THE STAFF RIDE

 FUNDAMENTALS, EXPERIENCES, AND TECHNIQUES

by Peter G. Knight and William G. Robertson

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2020
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Knight, Peter G., author. | Robertson, William Glenn, 1944- author. | 

Center of Military History, issuing body.

Title: The staff ride : fundamentals, experiences, and techniques / by Peter G. 

Knight and William G. Robertson.

Other titles: Staff ride guide.

Description: Washington, D.C. : Center of Military History, United States 

Army, 2020. | Series: Staff ride guide | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020038273 (print) | LCCN 2020038274 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army--Training administrators--Handbooks, 

manuals, etc. | Staff rides--United States--Handbooks, manuals, etc. | 

LCGFT: Handbooks and manuals.

Classification: LCC U283 .K55 2020 (print) | LCC U283 (ebook) | DDC 

355.48071--dc23 | SUDOC D 114.2:R 43/2020

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020038273

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020038274

CMH Pub 70–21

Revised and Expanded 2020

Second Printing 2014

First Printed 1987
v

FOREWORD

Staff rides are a unique and powerful way for today’s leaders to gain 

insight and wisdom from the past for present-day application. In the 

process of absorbing those gains, staff ride participants exercise and 

improve their critical thinking skills, essential creativity, and decisionmaking capabilities. Properly conducted, staff rides re-animate 

historical battles at the actual locations where each contest took place. 

Every staff ride experience provides examples of leadership, tactics, 

operations, strategy, communications, use of the physical terrain, and 

perhaps most importantly, the psychology of people in combat and other 

crises. The examination of these factors and choices, as well as their 

outcome, is just as applicable today as it was in the past. This reference 

guide, combined with personal research and reconnaissance, offers an 

invaluable opportunity for the professional development of leaders by 

enhancing their understanding of the effective use of military force in 

multidomain operations. 

Famous battles like Gettysburg—in which officers like Col. 

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain of the 20th Regiment Infantry, 

Maine Volunteers, exemplified initiative, resolve, and courage in 

the unforgiving crucible of combat—offer valuable principles for 

today’s leaders to study, venerate, and emulate. These leadership 

principles transcend time, space, and technological evolution. By 

the same token, learning from battlefield failures such as Lt. Col. 

George Armstrong Custer’s at the Battle of the Little Big Horn can 

be equally instructive.

Staff rides have become an integral part of leadership 

development and team building, both at professional military 

education institutions and within military units themselves. 

We welcome this update, entitled The Staff Ride: Fundamentals, 

Experiences, and Techniques, as a timely and essential revision of the 

guide that has served us so well for the past thirty years. The wisdom 

contained within these pages provides appropriate guidance for 

those seeking to use a staff ride to enhance the professionalism of 

soldiers and civilians as well as the national security establishment 
vi

as a whole. This revision combines new experiences and innovative 

techniques with well-established fundamentals to emphasize the 

most important elements bearing on the outcome of a battle or 

event, the actions of leadership involved, and the psychology of 

human beings in general. Participants in properly conceived and 

executed staff rides will reap the rewards of enhanced understanding 

of those key elements and of the essential fact that battles are not 

systematic, logical undertakings but rather chaotic contests of 

human beings, with all their frailties and strengths.

Washington, D.C. RYAN D. McCARTHY

October 2020 Secretary of the Army

JAMES C. McCONVILLE

General, U.S. Army

Chief of Staff 
vii

PREFACE

On 3 October 1889, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, renowned soldierscholar and former commander of the 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine 

Volunteers, dedicated a monument to his former unit upon Little Round 

Top on the Gettysburg battlefield. The Medal of Honor recipient 

eloquently explained the importance of military history and articulated 

why people seem to care about it in perpetuity:

In great deeds something abides, on great fields something stays. 

Forms change and pass. Bodies disappear. But spirits linger to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls. And reverent men and 

women from afar and generations that know us not and that we know 

not of, heart-drawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them shall come to a deathless field to ponder and 

to dream. And lo! The shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them 

in its bosom, and the power of the vision shall pass into their souls.1

For the modern national security professional, the intellectual 

and physical journey to a famous, well-preserved battlefield like 

Gettysburg is a truly formative endeavor. Vicariously experiencing 

the conflict through preliminary study; exploring the site; and 

analyzing, contextualizing, and reflecting upon the events that 

took place there enhances one’s understanding and appreciation 

of the realities of war and improves one’s professional knowledge, 

skills, and abilities.

As Dr. William G. Robertson wrote in the original 1987 version 

of this publication, “the combination of systematic historical 

study of a campaign with a visit to the site of operations for the 

purpose of professional military education is [known as] a staff 

ride.”2 In today’s parlance, the staff ride is an experiential learning 

1. Joshua L. Chamberlain, Bayonet Forward: My Civil War Reminiscences, 2d ed. 

(Gettysburg, Pa.: Stan Clark Military Books, 1994), p. 202.

2. William G. Robertson, The Staff Ride (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 1987; Reprint, 2014), p. 4.
viii

event, where the visualization, pondering, and dreaming, to 

which Joshua Chamberlain referred, translate into comprehensive 

observation, analysis, and evaluation of battles, campaigns, or 

events, all of which exercise students’ creativity, critical thinking, 

and decision-making skills. Through the development of these 

essential, professional skills and through the pure and visceral 

connections to the actual area of operations, the staff ride equips 

and inspires military professionals to higher levels of performance 

in the nation’s service. From the U.S. Army’s standpoint, 

General Carl E. Vuono, who was serving as the Army’s chief of 

staff at the time, wrote in a 1988 article for The Army Historian:

The staff ride is more than a mere historical tour that only relates 

what happened. The staff ride is primarily an analytical experience, 

one that allows the student to understand how and why events occurred as they did and to gain insights into what these observations 

mean in today’s military environment. At its best, therefore, the staff 

ride assists participants not only to understand the realities of war, 

but also to improve their professional expertise and the readiness of 

their units.3

The traditional staff ride concept has its roots in late nineteenthcentury Europe. The renowned Field Marshal Count Helmuth von 

Moltke the Elder, chief of the German Great General Staff and 

architect of three campaigns against France that led to the unification 

of Germany in 1871, fervently believed that war, to be understood, 

must be dissected and the parts examined. To that end, in the second 

half of the nineteenth century, Moltke directed a section of the General 

Staff to devote its energies exclusively to the study of military history 

and ordered that all General Staff officers, drawn from the cream of 

the Prussian officer corps, travel to battlefields, study the plans of the 

commanders involved, and relive the battles on the actual ground 

where the fighting took place. In this manner, Moltke believed, his 

officers could understand the interdependence of commanders’ plans, 

logistical considerations, morale factors, and other elements of war.

Maj. Eben Swift developed the first staff ride program in the U.S. 

military, which was similar to Moltke’s example, while he was serving 

as the assistant commandant of the U.S. Army General Service and 

Staff School (now the Command and General Staff College) at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. In July 1906, Swift led a group of twelve 

officers to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to begin a two-week study of the 

Atlanta campaign of 1864. This and other early Fort Leavenworth 

3. Carl E. Vuono, “The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting,” The Army Historian 

12 (Oct 1988), p. 1.
ix

staff rides were conducted on horseback, allowing participants to 

learn and analyze the terrain of the battles they studied.

Since the start of the twentieth century, the U.S. Army War 

College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and 

other Army educational institutions have employed staff riding as 

a technique to further the military education of professional Army 

officers. Distinct from a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) 

and a guided battlefield tour, a staff ride combines rigorous historical 

preparation with the exploration of the actual physical environment 

in which a battle occurred. This revised publication presents timetested fundamentals, new experiences, and innovative techniques for 

effective staff rides that can be used by military and civilian leaders 

across both the Army and the broader national security establishment. 

With enough effort, unit commanders and organizational leaders 

at any echelon can leverage this powerful experiential learning tool 

to develop their subordinates, and, along the way, encourage and 

strengthen the esprit de corps of their unit or organization—something 

all commanders and leaders must consistently strive to do.

After a long hiatus that started in World War II, staff riding 

gradually revived within the U.S. Army in the late 1960s and early 

1970s, as Army War College professor Jay Luvaas developed and 

refined staff ride technique. Additionally, the 1974 publication of 

Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, a historical novel about the Battle 

of Gettysburg, coincided with Luvaas’s efforts. The book became 

required reading, at various times, at the U.S. Army Officer Candidate 

School (OCS), the Military College of South Carolina, the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, the 

U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, and the U.S. Army 

Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course. Concurrent 

with the book’s rising popularity, the Army revived the practice of the 

staff ride, replacing horses with buses and automobiles, expanding 

the range of battles and operations studied well beyond those of the 

American Civil War, and extending the opportunity for participation 

to soldiers and service civilians of all ranks and specialties. 

As staff ride popularity continued to climb throughout the Army 

in the 1980s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), 

having been designated as the coordinator of the Army’s staff ride 

program, asked Dr. William G. Robertson, an associate professor of 

military history at the Command and General Staff College, to create 

a doctrinal guide for conducting staff rides. Robertson, a lifelong 

student of the American Civil War and a veteran of many battlefield 

studies, was uniquely qualified to author the guide. First published 

in 1987, Robertson’s The Staff Ride has been the Army’s doctrinal 

guide for staff rides for more than three decades. While practicing 

and following this original doctrine throughout these thirty years, 
x

the Army has continued to refine the techniques and applications 

of the staff ride. These refinements have been driven in part by the 

expanding scope of war, which now encompasses not only preexisting 

regular and irregular warfare but also new kinds of war such as those 

waged against global terror networks and those waged in multiple 

domains at once, including cyberspace. Now, more than ever before, as 

we adapt to the ever-evolving information age, we must continuously 

train our national security professionals of all ranks and grades to 

think critically and effectively at all levels of war (tactical, operational, 

and strategic), not just those deemed appropriate to their stations. 

Additionally, improved technology has allowed us to enhance the staff 

ride experience itself in ways that we could not have envisioned. 

Thus, as we progress steadily into the twenty-first century, the 

time has come to revise and expand this important publication. 

Dr. Peter G. Knight, Chief of the Field and International History 

Programs Division at CMH, a former assistant professor of military 

history at USMA, and the former Army Reserve Officer Training 

Corps (ROTC) professor of military science at Princeton University, 

with twenty-three years of commissioned service in Army intelligence 

and ten years of experience in planning and executing staff rides, is 

ideally suited to this task. 

The staff ride methodology affords numerous opportunities to 

study all three levels of war both within and beyond the traditional 

context of field campaigns and battles. Indeed, the use of the staff 

ride methodology has proven fruitful in addressing interdisciplinary 

matters of law, political policy, current ideology, and the corresponding 

historical impact each of these has on war and society. In this spirit, 

Knight built upon Robertson’s excellent, time-tested methodology by 

incorporating a variety of new contexts in which to apply the staff ride 

framework. Additionally, Knight canvased the Army History Program 

and the military history field to gather new pedagogical techniques to 

apply to the traditional battlefield case study and beyond. The fruits 

of his tremendous efforts are distilled in the pages that follow to the 

great benefit of all students of military history and the American 

profession of arms.

Washington, D.C. CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

October 2020 Chief of Military History
xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many of the most experienced staff ride practitioners from across the 

Army History Program and the Department of Defense contributed to 

this pamphlet revision. Mr. Kevin Kennedy, Mr. Charles Collins, Mr. 

Gary Linhart, and Dr. Curtis S. King of the Army University Press 

(AUP) Staff Ride Team contributed content from “Train the Trainer 

Walkbook Additions,” which they crafted in September 2008 as a guide 

for future staff ride practitioners. That work, while largely derived from 

Dr. William G. Robertson’s original 1987 version of this publication, 

goes into greater detail on the steps and principles Robertson outlined. 

Additionally, this team has produced the pioneering work “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR),” which has proven invaluable to practitioners constructing and executing virtual staff rides. This body of work 

and several subsequent efforts have helped to adapt and modernize the 

staff ride concept. Col. Jason Musteen, Ph.D., and Col. Raymond Kimball, Ph.D., both professors at USMA, contributed their knowledge and 

expertise in traditional and, especially, nontraditional applications of 

the staff ride methodology. They also provided insight into the potential 

utility of the “reacting to the past” pedagogical technique. Dr. Christopher S. Stowe, Dr. Bradford A. Wineman, and Dr. Paul D. Gelpi of 

the Marine Corps General Staff College contributed their knowledge 

and experience in the revival and modern application of decision-gaming 

technique in staff rides. Dr. J. Britt McCarley, U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Chief Historian, offered sage advice 

based on many years of experience in training and educating the Army. 

I am most grateful to all of these esteemed colleagues for their time and 

significant contributions to this revised publication.

Washington, D.C. PETER G. KNIGHT, Ph.D.

October 2020 Chief, Field and International 

History Programs Division 

U.S. Army Center of Military History

xiii

CONTENTS

FOREWORD  

PREFACE. . 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

2. STAFF RIDES VS. OTHER EXERCISES: WHAT IS 

THE DIFFERENCE? .

Tactical Exercise Without Troops. 

Battlefield Tour. 

Staff Ride .

3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES..

4. PLANNING A STAFF RIDE. 

Staff Ride Leader and Instructor Team Selection..

Staff Ride Selection.. 

Stand Selection and Design  .

Reconnaissance.. 

Logistics.. 

Research Sources  .

Constructing a Staff Ride Walkbook  .

Visual Aids  .

5. THE PRELIMINARY STUDY PHASE  .

Methods.. 

Objectives.. 

Training Aids  .

6. THE FIELD STUDY PHASE. .

The Orientation, Description, and Analysis (ODA) Process.. 

Methodology  .
xiv

7. THE INTEGRATION PHASE. .

Purpose  .

Conducting the Integration Phase.. 

Discussion Methods  .

8. TYPES OF STAFF RIDE EXPERIENCES.. 

Traditional Staff Ride . 

Nontraditional Staff Ride . 

9. STAFF RIDE PEDAGOGY . 

Traditional Techniques . 

Innovative Techniques. .

The Virtual Staff Ride. .

10. CONCLUSION . 

APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES OF STAFF RIDE STANDS  .

Traditional Staff Ride Stand . 

Nontraditional Staff Ride Stand . 

Virtual Staff Ride Stand . 

APPENDIX B. POINTS OF CONTACT FOR 

ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE. .

In the Continental United States. .

In Europe. .

In the Republic of Korea. .

ABBREVIATIONS  .

MAP

D-Day, Omaha Beach, Normandy, France, 6 June 1944 . 

ILLUSTRATIONS

Orienting participants at the Chancellorsville battlefield .

Setting the scene of the Aisne-Marne Campaign. 

Discussing early combat actions in the Ourcq River Valley. 

Describing the cliff assault on Point du Hoc . 

Reviewing the opening phase of the 

 Meuse-Argonne Campaign. .

On location atop Hill 204. .

Assembling outside Ford’s Theatre for the Lincoln 

 Assassination Staff Ride . 

A view of Antietam enhanced with augmented reality . 

Modern view from Widerstandsnest-73. .

Pvt. Harold Baumgarten. .
xv

The Main Navy and Munitions Buildings, ca. 1925. .

Constitution Gardens. .

The Main Navy and Munitions Buildings, ca. 1945. .

The former Liberty Loan Building . 

Digital terrain screenshot of the Shahi Kot Valley . 

Digital terrain screenshot of Landing Zone 13A . 

Students participate in a virtual staff ride . 

Front cover: (top) Joseph A. Seymour leads a World War I Centennial 

staff ride in Montfaucon, France; (middle) David E. Hilkert conducts 

a staff ride at the Battle of First Bull Run; (bottom left) Maj. Gen. Jeff 

Holmes leads a staff ride to the Stones River National Battlefield 

(Tennessee Air National Guard); (bottom right) Jeff McGovern describes 

the details of the battle for Aachen on a staff ride near the Huertgen 

Forest, Germany (30th Medical Brigade).

Unless otherwise noted, all images are from the Center of Military History.

1

INTRODUCTION 1

As a human endeavor, war is emotionally charged and therefore especially difficult to replicate through theoretical formulations. The human 

variables within any war are impossible to isolate or quantify precisely. 

Yet soldiers who are charged with the conduct of war must continually 

strive to prepare themselves to wage it successfully. Multiple methods 

of preparation exist. Direct personal experience may be the best guide, 

but knowledge gained from experience is usually limited in scope and 

often in short supply. Theory can be a substitute for experience, but it 

is far from satisfactory because its application is not always practical or 

realistic. Military history, by contrast, is not nearly as clear-cut as theory 

but can be far more illustrative of the complexities engendered by human 

factors in war.

Carefully integrated into training, the study of military history 

can provide, vicariously, the experience of war that is needed to 

further the professional education of both soldiers and civilians. One 

of the most effective ways to enlist military history in the cause of 

professional military education is to study the operations of opposing 

forces in actual campaigns. Campaigns of all historical periods contain 

valuable learning opportunities. Changes in technology and doctrine 

may render some insights obsolete, yet those same changes may also 

reveal new or timeless insights. Indeed, some lessons from history may 

seem particularly timeless because they spring either from universal 

operational principles or from universal human characteristics.

Military professionals who aspire to higher leadership positions and 

a true mastery of the art of war must absorb and internalize these lessons. They must understand the principles of war so often illustrated 

at the tactical and operational levels of war, and they must develop the 

capacity to think and comprehend in multidimensional, multifaceted, 

and strategic contexts, appreciating both principles and circumstances. 

Their ability to critically analyze complex situations and make timely, 

well-reasoned decisions must become second nature in times of crisis.

Just as the study of military history provides valuable and applicable 

lessons, so too can it provide the means to best solidify these lessons in 

the minds of students. Historical case studies of specific campaigns, 
2

battles, or significant events are particularly effective at driving these 

lessons home. These case studies should not be superficial, but should 

delve into as much detail as possible so as to enable both scholarly 

discovery and depth of understanding. Whenever possible, such events 

should be studied through primary sources, which provide both the 

required degree of detail and the serious intellectual challenge to fully 

involve the mind of the student. 

Students must engage with what German military theorist Karl 

von Clausewitz called “critical analysis,” meaning that they must 

determine the facts, establish cause and effect, and analyze the 

results. In simpler terms, the soldier or civilian must find out what 

happened, establish why and how events occurred as they did, and 

decide what these cause and effect relationships mean to them as 

Army professionals today. It is the immediacy of this last element—

the answer to the question, “So what?”—that makes this approach 

to analysis so germane. Such analysis is not simply about gleaning 

lessons; it is about gaining true insight and a deeper understanding of 

how and why war happens the way it does.

A significant component of a detailed case study is an evaluation 

of the environment in which the action took place and an analysis 

of how that operational environment shaped the contest or event. 

Good maps are essential for such analysis, but even the best maps are 

poor substitutes for firsthand knowledge of the area of operations. 

Thus, a visit to the actual sites associated with the campaign, battle, 

or event—if they are not too changed—provides the ideal impetus 

for analyzing the effects of the operational environment on the 

action studied. If a detailed historical case study encourages the 

identification of universal military insights, then a visit to the actual 

site is the ultimate means of reinforcing these insights in the minds 

of students. When systematic historical study is combined with 

visiting the relevant sites of action, for the purpose of professional 

military education, it is known as a staff ride.

Staff rides are experiential learning exercises that facilitate the 

study of war and associated historic events. Through staff rides, 

students come to understand that war is the highly complex and 

chaotic interaction of human beings and their machines, clashing in a 

dynamic environment. In this complicated arena, humans wage war 

for the attainment of military and political ends, making decisions and 

acting upon them according to their training, experience, intellect, 

and idiosyncratic personalities. These facets of war remain timeless. 

Yet war as a whole, as an inherently human phenomenon, 

continues to evolve. In the twenty-first century, wars are not fought 

solely on a terrestrial battlefield; they are fought in multidimensional, 

multifaceted operational environments. War is no longer characterized 

strictly in terms of discrete, joint, or combined campaigns taking place 
3

on land, sea, or in the air. Battles also take place in the virtual realm 

of cyberspace. The military term “key terrain” is no longer used solely 

in the geographical sense. Public opinion becomes key terrain in the 

execution of counterinsurgency and information operations. Spy 

satellites orbiting the earth and routers and servers in information 

networks are key terrain in battles for information dominance across 

the electro-magnetic spectrum and in cyberspace. Just as humans 

continue to evolve, the technology we use to fight wars evolves, and 

thus war itself changes. So, too, must the methods enabling the 

historical study of warfare evolve and change. 

In the spirit of that necessary evolution, we have revised this 

publication to introduce civilians, soldiers, historians, and all those 

pursuing a professional military education to a wider physical and 

historical context for the staff ride framework. We provide innovative 

pedagogical techniques for creating and executing exceptional staff 

rides, and we offer guidance for using the insights students gain from 

studying military history to spark a deeper evaluation and greater 

understanding of contemporary warfare.

Peter G. Knight orients soldiers of Program Executive Office Soldier to their precise 

location on the Chancellorsville battlefield relative to the battle positions of the U.S. and 

Confederate forces that fought there 30 April–6 May 1863. (Courtesy of PEO Soldier PAO)

5

2

Staff rides are often confused with other types of exercises or venues 

that explore campaign areas through the lens of military history. 

TACTICAL EXERCISE WITHOUT TROOPS

A tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) involves a hypothetical 

scenario played out on actual terrain, usually employing current doctrinal concepts. Although the exercise may take place on a battle site, 

any relationship to historical events is usually coincidental. A TEWT 

uses terrain, but not history, as a teaching vehicle.

BATTLEFIELD TOUR

A historical battlefield tour is a visit to the site of an actual campaign, 

albeit with little or no preliminary systematic study before the visit. 

These tours are relatively brief (three to four hours) and are often 

arranged with short notice. Participants have not been given the time 

or means for a full-fledged study phase before the event. Nevertheless, 

some instructors may provide brief, selected readings in advance, and 

the instructor or facilitator can still apply the general staff ride methodology. The instructor or facilitator may, at certain points, assume 

a greater role in the field study portion of the tour to compensate for 

the audience’s lack of depth in required preparation. Through the use 

of carefully prepared questions, posed to the audience during or after 

the tour, the instructor or facilitator can still make the battlefield tour 

an exercise of critical thought and analysis, drawing on the preliminary readings (if any) and the perspective acquired during the field 

study. In this way, the battlefield tour uses both the terrain and the 

historical situation as teaching vehicles, even without a preliminary 

study phase.

STAFF RIDE

A staff ride consists of three essential and distinct phases: (1) the 

systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, battle, or event; 

(2) an extensive visit (known more formally as a field study) of the 

STAFF RIDES VS. OTHER EXERCISES: 

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?
6

actual sites associated with that campaign, battle, or event; and (3) 

an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. Staff rides 

rely on maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to 

guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. In this way, staff rides 

link a historical event both to the systematic study of it and to its 

actual physical environment, a combination which produces analysis 

in all dimensions. A staff ride differs from a guided battlefield tour 

in that it can be used to study leadership and decision making and to 

analyze potential alternate outcomes. Finally, the staff ride requires 

active participation, which promotes active learning. To ensure an 

active learning experience, staff ride leaders should not simply be 

instructors lecturing to students. Rather, the staff ride leader should 

be more of a facilitator, who draws out student discussion by asking 

open-ended and Socratic-style questions in ways that make students 

engage with the subject matter, analyze and evaluate it on location 

and in context, and discuss their thoughts with their peers. This 

publication will present many techniques for achieving active learning 

on staff rides.

During a World War I Centennial Commemoration Staff Ride, Peter Knight orients soldiers 

of the 28th Infantry Division to the fighting location of the 28th Division atop Hill 204 

and describes the early actions of division elements during the opening stages of the 

Aisne-Marne Campaign.
7

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES3

The staff ride is a versatile educational tool designed to deepen the 

participants’ intellectual foundations in the military profession. This 

purpose is achieved through the development of critical thinking, creative problem-solving, and decision-making skills. Staff rides may be 

designed to achieve one or many objectives, depending on the needs 

of the students and the circumstances under which the staff ride is 

conducted.

Although professional military education is sufficient reason 

for devoting time and resources to staff rides, they also can help 

meet other important objectives. Because a visit to a historic site or 

battlefield may be an emotional experience, it can reinforce soldiers’ 

positive feelings for their profession, their units, and one another. If 

participants belong to the same unit or office, their shared experiences 

during the exercise may strengthen the camaraderie and esprit de 

corps that are necessary for workplace cohesion. If promotions or 

individual achievement awards are due to be conferred at the time 

of the staff ride, there can be no better setting for the ceremony than 

a site hallowed by earlier deeds of sacrifice and valor. Significant in 

themselves, such experiences become even more meaningful in the 

context of a staff ride to the site of a significant campaign, battle, or 

historic event.4

Other specific objectives for conducting a staff ride may be:

1. To provide case studies in leadership at strategic, operational, 

and tactical levels.

2. To provide case studies in the application of strategic, 

operational, and tactical doctrinal concepts.

3. To expose participants to the dynamics of battle, especially 

those factors which interact to produce victory and defeat.

4. An example of an exercise designed principally to achieve these secondary ends 

is described by Lt. Col. Richard M. Swain in “Terrain Walk,” Field Artillery Journal 

52 (Jul-Aug 1984), pp. 46–47.
8

4. To expose participants to the “face of battle,” the timeless 

human dimensions of warfare.

5. To provide case studies in the application of the principles 

of war.

6. To provide case studies in operational art to explore in 

depth and breadth.

7. To provide case studies in decision making under conditions 

of uncertainty.

8. To provide case studies in combined arms operations, joint 

operations, or the operations of a single arm or branch.

9. To help participants understand the dynamic relationships 

between technology, doctrine, tactics, operations, and 

strategy.

10. To provide case studies in how logistical considerations 

affect operations.

11. To show the effects of the environment (terrain, weather, 

technology, doctrine, and the human element) upon plans 

and their implementation.

12. To provide case studies in organizational dynamics, 

cohesion, team building, and teamwork.

13. To encourage the study of leadership through the use of 

military history.

14. To initiate or reinforce an interest in the history and heritage 

of the U.S. Army.

15. To teach historical-mindedness and critical thinking.

16. To teach military leaders that the lessons and insights of 

history are applicable to current operations.

Peter Knight orients 28th and 42d Infantry Division soldiers to their respective units’ 

fighting locations during offensive operations in the Ourcq River Valley, Aisne-Marne 

Campaign, July 1918.
9

PLANNING A STAFF RIDE 4

The planning phase for a staff ride, as in any military operation, is 

extremely important in laying the foundation for a successful and 

rewarding experience. This phase begins with the decision by the 

commander or group leader to conduct a staff ride. After determining 

how much time will be devoted to the execution of the staff ride, the 

commander usually assigns a staff ride leader and/or planner to assume 

responsibility for planning the staff ride.5 The Army’s eight-step training model, presented here, is integral to the planning process:

1. Plan the training

2. Train the leader(s)

3. Recon the site(s)

4. Issue the order or guidance

5. Rehearse

6. Execute the training

7. Conduct an after action review (AAR) to evaluate the training

8. Retrain if necessary

Implementing this model, combined with the guidance provided 

throughout this chapter, will result in a highly successful staff ride. 

STAFF RIDE LEADER AND INSTRUCTOR TEAM SELECTION

Select the staff ride leader carefully, as this person will both lead the 

group through the event and facilitate discussion during the exercise. 

Although the staff ride leader is not always expected to be an instructor during the staff ride, he or she is expected to be familiar enough 

5. For simplicity’s sake, we use the term “staff ride leader” throughout the rest 

of this manual to mean “the staff ride leader and/or the staff ride planner.” Some 

organizations may have both a leader and a planner; in others, the leader is the 

planner. 
10

with the material to be the primary facilitator of discussion. The staff 

ride leader can be virtually anyone in the command or unit, preferably 

with a relatively sufficient amount of Army schooling, experience, and 

leadership ability. An advanced degree in history is not required, but 

it is extremely helpful in being an effective staff ride leader. The staff 

ride leader should recruit and appoint additional instructors, as necessary, to form the instructor team.

To the degree that circumstances permit, the instructor team 

generally should:

1. Be thoroughly conversant with the sources, both primary and 

secondary, relevant to the campaign selected.

2. Understand current U.S. Army doctrine and terminology and 

be able to interpret significant events using this construct.

3. Be thoroughly familiar with the orders of battle and all major 

units involved, the operational environment where the fighting 

occurred, and the movements and operations of all significant 

units. Also, have a working knowledge of all major figures 

involved and their personalities.

4. Be able to assess and carefully monitor participants’ knowledge and interest levels to generate and retain their involvement 

throughout the exercise and keep them from becoming passive 

spectators.

5. Be familiar with the eight-step training model and use that 

model to prepare the staff ride as an Army training event.

STAFF RIDE SELECTION

The selection of an event and location for the staff ride is one of the 

most important decisions that the staff ride leader makes. Although 

staff rides can be conducted wherever a historical event has occurred, 

some events make better teaching vehicles than others.

Some of the important considerations for selecting an appropriate 

event and site include:

1. Home station proximity. Although every effort should be made 

to use a site that teaches the appropriate lessons, fiscal and time 

constraints can, unfortunately, interfere with this objective. 

Therefore, those who coordinate the staff ride should strike an 

appropriate balance between nearness to the home station and 

the insights that a particular site affords. Furthermore, the staff 

ride has to be supported logistically. Transportation, dining, 

and billeting facilities must be provided, when applicable. (For 

additional information, see Logistics, pp. 14–16.)

2. Historical site integrity. Some sites remain relatively unchanged 

from their original historical settings; others have been either 
11

altered in some way or virtually obliterated, leaving little or 

nothing of the historical scene intact. Although an effective 

staff ride can be conducted at any of these sites, the task of 

the staff ride leader becomes more difficult as the degree of 

historical integrity declines. When the historical setting has 

changed significantly, more visual or virtual aids are required 

to better animate the action under study. The ideal site is one 

that remains relatively intact and historically accurate, such 

as Antietam National Battlefield or Gettysburg National 

Military Park.

3. Availability of historical sources for the preliminary study 

phase. Staff rides require preliminary research into as many 

sources of information as can reasonably be obtained. These 

sources should consist of both primary and secondary 

accounts to ensure students gain the perspectives of the 

actual battle participants as well as the perspectives of those 

who have benefited from the passage of time and the ability 

to consult multiple sources to help determine the facts of 

what transpired. 

4. Logistical support and funding. No staff ride can be successful 

without proper logistical support. Food, transportation, 

lodging, and preparation of personnel and equipment for all 

types of weather are essential. The students should be free 

to focus on the learning objectives of the staff ride and not 

distracted by inadequate logistical support.

5. Audience considerations. Each staff ride should be shaped 

to needs of the participating group. Therefore, the staff 

ride leader should carefully consider the relationship of 

the historical site to the group’s learning objectives. Some 

considerations are: 

a. Echelon of command and type of unit. Many campaigns 

(Napoleonic, American Civil War, the world wars, 

and the Korean War) are complex enough to serve as 

excellent teaching vehicles at any echelon of command. 

Furthermore, most campaigns provide opportunities for 

studying the particular operations of infantry, artillery, 

and cavalry units, and the like.

b. Experience of opposing forces. No matter how well trained in 

peace time, units behave differently in first engagements 

than in subsequent contests. If “first battle” lessons 

are important, engagements such as First Bull Run 

or Kasserine Pass might be good choices. Operations 

involving veteran units may provide a different variety 
12

of lessons, including demonstrations of growth and 

adaptability.

c. Terrain. Staff ride leaders may wish to consider the type of 

terrain of a given battle, campaign, or event to ensure it 

provides good examples for illustrating its effects on the 

battle, campaign, or event and encourages participants to 

draw comparisons to current operating environments. Staff 

ride leaders must also pragmatically evaluate the terrain 

to ensure it can be safely traversed and explored and that 

students and leaders are appropriately dressed and equipped 

for that exploration.

STAND SELECTION AND DESIGN

Once the historical site meets as many of the above criteria as possible 

and the staff ride itself has been selected, the next step is to select and 

organize the individual stops that will make up the staff ride. The staff 

ride should be designed to visit all significant locations associated with 

the selected battle or event. These sites, referred to as “stands,” should 

be selected based on the following considerations:6

1. Proper chronological order. The staff ride route should feature 

stands in chronological order to avoid confusion and 

unnecessary complexity. To maintain engagement, the route 

should avoid backtracking as well as long, barren segments 

between stops. Two examples that challenge these goals are 

Shiloh, which is a two-day battle that traverses the same 

ground twice, and Gettysburg National Military Park, which 

has many one-way park roads, requiring creative planning to 

stay on the proper timeline. 

2. Historical significance or importance. Stops or stands along the 

route should be selected for their historical significance, visual 

impact, and logical necessity. Exact placement of the stand 

matters. Sometimes, moving ten meters to the left or right 

can make an incredible difference in perspective and visual 

impact, especially when considering how to give the entire 

student group the best view of the terrain.

3. Accessibility. As much of the route as possible should be 

traversed on foot. Many terrain features that would seem 

6. The term “stand” has its origin in the Army’s first staff rides, which were accomplished on horseback in the 1900s. When participants reached an important location 

on the battlefield, they would dismount their horses and “stand” at that location 

to observe the terrain and have discussions. Staff rides are no longer conducted 

on horseback very often, but the word “stand” continues to be used to identify key 

locations or stops. Staff ride terminology contains other holdovers from the days of 

mounted excursions, such as referring to the walking or field phase of a staff ride as 

the “dismounted” portion. Indeed, the word “ride” itself is a legacy of horse riding 

days, which explains why this is a staff ride manual and not, for instance, a staff 

fieldtrip manual.
13

insignificant from a motor vehicle suddenly become prominent 

when viewed from a foot soldier’s perspective. In some cases, 

the site of an important event may not be accessible (perhaps 

it is on privately owned property), but staff ride facilitators 

must still cover the material. If arrangements cannot be made 

to visit the actual site, facilitators should choose a location 

as close by as seems reasonable or comfortable so that the 

material can still be covered at the right time, perhaps using a 

map. One example of this dilemma is Nicodemus Heights at 

Antietam, which rests on private property, yet students may 

access it with prior coordination and the permission of the 

landowner. Alternatively, it can be pointed out from a nearby 

location within Antietam National Battlefield and referenced 

with a proper map. When feasible, try to obtain easements for 

access to sites not normally open to the public. Be sure to find 

appropriate parking for the type of vehicle being used for the 

staff ride. 

Once the stands have been selected, the staff ride leader should 

create a timetable that includes the time allotted for each stand and 

the time it takes to move between stands, so that there is a reasonable 

outline of how the day will progress. However, the timeline (and 

leader!) should allow for a certain amount of flexibility to make 

adjustments for unplanned stops (in Army parlance, “targets of 

opportunity”). For example, reenactors might be conducting an 

artillery fire display and drill that fits in with the learning objectives 

of the staff ride.

Whenever possible, the staff ride leader should link assigned 

readings to specific sites by intentionally referring to the readings at 

the stands. Tying primary sources to the sites that compelled their 

writing reinforces the value of studying them and helps students 

internalize the concepts being discussed.

RECONNAISSANCE

As with any planned military operation, reconnaissance of the staff 

ride site is absolutely necessary. Usually, a staff ride leader will need to 

reconnoiter the staff ride sites twice. 

The first reconnaissance is necessary early in the planning 

process to identify stops, parking, dismount points, lunch sites, route 

modifications, and more. If possible, the leader should conduct this 

reconnaissance with someone who has been on the staff ride (or a 

similar one) before or is familiar with the area or the specific sites 

being visited. The reconnaissance team should visit each of the 

planned stops and should coordinate face-to-face with onsite officials 

regarding any special rules for large groups or buses. The team should 

observe the terrain, foliage, and other variations, noting that they and 
14

the corresponding fields of fire and observation may have changed 

considerably since the time of the battle or event and differ based 

on the season of the visit as compared to the season in which the 

battle or event took place. If possible, the staff ride leader should 

use this first reconnaissance to rehearse the planned presentation at 

each stand to get a feel for the necessities of each stop and to identify 

areas of the presentation that need further refinement. The team 

should evaluate lunch sites in the area, identify the best options, and, 

whenever possible, discuss the planned lunch stop with the manager 

of the establishment(s). 

The second reconnaissance should be done a day or two before 

the ride itself. The staff ride leader and instructors treat this as a 

“test run,” rehearsing the entire ride and executing it as seamlessly 

as possible. Of course, the team also uses this visit to identify and 

adapt to any changes in the plan, such as road closures (because of 

construction, flooding, or downed trees, for example) and site-specific 

details (including hours of operation and admission costs). The team 

prepares alternate routes and adjusts the staff ride plan and timetable 

as necessary. 

Reconnaissance is essential to the success of the staff ride. It 

builds the staff leader’s confidence, reduces the frustration that can 

come from adapting to unforeseen changes, and supports an efficient 

timetable on the day of the staff ride. 

LOGISTICS

Properly planned logistics are critical to the success of any staff 

ride. Excellent logistical support allows participants to focus on 

the intellectual aspects of the exercise. Poorly designed travel 

schedules, inadequate dining arrangements, and uncomfortable 

billeting may distract participants from their primary purpose. 

This does not mean that the staff ride leader or instructor team 

must cater to every desire of the participants. Rather, the logistics 

of the field study phase should be designed and handled thoughtfully, such that they do not interfere with the educational aspects 

of the exercise. 

Because of the detail and coordination involved, responsibility for 

the logistics of the field study phase should be formally assigned to a 

logistical coordinator at the earliest possible moment. The logistical 

coordinator can be a member of the instructor team or a person 

from the unit, such as the G–4 or a logistics or supply officer or 

noncommissioned officer (NCO). The logistical coordinator should 

consult regularly with the primary instructor or staff ride leader to 

integrate education and logistics. When the number of participants is 

especially large, additional members of the instructor team will need 

to assist the logistical coordinator. Anyone assigned to logistical duties 
15

must be made aware of the importance of this work and its relevance 

to the success of the exercise. 

Some of the most important logistical considerations include:

1. Transportation. Normally, transportation considerations fall 

into two categories: travel to and from the battle site, and 

travel between the stands once at the site. Though modes of 

transportation are largely dependent upon group size, planes, 

buses, and vans (fifteen-passenger or smaller) are usually 

the most cost-effective modes for traveling to and from the 

site. In selecting transportation, the logistical coordinator 

should also consider which modes allow for maximum time 

on site. Once on site, travel between stands that cannot 

be done on foot because of time constraints and distances 

involved should be by vans or buses adequate to group size. 

Ideally, the van or bus should have an intercom speaker so 

that the staff ride leader can communicate to participants 

between stands. DVD/CD players in the bus may be another 

consideration. If the group is small, privately owned vehicles 

or rental vehicles can be used. Such vehicles are convenient 

and at times necessary (as when using an SUV to traverse 

rough terrain). However, too many vehicles may congest the 

battlefield roads, so carpooling should be maximized.

2. Timing. Each stop on the staff ride should be allotted the 

proper time in order to complete the exercise. Additionally, 

extra time should be built into the schedule to accommodate 

unforeseeable delays and to take advantage of teachable 

moments. Timing should be coordinated with the staff ride 

leader. (See Stand Selection and Design, pp. 12–13.)

3. Lodging. Accommodations should be arranged as needed for 

multiday staff rides. Some groups may wish to camp near the 

battlefield. Other options include local motels or hotels and 

lodging on nearby military posts or National Guard armories. 

The logistics coordinator should make arrangements or 

reservations for any of these accommodations and confirm that 

the cost fits within the authorized per diem.7 Note that a close 

lodging site can save time in movement to your first stand. 

4. Meals. Breakfast and dinner are not usually a concern for 

the staff ride leader or logistics coordinator. However, lunch 

should always be planned. Unless prior arrangements can be 

made, regular restaurants should be avoided because of the 

7. Curtis S. King and the Army University Press Staff Ride Team, “Train the 

Trainer Walkbook Additions” (Unpublished paper, Army University Press, Combat 

Studies Institute, Sep 2008), p. 24, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military 

History (CMH).
16

unpredictability of the service. Fast food places are usually 

able to accommodate large groups quickly, but it is best to 

find a cluster of options so the group does not overwhelm any 

one establishment. Alternatively, arrangements could be made 

to have food preset or delivered to a place on the battlefield. 

Prepacked lunches can be supplied and then eaten at picnic 

tables or on the bus. Note that dining sites may be limited 

to certain locations by regulation or availability, which may 

require adjustment of the proposed route. Finally, always be 

sure to have ample, potable water available, no matter the 

temperature or weather conditions.

5. Appropriate clothing. The uniform or dress code for the staff 

ride should be communicated clearly to the group. Civilian 

clothing is usually recommended. The staff ride leader should 

emphasize good walking footwear and long pants, especially 

if the participants will be walking over rough terrain or 

through tick- and chigger-infested fields or forests. Attention 

to headgear and footwear is particularly important when the 

sun is strong and proper protection is warranted.

6. Weather. Be prepared for all types of weather and plan 

accordingly. Staff rides are normally conducted rain or shine 

(unless lightning, high winds, or other hazardous conditions 

exist). All training aids should be weather-proof.

7. Fees and permissions. To keep the staff ride running smoothly, 

arrange for fee waivers (i.e., at National Park Service sites), 

coordinate land permissions, and negotiate group rates, 

especially at museums.8

8. Medical needs. Heat-related incidents, foot injuries, and other 

minor wounds occasionally occur. Standard precautions 

should include first aid kits, evacuation plans, keeping plenty 

of potable water on hand, and the identification of nearby 

sources of medical assistance.

9. Visual aids. The logistics coordinator works with the staff ride 

leader to create a plan for carrying, moving, and displaying 

visual aids. Tubular map cases and large art portfolios can be 

helpful.9

RESEARCH SOURCES 

The careful selection of research sources from the following categories can facilitate the smooth planning of a staff ride and, in turn, can 

imbue the preliminary study phase of the staff ride with meaningful 

reading.

8. Ibid., p. 25.

9. Ibid.
17

Primary Sources

Primary sources are documents that were produced by participants in 

or eyewitnesses to the event being studied, either contemporaneously 

with the occurrence of the event or at some point thereafter. Examples 

of primary sources to be used for a staff ride include:

1. Photographs, paintings, drawings, diagrams, and schematics 

2. Orders

3. After action reports (The Official Records of the War of the 

Rebellion is an excellent resource for Civil War battles.)

4. Correspondence, notebooks, datebooks, diaries, or other 

written materials

5. Audio recordings, including news reports and interviews

6. Period maps

7. Artifacts such as uniforms, personal effects, weapons, or inert 

ammunition

The value of primary sources is threefold:

1. Primary sources provide raw material for student analysis. 

The original details of these materials give students the opportunity to understand exactly how opposing forces conducted 

operational and administrative affairs. Students are empowered to draw their own conclusions about commanders’ and 

staffs’ mindsets at particular times.

2. By propelling students to an earlier time, primary sources 

allow students to relate more closely to a past situation, and 

because primary sources require students to study, they also 

provide students with an intellectual challenge. Students 

analyze and reach conclusions about primary sources without 

any added influence from secondary interpretations.

3. Primary sources encourage students to use critical thinking 

in evaluating the veracity of historical accounts. In spite of 

their value as immediate connections to the past, primary 

sources are not without problems. Peoples’ memories fade 

over time, even among those who were directly involved 

in a given battle, campaign, or event. Personal accounts 

can be subject to biases and can sometimes be selfserving. Primary source materials, including physical ones 

such as documents or artifacts, may also be incomplete 

or missing vital information. Because staff ride students 
18

are professional soldiers and civilians and not necessarily 

academic scholars, they often need assistance in threading 

their way through the primary materials provided for 

their use. Such assistance is important and necessary, but 

it should in no way relieve students of their responsibility 

to involve themselves deeply in the analytical process and 

draw their own conclusions.

Secondary Sources

Secondary sources are accounts of events that have been produced 

by nonparticipants, that is, people who received their information 

about the event secondhand, either from primary sources or other 

secondary accounts. Secondary sources are most often narrative in 

form; many are analytical in nature. Authors of secondary sources 

range from enthusiastic amateurs to professional historians. Examples of secondary sources that will be useful for conducting a staff 

ride include:

1. Historical monographs. These are the most common secondary 

source used in staff ride preparation.

2. Publications from the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(CMH) and Army University Press (AUP). CMH and AUP 

publish a variety of useful publications, all of which are 

available for download in PDF format, free of charge, from 

the CMH and AUP websites (see Appendix B). These 

publications include:

a. Campaign booklets and short monographs. These are excellent, 

preliminary readings on various battles and campaigns.

b. Staff ride guides and handbooks. These publications highlight 

the key points of an event, list orders of battle, discuss 

leaders and tactics, and recommend stand locations and 

discussion questions for a particular battle, campaign, or 

historical event.

c. Official histories. Through CMH, the U.S. Army has 

published an extensive set of volumes, now known as the 

“green book” series, chronicling its involvement in World 

War II. There are also comparable volumes about the 

Korean War (the “black book” series), the Vietnam War, 

the Persian Gulf War, and Operations Iraqi Freedom an

Enduring Freedom (the “tan book” serie

d. Documentaries. AUP has excellent documentary videos 

that can be used in prebriefs or on the bus to and from the 

staff ride.
19

e. Exportable virtual staff rides. AUP has an ever-increasing 

library of virtual staff ride options for both older and more 

recent battles, such as Stalingrad, Fallujah, and Wanat.

3. Battlefield guides. A variety of book-length guides are available 

to the general public for assistance in visits to American 

battlefields. Although many of these are designed to facilitate 

a battlefield tour, rather than a staff ride, they do provide 

excellent information on important events that occurred 

during a particular battle. Some of the best currently in 

publication are the U.S. Army War College Guide to Civil War 

Battles, as well as a similar series of guides published by the 

University of Nebraska Press. Many of these are available for 

purchase at National Park Service Visitor Center bookstores 

or online.

4. Films and documentaries. Films can be shown and used as learning tools in staff ride prebriefs or on the bus en route to the staff 

ride location. Instructors who opt to use a film or documentary must be ready to delineate between history and Hollywood.

Internet Sources

The internet provides abundant information on historical events for 

anyone looking for it, though the reliability and quality of online sources can vary tremendously. Information taken from websites other than 

those listed here should always be verified. Wikipedia, for example, 

is not necessarily a reliable source, but it often provides links to fairly 

reliable source material. User discretion is always advised. 

Reliable websites that may be helpful in facilitating a staff ride 

include:

1. National Park Service (www.nps.gov)

2. Library of Congress, especially for photographs (loc.gov)

3. The National Archives and Records Administration (www.

archives.gov)

4. Websites for specific battlefields that are managed under the 

auspices of individual states

CONSTRUCTING A STAFF RIDE WALKBOOK

The purpose of a walkbook (also sometimes known as a battle book) 

is to provide the instructor with a guide to facilitate the field study 

phase of the staff ride. It is an unpublished work, created by an individual instructor or staff ride leader, and tailored for a particular ride 

and its audience. The content of a walkbook is divided into sections, 

usually based upon the series of stands, in the order in which they will 
20

be conducted. Each stand’s section should be built on “orientation, 

description, and analysis” (ODA) guidelines, which will be discussed 

in greater detail later.10

Instructors should alter or add to their walkbooks based on their 

own style and the things they wish to emphasize. At a minimum, 

however, a walkbook should include the following items:

1. Directions. Whether driving or walking, it is good to have 

written or printed directions, GPS (global positioning system) 

coordinates, and maps to locate and navigate to the stand site.11

2. Orientation. Upon arrival at a site, the leader or instructor 

covers the key points to orient the participants to the site’s 

terrain, using maps and photos as needed, and referring to 

environmental surroundings.12

3. Description. Next, the leader covers the key events that 

transpired at the stand site. This is usually done chronologically, 

noting dates and times, though on occasion key events are 

summarized thematically. Additionally, leaders must be 

cognizant of the following:

a. Keep descriptions to a manageable size and avoid long 

narratives so that the information can be found quickly 

within the pages of the walkbook.

b. Remember that the goal is to keep participants involved. 

Prompt them to provide information. This works well when 

using role-playing technique. For example, while at the stand 

at Chancellorsville, Virginia, where Confederate Lt. Gen. 

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson attacks Maj. Gen. Oliver O. 

Howard’s flank, the leader could ask: “General Jackson, what 

was your plan for the attack? How did you array your troops 

(or forces)?”

c. Because a walkbook is unpublished and intended for 

instructional purposes only, sources are often copied and 

pasted into it and then formatted as needed. However, 

copyrighted content should always be cited within the 

walkbook so that the instructor can give proper credit 

to its author or creator, as appropriate, in the course of a 

discussion. Instructors must take special care to ensure 

that walkbooks containing copyrighted materials do not 

end up on the internet or passed around as published 

works.

10. Ibid., p. 17.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.
21

d. Extracts from orders, memoirs, and other primary sources 

can be included.13

4. Vignettes. These are human interest stories that are meant 

to engage the interest of students and elicit their reactions. 

Vignettes can be interspersed at various locations throughout 

a stand site or used at the end for a more powerful, lasting 

effect. Vignettes are not needed at every stand; they will lose 

their effect if overused. However, some stands may center 

on a particular vignette, such as the story of a Confederate 

sniper who wrote a letter to Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain after 

the war, explaining how he had taken aim at Chamberlain 

during the fighting on Little Round Top, but, holding 

Chamberlain’s life in his hands, had decided not to fire. 

Vignettes usually come from primary accounts (letters, 

diaries, memoirs, and so forth) and can be read verbatim 

directly from the source or paraphrased as needed. Not every 

quote constitutes a vignette. For example, you may quote 

orders, memos, or directives as part of the description of an 

event or stand, without presenting this as a vignette.14 (For 

more information on vignettes, see Methodology, pp. 34–36.)

13. Ibid., pp. 17–18.

14. Ibid., p. 20.

On location in Normandy, France, for a D-Day 75th Anniversary Commemoration Staff 

Ride, Secretary of the Army Mark T. Esper listens as Peter Knight describes important 

aspects of the 2d Ranger Infantry Battalion’s 6 June 1944 cliff assault on Point du Hoc. 

(Department of the Army PAO)
22

The following are examples of different types of vignettes:

a. The face of battle. Any of the first-hand accounts of troops 

landing at Omaha Beach on D-Day; Lt. Col. John Howard’s 

account at Cowpens of how the Americans refused their 

flank and delivered a devastating volley against the 71st 

Regiment of Foot (Highlanders).15

b. Humor. Henry Knox and Alexander Hamilton at Yorktown 

trying to avoid British shells; the parson at Chickamauga 

who is scared of battle.16

c. Sorrow or hardship. The father who brought his son to 

the battlefield at Chickamauga in a wagon and had to 

take him home dead that same night; identifying Capt. 

Thomas W. Custer at Last Stand Hill at the Battle of the 

Little Big Horn.17

d. Leadership. Accounts of Daniel Morgan walking among 

the troops the night before Cowpens; Brig. Gen. Norman 

Cota leading troop movement off of Omaha Beach under 

fire on D-Day in Normandy; Colonel Chamberlain 

leading the bayonet charge down Little Round Top at 

Gettysburg.18

e. Heroism. The 13th Infantry’s attack on Stockade Redan at 

Vicksburg; the French and American attacks on Redoubts 

9 and 10 at Yorktown.19

f. Fear. The account of a Confederate private before Pickett’s 

Charge.20

g. Other. The stories of injured, immobilized soldiers in the 

1864 Battle of the Wilderness perishing in the forest fires. 

The story of the soldiers at the 1864 Battle of Cold Harbor 

pinning their names to their uniforms, knowing that they 

would die.21

5. Analysis. This part of the walkbook includes the prompts and 

discussion questions that the instructor or staff ride leader will 

use to facilitate an open discussion among the participants. The 

goal is to allow learning points and insights to be shared among 

the participants. Although these questions are often open-ended 

and can have more than one answer, the walkbook should include 

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.
23

a list of possible answers for all sides of a debate, allowing the 

leader to play devil’s advocate and elicit discussion as needed.22

VISUAL AIDS

Visual aids enhance the learning experience by adding other media 

and/or tangible objects to the field study phase. The following examples describe different types of visual aids:

1. Maps. These are the most common and most useful of visual 

aids. It is not necessary to have a map at every stand, but 

any map that is used must be connected to the surrounding 

terrain.23 Maps should be printed on weatherproof canvas 

or mounted on ruggedized poster board. The source of the 

original map should be listed in the walkbook.

2. Photographs, paintings, and drawings. These are most effective 

when the image can be used for a “then and now” comparison 

by matching it to the exact spot and with the same view of 

the site. Pictures of equipment, vehicles, ships, aircraft, key 

leaders, and more may also be quite helpful in bringing history 

back to life. The source for any image that is not in the public 

domain should be listed in the walkbook.24

3. Diagrams and schematics. These can help illustrate complicated 

tactical moments or decision points. Examples include the 

schematics of Civil War units and their formations, and 

diagrams of various siege fortifications, such as those made by 

then Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Vicksburg.25

4. Films and documentaries (on DVD or streaming). These are 

usually not practical on the ground, but they can be useful in 

transit to the field site if using a vehicle equipped with a DVD 

player.26

5. Audio recordings. Music of the era and newsreel clips can 

be used to help set the mood or give a flavor of the times. 

The sounds of various weapons being fired can also be quite 

powerful.27

6. Artifacts. It often saves time in the field study phase to show 

artifacts such as weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and 

personal effects in the preliminary study phase, but it still 

22. Ibid., p. 18.

23. Ibid., p. 21.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
24

might be beneficial to share certain artifacts in the field study 

phase, if time allows.28

7. Smartphone and tablet applications. Various innovative visual 

aids can be at your fingertips with the use of these devices. 

For example, the American Civil War Battlefield Trust has 

designed several GPS-enabled mobile applications that 

allow users to scan QR codes at key locations on various 

battlefields. Doing so pulls up pertinent information such as 

orders of battle, maps, soldier biographies and data, campaign 

narratives, and iconic photographic images. 

8. Monuments, plaques, and signs. These can be useful—or 

distracting—during the field study phase of a staff ride. If 

instructors do not wish to integrate these items into the staff 

ride, they must instruct participants to avoid them, as people 

have a tendency to wander off and read signs. Alternatively, 

instructors can inform participants up front that they will be 

given time to explore these items after the stand is complete. 

During the staff ride reconnaissance, leaders should read and 

review the information presented on monuments, signs, and 

plaques to ensure that it is accurate. Staff ride leaders have 

periodically identified factual errors, misorientation of maps 

on signs, and monuments that have been erected in the wrong 

location. Instructors should feel free to incorporate a sign or 

plaque into the staff ride if it helps to orient and visualize unit 

locations and troop dispositions accurately.29

Using Visual Aids

Some instructors prefer to place visuals on the ground, oriented to the 

correct direction, while others prefer to have the visuals held up vertically. When using a map, instructors should always begin by pointing 

out the current location. Before creating a new map, staff ride leaders 

and logistics coordinators should consider where it will be positioned 

and how it will be oriented when using it. This will ensure that word 

placement on the map is consistent with how it will be oriented.30

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 23.

30. Ibid., p. 22.
25

THE PRELIMINARY

STUDY PHASE 5

This first step in staff ride execution lays the foundation for the success 

of the entire event. Experience shows that the more knowledgeable a 

group is about the battle or campaign, the more they benefit from the 

staff ride. That knowledge begins with the staff ride leader, who must 

gain a significant degree of historical understanding of the staff ride 

topic through intensive reading and study. The leader performs a preliminary search for the historical literature, including use of the internet, and then narrows the focus of study to specific primary source 

material and secondary literature that he or she will study in preparation for leading the staff ride. 

At this stage, the leader should check with the command historian 

or staff ride historians at CMH or AUP for their recommendations. 

These historians are expert staff ride leaders and have already 

identified the best published literature and primary source material 

for many different staff rides. Published battlefield staff ride guides 

can also be quite useful. 

Unless they are trained historians, even the best prepared staff 

ride leaders likely will feel overwhelmed by the depth of materials 

available, and they may never feel truly comfortable with their 

mastery of the details of the particular battle or campaign. This is 

a natural and normal reaction, but it will not necessarily detract 

from a successful staff ride. By diligently following the steps in 

this guide, staff ride leaders or instructors will be well prepared to 

facilitate and inspire meaningful discussion and thought among 

the staff ride participants.

METHODS

After the staff ride leader has completed his or her own preliminary 

research, he or she then selects (usually in conjunction with the unit 

commander) the method that will be used for the group’s preliminary 

study phase. Circumstances will dictate which form must be adopted, 

but some forms constitute far more effective teaching techniques than 

others. Several options are dependent on the amount of time available 
26

to the group before the execution of the field study phase of the staff 

ride. Leaders should plan and select a method accordingly.

Regardless of the method adopted for the preliminary study phase, 

the instructor team is responsible for ensuring that the objectives of 

that phase are met. The more limited the time available for group 

discussion, the more the instructor team must compensate by carefully 

choosing sources, providing individual study packets, and being 

available to facilitate discussion, answer questions, and stimulate 

critical thought and analysis. (For more information on assembling 

study packets, see Additional Training Aids, below.)

Overview Briefing

The staff ride leader or a subject matter expert presents the overview 

of the campaign, battle, or event to the group of participants. Training objectives for the staff ride should also be reviewed. Unfortunately, briefings provide little or no opportunity for group involvement, 

allowing students to become passive participants. Therefore, this 

method should be used only when time constraints preclude the use 

of other methods. Selecting this method relegates the vast majority of 

student-instructor and student-student interaction to the field study 

phase; ideally, those interactions should permeate every phase of the 

staff ride. If this method is selected, the briefing should be conducted 

no more than one week before the staff ride to ensure individual retention of the material.

Individual Study

The staff ride leader recommends and assigns overarching reading(s) 

to the group so that all participants may gain a situational understanding of the event they are studying. These assignments can be in the 

form of downloaded handouts, maps, articles, and even books, all of 

which are provided to the participants along with clear deadlines for 

completion. Note that readings and other media selected by the staff 

ride leader for student consumption must be tailored to the unit’s stated learning objectives.

In conjunction with this group study, the leader gives each 

participant an individual assignment to study in greater depth. 

Carefully selected reading packets, adapted for individual study, can 

illuminate critical aspects of the campaign in more detail. Packets 

should be designed to offer divergent viewpoints and generate 

discussion. Students should be prepared to present and discuss their 

individual topics during the field study phase of the staff ride. These 

discussions can take place on the battlefield or in the area of operations. 

Topics for individual study could include specific leaders of the battle 

or campaign, specific unit roles, missions, and performance, and 

critical correspondence between leaders. 
27

This approach essentially creates mini-experts on particular 

subtopics, which virtually guarantees lively discussion and debate, 

resulting in critical thought and analysis, among the participants. 

This method of study ensures a common level of understanding while 

also encouraging maximum participation by the students in both the 

preliminary study phase and the field study phase. 

Hybrid Method

The optimum preliminary study phase combines the methods 

described above: individual study, overview briefing, and group discussion facilitated and moderated by the staff ride leader. 

To actively engage participants, the staff ride leader should 

assign specific subjects for participants to investigate more deeply, as 

described in the individual study method above. Students can then 

brief the entire group, either in a formal classroom setting or later in 

the field study phase. 

The hybrid method can be structured in several ways, as 

schedules allow, and depending on the time available for the 

preliminary study phase. For example, the staff ride facilitator 

could assign group readings to be accomplished before the overview 

briefing, then hand out individual assignments at the overview 

briefing to be presented during the field study. Or, both group and 

individual study topics could be disseminated before the overview 

briefing, group discussion and debate can happen in conjunction 

with the briefing, and role-playing could carry over into the field 

study phase. 

By using the hybrid method, the high level of student involvement 

and interaction that is generated in the preliminary study phase carries 

over into the field study phase with positive results.

OBJECTIVES

The preliminary study phase in any form must accomplish certain 

tasks:

1. Participants must fully understand the purpose of the exercise. 

2. Participants must be active learners and not passive spectators.

3. Participants must acquire a general understanding of the 

selected campaign or event, based on the materials given 

to them during the preliminary study phase. (See Methods, 

above, and Training Aids, below.) 

TRAINING AIDS 

During the preliminary study phase, participants must be given 

access to the best sources possible, both online and in print. In the 

field study phase, training aids can orient students, clarify complex 
28

maneuvers, and create immediacy. (See also Visual Aids and Using 

Visual Aids, pp. 23–24.)

Study Packets

Study packets should contain materials that support general understanding of the selected event, including the following:

1. Organization, operating strength, technology, and doctrine of 

the opposing forces

2. Biographical data, personality insights, and idiosyncrasies of 

significant leaders

3. Relevant weapons characteristics

4. Relevant terrain and climatic considerations

5. General outline and chronology of significant events

6. Materials pertaining to the individual’s assigned topic

Additional Training Aids

As a minimum, all participants should receive or have access to the 

following:

1. A well-written, recently researched account (analytical, if 

possible)

2. A modern topographical map of the selected campaign or event

3. Relevant primary sources (such as after-action reports, official 

messages, personal accounts, contemporary maps)

4. PowerPoint presentations formatted with short, succinct 

bullets and attractive visuals, such as maps and charts. (Never 

let such presentations become the center of the staff ride 

experience. They are meant to augment, not replace, human 

thought and interaction.)

5. Terrain tables or boards, if available (useful in helping 

participants visualize the event and the terrain they will 

explore during the field study phase)
29

THE FIELD STUDY PHASE 6

The field study phase distinguishes the staff ride from other forms of 

systematic historical study. It combines all previous efforts by instructors and participants to understand selected historical events, to analyze the significance of those events, and to derive relevant lessons for 

professional development. 

Because field study builds so heavily upon preliminary study, each 

phase must be designed to produce a coherent, integrated learning 

experience. If the preliminary study phase has been systematic and 

thorough, the field phase reinforces ideas already generated. This is 

not to say that a systematic and thorough preliminary study phase 

permits a useless or hurried field study phase. Instead, the visual 

images and spatial relationships created by carefully designed field 

study reinforce any analytical conclusions acquired earlier. If, however, 

preliminary study has been hurried or incomplete, field study may 

raise entirely new issues or lines of analysis. In either case, the field 

study phase is the most effective way to stimulate the participant’s 

intellectual involvement and to ensure that he or she retains any 

analytical conclusions reached at any point in the staff ride process.

THE ORIENTATION, DESCRIPTION, AND 

ANALYSIS (ODA) PROCESS

The instructor team, with its knowledge of both the historical events 

and the environment, is responsible for ensuring that participants are 

correctly oriented, both chronologically and spatially, throughout the 

entire exercise. 

No matter how thorough the preliminary study phase has been, most 

participants will become disoriented at some point along the field study 

route, particularly in close terrain and highly complex historical situations. A partial solution is to have all participants carry compasses, maps, 

and notes on relevant documentary material such as orders of battle. 

While orientation is formalized at the beginning of each stand, the 

overall task of orientation is a continuous process that should not be 

confined to the ODA process.
30

Orientation

In this step, the staff ride leader or another facilitator points out the 

group’s current location on a map, orients the participants to the cardinal directions and where they stand on the ground, and identifies 

key aspects of the environment that are relevant to the battle or event. 

Orientation ensures that the students understand where they are and 

what the area looked like at the time of the battle or other historical 

event. The orientation does not have to follow a particular format.31

Recommended items to include in the orientation:

1. The group’s last location and, when the current stand is 

complete, the group’s next location (if either is visible from 

the current location)

2. The current location, pinpointed on the map 

3. The primary directions (north, south, east, west)

4. The key environmental features in the area (natural or 

manmade), for example, hills, streams, forests and other 

vegetation, buildings, roads, and railroads. (Point out the 

feature, then identify where it is on the map, as appropriate.)

5. A description of the area of operations, including differences 

between the physical environment as it was at the time of the 

event and the current environment. 

Tips for bringing the historic environment to life:

a. Use primary accounts, diaries, period maps, and the like 

to research what the environment was like at the time of 

the battle or event.

b. Hills or ridges are the least likely aspect of topography 

to have changed over time (although mining, erosion, or 

seismic activity could alter them considerably).

c. Water courses will often change over time. Look for dams, 

locks, and canals or other manmade controls that can 

change the water courses.

d. Forests can change considerably. Look at the size of the 

woods, as well as the type of foliage and density of the trees. 

Understand generally that at the time of the eighteenth 

and nineteenth centuries, woods were often less dense and 

had less underbrush because society was more agrarian 

and wood-burning.

6. Buildings in the area that date from the time of the battle 

or historic event. These will draw interest, so give a concise 

31. Ibid., p. 9.
31

history of the building and the people who owned, worked, or 

lived in it whenever possible.

7. Environmental conditions (weather, season) at the time of the 

battle or event.32

To transition to the next step (the description), get the students 

involved in the discussion by pointing out the locations of units within 

the area of operations. If they are prompted to do so, students assigned 

role-play or unit briefings will be motivated to talk about the events 

on the ground. For example: “Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett’s division 

staged its charge from the woods on the left and behind the ridge, and 

the federal defensive line was behind a stone fence over there.”33

Description

In this step, the staff ride leader and participants describe the historic 

events that occurred at (or are related to) the stand location. If the 

preliminary study has been conducted properly, the participants should 

be able to describe the events (such as combat actions, unit movements, 

32. The list of recommended orientation items was adapted from ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 10.

Charles R. Bowery Jr. facilitates discussion with 28th and 42d Division soldiers regarding 

unit movements in the opening phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign in the small 

French town of Cheppy. 
32

leaders’ decisions and actions, and individual soldier actions) with only 

selective prompting from the leader, thus avoiding the need for long 

lectures from the staff ride leader.34

Key considerations for the description: 

1. Content. The most common content in the description is 

a chronological narrative of the main events, which could 

include unit movements (overland marches, river crossings, 

etc.); combat actions (attack, defend, withdrawal, etc.); leader 

movements, actions, and decisions; and individual soldier 

actions (acts of heroism or cowardice). Additionally, the 

description could include key meetings or events between 

leaders, such as councils of war, correspondence, and the 

issuing and receiving of orders in any form (verbal, written, 

and signal).

2. Noncombat stands. Some stands may not focus on combat 

operations, but they still lend themselves to a chronological 

narrative of events. For example, a stand focusing on logistics 

at a rail junction may talk about when the rail line was 

established, how the line was utilized, what types of troops or 

supplies arrived, and when they arrived.

3. Thematic stands. Some stands are best described and executed 

thematically. For example, a stand that discusses the ability 

of Viet Cong guerrillas to blend into the population may 

not cover specific events in chronological order, but instead 

may cover aspects of the local population (culture, religion), 

the guerrillas (how they were summoned, their equipment, 

their logistical support), and the use of local terrain (jungles, 

tunnels, or village safe houses) for hiding.35

Analysis

The purpose of this step is to develop critical thinking skills. This is done 

by prompting participants to analyze how and why things occurred and 

to evaluate their significance. Students can perform this analysis from 

one of two perspectives: historical context and continued relevance. 

The following examples demonstrate various methods of inquiry 

that evaluate the significance of particular events, leaders, units, and 

systems within their own historical context.

1. Leaders and units. Did the leader demonstrate characteristics of 

good leadership? How so or in what ways? Did the leader make 

reasonable decisions? Avoid the “blame game.” Instead of 

focusing solely on whether a decision was good (or bad or right 

34. Ibid., p. 11.

35. The list of key considerations for the description step was adapted from ibid.
33

or wrong), focus on analyzing the factors behind a decision. 

Why did the leader make that choice? How did he or she arrive at 

a particular decision? What conditions, people, circumstances, 

beliefs, and assumptions informed the leader’s choice? This 

same process can be used to evaluate unit performance.

2. Systems and warfighting functions. Explore why a certain 

system or warfighting function worked or did not work within 

the parameters of the historical setting. This might include 

looking into the practices and standards for recruiting, arming, 

logistics, intelligence, and command and control that were in 

place at the time of the event. 

3. Historic implications. What were the (immediate or short 

term) effects of a particular moment or event on the overall 

battle, campaign, event, or war? Can the analysis of this 

moment lead to an understanding of subsequent (relatively 

immediate) events in history? What were the effects on 

society, culture, or the local populace? What were the effects 

on the development or evolution of the military profession?36

The following examples focus on methods of inquiry that examine 

the ongoing relevance of a historical event. These analyses can be of 

value to military and national security professionals because they 

demonstrate how the lessons and insights gained at the time of the 

event still apply to today’s organizations and operations. 

1. Answer the question head on. The instructor or leader asks the 

participants: “What insights can you derive from this action 

that still apply today?” This simple and open-ended question 

is the most direct method of analyzing history through the lens 

of ongoing relevance. It is an excellent question, and it gets 

directly to the heart of one of the main objectives of conducting 

a staff ride, but do not overuse it. Other methods of inquiry 

often end up here, so see if you can tease out a more focused 

conversation.

2. Compare and contrast. Ask the participants to narrow in on a 

particular aspect of the event to evaluate what has changed and 

what has not. For example: “What aspects (or necessities or 

peculiarities) of joint operations are revealed at Vicksburg that 

still must be considered today? What aspects or considerations 

have changed dramatically or no longer apply? Why?” 

36. The list of methods of inquiry concerning historical context was adapted from 

ibid., p. 13.
34

3. Current doctrine. The instructor can highlight aspects of 

current doctrine to glean insights from the past. For example: 

“What does the Army leadership manual tell us about where 

a commander should locate himself or herself during an 

engagement? What factors inform and influence this decision? 

Are any of these factors applicable to the decisions made by 

Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville?” Another example: 

“Which is truer today? Technological development drives 

doctrinal development or doctrinal development drives 

technological development? Was this the case during the Cold 

War? Why or why not?”

4. Personal experience. History gains immediate relevance when it 

taps into participants’ own experiences. Facilitators can ask, for 

example: “Have any of you witnessed a disruptive personality 

clash among leaders in your unit or organization? What was the 

root of the disagreement? What factors created or exacerbated 

the intensity of the confrontation? Which, if any, aspects of this 

clash feel similar to what happened between General Robert E. 

Lee and Lt. Gen. James Longstreet at Gettysburg? What can we 

learn from this?” Another example: “Have any of you seen units 

in combat or at a CTC (combat training center) that displayed 

exceptional cohesion? What traits did those units possess? Are 

any of those traits shared with Easy Company (Company E, 

506th Parachute Infantry) in World War II?”37

METHODOLOGY

Throughout the field study phase, the instructor team should make 

every effort to maintain intense participant involvement by removing distractions and keeping attention focused on the exercise. 

The Use of Personal Devices

Participants should be required to keep cell phones turned off or in 

silent mode, unless such devices are being employed for a specific 

instructional purpose.

Vignettes

A simple technique to enhance both participant involvement and 

orientation is the use of first-person accounts or vignettes at specific stops along the field study route. These personal accounts are 

essential to any battle or event analysis, because they provide important information on the attitudes, perspectives, and mental state of 

the people involved and thus illustrate the vital human dimension. 

37. The list of methods of inquiry concerning ongoing relevance was adapted from 

ibid.
35

Carefully devised and correctly executed, vignettes can contribute 

significantly to the sense of time, place, and mood which every staff 

ride must achieve to be truly successful. (For more guidance on 

designing and using vignettes, see Constructing a Staff Ride Walkbook, pp. 19–23.)

Vignettes may be read aloud from primary sources. Ideally, such 

vignettes are brief and colorful. The instructor team should select 

vignettes in advance and include them in the staff ride walkbook for 

easy access in the field. 

For relatively recent campaigns, veterans of the operation being 

studied can offer personal vignettes. These stories are often unmatched 

when it comes to encouraging and retaining the interest and involvement 

of staff ride participants. Profound discussion often follows. However, 

veteran vignettes must be used carefully for best effect. If possible, 

they should be chosen because of a particular role the veteran played 

in the selected campaign. The instructor team should screen veterans 

for articulateness and accurate recollection. In some cases, screening 

may expose personal biases or personality traits that would make the 

vignette ineffective. If such hurdles can be overcome, it will be worth 

the effort. Staff rides that involve veterans of the campaign being 

studied are powerful, effective, and extremely rewarding.

Discussion

At every opportunity during the field study phase, the instructor 

team should stimulate discussion among the participants, relating 

these discussions to similar ones held during preliminary study. 

Discussions may be supplemented by briefings from various participants. See the sections on Individual Study, Hybrid Method, and 

Study Packets in the “Preliminary Study Phase” chapter for more 

information on student presentations.

Group Size

The number of participants and the instructor-to-participant ratio 

will help determine the quality of the field study phase. In general, as 

the instructor-to-participant ratio declines, so does student involvement and discussion. In most cases, twenty-five to thirty participants 

is the maximum a single instructor can lead while still incorporating a degree of personal interchange. A much more effective ratio is 

one instructor for every fifteen to twenty participants. Members of the 

instructor team should be spaced throughout a large party to answer 

questions, encourage focus, retain interest, and stimulate discussion.

Group Management

When walking from stand to stand, the instructor team should 

maintain a steady pace, neither rushing nor dawdling but progressing 
36

purposefully from point to point. The group should be kept in as 

compact a formation as possible to prevent straggling. Left to their own 

devices, relatively large groups tend to disperse and have to be gathered 

at each stop. It may be necessary to assign team members to positions 

throughout the group to help keep people together. 

Weather

Given the inflexibility of travel dates for most staff rides, both instructors and participants should be prepared for bad weather. All members 

of the group should have seasonal protective clothing, and the instructor team should have route modifications and other contingency plans. 

Normally, these simple precautions will allow a successful field study 

even if weather is less than ideal.
37

THE INTEGRATION PHASE 7

No matter how detailed the preliminary study or how carefully 

crafted the field study, a truly successful staff ride requires a third 

and final phase. This integration phase is a formal or informal 

opportunity for participants and instructors to reflect jointly upon 

their experience. Most importantly, this phase is designed to connect the preliminary study and field study phases of the exercise, 

and, in so doing, find insights that benefit the modern national 

security professional.

PURPOSE

Several positive effects stem from the integration phase. First, it 

requires participants to analyze the previous phases and combine what 

they learned in each into a coherent overall view. Second, it provides 

a mechanism through which participants may organize and articulate 

their impressions of both the selected campaign and the lessons derived 

from its study. Third, participants may gain additional insights from 

sharing these impressions with their peers both during the staff ride 

and well beyond its conclusion. This phase highlights the utility of the 

staff ride experience and helps answer the “so what?” (or the purpose) 

of the entire study.

Note that this phase is not intended to be an after action review 

(AAR). An AAR can be conducted at another time or accomplished 

in written format. Nor is the integration session the right time to 

introduce another critique of the commanders or leaders on either 

side of a given battle or event. The idea is to focus on lasting insights 

rather than simply reiterating praise or blame for the people involved.

CONDUCTING THE INTEGRATION PHASE

The integration phase may be conducted on the battlefield immediately following the field study phase, at a nearby location following the 

field study phase, or upon returning to the participants’ home station. 

In general, however, the integration phase is most successful when it 

follows the field study phase as closely as circumstances permit.
38

An instructor should moderate discussion during the integration 

phase and focus on the exercise just completed. He or she should allot 

enough time for all who wish to speak and for a complete discussion 

of any issues raised. The instructor should encourage candor among 

all participants. 

The instructor should organize the integration phase based on the 

unit participants, time available, and the stated training objectives. 

Whatever method the instructor chooses to employ to frame the 

discussion (seminar-style dialogue, doctrine based, role specific, etc.), 

the most important consideration is ensuring that the participants do 

the majority of the talking.38 This fosters critical thinking and helps 

ensure active learning by the participants. 

Unit commanders or organizational leaders often like to speak 

during the integration phase. This is highly encouraged because it 

allows the commander to connect his or her personal experience of 

the staff ride, as well as any professional perspectives he or she has 

gleaned from it, to the unit’s current mission and personnel.

DISCUSSION METHODS

Various integration methods can work, but one proven method is to 

conduct the session in three parts, based upon three broad questions. 

Sometimes, with well-engaged groups, the leader need only present 

the general question and the group will carry the conversation. In 

38. Ibid., pp. 26–27.

3d Infantry Division soldiers on location atop Hill 204 overlooking the division’s assigned 

sector near Chateau-Thierry, France, discuss the division’s role in the Aisne-Marne 

Campaign of World War I with facilitator Charles Bowery.
39

other situations, the leader may need to prod the discussion along by 

asking additional follow-up questions.39

Three proven questions for integration are discussed below.

1. What perceptions of the battle (campaign or event) had you 

developed in the preliminary study phase that changed because of 

your study of the actual site?40

a. This is a crucial question because seeing the environment 

or site is central to the purpose of a staff ride. Otherwise, 

the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. 

Of course, students may develop a wide range of answers 

based on their personal study and what they observed in 

the field study phase.

b. The instructor can follow up with several related questions 

(e.g., Did seeing the environment or site alter your evaluation of 

any of the leaders?).41

2. What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have 

remained the same since the battle (campaign or event) we have 

studied in this staff ride?42

a. The aspects that have changed will probably seem more 

obvious to the modern military professional and often will 

be related to technology.

b. The aspects that have remained the same may not seem as 

obvious or as numerous at first, but the students will often 

build on some initial answers and find a lot of good items. 

c. Depending on the group, the instructor may want to ask a 

few more focused questions (e.g., What aspects of intelligence 

have changed and what aspects have remained the same?).43

3. What insights can the modern military professional gain from this 

campaign or event that are relevant today?44

a. Clearly, the students can take this discussion in a vast 

number of directions. Once again, to guide the discussion, 

it might help to focus on insights that are relevant to the 

type of unit participating in the staff ride. For example, a 

military intelligence unit might focus on the commander’s 

situational awareness, intelligence collection, and the 

importance of reconnaissance.45

39. Ibid., p. 27.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.
40

The three integration questions mentioned above are meant to 

aid in initiating discussion, not to dictate rules for conducting the 

integration. It is recommended that the instructor take some time 

before the staff ride to write down some of his or her own answers 

to these questions in order to have some potential starting points 

for student discussion. The idea is to generate discussion among 

the participants and to let the discussion roam down many different 

paths, so long as the paths are germane and logically and intellectually 

sound.46

Lastly, integration is something that need not be confined solely 

to the end of the staff ride. There may be numerous logical points 

throughout the field study phase where it may make sense to do 

“integrated integration.” Seizing these moments of discussion as they 

arise will emphasize and integrate particular points about the battle 

or a leader by tying them to doctrinal or leadership discussions and 

showing their contemporary relevance.47 Such points can be revisited 

in the final integration phase of the staff ride as a check on learning 

and to confirm student retention.

46. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

47. Email, J. Britt McCarley, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

Chief Historian, to author, 24 Apr 2020, sub: Working Draft of Staff Ride Guide 

Revision, Historians Files, CMH. 
41

TYPES OF STAFF

RIDE EXPERIENCES 8

Understanding that staff rides are experiential learning exercises that 

use the aforementioned three-phase methodology of preliminary study, 

field study, and integration, staff rides can effectively be grouped into 

two categories.

TRADITIONAL STAFF RIDE

The traditional staff ride focuses on a battle, campaign, or operation 

within a war. 

The most common version of the traditional staff ride includes a 

physical visit to the geographic locations of the event being studied. This 

is the exercise that has been defined and discussed in detail throughout 

this guide, based on William Robertson’s definition from the 1980s. It 

has been practiced by the U.S. Army, taught in the Army’s schoolhouses, and used by units at all echelons of command since the early 1900s. 

The virtual staff ride (VSR) is a newer variation of the traditional 

staff ride in which, instead of exploring the actual geographic location 

of an engagement, the exploration of the area of operations is done in 

the virtual realm with digital terrain or cyberspace network navigation. 

The VSR is a particularly effective option for studying more recent 

events. For example, the site of Operation Anaconda, which occurre

in the Shahi Kot Valley in Afghanistan from 2 to 19 March 2002, is 

located in an active theater of operations. Security and fiscal considerations preclude executing staff rides on location. Instead, digital terrain 

data, navigated by a computer operator in a secure and cost-effective 

classroom environment, re-creates and animates the area of operations 

for the benefit of staff ride participants. This fulfills the field study 

phase of the staff ride. The preliminary study phase and the integration 

phase of a VSR are identical to those of an in-person staff ride. (For 

detailed information about VSRs, see Virtual Staff Rides, pp. 51–56.)

NONTRADITIONAL STAFF RIDE

In nontraditional staff rides, the staff ride methodology is employed 

to study events that took place in atypical settings. That is to say, not 
42

all events related to military history and national security occurred on 

a terrestrial battlefield. For example, a staff ride studying the assassination of President Lincoln takes place at key locations throughout 

the national capital region: Ford’s Theatre, the Samuel Mudd House, 

and the conspirators’ trial room on Fort McNair. A Cold War staff 

ride might take place at locations like the former site of the Berlin 

Wall or at the Reichstag in the German capital city. Such staff rides 

might have a more strategic focus as opposed to focusing on operations or tactics. These staff rides may examine politics, economics, 

society, religion, culture, and language. They could also be interdisciplinary in approach, bringing in aspects of political science, international relations, law, literature, medicine, and philosophy.48 Numerous 

Army posts, camps, and stations like West Point, Fort Monroe, and 

Fort Leavenworth are ideal nontraditional staff ride venues, rife with 

opportunities to study the U.S. Army’s training, educational, doctrinal, structural, and institutional evolution.49

48. Jason Musteen, “Nontraditional Staff Rides at West Point,” Army History 110 

(Winter 2019), p. 29.

49. Email, McCarley to author, 24 Apr 2020.

David Hilkert (facing camera at center) addresses questions from officers and civilians from the Army Judge Advocate General’s office as they assemble outside the entrance to 

Ford’s Theatre as part of the Lincoln Assassination Staff Ride.
43

STAFF RIDE PEDAGOGY 9

Numerous effective techniques can be used to instruct and facilitate staff ride experiences. Below is a list of traditional, time-tested 

techniques as well as more recent and innovative techniques. All are 

designed to aid staff ride instructors and facilitators in optimizing the 

staff ride methodology to achieve the desired active learning objectives 

of their respective audiences.

TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES

Role-Playing (Character-Driven Method)

The staff ride leader assigns key leader roles to students who will 

research primary and secondary sources in preparation for playing 

their character role over the course of the staff ride. This method, 

when properly performed, often generates meaningful lessons and 

insights for its participants. Students will come to better appreciate 

the timeless, inherent complexities of leadership, command and control, and operations. However, while students become limited subject 

matter experts for their character, that singular emphasis can detract 

from discussions of larger themes and notable military variables like 

the principles of war, the military decision-making process, and the 

use of military ways and means to achieve political objectives. Staff 

ride leaders should be cognizant of this and encourage role-players to 

use their knowledge to broaden, not limit, discussion. (See Individual 

Study, Hybrid Method, and Study Packets in the “Preliminary Study 

Phase” chapter for related guidance.)

Socratic Dialogue

This technique employs the use of open-ended questions designed to 

make students engage in critical thought and analysis. Usually a “how” 

or “why” type question is used to ensure that students answer with 

more than a mere “yes” or “no” to a given question. These questions 

force students to analyze, evaluate, and interpret information, make 

an argument, and support that argument with facts. Another advantage of this technique is that it solicits engagement from all members 
44

of the group rather than targeting single participants to summarize 

the actions of assigned characters. If students and facilitators use this 

flexible methodology skillfully, it enables seminar-style learning to 

occur throughout the exercise. Additionally, this technique opens up 

multiple discussion threads such as warfighting functions, maneuver warfare, elements of national power, and civil-military relations. 

Threads like these may not be fully explored in a character-driven 

staff ride.50 That said, Socratic dialogue runs the risk, much like its 

character-driven counterpart does, of devolving into discussions of 

decision making and engaging in fault-finding instead of fostering 

genuine creative thinking among the participants. Moreover, this 

technique becomes significantly less productive if students intellectually detach or lack adequate preliminary study. Well prepared students, instructors, and facilitators are essential to executing a broad, 

Socratic dialogue within the parameters of the staff ride construct.51

Devil’s Advocate

This corollary technique builds upon Socratic dialogue such that 

students make an argument and the instructor or, better yet, 

another student can encourage more extensive critical thought by 

making a counter argument. If participants are engaging as they 

should this technique often happens on its own without instructor 

prodding. However, the instructor should be fully prepared to play 

devil’s advocate when necessary to enhance the group discussion. 

For example, if 100 percent of students participating in a staff ride 

of the Battle of the Little Big Horn begin to find fault with some of 

Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer’s decisions, then the instructor 

should step in and make an argument for Custer. Doing so forces 

the students to think through the full range of factors influencing 

a leader’s decisions and actions and prevents them from defaulting 

to a popular opinion.

Principles of War

This corollary technique uses the timeless principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, 

security, surprise, and simplicity) as a framework by which to analyze 

and evaluate leader actions or inactions and the associated decisions 

of a battle, campaign, or event. A person assigned a particular role 

would be responsible for explaining how their character did (or did 

not) adhere to the principles. The rest of the group can then engage in 

Socratic dialogue regarding how and why. 

50. Christopher S. Stowe, Bradford A. Wineman, and Paul D. Gelpi, “Staff Riding 

in the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Pedagogical Change?,” Army History 110 

(Winter 2019), p. 23.

51. Ibid.
45

Warfighting Functions

This corollary technique uses the six warfighting functions (movement 

and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, 

and protection) employed by leaders as a framework to analyze and 

evaluate leader actions or inactions and the associated decisions of a 

battle, campaign, or event. Again, a person assigned a particular role 

would be responsible for explaining how their character did (or did 

not) optimally employ the warfighting functions. The rest of the group 

can then engage in Socratic dialogue regarding how and why. 

Instructor Lecture

This technique entails straightforward lecturing by the instructor. At 

certain times this technique is highly effective, for example in conveying the strategic setting or operational overview of a given campaign 

to set the stage for the staff ride. However, this method should be used 

sparingly and with proper punctuation and timing. Overuse of this 

technique makes the staff ride devolve into a guided tour during which 

the students perform no critical analysis or evaluation of the information the instructor conveys. Staff rides are designed to make students 

engage in active learning by performing critical analysis, evaluation, 

and decision making. Passive absorption of information is the antithesis of experiential learning.

INNOVATIVE TECHNIQUES

Additional staff ride techniques have been revived or newly developed 

over the past several years. They provide excellent, innovative ways to 

enable students to exercise critical thinking, creativity, and decisionmaking skills through active, experiential learning.

Decision Gaming

In decision gaming, facilitators present students with detailed planning scenarios, drawn from past events, at the tactical, operational, or 

strategic levels of war. Students then plan their own courses of action, 

which they brief at the various staff ride stands. These plans are then 

assessed during the integration phase. 

Decision gaming as a staff ride technique has its antecedents in 

the map exercises and war games of the Prussian Grand General 

Staff and, later, the U.S. Army War College. The Prussian version 

of the war games required students to present their courses of action 

in historically based scenarios to faculty who graded the submitted 

product in both form and content against an approved solution. In 

contrast, the U.S. Army War College war games did not measure 

against a single approved solution. To its credit, the U.S. Army War 

College wanted to prevent an overreliance on history as a guide while 

also avoiding ex post facto decision making, so it omitted the names 
46

of the historical commanders involved. Today, students at the War 

College are presented with scenarios largely based on the historical 

narrative but often with some deviations. The commanders’ names 

are still omitted, thus encouraging maximum student creativity and 

critical thinking in formulating courses of action.52

Practitioners of decision gaming have observed that, in the 

planning phase, students like to employ geospatial representations of 

the area of operations in addition to reading published primary and 

secondary source manuscripts. They use both original maps from the 

time period under study, preferably those that were available to the 

real commanders, and modern Google Earth maps representing the 

current lay of the land. Most students tend to rely more heavily on the 

historic maps in an effort to remain period-focused.53

The following is an example of an operational-level decisiongaming scenario that would be presented to students during the 

preliminary study phase. This scenario and the courses of action the 

students generate from it then form the basis of the field study phase.

52. Ibid., pp. 22–23.

53. Email, Christopher Stowe to author, 31 Jan 2020, sub: Decision-Gaming 

Preparation, Historians Files, CMH. 

Taneytown, Maryland.

It is 1830 on 1 July 1863. You are Commanding General of the 

Army of the Potomac. The commanding general of the U.S. Army 

has directed you to protect both Washington and Baltimore, as well 

as operate against the enemy’s forces arrayed in Pennsylvania. Your 

headquarters is in front of defensive positions you have today selected 

astride Big Pipe Creek, Maryland, with the intent of luring the enemy into battle. This morning, your advance infantry corps arrived 

on your orders at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, some thirteen miles 

north of your current headquarters, after you received reports that 

your cavalry division had encountered the enemy there. Although the 

corps commander informed you of his intent to defend the town—

which conformed to the amount of discretion you extended to him in 

your orders—he was killed almost immediately after he committed 

his corps. Another general of a follow-on infantry corps, with whom 

you are less familiar, now commands the force at Gettysburg—now 

two infantry corps strong—and may not be privy to your latest intent. 

Consequently, you dispatched one of your most trusted subordinate 

officers, a man fully cognizant of your intent, to take temporary command of your forces in Gettysburg and assess the situation. His initial 

report has just now arrived, and you learn from it that two enemy 

corps have pushed your two corps out of Gettysburg. Your forces now 

hold a prominent height south of the town. Your trusted subordinate 

claims that the hill is good defensive terrain and that your advance 
47

Note that the given scenario may not always be fully consistent 

with the historical narrative.54 In this Gettysburg-based scenario, 

the existence of and approval to use an additional “composite corps” 

is a new variable that is not part of the actual historical narrative. 

However, in decision gaming, deviations from the historical narrative 

are encouraged in order to prevent students from clinging to what 

actually happened without considering alternatives. 

In decision gaming, students are not encouraged to assume the 

persona of the actual historical actor. Doing so often inhibits course 

of action development when the player defaults to the historical 

course of action or conjectures regarding what he or she thinks a 

historical actor might do. Instead, students should engage with the 

material and think critically and originally to formulate their own 

courses of action, which are in turn evaluated and critiqued by their 

peers (and facilitators as necessary). An interesting twist happens 

when students inject generic personality traits and biases into the 

commander-subordinate relationship.55 The decision-making process 

54. Stowe, Wineman, and Gelpi, “Staff Riding in the Twenty-First Century,” p. 26.

55. Stubbornness, vainglory, eccentricity, or a bias toward taking the offensive 

instead of fighting on the defensive are just a few examples of the many different 

forces have regrouped sufficiently to hold the position if they are reinforced. Fresh information received at headquarters indicates that 

the disposition of one enemy corps remains unknown. The enemy’s 

infantry appears to be converging upon Gettysburg, but you lack 

conclusive information to confirm their intent. Additionally, an enemy cavalry division had positioned itself three days earlier between 

you and the nation’s capital, but you now (similarly) lack conclusive 

intelligence of more recent enemy cavalry dispositions or intent. Your 

orders from the commanding general are clear: stay between the enemy and the nation’s capital. Only an hour ago, you learned that your 

request for a “composite corps” of reinforcements from the defenses 

of Washington and Baltimore has been approved. These forces number some 12,600 men according to the latest army returns. Defending 

at Big Pipe Creek seems the most feasible, acceptable, and suitable 

way to ensure you stay between the enemy and the capital while engaging enemy forces. Still, the enemy is miles away from Taneytown. 

Two of your corps have been hotly engaged at Gettysburg and at 

least one more corps should arrive in its vicinity before sundown. The 

“composite corps” cannot be expected to be present in the area of 

operations for two to three days. Your subordinate commanders need 

guidance, as the time has come to commit to Gettysburg, Big Pipe 

Creek, or elsewhere.

General, what are your orders?1

Adapted from Stowe, Wineman, and Gelpi, “Staff Riding in the Twenty-First 

Century,” pp. 26–27.
48

becomes fascinating to watch as these injections shape how decisions 

are made and influence the buy-in of both the commander and his or 

her subordinates during the game. Such factors introduce a level of 

friction that is often forgotten about during the planning process and 

course of action development.56

The objective of a decision-gaming exercise is not for students 

to pass judgment on or mimic their historical predecessors but 

to understand and appreciate the difficulties of decision making, 

particularly under duress, within the context of high-tempo operations 

and combat. Students are guided to come up with their own unique 

ideas of how they would respond to a given scenario armed with similar 

(not necessarily matching) knowledge, capabilities, and limitations 

as compared to the historical actors and actions under study. The 

main idea is to encourage students to solve complex military problems 

similar to those of their professional predecessors.57

An important component of using the decision-gaming technique 

within staff rides is the use of the integration phase to compare student 

solutions (and their projected outcome) to the historical commander’s 

solutions and outcome (i.e., what actually happened historically). 

This allows the group to fully understand the distinctions between 

their historically based scenario and the actual scenario as it played 

out in the battle or campaign. This comparison enables the students 

to better analyze, evaluate, and understand how the historical actors 

may have arrived at their decisions and creates a deeper appreciation 

for the factors that shaped those decisions. 

In the integration phase of decision-gaming staff rides, students 

learn to ask the right questions of what actually happened historically 

when reflecting upon their own decision making under similar 

circumstances. Ideally, students will comprehend the importance 

of acknowledging both similarities and differences in situations 

they will face in the future compared to those that occurred in the 

past. This is a pragmatic application of military history that can 

inform future operational and strategic planning; students can 

use insights from the past without succumbing to the dangers of 

historical analogy. In other words, students learn the crucial skill 

of comparison in context, understanding both the similarities and 

differences between the real-world or training scenarios they could 

experience compared to the campaigns, battles, and events of the 

past. It reinforces the lesson that military history does not provide 

a blueprint to guarantee future battlefield success. Instead, it is a 

vehicle for critically thinking about the past to glean useful insights 

for application in the future. 

personality traits that can shape and influence choices for action.

56. Email, Stowe to author, 31 Jan 2020. 

57. Stowe, Wineman, and Gelpi, “Staff Riding in the Twenty-First Century,” p. 26.
49

Reacting to the Past (RTTP)

This technique was developed and defined by Mark Carnes, professor 

of history at Barnard College, Columbia University, in 1996.

RTTP is an active learning pedagogy of role-playing games designed 

for higher education. In RTTP games, students are assigned character roles with specific goals and must communicate, collaborate, 

and compete effectively to advance their objectives. Reacting promotes engagement with complex ideas and improves intellectual and 

academic skills. Class sessions are run by students. Instructors advise students and grade their oral and written work. Reacting roles 

and games do not have a fixed script or outcome. While students are 

obliged to adhere to the philosophical and intellectual beliefs of the 

historical figures they are assigned to play, they must devise their own 

means of expressing those ideas persuasively in papers, speeches, or 

other public presentations. Students must also pursue a course of action to try to win the game.58

Applying this technique within the staff ride methodology involves 

students aggressively researching their assigned character roles and 

exercising critical thinking and creativity as they communicate and 

compete with their fellow students throughout the staff ride. For 

example, in the preliminary study phase, a student assigned the role 

of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade may research the series of orders and 

events that chronicled Meade’s assumption of command and then 

articulate Meade’s thoughts and desires in the form of some initial 

guidance, a message to the troops, and initial orders to his staff, upon 

assuming command of the Army of the Potomac. In the field study 

phase, the student playing Meade might recreate his nonbinding 

council of war on the night of 2 July 1863, soliciting the input of his 

fellow general officers and leading to his personal decision to stay and 

fight General Lee. Another example could be a student reenacting 

Meade’s heated encounter with Maj. Gen. Dan Sickles, who created 

a bulge in the union defensive line in front of Cemetery Ridge against 

Meade’s orders. The student playing the role of Sickles could respond 

with his rationale for taking the questionable action. The RTTP 

technique allows students to discuss the advantages and disadvantages 

of different courses of action considered by the historical character.

RTTP could also be used in the integration phase to reinforce 

key lessons or insights gained from the study of the campaign or 

event. For example, the student assigned to play General Meade 

might read some of his writings about the battle and then prepare 

a speech to be presented at the end of the staff ride to an audience 

58. “What is Reacting?” Reacting to the Past, Barnard College, https://reacting.

barnard.edu, Historians Files, CMH.
50

of his “soldiers,” congratulating them on the victory and preparing 

them for the rest of the war. Or perhaps “Meade” could give a speech 

to Congress, reporting the state of the Army of the Potomac after 

the battle.59

The instructor must carefully assign different students to play 

their respective character roles at various phases and stands of the 

staff ride and carefully manage the time for student dialogue at 

each to ensure all students get the opportunity to engage the wider 

audience and to appreciate and tie their actions to the operational 

environment. Instructors must also be vigilant to ensure the entire 

audience understands the historical facts and must promptly correct 

any student conjecture that occurs in the articulated role-playing. 

Additionally, instructors must evaluate student performances 

throughout the staff ride and determine a winner of the student 

competition. Students’ natural competitiveness will help make 

for an interesting experiential learning event. Students who are 

intimidated by role-playing or public speaking should view this 

method as an opportunity for personal and professional growth. 

Criteria for judging performances should be based on historical 

accuracy, demonstrated knowledge, and effective presentation. 

RTTP is a time-intensive technique and it may not work for 

units with a high operational tempo or units that lack sufficient time 

for student research in advance of the staff ride. This technique is 

primarily recommended for cadets as part of their required military 

history curriculum at USMA, ROTC, and OCS, or for officers in 

professional military education schools like the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College or the U.S. Army War College. 

Augmented Reality

Augmented Reality (AR) is “a technology that superimposes a computergenerated image on a user’s view of the real world, thus providing a 

composite view.”60 AR provides an interactive experience of a realworld environment in which the objects that reside in the real world are 

enhanced by computer-generated perceptual information that can be 

both seen and heard. 

The use of AR in staff rides is still quite rare, but when used it 

normally comes in the form of either a mobile tablet or a smartphone 

device. Facilitators and students can download applications that 

provide maps, period pictures, callout information boxes, and 

vignettes to juxtapose on their viewing screens while absorbing 

live, camera-view observation of the site under study. Eventually, 

59. Email, Jason Musteen, Academy Professor, Department of History, U.S. Military 

Academy, to author, 24 Feb 2019, sub: Reacting to the Past integration phase insights, 

Historians Files, CMH. 

60. “Augmented reality,” Lexico Powered by Oxford, https://www.lexico.com/en/

definition/augmented_reality, Historians Files, CMH.
51

as this technology progresses, staff ride participants will be able to 

use wearable devices like AR glasses as they traverse historical sites. 

The National Park Service and private historical organizations use 

such technology today at places like George Washington’s Mount 

Vernon.61

When using AR techniques, staff ride leaders are cautioned to 

make sure that they can control and synchronize the timing of the 

pertinent historical content augmentation to meet the objectives of 

their respective audiences.

THE VIRTUAL STAFF RIDE

Virtual staff rides (VSRs) are unique in that the physical area of operations is replicated digitally in a classroom environment. The 3D virtual terrain is projected and displayed at the front of the classroom, and 

it is the primary tool for bringing the area of operations to life.62 Aside 

61. For an example of the integration of augmented reality and experiential learning, 

see “Mount Vernon in AR,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon, https://www.

mountvernon.org/plan-your-visit/augmented-reality-tour/, Historians Files, CMH.

62. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University Press 

Staff Ride Team, p. 1, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/

staff-rides/Introduction_Stalingrad_VSR_ver_1-0.pdf, Historians Files, CMH.

Augmented reality enhances a real-world view of a given staff ride location and adds 

pertinent data for the user to absorb. This example shows a Civil War monument near the 

split rail fences marking the “Bloody Lane” at Antietam.
52

from that fundamental difference, a VSR is run just like any other 

traditional staff ride.63 However, it is quite possible that VSRs could be 

used for other kinds of staff rides as well, such as exploring battles that 

occur in cyberspace, where the information network and associated 

terminals actually comprise the area of operations. 

Background

Since 2004, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) of AUP has fulfilled the 

Army’s need to conduct leader training and education with computerdriven terrain analysis techniques, and has pioneered the ability to execute virtual staff rides in the classroom setting.64 During this time, CSI 

used emerging 3D technology and Virtual Battlespace 3 (VBS3) software 

to develop multiple VSRs tailored to the needs of particular units. CSI 

has also taken the additional step of creating exportable VSRs. Exportable VSRs contain all of the material necessary for a unit to execute the 

VSR on its own, without the assistance of CSI personnel. The exportable 

VSR follows the same basic principles as all other staff rides.65

Pros and Cons of VSRs

There are several advantages to conducting a staff ride virtually. 

VSRs allow staff ride participants to explore a vast amount of terrain quickly and from multiple viewpoints (both tactical and operational). VSRs are also quite cost effective in that they can be done 

at home station with little or no temporary duty (lodging, food, 

and transportation) costs for participants. (Some temporary duty 

costs may be incurred if qualified instructors or computer operators must travel to the site of the VSR.)66 Additionally, VSRs enable 

students to go back to any point on the digital terrain—instantly—

during the integration phase. This capability helps students assimilate what they learned from exploring the terrain in the field study 

phase. It is not a capability that can pragmatically or feasibly be 

replicated in nonvirtual staff rides.67 Of course, for cyber warriors, 

VSRs may end up becoming the one true staff ride option. Because 

the actual area of cyber operations is the real, live “terrain” of the 

worldwide information network, the VSR could conceivably depict 

past cyber operations digitally and graphically on screen, allowing 

participants to visit these “terrains” as they were at the time of the 

operation. It is also possible that VSRs could use isolated training 

63. Curtis S. King, “Virtual Staff Rides: Their Benefits and Methodology,” Army 

History 110 (Winter 2019), p. 37.

64. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 1. 

65. King, “Virtual Staff Rides,” pp. 37–38.

66. Ibid., p. 38.

67. Ibid., p. 39.
53

networks specifically designed to replicate the sensitive operations 

under study. 

VSRs, by definition, take place in a classroom setting, and this 

negates one of the biggest advantages of staff riding, which is traversing 

the hallowed ground where tremendous acts of valor and sacrifice took 

place, sometimes with world-altering effects. Despite impressive 3D 

technology, the “virtual walk” over the terrain in a VSR will always 

lack some of the full immersion experience that comes from exploring 

the real place where a fight occurred. 

All staff rides take participants away from their normal locations 

and routines, and this change of venue enables and encourages them to 

immerse themselves fully in the study of a battle or event. With VSRs, 

especially those that occur in conjunction with professional military 

education, participants run the risk of treating the experience as simply 

another classroom session. In these settings, staff ride leaders are 

encouraged to highlight the advantages of the VSR, and emphasize the 

unique experience that it is. Moreover, with the continuing evolution of 

virtual and augmented reality technologies and artificial intelligence, the 

capabilities of the VSR will expand dramatically in the years ahead.

Preliminary Study Phase

This phase includes all forms of individual and group study that are 

conducted before seeing the digital environment. At a minimum, 

participants must gain a general understanding of the battle or event 

being studied before the field study phase, when they will see the 

actual computer-generated terrain. If time permits, preparation can 

be more extensive and might include classes, student presentations, 

and more.68 (See pp. 25–28.)

Field Study Phase

During this phase, the participants see the computer-generated terrain 

and navigate to different locations within the virtual terrain to discuss 

actions in the battle, using the terrain to enhance discussion. During 

this phase, the digital terrain is juxtaposed with slides or other visual 

aids shown on an adjacent screen. Together, the visual aids and digital 

terrain provide unique perspectives. Participants can go to places on 

digital terrain that they either could not go to at all in real life or could 

not get to quickly on a terrestrial battlefield.69 (See pp. 29–36.)

Integration Phase

The integration phase allows participants to discuss how exploring 

the area of operations influenced their understanding of the battle 

68. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 2.

69. Ibid.
54

and provided them insights relevant to their modem military professional roles.70 The integration phase of a VSR is usually conducted 

in the classroom soon after completion of the field study phase. It is 

recommended that students take a break between the field and integration phases to gather their thoughts and reflect on the entire staff 

ride experience. The digital terrain should be displayed during the 

integration phase so it can be easily referenced during the discussions.71 (See pp. 37–40.)

Stands

Like its terrestrial counterpart, the VSR field study phase is divided 

into stands. The stands are usually discrete chronological or thematic 

breaks in the course of the experience. They allow for discussion of 

key analysis points at appropriate times and enable the participants 

to get breaks during the course of the field study phase. Bear in mind 

that each staff ride and its participants are unique, and while breaks 

should be factored into the staff ride timeline, they can also occur at 

any time as needed. In a VSR, the stands should be seen as guidelines, 

not necessarily fixed stopping and starting points.72 (See Appendix A 

for an example of a virtual stand.)

Virtual Views

A virtual view is a point providing a particular perspective within the 

virtual environment that is used to illustrate a staff ride stand. A single 

stand in a VSR can have multiple virtual views. The term is used in the 

instructor notes to help align the movements and views in the terrain 

with the historical material being discussed.73

Walkbooks, Visual Aids, and Directions

As for all staff rides, VSR instructors and VSR leaders must prepare 

thoroughly for a successful staff ride. Instructors should compile 

instructor notes into a walkbook, which they will use as a guide to move 

through all the stands in the field study phase. VSR walkbooks tend to 

follow the ODA format and, on the whole, they will be similar to the 

walkbooks described on pages 19–23. VSR walkbooks should contain 

directions for and descriptions of the movements through the virtual 

terrain; an account of the important events at each stand; and analysis 

questions.74 VSR walkbooks will also contain other elements found in 

typical staff rides such as vignettes, lists of visual aids and cues for their 

usage, and navigation directions within the area of operations. However, 

70. Ibid.

71. King, “Virtual Staff Rides,” p. 39.

72. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 2.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.
55

visual aids (which are usually maps) and navigational directions are 

used in a slightly different manner in VSRs.75

VSR visual aids are displayed in PowerPoint rather than on 

weatherproof canvas scrolls or ruggedized poster boards. The walkbook should list the visual aids for each stand, give cues on when to 

present them, and specify the PowerPoint slide number for each.76

Visual aids are essential in the VSR, but they should not distract 

from the digital terrain exploration. The most powerful visual aids 

for a VSR are photographs or paintings that can be replicated by the 

digital terrain view at a given stand, providing “a powerful connection to the past.”77

Movement and stand directions are more complicated in VSRs. 

The directions in a VSR do not only get the participants to a 

specific location in the virtual terrain, they also must describe other 

movements and views, which enable the computer operator controlling 

the movement in the virtual terrain to navigate to the desired location 

and viewing angle.78

Classroom Setup and Group Size

With the need to show participants the virtual terrain and the visual 

aids simultaneously, the classroom requires two viewing screens placed 

side by side. Thus, it is also necessary to have two computer-projector 

combinations, with the virtual terrain projected on the largest screen 

possible, and the visual aids projected to the side.79

The recommended group size is twelve to fifteen people. This size 

allows for maximum participation and a better view of the virtual 

terrain for all participants.80 Larger groups (up to twenty participants) 

are possible but not encouraged, because those unable to view the 

terrain well will be less likely to fully engage, which in turn significantly 

decreases discussion within the broader group.81

Personnel

Every VSR requires at least one staff ride instructor, but two instructors may be preferable as they can share the teaching load. To effectively execute all phases of the staff ride, instructors must be experts 

on the campaign and know the walkbook intimately.82 VSRs also 

75. Ibid., p. 3

76. Ibid.

77. King, “Virtual Staff Rides,” p. 41.

78. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 3.

79. Ibid.

80. King, “Virtual Staff Rides,” pp. 39, 41.

81. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 3; King, “Virtual Staff Rides,” pp. 38–39.

82. “The Exportable Virtual Staff Ride (VSR)—Stalingrad,” Army University 

Press Staff Ride Team, p. 3.
56

require a computer operator. This is the person who does the “flying” 

to navigate from one virtual view to the next. The computer operator 

must be familiar with VBS3 software and must rehearse the movements with the instructor so that the two can work together smoothly 

in actual staff ride execution.83 Just as terrestrial staff ride participants 

do not want to sit in the bus on the side of the road while a staff ride 

leader deals with an unexpected detour, VSR participants do not want 

to sit idle in a classroom while the staff ride leader fumbles through 

instructions to the computer operator, who is attempting to figure out 

the game controller moves to navigate to and position the next virtual 

view of a stand. In this regard, VSRs are no different from other staff 

rides: reconnaissance and rehearsals are essential to success.

83. Ibid.
57

CONCLUSION 10

The design and conduct of a staff ride is not a simple task. It should 

not be taken lightly or done on the cheap. By its very nature, a staff ride 

is both time and resource intensive. A staff ride requires subject matter 

expertise, intelligently applied in a systematic way, to guide professional soldiers and civilians through the most complex of intellectual 

exercises—the analysis of battle in all its dimensions. 

If a terrain exercise is all that is required, a TEWT could be 

constructed on any convenient piece of ground. Such terrain exercises are useful, but they are not staff rides in and of themselves. 

However, a TEWT can become a staff ride if it is specifically 

grounded in a past campaign, performed on location on the actual 

terrain, and made to follow the phased methodology illustrated 

in the decision-gaming technique presented earlier. In contrast, if 

participants are to be taken to a battlefield of the past but there is 

little or no time for systematic preliminary study, then a historical 

battlefield tour is all that is required. Such tours have their place, 

but they are not staff rides. A staff ride yields much greater results 

than a stand-alone TEWT or a battlefield tour can, but it is far 

more difficult to devise. Those who want to create a staff ride, be it 

traditional or nontraditional, virtual or terrestrial, must be aware 

of these difficulties. 

Carefully designed and intelligently executed, a staff ride is one 

of the most powerful instruments available for the development 

of national security professionals. Staff rides are among the best 

experiential learning events for fostering critical thinking skills 

through the analysis and evaluation of battles and events, appreciating the similarities and differences between past events and 

present challenges, and rediscovering the timeless aspects of warfare. Staff rides also foster creativity and mental agility, while addressing the complexities of leadership and decision making in the 

unforgiving crucible of multi-domain combat. Practitioners and 

participants gain useful insights that they can apply to improve 

and inspire their own service to the nation. May all those involved 
58

with staff rides now and in the future put forth their maximum 

efforts and leverage all available resources to gain the most from 

every aspect of this unique experience. 
59

TRADITIONAL STAFF RIDE STAND

ORIENTATION 

Situation

On 6 June 1944, the 116th Infantry, a regiment assigned to the 29th 

Infantry Division, lands on the western (left) half of Omaha Beach 

in the Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red, and Easy Green sectors to 

begin the Allied invasion of the European continent. The soldiers of 

the 29th Infantry Division face the daunting challenges of numerous mine-laden beach obstacles slowing their amphibious approach. 

They must make a deadly and desperate advance across a large 

beachfront in the face of determined German 352d Division soldiers 

defending from the high ground and flanking positions in concrete 

resistance nests (Widerstandsnester) armed with deadly machine 

guns, 75-mm. and 88-mm. field guns, and mortars to oppose the 

Allied landing with lethal, enfilading direct and indirect fires.

Battle maps depicting unit positions and actions are an essential 

visual aid to use at a stand like this to orient students to their location 

on the battlefield. Refer to the map (p. 61) and note the location of 

the 116th Infantry companies. Also note the locations in red of the 

formidable German defenses in 116th Infantry’s landing sector.

EXAMPLES OF STAFF

RIDE STANDS

APPENDIX

A
Modern view from Widerstandsnest-73 looking east down Omaha Beach
N

40

50

50

60

50

Louvières

Le Grand Hameau Cabourg

Colleville-sur-Mer

St.-Laurent-sur-Mer

Les Moulins

Hamel-au-Prêtre

Vacqueville

Château de Vaumicel

Vierville-sur-Mer

116 16

Charlie Dog Green Dog White Dog Red Easy Green Easy Red Fox Green Fox Red

X 1 29

5 Rn(+)

C 116

D 116B 116

K 116

F 116M 116

I 116 L 116

G 16

H 16

M 16

16 L 16 I 16 F 16 E E 116

H 116

G 116 A 116

C 2 Rn

A 2 Rn B 2 Rn

16 K

5 Rn

M 116

16 I

16 L

16 K M 16

16 E

H 16

16 F

G 16

E 116

L 116

I 116 K 116

G 116

F 116

C 2 Rn

D 116

A 116

B 116

C 116

A 2 Rn B 2 Rn

H 116

C 2 Rn

C 116

5 Rn

A 2 Rn

B 2 Rn

H 116 C 116

D 116

A 116

B 116

F 116

G 116 I 116

K 116

L 116

M 116

16 E

16 K M 16

16 L

16 I

H 16

16 F

G 16

Yards

0 500 1000

Planned Landings

Actual Landings

D-DAY, OMAHA BEACH

NORMANDY, FRANCE

6 June 1944
62

Stand Location

You are standing atop the location of German Resistance Nest 73 

(Widerstandsnest-73) overlooking Omaha Beach, Dog Green Sector, 

on the far western end of the beach on the western bluff nearest the 

Vierville Draw (D-1 Exit). Your view is looking eastward down onto 

and across the beach from the German vantage point. Standing at this 

location while referencing the map gives you the geographical references needed to understand where you are on the battlefield in relation 

to where significant battle events transpired. Moreover, from this vantage point, you can gain an appreciation of the terrain and the effect it 

had in shaping this battle.

DESCRIPTION

Widerstandsnest-73 was the German fortified defensive position atop the 

western bluff adjacent to the Vierville Draw (also known to the Allies on 

D-Day as the D-1 Exit) off of Omaha Beach.84 This position had several 

machine guns aimed at the beach below along with indirect-fire weapons 

like 8.14-cm. (Gr.W 34) mortars preregistered to fire on the beach, in 

addition to a 75-mm. (FK231-f) field gun targeting the beach from a 

concrete defilade position.85 The Germans turned Omaha Beach into a 

killing ground for the initial American assault waves arriving on D-Day. 

The first four companies of the 29th Infantry Division’s 116th Infantry 

were decimated by German direct and indirect fires within the first two 

hours of battle.86

Vignette

Harold Baumgarten, a native of New York City, was a private in Company B, 116th Infantry, 29th Infantry Division. He landed on Omaha

Beach, Dog Green Sector, at 0700 on 6 June 1944 as part of the second 

wave ashore. He recalled:

Now there are only two of us alive from my boat team, Charles Conner and myself. We had 85 percent casualties [in the] first 15 minutes. 

. . . I started cursing that machine gun that was on the right flank. I 

never used foul language, but I had to curse him because he was killing all the guys around me. A fellow named Nicholas Kafkalas was 

next to me when [he was] cut in half—I saw the machine gunner up 

there by the glare, the shine on his helmet. So I took my rifle, I was a 

super-expert, and that rifle fired. I shot at him—no more firing from 

that machine gun. Later on, when I got up on the bluff, he had his head 

84. Peter Caddick-Adams, Sand and Steel: The D-Day Invasion and the Liberation of 

France (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 553.

85. “German strongpoints in Normandy: Wn 73, Atlantic wall,” D-Day Overlord, 

https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/d-day/atlantic-wall/strongpoints/wn-73, Historians Files, CMH.

86. Caddick-Adams, Sand and Steel, pp. 571–75, 600.
63

shot off, armor-piercing ammunition. I was cursing that pillbox 

on the right flank and a shell went 

off in front of me, 88-mm. It blew 

off this cheek (gestures to his left 

cheek), gave me a hole in the roof 

of my mouth. I had teeth and gums 

lying on my tongue. This jaw was 

shot away, left upper jaw, the cheek 

was flapping over my ear. And I 

looked to my left front and Bedford Hoback, of Bedford, Virginia, 

got hit with the same shell, right in 

the face. He was dead. Next to him 

was a fellow named Elmer Wright 

of Bedford, Virginia; he was already dead. I figured I’d better get 

off the beach.87

Harold Baumgarten’s graphic, personal recollection of his experience landing on Omaha Beach on D-Day brings the “face of 

battle” to the students, making them come to grips with the terrible, 

relentless, unforgiving reality of ground combat and what it was like 

to be on the receiving end of German fires from the dominating high 

ground while trying to advance inland. Baumgarten was able to rely 

on his training and engage the enemy with some effectiveness despite his vulnerable position. He clearly demonstrates the resilience 

required of the American soldiers that fought on to eventual victory 

on D-Day. 

The Germans had an incredible advantage operating from the 

high ground dominating Omaha Beach. Their machine gun positions had enfilading fields of fire down the length of the beach that 

decimated the initial waves of Allied troops as they landed. These 

fires, in combination with deadly 88-mm. and 75-mm. guns in concrete defilade as well as indirect fire from mortars from elevated positions on the bluffs, made initial American advances extremely difficult to impossible. Only the steadfast determination of follow-on 

waves brought order to the chaos ensuing on the beach. Leaders like 

Brig. Gen. Norman Cota, Assistant Division Commander, 29th Infantry Division, and Capt. Ralph Goranson, commanding Company 

C, 2d Ranger Infantry Battalion, organized and led the small unit 

actions that would start to overcome the formidable German defensive positions. Goranson led the assault up the cliffside to take out 

87. Gordon H. Mueller, “Everything We Have,” D-Day, 6.6.44 (London: Andre 

Deutsch, 2019), p. 135.

Pvt. Harold Baumgarten (Courtesy of the 

National WWII Museum)
64

Widerstandsnest-73 atop the western bluff of the Vierville Draw.88

Goranson’s efforts enabled General Cota, who had led small unit 

elements up the eastern bluff of the Vierville Draw into the town of 

Vierville-sur-Mer, to finally take some Widerstandsnest-72 positions 

(on the eastern bluff) from behind, and eventually access the D-1 

Exit from the back end.89 These small unit actions, in combination 

with naval gunfire from Allied destroyers pulling as close into the 

shoreline as possible to engage the German Widerstandsnest positions, enabled American troops to eventually open up the D-1 Exit 

(Vierville Draw) and allow 29th Infantry Division elements to exit 

off of Omaha Beach.90

ANALYSIS

Key Teaching Points

Analysis of terrain, initiative, combined arms, the effect of technology, 

and the “face of battle.”

Discussion Questions

1. How did the terrain and environmental conditions shape and 

affect the course of the battle for Omaha Beach?

2. How did the American troops and German troops utilize their 

weaponry and equipment to their respective advantages?

3. How does the recollection of a soldier like Harold Baumgarten 

expand and inform your knowledge of what happened on 

Omaha Beach?

4. What insights have you gained from seeing and walking 

through the German position of Widerstandsnest-73 and the 

Omaha Beach landing zone for the 29th Infantry Division? 

5. How did the American troops finally overcome the formidable 

German positions on Omaha Beach?

6. How do small unit actions lead to larger, more significant 

results?

88. Caddick-Adams, Sand and Steel, pp. 605–06.

89. Ibid., p. 625.

90. Ibid., pp. 589–90, 625.
65

ORIENTATION

Situation

Temporary buildings were constructed on the National Mall to facilitate 

national military mobilization in preparation for World War I. Known 

as “tempos,” these buildings were kept and expanded upon throughout 

the interwar period and throughout and beyond World War II. Even 

though the Pentagon was completed in 1943, the tempos remained in 

use by the Navy and War Departments and the eventual Department of 

Defense well into the 1960s. They were demolished in the early 1970s. 

Stand Location

Constitution Avenue near the intersection with Eighteenth Street NW, 

Washington, D.C., looking to the southeast.

Note: The use of period and modern photographs side by side 

allows for a “then and now” comparison of the National Mall when 

students are walking the ground. 

DESCRIPTION

In the early twentieth century, and especially during World War I, 

temporary buildings were constructed in the city of Washington and 

used by the Army and other government organizations. Two large 

buildings were built on the National Mall near the Lincoln Memorial 

between the reflecting pool and Constitution Avenue. These were the 

Main Navy and Munitions Buildings, and they were used by the Navy 

and Army, respectively, during World War I. Built in only six months, 

the Main Navy and Munitions Buildings were four-story, steel and 

concrete buildings. They were erected under the auspices of Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to accommodate 

the rapidly expanding military bureaucracy of World War I.91 Although 

these buildings were supposed to have been temporary, they continued 

91. “‘Temporary’ War Department Buildings,” National Mall and Memorial Parks, National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/articles/temporary-war-department-buildings.

htm, Historians Files, CMH.
66

The Main Navy and Munitions Buildings, ca. 1925. The Washington Monument and the 

National Mall can be seen behind the building. (Library of Congress)

Constitution Gardens today, where the Main Navy and Munitions Buildings once stood.
67

to be used even after the Pentagon was built in 1943. Other “tempos,” 

as they were called, were built throughout the city of Washington.

Vignette

Talking about the buildings in a press conference on 19 August 1941, 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt said: 

When I first came down here in 1933, I said I didn’t think I would 

ever be let into the Gates of Heaven, because I had been responsible 

for desecrating the parks of Washington. Back in the fall of 1917, 

the Navy Department needed space, and I took up with President 

Wilson the possibility of building a temporary building—wooden 

building—down here on the Oval. And he said, “Why do you select 

that site?” I said, “Mr. President, because it would be so unsightly 

right here in front of the White House, that it just would have to be 

taken down at the end of the war.” “Well,” he said, “I don’t think 

I could stand all that hammering and sawing right under my front 

windows.” He said, “Can’t you put it somewhere else?” So I said, 

“Of course. Put it down in Potomac Park.” “Well,” he said, “Put it 

down there and we will get rid of it.”92

In 1914, the Army Quartermaster Corps’ Construction Division 

created plans for wartime mobilization camps and temporary buildings 

and, upon American entry into World War I, temporary military buildings 

were built on military bases and other sites throughout the country, 

including the first-generation tempos in Washington, D.C.93 The tempos, 

as their name suggests, were supposed to be torn down after their use in 

the war, but many of them continued to be used by government agencies 

well after the war, as the government and especially the War Department 

needed office space for the growing military bureaucracy. 

During and after World War I, several new agencies and bureaus 

were created—for example, the Finance Department, Chemical Warfare 

Service, and the Army Air Service—and they all needed headquarters in 

Washington. Following World War I, the Munitions Building housed the 

Quartermaster General, Army Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Corps, 

Chemical Warfare Service, Signal Corps, and Army Air Service.94 In 

92. Executive Office of the President Press Conference #762, Franklin D. Roo- sevelt, 19 Aug 1941, p. 11, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/pc/

pc0121.pdf, Historians Files, CMH. 

93. John S. Garner, World War II Temporary Military Buildings: A Brief History of the 

Architecture and Planning of Cantonments and Training Stations in the United States,

U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratories (USACERL) Technical Rpt CRC-93/01 (Champaign, Ill.: USACERL, Mar 1993), p. 22.

94. Official Congressional Directory, 67th Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 270–72; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Annual 

Report of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 4137–38; Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, 
68

1923, the Army’s Finance Office also moved into the building.95 Then, 

in 1933, the Army Inspector General’s office, Army Reserves, and the 

Chief of Chaplains’ office moved in as well.96 The National Guard 

Bureau and Army Industrial College were also located in the Munitions 

Building.97 The War Department Headquarters itself was still there 

(where the Constitution Gardens and Vietnam War Memorial are today, 

near the present-day National World War II Memorial). Things were 

getting crowded. 

In the late 1930s, as war clouds loomed again, the War Department 

received additional funding and used much of it to construct military 

buildings throughout the country, including second-generation tempos 

in Washington, D.C. These newer tempos occupied the land south 

of the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool and near the Washington 

Monument. Bridges were created across the water to allow office 

workers to cross between the northern and southern buildings. Like 

the previous buildings, these new tempos had gaps between them 

resembling combs, but the buildings themselves, being only two stories 

tall, were shorter than the first-generation tempos. Some people opposed 

the construction of these buildings because they ruined the aesthetic of 

the National Mall, crowded in next to memorials and museums.98

The Army Headquarters moved from the State, War, and Navy 

Building (now the Eisenhower Executive Office Building) to the 

Munitions Building in 1938–1939 because it was getting too big for the 

sixteen suites that the Army occupied in that building, which it still shared 

with the State Department. (The Navy had moved out in 1918 to the 

Main Navy Building because it, too, needed more room.) Increasingly, 

the Army had to compete with the White House, which sought to use the 

building for office space. As it seemed likely that the United States would 

enter World War II, the War Department needed space for a larger staff 

to plan for the massive military mobilization as well as the industrial and 

economic mobilizations that would accompany it. This was especially 

vital as it was assumed that World War II would become a two-front war.99

The Technical Services: The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War, U.S. Army 

in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989), 

p. 27; Dulany Terrett, The Technical Services: The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To 

December 1941), U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1956), p. 50; U.S. Air Service, vols. 5–6 (Air Service Publishing 

Company, 1921), p. 38, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024398912

&view=1up&seq=7.

95. “Army Finance Office Moves,” Washington Post, 4 Mar 1923.

96. “More Federal Bureaus Move Offices Today,” Washington Post, 4 Nov 1933.

97. Washington, City and Capital, Federal Writers’ Project, Works Progress Administration, American Guide Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1937), p. 871; Official National Guard Register for 1936 (Washington, D.C.: National 

Guard Bureau, 1936), p. 3; “Executive Branch Report,” United States Government 

Manual, October 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Government Reports, 1939), 

pp. 99–100.

98. “‘Temporary’ War Department Buildings.”

99. Garner, World War II Temporary Military Buildings, p. 11.
69

Because of this rapid expansion, it became necessary for the military 

to launch and supervise a number of programs for procurement, 

production of war materiel, and military construction in preparation 

for the probable conflict ahead.100 Therefore, the rest of the War 

Department staff moved into the Munitions Building, joining the 

majority of the War Department staff who had moved there in 1930. 

This transition, which finally located the War Department headquarters 

in the Munitions Building, completed a nearly decade-long move.101

Secretary of War Harry Woodring and Army Chief of Staff George 

Marshall both relocated to the Munitions Building in 1939.102 They 

soon realized that this building was not big enough for their offices 

and they again began looking elsewhere for more room. As the United 

States entered World War II, the War Department (still located in the 

Munitions Building) initially planned to move into a new building 

that had been built for them nearby in Foggy Bottom, but Secretary 

of War Henry Stimson believed this new building (now the Harry S. 

Truman Building, which houses the State Department headquarters) 

would also be too small for the 24,000 workers scattered across 

seventeen different sites and the 10,000 new workers he anticipated 

needing once the United States entered the war.103

Secretary Stimson and President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided 

that the War Department should instead build something larger in 

Virginia. The resulting building, the Pentagon, would become the 

100. Ibid.

101. “State, War, and Navy Building, July 1875–April 1947,” Buildings of the Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/

buildings/section27, Historians Files, CMH.

102. Ibid. 

103. Alfred Goldberg, The Pentagon: The First Fifty Years (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1992), pp. 5–9.

This view of the Main Navy and Munitions Buildings, ca. 1945, shows how much of the 

National Mall was covered by these temporary buildings at the peak of their expansion. 

(Library of Congress)
70

new War Department Headquarters when it moved there in 1942–

1943.104 The Pentagon’s larger structure allowed the War Department 

to have the office space it needed (and had lacked in the Munitions 

Building) and to centralize that staff and its operations under one 

roof.105 This was especially important for mobilization planning 

efforts, as it allowed War Department staff to be at one location and 

have the space it needed to fulfill its wartime functions.106 The Navy, 

also needing space, took over the Munitions Building in 1943 so it 

would not have to move its headquarters. 

Even after the Pentagon was built and World War II ended, the 

tempos on the mall continued to be used by the government. Fourth 

stories had been added to the Main Navy and Munitions Buildings 

during the war, but even these were not enough to accommodate the 

needs of the government.107

In the 1950s, approximately fifty tempos were still standing. 

Some were used by the Veterans Administration, State Department, 

Federal Aviation Administration, Civilian Aeronautics Board, Defense 

104. William Gardner Bell, Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2010), p. 8.

105. Steve Vogel, The Pentagon, A History: The Untold Story of the Wartime Race to 

Build the Pentagon—And to Restore It Sixty Years Later (New York: Random House, 

2007), pp. 29–33. 

106. “State, War, and Navy Building, July 1875–April 1947.”

107. “Main Navy and Munitions Buildings,” Naval History and Heritage Command, 

https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/places/washington-dc/

main-navy---munitions-buildings.html, Historians Files, CMH. 

The former Liberty Loan Building, built in 1919, is the last remaining “tempo” in 

Washington, D.C. It now houses the Bureau of the Fiscal Service.
71

Department, and Central Intelligence Agency.108 In 1960, the Main 

Navy and Munitions Buildings still held 7,000 workers from the Navy, 

Army, Air Force, Veterans Administration, and the State Department. 

But by the early 1960s, many of the tempos were suffering serious 

structural problems such as cracks in their concrete piers, cracked and 

bent walls, and major floor settling.109 In the mid-1960s, the government 

began to demolish the D.C. tempos to make room for new buildings. 

Eventually, the pressure to get rid of the Main Navy and Munitions 

Buildings on the National Mall resulted in their razing in 1970.110

Today, one solitary tempo survives, located just a few blocks away 

from the National Mall. The former Liberty Loan Building, built in 

1919, still stands between Fourteenth Street and the Tidal Basin. It is 

now the Bureau of the Fiscal Service.111

ANALYSIS

Key Teaching Points

Enduring and evolving needs of mobilization and demobilization and 

corresponding staff support in response to the ramp up, conduct, conclusion, and aftermath of the nation’s conflicts. 

Discussion Questions 

1. The United States has not mobilized for war on the scale of 

World War II since that conflict. Will the nature of future conflict ever require another such mobilization, or will we fight all 

future large-scale combat operations only with what we currently have available in the Guard and Reserve?

2. What aspects of the mobilization required increased office 

space, and would those same requirements for more office 

space pertain to a modern mobilization of the Army, assuming we mobilized on a large scale as we did for the world wars?

3. Given modern communications capabilities, would it still be 

necessary or desirable to have all the offices of an expended 

Army headquarters in proximity to the Pentagon? What would 

be gained or lost by having some of the offices located remotely? 

What factors might govern the selection of remote locations?

4. What other insights can you glean from the World War II experience regarding the possible rapid expansion of the Headquarters, Department of the Army?

108. John Kelly, “Answer Man Remembers the ‘Temporary’ Office Buildings that 

Once Blighted D.C.,” Washington Post, 18 Jul 2017.

109. Jerry Landauer, “‘Temp’ Built in First World War Still Used as Munitions 

Building,” Washington Post, 26 Apr 1960.

110. Ellen Hoffman, “Last ‘Tempos’ Fall in Style,” Washington Post, 16 Jul 1970.

111. “‘Temporary’ War Department Buildings.”
72

ORIENTATION

Situation

On 2 March 2002, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mount

attacked to destroy (capture or kill) al-Qaeda operatives in the vicinity of 

Sher Khan Khel in the Shahi Kot Valley, Afghanistan. Additionally, they 

were to identify or disrupt al-Qaeda insurgency support mechanisms 

and exfiltration routes into Pakistan. They were prepared to conduct 

follow-on operations to clear selected objectives and interdict al-Qaeda 

operatives’ movements in the area of operations. Task Force (TF) 1–87 

Infantry landed at Landing Zones (LZs) 13 and 13A with the mission

to secure blocking positions (BPs) Ginger and Heather to capture 

kill al-Qaeda fighters attempting to escape from the valley floor to the 

east and south.112

Below is a digital terrain screenshot of the Shahi Kot Valley, 

oriented north to south. TF 1–87 Infantry, LZs 13 and 13A, and BPs

112. Adapted from Operational Summary, Opn Anaconda, Capt. Michael Lovelan

and the 47th, 48th, and 130th Mil History Detachments, Mar 2002, compiled for 

use as Course Material, U.S. Army Military History Detachment Course 20–003, 

11–15 May 2020, pp. 1–9, Historians Files, CMH.

Digital terrain screenshot of the Shahi Kot Valley (Army University Press)
73

Heather and Ginger are located at the bottom right of the screensho

astride the south and southeastern exits from the valley.

Stand Location

This is a virtual view of the location of Company C, 1st Battalion, 

87th Infantry. Below is the digital terrain view from LZ 13A looking 

south into Heather Pass. BP Heather was probably somewhere i

the middle distance of the pass. Rak Tak Ridge is visible to the right 

(west). “The Bowl” or “Hell’s Halfpipe” is somewhere in the vicinity 

of the scrub brush on the left side of the screenshot. Company C, 1st 

Battalion, 87th Infantry, was pinned down in that area taking hostile 

indirect and direct fires from high ground on both sides of the valley.

DESCRIPTION

Al-Qaeda fighters were not in the villages on the valley floor as initial 

intelligence reports had predicted. In fact, the enemy was located in elevated positions overlooking the valley. Enemy mortars were particularly 

effective against soldiers from Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 

who were moving to occupy BPs Ginger and Heather. Company

began taking small-arms fire as soon as they hit their LZs. As the 1st and 

2d Platoons attempted to move off the LZs toward their designated blocking positions at Heather and Ginger, respectively, the enemy open

up with rocket-propelled grenade and machine-gun fires. Both platoons 

were forced to take cover, but 1st Platoon moved forward and established 

itself on BP Heather. Suddenly, the enemy dropped a succession of mortar rounds onto their position, wounding the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and eight others. Almost half the troops on BP Heather becam

casualties. Mortars from Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, who 

were accompanying 2d Platoon, were set up and began returning fire, but 

Digital terrain screenshot of Landing Zone 13A (Army University Press)
74

they soon expended all of their rounds. The 2d Platoon was also being 

hit, and the Company C commander, Capt. Nelson G. Kraft, pulled his 

men back and placed them in a company strongpoint in a nearby crater 

later known by the nickname Hell’s Halfpipe. This single strongpoint 

attempted to block both avenues of approach down the valley that were 

originally to be blocked by BPs Heather and Ging

113

Vignette

S. Sgt. Andrzej Ropel, a Polish immigrant who aspired to become a 

citizen of the United States, joined the U.S. Army in 1996. In March 

2002, Ropel found himself serving as a squad leader in Company C, 

1st Battalion, 87th Infantry.114 In the 2005 work entitled Not a Good 

Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, author Sean Naylor contextualizes Sergeant Ropel’s firsthand account of the fighting in 

Hell’s Halfpipe:

As Ropel scanned the face of the ridgeline opposite him, he saw a black 

shape moving about 175 meters away. Peering through a three-power 

scope that he’d removed from a set of night-vision goggles and fixed 

to his M4, he realized that what he’d seen was the head and torso of an 

enemy fighter. The figure was in a bunker made by building a stone 

wall to connect a boulder to the side of the mountain. It was through 

a little window in the wall that Ropel could see the enemy. Because 

Ropel’s ridgeline sloped down to the north, the bunker offered an 

excellent view of the Halfpipe. . . . Ropel immediately surmised the 

figure he could see was the observer who had been causing them so 

much trouble. But killing him proved difficult. The guerrilla knew 

he was being watched and seemed to enjoy the attention. He teased 

Ropel by popping his head up for a split second, then ducking before 

Ropel squeezed the trigger. After each shot Ropel fired, his target 

would yell “Allah U Akhbar!” – “God is Great!”

Ropel quickly tired of this “cat and mouse game.” He couldn’t afford to waste the ammo, and so slunk back out of sight and waited 

for his adversary to lose patience. By now his men were also eyeballing the guerrilla’s hiding place. Ropel told them not to fire. He had 

a better line of sight. “I did not want to scare him so he would go 

away,” Ropel said. “I wanted him to think that we were gone.” . . . 

Ropel and his men watched and waited. Finally, as Ropel had figured 

he would, the figure raised himself for a couple of seconds to look 

around, exposing his head and upper torso. That was all the Polish 

NCO needed. He lined up the man in his sight and pulled the trigger. 

113. Ibid., pp. 7–8.

114. Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda

(New York: Berkley Books, 2005), pp. 229–31. Ropel put his application for citizenship on hold to deploy to Afghanistan.
75

“I don’t know if I hit him or killed him, but I didn’t hear any more 

‘Allah U Akhbar!’” Ropel said. There was also a pause in the mortar 

fire, lending credence to Ropel’s suspicion that his target had been 

calling it in.115

During the next eighteen hours, the soldiers of Company C 

fought back al-Qaeda attempts to outmaneuver them and overrun 

their position in Hell’s Halfpipe. Conserving ammunition, the 10th 

Mountain Division soldiers defeated every enemy attack but absorbed 

additional casualties. 

Lt. Col. Paul J. LaCamera, commander of TF 1–87 Infantry,

and his battalion tactical command post had accompanied Company 

C on the assault and set up their operations near BP Heather. This

command post was also hit and suffered six casualties during the 

course of the fighting. By the day’s end, some twenty-five soldiers 

of the 10th Mountain Division were wounded, four seriously. The 

enemy fire began to dissipate by nightfall, and the soldiers of TF 

1–87 Infantry were able to safely access their rucksacks, attach their

nightvision goggles, and employ them to their distinct advantage to 

control the battlefield.116

Note: The vignette (embedded above) brings in the human 

element and the “face of battle” to the students. This vignette refers 

to the terrain feature nicknamed Hell’s Halfpipe, which was observed 

in the digital screenshot above and is easily explored in the VSR by 

navigating over to view that precise location from multiple angles, 

including both Sergeant Ropel’s and his adversary’s perspectives.

115. Ibid., pp. 267–68.

116. Ibid., p. 8.

Students gather at the completion of their virtual staff ride. (Army University Press)
76

Note: In a virtual staff ride, the digital terrain is depicted for 

ease of reference and juxtaposed with pertinent operational maps or 

other visual aids on the adjacent viewing screen as seen in the picture 

above. The computer operator can navigate around the digital terrain 

affording students multiple viewing angles and depths by which to 

explore and analyze the area of operations, while the operational map 

depicts the scheme of maneuver. These elements combine to animate 

the area of operations in the minds of the students.

ANALYSIS

Key Teaching Points

Maintaining command and control, decision making under direct fire, 

adjusting the battle plan to enemy contact, analysis of terrain, balancing survivability against mission accomplishment in both planning 

and execution.

Discussion Questions

1. How did enemy actions influence on-the-spot decision making 

for Capt. Nelson G. Kraft and for S. Sgt. Andrzej Ropel while 

pinned down in Hell’s Halfpipe? 

2. How did terrain and environmental factors influence the 

ability of Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, to respond 

to the enemy?

3. How has exploring the terrain of the Shahi Kot Valley affected 

your assessment of the performance of the various small unit 

leaders involved in the operation?

4. What insights can you glean from this operation that would 

help you in future combat engagements?
77

Advice and assistance on how to plan and conduct staff rides may be 

obtained from the following sources:

IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

U.S. Army Center of Military History

ATTN: ATMH-FPF

Collins Hall, Building 35

102 4th Avenue

Fort McNair, DC 20319-5060

(202) 685-2726 / DSN 325-2726

http://www.history.army.mil

Army University Press 

ATTN: ATZL-CSH

290 Stimson Road, Unit 1

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2345

(913) 684-2131/2082 / DSN 552-2131/2082 

http://www.armyupress.army.mil

U.S. Army War College

Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations

122 Forbes Avenue

Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 

(717) 245-4483 / DSN 242-4483

U.S. Military Academy

Department of History

West Point, NY 10996-1793

(845)-938-3300 / DSN 688-3300

POINTS OF CONTACT FOR

ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE

APPENDIX

B
78

IN EUROPE

U.S. Army Europe

ATTN: AECS-MH

APO AE 09014-9351

49-0611-143-537-0131 / DSN (314) 537-0131

IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army

ATTN: EAHO

APO AP 96205-0010

011-822-7915-3570 / DSN (315)-732-6544
79

ABBREVIATIONS

AAR after action review

AR augmented reality

AUP Army University Press

BP blocking position

CJTF combined joint task force

CMH U.S. Army Center of Military History

CSI Combat Studies Institute

CTC combat training center

GPS global positioning system

LZ landing zone

NCO noncommissioned officer

ODA orientation, description, and analysis

OCS Officer Candidate School

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

RTTP reacting to the past

TEWT tactical exercise without troops

TF task force

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

USMA U.S. Military Academy

VBS3 Virtual Battlespace 3

VSR virtual staff ride