U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1685

Overview of Practical Thinking Instruction

for Battle Command

Jon J. Fallesen

U.S. Army Research Institute

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19960619 074

November 1995

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction

of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Personnel

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Director

Technical review by

George E. Dodge

Kathleen A. Quinkert

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1. REPORT DATE

1995, November

2. REPORT TYPE

Final

3. DATES COVERED

August 1994-September 1995

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

Overview of Practical Thinking Instruction for Battle Command 5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

0602785A

6. AUTHOR(S)

Jon J. Fallesen

5c. PROJECT NUMBER

A790

5d. TASK NUMBER

Uli

5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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ARI

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Research Report 1685

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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

For additional detail see ARI Technical Report, Practical Thinking Innovation in Battle Command Instruction by

J.J. Fallesen, R.R Michel, J.W. Lussier, and J. Pounds

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences developed instruction on thinking, reasoning, and

decision making atthe request ofthe Training and Doctrine Command and the Command and General Staff School. The instruction

went beyond current educational and training practices. Practical thinking refers to the cognitive skills that are used in creative and

critical thinking. Emerging cognitive theories that emphasize how people naturally make decisions served as the basis for identifying

the desired skills. The lessons that were developed addressed how attitudes influence thinking, techniques for taking different

perspectives, how to speculate about assumptions, practical guidelines for reasoning, and how to form encompassing views.

The lessons were included as part of a course on Battle Command Seventy-three students participated in 12 hours of classes. At the

end ofthe course a sample ofthem reported an increase in their expertise in all six ofthe lessons. The notable accomplishment was the

application of a cognitive approach tojob-specific material for battle command and the experimental Mobile Strike Force. Five

directions are suggested for further exploration ofthe concepts.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Battle command

Naturalistic decision making

Cognitive skills

Reasoning

Human performance

Thinking

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF

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Unclassified

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Unclassified

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ABSTRACT

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31

21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

(Name and Telephone Number)
Research Report 1685

Overview of Practical Thinking Instruction

for Battle Command

Jon J. Fallesen

U.S. Army Research Institute

Fort Leavenworth Research Unit

Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

November 1995

Army Project Number Personnel Systems and

2O262785A790 Performance Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FOREWORD

The Fort Leavenworth Research Unit ofthe U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ART) performs research on leadership and battle command. A

recent initiative is the exploration of cognitive aspects ofsenior and tactical levels of command.

In August 1994, the Commander ofthe Training and Doctrine Command, GEN Frederick

M. Franks, Jr., requested that ARI play a pivotal role in developing a course for mid-career Army

officers. He asked that new instruction on thinking, reasoning, and deciding be developed for

inclusion in a course on the Art ofBattle Command. In 4 months the concept and content were

completed by ARI researchers for the Command and General StaffOfficers Course.

The major accomplishment to date is the development and transition of cognitive theory

and findings from actual battle command studies to the instruction ofthinking for command and

staffwork. The instruction departs from the systematic procedures suggested by classical models

of decision making. Instead ofprescribing a single sequence ofsteps, the approach considers how

tactical commanders and staff actually make decisions and solve problems and identifies basic

cognitive skills that support the natural ways ofthinking.

The cognitive-based instruction was incorporated as a subcourse on Practical Thinking for

the Battle Command Course. The Battle Command Course is an 180-hour advanced elective

during Terms II and III that serves as the test bed ofthe Mobile Strike Force projected for the

year 2015. In its inaugural implementation, Practical Thinking instruction was given to 73 senior

captains and majors. This report summarizes why a cognitive approach was advocated, what

practical thinking consists of, lessons learned from the implementation, and recommendations for

the future.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Deputy Director Director

(Science and Technology)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Practical Thinking project was not possible without the efforts of many individuals.

Mr. Rex Michel and Dr. James W. Lussier from ARI and LTC Harry Mclntosh from the

Command and General StaffCollege collaborated with the author on the development and

instruction ofthe lessons. Their creativity, critical thinking, and persistence made this work

possible. Ms. Julia Pounds, Consortium Research Fellows Program, provided assistance and

advice throughout.

The assistance of other Fort Leavenworth ARI personnel was appreciated: Dr. Joan

Silver, Dr. Delane Keene, and MAJ Lawrence "Clay" Miller. Dr. Stanley M. Halpin is also

acknowledged for his role in championing the human dimensions approach for battle command.

Also, it is important to acknowledge those decision makers that agreed to try something

that had not been done before. GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commander ofthe Training and

Doctrine Command, agreed that there was cause to approach decision making differently and

entrusted ARI with the mission. LTG John E. Miller, Commander Combined Arms Center; BG

Randall L. Rigby, Deputy Commandant U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege; and

COL J. M. Kain, Director ofthe Center for Tactics, allowed this untried and unproven Practical

Thinking program to be included in their most visible course. BG Geoffrey D. Miller, the

Commander ofthe Mobile Strike Force, and LTC John Burdan, course author, admirably met the

daily challenges ofthe battle command course that offered the context and practical problems

that the instruction addressed.

vi
OVERVIEW OF PRACTICAL THINKING INSTRUCTION FOR BATTLE COMMAND

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

In August 1994 General Franks, then Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC), concurred with ARI study findings that indicated that Army leaders do

not receive instruction in alternate ways of thinking. He requested that ARI develop a course

on thinking based on their findings about actual tactical decision making. The course was

directed to be a part of the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) on battle

command.

Procedure:

A cognitive skills approach was selected as the alternate way of teaching thinking. The

subcourse and the skills are referred to as Practical Thinking. Cognitive skills were identified

from a review of cognitive theories, cognitive skill instruction programs, and studies of tactical

expertise and planning. The review of cognitive instruction programs revealed many skills and

materials, but showed there were no existing cognitive programs targeted at specific jobs or job

areas; they all addressed general areas. More specifically there was no related program of

instruction applicable for mid-career Army officers that addressed the desired skills and

Practical Thinking concepts for battle command.

Specific cognitive skills were identified by considering the basic types of questions that

might be posed by battle commanders and staff, e.g., "what is this situation?" or "what needs to be

accomplished?' The candidate skills were then screened for importance and their fit into

available class time. Twelve hours of instruction organized into six lessons addressed the

following topics:

1. How attitudes affect our thinking.

2. Ways to broaden perspectives.

3. How to adapt thinking to important aspects of a situation.

4. Concepts for identifying hidden assumptions.

5. Ways to resolve uncertainty through reasoning.

6. How to reason to integrate complex and disparate factors.

Four instructors presented the Practical Thinking instruction to 73 CGSOC students. The battle

command course students also made up the staff for the notional Mobile Strike Force (MSF)

'95 division. The students were responsible to a real Commander for working real problems.

These problems included standard operating procedures; tactics, techniques, and procedures for

year 2015 forces; and tactical plans for a series of tactical missions. The students also worked

together to prepare for and conduct division-level warfighting exercises.

vu
Findings:

A fundamental accomplishment of this Practical Thinking program was the development

of the lesson materials. In this initial implementation, there was not sufficient time to integrate

the Practical Thinking lessons fully with the rest of the battle command course or to familiarize

the primary battle command course instructors with the concepts. Given the limited integration

and reinforcement that was afforded the Practical Thinking concepts, they still had a positive

effect. On the average, students' self-reports reflected a gain of 12.5 percent in expertise.

Eighty percent (16 of 20) of the students who responded to an end of course survey felt that the

course should be included in future CGSOC classes.

The application of Practical Thinking instruction to the battle command course can be

improved in the future. Students need more practice trying the skills, and this can be

encouraged by out-of-class assignments and more specific feedback. The Practical Thinking

concepts can be reinforced throughout the battle command course when the primary battle

command course instructors use them during their instruction and in after action reviews of

student exercises.

Utilization ofFindings:

The Practical Thinking instruction has been incorporated as a part of the premiere

course on battle command. The Practical Thinking instruction can be extended to other

CGSOC electives, other Army schooling, self-development materials, and for professional

development seminars. As the Army realizes the need to increase reliance on critical and

creative thinking skills, it becomes more important to define and try Practical Thinking

instruction.

Beyond the Army applications, the cognitive skills that were identified and lessons that

were developed can serve the basis for other adult instruction in complex decision making

environments. The Practical Thinking course materials have already gained interest from

national, state, and county law enforcement and fire fighting agencies.

viu
OVERVIEW OF PRACTICAL THINKING INSTRUCTION FOR BATTLE COMMAND

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

APPROACH 6

Practical Thinking Skills 6

Practical Thinking Lessons 7

Methods ofInstruction 8

DESCRIPTION OF PRACTICAL THINKING LESSONS 10

FINDINGS 14

Context for Instruction 14

Student Reactions 14

Instructor Insights 16

RECOMMENDATIONS 18

CONCLUSIONS 19

REFERENCES 21

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. C2 Performance Problems and Issues 1

2. Battle Decision Making Activities 2

3. Insight on Alternate Instruction for Thinking 3

4. Contrast ofFormal and Practical Thinking 4

5. Problem Solving Skills Proposed for Battle Command 8

6. Summary ofPractical Thinking Lessons 12

IX
CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table 7. Ratings ofImportance ofFuture Lesson Topics 16

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Self-reported expertise before and after instruction 15
OVERVIEW OF PRACTICAL THINKING INSTRUCTION FOR BATTLE COMMAND

Introduction

Current doctrine and instruction for command and staff decision processes are based on

classical models of decision making that are of questionable use (Fallesen, 1995; Klein, 1989).

The tactical decision making process lays out sequential steps, recommends that multiple courses

of action be generated, that each be assessed individually before any comparisons, that options

be compared with rigorous analytic procedures, and then the best course of action selected.

Although this process is taught, there are problems with the model. Fallesen (1993) provides

ample evidence of problems associated with the traditional procedures (see Table 1). Battle

commanders do not think or decide according to what those models prescribe. Emerging

Table 1.

C2 Performance Problems and Issues

Estimate Procedures Formulation of Alternatives

Failure to follow procedures. Failure to track concepts.

Imprecise procedures. Generation of single alternatives.

Inflexibility of estimate procedures. Inadequate concepts and contingencies.

Excessive time demand.

Evaluation and Comparison of Alternatives

Management of the Process Failure to evaluate.

Failure to include required staff (poor Serial evaluation of options.

coordination). Reaching early decisions.

Inadequate Commander involvement. Inadequate war gaming.

Poor management of the process.

Planning and Synchronization

Information Exchange Incomplete planning.

Failure to exchange information. Poor planning.

Failure to present plans to commander.

Failure to communicate interpretations. Enacting Plans and Monitoring

Poor orders dissemination.

Situation Assessment Failure to track the battlefield.

Failure to consider factors.

Failure to verify assumptions. Battle Success

Failure to assess information quality. Staff characteristics related to effectiveness.

Failure to interpret information. Understanding related to effectiveness.

Failure to make predictions. Quality of procedures related to effectiveness.

findings and new theories of decision making show that the classical models provide limited and

sometimes poor guidance (Fallesen, 1995; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993).

Traditional analytical approaches to tactical decision making procedures do not take into

account the ingenuity and insight required on the battlefield.

Some use the concept of "intuition" to account for these skills that the traditional model

does not address (Rogers, 1994). Others have proposed a recognitional process of perceiving

familiar patterns (Klein, 1989) or creativity (Madigan & Dodge, 1994). Little attention and

emphasis have been given to these or any other models as a basis for instruction on battle

command or tactical decision making. Given that much of the most critical decision making

does not conform to repeatable, analytical procedures and that alternate models exist, students

who will be future battle commanders should be exposed to different models. The objective of

this project was to explore how to define and teach alternate ways of thinking, reasoning, and

deciding for battle command.
ARI proposed a model different from the traditional tactical decision making process in

1992 (Fallesen, Lussier & Michel). The battle command concept (Madigan & Dodge, 1994)

adopted much of this model and summarizes the basics (see Table 2). The ARI proposed

model impacted command and staff decision doctrine to include two alternatives to the

deliberate decision making process. The combat and quick decision making procedures were

added to account for the time available and the experience of the staff (FM 101-5, 1993).

Under less time, less analysis is used, and with lower experience, there is greater need to involve

the commander.

Table 2.

Battle Decision Making Activities

The battle commander and his staff need to share an understanding of battle decision making activities,

why they are important, and what results from each. Tactical battle decision making is made up of three major

activities: planning, directing, and monitoring. The activities should not be prescribed as a fixed sequence of

procedures. Nor do the products have clear and definite end states. There are an endless number of ways in

which the activities may be linked. Specific sequences will be determined by s'rtuational factors, including the

strategies of the commander, whether hostilities are pending or in progress, the level of command, the

capabilities of the threat, results from one activity determining what needs to be done next, and so on. The

amount of effort required to perform various battle command activities and the thoroughness of resulting

products are highly dependent on situational factors. Mission goals, time available, uncertainty, and experience

determine what needs to be done and how it can be done.

• Visualization must be done proactively and should include forecasts of the end state. This requires

the commander to maintain running estimates of the situation.

• Deriving an effective concept of the operation is much more than selecting the best option; it

involves creating, refining, wargaming, and synchronizing the concept until it is adequately shaped

into an operation plan or order.

• Deception planning must be integrated into the concept not added later as an after-thought.

• Because no mission ever goes exactly as planned, contingency planning - branches and sequels -

- is a measure of insurance, to anticipate and prepare for alternative future events.

• Rehearsals and brief-backs are essential in directing and ensuring understanding execution of

plans.

• Monitoring must be done as the deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to ongoing events

and subsequent adjustments.

• Since battle command processes cannot be prescribed as a set sequence of activities, time

management, error-checking, and command and staff coordination need to be vigorously practiced

to match activities to goals and the situation.

(Madigan & Dodge, 1994, p 29)

The charter for this project came about because of parallel interests of the Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and ARI. At a Senior Leaders Conference in 1993, GEN

Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commander of TRADOC, asked the group, "what kind of research is

being done in information processing and decision making?" He pointed out that what the

Army says about how it makes decisions is not how it actually happens. ARI provided an

information paper outlining our research on identifying relevant cognitive skills, distinguishing

characteristics of expert decision making, and ways to build better decision aids. GEN Franks in

turn requested ARI develop a battle command initiative to explain the art of battle command

and determine how it can be formally transmitted and taught.

In nine months, ARI briefed GEN Franks on the findings of the study called The
Human Dimensions of Battle Command (Halpin, in preparation). The key insight of the study

concerned the lack of explicit instruction on ways to improve thinking (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Insight on Alternate Instruction for Thinking

Insight: Army officers are not formally instructed in alternate ways of thinking, reasoning, and

deciding.

So what: Perhaps the most critical asset that battle commanders possess are their abilities to think,

reason, and decide. Battle commanders display -- and situations demand -- variety. Instruction

should not advocate methods based on a single model.

What next: Identify the variability in leaders and determine how to enhance and supplement skills

used in everyday thinking, reasoning, and deciding.

(Halpin, in preparation)

While ARI was advocating a research program to first determine specific decision maker

qualities and styles using new models of thinking, GEN Franks asked that a battle command

elective be developed immediately to focus on alternative ways of problem identification,

formulation, and solution. CGSOC took the lead for the request and included ARI.

CGSOC combined this tasking with on-going efforts to explore tactics, force structure,

staff organization, weapons requirements and information technology in the Mobile Strike Force

(MSF), a notional division fighting in the year 2015. The resulting battle command course

(A308) followed the course model from the previous year. A large group of students (73 in

1995) are assigned to staff positions on the MSF. The class works together to develop tactics,

techniques, and procedures for the future division, and determines how to use the advanced

weapons and information system prototypes. At the core of the course was an abbreviated

subcourse on advanced maneuver, fires, intelligence, and logistics that other CGSOC students

receive in entirety. The A308 students also received instruction in MSF concepts and

experimental information technologies. Multi-session simulation exercises that follow the model

of the Battle Command Training Program's warfighting exercises occur throughout the course.

To address the tasking on alternative ways of decision making, CGSOC included ARI's

program of instruction on Practical Thinking and guest speakers. The Practical Thinking

instruction shared the goal ofpreparing students to perform tactical battle command with the rest

of the battle command course. The rest of the course was very much directed toward

developing a viable MSF Division and staff, that would perform well in Prairie Warrior '95 and

provide a test bed for warfighting concepts for the twenty-first century.

The Practical Thinking instruction took a new approach to the preparation of Army

leaders. Unlike the current approaches that teach tactics or that teach general staff procedures,

the Practical Thinking approach was based on identifying cognitive skills and attitudes that

impact those skills. Others have pointed out the lack of emphasis on cognitive or conceptual

skills.

The resultant procedures focus explicitly on technical skills, implicitly on interpersonal skills

and, largely omit the development of the conceptual skills.... The current approach to
leader development that does not emphasize conceptual development is unlikely to provide

leaders appropriately equipped to cope with the uncertainties and complexities of planning

for and conducting warfare in the twenty-first century. (Kluever, Lynch, Matthies, Owens, &

Spears, 1992, p 1-2.)

Another aspect that was emphasized was using adult learning theory in the design of the

instruction. Since the target audience already has a good deal of knowledge and competency in

the specific domain, an adult theory to education was applied. Under this andragogical model

(Knowles, 1990) the responsibility for learning is on the students; they decide what is worthy of

study and adoption.

Practical thinking was conceptualized to include aspects of both critical and creative

thinking. Critical thinking is judgmental, cautious, and convergent. It checks on the sensibility,

relevance, and relationship of meaning and possibility. Creative thinking is generative, daring,

and divergent. Together they make up practical thinking that relates to the new naturalistic

models (e.g., Klein et al., 1993) based on how people actually think and act. The use of the

term Practical Thinking resulted from the realization that innovation and evaluation complement

each other. In this sense, this is the practical way to approach thinking, rather than by classical

or formal ways.

Practical thinking is an important and valid notion to contrast with formal thinking (see

Table 4). Galotti (1989) identifies the characteristics of formal and everyday reasoning. Formal

reasoning can occur when all premises are supplied, problems are well-bounded, and there is

usually one correct answer. Everyday reasoning occurs when premises are implicit and some

Table 4.

Contrast of Formal and Practical Thinking

Aspect Formal Thinking Practical Thinking

Application Well-bounded problems Complex, everyday problems

Variation General purpose Tailored to circumstances, values,

experience

Source of

control

Theory dictates Person determines how thinking best

proceeds in each situation

Process Convergent Creative and discriminating

Orientation Form, process oriented Goal oriented

Foundation All premises exist Some premises are implied or missing

Knowledge Knowledge exists or can be

determined

Some level of uncertainty always exists

Goals Goals are taken as given Goals are determined. If they already

exist, they are checked.

Outcome Single answer exists and is found

through application of the process

An answer might not occur or many

acceptable answers might exist

Theoretical

1 basis

Classical models, enforce rational

decision making

Naturalistic, understand what makes

people adaptive and effective
premises are not supplied at all, problems are not well-bounded, several possible answers might

exist, established procedures rarely exist, there is uncertainty about the outcome of a solutionsometimes even after the solution is applied, and problems are solved as a means to further

ends, not as ends in themselves. Scribner (1986) describes practical thinking in contrast to

theoretical thinking. Practical thinking involves integrated mental processes directed toward

some goal and performed in specific circumstances. Practical thinking ability involves adaptation

to changing conditions of the circumstances and to the changing states of knowledge, purpose,

and values of the person.
Approach

To achieve the project objective of defining and teaching better ways of thinking for

battle command the overall approach was to emphasize practical thinking. The basis for the

Practical Thinking program of instruction was to build on the strengths of how people reason

naturally and informally in everyday situations. Important in this approach are the following

points:

1. The knowledge a person has is the basis for thinking; procedures for decision making

(e.g., steps or algorithms) are no short cut or replacement for experience.

2. Cognition, the way thinking is done, can be developed and improved through selfexamination and practice of various cognitive skills.

3. Ways of thinking should be adapted to the situation at hand.

The goal of the Practical Thinking instruction is not to pump more facts into the students.

Instead it aims to extend how students use what they already know to reason about what they

need to know.

The ARE program of instruction departs from traditional approaches that have been

grounded in analysis, probabilities, and formal logic. The attempts at analytical aiding have not

been very useful. Traditional theories of decision making assume that solutions come from

repeatable processes and can be clearly graded for optimality, but standard procedures or

formulae are not satisfactory under most real-world circumstances. Naturalistic studies show

that ideal decisions are unrealistic in complex, adversarial situations. Assigning probabilities to

past and anticipated events in complex, uncertain environments does not show much promise

either (Cohen, 1993), nor does teaching formal logic (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver, 1986).

Practical Thinking instruction is a unique component of CGSOC instruction as it focuses

on how individuals think, reason, and decide. It avoids giving recipes for the steps or analytical

procedures for thinking, instead advocating a conscious effort to learn, adapt to situations,

manage one's own thinking, an openness to other positions, flexibility in approaches to

problems, using standards in thinking, and to think using overarching viewpoints.

Practical Thinking Skills

Practical thinking concepts were identified by establishing a number of propositions

about how we learn and improve our reasoning. The propositions include issues like

1. One's skill at thinking can be improved.

2. Thinking is not always related to high scores on intelligence tests.

3. Reasoning errors can be decreased.

4. Thinking is goal-directed and done in context.

5. Models based on normative decision theory or formal logic are not very useful for

improving practical thinking.

6. Instead of changing everyone to a single style of thinking, make people aware of the

particular strengths, weaknesses, and safeguards of their style.

Fifteen cognitive instruction programs were reviewed to identify the thinking skills

incorporated into their instruction and results of the instruction (Fallesen, Pounds, Breeskin &
Saxon, in preparation). The results from the various programs were generally positive, but were

not as substantial as would be hoped. Positive results were indicated on some measures for

some programs but not for other measures. For example, positive results were indicated for the

Odyssey program (Harvard University, 1986) on the number of solution features and the

amount of detail and for the Productive Thinking Program (Covington, Crutchfield, Davies &

Olton, 1974) on fluency, better ideas, and detection of anomalies but not on better overall

solutions.

[Educational evaluation is inherently difficult, and its results are seldom unequivocal;

program developers have sometimes been sufficiently convinced of the merits of their

approach that they have not been motivated to attempt an evaluation themselves. . . .

Quantitative data on a few programs indicate that they produce modest improvements

in performance on a variety of tests of mental ability. They make it clear that no one

can yet assure the development of effective thinking skills in the classroom, but they

reinforce the conviction that the goal is a reasonable one and that progress is being

made in its pursuit. (Nickerson, 1984, p 36)

Bolstering skills and attitudes as general and as pervasive as those dealing with thinking is not

easy to do, and the absence of overwhelming efficacy should not be discouraging. Most of the

reviewed materials were targeted at younger students, and none of the existing programs had

the desired combination of skills identified from the propositions and recent cognitive theories.

The absence of existing cognitive programs was not unexpected, and reinforced the need for

developing materials specifically to try to enhance the skills of mid-career Army officers.

Cognitive skills for inclusion in the Practical Thinking subcourse were identified from the

consideration of the findings on battle command (e.g., Fallesen, 1993), cognitive theories (e.g.,

Klein et al., 1993), previous cognitive instruction programs (Fallesen, Pounds, Breeskin & Saxon,

in preparation), and questions that battle commanders and staff might pose. The questions

were those that in a reflective moment a person might ask him- or herself to make sure that

thinking is on track. Questions like, "what is this situation?" or "what needs to be accomplished?'

help identify important cognitive skills. These two questions relate to the cognitive skills of

situation assessment and goal identification, respectively. Table 5 lists the various questions and

skills that were identified.

Practical Thinking Lessons

At the same time skills were identified, lesson topics were chosen. Topics were chosen

based on the number of lessons that could be scheduled and named according to what the

students could easily relate to. Seventeen hours of instruction were developed for the following

topics:

Introduction

Multiple Perspectives

Adapting to Situations

Finding Hidden Assumptions

Practical Reasoning

Integrative Thinking

Skill Practice.
Table 5.

Problem Solving Skills Proposed for Battle Command

Thinking" question Related construct

What is this situation? situation assessment, understanding

What is this situation like? analogical reasoning

What isn't this situation like? dialectical reasoning

What else could this situation/solution be? creativity

Any assumptions not needed, new ones needed? hidden assumptions

What is the real problem? identification, definition, framing

What needs to be accomplished? goals, planning

What do I know about situations like this? assessment of own knowledge

How should I prepare for future situations? learning to learn

What don't I know that I should? using uncertainty

What do I still need to know? missing information

How can I remember? memory techniques

How could this situation happen? explanation-based reasoning

What constraints are there? constraint-based reasoning

What is likely? plausible reasoning

What should I know? learning to learn, attention, novelty

How to reason? consistency, clarity, counter-arguments

What is the solution? everyday reasoning

How should I think about this problem? metacognition

The materials and instruction were based on an adult learning philosophy that places the

responsibility for learning on the students, rather than a teacher-presented, student-recall

approach (Rnowles, 1990). This approach could not be used to the full extent possible, because

of limited instruction time available, limitations of the Practical Thinking instructors in the

context of the larger battle command course, and the students' limited familiarity with selfdirected learning.

Methods of Instruction

Various methods of instruction were included in the program. Lectures, readings,

exercises, discussions, and case studies were all used to try to keep the instruction dynamic and

interesting. Many different types of cases and examples were used to keep the focus on the

skill, rather than on the details of the specific problem. Examples included everyday situations,

such as job interviews, buying a car, and choosing a course of college study. Examples also

included domain specific situations such as lessons from Combat Training Centers, historical

cases, borrowed and devised tactical problems, and specific problems that the students had to
address. Specific problems that the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) addressed in the Practical

Thinking lessons included the application of critical reasoning standards to new weapon

concepts, enemy campaign plans, and a tactical concept for simultaneous attack. Application of

the Practical Thinking skills to the MSF led to lively discussions about the merits and faults of

specific MSF concepts.
Description of Practical Thinking Lessons

Several aims were identified for developing the Practical Thinking material. Ultimately

there was a desire to increase cognitive skills that would improve battle command performance.

This was something for which the students would have to take primary responsibility. Accepting

responsibility was largely a matter of understanding the need to change and improve. Attitudes

were addressed to encourage understanding of the Practical Thinking rationale, concepts, and

tools. The concepts were offered to impress upon students the importance to learn more than

simple procedures or subject matter knowledge that are presented elsewhere in their education.

Instruction stressed the students' desire to learn, to consider how they think, and to find and try

out tools for thinking. Lessons were centered around obstacles to thinking and concepts for

improving thinking. The instruction intentionally avoided the prescription of procedures for

thinking. The materials introduced concepts and techniques for performing certain skills, like

finding hidden assumptions. These concepts were used to illustrate different ways to think and

were not meant to be prescriptive.

An example of obstacles to thinking is the problem with parochial and traditional views

that keep new ideas from being thought about, tried, and implemented. The instruction

included historical instances of parochial views and some of the reasons why they are held.

Techniques were given for taking multiple perspectives, such as taking on other person's views

and attitudes to see where they would lead, if they were true. Some components were included

that were drawn from all of the cognitive instruction programs that were reviewed. The efforts

were geared toward improving cognitive skill, especially metacognitive skill, informing about

attitudes, and offering tools, heuristics, or guidelines for thinking.

The six lessons are briefly described in the following text and in Table 6. The lessons

started with general overview, covered creative thinking, thinking about thinking, dialectical

argumentation (possibility thinking), everyday and informal reasoning, and integrative thinking

about putting an encompassing picture together. The order of lessons was selected to go from

broad, familiar topics to more advanced and specific ones. The six lessons were spread out

throughout the battle command course to accommodate other course elements.

The topics selected for the first Practical Thinking lesson provided an Introduction to the

purpose of practical thinking, gave examples of the skills to be covered, and allowed the students

to start to reflect on how they think and how others might think.

The second lesson was on Multiple Perspectives. It was intended to support the MSF

course requirement to shift from the usual way of looking at things and to apply more creative

processes and solutions. Attitudes, general guidelines, and specific techniques for shifting

perspectives were presented and practiced through class exercises.

The third lesson was called Adapting to Situations and covered how the Practical

Thinking skills related to the tactical decision making procedures taught elsewhere in CGSOC

and how organizing one's thinking can be beneficial. A tool was offered for deciding how to

adapt one's thinking to the situation. This lesson was focused on metacognition, but several of

the instructors chose to provide more concrete discussions about making decisions under stress

conditions.

The fourth lesson was on Finding Hidden Assumptions. Finding hidden assumptions was

based on situation assessment research done by Cohen et al. (in preparation). Finding hidden

10
assumptions covered the problems associated with assumptions that are not apparent in a

person's thinking. Finding hidden assumptions opens up the range of possibilities for what a

situation is, what it means, why it might happen, and what to do about it. The nature of beliefs

and their relationship to assumptions and "facts" were discussed as were unstated assumptions.

A specific technique for finding hidden assumptions was discussed and practiced.

The fifth lesson was on Practical Reasoning. Practical reasoning covered the essence of

practical thinking, problems or flaws in practical argument (i.e., the debate that goes on inside

one's thought processes), standards of thinking one might use to avoid the flaws, how reasoning

is affected by attitudes, and six general tools as prompts for deeper thinking.

The sixth lesson, Integrative Thinking included discussion of the characteristics of military

expertise and stages characterized by different levels of reasoning sophistication. The lowest

stage is characterized by the deference of the thinker to a person or other source (like published

doctrine) in authority. This stage is characterized by the lack of critical and integrative thinking.

The highest level is characterized by the ability to put complex understandings together in

overarching views. The differences and similarities in levels were demonstrated with a car

buying example that everyone could relate to. Students were also challenged to predict how

someone at each integrative thinking level would respond to a tactical scenario with high

situation and goal uncertainty.

The original allocation of instructional time and number of lessons was reduced because

of other course demands. As a result, a planned lesson on Expertise was dropped, and the topic

of expertise was included in the Integrative Thinking lesson. Also a final lesson on Skill Practice

was shortened and taught immediately following the Integrative Thinking lesson. These changes

and others caused the classroom contact to be reduced from a planned 17 to 12 hours. Future

implementations should consider including additional instruction on expertise and increase

opportunities for practicing the skills.

11
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13
Findings

The goal of this Practical Thinking project was to determine and teach important

cognitive skills for battle command. An explicit cognitive skill approach for instruction of midcareer Army officers has not been undertaken before to our knowledge. This created a

challenge for relating abstract psychological concepts to practical concerns of battle command.

The first part of the goal was clearly accomplished. Lesson materials were developed that

discussed and described practical thinking for battle command (see Fallesen, Michel, Lussier &

Pounds, in preparation for more detailed description of the lessons). The improvement of

Practical Thinking skills by the students is a less tangible goal, though there are indications that

the students benefitted from the instruction. This section describes reactions of students and

instructors and thoughts for improving future Practical Thinking instruction.

Context for Instruction

To consider the impact of the instruction, one must consider the context in which

Practical Thinking instruction occurred. The Practical Thinking instruction shared with the rest

of the battle command course the goal of preparing students to perform tactical battle

command. There were different intentions and approaches also. The rest of the Course was

very much directed toward developing a viable MSF Division and staff, that would perform well

in Prairie Warrior '95 and provide a test bed for warfighting concepts for the twenty-first

century. While the students were able to operate as a Division staff in the Prairie Warrior '95

exercise, the applied approach was not always consistent with the themes of the Practical

Thinking instruction. Practical Thinking instruction encouraged reflection, flexibility, discovery

learning, critical and creative thinking for the practice of battle command.

Since the Practical Thinking concepts were newly organized and developed, the principal

battle command course instructors and the MSF Commander did not have the full opportunity

to consider the skill approach and its application to the MSF. The MSF Commander and

principal instructors generally supported the goals and objectives of the Practical Thinking

subcourse. However, due to lack of time for familiarization and training on the concepts, they

did not incorporate Practical Thinking as much as was desirable. The students were discouraged

from applying too much of their own ingenuity to maintain some consistency across staff

procedures and tactical operations. The students did not consider and apply the Practical

Thinking concepts very much to the MSF. One student said that the Practical Thinking

concepts were not applicable because of the many conflicting agendas associated with the MSF.

Student Reactions

Given the limited integration, reinforcement, and attention that was afforded the

Practical Thinking instruction, it still had a positive effect. ARI conducted a mid-course and end

of course written survey of the students. On the average, student self-reports reflected a gain of

12.5 percent in expertise for the six lessons (see Figure 1). Of the students who responded to

the end of course survey, eighty percent (16 of 20) felt that the course should definitely be

included in future CGSOC classes. One of the 20 students felt that the Practical Thinking

instruction was the best part of the battle command course and another hoped to receive

14
Self-ratings of Expertise Before and After Lessons

Expertise

Extensive

Considerable

Moderate

A little

None

3.3 3.4 3.5

3.3 3.4

Perspectives Adapting Assumptions Reasoning Integration

Lessons

I Before ÜAfter

Figure 1. Self-reported expertise before and after instruction.

future lesson materials and self-development modules. Some wanted more opportunities and

latitude to apply the concepts in the MSF. At least seventy-five percent felt the mix of theory

and application, level of difficulty, and coverage of the topics was appropriate.

Four of the 20 regarded the intent and approach of the Practical Thinking lessons

nonessential. They felt that the instruction would be appropriate earlier in their careers or that

thinking as a Major is so ingrained that there is not much chance of changing it. There were

additional unfavorable comments recorded on an CGSC overall course evaluation (Evaluation

and Standardization Division, in preparation).

An additional concern for future implementation was the identification of a fuller set of

cognitive skills. Fifteen similar topics were generated by the subcourse author. The students

were asked which would be most important for additional lessons. They preferred the more

applied topics (see Table 7), specifically, visualizing the battlefield, maintaining focus in crisis

situations, and applying practical thinking to leadership. The second grouping of skills would be

more compatible with the set already identified. They included learning and memory,

implementing creative ideas, discovering problems, asking questions, and resolving conflicts.

These topics were close behind the top three skills.

15
Table 7.

Ratings of Importance of Future Lesson Topics

Topic Average Rating

Maintaining focus in crisis situations

Visualizing the battlefield

Applying practical thinking to leadership

3.3

3.3

3.2

Improving learning and memory skills

Implementing creative ideas

Discovering and recognizing problems

Asking questions to explore possibilities

Managing and resolving conflicts

2.9

2.8

2.8

2.7

2.7

Making predictions

Forming/testing hypotheses & working assumptions

Understanding the role of personality and emotions in thinking

2.6

2.6

2.6

Mentally simulating planned actions

Improving shared understanding

Using individual thinking skills in groups

Use representation techniques to structure problems

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.3

(1= Very unimportant. 4= Very important.)

Instructor Insights

Instructors were polled by written questionnaire after the completion of each lesson.

They felt that there was too much material to cover in the time allotted for some lessons and

this resulted in too little time to practice the skills. They found that smaller groups of 8 to 12

students compared to the full class sizes of 18 allowed the skills to be considered more

thoroughly. They also found that practical thinking is not so much taught as it is something that

individuals need to actively pursue. Some students thought the concepts should be encouraged

by their daily instructors instead of being taught just by the outside Practical Thinking

instructors. Encouraging students to be self-reflective, critical thinkers requires special

instructor skills that could be improved.

The Practical Thinking instructors observed the students during other aspects of the

battle command course. Specifically they were observed during their development meetings for

MSF tactics, techniques, and procedures and during planning, conduct, and after action reviews

of their tactical exercises. The style of the Division and the student staff were influenced by the

presence of a General Officer as their commander.

While this led to successful performance in the Prairie Warrior '95 exercise, the

constraints on the students were not consistent with the themes of the Practical Thinking

instruction. In the after action review of the battle command course, students acknowledged

that they were discouraged from thinking creatively in their MSF assignments. The Adapting to

Situations lesson brought out the need to personalize the skills and incorporate them into the

standard procedures of an organization. In retrospect, the contrast between the Practical

16
Thinking concepts of reflection, flexibility, critical and creative thinking and those of consistent

organizational practices provided an opportunity and challenge to the students to deal with the

conflict in the ways of thinking. Unexpectedly they had to resolve how much to pursue their

own ways of thinking against the demands and constraints placed on them by the organization.

17
Recommendations

Combining the students' responses to the course survey and the insights from the

developers, five tracks are recommended for future work. The first is a continuation of Practical

Thinking lessons in the battle command course. The Practical Thinking lessons provide a good

complement to the very applied nature of what the students are required to do as part of the

MSF. The Practical Thinking lessons encourage the students to advance their skills in real

contexts. The Practical Thinking teaching points can be better integrated into future battle

command courses, since the primary battle command course instructors will have a better

opportunity to examine and reinforce the materials. Secondly, a separate elective would be a

good medium for the Practical Thinking lessons, since the students were somewhat divided in

their reactions. The concepts should also be tried out during earlier periods of an officer's

career, e.g., an Advanced Officer Course. A fourth implementation alternative is to pursue

development of the material as a series of self-development modules. Since the material is

focused on individuals it makes sense to format the instruction as self-paced material. With

adequate resources, there is no reason not to pursue these extensions simultaneously.

The above four suggestions all assume that all Army officers are able to improve thencurrent level of Practical Thinking skills. It is possible that some officers are less able, or even

unable, to grasp and integrate these concepts into their cognitive toolkits. A fifth direction for

follow-on work is a more fundamental research project to explore measures of cognitive style

and cognitive flexibility, and to determine whether it is possible to distinguish those individuals

without potential for flexible, innovative practical thinking.

Because the Practical Thinking approach was not prescriptive, directed feedback about

students' thinking also would be useful. External feedback would be useful because problem

solvers are not always aware of their attitudes and skill level. While an objective paper-andpencil test of thinking is one obvious approach, most so-called tests are not compatible with

practical thinking. If the propositions of the Practical Thinking approach are correct, a logical

reasoning test would not be of much benefit to students. Practical thinking is done by a specific

individual in a specific context for a specific purpose. Insight into one's particular styles of

thinking should be more useful than just results on logical reasoning. Instead of using reasoning

tests, cognitive style frameworks and methods should be explored and tried that would offer a

student some insight into his or her particular style.

18
Conclusions

The Practical Thinking instruction has been incorporated as a part of the premiere

course on battle command. Since an alternate approach to battle command instruction was

developed and tried with CGSOC students, the goals of the project were met. It would be

desirable to consider that the Practical Thinking students wül be better battle commanders and

staff officers because of the additional instruction. Although student self-reports support this

expectation, claims to its efficacy are not certain. As was pointed out with the excerpt from

Nickerson (1984), evaluation of cognitive instruction is inherently difficult because of the

problem of measuring outcomes. The measurement problem is compounded when considering

future performance in the complex and dynamic jobs required of commanders and staffs. There

are sufficient reasons to believe that the goal of improving practical thinking is reasonable. Such

a nontraditional goal will not occur without careful and repeated attempts.

The application to the battle command course can be improved from the findings of this

first trial course. Students need more practice trying the skills. Practice can be encouraged by

out-of-class assignments, more specific feedback, and endorsement and integration by military

instructors and commanders. The Practical Thinking concepts can be reinforced throughout the

battle command course by adoption of the concepts and use in after action reviews of student

exercises. The Practical Thinking instruction can be extended to other CGSOC electives, other

Army schooling, self-development materials, and for professional development seminars. The

Practical Thinking skills and the cognitive approach advocated here do not need to be limited to

battle command, but can be expanded to other functional areas, such as fire support,

intelligence, and logistics and to Army readiness issues such as budgeting, personnel policies,

downsizing, and training policies.

Beyond the Army applications, the cognitive skills that were identified and lessons that

were developed for them can serve the basis of other adult instruction in complex decision

making environments. The Practical Thinking course materials have already gained interest

from national, state, and county law enforcement and fire fighting agencies. Up until the recent

increased attention in naturalistic approaches, there were few innovations in training decision

making. Now with the development of this instruction, largely based on creativity, critical

thinking, and everyday reasoning there are alternative ways that intend to improve decision

making beyond formal logic, normative-based decision aids, and multi-purpose procedures.

19
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22