SAND98-0505/25 

February 2003 

Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Rajesh M. Basrur 

Mumbai, India 

Hasan-Askari Rizvi 

Lahore, Pakistan 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/25 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated 

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of 

Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and technical 

experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze, 

and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative security measures. As part of its 

mission, the CMC sponsors research on cooperative security and the role of technology. Reports of that 

work are provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research is conducted by Sandia staff, 

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For specific information on this report contact: 

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This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 

4
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Abstract 

Nuclear terrorism involves the actual or potential use of nuclear materials to generate fear 

to achieve political goals. This study focuses on the use of terror by non-state actors – mainly 

terrorist groups, but conceivably individual malcontents – through their attainment of some level 

of nuclear capability or threats to existing nuclear infrastructure. This study assesses the 

character and extent of the threat of nuclear terrorism. It reviews numerous forms of nuclear 

terrorism, ranging from the detonation of a nuclear weapon to the use of a nuclear bluff to 

blackmail a government. The potential political, psychological, economic, health, and social 

effects of a nuclear terrorist incident are described. National and international measures to 

combat the threat are discussed. The study then focuses on the specific situation in Pakistan and 

India, examining their respective political conditions, the terrorist threats faced by them, and 

their vulnerabilities to nuclear terrorism. It concludes with a series of recommendations on how 

Pakistan and India can tackle these threats individually as well as through bilateral cooperation 

based on mutual interests. The role of the United States in strengthening this cooperation and 

that of the global community in providing a framework for multilateral cooperation are also 

highlighted. 

5
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Acknowledgements 

The authors are deeply indebted to Kent Biringer, a constant source of advice and support 

throughout the duration of the project. Special thanks go to George Baldwin and Amir 

Mohagheghi for their invaluable criticism and support. We also thank Gaurav Rajen for his very 

useful suggestions and comments. Fred Luetters was a constant source of warmth and encouragement. But for the unstinting administrative support of Patricia Dickens, Stephanie Sustaita, 

Eric Whitmore, and Adam Pool, we would have accomplished little. Diane Ross sorted out our 

literary efforts with skill and good humor. The strengths of this work reflect the contributions of 

all; its failings those of the authors alone. 

6
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................15

2. DIMENSIONS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM ..............................................................17

2.1. TERRORIST GOALS AND THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD ...................................................18 

2.2. HOW SERIOUS IS THE THREAT?...................................................................................24 

3. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM..............................................26

3.1. POLITICAL IMPACT ......................................................................................................27 

3.2. ECONOMIC IMPACT .....................................................................................................29 

3.3. HEALTH IMPACT..........................................................................................................30 

3.4. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ............................................................................................31 

4. NATIONAL MEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR 

TERRORISM ....................................................................................................................32

4.1. DETECTION OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MATERIALS .......................................33 

4.2. IMMIGRATION AND BORDER CONTROLS......................................................................33 

4.3. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS..................................................34 

4.4. PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS ......................................................35 

4.5. NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SECURITY ...........................................................................36 

4.6. PERSONNEL RELIABILITY ............................................................................................37 

4.7. MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING.....................................................................38 

4.8. TRANSPORTATION .......................................................................................................39 

4.9. RADIOACTIVE WASTE .................................................................................................39 

4.10. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING .........................................................................................40 

5. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR 

TERRORISM ....................................................................................................................41

5.1. BILATERAL COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA...................................41 

5.2. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION ...................................................................................43 

5.3. OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION ....................................................................................45 

6. PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM ................................................................47

6.1. PERCEPTIONS OF INSECURITY......................................................................................47 

6.2. OFFICIAL POSTURES....................................................................................................51 

6.3. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND INFRASTRUCTURE...........................................52 

6.4. SECURITY MEASURES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11..............................................................55 

6.5. POLITICAL DYNAMICS.................................................................................................56 

6.6. HOW CREDIBLE IS THE THREAT? ................................................................................60 

7. INDIA AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM .........................................................................63

7
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

7.1. THE ENDURING TERRORIST THREAT ...........................................................................63 

7.2. NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND VULNERABILITIES ..................................................65 

7.3. RESPONSES TO THE NUCLEAR TERRORIST THREAT .....................................................70 

7.4. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE.........................................................................................71 

8. RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................73

8.1. NATIONAL MEASURES ................................................................................................73 

8.2. BILATERAL MEASURES ...............................................................................................74 

8.3. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES .....................................................................................75 

8.4. GLOBAL EFFORTS........................................................................................................77 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ...........................................................................................................78

8
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Acronyms 

ABNES Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj 

ADM atomic demolition munition 

AEC Atomic Energy Commission 

AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board 

BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 

C3 command, control, and communication 

CANDU Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor 

CIA (US) Central Intelligence Agency 

CICP (UN) Center for International Crime Prevention 

CISF Central Industrial Security Force 

CMC Cooperative Monitoring Center 

CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 

CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction 

DAE Department of Atomic Energy 

DBT Design Basis Threat 

DCC Development Control Committee 

DOE (US) Department of Energy 

DoD (US) Department of Defense 

ECC Employment Control Committee 

EU European Union 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

HEU highly enriched uranium

HuM Harkat ul-Mujahedeen 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IGCAR Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service 

ISI Inter-Service Intelligence 

JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed 

JUI Jamiat-ul-Ulema-I-Islam

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba 

LEU low enriched uranium

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAC Multi-Agency Center 

MCC Maoist Communist Centre 

MW megawatt 

NCA National Command Authority 

NDMA National Disaster Management Agency 

NPT Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group 

NT nuclear terrorism

NWFP Northwestern Frontier Province 

ODCCP (UN) Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 

9
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

PAL permissive action link 

PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology 

PNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act 

POTO Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

PW People’s War 

RCA Regional Cooperative Agreement 

RDD radiological dispersion device 

REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 

SAARC South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation 

SPD Strategic Plans Division 

TNLA Tamil Nadu Liberation Army

TNT trinitrotoluene 

TPB (UN) Terrorism Prevention Branch 

US United States 

UN United Nations 

WHO World Health Organization 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

10
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Executive Summary

Nuclear terrorism involves the actual or potential use of nuclear materials to generate fear 

while in pursuit of political goals. This study focuses on the use of terror by non-state actors – 

mainly terrorist groups, but conceivably individual malcontents – through their attainment of 

some level of nuclear capability or threats to existing nuclear infrastructure. 

This study assesses the character and extent of the threat of nuclear terrorism. It reviews 

numerous forms of nuclear terrorism, ranging from the detonation of a nuclear weapon to the use 

of a nuclear bluff to blackmail a government. The potential political, psychological, economic, 

health, and social effects of a nuclear terrorist incident are described. National and international 

measures to combat the threat are discussed. The study then focuses on the specific situation in 

Pakistan and India, examining their respective political conditions, the terrorist threats faced by 

them, and their vulnerabilities to nuclear terrorism. It concludes with a series of recommendations on how Pakistan and India can tackle these threats individually as well as through 

bilateral cooperation based on mutual interests. The role of the United States in strengthening 

this cooperation and that of the global community in providing a framework for multilateral 

cooperation are also highlighted. 

Measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism include (1) the use of modern 

technology (such as sensors) for the detection of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials to 

interdict unauthorized movement of weapons- or non-weapons-grade fissile materials within a 

country and across international borders, (2) the use of immigration and border controls to 

prevent the free movement of terrorists, (3) the control and protection of nuclear weapons, (4) 

the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, (5) the use of personnel 

reliability programs to ensure the trustworthiness of persons in sensitive positions, and (6) the 

use of material access control and accounting measures. 

In a world characterized by rapidly increasing communication and the ever-expanding 

physical movement of people and goods, terrorist threats transcend national boundaries. While a 

specific nuclear terrorist threat may be aimed at a specific country, the group that makes that 

threat may choose to target another country later. Or, the ransom extracted may affect the 

interests of more than one country. The sources of terrorism and the activities of terrorist groups 

often span national frontiers and measures to avert the threat must be international in scope to be 

effective. 

The community of states as a whole has a common stake in cooperating to suppress 

nuclear terrorism. Irrespective of their differences, all states share an interest in ensuring that 

non-state actors do not gain access to nuclear technology and materials for malicious purposes. 

Cooperation can be bilateral or multilateral. The United States (US) helps secure Russian 

nuclear weapons and materials against theft through a program of material protection control and 

accounting. Another project sponsored by the US has helped some Russian facilities pursue 

more civilian and commercial enterprises to provide job opportunities to Russian nuclear 

scientists and engineers who have been displaced or are underemployed. The United Nations 

11
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

(UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also play a significant part in 

addressing nuclear terrorism-related concerns through multilateral political and technical 

cooperation. 

This paper also provides insights on Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear programs and the 

nuclear terrorist threats to each. 

Pakistan embarked on its nuclear weapons program in 1972 when the then-civilian 

government decided in principle to explore the nuclear weapons option. However, no concrete 

measure was pursued until India’s first nuclear explosion in May 1974. The control of 

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program shifted to the Pakistan military in July 1977, but no change 

occurred in Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The decision in May 1998 to explode nuclear devices was 

made by the then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but with major input from the military top brass. 

The West has expressed serious concerns regarding the security of the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. 

The most dreaded scenarios envisioned control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or fissile material 

slipping into the hands of a pro-Taliban militant Islamic group or sympathizers in the military or 

the intelligence agencies. However, the size of Pakistan’s nuclear program and nuclear arsenal is 

small, which enables Army authorities to maintain centralized control over nuclear weapons and 

fissile material. The media reports of a possible US attempt to secure or destroy Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons and nuclear installations were generally resented in Pakistan, both officially 

and non-officially. The government of Pakistan took strong notice of these speculative reports 

and repeatedly assured the international community that its nuclear installations and assets were 

safe and that additional safeguards had been introduced after September 11, 2001. The most 

pessimistic scenario for the future of Pakistan and the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal is 

that Pakistan will increasingly become ungovernable. However, the probability of such a 

scenario unfolding is minimal. Pakistan’s state structure may be under stress, but two of its 

institutions, the military and the bureaucracy, are sufficiently strong and cohesive to ensure the 

functioning of the state. 

Despite its history of sustained democratization, India has constantly been troubled by 

terrorist violence. While much attention has been focused on the current secessionist movement 

of Muslim groups in Kashmir, terrorist threats have always been diverse, encompassing 

numerous geographical areas, ethnic groups, ideologies, and cross-border spillovers. Of the 

many groups active today, only the “jihadists” fighting in Kashmir – mostly radicals from

outside India – pose a serious nuclear terrorist threat. India’s relatively large nuclear 

infrastructure appears secure. Reactor buildings are strong and well guarded, and nuclear 

warheads are reportedly stored in an unassembled state. After September 11, security measures 

have been enhanced. There has been no significant nuclear terrorist threat, but that may be in 

part a function of a lack of effort on the part of terrorists so far. Terrorists have penetrated and 

launched attacks in high security zones such as Army camps, ammunition dumps, the national 

Parliament and, in the case of Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister’s residence. Given this backdrop, the risks of a nuclear terrorist incident occurring remain significant. Hence, there is a need 

to improve security by, among other things, upgrading monitoring technology, improving 

organizational coordination, and paying more attention to nuclear sources in hospitals and 

industries. 

12
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

The probability of terrorist groups acquiring fully operational nuclear weapons in India 

and Pakistan is extremely low since both countries are believed to keep them in unassembled 

form and because their components are stored separately. Terrorists are also unlikely to be able 

to manufacture an operational nuclear weapon of their own given the difficulties involved in 

obtaining the required facilities and technical know-how. However, terrorist groups are more 

likely to resort to other forms of nuclear terrorism. First, they might sabotage a nuclear facility 

(including a military facility) to release lethal radiation. Second, they could utilize a dirty bomb 

to disperse radiation. In either case, the result would be widespread panic and violence, perhaps 

even war. Third, they could take control of and threaten to blow up a nuclear facility in order to 

blackmail a government into accepting their demands. Fourth, they might engage in the 

clandestine transfer of nuclear materials out of India and Pakistan for use in another part of the 

world. Desirable national measures to counter the threat include the following: 

1. Continue to track the numerous groups and individuals engaged in overt or covert 

violence or terrorism in their respective countries. 

2. Enhance measures to control the movement of goods and people across international 

borders. 

3. Acquire modern technology and equipment to upgrade the physical security of 

nuclear weapons components, nuclear materials, and installations, including 

radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities. 

4. Give greater attention to personnel reliability issues in order to minimize insider 

threats. 

5. Acquire the latest technologies for the packaging, sealing, and monitoring of fissile 

and radioactive materials during transportation. 

6. Establish an autonomous and highly trained security force devoted exclusively to 

protecting nuclear facilities and materials, instead of using agencies that have other 

assignments as well. 

7. Within each country, appoint a coordinating body to integrate the various domestic 

organizations related to the nuclear infrastructure. 

8. Finally, make provisions for disaster management, including emergency response 

teams for tackling a security alarm or actual nuclear terrorist incident. 

Neither India nor Pakistan would want a terrorist group to acquire nuclear capability of 

any kind. Hence, they have a common interest in cooperating against nuclear terrorist threats. 

The authors recommend the following measures for bilateral cooperation: 

1. Cooperation between the border security authorities of India and Pakistan in interdicting unauthorized movement of goods and people across their boundaries. 

2. Monitoring the activities of transnational terrorist groups, exchanging information on 

these groups, and making joint efforts to disrupt their connections, transactions, and 

movement could be another measure. An agreement specifically designed to help 

each other combat nuclear terrorism could encourage cooperation. 

13
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

3. A formal agreement on maintaining nuclear arsenals in a non-operational form could 

consolidate the tacit cooperation already in existence. This would not only strengthen 

strategic stability directly, but also help reduce the scope for terrorists to target 

nuclear weapons. 

The United States can contribute to strengthening the safety and security of their nuclear 

programs in several ways: 

1. The United States could share its knowledge on personnel reliability systems to help 

protect against the insider threat. Training workshops could be held for Pakistani and 

Indian personnel and relevant literature (manuals, guidelines and procedures) could 

be made available to them. 

2. The United States could extend useful assistance for safe and secure storage, transport, and disposal of nuclear waste. 

3. The United States could help India and Pakistan improve organizational practices to 

ensure better coordination among various organizations involved in their nuclear 

programs. 

4. The United States could make modern technologies available to India and Pakistan to 

strengthen the safety and security of their nuclear programs. 

The nuclear terrorist threat is global in scope. Continued global cooperation is needed to 

identify, track down, and apprehend terrorist groups. This will require strengthening of interstate information exchange and the establishment of arrangements for extradition of terrorists 

within the framework of the UN. The measures initiated by the IAEA to enhance cooperation 

with respect to the physical security of civilian nuclear facilities and materials should be 

continued and intensified. In order to ensure the diffusion of advanced monitoring technologies 

and best practices, the IAEA should be provided with additional funding and an expanded 

agenda. The creation of a special fund for assisting countries needing upgraded technology 

should be seriously considered. 

The states possessing nuclear weapons should engage in a similar – perhaps, informal at 

first – set of arrangements on physical security with respect to military nuclear facilities and 

materials. Regardless of inevitable tensions over how much information can be given and how 

much received, some degree of cooperation can be beneficial to all. Here, the authors believe it 

is necessary to go beyond traditional objections to “rewarding” proliferators: whether nations 

will or will not obtain nuclear weapons is determined by capabilities and interests, not by vague 

notions of reward and punishment. Finally, the authors believe that future arms control 

agreements must eliminate specific weapons fully rather than place large numbers under storage, 

where they will continue to be potential targets for terrorists. 

14
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

1. Introduction 

Nuclear terrorism (NT) involves the actual or potential use of nuclear materials to 

generate fear, while in pursuit of political goals. This study focuses on the use of terror by nonstate actors – mainly terrorist groups, but conceivably individual malcontents – through their 

attainment of some level of nuclear capability or threats to the existing nuclear infrastructure. 

This could involve the use of stolen nuclear weapons or weapons manufactured from fissile 

materials

1

 such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained from military or 

civilian sources. Nuclear terrorism may also involve the dispersal of radioactive materials in a 

“dirty” bomb to cause radiological contamination. These materials include fissile materials, 

natural uranium, nuclear waste, or radionuclides used in medical and health centers, scientific 

research, and industries. Sabotage of a reactor or other nuclear facility is yet another form of 

nuclear terrorism. 

The twentieth century was witness to the proliferation of diverse weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), of which nuclear technology provided the most fearsome potential. The 

post-Second World War era also saw the growth of terrorism as a political phenomenon. Nonstate actors used their advantages – compact organization, mobility, and secrecy – in conjunction 

with the increasing availability of powerful weapons to wreak destruction against states 

possessing far greater resources. The period also produced cults like Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo and 

angry, isolated individuals such as the Oklahoma City bomber, who were willing to unleash 

indiscriminate mass destruction on innocent people. The former case was a rare but frightening 

one: it involved the practice of WMD terrorism, in this case the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo 

subway system. The question that troubled security specialists was: With access to nuclear 

materials, what horrors might a similarly motivated group or individual produce? Numerous 

studies produced considerable understanding of the dangers of nuclear terrorism and generated 

efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities. In the late twentieth century, the growing 

incidence of terrorist acts by fundamentalist groups such as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 

accelerated these efforts. 

The events of September 11, 2001, galvanized the world into widespread and concerted 

action. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), warned that the attacks made it “far more likely” that terrorists would target nuclear 

facilities, and that states had to cooperate to stop them because “radiation knows no frontiers.”2

 

In particular, there was a growing fear that al-Qaeda was engaged in a serious effort to acquire 

nuclear capability.3

 This in turn brought close attention to the turbulent political situation in 

South Asia. Al-Qaeda, held responsible for the September 11 acts, was then based in 

Afghanistan, adjacent to Pakistan and India. Both countries have developed nuclear programs 

 

1 Fissile materials are those nuclear materials that are able to explode because of an uncontrolled nuclear chain 

reaction, under suitable conditions. They are the essential materials for making a nuclear weapon. 2 “Calculating the New Global Atom Threat,” Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency, November 1, 

2001. http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/P_release/2001/nt_pressrelease.shtml 3 Philip Webster and Roland Watson, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Threat,” Times, October 26, 2001; Anthony Loyd, “Bin

Laden’s Nuclear Secrets Found,” Times, November 15, 2001. 

15
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

and are plagued by civil strife, terrorism, and threats to political stability. Some of Pakistan’s 

extremist Islamic groups had close ties with the Taliban, which facilitated their interaction with 

al-Qaeda. In the past, the government of Pakistan had maintained a friendly disposition towards 

the Taliban regime and supported them in intra-Afghan strife. Terrorist groups based in Pakistan 

were active in India. 

The international community became acutely sensitive to the possibility of al-Qaeda and 

other terrorist groups acquiring fissile and radioactive materials from the region, or attacking its 

nuclear facilities. These groups, it was feared, would be motivated by a desire for retaliation 

against the decision of India and Pakistan to join the United States (US)-led campaign in 

Afghanistan. The groups were particularly incensed with the Pakistan government, whose decision to join the United States was viewed by them as a betrayal. While some of these fears may 

have been exaggerated, the nuclear terrorist threat to the region cannot be discounted. 

This study is an effort to assess the character and extent of the threat of nuclear terrorism. 

It reviews numerous forms of nuclear terrorism, ranging from the detonation of a nuclear weapon 

to the use of a nuclear bluff to blackmail a government. The potential psychological, social, 

political, and economic effects of a nuclear terrorist incident are enumerated. National and 

international measures to combat the threat are discussed. The study then focuses on the specific 

situation in Pakistan and India, examining their respective political conditions, the terrorist 

threats faced by them, and their vulnerabilities to nuclear terrorism. It concludes with a series of 

recommendations on how Pakistan and India can tackle these threats individually as well as 

through bilateral cooperation based on mutual interests. The role of the United States in 

strengthening this cooperation and that of the global community in providing a framework for 

multilateral cooperation are also highlighted. 

16
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

2. Dimensions of Nuclear Terrorism 

A great deal has been written about terrorism, but the term has not always been clearly 

defined. Terrorism is often equated with the use of violence by non-state actors for political 

ends; but that is also true of insurgency, or guerrilla warfare. Terrorism has also been defined as 

“violence or threatened violence intended to produce fear or change.”4

 A more careful definition 

offered by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and the one used in this 

paper, is “the use of violence, often against people not directly involved in a conflict, by groups 

operating clandestinely, which generally claim to have high political or religious purposes, and 

believe that creating a climate of terror will assist attainment of their objectives.”5

 This is not 

entirely complete, since it omits state terrorism, in which states directly or indirectly seek the 

same objectives and use the same methods. In practice, however, states are unlikely to sponsor 

terrorist acts involving WMD, since loss of control over terrorist groups that possess WMD 

capability could have extremely adverse consequences for them.

6

Nuclear terrorism involves the actual or potential use of nuclear materials to generate 

fear in the pursuit of political ends. Nuclear terrorist incidents include the acquisition of, use or 

threatened use of, or attack on nuclear materials or facilities, as well as the resort to false threats 

or hoaxes that, to the extent they are convincing, would have the same effect.7

 The materials that 

could conceivably be used encompass manufactured or stolen nuclear weapons (not necessarily 

of a sophisticated variety), and fissile materials such as HEU and plutonium. A sub-category of 

nuclear terrorism is radiological terrorism, which involves the use of radioactive materials – 

perhaps in conjunction with regular explosives – to disperse radioactivity only to contaminate 

the environment. The range of possible terrorist actions is wide, and the following list is 

indicative rather than exhaustive: 

• A hoax threatening a nuclear explosion or the release of radioactivity in a populated area; 

• The takeover of a nuclear plant or seizure of materials during transportation, followed by 

the threat of a radioactive release; 

• Release of radioactivity in an isolated area as a warning of impending damage at a higher 

level; 

• An attack on nuclear materials during transportation so as to cause a release of radioactivity; 

 

4

 Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction (1991, incomplete citation), cited in Political Terrorism Database. 

http://polisci.home.mindspring.com/ptd/ptd_definition.html 5 “Defining Terrorism: Focusing on the Targets,” Strategic Comments, 7, 9 (2001). http//:www.iiss.org. 

stratcomsubarchive.php?scID=193 6

 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (Basingstoke and London:

Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 10-12. 7

 For a chronology of WMD terrorism incidents, including hoaxes, see Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman, and Kimberly

McCloud, 2000 WMD Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-national Actors and Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, or Nuclear Materials, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International 

Studies. http//:cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/cbrn2k.htm

17
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

• A radiological attack on symbolic targets with a relatively immediate impact, e.g., a 

national monument or a major public building; 

• A radiological attack on industrial targets, e.g., factories, ports, and office complexes; 

• A radiological attack on government centers and military targets; 

• A conventional attack on a nuclear reactor or a waste storage/disposal site; 

• A radiological attack on urban concentrations with intent to maximize fatalities; and 

• A nuclear blast aimed at any of the targets identified above. 

The actual physical damage may range from the nonexistent to the horrific, but the 

common effect will be to create terror in the minds of the public, which is the desired end of the 

terrorist. 

2.1. Terrorist Goals and the Nuclear Threshold 

A world in the throes of globalization and the uncertainties it has engendered is fertile 

soil for the terrorist. The erosion of traditional identities, combined with the disparities and 

insecurities produced by economic change, have given rise to growing anger and frustration, to 

“marginalized subcultures” and to “selective technopolitical rage.”8

 Terrorists are driven both 

by strategic reasoning and by deep psychological motivations. As rational calculators, they may 

resort to violence because they lack adequate mass support, because they are subject to severe 

repression, or perhaps because of a need to seize upon a critical moment of government weakness or the infusion of new resources.9

 At the same time, terrorists are also creatures of a 

“special psycho-logic”: often propelled by a pattern of educational and vocational failure and a 

sense of social rejection; they are aggressive, stimulus-hungry, and prone to violence against 

those in whom they seek to project their own failures.10 Group pressures tend to propel 

individuals across the threshold of violence, and sometimes to encourage a higher level of 

bloodshed. 

What might motivate a terrorist to “go nuclear”? The history of terrorist mass destruction 

is a relatively sketchy and short one. 

The resort to nuclear terrorism, with its potential for mass annihilation, appears to have 

inherent constraints from the rational standpoint. Indeed, there are very few examples of mass 

 

8

 Paul Schulte, “Motives and Methods of Future Political Violence: Landscapes of the Early 21st Century,” in Yonah 

Alexander and Milton Hoenig, eds., Super Terrorism: Biological, Chemical and Nuclear (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001), p. 46. 9 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as A Product of Strategic Choice,” in Walter 

Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1990). 10 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Reich, ed., 

Origins of Terrorism; Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, Ch. 2. 

18
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

killing by terrorists over the past hundred years or so.11 Terrorists have numerous reasons for 

eschewing a strategy of mass casualty attacks.12 They usually want to create fear, not revulsion. 

As Brian Jenkins puts it, “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.”13

Resorting to mass killing can alienate not only the public, but members of a terrorist organization 

as well. Terrorists have numerous alternatives that can accomplish the objective of creating 

widespread fear with less difficulty, such as hijackings, bomb blasts, and kidnappings. For those 

who want to exterminate large numbers, as in the “ethnic cleansing” that has occurred in recent 

times in Rwanda and Bosnia, simple weapons are sufficient. Besides, most terrorist groups wish 

to displace governments, and hence they behave – at least to some extent – like governments 

themselves, which places a constraint on unrestrained and indiscriminate violence.14 Above all, 

coercive strategies rarely succeed because governments resort to greater repression, and hardly 

ever make major concessions. 

Nuclear terrorist threats have been rare, and have never actually been carried out. In 

1985, for instance, an “Armenian Scientific Group” threatened to destroy Turkey’s major cities 

by exploding three nuclear devices, but nothing came of it.15 In 1995, evidently on information 

provided by a rebel Chechen leader, a Russian television crew found a small quantity of cesium137 in a Moscow park.16 However, two terrorist groups have actually carried out acts of mass 

violence. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult group that conducted a chemical weapons attack in 

the Tokyo subway in 1995, is known to have attempted (unsuccessfully) to acquire nuclear 

capability. More recently, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda is also known to have tried to obtain 

nuclear material and technology. History does not appear to be an adequate guide to the future. 

Indicators of a new trend toward mass killing warn of an increased risk of nuclear terrorism in 

times to come.

17 The steady diffusion of technical knowledge means there is an ever-growing 

pool of capable individuals from which terrorist groups can draw. Nuclear materials are widely 

distributed around the world and are secured inadequately in some facilities. Above all, the rise 

of religion-based terrorism and of doomsday cults has been accompanied by ever-higher levels 

of violence, as manifested in the September 11 attacks in the United States. Religious terrorists 

are less inhibited in their destructiveness because their ultimate audience is not the government 

or the public, but God. For them, violence becomes “a sacramental act, dictated and legitimized 

by theology.”18 The biggest threats come from “megalomaniacal hyperterrorists,” individuals 

who dream of altering the trajectory of history through great acts of destructive transformation.19

 

11 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1998), p. 47, 

Table 1. 12 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel, pp. 45-59. 13 Brian M. Jenkins, “Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?” in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Nuclear 

Terrorism: Defining the Threat (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1986), p. 28. 14 Jenkins, “Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?” p. 29. 15 Jenkins, “Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?” p. 28. 16 William Potter, “Less Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet 

Union,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, August 1997. (http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/nuccases.htm) Some

half a dozen other cases cited by Potter are of a criminal nature, and would not fall into the category of terrorism as 

defined above. 17 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel, pp. 168-215. 18 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel, p. 184. 19 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Lone Gunmen,” Foreign Policy, (November–December 2001). http://www.foreignpolicy. 

com/issue_novdec_2001/sprinzakhyper.html

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Though they may act alone (as did Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber), they often show a 

capacity to organize and lead terrorist groups (bin Laden of al-Qaeda, Shoko Asahara of Aum

Shinrikyo, and Ramsey Yusuf, who masterminded the World Trade Center bombing of 1993). 

Hence, bin Laden’s exhortation to Muslims in The Nuclear Bomb of Islam to do their “duty” and 

“prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God” has to be taken very 

seriously.20

The major threats posed by nuclear terrorism are as follows: 

1. Acquisition and Development of Nuclear Weapons and Components 

Terrorists might be able to steal or, more likely, use force to acquire a nuclear weapon. 

Whether tactical or strategic, the ability of terrorists to use these weapons would be dependent on 

the level of built-in safeguards. Sophisticated weapons are less vulnerable because protective 

devices, such as permissive action links (PALs) implemented in the United States, would make it 

virtually impossible to utilize them as they are. However, depending on the design, they might 

be dismantled and reassembled into workable weapons. Unassembled weapons might also be 

assembled and used. The assembly of a weapon would, of course, require a high degree of 

sophistication. It is also possible for terrorists to steal nuclear bomb components in order to 

make their own weapon. Not least, the mere possession of a stolen nuclear weapon would 

enhance the “capability” of a terrorist group. Whether the weapon is workable or not, those at 

the receiving end of a threat cannot afford to assume that it will not work. 

Basic bomb designs are not hard to obtain or develop, since the technical knowledge has 

now been publicly available for many years. More difficult are the tasks of obtaining fissile 

material and employing the techniques that go into the actual fabrication of a nuclear bomb. 

Global stockpiles of fissile material are large, amounting to some 450 tons of plutonium and over 

1,700 tons of HEU.21 (Other estimates are higher.) Though most of these are held by the five 

major nuclear states, considerable quantities also exist in Belgium, Germany, Japan, India, Israel, 

and Switzerland. In addition, research reactors in 43 countries have more than 2,772 kilograms 

of HEU. The global stock of raw uranium that could be converted into fissile material or used 

directly for radiological terrorism is estimated to be close to 65,000 tons.22 Despite the 

considerable efforts and resources devoted to guarding these inventories, the possibility for 

leakages is substantial. 

Major sources of such leakages have been the successor states of the Soviet Union, 

especially Russia. William Potter has identified seven cases of diversion of significant quantities 

of nuclear material, and four other possible cases.23 More alarming, a February 2002 assessment 

by the US National Intelligence Council states that undetected diversion of weapons-grade and 

weapons-usable materials has taken place from Russian institutes, but “we do not know the 

 

20 Cited in Jim Puzzanghera, “Possibility for Nuclear Terror Too Real to Be Ignored,” Mercury News Washington 

Bureau, October 14, 2001. 21 M. Bunn and G. Bunn, “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage,” International Atomic Energy

Agency, n.d., IAEA-SM-367/4/08. 22 “World Nuclear Power Reactors 2000-2001 and Uranium Requirements,” World Nuclear Association, June 2002. 

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm 23 Potter, “Less Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet Union.” 

20
Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

extent or magnitude of such thefts.”24 Russia is estimated to possess 150 tons of weapons-grade 

plutonium, 1,000 tons of enriched uranium, and, at the Chelyabinsk complex alone, 685,000 

cubic meters of radioactive waste.25 Given the reality of poor accounting, organizational 

deterioration because of adverse economic conditions, and inadequate physical controls, it is not 

surprising that there are numerous examples of material diversion, more often than not by 

insiders.26 Moreover, projections of Russian weapons inventories show that, over the next 

decade, about 3,500 warheads containing approximately 84,000 kilograms of fissile material will 

be removed from deployment.27 Besides material diversion, it is also possible for small atomic 

weapons, known as atomic demolition munitions (ADMs, also loosely referred to as “suitcase 

nukes”), to be stolen. Though much attention today is centered on Russia, other sources of 

material and/or components do exist. Thomas Davies has pointed to lax standards of security 

during the transport of HEU in Europe, and to the purchase of three disarmed but workable 

short-range missiles by a junk dealer in the United States.28

The possibility of a workable nuclear weapon being assembled by a terrorist group 

cannot be discounted.29 A relatively simple gun-type nuclear weapon design (such as that used 

for the Hiroshima bomb) involves the firing of a subcritical HEU projectile into a subcritical 

HEU target to achieve a (supercritical) nuclear chain reaction. A more difficult implosion type 

design (Nagasaki type) requires a near-critical piece of fissile material (uranium or plutonium, 

possibly uranium oxide or plutonium oxide) to be compressed by the detonation of a surrounding 

high explosive in order to achieve supercriticality. The amount of material required depends 

upon several factors, including what material is used and how the weapon is designed, but even 

the minimum amount is several kilograms for plutonium and tens of kilograms for HEU.

30 Even 

though the designs for less sophisticated bombs may require less material, the amount of material 

required is still large (multiple kilogram-quantities). The making of a bomb would take 

considerable time (months, at best) and require extensive expertise with different specializations 

in metallurgy, neutronics, radiation effects, high explosives, hydrodynamics, and electronics. 

The end product in the case of a simple design would be a large and unwieldy bomb weighing 

over a ton. More manageable sizes would involve more difficult processes. 

However, very crude devices, sometimes with very limited effects, would still be possible. Reactor-grade plutonium from a commercial light-water reactor could be used to develop a 

bomb with a relatively small yield of one or a few kilotons. Even if this does not work very 

well, because reactor-grade plutonium tends to “pre-initiate” on account of spontaneous fission 

 

24 Jon B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia,” Survival, 44, 2 

(Summer 2002), p. 71. 25 Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 2. 26 Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 2-13. 27 Wolfsthal and Collina, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia,” p. 73. 28 Thomas D. Davies, “What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?” in Leventhal and 

Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 58, 63. 29 Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, “Can Terrorists Build 

Nuclear Weapons?” Nuclear Control Institute, n.d., http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm; Milton Hoenig, 

“Terrorists Going Nuclear,” in Alexander and Hoenig, eds., Super Terrorism; Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 

America’s Achilles’ Heel, pp. 126-136. 30 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel, p. 131; Hoenig, “Terrorists Going Nuclear,” p. 34;

Mark et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?”

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

of some of its components, the resultant “fizzle yield” would still yield a devastating blast.31 On

the whole, it would seem that the obstacles in the path of nuclear bomb making are sufficiently 

difficult in terms of availability of knowledge and materials to make the prospect appear very 

low. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot altogether be ruled out. 

2. The Insider Threat 

A serious potential threat to nuclear facilities, whether military or civilian, comes from

insiders. The range of possible threats includes theft of materials; support to outsiders by way of 

disruption of alarm systems; sabotage of facilities or specific processes (such as reactor cooling 

systems); and simple acts such as providing building layouts or access codes to terrorists.32 

Most acts of sabotage have been caused by disgruntled employees who have expressed their 

anger by, among other things, cutting electrical cables, setting fires, or destroying security 

cameras.33 Most nuclear-related organizations are also vulnerable to cyber-security threats: 

information on any aspect of a nuclear facility from bomb design to security measures could be 

misappropriated by an insider.34 It is important to recognize that the insider threat applies to 

military facilities too. Herbert Abrams has illustrated the seriousness of the problem by 

recording the significant levels of psychiatric disorders and drug and alcohol abuse, as well as of 

actual violent acts by military personnel cleared through personnel reliability screening 

programs.35 While this study applies to the US armed forces, there is no reason to believe that 

military personnel elsewhere are significantly different in their behavior patterns. 

3. Acquisition and Use of Materials for Radiological Terrorism 

Apart from fissile material, large quantities of radioactive material are available around 

the world. Terrorists could utilize these for contaminating the environment in diverse ways, 

from direct contamination of food and water to exploding a radiological dispersion device 

(RDD), or “dirty bomb,” which would use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive 

material. Radioactive materials are commonly used for nonmilitary purposes. According to a 

recent count, there are 283 research reactors operating in 56 countries employed in nuclear 

research, environmental science, advanced materials development, the drug design, and nuclear 

medicine for numerous purposes.36 Hospitals and medical research centers widely use nuclear 

materials known as radioisotopes such as cobalt-60 (external radiation therapy), iodine-131, 

iridium-192 (both for internal therapy), and technetium-99 (for imaging).37 Less well known is 

the widespread and increasing use of radioisotopes in industry, such as americium-141 (smoke 

detection and measuring ash content in coal), cesium-137 (identification of sources of soil 

erosion and deposition), cobalt-60 (sterilization of food and medical products) and tritium (exit 

 

31 Hoenig, “Terrorists Going Nuclear,” pp. 35-36. 32 Daniel Hirsch, “The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities.” 33 “The Insider Sabotage Problem,” Three Mile Island Alert, n.d. http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html 34 Project on Government Oversight, US Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk, pp. 21-23. 35 Herbert L. Abrams, “Human Reliability and Safety in the Handling of Nuclear Weapons,” Science & Global

Security, 2 (1991), pp. 1-26. 36 “Research Reactors,” World Nuclear Association, July 2001. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ inf61print.htm 37 “Radioisotopes in Medicine,” World Nuclear Association, May 2001. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/

inf55.htm

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

signs and watch dials).38 The extent of the problem is hard to estimate, but it is known that even 

in countries where security regulations are tight, considerable leakage occurs. For instance, the 

IAEA disclosed in June 2002 that US companies had lost track of as many as 1,500 radioactive 

sources since 1996, over half of which remained untraced.39

The extent of damage that terrorists can cause by using such materials to create a dirty 

bomb depends primarily on three factors.40 The size of the conventional explosive used would 

determine the extent of dispersion of radioactivity, and the quantity and quality of the radioactive 

material would determine its relative lethality. Contrary to a common perception, the potential 

for contaminating water supply on a large scale is negligible. Most radioactive material is not 

soluble in water and would either settle or be trapped in filters, and in any case, the quantity of

material required to contaminate large bodies of water would be very great.41 As a way of 

estimating the potential effects of such materials, it bears noting that in 1987, a 20-gram capsule 

of cesium-137 stolen by a gang of thieves in Brazil caused 4 deaths, 14 cases of radiation burns, 

and 249 cases of contamination.42 A report produced by the Federation of American Scientists 

undertook three hypothetical case studies of dirty bombs being exploded over urban concentrations using cesium, cobalt, and americium. The study found that, while immediate casualties 

would be few, there would be a significant number of cancer deaths, high levels of cancer risk 

over fairly large areas, and the need to evacuate and decontaminate or rebuild much of the contaminated area. For instance, if a typical quantity of americium used for oil well surveys were to 

be blown up with one pound of TNT, an area covering 20 city blocks would have to be 

evacuated within half an hour, and, if an area of 60 city blocks had to be rebuilt, the cost could 

be more than $50 billion.43 The most powerful effects would be panic, social tension, and the 

undermining of societal stability. 

4. Sabotage: Nuclear Plants, Storage, and Transport 

Nuclear power plants are subject to a wide set of potential threats. Plants are designed to 

be protected from a range of credible threats – captured by the concept of the “Design Basis 

Threat” (DBT), which anticipates direct attacks from the ground, air, and possibly water.44 

Some current DBTs do not take into account some worst-case scenarios that are difficult to 

ignore after September 11. The destruction of the World Trade Center has brought particular 

attention to the potential effects of a large passenger plane crashing into a nuclear reactor. Such 

a threat was actually made in the United States in 1972, when hijackers warned they would crash 

 

38 “Radioisotopes in Industry,” World Nuclear Association, November 2001. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ 

inf56.htm 39 Serge Schmemman, “Agency Says ‘Dirty Bomb’ Could Be Made in Any Country,” New York Times, June 26, 

2002. 

40 “Dirty Bombs,” Transcript of Online Discussion with Jim Walsh, Washingtonpost.com, June 10, 2002. 

http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/walsh061002.htm 41 First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 15, 1999, RAND, Washington, D.C. 42 Mark Henderson, “Terrorists ‘Could Make Atom Bomb by Raiding Hospitals,’ ” The Times (London), November 

1, 2001. 

43 Public Interest Report, 55, 2 (March/April 2002), pp. 2, 6-10. 44 For a more detailed discussion of Design Basis Threats, see Project on Government Oversight, US Nuclear 

Weapons Complex: Security at Risk, Washington, D.C., October 2001, pp. 9-11. Threats from water sources are not

discussed in the report.

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a Southern Airways jetliner into the Oak Ridge nuclear weapons complex, but did not carry it 

out.45 Aircraft engines, the most rigid parts, could possibly penetrate the containment structure 

and cause a major fire or explosion, releasing radioactivity on a massive scale.46 Some nuclear 

power plants may be ill equipped to counter certain levels of a sophisticated armed attack. For 

instance, a large, properly placed truck bomb could have a similar effect as above, destroying the 

cooling systems and breaching the containment structure of a reactor, and causing a meltdown 

and possible dispersal of radiation.47 Armed ground assaults might also be launched to take over 

plants temporarily and indulge in sabotage, perhaps by destroying safety systems. Generally, 

spent fuel pools contain more hazardous material than reactors, and are less well protected than 

reactor buildings. While most spent fuel pools are underground, they are vulnerable: should the 

cooling system be damaged, or if a crack allowed the cooling water to escape, the spent fuel 

would either melt or burn, causing radiation to spread.48 In the case of dry storage, spent fuel 

casks can be penetrated by armor-piercing shells or blown up.49 This kind of sabotage has the 

potential to cause significant contamination. 

Nuclear materials are particularly vulnerable to sabotage during transportation.50 This

includes the transportation of nuclear materials within a nuclear power complex. Methods of 

attack may include using armor-piercing shells to penetrate storage casks; capturing and blowing 

up casks; destroying the transportation infrastructure, such as a bridge or tunnel during movement of nuclear material; and causing high-speed derailment of rail cars. The kind of damage 

caused to the USS Cole in Yemen may also damage or sink a ship carrying nuclear materials. In 

addition, nuclear weapons or their components (separated cores, unmated warheads) may also be 

subject to attack during transportation. 

2.2. How Serious Is the Threat? 

It is still a matter of debate as to whether nuclear terrorism is a likely prospect, given the 

numerous obstacles that have prevented it from occurring so far. First, for many terrorists, an act 

of nuclear terror would be politically inexpedient as well as morally unacceptable. Second, 

terrorists may have the will, but lack the capability. Building a nuclear bomb is a very difficult 

task, as several nations with considerable resources at their command have found. Nuclear 

weapons and facilities are generally well guarded. Even a dirty bomb may be hard to make, as 

 

45 Duncan Mansfield, “Hijacked Plane Targeted Nuclear Complex,” Washington Post, September 19, 2002. 46 “Security of the Nation’s 103 Nuclear Reactors,” Transcript of News Conference, Nuclear Control Institute and 

Committee to Bridge the Gap, Washington, D.C., September 25, 2001. 47 Daniel Hirsch, “The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities,” Nuclear Control Institute, 1987, 

http://www.nci.org/g-h/hirschtb.htm; Project on Government Oversight, U. S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security

at Risk, p. 20. 48 Alden Meyer, “New UCS Fact Sheet on Spent Fuel Security,” World Information Service on Energy, 

Washington, D.C., http://www.antenna.nl/wise/terrorism/10232001us.html; “Nuclear Reactor Security,” Union of 

Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/energy/br_safenplants.html; Paul Choiniere, “Officials Taking a 

Second Look at Plant Security,” TheDay.com, September 19, 2001, http://www.nci.org/01/09/19-10.htm 49 “Castor and Terror,” World Information Service on Energy, Washington, D.C., November 23, 2001. http://www.

antenna.nl/wise/terrorism/11222001wis.html 50 State of Nevada, Nuclear Waste Project Office, Fact Sheet: Terrorism Considerations in the Transportation of

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,” n.d. http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/yucca/ terrfact.htm

24
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the handling of radioactive materials is a difficult business.51 Third, any number of targets, such 

as city centers and symbolic buildings, are easier to attack with conventional explosives and can 

yield the same results – in terms of public fear – that terrorists seek. Fourth, other means of mass 

destruction are more easily available. While chemical and biological weapons may be hard to 

utilize in such a way as to cause very large-scale damage, their capacity to produce fear is 

immense, as we know from the public effects of the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001. 

On the other hand, it is also true that the incidence of mass casualty terrorism, backed by 

extremely atavistic mindsets, is rising. While no incidence of nuclear terrorism has as yet 

occurred, there is clear evidence of interest in it on the part of Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda. 

Other materials may be available, but there is little doubt that nuclear technology has an 

unrivalled quality as a mechanism to generate fear. A nuclear bomb may be difficult, but not 

impossible, to make; a dirty bomb is well within the capacity of many. Those who wish to inflict 

apocalyptic destruction do manage to find and train cadres with no fear for their lives, and hence 

the readiness to handle dangerous materials without abundant caution. Risk is often measured as 

a product of the likelihood of the occurrence and the potential consequences of an event. While 

the probability of the required knowledge and materials falling into the wrong hands may not be 

great, it cannot be ruled out. Above all, the events of September 11 demonstrated that the past is 

not always an adequate guide to the future. The chances of an act of nuclear terrorism occurring 

may be relatively low, but the potential consequences are sufficient to demand that we take the 

risk very seriously indeed. 

 

51 Mohamed El Baradei, “Dirty Bombs: Assessing the Threat,” Washington Post, July 2, 2002. 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

3. Potential Effects of Nuclear Terrorism 

Terrorist groups can resort to nuclear terrorism through both the threat of an event and 

the actual occurrence of an event. The impact of nuclear terrorism would depend on a host of 

factors that should be considered for devising an appropriate response. 

The impact of the threat of an event would depend on the credibility of the terrorist group 

and the nature of the threat. The track record and the known capabilities of the terrorist group 

would, to a great extent, determine the credibility of a threat. Furthermore, the nature of the 

threat would have to be taken into account. Is it a threat of detonation of a nuclear weapon, 

dispersal of radioactive materials, an explosion of a dirty bomb, or an attack on a nuclear 

facility? In the case of a threat, the response would focus on dissuading the terrorist group from

carrying out its threat as well as on preparing to deal with the consequences of the 

implementation of the threat. If the terrorist group resorts to nuclear terrorism without warning, 

the focus would be on consequence management, including efforts to apprehend the culprits. 

The following factors are important for assessing the impact of an actual occurrence of an 

event: 

• The nature of the explosion/attack and the material used 

• The means of dispersal 

• Major characteristics of the population in the affected areas 

• Weather and environmental factors 

• Management capacity of the administration 

• The period of public exposure to radioactivity 

In the case of a weapon scenario, it is important to understand the nature and contents of 

the explosion: is it a nuclear explosion or a dirty bomb that uses conventional explosives to 

spread radioactive material? Its impact depends on the nature and amount of radioactive 

material released and the means by which it is dispersed. Candidate radioactive materials 

include cesium-137, strontium-90, cobalt-60 and iridium-192.52 These materials could be stolen 

from nuclear facilities or unprotected research centers, industrial or medical establishments, food 

irradiation plants, or oil drilling facilities. The early determination of the radiation’s type and the 

strength and the mode of dispersal are extremely important to deal with its impact. 

Communicating this information to the government, local administration, and the population is 

important to avert rumors and a mass scare. 

The characteristics of the population in the affected area need to be taken into account. Is 

it a residential or commercial area? The density of population and its major characteristics have 

to be taken into account. 

Weather and environmental conditions also influence the spread of radioactivity. The 

speed and direction of winds, rain, and humidity affect the impact and coping procedures. 

 

52 John Deutch, “The Nuclear Threat,” in Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, eds., Super Terrorism: Biological,

Chemical, and Nuclear (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), pp. 67-74. 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

The most crucial factor is the capacity of the local authorities to cope with the 

emergency. This management capacity involves several key issues such as a correct assessment 

of the situation by detecting the magnitude and extent of radiological contamination without 

unnecessary delay. This implies that the equipment to detect radiation and decontaminate the 

affected area and trained personnel are readily available. Are the required emergency medical 

and first-aid facilities available? Are trained responders available to carry out rescue and relief 

operations? The local authorities should give proper guidance and instruction for coping with 

the situation – should people evacuate or take shelter inside? Furthermore, interagency 

cooperation amongst various departments and agencies of the government and levels of 

administration will also have implications for the management of the situation. Effective and 

timely handling of key issues is needed to mitigate the impact to populated areas. 

It is also important that the administration and the media interact closely to avert the 

broadcast of misinformation and rumors. Radio, television, and the press can extend invaluable 

service by informing people about what they should or should not do. In case of an evacuation 

or the adoption of other measures at the mass level, the media can pass on the necessary 

instructions for orderly management. 

3.1. Political Impact 

Nuclear terrorism could produce far-reaching political consequences for a society and 

especially its government. If the post-nuclear terrorism situation is not dealt with by the 

administration in a swift and effective manner, it could cause such a social and political upheaval 

that parts of the country may slide into anarchy, threatening the socio-political order. 

If the administration does not take effective control of the situation at the earliest, the fear 

of radiation exposure could cause panic in the populace. Even a rumor of release of radioactivity 

can have a devastating impact. In the absence of any guidelines for coping with the situation, 

people may start fleeing the area, creating a host of problems. An unplanned evacuation would 

add to the hardships due to traffic jams, road accidents, and disruption of the transport system. 

Private transporters may extort exorbitant fares for moving people to safer places. Those unable 

to pay such fares may set off on foot, creating additional traffic problems. An unplanned mass 

migration could cause shortages of food, water, medicine, and fuel for transport. Frustration and 

anger caused by these difficulties could lead to violence. Criminals may take advantage of the 

panic and chaos and may engage in extortion or looting. 

The political fallout of a radiological attack depends on how the government handles the 

situation. Major issues include the following: 

1. Was the government able to identify and apprehend those responsible for nuclear terrorism?

2. Why did the government and the local administration not adopt precautionary safety and 

security measures to preempt nuclear terrorism? Was the government guilty of negligence? 

3. How did the government respond to the emergency? Was it able to mobilize its resources 

quickly for extending medical treatment and first-aid facilities to the injured? 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

4. Did the government undertake the rescue and evacuation work in an orderly and swift 

manner?

5. Did the government provide effective strategies for the cleanup of the affected area and for 

rehabilitation of affected and displaced people? Did it offer material support (i.e., grants and 

loans) to help people cope with financial losses and to restart their businesses? What steps 

did the authorities take to avert such disasters in the future? 

6. Did the government handle the situation in a transparent manner and maintain an effective 

liaison with the media and the leaders of the community? Was the government responsive to 

suggestions and complaints about the handling of the situation? 

The government’s failure to satisfy the people on these issues can “cause the citizenry to 

lose confidence in the government.”53 The affected people and their sympathizers may engage in 

anti-government agitation and resort to violence. The opposition political parties might be 

willing to take advantage of such a situation by lashing out at the government for neglecting the 

people or for corruption and mismanagement of relief and rescue operations. They could press 

for the resignation of the government or create agitation. The media could also highlight the 

hardships faced by the people and censure the government for any perceived lack of ability to 

cope with the challenges posed by nuclear terrorism. 

A perception of the government’s failure to cope with the consequences of nuclear 

terrorism may exacerbate existing social, ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages. These 

tensions could lead to inter-ethnic or inter-communal riots, especially if a minority community is 

somehow viewed as being linked with nuclear terrorism. In case of agitation, the government 

may attempt to deflect this by targeting weaker sections of society, especially minority groups. 

These developments could destabilize the polity and jeopardize the future of the government. 

Nuclear terrorism has implications for inter-state relations. If the ruling elite of the state 

that is a victim of nuclear terrorism somehow links nuclear terrorism with another state and 

holds it responsible for the incident, bilateral relations will be marred. This is more likely to be 

the case if the two states happen to be neighbors and have a history of acrimonious relations. 

They may trade charges and countercharges, followed by a downgrading of their diplomatic ties 

and a resort to coercive diplomacy, if not armed conflict. A target state may accuse a particular 

or an unnamed foreign power of sponsoring nuclear terrorism in order to deflect domestic 

criticism.

How a state copes with nuclear terrorism or deals with terrorist groups will draw the 

close attention of other states amid the growing global concern about terrorism and transnational 

linkages of terrorist groups. If a state is perceived to be unable or unwilling to take effective 

measures to check terrorism, its relations with other countries may be adversely affected. Other 

states will seek information on these groups and may pressure the state concerned to take 

definite and firm action for containing terrorism. 

 

53 Fakenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, p. 7. 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

3.2. Economic Impact 

A radiological attack can cause a chain of economic impacts. All business and 

commercial activity would shut down as the affected area is cordoned off soon after the 

explosion of a dirty bomb. If it is determined that the quantity of radioactivity released is 

dangerous for humans, commercial activities in the affected area would face more serious and 

long-term economic hardships. Business activity would be disrupted for a considerably long 

time. This does not merely mean a loss of jobs for the people working in the affected area; the 

people and the establishments engaged in manufacturing of goods for supply to the business 

outlets in the affected areas would also be affected. Furthermore, most goods and products left 

in the affected area may also be contaminated, especially food in stores, restaurants, and home 

kitchens. Their suitability for human consumption would have to be checked. 

Real estate would be adversely affected as large areas may become uninhabitable for a 

long period. New investment would avoid the area, which would have negative implications for 

the future economic prospects of the area. The stock market would also be hit hard by nuclear 

terrorism. Share values would tumble and new investment would dry up, at least for some time. 

Businesses and commercial activities such as banking services would be relocated or 

shifted to branches. However, a large number of business and commercial concerns would not 

be able to resume their activities quickly. Medium- and small-level businesses could go out of

business. Transportation and related services, caterers, restaurants, and street vendors would 

also be adversely affected. Nuclear terrorism could thus cause economic dislocation to many 

people. 

A radiological attack also carries negative implications for insurance and reinsurance 

businesses. Insurance companies may be inundated with claims for human and material losses 

caused by the radiological attack. Insurance companies may be reluctant to seek new business, 

or may raise insurance premiums for the affected area. In the United States, total payments for 

insurance claims from September 11 are expected to range between $40 and $50 billion. In the 

post-September 11 period, all insurance companies are excluding or limiting coverage for 

terrorist acts from new policies. If terrorism insurance is offered, the premium is high,54 which 

adversely affects business and commercial activities. 

Even if the affected area were declared safe for human beings, it would suffer from a 

crisis of public confidence. Many people, especially those whose relatives and close friends died 

or suffered from serious illness, may not want to return to the area. Tourists and other visitors 

may continue to stay away from the area. The government would have to make special efforts to 

convince people, especially business and commercial interests, that the area is now safe. It may 

have to offer incentives to those who return to the area to live and especially to initiate economic 

activity. 

Nuclear terrorism may damage the affected country’s exports. Many countries may be 

reluctant to purchase processed food and agricultural products from that country, fearing that 

 

54 For details, see Economic Perspectives on Terrorism Insurance, Report of the Joint Economic Committee, US 

Congress, Washington, D.C., May 2002. See also Abraham McLaughlin, “Insurance Rates Spiral Up in Wake of 

September 11,” Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 2002. 

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these may be contaminated by radiation. International trade (imports and exports) may also be 

affected by a greater emphasis on security. Customs authorities may impose strict rules for 

inspection of goods moving across international boundaries. Conceivably, all incoming goods 

would be subjected to strict inspections, slowing down the movement of goods. A large number 

of containers piled up at the New York port in the immediate aftermath of September 11 because 

the US Customs Service tightened controls. Later, it launched several new programs to increase 

anti-terrorism capability. One such program calls upon US importers to adopt additional security 

measures in return for expedited clearance of their goods by the Customs Service at the port of 

entry.55 Similarly, as additional controls are imposed on immigration, the movement of people 

will be restricted. Slowing down the movement of goods, services, and people has negative 

implications for the global economy. 

3.3. Health Impact 

A radiological terrorist attack would produce short- and long-term health-related consequences, depending on the nature and quantity of the radiation released. Death and injury from

the explosion would be immediate. Radiation sickness or illnesses such as cancer may occur, 

depending on the nature and amount of radiation and the duration of exposure. 

Intense gamma rays cause tissue damage and acute radiation poisoning. Low levels of 

gamma rays can cause genetic mutations leading to cancer. Alpha particles emitted by 

plutonium and americium cause health hazards, especially if these are inhaled, causing damage 

to lung tissue.56 Long-term consequences are equally alarming. Inhaled plutonium can cause 

lung, bone, thyroid, and liver cancer, which may surface after some time, perhaps after years. In 

certain cases, the effects of exposure to radiation may not appear for several decades. People 

may continue to suffer from the consequences for a very long time after the exposure. Health 

problems will continue to afflict the affected population, often surfacing years after the 

incident.57 Children born to people suffering from radiation exposure may inherit genetic 

effects, which need to be distinguished from the somatic effects suffered by exposed persons.58

Radiation health consequences can be reduced if first aid and medical assistance are 

readily available after a nuclear terrorist incident has occurred. The people directly exposed to 

radiation need to be provided with emergency medical assistance and shifted to hospitals situated 

in safer areas. Specialized training is needed to cope with an emergency caused by a 

radiological attack or incident. Hospitals must be ready to deal with a large number of patients. 

This calls for the availability of the required medicine, equipment, trained doctors, and support 

staff. Personnel engaged in first aid, transportation, and subsequent care of patients need to be 

protected from radiation exposure. If protective gear were not available, fewer people would be 

willing to undertake medical assistance and rescue operations. 

 

55 Edward Walsh, “Changing Customs: Can Free Trade Flourish with Focus on Terrorism?” Washington Post, July 

26, 2002. 

56 Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of American Scientists, before the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, March 6, 2002. http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030602-kellytestimony.htm 57 Merril Eisenbud and Thomas Gessell, Environmental Radioactivity from Natural, Industrial and Military 

Sources, Fourth Edition (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), p. 15. 58 For a discussion of the somatic and genetic effects, see Ibid., pp. 15, 22-38. 

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In addition to caring for the injured and sick, the remainder of the affected populace 

would need help, i.e., moving out of the affected areas and receiving precautionary medical and 

safety guidance. For example, to offer limited protection against radioactive iodine exposure, 

potassium iodide pills may be made available. 

3.4. Psychological Impact 

Terrorism has powerful psychological effects. It causes acute fear and confusion at the 

individual and societal levels, thereby undermining the collective morale and individual selfconfidence that keep the social fabric intact. A major act of terrorism could thus threaten social 

and political stability. Terrorism involving nuclear, chemical, or biological agents could result 

in great panic because these agents cause both immediate and long-term damage to human life 

and the environment. 

The psychological impact of a dirty bomb exceeds the radius of deaths and injuries. “It is 

a weapon of terror, fear and panic and disruption rather than one of mass destruction.”59 Deaths 

and injuries may be confined to the immediate vicinity of the explosion, but fear could cause 

panic in a very large area. For ordinary people, fears of the unknown and the unseen cause much 

personal insecurity. A rumor of an airborne radioactive release that poses serious health hazards 

would be enough to create panic, causing many people to flee the area. Commenting on the 

psychological impact of radiological terrorism, John W. Poston, Sr., says, “You can think of all 

kinds of things, people panicking, killing each other in automobiles, arguing over who has the 

right of way, crazy things that would have nothing to do with radioactivity but would be caused 

by psychological effects.”60 

Fear of being contaminated can impose psychological pressures on a large number of 

people. Some may face a nervous breakdown or develop symptoms of perpetual anxiety and 

insomnia. The stress caused by the spread of radiation and the subsequent evacuation could 

increase the incidence of heart attack and related ailments. These problems might persist long 

after the incident. 

The trauma would be severe for the relatives and close friends of those killed or seriously 

injured in the accident. The adverse impact may be more acute for the elderly, especially those 

already suffering from serious health problems. If proper attention is not given to them, they 

could develop feelings of abandonment and helplessness. 

Heavy financial losses through the loss of property as well as the disruption of regular 

income can produce serious stress. Coupled with the death or serious illness of members of the 

family, stress may become unbearable, alienating individuals from society. Children may 

develop lifelong insecurities and deep fears. A large number of people may need varying 

degrees of consultation and care from mental health professionals and psychologists. 

 

59 Don Oldenburg, “How Bad Would ‘Dirty’ Bomb Be?,” Washington Post, June 13, 2002. See also Morten Bremer 

Maerli, “The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices,” paper presented 

at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, October 29–

November 1, 2001. http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/Nuclear_Terrorism/maerli.pdf 60 Matthew L. Wald, “Fear Itself is the Main Threat of a ‘Dirty’ Bomb,” New York Times, June 11, 2002. 

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4. National Measures to Combat the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 

The growing concern about nuclear terrorism has focused attention on the security of 

nuclear weapons, plutonium, and weapons-grade uranium, lower-grade radioactive materials, 

and nuclear installations. In the past, the primary focus was on unauthorized and accidental use 

of nuclear weapons, accidental release of and exposure to radiation, and safety of the personnel 

handling radioactive materials. These concerns continue to be important today but, in the postSeptember 11 period, the issue of combating nuclear terrorism has acquired much salience. 

The underlying consideration is that individual states and the international community 

should adopt security measures to ensure terrorists cannot threaten the security of a nuclear 

facility and/or obtain nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile materials, or lower-grade radioactive materials. 

Nuclear weapon states adopt strict measures for the security of nuclear weapons and 

weapons-grade fissile materials. The same may not always be true of non-weapons-grade 

radioactive materials that are used by civilian institutions. 

Radioactive materials of varying strength and quantity are used in universities, medical 

and health institutions, food processing plants, oil drilling processes, and other commercial 

enterprises. The quantities of radioactive substances used by the civilian sectors may range from

tiny traces to larger amounts sufficient to make a dirty bomb. It is difficult for a state to track all 

such equipment and materials located in its territory. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

has reported that US companies lost track of nearly 1,500 radioactive pieces of equipment since 

1986, and more than half were never recovered. An environmental agency has claimed that up 

to 30,000 radioactive parts have been thrown away or abandoned by private companies and 

institutions.61 According to IAEA estimates, more than 1,306 kilograms of HEU existed in 

research reactors in 27 countries in August 2000. The estimates for civilian plutonium were 

180,000 kilograms in 12 countries.62 

Many experts have expressed concern about the security of post-Soviet nuclear weapons 

and materials. The media have reported smuggling of fissile materials from Russia, Ukraine, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan and the availability of radioactive materials from these states on the 

black market. Fear has been expressed about the possibility of unemployed or poorly paid exSoviet nuclear scientists selling their skills to the highest bidder or becoming involved in the 

smuggling of nuclear material. The IAEA has reported 175 incidents of smuggling of enriched 

uranium from ex-Soviet territories since 1993. Other estimates cite a higher figure.63

Some analysts advocate disarmament and arms control as the best safeguards against 

nuclear terrorism. They argue that the international community should work toward elimination 

 

61 Barton Gellman, “Arrest Shifts Focus to US Sources of Atomic Isotopes,” Washington Post, June 11, 2002. 62 George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler, “Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Material From Terrorists and Thieves,” 

Arms Control Today (October 2001). http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/bunnoct01.asp 63 Loose Nukes: Terrorism Questions and Answers, New York: Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.

cfrterrorism.org/weapons/loosenukes.html; Karl F. Inderfurth, “Leftovers from an Old War,” New York Times, 

November 7, 2001; Scott Peterson, “Uzbeks Block Central Asia’s Nuclear Corridor,” Christian Science Monitor, 

August 7, 2002. 

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of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in order to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. This 

idealistic solution is not likely to be realized. However, arms control and especially nuclear 

nonproliferation can contribute to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. If nuclear materials 

and technologies proliferate, terrorists are likely to get more opportunities to obtain weapons or 

fissile materials. 

Nuclear arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies are 

relevant to limiting nuclear terrorism. An effective check against nuclear terrorism requires that 

states adopt adequate means for the protection of nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile 

materials, other radioactive materials, and nuclear installations. These measures involve 

technology, human involvement, methods and procedures, and regular review and upgrading of 

these measures and techniques. The major methods for combating nuclear terrorism are 

discussed below. 

4.1. Detection of Radiological Weapons and Materials 

The use of modern technology (such as sensors) for the detection of nuclear weapons and 

radioactive materials enables internal and border security personnel to interdict unauthorized 

movement of weapons and materials within a country and across international borders. This 

discourages smuggling of radiological materials and deters terrorist groups from transporting 

such materials or a dirty bomb from one place to another. 

A detection system faces three major problems. First, terrorists can be expected to adopt 

some measures, e.g., use of some shielding, to transport a radiological weapon to make detection 

difficult, if not impossible. Second, some background radiation always exists. If a shielded 

radiation source does not emit radiation that stands out above the background radiation, it may 

not be detected. Third, strict surveillance for detection of radioactive materials may slow down 

the movement of goods and people. Furthermore, there may also be false alarms by radiation 

detectors. If every container and bag is carefully checked at ports of entry or at entry points to 

major cities, serious problems and delays will ensue. Therefore, a balance is needed between the 

imperatives of security measures against nuclear terrorism and the need for quick movement of 

goods and people. The government should maintain regular consultations with business 

concerns and transporters on these issues and the security requirements and the changes therein 

should be clearly notified so that businesses and travelers do not face serious hardships. 

4.2. Immigration and Border Controls 

A number of terrorist groups have become transnational. They function in several 

countries or maintain contacts with their counterparts in different countries. It is therefore 

important to track their transnational activities and disrupt their connections, transactions, and 

movements. 

This requires stricter criteria for issuance of visas and careful checks at points of 

entry/exit of a country. Similarly, more effective measures can be adopted to check illegal 

movement of goods and personnel across land borders and coastlines. Surveillance cameras, 

motion sensors, and trained personnel are needed in border areas used for illegal trans-border 

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activities. Surveillance of air space in border areas with the help of radars and human monitors 

is also important to check unauthorized movement of goods and people. The precise nature of 

border controls and monitoring will depend on the particular topographical and environmental 

conditions of the area and on threat assessment. 

An official US report (December 2001) has argued that the “issues of immigration 

enforcement and border security” are “especially important in developing a national strategy for 

combating terrorism.”64 Effective immigration controls and monitoring and surveillance of

international boundaries, including coastline and airspace, can discourage the movement of 

terrorists and radioactive materials and other dangerous substances or contraband. These goals 

can be facilitated if the border security authorities of neighboring states cooperate with each 

other for interdicting the unauthorized movement of goods and people across international 

boundaries. 

4.3. Control and Protection of Nuclear Weapons 

Nuclear weapons require the maximum possible security against theft or unauthorized 

use. This calls for a multilayered security system such that if one element malfunctions or is 

somehow breached, other security mechanisms can foil the attempt. 

Barriers such as fences, vehicle traps, and pop-up crash barriers prevent access to nuclear 

weapons storage areas. These measures are augmented by the presence of security guards, 

surveillance cameras, motion detection sensors, and a system of identification for authorized 

persons and vehicles. Admission to high-security areas is restricted to a small number of 

authorized persons. 

A major consideration of installing physical obstacles is to delay the entry of unauthorized persons so that, when intruders are detected, response force personnel can be activated to 

counteract the situation. 

Security features can be built into nuclear weapons to protect them from unauthorized 

use or accidental detonation. The United States has developed PALs to preclude the 

unauthorized arming of a nuclear weapon. Unless certain specified procedures are observed, 

nuclear warheads do not become operational. The PAL system ensures that if terrorists 

somehow steal a nuclear weapon, it cannot be detonated. However, not all nuclear weapons 

states have a PAL system to protect their nuclear weapons. 

Another option is to store nuclear weapons in unassembled form. Components are stored 

at different locations. This strategy precludes the chances of a fully operational nuclear weapon 

falling into the hands of terrorists. However, adequate measures must safeguard the nuclear 

weapon components hidden in different locations. An accounting system for nuclear warheads 

and their components is also essential. 

 

64 Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2001, p. 35. 

http://www.rand.org/terrpanel

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The security of nuclear weapons also depends on an effective Command, Control, and 

Communication (C3) system. This must be designed and managed to cope with all possible 

threats to the security of nuclear weapons, including their unauthorized and accidental use. A 

secure and effective C3 system with clear lines of authority and communication can play a key 

role in keeping nuclear weapons safe and secure. 

4.4. Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 

The protection of nuclear materials has always been a matter of concern for the international community but implementation relies on national measures. The IAEA advises its 

member states on the protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials through publications65

and visits to nuclear facilities, at the member states’ invitation. The IAEA emphasizes that an 

individual state’s physical protection of nuclear materials should ensure two inter-related goals: 

1. To establish conditions which would minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal 

of nuclear material and/or for sabotage; and 

2. To provide information and technical assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive 

measures by the State to locate and recover missing nuclear material and to cooperate 

with safety authorities in minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage. 

The IAEA has proposed a number of new measures, including border monitoring, to 

strengthen the security of nuclear materials. In the immediate aftermath of September 11 and in 

March 2002, its Board of Governors approved an Action Plan designed to help states in their 

efforts to enhance the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials.66

One way to prevent terrorists from acquiring the means to create a dirty bomb is to 

strengthen the protection of radioactive materials. Protection measures include fences, road 

barriers, guards, and entry control systems, as well as electronic and video systems to detect and 

assess intrusions. A CMC study discusses a three-element remote monitoring system for 

strengthening security. These elements are sensors to measure observable quantities, 

communication links, and data storage and analysis systems.67 The underlying consideration is 

to make it impossible for an unauthorized person to access radioactive materials and remove 

these from storage without detection. 

In addition to video monitoring and detection sensors, all persons and packages, 

including personal bags, should be thoroughly searched on entry and exit. Preferably, no 

personal belongings should be allowed beyond certain points in the high-security area. Access 

 

65 The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, item 3.1, IAEA Information Circular 225, 

Revision 4 (Corrected). http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/inf225rev4/rev4_content.html 66 IAEA Press Release: Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat, November 1, 2001, 

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/nt_pressrelease.shtml; IAEA Press Release: Board of

Governors Approve IAEA Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, PR2002/04, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/

Press/P_release/2002/prn0204.shtml 67 John N. Olsen and Charles D. Harmon, Technology Development for Nuclear Transparency Applications. 

http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Links/about/papers/jolsenTransApp/JNCpaper.htm

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to high-security storage areas should be limited to a small number of people whose 

trustworthiness is fully established and whose jobs require their entry. 

Any program for the protection and security of nuclear materials would be incomplete 

without strategies for recovering missing nuclear materials. If some radioactive material is 

stolen, misplaced, or not accounted for, all possible physical and technical measures should be 

adopted to track it down without causing unnecessary alarm about radiation hazards. 

4.5. Nuclear Installation Security 

A terrorist attack on a nuclear plant cannot easily succeed in causing the dispersal of 

radiation. These plants were built to withstand earthquakes, cyclones, hurricanes, small plane 

crashes, or even bomb attacks. The containment walls around a nuclear reactor are several feet 

thick and equipped with a robust security system68 and safety mechanisms. Much depends on 

the magnitude of the attack and the extent to which security has been breached. If the building 

containing a nuclear reactor and its safety systems are damaged, serious consequences could 

ensue. 

The security system of nuclear facilities “deters, detects and denies access”69 to 

unauthorized persons. Two basic frameworks for the security of nuclear plants are graded 

security and power block security. Under the graded security system, sophisticated security 

arrangements start from the outer perimeters, and these become tougher as the intruder 

approaches the buildings and assets being protected. These measures include strong perimeter 

fences, barriers, and roadblocks as well as security guards, reinforced by a backup or response 

force, to intercept intruders. Electronic surveillance and video cameras are used to detect 

motion. The building housing a nuclear reactor or a storage site has its own security system

involving secure locks, vaults, steel doors, concrete walls, a surveillance system, identification 

devices, and security guards. Under the power block security system, the outer perimeter 

security is not strict. The outer fences may be only to keep animals away or to clearly demarcate 

the area. However, security arrangements are very robust around and in the building and storage 

site, similar to those adopted under the graded security system, in order to deter and deny access 

to unauthorized personnel.70 

As concern for the security of nuclear plants has increased in the post-September 11 

period, a combination of the two methods is likely to be useful. A combination of modern 

technology, procedures, and trained personnel is required to strengthen the perimeter and 

building security. Special attention should be given to the security equipment, systems, or 

 

68 Matthew Bunn and George Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of Theft

and Sabotage,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 30, 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 48-60. 69 Herbert Dixon, Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Control Institute, p. 194. 

http://www.nci.org/pdf/nt-book/Dixon.pdf 70 Dixon, Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities. 

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devices in the vital areas. If the staff finds evidence of tampering, this needs to be reported and 

rectified.71

Many countries also adopt a carefully devised air defense system for nuclear 

installations. The airspace on or around nuclear installations and plants is designated as a no-fly 

zone and is closely monitored. In case of emergency or some perceived threat, anti-aircraft and 

anti-missile armor is installed to protect the installations from a possible air attack. 

4.6. Personnel Reliability 

Despite the sophistication of the technology used for ensuring the security of nuclear 

weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear facilities, the reliability of personnel managing security 

arrangements is extremely important. Personnel reliability has two aspects. One, persons 

dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as security forces employed at 

nuclear facilities must be qualified and trained. Strict standards of professional competence must 

be adhered to. Two, these people must be highly trustworthy and reliable for handling sensitive 

information. Their commitment to their profession and loyalty to the organization must be fully 

established so that they do not compromise the confidentiality and security of their assignments. 

Personnel reliability is one measure used to counter insider threats of radiological sabotage. A frustrated or an alienated employee could resort to sabotage or may not fully carry out 

an assigned task, thereby compromising security and safeguard procedures, which may produce 

hazardous consequences. A more dangerous situation could develop if an insider colludes with 

an outsider to subvert the security system. An alienated insider can play a passive or active role 

in undermining security safeguards. A passive insider could provide sensitive information to an 

outsider. Active insiders are defined as those who not only provide information, but also help 

outsiders enter the facility, and might participate in a violent attack. An insider may be motivated by money, grievances against management, ideological beliefs, or suffer from mental 

instability. 

The reliability and trustworthiness of persons in sensitive positions are established and 

verified periodically through a continuous process that starts from the time of recruitment and 

continues throughout the service period. The following strategies can help to ensure personnel 

reliability.72

1. A thorough background check is required to verify the individual’s identity and to 

investigate the individual’s credit history, criminal history, reputation, and character. 

2. A psychological screening will facilitate personality assessment against the backdrop 

of the data secured under item 1. 

 

71 INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected), Section 7, “Requirements for Physical Protection Against Sabotage of Nuclear 

Facilities and Nuclear Material During Use and Storage” http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/program/protection/ 

inf225rev4/rev4_sabotage.html 72 Report of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Control

Institute, 1986, p. 10. See also letter entitled “Protection Against Radiological Sabotage by Insider(s)” by the Union 

of Concerned Scientists to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., November 29, 2001. 

http://www.ucsusa.org/index.html

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3. A detailed interview at the time of first employment or when a sensitive task is being 

assigned is also helpful in assessing the personal disposition of an individual. 

4. A periodic review of job performance and interaction with co-workers is important. 

Annual job performance reports and periodic reviews of the career record, including 

improvement of academic and technical skills and other professional achievements, 

may be taken into account when assigning a person to highly sensitive positions. 

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has established a Personnel Reliability Program

(PRP) for persons performing duties relating to nuclear weapons.73 The PRP emphasizes the 

initial as well as continuing evaluation of the personnel concerned. The qualifying standards of 

the PRP include physical competence, mental alertness, and technical proficiency. Other 

requirements include dependability in accepting responsibilities, effective performance, 

flexibility in adjusting to the changes in the work environment, capacity for social adjustment, 

emotional stability, an ability to exercise sound judgment in an adverse or emergency situation, 

and a positive attitude toward the assigned duty. Security clearance, medical fitness, and a 

personal interview are also integral to the PRP. 

The PRP specifies conditions that may disqualify or decertify a person from holding 

nuclear weapons-related assignments, such as alcohol abuse or dependency, drug abuse, conviction of, or involvement in, a serious incident, an adverse medical—physical and mental—

condition or serious progressive illness, lack of motivation, and suicide attempt or threat.74

In addition to personnel vetting, security measures include use of the two-person rule and 

rotation of assignments. Periodic monitoring of a person’s after-work activities may be 

desirable. 

4.7. Material Control and Accounting 

An effective nuclear material control and accounting system tracks the quality and 

quantity of nuclear materials and their authorized movement, which helps to detect if there has 

been any unauthorized removal of such materials. Nuclear material control implies the adoption 

of “control and monitoring measures” to prevent loss. It also involves taking physical inventory 

of the materials.75 Regular accounting makes it possible to detect if nuclear materials have been 

diverted. 

State parties to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA are required to use material 

control and accounting as a strategy for keeping nuclear materials safe and secure. The IAEA 

requires that “a state that is operating nuclear facilities is able to account for its nuclear 

 

73 Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulations, DoD5210.42-R, Washington, D.C.:

Department of Defense, January 8, 2001. 74 Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulations. 75 Material Control and Accounting, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/

safeguards/mca.html

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material.”

76 However, the actual accounting, i.e., bookkeeping and stocktaking of nuclear 

materials, is done by a state itself subject to independent verification by the IAEA. It may be 

desirable for a state to associate the IAEA with the accounting process or seek its advice for 

effective accounting to assure the international community that nuclear materials are under its 

firm control. 

4.8. Transportation 

Nuclear materials are vulnerable to attempts at unauthorized removal or sabotage during 

transportation from one nuclear facility/storage to another facility. States take extraordinary 

precautions in transporting nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile material, and other 

radioactive materials. All aspects of transportation are considered, including the selection of 

route, mode of transportation, quality of the containers carrying the materials, security arrangements, and emergency response. Details are kept confidential. 

Nuclear materials are transported in secure containers that are placed in secure trucks or 

railway compartments capable of withstanding terrorist attacks. Trained, armed guards travel 

with the transport and reinforcements are available. Mobile patrols or helicopters guard the 

route. Constant communication is maintained between the transport vehicle, escort or security 

personnel, and the transportation operation control center. When the consignment reaches its 

destination, the security of the contents is verified.77 Similarly, a high-security procedure is used 

when shipments are sent from one state to another. When Japan shipped defective nuclear fuel 

to its British supplier in July 2002, the two cargo ships had an elaborate security system.

78 

National navies may escort such shipments. 

4.9. Radioactive Waste 

Nuclear energy applications produce waste, which is radioactive to varying degrees. It 

has to be disposed of in a manner that does not cause any threat to human health and the environment. The IAEA describes radioactive waste as “any material that contains a concentration of 

radionuclides greater than those deemed safe by national authorities and for which no use is 

foreseen.”79

Depending on its radioactive content, the IAEA classifies radioactive waste into the 

following categories: exempt waste, low- and intermediate-level waste, and high-level waste. 

The exempt category of nuclear waste has negligible radioactive content and it can be disposed 

of easily. Low- and intermediate-level waste contains enough radioactivity to cause some health 

 

76 Ed Lyman, “Role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control in the NPT,” paper presented at the Conference 

on Nuclear Dangers and the State of Security Treaties, Institute for Energy and Environment Research, New York, 

April 9, 2002, pp. 2-3. http://www.ieer.org/latest/npt02el.html 77 Dixon, Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities. 78 Howard French, “Japanese Shipment of Nuclear Fuel Raises Security Fears,” New York Times, July 25, 2002. 79 Managing Radioactive Waste, IAEA Fact Sheet. http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Peridocals/Factsheets/English/ 

manradwa.html

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and environmental problems. Depending on its radioactive content, necessary safeguards have 

to be adopted. High-level nuclear waste requires cautious handling for a longer duration.80

A nuclear waste storage and disposal system can be a potential target of terrorists. A 

successful terrorist attack on a nuclear waste storage area could cause radiological 

contamination. The intermediate-level and high-level waste could be used for making dirty 

bombs. Waste may be stored initially at the nuclear facility and later moved to a permanent 

storage and disposal area. These sites have to be completely secure against all unauthorized 

entries. 

Current long-term disposal of radioactive waste is accomplished by burying the waste in 

secure containers in a remote area. These storage areas are monitored to ensure that there is no 

radiation leakage from the stored waste. Arrangements have to be made for perimeter security of 

the storage area to check unauthorized entry. In the past, there have been instances of nuclear 

waste becoming “abandoned” as nobody is prepared to look after it. There have also been 

instances of unsafe disposal of nuclear waste.81 Given the heightened sensitivity about terrorism

in the post-September 11 period, greater attention has been paid to the safe disposal of nuclear 

waste because its theft or a terrorist attack on a waste site could cause serious consequences. 

4.10. Intelligence Gathering 

The goal of deterring, detecting, and thwarting a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility or 

the theft of nuclear materials cannot be achieved without intelligence gathering. Intelligence 

agencies must quietly monitor activities in and around nuclear facilities in order to detect any 

extraordinary activities, including exceptional movement of people or goods. Periodic 

surveillance of the off-duty activities of those in highly sensitive positions is advisable. Intelligence services should track highly politicized and terrorist groups—their leadership, goals, 

strategies, and linkages. The crucial issue is the assessment of their capabilities and intentions to 

engage in nuclear terrorism. Do the members of these groups try to obtain information on 

nuclear installations and nuclear technology? Do they try to develop interaction with people 

associated with the nuclear program? Are these groups trying to infiltrate nuclear installations 

by recruiting the staff, scientists, and technical personnel associated with the nuclear program?

Intelligence agencies can also play an important role in enforcement of the PRP by collecting 

information for pre-service background checks. 

Given the transnational character of terrorist groups, states (especially neighboring states) 

should share information on threats of nuclear terrorism and the terrorist groups that are likely to 

engage in such activities. Active cooperation among various national intelligence services is 

likely to improve their capacity to combat nuclear terrorism. Many terrorist groups now use 

modern technology for communication and interaction. They often use mobile phones, the 

internet, e-mail, and fax. 

 

80 Managing Radioactive Waste. 81 Joel O. Lubenau and Daniel J. Strom, “Safety and Security of Radiation Sources in the Aftermath of 11 

September 2001,” Health Physics, 38, 2 (August 2002), pp. 155-164. 

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5. International Efforts to Combat the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 

In a world characterized by rapidly increasing communication and the ever-expanding 

movement of people and goods, terrorist threats transcend national boundaries. While a specific 

nuclear terrorist threat may be aimed at a specific country, the terrorist group may choose to 

target another country later. The sources of terrorism and the activities of terrorist groups often 

span national frontiers, and measures to avert the threat must be international in scope to be 

effective. The community of states as a whole has a common stake in cooperating to suppress 

nuclear terrorism. Irrespective of their differences, all states share an interest in ensuring that 

non-state actors do not gain access to nuclear technology and materials for malicious purposes. 

Cooperation can be bilateral or multilateral. Because of its technological and financial 

advantages, the United States has played a substantial role in curbing the scope of nuclear 

terrorism. 

5.1. Bilateral Cooperation: The United States and Russia 

An example of how the threat of nuclear terrorism can be curbed through bilateral 

agreements is discussed in this section. 

Following the end of the Cold War, the process of downsizing and reorganizing the large 

and unwieldy nuclear infrastructure of the Soviet Union was initiated by the United States. The 

ongoing Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has supported projects in Russia, 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.82 Apart from overseeing the transfer of the nuclear assets of 

the latter three to Russia, the nuclear component of the CTR program has provided the following 

ways to prevent nuclear losses of material and weapons: 

• Securing Russian nuclear weapons against theft through accounting and tracking during 

the storage, transport, and dismantlement of warheads. Alarm systems and other security 

needs have been provided to numerous nuclear material storage sites. 83

• Securing materials not directly used for nuclear weapons. Security upgrades have been 

provided for 53 facilities that stockpile nuclear materials.84 The CTR program also 

provided training for Russian customs and border officials in the detection of smuggling. 

The Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, designed to store material from dismantled 

Russian weapons, is a joint venture of the United States and Russia. 

• Providing job opportunities to thousands of underpaid or unemployed scientists and engineers, some of whom might sell their services or provide assistance to terrorist organizations. The International Science and Technology Center funds projects in fields such 

 

82 United States Department of Defense, “CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction,” http://www.defenselink.

mil/pubs/ctr/ (downloaded August 1, 2002); Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Cooperative Threat Reduction” 

http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1b5.html (downloaded August 1, 2002). 83 Tom Z. Collina and Jon B. Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia,” Arms Control Today, 

32, 3 (April 2002). http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/colwolfapril02.asp 84 Collina and Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia.” 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

as environmental monitoring; immunology and pathology; nuclear safety and materials 

safeguarding; chemical process engineering; and power production.85

In addition, the United States joined with Russia and the IAEA to launch a tripartite 

working group on “Securing and Managing Security Sources” in June 2002. The group’s tasks 

include the location, recovery, security, and recycling of “orphaned” radioactive sources, i.e., 

those sources that have not been under, or have slipped out of, state control.86 

However, numerous obstacles to cooperation are inherent in inter-state politics. The 

recipient state is often reluctant to permit aid-givers access to all its facilities. An aid-giver may 

be tardy in extending wholehearted financial assistance. For instance, the United States devoted 

much attention after September 11 to emergency funding for domestic counterterrorism needs, 

but did not provide more money for the CTR program.

87 Alternatively, conflicting political 

objectives may impede cooperation. During FY 2002, the US State Department blocked funding 

for new CTR programs on the grounds that Russia had failed to comply with existing arms

control treaties as required by the US Congress.88 

Despite such hurdles, bilateral cooperation plays a major role in reducing the risk of 

nuclear terrorism. Depending on how priorities are framed, more such programs could be 

instituted for other countries. With respect to Russia alone, experts have put forward numerous 

proposals for more effective action. These include enhanced security measures for weapons and 

materials sites; the consolidation of material storage sites; replacement of HEU with low 

enriched uranium (LEU) in research and test reactors; conversion of HEU into LEU by a process 

of “blending down” to make it unusable (directly) for weapons production; conversion of excess 

plutonium stocks into non-weapons-usable forms; upgrading of material accounting systems, 

including “rapid accounting” to quickly identify and tag all nuclear weapons and materials; and 

use of “debt for nonproliferation” swaps (canceling debts in exchange for commitments to 

measures augmenting security).89 The US Department of Energy (DOE) also operates the 

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) designed for domestic and 

international crisis management in case of a radiation accident.90 This institution, which 

 

85 International Science and Technology Center, “Resources for CIS Weapons Scientists.” http://www.istc.

ru/istc/website.nsf/fm/Resources+for+CIS (downloaded August 2, 2002). 86 “Russia, USA & IAEA Join Forces,” IAEA Bulletin, 44, 1 (2002), p. 3. 87 Frank von Hippel, “Recommendations for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” FAS Public Interest Report, 54, 6 

(November–December 2001). http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n6/prevent.htm 88 “Safeguarding Soviet Weapons,” Washington Post, July 26, 2002. 89 Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., April 2000; M. Bunn and G. Bunn, Reducing the Threat of

Nuclear Theft and Sabotage, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, October 30, 2001, Document No. 

IAEA-SM-367/4/08; Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weapons and 

Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 

University, Cambridge, MA, May 2002; Robert L. Civiak, Closing the Gaps: Securing High Enriched Uranium in

the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D.C., May 2002. 90 United States Department of Energy, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. 

http://tis.eh.doe.gov/health/hservices/radiation_easst.html (downloaded August 2, 2002). See also “International 

Response,” Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, TN, February 21, 2002. http://www.

orau.gov/reacts/intlresp.htm

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

collaborates with the IAEA and the World Health Organization (WHO), has the potential to play 

a significant role in the event an act of nuclear terrorism is committed anywhere in the world. 

5.2. Multilateral Cooperation 

There are numerous avenues of multilateral cooperation against the terrorist threat. The 

global nonproliferation regime maintains a system of control over materials and technologies 

through formal treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 

as well as informal consultative processes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), supplemented by national laws regulating nuclear technologies and materials. However, the nonproliferation regime has a number of limitations: (1) It is primarily designed to prevent state 

proliferation rather than non-state proliferation; (2) It has not focused specifically on terrorism; 

and (3) It has not fully integrated the nuclear weapon states that are not NPT signatories (i.e., 

India, Israel, and Pakistan). 

The United Nations 

The United Nations (UN) has undertaken a series of actions to combat terrorism in 

general, including the creation of eleven conventions, notably the International Convention for 

the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the 

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).91 The UN has also created (1999) the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) as an arm of the Vienna-based UN Office for Drug Control and 

Crime Prevention (ODCCP). The TPB coordinates its activities with the UN Center for 

International Crime Prevention (CICP), which is also based in Vienna, and which is responsible 

for – among other things – the prevention of transnational crime.92 The TPB is mainly a research 

and data-gathering organization concerned with assisting in the investigation, prevention, and 

management of terrorist acts. In response to September 11, the UN Security Council approved 

the wide-ranging Resolution 1373, which created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to 

monitor UN counterterrorism efforts.93 The CTC has established a directory, which acts as a 

“one-stop shop” for states seeking help on legislation, on executive actions, and for details of 

training and assistance programs.94

While all of the above is indirectly relevant to nuclear terrorism, specific actions in this 

area have also been undertaken.95 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 

Material (CPPNM, in force since 1987) has two objectives: establishing the levels of protection 

 

91 United Nations, “United Nations Treaties Against International Terrorism.” http://www.un.org/News/dh/

latest/intreaterror.htm (downloaded August 2, 2002). 92 United Nations, “UN Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB).” http://www.undcp.org/terrorism.html (downloaded 

August 2, 2002). 93 United Nations, “Security Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning CounterTerrorism: Counter-Terrorism Committee.” http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ (downloaded August 2, 

2002). 

94 United Nations, Presentation by Ambassador Greenstock, Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 

at the Symposium: “Combating International Terrorism: The Contribution of the United Nations,” Vienna, Austria, 

June 3-4, 2002. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ViennaNotes.htm 95 Larry D. Johnson, “Treaties Against Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Legal Framework Can Make a Difference,” 

IAEA Bulletin, 44, 1 (2002), pp. 4-6. 

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required for securing nuclear material used for peaceful purposes during international 

transportation, and punishing (through national laws) acts threatening nuclear material during 

international transportation or while in domestic storage. Though movement on the issue has 

been relatively slow (a review process began in 1999), there is a growing consensus that the 

Convention needs to be strengthened: that it should apply to all nuclear material, enumerate 

concrete measures to be adopted by states, and incorporate mechanisms for compliance. 

Besides, the Convention needs more members: as of July 2002 it had only 77.96 The more

comprehensive Draft Treaty for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (under 

consideration with the Legal Committee of the General Assembly at the time of writing) also 

lacks strong binding requirements.97 

The International Atomic Energy Agency 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also plays a significant part in addressing nuclear terrorism-related concerns.98 Its primary role – preventing state proliferation through 

a system of safeguards and inspections to audit the nuclear materials and facilities of nonweapon states that are NPT signatories – contributes indirectly to counterterrorism by preventing 

the loss of fissile material. Safeguards are in the process of upgrading by means of Additional 

Protocols. By June 2002, 62 states had signed these protocols.99 

For the protection of nuclear materials, apart from the CPPNM (which was negotiated 

under the IAEA), the Agency has established, among other things, Physical Protection 

Objectives and Principles, and an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to 

assist member states in reviewing and enhancing their physical protection systems for nuclear 

facilities and nuclear materials. The IAEA has also published a document, Information Circular 

225, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities,

100 which provides 

recommendations for member states on international good practices. 

The IAEA also facilitates the continuous improvement of national systems of material 

accounting and control, and measures to counter illegal trafficking in nuclear materials through 

technical assistance and information exchange.101 The latter set of activities involves collaboration with other international agencies, such as the World Customs Organization and Interpol. In 

the event of a nuclear emergency, the IAEA has an emergency international response system for 

rapid communication and assistance under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 

Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 

 

96 “Nuclear Security Regime,” Worldatom FrontPage News, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, 

July 17, 2002. http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/News/NucSecurRegime.shtml 97 Johnson, “Treaties against Nuclear Terrorism,” pp. 5-6. 98 Anita Nilsson, “Security of Material: The Changing Context of the IAEA’s Programme,” IAEA Bulletin, 43, 4 

(2001), pp. 12-15. 

99 “Safeguards Update,” Worldatom FrontPage News, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, June 

20, 2002. http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/News/sg_update062002.shtml 100 The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected). 

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/inf225rev4/rev4_content.html 101 “Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear Radiation, Transportation and Waste Safety,” 

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, August 6, 2001, Document No. GOV/2001/29-GC (45)/12. 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

Emergency.102 While this system was originally devised for responding to accidents, it can be 

applied to emergencies that fall under the category of nuclear terrorism as well. 

In response to September 11, the IAEA has begun a process of enhancing measures for 

safety and response by means of an Action Plan to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.

103 

Much remains to be done. Lawrence Scheinman has recommended enlarging the membership of 

the IAEA, extending the CPPNM to more comprehensive regulation of domestic practices, 

making the IAEA’s recommendations binding, and expanding the IPPAS program.

104

Regional Organizations 

Some broad-based cooperation has also occurred at the level of regional organizations. 

Regional conventions on terrorism have been signed by the Organization of American States 

(1971), the Council of Europe (1977), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 

(SAARC) (1987), the League of Arab States (1998), the Commonwealth of Independent States 

(1999), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1999), and the Organization of African 

Unity (1999).105 None of these encompass nuclear terrorism, but could be extended to that field. 

The same is the case with the 17-member Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, 

Development and Training related to Nuclear Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA), which 

was established in 1972 and has recently been extended to 2007.106 The potential for regional 

cooperation is yet to be fully tapped and could cover material control, safety, and environmental 

protection.107

5.3. Obstacles to Cooperation 

An axiom of international politics states that cooperation among states is constrained by 

conflict of national interest. For various reasons, many states have not become members of the 

IAEA: as of April 2002, as many as 56 members of the UN had not joined the IAEA.108 Also, 

many member states have yet to sign the Additional Protocols that require them to strengthen 

domestic nuclear safety measures. Financial commitments are limited by competing priorities. 

As a result, the IAEA suffers from a shortage of funds, with budgets stagnating since the mid-

 

102 “The IAEA Emergency Response System,” IAEA Fact Sheet, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 

Austria. http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Factsheets/English/emergency.html 103 “IAEA Board of Governors Approves IAEA Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” International Atomic

Energy Agency, March 19, 2002. http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/prn0204.shtml 104 Lawrence Scheinman, “Transcending Sovereignty in the Management & Control of Nuclear Material,” IAEA 

Bulletin, 43, 4 (2001), pp. 33-38. 105 United Nations Treaty Collection, “Conventions on Terrorism.” http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp. 106 “Nuclear Cooperation Extended in Asia and the Pacific,” Worldatom FrontPage News, International Atomic 

Energy Agency, June 26, 2002. http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/News/rca_exten.shtml 107 John N. Olsen and Richard C. Lincoln, “Potential Nuclear Cooperative Measures for Safety, the Environment

and Nonproliferation in East Asia,” Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 

NM, August 1997. http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Links/about/papers/SAND97-1404c/index.html 108 Calculated from “Member States of the IAEA,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, 

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Profile/member.html (downloaded August 22, 2002); and “Member States,” 

United Nations, http://www.un.org/members/index.html (downloaded August 22, 2002). 

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1980s.109 The voluntary nature of contributions to the IAEA budget creates a “free-rider 

problem”: many countries pay very little or not at all.110 States are often reluctant to accept 

oversight by external agencies or other states. As of late 2001, as many as 50 NPT signatories 

had not entered into specific required safeguards agreements with the IAEA.111 Three states with 

nuclear capability – India, Pakistan, and Israel – are not members of the NPT and, as a result, 

have not been properly accommodated into the nuclear suppliers’ oligopoly. 

The limitations of arms control also have an effect. So long as nuclear weapons continue 

to exist in large numbers, the availability of materials will be correspondingly high. The USRussian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (May 2002) permits the weapons “eliminated” by 

its lowered ceilings to be stored, which means Russia will retain a large nuclear weapons 

complex that could be vulnerable to terrorism. Finally, the extent to which global multilateral 

actions can pursue counterterrorist goals is limited not only by the difficulty of mobilizing a 

large number of states, but also by their often conflicting perceptions and interests. Notably, in 

spite of the prolonged deliberations of a committee dedicated to the task since 1996, the UN is 

still unable even to agree on a definition of “terrorism.”112 Clearly, considerable effort is still 

required for the building of a more effective global regime to counter the threat of nuclear 

terrorism. 

 

109 Pierre Goldschmidt, “Strengthened Safeguards: Meeting Present and Future Challenges,” IAEA Bulletin, 43, 4 

(2001), pp. 10-11. 

110 Scheinman, “Transcending Sovereignty in the Management & Control of Nuclear Material,” p. 35. 111 Scheinman, “Transcending Sovereignty in the Management & Control of Nuclear Material,” p. 34. 112 Peter Weiss, “International Law Related to Terrorism,” paper presented at the Conference on Nuclear Dangers 

and the State of Security Treaties, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), New York, NY, April 

9, 2002. http://www.ieer.org/latest/npt02pw.html 

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6. Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism 

The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was a major concern expressed in the United 

States in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, especially after 

the United States launched air attacks on Afghanistan on October 7. These fears were 

heightened by television images and newspaper reports of the street agitation launched by 

militant Islamic groups in Pakistan protesting US attacks on Afghanistan and by the decision of 

Pakistan’s military government to support US policy. The most dreaded scenarios envisioned 

control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or fissile material slipping into the hands of a pro-Taliban 

militant Islamic group or sympathizers in the military or intelligence agencies. 

This was not the first occasion on which US security experts and official circles raised 

the issue of security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. These concerns were expressed occasionally 

in the aftermath of Pakistan’s nuclear testing in May 1998, against the backdrop of the Pakistan 

military regime’s growing ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and its active support 

to some extremist Islamic groups for their armed involvement in the insurgency in Indianadministered Kashmir. In an interview broadcast on the CBS program “Sixty Minutes” in 

October 2000, General Anthony Zinni, former commander of the US Central Command, 

expressed apprehensions that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal “could wind up in the hands of extremist 

religious leaders.”113

6.1. Perceptions of Insecurity 

The fears of al-Qaeda or other religious extremists acquiring nuclear weapons, fissile 

material, and technological know-how were heightened by speculative reports that they might 

have obtained ex-Soviet fissile material from the black market in Central Asia. They could also 

obtain expertise from unemployed ex-Soviet nuclear scientists. The other possible source for 

nuclear weapons and fissile material was perceived to be Pakistan. A number of possible 

scenarios about the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear program are outlined below: 

1. The anti-government agitation launched by Islamic groups to protest Pakistan’s 

support to US air attacks on Afghanistan in October 2001 created the specter of the 

agitation becoming nationwide. The fear was that a nationwide agitation could 

threaten the stability of the Musharraf regime. This did not happen. However, the 

risk of instability occurring persists because the Musharraf regime has not been able 

to expand its support base. If turbulence erupts for any reason (e.g., if it is perceived 

that the general elections were not conducted in a fair manner) and continues for 

some time, the future of the Musharraf regime and his post-election “civilianized” 

political order could be jeopardized. Such an agitation is also expected to raise the 

issue of Pakistan’s support to US policy on Afghanistan. This could cause instability 

in the country, threatening the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. 

2. If Army officers and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) personnel sympathetic to 

extremist Islamic groups and the Taliban dislodge General Musharraf in a counter-

 

113 Masood Haider, “Pakistan’s N-Arms Worry Zinni,” Dawn, October 17, 2000. 

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Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia 

coup, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be under the control of an extremist Islamic 

regime. It is generally assumed that such a regime would be anti-United States and 

supportive of al-Qaeda. 

3. Extremist Islamic elements might forcibly take over a nuclear facility and threaten to 

blow it up if the government does not accept their demands. They might remove 

fissile materials from the captured facility for later use. 

4. The possible use of a truck bomb by an extremist Islamic group to force entry into a 

nuclear installation or to damage it cannot be ruled out. Even if it were not able to 

take over a nuclear facility, a bomb explosion on a nuclear facility would have 

propaganda value for the group, raising serious questions about the security 

arrangements of nuclear installations. 

5. Collusion between an insider and an outsider could cause serious security problems. 

Extremist Islamic groups may cultivate an Islamic extremist working in a nuclear 

facility or an alienated employee may collaborate with outsiders for revenge or for 

material gain. An insider may pass sensitive information to an outsider (i.e., an 

extremist Islamic group) or facilitate a security breach or theft of nuclear materials. 

6. An extremist Islamic group may try to obtain Soviet-era weapons-grade materials 

available on the black market in Central Asia or secure some radioactive materials in 

Pakistan for making dirty bombs. 

The US print and electronic media, security experts, and the intelligence community have 

raised serious questions about the credibility of security arrangements of Pakistan’s nuclear 

program. They were of the view that Pakistan’s nuclear materials (both weapons-grade and nonweapons-grade) and nuclear installations could fall into the hands of extremist Islamic groups 

who could inflict nuclear terrorism on the United States or its troops in Afghanistan. David 

Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, took an alarmist view 

of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program. He maintained that Pakistan pursued “an 

organizational culture that scorns security guidelines” because it had built its nuclear program

through “illicit procurement and deliberate deception” that circumvented western export controls 

and the discipline of nonproliferation. He asserted that, “in the organizational culture of such a 

program, disaffected individuals could find plenty of justifications and opportunities to transfer 

classified information or sensitive items. Others might be disinclined to report the suspicious 

actions of colleagues. Some might even feel ownership over parts of the program and believe it 

is their right to sell their contributions for personal benefit.”114 He accused Dr. Abdul Qadeer 

Khan, Pakistan’s ace nuclear scientist, of making an unsuccessful bid to sell “bomb designs” to 

Iraq in return for “handsome” monetary rewards.115

 

114 David Albright, “Secrets, What Secrets?” Scientific American, December 2001. http://www. sciam.com/2001/ 

1201issue/1201ramanabox2.html. See also Bill Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares,” New York Times Magazine, May 26, 

2002. 

115 Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares.” 

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Other analysts have argued that Pakistan’s nuclear materials and installations were not 

adequately secure against terrorist attacks or attempts to steal radioactive materials.116 Some

were perturbed by the links the Pakistan Army, and especially the ISI, had maintained with the 

Taliban in the past. The ISI had been instrumental in the rise of the Taliban in 1994 to 1996 and 

had helped to plan their military operations against their adversaries, especially the Northern 

Alliance in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan turned its back on the Taliban after September 11, 

2001, many observers felt that some linkages and support for the Taliban persisted at the middle 

or lower levels of the ISI. The fear was that these Taliban sympathizers might compromise the 

security of nuclear materials and installations and enable the extremist Islamic elements to obtain 

some fissile material.117

These apprehensions were strengthened by a number of developments in the course of 

US military action in Afghanistan. First, two Pakistani scientists formerly associated with the 

nuclear program, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhary Abdul Majeed, were taken into 

custody for questioning in the last week of October 2001 on a tip from the US administration. 

They were questioned by Pakistani and US intelligence agencies for their alleged links with the 

Taliban. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a deeply religious person, had established a charitable 

trust, “Umah Tameer-I-Nau,” for relief work in Afghanistan after his retirement from service. 

He met with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Two other 

retired nuclear scientists, known to be Mahmood’s friends, were also questioned.118 After

intense questioning by Pakistani and US security personnel over two months, no evidence was 

found that they had passed on nuclear technical knowledge or sensitive information about 

Pakistan’s nuclear program to the Taliban or bin Laden. The government of Pakistan closed the 

matter and released the two nuclear scientists, although they were kept under intelligence 

surveillance.119 

Second, in an interview with a Pakistani newspaper correspondent in the first week of 

November 2001, Osama bin Laden made a vague claim of possessing nuclear weapons—a claim

disputed by several Pakistani strategic analysts. He declared in the interview: “I have heard the 

speech of US President Bush yesterday. He was scaring the European countries that Osama 

wanted to attack with WMD. I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear 

 

116 Amir Mateen, “Pakistani Nukes: The Latest US Scare,” News, November 11, 2001; Mansoor Ijaz and James 

Woolsey, “How Secure is Pakistan’s Plutonium?” New York Times, November 28, 2001; Barton Gellman, “Fears 

Prompt US to Beef Up Nuclear Terror Detection,” Washington Post, March 3, 2002. 117 For the fears caused by the Pakistan Army’s linkages with extremist-Islamic elements and the Taliban, see 

Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for 

Immediate Action (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University, May 2002), pp. 6, 52-53; Andrew Schneider, “Elite US Team Works to Keep 

Nuclear Bombs From Terrorists,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 21, 2001. 118 Daily Khabrian, October 25 and 27, 2001; News, October 26 and November 11, 2001; Amjad Bashir Siddiqi, 

“Pak Scientist Regrets Meeting Osama, Omar,” News, March 19, 2002; Arshad Sharif, “Assets of Nuclear Scientist

Frozen,” Dawn, January 31, 2002; David Sanger, “Nuclear Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al-Qaeda,” 

New York Times, December 9, 2001; Peter Baker, “Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraph, 

Renewing Suspicions,” Washington Post, March 3, 2002. 119 Kamran Khan, “The Probe Ends,” Weekly Independent, May 9-15, 2002, p. 6. 

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weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the 

weapons as a deterrent.”120

Third, the leader of a pro-Taliban Pakistani Islamic party, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-I-Islam (JUI), 

Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, said that the Taliban could use nuclear weapons in their defense and that 

they were close to acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The Taliban ambassador based in 

Islamabad contradicted the statement of the Pakistani leader, but his statement could not remove 

Western apprehensions.121

Fourth, an article by Seymour M. Hersh in The New Yorker in November 2001 also 

fueled speculations about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Describing how the 

Musharraf regime could lose control of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Hersh claimed that an elite 

US Army unit was in training with an Israeli special operations unit, known as Unit 22, in 

preparation for taking control of or destroying Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and installations if 

there ever arose a danger of their falling into the hands of extremist Islamic elements.122

The US administration denied that any army unit was being prepared for taking over 

Pakistan’s nuclear installations. However, US security experts, including those associated with 

the US administration, did talk about a military operation to secure or remove Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons and fissile material if extremist Islamic groups threatened these. Newsweek quoted 

official sources saying that Marines could be sent to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and 

materials.

123 David Albright also refers to various suggestions for dispatching the US forces to 

Pakistan to secure its nuclear arsenal in an emergency. He, however, describes this as an 

“extremely difficult and dangerous option.”124 Another analyst describes direct military action 

as an “option to block access to nuclear weapons or materials by a radical successor 

government” in Pakistan, but he advises that there is a need to address a number of issues before 

embarking on such an operation. These issues include “military feasibility, potential risk of loss 

of life among innocent civilians, risk of wider conflict and regional as well as global 

consequences.”125 Some people talked of a joint US, Israeli, and Indian military action “if there 

was any doubt about the custody of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.”126

 

120 For the text of the interview, see Hamid Mir, “Osama Claims He Has Nukes,” Dawn, November 10, 2001; see 

also Tim Weiner, “Bin Laden Has Nuclear Arms. He Tells Paper,” New York Times, November 10, 2001. 121 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Nuclear Assets are in Safe Hands,” Dawn, November 12, 2001; Bob Woodward, Robert

G. Kaiser, and David B. Ottaway, “US Fears Bin Laden Made Nuclear Strides,” Washington Post, December 4, 

2001. 

122 Seymour M. Hersh, “Watching the Warheads: The Risks of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” New Yorker, November 

5, 2001. 

123 John Barry, “Priority: Pakistan Nukes,” Newsweek (International Edition), November 12, 2001; C. Raja Mohan, 

“Securing Pak Nuclear Arsenal,” Hindu (Madras), October 25, 2001. 124 David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” paper presented at the 42nd Strategy for Peace 

Conference, Stanley Foundation, October 25-27, 2001. http://www.isis-online.org/; Bruce Blair, “The Ultimate 

Hatred Is Nuclear,” New York Times, October 21, 2001. 125 Lewis A. Dunn, “Balancing Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation,” in A New Equation: US Policy Towards 

India and Pakistan After September 11 (Working Papers), Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, May 2002, pp. 31-32. 

126 “A Buyer for the Bomb,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 22, 2001; Jawad Naqvi, “New Delhi Slams 

Speculation on N-site Attack,” Dawn, October 23, 2001. 

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6.2. Official Postures 

The press reports of a possible US attempt to secure or destroy Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons and nuclear installations were generally resented in Pakistan at the nonofficial and 

official levels. A number of political analysts and Islamic groups maintained that having failed 

to stall Pakistan’s nuclear program in the past, the United States was now using the cover of 

counterterrorism to undermine or take over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Some expressed the 

apprehension that the United States could use its aircraft and troops based in Pakistan or flying 

over Pakistan for its operations in Afghanistan for dropping paratroopers to take over nuclear 

installations. The Daily News commented in an editorial that most westerners are “mighty 

scared of these dreaded weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists and terrorists. But 

many Pakistanis also have the same fear of these assets going under undesirable control. But 

most of them think that the danger is of India, the United States and even Israel getting hold of 

these under cover of this Afghan war or its later extension to other places.”127 There were 

suggestions that Pakistan should make it clear to the United States and other states that it would 

resist any attempt to forcibly occupy Pakistan’s nuclear installations.128

The government of Pakistan took strong notice of these speculative reports and 

repeatedly assured the international community that its nuclear installations and assets were safe

and that additional safeguards had been introduced after September 11. Pakistan’s Foreign 

Minister Abdul Sattar issued a special statement emphasizing that Pakistan’s nuclear assets were 

“under foolproof custodial control” and that “any apprehension that the [nuclear] assets might 

fall into the hands of extremists is entirely imaginary – a product partly of distortion caused by 

TV images magnifying the sights and sounds of protesters.”129 General Pervez Musharraf said in 

a press conference in New York that Pakistan’s nuclear program was under “very strong 

custodial control.” He further said that the press reports that the Pentagon might have plans to 

“pinch” or “neutralize” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to prevent them from falling into the hands 

of extremist Islamic groups had “a very negative impact on the public mind” in Pakistan.130

The official US disposition toward the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was rather 

cautious. Expressing their determination to keep WMDs out of the reach of terrorists, senior US 

officials communicated their apprehensions about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to 

the Pakistani authorities through diplomatic channels. 

Nuclear safety and security issues were discussed when Secretary of State Colin Powell 

and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George J. Tenet visited Islamabad in 

October and December 2001 respectively. Powell said in a press statement that General 

Musharraf “understands the importance of ensuring that all elements of his nuclear program were 

 

127 “N-Weapons Security,” News, November 9, 2001; see also the editorial entitled “Stable Pakistan: Unfounded 

American Fears and Us,” Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, October 28, 2001. 128 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities,” IPRI Journal, 2, 1 (Winter 2002). 

http://www.ipri-pak.org/winterjournal02/safetyandsecurity.htm 129 Press Release, Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2001. http://www.forisb.org/FM01-133.html. 

See the statement of the spokesperson of the Pakistan Military on the security of nuclear installations, News, 

October 31, 2001. 130 Nation, November 11, 2001. 

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safe and secure.”131 He expressed his government’s willingness to extend technical assistance 

for improving the security arrangements of Pakistan’s nuclear installations. 

The US concern for the security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations is part of its global 

efforts to make sure that terrorist groups are not able to obtain WMD, especially nuclear 

weapons and fissile material. Though the US administration concluded in February 2002 that alQaeda had not so far succeeded in obtaining nuclear materials for making a bomb,132 this did not 

mean that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups had given up the option of nuclear terrorism. 

Their search for fissile and radioactive materials is likely to continue.133 

6.3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and Infrastructure 

Pakistan embarked on its nuclear weapons program in 1972.134 The then-civilian 

government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided in principle to explore the nuclear weapons option. 

However, no concrete measure was pursued until India’s first nuclear explosion in May 1974. 

Pakistan signed an agreement with France in 1976 for the delivery of a nuclear reprocessing 

plant. This agreement soon ran into US opposition and France cancelled it in 1978. Meanwhile, 

Pakistan launched a covert operation to set up a uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, near 

Islamabad. By the time US intelligence got wind of this clandestine effort towards the end of

1978, the enrichment plant was near completion. Pakistan began enriching uranium during the 

next few years. 

The control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program shifted to the Pakistan military after 

it dislodged the civilian government in July 1977 and assumed power under the Army Chief, 

General Zia-ul-Haq. There was no change in Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The military 

government continued to pursue the weapons program. Since then, the military has controlled 

Pakistan’s nuclear program. Even after the restoration of civilian rule in 1985, the military 

maintained overall control of the nuclear weapons program. However, the civilian government 

and the military shared the decision making on nuclear issues. The decision in May 1998 to 

explode nuclear devices was made by the then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but with major 

input from the military top brass.135

The coup led by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 combined control of the 

nuclear program and nuclear decision making in the military. With Pakistan’s return to 

 

131 Nation, November 2, 2001. 132 Thom Shanker, “US Analysts Find No Sign Bin Laden Had Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, February 26, 2002. 133 David Albright, Correy Hinderstein, and Holly Higgins, Does Al-Qaeda Have Nuclear Materials? Doubtful 

but....,” ISIS Commentary, March 1, 2002. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/doubtful.html

See also David Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins, “Bin Laden and the Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, 58, 1 (January–February 2002). 134 Pakistan’s nuclear program dates back to 1955. Pakistan obtained its first research reactor in 1965 from the 

United States, and it was installed at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), 

Nilhore, near Islamabad. The Canadian-supplied first nuclear power plant (KANUPP) turned operational in 1971 at

Karachi. Both the reactors are under the IAEA safeguards. 135 For a study of the factors that shaped Pakistan’s decision to undertake nuclear explosions in May 1998, see 

Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing,” Asian Survey, 41, 6 (November–December 2001), pp. 943-955. 

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constitutional rule in 2002, the earlier pattern of shared decision making is revived, although the 

military will continue to manage the actual control of the nuclear weapons program. 

The size of Pakistan’s nuclear program and nuclear arsenal is small, which makes it easy 

for the Army authorities to maintain a centralized and tight control over nuclear weapons and 

fissile material.136 The nuclear devices exploded in May 1998 were based on HEU. Of late, 

Pakistan has acquired the capability to produce plutonium from irradiated fuel of nuclear 

reactors. It is not known if Pakistan has so far produced enough plutonium to build four or five 

nuclear weapons. 

Pakistan’s main uranium enrichment facility is at Kahuta (Khan Research Laboratories). 

Smaller uranium enrichment facilities exist at Sihala and Golra. Another place where uranium

enrichment-related work might be under way is Gadwal, near Wah. Plutonium extraction work 

is done at the New Lab, near the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology 

(PINSTECH), Nilhore, and at Khushab in central Punjab. Pakistan has two nuclear power 

plants. One, which was set up with Canadian cooperation, is located at Karachi (KANUPP). It 

has been operating, with occasional closures, since 1971. Its design life was extended for 

another 20 years in 2001 by indigenous efforts.137 The other nuclear power plant is located at 

Chasma (CHASNUPP). Based on China’s Qinshan nuclear reactor, it was built by the Chinese 

under an agreement signed in December 1991. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 

took over the 50-megawatt (MW) power plant in September 2000. 

Pakistan has a research reactor (PARR-l) at PINSTECH. Designed and built with US 

cooperation, it was upgraded from 5 MW to 9 MW and converted to low enriched fuel in 1990. 

Designed and built with Chinese cooperation, another research reactor (PARR-II) went critical in 

1989. The PARR I and II reactors and the power reactors at KANUPP and CHASNUPP are 

under IAEA safeguards. Non-nuclear parts of nuclear weapons are built at the Defense 

Ordnance complex in and around Wah. 

Radioactive materials are also available in civilian institutions. The Pakistan AEC 

manages 11 medical centers in different cities as well as agricultural research and food 

processing facilities. Some hospitals also have equipment with radioactive elements. 

Nuclear weapons and fissile materials storage are located on military bases for ensuring 

their security. The military bases are self-contained communities that cannot be accessed easily 

by civilians. The advantage of this arrangement is that even if there is some agitation in the 

cities and consequent loss of control of some urban centers by the government, the nuclear 

arsenal’s security is not necessarily threatened.138

 

136 Many security experts highlight the smallness of Pakistan’s nuclear program as a factor facilitating its security. 

See, for example, Haider K. Nizamani, “Is Pakistan on Taliban and Nuclear Fuse?” GSC Quarterly Newsletter, No. 

3 (Winter 2002). http://www.ssrc.org/gsc/newsletter3/nizamani2.htm 137 See the statement of Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dawn, November 8, 

2001. 

138 See Gurav Kampani, Safety Concerns About the Command & Control of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces, Fissile

Material, and Nuclear Installations, Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, September 28, 2001. www.cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/spna.htm

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Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are neither operational nor on hair-trigger alert. They are 

kept in unassembled form and the components stored separately at different locations. The 

fissile core is separated from nonnuclear components. It is possible that the weapons minus the 

fissile cores are mounted on delivery vehicles and the fissile cores stored separately. General 

Mirza Aslam Beg (Chief of Army Staff, 1988 to 1991) said in June 2001: “We have a bomb-inthe-basement policy where not even a bomb is placed over there, not a device, but components 

are there to put it together if needed... And then it is many miles away from the delivery system, 

that is, the missiles and the aircraft.”139 He maintained that the assembly of an operational 

nuclear weapon and mating it with the delivery system would take “two or three days.”140 Most 

Pakistani and a number of other security experts view the unassembled nature of Pakistan’s 

nuclear arsenal as one security measure against theft and unauthorized use.141 This separation is 

a procedural approach to security and use control rather than a technical one like that of a PAL 

system. However, adequate security is needed for the component parts stored separately. If the 

Pakistani authorities decide to assemble them in a situation of high tension between India and 

Pakistan, ensuring security to counter theft and unauthorized use will become vital. 

Not much is known about the transportation of nuclear weapon components and fissile 

and other radioactive materials. Armored vehicles and aircraft are used for that purpose, and the 

Army and the ISI provide security. Special precautionary measures are taken when highly 

sensitive materials are transported. For example, if an aircraft is transporting nuclear materials, 

the relevant airports and airspace are closed to other aircraft. Secure transport by the National 

Logistics Cell, a transport company of the Army, may also be used under adequate security. 

A National Command Authority (NCA) was set up formally in February 2000 for 

ensuring effective control and management of the nuclear program and to check the possibility 

of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.142 The NCA is assigned the responsibility for policy 

formulation, and command and control and management of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile 

programs. It comprises the Employment Control Committee (ECC), a Development Control 

Committee (DCC), and a Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The ECC is the highest body in the 

NCA system and is headed by the head of the government. It also includes three members of the 

federal cabinet (Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior), the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chiefs of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Director 

General of the SPD, and technical advisers as required by the Chairman. The DCC is also 

chaired by the head of government and includes the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

the Services Chiefs, the Director General of the SPD, and representatives of strategic 

organizations, including the Pakistan AEC, Khan Research Laboratories, and Pakistan Defense 

Industries. Its primary responsibility is to look after the development of nuclear weapons and 

other strategic assets. The SPD, headed by a serving Lieutenant General, is based in the Joint 

Services Headquarters. It serves as the secretariat of the NCA and undertakes the tasks of 

 

139 News, June 27, 2001. 140 Elizabeth Neuffer, “A US Concern: Pakistan’s Arsenal,” Boston Globe, August 16, 2002. 141 See Scott D. Sagan, “Terrorism, Pakistan, and Nuclear Weapons,” in Michael Barletta, ed., After 9/11: 

Preventing Mass Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Occasional Paper No. 8, Monterey: Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, May 2002, pp. 46-50. 142 Dawn, February 3, 2000. 

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establishing a “reliable command, control, communication, computers and intelligence network 

for the NCA.”143

In January 2001, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) was established for 

control, regulation, and supervision of all aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection. 

Pakistan is a party to the Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Nuclear 

Safety, and to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In July 2000, 

Pakistan notified that nuclear substances and equipment could not be exported from Pakistan 

without a written clearance from the Pakistan AEC. The restricted nuclear substances and 

equipment were specified in that notification.144 

6.4. Security Measures After September 11 

Physical security measures have traditionally been tight for Pakistan’s nuclear installations. As Pakistan initiated its weapons program in a clandestine manner, the Pakistani authorities were very sensitive about its confidentiality and security. Pakistan’s nuclear installations, 

especially the uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, always had extremely tight security with 

orders to shoot unauthorized persons trying to breach the outer security perimeters. There has 

not been any reported incident of unauthorized entry into Kahuta and other uranium enrichment 

facilities. The security authorities were also conscious of the threat of an air raid on Pakistan’s 

nuclear installations on the lines of Israel’s air attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility near 

Baghdad in June 1981. In 1982 and 1983, unconfirmed reports of a possible Indian air attack on 

the Kahuta nuclear facility led to the adoption of stringent air security arrangements for the 

nuclear installations. These include, inter alia, closer monitoring, designation of the airspace on 

and around nuclear installations as no-fly zones, and installation of air defense systems such as 

anti-aircraft guns, and missiles. In December 1988, Pakistan and India signed an agreement not 

to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. Despite this, air defense is integral to the security 

system for key nuclear installations. 

Pakistan’s military authorities reviewed these security arrangements in the immediate 

aftermath of September 11, 2001. The existing security arrangements were reinforced for all 

nuclear installations, especially the nuclear installations in Kahuta, Khushab, Chaghai Hills, and 

missile sites around Sargodha. Additional radars were installed to monitor aircraft movement in 

Pakistan’s airspace and along the borders. On September 12, some airports, including Islamabad 

airport, were closed down for several hours for transporting nuclear weapon components and 

fissile material from known nuclear installations to different locations.145 The Pakistani 

authorities were fearful of a possible air strike on nuclear installations. They also wanted to 

 

143 See the text of the official statement setting up the NCA. “Pakistan Announces Nuclear-Weapons Commandand-Control Mechanism, February 2000,” Acronym Institute, n.d. http://www.acronym.org.uk/sasia/spmech.htm. 

For the organization chart of the NCA, see the website of Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

http://forisb.org/NCA.html. 144 Dawn, July 24, 2000. 145 Amir Mir, “Umbrella on Nuclear Sites, ” Weekly Independent, September 21-27, 2001, p. 1. 

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remove nuclear materials from the air corridors the United States might be using for air strikes in 

Afghanistan.146

In late October 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, on a visit to Islamabad, offered 

to provide training facilities to Pakistani personnel for strengthening security of nuclear 

installations and materials. Pakistan accepted the offer. However, it is not known if the two 

governments adopted follow-up measures. 

The PNRA streamlined nuclear disaster management in February 2002 by announcing a 

host of new measures for protecting “the plant and the society from hazards that could be manmade or natural.” These measures included stricter quality controls and monitoring for infrastructure and equipment; multiple physical barriers to uncontrolled release of radioactive 

materials; radiation protection and acceptance criteria; automatic activation of safety systems; 

disaster limitation equipment and arrangements; reactivity and heat control system; sound 

electrical power structure; and independent verification of safety assessment. The PNRA also 

addressed resource issues in nuclear facilities such as division of responsibilities and quality of 

the technical and other staff.147 

6.5. Political Dynamics 

Many observers believe that Pakistan’s political and economic vulnerabilities can create 

a situation in which the government is unable to maintain a credible security system for its 

nuclear installations and materials. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear materials may 

become vulnerable to theft or unauthorized use, and its nuclear installations may encounter 

accidents because of safety lapses, causing radiation leaks. 

The track record of the Pakistani polity shows repeated failures “to establish enduring 

and credible political institutions.”148 There was “frequent breakdown of constitutional order, 

military rule, absence of elections at regular intervals, a selective enforcement of the rule of law 

and a poor tradition of accountability of rulers. The authoritarian traditions inherited from the 

colonial period persisted with the rise of a bureaucratic-military elite, which maintained a 

patron-client relationship with political leaders, institutions and processes.”149

Pakistan experimented with three regular constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973) and two 

interim constitutions (1947, 1972), in addition to a host of provisional constitutional orders 

issued by military governments. The lack of political continuity adversely affected consensus 

building and institutionalization in the polity. The generals alternated with political leaders in 

the exercise of power. Four Army Chiefs (Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez 

Musharraf) ruled Pakistan for more than half of its independent life. Ayub Khan introduced a 

new constitution in 1962 to civilianize his military rule. Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf intro-

 

146 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001. 147 Ikram Hoti, “N-Disaster Management Mechanism Put in Place,” News, February 22, 2002. 148 Stephen P. Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, 25, 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 

109-122. 

149 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy (eds.), The Pivotal States: A 

New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 71.

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duced far-reaching changes to the 1973 Constitution in March 1985 and August 2002 respectively to adopt some semblance of participatory governance while ensuring that they continued 

to control the political process from the top. Yahya Khan also had similar plans, but Pakistan’s 

military debacle in Bangladesh in December 1971 caused the collapse of his military regime. 

The periods of civilian rule (August 1947 to October 1958, December 1971 to July 1977, 

November 1988 to October 1999) were no less problematic. Political leaders often resorted to a 

free-for-all struggle for power, disregard of democratic norms, partisan use of state machinery 

and resources, and corruption. Consensus building and sustainability of participatory institutions 

and processes were neglected, making it possible for ambitious generals to sweep aside civilian 

governments at will. 

The periodic breakdown of political and constitutional order accentuated existing ethnic, 

linguistic, and regional cleavages because these could not be accommodated in the political 

process, which caused political alienation and brought serious strains on the polity. These 

problems were accentuated by a sagging economy in the 1990s. Extensive borrowing from

international sources caused a heavy debt burden. In 2001, Pakistan’s total external debts were 

about $37 billion (US) and debt servicing was the biggest expenditure item in the national 

budget, followed by defense expenditure. When debt servicing and defense expenditure are 

combined, very few financial resources are left for the federal government, which has had to 

borrow from domestic and external sources to run the state and undertake development work. 

Religious extremism began to develop against the backdrop of political uncertainties and 

deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Islamic political parties and groups always existed in 

Pakistan and pressed the government to adopt what they described as a truly Islamic system. 

Though some Islamic parties had a cadre of committed workers, none performed well enough in 

the elections to pose a serious threat to the government. Even today, Islamic political parties 

have limited electoral support and are not expected to result in more than 25 seats in the national 

and four provincial assemblies. However, a number of international, regional, and domestic 

factions have increased their street power and extremist Islamic elements have proliferated. 

Pakistani and Afghan Islamic groups gained strength as material resources became 

available to them (mainly from the US CIA and Saudi Arabia) for bolstering their armed 

resistance to Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1979 to 1989). A number of Arab philanthropists 

also extended material support to the Afghan resistance. The United States and Egypt supplied 

weapons to them through Pakistan’s ISI. Some weaponry was purchased on the black market in 

Pakistan’s tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Afghan war period also 

witnessed the development of close interaction between Islamic militant groups of the Arab 

world and the Afghan resistance movement. A few thousand Arab volunteers joined the Afghan 

resistance movement to fight against the Soviet Union. After the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan in 1989, the United States gradually withdrew support to the Afghan Islamic groups 

but the Afghan warriors continued with the violent pursuit of their Islamic agenda. They 

targeted US interests and pro-US Arab regimes and became directly involved in Islamic causes 

in different parts of the world, including Kashmir, Bosnia, and Chechnya. 

Pakistan’s military government of General Zia-ul-Haq projected itself as the front-line 

state in the fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan and patronized the Afghan Islamic 

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resistance, which helped to boost the fortunes of his regime at the global level. In the domestic 

context, he pursued Islamization and cultivated orthodox and extremist Islamic groups (most of 

which were involved in the Afghan war) in order to gain political legitimacy and to undercut the 

support of his political adversaries. State patronage coupled with international support in the 

context of the Afghan war strengthened Islamic orthodoxy and extremism in Pakistan. 

The Pakistani military authorities, especially the ISI, developed strong linkages with 

Afghan and Pakistani Islamic groups during the Afghan war period. They continued with this 

relationship after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan for two major reasons. First, 

they wanted to ensure that a pro-Pakistan government came to power in post-Soviet Afghanistan, 

and were thus closely involved in intra-Afghan politics. In 1994, the ISI was instrumental in the 

emergence of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, which captured Kabul in September 1996. 

Second, the ISI dispatched some of these extremist Islamic groups to Indian-administered 

Kashmir to step up the ongoing insurgency there.150

Most Pakistan-based extremist Islamic groups involved in post-Soviet Afghanistan and 

Indian-administered Kashmir belonged to the Deobandi or Ahle-Hadith persuasions of Islam,

known for their extremist views and hard line on social, economic, and political issues. Their 

seminaries all over Pakistan, especially in the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) adjoining 

Afghanistan, were the main recruiting grounds for volunteers to fight along with the Taliban in 

Afghanistan or in Kashmir. Some of the well-known groups included Harkatul Ansar, Harkatul 

Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Some of these groups 

interacted with al-Qaeda.151

Pakistan’s military authorities viewed the reinforcement of the insurgency in Kashmir 

through these extremist Islamic groups as a relatively low-cost strategy for “bleeding” India. 

However, while “bleeding” India, Pakistan began to bleed itself. The extremist Islamic groups 

began to use weapons at their disposal and training in Afghanistan to pursue their partisanreligious agenda within Pakistan. They attacked or killed those who did not share their 

perspective on Islam. This increased religious-sectarian violence and killings in Pakistan152 and 

threatened civic order and peace, which adversely affected the prospects of new investment in 

Pakistan. The domestic fallout of their support to the extremist religious groups perturbed the 

military government. It adopted tough measures to contain religious-sectarian violence in 2000 

and 2001. However, as the military government needed these extremist Islamic groups for 

pursuing its agenda in Kashmir, it often backed out of strict measures against them. 

 

150 For an in-depth study of the linkages between the ISI and the Afghan resistance, especially the Taliban, see 

Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2001). 

151 For an analysis of origins and dynamics of extremist Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, see M. Ehsan 

Ahrari, Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US 

Army War College, August 2001); Saeed Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad 

and Lashkar-e-Taiba,” in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (New Delhi: 

Manohar, 2002), pp. 131-147. 152 For a study of religious-sectarian violence in Pakistan, see Abbas Rashid, “The Politics and Dynamics of Violent 

Sectarianism,” in Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmad (eds.), Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan’s Crises of

State and Society (Lahore: Mashal, 1997), pp. 27-49. 

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The military government turned its back on the Taliban in Afghanistan and the extremist 

Islamic groups in Pakistan after September 11, 2001. It mustered enough strength to stand up to 

them in the wake of the devastation caused by terrorism in the United States, the international 

consensus to adopt the toughest possible measures against terrorism, and a US commitment to 

support Pakistan in return for joining the international coalition for counterterrorism. 

Pakistan opened its airspace for US aircraft and provided logistical, communications, and 

emergency support to US military operations in Afghanistan. The top command of the ISI was 

reshuffled on October 7, a few hours before the United States launched air strikes in 

Afghanistan, to rid the ISI command of officers sympathetic to the Taliban. The ISI shared 

information on Afghanistan with US military authorities. Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) was allowed to operate in Pakistan for rounding up religious extremists, 

especially the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who had secretly slipped into Pakistan after 

the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan. Pakistan stationed up to 100,000 troops on the PakistanAfghanistan border to check infiltration and to engage in joint operations with US troops in 

Pakistan’s tribal areas for tracking down the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel. 

Pakistan’s partnership with the United States against counterterrorism yielded economic 

rewards for Pakistan. The United States gradually lifted all economic sanctions against Pakistan, 

dating back to October 1990, when it imposed the first set of economic sanctions against 

Pakistan.153 The United States offered bilateral economic assistance of about $1 billion in 2002, 

and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank offered long-term assistance for 

poverty reduction and social development. The European Union (EU) allowed more trade 

facilities and the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium (based in Paris) rescheduled most of Pakistan’s 

debts for 38 years on favorable terms, thereby reducing the debt servicing and repayment burden. 

This economic assistance has offered Pakistan an opportunity to work toward overcoming the 

acute economic crisis that has often raised the specter of Pakistan slipping into widespread 

anarchy. 

Pakistan’s post-September 11 policies have angered the extremist Islamic groups who 

describe these as a betrayal of Islam under US pressure. Initially, they launched street agitation 

to force the government to change its pro-US policies. When this agitation did not accelerate 

because other sections of the population and the major political parties did not join in, they 

appealed to the Army personnel to resist the decision of the top commanders. This also did not 

work. 

The extremist Islamic groups were outraged when some of the leading groups were 

banned and their leaders arrested in January 2002, followed by joint Pakistan-US military 

operations in the tribal areas. Similarly, they resented the permission granted to the FBI to 

function in Pakistan for counterterrorism. It was in this context that they vowed to dislodge the 

 

153 Pakistan was under four types of US sanctions on September 11, 2001. First, nuclear-program-related sanctions 

were imposed against Pakistan in October 1990, under the Pressler Amendment (1985), which suspended all

military sales and bilateral economic assistance to Pakistan. Second, new economic sanctions were imposed after 

Pakistan carried out nuclear explosions in May 1998. (These sanctions also applied to India because it had 

conducted nuclear tests earlier that month). Third, additional sanctions were imposed after the military takeover in 

Pakistan in October 1999. Fourth, the United States imposed limited sanctions for Pakistan’s alleged violation of the 

missile technology control regime. 

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Pakistan government and began to engage in bomb explosions and commando assaults on 

newsworthy targets in different parts of the country in order to undermine the credibility of the 

government, cause confusion and uncertainties in the society, and derail the economy. Bomb

explosions, terrorist attacks, and religious-sectarian killings by these elements haunt the presentday Pakistan. 

6.6. How Credible Is the Threat? 

The most pessimistic and alarming scenario for the future of Pakistan and the safety and 

security of its nuclear arsenal is that Pakistan will increasingly become ungovernable. The writ 

of the government will be extremely limited or nonexistent as socio-economic pressures intensify, ethnic and regional discontinuities sharpen, and cultural and religious-sectarian intolerance 

overwhelms the polity. As sophisticated weapons are easily available and several Islamic groups 

have sufficient experience and motivation to resort to violence in pursuit of their agendas, the 

competing groups can attempt to settle their scores by resorting to violence. This will further 

erode the writ of the already tottering government’s authority. This can produce acute political 

instability, economic turmoil, and societal anarchy. A high degree of turbulence can cause 

serious threats to the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear program. 

However, the probability of such a scenario unfolding is minimal. Pakistan’s state 

structure may be under stress, but two of its institutions, the military and the bureaucracy, are 

sufficiently strong and cohesive to ensure the functioning of the state, although they lack the 

vision to transform it. The changes in Pakistan’s policies after September 11 and especially the 

availability of international diplomatic and economic support offer new opportunities to Pakistan 

to reverse the political and economic drift. Pakistan’s economy has shown reasonable 

improvement in the post-September 11 period, although it is still not out of trouble. 

The probability that extremist Islamic groups will overwhelm the state is also low. While 

they do have an ideologically committed cadre, the weaponry, and the experience to engage in 

violence, they are not expected to succeed in a head-on collision with the Pakistani state. They 

owe a good part of their strength to the patronage extended to them by Pakistan’s military and 

intelligence authorities. The non-availability of this support has weakened them. Furthermore, 

these Islamic groups are not a united or monolithic entity. They differ sharply because of 

denominational differences and personality clashes. Not all Islamic groups have violent 

agendas. A number of Islamic groups and parties and leaders of Islamic seminaries (madrasas) 

maintain that these extremist groups have undermined Islam by engaging in terrorism within and 

outside Pakistan. 

There is hardly any prospect of an extremist Islamic movement led by a cleric, like 

Khomeini in Iran, taking over the Pakistan state and declaring war on India and the United 

States. However, the extremist Islamic elements have sufficient capability to resort to violence 

or engage in terrorist activities from time to time and thus threaten political stability and civic 

order. Alternatively, they can create enclaves for themselves in far and remote areas (especially 

close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) where the writ of the government may be restricted. 

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A third possible scenario is a coup or counter-coup led by an Islamist general. While the 

theoretical possibility of this development cannot be ruled out, its chances are remote in the near 

future. The consensus among Pakistan watchers is that the Pakistan military continues to be a 

highly professional, hierarchical, and disciplined force. The top command and Army headquarters led all previous coups. The Army Chief, Principal Staff Officers, and the Corps Commanders, who meet periodically to deliberate on domestic and security affairs, share decision making 

in the Army. They function on the basis of consensus that is implemented by the Army Chief in 

a given situation. Internal cohesion is also helped by the fact that the military looks after the 

material interests of its personnel in service and after retirement. The monitoring of “personnel 

reliability” for senior officers is strict, and they are not allowed to develop linkages with political 

groups or leaders or engage in religio-political activism.

Furthermore, the Army may use the Islamic elements to advance its goals but the senior 

commanders are not expected to let the initiative slip into the hands of the Islamic elements. The 

probability of a pro-Islamic counter-coup against a sitting Army Chief is extremely low. If a 

general assumes power, he is expected to represent the interests of the military as an institution 

rather than the agenda of a non-military political or religious group. 

If General Pervez Musharraf is assassinated or disabled, much will depend on the 

consensus among the top Army commanders. They can either assume power under their seniormost officer or allow the constitutional procedures to take effect. In the latter case, the Chairman 

of the upper house of the Parliament, the Senate, assumes the presidency and new presidential 

elections are held within 60 days. 

The most likely scenario is that power will alternate between the generals and civilian 

leaders and Pakistan will continue with its off-again, on-again march towards participatory 

governance. The Pakistani state will be able to function as a political and administrative entity, 

although its efficacy will vary, depending on internal and external pressures. 

What are the implications of these scenarios for the safety and security of Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons, fissile and other radioactive materials, and nuclear installations? The apprehensions expressed about their safety and security are exaggerated but not totally unfounded. 

Given the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear program began in a clandestine manner, both civil 

and military governments have always been very sensitive about its confidentiality and security. 

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, as discussed earlier, is under the security control of the Army with a 

clear command, control, and communication system. The nuclear program is viewed as a matter 

of pride and excellence, and is integral to Pakistan’s security. The military authorities thus take 

its safe custody very seriously. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not expected to fall into 

unauthorized hands. 

However, Pakistan’s extremist Islamic elements could attack a nuclear facility. This 

attack may take the form of an armed raid, truck bombs, hurled bombs, or remote-controlled 

explosions. Such an effort may or may not succeed but it would make a big news story, causing 

panic in Pakistan and abroad. If the terrorists were able to enter the main installation of a 

nuclear facility, they might blackmail the government or damage the installation. If they gained 

access to radioactive material, they might use it for making a dirty bomb. The greater 

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probability is that radiological material would be slipped out of Pakistan for use elsewhere. 

Islamic groups may be hesitant to use a dirty bomb within Pakistan due to the fear of losing 

goodwill at the popular level. 

“Insider-outsider” collusion provides another possibility for undermining security. An 

extremely religious person may be vulnerable to appeals of an Islamic group and may consciously or unconsciously pass on sensitive information. Similarly, an alienated or disgruntled 

employee may conspire with interested outsiders for monetary gain or to manifest his or her 

anger. “Insider-outsider” collusion may compromise security, result in the theft of equipment or 

documents, or facilitate some terrorist action against a nuclear facility. 

These security challenges are not insurmountable. However, any international military 

operation to take over nuclear installations or remove nuclear weapons or fissile material without 

the prior consent and cooperation of the government of Pakistan may be counterproductive. The 

Pakistan military is expected to resist such an attempt. The consequences could be disastrous if

the Pakistani authorities perceived such an attempt as an attack from India. 

The United States and the IAEA can extend advice, technology, and training for 

upgrading existing safety and security arrangements for Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and 

materials. The areas that need attention are physical security and remote monitoring of nuclear 

facilities, a PRP, transportation and communications, and methods for coping with nuclear 

accidents and radiological contamination. 

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7. India and Nuclear Terrorism 

In an early work, Paul Leventhal and Brahma Chellaney drew attention to the threat of 

nuclear terrorism in South Asia.154 Their view that the threat was mounting was based on four 

long-term trends: the rapidly expanding nuclear programs of India and Pakistan, their growing 

stockpiles of nuclear materials, the enduring problem of terrorism faced by both countries, and 

the increasing technical sophistication of terrorist groups. Since September 11, some attention 

has been given to the potential for nuclear terrorism, particularly because of the discovery of 

linkages between al-Qaeda and Pakistani nuclear scientists.155 Nonetheless, published writings 

on the nature and extent of the threat, particularly with reference to India, have been cursory.156 

This section provides an overview of the terrorist threats faced by India, its nuclear infrastructure 

and vulnerabilities, and the efforts undertaken to combat terrorism (including nuclear terrorism) 

since September 11. Because of the inherently secretive nature of the subject, hard evidence is 

relatively sparse. Nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at a general understanding of the extent of 

the problem and of what needs to be done. 

7.1. The Enduring Terrorist Threat 

Perhaps the most remarkable political characteristic of Indian society has been the steady 

growth of democratic institutions and values since independence in 1947. Nevertheless, 

militancy and violence have been constant features of the Indian political landscape. The 

process of uneven economic development has been accompanied by relentless struggles among a 

plethora of social groups divided by caste, language, tribe, and religion competing for an 

adequate share of a relatively small economic pie. The volatile political environment has bred 

recurrent outbreaks of violence, often of an ephemeral and localized character, but periodically 

in the form of movements espousing the use of force against the state as well as against civilian 

targets. These movements are often associated with criminal activity (e.g., drug smuggling and 

gun running), and frequently draw sustenance from adversary states (China in the 1950s and 

1960s, Pakistan since the 1980s). Over the decades, there has been a distinct trend toward everhigher levels of violence.157 The government of India has followed a customary carrot-and-stick 

strategy in response, alternating between the use of force to suppress militants and negotiation to 

accommodate them.

158 Mushrooming agitations and insurgencies have either died down or been 

contained. Overall, the integrated character of the Indian political union has crystallized 

 

154 Paul Leventhal and Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia, 

Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1988. 155 “Terrorists Courted Pak N-Scientists,” Hindustan Times, November 12, 2001. 156 S. Gopal, “Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia,” Paper No. 359, South Asia Analysis

Group, November 10, 2001, http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper359.html; Achin Vanaik, “Nuclear Terrorism: A 

New Threshold?” Economic & Political Weekly, January 26, 2002, http://www.epw.org.in/

showArticles.php?root=2002&leaf=01&filename=4013&filetype=html; J. V. Deshpande, “Nuclear Terrorism and 

All That,” Economic & Political Weekly, April 6, 2002, http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles. 

php?root=2002&leaf=04&filename=4320&filetype=html. The latter two are more in the nature of a polemical

exchange. 

157 Rakesh Gupta, “India: Towards A Political Economy of Intra-State Conflicts,” Faultlines, Vol. 5 (n.d.). 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume5/Fault5-9rgupta.htm (Downloaded August 19, 2002). 158 Kanti Bajpai, “Diversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India,” in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds., 

Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1997). 

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steadily, and is hardly questioned by the great majority of people. Nonetheless, political 

turbulence has been – and remains – a prominent feature of contemporary life, and terrorism an 

inescapable part of it. 

While much attention has been given to the Islamic threat in recent years, the Indian 

experience has encompassed a wide variety of terrorist and similar violent threats.159 During the 

1980s, the chief center of terrorist activity was the state of Punjab, where Sikh extremists 

engaged in a secessionist movement that took a heavy toll in lives, including that of Prime 

Minister Indira Gandhi. A recent report states that as many as 32 groups have been officially 

banned under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).160 These include not only terrorist 

groups active in Kashmir, such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed, but also non-Muslim terrorist groups 

such as the less-known Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA) in the south and the Akhil 

Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) in the north. The genesis of current terrorist movements 

has been internal in most cases, as with those in Kashmir in the north, and Assam and Tripura in 

the northeast.161 Some violent political movements have sought structural political change rather 

than secession or autonomy, for instance, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the People’s 

War (PW), both of which are very active in northern and eastern India.162 Domestic political 

violence has the potential to breed more such movements. Events like the severe anti-Muslim

riots in Gujarat in 2002 could give rise to social polarization and terrorism.

163 

However, spillovers from neighboring countries have been common. Notably, the 

secessionist movement in Kashmir has drawn support from the Pakistan government, and 

attracted a large number of non-Kashmiris, who have given it an increasingly Islamicfundamentalist character.164 The prolonged Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka has had 

powerful effects on Indian politics, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv 

Gandhi (1991) by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Chief Minister of the 

Indian state of Tripura has accused Bangladesh officials of harboring terrorists active in his 

state.165 State support aside, terrorist groups may have their own linkages, as in the case of the 

 

159 For an incomplete list that illustrates this variety, see “Armed Groups in South Asia,” Institute for Peace and 

Conflict Studies, New Delhi. http://www.ipcs.org/nmt/milgroups/mg-index.html (August 8, 2002). 160 “TNLA, TNRT, ABNES Banned Under POTA,” Hindustan Times, July 3, 2002. 161 D. Suba Chandran, “Militant Groups in Kashmir: An Analysis,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New 

Delhi, Article No. 258, September 6, 1999, http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/258-ip-suba.html; Mahadev 

Chakravarty, “Insurgency in Tripura: Some Trends,” Economic and Political Weekly, June 23, 2001, 

http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2001&leaf=06&filename=3149&filetype=html; Monirul Hussain, 

“State, Identity Movements and Internal Displacement in the North-East,” Economic and Political Weekly, 

December 16, 2000, pp. 4519-4523. 162 K. Balchand, “Spreading Tentacles,” Hindu, August 11, 2002. 163 On the Gujarat riots, see Anjali Mody, “Genocide in the Land of Gandhi,” Hindu, March 10, 2002. On their 

broader implications for social stability, see Rajni Kothari, “Middle Ground Quakes,” Hindustan Times, May 1, 

2002. The killing of 32 people in the terrorist attack on the Hindu temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat (September 

2002) was apparently motivated by a desire to avenge the slaughter of Muslims in those riots. Manas Dasgupta, 

“Temple Siege ends,” Hindu, September 20, 2002. 164 Yoginder Sikand, “Changing Course of Kashmiri Liberation Struggle: From National Liberation to Islamist

Jihad?” Economic and Political Weekly, January 20, 2001. http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=

2001&leaf=01&filename=2099&filetype=html 165 P. P. Singh, “Smash Militant Camps in Bangladesh: Tripura CM,” Times of India, August 21, 2002. 

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LTTE’s links with the Maoist guerillas fighting in distant Nepal.166 The recent emergence of a 

left-wing “people’s war” in Nepal represents yet another potential threat that could spill over 

into India.167 

How serious are these threats from the standpoint of nuclear terrorism? To date, none 

has shown direct evidence of a strong interest in mass destruction. Most of the violent 

movements cited above have localized interests and have not shown an inclination toward 

indiscriminate mass violence. The LTTE has resources, organizing capability and a capacity for 

suicide attacks, which would facilitate the handling of radiological materials without much care 

for self-preservation. However, the lesson of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is that there are 

political limits to the use of violence. That single act lost the LTTE the sympathy of the Indian 

public.168 The so-called “jihadis” or “holy warriors” fighting in Kashmir – mostly outsiders, as 

distinct from indigenous militants fighting for the localized identity of “Kashmiriyat” – do 

appear to have the mindset that would consider an act of mass annihilation “do-able.” The one 

link between the militancy in Kashmir and nuclear capability discovered so far is a relatively 

tenuous one. Ayub Thakur, a London-based nuclear physicist formerly from Kashmir University 

in Srinagar who had also briefly worked with the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 

Bombay, is known to have had close links with Kashmiri secessionism.

169 But, there is no 

evidence that Thakur’s knowledge of nuclear science has had any bearing on his political 

activity. There appears to have been some linkage between the Harkat ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), 

an extremist group active in Kashmir, and al-Qaeda.170 The HuM and other groups, such as the 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have shown a propensity for 

indiscriminate violence against civilians and hence a potential for nuclear terrorism. Given the 

shadowy links between these groups and al-Qaeda, and the latter’s interest in acquiring nuclear 

capability (see Section 6 on Pakistan), the possibility of a nuclear terrorist threat remains a 

significant one.171 At least one explicit threat to target nuclear facilities has been made. The day 

after the September 11 attacks in the United States, Sheikh Jamil-ur-Rehman, leader of the 

Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen, a terrorist group active in Kashmir, vowed to attack nuclear facilities in 

India.172

7.2. Nuclear Infrastructure and Vulnerabilities 

India’s AEC stands at the apex of an extensive nuclear infrastructure that incorporates 

warhead manufacture, electrical power production (14 reactors, with 6 more under construction), 

fuel fabrication and reprocessing, waste management, mining, research, and medical and 

industrial applications.173 The physical security of nuclear installations is managed by an inde-

 

166 “Nepal Accuses LTTE of Supporting Maoists,” Times of India, June 14, 2002. 167 Rita Manchanda, “Escalating Civil War,” Frontline, May 11-24, 2002. http://www.frontlineonnet.com/

fl1910/19101290.htm 168 Nirupama Subramanian, “It’s No More Tiger Country,” Hindu, July 28, 2002. 169 Chandan Nandy, “London Conduit Was Nuclear Scientist,” Hindustan Times, June 12, 2002. 170 “In A Desolate House, Vestiges of a 1999 Hijacking,” New York Times, December 6, 2001. 171 Rohan Gunaratna, interviewed by Sonia Trikha, Indian Express, August 30, 2002. 172 “Terrorists Vow to Hit Indian N-Sites,” Times of India, September 12, 2001. 173 For an overview, see Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 2001-2002. Official 

publications, however, are not informative with respect to the military and security aspects of the nuclear program. 

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pendent body, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), a paramilitary force under the 

Ministry of Home Affairs. The CISF is also responsible for the protection of other high-risk 

facilities such as defense production units, space installations, oil refineries, and major ports, but 

little is known about how it actually organizes the security of nuclear facilities.174 According to 

informed sources, the nuclear warheads located at BARC facilities are under military security. A 

study by P. R. Chari notes that the Indian Army provides air defense cover, security is strict, and 

access control is maintained through physical barriers and electronic systems.175 We also know 

that the BARC has an ongoing program for the development of sophisticated security systems, 

such as a voice-activated phonetic identification system.

176 On the nature of the coordination 

among the three entities – the scientific bureaucracy, the Army, and the CISF – there is no public 

information. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is empowered to regulate all 

civilian facilities, while the BARC has an internal review mechanism for military facilities. 

Though much of the AERB’s function is related to preventing and responding to accidents, part 

of the counterterrorism function of controlling nuclear plants and other facilities and responding 

to emergencies would be covered by the same systems.177 

No security system, of course, is foolproof. Numerous cases of theft have occurred over 

the years. For instance, in July 1998, the Central Bureau of Investigation recovered over 8 

kilograms of natural uranium stolen from the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 

(IGCAR) in Chennai.178 Besides, it is difficult to ensure security over materials that are outside 

the control of the CISF, such as radiological sources in the possession of hospitals and industries. 

In July 2002, a gamma radiography camera containing iridium-192 with a radioactive strength of 

19.7 curie was stolen during transportation in the northeastern state of Assam. A disturbing 

aspect of the incident was that the camera, a highly radioactive device, was left unlocked in the 

trunk of a public bus in a region plagued by terrorist activity.179 Although AEC Chairman Anil 

Kakodkar claimed there was no need to panic, the fact remains that the camera was a powerful 

potential source for a dirty bomb.180

It is also known that terrorists have periodically penetrated zones of high-level military 

security. In mid-July 2001, five Army men were killed in an attack on a military camp in the 

Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.181 In early November 2001, a similar attack killed four 

 

174 The CISF’s own website at http://cisf.nic.in/ does not even mention its role in the protection of nuclear facilities 

directly. For a more useful – but still sparse – overview, see Joseph A. Mallika, “The Central Industrial Security 

Force,” Article No. 687, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 31, 2002. 

http://www.ipcs.org/issues/newarticles/687-mi-mallika.html 175 P. R. Chari, “Protection of Fissile Material: The Indian Experience,” ACDIS Occasional Paper, Program in Arms

Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, September 1998, p. 

6. 

176 D. N. Srivastava, “Hi-Tech Computerized Security Management,” Nuclear India, 34, 3–4 (September–October 

2000). http://www.dae.gov.in/ni/nioct00/nioct00.htm 177 For a review of these functions, see Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, Emergency Preparedness in

Nuclear Power Plants. http://www.npcil.org/docs/emergency.htm (downloaded on August 8, 2002). 178 “Uranium Racket Unearthed,” Indian Express, July 23, 2002. 179 “Radiation Scare in Assam,” Hindustan Times, July 21, 2002. 180 “ ‘No Chance of N-Material Falling into Wrong Hands,’ ” Hindu, July 21, 2002. 181 “Day Two of Summit: 34 Die in Valley,” Tribune, July 17, 2001. 

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soldiers, and two of the three terrorists involved escaped.182 Two weeks later, ten soldiers and 

three civilians died in an assault by two terrorists.183 In May 2002, three terrorists dressed in 

Army uniforms stormed an Army camp at Kaluchak near Jammu city and killed five soldiers and 

25 civilians before being killed themselves.184 A repetition of the Kaluchak massacre was 

narrowly prevented in August 2002 when militants entered a high-security zone housing senior 

police and civilian officials and their families before being intercepted.185 Such incidents 

illustrate the relative ease with which areas under high levels of security cover are penetrated by 

small numbers of determined terrorists. Between April 2000 and May 2001, as many as six 

major fires occurred at Army ammunition dumps, some of them very large ones, such as the 

enormous fire that destroyed some 10,000 tons of ammunition in Bharatpur on April 28, 2000.186

In at least some cases, sabotage was involved. While Army officials variously attributed the 

disasters to local geography, the malfunctioning of electrical equipment and, in one case, to an 

“act of God,” intelligence officials disclosed that at least three of the fires were caused by 

sabotage.187 The fact that no nuclear facilities have so far been penetrated is not in itself

reassuring in this respect. It is also notable that when India’s nuclear tests were being carried out 

in 1998, an unauthorized individual – an Army washerman who had jumped into a military truck 

with other soldiers because he wanted to help – was discovered by accident at the test site 

because a scorpion had stung him.

188 A more shocking security breach in a high-threat zone was 

the assault on India’s Parliament by a small team of heavily armed terrorists in a car loaded with 

explosives in December 2001.189

Indian nuclear plants are characterized by a high level of built-in safety, which indirectly 

makes them relatively less vulnerable to sabotage. In addition, Canadian Deuterium Uranium

(CANDU) plants are enclosed by heavy concrete walls, including a reactor vault of minimum

four-foot thickness surrounding the nuclear core itself. Hence, it is unlikely that a large 

passenger aircraft crashing into the vault could cause a major disaster.190 However, it is not 

known what effect an aircraft loaded with high explosives might have if it crashes into a typical 

Indian reactor building. 

The two VVER-1000 type plants being built by Russia at Koodankulam in the southern 

Indian state of Tamil Nadu may be inherently vulnerable to an airliner crash. Weaknesses of 

existing plants of this type include the inadequate strength of walls and roof, the location of the 

control room at the lower levels of the reactor building (necessitating early evacuation in case of 

 

182 Mukhtar Ahmad, “Militants Storm J & K Army Camp, 4 Jawans Killed,” Rediff.com, November 4, 2001. 

http://indiaabroad.com/news/2001/nov/04jk.htm 183 Mukhtar Ahmad, “Militants Attack Army Transit Camp, 13 Killed,” Rediff.com, November 18, 2001. 

http://indiaabroad.com/news/2001/nov/18kash.htm 184 “Morning Terror in Jammu Casts Shadow on Days Ahead,” Indian Express, May 15, 2002. 185 “Army Officer, Four Rebels Dead in Kashmir Clash,” New York Times, August 1, 2002. 186 “Blowing Up in Our Faces,” Hindustan Times, May 2, 2001, http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/

020501/editpage.asp#two; Vishal Thapar, “Ammo Fires: Not Quite Accidental,” Hindustan Times, August 5, 2001, 

http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/050801/detFEA02.asp 187 Thapar, “Ammo Fires: Not quite Accidental.” 188 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 422. 189 Ranjit Bhushan, “Shock Therapy,” Outlook, December 24, 2001. 190 “The Canadian Nuclear FAQ – Section D: Safety and Liability.” 

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melt-through of the containment), and proximity of steam lines and isolation valves (hence, 

vulnerability to a single blast).191

Apart from relatively well-protected nuclear facilities, there are many sources of radiological materials that are much less secure. For instance, medical and industrial sources are very 

widely distributed and often inadequately guarded. Ironically, such sources are underlined as 

targets by warning signs that highlight their locations. These sources can very easily be stolen or 

released in the form of an RDD or dirty bomb. It bears repetition that an RDD may not be very 

lethal, but can generate fear, panic, and violence, the very goals that terrorists wish to achieve. 

Finally, India’s evolving nuclear doctrine and posture will have a bearing on the terrorist 

threat. As the Indian nuclear weapons infrastructure expands, new points of vulnerability will 

appear over time. At the time of writing, it is believed that Indian nuclear weapons are kept in a 

disaggregated state. Not only are warheads not “mated” with delivery vehicles, but the warheads 

themselves are unassembled: The core is stored separately from the assembly. While this 

reduces the risk of inter-state war, unassembled weapons remain vulnerable to terrorist threats. 

Terrorists might obtain a nuclear core and use it for a dirty bomb or, possibly, to build a nuclear 

weapon. However, this may change once the Indian command and control system crystallizes 

and there is pressure for a less passive nuclear posture. If weapons are actively deployed, the 

location points of nuclear warheads are likely to multiply, creating more potential targets. 

Another possibility is that if India-Pakistan crises of the kind that have occurred regularly 

since the mid-1980s continue, the nuclear element, already an inescapable part of bilateral 

tensions, may rise. In the crisis that spanned the first half of 2002, India announced that it had 

“moved,” but not “deployed,” its nuclear-capable short-range Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles 

close to the border.192 Future crises may involve a higher level of escalation in which nuclear 

weapons may be assembled, mated, and deployed in dispersed locations. Should that happen, 

the process of transportation and deployment of warheads would create fresh targets for 

terrorists. Notwithstanding the extensive precautions that surround nuclear weapons, mistakes 

and accidents do occur. We know, for instance, that several accidents have occurred with 

respect to US nuclear weapons.193 The probability that terrorists may succeed in targeting Indian 

nuclear weapons during transportation or in storage at several sites is therefore significant. 

Given the failures of Indian security systems even in terrorist-ridden high-security areas, 

diverse possibilities of nuclear terrorism can be anticipated. Some of these may be outlined as 

follows: 

• In a worst-case, but least likely, scenario, determined terrorists may detonate a nuclear 

bomb either developed by them or obtained in ready-made form, for example, a small 

tactical weapon stolen from Russia. A nuclear explosion in a large Indian city would 

have horrific effects. One study has estimated that a 15-kiloton explosion in Mumbai 

 

191 Helmut Hirsch, “Vulnerability of VVER-1000 Nuclear Power Plants to Passenger Aircraft Crash,” WISE, 

November 2001. http://www.antenna.nl/wise/terrorism/112001vver.html 192 Vishal Thapar, “Prithvi Missiles Moved Near Border in Punjab,” Hindustan Times, December 25, 2001. 193 Chuck Hansen, “The Oops List,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 56, 6 (November/December 2000), pp. 65-66. 

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would result in somewhere between 160,000 and 866,000 deaths.194 A smaller explosion 

would cause much less harm, but would still have the potential to kill many thousands, 

and create panic and chaos. While the likelihood of such an event is low, it cannot be 

ruled out altogether. 

• A somewhat higher probability would be a terrorist attack on an army installation where 

nuclear warheads are kept. If terrorists seized possession of the nuclear warheads, they 

might not be able to detonate the warheads directly. Nevertheless, they could 

conceivably explode a warhead and disperse radioactivity, creating serious effects. If a 

large city like Delhi or Mumbai were downwind of the detonation, the result has been 

estimated to be from 5,000 to 20,000 cancer deaths over some decades.195

• A less improbable event would be a terrorist assault on a nuclear plant. A small, wellarmed team of terrorists dressed in military uniforms might force its way through security 

barriers and, perhaps with the help of an insider, gain access to a reactor or to a spent fuel 

storage area. A powerful conventional explosion might then directly release radiation, or 

cause a meltdown by damaging the containment system of a reactor. The effect would be 

similar to a major RDD, generating terror in nearby areas. 

• A more plausible event would be a terrorist explosion of an RDD. The radiation released 

in this form in one or more public buildings in a major city would not cause great direct 

harm, but would nevertheless be “cost-effective” from the standpoint of a terrorist. It 

would create widespread fear, impose high economic costs by rendering large areas 

uninhabitable for a long time, and engender political tension and perhaps social violence 

and instability. 

• Terrorists obtaining nuclear material may release some radiation and either threaten a 

nuclear explosion or more releases. Even a bluff creates a strong potential for nuclear 

blackmail, since it would be hard to discount the threat. 

The wider repercussions of a nuclear terrorist incident may be considerable. For 

instance, if one or more RDDs were to be exploded in the city of Mumbai – say, in a nuclear 

version of the multiple bomb blasts of 1993 – the following sequence of events might occur. 

The immediate result would be widespread panic, followed by a chaotic mass movement of 

people desperate to escape the consequence of an unknown level of harm. Very possibly, there 

would be violence, with people fighting to get away by any means of transport available. The 

already overburdened streets would be jammed with fleeing vehicles caught in traffic snarls, and 

spreading lawlessness would be marked by looting and sporadic – perhaps even mass – 

bloodshed. Further, there might well be widespread sectarian violence pitting Hindus against 

Muslims (not unlike the mass killing of Sikhs in the wake of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 

 

194 M. V. Ramana, “Bombing Bombay? Effects of Nuclear Weapons and a Case Study of a Hypothetical

Explosion,” IPPNW Global Health Watch Report No. 3, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 

Cambridge, MA, 1999. 195 Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana and R. Rajaraman, “Plutonium Dispersal and Health Hazards from Nuclear Weapon 

Accidents,” Current Science, 80, 10 (May 25, 2001), pp. 1275-1284. The study focuses on accidents, but the 

effects of sabotage would be similar. 

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assassination in 1984). The incident would also generate immediate and intense hostility toward 

Pakistan as happened in late 2001 following the terrorist attack on India’s Parliament. This in 

turn would very likely bring about an India-Pakistan crisis and raise the specter of war. While 

this may appear to carry a conjecture rather far, history offers numerous examples of relatively 

small incidents snowballing into great tragedies, most famously the “shot heard round the world” 

in 1914 that killed a little-known Austrian archduke and led to world war. Even if the worst did 

not happen, there would be mass misery and terror, public disorder, political crisis, rising costs 

across the board imposed by higher insurance rates, capital flight, diversion of domestic and 

international investment, and a cloud over the role of nuclear energy as a source of electrical 

power. 

7.3. Responses to the Nuclear Terrorist Threat 

Given its long-standing experience of secessionist violence, India has over the past few 

decades developed measures to guard against the general threat of terrorism. These include 

relatively high levels of security at airports and other critical facilities, the use of the armed 

forces to fight insurgencies, and the promulgation of anti-terrorist laws that provide the state 

with extensive powers. The intensified attacks by terrorists espousing the cause of Kashmir, 

especially after September 11, 2001, brought still greater efforts in this direction.196 In October 

2001, India issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO), later to become the POTA, 

providing for 90 days’ detention without trial, special courts to deal with terrorist cases, and 

police powers to intercept communications, which could be later presented as evidence in court. 

Passport and visa restrictions were tightened, as were laws designed to curb the financing of 

terrorism. Quick reaction teams were deployed at all major airports along with other enhanced 

security measures.197 Security was tightened at vital installations relating to space and nuclear 

energy, refineries, and power utilities, at government offices, and at important commercial, 

religious, and historical centers. It was decided to create a National Disaster Management 

Agency (NDMA) and similar agencies at the level of the states to prepare comprehensive 

guidelines for disaster management, train paramilitary forces for rapid deployment in case of a 

terrorist attack (including a WMD attack), draw up lists of vulnerable targets, strengthen fire and 

medical services, and revamp communication networks.198 In August 2002, it was announced 

that central and state security agencies would henceforth pool their knowledge resources though 

a new Multi-Agency Center (MAC). 

All these broad measures contribute to countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. 

Additional specific measures include a decision to place almost all nuclear plants under “no-fly” 

or restricted zones for aircraft. However, the BARC establishment, which includes the country’s 

designated weapons laboratory, remains at some risk because of the location of a backup runway 

at Mumbai airport.199 In April 2002, the Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation announced 

 

196 For a detailed post-September 11 description of domestic and international measures undertaken by the 

Government of India, see United Nations Security Council, Report by India to the Counter-Terrorism Committee 

Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001), Enclosure, Document No. S/2001/1278, December 27, 2001. 197 India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2001-2002, Chapter III. 198 India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Press Release, October 5, 2001. 199 Kalyan Ray, “Move to Put Nuclear Plants Under Restricted Zone,” Deccan Herald, October 13, 2001. 

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that he was aware of the terrorist threat, and that special security drills had been conducted by 

the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and CISF staff at nuclear facilities.200

At the international level, India had already begun to develop numerous avenues of 

cooperation to counter the terrorist threat. By September 11, it had become a signatory to all the 

UN treaties relating to terrorism except one. It acceded to that exception – the CPPNW – in 

January 2002. It became a member of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation 

(SAARC) Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1987. It also established 

bilateral Joint Working Groups to address the terrorism issue with several countries. By late 

2001, it had signed bilateral agreements on counterterrorism with eight countries and extradition 

treaties or agreements with 24. Bilateral cooperation with the United States reached significant 

levels soon after the September 11 tragedy. The Indo-US Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism met regularly, established antiterrorism training programs (including a workshop on 

WMD for senior Indian officials in December 2001), and began developing cooperation on a 

wide range of issues that covered finance, homeland security, forensic capability, aviation 

security, and cyberterrorism.

201 Preliminary talks also began on possible US assistance to India 

for the security of nuclear plants.202 Nuclear cooperation, however, faces difficult obstacles 

because of the nonproliferation concerns of the United States. 

India has shown a serious interest in obtaining sensors for monitoring the India-Pakistan 

border and curbing the flow of terrorists into India.203 Without doubt, border control remains the 

most difficult issue for India. The length and porosity of the India-Pakistan border makes unilateral control difficult. The terrorist attack on India’s Parliament in December 2001 brought an 

intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. India engaged in a massive buildup of armed 

forces along the border in order to exert strong pressure on Pakistan to stop its support for 

extremist groups active in Kashmir. The outcome of this exercise in compellence – as yet unfinished at the time of writing – has an important bearing on the nuclear terrorism threat to India, 

since, as noted above, the “jihadists” fighting in Kashmir have the greatest potential for indiscriminate mass destruction.204 In the meantime, the cross-border flow of terrorists and the 

periodic incidence of lethal attacks continue. 

7.4. What Needs To Be Done 

The nuclear terrorist threat to India is best seen in the scenarios outlined earlier in this 

section. Government officials have taken the threat seriously, and have undertaken a series of 

domestic and international responses to meet it. Nevertheless, the vulnerabilities evident even in 

high-security contexts reveal that the absence of a nuclear terrorist incident so far may have as 

much to do with lack of interest or effort on the part of terrorists as with the measures that deter 

them. Certainly, the experience of September 11 gives us reason to expect the highly improbable. Four areas that need to be attended to are: 

 

200 R. K. Radhakrishnan, “ ‘Security Concerns Will Not Stop New Nuclear Plants,’ ” Hindu, April 4, 2002. 201 “US to Help India in Border Vigil,” Hindustan Times, January 22, 2002. 202 Atul Aneja, “India, US Discuss N-safety Issues,” Hindu, March 30, 2002. 203 “India to Install Advanced American Ground Sensors on LoC,” Hindustan Times, June 19, 2002. 204 On India’s turn to a compellence strategy, see Rajesh M. Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism and India’s Strategic Shift,” 

India Review (forthcoming). 

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1. Technology: Counterterrorism requires technical sophistication, and considerable 

investment in order to achieve that. This means not only border monitoring, but 

control of nuclear facilities, including nuclear plants, research reactors, waste 

management facilities, and medical and industrial establishments that have physical 

possession of nuclear materials. The armed forces, which utilize nuclear materials for 

military purposes, constitute a separate and important category. 

2. Organization and Training: The wide distribution of nuclear materials brings 

numerous organizations into contact with them. These include government 

organizations (the military, intelligence, the atomic energy establishment, police and 

paramilitary forces), medical centers, and industries. Control and supervision of the 

security of materials across organizations, especially during transportation, requires a 

comprehensive overview, planning, and coordination. A coordinating organization 

for this purpose is necessary to minimize the risks posed by terrorism. Officials who 

are likely to come into direct contact with a nuclear terrorist incident need to be 

trained for safety and crisis management.

3. Public Information and Education: In order to minimize confusion and chaos, it is 

necessary to create public awareness about the potential effects of nuclear terrorism. 

This involves integrating the official and unofficial media to disseminate information 

and encourage public confidence without causing unnecessary panic.

4. Accountability: Independent monitoring of nuclear-related organizations is important 

to ensure accountability. The role of an independently appointed executive body, or 

of a legislative committee analogous to Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, is 

crucial in this respect.

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8. Recommendations 

Nuclear terrorism encompasses a spectrum of potential threats from the elementary level 

of nuclear hoax and blackmail to the detonation of a nuclear bomb. While the effects of the 

former would almost certainly be devastating, those at the other end of the scale would still be of 

serious consequence. From the terrorist’s standpoint, the lower part of the scale would be more 

cost effective and manageable. Nevertheless, the lesson of September 11 is that nothing can be 

discounted, and that the unexpected should be expected. 

The probability of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan is 

extremely low since both countries report keeping them in unassembled form, and because their 

components are stored separately. Terrorists are also unlikely to be able to manufacture an 

operational nuclear weapon of their own, given the difficulties involved in obtaining the required 

materials, facilities, and technical know-how. However, terrorist groups are more likely to resort 

to at least four types of nuclear terrorism. First, they might sabotage a nuclear facility (including 

a military facility) to release lethal radiation. Second, they could utilize a dirty bomb to disperse 

radiation. In either case, the result would be widespread panic and violence, perhaps even war. 

Third, they could take control of and threaten to blow up a nuclear facility in order to blackmail 

a government into accepting their demands. Fourth, they might engage in the clandestine 

transfer of nuclear materials out of India and Pakistan for use in some other part of the world. 

8.1. National Measures 

At the national level, it is imperative that the system of controls established to prevent 

nuclear terrorism be both technically and organizationally sophisticated. The costs involved may 

be high, but are justified by the potentially enormous damage and instability that can be caused 

by a nuclear terrorist incident. Regardless of partisan interests, all political groups (other than 

nuclear terrorists themselves) have a common interest in preventing terrorists from gaining 

access to nuclear materials and technology. Some desirable measures are enumerated below. 

1. India and Pakistan must continue to track the numerous groups and individuals engaged in 

overt or covert violent activities or terrorism in their respective countries. Their movements, 

interactions, and transactions within and outside the country must be tracked in order to 

prevent them from carrying out nuclear terrorist acts. 

2. Enhanced measures should be adopted to control the movement of goods and people across 

their respective international borders. Enhanced levels of surveillance of land borders and 

coastlines are necessary. Both countries need to have a centralized record of people entering 

or exiting the country, which could be accessed by immigration authorities from any port of 

entry or exit. 

3. Both need to acquire modern technology and equipment to upgrade the physical security of 

nuclear weapons components, and nuclear materials and installations, including radioactive 

waste storage and disposal facilities. 

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4. Greater attention must be given to background checks of new entrants into their respective 

nuclear infrastructures. Strict scientific criteria and procedures should be adopted to verify 

periodically the reliability of personnel holding sensitive assignments. This will help secure 

the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs against insider threats or from insider-outsider 

collusion. 

5. Nuclear materials are vulnerable during transportation. India and Pakistan should acquire the 

latest technologies for packaging, sealing, and monitoring of fissile and radioactive materials 

during transportation, and obtain trucks or railway carriages especially designed for safe and 

secure movement of nuclear materials. Security of transportation demands that they also 

acquire updated equipment for real-time communication among transport vehicles, escorts, 

and a transportation operation center. 

6. An autonomous and highly trained security force should be established for protecting nuclear 

facilities and materials instead of depending on a nationwide security agency that undertakes 

other assignments as well. Personnel may be transferred from other security agencies to the 

nuclear security agency, but the latter must be an autonomous organization devoted exclusively to securing nuclear facilities and materials. The agency must also oversee the security 

of materials and related facilities in the mining, medical, research, and industrial sectors. 

7. There should be coordinated efforts among the various organizations that are related to the 

nuclear infrastructure. Coordinating bodies may be separate for military-related aspects, 

government-controlled power production, and private industry, but there must be a single 

autonomous body to ensure oversight and accountability. 

8. Finally, provisions for disaster management are of the essence. These would include emergency response teams for tackling a security alarm or actual nuclear terrorist incident; wider 

arrangements involving the administrative apparatus, the police, hospitals, public health 

services, transportation systems, and the like for tackling a nuclear emergency; and the 

dissemination of information and confidence to the public through government and private 

media. 

8.2. Bilateral Measures 

Despite their long-standing hostility and recurring crises, India and Pakistan have a 

shared interest in thwarting nuclear terrorism. It is not in the interests of either to allow terrorist 

groups to obtain nuclear capability. Once it has obtained nuclear capacity in some form, a 

terrorist group would be hard to control. However amicable its relationship to a particular 

government, the possession of such enormous coercive power would, from that government’s 

standpoint, give the group an unwelcome potential to change the domestic balance of power. At 

the very least, the group would be in a position to use its nuclear capability as leverage in 

extracting a high political price from even a friendly government. As states, India and Pakistan 

thus have a common stake in preserving their control over WMD. 

Second, the occurrence of a nuclear terrorist incident can have far-reaching repercussions 

on strategic relations between India and Pakistan. If a terrorist group effected a radiation release, 

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say by means of a dirty bomb or an attack on a nuclear facility, there is every chance that the 

target country would treat it as a provocation by the other. This would then likely lead to a 

military confrontation that could assume far more serious proportions than anything the region 

has witnessed hitherto. In the unlikely event a serious nuclear incident – such as the detonation 

of a nuclear bomb by terrorists, or a highly damaging attack on a nuclear weapons site or a 

nuclear plant – should occur, the target state might even assume that it constitutes an attack by 

its adversary. If there is already a confrontation between the two rivals, as happens from time to 

time, the risk of war would be very high. The pressure to strike in reprisal would be hard to 

resist, with potentially disastrous results. 

In this context, it is important to recall that India and Pakistan have in the past been able 

to cooperate on nuclear-strategic matters even in times of high tension. In December 1988, they 

signed an agreement to avoid attacking each other’s nuclear facilities, to the terms of which they 

have adhered by exchanging lists of their respective facilities even at the height of confrontation. 

Similarly, both have consistently informed each other of impending missile tests in accordance 

with the Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lahore in 1999. Hence, there is room for 

optimism that the long-standing adversaries may cooperate in curbing the common threat of 

nuclear terrorism. The measures the authors recommend are: 

1. Cooperation between the border security authorities of India and Pakistan in interdicting unauthorized movement of goods and people across their boundaries. They 

could share intelligence on these issues and, if needed, undertake joint operations to 

control illegal transactions and movements across their borders. The Pakistan 

Rangers and India’s Border Security Force hold meetings twice a year to discuss 

border security. The scope of these meetings could be extended to cover issues 

pertaining to nuclear terrorism. 

2. Monitoring the activities of transnational terrorist groups, exchanging information on 

these groups, and making joint efforts to disrupt their connections, transactions, and 

movements could be another measure. An agreement specifically designed to help 

each other combat nuclear terrorism could encourage cooperation. 

3. A formal agreement on maintaining nuclear arsenals in a non-operational form could 

consolidate the tacit cooperation already in existence. This would not only strengthen 

strategic stability directly, but also help reduce the scope for terrorists to target 

nuclear weapons. 

8.3. Role of the United States 

The United States has a strong interest in ensuring peace and stability around the world. 

Terrorism transcends borders, and hence the United States has launched a worldwide effort to 

track down and combat terrorist networks. South Asia has been of particular interest to the 

United States because of the ongoing campaign to destroy the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and related 

groups, whose activities have spanned Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The United States also 

has a strong interest in preventing a war – potentially, a nuclear war – between India and 

Pakistan. Given, as we have seen, the risk that a nuclear terrorist incident could well unleash 

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war in the subcontinent, the US role in counterterrorism in the region has perforce to be a central 

one. In addition to working toward defusing tension between India and Pakistan and 

encouraging them to open a dialogue on their contentious issues, the United States can contribute 

to strengthening the safety and security of their nuclear programs in several ways, as follows: 

1. The Indian and Pakistani systems for personnel reliability are outdated, limited in 

scope and lacking in sophistication. India and Pakistan can certainly benefit from

some knowledge of the PRP utilized by the US nuclear program. Training workshops 

could be held for Pakistani and Indian personnel and relevant literature (manuals, 

guidelines, and procedures) could be made available to them. 

2. The United States can extend useful assistance for safe and secure storage, transport, 

and disposal of nuclear waste. 

3. The United States can help India and Pakistan to improve organizational practices to 

ensure better coordination among various organizations dealing with diverse aspects 

of their nuclear programs. Inadequate coordination and lack of cohesion among 

different actors engaged in nuclear program-related activities can undermine 

efficiency and make them more vulnerable to terrorism. 

4. The United States can make modern technologies available to India and Pakistan to 

strengthen the safety and security of their nuclear programs. Some of the 

technologies and equipment include remote sensing, radiological sensors, video 

monitoring, alarms, and tamper-indicating seals. 

These recommendations do not conflict with US obligations under the NPT, which calls 

upon the nuclear weapons states not to “assist, encourage or induce” any non-nuclear weapon 

state in manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. These recommendations do not improve 

the bomb-making potential of India and Pakistan, nor do they encourage them to keep their 

nuclear arsenals in assembled and deployed form. A security breach in a nuclear facility can 

produce dangerous consequences. US policy makers should weigh the advantages of helping 

India and Pakistan strengthen security measures against nuclear terrorist threats vis-à-vis a rigid 

interpretation of the NPT. They may also be constrained by export restrictions on certain kinds 

of technologies and equipment. The United States could take up each category of assistance on a 

case-by-case basis. 

Just as US policy makers will face constraints in offering security assistance, Indian and 

Pakistani policy makers are also likely to be wary in accepting US assistance. They will 

measure the benefits of US offers against the confidentiality imperatives of their own nuclear 

programs. In particular, they will not want US experts to have access to their nuclear weapons 

programs. There is a limit to what India and Pakistan can accept from the United States. 

However, despite some reservations on both sides, there are ample areas where the United States 

and the two South Asian states can work together for improving the safety and security of their 

nuclear programs. With both sides likely to guard their respective secrets zealously, the 

transmission of expertise is bound to be cautious and slow. Detailed blueprints need not be 

supplied. Rather, India and Pakistan require, apart from appropriate technology, guidance on 

best practices and frameworks that they can adapt to their specific needs. 

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8.4. Global Efforts

The nuclear terrorist threat is global in scope. Its main components – nuclear materials, 

terrorists, and targets – are not limited by political geography. Hence, all countries have an 

interest in controlling it. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, the IAEA, the UN, and regional 

organizations have all played some part in reducing the scope for terrorists to inflict nuclear 

blackmail or horror upon the world. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. 

1. The ongoing war against terrorism must be sustained. Global cooperation is needed 

to identify, track down, and apprehend terrorist groups, beginning with those whose 

activities are known to be transnational. This will require the strengthening of interstate information exchange and the establishment of arrangements for extradition of 

terrorists within the framework of the UN. Cooperation on these lines should be 

made obligatory. 

2. The measures initiated by the IAEA to enhance cooperation with respect to the 

physical security of civilian nuclear facilities and materials should be continued and 

intensified. In order to ensure the diffusion of advanced monitoring technologies and 

best practices, the IAEA should be provided with additional funding and an expanded 

agenda. The creation of a special fund for assisting countries needing upgraded 

technology should be seriously considered. 

3. The states possessing nuclear weapons should engage in a similar – perhaps informal 

at first – set of arrangements with respect to military nuclear facilities and materials. 

Regardless of inevitable tensions over how much can be given and how much 

received, some degree of cooperation can only be beneficial for all. Here, it is 

necessary to go beyond traditional objections to “rewarding” proliferators. Whether 

nations will or will not obtain nuclear weapons is determined by capabilities and 

interests, not by vague notions of reward and punishment. 

4. Finally, there must be a serious effort to “build down” the vast arsenals of the United 

States and Russia. Future arms control agreements must eliminate weapons fully 

rather than place large numbers under storage, where they will continue to be 

potential targets for terrorists. 

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About the Authors 

Dr. Rajesh Basrur has BA, MA, and M Phil degrees in History from Delhi University, 

and MA and PhD degrees in Politics from Mumbai University. He taught at Ramnarain Ruia 

College from 1978 to 1996, and at Mumbai University from 1996 to 2000. He has had 

fellowships at Simon Fraser University in Canada, the University of Illinois, and the Henry 

Stimson Center and the Brookings Institution in Washington. He has specialized in international 

security relations, especially the politics of nuclear weapons, and in international relations 

theory. He has published three books, a number of articles on nuclear issues, and is currently 

writing a book on India’s nuclear strategy. 

Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is an independent political and defense analyst based in Pakistan. 

He obtained his MA and PhD degrees in International Relations/Political Science from the 

University of Pennsylvania and an M Phil degree in Politics from the University of Leeds in the 

United Kingdom. He has taught at Columbia University in New York, Heidelberg University in 

Germany, and the University of the Punjab in Lahore, Pakistan. His books include Military, 

State and Society in Pakistan (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 2000) and Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment (London: Macmillan, 1993). He is a contributor to Pakistan’s national 

dailies and has published many journal articles and research papers in professional journals. 

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