Out of the Closet: Addressing Policy Options

A MONOGRAPH

BY

YVETTE C. HOPKINS

MAJ, MI

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff

College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 00-01

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited
Abstract

OUT OF THE CLOSET: ADDRESSING POLICY OPTIONS

by MAJ Yvette C. Hopkins, Army, 48 pages.

The status of American culture in the year 2000 indicates a liberalized change in

attitude toward lesbians and gays, particularly in the area of military service. However,

the military is staunchly opposed to full inclusion of known lesbians and gays in its ranks

and, like other controversial social issues, has failed to consider a plan for implementing

full integration in the event current policy should change.

The paper seeks to answer the question whether previous social changes within a

military institution can provide an experiential basis for prescribing a contingency plan in

the event known lesbian and gay persons are granted permission to serve in the US

military.

The paper concludes that, although past military social transformations cannot

provide an exact blue print for integration of lesbians and gays, the experiences can

provide a framework. The highly controversial and historic integration of black soldiers

in the US military in 1948 and Canada’s litigious complete integration of lesbian and gay

soldiers in 1992, together provide the social construct to which a change model for large

organizations is applied and used for analysis and the paper’s conclusions.

The paper argues for anticipating change and initiating an early start to the planning

process and to shaping operations. Most importantly, the paper argues for visionary

leadership. The monograph concludes that a contingency plan is needed, and suggests

a conceptual framework for the plan.
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the

Department of Defense. This paper is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 2

CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGY.............................................................................. 6

CHAPTER THREE – US MILITARY RACIAL INTEGRATION ........................................ 8

CHAPTER FOUR – CANADIAN MILITARY.................................................................. 18

CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 28

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 35

FINDINGS ................................................................................................................ 35

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................ 37

SHAPING OPERATIONS ..................................................................................... 39

DECISIVE OPERATIONS..................................................................................... 43

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS................................................................................ 46

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 47

APPENDIX A................................................................................................................ 49

APPENDIX B................................................................................................................ 50

ENDNOTES ................................................................................................................. 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................56
2

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

In the year 2000, the United States Army does not have a contingency plan in

the event the 1993 policy prohibiting homosexual conduct in the Armed Forces is

lifted.1

 The policy, commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT), has been

steeped in controversy since its inception, and current trends indicate the

potential for a liberalized policy change in the future.2

 Though the US Army is

accustomed to rapid changes in technology and battle threats, it is historically

averse to social change. Despite such aversion, the Army cannot exempt itself

form social change. It does, and must, reflect the will of the population it serves

to defend. The challenge, therefore, is to identify a means for the Army to

succeed in its mission against the changing social landscape on which it must

operate. This paper seeks to draw upon the Army’s experience in an attempt to

discern a contingency plan to formulate a policy that allows lesbians and gays to

serve openly in the Army in the event that the current policy changes.3

Many facets of current American culture indicate a change in attitude toward

lesbians and gays throughout our society. The ongoing discourse in politics, law,

media, and the military, indicates attitudinal changes, which could directly affect

the current DADT policy.

Polls indicate American public support for acceptability and legality of

homosexual conduct is at its highest level of support in the past decade (1990 –

2000).4

 In 1999, half of Americans believed homosexual relations between

consenting adults should be legal and considered an acceptable lifestyle. While

the other half of the population believes homosexual conduct is immoral, there is
3

little question in the eyes of the American public that lesbians and gays should

have equal rights in terms of job opportunities. Eighty-three percent of

Americans support lesbians and gays having equal rights to job opportunities,

and seventy percent support them serving in the military.5

 The support of

lesbians and gays in the military has significantly increased from fifty-one percent

in 1977 to fifty-seven percent in 1992, the year before President William Clinton

unveiled his DADT policy.6

The DADT policy resurfaced as a major issue on the 2000 political scene at

the highest level of interest since 1993. During the 2000 round of presidential

debates, Vice President Albert Gore categorically affirmed his intention to, if

elected, open the ranks of the services to homosexuals. Gore further asserted

he would only appoint military chiefs who agreed with the policy. Though he later

backed down from the last statement, saying he would not require of the brass

an a priori litmus test, he had made his intentions known. First Lady Hillary

Rodham Clinton and Senator Bill Bradley called for repeal of DADT in order to

allow full participation of homosexuals in the military. Governor George W. Bush

and Senator John McCain called for better implementation of the current policy.7

President Clinton described DADT as “out of whack” and in the December 2000

issue of Rolling Stone magazine, he called it a “dumb ass” policy.8

The validity of DADT is being questioned, not only in the national media, but

also increasingly in international media. Nationwide news headlines and reports

of increased military discharges due to homosexuality, election campaign

rhetoric, and the murder of Army Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell at Fort
4

Campbell, Kentucky, have both liberal and traditionally conservative newspapers

questioning the future of DADT.9

 The international media is becoming more

focused on the United States’ DADT policy due to the fact that only two NATO

countries maintain a ban on homosexual conduct: Turkey and the United States.

On January 12, 2000, Britain was forced to terminate its military ban on

homosexuals, joining twenty-three countries that allow homosexuals in uniform.10

While other countries have revised their laws and policies concerning

lesbians and gays in the military, in the US, homosexual conduct in the military

remains against the law, specifically Title 10, US Code §654. If however, the US

decided to overturn the current law, it could do so by one of two ways: either

through a court decision (ultimately a question for the Supreme Court) or through

Congressional legislation. The Servicemen’s Legal Defense Fund (SLDN), a

DADT watch dog organization, prognosticates that more moderates would be

needed in Congress to overturn the law, and that, at a minimum, two to four new

moderate to liberal Supreme Court Justices would need to be appointed.11

However, they contend that trends indicate the law is likely to be overturned due

to the increased frequency of federal courts considering legal challenges to the

current policy and to the ban on military service for lesbians and gays. Though

courts have traditionally resisted ruling on military matters, there have been

eleven challenges to the DADT policy to date.12

As the rest of society appears to be liberalizing its view on homosexuals

serving in the military, the military itself, “from top brass to new recruits, is

overwhelmingly opposed to allowing homosexuals to serve.”13 Reports of chains
5

of command not following policy and asking and investigatively pursuing its

service members about sexuality are increasing. In spite of this, the military has

never held any commander accountable for violating the current policy.14

Nearly every credible study states that the DADT policy failed due to senior

military complacency in its implementation. Over the past six years, the policy

has been entrenched in controversy. Discharges of lesbian and gay soldiers

have drastically increased while the services struggle to meet retention and

reenlistment goals. Early release of these soldiers has have cost American

taxpayers over $160 million.15 In considering the validity of a change in policy,

pundits charge that, in a democracy, a military that fails to evolve in concert with

the civilian culture it defends will inevitably become a threat to that democracy.

Whether the military likes it or not, it is widely viewed as a pioneer in providing

equal opportunity for its uniformed members. From the 1948 Executive Order

signed by President Harry S. Truman that formally began the long process of

racial integration to the more recent admission of women into most military

occupational specialties, the military services have compiled a good record for

providing equal opportunity that often exceeds the progress of civilian society.

While the Army is traditionally the slowest service in accepting civilian-forced

social change, it enjoys a reputation as being the most successful Service when

it eventually implements social change. The Army has a history of resistance to

change and thus does not plan for nor implements social change expeditiously or

efficiently.
6

Current societal attitudes coupled with ongoing political climate shifts could

affect a change in the law regarding homosexual conduct in the military. The

Army needs to be prepared. The official military position is that “institutionally,

the Army is not projecting incorporation of openly serving homosexuals...no

planning has been done in anticipation of changes in the law regarding

homosexual conduct.” However, unofficial dialogue has begun in senior military

circles. During the October 28 to November 3, 2000 Brigadier Generals Training

Conference at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the attendees were tasked to consider,

as part of the course curriculum, a strategic problem counter to Army official

policy. One of the topics assigned for discussion was a strategic action plan for

the following statement problem: “The prohibition against homosexual conduct

for the Armed Forces will be lifted effective 01 January, 2005.”

The purpose here is not to argue the morality or immorality of homosexuality,

or the validity of the current military policy, but rather to analyze historical social

change cases to provide an experiential basis for a contingency plan should the

law change. The integration of blacks into the US Army and the integration of

homosexuals into the Canadian military will serve as model examples.

CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGY

The most significant social change in the US military after World War II was

the integration of blacks into the military. The policies leading to this

controversial change are widely known, however little is understood about the

execution of the policy. In 1992, the Canadian military experienced a significant

social change when it implemented policy to lift its ban on homosexuals.
7

Investigation into the leap from policy to execution should provide insight to the

unit level, the level where implementation of a policy determines its overall

success or failure.

The methodology for analyzing the historical models for affecting social

change will use a corporate business model to assess the strategic and

operational trends as well as interviews with service members who were in the

midst of these great social changes in the military to enhance the analysis.

The strategic model is based on John P. Kotter’s action plan from his book

“Leading Change”. Kotter’s model is a blueprint for strategy implementation in

large organizations in the twenty-first century. Kotter outlines an eight-stage

process of creating major change.16

1. Establishing a sense of urgency

- Examining the audience.

- Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities.

2. Creating the guiding coalition

- Putting together a group with enough power to lead the change.

- Getting the group to work together like a team.

3. Developing a vision and strategy

- Creating a vision to help direct the change effort.

- Developing strategies for achieving that vision.

4. Communicating the change vision

- Using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision

and strategies.

- Having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of the

soldiers.

5. Empowering broad-based action

- Allowing key personnel to take ownership.

- Changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision.

- Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions.

- Getting rid of obstacles.

6. Generating short-term wins

- Planning for visible improvements in performance, or “wins”.

- Creating those wins.

- Visibly recognizing and rewarding people who made the wins possible.
8

7. Consolidating gains and producing more change

- Using increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies

that don’t fit together and don’t fit the transformation vision.

- Hiring, promoting, and developing people who can implement the change

vision.

- Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents.

8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture

- Creating better performance through behavior, attitudes and leadership.

- Articulating the connections between new behaviors and organizational

success.

- Developing means to ensure leadership development and success.

Adoption of a ‘known lesbian and gay’ policy would cause significant

social change for the US Army. Many of the characteristics of the US military

racial integration case and of the Canadian military case would be present: prepolicy controversy, staunch military opposition, turbulence within the ranks, and

top-down management. The parallels between these situations, while not exact,

may allow the Army to draw conclusions about what a contingency plan should

look like for successfully integrating known lesbians and gays with minimal

operational impact.

CHAPTER THREE – US MILITARY RACIAL INTEGRATION

The environmental conditions surrounding racial integration are similar to, if

not more harsh, than the circumstantial conditions surrounding the debate on

lesbians and gays in the military. However, in the span of six years, the Army

moved from a state of racial intolerance to indifference and acceptance,

becoming America’s model of institutional behavior and attitude change. The

change came with President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 (E.O. 9981), which
9

provided “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed

services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”17

Background

Before E.O. 9981, the American public vehemently opposed racial integration

of the military. In 1943, ninety percent of white civilians and eighteen percent of

black civilians favored continued segregation in the military. Similarly, in the

military eighty-eight percent of white soldiers and thirty-eight percent of black

soldiers believed that whites and blacks should be assigned to separate units.18

The Army discussion on racial integration centered on the projected breakdown

of combat effectiveness, specifically unit cohesion, morale, and discipline. Five

years later, when President Truman signed E.O. 9981, a Gallup poll revealed

that support for segregation still remained very high, although it had noticeably

declined. Sixty-three percent of American adults endorsed the separation of

blacks and whites in the military, while only twenty-six percent favored

integration.19 A year after E.O. 9981, military support for segregation declined. A

survey of white Army enlisted personnel and officers indicated that thirty-two

percent of white soldiers opposed any degree of racial integration in the Army.

However, sixty-eight percent, expressed tolerance for the idea of partial

integration, in which blacks and whites worked together but did not share

dormitory and mess facilities. The major concerns among white soldiers seemed

to be the prospects of intimate physical contact with blacks not the presence of

blacks per se.20
10

Establishing A Sense Of Urgency

The catalyst for racial integration in the military was twofold: leadership and

military manpower shortages. First, President Truman may have used

integration as a political platform to obtain endorsement from the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and ultimately the

black vote for reelection, but it was his singular leadership in the face of

opposition which provided the driving force in this historic step. Second, the

Navy and Air Force were experiencing a manpower shortage and could no longer

continue as they were.21

 The Navy and Air Force experimented with racial integration prior to E.O.

9981 (in 1944) purely out of manpower necessities. Both Services formed

planning groups and conducted limited integration experiments. The Navy

racially integrated ships in 1944 to solve a crew distribution problem. Two

navies, one black and one white, proved inefficient and expensive. The Air Force

racially integrated flying units in 1948 due to a shortage of black pilots. It had

become impossible to fill all the positions in the black air units, to rotate pilots

through advanced training, and to provide normal rotation at the same time.

The integration of the Army was more protracted. The Army did not have an

initial manpower shortage nor did it have an internal group of officers, or change

agents, who favored racial integration. Therefore, no contingency planning or

large-scale experiments occurred until after E.O. 9981. Even then, the Army

expended time and effort resisting the change.22 The Army did not establish a
11

sense of urgency until the Korean War, two years after Truman’s Executive

Order.

Creating The Guiding Coalition

President Truman signed on July 26, 1948, Executive Order 9981, entitled

“Equal Treatment and Opportunity Order.” The order did not promise integration,

but rather the “equality of treatment and opportunity” for blacks. In addition, it

established the first of a series of guiding coalitions; the Committee on Equality of

Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, better known as the Fahy

Committee.23 The Fahy charter was to provide a plan for racial integration and

“to examine into the rules, and procedures and practices of the armed service in

order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be

altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order.”24 Initially

a military coalition, in 1949 the committee was integrated with civilians. Civilian

membership provided differing points of view into the military complex to counter

the rigid outlook the military had on racial matters. While the Fahy committee put

promise on paper to achieve true integration, blacks remained segregated.25

The second guiding coalition was established in late 1949. The Chamberlin

Board reviewed the Fahy Committee’s racial plan to see if integration was

feasible. 26 Despite E.O. 9981, the Board vigorously opposed the combining of

white and black units and strongly urged the retention of the all-Negro unit.

Ultimately it was the Board’s findings that there would be widespread resentment

on the part of most white soldiers, which would consequently destroy combat

effectiveness. Integration would place the Negro in a competitive field he was
12

not prepared to face, thus denying him opportunity and retarding the

development of Negro manpower in the military. Furthermore, integration would

place Black officers and NCO’s in command of white troops, a position which

only the exceptional Black servicemen could successfully fill.27

However, it was the Fahy Committee Report that prevailed, receiving

approval on 1 March 1950. In accordance with the report findings, the Army

announced that beginning in April 1950, enlistment was “opened to qualified

applicants without regard to race or color”. Segregation was out.28

The coalitions guiding the individual services differed in their implementation

of the new policy. According to MG (Retired) Vance Coleman, the true catalyst

for establishing a sense of urgency in the Army was the Korean War in the Far

East Command (FECOM) in 1950.29 The guiding coalition was composed of

combat regimental commanders who cut through the politics and said, “give me

good soldiers,” without regard to race. These commanders were backed by

General Ridgeway, Eighth Army Commander.30

In sharp contrast to the FECOM, there was little support and universal

skepticism for full integration among senior Army officials in Europe at the United

States Army European Command (USAREUR). Most commanders were

unaware of the Army’s success with integration in FECOM and in the training

divisions at home. When they were informed of integration progress elsewhere,

they were quick to declare such a move impractical for Europe. They warned of

the social problems that would arise with the all-white civilian population and

predicted that the Army would be forced to abandon the program in midstream.
13

Developing A Strategy And Vision

There was no overarching vision to racially integrate the military, only

President Truman’s vague declaration of policy. “It is hereby declared to be the

policy of the President of the United States that there shall be equality of

treatment and opportunity of all persons in the armed services without regard to

race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as

rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any

necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.”31 While the

translation of this declaration into a directing vision did not occur, different

strategies on how to implement the declaration began to emerge.

Communicating The Change Vision

The absence of a vision and the Army’s reluctance to racially integrate

created an atmosphere of secrecy and a general lack of policy awareness

throughout the chain of command. Generally, neither officers nor enlisted

understood the new policy. Most soldiers tended to think that Department of the

Army policy was whatever they had experienced in their own unit – i.e.,

segregation or mixing. Yet, born from this confusion, the Army produced two

strategies. The first integration strategy was almost accidental. In the summer of

1950 MG William B. Kean, Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (ID),

FECOM, declared that the all black 24th Infantry Regiment (IR), constituted a

threat to the security of his division and requested its replacement.32 While there

were individual acts of heroism, the 24th (IR) performed poorly as a whole, and

was considered the weak link on the 25th ID line. Kean concluded that
14

segregated units would not work in a combat situation and that the combat value

of black soldiers would never be realized unless they were integrated into white

units.33 This pronouncement by Kean coupled with battle losses in white units

and a growing surplus of black replacements resulted in the Eighth Army

assigning individual black soldiers to under-strength units. The practice of

assigning individual blacks throughout white units in Korea accelerated during

early 1951 until it became systemic, with a caveat not to exceed fifteen percent

‘black’ strength.

In 1951, Lieutenant Vance Coleman, serving with a Kentucky National Guard

Field Artillery in Korea, was only the second black officer in the unit. It was the

first time the unit was integrated. As a forward observer and then a Company

Executive Officer, Coleman never saw command policy or guidance on unit level

issues pertaining to racial integration. According to Coleman, “It just

happened.” The unit, previously all-white, was now approximately thirty percent

blacks. Coleman professes that in terms of unit cohesion, morale and discipline,

“there were no problems whatsoever.” Individually Coleman heard comments

such as “I never looked at blacks as people before.” However, Coleman

attributes the success to “the leadership environment, which provided room to

grow and to accept.”34

The second strategy emerged on 1 April, 1952 (four years after E.O. 9981),

when the Army initiated integration in the European command. While integration

may have quietly occurred in FECOM, segregation was still the rule in
15

USAREUR where many were unaware of the progress that had been made

elsewhere.35

The European strategy was one where publicity was avoided and units were

quietly phased into racial integration. The planning prior to implementation was

classified. However, the Army in Europe did formalize the system and

communicate the strategy through a series of letters of instruction to all major

subordinate commands. Numbered units received individual black soldier

replacements on a predetermined schedule. Combat arms units were the first to

integrate. Each unit integrated over a six-month period. No official

announcements were made to the public until the program was completed.36

Empowering Broad-Based Action

Once President Truman ordered the integration of the services and

directed the Fahy committee to develop acceptable racial programs, he quickly

turned the matter over to his subordinates in the Department of Defense,

severing White House ties to the issue. “The necessary programs have been

adopted,” he told Fahy, it was time for the services "to work out in detail the

procedures, which will complete the steps so carefully initiated by the

committee.” In effect, the president was guaranteeing the Services freedom to

put their own houses in order.37

Implementation plans differed throughout the Army because there was not

an overall strategic action plan. The Army did not extend its command policy or

empower its subordinates evenly. Different Commands received authority to

execute the policy at different times (first FECOM, then USAREUR, then
16

Northern United States, followed by the South). Even then, command policy did

not extend within the commands evenly. For example, southern states were told

to wait or slow down the integration process due to perceived local disruption.

Commands were requested to submit their own action plans. Some commands

got carried away and incidents of “unauthorized integration” occurred, while other

commands were complacent and did nothing toward racial integration. It was not

until the early 1970’s, that a training program on equal opportunity and race

relations was integrated in the Army’s education and command systems.

Generating Short-Term Wins

Racial integration highlighted fears long entertained by military traditionalist

leaders. Of immediate concern was the breakdown of combat effectiveness, unit

cohesion, morale, and discipline. The short-term goals addressing those

concerns were preventative in nature: do not lose combat effectiveness, do not

lose unit morale, and do not increase race-related crime.

The standard Army guides for determining combat effectiveness and

appropriate levels of performance are the various unit training tests and

inspections. As units were integrated and then tested either through training

events, inspections, or actual combat, the level of performance of former allBlack units increased and the combat effectiveness of former all-white units did

not decrease.38

The next short-term goal was to stabilize morale in units. Prior to integration,

the morale and retention of black units was low due to a myriad of problems such

as second-rate training and equipment, limited educational opportunities, feelings
17

of inferiority, and poor leadership. Retention rates in all-black units were also

low. As units integrated, and education and training opportunities for blacks

increased, the morale of the black soldiers increased and, contrary to previous

rhetoric, the morale of white soldiers remained the same. In fact, high rates of

reenlistment and extensions caused black ‘overages’, and white soldiers became

more favorably disposed toward serving in the same units with black soldiers.39

Finally, it was feared that social mingling would cause breakdown in unit

discipline, which, it was thought, would lead to racial incidents and crime.

However, the complete opposite occurred. There was no increase in racially

motivated crime, and in 1953 most all official military dances were racially

integrated without incident. Additionally, success with social mingling on military

installations changed racial attitudes and behavior outside the confines of the

bases, causing racial attitudes generally to become more progressive.

Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change

Segregation officially ended in the active armed forces with the

announcement of the Secretary of Defense in 1954 that the last all-black unit had

been disbanded. In the six years since President Truman’s Executive Order a

quarter of a million blacks had indiscriminately mixed with whites in military units

worldwide. However, local communities were still discriminating against blacks in

residential areas and business establishments. In a 1963 directive, Secretary of

Defense McNamara outlined a new racial policy. The new policy vowed to carry

the crusade for equal treatment and opportunity for black soldiers outside the

military compound into the civilian community beyond. The new policy ordered
18

the Services to launch integration programs in communities (near military bases)

and made the local commanders responsible for its success. In conjunction with

other federal officials operating under provisions of the1964 Civil Rights Act, local

commanders helped open thousands of theaters, bowling alleys, restaurants,

and bathing beaches to black servicemen. Only in the face of continued

opposition to open housing by landlords who dealt with servicemen, and then not

until 1967, did McNamara decide to use the powerful and controversial weapon

of ‘off-limits sanctions’.40

Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture

The military was the only segment of American society to have integrated,

however imperfectly, the races on so large a scale. In doing so, they

demonstrated that a policy of equal treatment and opportunity is more than a

legal concept; it also ordains a social condition. Between the idea of change and

its eventual fulfillment, traditionalism and bigotry shadowed progress. The record

shows Services surmounted bigotry and rejected the old ways, and were

successful in bringing the races together thus prospering the nation’s ideal of

equal opportunity for all citizens.

CHAPTER FOUR – CANADIAN MILITARY

In 1992, the Canadian Forces (CF) experienced significant social change

when it implemented a lesbian and gay non-discrimination policy. Where prepolicy controversy and staunch military opposition existed before this policy

change, they steadily dissipated with the acceptance of the policy. While
19

Canada’s experiences cannot necessarily be reproduced by another country,

insights can be gained on how to successfully implement a controversial policy.41

Background

Prior to 1988, lesbians and gays were prohibited from serving in the

Canadian Forces. Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) argued that

the special mission of the Forces necessitated an exclusionary policy. Military

leadership feared that lesbian and gay soldiers would compromise operational

effectiveness, as well as damage “cohesion, morale, discipline, leadership,

recruiting, medical fitness, and the rights to privacy of other members”.42

Additional fears from the field, such as, sexual harassment by homosexual

soldiers, gay-bashing, and heterosexual resignations and refusals to work with

homosexuals, spurred continuing support for an anti-homosexual policy. 43

Military personnel, particularly men, were strongly against removing the

ban. Service members expressed concern about all aspects of serving with

lesbians and gays; sixty-two percent of male soldiers stated that they would

refuse to share showers, undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier,

and forty-five percent declared that they would refuse to work with gays.44

According to a field grade Canadian combat arms officer, Major Doug

Claggett, the overall sentiment of the CF during this time was ‘restrictive and

exclusionary’ in nature toward minorities, citing the role of women as an example.

“The roles in the military were very traditional. Women were excluded from the

combat arms and worked as clerks in logistics units.” 45 When asked about the

sentiment of the soldiers toward homosexuals prior to lifting the ban, Claggett
20

responded that “The Canadian regimental system fostered an idea of

camaraderie where a soldier had to be a ‘man’ and drink beer, hit on women, and

joke with the boys. Soldiers did not want to be associated with gays for fear of

being labeled a ‘fag’ and excluded from the group.” Claggett continued that there

was a general perception that “gays were sexually liberated and predators.”46

The military policy was relaxed in 1988 and allowed homosexuals to

serve, but with restrictions. The order to inform was removed and those

discovered to be gay, were not summarily dismissed.47 The interim policy began

when Michelle Douglas and four other service members filed separate lawsuits

against the Canadian Forces that directly challenged the new policy toward

homosexuals.48 Michelle Douglas won the lawsuit and the Canadian Federal

Court decision extended the rights of lesbians and gays under both the Charter

of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Act. As open dialogue on the

policy circulated, young Army leaders such as Claggett began to ask of

themselves how they could “foster and develop small group cohesion, particularly

in the regimental system?”

In preparing for the appeal in the Douglas case, the DND concluded that it

could not meet the standard of proof required for a “reasonable limitation”

argument. Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain privately

informed members of parliament that the ban was about to be lifted in late 1991.

However, the federal government delayed the lift due to adamant refusal by

some Conservative Members of Parliament to support the policy.
21

Establishing A Sense Of Urgency

Unlike the US Military, which has the leeway to be separate and distinct

from society, the Canadian military has a different tradition. Due to the close

reflection of military policies to Canadian civil laws, it was natural that the military

revoke its policy and removed all restrictions on homosexuals. In 1992, when the

Human Rights Court ruled that the military’s policy concerning homosexuals was

unconstitutional, Canadian culture hastened military acceptance because a basic

value upon which the Canadian culture is predicated, and which is reflected in its

constitution and legislation, is that of equality.

Creating The Guiding Coalition

In a communiqué entitled “Homosexual Conduct,” Chastelain revoked

Canadian Forces Administration Order (CFAO) 19-20 and all related interim

policies. The military would no longer make distinctions between its

heterosexual and homosexual soldiers. He expressed his “full support” of the

Federal Court’s decision and stated his expectation the chain of command

would also support the policy change. Senior leaders endorsed the change and

appealed to service members’ sense of duty. Unit leaders relied on a strict code

of conduct of equal standards for the conduct of lesbians, gays, and

heterosexuals. Several years later, upon reflecting on the smooth transition of

the policy, observers attributed the lack of problems to the unified military

leadership’s public support for the new policy.
22

Vision

 The publicly stated vision came in the form of a press report where General

de Chastelain declared: “the Canadian Forces will comply fully with the Federal

Court’s decision. Canadians, regardless of their sexual orientation, will now be

able to serve their country without restriction.” In private military circles, the

vision included an implementation plan with three phases: obtaining compliance

with the new policy, promoting acceptance of the policy, and finally changing the

attitudes of military personnel toward homosexuals through training.49

Communicating The Change Vision

Once the demise of the ban was imminent, General Chastelain and other

military leaders took decisive steps to create a smooth transition. They dissolved

any distinctions in the regulations between heterosexual and homosexual

soldiers. They made it clear that the policy change had the full support of the CF

leadership. The DND outlined the standards of behavior that would be expected

of all military personnel, regardless of sexual orientation, and widely distributed

both those standards and the changes in military regulations. In addition, the

military leadership emphasized the distinction between beliefs and behavior. The

personal attitudes and decisions of individual soldiers would be respected, but

soldiers would be expected to put personal feeling aside to accomplish military

objectives and to uphold the law.

The senior leadership provided guidance for subordinate leaders. A “PostAnnouncement Action” was issued by the Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel

to provide military leaders with guidance to “communicate the rationale for the
23

change, encourage its acceptance, and respond to the personal concerns of the

CF members.” A Canadian Forces Personnel Newsletter was also disseminated

to the Force that described the policy change.

The CF promoted the policy change through explicit answers to specific

questions about appropriate behavior. The National Defence Headquarters

(NDHQ) issued a “Questions and Answers” sheet for use within the CF that

explained the change in policy. This message included likely concerns and

emphasized that homosexual and heterosexual soldiers would be held to the

same standards of behavior:

Q31: Will such activities as dancing, hand holding, embracing between

same/sex members be accepted in mess social functions?

A31: Standards of conduct for homosexual members will be the same as

those for heterosexual members. Common sense and good judgment will be

applied and required of all members.50

Empowering Broad-Based Action

In December 1992, the CF issued a new regulation (CFAO 19-36) providing

leaders and service members judicial guidelines. The regulation, entitled “Sexual

Misconduct,” amended a personal harassment regulation to detail what

constituted inappropriate sexual conduct for both homosexual and heterosexual

soldiers.51

In 1996 the DND implemented a training program to increase general

awareness among its civilian and military workforce about harassment and racist

conduct, including harassment based on sexual orientation. The program was
24

based on social situation exercises designed to prevent, recognize and handle

harassment. The Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP)

anti-harassment training program did not institute a separate procedure to handle

same-sex sexual harassment or personal harassment based on sexual

orientation. The SHARP section on sexual harassment and sexual misconduct

uses gender and orientation-neutral terms describing specific behavior that would

be classified as harassment or misconduct. Examples such as leering, requests

for sexual favors, derogatory name-calling and sexually suggestive gestures are

listed without regard for the gender of either the harasser or the target. Sexual

harassment by someone of the same sex or abusive comments about one’s

sexual orientation falls under the general sexual harassment framework.52

While senior leader concerns centered on establishment of the policy, junior

officers and NCO’s had other concerns about the new policy. According to

Claggett, his initial concern was for the safety of the lesbian or gay soldier who

theoretically might openly declare his or her sexual orientation.53 The next

concern was disciplining service members who might harass a gay soldier,

followed by how to build group cohesiveness in a situation where an openly gay

soldier might be isolated. After policy implementation, in some instances, junior

officers took advantage of the broad policy and reinterpreted the policy to find

ways to “get him (a gay soldier) out of my unit”. When asked about the

effectiveness of the SHARP training, Claggett expressed that initially, the

program “was not well received” by the troops. Many soldiers perceived that they

were being told to “love gays”, and Claggett believed that the initial reluctance to
25

SHARP training was due in part to soldiers’ values being ‘challenged’, and new

values being “forced upon” them. However, as a leader, Claggett understood

that while education training was centrally directed Army wide, he was

empowered to execute. It was business as usual; any problems were solved at

the lowest possible level.

Generating Short-Term Wins

Lifting the ban on lesbian and gay servicemembers surfaced fears long held

by military traditionalist leaders. Of immediate concern was the breakdown of

combat effectiveness, unit morale, and discipline. There have not been any

reported problems with harassment, violence, resignations or recruitment

associated with the policy since its inception. “Despite all the anxiety that existed

through the late 80s into the early 90s about the change in policy, here’s what the

indicators show: no effect.”54

Less than a year after the policy change, in a 1993 attitudinal survey, when

asked to describe how satisfied they were with the policy on sexual orientation,

only twenty-eight and one half percent of the CF polled were either dissatisfied or

very dissatisfied.55

While the CF may not have conducted initial evaluations or surveys, other

researchers did.56 Neither research results from Rand National Defense

Research Institute, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and the US

Army Research Institute, nor information gathered from US Congressional

testimony or media accounts offer any indications of resignations, problems with

morale, violence, or harassment due to the policy change.57
26

Data strongly suggests that fears of a substantial increase in personal or

sexual harassment due to the policy change were unwarranted. The rate of selfreported harassment actually decreased overall during the period. The

percentage of service members who reported experiencing sexual harassment in

the previous twelve months declined from eleven percent in 1992 to six percent

in 1998. Four percent of servicemen and seven percent of servicewomen who

reported personal harassment had experienced harassment rarely or

occasionally due to their sexual orientation.58

Observers were surprised at the level of heterosexual tolerance and offer the

following reasons based on studies of foreign countries with a homosexual

inclusion policy. Few lesbians and gays have actually “come out” or declared

themselves homosexuals because they are reluctant to openly admit their sexual

orientation for a variety of reasons: the fear of discrimination or negative

reactions from peers or superiors, the belief that sexuality is a private matter, and

the absence of any advantage to openly identifying homosexual preference.

Claggett believes the reluctance to come out is because “homosexuality is a

threat to the male psyche.”

Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change

One of the effects of lifting the ban on homosexuals has been the extension

of benefits to lesbian and gay service members and their partners. In June,

1996, the Canadian federal human rights tribunal ordered the federal government

to provide the same medical, dental and other benefits to gay and lesbian

couples as provided to heterosexual common-law couples. The CF human
27

resources office distributed a memo in December, 1996, outlining the policy of

granting same sex partner benefits to CF personnel. These benefits included:

compassionate leave; leave without pay for spousal accompaniment on military,

foreign service, or isolated post assignments; and relocation entitlements. Same

sex partners would also be entitled to dental care and health care plans as

dependents.59 In April, 1999, a DND report revealed only seventeen claims for

medical, dental, and relocation benefits for gay and lesbian partners of soldiers

had been filed in 1998.60

In the years since the removal of the ban, the CF has continued to move

forward in its full integration of lesbian and gay soldiers. It has done so as part of

a larger effort to reduce harassment and discrimination of all types among its

personnel.

Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture

Perhaps the best measure of acculturation is that the issue of lesbian and gay

soldiers in the CF has all but disappeared from public and internal military

debates, nor has it affected recruiting or retention in the Canadian Forces.

 “From a long-term recruiting perspective, I think this was a necessary step for

us, as were all of our other cultural types of initiatives in terms of recruiting,

because the population base that we’re working with in terms of recruiting is

shrinking. So by broadening the population base and making things more

acceptable, some of our social policies, what we’re doing in effect is preserving

the long-term quality of the Canadian Forces, because there are only so many

white, Anglo-Saxon males that you can recruit.”61
28

CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS

So, how applicable are the Kotter model and the experiences of the

American and Canadian armies in determining a model for the integration of

lesbians and gays into the US military?

Deconstructing The Models

Kotter Model: In an Autumn 2000 Parameters article, two social science

instructors from the United States Military Academy attempted to deconstruct a

perceived movement in the Army toward civilian organizational and decision

making concepts which were intended to lead, design and restructure corporate

institutions. They contend that corporate models are efficiency-based change

models geared toward bureaucratic and non values-based organizations, while

the Army requires effectiveness-based change models, characterized by

professionalism and leadership.62 However, as both the business and military

communities’ journey through their respective revolutions, they are learning from

each other.63 Senior military leaders, such as General (retired) Gordon Sullivan

and former Navy Captain Dick Marcinko, write organizational and leadership

books for the business community, while the military increasingly searches for

alternate methods of professionalizing its organization from corporate business.

John P. Kotter’s successful book, Leading Change, has a multitude of new ideas

for incorporating change in large organizations, including organizations similar to

the military where leadership and values are stressed.

Black Model: Some argue that the black integration model does not

correlate to a potential known lesbian and gay model, and former Chairman of
29

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, is one of them. Powell

made clear in his 1995 best-selling book, My American Journey, that he saw no

correlation between racial and sexual discrimination. “Skin color is a benign,

nonbehavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound of

human characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient, but invalid

argument.” However, as with most of the past military social change discourse,

his comment appears based on feeling and emotion, not on fact. The correlation

is not between benign and behavioral characteristics, but on discrimination itself.

Sociologists, anthropologists, clergy, and society in general have not come to

a consensus on whether homosexuality is a result of “nature” or “nurture.”

Naturists pose the question, why would anyone want to choose a lifestyle where

full civil rights are denied, and second class citizenry, harassment, discrimination

and humiliation are the norm? Nurturists point to the basic laws of mankind and

procreation as the reason why homosexuality is learned behavior. However, the

circumstantial issues for the military surrounding both the Black and Canadian

cases such as behavior, attitudes, and rhetoric on combat effectiveness, are the

same. Consequently, it is valid to say there is a correlation between

discrimination in all three models.

Canadian Model: Most Americans believe the United States has the best

military in the world.64 The perception that the Canadian military is not a robust

military and only conducts peacekeeping operations introduces the argument that

the Canadian military does not require the same high level of combat

effectiveness as does the US military and, therefore, cannot support an accurate
30

experiential basis to learn from. However, the Canadian model provides eight

years of experience with an open homosexual policy whose society, military

values and institutions are very similar to the United States.

Background Comparison

Despite the fifty-year difference between the Black and Canadian models, the

pre-policy controversy that surrounded both are strikingly similar. Before policy

change, both US and Canadian public sentiment wanted to keep the status quo,

and was against the change. In both models, senior military leadership was

adamantly opposed to inclusion, citing breakdown of combat effectiveness, unit

cohesion, morale, and discipline as its official incantations. Small unit leaders of

both models expressed fears of increased crime, and soldiers expressed fears of

proximity in the field, barracks, and showers. The pre-policy environment

surrounding the current discussion on lifting the ban on lesbians and gays in the

military is virtually identical to both the Black and Canadian models.

Both models unsuccessfully attempted to liberalize their exclusionary policies

before adopting full inclusion policies. For example, in 1944, the US Navy and

Air Force conducted racial integration experiments prior to E.O. 9881, and in

1988 Canada officially accepted lesbian and gay servicemembers, but with

restrictions.65 It could be argued that the DADT policy, is also an interim policy.66

Establishing A Sense Of Urgency

External and internal catalysts generated a sense of urgency in both

models. President Truman took the initiative in advancing the civil rights of

Americans who were denied opportunity and used the executive arm of
31

government for change. The Human Rights Court extended its judicial arm for

change in the Canadian model. Internally, the need for manpower, generated by

the Korean War for the US and by the CF senior leadership, generated change in

the Black and Canadian models respectively.

Creating the Guiding Coalition

The leadership alliances for each model were on opposite ends of the

performance spectrum. In the Black model, the consortium of different guiding

coalitions at different levels in different theaters, working on different strategies,

provided general confusion and chaos during the process. On the other hand,

the clear support from the top-down through the chain of command provided a

more controlled environment in the Canadian model.

Developing a Strategy And Vision

Neither model produced long-term direction by Kotter’s standards. The

Black model used a presidential declaration as a guide for senior military leaders,

however, the declaration did not describe what the social environs of the military

should look like as an end result. The senior military leaders failed to produce

their own vision to clarify the presidential declaration for such a significant

change to the institution. Though Canada delivered a vision via a press release,

it too fell short of the Kotter model. Although Canada’s vision delivery was quick,

and its message clear, it was too broad, failing to depict a successful end state.

Communicating The Change Vision

Both models chose to have a publicity blackout on their respective plans.

The black model refused to broadcast its intentions both externally to the
32

institution, as well as internally. The American public was unaware of the

changes occurring first in Korea, then Europe, and many segments of the Army

were ignorant of the fact that racial integration had even occurred. Guidance to

commanders, if given, was not consistent, varying at different places and times.

Conversely, the Canadian model introduced guiding mechanisms to inform the

entire force of policy changes, from the senior leader to unit level. It also

provided a mechanism for dialogue and feedback through its SHARP training

program. To avoid criticism, the Canadians also chose to have a publicity

blackout external to the military. All queries from the media and news agencies

concerning the policy change was “censored” (and further discouraged) through

the public affairs office.

Empowering Broad-Based Action

Leaders must have an understanding of the vision if they are to take

ownership of a policy and make viable decisions. A clear direction provides

focus for both developing a corresponding strategy and for implementing one.

Both models empowered their key leaders differently, but the end results were

the same. At the unit level, basic leadership application coupled with soldier

sensibilities prevailed.

The Black model did not have a vision and its implementation was

decentralized, executed by requesting various commands to submit their

individual action plans. It was not until the 1960’s that the strategy for integration

became centralized through the systemic drive to integrate the civilian

communities surrounding the installations. The execution of flawed strategies did
33

not empower soldiers or small unit leaders, however, they still took custody of

their soldiers and, as Vance Coleman said “it just happened.”

The Canadian model had an achievable vision and it centralized its strategy

starting with education and training, thereby ensuring all service members were

empowered with the same knowledge. Execution of the strategy was

decentralized, and leaders were expected to solve situations at the lowest level

possible.

Generating Short-Term Wins

Although a subjective benchmark, both models considered combat

effectiveness (unit cohesion, morale and discipline) as a vital interest and an

immediate objective during their respective social changes. Combat

effectiveness did not decline in either model.67 Since the inception of both

models, there have been several wars and numerous conflicts. If it were

perceived that either model disabled young soldiers from fighting effectively,

restrictions would most probably have been reimposed. To date there have been

no formal discussions on resegregating the US military or permitting restrictions

on lesbians or gays in the Canadian military.

Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Despite the precarious visions, significant social changes occurred far

more rapidly than expected in both the Black and Canadian models. Racial

integration in the military provided a beacon for civil rights activists and the rest of

society from which to integrate large segments of America, starting with the

military’s help in transforming civilian societies surrounding military bases.
34

The introduction of partner benefits in the CF is also compelling Canadian

civil society to advance its human rights agenda.

Anchoring New Approaches In the Culture

Social attitudes become significantly closer in egalitarian settings where

there are shared experiences.68 Today, it is difficult to imagine a racially

segregated military. The Army is the most successful racially integrated

institution in American society. That does not negate the fact that blacks and

whites still have disparate views of equal opportunity. Fifty years ago, the

military hierarchy was concerned only with incidents of behavior such as crime or

harassment. Now punishment is meted out in incidents of attitude such as racial

slurs, jokes, or subtle favoritism. Racist behaviors and attitudes are not tolerated

within the leadership of the military organization, and exhibiting either can end a

career. The fact that racial remarks are rarely heard among Army NCO’s and

officers even in all-white groups, reflects the strict adherence to this norm.69

The social climate experienced in the Black and Canadian models is

virtually the same as that facing the US military now concerning acceptance of

lesbians and gays. Concerns of decreasing combat effectiveness and senior

military leadership opposition permeate all three models. The current

environment, however, may be more conducive to change. The American public

supports lesbian and gay servicemembers openly serving and the military is

socially smarter, having forged through racial integration, the all-volunteer force,

and gender integration. In addition, a neighboring military ally, similar to the US

military in structure and values has successfully implemented an open
35

homosexual policy with little to no adverse effect. A table method comparison

analysis is at Appendix A.

Whether in one or twenty years, trends indicate there will be a change to

the status quo in regards to serving lesbian and gay soldiers. Whatever the

case, it will take time and resources to plan for change, particularly if military

planners have to start from pure cloth. The consequences of not having a

proposed contingency plan could have detrimental effects, particularly in this

scenario.

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

FINDINGS

Both Black and Canadian cases are universally considered a success. The

integrated Army is the most successfully racially integrated institution in

American society. The Canadian model is considered a success by the very fact

that it was a “non-event.” While there are many successes to be gleaned from

these models, there were also mistakes made and lessons learned.

• Neither model anticipated the change to policy, therefore the force was not

informed or prepared.

• Senior military leadership determined the level of chaos or control that

policy implementation had.

• Vision was important to each model’s military force.

• Both models required interim policies.

• The implementation plans focused on behavior change instead of attitude

change.

• Small unit leaders were responsible for the success of the strategic plan

The Army can and should develop a contingency plan in the event either the

law banning homosexual conduct from military service is changed, or the DADT
36

policy is lifted or liberalized. The plan should use historical cases to provide an

experiential basis for success. Though the Army historically waits until the last

moment to develop its social plans, the senior leadership and their planners owe

it to the men and women in uniform to have a prepared contingency plan geared

for success. The two cases discussed herein provide an experiential basis for

planners to capitalize on successes and learn from shortcomings.

The real challenge to formulating a ‘known lesbian and gay’ contingency plan

in the event the ban is lifted lies in the military’s aversion to social change. Even

today, terms like ‘social experimentation’ conjure feelings of resentment among

its members. The US military, and in particular the Army, has a history of

avoiding and then fighting social change. This distaste is rooted in fear and

prevents military traditionalists from even entertaining the idea of planning for

change, for fear that "if we plan for it, we'll have to do it."

The Army fears the loss of combat effectiveness due to the breakdown of unit

cohesion, morale, and discipline if the ban were lifted. Army leaders fear antihomosexual violence, and soldiers (mostly male) fear proximity to homosexuals.

Others fear that homosexuals would band together and discriminate against

heterosexuals. Some fear unwelcome sexual advances and some fear

contracting AIDS.70 All of the fears mentioned (exchanging AIDS for venereal

diseases) are identical to those expressed in pre-integrated WWII units by white

military members. Lack of education and information inflame those fears. In

addition, serving lesbian and gay soldiers fear intimidation, isolation, violence,

and subtle retaliations such as loosing an assignment, promotion or receiving an
37

unfavorable rating on an efficiency report.71 However, the US military has the

planning tools to overcome its fear of social change and prepare for the

possibility of known lesbians and gays serving without secrecy in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

According to the Department of the Army Command Policy Office, the Army

does not officially have a strategy or action plan to put into effect if the military

ban is lifted or the current policy liberalized.72 According to the Center for

Studies on Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSM) or the SLDN, neither do the

lesbian and gay communities. However, in formulating initiatives, the Army has

several frameworks, models and blue prints to help formulate a plan. First, the

Draft Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, provides a strategy framework

composed of shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations. Second, a look at

past national experiences with social change, coupled with the experience of

foreign militaries that have planned for and implemented military cultural change,

provides a baseline model for strategy considerations. Finally, the steps of a

corporate business model for transformation provide an innovative and new way

of preparing a contingency plan for the incorporation of known lesbians and gays

into the military.
38

Shaping Decisive Sustaining

GOAL: Prepare the force

TARGET: Inform the

 public

GOAL:Create a climate

 of respect

TARGET: Eradicate fear

GOAL: Advance 

American values

(justice, equality, 

 and freedom)

TARGET: Erase 

institutional prejudice

D-Day D+20 years

Catalyst

Figure 1. Known Lesbian and Gay Plan

The contingency plan would encompass the three phases of a campaign

plan outlined in FM 3-0 (shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations). Shaping

operations “create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive

operation.” Decisive operations “directly achieve the mission of the higher

headquarters,” and “. . . determine the outcome . . . .” Sustaining operations

“enable shaping and decisive operations by assuring freedom of action and

continuity of operations.”73 Like most campaign plans, each operational phase

would have a target and goal incorporated into the overall strategic target and

goal. While the framework would be linear, the phases would often overlap. (See

Figure 1).
39

The criterion for success in each phase would be the degree of adherence

to steps of the Kotter model for large organizational change. Step completion

allows forward movement to the next phase. (See Figures 2 through 4).

SHAPING OPERATIONS

Target: Inform the public (military and civilian)

Goal: Prepare the force

Shaping

Catalyst Kotter Model Criterion Trigger

1. Urgency

2. Build a Coalition

3. Vision/Strategy

Figure 2. Shaping Operations

SHAPING OPERATIONS

Target: Inform the public (military and civilian)

Goal: Prepare the force

The more attention paid to shaping the environment and setting the

conditions for success, the better the plan. The target of the shaping phase is to

inform the public, both civilian and military of the forthcoming change. The goal
40

is to prepare the force through open dialogue to reduce distress and resistance.

There is no timeline for this phase since the plan is predicated on a possible

future event. Whether the event occurs in the next year or the next 50 years, the

more prepared the force is, the less traumatic will be the event.

Urgency: The first step in the shaping phase is establishing a sense of

urgency, usually accomplished through a catalyst. Realistically, there are three

possible catalyst scenarios which could generate a sense of urgency: the

Supreme Court could find the current law unconstitutional, the Congress could

overturn the current law, or Congress could pass a new law. The likelihood of

the military being its own catalyst in peacetime is extremely low, but war could

cause a relaxation of the current DADT policy.74

Preparing the force should start at the top through educational dialogue at the

senior military level. Examples include inserting recent editorial articles

concerning lesbian and gay soldiers in the close-hold general officer (GO)

electronic newsletter or as an agenda item at the CINC conferences. Senior

level education in advance of reform would provide knowledgeable support from

the top. Army leaders must be seen to support the change, not just pay lip

service to a change imposed by an outside force.

Coalition: Kotter’s second step is creating the guiding coalition, a group with

expertise, credibility, proven leadership, and positional power. An optimal

guiding coalition would start at the highest civilian and military levels from the

National Command Authority (NCA) to the CJCS and the Commanders-in-Chief,

with active support from knowledgeable political figures including members of
41

Congress.75 Participation by known gay GO retirees, such as MG Coleman,

could also provide credibility and legitimacy to transition efforts. Additional

expertise could come from the directors of lesbian and gay military support

organizations such as SLDN and the CSSM, and from representatives of the

Canadian military.

On another level, each Service could provide its own guiding coalition. The

Army could establish a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) that would

meet regularly to discuss the issues and devise action where appropriate.

GOSC agendas could include presentations by noted experts such as

organizational behaviorists, sociologists, public affairs specialists, or members of

the clergy to provide lectures in their areas of expertise. If the socially rigid and

conservative GO cohort is educated on the issues, they are in a better position to

formulate a well-thought out vision and strategy. The rest of the institution will

follow their lead. The discussion must then trickle down to the rest of the senior

military leadership to create the conditions that can support successful

transformation.

It is in the senior leadership's best interest to draft a contingency plan during

the shaping phase. Difficult social issues like this one can quickly become

politicized and easily result in Congressional political groups dictating to the

military how an implementation plan will occur. If the GO’s already have a

contingency plan, the likelihood for political interference decreases.

Vision: Kotter’s third step is the development of a vision and strategy. A

function of the guiding coalition is to provide vision and strategy which are nested
42

to ensure leaders at all levels are working as one. For instance, top leaders

create a sensible and appealing picture of the future and present the logic of how

the vision can be achieved. Middle leaders create specific steps and timetables

to implement the strategies and convert broad plans into specific financial

projections and goals. Unit leaders execute and provide hands-on leadership.

 Because the US military is a values-based organization, the vision must

appeal to military cultural values. For example, in a recent statement regarding

consideration of others, General Shinseki appealed to the military’s values of

dignity, respect and trust: “When individual dignity and respect are violated,

mutual trust and unit cohesion erode. Harassment of any kind violates individual

dignity and tears at the fabric of this trust and the cohesion of our Army.” 76

The long-range vision must move the Army from one state of being to

another; from tolerance of known lesbians and gays serving in the military to

acceptance. Anything less than acceptance would mean lesbian and gay

soldiers would continue to live as second class citizens. The Army’s Public

Affairs Office (PAO) in conjunction with the CSA speechwriters, must thread a

clear, concise theme throughout the vision.77 Here are a couple possible vision

statements:

 "American is great today because of its people. The diversity of its people contributes to

its enormous success and wealth. The United States Army is people - people from different

ethnic groups, backgrounds and religious upbringing. Those people come from cities and

hamlets across this great nation from sea to shining sea. They are America's finest sons and

daughters and they are patriots. Whatever their background. Whatever their religious choice.

Whatever their sexual orientation, they are first and foremost Americans. Americans who

have volunteered to represent their country in defense of freedom and justice.

 The new Army Vision is one of acceptance, inclusion, and tolerance, not discrimination,

exclusion, or indifference. To this end, we pledge a new effort to end discrimination in any

form. We accept soldiers who are committed to the values of loyalty, dedication, respect,

selfless service, integrity, and personal courage. These are the only standards by which

soldiers are judged.”78
43

Or:

 “It is our goal to remain the world’s dominant military power, headed by the world’s best

leaders. We are successful due to all the men and women of our Service. Men and women,

of all colors, ethnicity, religions. We are very proud of our status as the Nation’s leader in

diversity and equal opportunity. In order to remain on top, we will continue our policy of

inclusion and not exclusion. But there is more to do. Lesbian and Gay soldiers have been a

part of, and contributors to, our Army’s history – but not without fear of retribution.

 Our new policy is one of inclusion, tolerance, and acceptance not exclusion. All soldiers

deserve dignity and respect, not abuse. Our vision is achievable. Virtually every modern

army in the world recognizes and accepts lesbian and gay soldiers into their armies.

Achieving this ambitious attitude will require us to not only take into our hearts, but into our

minds – our army values. Dignity and respect. It will require all of us to grow. I sincerely

believe that if we work together we can achieve change, and in this process create an

environment of tolerance and acceptance. It is fundamental to the well being and success of

the US Army to be free of abject discrimination. The Army is a place where all are accepted,

as we continue to defend the constitution and the rights of all people. “

Decisive

Kotter Model Criterion

1. Communicate vision/strategy

2. Empowering Broad-based action

3. Generating short term wins

Trigger Trigger

Figure 3. Decisive Operations

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

Target: Eradicate fear

Goal: Create a climate of respect
44

The acceptance of a ‘known lesbian and gay’ plan is decisive to the overall

strategy of change. Success lies in what occurs at the unit level. The target of

this phase is to eradicate the fear that manifests itself in violence and

apprehension of proximity to homosexuals. Fear, as discussed in chapter one, is

the root of complacency and resistance to change. Optimally the senior

leadership, through information, dialogue, and education in the shaping phase,

will have removed fear from its cohort group which will then skillfully lead the way

for rest of the institution. It is important to provide clear command and legal policy

and guidance, as well as implement a parallel PAO strategic plan.

Communicating The Vision: According to Kotter’s fourth step, the change

must be quickly communicated throughout the organization. Human factors

indicate that urgency levels drop when it becomes clear that quality program or

cultural change efforts are going to take a long time.79 Communicating the

change vision requires a PAO strategy, using different vehicles to repeatedly

send the command message and elements of the vision. For example, the CSA

is currently communicating his vision on Army transformation through civilian and

military literature, interviews, and television. He rarely makes a speech without

incorporating the Army’s transformation vision. Another way to communicate the

vision is at educational institutions where leaders are being trained.

Incorporating media “practice sessions” into the classroom and military exercises

highlights the importance of effectively relaying polemic messages while

attempting to convey an image of honesty and straightforwardness (particularly

for those leaders who do not embrace the vision).
45

Communicating the vision at the unit level is the linchpin to success.

Translating this vision at the unit level, where the highest levels of apprehension

of violence and proximity exist, is important. At a minimum it should include a

zero tolerance crime and harassment policy, a reiteration of the code of conduct,

and a policy where all soldiers are treated the same. This last element would not

provide for separate sleeping, eating or bathing facilities.

Empowering Broad-Based Action: Direction must be unequivocal from the

top, and recourse for anyone experiencing discrimination must be clearly

delineated. Leadership must make it absolutely clear that discrimination will not

be tolerated under any circumstances. Soldiers should know their legal rights

and where to find redress if those rights are violated. Unit commanders must be

held responsible for a climate of tolerance within their units and must be swift to

act if a soldier’s rights are violated. All soldiers should know the consequences if

they harass or discriminate and punishment should be immediate and

evenhanded.

Generating short-term wins: A decline in combat effectiveness is also the

vital interest in this situation, as it was in the Black and Canadian models.

Surveys monitoring crime and harassment statistics are easily implemented,

however monitoring other effectiveness measurements could be difficult.

Tracking promotion or retention, for example, would not be possible unless

lesbian and gay soldiers disclosed their orientation. But there are other, more

subjective short-term wins worth tracking. Climate surveys coupled with several

other mechanisms could gauge progress. The PAO can track when debate on
46

the issue increases, decreases, or when it ceases to be debated in the news at

all. The Army Chaplain Corps can gauge installation congregations. As the

climate progresses to an environment of respect, the GOSC could be disbanded.

The end result would find an environment where if a lesbian or gay soldier

chooses can without fear of subtle retribution, feel safe to put a partner's

photograph on his or her desk.

Sustaining

Kotter Model Criterion

1. Consolidating gains - producing more change

2. Anchoring new approached in culture

Trigger

Figure 4. Sustaining Operations

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

Target: Erase institutional prejudice

Goal: Advance traditional American values of justice, equality, and freedom

Consolidating gains and producing more change: Climate surveys should

continue to measure progress from tolerance to acceptance, or when verbal
47

harassment becomes the social deviation. Other institutions should also conduct

climate surveys to gauge what effect the change may have on greater society.

The attitudes of society in general toward the change, particularly those areas

around military bases, should be measured. Political pundits should measure

whether the activities of watchdog organizations, such as SLDN, decrease.

Planners must also consider, from the very beginning, the issue of same-sex

partner benefits, the natural progression to lifting the ban on homosexual

conduct.

Anchoring new approaches in the culture: To institutionally change military

culture, its constituents must believe that the new behaviors and attitudes have

helped improve the performance of the group. Until new behaviors become

rooted in social norms and shared values, they are always subject to regression

as soon as watchdog mechanisms associated with the change (EO chain, chain

of command etc.) become lethargic on the issue. Group success could include

demonstrating the fiscal advantage of not discharging lesbian and gay soldiers,

or the expansion of the recruiting pool. Unfortunately, the true validation of

combat effectiveness with an open lesbian and gay policy is probably America’s

next war. As Colin Powell was the epitome of the success of racial integration,

‘known lesbian and gay’ policy validation may require a modern day “Alexander

the Great.”

CONCLUSION

Currently, the Army does not have a plan in the event the ban on homosexual

conduct is lifted, even though trends indicate the cultural change will come.
48

Historically, the military has chosen to ignore the winds of change, and

consequently, when it comes, is ill prepared to lead the soldiers expeditiously

through cultural transformation. As so many senior leaders are quick to say, “the

Army is soldiers,” yet we are hesitant to even dialogue on those issues that

directly affect them. The Army today is no longer an authoritative dogmatic

organization, but a participatative, professional institution. The soldier of today,

in the all-volunteer force, is older and smarter than the soldier of the past. What

has not changed, though, is the critical importance of leadership. Leadership at

the senior levels will need to step away from social constraints, take

responsibility and provide the direction to shape the environment for the future

and its impact on the Army. It is incumbent on Army leaders to initiate dialogue,

to start a plan, and to ultimately lead the change. Leadership at the junior levels

must help shape the soldier’s immediate environment and create a climate of

respect and dignity for all soldiers. Leadership includes understanding the plight

of lesbian and gay soldiers who currently work and live in an environment where

the mantra of values, including integrity, is drummed everyday. Yet those

soldiers are expected to lie, hide, and be someone they are not. Leaders must

help soldiers transition from a climate where intolerance is the norm to a state

where inclusion and acceptance is the norm. Only leadership can blast through

the inertia of decades of intolerance. Only leadership can motivate the actions

needed to alter behavior in any significant way. Only leadership can get change

to stick by anchoring it in the very culture of an organization. Only leaders can

take the first step in developing an action plan in the event the law is changed.
49

APPENDIX A

Chapter Five Analysis Comparison

Kotter Model Black Model Canadian Model

Environment • Segregationist • Segregationist

Establish a Sense of

Urgency

• Presidential declaration

• Korean War

• Manpower shortages

• High complacency to

change (Army)

• Human Rights Court Case

• Acceptance of change

Create a Guiding

Coalition

• A series of coalitions • Strong top-down coalition

• Spoke with one voice

Developing a

Vision/Strategy

• Decentralized • Centralized

Communicating

vision/strategy

change

• Publicity black out

(internal and external)

• ‘Surprise’ integration

completion

announcement

• Publicity black out (only

external)

• SHARP training

Empower broadbased action

• Decentralized • Decentralized

Generate short-term

wins

• Combat effectiveness • Combat effectiveness

Consolidate Gains

• Integration of surrounding

communities

• Same-sex partner

benefits

Anchor new

approaches

• Changed attitudes • Changed attitudes
50

APPENDIX B

Background on the Army and Social Change

Whether it wants the reputation or not, the military is the US standard for

success in effecting major social programs. The civilian sector until recently did

not have the leadership or understanding of large organizations to make any

social transformations. The military, on the other hand, has a historical context of

leadership and change in large organizations. From the Revolutionary war to

World War II (WWII), the military has taken on social experimentation first out of

need (expansion of the west), and later by assuming the moral high ground

(assimilation of Negro soldiers). From the Revolutionary War to the Civil War,

the small size of the Army and its general isolation from American society

focused the military’s social action on economic programs to expand to the West.

However, the assimilation of the Negro into the armed forces of the nation, albeit

in a subservient role, provided the most significant social action during this early

period. Between the Civil War and WWII no major social action evolved besides

the late 1800’s commissioning of 700 Negro Infantry officers at the segregated

officers training camp at Des Moines, Iowa.

Historians indicate the paradigm shift in truly important sociological

programs in the military services began in WWII. Just before WWII, the US Army

did something no Army in history had ever done before. Trained psychologists,

sociologists and other experts were called in to conduct opinion research studies

(over 300 reports) of the morale problems of soldiers assigned to all types of

units. It was one of the largest social sciences projects in history. For the first
51

time on a large scale, an attempt was made to direct human behavior on the

basis of scientific findings. Integration of blacks is considered by many to be one

of the most significant social developments in American society. In the short

span of 20 years, the military establishment had been transformed from a rigidly

segregated institution into one that some view as the champion of racial equality.

After WWII, the Army changed its patterns of military authority. The Army

moved from an authoritarian system of control based on domination (physical

threats, and negative sanctions) to a system based upon the ‘techniques of

manipulation” (group persuasion and positive incentives). The army also started

to use attitude and opinion polls as a tool of management after a 1955 Gallup poll

survey of civilian attitudes toward the military. The poll results showed the

military had low prestige and that civilians regarded military service as an

onerous obligation. The military also emerged as the largest educational system

in the country.

Due to the large numbers of military personnel, the changing patterns of

military authority, and the closer identity of the military with the civilian

community, a new social awareness evolved after WWII which continues to have

a profound effect on American society.
52

ENDNOTES

 

1

 Department of the Army Office of Army Command Policy, November 07, 2000 email exchange

between author and LTC Baugh.

2

 The Department of Defense DADT policy has expanded to include “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t

Pursue, Don’t Harass”. In November 1992, President-elect Clinton (D) told Americans he

planned to lift the military’s fifty year ban on homosexuals. However, soon after taking office in

1993, Clinton faced senior military leaders and congressional opposition to lifting the ban. For the

next six months, debate ensued about the military’s ban on lesbians and gays. In July 1993, a

compromise policy was struck. The compromise, known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” allowed

lesbians and gays to serve in the military as long as they did not proclaim their homosexuality or

engage in homosexual conduct. Under the policy, military commanders would not try to find out

the sexual orientation of personnel, and lesbian and gay personnel would not disclose their

sexual orientation. The policy marked a change from past practice in that simply being

homosexual was no longer a disqualifier for military service.

3

 The term homosexual implies same-sex conduct. The terms "lesbian and gay" (male) describe

a person who identifies with a lifestyle. “Open” lesbian or gay implies a declaration of lifestyle

choice, commonly known as “coming out.” The term “known” implies an understanding of

lifestyle choice without declaration. Therefore to be inclusive and properly reflect the wishes of

currently serving lesbian and gay soldiers (per Servicemen’s Legal Defense Network or SLDN),

the term “known lesbian and gay” will be used when referring to a contingency plan.

4

 The strongest level of support for consenting lesbian and gay relations came in 1987, when fiftyfive percent of Americans approved. Gallop Organization Poll releases, April 7, 1999.

5

 Based on the noted 1956 Kinsey Study, a conservative, two to six percent of the American

population is homosexual. It is reasonable to believe that there is the same representation within

the military. Based on the 480,000 active duty population, there may be approximately 9,600 to

28,800 lesbian and gay soldiers currently serving.

6

 The Gallop Organization Poll releases, March 1, 1999.

7

 SLDN, Conduct Unbecoming: Sixth Annual Report on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue,

Don’t Harass, (hereafter referred to as SLDN, sixth annual DADT Report) 9 March 2000,

available from http://www.sldn.org; Internet; accessed September 2000. 8

 CBS Radio News Interview April 2000. 9

 In the summer of 1999, PFC Winchell was beaten to death with a baseball bat, allegedly

because he was gay.

10 Associated Press, Britain ends military ban on gays by Maureen Johnson. 13 January 2000.

Available from http://www.ap.org; Internet accessed September 2000. 11 SLDN’s Sixth Annual DADT Report. 12 Ibid.

13 Report of a National Defense Research Institute Study (RAND) on Sexual Orientation and U.S

Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

1993. Hereafter referred to as The RAND Report. Based on a 1993 Los Angeles Times Survey

& an independent Moskos/Miller Army Survey. Seventy-five percent of males in the Army

disapproved of removing the ban, and fifty-one percent of females disapproved of removing the

ban. RAND Report pg. 209.

14 SLDN Sixth Annual Report. 15 Ibid., 9. GAO 1993 dollars. This figure represents costs of retraining replacements alone and

does not include the significant expense of investigations and separations. Senator Ted Kennedy

used the figure “nearly half a billion dollars” to discharge 16,000 lesbian and gay soldiers over a

twelve year period between 1981 and 1993. (March 31, 1993 Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate

Armed Services Committee on the role of cohesion in developing combat effectiveness in relation

to a ban on homosexuals in military).

16 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change,” Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts,

1996 pg.21. Some words have been changed to make the model more ‘military-friendly’.
53

 17 MacGregor, Morris J., Jr. Integration of the Armed Forces 1940 – 1965. Washington DC:

Center of Military History, 1981. Pg. 312.

18 RAND Report, pg. 183 (Research Branch, Special Service Division, United States Army,

Attitudes of the Negro Soldier, cited in Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 305). 19 Ibid., 184. (The Gallup Organization: Survey of 3000 Adults Based on Personal Interview, June

1948).

20 Ibid. (MacGregor and Nalty eds., Blacks in the United States Armed Forces, Basic Documents,

Vol. XII, pp. 145-149).

21 The term Air Force is used throughout, but also includes the Army Air Corps and Army Air

Service, when referring prior to 1947. The Air Force was not established until the National

Security Act of 1947.

22 Incidents such as threats of mass resignations by military officers and General Omar Bradley

warning a Congressional Committee that complete integration might seriously affect morale, and

thus affect battle efficiency, were a few events designed to resist the oncoming change.

23 Named after the Committee Chair, the US Solicitor General Charles H. Fahy. 24 Paragraph three of E.O. 9881. 25 Promises included: Abolish quotas for units and schools, develop a new promotion system

based on competition without regard to race, establish a board of army officers to review

integration policies; and retain segregated units but give qualified Blacks the opportunity to gain

skills previously unattainable and assign Blacks who had acquired skills to positions where their

specialties might be applied in a manner useful to the military.

26 Named after its Chair, LTG Stephen J. Chamberlin. 27 Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, 44.

28 Martha S. Putney, When the Nation was in Need: Blacks in the Women’s Army Corps During

World War II. New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1992, pg.143. 29 Major General (Retired) Vance Coleman enlisted in a segregated Army in the later 1940’s. He

was a Field Artillery Officer, and the second black officer assigned to a newly integrated Artillery

unit at the start of the Korean War. He is currently on the talk circuit for anti-discrimination

practices in the Armed Forces. He has been interviewed by 60 minutes and other news shows

and is thinking of writing a book on his experiences in the US Army.

30 The challenge Ridgeway faced was a severe shortage of replacements for depleted white units

while accumulating a surplus of black replacements. On May 14, 1951 Ridgeway forced the issue

of integration by formally requesting authority to abolish segregation in his command, and was

approved on July 01. However, so pressing was his need that even before permission was

received from Washington, integration had already begun on the battlefield.

31 Morris MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, pg. 312. The first paragraph of

E.O. 9981 signed by Harry S. Truman on 26 July 1948.

32 The largest of the fourteen all-Black units in the Far East Command (FECOM). 33 Morris MacGregor, pg. 437. 34 Telephonic interview between the author and MG (retired) Vance Coleman, November 13,

2000.

35 The Army saw no need for publicizing the integration program. Far from precluding adverse

reaction, releasing special publicity would invite criticism.

36 Morris MacGregor, pg. 9. “The public information aspect of the proposed integration program

was a very important consideration. Properly presented, both to the public and Negro soldiers,

the discontinuance of Negro combat units would be accepted as a logical, reasonable action.

However, if an incorrect impression of the motive behind this action was imparted, the

Department of the Army might be subjected to criticism and congressional pressure.

Consequently, before implementation of the integration plan the Public Information Division was

to prepare a press release announcing the change in policy. In addition the Troop Information

and Education Division was to prepare an orientation lecture to be given to troops on the same

subject.”

37 Ibid., 379.

38 Ibid., 332.
54

 39 Ibid., 441- 444. From the Operations Research Office (ORO) which performed qualitative and

quantitative analyses of strategy, tactics, and materiel.

40 ‘Off-limits sanctions’ meant using economic sanctions (prohibiting military members from

conducting business there) against recalcitrant businessmen.

41 GAO Report to the honorable John W. Warner on Homosexuals in the military: policies and

practices of foreign countries.

42 The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities (CSSM), Report on Effects of the 1992 Lifting of

Restrictions on Gay and Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces: Appraising the Evidence. By

Aaron Belikin and Jason McNichol, Director, CSSM and Doctoral Candidate respectively.

University of California Santa Barbara. Accessed September 2000; available from

http://gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/canada_pub.htm; Internet. Hereafter referred to as CSSM Study.

CSSM is an academic research center that promotes the interdisciplinary analysis of lesbian, gay,

bisexual, transgendered and other marginalized sexual identities in the armed forces by

sponsoring conferences, fellowships and research.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Women now serve in combat arms units in combat arms roles.

46 Major Doug Claggett, Student, School of Advanced Military Studies. Interview by author, 10

November 2000, Leavenworth. Interview notes.

47 Canadian Forces recruiters would not knowingly enroll homosexuals. If servicemen or women

were discovered or announced themselves to be gay, they would be asked to leave, but they

would not be dismissed. Those who chose to stay would not be eligible for training courses,

security clearances, transfers, promotions or reenlistment. “Administrative action might be taken

to release a member of the Canadian forces who acknowledges that he or she is a homosexual

and the member concerned does not object to being released. If the member did not agree to be

release he or she would be retained with career restrictions which, ...would have meant [he or]

she was ineligible for promotion, for conversion of [his or] her existing terms of service, for posting

outside the geographic area, for transfer to the reserve force or for any further qualification

courses or training except that required to carry out restricted employment”

48 The Michelle Douglas case was probably the most notable case and received wide publicity

and public sympathy. Douglas was an Air Command Lieutenant with an exemplary service

record who had been charged with lesbianism, investigated, and had her security clearance

revoked (with additional career restrictions).

49 A low profile was kept on the implementation process and the press was required to submit all

questions relating to the policy to the public affairs office.

50 CSSM Study. 51 Ibid. Definitions: sexual misconduct: “an act which has a sexual purpose or is of a sexual or

indecent nature and which constitutes an offense under the Criminal Code or the Code of Service

Discipline”. Sexual harassment is defined as “ a type of personal, harassment that has a sexual

purpose or is of a sexual nature including, but not limited to, touching, leering, lascivious remarks,

and the display of pornographic material."

52 SHARP is similar to the US Army Consideration of Others program. 53 In all studies of countries where there is an open homosexual policy, very few gays have ‘come

out of the closet.” According to SLDN, there is still an environment of hostility, and therefore

lesbian and gay soldiers will not come out unless it is in an environment of safety. In addition,

lesbian and gay persons “come out” in stages over long periods of time due to the stigma still

associated with a homosexual act. Stages are: personal acceptance, disclosure to lesbian or gay

community, disclosure to trusted straight or heterosexuals of a close social network, and finally,

the family or fellow lesbian and gay or straight colleagues at work.

54 CSSM Study. 55 Female service members were generally more accepting than males of the sexual orientation

policy, and senior officers were overall the most dissatisfied (37.5%), and junior NCO’s were the

least dissatisfied (25.7%).

56 To date, the CF has still not formally evaluated the effects of the full removal of the ban on

lesbian and gay service in 1992. CF officials felt that making any distinction between homosexual
55

 

and heterosexual soldiers, even for the purposes of data collection, would itself be a violation of

the CF policy of treating everyone equally without regard to sexual orientation. Therefore, despite

the lack of formal analysis conducted by the CF, additional resources exist that shed light on

longer-term consequences of the full lifting of the ban.

57 CSSM Study. 58 Teasing jokes and remarks remains the most common form of sexual harassment, and actual

or attempted rape or sexual assault is the least common type of sexual harassment.

59 Same sex partners would be considered dependents for the purpose of benefits if: “...for a

continuous period of at least one year, a member has lived with a person of the same sex in a

homosexual or lesbian relationship, publicly represented that person as his/her life partner and

continues to live with that person as his/her life partner.”

60 Women servicemembers made all of the requests. 61 CSSM Study. 62 http://carlistl-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/snider.htm, Autumn, 2000

63 Literature suggests the business community is going through a global revolution and the

military through an information and technology revolution.

64 Gallup Poll Releases, Military on Top, HMOs last in public confidence poll, July 14, 1999.

Available from http://www.gallup.com//poll/releases/pr990714.asp.; Internet; accessed

September 2000.

65 This situation is almost identical, with small changes. The current attitude is more acceptance

oriented with 83%, as opposed to the 88%, and 68% Black and Canadian cases respectively.

66 DADT is considered a failure by reputable studies, and many suggest that DADT cannot stay

status quo, therefore, another policy/law is on the horizon.

67 GAO Report offers insight into twenty-three countries that have various homosexuality inclusion

programs, to include countries with more combat missions (such as Israel) have all shown no

affect of declining combat effectiveness.

68 Charles Moskos and John Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial

Integration the Army Way. Harper Collins, 2000. 69 Charles Moskos and John Butler, pg. 133. 70 RAND Survey. 71 Interview with Michelle Benecke, Director, SLDN.

72 Department of the Army Command Policy Office and Assistant Secretary of the Army,

Manpower and Reserve Affairs Office.

73 Field Manual, 3-0, 15 June 2000. Operations, DRAG edition, pg. 4-22 to 4-23. 74 Shilts, Randy. Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military. New York:

Fawcett Columbine, 1994.

75 Potential congressional coalition membership. Senate: Ted Kennedy, Jack Reed, Barbara

Boxer, and Diane Feinstein. House: Jerry Jadler, Barney Frank, and Lynn Rivers to name a few.

76 Current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, 21 July 2000. 77 Examples include, stressing how all members of the military are the same: human beings,

sworn to support and defend the US constitution, or stressing military institutional values which

stress dignity and respect toward a common mission.

78 Written by LTC Richard Matthews, Military Intelligence Officer, currently serving in Washington

DC as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, (DCSOPS) speechwriter.

79 John Kotter Leading Change.
56

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