Patterns of Influence

Patterns

of 

Influence

Strategic Culture 

Case Studies and Conclusions

Edited by Matthew R. Slater, PhD

Quantico, VA

2020
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Names: Slater, Matthew R., editor. 

Title: Patterns of influence : strategic culture case studies and 

 conclusions / edited by Matthew R. Slater. 

Description: First edition. | Quantico, VA : Marine Corps University Press, 

 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “This 

 book addresses applied strategic culture and investigates the usefulness 

 of the concept to better understand how internal state dynamics form 

 unique institutions, behaviors, and perspectives that impact their 

 external interactions with other states. The strategic culture 

 literature successfully provides the necessary intellectual 

 underpinnings; this volume is more concerned with its practical 

 application for policy makers and analysts. This is accomplished by 

 comparing a diverse set of case studies, including Afghanistan, Brazil, 

 China, and Kosovo, to see if they use strategic culture consistently, 

 which provides useful insights despite differences in state size and 

 degree of political and social order”— Provided by publisher. 

Identifiers: LCCN 2019028785 | ISBN 9781732003057 (paperback) 

Subjects: LCSH: Strategic culture—Case studies. | International 

 relations—Decision making—Case studies. 

Classification: LCC U21.2 .P334 2019 | DDC 355/.0335—dc23 

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019028785

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They do not 

necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine 

Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. 

government. The information contained in this book was accurate at the time of 

printing. Every effort has been made to secure copyright permission on excerpts 

and illustrations reproduced in this volume. Please contact the editors to rectify 

inadvertent errors or omissions. The production of this book and other MCUP 

products is graciously supported by the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Marine Corps University Press

2044 Broadway Street

Quantico, VA 22134

www.usmcu.edu/mcupress 

First edition published 2020

ISBN: 978-1-7320030-5-7
v

Contents

Foreword vii

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 3

by Matthew R. Slater, PhD

1. A Strategic Culture Framework for Practitioners 15

 by Blagovest Tashev, PhD

2. China’s Strategic Culture and Its Diverse 66

 Strategic Options

 by Christopher D. Yung, PhD

3. Does Afghanistan Have a “Strategic Culture”? 103

 by Vern Liebl

4. Brazilian Strategic Culture and the Amazon 132

 by Denise Slater

5. A New State with a Nascent Strategic Culture: 175

 International and Domestic Influences in Kosovo

 by George Bogden, PhD

Conclusion 205

by Matthew R. Slater, PhD

Glossary and Abbreviations 215

Index 219

Foreword

When the Cold War ended in 1991, we adjusted our national security strategy to address global instability. This took the 

American military to many places, such as Somalia and Iraq, 

where our forces engaged in persistent, low-intensity conflict. 

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the American military deployed large numbers of 

forces to the greater Middle East—primarily in prolonged 

campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other places too—

to counter violent Islamic terrorism. As these campaigns wind 

down, once again the world is realigning, but this time into a 

multipolar power structure. Patterns of Influence: Strategic Culture Case Studies and Conclusions is a timely book because of its 

applicability to the emerging strategic environment. Not only 

can it help us understand emerging threats, but the strategic 

culture approach emphasized in this book can help us bridge 

the gap between academic and military disciplines. 

Now that the United States finds itself once again in an 

era of great power competition, new and novel approaches will 

be needed to ensure peace and prosperity for our country, our 

allies, and partners. Strategic culture may not be a new approach—Jack L. Snyder wrote about it more than 50 years ago 

to help American strategists better anticipate the Soviet Union’s 

counterstrategies to U.S. defense planning—but it has been 

underemphasized for several years. The emerging strategic environment is characterized by multipolarity, power balancing, 

selective engagement, and spheres of influence, among other 

vii
viii foreword

trends. Understanding a country’s strategic culture can aid U.S. 

policy makers in factoring in military capabilities, economic 

competition, and the unique proclivities of various countries 

in comprehensive U.S. military and diplomatic planning to 

advance American interests.

The strategic culture method emphasized in this book 

can be useful for professional military education. The military requires tangible outcomes for an investment of time and 

resources, just as any other practical endeavor. The strategic 

culture approach has the potential to enable military planners 

to inform us about the human aspects as well as the unique 

cultures found in different operational environments. A thorough understanding of history and culture lets us know about 

the cultural fault lines of a given country, which can help the 

American military navigate difficult human terrain. Strategic 

culture is particularly important for information operations because we must be able to understand the adversary well enough 

to shape their courses of action before conflict erupts, or we 

risk being shaped by their counterintelligence and information 

offensive efforts.

Patterns of Influence performs an important function by 

informing readers about the strategic cultures of China, Afghanistan, Brazil, and Kosovo. Patterns of Influence also advises 

practitioners on the pitfalls and best practices when applying 

the strategic culture method. 

Brigadier General William J. Bowers

President and Commanding General

Marine Corps University

July 2017–July 2019
ix

Acknowledgments

I want to thank George Dallas for his unwavering support for 

the book. The MCU Press team was exceptional throughout 

the publication process, particularly Angela Anderson and Jason Gosnell for assisting with title selection, book cover design, 

and timely editing. Alexandra Kindell played an important 

role by providing editorial assistance and helping to launch the 

project.

Patterns of Influence

3

Introduction

by Matthew R. Slater, PhD

Approach and Overview

This book addresses applied strategic culture and investigates the 

usefulness of the concept to better understand how internal state 

dynamics form unique institutions, behaviors, and perspectives 

that impact their external interactions with other states. The 

strategic culture literature successfully provides the necessary 

intellectual underpinnings; this volume is more concerned with 

its practical application for policy makers and analysts. The authors accomplish this by comparing a diverse set of case studies, including Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Kosovo, to see if 

the strategic culture approach provides a deeper understanding 

about their policies and decision-making outcomes despite differences in state size and degree of political and social order. 

Strategic culture is an intuitive concept that has endured 

over the years since it was introduced to the academic lexicon 

by Jack L. Snyder.1

 Both strategy and culture are broad academic terms that develop a more specific meaning when brought 

together. Colin S. Gray writes that strategy “should be thought 

1

 Snyder states: “It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a 

unique ‘strategic culture.’ Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode 

of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, 

attitudes, and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a 

state of semipermanence that places them on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere 

‘policy’.” Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1977), v.
4 matthew R. slater

of as glue that holds together the purposeful activities of a 

state.”2

 He explains that “strategy can be considered a system 

that enables functional cooperation among categorically distinctive behaviours in the interest of advancing some common 

purpose.”3

 Strategy may be thought of as the glue, but culture 

informs us about the environment or conditions that impact 

the glue’s resiliency or strength. Each state makes distinct decisions about its strategy under circumstances unique from other 

states and culture refers to these distinctive qualities. 

The study of strategic culture consists of both the logical 

and seemingly illogical elements of state decision making. 

Strategic culture research helps us to understand the unique 

elements of a given state (e.g., historical narrative, political 

structure, or social organization) and informs us of how states 

interact with other actors. The strategic culture lens can, at 

minimum, provide the researcher with a contextual framework 

for understanding state decisions—and perhaps in some cases 

allow the researcher to predict a state’s range of reactions to 

situations.

The case studies presented in this book highlight important and diverse questions regarding the practical application of 

the strategic culture concept. For example, is strategic culture 

more appropriate for states with reconciled identities, such as 

Brazil and China, rather than newly formed states still adapting to social and political transformation, such as Kosovo and 

Afghanistan? Politically coherent states possess clearly defined 

organizations and processes and newer states typically lack the 

traditions, organizational maturity, and cohesiveness to generate repeating patterns of behavior. If strategic culture is only 

useful to assess “stable” states, then its utility for analysts and 

2

 Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 23. 3

 Gray, The Future of Strategy, 23.
introduction 5

academics is somewhat restricted. However, strategic culture 

may be of use by shedding light on previously unthought of or 

nascent institutions that are generating some level of consistent 

state behavior and leading toward formative strategic culture.

The case studies in this volume address the usefulness of 

strategic culture regarding small states. Because smaller states 

are always heavily influenced by the actions of their larger or 

more powerful neighbors, is it advantageous to study their internal history, structures, and processes? Should a researcher 

spend a greater portion of their time examining more powerful 

regional states that may be the true source of small state strategic culture? The comparison of diverse case studies may provide 

insights to this complex question. 

The second section of this introduction provides a brief 

summary of the development of strategic culture, orienting the 

reader to the strategic culture approach. The primary tenet of 

strategic culture is the notion that the strategy-making process 

and resulting policies are the output of both culture and power considerations. This seems intuitive, but until Snyder gave 

prominence to the field of study, the role of culture in state 

behavior was frequently overlooked in favor of a given state’s 

economic power and military capability. Other writers, most 

notably Gray and Alastair Iain Johnston, continue to debate 

and enrich the field of study. 

The third section makes the argument that strategic culture may be useful to international studies, but it also defies 

conventional theoretical approaches because it encourages the 

researcher to consider multiple levels of analysis simultaneously. J. David Singer warned us that researching more than one 

level of analysis at a time could be problematic because they 
6 matthew R. slater

are inherently distinct.4 Robert D. Putnam presents a two-level 

approach that combines the domestic and international levels 

and offers a method to bridge the theoretical gap. Peter Alexis 

Gourevitch takes the argument full circle and contends that the 

domestic and international levels are intertwined and should always be considered together in any comprehensive assessment. 

This introduction provides a preview of the five chapters 

that comprise this book, which begins with a strategic culture 

framework proposal and is followed by four case studies. The 

last section of the introduction also proposes questions for 

the reader to consider while reading through the case studies. 

These questions are addressed in the conclusion of the book.

The Development 

of the Strategic Culture Approach

The strategic culture body of literature has matured during 

the last 40 years, from its introduction as a new concept that 

generated debate regarding its theoretical value, to more recent 

discussions regarding its utility to international relations practitioners. The term strategic culture was first coined by Snyder in 

a research report titled The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications 

for Limited Nuclear Operations. The term gained recognition 

and today it is a widely accepted approach in international relations.5

 The ideas in Snyder’s work challenged conventional 

thinking at the time that tended to rely on rational actor as4

 J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 

World Politics 14, no. 1 (October 1961): 78, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557. 

Singer states that “we have, in our texts and elsewhere, roamed up and down the 

ladder of organizational complexity with remarkable abandon, focusing upon the 

total system, international organizations, regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure groups, social classes, elites and individuals 

as the needs of the moment required.” He notes that researchers’ propensity for 

“vertical drift” causes methodological instability.

5

 Please see chapter 1 for a more thorough overview of the development and definition of strategic culture.
introduction 7

sumptions and discounted cultural influences. He questioned 

the notion that Soviet military planners and policy makers 

would follow the same logic as their U.S. counterparts on the 

limited use of nuclear weapons:

Will the Soviets agree to play according to the illunderstood and esoteric rules of intrawar deterrence—a 

notion that Soviet writings characterize as “abstract from 

life”? Or will they see any limited nuclear attack as voiding all rules of restraint, presaging inevitable escalation? 6

Snyder warned U.S. strategists about the dangers of ethnocentrism and determined that the contrast in Soviet and American approaches stemmed from a true difference in perspectives 

based on preexisting cultural beliefs rather than an intent to 

manipulate and deceive.7

After the end of the Cold War, other authors built on 

Snyder’s work. Gray wrote that public, strategic, and militaryorganizational aspects of strategic culture are all important, but 

he warned about the concept’s inherit limitations: “The needs 

of theory building and the reality of culture’s ubiquitous contextuality, are, alas, severely at odds.”8

 He understood strategic 

culture as an organic element to any assessment of state behavior, but due to the pervasive nature of culture it is “deadly for 

the practicality, let alone the utility of theory.”9

 Although Gray 

acknowledges the importance of strategic culture, he warned 

against using it as the sole means to examine state relations: 

“Culture matters deeply. . . . But, it is not all that matters in 

strategy and security.”10

6

 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 2. 7

 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 38. 8

 Colin S. Gray, Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture (Fort Belvoir, 

VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 

2006), 26.

9

 Gray, Out of the Wilderness, 26. 10 Gray, Out of the Wilderness, 4.
8 matthew R. slater

Johnston is another important voice in the strategic culture 

dialogue. Johnston finds common ground with Gray, but he 

also diverges on the question of theoretical potential. Johnston 

agrees with Gray’s interpretation that “the concept of strategic 

culture is viewed as an amalgam of a wide range of (potentially 

competing) variables or inputs.”11 Unlike Gray, Johnston states 

that it is imperative to apply a structure to strategic culture 

inquiry to make the concept theoretically rigorous. During his 

survey of the literature, Johnston noted that there are broad 

differences of opinion regarding the assumption that strategic 

culture plays any role in state behavior, or whether it is the sole 

determining factor.12 Johnston warned that strategic culture 

should be applied with a great deal of caution because findings 

suggest an irregular pattern of influence in state behavior that 

would greatly diminish strategic culture’s explanatory potential.

Considering Domestic Sources 

of State Behavior

Despite the theoretical problems surrounding the use of strategic culture, international relations scholars have long recognized the need to account for the domestic sources of state 

behavior. The value of strategic culture is based on the depth of 

understanding it provides about the statements, policies, and 

actions of leaders and institutions. For example, some may find 

China’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea inexplicable 

due to the billions of dollars in trade that supports friendly economic ties throughout the Pacific, or Brazil’s prevailing belief 

that state, nonstate actors, and foreign powers may use environmental concerns as a reason to invade and occupy the Amazon.13 Looking at circumstances through the lens of political 

11 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security

19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 33n2, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119.

12 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 63.

13 These issues are addressed in chapter 2 on China and in chapter 3 on Brazil.
introduction 9

and economic rationality, one could assume China would take 

a multilateral approach to security interests in the South China 

Sea. In the case of Brazil, it is highly unlikely any state would 

take the risks necessary to invade and occupy the Amazon, 

even though the environment is a growing concern with the 

international community. Strategic culture helps explain the 

gap existing between the seemingly irrational and unpredictable behavior of states (as viewed by outsiders) by addressing 

the roots of domestic influences on state strategies and policies. 

Strategic culture holds the promise to illuminate why a state 

behaves in a certain way, and it also sheds light on how their 

internal narrative shapes the conditions of policy making.

The ambition of explaining the role of internal influences 

on state behavior is not unique to strategic culture. Research 

executed by Singer, Putnam, and Gourevitch attempted to 

bridge this gap, with each author using a distinctive approach. 

Singer’s research emphasized a rigorous levels of analysis methodology that acknowledges the legitimacy of both domestic 

and international factors but within their unique contexts. His 

utilitarian model insists that a debate concerning the primacy 

of one level over the other must be preceded by an acknowledgment of what the researcher is trying to study. An impartial 

researcher should be able to reduce distortions on their topic, 

or focus on the level where “distortion is least dysfunctional 

and where such accuracy is absolutely essential.”14 In other 

words, optimization at a chosen level of analysis will suboptimize research at the other levels.15 In his final analysis, Singer 

reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each level: the in14 Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 79.

15 Singer delineates two levels of analysis in his 1961 article, including the international system and the state. International relations literature addresses many other 

levels, such as the individual, global, regional, and subnational identity. In Patterns 

of Influence, the authors address most of their work at the state or domestic level, 

however, Tashev leaves the door open to other possibilities that he addresses in his 

framework discussion in chapter 1.
10 matthew R. slater

ternational relations level provides a more comprehensive and 

coherent view, whereas the domestic view provides richer detail 

and depth. 

Putnam, like Singer, takes an ambivalent view regarding 

the importance of the international system compared to domestic variables, however, unlike Singer he tries to bring the 

two levels together to explain state behavior.16 He emphasizes 

how decision makers must simultaneously take international 

and domestic considerations into account; therefore, it is impossible to declare the primacy of one level over another or ignore the importance of one at the expense of the other. Putnam 

discusses the dynamic linkages not only between levels but also 

how one dyad affects the same linkages in different issue areas. 

For instance, an agreement reached about a border dispute may 

demonstrate the effects of international pressure on a state, but 

the resulting internal schisms may weaken a leader and cause 

the state to back away from future agreements. This dyad may 

affect other issues such as security. If a leader was viewed as 

too conciliatory about a trade issue, it might explain why they 

became hawkish in other areas of foreign policy. Putnam states, 

“It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that 

question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes’.”17

Using state-level policy decisions to explain international 

conflict, or the possibility of conflict, is not unusual in international studies, particularly in the field of political economy. 

Gourevitch offers an observation on the European interwar 

years: “International cooperation on policy survives so long as 

the political forces committed to its continuation within each 

16 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 

Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 460. 17 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 427.
introduction 11

country are able to prevail.”18 He explains how the international economy of the period was a product of the national 

processes and policies where “political institutions, politicians, 

leaders and interest groups interact.”19 The domestic choices 

of each state converged with those of other states to produce 

global results; the choices of domestic actors matter more than 

external variables, such as the international structure. Although 

Gourevitch did not focus on the topic of security, he offered a 

clear explanation of how the internal dynamics of states affect 

state and international behavior.

Each author contributes an important theoretical perspective to the holistic approach of strategic culture. Singer tells us 

that there is no competition between the levels of analysis—

only distinction. Therefore, unlike structural philosophy, the 

utility of a given level of analysis is determined by the issue 

under consideration. Putnam provides us with a logical narrative that allows us to sidestep Singer’s warnings about moving 

between levels because he recognizes the need to bring domestic and international levels of analysis into the conversation simultaneously. Gourevitch provides us with examples when the 

domestic level must be explored as the root cause of outcomes 

at the international level, even in cases when the international 

level may play an important role in outcomes. Strategic culture 

takes a primarily domestic-level view, but counter to traditional schools of thought, cuts across the levels of analysis to exam18 Peter Alexis Gourevitch, “Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 354, 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028599. While reviewing Barry Eichengreen’s Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Beth A. Simmons’s Who Adjusts?: 

Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), Gourevitch gives examples of domestic 

sources of economic policies, such as Germany’s reparations, wartime debts, shifts 

in production, and the structural effects of new technologies.

19 Gourevitch, “Squaring the Circle,” 352.
12 matthew R. slater

ine the role of leadership (individual level), regional actors and 

international organizations (international level), and internal 

bureaucracies and subgroups (state level) simultaneously. 

Organization

This book embraces the theoretical ambiguity of strategic culture, consciously recognizing the trade-off of increased flexibility and the sacrifice of theoretical rigor. In the first chapter, 

Blagovest Tashev proposes a well-researched framework that 

provides practitioners with potential sources of strategic culture. Tashev includes some variables that are not typical for 

strategic culture studies but purposefully casts a wide net to 

provide an inclusive method for researchers. His overview of 

strategic culture literature provides the reader with a reference 

for the diverse case studies presented in this volume. After an 

examination of strategic culture primary literature, he introduces the components of his framework with their associated 

explanations and examples. These components draw from both 

culturalist and realist approaches, as well as the domestic and 

international levels of analysis that provide a high level of flexibility for the practitioner.20

Most strategic culture case studies presented in the next 

chapters deal with the dilemma of identifying coherent security policy or strategic-level trends: such is not the problem 

with the case study on China. Christopher D. Yung provides 

20 John Glenn’s summary of the classic neorealist (or structuralist) argument illustrates how it differs from strategic culturalists. Neorealists assume a range of 

predictable behavior by states, known as the rational actor assumption. They hold 

that because state behavior is heavily influenced by the presence of anarchy, their 

choices are narrow; there is little to be learned from studying the unique aspects 

of a state. Culturalists think the opposite: state actions shape the international 

system and should be assessed by their own unique characteristics. See John Glenn, 

“Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?,” International 

Studies Review 11, no. 3 (2009): 523–51, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486

.2009.00872.x.
introduction 13

the reader with a succinct overview of 4,000 years of Chinese 

strategic culture to determine if current strategic behavior is 

influenced by identifiable sources. He points out that it is possible for researchers to explain any potential strategic culture 

outcome based on any specific era of China’s long and diverse 

history. Therefore, his challenge is to identify key characteristics of current strategic behavior and determine its origins from 

the vast backdrop of Chinese history. 

Vern Liebl provides a revealing case study about the strategic culture of Afghanistan that asks a key question: Does Afghanistan have a strategic culture? Liebl explains the nuanced 

political and ethnic situation in Afghanistan, concluding that 

Afghanistan should be regarded as a single political entity. He 

refers to the 14 ethnic groups mentioned in the Afghan national anthem as an example of its disaggregated nature. Liebl’s chapter questions the usefulness of the strategic culture 

perspective to developing countries that lack the fundamental 

coherence to be considered a legitimate state. He calls Afghanistan a “nation of nations.” Can one realistically expect to find a 

collective narrative associated with strategic culture in a politically and ethnically fractured state? Through historical analysis, 

Liebl shows us how there can be identity within disunity that 

helps us to test the practical limits of strategic culture application. 

Denise Slater provides a well-researched chapter concerning the strategic culture of Brazil. Unlike many developing 

countries in the region, the Brazilian national narrative has 

now become unified after a series of historical events shaping 

their collective perceptions and fears. Denise Slater addresses 

the country’s strategic culture by identifying its primary tenets. 

She uses the assumption of a state’s emotionality, or seemingly 

irrational decisions, beliefs, or narrative to analyze that country’s strategic culture. Her analysis presents additional insights 

to understand Brazilian policies and actions regarding the Am-
14 matthew R. slater

azon. It also contradicts the notion of states as rational actors, 

or at least expands the boundaries on the composition of rational actor behavior. By citing mostly Brazilian sources and strategy documents, she shows how policy makers, both military 

and civilian, are seemingly convinced of the possibility of a 

foreign occupation of the Amazon. What unique strategic culture narratives are consistently pushing Brazilian leaders in this 

direction, and why do they exist? Slater provides a definitive 

assessment and application of strategic culture elements and 

concepts in such a way that it enriches the body of literature on 

the subject and demonstrates the value of the strategic culture 

perspective.

George Bogden writes a richly detailed chapter on Kosovo 

that challenges the traditional notions of national identity. Like 

Afghanistan, Kosovo possesses a fractured national identity. In 

Kosovo’s case, the discontinuity is related to the high degree of 

control exerted by the European Union and the internal debates regarding regional and internal security. Unlike Afghanistan, Kosovo is a relatively new state. Strategic culture literature 

assumes a historical coherence and continuity that cannot be 

claimed by new states. Does this mean the application of strategic culture in these cases is a fruitless endeavor? Bogden will 

provide an interesting answer to this question, which may provide ideas to other researchers about the challenges associated 

with nascent strategic cultures. 
15

Chapter

1

A Strateg ic Culture 

Framework 

for Practitioners

by Blagovest Tashev, PhD

Introduction

This chapter links the concept of culture to the understanding 

of a state’s decision making and behavior in international relations. For this purpose, it introduces the concept of strategic 

culture and its evolution, demonstrating how the concept of 

strategic culture can be used to understand national decision 

making and discern the range of probable actions a state is likely to take internationally to pursue its interests.

The dominant approach to the study of international 

relations and foreign policy, often called realism, studies the 

material characteristics of the environment to understand the 

behavior of the state. This approach views the international environment through the lens of the distribution of military, economic, and favorable demographics among states, also called 

the balance of power. The greater the capabilities of a state compared to the capabilities of another, the greater the power of the 

first state. This distribution of material capabilities determines 

the outcome in interactions between states. What states do and 

how they do it is determined by the relative power they have. 
16 blagovest tashev

Larger states, possessing greater economies, more powerful 

militaries, and larger populations are expected to achieve their 

goals when confronting smaller states, which accordingly possess less capability. Similarly, an alliance of states that possesses 

greater capabilities than another alliance is expected to dominate a conflict (any conflict, not just violent ones) between the 

two. Even when the relationships between states are not violent, the nature of the states’ preferences, goals, and behaviors 

are supposed to be determined by the relative material power 

of each state.

Proponents of this logic developed the rational actor model to analyze state behavior. This model assumes that decision 

makers are rational in the sense that they would choose actions 

that help them achieve their goals.1

 The rational actor model 

sees the foreign policy choices states make in pursuit of survival and security as products of the following sequence: When 

confronted by a problem, the rational decision maker identifies 

the foreign-policy goals and prioritizes them. Then the various available options in pursuit of these goals are analyzed and 

ranked according to the likelihood of success and the costs and 

benefits associated with each option. The decision maker then 

chooses the highest-ranked choice among the options. 

This model has been constantly modified in an attempt 

to improve its analytical power and in response to numerous 

criticisms pointing out various shortcomings. For example, 

many point out that the model assumes decision makers have 

all the information they need to make the best decision, an 

1

 For an overview of realism’s assumptions, including the rational actor assumption, see Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1986); and Miles Kahler, “Rationality in International Relations,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): https://doi.org/10

.1162/002081898550680. 
chapter one 17

assumption easily undermined by lessons from real-life crises.2

Others point out that the model does not take into consideration that once the final decision has been made, it might not 

be ideally implemented, as it is various agencies with their own 

often divergent preferences and goals that are entrusted with 

the execution of the decision. 

Realism is challenged by the idea that states are embedded 

in state and international environments that have not only a 

material but also a cultural dimension.3

 Cultural factors influence the state and its elites in a variety of ways. Cultural factors 

affect the way the world is perceived by state elites and society; 

impact the definition of enduring national interests; influence 

the goals the state seeks to obtain; predispose the state elite and 

society toward certain actions and policies rather than others; 

limit the number of options that are considered possible and 

available; influence the way options are assessed; and affect how 

policies are enacted. Accordingly, culturalist approaches to the 

study of states’ approaches to security focus on a range of topics, including the effects of domestic political cultures, the ways 

the cultures of various state institutions responsible for ensuring national security affect their functions, the effect of domestic attitudes and assumptions about the use of force on the way 

the state uses force, and the influence of culture on crafting and 

executing security and defense strategies. The culturalists’ argument is that a state’s behavior is influenced not only by their 

physical capabilities and how they relate to the capabilities of 

other states but also by domestic, nonmaterial factors. 

In addition to the internal environment, the external cul2

 After the end of the Cold War, for example, American historians were finally able 

to research Soviet archives and consequently gain a more realistic understanding 

of Moscow’s past goals, motivations, and views. See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now 

Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 3

 For a review of the culturalist approaches to international relations, see Michael 

C. Desch, “Culture versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies,” Strategic Insights 4, no. 10 (October 2005).
18 blagovest tashev

tural environment, too, has a powerful influence on states’ 

behavior. There are at least three layers to the international 

environment in which the states operate that influence strategic culture.4

 First, there are international institutions, ranging 

from the formal organizations—the United Nations (UN), the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union 

(EU), Organization of American States (OAS), Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), among many others—to 

treaties and regimes—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and the 

like. Another layer is a world political culture. It includes elements like rules of sovereignty and international law as well 

as transnational political discourse carried out by international 

movements and players like Doctors without Borders and the 

Catholic Church. The third layer includes patterns of amity 

and enmity based on culture, ideologies, and practices. For 

example, studies point out that, although all states may participate in violent conflict with other states, democracies do 

not fight other democracies. Although studies have advanced 

several explanations for this pattern, they agree that democracies share some cultural and institutional characteristics that 

prevent them from fighting each other. 

Importantly, cultural environments, both state and international, affect not only the incentives for various kinds of decisions made by the state but also the state’s identity. This refers 

to the basic character of the state, its collective self-image, and 

its perception of its proper role and behavior in the international system. Studies investigate influences from history, geography, ideas, texts, and experiences that have an impact on the 

4

 The discussion in this chapter on the international cultural environment adopts 

concepts and ideas from Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1996), 34. 
chapter one 19

state’s strategic identity over time. Researchers are particularly 

interested in the state’s formative early years as they are thought 

to have a significant and long-lasting impact on its identity in 

general and strategic culture in particular.

This author subscribes to the notion that the successful 

study of state behavior requires an approach that integrates 

material and cultural elements.5

 It is important to note that 

most culturalists do not deny the importance of material causes, such as the relative military, economic, and demographic 

capabilities, but they point out that attempts to explain the 

behavior of states solely in terms of material factors are unconvincing. 6 In other words, culturalist approaches to the study of 

international relations and foreign policy should be seen as an 

attempt to supplement dominant realist theories rather than 

supplant them. 

This chapter proceeds with an introduction to the concept of strategic culture, including its evolution. It then adopts 

a working definition of strategic culture and a model for its 

analysis. The model includes variables, the most important cultural tenets that affect a state’s security policy and behavior. 

The chapter then introduces the most important tenets of the 

international cultural environment that also shape the state’s 

policy and behavior. The concluding section of this chapter in5

 Others, however, argue that realism and strategic culture are at the opposite ends 

of the spectrum, because they adopt different levels of analysis—strategic culture 

focuses on the state and society, while the realists direct attention to the structure 

of the international system in their search for explanations for state behavior. Currently, the authors applying the strategic culture approach broadly agree that culture influences strategy in addition to any external material forces. States confront 

distinctive geostrategic problems through the prism of their individual strategic 

culture while having unique sets of capabilities and liabilities. For further discussion, see John Glenn et al., eds., Neorealism versus Strategic Culture (Burlington, 

VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).

6

 Although realists do not dismiss culture as a factor, they consider it as merely 

an intervening variable that may influence behavior, largely having a secondary 

importance to material variables. 
20 blagovest tashev

cludes research questions aiding the analysis of the domestic 

and international variables shaping the state’s strategic culture. 

Strategic Culture: Past to Present

The beginning of the modern exploration into the role of culture in state behavior can be traced back to 1977 when Jack L. 

Snyder proposed that American and Soviet nuclear strategies 

were products of different organizational, historical, and political contexts.7

 Snyder developed his argument to address defense 

planners’ inability to anticipate the responses of Soviet nuclear 

strategists to American moves. Heavily influenced by the rational actor model and game theories, American nuclear planners 

expected their Soviet counterparts to have similar attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs about nuclear weapons and their use. 

Instead, Snyder suggested that the strategic elites of the two 

countries had separate cultures related to military and strategic 

affairs, including distinct beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, and 

behavioral patterns regarding nuclear strategy. He posited that 

these cultures do not exist in a vacuum, but instead they were 

manifestations of a society’s culture in relation to security and 

the use of force, acquired through a socialization process. Notably, Snyder argues that because of this socialization process, the 

set of beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns achieves a level of 

culture, rather than a level of mere policy. In other words, the 

set of beliefs is semipermanent and not easily changed. 

Snyder argued that strategic culture has an independent 

influence on strategic policy patterns. He speculates that Russia’s long history of insecurity and authoritarian rule conditions 

the military’s preference for offensive, preemptive military actions when confronting a threat. Despite his novel focus on 

cultural factors, however, Snyder did not explore the role of 

Communist ideology on Soviet strategic thinking. This is rath7

 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture.
chapter one 21

er remarkable given the ideology’s extensive focus of the nature 

of conflict and war in the modern era, including clearly defined 

and constantly reinforced axioms among all strata of society.

Snyder was not alone in the exploration of cultural influences in strategic policies, especially in the context of the Cold 

War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 

Union. Ken Booth and Colin S. Gray investigated the link between strategic culture and the superpowers’ strategies related 

to weapons of mass destruction.8

 In this early period, the proponents of the strategic culture approach focused mostly on 

the two superpowers and did not develop a robust theoretical 

foundation for the study of state behavior that accommodates 

cultural factors. Most important, the dominant school in international relations—realism—dismissed the value of culture as 

an independent variable that helped to explain a state’s security 

behavior. The end of the Cold War decreased scholars’ interest 

in exploring what drives the nuclear strategies of superpowers; 

similarly, interest in strategic culture diminished.

The concept of strategic culture attracted attention once 

again in the 1990s and the 2000s. The study of strategic culture broke away from its initial focus on nuclear strategy and 

researchers began to examine other security issues.9

 What partially accounts for the renewed interests were the failure of realism to anticipate the end of the Cold War and the growing 

8

 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Routledge, 1979); Colin S. 

Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security

6, no. 2 (Fall 1981); Colin S. Gray, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” Parameters 

14, no. 4 (Winter 1984); and Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style

(Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986).

9

 This came as no surprise as authors investigated the strategic cultures of nonnuclear states. Authors also began to focus on strategic behavior that was not explicitly related to the use of force. For example, official documents on the strategic culture of the European Union explicitly explored the nonmilitary, soft power strategy 

of the European Union. See European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better 

World (Brussels, Belgium: European Union External Action Service, 2003); and see 

also a special issue of Oxford Journal on Good Governance 2, no. 1 (March 2005).
22 blagovest tashev

influence of constructivism in international-relations theory. 

In fact, some authors believe culturalist approaches can be a 

better predictor of state behavior and outcomes in international relations than what they consider to be a discredited realist approach.10 Constructivism, for its part, provided insights 

into the influences of domestic society and politics on a state’s 

identity and actions in international relations. Scholars applied 

culture to explain how states crafted and reproduced strategic 

policies to create and maintain particular power relationships 

at home and abroad. The renewed interest in strategic culture 

was also accompanied by a more rigorous examination of theoretical and methodological issues. Many students of the subject 

were critical of the existing models because they struggled to 

separate independent from dependent variables. 

Explorations in strategic culture also exposed the lack of a 

common approach to the study of the subject matter and deep 

disagreements about issues of definitions and methodologies. 

The most prominent of those disagreements was the debate 

between Colin S. Gray and Alastair Iain Johnston. Johnston 

sought to bring more methodological rigor to the study by 

avoiding the vague definition of culture and by distinguishing between culture and behavior. Culture, in his view, was “an 

integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, 

languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences.”11 Johnston 

treated culture as an independent variable that affects the dependent variable, strategic behavior.12 In his study of Chinese 

strategic culture, Johnston investigates the effect of culture on 

10 Glenn et al., Neorealism versus Strategic Culture; and John S. Duffield et al., “Ism 

and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies,” International Security

24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 156–80, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560086.

11 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 

Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 36. 12 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 36. 
chapter one 23

military strategy.13 Gray, however, considered it a mistake to 

distinguish culture from behavior. Instead, he argued that strategic culture “should be approached both as a shaping context 

for behavior and itself as a constituent of that behavior.”14

Researchers and writers were also split on the explanatory 

power of strategic culture. Some of them who were very critical of the realist approach asserted that strategic culture, rather 

than the material distribution of power, provided a better explanation of state behavior. Others, while critical of realism, 

did not discount material factors and instead argued that strategic culture complements the dominant school of thought. 

In addition to exploring the content of the concept, they 

also deliberated on the sources of strategic culture. Once again, 

no consensus emerged. However, in a review of the literature, 

Darryl Howlett noted that the “most frequently cited sources 

of strategic culture are: geography, climate and resources; history and experience; political structure; the nature of organizations involved in defense; myths and symbols; key texts that 

inform actors of appropriate strategic action; and transnational 

norms, generational change and the role of technology.”15

The concept of strategic culture deals with the relationship 

between culture and strategy. Culture concerns how people 

and groups view the world, make sense of what they observe, 

make decisions, and act. Culture includes several key factors: 

it is shared among people of a particular group; it provides the 

foundation of a worldview; and it helps us interpret the actions 

of individuals and events in the world. One problematic quality for researchers is that all aspects of culture are interrelated, 

13 Johnston, Cultural Realism. 14 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory 

Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999): 50, https://

doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599000492.

15 Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 10 (November 2005). 
24 blagovest tashev

making it fluid and dynamic. This makes it difficult to identify 

with a high degree of certainty cultural patterns and their relative impact. 

We should not use culture as the only way to explain the 

behavior of states in international relations. There is always 

a danger to misuse culture in the analysis of state behavior. 

It is misleading to present culture as something out there—

independent of people—an unchanging set of rules, beliefs, 

and norms that control human action. Instead, culture must 

be thought of as patterns of meaning and behavior created, 

maintained, and changed by people. These patterns emerge, 

endure, and change by people repeating them. People live culturally rather than live in culture. It is also important to point 

out that these patterns are not perfectly shared by all members 

of the group, which explains variations in behavior. 

The term strategy refers to the way military power is used 

by states in the pursuit of national interests. Some researchers 

conceive of strategy to include not only military options as a 

means of attaining objectives but also economic and diplomatic 

pursuits. In this context, the concept is conceived as the coordinated use of all elements of national power to attain securityrelated national goals in response to external threats and risks.16

Regardless of which definition of strategy one adopts, a 

strategic culture approach investigates the relevance of cultural 

contexts in influencing strategy, including strategic preferences 

and choices. If strategy refers to the way a state uses the instruments at its disposal (or only military power) in the pursuit of 

the state’s interest, the strategic culture approach helps us understand how the cultural context shapes interests, preferences, 

and choices as well as how the state goes about pursuing them. 

When we refer to American strategic culture, for example, 

16 For more on strategy, see Gray, The Future of Strategy; and Williamson Murray 

et al., eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
chapter one 25

we suggest that the United States has a distinct way of looking 

at and understanding the world and its place in it—and of acting strategically based on this. This also means that China has 

a distinct way of seeing the world and itself. China therefore 

acts and responds differently in pursuit of its national interests. 

The idea of incorporating culture into the study of state 

security behavior is not new. Thucydides’s The History of the Peloponnesian War, for example, attributes differences in the behavior of the warring parties to cultural differences among the 

city-states.17 Thucydides does not explain the causes and conduct of hostilities between the city-states by the distribution of 

power among them but by the differences in national character 

and the character of the leadership. Similarly, Gray points out 

that, according to Carl von Clausewitz, the object of war is “to 

impose our will on the enemy,” and thus the strength of the 

enemy’s will is the subject of cultural inquiry.18

A Definition and Methodology

Although the study of strategic cultures became a prominent 

approach in the study of national security, there is no widely 

accepted definition of what precisely strategic culture is. Jack 

Snyder, a pioneer in the field, sees strategic culture as a “set of 

semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns 

socialized into a distinctive mode of thought.”19 Booth, in one 

of the more popular attempts in the formative years of the 

field, defined it as

a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of 

17 See Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,” International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 133, 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000849.

18 Colin S. Gray, “British and American Strategic Culture” (unpublished paper 

prepared for the Jamestown Symposium, 18–19 April 2007).

19 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 5.
26 blagovest tashev

adapting to the environment and solving problems with 

respect to the threat or use of force.20

These early attempts at defining strategic culture hinted at 

the challenges the concept is to face in the coming years, as the 

definitions seemed all too inclusive and expansive. Similarly, 

Gray, an enthusiastic proponent of the concept, embraces an 

earlier attempt by Snyder, which defined strategic culture as

the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of 

a national strategic community have acquired through 

instruction or imitation and share with each other with 

regard to strategy.21

Though Snyder’s definition refers to a state’s cultural 

characteristics, it provides no guidance as to which of them 

should be the focus of study or how to solve the issue of having 

contradictory cultural tendencies. Snyder and Gray, however, 

identify the members of the national strategic community as 

the group whose cultural characteristics should be the focus 

of inquiry. However, while Gray points out the discrete group 

that bears the characteristics associated with strategic culture, 

his definition’s reference to the “sum total” of cultural elements 

that poses a dilemma for any researcher—either include any 

and all cultural elements or select those deemed to matter in an 

individual case study. 

Many authors also adopt a working definition of strategic 

culture and apply it to specific case studies. For example, Jeannie L. Johnson, with an eye on methodological issues, is more 

concerned with how a definition will guide the research for 

specific case studies:

20 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 

1979), 121.

21 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 8.
chapter one 27

Strategic culture is the set of shared beliefs, assumptions, 

and modes of behavior, derived from common experience 

and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that 

shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, 

and which determine appropriate ends and means for 

achieving security objectives.22

Although the definitions of strategy differ in their emphasis 

and reveal theoretical challenges with the use of the concept, 

they all point out to domestic sources of states’ behavior in international relations, and more specifically to cultural elements. 

This chapter, too, while recognizing the numerous theoretical issues surrounding the concept of strategic culture, is more 

concerned with how a definition of strategic culture shapes 

the work of researchers analyzing the role of culture in states’ 

foreign policy behavior. For the purposes of creating a simple 

model, this chapter defines strategic culture as the set of shared 

beliefs, assumptions, and patterns of behavior that define the 

identity of a country’s national strategic community and shape 

its ways, means, and ends for achieving security.

Consequently, the model includes the following variables, 

which are the most significant tenets of strategic culture: identity, prevalent national assumptions about the way the international system works, interests of the state in the international 

system and how they should be achieved, and patterns of national behavior in the international system. This model adopts 

Snyder and Gray’s focus on the security elite as the focus of the 

study, while also embracing the belief of those culturalists who 

see culture as both shaping the context for state behavior and 

as a constituent of that behavior. 

Although no widely acceptable definition has emerged, 

22 Jeannie L. Johnson, Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct (Fort 

Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts 

Office, 2006), 5.
28 blagovest tashev

since the early 1980s, the study of strategic culture has adopted 

a diverse and broad research agenda concerned with identifying 

cultural, ideational, and normative factors that may influence 

the strategy and behavior of the state. Gray makes a powerful 

case for the use of strategic culture as a tool for understanding 

the security policies of a state.23 Every society has a distinctive 

strategic culture that is the product of historical experience. Every society conducts war and behaves in conflict according to its 

distinctive character while constrained or empowered by context and circumstances. Societies differ in their beliefs and practices vis-à-vis war, peace, and strategy, and these differences are 

likely to manifest themselves in policy, strategy, and behavior.

Although there are many limitations to the concept of 

strategic culture—issues of definitions, methodology, etc.—

it is useful to know a state’s strategic culture. This knowledge 

provides insights into how the state perceives the international 

system; what the state’s long-term goals and interests are; who 

the state traditionally see as friends and foes; what its perceptions of the interests, goals, and intentions of other states are; 

what options for policies and actions it may consider and what 

options it may not consider; what explains the state’s force posture and structure; how the decisions are made and policies 

applied; and who are the major players in the decision-making 

process. Knowledge about the strategic culture of a state may 

help to distinguish between its more and less likely courses of 

action and anticipate some second- and third-order effects in 

the state and its behavior in response to external events. 

One of the most important issues in studying a country’s 

strategic culture is one of methodology—identifying the sub23 Gray, “British and American Strategic Culture.” 
chapter one 29

jects to be studied and how they can be analyzed.24 Although 

there is no universally accepted agreement on this, one of the 

more popular methodologies was developed by Alastair Iain 

Johnston, who identified the writings, debates, thoughts, and 

words from a state’s strategists, military leaders, security elite, 

weapons designs, as well as media images of war, military symbols, and military literature to be among the objects most laden 

with evidence of the state’s strategic culture.25 Similarly, Gray 

suggests that culture is to be found in society’s ideals, its documents and some other material artifacts and icons, and in its 

behavior.26 Other approaches invoke influences from history, 

geography, ideas, texts, and experiences that have impacted 

a state’s strategic identity. Jeannie L. Johnson identifies valueladen national cultural variables that have an effect on security policies, including identity, values, norms, and perceptive 

lenses.27

Another methodological issue is the question of whose 

strategic culture is the subject of study. Most students in the 

field simply refer to the state when analyzing strategic culture. 

However, states do not define goals, make decisions, and act—

people do. But who exactly does this—society at large, a small 

group of policy makers, or a community of individuals involved in thinking and acting strategically? If we want to know 

the strategic culture of a state, do we discern it in the state at 

large or instead focus on the national strategic community? The 

national strategic community includes policy makers in the 

legislative and executive branch, military leaders, academics, 

influential public figures, and even the judicial branch of gov24 It must be noted that strategic culture is an approach rather than an explanatory 

theory. To devise an explanatory theory of strategic culture, it would be necessary 

to identify the causal process whereby culture is translated into strategic decisions 

and behaviors. 

25 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 49.

26 Gray, “British and American Strategic Culture,” 8.

27 Johnson, Strategic Culture, 11–14.
30 blagovest tashev

ernment involved in the shaping of national security strategies. 

Modern societies have a heterogeneous nature, and identifying 

a single strategic culture is challenging. Should we then instead 

focus on a particular group—the national strategic community, for example—and try to identify its strategic culture? One 

is tempted to take this route, especially because it seems that 

the preferences, choices, and behavior related to the security 

of states reflect the preferences and culture of the elite members of a given society. Yet, there are many examples of elites 

making choices that contradict the preferences of the society. 

The security elites of Communist countries in Eastern Europe 

during the Cold War frequently selected courses of action that 

seemed to contradict what one would describe as the prevailing 

preferences of the society at large. Their sudden fall from power 

in 1989 revealed how inconsistent their choices were with the 

national strategic culture, as states in the region changed their 

goals and preferences almost overnight.28 Although there are 

no clear solutions to these dilemmas to be found, one must be 

aware of the potential pitfalls in selecting a particular approach. 

At a minimum, one must determine whether the preferences 

and policies of elites are consistent over time with the prevailing preferences and attitudes of the society at large.

The research method proposed consists of a framework including cultural variables that have an effect on a state’s security 

policy and behavior. These include identity, assumptions about 

the international system, the pursuit of interests in the international system, and patterns of state behavior in the international system. Each variable is associated with a set of research 

28 Many authors called this the “return of history” to the region. For a description 

of how Soviet dominance imposed on Communist countries in Eastern Europe 

a foreign policy behavior that was a radical departure from existing patterns, see 

Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History 

of East Central Europe Since World War II, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2000).
chapter one 31

questions (to be found at the end of this chapter) to guide the 

analysis. This framework operationalizes the working definition by guiding the researcher through a series of questions, but 

it ultimately allows the researcher the freedom to choose the 

most important variables associated with their particular case 

study. This is important because the dynamic nature of culture 

means that the underlying factors contributing to individual 

strategic culture will vary. 

The Tenets of Strategic Culture

This section of the chapter discusses each of the variables associated with strategic culture. Each variable includes a set 

of associated research questions to be found at the end of the 

chapter. 

Identity

This chapter refers to identity as a shorthand label for varying 

constructions of national identity and state identity.29 Identity is a national ideology of collective distinctiveness and purpose.30 It defines what makes one state different from all other 

states. Identity is a self-image of distinctiveness held and projected by the state. It is formed and modified through relations 

with other states. Identity is crucial in the study of security as 

29 See the meaning of identity as used by the authors of essays in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

30 A group of people sharing the same national identity is called a nation. The terms 

state, nation, and nation-state are often used interchangeably, although there are 

differences between them. Nation refers to a group of people who in addition to 

sharing a common identity also would like to govern themselves in a separate state. 

State is a legal entity composed of territory, population, and government and is 

recognized by other states. A nation-state is used when the boundaries of the state 

and the nation are the same. Thus, not all nations have states (e.g., the Palestinian 

nation), while some states have more than one nation within their borders (e.g., 

Belgium). Nation-state is also widely used in recognition of the fact that in most 

cases people living in a state do have a common identity and thus are a nation. 
32 blagovest tashev

states are concerned with construction of identity through the 

interplay of differences or distinctions with other states. States 

try to establish unique national identities that distinguish them 

from other states to provide a positive sociocultural identity 

to their citizens. Understanding identity gives us insights into 

what the state sees as its origin, virtues, foes and friends, and 

destiny. 

A word of caution is in order. Identity exists both at the 

level of individual identity and collective identity. When this 

chapter refers to national and state identity, it means the identity framed, promoted, and supported by the state. It might 

or might not be the dominant identity among the people in 

the state, but it is the one the state endorses as the dominant 

identity. The state supports this identity through education, socialization, propaganda, and other means, while discouraging 

or suppressing alternative ideas about national identity.

Although states almost invariably claim to have the origins 

of their national identities’ in the very distant past, most of 

them are new constructs, and the study of identity encompasses relatively short historical periods.31 Whenever their formative period occurred, whether in the distant or recent past, this 

era is a state’s most important period of its evolution, and it is 

thus also crucial in the study of a state’s strategic culture. This 

period tends to have great impact on identity as symbols, traditions, and narratives from this period are considered beyond 

national dispute—almost sacred in some states. The national 

foes in this period tend to remain the national foes; significant 

aspirations and values associated with that phase usually remain intact into modernity. For example, witness how many in 

the United States defend the legitimacy of intervention abroad 

in defense of other democracies with the birth of the Ameri31 The state as an entity has existed for thousands of years. The nation, a group of 

people sharing the same national identity, is a relatively new social construct.
chapter one 33

can nation in opposition to undemocratic British oppression. 

National flags, anthems and symbols, military uniforms and 

insignia, arts, mass education, and national narratives are all 

heavily influenced by the formative years of a nation. 

Identity also determines whether the nation coincides with 

the state. If identity is based exclusively on a single ethnicity, it is very likely then that groups outside the state borders 

that share the same ethnicity would be identified as part of 

the nation, sometimes known as irredentism when territory is 

attempted to be reclaimed. This is one of the most frequent 

sources of conflicts in international politics as states seek 

changes to national borders in order to join ethnic minorities 

residing in other states to the nation. Knowing whether an 

identity includes not only groups in the state but also minorities beyond the border provides insights into a state’s long-term 

goals and strategies. States may feel a special responsibility for 

ethnic brethren in other states, which would compel them to 

interfere in their affairs and cause international conflicts. For 

example, in 2010, Hungary caused tensions with its neighbors 

when it allowed ethnic Hungarians living abroad to apply for 

Hungarian citizenship. The move was perceived as a security 

threat by Slovakia as close to one-tenth of its population is of 

Hungarian ethnicity.32 In retaliation, Slovakia amended its own 

citizenship law, stripping anyone of their Slovak citizenship if 

they applied for another citizenship. 

Identity also includes the shared values of those belonging 

to the nation. One may argue that people and groups of people share universal values. For example, Americans frequently 

argue that people all over the world are not that different, and 

they value democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech. 

One can certainly make this case, however, it ignores the fact 

that nations prioritize and order values differently, and in dif32 “Slovaks Retaliate over Hungarian Citizenship Law,” BBC, 12 March 2012.
34 blagovest tashev

ferent contexts the order may change. Violent conflicts, for 

example, tend to make security a higher priority than other 

values. Although values tend to change only slowly, their shifting order may influence the state’s behavior in new ways.

When analyzing the state’s identity, we must keep in mind 

that it is not a simple aggregation of the identities of people 

and groups in the state. In fact, a state may have two or more 

groups that have different, often competing and conflicting, 

identities. In this case, what we recognize as the state identity

may be the identity of the group that holds the monopoly over 

institutions of the state and its political system. Identifying the 

existence of more than one identity and assessing their relationships and balance of power provides insights into the stability 

and durability of the dominant state identity. 

Understanding the dynamics between groups’ identities 

also provides insights into a state’s ability to prevent violence 

and conflict among groups in a single state. In some states, 

groups sharing identities different from the dominant nation 

may simply want no part in the state. If such groups have the 

capacity, they may prefer to split from the state and create a new 

state or join another. Analyzing the relationships of group identities in the state provides an understanding of the strength of 

dominant identity, the future stability of the country, and some 

of the domestic forces that shape its international behavior. 

This analysis also has significant implications for the Marine Corps, as it provides insights into a state’s will to endure 

in a fight, deploy a cohesive military force, and summon the 

will to overcome hardships. The more fractured the society in 

which groups do not share the same national identity, including, among others, ethnic, racial, and cultural attributes, the 

more difficult it will be for the state to mobilize, deploy, and 

sustain military power. However, the politics of identity is only 

one of several factors that influence the state’s capacities. 

The existence of multiple group identities and even na-
chapter one 35

tional identities in a state does not in itself suggest a structural weakness, which manifests under certain conditions. What 

matters is whether there are incompatibilities and conflicts 

among identities. Having the statistics on the ethnic composition in a state, for example, is just a start. Having an understanding of the dynamics and politics of interethnic relations 

based on different identities is the next logical step in capturing 

the complex state of identity and its effects on the strategic 

culture of the state. 

Assumptions about the International System

States have different views of the nature of the international 

system and how it works. Some states subscribe to the view 

that the system is inherently conflict and violence prone, war is 

the rule, and its absence is the exception. In such an environment, the logic follows that states seek to maximize their power as the only way to guarantee their security. Although there 

are international organizations, such as the UN, which exist 

for the purpose of settling conflicts and preventing wars, and 

there is international law created to ameliorate conflicts, these 

organizations and institutions are often powerless to prevent 

aggression and provide security. States are on their own when it 

comes to assuring their survival and interests. Only power can 

ensure security. In seeking power and security, states may enter 

into alliances, but there are no permanent friends, and alliances disintegrate once their goals are achieved. Cooperation is 

always temporary, and once it stops serving the interests of the 

states, they end it. Even when violence is not likely, dealings 

between states are a zero-sum game: you either win or lose in 

dealings with other states.

Other states, although accepting that there are conflicts 

in the world, many with the potential to turn violent, see the 

system as more ordered and predictable. These states recognize 

that there is a mutual benefit in cooperation to create various 
36 blagovest tashev

formal and informal arrangements and institutions to promote 

conflict resolution and alter the political calculations of other 

states. Cooperation among the states is not only possible but 

durable because it is based on a win-win game; all states can 

benefit from cooperation. Institutions that promote cooperation not only ameliorate and prevent conflicts but also have the 

capacity to change the state’s view of the international system 

and alter their goals of accumulating power as the ultimate, 

zero-sum game as a guarantee for survival. 

Although these two views represent the two opposite extremes of a continuum, all states fall somewhere in between. 

The view of the international system is the lens the state uses 

to interpret events and the policies of other states. It is also the 

foundation of a state’s own policies. These views have strategic and political consequences; they are translated into policies 

that have real-world consequences. States that ascribe to the 

first view or one of its variations would seek to maintain large 

military power even when no immediate enemy is identified, 

and they would be quicker to resort to violence or the threat of 

violence than states that do not hold this view. They would also 

be more prone to switching alliances.

Russia, for example, seems to subscribe to the pessimistic 

view on the nature of the international system. As indicated 

in national security documents, Russian security elites believe 

that states unapologetically seek to accumulate power as the 

ultimate guarantee for national security and interests.33 The 

use of violence is a legitimate instrument of national policy 

and states readily use it in furthering their interests. Wars occur 

frequently, and international institutions and law have only a 

limited ability to ameliorate conflicts between states. In such 

33 For an excellent summary of Russia’s strategic culture, see Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perceptions and Strategic Posture,” in Russian Security Strategy under 

Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2007), 35–47.
chapter one 37

a world, states have no choice but to consider states with significant power as potential enemies. Accordingly, states always 

seek to increase their relative power in anticipation of a conflict with a yet unknown or emerging future enemy. Current 

partners can always turn into enemies. These are fundamental 

assumptions that shape the Russian elite’s thinking, behavior, 

and strategies. In other words, these assumptions of this particular state mind-set have policy and political consequences. 

This outlook prompts Russia to heavily rely on the military 

and defense posture for its security, seeking to strengthen its 

capabilities by preparing to face any potential adversaries. In 

the case of Russia, one may also argue that these fundamental 

assumptions about the nature of the international system are 

shared by both elites and the public at large.

Unlike Russia, the United States has a more benign view of 

the international system. One of the reasons for this difference 

is that the current international order was actively crafted by 

the United States and reflects many American preferences. After World War II, the United States emerged as the preeminent 

world power. While recognizing Soviet dominance in parts of 

Asia and Europe, the United States also embarked on crafting 

a liberal world order based on institutions, alliances, norms, 

and practices that reflected American values and interests.34

The goal of this international order was to stabilize international politics, safeguard American security and its way of life, 

and advance American interests worldwide. More specifically, 

it included institutions and norms that promoted free trade, 

financial stability, political integration among states, conflict 

resolution, and democracy and human rights. American values and norms shaped the international order that emerged 

after the war. The Soviet Union, although a participant in the 

34 Michael J. Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2016), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1598.
38 blagovest tashev

creation of the post–World War II order, created a sphere of 

influence—with its own political, economic, and social foundations—that differed markedly by the one created by the 

United States and its allies. The end of the Cold War left the 

Soviet order in ruins and the American order intact. 

Getting to know a state’s fundamental assumptions about 

the international system is a crucial step, as it provides a powerful tool in understanding the state’s perceptions and behavior, which would help avoid actions that may be misconstrued 

by its decision makers. Russia’s behavior and perceptions, once 

again, provides a good case in point. The expansion of NATO 

into Eastern Europe in 1999–2004 was seen by the West as a 

natural enlargement, which included states that aspired to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community and, at least from 

the American point of view, presented no threat to Russia. 

Russian elites, and later the Russian public, however, saw this 

process very differently. Although NATO was seen as presenting no immediate security threat to Russia, Russians perceived 

the expansion as, among other things, a long-term threat to its 

territory and interests. By the Russians, it was perceived as an 

encroachment of a powerful military alliance on Russian borders and spheres of influence. Similarly, U.S. attempts in the 

2000s to place components of a defense shield against Iranian 

missiles in Eastern Europe were perceived as a direct threat to 

Russian security. In Russia’s thinking, it was the availability of 

foreign military capabilities near the borders that mattered, not 

the rationale and intentions of the foreign power that deployed 

them. 

Discerning where the state stands on the nature of the 

international system continuum can be tricky. Today, even 

pessimistic states commend the virtues of cooperation and in-
chapter one 39

ternational law.35 However, they also share a deep-seated distrust of cooperation, international law, and institutions as a 

solution to their security dilemmas and challenges. Only careful reading of statements by members of the security elite and 

the wording of national security documents can reveal a state’s 

dominant assumptions and attitudes regarding the nature of 

the international system. 

The Pursuit of National Interests in the System

Identity and how the state sees the international system heavily influences the way the state defines its role or interests in 

the system and how to pursue those interests. Societies tend to 

have narratives—sometimes more than one, even competing 

ones—about a state’s aspirations and role in the world. In the 

past, political leaders and elites used to speak of a state or a 

nation’s destiny; Manifest Destiny is one American example. 

Examples from various states and times include the spread of 

civilization (as defined by the state spearheading the effort), the 

spread of Christianity or another religion, or the enlargement 

of the living space for a nation. The system, ranging from the 

entire international system to the small regional system, was 

seen as imperfect and required the efforts of the entire state to 

correct. More recently, states tend to list their vital interest and 

goals in formal documents, including national strategies, national doctrines, and security strategies. Depictions of national 

purpose and interest also find their way into speeches and articles by political leaders and representatives of the political and 

nonpolitical elites. 

Knowledge about what the state sees as its place in the 

system and how to achieve it reveals two important understandings. First, states either accept the fundamental order 

35 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968).
40 blagovest tashev

of the international system or they reject it either entirely or 

partially. The modern international system, which is based on 

nation-states; a system of international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, the 

World Bank, World Trade Organization, and various regional 

organizations; the principles of free trade, free flow of capital, 

and the freedom of the commons; and the almost universal 

acceptance, if not practice, of democratic governance and human rights—is carefully maintained by states and international 

organizations. The system is what it is because the influential 

states in it, particularly the United States with its enormous 

military and financial might after the Second World War, had 

crafted it and maintain it. Most states accept the fundamental 

principles of this order and do not seek to change it. 

There are states, however, who see the system as fundamentally unjust and contrary to their strategic goals and interests. The Soviet Union during the Cold War, for example, 

although a member of the United Nations, created an alternative international Communist system that had very different 

values, norms, and beliefs and sought to spread it throughout 

the world. Moscow participated in the United Nations because 

it was a useful venue to play power politics in the bipolar struggle with the United States, and it had a particularly strong influence on the organization as a permanent member of the UN 

Security Council. However, it rejected participation in almost 

all other institutions and practices of the international system 

outside the UN. The Soviet Union and its allies were not members of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 

World Trade Organization (known as the General Agreement 

on Tariffs and Trade during the Cold War), did not practice 

free trade, and accepted intervention in one another’s affairs 

when the Communist nature of the regime of any state was 

under threat, including internal threats. Above all, the Com-
chapter one 41

munist states sought a fundamental change to the international 

system. If the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, the current 

international system would look very different and would reflect their strategic interests.

Other states, too, can find the existing international system unjust on a regional level and take steps to change it. Iran, 

for example, sees the international order in the Persian Gulf 

and the Middle East as unacceptable and makes no secret of its 

willingness to change it. In the past, Germany, after the First 

World War, rejected the peace settlement that carved out German territories and denied the state what it perceived as its 

rightful place as a great European power. This rejection was 

eventually translated into policies to remake the existing order 

and led in part to the Second World War. 

Two potential ways to describe how states pursue national 

interests include status quo and revisionism. States that accept 

the existing international order and do not make attempts to 

change it fundamentally are called status quo states. Conversely, 

states that do not accept the existing order and seek to remake 

it are called revisionist states.

36 Not all states that reject the existing regional or international order take steps to remake it, as 

this action in most cases requires capabilities beyond what is 

available to them and risks opposition from many states. 

Even when states do not seek to change the system, their 

self-declared goals and interests reveal important information 

about what drives their policies and actions. Of course, the 

behavior of the states is determined not only by intentions 

but also by material factors. Still, the self-declared goals of the 

state, coupled with what it possesses as capabilities to achieve 

its goals and the international context and distribution of pow36 Jason W. Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status-Quo States (New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
42 blagovest tashev

er at the time, provides clues about whether certain actions are 

possible or likely. 

Most states do not hide their fundamental interests and 

goals. They are signaled not only to the outside world but are 

also a powerful instrument in garnering domestic support and 

mobilizing the public. One must always consider whether there 

are discrepancies between the proclaimed interests and objective of the state’s elite and the interests and objectives of the society and its groups. For example, the Communist elite of East 

Germany aligned its policies, including its foreign policy, with 

those of the Soviet Union. The society in East Germany, however, did not generally align ideologically and culturally with 

the Soviet Union but rather with their compatriots to the west. 

Patterns of State Behavior in the International System

Strategic culture may have a powerful effect on how states behave, or it may have a very limited effect. In different contexts 

and circumstances, a variety of factors influence the decisions 

and policies of leaders, including noncultural factors such as 

material capabilities, geography, and institutional constraints 

and opportunities. Discerning patterns of behavior and assessing them against what we have identified as elements of 

the nation’s strategic culture from official documents, national 

narratives, and symbols would help identify how strong the relationship between the state’s strategic culture and its behavior 

is. At the same time, we must be aware that the state’s pattern 

of behavior is part of its strategic culture. For example, Gray’s 

argument is that strategic culture must be seen as shaping behavior and itself is a constituent of that behavior. 

Knowing the strategic culture of a state does not necessarily enable us to predict the behavior of the state under different 

circumstances. In determining state behavior, sometimes strategic culture matters more, sometimes less. For example, the 

strategic culture of the security elite may favor the use of force 
chapter one 43

in a particular case. However, the capability of the state to mobilize forces may be limited by the inability of the armed forces to mobilize on short notice, an international environment 

unfavorable to military options, or geographic and weather 

conditions that make warfare hard in the short term. In these 

cases, it may force the decision makers to rule out the use of 

force as a preferred course of action. Similarly, crises have the 

capacity to reveal the true nature of strategic culture of a state 

as security leaders. The lack of time to respond, coupled with 

high stress, tend to force states to fall back on patterns of behavior, while at the same time demonstrating incongruities in 

strategic cultures, as the lack of time and the high stress tend 

to lead to misperceptions, miscalculations, and counterproductive decisions.37

Considerations When 

Researching Strategic Culture

The type of political system is an important consideration when 

researching strategic culture. The national political system does 

have an effect on the strategic culture of the state. Political 

leaders in democracies, for example, face complex decisionmaking and implementation processes. When they formulate 

the policies of their states and make decisions, they need to 

take into consideration multiple institutions and players that 

have authorities and responsibilities in the decision-making 

process, including the public (whose support the leaders need), 

the legislative and judiciary branches of government, and various interest groups. 

In contrast, leaders in nondemocratic states face fewer political and institutional constraints. Operating in a nontransparent and nonaccountable environment does not mean that 

37 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
44 blagovest tashev

leaders of undemocratic societies do not carefully weigh various possible courses of action. It means, however, that there 

are fewer checks on the decision-making process, as power and 

authority are concentrated in a single institution or a single 

leader, which makes the decision to use force or the threat to 

use force contingent on the whims of relatively few people. 

Such leaders do not have to include in their calculations institutional and public opinion support. They can easily mobilize 

military forces without seeking formal approval from national 

institutions, including legislative approval for the use of force 

and appropriation of financial resources. Quantitative and 

qualitative anthropological studies support the hypothesis that 

societies and groups with widespread participation in decision 

making and higher elite accountability are less prone to war, 

while societies characterized with less leadership accountability 

and more hierarchy are more war prone.38

Lack of democracy and transparency in the political system also makes the study of strategic culture difficult. While 

the decision-making process and the players in it are transparent in democracies, it is hard for the outside observer to discern 

the organizational culture of a nondemocratic state, including 

who is in charge of the process and how it works. In addition, nondemocracies rarely declare their long-term security 

goals and the means to achieve them in official, formal documents such as national strategy, military and defense doctrines, 

defense reviews, or white papers. These states also discourage 

the emergence of independent think tanks and institutes that 

might conduct research on security and defense and publish 

their findings. Instead, the researcher has to rely on limited 

information and indirect evidence. For example, when a coun38 Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from Anthropology of War,” International Organization 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 23, https://doi.org/10.1162

/002081802753485124.
chapter one 45

try publishes no official documents on its strategic and security outlook and policies, including real accounting of defense 

spending, one must look at patterns of behavior and how the 

country has acted in the past, then draw some conclusions as 

to how it may act in the future.39

Democratic political systems not only impose institutional 

checks and balances that constrain and enable decision makers, 

but they also change culture. There are examples where emerging democratic institutions and habits change the very nature 

of strategic culture. West Germany and Japan after the Second 

World War introduced democratic institutions and quickly 

transformed strategic cultures, which previously compelled the 

states to seek territorial expansion and easily resorted to the 

use of force, into cultures that can now be defined as pacifist. 

This pacifism was rooted in democratic institutions and democratic political culture. By creating a political system based 

on the division of power, more so in Germany than in Japan, 

the two countries made it virtually impossible for a national 

government to unilaterally involve the state in a war beyond 

the national borders. The Japanese constitution prohibited 

the country from maintaining armed forces: Japan has a SelfDefense Force (SDF) rather than a traditional armed force 

and the law imposes strict civilian control over the SDF. The 

German constitution, known as the Basic Law for the Federal 

Republic of Germany, describes the armed forces as absolutely defensive ones and imposes civilian and democratic control 

over them. In addition to the structural constraints on the use 

of force in both countries, the political and social culture makes 

it very difficult for governments to use the armed forces. Rooted in the pre-1945 period, a culture emerged that not only 

39 Gordon G. Chang, “Why China’s Military Budget Is Larger than It Appears,” 

National Interest, 8 March 2017.
46 blagovest tashev

denounced the use of force by both countries but also was generally resistant to the use of force by any country in the world. 

These structural and cultural constraints on the use of 

force in both countries presented a problem after the end of 

the Cold War when the international community faced a new 

set of security challenges, and the demands on both countries 

to contribute to international efforts, including with armed 

force, mounted. Both countries have adjusted their policies, 

including constitutionally and institutionally, and now send 

troops abroad. The strategic cultures of both Japan and Germany, however, are adjusting only slowly and both countries still 

exhibit passionate internal debates on the legitimacy of the use 

force abroad. In fact, the examples of Japan and Germany clearly illustrate how knowing the strategic culture of a country provides insights into the constraints an American ally might face 

when participating in a coalition with the U.S. armed forces. 

For example, the German forces taking part in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have a mission constrained 

by multiple caveats that prevent the forces from participation 

in combat operations. Although the German military has powerful capabilities, strategic culture partially explains why those 

capabilities cannot be deployed in Afghanistan. 

Even democracies have varying institutional structures and 

decision-making procedures for defining their policies and behavior in the international system. Some states have trusted 

prime ministers and their cabinets with most of the authorities in this area, while others have vested their presidents with 

foreign policy and defense powers. In some states, relatively 

few institutions are involved in the process, and others include 

multiple institutions, the public, and interest groups. Getting 

to know the political system and the place of the foreign policy 

and defense apparatus provides insights into who the most significant players are and how they reach decisions. 

Strategic culture can change; however, change is slow and 
chapter one 47

incremental.40 Changes in the state’s policies and behavior do 

not necessarily reflect changes in the state’s strategic culture. 

When a state elects a new government, the new administration may adopt policies and behavior reflecting the priorities 

of the political party running the government. This does not 

necessarily mean that the strategic culture of the country has 

shifted. Strategic culture is only one factor that determines the 

strategy, policies, and behavior of states. There are numerous 

other factors that have influenced the choices and decisions of a 

new government, which consequently leads to the state’s 

altered policies and behavior. For example, a state’s more proAmerican policies after a new government takes power might 

reflect the more pro-American attitudes of the new ruling party 

and a shift in American policies toward the country rather than 

a fundamental shift in the strategic culture of the country. 

Similarly, changes in the rhetoric of security elites and in 

public attitudes that seem to contradict what is seen as the national strategic culture do not necessarily signify a significant 

shift. Rhetoric and attitudes are very dynamic and heavily influenced by fast-changing contexts and circumstances. Changes 

in elite rhetoric may be a matter of political expediency rather 

than a reflection of deeply held values and interests. Strategic 

culture should be identified as transformed only when the new 

approach to strategy becomes embedded in institutions, symbols, organizations, training, and force posture.

The case of Germany’s transformation after the Second 

World War is a good example of a fundamental change in strategic culture. The change took place in a broader West German 

40 Gregory Giles, for example, points out that demographic and generational 

changes, media and academic influences, and the rise of individualism and religious nationalism have gradually shifted the foundations of Israeli strategic culture. See Gregory F. Giles, Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture (Fort 

Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts 

Office, 2006).
48 blagovest tashev

process of domestic democratization and international integration. Successive West German governments and political 

and military elites not only adopted democratic rhetoric and 

antimilitaristic narratives but carefully constructed national 

institutions that would sustain the democratic foundations of 

the political order and the overall democratic and civilian control over the armed forces and other security institutions. West 

Germany also denounced past discredited policies for achieving national goals and instead defined the pursuit of national 

interests strictly in the framework of an integrated and democratic Europe. For this purpose, the country became one of 

the main engines of building the institutions of the European 

Union while it shouldered the substantial financial burden required for this endeavor. 

Gradually, a new strategic culture gained a life of its own, 

distinct from the social and political interests that helped give 

rise to it. In the past, the use of military force was seen as a 

legitimate means to achieving national goals (i.e., territorial expansion), but the modern West German state defined its interests in the framework of international (UN, EU, NATO, and 

the Group of Seven) and domestic (federal states, separation 

of power, a powerful constitutional court, and civilian control 

of the military) institutions that constrained any attempt at 

unilateral pursuits of interests and power. These institutions 

not only reflected the interests of powerful political and social 

forces during the emergence of the new West German state, 

they consequently reinforced and maintained these interests 

and ultimately transformed the state identity. 

Strategic culture is not static. Major events, including the 

futility of old strategies, generational change, wars, political 

revolutions, foreign occupation, and other significant developments can spur changes in previously long-held strategic culture ideals. It is therefore prudent to occasionally revisit our 
chapter one 49

knowledge of a country’s strategic culture and update the analysis to reflect current situations and political environments. 

The Influence of the International 

Cultural Environment

In addition to the internal cultural environment, the external 

cultural environment, too, has a powerful influence on states’ 

behavior. As pointed out in the introduction, there are three 

cultural layers to the international cultural environment in 

which the states operate—international institutions; patterns 

of amity and enmity based on culture, ideologies and practices; 

and world and regional cultural environments. The purpose of 

this section of the chapter is to demonstrate how the external 

cultural environment influences and permeates the domestic 

cultural environment. The concluding section of this chapter 

includes research questions to assist the study of those influences. 

A single example may best illustrate the importance of the 

international cultural environment. In the current international system, states, frequently with the authorization from the 

United Nations, intervene in other states to stop human-rights 

abuses, violence, conflicts between ethnic groups, genocide, 

and civil wars. In early 2011, for example, after a resolution 

of the UN Security Council and a resolution of the Arab 

League, the United States and its NATO allies launched air 

strikes against the forces of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi 

to prevent them from massacring their political opponents and 

civilians. This was a foreign intervention in a country based on 

humanitarian grounds, a type of intervention that is relatively 

new in international relations. 

Until the Second World War, states fought other states, 

but preventing genocide or stopping the aggression of a government against its people was not one of the causes. The 
50 blagovest tashev

Second World War spurred a change in the thinking about 

whether intervening in other states on humanitarian grounds 

was legitimate and lawful, and gradually states came to accept 

this as a ground for action. To be sure, the confrontation of the 

Cold War prevented states from frequently intervening on humanitarian grounds, but in the early 1990s and especially after 

the civil war in Yugoslavia (1991–95), this became the norm. 

What happened was a cultural change—what was not permissible at one time now became the norm and the law. One must 

bear in mind, however, that this international principle is in 

conflict with another international principle—the sovereignty 

of the state that prohibits other states from interfering in its 

affairs. Ultimately, however, the international community accepted that some states, under certain conditions, may lose the 

protection of sovereignty. 

International Institutions

International institutions are important to consider because 

they have a role in mitigating conflicts. States create international institutions and seek to join them because they facilitate 

rulemaking, negotiating, implementing decisions, and enforcing rules and decisions. They also help to reduce uncertainty.41

International institutions have a significant impact on 

the national and foreign policies of states. Although institutions cannot eliminate conflict and war between states, they 

can change the character of the international environment by 

influencing states’ preferences, choices, and policies. International institutions do this by either creating incentives for cooperation or disincentives for particular actions. For example, 

an international organization can impose trade sanctions on 

a state and demand changes to its policies as a condition of 

41 See, for example, Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, eds., International Institutions: An International Organization Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
chapter one 51

lifting the sanctions. Alternatively, an international institution 

can encourage a particular behavior in a state by offering the 

state trade agreements that will benefit it.

International institutions can also operate to encourage 

a particular collection of norms, rules, and routines rather 

than formal structures. Instead of motivating states’ behaviors 

through the use of rewards, they instead create an environment 

of expectations about the proper behavior of the state: the state 

acts in ways that are consistent with these expectations even 

when no self-interest is evident. International institutions facilitate the transplantation of norms and rules into the national 

cultural context either through a process involving pressure on 

national elites to adopt the new norms and rules, or a process of voluntary adoption. The process can also occur through 

radical means, including occupation or pursuit of war crimes 

through The Hague, which entails major cultural changes. For 

example, the Allied occupation of West Germany after the defeat of Nazi Germany promoted not only radical changes in the 

political, social, and economic structures of the state but also 

dramatic cultural changes.42

International institutions vary in their influence over 

states. The presence of an international institution does not 

guarantee a state’s compliance; therefore, an analyst must research the level of institutional impact. Some have a profound 

effect on many functions of their members. For example, the 

European Union, an organization including 28 states, has 

taken over some of the authorities of its members and set up 

common policies in areas, including trade, finances, the social 

sphere, education, and foreign policy—that previously individual states were responsible for. There is also no border control 

between most of the members of the European Union due to 

42 See Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany 

and Japan,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities, ed. Peter J. 

Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317–56.
52 blagovest tashev

the Schengen Agreement (1995) and most of them use a single 

currency, the Euro. The EU has a profound effect on its members as they now craft common EU policies on various issues 

based on consensus rather than 28 individual policies. 

Other international institutions have much more limited 

functions and ability to change the policies of their members. 

Some of them exist for the purpose of addressing a single issue 

and have rather limited authorities. Others, while possessing 

limited authorities, have more ambitious missions but rely on 

simply promoting policies and coordinating the efforts of its 

members. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 

Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for example, works to 

“create the conditions for dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples, based upon respect for commonly shared 

values.” However, the organization has no authority to force its 

members to do anything.43

A defense alliance, while created to address a single issue

—a military threat—is a powerful instrument in creating common security and defense policies among its members. However, once the threat that had prompted the creation of the 

alliance is gone, the rationale for its existence is also not as 

relevant.44

Therefore, analyzing the cultural effect of membership in 

an international organization on the state requires an understanding of the nature of this organization. Membership in 

some organizations, such as the EU, leads to profound changes 

in the state’s preferences, policies, and behavior, while others 

have rather limited, if any, effects. Fortunately for analysts, this 

is not a question they need to figure out on their own, as the 

existing literature on international organizations extensively 

43 “Introducing UNESCO: What We Are,” UNESCO.org, 2017.

44 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an exception to this pattern. 

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, NATO 

somewhat redefined its roles and missions and continued to exist. 
chapter one 53

discusses the institutional and cultural implications on member states. Knowledge of these provides insights into what are 

possible, preferable, and likely choices and policies for a given 

state. 

Patterns of Amity and Enmity 

Based on Cultures, Ideologies, and Practices

Culture, ideology, and practices can determine how states interact. Sometimes similarities in political systems between states 

help them have harmonious relations, and sometimes they do 

not. For example, social science research points out that stable democracies are unlikely to engage in violent conflict with 

other democracies or to let disputes among them escalate into 

wars. This phenomenon is known in the social science literature as “democratic peace.”45 The research points out that it is 

not the similarity in the form of government that causes the 

peaceful coexistence of democratic states—there are plenty of 

examples of violent conflicts between Communist states or between states ruled by military regimes—but rather the form 

of government itself. There are both cultural and institutional 

explanations for this phenomenon.46

The cultural explanation for how the form of government 

influences strategic culture emphasizes the rule of law, individual freedoms and rights, tolerance of dissent, shifting political and social coalitions, and peaceful resolutions of conflicts 

among groups and individuals in the society as values and attitudes that translate into state values and attitudes. In other 

words, the political culture of the state aligns with the political 

culture of its society. Similarly, a society that espouses these 

values tends to develop affinities with societies that share those 

45 For review of the vast literature on democratic peace, see James Lee Ray, “Does 

Democracy Cause Peace?,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 1 (1998): 27–46, 

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.27. 

46 Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Peace: Selected Essays (New York: Routledge, 2012).
54 blagovest tashev

same values and this shared worldview prevents the emergence 

of enemy images that are essential in initiating or sustaining 

aggression. Even when conflicts between two states whose societies seem to share these values emerge, as they often do, there 

is the expectation on both sides that the disagreements would 

be resolved peacefully, in the tradition of both societies. By 

contrast, these considerations do not apply when the conflict is 

between two states governed by two different political systems. 

The society in the democratic state sees the ruling elite of the 

nondemocratic states as oppressive and nonrepresentative of 

the society they govern; in other words, it is illegitimate. The 

use of force against nondemocratic states is then seen not as a 

war against its people but against an illegitimate government 

that oppresses its people. 

The structural explanation emphasizes the existence of 

democratic institutions based on the division of powers, multiple institutions responsible for defense and security policy, regular elections, and multiple checks and balances. These factors 

make the use of force or the threat of use of force in most cases 

possible only after careful consideration of options, deliberations among institutions, debate in the society, and multiple 

inputs in the decision-making process. Leaders must convince 

other institutions and the public in general that the use of force 

is the right option. Failure to do so might not prevent them 

from initiating the use of force. However, the lack of institutional and public support denies them the ability to sustain 

the effort in the long term. This does not imply that sharing 

the same ideology and political system assures good relations 

between states. There are plenty of examples of the opposite. 

However, democracies seem to be unique in this regard.

There are other similarities in culture, ideology, and practices that may promote amity. Religion, ethnicity, nationality, 

political ideology, and common historical experience often—

but not always—facilitate cooperation between states. The 
chapter one 55

existence of these similarities does not guarantee cooperation 

between the states sharing it. However, under certain conditions, it may. Looking back at the historical record should 

identify those conditions. Certain contexts and circumstances 

reinforce certain traits and elements in identities, for example, 

and that may prompt two states to seek closer cooperation. 

Conversely, different sets of contexts may lead to a breakdown 

in cooperation between states. In any event, history provides 

the best guide in identifying those patterns. For example, does 

the country tend to ally with certain states based on specific 

commonalities? Otherwise, based on what kinds of conflicts 

does the state tend to confront some states? Relations with other states, of course, do not have to be defined by the use of force 

or the threat of use of force. Identifying a pattern of intensive 

political, economic, and social interaction between states tells 

us something about the effects this pattern may have on each 

participant.

Regional Cultural Environments

In addition to a global cultural environment, it is possible 

to delineate regional cultural environments. A set of values, 

norms, and practices broadly shared by the states in one region may differ from the ones in another region. For example, 

the understanding and practice of sovereignty and statehood 

in most of Africa differs from that in other regions. In African 

states, national identities do not broadly overlap with national 

borders and formal sovereignty is more important than the real 

exercise of sovereignty.47 On the contrary, Europe, particularly the European Union, is experiencing a dramatic change in 

the understanding and practice of sovereignty as states have 

47 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The 

Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 

1–24, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010277.
56 blagovest tashev

voluntarily given up many of their authorities and powers and 

instead entrusted them to supranational institutions. These 

are not simply institutional changes but fundamental cultural 

changes that have powerful effects on states, societies, groups, 

and individual citizens. 

In the international system, states and their fates are 

inextricably tied together, and they are interdependent. Interdependence in the international system refers to situations 

characterized by reciprocal effects among states or among actors in different states. These effects result from international 

transactions—flow of capital, goods, people, information, 

and ideas across national borders. These transactions increase almost every year and lead to growing interdependence 

among states. Developments and events in one state have 

unavoidable effects in other states. These cause repercussions 

that have both benefits and costs, depending on the country 

and the context. 

The economic collapse in Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, 

for example, resulted in dramatic decline in economic activity 

in this part of the world, which pushed the global demand 

for energy down. As a result, the price of oil in the global 

market declined dramatically and motorists in many places in 

the United States were able to purchase gasoline for less than 

a U.S. dollar per gallon. The eradication of poppy fields in Afghanistan after the invasion in 2001 not only affected the lives 

and livelihood of Afghan farmers—a consequence now fully 

understood by ISAF—but also increased the price of illegal 

drugs on the market in Western Europe. In the international 

system, actions and processes have expanding consequences; 

these actions ripple through the international system because 

of the interdependent relationships that link the states and 

their societies. 

The consequences of interdependence can be intended and 

unintended. The spread of revolutions in the countries of the 
chapter one 57

Middle East in early 2011, for example, increased the uncertainty about the flow of oil to the international market and 

increased its price—clearly an unintended consequence of the 

occurrences. Others are fully intended, such as when a diplomatic conflict in 2010 between China and Japan about disputed islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu 

in China, resulted in a Chinese decision to limit the export of 

rare earth minerals to Japan, which are essential components in 

various products in cars, computers, and smart bombs.48 China 

hoped to punish Japan for its diplomatic position. As the largest exporter of rare earth minerals, China’s move increased their 

price (perhaps another intended consequence) but also forced 

other countries to seek alternative sources of the minerals, including in places where the extraction was previously unable 

to compete with the Chinese prices (perhaps an unintended 

consequence of China’s decision). 

International interdependence has two important dimensions. First, states are sensitive in various degrees to changes in 

the international system and the behavior of actors in it. The 

degree of sensitivity depends on how quickly a state is affected by changes in the other states or the international system. 

The quicker the change is felt, the more sensitive to interdependence the state is. Second, states are vulnerable—to various degrees—to changes in the system. The higher the cost of 

change on a state imposed by developments in the international system, the more vulnerable the state. For example, some oilproducing states that rely exclusively on the export of oil for 

their income are not only sensitive to the changes of global 

prices of oil but also very vulnerable to those changes, particularly in comparison to oil-producing states that have more 

diversified economies—their national income is not as severely 

48 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tensions, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” New York 

Times, 22 September 2010.
58 blagovest tashev

impacted by the fluctuation of a single commodity. In general, 

the states that are both highly sensitive and highly vulnerable 

to interdependence are prone to instability and turmoil.

States are also unequally interdependent. A relationship 

of asymmetrical interdependence between two states characterizes a relationship in which one state is more dependent on 

the other, while the latter is less. For example, the economic 

relationship between the United States and Mexico is one of 

interdependence. However, Mexico’s economic development is 

much more dependent on the health of the American economy 

than the other way around. An economic crisis in the United 

States would have more serious negative consequences for the 

Mexican economy than a crisis in the Mexican economy would 

have on the U.S. market. This logic applies in security and defense as well. For example, during the Cold War, Western Europe depended much more on the U.S. commitment to defend 

it in case of a Soviet attack, while the United States relied less 

on Western Europe to face the Soviet threat. Yet, the security interdependence between Western Europe and the United 

States was beneficial to both sides. 

Current interdependence is characterized by a higher degree of sensitivity and vulnerability than in the past. In response to these conditions, states develop various strategies 

to address national sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Yet, some 

states are more capable than others of doing so. The more successful states—recognizing that the modern world is truly interdependent and sensitivity to changes is impossible to avoid, 

short of imposing complete self-isolation—develop strategies 

and policies to address vulnerability. States that rely exclusively 

on imports to meet their energy needs, for example, are aware 

that they are both sensitive and vulnerable to changes in the 

price and availability of energy sources on the world market. 

To address their vulnerability, they may attempt to diversify 

the sources and the types of energy commodities they import, 
chapter one 59

while at the same time they might take steps to limit their dependence on energy imports by developing domestic sources 

of energy. 

Nonetheless, putting these policies in place and changing 

the trends is challenged by the power and pace of the forces 

of interdependence. Even powerful states have a difficult time 

diminishing vulnerability—witness the United States’ growing 

dependence on imported oil for its energy needs, despite oftendeclared goals of gaining energy independence. Weak and poor 

states have an even harder time. The food prices on the global 

market increased substantially in 2009–10 and triggered crises in poor countries that are both sensitive—in that they rely 

on constant foodstuff imports for their needs—and vulnerable 

because they do not have the financial resources to purchase 

imports due to increasing food prices.

Assessing a country’s sensitivities and vulnerabilities in today’s interdependent world provides further understanding of 

a state and its people. It must be noted that this assessment 

must include not only the effects of interdependence on the 

state but also on its institutions, society, and diverse groups. 

Not all groups in the society are equally sensitive and vulnerable to changes and events outside the state. In assessing the 

repercussions to states from changes in the international system, one must carefully identify what groups (e.g., industries 

or institutions) in the state will be most affected before proceeding to assess the overall effect on the state as a whole. Only 

then may one proceed to make an informed speculation about 

the possible responses and behavior by the state, its institutions, society, and its diverse groups. Interdependence is also 

very dynamic; states and groups in it respond to changes in 

the international environment by adopting policies designed to 

maximize benefits from changes and minimize negative consequences—a process that triggers another set of events, changes, 

and aftereffects. 
60 blagovest tashev

Conclusion

A systematic approach to researching strategic culture will help 

analysts better understand the countries and regional and global contexts they are studying. This chapter does not help to predict what the behavior of a state is going to be under different 

conditions; rather, it is a guide to getting to know a country 

better and how it interacts within its ever-changing global and 

local environment. This chapter advocates thinking about factors other than material capabilities and assets, which are the 

factors usually considered by traditional security and defense 

approaches in analyzing countries and regions. Analysts should 

be encouraged to consider the intangibles, about how cultural 

factors affect states as actors in the international system, and 

about the cultural dimension in the interaction between states 

and their international and regional environments.

Knowing the material characteristics of countries and regions is important. Assessing the size of a country’s geographical 

area, population, economy, military capabilities, and organizations is necessary to evaluate the country and its ability to face 

various security and defense challenges. However, this analysis 

will be incomplete, because while evaluating the tangibles, it 

leaves out some very important intangibles. The strategies, policies, and behavior of the states, and ultimately the outcome 

of dealings with other players in the international system, depend on some powerful intangibles, including culture. A country may have a large military and advanced weapon systems. 

However, this does not necessarily translate into a powerful 

and capable military power and into a national capability to 

achieve its goals in the international system. If, for example, the 

population is divided between groups with competing identities—for example, a large group in the country may want to 

split from the state—this conflict will inevitably influence the 

cohesion and effectiveness of the armed forces and degrade the 

country’s ability to reach its international goals. And even if the 
chapter one 61

military is cohesive and powerful, the country may not be able 

to achieve its goals through force if the regional cultural environment makes it unacceptable and politically costly to attain 

national goals through the use of force. The study of states and 

regions requires not only analysis of material factors but also 

cultural and other tangible features. 
62 blagovest tashev

Postscript

Guiding Research Questions for the Analyst

Domestic Cultural Environment

Identity

• Did the state emerge while in a struggle with other political entities (e.g., a colonial power, empire, 

or dominant state)?

• Does the state incorporate in its symbols, national narratives, and educational systems any memories and histories of rivalries during the formative 

years of the state? What are the foes in these national struggles? Are the current foes the same as 

the ones during the formative years of the state?

• Is the national identity explicitly formed in rejection of another state or a group?

• Is any other state seen as having provided help in 

the formative years of the nation? 

• How much of the struggles in the formative years 

of the state are depicted in the national narrative, 

education, and arts?

• Is there a single national identity or multiple 

groups having different national identities in the 

states? Are there conflicting identities? Is there a 

history of violent conflict between these groups?

• Is there a group in the state that does not share 

the same national identity as the state and would 

like to either break up the state or join another 

state?

• Are there any groups with identities that are incompatible with the prevailing national identity? 

Have they been in conflict in the past? Are these 

conflicts capable of breaking up the state?
chapter one 63

• What factors in the past have been capable of 

shifting and changing the national identity?

Assumptions about the International System

• Where does the nation stand on the nature of the 

international system continuum?

• Does the state see relations with other states as a 

zero-sum game or a win-win game? 

• Does the nation see cooperation as possible but 

temporary or does it see it as desirable and mutually beneficial?

• Does the state see wars as unavoidable events or 

aberrations that can be limited?

• Does the state see military power as the ultimate 

guarantee for security or does the state see the expansion of international organizations and law as 

the ultimate solution to interstate wars? 

The Pursuit of National Interests in the System

• What has the state identified as its vital interests 

and long-term goals in official documents?

• Are these official interests and goals shared by the 

society at large?

• Does the state see the international and/or regional system as fundamentally just or unjust?

• Is the state a revisionist state or a status quo state?

• Does the state have a program/strategy to remake 

the international/regional system? 

• Does the state have the capabilities to remake 

or maintain the existing international and/or regional system?
64 blagovest tashev

Patterns of State Behavior in the International System

• Are the state’s strategies, policies, and behaviors 

compatible with the self-declared visions, roles, 

and goals in the international system? If not, are 

there any patterns that can be discerned?

• If there are large discrepancies between declared 

visions and roles, what explains that? Are the reasons for the discrepancies found internally or externally?

• Do discrepancies represent a pattern of their 

own?

International Cultural Environment

International Institutions

• What international organizations is the state a 

member of? Which of them have significant impact on the state’s behavior in the international 

system? In what way do memberships in international organizations affect the state’s behavior?

• Are international organizations using incentives 

or penalties to influence the behavior of the state?

• Are there any values, norms, or practices promoted by the international organizations that the 

state internalizes, which then become the state’s 

values, norms, and practices?

• Are there any elements of the state’s foreign, security, and defense policies that are determined or 

heavily influenced by international organizations 

(e.g., NATO, EU, Arab League, etc.)?

• Are there cases when the state acts in conformity 

with the policy of an international organization 

even if that policy seemed to contradict the state’s 

short-term interests?
chapter one 65

Patterns of Amity and Enmity 

Based on Culture, Ideologies, and Practices

• Are there any patterns of amity and enmity based 

on culture, ideologies, and practices the state has 

with other states, groups in other states, international organizations, or transnational players? 

• What contexts and circumstances create amity or 

enmity based on culture, ideology, and practice?

• What are the policy and behavioral consequences 

of amity or enmity?

Regional Cultural Environments

• Is the regional cultural environment different 

from the prevailing world cultural environment?

• What are the basic tenets of the regional cultural 

environment?

• Is the state’s strategic culture different from the 

prevailing regional cultural environment?

• How is the state adjusting to the regional cultural 

environment? 

• How are the world and regional cultural environments affecting the state’s sensitivity and vulnerability?

• Does the state have strategies to address various 

sensitivities and vulnerabilities?
66

Chapter

2

China’s Strateg ic 

Culture and Its d iverse 

Strategic Options

by Christopher D. Yung, PhD

Introduction

The challenges in assessing the strategic culture of a civilization 

such as China’s are many and varied. The Chinese civilization 

is one of the oldest on the planet—close to four millennia. 

Its long history has involved foreign invasions, some of which 

involved non-Chinese peoples occupying the seats of power 

in China and then subsequently taking military action against 

other peoples. It has also had multiple cultural influences: Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Its long history 

has seen China through many different strategic and military 

situations. It is a difficult task to generalize across thousands 

of years of military conflict to arrive at a small set of common 

cultural factors defining Chinese thinking on strategy.

China has an additional complication when it comes to 

examining its strategic culture. In addition to its long and varied 

history, it also had the significant experience of Communism. 

The Communist experience was so radically different from anything Chinese civilization had experienced before that it can be 

argued the military thinking and strategies formulated during 

the Chinese Civil War (1927–37, 1945–49), the Anti-Japanese 
chapter two 67

War (a.k.a. the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–45), and 

the Cold War should be considered the new foundation for 

China’s strategic culture. During the late nineteenth century, 

Chinese thinkers, strategists, and government officials found 

themselves in a hostile, predatory world illustrated by the imperialist powers carving China up into colonial spheres of control. The Chinese civilization was unalterably marked by such 

a searing experience that some observers argue that if Chinese 

strategic culture was not realist before, then it certainly became 

hyperrealist thereafter.1

 This is not to say that pre-Communist 

strategic thought was necessarily less realist than Communist 

strategic thought—only that Communist realpolitik behavior 

is clearly the result of a predatory environment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ancient Chinese strategic 

thought had many influences, including warlike and unstable 

interstate conditions. In any case, sinologists have found too 

many examples of ancient culture having an effect on the way 

Chinese today think about governance and strategy outside of 

pure power considerations, and it is safe to say that the characterization of China as a pure realist state is overstated. Thus, 

it may be that China indeed has a strategic culture, but its historical experiences are so complex that its strategic culture is 

difficult to identify.

Strategic culture became the subject of study in the late 

1990s, with different well-known intellectuals debating complex cases of strategic culture, including China’s. For some international relations scholars, such as Colin S. Gray, culture 

provides a context for understanding decision making instead 

of identifiable, testable factors. As Gray has written, it is folly 

1

 In international relations theory, realism refers to the concept that countries are 

power maximizers. They are therefore fixated on measures of power in relation to 

other nation-states and persistently act to build up their power. This includes the 

formation of alliances, constant procurement of military equipment, and efforts to 

threaten and sometimes weaken adversaries or competitors. 
68 christopher d. yung

to view strategic culture as a means to predict policy behavior or to determine the likely operational or tactical actions of 

a particular state.2

 Gray notes that there are many factors involved when a country makes strategic and military decisions. 

Consequently, it becomes conceptually unwieldy for strategic 

culture as a model for understanding specific strategic decisions 

to work. At the same time, Gray also correctly observes that 

strategic culture may help in building a context for us to understand the rationale for strategic and military decisions made 

by a specific state at a particular time.3

Similarly, although Alastair Iain Johnston sparred with 

Gray for years about the strategic culture issue, he comes to 

some similar conclusions about the general treatment of strategic culture and what it teaches us about a target country’s policy options. He notes that a strategic culture can tell us about 

the assumptions a country may make about the role of war 

in human affairs, and it may inform us about that country’s 

view of what strategies have proven effective, given a specific 

strategic environment. The former emphasizes context and the 

difficulty of operationalizing the concept of strategic culture; 

the latter emphasizes the likelihood or probability that a certain type of strategic choice may be preferable to the Chinese 

under given circumstances. It is probably counterproductive, 

at least in the case of China, to identify a specific historical 

incident in China’s past and declare it as singularly significant 

enough to directly lead to subsequent specific strategic decisions. Instead, a civilization’s past—in this case China’s—can 

create a background for us to understand how its current leadership may view a variety of specific strategic choices. For this 

chapter, the complexity of this issue strongly suggests that a 

different approach is needed to enlighten us on how to think 

2

 Gray, Out of the Wilderness. 3

 Gray, Out of the Wilderness.
chapter two 69

further about China and how we can apply strategic culture to 

different societies. 

This chapter will take a decidedly different approach to 

examining this issue. It will first start with strategic issues confronting the modern-day Western strategist and policy maker 

regarding China, categorize these strategic issues into themes, 

and then work backward to see if the strategic question involved can be framed and examined in terms of strategic culture. In this way, we can better understand the context in which 

today’s Chinese leadership evaluates their strategic options. By 

examining several themes in this chapter, it will demonstrate 

how policy makers and leaders in China prefer to operate as 

they have within their cultural milieu while adapting to external forces and current strategic challenges. Therefore, at times, 

it is important to discuss Western ideas on strategy to see how 

China alternates between its historical preferences and adaptations made to meet these modern, external demands. The goal 

here is not to provide all-inclusive examples of this tendency 

but to give readers a better model for understanding Chinese 

policy behavior. 

Confucian, Realist, or Something Else?

The Chinese military and Chinese scholars are fond of the argument that their nation’s strategic culture is defensive. As Andrew Scobell notes in his work on this subject, the Chinese are 

not only inclined to have this view, they are close to fanatical 

about it. He gives current Chinese strategic thinking the unflattering label of “a cult of the defensive.”4

 Scobell notes that 

the Chinese line of argument is that the foundation of Chinese 

civilization is Confucian thought. Ideas ascribed to Confucius 

shaped Chinese views on governance, justice, security, use of 

4

 Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, 2002). 
70 christopher d. yung

force, bureaucracy, the role of government in promoting societal harmony, and commercial policy. 

Because Confucius argued that the best policy to preserve 

peace and harmony, both within China and in territories outside of China, is to treat citizens and neighboring countries 

justly and to focus on economic prosperity of the society; 

the Chinese argue that their inclination is to pursue security 

through policies that are inherently defensive and that pose no 

threat to anyone.5

 This philosophical line is more than mere 

academic musing. It has policy implications for the real world. 

When the U.S. military observes Chinese military modernization, which was based on a 10 percent growth in the Chinese 

defense budget for close to two decades and the acquisition of 

very modern weapons systems and platforms, American leaders are inclined to become concerned that China is pursuing a 

military policy that will ultimately threaten the United States 

and its national security interests. The Chinese point out that, 

because their strategic culture is inherently defensive, this is an 

unfair characterization of China’s intentions. 

Scobell notes that the Chinese exhibit a curious pattern of 

fervently believing that their actions and policies are inherently 

defensive and pose no threat to anyone, yet their actions seem 

contradictory, reflecting a realist mind-set.6

 Advocates of China 

as a realist state point to periods in history in which the Chinese 

authorities acted in un-Confucian ways. The earliest evidence 

of this behavior can be found in the formative years of Chinese 

civilization. At the end of the Warring States period (403–221 

BCE), a single state, Qin, had accumulated enough power 

to unify the territories that we now recognize as a substantial 

5

 Scobell, China and Strategic Culture. 6

 Scobell, China and Strategic Culture.
chapter two 71

part of Eastern China.7 The arguments that the advisors to the 

Qin ruler gave for unification would be largely familiar to a 

realist: Qin has the power to unify; the other states have been 

weakened through years of warfare and are therefore ripe for 

conquest; and governance of these territories would be much 

more efficient, just, and effective under unified leadership than 

under a system of splintered and divided states.8

 Additional 

historical evidence of realist behavior can be found in battlefield statistics. Some of China’s wars cost millions of lives. The 

Qing military conquest of the Ming in the seventeenth century CE, for example, cost 25 million lives; the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century cost more than 20 million 

lives; and An Lushan’s rebellion during the Tang dynasty in 

the eighth century CE cost more than 13 million lives.9

 These 

results suggest that, while Confucian ideas may have had an 

impact on how the Chinese view themselves and their security 

as defensive in nature, there is historical evidence that the Chinese in the past have not necessarily adhered to those ideals. 

Alastair Iain Johnston’s work on Chinese strategic culture is also enlightening. Following a detailed survey of Ming 

dynasty foreign policy behavior as well as an examination of 

Chinese Communist military actions during the Chinese Civil 

War and the Anti-Japanese War, Johnston concludes that China has displayed an unusual reliance on the use of force to settle 

political disputes.10 Statistically, Johnston concludes that the 

modern Communist Chinese use of force exceeds the norm 

7

 Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, comp., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 

vol. 1, From Earliest Times to 1600, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1999), 139–40. 

8

 de Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition. 9

 Kyle Mizokami, “Asia’s 5 Most Lethal Wars of All Time,” National Interest, 1 

August 2015. 

10 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The 

Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216–56. 
72 christopher d. yung

displayed by other major powers. His label for the observed 

Chinese behavior, a parabellum strategic culture, would seem to 

confirm the views of those analysts who conclude that China 

is a realist state.11 Scobell adds in his seminal work on the Chinese use of force that there is a tendency in Chinese culture to 

decry pacifistic philosophies, and at the same time, to criticize 

warlike and extremely violent tendencies.12 He notes that the 

Chinese philosophical inclination is that force has its place in 

the world and can be used to bring about just and effective 

results.13

It is here that China’s long and complex history becomes 

instructive. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, both 

historians of China, observe that as early as the Song dynasty, 

China has had extensive contact through trade with the peoples of Southeast, South, and Middle Asia and was knowledgeable of Mediterranean Europe. They note that China’s nautical 

technology was superior to all of these peoples and had the 

power to invade and colonize Western Europe from Asia—yet 

chose not to.14 The Chinese also correctly note that if China 

was a realist state, why then did it not continue its expansion? 

During the Ming dynasty, the Chinese launched seven expeditions throughout Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and parts 

of the Middle East.15 Ming-era Chinese military and seafar11 A parabellum strategic culture is defined by Johnston as a culture that has an 

unusual reliance or willingness to use military force to settle political disputes. The 

country or civilization involved may engage in negotiation and diplomacy as well, 

however, it also displays throughout its history a tendency to rely on force to resolve major disputes. Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China.”

12 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long

March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2, https://doi.org/10.1017

/CBO9780511510502. 

13 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force. 14 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, 

MA: Belknap Press, an imprint of Harvard University Press, 2006), 93.

15 Charles O. Hucker, China’s Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and 

Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 291.
chapter two 73

ing technology were far superior to any other competitors at 

that time. China could easily have begun the colonization of 

the territories ringing the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 

There is some dispute about exactly how peaceful these maritime expeditions were, but following the seventh expedition, 

Zheng He was ordered by the emperor to cease his expeditions, 

and with the emperor’s direction, the nation turned its attention to internal Chinese matters.16

China’s surprising entry into the modern world in the 

mid-nineteenth century might have shook Chinese culture to 

its core. This experience made China prone to realist, powerseeking behavior, at least in the modern era. The Opium Wars, 

the Sino-Japanese Wars, and later military occupation by Japan 

left Chinese scholars and government officials seeking solutions to very difficult questions. In the so-called Opium Wars, 

Western imperial powers forced the opening up of China to 

trade and colonization, which was eventually followed by the 

occupation by Japan of the eastern part of mainland China 

(1937–45). Significantly, Japan had traditionally been seen by 

the Chinese elite to be China’s inferior. These events rocked 

Chinese perceptions of its historical strength, autonomy, and 

cultural superiority in Asia.

Out of this context, Mao Zedong emerged as one of those 

seeking to resolve China’s many strategic and political problems. He found his answers in Marxism-Leninism, but his writings also reveal that he found answers in the writings of such 

military thinkers as Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri 

Jomini.17 This realist narrative goes far in explaining Chinese 

military and strategic behavior during the Chinese Civil War 

(1927–37, 1945 – 49), in its War of Resistance against Japan 

(1937– 45), and in China’s strategic behavior during the Cold 

16 Hucker, China’s Imperial Past, 291. 17 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in Selected 

Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 1:179–249. 
74 christopher d. yung

War against not just the United States in Korea but also against 

the Indians in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam 

in 1979. Following the death of Mao, however, this clean narrative was essentially undercut when Deng Xiaoping came to 

power in 1979, informed the military that it was to receive 

little funding for defense modernization, was to be considered 

the lowest priority for the foreseeable future, and placed the 

Chinese Communist Party’s focus almost entirely on economic 

growth and enhancing the quality of life of its citizens—a very 

Confucian notion.18

The bottom line is that China is both Confucian and realist in outlook, depending on the specific strategic situation 

that it finds itself in; China throughout its history has used 

military force ruthlessly to defeat opponents threatening China’s borders and its dynastic rule, but China has also negotiated 

with nomadic foes living outside of Chinese civilization. Chinese rulers have recognized the utility and necessity of developing military capabilities, particularly new types of weapons; 

however, at the same time, the Chinese have at the height of 

their power turned their back on potential conquests outside 

of the homeland. China has engaged in ruthless wars of annihilation leading to the deaths of millions of combatants, but it 

has also been involved in multiple conflicts in which lethality 

and destruction were not what marked the conflict but stratagem and wars of maneuver leading to negotiated outcomes. 

Chinese strategic culture as described here appears to reflect 

both a reliance on habits of thought, shared beliefs, and modes 

of behavior derived from common experiences and narratives 

during a long period of time, while at the same time reflecting 

particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving 

problems with respect to the threat or use of force. 

18 Peng Guangqian, “Deng Xiaoping’s Strategic Thought,” in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 1997), 3–11.
chapter two 75

A Continentalist or Maritime State?

When American strategists look at Chinese military modernization during the past two decades, they worry that China 

is following directly in the American path toward hegemony. 

With China’s island reclamation activities and its militarization of features in the South China Sea, as well as the apparent 

emergence of an antiaccess/area denial and counterintervention strategy apparently designed to keep the American military out of the region or, at best, to reduce the U.S. military’s 

room for operational maneuver, they see the emergence of a 

Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine against colonialism 

and designed to ultimately push the United States out of Asia. 

When American strategists look at the steady development of 

Chinese naval power projection capabilities, coupled with forays into commercial port facility development in the Indian 

Ocean and in Africa, they remember the competition the U.S. 

Navy engaged in with the British Royal Navy in the nineteenth 

century with the development of American global maritime 

power. Recent American scholarship backs up this strategic inclination by observing that the father of the modern Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, Admiral Liu Huaqing, 

initially had in mind plans that were based on the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, America’s best-known advocate of early 

American naval power.19

The counterargument is that it is a distortion to use the 

American model of global power trajectory to assess China’s 

strategic trajectory because, simply put, the United States is 

not China; the United States attained its hegemonic status in 

the aftermath of two world wars and the collapse of European 

colonial powers. More important, while it is evident that Chi19 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and 

the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 

See also Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a 

Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014). 
76 christopher d. yung

na recognizes the importance of developing a power projection 

navy and a military capability to protect its interests abroad, 

China defines its strategic global interests narrowly and does 

not see the need to militarize its foreign policy so broadly that 

it ends up being a military competitor with the United States 

on a global scale. And why does China define its global interests so narrowly? It does so, advocates argue, because China is 

naturally a continentalist state; views its security and political 

interests as rooted in what is going on in China proper; and is 

hyper fixated on security issues that directly affect the legitimacy, survivability, and viability of the government in power.20

Insofar as international security issues have an impact on those 

narrow issues, the Chinese government will apply resources 

and formulate strategies to address them.

The first bit of evidence in favor of one side or the other is 

historical. For most of China’s existence as a polity, its focus has 

been on the eastern Asian continent and not on the maritime 

space abutting the Chinese mainland. Chinese history is filled 

with episodes of dynasties having to wrestle strategically with 

Turkic, Manchurian, and Mongolian peoples who resided in 

the steppes, on the periphery of what was considered China 

proper.21 Occasionally these nomadic peoples conquered the 

Chinese state, either through a new military technology (e.g., 

the crossbow and mounted archery) or because the Chinese 

state had become corrupt and collapsed from within. These 

peoples, inevitably convinced that Chinese culture was more 

refined and superior to their own, were eventually co-opted by 

the Chinese bureaucracy and absorbed into Chinese culture. 

These were the experiences of the Mongols and the Manchurians, who became the Yuan and Qing dynasties, respectively. 

20 See, for example, Robert Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects 

and U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 46–81. 21 Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973), 26.
chapter two 77

Fairbank and Goldman, furthermore, have advanced the thesis 

that Sinic civilization merged with nomadic peoples to create a 

polity unique to China.22 They write: 

(1) . . . [E]arly China created a politicized state organized for purposes of central control both by bureaucratic 

methods of philosophic persuasion and by the imperial 

autocrat’s use of violence; (2) . . . non-Chinese invaders 

from Inner Asia became integral participants in the Chinese polity by their military prowess and administrative 

skill; and (3) . . . the resulting Sino-nomadic imperial 

power continued to maintain the primacy of central political control.

23

Additionally, even setting aside the persistent tug of war 

between Chinese civilization and its nomadic neighbors, the 

history of the birth, maturation, and collapse of Chinese dynasties resides in the challenges of administering such a vast 

landmass that the Chinese state encompassed. Mark Elvin, in 

his classic work, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, notes that “the 

critical factor [in the rise and fall of empires], particularly evident in the . . . early Chinese empires, is usually the heavy 

cost, relative to total output of food and goods, of maintaining 

the administrative superstructure, and of providing the soldiers 

and supplies necessary for imperial security.”24 Inevitably, there 

is harsh taxation and this in turn tends to induce social and 

political changes that undermine the fiscal soundness of the 

state.25 Fairbank and Goldman describe a similar dynamic:

In each dynasty the progressive withdrawal of land from 

taxation to benefit the ruling class led to a dangerous 

22 For the purposes of this discussion, Sinic refers to the cultures of China, Japan, 

Korea, and Vietnam.

23 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 126–27. Emphasis in original. 24 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, 19. 25 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, 19.
78 christopher d. yung

reduction of imperial revenues. . . . As time went on 

there ensued a struggle between the interests of the imperial government and of the great families who lived 

under it.26

Wealthy aristocratic families were, over time, able to 

withdraw land holdings from the reach of imperial power for 

the purposes of taxation. Additionally, they were also able to 

convince an increasing number of peasant and middle-income 

families to stop paying imperial taxes and to come under their 

protection. “This,” according to Elvin, “created a vicious spiral in 

which a greater burden was placed upon the still-taxable land 

of the peasantry, at a time when the demands of the government for revenue were probably increasing. . . . [and] a progressively smaller proportion of the land was expected to pay 

a progressively larger amount of revenue. Peasant disorders 

would eventually result.”27 These internal issues seem to provide convincing evidence to interpret the Chinese as unvarnished continentalists.

If this pattern of government preoccupation with its internal troubles was the primary concern of those in power throughout Chinese history, it is easy to understand why 

Chinese rulers may have been inclined to not worry about the 

maritime domain. The advocates of China as a renewed maritime state point to history as well. They note that perhaps a 

continentalist perspective dominated Chinese security perspectives in the dynasties previous to that of the Qing dynasty in 

the nineteenth century; however, by the middle of the century 

China was confronted with a new kind of adversary—one that 

came from the sea. The British arrived with modern warships 

and, unlike previous invasions, did not consider Chinese cul26 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 48–49. 27 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 48–49.
chapter two 79

ture or civilization superior.28 The British set about forcing the 

Qing emperor to open China to British trade, to allow British 

and later other imperial powers to settle in China, and ultimately to proselytize Christianity in China.29 This century and 

a half of humiliation that the Chinese readily point to as a 

primary rationale for a strong navy is evidence that Chinese 

strategic interests have expanded to include recognition of the 

importance of a strong navy, as the maritime state advocates 

argue. 

Continentalists claim, however, that history still supports 

the view that China is culturally more inclined to fixate on 

continental security issues than maritime ones. They note that 

the Chinese concern about the sea serving as the domain in 

which the Western powers invaded mainland China is translated into a naval force structure designed to erect defensive 

zones to keep outside powers at bay. Antiaccess/area denial as a 

strategic concept can be interpreted this way; similarly, so can 

island reclamation and the militarization of island features in 

the South China Sea. Continentalists also observe that Chinese power projection outside of the Asia-Pacific appears to 

be, in practice, exactly as they have argued in theory—that is, 

designed to address narrow security interests that are heavily 

focused on meeting the direct security needs of the Chinese 

mainland. China does not build large-scale military bases 

abroad; rather, it relies on “dual use logistics facilities” that involve a small number of military personnel, do not have the 

full characteristics of a military base, and cannot be used to fully prepare China for a conventional conflict abroad.30 Chinese 

28 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 196. 29 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 196. 30 Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not 

an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University, 2014). 
80 christopher d. yung

military activities abroad have been strictly limited to counterpiracy operations, United Nations peacekeeping operations, 

noncombatant evacuation operations, and select joint military 

exercises. Were China a maritime-focused state, it is arguable 

that these activities would be reflective of actions designed to 

robustly protect China’s expansive maritime policies; instead, 

they appear to narrowly address specific security interests 

abroad that are meant to support China’s continued economic 

growth and its internal stability.31 Again, this brief discussion 

on China as either continentally focused or maritime focused 

sheds additional light on the concept of strategic culture. As 

discussed in the opening chapter of this book, strategic culture is the combination of internal and external influences and 

experiences—geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political, and military—which shape the way a country understands 

its relationship to the rest of the world and how that country 

will behave in the international community. 

The “Three Knockheads” of the Tributary System

At the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

Regional Forum in 2010, Yang Jiechi, the then-Chinese foreign 

minister, following an effort by 12 of the ASEAN states to raise 

the South China Sea territorial dispute as a topic of discussion, 

turned his ire toward the Singaporean foreign minister, and 

angrily announced: “China is a big country and other countries 

are small countries, and that is just a fact!”32 The angry diatribe 

reminded many sinologists of the ancient tributary system in 

which China was so dominant in Asia that the emperor expected smaller kingdoms that were well within China’s political 

31 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun.” 32 Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive,” 

China Brief 10, no. 25 (December 2010).
chapter two 81

sphere of influence to make an annual visit to the capital to pay 

homage.33 At the beginning of the audience with the emperor, 

the envoy from the kingdom in question was expected to kneel 

before the emperor and lower their face to the floor, knocking 

their forehead three times in supplication. In Chinese, the term 

is san ketou or “three knockheads,” hence the phrase in English 

“kowtow.” 

The possibility that a long-term goal of China’s is to recreate a modern-day tributary system is no laughing matter for 

scholars who think about foreign policy. If China’s political and 

strategic cultures inherently offer its political leaders the option 

of demanding an international order that eventually involves 

Chinese domination with lesser states in constant positions of 

inferiority, then this is in direct tension with the international 

order that the United States has created since the Second World 

War. Even if China’s leadership was to press for such an order 

in the Asia-Pacific region alone, such a structure would be at 

odds with fundamental American conceptions of its interests 

in the region. U.S. national security interests have centered on 

countering the rise of hegemons attempting to dominate their 

respective regions. In the case of the Asia-Pacific, the United 

States has a very real interest in maintaining its presence there 

and to counter an order in which the Chinese leadership expected the surrounding countries of the region to kowtow to 

Beijing.

Some scholars have observed that the tributary system, 

when operating under a philosophy of Confucian universal 

33 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 112, 113, 201.
82 christopher d. yung

harmony, led to peace.34 David C. Kang, in his 2010 book, 

observed that between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries 

China did not engage in war with Japan, Korea, or Vietnam— 

at the time, the major kingdoms of the East Asian Confucian 

order.35 Because states peripheral to China adopted—in one 

form or another—ideas of the Confucian ethic, which involved 

a concept of Confucian universal harmony, it is arguable that 

all of these peoples adhere to a universal or Asian value system.36 Kang notes that there was no conflict because the four 

states shared common values in an international system based 

on a hierarchical structure with China at the top and these 

countries below.37

In contrast to a Westphalian world order in which the ideal is represented by sovereign nation-states in a balance of power with other major states in the system, the Chinese order was 

hierarchical with the Chinese emperor clearly at the top and 

with the other nations below. Other scholars have argued that 

Kang’s depiction of East Asian international relations is a distortion of history that cherry-picks supporting facts. Wontack 

Hong argues that the tributary system was a “glorified pro34 The Confucian concept of universal harmony posits that order, peace, and stability are assured when all parties to a political situation, whether they be rulersubject, a group of civilizations or nation-states, a collection of citizens, etc., have 

a common set of values and arrive at a common set of governing concepts. Ultimately, this means that peace and order is assured when all parties to a political 

situation know their place in a hierarchy of political relationships established by 

a number of different political processes: king-subject, parent-child, merchantcustomer, lord-subject, or prosperous state-developing state. 

35 David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

36 There is no single definition of an Asian value system. However, common elements of it involve: (1) respect for tradition; (2) a hierarchical view of order and 

stability, or more specifically acceptance of one’s place in a given pecking order; 

(3) respect for elders and ancestors; (4) a high value placed on education; (5) the 

prioritization of the welfare of the group or collective over individual interests and 

rights; and (6) in some Asian societies, an emphasis on stability and order over 

individual freedoms.

37 Kang, East Asia before the West. 
chapter two 83

tection racket” in which China shook down those kingdoms 

weaker than itself while China paid off nomadic peoples along 

China’s steppes, depending on the nature and level of threat 

these peoples posed to China.38 A bridge between these two 

interpretations of the Chinese ancient world order is whether 

it is the pursuit of harmony or the Chinese inclination to pay 

off potential threats that provided the motivation for this type 

of system. The Chinese conception of strategic order comes 

down to four aspects: (1) a hierarchy of states, each with a 

clear understanding of their position within the system; (2) a 

strong sense of values, manifest in ritual behavior to signify 

compliance with the established order; (3) material exchange as 

a means to address tension in the system; and (4) the absence 

of the need to resort to force to maintain order in the system if 

all of the major players recognize their position in the hierarchy 

and have well-developed channels to resolve disputes absent 

the use of force.

Chinese scholars have vigorously argued that China has no 

desire to return to a tributary system and commentary that suggests otherwise is inaccurate. These scholars, including Yongjin Zhang and Shu Changhe, argue that instead of focusing 

on the ancient Chinese system demanding tribute, that Western scholars look at the Chinese concept of universal harmony, 

which is really at the heart of how the Chinese tributary system worked.39 A Chinese notion of harmony as opposed to 

the Western ideal of balance, Chinese scholars argue, is a more 

38 Wontack Hong, East Asian History: A Tripolar Approach (Seoul: Kudara International Press, 2010).

39 Yongjin Zhang, “China and Liberal Hierarchies in Global International Society: Power and Negotiation for Normative Change,” International Affairs 92, no. 

4 (July 2016): 795–816, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12652; and Shu 

Changhe, “The Possibility of Gongsheng International System: How to Build a 

New Type of Great Power Relations in a Multipolar World,” in A New Type of 

Great Power Relations: Opportunities and Challenges (Beijing: Peking University 

Press, 2015), 81–107.
84 christopher d. yung

durable formula for peace. Harmony is based on shared values, while balance, at least in an international relations sense, 

connotes stasis arising from two opposing forces unable to 

overcome each other. These scholars observe that the Chinese 

focus on harmony is pervasive in modern Chinese foreign and 

defense policy concepts. 

The early foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China had aspects of the universal harmony theme. Zhou Enlai, 

China’s then-foreign minister, announced in the mid-1950s 

that the guideline for Chinese foreign policy was the Five 

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel 

Treaty, which came out of the Bandung Conference of 1955. 

It called for countries to respect the sovereignty of all other 

nation-states, to not interfere in the internal affairs of other 

countries, to treat other countries with mutual respect, to not 

invade and act aggressively toward other nation-states, and to 

not act like a bullying hegemon.40

A recent example of Chinese policy associated with a theme 

of universal harmony is the larger policy to manage its relationship with the United States, described as a new type of great 

power relationship.41 The concept, which originated in 2011, 

argues that the structural situation China and the United States 

find themselves in—that is, a rising power, an established hegemon, and an eventual overtaking in global influence of the 

latter by the former—will likely lead to major power conflict 

unless something creative is done to manage the relationship. 

The Chinese concept of a new type of great power relationship 

is supposed to be that creative solution. In it, the Chinese argue 

that the United States and China pursue the following path toward an improved relationship: (1) a policy of “no conflict, and 

40 Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1980), 19.

41 Cheng Li, “A New Type of Major Power Relationship?,” Brookings, 26 September 2014.
chapter two 85

no confrontation”; (2) mutual respect for each other’s “core interests”; and (3) win-win cooperation. American interlocutors 

engaged in strategic dialogues with their Chinese counterparts 

wryly observe that the new type of great power relationship is 

easy to comprehend: all the United States needs to do is respect 

China’s vitally important interests, while China ignores all of 

America’s important interests.

So, does China want to return to a tributary system in 

the Asia-Pacific or not? If stated another way, does China want 

to dominate the Asia-Pacific region with China hierarchically 

on top and other nations of the region below? If this is the 

question, then the answer is probably “yes.” The evidence for 

this argument can be pieced together through a number of different examples: China’s push for an East Asia for Asians to 

the exclusion of the United States; China’s refusal to negotiate or discuss the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN as 

a unified, coequal body; China’s continuing enmity with its 

most robust regional rival, Japan, even though it would make 

strategic sense for China to make common cause with the Japanese, if only to ease the United States out of the region; and 

China’s downplaying of South Korea’s actual defense needs regarding South Korea’s request that the United States deploy a 

missile defense, known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), in South Korea against North Korean missile 

threats, while China decries the perceived negative effect such a 

system would have on China’s own security needs. The discussion on China’s desire to return to a tributary system reinforces 

some of the conceptual definitions of strategic culture laid out 

in the opening chapter of this book. In this case, it illustrates 

how strategic culture refers to the social ordering of the system 

(either internal to a country, or externally among a number of 

countries) that individuals rely on to tell them how the world 

works, which norms and values should be upheld internationally, and which rules should govern state interactions.
86 christopher d. yung

Deterrence and Coercion: 

Two Sides of the Same Coin?

The use of force is an important aspect of strategy, but the associated concepts of deterrence and coercion are understood 

differently by the Chinese. Westerners, Americans especially, 

see these concepts as two separate constructs, each with different sets of norms, legal restrictions, accepted actions, and 

safeguards associated with them. But for China, these two constructs are not considered so distinctly, which causes confusion 

from those on the outside looking in at Chinese use of deterrence or coercion. To better understand the Chinese point of 

view, it is first helpful to understand their conceptualizations 

about power, which are part historical and part linguistic, and 

equally helpful is a good understanding of China’s historical 

foundations regarding sovereignty. 

Essentially, Chinese concepts of sovereignty did not involve the religious, legal, and governmental checks and balances that Western societies accepted or imposed on their 

rulers. Although developed over centuries, the European system of governance involved kings having to share power over 

time with religious institutions, such as the Roman Catholic 

Church, ruling over societies with well-developed systems of 

law and legal jurisprudence. The Western calculus to use force, 

then, has traditionally taken into account significant religious 

and legal factors that invariably demanded a legal and religious 

justification, and which ultimately involved making a distinction between force designed to defend or retaliate and force designed to compel. By contrast, Chinese emperors did not suffer 

from similar restrictions on their power and came to develop 

well-thought-out ideas on how to use military power—either 

to prevent adversaries or citizens from doing something by 

deterrence or compelling these same parties to do something 

through coercive measures. 

Arthur Waldron, a keen observer of the connection be-
chapter two 87

tween Chinese culture and concepts of security, has stated that 

in China there are different ways to say the word “power.”42

There is li, or the attributes associated with power—size of a 

population; number of men at arms that a ruler has access to; 

number of ships, weapons, etc.; and the size of the economy. 

There is shi, the skillful use of li, and xing (the strategic situation or net assessment) to bring about a desired political objective. And then there is wei; that is, the appearance of power or 

awesomeness, which by itself can generate political outcomes 

because adversaries and friends alike will behave differently around you depending on the degree of wei you possess. 

Of course, the skillful strategist uses wei through stratagems 

to coerce or negotiate a better political outcome for the state. 

Therefore, in China the ruler was not overly preoccupied with 

the justification of the use of military power and force, but 

instead was particularly concerned with the effectiveness of the 

use of force.

Another distinctive feature of Chinese strategic culture related to deterrence and coercion is the Chinese strategic and 

philosophic tendency to see political objectives intimately related to the military instrument; notwithstanding Clausewitz’s 

famous dictum, the West does not. When Clausewitz claimed 

that “war is the continuation of policy by other means,” the 

rejoinder to that phrase was that militaries were to be used to 

eliminate the armies of one’s adversary so that the state can 

impose its will on the adversary.43 Clausewitz described militaries as two wrestlers in a ring attempting to gain leverage 

42 These concepts were presented during lectures at the U.S. Naval War College in 

the 1990s. However, the author heard Arthur Waldron make these remarks at conferences on Chinese strategic thinking in the latter part of the 1990s, in particular, 

a director of the Office of Naval Intelligence-sponsored conference at Lansdowne 

Conference Center, Leesburg, VA, in June 1996. 

43 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77, 87. 
88 christopher d. yung

over the other, the goal of which is to throw and pin the other 

down.44 Despite Clausewitz’s claim that one was the extension 

of the other, giving the impression that war and policy making occupied the same conceptual sphere, he commented that 

ultimately the means through which the military serves the political objective is through combat, so warfighting must be the 

primary focus of the military. He writes:

If a decision by fighting is the basis of all plans and operations, it follows that the enemy can frustrate everything 

through a successful battle. This occurs not only when 

the encounter affects an essential factor in our plans but 

when any victory that is won is of sufficient scope. For 

every important victory—that is, destruction of opposing 

forces—reacts on all other possibilities. . . . Thus it is 

evident that destruction of the enemy forces is always the 

superior, more effective means, with which others cannot 

compete.45

Military historian Antulio J. Echevarria II notes that beyond Clausewitzian theory, in practice, the Western strategic 

tradition is to not view war as a continuation of policy by other 

means and instead sees it as an alternative to politics. That is, 

“politics brought war into being, but war existed as a violent alternative to politics, rather than its logical extension.”46 He observes that German, English, French, and American strategists, 

practitioners, and theorists have tended to use the Napoleonic 

wars and later Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke’s campaigns as the ideal for thinking about wars. For these Western 

strategic thinkers, “winning wars meant winning battles, and 

44 Clausewitz, On War, 77, 87. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 97. 46 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle, PA: U.S. 

Army War College Press, 2004), 3. 
chapter two 89

that doing so would accomplish most, if not all, war time objectives.”47

This tradition lives on today in the way that Western politicians talk about the use of force. American presidents have 

said on a wide range of occasions that everything is on the table 

(i.e., the use of force) but only after we have exhausted every 

possible solution. The existence of this tradition of the philosophical separation of the political and military spheres was 

why Americans were so uncomfortable thinking about nuclear 

weapons. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate political weapon. 

Their absolute destructiveness limits their utility on the battlefield, and their actual use in the case of a full-scale nuclear 

exchange would ultimately mean the end of the viability of the 

states employing them; nuclear weapons are ultimately useless 

as military weapons but quite as useful as a political weapon to 

either deter adversaries or to coerce them. 

If the Western intellectual tradition tended to separate the 

political and military spheres, the advent of nuclear weapons 

forced Western strategic thinkers into fully contemplating the 

political use of these weapons. Deterrence was suddenly thrust 

into the policy realm as a central and important guiding defense concept. Preventing aggressive states from violating international law or attacking other weaker states conformed with 

Western ideas of just war theory and the relationship of force 

to political order. Coercion at that time was a much less popular idea among Western strategists, and it can be argued that 

it would not have been politically sustainable in Western-style 

democracies. Certainly, a policy by which the United States 

forces other countries into compliance (even its former superpower competitor, the Soviet Union) through the threat of a 

nuclear attack would neither have been conducive to strategic 

stability, nor would it have been a good fit for an internation47 Echevarria, Toward an American Way of War, 2.
90 christopher d. yung

al order the United States was trying to build following the 

Second World War. This international order was based on international law, human rights, equality of nations, and an international economic system that allowed any state to succeed 

or fail based on individual national effort. Since the early years 

of the Cold War, deterrence—either conventional or nuclear

—has taken up a central position in Western defense policy. 

Coercion occupies a second-rung position and is often seen as 

a last resort, if at all, when other nonkinetic options have failed.

From the Western perspective, then, the primary political use of the military is to either defeat the enemy adversary 

(a military objective that supports a political one) or to deter 

aggression. Philosophically, the West has problems justifying 

that an important purpose for the use of force by a country is 

to coerce other countries into compliance, or at least to do so 

and remain consistent with the Western theory of just war. Examples where the United States has used force coercively (e.g., 

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom) have taken 

place under conditions in which the United States has been 

attacked first, or in which the target country was perceived 

to pose an extraordinary threat to the national security of the 

country. 

Returning to the Chinese concept of power and its uses, 

the Chinese have no similar scruples about the purpose of the 

military. If it can be argued that Clausewitz served as the philosophical underpinning for how the West thinks about strategy 

and the military, we must now turn to Sun Tzu to obtain a 

corresponding Eastern view. Scholars of Sun Tzu observe that 

he made a similar statement to that of Clausewitz regarding the 

purpose of military.48 In contrast to Clausewitz, Sun Tzu never 

claimed that the purpose of the military is to annihilate the ad48 Michael Handel, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 1991).
chapter two 91

versary’s military for the purpose of imposing one’s will on the 

other side.49 Sun Tzu argued that the military is part of a more 

comprehensive policy of security that ultimately serves the political objective of the state. “The acme of skill,” Sun Tzu writes 

in The Art of War, “is not for the General to win one hundred 

victories in one hundred battles.” He continues, “To subdue 

the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”50 This can 

be accomplished through the skillful combination of a comprehensive strategy: a mix of diplomacy, economic statecraft, 

alliance formation, and the use of the military instrument. If 

the military can best aid in this endeavor by maneuvering itself 

into a position to then threaten something that the king of an 

adversary state loves (e.g., a city or a specific territory), then the 

general has made proper use of the military instrument.51 If in 

doing so the strategist uses the military instrument to coerce 

the adversary into taking a course of action in line with one’s 

own strategic objectives, then the strategist has done well.

Culturally, the Chinese have a much wider acceptance 

of the different uses of the military. The military can be built 

up to the extent that its wei (awesomeness) deters potential 

adversaries from attacking or coercing China (e.g., counterdeterrence against the United States). The military can be used 

to attack adversaries on China’s periphery for the purposes of 

coaxing (or coercing) them into acceptance of Chinese dominance and punishing them for acting independent of Chinese 

interests (e.g., the Vietnam border clash of 1979). The military 

can seize territory of an adversary for the purposes of forcing 

them to negotiate a larger treaty defining the peace between 

China and the nation involved (e.g., the Sino-Indian border 

clash of 1962). The military can be used to bully, harass, and 

49 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 1963), 77.

50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77. 51 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77.
92 christopher d. yung

wear down smaller countries to force them into accepting Chinese negotiated terms for maritime territorial disputes (e.g., the 

South China Sea territorial disputes from the mid-1970s to the 

present). Finally, the military can ultimately be used to annihilate the army of the adversary so that the state can impose its 

will on the enemy—for example, the PLA during the Chinese 

Civil War. This discussion, as with the previous sections of this 

chapter, again illuminates an element of the strategic culture 

debate. In this case, the unique Chinese view of deterrence and 

coercion is supportive of the definition presented in the opening chapter of this book, in that a strategic culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use 

of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over 

time through a unique, protracted historical process.

Stratagem: A Chinese Way of War?

As many scholars have described, Americans indeed have a peculiar way of war that contrasts distinctly with the way the 

Chinese have pursued war during their multimillennia history. 

To start with an American point of reference, historian Russell F. Weigley, in his well-known book on the American way 

of war, describes American warfighting throughout U.S. history as a combination of strategies focusing on attrition and 

wearing down one’s opponents through battle.52 This emphasis, 

Weigley noted, led to ever-increasing lethality and firepower to 

resolve military problems, and the ability to arrive at ingenious 

engineering and technological solutions.53 This observation 

might even be extended to a Western way of war, championed 

by such scholars as Victor Davis Hanson, in which the history 

of militaries in the West are characterized by the arrival of new 

52 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 

Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960). 53 Weigley, The American Way of War. Gen Ulysses S. Grant’s campaigns during the 

latter part of the Civil War immediately come to mind.
chapter two 93

technologies, a mastery of logistics, and a period of adaptation. 

As a result, strategists and military officers learn to apply new 

technologies to military problems and develop new military 

doctrine, and then strategists and heads of state apply the new 

military capabilities to strategy.54 The history of warfare in the 

Western world can be described as a dynamic pattern dominated either by offensive weapons technology or defensive weapons technology.55

Arthur Waldron, the aforementioned scholar, notes that 

Chinese strategy and military endeavors, in contrast, have neither emphasized lethality and firepower nor engineering solutions. Moreover, he notes that Chinese military history is filled 

with examples where the contestants outmaneuvered forces, 

outwitted opponents, forced negotiations on their adversaries, 

or forced an adversaries’ allies to switch sides, which dramatically changed the strategic situation. China has had its share of 

technological breakthroughs, and certainly the arrival of new 

technologies did have an effect on the battlefield and dictated 

outcomes. It is telling that China invented gunpowder in the 

ninth century CE, yet this new technological invention was not 

harnessed against China’s Mongol enemies at the time—ironically, the Mongols overthrew the Chinese dynasty only one 

century thereafter.56 Ultimately, the Chinese prefer maneuver 

over attrition to bring about a negotiated settlement instead of 

annihilation of the enemy through the introduction of some 

new weapon or technology.57

As opposed to the West, the most famous Chinese stories involving the military and warfare, Waldron notes, always 

54 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Battles in the Rise to Western Power

(New York: Random House, 2002). 

55 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society 

Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 56 Fairbank and Goldman, China, 115. 57 Arthur Waldron, “China’s Military Classics: A Book Essay,” Joint Force Quarterly, 

no. 4 (Spring 1994): 114–17. 
94 christopher d. yung

entailed stratagem and outwitting their opponent. The most 

famous such story, Luo Guanzhong’s Romance of the Three 

Kingdoms, involves the hero, Zhuge Liang (181–234 CE), frequently outwitting his opponents on and off the battlefield. 

Even in the most famous foundational story in the West, Homer’s The Iliad, in which the eventual outcome of the Trojan 

War is determined by stratagem and trickery, it needs to be 

recalled that the use of a Trojan horse still involved engineering a solution (the creation of the Trojan horse itself) and that 

the Greeks resorted to this stratagem after every other military 

option had been exhausted, including a direct assault on Troy. 

We can also see the differences between West and East in how 

the heroes are represented in these stories. In Chinese civilization the quintessential hero, Zhuge Liang, is most noted for 

his quick wit and ability to derive stratagems. In Homer’s The 

Iliad and The Odyssey, although Odysseus ultimately comes up 

with the stratagem to defeat Troy (e.g., Trojan horse), the true 

hero is Achilles, famous for his attributes of strength and skill 

in killing his enemies on the battlefield. In the end, Western 

militaries to this day strategically or tactically depend on attrition, while the Chinese are interested in stratagem—including 

pressuring enemies to negotiate.58

Waldron observes that it is logical that Chinese civilization 

should prize stratagem and the ability to generate negotiated 

solutions to strategic problems. China encompassed territory 

far too vast, involving too large a population, and including 

too many powerful states or provinces for the central power 

to resolve all of its political problems through greater lethality. 

Chinese strategists had to come up with political-military solutions; they could not bully their way to controlling such a vast 

landmass and such a large population.59 For most of its history, 

58 Waldron, “China’s Military Classics.”

59 Waldron, “China’s Military Classics,” 114–17.
chapter two 95

the Chinese central authorities had to govern an area of territory exceeding 1 million square miles.60 Therefore, logistical, 

attrition-based warfare made little sense. As military professionals know, the overextension of lines of communication and 

supply lines leads to loss of power—not a position of strength.

A de-emphasis on technological change as the driver for 

strategy also makes sense from a geostrategic point of view. If 

one simply looks at a map of China, where would the Chinese state be confronted with relentless pressure from a peer 

competitor? China’s geography makes China relatively isolated 

from Middle East rivals, particularly Iran and other major empires coming out of that region. Slavic empires did not emerge 

until much later along China’s historical time lines. China 

dominated littoral Asia, with no threats coming from Japan, 

the Korean peninsula, or the Southeast Asian kingdoms. As 

mentioned before, the single most significant and persistent 

type of external threat to Chinese states were nomadic peoples, 

some of whom did develop military technologies—the mounted archer, the crossbow—to which China had to eventually 

confront and adapt. However, it was more often the case that 

Chinese statesmen ended up using political stratagems to neutralize threats. These stratagems included paying off invading 

tribes; forming alliances with one nomadic group of peoples 

against another; merging the children, especially the daughters 

of tribal chieftains, into noble Chinese families; and, if all else 

failed, absorbing a conquering nomadic enemy into Chinese 

culture itself (e.g., the Yuan and Qing dynasties were invading peoples who ended up becoming sinicized). In essence, 

Chinese heads of state and strategists are adept at formulating 

stratagems to manage a wide range of strategic problems; they 

are not prone to immediately go to an engineering solution or 

a strategy of attrition to solve security dilemmas.

60 Waldron, “China’s Military Classics,” 114–17.
96 christopher d. yung

This preference for stratagem over engineering and technological solutions may explain, at least partially, how an advanced civilization such as China’s could, in the nineteenth 

century, fall technologically behind compared to the West. 

Some Chinese historians have observed that the Chinese state 

was so large that its energies were focused on managing a large 

and significant bureaucracy; some historians blame Confucianism, with its emphasis on hierarchical relationships as leading 

to the dulling of the Chinese drive to innovate. Moreover, 

scholars of Chinese philosophy have pointed out that the philosophical worldview in China made it less inclined to the scientific method. That is, in Chinese philosophy and cosmology, 

the Chinese did not differentiate between a subjective world in 

which we live now and an objective “other” world where truth 

resides.61 The Son of Heaven (tianzi) was sovereign of both the 

natural world and the supernatural world. In the West, by contrast, the American Judeo-Christian ethic is dominated by the 

idea of a monotheistic God who shall reveal universal truth at a 

time of their choosing. The Ancient Greeks also had a notion of 

a subjective world, and an objective world of truth as evidenced 

by Plato’s story of the cave in which humans live in ignorance 

of universal truth, and it is the philosopher’s calling to reveal 

truths to them through philosophical inquiry. These Western 

philosophical reference points contrast so deeply with Chinese 

thought that it is important to mark the points of departure.62

Interestingly, the single most significant technological surprise confronting the Chinese state was the arrival of the Western imperialist powers by the sea in the nineteenth century that 

61 Roger T. Ames, “The Confucian Worldview: Uncommon Assumptions, Common Misconceptions,” in Asian Texts, Asian Context: Encounters with Asian Philosophies and Religions, ed. David Jones and E. R. Klein (Albany: State University of 

New York Press, 2010).

62 Ames, “The Confucian Worldview.”
chapter two 97

forced the Chinese to reconsider its continentalist approach. 

The Chinese had no answer to superior seapower and a military 

capability marrying control of the sea with the ability to sustain 

expeditionary armies ashore for long periods of time. China’s 

efforts to defeat this new type of threat through political stratagem proved fruitless. In the soul-searching that came out of 

the late nineteenth century to early- and mid-twentieth century humiliation of China, Chinese thinkers were convinced 

that mastering new technologies were central to meeting future 

threats to China, along with trying out new philosophies of 

governance—including Marxism-Leninism. 

Consequently, it is the modern Chinese strategist’s common historical and cultural experience that technology is vitally important, it needs to be developed indigenously, and if 

necessary it needs to be borrowed, bought, or stolen if only to 

ensure the survival of Chinese civilization. These technologies 

that are appropriated from the West must be carefully introduced into China, for today’s Chinese, like their counterparts 

in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, recognized 

that absorbing wholesale new technologies from foreign countries posed risks to the Chinese order. It is this balance of seeing 

the need to absorb advanced technology and new innovations 

while at the same time carefully screening the absorption of 

these new ideas that the Chinese frequently add the label “with 

Chinese characteristics” to imported foreign ideas or concepts 

to reflect this reality (e.g., “socialism with Chinese characteristics”). 

A strategic culture that stresses stratagem combined with 

a judicious pursuit of advanced technologies has manifested in 

interesting ways in China. First, the Chinese have spared no 

expense or effort to borrow, buy, or steal military technology 
98 christopher d. yung

from abroad.63 The history of China’s defense modernization 

is filled with this type of behavior. The Chengdu J-20 stealth 

fighter is essentially a platform entirely lifted from the American Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. The Chinese have learned 

how to mass produce surface combatants and arm them with 

longer ranges and more lethal surface-to-surface missiles. Additionally, they have for the past six years been experimenting with and learning how to operate off of an aircraft carrier 

acquired from Ukraine and have just recently introduced an 

indigenously produced carrier. The Chinese are said to soon 

produce a large deck amphibious ship, similar to a U.S. Navy 

landing helicopter dock (LHD). Notwithstanding the Chinese 

effort to pursue advanced technology through the concerted efforts of numerous special programs and offices, these efforts appear to be part of a larger Chinese strategy to gradually nudge 

the United States out of the Asia-Pacific; the pursuit of advanced technologies is conducted in conjunction with a number of coercive activities aimed at the countries of the region 

but designed to erode American credibility. Significantly, the 

American strategic response to China’s defense modernization 

and its rise is to refocus efforts on widening the technology gap 

with China through a Third Offset Strategy and to enhance 

America’s ability to operate in a heightened threat environment 

caused by Chinese technological advances through an Air-Sea 

Battle Concept.64

It is evident that China marries defense modernization 

and the incorporation of advanced technology with its military 

63 Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman, “China’s Quest for Advanced Aviation Technologies,” in The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, ed. Richard P. Hallion et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 2012), 271–324.

64 Mackenzie Eaglen, “What Is the Third Offset Strategy?,” RealClearDefense, 15 

February 2016; and Terry S. Morris et al. “Securing Operational Access: Evolving 

the Air-Sea Battle Concept,” National Interest, 11 February 2015. 
chapter two 99

to accomplish political and strategic objectives through stratagem. If China’s intention is to ultimately dominate the region 

and it intends to do so through a gradual erosion of American 

military effectiveness, then China’s force-structure development will be designed to do just that. Through a steady and 

persistent development of Chinese military capabilities, coupled with the closing of the technology gap with the United 

States, the Chinese are sending a strong signal to the United 

States, its allies, and other countries of the region that they are 

here to stay, U.S. military technology superiority is waning, 

China will soon be in a position to keep the United States from 

intervening in the region, and the region will be left with a 

dominant Chinese military. The message China is sending is 

that it is better to align with China now before it is too late. Finally, this discussion on stratagem as representative of Chinese 

strategic culture highlights one of the definitions presented at 

the beginning of this book. That is, this case in particular defines strategic culture as a state or nonstate actor’s shared beliefs 

and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and 

narratives, which shapes the ends and means for achieving national security objectives. 

Conclusion

This survey of Chinese strategic and cultural history illustrates 

that China’s long and complicated history does not lend itself easily to broad generalizations about Chinese strategic behavior. In fact, China’s extensive and lengthy experience with 

military and strategic issues provides opportunities for analysts 

on either side of a debate about China’s future strategic trajectory to pick and choose what they want from history. At the 

same time, it must not be forgotten that the Chinese political 

leadership is unalterably marked by the fact that they live in a 

Leninist authoritarian system, and their most recent experience 

with war and conflict came about as a Communist polity. It 
100 christopher d. yung

cannot be denied that the Communist experience and the historical experiences associated with fighting the Chinese Civil 

War, the War of Resistance against Japan, the Korean conflict, 

and the Cold War had an indelible impact on Chinese strategic 

thinking. Beyond this observation, it is safe to say, however, 

that watching China’s strategic behavior throughout its history 

has revealed a few patterns. First, the Chinese fervently believe 

that their strategic culture is defensive, even though Chinese 

history does not consistently support this view. The Chinese 

are not shy to use force if the use of force is designed to defend 

the state, or even to shape conditions enhancing the defense of 

the state. Second, the use of force within China has not always 

remained controlled and limited; sometimes the number of 

battlefield deaths in China’s wars has numbered in the millions. 

This tendency to see their actions as defensive, while being 

oblivious to the fact that others see their actions as aggressive, 

is illustrated by some of the actions recently undertaken by the 

Chinese in the South China Sea. Chinese island reclamation, 

militarizing the islets China controls in the area through the 

construction of airfields and ports, emplacing radar and surfaceto-air missiles on these islets, harassing foreign fishermen, and 

increasing patrols in the area are but a few select examples of 

this dynamic. 

There is also a geographic component to how the Chinese 

view strategy. For most of its history, China has had to worry 

more about security threats emanating from within the Asian 

continent, and not from the Asian littorals. This created a continentalist mind-set that had Chinese emperors fixated on the 

problem of managing threats from along China’s steppes, which 

downplayed the significance of threats from the maritime domain. This strongly suggests that despite the Communist experience, the Chinese historical experience with its geography 

has made a significant impression on the Chinese perspective 

about how they think about security. Such a continentalist at-
chapter two 101

titude only required changing when the British appeared from 

the sea and initiated a century and a half of humiliation for 

China. In adjusting to the shock of that threat coming from 

the sea, it can certainly be argued that the Chinese response, including the development of a modern navy and the pursuit of 

modern technology to ensure China’s military would never be 

outgunned again by any foreign invader, reflects the beginning 

of a departure from a continentalist mentality.

While it is probably unlikely that China wants a formal 

tributary system requiring that modern vassal states pay homage to China, a good argument can be made that China does 

desire a hierarchical international relations structure in the 

Asia-Pacific. That hierarchy, of course, would involve China 

on the top with the other countries of the region below. China 

most likely aspires to dominate the region so convincingly that 

the leaders of the countries in the region dare not make decisions that would draw Beijing’s ire. It goes without saying that, 

in this vision, the United States would have little influence or 

presence in the region. 

One need only look at Chinese nuclear doctrine to conclude that China has a different perspective with regard to 

certain strategic concepts, such as deterrence. Its “no first use” 

declaratory doctrine as well as its reliance on a secure second 

strike with intercontinental ballistic missiles numbered only 

in the hundreds (as compared with the thousands of missiles 

possessed by the United States and Russia) suggest a strategic 

calculus quite different than that of either the United States 

or Russia during the Cold War. Additionally, China’s employment of its conventional forces—part shows of force to elicit 

a deterrent effect, part coercive to prompt rivals to the negotiating table—strongly suggests that the Chinese have much 

wider latitude than many other countries on the state’s use of 

the military as an instrument of policy.

Finally, Chinese force structure development and PLA 
102 christopher d. yung

modernization appear to reflect a strategic outlook that combines both the pursuit of advanced technology (either through 

acquisitions from abroad or through indigenous efforts) with 

stratagems designed to generate substantial political effects favoring Chinese political objectives. Accordingly, we can conclude that the modernization efforts of the last two decades are 

designed to close the technological and capability gap between 

the two powers. The ultimate objective is to nudge the strategic 

environment toward a gradual departure of the United States 

from the region to a China dominating the region politically, 

economically, and militarily.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, strategic culture 

cannot be used as a predictor of precise strategic and military 

decisions of a state. As Gray noted, there are too many factors 

going into a specific decision to be able to generalize that a 

certain historical event in a civilization’s past is the exact cause 

of that decision. Strategic culture, however, can provide useful 

context in which we can understand the perception of decision 

makers as they review a variety of strategic options. Therefore, 

the fact that for most of China’s history its leaders have had 

much more to worry about from continental threats than maritime ones does not preclude China from developing a blue 

water navy and a power projection capability; at the same time, 

a continentalist mind-set would help explain China’s behavior 

over the past few decades. Why no full-fledged overseas military bases? Why the peculiar name of People’s Liberation Army 

Navy? Why has China’s military organization, until now, been 

structured on geographical internal defense and not on missions abroad, despite its increasing interests abroad? Strategic 

culture will not predict what China’s leaders will choose on 

their menu of strategic options; however, it will help us to understand what their preferences have been in the past, and why, 

and those preferences could shape the choices they pick in the 

future.
103

Chapter

3

Does Afghan istan Have 

a “Strategic Culture”?

by Vern Liebl

Pull out your swords and slay anyone that says 

Pashtun and Afghan are not one! Arabs know 

this and so do Romans; Afghans are Pashtuns, 

Pashtuns are Afghans! 1

In a recent publication, Ashley J. Tellis wrote, “All states arguably have unique strategic cultures, which invariably shape 

their political behaviors. The accumulation and use of national 

power, including material military capabilities, are constantly 

shaped by historical and social context.”2

 This is a fairly clearcut statement, yet one has to wonder if the author ever really 

looked at Afghanistan. However, the purpose of this chapter 

1

 Pashtun warrior poet and scholar, chief of the Khattaks, who died in 1698. Extract from Khushal Khan Khattak, “Passion of the Afghan,” in Afghan Poetry of 

the 17th Century: Selections from the Poems of Khushal Khan Khattak, trans. C. E. 

Biddulph (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1890). Today, the Khattak tribe, 

with nearly 3 million members, spans the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

They are part of the larger Kakai Karlanri confederacy.

2

 Ashley J. Tellis, “Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific,” in Strategic Asia 2016–17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Michael 

Wills et al. (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research).
104 vern liebl

is not to address the academic definition of strategic culture, 

as one can refer to Stuart Poore’s 2003 article exploring the 

debate between Colin S. Gray and Alastair Iain Johnston.3

 This 

is more about how a people—in particular, those who we refer 

to as Afghans, and who are certainly not a homogeneous ethnic 

or linguistic grouping of people—view themselves through the 

nation-state context or through the strategic culture lens. Indeed, the Afghans do not consider themselves as a homogenous 

ethnic or linguistic group, but by taking this into account as we 

compare their experience with what we expect of nation-states, 

we can gain a better understanding of a country that has defied Western categorizations for most of its history, as Khushal 

Khan Khattak indicated above.4

Is Afghanistan a State?

Before exploring whether Afghanistan has a strategic culture—

and if it does, what it may look like—there needs to be at least 

a brief exploration of whether Afghanistan can be considered a 

state, a nation, or possibly neither. Clearly, if the definition of 

state is explained as an entity that concerns all institutions and 

laws that organizes the public life of a group of people within 

a given territorial boundary (however elastic and temporary it 

may be in a political and historical sense), then it is a state in 

that meaning. Therefore, the next query concerns nationhood. 

3

 Stuart Poore, “What Is the Context?: A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on 

Strategic Culture,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (April 2003): 279–84, 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503002791.

4

 There have been some efforts to categorize Afghanistan; for three examples, see 

Shahmahmood Miakhel, “The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali 

in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance,” in Challenges and Dilemmas of State-building in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Kabul, ed. Arpita Basu 

Roy (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008), 97–110; Jennifer Keister, “The Illusion of 

Chaos: Why Ungoverned Spaces Aren’t Ungoverned, and Why that Matters,” Cato 

Institute Policy Analysis, no. 766, 9 December 2014; and Elliott Averett, “Lines in 

the Sand: The Strategic Culture in the Afghan Taliban,” Midwest Journal of Undergraduate Research, no. 6 (2016): 94–119.
chapter three 105

Is Afghanistan a nation? Usually nation and state are used synonymously, as nation-state describing a single cohesive entity. 

In reality, the term nation can actually be described as something similar to an ethnic group that gives political meaning to 

their aggregate identity. Still, the very definition of the word 

nation does not actually clarify the situation. Nation, from the 

Latin natio—people, tribe, kin, genus, class, flock—is a social 

concept most commonly used to designate larger groups or 

collections of people with common characteristics attributed 

to them, including language, traditions, customs, habits, and 

ethnicity. With this definition, a community of people with 

a similar language, habits, and ethnicity can be a nation. In 

other words, Afghanistan clearly has several different nations—

Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and more. So, Afghanistan 

may be termed a nation of nations. 

As a pragmatic principle, when examining Kosovo, China, and Brazil in the other chapters of this book, they tend to 

possess one national identity and one language despite ethnic 

diversity. However, in reality, there are exceptions, such as the 

ethnic divisions within the same linguistic grouping like the 

Serbo-Croats, as a contrarian example. Unlike in some other 

countries with significant minorities or increasing numbers of 

immigrants, the overwhelming majority of the people in the 

three named countries are ethnically and/or culturally alike 

with a reasonably uniform cultural narrative. It is therefore relatively easy to examine what is or may be the strategic culture 

of such states. 

Ethnicity and Identity as Factors

Afghanistan, despite Western presumptions, is not dominated by one ethnic group.5

 In fact, just looking at the current 

5

 For a recent exploration of this topic, see Whitney Azoy, “Post-Buffer Afghanistan: A Nation-State Here to Stay?,” in Afghanistan, 1979–2009: In the Grip of 

Conflict (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2009), 14 –16. 
106 vern liebl

Afghan national anthem is quite illustrative as to the ethnic 

complexities of Afghanistan:

This land is Afghanistan—It is the pride of every Afghan 

The land of peace, the land of the sword—Its sons are 

all brave 

This is the country of every tribe—Land of Baluch, and 

Uzbeks 

Pashtoons, and Hazaras—Turkman and Tajiks with 

them, 

Arabs and Gojars, Pamirian, Nooristanis

Barahawi, and Qizilbash—Also Aimaq, and Pashaye 

This Land will shine for ever—Like the sun in the blue 

sky 

In the chest of Asia—It will remain as the heart for ever 

We will follow the one God

We all say, Allah is great, we all say, Allah is great 6

And they all claim to be Afghans. So it can be described 

as a nation, even if the 14 ethnicities identified in the national anthem, and the other even smaller groups not mentioned, 

maintain their own specific cultural narratives. This suggests 

that some form of strategic culture exists in that it remains one 

state despite its multitude of identities and 38 years of conflict. The nearly four decades of fighting began in December 

1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The 10-year-long 

Soviet intervention (it clearly was not an occupation as Soviet 

troops did not physically occupy most of the country but did 

devastate large portions by air attacks) ended in 1989. It gave 

way to the Warlord Era (1989–96), followed by the Afghan 

Civil War/Taliban era (1996–2001), and then the U.S. intervention/Kabul government period (2001–present). 

6

 Adopted in 2006, the anthem is called the “Surud-e Milli” in Dari and “Milli 

Surood” in Pashto.
chapter three 107

Despite possessing numerous potential catalysts for division and secession, there has been no major separatist movement to remove one or more ethnic groups from Afghanistan 

to join with any of the surrounding states, namely Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (map 1).7

7

 In 2004, the author was told a story while in Afghanistan that, when Afghans 

were polled in late 2003 about the future of Afghanistan, not one of the 300 

responses advocated breaking it up by ethnicity or language. There is no “reliable 

source” for this information, but it was frequently repeated within the Combined 

Joint Task Force 180 headquarters in Bagram as well as in the subsequent Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan headquarters, specifically among civil affairs 

and intelligence personnel.

Map 1

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, adapted by MCU Press
108 vern liebl

Unhelpful as Neighbors

Two groups provide some support to separatist movements in 

other countries, one comprised of a small number of Pamiris in 

Badakhshan (mainly in the Wakhan Corridor area), who support the majority Pamiris of Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous 

oblast, a mountainous region in eastern Tajikistan.8

 The other 

ethnic group are the Baloch of southern Afghanistan, some of 

whom support their ethnic relatives in Pakistan and Iran in 

their conflict with those respective governments.9

 In the 1930s, 

there was an expatriate group of Turkmen and Uzbeks who 

supported the Basmachi Revolt in Central Asia against the Soviets, but that essentially died out due to thorough defeat in 

Central Asia, with most of the expatriates moving on to Turkey 

in the 1940s and 1950s. In none of the above instances was 

there any effort to divide Afghanistan; rather, their goals tended to involve attempts to fragment neighboring countries. 

However, there are the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group 

within Afghanistan (see map 1), some of whom could be described as irredentists. This means that they would like to see 

portions of modern Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns restored to 

Afghanistan. There are some problems with this.

The Pashtuns of Afghanistan supposedly number around 

13 million, although the last census was conducted in 1979 

when a total of 15.5 million inhabitants of all ethnicities were 

counted. Today, the number of inhabitants in Afghanistan is 

8

 The majority of Pamiris in the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous oblast are Ismaili 

Muslims (or Nizari Sevener Shia) and are being supported in their very low-level 

insurgency by the Aga Khan Foundation, a charity not known for links to any 

insurgencies.

9

 In Iran, this support is often given to Jaish al-Adl (or Army of Justice) and/

or Harakat Ansar Iran (or Partisan Movement of Iran). In Pakistan, this Afghan 

Baloch support is given to multiple organizations; the Baloch National Front (a 

political umbrella organization) and/or the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), based 

both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Interestingly, Pakistan and the United Kingdom 

have declared the BLA a terrorist organization, but the European Union, India, 

and the United States have not declared it as such.
chapter three 109

estimated at between 29 and 36 million, which allows for the 

increase in Afghan Pashtuns. Or, if one estimates the proportion of Pashtuns at approximately 42 percent, extrapolating 

from the 1979 census and applying that to 2017 population 

figures, that gives the current estimate of 13 million Pashtuns.10

The irredentist theme results from the many Afghan Pashtuns 

who would like to reincorporate their Pakistani Pashtun brethren into Afghanistan. Pashtuns in Pakistan comprise almost 

16 percent of the population, or approximately 31 million 

Pashtuns.11 To date, there has been no groundswell of support 

among Pashtuns in Pakistan for joining with their Afghan 

brethren to form “Pashtunistan”—an old concept that includes 

vast areas where Pashtuns have not historically lived, such as all 

of Balochistan, much of the Hazarajat, and extensive Tajik-inhabited areas. Basically, this is an advocacy by Afghan Pashtuns 

to enlarge Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan.

The Near-Abroad Pashtuns 12

Some “Pakistani Pashtuns” provide support to Afghanistanbased insurgent groups, such as the Taliban, and some Pakistanbased Pashtun tribes are trying to supplant Afghanistan-based 

Pashtun (or Baloch) tribes by physically displacing them. The 

primary example would be the Kakar tribe of the Gurghusht 

tribal confederation. The Gurghusht, who occupy Pakistan’s 

western border region of the Balochistan Province, have 

worked to physically and violently replace the Alikozai tribe 

of the Durrani tribal confederation, out of Sangin District in 

10 Although, the 2015 CIA World Factbook holds the Afghanistan Pashtun population at 10.75 million.

11 This number comes from the 2012 CIA World Factbook; accurately counting 

Pashtuns in either country is difficult at best.

12 Pashtuns living in Pakistan refer to themselves as Afghans. It is the rare Pashtun 

who identifies as a Pakistani, which for almost all Pashtuns indicates a Punjabi, 

which is an insulting term.
110 vern liebl

Afghanistan’s Helmand Province.13 This entire effort is camouflaged by the Taliban conflict in southern Afghanistan, abetted by the struggle to control the opium trafficking network. 

However, the Kakar-Alikozai struggle cannot be classified as 

an irredentist movement or a separatist movement, as it is an 

intraethnic or intranational tribal war.

If the surrounding neighbors of Afghanistan are examined 

(even including the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan), one would find 

little, if any, evidence of irredentist desire to divide Afghanistan 

by either ethnic division or absorption of “kindred” ethnicities. 

Pakistan loudly declaims it wants no territory or peoples of 

Afghanistan.14 Apparently the thought of more Pashtuns is unpalatable at best, and Pakistan wants to formalize the Durand 

Line as a permanent border versus a frontier.15 For the peoples 

of western India, the Pashtuns represented the diabolical “other” and were the nightmares of many Hindu and Sikh Punjabi children for centuries—on the Hindu Kush mountains of 

Afghanistan, the name is believed to be Persian for “killer of 

Hindus.” 

The people of Iran do not want to recover any part of Afghanistan lost to the Pashtuns. Despite some cultural affinity 

with the Farsiwan (or Persian speakers) of western Afghanistan, 

13 The author discovered this while working in Afghanistan, as he was the officer in 

charge of the Joint Document Exploitation Cell. Numerous captured documents 

from southeastern Afghanistan indicated this intratribal conflict and the drive to 

dispossess the Alikozai out of Sangin (Sangeen) by the Kakar tribe. 

14 Anatol Lieven, “Afghanistan: What Pakistan Wants,” New York Review of Books, 

15 July 2013.

15 The Durand Line is the 2,640-kilometer (1,640-mile) border between Afghanistan and Pakistan created by an agreement between Sir Mortimer Durand, secretary of the British Indian government, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the emir of 

Afghanistan, which was signed on 12 November 1893. It has served as the official 

border between the two nations for more than 100 years, but has been the source 

of much controversy because, when the Durand Line was created, Pakistan was 

still a part of India, which was controlled by the United Kingdom from 1858 until 

India’s independence in 1947. Pakistan also became a nation in 1947.
chapter three 111

Iran has no desire to fight over Herat, as it has been ruled largely by Pashtuns since the early 1700s. Linguistically linked to 

both the Aimaq, the Tajiks, and even the Hazara, the Persians 

are ethnically distinct from all three groups.16 Even the nearwar of 1998 between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and 

Iran was provoked by the Taliban murder of Iranian diplomatic 

personnel, not over issues of land or ethnic irredentism.

Afghanistan’s northern neighbors—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—have no designs or desires for any Afghan territory. Those ethnic minorities in Afghanistan show no 

interest at all in seceding from Afghanistan and joining with 

those countries. For example, Uzbekistan has shown a willingness to host, in small numbers over the past few decades, 

Afghan Uzbek refugees, but they also have displayed an equal 

willingness to encourage the return of those refugees back to 

Afghanistan as soon as possible.17 Most of the Uzbek in Afghanistan are descended from refugees who fled Soviet forces 

in the 1920s and 1930s, having drifted apart from the remaining Uzbeks who survived the ministrations of Sovietization. 

All three named countries are far more concerned with their 

own internal security, meaning insurgent and separatist groups, 

than with Afghanistan.18

In sum, to all five of the above countries, there are no 

irredentist claims on Afghanistan and there are no ethnic rebellions to be fomented, the Kakar tribal invasion notwith16 All three ethnic groups speak closely related varieties of modern Persian, which 

is Farsi. The Tajiks of Afghanistan number approximately 11 million, the Hazara 

number approximately 6 million, and the Aimaq number approximately 1 million. 

The Persians of Iran openly discriminate against all three groups if they reside in 

Iran, especially the Hazara and the Aimaq, who often look Mongolic.

17 Gabriel Dominguez, “Why Central Asia Is Increasingly Worried about Afghanistan,” DW, 4 November 2015.

18 For a good examination of the relations between Afghanistan and the Central 

Asian republics, see Christian Bleuer and S. Reza Kazemi, Between Co-operation 

and Insulation: Afghanistan’s Relations with the Central Asian Republics (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Analysts Networks, 2014).
112 vern liebl

standing. Additionally, none of the surrounding countries see 

any economic or strategic payoff even if they had designs to 

invade, occupy, or partition Afghanistan (map 2).

Looking at Afghanistan, there is opportunity for division, 

or to find support to weaken or divide the country into fragments. Pakistan is not at all shy in trying to manipulate Pashtun tribal factions to target an ethnicity or even incite sectarian 

strife in an effort to keep Afghanistan weak and divided. Pakistan uses these techniques to mitigate the historical threat of 

Afghan invasion and incursion eastward across the Indus River. 

Pakistan is trying to manage what it sees as not a military threat 

but more of a tribal (divisiveness) and social stability (crimiMap 2

U.S. Army, adapted by MCU Press
chapter three 113

nality) security issue, and it is also engaged in a proxy conflict 

against India within Afghanistan. India supports Afghanistan 

precisely as a counterweight to Pakistan, diplomatically and 

economically where possible, and covertly via intelligence and 

support to anti-Pakistani insurgent organizations (e.g., the Baloch Liberation Army or BLA).

Yet, Afghanistan, as a case study for strategic culture, does 

provide insight into the concept and how to apply it to a place 

or places that seem unlikely to have strategic culture. By looking at Afghanistan’s history, there are historical and cultural 

patterns that can aid military advisors, analysts, and civilian 

scholars to better understand those places that do not seem to 

fit the definitive categories of strategic culture. 

Afghanistan’s Historical and Cultural Context

The region that is now Afghanistan has been a part of the history of kingdoms and empires, very often divided among several. 

Due to its location, it has often been a crossroads as well, seeing 

conquering or defeated foreign armies usually moving east or 

west, usually committing widespread depredations in passing. 

But by the middle of the seventeenth century, something was 

achieved that marked the beginning of what we might call the 

modern world system, leading inadvertently to conditions that 

would help create an identifiable state of Afghanistan. This 

would also allow for an unexpected and disproportionate role 

for Afghans on the world stage. 

Mercantile-based Imperial Era

This modern world system of the mid-seventeenth century was 

marked specifically by the creation of economic networks. The 

Dutch Republic (Republic of the United Netherlands), headquartered out of Amsterdam and building on the earlier efforts of the Spanish and Portuguese, managed to incorporate 

local and regional trade linkages into what history has come 
114 vern liebl

to recognize as the first global hegemonic power of the “capitalist” world economy.19 This was a prodigious and rare feat in 

world history subsequently achieved later only by Great Britain 

and the United States.20 The Dutch traded through a series of 

corporations, via outposts and factories in such places as Recife, Brazil, in New Amsterdam (which became New York), 

and dozens of other locations. The largest corporation was the 

Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or the Dutch East Indies 

Company, normally identified as the VOC.21 The VOC controlled the most profitable portion of this new global economic 

entity, and a huge portion of that profit came out of trade with 

the Safavid Empire in Persia, which traded for, or more usually 

bought European goods, paying in silver.22 The Safavid Empire forces occupied as colonial territory most of what today 

would be referred to as southern and eastern Afghanistan, an 

area populated by Pashtuns.

In 1721, the Hotaki Pashtuns in that Safavid-ruled region 

rose in rebellion. By 1722, the Hotakis had not only freed 

themselves but had essentially driven the Safavid Empire out 

of existence except for some dynastic fragments who never re19 It was neither truly a free market à la Adam Smith nor was it truly mercantilist, 

but it demonstrated characteristics that presaged modern capitalism. 

20 Jeffrey R. Macris and Saul Kelly, eds., Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and 

the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 16. 21 A factory, from the Latin “to do,” was an establishment for factors (Latin—

“doer”) engaged in the selling and receiving of goods on commission, usually transacting business without disclosing their principal. Typically located for safety and 

access, these could be called trading posts and were, in South Asia, often precursors to colonial expansion. In South Asia, the initial factories were established 

by the Portuguese (feitoria) in the fifteenth century, ultimately being displaced 

by the Dutch (factorij), the French (factorerie), and mostly by the English, except around Goa. Factories served simultaneously as market, warehouse, customs 

post, defense, support to navigation or exploration, and as the de facto headquarters or government of local communities. For more, see James D. Tracy, ed., The 

Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), https://doi.org/10.1017

/CBO9780511665288.

22 Macris and Kelly, Imperial Crossroads, 17–18.
chapter three 115

gained significant power or stature before being swept from 

history a few years later. This explosion of “Afghans” from the 

region of Kandahar, completely unforeseen, destroyed the economy of Safavid Persia, which immediately stopped trade with 

the VOC. The unforeseen loss of silver income sent a severe 

shock through the company. By 1725, the VOC was forced 

to retrench its economic and political networks, withdrawing 

from the Persian Gulf. It reconsolidated in a much-reduced 

structure in what would become known as the Dutch Nederlands Oost-Indie, or the Netherlands East Indies, basically ceding the western Indian Ocean to a new and upcoming trading 

power, the British joint-stock East India Company (or EIC). 

By the early 1760s, the EIC was making astounding economic and political inroads into the Indian subcontinent territory. The EIC was freed from any serious competition from the 

Dutch, and the EIC was not seriously hindered by the French 

in the Indian Ocean during the global Seven Years’ War of 

1756–63. The major limiting factors for the EIC at this time 

were the Moghul Empire, a declining but still powerful entity, 

as well as the rising Maratha Empire. 

Yet, the impact of Afghans again changed everything. The 

Hotaki Afghans had been defeated by the Persian Afsharid Empire in 1738. The Afshari, with the death of Nader Shah in 

1747, were then subsumed by a new Pashtun “explosion,” this 

time called the Abdali, who renamed themselves the Durrani.23 By 1750, Persia was conquered by the Durrani, who then 

repeatedly invaded India. By 1767, the Durrani forces had essentially destroyed the declining Moghul Empire, whose rem23 The 1747 Pashtun revolt against Nader Shah was led by an Abdali tribal leader, 

who was the captain of Nader Shah’s bodyguard, Abdul Khan. He assumed power 

as the emir of the Abdali, which he achieved by stealing the now dead Nader Shah’s 

mobile treasury and spreading it among the other Abdali tribal leaders. He then 

changed his name to Padshah durr-I durran, meaning “King, pearl of the age.” The 

Abdali tribal confederacy was thus renamed the Durrani.
116 vern liebl

nants would later be completely swept away by Britain in the 

wake of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. The rising Maratha Empire 

was brutally cudgeled into impotence with its remnants to be 

protected by the British Raj after 1818, for British economic and imperial benefit.24 These Durrani-led Afghan invasions 

and extensive destruction gave the EIC, and also the rising 

British imperial forces, a much stronger hand to act against 

greatly weakened regional powers throughout South Asia and 

ultimately drove others, such as the Sikhs, Rajputs, Punjabis, 

Baloch, and Sindhis, into the arms of the British as imperial 

volunteers or as allied princely state military forces.

The Durrani Afghans, through a series of vicious and 

self-destructive dynastic succession struggles, greatly weakened 

the western geographic part of the Indian subcontinent, allowing for extensive EIC and British imperial penetration. This 

British expansion also attracted imperial Russian interest visà-vis British interests in Afghanistan, especially security from 

Pashtun invasion or raiding and as an imperial buffer zone, as 

well as resurgent Persian Qajar interest in the Herat region. 25

By the early 1800s, the area today called Afghanistan was vital 

to the British as an area that no one else controlled to better 

secure the British Raj of the Indian subcontinent.

24 The Marathas were a Hindu warrior group originally from the Deccan Plateau, 

who in the mid-seventeenth century revolted from the Muslim Mughal Empire. 

They managed to establish a Hindavi Swarajya (an area of Hindu self-governance) 

in former Mughal lands. It was the Mughal-Maratha Wars of 1680–1707 that, 

in conjunction with the religious excesses of Mughal emperor Aurengzeb (ruled 

1659–1707), was the main cause for the decline of the Mughals. The Durrani 

victory in 1761 over the Marathas at the Third Battle of Panipat (approximately 

95,000 Maratha dead) checked forever Maratha expansion.

25 The Qajars were a Persian dynasty of Turkic origin who reclaimed eastern Persia from the Durrani Afghans and united it with western Persian (being ruled by 

the Lurish Zand dynasty from 1751–96). They ruled Persia from 1789 to 1925. 

It was the Qajars who provoked the Anglo-Persian War of 1856 over Herat, the 

British preventing Qajar repossession of Herat and making it a permanent part of 

Afghanistan. For more, see Abbas Amanat, The Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din 

Shah and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896, rev. ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008).
chapter three 117

Imperial Competition

This series of events initiated what became known as the “Great 

Game.”26 It can best be described as an imperial geopolitical 

contest primarily between Britain and Russia, but with other 

minor players, such as the previously mentioned Qajar and on 

occasion the French, Ottomans, and Chinese. Afghanistan was 

the main locus of this long rivalry, initiated by competition in 

Central Asia bringing expansion of the Russian Empire and the 

concomitant destruction of the Khiva and Bukhara Emirates 

by the Russians. This Russian expansion and British failure to 

succor the emirates brought the Russians to the inchoate frontiers of the British protectorate of Afghanistan. This presence, 

along with Russian diplomatic ventures into British India and 

suggested hints at support of the Afghan emir, induced Britain 

to adopt a forward defense posture in Afghanistan. Subsequent 

British and Russian machinations in the Persian Gulf, involving the Persian Qajars over the issue of Herat, ultimately led 

to further British intrusion into the littoral areas of the Persian 

Gulf. Likewise, Russian, French, and Ottoman competition 

in Jerusalem provided flammable tender for the Crimean War 

of 1853–56 in the distant Black Sea, where Britain felt obligated to aid the Ottomans and French specifically because 

of the Russian-British rivalry over Afghanistan. Completely 

26 The Great Game is a term historians use to refer to a period of conflict and 

maneuver throughout Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan beginning in 

1930 and not ending until the 1920s. The primary players were Great Britain and 

Russia. For more, see Martin Ewans et al., The Great Game: Britain and Russia 

in Central Asia, vol. 1, Documents (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Martin 

Ewans, Securing the Indian Frontier in Central Asia: Confrontation and Negotiation, 

1865–1895 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2010); The Imperial Gazetteer of India: 

The Indian Empire, vol. IV, Administrative (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), xxx, 

552; Sneh Mahajan, British Foreign Policy, 1874–1914: The Role of India (London: 

Routledge, 2001);  Gerald Morgan, “Myth and Reality in the Great Game,” Asian 

Affairs 4, no. 1 (1973): 55–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068377308729652; 

and Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810–1895 (London: 

Routledge, 1981).
118 vern liebl

aside from the political machinations, and from a personal level, Afghanistan was accepted by Britain as the place where an 

Englishman could prove his manhood in the Victorian era of 

Rudyard Kipling.27 Afghanistan became a locus of romantic 

danger, not a “state” feared as an invader.

Following the First World War, Afghanistan temporarily 

slipped from the global stage, although Turkish efforts to create 

a regional ally provided a stabilizing influence to the kingdom 

as it roiled with Soviet jockeying along its northern frontier 

(the previously mentioned Basmachi Revolt, the flight of refugee Uzbeks into Afghanistan, and the occasional Soviet “hot 

pursuit”) and several internal Pashtun rebellions (antimodernization uprisings). The era of imperial powers jockeying 

for control over present-day Afghanistan ended in the early 

1920s, when the newly ascendant Soviets drove the British 

(and French) from the Caucasus, of which one side effect was 

to finally delineate the northern borders of the kingdom of Afghanistan.28

In Afghanistan, a Tajik briefly supplanted the Barakzai 

Durrani Pashtuns in 1929, but Pashtun political dominance 

27 Rudyard Kipling’s poem “Arithmetic on the Frontier” is a good literary example 

of this. That it was fully reciprocated by Pashtuns can best be seen in T. L. Pennell, 

Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier: A Record of Sixteen Years’ Close Intercourse with the Natives of the Indian Marches (London: Seeley, 1909). 28 Afghanistan invaded British India in May 1919, quickly being repelled by a depleted Indian Army, primarily via the use of British airpower. This is known as the 

Third Anglo-Afghan War. Stalemated, Afghanistan and Britain signed the Treaty 

of Rawalpindi in 1919, which recognized the independence of the Emirate of Afghanistan and removed British subsidies. In 1926, the emir, Amanullah Khan, declared himself king and Afghanistan a kingdom. Additionally, Afghanistan and the 

Soviet Union had a minor military clash over the island of Urta-Tugai in the Amu 

Darya. It was initially occupied by Soviet troops; Afghan forces attacked them and 

ultimately a treaty was signed that specifically delineated the northern frontier. See 

Sergei Borisovich Panin, “Soviet-Afghan Conflict of 1925–26 over the Island of 

Urta-Tugai,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12, no. 3 (1999): 122–33, https://

doi.org/10.1080/13518049908430405.
chapter three 119

was quickly reimposed.29 As the Second World War neared, 

Japanese and German engineers began the long effort to tame 

the Helmand River, an ongoing effort today. The Afghan government, led by King Mohammad Zahir Shah, while favoring 

the Axis, remained one of the few countries in the world that 

managed to sit out the war. Despite being neutral during the 

Second World War, Afghanistan was rife with foreign agents, 

primarily Italian for the Axis and British for the Allies, and 

occasionally prominent in Axis plans aimed at disrupting the 

British in India or, less often, aimed at disrupting the Allied 

position in Persia.

Soviet Intervention and Aftermath

Post–Second World War Afghanistan under King Zahir Shah 

began an intensive program aimed at modernizing the country, an effort that grew increasingly unpopular among much of 

the populace. The king’s prime minister, Muhammad Daoud 

Khan, who was also his cousin, became the prime motivating 

agent behind the modernization efforts. It was Daoud who requested assistance from both the United States and the Soviet 

Union, beginning a foreign aid race over Afghanistan by both 

powers. Daoud overthrew his cousin, the king, in 1973, dissatisfied with the slow pace of modernization the king wanted 

and invited greater Soviet influence in Afghanistan. It was the 

29 Habibullah Kalakani, an ethnic Persian from a small village north of Kabul. In 

1929, with the Afghan Army distracted by Pashtun discontent in Nangarhar and 

Laghman provinces, Kalakani led a minor antimodernization revolt and attacked 

Kabul from the north. Aided by a serendipitous attack against southern Kabul 

by Waziri tribesmen from Paktia, he pressured the king into abdicating to him. 

Assuming the kingship in January 1929, he ruled for nine months, working to 

erase all traces of modernization, sometimes brutally. He was overthrown by Muhammad Nadir Shah, who reasserted the Barakzai dynastic line. Hanged two weeks 

after being deposed, he was buried in an unmarked grave. In September 2016, his 

reburial by the Ghani administration became political, ultimately resulting in one 

death and four injured. The Pashtuns refer to him by his pejorative nickname, 

which is Bacha-i-Saqao, or “water carrier’s son.” 
120 vern liebl

increased influence of the Soviets in the 1960s and 1970s, the 

Saur Revolution in 1978, and then a regime change in 1979 

that led to Soviet assistance to Afghanistan with the intervention of the Soviet 40th Combined Arms Army. 

Lasting almost a decade, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, later called the Limited Contingent of Soviet ForceAfghanistan (LCSF-A), witnessed the deaths of approximately 

2 million Afghans as well as forcing approximately 7 million 

into refugee status (with more than 4 million flooding into Pakistan).30 The Soviets lost 14,500 military personnel and 55,000 

wounded before withdrawing. As imperial wars go historically, 

this was not a conflict that would seem to have been an existential threat to the Soviet Union, but it was. The Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) was vastly overcommitted globally, with more than 5.5 million servicemembers under arms.31

The Soviets had to deploy multiple military components, such 

as ground forces, navy, air force, Air Defense Forces, Strategic 

Rocket Forces, KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti 

or “Committee for State Security”) military units, and Ministry of Internal Affairs internal police forces—many deployed 

in Europe as part of Warsaw Pact forces or along the Chinese 

border in the Far East. While the approximately 115,000 soldiers of the LCSF-A do not appear to be a large draw on Soviet 

manpower requirements, this was the first significant loss suffered by the Soviet Union, one inflicted by lightly armed religious guerrillas. That this was combined with casualty numbers 

made the losses a critical fact worth noting at the time as well as 

in the present. Indeed, historians have referred to Afghanistan 

as the Soviet’s equivalent to the American intervention in Vietnam; invasion and occupation drained the Soviet economy and 

30 Marek Sliwinski, “Afghanistan: The Decimation of a People,” Orbis 33, no. 1 

(Winter 1989): 9.

31 Steven W. Popper, The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements

(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1989).
chapter three 121

has been cited as an internal weakness leading to the fall of the 

USSR.32 The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, portrayed as 

voluntary in 1989, was followed by the rejection of the USSR’s 

rule by Soviet Bloc nations. Between 1989 and 1990, nationalist movements in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, and the refusal of the Soviet 

leadership to commit military force to crush those movements, 

led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in July 1991. 

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was the last in a string 

of internal and external pressures that strained the Soviet Union 

and led to its collapse. That does not mean things suddenly became delightful for the people of Afghanistan. Withdrawal of 

a superpower also meant a loss of resources desperately needed to rebuild a completely devastated region, to reestablish a 

state structure, and to provide a safe future for Afghans of all 

ethnic groups. Pakistan extensively manipulated the internal 

situation of Afghanistan and exploited instability, ably funded 

by Islamist organizations from the Arabian Peninsula. Civil war 

exploded, adding further death and destruction. The dire situation created the conditions for the rise of a religious group, the 

Taliban, who by 1998 had assumed the status of a state called 

the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It ultimately controlled almost 90 percent of Afghanistan by 2001. 

At this juncture, Afghanistan again forcibly inserted itself 

onto the world stage. It was in Afghanistan that the terrorist 

organization al-Qaeda coordinated, funded, and selected the 

individuals who participated in the hijacked airliner attacks 

on U.S. targets on 11 September 2001. Initially stunned, the 

United States invaded Afghanistan, conflating the Afghan Taliban with the primarily Arab internationalist al-Qaeda. The 

Taliban were driven from Afghanistan by December 2001, 

32 A combined total of roughly 50,000 (15,000 dead and 35,000 wounded). Not 

included in the total are approximately 2 million Afghans dead, mostly civilian.
122 vern liebl

with most of the survivors initially fleeing to largely Pashtun 

areas of Pakistan. Since then, U.S. and other foreign military 

forces have maintained a presence in Afghanistan to suppress 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda and assure the survival of a “sort of 

democratic” Kabul-based government. As of 2019, this effort 

does not seem to be prospering with a resurgence of Taliban, 

al-Qaeda, and the creation of an even more violently extreme 

organization called Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP). 

The point of reviewing the previous roughly 300 years of 

history associated with the area we call Afghanistan today is 

to show that any assumption that this geographically isolated, 

backwater area is of little importance is a gross mistake. Afghanistan and its inhabitants should be ignored at one’s peril, 

as they have shown a propensity to reach beyond their borders—however that can be achieved—to bring death, destruction, and vast global restructurings.

Opium as a Transformative Agent

One of the major reasons for the recent prolonged resistance 

of Afghan insurgent groups and supporting foreign Islamic 

fighters and a major cause of the failure of the Kabul-based 

government is the rapid growth of opium planting, harvesting, 

and trafficking. Opium has been grown in Afghanistan for centuries, but it was a localized product, with most commercially 

marketed opium originating in India or elsewhere. During the 

Soviet occupation, Afghanistan state control diminished and 

insurgents began growing opium to finance insurgent acquisition of weapons and support—combined, these two consequences of occupation inspired a significant uptick in opium 

growth. Moreover, during civil war, with the prominence of 

local warlords and few tangible resources to barter with, opium 

growth skyrocketed. By 2000, despite an advertised Taliban antiopium campaign, opium trafficking out of Afghanistan went 

global.
chapter three 123

Today, opium farming has taken root in Afghanistan as the 

primary cash crop, and trafficking with its concurrent corruption and erosion of effective governance is an existential threat 

to the current Afghan government and possibly its tenuous 

status as a state. Moreover, these problems exacerbate threats 

to the religious and moral integrity of the Taliban. If research 

coming out of organizations such as the United Nations is correct, as of 2019, approximately 80 percent of all opium grown 

globally is sourced from Afghanistan, from which almost 90 

percent of heroin production is drawn from. To provide greater 

context, 40 percent of opium worldwide comes from Helmand 

Province alone.33 The result is millions of opium addicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia, and beyond. These 

hard facts are driving Russia and Iran to negotiate with the 

Taliban, who do not tolerate opium addicts within their ranks 

and have shown a marked ability to control the flow of opium. 

These actions simultaneously withdraw legitimacy from the 

Kabul-based Afghan government and provide the Taliban with 

political legitimacy. With a politically and militarily stronger 

Taliban, the United States decided to raise U.S. force levels in 

Afghanistan from 8,500 to possibly 14,000 or more.34

Religious versus Ethnic Narrative

Within the context discussed to this point, it only gets more 

complicated, because if the question is asked (and it is), What is 

the strategic culture of Afghanistan today?—this author would 

have to respond by asking: Which one? While the historical 

review, combined with the ethnicity puzzle has been depict33 See Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2016: Cultivation and Production (Vienna: UN 

Office on Drugs and Crime, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics, 2016). An astounding 37 percent of global opium comes from Sangin 

District in Helmand Province. 

34 See David Nakamura and Abby Phillip, “Trump Announces New Strategy for 

Afghanistan that Calls for a Troop Increase,” Washington Post, 21 August 2017.
124 vern liebl

ed by this chapter, one needs to add to this brew another key 

variable—religion. The primary religion of Afghanistan is Islam, with approximately 85 percent of the population being 

Sunni Muslim. The Shia minority is almost completely Hazara 

(see map 1), with a tiny slice of Pashtuns located in eastern 

Afghanistan (a handful of Turi tribesmen mostly in extreme 

eastern Paktia and Khost provinces). In addition, there are 

approximately 200,000 Nuristanis in Nuristan Province, approximately 10,000 Zoroastrians (followers of a pre-Islamic 

religion) in far western Afghanistan, and minute pockets of 

Hindus (about 1,000) and an unknown number of Baloch 

Zikri Muslims (a.k.a. Mahdavia). 35 It is therefore clear that, 

while Afghanistan has a main religion, most Afghans practice 

Islam in different ways and there are further conflicts with 

those who are considered outside of the mainstream religion.

The Pashtuns of Afghanistan (and Pakistan) follow an unwritten moral and ethical code that provides extensive rules 

and guidance for their behavior(s) and lifestyle(s). It has existed 

since at least the 1st millennium BCE.36 This system of law and 

governance emphasizes the personal responsibility of Pashtuns 

to continually explore its essence and meaning. It is interpreted 

as the way of the Pashtun. It is practiced widely among rural Pashtuns, which are the majority, and less so among those 

in urban areas. It has also been adopted among some nonPashtuns, generally those who live among or near Pashtuns. 

As it has been present for so long, it has and does pose a direct 

challenge to Islam, which is a complete religious ideology on 

35 Mainly of Dardic descent, they follow a variety of localized Indo-Iranian polytheistic practices and have been the subject of numerous Sunni jihads for the last 

250 years or so. The author conducted several negotiations with the Nuristanis and 

learned of the Sunni Pashtun jihadi practices in person.

36 For more, see Samir Nath, Dictionary of Vedanta (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 

2002); and Marlijn T. Houtsma et al., eds., E. J. Brill’s First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 

1913–1936, vol. IV (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1993).
chapter three 125

how to live one’s life. When Islam was introduced by way of 

war (jihad) in the late 600s, it was resisted fiercely by Pashtuns, 

who rallied around the Pashtunwali (unwritten ethical code). 

It was not until the 1100s that Islam became the major faith 

of many Pashtuns, and Islam was the single major remaining 

religion in Afghanistan only once the Mongols in the 1220s 

and then the armies of Tamerlane in the 1380s managed to exterminate Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism. Still, the struggle to convert continues in northeastern 

Afghanistan even today, aimed at the non-Pashtun Nuristani 

peoples who live adjacent to the Pashtuns. 

Today, Islam is the overwhelming religious faith of most 

Afghans, yet it conflicts in many ways with the Pashtunwali. Other ethnic groups have similar or related “codes” such as 

the Balochmayar and the Turkmenchiliki, yet almost all Afghans, even those not Pashtun, are familiar with much of the 

Pashtunwali. The treatment of Afghans versus the treatment of 

Muslims in the case of killing is one conflict (revenge versus 

no harm to fellow Muslims), as is the treatment and status of 

women (with Islam being the much more tolerant “system”). 

There are enough significant differences between the Pashtunwali and the religion of Islam to create cultural confusion, 

which can be exploited and calls into question which strategic 

culture (or narrative) one should consider when operating in 

Afghanistan. 

These religious differences have noticeable impact, depending on what the individual Afghan chooses to identify 

with. If an Afghan wants to identify with a specific ethnicity, 

that would presuppose an increasing awareness of the Pashtun plurality working hard for “Pashtunization” of all Afghans, 

something underway since Emir Abdur Rahman Khan’s rule 

in 1880–1901, which saw the slaughter of more than 50 percent of the Hazara population then. Despite an acceptance by 

all ethnic groups within Afghanistan, the Pashtunization effort 
126 vern liebl

has not been notably successful when separate from genocidal 

methods of rule (something the Taliban would like to bring 

back) as the language of governance is still Dari (a close variant 

of Farsi spoken mainly by Tajiks). 

If an Afghan chooses an identity based on religion, that 

presents several options as most Afghans are illiterate and depend on illiterate or semiliterate mullahs (religious leaders) for 

their guidance. There are essentially two options for a religious 

Sunni Afghan: one is Salafism, which can lead to the preoccupation with preventing taghut so as not to upset religious 

leaders or rulers, dissatisfaction with the government, and a 

trend toward the Taliban (or more recently toward IS-KP). Alternatively, Sunni Afghans can also pursue the influence and 

moderation that is espoused by Sufism and its practices. All of 

this is a gross simplification, but it needs to be noted.37

Informal Security-based Institutions

Considering several factors to this point—Afghanistan’s long 

history, the role of opium, and religious and ethnic differences

—it is clear that Afghanistan might be a state but not a unified 

state. Therefore, an Afghan as an individual is a composite of 

several identities based on ethnicity, tribal affiliation, religion 

or sect membership, and region. Afghanistan, or the region we 

recognize as Afghanistan today, has traditionally not been under centralized control but under extremely devolved, or decentralized, rule.

37 Taghut is an Arabic term for the following: the three-letter Arabic verbal root of 

ط-غ-ت T-G-T, which means to “cross the limits, overstep boundaries” or “to rebel.” 

From this, taghut denotes one who exceeds their limits. This notion is associated 

with the three stages of disbelief in the Islamic context. The first stage of error is 

fisq (i.e., disobeying God without denying that one should obey), the second is kufr

(i.e., rejection of the very idea that one should obey God). The last stage would 

be not only to rebel against God but also impose their rebellion against the will of 

God upon others. Those who reach this stage are considered as taghut. Taghut can 

be associated with Salafism, which is all about preventing taghut.
chapter three 127

When looking for a strategic culture in Afghanistan, it is 

fairly accurate to say that any definition would have to take 

into account security institutions (tribal, dynastic, invading) 

that typify a significant emphasis on militarized culture at the 

lowest levels and intimate knowledge with the utility (both 

positively and negatively) of force. The two major competing 

ideologies—Islam and the Pashtunwali—are constantly competing with how to resolve disputes at all levels, peacefully or 

not, which creates confusion in identifying such a strategic 

culture. Regional order has always been important to those 

who reside within Afghanistan, with an apparent preference 

of organized forces to enforce peace. Additionally, that same 

preference for security through the use of force is influenced by 

the massive instabilities created by Persian, British, and Russian 

imperial intervention, Soviet invasion, U.S./Coalition intervention, and the pervasively corrupting glut of opium.

Kin Networks

Still, Afghans have developed an institutional device that might 

be at least the outline for a strategic culture, or perhaps something less than strategic culture—a strategic narrative. As amply 

depicted above, Afghans self-divide and do so even more granularly than discussed to this point. At the foundation of this 

division is not the tribe or ethnicity but the family, all of whom 

live in extended kinship networks. Expansion and growth of 

such networks leads to the development of clans and ultimately 

tribes (or for Tajiks, regionally based identities, such as Panjshiris, Badakhshi, or Andarabi).38 Afghans can and often do 

unite, however. Despite ethnic, tribal, or religious differences, 

Afghans will, when a threat arises that threatens all, come together employing a social-cultural device called the “manteqa.” 

38 Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, “The Invention of the Afghan Nationalities, 1980–2004,” Middle East Institute, 18 April 2012.
128 vern liebl

The Manteqa

In addition to tribe or place or region where a person comes 

from or lives, the manteqa is another element shaping identity 

in Afghanistan. While other factors seem to divide Afghans, 

the manteqa builds solidarity into society and provides a foundation for considering how Afghanistan, as a nation-state, pursues its strategic culture. The manteqa is possibly the actual 

social and territorial unit of rural Afghanistan, but it is not 

reflected in formal governance structures such as districts or 

provinces. Commonly, a manteqa is composed of several villages or a cluster of villages where solidarity is shaped among 

the local population; higher- and national-level identities are 

only used in the advent of real or potential overwhelming 

threat. These manteqa do not have any administrative recognition, although traditional structures and committees exist at 

the manteqa level (i.e., shura-e manteqa, rish safedan-e manteqa, 

nomayendagan-e manteqa, or shura-e mahali).39 The manteqa 

and their committees are the missing interactive links between 

the federal, provincial, or district administration and the kin39 The definition of community is complicated in an Afghan context. There are 

various terms in regards to the loci of rural community life, in addition to the term 

manteqa, which approximately means “area.” These other terms can be used or 

included under manteqa, those being qarya (usually translated as village) and qishlaq (settlement). None of these concepts have a standard administrative definition 

within the current local unit of government in Afghanistan, the district (woluswali). A district contains many qarya, qishlaq, and manteqa, yet none are formally 

associated with the district council or municipal administrative center. However, 

despite not having any formal administrative designation, the traditional institutional structures of manteqa, qishlaq, and qarya, normally called shuras (e.g., 

shura-e manteqa, shura-e qishlaq, or shura-e qarya, all of which are informal governing structures versus having any religious connotation), typically resolve conflicts over rangeland and agricultural land rights (village chakbashi, mirab, and 

zamindar can play key roles here, often with a respected mullah or sufi pir playing 

the mediator) within a given manteqa. For more on this, see Raphy Favre, Interface 

between State and Society in Afghanistan: Discussion on Key Social Features Affecting 

Governance, Reconciliation and Reconstruction (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: AIZON, 

2005).
chapter three 129

based village. The manteqa committees, part of an informal 

governance system and based on the Pashtunwali, are called 

jirgas. Jirgas, literally meaning circle to emphasize the complete 

equality of all Pashtun men, are normally used for resolving 

major tribal or interclan issues, such as conflict, land disputes, 

or serious crimes. As such, it is secular in nature and not based 

on religion, making it ideal for the manteqa.

Examples of how manteqa are used are numerous and encompass a wide range of threats from environmental to geopolitical. Security-wise, if Afghanistan is invaded by powerful 

outsiders (say, the Soviet Union) and most or all Afghans recognize that threat, divisive routines are dispensed with and most 

unite to fight the invader. If there is a natural disaster, such as a 

massive flood on the Helmand-Arghandab river system, everybody unites or they die. It is also used in peacetime, primarily 

to address water resource issues, which are an ongoing general threat to health and survival. For example, almost all water 

issues in Afghanistan are handled via this device and not by 

the government, aside from a few major projects. Coincidentally, when Afghanistan has attempted major projects through 

the government instead of the manteqa, such as the Helmand 

and Arghandab Valley Authority, they have been well-meaning 

and ambitious but not done well. Here are several examples of 

successfully using manteqa for water management at various 

levels:

Wakil and mirab-bashi (interprovincial manteqa)—

for overall management, conflict resolution, scheduling 

annual maintenance, coordinating hashar (communal 

unpaid labor), collection of annual contributions, coordinating emergency response, and external coordination 

Mirab and chakbashi (drainage basin manteqa)—

management of branch water allocation and rotation, coordinating annual maintenance, and conflict resolution 

Mirab and chakbashi (inter- and intradistrict man-
130 vern liebl

teqa)—managing system operation, supervising annual 

maintenance, supervising construction works, and collection of annual contributions 

Zamindar/Mirab Canal Committee (village-level 

manteqa)—management of water allocation and provision of hashar labor for maintenance

It should be noted that, within all the above examples of 

water management using the manteqa device, security concerns (e.g., conflict resolution, communal labor, and collecting 

contributions) dominate. These instruments and resulting institutions are the foundation of the strategic culture of Afghanistan but exist outside of established governance structures. 

Any entity, however, that desires to exert political control and 

security over the area of Afghanistan depends upon this nongovernmental structure, often unwittingly. 

As a side note, there has been an extensive amount of publishing done on Afghanistan, writings that refer to the region 

as an “ungoverned space,” either in part or in whole. The above 

outline should put that tendentious view to rest. In some ways, 

it could be said that Afghanistan has an overabundance of governance at the village level.40

Conclusion

Depending on who is asking and who is answering, describing 

what the current strategic culture of Afghanistan is can bring 

various and often conflicting responses. Clearly, there is an emphasis on security, be it the Kabul government, Taliban, IS-KP, 

or outsiders such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan, or the United States, 

who also want security and control to prevent crossborder drug 

flow, insurgency actions, refugee migration, instability, etc. 

While Afghanistan could be a near-failed state, the historical 

40 Keister, “The Illusion of Chaos.”
chapter three 131

record suggests that it directly influences not only surrounding 

countries but also many countries across the globe. Afghanistan 

is important, given its location and terrain, even though perhaps it should not be. Maybe it is—as Milton Bearden called it 

in 2001—a “graveyard of empires.” Or one might even argue 

that Afghanistan can be called the “destroyer of empires.”41

In fact, an argument can be made that Afghanistan should 

not even be a state, because it was not much more than a buffer 

space between established states maintained to keep empires 

from clashing during the era of the Great Game. Yet, Afghanistan has been and remains a state with a national identity, 

even though it can be depicted, with apologies to Samuel P. 

Huntington, as a clash of minicivilizations.42 While Afghanistan might not fit into the traditional categories that Western thinkers use, and on which foreign policy analysts rely, 

viewing the nation through the lens of strategic culture has 

value. Asking questions about Afghanistan’s strategic culture 

answers some questions and raises others but, in the end, the 

questions themselves demonstrate how differently Americans 

think about problems of security and responses to them as 

compared to Afghans. Moreover, Americans need to be aware, 

when trying to find commonalities among Afghans, how diverse Afghans are themselves. Considering the endurance of 

Afghanistan despite invasion, intervention, occupation, and 

even genocide, it has continued to defy Western solutions to 

security. It seems clear that asking more questions about Afghanistan, as we have done here, may be more important than 

what the current answers are.

41 For more, see Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” Foreign 

Affairs, November/December 2001. 42 In reference to Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign 

Affairs, Summer 1993. The term has also been used by Bernard Lewis, “The Roots 

of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September 1990; and Basil Mathews, Young 

Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2007), 196.
132

Chapter

4

Braz il ian Strateg ic 

Culture and the Amazon

by Denise Slater

Brazil maintains a long history of partnership with the United 

States that started in 1826 and became more significant after 

World War II.1

 This chapter will explore some aspects of Brazilian strategic culture that are relevant to understanding how 

Brazil perceives threats and their major security concerns, especially in relation to the Amazon region. This understanding 

is particularly important for U.S. policy makers, government 

officials, and military personnel who regularly engage in diplomatic or security cooperation activities with Brazilians. 

After a brief discussion of Brazilian strategic culture themes, 

this chapter will outline the two main institutional players in 

Brazil that have historically helped create, shape, and maintain 

strategic culture: the diplomatic corps and the military. The 

analysis will focus on the case study of the Amazon region that 

is center stage in Brazilian strategic culture. It will also present the processes by which these key players, and in particular 

the armed forces, have interwoven their long-lasting security 

1

 William R. Manning, “An Early Diplomatic Controversy between the United 

States and Brazil,” American Journal of International Law 12, no. 2 (April 1918): 

291–311, http://doi.org/10.2307/2188145. 
chapter four 133

sensitivities—or strategic culture elements—into the national 

defense strategy. Once incorporated into the national defense 

strategy, these strategic culture elements trickled down to military doctrine and into military organizational culture. This 

process allowed for the strengthening of these themes promoted by the military, as these achieved a permanent status into a 

defense strategy that was broadly vetted by civil society. This 

magnified their reach and their scope, but it also consolidated 

their permanence into Brazil’s policy making and institutions. 

When writing about nations that may present a clear 

threat or danger to the United States, authors frequently focus 

on strategic culture themes that will give a broader understanding of a nation’s motivations for action, its cultural peculiarities on security, or may even attempt to predict that country’s 

future behavior in certain situations. Therefore, the strategic 

culture definitions used for these studies are often broad, thorough, and as all-encompassing as possible. Other authors have 

included an additional layer, expanding the study’s scope from 

international relations into other social sciences, such as psychology and anthropology. Colin S. Gray endorsed Jack L. 

Snyder’s 1977 definition of strategic culture, which illustrates 

this conceptual broadening:

the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of 

a national strategic community have acquired through 

instruction or imitation and share with each other with 

regard to [nuclear] strategy.2

This definition is central to this study, as well as Nayef 

al-Rodhan’s, who contributes to an expanded view of strategic 

culture, one that encompasses “the emotionality of states (national pride and prestige) and the egoism of states (the pursuit 

2

 Gray, Out of the Wilderness, 9.
134 denise slater

of national interests).”3 Both definitions highlight the relevance 

of emotionality as a key element of strategic culture and both 

provide insights for understanding Brazilian strategic culture, 

particularly regarding the Amazon region.4

The emotionality of states approach, seemingly irrational to 

an outside observer, may illuminate the internal thinking of 

key governmental institutions and agencies, which are reflected 

in their organizational culture. Organizational culture is a topic 

that has been studied by various disciplines and through many 

approaches, and therefore it has no single widely accepted definition. For this study, organizational culture will be understood 

as “the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an 

organization.”5

 Organizational culture, in this context, will be 

used to shed light on the behavior of key institutional players—

in this case, the Brazilian military. The analysis will include the 

processes that have resulted in the implementation of emotional elements of strategic culture into the organizational culture 

of the armed forces. Once consolidated in the national strategy, 

these elements upgraded doctrine and were thus incorporated 

into the military’s organizational culture. As the military continued to execute guidelines set forth by the new doctrine, these 

new patterns of behaviors were consolidated and strengthened 

in “conditioned emotional responses,” as described by Gray.6

Therefore, observing these processes can ultimately help 

3

 Nayef al-Rodhan, “Strategic Culture and Pragmatic National Interest,” Global 

Policy, 22 July 2015. 4

 Russell D. Howard, Strategic Culture, JSOU Report 13-8 (MacDill Air Force 

Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), 2; Gray, Out of the Wilderness, 14; and al-Rodhan, “Strategic Culture and Pragmatic National Interest.” 5

 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational 

Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 

1999), 14. See also Stephen J. Gerras et al., Organizational Culture: Applying a 

Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 2. 6

 Gray, Out of the Wilderness, 9.
chapter four 135

U.S. government institutions and agencies that regularly engage with Brazilian military and civilian institutions to better 

understand the Brazilian armed forces’ organizational culture. 

In short, this case study will provide an additional layer for the 

understanding of certain emotional, unexpected, or seemingly 

irrational responses on the part of key decision-making Brazilian institutions that influence strategy, especially concerning 

the Amazon region. Specifically, this case study will shed light 

on two main issues. The first issue will address how the Brazilian military, and to a lesser extent the diplomatic corps, inserted certain themes and elements of strategic culture that shaped 

Brazilian national defense policies. These elements of strategic 

culture promoted by the military refer primarily to the strategic 

relevance of the Amazon. These views reflect a strong nationalism in relation to the Amazon as well as the consolidation 

of geopolitical views that combine nationalism, modernization, 

and development of the Amazon. These themes and others will 

be detailed in the sections below. The second issue addressed is 

how these ideas have guided military doctrine and influenced 

the organizational culture of the armed forces once they were 

incorporated into policy. 

Why would this be relevant to U.S. policy makers or to 

government officials and military personnel engaged with their 

Brazilian counterparts? Many of the political, religious, and 

cultural differences between the United States and Iran, or the 

United States and North Korea, are evident due to polarized 

and antagonistic worldviews. The differences are so marked 

that it is expected that cultural sensitivities could trigger emotional responses from these states. These cultural sensitivities 

could also be triggered by certain topics or elements of strategic 

culture. However, when dealing with friendly, partner nations 

such as Brazil, which is a democratic nation that shares many 

similar cultural values, these cultural sensitivities that could 

trigger the emotionality of the state are not as easily under-
136 denise slater

stood and may be more subtle. Nevertheless, there are topics 

or elements of strategic culture that could trigger the emotionality of these states as well. These potentially hot-button issues 

are embedded as an intrinsic part of the elements of strategic 

culture of all states. This case study shows how these elements 

of strategic culture make their way into the organizational cultures of the primary shapers of strategic culture in Brazil. Strategic culture may provide American policy makers or military 

personnel additional insights into how a partner nation might 

react when dealing with sensitive topics related to strategic culture or to its elements. This kind of insight could help them 

avoid unnecessary strains in relations resulting from miscommunication or misunderstanding. 

The Primary Shapers 

of Brazilian Strategic Culture

Historically, the armed forces and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores)—also known 

as Itamaraty—have been the most influential and stable institutions in Brazil, and because of this they have the most influence on strategic culture.7

 The Brazilian military is one of the 

few governmental organizations in Brazil that is highly trusted by the public; according to one study, the military have a 

68.1 percent approval rating, with similar or higher averages by 

other polls.8

 Consequently, their actions and perceptions with 

regard to strategic culture reverberates throughout Brazilian society. A high rate of approval by civil society contrasts sharply 

with low trust in political institutions, a trend that continues to 

7

 Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz, Brazilian Strategic Culture (Miami: Florida International University Applied Research Center, 2009), 5. 

8

 Daniel Montalvo, “Do You Trust Your Armed Forces?,” AmericasBarometer Insights, no. 27 (2009); and Guilherme Russo, “Amid Brazil’s Crises: Low and Declining Respect for Political Institutions,” Americas Barometer Topical Brief, 1 April 

2016, 4. 
chapter four 137

spiral down as multiple corruption scandals undermine public 

trust in politicians and state institutions.9

The Brazilian diplomatic corps, along with the military, 

also enjoy a high rate of public approval. Since the late nineteenth century, when the Brazilian borders were consolidated 

through peaceful negotiations, Itamaraty enjoyed the reputation of a world-class diplomatic corps and is a respected institution among Brazilians. Therefore, while in other countries, 

where leaders of religious groups, political parties, castes, ethnicities, or social classes are key to creating the strategic culture of their nations, the military and diplomatic leadership 

are central to the formation of Brazilian strategic culture. As in 

most nations, neither the culture nor the creators of it exist in 

a vacuum, and Brazilian history explains how these two groups 

became the primary influencers of Brazilian strategic culture.10

The Origins of Diplomatic Identity 

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, known as the Baron of Rio Branco (1845–1912), was the most renowned diplomat in Brazilian 

history and the patron of Brazilian diplomatic corps.11 As a 

diplomat and a historian, the baron masterfully settled Brazilian border disputes—many times resorting to international 

arbitration—but without the need to engage in military confrontation or all-out war. However, the baron still supported 

the existence of a strong deterrence, as he once proclaimed: 

“No State can be peaceful without being strong. It is very good 

9

 Russo, “Amid Brazil’s Crises,” 4.

10 Luigi R. Einaudi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” Strategic Forum—National Defense University, SF No. 266 (March 

2011): 5.

11 “Biografia: Barao do Rio Branco (Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos),” Academia Brasileira de Letras, accessed 6 July 2017.
138 denise slater

to discuss treaties while having behind you a credible fleet.”12

The baron’s successful negotiation skills benefited Brazil on 

numerous occasions and earned him the accolade of “father” 

of Itamaraty. His successful negotiations solidified the reputation of Itamaraty, both nationally and internationally. Therefore, Brazilian foreign policy has historically promoted Brazil’s 

identity as a peaceful nation. This identity has manifested itself throughout Brazilian diplomatic and military culture. For 

example, there is a strong belief that peace should always be 

pursued first, prizing negotiation and accommodation to avoid 

conflict. Over time, this cultural trait consolidated into an 

identifiable trait in Brazilian diplomacy, as Brazil always supports international multilateralism, favoring pacifist dispute 

resolutions, respect for principles of sovereign equality, noninterventionism, international legal frameworks, and human 

rights. These themes have evolved and became a part of the 

zeitgeist of national culture. In his inaugural class to students 

at the Brazilian diplomatic academy, the former defense minister, Raul Jungmann (2016–18), said that Brazil lives by the 

“mantra of soft power” and that “the nation represents a powerhouse of peace.” Additionally, he claimed that Brazil suffers 

“no threats” and presently has “no enemies.”13 From the baron 

to Jungmann, Brazilian diplomats have pursued a century of 

peace that suits the nation’s cultural and social values.14

Other elements of this peaceful identity can be traced 

back to colonial times (1500–1822). Brazilian colonial history 

contrasts with the history of colonial Spanish America in four 

crucial ways. First, unlike the Spanish conquistadors, the Por12 Raul Jungmann, “Aula Inaugural proferida pelo Ministro de Estado da Defesa” 

[Inaugural lecture given by the Minister of Defense] (lecture, Instituto Rio Branco, 

Brasilia, DF, 25 January 2017), slide 7.

13 Jungmann, “Aula Inaugural proferida pelo Ministro de Estado da Defesa,” 

slide 10. 

14 Jungmann, “Aula Inaugural proferida pelo Ministro de Estado da Defesa,” 

slide 10.
chapter four 139

tuguese colonizers were neither warriors nor Christian noblemen. Moreover, the Portuguese colonizers, as opposed to their 

Spanish counterparts, did not have to fight advanced civilizations, such as the Incas and Aztecs. Second, at the time of the 

Portuguese exploration of South America in 1500, there was 

no organized widespread indigenous society in the land that 

became Brazil; there were only scattered tribes of hunters and 

gatherers, such as the Tupí Guarani and Tapuias, living on a 

foraging existence. In sharp contrast with the experience of the 

Spanish in the Americas, there was no gold or silver found in 

Brazil for the first hundred years, making Brazil less profitable 

than the Spanish American colonies.15 Third, Portugal did not 

possess the same financial and military power as the Spanish, 

which made it more difficult to keep a tight grip on its American colony as had the Spanish. Fourth, the Brazilian independence from Portugal was relatively bloodless and nonviolent. 

This historical narrative of peaceful nation building formed a 

key feature of Brazil’s enduring strategic culture.

The Brazilian path to independence contrasts sharply from 

Spanish America’s violent wars of independence from Spain. 

When the Portuguese court fled from Napoleon’s forces that invaded Iberia in 1807, the British Royal Navy escorted the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro. The court settled in Rio de Janeiro 

from 1808 to 1821, and its presence brought unprecedented progress to the colony. Portuguese Prince Regent João VI (1769–1826) 

and more than 10,000 officials moved to Rio de Janeiro, which 

became the capital of the Portuguese empire for the next 13 years. 

The son of the king of Portugal, Dom Pedro I, declared Brazilian 

independence from Portugal in 1822, which was achieved in a 

relatively simple and easy manner. Moreover, it did not encounter 

15 Rex A. Hudson, ed., “The Indigenous Population,” in Brazil: A Country Study

(Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997); and 

Thomas E. Skidmore et al., Modern Latin America, 3d ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 1992), 24.
140 denise slater

much significant opposition from the Portuguese crown or from 

the Portuguese merchants who benefited economically from the 

status quo. While the opposing sides engaged in some scattered 

guerrilla confrontations, occasional demonstrations occurred, and 

plenty of political maneuvering took place, both sides avoided 

outright conflict.16

The Brazilian Military

Brazil’s history also explains why its military plays a key role 

in shaping strategic culture. After independence, Brazil spent 

the next 67 years as a peaceful empire. The first emperor, Dom 

Pedro I, was forced to leave for Portugal, for dynastic reasons. 

His son, Pedro II, enjoyed a long reign, which was only interrupted by the Paraguayan War (1864–70), until being deposed 

in 1889, which to this day was Brazil’s largest war. The Paraguayan War, also known as the War of the Triple Alliance, gave 

the Brazilian Army its main battle experience, and its only war 

in the nineteenth century.17 While some countries deemphasize 

the military after war, in the case of Brazil, the war helped bring 

the military into important political and cultural roles.

The war provided the Brazilian Army with iconic military 

heroes, allowed for the rapid expansion from 17,000 personnel to 100,000, cemented close relations with Argentina, and 

fixed the main operations on the southern borders for decades 

to come. The war also had a deep and lasting effect on politics within Brazil, with officers becoming important actors in 

Brazilian politics, which led to the creation of the Republican 

movement in Brazil in the 1870s. The Republicans were abolitionists and were behind the political effort that culminated 

16 Hudson, “The Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, 1815–21,” in Brazil; and Hudson, “The Second Empire, 1840–89,” in Brazil. 17 Dannin M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., “The War of the Triple Alliance,” in Paraguay: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 

Library of Congress, 1988). 
chapter four 141

with eliminating slavery in Brazil. On 13 May 1888, Princess 

Isabel Cristina de Bragança e Bourbon d’Orléans (daughter of 

Dom Pedro II) signed the Golden Law, which by a strike of her 

plume literally abolished slavery in Brazil. With the military’s 

support, the Republican party led a political movement that 

also put an end to the monarchy in 1889.18 Amid a political 

crisis, Field Marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca proclaimed 

the republic. Since then, the Brazilian military has been part of 

the country’s ruling elite and is deeply involved in the shaping 

of Brazilian strategic culture.

Another important event that shaped Brazil’s military strategic culture occurred during the interwar and World War II 

era. Brazil faced a series of political crises in the 1930s and 

1940s that included Communist insurgency, revolutionary uprisings, and military interventions. The period was particularly 

marked by the presidency and the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas (1930–45 and 1951–54), a period known as Estado Novo

(“The New State”). Vargas led Brazil during the polarization 

between Communism and fascism, a historical period that 

closely resembled fascism in Brazil.19 But it was a representative 

of the diplomatic corps—Brazil’s former foreign minister and 

former ambassador to the United States and a close friend to 

Vargas, Oswaldo Aranha (1894–1960)—who convinced Vargas to join the Allies in the war. Even though Vargas eventually 

followed Oswaldo Aranha’s advice, Brazil was late but joined 

the Allies in the fight against Germany and Italy in 1944.20

Even though Brazil joined the Allied forces late in the war, 

18 Hudson, “The Second Empire,” Brazil; and Skidmore et al., Modern Latin America, 149–50. 19 “Diretrizes do Estado Novo (1937–1945); Estado Novo e Fascismo,” Centro de 

Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC)—Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getulio Vargas, accessed 15 August 2017. 20 Rollie E. Poppino, “Getulio Vargas,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 15 April 2019; 

and “Biografias: Oswaldo Aranha” [Biographies: Oswaldo Aranha], UOL, accessed 

6 July 2017.
142 denise slater

the country did provide essential raw materials to Allied air and 

naval bases. In 1944, Brazil sent a combat division of 25,000 

troops to Italy that fought alongside the U.S. Fifth Army 

during the Allied invasion. Vargas negotiated for some benefits 

with the United States in exchange for providing raw materials 

and bases. He also raised the Amazon’s strategic wartime importance, which resulted in successful exchange of economic 

and technical assistance from the U.S. government to advance 

long-term development goals in the Amazon region. Vargas’s 

regime laid the groundwork for the government’s public policies in the Amazon for decades to come, especially during the 

military rule, from 1964 to 1985.21

During the Cold War, an era when the world was characterized by two antagonistic regimes, the Brazilian military 

sided ideologically with the United States. However, in 1964, 

Brazilian democracy began to disintegrate. The country was 

engulfed in the political chaos posed by the threat of a Cuban 

Revolution–inspired Communist insurrection. As historian 

Thomas Skidmore described, 

The populist policies of Getulio Vargas constructed a 

hierarchical order through which the state created and 

controlled institutions for organizing urban workers. This 

posed a significant, but ultimately unacceptable challenge 

to the upper and middle classes, the latter largely represented by the military.22

The urban guerrillas’ goal was to install a Communist state 

in Brazil, a proposal that clashed with the military. The military 

seized power and controlled the country for 21 years, leading 

21 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 168; and Seth Garfield, In Search 

of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region (Durham, NC: 

Duke University Press, 2013), 205, 201. 

22 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 178.
chapter four 143

the country through a progressive, bureaucratic-authoritarian 

regime.23

The Concept of Grandeza

During the 1970s and 1980s, the military forged an ideology 

that combined nationalism, modernization, and development 

that has continued to influence civilians and politicians alike. 

The centerpiece of their ideology was based on the concept of 

grandeza (greatness), which is the enduring belief that Brazil is 

destined to be great and that it has everything it needs to become a great power. This geopolitical deterministic belief was 

well developed by General Golbery do Couto e Silva (1911–

87) in his 1967 book titled Geopolítica do Brasil (Brazil’s Geopolitics). His ideas as expressed in the book heavily influenced 

the army during the military regime.24 The Amazon’s strategic relevance was central to his geopolitical thinking. As previously mentioned, the Amazon’s importance was boosted by 

the Vargas regime during WWII, which resulted in economic 

and technical assistance from the U.S. government to advance 

long-term development goals in the Amazon region.

General Carlos de Meira Mattos was another author who 

also influenced military thinking in that time, especially regarding the Amazon. Like General Golbery, General Mattos 

also highlighted the importance of integrating the vast Amazon rainforest and basin with the rest of the country. Together, 

they made an imprint regarding the geopolitical component of 

grandeza, focusing on the certainty that Brazil was destined to 

be a superpower because of its immense and largely untapped 

natural resources. 

In 1979, the military regime responded to political pressures 

for democratization by allowing for the creation of multiple 

23 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 178. 24 Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geopolítica do Brasil (Brazil: José Olympio, 1967).
144 denise slater

opposition parties.25 These opposition parties gained momentum in the late 1980s, coinciding with the broader, worldwide 

movements for the end of Cold War, which prepared the way 

for the military to allow for the return of democracy to Brazil 

in 1985. In the early 1990s, after democracy was reinstated, 

the military’s direct political influence diminished, and though 

they were castigated by sharp budget cuts, their capacity to 

shape strategic culture did not subside. Nevertheless, after a 

21-year military rule, the role of the armed forces dramatically 

changed in Brazil. After the redemocratization process began, 

the armed forces peacefully handed power back to civilians. 

Since then, the Brazilian military has been under the authority 

of an antimilitary, populist, socialist-oriented executive branch, 

a period that ended in 2018 with the election of Jair Messias 

Bolsonaro, a conservative former army captain who is highly supportive of the military. Notwithstanding, the prior two 

decades also coincided with one of the most severe economic 

crises that engulfed Latin America. 

The crisis affected many countries in the region, especially 

Brazil, and included hyperinflation, the erosion of income, the 

decline of the middle class, and a sharp reduction in savings for 

all citizens. During the same period, the new congress deeply 

cut military expenditures and military pay. The military withdrawal from power coincided with an economic downturn, 

resulting in deeper budget cuts for the military. Because Brazil 

was already among the countries with the lowest levels of military expenditures, those cuts sharply affected military readiness and morale.26 Nevertheless, despite the military’s declining 

political influence and drastic cuts to its budget, it retained 

many prerogatives and remained a major actor on many issues, 

25 “Governos Militares no Brasil (continuação),” Sohistoria, accessed 5 September 

2017.

26 “Brazil: Defense Spending,” GlobalSecurity, accessed 6 July 2017.
chapter four 145

including being one of the major strategic culture players in 

the nation.27

The Search for a New Role and Mission 

for the Armed Forces

In 1999, the new civilian administration created the Ministry 

of Defense (MOD), combining the army, the air force, and 

the navy under civilian command. As the administration and 

the Brazilian armed forces searched for new missions and a 

redefined role in society, it became clear that Brazil needed a 

new national defense strategy. During the reshaping of national 

defense priorities, resuming deployment of Brazilian troops to 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions was something 

that the Brazilian armed forces welcomed wholeheartedly. The 

2005 UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, called the United 

Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations 

Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti [MINUSTAH]), offered 

the Brazilian military the perfect opportunity to modernize its 

outdated equipment, boost salaries, acquire training, and align 

the military with the civilian government’s strategy.28

This new direction, in the form of a UN peacekeeping 

mission strategy, improved the country’s international standing and paid off in multiple areas. MINUSTAH provided the 

Brazilian military with much-needed training for their troops. 

Brazilian battalions conducted regular patrols and raids to 

pacify the most violent neighborhoods in Haiti, such as Cité 

Soleil. Upon their return to Brazil, the military used this training to launch similar cleanup operations in the crime-ridden 

27 Scott D. Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary 

Democracy” (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Latin American Studies 

Association,  Sheraton, Washington, DC, 28–30 September 1995).

28 “Estrategia Nacional de Defesa” [National defense strategy], Ministerio da Defesa [Ministry of Defense], accessed 6 July 2017; and “United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, 21 November 2016, accessed 6 July 2017.
146 denise slater

slums of Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian government purchased 

new equipment from the Brazilian defense sector to support 

the army’s participation in MINUSTAH, providing a considerable boost to the defense industry.29

Diplomatic and Military Convergence

The period from 2003 to 2016 was marked by socialist populism, rampant political corruption, and political continuity, 

starting with the election of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 

(2003–11), known popularly as President Lula, and then the 

election of his handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011–16). 

This period demonstrates the enduring nature of strategic culture elements such as grandeza, because it appealed to both the 

bureaucratic-military rulers of the 1970s and to the socialistoriented Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), the party of 

Lula and Rousseff. The nationalistic notion of grandeza is undeniably a reoccurring theme in Brazilian strategic culture. Historically used by the military and by the diplomats, now it was also 

embraced by populist leaders belonging to the opposite side of the 

political spectrum of the military. 

Indeed, by 2005, President Lula rediscovered the political 

value and a new use to the notion of grandeza to justify his own 

ambitious agenda and his political goals. President Lula’s grandiose 

vision of projecting Brazil in the global arena included a plan to 

obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. His policies 

boosted the country’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions, 

which was part of a broader strategy to integrate defense and foreign policy.These peacekeeping missions highlighted the impor29 Global Study on Homicide, 2013: Trends, Context, and Data (Vienna, Austria: 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014), 47; and Kenneth Maxwell, 

“Brazil’s Military Role in Haiti,” Second Line of Defense, 19 June 2012. Note: 

calculated exchange rate of Brazilian reals to the U.S. dollar as of 6 July 2017: 

$1=R$3.31.
chapter four 147

tance of a holistic approach in the formulation of new, broader 

national strategy, which included interrelated sectors, such as the 

economy, politics, the environment, national productivity, science, and technology.30

Consequently, in 2005, Lula determined the creation of 

the first update of the 1996 National Defense Policy (Política 

de Defesa Nacional).31 The National Defense Policy included a 

much broader and encompassing list of security and defense 

goals. In particular, the National Defense Policy addressed widespread concerns—from the military and civilians alike, with 

what was described as “international greed, or covetousness” 

over the riches of Amazon, as well as the need to systematically provide resources for its protection.32 There was, however, 

a vacuum between these political goals and a plan to achieve 

them. This gap was bridged in 2007 when Lula officially mandated the Ministry of Defense to establish a National Defense 

Strategy (A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa), based on the National Defense Policy, which was resumed in 2008.33

The main elements of the strategy included the need for 

new technologies, a space program, nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes, restructuring of the armed forces, modernization 

of the military, hardware acquisitions, and domestic and bor30 Arturo C. Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military 

Relations and the United Nations (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2013), 84; and Andrew Fishman and Max Manwaring, comp., “Brazil’s Security 

Strategy and Defense Doctrine” (brief, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2009), 2.

31 Jungmann, “Aula Inaugural proferida pelo Ministro de Estado da Defesa,” 

slide 9. 

32 Claudio Alexandre De Almeida Freitas, “A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no 

Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira” [The National Defense Strategy in the context of 

the Brazilian Amazon] (diss. presented to the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior 

do Exército, Escola Marechal Castello Branco, Rio de Janeiro, 2011), 37.

33 Fishman and Manwaring, “Brazil’s Security Strategy,” 1.
148 denise slater

der security.34 Combined, these interrelated efforts blended to 

maximize focus and capability in a strategic culture theme: the 

simultaneous development and defense of the Amazon. 

The previous sections presented a chronological sequence 

of political and historical events related to the Amazon; the 

following sections will detail how the Amazon was consolidated in Brazilian strategic culture as a central theme and as an 

intrinsic element, as well detailing the role of the military and 

diplomats in this process. 

Security of the Amazon Region

As the previous sections have demonstrated, key historical factors 

and important geographical features, such as Brazil’s continental 

size, have played a significant role in how Brazilians shaped their 

strategic culture. This is highlighted in Brazil’s 2013 Defense White 

Paper as the immediate and pressing concern with the size of the 

Amazon was addressed: 

Brazil has frontiers with 9 other South American countries 

and one of France’s overseas territories, which represent almost 17 thousand kilometers of shared borders. Approximately two thirds of this total is Amazon border.35

Geography is crucial to Brazil’s national identity, and that is the reason the Brazilian Amazon is used in this chapter as a case study, because it brings together all the separate elements of strategic culture. 

More than just a part of the nation’s identity—geography and 

politics intersect at all levels. The Brazilian Amazon occupies onethird of the national territory. Consequently, within a geopolitical 

context, Brazil can be considered an entire subregion of South 

America, because it is the largest country in the region by area and 

34 Fishman and Manwaring, “Brazil’s Security Strategy,” 1.

35 Brazil Defense White Paper: Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional (Brasilia, Brazil: 

Governo da Republica Fereativa do Brasil, 2012), 17. 
chapter four 149

population. Moreover, it is distinct because its primary language 

is Portuguese instead of Spanish, and within the nation there are 

many subregional cultures.36 Brazil’s landmass is equal to the continental United States, and its population is the fifth largest in the 

world. The Ministry of Defense made it clear that the Amazon is 

the focus of national defense:

The Amazon is one of the areas of highest interest to the 

Ministry of Defense. The Pan Amazon, which is constituted by the entire Amazon forest in South America, consists 

of approximately 40% of the South American continental 

area and holds 20% of the world’s fresh water reserves. The 

largest area of the Pan-Amazon belongs to Brazil—around 

70%. Brazil defends its unconditional sovereignty over the 

Brazilian Amazon, which comprises over 4 million square 

kilometers, shelters all kinds of mineral reserves and the 

planet’s largest biodiversity. Brazil’s cooperation with other 

countries holding territory in the Pan-Amazon is essential 

for the preservation of this natural treasure.37

Considering the earlier discussion of Brazil’s strategic culture 

identity as a peaceful nation, another element of the nation’s strategic culture is oriented toward protecting its most valued repository of resources—the Amazon. Accordingly, the Defense White 

Paper highlights that the Amazon region has an immense mineral 

wealth and the largest volume of water compared to any other 

river system on Earth. In addition to the Amazon River, the document reflects concern about the underground water related to the 

Amazon, primarily the Guarani and Alder do Chão Aquifers.38

The Amazon basin is shared by other countries, such as Bolivia, 

36 Brian W. Blouet and Olwyn M. Blouet, eds., Latin America and the Caribbean: 

A Systematic and Regional Survey (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 345. 37 Blouet and Blouet, Latin America and the Caribbean, 19. 38 Blouet and Blouet, Latin America and the Caribbean, 19.
150 denise slater

Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela.The 

Amazon River is also strategically important because it has the potential to become a major commercial route into the heart of the 

Amazon (map 3).

Brazil’s continental dimensions have challenged the country’s ability to defend its national sovereignty. Five of Brazil’s 

nine neighbors are the largest drug-producing countries in 

the world. The northern and western borders of the Amazon 

rainforest are sparsely populated. Most of Brazil’s population 

is heavily concentrated on coastal urban areas in the southeast 

Map 3

This map illustrates the three Amazon regions referenced in this chapter: 

the northern region of Brazil, the Brazilian Legal Amazon, 

and the International Amazon. 

Portal Paramazonia, adapted by MCU Press
chapter four 151

and northeast regions and the Amazon region is home to only 

5.1 percent of Brazil’s population.39

The Evolution of an Amazonian Strategy 

The Brazilian military has always considered the Amazon a 

primary strategic consideration. For this reason, the Brazilian 

Army’s constitutional mission reflects an internal civil affairs 

focus. For example, the Brazilian Army’s mission statement 

identifies its role to perform state functions in remote areas 

of the vast national territory, especially in the Amazon region:

The Army, present in the Amazon since the beginning of 

the 17th century, has been intensifying its presence by creating new Border Units. Such facilities represent development nuclei around which small urban clusters grow, 

guaranteeing the national sovereignty in the area. Such 

pioneering, trail-blazing actions of the Brazilian Army, 

not only in the Amazon but in other regions throughout 

the country as well, is part of the Army’s constitutional 

mission. Helping the populating of remote areas, providing a minimum infrastructure until development reaches 

the area, supplying basic services, this silent work is a 

solid parcel of the Army’s contribution to the progress of 

the Nation.40

Until the 1970s, the Brazilian Army maintained a minimal 

presence in the Amazon. This began to change during the military regime (1964–85), when the Brazilian military favored 

economic expansion into the Amazon to promote the integra39 “Região Hidrográfica Amazônica” [The Amazonic Hydrographic Region], Agência Nacional de Águas; and “Conheça Cidades e Estados do Brasil” [Learn about 

the cities and states in Brazil], IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics—Population of Brazilian Cities], accessed 6 February 2019.

40 “Amazônia” [The Amazon], Exército Brasileiro [Brazilian Army], accessed 6 February 2019.
152 denise slater

tion of remote states, such as Amazonas, Roraima, Acre, and 

Rondônia. The military regime implemented the National Integration Plan, known as PIN (Plano de Integração Nacional) 

that prioritized Amazonian road construction to foster internal migration to isolated areas: this effort was successful and 

substantially increased the population of the Amazon until the 

early 1990s.41

The National Integration Plan included a radar project 

for the Amazon, known as the Radar Mapping Project (Radar 

da Amazônia [RADAM]), an initiative pioneered by the Brazilian government to map the country’s natural resources in 

the Amazon using radar and imaging sensors.42 Information 

from RADAM was used to collect data on mineral resources, 

soil, vegetation, land use, and topography of the Amazon and 

adjacent areas in the northeast region. The project eventually extended to the rest of the entire national territory. Huge 

mineral resources were discovered and mapped in the Amazon, 

which attracted both international and national investments. 

For example, Carajás Mine, the world’s largest iron ore mine, is 

in the state of Pará in the Amazon region. Carajás also contains 

valuable natural resources, such as manganese, copper, tin, aluminum, and gold. In the 1970s, U.S. Steel was initially part of 

a joint venture with the Brazilian government to mine ore, but 

U.S. Steel withdrew in 1977 by selling its share to the stateowned Companhia Vale do Rio Doce.43 U.S. Steel originally 

wanted to mine the ore alone, but the military regime did not 

allow for a foreign company to have control of a key industry 

in the heart of the Amazon. 

41 “Programa de Integração Nacional (PIN),” [National Integration Program (PIN)] 

FGV/CPDOC, accessed 7 July 2017.

42 “RADAM-D,” CPRM Servico Geológico do Brasil [Brazil’s Geological Service], 

accessed 5 September 2017.

43 “RADAM-D”; and “Carajas Iron Ore Mine,” Mining Technology, accessed 7 

July 2017.
chapter four 153

Other military development plans provided for the constructions of large hydroelectric dams in the Amazon.44 The 

slogan the military used was “ocupar para não entregar,” which 

translates to “occupy it to avoid surrendering it.” The military 

regime offered tax incentives to foster land use in the Amazon 

to generate development.45 At the end of that period, the international community and environmentalists began voicing their 

concerns over the deforestation of the Amazon. Those claims 

did not go unnoticed by the military; foreign commercial interests were already under suspicion but now environmentalists 

were as well. Some environmental groups stoked Brazilian government concerns because they actively promoted antigovernment sentiment. The combination of these factors fueled the 

fear of direct foreign military intervention in the Amazon.

Security Sensitivities

A summary of these views that demonstrate enduring Brazilian concerns about losing control of the Amazon can be found 

in an article entitled “Amazonia: Vulnerabilidade—Cobiça—

Ameaça” (Amazon: Vulnerability—Covetousness—Threats), 

published in 2006 and written by General Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva.46 In his article, General Paiva talks about the need to 

have the armed forces ready to deal with emerging “desafios e 

novas ameaças” (challenges and new threats), which he identifies as being transnational crime, international terrorism, and 

loss of authority of the nation-state.47 General Paiva claims international greed has targeted the Amazon since 1850, when 

a U.S. naval commander wanted to internationalize the Ama44 “The Rights and Wrongs of Belo Monte,” Economist, 4 May 2013. 45 Alexei Barrionuevo, “Whose Rain Forest Is This, Anyway?,” New York Times, 18 

May 2008.

46 Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva, “Amazonia: Vulnerabilidade—Cobiça—Ameaça” 

[Vulnerability—Covetousness—Threats], Military Review [Portuguese Edition] 

(March/April 2008), 5. 

47 Paiva, “Amazonia.” 
154 denise slater

zon River through the implementation of navigation laws that 

would intrude on Brazilian sovereignty. In 1989, U.S. senator 

Al Gore commented, “Contrary to what Brazilians think, the 

Amazon is not their property, it belongs to all of us.”48 In 1989, 

then-French president François Mitterrand added to the military’s list of concerns when he said, “Brazil needs to accept a 

relative sovereignty over the Amazon.”49 Then in 1992, Mikhail 

Gorbachev, president of the reform-era Soviet Union (1990–

91), declared that Brazil should delegate parts of its rights 

over the Amazon to a competent international organization, 

adding fuel to the theory that the international community 

was orchestrating a way to turn the Amazon into an international zone (i.e., the “internationalization of the Amazon”).50

The historical examples of public figures challenging Brazil’s 

autonomous control over the Amazon are numerous and include historic figures, such as Henry Kissinger and Margaret 

Thatcher.51 Collectively these statements seem to form a growing international consensus and confirmed the worst fears of 

Brazilian civilian and military leadership.

General Paiva identified three actions needed to counter 

potential foreign intervention in the Amazon: first, there was 

the need to reduce environmental crimes; second, the need to 

counter transnational crime by reinforcing border control and 

air space to neutralize transnational crime and other armed 

groups that infiltrate the region to confront groups with opposing interests; third, there was the need to revive the policies 

to integrate the Brazilian indigenous tribes. Paiva also wrote 

about the lack of resources for the armed forces, citing the fact 

48 Paiva, “Amazonia,” 3.

49 Paiva, “Amazonia,” 5.

50 Alexander López, “Environmental Change, Security, and Social Conflicts in the 

Brazilian Amazon,” Environmental Change & Security Project Report, no. 5 (Summer 1999): 28. 

51 Paiva, “Amazonia,” 4.
chapter four 155

that “most equipment used in the Armed Forces are imported,” something he claimed was a serious vulnerability because 

it made “us dependent on someone else to be able to sustain a 

long-term military operation.”52 This point highlights the general’s holistic views, which makes the case for the development 

of the national defense industry with the strategic purpose of 

sustaining long-term operations in the Amazon.

The issue of the indigenous people is worth noting because 

the military was concerned that the Yanomami Park on the 

Venezuelan-Brazilian border could eventually be turned into 

an independent indigenous state. In 1989, an activist nongovernmental organization (NGO), Survival International, 

lobbied the international community for the creation in the 

northern Amazon of an indigenous reservation in Yanomami 

Park, which would be the largest indigenous reservation in the 

world.53 The military leadership expressed concern, at the time, 

that the new, independent tribal government that would have 

resulted from this change could be easily manipulated from 

abroad, including by NGOs and by the international community.54

Unsurprisingly, when the National Defense Strategy came 

out in 2008, many elements of General Paiva’s assessment were 

included in the document. This highlights the fact the Brazilian military has been and continues to be a primary source 

for Brazilian strategic culture. For instance, the new strategy 

provided for the armed forces’ modernization, increased state 

presence in the Amazon, and surveillance projects in the Amazon, while giving a boost to the national defense industry by 

specifically encouraging purchases involving technology trans52 Paiva, “Amazonia,” 8.

53 López, “Environmental Change, Security, and Social Conflicts in the Brazilian 

Amazon,” 2.

54 López, “Environmental Change, Security, and Social Conflicts in the Brazilian 

Amazon,” 2.
156 denise slater

fers over purchases that typically required “buying from over 

the shelf.”55 This boost to the national defense industry was 

identified as a need by General Paiva to sustain long-term military conflicts in the region.

Other Security Concerns in the Amazon

Brazil’s military leadership saw these statements—from Al 

Gore’s environmental concerns to the NGOs’ lobbying for a 

protected indigenous reservation—as potential security threats 

to Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon. These statements 

brought back fears caused by the long U.S. history of political and military interventions in Latin America, but this time 

interventionism was under the facade of environmentalism. 

When General Paiva wrote his 2006 article, he made these 

fears clear when he referenced the “camouflaged true motives 

of other opposing actors,” regarding the need to control unspecified “illicit transnationals.”56 This veiled reference to the 

United States might help shed some light on other apparently 

unrelated events, which resulted on Brazil repositioning more 

troops to the Amazon. 

The drug war long troubled the Brazilian military because 

it was also regarded as pretext for foreign intervention in the 

Amazon. The Colombians had been fighting a four-decade 

long war against the violent insurgency led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]), which had depleted the military 

resources of the nation and risked the security of the state. 

This sensitive situation occurred when then-President of Colombia Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) asked the United States 

for international support for the creation of Plan Colombia, to 

55 Einaudi, “Brazil and the United States,” 6–7.

56 Paiva, “Amazonia,” 7.
chapter four 157

assist Colombia with counternarcotic capabilities.57 While the 

United States has a history of indirect and direct interference 

in affairs south of its border, American participation in Plan 

Colombia (2000–16) specifically sparked new concerns among 

Brazilian military leaders. Plan Colombia and the suspicions 

that it created gave the Brazilian military the motivation to 

redesign its mission.58 Brazilian concerns about Plan Colombia 

were ultimately the unstated reason why the Brazilian Army 

relocated military units from Southern Brazil to the Amazon 

region. Other incentives existed, such as the Calha Norte Project, which is one of the main military initiatives in the Amazon 

that will be detailed later, and the Amazon Surveillance System 

(Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia [SIVAM])—the air force’s 

satellite surveillance system, that is addressed below.59

In fact, the fear of perceived U.S. meddling in the region 

is another reoccurring theme in Brazilian strategic culture. Dr. 

Luis Bitencourt, a National Defense University professor and 

former director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, states that “Brazilians believe 

that American policymakers tend to exaggerate the relevance of 

security issues in the region to the detriment of more meaningful themes such as trade and economic development. Brazilians 

also believe with some reason that in dealing with security issues, Americans resort to the use of force far too soon, in an 

57 June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations and Congressional Interest

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

58 Luis Bitencourt, “Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security, Cooperation: A Brazilian Perspective,” in Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia: 

Hemispheric Security (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 32; and “Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia—A New Era of Partnership 

between the United States and Colombia,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, 4 February 2016. 59 Bitencourt, “Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security, Cooperation,” 32.
158 denise slater

overwhelming and arrogant manner which may be harmful for 

negotiated solutions within the region.”60

Deforestation and Environmental Security

Several decades after the implementation of integration and 

development projects in the Brazilian Amazon, deforestation 

continues to be a significant environmental concern in the region, home of the world’s largest rainforest. Approximately 20 

percent of the forest has been cut down in the past 40 years, 

with predictions that another 20 percent will be cut in the next 

20 years. Despite efforts by the Brazilian government on demarcating forest conservation areas and passing environmental 

protection legislation, the forest continues to be systematically, 

though illegally, logged (figure 1). The way forward in dealing 

with this challenging dilemma is not very clear.61

Individuals and groups are unlawfully clearing land for 

pasture, mining, and logging, while others are pursuing legal 

activities, such as road building and hydroelectric dam construction, all of which leads to deforestation of the Amazon. 

For instance, in Northern Brazil, soybean crops are grown 

mostly on land previously cleared for pasture, but the production of both commodities clearly contribute to deforestation. 

The soybeans’ cycle of production and trade promotes the rapid buildup of transportation infrastructure, such as the construction of roads, barrage systems, and railroads. This buildup 

in infrastructure also promotes the influx of migrants, attracted 

to work associated with these activities, resulting in more deforestation.62

60 Bitencourt, “Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security, Cooperation,” 21.

61 Scott Wallace, “Last of the Amazon,” National Geographic, January 2007; and 

Blouet and Blouet, Latin America and the Caribbean, 381. 62 Philip M. Fearnside and Adriano M. R. Figueredo, China’s Influence on Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: A Growing Force in the State of Mato Grosso (Boston, 

MA: Boston University, Global Economic Governance Initiative, 2015), 8.
chapter four 159

Antonio Donato Nobre, a renowned researcher at the 

National Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de 

Pesquisas Espaciais [INPE]), warns that the logging and burning of the Amazon forest could be connected to worsening 

droughts in other regions of Brazil. His observations are focused particularly on the 2012–15 drought that affected the 

whole country—particularly São Paulo, in the state of São 

Paulo, and the largest city in Latin America, with 30 million 

people in its metropolitan area. Nobre also forecasts that these 

interrelated phenomena are likely to eventually lead to more 

extreme weather events in the southeast region of Brazil.63

Nobre’s scientific conclusions were based on some 200 

studies that tracked the South American rain clouds. He relat63 Jonathan Watts, “Brazil’s Worst Drought in History Prompts Protests and Blackouts,” Guardian, 23 January 2015.

figure 1

Illegal logging in the state of Para, 2016.

Diretoria de Proteção Ambiental—IBAMA
160 denise slater

ed his findings in a report presented at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, in December 2014. 

These studies pointed out that the devastation of the Amazon 

is responsible for many aspects of the changes that have recently taken place in the regional climate in the South American 

continent. The altering of the moisture-generating rain mechanism is caused by the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest. 

The deforestation, in turn, is a result of illegal logging, mining, 

farming, and ranching. Nobre explains that 

the Amazon pumps into the atmosphere the humidity that will be transformed into rain in the Midwest, 

Southeast and Southern regions of Brazil. The larger the 

deforestation, the less humidity in the atmosphere and 

therefore less rain. Without the rain, the reservoirs are 

empty, and the taps dry.64

Environmental Laws and Reality

The Brazilian constitution explicitly states the Brazilian people’s right to an “ecologically balanced environment” and empowers the government to provide environmental preservation. 

Deforestation concerns are mentioned in the Brazil Defense 

White Paper in terms of defense, as follows: “The environmental theme is of growing strategic concern for Brazil and brings 

new challenges for the country in the field of defense. The 

protection of natural resources is a highlight of the National 

Defense Strategy, mainly regarding the Amazon region.”65 Diplomatically, Brazil cooperates with other countries in the region 

for the preservation of the Amazon. Brazil is part of the Permanent Secretariat/Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization 

(PS/ACTO), and their 2010 Amazonian Strategic Cooperation 

64 Falta D’Água Em Cidades Tem a Ver Com a Devastação da Amazônia [Water shortage in cities has to do with the devastation of the Amazon] (São José dos Campos, 

Brazil: Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, 2014), 1.

65 Brazil Defense White Paper, 50. 
chapter four 161

Agenda reflects their common goals, encompassing a series of 

cooperation initiatives in the field of preservation. Additionally, Brazil is also active in the United Nations Forum on Forests, 

which strengthens international cooperation for sustainable 

development and preservation.66

Despite the laws in place and Brazil’s participation in multilateral forums regarding conservation, some policies being 

applied in the Amazon may have contradictory goals. This is 

because some of them are designed to accelerate development 

of the Amazon while others aim to conserve the environment. 

Additionally, many conservation policies remain on paper, as 

they are never enforced because of a lack of funds or a failure 

to implement them.67

Deforestation and Internal Threats: 

Political and Economic Pressures

There are multiple political and economic factors that interrelate, contributing to an upsurge of deforestation at particular 

times. As an example, when soybean prices are high and in 

strong demand in the international market, there is more economic incentive to increase soybean production. This results 

in more illegal activities and in political pressure to ease environmental laws, which means more deforestation. One of the 

world’s leading scientists in the Amazon, Dr. Philip M. Fearnside of the National Institute for Amazonian Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia [INPA]), explains that 

deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon declined in 2004, 

coinciding with a decline in soybean demand, which eventually culminated in the 2008 world financial crisis. The reality is 

that the main driver of lower deforestation rates in that period 

66 Amazonian Strategic Cooperation Agenda (Brasilia, Brazil: ACTO, 2010). 67 Xavier Arnauld de Sartre et al., “Eco-Frontier and Place-Making: The Unexpected Transformation of a Sustainable Settlement Project in the Amazon,” Geopolitics

17, no. 3 (July 2012): 585, http://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.631199.
162 denise slater

was the drop in the soybean and beef prices in the international market. There is a direct correlation between less pressure 

for land clearing to produce soybeans and less deforestation 

and economic decline. This was exactly what happened during 

the time when the international prices of soybean and beef 

dropped in 2004–6—during a low exchange rate for the Brazilian currency—coupled with the lack of profits for exporters 

at that time. Despite commodity price increases between 2008 

and 2012, the exchange rate rise needed to benefit exporters 

only recovered in 2012. Therefore, once higher international 

market prices for soybean and beef increased, the pressure to 

clear land for building infrastructure to transport the soybean 

has significantly increased again in recent years, reinforcing the 

correlation between economic activity and deforestation and 

land clearing.68

The combination of the factors mentioned above help 

explain the Brazilian government’s shift from conservation 

initiatives to a new drive in fostering the development of the 

Amazon, which in this case means increased deforestation. 

These recent shifts in Amazon policy is the result of the powerful influence of the ruralistas lobby, which are influential and 

large soybean agribusiness groups who strongly pressure Brazil’s National Congress.69

The ruralistas helped elect politicians who are pro-business 

instead of pro-conservation candidates. Their success has had 

direct and pernicious effects on environmental policies pursued 

by the congress. An example of the power of the pro-business 

ruralistas lobby was the federal government’s enactment of new 

laws and regulations in the 2012 Forest Code, which clashed 

with the 1988 constitution’s environmental clauses. Fearnside 

explains that the new Forest Code, enacted by the government 

68 Falta D’Água Em Cidades Tem a Ver Com a Devastação da Amazônia, 10, 16, 21. 69 Richard Schiffman, “What Lies Behind the Recent Surge of Amazon Deforestation,” YaleEnvironment360, 9 March 2015.
chapter four 163

in 2012, “weakens critical environmental laws and also offers 

an amnesty for all those who violated environmental laws before 2008.” Basically, he points out, “if you cleared illegally, 

you got away with it. And the expectation is that if you clear 

illegally now, sooner or later there will be another amnesty that 

will forgive your past crimes. On the other hand, if you actually 

obeyed the law, you lost money. So, the incentives are very perverse.”70 In other words, the Brazilian government provided incentives and amnesty to ignore their own constitution, which 

was designed to protect the Amazon.

Countering Deforestation: 

More Internal Threats and Corruption

The Brazilian government implemented a satellite program to 

monitor deforestation in 1988, a project called Satellite Monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon Forest (Programa de Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite [PRODES]). 

The project puts out yearly estimates on deforestation based 

on images provided by a 220 Landsat/CBER satellite, with 

all data made available in the internet.71 The data reported by 

PRODES includes only “low-cut” deforestation, which are 

areas that are completely deforested or that have been totally 

cleared.72 For instance, the official 2015 PRODES estimate of 

low-cut deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is 5,381 square 

kilometers (2,077 square miles). Between 1988 and 2015, the 

total deforestation registered was 413,506 square kilometers 

(159,655 square miles). Antonio Nobre of INPE points out 

that these official numbers demonstrate that “over the past 40 

years, nearly 20 percent of the Amazon has been destroyed; an 

70 Schiffman, “What Lies Behind the Recent Surge of Amazon Deforestation.”

71 CBERS is the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite.

72 “Monitoramento de Floresta Amazônica Por Satélite” [Monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon forest by satellite] (presentation, São José dos Campos, Brazil, OBT/

INPE, n.d.), 2, accessed 7 July 2017.
164 denise slater

area twice the size of Germany; while an additional 22 percent 

has been seriously compromised.”73 These results were unsettling but clearly not unexpected since the Brazilian government 

put this project into place as one of the measures to help protect the Amazon. These numbers highlight the magnitude of 

the task and the need for resources, which were described in 

the 2008 National Defense Strategy, especially the need for the 

armed forces modernization, increased state presence in the 

Amazon, and surveillance projects in the Amazon.

Since the inception of PRODES and later by a more accurate and sophisticated surveillance system, known as SIVAM, 

forest clearing diminished considerably. By 2014, despite the 

efforts to protect the Amazon, deforestation has significantly 

increased in response to the renewed lobbying of the ruralistas. 

Their influence resulted in the passing of a 2012 lax Forest Code 

and the subsequent detrimental effects in the environment.74

Indeed, PRODES 2014 data revealed a 190 percent surge in 

deforestation from August and September of that year.75 Conservationists took notice of this sudden trend, which meant 

another uphill political battle was on the way.

Undoubtedly, corruption played a significant role in recent deforestation. At the time, Brazilian scholars understood 

the problem and were trying to expose government corruption. From inside INPA, Dr. Fearnside denounced this upward 

trend in deforestation, claiming that “the government hid these 

73 Taxa Estimada do Desmatamento da Amazônia Legal Para Período Ago/2014–

Jul/2015 [Estimated rate of deforestation of the legal Amazon for the period of 

August 2014 to July 2015] (Brasilia, Brazil: Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e 

Inovação, 2015), 5, 10; and Reed Johnson and Rogerio Jelmayer, “Deforestation 

Sparks Brazilian Debate,” Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2014. 74 President Dilma Rousseff’s first term was from 2011 to 2014; her second term 

began 2 January 2015. She was impeached and removed from office on 31 August 

2016.

75 Jonathan Watts, “Amazon Rainforest Losing Ability to Regulate Climate, Scientist Warns,” Guardian, 31 October 2014.
chapter four 165

figures before the [2014 presidential] election.”76 These claims 

are no longer speculation or opinions; they are now historical 

facts and a component of the Brazilian political scandal that 

helped bring down President Dilma Rousseff. Her government 

manipulated other important numbers in the federal budget 

and committed fiscal fraud—the main legal accusation that led 

to her impeachment from the presidency in 2016. This fraudulent accounting used by Rousseff’s government paid off in the 

short term, allowing her to win a second term in a close 2014 

race. Despite the success of Rousseff’s reelection, Fearnside denounced the delay of the publication of data, which revealed 

the dramatic increase in deforestation. Thus, the Amazon’s security is also threatened by internal factors, such as corruption 

and unsustainable economic practices.77

Interweaving Security Sensitivities 

into the National Defense Strategy 

As stated previously, the Amazon has historically been a major 

focus of the Brazilian military’s strategic thinking, actions, and 

resources. However, due to the difficulties of effectively policing such an immense swath of territory, this eventually led to 

a lack of state presence in the region, resulting in a structural 

inability to enforce environmental preservation of the Amazon. 

As a result, this security gap became an intrinsic part of the 

Brazilian Army mission authorized by the Brazilian national 

constitution. The military’s view that the Amazon is under the 

threat of being annexed by the international community became an integral part of the National Defense Policy and there76 Schiffman, “What Lies Behind the Recent Surge of Amazon Deforestation.” The 

August and September data would normally have been released in October, before 

the 26 October presidential election, but the government of Dilma Rousseff sat on 

the data, and it was not disclosed until the end of November.

77 Joe Leahy, “What Is Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff Accused of?,” Financial 

Times, 12 May 2016; and Schiffman, “What Lies Behind the Recent Surge of 

Amazon Deforestation.” 
166 denise slater

fore the National Defense Strategy. Even before the National 

Defense Strategy was published, which was soon after the creation of the Ministry of Defense, the focus of military doctrine 

was to integrate the various projects in the Amazon. 

There is an ever-evolving cause and effect relationship 

regarding how military strategic culture informs the National Defense Strategy and the army’s organizational culture. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense has been instrumental in 

orchestrating the national dialogue by promoting conferences, 

symposiums, and talks on security concerns with Brazilian society. This is especially true in relation to topics on the Brazilian 

Amazon. Other strategic culture topics that are discussed within Brazilian society include the concept of the Blue Amazon 

(i.e., Brazilian offshore natural resources, which the Brazilian 

Navy calls “Amazônia Azul”) oil reserves in deep waters, cyberspace, and borders to a lesser extent.78

It was, therefore, a widely accepted view in the country 

that the Amazon is vulnerable, and that multiple threats seriously jeopardized national sovereignty. For most Brazilians—

civilians and military alike—the Amazon region evokes unified 

concern from a security standpoint. In fact, the Amazon may 

be the only topic that arouses a collective and emotional response from both Brazilian leadership and the general population; most Brazilians generally perceive outside concerns 

regarding the Amazon’s ecosystem as an attempt to appropriate 

untapped resources, which evokes highly emotional and nationalistic reactions.79

78 Reinaldo Sótão Calderaro, “A Ação do Ministério da Defesa na Articulação da 

Política de Defesa com A Política Externa Brasileira a Partir de 2007” [Defense 

Ministry actions in the articulation of defense policy with Brazilian foreign policy 

after 2007] (diss. presented to the Escola De Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, Escola Marechal Castello Branco, 2013), 120. 

79 Bitencourt, “Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security, Cooperation,” 21.
chapter four 167

While the national government attempts to reconcile 

competing priorities between their environmental concern for 

the Amazon and the more pressing need to appease their political base, the army and the MOD remain firmly focused on 

the security of the Amazon. The MOD’s organizational structure highlights the importance of the Amazon, with the Center 

for the Management and Operation of the Amazon Protection 

System (Centro Gestor e Operacional do Sistema de Proteção da 

Amazônia [CENSIPAM]) representing one of the four policy 

pillars under MOD’s secretary general. CENSIPAM’s policies rely on a partnership between federal and state organizations, as well as NGOs, to promote a gradual activation of the 

Amazon Protection System (Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia

[SIPAM]).80

The 2005 National Defense Policy also encompassed the 

Military Defense Policy, with specific guidelines to Brazil’s Joint 

Command and Staff of the armed forces regarding military 

strategies. Therefore, following the publication of these guidelines, the 2006 Military Defense Strategy directed the publication of operational plans. In 2007, Military Defense Doctrine 

established the operational guidance to enable the armed forces 

to execute missions as allowed in the constitution.81 From the 

linkages described above, one can see how strategic culture elements, particularly regarding the Amazon region and its importance to the concept of Brazilian strategic culture, informed 

the National Defense Strategy and how these elements trickled 

down, affecting the organizational culture of the armed forces.

Additionally, Brazilian Army doctrine is constantly updated and refined by the army’s Command and Staff College (Escola de Comando do Estado-Maior do Exército [ECEME]) and 

by the War School (Escola Superior de Guerra [ESG]), which 

80 Brazil Defense White Paper, 58, 64. 81 Freitas, A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira, 38.
168 denise slater

are both directly linked to the Ministry of Defense. ESG is 

also an institute of advanced studies and research in the areas 

of national development, security, and defense. There has been 

intense collaboration and coordination between ESG and the 

diplomatic corps in a process that has intensified between the 

1950s and the 1970s. Collaboration culminated in the 1990s, 

as the diplomats and the military authored the National Defense Policy and updated the national defense strategies of 2005, 

2008, 2012, and 2016, including the Brazil Defense White Paper, published in 2012.82

The Brazilian Army and the other branches of the armed 

forces contribute to the Institute for Joint Operations Doctrine, with papers, dissertations, theses related to national defense, and strategies. All these combined efforts assist in the 

formulation of specific priorities from national defense to 

doctrine level, which includes the strategic culture elements 

that make their way into the National Defense Strategy and are 

brought back down in the form of updated doctrines. For example, the new armed forces doctrine has been integrated with 

the National Defense Strategy, aligning the armed forces operational capacity throughout the national territory. There are new 

elements of strategic culture, specifically originally related to 

the Amazon that were expanded to include the entire national 

territory, which are now clearly present in the doctrine. These 

concepts were summarized in two main strategic concepts in 

the doctrine: dissuasion and presence. Dissuasion refers to the 

need to maintain sufficiently strong forces for immediate action, including military presence in the entire national territory 

to guarantee constitutional law and order, sovereignty, national 

82 Brazil Defense White Paper, 65; and Jungmann, “Aula Inaugural proferida pelo 

Ministro de Estado da Defesa,” slides 8–9.
chapter four 169

integration, and development.83 In other words, the military 

succeeded in affecting national policy, adapting doctrine, and 

in attaining additional forces, as they perceived they needed. 

This process reinforces their role as the keepers and primary 

policy makers of Brazilian strategic culture.

In addition to these concerted efforts, the National Defense 

Strategy provided for other complementary strategic actions in 

the Brazilian armed forces. With the 2008 National Defense 

Strategy in place, the Brazilian Army developed several new interrelated projects in the Amazon region to align their mission 

to safeguard national sovereignty with other sensitive scientific 

initiatives prescribed in the National Strategy on Science, Technology and Innovation. Pro-Amazon (Proamazônia) is one such 

project, created to promote the expansion of research and the 

use of new technologies in the Amazon. The ultimate objective 

is “to promote sustainable development in the nation’s most 

strategic region.”84 Another objective of the project is to align 

other command and control projects of the Brazilian army in 

the Amazon with Proamazônia. 

Proamazônia’s goals include having the Brazilian Army 

provide logistical support for several ongoing projects that are 

the responsibility of other governmental agencies and various 

academic institutions. For example, there are projects from the 

University of Rio de Janeiro; University of São Paulo; INPA; 

SIPAM, which was created to manage the actions implemented by SIVAM; the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 

(Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária [EMBRAPA]); and 

83 Carlos Roberto Resende et al., “O Exército Brasileiro e a Gestão Ambiental da 

Amazônia no Século XXI: Uma Visão Estratégica” [The Brazilian Army and the 

environmental management of the Amazon in the twenty-first century: A strategic 

vision] (paper presented at the Brazilian Army Management School, 2004); and 

Freitas, A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira, 23. 84 “Amazônia ‘Conhecer para Proteger’ ” [“Amazon ‘know it to protect it’ ”] Exercito Brasileiro Comando Militar da Amazonia [Brazilian Army Military Command 

of the Amazon], accessed 28 February 2018.
170 denise slater

others.85 These various projects include assisting the Yanomami indigenous people, researching programs in biodiversity in 

the western portion of the Amazon, protecting wildlife with 

preservation programs, and funding water-quality projects and 

geopolitical projects. 

In sum, the Brazilian Army has implemented dozens of 

coordinated projects, actions, and plans in the Amazon to 

align with the National Defense Strategy. The way these projects interrelate and derive from the major defense document 

on the land, informing doctrine down to the daily job of an 

army unit, were detailed in a very informative study by Major Claudio Freitas. His 2011 dissertation for ECEME titled 

“The National Defense Strategy in the Context of the Brazilian 

Amazon” provided an in-depth account of the process.86 He explains how all these combined new actions and directives, also 

originally envisioned for the Amazon, but later expanded to 

the whole territory, fomented continual internal organizational 

adaptations and changes. One such action included the implementation in 2009 of the Strong Arm Strategy (Estratégia Braço 

Forte), which involved two levels—an articulation level and an 

equipment level, with the combined goal to modernize the army.87 The Articulation Plan included the Protected Amazon 

Plan (Programas Amazônia Protegida) and the Nation’s Sentinel (Sentinela da Pátria), with the first consisting of projects to 

strengthen the land-based military presence in the Amazon region and the second including projects to reorganize and adapt 

operational and logistical structures in the military commands 

85 Forests Sourcebook: Practical Guidance for Sustaining Forests in Development Cooperation (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, 2008), 251.

86 Freitas, A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira, 22. 87 Freitas, A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira, 22.
chapter four 171

in the area.88 The plan for equipment renewal included a program for mobility and a program to equip the force, based on 

a vision for the future of the army that takes into account the 

evolution of military doctrine, science, and technology. 

Other Strategic Projects in the Amazon

As prescribed in the National Defense Strategy, by 2004, Project 

Calha Norte became the centerpiece of Brazil’s comprehensive strategy for sustainable development of the Amazon region. The fully operational project prioritized settlement and 

infrastructure construction, as well as the creation of special 

border platoons along the northern border in the Amazon region. The project was equipped with an operational system for 

the surveillance of Amazonia—SIVAM—consisting of radar 

and environmental sensors. SIVAM provides tools to monitor problems in the Brazilian Amazon, such as illegal mining, 

drug trafficking, forest burning, agrarian conflicts, invasion of 

indigenous lands, and cattle ranching. Brazil’s experience with 

SIVAM is considered an example of extensive cooperation and 

technology sharing between Brazil and the United States.89

In addition to Project Calha Norte, the Ministry of Defense 

has secured resources for many other projects in the coming 

years, “especially for projects that involve air space, cybernetics, 

and nuclear power, such as Prosub, Sisfron, KC 390, Proteger 

and the army’s Cybernetics Center.”90 The Integrated Border 

Monitoring System (Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de 

Fronteiras [SISFRON]) will allow the land forces to monitor 

88 Freitas, A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa no Contexto da Amazônia Brasileira, 22. 89 John A. Cope and Andrew Parks, Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016), 1; “Raytheon Presentation: 

SIVAM Presentation on Nov. 13th, 2002,” MIT, 13 November 2002; and Julia 

E. Sweig, “NSA, SIVAM, Dilma and Barack,” Folha de São Paulo, 17 July 2013. 90 Calderaro, “A Ação do Ministério da Defesa na Articulação da Política de Defesa 

com A Política Externa Brasileira a Partir de 2007,” 120.
172 denise slater

national borders and to promptly respond to any aggression or 

threat, especially in the Amazon region.91

In 2011, the government launched another security initiative, the Strategic Borders Plan, which provided for military 

and law enforcement security operations to counter criminal 

activities. The plan also aligned with the military’s wish list that 

was included in the 2008 National Strategy of Defense. Accordingly, the National Congress of Brazil granted the armed forces 

policing powers within 90 miles of the frontier, which included 

provisions to better integrate actions with police operations.92

This meant that all three branches of the armed forces would be 

restructured to better monitor and control the border, allowing for improved mid- and long-range capabilities. The plan’s 

implementation has yielded improvements in counternarcotic 

operations as well as illegal weapons and various illegal commodities’ interdiction.

Since the publication of the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the armed forces have a clear mandate to protect the resources of the Brazilian Amazon. The strategy provided the 

armed forces with provisions and increased financial support 

to allow for its current modernization and restructuring. This 

includes the incorporation of sophisticated technology to increase the armed forces’ presence in the Amazon region, as 

well as incentives to boost the Brazilian defense sector with 

the development of new equipment, which includes favoring 

purchases of defense equipment involving technology transfer 

and giving preference to the Brazilian defense industry instead 

of imports.

Conclusion

Because the armed forces represent one of the main developers 

91 Brazil Defense White Paper, 74. 92 Cope and Parks, “Frontier Security,” 12.
chapter four 173

of Brazilian strategic culture, the need to secure the Brazilian 

Amazon will therefore remain the centerpiece of Brazilian strategic culture for decades to come. Despite all the initiatives, 

policies, and actions taken, new potential security risks continue to emerge in the region, forcing the army and government 

to deal with both the perceived security threats and with the 

ever-growing security challenges that currently exist in the Amazon. These new security challenges branch off into political 

pressures, socioeconomic problems, and environmental risks 

that gradually accumulate each day in the Amazon region. The 

current state of disarray in Venezuela adds to the list of security 

concerns, which will likely spill over to the Brazilian side if civil 

war breaks out in that country. At the same time, there is new 

evidence of risks posed by deforestation of the Amazon, which 

will impact water scarcity in the rest of the country. Water scarcity in the southeast region and elsewhere in the country is 

likely to increase and will slowly put pressure on the Brazilian 

military to increase their control of the Amazon region.

Gradually, the armed forces might concede that their original fears that the international community wants to control 

the Amazon might give way to an even more challenging problem—preventing corruption. As the military realizes that the 

main enemy of the integrity of the Brazilian Amazon is political corruption, they might feel compelled to counter it more 

boldly. For instance, the armed forces may feel pressured to 

increase their ability to conduct police actions in the region. 

This would promote a shift toward providing internal stability, 

which is the opposite direction of what the politicians have 

been attempting to establish since the creation of the Ministry 

of Defense in 1999. Those new missions may need to include 

concerted and well-funded domestic actions to counter corruption and, subsequently, the deforestation that comes with 

it. The need to protect the Amazon from deforestation will encounter problems as well and will most likely clash with eco-
174 denise slater

nomic pressures to maintain strong momentum for exports of 

commodities to generate hard currency for the country, something that soybeans and beef generate. 

The correlations between security and environmental responsibility might take time to consolidate in military doctrine 

and in the national narrative. The wealthier southern Brazilian 

states will eventually put more pressure on their political representatives to counter deforestation in the Amazon. These states 

are responsible for most of Brazil’s national industrial output 

and are heavily dependent on hydroelectricity. Recent and unprecedented droughts are possibly also aggravated by deforestation in the Amazon, along with various climate-related reasons, 

such as pollution of riverbeds and destruction of ciliary forests, 

which are forests along basins and springs that provide protection to the river. This will encourage all of society to regard the 

destruction of the Amazon as a threat to the nation’s economy, 

directly affecting a large segment of the population’s lives and 

livelihood, as well as impacting Brazil’s gross domestic product.

The armed forces will continue to adapt their doctrine 

and their organizational culture to these new challenges, as the 

Amazon will become an increasingly sensitive topic in bilateral 

relations with the United States. These sensitivities will trickle 

down to the agency level that engage in security cooperation, 

trade, development of nuclear energy, or climate change related 

forums. This means that U.S. officials, military or civilian, that 

deal with the Brazilian military will need to be aware of the 

high value that the Brazilian military and population place on 

the autonomy of the Amazonian territory within its national 

boundaries. The Amazon is indeed a topic that could evoke 

nationalistic, emotional responses from the Brazilian government, government officials, the military, and civilians alike. 
175

Chapter

5

A New State w ith a 

Nascent Strategic Culture

International and Domestic Influences in Kosovo

by George Bogden, PhD

Introduction

The western end of the main boulevard in Kosovo’s capital, 

Pristina, embodies the dichotomies and contradictions that 

shape the country’s strategic culture. Facing the square in front 

of the parliament, to the left, a statue of Skanderbeg dominates 

one’s field of vision. He was a mighty medieval warlord who 

turned against the Ottoman empire to lead Albanian Christians in armed resistance against Muslim rule. His horse is 

midstride, his sword unsheathed. On the opposite side of the 

square stands Ibrahim Rugova, the man considered the nation’s 

first president. A literary as well as political figure, he was an 

ardent supporter of nonviolence and perpetually campaigned 

for Kosovo’s independence among the international community, which earned him the sobriquet “Gandhi of the Balkans.” 

In these two images, the Kosovar will for self-determination, 

deeply embedded nationalism, capacity for marshal resistance, 

and reliance on international support and intervention are woven together, leaving the thoughtful observer with an uneasy 

sense of paradox.
176 george bogden

To search for Kosovo’s strategic culture is to address myths 

and aspirations, not only of its population but also those harbored by the world leaders who shouldered the effort to bring 

the country into existence. Having just celebrated its first decade of independence, now is an appropriate time to reflect on 

key strategic ideas that underlie realities on the ground, and 

that are reflected in Kosovo’s security and military institutions. 

Though still in their infancy, these organs of the state bear discernible attributes worthy of scrutiny by students seeking to 

understand how a nascent country develops a defining perspective on military affairs. 

Given the typical scope of case studies in this text, one 

might think it is futile to attempt to decipher the strategic culture of a small, new country such as Kosovo, with a population 

of less than two million. The government in Pristina is still attempting to achieve broad recognition as a state, to consolidate 

its legitimacy, and to establish basic functions of governance, 

which it continues to share with the United Nations Mission 

in Kosovo (UNMIK). Yet, several features of Europe’s youngest 

democracy make it a prime candidate for examination as a case 

study in strategic culture. First and foremost, it serves as a contemporary example of how a post-conflict society responds to 

the pressures to change from within as well as those exerted by 

outside forces. Kosovo has struggled and will continue to act to 

transform its military capacities. The efforts and resources used 

to rid itself of a former government perceived as illegitimate 

are being redirected into the competencies necessary for institutionalized self-defense.

Prelude to Independence

Any analysis of Kosovo’s strategic culture must begin with a 

brief reprise of the political circumstances that led to its existence. The topic of this chapter, the strategic culture of one 

state, is too narrow to contend with even a cross-section of the 
chapter five 177

history of the entire Balkan region. To deal seriously with the 

whole peninsula’s rich past is to confront the legacies of multiple empires—Greek, Achaemenid, Roman, Byzantine, Venetian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian, to name but a few. It 

would also require a reckoning of the interplay of many ethnic 

and religious dimensions of identity—among them Albanian, 

Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, as well as Catholic and Orthodox 

Christian, not to mention the Islamic faith. For millennia, 

Balkan peoples have governed themselves and been governed 

through a shifting mosaic of power and cultural influence, accepting and overturning numerous systems of rule and ideological attachments. Kosovo, as a small territory in the region, 

has remained enveloped in these crosscurrents, reflecting the 

complex distinctions its populations have drawn to define and 

redefine their relationships to neighboring political entities. 

Rather than providing a complete account of this remarkable 

history, it is useful and appropriate to examine the position of 

Kosovo in the twentieth century. This review should proceed 

by paying special attention to the two decades, beginning in 

1997, in which it began on its current course toward development as a state.

Although the history of territorial disputes in the Balkans 

remains highly contested, the broad outlines of Kosovo’s political position in the last century are clear. The borders of what 

is known today as the Republic of Kosovo were roughly drawn 

within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946. At 

that time, it was first recognized as an administrative unit of 

the constituent Socialist Republic of Serbia, itself part of a larger Yugoslavian polity.1 Like the dynamics leading to fragmentation elsewhere in the region in the 1990s, Kosovo’s struggle 

for self-determination began in earnest in the 1960s. Although 

1

 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1998), 223–24.
178 george bogden

interethnic tensions flared in the region throughout the twentieth century, they became particularly intense with the reversal 

of the decentralization of authority that occurred in Yugoslavia 

in the 1960s. After this process culminated with the ratification 

of the 1974 Constitution, authorities in the States Councils of 

Yugoslavia began to roll back provisions for autonomy in certain provinces, such as Kosovo. Its special status as the Socialist 

Autonomous Province of Kosovo within Yugoslavia’s complex 

system of governance coincided with demographic changes 

and fluctuations in nationalist sentiments, which pitted a majority of ethnic Albanians, most of whom were Sunni Muslims, 

against other ethnic and religious groups, especially ethnic Serb 

Orthodox Christians. 

Throughout the 1980s, the government in Belgrade began to answer claims of oppression made by Serbs residing in 

Kosovo. Leaders in the Serbian minority community melded 

their grievances with claims about the special meaning ascribed 

to Kosovo in Serbian history. They highlighted the cultural significance of battles fought in the area and the spiritual 

importance of certain churches and monasteries.2 These trends 

reached their first crescendo when, on 28 June 1989, President Slobodan Milošević addressed a crowd of ethnic Serbs in 

Gazimestan. He ostensibly sought to commemorate the sixth 

centennial anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Yet, he was also 

simultaneously signaling changes in Belgrade’s priorities to 

Serbs throughout the Balkans. Shortly afterward, he began a 

campaign of fear and political pressure to achieve his two primary goals for governing Kosovo. At the time, the president of 

Serbia sought to persuade central Yugoslav authorities to lessen 

Kosovo’s autonomy, while reshaping local institutions to en2

 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 

1998), 195–96.
chapter five 179

gage in multifaceted forms of oppression of ethnic Albanians.3 

The systematic revocation of previous political concessions to 

Albanian leaders in the region underlaid this change. Measures 

included banning the Albanian language in public primary and 

secondary schools. Kosovar Albanians who lived through the 

period commonly characterize these policies as constituting a 

form of “apartheid.”4

In response, a long-standing, nonviolent movement for 

independence began among Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s. 

Although an initial attempt to attain sovereignty occurred in 

1992, it failed to gain recognition by any other state than Albania. The question of Kosovo’s independence was left largely 

unanswered by the international agreements that ended major 

conflicts elsewhere in the Balkans.5

 Although the first phase 

of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia—which ended 

with the 1995 Dayton Accords—did not resolve the tensions 

surrounding Kosovo’s governance, they did demonstrate to 

an aggrieved Albanian ethnic majority that the international 

community could and would intervene in the Balkans. The last 

credible census that took place in Kosovo before the conflicts 

of the 1990s occurred in 1981. Ethnic Albanians represented 77 percent of the population, with Serbs constituting 13 

3

 From the period, see the “What’s Next for Slobodan Milošević?,” Economist, 5 

June 1999, 24. For a broader analysis of this turning point, see Carole Rogel, 

“Kosovo: Where It All Began,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society

17, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 167–80, http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025397128633.

4

 This tendency is mentioned by the historical surveys of the period cited above 

and was confirmed in the majority of the interviews this researcher conducted. 

Without prompting, the subjects of these interviews would put forward this characterization and discuss how it influenced the new government’s policies and disposition toward Serbia.

5

 The Kosovo Memory Book database, Humanitarian Law Center, continually updated, accessed online for the last time on 7 July 2016.
180 george bogden

percent.6 In 1991, the Federal Statistical Office of the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia estimated that of a population totaling 

approximately 1,956,000 in 1991, 82 percent were Albanians, 

10 percent Serbs, and 8 percent others.7

 The formidable ethnic 

Albanian community remained deeply unsatisfied with worsening rule by Belgrade.

With regard to Kosovo’s development of strategic culture, 

the late 1990s constituted a crucial period. Kosovo’s ensuing 

war of liberation defined its orientation to surrounding populations and to its regional environment. The conflagration 

resulted in independence. And out of the conflict came both 

the basic institutions of Kosovo’s defense forces, as well as the 

international framework that still applies to some aspects of its 

governance.

By 1996, local Albanian populations became sympathetic to calls for a violent mode of opposition to Serbian rule, 

conducted by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Armed 

resistance persisted through the late 1990s, answered by increasingly brutal responses from Serbian security forces. Early 

massacres are too numerous to count. Cases like the Serbian 

attack on the village of Prekaz came to symbolize the asymmetry between Albanian militants, who commanded small bands 

of irregular soldiers, and the organized, state-funded security 

forces sent by Belgrade to quell the rapidly growing rebellion. 

The martyrdom of Adem Jashari—killed after a siege of his 

home in Prekaz following multiple violent confrontations with 

a so-called antiterrorism unit—exhibited the unequal contest 

between Albanian forces and their foes, as well as the fierceness 

6

 The official 1991 Yugoslav census was largely boycotted by the ethnic Albanians. 

This is noted in Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 479. 7 Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office, Government 

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997).
chapter five 181

of Belgrade’s methods to achieve military objectives.8 Jashari, 

often depicted holding an automatic rifle, is memorialized as 

the father of the KLA, illustrating the continued presence of 

early guerrilla fighters in the imagination of the national community. That his death is commemorated throughout urban 

landscapes, as well as in popular art, literature, and musical lyrics, conveys the common understanding that Kosovo’s struggle 

has not yet ended. This narrative’s message is clear: it is the duty 

of free Kosovar peoples to resist injustice until the bitter end. 

After the collapse of a cease-fire orchestrated by the United States in 1998, a multilateral conference was convened in 

1999, resulting in the Rambouillet Accords. This agreement 

required greater autonomy for Kosovo.9 Once Serbia rejected 

its terms, a bombing campaign commenced, through which 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sought to 

compel Milošević to withdraw all armed military units from 

Kosovo. Open war raged between Albanian militias under the 

direction of the KLA and Serbian forces. Although statistics 

about casualties from the conflict are still occasionally revised, 

the most commonly cited figures are from the Humanitarian Law Center.10 It suggests that 13,517 persons were killed 

during the armed conflict in Kosovo. Approximately 1,886 

persons remain missing, and discoveries as late as 2013 of mass 

graves with hundreds of Albanian bodies suggested the final 

death count will continue to rise.11 Human rights violations by 

8

 Heike Krieger, ed., The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 

92–96.

9

 Larry Minear et al., NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, occasional paper no. 36 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2000), 34–35.

10 For academic rather than political critiques of the death toll count, see Elizabeth Minor, Towards the Recording of Every Casualty: Analysis and Policy Recommendations from a Study of 40 Casualty Recorders (London: Oxford Research Group, 

2012).

11 “EULEX: Human remains found in Rudnica,” b92, 13 December 2013.
182 george bogden

Serbian forces against Albanians during the conflict spanned 

many aspects of life that have only recently been addressed. 

The international community’s renewed attention to the survivors of sexual violence during the war, and the new national 

memorial created in Pristina in their memory, is but one example.12

Postwar Reform and the KLA’s Recrudescence

After years of fighting, Belgrade relented. Milošević’s government relinquished direct control of the region shortly after the 

United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 in 

June 1999. It created UNMIK to administer transitional authority in the province. Although the resolution set out greater autonomy for Kosovo, authorizing a NATO peacekeeping 

force to implement these measures, it also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), 

of which Kosovo legally remained a province. 13 At this stage, 

12 For information regarding the belated international response to the legacy of sexual violence during Kosovo’s war of independence, see Siobhan Hobbs, Designing 

a Reparation Programme for Victims of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Kosovo: 

Principles, Practices and Recommendations (New York: UN Women, 2016), 2–6. 

The 2016 establishment and building of a war memorial in downtown Pristina for 

these victims, across from the commemorative Newborn sculpture, which uses the 

moniker “Heroines” in Albanian, served as a symbolic commitment to pursuing 

justice for them in the years to come. While much of the investigation of human 

rights violations during the decade after the conflict centered on the crimes of the 

Serbian state and its security forces, atrocities committed by Albanian forces have 

begun to take a more pronounced position in Kosovo’s society and in its relations 

with the European governments and the United States. See Marija Ristic, “Council 

Adopts Kosovo Organ Trafficking Resolution,” Balkan Insight, 25 January 2011, 

1–4. See also Marija Ristic, “Serbia Locates Alleged Organ Trafficking Doctor,” Balkan 

Insight, 2 September 2014, 2. 13 On this latter point, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 read, “Reaffirming 

the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out 

in the Helsinki Final Act.” See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 

(10 June 1999).
chapter five 183

the considerable role of the international community in creating Kosovo’s security institutions came into effect. 

Resolution 1244 clearly accorded full governmental authority—described as “reserved powers”—to the special representative of the secretary general (SRSG). This individual was 

tasked with coordinating all aspects of the civilian and military 

organizations acting to secure Kosovo. The SRSG remained responsible for deciding parameters for the reconstruction of the 

country and the establishment of its institutions.14 Although 

UN authorities influenced, to a significant degree, all aspects 

of government in post-conflict Kosovo, the most salient to the 

development of strategic culture was the so-called first pillar of 

the mission, humanitarian assistance, later renamed justice and 

security. This particular wing of the UN mission set up two key 

organs of state: the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The latter emerged directly from 

the KLA, and its mandate was initially limited to civil protection and emergency services, confined to addressing the needs 

of municipalities. The diminution of the scope of the former 

fighting force’s purpose was compounded by the decision of 

the SRSG to deny local institutions the remit of national defense and intelligence collection. Instead of initially setting up 

Kosovar institutions to address these areas of policy, the SRSG 

retained control over these state functions.15

As a result, the first half-decade following the end of hostilities in 1999 was marked by the absence of local Kosovar 

14 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244. In addition, it is worth noting the conclusion of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo with 

regard to the concept of reserved powers. The body argued that, as a result of this 

mechanism, “instead of the substantial self-government promised the Kosovars under Resolution 1244, they will instead get very limited autonomy.” The Follow-Up 

to the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence? (Stockholm: Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2001), 20.

15 Florian Qehaja, International or Local Ownership?: Security Sector Development 

in Post-Independent Kosovo (Washington, DC: Westphalia Press, 2017), 55–56.
184 george bogden

security actors from the primary institutions that typically play 

host to a state’s strategic culture. UNMIK remained particularly stubborn about the creation of an independent Kosovar 

defense bureaucracy. UN authorities refused to hand over responsibilities incrementally with regard to national security. 

The UN mission justified its draconian stance based on a rigid 

application of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Steps to 

amend this policy were never charted, let alone adopted, before 

specific guidance from UN Headquarters made a gradual transition mandatory.

An intermediate step toward greater integration of local 

security forces was initiated in 2005. In that year, UNMIK began the formal procedure of an annual Internal Security Sector 

Review (ISSR). This program monitored the operation of security institutions, proposing means of increasing their capacities 

and producing greater self-sufficiency. Eventually, the ISSR 

identified goals to be orchestrated by Kosovar leaders. ISSR 

recommendations were the product of attempted engagement 

with a broad diversity of civic leaders in Kosovo. Planners accepted advice and guidance from a representative cross-section 

of urban and rural communities. Nonetheless, the individuals 

driving the process—conducting interviews and compiling 

reports—always hailed from international organizations.16

They were inherently removed from the local view of security 

imperatives on the ground because they were separated by their 

experience from the outlook of those who lived through the 

war for independence. Only in its second year did the ISSR begin to recommend greater involvement and further input from 

conflict survivors, as well as returned members of the diaspora. 

UNMIK responded by hiring Kosovars more often and design16 Florian Qehaja and Mentor Vrajolli, Context Analysis of Security Sector Reform 

in Kosovo, 1999–2009 (Pristina: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2011), 14.
chapter five 185

ing channels of communication with members of civil society 

invested in questions of national defense.17

Subsequent processes undertaken between 2006 and 2008 

deeply impacted Kosovo’s strategic culture after formal independence arrived. Intermittent episodes of unrest, punctuated 

by riots and coinciding with the mass exodus of ethnic Serbs, 

served as a prelude to contentious negotiations that began in 

2006 regarding Kosovo’s final status, as had been prescribed by 

the UN Security Council. The appointment of Martti Ahtisaari 

as UN special envoy in February 2006, led to a lengthy period of exchange among international stakeholders about how 

Kosovo would be governed in the future. Leaders in Belgrade 

and Pristina stridently disagreed about the extent of self-rule 

that Kosovo should be accorded. The special envoy submitted a 

“plan” for independence “supervised by the international community” a year after his appointment.18 This document, which 

enumerated guiding principles for Kosovo’s integration into 

the international community, aimed to serve as a framework 

for action by the UN Security Council to fulfill the end goal 

proposed by the special envoy. Russian opposition ensured that 

a Security Council resolution implementing the Ahtisaari Plan 

17 This reality is reflected in the report, Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) in 

Kosovo (Pristina: United Nations Development Programme, 2006). 18 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Special Envoy of the SecretaryGeneral on Kosovo’s Future Status, S/2007/168 (New York: United Nations Security 

Council, 26 March 2007), 5.
186 george bogden

never passed.19 Violation of state sovereignty remains the principle objection cited by Moscow’s permanent representative 

to the UN, who has consistently threatened to veto Security 

Council resolutions that would end UNMIK, despite strong 

support for doing so among the original intervening parties.20

Kosovo’s Emergent Autonomy

In the aftermath of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, the international community began to incorporate local 

elites selectively into leadership roles in the slowly developing 

institutions dedicated to Kosovo’s national defense. Unfortunately, these measures were not nearly as egalitarian or inclusive 

as those proposed earlier by the ISSR. Florian Qehaja, executive director and cofounder of the Kosovar Center for Security 

Studies, points out the emergence in state institutions of what 

19 See Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123–25. Russia’s late opposition to these 

plans came after a troika made up of representatives from its government, as well 

as from the European Union and the United States, engaged in a series of negotiations lasting three months. In the ad hoc intergovernmental body’s report to 

the UN Secretary General, the governments jointly argued that “the parties were 

unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s status,” stating that “neither side was 

willing to yield on the basic question of sovereignty.” See Report of the European 

Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo, S/2007/723 (New York: 

UN Security Council, 2007). As a result, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reiterated the position sustained in the letter sent from his office on 26 March 2007. 

It stated to the president of the Security Council that “having taken into account 

the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I 

fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report 

on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 

Settlement.” The International Court of Justice noted in its advisory opinion on 

Kosovo’s independence that it was Russia’s opposition amid these developments 

that led the drafters of the Security Council Resolution in pursuance of the Ahtisaari Plan—France, Italy, the United States, Belgium, and the United Kingdom—

to withdraw the measure from consideration. See “Accordance with International 

Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence with Respect to Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,” International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010.

20 Henry H. Perritt Jr., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 42–45.
chapter five 187

he refers to as a KLA elite. This term captures the prominent 

political position assumed by former commanders in the KLA, 

and the willingness of the international community to recognize their authority for the sake of ensuring stability. These individuals, who identified overwhelmingly as Albanian Sunni 

Muslims, brought with them a deep fear of the reemergence of 

conflict, as well as an abiding motive to prepare for the return 

of hostilities. Their experience of fighting a war from a position 

of disadvantage—in terms of numbers, armaments, and knowhow—made them permanently wary of renewed fighting.21

The rise of the KLA elite coincided with the greater authority accorded to the state over the security sector. Once ratified, 

the country’s new constitution required that “the Republic of 

Kosovo has authority over law enforcement, security, justice, 

public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response, and border control within its territory.”22

Despite this legal transformation that entailed greater local 

control over the security sector, the international community 

remains deeply invested in its role of oversight and management regarding Kosovo’s security. The Ahtisaari Plan serves as a 

reference for the development of institutions that protect and 

defend Kosovo, with the International Civilian Office (ICO) 

now acting as a watchdog for deviations from the terms of the 

settlement. The ICO regularly intercedes in the security sector 

when its staff receives reports of inconsistencies between the 

laws and policies of the Kosovar government and the stated 

goals and expectations of the Ahtisaari Plan. The European 

Union’s (EU) “rule of law mission”—known as EULEX—similarly intervenes on a regular basis in matters of internal policy 

making. NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), which initially conducted the full panoply of necessary peacekeeping operations, 

21 Qehaja, International or Local Ownership?, 61–42. 22 Republic of Kosovo Const., art. CXXV.
188 george bogden

serves as another example of consistency rather than change 

amid the country’s transition to formal independence. Its mandate has never been substantially altered in writing since the 

force’s initial creation. Despite more than 80 percent reduction 

in boots on the ground—from 50,000 troops at the height of 

KFOR’s presence in 1999, down to 8,000 after independence 

in 2008—NATO remains a constant arbiter of key security 

questions. KFOR’s operational emphasis has shifted toward 

maintaining peace in the northern part of Kosovo, especially 

around Serbian enclaves. Some progress toward greater autonomy has occurred: KFOR has transferred most border control 

duties, which it previously entirely controlled, to the KPS. 

With regard to the development of Kosovo’s early strategic culture, nowhere has the push and pull of international 

versus domestic influences been more consequential than in 

the creation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). This institution was designated to supersede the vestiges of the KLA 

and the formally disbanded KPC. After the conclusion of the 

UN special envoy on Kosovo status’s work, Ahtisaari and his 

staff prescribed the establishment of the KSF in precise terms. 

Ahtisaari recommended 2,500 active, lightly armed personnel, with 800 servicemembers in reserve. Their remit would 

be limited strictly to disaster relief and civil protection. This 

idealized role for the KSF was connected to the international 

community’s demands for demilitarization and disbandment 

with dignity, which sought to eliminate militant, nationalist 

organizations that aimed to ensure Kosovo’s security.23 Embedded in this approach was a deep and abiding belief that these 

kinds of informal institutions would damage Kosovo’s position 

as an avowedly multiethnic society, with a security sector that 

equally represented all minority communities. 

23 Ade Clewlow, The Kosovo Protection Corps: A Critical Study of Its De-activation as 

a Transition (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010).
chapter five 189

The steps to disband existing militias and discourage new 

ones stirred resentments. First, these maneuvers operated on 

the presumption that Kosovo’s Albanian population, which 

understandably felt under threat, should not maintain militias 

to protect their communities. In addition, the KSF’s strictures 

created a backlash because they compromised the careers of 

many fighters who saw themselves remaining involved in national defense. The KSF would not allow more than 50 percent 

of the KPC to become part of the KSF. Uncertainties associated with the reintegration of KPC members became an important concern. Civilian employment for the majority of the 

KPC members was tied directly to the preservation of international support for Kosovo’s statehood. This progression of 

events seemed overbearing to vocal representatives of Albanian 

communities. The experience left a lasting mark on relations 

between them and international staffs focused on Kosovo’s security sector. The decision to dissolve an existing institution—

the KPC, which had a locally defined role to provide national 

defense—and to supplant it with a new organization with an 

internally defined role led to a great deal of concern among 

local elites about how Kosovo would address future security 

threats.

Dependence and Self-Determination

The Kosovar government’s dependence on external support 

remains tied to the influence of international organizations 

that were present during the nascent stages of security institution development. Despite steps toward autonomy and the 

advent of independence in 2008, Kosovo’s government still relies heavily on the international community. This reality limits 

its capacity to resist external decisions and recommendations, 

even in cases where local politicians express concern that overreliance on outside assurances might not fully ensure Kosovo’s 

stability and security. 
190 george bogden

Kosovo’s dependence on external actors stems primarily 

from the legacy of international support for its economy. This 

fundamental aspect of life in the country—which affects the 

livelihood and long-term prospects of every man, woman, and 

child—is at the forefront of decision making. Desperate to improve Kosovo’s position as the third poorest country in Europe, 

local politicians will do whatever is necessary to avoid creating 

worse economic circumstances. This necessitates shrewd thinking that preserves existing productivity and streams of income, 

which are tied to programs supported through aid initiatives. 

Although Kosovo’s GDP per capita (U.S. dollars) has increased 

from $1,088 in 2000 to $3,641 in 2016, economic dissatisfaction and related civil unrest remain high.

There are three major components comprising Kosovo’s 

economy. First, there is the unusually small sector of local industry that constitutes 16 percent of GDP: 10 percent is in 

manufacturing and 11 percent in agriculture. Ninety-seven 

percent of enterprises in Kosovo are most appropriately termed 

microenterprises, with 1–9 employees in total.24 Second, remittances from the diaspora bolster the economy, but this stream 

of proceeds is hard to measure and subject to considerable 

change from year to year. Many members of the diaspora invest 

in property in Kosovo or undertake short-term, profit-bearing 

projects. 

Finally, there is the flow of aid. The World Bank estimates 

a steady decline from approximately U.S. $782 million in 

2000, down to the present $370 million in 2016.25 Because 

Kosovo’s 2017 GDP totals only $6.6 billion, even the current 

reduced flow of aid accounts for a significant proportion of 

economic activity. Nearly 18 percent of GDP originates from 

24 Republic of Kosovo Systematic Country Diagnostic (Washington, DC: World Bank, 

2017), 35. 

25 “Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, Kosovo,” 

World Bank, updated February 2018.
chapter five 191

international aid agencies tied to governments. When considered in conjunction with Kosovo’s significant unemployment 

rate, 32.7 percent, and its particularly worrisome youth unemployment rate, 57.6 percent, the importance of sustaining 

aid to maintain societal stability becomes apparent. Kosovo has 

remained one the world’s highest per capita recipients of aid for 

nearly two decades.26 The initial emphasis of donors on helping refugees has moved toward enhancing competitiveness and 

building enterprises. Nonetheless, habits have emerged among 

policy makers to incorporate the distribution of aid into many 

political calculations. Even comparatively small reductions in 

aid would make certain enterprises unsustainable and have ripple effects across communities. These alterations can produce 

significant negative effects and adverse political ramifications 

for those in power.

It should come as no surprise that, in this context of deep 

economic dependence, a tendency toward acquiescence to international actors arose and came to pervade Kosovo’s early 

strategic culture. The most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon appeared in the stilted and slow transition of stated 

aims in Kosovo’s National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. 

In a democratic country, comprehensive policy statements typically seek to set out the strategic framework that will guide 

the security sector. Such documents tend to propose a vision 

of reform that scrutinizes existing strengths to secure citizens 

and the state from threats on the horizon.27 Kosovo’s NSS was 

prescribed by the final negotiations on its status, which included the provision that “Kosovo shall develop a security strate26 Republic of Kosovo Systematic Country Diagnostic, 55–57. 27 See definition derived in Democratic Control of Armed Forces, National Security 

Policy (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed 

Forces, 2005).
192 george bogden

gy.”28 The constitution later created the prerogative for local 

political actors to produce this document, providing explicitly 

that “the Security Council of the Republic of Kosovo in cooperation with the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the 

Government develops the security strategy for the Republic of 

Kosovo.”29 The parliament’s 2008 Law on the Establishment of 

the Kosovo Security Council (KSC) suggested that this agency would undertake the drafting and publication of the document, which was planned to be initiated in 2009.30

Despite the legal basis for a robust local role in the creation 

of the NSS, international influence proved overwhelming. Due 

to a lack of capacity in the KSC, Kosovo’s Ministry of Internal 

Affairs took on the task of coordinating the production of the 

first strategy document. The ministry organized several working groups, focused on legal questions, technical concerns, and 

measuring risks, as well as a few dedicated to specific threats. 

Two civil society representatives were recruited to be members. 

Only one international expert contracted with the ministry to 

serve as a consultant and was tasked with assessing the next logical steps to mature the NSS. Although this open and pluralistic process promised to emphasize local perspectives on security 

affairs, involvement by the ICO in Pristina quickly altered the 

course of policy formulation. Drawing on its mandate to ensure compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan, staff from the ICO 

monitored the meetings of the ministry’s working group members. Rather than simply invoking its executive powers, the 

ICO undertook a remarkable intervention. 

This endeavor entailed putting forward a framework for 

the NSS that melded international best practices with steps 

28 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Vienna, Austria: Office 

of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the Future Status Process for 

Kosovo, 2007), 49. 

29 Republic of Kosovo Const., art. CXXVII.

30 Law on the Establishment of the Kosovo Security Council, Law No. 03/L-050.
chapter five 193

toward European integration. Officers from the ICO sought 

to establish a document that did not address certain areas of 

concern for Kosovo’s ministerial staffs. The areas of concern not 

addressed were the pursuit of full international recognition, the 

rise of violent extremist movements, the position of communities in northern Kosovo, wide-ranging quarrels with Serbia 

about territorial demarcations, the fate of minority groups, and 

many other disputes. These topics were omitted with the justification that directly addressing them would potentially worsen 

threats and trigger inflammatory reactions. Kosovo’s international partners urged a focus on less controversial policies. 

The ICO recommended vague references to human security, without ever fully defining the term. International experts 

associated with the organization proposed assessing risks and 

threats through indicators related to economic, environmental, and societal hazards, which avoided any pronouncements 

regarding military and political insecurity.31 As a result, capable members of the technical working group in charge of the 

drafting process resigned. Once critical members of this team 

removed themselves from the process, the ICO proceeded to 

radically change the draft, producing a document that was fundamentally different from the original version’s outlines.32 The 

ICO’s approach was based on a deep concern that hostilities 

must be avoided at all costs. Nonetheless, the impact of this 

initial experience created a lasting impression that the management of the Kosovo security sector would remain deeply 

influenced by the international community.

The ICO’s input was based on a preference for noncon31 The 2009 NSS ended up loosely following the division of threats put forward by 

political scientists Buzan and Weaver in their delineation of national security concerns among democratic states. See Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework 

for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 32 Dennis Blease and Florian Qehaja, “The Conundrum of Local Ownership in 

Developing a Security Sector: The Case of Kosovo,” New Balkan Politics, no. 14 

(2013): 1–20.
194 george bogden

frontation as well as a belief that such an approach would 

contribute to broader stability in the Balkans. To this end, 

the original NSS presumed that the Balkans were becoming a 

peaceful and democratic neighborhood, and that Kosovo was a 

multiethnic society committed to cosmopolitan values. For example, the NSS proposed that Kosovo profess a foreign policy 

in line with the European Union’s creed, “United in Diversity.” 

Unfortunately, this idealistic approach was not mirrored by adjacent states that, unlike Kosovo, did not include international 

actors in the formulation of their security policy. A comprehensive Serbian security strategy was published in 2009, which 

stated that “the introduction of the so-called KSF represents 

a serious threat toward the existing regime of arms control and 

. . . is detrimental toward the balance of powers in the region.”33

These developments were not lost on local government officials 

in Kosovo, who believe that Kosovo has no choice but to take 

antagonistic neighbors seriously.

A delayed reaction among Kosovar security elites in 2012 

eventually produced an entirely separate process that resulted 

in the preparation of the Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR). 

The SSSR was primarily shaped by local bureaucrats and politicians and intentionally sidestepped any past or future disagreements with the NSS. The specific aim of the government 

was to enact a legal framework for the transformation of the 

KSF. The work leading to the SSSR began with a wide-ranging 

review of the security sector and involved input from diverse 

ministries and agencies across Kosovo’s national government. 

The document addressed many issues, including the specter of 

Islamist extremism. The document proposed retaining the KSF 

and creating the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) to be dedicated to addressing external threats. After the publication of the 

33 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade: Government of 

Serbia, Ministry of Defence, 2009), 8.
chapter five 195

SSSR in March 2014, the prime minister of Kosovo, Hashim 

Thaçi, announced that the KAF would be comprised of 5,000 

active members and 3,000 reserve members, with the establishment of a Defense Ministry to follow by 2019.34

Polling conducted among Kosovo’s population by the 

Pristina-based Centre for Security Studies demonstrated wide 

support for this approach. A survey conducted within one year 

of the change in policy suggested that 87 percent of citizens 

in both domestic and rural contexts preferred the decision to 

transform the KSF into the KAF. The option to maintain the 

KSF as it was implemented by the NSS was supported by only 

6 percent of respondents.35 These statistics indicate the divergence between local perspectives on strategic matters and the 

desire of international partners to promote change in that collective outlook. The maturation of the policy making process 

and the similar growth of an organic strategic culture was in 

step with the sentiments of Kosovo’s citizens.

It is crucial to note that these dynamics are not endemic 

to Kosovo. “Getting to Denmark,” as Francis Fukuyama said 

regarding state-building, is harder than many international organizations assume it to be. The creation of stable, democratic 

societies has proven elusive in many post-conflict and so-called 

failed states. Recipes for effective institutions, a homegrown 

and credible postwar defensive posture, and local preferences 

for formal rules over informal relationships are hard to come 

by. As Fukuyama suggests, a general theory of development 

aimed at supplying these attributes of the state, based on stu34 The following report was issued to flesh out the prime minister’s proclamation: 

Analysis of Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo (Pristina: Government of Kosovo, 2014).

35 Qehaja, International or Local Ownership?, 93–94. For important context, see 

Nihat Çelik’s work indicating this disposition for outward-looking defense forces 

throughout the Balkans. Nihat Çelik, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations 

and Democratization in the Balkans,” Journal of Regional Security 7, no. 1 (2012): 

1–15.
196 george bogden

dious attempts to replicate the historical progress of successful 

peers, will likely remain a chimera for the foreseeable future.36

Yet, less than perfect outcomes do not dissuade bodies such as 

the ICO from attempting to shape the security policies that 

salve consciences more than solve problems posed by hostile 

environments.

A Domestic Crucible: 

Specialist Chambers and War Crimes

Veterans of the bureaucratic processes associated with the creation of national security documents might read the previous 

section with wise skepticism. Official tracts like the NSS and 

SSSR often obscure as much as they reveal, reflecting the tendency of political actors to put forward pretexts to mask their 

true interests and motives. Just as with any writing associated 

with public affairs, these valuable pieces of evidence deserve 

special scrutiny and should be considered in tandem with other 

evidence. For that reason, it is important to examine an issue that 

reveals less savory—and perhaps less flattering and presentable

—aspects of Kosovo’s relationship with its surrounding region 

and the wider world. The prosecution of Kosovar war criminals 

provides just such a cross section of fears, concerns, and tensions, which occasionally spill into public view.

Before addressing this touchstone issue, it is important to 

explain the turmoil that often engulfs controversial legislation 

in Kosovo. Unsurprisingly, it does not take much to stir the 

fears of the voting public who are still traumatized by war. The 

country’s internal deliberations exhibit turbulence that is common among states attempting to transition to democracy after 

suffering decades of authoritarian rule. This disputatious political environment usually creates turmoil when sensitive issues 

36 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 29.
chapter five 197

are raised such as the fate of Serbian ethnic enclaves and unresolved border demarcations. Compromise on these issues can 

easily be portrayed as jeopardizing the territorial integrity for 

which blood was shed. Sentiments fueled by recent memories 

easily change into destructive behavior. 

The most familiar trope associated with media coverage 

of Kosovo arose from the opposition’s repeated use of tear gas 

in the parliament chamber to stop votes on pending legislation. These episodes should not be read as blanket evidence 

that Kosovo’s government perpetually slips into disarray. For 

one thing, these dramatic acts are essentially the protestations 

of political minorities in a given debate who believe they have 

no other recourse short of violent confrontation with the majority. They indicate a desperation to maintain the status quo. 

It would be wrong to ignore the seriousness of these incidents, 

or to claim they do not represent deep dysfunction in Kosovo’s domestic political system. However, they provide very little substance or insight for those studying Kosovo’s strategic 

culture. Discerning relevant insights from the froth and wailing that accompanies legislation on war crimes prosecutions 

requires careful attention.

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers, which seek to prosecute 

war criminals, have had an irreversible impact on Kosovo’s strategic culture. Focused on the period from 1998 to 2000, the 

Specialist Chambers were created to deal with the findings first 

put forward by Dick Marty, a Swiss politician. Authored under 

the auspices of the Council of Europe, his report argued that 

war crimes had been committed by the Albanian paramilitary 

organizations that fought to free Kosovo from Serbia.37 The 

Specialist Chambers, which function as a court, were commissioned by the state specifically to address alleged crimes com37 Dick Marty, Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs 

in Kosovo (Strasbourg, France: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 

2010).
198 george bogden

mitted by soldiers and leaders in the KLA. These individuals 

are accused of committing atrocities against “ethnic minorities and political opponents” during and directly after the war 

of liberation.38 Early on in Kosovo’s development as a state, 

these revelations led EULEX to prompt its Special Investigative Taskforce to examine the council’s claims further. EULEX 

prosecutors ruled that facts were adequate for the prosecution 

of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although EULEX 

initiated prosecutions of the approximately 1,200 war crimes 

cases referred to it by UNMIK, 500 were dismissed and 600 

remain pending within various offices of prosecutors. EULEX 

has initiated 51 new cases; yet, since independence, it has only 

fully adjudicated 15 war crimes cases.39

Because of the perceived slow-moving and limited prosecution of these cases by existing bodies such as EULEX, the 

international community has consistently pushed for further 

measures. The Specialist Chambers is an institution dedicated 

to this purpose. Years of advocacy in this regard led the Kosovo 

Assembly to enact a series of laws, culminating in a constitutional amendment in 2015, to allow accused Kosovar citizens 

to be tried outside the country in The Hague. Created by Kosovar law, the court’s location ensures adequate protection for 

witnesses.40

Progress toward achieving the stated goals of the Specialist 

Chambers has stalled. Wave after wave of opposition to the 

commencement of adjudication are to blame. Most recently, 

in late 2017 and in early 2018, legislation was introduced in 

Kosovo’s parliament to prevent the court from beginning its 

proceedings. These measures were supported by Kosovo’s rul38 “Kosovo Court to be Established in The Hague,” Government of the Netherlands, 15 January 2016.

39 Bernd Borchardt, “EULEX and War Crimes,” EULEX Kosovo, 14 March 2017.

40 Marija Ristic, “New Kosovo Court Confronts Witness Protection Fears,” Balkan 

Insight, 3 October 2016.
chapter five 199

ing coalition—the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Alliance 

for the Future of Kosovo, and the Initiative for Kosovo. For 

now, this scheme has failed to pass. Despite its legal preservation, the Specialist Chambers recently lost its chief prosecutor, 

David Schwendiman, who resigned in March 2018.41

Two crucial security-related themes are revealed by these 

bottlenecks, which demonstrate aspects of Kosovo’s incipient strategic culture. First, popular and political sentiments 

are firmly set against the legal processes to prosecute crimes 

undertaken by militias against the Serbian military, as well as 

unrelated acts committed under the banner of that cause. Interestingly, most of the crimes on the docket for prosecution 

have been reported by Kosovar citizens against their fellow 

citizens. Individual members of the national community feel 

wronged by political killings, acts of sexual violence, and many 

other nefarious activities. Yet, the Specialist Chambers serve as 

a potential threat to nationalist sentiment, which is a vital constituent component of Kosovo’s strategic culture. 

The war of liberation remains a sacrosanct narrative that 

emphasizes the moral righteousness of freedom fighters seeking independence. As such, it must not be challenged, even if 

the aggrieved parties are fellow ethnic Albanians. Those who 

dispute this view are to be shunned. Countrywide polling on 

public confidence in the chambers’ witness protection policies 

reflect these biases. Individuals who might betray the publicly 

accepted account of the war do not believe they will escape 

retribution for doing so, regardless of the setting (in domestic 

courts, or abroad in the Netherlands—at the chambers’ proposed location). Others believe that testimony, which complicates the Manichean narrative to be an unforgivable offense in 

itself. For example, 82 percent of ethnic Serbs and nearly one41 Marija Ristic, “Kosovo Special War Court Prosecutor to Step Down,” Balkan 

Insight, 15 February 2018.
200 george bogden

half of all ethnic Albanians do not believe it is safe for witnesses to deliver testimony. Nonetheless, strong majorities of both 

Albanians (64.8 percent) and Serbs (53.2 percent) feel war 

crimes committed from 1998 to 2000 must be adjudicated.42

The contradictions embedded in this public opinion reflect 

the crosscurrents in collective beliefs about Kosovo’s position 

in the region. For the country to remain secure, it is believed, 

the moral claims that justified its fight for independence must 

remain untarnished. These imperatives still undergird its right 

to exist.

Second, the controversy surrounding the Specialist Chambers reflects the sense of persecution and embattlement shared 

among ethnic Albanians. Despite widespread public campaigns to educate the public about the domestic, legal basis for 

the court, opposition to it remains associated with the plight 

of Albanians in a region previously dominated by Serbia. Parliamentary attempts to close the Specialist Chambers emanated 

from movements among the public that articulated this view. A 

petition filed by KLA veterans became the clearest expression 

of the belief that the court served an inherently discriminatory 

purpose. They and others in Kosovo’s society argued that, because the Specialist Chambers will indict only Kosovo citizens, 

it will not fairly address crimes committed by Serbian forces. 

These claims, of course, disregard the fact that the court was 

created by the Kosovo state specifically to prosecute crimes of 

citizens under the jurisdiction of the state. Nevertheless, the 

continued pull of these arguments shows no signs of abating. 

Polling from last year indicated that, among ethnic Albanians, 

76.4 percent view the court’s mandate as unacceptable because 

it emphasizes war crimes and crimes against humanity mainly 

associated with the KLA. Fifty-one percent of the same group 

42 Michael James Warren et al., Public Perception of the Kosovo Specialist Court: Risks 

and Opportunities (Utrecht, Netherlands: PAX, 2017), 4–6.
chapter five 201

are willing to protest further if KLA fighters are eventually 

indicted, and 36 percent are willing to take action—beyond 

protesting—to stop the prosecution of KLA members.43 Here 

again, a sense of embattlement, persecution, and the necessity 

of preserving the capacity for defense are reflected in popular 

opinion.

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated Kosovo’s strategic culture, providing 

insights not ordinarily available in the vast literature on the 

country’s position as a post-conflict society. The capacious definition of strategic culture set out by this volume undoubtedly 

may be mapped onto the information presented here. Elites 

in Kosovo most certainly have developed identifiable shared 

beliefs, assumptions, and patterns of behavior, constructing for 

themselves ways, means, and ends for achieving security. 

When assessing these attributes, it is clear in Kosovo’s case 

that they have just as often been shaped through interactions 

with supportive external actors, as through encounters with 

hostile, nearby foes. A central theme of this analysis has been 

to highlight the agency of a people whose destiny has been 

so fully determined, since independence, by outside actors—

NATO, the UN, the EU, and others. Simply because these 

non-Kosovar actors have influenced Kosovar strategy does not 

mean that Kosovars have themselves failed to muster responses 

based on their own conceptions of strategy. Throughout the 

period of Kosovo’s earlier development, local elites have accepted, rejected, and modified the standards and concepts provided 

to them by outsiders. In fact, the response by local political 

elites—to the dissolution of the KPC, to the NSS, and to the 

Specialist Chambers—indicates their development of methods 

43 Warren et al., Public Perception of the Kosovo Specialist Court, 1–6.
202 george bogden

for coping with and altering aspects of their strategic policy 

that they do not fully control. As a result, their interaction with 

the international community has often showcased the independent will of the Kosovar people. To deny this would be to disregard their agency altogether. 

Another important theme, which naturally complements 

this primary finding, relates to the divergence of Kosovar and 

international perspectives on what its security policy should be. 

Members of the international community overseeing Kosovo’s 

transition have often put forward ambitious plans. They seek to 

change Kosovo through a regime of good governance, replete 

with administrative steps that celebrate Kosovo’s multiethnic 

status and that avoid direct confrontation with problematic 

neighbors. This path—according to well-meaning, international actors—is the way to maintaining peace and prepare 

the country for European integration. Kosovars on the ground 

often view the time line and horizon of threats differently. 

They argue pragmatically for policies that will address existing 

threats from countries around Kosovo that could seek to dominate it. Obviously, these conflicting visions are the result of 

different strategic cultures. Local politicians, bureaucrats, and 

members of the media often advocate for traditional means of 

wielding hard power while formulating national security priorities and policies that comport with short-term goals. The 

conflict between this vision and that of external actors remains 

highly consequential.

Unlike other cases evaluated in this book, Kosovo has not 

developed strategic culture by deriving it directly from an uninterrupted, long history of wars conducted as an independent 

state. However, it would be wrong to suggest that this amounts 

to evidence that Kosovars themselves have yet to understand 

their role in a dangerous neighborhood of states. In a world 

that has turned against the kind of Western intervention that 
chapter five 203

brought Kosovo into being, this autonomy will remain crucial. Kosovars will likely need to seize the reigns of their policy 

prerogatives, act on their assessment of local challenges, and 

prepare for the turbulence resulting from further American and 

European disengagement.

205

Conclusion

by Matthew R. Slater, PhD

Parting Thoughts 

on the Strategic Culture Approach

The methodological issues associated with data from different levels of analysis are increasingly gaining the attention of 

practitioners and academics. Strategic culture falls into this 

category by existing between the seams of the international, 

domestic, and individual levels of analysis.1

 Strategic culture’s 

controversy is amplified by existing at the crossroads of academic disciplines, including international relations, history, geography, and sociology. The evidence of strategic culture’s value 

may be found in the fact that, despite its disruptive nature, it 

has endured and even flourished since Jack L. Snyder brought 

attention to the term in 1977. There are advantages and disadvantages to existing in the theoretical middle ground: strategic 

culture offers researchers additional choices to consider, but it 

is also more vulnerable to criticism since it defies traditional 

methodologies. This concluding chapter will provide an overview of research insights that emerged from the five case studies. These findings are reviewed below in thematic sections. 

1

 Strategic culture is primarily focused at the domestic level of analysis but also 

considers strategic leadership (individual) and the impact of regional and international influences.
206 matthew r. slater

Which History?

The application of strategic culture requires the author to use 

history in its proper context. However, that is often easier said 

than done. Which history of the state is the most relevant? The 

overreliance on recent history could miss the subtle influences 

from hundreds of years ago, or what may be referred to as a 

reductive fallacy that tries to reduce complexity and in the process changes or distorts facts.2

 An author who wants to prove 

the persistence of certain cultural patterns of behavior from the 

distant past may be biased toward finding reoccurring behavior 

in modern governments. The case studies from this book provide a few suggestions on how to effectively assess the past in 

combination with current state dynamics. 

In the Brazilian case study, Denise Slater points out that 

the recent accommodation between the military and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Itamaraty, was key to 

melding the nation’s strategic culture into a coherent whole. A 

common view between the two institutions began to coalesce 

after the last regime change, when the military gave way to 

democracy in 1985. Since that time, the two organizations 

worked together, and despite their differences forged a shared 

view of Brazilian national interests and how to achieve them. 

The China case study relies primarily on Confucianism to 

explain the elements of consistency in its strategic culture, but 

through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Christopher D. 

Yung points out how difficult it is to isolate the individual aspects of a strategic culture with thousands of years of history. 

How does one begin to evaluate which era is most relevant 

to the collective whole? The advent of the most recent political system is an important starting point, but Yung also assesses the traditions, philosophies, and influences of the past 

2

 David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought

(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 172.
conclusion 207

against current political dynamics. The Chinese revolution had 

a sweeping impact on traditional political, economic, and social systems, but Confucianism continues to influence Chinese 

decision making. 

The Brazilian case suggests that strategic culture analysis 

should begin with recent history—perhaps with the most recent regime change. The China example tells us about the importance of understanding recent regime changes along with 

the deeply embedded traditions of the past.

New States, Old States, and Strategic Culture

Strategic culture assessment is dependent on historical trends 

and patterns that form the foundation for a historical narrative. Because of this, one might assume that understanding the 

strategic culture of a state with an established history is less 

complicated than the study of the emerging history of newly 

founded states. The logic of this argument is that the longer 

the history, the greater the likelihood of discerning consistent 

patterns of behavior. 

However, there are also disadvantages to researching states 

with an extensive history. The Afghanistan and Chinese case 

studies show us that the researcher must possess expertise that 

extends potentially hundreds of years into the past to adequately assess strategic culture. Not only must the author understand 

the breadth of a state’s history, but they must also be able to 

assess what parts of history endure to impact current strategic 

culture. Choosing which history to focus on is likely the most 

controversial aspect of the strategic culture concept: an overreliance on a particular era may bias the results of a study. More 

recent states such as Kosovo, with its newly forming institutions, allow for less complexity about what to assess, although 

the cultures within the state may have celebrated histories that 

must be factored into strategic culture assessment.

What is meant by the term new states? The most funda-
208 matthew r. slater

mental meaning insinuates that the government of a state was 

recently established. A new political regime will undoubtedly 

impact strategic culture due to changes in bureaucracies, laws, 

foreign policy, a reordering of interest groups, and many other 

revisions. However, governmental change should not assume 

a completely different path for the historical narrative. Subgroups of the state may possess histories that are much older 

than the political order, as in the case of Kosovo and the Albanian and Serbian subgroups. This begs the question: At what 

point in time should a researcher begin their historical assessment? For example, the current Brazilian government began 

in 1985, it became a republic in 1889, and declared its independence from Portugal in 1822. Many Brazilians believe the 

state’s inception occurred after defeating the Dutch in 1654. 

Which of these dates should be used as a starting point to evaluate Brazil’s strategic culture?

The most accurate answer is that every case study will be 

unique. One method suggested by the Chinese and Brazilian 

case studies is to approach strategic culture from the perspective of recent history and then move back through time, carefully eliminating the historical outliers from your assessment. 

If the author chooses to ignore a seemingly influential era in 

a state’s history, they must do so with caution and justify why 

there is a lack of relevance. This method assumes that the most 

recent political, military, and social institutions will likely have 

the most importance to current strategic culture.

The Kosovo case study demonstrates that, although history will always be a major component of strategic culture assessment, the lack of state history does not preclude the value 

of strategic culture assessment. Studying the emerging institutions, politics (internal and external), and group dynamics in 

Kosovo demonstrates the cognitive dissonance that will shape 

the character of its emerging strategic culture. The lack of consistency in strategic decision making made George Bogden’s as-
conclusion 209

sessment more challenging. He highlighted the domestic-level 

sources of influence and their clash with regional and international institutions. The author was able to provide a coherent 

picture of Kosovo’s strategic range of options, despite the new 

state’s emerging policies and institutions.

Dealing with Composite Regimes

Failing states frequently capture the interest of U.S. foreign and 

defense policy makers. They are often the epicenter of regional 

instability because they foster competition among neighboring states; produce refugees, causing both internal and external 

displacement; attract outside and internal terrorist groups; and 

disrupt regional trade. Failing states usually possess fragmented governance. The central government typically maintains a 

strong presence in the capital and in other urban centers or 

nearby provinces. Competing political or ethnic groups may 

control spaces ranging from an entire province to more localized areas such as a village. 

This patchwork of governance, or composite regimes, challenges the utility of strategic culture.3

 Is strategic culture only 

useful in the case of states with developed internal strategic 

communities? Vern Liebl’s Afghanistan case study demonstrated that regardless of the limitations posed by composite regimes, 

the search for unifying history and institutions within Afghanistan yielded interesting results. Despite the limited control of 

the federal government, there were integrating features such as 

Pashtunwali and manteqa that help explain Afghanistan’s consistently decentralized historical narrative. The mutual disdain 

and resistance against invaders permeate all ethnic groups, and 

despite the political autonomy from each other and the federal 

3

 The term composite regimes was coined by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. It 

is defined as: “Regimes in which different systems of rule shape the contentious 

repertoires of different populations.” Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious 

Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163.
210 matthew r. slater

government, they historically come together under manteqa to 

resist outside attack. These informal but universal features of 

Afghanistan’s strategic culture inform practitioners about unifying characteristics that begin at the micro level and impact 

behavior at the national level. The Afghanistan case study may 

be a starting point for researchers dealing with the challenges of 

applying strategic culture to highly decentralized states. Rather 

than focusing on federal-level institutions or policies, perhaps 

more answers will be found at the lower levels of governance.

National Strategic Communities

Chapter two mentions the term national strategic communities. This refers to the institutions, groups, or individuals that 

are internal to the state and make a significant contribution 

to the strategic culture. The Chinese case study refers to the 

Communist Party as the primary national strategic community, whereas the Brazilian case study refers to the military and 

the Brazilian foreign service as integral institutions. The Kosovo case study focuses on the office of the prime minister, the 

KLA, and outside influences such as the International Court 

of Justice, among others. The Afghan strategic community is 

decentralized among multiple competing power centers, but 

the common thread between them is the Pashtunwali and the 

manteqa. These examples show that the concept of national security communities is flexible and allows a great deal of latitude 

for the researcher. This flexibility may be viewed as a disadvantage if one’s purpose was to construct theory, but works to the 

advantage of a practitioner who seeks to describe the unique 

strategic culture of a given state.

There is a great deal of potential research by employing 

the perspective of national strategic communities. Understanding the composition of national strategic communities is an 

important first step. How should the components of national 
conclusion 211

strategic communities be categorized? What is the relationship 

between them? Other lines of inquiry may compare the national strategic communities of individual states to determine 

if types of strategic communities will generate similar state 

behavior. Modeling tools such as social network analysis may 

help decipher how state strategic communities are organized 

and how decisions are made that lead to a standardization 

of national strategic community types. Although similarities 

between communities would likely be superficial and still require research to understand the unique elements of individual 

states, a taxonomy may facilitate comparative analysis and further the study of strategic culture.

The Challenge of Dependent States

The case studies in this book highlight the challenges of applying strategic culture to small, newly formed states, such as 

Kosovo. Small states may be heavily influenced by external actors due to their relative vulnerability. The influence of the European Union on Kosovo’s domestic politics demonstrates this 

point. When applying strategic culture to dependent states, it 

is important to discern the level of outside influence. Is it possible to separate an independent strategic culture in these cases 

and how does that influence the research? What is the dividing 

line between independent decision making and choices heavily shaped by the outside power? The European Union seems 

intent on developing Kosovo to be multicultural even when 

the majority Albanian population deeply distrusts the minority 

Serbian ethnic group. 

Even in these cases, strategic culture assessment provides 

relevant descriptions of state behavior by explaining the source 

of outside influences, their agenda, and how they interact with 

the domestic strategic community to achieve their ends. Not 

only does this explain current policy choices for the dependent 
212 matthew r. slater

state, but it may also help qualify how the struggle between the 

domestic strategic community and outside influences generates 

patterns of behavior. 

Research Suggestions and Follow-on Research

Particular lines of research could augment the current strategic culture body of literature, including the topics of complex 

strategic cultures, weak states, the role of subgroups, strategic 

narratives, the concept of national strategic communities, and 

the effect of transnational actors and diasporas. 

Complex strategic cultures offer a unique challenge to 

researchers.4

 When studying complex strategic cultures, the 

author should be prepared to refute counterarguments within 

the literature because of the unsettled nature of the state in 

question. Having issued a “proceed with caution” statement, 

the exploration of these kinds of cultures may also be the 

most rewarding because fewer studies tend to exist. If the author presents a well-documented, cogent assessment, it increases the likelihood of broad acceptance in the community 

of practice.

When studying strategic cultures, the researcher should intentionally include subgroups or informal institutions—even 

in cases where a strong central government is present. Subgroups may play a role in shaping the strategic culture that 

might be missed if not specifically targeted in each study. In 

the case of failing states, the need to include subgroups is selfevident due to a lack of central government control. Even 

in states with strong central governments, researchers may 

strengthen their case by including prominent subgroups and 

institutions. In the final assessment they may not be specifically 

4

 The use of the term complex refers to strategic cultures lacking historical precedent, possessing political decentralization, or may simply be under researched so 

the composition of their strategic culture remains partially understood.
conclusion 213

addressed as a key influence but their impact at the outset of 

study may help the researcher frame their line of inquiry. 

More research would help shed light on the role of the 

strategic narrative in shaping strategic culture and how to apply 

it within the context of strategic culture. A strategic narrative 

may be defined as “representations of a sequence of events and 

identities, a communicative tool through which political actors

—usually elites—attempt to give determined meaning to past, 

present, and future in order to achieve political objectives.”5

 A 

deeper understanding of a state’s strategic narrative is important for several reasons. By identifying a strategic narrative, such 

as Christopher D. Yung and Denise Slater in the China and 

Brazilian case studies, the author may be able to conclude the 

interests, methods, and goals of state governments. 

The case studies indicate that the convergence of a national 

strategic community, usually triggered by external events, plays 

a formative role in strategic culture. In the case of Afghanistan, 

an enduring pattern reemerges when an invasion evokes a common response from major subgroups. The perceived threat to 

the Amazon forced a coherency to Brazilian strategic culture 

that had not been present during the prior 20 years. China 

uses the traditional fear of foreign intervention combined with 

the unity provided by the Communist Party to fuel its national 

cohesion. Kosovo’s strategic culture seems to be defined by its 

perpetual fear of Serbian aggression. Researchers may want to 

begin their assessment by understanding how a state perceives 

current threats, and how that may or may not act as a catalyst 

to unite a state’s strategic community toward a common purpose. 

The role of transnational actors and diasporas are other 

topics of interest not covered in the case studies but suggested 

5

 Alister Miskimmon et al., Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New 

World Order (New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.
214 matthew r. slater

as part of a standard strategic cultural framework by Blagovest 

Tashev in chapter 1. In many states, as demonstrated by the 

European Union’s influence in Kosovo, transnational actors 

may exert influence on a state’s decision-making process and 

outcomes. Diasporas may act as a hidden force of influence 

in some states such as Lebanon. There are now at least twice 

as many Lebanese living abroad than the state’s current population of 6 million. The diaspora may be important actors in 

the economies and politics of some states and their influence 

should be considered.
215

Glossary 

and Abbreviations

Arab League Regional multinational organization of Arabicspeaking countries in Africa and Asia

ASEA Association of Southeast Asian States

BLA Baloch Liberation Army

CENSIPAM Center for the Management and Operation of the 

Amazon Protection System (Centro Gestor e Operacional do Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia)

Durand Line The 2,640-kilometer (1,640-mile) border between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan created by an agreement 

between Sir Mortimer Durand, secretary of the British Indian government, and Abdur Rahman Khan, 

the emir of Afghanistan. It has served as the official 

border between the two nations for more than 100 

years

EIC East India Company

Embrapa Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária)

ESCEME Brazilian Army’s Command and Staff College (Escola de Comando do Estado-Maior do Exército)

ESG Brazilian Army’s War School (Escola Superior de 

Guerra)

EU European Union

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)

Group of Seven Also known as the G7. The Group of Seven, or 

G7, is an international economic organization consisting of the seven largest International Monetary 

Fund-described advanced economies in the world: 
216 glossary and abbreviations

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States

ICO International Civilian Office, a watchdog for deviations from the terms of the Ahtisaari Plan settlement 

in Kosovo

INPA National Institute for Amazonian Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia)

INPE Brazilian National Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais)

Irredentism The policy of the incorporation or reincorporation 

of territory historically or ethnically related to one 

political unit but under the control of another

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

IS-KP Islamic State-Khorasan Province

ISSR Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) initiated by 

the UN in Kosovo. This program monitored the 

operation of security institutions, proposing means 

of increasing their capacities and producing greater 

self-sufficiency

Itamaraty The metonym for the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores)

jirgas Manteqa committees, part of an informal governance system based on the Pashtunwali

KAF Kosovo Armed Forces

KFOR NATO’s Kosovo Force

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or “Committee for State Security”

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS Kosovo Police Service

KSC Kosovo Security Council

Kosovo Specialist Charged with prosecuting war crimes

Chambers

manteqa Composed of several villages and is the actual social 

and territorial unit of rural Afghanistan

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en 

Haïti)
glossary and abbreviations 217

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAS Organization of American States

PIN Brazilian National Integration Plan (Plano de Integração Nacional)

PLA People’s Liberation Army, the armed forces of China 

Rational Assumes that decision makers are rational and would

actor model choose actions that help them achieve their goals

RADAM Radar Mapping Project (Radar da Amazônia), an 

initiative pioneered by the Brazilian government to 

map the country’s natural resources in the Amazon 

using radar and imaging sensors

Realism The study of the material characteristics of the environment to understand the behavior of states

PRODES Satellite Monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon Forest 

(Programa de Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite), which is the Brazilian government’s satellite program to monitor deforestation 

in the Amazon

PS/ACTO Permanent Secretariat/Amazon Cooperation Treaty 

Organization

Schengen The treaty that led to the establishment of the

Agreement Schengen Area in Europe, in which internal border 

checks have been abolished

SDF Japanese Self-Defense Force—military after World 

War II

SISFRON Integrated Border Monitoring System (Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras)

SIVAM Amazon Surveillance System (Sistema de Vigilância 

da Amazônia)

SRGC The special representative of the secretary general, 

an individual tasked by the UN with coordinating 

all aspects of the civilian and military organizations 

acting to secure Kosovo

THAAD A U.S. missile defense system known as Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense

UN United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
218 glossary and abbreviations

UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo

Universal A Chinese notion of harmony based on shared valharmony ues as opposed to Western ideals of balance

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VOC Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or the Dutch 

East Indies Company

Warsaw Pact A mutual defense organization that put the Soviets 

in command of the armed forces of the member 

states. Signed in Warsaw, Poland, the treaty included the USSR, Albania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, 

East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria
219

Index

1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, 

178

A2/AD. See antiaccess/area denial

acme of skill: and Sun Tzu, 91

Afghanistan: borders defined, 118; 

as Britain’s protectorate, 117; 

British involvement in, 118; 

British and Russian interest 

in, 116; corruption in, 123; 

destruction of poppy fields 

in, 56; ethnolinguistic groups 

in, 112; Indian support of 

Afghanistan, 113; King Zahir Shah, 119; lack of separatist movements in, 107; as 

locus of Great Game rivalry, 

117; multiethnic groups in, 

23, 105–6; national anthem 

of, 106; opium production 

in, 110, 122–23; Pashtuns 

in, 108, 109, 124; and Pashtunwali, 125; Prime Minister 

Muhammad Daoud Khan, 

119; religion in, 124, 125; 

several nations within, 105; 

Soviet influence in, 119–20; 

Soviet invasion of, 106, 120; 

Soviet withdrawal from, 121; 

Taliban and, 110, 121; use 

of manteqas, 128, 129, 130; 

U.S. presence in, 56, 122; war 

with Iran, 111

Ahtisaari, Martti: appointment as 

UN Special Envoy, 185; and 

establishment of the KSF, 188

Ahtisaari Plan: development of institutions to protect and defend Kosovo, 187; International Civilian Office (ICO) 

involvement in, 187, 216; 

Russian opposition to, 185, 

186n19

al-Qaeda: in Afghanistan, 121

Amazon: abundance of resources 

in, 149, 152; as a security concern to Brazil, 132, 148, 149, 

153, 154, 156; Brazil’s concern 

over the international community occupying the Amazon, 

8, 9, 14, 154, 156, 157, 165; 

Brazilian Army’s presence in, 

151–52, 155, 156, 157, 165 

169, 170; construction of 

hydroelectric dams in, 153, 

158; deforestation of, 153, 

158, 159, 161, 163, 165; 

destruction causing climactic 

changes, 160; development 

of, 142; effects of Brazilian 

ruralista lobbying on, 162; 

potential foreign intervention 
220 index

Amazon (continued): in, 154, 156, 

157, 165; regions of in Brazil, 

150; strategic importance to 

Brazil, 143

Amazon River, 149, 150

American way of war, 192. See also 

Weigley, Russell F. 

Anti-Japanese War. See Second SinoJapanese War

An Lushan’s Rebellion, 71

antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD), 

75, 79

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 80, 85

Bandung Conference, 84

Baron of Rio Branco, 137

Brazil, and the Amazon: and the 

Amazon Surveillance System 

(SIVAM), 157; as a part of 

Brazil’s strategic culture, 132, 

134, 135, 142, 143, 148, 151, 

165; as a security concern to 

Brazil, 132, 148, 149, 153, 

154, 156; conservation versus development of the Amazon, 161; construction of 

hydroelectric dams in, 153, 

158; and deforestation of 

the Amazon, 153, 158, 159, 

161, 163, 165; droughts in, 

159; economic expansion in 

the Amazon, 151–52, 162; 

effects of ruralista lobby on 

the Amazon, 162, 164; emotional response from outside 

interference, 166, 174; implementation of the Satellite 

Monitoring of the Brazilian 

Amazon Forest to monitor 

the Amazon, 163; and National Defense Strategy, 147, 

160, 165–66; population of 

Amazon region in, 151, 152; 

potential foreign intervention 

in, 8, 9, 14, 154, 156, 157, 

165; regions of the Amazon 

in Brazil, 150; strategic importance to Brazil, 143

Brazil, corruption in, 137, 146, 

163, 164, 165, 173

Brazil strategic culture: and concept of grandeza, 143, 146; 

importance of Itamaraty to, 

136, 137, 138

Brazilian Agricultural Research 

Corporation, 169

Brazilian Army, 167; as a primary 

source of Brazilian strategic 

culture, 155; contribution to 

the National Defense Strategy, 168; development of 

Proamazônia, 169; expansion 

of, 140; mission statement, 

151, 165; presence in the Amazon, 151–52, 155, 156, 157, 

165 169, 170 

Brazilian Military Doctrine, 166, 

171, 174

Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 145, 

147, 149, 166, 168, 171, 173

Carajás Mine, 152

century and a half of humiliation, 

and China: 79, 101

China: attributes of Chinese strategic culture, 86–87; British 

invasion of, 78–79; century 

and a half of humiliation, 

79, 101; concept of universal 

harmony, 82, 83, 84; conflict 

with Japan over the Senkaku 

Islands, 57; Confucianism’s 

influence on strategic culture 
index 221

of, 69, 70, 74; and the “cult of 

the defensive,” 69; identity as 

a defensive strategic culture, 

69, 70; and imperialist powers 

involvement in, 67, 79; merging with nomadic peoples to 

create a unique polity, 76–77; 

use of crossbow against China, 76, 95. See also People’s 

Republic of China

Chinese Civil War, 66, 71, 73, 92

Chinese concept of sovereignty, 86

Clausewitz, Carl von, 25, 73, 87, 

88, 90

Cold War, 7, 21, 30, 38, 40, 41, 

46, 50, 58, 67, 73–74, 90, 

101, 142, 144

Communism, 66, 67, 70–71, 141

Confucius, 69, 70, 82

continentalist state, China as: 75, 

76, 78, 79, 97, 100–1, 102

counternarcotic operations: and 

Brazil, 172; and Colombia, 

156–57

Crimean War, 117

cult of the defensive. See China

cultural sensitivities: as essential to 

understanding strategic culture, 135

dams: hydroelectric dams in the 

Amazon, 153. See also Amazon

Defense White Paper (Brazil), 148, 

149, 160, 168

deforestation: of the Amazon, 153, 

158, 159, 161, 163, 165. See 

also Amazon

Deng Xiaoping, 74

deterrence and coercion: in Brazilian strategic culture, 137; 

in Chinese strategic culture, 

86, 87, 91, 92, 101; nuclear 

weapons as a deterrent, 89, 

90; Soviet notion of deterrence, 7; Western use of deterrence, 89, 90

Diaoyu Islands. See Senkaku Islands

diplomatic identity: in Brazil, 137, 

138; and José Maria da Silva 

Paranhos, 137

drought: in Brazil, 159, 174; relation to the Amazon, 159, 174

Durand Line, 110. See also Afghanistan

Echevarria, Antulio, 88

Elvin, Mark, 77, 78

emotionality of states approach, 

133, 134

emotional responses: as a basis for 

strategic culture, 26, 134; 

emotional response from outside interference, 134, 166, 

174

environmentalists: opposition to 

deforestation of the Amazon, 

153

EULEX, 187; and Special Investigative Taskforce 198. See also 

Kosovo 

European Union, 14, 18, 48, 51, 

55, 187, 194, 211, 214

Fairbank, John King, 72, 76–77

FARC. See Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (a.k.a. the Panchsheel 

Treaty), 84

foreign policy: as part of strategic 

culture, 208; in Brazil, 138, 

146; of China, 71; culturalist 
222 index

foreign policy (continued): approaches to the study of, 19; 

in different political systems, 

46; East Germany’s, 42; in 

the European Union, 61; in 

Kosovo, 194; of the People’s 

Republic of China, 71, 76, 

84; and the rational actor 

model, 16; role of culture in 

states’ use of, 27; the study 

of, 15

Forest Code: of Brazil, 162, 164 

Goldman, Merle, 72, 77

grandeza: Brazilian concept of, 

143, 146

Gray, Colin S., 3, 21, 22, 67, 104, 

133 

gunpowder: Chinese invention of, 

93

Hanson, Victor Davis, 92

harmony versus balance: Chinese 

concept of, 83–84; Western 

ideal of, 83–84

Helmand River, 119. See also Afghanistan

hydroelectric dams. See dams

Iliad, The, 94

indigenous tribes: in Brazil, 154

International Civilian Office (ICO), 

187, 192, 193. See also Kosovo

Internal Security Sector Review. See 

Kosovo

Islam, 124, 125

Itamaraty, 136, 137, 138. See also 

Brazil strategic culture

Japan: Chinese conflicts with, 57, 

66–67, 73, 85

Jashari, Adem, 180

Johnston, Alastair Iain, 5, 22, 29, 

68, 71, 104

King Zahir Shah, 119. See also Afghanistan

Kang, David C., 82 

KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 

Bezopasnostior “Committee 

for State Security”), 120

Kosovo: Albanian population, 189, 

199; collapse of cease-fire, 

181; declaration of independence, 186; end of hostilities, 183–84; dependence on 

external support, 189, 190, 

191; economy of, 190; formal independence of, 185, 

189; Internal Security Sector 

Review, 184; International 

Civilian Office (ICO), 187, 

192, 193; involvement of the 

international community in, 

183; Kosovo prime minister 

Hashim Thaçi, 195; Kosovo 

Specialist Chambers, 197, 

198, 199, 200, 201; National Security Strategy (NSS) of, 

191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 201; 

NATO involvement in, 188, 

201; poverty in, 190, 191; 

prosecution of Kosovar war 

criminals, 196, 107; and the 

Rambouillet Accords, 181; 

Serbian ethnic enclaves in, 

197; Strategic Security Sector 

Review (SSSR), 194, 195, 

196; territorial disputes with 

Serbia, 193; United Nations 

appointment of a special representative of the secretary 

general (SRSG), 183; United 

Nations influence in, 183, 

184, 201; war crimes com-
index 223

mitted by, 197, 199; war of 

liberation, 180, 199

Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 186

Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF), 194, 

195

Kosovo Force (KFOR), 187, 188

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 

180, 181, 182, 183, 188; 

and the KLA elite, 187; war 

crimes committed by, 197–

98, 200, 201, 210

Kosovo Police Service (KPS), 183, 

188 

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 

183, 188, 189, 201

Kosovo Security Council (KSC), 

192

Kosovo Security Force (KSF), 188, 

189, 194, 195

Kosovo Specialist Chambers. See 

Kosovo

Kosovo’s National Security Strategy. 

See Kosovo

li, 87

Liu Huaqing (admiral), 75

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 75

manteqa, 127–28, 129, 130, 209, 

210. See also Afghanistan

Mao Zedong, 73

maritime state: and China, 75, 78, 

79

Marxism-Leninism, 73, 97

Ming dynasty, 71, 72

Milošević, Slobodan, 178, 181, 

182

MINUSTAH, 145, 146. See also 

Brazil

Monroe Doctrine, 75

mounted archer, 76, 95

multilateralism: and Brazil, 138

National Defense Policy (Brazil), 

147, 165, 167, 168

National Defense Strategy (Brazil), 

147, 155, 160, 164, 165, 166, 

168, 169, 170, 171, 172

National Institute for Amazonian 

Research (INPA), 161, 164, 

169

National Institute for Space Research (INPE), 159, 163

National Integration Plan (Brazil): 

and radar project for mapping 

Amazon, 152

new type of great power relationship. See People’s Republic of 

China

nomadic peoples, 76–77

noninterventionism: as part of Brazil’s strategic culture, 138

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 18, 48; air 

strikes against Libya, 49; 

bombing campaign against 

Serbia, 181; expansion of 

NATO into Eastern Europe, 

38; and Kosovo, 182, 187, 

188, 191, 201

nuclear weapons, 89, 90; Chinese 

nuclear doctrine, 101; nuclear 

strategy, 21, 133; Soviet nuclear strategies, 7, 20

Odyssey, The, 94

Opium Wars, 73

organizational culture: of Brazil, 

133, 134, 135, 166, 174, 

177; definition of, 134; of the 

military, 133, 134, 135, 166, 

174, 177; of nondemocratic 

states, 44
224 index

pacifist: cultures, 45

Panchsheel Treaty. See Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

parabellum strategic culture: Chinese behavior and, 72

Paraguayan War. See War of the 

Triple Alliance

Pashtuns, 110, 111; in Afghanistan, 

103, 105, 108, 109, 118, 124; 

conversion to Islam, 125; in 

Pakistan, 109; and Pashtunwali, 125

Pashtunwali, 125, 127, 129, 209, 

210. See also Pashtuns

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 

92

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

Navy, 75, 102

People’s Republic of China (PRC): 

Communism as part of the 

strategic culture, 66, 67, 

70–71; during the Cold War, 

73–74; island reclamation activities, 75, 79; and the militarization of the South China 

Sea, 8–9, 75, 79; new type of 

great power relationship with 

the United States, 84, 85; 

relationship with the United 

States, 81, 84, 85; territorial 

disputes in the South China 

Sea, 8–9, 75, 79, 80, 85, 92. 

See also China

Permanent Secretariat/Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (PS/ACTO), 160; and 

the Amazonian Strategic Cooperation Agenda, 160–61

Plan Colombia, 156–57

populism, 146

Proamazônia, 169

Qin dynasty, 70–71

Qing dynasty, 71, 76, 78, 79

Rambouillet Accords, 181

rational actor model, 16, 20 

realism, 15, 16n1, 17, 19n5, 21–

22, 23, 67n1

redemocratization: in Brazil, 144

Resolution 1244: creation of 

UNMIK, 182; Kosovo and, 

182n13, 183; passed by the 

United Nations Security 

Council, 182

Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC), 156

Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 94

ruralistas: lobbying to develop the 

Brazilian Amazon, 162, 164, 

166

Safavid Empire, 114, 115; occupation of southern and eastern 

Afghanistan, 124

satellite surveillance: Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM), 

157; Satellite Monitoring of 

the Brazilian Amazon Forest 

(PRODES), 163. See also Brazil, and the Amazon

Scobell, Andrew, 69, 70, 72

Second Sino-Japanese War, 66–67, 

73

Senkaku Islands, 57

Serbia: human rights violations 

against Serbians, 181–82; 

rejection of greater autonomy for Kosovo, 180; NATO 

bombing campaign against, 

180; territorial disputes with 

Kosovo, 193

shi, 86
index 225

Shu Changhe, 83

Sino-Japanese Wars, 73. See also 

Anti-Japanese War

soft power, 21n9; and Brazil, 138

Son of Heaven, 96

Song dynasty, 72

South China Sea: territorial disputes in, 8–9, 75, 79, 80, 92

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR)

Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG): and 

Kosovo, 183

state behavior, 9, 10, 19, 211; culturalist approaches to, 8, 22, 

24, 27; patterns of, 30, 42; 

and States Councils of Yugoslavia, 178. See also Serbia

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 

18

strategic culture, 5, 7, 21, 23; using 

the rational actor model to 

analyze, 16

Strategic Security Sector Review

(SSSR), 194, 195, 196. See 

also Kosovo

Sun Tzu, 90, 91

Taliban, 110, 121

Taiping Rebellion, 71

Tang dynasty, 71

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), 85

Third Offset Strategy, 98. See also

People’s Republic of China 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons, 18

tributary system: and China, 80, 

81, 82, 83, 85, 101

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), 120, 121

United Nations (UN), 18, 40, 49, 

80, 123, 145, 160, 161

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 52

United Nations Mission in Kosovo 

(UNMIK), 176, 184, 186, 

198; creation of by the United 

Nations, 182. See also Kosovo

United Nations Security Council, 

182, 186 

universal harmony, 82, 83, 84

Waldron, Arthur, 86–87, 93, 94 

War of Resistance against Japan. 

See Second Sino-Japanese War

War of the Triple Alliance, 140

Warring States period, 70. See also 

China

Warsaw Pact, 120

water scarcity: in Brazil, 173

wei, 86, 91

Weigley, Russell F., 92. See also

American way of war 

Westphalian world order, 82

Wontack Hong, 82

World Bank, 190

Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT), 146

Yongjin Zhang, 83

Yuan dynasty, 76, 95

Zheng He (admiral), 73

Zhou Enlai, 84

Zhuge Liang, 94