CTC REPORT

Stealing 

Al-Qa’ida’s 

Playbook 

JARRET M. BRACHMAN

WILLIAM F. MCCANTS

February 2006 

To be published in a forthcoming issue of the journal 

Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Military Academy, the 

Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government. 

2

Published in 2006 by the 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

607 Cullum Road 

United States Military Academy 

West Point, NY 10996 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu 

To obtain additional information, contact the CTC at 

845.938.8495 or email: ctc@usma.edu 
Foreword  

General Wayne A. Downing (Retired)

Policies and strategic communications cannot be separated.

—Report of the Defense Science Board on Strategic 

Communications, September, 2004 

  

As the Defense Science Board observed two years ago, an essential element of

U.S. combating terrorism efforts must involve strategic communications

composed of coordinated public diplomacy, public affairs, open military

information operations (which include psychological operations), and

classified operations.  

The United States government reached a significant stage in the fight

against jihadi‐inspired terrorism this past year when it decided to place a

greater emphasis on fighting its ideological roots.    Yet despite this

appropriate course adjustment, the U.S. government and its Western allies

generally do not know the main producers of this ideology and the

significant issues that unite and divide the movement—information that is

key to defeating it.   

Our authors suggest ways to address this significant shortfall.  Not only do

they attempt to answer the who and what sort of questions in plain language;

they also outline a highly original method for discerning the answers to

these questions that has, up to now, been ignored or poorly used.   

One of the best places to look for information regarding the strengths and

weaknesses of the jihadi movement, Brachman and McCants argue, is in

texts written by jihadi ideologues.

*

  Of course, a number of analysts inside

and outside the U.S. government read texts like these for insight into al‐

Qa`ida’s strategic thinking.  But it has been my experience that many of the

most useful texts have not received attention.  And of those that do, there

 

* The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is currently conducting this type of

investigation using recently declassified al‐Qa`ida documents, which are being made

publicly available for the first time at www.ctc.usma.edu. 

3
are often useful pieces of information that get overlooked.   There are two

reasons for this:

• First, there is an overabundance of texts.    Since there is no

metric yet for determining which works are important within

the jihadi movement, text selection tends to be a very

subjective process and minor thinkers sometimes receive more

attention than they deserve.  Moreover, the overabundance of

texts and the paucity of analysts mean that the latter must

often scan texts rapidly for important information, which is

sometimes predetermined by their initial assumptions.  Time

and resources are not available for looking for information

that challenges these assumptions.   

• Second, useful pieces of information are overlooked because

many analysts who are new to this literature do not know

what to look for.  As Brachman and McCants observe, jihadi

leaders are remarkably open and blunt when discussing who

their biggest competition is and what their PR vulnerabilities

are.    This is precisely the sort of information needed for

crafting effective counterterrorism strategies.   The authors of

this article have given several concrete examples of what type

of information to look for, making it easy for others to use

their method.

If the jihadis are right in their assessment of geopolitics and the situation in

the Middle East, overt U.S. military action or diplomacy can often be more

harmful than helpful in the fight against jihadi‐inspired terrorism.  Indeed,

the jihadi ideologues surveyed in the article focus most of their attention on

psychological operations to exploit our actions rather than on large‐scale,

direct military action.    

Understanding the vulnerabilities of the jihadi movement is the necessary

prelude to defeating it.  In this article, Brachman and McCants give us the

tools and some recommendations to do just that.  

4
Stealing Al‐Qa`ida’s Playbook

Jarret M. Brachman

William F. McCants*

  

The key to defeating the jihadi movement is identifying its strengths and

weaknesses so that the former may be countered or co‐opted and the latter

exploited.  In this article we argue that the people who know these strengths

and weaknesses best are the jihadis themselves; one just needs to know

where (and how) to look for their insights.  

Jihadi leaders are surprisingly frank when discussing the vulnerabilities of

their movement and their strategies for toppling local regimes and

undermining the United States.    Their candor is, in large part, a

consequence of struggles for leadership within the movement; thus, a leader

of one group will publish his strategic vision in order to gain more recruits

and achieve a reputation as a serious scholar worthy of respect.  It is also a

consequence of the United States’ success in destroying jihadi training

camps and denying safe havens—jihadi leaders have had to put their

writings online so as to provide continuing guidance to a very decentralized

following.

In a sense, members of the jihadi movement have put their team’s

playbooks online.    By mining these texts for their tactical and strategic

insights, the United States will be able to craft effective tactics, techniques,

and procedures to defeat followers of the movement.  In what follows, we

will demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by highlighting the insights

we have gleaned from the works of four prominent jihadi ideologues.**

 

* Jarret Brachman is the Director of Research of the Combating Terrorism Center at West

Point.  William McCants is a Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and

director of its Salafi Ideology Project.

** With the exception of Ayman al‐Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, the

other books discussed below can be found in Arabic on al‐Qa`ida’s premier electronic

library, www.tawhed.ws.  Zawahiri’s work is readily available online in English

translation.

5
The Prophet and Paul Kennedy  

O people!    The viciousness of the Russian soldier is twice that of the

American soldier.   If the Americans suffer one tenth of the casualties the

Russians suffered in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will flee and never

look back.    That is because the current structure of the American and

Western armies is not the same as their structure during the colonial era.  

They have reached a stage of effeminacy that makes them unable to sustain

battles for a long period of time, a weakness they compensate for with a

deceptive media halo.

   

—Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Barbarism,

1 2004

Although we would like to claim credit for the approach described in the

introductory paragraphs, it is modeled after a similar approach used by

Abu Bakr Naji, a rising star in the jihadi movement.  In his 2004 work, The

Management of Barbarism,

* Naji urges fellow jihadis to study Western works

on management, military principles, political theory, and sociology in order

to borrow strategies that have worked for Western governments and to

discern their weaknesses.2    For example, Naji urges his readers to study

works on administration so that they will be able to administer regions that

fall into political chaos (see below).3  Military principles should be studied

so that the jihadis may better engage in asymmetrical warfare.4  Works on

sociology should be studied, particularly those about tribes in the Middle

East, so that jihadis can better mobilize tribal and ethnic groups for their

own ends.5    (Naji advocates buying off tribal leaders and justifies his

position by adducing examples of the Prophet doing the same.)6    Finally,

works on political theory should be studied so that the jihadis will be able to

identify and exploit the political weaknesses of the United States.7  He urges

them to identify and capitalize on the self‐interest of allies of the United

States in order to fracture their alliances.8    He also urges them to study

books on the consequences of imperial overreach.   In this vein, he quotes

directly from an Arabic translation of Paul Kennedyʹs Rise and Fall: “If

 

* William McCants translated this work for the Olin Institute at Harvard under the

direction of Michael Doran, who was one of the first people to find the text on the Internet.  

Doran has written a very insightful introduction to the work that is not yet published (the

observation regarding the spread of jihadi strategy documents online as a consequence of

the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is his).  Stephen Ulph at www.jamestown.org has also

written a useful précis of the work.  

6
America broadens its use of military power and strategically expands more

than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.”9

Based on his reading of these works and the experience of the jihadis in

Afghanistan, Naji articulates a grand strategy for defeating the United

States.    First, he observes that after the rise of the two superpowers

following World War II, nations allied themselves with the United States or

the Soviet Union in return for financial and military support.10  The jihadi

movement had been unsuccessful in the past because the superpowers

propped up these proxy governments and convinced the masses through

the media that they were invincible.11  The solution, Naji says, is to provoke

a superpower into invading the Middle East directly.  This will result in a

great propaganda victory for the jihadis because the people will 1) be

impressed that the jihadis are directly fighting a superpower, 2) be outraged

over the invasion of a foreign power, 3) be disabused of the notion that the

superpower is invincible the longer the war goes on, and, 4) be angry at the

proxy governments allied with the invading superpower.12   Moreover, he

argues, it will bleed the superpower’s economy and military.13    This will

lead to social unrest at home and the ultimate defeat of the superpower.14   

Naji does not suffer under the illusion that the jihadis can defeat the United

States in a direct military confrontation; rather, the clash with the United

States is more important for propaganda victories in the short term, and the

political defeat of the United States in the long‐term, as its society fractures

and its economy is further strained.    Naji observes that this strategy was

used with great effect against the Soviet Union and that it will work against

United States.15    Indeed, it may work better against the United States

because it does not have the ruthlessness or resolve of the Soviet Union.16

Interestingly, Naji does not explicitly say that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has

played into this strategy, but he does counsel his jihadi brothers in Iraq to

be patient, telling them that victory can come at any time.17  Once the U.S.

withdraws from Iraq, he forecasts, its media halo will dissipate and the

regimes that supported it will be vulnerable.    The jihadis should quickly

take advantage of the situation by invading countries that border Iraq,

where they will be welcomed as liberators.18

Just as Naji has a plan for exploiting the vulnerabilities of U.S. hegemony,

he also has a strategy for establishing a caliphate.  This strategy, inspired by

his reading of Western literature, his experience in the Middle East, and his

7
interpretation of Muhammad’s early career,19 consists of three stages.  First,

jihadis should bomb sensitive local targets, such as tourist sites and oil

facilities.20  These “vexation and exhaustion” operations will force the local

regime to enhance security around these crucial industries.21  This drawing

in of security forces will then open up security vacuums in remote regions

or cities.    The resulting chaos in those areas will cause the population to

welcome a jihadi cadre of administrators who will manage the basic

necessities of life.    Once they have gained control of these regions, these

“administrations of barbarism” can network with each other and move

towards a caliphate (Naji is not clear about the transition from the second to

third stage).

22   

In addition to outlining his strategic vision, Naji also discloses weaknesses

in the jihadi movement.  As a member of a secret terrorist organization, Naji

discusses the problems that predictably confront such an entity, like

difficulties in resolving chains of command, ferreting out spies within the

organization, and reining in overzealous recruits.23    Naji also worries that

low‐ranking members of the movement will initiate their own large‐scale

attacks against high‐value targets.   Medium and small attacks are fine, he

argues, and one does not need approval from the High Command for

them.24  (Thus, Naji suggests that if jihadis are arrested in one country, a cell

in another country should respond by bombing a medium‐sized target,

which will enhance the perception that there is a worldwide jihadi

movement).

25    But launching another 9/11‐type attack or targeting certain

classes of people is a decision best left to the High Command—targeting the

wrong people at the wrong time would turn the masses against the

movement.26

This solicitude for the sentiments of the masses indicates that public opinion

is of great concern for Naji—if the movement loses the support of the

masses, its pool of recruits will dry up and operations will be harder to

undertake.  The Muslim public is particularly troubled, he observes, by the

jihadis’ excessive use of violence, particularly against other Muslims.27  They

are also concerned that the jihadis do more harm than good, creating public

disorder (traditional Islam values social stability over all else) and

provoking government crackdowns on innocents.28   

Part of the problem, Naji points out, is that jihadi groups in the past failed

miserably to explain their attacks to the public, which allowed the local

regime to turn public opinion against them.  One example he notes was the

8
failure of the Islamic Group in Egypt to properly spin its attack on the

tourist industry, which made it easy for the government to portray it as an

attack on the nation’s economy.  This had a devastating impact on the jihadi

movement in Egypt in the 90s.29    The movement was also crippled by

arbitrary arrests of suspected jihadis, he recalls, which led many families to

pressure their youth not to join.30

Naji is also concerned that the momentum of the movement can be slowed

by other clerics who challenge its legitimacy and siphon off its recruits

among the youth.  Thus, he sharply criticizes fellow Salafis* who refuse to

engage in a jihad not sanctioned by a ruler and who focus their energy

instead on proselytizing.31    It is violence, Naji avers, that will force the

Muslim masses to choose sides, not peaceful proselytizing among them.32  

Once an Islamic caliphate is established, then the people can be made to

understand true Islam.33

In addition to criticizing fellow Salafis, Naji also worries about non‐Salafi

clerics who are popular among the youth and who siphon off support for

the jihadis.  For example, he mentions al‐Habashi in Lebanon, a leader of a

popular Sufi** order who is willing to participate in parliamentary elections.  

Naji maintains that it would have been better to have killed him early in his

career than to have let him become the powerful figure he is today (he

quotes Abu Qatada in this regard – see below).34  Of even greater concern is

the Muslim Brotherhood35 – its success in recruiting youth, its willingness to

 

* Salafis are Sunni Muslims who believe that the true understanding of Islam is based solely

on the words and deeds of Muhammad and his Companions; therefore, they are extremely

conservative given that their understanding of Islam is rooted in the seventh century.  But

they are not traditional religious thinkers since they refuse to accept the rulings of most

medieval Muslim authorities, unless they are also based on the practice of the pious

forefathers (salaf).    

** Sufis are Muslim mystics (predominantly Sunni) who seek to draw closer to God.  Sufi

ideas began to percolate in early Islam, but followers of Sufi leaders did not begin to

organize themselves into brotherhoods until a later period.  Their fraternal bonds and their

obedience to a local spiritual guide make Sufi orders a very powerful and cohesive element

of Islamic society.  

Aside from the shared focus on drawing closer to God, Sufis are incredibly diverse.  

Some Sufi orders are entirely otherworldly, eschewing politics altogether, while others are

more activist (e.g. members of some Sufi orders in Afghanistan fought against the Soviets).  

Some are extremely conservative, while others are more liberal in their religious practice.

9
work with local regimes, and its efficacy in providing social services make it

the leading competitor for jihadis.

Finally, Naji addresses an issue that is peculiar to a religiously‐inspired

movement: sectarianism.  He observes that the jihadi movement has often

split apart over theological differences.    As with his rejection of peaceful

proselytizing, Naji suggests tabling these differences until the caliphate is

established.  In support of his viewpoint, he notes that Ibn Taymiyya and

other medieval Muslim scholars respected by Salafis were willing to work

with rulers they did not agree with theologically as long as they were

willing to undertake jihad in defense of the community.36

10
The Shayma Effect

The government used the death of Shayma, may God bless her soul, and

portrayed the incident as an attack by the Al‐Jihad Group against Shayma,

not against Prime Minister Sidqi.

   

—Ayman al‐Zawahiri, Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet,

2001

Readers may rightly detect a number of similarities between Najiʹs work

and the recent letter by Ayman al‐Zawahiri to Abu Mus`ab al‐Zarqawi: the

headaches caused by overenthusiastic recruits; worry about sectarianism;

the reverse “oil‐spot” strategy; the concern with maintaining popular

support; the desire for direct U.S. engagement as a means for motivating the

masses; and a disapproval of Muslim‐on‐Muslim violence. The similarities

are not because Zawahiri is reading Naji; rather, Naji’s work encapsulates

the thinking of the High Command since the late 90s.   

Both works are also informed by the propaganda failures of jihadis in Egypt

during the 90s.    Yet, whereas Naji can coolly play armchair mujahid (to

borrow a phrase from Stephen Ulph), those lessons were hard‐learned for

Zawahiri during his stewardship of Islamic Jihad.   

One of his most painful lessons, Zawahiri relates in his Knights Under the

Banner of the Prophet, was learned after an assassination attempt on Egyptian

Prime Minister Atif Sidqi.  Members of Islamic Jihad detonated a car bomb

in a failed attempt to kill the prime minister as his motorcade passed by.  

Instead, the blast killed a 12 year‐old girl named Shayma in a nearby

elementary school.  The government launched a media campaign claiming

that Islamic Jihad had deliberately targeted Shayma and not the prime

minister.  Zawahiri explains that members of the group had surveyed the

area and thought the school was unoccupied.  Nevertheless, he admits that

he was deeply pained by the death of the girl and acknowledges that the

governmentʹs media campaign drastically reduced public support for the

movement.  It also stunned his senior leadership, causing several of them to

resign from the organization.   

This background explains Zawahiri’s words of caution to Zarqawi in his

recent letter, counseling him against attacks that could inadvertently kill

11
Muslim civilians.  This is not out of ideological or theological reasons, but

from a purely pragmatic, strategic calculus: The masses must view jihadis as

liberators, not oppressors.    They must be seen as fighting a just war and

walking the moral high ground.  Killing Muslims—even when undertaking

legitimate operations against members of an unpopular local regime or

symbols of Western occupation—is damaging to the jihadi movement

because it inevitably leads to a loss of support among the Muslim masses, a

consequence we call the “Shayma Effect.”

12
Creating More Competition in the Salafi Marketplace

This man is content to claim that he is a Salafi so that he can be an imam for

some inexperienced boys whom he feeds slogans and shimmering phrases.   

—Abu Qatada, Between Two Methods,

37 1994

Just as jihadi ideologues are frank about the propaganda tactics they are

most vulnerable to, they are equally blunt about which Muslim religious

leaders they most fear.    Contemporary jihadi tracts can be mined for this

sort of information, but older works are equally instructive—a specific

enemy may no longer be a threat, but by understanding why he was a

threat in the past we can look for, and perhaps exploit, similarly threatening

enemies in the present.   

Take, for example, the writings of Abu Qatada, one of al‐Qa`ida’s chief

religious ideologues.*

    They are a veritable who’s‐who of jihadi enemies.  

We have already seen one example of this in Naji’s book, where he quoted

Abu Qatada’s fulminations over the power of al‐Habashi.   

But Abu Qatada does not limit his anger to non‐Salafis; indeed, some of his

sharpest criticism is aimed at fellow‐travelers.  For instance, his Between Two

Methods, an influential series of articles written in 1994 (Naji quotes from it

repeatedly to justify his positions), contains numerous references to various

Salafi competitors at that time.  In these articles, one Salafi above all others

is the object of Abu Qatada’s ire: Rabi` al‐Madkhali.  Abu Qatada rages at

this “so‐called Salafi” for challenging jihadi notions of leadership.38  He also

expresses dismay that he has succeeded in duping the youth into following

him and for using them as spies for the Saudi government, informing on

any jihadis who enter Saudi Arabia illegally.39

 

* Abu Qatada is a Jordanian of Palestinian origin.  He studied Islamic law in Saudi Arabia,

where he obtained a Master’s degree in jurisprudence.  In 1993 he went to the U.K. seeking

political asylum.  There he edited al‐Ansar, the official organ of the GIA (the Armed Islamic

Group, a particularly violent jihadi organization in Algeria that was responsible for

massacring thousands of civilians during the 90s), and served as al‐Qa`ida’s chief

spokesman and coordinator in Europe.  Although the U.K. government has curtailed his

activities, his writings continue to have an immense influence on the jihadi movement.

13
One could be forgiven for failing to understand why Abu Qatada was so

angry:    Madkhali is not well‐known in the West and he is no longer a

person of much influence in Saudi Arabia.  But in the 90s, he was incredibly

influential in Saudi Arabia (and he still has a large following among

Muslims in Europe).*

  Much of this influence derived from the support he

received from the Saudi government.  During and after the first Gulf War,

the Saudi government faced intense criticism from the leaders of the Sahwa  

movement (a politically active strain of Wahhabism) for allowing U.S.

troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia.  These leaders had a large following,

particularly among the youth.  To blunt their appeal, the Saudi government

arrested the movement’s leaders and strongly backed Madkhali, who

supported the regime, was politically quietist, and, most importantly, was

effective at siphoning off potential Sahwa recruits, particularly among the

youth.40   

Aside from Saudi support, two things account for much of Madkhali’s

popularity among the youth: he used cassette tapes to spread his message41

and he was quite skillful at discrediting his opponents.  As an example of

the latter, one of his favorite tactics was to call jihadis “Qutbis” rather than

Salafis, since they agreed with the political doctrines of Sayyid Qutb, a

leading jihadi thinker who was executed by the Egyptian government in the

60s.    Doing this denied them the legitimacy of being known as Salafis,

followers of the pious forefathers, and suggested that they were members of

a deviant sect.   To this end, another of Madkhali’s effective tactics was to

force an opponent to acknowledge that Sayyid Qutb, whose teachings he

followed, had made a number of theological statements that were at

variance with orthodoxy; thus, his followers were heretics too.

 

* For example, in 2002, four hundred followers gathered in a French mosque to hear a

badly‐relayed phone call from Madkhali to the congregation

(www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vernag/EH/F/cause/lectures/essor_des_salafistes.htm).  See

also Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 251‐3.

14
The Lessons of Jihads Past

History is filled with lessons...and wars and revolutions are no exception.... 

The period which followed the tragedy gave us time to contemplate and 

examine Islamic and global experiences that are rich and worthy of 

study....[These] rich experiences that pervade Muslim and non-Muslim 

communities have been investigated and recorded, making them easy to 

obtain for those who want to study and learn. However, no one studied 

them and we had to walk this path to reveal it for ourselves so that the 

pitfalls could be laid bare. I hope we heed the lesson. 

—Abu Mus`ab al‐Suri, Observations Concerning the Jihadi

Experience in Syria,

42 date unknown

As the author of a massive handbook on global insurgency—or, as he calls

it, “the remedy for the U.S. disease”43—Mustafa Setmarian Nasar has

written his way into the intellectual heart of today’s jihadi‐Salafi movement.  

Also known as `Umar `Abd al‐Hakim, “the pen jihadist,” “Castro,” and

most widely by his nom de guerre, “Abu Mus`ab al‐Suri,” this senior al‐

Qa`ida ideologue had been off the counterterrorism radar until recently.  

Indeed, in one massive chart of links between jihadi leaders and operatives

that the authors saw this past year, Suri was depicted as a person of little

consequence, possessing a single link with another al‐Qa`ida operative.  

While such link analysis is important when determining personal contacts,

it fails to accurately depict the intellectual impact of ideologues like Suri.*

   

Like Naji, Suri is an astute observer of Western strategic thinking.    In

particular, he closely monitors Western counterterrorism strategy, believing

the following to be its salient features:

   

• Drying up financial springs for terrorism  

• Killing and imprisoning the jihadi leadership and lower‐level cadres

• Creating multinational agreements for the extradition of terrorists

• Abolishing safe havens and shelters for terrorist organizations  

• Moving from regional to international security cooperation

 

* For example, Reuvan Paz has noted that Abu Muhammad al‐Hilali’s recent analysis of

jihadi terrorist attacks in Egypt is heavily indebted to Suri for its overall theoretical

framework (Reuven Paz, “Al‐Qaeda’s Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi

Activity in Egypt and Sinai,” PRISM Occasional Papers, Vol. 3, No. 7 (October 2005),

available on‐line at www.e‐prism.org).

15
• Expanding counterterrorism legislation  

• Launching an aggressive media war aimed at the defamation of the

jihadis44

Suri is also a careful student of jihads in the modern era that failed.  These

failures, Suri contends, happened for several reasons.    First, local regimes

worked together against the jihadis.    Syria, for instance, worked with the

security services of Jordan, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries to

cripple the movement from the mid‐60s through the 80s.45  Had other jihadi

campaigns been launched in those neighboring countries, Suri points out,

significant pressure on the Syrian jihadis would have been alleviated as

foreign security services would have been distracted by events at home.46  

Therefore, jihadis around the world must begin launching attacks and

establishing bases of operation (no matter how small) in every country.  As

Suri remarks, “Neither the United States nor ten armies of its like will be

able to fight in hundreds of Fallujahs throughout the Arab and Islamic

world.”47   

Second, jihadis failed in the past by ignoring ethnic minorities and tribes.  

Thus, Syria bought off Kurds and Bedouin tribes, using them against the

jihadis.  Suri counsels that jihadis should pay more attention to these sorts

of ethnic minorities and tribes so that they cannot be co‐opted in the

future.48    Indeed, America’s use of local Pakistani and Afghani forces to

serve as military proxies in its invasion of Afghanistan was a particularly

painful reminder of this lesson for Suri, who bitterly recalls the “betrayal”

of some of the Pakistani border tribes who turned over a number of jihadis

who had fled from Tora Bora to the Americans.49  This devastating blow to

al‐Qa`ida could have been prevented had it reached out earlier to these

groups.

Third, past jihads failed because low‐ranking fighters did not feel a personal

connection to their leaders.  As a consequence, Suri relates that many jihadis

laid down their rifles and began pursuing their own interests over those of

the movement, some marrying locals and starting families, others simply

returning home.50   

Contrary to the common Western assumption that this tier is little more

than cannon‐fodder, Suri concentrates, à la Mao Tse Tung, on the

importance of these foot soldiers, arguing that they will eventually ascend

the ranks to senior level positions, replacing those who have been captured

16
and killed.  Therefore, these fighters have to be taught the correct strategic

vision early on so that they will be ready to assume senior command

positions later.51  

Fourth, past jihads failed because those fighting them did not win popular

support.    The Muslim masses did not understand who the jihadis were,

what they wanted to accomplish, and why they used violence to achieve

their goals because jihadis did not sell themselves and their movement

effectively.  The Muslim masses, Suri argues, must be viewed as an integral

part of the broader strategy and given a stake in the jihad.52   

Propagandists, Suri states, will play the pivotal role in generating the

“global Islamic resistance” (see below).    They can do this by pursuing

aggressive media campaigns and using technology like satellite television

and the Internet to communicate the movement’s objectives and justify its

use of violence to the public, particularly to the young Muslim men around

the world in search of ways to participate.53    But Suri warns would‐be

propagandists against using lies and exaggeration. The target Muslim

populations, he argues, will see through such falsehoods and grow

disaffected with the Salafi message.

54   

Finally, Suri argues that one of the most effective ways to foster the

emergence of new local jihadi movements is to keep Muslim clerics actively

involved.    Previous jihadi campaigns suffered from a lack of strategic

thinking and religious legitimacy because they alienated the religious

elders.  Only by making them the core of their fight will the movement have

the legitimacy and ideological firepower necessary to facilitate the

development of a new generation of jihadi intellectuals and foot soldiers.55

Although religious leaders have an important role to play in the education

of the rising generation of jihadis, the most important component of their

education will be engagement in jihad itself.  Indeed, it seems the primary

purpose of local jihads is not the overthrow of the West, but the training

and indoctrination of this rising generation56 (Naji and earlier ideologues

like `Abd Allah `Azzam also emphasize the didactic value of jihad).  From

this, a self‐sustaining, ever‐widening movement Suri calls the  ʺglobal

Islamic resistanceʺ  will be born that will sweep away the old order and

establish the global caliphate in its place.57   

17
Conclusion

We argued in the beginning of this article that texts like those surveyed

above can be mined for strategic and tactical insights that will enable the

United States to significantly diminish the power of the jihadi movement.   

What follows are several general observations based on the above texts,

each followed by some recommended possible actions that the U.S. can

undertake to counter or exploit the jihadis’ messages and actions.*

1.  Thus far, direct engagement with the United States has been good for the

jihadi movement.  As Naji argues, it rallies the locals behind the movement,

drains the United States of resources, and puts pressure on the regimes that

are allied with the U.S.  Conversely, it is bad for the jihadi movement when

the United States operates clandestinely or through proxies, whether they

be local regimes, tribes, or ethnic minorities—jihadis have nothing to rally

the public against and will be seen as fighting their own people.

The United States should avoid direct, large‐scale military action in the

Middle East.  If such fighting is necessary, it must be done through proxies

whenever possible.    Buying off tribal leaders, as Naji advocates, may be

effective in some regions.   

2.  The jihadi movement has become decentralized and training camps like

those in Afghanistan four years ago are no longer absolutely necessary for

the military or doctrinal preparation of new recruits.  Certainly, safe havens

are still useful, but the jihadis have created serviceable alternatives by

offering training in urban areas and virtually on the Internet.    The jihadi

movement has now metastasized, as Suri hoped, into a self‐sustaining

movement in which battles and bombings are more important as a means

for recruiting and radicalizing a new generation of followers than as a

means to a political end.

This suggests that the United States must be aware of the consequences of

creating new theaters for jihad, particularly in the Arab world.    The U.S.

must also find ways to redirect the alienation among Muslim youth that is

fueling recruitment (points 4 and 5 following will discuss ways to do this).

 

* Note that these recommendations are aimed solely at destroying the jihadi movement and

must be balanced with other U.S. strategic goals.

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3.  Although jihadi ideologues recognize the utility of the long term, eternal

struggle, they are absolutely serious about establishing Islamic states in the

near term.    Leading ideologues like Zawahiri and Naji are not thinking

within the confines of the nation‐state.    They are less interested in

overthrowing a ruler and replacing his apostate regime with an Islamic

regime than they are in establishing small enclaves across the globe in

regions that are not well‐policed.  These regions may spread across several

states or they may be as small as a city (e.g. Fallujah) or a province (e.g. al‐

Anbar).    These enclaves can be used as bases for training and launching

attacks; but they are more important as nuclei of the future jihadi order,

visible examples of the caliphate(s) to come.   

The United States must consider the use of local surrogates to thwart the

establishment of these enclaves, denying jihadis the tactical and

propaganda victories that would accrue.    It can also use surrogates to

establish “zones of order” in regions where there are security vacuums (i.e.

an oil‐spot strategy,58 the reverse of Naji’s “zones of barbarism”).    This

would prevent the jihadis from moving in and also create local leaders who

could effectively compete with the jihadis.

4.    Positive public opinion is necessary for attracting people to join or

support the movement; thus, effective propaganda is crucial for the success

of the jihadi movement.  Conversely, the movement declines in popularity

when it is perceived to be attacking fellow Muslims, causing public

disorder, damaging critical national industries, or engaging in sectarianism.

The United States government must fund media campaigns that focus on

turning Muslim public opinion against the jihadis, but in a very low key

and indirect manner.  In particular, the U.S. must harness the power of the

“Shayma Effect”, broadcasting images of jihadi attacks that have killed

Muslim children.   

In light of the foregoing points highlighting the deleterious effects of direct

U.S. action in the region, it is essential that the U.S. operate behind the

scenes.    Thus, media campaigns like those mentioned above must be

carefully managed by professionals using some of the same, excellent

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information strategies and organizations that the U.S. employed so

effectively in the Cold War.*

Furthermore, the U.S. must recast its ineffectual public diplomacy efforts.  It

is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to elicit pro‐American

feelings in the Middle East by making public pronouncements about the

true nature of Islam or the virtues of democracy.    An extremely

sophisticated public diplomacy campaign using surrogates and friends is

required to avoid the current perception of such pronouncements as hollow

and hypocritical, which generates even further bad feeling.    Some U.S.

efforts have even become fodder for the jihadi propaganda machine and

have destroyed the credibility of some Muslim leaders who have tried to

help.**   

5.  Religious leaders play a critical role in attracting youth to the movement,

providing religious justification for violence, and determining its overall

strategic direction.  But this cuts both ways, as non‐jihadi religious leaders

are able to siphon off support from the movement and challenge its

legitimacy.

The United States should very carefully and unobtrusively support Muslim

religious leaders and movements that can effectively compete with the

jihadi movement in terms of mass appeal and popularity among the youth.  

Naturally, many of the most effective competitors will not be friendly to the

United States and the West; but if the bottom line is a rejection of violence

against the United States and its allies, they should be supported.

The difficulty comes in identifying the right leader or group.  The U.S. could

discretely fund mainstream Salafi figures like Madkhali who are effective in

siphoning off support from jihadis and who do not advocate violence (e.g.

 

* It is questionable whether the Department of Defense can or should manage or be

involved in such programs, especially sensitive, classified efforts.

** The following statement from Karen Hughes, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy

and Public Affairs, was cited recently on a jihadi website as proof that the U.S.’s new

diplomatic efforts in the region are sinister and meant to pave the way for further military

occupation:  “And we plan to forward‐deploy regional SWAT teams who can look at the

big picture and formulate a more strategic and focused approach to all our public

diplomacy assets; not just country by country, but within a region of the world...” (Loy

Henderson Auditorium, Washington, DC, September 8, 2005).

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by paying for publications, lectures, new schools).  This will be effective in

the short term, but it further strengthens the dehumanizing Salafi ideology

from which the jihadi movement derives much of its inspiration.  The U.S.

could also fund non‐Salafis, but it currently lacks the expertise necessary to

determine who is truly influential.    Perhaps a better strategy in the near

term would be to pressure Middle Eastern governments to allow greater

political participation and visibility for groups that jihadis are threatened

by.  This approach should vary from country to country.  For example, in

Egypt, it would be the Muslim Brotherhood; in Saudi Arabia, the Shi’a.  

Again, it is essential that the U.S. hand not be seen.

6.    Jihadi ideologues closely follow Western thought and U.S. strategic

planning for insights that can be used against the United States and its

allies.   

The United States government might consider establishing a think tank

staffed with highly trained experts on the Middle East and

counterinsurgency whose sole purpose would be to identify the major

jihadi thinkers and analyze their works in the manner we outlined above.  

The fruit of this analysis would then be disseminated to other government

agencies involved with counterterrorism.  As it stands now, there are few

agencies that have these sorts of experts.  Moreover, when these experts are

tasked with analyzing the sorts of texts we have used above (which is very

infrequent given other pressures on their time), this analysis often does not

escape the orbit of the agency where it originated.

These observations represent a small portion of the strategic and tactical

insights that can be gleaned from reading the texts mentioned in this article,

to say nothing of the hundreds of texts that are circulating online.   Jihadi

ideologues have left their playbook lying open.    The United States just

needs to read it.

21
 

Notes

1

 Naji, Management, 7.

2  Naji, Management, 24, 28, 39, 98.  

3  Ibid., 23‐4.  

4  Ibid., 28‐30.  

5  Ibid., 39.  

6  Ibid., 48.  

7  Ibid., 37‐40.  

8  Ibid., 38.  

9  Ibid., 7.  

10  Ibid., 5.  

11  Ibid., 7.  

12  Ibid., 8.  

13  Ibid., 8.  

14  Ibid., 7‐8.  

15  Ibid., 8, 10, 19.  

16  Ibid., 9.  

17  Ibid., 91.  

18  Ibid., 61.  

19  Ibid., 12 and passim.  

20  Ibid., 19.  

21  Ibid., 14.  

22  Ibid., 16‐21.

22
 

23  Ibid., 25‐27, 65‐6, 67, 71‐2.  

24  Ibid., 16‐17.  

25  Ibid., 33.  

26  Ibid., 17, 25.  

27  Ibid., 31‐33.  

28  Ibid., 106‐9.  

29  Ibid., 19, 41.

30  Ibid., 82.  

31  Ibid., 73‐80.  

32  Ibid., 46‐7.  

33  Ibid., 75.  

34  Ibid., 69.  

35  Ibid., 3.  

36  Ibid., 34.  

37 Abu Qatada, Between Two Methods, Article 8. 

38  Abu Qatada, Between Two Methods, Article 8.  

39  Ibid., Article 8 and 9.  

40  ICG Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: “Who Are the Islamists?” 31, Sept. 2004: 6.  

41  Ibid.  

42  Suri, Observations, 6‐7.  

43  “A Statement by Abu Mus`ab al‐Suri in Response to the Announcement by the U.S. State

Department,“ Majallat risalat al‐mujahidin, 2005, no. 3: 10 (available online at

www.eprism.org).

44  Suri, Global Resistance, 666.

23
 45  Suri, Observations, 7‐8.

46  Ibid., 8.

47  Suri, “Statement,” 9.  

48  Suri, Observations, 9‐10.

49  Suri, Global Resistance, 731.

50  Suri, Observations, 6.

51  Ibid., 3.

52  Ibid., 2.

53  Suri, Global Resistance, 1445.  

54  Suri, Observations, 4.

55  Ibid., 9.

56  Suri, Global Resistance, 1335f.

57  Ibid., 192‐3; 881.  

58  For the use of the oil‐spot strategy in Iraq, see Andrew F. Krepinevich’s “How to Win in

Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.

24
 

The Combating Terrorism Center  

at West Point

The United States Military Academy at West Point has been providing

commissioned leaders to the nation for over two hundred years.   Established in

1802, West Point’s distinguished alumni include such names as Eisenhower,

MacArthur, Schwarzkopf, Downing and McCaffrey.   West Point educates, trains

and inspires its graduates to a career of commissioned service in the U.S. Army

and to a lifetime of selfless service to the nation.  West Point provides cadets with a

first‐rate education.    Part of that educational experience includes developing a

clear sense for the complex global security environment.

In recognition of the immediate need for providing cadets with a superior

education in terrorism and counterterrorism studies, USMA established the

Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point within the Department of Social

Sciences.  The CTC seeks to better understand the foreign and domestic terrorist

threats to security, to educate future leaders who will have responsibilities to

counter terrorism, and to provide policy analysis and assistance to leaders dealing

with emerging security challenges.  

The CTC develops strategically integrated and balanced perspectives on national

and international security issues. It combines academic, public policy, and military

expertise to create a dynamic, intellectual, and practical research approach to

terrorism, counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and homeland security

issues. Each area of research is critical for understanding the national security

environment and provides the underpinnings necessary for critical policy analysis.

The CTC seeks to apply theoretical study and policy analysis in a manner that is

useful to our nation’s leaders. Its staff understands the paramount importance of

policy‐relevant research and education in light of the new security environment. In

this way, the CTC facilitates educational opportunities and provides policy

analysis to enable greater understanding of the threats our nation faces in these

troubled times.

For more information about the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, please

contact us at 845.938.8495 or by email at ctc@usma.edu.  

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