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S. HRG. 115–195 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 23, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina, Chairman 

JONI ERNST, IOWA

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, NEW YORK

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 23, 2017 

Page 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REFORM .................................... 1 

Junor, Honorable Laura J., Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense ....................... 3 

Levine, Honorable Peter K., Performed the Duties of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense ................... 9 

Zakheim, Honorable Dov S., Former Comptroller, Department of Defense ....... 13 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 33 

APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................... 34 

(III)

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REFORM 

THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Thom Tillis 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Senators Tillis, Ernst, Gillibrand, and Warren. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOM TILLIS 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you all for being here, and I am sorry, we 

are running a little bit late. I do not like starting late. We just had 

a vote, but now we can dedicate our attention to a very important 

topic. I appreciate the ranking member and the Senator from Iowa 

joining us, and we may have other members join us later. 

But the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee meets 

this afternoon to discuss a very important topic in my mind, and 

it is civilian personnel reform. We are fortunate to have a group 

of former Department of Defense appointees with us, and I do mention ‘‘former’’ just in case people want to treat you like the current 

ones, to discuss ideas for forward-thinking reforms. 

The Honorable Dov Zakheim, the former Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller; the Honorable Peter Levine, former Deputy 

Chief Management Officer [DCMO] and official performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Was that your full title? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LEVINE. Senator, I was Acting Under Secretary, and then 

with the Vacancies Act, at a certain point, you are not allowed to 

be ‘‘acting,’’ and they give you a tongue-tying title to replace that. 

Senator TILLIS. Gotcha. The Honorable Laura Junor, former 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness. 

I think most of us know, but it bears repeating that the Department of Defense employs close to 1 million civilian employees who 

serve in capacities supporting the warfighter, such as depot maintenance, facility mechanics, administrative support, nuclear engineers, scientists, healthcare professionals, lawyers, and accountants. These individuals are an important force multiplier for the 

Department of Defense missions worldwide. Today, we will discuss 

2 

areas for improving the laws and regulations governing these employees. 

The management structure governing civilian employees is outdated, restrictive, and cumbersome. The Department of Defense 

and service branches are constantly asking for relief to make the 

system more flexible and manageable. This committee has spent 

the last few years legislating around restrictive civilian personnel 

practices, adding direct hiring authorities for scientists, students, 

acquisition personnel, and requiring stronger performance metrics 

and demanding that employees and supervisors be held accountable for mission accomplishment. 

However, these efforts are merely a start. Beginning in late 2015, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee held a series of hearings at 

the full committee level dedicated to the Department of Defense 

management overview and reform. At our November 15, 2015, 

hearing, ‘‘Overcoming Obstacles to Effective Management,’’ Mr. 

Richard Spencer, a former member of the Defense Business Board, 

testified to the challenges faced by an outdated system that 

prioritizes tenure above all else. 

He noted, ‘‘On the civilian side, we need to adopt meaningful 

management performance measurement tools and educate managers on how to use those tools in order to craft a high-performance 

Government service and Senior Executive Service cadre. 

‘‘To quote a charge-charging GS–14 [General Schedule] we interviewed, ‘How can the building compete for the best and brightest 

when the strategy for long-term success and promotion is just do 

not die?’ ’’ 

Today, we will discuss alternative strategies for effectively hiring, managing, supporting, promoting, and divesting Department of 

Defense civilian personnel. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel on the important issue of civilian personnel reform. 

Senator Gillibrand, would you like to read an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Sure. Well, thank you, Senator Tillis, for 

your leadership and holding this hearing. 

I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses as we discuss this 

important topic. 

I want to start by stating for the record how essential I believe 

the civilian workforce is to the Defense Department. They are integral to the total force. They provide continuity at all levels of the 

force, from units deployed overseas to installations in the States to 

headquarters in Washington. 

They maintain our equipment at depots throughout the Nation; 

provide contracting and legal expertise; investigate misconduct, 

fraud, and waste and abuse; and address myriad issues within the 

services, such as investigating and responding to sexual assault 

and hazing. They are Americans who are committed to our national 

defense and may spend a lifetime performing vital work on behalf 

of the Nation in the capital region, across the country, and across 

the globe. 

In recent years, this committee and this Congress have used the 

civilian workforce as a target for cost cutting, with little focus on 

3 

the larger strategic picture of how we recruit and retain the best 

people to support our warfighters. Congress reduced the civilian 

workforce’s retirement benefits twice and mandated across-theboard reductions to workforce that were completely divorced from 

strategic purpose or consideration for health of the force. 

These measures have hurt morale, and they inhibit the Government’s ability to properly shape this workforce. Under President 

Trump, management of civilian workforce has deteriorated further. 

Days after his election, the President instituted a Government-wide 

hiring freeze, which, though it has a national security exemption, 

has led to the confusion, frustration, and disarray within our civilian workforce. 

As just one example, my office has fielded calls from concerned 

military parents whose DOD [Department of Defense] school cannot hire teachers and whose military child care center cannot hire 

staff needed to address child care shortages. I know many others 

on both sides of the aisle are receiving similar complaints. 

There is a better approach to civilian personnel reform, which focuses on improving the Department’s ability to hire talented individuals, sharpens the incentives to manage the workforce, and ensures the integrity of the workforce by enforcing merit principles 

and competitive hiring practices. 

I thank the chair, Senator Tillis, for holding this hearing so we 

can hear directly from these experts about how to more efficiently 

and effectively manage DOD’s civilian workforce to shape the force 

we need today and into the future. 

Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not point out that most, if not 

all, legislation in this area is actually in the primary jurisdiction 

of the Homeland Security Committee and Government Affairs 

Committee, which Senator McCaskill is ranking on. 

Again, I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator Warren, welcome to the committee. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you for attending. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TILLIS. We will start with the witness statements, and 

we will begin with Dr. Junor. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LAURA J. JUNOR, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. JUNOR. Thank you, Chairman Tillis, Ranking Member Gillibrand, for allowing me to come and talk about a workforce that I 

have the utmost respect for. 

I have already submitted my written testimony. So I would like 

to just briefly cover some of the observations and thoughts I have 

on reform. 

Over the course of my career, the vast majority of my colleagues 

have been high performers, if not overachievers, even in the midst 

of furloughs, pay freezes, and a constant rhetoric about how they 

more often detract from the business of the Government—of the 

Department rather than being part of the critical enabler. 

4 

In fact, most of the frustration I have observed is not with the 

DOD’s civilians themselves. Rather, it has been with the inflexible 

human resource system that governs them. 

For example, I have observed that it is hard to hire employees 

especially if you require particular skills for a position. It is also 

surprisingly difficult to hold employees accountable for poor performance or violating clearly established departmental or Federal 

policies. Finally, I found that it is difficult to adapt the inventory 

of Federal civilians even when the work goes away or substantively 

changes. 

For example, consider my experience on Secretary Gates’ efficiencies task force in 2010. As I am sure you are aware, Secretary 

Gates wanted to shift the Department’s resources away from overhead and towards activities more closely aligned with warfighting 

capabilities. 

Rather than repeating mistakes of blind percentage-based reductions, he preferred the painstaking approach within OSD [Office of 

the Secretary of Defense] of identifying and then eliminating lowpriority lines of work and the staff that was associated with them. 

In the end, we found that adjusting the inventory of the traditional 

Title V workforce was much harder than we expected it to be. 

I believe there are some changes that could yield a more efficient 

workforce. First, publicly recognize the talent and significance of 

our civilian workforce. Again, this workforce has been plagued by 

furloughs, pay freezes, and this rhetoric that systemically associates them with being more of a burden to the Department than a 

critical enabler. It is hard to believe that we will continue to attract 

top talent with this as a background vocal. 

In addition, we should consider finding the right balance among 

Federal civilian, military, and contract labor forces. Each one of 

these labor pools has pros and cons. Imagine what we could do if 

we allocated work based on those attributes alone. 

We should also evolve towards flexible hiring authority, specifically the use of Title X, term employees, and I want to point out 

that I am currently sitting in a Title X term billet right now. That 

is how I am employed at the National Defense University. 

Finally, I want to consider holding supervisors more directly responsible for the performance of their subordinates and also supporting their validated employee assessments. 

In closing, I am proud to serve as a DOD civilian and humbled 

by the talent of my colleagues. This is an important topic. Thank 

you again for holding this hearing, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Junor follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LAURA J. JUNOR, PHD 

The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not reflect those of the 

National Defense University or the Department of Defense. 

Chairman Tillis and Ranking Member Gillibrand, thank you for allowing me the 

opportunity to talk about a workforce for which I have the deepest respect. I’ve 

spent the majority of the last two decades analyzing military readiness, and in the 

course of those analyses I’ve learned that the quality of our people is the single 

greatest determinant of the readiness of our force. We know that this finding extends to Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel as well; these folks are 

the artisans at our maintenance depots, the medical professionals that care for the 

physical and mental well-being of our 9 million beneficiaries, the intelligence anaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
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1From the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service FY2017 DOD Appropriated Fund Population Summary. 

lysts and cyber security experts that keep us safe, and the scientists and engineers 

that are solving tangible operational problems today and developing new capabilities 

for tomorrow. Attracting and maintaining a high-quality, high-functioning federal 

workforce is a critical enabler of DOD’s mission, yet those that have worked in this 

personnel system are well acquainted with its challenges. I am honored to share 

with you my observations as a member and senior manager of this workforce. I will 

close with my thoughts on evolving the federal workforce in ways that benefit both 

the employees and their mission. 

OBSERVATIONS

I’ve observed the typical DOD civilian to be a dedicated professional who takes 

the mission of the Department very seriously. Contrary to stereotypes, over the 

course of my career the vast majority of my colleagues have been high performers, 

if not overachievers, even in the midst of furloughs and perennial pay freezes. The 

typical federal civilian has marketable professional or technical skills and is not employed in the Washington, DC area. The average worker is about 47 years old with 

12 years of service. 1

Our civil service system today is based on the same merit principles on which it 

was founded in 1883; and there’s a lot of goodness in those principles. For example, 

we should: 

• Recruit, select, and advance our people on the basis of merit, after fair and open 

competition • Treat employees and applicants fairly and equitably • Provide equal pay for work of equal value and reward excellent performance • Retain or separate employees on the basis of their performance • Protect employees from reprisal for lawful disclosures (whistleblower rights) • Create an environment that encourages the development of new talent and 

ideas 

However the way that we have ‘‘operationalized’’ those principles ends up being 

extremely restrictive and that’s detrimental to our mission and to our workforce. 

Most of the frustration I’ve observed is not with DOD employees themselves. It’s 

been with the inflexibility of the human resources system that governs them. In 

fact, we’re not talking about only one system; DOD has more than 66 different pay 

systems, and each has its own set of laws, regulations, and policies. 

It is hard to hire employees especially if you require particular skills for a position. 

According to my colleagues in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R), it takes between 80 and 150 days to hire 

someone in DOD, and that is when things go smoothly. In 2014, I attempted to hire 

an experienced, Title V General Service (GS)–14 readiness analyst. I was looking 

for an excellent writer, with demonstrated analytic skills and experience in some 

facet of readiness management. I gave up after nearly a year of frustration. Here’s 

what I learned. First, in order to hire someone, you have to have an authority. We 

have at least 34 hiring authorities; that means a different set of regulations and 

processes for each authority. We have so many authorities, that in many cases, we 

don’t know the rules for using them, or when we do know the rules, they are applied 

differently depending on where you work. 

For example, an excellent pathway to bring in new, skilled talent to the federal 

workforce is through the National Security Education Program Boren (NSEP) Scholars and Fellows program, which provides federal funding to bright undergraduate 

and graduate students to study the languages and cultures most critical to national 

security. However, to date, not enough federal human resources professionals know 

that Congress has provided direct hiring authority for this talented group of students. More simply, we give these students funding to fill a critical security need, 

require them to pay that funding back with federal service, and then struggle to 

find them positions in which to serve. Similarly, we typically only use a small percentage of the Department’s authorized allotment of Highly Qualified Experts 

(HQEs). The Department has recently streamlined this process, but the true demand for HQEs is still likely more than the amount we are bringing on board. 

Again, many federal human resources professionals are probably unclear about the 

myriad of hiring options. 

The second thing that I learned as I attempted to hire a readiness analyst is that 

describing the required skills or performance standards for a job is surprisingly centralized. These standards also factor into how much we can pay an employee. ClearVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
6 

ly, setting accurate and current performance standards is a critical element of hiring and managing employee performance. Under one of our pay systems, the General Schedule, jobs are ‘‘classified’’ based on a set of standards; in many cases, these 

standards are outdated or irrelevant. For example, the standard for ‘‘computer 

science’’ was developed in 1988. The standard for telecommunications was developed 

in 1990. It can take years to update or develop a new standard. Information Technology (IT) standards were updated in 2011 after three years of work. Given 

changes in IT, they are likely out of date again. 

It is extraordinarily difficult to adapt the inventory of federal civilians even when 

the work goes away or substantively changes. 

Consider my experience on Secretary Gates’s efficiency task force in 2010. Faced 

with 3 years of $1 trillion federal budget deficits, two demanding wars, increasing 

concerns about China, and a growing realization that the economy was disintegrating into a national security concern, Secretary Gates wanted to shift the Department’s resources from overhead activities to those activities that directly contributed 

to warfighting capabilities. Rather than repeating the mistakes of past blind percentage-based reductions, he preferred a painstaking approach of identifying and 

then eliminating low-priority lines of work and the staff that was associated with 

them. His initial focus was on his own organization, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). His own hand-picked team worked with the OSD staff to identify 

these low-priority production lines, inventory the associated personnel and funding, 

and ultimately eliminate them in the next budget submission. We underestimated 

how difficult this was going to be. Without a reduction in force (RIF), the people 

that were associated with these billets remained a part of OSD, despite the fact that 

their work went away. Now the Department had the responsibility to find them 

other jobs. Many were placed in positions for which they were well matched. But 

many were placed more out of a need to find them ‘‘any’’ position rather than 

whether they were well qualified for a particular position. There were others that 

literally drifted without a billet for years. We had written into our procedures for 

addressing these personnel a provision that kept them from turning down more 

than one offer; we had not considered the prospect that some—many of them senior 

executives—would not receive an offer, even after repeated interviews. While the 

number of individuals in this category was very small, it does illustrate some of the 

challenges with the traditional title 5 system. 

There are also few options for adapting a traditional title 5 organization to 

changes in the nature of work, such as those that arise because the work becomes 

more technical or requires new sets of advanced skills. Consider the Defense Language Institute (DLI), an organization primarily composed of title 10 instructors, 

each of whom is a native language speaker hired on a term basis. At DLI, the organization’s demand signal is defined as the number of students for each language. 

As you can imagine, this demand signal changes significantly over time as different 

areas of the world become concerning. In the Cold War, for example, proficient Russian speakers were in high demand. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved, 

different Middle Eastern languages became more critical. Now, DLI is likely seeing 

another swing in student requirements as Russia and the Balkans become increasingly concerning again. Because these are title 10 instructors, DLI could always adjust the workforce accordingly, thus avoiding the need to figure out how to get Japanese or Spanish instructors to teach Farsi, or more recently, how to get Farsi instructors to teach Russian. 

It is surprisingly difficult to hold employees accountable for poor performance or violating clearly established departmental or federal policies. 

Resolving cases of low performers or employees who engage in misconduct is a 

sensitive issue, and it should be. Let me begin with two clarifying points. First, I’ve 

only ever experienced a handful of these cases in all of the years that I’ve been employed by or associated with DOD. Second, although this problem is small, it matters a lot. The harm done by not resolving these cases is often born by employees 

across the whole of the affected organization. Again, this is a population that takes 

enormous pride in their mission and, when faced with a peer that is not holding 

up their part of the work, they often attempt to make up for that loss. In the case 

of an employee who engages in malfeasance, the peers often bear the brunt of the 

issue. Supervisors are duty-bound to protect their organizations from these effects, 

and most recognize that. Few follow through though. Based on my experiences, 

here’s why I think that is. 

First, it takes years of copious record keeping and evidence gathering to even 

begin holding an employee accountable. In my experience, even documented evidence from 3rd parties (e.g., inappropriate activity on federal computers, time card 

7 

2 A summary of this research is in Daniel H. Pink, Drive: The Surprising Truth About What 

Motivates Us (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009). 3 Bob Hale, the former Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer in DOD, made the same point 

in his recent publication. Robert F. Hale, ‘‘Business Reform in the Department of Defense: An 

Agenda for the Next Administration’’ in Defense Strategies and Assessments (Washington, DC: 

Center for a New American Security, November 2016). 

fraud, and inappropriate contract management) or disconcerting results from repeated formal climate surveys were insufficient to overcome the reticence of senior 

leaders, labor management relations personnel, and attorneys, to move forward with 

action against an employee in excess of a minor counseling session. This is based 

on the fear of retaliatory complaints and law-suits from the poorly performing personnel. Employees must be protected from unsubstantiated or spurious accusations 

from their leaders; there is no question about that. But I found that even with clear 

and convincing evidence of misconduct or poor performance, there is almost no support for imposing meaningful penalties, much less undertaking the termination of 

an employee. 

Complicating matters, I’ve observed supervisors’ tendencies to over-rate average 

or even poorly performing employees. This is likely true for three reasons: 

• It is simply easier for supervisors to give a satisfactory rating. There is little 

justification required and it preserves peace in the organization. • If it’s a title 5 employee, that employee will likely stay in that position for many 

more years, even if their performance is rated below average. Put slightly differently, there is little short-term gain from a low assessment, and the potential 

for a great deal of loss, especially if the employee files a formal complaint as 

a result of the appraisal. • There is a credible fear of the employee filing a retaliatory formal complaint 

against a supervisor. It typically takes a year or longer for most of these complaints to resolve, leaving both the employee and the supervisor in a very difficult position. 

REFORM THOUGHTS

I’ve argued that the civilian workforce is a critical enabler of DOD’s mission, but 

there are real challenges in how we manage this workforce that constrain its extraordinary potential. What follows are my thoughts for how to address these challenges. 

Publically recognize the talent and significance of our civilian workforce. 

This workforce has been plagued by furloughs, pay freezes, and worst yet, systematic rhetoric that our civilian employees detract from DOD’s mission, rather than 

serving as a critical enabler. It is hard to believe that we will continue to attract 

top talent with this as a background vocal. There is a body of research that suggests 

that mastering a skill and making a contribution are even more powerful personnel 

motivators than fiscal rewards. 2 The converse is also true; the effects of careless 

disparagement of individuals that have mastered their craft and are contributing in 

meaningful ways is harmful and unnecessary. 3

Find the right balance among the federal civilian, military and contract labor forces. 

Although Secretary Gates’s efforts to reduce overhead spending were much harder 

to accomplish than any of us realized, his objection to blind, ‘‘salami slice’’ cuts was 

well founded. Reducing any aspect of this workforce without reducing the actual 

work that goes with it will exacerbate existing inefficiencies and performance problems and jeopardize the mission. Such cuts are also likely to result in an eventual 

resurgence of some aspect of the workforce that has been ‘‘eliminated’’, despite the 

best attempts to prohibit that. There are pros and cons to utilizing each of the broad 

labor categories: civilian, military, and contractor, and when the work is allocated 

based on these attributes, we can and should expect to achieve a more effective and 

efficient workforce. That said, such an outcome requires policy and legislative tools 

to adapt the federal workforce; I will discuss those below. 

As a means of finding real workforce efficiencies, consider the potential benefits 

from modernizing the human resources IT systems that we use to track and manage 

civilian and military personnel. Both are in tremendous need of updating. Upgrades 

offer the very real potential of saving significant labor while providing a significantly better product. For example, the military personnel management system remains as paper-intensive as it was in the 1950s. Even today, retiring personnel are 

told to make copies of their personnel records; typically hundreds of pages. We’ve 

invested in a very expensive electronic health record, but the very first medical form 

is the scan of a piece of paper from a Military Entrance Processing Station. On the 

8 

4 IPA stands for Intergovernmental Personnel Act. This is a program sponsored by the Office 

of Personnel Management that allows for the ‘‘temporary assignment of personnel between the 

civilian side, the myriad of human resources systems are equally inefficient, often 

inaccurate and incomplete, and lack the ability to ‘‘talk to’’ one another. Again, a 

modern system would certainly reduce labor and error costs as well as increase productivity. 

Evolve toward simpler, flexible hiring authorities. 

The single biggest challenge that I’ve experienced in managing the civilian workforce is the inability to shape that workforce. That includes moving people with specific skills into jobs that require those specific skills and removing those that are 

either not performing well or those whose skills are no longer needed. I’ve found 

that title 10 offers a great deal of flexibility, while maintaining incentives that will 

attract a quality workforce. I have managed title 10 workforces and am currently 

occupying a title 10 positon. 

I’ve already described the critical workforce shaping advantages this authority 

provides to DLI. I am currently employed at the National Defense University (NDU) 

where 80 percent of teaching and research faculty are title 10. There is no evidence 

that this causes a problem attracting and retaining a talented workforce. In fact, 

my peers and I—each of whom has been hired for a particular and finite term of 

years—don’t mind being held to challenging but fair performance standards, even 

at the risk of not being renewed for another term. This is an overachieving workforce that gains a lot of satisfaction from being recognized as authorities in their 

fields. The organizational risk of having such high performing employees is that 

they are extremely marketable and can be lured away at any moment. Retention 

has to be explicitly managed. At NDU, we do this with academic freedom, retention 

incentives, and publication support. 

I understand the concerns of many that moving toward a title 10 civilian workforce would appear to forsake the tenets of a merit-based civil service system, potentially increasing the potential for unscrupulous managers to mistreat or mismanage 

applicants for vacant positions and subordinates. This risk can be minimized. NDU 

employs a governing Talent Management Review Board to ensure that our personnel are treated fairly and with respect. The typical term for an NDU employee 

is three years; this term can be renewed indefinitely, but each time, a decision to 

renew (or not) is made deliberately, based on an employee’s performance and the 

University’s requirements. NDU requires that every term employee be notified 

about whether they will be renewed at least a year before the end of their term. 

Each of these decisions is proposed by the employee’s supervisor, but must be approved by the board. More specifically, an employee’s supervisor, two years prior to 

the end of the term, recommends whether that employee is on target for renewal. 

If the issue is performance, the employee will have another year to improve before 

a final decision is rendered on his or her renewal. If the issue is a change in the 

University’s requirement—meaning that the individual’s skills are no longer needed—the employee’s term is simply not renewed. 

A title 10 workforce means that there will be more employee turnover than we 

see with title 5 employees. That means new people will join organizations and bring 

with them new skills and perspectives. This ensures that the demand and supply 

for labor remains in sync. Both of these are great attributes that contribute to a 

highly effective organization. It also means that some people will have to leave the 

organization before they are ready to do so, and that can be hard. That is unavoidable, but it is a reality that millions of people in both the public and private sectors 

manage successfully throughout their careers. We owe employees a fair and predictable system and we can do that even, while at the same time affording both DOD 

and our employees greater flexibility. 

Not every organization would benefit from a title 10 workforce. But title 10 does 

seem to fit organizations with the following characteristics: 

• The potential for the nature of the work to change significantly over time • Work associated with technical/professional skills that require currency 

Furthermore, organizations should be delegated decisions over the critical elements of implementing a title 10 workforce. These include: • Term length (e.g., 2 to 5 years) • Establishment of clear performance metrics • Renewability (limits on the number of terms authorized or indefinite) • Competitive salaries 

• Other perks, such as education and training support, telework agreements, 

sabbaticals, or IPA-type 4 experiences within and outside of government to retain highly performing employees 

9 

Federal Government and state and local governments, colleges and universities, Indian tribal 

governments, federally funded research and development centers, and other eligible organizations’’. These assignments are for a finite term; usually one or two years with the potential to 

renew the term once. From <opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-information/intergovernmentpersonnel-act>. 

Hold supervisors responsible for the performance of their subordinates and support 

their validated employee assessments. 

The most basic reform must address the failure to identify current, job-specific 

performance standards and to hold employees to those standards. Moving to a title 

10 authority will not be useful if supervisors don’t know what good performance 

looks like or are unwilling to hold employees accountable for that performance. This 

begins with decentralizing position descriptions and performance standards to reflect current requirements of individual vacancies. Supervisors are responsible for 

accurately assessing each individual’s ability to meet those requirements. Holding 

supervisors personally accountable for the work of their subordinates is essential. 

Each supervisor should have in one of his or her performance objectives an element 

that addresses how well their employees perform individually and as an organization. For example, if an employee fails on a project, the supervisor’s rating should 

reflect whether the supervisor actively addressed that failure. Conversely, supervisors should be rewarded when individuals and the collective improve. There is no 

way to avoid the supervisor’s fear of retaliatory charges associated with low performance ratings or holding employees accountable for major policy violations. Employees must have the means to signal unfair or unethical supervisor treatment. 

However, we can and should expect all charges to be reconciled within six months. 

Faster resolution would benefit everyone. 

In closing, I am proud to serve as a DOD civilian and humbled by the talent and 

dedication of my colleagues. We can provide a more rewarding work experience and 

a better mission outcome by simplifying our hiring authorities, decentralizing their 

implementation, tailoring performance standards and position descriptions to the 

specific requirements of each job, and definitively recognizing both good and bad 

performance. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Dr. Junor. 

Mr. Levine? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PETER K. LEVINE, PERFORMED 

THE DUTIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

PERSONNEL AND READINESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Gillibrand, 

members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for taking on this issue. I think it is a tremendously 

important issue, and I agree with—with I think everything that 

Dr. Junor just said. 

I would like to—you have my written statement. So I would like 

to just focus again on a few key points. 

First, the DOD’s civilian workforce is not only incredibly important. It is also an incredibly diverse workforce. We have everything 

from nurses to truck drivers to people who make foreign policy recommendations, and I think that you need to understand that, and 

I hope that you will keep that in mind and avoid ‘‘one size fits all’’ 

solutions, thinking that the same solution that we need for the policy adviser is also appropriate for the truck driver. 

With that said, I would like to specifically address a number of 

the topics that you raised in your invitation letter. First, hiring. It 

seems to me that the single most important thing that you could 

do in hiring is the step that you took last year by giving DOD direct hiring authority for students and recent graduates. 

I know when I was in the Department, we really appreciated 

that, and if there were one thing I could urge you to do, it would 

be to make that authority permanent. If you were going to look for 

10 

other areas to reduce red tape, I would suggest giving the Department its own classification authority independent of OPM. 

I would—you might also want to think about establishing a separate DOD SES [Senior Executive Service] workforce, a defense SES 

workforce so that DOD would be able to hire its own SES employees independent of OPM [Office of Personnel Management] review 

and approval. I cannot tell you how long and aggravating that 

OPM review and approval process is. 

Second, with regard to pay systems, DOD has long benefited 

from the flexible pay authorities that Congress has authorized for 

science and technology employees, acquisition employees, medical 

professionals, the cyber employees, and I support these kinds of authorities—the expansion of these kinds of authorities to financial 

managers, policy experts, and other knowledge workers. 

I think there are a variety of approaches you could consider for 

these kinds of knowledge workers, including the use of step increases based on performance rather than tenure, more flexible 

bonus authority. I think it is extraordinary right now, and I do not 

know how many people know this. But an SES employee can get 

up to 15 to 20 percent of their salary, their base salary in bonuses, 

but a GS–15 is limited to about 1 percent. Now that is not a balance in terms of incentives that makes a lot of sense to me. 

The one thing I would be cautious about is an across-the-board 

pay banding approach like what the Department tried with the 

NSPS [National Security Personnel System] system, and that is because, again, looking at the diversity of the workforce, the authorities that the Department needs for its high-tech professionals and 

knowledge workers may not be appropriate for clerical workers or 

truck drivers, wrench turners, warehouse workers, and others. 

Experience shows that it will take a lot of effort for the Department to establish that to try to impose that kind of authority. In 

the past, that undermined the entire effort, and the effort to reform 

DOD personnel practices were lost over that. 

Third, performance management. I was personally disappointed 

by the recent change in the DOD performance management system 

that makes it more—that eliminated—reduced the number of evaluation categories, making it more difficult to distinguish employees 

who show consistent hard work from those who just meet minimum 

requirements. This may be the right answer for some parts of the 

workforce, but I would advocate again, at least for the knowledgebased workforce of the Department, restoring a fourth evaluation 

category so that those employees who go above and beyond requirements can be rewarded for their effort. 

Finally, with regard to preference eligibilities, I think that the 

committee made a noble effort last year to address this issue, even 

though the language that you drafted proved problematic because 

of unintended consequences for the veterans preference, and I 

would suggest that if you choose to address the issue again, it 

would be wisest to focus specifically on internal promotions and to 

clarify that internal promotions are to be merit based, with preferences as a tie-breaking factor. That would then ensure that the 

role of preferences for all outside hires would remain unchanged. 

11 

I appreciate your inviting me here today. I appreciate your taking on these difficult issues. They are very complex, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levine follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PETER LEVINE

Chairman Tillis, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Members of the Subcommittee, it 

is a pleasure to appear before your Subcommittee this afternoon. The views I express are entirely my own, and should not be interpreted as reflecting any position 

of my new employer, the Institute for Defense Analyses. 

As you know, I worked on the staff of the Armed Services Committee for 18 years, 

and I place a tremendous value on the work that you do to support our men and 

women in uniform and their families. As the Subcommittee undertakes the important task of civilian personnel reform, I would suggest that you take into account 

a few considerations. 

First, the civilian employees of the Department of Defense are an essential pillar 

of the Department on which our military relies to perform its critical missions 

around the world every day. 

DOD civilians administer highly complex and legislatively mandated personnel 

and pay systems. They run training and education programs, manage travel and 

change of duty stations, and provide security, support, and facilities sustainment on 

military bases. They help address problems like sexual assault, suicides, bullying 

and hazing, and drug abuse. They provide financial advice, voting assistance, and 

family life counseling to Service members around the world. They play key roles in 

running 664 hospitals and clinics, 172 schools for military children, 1,880 retail 

stores, and 2,390 restaurants for our men and women in uniform. 

DOD civilians also serve as operational enablers in the intelligence and cyber domains, and are essential to warfighter training and combat system and equipment 

readiness. They help manage and oversee more than $200 billion a year in acquisition spending and run the largest and most sophisticated research and development 

activity in the world. They operate depots and arsenals that maintain and recapitalize a huge inventory of the most complex and advanced fighting equipment in 

human history. They are the life-blood of a logistics system that works 24 hours a 

day, 365 days a year to ensure that military equipment and supplies are ready 

when and where needed, anywhere in the world, and often with little or no notice. 

Second, the vast majority of DOD civilian employees are highly motivated, hardworking, and strive to perform with excellence. In my time at DOD, I found that 

the career civilians who surrounded me believe strongly in the importance of the 

Department’s mission and want to contribute to it. New projects and new work are 

embraced enthusiastically by employees who work long hours without any reward 

beyond the challenge of the work itself and the understanding that the results they 

produce are valued by the Department’s leadership. 

This, in my view, is the great competitive advantage of the Department of Defense 

in the employee marketplace. DOD will never be able to pay its civilian employees 

as much as the private sector. What the Department can offer instead is challenging 

assignments, great responsibility, and the pride that comes from serving a cause 

that is greater than oneself. Of course, this also means that when we treat DOD 

civilians as worthless bureaucrats who are sucking up money that could be better 

spent on more ships and planes, we risk undermining the competitive advantage 

that enables us to attract and motivate the capable employees we need to support 

the national defense mission. 

Third, the laws, rules, and practices governing the civil service system at DOD 

have become overly bureaucratic and stultified over the years. As a result, it is more 

difficult than it should be to hire the talent that the Department needs, to remove 

workers who aren’t up to the job, and to advance capable employees into the positions in which they can contribute the most. Capable military and civilian leaders 

at the Department are generally able to work within the existing system to get the 

results they need, but it can be frustrating and time-consuming for everyone involved. 

For example, when I was serving as Acting Under Secretary for Personnel and 

Readiness, it came to my attention that when a civilian employee moves from one 

DOD component to another—for example, from the Army to the Navy, or from the 

Air Force to the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA]—he or she was treated as a new 

employee. That meant getting a new ID [identification] card, a new drug test, and 

12 

repeating mandatory training events the employee had already completed in the 

previous position. By establishing reciprocity in these areas, we were able to save 

more than $25 million dollars a year—and avoid countless hours of aggravation for 

employees who no longer have to undergo these meaningless requirements. 

This Committee has already enacted significant new flexibilities that enable the 

Department to better manage its civilian workforce. These include demonstration 

programs providing flexibilities for science and technology employees, for acquisition 

employees, for intelligence employees, for medical professionals, and most recently 

for cyber employees. They include the direct hiring authority that you enacted last 

year, and the revised Reduction in Force authority that you enacted the year before 

that. 

Here’s how important these reforms are: two years ago, one of my SES managers 

complained to me that her aging workforce was reluctant to embrace new technologies. A second manager said that she didn’t have this problem—her workforce 

skewed young and adopted new technologies on their own without prompting. The 

difference was that the second manager was in the Acq Demo program, with direct 

hiring authority that greatly enhanced her ability to bring recent graduates into the 

workforce. The legislation you enacted last year provides this critical authority to 

the entire Department of Defense. 

So, we have a highly capable and motivated civilian workforce, working in a 

clunky personnel system that too often impedes their performance. This isn’t a contradiction, but it does mean that while reform is needed to improve workforce management, the reform effort must be carefully targeted to ensure that it addresses 

what is broken without undermining the large and diverse civilian workforce on 

which the Department relies today. 

I would suggest that the committee consider three principles to ensure that your 

reform efforts build and improve upon DOD’s civilian workforce and do not risk 

breaking it. 

First, beware of one-size-fits-all solutions. A reform that works for scientists and 

engineers in defense laboratories might not meet the needs of wrench-turners in the 

depots and arsenals. 

When I served as DCMO, I learned that the hiring process in the Pentagon was 

hamstrung, in part, because we relied on a standard questionnaire applied by the 

Defense Logistics Agency to determine who was ‘‘best qualified’’ for a position. Because this questionnaire failed to serve as an effective screen, hiring managers 

spent countless hours refining position descriptions to ensure that their new hires 

were actually qualified. 

I got around this problem by authorizing hiring managers to use panels of subject 

matter experts, in lieu of the DLA questionnaire, to determine who was really ‘‘best 

qualified’’ for a position. I did not make this process mandatory, however, because 

the Director of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency told me that he needed to be 

able to hire several hundred new law enforcement officers at a time, and it would 

not be practical for him to use expert panels in lieu of a screening test. This was 

an important lesson for me in the diverse needs of different parts of the DOD civilian workforce. 

Second, don’t reinvent more than you have to. Our civil service system is incredibly complex. It has thousands of pages of rules—but that is because there are thousands of issues that human resource managers must address, and they cannot do 

so without guidance. 

Back in the 1990s, when then-Vice President Gore was leading a task force on 

‘‘reinventing government,’’ he made a big show of throwing out the civil service rule 

book as a streamlining measure. I remember being told at the time that savvy 

human resource managers kept bootleg copies of the rules, because the same questions were still going to come up and they were still going to need to know how to 

answer them. 

A few years later, when Congress authorized the Department of Defense to establish a new ‘‘National Security Personnel System,’’ the Department spent countless 

hours writing new rules to replace the old ones. NSPS made changes to parts of the 

system that probably needed change, but it also changed parts of the system that 

were working perfectly well. In the end it failed because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that probably weren’t necessary at all, and this 

failure dragged down the prospect of constructive reform—in areas where it remains 

very much needed—for another decade. 

Finally, any reform effort should treat employees as allies, not enemies. I know, 

for example, that there is great interest in making it easier to remove poor performers. It is true that the Department has a very small number of civilian employees who simply aren’t up to the job or refuse to carry their share of the workload. 

13 

These employees can be a drag on the rest of the workforce, and are very difficult 

to remove. 

A large part of the problem is that few DOD managers believe it is worth the time 

and effort required to go through a performance improvement process that can take 

more than a year to complete. At least in the short run, they are probably right: 

the overall productivity of a program or office is likely to go down, not up, if the 

senior manager is required to spend huge quantities of time on an employee who 

produces a tiny amount of work. The kind of managers we want in the Department—the kind of people who are motivated by the mission—would rather spend 

their time on substantive work, even if it means leaving an unproductive employee 

on the payroll. 

As you consider possible measures to address this issue, however, you consider 

the impact that any proposed changes would have on the balance of the workforce. 

If legislation that is intended to address a problem with one percent of the workforce is perceived as threatening and hostile by the other 99 percent, it may undermine morale and reduce the Department’s ability to attract and retain the capable 

employees that it needs. The civilian workforce will not become more productive if 

problem with a small number of poor performers is addressed with measures that 

are perceived as a declaration of war on all employees. 

Fortunately, I believe that there are steps that Congress and the Department 

could take to make it easier for managers to remove poor performers within the existing rules, without threatening the vast majority of the workforce whose performance and work ethic does so much for the Department every day. 

For example, this Committee recently enacted legislation that established a twoyear probationary period for DOD civilian employees, but the Department has done 

little to take advantage of that legislation. What if DOD were to institute a routine 

review, before the expiration of the probationary period, to assess the employee’s 

performance and determine deliberately whether or not he or she should be retained 

as a tenured employee? 

With regard to the existing removal process, why not offer assistance to managers 

rather than requiring them to bear the burden of the performance improvement 

process alone? Isn’t it possible that by establishing a few dedicated performance improvement managers in an agency, we would change the managers’ calculus, opening a route for them to remove unproductive employees without sacrificing countless 

hours of their own time to the effort? 

These are difficult issues, but important ones. I thank the Subcommittee for taking on the issue of civilian personnel reform, and I thank you for inviting me to participate in your review. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Levine. 

Dr. Zakheim? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DOV S. ZAKHEIM, FORMER 

COMPTROLLER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, thank you, Chairman Tillis and Ranking 

Member Gillibrand and members of the committee. 

I appreciate your giving me the chance to testify on this issue. 

I have also submitted written testimony, and I would request that 

it be included in the record, if that is okay? 

I do not disagree with much of what you just heard, but I would 

go further and wider. First of all, and maybe this is because I not 

at all that long ago was a green eyeshade, DOD civilian personnel 

account for about 36 percent of all full-time DOD personnel, including the Guard and Reserves that serve full time. 

In the past 15 years, DOD has added 77,000 more civilians. That 

represents an 11.5 percent jump in the workforce since 2002. Military end strength declined by 8 percent, or 120,000 personnel, in 

the same time frame. 

Over those 15 years, civilian pay increased by a very healthy 31 

percent, and most of that increase went to General Schedule white 

collar workers. The blue collar wage board—it is about one-third of 

the total civilian force—their pay actually declined in fiscal year 

14 

2017 dollars by about 5.5 percent. So you got a real imbalance right 

there. At the same time, of course, as you know, total military pay 

for Actives and full-time Guard and Reserve barely rose at all, 0.2 

percent. 

So with civilian pay consuming a significant portion of the budget and in light of other needs in the defense enterprise, whether 

it is to increase Active Duty end strength or enhance readiness or 

provide more funding for acquisition, you have got to look at 

whether the productivity of the civilian workforce justifies the resources it has consumed over the last decade and a half, and I 

think the answer is clear. It simply has not. 

It is highly questionable whether defense civilians—not all of 

them, obviously—are making the most of information technology 

systems that are available to them, operating at the cutting edge 

of cyber technology, or acting as an educated consumer when procuring the vast range of high-tech systems that combine with our 

military personnel and comprise the lifeblood of our fighting power. 

Finally, the availability of contractors to carry out many of the 

same missions as the civilian staff, which we politely term ‘‘staff 

augmentation,’’ has often resulted in civilians offloading to contractors works for which they are themselves responsible with the result that what is produced is more costly and often, in my personal 

experience, less than adequate to the task. 

I am first going to talk about manpower efficiencies and then 

talk to some training and education issues and the issue of staff 

augmentation. GAO [Government Accountability Office], in December 2015, reporting on just the acquisition workforce, said that the 

Department had yet to identify and certainly not address all the 

gaps in civilian skills, and I am quoting here, ‘‘that are essential 

for effective human capital management.’’ 

At the time of the report, DOD had not an updated its acquisition workforce plan, and at that time, it appeared that DOD had 

not established time frames for addressing these concerns, all of 

which go to the heart of workforce efficiency. Not clear to me how 

much progress has been made in the past year. 

Then in October of 2016—in other words, 6 months ago—GAO 

addressed the entire workforce, and it said that DOD had ‘‘not developed and implemented an efficiencies plan for reducing civilian 

and contracted services workforces.’’ In fact, DOD, according to 

GAO, seemed to be circumventing the intention of Section 955 of 

the 2013 NDAA, which called for this kind of a plan to cover fiscal 

years 2012–2017. 

Section 955 allowed DOD to exclude required reductions that it 

identified as critical, and the Department—and this is not the first 

time I have seen this happen in my career—excluded 538,000 out 

of the 776,000 civilians, which meant, of course, that you really 

were not going to be dealing with the entire civilian workforce. 

DOD has not really challenged GAO’s findings or the assumption 

that the civilian workforce could be more efficient. 

In fact, in his memo of February 17th of this year, Secretary of 

Defense Mattis explicitly called for, and I am quoting, ‘‘making our 

business operations more efficient and freeing up funds for higher 

priority programs.’’ So what I am saying is not original at all. 

15 

Moreover, and here he was incorporating a taxonomy that the 

Defense Business Board highlighted in its own January 2015 examination of DOD efficiencies, the Secretary called for ‘‘exploring efficiencies with respect to human resource management.’’ The board 

specifically identified civilian personnel as a major target of opportunity for efficiencies in the human resources realm. 

The board pointed out that annual savings from what it termed 

‘‘optimizing the Government labor footprint’’ could amount to anywhere from 8 to 13 percent of total back office costs. Allowing for 

the fact that 60 percent of that force is civilian, we are talking 

about $5 billion to $8 billion in the fiscal 2017 budget alone. 

Part of the reason that the workforce is not as efficient as it 

could be is lack of training and education that it needs to keep pace 

with new development in technology, in cyber, and in human resource management itself. DOD civilians can take courses in everything from auditing to contracts management to test and evaluation and cost estimation. But many or most of these course are 

taught via distance learning, which does not necessarily ensure 

that students will absorb or retain what they have been taught. 

They take these courses at the Defense Acquisition University. 

All you have to do is go online and look at the course offerings. It 

does not offer courses in human resource management, which is 

key to ensuring that officials at every level strive for efficiency on 

the part of their staffs, and most of its courses are, in fact, distance 

learning courses. 

Now the various better buying power of reforms that have been 

promulgated in recent years, they have gone some distance to remedying the paucity of training requirements for acquisition officials, 

but there is some way to go. Human resource training programs for 

civilian managers, which you have just heard about, are much further behind. 

There is no advanced education requirement for members of the 

Senior Executive Service or people who want to be promoted to the 

Senior Executive Service. DAU [Defense Acquisition University] offers training. That is very different from education. To be proficient 

in the management of human resources or even to be an educated 

consumer of technology, you need more than training. 

The military has a system of professional military education. You 

cannot move up unless you have taken, been at staff college, been 

at National War College or one of the service war colleges. Not the 

case for civilians. There is no civilian equivalent. 

I would recommend that no civilian be promoted to the SES, the 

Senior Executive Service, without getting a year of appropriate 

education at one of the Nation’s top business schools or at a top 

institute of technology. There has never been such a requirement 

imposed by the Department nor by OPM. 

It looks like legislation would be the only way to ensure that our 

top civil servants and those aspiring to make it to the top will both 

get the education and the training they need to carry out their 

tasks most efficiently. 

Now in addition to changes in the way the civil servants are 

trained and educated for their jobs, there is an urgent need to alter 

the culture that seems to govern their behavior. Again, I am speaking from eyewitness experience. 

16 

Too often DOD civilians rely all too heavily on contractors for 

work that they should undertake themselves. It was for good reason that Secretary Gates sought to reduce the level of staff 

augmentees. The work should be done by the civil servants. 

One way to change the situation would be to prohibit anybody 

from retiring from the military, as well as any retiring DOD civilian, from serving in a staff augmentation position for 5 years after 

retirement. Too many folks flip their badges. Friday, they are a 

Government official or a military person. Monday, they are working 

for a contractor back at the same job, back with the same colleagues. Now, come on. 

Given the cost of DOD’s civilian workforce and its acknowledged 

lack of efficiency—again, it is not me, Secretary of Defense—it 

might have been expected that the proposed fiscal 2018 budget as 

well as the 2017 budget amendment would call for a reduction in 

civilian end strength. But even though the Trump administration 

is proposing cuts to the Federal civilian workforce, it has not identified any reductions in the DOD workforce, not the $54 billion increase in 2018 or the $25 billion amendment for 2017. 

It is true that there is a hiring freeze and, combined with anticipated retirements, there could be some reduction in civilian levels. 

But the proposed increases in 2018 could well result in a higher 

civilian force should the freeze be lifted. Even if the freeze is not 

lifted, civilian personnel levels may not or probably will not decline 

significantly. 

The only way to do it is through a targeted effort, and that is 

something that Congressman Ken Calvert has proposed in his REDUCE Act, which stands for—it is a heck of an acronym—Rebalance for Effective Defense Uniformed and Civilian Employees Act. 

He has been proposing it for the last several years because what 

it would do is limit full-time positions in DOD in each year of fiscal 

years 2024 to 2028 to a number of not greater than 85 percent of 

the number of such positions as of September 30th of 2018. 

To begin the process, the bill would authorize the Secretary to 

offer separation incentive early retirement payments to civilian employees. But if he does not hit the right number, he can reduce 

force and reduce personnel involuntarily. The act would also cap 

Senior Executive Service at 1,000 personnel. 

Now, not surprisingly, this bill has been opposed bitterly by the 

Civil Service unions that represent DOD civilians. The unions have 

been a major stumbling block in the way of Civil Service reform. 

They want to see no changes in the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, 

which, among other things, enabled civil servants to unionize. 

So when the Secretary of Defense, my former boss, Secretary 

Rumsfeld, sought to initiate a merit-based system for evaluating 

and promoting civilian personnel, which my colleague Peter Levine 

mentioned in passing reference, and that would have clearly led to 

more civilian efficiency because it was merit based, he was met 

with a boatload of criticism and lawsuits filed by the unions, and 

he had to drop the proposal. 

It should be noted, however, that the very same act allows the 

President to exempt groups in the name of national security. The 

armed services, employees of CIA, and the FBI are already exempted. So, in theory, the Trump administration could—the Secretary 

17 

of Defense could exempt civil servants in the Department of Defense from unionizing. That would free up a lot of the kinds of recommendations that you have heard from my colleagues here on the 

panel and several that I have talked about. 

DOD relies heavily on its civilian personnel. They are integral to 

the Nation’s ability to fight and win its wars. To that end, it is critical that we ensure that the DOD’s civilian corps operates in the 

most efficient manner possible, and it is an urgent requirement if 

DOD is successfully to confront and overcome the challenges that 

are constantly emerging in today’s international security environment. 

Thank you for your patience in listening to me. I would be delighted to answer your questions as best I can. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DOV S. ZAKHEIM

Chairman Tillis, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Members of the Committee, I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to testify on the critical issue of DOD civilian personnel reform. DOD civilian personnel currently account for approximately 

36 percent. of all full-time DOD personnel, including full-time National Guard and 

Reserves. In the past fifteen years, DOD has added 77,000 more civilians, representing an 11.5 percent jump in the civilian workforce since fiscal year 2002. During the same period military end strength declined by 8 percent., or 120,000 personnel. 

Over that same fifteen year period, civilian pay increased by a very healthy 31 

percent. Most of that increase went to General Schedule white collar workers, who 

account for two-thirds of all DOD civilian employees. On the other hand, blue-collar 

Wage Board pay actually declined by about 5.5 percent. At the same time, total military pay for all Active personnel, including full-time National Guard and Reserves, 

rose by a mere 0.2 percent. 

Of course, the decline in military end strength means that on a per-capita basis, 

military pay increased markedly since 2002, and indeed, military pay increases have 

either equaled or exceeded civilian pay increases ever since. Nevertheless, with civilian pay consuming a significant portion of the budget, and in light of the need to 

bolster other elements of the defense enterprise, whether to increase Active Duty 

end-strength, or to enhance readiness, or to provide more funding to meet acquisition needs, it is important to examine whether the productivity of the civilian workforce justifies the resources it has consumed over the last decade and a half. 

Members of the subcommittee, the answer is clear: DOD has benefitted from precious few gains in efficiency even as the workforce has grown so markedly. Moreover, it is not at all evident that the civilian workforce is properly trained to deal 

with the speed of changes in technology given Moore’s Law, which posits that the 

power of computer central processing units, or CPUs, doubles every two years. In 

other words, it is highly questionable whether Defense civilians are making the 

most of Information Technology systems available to them, operating at the cutting 

edge of cyber technology, or acting as an educated consumer when procuring the 

vast range of high technology systems that combine with our military personnel to 

comprise the lifeblood of America’s fighting power. 

Finally, the availability of contractors to carry out many of the same missions as 

the civilian staff—politely termed staff augmentation— has often resulted in civilians offloading to contractors work for which they are themselves responsible, with 

the result that what is produced is more costly and often, in my experience, less 

than adequate for the task at hand. It is not without good reason that former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates targeted staff augmentation as an area that deserved 

both greater scrutiny and urgent reform. 

I will first address the question civilian manpower efficiency and then turn to 

some training and education issues and to the matter of staff augmentation. Numerous reports by the Government Accountability Office, most recently those of DecemVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
18 

1Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisition Workforce: Actions Needs to Guide 

Planning efforts and Improve Workforce Capability (GAO–16–80: December 2015) http:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/680/674152.pdf 2DOD Civilian and Contractor Workforces: Additional Costs Savings Data and Efficiencies 

Plan Are Needed (GAO–17–128: October 2106) http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680415.pdf 3 James Mattis, ‘‘Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense: Establishment of Cross-Functional Teams to Address Improved Mission Effectiveness and Efficiencies in the DOD,’’ (February 17, 2017), p.1. 4The DAU course catalog can be accessed at http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/tabnav.aspx. 

ber 2015, 1 which addressed the acquisition workforce, and of October 2016, 2 which 

called for efficiencies in both the civilian and contractor workforces, underscore the 

judgment that the efficiency of the civilian defense workforce leaves much to be desired. The GAO’s 2015 report on the acquisition workforce noted that DOD had yet 

to identify, much less address, all gaps in civilian skills that, it stated, ‘‘are essential 

for effective human capital management.’’ Nor, as of the time of the report, had 

DOD updated its acquisition workforce plan. It noted that 26 percent. of all acquisition-related hirings were not in line with DOD’s own stated priority career fields. 

Most troubling, it appeared that DOD had not established time frames for addressing these concerns, all of which go to the heart of workforce efficiency. 

The October 2016 report, which, as noted, addressed the entire civilian DOD 

workforce, not just its acquisition component, pointed out that DOD had ‘‘not developed and implemented an efficiencies plan for reducing the civilian and contracted 

services workforces.’’ Indeed, DOD seemed to be circumventing the intent of Section 

955 of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, which called for such an 

efficiencies plan to cover the period fiscal years 2012–217. Section 955 allowed DOD 

to exclude required reductions that it identified as critical, and the Department excluded 538,000 of its 776,000 personnel! 

DOD itself has not challenged GAO’s findings, nor the general assumption that 

the civilian workforce could be far more efficient than is currently the case. Indeed, 

in his memo of February 17th of this year, Secretary of Defense Mattis explicitly 

called for ‘‘making our business operations more efficient and freeing up funds for 

higher priority programs.’’ 3 Moreover, incorporating a taxonomy that the Defense 

Business Board highlighted in its own January 2015 examination of DOD efficiencies, Secretary Mattis called for ‘‘exploring efficiencies [with respect to] human 

resource management.’’ Significantly, the DBB identified civilian personnel as a 

major, if not the major, target of opportunity for efficiencies in the human resources 

realm. The Business Board noted that annual savings from what it termed ‘‘Optimizing the Government Labor Footprint’’ could amount to anywhere from eight to 

thirteen percent. of civilian personnel costs, or anywhere from five to eight billion 

dollars in the fiscal year 2017 budget alone. 

Part of the reason for the civilian workforce’s inefficiency is its lack of the training 

and education required for it to keep pace with new developments in technology, including cyber, and indeed, in human resource management as well. DOD civilians 

can take courses in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) in everything from 

auditing, to contracts management, to test and evaluation and cost estimation. 4 But 

many, if not most, of these courses are taught via distance learning, which do not 

necessarily ensure that students will absorb or retain what they have been taught. 

Moreover, DAU does not offer courses in human resource management, which is the 

key to ensuring that officials at every level strive for efficiency on the part of their 

staffs. The various Better Buying Power reforms promulgated in the past few years 

have gone some way to remedying the paucity of training requirements for acquisition officials, but there is still some way to go, while human resource training programs for DOD civilian managers are even further behind. 

Finally, there is no advanced education requirement for members of the Senior 

Executive Service, or those seeking promotion to the Senior Executive Service. DAU 

offers training, not education. Yet to be proficient in the management of human resources, or indeed, to be an educated consumer of technology, more than training 

is required. The military has its system of professional military education; there is 

no such equivalent for civilians. A civilian with a Masters’ Degree can serve forty 

years in the Defense Department without ever taking another graduate level course 

throughout his or her career. Such a situation is unacceptable. Specifically, no civilian should be promoted to the Senior Executive Service without receiving a year of 

appropriate education at either one of the Nation’s top business schools, such as 

Harvard, Stanford, Chicago or Rice, or at a top institute of technology such as MIT, 

RPI, Cal Tech or Georgia Tech. The Department has never imposed such a requirement, nor has the Office of Personnel Management. Officials do take a year off to 

attend graduate programs, such as that at Harvard’s Kennedy School, which is tailored for senior government executives. Still, participation in these programs is volVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
19 

5 James Mattis, ‘‘Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et. al.: Implementation of Civilian Workforce Hiring Freeze,’’ (February 1, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/ 

1/Documents/pubs/OSD000999–17–RES–Final.pdf. 6https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/340. 

7 ‘‘(2) The President may issue an order suspending any provision of this chapter with respect 

to any agency, installation, or activity located outside the 50 States and the District of Columbia, if the President determines that the suspension is necessary in the interest of national secuContinued 

untary, and many executives are reluctant to spend a year away from their place 

of work; or, their superiors are reluctant to lose them for a year. Legislation appears 

to be the only way to ensure that our top civil servants, and those aspiring to the 

make it to the top, will get both the education and the training that they need to 

carry out their tasks in a most efficient manner. 

In addition to changes in the way civil servants are trained and educated for their 

jobs, there is an urgent need to alter the culture that seems to govern their behavior. Too often, DOD civilians rely all too heavily on contractors for work that they 

should undertake themselves. For example, many reports to the Congress actually 

are prepared by contractors, often ‘‘staff augmentees’’ who retired from the military 

or the civil service only to return to virtually identical jobs in the same office, with 

the same colleagues, but now are wearing a contractor badge. Yet the reports these 

contractors produce are often poorly written and formulated; it is questionable 

whether civilian DOD staffs carefully review what has been produced before forwarding the reports up their command chain. It was for good reason, as I mentioned 

earlier, that Secretary Gates sought to reduce the level of staff augmentees; the 

work should be done by civil servants themselves. One way to help change what 

might be termed a poisonous symbiosis of DOD civilians and contractors would be 

to prohibit anyone retiring from the military, as well as any retiring DOD civilian, 

from serving in a staff augmentation position for five years after retirement. DOD 

staff would then either take on the work themselves, or, if they feel uneasy about 

their workload, find jobs elsewhere. 

Given the cost of DOD’s civilian workforce and its acknowledged lack of efficiency, 

it might have been expected that the proposed fiscal year 2018 defense budget as 

well as the fiscal year 2017 budget amendment would call for a reduction in its end 

strength. Ironically, however, even as the Trump Administration is proposing cuts 

to the total Federal civilian workforce, it has not identified any such reductions in 

the Department of Defense. Neither the proposed $52 billion increase for fiscal year 

2018, as well as the $25 Billion budget amendment for fiscal year 2017 reveals any 

indication that Administration plans to reduce DOD civilian personnel levels. It is 

true that the current hiring freeze, combined with anticipated retirements, should 

result in some reduction in current civilian levels. 5 On the other hand, the proposed 

increases for fiscal year 2018, could well result in a higher civilian force level should 

the freeze be lifted. 

Even if the freeze remains in place, civilian personnel levels are unlikely to decline significantly. Only a major targeted effort will result in lowering those levels. 

Such an effort is encapsulated in the Rebalance for an Effective Defense Uniformed 

and Civilian Employees Act, commonly known as the R.E.D.U.C.E Act. This bill, 

which Congressman Ken Calvert first proposed in January 2015 and has subsequently proposed each year since, would, in its current form, limit full-time positions 

in the Department of Defense, in each year of fiscal years 2024 to 2028, to a number 

not greater than 85 percent. of the number of such positions at DOD as of September 30, 2018. To begin the process, the bill would authorize the Secretary to 

offer separation incentive early retirement payments to civilian employees. Most importantly, it also requires the Secretary to use involuntary measures, such as reductions in force, beginning on October 1, 2018, ‘‘to achieve required reductions in personnel levels if voluntary measures are inadequate.’’ 6 The Act would also cap the 

Senior Executive Service at 1000 personnel. 

Needless to say, this bill has been strenuously opposed by the civil service unions 

that represent DOD civilians. The unions have been a major stumbling block in the 

way of civil service reform; they wish to see no changes to the 1978 Civil Service 

Reform Act (CSRA), which, among other things, enabled civil servants to unionize. 

Thus, when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld sought to initiate a merit-based system 

for evaluating and promoting civilian personnel, which would clearly have led to an 

improvement in civilian efficiency, he was met with a torrent of criticism and lawsuits filed by the unions and eventually dropped the proposal. 

It should be noted, however, that the CSRA also allowed the president to exempt 

groups in the name of national security. 7 Indeed, the armed services, employees of 

20 

rity.’’ PUBLIC LAW 95–454—OCT. 13, 1978 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/s2640/ 

text/en. 

the CIA and the FBI already are exempted. Should the Trump Administration exempt DOD civilians, it would clear the way for both reducing the level of DOD civilians and implementing reforms along the lines that Secretary Rumsfeld proposed. 

Should the Administration not act to exempt civilians from the CSRA’s provisions 

regarding unionization, and even if it does act, the Congress should consider passing 

the R.E.D.U.C.E. Act. This Act not only would act as a catalyst for a far more efficient and effective civilian DOD corps, but also which result in significant savings 

that could be redirected to other urgent defense needs. that continue to emerge in 

today’s increasingly uncertain international security environment. 

The Department of Defense relies heavily on its civilian personnel; they are integral to the Nation’s ability to fight and win its wars. To that end, ensuring that 

the DOD civilian corps operates in the most efficient manner possible is a critical 

and urgent requirement if DOD is successfully to confront and overcome the challenges that are continually emerging in today’s increasingly uncertain international 

security environment. 

Thank you. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

You know, one of the big surprises to me when I came into the 

Senate 2 years ago was how you form your office. I just naturally 

assumed there were all kinds of personnel requirements and structures, and they basically say your State is this big. You have this 

allocation. Best of luck. 

Which was great because we were able to treat it like a small 

business and create personnel practices. I immediately went back 

to the work that I had done when I was doing recruiting and retention work at Pricewaterhouse, and we adopted a very similar model 

within my office. 

Every staff has a professional development plan. Every staff has 

a knowledge and skills inventory at the beginning of the year. We 

have very specific expectations for continuing education. There is 

a place for online education, but there is also a place for hands-on 

applied education. 

We have made that every staff in our office at every level has 

these plans, and they are expected to perform and develop a knowledge and skills that shows growth over time. I do not think any 

employee, and I believe it may have been Mr. Levine that talked 

about how sometimes there is no, you know, direct obvious attainment of knowledge and skills from year to year. I think that that 

is a problem because you are not adding value. 

If you are not adding any additional value other than what you 

got paid for the year before, why should you expect to get anything 

more over the cost of living? That mentality does not seem to exist 

anywhere in the Federal Government. 

We also at Pricewaterhouse had an 18 percent attrition rate. A 

lot of people say, oh, my goodness. We thought that was healthy, 

somewhere between 15 and 18. I do not know what it is today. 

About half or two-thirds of those were people who consulting was 

not for them. 

That is when working at home happened on Saturdays and Sundays and when there was not such a thing as mobile commuting. 

Hopefully—or happily, we have gotten past that, but it was a tough 

job, and we expected people to move on. 

But we also counseled out 5 to 8 percent a year. They were brilliant people. We recruited them from the best schools, and they all 

21 

had GPAs [Grade Point Averages] of 3.5 or higher. But it was a 

tough job, and they just did not demonstrate the value that made 

sense for the firm. 

So is there any evidence of that happening anywhere in the 

DOD? Is there any best practice or an area out there that we 

should be looking at? 

Dr. JUNOR. Well, I am currently at NDU [National Defense University], and I am—like I said, I am filling a Title X term position. 

When I was at P&R, I also oversaw, as did Peter, the Defense Language Institute, which is also run by—for title X. The advantage— 

so I am not a ‘‘one size fits all’’ proponent either. But the advantage of this authority is that you are hired with a—for a very specific job, and you can ask for very specific attributes to meet that 

job, which is surprisingly not common, and that goes to the classification authority that Peter was alluding to earlier. 

But when you are hired, in my case, we are hired on average for 

a 3-year term, I know every 3 years, I have got to come to a table, 

and I am going to be held accountable for whether I have met my 

performance objectives. If my term runs out, this is not something 

I can dispute. It is done. So I can be not renewed either because 

I failed to meet performance objective or because the needs of my 

employer change. 

Senator TILLIS. Now let me talk about—let talk me talk about 

performance objectives, and reading the background material, it 

seems like do have the situation where you may be working for 

somebody who works for the DOD. They move to different assignments, and sometimes there seems to be a lack of real interaction 

between the supervisor and the employee with respect to the development of their knowledge and skills and really preparing maybe 

for the next opportunity. 

Do we have a problem there any of you would want to talk 

about? Mr. Levine? 

Mr. LEVINE. Sure, let me address that one. I think we have a 

problem with the systematic development of careers for civilian employees. We have a systematic focus on military careers, and we 

know what education blocks and what training blocks and what are 

expected and what those are building to. 

There is nothing comparable for civilian employees. So when civilian employees have the kind of training that Dov talked about, 

they have training opportunities, but those training opportunities 

may be handed out as a plum to somebody who has done well. 

They may also be handed out to somebody who is not very good 

that you just want to get out of your organization. 

Either way, there is not a whole lot of conscious thought what 

is that building to, what is the next step, and how are we going 

to utilize and take advantage of that training? So that kind of planning is something that the Department has been short on, and 

really, it is not easy to address, but needs to be addressed. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, thank you. 

Consistent with my policy of rodeo rules, I do not want to go 8 

seconds over. So I am going to go to Senator Gillibrand, and then 

after we go through a round, if you all are okay, we will just open 

it up to questions if we have them. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Mr. Chairman? 

22 

Senator TILLIS. We will just do it openly. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Mr. Chairman, could I just add, if I may? 

Senator TILLIS. Yes. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Peter actually pretty much said what I wanted to 

say, but I want to add one other thing. I am familiar with at least 

one case of somebody who was clearly looking to get out of—had 

enough years to get a pension and needed something more to be 

able to get a good job on the outside. So that person went to his 

supervisor and got to the Kennedy School. That is not what you 

want. 

It seems to me that unless—— 

Senator TILLIS. Dr. Zakheim, we will come back to that in my follow-up. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Okay. Good. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to talk a little bit about cyber. Growing the cyber workforce has been a subject of intense interest on this committee, including determining the proper mix of Active Duty and Reserve 

component, including National Guard and civilian personnel. 2016 

and 2017 defense bills included additional authorities for the Department to hire cyber civilian employees, including direct hire and 

special pay authorities. 

What are your views on these provisions and how the Department is or is not using them? What else would you recommend 

with respect to hiring and retraining—excuse me, hiring and retaining civilians with critical cyber and computer skills, including 

those who are members of the Reserve components? How best can 

we utilize those talents, and is there more we could be doing with 

universities to increase recruitment in this area? 

Dr. JUNOR. Mr. Chair—— 

Mr. LEVINE. Well, the answer is—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Can I ask Ms. Junor to do the first? Thank 

you. 

Mr. LEVINE. Oh, I am sorry. 

Dr. JUNOR. That is fine. Getting the right balance of the cyber 

workforce is a—it is an absolutely huge issue. Like the three components or four components that you just labeled, each has their 

own pros and cons. When I was—so I am a little—my knowledge 

is a little bit dated. I have been out for over a year now, but the 

Department struggled with, first, identifying the appropriate mix 

and then determining exactly how to recruit and retain and continue to grow those cyber professionals. That work is ongoing. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Levine? 

Mr. LEVINE. So, first of all, the authorities that you have given 

the Department, I think, are very important ones. So you did ask 

about that. This is another area where you have given the Department flexible hiring authority and flexible pay authorities, which I 

think for a high-tech workforce, in order to compete with the private sector, those are very important. 

I agree with Dr. Junor that we have not done what we need to 

do yet in terms of figuring out the proper mix of the workforce, but 

I think there is an underlying problem, which is we have not figure 

23 

out what we are doing in terms of cyber strategy. Until we figure 

out our cyber strategy it is hard to figure out what the workforce 

is you need to meet that strategy. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Zakheim? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is Zakheim, by the way. I would only add that 

at the service level, they know they have the need and they are 

boxed in by the categories they have for taking people on. In particular, they could do very well hiring Reservists or, rather, taking 

in Reservists who have that background, but the system for taking 

in Reserves does not necessarily fit. 

So individual commanders decide whether they will kind of bend 

the rules a little bit. They need some more guidance and help because they know what they want, and as Reservists, they have got 

people to do it. But you will get people in the Navy who are basically working in the bilge or something and actually are CEOs 

[Chief Executive Officer] of high-tech companies. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Separate topic. Civilian hiring authority for 

healthcare providers. The military is having difficulty hiring and 

retaining civilian healthcare workers in critically needed 

healthcare occupations, such as behavioral health, family medicine, 

pharmacy, and physical and occupational therapy. 

In a report issued in February of this year, DOD reported that 

despite the use of special salary rates and hiring flexibilities authorized by Congress, current and projected difficulties relate to 

competition from the private sector and supply shortages. Interestingly, the report does not recommend to request new and enhanced 

hiring authorities or additional compensation authorities. 

Does the Department need enhanced civilian hiring authorities 

and/or authority for additional compensation in order to address 

these shortages for healthcare providers? If so, what do you recommend? Dr. Junor? 

Dr. JUNOR. I am not exactly sure what—I would have to—I am 

an economist. I would have to look at exactly what the mismatch 

is in that labor pool. I think all the authorities that you could provide would be helpful. For example, the—if it is a pay disparity, 

the pay you get on the outside has a much higher potential than 

it would with our limitations within the Civil Service. That is clear. 

I also, though, worry, and this goes back to the how we cast our 

civilian workforce, and I have been worried writ large about the 

ability to hire especially in areas where there is a lot of competition 

from the civilian side. If the background vocal continues to be that 

the civilian workforce is more of a plague than an asset, then I 

think this is going to be an issue with cyber, with health, with any 

technical skill set. 

So, yes, increasing authorities would definitely help, but along 

with finding a way to better manage this workforce and talk about 

it. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Levine? 

Mr. LEVINE. So, first, with regard to competing on salary, we 

cannot compete on salary with Federal employees. You will not 

give enough for some of these specialized professions. You will not 

give enough salary authority or allow us to pay high enough, and 

so we then have to look at a contract model in some cases. 

24 

But I would agree with Dr. Junor that our biggest competitive 

advantage in hiring and retaining people is the mission and the 

feeling of people that they have an opportunity to contribute and 

contribute to something greater than themselves that they are involved in public service. When we undermine that by the way we 

talk about civil servants, we undermine our ability to attract and 

retain really highly qualified people that we need. 

Senator TILLIS. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, everyone, for joining us today. 

I am going to continue along those same lines and not just cyber 

or healthcare industry. Dr. Junor, you talked about a lot of other 

fields as well, but when we are looking at those that are in the 

STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] fields, 

or the science, technology, engineering, and math, recruiting there 

can be really challenging, and I have seen a lot of the benefits coming from STEM even in my home State of Iowa, who does tend to 

be on a leading edge with STEM education. 

What incentive systems exist out there, or are there any, where 

we can recruit the best and the brightest of those young people 

that are engaging in STEM fields? Is there something that exists 

out there that we are not aware of, and if it does not exist, is there 

something that we should look at? 

If we could start with you, Dr. Junor? 

Dr. JUNOR. Peter referenced the direct hiring authorities for the 

recent graduates. I think that is a very big deal. If you can—if you 

can get these folks in right after they have learned the skill set, 

number one, they are bringing in current thinking that is technologically relevant. This is an aging workforce. So that is helpful. 

But also if we can get them in and retain them and attract them 

and get them hooked on our mission, which is actually a pretty cool 

way to spend your career, that is an absolute plus. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Mr. Levine? 

Mr. LEVINE. What I would add to that is that you need to think 

about the work that you are giving people when you are bringing 

them. So if you are going to try to attract and retain highly skilled 

workers, you bring in these young people, you do not want to plug 

them in so they are another widget in a giant system. You want 

to give them the ability to be creative and feel like they are really 

contributing. 

I think the IT [Information Technology] area is a place where we 

can do that because we are challenged in IT in every way, and we 

can use these teams that sort of stand outside the system and try 

to reinvent the way we work. But you need to think about that and 

recognize that the only way you are going to attract and retain 

young people who—with these kind of talents is if you challenge 

them and make them excited by the work. 

Senator ERNST. Very true. Dr. Zakheim? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. There is a program that is not career but is important called Highly Qualified Experts. We tend to think of highly 

qualified experts as people in their fifties, whatever. But when you 

are talking about IT and high tech, probably the highly qualified 

experts are 25. 

Senator TILLIS. Or 19. 

[Laughter.] 

25 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, that is true. I mean, my grandchildren are 

clearly highly qualified experts. Bringing those kinds of folks in 

under the program, expanding it, and then perhaps as we—creating a vehicle for those that want to stay to be able to stay because they are doing interesting work might be another way to deal 

with this issue. 

You find somebody who is 25, 30, whatever, who is doing fantastic work. You bring them in as a highly qualified expert, and 

then if they are good, it becomes a kind of, you know, almost probationary-type effort, and then they stay and we will benefit. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. I know that we have the USAJOBS 

hiring process that exists out there, and Dr. Zakheim is laughing. 

Yes, we have experienced so many difficulties with this system, 

and the length of time it takes to bring those applicants into the 

system is horrendous. I have heard story after story. 

So the direct hiring process is one way that we could mitigate 

that. Can you explain some of the problems that we are having 

with USAJOBS, and then what is a better alternative? 

Mr. LEVINE. So when you are trying to bring in a college—somebody who is graduating from college, if you have to go through the 

USAJOBS process, then you can go to the campus, but you cannot 

offer them a job. You can say go ahead and apply. There is this 

portal, and in 6 months or a year, it will kick out or it will not kick 

out. You have got to apply job by job. 

That is not the way anybody else recruits on campus, and we 

cannot compete if we do that. We need to be able to go there and 

say you are talented, we want you. We will find a place for you, 

and here are the kinds of things we can do, and here are the kinds 

of places we can put you. Yes, we are going to tell you yes now, 

and we are going to figure out a way to make it work. 

Direct hiring enables us to do that. USAJOBS will never enable 

us to do that. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It takes about 83 days now to hire somebody, apparently. So it is about 3 months. But again, the manager is not 

the one that actually gets into the hiring process until very late in 

that process. That is because of HR getting into it and the automated stuff that Peter spoke about so that if—again, if you are 

looking for a job and you are good and other people are offering you 

something, you are not going to have the patience to wait around 

and see what happens. 

Senator ERNST. They are going to snap you up before—— 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Yes. 

Senator ERNST. Right. Certainly. 

Dr. JUNOR. Eighty-three days is on the short end. I have tried 

to hire and be hired on USAJOBS, and there is a lot of things 

wrong with it. But the single most frustrating part to me is how 

the work is classified. 

If you get stuck in a rigid OPM ‘‘this is how we have to define 

the attributes for a job,’’ it is lethal. I ended up—I worked in OSD 

personnel and readiness, and I wanted to hire somebody. I gave up. 

I was frustrated. 

It took—we iterated for the better part of a year, and I could 

not—I had some attributes that I wanted, and I could not figure 

26 

out how to jam them into the rigid boxes that OPM gave me so 

that I was sure I was not going to come out with really odd 

matchings that I had to contend with. In fact, that is what happened, and that is why I ended up giving up. 

If you are on the—trying to be noticed, if are trying to get a job, 

these things are equally lethal. So the direct hiring authority, 

being able to actually list, if you are an employer, what you want 

in an employee and then allowing employees to match to that, it 

is much better on both sides. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TILLIS. Senator Warren? 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In October, a gunman opened fire on American personnel visiting 

an Army munitions supply point outside Kabul. Two Americans 

were killed in the attack. One was Army sergeant Douglas Riney. 

The other was Michael Sauro, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army. 

They may not wear the uniform, but civilian workers are an essential part of our national defense effort. They care for service 

members in military hospitals, as we were just discussing. They 

service our most advanced aircraft. They keep our military bases 

running. 

Thousands of civilian from DOD, from State, from our intelligence agencies have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over 

the last 15 years, serving right alongside uniformed personnel. 

Some have been wounded. Some, as this shows, have been killed. 

I mention this because I am not convinced that we are treating 

these personnel with the respect that they deserve. 

Our civilian workforce has become accustomed to hiring freezes, 

to furloughs, even a Government shutdown, and it is getting worse. 

The new administration has issued yet another hiring freeze that 

includes much of DOD, and the budget released last week would 

require the largest cuts to the Federal workforce post World War 

II. 

So I just want to ask, Mr. Levine, what impact do actions like 

the furloughs and the pay freezes have on the effectiveness of the 

Defense Department’s civilian workforce? 

Mr. LEVINE. We have to worry about demoralizing the civilian 

workforce. I think that the morale is still pretty high because there 

is belief in the mission. But the more these attacks accumulate, the 

more you have a problem, and you can undermine the effectiveness 

of the workforce. 

I agree with Dr. Zakheim and Dr. Junor that we have a threepillared workforce. It is not only the military, not only the civilians, 

but also the contractors. It is important to recognize that we rely 

on all of them. You start with you have a job that gets done. Who 

is the right person to perform that? 

One of the reasons that we have more civilians and fewer military now, and it is you do these trade-offs. But we had an effort 

over the years to say let us get our military more to the pointy end 

of the spear. Let us get them out of doing the back office stuff that 

they used to do, and as you do that, somebody still has to do the 

work. 

27 

So you are relying on civilians to do all kinds of things that the 

military cannot do their job without, but it is all one workforce, and 

we need to—we need to treat them as one workforce and respect 

them as one workforce. 

Senator WARREN. So let me go back to this point in terms then 

of professional development that you raised earlier and that we 

have talked some about here, and talk about the disparity. We assume with contractors that they work on professional development. 

That is part of their job. 

Obviously, with the military, we have been very strong on professional development. But on civilian employees of the Government, 

we have not done the same, even though they have positions of 

great responsibility. 

So, for example, we will let people pause their military career so 

they can go back to school and acquire more skills that they will 

bring back to the jobs. We send them to schools. We send them to 

professional development. We do not do the same with civilian 

managers. 

So let me ask you the question. Now I am going to assume that 

we would benefit from a robust institutional process that assures 

that civilians get more access. Why has it not happened? Anyone 

want to weigh in on that? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I think—yes. 

Senator WARREN. I want to be careful about my time. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Sure. I think it has not happened in part because, 

in that respect, civilians are taken for granted. In part because the 

system is so rigid that you move up the scale almost no matter 

what, as long as you have been around. If you are alive, you are 

going to move up. 

I think it is unfair to the civilians. It is not just unfair to the 

Department or the taxpayer. It is unfair to them because they need 

to get out there. I mean, look, if you get a physics degree, say, a 

master’s at the age of 23, and you do not take another course for 

40 years, I mean, how really can you understand what the latest 

developments are when Moore’s law tells you every couple of years, 

you know, the computing capability doubles? 

Senator WARREN. I hear—— 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. We are doing them a disservice. I think this needs 

to become, and that is why I have said, it needs to become a requirement, particularly if you are joining the Senior Executive 

Service. You want to be a top manager, you better spend a year at 

Harvard or MIT or whatever. 

Senator WARREN. I hear your point. I just have a little bit of time 

left. 

Dr. Junor, could you just weigh in on this, please? 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes, I think Dr. Zakheim nailed it. We have a current 

system—sorry. We have a current system right now that is completely focused on longevity. Everything is about longevity, and so 

that is not going to breed the best productivity out of our people 

when it comes to, you know, hiring the young, eager, technically 

savvy workforce. If they come into this kind of—that is lethal if 

they come into this kind of environment. 

So, in a sense, we are not even promoting mediocrity. We are 

promoting sitting in a seat. People do not want that. Most people 

28 

love their job, and they want to be good at it. That is one of the 

attributes of feeling good and having self-confidence. 

So if we built a system that rewarded and encouraged that 

through things like learning, I think the civilians would be better 

off, the Government would be better off. Turns out that is a little 

bit hard, although there are tools out there where we have seen 

this work. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you. 

I appreciate this because it just seems to me we have got to have 

both compensation structures and opportunity structures that really help our civilian employees that recognize all they have done, 

but also help them develop and be all they can be. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Warren. 

You know, Senator Warren made some points that I think bear 

repeating, and I—because my time was limited, I did not get to it 

in the first discussion. But we do need to make it very clear that 

they are a very important part of what we do. 

I have been to several military installations. I have seen helicopter maintainers, aircraft maintainers. They are in there. They 

believe in the mission as much as anybody else in the military. So 

they need to understand we understand the role that they play, the 

force multiplier. If there is any doubt, at least on my part, and I 

think I speak for the members here, that they are important to us. 

But what this is about is enriching their opportunity, enriching 

them professionally, building their knowledge and skills, and recognizing that in any group of employees, some are higher performers 

than others. Do they satisfy minimum requirements to keep them 

employed, or is there some point where you need to counsel them 

out? 

That is very difficult. We called it counseling out. Divesting is an 

interesting one. I have used it more in my financial business than 

I have with a human being. But I mean, it is more a matter of creating a high-performing environment. 

But you cannot create a high-performing environment—and to 

Senator Ernst’s point, STEM, I mean, we are all fighting for STEM 

resources—public sector, private sector. The difference is when I 

would go and recruit at Penn State or Cornell or somebody, I saw 

somebody who was extraordinary, they could get an offer right 

there. I had the authority to do it. 

Bring them into training and get them deployed to an engagement 6, 8 months, 9 months later after an extensive training program. It is 120 days. I believe my staff in the staff memo said the 

average is 120 days, and it can extend up to 180 days. 

You are not going to get a kid that graduated with a physics degree or, you know, pick—an economics degree, something like that 

from a top school with a high GPA [Grade Point Average] and say 

we just need you to wait around 4 to 6 months, and maybe these 

five different jobs that you apply for, one of them will pop up. So 

that is clearly an area that I think that we need to drill down on. 

The other thing I just wanted to ask, and Senator Gillibrand, 

just jump in if you have any other questions. But I know we have 

an internship program, and I was asking about that at about the 

same time that Senator Ernst asked about the USAJOBS system. 

29 

But it seems like you could come in and have an intern do great 

work, and you want to hire them. But there is such a lapse between having that promising person who really wants to go work 

and actually transition to a job. 

That seems to be another area that we need to focus on. Would 

you agree with that, Dr. Zakheim? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Absolutely. I had interns that were what in those 

days called ‘‘presidential management interns.’’ I think there is a 

slightly different name now. But you are hired as a civil servant. 

So you come in. 

By the way, the only reason I used 83 days is because that is the 

lowest number I could find. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I do not disagree with you at all. But getting an 

intern in the sense that you did or I did in the private world just 

does not happen. So an internship program that then allows you, 

as in the private sector, to move into the Government, as opposed 

to being hired as a Government official who is then an intern, I 

think that would be a tremendous step forward. 

Senator TILLIS. Dr. Zakheim, you said something that I do not 

think I really take exception to it, but—but as we are looking at 

policies that once we pass something, it becomes this rigid thing 

that people follow or have to follow. I am thinking more in the 

cyber space or the technology space. 

I understand at certain levels, there are requisite requirements, 

particularly within the Comptroller’s office. Financial, education, 

those sorts of things are important. But it also goes back to treating different jobs and different skill sets differently. I could think 

about cyber as one example. 

I was actually recruited to Pricewaterhouse without a college degree. When I started there in 1990 at 30 years old, I did not have 

a college degree, and I was continuing my education, but I happened to work in a technologies field that was imaging and kind 

of artificial intelligence field that there was not a lot of people 

doing that back then. 

So we have got to make sure that when we look at getting these 

top skills where clearly credentialed skills are necessary for certain 

jobs that you would have performed, that we have the flexibility to 

bring in top talent and not take a Bill Gates, who did not get a 

college degree and not have him come work in software development. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, let me—— 

Senator TILLIS. Would you not agree? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Let me make myself clear. I am not—was not talking about how we take them in. I think you are absolutely right. 

I would have hired Bill Gates, and so you would, I think, Senator. 

But once they are in, you do not want them to just live off their 

intellectual capital forever. 

Senator TILLIS. That is right. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. That is really what I was focusing on. 

Senator TILLIS. Okay, very good. Mr. Levine? 

Mr. LEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I think you are onto a point there 

because as—as somebody who was a senior manager, I wanted to 

be able to get the most talented, most capable person for a position, 

30 

and I resented where there was an artificial constraint so I could 

only look at this subcategory. 

So I would be careful. I think that authorizing somebody to establish requirements, and a few years ago, we authorized the 

Comptroller, for example, to require CPAs [Certified Public Accountants] for certain positions. Authorizing that is a good thing. 

Requiring it is another matter. Because if you require it, then you 

say you are not allowed to have the choice to get the person you 

think is best suited. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. No, I have no further questions. Thank you 

so much for your testimony. It was excellent. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, I have got one or two others then. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Go ahead. 

Senator TILLIS. Then I can crawl off to Judiciary. But, Senator 

Gillibrand, I know if you have other commitments, certainly feel 

free to leave when you need to. 

This needs to be a dialogue. There is a lot of things that we will 

follow up, based on your statements. 

But you know, I remember working for a Marine. He was an Annapolis graduate. By the way, I did get my degree after I was admitted to the partnership. But I did finish it off because I told everybody I love public education so much I went to it for 17 years 

after graduating from high school. 

But this partner, he was a Marine, and he had this way about 

him that was truly what you would expect out of a Marine coming 

out of the Naval Academy. He said I am going to treat you all fairly, but I am not going to treat you equally. 

There are certain things that we have to accomplish for our clients, and there are certain skills that we need to bring, which 

means that I necessarily have to differentiate based on your knowledge, your skills, and the value that you are producing. 

We went to a point in the 1990s where we had what we called 

‘‘hot skills bonuses.’’ That when there was a specific task that required a unique skill. May not be something, particularly in today’s 

world because of the changing of technology, last year’s hot skill 

may or may not be next year’s hot skill. 

What flexibility do we have or do we need to allow that same sort 

of capability among our employee base? 

Dr. JUNOR. I think this is the area that we need the most work, 

frankly, and it is not a simple thing to fix. The flip side of being 

part of a critical workforce like we have is being accountable for 

your performance in that critical workforce, and that is hard for a 

variety of reasons. 

When you hold—and this is—accountability is part of this issue. 

But focusing just on accountability, it is very difficult to hold—and 

as I said in my testimony, to hold an employee accountable for poor 

performance, for example. The process is long and drawn out. Most 

supervisors just do not do it for a variety of reasons. 

A low performer is most likely to be given a middle grade because it is easier. The—being rewarded—so the poor performers 

gravitate toward some kind of middle score. We do not have a lot 

31 

of flexibility to reward the high performers. In the Title V system, 

you cannot—you cannot promote them really early. 

Senator TILLIS. Do we have any system of creating—it would 

seem to me we have a large enough population to create cohorts 

that we can force into a bell curve on performance. I mean, if you 

look out at a lot of HR best practices, there is this theory that any 

cohort will fit into one of three or four categories—the top 15 percent performers, the 25 percent exceeds expectations, 35 percent 

expectations, 15 percent need to bump up or get out. 

Do we have any examples of where we—where either the organization has adopted these practices or been allowed to adopt these 

sorts of practices among the civilian employees? 

Mr. LEVINE. I would say that the entire culture of the Department of Defense is contrary to that, and not only— not only with 

regard to civilians, but with regard to contractors. It used to frustrate me no end that you would see contractors who were clearly 

failing in their performance who would get 98 percent ratings on 

their past performance ratings. 

It is the same thing on civilians. It is a—it is a management culture which generally tries to avoid confrontation, and avoiding confrontation means you do not grade somebody at the bottom level. 

Senator TILLIS. What is the potential—what is the potential risk 

of forcing a bell curve? In other words, you do your individual evaluations, but they have to be—if I have a supervisor of a group of 

people they have got to be forced into a bell curve where you are 

having to do a comparative assessment within a cohort, what are 

the potential challenges for doing something like that? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, Secretary Rumsfeld actually tried that, and 

he ran into, like I said, a buzz saw of union opposition. Because 

what he tried to do is take the various GS [General Schedule] levels and create much wider bans, which would then allow for exactly 

what you are talking about. But he just could not pull it off. 

You also have another issue here that OPM is a major player in 

this, and OPM’s whole approach is kind of different. I remember 

I was on one commission or another, I cannot remember which, 

where we talked to OPM folks and discovered that I think it was 

90 percent of SESers were above average. Now that is straight out 

of Lake Wobegon. 

So you have got a fundamental problem with how people are 

evaluated. 

Senator TILLIS. Yes. That is—Dr. Junor? 

Dr. JUNOR. Yes, there is certainly nothing easy about this. But 

I go back, if you have a small organization, then the bell curve is 

really not going to work. Because if you have three people, it is entirely possible that they are all superstars based on the criteria 

that you used to pull them in. 

Let me give you a counter thought. A counter thought would be 

what if we could get rid of the incentives or the restrictions that 

prevent managers from honestly assessing their employees? What 

if we—what if we could find a way to reduce the friction or compel 

managers to be held responsible for the performance of their employees? 

In other words, if your employees mess up a project, that is now 

on your performance statement, right? You cannot do any better 

32 

than your worst employee kind of thinking. On the other end, I 

mean, what if we could give GSers more of a bonus, spot bonuses 

that reward? From what I have read about improving employee 

performance, spot bonuses, rewards, especially recognition for 

things well done right when it happens is probably more impactful 

than waiting to the end of the year for a bureaucratic assessment 

of what they have done. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, I could go on forever about this, and actually, I want to. But I think that Senator Gillibrand and I both intend to work on language that will move forward to the full committee, and we would like your continued feedback. Because, again, 

an environment where we really recognize role model behavior and 

we put on performance plans those who need to add value or counsel them, respectfully, into other careers are things that we want 

to talk about. 

I would also like to follow up on a comment, Dr. Zakheim, that 

you made about somebody that rebadges. One day, they have got 

one badge. The next day, they have got another badge. Because I 

think that that is another area. 

We saw that in the private sector. A lot of times we go in and 

we would see problems with an IT shop. It is because they were 

not really changing the mix, and they were just broadening the 

base of problems, to be honest. Not in every case. Some cases you 

want to retain those people, and it may be the only way you can. 

But you all have given us a lot of feedback in this brief committee, and I hope that we can continue the dialogue with myself, 

the ranking member, and our staff as we move forward marking 

up language for consideration for the full committee. 

Thank you all for being here. 

I also want to move, without objection, that we include any outside statements received in the official record for the hearing. 

Without objection, so moved. 

[The information referred to can be found in Appendix A.] 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you for being here this afternoon. 

This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

33 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Senator WARREN. Dr. Junor, in the hearing you said ‘‘We have a current system 

right now that’s completely focused on longevity. Everything is about longevity. And 

so that is not going to breed the best productivity out of our people. . . . Most people 

love their job, and they want to be good at it. That’s one of the attributes of feeling 

good and having self-confidence. So if we build a system that rewarded and encouraged that through things like learning, I think we—the civilians would be better off. 

The government would be better off. Turns out that’s a little bit hard, although 

there are tools out there where we’ve seen this work.’’ Please provide additional detail on the types of tools available and where you believe they have been used successfully. 

Dr. JUNOR. The most significant tool is the use of Title 10 hiring authority for 

a defined term with organizational renewal authority and specific performance objectives. Here’s why that works: 

• It creates a clear understanding of what the organization needs out of each employee 

• It creates an incentive to perform (or risk non-renewal) 

• It maintains quality peers (low-performers are less likely to be renewed) 

In summary, this type of hiring authority maintains a culture that motivates individual and organizational improvement. This authority works even better when an 

organization uses an annual oversight process to review renewal decisions. Such a 

process would ensure that employees are treated fairly and are given at least one 

year’s notice in the event they will not be renewed. 

I believe professional development offered in this environment is much more likely 

to be effective than in an environment that emphasizes longevity. I have seen this 

authority work well at National Defense University (where I am currently employed) and at the Defense Language Institute. 

34 

APPENDIX A 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY J. DAVID COX, SR., NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERICAN

FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL–CIO 

On behalf of the almost 700,000 federal and District of Columbia employees, including 270,000 in the Department of Defense (DOD), who are represented by the 

American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO (AFGE), thank you for 

the opportunity to submit this Statement for the Record on DOD Civilian Personnel 

Reform. Our members’ experience and dedication ensures reliable and cost-efficient 

support for our nation’s war-fighters—from maintaining weapons to overseeing contractors to guarding installations. 

AFGE has had numerous occasions to study and testify on proposed changes to 

the DOD civilian personnel system. We are all too familiar with various efforts within the Defense establishment to further the agenda of placing all DOD civilian personnel within a title 10 framework, and removing the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) from any meaningful role with respect to DOD civilian personnel. 

AFGE opposes these efforts. Neither DOD nor any defense ‘‘studies’’ have made a 

coherent case for shifting civilian employees from civil service coverage under the 

well-developed framework of title 5 to a DOD driven title 10 system that shortchanges the pay and rights of federal workers. 

THE THREAT TO REVIVE THE DISCREDITED NSPS: PERFORMANCE PAY AND FORCE

OF THE FUTURE

The Federal Government’s disastrous experience with the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in the Department of Defense during the George W. Bush 

administration is a cautionary tale on the dangers of abandoning an objective ‘‘rankinposition’’ system like the General Schedule for federal agencies. From 2006 to 

2009, 225,000 civilian workers in DOD were subject to a system that based salaries 

and annual salary adjustments on supervisors’ assessments of employee performance. NSPS also granted managers tremendous ‘‘flexibility’’ on classification of jobs, 

hiring, assignments, promotion, tenure, and ‘‘performance management.’’ The system’s only additional funding relative to the General Schedule payroll base was for 

outside consultants who had a large role in designing, implementing, and training 

DOD managers in their new system. 

It was not surprising that even in its brief three-year reign, NSPS damaged the 

Federal Government’s excellent record of internal equity on race and gender. Data 

on salaries, performance ratings, and bonuses showed marked advantages to being 

white and male, and working in close geographic proximity to the Pentagon. Those 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Tricare were found to be higher performers, on average, than civilian employees in the Departments of the Army, Navy or Air Force. 

NSPS was a system conceived in a highly politicized context. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) had been established two years earlier, in 2002, and its 

secretary was granted broad personnel authorities, construed by the agency to include the right to unilaterally abrogate provisions of collective bargaining agreements and replace them with agency directives. The rationale for DHS’ grant of authority to create a new pay and personnel system was the war on terror and the 

administration’s belief that union rights and national security were mutually exclusive. So in 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld used the same rationale to seek personnel authorities similar to those granted to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

In early 2016, the Defense Department began exploring NSPS 2.0 under the rubric of ‘‘Force of the Future.’’ Early drafts of the Force of the Future proposals for 

civilians included the notion of moving virtually all DOD civilians from title 5 to 

title 10. This was the original plan for NSPS. Title 10 governs the Department’s 

uniformed personnel, but includes a few provisions for civilians in intelligence and 

Defense universities. A move from title 5 to title 10 would eliminate most civil service protections, and give the hiring authority complete discretion to set and adjust 

pay. AFGE strongly opposes any and all efforts to restore NSPS, whether under the 

guise of Force of the Future or by any other name, including the just released report 

of Bipartisan Policy Center. The flaws of that system were well-documented and 

there is certainty that a revival would reproduce all the discriminatory effects of its 

earlier incarnation. 

DOD has often argued that it needs a more ‘‘flexible’’ personnel system in order 

to manage its workforce than is contemplated or permitted under title 5. However, 

if experience is any guide, DOD rarely, if ever, simplifies much of anything, even 

35 

when given broad latitude by Congress. More recent examples include DOD’s implementation of the broad-banded Senior Executive Service pay system, or implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. In each case, the Department developed and grew its own dedicated systems that blunted any alleged 

flexibilities that were sought. The net effect is an even more bureaucratic and internally rule driven process than the old system that the putative ‘‘flexibilities’’ were 

designed to replace. 

At the Department of Homeland Security, AFGE preventing that agency’s proposed new personnel system, called MaxHR, from ever getting off the ground, 

thanks to a lawsuit that successfully argued that its undermining of collective bargaining rights violated the law. But at DOD, NSPS did move forward in part because its focus was not on eliminating the union per se, but rather on creating a 

pay system that allowed managers to reward themselves and their cronies, and punish others. NSPS could only have continued if Congress had been indifferent to its 

discriminatory outcomes. Fortunately, when faced with data that showed NSPS 

gave systemic advantages to white employees and other relatively powerful groups 

at the direct expense of other DOD civilians, and that the venerated Merit System 

Principles had been undermined, Congress voted to repeal the system in 2009. 

But the architects of NSPS never gave up on the dream of a subjective pay system 

for the Federal Government, one in which managers can decide each employee’s salary and whether and by how much that salary will be adjusted each year. Prior to 

the 2016 iteration of Force of the Future, the contractor Booz Allen Hamilton ($5.41 

billion in revenue in FY 2016, 98 percent of which is from the Federal Government) 

endowed the publication of a report under the imprimatur of the Partnership for 

Public Service. 

The report trod the well-worn path of those seeking lucrative contracts to revamp 

the federal personnel system. It employs many of the hackneyed tropes that have 

become all too familiar among the enemies of fair pay for federal employees: the 

General Schedule is ‘‘stuck in the past,’’ ‘‘broken,’’ ‘‘rigid,’’ and ‘‘fragmented.’’ It conveniently neglects to acknowledge the fact that numerous flexibilities and modernizations have been enacted over the past few decades. In the 1990’s, the General 

Schedule went from having one nationwide annual cost-of-living adjustment to a 

city-by-city, labor market-by-labor market cost-of-labor salary adjustment system. 

Special rates were authorized as well. In the 2000’s, Congress passed legislation 

that introduced broad new hiring authorities, managerial flexibilities in salary-setting, and a program for substantial bonuses for recruitment, relocation, and retention. Congress enacted legislation to allow student-loan repayment, new personnel 

system demonstration projects, and phased retirement. The list of new flexibilities 

is long, and in many cases, these new authorities have improved the General Schedule. In any case, the list stands as a refutation of the myth that the General Schedule is a relic, untouched by modernity or that Congress has failed to address needed 

changes in the civil service system for decades on end. 

Congress has been careful, however, not to go so far as to undermine the Merit 

System. Unlike a private firm, the Federal Government is spending the public’s 

money in ways that are meant to promote the public interest. NSPS was an object 

lesson in what happens when a Booz Allen Hamilton plan is implemented in a federal agency. Despite good intentions, the Merit System Principles are undermined, 

particularly the principles that promise ‘‘equal pay for work of substantially equal 

value,’’ and that ‘‘employees be protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes.’’ Veterans Preference in hiring, retention and promotions is also inevitably undermined. These are the lessons of 

NSPS. 

Now we see that what is old is new again under the title ‘‘Building a F.A.S.T. 

Force: A Flexible Personnel System for a Modern Military’’ (hereinafter the ‘‘FAST 

Report’’) issued by the Bipartisan Policy Center. While most of the FAST Report 

deals with military personnel policy on which AFGE does not take a position, the 

sections addressing civilian personnel policy look like they were cribbed from previous reports and proposals, including last year’s Force of the Future proposal. 

AFGE does not suggest that either the Partnership, the architects of Force of the 

Future, or the FAST Report, advocate discrimination in pay. They likely have good 

intentions. But we also know that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, 

and federal employees have no desire to revisit the hell of NSPS. To be clear: Force 

of the Future and/or the FAST Report blueprint are not just cut from the same cloth 

as NSPS, they are NSPS redux. 

While NSPS and its would-be successors fail the internal equity test, there is no 

question that when it comes to external equity, Congress and the Clinton, Bush, and 

Obama administrations all failed to perform their role. It is preposterous to blame 

the current system for failing to produce external equity. External equity is a fundVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
36 

ing issue, and the General Schedule cannot fund itself. It relies on budget authority 

and appropriations. To pretend that Congress would magically provide billions more 

each year to fund a new civil service system identical to one it repealed in 2009 on 

the grounds that it was discriminatory is folly. 

The cost of living has risen 10 percent from 2010 to the present. So even before 

the salary reductions for new employees of 2.3 percent and 3.6 percent (i.e., the increase in employee contributions to FERS), the purchasing power of federal salaries 

had declined by 4.6 percent. The degree to which they lag the market varies by city, 

but the nationwide average is 34.92 percent according to the most recent estimates 

from OPM, using data from BLS. That number includes current locality payments 

which were frozen for five long years. https://www.opm.qov/policy-data-oversiqht/ 

payleave/pay-systems/qeneral-schedule/pay-aqent-reports/2015report. pdf 

INEQUALITY, THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS, AND WAGES AND

SALARIES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

The decline in living standards for America’s middle class and the ongoing misery 

of the poor have been much in the news recently. Even as the rate of unemployment 

has dropped, wages continue to stagnate as do household incomes. On one side are 

those who deny the numbers, attribute changes in the distribution of income and 

wealth to changes in educational attainment or willingness to exert effort. On another side are those who recognize that the decline of unions, the rise of outsourcing 

and global free trade agreements, and the deregulation of the 1990s and other factors are better explanations. Median incomes for middle class American families, adjusted for inflation, are lower than they were in the 1970s and the very rich have 

benefited so disproportionately from economic growth over the decades that America 

is now more unequal than it was in the 1920s. Both middle incomes and the incomes of the poor are now higher in several European countries and Canada than 

they are in the U.S. After adjusting for inflation, median per capita income in the 

U.S. has not improved at all since 2000. 

Federal employees are typical middle class Americans. They work hard and have 

historically received modest, but fair pay from their employer. It has been recognized that the nation benefited from having an apolitical civil service governed by 

the merit system principles. The pay and benefits that derived from those principles 

were supposed to be adequate to recruit and retain a high-quality workforce, capable of carrying out important public sector functions, from law enforcement to guaranteeing care for wounded warriors to protecting public health. 

The government would not be a bottom-of-the-barrel employer, paying the lowest 

possible wages and forgoing health care and retirement benefits, like so many of today’s most profitable corporations. Likewise, the government would not be a place 

where anybody went to get rich at taxpayer’s expense (that role is assumed by government contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton). The government as an employer 

would be a model when it came to ideals of internal equity and non-discrimination, 

promoting both fairness and seeking employees devoted to the public interest. On 

pay and benefits, it would aim at ‘‘comparability,’’ defined in the pay law as no less 

than 95 percent of what private and state and local government pays on a locality 

basis. 

While some brave politicians have held fast to these principles over the past several years when there has been immense political pressure to reduce government 

spending no matter what, many more have succumbed to the notion that America 

should reconcile itself to declining living standards for all but the very rich. As such, 

they supported the pay freeze, the 1 percent pay adjustments, the federal retirement 

benefit cuts, which have cut purchasing power of some federal paychecks by an additional 2.3 or 3.6 percent; and they have supported the Budget Control Act’s discretionary spending caps, which have meant temporary layoffs and could mean permanent job loss for thousands. 

We recognize the politics behind the pressure to constantly reduce federal spending. We understand the vast power of those who would protect the low tax rates 

of the wealthy at any cost. Regardless of one’s position on austerity and sequestration, both Force of the Future and FAST Report proposals deserve strong opposition 

because they introduce subjectivity and politicization into federal pay, undermine 

veterans’ preference and violate the merit system principles. These plans are also 

objectionable because they would reallocate salary dollars away from the lower 

grades toward the top, increasing inequality and decreasing opportunity for advancement. Even if the direct attacks on federal employees’ pensions were to stop 

and funding for salaries were enhanced, it would be important to reject Force of the 

Future and the FAST Report approach, because they quite explicitly advocate greater inequality between the top and the bottom of the federal pay scale. 

37 

The elitism of Force of the Future and the FAST Report is striking. They ignore 

the Federal Government’s hourly workforce altogether. Apparently blue collar workers are so bereft of the qualities DOD and its contractors want to reward in their 

pay schemes that they are not worth notice. The implied segmentation of the General Schedule or salaried workforce is also highly elitist. Employees in the lower 

grades, like hourly workers, are excluded entirely, again because, presumably, trying to measure their contribution to excellence would be a pointless exercise. But 

excluding the lowest paid federal workers is only one part of the inequality enhancement exercise that Force of the Future and the FAST Report propose for DOD. Like 

their NSPS forbearer, the plans would divide the workforce by occupational category, reserving the highest raises for the highest earners. Those in the midlevel 

occupations would stagnate or decline, while their betters would be provided with 

both higher salary increases and a larger pool of funds from which to draw performance-based adjustments. 

Force of the Future and its government-wide twin from the Bipartisan Center 

should also be opposed because they both would undo the tremendous achievement 

of the current system with respect to eliminating discrimination in pay. AFGE urges 

Congress to treat the findings of the OPM study on pay equity as important accomplishments worth protecting. We should be celebrating this success, not considering 

replacing the system that produced it. That celebration must include full funding, 

so that federal employees can restore their status in the middle class. 

MAINTAINING A MERIT-BASED CIVIL SERVICE AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

A ‘‘merit-based’’ civil service system forms the cornerstone of all modern Western 

democracies. It ensures that technical expertise is brought to bear on performing 

agency missions, without the threat of overt partisan agendas driving day-to-day operations. 

When the FAST Report at recommendation A–5 states: ‘‘Create a separate and 

unique personnel system for all Defense Department civilian employees,’’ we at 

AFGE ask, will due process rights be maintained? The FAST Report further comments on page 27: ‘‘Another issue with the civilian personnel system is the lack of 

flexibility to hire and fire employees in a timely manner. Since the system’s primary 

rationale is fairness and impartiality, it is exceedingly difficult to remove low performers.’’ 

These code words and the outright contempt for civil service due process rights 

they express should be opposed by all those who care about maintaining a nonpartisan career civil service. The notion that poor performers and those who commit 

acts of misconduct cannot be disciplined or removed are myths that have been perpetuated by advocates for an ‘‘at will’’ civil service. 

The FAST Report ignores that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) provides that 

all title 5 employees, including DOD employees, may be removed for either misconduct or poor performance. The employee merely needs to be informed of his or 

her alleged deficiency and the reason that management proposes to take an action 

against him or her (removal, demotion, suspension, etc.). 

An employee is subject to a final adverse action by an agency 30 days after receiving an adverse proposal. An employee may file an appeal to an adverse action to 

the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), a third-party agency that hears and adjudicates civil service appeals. MSPB administrative judges (AJs) hear the matter 

in an adversarial setting and decide the case in accordance with established legal 

precedents. If dissatisfied with the AJ’s decision, either the agency or the employee 

may appeal the decision to the full three Member MSPB. 

The MSPB appeal process is highly efficient and expeditious. Most AJ decisions 

are rendered within 70 days of the filing of an appeal. On appeal to the full MSPB 

from an AJ decision, agencies win 80–90 percent of the time. Meanwhile, the agency’s decision, e.g., removal of the employee from the payroll, remains in effect during 

the entire appeals process. 

The importance of maintaining a nonpartisan, apolitical civil service in an increasingly partisan environment cannot be overstated. First, most federal jobs require technical skills that agencies simply would not obtain through non-merit 

based appointment. Second, career employees must be free to perform their work 

in accordance with objective professional standards. Those standards must remain 

the only basis for evaluating employee performance or misconduct. 

Calls to make it easier to fire a federal employee by decreasing due process rights 

or speeding up the removal process are ‘‘dog whistles’’ for making the career service 

subject to the partisan or personal whims of a few supervisors or political appointees. 

38 

The drafters of the FAST Report may find it politically unpopular to admit this, 

but federal managers are already fully empowered under existing law to take appropriate action when employees are underperforming or engaged in misconduct. There 

is no group of people who object more to the continuing presence in the workplace 

of those who are not performing well or who may engage in misconduct than fellow 

federal employees. When someone doesn’t perform up to speed, it simply means 

more work for the rest of the people who do perform well. Similarly, an individual’s 

misconduct hurts all employees in the workplace, and it is usually fellow employees 

who are the first to shine light on misconduct. 

A premise of both DOD’s ‘‘Force of the Future’’ proposal and the FAST Report 

seems to be that federal managers lack adequate authority and tools to discipline 

those who engage in misconduct or who are poor performers. Thus, they argue, 

shifting employees from existing title 5 processes and protections to a new title 10 

system for all DOD civilian employees is warranted. Despite the various protestations of some managers, management-associated think tanks, and so-called bipartisan groups, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) have all 

issued reports and analyses that have come to pretty much the same conclusion: 

When poor performers are not dealt with it is never because the civil service laws 

or procedures are too difficult to navigate, but rather because some managers (or 

their managers) either do not want to take the time and effort to properly document 

poor performance and remove or demote poor performers, or because they lack the 

knowledge, skills, and ability to do this. 

A recent GAO report, ‘‘Improved Supervision and Better Use of Probationary Periods Are Needed to Address Substandard Employee Performance,’’ (GAO–151–191), 

February 6, 2015, found four principal reasons why agencies do not use the already 

substantial tools they have available to them to remove the relatively few poor performers. All four reasons related to management failures and/or unwillingness to 

properly identify and document poor performance. AFGE would urge this Subcommittee to review GAO’s well thought-out recommendations and its careful analysis of relevant statutes and regulations. 

The premise that the procedural hurdles for removing poorly performing employees are too high is simply not borne out by the facts. When an employee invokes 

his/her rights to a formal adjudicatory hearing before the MSPB, the agency almost 

always prevails. For example, in 2013, only 3 percent of employees appealing their 

dismissal to the MSPB prevailed on the merits. In contrast, agencies were favored 

at a rate five times that of employees when formal appeals were pursued. The notion that the MSPB makes it impossible to fire a federal employee is simply not 

true. Perhaps we should call it an ‘‘alternative fact.’’ 

There are well-established and fully adequate processes and procedures for removing problem federal employees. This is true for performance or conduct reasons. In 

fact, the standards for removing underperformers were specifically developed so that 

poorly performing employees may be more easily dismissed than employees committing conduct-related offenses. Even more important, the burden of proof is lower for 

removing a poor performer—it is only the ‘‘substantial evidence’’ test, so that reasonable supervisors are given leeway to determine what constitutes unacceptable or 

poor performance. 

A BETTER WAY FORWARD

Already federal workers, including DOD civilian employees, have contributed over 

$182 billion to deficit reduction during the past 8 years. Employee pay adjustments 

during this period have been very small (and in quite a few years there were no 

adjustments at all), and inflation-adjusted federal employee compensation has actually decreased. Rather than continuing to punish and vilify DOD civilian workers, 

Congress should consider giving DOD supervisors appropriate tools to reward high 

performers. Freezes in pay, promotions and awards, and decreases in benefits 

whether directly or through more employee cost-sharing, do nothing to improve 

quality. 

History is replete with examples of public service corrupted by unfettered, politically-based employment decisions. That’s why we continue to support a meritbased 

civil service system with appropriate due process, and checks and balances to ensure 

that both hiring and firing decisions be merit-based, and subject to meaningful review. 

AFGE strongly supports improvements in agency performance management systems, such as the Defense Department’s New Beginnings approach. We look forward 

to working with lawmakers and others to see this carried-out. AFGE also supports 

better training of both supervisors and employees so that clear expectations are esVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
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tablished, performance is measurable, and appropriate steps are taken to either 

remedy performance problems, or to remove the small number of poor performers 

from the workplace. AFGE also recommends that Congress focus more on empowering and improving the quality of the workplace for the 99 percent of DOD employees who perform well. While we understand the need to deal with the 1 percent who 

may be problem performers, we must not allow the other 99 percent to be tarred 

and feathered with the same brush. Improving the lot of the 99 percent will further 

reduce the influence and tolerance for the 1 percent to remain employees. This 

starts with more proactive management. 

AFGE opposes virtually all of the proposals set forth in the FAST Report as they 

may affect civilian DOD workers. They are simply a replay of NSPS, and its destructive tone. AFGE does support the call in the FAST Report for improving educational opportunities for civilian DOD employees. However, these authorities already exist. It is a lack of funding that is responsible for the dearth of career development of civilians at DOD. 

IMPACT OF HIRING FREEZE ON MILITARY READINESS

As many of you are aware, the current freeze on hiring and promotion of federal 

employees has had and is continuing to have a negative impact on operations at 

DOD. While wide swaths of employees have received permission for exemptions on 

an individual basis, such as depot maintenance employees, others, who have a direct 

impact on the ability of the ‘‘unfrozen’’ employees to conduct their jobs, are still 

caught in the freeze even though their jobs have a direct impact on national security. For example, many of the engineers and systems integrators that plan and direct workload at depots across the country remain firmly caught in the freeze. Additionally, other key and equally important areas of the organic industrial base, such 

as arsenals, supply depots, and DLA are still caught in the freeze even though their 

workload and workforce have a direct impact on military readiness. Further, working capital fund employees, who work on funded orders from customers, are still 

caught in the freeze, which is simply unreasonable and makes no sense when current statute clearly states that their work and manning should be tied to workload. 

AFGE believes that the Armed Services Committee, the Senate and all of Congress 

should act to ensure that the freeze on civilian employees at DOD—and across government—are removed from the freeze on hiring and promotions. The current freeze 

is the most inefficient method of managing employees and has a tremendously negative impact on morale. 

As you will recall, a recent GAO study identified that the military services are 

failing to meet core requirements under 10 U.S.C. 2464 at several locations across 

the organic industrial base. These gaps in core requirements were identified at the 

lower tier levels and create skill gaps that are critical to maintaining weapons systems that are necessary for war fighting. Increased funding is needed in some cases 

to ensure that backlogs are covered. In other cases, there is a need to transfer workload to the organic depots. Regardless, these core skills must be preserved to ensure 

military readiness. Failure to enforce the law is not a good option. This is an area 

that must be addressed by this Committee. GAO made recommendations that we 

hope the Committee will enact. 

AFGE would like to bring to the attention of this Committee an issue that has 

an impact on retention and hiring at some facilities, particularly DOD organic industrial facilities. Ata limited number of facilities across the country, there is a 

great unfair disparity between the wages of the GS employees and wage grade employees based on illogical decisions that were made in the past or failure to make 

logical decisions. For example, the salaried employees at Tobyhanna Army Depot in 

Pennsylvania are in the New York locality pay area, while the hourly employees are 

in the Scranton, Pennsylvania area for purposes of locality-based pay. This differential treatment of salaried and hourly employees results in enormous disparities in 

pay. Both hourly and salaried workers at the Tobyhanna Army Depot should be in 

the New York locality pay area, as commuting patterns for both workforces show 

that the relevant labor market for all occupations employed at the Depot is most 

closely aligned with New York. The Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee 

has recommended this unification, but OPM has not implemented the change. We 

urge the Committee to enact legislation to correct this unjustifiable inequity. 

At some of our depots, AFGE Locals and management have worked together on 

innovative ideas and programs to improve workload leveling and to implement skills 

enhancement programs that will also increase pay for employees. One such example 

is the Multi-Trades Demonstration Pilot Program that Congress has authorized and 

reauthorized to allow all of the military services to enter into agreements where certain skilled journeymen level artisans could be trained in another skill and work 

40 

in both skills for a higher grade and higher pay. The Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC) has worked diligently on a program at Ogden Air Logistics Complex to implement a pilot program. This pilot demonstration project has been years in planning. It has been approved and promoted through the 4–Star Commanding General 

at AFMC multiple times and forwarded to the Air Force, DOD and OPM. Yet, in 

spite of the coordination and agreement between labor and management and despite 

the solid business case analysis, the plan is caught in a bureaucratic nightmare at 

DOD and OPM. AFGE needs your help to get this pilot program moving and approved so we can implement the demonstration program to determine whether it is 

a good model for the future. 

CONCLUSION

We would urge this Subcommittee to reject any movement of DOD’s civilian workforce from coverage under title 5 to a system run by the Department under the authorities of title 10. This was tried under NSPS only a few years ago, and was rightly abandoned when the gross inequities of the system became apparent. 

Although it is easy to focus on the small number of employees in any organization 

who create problems, it is important to remember that the vast majority of federal 

employees perform very well, and that agency systems and the laws and regulations 

governing employee performance serve the public interest in an apolitical, transparent, and accountable civil service. We do not need new laws or authorities regarding public administration. We need to make sure that agency managers and supervisors (and the supervisors of supervisors) have the training and will to implement current rules effectively. In this, we share the concern of this Subcommittee, 

and we will work with you as we strive to ensure that our civil service system motivates and maintains high quality employee performance at DOD. Due process 

rights, including union rights, for civil servants at DOD or other agencies provides 

accountability to the public for both managers and political appointees and is a cornerstone of our system of democracy and should not be treated as expendable. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAX STIER, PRESIDENT AND CEO PARTNERSHIP FOR

PUBLIC SERVICE

Chairman Tillis, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Members of the Subcommittee on 

Personnel, thank you for the opportunity to submit a statement for the record regarding the state of the Department of Defense’s civilian workforce and the need 

for meaningful personnel reform. 

I am Max Stier, President and CEO of the Partnership for Public Service, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization committed to inspiring a new generation to enter 

public service and transforming the way government works. 

This Committee deserves credit for its leadership in taking steps to reform the 

decades-old federal civil service system. The Committee recognizes the stark reality 

that, as it exists today, the federal personnel system is no longer a good fit for the 

dedicated civilian employees of the Department of Defense and, more importantly, 

undermines our government’s ability to keep us safe. The personnel system governing the Department, and our Federal Government more generally, is a relic of 

a departed era and reflects a time when many federal jobs were clerical in nature 

and did not require the specialized knowledge and skills that they do today. America’s warfighters deserve and depend on a civilian workforce comprised of top talent, 

which will not happen unless the personnel system promotes effective recruitment, 

hiring, and compensation processes. Achieving the best possible mission outcomes 

requires that the Department recruit and hire the best and brightest civilian talent, 

compensate that talent fairly, engage and develop employees’ skills, and, when necessary, discipline employees to achieve the best possible mission outcomes. The Senate Armed Services Committee has led the way on reform, and the Partnership believes that the time is right for Congress to do more to overhaul the civil service 

system so that the Department can better utilize its most important resource—its 

people. 

THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM IS IN CRISIS AND NEEDS REFORM

The current civilian personnel system dates back to 1949 and serves only to disconnect the federal workforce from the larger talent market for knowledge-based 

professional jobs. To help agencies meet their talent needs and accomplish their 

missions, Congress and OPM have, over the years, authorized numerous agency-specific systems and flexibilities. The result has been balkanization and fracturing of 

41 

1 ABC News. ‘‘ ‘Book excerpt: Robert Gates’ ‘A Passion for Leadership’ ’’ ABC News. ABC News 

Network, 29 Jan. 2017. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 2 United States of America. Department of Defense. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness. Force of the Future: Final Report: Reform Proposals. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015. 64. 3 ‘‘2016 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey EMPLOYEES INFLUENCING CHANGE.’’ U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 4Katz, Eric. ‘‘Trump’s Defense Secretary Pick Promises Efficiencies Among Civilian Workforce.’’ GovernmentExecutive. N.p., 12 Jan. 2017. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 5 5 The Department of the Navy ranked 12 of 18, the DOD Fourth Estate ranked 13 of 18, 

the Department of the AirForce ranked 14 of 18, and the Department of the Army ranked 16 

of 18. 6 Building the Enterprise: A New Civil Service Framework. Rep. Washington, DC: Partnership 

for Public Service, 2014. 

the civil service. Agencies compete not only with the private sector for talent but 

with other federal agencies as well. 

Americans who want to serve our country and enter public service confront a disjointed, unresponsive hiring process that is difficult to understand, frustrating to 

navigate, and fails to meet the needs of agencies or applicants alike. Individuals 

hired confront a job classification and pay system which treats all occupations the 

same and sets pay and grade level based on an arcane and arbitrary formula, bearing little relationship to private sector compensation. Former Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates noted in his memoir, A Passion for Leadership, that, ‘‘Most of the sclerosis that impedes change in terms of hiring, firing, work rules, pay, and personnel 

is generally hardwired into law or regulations’’ which, when combined with attacks 

on public service more broadly, ‘‘discourage young citizens with desirable and needed talents from entering public service.’’ 1

The need for a modern, streamlined personnel system is particularly acute at the 

Department of Defense, which employees nearly 700,000 civilian employees and currently operates under 66 unique civilian personnel systems. 2 According to the Partnership’s analysis of the most recent Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), percent positive responses to the statement, ‘‘My work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills’’ ranged between 

39 percent at the Department of the Army to 42 percent at the Department of the 

Air Force. 3 These responses indicate that employees see clearly an inability to hire 

and retain needed talent in DOD. To its credit, Pentagon leaders recognize the need 

for meaningful reform. Secretary Mattis, in his confirmation hearing, stated that he 

would ‘‘pursue reforms to the civilian personnel system.’’ 4 There have been many 

attempts to modernize the Department over the years, from the China Lake Demonstration Projects to AcqDemo and more recent reforms that have sought to implement new approaches to compensation, classification and performance management. 

However, these reforms have not had a fundamentally transformative impact on the 

Department’s talent management approach, and it continues to struggle to recruit, 

hire, retain, and engage the talent it needs. According to the Partnership for Public 

Service’s Best Places to Work in the Federal Government Rankings®, the most comprehensive measure of employee engagement available, neither the DOD’s Fourth 

Estate nor any of the services ranked higher than 12th of 18 large agencies in overall employee engagement. 5

True reform will require a thoughtful framework, strong leadership, and employee 

buy-in. The Partnership offered just such a blueprint in our 2014 report, Building 

the Enterprise: A New Civil Service Framework. 6 In that report, we proposed a comprehensive, fundamental overhaul which offered ideas on how to speed hiring, modernize compensation, simplify job classification, strengthen employee accountability, 

and develop effective leaders. Our overarching goal was to create a unified federal 

enterprise that balances merit principles and common policies across government 

with agency flexibility to tailor personnel systems to their unique missions. Agencies 

like DOD ultimately know best how to hire, support and engage the people they 

need, and the civil service system should help them do so rather than stand in their 

way. 

CONGRESS SHOULD VIEW DOD AS A TEST-BED FOR COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL

SERVICE REFORM

The current political moment represents a valuable opportunity for major reform. 

Leaders in the public and private sector, in academia and the good government 

stakeholder community all agree that the Federal Government’s personnel system 

is in desperate need of reform. The Senate Armed Services Committee has led the 

way. Reforms enacted over the last few years—creation of a public-private talent exchange to facilitate sharing of best practices with the private sector, expanding 

42 

7 Brad Carson, Greg Mallory, and Mel Wolfgang. ‘‘The Pentagon’s ‘Force of the Future’ Reinvents Hiring’’ www.bcgperspectives.com. Boston Consulting Group, 15 Sept. 2016. Web. 20 

Mar. 2017. 8 United States of America. Government Accountability Office. Federal Hiring: OPM Needs to 

Improve Management and Oversight of Hiring Authorities. Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 9 9 ‘‘2016 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey EMPLOYEES INFLUENCING CHANGE.’’ U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 

merit promotion privileges to employees on time-limited appointments new authority to hire students and recent graduates quickly, among many others—represent 

an important starting point for the Department and the government as a whole. 

While the full impact of these recent reforms is not yet known, there is no doubt 

that the Committee’s efforts have set the tone and direction for the rest of government. As the Boston Consulting Group points out, ‘‘Given that almost one-third of 

all federal employees work in the DOD, its views are extraordinarily influential, and 

there is a growing realization that the civil service system is inadequate for effective 

government. It is opaque, inefficient, and inflexible.’’ 7 The Committee should use its 

influence to reimagine the Defense Department’s personnel system as a modern, 

agile, unified system that attracts and retains the best and brightest and serves as 

a model for the rest of government. Below, I outline several recommendations for 

doing so, focusing on both long-term ideas for broader civil service reform beginning 

at DOD and spreading throughout government, and actionable, short-term legislative ideas that can have an immediate impact on the Department’s ability to manage its talent. 

LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

Pursue comprehensive civil service system reform at the Department of Defense 

The size and influence of the Department of Defense over the rest of government 

mean that it can, should, and likely will serve as the leader in personnel reform. 

With this in mind, the Committee should pursue broad reform at the Department 

that can serve as a model for other agencies. This reform should create a Defense 

Department that has the flexibility to hire, pay, and hold accountable its workforce 

in an equitable manner consistent with merit principles, veterans’ preference, and 

the foundational ideas of a professional civil service. The Secretary should have 

broad authorities to recruit, hire and compensate mission-critical talent in a way 

that best meets the needs of the organization and should be able to manage performance and deal with poor performers through a fair but reasonable process that 

serves both managers and employees. The Armed Services Committee has already 

laid the groundwork, and we strongly urge you to continue down the path of reform. 

Benchmark the Department’s Hiring Process and Other Aspects of Talent Management 

For the Department of Defense to become an employer of choice for the best and 

brightest, it must first be able to make meaningful comparisons to the organizations 

with which it competes in critical hiring and other talent management metrics. A 

human capital benchmarking initiative would allow the Department to understand 

its talent challenges better and lay out a path towards resolving them. Key metrics 

might include time-to-hire; quality of hire; manager, applicant, and new hire satisfaction with the hiring process; ability to reach and recruit talent from diverse talent pools; and the use and impact of special hiring authorities and flexibilities. This 

last metric is particularly important in light of recent GAO findings that government as a whole does a poor job of understanding and utilizing the dozens of hiring 

authorities and flexibilities currently in law. 8 Congress could require the Department to collect this information and use it to improve its internal talent management practices continuously. 

Provide Regular, Meaningful Oversight of the Department’s Performance Management Processes 

As DOD finally begins rolling out the ‘‘New Beginnings’’ performance management process, this Subcommittee should commit to performing regular oversight to 

ensure that the initiative is meeting its goals. The data shows that, as of now, performance management is a problem. Across the Department, just a third of employees respond positively to the statement that ‘‘Promotions in my work unit are based 

on merit,’’ while even fewer agree that ‘‘steps are taken to deal with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve.’’ 9 Ensuring that wider civil service reforms, 

including the new requirement that reductionsin-force (RIFs) be based primarily on 

performance, truly take hold will depend on an effective performance management 

process which employees believe is both fair and equitable. Ultimately, holding emVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
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ployees accountable for their performance is core to mission accomplishment. This 

Subcommittee will be essential to holding DOD itself accountable and making sure 

that the Department is adjusting course as necessary. 

The topic of RIFs deserves special focus. Congress took a step in the right direction by weighting performance more heavily in executing reductions-in-force. However, given that there has not been a large-scale RIF in over 20 years, there is reason to believe that the process may have unanticipated and unintended negative 

consequences on the Department’s overall talent posture—e.g., upending succession 

planning by pushing out or discouraging younger talent and making it harder to 

bring in new talent because of the re-employment rights of employees released as 

part of a RIF. It will be essential for the Committee to understand how the Department would execute a RIF and how a RIF would affect the ability of the Department 

to recruit, deploy, develop and discipline its civilian talent. 

SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

Change the Standard for Using Direct Hire Authority from a Shortage of ‘‘Minimally-Qualified’’ Candidates to a Shortage of ‘‘Highly-Qualified’’ Candidates and 

Grant DOD the Authority to Make Direct Hire Determinations 

In filling the ranks of the civilian workforce, government as a whole and DOD, 

in particular, should only hire people who are highly qualified for their jobs—settling for candidates who are minimally qualified is simply the wrong bar. Currently, 

however, agencies must demonstrate to OPM that they face a shortage of candidates 

who are minimally qualified before requesting direct hire authority for that position 

or group of positions. Further, to show a lack of minimally qualified candidates, an 

agency must go through the full hiring process before applying to OPM for such authority, adding a minimum of six months to the process. Therefore, we propose that 

Congress change the standard that the Department of Defense must meet to use 

direct hire authority for any position to a demonstration of a shortage of highlyqualified talent. Also, the Secretary of Defense should have the authority to grant 

direct hire authority to components or for positions where it is needed, with proper 

OPM oversight. The Department knows best what its talent needs are and where 

the roadblocks to reaching that talent lie, and it should have the power to act to 

address them. 

Allow the Secretary to Offer Market-Based Pay for Mission-Critical Positions 

The General Schedule is more than six decades old and no longer serves to effectively and rationally compensate the talent that the Department needs. While there 

are certainly some employees who may be overcompensated by the current system, 

relative to the labor market, there are other vital positions for which federal pay 

is simply not competitive. The Partnership’s report, Building the Enterprise: A New 

Civil Service Framework, laid out a new pay-setting process for the federal workforce. The modernized pay system would establish broad pay bands for employees 

rather than rigid grades, better align salaries and benefits on an occupation-by-occupation basis, set salaries based on those comparisons and give agencies the flexibility to bring talent in at the appropriate salary level. While the Committee need 

not pursue this detailed of an approach in the short term, the Department would 

greatly benefit from having the authority to set market-based pay levels for specific 

mission-critical occupations as a way to better attract and retain badly-needed talent. 

Authorize DOD to Noncompetitively Rehire Former Department Employees to Any 

Position for Which They Qualify 

Currently, former federal employees who have held a career or career-conditional 

position can be reinstated non-competitively within the Federal Government, but 

only to a job that is at or below the grade level they last held in the Federal Government. The individual applying may be qualified for a more senior position due to 

several years of valuable higher-level experience outside the government, but that 

experience does not matter for the purpose of their non-competitive eligibility. The 

result is that government unnecessarily disincentivizes talented former federal employees from returning to public service. This proposal would create better flow between DOD and the private sector and encourage talented individuals to return to 

government service. 

Require DOD to Accept Resumes for SES Positions in the Initial Stage of the Hiring 

Process 

In many cases, applicants for SES positions must apply for these jobs by writing 

lengthy essays addressing their qualifications for the position. This process is timeconsuming and greatly deters external candidates from applying. A report by the 

44 

10 A Pivotal Moment for the Senior Executive Service: Measures, Aspirational Practices and 

Stories of Success. Rep. Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service, 2016. 15. 11 ‘‘Selection Process.’’ U.S. Office of Personnel Management. OPM, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 12Partnership for Public Service. ‘‘Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.’’ Best 

Places to Work in the Federal Government. Partnership for Public Service, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 

2017. 13 In the Best Places to Work subcategory of ‘‘Effective Leadership—Senior Leaders’’, the 

rankings were as follows: Department of the Air Force (6 of 18), DOD Fourth Estate (9 of 18), 

Department of the Navy (11 of 18), Department of the Army (12 of 18) 14 ‘‘2016 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey EMPLOYEES INFLUENCING CHANGE.’’ U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 

Partnership, A Pivotal Moment for the Senior Executive Service: Measures, Aspirational Practices and Stories of Success, pointed out that the application process ‘‘discourages many potential candidates from applying, particularly if they come from 

the private sector.’’ 10 By allowing all applicants for SES positions to apply with a 

simple resume at the initial stages of the hiring process, agencies can ensure they 

are receiving a diverse pool of candidates from both within and outside government. 

As part of this recommendation, it may also be useful to require agencies to survey 

candidates, new hires and hiring managers to ensure the hiring and selection process brings the best possible talent to the Department. 

Authorize DOD, rather than OPM, to certify that their selected SES candidates possess the Executive Core Qualifications 

Rather than relying on the current OPM Qualifications Review Board (QRB) that 

is required to approve applicants for executive positions, DOD should be able to certify its executive talent on the basis that the Department itself knows best what 

type of executive it needs. The QRB serves as the last step in the SES selection 

process, and its purpose is to certify that an SES candidate possesses broad leadership skills. 11 However, the QRB process extends the length of the hiring process 

even while it approves nearly all candidates. Delegating this authority to DOD has 

the potential to speed up the hiring and certification process for new executives and 

allow the Department to manage its executive talent better. To protect against 

abuse and ensure quality candidates, OPM could review and certify a sample of hiring decisions annually to ensure the Department is acting appropriately. 

Establish a Dual-Track Promotional System to Enable Both Managers and Technical 

Experts to Advance Their Careers 

The rigid structure of the General Schedule typically requires employees to move 

into supervisory and management roles to advance their careers, even in cases 

where the employee may not be an effective manager. For employees who possess 

valuable technical expertise but are not suited for supervisory duties, this is especially challenging. A dual promotional track that allows employees to become either 

managers or technical experts would give both agencies and employees more 

choices. Individuals with superior technical qualifications could advance in their careers without being forced to become a manager, while those who have demonstrated an aptitude for leadership would be allowed to take on those responsibilities. The outcome is not just more satisfied employees, but more effective managers 

throughout the organization. 

Require Performance Plans for Political Appointees Which Recognize Critical Management and Leadership Goals 

As the highest level of leadership in the Department of Defense, political appointees play a crucial role in providing leadership and setting priorities for the organization. Appointees should be held accountable for their performance and contributions like every other employee. Unfortunately, DOD does not perform particularly well regarding the effectiveness of its leadership—with rankings among its 

major components in the Partnership’s measure of ‘‘Effective Leadership’’ ranging 

from seventh to 15th out of 18 large agencies. 12 Scores in the subcategory specifically measuring satisfaction with senior leaders are only marginally better, with the 

major DOD components ranging from between sixth and 12th among 18 large agencies. 13 Across the Department, between 39 percent and 45 percent of employees respond positively to the statement, ‘‘In my organization, leaders generate high levels 

of motivation and commitment in the workforce.’’ 14 Performance plans should address the accountability of leaders for managing well, supporting efforts to recruit, 

hire and retain highly-qualified talent, training and developing future leaders, engaging employees, and holding subordinate managers accountable for addressing 

employee performance issues. Each of these criteria plays a role in building a highVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:57 Apr 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29481.TXT WILDA
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15 ‘‘U.S. Office of Personnel Management.’’ FedScope. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 16 United States of America. U.S. Chief Information Officers Council. Office of Management 

and Budget. Federal Shared Services. Washington, DC: U.S. CIO Council, n.d. 17 United States of America. Department of Defense. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness. Force of the Future: Final Report: Reform Proposals. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015. 105. 18 18 Ibid. 105. 

performing workforce and will drive leadership attention to the pressing workforce 

and management issues within the Department. 

Expand the Pathways Programs to Allow for the Conversion of Third-Party Interns 

and Volunteers 

Student interns and recent graduates provide a critical pipeline of entry-level talent into any organization. Increasing the number of young people in an organization 

provides new ideas, reinvigorates the workforce, and creates a pool of future leaders. 

At the Department of Defense, where just seven percent of the workforce is under 

the age of 30—a number well below the comparable level in the private sector—this 

is especially true. 15 Further, internships give agencies the opportunity to evaluate 

potential employees on the job, where they can most effectively assess their work 

product and their fit within the organization. The Pathways Programs serve as the 

best means of bringing younger talent into government; codifying conversion authority while simultaneously expanding it to allow for excepted service appointments of 

student interns, volunteers who perform substantive work functions, and interns 

hired through third-party organizations would increase the pool of proven, highquality entry-level talent available to DOD. 

Require Aspiring DOD Executives to Demonstrate Experience in Another Sector, 

Level of Government, or Agency Before Being Selected for the SES 

The Senior Executive Service, established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 

was originally conceived as a mobile corps of federal leaders. This Committee recognized the importance of mobility and diversity of experience for the civilian workforce last year when it included a provision authorizing a DOD public-private talent 

exchange in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114– 

328). The Armed Services Committee could build upon this new authority by requiring DOD to give added weight during the SES selection process to candidates who 

would bring a diversity of experience to the role. Rotations offer a rich professional 

development opportunity in management and policy for current and aspiring leaders 

and allow agencies to build managerial skills, strategically fill vacancies, and infuse 

new thinking into their organizations. However, barriers to greater mobility among 

executives and aspiring executives have built up over time. These include agencies’ 

hoarding of talent and reluctance to accept short-term transition costs of losing a 

top performer, and organizations doing a poor job of onboarding new executives. 

Overcoming these roadblocks, at least initially, will require a push from Congress, 

and the Partnership firmly believes that the benefits far outweigh the costs. 

Move to a Shared Services Model for DOD Human Resources 

In a constrained fiscal environment, the Department of Defense must look for new 

ways to seek efficiencies and reduce spending. Shared services offer the ability to 

use resources more efficiently while enabling more effective delivery of mission 

through efficient administrative services. For an organization the size of DOD, the 

savings potential of a move to an HR shared services model is well into the billions 

of dollars; the Federal CIO Council has estimated that the savings generated by 

shared services can be estimated somewhere between $21 billion and $47 billion per 

year. 16 The need for such efficiencies at DOD is great: the Department operates 

hundreds of separate HR IT systems and employs 22,000 civilian employees in 

HR. 17 Further, DOD has found that ‘‘due to the lack of modern automated 

workflows, gaps in functionality are bridged by human intervention.’’ 18 Shared services can bring about this system modernization at a lower cost to the Department 

than if it were to develop such systems in-house. Whether the move to a shared 

service model results in a centralized DOD HR function or one where a single component acts as an executive agent for all DOD is a tactical decision—the demands 

on the Department’s resources are too pressing not to move down this path. Creating the right environment for shared services entails committing to the goal, altering spending expectations and incentives, and rethinking how government makes 

investments in its administrative services and infrastructure. The Committee can 

46 

19 19 ‘‘Human Resources Shared Services: Progress, Lessons and Opportunities .’’ 

Ourpublicservice.org. Partnership for Public Services, Dec. 2015. Web. 20 Mar. 2017. 8. 

and should play a leading role in driving that commitment and investment forward. 19

The Committee Should Pay Close Attention to the Management Qualifications of 

Nominees to Critical Positions Within the Department 

As the single largest federal Department, with hundreds of thousands of employees in offices and installations across the country, the Pentagon represents a challenging management environment for even the most effective leaders. Each service, 

even taken individually, is comparable in size, budget, and complexity to a Fortune 

100 company. The Armed Services Committee plays a crucial role in ensuring that 

nominees for key executive positions in the Department bring management skills to 

their new jobs along with subject matter expertise—a role that is especially important because successfully managing in the Federal Government is much different 

than managing in other sectors. As this Subcommittee, as well as the full Committee, begin to consider the President’s nominees for important DOD posts, the 

Partnership urges you to review, and question, each nominee’s management qualifications to ensure that potential Defense Department leaders understand the challenges they are taking on and are capable of successfully leading their organizations. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Tillis and Ranking Member Gillibrand, thank you for the opportunity 

to share my views on the need for civilian personnel reform at the Department of 

Defense. I am pleased to see this Subcommittee maintain its commitment to modernizing and strengthening the civil service system so that it can meet the needs 

of the Department’s hundreds of thousands of civilian employees, as well as our men 

and women in uniform. I look forward to working with the Subcommittee on these 

important issues moving forward. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SARAH MAPLES, DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND

FOREIGN AFFAIRS VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Chairman Tillis, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the 

Personnel Subcommittee, on behalf of the men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) and its Auxiliary, I thank you for the opportunity to provide the VFW’s views on the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel reforms. We appreciate the work this subcommittee has done in the past to 

improve programs and policies for our service members and their families. 

Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2016 required DOD to develop a new Reduction in Force (RIF) policy wherein, 

should civilian employees be required to be let go from service, determination of who 

will be released from employment ‘‘shall be made primarily on the basis of performance.’’ In January 2017, DOD released its new policy, which it claims meets this 

requirement. Upon review, however, the VFW believes the new policy not only fails 

to meet the NDAA requirement, but it also disadvantages veterans by reducing the 

value of veterans preference, particularly for transitioning service members who 

gave years of honorable service to our country but lack enough tenure in post-military federal service to have received a performance rating. 

Under DOD’s previous RIF policy which continues to apply to the rest of the Federal Government, the order of retention was: 1) tenure of employment; 2) veterans 

preference; 3) length of service; and 4) performance. DOD’s new policy claims to adhere to the following order of precedence: 1) performance; 2) tenure; 3) average 

score; 4) veterans preference; and 5) service computation date. However, this is inaccurate, as the new policy requires DOD to divide employees by tenure group and 

number of months of assessed performance before performance is even considered. 

Therefore, the true order of precedence is as follows: 1) tenure group; 2) months 

of assessed performance; 3) performance rating of record; 4) tenure group; 5) average score; 6) veterans preference; and 7) service computation date. This means civilian employees are protected by two rounds of tenure before their performance is 

even considered which is counter to the intent of the NDAA mandate and more tenure-centered than the previous policy. Not only does this new order unfairly weight 

the system towards tenure, as opposed to the stated performance, it also undervalues the service veterans performed for their country. 

47 

Under the previous system, if two individuals were hired on the same day—one 

a civilian who had worked six months for another federal agency before transferring 

to DOD, and the other a veteran with ten years of honorable military service—and 

a RIF was then implemented, the veteran would be retained above the civilian. The 

previous policy recognized that veterans, while absent from the civilian workforce, 

have valuable experience worth considering. Therefore, in situations where individuals were in the same tenure group, the veteran’s service was the deciding factor 

in who was retained. 

According to the new policy, if DOD has not yet rated either employee, the transferred civilian will be retained before the veteran, simply because that individual 

would have a rating of record, whereas the veteran would not, despite the veteran’s 

ten years of honorable military service. This is true even if the civilian’s rating of 

record reflected below average performance. 

This is because DOD’s performance management system does not provide appraisals until after an employee has served more than 90 days. In instances where DOD 

has not yet evaluated an individual’s performance, they will accept a rating from 

another federal agency. They will not, however, accept a military performance rating 

in a similar circumstance. Therefore, a recently transitioned veteran with ten years 

of honorable military service will be given no performance value and, instead, will 

be cut based on lack of tenure. Meanwhile, a non-veteran with a poor performance 

rating from another federal agency and as little as three months of service to DOD 

is retained. 

Additionally, when asked why it cannot include a performance factor for veterans 

that recognizes their honorable service, DOD responded in a letter to the VFW that 

it has ‘‘remained consistent with the government-wide regulations, which do not 

allow consideration of performance assessed using military . . . ratings of record.’’ 

The VFW finds this statement to be disingenuous, as the rest of the government 

is providing a value for military performance by using veterans preference as the 

second highest factor in RIF proceedings. However, DOD has reduced veterans preference while providing no comparable evaluation of military performance. 

DOD has repeatedly stated that they believe their new system will better benefit 

‘‘high performing veterans.’’ However, it is clear that many veterans may never 

make it to the ‘‘high performing’’ category, as they will be eliminated before their 

performance can ever be evaluated. Meanwhile, underperforming civil servants will 

be retained at the expense of veterans who honorably served the very department 

that now casts them out. This is particularly concerning for veterans who received 

high performance marks during military service and are now on a RIF short list 

simply because they have less than 90 days of civilian work experience. 

Congress has continually tried to ensure that time spent serving our Nation in 

the Armed Services is valued when veterans move into the civilian workforce. When 

passing the Jobs for Veterans Act (Public Law 107–288) in 2002, which revised and 

improved employment, training and placement services furnished to veterans, Senator Rockefeller said, ‘‘As we ask the young men and women of this Nation to prepare themselves to take up arms in its defense, we must ensure that we will be able 

to help them find productive careers upon their return as we did for the previous 

generations that defended our freedoms.’’ 

This protection for those who have returned from the battlefield is no less needed 

now, after fifteen years of war and its associated demands, than it was at the beginning of the war. As such, the VFW calls on Congress and the Department of Defense 

to recognize the service and sacrifice of this Nation’s veterans by correcting the injustice done by DOD’s new RIF policy. Specifically, we call on the Department of 

Defense to meet the true intent of the 2016 NDAA by limiting tenure consideration 

to a single instance, as opposed to the multiple considerations it is currently being 

given, and restoring veterans preference to its proper place in the RIF factors in 

order that the performance of veterans be properly reflected. 

Æ