This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-1254 A16-1270 In the Matter of the Welfare of the Ch ild of: M. M. and L. S., Parents. Filed February 17, 2017 Affirmed Reyes, Judge Carlton County District Court File Nos. 09-JV-16-86; 09-JV-15-229 Bill L. Thompson, Duluth, Mi nnesota (for appellant L.S.) Terri Port Wright, Cloquet, Minnesota (for appellant M.M.) Thomas H. Pertler, Carlton County Attorney , Jeffrey Boucher, Assistant County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent) Tim DiPuma, Carlton, Minne sota (guardian ad litem) Considered and decided by T. Smith, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N REYES , Judge In a consolidated appeal, appellant-mother, L.S., and appellant-father, M.M., each challenge the district court’s termination of their parental rights. In addition, M.M. argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that (1) Carlton County Public2 Health and Human Services (the county) made reasonable effo rts to rehabilitate L.S. and M.M. and to reunite the fami ly; (2) there is a statutory ground for termination; (3) termination is in the best interests of th e children; and (4) M.M. is unable to satisfy the Strickland standard, we affirm. FACTS R.R.M. was born in 2015, to father M.M. a nd mother L.S. Prior to R.R.M.’s birth, both parents received social serv ices, including three sessions of prenatal education from the public-health nurse. Th e public-health nurse noted that both parents possessed a low knowledge base and that most people tend to have more parental knowledge before having a child. After R.R.M.’s birth, hos pital staff observed bot h parents exhibiting elevated levels of stress and frustration arou nd the child. L.S. told the hospital nursing staff that she needed medication to deal with the stress, that she only knows what not to do with the infant, and that she had not hit the child. Hospital staff observed M.M. standing near R.R.M.’s bassinet while clenchi ng and unclenching his fists. M.M. stated to the hospital staff that it wa s not a good idea for him to soothe the child because he does not deal with stress well. A report was filed with the county, which raised concerns about the parents’ ability to parent and care for R.R.M. The child-protection investigator with th e county, who was assigned to the case, interviewed the parents at the hospital. Both parents indicated that they had initially been frustrated with R.R.M. but that they felt th eir parenting abilities were improving. By the end of the interview, the investigator was c oncerned that the parents were not having any physical interaction with R.R.M., that they did not have a solid family support structure3 in place, and that they did not possess the capabilities to adequa tely parent. As a result, the investigator requested that a protective- law-enforcement hold be placed on R.R.M. The investigator also spoke with the parent s’ respective social wo rkers. The following day, the investigator met the parents at thei r residence and had signi ficant concerns with the condition of the residence, including the la ck of a sanitary place to bathe R.R.M., exposed electrical hazards, and inadequate fire safety. They informed the investigator that they used a bucket to transport bodily waste from their unit to a bathroom that they shared with other tenants. While R.R.M. was still in the hospital, a petition alleging R.R.M. to be a child in need of protection or services was filed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subds. 6(3), (4), (8), (9) (2014). Following an emergency protective-care hearing on that same date, the county was granted temporary legal and physical custody of R.R.M. The county placed R.R.M. in the foster care of S.G. Both parents participat ed, with their attorney 1 , in a parallel protection process family planning conference and both agreed to enter an admission that R.R.M. was in need of prot ection or services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3). Subsequently, R.R.M. was adjudicated in n eed of protection or services and, following a reunification plan f iled by the county, the district court ordered the parents to work towards reunification. The reunification plan stated that both parents were to: (1) complete a psychological evaluation and follow any reco mmendations; (2) be in communication with

1 Both parents were assigned the sa me attorney to represent them.4 the county; (3) continue working with the public-health nur se; (4) obtain safe and suitable housing for R.R.M.; and (5) regularly attend vis itation with R.R.M. In addition, L.S. was to continue to work with her developmental-disabilitie s case manager and semiindependent living-skills work er, and M.M. was to continue working with his social worker. Thereafter, the county filed a petition seeking termination of parental rights. In terminating L.S. and M.M.’s parental rights, the district court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported th at (1) the county made reasona ble efforts to rehabilitate the parents in order to reunite the family; (2 ) three statutory grounds for termination exist pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301 subd. 1 (b)(2), (5), (8) (2 014); and (3) termination is in the best interests of R.R.M. Each parent filed an appeal , and this court consolidated those appeals. D E C I S I O N Courts presume that natural parents are fi t to care for their child, and “[p]arental rights may be terminated only fo r grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (M inn. App. 2012) (q uotation omitted). Te rmination requires clear and convincing evidence that (1) the county has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family; (2 ) there is at least one statutory ground for termination; and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “[O]n appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we will review the district court’s findings of the underlying . . . facts for clear error, but we review its determination of whether a5 particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parent al rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (listing bases for terminating parental rights). The “district court’s individual fact findings will not be set aside unless our review of the entire record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Welfare of D.T.J. , 554 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. Ap p. 1996) (quotation omitted). I. The district court did not abuse its dis cretion in determining that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate L.S. and M.M. and to reunite the family. In order to terminate L.S. and M.M.’s pare ntal rights, the district court must make “specific findings” that the county made reas onable efforts to rehabilitate them and to reunite the family. Minn. St at. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2014 ). “When determining whether reasonable efforts have been made,” the district court must consider “whether services to the child and family were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the ch ild and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2 014). “Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W. , 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The district court found that the county provided the fo llowing nonexclusive list of services to the parents over a 300-day period: foster-car e placement; child-protection6 case-management services; supervised vi sitation; psychologica l assessments; and coordination of mental-health services. A county social worker testified at length regarding the county’s extensive efforts and the case-plan services made available to both parents throughout the penden cy of this matter. She testified that, despite the department’s dedicated assistance and effo rts, both parents’ case-plan compliance was inconsistent, and they failed to follow up on the recommendations found in their evaluations, including enrolling inindividual therapy sessions. She further testified that, although the parents were able to find amenab le housing pursuant to their case plan, they failed to work with their pub lic-health nurse or other soci al-service workers throughout the reunification process. She also testifie d that during the supervised visitations at WINDOW Visitation Center, 2 arrangements were made to provide both parents with oneon-one parenting instruction. However, st aff notes from WINDOW indicate that they were not willing to receive such instruction, they would still grow frustrated with R.R.M., they demonstrated a lack of understanding of R.R.M.’s development and developmental needs, and they still demonstrated a lack of ability to adequately care and interact with R.R.M. In addition, of the 44 scheduled visitations, the pare nts cancelled at least 13 of them. The district court found that parental instruction was provid ed to the parents throughout the pendency of this case, and the parents failed to make adequate progress in addressing the concerns which le d to the out-of-home placement. The district court also

2 WINDOW is a non-profit corporation that, am ong other things, operat es a visitation and safe exchange center in Hinckley, Minnesota.7 found that the county attempted to find alte rnative placement with relatives, which was unsuccessful. Finally, the district court foun d that the parents failed to access services that might have improved their parenting skills. As a result, the district court determined that the county made reasonabl e efforts to rehabilitate the parents and to reunite them with R.R.M., and the county’s “efforts have been relevant to the safety and protection of the child, adequate to meet th e needs of the family, and ar e culturally appropriate.” After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court’s finding that the county’s exte nsive efforts were genuine and ade quate to address this family’s unique needs is not clearly erroneous. Theref ore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and to reunite the family. II. The district court did not abuse its discre tion in determining that at least one statutory ground for termination has been met. The district court found clear and convincing evidence in support of three statutory bases for terminating the parental rights of both parents. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8). Since only one statutory ground mu st be supporte d by clear and convincing evidence, our analysis will address onl y subdivision 1(b)(5). See In re Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). A statutory basis for terminating parentalrights exists under subdivision 1(b)(5) when “reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement” out of the home. Subdivision 1(b)(5) further provides that a failure of reasonable efforts is presumed where8 (i) a child has resided out of the parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months. In the case of a child under age eight at the time the petition was filed allegi ng the child to be in need of protection or services, the pr esumption arises when the child has resided out of the parental home under court order for six months unless the parent has maintained regular contact with the child and the parent is co mplying with the out-of-home placement plan; (ii) the court has approved the out-of-home placement plan . . . ; (iii) cond itions leading to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected. . . ; and (iv) reasonable efforts have been made by th e social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)–(iv). The district court determined that this presumption applies to R.R.M. because the parents had failed to maintain regular contact by cancelling many of their visits and failed to follow the out-of-home placement plan. The district court also dete rmined that reasonable effort s “to permit reunification and prevent out-of-home placement a nd finalize the permanency plan for the child have been made.” As stated above, the record supports the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate both parents and to reunite the family. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that neither parent utilized these efforts to correct the conditions that led to out-of-home place ment. We conclude that the record supports the finding th at the county’s reasonable efforts, under the district court’s direction, failed to correct the parents’ inab ility to care for and understand the needs of R.R.M., which were the conditions that le d to R.R.M.’s out-of-home placement. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a statutory ground for termination exists under subdivision 1(b)(5).9 III. The district court did not abuse its dis cretion in determining that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the best interests of R.R.M. In a termination proceeding, “the best inte rests of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 7 (2014). “We review a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is ina child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d at 905. “[T]he court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing intere st of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Mi nn. App. 2004). Competing interests of the child “include a stable enviro nment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of M.A.H. , 839 N.W.2d 730, 744 (Mi nn. App. 2013). In its termination order, the district court must explain its rationale for concluding why termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003). The district court found that it is in R.R. M.’s best interests to achieve permanency as soon as possible. The district court also found that L.S. and M. M. have demonstrated that if R.R.M. remains in their custody, he will be at continued risk of not receiving the care needed for his safety and development, especially considering his young age. In addition, R.R.M.’s guardian ad litem testifie d that termination was in R.R.M.’s best interests because both parents have demonstrat ed a lack of progress in being able to demonstrate that they can care for their child’s needs. As a result, the district court10 determined that, despite the parents expressed interest in parenting R.R.M., it is in the best interests of the R.R.M. to termin ate L.S. and M.M.’s parental rights. We conclude that the district court’s fi ndings are firmly supported by the record, which includes ample evidence of the parents’ failure to access services directed at assisting them with parenting and their behavioral issues. Further, the record demonstrates an ongoing lack of progress in L.S. and M. M.’s ability to care for R.R.M. and understand his behavior. Because the child’s best inte rests must be the paramount consideration, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of L.S. and M.M.’s parental right s is in the best interests of the R.R.M. IV. M.M.’s ineffective assistance of co unsel argument is without merit. M.M. argues that his due-process rights were violated due to in effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, M.M. argues thatthere was an inherent conflict of interest in one attorney representing both parents and that the qu ality of representation he received was insufficient. M.M. contends that he was more engaged with his case plan than L.S. and that their attorn ey did not represent that in an effort not to damage L.S.’s

case. M.M. has “the right to effective assist ance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court.” Minn. Stat . § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2014). Minnesota courts have used the test set out in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984) when considering ineffective assi stance of counsel claims in noncriminal matters. See, e.g. , In re Welfare of L.B. , 404 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987) (applying Strickland in juvenile-delin quency context); see also Beaulieu v. Minn.11 Dep’t of Human Servs. , 798 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Min n. App. 2011). Under Strickland , M.M. has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness” and that a reasonable probability exists that , but for the attorney’s erro r, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Gates v. State , 398 N.W.2d 558, 56 1 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ). This court “need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is determinative.” State v. Rhodes , 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). Here, M.M. is unable to demonstrate either prong. To establish deficient performance, M.M. must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In Minnesota, an attorney acts competently when one demonstrates “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney woul d perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Gassler , 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993) (q uotation omitted). To prevail on his claim, M.M. must overcome the strong presumption that his attorney’s performance was “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Pierson v. State , 637 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Minn. 2 002) (quotation omitted). U nder the prejudice prong, reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. See Rhodes , 657 N.W.2d at 842. Contrary to M.M.’s assertion, the record indicates no conflict arising from a single attorney representing both pare nts in this matter. Their positions and interests were aligned and, as a result, both raised the same ar guments in defense of their parental rights.12 The district court made numerous findings of fact demonstrating that M.M., like L.S., failed to follow the case plan in learning to care for R.R.M. On appeal, M.M. also challenges his attorney’s trial strategy, includi ng an alleged failure to object to much of the county’s evidence. Howe ver, we do not review compet ency of trial strategy. See State v. Doppler , 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999 ). Therefore, M.M.’s ineffectiveassistance claim is without merit as he unable to satisfy the Strickland standard. Affirmed.