Filed 7/19/22 In re D.L. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.L., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B312279

(Super. Ct. No. MJ24220)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.L.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

D.L. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile 

court found true a petition’s allegations that he had committed 

the following crimes: count 2 – attempted murder with personal 

discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 

12022.53, subd. (c));1 count 3 – second degree robbery with 

personal use of a firearm (§§ 211, 212.5, 12022.5, subd. (a)); and 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

count 7 – another second degree robbery during which a principal 

was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). G.T. was the 

victim in counts 2 and 3. Count 7 named a different victim. In 

an earlier, separately filed petition, the court found true an 

allegation that appellant had committed felony vandalism (§ 

594). 

At the disposition hearing on both petitions, the juvenile 

court ordered appellant to be “placed at Dorothy [S.] Kirby 

Center for a minimum of one year.” The court set appellant’s 

maximum term of confinement at 31 years, including 27 years on 

count 2 (attempted murder) plus a consecutive two-year term on 

count 3 (robbery). 

Appellant contends that section 654 prohibits punishment 

on both counts 2 and 3 because “the facts . . . establish that [he] 

must have had one, single intent in carrying out” the crimes 

against G.T. In addition, appellant claims that the juvenile court 

erroneously failed to award predisposition custody credit for the 

time he had spent at home in an electronic monitoring program. 

We affirm.

Facts Underlying Counts 2 and 3

G.T. was working at a smoke shop. Appellant and another 

male entered the store. Appellant “ran fast” toward G.T. 

Appellant “was holding [a] firearm with his right hand 

brandishing the weapon.” He pointed the gun at G.T.’s chest and 

said, “‘Open the register. Give me the money.’” Appellant fired 

the gun. The bullet missed G.T. by about two inches. 

G.T. opened the cash register, and appellant’s accomplice 

began taking money from the register. The accomplice told 

appellant not to fire the gun again because G.T. had opened the 

register. But appellant “tried to shoot [G.T.] one more time.” He 
3

“pull[ed] the slide back on the gun,” and a bullet was “ejected 

from the firearm.” “[H]e reloaded the gun,” pointed it at G.T.’s

chest, and pulled the trigger again. G.T. saw “the gunman’s 

finger pushing down on the trigger.” But the gun “was jammed” 

and would not fire. G.T. heard a “clicking noise” coming from the 

firearm. After taking about $2,000 from the register, appellant 

and his accomplice left the store. 

Section 654 Does Not Bar Punishment for Both 

the Attempted Murder and the Robbery of G.T.

“Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single act 

that violates different provisions of law.” (People v. Mitchell

(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 352.) “‘“Section 654 has been applied 

not only where there was but one ‘act’ in the ordinary sense . . . 

but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute 

and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction 

which could be punished under more than one statute within the 

meaning of section 654.” [Citation.] [¶] Whether a course of

criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than 

one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent

and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to 

one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such 

offenses but not for more than one.’” (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 

47 Cal.4th 501, 507.)

“‘The question whether . . . section 654 is factually 

applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and 

the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this 

determination. Its findings on this question must be upheld on 

appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.’ 

[Citation.] . . . ‘“We must ‘view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the 
4

[sentencing] order the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence. . . .’”’” (People v.

Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626-627.)

The juvenile court stated that section 654 would have 

applied had appellant “not pulled the trigger a second and/or 

third time . . . but because he . . . pulled the trigger . . . at least a 

second time that . . . takes it out of the 654 realm.” Substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination. People

v. Nguyen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 181 is directly on point. There, 

the defendant and his accomplice committed an armed robbery of 

a market. “While Nguyen remained at the store’s till, his crime 

partner took the [store clerk] into a back room, relieved him of his 

valuables, and then forced him to lie on the floor in an obvious 

attempt to forestall any resistance. Only after the clerk assumed 

that position did Nguyen’s accomplice shoot him.” (Id. at p. 190.) 

The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for robbery and 

attempted murder. Nguyen claimed that the consecutive 

sentences violated section 654 “because the facts suggest the 

clerk was shot in order to eliminate him as a witness or to 

facilitate the assailants’ escape.” (Nguyen, at p. 191.) The 

appellate court disagreed: “This act [of shooting the clerk] 

constituted an example of gratuitous violence against a helpless 

and unresisting victim which has traditionally been viewed as 

not ‘incidental’ to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 

654.” (Id. at p. 190.)

Here, as in Nguyen, G.T. was “a helpless and unresisting 

victim.” (Nguyen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 190.) He opened 

the cash register and permitted appellant’s accomplice to take 

money from the register. The accomplice told appellant not to 

fire the gun again because G.T. was being cooperative. 
5

Nevertheless, appellant reloaded the gun, pointed it at G.T.’s 

chest, and pulled the trigger. Appellant probably would have 

killed G.T. had the gun not jammed. “It is one thing to commit a 

criminal act in order to accomplish another; Penal Code section 

654 applies there. But that section cannot, and should not, 

be stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far 

beyond those reasonably necessary to accomplish the original 

offense. Once robbers have neutralized any potential resistance 

by the victims, an assault or attempt to murder to facilitate a 

safe escape, evade prosecution, or for no reason at all, may be 

found by the trier of fact to have been done for an independent 

reason.” (Id. at p. 191.)

Appellant claims that, in view of “a record that firmly 

establishes [his] lifelong history of mental health problems, and a 

relatively low I.Q., the facts underlying [counts 2 and 3] . . . 

establish that [he] must have had one, single intent in carrying 

out both [the robbery and the attempted murder].” But nothing 

in the record shows that, because of his mental health problems 

and low I.Q., appellant was incapable of harboring separate 

intents for these offenses.

Appellant Is Not Entitled to Custody Credit for Time

Spent at Home While Subject to Electronic Monitoring

The juvenile court awarded appellant credit for 575 days of 

predisposition custody. The People concede, “[T]he court’s award 

. . . apparently contemplated [appellant’s] physical detention time 

but not appellant’s prior home detention” in an electronic 

monitoring program. Appellant “requests that [this] Court find 

the failure to award him electronic monitoring predisposition 

custody credits is an unjust reading of the juvenile law.” 
6

Based on In re Lorenzo L. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1076, 

appellant acknowledges that “[m]inors are currently not entitled 

to custody credits for time spent at home on electronic 

monitoring.” In Lorenzo L. “[t]he minor contend[ed] the juvenile 

court erred by failing to award him predispositional credit for 28 

days he spent in an electronic monitoring program at his 

residence.” (Id. at p. 1079.) The appellate court noted that a 

minor “‘is entitled to credit against subsequent physical

confinement only for earlier physical confinement. . . .’” (Ibid.)

The court held, “Because the minor’s electronic monitoring was 

not physical confinement, it does not entitle him to credit against 

his subsequent confinement.” (Id. at p. 1080.) We find the 

reasoning of Lorenzo L. persuasive and decline appellant’s 

invitation to disagree with it.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
Lisa M. Strassner, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Roberta D. Davis, David E. Madeo, 

Viet Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.