprehensive research agenda in the areas of

e Selection and classification,

¢ Personnel planning and policy analysis,

¢ Distribution and assignment,

¢ Knowledge management systems, and

« Personnel surveys and program evaluation.

At the time of this writing (August, 1999), manpower and personnel research on the future

Navy was undergoing the annual competition for funding. Funding decisions for fiscal year 2000
were expected by the end of September.

Implications for Quality Soldiers and Their Work in the Future

For this study, we have assumed that the systems described in Army writings will come into
operation roughly on schedule. That assumption appears reasonable because the technological
needs of the Army appear to be richly covered in the George Washington University predictions,
the RAND survey of the private sector’s future needs, and military investment in R&D. But

* NPRDC will become the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Department late in 1999.

A-18



Table 17 (continued)

Predictors of NCO Job Performance

Basic Math Facility. Knows and applies addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and
simple mathematical formulas.

Basic Electronics Knowledge. Knows general information regarding electronics principles and
electronics equipment operation and repair.

Basic Mechanical Knowledge. Knows general information regarding mechanical principles,
tools, and mechanical equipment operation and repair.

Spatial Relations Aptitude. Has the ability to mentally visualize the relative positions of
objects in three-dimensional space, and how they will be positioned if they are moved in
different ways.

Working Memory. Has the ability to maintain information in memory for short periods of time
and to retrieve it accurately.

General Cognitive Aptitude. Has the overall capacity to understand and interpret information
that is being presented, the ability to identify and solve problems, and the capability to learn new
things quickly and efficiently.

Perceptual Speed and Accuracy. Has the ability to recognize and interpret visual information
quickly and accurately.

Psychomotor Aptitude. Has the ability to coordinate the simultaneous movements of one’s
limbs (arms, legs), to operate multiple controls simultaneously, and to make precise control
adjustments that involve eye-hand coordination.

Conscientiousness/Dependability. Has the tendency to be trustworthy, reliable, planful, and
accountable. Respects the chain of command and the value of discipline. Does not shy away
from responsibility.

Emotional Stability. Has the tendency to act rationally, to display a generally calm and even
mood, and to maintain composure and not be overly distraught by stressful situations.

Need to Achieve and General Energy Level. Has confidence in own abilities, seeks and
enjoys positions of leadership and influence, is typically enthusiastic and energetic, sets high
standards, and strives for accomplishment and recognition.

Motivating and Leading Others. Recognizes, encourages, and rewards effective performance
of subordinates. Corrects unacceptable conduct. Acts as a role model. Leads by example. Fosters
loyalty and commitment.

Training Others. Evaluates and identifies individual or unit training needs. Institutes formal or
informal programs to address training needs. Develops others by providing appropriate work
experiences. Guides and assists subordinates on technical matters.

Directing, Monitoring, and Supervising Work. Assigns tasks to subordinates. Sets goals,
targets, and criteria for work and assignments. Ensures that assignments are clearly understood.

(table continues)

34