U.S. Naval War College 

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons 

CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute 

8-1-2020 

China Maritime Repor China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China t No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Str otential Strategic 

Strongpoint in Pakistan 

Isaac B. Kardon 

Conor M. Kennedy 

Peter A. Dutton 

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Recommended Citation 

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Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan" (2020). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 7. 

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China Maritime Studies Institute 

China Maritime Report No. 7

Gwadar Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton August 2020 China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan
Series Overview

This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian 

Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military 

officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically 

valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1

Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, 

commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese 

official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its 

transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.

The case studies illuminate the various functions of overseas strategic strongpoint ports in China’s 

Indian Ocean strategy. While the ports and associated infrastructure projects vary across key 

characteristics, all ports share certain distinctive qualities: (1) strategic location, positioned astride 

major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and/or near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) high-level 

coordination among Chinese party-state officials, state-owned enterprises, and private firms; (3) 

comprehensive commercial scope, including Chinese-led development of associated rail, road, and 

pipeline infrastructure and efforts to promote trade, financing, industry, resource extraction, and 

inland markets; and (4) potential or actual military utilization, with dual-use functions that can 

enable both economic and military activities. 

Ports are a key enabler for China’s economic, political, and potentially military expansion across the 

globe. As China’s overseas economic activity grows, so too have demands on the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) to secure PRC citizens, investments, and supply lines abroad. Official PLA missions 

now include “safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests,”3 but “deficiencies in overseas 

operations and support” persist.4 Yet with the notable exception of the sole overseas PLA Navy

(PLAN) base at Djibouti, all of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. 

Notably, the establishment of the Djibouti base followed many years of Chinese investment at the 

adjacent commercial port and sustained attention into resources and markets inland.

5

We should not assume that Djibouti is a model for other future bases. Instead, China’s strategic 

strongpoint model should be understood as an evolving alternative to the familiar model of formal 

overseas basing. With strongpoints, trade, investment, and diplomacy with the host country remain

the principal functions. However, the strongpoint creates conditions of possibility for the PLAN to

establish a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs. We are already observing this nascent 

network in operation across the Indian Ocean, and this series seeks to understand its key nodes. 

1 For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinesenaval-strategy/. 2 Future case studies include Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, and Dar es Salaam and 

Bagamoyo in Tanzania. None of these other commercial port projects hosts any PLA military facilities to date, though 

Chinese analysts discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint. 3 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (May 2015), 

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm 4 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era (July 2019), 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. The section on “Protecting China’s Overseas Interests” 

states that China “builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in accomplishing 

diversified military tasks.”

5 See Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, “Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,” 

CMSI China Maritime Report No. 6 (April 2020), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/6/.
2

Summary Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform 

for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region. 

As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped 

and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service 

of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar 

are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to 

stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this 

case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for 

hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the 

linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military 

potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a 

range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations.

Key Findings

• Chinese analysts view Gwadar as a top choice for establishing a new overseas strategic 

strongpoint, owing to its prime geographic location and strong Sino-Pakistani ties. Many PLA 

analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for naval support.

• China’s interest in Gwadar—and in Pakistan’s economic development in general—does not 

depend primarily on commercial returns. Instead, the Gwadar project is best understood as a 

mode of strategic investment in China’s internal and external security.

• Externally, Gwadar’s principal strategic purpose for China is to become an “exit to the ocean”

(出海口)—that is, a direct route via Chinese infrastructure to secure reliable access to the 

strategic space and resources of the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

• Internally, Gwadar is an extension of China’s national security and development policies. Beijing 

seeks to develop commercial linkages between western China, Pakistan, and Central Asia to 

promote economic growth and thus manage perceived risks to social stability in Xinjiang.

• Extensive transport infrastructure is fundamental to China’s overall plans for Pakistan. Yet while 

the planned transport corridor is often discussed as though it were operational, very little modern 

infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port itself.

• The inland markets and resources of Pakistan (and Afghanistan) present some commercial 

prospects, but these have not yet borne fruit in part due to severe insecurity.

• Security measures may mitigate some risks to Chinese projects and personnel, but Gwadar and its 

hinterlands are unlikely to be secure enough to become a major commercial entrepôt.

• Gwadar is not a PLA base, but it is used extensively by the Pakistan Navy (PN). The PN operates 

frigates and patrol vessels bought from China and will also field Chinese-made submarines. Their 

facilities, parts, and technicians may be readily employed for some of the PLAN fleet.

• Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels. Beyond the pier, Gwadar 

possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and materials.

• Gwadar will not necessarily have utility as a base in a wartime scenario. The most critical factor 

informing this view is the apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to 

provide mutual military support during times of crisis or conflict.

• If the infrastructure projects mature, Gwadar could become a key peacetime replenishment or 

transfer point for PLA equipment and personnel. Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other 

materials at Gwadar would be a productive use of the port and airfield facilities.
3

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been the chief promoter, financier, developer, manager, 

and operator of the seaport at Gwadar since 2002.

6 In October 2016, a decade after the port went into 

operation, the first trade expedition traveled from China to Gwadar on a 15-day, 3,115 kilometer 

(km) overland convoy from Xinjiang.7 The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, described this 

elaborate exercise to export a modest 100 containers by truck as the “first movement in the ‘One Belt 

One Road’ symphony, rich in romance.”8 There has not yet been a “second movement” of large-scale 

transport from China to Gwadar, calling into question the heavily promoted idea of an economic 

corridor from China to the Indian Ocean.

Partly due to its anemic commercial performance, some observers conclude Gwadar port is on the 

verge of becoming “a new naval base in China’s string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean.9

Meanwhile, Chinese and Pakistani promoters claim that the dusty, isolated fishing town of 90,000 

people is poised to become “a bustling city of two million people with a $30 billion GDP...and 1.2 

million high paid jobs.”10 Neither scenario is likely. While senior Pakistani officials have reportedly 

asked China to establish a Pakistani naval base at the site,

11 China has taken a different tack. Chinese 

leaders instead envision Gwadar’s development into an international transport hub, the centerpiece of 

an ambitious bilateral economic and security program.

Chinese firms would need to bring about a wholesale transformation of Gwadar for it to flourish in 

Pakistan’s remote and restive Balochistan province. Gwadar’s hinterlands are a sparsely populated, 

poor region bordering comparable areas of Iran and Afghanistan. It is forbidding terrain, prone to 

drought, flooding, and acute water and energy shortages, and plagued by labor unrest, terrorism, and

long-standing anti-government militancy.

12 The area is potentially resource-rich, but almost totally 

6 吴邦国副总理出席巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口项目一期工程开工典礼 [“Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo Attends the 

Groundbreaking Ceremony of the First Phase of Gwadar Port Project in Pakistan”], PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

March 25, 2002, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676308/xgxw_676314/t5512.shtml.

7 郝洲, 周戎, 刘英 [Hao Zhou, Zhou Rong, and Liu Ying], 中巴经济走廊实地调研报告 [“China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor Field Research Report”], 人民大学重阳金融研究院与财经杂志报告 [Renmin University Chongyang Institute 

and Caijing Magazine Report], no. 19 (December 2016), p. 6. (“Renmin/Caijing Report”)

8 中巴经济走廊树起“一带一路”样板 [“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Sets a Model for the Belt and Road”],” China 

Industry & Commerce News [中华工商时报], January 6, 2017, 

http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fwydyl/zgzx/201701/20170102496988.shtml. 9 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific,” CSIS 

Briefs, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indopacific. 10 Gwadar New Smart Port City Masterplan 2020, http://investment.cpicglobal.com/gwadar2020-brochure-bau-usgs?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7Kb9ipiV6QIVhZ6fCh1QPwNDEAAYASAAEgJ8RvD_BwE. 11 In 2011, visiting Beijing less than two weeks after the U.S. raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan’s 

Minister of Defense, Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, told foreign media that “we have asked our Chinese brothers to please 

build a naval base at Gwadar.” See Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 

2011, https://www.ft.com/content/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0. Chinese media covered these comments, 

declining to say whether or not Chinese leaders had agreed. See 外媒称巴基斯坦希望中国援建海军基地 [“Foreign 

Media Say Pakistan Hopes China Will Help Build a Naval Base”],”新华网 [Xinhua Net], May 23, 2011, 

http://news.cntv.cn/china/20110523/105539.shtml. 12 Frederic Grare, “Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (April 11, 

2013), https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-state-versus-nation-pub-51488. A United Nations 

Development Program report from 2017 noted that the situation is, if anything, deteriorating. “In Balochistan, 20 out of 24 

districts, for which decade-old data is available, suffered a fall in their rankings [in the Human Development Index, a 

composite indicator of standards of living].” Adil Najam and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan Human Development Index Report 
4

lacking in industry and modern infrastructure to deliver its possible mineral wealth to market.13

Chinese analysts nonetheless continue to assert that “Gwadar is becoming ‘Shenzhen’ in Pakistan,”

hoping against all odds that Balochistan will reprise the economic miracles of China’s Pearl River 

Delta.14

Thus far, commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited. The port has seen very little vessel 

traffic in over a decade of operation, and its overland transport links remain tenuous. Nonetheless, 

Chinese leadership continues to plow financial and political capital into this ambitious, long-term 

enterprise. If it is unlikely to become a major economic hub, why is the Gwadar project still under 

development? What are the motivations for continued Chinese interest and investment in the port and 

surrounding infrastructure? How do Chinese leaders and experts understand the purpose of this 

venture?

This case study focuses on China’s domestic discussion about Gwadar to understand why it remains 

a desirable overseas strategic strongpoint for the PRC. There are two principal reasons, which 

converge uniquely on Gwadar. The first is the port’s prized geostrategic location; the second is its 

critical function in a broader Chinese program to develop Pakistan in order to better address China’s 

domestic and regional security concerns. The evidence for these motivations emerges in the course of 

the proceeding analysis, but both warrant brief exposition before analyzing the port complex itself. 

2017,” United Nations Development Program Human Development Report, 2017, 

https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/HDR/HDI%20Report_2017.pdf. It is also the site of major shortfalls in 

human resources, including poor health and education. See The World Bank, “Balochistan, Pakistan: Strengthening 

Budget Management to Improve Education Service Delivery,” May 2018, 

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/872171540557541709/pdf/Balochistan-Strengthening-Budget-Managementto-Improve-Education-Service-Delivery.pdf. 13 Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, “Draft Balochistan Comprehensive Development 

Strategy (2013-2020),” United Nations Development Program Roadmap, 2013,

https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/PROCUREMENT/2018/July%202018/2)%20BCDS%20Revised%20Fi

nal%20Draft%20August%2027%202013.pdf; Asian Development Bank, “Technical Assistance Islamic Republic of 

Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report,” ADB Technical Assistance, Project Number 39003, (December 2005), 

https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/68721/39003-pak-tar.pdf; Azhar Ahmad, 瓜达尔—地区战略转

型中的平衡点 [Gwadar: Balance Point For a Region in Strategic Transition], trans. 李景峰, 史高杰 [Li Lingfeng and 

Shi Gaojie], (Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 2017), p. 180.

14 季伟 [Li Wei], 瓜达尔正在成为巴基斯坦的“深圳” [“Gwadar Is Becoming Pakistan’s ‘Shenzhen’”], 新华网 [Xinhua 

Net], August 28, 2018, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2018-08/28/c_1123340282.htm; 黄安芸, 杨超, 成奕霖 [Huang Anyun, 

Yang Chao, and Cheng Yilin], [“Gwadar: From a ‘Small Fishing Village’ to the ‘Pearl’ of the China Pakistan Economic 

Corridor”], 看看新闻 [KanKan News], May 19, 2017, http://www.kankanews.com/a/2017-05-19/0037996621.shtml
5

Figure 1. A view of the Indian Ocean from China.

15

Objective #1: An Exit to the Sea

China’s interest in Gwadar is dictated first by its strategic geography. Sited on Pakistan’s 

southwestern Makran coastline, the port lies just 400 km east of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow 

waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to global markets, and through which over 40 percent of 

China’s imported oil transits.16 Iran is only 80 km to the west, and Gwadar’s home province of 

Balochistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, some 500 km to the north of the port. Traveling 

overland from Gwadar, China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang lies 1,800 km northeast over the 

Karakorum mountain range. Pakistan also shares a 520 km border with Xinjiang, part of which is 

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir disputed with India.

15 Map commissioned by CMSI, created by Andrew Rhodes. Blue lines show major shipping lanes, and red lines show 

proposed economic corridors linking western China directly to the Indian Ocean. The reddish shaded areas along the SinoIndian borders designate disputed territory. 16 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil exports passing through the Strait of Hormuz average 21 

million barrels/day, accounting for one third of globally traded oil. See “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most 

Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 20, 2019, 

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932. The Chinese oil import figure (40.9 percent) comes from 

researchers at Dalian Maritime University under grants from the PRC State Council (Ministry of Natural Resources and 

Ministry of Education), Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Communist Party (Central Party Grant for Basic Research). 

王爽 [Wang Shuang] et al., 瓜达尔港通航后的中国进口原油海运路径选择研究 [“Research on the Selection of Routes 

for Maritime Transportation of Imported Crude Oil from Gwadar Port to China”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no. 

5 (2018), p. 21.
6

Because of this geography, Chinese strategists prize Gwadar as a strategic strongpoint in a vital 

geopolitical region. It holds particular salience among China’s strongpoints for its role as an “exit to 

the sea” (出海口) that links the Chinese mainland directly to the Indian Ocean.17 In this respect, 

Gwadar differs significantly from the strategic strongpoint at Djibouti, the subject of the first case 

study in this series. The Chinese presence at Djibouti expands the nation’s reach with a foothold on 

the African continent, creating a military base from which to begin establishing exterior lines of 

naval operations from the Chinese mainland across the Indian Ocean.

18

Pakistan, by contrast, is on China’s immediate periphery and provides a rare channel of access to the 

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Pakistan and Myanmar are the only states other than India that are 

contiguous to both Chinese territory and the Indian Ocean, and therefore have significant bearing

both on China’s peripheral security and its maritime access (see Figure 1).

19 If overland road, rail, 

and pipeline connections can be achieved, Chinese control over the port of Gwadar would anchor a 

direct connection between Xinjiang and the Indian Ocean. Developing this infrastructure could 

produce the first modern, multi-modal, continental line of operations—for commercial as well as 

military purposes—from the ocean to the previously land-locked regions of western China.

Energy flows are a key component of this objective, which includes “entry” from the Indian Ocean 

and Persian Gulf as well as “exit” from the Asian continent. Secure energy flows are vital to China’s

commercial and military objectives. Energy insecurity has long been an acute concern for Chinese 

strategists, epitomized by the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” or China’s reliance on shipping that 

17 While the term translates directly to “estuary” and can be used for that technical purpose, it is also used in official and 

scholarly discourse to mean a port for accessing the ocean. For example, a description of Pakistan as a strong point on the 

Belt and Road by the PRC Ministry of Commerce frames the transport network through Pakistan as opening “an exit to the 

Indian Ocean” (打开一个面向印度洋的出海口). See 六、巴基斯坦与 “一带一路” 的关系 [“Six, Pakistan’s 

Relationship to the Belt and Road”], 商务历史 - 中华人民共和国商务部 [History of Commerce – PRC Ministry of 

Commerce], Undated, http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=bjstyydyldgx, (accessed July 31, 2020); Former chairman of 

Pakistan’s Board of Investment senator Saleem Mandviwalla explained to Chinese media that Xinjiang has gained an exit 

to the sea that can save time and effort through an overland route to Gwadar. 观察: 中国在巴基斯坦为新疆打造出海口

[“Observer: China Creates an Exit to the Sea for Xinjiang in Pakistan”], BBC News – Chinese, April 21, 2015, 

https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/04/150421_ana_xi_pakistan. In official diplomatic exchanges, CPEC is 

commonly referred to as an agreement between China and Pakistan on the construction of infrastructure between Xinjiang 

in the north and the “Indian Ocean exit to the sea, Gwadar Port.” See: 各国大使谈两会: 世界将从中国改革中分享红利

[“Ambassadors Discuss the Two Sessions: The World Will Share the Dividends of China’s Reforms”], 新华网 [Xinhua], 

March 5, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0305/c70731-24538827.html. For scholarly discussion of the term, 

see 李靖宇 [Li Jingyu], et al, 关于中国在南亚区域选取印度洋出海口的战略推进构想 [“The Strategic Concept of 

Selecting Points for China’s Access to the Indian Ocean in the South Asia Region”], 中国海洋大学学报 [Journal of 

Ocean University of China], no. 5 (2012), pp. 29–39; 李鲁奇, 孔翔, 李一曼, 许杨 [Li Luqi, Kong Xiang, Li Yiman, and 

Yang Xu], “一带一路”倡议下中国与中亚合作的战略支点选择 [“Selection of Strategic Strongpoints for China-Central 

Asia Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”], 地理研究 [Geographical Research] vol. 38, no. 7 (2019), pp. 

1705-1719; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to 

Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), pp. 17–20; 刘新华 [Liu Xinhua], 力量场效应、瓜达尔港与中国的西印度

洋利益 [“Force Field Effect: Gwadar Port and China’s Western Indian Ocean Interests”], 世界经济与政治论坛 [World 

Economics and Politics], vol. 53, no. 5 (2013), pp. 1–18. 18 On China’s interior/exterior lines, see Peter Dutton, “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South 

China Sea,” Naval War College Review, vol. 69, no. 3 (2016), pp. 5-13. 19 Kyaukphyu in Myanmar (the subject of a forthcoming CMSI China Maritime Report case study) is often discussed as 

the other alternative “exit to the sea” for China to the Indian Ocean. Some analysts include ports in Bangladesh 

(Chittagong in particular) as also serving this function, though Chinese access to these ports would necessarily traverse 

India—including territory disputed between China and India in Arunachal Pradesh. See Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic 

Concept of Selecting Points.” 
7

might be interdicted on its way through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean.20 Overland 

transport from China to Gwadar can ostensibly “shed 85 percent of the distance of sea-only 

transport,”21 and avoid Malacca altogether. If sufficient Chinese maritime power can be projected 

into Hormuz, as leading civilian transport officials have proposed, a new and secure energy route 

appears possible.22 Creating an alternative, protected channel for flows of vital resources and trade 

could reduce China’s vulnerability to disruptions from foreign maritime powers, piracy, natural 

disasters, and other shocks to maritime transportation. The confluence of land and sea access to the

greater Middle East afforded by Pakistan is unique and could be strategically significant.

Figure 2. Gwadar-Xinjiang connection23

20 There is some discussion in China as to whether this is an entirely rational concern, but the concept remains prevalent. 

For a well-informed discussion of it, see 薛力 [Xue Li], 马六甲困境"内涵辨析与中国的应对 [“Analysis of the Content 

of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s Response”],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 10 (2010), pp. 

117–140. For analysis specific to Gwadar, see 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 瓜达尔港与中国能源进口 [“Gwadar Port and 

China’s Energy Imports”], 财经杂志 [Caijing Magazine], December 20, 2016, 

http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20161220/4214477.shtml. 21 A February 2015 report stating that China would imminently enjoy an 85 percent reduction in transit distance for 

imported oil garnered great attention on Chinese social media. 巴基斯坦第三大港口 4 月运营我国石油运输线缩短 85% 

[“Pakistan’s Third Largest Port Will Go Into Operation in April, Reducing the Transit Distance of Chinese Oil by 85%”],

新浪财经 [Sina Finance], February 21, 2015, https://finance.sina.cn/chanjing/gdxw/2015-02-21/detailicczmvun6226180.d.html?from=wap; see also later skeptical commentary on it by a researcher from the PRC Ministry of 

Commerce (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation): 梅新育 [Mei Xinyu], 中巴油气管线构

想 深陷经济安全误区 [“The Concept of China-Pakistan Oil and Gas Pipelines is Deeply Trapped in Misconceptions 

About Economic Security”] 第一财经日报 [First Financial Daily], August 18, 2015, 

https://www.yicai.com/news/4671232.html; 蔡晨宇[Cai Chenyu], 瓜达尔港的开发任重道远 [“The Development of 

Gwadar Port Has a Long Way to Go”], 中国港口 [China Ports], no. 1 (2017), p. 17. 

22 Song Dexing, Director of the Water Transportation Bureau at the PRC Ministry of Transport, calls for “improved 

maritime power and influence in the Strait [of Hormuz].” See 史春林, 李秀英 [Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying], 霍尔姆斯海

峡安全对中国进口石油供应和运输影响 [“The Impact of the Security of the Strait of Hormuz on China’s Imported Oil 

Supply and Shipping”],” 中国软科学 [China Soft Sciences], no. 7 (2013), p. 15. 

23 “一带一路”期间与标杆—中巴经济走廊 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Flagship and Model—China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor”], 新华网思客 [Xinhua Net Thinker], archived June 17, 2020, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20200617213149/http://sike.news.cn/hot/1705cpec/index.html
8

Objective #2: Shoring Up Peripheral Security and Stability

Gwadar is also a key instrument for advancing Beijing’s interest in a secure and stable Pakistan. This 

interest has both foreign and domestic security policy drivers, arising from the states’ contiguous 

border regions of Xinjiang, in China, and Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (i.e., 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is disputed by India). This complex and unresolved border 

thus implicates both China’s long-standing internal campaign to stamp out “separatism, terrorism, 

and extremism” in its ethnic minority western regions, and its external objective to keep India 

strategically focused on Pakistan.24

These enduring interests make Pakistan a high priority for Chinese leaders, who routinely reaffirm 

the bilateral relationship in hyperbolic terms.25 Pakistan is perennially China’s largest armspurchaser, and owes much of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities to the PRC.26 Since China’s 

border war with India in 1962, the Sino-Pakistani entente has functioned largely as a check on Indian 

power in the region, emphasizing military and intelligence cooperation, with mostly solid diplomatic 

support.

27 This basic logic still obtains, but China’s broader regional objectives have led it to pursue 

a greatly augmented economic dimension to the relationship.

Beginning in 2013, Chinese and Pakistani leaders announced that Gwadar port would be the 

centerpiece of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) (中巴经济走廊).28 Chinese

planners envision the port as the oceanic node of a transportation network of road, rail, and pipeline 

infrastructure intended to traverse over 3,000 km of rugged, often insecure Pakistani terrain to link up 

with Chinese transport networks in Xinjiang province. From a northern terminus at Kashgar in 

western Xinjiang, goods conveyed from Gwadar can then, in theory, proceed on to massive PRC 

markets further east, and vice versa. Landlocked central Asian states—Afghanistan in particular—are 

among the intended beneficiaries of this aspirational transport system.

29 Gwadar port is now heralded 

24 See Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015); Isaac Kardon, “China and Pakistan: 

Emerging Strains in the Entente Cordiale,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, March 2011, https://project2049.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/china_pakistan_emerging_strains_in_the_entente_cordiale_kardon.pdf. 25 Both sides routinely affirm that their “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” is “higher than the Himalayas,” 

“deeper than the Indian Ocean,” and “sweeter than honey.” See, for example, Hu Jintao, “Address at Islamabad 

Convention Center: ‘Carry on Traditional Friendship and Deepen All-Round Cooperation’,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

the People’s Republic of China, November 24, 2006, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2757_663518/2758_663520/t285

917.shtml; “China, Pakistan Vow to Push Forward All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership to New High,” Xinhua, 

September 8, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/08/c_137454716.htm. 26 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 27 For a comprehensive discussion of this long-standing diplomatic entente, see Small, “The China-Pakistan Axis.” 

Recently, China declined to defend Pakistan against its listing on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” of 

countries needing to control financing for terrorism. Adnan Aamir, “The Grey List: More Trouble for Pakistan’s 

Economy,” The Lowy Institute Interpreter, July 18, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/grey-list-moretrouble-pakistan-s-economy 28 “Li Keqiang Urges Development of ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’,” South China Morning Post, May 23, 2013, 

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1244267/li-keqiang-urges-development-china-pakistan-economic-corridor 29 A comprehensive study of CPEC and Gwadar conducted by researchers from Renmin University and reporters from 

Caijing Magazine argued that Gwadar was positioned to become “the port of choice for Central Asia, which will promote 

economic development in Central and South Asia.” See Renmin University Chongyang Institute and Caijing Magazine, 

“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Field Research Report,” p. 3. See also 唐孟生 [Tang Mengsheng], 唐孟生谈中巴经

济走廊:一带一路的旗舰与标杆 [“Tang Mengsheng Discusses CPEC: One Belt One Road’s Flagship and 

Benchmark”], Sina, May 26, 2016, http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2016-05-26/doc-ifxsqxxu4430007.shtml.
9

as “the second great monument of Pak-China friendship after the Karakorum Highway,” the high 

mountain road that connects the two countries.30

China’s senior leadership has staked considerable capital and credibility on the success of Gwadar. 

During Xi Jinping’s April 2015 visit to Pakistan, he elevated CPEC to the highest priority and 

“flagship” of his “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).

31 Xi named Gwadar as one of the four pillars of 

CPEC, and pledged $46 billion in Chinese investment over the next 15 years.32 This largesse is a 

major departure from China’s long-standing economic neglect of Pakistan.33 The huge and growing 

outlay of promised PRC investment in CPEC is estimated at as much as $87 billion, 34 though only 

$28.6 billion is allocated as of the latest official tally.35 Whatever the ultimate figure, it is not a trivial 

sum. Chinese leaders have opted for a strong dose of economic engagement to shore up this 

important relationship for the new era. Direct investment at Gwadar is estimated to be $1.62 billion 

to date, constituting a small but significant proportion of the PRC’s CPEC program.36 As the key 

project in Xi’s signature international program, Gwadar’s development holds immense symbolic as 

well as practical value for Chinese foreign policy.

These huge investments are necessary, in PRC leadership’s estimation, because of Pakistan’s dire 

social and economic weakness. Xi has pledged a Chinese “blood transfusion” to shore up Pakistani

instability.37 This medical metaphor is also used within China to describe the “disease” of Uyghur 

30 Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, “Year Book 2016-2017,” Islamabad, 2018, 

http://moma.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/YB_2016-17.pdf, p. 51

31 张尼 [Zhang Ni], 习近平今启年内首访如何助推中巴经济走廊引关注 [“How Xi Jinping’s First Visit This Year Will 

Boost the CPEC”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 20, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0420/c1001-

26869793.html

32 Xi himself has played a key role in defining the nature of China-Pakistan economic initiatives. During his visit in 2015, 

he outlined four main lines of effort for CPEC: expanding Gwadar port and its free zone, constructing energy projects, 

developing nation-wide transport infrastructure, and forging bilateral industrial cooperation. See 崔小粟 [Cui Xiaosu], 习

近平在巴发表署名文章 描绘中巴关系新前景 [“Xi Jinping Publishes Signed Article in Pakistan Depicting New 

Prospects for China-Pakistan Relations”] 中国共产党新闻网 [China Central Party News Network], April 20, 2015, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0420/c385474-26870490-2.html; Subsequently, Xi has personally promoted the 

Gwadar project, citing it as an example of “continuous strengthening of facility connectivity” between ports and their 

connecting highways, railways, pipelines, and airports. 习近平出席“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛开幕式并发表主旨演

讲 [“Xi Jinping Attended The Opening Ceremony of the ‘Belt and Road’ International Cooperation Summit Forum and 

Delivered Keynote Speech”] 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], May 14, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-

05/14/content_5193673.htm#allContent

33 Arif Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact,” Peaceworks, no. 135 (Washington, DC: 

United States Institute of Peace, 2017), pp. 5-6; Small, “The China-Pakistan Axis,” pp. 93-116. 34 The topline figure crept from $46 billion to $55 billion and later expanded to $62 billion. Salman Siddiqui, “CPEC 

investment pushed from $55b to $62b,” The Express Tribune, April 12, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpecinvestment-pushed-55b-62b/. One recent assessment places the total at $87 billion, including CPEC projects that have 

been paused or cancelled. See Jon Hillman, Maesea Mccalpin, and Kendra Brock, “The China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor at Five.” CSIS Briefs, (April 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-five. 35 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Yearbook 2018-2019,” Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform

(Islamabad, 2020), https://www.pc.gov.pk/images/final_year_book.pdf, p. 144.

36 王然 [Wang Ran], 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港已具备运营能力 [“Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Has Operating Capabilities”], 港口

经济 [Port Economy], no. 4 (2015), p. 53; 中国共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of Commerce], 巴基斯坦与“一带一路”的

关系 [“Pakistan’s Relationship With the Belt and Road”], 商务历史 [The History of Commerce], Ch. 6, 2020, 

http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=bjstyydyldgx

37 Tang Mengsheng notes that of 51 total investments announced with MOUs, 36 are projects currently designated as 

“CPEC,” of which 21 are focused on energy capacity. See Tang Mengsheng, “One Belt One Road’s Flagship and 

Benchmark.”
10

Muslim separatism.38 Chinese analysts describe the connection of the port to China as “a large 

artery” supporting Pakistan’s health—and China’s, too.

39 Such emphasis on the basic unity of

internal and external security reflects Xi Jinping’s conception of “holistic national security,” rooted 

in long-standing Chinese strategic thinking about its western frontiers.

40 According to the former 

PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, the CPEC program “will improve the economic and social 

development of the backward areas of Pakistan and China. The situation provides a ‘cure’ for the 

terrorist threat in the region.”41

Chinese rulers have long viewed economic development along China’s western periphery as a means

to maintain stability. General Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the PLA National Defense 

University, captured this long-standing conception of China’s near abroad, stating that “we should 

see the western regions not as a frontier but rather as our advancing hinterlands.”42 From this

perspective, Pakistan is part of the same socio-economic and security system as Xinjiang. Chinese 

security leadership considers instability in Pakistan to be a significant threat to PRC domestic 

stability, in large part because of its close connections to Xinjiang.43 As the People’s Armed Police 

(PAP) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Qin Tian put it, “the trend of foreign terrorists returning to 

the country is obvious. Xinjiang is under attack.”44 Chinese analysts consider Pakistan a major vector 

for radicalization of Chinese Muslims. Beijing has thus long relied on Pakistan to “mediate major 

elements of its counter-terrorism policy.”45

The economic program of CPEC (of which Gwadar is a component) is best understood then as an 

instrument of Beijing’s security policy. The aim is to stabilize and pacify Xinjiang by integrating its 

development with countries on China’s periphery. The development of an Indian Ocean port is 

fundamental to the overarching goal of internal stability and peripheral security. To understand why 

and how first requires an understanding of the port and its connecting infrastructure.

38 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression: China’s 

Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International Security, vol. 44, no. 3 (2019), pp. 9-47. 39 Cai Chenyu, “Gwadar Port Has A Long Way To Go,” p. 17

40 For an assortment of Xi statements on his “holistic national security outlook,” see: 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 习近平关于总

体国家安全观论述摘编 [Selected Works of Xi Jinping on The Holistic National Security Outlook] (Beijing: Central Party 

Publishing, 2018); see also Timothy Heath, “The ‘Holistic Security Concept’: The Securitization of Policy and Increasing 

Risk of Militarized Crisis,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 15, no. 12 (June 19, 2015), 

https://jamestown.org/program/the-holistic-security-concept-the-securitization-of-policy-and-increasing-risk-ofmilitarized-crisis/.

41 陆树林 [Lu Shulin], 中巴经济走廊: “一带一路” 的 旗舰项目和示范项目 [“China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A 

Flagship and Exemplary Project of the Belt and Road”], 印度洋经集体研究 [Indian Ocean Economic and Political 

Review], no. 4 (2015), p. 104.

42 刘亚洲 [Liu Yazhou], 西部论 [“On the West”] 凤凰周刊 [Phoenix Weekly], August 5, 2010, 

http://risechina.blogspot.com/2013/03/blog-post_9585.html 43 “Xi takes an integrated view of the international and domestic counter-terrorism situation,” according to then-Chief of 

Staff of the People’s Armed Police. 秦天 [Qin Tian). 21 世纪前期反恐形势 与中国反恐军事力量建设 [“The AntiTerrorism Situation in the Early 21st Century and the Building of China’s Anti-Terrorist Military”] 中国军事科学 [China 

Military Science), no. 1 (2017), p. 53 44 Ibid., p. 52

45 Andrew Small, “China and Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Pakistan?” in Michael Clarke (ed.), Terrorism and 

Counterterroism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 187.
11

Image 1: Gwadar Bay with Port inset46

Image 2: Gwadar Port and Surrounds47

46 瓜达尔港 [“Gwadar Port”], 中国交通建设股份有限公司 [China Communications Construction Co., Ltd.], December 

14, 2018, http://www.ccccltd.cn/zt/qzggkfsszn/ssxzdgc/201812/t20181214_95426.html. 47 Alvina Sajid, “China to Establish Special Economic Zone in Gwadar,” Customs Today, November 21, 2014, 

https://customstoday.com.pk/china-to-establish-special-economic-zone-in-gwadar/.
12

Port Capacity & Characteristics 

The port at Gwadar has been in operation since 2008 but has yet to see regular commercial service. 

Situated in the east bay of a hammer-shaped peninsula, it has historically supported artisanal fishing 

for the local population. That population has not yet been displaced by the industrial-scale 

commercial port operation intended by the project developers. Indeed, Gwadar port’s commercial 

throughput is not yet reported by any major industry sources. The port and its adjacent free trade and 

export processing zone nonetheless continue as the subjects of voluminous reporting in Pakistani and 

Chinese media while incremental upgrades and expansions take place. 

Port Development

The dream of a deep-water port at Gwadar has been long in the making. A survey by the United 

States Geological Service in 1954 demonstrated the suitability of the site’s natural harbor for 

development as a port, after which Pakistan negotiated the purchase of the Gwadar site from the 

Sultanate of Oman for $3 million in 1958.48 Pakistani officials marketed the prospective port at 

Gwadar to foreign firms throughout the intervening decades, and nearly reached a deal in the late 

1990s with the U.S. oil and gas firm Unocal, which reportedly aimed to use Gwadar as hub for 

natural gas pipelines spanning the region.49 Pakistani leaders were unable to secure capital and 

technical expertise for the port’s development until August 2001, when PRC Prime Minister Zhu 

Rongji committed Chinese support for the project.50

The China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC)51 was the general contractor on the initial 

development of the site, breaking ground in March 2002.52 CHEC inherited a design from a British 

firm, but opted to redesign “in line with Chinese port construction standards,” according to the 

general manager and chief engineer of the project, Sun Ziyu, who noted that it was “built to 

specifications 70 percent higher than the standards of the United Kingdom.”53 Sun claimed that they 

were not the low bidder, but rather offered the highest quality project (though there is no public 

record of open bidding on the project).

54 One strength of the Chinese bid was the financial backing of 

state. The leading PRC policy bank supporting overseas construction, China’s Export Import Bank 

(Exim Bank), financed the port construction project with a $50 million grant, a $50 commercial 

48 “Gwadar Port: ‘History-Making Milestones,’” Dawn, April 14, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/297994. 49 The firm reportedly engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations with the Pakistani government during the 1990s, hoping 

to use the port to connect to the energy-risk Caspian Sea. 郝洲 [Hao Zhou], 瓜达尔港曲折起航 [“Gwadar Port Sets 

Sail”], 财经 [Caijing), May 5, 2017, http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20170505/4268608.shtml. Another U.S. firm also 

signed an investment memorandum of understanding for a $460 fishing port and modern industrial fishing fleet, but also 

failed to close the deal. See Syed A. Aslam, “$460 m Forbes Project is Dead,” Pakistan Economist, no. 30 (August 1, 

1999), https://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue1999/issue30/i&e1.htm.

50 朱镕基会见巴基斯坦财政部长和交通部长 [“Zhu Rongji Meets with Pakistani Minister of Finance and Minister of 

Transportation”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 9, 2001, 

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20010809/531795.html; Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 51 CHEC is a subsidiary of the leading central SOE working on global port projects, China Communications Construction 

Company (CCCC) (中国交通建设股份有限公司).

52 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港口项目工程简介 [“Introduction to the Gwadar, Pakistan Port Project”], 中华人民共和国商务部

[PRC Ministry of Commerce], May 5, 2004, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bi/200405/20040500216204.shtml.

53 李强 [Li Qiang], 中港董事长:瓜达尔港让中国工程走向世界 [“China Harbour Director: Gwadar Port brings 

Chinese engineering to the world”], 世界博览 [World Expo], September 27, 2011, 

http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/sjbl/detail_2011_09/27/9505763_0.shtml, p. 1. No other sources report on the British design 

firm. 

54 Ibid., p. 1.
13

credit, and a $98 million state credit repayable over 15 years, with Pakistan providing the remaining 

$50 million for the $248 million project.

55

The project faced significant security and technical challenges, including fatal terrorist attacks 

against the Chinese engineers and laborers working on site.

56 Lacking fresh water, reliable electricity, 

and modern roads, the Chinese laborers also made do with infrequent shipments from the PRC; 

project equipment came in on a semi-submersible barge from the mainland because it could not be 

conveyed overland.57 These threats and obstacles notwithstanding, CHEC completed Phase I of 

construction in the spring of 2007, three months ahead of schedule, but $50 million over budget.

58

The facility features a 4.7 km approach channel dredged to a depth of 14.5 meters (m), with a turning 

basin with a maximum allowable length overall (LOA) of 295m.59 The 602m continuous quay wall 

includes three 200m multipurpose ship berths that can accommodate up to 50,000 DWT vessels with 

a maximum 12.5m draught.60 The cargo berths are outfitted for container, RO-RO, breakbulk, and 

heavy project cargo; a 100m service berth is immediately west of the quay.61 The designed capacity 

is 137,000 TEU (containerized cargo) per year, and 868,000 tons of general and bulk cargo per 

55 巴基斯坦政府正积极寻求外国公司运营瓜达尔港 [“Pakistani Government is Actively Seeking Foreign Companies to 

Operate Gwadar Port”], 中国驻巴基斯坦大使馆经济商务处 [PRC Embassy in Pakistan Economic and Commercial 

Office], February 26, 2006, http://pk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/200602/20060201601928.shtml. For more information 

on the loans and grants, see A. Dreher, A. Fuchs, B.C. Parks, A.M. Strange, and M.J. Tierney, “China Exim Bank 

Provides USD 98 Million State Credit for Gwadar Port Project, Pakistan (Linked to #38995 and #35124), Aid, China, and 

Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: 

AidData, 2017. 

56 “3 Engineers killed in car bomb in Pakistan,” China Daily, May 3, 2004, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-05/03/content_328070.htm; PRC Ministry of Commerce, “Pakistan’s 

Relationship With the ‘Belt and Road”

57 Li Qiang, “Gwadar Port Brings Chinese Engineering to The World.”

58 The project cost later increased to $298 million. See “Gwadar Port: ‘History-Making Milestones;’” Li Qiang, “Gwadar 

Port Brings Chinese Engineering to the World,” p. 2.

59 Port characteristics drawn from IHS Markit, “Gwadar Port Detail,” Seaweb Ports, accessed May 1, 2020. China 

Communications Construction Company subsidiary Shanghai Dredging Co. Ltd. spent five years dredging the port. Phase 

I was initiated in May 2002 and dredged the channel to 8 meters. Phase II later dredged the channel to 10-11 meters. For a 

personal account of the dredging work by company management, see 在巴基斯坦瓜达尔港疏浚航道的日子 [“The Time 

We Dredged Gwadar Port’s Channel in Pakistan”], 东南商报 [Southeast Business News], May 13, 2017, 

http://daily.cnnb.com.cn/dnsb/html/2017-05/13/content_1049758.htm?div=-1. This company has undertaken other projects 

of national importance, such as dredging artificial islands in the disputed Spratly Island Group of the South China Sea. See 

百年上航 卓越领航 [“A Hundred Years of Shanghai Dredging Co., Leading in Excellence”], 中交上海航道局有限公司

[CCCC Shanghai Dredging Co. Ltd.], September 7, 2018, http://www.sh-syh.org/node2/shsyh/qywh/u1ai3817.html. 60 These are the numbers available from IHS Markit’s Seaweb Ports entry for Gwadar. The COPHC website lists 12.5m 

for maximum draught and 70,000 for maximum DWT, but given that IHS Markit is a paid service for commercial 

operators, it is likely that the COPHC-published figures are inflated, or at best anticipatory of future dredging and 

expansion. See China Overseas Port Holdings Company, Pakistan, “Gwadar International Terminals Limited,” 

http://cophcgwadar.com/gitl.aspx, accessed May 1, 2020. The Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs annual report also 

lists 12.5m as the draught, but 50,000 as the maximum DWT. See Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, 

“Year Book 2016-2017,” http://moma.gov.pk/userfiles1/file/YB_2016-17.pdf, p. 2. 61 IHS Markit, “Gwadar,” Seaweb Ports, accessed April 20, 2020. The current port operator, China Overseas Port 

Holdings, claims in its brochure that the facility can handle 70,000 DWT vessels, but this is not the current 

recommendation from commercial sources like IHS Markit. See China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (Pvt.) 

Ltd., “A Deep Sea Port Exploring Global Opportunities,” COPHC Company Profile, 

http://cophcgwadar.com/files/pdf/COPHC_Company_Profile.pdf, p. 14. The overall port area is 640,000 m2 and includes 

48,278 m2 for container stacking, a 28,669 m2 open storage yard, 3,750 m2 of warehousing, an 1,800 m2 hazardous cargo 

storage yard, and 400 reefer plugs for refrigerated cargos.
14

year.

62 These are the modest port facilities currently operating, with only minor augmentation well 

over a decade later.

Port Management

The Gwadar Port Authority tendered international bids in 2006, and the Port of Singapore Authority 

(PSA) won a 40-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) lease for Gwadar port in 2007.63 CHEC and 

Dubai Ports World also bid on the project, but PSA was awarded the concession on the strength of its 

reputation as a leading global port operator.64 Under the agreement, PSA was to receive 91 percent of 

cargo operations revenues and 85 percent of the free zone revenues.65 As part of this concession, PSA 

agreed to develop Phase II of the port, pledging a $550 million investment in the construction of four 

additional container berths, a bulk cargo terminal, two oil terminals, a roll-on roll-off terminal, and a 

grain terminal over the next five years.66 Stymied by political, engineering, and legal obstacles, PSA 

failed to implement Phase II expansion.67 The port was only utilized for bulk cargos of fertilizer, 

urea, and wheat imported directly by the government-operated Trading Corporation of Pakistan, 

which had to subsidize these transactions.

68 In 2011, PSA entered negotiations to exit the project.

By February 2013, PSA had opted to sell all of its equity in the port to the Chinese state-owned firm 

China Overseas Port Holdings Company, Ltd. (COPHC).69 When COPHC took over the port from 

PSA in February 2013, the facilities were in disrepair. Engineers from the China Communications 

Construction Corporation-Fourth Harbor Engineering Investigation and Design Institute Co., Ltd.

(CCCC-FHDI, which was involved in the survey and planning of the port’s construction from 2002-

2007) assessed the port after the Chinese take-over and found the main pier in sound structural 

condition, but almost everything else had been neglected and was in various stages of decay. The 

approach had silted up to only 12.1 meters (from 14.5 m), steel components of the loading equipment 

and cranes were “severely corroded,” quay crane hydraulic systems were leaking, and yard 

62 Pakistan Ministry of Ports and Shipping, Gwadar Port Authority, “Gwadar Port & CPEC,” A Presentation to 

Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, November 28, 2015, 

http://www.na.gov.pk/cpec/sites/default/files/presentations/Parliamentary%20Committee%20on%20CPECNew.pdf, p. 9. 63 China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (PVT) Ltd., “Brief Summary of Development: Gwadar Port and Free 

Zone,” Presentation delivered at PRC Embassy, Pakistan, Islamabad, 26 October 2018, http://www.pakistanchina.com/wb-pci-pci/demo/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/cpec-3.pdf. 64 Some reports speculated that PSA was chosen over CHEC because then-President Pervez Musharraf sought to assuage 

American concerns about leasing a strategic asset to the PRC. See Declan Welsh, “Chinese Company Will Run Strategic 

Pakistani Port,” New York Times, January 31, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/chinese-firm-willrun-strategic-pakistani-port-at-gwadar.html. 65 K. Raffat Zaheer, “Development and Operations of the Port of Gwadar,” International Federation of Shipmasters’ 

Associations working paper, 2008, http://www.ifsma.org/tempannounce/aga33/Gwadar.pdf. 66 “SC Revives Issue of Controversial Contract for Gwadar Port” Dawn, November 3, 2010, 

https://www.dawn.com/news/892058.

67 宋笛 [Song Di], 看见瓜达尔港:世界最大的深水港 [“Behold Gwadar Port: The World’s Largest Deepwater Port”], 

中国企业报 [China Enterprise News], February 17, 2016, http://www.cccnews.cn/mtjkj/201602/t20160217_45539.html. 68 Song Di, “Behold Gwadar Port”; Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.”

69 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” The principal complaint from PSA was the failure of the Pakistani Navy to turn 

over a large plot (584 acres of land at Shamba Ismail) that was meant to be developed as warehousing space adjacent to 

the port. Pakistani analysts differ as to whether this or broader security, commercial, or other political concerns were the 

principal causes of PSA’s failure to perform planned expansion and operate the port successfully. See also “Putting 

Economics in Command,” Dawn, September 2, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/746500/putting-economics-incommand; “Gwadar Port To Be Taken Over By Chinese Company: Minister Informs Senate Body,” Business Recorder, 

August 29, 2012, https://fp.brecorder.com/2012/08/201208291231513/.
15

equipment “urgently needed maintenance.”70 As late as 2016, the port’s cargo-handling equipment

was reportedly unusable due to neglect; oil storage tanks were rusted over and non-functional, and 

“mountains of garbage filled the port area.”71 Still, shortly after Xi Jinping’s landmark trip and 

announcement of the CPEC project, COPHC finalized a new 40-year lease on the Gwadar port in 

November 2015.72 

COPHC had no prior experience owning or operating a port terminal before taking over at Gwadar.73

Indeed, the firm was incorporated and registered (in Hong Kong) in August 2012.

74 According to 

COPHC’s chairman, Zhang Baozhong, the firm “was specially-designed and purposely-built...for 

Gwadar port by the Chinese government.”75 Disclosures to the Hong Kong Exchange where the firm 

is domiciled describe it as a private corporation in which Zhang himself owns one third of the issued 

shares (worth only $500,000 USD).

76 The firm is otherwise opaque, and unwilling to respond to 

Pakistani journalists’ requests for further information.

77 Public documents do not list any identifiable 

government actors in the firm’s management or ownership structure.

78 Nonetheless, the “stateowned” status of the port operator appears to be a selling point for developments surrounding 

Gwadar, indicating a degree of PRC government commitment, perhaps intended to assure investors.79

This lease reportedly replicates the arrangements of the earlier PSA deal, with 91 percent of port 

revenues allotted to COPHC, 9 percent to the federal Pakistani government, and nothing to the 

70 席芳, 汪超, 李俊星 [Xi Fang, Wang Chao, and Li Junxing], “一带一路” 战略下的巴基斯坦瓜达尔港 SWOT 分析及

发展策略 [“SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar Under the One Belt One Road Strategy”], 交通企业

管理 [Transportation Enterprise Management], no. 2 (2017), pp. 2-3.

71 Renmin/Caijing report; Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.”

72 Salman Masood and Declan Welsh, “Xi Jinping Plans to Fund Pakistan,” New York Times, April 21, 2015, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/asia/xi-jinping-plans-to-fund-pakistan.html. 73 COPHC did bring on experienced Chinese state-owned enterprises to take on some construction tasks, e.g. Zhuhai Port 

Holdings Group Co., which signed a $1.02 billion contract as part of a Zhuhai-Gwadar “sister port” program that entailed 

Chinese support on “harbor construction, personnel training, route exploration, goods supply, logistics warehouse 

construction and an information platform.” See Zheng Xin, “Zhuhai Port Scores big deal in Pakistan,” China Daily, 

October 30, 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-10/30/content_22326165.htm. 74 China Overseas Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Return, Company no. 1787136, Form NAR1,” Hong Kong 

Integrated Companies Registry Information System, August 15, 2019. 75 Yasir Habib Khan, “China Overseas Port Holding Company was made specifically to build the Gwadar port: chairman,” 

Geo News, May 14, 2019, https://www.geo.tv/latest/237251-our-company-was-made-specifically-to-build-the-gwadarport

76 China Overseas Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Return, Form NAR1.”

77 A Pakistani newspaper investigated the firm and discovered that it is registered to a single room in Hong Kong that is 

also the registered address of four other firms. It has failed to submit annual documents to the Pakistan Securities and 

Exchange Commission. “The Mysterious China Overseas Port Company,” Business Recorder Research, February 18, 

2018, https://www.brecorder.com/2018/02/19/399768/the-mysterious-china-overseas-ports-holding-company/.

78 Zhang Baozhong (张保中) owns one third; another third is owned by an individual named Li Kejing, with a residential 

address in Hong Kong; the final third is owned by Cheer View Development Limited, with a British Virgin Islands 

address. One of the three directors, Qin Ling (秦岭), is listed in COPH’s filing to the Hong Kong Exchange has a Beijing 

residential address; the other, Li Jianhui (李建辉) has a Hong Kong residential address.

79 See, for example, the promotional brochure of a Pakistani-British real estate development firm selling condominiums in 

two large residential zones in Gwadar city: “The port has been leased to China Overseas Port Holding Company a Chinese 

state-owned port operator for a term of 40 years and is being redeveloped under the economic model of Shenzhen in 

China.” “International Port City Gwadar,” China Pakistan Investment Corporation, 2019, 

https://www.cpicglobal.com/downloads/Web2019-IPC-Brochure.pdf, p. 9.
16

Baloch provincial government.80 The COPHC lease also retains all of the PSA-negotiated 

arrangements and preferential conditions—“even PSA’s corporate structure for operation and 

management of ports and free zones—we have copied them intact,” according to a COPHC executive 

in Pakistan.81 PSA is among the leading global terminal operators, and has had the world’s highest 

throughput of containers through its terminals since 2008.82 Yet this world-class firm was unable (or 

unwilling) to successfully bring the port into commercial operation, calling into question the business 

case for COPHC’s subsequent efforts.

Port Utilization

Commercial activity at Gwadar has been quite limited, as of June 2020. While industry reporting 

does not cover throughput or utilization at the port, available evidence makes clear it is operating 

well below its designed capacity. According to the Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, cargo 

throughput actually decreased after COPHC took over the lease in 2013. Only 1.42 million tons of 

cargo and 99 ships came through Gwadar in the entire five years from 2013-2017 (the last time 

throughput was officially reported).83 By contrast, in the second year of the port’s operation under 

PSA in 2009, a total of 2.25 million tons of cargo were imported through Gwadar by 70 ships. The 

port has generated only $2.26 million in revenues during the period since the COPHC takeover in 

2013, and only about $200,000 went to the Gwadar Port Authority, according to reports from the 

Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs in spring 2019.84

“Most of the time,” wrote a Chinese industry analyst in 2017, “Gwadar port is basically idle.”85 In 

the early years of COPHC operation, industry analysts described the problem at Gwadar as “ships but 

no cargo, or cargo but no ships.”86 Three years after assuming control of the port, the Chinese 

operator handled its first commercial cargo vessel: the Sinotrans Shipping bulk carrier Changhang 

Hanhai, which offloaded 30,000 tons of engineering equipment and building materials at berth 2 in 

October 2016.

87 This limited activity consisted primarily of cargo for construction on the port and its 

80 “China To Get 91pc Gwadar Income, Minister Tells Senate”, Dawn, November 25, 2017; China Overseas Ports Holding 

Company Pakistan (PVT) Ltd., “Brief Summary of Development: Gwadar Port and Free Zone.” 81 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.”

82 “Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast, Annual Report 2019” Drewry Maritime Research, 

p. 26.

83 Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, “Year Book 2016-2017,” p. 54. In the entire period of operation through 2017, 

the port had handled only 205 vessels and 6.453 million tons of cargo (Ibid., p. 2). The PRC Embassy in Pakistan, based in 

Islamabad, is nonetheless an enthusiastic promoter of the project. Although the figure conflicts with those reported by the 

Pakistan Ministry of Maritime Affairs, the embassy reported 400,000 tons of cargo handled in 2017 “Latest Progress on 

the CPEC,” Embassy of the PRC in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, December 29, 2018, 

http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1626097.htm. For reference, Handymax bulk carriers, the largest that 

Gwadar can currently accommodate, can offload 50,000 tons of cargo; large container ships carry as many as 20,000 

TEUs.

84 “Economic Activity in Gwadar Increases as Port Generates PKR 358 Million,” China-Pakistan Economic Recorder, 

March 22, 2019, http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/economic-activity-in-gwadar-increases-as-port-generates-pkr-358-

million/NjgyOQ==. 85 Cai Chenyu, “The Development of Gwadar Port,” p. 18

86 张任重 [Zhang Renzhong], 瓜达尔港——中巴经济走廊的璀璨明珠 [“Gwadar Port—The Bright Pearl Of The ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor”], 光明日报 [Guangming Daily], August 26, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-

08/26/c_1123331199.htm.

87 中外运长航正式开通瓜达尔航线 [“Sinotrans Changhang Officially Opens the Gwadar Route”], China Overseas Port 

Holdings, Gwadar, October 28, 2016, http://cophcgwadar.com/hotnews26.aspx.
17

surrounding facilities.88 Cargo throughput for import was not yet economically feasible. Engineers

from CCC-FHDI reported in 2017 that cargo passing through Gwadar port required government 

subsidies of twenty USD per ton.

89

Actual commercial utilization began in 2018, when COPHC and COSCO announced the start of a 

regular container service. The MS TIGER arrived at Gwadar on March 7, 2018, accompanied by two 

Pakistani naval vessels and much fanfare.90 The vessel subsequently loaded an undisclosed number 

of frozen seafood containers and left for Jebel Ali, UAE that same day. This “Karachi-Gwadar 

Express Service” was intended to run every Wednesday. However, according to COSCO logs online, 

the service ceased after only 9 such transits, in May 2018.91

Limited equipment upgrades have improved the handling capacity at the port. Three new quay cranes 

arrived mid-July 2018.92 These quay cranes have permitted the modest uptick in the frequency of 

ship visits, including for dry bulk items for which the cranes are well-suited.93 In 2019, seven

container vessels visited Gwadar; as of May 2020, three container vessels, two bulk vessels, and one 

liquid petroleum gas (LPG) carrier have called on the port, though there is no LPG terminal. Still, 

CCDI-FHDI engineers reported in 2019 that “due to the lack of specialized coal, ore, container, oil 

and gas berths in Gwadar port, the types of cargo handled are relatively simple. The role assumed in 

Pakistan's maritime trade is not yet prominent.”94

The COSCO container service appears to have been resuscitated in early 2020,

95 though firm 

representatives say the line often skips Gwadar.96 Throughput may improve marginally as enterprises 

begin operating out of the initial section of the free zone, but full utilization of the port is not on the 

horizon.

88 王琳 [Wang Lin], 一带一路倡议下,瓜达尔每天都在变化 [“Gwadar Changes Everyday Under the One Belt, One 

Road Initiative”], 第一财经 [China Business Network], May 8, 2017, http://www.yicai.com/news/5280826.html. For 

example, one Zhejiang-based contractor for electrical cable pipe conduits has reported its preparations for delivery of 

piping to Gwadar port’s free zone in April 2017. See 驰讯管业中标瓜达尔港电缆管道顺利起运装船 [“Successful 

Bidder Zhuxun Piping Industries Load Up Ships for Gwadar Port’s Electrical Cable Piping”], April 14, 2017, 

http://zjcxgy.com/news/html/?424.html. 89 Xi Fang, et al, “SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar,” pp. 1-2. 90 “First-ever container vessel under CPEC arrives at Gwadar Port,” The News International, March 7, 2018, 

https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/289561-first-ever-container-vessel-under-cpec-arrives-at-gwadar-port. 91 COSCO SHIPPING Lines, “KARACHI GWADAR GULF SERVICE (KGS),” https://news.cpecb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/KGS-LTS-updated.xlsx, accessed June 6, 2020. 92 Staff Writer, “New Cranes Arrive at Gwadar Port,” July 13, 2017, www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-newsdetail?id=MzQ1Nw==. 93 An October 2018 COPHC report to Pakistani officials claimed that two 50,000 DWT Handymax vessels can be 

accommodated simultaneously, handling bulk-cargo, general cargo, containers, and roll-on roll-off “efficiently” (COPHC, 

“Brief Summary of Development of Gwadar Port & Free Zone,” PRC Embassy Islamabad, October 26, 2018, 

http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/brief-summary-of-development-of-gwadar-port--free-zone-(oct-2018)/NjEzMw==.

94 周惊慧 [Zhou Jinghui], et al. 瓜达尔港发展及布局研究 [“Research on Development and Layout of Gwadar Port”], 水

运工程 [Port & Waterway Engineering] 9 no. 560 (2018), p. 126. 95 A search of COSCO Shipping’s “Sailing Schedules” by city pairs found two container vessels, the Liberian flagged 

“Manet” and Tuvalu-flagged “Diyala” traveling between Jebel Ali and Gwadar every 5 to 9 days in May-June 2020, 

https://elines.coscoshipping.com/ebusiness/sailingSchedule. 96 Sheridan Prasso, “One of China’s Most Ambitious Projects Becomes a Corridor to Nowhere,” Bloomberg, March 2, 

2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-02/a-china-belt-and-road-project-becomes-a-corridor-tonowhere.
18

Image 3: Gwadar Port and Free Zone, April 202097

Free Zone Development

The port is designed to incorporate an adjacent free trade and export processing zone modeled on

Shekou, the port complex at the heart of the PRC’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.98 The basic 

“Shekou Model” (蛇口模式) is a port surrounded by a logistics and free trade zone, and bolstered by 

a purpose-built commercial and residential city to support the work-force for the whole complex. 

This “port-park-city” is designed to reproduce a thriving, Chinese business ecosystem that can 

generate and process the trade required to make the port and its hinterlands prosper.

99 Like Shenzhen, 

Gwadar’s development begins from humble origins as a fishing village.100 While Gwadar is plainly 

lacking most of the other crucial ingredients that make Shenzhen the economic miracle that it is, 

Chinese firms are nonetheless advocating a similar approach there.101

97 CPEC Authority, “Development of Free Zone,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/projectdetails/36 (accessed August 3, 2020) 98 See Gwadar New Smart Port City Masterplan 2020, http://investment.cpicglobal.com/gwadar2020-brochure-bau-usgs?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7Kb9ipiV6QIVhZ6fCh1QPwNDEAAYASAAEgJ8RvD_BwE; 宋笛 [Song Di], 深圳的蛇口模

式正在巴基斯坦瓜达尔港复制 [“Shenzhen’s Shekou Model Is Being Replicated in Gwadar Port, Pakistan”], 经济观察

网 [Economic Observer Online], September 10, 2016, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2016/0910/291806.shtml. 99 For analysis of the “Shekou Model” that inspires this comparison, see Peter Dutton, Isaac Kardon, and Conor Kennedy, 

“Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,” pp. 6-8; see also 孔晓青[Kong Xiaoqing], 招商港口 发展“蛇口

模式”的形成 [“Formation of the China Merchants Port 'Shekou Model' of Development”], 国家航海 [National 

Navigation], (November 2017), pp. 39-54; 何继江, 刘宁 [He Jijiang and Liu Ning], 蛇口模式:一种社会技术创新

[“Shekou Model: A Type of Social Innovation of Technology”], 特区经济 [Special Economic Zone Economies], no. 12 

(2014), pp. 53-57. 100 Some 75 percent of Gwadar’s population of 85,000 is engaged in the fishing industry. See Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 7 101 Shenzhen is in China’s economically vibrant Pearl River Delta region, adjacent to the huge urban centers of Hong

Kong and Guangzhou, and served by a huge pool of high-skilled labor, functional infrastructure, and a technocratic, 
19

The free zone is conceived as an integral part of the overall port project. COPHC secured a 43-year 

lease in 2015 to develop a 2,281-acre tax-free industrial, logistics, warehousing, and export zone 

north of the port, called the “Gwadar Free Zone.”102 It is operated by a COPHC subsidiary, Gwadar 

Free Zone Company, which intends to interface between Chinese firms and the local government, 

while providing utilities and security for the site.103 Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Shahid Abbasi 

presided over the inauguration of Phase I of this project in January 2018, a 60-acre initial commercial 

logistics zone on the western flank of the existing port facility. 

The zone is meant to attract Chinese and Pakistani firms to the port. COPHC’s chairman, Zhang 

Baozhong, claims thirty-plus Chinese and Pakistani firms have already invested nearly $500 million

to use the facilities. COPHC posted an online investment guide with all of the registration procedures

required for operating in the free zone, meant to attract Chinese firms and streamline the process for 

getting into the Pakistani market.104 Incentives include the possibility of 100 percent ownership for 

foreign investors, a 23-year tax holiday on any revenues from operations in the zone, 99-year landleases, duty-free imports and exports, a “world-class infrastructure and security arrangement,” and 

other promised business perks like flexible visas and ready-to-use office, industrial, and warehousing 

space.

105

The PRC Embassy in Islamabad reports that a wide range of state-owned and private firms, both 

Chinese and Pakistani, have submitted applications to become free zone companies.

106 Among them 

are the Shandong Linyi Overseas Investment Company, which has begun preparatory work on a trade 

exhibition hall and commercial logistics park.107 Some large state-owned enterprises are involved at 

the Gwadar free zone, including the China Merchants Group and China Communications 

Construction Corp., but most of the contracts have reportedly gone to smaller local SOEs and private 

firms.108

In January 2018, the Gwadar Free Zone desalination facility entered operation.109 After upgrades, the 

plant now processes 220,000 gallons per day. 110 Chinese sources claim the plant’s water supply and 

growth-oriented government. For an early analysis of the “economic miracle” of the region, see Ezra Vogel, One Step 

Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 102 Zhu Xi, “Pakistan to Hand Over 2,281 Acres of Gwadar Port’s FTZ to China,” People’s Daily Online, November 11, 

2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1111/c90000-8974374.html. 103 China Overseas Ports Holding Company, “Gwadar Free Zone Investment Guide,” (2016) 

http://cophcgwadar.com/files/pdf/Investment_guide.pdf. 104 China Overseas Ports Holding Company, “Gwadar Free Zone Investment Guide.” 105 “Free Zone of Gwadar Port Inaugurated to Boost Regional Development,” Xinhua, January 29, 2018, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/29/c_136933829.htm. 106 “Development of Gwadar Free Zone,” PRC Embassy in Pakistan, October 1, 2018,

http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1627112.htm. 107 Song Di, “Gwadar Free Zone”; Companies from Shandong province are reportedly among the main entrants into this 

market, due to reported incentives from the provincial government and what one Chinese scholar described as their “selfimage as tough men” capable of dealing with the harsh environment of Balochistan. Author interview, Beijing March 

2018).

108 Song Di, “Gwadar Free Zone.” Of five confirmed businesses operating in the free zone, three are Chinese, while two 

are Pakistani. Licenses have been issued to these companies, which will manufacture high-density steel pipe and electric 

motor bikes, and process fish and edible oils. Naseer Khan Kashani, “Port Will Make Gwadar a Prosperous City,” Global 

Times, April 23, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1147080.shtml. 109 “Introduction on CPEC Projects,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 

December 29, 2018, http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/P020181230760035767518.pdf, p. 29. 110 Reports differ as to the total capacity currently and the desired capacity. The PRC Embassy in Pakistan claims that the 

facility desalinates 220,000 gallons a day. “Latest Progress on the CPEC,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
20

drainage system will support not only the port complex, but also parts of the surrounding community, 

which is plagued by persistent water shortages.111 Other efforts around the Gwadar Free Zone include 

schools, hospitals, and commercial and residential real estate.112

Although the free zone intends to foster new industries, the long-standing fisheries industry was the 

first to attract Chinese investment and trading activity at the port. A Xinjiang-based fishing company,

Yufei International Fishing Company, invested in building a fish processing and cold-storage center, 

kicking off construction in the initial section of the free zone in May 2017.113 The firm plans to ship 

frozen seafood from Gwadar in reefer containers and truck it over the roughly ten-day, 1,800-km 

route through the Khunjerab Pass into Xinjiang Province.114 Western China got its “first taste of the 

Indian Ocean” at a promotional event for Gwadar’s seafood in Karamay, Xinjiang on May 20, 2017. 

For this event, however, Yufei flew two tons of seafood from Gwadar to Urumqi via Karachi and 

Beijing, arriving on Karamay citizens’ tables 34 hours later.115 There is no subsequent reporting on 

overland transport of Gwadar fish, though the container service has exported it to regional markets.116

Phase II and Beyond

Phase II expansions to the port and free zone are planned, but little progress is evident. One common 

sentiment among Chinese analysts is that the infrastructure must precede the commercial activity. In 

the words of an economics reporter who led a major study of the port: “in the longer term, when 

China lays out the basic infrastructure, it needs more participants to form a self-operating economic 

ecology. Relying solely on China’s unilateral blood transfusions is unsustainable. If you want to 

attract more foreign investors, you need to take your time and wait for Pakistan’s economic 

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, December 29, 2018, http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1626097.htm. The 

China International Development Cooperation Agency claims that COPHC expanded the plant’s capacity from 100,000 to 

200,000 gallons/day. 瓜达尔港 – 中巴经济走廊的璀璨明珠 [“Gwadar Port—A Bright Pearl in the China-Pakistan 

Economic Corridor”], 光明日报 [Guangming Daily], August 28, 2018, http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2018-

08/28/c_129941571.htm. According to the Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, the project is ultimately going 

to process 5 million gallons/day, but reports that less than 2 percent of the estimated cost has been spent as of the end of 

2019. Another 13 percent is allocated for 2020. See Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Pakistan Public 

Sector Development Programme 2019-2020,” Planning Commission of the Ministry of Planning, Development, and 

Reform (2020) https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/archives/PSDP_2019-20_Final.pdf, p. 23. 111 “Gwadar Port – A Bright Pearl in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”; Renmin/Caijing Report, pp. 7-9 112 “Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan Project—Special Report on CPEC Projects (Transportation Infrastructure: Part 

6)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, October 1, 2018, 

http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1627114.htm; Adnan Aamir, “Pakistan’s Belt and Road Has Singaporesize Goal”, Nikkei Asian Review, March 2, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistan-s-Belt-andRoad-port-has-Singapore-size-goal; 中巴经济走廊瓜达尔联合工作组第四次会议在伊斯兰堡召开 [“The Fourth 

Meeting of the Gwadar Joint Working Group of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Held in Islamabad”], 国际合作司中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会 [International Cooperation Department – National Development and Reform 

Commission], September 29, 2019, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/jgsj/gjs/sjdt/201909/t20190929_1195782_ext.html. 113 Wang Lin, “Gwadar Changes Every Day Under the One Belt, One Road Initiative.” 114 This ten-day route over land is reportedly twenty days shorter than getting Pakistani seafood to Xinjiang by sea. Cui Jia 

and Mao Weihua, “Pakistan to Export Seafood to Xinjiang via Land,” China Daily, February 17, 2017, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/17/content_28234349.htm.

115 瓜达尔港海鲜 34 小时飞到克拉玛依市民餐桌 [“Gwadar Port Seafood Flies in to Karamay Citizens’ Tables in 34 

Hours”], 人民网-新疆频道 [People’s Daily Online—Xinjiang Channel], May 22, 2017, 

http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0522/c349472-30222892.html; 巴基斯坦海鲜正游向中国! [“Pakistan Seafood Is 

Traveling To China!”], 搜狐媒体平台 [Sohu Media], June 28, 2017, https://m.sohu.com/n/498942735/.

116 COSCO logs do not specify that Yufei is the exporter, but they do indicate shipping of reefer containers from Gwadar 

to Jebel Ali, UAE. COSCO SHIPPING Lines, “KARACHI GWADAR GULF SERVICE (KGS),” 

https://news.cpecb.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/KGS-LTS-updated.xlsx, accessed June 6, 2020.
21

fundamentals to be revitalized.”117 The medical metaphor of Pakistan as a sick patient is indicative of 

some of the socio-economic and security concerns that have hampered expeditious development at 

the port and free zone.

Figure 3. Gwadar city master plan118

Phase II plans include a further nine berths to the east of the existing multipurpose berths, including a 

container terminal with four berths, a grain terminal, a bulk terminal, and two oil terminals on the 

northeast of the bay.

119 COPHC has submitted a proposal to construct the breakwaters needed to 

carry out this expansion, but the business plan remains under review by the Pakistan Ministry of 

Ports and Security.120 Indeed, reviews and approvals from Pakistani officials have been a source of 

major frustration for COPHC, which all but begged for support from Pakistan’s Federal Board of 

Revenue in a recent presentation at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad.121

Trade is hampered by customs regulations that thus far have limited imports to only 20 specified

items. Pakistan’s bureaucracy also has a complicated licensing system for potential investors in the 

free zone, such that only 12 of the 30 registered investors had been licensed (as of the last report in 

October 2018).

122 COPHC noted that these are among the obstacles “involved in non-operation of 

Gwadar Port for commercial purposes” and claim that desired actions by Pakistani officials will 

117 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 118 China Overseas Port Holding Company Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd, “A Deep Sea Port Exploring Global Opportunities,” 

COPHC Company Profile, http://cophcgwadar.com/files/pdf/COPHC_Company_Profile.pdf, p. 25. 119 CPEC Authority, “CPEC Gwadar Projects,” http://cpec.gov.pk/gwader, (accessed July 31, 2020); “China to Construct 

3.2km Additional Berths at Gwadar Port,” Customs Today, March 9, 2016, http://www.customstoday.com.pk/china-toconstruct-3-2km-additional-berths-at-gwadar-port/. 120 CPEC Authority, “Construction of Breakwaters,” CPEC-China Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/34, (accessed July 31, 2020). 121 In a briefing to Pakistani and Chinese officials, COPH officials addressed “matters involved in non-operation of 

Gwadar Port for commercial purposes,” stating that “issuance of necessary approvals” and permissions for trade are “a 

stepping stone for the prompt operationalization of Gwadar Port.” COPHC, “Brief Summary of Development: Gwadar 

Port & Free Zone,” pp. 43-44. 122 COPHC, “Brief Summary of Development: Gwadar Port & Free Zone,” pp. 22-23.
22

allow the “operationalization of Gwadar Port.”123

The natural sedimentation of the port means that continuous dredging is required for sufficient depth 

to be maintained for larger vessels to call.124 Officially, a COPHC bid to conduct further dredging of 

channels and berths is under review by the Pakistan Ministry of Ports and Shipping and the Gwadar 

Port Authority.125 No contract has yet been publicized, but maintenance dredging occurs periodically 

in order to maintain the current depth and provide landfill for port projects.126 Recent channel 

dredging observed in Spring of 2019 is reportedly being done for construction of the East Bay 

Expressway.

127 A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson publicized this dredging 

activity, noting that it was conducted by one of the vessels involved in China’s land reclamation in 

the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, the M/V Tian Bai owned by CCCC subsidiary 

Tianjin Dredging Company.128 One Chinese analyst claims COSCO would begin to operate more 

regularly out of Gwadar if vessels larger than the current maximum of 50,000 DWT (Handymax) 

could use the facility.129 Given the low utilization of the port at present, it is hardly certain that larger 

ships would call even with adequate facilities.

Satellite imagery shows signs of new construction occurring adjacent to the port, with current focus 

on roadways and storage laydown areas. Most observed construction appears to be focused on land 

preparation, roads, piping, and structures of the initial section of the free zone. Substantial land 

reclamation must be completed before work on much of the other infrastructure can even be initiated. 

The land on which planners envision the secondary container terminal, the grain and bulk terminals, 

and the oil terminal, does not yet exist. Continued dredging and deepening of the approach channel 

could provide some of the landfill for such reclamation.130

123 Ibid.

124 Excessive silting in the harbor may be responsible for delays in this planned upgrade.阎新兴, 刘国亭, 蔡嘉熙 [Yan 

Xinxing, Liu Guoting, Cai Jiaxi], 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港泥沙来源及海岸稳定性分析 ["Analysis of Sediment Source and 

Coastal Stability of Gwadar Harbor of Pakistan”], 水道港口[Waterways and Ports] 23, no. 3, 2002; NGA, “Sailing 

Directions (Enroute) Red Sea and Persian Gulf 172”, NGA, 2017, p. 249; Wang, et al. “Research on the Selection of 

Routes for Maritime Transportation,” p. 20.

125 CPEC Authority, “Dredging of Channel and Berthing Areas,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/35 (accessed July 31, 2020). 126 Chinese engineering experts from the CCCC subsidiary CCCC-FHDI Engineering Co., Ltd., which was involved in the 

survey and planning of the port’s construction, reported sedimentation buildup in the harbor and waterway revealed by 

surveys, and said it could prohibit the aspired navigation of fully loaded 50,000-ton ships to the terminal without regular 

maintenance dredging. See Xi Fang, et al., “SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar Port,” p. 2.

127 “Developing Pakistan” (@DevelopmentPk). 2019. Twitter, March 26, 2019, 12:13 p.m. 

https://twitter.com/DevelopmentPk/status/1110575521220517888?s=20.

128 Zhao Lijian 赵立坚 (@zlj517). 2019. Twitter, March 26, 2019, 4:48 a.m. 

https://twitter.com/zlj517/status/1110463636840030208/photo/1.

129 宋笛 [Song Di], 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港自由区启动三家中方公司共同运营 [“Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Free Zone Begins 

Operations - Jointly Operated by Three Chinese Enterprises”] 经济观察网 [The Economic Observer], September 10, 

2016, http://www.ship.sh/news_detail.php?nid=22281. 130 This assessment is based on satellite images of the land to the east of the terminal being filled in with dredging fill. 

Satellite imagery from MAXAR. For details, see 瓜达尔港为巴基斯坦打造区域商贸线路 [“Gwadar Port Creates 

Regional Trade Routes for Pakistan”], 中央广电总台国际在线 [CCTV International Online], February 8, 2019, 

http://news.cri.cn/20190208/90c19e43-6beb-35b2-504e-7097bdf77c37.html; 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港工程 [Pakistan Gwadar 

Port Project], 中交第四航务工程勘察设计院有限公司 [CCCC-FHDI Engineering Co., Ltd.], April 15, 2013, 

https://www.fhdigz.com/project_detail.php?id=79.
23

Competition from Other Ports

Pakistan already has two large ports in a major urban area, relatively well-connected to their 

hinterland, that are also being actively expanded by Chinese firms: Karachi and Port Muhammad Bin 

Qasim (Port Qasim). Virtually all maritime trade in Pakistan goes through Karachi or Qasim, some 

600 km to the east in relatively prosperous Punjab province.131 Commercial data providers still do not 

bother reporting statistics on Gwadar’s throughput, because according to engineers from CCCCFHDI, Gwadar’s cargos account for less than one percent of the roughly 100 million tons of annual 

throughput in Pakistani ports in recent years.132 Yet despite its underutilization to date, the project’s 

backers claim Gwadar will handle a staggering 300 million to 400 million tons annually once all 

phases of construction are complete by 2030.133

Sited in the largest Pakistani city by population, Karachi’s port is the nation’s principle maritime 

trade link. The second most active hub is Port Qasim, which is 35 km east of Karachi city but 

sometimes considered to be a part of the Karachi port complex. Both are linked up with Pakistan’s 

rail and road system on the better developed eastern side of the country. The Gwadar Port Authority

and Chinese engineers promote Gwadar as a response to growing demand and lack of space for 

Karachi’s future expansion, and the geographic disadvantages of Qasim.134

The claim that these established ports cannot expand to meet capacity demand, however, is belied by 

Chinese firms’ active pursuit of expansion at both sites. Chinese firms have recently pursued a 

container terminal expansion at Karachi (beginning 2019)135 and the construction under CPEC of two 

660 mW coal-fired power plants and a coal-berth at Port Qasim (begun 2015, made operational in 

2017 and 2018).136 Bidding for a floating LNG terminal expansion project at Qasim is open and 

attracting international bids.137 Qasim and Karachi are actively under development and evidently still 

present a value proposition for Chinese and other foreign firms.

If Gwadar has any competitive advantages over these established facilities, they lie in the PRC’s 

intimate connections to Pakistan. Its success will depend on the distinctive characteristics of China’s 

strategic strongpoints—particularly the coordinated efforts of the Chinese party-state and business 

enterprises to realize their comprehensive development goals. For Gwadar to thrive, it will depend on 

131 CEIC, “Pakistan Container Port Throughput,” UN Conference on Trade and Development Data, 2008-2018, 

https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/pakistan/container-port-throughput. 132 Zhou Jinghui, et al., “Research on development and layout of Gwadar Port,” p. 126 133 Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 5 134 The Gwadar Port Authority argues that Port Qasim is 40 km inland, thus requiring long transits that are difficult and 

costly for larger vessels. Gwadar Port Authority, “Gwadar Port,” http://www.gwadarport.gov.pk/about%20us.aspx. CCCFHDI engineers also argue that Karachi is limited in its room for expansion because it abuts the city, while Qasim’s 

position further inland on the delta makes “channel maintenance on its long entries a factor restricting the enlargement of 

the port.” Zhou Jinghui, et al. “Research on development and layout of Gwadar Port,” p. 126

135 Hutchison Ports, a major Hong Kong port operator and developer, has operated at Karachi since 2007 and recently 

commenced construction on an expansion of its container terminal to achieve a 3.2 million TEU handling capacity. 

“Hutchison Ports Commences Port Expansion Project in Pakistan with US$240 Million, Bringing Total Investment in the 

Country to US$1 Billion,” Website of Hutchison Ports, October 16, 2019, 

https://hutchisonports.com/en/media/news/hutchison-ports-commences-port-expansion-project-in-pakistan-with-us240-

million-bringing-total-investment-in-the-country-to-us1-billion/; “Chinese company awarded $239mln contract to build 

jetty,” The News, March 16, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/105491-Chinese-company-awarded-239mlncontract-to-build-jetty. 136 CPEC Authority, “2x660MW Coal-Fired Power Plants at Port Qasim Karachi,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/1 (accessed June 11, 2020). 137 “Port Qasim LNG Expansion Project Moves Ahead,” Greenport, February 10, 2020, 

https://www.greenport.com/news101/lng/port-qasim-lng-expansion-project-moves-ahead
24

robust transport networks that link it to markets and resources. Functional road, rail, air, and pipeline 

infrastructure are essential to expanding the hinterland served by the port.

Transport Infrastructure

The promise of a direct commercial connection between the Indian Ocean and Xinjiang province has 

fixated Chinese leaders and analysts—especially as a means of circumventing the much-hyped 

“Malacca Dilemma.”138 But the Balochistan hinterlands are sparsely populated and barely developed, 

making it essential to develop modern transport links to convey goods and natural resources between

the port and more substantial inland markets.

139 Progress in constructing transport infrastructure 

providing connectivity to the port has been halting. Nearby the port, the obstacles to infrastructure 

development include poor power and water supply, difficulty in securing permits and support from 

local government, persistent terrorist attacks on projects and personnel, and difficulty securing 

capital given those risks and continued non-performance of the port itself.140 Further afield, it is the 

engineering challenges that loom large, especially as the terrain climbs the Himalayan plateau in 

Pakistan’s north and east and crosses the Khunjerab Pass in order to connect to PRC rail, road, and 

pipeline networks. 

Work to date has yet to meaningfully connect the port to inland transport networks. Instead, CPEC 

construction has largely focused on “early harvest” projects that prioritize power generation. A 

CPEC “Joint Commission” consisting of government and commercial actors from both sides was 

established in August 2013.141 Its biannual meetings have led to a prioritization on energy generation 

and transmission. Power plants, mostly coal, and related infrastructure have largely been constructed

along the already better-developed central and eastern corridors, rather than the western corridor 

traversing Balochistan.142

Gwadar and its hinterlands have been neglected in favor of the relatively better-off and more 

developed eastern portions of the country, Punjab and Sindh. This prioritization largely reflects 

political goals of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2013-2017), who ran on a platform of ending 

power blackouts (his slogan was “Bright Pakistan”).143 Sharif initiated CPEC with a vision of 

leveraging Chinese firms’ extraordinary capacity in coal power generation. This prioritization of the 

program differs from that of his successor, Imran Khan, who has shown more interest in industrial 

138 张运成 [Zhang Yuncheng], 马六甲海峡与世界石油安全 [“The Malacca Strait and World Oil Security”], 人民日

报 [People’s Daily], December 5, 2003, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/10833/983912.html; Ian Storey, “China’s 

‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 6, no. 8 (April 12, 2006), https://jamestown.org/program/chinasmalacca-dilemma/. 139 Quantitative modeling for port connectivity in Pakistan by Chinese scholars supports the case for Gwadar, arguing that 

it is not far-fetched if it has an adequate hinterland transport system in place that connects it to markets and resources in 

Xinjiang and Central Asia. See 雷艳灵, 刘崇献 [Lei Yanling and Liu Chongxian], 中巴物流通道建设分析 [“Analysis of 

the Construction of the China-Pakistan Logistical Corridor”], 对外经贸 [Foreign Economic Relations and Trade], no. 6 

(2019), pp. 6-10; Naima Saeed and Odd I. Larsen, “Container Terminal Concessions: A Game Theory Application to the 

Case of the Ports of Pakistan.” Maritime Economics and Logistics, vol. 12, no. 3 (2010), pp. 237–62; Ryuichi Shibasaki, 

Satoshi Tanabe, Hironori Kato, and Paul Tae Woo Lee, “Could Gwadar Port in Pakistan Be a New Gateway? A Network 

Simulation Approach in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative.” Sustainability, vol. 11, no. 20 (2019), pp. 1-28. 140 Xi Fang, et al., “SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar,” pp. 2-3. 141 Tang Mengsheng, “One Belt One Road’s Flagship and Benchmark.” 142 For an in-depth analysis of the power projects under CPEC, see Erica Downs, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 

Power Projects: Insights Into Environmental and Debt Sustainability,” Columbia University Center on Global Energy—

China Energy and Climate Research Program,” (October 2019), 

https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/China-Pakistan_CGEP_Report_100219-2.pdf. 143 Erica Downs, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Power Projects,” pp. 13-14.
25

parks than power plants.

144 The following section summarizes the limited progress to date in 

connecting Gwadar to road, rail, air, and pipeline networks.

Road Networks

The most immediate priority for Gwadar’s connectivity is the construction of a road that links the 

port to Pakistan’s highway system. Pakistan’s national highway system also requires upgrades and 

expansion to connect it to Chinese road networks in Xinjiang, and to the wider Central Asian region.

At present, there are only two roads connecting Gwadar to Pakistan’s road network: the Makran 

Coastal Highway (N-10) that runs east toward Karachi and west to the Iranian border, and the 

incomplete M-8 highway, which runs north-east toward Sindh and Punjab. Neither provides 

sufficient land transport capacity or range to support a thriving gateway port at Gwadar.

Figure 4. Official CPEC roadways map145

At present, the only thoroughfare connecting the port to other roads is a 16-foot wide local road lined 

by restaurants, mosques, and food stalls.146 This is not a viable route for trucks serving the port. After 

144 Drazen Jorgic, “Fearing Debt trap, Pakistan Rethinks Chinese ‘Silk Road’ Projects,” Reuters, September 30, 2018, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-silkroad-railway-insight/fearing-debt-trap-pakistan-rethinks-chinese-silk-roadprojects-idUSKCN1MA028. 145 CPEC Authority, “Monographic Study on Transport Planning, 2013-2030,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/1 (accessed August 1, 2020). 146 CPEC Authority, “Gwadar East-Bay Expressway,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/projectdetails/32 (accessed May 4, 2020).
26

land reclamation and construction along Gwadar’s east bay (currently underway), this route will be 

replaced by a 6-lane expressway. The planned “East-Bay Expressway” is intended to connect the port 

area to the M-8 highway and N-10 arteries that connect Gwadar to the rest of the country. The CCCC

broke ground on this project in November 2017,147 and landfill on the east side of the peninsula can 

be seen on satellite imagery. The project has been repeatedly paused, however, and may be forced to 

reroute due to protests by local fishermen whose livelihoods will be upset by the highway cutting off 

access to their fishing pier.

148 Completion of an expressway that will circumvent that route is now 

projected for October 2020. 

Gwadar is thus in the process of being connected to Pakistan’s highway system. However, for 

Pakistan’s highways to provide a “corridor” connecting the port to western China, substantial road 

works are required elsewhere in the country. In particular, the linchpin of the China-Pakistan 

overland connection is the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in the northeast of the country. It long 

predates CPEC and is sometimes referred to as the “China-Pakistan Friendship Highway,” because it 

was jointly constructed and is the only road link between the two countries. Construction began in 

1959, and Chinese engineers and workers were instrumental throughout the 27 years it took to build 

this “Eighth Wonder of the World,” so dubbed because it traverses some of the most treacherous 

terrain on the planet (and reportedly cost the lives of 800 workers).

149

The KKH runs 1,300 km, from Hasan Abdal in Punjab province and passes through Gilgit-Baltistan 

before traversing the highest mountain pass in the world (the Khunjerab Pass, over 4,500 meters

elevation) and terminating in Xinjiang. It is another 420 km along China National Highway 314 to 

the first Chinese city, Kashgar. The mountainous sections of the route are only passable several 

months a year, depending on conditions, and major landslides, avalanches, and earthquakes often 

render it impassable even during the warm season.150 Since an MOU was signed between the two 

governments in 2008, Chinese firms funded by China Export-Import Bank loans have been working 

to expand the road from 10 to 30m in width to triple its transport capacity.151 But natural disasters 

have limited progress to date. A landslide in the Hunza Valley in January 2010 created a massive 

lake covering more than 20km of the road. After several years of trying to repair the road, the CBRC 

147 CPEC Authority, “Gwadar East-Bay Expressway,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/projectdetails/32 (accessed June 7, 2020). 148 “CPEC and Gwadar Fishermen,” Daily Times, March 18, 2019, https://dailytimes.com.pk/366412/cpec-and-gwadarfishermen/. 149 “Tribute Paid to Chinese, Pakistanis Who Died During KKH Construction,” Pakistani Dawn, April 7, 2019, 

https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=07_04_2019_007_001. MFA estimates that 140 of these were 

Chinese workers. “Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the 

Senate of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 23, 2013, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/lkqipsg_665690/t1043526.shtml. 150 The site of the road in the world’s highest mountain range forces construction to contend with “very high geodynamic 

activity.” The “KKH has been subject to damage and disruption by rockfall, sliding of rock and debris, debris flow, 

mudflow, dry powder flow, flash flooding by water and torrent gravels, basement undermining by abstraction, subsidence 

and frost heaving. The road surface is regularly damaged by rockfall impact, floods and frost shattering.” Edward 

Derbyshire, Monique Fort, and Lewis A. Owen, “Geomorphological Hazards along the Karakoram Highway: Khunjerab 

Pass to the Gilgit River, Northernmost Pakistan,” Erkunde, vol. 55, no. 1 (2001), pp. 49-71. 151 China Aid Data, “Loan for upgrading of Karakoram Highway, Pakistan (CPEC),” Project ID 35739, 

https://china.aiddata.org/projects/35739. Though many Chinese analysts describe KKH as though it were already a fully 

functional commercial roadway, better informed scholars recognize the need for significant capacity and quality upgrades. 

See, for example, Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic Concept of Selecting Points for China’s Access to the Indian Ocean in 

the South Asia Region,” p. 14; 陈小萍 [Chen Xiaoping], 中巴贸易能源通道构想与前景 [“Concept and Prospect of a 

Sino-Pakistani Trade and Energy Corridor”], 南亚研究季刊 [South Asian Studies Quarterly], no. 136 (2009), pp. 80-86.
27

opted to reroute it in 2012 and completed a new road and series of tunnels circumnavigating the lake 

in September 2015.152 Plans to re-establish the original route have been permanently shelved.153

Elements of the KKH have been upgraded, with a spur from Thakot to Havelian in Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa province “substantially completed” by CCCC in March 2020. Another spur running 

136 km from Thakot to Raikot in Gilgit Baltistan is still undergoing a “feasibility study for 

realignment,” reflecting both engineering and bureaucratic challenges facing this high mountain 

route.154 Pakistani planners claim they are searching for “financially viable road projects and schemes 

in less developed areas,” including “the western route of CPEC [to Balochistan and Gwadar],” but 

allocation of funding still skews towards the more developed east of the country.155

Despite slow progress in road construction, China’s third largest truck manufacturer, state-owned 

China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk), signed a strategic cooperation 

framework agreement with COPHC and Gwadar’s port authority in August 2017.156 Heavy trucking 

industries will be critical to ongoing construction and transport, particularly in the absence of railway 

links to the port at Gwadar. 

Railroad Networks

Gwadar is not yet connected to Pakistan’s rail networks. Technical studies on Gwadar’s viability as a 

port hinge on successful development of links to inland railroads, which are concentrated in the east 

of the country.157 China, which has laid more domestic high-speed rail line than any other nation in 

history, has a direct interest in improved rail systems,158 since the continental portion of its Belt and 

Road Initiative hinges on extensive rail connectivity throughout Eurasia.159 The rail network in 

Xinjiang is comparatively well-developed and could easily facilitate access to the wider Chinese 

market once rail connectivity to the port of Gwadar is completed.160

152 Asghar Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, “KKH Realighnment: 94% work on the project completed so far, remaining to be 

completed by Sep. 25 this year: Pamir Times, June 27, 2015, https://pamirtimes.net/2015/06/27/kkh-re-alignment-94-

work-on-the-project-completed-so-far-remaining-to-be-completed-by-sep-25-this-year/. 153 Irfan Haider, “PM Nawaz Inaugurates Pak-China Friendship Tunnels Over Attabad Lake,” Dawn, September 14, 2015, 

https://www.dawn.com/news/1206911. 154 CPEC Authority, “KKH Thakot-Raikot N35 Remaining Portion,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/71 (accessed June 7, 2020). 155 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Annual Plan 2019-2020,” Ministry of Planning, Development, and 

Reform (2020), https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/annualplan/AnnualPlan2019-20.pdf, pp. 156-158.

156 中国重汽集团与中国港控公司、巴基斯坦瓜达尔港务局正式签署战略合作框架协议 [“China National Heavy 

Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. Officially Signs Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement with COPHCL and Pakistan’s 

Gwadar Port Authority”], 中国重汽集团 [China National Heavy Duty Truck Group], August 14, 2017, 

http://www.cnhtc.com.cn/view/NewsDetailPic.aspx?id=394. 157 Lei Yanling et al, “Analysis of the Construction of the China-Pakistan Logistical Corridor”; Naima Saeed and Odd I. 

Larsen, “Container Terminal Concessions: A Game Theory Application to the Case of the Ports of Pakistan”; Shibasaki, et 

al. “Could Gwadar Port in Pakistan Be a New Gateway?”

158 “Fact Sheet: High Speed Rail Development Worldwide,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, July 19, 2018, 

https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide; “China Has Built the World’s 

Largest Bullet-train Network,” The Economist, January 13, 2017, https://www.economist.com/china/2017/01/13/chinahas-built-the-worlds-largest-bullet-train-network.

159 铁路助力“一带一路”建设 [“Railways Help the Construction of the Belt and Road”], PRC Ministry of Commerce, 

May 25, 2015, http://cafiec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjipeixun/201505/20150500983191.shtml. 160 In May 2020, tracklaying began to complete a high-speed railway loop circling the Taklimakan desert. “Tracklaying 

starts on southern Xinjiang rail links,” Railway Gazette International, May 21, 2020, 

https://www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/tracklaying-starts-on-southern-xinjiang-rail-link/56562.article.
28

Figure 5. CPEC official railway plan161

161 CPEC Authority, “Railways Network of CPEC,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/2

(accessed June 7, 2020).
29

However, Pakistan’s existing railroad network requires substantial investment since it lacks the 

capacity to meet current commercial demand.162 As is the case for most other infrastructure, 

Balochistan is worse off than the rest of the country.163 Nonetheless, Gwadar’s rail connectivity has 

not yet been a priority for Chinese and Pakistani planners. Current CPEC plans prioritize 

improvements to Pakistan’s existing rail network—including at Port Qasim—and postpone plans for 

new rail lines to connect Gwadar to the “middle and long term.”164 Pakistani Railway Ministry 

officials evidently do not view the costs of connecting Gwadar as worth the expected benefits—

especially not weighed against other priorities.165

For some Pakistani transport analysts, if the goal is to link Gwadar to Central Asian and Chinese 

markets, then the port is more likely to be integrated into Iranian rail network to the west.166 The 

relative efficiency of the Iranian rail system provides one argument for continuing to delay any major 

investment in rail in Balochistan.

167 Sanctions on Iran have made this option unattractive, but this 

disincentive is not necessarily permanent. As China and Iran explore a more substantial bilateral 

relationship, the prospect of circumventing western Pakistan to access Central Asia through Iran may 

prove more appealing.168 India’s existing port project at Chabahar and fraying Sino-Indian ties, 

however, will make Chinese inroads into Iran’s transport networks more challenging.169

162 Dr. Muhammad Asim and Imtiaz Qanita, “International Review of Management and Business Research Pakistan 

Railways at the Verge of Collapse: A Case Study.” International Review of Management and Business Research, vol. 3, 

(September 2014), pp. 2306-9007; Sohail Rahsid, “55% of Pakistan’s Rail Tracks Are More Than 100 Years Old,” Samaa, 

March 19, 2019, https://www.samaa.tv/news/2019/03/55-of-pakistans-rail-tracks-are-more-than-a-100-years-old-report/; 

The official CPEC site calls for “capacity development” and has established “focus groups...for capacity enhancement.” 

CPEC Authority, “Progress Update,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update (accessed 

August 1, 2019).

163 Planning & Development Department, Government of Balochistan, “Infrastructure Development in Balochistan,” 

World Bank Public Sector Development Programme, 2003-2004, 

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/Pakistan-Development-Forum2004/RDPBalochistan.pdf; Fahad Naveed, “Train to Balochistan,” Pakistani Dawn, October 8, 2016, 

https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153377. 164 Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, “Annual Plan 2019-2020,” p. 156. 165 Chief Executive of Pakistan Railways, Aftab Akbar, testified to a Senate Sub Committee on Railways that Gwadar rail 

links (to Mastung and Besima to Jacobadad) are not planned until 2025, largely because the cost is prohibitive. Amin 

Yusufzai, “Rail Connectivity of Gwadar With Other Parts of Pakistan Not a Priority: Officials,” Propakistani, April 6, 

2019, https://propakistani.pk/2019/04/06/rail-connectivity-of-gwadar-with-other-parts-of-pakistan-not-a-priority-officials/. 166 “Iran ‘Ready to connect Gwadar to Chabahar Port,’” The Express Tribune, May 24, 2019, 

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1979802/3-iran-ready-connect-gwadar-chabahar-port/; “Iran After Connecting Chabahar to 

Pakistan’s Gwadar,” Fars News Agency, May 24, 2019, https://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13980303000457. 167 There have been discussions by Chinese and Indian sources about linking Gwadar to Chabahar, the nearby Iranian port 

developed by India. 伊朗查巴哈尔港比中国援建的巴基斯坦瓜达尔港更具发展优势 [“Iran’s Chabahar Port is More 

Advantageous Than the Chinese-built Gwadar Port in Pakistan”], 驻巴基斯坦使馆经商处 [Economic and Commercial 

Office of the PRC Embassy in Pakistan], March 24, 2008,

http://pk.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200803/20080305443938.html; Sudha Ramachandran, “India Doubles Down on 

Chabahar Gambit,” The Diplomat, January 14, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/india-doubles-down-on-chabahargambit/. 168 Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership,” New York 

Times, July 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html; Shahram 

Akbarzadeh and Mahmoud Pargoo, “Iran-China deal raises more questions than answers,” Middle East Institute, July 27, 

2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-china-deal-raises-more-questions-answers. 169 There has been Indian interest in the commercial port at Chabahar since roughly 2003. In 2016 the countries agreed to 

upgrade the port and into rail lines connecting Chabahar to Iran and Central Asia. In 2020, in the wake of the announced 

“China-Iran deal,” the status of the Indian project at Chabahar wsd called into doubt. See Maya Mirchandani, “On 

Chabahar, India Must Recover Lost Ground With Iran Quickly,” NDTV, July 18, 2020.
30

Some Chinese scholars believe that if Pakistan could connect directly into China’s advanced logistics 

networks it could readily “turn Gwadar into China’s exit to the sea.”170 These and other hopeful 

suggestions neglect to consider the engineering and security challenges posed by building rail lines 

across mountainous and insecure terrain of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan.

171 A ChinaPakistan joint railroad group met in summer 2017 to develop these plans, but no progress is visible.

At present there is little realistic prospect of laying down rail connecting China and Pakistan.172

Remarkably, a former senior diplomat at the PRC Embassy in Islamabad pointed out that “a ChinaPakistan railway must always lose money” because of the relative cheapness of maritime shipping 

and the prohibitive expense of building and maintaining rail infrastructure.173

Air Transport

Gwadar’s viability as an international transport and trading hub requires air transport. Beginning in 

2019, Chinese firms began constructing a “New Gwadar International Airport” to replace the small 

facility currently serving Gwadar. This new project is managed by China Airport Construction 

Group, directly subordinate to the Civil Aviation Administration of China, a branch of the PRC 

Ministry of Transport. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co., Ltd. and China Railway Beijing 

Engineering Group Co., Ltd. are contracted to construct the airport. 174

Although the Chinese government converted the original $230 million loan to a grant in 2015,175 it 

took four years before construction began at a site 26 km east of Gwadar out in the desert in an area 

known as Goran Dani.176 A groundbreaking ceremony was held in March 2019 with Pakistan’s 

President Imran Khan in attendance.177 It is designed to be Pakistan’s second largest airport covering 

18 square kilometers (6.9 square miles) with a runway more than 12,000 feet (3,658 meters) long—

capable of handling the largest civilian and military aircraft.178

170 Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic Concept of Selecting Points,” p. 34 171 See, for example, Liu Xiaotong, Zhang Kai, Chen Bokui, Zhou Jun, and Miao Lixin, “Analysis of Logistics Service 

Supply Chain for the One Belt and One Road Initiative of China.” Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 

Transportation Review, no. 117 (2018), pp. 23–39; Shibasaki, et al. “Could Gwadar Port in Pakistan Be a New Gateway?” 172 Fawad Yousafzai, “3 Railway Projects Included in CPEC: Saad,” The Nation, January 6, 2017, 

https://nation.com.pk/06-Jan-2017/3-railway-projects-included-in-cpec-saad

173 毛四维 [Mao Siwei], 认识中巴经济走廊的三大错误 [“Three Big Mistakes in Understanding the CPEC”], 财新博客

[Caixin Blog], Dec. 15, 2016, http://maosiwei.blog.caixin.com/archives/156135. The low priority for developing rail to 

and from Gwadar may also reflect the priorities of the Imran Khan government, which since taking office in 2018 has 

downgraded the priority of railway construction under CPEC. Press Trust of India, “Significant Shift in CPEC Projects: 

Report,” The Business Standard, October 22, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/pak-pmimran-khan-wants-significant-shift-in-cpec-projects-report-118102201102_1.html.

174 连线巴基斯坦 – 帮 “巴铁” 建机场,我参与了最大无偿援外工程 [“Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan Build 

an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project”], 中国民航网 [Civil Aviation Administration of China 

News], May 8, 2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/393879179_263678; Also see the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s 

(中国民用航空局) main website under “directly subordinate agencies” (直属机构), http://www.caac.gov.cn/website/old/, 

(accessed May 18, 2020).

175 “China Converts $230m Loan for Gwadar Airport into Grant,” The News, September 23, 2015, 

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/14833-china-converts-230m-loan-for-gwadar-airport-into-grant

176 中巴经济走廊重点项目瓜达尔新国际机场启动奠基 [“New Gwadar International Airport Kicks Off, Key Project for 

the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 观察者 [Observer], March 31, 2019, 

http://www.guancha.cn/internation/2019_03_31_495735.shtml. 177“Pakistan breaks ground for China-funded New Gwadar International Airport,” Xinhua, March 30, 2019, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/30/c_137935903.htm. 178 Chinese reporting states the airport will be capable of handling the world’s largest passenger aircraft, the Airbus A380. 

巴基斯坦新瓜达尔国际机场举行奠基仪式 [“Pakistan’s New Gwadar International Airport Holds Groundbreaking 
31

Image 4. Chinese staff working on the New Gwadar International Airport179

Security and virus containment measures are recent challenges for the airport construction site that 

reveal aspects of its development. In May 2020, the head of the Chinese project management group 

visited the site in a convoy of military and police vehicles. He said the site resembled a military 

facility due to the large presence of military personnel, bunkers, concrete roadblocks, sandbags for 

blast proofing, and watch towers. No medical facilities capable of handling the spread of COVID-19 

exist. The virus situation has also slowed shipments of construction supplies from Karachi from 

weekly to monthly. That the supplies come from Karachi strongly confirms that the nearby port of 

Gwadar remains ill-suited to meet even local needs.180 

Ceremony”], 新华网 [Xinhua], March 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-03/30/c_1124303511.htm; 连线

巴基斯坦 – 帮 “巴铁” 建机场,我参与了最大无偿援外工程 [“Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan Build an 

Airport, China Participates in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project”], 中国民航网 [China Civil Aviation Web], May 8, 

2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/393879179_263678; “Construction of New Gwadar International Airport Enters Its Second 

Phase,” The News, May 17, 2020, http://cpecinfo.com/construction-of-new-gwadar-international-airport-enters-its-secondphase/. 179 Plans for the airport include a 150,000 sq. ft. terminal building, support facilities (warehouses, offices, etc.), air space 

control facilities, public use infrastructure (water, electricity, etc.), and an adjacent hospital, school, and residence facility. 

See “Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan Build an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project.” 180 Ibid. While worker temperatures are tested twice daily and precautionary measures are in place, the restriction on their 

movement in and out of the work site has seen a reduction in the 200 Pakistani workers, thereby impacting the project’s 

progress.
32

Once the new airport is operational it will provide a ready connection to China without the manifold 

challenges posed by ground transportation. The PRC central government intends to develop 

Xinjiang’s aviation sector and its role as a hub for Central and South Asia.181 Chinese analysts 

promote an “Aviation Silk Road” and claim that “by building up and expanding airports and aviation 

operations in Pakistan’s major cities and along its coast, China can open up an air corridor to the 

Indian Ocean.”182 Air transport may augment the commercialization of the port, but its low capacity 

and high cost make aviation an unlikely commercial savior.

183 It could, however, enable military 

logistics that would have otherwise been impossible.

Oil and Gas Infrastructure

For nearly 15 years, China and Pakistan have made announcements of ambitious plans for oil and gas 

infrastructure development at Gwadar as detailed below, but to date no oil or gas terminals, 

refineries, or pipelines have been built.

• In 2006 Hu Jintao visited with a delegation that signed an MOU for a $12.5 billion Chinese 

petrochemical terminal at Gwadar.184

• In 2015, China Pipeline Petroleum Bureau (a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum 

Corporation, one of the three major Chinese national oil companies) agreed to build a 42-inch

diameter pipeline with two compressor stations to handle some 500 million cubic feet per day 

from the planned terminal at Gwadar.185 The projected cost of $1.6 billion of both pipeline 

and LNG terminal would bring the line as far as Nawabshah to connect with other Pakistani 

pipelines; an additional spur to Lahore is planned for another $2 billion.186 These projects 

have not yet been approved by Pakistan’s Ministry of Petroleum and Resources.187

• In 2018, a planned LNG terminal on the north side of the bay was originally due to be 

completed, but work on the project was delayed when Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning sought 

to lease an FSRU rather than purchasing one outright, as a cost saving measure.188

181 铁路公路航空三路并进 新疆构建 “立体丝路” 大通道 [“Three Ways of Rail, Road, and Air Advancing Together as 

Xinjiang Build a ‘Three-Dimensional Silk Road’ Grand Corridor”], 国务院新闻办公室网站 [State Council Information 

Office], December 21, 2015, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31208/Document/1459644/1459644.htm.

182 周恒 [Zhou Heng], “航空丝路” 重点国家筛选和应对策略 [“Strategies for Choosing and Approaching Key Countries 

for the ‘Aviation Silk Road’”], 中国军转民 [Defence Industry Conversion in China], no. 6 (2017), p. 69.

183 Liu Xiaotong, Zhang Kai, Chen Bokui, Zhou Jun, and Miao Lixin, “Analysis of Logistics Service Supply Chain for the 

One Belt and One Road Initiative of China,” Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, no. 

117 (2018), pp. 23–39. 184 “PSA Bags Gwadar Rights”, Seatrade Maritime News, December 13, 2006, https://www.seatrademaritime.com/asia/psa-bags-gwadar-rights. 185 The framework MOU was signed when Xi visited in 2015. Saeed Shah, “China to Build Pipeline from Iran to 

Pakistan,” The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-build-pipeline-from-iran-topakistan-1428515277; “Pak China In Talks to Have an LNG Terminal at Gwadar,” Pak-China News, September 6, 2016, 

http://pakchinanews.pk/pak-china-in-talks-on-lng-terminal-in-gwadar/; Khalid Mustafa, “China Wants End to Delay in 

LNG Project,” The News, February 20, ,2017, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/187582-China-wants-end-to-delay-inLNG-project. 186 “Gwadar-Nawabshah Pipeline, LNG Terminals: All Projects Will be Completed On Time, Says Official,” Tribune, 

May 12, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1101858/gwadar-nawabshah-pipeline-lng-terminals-all-projects-will-becompleted-on-time-says-official. 187 Fawad Yousafzai, “Construction Mode of Gwadar LNG Terminal Changed from BOOT to APC,” The Nation, January 

30, 2017, https://nation.com.pk/30-Jan-2017/construction-mode-of-gwadar-lng-terminal-changed-from-boot-to-apc. 188 While the Planning Commission has opposed the leasing option of an LNG terminal at Gwadar, preferring an outright 

purchase of the facility for Rs41 billion, the Central Development Working Party (CDWP) led by Planning and 

Development Minister Ahsan Iqbal has set aside the commission’s objections, giving the petroleum ministry a go-ahead 
33

• In 2019, CNPC reportedly considered building an 80km spur connecting Gwadar to the 

Iranian border, but persistent sanctions on Iran have prevented development.

189

In early 2019, Saudi Arabia stepped in to offer financing and construction for oil facilities near 

Gwadar that may displace the long-stalled Chinese project.190 After a trip to Pakistan by Saudi crown 

prince Mohammad Bin Salman, the Saudis pledged $10 billion to build a petrochemical refinery 

complex in the north bay at Gwadar.191 Chinese firms initially appeared concerned about this Saudi 

interest.

192 Increasingly, they express cautious optimism about possible Sino-Saudi cooperation to

help Pakistan’s troubled fiscal situation.193 Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE have pledged financing 

to keep Pakistan on track in servicing its current IMF bailout loan, providing some evidence of 

coordinated Chinese and Saudi support for their struggling partner.194 More recent reports, however,

deal another blow to hopes of developing Gwadar. The Saudis announced they may move the 

location of their refinery from Gwadar, where there are no other oil and gas facilities, to Hub, a city 

near Karachi.195

Chinese analysts may be coming to terms with the commercial futility of developing Gwadar into a 

petrochemical processing hub. The urgency to do so may be diminished, as oil and gas are now piped 

from Kyaukphyu, Myanmar to Yunnan province in southwestern China, providing one direct link to 

the Indian Ocean (and the subject of a forthcoming case study in this series). Further, the feasibility 

and desirability of a Pakistan energy corridor is in doubt. A researcher from the PRC Ministry of 

Commerce recently disparaged the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” as a “pseudo-concept,” in part due 

to varied needs China would face if there was actually a concerted effort to interdict China’s 

maritime energy shipments. Wartime oil demand could be curtailed, and reserves and existing 

overland routes could be tapped in the short term.196 In peacetime, the cost of constructing pipelines 

and refineries compared to building and operating crude oil carriers makes the maritime route 

significantly cheaper and higher capacity, even given the greater distance.197 This research report 

for leasing the Floating Storage and Re-gasification Unit (FSRU) for 25 years at an estimated cost of $120,000 per day. 

Khaleeq Kiani, “Planning Commission opposes LNG terminal leasing at Gwadar,” Dawn, March 24, 2017, 

https://www.dawn.com/news/1322510. 189 Zafar Iqbal, “Pakistan’s hopes for an energy pipeline with Iran evaporate,” Asia Times, July 1, 2019, 

https://asiatimes.com/2019/07/pakistans-hopes-for-an-energy-pipeline-with-iran-evaporate/. 190 Ismail Dilawar and Kamran Haider, “Saudi Prince Starts Asia Trip Pledging $20 Billion for Pakistan,” Bloomberg, 

February 17, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-17/saudi-crown-prince-arrives-in-pakistan-to-signinvestment-deals. 191 “Land Allocation in Process For $10b Saudi Aramco Refinery in Gwadar,” Arab News Pakistan, March 2, 2020, 

https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1629231/pakistan.

192 沙特在瓜达尔兴建最大炼油厂,中资利益恐受损? 说好“巴铁”呢 [“Saudi Arabia Constructing Largest Refinery in 

Gwadar, Do Chinese-funded Interests Fear Losses? What about Pakistan”] 金十数据 [Gold Ten Data], January 28, 2019, 

http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/E6K93IE80519EO06.html; 沙特加入中巴经济走廊 中国再平衡巴基斯坦瓜达尔深

水港利益格局 [“Saudi Arabia Joins the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China Rebalances Interests in the Pakistan 

Deepwater Port of Gwadar”], 第一黄金网 [First Gold Net], February 25, 2019, http://www.dyhjw.com/gold/20190225-

30592.html. 193 Saeed Sha and Benoit Faucon, “Pakistan Pursues Saudis in Bid to Avoid More China Debt,” Wall Street Journal, 

September 30, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-pursues-saudi-role-in-chinas-infrastructure-program1538330703. 194 International Monetary Fund, “First Review Under the Extended Arrangement,” p. 17. 195 Khalid Mustafa, “S Arabia May Install Refinery, Petrochemical Complex in Hub,” The International News, March 2, 

2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/622614-s-arabia-may-install-refinery-petrochemical-complex-in-hub. 196 Mei Xinyu, “Gwadar Port and China’s Energy Imports.” 197 The pipelines would need to pass through altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 meters, with corresponding requirements for heat, 

power, and insulation. 
34

estimated that the overland transport costs would be 42 percent of the selling price of the oil, 

compared to less than 2.5 percent of the price of oil transported by sea.198 While some Chinese 

academics unaccountably predict that some 60% of China’s energy needs could be supplied via 

pipeline from the Indian Ocean,

199 Chinese officials do not consider this remotely realistic.200

Technical analyses of the viability of overland pipelines to supply Chinese energy demand make note 

of the capacity limitations inherent in pipelines. Pipelines have a maximum throughput that cannot be 

scaled up like seaborne transport. Logistics experts at Dalian Maritime University have analyzed the 

cost and reliability of the overall logistical chain, modeling a series of scenarios predicated on 

different assumptions about risks to different maritime and land channels. They find that the highest 

utilization scenario for Gwadar would provide only six percent of China’s oil imports.

201 These 

analysts also note the many other seaborne passages for oil and gas, including from the Americas, 

Africa, and the Arctic, that could further mitigate the “dilemma” and obviate the need for costly, 

risky overland routes.202 Other analysts assess the overland security risks (e,g., from terrorism and 

natural disasters) are both more acute and more likely than those affecting the maritime route.203

Power Priorities

The slow pace of linking Gwadar with transport infrastructure is partly a result of those projects 

being crowded out by a higher Pakistani priority: power. The majority of the projects listed formally 

as “CPEC” concern power generation, mostly in the form of coal fired power plants.204 Power 

shortages are the norm in Pakistan, especially in Gwadar, where severe outages—as long as 20 hours 

per day—are not unusual. Since 1999, all of Gwadar’s electricity has been imported from Iran.205

There is great demand for stable power that must be met before any more ambitious development can 

be carried out.

Power generation is thus among the key Chinese projects around Gwadar. The CCCC began 

constructing a $542 million 300mW coal-fired power plant 40 km east of Gwadar on November 4, 

2019. Ning Jizhe, the deputy director of China’s lead economic planning group, the National 

Development and Reform Commission, attended the groundbreaking ceremony to emphasize China’s 

leadership’s focus on projects in line with Pakistani demands.

206 Pakistan’s Ministry of Water and 

198 Mei Xinyu, “Gwadar Port and China’s Energy Imports.”

199 李希光, 孙力舟 [Li Xiguang and Sun Lizhou], 中巴经济走廊战略价值与安全形势 [“Strategic Value and Security 

Situation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 观察者 [Observer], April 20, 2015, 

https://www.guancha.cn/LiXiGuang/2015_04_20_316607.shtml.

200 毛四维 [Mao Siwei], 中巴经济走廊到底有多重要 [“How Important is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 观察

者 [Observer], July 24, 2015, https://www.guancha.cn/MaoSiWei/2015_07_24_328017.shtml.

201 Wang Shuang, et al. “Research on the Selection of Routes for Maritime Transportation,” p. 20 202 Ibid., p. 19-21 203 Li Jingyu, et al, “The Strategic Concept of Selecting Points,” pp. 34-36; Tushar Mohanty, “Balochistan: Running out of 

Gas,” South Asia Intelligence Review, vol. 56, no. 9. (2011) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair9/9_46.htm; 

Renmin/Caijing report, pp. 12-18. 204 CPEC Authority, “CPEC Energy Projects,” China Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update

(accessed June 7, 2020). 205 Iran provides power to the Gwadar, Ketch and Panjgur districts of Makran division of Balochistan. From 1999 to 2013, 

it provided 35 megawatts per day; beginning in 2013, this increased to 100 megawatts, but has been unreliable. See

Naimat Khan, “Parts Of Balochistan Plunged Into Darkness As Iran Cuts Off Power Supply,” Arab News, July 16, 2018, 

https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1339891/pakistan.

206 宁吉喆出席瓜达尔中国企业项目奠基仪式 [“Ning Jizhe attended groundbreaking ceremony of Chinese enterprise’s 

Gwadar project”], China Communications Construction Corp., Ltd., November 11, 2019, 

http://www.ccccltd.cn/news/gsyw/201911/t20191111_98243.html.
35

Infrastructure took a long time approving the project in part because the local Baloch government 

claimed that 14mW is sufficient for local purposes and the resources would be better spent 

elsewhere. The Balochistan Environmental Protection Agency also took several years to authorize 

the plant’s construction.

207 Despite these delays, Dongfang Electric Corporation reportedly won the 

bid to supply two 150mW steam turbine generators for this project in late March 2020.208 With this 

large-scale equipment on the way, Gwadar may have ample electricity in the near future.209

Overall Assessment of Transport Infrastructure

While Chinese officials and scholars routinely discuss the prospective transport corridor as though it 

were operational, very little modern infrastructure has been built beyond a few roads and the port

itself. This is not atypical of Chinese investment abroad, which is marked by leadership summits with 

memorandums of understanding signed, repeated announcements of the same projects, followed by 

halting progress.210 Chinese engineers familiar with the project acknowledge “at present, the 

hinterland of the port is limited to the neighboring areas.” 211 The lack of high capacity transport 

infrastructure greatly limits the potential for Gwadar’s commercial development. The Balochistan

hinterland is insufficient to realize the grand regional ambitions for Gwadar. However, the long-term 

nature of China’s interest in Pakistan’s development cautions against ruling out the eventual 

development of a viable transport network. Such connectivity is vital to both of Beijing’s central 

aims, to create an “exit to the sea” and to develop Pakistan—and through that development, to 

promote security and stability in China’s western provinces and near abroad. 

Inland Markets & Resources

The resources and markets of Pakistan (and of its neighbors) provide China with linked economic 

and security incentives to remain invested in the Gwadar project. The CPEC program, of which 

Gwadar is a key instrumentality, is the main vehicle for Chinese commercial activity in Pakistan. To 

date, however, that “flagship” initiative has largely focused on power projects without developing the 

transport infrastructure that would enable Gwadar to drive broad-based economic development. This 

section briefly summarizes the markets and resources that the port and its transport infrastructure 

may unlock, exploring Chinese projects inland as well as more recent efforts to trade with landlocked 

Afghanistan. 

Pakistan’s Limited Commercial Appeal 

The Chinese aim to develop Gwadar and its hinterland transport network targets some significant 

economic opportunities. Pakistan’s 233 million people make it the world’s fifth most populous 

207 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail”; CPEC Authority, “300MW Imported Coal Based Power Project at Gwadar, 

Pakistan,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/5 (accessed July 31, 2020).

208 东方电机中标巴基斯坦瓜达尔港 2x150MW 汽轮电机项目 [“Dongfang Electric won the bid for 2x150mW steam 

turbine motor project in Gwadar Port, Pakistan”], 东方电机网站 [Dongfang Electric Website], March 31, 2020, 

http://www.dongfang.com/data/v/202003/8518.html

209 Other power generation projects at Gwadar are also under consideration. Chinese scientists from the PLA University of 

Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Dalian Naval Academy, and the State Oceanic 

Administration have also been exploring the wind energy potential around Gwadar, finding it “stable year round” based on 

a multi-year study. See 郑崇伟 [Zheng Chongwei], et al., 巴基斯坦瓜达尔港的风能资源评估 [“Analysis of Pakistan’s 

Gwadar Port Wind Energy Capability”], 厦门大学学报 [Journal of Xiamen University], vol. 55, no. 2 (2016) pp. 210–15.

210 According to a RAND study, only 6 percent of a pledged $66 billion in Chinese outward foreign direct investment 

came through in the period 2001-2011. See Charles Wolf, Jr., Xiao Wang and Eric Warner (eds.), China's Foreign Aid and 

Government-Sponsored Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations and Implications (Santa Monica: CA: RAND, 

2013), pp. 37-38. 211 Xi Fang, et al, “SWOT Analysis and Development Measures for Gwadar,” p. 2.
36

nation.

212 This vast human potential is one of the reasons for China’s largesse in Pakistan, and 

informs the business case for investment in power and transport infrastructure. PRC Ministry of 

Commerce analysts believe that with “early harvest” projects for power generation and transmission

intact, China can help Pakistan to “build a complete industrial sector through international capacity 

cooperation and the construction of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones.”213 That is, 

China will export its goods and industrial capacity to Pakistani markets once the country has 

sufficient infrastructure. This is a heroic aim, and despite the enthusiasm of Chinese promoters, is 

privately not considered a high-probability outcome by more sober-minded analysts.214

Pakistan is beset by major problems hindering economic progress. Although its GDP grew at an 

annual rate of roughly 5 percent for the period 2013-2018,

215 Pakistan suffers from chronic 

macroeconomic instability. In mid-2019, Pakistan received its thirteenth IMF bailout in the last thirty 

years, 216 this one a $6 billion loan to deal with a persistent balance of payments crisis.217 China’s 

CPEC investment evidently has not improved Pakistan’s macroeconomic health.218 Although 

Pakistan is the target of growing Chinese investment, Sino-Pakistani bilateral trade remains “tiny and 

weak,”219 actually contracting from 2017 to 2018.220

Poor past performance notwithstanding, Pakistan’s young demography and low levels of 

urbanization present some attractive growth opportunities.

221 In light of China’s growing labor costs 

and export tariff burdens to key markets, Pakistan is also attractive as an investment destination 

212 “South Asia: Pakistan,” CIA World Factbook (July 2020 estimate) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pk.html.

213 卢伟, 申兵[Lu Wei and Shen Bing], 从中长期看中巴经济走廊建设的关键问题 [“Looking at the Key Issues in the 

Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 中国发展观察杂志社 [China Development Survey Magazine], 

June 7, 2017, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0607/c83853-29323649.html. 214 Authors’ discussions with Chinese economic analysts and country specialists, Beijing and Hong Kong, June 2019. 215 The World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %)—Pakistan,” World Bank DataBank, accessed June 10, 2020. 216 Sophia Saifi and James Griffiths, “Pakistan Agrees to 13th Bailout in 30 years from the IMF,” CNN International, May 

13, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/13/asia/pakistan-khan-imf-intl/index.html. 217 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on Economic Policies with Pakistan for a ThreeYear Extended Fund Facility,” IMF Press Release, No. 19/157, May 12, 2019, 

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/05/12/pr19157-IMF-Reaches-Staff-Level-Agreement-on-Economic-Policieswith-Pakistan-for-a-Three-Year-EFF. 218 Debt to China is among the many economic burdens cited by the IMF, which notes that 25 percent of outstanding 

public debt and nearly 40 percent of the debt that will come due during the period of the 2019 IMF “Extended Fund 

Facility” is owed to the PRC. See International Monetary Fund, “First Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under 

the Extended Fund Facility and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria,” IMF Country Report, no. 19/380, 

December 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/12/20/Pakistan-First-Review-Under-the-ExtendedArrangement-Under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-and-48899, pp. 28-34. 219 Ye Hailing, "China-Pakistan Relationship: All-Weather, But Maybe Not All-Dimensional," in Kristina Zetterlund (ed), 

Pakistan—Consequences of Deteriorating Security in Afghanistan (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 

2009), cited in Small 2015, p. 117.

220 World Bank, “China imports, exports, and trade balance by country and region (2017),” World Integrated Trade 

Solutions, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2017/TradeFlow/EXPIMP. The 2017 trade 

volumes are $84 billion with India and $20 billion with Pakistan. 221 Pakistan’s average age is 22, or the 48th youngest; it is 37.2 percent urbanized. See CIA, “South Asia: Pakistan,” The 

World Factbook, June 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html. Because 

urbanization is low in Pakistan, Chinese experts from the National Development and Reform Commission believe that 

their infrastructure will have a multiplier effect as Pakistan’s large population seeks more productive work in cities. See 

Lu and Shen, “Critical Issues in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor From a Long-term Perspective.”
37

because of its low tariffs into the American market.

222 Chinese trade specialists meanwhile

emphasize the “significant trade complementarities” between imports of Pakistan’s minerals and 

agriculture, and exports of China’s consumer goods and technology products.

223

Inland Industrial Parks 

The CPEC program intends to help Pakistan move up the value chain from commodity exports into 

light manufacturing and industry. This development would potentially facilitate “industrial transfer” 

from China to Pakistan and creating consumers for Chinese exports.

224 During a meeting of the 

China-Pakistan Joint Cooperation Committee in December 2016, nine special economic zones were 

proposed, each to be established with China’s financial and managerial assistance. These zones 

require stable power, water, labor, and administration, and therefore depend upon the success of 

“early harvest” projects.225 Many in Pakistan are advocating for a an even larger-scale effort in 

industrialization with the creation of 46 special economic zones.226

None of these zones are yet operational, but the official CPEC website currently lists the nine zones 

in various stages of planning and development.227 One more mature example with a Chinese investor 

and operator is the Rashakai Economic Zone. It is the result of an MOU signed between the Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa provincial government and China National Electric Engineering Company in January 

2017.228 This zone is meant to eventually cover 1,000 acres and is meant to feature industrial clusters 

in garment and textile products, home building materials, general merchandise, electronics and 

appliances, automobiles and mechanical equipment.229 It is reportedly the first zone to begin 

attracting Chinese business, offering customs relief, ten years of income tax exemption, permission 

for full foreign ownership of assets, and other incentives tailored to Chinese investors.

230 There are 

222 Pakistan’s trade agreements with the EU and United States give it a lower effective tariff rate than goods exported 

directly from China. See Renmin/Caijing report, p. 7. Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, over 3,500 

products from Pakistan can enter the U.S. duty-free—including manufactured items, minerals, and other consumer 

products. See U.S. Embassy Pakistan, “Pakistan and the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Program,” 2017, 

https://pk.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/76/2017/01/GSP-Brochure.pdf.

223 赵志文 [Zhao Zhiwen], 基于 SWOT 分析南疆四地州参与中巴经济走廊建设 赵志文 [“SWOT Analysis of the 

Participation of Four Prefectures in Southern Xinjiang in the Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 新

疆职业大学学报 [Journal of Xinjiang Vocational College], vol. 23, no. 3 (2015), p. 18; 殷永林 [Yin Yonglin], 中巴商品

贸易发展研究 [“Research on China-Pakistan Commodity Trade Development”], 南亚研究季刊 [South Asia Research 

Quarterly], no. 1 (2015), pp. 55-59 224 Lu and Shen, “Looking at the key issues in the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” 225 See Erica Downs, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Power Projects: Insights Into Environmental and Debt 

Sustainability.”

226 中国推动巴基斯坦设立经济特区 [“China Promotes Pakistan in Establishing Special Economic Zones”], 瓜达尔临沂

商城-市场部 [Gwadar-Linyi Mall-Marketing Department], July 20, 2017, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3Efeg1MSSn6fI7MEVbc9w?. 227 Some are still undergoing feasibility studies while others are have acquired land and are in the bidding process. See 

“CPEC Special Economic Zones (SEZs),” CPEC – China Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/specialeconomic-zones-projects, (accessed August 3, 2020). 

228 “CNEEC Pakistan Rashakai MOU Signing,” 中电工巴基斯坦工程有限公司 [CNEEC Pakistan Engineering Co., 

Limited], Undated, http://cneec.com.pk/company/Rashakai.html, (accessed July 15, 2020). 229 The official CPEC website states that this project will break ground during the visit of Chinese General Secretary Xi 

Jinping in 2020. See: “Rashakai Economic Zone, M-1, Nowshera,” CPEC – China Pakistan Economic Corridor, 

http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/53, (accessed 3 August 2020).

230 中巴经济走廊首个产业园区开始招商,欢迎中国企业入驻 [“First Industrial Park of the China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor Begins Attracting Investment and Welcoming Chinese Enterprises”], 经济日报 [Economic Daily], February 19, 

2020, https://www.investgo.cn/article/gb/tzbg/202002/477435.html.
38

also special economic zones or industrial parks spanning a variety of industries planned at sites in 

Bostan, Islamabad, Faisalabad, the Port Qasim area and elsewhere.

231 

Balochistan’s Resources

Image 4: Map of Major Mineral Distribution in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.232

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest and poorest province. Its substantial mineral resources present a 

tempting commercial opportunity, but political instability and significant security risks have kept 

most investors at bay. Chinese firms, however, have invested in Balochistan’s mineral resources 

since the 1990s. Chinese analysts note that geologic surveys reveal that Pakistan is not as poorly 

endowed with minerals as was once believed, and that there is a great potential for further 

development.233 Chinese analysts identify some 40 minerals as abundant in Balochistan.234 Metals 

231 “CPEC Special Economic Zones (SEZs),” CPEC—China Pakistan Economic Corridor. 232 This image was located in a 2010 article authored by the Chinese Academy of Geologic Sciences Institute of Mineral 

Resources. See 吴良士 [Wu Liangshi], 巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国矿产资源及其地质特征 [“Mineral Resources and their 

Geological Characteristics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”], 矿床地质 [Mineral Deposits], no. 2 (2010), p. 379. 

233 姚文光, 洪俊, 计文化 [Yao Wenguang, Hong Jun, and Ji Wenhua], 巴基斯坦和阿富汗矿产资源投资前景比较

[“Comparison of Investment Prospects of Mineral Resources in Pakistan and Afghanistan”], 矿物学报 [Acta 

Mineralogica Sinica], no. S2 (2013), p. 1074; 宋国明 [Song Guoming], 巴基斯坦金属矿产资源及开发现状 [“Pakistan’s 

Metallic Mineral Resources and Current Development”], 中国金属通报 [China Metal Bulletin], no. 19 (2009), p. 34.

234 李家成, 姜宏毅 [Li Jiacheng and Jiang Hongyi], 解析瓜达尔港建设的 巴基斯坦国内阻力 [“Examining the Pakistani 

Political Obstacles to the Construction of Gwadar Port”], 区域与全球发展 [Regional and Global Development], no. 5 

(2018), p. 126. 
39

(especially copper and gold) and natural gas are found largely in Balochistan, while other minerals

like coal are concentrated in central Pakistan.235 Balochistan is the source of nearly 80 percent of 

Pakistan’s oil and gas reserves, by some estimates.236 The largest gas field in Pakistan, at Sui in 

eastern Balochistan, is past its peak but still active and being developed by Pakistani firms.237

Metallurgical Construction Corporation of China (中国冶金建设集团公司) was one of the earliest 

Chinese developers of Pakistan’s mining industry, building the Saindak copper and gold mine in the 

1990s, near Pakistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan. It gained the rights to operate this mine in 

late 2001, and has exported copper and other minerals to China. Further to the east, the firm also 

established the Duddar lead and zinc mine in November 2008, operated jointly by three Chinese 

firms. Both of these projects in Balochistan are tax-exempt.238

However promising the mineral wealth, thus far it has not been successfully exploited and marketed. 

Even optimistic Chinese observers concede that a host of issues—security prominently among 

them—continue to frustrate Balochistan’s potential.239 The “lack of physical, institutional, and 

regulatory infrastructure” in Balochistan means that agriculture, livestock, and fisheries remain the 

principal industries in the province.240 Chinese efforts to develop a Gwadar fishing industry may be 

mostly an attempt to mollify worsening sentiments among the local population.241 Gwadar Free Zone 

Company is pushing for “relevant enterprises” to outfit Gwadar fishermen with upgraded oceangoing fishing vessels and training in their operation on a “partial donation” basis.242 Displaced local 

fishermen will be “absorbed” into fish processing and other activities related to their own occupation 

once the factories are set up.243

Chinese analysts further lament that “low-grade transportation channels” have so far limited the 

exploitation of Balochistan’s mineral wealth.244 Chinese engineers with experience at the port believe 

that the effort to connect the port to markets and resources further afield is unlikely to succeed in the 

235 Wu Liangshi, “Mineral Resources and their Geological Characteristics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” pp. 379-

381.

236 Syed Fazl-E-Haider, “Making Balochistan’s Gas, Oil Findings Worthy,” Pakistan & Gulf Economist, April 22, 2019, 

https://www.pakistangulfeconomist.com/2019/04/22/making-balochistans-gas-oil-findings-worthy/. 237 “Sui Gas Field,” Pakistan Petroleum Limited, https://www.ppl.com.pk/content/sui-gas-field-overview (accessed Aug 3, 

2020).

238 Song Guoming, “Pakistan’s Metallic Mineral Resources and Current Development,” p. 35. 239 Li and Jiang, “Examining the Pakistani Political Obstacles,” p. 133. 240 United Nations Development Program, “Balochistan: Millennium Development Goals,” 2011, 

https://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/mdg/publication_1.html, p 4. 241 Chinese enterprises are attuned to the local resistance to Gwadar development. For example, Gwadar fishermen staged 

a 3-week-long protest in early 2019 and physically prevented construction of the East Bay Expressway connecting the port 

to the Chinese-built highway, claiming that the construction hindered their access to the sea and their livelihood. 

“Fishermen reject Gwadar’s East Bay Expressway model,” Dawn, January 28, 2019, 

https://www.dawn.com/news/1460214. 

242 梁桐 [Liang Tong], 中巴经济走廊 一带一路头炮何时真正打响 [“When the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Belt 

and Road Initiative really started”], 观察者网 [Observer Net], June 3, 2015,

http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2015-06/3018638.html. 243 Zofeen Ibrahim, “Gwadar Fisherfolk Worry About One Belt One Road,” thethirdpole.net, May 18, 2017, 

https://www.thethirdpole.net/2017/05/18/gwadar-fisherfolk-worry-about-one-belt-one-road/. China International 

Engineering Company broke ground for this project on December 16, 2019. See CPEC Authority, “Pak-China Technical 

and Vocational Institute at Gwadar,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/39 (accessed 

July 31, 2020). 244 Li Jiacheng and Jiang Hongyi, “Examining the Pakistani Political Obstacles to the Construction of Gwadar Port,” p. 

126-127.
40

near term because of long and costly effort required to build transportation infrastructure. 245 Thus 

they conclude that industrialization on site at the port and its immediate surroundings is the optimal 

development goal, with potential for “petrochemicals, automobile assembly, and construction 

material processing...and as conditions mature, gradually expanding to shipbuilding, equipment 

manufacturing, and other heavy industries.” The commercial case for developing Gwadar as a means 

for accessing Pakistan’s markets and resources, then, is not a powerful one—even among Chinese 

advocates. 

Other Markets and Resources Beyond Pakistan

Gwadar figures prominently as “the exit to the sea for the five Central Asian countries.”246 Among 

these, Afghanistan has been the Central Asian state of most interest. Pakistan has been part of the 

regional trade and transport organization, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 

since 2010 (and China is a founding member). Industry analysts believe that “Pakistani seaports 

(Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar) are becoming promising gateways for CA [Central Asia], 

including the XUAR [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region], because most cities in CA are closer to 

the Pakistani seaports than the ports in Russia, China, Iran, Georgia and the Baltic countries.”247

Gwadar will require extensive development of transport infrastructure to facilitate trade to 

landlocked Central Asian states, but this potential broader market is part of its appeal.

Afghanistan is the first, and most proximate, landlocked Central Asian state to see trade from 

Gwadar port. In January 2020, Gwadar was officially opened for use under the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).248 This overland transit to landlocked Afghanistan used the N-65 

road from Gwadar, one of a small handful of completed CPEC transport infrastructure projects in the 

area (see Image 7 below). The first shipment of chemical fertilizer was delivered by a COSCO ship 

in January 2020, then trucked up to the border at Chaman in northern Balochistan,249 with subsequent 

shipments continuing in May.250 Pakistani officials have been looking to shift NATO cargoes to 

Afghanistan from Karachi to Gwadar since at least 2018,251 and Chinese-built infrastructure appears 

to be making this a possibility. However, such limited commercial activity at Gwadar port is 

demonstrative rather than profit-driven. It enabled officials to highlight the use of local labor and 

once again to hold out hope for expansion beyond fertilizers into other bulk cargoes like sugar and 

wheat. But at present the enterprise remains quite small in scale.

252

245 Zhou Jinghui, et al, “Research on the Development and Layout of Gwadar Port,” p. 126-127. 246 Zhou Jinghui, “Research on the development and layout of Gwadar port,” p. 128 247 Shibasaki et al, “Could Gwadar Port in Pakistan be a new gateway?” 248 This agreement had previously included only Karachi and Qasim as points of transshipment for transit trade. 

“Pakistan’s Gwadar port offers new opportunity for Afghan economy,” Xinhua, January 22, 2020, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/22/c_138725837.htm. 249 Adnan Aamir, “Beijing-Backed Pakistan Port Opens As Hub for Afghanistan Trade,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 30, 

2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Beijing-backed-Pakistan-port-opens-as-hub-for-Afghanistantrade#:~:text=In%20October%202019%2C%20Pakistan's%20Ministry,cargo%20to%20and%20from%20Afghanistan. 250 “Gwadar Port to Boost Pakistan-Afghanistan Trade: Envoy,” Xinhua, May 29, 2020, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/29/c_139099235.htm. 251 Ismael Dilawar, “China’s Flagship Port in Pakistan Shackled by Heavy Security,” Bloomberg, February 7, 2018, 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-26/china-s-flagship-port-in-pakistan-shackled-by-heavy-security. 252 The May 2020 shipment was 16,000 tons of urea, of a national inventory of 900,000 tons of urea designated for export. 

“Gwadar port to boost Pakistan-Afghanistan trade: Afghan envoy,” Xinhuanet, May 29, 2020, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/29/c_139099235.htm; Usman Hanif, “Pakistan’s excess urea can fetch $250m 

in exports,” The Express Tribune, November 26, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2106428/pakistans-excess-urea-canfetch-250m-exports. 
41

In aggregate, the markets and resources of Pakistan and its Central Asian neighbors are potentially 

significant but unlikely to be accessed via Gwadar at scale without much more substantial 

investment. Analysts differ on the magnitude of the commercial opportunity and the probability that 

the transport networks will make it possible. However, in surveying the Chinese discourse on the 

economic purposes of Gwadar port and the broader CPEC endeavor, the most consistent themes are 

concerns about security, both internal and external. While PRC reporting on Gwadar and CPEC 

dutifully hypes the business case for the projects, nearly all Chinese analysis calls attention to the 

abundant risks that attend any development in Pakistan. Chinese officials, businesspeople, and 

analysts are actively debating whether Pakistan’s various “non-economic problems” can be overcome 

by Chinese capital and expertise.253 Those problems—especially terrorism and political instability—

are even more acute in Balochistan, which must be developed if Gwadar is to thrive. 

Figure 6. Six Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors254

253 Tang Mengsheng, “One Belt One Road’s Flagship and Benchmark” 254 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, “Six Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors,” 

2013 (archived October 2018, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20170809211642/http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=carec-countries).
42

The Xinjiang Connection

Chinese interest in Pakistan’s economic development becomes more comprehensible when 

considered as part of China’s “holistic” outlook on internal and external security policy. Though 

Gwadar is distant from the PRC border, it is the essential node linking China’s western regions to the 

Indian Ocean. It is therefore vital to the realization of Beijing’s second strategic objective identified 

in the introduction to this case study—namely, to secure its periphery and stabilize Xinjiang.

The ambitious PRC development projects underway across Pakistan are recognizable as extensions 

of long-standing social and economic development policies in its far-flung western regions, Xinjiang 

in particular. Xinjiang is officially designated a “core area” of the BRI because it sits at the heart of 

Central Asia’s regional transport networks.255 It is also Beijing’s central concern in two decades of 

policy programs to develop the less prosperous western regions of China. Chinese security officials 

and analysts believe that terrorism and unrest in Xinjiang is a consequence of its connections to 

people, ideas, and resources beyond its borders, especially in Pakistan. China’s continuing efforts to 

promote Pakistan’s development thus reflect this first order security priority more so than the highly 

uncertain prospects of realizing the touted commercial goals for Gwadar and CPEC. This section first 

examines the security threats facing by Chinese businesses operating at Gwadar and Balochistan, 

then explores the connections drawn between terrorism and development in Chinese thinking about 

its relationship with Pakistan.

Security Risks in Pakistan

The commercial prospects for the Chinese projects at Gwadar are uncertain in significant part 

because of the local security situation.

256 Terrorism in particular poses a direct threat to Chinese 

workers and projects, which have been targeted by Baloch nationalist groups hostile to China’s

presence.

257 This risk has not, however, deterred Chinese investment in Pakistan—in fact, perhaps 

counterintuitively, it may have spurred increased investment since bringing about a more secure and 

stable Pakistan through development is the underlying strategic motivation.

The willingness to invest despite known security costs in Balochistan is not necessarily out of step 

with Chinese risk acceptance across the Belt and Road portfolio. Indeed, Chinese outbound

investment concentrates in countries and regions with relatively high levels of security, political, and 

255 杨明方 [Yang Mingfang], 书写一带一路建设新疆篇章——访新疆维吾尔自治区主席雪克来提·扎克尔 [“Writing a 

Chapter On Building the Belt and Road in Xinjiang—Interview With The President of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 

Region”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], September 18, 2017, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0918/c64102-

29540746.html. 256 For updated data and analysis on the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, see South Asia Terrorism 

Portal, “Datasheet—Pakistan,” https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan. For a detailed discussion 

of Chinese struggles with terrorism in Pakistan, see 李丽, 苏鑫 [Li Li and Su Xin], 巴基斯坦安全形势对中巴经济走廊

建设的影响 [“The Impact of Pakistan’s Security Situation on the Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor”], 国际经济合作 [Journal of International Economic Cooperation], no. 5 (2015), pp. 17-21.

257 For a review of selected terrorist incidents and persistent threats to Chinese workers and projects, see 李忠 [Li Zhong], 

中方在巴海外利益恐怖主义威胁统计分析 [“Statistical Analysis of the Threat of Terrorism for China’s Overseas 

Interests in Pakistan”], 警学研究 [Police Science Research], no. 2 (2018), pp. 51-54. Another study found increasing risks 

of terrorist attacks in Balochistan. See 程灿阳, 陈文静 [Cheng Canyang and Chen Wenjing], 基于空间统计的巴基斯坦

恐怖袭击分析 [“Analysis of Pakistan Terrorist Attacks Based on Spatial Statistics”], 现代计算机-专业版 [Modern 

Computer—Professional Edition], no. 5 (2019), p. 25. There is no open source collection that specifies all of the attacks, 

kidnappings, and other threats against Chinese citizens in Pakistan. According to open-source reports compiled by authors, 

there have been regular small-scale attacks, and at least 21 with loss of life or major injury to PRC citizens since 2002.
43

economic risk.258 China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), the leading Chinese 

state-owned insurance firm, rated overall risk for investing in Pakistan at a 7 out 9 (with 9 as the 

highest risk), and judged terrorism in the South Asian region overall makes it “one of the most risky 

in the world.”259 Nonetheless, China’s officially pledged $62 billion investment in CPEC is the 

highest such figure among BRI countries since 2013, and Pakistan has been China’s third largest 

target for outbound FDI and construction.

260

To manage these risks, Chinese people working across the country are protected by dedicated 

security personnel. Pakistan provide a “Special Security Detachment” (SSD) headquartered in 

Karachi and Rawalpindi of between 15,000 and 17,000 armed personnel detailed specifically to 

protect Chinese nationals and projects.261 Between 3,000 and 5,000 of these have been detailed to 

Gwadar262 and the rest to the developed eastern part of the country.263 Chinese analysts have also 

urged Chinese firms to hire private security contractors.264 Typically, Chinese personnel and firms 

are protected by a mix of military, paramilitary, police, and private security contractors and secure 

housing and work areas.265 Most of the security contractors are Pakistani, but the Chinese private 

security firm Dewei Security Service Group was reportedly hired to implement security measures at 

Gwadar port.266 Enhanced security is evidently required at Gwadar and along the Makran coastal 

highway. Visits to Gwadar must be preapproved by the Pakistan Government and military, and 

danger along the coastal highway has led Pakistani authorities to prohibit Chinese from taking the 

road from Karachi to Gwadar, requiring them to fly instead,267 and as recently as January 2020, the 

258 One study by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Sciences analyzes 74 Belt and Road countries and finds “an 

‘investment paradox’ in some [BRI] countries, namely, a large amount of investment and a high level of risk” 刘海猛 [Liu 

Haimeng], et al., “一带一路”沿线国家政治-经济-社会风险 综合评估及防控 [“A Comprehensive Assessment Of 

Political, Economic, And Social Risks And Their Prevention For The Countries Along The Belt And Road”],” 地理研究

[Geographic Research], no. 38 (March 2019), pp. 15-16.

259 中信保国别风险研究中心 [Sinosure Country Risk Research Center], 一带一路 65 个国家风险状况分析 [“Analysis 

of the Risk Status of 65 Countries Along The Belt And Road”], 中国海洋发展研究中心 [China Oceans Academy 

Research Center], October 12, 2018, http://aoc.ouc.edu.cn/3f/1c/c9824a212764/pagem.psp. 260 At $46.2 billion, Pakistan trails only Australia ($58.89b), the UK ($70.76b), and the US ($142.56b). See “China Global 

Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/, accessed June 

20, 2020.

261 Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 22. 262 A Pakistani analyst cites 5,700 personnel of the paramilitary Frontier Corps. Maham Hameed, “The politics of the 

China―Pakistan economic corridor.” Palgrave Communications, vol. 4, no. 64 (2018), 

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0115-7.pdf, p. 7. A Chinese analyst cited a Pakistani army officer who 

claimed 3,000 army personnel were deployed to Gwadar port alone. See 濠州 [Hao Zhou], 中巴经济走廊的卡西姆难题

[“CPEC’s Qasim Problem”], 财经杂志 [Caijing Magazine], April 6, 2017, https://finance.sina.cn/2017-04-06/detailifyecfnu7476475.d.html?from=wap.

263 For example, a special detail is assigned to the Chinese power project and coal berth at Port Qasim. 彭光桥, 张文斌

[Peng Guangqiao and Zhang Wenbin], 中巴经济走廊特别安保部队新长官到卡西姆项目视察 [“New Security Chief of 

CPEC Special Security Detachment Inspects Qasim Project”], 卡西姆港发电有限公司 [Qasim Port Power Generation 

Co. (Subsidiary of Power China Corp)], http://pr.powerchina.cn/g163/s927/t7799.aspx.

264 张新平, 张立国 [Zhang Xinping and Zhang Liguo], 中巴经济走廊”建设中的俾路支问题 [“The Baloch Question and 

the Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”], 和平与发展 [Peace and Development], no. 5 (2018), p. 48.

265 金华 [Jin Hua], 巴基斯坦恐怖袭击威胁分析与防范策略探讨 [“Pakistan terrorist attack threat analysis and 

discussion of prevention strategy”], 中国安防 [China Security and Defense], no. 12 (2018), pp. 35-40.

266 用科技护航海外利益,中国安保勇迈 ‘高风险区’ [“Use Technology to Escort Overseas Interests, Chinese Security 

Moves Forward into ‘High-risk Areas’”], 凤凰国际智库 [Phoenix International Think Tank], June 28, 2017, 

https://pit.ifeng.com/a/20170628/51334082_0.shtml. 267 “Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan Build an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project.”
44

PRC Ministry of Foreign affairs renewed a standing warning for Chinese citizens not to go to 

Balochistan at all.268

Security measures may mitigate the risks, but they do not make Pakistan—Balochistan in 

particular—a safe place for commerce. A geospatial analysis of terror attacks in Pakistan by 

researchers at China’s People’s Public Security University found the spread of terror attacks in 

Balochistan to be worsening over time.269 The PRC government reportedly offered to dedicate an 

additional 1 percent of each project to support security costs.270 The port’s free trade zone has better 

security than the city itself,271 but even this “green zone” is not immune from terrorist attacks. In 

May 2019, Baloch gunmen stormed the only upscale hotel in Gwadar where Chinese business 

travelers stay, killing five Pakistanis.272 The Balochistan Liberation Army’s video statement 

following the attack was unequivocal: “BLA [forces] will attack Chinese officials and installations in 

Balochistan.... The CPEC will fail miserably on the Baloch land. Balochistan will be a graveyard for 

your expansionist motives.”273

Perceived Transnational Terrorist Threat to China

Chinese security analysts are fixated by the potential for Pakistan-based terrorism and social 

instability to spill over into China. The “Chinese War on Terror” concentrates on Pakistan because its 

loosely governed border regions appear to be a major vector for radicalization and training of 

Chinese Muslims.274 Pakistan’s security forces have been long-time collaborators with China in its 

efforts to eradicate a succession of purported Uyghur terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, beginning as early as the 1990s.275 Domestically, Beijing’s perception of an increased

threat of terrorism has led to a dramatic intensification of its already harsh policies of repression of 

Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

276

The transnational element of the perceived terrorist threat—whether accurate or not—evidently 

provides powerful impetus to Beijing to pursue aggressive policies in Xinjiang and the countries 

bordering it.

277 Leading Chinese security officials, like Qin Tian, deputy commander of the 

268再次提醒中国公民近期暂勿前往巴基斯坦俾路支省 [“Additional Reminder to Chinese Citizens Not to Travel to 

Balochistan in the Near Future”], PRC Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, January 13, 2020, 

http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lsyj/t1731374.shtml. 269 Cheng Canyang and Chen Wenjing, “Analysis of Pakistan Terrorist Attacks Based on Spatial Statistics,” p. 25. 270 Renmin/Caijing Report, p. 23. 271 Hao Zhou, “Gwadar Port Sets Sail.” 272 Asad Hashim, “Gunmen Attack Hotel in Pakistan’s Gwadar, Kill Five People,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019, 

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/gunmen-attack-hotel-pakistan-port-city-gwadar-190511134034253.html. 273 Shahzad Hussain (@SHussainShokat). 2019. Twitter, May 19, 2019,5:53 p.m. 

https://twitter.com/SHussainShokat/status/1130230043991523328. 274 See Small, “The China Pakistan Axis,” pp. 67-91 for a study of China’s “war on terror” from the 1990s onward, 

including extensive PRC collaboration with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

275 刘双瑜, 吴绍忠 [Liu Shuangyu and Wu Shaozhong], 浅析中国与巴基斯坦开展反恐合作的缘由及实现路径

[“Reasons and Achieving Paths of China’s Cooperation with Pakistan on Anti-Terrorism”], 贵州警官职业学院学报

[Journal of Guizhou Police Officer Vocational College], no. 6 (2016), pp. 101-106; see also Small, “The China Pakistan 

Axis,” pp. 67-91, and Small, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in China.” 276 For an extensive review of these policies, see Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart 

Attitude’: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign In Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 1 (2019), pp. 102-

128.

277 For a nuanced analysis of this phenomenon as it bears on Chinese policy in Xinjiang, see Greitens et al., 

“Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression.” For further discussion of the actual incidences of transnational terrorism 

involving Chinese citizens, see Mathieu Duchatel, “China’s Foreign Fighters Problem,” War on the Rocks, January 25, 

2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/chinas-foreign-fighters-problem/ and Small, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in 
45

paramilitary People’s Armed Police, are focused on the Uyghur linkages with terrorist groups and 

other “hostile forces” abroad:

In light of the terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang and the way many carried out

planning and command overseas for attacks within our borders, a pattern of collusion has

formed. The terror incidents occurring along the frontier border regions are based out of

transnational terrorist organizations and backed by hostile forces. Foreign terrorist 

organizations mainly support [China’s] domestic terrorist organizations in terms of 

organization, public opinion, funding, technology, and strategy.

278

Terrorist activity in Pakistan and the instability in Xinjiang are therefore intrinsically linked in the 

minds of China’s leaders. Xi Jinping’s “holistic security outlook” (总理国家安全观) prescribes 

coordination between “the two security situations at home and abroad” and thus carries on a long 

tradition in Chinese strategic thought linking internal and external security.279 Applying this

“holistic” approach, Chinese analysts call attention to domestic and international causes and 

consequences of the perceived terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Purported terrorist cells in China “use 

West Asia as a base camp, Central Asia as a bridgehead, South Asia as a training base, Europe and 

the United States as their coordination and command center, and China as the main battlefield.”280

Internal security, in this line of thinking, requires management of external threats. The preferred 

mode of managing those threats is through economic development.

The notion that economic development is the “cure” for the “disease” of terrorism is one corollary of 

Xi’s prescribed security outlook.281 The view that “economic security is the foundation of holistic

national security” 282 leads China to pursue policies of economic development precisely to manage

Pakistan’s unfavorable security situation. A leading Chinese diplomat and former PRC Ambassador 

to Pakistan dismissed the American post-9/11 military approach to counterterrorism as “treating 

symptoms but not curing the disease” and prescribing instead “gradual implementation of the 

projects of CPEC so that economic and social conditions of the backward areas of both Pakistan and 

China.” While there is an increasing incidence of Uyghur fighters overseas, the number and severity of terrorist attacks in 

China remains quite low. This does not, however, mitigate Beijing’s belief in a Uyghur threat and aggressive measures to 

stifle it with “preemptive repression.” See Greitens et al., “Counterterrorism and Domestic Repression,” pp. 37-44. 278 Qin Tian, “The Anti-Terrorism Situation,” p. 52 279 See, for example, Chusei Suzeki, “China’s Relations with Inner Asia: The Hsiung-Nu, Tibet,” David M. Farquhar, 

“The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” and Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-1884,” in John 

King Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, (Cambridge: Harvard University 

Press, 1968).

280 王宏伟 [Wang Hongwei], 国家安全治理的内外整合:以打击’东突’恐怖主义位列 [“Integration of Domestic and 

International Factors in National Security Governance: A Case Study of China’s Combat Against East Turkistan Terrorist 

Forces”], 国际安全研究 [International Security Research], no. 3 (2019), p. 88.

281 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 习近平关于总体国家安全观论述摘编 [“Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Discussion on the Holistic 

National Security Outlook”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 26, 2018, 

http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0426/c1003-29952393.html. This medicalization of terrorism extends to Pakistan as 

well. According to two Chinese scholars, “Balochi terrorism is like a cancer that hinders the development of Pakistan. If it 

is allowed to grow and develop, it is tantamount to “cultivating a tumor. See Li Jiacheng and Jiang Hongyi, “Examining 

the Pakistani Political Obstacles to the Construction of Gwadar Port,” p. 136.

282 Xi emphasized this point in the first meeting of the Central National Security Committee in April 2014. 习近平 [Xi 

Jinping], 坚持总体国家安全观 走中国特色国家安全道路 [“Adhere to the Holistic National Security Outlook and Take 

the Road of National Security with Chinese Characteristics”], 新华网 [Xinhuanet], April 15, 2014, 

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0415/c64094-24899781.html.
46

China will be improved, and the hotbed of terrorism—poverty—will be gradually reduced.”283

Economic development is often the primary prescription for how to treat the real and imagined 

ailments of the Chinese body politic.

Pakistan’s Role in China’s “Develop the West” Campaign

Pakistan is vital to Chinese ambitions to cure the “disease” of terrorism with economic development. 

Beijing’s vision to develop and thereby stabilize its far western provinces, especially Xinjiang, 

explicitly involves efforts like Gwadar and CPEC. Chinese economic attention to Pakistan should be 

understood as part of the gradual development of China’s campaign to develop its western regions, 

which have badly lagged the coastal, eastern parts of the country. The desire to develop and stabilize 

China’s western provinces explains much of China’s sustained economic program in Pakistan. The 

widely publicized Silk Road Economic Belt (i.e., the land “belt” in the Belt and Road) is in many 

respects the extension of these domestic stability and development policies. The “Great Western 

Development” (西部大开发) or “Go West” (西进) strategy, initiated in 1999, is the domestic

precursor to BRI, and the programs are now intertwined.

284

The objective of a stable, prosperous Xinjiang lies at the heart of both programs. China’s leaders 

explicitly link Gwadar’s development and the CPEC program to these efforts. When Li Keqiang 

announced CPEC in 2013, he stated that China and Pakistan “agreed to establish an interface 

between China’s strategy to develop its western region and Pakistan’s domestic economic 

development.”285 The former PRC Ambassador to Pakistan, Zhou Gang, explained the impetus for 

this linkage:

Pakistan’s security is China’s security.... Pakistan has critical significance for safeguarding 

peace and tranquility in China’s Xinjiang Region, steadily advancing the Great Western 

Development strategy and the development of friendly relations with Central Asia, South 

Asia, and the Gulf countries.”286 

The tight coupling of security and development in Xinjiang and Pakistan is plain across official and 

scholarly commentary on CPEC.287 Official guidance reinforced this linkage in a May 2020 “Guiding 

283 Lu Shulin, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Flagship and Exemplary Project of the Belt and Road,” p. 56. 284 Then-president Jiang Zemin proposed the program in June 1999, which was unveiled during the Fourth Plenary Session 

of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and marked for its implementation during the Central 

Economic Work Conference later that year. See 共和国的足迹——1999 年:西部大开发 [“The Footprints of the 

Republic—1999: Great Western Development”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government Portal], October 10, 2009, 

http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-10/10/content_1435029.htm. For discussion of the internal-external policy connections, see 

董志敏 [Dong Zhimin], “一带一路”与“西进”战略的关系 [“The relationship between ‘One Belt One Road’ and ‘Go 

West’ Strategies”], 边疆经济与文化 [The Border Economy and Culture], no. 2 (2016), pp. 24-25. 285 中国和巴基斯坦关于深化两国战略合作的联合声明 [“China and Pakistan Joint Statement on Deepening Bilateral 

Strategic Cooperation”], 新华 [Xinhua], May 24, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-05/24/content_2410193.htm.

286 张蔚然 [Zhang Weiran], 李克强将访巴基斯坦 “四好”关系续新篇 [“Li Keqiang to Visit Pakistan, Continuing the 

‘Four Goods’ Relationship”], 中国新闻 [China News], May 15, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/05-

15/4821007.shtml. 287 Lu Shulin, another former Ambassador to Pakistan and later think tank expert and author, provides a clear example: 

“For China, the significance of building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is also very obvious. After more than 30 

years of reform and opening up, the economy in eastern my country has developed rapidly, and the western region has also 

improved significantly, but it is still relatively behind the eastern coastal regions. Now China is vigorously advancing the 

‘Great Western Development’ strategy in order to achieve balanced development of the east and the west and achieve 

long-term stability of the country.” Lu Shulin, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Flagship and Exemplary Project of 

the Belt and Road,” p. 51.
47

Opinion on Promoting Development of the Western Regions in the New Era,” which exhorted 

officials to “coordinate the two major issues of development and security, and make better use of the 

national security barrier in the western region.”288 That recent authoritative statement also referred to 

Xinjiang as a “core region” of the BRI and urged cadres to “accelerate” the “west-facing 

transportation hub and trade logistics center.”289 Rebranded in this Guiding Opinion as “Go West,” 

China’s domestic western development plans dovetail with their foreign BRI program, with a nexus 

in Xinjiang.

China’s domestic priorities further designate Xinjiang a conduit for energy from abroad that bolsters 

growth (and promotes security) in western provinces. As one group of scholars put it, “to push 

forward China’s Great Western Development strategy we need an ‘exit to the Indian Ocean.”290 This 

demand for Xinjiang’s Indian Ocean connectivity was captured in policies such as the 2007 PRC 

State Council’s determination that Xinjiang should be an “energy import corridor” to the west.291

This long-held ambition has yet to produce a pipeline through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.292 

In summary, the inland markets and resources of Pakistan and neighboring countries present some 

theoretically attractive commercial prospects, but these have not borne fruit largely because of the 

high costs associated with instability and security risks. In PRC public discourse, despite scattered 

dissent,293 the most commonly expressed view is that Pakistan’s development is instead a matter of 

PRC “border security.” In the words of two academic analysts, PRC goals in Pakistan are to secure 

“stability and prosperity in Pakistan through the participation of Xinjiang, such that China’s antiterrorist barrier and security outpost can maintain its stability on the western frontier, ensuring longterm security in Xinjiang.”294 Beyond securing China’s troubled border areas, however, the prospect 

for naval utilization of the port remains a tantalizing possibility.

288 中共中央 国务院关于新时代推进西部大开发形成新格局的指导意见 [Guiding Opinion of the CCP Central 

Committee and PRC State Council on Promoting Development of the Western Regions in the New Era], 新华社 [Xinhua 

News Agency], May 17, 2020, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-

05/17/content_5512456.htm?mc_cid=216ccf8998&mc_eid=1c94aeb772. 289 Ibid. 290 Li Jingyu, “The Strategic Concept of Selecting Points,” p. 30. 291 Customs and procedures along Xinjiang’s borders with Central Asian and South Asian countries were subsequently 

streamlined to improve cross-border trade. See 海关总署: 支持新疆维吾尔自治区提高对外开放水平 [“General 

Administration of Customs: Support Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Zone Enhance Opening Up”], 海关总署网站 [PRC 

General Administration of Customs website], February 28, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-

02/28/content_1246828.htm; “大通关”助推新疆成为西部外贸 “大通道” [“‘Great Customs Clearance’ Drives Xinjiang 

to Become a ‘Great Corridor’ of Trade in the West”], 新华社 [Xinhua], September 22, 2009, 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-09/22/content_1423641.htm. 292 Official media states that this import corridor was achieved via completion of “China’s northwestern oil and gas 

strategic passage” (中国西北部油气战略通道). See 新疆“西进东输”打造丝绸之路能源大通道 [“Xinjiang’s ‘West to 

East Transfer’ Creates a Major Energy Corridor on the Silk Road”], 新华社 [Xinhua], June 26, 2014, 

http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/26/content_2708718.htm; 新疆成为 “西进东送” 能源大通道 [“Xinjiang to Become 

‘West to East’ Major Energy Corridor”], 新华社 [Xinhua], September 3, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-

09/03/content_2744853.htm.

293 罗建波 [Luo Jianbo], “莫当“救世主”!国内问题应为中国关注重点 [“Don’t be the ‘Saviour of the World’! Domestic 

Issues Take Priority in China”], 中国选举与治理 [China Elections and Governance], June 18, 2017, 

http://www.chinaelections.org/article/141/245978.html. 294 Lei Ming, et al. “Current Situation and Recommendations for Pakistan Economic Cooperation,” p. 49. This belief in 

Pakistani development accruing to the stability of Xinjiang is widely shared. For example, one professor from Sichuan 

University argues that “a Pakistan with economic prosperity and social progress and stability is conducive to the stability 

and prosperity of Xinjiang. The ethnic and religious situation in Xinjiang is complex and susceptible to the external 
48

Naval & Military Component

Reports of Gwadar’s use as a Chinese naval or military facility are premature.295 The port’s location, 

its low commercial utilization, and the close bilateral political-military relationship make it a 

perennial favorite for analysts predicting China’s next overseas military base. Yet there have been no 

PLA deployments to Gwadar to date, nor even a single observed PLAN port call. The reasons for this 

lack of military utilization may outweigh those recommending it. This section first considers the 

physical capacity of Gwadar to support PLAN operations, then analyzes its military utilization to 

date, and assesses future possibilities for the facility.

Suitability for Hosting PLAN Vessels

From the standpoint of physical capacity, Gwadar could readily be repurposed for use as a PLA 

military facility. If no commercial traffic is permitted, the draught (12.5m) and quay wall (602m) 

dimensions mean Gwadar’s port facilities could support the PLAN’s largest vessels, such as the

Type-075 amphibious assault ship (LOA 235m, draft 7-8m), Type 071 landing platform dock (LOA 

210m, draft 7m), and the Type-901 fleet replenishment ship (LOA 241m, draft 10.8m).296 PLAN 

aircraft carriers could also call on Gwadar, though conditions such as tidal variation, wind, and 

atmospheric pressure could push depth at the port below PLAN under-keel clearance limitations.297

Any major surface combatant (Type 055 cruisers, Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates) could 

berth simultaneously with the carrier. Periodic dredging can manage Gwadar’s siltation issue and 

make the port navigable for all PLAN vessels under most conditions. 

environment. Radical thoughts and social movements from outside will be transmitted back to Xinjiang. The good 

situation in Pakistan will play a positive role in promoting long-term security in Xinjiang. China's policies in Xinjiang also 

require a mild external environment. The Western Development and China-Pakistan Energy Channel go hand in hand.” 戴

永红 [Dai Yonghong], 以跨喜马拉雅合作为战略支点构建中国西部边疆“安全三”角 [“Developing Cross-Himalayan 

Cooperation: Toward a ‘Security Triangle’ Along China's Western Frontier”], 南亚研究季刊 [South Asian Studies 

Quarterly], no. 2 (2017), p. 90. 295 It is common for news reports in the U.S., India, and elsewhere to state that there is already a Chinese base, either at 

Gwadar or nearby at Jiwani (where there is no construction at all, as of August 2020). See, for example, Manish Shukla, 

“Amid Standoff With India, China Strengthening Naval Base in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port,” Zeenews India, June 3, 2020, 

https://zeenews.india.com/india/amid-standoff-with-india-china-strengthening-naval-base-in-pakistan-s-gwadar-port2287678.html; Rajeswari Pillai Rajoagopalan, “A New China Military Base in Pakistan?” The Diplomat, February 9, 

2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/a-new-china-military-base-in-pakistan/; Maria Abi-Habib, “China’s ‘Belt and 

Road’ Plan in Pakistan Takes a Military Turn,” New York Times, December 19, 2018, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-belt-road-military.html. 296 The Type-075’s draft determined from imagery of its draft lines published online; the waterline reads 8.1m. This was 

when the vessel was presumably empty, so the draft will be deeper when carrying its full complement of embarked 

aircraft, vehicles, and personnel. See 吃水线曝光! 我首艘 075 型两栖攻击舰好似巍然巨兽 [“Draft Lines Revealed! 

China’s First Type-075 Amphibious Assault Ship is Like a Behemoth”], 新浪图片[Photo.sina.com.cn], September 29, 

2019, http://slide.mil.news.sina.com.cn/h/slide_8_203_73986.html#p=2; “Type-071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD),” 

Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/type-071-landing-platform-dock-lpd/, (accessed May 28, 

2020); Xiavier Vavasseur, “China’s Type 901 Large Supply Vessel Alongside 2nd Aircraft Carrier Type 002,” Naval 

News, April 30, 2019, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/04/chinas-type-901-large-supply-vessel-alongside2nd-aircraft-carrier-type-001a/. 297 Gwadar’s tidal station indicates a max tidal range of 3.01m/9.9 ft. This could be further driven down by prolonged 

winds and atmospheric pressure. “Gwadar West Tide Times & Tide Charts,” Surf-Forecast, https://www.surfforecast.com/breaks/Gwadar-West/tides/latest, (accessed May 28, 2020). The Type-001 Liaoning carrier draws 8.97m, 

while the Type-002 Shandong carrier reportedly draws ten or more meters. Under keel clearance limits in the PLAN are 

unavailable; however, PLAN carrier bases in China are reported to be around twenty meters deep. See “Type 001 Liaoning 

Class,” Sino Defence, August 19, 2017, https://sinodefence.com/type-001-liaoning-class/; 郭媛丹 [Guo Yuandan], 中国国

产航母入列创造五个“首次” [“China’s Domestic Aircraft Carrier Marks Five ‘First’ When Commissioned”], 环球网

[Global Times], December 18, 2019, http://yuqing.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1218/c209043-31511090.html.
49

Beyond the pier, Gwadar possesses a sizeable laydown yard for marshalling military equipment and 

materials. If the free zone adjacent to the terminal fails to attract business, the vacant warehouses, 

administrative buildings, and living quarters could be provided for military use. While the PLA could 

likely deliver reliable power to such a facility and thus the ships at quay, it may not be necessary if

Dongfang Electric Corporation’s turbine generators are installed in the expected Gwadar Coal Power 

Plant. Additionally, bunkering services, water supply, ship chandlery, medical services, and crew 

arrangements are among the services reportedly provided by Gwadar Marine Services Limited, a 

COPHC subsidiary.

298 Especially given low levels of commercial utilization, Gwadar could provide a 

number of regular services to naval ships operating in theater without much economic disruption to 

the terminal. 

Potential Value as a Military Base

Despite sufficient capacity, the PLA has not made use of Gwadar to date. No officials have 

commented on why this is the case, nor have Chinese analysts speculated about why the facility has 

not been utilized by the navy. However, there are several circumstances under which the PLA might 

request and receive access to facilities at Gwadar. These are worth considering in operational terms,

even if they are politically uncertain.

PLAN vessels could stage from Gwadar to operate in and around the Persian Gulf, or to assist in 

convoying commercial vessels across the Indian Ocean during times of crisis or conflict. Security 

issues and the lack of connectivity with the rest of Pakistan are major obstacles in the commercial 

development of Gwadar, but these conditions make for a more secure location from a military 

perspective.299 With no significant commercial activity or international presence in Gwadar, PLA 

activities could be concealed from foreign observers. Gwadar’s port and airport sites are tightly 

guarded compounds, walled off from outsiders and manned with the help of Pakistan forces.300 

China’s primary SLOC and first overseas military base in Djibouti are far-flung for the PLAN, and 

not supported directly by any other Chinese military facilities. Stronger logistical support in the 

northern Indian Ocean would be useful. Running through the South China Sea and across the Indian 

Ocean, it takes ten or more days for PLAN task forces to reach the Gulfs of Aden or Oman.301 PLAN 

forces are tasked with diverse overseas missions, from humanitarian/disaster relief efforts to the 

projection of power to secure overseas interests and citizens.302 However the geographic distances 

involved present major problems for equipping and supplying PLAN ships for all contingencies, 

especially in urgent situations. Ships will not likely be carrying everything they need when a crisis 

arises. 

298 “Gwadar Marine Services Limited,” COPHC Website, http://cophcgwadar.com/gmsl.aspx, (accessed May 24, 2020). 299 The case can be made that such isolation and insecurity also make supplying a navy base there more difficult. However, 

if all that is required is basic parts support, fuels and lubricants, and husbanding services, the resident infrastructure is

more than sufficient. If the port is to be used for more complex wartime operations, however, its poor connectivity will 

limit how well personnel and heavy equipment can be transported overland. Air and sea transport direct to Gwadar are not 

limited by poor road and rail connection, so the facility could well be adequately supplied for some period of time.

300 For a project manager’s impression of security at work sites in Gwadar, see “Connecting Pakistan—Helping Pakistan 

Build an Airport, I Took Part in the Largest Free Foreign Aid Project.” 

301 The 1st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force reportedly took ten days and nights to travel from Sanya, Hainan to the Gulf of 

Aden. Other points of departure, weather conditions, and technical issues could prolong the journey. 中国海军舰艇编队

抵达任务区正式开始护航 [“Chinese Naval Task Force Arrives in Mission Area and Formally Begins Escorts”], 中广网

[China National Radio], January 6, 2009, 

http://www.cnr.cn/military/tebie/smlhd/ywsd/200901/t20090106_505201148.html. 302 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy.
50

Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other materials at Gwadar would be a productive use of the 

facilities. Such measures would complement other supply points around the region and mitigate the 

political risks that one or more might be unavailable at a given time. It would also allow task forces 

to optimize their loadouts for more immediate mission requirements. Even a low-footprint 

warehousing agreement in Gwadar would provide significant benefit to PLAN forces. Two PLA 

Army logistics experts recently recommended flexible overseas prepositioning methods, including 

rental or construction agreements with overseas commercial ports and airports to embed such support 

amongst commercial operations.303 Additionally, general-use goods could be stored in Gwadar’s 

warehouses, freeing up more secure locations such as the underground facilities of the Djibouti 

Support Base to store munitions, parts, and other high-end materials.304 Furthermore, Chinese naval 

vessels need not go to Gwadar themselves to retrieve stored materials. Merchant vessels contracted 

as part of the strategic projection support shipping fleets could provide regular service for the PLAN 

to reduce any negative responses from international observers.305 COPHC or any other PRC logistics 

provider would be competent in managing prepositioned inventories in Gwadar port’s newly 

constructed warehouses. While there is no evidence as yet to demonstrate that the PLAN intends to 

use Gwadar as a logistics hub, the possibility bears careful observation. Additionally, COPHC would 

be legally bound to render support to PLA overseas operations according to article 38 of the PRC’s 

National Defense Transportation Law.306

Similarly, the PLA could make use of Gwadar’s new international airport. The construction of the 

East Bay Expressway will provide an improved link between the port terminal and the airport. The 

length of the new airport under construction at Gwadar (12,000 feet) and secure housing and medical 

facilities on site could accommodate any PLA aircraft. The airfield is within the maximum range of 

the Y-20 PLA strategic transport aircraft flying from the Chengdu-Qionglai airbase in western 

China.307 It could thus provide a site for these aircraft to land, refuel, and rest their crews, and to 

deliver parts, personnel, and combat and support vehicles. 

303 Authors are from the PLA Army Logistics University. 刘俊, 段志云 [Liu Jun and Duan Zhiyun], 境外行动中的军事

物流保障研究 [“Military Logistics Support for Overseas Operations”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 

Transportation University], no. 5 (May 2019), p. 61. 304 While not specifically referring to Gwadar, the ideas of warehousing agreements to reduce the load on overseas support 

bases is discussed by PLA logistics experts in 李守耕, 陈铁祺, 王丰 [Li Shougeng, Chen Tieqi, and Wang Feng], 战备物

资预置储备模式研究 [“On Preset Reserve Mode for Combat Readiness Material”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of 

Military Transportation University], no. 7 (July 2019), p. 60. 305 Anti-piracy escort task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden already use merchant shipping to bring along required 

materials or coordinate enterprises in the region to make local purchases. However, they do not have sufficient fixed 

infrastructure used for military prepositioning. See 刘俊, 段志云 [Liu Jun and Duan Zhiyun], 境外行动中的军事物流保

障研究 [“Military Logistics Support for Overseas Operations”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation 

University], no. 5 (May 2019), p. 60. For more information on the development of strategic projection support force, see 

Conor M. Kennedy, “Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection,” CMSI China Maritime Report No. 4 (December 2019), 

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/4/.

306 This would include assistance in the replenishment and rest of PLA vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel. See 中华

人民共和国国防交通法 [Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation], 中国人大网

[Npc.gov.cn], September 3, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764.htm. For 

discussion by PLAN officers of the applicability of the National Defense Transportation Law to overseas port calls, see 高

志文 [Gao Zhiwen], 中国战舰靠国外港口实现一站式服务 中企帮大忙 [“Chinese Warships Rely on Foreign Ports for 

One-Stop Service”], 中国军事网 [China Military Online], September 30, 2016, 

https://mil.sohu.com/20160930/n469427123.shtml. 307 Chad Peltier, “China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations,” Jane’s, April 15, 2020, 

https://www.uscc.gov/files/001301, p. 30.
51

Further, the airfield could allow inflow of Chinese military forces to the region. Indeed, the head of 

the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Transport and Delivery Bureau noted in 2017 the improving conditions 

of overseas ground support from overseas agents and Chinese enterprises. He recommended greater 

use of their services to support aircraft overseas through bidding and contractual agreements.308

Another officer in his bureau sees the construction of airports along the Belt and Road as a great 

opportunity to strengthen China’s overseas aviation projection capabilities.309 The PLA lacks fixedwing support capabilities at its support base in Djibouti, increasing the possibility that Gwadar may 

someday be used for China’s growing strategic lift fleet of Y-20s.310

Indeed, for these reasons many PLA analysts consider Gwadar to be a suitable site for military 

support. Several PLA authors noted in 2015 that under COPHC’s lease the port could “absolutely” 

become a long-term rest and replenishment point for PLAN escort task forces.311 Other PLA experts 

find Gwadar to be an obvious choice for establishing an overseas strategic strongpoint, owing to its 

geographic location, military importance, and Chinese port operator.312 Some state outright that the 

PLA is exploring the construction of a support base in Gwadar.313 Other Chinese military observers 

believe PLA access to Gwadar is as good as established. One PLA officer said of the PLAN’s option 

for using Gwadar as a base, “The food is already on the plate; we’ll eat it whenever we want to.”314

Pakistan Navy Utilization of Gwadar

Capacity for berthing warships and meeting logistics requirements only establishes conditions of 

possibility. It tells us very little about how the facility is likely to be employed. One Pakistani Navy 

(PN) officer hopes “China would also deploy its naval ships in coordination with Pakistan Navy to 

safeguard the port and trade under the CPEC.”315 This raises the possibility of a combined facility 

used by both militaries. The actual PN utilization gives us some sense of the current naval and 

military utility of Gwadar and indicates areas where such cooperation might occur.

308 张方, 李剑肆, 何建涛 [Zhang Fang, Li Jiansi, and He Jiantao], 加强空中战略投送地面保障体系建设的思考

[“Thoughts on Accelerating Ground Security System Construction for Air Strategic Projection”], 军事交通学院学报

[Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 4 (April 2017), pp. 1-3.

309 陈瑜, 李剑肆, 曾宇 [Chen Yu, Li Jiansi, and Zeng Yu], 境外空中战略投送能力建设研究 [“Research on 

Development of Overseas Strategic Airlift Capability”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation 

University], no. 2 (February 2019), pp. 7-8. 310 For recent discussion on the production of Y-20 aircraft, see Tyler Rogoway, “A Whopping 20 Y-20 Airlifters Seen at 

Chinese Aircraft Plant and Test Base,” The Drive, December 30, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31667/awhopping-20-y-20-airlifters-seen-at-chinese-aircraft-plant-and-test-base.

311 李鹏, 罗雷, 宋健, 乔浩伟 [Li Peng, Luo Lei, Song Jian, and Qiao Haowei], 我军海上投送海外保障支撑点的建设

[“Construction of Overseas Support Locations for Maritime Projection”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 

Transportation University], no. 3 (2015), p. 4.

312 胡中健, 胡欣 [Hu Zhongjian and Hu Xin], 布局与破局: 中国的海外战略支撑点 [“Making and Breaking the Status 

Quo: China’s Overseas Strategic Strong Points”], 现代军事 [Contemporary Military], no. 12 (2015), pp. 34-36.

313 梁峰, 甘明, 王丰 [Liang Feng, Gan Ming, and Wang Feng], 美军海外战备物资储备模式及启示 [“Overseas War 

Readiness Materials Reserve Mode in US Army and Enlightenment”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 

Transportation University], no. 11 (November 2017), pp. 51-52.

314 Unnamed PLA officer cited in 金吴 [Jin Wu], 吉布提:人民解放军首个海外基地 [“Djibouti: The PLA’s First 

Overseas Base”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix Military], April 11, 2016, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160411/48414276_0.shtml.

315 “China Deflects Queries Over Naval Deployment at Gwadar Port in Pakistan,” The Economic Times, November 30, 

2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-deflects-queries-over-naval-deployments-at-gwadar-portin-pakistan/articleshow/55706511.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
52

In the absence of commercial activity, Gwadar port’s operations appear to be dominated by the 

PN.316 The PN prizes Gwadar port because its distance from the Indian border provides a degree of 

strategic depth that Karachi does not enjoy.

317 Gwadar is home to the small Pakistan Naval Station 

Akram, established in 1987 as a depot for naval detachments.318 PNS Akram occupies a large amount 

of land on the peninsula’s cliffs, with only a small pier on the far east end of the Gwadar peninsula. It 

also serves as a surveillance station, part of Pakistan’s network for monitoring the North Arabian 

Sea.319 Further, a 500-man 3rd Marine Battalion was commissioned in March 2013 and is stationed in 

Gwadar to provide security for the port and its operations.320

While Gwadar port is a commercial venture, a 2016 Pakistan Senate briefing by deputy chief of naval 

staff for operations reports that the facility offers the PN “substantial operational flexibility.” 

According to the report, the PN has been given 600 meters of berthing space at the port and the 

establishment of a naval base at Gwadar is “high on priority.”321 This means the entirety of the 

Gwadar terminal’s current frontage is available for the use by the PN.

Accordingly, Pakistan’s naval forces are making extensive use of the facility. PN Task Force-88 was 

established in December 2016 to secure the sea lanes and maritime areas around Gwadar. It

comprises ships, fast-attack craft, aircraft, drones, and other surveillance assets.322 From February 

2019 through April 2020, Pakistan Navy vessels called at the port every month an average of three 

times.323 In a third of these port calls, at least one of the 2,500 ton, Chinese-built F-22P “Zulfiqar” 

frigates was among the vessels at the pier.324 These vessels are export versions of the PLAN’s Type316 There appears to be some precedence for this. A 2006 World Bank report noted “the dominance of the Navy in port 

management is unusually high by international standards,” recommending changes to the role of the navy in Pakistan’s 

ports. See “Pakistan—Transport Competitiveness in Pakistan: Analytical Underpinning for National Trade Corridor 

Improvement Program,” World Bank Report No. 36523, July 18, 2006, p. 37, 

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/961511468289228268/pdf/36523.pdf. 317 Hu Zhongjian and Hu Xin, “Making and Breaking the Status Quo,” p. 35; Hasan Yaser Malik, “Strategic Importance of 

Gwadar Port,” Journal of Political Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (2012), pp. 57-69. 318 “PN History,” Pakistan Navy, Undated, https://www.paknavy.gov.pk/history_more.html, (accessed May 22, 2020). 319 Pakistan can operate fixed-wing aircraft out of air stations in nearby Pasni and Turbat, both east and northeast from 

Gwadar respectively. There is another surveillance station located west of Gwadar in Jiwani. See Shazia Hasan, “Naval 

Network Providing Security to Gwadar Port,” Dawn, March 15, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1320631. 320 “PN Commissions 3rd Pak Marines Battalion,” The Nation, March 29, 2013, https://nation.com.pk/29-Mar-2013/pncommissions-3rd-pak-marines-battalion. The Gwadar police inspector explained that this battalion would provide security 

for the ships, crews, and cargo. 探访瓜达尔港: 中巴经济走廊南起点 战略位置重要保安严密 [“Visiting Gwadar Port: 

The southern starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is strategically located and tightly secured”], 第一财

经 [Yicai], May 13, 2015, https://www.yicai.com/video/4617331.html.

321 “Visit & Meetings of Senate Standing Committee on Defence at Pakistan Navy Installations Karachi, Ormara and 

Gwadar,” Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Defence—Report No. 10, May 16, 2016, pp. 3-4, 

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1463460418_416.pdf

322 巴军建特遣队保护瓜达尔港 中方向巴转让潜艇技术 [“Pakistani army-built task force protects Gwadar port and 

China transfers submarine technology to Pakistan”], 参考消息 [Reference News], December 22, 2016, 

http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/mil/20161222/1539263.shtml

323 Two Zulfiquar-class frigates, hull numbers 251 and 253, can be seen docked at Gwadar in on a Pakistani television 

special on the port project. “Mahaaz Gawadar ka Mahaaz, Part 2” Dunya News, May 22, 2016, 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7RAa78ftFg, starting at 19:30. 324 Observations based on satellite imagery provided by MAXAR.
53

053H3 frigate, which Chinese defense experts consider essential to Pakistan’s ability to operate in the 

Indian Ocean in light of India’s superior naval forces.325

The PN has also increased land acquisitions and augmented its presence in the Gwadar district,

indicating greater Pakistan military entrenchment in Balochistan.326 Some suggest this expansion into 

Balochistan is part of Pakistan’s Regional Maritime Security Patrol initiative, meant to enhance 

maritime security in the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean region and boost Pakistan’s role in 

securing the critical sea lanes in its neighborhood. 327

The need for Chinese technical expertise to operate and service the PN will likely increase. In 

addition to the four F-22P frigates delivered between 2009 and 2013, the PN entered into a contract 

with China Shipbuilding Trading Company Ltd. in 2018 to deliver four Type-054A frigates by 2021. 

Ships developed with Chinese technical assistance account for the bulk of the PN’s surface fleet and 

the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency’s vessels.

328 Technicians from China State Shipbuilding 

Corporation are often present in Karachi to provide assistance, and regular flights between Karachi 

and Gwadar mean these experts could be on site with little notice.329 Chinese technical expertise is 

already important to the PN, but will grow even more so after delivery of the eight contracted S-20 

conventional submarines (export variant of the Yuan-class). An agreement reached in 2015 stipulates 

delivery of four hulls built in China between mid-2022 and 2023 with the remaining four to be 

constructed at the Karachi shipyard by 2028.330

Because China and Pakistan maintain close technical connections, it is possible PLAN ships may 

make technical stops at Gwadar to receive parts and take advantage of resident Chinese technical 

expertise.331 COPHC is legally obligated to provide for the supply and rest of PLA forces, and 

controls all operations and services at the port.332 There is also some scope for the PLA to exercise or 

325 兰舟达, 旷毓 君 [Lan Zhouda, Kuang Yujun], 地缘政治视角下的中巴军事技术合作 [“Sino-Pakistani Militarytechnical Cooperation from a Geopolitical Perspective”], 国防科技 [National Defense Science and Technology], vol. 35, 

no. 5 (October 2014), p. 89. 326 Maqbool Ahmed, “The Mysterious Case of Land Acquisitions in Balochistan,” Herald, November 23, 2018, 

https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398696. 327 Kryzysztof Iwanek, “No, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is Not a Chinese Naval Base (Just Yet),” The Diplomat, November 

19, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/no-pakistans-gwadar-port-is-not-a-chinese-naval-base-just-yet/; Sohail Azmie, 

“Regional Maritime Security Patrols (RMSP),” Pakistan Today, June 3, 2019, 

https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/06/03/regional-maritime-security-patrols-rmsp/. 

328 巴基斯坦海军自造首艘导弹艇下水 技术源自中国 [“Pakistan Navy’s First Indigenously Built Missile Craft 

Launches, Built with Chinese Technology”], 兵工科技 [Ordnance Industry Science Technology], December 5, 2019, 

https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2019-12-05/doc-iihnzhfz3763419.shtml. Also see the Pakistan Maritime Security 

Agency’s website: “Assets / Bases – Operational Assets of PMSA,” Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, 

http://www.pmsa.gov.pk/pmsa-bases.php, (accessed May 21, 2020).

329 李鹏, 罗雷, 宋健, 乔浩伟 [Li Peng, Luo Lei, Song Jian, and Qiao Haowei], 我军海上投送海外保障支撑点的建设

[“Construction of Overseas Support Locations for Maritime Projection”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 

Transportation University], no. 3 (2015), pp. 3-4; 中船集团交付巴基斯坦 1500 吨级海事巡逻船 [“China Shipbuilding 

Corporation Delivers 1,500-ton Maritime Patrol Vessel to Pakistan”], 中船集团 [China State Shipbuilding Corporation], 

July 27, 2018, http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n112/n117/c6802428/content.html.

330 巴基斯坦要购中国 8 艘潜艇 [“Pakistan Wants to Purchase 8 Chinese Submarines”], 钱江晚报 [Qianjiang Evening 

News], April 12, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2015-04/12/c_127679390_2.htm; “China to Provide Eight 

Submarines to Pakistan,” The News, August 27, 2016, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/145701-China-to-provide-eightsubmarines-to-Pakistan. 331 Lan and Kuang, “Sino-Pakistani Military-technical Cooperation from a Geopolitical Perspective,” pp. 86-90. 332 China’s 2017 National Defense Transportation Law provides that Chinese enterprises stationed abroad “shall provide 

assistance for the ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel of China’s overseas military operations.” See Article 38, 中华人
54

patrol with the PN in maritime security operations in and around the Gulf, as well as to share 

intelligence and surveillance data collected from the station at PNS Akram. However, the absence of 

PLAN at Gwadar despite these opportunities is an important (but not permanent) observation.

The Preferred Karachi Alternative

To date, the PLAN has preferred the established well-developed facilities of the port of Karachi.

Chinese naval vessels visiting Pakistan have so far exclusively made port and replenishment calls 

there, and with some regularity (see Appendix).333 The commercial port at Karachi can satisfy PLAN 

replenishment requirements and serve among several of other preferred resupply locations that 

enable PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean.334 China’s 2nd Anti-Piracy Escort Task Force (ETF)

conducted a friendly visit to Karachi in August 2009.

335 Other ETFs have visited Karachi in the years 

since (see Appendix), although Oman, Djibouti, and Saudi Arabia are the sites of more frequent port 

calls for PLAN rest and replenishment.

336

The PLAN typically visits Karachi for diplomacy and joint exercises. It consistently participates in

the Pakistan-hosted “Aman” series of multilateral exercises, which feature participating ships and 

observers from numerous nations.337 More recently, the Southern Theater Command Navy sent four 

ships to the China-Pakistan nine-day bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians-2020,” held for the first time 

in Karachi.338 Sea-based exercises in the northern Arabian Sea included formation maneuver, joint 

patrol, air-defense, maritime interdiction, joint anti-submarine warfare, live-fire drills, and joint 

marine corps training. The PLAN provided overall direction for the exercise, taking the lead in 

efforts to improve organization and command and control for combined missions.

339 Such exercises 

民共和国国防交通法[“National Defense Traffic Law of the People's Republic of China”], adopted at the 22nd Meeting 

of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress, September 3, 2016, 

http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764.htm

333 The PLAN made its first overseas foreign port call in Karachi in 1985, a time when the PLAN rarely operated in distant 

waters. They did not make another friendly visit to Karachi until eight years later in 1993. Regular visits to Pakistan did 

not occur until the mid-2000s when Pakistan began hosting the biennial Aman-series multilateral joint exercises in 2007 

and the PLAN started deploying anti-piracy escort task forces to the region in late 2008. See Appendix for further details. 334 The first replenishment visit at Karachi took place in August 2009, when the 2nd Anti-Piracy Escort Task Force 

conducted a friendly visit and was reportedly conducting feasibility studies of regional ports for future resupply intervals.

中国海军舰队首次使用卡拉奇港补给 [“First Time Chinese Naval Fleet Uses Karachi Port for Replenishment”], 东方早

报 [Oriental Morning Post], September 10, 2012, https://www.guancha.cn/Neighbors/2012_09_10_96585.shtml.

335 中国护航行动进入常态化 海外多港口成休整基地 [“China’s Escort Operations Become Regularized as Many 

Overseas Ports Become Bases for Rest”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 23, 2009, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-08-

23/1005563478.html. 336 For analysis of PLAN anti-piracy escort task force operations in the Gulf of Aden, see Andrew S. Erickson and Austin 

M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” China Maritime Study 

No. 10, November 2013, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/12/. 

337 薛成清, 顾亚根 [Xue Chengqing and Gu Yagen], 我海军参加‘和平-19’ 多国海上联合军演 [“Chinese Navy 

Participates in ‘Aman-19’ Multilateral Maritime Joint Military Exercises”], 中国军网综合 [China Military Online 

Comprehensive], February 9, 2019, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2019-02/09/content_9423502.htm. For more details on the 

“Aman” exercises, see “Exercise Aman 2019—Together for Peace,” Pakistan Navy, 2019, https://aman.paknavy.gov.pk/, 

(accessed May 10, 2020). 

338 “China, Pakistan Kick Off ‘Sea Guardians-2020’ Naval Drill in Karachi,” China Military Online, January 6, 2020, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-01/06/content_9710755.htm.

339 See Appendix or the participating Chinese ships. “海洋卫士-2020” 中巴海上联合演习开幕 [“China-Pakistan Joint 

Maritime Exercises ‘Sea Guardians-2020’ Commences”], 海军新闻 [Navy News], January 6, 2020, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2020-01/06/c_1210427264.htm.
55

demonstrate a substantial degree of cooperation between the PLAN and PN, providing some 

confidence that Gwadar might also be used by the PLAN, alone or in combination with the PN. 

Image 5: Liugongdao submarine tender and Weishanhu replenishment ship at Karachi during “Sea Guardians-2020” exercise

Karachi’s proximity to India make it less desirable to some Chinese analysts.

340 However, the PLAN 

continues to make extensive use of it even with a functioning port at Gwadar. China State 

Shipbuilding Corporation personnel in Karachi have provided unspecified “equipment repair 

services” to PLAN escort forces in port.341 Other reports also find that PLAN submarines conduct 

stops in Karachi, with at least one occurring in May 2015, although specific submarine port calls are 

difficult to confirm through open sources. PLAN submarine activities in the region cause significant 

consternation in India.342 Such sensitivities may impose significant restraints on building reliable 

overseas logistics support for PLAN submarines, although Pakistan could conceivably do so.

343 This 

broader question would require political decisions in Beijing and Islamabad, and consideration not 

only of Indian sensibilities, but those of extra-regional powers like the United States. 

Because Pakistan is such a close security partner with China, and so dependent on Chinese good will 

for its economic and military development, it is not far-fetched to expect that Pakistan would 

welcome more substantial PLA use of the facility under some conditions. Still, the most critical 

factor limiting the basing option at Gwadar (or Karachi, Jiwani, or elsewhere in Pakistan) is the 

apparent lack of political commitment between China and Pakistan to provide mutual military 

340 “Compared to Karachi, Gwadar has the important advantage of greater strategic depth.” See Li Jingyu, et al., “The 

Strategic Concept of Selecting Points,” p. 31.

341 李鹏, 罗雷, 宋健, 乔浩伟 [Li Peng, Luo Lei, Song Jian, and Qiao Haowei], 我军海上投送海外保障支撑点的建设

[“Construction of Overseas Support Locations for Maritime Projection”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military 

Transportation University], no. 3 ( 2015), p. 4. 342 See Appendix. Remote sensing data also indicates at least one other visit. See “Satellite Imagery Reveals Presence of 

Chinese Nuclear Submarine in Karachi,” The Economic Times, July 12, 2018, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-nuclear-submarine-spotted-at-karachi-revealed-in-satelliteimagery/articleshow/56375723.cms?from=mdr.

343 汪国征, 蒲海洋 [Wang Guozheng and Pu Haiyang], 吴胜利出访埃及、南非和巴基斯坦 [“Wu Shengli Visits Egypt, 

South Africa, and Pakistan”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], May 10, 2016, p. 1.
56

support during times of crisis or conflict. More likely in the short- to medium-term is a fuller 

realization of the dual-use potential of the facility. If the transport infrastructure projects mature, 

Gwadar could become a key peace time replenishment or transfer point for PLA equipment and 

personnel.344 But establishment of a base from which the PLAN could undertake naval operations 

throughout the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean during periods of conflict is unlikely. Ultimately, 

the militarization of China’s Gwadar port facility requires a strategic decision in both Beijing and 

Islamabad that will not come without significant trade-offs.

Conclusion

Gwadar will not inevitably become a PLAN base. The strategic strongpoint concept, however, 

recommends serious consideration of the site’s potential military utility for China. That is, Gwadar 

will continue as a commercial facility operated by a state-owned Chinese firm that can make 

arrangements for military use: guaranteed pier space, fuel and supplies, and perhaps even munitions 

and some level of technical support for the PLAN fleet and personnel. In this model, China’s aims to 

put its best foot forward—namely, the huge scale of trade, investment, finance, and construction that 

its government and state-owned enterprises can deliver in concert. This substantial economic 

footprint is meant to develop and secure Pakistan for China’s benefit. By leading with commercial 

presence, China aims to create permissive conditions for political decisions that could support 

military utilization of the port and its surrounding infrastructure.

Such arrangements are uniquely suited to Pakistan, which is reasonably considered a most-likely 

candidate for China’s next military base. Pakistan is after all distinguished by its long-standing 

strategic alignment with China, growing dependence on Chinese trade and investment, extraordinary 

reliance on Chinese weapons sales, and close military and intelligence cooperation with the PLA.345

However, Pakistan is not a Chinese ally. China has never intervened on Pakistan’s behalf in its serial 

conflicts with India, and evidently prefers to provide Pakistan with only sufficient capability and 

diplomatic cover to take care of its own affairs.346 Thus, mutual political commitment between the 

two countries that would allow for PLA basing in times of conflict cannot be assumed.

Managing China’s relationship with India (however strained it is at present) is a high priority for 

Beijing—arguably higher than any other in the region, including Pakistan. Chinese leaders will not 

sacrifice that crucial bilateral relationship for the sake of a single military facility, and will carefully 

consider first- and second-order effects that would certainly result from a more overtly militarized 

PRC posture in Pakistan. As a former counsellor to the PRC Embassy in Pakistan put it, “if China 

builds a military base in Gwadar, no matter whether or not it signs a treaty, it will essentially form an 

alliance with it...this runs counter to our South Asia policy for the last 30 years.”347 It would indeed 

be an extraordinary change to China’s diplomacy in the region to decide that it prefers marginal 

improvement in its naval posture in the region to a stable relationship with India.

344 Minnie Chan, “As Overseas Ambitions Expand, China Plans 400 Per Cent Increase to Marine Corps Numbers, Sources 

Say,” South China Morning Post, March 13, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/2078245/overseas-ambitions-expand-china-plans-400pc-increase; “China May Deploy Marines to Gwadar 

Port,” The Maritime Executive, March 17, 2017, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-may-deploy-marinesto-gwadar-port. 345 Pakistan has been the largest importer of Chinese arms since the 1970s, and 73 percent of its total arms imports in the 

period 2015-2019 came from China. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” 

https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 346 For analysis of China’s arms-length approach to Pakistan’s conflicts, see Small, “The China-Pakistan Axis,” pp. 9-25. 347 Mao Siwei, “Three Big Mistakes in Understanding the CPEC.”
57

Drawing primarily on the official and academic discourse in China, this case study has focused on 

how Chinese experts understand the value of investing in a strategic strongpoint at Gwadar. We 

identify two distinct but converging objectives, one largely internal, the other external. The first, 

internal objective is arguably the most urgent and proximate explanation for China’s largesse in 

Pakistan. That is, Beijing hopes to stabilize Xinjiang province by providing security and development 

in neighboring Pakistan. Gwadar is an anchor for this ambitious development program for Pakistan, 

CPEC. PRC officials and analysts view peripheral security as fundamental to internal stability, 

drawing on a “holistic national security concept” with deep provenance in Chinese thinking on 

managing its frontiers. Nominally economic programs like the “Great Western Development” (and 

its rebranding as “Go West”), the “Belt and Road Initiative,” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk 

Road” all manifest this internal-external orientation, and require that both Xinjiang and its peripheral 

areas remain stable, secure conduits for China’s relations with the rest of the Eurasian continent.

The second objective, largely external, is to ensure reliable access to the Persian Gulf to support 

energy flows and a strategic presence in the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean region. Gwadar 

has major geographic appeal as an “exit to the ocean” because Pakistan is contiguous to western 

China and can, in theory, provide a secure logistical corridor to the sea. Only Myanmar and India 

likewise share borders with China as well as the Indian Ocean. The key limitations on realization of 

this objective are the insecurity, instability, and underdevelopment of Gwadar and Balochistan. 

China’s efforts to build transport infrastructure are proceeding, albeit at a glacial pace. Road, rail, and 

pipeline connections require political stability and a level of security that has proved unattainable in 

Pakistan. This situation should not be expected to change quickly, if at all. While the untapped inland 

markets and resources of Pakistan and Central Asia may provide some real incentive for 

consolidating these transport links, the COVID-19 pandemic, continued Pakistani macroeconomic 

instability, and China’s domestic economic slowdown combine to recommend a healthy dose of 

skepticism that these lofty economic purposes will be achieved.

Despite these challenges, Gwadar need not be a major commercial hub to help anchor China’s 

military, political, and economic presence in the Indian Ocean region. Its potency as a geopolitical 

instrument, however, comes with significant opportunity costs. Pakistan’s neighbor and rival, India, 

is hostile to China’s expanding presence in the region. Especially with the existing strains on the 

Sino-Indian relationship due to their border disputes, a “second front” is sure to drive India to more 

aggressive balancing against Chinese power in the Indian Ocean region. The more India feels 

threatened by Chinese presence in the region, the more attractive the United States becomes as a 

security partner for historically unaligned India. Beijing may not believe that India is likely to join an 

alliance with Western nations, but the rapid decay of that major bilateral relationship would greatly 

complicate China’s overall posture in the Indian Ocean region. 

These wider considerations hardly rule out the possibility of a more assertive and militarized Chinese 

presence at Gwadar. They do, however, establish hard trade-offs for Chinese strategists considering 

the net gains that Beijing would reap from a Gwadar military venture. If China-India and China-US 

relations continue to deteriorate rapidly, China may well determine that a confrontational posture is 

inevitable. In this case, overt militarization of China’s presence at Gwadar—perhaps in response to a 

terrorist incident or a threat in the Strait of Hormuz—might look appealing, even if it provoked harsh 

counter-measures. If, however, China is seeking to stabilize the precipitous decline in those 

geopolitical relationships, the internal and external security concerns analyzed here should win out. 

We would then expect to see China’s continued pursuit of Gwadar’s comprehensive development as 

a strategic strongpoint in the Indian Ocean.
58

Appendix. PLAN Port Calls to Karachi: 

Date Mission Vessels

8 December 1985 Friendly visit Type-051 destroyer Hefei and Type-905 replenishment 

ship Fengcang

November 1993 Friendly visit Type-679 training ship Zhenghe

20 May 2001 Friendly visit Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin and Type-905 

replenishment ship Taicang

21 November 2005 Friendly visit/joint exercise Type-051B destroyer Shenzhen and Type-903 

replenishment ship Weishanhu

5 March 2007 Multilateral exercise “Aman-07” Type-053H3 frigates Lianyungang and Sanming

21 February 2009 Multilateral exercise “Aman-09” Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou

5 August 2009 2nd Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/friendly visit

Type-054A frigate Huangshan and Type-903 

replenishment ship Weishanhu

24 February 2011 8th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/multilateral exercise “Aman2011”

Type-054 frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan

8 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest 

and resupply

Type-054A frigate Yiyang 

15 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/ 

rest and resupply

Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu

22 September 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force/rest 

and resupply

Type-054A frigate Changzhou

3 March 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/multilateral exercise “Aman2013”

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-053H3 frigate 

Mianyang, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu

29 July 2013 “Harmonious Mission-2013” Type-920 hospital ship Peace Ark

27 September 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/friendly visit/joint exercises

Type-052C destroyer Changchun and Type-054A 

frigate Changzhou

22 May 2015 Rest and resupply Type-039B conventional attack submarine No. 335

7 January 2016 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/friendly visit/joint exercises

Type-908 replenishment ship Qinghaihu, Type-054A 

frigate Liuzhou, and Type-054A frigate Sanya

15 November 2016 Joint exercises Type-054A frigate Handan

14 February 2017 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-17”

Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin, Type-054A frigate 

Handan, Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu

10 June 2017 Task Force 150 friendly visit/joint 

exercises

Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A frigate 

Jingzhou, and Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu

30 November 2017 Joint exercise “Friend-2017” Type-054A frigate Jingzhou 

7 February 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task 

Force/multilateral exercise “Aman-19”

Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan and 

Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu 

4 January 2020 Bilateral exercise “Sea Guardians2020”

Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan, Type-054A frigate 

Yuncheng, Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu, 

and Type-926 submarine support ship Liugongdao
59

Appendix Sources: 第一次军舰出访: 东海舰队访问南亚三国 [“First Warship Visits: East Sea Fleet Visits Three South 

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Karachi”], 驻卡拉奇总领馆 [Consulate General in Karachi], September 26, 2012, 

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基斯坦 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship Peace Ark’s First Visit to Pakistan”], 中国新闻网 [China News], July 29, 2013, 

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01/12/content_6853217.htm; 中巴海军双边联合军演海上实兵演习阶段拉开战幕 [“Maritime Live-Troops Phase of 

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60

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About the Authors

Peter A. Dutton, JD, PhD is professor of strategic studies at the China Maritime Studies Institute at 

the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Dutton's research focuses on Chinese views 

of sovereignty and international law and how those views are shaped by geostrategic and historical 

factors. He advises senior officials and military leaders across the government and has testified 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 

Committees. Dutton is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and former Naval Flight Officer. He holds a 

J.D. from the College of William and Mary and a Ph.D. from King’s College London. He is an 

adjunct professor of law at NYU School of Law and a Research Fellow at the US-Asia Law Institute.

Isaac B. Kardon, PhD is assistant professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute. He researches, 

writes, and teaches on China’s foreign policy, with a focus on maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific 

maritime security and commerce, and China-Pakistan relations. His book, China’s Law of the Sea: 

Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction, is forthcoming from Yale University Press. He holds a PhD in 

Government from Cornell, an MPhil in Modern Chinese Studies from Oxford, and a BA in History 

from Dartmouth.

Conor Kennedy is a research associate at the China Maritime Studies Institute. He received his MA 

from Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

The authors relied on invaluable research support and technical analysis from Terence Nicholas, an 

Operations Specialist at the U.S. Naval War College.