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How to Master Wargaming:

Commander and Staff Guide 

to Improving Course of Action 

Analysis

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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

How to Master Wargaming: Commander and Staff Guide to 

Improving Course of Action Analysis

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Visualization 7

Seeing Ourselves, the Enemy, and the Terrain 8

Historical Vignettes 9

Tools to Increase Proficiency in Visualization and 

Improve Course of Action Analysis 17

Conducting a Commercial Wargame 19

Choosing the Right Wargame 24

Wargame Mediums 25

Thoughts on Course of Action Analysis: Action, Reaction, 

Counteraction, and Adjudication 29

Course of Action Analysis Methods 33

Conduct of the Wargame (Action-ReactionCounteraction) 37

Wargame Rules and Methods 38

Adjudication 40

Correlation of Forces and Means 42

Analog Correlation of Forces and Means and Step 

Losses 44

Conducting Action-Reaction-Counteraction Cycles 47

Wargame Vignette 50

Thoughts on Training the Staff 59

Example of a Staff Training Plan 63

List of Sample Commercial Wargames 65

Appendix A. Technical Assistance Field Team Task Guide: 

The Military Decisionmaking Process. Collective Task 

Number 71-8-5111

73

Appendix B. References 85

Appendix C. Supplemental Resources 89
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

File One: Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming) 

Videos 89

File Two: Professional Reading 90

File Three: Supplemental Training Material 93

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director COL Christopher J. Keller

CALL Lead Analyst Mr. Richard Averna

CALL Contributing Analyst

Special Contributors

Mr. Donald N. Matcheck

Dr. James E Sterrett, Directorate of 

Simulation Education, CGSC

Mr. Michael B. Dunn, Directorate of 

Simulations Education, CGSC

Dr. Bruce Stanley and the School of 

Advanced Military Studies

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periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required 

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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Introduction

“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his 

temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few 

calculations beforehand.”

Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Vignette: National Training Center, Present Day

Six days into a 14-day rotation at the National Training Center, the battalion 

had just completed its second force-on-force: A deliberate attack, breach, 

and assault. It had been a rough day.

The battalion commander made his way back to the tactical operations 

center, with his mission and the day replaying in his head: Clear Objective 

Omaha to facilitate the passage of an Armor Battalion Task Force in order to 

complete the brigade combat team’s seizure of Objective Nebraska.

When the commander entered the tactical operations center, the S-3 was 

already back. The staff was around the map and the executive officer (XO) 

was thinking aloud. “The course of action (COA) had seemed simple 

enough, and the wargame had been a breeze.”

The commander took off his helmet and sat down on a steel folding chair, 

sighing heavily. “That was ugly. It seemed almost from the beginning we 

were chasing the day.”

The S-3 began to explain, “Yes sir, at about one kilometer across Phase 

Line Sprint, Alpha Company’s (A Co’s) lead platoon took two volleys of 

enemy tank fire, disabling two tanks and destroying one Bradley. That was 

a surprise. I was not sure where it was coming from. Then, we could see it 

was from Support by Fire (SBF) 1. SBF1 was just out of our range, so I set 

the section of mortars with us and put some suppression on it so A Co could 

begin bounding; they had to fight for the position.”

“It seemed to be going okay, then one of the mortar tracks was hit with antitank fire. It looked like the enemy was pulling off the rise and A Co picked 

up its movement. As A Co occupied SBF1, its combat power was down to 

six M1s and three M2s. Mortar Section 1, down one track, was still en route 

to its position. Once on SBF1, we were fighting in two directions. It took us 

forever to gain any effects needed to launch the breach and I’m not sure we 

ever did. The enemy was more determined than in our wargame, and on top 

of that, made us fight for SBF1. We did not see that during the wargame, but 

we tried to address it during the combined arms rehearsal (CAR).”
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The commander sat up. “Ok, one of the problems is right there. We have to 

get away from wargaming events at the CAR.”

The XO nodded in agreement before picking up the explanation. “I was on 

the radio with the S-3 and the mortars used half their basic load and were 

down one tube. They were black on high explosives. A Co’s expenditure 

of ammunition was higher than we wargamed. It forced us to shift some of 

the artillery fire to suppress the far right enemy platoon. That delayed the 

buildup of smoke on the main objective by about 40 minutes, or maybe 

longer.”

The fire support officer muttered, “I am sure they will tell us in the after 

action review (AAR).”

The commander sighed, “How did that even happen?”

The XO continued, “Our wargame did not include the movement, just the 

actions at the objective. I was trying to save time so we could get the order 

out quicker. We assumed A Co could move rapidly to SBF1. Speed was one 

of our criteria, and we did not visualize the enemy forward of the obstacle. 

As a result, the enemy engaged A Co earlier, which caused A Co to occupy 

SBF1 with less combat power and without mortar support. A Co also lacked 

the ammunition to sustain direct fires that could destroy enough of the 

enemy on Objective Omaha.”

The commander walked over to the map, “There is a second issue we 

cannot just wave off: the enemy. We have to assume it will fight, is free 

thinking, determined, and will try to surprise us and throw us off. That is 

what we have to wargame. Visualize the what-ifs.”

The S-3 responded, “Yes sir, and from that event on, our timing was off. 

Shifting some of our artillery from the breach to compensate affected 

the high explosives and smoke supporting the breach. The smoke was 

dissipating when the breach was still ongoing and the enemy was not 

suppressed. We were losing tanks, and at that time, we had Bravo Company 

(B Co) send its tank platoon to reinforce Delta Company (D Co), and we 

had to commit Mortar Section 2 to support the breach instead of the assault. 

Our coefficient of forces, with one tank company and 45 minutes of artillery 

suppression and obscuration, won this in the wargame, but the enemy had 

voted and not in our favor!”

The XO thought to himself, “Our wargame just consisted of filling in the 

events on the synchronization matrix, and a review of the decision support 

matrix. Everything we did was perfect. The enemy died where and when we 

wanted it to. We thought if we missed something, we could catch it at the 

CAR.”
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

The 3-291 Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) cleared Objective Omaha, 

but it was at a heavy cost. At the AAR that night, the cause and effect 

traced directly back to insufficient wargaming. The commander stood 

up and stressed what he saw as shortfalls in the wargame, saying, “We 

need to improve on the following: better understanding by the staff of its 

warfighting function, visualizing the fight with realistic adjudication of a 

thinking enemy, planning for and anticipating outcomes, synchronizing 

events and not just filling in a matrix, and finally, the CAR cannot be where 

we wargame.”

WARGAMING

“Wargaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt 

to visualize the flow of the operation, given the force’s strengths and 

dispositions, threats, capabilities, and possible COAs, impact and 

requirements of civilians in the area of operations (AO), and other 

aspects of the situation.”

Field Manual (FM) 6-0

Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 MAY 2014.

It is not the purpose of this handbook to repeat the doctrine on COA 

analysis. This handbook instead focuses on three items: First, how to 

improve and develop the cognitive skill of visualizing, a key component to 

COA analysis (wargaming); second, improving the methods and conduct of 

action, reaction, and counteraction adjudication of COA analysis with offthe-shelf wargames; and third, thoughts on training the staff.

Why focus on COA analysis? It is identified across all combat training 

centers (CTCs) and other training events as being the one step in the 

military decisionmaking process (MDMP) where staffs have the most 

difficulty. Further, integrating off-the-shelf wargames into staff training can 

help develop better understanding of how to apply rules and judgments to 

realistically adjudicate outcomes in the action, reaction, and counteraction 

process.

COA analysis (wargaming) is the fourth step in the MDMP and is arguably 

one of the most critical because it takes the commander’s plan from concept 

to detail and synchronizes the unit’s combat power for an operation. 

Recent observations of multiple units executing decisive action training 

environment rotations and Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) 

warfighter exercises (WFXs) have shown that battalions through division 

staffs do not conduct the wargame effectively. Staffs are challenged in 

visualizing events in time and space. Also, a solid home-station training 

plan for the staff on the MDMP is lacking. This leads to issuing incomplete 
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plans to subordinate units, a lack of shared understanding across the Army 

warfighting functions, and poor synchronization of all maneuver and 

support elements in the operation.

The following are observations from maneuver CTCs, MCTP WFXs, and 

training:

• Staffs are untrained on the MDMP upon arrival at the CTC. Typically, 

staffs will only have conducted one to two iterations of MDMP 

training prior to their rotations. Conversely, majors leaving the 

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) will have conducted 

eight to fourteen iterations of the MDMP before graduation. This 

number of repetitions could be a realistic goal for units prior to a 

deployment. 

• Critical thinking can only be acquired in objective analysis — in 

this case doctrinal-based analysis (wargaming) — and applying that 

analysis to a tactical problem. More training repetitions and sets in 

staff exercises, command post exercises, planning drills, etc., are 

helpful. However, staffs feel they do not have time for repetitive 

training. Therefore, the CTC rotation becomes their single learning 

environment. Units do not turn enough repetitions to build an 

experienced staff team. 

• Logic, reasoning, and visualization are the key cognitive skills that 

staffs require to conduct COA analysis. It is essential to visualize the 

fight in time and space. Generally, friendly and enemy forces have the 

same physical limitations. By understanding that concept, staffs can 

logically deduce what forces will need to accomplish their mission, 

and the decisions commanders will have to make.

• Only limited members of the staff understand the process of COA 

analysis (XO, S-2, S-3, and fire support officer). Unfortunately, many 

members of the staff do not understand their role in COA analysis, 

which links back to the MDMP training.

• COAs are far from complete and therefore, difficult to analyze. The 

enemy and friendly COAs are not understood by most of the staff 

going into the analysis step. Typically, often only the S-2 and S-3 

are involved in the creation of these products. They are not staffsynchronized products.

• The chief of staff, deputy chief of staff for strategic plans (G-5), and 

XO do not allocate enough time to conduct COA analysis. By doctrine, 

one third of the planning timeline should be dedicated to COA analysis 

(the same time allocation as mission analysis).2

 Staffs will typically 

over-allocate planning time to mission analysis at the expense of COA 

analysis.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

• Staffs struggle with “gathering the tools” prior to COA analysis. 

The most valuable tools are commander decision-making products, 

decision support matrices, and decision support templates. 

• Staffs lack the doctrinal foundation to execute wargaming. Only 

the XO or S-3 may know the doctrinal foundation of COA analysis 

(wargaming), because they are Military Education Level 4. Staffs do 

not have a planning standard operating procedure (SOP) to address 

planning requirements for each warfighting function (WfF)/staff 

representative. Commanders are not often involved in the planning 

timeline to ensure their staff executes wargaming. Brigade staffs are 

also torn between current operations, future operations, and the plans 

cell. Therefore, planning horizons become muddled, and staffs are 

bouncing around and leaving wargaming to a skeleton crew. Staff 

noncommissioned officers are not involved in wargaming, but they are 

valuable assets and should be trained and integrated into the process. 

Staff NCOs have a lot to offer in finding on-the-ground friction when 

analyzing a COA.

The problem is training and educating unit staffs to become highperformance teams. The consensus in the field is that field-grade officers 

graduating from CGSC understand the academic steps of the MDMP to 

include COA analysis (wargaming). However, the dilemma in building 

any team is integrating individual members so they understand where and 

how they fit in the team, and how they contribute to the common goal. For 

example, the individual M240 machine gunner understands how to load, 

clear, take care of, and engage targets with his M240. However, he does 

not know how this weapon is employed within the squad to support the 

overall task and purpose. The machine gunner must learn how his squad 

leader thinks and acts, how the fire teams move, and what the SOPs and 

battle drills are, so he will know when to lift or shift fires, etc. Only after 

learning the SOP and battle drills, and practicing them during multiple field 

problems, first without and then with live ammunition, does he become an 

integral member of the team. 

It is the same for a staff. Like any unit, the staff must train and educate 

its members individually and collectively, “...helping the commander 

understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions 

into a fully developed plan or order ... During COA development and COA 

comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander 

in selecting a COA.”1
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In addition to training, there is a component of repetition or practice, which 

helps to hone the staff into a high performance team. Observations have 

shown that due to time, COA analysis is often rushed or not done at all. 

Like the adage “practice makes perfect,” a staff that routinely rehearses the 

MDMP and continuously changes the conditions under which they will have 

to plan and generate orders, will be more likely to meet the high operating 

tempo of large-scale combat operations. COA analysis is similar to any 

collective skill, and is perishable if not continually trained and rehearsed. 

Therefore, it is the purpose of this handbook to provide thoughts on how 

to develop individuals and staffs so they can better conduct COA analysis 

during the MDMP.

This handbook includes supplemental resources providing additional 

information to assist in educating and training the staff. These resources can 

be accessed on the Center for Army Lessons Learned public website here: 

https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=17879 More information about 

these resources can be found in Appendix C on page 89 of this handbook.

Endnotes

1. FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 05 MAY 2014. Page 

9-2.

2. Ibid. Page 10-4.
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CHAPTER 1

Visualization

“Therefore I say: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need 

not fear the results of a hundred battles. When you are ignorant of the 

enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. 

If ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every 

battle to be in peril.”

Sun Tzu

The Art of War

The ability to visualize events or activities that occur sequentially or 

simultaneously in time and space is a critical skill for military leaders and 

their staffs. The art of true visualization is to understand with clarity how 

an enemy can affect these events or activities. An American version of the 

preceding quote from Sun Tzu might be: See yourself, see the enemy, see 

the terrain. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: 

Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 JUL 2019, discusses the ability 

to create shared understanding, and how creating shared understanding is a 

challenge for commanders and their staffs.1

 In reality, it is a larger challenge 

for staff, because the commander’s vision is already clear in his own mind. 

Although this chapter provides some perspective on how to better visualize 

the common picture, it offers no guarantee the reader will instantly become 

a Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Patton, or Rommel. Developing this ability takes a 

lot of time, practice, and personal development. 

ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 JUL 2019, describes the 

commander’s visualization as “...the mental process of developing 

situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning 

an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state.”2

How can an individual or staff develop this cognitive skill of visualizing so 

they can improve the collective ability to analyze or wargame courses of 

action (COAs) to support the commander’s vision?
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SEEING OURSELVES, THE ENEMY, AND THE TERRAIN

We often know more about the enemy than we do about ourselves. 

Seeing ourselves. Seeing ourselves is derived from all the combined 

running estimates. These estimates are part of the tools gathered and 

assessments made, which includes the training level of the force and 

leader experience. Each individual staff officer brings his own estimate 

as it pertains to his specific warfighting function (WfF). These estimates 

provide a snapshot in time, but are also part of the assumptions made about 

what the unit’s combat power will be at execution time, projecting out 12, 

24, and 48 hours. This projected combat power and associated combined 

arms capability is used for seeing ourselves during COA development and 

analysis.

A way. A crawl, walk, run approach: Each individual staff officer must 

become the subject matter expert (SME) of his WfF. Individual self-study 

and reflection is required. A way to improve visualizing single WfFs is to 

conduct a tabletop exercise (TTX). For example, engineers conducting a 

mechanical breach of a complex wire and mine obstacle. The engineer by 

himself or with his team (add the engineer commander if available) gets a 

piece of butcher paper, and puts grids on it. He then adds the obstacle, but 

nothing else goes on the butcher paper, not even the enemy. He lists out 

all the friendly engineer assets available and arrays them for the breach. 

He then lists all the critical events, and conducts the breach unopposed, 

taking notes of the time it takes. Next, he adds an enemy and conducts 

the exercise, changing the conditions and thus gaining insights and taking 

notes of friction points. This leads to a higher level of visualization of his 

WfF. Next, he will add terrain, then he will attrit his force, and so on.

“In the absence of definite information, units must be guided by their 

mission and by the terrain.”3

Seeing the terrain. Seeing the terrain is vital. As Sun Tzu pointed out, if 

you know nothing about the enemy but you understand yourself, you have 

a 50 percent chance of winning. Visualizing how our forces or the enemy’s 

forces will use the terrain to gain an advantage or exploit a vulnerability, 

is vital. By doctrine, the engineer owns the modified combined obstacle 

overlay (MCOO), which is essential for seeing the terrain. However, in 

reality every staff officer must be able to see the terrain, because it is crucial 

to developing the cognitive skill of visualization, which is the purpose of 

the TTX below.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

A way. The best way to visualize the good, the bad, and the ugly of the 

terrain is by getting out on it, walking it, standing on it, and discussing 

it. However, this is not always possible due to competing requirements 

in garrison. A TTX helps the staff build their ability to visualize terrain. 

To gain a better grasp of terrain, historical examples are key. For 

instance, Gettysburg. Maps of the area are readily available. Get the 

map, enlarge it if possible, array friendly and enemy forces as they were 

historically. Knowing the actions of both forces, focus on the terrain. See 

the advantages and disadvantages. There is a propensity to focus on the 

history, but the objective is to see, study, and visualize the terrain, and to 

gain a deeper understanding of how the terrain can be best utilized. 

Understanding the enemy is not just the S-2’s responsibility.

Seeing the enemy. Seeing the enemy consists of a detailed intelligence 

preparation of the battlespace (IPB) (i.e., considering the weather, terrain, 

disposition of the enemy, his strength, and likely COAs). This is the 

foundation for developing a COA, and thus sets the groundwork for an 

effective COA analysis. The S-2 is the overall SME on the enemy, but each 

staff officer must be an SME on the enemy’s WfFs, known as reverse WfFs. 

Having this understanding is the first step in visualizing how the enemy will 

fight and employ its combat power.

A way. This tabletop exercise involves the entire staff, led by the S-2. 

Start with an enlarged portion of a map (a MCOO of the terrain is 

essential). The S-2 develops the enemy maneuver and each staff officer 

then develops the reverse WfF enemy COA. The next step is to list out 

the enemy mission, task, purpose, and key events. Once complete, the 

staff then fights the COA — no U.S. forces — just a flow of the enemy 

fight. Crucial to this exercise are the discussions that should take place 

such as “Why is he doing that?” and “What are the effects?” It will be 

hard not to interject a U.S. force, but keep that to a minimum. The object 

here is to see the enemy and visualize its actions and effects. The more 

the staff as a team conducts this TTX, the deeper its understanding of the 

enemy will grow.

HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

The following historical vignettes illustrate how seeing ourselves, the 

enemy, and the terrain are essential in visualizing actions that lead to 

success. The first vignette is about Civil War Union general, BG John 

Buford Jr. at Gettysburg, and the second American Revolutionary War 

general, BG Daniel Morgan at the Battle of Cowpens.
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Figure 1-1. BG John Buford at Gettysburg 

(Source: Library of Congress)

BG Buford’s defense of McPherson’s Ridge outside Gettysburg is a 

classic example of the importance of visualization. On June 29th, Buford 

marched with his first and second brigades to Fairfield, PA. BG Buford 

knew a considerable size of enemy infantry was in the area. However, the 

exact location, size, and intent of the enemy was unclear. “The inhabitants 

knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy’s camp, yet not one of 

them gave me a particle of information, nor even mentioned the fact of the 

enemy’s presence.4” BG Buford arrived at Gettysburg on June 30th with 

less than 3,000 men. As his scouts entered the town, they skirmished with 

enemy patrols, who quickly withdrew west. BG Buford quickly deployed 

pickets, under the command of COL Tom Devin, covering the countryside 

and the roads leading in and out of town. COL Devin considered the 

rebel patrols insignificant, telling Buford he could handle whatever came 

along. However, BG Buford recognized the rebel patrols as being from 

two Mississippi Regiments of A.P. Hills Corps, of Robert E. Lee’s Army 

of Northern Virginia. This was no small scrap. BG Buford’s reply to COL 

Devin was clear “No, you won’t. They will attack you in the morning, and 

they will come booming — skirmishers three-deep. You will have to fight 

like the devil until support arrives.”5

BG Buford’s years of combat experience taught him to hold the high 

ground. MG John Reynolds, with I Corps, was still a day or more away. 

BG Buford quickly understood his small force was the only thing that 

stood between Lee’s army and Gettysburg. If he withdrew, Lee would 

gain the high ground, be set for the fight, and possibly deal a strategic 

blow to the Union Army. The remainder of June 30th proved to be busy 

for BG Buford as he surveyed the grounds, visualizing his force and 

the fight to come. “About a half mile west of the of Gettysburg town 
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square is a moderate elevation called Seminary Ridge, running north 

and south and named for the Lutheran Theological Seminary that 

stands on its crest. This ridge is covered throughout its length with 

open woods. The ground sloping downward toward the west rises again 

to form McPherson’s Ridge about 500 yards away. To the north, both 

ridges intersect at Oak Hill. West of McPherson is Herr Ridge and then 

Willoughby Run Creek crossing Chambersburg Pike.”6

BG Buford realized the creek would keep the enemy in column on the 

Pike, causing a delay in their deployment. The three successive ridges 

gave him the high ground needed to fight a delaying action, and therefore 

buying him the time needed for MG Reynolds to close. He deployed 

his cavalry brigades as mounted infantry. Every fourth man stood to the 

rear holding horses, which effectively reduced his force to 2,200 men. 

However, dismounted, his men took up covered firing positions from 

behind trees, bushes, and fence posts, further maximizing the advantage 

of their breech-loading Spencer carbines. BG Buford positioned his six 

cannon for maximum effect. LT John Calef, specifically, “ ... worked 

his guns deliberately with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful 

effect on the enemy.”7 On July 1st, BG Buford’s Cavalry was hotly 

engaged, but by 1430, when MG Reynolds finally arrived, BG Buford 

had held the high ground and shaped the Battle at Gettysburg.

Insight. BG Buford possessed the ability to see the situation and to 

understand its second-and third-order effects. This ability might have come 

naturally, but likely it was because he had the training and the experience. 

In the 1850s he fought in the Indian Wars and had been serving in the Civil 

War up to this point, which had developed his ability to visualize his force, 

the enemy, and the terrain. In this example, BG Buford knew little about 

the enemy, only that he thought they would be coming down Cashtown 

Pike Road. He did, however, understand the terrain, visualizing the 

difficulty the enemy would have trying to deploy and that his force, small 

as it was, had the advantage of the Spencer Repeating Rifles, with a rate 

of fire of 14 to 20 rounds per minute. Fighting as infantry, his forces could 

delay the enemy, and therefore hold the high ground.
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Figure 1-2. BG Buford holding the high ground

Gettysburg, 1000 Hours, July 1863 

(Source: United States Military Academy) 
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Figure 1-3. BG Buford holding the high ground

Gettysburg, 1430 Hours, July 1863 

(Source: United States Military Academy) 
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Figure 1-4. BG Daniel Morgan at Cowpens 

(Source: Independence National Historical Park)

BG Daniel Morgan’s actions at the Battle of Cowpens on January 17th, 

1781 is an example of how to understand and use seeing the enemy, 

forces, and the terrain. 

“When he led his party out of the wood at the end of Cowpens, Morgan 

halted to survey the ground in front of him to the northwest. The ground 

— meadow-like, as described by Major McDowell — sloped gradually 

upward to a low crest about 400 yards ahead. Beyond that was what 

appeared to be a ridge formed by two small hills. Morgan would later find 

that behind the nearer crest was a swale or extended dip running about 80 

yards to the far or more northern crest. Taken in all, the terrain was indeed 

very gently rolling, with the higher ground never more than 25 yards 

higher than the plain. The rolling open terrain was ideal for the movement 

of cavalry, and there were no obstacles such as thick woods, swamps, or 

underbrush, which could serve to cover Morgan’s flanks. In addition, the 

Broads River, about five miles distance, curved around the rear of the 

position, cutting off a retreat in that direction.”8

BG Morgan understood his enemy. British Col Banastre Tarleton was a 

brash, young 27-year-old cavalryman who was out to make a name for 

himself. Morgan “ ...was aware of Col Tarleton’s impetuous charges and 

hell-for-leather tactics that could destroy an enemy caught by surprise.”9

Several of BG Morgan’s officers had fought Col Tarleton before, and 

emphasized that he would not go in immediately, but hang back and send 

several troops in first. When Col Tarleton saw confusion or the enemy 

withdrawing, he would then charge with the reserve. Perhaps more 

importantly, BG Morgan understood the disdain that Col Tarleton had for 

the American fighting-man, especially the militia.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

BG Morgan positioned his infantry in two lines on the open and sloping 

ground of the first hill. In the first line, he placed 150 militia in picket 

formation. They would lay low, engage the enemy at 50 yards, and then 

retire to the second line. The second line was 300 militia who were to 

fire two aimed volleys, then move off quickly to the rear and reform. 

The third and main line, his veteran Continentals, were positioned on 

the military crest of the second hill, hidden from the enemy. Half a mile 

behind the main line and concealed by the second hill, he positioned COL 

William Washington’s Dragoons, reinforced by 45 mounted militia.

Seeing the American militia forward, and true to his reputation of not 

being able to restrain his eagerness, Col Tarleton ordered the attack 

before his commanders were ready. British infantry moved forward. The 

American first line engaged and fell back in order among the 300 militia. 

The militia firing two volleys momentarily stopped the British attack and 

then moved off to the left in “a river of men.”9 Col Tarleton saw a retreat 

and charged just as BG Morgan had envisioned. BG Morgan’s main line 

blunted the charge and COL Washington’s Dragoons caught Col Tarleton 

by surprise, driving him from the field. The veteran Continentals and the 

reorganized militia defeated Col Tarleton’s committed reserve and the 

American force prevailed.

Insight. BG Morgan, unlike BG Buford, was not a career military officer. 

He did serve in the French and Indian War as a teamster, but it was during 

the Revolutionary War that he rose to become one of America’s most 

competent generals. His actions at Cowpens make that point. His ability 

to see himself, the enemy, and the terrain was translated to victory. By 

controlling where he would fight, he negated Col Tarleton’s ability to 

surprise him, offering the enemy limited maneuver space. BG Morgan’s 

understanding of terrain allowed him to conceal his force in depth, turning a 

perceived weakness — his militia — into an advantage against Col Tarleton. 
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Figure 1-5. The Battle of Cowpens

(Source: United States Military Academy)
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

TOOLS TO INCREASE PROFICIENCY IN VISUALIZATION 

AND IMPROVE COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole Army.

Field Marshal Karl Freiherr von Muffling, 

Chief of the Prussian General Staff

Commercial Wargames as Tools to Increase Proficiency

Commercial wargames are an excellent tool for professional development 

and increasing individual and collective proficiency. Wargames hone 

decision-making skills and visualization. When done in conjunction with a 

professional development program and home-station training plans, staffs 

can increase their proficiency as a team. Note: Commercial off-the-shelf 

wargames are specifically training aids, and should not be used to take the 

place of an actual operational COA analysis.

In the following two selections from a recent study conducted at the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, The Effects of Simple RolePlaying Games on the Wargaming Step of the Military Decisionmaking 

Process (MDMP): A Mixed Method Approach, found in Volume 45 of 

Developments in Business Simulations and Experiential Learning, it was 

found that staff groups that played Kriegsspiel improved their visualization 

skills.11

Kriegsspiel

“The board game Kriegsspiel dates back to the early 1800s in Prussia, 

where it was used to teach members of the staff. Much of the game 

centers on a situation for each side, where they experience the ‘fog of 

war.’ Two sides play against each other, and are aided by running umpires 

that carry messages back and forth between the head umpire and player. 

Players see their unit represented on a map, with small blocks of different 

shapes and colors representing their role. During turns, the players write 

orders for their units, or updates for other friendly players. Every two 

minutes or so, the running umpire provides an update and collects new 

messages. The head umpire adjudicates movement and combat, provides 

outbound message traffic, and informs each participant’s running umpire 

of what they can see and what their force is doing. 

This manner of play forces the players, who are secluded from each 

other, to anticipate future requirements and analyze how to accomplish 

their mission alone. Explicitly, commanders learned that subordinate 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

role players do not execute orders immediately because there is a 

delay for the travel of the message, and then a subsequent delay in 

the formation they command to respond to the order. Further, players 

gain an appreciation for concise mission-type orders, and an increased 

visualization of events in time and space.

Regarding arbitration, there are two forms. The original form, strict 

adjudication, is where combat is resolved by looking up force ratios, 

rolling a die, consulting a table, and accounting for each loss on a 

register. In the second type, accounting is simplified using ratios, tables, 

and accounting to keep the game moving at a brisk pace. The first 

provides for a more random outcome and the second provides a more 

likely outcome.”

Developments in Business Simulations and Experiential Learning, p. 330

For Commanders and Staffs

“The chief recommendation, that resulted from the aforementioned 

study, was for commanders and staffs to wargame. Take the time 

to deliberately analyze COAs by wargaming as part of the military 

decisionmaking process (MDMP). All too often, planners skip the 

wargaming step entirely, and operations over the last ten years have only 

contributed to the atrophy of this skill in military planning. Wargaming 

provides commanders and staffs a method to analyze and compare COAs 

against one another, while testing the validity of the COAs against an 

uncooperative and thinking enemy. This test helps commanders and 

staffs identify gaps in planning, synchronize COA events in time and 

space, identify previously undiscovered threats and opportunities, 

and ultimately identify and think through potential decisions that 

commanders may be required to make in the execution of the fight. If 

planners skip or water down the wargaming step, then the gaps and 

synchronization will only become evident during rehearsals, or worse, in 

execution.

Wargame regardless of the number of COAs. When the commander 

gives a directed COA to staffs, there is only one option for execution. 

Therefore, in a time constrained environment, the perceived need to 

wargame only one COA may seem like a waste of time. After all, the 

sixth step of the MDMP is “course of action comparison,” so why 

wargame if there is only one COA to compare? If COAs were perfectly 

developed, with no gaps in understanding or synchronization, then 

the wargaming step would seem to be a waste of time. However, no 
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

matter how skilled planners are, COAs can always be refined, and 

staffs must test them for the reasons identified in the paragraph above. 

Again, if staffs fail to wargame, then the gaps in understanding and 

synchronization will only become evident when it may be too late. 

Consider role-playing games as staff and officer professional 

development activities in order to increase commander and staff 

visualization abilities. This study used Kriegsspiel, and found it to 

have a correlation with increased visualization, particularly with a 

planner’s ability to better understand and visualize their own units on 

the battlefield. Other games and techniques may be useful to facilitate 

this end. Other options include GOTM (Ancient Chinese strategy game), 

StrategoTM, HunabiTM, Chess, and simple visualization exercises of 

having subordinates draw out their understanding of the operation on a 

white board, or even in the dirt. This capability will help staff officers 

visualize operations, and enhance commander and unit understanding.”

Developments in Business Simulations and Experiential Learning, p. 338

Wargames allow leaders to gain confidence in decision making through 

repetition and learning, improve visualization and understanding of military 

operations; and build teams and demonstrate individual personality traits 

and thought processes. Wargames allow experimentation in “safe-to-fail” 

environments and multiple opportunities to practice analysis and decision 

making. Wargames facilitate deep exploration of opportunity costs and 

incorporation of variables or conditions otherwise not easily replicable. 

Compared to most other training events, wargames require minimal 

overhead and resources. Many commercial wargames provide ready-made 

scenarios that are detailed enough to support basic planning drills. Most 

can be customized to create specific scenarios. If incorporated into a unit’s 

history program, wargaming a historical event provides much greater depth 

of understanding than just reading about the event.

Time spent exercising the intellect to improve the understanding of warfare 

is time well spent. Wargames provide an essential ingredient to the wellrounded professional’s education and training.

CONDUCTING A COMMERCIAL WARGAME

Like any training event, conducting a wargame requires time and 

dedication. To achieve maximum benefits, approach wargaming in a 

deliberate and disciplined manner. The following outline may seem 

intensive, but it provides planning, preparation, and execution, ranging from 

larger unit exercises like a command post exercise, to the list of off-theshelf wargames listed at the end of this chapter. Most of these off-the-shelf 

wargames take minimal time to learn, set up, and play.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The primary components of a wargame event are learning objectives, 

targeted training audience (staff), setting and scenario, simulation, rules and 

adjudication procedures, supporting players and facilitation personnel, and 

assessment method.

Planning

1. Determine training objectives. What outcomes are desired? Examples 

include: 

• Improving visualization in time and space

• Cohesion and team building

• Decision making in ambiguous circumstances

• Understanding and visualization of how units operate in time, space, 

distance, and uncertainty against an adaptive threat

• Understanding and visualization of how key leaders process 

information, make decisions, and execute the fight

• Understanding the technical aspects of the MDMP

• Understanding the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for how a 

unit conducts operations or the MDMP

• Developing expertise within individual duty positions, WfFs, and 

reverse WfFs, and their role in collective operations

• Understanding an operational environment

• Developing references and tools for staff estimates

• Familiarizing with a geographical area or a specific threat

• Practicing or exploring a specific event

2. Identify key events (such as the MDMP, reception, staging, onward 

movement, and integration [RSOI], delay, perform a wet gap crossing, etc.) 

to incorporate into the wargame:

• Identify the wargame to be used. 

• Learn the wargame mechanics and components. The wargame is 

the vehicle to get to the training objectives. Understand both its 

opportunities and limitations. Identify any required modifications 

to the wargame, such as developing a customized scenario or rule 

modifications/workarounds. Ensure the selected wargame will do what 

is intended for the training. 
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

3. Identify resources required:

• Personnel and responsibilities: Every player may have multiple 

exercise roles and duties. This is normal for small wargames. The 

following list is not meant to overcomplicate planning, but rather 

allow the planners to visualize wargame components better:

○Exercise director. The exercise direction is in command of t

exercise. He determines what is to be accomplished, approves 

how it is to be accomplished, and approves resources to commit, 

including time and participants. He also approves adjustments or 

time changes to key events, as well as additions, deletions, injects, 

or scenario adjustments.

○Exercise planner. The exercise planner identifies and coordinat

all required resources, and understands game mechanics. He 

develops scenarios and execution methods that meet training 

objectives, and assigns personnel their responsibilities for the 

exercise. 

○Simulation expert/facilitator. The simulation expert/facilitat

understands all technical aspects of the game and conducts 

necessary training for players. He facilitates execution, and assists 

in adjudication. He also works with planners and exercise control 

(EXCON) to adjust scenarios and rules as necessary.

○Exercise control. EXCON is responsible for conducting t

exercise. They provide administrative instruction on scenarios, 

roles, responsibilities, and exercise conduct, as well as providing 

SME support for game play, ensuring game rules are understood, 

and adjudicating outcomes and any issues that arise. They 

also control the timeline, injects, and key events, and adjust as 

required.

○Higher command. Higher command replicates the high

headquarters for players to interact with and receive orders/

guidance from. They often control adjacent units, or other units, to 

create the appropriate environment for the players.

○Role players. These are non-competitive participants who intera

with the training audience to create the desired environment, or 

stimulate desired behaviors. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

○Observer/controllers. Observer/controllers observe and monit

execution and decision-making, records events for analysis and 

after action reviews (AARs), ensure EXCON is aware of events, 

decisions, and timelines, and identify training opportunities or 

frictions to EXCON. (They can also act as facilitators.)

○Support personnel. Support personnel may include tech personne

security personnel, maintenance personnel, etc.

• White cell. The white cell resources, creates, and manages the 

environment and inputs for players to interact with the simulation, 

make decisions, and achieve the game’s desired training outcomes.

• Blue cell. The blue cell, commonly known as friendly forces or blue 

forces (BLUFOR), are the active participants and training audience 

that function competitively.

• Red cell. The red cell is commonly known as opposing forces 

(OPFOR), and may or may not be actively competitive. They execute 

the scenario per guidance from EXCON. However, there is no reason 

why both blue and red cells cannot both be training audiences of equal 

stature and actively compete against each other.

• Gaming materials. How many copies of the game are needed? Any 

special requirements like rule summaries/cheat sheets?

• Computer game considerations. Computer games cannot be easily 

loaded onto government computers without proper authorization, and 

getting that authorization can be difficult and time consuming. What 

is the workaround? Use personal computers? Is it possible to network 

personal computers that are part of the design?

• Facilities. Are they secure and devoid of distractions? Do they support 

planning and briefings? Do they allow for private conversations out of 

OPFOR’s earshot?

• Time. Is enough time allotted for set up, teaching rules, practice runs, 

scenario briefings and orientation, planning, execution, and the AAR/

hot wash?

Preparation

• Acquire gaming materials. Sometimes it is necessary to have multiple 

copies of the game. 

• The game SME/exercise planner must learn game rules and conduct 

a game dry run to ensure the game is suitable to achieve training 

objectives. This person must know the game cold.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

• The exercise planner and exercise director select the scenario(s).

• The simulation expert and exercise planner develop the additional 

resources that are required, such as scenario extracts, fragmentary 

orders (FRAGORDs), or gaming aids.

• Establish key events and identify any exercise control decision points, 

additional injects, branches, or sequels.

• Identify required game mechanic workarounds or facilitator 

adjudications. Some game rules are not worth the time or additional 

complexity to incorporate or adjudicate. Determine what is necessary 

and how to manually adjudicate without loss of training value.

• Game SME/exercise planner develops an appropriate method to teach 

participants enough rules to execute the wargame efficiently. These 

people do not need to fully understand every rule.

• Establish a timeline, which should include facility setup, teaching 

and practicing the game, scenario orientation, planning procedures, 

execution, and the AAR/hot wash. Some support personnel may 

require additional training and rehearsals.

• Set up facilities.

Execution

• A successful game is challenging, immersive, engaging, adversarial, 

and perceived as relevant. Make it fun!

• A game does not have to go to completion or have a clear front runner 

in order for learning to take place. Often, a better discussion will result 

if neither side has won.

• The key focuses for a successful wargame are, “...the players, 

the decisions they make, the narrative they create, their shared 

experiences, and the lessons they take away.”12 Also, focus on how the 

wargame shapes future understanding of warfare and decision making.

• Teach personnel how to play the game. Conduct a practice game in 

order to help them understand game mechanics.

• Conduct a scenario briefing and orientation.

• Conduct mission planning, even if it is a single person computer game. 

It is highly beneficial to go through the planning and decision process 

and brief plans.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Facilitator/EXCON: 

○Keeps the game mov

○Facilitates game play and rule execut

○Adjudicates as necess

○Provides injects or guidance to players to meet training objective

per guidance from the exercise director

○Controls the exercise timel

○Records key events, decisions, e

Post-Exercise

• Conduct AARs.

• Update SOPs.

CHOOSING THE RIGHT WAR GAME

Wargames are tools. Like any tool, it is important to use the right one for 

the job. The first question should always be “What are the training and 

education objectives I am trying to achieve?” The next question should 

be “Does the game do what is necessary to address these objectives?” 

Any game design is about compromise. Some aspects will be abstracted, 

such as supply distribution or combat outcomes, in order to focus on some 

other aspect of the problem. Is the game relevant to the training exercise? 

Does the game do what you care about? The list at the end of this chapter 

provides some possible commercial wargames that can be used to train the 

staff. 

Factors to consider:

• Is the game so complex that it will be difficult to learn and will bog 

down play?

• Do existing scenarios meet the objectives? How difficult is it to 

customize scenarios for the needs of the staff?

• How long does it take to play?

• What is the planning effort required?

• How many support personnel are required?

• What are the logistic considerations?

• What are the costs?
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Often, games are rejected for suitability because they are not geared toward 

the “correct” echelon, but relevant learning will occur no matter what the 

echelon of the staff. Likewise, fixating on a “current environment” game 

unnecessarily discards many other excellent teaching games. Historical 

games can provide relevant experience, placing the participants in the shoes 

of those who wrestled with complex, ambiguous problems, and deliver a 

fantastic learning experience. Moreover, decision making with imperfect 

information under pressure does not fundamentally change era to era.

Keep in mind that many commercial games that are not military in nature 

can be surprisingly useful for team building, IPB, critical thinking, analysis, 

and decision-making.

Commercial gaming sites often provide in-depth reviews, tutorials, forums, 

and other resources to help make the best choices and assist with planning 

and execution.

WARGAME MEDIUMS

Computer Games

Advantages:

• May come with off-the-shelf, pre-loaded scenarios, requiring little 

setup time

• Automated bookkeeping, combat outcomes, etc.

• May facilitate fog of war

• Can be easy to learn

Disadvantages:

• The Department of Defense (DOD) generally does not allow 

commercial gaming software to be installed on DOD computers 

without an involved process. Privately owned computers often must be 

used. There might also be issues with networking on DOD systems.

• Multi-player participation may require multiple copies of the same 

game.

• May have limited scenarios or ability to customize. Adjudication is 

often in a black box, and thus participants may not understand why 

outcomes occurred.

• Limited ability to change or adjudicate outcomes or environments 

during execution to facilitate training objectives or explore branches 

and sequels.
26

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Limited ability to remove or mitigate onerous, unwanted, or distracting 

aspects of the game.

• May not allow multi-player teams or competitive head-to-head 

interactions; OPFOR may be controlled via artificial intelligence.

• Learning menus and interfaces may not be intuitive or easy.

• Fixation on computer terminals may inhibit learning discussions 

between players. However, the use of a proxy projector can allow for 

the image to be projected so a larger training audience can see it.

Board Games

Advantages:

• Encourage socialization, discussion, teamwork, and competition.

• Scenarios and rules can be truncated or adjusted to meet training 

objectives before or during execution. Branches, sequels, and “whatif” events can be explored.

• A single simulation expert/facilitator with mastery of the rules is often 

enough to run the game; all others need only be familiar with some 

key concepts.

• Can include fog of war with additional resourcing.

• System is open and participants understand why outcomes occurred.

Disadvantages:

• Setup can be tedious if there are many parts and pieces.

• Requires a simulation expert.

• Manual bookkeeping, combat outcomes, etc.

• Some boards and game pieces are not aesthetically pleasing and may 

seem unanimated.

• Fog of war may be resource intensive to incorporate.

• May be difficult to store if played over multiple days.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Miniature Games

(Scaled three-dimensional terrain models using micro armor 

[i.e., Dunn-Kempf])

Advantages:

• Visually engaging and immersive. Games with realistic units and 

terrain generate almost irresistible interest. 

• Allows better visualization of the terrain.

• Rules and scenarios can be adjusted to meet training objectives before 

or during execution.

• Encourages contemplatively standing around the map board, even 

during pauses.

• In most cases, a single facilitator is adequate to have mastery of the 

rules; all others need only some key information.

Disadvantages:

• Terrain and model pieces may be quite expensive and time consuming 

to assemble.

• Replicated area may be limited.

• Rules can be complex.

• Requires a large area to set up.

• May be difficult to secure/store if played over multiple days. 

• Fog of war requires some creativity.

WARGAME MISTAKES

• Failure to differentiate wargames from reality: Wargames are not 

completely realistic simulations. They model specific aspects of 

reality, but in doing so invariably give up other aspects of realism. The 

precise technical replication of real-world outcomes may or may not 

be accurate. For example, artillery may or may not be as effective as 

the game projects.

• Failure to use preparation for the game as a formal training opportunity 

unto itself: Do not jump into a game, use it to practice analysis and 

planning.

• Failure to understand the rules and conduct of the game: It is good to 

spend time on technical rehearsals, so the rules and mechanics will not 

become a distraction during execution.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Failure to make realistic decisions (“gaming the game”): Avoid doing 

activities that would not happen in reality, or that real troops would 

refuse to do.

• Obsessing over game mechanics and rules: Make a plausible decision 

or outcome and get on with it.

• Failure to dedicate enough time for the event

• Failure to shield the event from distractions

• Failure to conduct an introspective analysis and AAR after the game

Note: For a list of sample commercial wargames, see Chapter 3.

Endnotes

1. ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 JUL 

2019.

2. ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 JUL 2019. Pages 1-8

3. Infantry School Staff. (1939) Terrain. Infantry in Battle (pp. 69-78). Washington 

D.C.: The Infantry Journal Incorporated.

4. LTC Smith, C. R. (1863). Brigadier General John Buford, U.S. Army, 

commanding First Division: Battle of Gettysburg. In United States War Department 

(Ed.), The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union 

and Confederate armies. (Series 1, V. 27–Part 1) (pp. 927-993). Washington, 

Government Printing Office.

5. Longacre, E.G. (2000). Lincoln’s Calvarymen: A History of the Mounted Forces 

of the Army of the Potomac. (p. 183) Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.

6. Stackpole, E. J. (1982). They Met At Gettysburg. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books.

7. LTC Smith. Ibid.

8. Wood, W. J. (1990). Battles of the Revolutionary War 1775-1781. Chapel Hill, 

NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill.

9. Wood. Ibid.

10. Wood. Ibid.

11. McConnell, R. A., Gerges, M., Dalbey, J., Dial, T., Hodge, G., Leners, M.,... 

Schoof, P. (2018). The Effect of Simple Role-Playing Games on the Wargaming Step 

of the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP) A Mixed Method Approach. Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

12. Ministry of Defence. (2017). The Wargaming Handbook. The Development, 

Concepts and Doctrine Centre: Ministry of Defence Shrivenham.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

CHAPTER 2

Thoughts on Course of Action 

Analysis Process: 

Action, Reaction, Counteraction, and 

Adjudication

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated 

warriors go to war first and then seek to win.”

Sun Tzu

The Art of War

This chapter provides thoughts and ideas on course of action (COA) 

analysis, focused on action, reaction, counteraction, and the adjudication 

process. COA analysis is the step in the military decisionmaking process 

(MDMP) that links COA development to COA comparison and COA 

approval. COA analysis facilitates visualization and understanding of the 

fight in time and space, allowing commanders and staffs to determine 

the optimal COA, and to identify difficulties, coordination problems, 

and probable consequences of the planned actions for each COA being 

considered. It also facilitates detailed planning and allows synchronization 

of warfighting functions (WfFs). Within the MDMP, COA analysis is often 

referred to as wargaming.

COA analysis is used to visualize the battlefield through the operational 

framework of deep, close, and consolidation areas over time and space. 

Echelons above brigade focus on intelligence, fires, protection, and 

sustainment to set conditions for the maneuver close fight, and to manage 

transitions to the next phase. Brigade and echelons below focus on 

visualizing and synchronizing the close fight.

A successful COA analysis:

• Is structured and rules-based

• Is a combination of science and art

• Is honest, introspective, and objective

• Applies critical thinking and avoids bias or mind traps 

• Explores second-and third-order effects
30

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Includes realistic and plausible:

○Environme

○Friendly and enemy forces and capabilit

○Decisi

○Adjudication of acti

• Has detailed notes recorded

• Updates the products/estimates throughout

The following are tips for a successful COA analysis:

• Have all tools on hand, prepared, and ready.

• Have all the correct participants in the correct places.

• Have an ergonomic set-up. Participants must be able to see, hear, and 

be free from distractions.

• The facilitator must clearly understand and be able to articulate the 

time period and what events will be covered in each action-reactioncounteraction segment.

• All participants must understand exactly what is to be wargamed in 

time and space.

• Understand the common thinking or psychological traps, biases, and 

prejudices that can create inaccurate assessments. Examples include 

being emotionally attached to a COA, confirmation bias, or anchoring. 

Even a participant’s branch, rank, or personal experience can create 

unconscious bias.

• Be honest and candid when evaluating a COA. Commanders 

must create an environment where subordinates can freely and 

professionally voice concerns and disagreements, especially with those 

who outrank them or have domineering personalities.

• Ensure adjudication outcomes are realistic and probable. Focus on the 

most probable outcomes; less probable outcomes should be wargamed 

separately as branches.

• Focus on decision points and explore second-and third-order effects 

and mitigations.

• Each participant should understand their own inputs and outputs to the 

wargame, and how to succinctly present them.
31

HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

• Participants should provide input into reverse WfFs and specialties 

to assist intelligence in describing environment and enemy actions/

capabilities.

• Identify advantages, disadvantages, risks, and areas requiring further 

study as the wargame progresses.

• As the wargame progresses, fill out, develop, and refine additional 

products such as tasks to subordinates, coordinating instructions, 

and additional graphic control measures, decision support templates 

(DSTs), and synchronization matrices.

• Include specialty liaison officers (LNOs) in the planning process. 

These might include attachments that are unfamiliar with the process, 

such as coalition partners, U.S. Marine Corps attachments, etc. 

• Do not have tunnel vision and neglect to incorporate events from 

adjacent units into the wargame. Ensure information operations and 

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, 

physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) are incorporated. For 

example, refugees can disrupt movement schedules as surely as a 

minefield and newspaper headlines can change a campaign outcome.

The following are common issues with COA analysis:

• Failure to practice. From practice comes all MDMP understanding and 

proficiency. The field should not be the first time, or even the second 

or third, the collective staff is conducting a wargame together.

• Participants lack experience and education to provide useful or realistic 

input that is packaged clearly and succinctly. Participants do not 

understand their WfF’s role in relation to other WfFs and “the big 

picture.”

• Incomplete COAs: COAs must be complete or time will be wasted and 

confusion will prevail as COA analysis turns into COA development.

• Rarely is there enough time to wargame all COAs thoroughly and 

incorporate branches and sequels into the analysis. Choices must be 

made when planning the wargame (as in most planning steps) of what 

the priorities are and where planning risk can be tolerated.

• Wasting time during execution: The planning team leader must not be 

afraid to cut people off, use brief by exception, or shelve issues. It is 

COA analysis, not COA development or an open-ended brain-storming 

session. Avoid bogging down in minutia or arguments on battle 

damage assessment (BDA).
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Wargaming battle drills instead of COAs: COA analysis is not the time 

to rehearse or discuss unit or staff battle drills.

• The opposing force (OPFOR) changes the enemy COA substantially 

from previous briefings. For example, instead of wargaming against 

the most likely COA, which the friendly COA was designed to defeat, 

the wargame is against something the plan was not designed for, and 

that should be considered a branch.

• The OPFOR is not given the opportunity to fight back as a thinking 

and adaptive enemy.

• Units often focus planning, wargaming, and rehearsing only on 

“actions on the objective.” However, units often encounter difficulties 

and culminate before reaching the objective. Ensure actions during 

contested movements or while forces are otherwise vulnerable, are 

adequately addressed.

COA analysis does the following:

• Creates shared understanding through visualization and discussion of 

friendly, enemy, environment, and other domains in time and space. 

Understanding informs decision making

• Refines existing decision points and identifies new ones, and identifies 

branches and gaps

• Facilitates identifying risks and mitigation to those risks, as well as 

opportunities to exploit

• Tests friendly COAs against various enemy COAs and variables, and 

illustrates possible outcomes, and facilitates identifying advantages 

and disadvantages of a COA

• Synchronizes and refines a COA across all WfFs

• Enables more detailed planning than in COA development. It allows 

for refining the plan, improving incorporation of enablers, and creating 

or updating products like synchronization matrices, situation templates 

(SITEMPS), graphics, tasks, and decision support matrices (DSMs). 

Detailed recordkeeping by all participants greatly eases the completion 

of the final order.

• Challenges assumptions and planning factors

• Facilitates the determining of information requirements

• Validates COAs as feasible, viable, and acceptable
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

COA analysis does not do the following:

• Predict with certainty: Wargames can predict plausibility, but there are 

too many variables to definitively predict probability.

• Create reproducible results: Expect neither a real operation nor a repeat 

of a wargame to unfold exactly as predicted.

• Address chance (i.e., black swans), or reveal the enemy’s thought 

process

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS METHODS 

FROM FIELD MANUAL (FM) 6-0, COMMANDER AND STAFF 

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, 05 MAY 2014

“Three recommended wargaming methods exist: belt, avenue-in-depth, 

and box. Each method considers the area of interest and all enemy 

forces that can affect the outcome of the operation. Planners can use the 

methods separately, in combination, or modified for long-term operations 

dominated by stability.”

The belt method divides the area of operations into belts (areas) running 

the width of the area of operations. The shape of each belt is based on 

the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The belt 

method works best when conducting offensive and defensive tasks on 

terrain divided into well-defined cross-compartments, during phased 

operations (such as gap crossings, air assaults, or airborne operations), 

or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons. Belts 

can be adjacent to each other, or overlap.

This wargaming method is based on a sequential analysis of events 

in each belt. Commanders prefer the belt method because it focuses 

simultaneously on all forces affecting a particular event. A belt might 

include more than one critical event. Under time-constrained conditions, 

the Commander can use a modified belt method. The modified belt 

method divides the area of operations into three or less sequential belts. 

These belts are not necessarily adjacent or overlapping, but focus on the 

critical actions throughout the depth of the area of operations.”
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-1. Sample Belt Method 

(FM 6-0 page 9-28)

“The avenue-in-depth method focuses on one avenue of approach at 

a time, beginning with the decisive operation. This method is good for 

offensive COAs, or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual 

support.”

Figure 2-2. Sample avenue-in-depth method 

(FM 6-0 page 9-29)
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

“The box method is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an 

engagement area, a wet gap crossing site, or a landing zone. It works 

best in a time-constrained environment, such as a hasty attack. The box 

method is particularly useful when planning operations in noncontiguous 

areas of operation. When using this method, the staff isolates the area 

and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that friendly 

units can handle most situations in the area of operations, and focus their 

attention on essential tasks.”

Figure 2-3. Sample box method

(FM 6-0 page 9-30)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Note: Staff must keep the inputs and outputs of the wargame in mind. 

The table below illustrates these inputs and outputs, and the process or 

checklist for setting up the wargame. Regardless of the method used, the 

approach is always action-reaction-counteraction.

Figure 2-4. Input/output process (Source: FM 6-01)

During execution, the hard outputs, like DSTs, DSMs, and 

synchronization matrices, are important in assisting the commander with 

seeing and anticipating events and actions relating back to the wargame. 

These decisions may be planned, but as events in real-time occur, 

unanticipated decisions will occur. It is at this point that the critical skills 

of visualization will help reconcile the results of the wargame with the 

reality of the fight. What is changing? Why is it changing? What does it 

mean? Is this an opportunity or a crisis? How is the plan affected? What is 

the recommended reaction or counteraction? 

The intangible result gained from the higher level of visualization (seeing 

your force, the enemy, and the terrain) and the wargame is that units will 

focus more on fighting the enemy than the plan. As changes occur during 

contact with the enemy, the staff’s battle rhythm during execution should 

turn into an extension of the wargame, reactions and counteractions, 

with a greater understanding of realized threats and opportunities. In the 

end, enemy actions and unanticipated information can lead to the staff 

recommending new decisions or adjustments to the commander.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

CONDUCT OF THE WARGAME

(ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION)

“Adversarial” is a key — perhaps the key — characteristic of wargaming. 

Wargaming is a competitive intellectual activity, and the primary 

challenge is usually provided by a combination of opposing players 

representing active, thinking, and adaptive adversaries and competitors.

Wargaming Handbook

UK Ministry of Defense, August 2017

Execution Steps

The actual conduct of a COA analysis wargame has the following steps:

• Conduct a COA analysis orientation pre-brief. 

• For every COA and branch wargamed:

○Brief the initial set for the COA about to be wargam

○Play turns. For each tu

*Brief the turn overvi

*Execute the turn: action-reaction-counteraction phas

*Adjudicate outcom

*Conduct an end-of-turn assessme

○Conduct an end-of-COA/branch wargame review and assessme

• Compare COAs.

The following are measures of wargame success:

• Can all participants visualize and understand how the plan will unfold?

• Are the plans being synchronized across all WfFs?

• Are the gaps, issues, and risks being identified and mitigated?

• Are advantages and disadvantages assessed against evaluation criteria?

• Is enough information being generated to complete a detailed plan?

○Is information efficiently record

○Are there branches or events that require additional wargami
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Are identifying and developing decision points being emphasized? 

Decisions should:

○Define what the alternative actions (options) a

○Define triggers and conditions (event, time, etc

○Define information requirements to support the decisi

○Define who is responsible for tracking the informati

requirements, and packaging them for the decision maker.

○Define who makes the decisi

○Synchronize the decisions/options across the Wf

WARGAME RULES AND METHODS

Russian Wargame of the Battle of Tannenberg

Just prior to World War 1, the Russian General Staff conducted a 

wargame of a Russian invasion of East Prussia by the First and Second 

Russian Armies in a two-pronged assault. During the wargame, each 

Russian army was isolated, and in turn destroyed, by the smaller, 

quicker German force. Furious, the two Russian commanders 

demanded the wargame’s facilitator change his adjudication of how 

quickly the German forces could move, slowing them considerably. 

Under intense pressure, the facilitator restarted the wargame, slowing 

the Germans and allowing the two-pronged attack to succeed 

spectacularly. Four months later, when the same plan was executed 

on the real battlefield, the Germans moved as quickly as the facilitator 

had originally predicted and destroyed both Russian armies one at 

a time: The first one at Tannenberg and the second one a week later 

at Masurian Lakes. The Russians were ejected from East Prussia, 

suffering over 300,000 casualties.2

Games need rules. 

A set of commonly understood rules, ideally codified in a standard operating 

procedure (SOP) and practiced routinely, greatly eases wargame execution, 

and allows participants to focus on analyzing their actions instead of 

focusing on how to play. Off-the-shelf wargames come with instructions, 

but the doctrine for COA analysis does not necessarily prescribe rules to 

conduct action, reaction, and counteraction. This leaves the staff on its own 

to determine the rules.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

The Simulation.

The simulation is the engine that drives the adjudication and outcomes 

of decisions or planning. The simulation consists of tools to replicate the 

environment and actors (such as a map board and unit markers), rules for 

methods of decision making and action taking (such as the action-reactioncounteraction format), and methods for adjudicating the outcomes of 

decisions and actions (such as a correlation of forces and means (COFM) 

spreadsheet or loss table). A simulation may be extremely detailed and even 

computer-driven, such as Warfighting Simulation (WARSIM) supporting 

warfighter exercises, or it may be as simple as participants moving sticky 

notes around a sketch on a dry-erase board and applying their professional 

knowledge to create probable, realistic outcomes. Ultimately, the facilitator 

must manage the simulation and decide outcomes based on personal 

judgement and experience, incorporating input from the participants and 

other references. Simulations address variables such as:

• How to portray units and terrain, time, and distance

• Movement rates under various conditions

• Unit and column “footprints” and densities

• Combat outcomes and BDA

• Supply consumption

• The human dimension (morale, proficiency, fatigue, etc.)

• Detection, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

• Friction and fog of war

• How quickly subordinate units can react to orders or consolidate and 

reorganize

• Terrain and weather impacts

• Task performance such as entrench; breach an obstacle; establish a 

command post; and command, control, and communication (C3)

• Cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA)

• PMESII-PT events
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

ADJUDICATION

Within the simulation, wargames require a method to assess the success or 

failure of a task, how long it takes to perform, and the associated losses. 

This is called adjudication.

Adjudication is a combination of art and science. It refines the battlefield 

calculus used during COA development. Relative combat power analysis 

and force ratio models, as well as relevant historical examples, can be used 

to inform estimated outcomes.

The following are rules for adjudication:

• Ensure a human is in the adjudication decision loop. This is important 

to identifying and incorporating variables that the simulation does 

not account for when determining likely outcomes, such as training 

proficiencies of teams and crews.

• Be consistent.

• Avoid favoring friendly forces.

• Use the most likely outcome as the basis for the COA analysis, not 

a less-likely outcome. Wargame less-likely outcomes as separate 

branches and possible decision points.

• If either the likely outcome or less-likely outcome is negative or less 

than desirable, refine the plan to mitigate and reduce risk. Always ask 

“What happens if we have higher than expected losses or less success 

at a task than expected? What is the risk and how can it be mitigated?”

• Utilize all staff and WfFs to identify and mitigate risks.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Tip. If available, FA57 Simulation Officers, FA49 Operations Research 

and Systems Analysis Officers, and Red Team Officers can assist in 

adjudications.

Tip. Oversized personalities can have oversized impacts on adjudication 

results. The facilitator must be forceful in keeping outcomes realistic, and 

not favoring those with the loudest voices or the most rank.

Tip. Do not fight subordinate units’ fights for them as part of the 

wargame.

Tip. Do not turn the wargame into a battle drill rehearsal.

Tip. Effectiveness of indirect fire is often overstated.

Tip. Effectiveness of friendly forces (blue forces [BLUFOR]) weapons 

are often overstated.

Tip. The human dimension is often overlooked; it is assumed Soldiers are 

immune to fear and fatigue.

Tip. The Data and Analysis Center has software available on a classified 

network that can further assist in assessing the BDA.

Adjudication Methods

The choice of method is driven primarily by time available, resources, and 

staff experience. An experienced staff and facilitator may allow expedited 

adjudication in time-constrained environments. Inexperienced staffs must 

rely more heavily on consulting references and using calculators. The 

following methods can be combined for an optimal balance of efficiency 

and accuracy.

Talk Through. This is the simplest type of adjudication. The facilitator 

allows the participants to assess the outcomes of their actions, to include 

movement, task performance, and BDA. Other participants may question 

the stated outcome. The facilitator can then confirm or adjust if necessary. 

This allows the participants the opportunity to state the rationale behind 

their estimate, as they may have thought of something others did not. 

Conversely, if the facilitator vetoes the participants’ estimates, that rationale 

should be given as well. This allows the facilitator to assess the personalities 

and experiences of the participants, and also affords the opportunity to 

educate and mentor participants in visualizing the battlefield. The quality of 

this method is completely dependent on the skill and experience of the staff 

and facilitator.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Analog Charts and Tables. Multiple references provide planning 

estimates for tasks based on historical data and experiments. These 

references can address everything from movements of units under various 

conditions to fuel and ammunition consumption rates to the time it takes 

to emplace a bridge. Simply find the appropriate table and read the results. 

Scale the task and unit size to the specific situation being evaluated. 

Finally, adjust the results for mission variables such as weather, visibility, 

fatigue, etc. Note that these references are just averages. Actual results will 

generally follow a bell curve, but may sometimes have a more randomized 

distribution.

Automated Calculators. Similar to analog charts and tables, several 

automated programs exist where the user can input data and get an estimate, 

such as time of travel tools. Again, the user must control for variables not 

addressed in the software.

CORRELATION OF FORCES AND MEANS

“The goal for using the calculator is not so much to predict the 

outcomes of engagements as it is to add some objectivity to the 

force allocation process and to facilitate staff synchronization of the 

warfighting functions, to achieve the effects directed in the plan. Rules 

of thumb for calculator shortfalls allow the staff to focus more on 

synchronization, by accepting the calculator outcomes as good enough 

rather than an intellectual tug of war between the S2 and S3 over 

whether a system or unit was truly destroyed. Wargaming will progress 

more smoothly, making the outcomes more timely and synchronized.” 

Dale Spurlin and Matthew Green

Demystifying the Correlation of Forces Calculator, Infantry Magazine

Jan-Mar 2017

COFM is the nickname for a mathematical model that allows comparing 

various forces’ relative combat power and effectiveness in specific mission 

sets against each other, and coming up with objective and “scientific” 

estimated losses and kills. It translates each unit into a “force equivalent 

(FE)” rating, that quantifies the unit’s combat abilities.

COFM and relative combat power assessments use the historical force ratio 

table (see Table 2-1). These ratios are considered the ratios where success 

is a 50:50 proposition. Additional combat power is required to create a true 

advantage for one side or the other.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Table 2-1. Historical minimum planning ratios (Source: FM 6-03)

Friendly Mission Position Friendly:Enemy

Delay 1:6

Defend Prepared or fortified 1:3

Defend Hasty 1:2.5

Attack Prepared or fortified 3:1

Attack Hasty 2.5:1

Counterattack Flank 1:1

Tip. Each staff officer should actively collect useful tables and calculators 

for their smart books. Among others, the Army Techniques Publication 

(ATP) 5-0.2, Staff Reference Guide, to be posted in 2020, has many useful 

references as a starting point.

CAUTION: The FE rating typically reflects the unit’s inherent effectiveness 

at engaging in combat the way the unit was designed. It does not account 

for how suited a unit’s predominant weapon systems are against specific 

target types or circumstances. For example, an artillery unit’s FE is based 

on its indirect fire abilities, not how well it would perform in a direct fire 

engagement against a tank unit.

CAUTION: It may be tempting to “pile on” units in an engagement to 

achieve a higher relative combat power ratio, but only include those 

units that could realistically directly participate given time and space 

considerations. The law of diminishing returns applies here, and there is the 

risk of creating a dense target rich environment.

CAUTION: There is no proponent tasked to update the COFM to account 

for changes to organization, technology, etc. Information may be stale.

The facilitator must adjust COFM FEs to reflect significant variables.

COFM does not account for terrain, training, morale, C3 degradation, 

weapon ranges, or other asymmetries. It does have a limited ability to 

account for the degree of fortification. Variables can be accounted for 

in several ways: Increasing or decreasing the unit strength to reflect an 

advantage or disadvantage in a given situation, manually adjusting the 

outcome, or if using an analog chart, shifting a column, which changes the 

force ratio. 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Digital COFM. The Department of Tactics at the Command and General 

Staff College (CGSC) created a COFM calculator in an excel spreadsheet. 

It uses data derived from studies at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) G-2/7 (formerly known as TRADOC Intelligence 

Support Activity [TRISA]) and TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), and is 

used as a tool within the school house.

(Note: TRAC is now assigned to Army Futures Command’s Futures and 

Concepts Center.) The examples on pages 58 and 59 are derived from that 

calculator. 

The procedure for use is simple: From a drop-down menu, select all 

friendly forces participating and input their strength percentages (default 

is 100 percent), the number of this type of unit, and their mission type. Do 

likewise for enemy forces. The COFM calculator will provide a casualty 

estimate. Ensure the facilitator adjusts for variables. This can be done by 

increasing or decreasing units’ percentage strength within the calculator, or 

by adjusting the final result manually. It is also possible to have fractions of 

units instead of whole numbers. The authors of the tool recommend using 

lower-echelon combat units, such as battalions instead of brigades, as this 

more accurately reflects what is actually engaged in a given fight. For higher 

echelons and longer duration fights, brigades can be used to help reflect the 

resiliency and sustainability of those units.

Analog COFM. The following is “a way” to manually calculate the COFM 

using simple math: The FE numbers are scaled by one fourth, and then 

rounded to the nearest whole number to make them more manageable. 

For example, a full-strength, armor-heavy M1A2 combined arms battalion 

has a nominal FE of 37.24. This is an awkward number to manipulate, so 

their scaled FE is 9. To calculate the COFM, add up all the scaled FEs on 

each side and find the ratio. Consult the damage table for the appropriate 

missions (for example: deliberate attack versus hasty defense) and read the 

losses for each side. If in the aggregate, there are other variables that have 

a significant impact on combat, favoring one side against the other, shift 

the column left or right, which effectively changes the force ratio used to 

calculate the outcome.

ANALOG CORRELATION OF FORCES AND MEANS AND 

STEP LOSSES

A simple method to track damage is through step losses with a damage 

table. Each step loss is an abstract measurement of combat power and 

corresponds to a transition in the military shorthand of “green, amber, red, 

black.” (See Figure 2-5 for corresponding percentages.) While not precise, 

this is a quick way to track units’ combat effectiveness. Unit icons can 
45

HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

even have the scaled FE for each step loss marked directly on them. Write 

directly on the icon to indicate the current FE and green, amber, red, or 

black status. Alternatively, rotate the counter so the current status is always 

toward the top of the game board. (See Figure 2-6 for an example of a 

customized board game icon.)

Figure 2-5. Example of friendly to enemy loss percentages in 

green, amber, red, and black statuses. 

(Source: CGSC Tactics Division)

Figure 2-6. Example of a customized board game icon. 

(Source: CGSC Tactics Division)

Tip. Units still suffer losses in combat, even if those losses are not large 

enough to warrant a step loss. A unit that participates in multiple combats 

but does not get a step loss on the damage table might eventually accrue a 

step loss based on the facilitator’s and other participants’ judgement.
46

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-7 is an example of an analog unit FE matrix from the COFM 

generator, which is the simplest method to track damage through step 

losses. It has scaled step losses and a combined arms battalion marker with 

“green, amber, red, black” and corresponding FEs for each step loss.

Figure 2-7. Example of an analog unit friendly-to-enemy matrix. 

(Source: CGSC Tactics Division)

Figure 2-8. Example of further friendly-to-enemy ratios.

 (Source: CGSC Tactics Division)

Example of an analog scaled COFM with step loss

Two green M1A2 battalions (FE 9), supported by an amber FA battalion 

(FE 6), conduct a hasty attack against a green BMP-3 battalion (FE 10) 

conducting a deliberate defense. The total friendly FE is 24 (9+9+6) 

against an enemy FE of 10. The ratio is 2.4:1, which is then rounded to 2:1. 

Friendly forces lose two step losses for each unit, and the BMP loses one 

(no losses for the artillery). The new FE for the friendly tank units is now 

six and in a red status. The BMP unit is now FE 8 in an amber status. This 

does not account for variables, such as training or visibility. Assess if all the 

variables in total would have a substantial impact. For example, consider 

the .4 from the 2.4:1 force ratio that rounded down to a 2:1. If there was a 

substantial impact, shift the column to the left or right to assess losses.
47

HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

CONDUCTING ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION 

CYCLES

The basis of the wargame is the action-reaction-counteraction cycle. The 

facilitator drives this process, ensuring timelines are met and the staff is 

focused. He avoids getting mired or going off on tangents, and produces 

quality outputs. The following is an example of how the cycle works, which 

assumes BLUFOR have the initiative:

• Determine initiative, which then determines which force initiates the 

turn with the action, and which side reacts. Normally the offensive 

side starts with the initiative. There are times when there will be a 

change of which force (friendly or enemy) initiates the action-reactioncounteraction sequence.

• The facilitator utilizes the synchronization matrix to call on WfF 

briefers in a logical order.

• The WfF briefers in turn describe the locations and actions/activities 

in their respective WfF. Briefers are concise, sharing only what is 

necessary for the recorder and scribe to capture and to create shared 

understanding with the other participants.

• The level of success or failure of the action is assessed as per the 

adjudication method chosen by the facilitator.

• Continue through all WfFs and briefers, until all have had the 

opportunity to provide input. Not every WfF will always have input.

• The opposing forces (OPFOR) conduct their reaction phase to the 

BLUFOR’s actions, and address all relevant WfF activities. In some 

cases, with the facilitator’s permission, the OPFOR may interject a 

reaction at an earlier point before all BLUFOR actions are taken. The 

facilitator adjudicates the reaction, including BDA, as required.

• A counteraction may then be initiated against the OPFOR reaction. 

Again, the facilitator adjudicates as required.

• Additional iterations of reactions-counteractions can take place within 

the same turn, following a natural flow of discussion. However, it 

should be manageable and the facilitator should decide if breaking this 

turn into multiple turns is beneficial.

• If participants identify risks, gaps, requests for information (RFIs), 

advantages/disadvantages, issues, etc., during the turn cycle, they take 

note and either bring it up immediately or brief it during the end of 

turn assessment.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• The scribe and recorder enter data into the synchronization matrix and 

other documents as necessary.

• All participants take appropriate notes, and update products and staff 

estimates. At turn end, the facilitator leads the end of turn assessment. 

This discussion identifies risks, advantages, disadvantages, RFIs, 

issues, branches, etc., associated with this turn.

Tip. The recorder projects a synchronization matrix where all can see it, 

and fills it out as the wargame progresses.

Tip. The facilitator may wait until all actions-reactions-counteractions are 

complete before adjudicating outcomes, particularly combat outcomes.

Tip. The scribe records advantages, disadvantages, risks, opportunities, 

assumptions, RFI decisions, and areas or contingencies needing further 

study as they are identified.

Tip. Participants update their planning products for this COA as they 

progress through the wargame.

Conducting Turns Using an Operational Framework

For each turn, it may be useful to divide the action into operational 

frameworks and wargame each part of the framework individually, from 

deep, close, and consolidation/security/rear/sustainment. The OPFOR 

mirrors the BLUFOR.

Wargame Discussion Questions

The purpose of the game is to explore the COA, not just to check the 

blocks on a synchronization matrix. The facilitator and other participants 

should ask the following questions throughout the course of the wargame to 

promote discussion and thorough analysis:

• What is the risk at this point to this unit? To the mission? How can it 

be mitigated?

• What happens if losses during an event are higher than expected, or if 

there is difficulty completing a task or movement?

• What other assets or combat multipliers can be used to facilitate a task 

or mitigate a risk?

• Does the battlefield array and architecture balance force protection and 

rapid action and massing?

• What are the weather, light, and terrain impacts? What is the key 

terrain?
49

HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

• What is the enemy commander thinking at this point? What is his next 

decision?

• What are the enemy reserves and triggers for commitment?

• What combat multipliers might the enemy bring into play?

• How does something impact decisions? What new information 

requirements does this generate?

• Where are casualties right now? Where are the supply convoys 

(coming and going)?

• What is needed to avoid culmination?

• What events in the area of interest have an impact and need to be 

tracked? How does higher headquarters see the fight at this point?

Tip. The Maneuver and OPFOR leads should routinely ask each other 

(and themselves) questions along the lines of “What could I do to 

interfere with the execution of the desired action?” This assists to identify 

risks, mitigations, decision points, branches, and opportunities.

Turn Completion

The facilitator conducts an end-of-turn review and assessment:

• Confirm the COA still meets the criteria of feasible, acceptable, and 

suitable, and meets all the commander’s screening criteria.

• Review changes to:

○Decision points and any substantial adjustments to the 

○Assumptions, task organization, taskings, timings, addition

guidance, coordination required, control measures, information 

requirements, and RFIs generated

○Gaps and “tabled” or “parking lot” top

○Branches or issues that require further attentio

• Conduct an assessment by evaluating the WfF against the established 

criteria as applied during that turn.

○Advanta

○Disadvanta

○Ri
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• The facilitator identifies and prioritizes remaining branches to be 

wargamed. The staff wargames the desired branch (before going to 

another COA if possible), and conducts an additional end-of-turn 

assessment.

Tip. Add rows for evaluation criteria and risk, and add notes to the 

bottom of the synchronization matrix to help record results.

WARGAME VIGNETTE

“If you take a flat map 

And move wooden blocks upon it strategically, 

The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should. 

The science of war is moving live men like blocks. 

And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment. 

But it takes time to mold your men into blocks 

And flat maps turn into country where, creeks and gullies 

Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush, 

They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries 

And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.

It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind, 

But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow 

To move, when they start they take too long on the way 

The General loses his stars, and the block–men die 

In unstrategic defiance of martial law 

Because still used to just being men, not block parts.”

Stephen Vincent Benét

John Brown’s Body (1928)

The following vignette covers one turn in the middle of an armored brigade 

combat team (ABCT) offensive wargame on an analog map board, using the 

belt method. Several turns have already happened. The scheme of maneuver 

is for Task Force (TF) 1, Shaping Operation, to fix the enemy on Objective 

(OBJ) Club, to prevent repositioning to OBJ Sword. TF3, Decisive 

Operation, seizes OBJ Sword to protect the flank of an adjacent brigade. 

TF2 is the reserve.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Figure 2-9. Wargame vignette graphic (deliberate attack)

Turn Overview

Facilitator. The next turn is Phase 2A: Movement to Phase Line (PL) 

Jaguar, and isolation of OBJ Sword from hour (H) +3 to H+4. Okay, what is 

the larger picture area of interest update?

Intelligence. No weather or light changes. Low ceilings and intermittent 

rain continue.

Maneuver. Enemy long-range fires have been degraded by 50 percent. 

The Division has just executed division Decision Point 2, which is for our 

brigade and the 4th Brigade to cross PL Lynx and simultaneously continue 

to attack in-zone. The 2nd Brigade remains in its tactical assembly area 

(TAA).

OPFOR. I am still in the defense. My security zone elements that were 

forced to withdraw are reconsolidating west of PL Tiger. I haven’t 

committed any reserves from battalion through division. My next decision 

is where to commit the battalion and regimental reserves.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Action Phase

Intelligence. Shadow 1 and TF1 scouts observe Named Area of Interest 

(NAI) 1 on OBJ Club, and refine the target group, task group (TG) 11. 

Shadow 2 observes Target Area of Interest (TAI) 2 for the enemy’s 

regimental reserve.

Maneuver. All units are still green. TF1 crosses the line of departure (LD) 

and attacks in-zone to occupy Support by Fire (SBF) 1, in order to fix 

enemy forces on OBJ Club to prevent repositioning of forces against TF3’s 

attack on OBJ Sword. On order, TF3 attacks in-zone to seize OBJ Sword, to 

protect 4th Brigade’s flank. TF2 has no change, still in reserve.

Decision points. Initiating TF3’s movement to attack OBJ Sword is 

Decision Point 1 for the brigade.

Aviation. Air Weapons Team (AWT) 1 supports TF1. We’ll have one hour 

time on-station for the Apaches until the forward arming and refueling point 

(FARP) moves to PL Puma, which doesn’t happen until after OBJ Sword is 

secured. AWT 2 is on-ground at the FARP, and is 15 minutes from PL Lynx 

and 25 minutes from PL Jaguar.

Fires. Fire support coordination line (FSCL) is PL Tiger. Field artillery 

(FA) is in the Position Area for Artillery (PAA) 2. We are down to two 

battalion 6’s of dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM). 

Priority of fires (POF) to TF1, and shifts to TF3 when TF3 crosses PL Lynx. 

We’ll shoot Target AB0001, suspected enemy battalion headquarters (HQ), 

when TF1 crosses the LD and TG 11 is on-order. Q36 establishes critical 

friendly zones (CFZ) on ABF 1. Division artillery (DIVARTY) is providing 

counter battery.

Intelligence. If electronic warfare (EW) jams with the fire mission on the 

CP, it would be a good chance to do some collecting. Their communications 

nets will be very active trying to figure out what’s going on.

Air liaison officer (ALO). We have no apportioned missions. The division 

has six on-call close air support (CAS) missions we can request but priority 

is to 4th Brigade, and targeting the enemy division reserve once identified.

Protection. The team engineer follows TF3, and has to be prepared to 

conduct an in-stride breach on OBJ Sword. Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) 

Collection Point 1 has been established.

Air defense officer (ADO). ADO sections are opconned (operationally 

controlled) for movement with the TFs. Sentinel and one section are set on 

PL Lynx, and can cover up to PL Jaguar. 
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN). 

Decontamination (decon) platoon follows TF1 and moves to CP 1 on 

PL Lynx. We have enough supplies to do thorough decon of two tracked 

companies.

Sustainment. Class V resupply for artillery departs from the brigade 

support area (BSA). Estimated time of arrival (ETA) H+6 vicinity PAA-3. 

Brigade ambulance exchange points (AXPs) have been established at CP3 

after TF1 LDs, and CP4 after TF3 LDs.

Command and control. The tactical command post (TAC) follows TF1.

Civil military officer (CMO). Occasional internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) are in sector. Not enough to slow movement, but enough to be 

careful about positive identification (ID) of targets.

Reaction Phase

OPFOR. I have my raven equivalents and dismounted scouts screening all 

avenues of approach, and I detect TF1 crossing the LD. The rain has flooded 

the creek and made crossing anywhere but a bridge difficult, and I have 

thoroughly mined the bridges and easy fording sites.

OPFOR. My radar picks up your artillery shooting at my command post, 

and my DIVARTY shoots a BM21 rocket counter-battery. Then I engage 

TF1 with my regimental artillery group (RAG) when they attempt to cross 

the creek.

OPFOR. As TF1 sets its ABF, I engage with anti-tank guided missiles 

(ATGMs) and mortars.

Maneuver. We just destroyed your command post with artillery. How are 

you calling in indirect fire (IDF) when we cross the creek? Your forces don’t 

have C3, and you are confused and demoralized.

OPFOR. You shot my CP an hour ago when you crossed the LD. I’ve had 

more than enough time to reestablish C3.

Maneuver. Okay, we need to adjust the timing of engaging the CP and 

when we prep OBJ Club. OPFOR, when would be the most disruptive time 

to hit your CP? We’ll adjust the trigger.

OPFOR. About five minutes before you get in direct fire range.

OPFOR. And I blew up ten of your tanks with my artillery crossing the 

creek, and another 15 with my ATGMs when you moved into the ABF.

OPFOR. And my counter battery destroyed six artillery pieces.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Facilitator. Hold up there on the BDA for now.

Facilitator. OPFOR, what decision points do you have?

OPFOR. My next decision is to commit my battalion reserve, but the 

trigger for that isn’t until I identify your main effort crossing PL Jaguar.

Counter-Action Phase

Intelligence. None

Maneuver. TF1 employs counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). 

TF1 emplaces scissor bridges to rapidly cross the creek to avoid artillery 

fire and mines, and attacks to destroy enemy intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance assets in-zone en route to ABF 1. Under cover of fires, TF1 

occupies ABF 1 and engages enemy on OBJ Club 

Fires. DIVARTY shoots counter battery against the RAG, targeting TF1’s 

creek crossing as acquired. On-order, our artillery shoots TG11 on the 

objective. We are now down to one battalion 6 of DPICM.

Protection, sustainment, command and control. No change.

Facilitator. Okay, let’s do some BDA. Let’s start with IDF. First, I assess 

the enemy battalion CP is now at 50 percent effectiveness, and can’t 

conduct any C2 for thirty minutes. Next, let’s address the enemy’s 122mm 

RAG shooting at the creek crossing. Fires, how long will the enemy be able 

to shoot before we can get effective counterbattery on them, and how much 

can they shoot before then?

Fires. It’s already covered in a CFZ, so maybe four minutes from 

acquisition to splash. The enemy CP is degraded from our fire mission. 

We’ll say they can shoot about 75 rounds at each of the two crossing sites. 

The target is spread out and moving. According to my artillery effects table, 

we’ll say one scissor bridge and three tanks are destroyed. The counter 

battery will destroy three enemy systems and force them to move, taking 

them out of the fight until they reposition.

Maneuver. That’s a loss of four percent for TF1, which brings them to 90 

percent. They’re still green. What are the effects on OBJ Club?

Fires. Let’s see. A battalion 6 of DPICM against entrenched vehicles spread 

out. I’d say four BMPs and one tank. Artillery will conduct survivability 

moves by battery to provide continuous suppression of the OBJ, but will 

only be shooting high explosives (HE) for suppression at this point. We can 

shoot for about 15 minutes of suppression.
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Facilitator. Okay, let’s put the friendly versus enemy maneuvers in the 

COFM spreadsheet. This will be a friendly deliberate attack versus an 

enemy deliberate defense. Maneuver, OPFOR, what’s your combat power?

Maneuver. One tank-heavy combined arms battalion at 90 percent 

strength, and one paladin battalion at 90 percent strength.

OPFOR. After the artillery prep, I’ve got two BMP-3 companies at 80 

percent in fortified positions.

Facilitator. Okay, who else can bring something to this?

Aviation. They’ve got the AWT 1, too.

EW. We can attempt jamming as well, but we can’t do it for long.

(The COFM operator selects an M1A2 battalion at 90 percent, a Paladin 

battalion at 90 percent, and an Apache company at 25 percent. There is no 

“AWT” or platoon selections available so the unit is scaled accordingly. 

A BMP-3 battalion is selected at 80 percent, but under “Number,” a “.7” 

is used instead of a “1” because only two of three companies from the 

battalion will be engaged per the SITTEMP for the objectives.)

Facilitator. What else impacts this? Subtract 10 percent from the enemy 

strength for the jamming and C3 disruption.

Facilitator. We’ve got a force ratio of about 3 (2.98):1, and losses of 21 

percent versus 34 percent. Any other input? That puts TF1 at 69 percent 

effectiveness, which is amber, and the BMP companies to 46 percent, which 

is black. TF1 has accomplished its task of fixing.

Figure 2-10. Example of a force ratio calculator matrix for the 

vignette (Source: CGSC Tactics Division)
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Facilitator. What happens if TF1 takes heavy casualties before it can make 

it into ABF 1? Anything else we can do to mitigate that from happening, 

and if it does happen, what next?

Maneuver. Because TF1 is just a fixing force, it doesn’t take as much 

combat power to just fix. The risk is low of us not being able to get enough 

force across to fix.

Facilitator. How long until TF3 gets up?

Maneuver. That’s Decision Point 1. (Reviews the decision point 

worksheet.)

Figure 2-11. Decision Support Matrix
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

Facilitator. Is Decision Point 1 still valid and complete? Okay.

Turn Completion

Facilitator. Any gaps, issues, or changes to assumptions? Alright, is it still 

feasible, suitable, and acceptable? Good. Let’s discuss evaluation criteria 

and risk. The evaluation criterion we’re using are tempo and flexibility.

Maneuver. Tempo is a disadvantage right now. We have TF1 on the SBF 

for too long, and they can bleed out before TF3 gets there. I’d classify that 

as a risk. We can mitigate that by having TF3 LD earlier and hold up closer 

to OBJ Sword.

Facilitator. How long will it take TF3 to get to the objective?

Maneuver. TF3 has about a 15 kilometer cross country movement over 

slow-go terrain in tactical formation. (Inputs data into route planning tool.) 

It will take about an hour for them to reach PL Jaguar and begin the attack 

on the main objective. That’s against light resistance. Due to the rain, we’ll 

add another 15 minutes. Engineer, how long to emplace two scissor bridges 

and cross five tracked companies?

Engineer. (Consults planning tables) About 30 minutes if things go 

smooth.

Maneuver. Okay, let’s have TF3 LD about 45 minutes after TF1, around 

when TF1 reaches the creek. Create an attack position graphic for TF3 to 

hold up into until ordered to continue to attack. We’ll update Decision Point 

1 to reflect this.

Manuever. Flexibility is an advantage. We have a very robust reserve and 

TF1 can still accomplish their task even with heavy casualties. 

Fires. Culmination is a disadvantage and a risk. If the field artillery (FA) 

shoots much more than expected, we’ll be black on ammunition, and have 

to stop.

Sustainment. Maybe we can mitigate the Class V by flying in some of the 

resupply, instead of trucking it all the way from the port to the BSA.

OPFOR. You have a planning gap or risk from my perspective. You don’t 

have a plan to locate and destroy my regimental reserve tank company.

Engineer. I’ve got a risk. We’ve only got four scissor bridges. If we start 

losing them, the brigade can still cross the creek, but it will be very slow. I 

recommend we send a request or RFI for additional bridge resources.

Facilitator. Okay, let’s make those adjustments. (Has the scribe review 

pertinent findings and sets the next turn.)
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This vignette example illustrates the interactions and frictions that take 

place in a good COA analysis (wargaming), where the facilitator, the 

executive officer or G-5 adjudicates actions and reviews decision points as 

the staff visualizes the fight in time and space.

Endnotes

1. Field Manual (FM) 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 

MAY 2014.

 2. Kretchik, W. E. (1991). The Manual Wargaming Process: Does our Current 

Methodology Give Us the Optimum Solutions? A Monograph for the School of 

Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military 

Studies.

3. FM 6-0. Table 9-2 
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CHAPTER 3

Thoughts on Training the Staff

“You can ask me for anything you like, except time.”

Napoleon Bonaparte

The Corsican: A Diary of Napoleon’s Life in His Own Words

There is never enough time, or at least that is the perception. Training 

begins with a solid home-station training plan. Although the commander 

is responsible for training his staff, he has his executive officer (XO) or 

senior planners to assist with this training and with devising a home-station 

training plan. Staff training does not happen without command emphasis.

Staff tasks are like any other unit collective or individual task: Proficiency 

requires education, training, and practice. Without deliberate effort and 

command support, results will be haphazard at best. The commander and 

his primary staff officers should develop yearly nested training plans that 

address all aspects of staff training and education. These events should be 

planned, resourced, briefed, and approved during the quarterly training 

brief, added to calendars, and given as much protection as any other 

training event that builds readiness. Staff members must also actively take 

responsibility for their own professional development and training, as well 

as the training for any subordinates they may lead. 

The goal is to create staff members who have an intuitive understanding and 

visualization of both their warfighting function (WfF) and the battlefield. In 

addition, staff members must understand their role during course of action 

(COA) analysis, as well as what to provide and how they add value. Based 

on observations from combat training centers (CTCs) and other exercises, 

the following are key trends staffs must address in their training:

• Lack of individual technical competencies. Wargame participants 

must be subject matter experts on their WfF and branch. For example, 

an engineer officer must speak authoritatively on terrain and the 

composition, capabilities, and employment of different bridging 

companies. Participants must visualize time, space, resources, and 

event outcomes within their areas of expertise. Participants must have 

access to, and be familiar with, reference manuals. They must study 

and conduct professional development at every opportunity. This also 

includes competency of reverse WfFs, understanding their WfF’s 

threat, and coalition counterparts.
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• Failure to practice. Repetition, repetition, repetition! The military 

decisionmaking process (MDMP) steps, such as COA analysis, 

that are not routinely trained and practiced, invariably lead to poor 

outcomes and take more time to accomplish. Make this a battle drill 

so mental energy is spent on analyzing the plan, not on figuring out 

how to execute the wargame. Units must practice often and include 

all planning enablers, including attachments, even if they are not 

permanently assigned to the planning team. Ensure the associated 

briefings are practiced as well.

• Failure to understand how the unit fights and commanders think. 

All units and individuals have personalities, cultures, etiquettes, 

pet peeves, etc. Planners must understand and visualize how these 

variables will affect the fight. This begins with understanding doctrine 

and unit standard operating procedures (SOPs), but does not stop there. 

How does the commander like to conduct counter reconnaissance 

and employ reserves? How are command and control nodes used? 

How does the commander like to use attack aviation? What are the 

personality traits of higher headquarters (HHQs), adjacent units, staff, 

and subordinate units that will affect planning and execution? What 

is the training level of each subordinate unit? Officer professional 

development allows commanders and key staff to communicate their 

visions. Staff exercises, team building, and even playing commercial 

wargames can help with this visualization.

The following are tools to address focus areas:

• Professional development sessions. Examples include discussions 

of professional readings, common operating environment updates, 

capability briefs, military history presentations, and how-to instruction 

on tasks such as gap crossings.

• Staff rides. These historical on-site studies are helpful, if the time and 

the resources are available.

• Staff exercises. These are either self-resourced or nested. They can 

range from table top exercises (TTXs), such as a simple tactical 

exercise without troops, to simulation-driven command post exercises 

with deployed command posts and 24-hour operations. Many units 

fail to take advantage of home-station events, such as gunnery, as 

opportunities to train the staff.

• Professional reading. This can be mixes of history books, professional 

journals, and publications. Many books without an obvious military 

connection are also useful and should not be discounted.
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• SOP working groups. It is useful to periodically walk through and 

discuss planning procedures and products to create understanding 

and ensure products are current and distributed. It can be particularly 

effective conducting these in support of after action reviews (AARs) 

after major events.

• Orders. Keep and use old unit orders or reach out to the CTC, Mission 

Command Training Program, or the Command and General Staff 

College for old orders, which can be used as a driver for MDMP 

training.

• Administrative missions and taskings. Use the MDMP and orders 

publications for non-tactical events. Using the MDMP familiarizes 

the staff with tools and formats. This allows focusing on the output, 

and not the procedure. Although this may not always be a perfect 

fit, everyday garrison planning activities can provide training 

opportunities.

Breaking the MDMP process down into its parts aids in the development 

of training plans that seek to improve one step at a time. A new staff trying 

to take on the entire process at one time can lead to frustration and the 

development of bad habits. Focusing on one aspect of the MDMP at a 

time will allow deeper understanding and developing better individual and 

staff collective habits. Keep in mind that the output of one step is needed 

to train the next step. Further, repetition will allow the staff to attain a 

battle rhythm and level of efficiency for planning high-tempo large-scale 

combat operations. Figure 3-1 on the following page breaks the MDMP 

into its logical parts. Next, develop a training plan for Step 4, COA analysis 

(wargaming).
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Figure 3-1. Steps of the MDMP
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

EXAMPLE OF A STAFF TRAINING PLAN

Below is a simple example of a training concept using what has been 

discussed to develop the conative skill of visualization and improve COA 

analysis. Note: Appendix A on page 73 provides a comprehensive reference 

for COA analysis (wargaming) tasks, conditions, and standards with 

detailed performance measures and outputs.

With the commander’s guidance specific to the unit’s mission essential task 

list (METL) and focusing on COA analysis (wargaming), the XO developed 

the following training plan concept. The training event will take place over 

a seven-week period and will culminate with practicing several iterations 

of Step 4 of the MDMP, COA analysis, with the main command post (CP) 

deployed to the field during platoon situational training exercise (STX) 

evaluations. 

The training objective is to improve staff ability to conduct COA analysis. 

The terminal learning objective is to improve COA analysis, and the 

enabling leaning objective is to improve visualization (seeing ourselves, the 

enemy, and the terrain).

Using the crawl, walk, run approach, the staff will execute leader training, 

consisting of leader development classes, practical exercises using 

wargames, and TTXs. In this example, the XO initially uses chess as a 

means to develop individual conative skills and then uses the board game 

Kreigsspiel (mentioned in Chapter 1 of this handbook) to develop staff 

collective conative skills. The TTXs will further develop visualization of 

seeing ourselves, seeing the terrain, and seeing the enemy. This training 

event will culminate with conducting at least three full wargames in a field 

environment. Figure 3-2 is a graphic representation of this major staff 

training event.
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Figure 3-2. COA wargaming training plan (A way) 
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

LIST OF SAMPLE COMMERCIAL WARGAMES

The following is a list of commercial wargames put together in coordination 

with the Directorate of Simulations Education, U.S. Command and General 

Staff College. This list does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Army, 

and is not all-inclusive. There are many similar games out there, in addition 

to variations of the ones mentioned below. For commanders and staff that 

wish to explore these further, please contact the Directorate of Simulations 

Education, U.S. Command and General Staff College at (913) 684-3043 or 

(913) 684-3157.

Silver Bayonet by GMT Games

Description: Silver Bayonet is a turn-based board game depicting 

battalion and brigade battles of the 1st Cavalry Division against the 

North Vietnamese Army, with a heavy air assault component. It is not a 

counterinsurgency focused game. It incorporates morale and fatigue.

Training benefit: This game is useful for staff planning. It can be played 

as a campaign, and helps visualize brigade and battalion movement on a 

battlefield. It exercises the awareness of mental and physical readiness of 

troops, not just counting bayonet strength.

Complexity: Medium. A facilitator is required. Company-sized icons.

Players: 2-8

Time: 2-4 hours

Note: Effective for team play.

Silver Bayonet can be accessed at: https://boardgamegeek.com/

boardgame/7994/silver-bayonet-first-team-vietnam-1965 

Alternate GMT games can be found at: https://www.gmtgames.com/

Combat Mission: Shock Force by Battlefront

Description: This is a series of real-time single player computer games 

replicating tactical actions at the company level. It has variants which 

include Stryker companies in Syria and Tank Teams in Ukraine. It is 

visually engaging, and includes individual vehicle and weapon icons.

Training benefit: This game is excellent for teaching planning and decision 

making at a tactical level with modern weapon systems. The game is 

relatively realistic and unforgiving of tactical blunders, and multiple 

scenarios allow it to be played multiple times.

Complexity: Medium. Requires some practice.
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Players: 1

Time: Self-paced

Note: Have each player brief their planning efforts to their peers before 

playing. After the game, explore the various outcomes. 

Combat Mission: Shock Force by Battlefront can be accessed at: http://

www.battlefront.com/shock-force-2/

Alternate Battlefront games can be found at: http://www.battlefront.com/

Tactical Decision Games

Description: This is a “do-it-yourself” game. It provides a tactical (or other) 

dilemma, and gives a fixed amount of time to develop a solution. Players 

can work as individuals or in teams. Each team briefs their solution set and 

rationale, and is then critiqued by their peers. (Additional resources on the 

TDG website.)

Training benefit: This game creates confidence in developing situational 

awareness and decision making under pressure/time limits. The facilitated 

discussion/AAR can address almost any desired training or education focus 

areas.

Complexity: Easy

Players: 1 individual or up to 5 per team

Time: 4-6 hours. (This is dependent on the development by the facilitator, 

the executive officer.)

Note: There is a developer’s workbook found in the supplemental 

resources, linked in Appendix C on page 87, which provides assistance in 

developing your own game. Develop and print a problem set and sketch. 

Incomplete or ambiguous information may be a deliberate part of the 

scenario. Provide specific guidance on what is to be briefed as part of the 

solution set (i.e., a COA sketch, assumptions, etc.). Set a time limit.

Note: If desired, the COA can be explored through informal COA analysis 

(wargaming) to examine it in more detail or explore branches, sequels, or 

longer-term consequences.

Tactical Decision Games can be accessed at: http://companyleader.

themilitaryleader.com/tdg/

Pandemic by Z-Man Games

Description: This is a board game, which involves a cooperative team 

versus artificial intelligence. Players are trying to find cures for global 
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HOW TO MASTER WARGAMING

disease outbreaks while facilitating containment.

Training benefit: In addition to team building/ice breaking, the primary 

output of the game is that, during the AAR, the groups learn each other’s 

character traits and how they think, while witnessing multiple concrete 

demonstrations of multiple mind traps, from group think to anchoring. This 

increases critical thinking, communication, and problem solving skills.

Complexity: Easy. It is a simple entry-level game for those uncomfortable 

with games.

Players: 2-4, plus an observer and/or facilitator

Time: Set up is 10 minutes. Training is 10 minutes. Play time is 1 hour.

Note: The maximum benefit of this game will derive from an introspective 

AAR discussing mind traps and group dynamics.

Pandemic by Z-Man Games cane be accessed at: https://www.zmangames.

com/en/games/pandemic/

Alternate Z-Man games can be found at: https://www.zmangames.com/

Artemis Spaceship Bridge Simulator

Description: This game is a real-time computer simulation, requiring a 

cooperative team versus artificial intelligence. Players each have their own 

computers that simulate various battle stations on a Star Trek-like spaceship. 

Each position only has specific information, requiring information sharing 

to effectively understand a problem set and then develop and execute a 

solution.

Training benefit: This is a team-building exercise that focuses on 

information management to support decision making. Many of the problem 

sets present extremely ambiguous “black swan” events that truly challenge 

critical thinking and adaptability.

Complexity: Easy

Players: 6 (Additional games can be linked, allowing multi-ship team play 

or head-to-head adversarial play.)

Time: Practice is 30 minutes. Play time is 1-2 hours.

Note: Requires computers with access to a common server. Maximum 

training benefit accrues if a reflective AAR is conducted immediately 

afterwards.

Artemis Spaceship Bridge Simulator can be accessed at: https://

artemisspaceshipbridge.com/
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Flashpoint Campaigns: Red Storm Player’s Edition by Matrix 

Games

Description: This is a turn-based, computer-driven, single-player game. 

This game replicates a tactical combined arms battalion minus to battalion 

plus-sized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) versus Warsaw Pact 

engagements in the mid-1980s. Icons typically represent platoons. The 

game has an easy, intuitive interface, incorporates fog of war, and is notable 

for including orders delay based on enemy electronic warfare jamming, 

among other things. It also incorporates troop fatigue and morale. Each 

scenario comes with a reasonable mission FRAGORD. It includes platoon 

and section-sized icons.

Training benefit: This game trains decision-making in ambiguous situations. 

It requires being able to envision yourself, the enemy, and terrain in relation 

to time and mission. It also teaches equipment capabilities, vulnerabilities, 

and hints at tactical best practices. 

Complexity: Easy 

Players: 1

Time: Set up is 5 minutes. Training/practice is 1 hour. Play-time is 1 hour.

Note: Most effective learning outcomes require some detailed planning 

prior to execution. A staff or individual can perform a reasonable MDMP 

on this. A time investment in conducting mission planning is well worth 

it. The game comes with multiple scenarios, many of which are non-U.S, 

but are still valid training scenarios and should be considered. Customizing 

scenarios is very time consuming. 

Flashpoint Campaigns: Red Storm Player’s Edition can be accessed at: 

https://www.matrixgames.com/products/471/details/flashpoint.campaigns:.

redstorm

Alternate Matrix Games can be found at: https://www.matrixgames.com/

Main Battle Tank by GMT Games

Description: Main Battle Tank is a turn-based tactical board game. This 

game replicates tactical platoon to company-sized NATO versus Warsaw 

Pact engagements in the mid-1980s. Icons represent individual vehicles 

and squads. This game has optional rules allowing incorporation of more 

complex and realistic conditions. It has individual, vehicle, and squad icons.

Training benefit: This game trains decision making in ambiguous situations. 

It requires being able to envision yourself, the enemy, and terrain in relation 

to time and mission. It also teaches equipment capabilities, vulnerabilities, 

and tactical best practices. 
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Complexity: Medium

Players: 2-6 players

Time: Set up is 15 minutes. Training/practice is 45 minutes. Play-time is 1-2 

hours. (Facilitator requires 2 hours to learn all rules.)

Note: A facilitator who understands all the rules, and can quickly answer 

questions and resolve combat outcomes, will greatly enhance the game. The 

facilitator can also incorporate realistic friction into the game. Time spent 

mission planning will greatly improve the learning benefit from the game. 

Fog of war can be incorporated by a facilitator. Double blind games, using 

multiple copies, take time and planning, but can greatly enhance realistic 

decision making. With some creativity, this can be adapted into a miniatures 

game.

Main Battle Tank can be accessed at: https://boardgamegeek.com/

boardgame/157323/mbt-second-edition

Axis and Allies Global or 1942 by Milton Bradley

Description: This is a turn-based strategic board game. Teams of players 

play the major world powers of WW2 and compete militarily for resources, 

key terrain, and achieving key strategic conditions on a global scale. Players 

build naval, air, and ground forces with unique costs and capabilities.

Training benefit: This game is the perfect venue for reinforcing the 

principles of war. It is also a great way to train center of gravity analysis, 

and explores and teaches evaluating opportunity costs.

Complexity: Medium. Rules appear intimidating at first, but practice rounds 

can quickly gain players proficiency.

Players: 2-8

Time: 4-8 hours

Note: Practice rounds are necessary to understand the mechanics and 

develop feasible strategies.

Axis and Allies Global or 1942 can be accessed at: https://www.

axisandallies.org/axis-and-allies-versions/

Kriegsspiel

Description: Kriegsspiel is the classic wargame that first brought wargaming 

into military training and education. It is a large board game played with 

blocks on enlarged military maps. It generally replicates Napoleonic 

meeting engagements from brigade to corps. It requires a facilitator. The 

unique aspect of this game is players are not allowed to communicate 
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directly with each other or with their units. They must write notes to fellow 

players and provide written orders to their units, which they give to the 

facilitator. The facilitator then determines when to pass the message and 

how well the troops perform the actions. Krieggspiel uses battalion-sized 

icons.

Training benefit: This game is about effective communication, providing 

clear, succinct orders, and the exercise of command and control. Players 

have limited opportunities to influence their subordinates, so excellent 

guidance and intent is necessary. 

Complexity: Easy

Players: 2-8 (Generally, however with 4-10 players, one or more facilitators 

are required. Given N players, you need N+1 umpires. One on the map, then 

one per player.)

Time: Set up is 20 minutes. Training/practice is 30 minutes. Play-time is 2 

hours. 

Note: Neither side’s commander is allowed to see the game table. They are 

quarantined and must rely on the written reports from their subordinates 

for situational awareness. An AAR discussing command and control and 

communications post-game is where the most learning takes place. Ideally, 

with additional resources, this can be played as a double-blind game, which 

adds an altogether new aspect.

Kriegsspeil can be accessed at: https://boardgamegeek.com/

boardgame/16957/kriegsspiel

Chess

Description: Chess is a classic tactical game that is about 1500 years old. 

It is a two-player game but, if played as a tournament, can generate good 

interaction and stimulates visualization.

Training benefit: This game is good for developing the conative skills 

of visualizing yourself and the enemy. Further, it forces the individual 

to see and analyze several moves in advance. Chess helps players to 

see the second and third ordered effects of their actions. With the pieces 

having different capabilities, it replicates combined arms, and stimulates 

the individual to gain a combined affect against his opponent. This is a 

reasoning and thinking game.

Complexity: Easy to difficult dependent on the experience of the individuals 

playing

Players: 2 (However, a chess tournament can involve the entire staff.)
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Time: Set up is 5 minutes. Training/practice is 15 minutes. Play time 

depends on the 2 players, but on average 30-45 minutes.

Online chess can be accessed at: https://www.chess.com/

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APPENDIX A

Technical Assistance Field Team 

Task Guide:

 Military Decisionmaking Process

Collective Task Number 71-8-5111

Author’s Note: Although Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) is no 

longer an active organization, the information found in this Task Guide is 

supported by Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization 

and Operations, 05 MAY 2014 and the Digital Training Management 

System. The information was supported by Army Doctrine Reference 

Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 MAY 2012, which 

has since been superceded by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The 

Operations Process, as of 01 AUG 2019.

STEP 4 — COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING)

Conditions: The staff is conducting or preparing to conduct operations. 

Communications are established with subordinates, adjacent units, and 

higher headquarters (HHQ). Command and Control (C2) Information 

Systems (INFOSYS) are operational and are passing information in 

accordance with tactical standard operating procedures (TSOPs). The 

command has received a warning order (WARNORD) from higher HQ, 

and is exercising mission command. Some iterations of this task should 

be performed in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4.

Standards: The staff analyzes a mission received from HHQ; develops, 

analyzes, and compares courses of action (COAs) against criteria of 

success and each other; selects the optimum COA to accomplish the 

mission; and produces and disseminates an operation plan/operation order 

(OPLAN/OPORD) to subordinates.

Note: Task steps and performance measures may not apply to every unit 

or echelon. Prior to evaluation, coordination should be made between 

evaluator and the evaluated units’ HHQ to determine the task steps and 

performance measures that may be omitted.
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks (Continued)
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks (Continued)
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks (Continued)
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks (Continued)
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Table A-1. Collective Tasks (Continued)
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Table A-2. Supporting Individual Tasks. Participate in COA 

Analysis and Wargaming
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Table A-2. Supporting Individual Tasks. Participate in COA 

Analysis and Wargaming (Continued)
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Table A-2. Supporting Individual Tasks. Participate in COA 

Analysis and Wargaming (Continued)
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Table A-2. Supporting Individual Tasks. Participate in COA 

Analysis and Wargaming (Continued)

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APPENDIX B

References

Adkinson, F.L. Personal Interview on Observations on COA Analysis from 

the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center. December 10, 2018. 

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 JUL 

2019.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 

JUL 2019.

Benet, S.V. (1961). John Brown’s Body. (pp. 27-28). New York, NY: 

Dramatists Play Service, Inc.

Burggrabe, Reed. Personal Interview on Doctrinal Updates and TTPs for 

COA Analysis. February 20, 2019.

Field Manual (FM) 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and 

Operations. 05 MAY 2014. C1 incorporated 22 APR 2016.

Frame, J. E. (1997). Gazing into the Crystal Ball Together: Wargaming and 

Visualization for the Commander and Staff. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College.

Frank, Anders (2012). “Gaming the Game: A Study of the Gamer Mode in 

Educational Wargaming.” Simulation and Gaming 43, no. 1: 118-132.

Garra, N. A. (2004). Wargaming a Systematic Approach, Discover the Fast 

Effective way to Supercharge your Battle Staff. Sierra Vista, Arizona: S2 

Company.

Infantry School Staff. (1939) Terrain. Infantry in Battle (pp. 69-78). 

Washington D.C.: The Infantry Journal Incorporated.

Kretchik, W. E. (1991). The Manual Wargaming Process: Does our Current 

Methodology Give Us the Optimum Solutions? A Monograph for the 

School of Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of 

Advanced Military Studies.

Krueger, R. L. (2018). CTCD Quarterly Bulletin 01-09 Wargame Planning 

Considerations. Fort Polk, LA: Joint Readiness Training Center.

Leader Training Program Coach, N. T. Personal Interview on Observations 

and Trends on Unit’s Conduct of Course of Action Analysis (War-gaming). 

March 3, 2019.
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Longacre, E.G. (2000). Lincoln’s Calvarymen: A History of the Mounted 

Forces of the Army of the Potomac. (p. 183) Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books.

McConnell, R.A. (2020). “Connecting the Dots: Developing Leaders who 

can Turn Threats into Opportunities.” Military Review

McConnell, R. A., and Gerges, M. T. (2018). Seeing the Elephant, 

Improving Leader Visualization Skills through Simple War Games. Military 

Review Online Exclusive.

McConnell, R. A., Gerges, M., Dalbey, J., Dial, T., Hodge, G., Leners, 

M.,... Schoof, P. (2018). The Effect of Simple Role-Playing Games on the 

Wargaming Step of the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP) A Mixed 

Method Approach. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College.

Ministry of Defence. (2017). The Wargaming Handbook. The Development, 

Concepts and Doctrine Centre: Ministry of Defence Shrivenham. 

Napoleon 1. (1910). The Corsican: A Diary of Napoleon’s Life in His Own 

Words. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 

Pray, J. L.-O. Personal Interview on Observations on COA Analysis from 

the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center. December 10, 2018.

Reinwald, B. R. (2000). “Tactical Intuition.” Military Review 80, no. 5. (pp. 

80-88).

Rubel, Robert C. (2006). “The Epistemology of War Gaming.” Naval War 

College Review 59, no. 2, Article 8.

Sallot, Steven. Personal Interview on Applying Commercial Games to 

Military Education. January 15, 2019. 

LTC Smith, C. R. (1863). Brigadier General John Buford, U.S. Army, 

commanding First Division: Battle of Gettysburg. In United States War 

Department (Ed.), The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 

Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. (Series 1, V. 27–Part 1) (pp. 

927-993). Washington, Government Printing Office.

Scott, H. D. (1992). Time Management and the Military Decision Making 

Process. A Monograph for the School of Advances Military Studies, U.S 

Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of 

Advanced Military Studies.

LTC Spurlin, D. and LTC Green M. (2017). Demystifying the Correlation of 

Forces Calculator. Infantry Magazine January-March 2017 (pp. 14-17).
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Stackpole, E. J. (1982). They Met At Gettysburg. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books.

Stallings, P. A. (1992). What To Do, What To Do? Determining a Course 

of Action at the Operational Level of War. A Monograph for the School of 

Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced 

Military Studies.

Stanley, E. B. (2000). Wargames, Training, and Decision-Making, 

Increasing the Experience of Army Leaders. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School 

of Advances Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General staff 

College.

Sun Tzu, T. B. (1976). SUN TZU, The Art of War. New York: Printed in the 

United States of America.

Training Circular (TC) 6-0. Training the Mission Command Warfighting 

Function. 21 DEC 2017.

Training Analysis Feedback Team. (2014). Military Decision Making 

Process (MDMP) COA Analysis (War-gaming). Task Guide MDMP, (pp. 

80-100). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Flemming Group, LLC.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (1991). Student Test 

100-9. Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decision-making. Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (1993). Student Text 100-

9. The Tactical Decision Making Process. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (1989). Student Text 

100-9. The Command Estimate. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (1992). Student Text 

100-9. The Command Estimate Process. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. 

Command and General Staff College.

Wood, W. (1995). Leaders and Battles, The Art of Military Leadership.

Novato, CA: Presidio Press.

Wood, W. J. (1990). Battles of the Revolutionary War 1775-1781. Chapel 

Hill, NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill.

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APPENDIX C

Supplemental Resources

These supplemental resources provide additional information to enhance 

this handbook and assist in educating and training the staff.

These resources can be accessed on the Center for Army Lessons Learned 

restricted website at: https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=17879

(Common Access Card (CAC) login required)

The resources found at this link are organized into three files. The first file 

is a course of action (COA) analysis video from the School of Advanced 

Military Studies (SAMS), which contains a three-part video of a SAMS 

staff group conducting COA analysis (wargaming). The second file contains 

professional reading — ten articles and a leader development program 

wargaming handbook. The third file contains further useful documents for 

staff training.

FILE ONE: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING) 

VIDEOS

Dr. Bruce Stanley leads parts one and two of this COA analysis video series. 

Part one is a COA analysis walk through, lasting an hour and twenty-three 

minutes. It focuses on setting up and friendly actions for wargaming. 

Part two is an hour and ten minutes, and focuses on the first two tactical 

events: the forward passage of lines/security zones, enemy reactions, 

friendly counteractions, and recap. The third video is an hour and thirty-two 

minute class focused on COA analysis (wargaming) — large-scale combat 

operations academics. The following two links from the National Training 

Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center provide additional video 

examples of wargaming. (CAC Access Required.)

National Training Center: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/leadercasts/7682

Joint Readiness Training Center: https://atn.army.mil/joint-readinesstraining-center-(jrtc)/joint-readiness-training-center-(jrtc)
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FILE TWO: PROFESSIONAL READINGS

Correlation of Forces. The Quest for a Standardized Model 

Major David R. Hogg

This study is an examination of how to measure combat power. The 

different methods to measure combat power range from a numerical count 

(bean count) to the subjective and objective analysis of individual weapon 

systems and/or units. The critical base to any correlation of forces model 

is the values associated with the weapon systems or units. Four different 

correlation of forces models are examined using specific criteria. The 

models studied are: The National Training Center model, the Command and 

General Staff College model, the Theater Analysis model, and the Historical 

Evaluation and Research Organization model. The criteria applied to each 

of these models are: flexibility, simplicity, definable values, and the ability 

to provide at least a 90 percent solution. The conclusion of this study is 

that a standardized model is needed, and that the model should be based on 

individual weapon system values (using operational lethality index factors).

Development and Assessment of Battlefield Visualization 

Training for Battalion Commanders

Scott B. Sahdrick, David Manning, James Bell, Dennis K. 

Leedom, and Carl W. Lickteig

This article focuses on visualization. The art and science of developing 

situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning 

how to move the force from its current state to the desired end state is 

critical to successful battle command (mission command). Today’s Army 

does not have the most effective method for developing expert visualization 

skills. Recent research on expertise indicates that experience alone, be it 

real or in simulated battle, is not adequate. Instead, expertise is more likely 

to be attained through a combination of education, training, practice, and 

experience.

From the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education 

Conference (J1TSEC 2008).
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Seeing the Elephant, Improving Leader Visualization Skills 

through Simple War Games

LTC Richard A. McConnell, DM, and LTC Mark T. Gerges, PhD

This is a summary of an exhaustively detailed academic paper titled The 

Effect of Simple Role-Playing Games on the War-gaming Step of the 

Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP): A Mixed Methods Approach, 

previously published in Developments in Business Simulation and 

Experimental Learning: Proceedings of the Annual Association for Business 

Simulation and Experiential Learning Conference 45 (2018). For those 

interested in seeing the entire paper, it can be accessed at: https://journals.

tdl.org/absel/index.php/absel/article/view/3200/3127

Connecting the Dots: Developing Leaders who can Turn 

Threats into Opportunities

R.A. McConnell

Connecting the Dots is the sequel to Seeing the Elephant. It is the latest 

milestone in a multiple year and publication journey, attempting to 

understand visualization, its components, and how to improve this vital 

skill. It was written to present literature and analysis that could serve as 

a foundation for further research and publication, which could result in 

recommendations to improve leader visualization skills through deliberate 

practice.

Tactical Intuition

Major Brian R. Reinwald

This article focuses on visualizing and improving intuition.

The Manual Wargaming Process: Does our Current 

Methodology Give us the Optimum Solution 

Major Walter E. Kretchik

This monograph analyzes the manual wargaming portion of the U.S. Army’s 

decision-making cycle, in order to determine if the process deduces the 

optimal COA.

Time Management and the Military Decisionmaking Process 

Harry D. Scott, Jr.

This monograph analyzes the military decisionmaking process in terms 

of time management, in order to determine if a timeline will expedite 

the process. It begins by establishing the importance of time and time 

management in planning. There is also a general discussion of time, an 
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explanation of the Army’s one-third to two-thirds rule, and a synopsis of 

the deficiencies and recommendations for improvement of units’ execution 

of the military decisionmaking process during rotations to the National 

Training Centers. The monograph concludes with the advantages and 

disadvantages of utilizing a timeline. The end result is that the advantages 

of a timeline far outweigh the disadvantages.

Wargame Planning Considerations

LTC Roy Krueger

This is a joint readiness training center, CTC quarterly bulletin, focused on 

providing ways to improve COA analysis.

Wargames, Training, and Decision-Making: Increasing the 

Experience of Leaders 

Major Bruce E. Stanley

This monograph examines the question, can commercial computer 

wargames increase the experience level and decision-making abilities 

of Army leaders? Additionally, the monograph looks at three secondary 

questions. How can the Army use computer wargames to increase 

experience and decision-making? Why should the Army use computer 

wargames? And, what are the benefits of computer wargames for the Army? 

This monograph shows that computer wargames, when used consistently by 

Army leaders, can increase experience and decision-making skills. Like any 

training, computer wargames must be used repetitively to achieve results. 

Gazing Into the Crystal Ball Together: Wargaming and 

Visualization for the Commander and Staff 

Major John R. Frame

This monograph discusses the importance of the commander and staff 

wargaming together. Wargaming is a critical visualization event where the 

participants develop detailed images of the operation. Wargaming allows the 

commander and staff to build a common vision and understanding of battle.

Demystifying the Correlation of Forces Calculator 

LTC Dale Spurlin and LTC Matthew Green

This article describes the development of the correlations of forces and 

means calculator currently in use with the Department of Army Tactics 

at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. It addresses the 

methodology used to determine the values, suggests appropriate uses of 

the tool, and suggests some ideas for adding professional judgment to the 

results.
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The Epistemology of Wargaming

Robert C. Rubel

This article discusses potential problems that may occur if individuals 

or groups do not adhere to the principles and realities of wargaming. 

Wargames can be useful for planning and decision-making, but they can 

also produce “valid looking garbage.” There are principles that can help 

users and analysts tell the difference and avoid the pitfalls, but if game 

results are to earn the confidence they are now given, the craft of gaming 

must become a profession.

Gaming the Game: A Study of the Gamer Mode in 

Educational Wargaming

Anders Frank

This article discusses problems that can occur if players do not focus on 

their actual training goals while using off-the-shelf wargames. One risk 

associated with the use of games in training and education is that players 

start to “game the game,” instead of focusing on their learning goals. The 

term “gamer mode” is proposed to describe this attitude. A player with a 

gamer mode attitude strives to achieve goals that are optimal for winning 

the game, but suboptimal with respect to the educational objectives. In this 

study of cadets playing an educational wargame to learn ground warfare 

tactics, the author examined the occurrence of gamer mode. The results 

showed that gamer mode emerged sporadically throughout all analyzed 

sessions. Cadets’ understanding of the wargame was different from what 

the instructors expected. This study discusses why it is important to avoid 

situations where gamer mode can emerge, and also speculates on the 

sources that generate this attitude — the game itself, the educational setting, 

and the participants’ previous experiences.

FILE THREE: SUPPLEMENTAL TRAINING MATERIAL 

Design and Delivery of Tactical Decision Games Sand Table 

Exercises: A Tool Box Reference

This workbook is to assist leaders in the design and delivery of tactical 

decision games and sand table exercises. The first part of this workbook 

focuses on the design of specific exercises, while the second part focuses 

on delivery techniques that will enhance the success and effectiveness 

of the exercises. Tactical decision games and sand table exercises, when 

properly designed and delivered, will allow the staff to practice situational 

assessment, to consider, select, and war-game COAs, and to practice 

communicating those decisions.

Based on The How To of Tactical Decision Games by Major John F. 

Schmitt, United States Marine Corps, 1994. Marine Corps University 

Publication.
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Task Guide and Military Decisionmaking Process Reference

This task guide provides detailed tasks, conditions, standards, performance 

measures, inputs, and outputs for the entire military decisionmaking 

process. This is helpful for planning and assessing.

Product of the Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), Fort Leavenworth, 

KS. 

Integrated Staff Planning Matrix: Receive the Mission 

Through Wargaming

This is a helpful graphic training aid on wargaming.

LTC Richard B. Averna (U.S. Army, Retired)

Correlation of Forces Calculator: Automated and Analog, 

Version 2017.01

This can be helpful in determining relative force ratios. Once this Excel 

document is opened, directions for usage can be found under the second tab.

Provided by the Tactics Division at the Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC), in addition to Dr. James E. Sterrett and Mr. Michael B. Dunn, 

Directorate of Simulation Education, U.S. Army, Command and General 

Staff College.

Wargaming Big Picture

Jacob A. Mong

This is a PowerPoint file that provides a quick reference for Step 4 of COA

Analysis (Wargaming), and can be used to generate discussion. It provides 

the following discussion points: input/process/output; example of room 

setup; a wargame flow chart; decision-making in execution; execution 

decisions; and adjustment decisions.

Unit Icon Template

The unit icon template for the correlation of forces calculator is a grouping 

of enemy and friendly graphic unit icons that can be developed to reflect the 

table of organization and equipment for use during the wargame enemy.

Developed by CGSC Students, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Sub-Folder

This sub-folder includes examples of synchronization and decisions 

matrices that can be adapted for use.

These examples are taken from the National Training Center and the Joint 

Readiness Training Center.
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