alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2954. Information to committees of Congress on request

An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 413; Pub. L. 103–437, §3(b), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4581.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 105a. | May 29, 1928, ch. 901, §2, 45 Stat. 996. |

Statutes at Large

The words "Executive agency" are substituted for "executive department and independent establishment" in view of the definition of "Executive agency" in section 105.

The words "Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives" are substituted for "Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the House of Representatives" on authority of H. Res. 647 of the 82d Congress, adopted July 3, 1952.

The words "Committee on Government Operations of the Senate" are substituted for "Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the Senate" on authority of S. Res. 280 of the 82d Congress, adopted Mar. 3, 1952.

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1994—Pub. L. 103–437 substituted "Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate" for "Committee on Government Operations of the Senate".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

Committee on Governmental Affairs of Senate changed to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of Senate, effective Jan. 4, 2005, by Senate Resolution No. 445, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Oct. 9, 2004.

Committee on Government Operations of House of Representatives treated as referring to Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of House of Representatives by section 1(a) of Pub. L. 104–14, set out as a note preceding section 21 of Title 2, The Congress. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Government Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Jan. 6, 1999. Committee on Government Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2019. Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
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EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 39.44 N 77.04 WMeters AGL
#### Anthony L. Wathley, Appellant, v. Paul Rosen, as Executor of Mabel R. Russell, Deceased, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. Anthony L. Wathley, Appellant, v. Gertrude Hufcut, Respondent.

In consolidated actions pursuant to article 15 of the Real Property Law, to establish a roadway easement by prescription and to enjoin interference therewith, the plaintiff in both actions appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, entered July 19, 1962 upon the court’s decision, after a nonjury trial before an Official Referee, which dismissed the complaint upon the merits. Judgment affirmed, with costs to defendants Rosen and Soukup only. In order to satisfy the 15-year prescriptive period, the plaintiff was required to establish “ tacking ”, The learned Official Referee properly found that the evidence failed to establish either: (1) a continuous, adverse use of the roadway, under claim of right, by plaintiff’s predecessors in title; or (2) any intent by such predecessors in title to convey any rights in the roadway to plaintiff and his wife *(Jacobs*v. *Lewicki,*12 A D 2d 625, affd. 10 Y Y 2d 778; *Van Roo*v. *Van Roo,*268 App. Div. 170, affd. 294 Y. Y. 731). Moreover, the proof failed to establish the essential continuous, exclusive and adverse use of the roadway, under claim of right, by the plaintiff himself *(Firman*v. *Confer,*273 Y. Y. 357; *Belotti*v. *Bickhardt,*228 Y. Y. 296, 302). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Angelo Paolangeli, Petitioner, v. W. T. Stevens et al., Constituting the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Ithaca, Respondents.

Appeal from an order of a Special Term, Supreme Court, Broome County. The respondents, constituting the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Ithaca, granted a limited zoning ordinance variance to permit Benedetto Campagnolo and Guy Campagnolo to operate a dry cleaning and tailoring establishment at premises 507 North Meadow Street. The limitation imposed was that only one automatic machine for dry cleaning should be installed; that the premises should not be used as a pick-up station for dry cleaning; that the personnel employed in the work should be limited to three; that the display sign should not be increased in size and that certain landscaping should be carried out. The premises were used by the owners prior to the variance for tailoring and pressing, but not for dry cleaning. Petitioner operates a dry cleaning establishment at 315 North Meadow Street, in the same residential zone, and has had the benefit of a variance to erect this establishment. The establishments of petitioner and the Campagnolos are within two blocks. Petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding, which the court at Special Term has dismissed. On abundant authority, a competitor whose only complaint against such a variance as Was granted to respondents here is increased competition, has no sufficient standing to challenge the official action. *(Circle Lounge & Grille,*v. *BowrA of Appeals of City of Boston,*324 Mass. 427; *Colantuoni*v. *Selectman of Belmont,*326 Mass. 778; *Kammerman*v. *LeBoy,*133 Conn. 232; *Zuckerman*v. *Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford,*144 Conn. 160; *Matter of Bettman*v. *Michaelis,*27 Mise 2d 1010, 1013; 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, pp. 40-14, 40-17.) Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
#### § 931.13 Preemption of New Mexico laws and regulations.

Under the authority of sections 505(b) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1255(b), and in accordance with the position taken by the State of New Mexico, the following provisions of New Mexico law and regulation are hereby preempted and superseded as they may apply to coal exploration and surface coal mining and reclamation operations:

The State Wildlife Conservation Act (17-2-37 to 17-2-46 NMSA 1978) to the extent it is inconsistent with provisions of SMCRA related to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 USC 1531 *et seq.*).
Exhibit 31.1
                                  CERTIFICATION

I, John Kehoe, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form 8-K
containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect of periods
included in the year covered by this annual report, of MS Structured Asset Corp.
on behalf of SATURNS Trust No. 2002-11;

2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a whole,
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information required to
be provided to the depositor by the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or
similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;
and

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the depositor and
the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement and based
upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required under that
agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the depositor and trustee
have each fulfilled its obligations under that agreement.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: LaSalle Bank National
Association and its officers and agents.



                                                   By: /s/ John Kehoe
                                                      ----------------------
                                                   Name:  John Kehoe
                                                   Title: Vice President
                                                   Date:  February 27, 2004
# EUR-Lex - 61996B0047 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 61996B0047

**Order of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 12 November 1996. - Syndicat départemental de défense de droit des agriculteurs v Commission of the European Communities. - Refusal by the Commission to initiate an infringement procedure - Action for failure to act - Inadmissibility. - Case T-47/96. **

*
European Court reports 1996 Page II-01559 *

Summary

## Keywords

1 Actions for failure to act - Natural or legal persons - Actionable omissions - Failure to respond clearly to grounds put forward in a complaint concerning the applicability of a directive - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Art. 175, third para.)

2 Actions for failure to act - Natural or legal persons - Actionable omissions - Failure to initiate an infringement procedure - Inadmissible

(EC Treaty, Arts 169, 173, fourth para., and 175, third para.)

Summary

3 An action for failure to act brought by a natural or legal person, seeking a declaration by the Court that the Commission failed to respond clearly to the grounds put forward by the applicant in its complaint concerning the applicability of a directive, is inadmissible. A natural or legal person may rely on the third paragraph of Article 175 of the Treaty only in order to seek a declaration that, in infringement of the Treaty, there has been a failure to adopt an act of which that person is a potential addressee. The applicant cannot be regarded as the potential addressee of an act of the Commission concerning the justification of its complaint, since there is no provision in the Treaty or any secondary legislation obliging the Commission to address to an individual an act embodying a finding as to the compatibility of national legislation with Community law. In any event, once the Commission has in fact responded or defined its position in response to a request made by an individual, there is no failure to act within the meaning of Article 175 of the Treaty. The fact that the measure adopted or the position defined by the institution concerned does not satisfy the applicant is of no relevance in that regard since Article 175 refers to failure to act in the sense of failing to take a decision or to define a position, and not that of adopting a measure different from that desired or considered necessary by the applicant.

## Summary

4 An action for failure to act brought by a natural or legal person, seeking a declaration that, by not addressing a reasoned opinion to a Member State, the Commission, in infringement of the Treaty, failed to act, is inadmissible.

The Commission is not bound to initiate an infringement procedure against a Member State; on the contrary, it has a discretionary power of assessment, which rules out any right for individuals to require it to adopt a particular position.

Moreover, in the context of the infringement procedure laid down by Article 169 of the Treaty, the only measures which the Commission may have to take are addressed to the Member States, so that, not being a potential addressee of such a measure, a natural or legal person may not rely on the third paragraph of Article 175.
M. P. No. 76-241.

#### Donald A. Demers, Jr. *v.*James W. Mullen, *Warden.*

*Robert B. Mann,*for petitioner.

*Julius C. Michaelson,*Attorney General, for respondent.

The order of June 24, 1976 consolidating this case with the case of *Mello*v. *Superior Court,*116 R.I. 944, 359 A.2d 710 (1976), is hereby vacated.

The petitioner is ordered to *show cause,*by filing a memorandum within 20 days of this order, why his case should not be dismissed as moot- in light of this court’s opinion in *Mello*v. *Superior Court,*No. 76-165-M.P., (R.I., filed Feb. 18, 1977).

Bevilacqua, C. J., not participating.
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</TABLE>
# C_2023123EN.01000801.xml

| 5.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 123/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 123/8

---

Networking of organisations operating in the fields within the European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA’s) mission

(2023/C 123/08)

Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (1), Article 36(2), provides that the European Food Safety Authority's ‘Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director, shall draw up a list to be made public of competent organisations designated by the Member States which may assist the Authority, either individually or in networks, with its mission.’

The list was first drawn up by EFSA’s Management Board on 19 December 2006, and since then is:

| i. | updated regularly, on the basis of proposals from EFSA’s Executive Director, taking account of reviews or new designation proposals from the Member States (in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2230/2004, Article 2(4) (2)), and |
| --- | --- |

i.

updated regularly, on the basis of proposals from EFSA’s Executive Director, taking account of reviews or new designation proposals from the Member States (in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2230/2004, Article 2(4) (2)), and

| ii. | made public on EFSA’s website, where the latest updated list of competent organisations is published. |
| --- | --- |

ii.

made public on EFSA’s website, where the latest updated list of competent organisations is published.

This respective information is available on the EFSA website, at the following locations:

| i. | the latest amendment to the list of competent organisations by EFSA’s Management Board on 23 March 2023 –
  https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/94th-management-board-web-meeting, and |
| --- | --- |

i.

the latest amendment to the list of competent organisations by EFSA’s Management Board on 23 March 2023 –

https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/94th-management-board-web-meeting, and

| ii. | the updated list of competent organisations – http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/partnersnetworks/scorg. |
| --- | --- |

ii.

the updated list of competent organisations – http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/partnersnetworks/scorg.

EFSA will keep this Notice updated, specifically regarding the provided website links.

For more information please contact Cooperation.Article36@efsa.europa.eu.

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2230/2004 of 23 December 2004 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 with regard to the network of organisations operating in the fields within the European Food Safety Authority’s mission (OJ L 379, 24.12.2004, p. 64), as last amended.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7909

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER TOBY HAYES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior

District Judge. (3:02-cr-00548-CMC-7)

Submitted: March 17, 2016 Decided: March 22, 2016

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Toby Hayes, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, John C. 

Potterfield, Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, Carrie Fisher Sherard, 

Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

Christopher Toby Hayes appeals the district court’s order 

granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for sentence 

reduction based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, 

as well as its order dismissing his motion for reconsideration. 

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting 

Hayes’ § 3582(c)(2) motion for the reasons stated by the 

district court. See United States v. Hayes, No. 3:02-cr-00548-

CMC-7 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2015). We also agree with the district 

court’s assessment that it lacked authority to entertain Hayes’ 

motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Goodwyn, 596 

F.3d 233, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we likewise 

affirm the district court’s order dismissing Hayes’ motion for 

reconsideration. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid in the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


         This Second Amendment to Employment  Agreement (the "Second Amendment")
is entered into by and between Phar-Mor,  Inc., a Pennsylvania  corporation (the
"Company")  and Sankar  Krishnan  (the  "Employee")  as of August 27,  1998 (the
"Effective Date").

         WHEREAS,  Employee is currently  employed by the Company  pursuant to a
written  Employment   Agreement  dated  as  of  June  13,  1997  (the  "Existing
Agreement") as amended as of June 23, 1998 (the "First Amendment"); and

         WHEREAS,  the  Company  and the  Employee  desire to further  amend the
Existing Agreement, as amended.

         NOW,  THEREFORE,  in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants
contained herein, the parties agree as follows:

1.  Paragraph 4 of the First  Amendment  relative to Section  IV.,  TERMINATION,
sub-paragraph 3 of the Existing Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety.

2.  Section IV.,  TERMINATION,  sub-paragraph  F.3.,  Other Than for Cause or by
Reason of Death or Disability,  as set forth in the Existing  Agreement shall be
amended to provide,  notwithstanding  anything to the contrary  contained in the
Existing  Agreement or the First Amendment,  should a Change of Control occur on
or prior to August 27, 1999, then the Employee shall be entitled to all of those
benefits set forth in  sub-paragraph  F.3.(b) in addition to any other  benefits
the Employee is entitled to thereunder. The date "June 13, 1998" as contained in
sub-paragraph F.3.(b) of the Existing Agreement shall be deleted and "August 27,
1999"  shall be  inserted in its place as it applies to any Change of Control to
provide  that  in  such  event  the  Employee  shall  receive  two  times  total
compensation as described in the Existing Agreement.

3. All other current terms and conditions of the Existing Employment  Agreement,
as amended,  shall remain the same and any defined  terms used herein shall have
the meaning as defined in the Existing Agreement, as amended.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as
of the date first above written.

PHAR-MOR, INC.

By:_______________________________            __________________________________
         Abbey J. Butler                                Sankar Krishnan
         Co-Chairman and Chief
         Executive Officer

By:_______________________________
         Melvyn J. Estrin
         Co-Chairman and Chief
         Executive Officer