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28–282 PDF 2018

S. HRG. 115–133 

NOMINATIONS OF JOSEPH OTTING AND RANDAL 

QUARLES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

THE NOMINATIONS OF: 

JOSEPH OTTING, OF NEVADA, TO BE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE

OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY

RANDAL QUARLES, OF COLORADO, TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF

GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, AND VICE CHAIRMAN FOR

SUPERVISION, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

JULY 27, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

( 

Available at: http://www.govinfo.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho, Chairman 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada 

GREGG RICHARD, Staff Director 

MARK POWDEN, Democratic Staff Director 

ELAD ROISMAN, Chief Counsel 

JOE CARAPIET, Senior Counsel 

GRAHAM STEELE, Democratic Chief Counsel 

LAURA SWANSON, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

DAWN RATLIFF, Chief Clerk 

CAMERON RICKER, Hearing Clerk 

SHELVIN SIMMONS, IT Director 

JIM CROWELL, Editor 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2017 

Page 

Opening statement of Chairman Crapo ................................................................. 1 

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: 

Senator Shelby .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Richard Burr, Senator from the State of North Carolina .................................... 1 

NOMINEES 

Joseph Otting, of Nevada, to be Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency ............................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Biographical sketch of nominee ....................................................................... 38 

Responses to written questions of: 

Senator Brown ........................................................................................... 59 

Senator Sasse ............................................................................................ 66 

Senator Reed .............................................................................................. 70 

Senator Menendez ..................................................................................... 71 

Senator Heitkamp ..................................................................................... 72 

Senator Schatz ........................................................................................... 74 

Senator Cortez Masto ................................................................................ 76 

Randal Quarles, of Colorado, to be a Member of the Board of Governors 

of the Federal Reserve System, and Vice Chairman for Supervision, Board 

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ..................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Biographical sketch of nominee ....................................................................... 47 

Responses to written questions of: 

Senator Brown ........................................................................................... 79 

Senator Sasse ............................................................................................ 88 

Senator Reed .............................................................................................. 90 

Senator Menendez ..................................................................................... 92 

Senator Heitkamp ..................................................................................... 94 

Senator Schatz ........................................................................................... 97 

Senator Cortez Masto ................................................................................ 98 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD

Letters submitted in support of the nomination of Joseph Otting ...................... 115 

Letter submitted in support of the nominations of Joseph Otting and Randal 

Quarles .................................................................................................................. 121 

(III)

(1) 

NOMINATIONS OF JOSEPH OTTING AND 

RANDAL QUARLES 

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met at 9:59 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Michael Crapo, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Chairman CRAPO. And would the witnesses for our hearing 

please come and take their seats, and while they are doing that, 

Senator Shelby cannot be here for his questioning time, and so he 

has asked for just like a minute to make a quick statement. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I will be real quick today. 

I just want to say I will not be here. I have got to preside over 

an appropriations hearing, but I believe that the President has 

sent us two good nominees. One, we have waited a long time on 

the Vice Chairman of Supervision for the Fed—Mr. Quarles, Mr. 

Otting—and I think they are outstanding nominees. I hope that 

you—the hearing goes well and we can expedite these nominees 

and get them in place. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you, Senator Shelby. 

All right. The hearing will come to order. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MIKE CRAPO 

This morning we will consider the nominations of Mr. Joseph 

Otting to be Comptroller of the Currency and the Honorable 

Randal Quarles to be a Member of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System and Vice Chairman for Supervision of the 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 

Welcome to both of you. 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you. 

Chairman CRAPO. And congratulations to you on your nominations to these important offices. 

I see that you have friends and family sitting with you, and I 

welcome them here today as well. 

These two positions are critically important to ensuring a safe, 

sound, and vibrant financial system, and we are fortunate to have 

two highly qualified individuals to consider for these posts. 

Mr. Otting brings a particular expertise and understanding of 

our banking system from a long career in financial services. As 

2 

head of the OCC, Mr. Otting would oversee supervision of all 

national banks and Federal savings associations as well as Federal 

branches and agencies of foreign banks. Having served in leadership positions at various financial institutions in the past, I am 

confident that Mr. Otting will bring strong leadership to the OCC. 

Mr. Quarles has a wealth of government and private-sector experience as well dealing with both domestic and international financial markets. He is no stranger to public service, having previously 

served in multiple top posts in the Treasury Department. As Vice 

Chairman for Supervision, Mr. Quarles would play a key role in developing regulatory and supervisory policy for the Federal Reserve 

System. 

President Obama never designated anyone for this role. Instead, 

former Fed Governor Dan Tarullo acted as the de facto Vice Chairman for Supervision in various ways, including by chairing the 

Federal Reserve Board’s Committee on Supervision and Regulation, 

overseeing the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee, and representing the Fed at the Financial Stability Board 

and in Basel, among other functions. 

In February, Chair Yellen committed in a hearing that she expected President Trump’s nominee for Vice Chairman for Supervision will have the same responsibilities that Governor Tarullo 

had, including heading the Federal 

Reserve’s Committee on Supervision and Regulation and representing the Fed at the Financial Stability Board and in Basel. I 

look forward to working with Mr. Quarles in this effort. 

Congratulations again on your nominations, and thank you and 

your families for your willingness to serve. 

Senator Brown. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHERROD BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the 

witnesses. 

I appreciate holding today’s hearing. I thank the witnesses for 

their willingness to enter public service. 

This Committee under the previous Chairman, not the gentleman whom I respect sitting next to me, waited 2 years and 

never did hearings on two Federal Reserve nominees. I am glad 

that this Chairman and the Democrats are willing to move forward 

on a nominee of the President, of the party that is not ours, unlike 

what this body, this Committee failed to do for 2 long years. 

You are seeking, all of you—the two of you are seeking to follow 

in the footstep of two people, each in the Fed and OCC, who are 

dedicated public servants and did a great deal to make our financial system safer. 

Mr. Quarles served as Treasury’s Under Secretary for Domestic 

Finance in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. His job 

was to coordinate oversight of the financial industry and ensure 

Government watchdogs were looking out for the best interest of 

American taxpayers. However, many of his statements leading up 

to the crisis lead me to wonder whether he was asleep at the 

switch or willfully turning a blind eye to Wall Street abuses and 

excesses. 

3 

Contrary to Mr. Quarles’ predictions in 2006, the economy was— 

quote, was not, as he said, ‘‘strong’’; the financial sector was not, 

as he said, ‘‘healthy’’; and our future was not, as he said, ‘‘bright.’’ 

The banks were not, in fact, as he said at the time, ‘‘well capitalized,’’ and as a result, taxpayers paid billions to bail these banks 

out, while Mr. Quarles and his company turned a profit off of the 

crisis. 

Exotic mortgage products were not confined to, as he said, quote, 

‘‘upper-income individuals that can manage a sizable increase in 

their monthly mortgage payment,’’ unquote. Shady loans were 

pitched to sheet metal workers in Parma, Ohio; school teachers in 

Cleveland, Ohio; servicemembers from Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base in Dayton, Ohio. 

The financial crisis devastated the Ohio families that lost their 

jobs and their homes and their savings, but for wealthy bank executives, for private equity investors, the crisis was hardly lifechanging. It was an opportunity to profit by flipping failing banks 

bought at rock-bottom prices and foreclosing on working families, 

all while raking in taxpayer dollars. 

I have said this in Committee before. My wife and I live in ZIP 

Code 44105 in Cleveland. In 2007, the first half of that year, more 

homes were foreclosed on than any ZIP Code in the United States 

of America. So I see—I see the aftermath of that every day I am 

in Ohio, which is 4 or 5 days almost every week. 

Mr. Otting’s bank made money by kicking seniors out of their 

homes and then turned around and said the Government made 

them do it. Mr. Quarles bemoaned the role of the Government as 

a player in the financial sector rather than a referee. These sentiments would ring a little less hollow had their banks not accepted 

$2.5 billion from the FDIC to protect them from losses. Apparently, 

they believe in Government help for Wall Street, just not families 

in ZIP Code 44105. 

In the wake of the crisis, the FDIC was forced to step in to share 

losses at failed banks, banks like IndyMac and BankUnited, to prevent a bigger hit on the insurance fund. Mr. Quarles and Mr. 

Otting then stepped in and made good money after those banks 

had been propped up by taxpayers. 

According to the Columbus Dispatch, Ohio’s most conservative 

newspaper, 2,000 Ohioans were foreclosed on by OneWest in our 

six largest counties alone from 2009 to 2015 while Mr. Otting 

served as its CEO. In fact, he was held accountable for robosignings by the Office of Thrift Supervision, the predecessor to the 

agency he now hopes to run. 

My concern is not whether today’s nominees have a great—have 

a wealth of experience—they do—running, working for banks. My 

concern is whether they will work for American taxpayers and 

working families. 

We have made a lot of progress in the 7 years since we passed 

Wall Street reform. One-fifth of the rules, however, remain unfinished. Instead of finishing the job, Wall Street’s allies in this town 

try to take us backward, weakening or eliminating important safeguards. 

We already see this at some of the agencies that have removed 

Wall Street reform from their agendas and attacked other 

4 

agendas—other agencies—excuse me—for doing their jobs. This collective amnesia reminds me all too well of 2006. Big banks make 

record profits, yet they claim they are besieged by their overseers, 

the regulators. 

The banks’ refrain is to be expected. What is not acceptable is 

for the referees to join the chorus. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

We will now—will the nominees please rise now and raise your 

right hands, and we will administer the oath. This constitutes two 

questions. First, do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Mr. OTTING. I do. 

Mr. QUARLES. I do. 

Chairman CRAPO. And then, second, do you agree to appear and 

testify before any duly constituted Committee of the Senate? 

Mr. OTTING. I do. 

Mr. QUARLES. I do. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. Take your seats. 

Your written statements will be made a part of the record in its 

entirety. I think you have already been advised we allocate you 5 

minutes for an introductory oral statement. 

I again remind my colleagues on the Committee that the time for 

questioning is 5 minutes and ask cooperation of all to try to maintain those timeframes. 

Before you begin your statement, I invite you, if you would like 

to do so, to introduce any of your family members who are in attendance, and, Mr. Otting, you may proceed. 

Mr. OTTING. OK. Thank you very much, Chairman Crapo. 

First of all, I would like to introduce my wife and best friend, 

Bonnie Otting, who is sitting behind me. Sometimes you get lucky 

in life, and I am forever grateful the day that we had the opportunity to meet. She has always been my compass in life, and for 

that, I love you. 

In addition, I would like to recognize Bonnie’s father, Herman 

Espinoza, who could not be with us today due to his health and age 

of 94. Herman is a first-generation immigrant who came to the 

United States to pursue the American dream so his family could 

live a better life. One of his proudest moments was when he was 

granted his U.S. citizenship. 

My mother, Grace Ann McQuillen Otting, is with us today also. 

She has been my guiding light in life, instilling in me a strong 

moral compass and helping me appreciate the values of sound family life. She taught school for 35 years and was an inspiration to 

many students. 

I would also like to acknowledge my late father, James Otting, 

and mother-in-law Jessie Espinoza. My father taught me very 

many valuable lessons in life, not the least of which were his business acumen, focus on family, and his commitment to serving his 

community. From Bonnie’s mother, I learned the value of kindness 

to others and that love can solve many things. 

Last, I would like to introduce my sister, Julie Ardell Otting, and 

my brother, James Otting, who are also with us today. Over the 

5 

years, we have learned the value of love, companionship, and the 

ability to be dependent on each other. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you, and, again, welcome to your family. 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you. 

Chairman CRAPO. You may begin your statement. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH OTTING, OF NEVADA, TO BE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 

Mr. OTTING. Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, and 

Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today. 

I am grateful to be nominated by President Trump to be the 

Comptroller of the Currency, and if confirmed for this role, I would 

be honored to serve the citizens of the United States of America. 

Thank you to all the Committee Members I had an opportunity 

to meet. I enjoyed the opportunity to meet some of you for the first 

time and to get reacquainted with others, but most importantly, I 

appreciated the opportunity to learn more about the issues you feel 

are important to the people of America. For those who I did not get 

to meet, if confirmed, I look forward to meeting and working with 

you in the future. 

I grew up in a Midwestern family where my father was an entrepreneurial businessperson and my mother, as I indicated, was a 

school teacher. At the young age of 10, I learned the value of business, client relationships, and leadership from my father while 

working at his businesses, often doing the jobs at that age that nobody else wanted to do. I also observed how my father—how hard 

work, willingness to take risk, and family support led to success. 

I learned from my mother, who taught school during the day, 

raised three children and went to college at night, that hard work 

and dedication can make a difference. 

I studied at the University of Northern Iowa, following a family 

tradition of my mother, sister, and ultimately my brother to the 

university. During the summer and holiday breaks, my father 

would have me work at his businesses and arranged other roles, 

which included working at an electrical dam for a regional utility, 

commercial construction, and at a bakery, all great roles for building character, an appreciation for people and their individuality, 

and how leadership can make a difference. 

After college, I was fortunate to be chosen to be part of Bank of 

America’s training program in California. It was an experience that 

forever changed my life. I gained insight into the banking system 

from the other side of the table and discovered how banks can help 

consumers and businesses with services, deposits, and loans. It is 

in this industry that I spent the next 34 years of my life and 

learned the importance of serving employees, the community, customers, and shareholders. 

My banking experience has allowed me to work for one of the 

largest banks in the United States, two well-respected regional 

banks, and a community bank. I have touched virtually every segment of the industry, including serving consumers, businesses, 

6 

trust functions, private banking, investment services, human resources, compliance, audit, treasury, financial management, and 

operations. This experience provides a broad base of knowledge 

that would be helpful and insightful if I was chosen to be the 

Comptroller. 

In 2010 I decided to leave an executive position at an established 

financial institution because I felt Southern California was in need 

of a hometown bank. When approached about the idea, I knew it 

would be challenging and a tremendous amount of work but ultimately an achievement for myself and the company. With the assistance of many dedicated men and women of OneWest Bank, we 

were able to create the largest hometown bank in Southern California. It was able to grow beyond just being a mortgage company 

and being able to serve the needs of local businesses, families, and 

consumers. Hopefully, helping build this company is something 

that I will and will remain proud of. 

After a successful merger in 2015, I left the organization and became an entrepreneurial person returning to me roots in real estate and small business. 

The mission of the OCC is to ensure that national banks, Federal 

savings and loans, and foreign operations of international banks 

operate in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial 

services, treat customers fairly, and comply with applicable laws 

and regulations. If confirmed as Comptroller of the Currency and 

given the opportunity to lead the men and women of the agency, 

I pledge to honor the OCC’s mission and cooperate and work with 

this Committee and all Members of Congress. 

Thank you for your time today. I look forward to answering any 

questions the Committee may have, and I am honored to share this 

hearing with Mr. Quarles. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you, Mr. Otting. 

And, Mr. Quarles, you may begin. 

Mr. QUARLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to introduce my wife, Hope Eccles, who is with me 

here today; my parents, Ralph and Beverly Quarles; and our niece, 

Liza Burnett, who is interning here on the Hill and can be with 

us today. 

Chairman CRAPO. Well, thank you, and, again, we welcome your 

family. 

Mr. QUARLES. My statement? 

Chairman CRAPO. Yes. Please go forward. 

STATEMENT OF RANDAL QUARLES, OF COLORADO, TO BE A 

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 

RESERVE SYSTEM AND VICE CHAIRMAN FOR SUPERVISION, 

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Mr. QUARLES. Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am honored that the President has nominated me to serve as 

a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 

and as the Board’s Vice Chairman for Supervision, and I am grateful for the privilege of your consideration. And I am also very 

grateful for the support not only of my wife and family who are 

7 

here, but of our three children, Randy, Spencer, and Hope Jr., who 

have put up with a lot in their lives from their father’s public service. 

The Federal Reserve System occupies a central position in our 

country’s policy infrastructure for promoting a strong economy and 

the stability of the financial system and supporting robust job 

growth in a context of price stability. I can assure the Committee 

that were I to be confirmed as a Governor of the Federal Reserve, 

I would be strongly committed to all these objectives. 

The specific position for which I have been nominated, Vice 

Chairman for Supervision, has a particular role in ensuring the 

safety, soundness, and efficient operation of the financial system. 

As recognized by the Treasury’s recent report, regulatory policies 

that have been enacted since the financial crisis have improved the 

safety and soundness of the system, but as with any complex undertaking, after the first wave of reform, with the benefit of experience and reflection, some refinements will undoubtedly be in order. 

Former Governor Dan Tarullo, who was one of the principal architects of many of these reforms, said as much himself in a valedictory speech that he gave in April on the occasion of his leaving 

the board, stating that there are clearly some changes that can be 

made without endangering financial stability. The key question will 

be ensuring that as we continue to refine the system over time, we 

do so while maintaining the robust resilience of the system to 

shocks. 

I believe that I am well qualified to undertake that role. As this 

Committee knows, I have had experience over my career with the 

financial sector from many different points of view. I have been a 

practicing lawyer versed in the granular technicalities of the most 

complex aspects of the regulatory system. At the other end of the 

spectrum, I have been an investor in small community banks. I am 

familiar with the particular benefits and challenges that those institutions face. 

And I have been a financial regulatory policymaker under two 

different Presidents in two different decades. In fact, my first tour 

of duty in public service was during a similar period of response 

after a financial crisis, arriving in 1991 during the clean-up phase 

of the savings and loan crisis and facing the insolvency of the 

FDIC’s insurance fund. 

While this experience has given me substantive insight into the 

issues that the Federal Reserve’s Vice Chairman for Supervision 

will face, it has also reinforced my commitment to what I think is 

the single most important characteristic of a good policymaker, 

that he be humble, humble about the constraints on our understanding of complex systems, humble about the fallibility of our 

judgments, and humble about how our assumptions and views influence even what we believe to be our most data-driven and analytical conclusions. 

As a consequence, were I to be confirmed for this position, I 

would approach this undertaking as I try to approach every task, 

with a continual openness to input from every source. In particular, 

I would look forward to working with the Members of this Committee on both sides of the aisle and their staffs to understand the 

challenges that face the financial system as they evolve over time. 

8 

Thank you for the honor of this hearing, and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you, Mr. Quarles. 

And, Mr. Quarles, I will start and will start with you first. 

Immediately prior to leaving the Fed, former Governor Tarullo 

gave a speech highlighting areas where regulatory relief could be 

appropriate, in his opinion. Former Governor Tarullo said, one, the 

$50 billion SIFI threshold should be changed; two, the Volcker rule 

is too complicated and may be having a deleterious effect on market making, particularly for some less liquid issues; three, community banks should have a much simpler capital regime; four, the 

supplementary leverage ratio should be revisited; five, the $10 billion asset threshold for company-run stress test is too low; and six, 

the Federal Reserve should consider eliminating the qualitative 

portion of CCAR for all banks. 

Mr. Quarles, do you agree with all of these recommendations? 

Mr. QUARLES. I actually do agree with all of those recommendations. I think they are very much in line with how I would approach regulation. 

Chairman CRAPO. Well, thank you. 

And this second part of this question may be something you want 

to take a little bit of time and think about and respond later, but 

if you have any ideas right now, are there any additional areas of 

regulatory relief that you think it would be appropriate for us to 

look at? 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that one important area that was not mentioned in that list is transparency. I would want that to be a theme 

of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory activities, were I confirmed for 

this position. 

I think that both as an appropriate relationship between the regulator and the regulated and also as a matter of improving the content of regulation, it is important for regulators to be very clear 

about the principles that are driving their decisions and about the 

expectations they have for the regulated system. 

I think an example of that, although it is only one example, is 

the lack of transparency that has surrounded the CCAR stress test 

up to now. So I do think that the Federal Reserve can look at being 

more transparent about those activities and can do it in a way that 

does not in any way reduce the effectiveness of those tests. 

Chairman CRAPO. Well, thank you. I appreciate that, and as you 

have further observations, I welcome you relaying them to us. 

Mr. Otting, I enjoyed meeting with you last week, and at our 

meeting, we spent some time discussing your time as an executive 

at OneWest. There has been some controversy about OneWest, and 

would you like to take a little minute or two here to respond to 

some of the questions that have already been raised and, frankly, 

to describe for the Committee your tenure at OneWest? 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you, Chairman Crapo. 

First of all, in 2008 was when IndyMac failed. It was taken over 

by the FDIC, and it operated until March of 2009. In March of 

2009, an investment group led by Steven Mnuchin acquired the 

bank and renamed the entity OneWest Bank. As we all know, this 

was a very difficult time in America in the middle of the financial 

crisis. 

9 

The investment group bought IndyMac because they believed in 

an American recovery, that they could rebuild and create a regional 

bank and save thousands of jobs. Going into IndyMac can only be 

described as what a fireman feels when he gets to the front door 

of a five-alarm fire. The bank had almost 200,000 loans in default. 

The men and women of OneWest Bank were working diligently to 

save the homes of thousands of Americans. 

While some of those who focus on the homes that were lost—and 

this was clearly a tragedy—we like to focus on the 80 percent, 

roughly, of the 160,000 homes that were able to be saved, and 

those Americans are in those homes today. 

We did this by having some very creative initiatives. We were 

the first to offer principal forgiveness. We lowered interest rates, 

and we modified payments and moved principal to the back so people could afford their homes. 

Another area the bank received attention was the servicing of 

mortgages. The bank through the acquisition of IndyMac assumed 

a large portfolio of non-owned servicing of mortgages. We were 

doing them as a third-party servicer. These portfolios often had restrictive agreements on what both the bank—actions they could 

take regarding those agreements. 

In April of 2011, OneWest Bank and all the large mortgage 

servicers in America signed a consent order to review and improve 

servicing practice and standards. A significant part of this order 

was the review of foreclosures and modifications completed in 2009 

and 2010. For OneWest Bank, this involved reviewing 175,000 borrowers that were in foreclosure. 

Ultimately, OneWest Bank was the only bank, 1 out of 14, that 

actually completed that look-back of the foreclosures. This was 

completed by an independent third party under the engagement 

and supervision of the OCC. The results prove that OneWest Bank 

had a very low error rate, and independent Government reviews 

routinely demonstrated that we had the most effective loan modification of any program. These are facts that are available in the 

public arena. 

We also took litigation efforts against some of the holders of the 

mortgages to allow us to have similar actions against their portfolios. For any errors that were identified—and there were errors, 

but they were small and in the small basis points—the bank made 

full restitution to the borrowers to the tune of almost $9 million. 

If it were not for the hardworking employees of OneWest Bank, 

I believe that many more foreclosures would have happened, numerous job losses would have occurred, and Southern California 

consumers and businesses would have been left without an additional bank that could provide loans and products and services. 

Thank you, Chairman Crapo, for allowing me to address that. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. Otting, I will start with you, and thank you for that explanation. I want to pursue that further. 

The Columbus Dispatch article I mentioned, one, the most conservative newspaper in Ohio, OneWest denied loan modifications or 

gave the runaround to homeowners like Carla Duncan, a social 

10 

worker from Cleveland Heights who was current on her mortgage. 

As CEO of OneWest, you signed the consent order that I mentioned 

in my opening statement for shoddy services and improper foreclosures related to the practice of robo-signing, which you did not 

mention in your robo-signing, I do not believe you mentioned in 

your answer to Chairman Crapo. In other words, you permitted 

your bank to break the rules while in the process making life harder for homeowners like Ms. Duncan across the country trying to 

stay in their homes. How do we trust that you will not allow banks 

to skirt the rules and harm their customers as their regulator? 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you, Senator Brown, for the question. 

First of all, just for a correction, I did sign the consent order, but 

we did not confirm or deny the accusations in the consent order. 

The follow-up review reviewed 175,000 borrowers. In the area of 

did we not provide modifications, I believe the number—I could be 

wrong—was roughly 35 out of 29,000 modifications that were reviewed. 

We did make 29 mistakes, and I apologize to the American people for that. But the error rate was incredibly low, and so my viewpoint is if you look at the actual facts, there is a false narrative 

out there about the OneWest Bank servicing operation. I think you 

would walk away feeling very good about our operations. 

Senator BROWN. Well, it is a false narrative to you, not to those 

that lost their homes. More on that in a moment. 

Mr. Quarles, year before the beginning of the financial crisis 

while in charge of the Office of Treasury, responsible financial regulation, you downplayed the risks emerging in the financial sector. 

You touted its resiliency. You said, ‘‘I can assure you that my colleagues and I at Treasury are doing everything in our power to 

make our financial system even more resilient in the future.’’ 

In retrospects—in retrospect, do you believe you and your colleagues at Treasury did everything you could have and should have 

to prevent the crisis, and what more—if not, what more should 

have been done? And be as precise as you can. 

Mr. QUARLES. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that question because I have, obviously, reflected since the crisis on the measures 

that were taken leading up to the crisis. 

We were aware—I guess the right way to put it is that we believed that even given the information that we had from the regulatory system that the risks that were building up in the system 

were manageable, we did believe that there were measures that 

could be taken to improve the resiliency of the regulatory system 

and the ability of the regulatory system to understand risk, and we 

were beginning a process of presenting a program for change that 

would have improved the regulatory system. 

With the benefit of hindsight, we could have been more aggressive in pushing that program forward and in putting those ideas 

forward. 

As I think you can appreciate and all the Members of this Committee can appreciate, in advance of the financial crisis, the political obstacles to the changes that we thought would be appropriate 

to improve regulation would have been formidable, and so we were 

proceeding cautiously. With the benefit of hindsight, I would say it 

was probably too cautious to putting forward—— 

11 

Senator BROWN. Right. But implicit and political obstacles are 

the power of—and the influence of Wall Street on this Committee? 

Mr. QUARLES. I would not say it was so much the power and influence of Wall Street on this Committee. I think, you know, one 

of the ways in which I think that on a clean slate, financial regulation could be improved would be to have a much simpler, clearer, 

less kaleidoscopic construction of the regulatory system that would 

make it easier for the regulators to understand where risk is and 

where it is not. 

The political obstacles to that were less those of the industry 

versus the Committee and more those of people of goodwill having 

differing views in a time that was not a crisis as to what the right 

answers were. It had been a longstanding question that changing 

those rules was going to be difficult. 

I do think it is a very fair question to ask what could we have 

done differently, and I think my answer would be we could have 

moved more quickly. We could have been more aggressive in pushing some of these regulatory changes that we wanted to push but 

believed would be politically difficult. 

Senator BROWN. And last, back to you, Mr. Otting. Treasury released its report recently on financial regulation as required by the 

President’s Executive order. Much of that report focused on rolling 

back rules for the Nation’s largest banks, including decreasing capital requirements. Do you agree we should roll those rules back for 

the Nation’s largest banks? 

Mr. OTTING. I believe there were a lot of recommendations in 

that report, and I do support a number of those specifically as they 

deal with community banks and small banks across America. 

Senator BROWN. Yeah, but that was not my question. Specifically, I knew—I knew from our individual conversation that was 

the case, but—— 

Mr. OTTING. I think the capital structure that we have in place 

today is highly complex, and I think it needs to be examined. And 

I would be—welcome to sit down and have dialogue with you on 

that. 

Senator BROWN. Well, you said in our conversation on Tuesday 

that you think the rules for the largest banks are appropriate and 

should not be weakened. 

Mr. OTTING. Well, I said I—overall, I think that the regulatory 

system we have in place today has resulted in banks understanding their risks much better than they ever have, and we have 

better capital levels. 

I do think that we have created—you know, in 150 years, we 

have had many provisions and laws that have come through the 

banking system. Seven years ago when Dodd-Frank was put in 

place, I think it has opened up to look at some of the characteristics, but I am a believer of a well-capitalized banking system and 

a banking system that understands its risk. 

Senator BROWN. Well, I am concerned that a President who says 

we should drain the swamp, as he surrounds himself with him almost looking like a Wall Street executive retreat in his President’s 

Cabinet, I am concerned about a report coming from Treasury suggesting decreasing capital requirements. 

12 

I will just close with this. I just hope that you are not part of 

any effort to weaken capital requirements. That clearly is the 

wrong direction for a stable banking system. 

Chairman CRAPO. Senator Toomey. 

Senator TOOMEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. 

Let me start with Mr. Quarles. Thanks for visiting with me recently in my office. I enjoyed our discussion, and I want to follow 

up a little bit on one aspect of that which relates to the resolution 

authority of Dodd-Frank. 

As you know, I made it clear, among the many very serious flaws 

in Dodd-Frank, one that has bothered me from the beginning is the 

resolution authority that grants very disturbing discretion to regulators in the case of a failing institution and puts taxpayers at risk 

for having to bail out a failing financial institution. 

It has always been my view that the right way to resolve the failure of a big financial institution is to do it in bankruptcy, where 

the losses would be taken by shareholders and unsecured creditors, 

where creditors could know with complete transparency how they 

will be treated, because it is a matter of precedent and law, and 

where similarly situated creditors would be treated the same way. 

These are fundamental principles of bankruptcy, and yet it seems 

to me as long as we have this resolution authority and a bankruptcy code that needs to be modified, there is a danger that in the 

event that a big financial institution gets into trouble, we would 

have—we would use this flawed authority. 

So I have legislation that would amend the bankruptcy code. It 

is designed to enable bankruptcy to work for even a very large, 

very complex financial institution, and I would just like to get your 

thoughts on whether, A, you believe it is necessary and appropriate 

to amend the bankruptcy code for this purpose and whether you 

would work with me and this Committee to try to get to that goal 

so that we would never have to worry about taxpayers having to 

bail out a financial institution again. 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, thank you, Senator. 

I think a theme throughout my career of my approach to policymaking and particularly to regulation has been that the discretion 

of policymakers and regulators—particularly regulators—should be 

as constrained as possible, and where discretion remains, those 

regulators should be as clear as possible about how they will exercise it in the future so that their actions are predictable and there 

is less uncertainty as to what their policy will be. 

In connection with that, I do think that it is a very valuable effort. Indeed, the right way to approach continuing to improve the 

environment for the resolution of financial institutions is to improve the operation of the bankruptcy code so that a financial institution could fail in the same way that any other institution fails, 

and the rules surrounding that would be understood as they are for 

any other institution with as little exercise of discretion as is possible. 

I think that, as you have noted, there is more work that needs 

to be done to improve the bankruptcy code, a lot of questions that 

surround how one can do that, but I believe that is achievable, and 

I would be happy to work with you and your staff on that effort. 

13 

Senator TOOMEY. Great. Thank you. 

I am going to run out of time, so I just want to be quickly—I 

want to touch on CCARs. And, Mr. Quarles, you mentioned earlier, 

if I understood you correctly, that you think there should be more 

transparency in the methodology. 

I just want to mention for the Committee’s benefit a reminder of 

the GAO report on CCARs. In addition to—we know how incredibly 

costly it is to comply with this regime, but the models and testing 

procedures are not transparent according to GAO. But not only 

that, the Fed has not done enough to assess whether CCAR is inadvertently pro-cyclical, and, of course, if it is, there is a danger that 

it actually could contribute to systemic risk through the dynamic 

of the crowded trades that you have alluded to. 

So I would just urge you to seriously consider that possibility and 

the extent to which really CCAR is even necessary anymore, especially given the DFAS mechanism. 

Very quickly, Mr. Otting, if I could just ask you a question. One 

of the other things about Dodd-Frank that I find very problematic 

is the SIFI designations. I object to the concept, but I acknowledge 

that it is the law. 

Nevertheless, the process by which the FSOC has made the designations has been so badly flawed that, as you know, a court has 

ruled that it is impermissible in at least one case. 

You would be a member of the committee making designations. 

I think it is irrefutable that the process has been opaque. That institutions subject to the designation do not know the criteria by 

which they are designated. That there is no well-defined process by 

which a firm could choose to discontinue the activity that would 

cause a designation. There is no well-defined process for a de-designation. 

Given all of these fundamental flaws, which at least one court 

has agreed, do you think it is appropriate that there would not be 

any additional nonbank SIFI designations until at least this process is changed? 

Mr. OTTING. Senator Toomey, first of all, I agree with all the 

points that you made, and I think it—both of us, as a Committee, 

to sit down and bring greater definitions to those before we would 

designate another SIFI. So I do agree with you. 

Senator TOOMEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Warren. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So after the 2008 crisis, Congress put the Fed in charge of supervising the biggest banks and created a new position, this Vice 

Chair for Supervision that was supposed to lead that effort. That 

means if you are confirmed to this position, Mr. Quarles, you will 

have more influence than any other person over the regulation of 

the big banks. 

Now, given that enormous power, the number one thing we need 

from the Fed’s Vice Chair for Supervision is a demonstrated willingness to stand up to the interests of the big banks that threaten 

the financial institutions, but when I look at your 30-year career 

spinning through the revolving door of the private sector, Mr. 

14 

Quarles, I just do not see it. You have got 15 years representing 

big banks at a New York law firm working on some of the mergers 

that created the too-big-to-fail banks that we have today. You have 

two stints at the Treasury Department, including shortly before the 

2008 crisis, where you insisted that the banks were well capitalized 

enough to survive a housing downturn—it turns out they were 

not—and more than a decade in private equity and investment 

management, where you have argued repeatedly for weaker rules 

for the biggest banks. So that is not a track record that should give 

Americans a whole lot of confidence in you. 

But what I want to do is try to look ahead on this. The big banks 

and financial firms have a lobbying organization called the Financial Services Roundtable, or FSR, and it has no community bank 

members. It is purely the big guys. FSR recently submitted a 124- 

page wish list of financial rule rollbacks for the Treasury Department. 

So I want to go through some of these and see how your views 

line up with the views of the big banks. So first one here, FSR 

would like to see the stress test relaxed for the Fed and give it 

stress test models to the banks before the actual test. They want 

to see the test ahead of time. Do you support those changes? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, not having read the FSR’s report, I do not 

know all of the details about the—— 

Senator WARREN. Wait, wait. Let me get this straight. You have 

been nominated to be the head of Fed Supervision, and you have 

not read this from the FSR? 

Mr. QUARLES. I have not read that report. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So we will ask the question, then, more 

generally: Do you think that stress test standards need to be relaxed and the banks need to see them in advance? 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that transparency around the content of 

the test with the public in general, which would include the regulated entities, is a benefit. 

Senator WARREN. So they ought to be able to see the test in advance? 

Mr. QUARLES. I believe that that would—— 

Senator WARREN. And you think they ought to be relaxed? 

Mr. QUARLES.——improve the conduct of regulation. 

I do not have a view as to whether they ought to be relaxed—— 

Senator WARREN. All right. 

Mr. QUARLES.——in part because I am not—because of the lack 

of transparency, I am not perfectly familiar with all of the content 

of the test. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So you think they ought to see the test in 

advance, which is what they are asking for, and you do not have 

an opinion on whether or not they ought to be weakened. 

How about capital? FSR would like a bunch of changes to the calculation of how capital and leverage requirements that would have 

the effect of lowering—all of which would have the effect of lowering these standards. Do you believe that capital and leverage 

standards should be lowered? 

Mr. QUARLES. I do not have a view as to whether they should be 

higher or lower. 

15 

I do think that more can be done to ensure that in setting the 

capital for the full range of institutions in the system that we can 

be more sensitive to the character of each institution in determining the appropriate—— 

Senator WARREN. So you think it should be lowered for some but 

raised for others? 

Mr. QUARLES. Again, in advance of the analysis, I could not tell 

you—— 

Senator WARREN. So you do not have an opinion on that. 

What about the Volcker rule, which prohibits the banks from 

making risky bets with their own money? FSR wants to cut the 

rule back so that the banks can make more of those kinds of investments. Do you agree with FSR that the Volcker rule should be cut 

back so that it should place fewer restrictions on the banks? 

Mr. QUARLES. I agree with former Governor Tarullo that the 

complexity of the rulemakes it very difficult to apply, and that we 

should work to try to simplify the application of the rule. 

Senator WARREN. Well, now, that is easy. If you just want to simplify it, you would support Glass-Steagall. Right? Do you support 

Glass-Steagall? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, as you know, Senator, the key provisions of 

Glass-Steagall are still in force—— 

Senator WARREN. Well—— 

Mr. QUARLES.——which are Sections 16 and 21 of the Banking 

Act—— 

Senator WARREN. No, no. 

Mr. QUARLES.——of 1933. 

Senator WARREN. The key provisions of Glass-Steagall are not 

enforced any more. They have been repealed. 

Mr. QUARLES. No. The ancillary provisions, which are Section 20 

and 32—— 

Senator WARREN. Which are the ones which permit the big 

banks—— 

Mr. QUARLES.——of the Banking Act of 1933—— 

Senator WARREN.——to be able to engage in these combined activities that Glass-Steagall were supposed to separate. That is 

what is now permitted. 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, the core provisions actually prevent the bank 

from engaging in that, so Section 16 and 21—— 

Senator WARREN. So you think we are perfectly protected if we 

took away Volcker? Is that what you are saying, and we do not 

need Glass-Steagall? 

Mr. QUARLES. I am sorry. I did not catch the first part of the 

question, ma’am. 

Senator WARREN. You are saying we are protected if we took 

away Volcker and did not put Glass-Steagall in its place? That is 

why nothing went wrong in 2008? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, I do not think that the re-imposition of 

those—of the ancillary provisions governing affiliates, which are 

Sections 20 and 32, would, in fact, have made a difference in the 

financial crisis. But, usually, when people are talking about today 

about the re-imposition of Glass-Steagall, they are talking about 

ensuring that the depository institution is protected from risks in 

another part of a large financial institution. 

16 

Senator WARREN. You know—— 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that is a very worthy goal. 

Senator WARREN. I am over my time, and so I want to be respectful here. 

But I am just looking for any area where you disagree with the 

major financial institutions, and I am not hearing it. The primary 

purpose of this job is to be able to stand up to the largest financial 

institutions in this country. You have no history of having done 

that, and sitting here right now, all you can say is, gee, I have not 

thought about that. 

We just went through a devastating financial crisis less than a 

decade ago because powerful people in Government let powerful financial institutions call the shots. We cannot go down that road 

again. We need people in Government who are willing to stand up 

to large financial institutions, and we need people who have a demonstrated history of that. And you simply do not, Mr. Quarles. 

Thank you. I apologize for running over, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Rounds. 

Senators Rounds. Mr. Quarles, I am just curious, and I will give 

you a chance to kind of respond on the comments here. Do you believe that a strong regulatory process is appropriate? 

Mr. QUARLES. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you believe that a regulatory process which 

clearly defines what the rules are is appropriate? 

Mr. QUARLES. That, I also agree with. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you believe that the regulations should be 

such that the—that there is an understanding of what the expectations are of any bank, regardless of its size, should be in place? 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that that is not only appropriate; it is necessary for the regulations to be effective. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you think that there are regulations in 

place today that make it difficult for financial institutions to understand the direction that the regulators expect them to go without 

going back in and asking for additional information time and time 

again? 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that is true in many areas of the current 

system. 

Senator ROUNDS. I have been aware of concerns that certain 

bank risk exposure regulations have inadvertently impacted liquidity in the listed options market. The regulations fail to account for 

the risk-mitigating nature of options and are impeding access to 

central clearing and hampering market liquidity by artificially constraining clearing members and their customers who make markets. It is concerning when markets that effectively provide portfolio insurance to investors are—well, let us just say adversely impacted by banking regulations because the regulations are not sufficiently precise to account for the offsetting characteristics of options. 

Are you committed to exploring ways to remedy this unforced 

error, including via interpretive relief from the Board of Governors? 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that would be a very appropriate area for 

us to look into. I do not have all of the details around that 

17 

question, but I think that question and questions like it are important areas for the board to examine. 

Senator ROUNDS. Post-crisis, our Nation’s banks, especially the 

largest, hold significant levels of capital. Governor Powell and Secretary Mnuchin have echoed this in the past while testifying before 

Congress. Additionally, you recently noted that you do not believe 

that we will likely—that you believe that we will likely not see another financial crisis in our lifetimes due to post-crisis reforms. 

In June, the Fed announced that all banks had enough capital 

to pass a stress test, including both the quantitative and the qualitative elements of CCAR, and you did not object to a single bank’s 

capital plan. 

I have heard discussion of potential Fed proposal incorporating 

G–SIB surcharge into CCAR as the new post-stress minimum capital requirements. Would you support the inclusion of the G–SIB 

surcharge in CCAR? 

Mr. QUARLES. I would have to look at that question in more 

depth, but at this point, I think that is something that is definitely 

worthy of looking at. 

Senator ROUNDS. Would you drop us a note back on that as a 

take-it-for-the-record, please? Would you? 

Mr. QUARLES. Yes, I would be very happy to. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. 

I would like to—for both of you, I would like to discuss questions 

that I recently had the chance to ask Federal Reserve Governor 

Powell at another recent hearing. I had the opportunity to ask Governor Powell about the supplemental leverage ratio, or SLR. As I 

told Governor Powell, it is a blunt instrument that fails to account 

for very safe investments like cash deposited at central banks. 

In particular, institutions that provide custodial services have 

raised concerns that the SLR fails to account for very safe investments like cash deposited within the central banks. 

In response to one of my colleagues on the House side, Chairman 

Yellen acknowledged that these concerns, in a question for the 

record, and said that the Federal Reserve Board is actively considering these suggestions and other suggestions about how to improve the cost-benefit balance for our leverage ratio requirements. 

Can both of you discuss any suggestions you would have to improving the ESLR and—or the SLR and the ESLR? My concern is 

this. Mutual funds right now—if we want mutual fund investors to 

have the least expensive approach, then one of the ways we do that 

is by considering whether or not investments in a central bank, 

like these do—they invest back in, in treasuries, in a custodial nature—should we include or should we take that out of the denominator in determining what the ESLR is or the SLR is? Is that 

something that should be fairly considered, just to bring down the 

price to investors in mutual funds? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, I think that the practical consequences of 

those regulations, of any regulations and particularly with respect 

to the leverage ratio regulations, should definitely be taken into account in determining the character of the regulation. 

So in looking at that proposal as well as a whole range of proposals about how to address the leverage ratio, I think that that 

is something that we ought to be looking at. Yeah. 

18 

Senator ROUNDS. Sir? 

Mr. OTTING. Senator Rounds, thank you much for the question. 

I too think it should be examined, as we discussed in your office. 

I think the complexity that we built via Dodd-Frank and the capital structure makes it incredibly difficult for banks to bounce 

around between all the categories—risk base, leverage—and I do 

think that when you look at some of the assets that are held on 

the balance sheet, they really have limited to no risk. And I do 

think it is impairing certain segments of the industry, as you described. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Cortez Masto. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for your willingness to serve. 

Welcome to your family members as well. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you in person. Sorry our meeting had to be rescheduled, and so always look forward to that opportunity. 

But, Mr. Quarles, I would like to start with you, and let me just 

say I think your actions in the past are important for us to figure 

out how you are going to pursue your roles currently that you have 

been nominated for. So some of the questions are going to be some 

of the past actions and the work that you have done in the past. 

So, Mr. Quarles, one of the things I want to understand, that you 

have been a member of the board of directors at FINRA since 2015. 

Correct? 

Mr. QUARLES. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And FINRA is the organization that 

is supposed to serve as a watchdog for Wall Street. You qualify as 

the, quote, ‘‘public Governor’’ on FINRA’s board, which is the slot 

that is meant to represent the investing public when it comes to 

how FINRA operates. Correct? 

Mr. QUARLES. That is correct, ma’am. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And as the qualified—as a public 

interest representative, you qualified even though you have investments in lines of credit from many firms regulated by FINRA, and 

you also serve, currently on the board of directors for the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce, during that time. Is that correct? 

Mr. QUARLES. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And the Chamber of Commerce has 

repeatedly sued regulatory agencies to overturn investor protections on behalf of its Wall Street members. If confirmed to the position at the Fed, how can we trust you to balance the public interest 

against the interests of Wall Street, given the obvious conflicts in 

your current role? Can you explain that to me? 

Mr. QUARLES. In the same way that in representing the public 

on the FINRA board, I have done that without any influence from 

or even discussion with the Chamber of Commerce. I think that it 

is possible to exercise responsibilities, given the nature of the duties that a person has. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. So when the Chamber of Commerce, 

which includes Wall Street, some of the Wall Street’s biggest banks 

and accepts their contributions, sues to overturn rules on their 

19 

behalf, you are—are you in a role of supporting those actions by 

the Chamber of Commerce, even though you sit on the opposite 

side as a public interest representative with FINRA? 

Mr. QUARLES. If there were any specific decision that involved a 

matter of which the Chamber of Commerce was a party, I would 

recuse myself. That has not arisen while I have been on the board. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. So you have never recused yourself 

while you are on the board of the U.S. Chamber and/or FINRA in 

relationship to your interactions on both? 

Mr. QUARLES. No matters have arisen that would have required 

that. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And if confirmed to the Fed, will 

you use your position to try and stop the CFPB’s arbitration rule? 

Mr. QUARLES. I do not believe I have a role with respect to that. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. So that is a no? 

Mr. QUARLES. I have not given any thought as to how I would 

affect that. The CFPB is an independent regulator and appropriately so. With regard to it, I think that the robust enforcement 

of the consumer rules is an important policy matter, and I certainly 

support that. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Thank you. 

Did you ever use your slot on FINRA’s board to advocate for the 

Chamber’s position on arbitration? 

Mr. QUARLES. No, ma’am. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. Thank you. 

My time is running low. So, Mr. Otting, let me jump back to 

some questions in a follow-up to the conversation you were having 

with Senator Brown. 

If I understand this correctly, you said that 160,000 homes were 

saved, and when you say 160,000 homes were saved, they were actually modified? People were able to stay in their homes. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. OTTING. They did not go through foreclosure. That is correct. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And then 175,000 nonbanked— 

non—I guess homes that were not in your portfolio were the subject of a separate modifications, or can you explain that $175,000 

figure you cited? 

Mr. OTTING. There were 175 loans that went through the consent 

order look-back, which was done by an independent consultant 

under the guise of the OCC. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And it is true that OneWest is the 

only bank that did not settle the independent foreclosure review. 

Correct? 

Mr. OTTING. That is correct. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. And so can you—— 

Mr. OTTING. Well, can I—— 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Sure, go ahead. 

Mr. OTTING. The other bank settled. OneWest Bank was the only 

one who completed the look-back that had the actual results associated with the consent order. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. Thank you. 

And can you tell me how many actual loan modifications did 

OneWest provide to Nevadans during your tenure while you were 

there? Do you know? 

20 

Mr. OTTING. I do not have that number. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. I appreciate that. 

Can you—let me just say this. As the Comptroller of the Currency, you are going to be entrusted with tremendous responsibility. The decisions the Comptroller makes impact whether borrowers can keep their homes or whether we have another economic 

crisis, as you well know, and we have talked about this when we 

were together. 

Can you point to a single area where you think additional consumer protection is needed? 

Mr. OTTING. I think there is a lot of discussion today about 

small-ticket dollar amounts for lending activities, and what came 

out of Dodd-Frank was a fairly, highly complicated product that almost requires you to underwrite a $2,500 loan, like a mortgage. 

And I think that is one area that would require a lot of input and 

discussion to be able to make those products available. We have 

kind of pushed those out of the banking sector, and I think they 

should be actually back into the banking sector, where oversight 

and regulation can allow those to be offered in a fair and economic 

manner. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. To the exclusion of the CFPB? 

Mr. OTTING. No, not to the exclusion. In participation. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. Thank you. 

I notice my time is up. Thank you very much. 

Mr. OTTING. You are welcome. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Scott. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today, and thank you to the nominees for joining us today. 

At their core, both the Federal Reserve and the OCC are bank 

regulators, yet due to nonbank SIFI designations from FSOC, they 

now oversee a huge chunk of the insurance industry. Having sold 

insurance for more than 20 years and being well versed in the business, I think it is time to reconsider the designation process. The 

President agrees per his executive order earlier this year. 

Insurance has primarily been regulated on the State level, and 

nonbank SIFI designations are a deviation from a system that has 

worked well for about 150 years. 

FSOC and its Federal regulators lack an understanding of the 

differences in business models between banks and insurance companies. Insurance firms simply do not pose the same systemic risk, 

but the added costs associated with a council’s designations have 

an outsized impact on the economy at large. 

For example, life insurers are the largest investors in corporate 

bonds in the United States, the same bonds that fund business 

growth in South Carolina. They also manage 20 percent of all defined contribution plan assets and 14 percent of IRA assets. Many 

Americans have entrusted life insurers with their savings. 

I will ask Mr. Quarles first and then Mr. Otting: Does the business of insurance pose the same systemic risk as banking? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, I think that it would be difficult to say that 

the business of insurance posed the same systemic risks as banking. I mean, principally, as is also obvious, systemic risk is created 

when you have organizations that have liabilities that can run, 

21 

short-term liabilities that can all be called very quickly, that are 

funding activities that are very interconnected with the rest of the 

system and usually of a size that the disruption of that interconnectedness would result in severe problems for the system. 

Insurance companies—and particularly life insurance companies—I guess in some theoretical way could have a run if all of the 

policyholders showed up and asked for the cash surrender of the 

value of their policies at the same time, but that is such a remote 

and historically unprecedented possibility that I do not think it is 

a practical one to consider. 

So I think that the risks that are posed by insurance companies 

are quite different. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Otting? 

Mr. OTTING. Senator Scott, thank you for the question. 

I agree with Mr. Quarles. I do think the funding source—and as 

long as the core business is in line with the mission of an insurance 

company, I do not agree that it poses the same risk as a financial 

institution. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. 

Do you support legislative efforts to ensure there is always a voting member on FSOC with insurance expertise? 

Mr. OTTING. Absolutely. 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that would be wise. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. 

I am looking forward to our Chairman and our Ranking Member 

continuing their efforts to make this a reality. 

For regulatory purposes, the Federal Reserve often uses arbi- trary asset thresholds like $250 billion or $50 billion or $10 billion. 

These levels seems to come with very little rhyme or reason. At the 

same time, multiple regulations, which utilize these thresholds, including Basel framework, include waiver language that allows the 

Fed to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. In other words, 

you can tailor regulations as you see fit. 

Mr. Quarles, would you use this discretionary power under the 

law, and if so, under what circumstances? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, I think that one of the important general 

themes of regulation is ensuring that the character of the regulation is adapted to the character of the institution being regulated, 

what has become the word ‘‘tailoring.’’ I fully support that, and I 

think that it is not only appropriate to recognize the different levels of risk and types of risk that different institutions in the system 

pose, but then it also makes for better and more efficient regulation. And efficient regulation allows the financial system to more 

efficiently support the real economy. 

So I do think that we should look very carefully—and will certainly be an advocate for that were I confirmed—at tailoring capital regulation and other types of regulation to the particular character of the institutions that are regulated, and that includes their 

size, and it includes other aspects of their character. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

Senator Tester. 

22 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and a special thankyou to the Honorable Senator from Indiana for letting me go ahead 

of him. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

First of all, Mr. Otting, Mr. Quarles, thanks for both being here 

today. I very much appreciate it. 

Mr. Otting, when you were in my office earlier this week—and 

thank you for coming in—we talked a little bit about 

NeighborWorks, and at that moment in time, you were not up to 

speed on it. I told you I was going to ask you some questions on 

NeighborWorks at this hearing, and hopefully, you have gotten up 

to speed. Have you had a chance to take a look at it? 

Mr. OTTING. I have. I went to graduate school over the last 24 

hours. 

Senator TESTER. Oh, good for you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator TESTER. Well, the question is, is that, What is your view 

on NeighborWorks? You are going on—you are going to be a director of that program. It is an affordable housing program. What is 

your view of it? 

Mr. OTTING. Senator Tester, we—there is a representative from 

the OCC. It is not currently the acting nor was Mr. Curry in that 

role when he left, but it is one of the more senior persons that does 

sit on the board and actually is the chairman—— 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING.——of the NeighborWorks. 

I would say, you know, I have spent a lot of time. I have noticed—you know, I went and looked at the budget. 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING. It was $200 million last year. One-hundred-eighty 

of it came from appropriations. About 20 of it came from really 

foundation gifts. 

I also went out and spoke with people in Nevada last night at 

a very late time on the east coast here and learned about the organizations—— 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING.——what they do about going back to the communities really across the United States and offering consultative 

and—— 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING.——data of how you do that. 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING. And I think, you know, you know my perspective on 

affordable housing. 

Senator TESTER. Yeah. 

Mr. OTTING. It is a critical element of our economy, and I also 

think we have to find a way for an organization like 

NeighborWorks to be able to maintain their place in America. 

Senator TESTER. OK. And so I assume by your previous statement that you do not intend to be the rep on the NeighborWorks? 

Mr. OTTING. I did not say that. I was just clarifying when you 

said—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. OTTING.——that I was on that. 

23 

Senator TESTER. Oh, yeah. I am sorry. I meant to say your position. 

Mr. OTTING. Yes. 

Senator TESTER. Do you intend to fill that, or do you intend to 

appoint? 

Mr. OTTING. It is a role I have historically played in the communities that I lived in. 

Senator TESTER. Good. 

Mr. OTTING. And so I would be honored to be considered for that. 

Senator TESTER. Good. 

As you well know, the President slashed the budget of NeighborWorks from $140 to $27 million, also cut a lot of other affordable housing programs. 

I asked you this in the office, and I will ask you this. If these 

are programs you believe in, are you willing to push back and talk 

about the positive impacts of these programs and potentially help 

us get to a point where the funding is at a reasonable level? 

Mr. OTTING. I would be happy to. 

Senator TESTER. I appreciate that, and I appreciate that answer 

too, by the way, because oftentimes we do not get that straight-up 

kind of stuff. I appreciate that. 

The next line of questioning is something we also took in my office that is critically important for my support of you. I will just 

tell you this, because when we talked about robo-signing in my office, your exact words were ‘‘This is a false narrative.’’ 

And I went back and I looked at the consent orders with the Office of Thrift Supervision, which no longer exists, but which part 

of that job is going to be in the OCC and the other regulators. And 

here is what it said about OneWest, of which you were a big part 

of. It says that, ‘‘Numerous affidavits or other mortgage-related 

documents were not properly notarized.’’ That is a quote, and this 

is quote too: 

Litigated foreclosure proceedings without always ensuring that a promissory note or mortgage document were properly endorsed or assigned, and 

that OneWest failed to devote sufficient financial staffing and managerial 

resources to ensuring proper administration of its foreclosure processes. 

Can you tell me what that is if that is not robo-signing? 

Mr. OTTING. Well, I do not believe that is robo-signing. First of 

all, when we signed the consent order, we did not confirm or deny 

the accusations in the consent order. That was a fairly generic consent order that all banks were asked to sign and really did not 

have a choice. 

The issue—I think the issue of documentation and robo-sign are 

two separate things. There was an organization called MERS 

where most of notes and deeds of trust were electronically stored, 

and there was a provision at that time where you could use the 

MERS system to be able to do foreclosures. And when the OCC 

came in and the OTS, they found that there were lots of errors in 

that system, and they forced upon the banks to clean that up, 

which we did. 

Senator TESTER. I got it. I got it, and I appreciate—— 

Mr. OTTING. But if I could comment on the robo-signing—— 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Mr. OTTING.——for you, I would be happy to do that. 

24 

Senator TESTER. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. OTTING. So, in my mind, there are a lot of definitions to robosigning. I think if—like I told you in your office, if we all wrote it 

down, my guess is we would have different descriptions of it. There 

are four key ways that I would answer did OneWest Bank robosign. The first is, did we have a process and controls to review the 

affidavits and complete those at OneWest Bank? We did. Were 

there errors from time to time? I could—I do not have that statistic, but I would tell you there were. 

Second of all, in some accusations of robo-signing, it was that 

people signed other people’s names. I can tell you that was never 

done at OneWest Bank, that Bill Jones signed for Sally Smith. 

The third, the third issue was—was that were they properly notarized, and we had all our notarization activity occurred in one location. People sat next to each other. They knew those people. They 

were not doing it remotely. 

And, last, the critical component of a foreclosure is that the affidavit is the person who is signing that affidavit validated principal 

past due and amount due, and quite frankly, we found no errors 

when that person was doing that work. 

Senator TESTER. And I would just say this—and I am way over 

time, Mr. Chairman, and just bear with me just for a second. But 

if, in fact, you were to sign off on an agreement that was not accurate—I do not know why you would do that being in business and 

especially in the banking business. 

Mr. OTTING. I would agree with you. 

Senator TESTER. And this is pretty darn clear when it says litigated foreclosure proceedings without always ensuring that the 

promissory note or mortgage document were properly endorsed or 

assigned. 

Now, I would imagine that if the Office of Thrift Supervision 

found that happened once or twice, this would not be in there. It 

happened—it had to happen with some regularity, and I got it. I 

am not saying that, but it does say properly endorsed or assigned. 

Mr. OTTING. I would appreciate the opportunity to have a followup discussion with you. 

Senator TESTER. We can do that. 

Mr. OTTING. So we can—I can try to gather data and bring it 

in—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. OTTING.——from public sources. 

Senator TESTER. Well—— 

Mr. OTTING. But I can tell you, similar to Secretary Mnuchin, we 

have kicked this thing five ways to Sunday. 

Senator TESTER. I know, but—— 

Mr. OTTING. But there were errors. I do not want you to think 

that we never made errors—— 

Senator TESTER. No, I—— 

Mr. OTTING.——because that—we did make errors. 

Senator TESTER. I am going to close it out real quick, and we will 

talk. But the issue is you are going to be ahead of the OCC. 

Mr. OTTING. That is correct. 

Senator TESTER. You are going to be supervising people who potentially did the same thing that was claimed on OneWest. 

25 

Mr. OTTING. That is correct. 

Senator TESTER. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman CRAPO. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and congratulations to you 

and your family on your nominations. 

Someone earlier said, Mr. Quarles, that they were concerned 

with you doing the revolving door between regulatory roles and out 

in the private sector. I actually find that refreshing versus bureaucrats that just ride this escalator to learn how to regulate, regulate, 

regulate more, so I think that is a good thing, not a bad thing. And 

I am impressed with your past experience in both, in both settings. 

First, to either one of you, do you think Glass-Steagall caused the 

2008 financial crisis? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, as I had mentioned in the context of the previous—— 

Senator TILLIS. Give me a real quick yes or no or maybe, because 

I have got a couple other ones. 

Mr. QUARLES. Oh, you have got a couple other ones. 

I do not believe so. I think that keeping the depository institutions safe from other activities in a larger organization is important. 

Senator TILLIS. I am going to get back to that in a follow-up. 

How about you, Mr. Otting? 

Mr. OTTING. I do not. 

Senator TILLIS. Now, the Fed Chair Volcker has said that he actually thinks that the rule should be simplified. Do you all agree 

with the former Fed Chair? 

Mr. QUARLES. I do. 

Senator TILLIS. Yeah. I have tried to give somebody that, you 

know, is watching this and does not understand what we are talking about in terms of the regulatory overreach a kind of visual, 

and, Mr. Quarles, you and I talked about this briefly. I have done 

the math since our meeting the other day. 

Mr. Otting, I have not had the pleasure to meet with you, but 

I will look forward to it. 

But there are some—some of the larger, more complex banks will 

submit as many as 80 to 100,000 pages—80 to 100,000 pages—annually to be compliant with the CCAR, the stress test submission. 

That is seven—if you line up those pieces of paper, long end, that 

is 17 miles, yet it is 81 volumes of ‘‘War and Peace.’’ It is close to 

20 or 30 feet of shelf space. 

Now after they submit it, we hear regulators going into these 

agencies a week or so later. I do not know if anybody in here can 

read 81 volumes of ‘‘War and Peace’’ in a week and digest it, but 

my guess is no regulator can. 

So it raises a question about how valuable that information is, 

and one thing that I think we have to look at is, of course, we 

would—many of these larger banks, many of the smaller banks 

regulatory do stress tests. Can you talk about why you think the 

transparency is not—I think some people are suggesting it is kind 

of giving somebody the answer key before they take the exam. Can 

you—can you tell me why you think that transparency is important 

and still provide you with that—the regulatory—I mean, having 

26 

the lens into that, that it is not an issue to be actually transparent, 

and let the institutions kind of know what they have got to be up 

against? 

Mr. QUARLES. Well, I think there—— 

Senator TILLIS. And, Mr. Otting, I am happy to have you opine 

as well. 

Mr. OTTING. OK. 

Mr. QUARLES. I think there are a number of aspects of that. It 

is not giving the entity the answer key; it is giving them the questions. It is giving them the test. So it is a little difficult. 

I mean, if the situation we are in now—— 

Senator TILLIS. Yeah. But the suggestion is that if they get it, 

then they can game the system, but I just do not—I do not get that, 

particularly for these institutions who are regularly doing stress 

tests anyway. 

Mr. QUARLES. I think that, certainly, the benefits of transparency 

outweigh any of the theoretical costs, because if you are clear about 

what it is that you expect, you will inevitably get more compliance. 

Plus, you will get feedback—and not only from the banks, but from 

the public—as to how the test can be improved. 

Senator TILLIS. And who ultimately pays for the cost of this? At 

the end of the day, if we keep on ratcheting up the cost, who ultimately pays for this? 

Mr. QUARLES. The consumer. 

Senator TILLIS. Yeah. The little guy. 

Mr. QUARLES. Exactly. 

Senator TILLIS. I wanted to ask a question about—and, Mr. 

Otting, I will start with you. How many tips are there on a spear, 

a classical spear? 

Mr. OTTING. Two. 

Senator TILLIS. Two. 

So we have got five—or four or five on the regulatory spear for 

the financial services industry. Right? 

Mr. OTTING. Yes. 

Senator TILLIS. We have people—and let us get away from the 

big banks for a minute. Let us deal with the community banks or 

the midsize banks. We have got four or five regulatory agencies on 

any given day going into a bank, pretending to be at the tip of the 

spear. Does that make sense? Is there some way that we can actually get to a point where we have certainty and responsibility 

around the regulators so that the financial services industry, 

whether you are a small community bank or a super bank, actually 

knows who they should be answering to for a given set of regulatory regimens? 

Mr. OTTING. Well, I would say for the record, I misspoke. It 

should be one tip, not two. 

Senator TILLIS. Yeah, I know. 

Mr. OTTING. But—— 

Senator TILLIS. I gave you a pass. I was going to look it up on 

the Internet later on, but—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OTTING. But I will say one of the complexities—— 

Senator TILLIS. There are two ends. 

Mr. OTTING. Yes. 

27 

Complexities of the regulatory body when you talk to a financial 

institution is often similar entities are asking for same information. 

One is coming in the door when the other is going out, and the lack 

of coordination makes it very difficult on the industry. 

Senator TILLIS. And this is an area where I will ask you all to 

commit to not being territorial and deciding that you are right, 

there is only one tip of the spear, and you are the tip. I think there 

are logical—assignments are a rational basis for one to take the 

lead and the other to follow and provide that clarity to the financial 

services industry. 

If you really do want to help the little guy, you better stop passing the regulatory costs down to them by adding a regulatory burden. 

I worked at Pricewaterhouse. Regulations were good for us, put 

my kids through college, but I think we have to simplify these 

things so that we get to right-size regulations. Otherwise that 

money goes down to that individual depositor, that individual small 

business, the people who are using these financial institutions, and 

I hope that you all will get in there, right-size the regulations. Regulations exist for a reason, but do it in a way that actually is responsible, predictable, and as lean as possible, because I think it 

will have an enormously positive impact on the movement of capital in this country and getting growth where we need it to be. 

Thank you. I look forward to supporting your nominations. 

Oh, and, Mr. Quarles, I hope you do not have an opportunity to 

deal with the arbitration rule, because I hope we repeal that long 

before you ever get there. 

Chairman CRAPO. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both 

for being here. 

I would just like to let you know real—obviously, these are positions of incredible importance and that the American people are 

counting on you. 

I just want to quickly let you know the results of what happened 

in 2008 in my congressional district that I represented at the time. 

Elkhart County, 20 percent-plus unemployment. The Chrysler 

transmission plant, that was in my district. Over 5,000 people 

worked there; a little bit later, less than 100. So that is 4,900 people who are wondering how they are going to pay their mortgage, 

how they are going to feed their family, how they are going to be 

able to make ends meet. 

Small businesses in my district, I met with one after another 

that had lines of credit that were all called, and these lines of credit that were called, these are small businessmen who had worked 

all their lives, small businessmen and—women who then at that 

point had to have a fire sale of assets in order to cover the line of 

credit. Twenty percent unemployment, lines of credit being called, 

people losing jobs because we had a financial collapse caused by 

Wall Street, but it was not—it was not Wall Street who at the end 

of the day got the pain. It was—it was the folks I live with in Indiana. 

And so when you miss it, the real result is people losing their 

houses who did nothing wrong other than show up for work every 

day and work nonstop to take care of their family, and that is the 

28 

obligation and the responsibility of these jobs that you are walking 

into. 

And I just wanted to ask a couple questions. Mr. Quarles, one 

of the things I saw was that the ratings agencies basically were 

selling ratings. Were you aware that they were taking B and BB, 

stuffing them together, and then having that be rated AAA by the 

agencies at the time? 

Mr. QUARLES. The exact mechanics of some of that rating agency 

practice, I was not aware of, but I was—we were looking at the rating agencies and their practices is something that we were in the 

process of doing when I was there. 

Senator DONNELLY. Did you see anything that caused you to— 

caused concern for you back then when you looked at their practices? Because you could see the products that they were putting 

together. 

Mr. QUARLES. I would say that while we did not appreciate the 

depth of the problem, it was something that we were looking at. 

I think that was an issue that was evident and should have been 

more evident to us. 

Senator DONNELLY. Synthetic CDOs, pure gambling is what it 

struck me as. Do those kind of things concern you? Do you think 

they are appropriate? 

Mr. QUARLES. I spoke at the time against excessively complex derivative products, so yes, they did concern me. And I do not believe 

that they are appropriate. Yes. 

Senator DONNELLY. Mr. Otting, what lessons did you take from 

the crisis that you would bring to this job? I mean, we were looking 

at basically the Wild West, synthetic CDOs, rating agencies that 

would take B’s and C’s, and you put enough of them together, and 

all of a sudden, you have a AAA. And, as I said, the people that 

suffer live in Indiana and lose their jobs. 

Mr. OTTING. Senator Donnelly, thank you for the question. 

I too have experienced pain of people who I have personally met 

with who went through the foreclosure process. It is a life-changing 

event for those people, especially when, as you said, they are hardworking Americans. 

At the time of the crisis, I worked at U.S. Bank, and we never 

participated in any of the subprime—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

Mr. OTTING.——activities. We always felt that people, you know, 

needed to have the proper credit, proper underwriting. 

Senator DONNELLY. When you were working with the other people there, did you ever look at some of this and say this is crazy? 

Mr. OTTING. We did. We did. In fact, I—there was a point in time 

where there used to be kind of a matrix with high-to-low—to loan 

value and high/low FICO, and if somebody had a really good FICO, 

maybe they justified a higher loan-to-value, or if they had a bad 

FICO, they better be less loan-to-value. When the boxes flipped 

where you could have low FICO and high loan-to-value, we knew 

this was—— 

Senator DONNELLY. I am almost out of time, so I want to ask one 

more question, which is as you look ahead, you know, obviously, I 

want to make sure that it does not happen again. Everybody does. 

29 

What concerns you the most? Student loans, or is there anything 

on the horizon that you look at and go, ‘‘This could be a problem’’? 

Mr. OTTING. I think—I think student loans are an issue if you 

really look at it from an underwriting perspective, and I think the 

auto loan market, it got a little overcooked. It has, I think, pulled 

back a little bit now, where terms were getting aggressive, loan-tovalues were getting aggressive, and now I think with the insight 

of the OCC examining, they have pulled back some of the autolending activities. 

Senator DONNELLY. Mr. Quarles? 

Mr. QUARLES. I would agree with both of those points. 

Senator DONNELLY. Anything else that concerns you as you look? 

Mr. QUARLES. You know, I continue to be concerned about the— 

some of the level of complexity in the system I do not think that 

we have given enough thought, and that we can give more thought 

as to how various parts of it relate to each other. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OTTING. Could I add one thing, Chairman? 

Chairman CRAPO. Briefly. 

Mr. OTTING. You asked me about what concerns me about America today. My big concern is that a lot of people at the lower end 

or echelon of the banking are not qualifying for banking products 

and services. You have branches going away. You have people concerned when they walk into branches, the kind of questions people 

are asking about opening up accounts, and I think there needs to 

be a real focus of how do we make banking available for the lower 

economic and ethnic people across America. 

I think there are some tools to do that with automation. We did 

that at OneWest Bank, where we really focused on bringing people 

in and making banks available to them when they were not in 

their neighborhood, so—— 

Chairman CRAPO. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Quarles, you left the Treasury Department in 2006 and 

joined The Carlyle Group, a private equity firm in 2007. After you 

left the Administration, you publicly advocated to change the rules 

limiting private equity investment in banks. Is that correct? 

Mr. QUARLES. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, in September of 2008, the Federal Reserve announced a policy shift allowing for private equity firms to 

take larger ownership stakes in banks. In May of 2009, The Carlyle 

Group acquired, along with two other firms—$12.8 billion— 

BankUnited. Is that correct? 

Mr. QUARLES. That is also correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. As part of that deal, the FDIC agreed to 

cover most of the losses, and in total, the FDIC made $1.6 billion 

in payments, more than any other loss-sharing agreement during 

the financial crisis. 

Ultimately, BankUnited failure cost the FDIC $5.7 billion, and 

The Carlyle Group and other private equity investors walked away 

with more than $2 billion. That sounds pretty much to me like 

IndyMac and OneWest. 

So it seems, Mr. Quarles, that you used your remaining influence 

in the Administration to change the rules to make it easier for your 

30 

new employer, a private equity titan, to turn America’s struggling 

community and regional banks into cash cows, and in so doing, you 

gave little regard for the communities served by these banks. 

And I hope my colleagues are acutely aware of the consolidation 

of community banks, that they understand what we are talking 

about here. Mr. Quarles lobbied the Government so that his employer could invest in deals where the FDIC would take on all the 

risk. The private equity investors would reap all the benefits, and 

the future of the community banks involved was merely an afterthought. And that worries me in the context of some of the comments that you and I discussed yesterday about your views on regulatory oversight, changes in that regulatory reform, changes in 

the Wall Street reform that came in the aftermath of the world’s 

worst financial—or the Nation’s worst financial crisis, where we 

were told by Ben Bernanke we were going to have a global financial meltdown. And so I worry about that. 

Mr. Otting, I heard the answers you gave to Senator Tester on 

robo-signing, and I think—just like Secretary Mnuchin, I think 

there is a misstatement of the facts here, but I think Senator 

Tester did a good job on focusing on that. 

Let me ask you something else. Did OneWest engage in the practice of dual tracking, offering a struggling homeowner the hope of 

a modification while simultaneously pursuing a foreclosure? 

Mr. OTTING. Mr. Menendez, that was an industry practice. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I did not ask you that. 

Mr. OTTING. And so—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I asked you did OneWest engage in it. Yes 

or no? 

Mr. OTTING. The answer to that is yes. We did, and it was an 

industry practice that we discontinued once it was identified in the 

consent order as not to be an acceptable practice. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Will you commit to provide the total number 

of foreclosures and loan modifications completed in each of the 

States represented by Members of this Committee prior to the 

Committee’s vote on your nomination? 

Mr. OTTING. I do not have access to that data. It is the—and it 

is owned by CIT Bank, and we could—you can request that information from them, but I would not have any influence over that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You do not have the wherewithal to ask 

them to provide that? 

Mr. OTTING. I do not. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well—— 

Mr. OTTING. Will ask, but I do not know if they would comply. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I understand that while you may not have 

direct access to the information, you certainly can be helpful in requesting CIT provide this information prior to the Committee voting on your nomination. I hope you would do that. 

Mr. OTTING. Are you asking for me to request that information? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. 

Mr. OTTING. I do not think that that is my position, Senator, to 

request that information from CIT. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me just say New Jersey was particularly hard hit by the 2008 financial crisis, and it continues to 

have the highest foreclosure rate in the Nation. So as long as 

31 

homeowners in New Jersey continue to struggle with foreclosure, 

I am not going to forget OneWest’s practices and expect you will 

take seriously my request for this information, and you are going 

to a position for which this information is critical. 

I cannot understand nominees who must understand that based 

upon the positions they have been nominated to and positions they 

have taken in the past that one does not come prepared to reconcile—or try to reconcile those views. So I have a problem with 

that. 

Finally, Mr. Quarles, you and I spoke about a rules-based approach to monetary policy, and you told me you do support a rulesbased approach to monetary policy. Do you accept the analysis that 

suggests that following a strict Taylor rule would undermine the 

Fed’s ability to achieve its full employment mandate? And talk to 

me about the full employment mandate as part of your dual obligation. We talked a lot about the one side of that obligation. We did 

not talk very much about the full employment side and your views 

on that. 

Mr. QUARLES. Certainly, Senator. I think that the Taylor rule is 

merely one example of a rule. I am not advocating the adoption of 

the Taylor Rule to guide Fed policy. 

With respect to the employment mandate as part of the dual 

mandate that faces the Federal Reserve, I think that is an important element of the Federal Reserve’s obligations. I would take it 

very seriously. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you, Senator. 

That concludes the questioning, except that Senator Brown has 

asked to ask two more questions. So we will do that, and then the 

hearing will conclude. 

Senator BROWN. Before Senator Menendez leaves, I was a little— 

perhaps the collective amnesia has spread to me personally from 

this, but my understanding in my office when I pointed out the information that Senator Menendez just asked you for, I had asked 

Secretary Mnuchin in six different letters. Senator Menendez and 

I sit on the Finance Committee together. I believe he signed a couple of those letters asking for the information he just asked you 

about. I thought you said in my office that you would be willing 

to make that request to get that information for us, so I would like 

to reiterate that you—— 

Mr. OTTING. I do not believe I—if I led that impression, I did not 

say I would seek that information. 

Senator BROWN. Well, I would like to ask you—— 

Mr. OTTING. I said I would help participate, but it is solely at 

CIT’s decision whether they will release that. 

Senator BROWN. I understand that, but I think a request from 

the designee for the—to be the Comptroller might get their attention, and it did not get their attention through the whole process. 

When Secretary Mnuchin was nominated, we all—a number of us 

asked him repeatedly. He would not disclose that, and he would 

not try to disclose that information. We went a number of letters 

and could not get it. So I would ask you to help us with that, to 

commit to help us try to get that information. 

32 

Mr. OTTING. Yes. As I said, I would be happy to help support, 

but I do not feel it is my position to request that information. 

Senator BROWN. I am sorry to hear that. 

Thank you, Senator Menendez, for that. 

My two questions about this, one—one is, Mr. Otting—and earlier you had talked about the 38 people, I guess, you just apologized to in my question earlier, and I want to follow up on that. 

The OCC’s April 2014 report on the consent orders we discussed 

found that OneWest did not comply with rules to protect active 

duty servicemembers, borrowers not in default, modification requests, and others. The report, the consent order said that there 

were 10,700, not the 38, I believe, number that you cited an hour 

or so ago. Why not apologize to the 10,700? 

Mr. OTTING. Yeah. The 10,000 number was—there was an accepted practice. If you had a de minimis dollar amount at the close 

of escrow—when an escrow would close, you would get a bid for a 

title policy, an appraisal policy, for other activities, and often these 

would be 2 cents. And so the thought was that between relatively 

small-dollar amounts, we did not ask for nor give refunds. 

When the OCC came in and said we had to be 100 percent accurate on those transactions—and so anybody—99 cents or less on 

those—we gave them the actual dollar amount. In certain circumstances, it was 10 cents plus $25, and we scaled that up. But 

we ended up reimbursing every one of those dollar amounts. 

Senator BROWN. OK. I want to know more about that. 

Mr. Quarles, last question for you. You earlier—you had said, 

quote, ‘‘Markets are always ahead of the regulators. Frankly, that 

is how it should be. It is analogous to the advice that my father 

provided me,’’ that, quote, ‘‘If you do not miss at least two or three 

planes a year, you are spending too little time at the airport’’—I 

am sorry—‘‘you are spending too much time in airports’’—sorry 

about that—unquote. If the regulators are not—you went on to say, 

‘‘If the regulators are not a little behind the market in a few areas 

at any given time, they would be stifling innovation and evolution,’’ 

unquote. 

We have all been guilty of using unfortunate analogies, but what 

concerns me that this—is that this world view contradicts the ideas 

that you were—the idea that you were doing everything in your 

power to prevent a crisis. It concerns me even more that you believe that oversight agencies, like the one you hope to run, should, 

in fact, miss risks, miss a plane here and there, should miss risks 

in the system. The last time you missed those risks, it cost my ZIP 

Code and my State and our country, lots of people, their homes, 

their jobs, their retirement savings. You claim it is in the name of 

innovation, but the question is at what price. 

So do you stand by your statement that regulators should be, 

quote/unquote, ‘‘behind the market’’? 

Mr. QUARLES. That is probably the most unfortunate use of language that I have ever made, and I do not stand behind that statement. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Thank you. And thank you for what 

you said in your earlier statement about humility. Those are two 

things we do not always see in this Committee. 

33 

My last—just last thing I would like to say is when Chair Yellen 

was nominated and confirmed, I asked her to come to Cleveland 

and see what—see what the real economy looked like and learn a 

little more about manufacturing and what decision she would make 

as Chair of the Federal Reserve, the impact, and she did that, went 

to Alcoa, got to operate—sort of, kind of operate a 50,000-ton press. 

And considering what Mr. Otting’s bank, the impact it had on my 

neighborhood and beyond, considering what some of the statements 

from Mr. Quarles—and I so much appreciate your comments a 

minute ago—I would like to invite both of you, once confirmed, to 

come to my State. 

President Lincoln once said that while his staff wanted to keep 

him in the White House to win the war and free the slaves and 

preserve the union, he said, ‘‘I have to get my public opinion bath 

and go out among people,’’ and I would like to invite each of you, 

if confirmed, to Ohio to join me in learning more about an economy 

in the Midwest. 

Mr. QUARLES. I would be delighted to do that. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you both. 

Mr. OTTING. Back to Cleveland for me. 

Senator BROWN. Back to Cleveland for a Midwestern guy. Thank 

you. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

And I understand Senator Cortez Masto has one brief question, 

I hope. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. I do. Just a clarification. Thank you, Mr. 

Chair. 

So, Mr. Otting, in your answers to Senator Tester, did I hear 

right that you said that OneWest did not engage in robo-signing? 

Mr. OTTING. I said when I answered the question that there 

could have been errors, they were not identified in the robo-signing, 

but our process is in place. And, again, what I would comment on 

is that I think a lot of people have different definitions of robo-signing. Mine is, did we have a process for the affidavits? Second of all, 

did anybody sign any affidavits of another person’s name? Third 

was the data check before somebody signed the affidavit, and last, 

was a notarization process done? And I would respond that we did 

do those at OneWest Bank accurately. There may have been exceptions. I am not aware of those exceptions, and they were not identified as any issues in the interim OCC report that reported our results. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. OK. Here is my concern, and very briefly. I have in front of me the consent order between the Office of 

Thrift Supervision and OneWest. 

Mr. OTTING. Right. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. And, specifically, it states that OneWest 

Bank engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices relating to 

mortgage servicing and the initiation and handling of foreclosure 

proceedings. Specifically, those unsound practices included filed or 

caused to be filed in State and Federal courts or in local land 

records, offices—and this is—and it happened in Nevada—numerous affidavits or other mortgage-related documents that were not 

properly notarized, specifically that were not signed or affirmed in 

the presence of a notary, litigated foreclosure and bankruptcy 

34 

proceedings, and initiating nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings 

without always ensuring that the promissory note and mortgage 

document were properly endorsed or signed and, if necessary, in 

the possession of the appropriate party. That is robo-signing. That 

is what is in this consent order that says that you have done. 

Mr. OTTING. The things that were made, if you will know, we did 

not confirm or deny. You have to look at the results that came from 

the—— 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Then why did you sign the consent 

order? If you did not agree with the decision—— 

Mr. OTTING. Have you ever had to sign a consent order? 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Actually, I was Attorney General of the 

State of Nevada. 

Mr. OTTING. You basically do not have a choice. When the—— 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. So you are telling me that your company—— 

Mr. OTTING. You do not have a choice. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO.——did not engage in this, but you were 

forced under duress to sign this consent order? 

Mr. OTTING. I hope you are never in the position that I was. I 

had great pride. I had been at that company a little less than a 

year, and I was—I would argue I had to, for the benefit of our employees, sign that consent order, when I did not agree with what 

was described. The words that were inserted in there were ‘‘do not 

confirm or deny.’’ I think I would encourage you to look at the results that were produced in 2014. I would be happy to get those 

over to your office. I think it paints a different story of OneWest 

Bank. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. If you did not engage in the practices, 

then you should not have signed the consent order, Mr. Otting, 

but—— 

Mr. OTTING. I wish—I wish it was that easy. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO.——I appreciate your comments. 

Mr. OTTING. I wish it was that easy. 

Senator CORTEZ MASTO. Thank you very much. It was very instructive. 

Chairman CRAPO. Thank you. 

And that does conclude the questioning and the hearing, with the 

exception of a few final announcements. 

Before I do that, though, I want to again thank you both for coming in and participating today at the hearing, and I thank you for 

your willingness to serve the country. 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you. 

Chairman CRAPO. For Senators, all follow-on questions need to 

be submitted by Tuesday, August 1st, and for our witnesses, response to those questions are due by the following Monday morning, August 7th. So please respond quickly to the questions as you 

receive them. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. OTTING. Thank you. 

Mr. QUARLES. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

35 

[Prepared statements, biographical sketches of nominees, responses to written questions, and additional material supplied for 

the record follow:] 

36 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH OTTING 

TO BE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE

CURRENCY

JULY 27, 2017 

Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Committee, it is 

an honor to appear before you to today. I am grateful to be nominated by President 

Trump to be the Comptroller of the Currency, and if confirmed for this role, I would 

be honored to serve the citizens of the United States of America. 

Thank you to all of the Members of the Committee I had an opportunity to meet. 

I enjoyed the opportunity to meet some of you for the first time, and to get re-acquainted with others, but most importantly, I appreciated the opportunity to learn 

more about the issues you feel are important to the people of America. For those 

I did not get to meet, if confirmed, I look forward to meeting and working with you 

in the future. 

I would like to introduce my wife and best friend of 27 years, Bonnie Otting. 

Sometimes you get lucky in life and I am forever grateful for the day we met. You 

have always been my compass in life and for that I love you. In addition, I would 

like to recognize Bonnie’s father, Herman Espinoza, who could not be with us today 

due to his health and age of 94. He is a first generation immigrant who came to 

the United States to pursue the American dream, so his family could live a better 

life. One of his proudest moments was when he was granted his U.S. citizenship. 

My mother, Grace Ann McQuillen Otting, is with us today. She has always been 

my guiding light in life, instilling in me a strong moral compass and helping me 

appreciate the values of a sound family life. She taught school for 35 years and was 

an inspiration to so many students. 

I would also like to acknowledge my late father, James Otting, and mother-in-law, 

Jesse Espinoza. My father taught me many valuable lessons in life, not the least 

of which were his business acumen, focus on family and his commitment to serving 

his community. From Bonnie’s mother, I learned the value of kindness to others and 

that love can cure many things. 

Lastly, I would like to introduce my sister Julia Ardell and my brother James 

Otting. Over the years we have learned the value of love, companionship and dependence on each other. 

I grew up in a Midwestern family where my father was an entrepreneurial business person and my mother, as I indicated, was a school teacher. At the young age 

of 10, I learned the value of business, client relationships and leadership from my 

father while working at his businesses. Often doing the jobs no one else wanted to 

do! I also observed from my father how hard work, willingness to take risks and 

family support led to success. I learned from my mother, who taught school during 

the day, raised three children and went to college at night, that hard work and dedication can make a difference. 

I studied at the University of Northern Iowa, following a family tradition of my 

mother, sister and ultimately my brother to the University. During the summers 

and holiday breaks my father would have me work at his businesses and arranged 

other roles which included working at an electrical dam for a regional utility, a commercial construction site and at a bakery. All great roles for building character, an 

appreciation for people and their individuality, and how leadership can make a difference. 

After college, I was fortunate to be chosen to be a part of a management training 

program for a leading national financial institution. It was an experience that forever changed my life. I gained insight into the banking system from the ‘‘other side’’ 

of the table and discovered how banks help consumers and businesses with services, 

deposits, products and loans. It is in this industry I spent the next 34 years of my 

life and learned the importance of serving employees, the community, customers, 

and shareholders. 

My banking experience has allowed me to work for one of the largest banks in 

the Nation, two well respected regional banks, and a community bank. I have 

touched virtually every segment of the industry including serving consumers, businesses, trust functions, private banking, investment services, legal, human resources, compliance, audit, treasury, financial management, operations and technology. This experience provides a broad base of knowledge that will be helpful and 

insightful in the role as Comptroller. 

In 2010 I decided to leave an executive position at an established financial institution because I felt that Southern California was in need of a ‘‘hometown bank.’’ 

When approached about the idea, I knew it would be challenging and a tremendous 

amount of work, but ultimately an achievement for myself, the company, and the 

37 

region. With the assistance of the many dedicated women and men of OneWest 

Bank, we were able to create the largest hometown bank headquartered in Southern 

California. It was able to grow beyond primarily mortgage originations to a bank 

with a full suite of products and services for local businesses, families and consumers. Helping build this company is something I am and will remain proud of. 

After a successful merger, I left the organization in late 2015 and became an entrepreneur focusing my efforts on real estate and small businesses. 

The mission of the OCC is to ensure that national banks, Federal savings and 

loans and foreign operations of international banks operate in a safe and sound 

manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply 

with applicable laws and regulations. 

If confirmed as Comptroller of the Currency and given the opportunity to lead the 

women and men of the agency, I pledge to honor the OCC’s mission and cooperate 

and work with this Committee and all members of Congress. 

Thank you for your time today. I look forward to answering any questions the 

Committee may have. 

38 


72717013.eps

STATEMENT FOR COMPLETION BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

Name: Otting Joseph Michael 

(l.asl) (00..) 

Position to whidt nominated: Comptroller of the Currency 

Date of nominAtion: 06-06-1017 

Date of birth: l7 11 1957 Place of birth: Maquoketa, lA 

(Oay) (Moolll) (Year) 

Marital Status: Mairied Full name of spouse: Yvoune Rita Ottiag 

Name and ages of children: NIA 

Eduutlou: 

Honon 

·and awards: 

Institution 

Maquokm High School 

University ofNorthem. 

Iowa 

Dates 

attended 

9m-sn6 

9n6-S/81 

Graduate School ofCmtit 7/90 • 7/92 

and F-.nancial Mant&ement 

Degrees 

received 

HSDiploma 

BA 

NIA 

Dates of 

Sn6 

S/81 

CerrifiC8le of completion 

received 7192 

Lisl below all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, military medals, honol81}' 

society memberships and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or 

achievement. 

• Killebrew Thompson Memorial recognition for Service and Dedication as Chairman 

of the Board 

·Cal Chamber recognition for Devoted and Dedicated Leadership as O!air of the 

Board 

·University ofNorthem Iowa President's Club 

• Have received numerous other community and civic recognitions 

2 
39 


72717014.eps

Membenhips: List below all membelships and offices held in professional, fraternal, business, scholarly, 

civic. charitable and olher organizations. 

Organization OffiCe held (If any) 

Calirornia ChamberofCMmcrce Prior C!loitut ofehe Boord. 

Cuzrmt E=llveCommillee 

8l1d Bcerd Member 

KiRdlrtw Thompsen Memorial Prior Choinnan or 111e Boatd, 

Soulhan Higttlaods Oolraub 

NBikloal Rlfle Associllion 

~Cklb 

Cllrrtlll Board Manbet 

Co-Oiainnan lBoerd Membel 

Member 

Prior Boanl Member and 

Trtasurer and eumot member 

Wilsllire CC Member Calir.mia Btok<n Allocilllioo Boord Member 

lOOOubofLosAn&<les Member 

fiiiWiol Scnoica ROUlldbllle Member 

Mltmosota OIIJIIber ofCllllllliO!Oe Board Membel 

MiMeapolis Ollb Member 

Orqoo Busioess Clluacil 8oerd Member 

Portlmcl Bllsiness Alliwe 8oerd Memter 

Asscdaled Oregon lndllllries Boord Member 

WmtleyCC Member 

ArUa3100 Club Member 

Otep cc Membu 

Ortp8811kers Associolion Boatd Member 

SOLV l'olllders Cilde Member 

Los AQgtles Chlmbet ofCommer.e Boenl Membu 

LA Ecoooalie DMiopmalt C«p Boenl Member &E=Itive 

Commillee 

Dates 

2009 • Plesont 

2007-Presa>~ 

2016 • Presmt 2017. Presetll 

1997-Presetlt 

1996 • Plesont 

200?-2013 

2013 ·201$ 

2014.2015 

2004-2006 

2006·2003 

2002· 2003 

2002-2003 

2002-2003 

2003-2010 

2003-2009 

2002-2003 

2002·2003 

2003-2003 

-1996 

·1996 

Employmmt record: List below all positions held since college, iMiuding the title or description of job, 

name of employment, location of work, and inclusive dates of employment. 

Bank of America N.A. 11/81· 5186 

Bakmfldci,CA 

Positions ht.ld: Mw~tmetll Trainee Prostam, ~suma Baaldlli Officu, Small Business 1111<1 a Middle Market Leeder, Pltfetred 81Dkia& 

Officer and Ass'lllnodt Mana&et 

Uni011 Bank Of California 5186 • 12101 Los Angeles, CA and Sao Dieco, CA Posi1ions hdcl: Middle Matkel Relllionstoip ManaJtr, T""' Leader ofRduionship Maaa&at, Re&ional ~and Group Head 

US BalCOm 12101- 2110 

Portllacl, OR, MiODeOpOiis, MN 8l1d Los A .... CA ~itioos held: Portland Matkel Pmic!<Jd, Elllenl Re&ioaol ExecWve and Vice Cbainnan ofCommercW Banking 

One West Bank and 1MB HoldCo 2{10 • 8/15 

Paladciii,CA 

Positioos held: President.-.! CEO ofOote West Bank, PresidenlofiMB HoliiCo ,.d Boanl member of One\Vesl Bank. Responsible forlhe 

ltwitioa of 1 dtrlft dlartmd noortvae COJDlliiiY Into 1 filM sel'lice National Banking tlla1md flllaJICial insliMion oiT<ti~~g a suhe of 
40 


72717015.eps

book ill& ptoductund services to business and com~~mers. Sllccessfully metgcd One West lltd IMBI!ddCo loto lbe OT 01g111izadon lltd 

llti«ialed and impkmeoted a comprdtcnsl .. CRA plan w~b co"""unity based Olpllilllion! 

CIT Group Iu. and CIT Bank 8115 ·lUIS 

PasadMo,CA 

Pooitiooslodd: Presideol and cro of CIT Bank N.A. and eo.l'ltsident of CIT Group, Inc. 

Ocean Blvd LLC 1116 ·Present 

l..lsVeps.NV 

Posilioclbeld:tdznosiocManber 

F.llllty is a boldine compa~~y LLC lilaC owns 2S% ofSHGC LLCas its soleSHGC. LLC 2/16 • Presmt 

l..lsVCCANV 

Pooilioohdd: Co-~ l'lrW:r lltd """'"" oflhe advfsooy boord 

Lake Blvd LLC U16 · Present Pooitlooheld:~Manbet 

The Otting Family Trast3110 ·Present Pooitloo held: eo. r.-

Government 

experience: 

Published 

Writings: 

Political 

Affiliations 

List any experieooe in or direct 8SS(J(:iation with Federal, State, or local governments, 

including any advisory, consul1lltive, honorary or od!er part time service or positions. 

·While acting as Market President for US Bank in Portland, OR in the 2001 • 2003 time 

frame I participated in a task force sponsored by a State Senator to review options to 

close budget deficits 

List the titles, publishels and dates of books, articles, reports or other published materials 

you have written. 

-None 

11d activities: List memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or 

election committees during the last I 0 years. 

• Registered Republican 

·Trump tntnsition team volunteer 

Political 

Contributiou: Itemize all political contributions of$500 or more to any individual, campaign 

organization, political party, political action committee or similar entity during tbe last 

eight years and identify specific amounts, dates, and names 

RECIPIENT 
41 


72717016.eps

Qualificalions: 

Futare employment 

11108/16 

10124116 

10119117 

10117116 

09/lll/16 

09/Jil/16 

091l0116 

09/ll/16 

09/ll/16 

09122115 

06.WI4 

ILWI4 

09/)()114 

07111113 

06124113 

01111113 

lll/23/12 

0100112 

1~11 

09m/ll 

o&A)4/II 

07114111 

01120111 

Ol/14111 

<$2,700> 

$3$,0110 

$3,0110 

<$2,700> 

$2,700 

$2,700 

$10,000 

$2,700 

$2,700 

$1,0110 

$4,100 

$2,SOO 

$2,000 

$1,0110 

$2,SOO 

$200 

S2,SOO 

S8IIO 

$2,SOO 

$1,000 

$1,000 

$1,2$0 

S2SO 

$200 

Joe llcck via Friends of Joe Hedt rot US Sc• T'rumjiVictor)' 

CaiChombcr PAC 

Jason <llalklz via Fricnils ol lasoo Chall<tt 

Troy Gowcly lor Consms Dfmll bsa lor Con&fCS$ 

Tramp Molce Amtri<J Grtot 

Joe Httk via Friends or Joe Hed< for us s.- la!()o Chall'etz via Fricn<lsoi'J11$011 Qa!Teu 

Ritlanl Bloom for California Sllle Assembly 

RidlaniBioom lOr Cllifomia SIIIC A=lb!y 

Ridlord Bloom lor Califomia SWt Assclllbly 

SclllleCOOSCMIMs fund 

Dfm!IISSI (or CIII1S'ess 

CaiO>amber PAC 

CA O..km Association F<dcral PAC M R..,.,cyll' Ryan via Ronmty F« Ptaideo~ loc CA Bookm Association Fecla11 PAC 

M RClOlOCY>'P R)'lll via Ronmty F« Ptcsideot, loc. Colehombtr PAC 

Tim l'lwlally via Pawlenly For Presi<falt 

Tim Pawkoly via Powltnly For Presi<falt 

CA BlntcnAssociolioo Fcdtnll PAC 

CAa..kmAssocialiooftdtdiPAC 

State fully your qualifications to serve in the position to which you have been named 

(attach sheet) 

See attached Exhibit A 

relationshipl: I. Indicate whether you will sever all connections with your present employer, business 

firm, association or organization if you are confirmed by the Senate. 

• As ®scribed in the Ethics Agreement that I have entered into with the U.S. 

Deparunent of the Treasury Assistmt General Counsel of Law, Ethics and 

Regulations, wbich has been provided to the Committee, if confirmed by the 

Senate, I will sever all such connections and parti<:ipation in business affairs 

As part of my prior employment with US Bancorp, I am eligible to receive a defined 

benefit plan and snpplemental plan benefits. If confirmed by the Senate, I wiU 110( 

receive these benefits during my tenure as Comptroller. 

2. As far as can be foreseen, state whether you have any plans after completing 

govemment service to rtsume employment, affiliation or practi<:e with your previous 

employer, business firm, association or organization. 

·After completing government service, I would plan on returning to managing and 

leading family real estate and small business investments. 

5 
42 


72717017.eps

3. Has anybody made you a commitment to a job after you leave government? 

-No 

4. Do you expect to serve the full tenn for which you have been appointed? 

• Yes 

Potetllial oonllitb 

of iDterest: I. Describe any financial anangements or deferred compensation agreements or other 

continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers who will be 

affected by policies which you will influence in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

-None 

2. List any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which might involve 

potential conflicts of interest with the position to which you have been nominated. 

• In connection with the nomination process, I have begun consulting the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Department of the Treasury's desigoated agency ethics 

officials to identify any potential conflicts of interest Any potential conflicts of 

interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I 

will enter into with the department's desigoated agency ethics official and that will 

be provided to this committee. · 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction (other than tax 

paying) which you have had during the last 10 years with the Federal Government, 

whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that might in any 

way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest with the position to which 

you have been nominated. 

-In connection with the nomination process, I have begun consulting with the Office 

of Government Ethics and the Department of the Treasury's desigoated agency 
43 


72717018.eps

Civil, criminal and 

invatigatoey 

actions: 

ethics officials to identify any potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conllicts 

of interest will be resolved in acoordance with the·terms of an ethics agreement that I 

will enter into with the department designated agency ethics offici&! and that will be 

provided to this committee. 

4. List any lobbying activity during the past ten years in which you have engaged in for the 

purpose of directly or indirectly inllueneing the passage, defeat or modification of any 

legislation at the national level of government or affecting the administration and 

execution of national law or public policy. 

-No~ 

5. Explain how you will resolve any conflict of interest that may be disclosed by your 

responses to the items above. 

N/A 

L Give the full derails of any civil or criminal proceeding in which you were a defendant 

or any inquiey or investigation by a Federal, State, or local agency in which you were 

the subject of the inquiry or investigation. 

I have not been a defendant in any criminal proceeding or the subject of a govemmeotal 

inquicy or investigation to the best ofknowledge. I have not been a defendant in any civil 

proceedings other than those where I was named as a co-defendant in my official capacity 

as President and CEO of One West Bank N.A. and President of 1MB Holdco. A search 

for these on Bloomberg Law and LexisNexis, resulted in the 

following cases, which to the best of my knowledge represents all cases . 

Cases 

• Calderon v. Otting 

• Moon v. Moynihan 

• Kuzner v. One West Bank 

• Lucero v. Freddie Mac Equity 

Plus I·ESIC Ltd P'ship 

. Role 

D 

Co-D 

Co-D 

Co-D 

• Arlen Paul Odegard v. Joseph D 

Otting 

• Hernandez v. One West Bank Co-D 

Status 

Dismissed 3/24/14 

Dismissed 4121111 

Dismissed 10/16/14 

Dismissed 7/28/15 

Dismissed with prejudice 2118/11 

Dismissed 217/14 
44 


72717019.eps

- Clark v. Keys Co-D 

- Guevara v. FDIC Co-D 

- Clark v. Boyle Co-D 

- Metcalfe v. Williams Co-D 

- Larson v. One West Bank Co-D 

- Diaz v. Dimon Co-D 

- New Jersey v. Financial Freedom Co-D 

- Colebrook v. App Co-D 

- New Jersey v. Otting D 

-Colebrook v. Otting Co-D 

- New Jersey v, Otting D 

- Phayer v. One West Bank Co-D 

- Parson-Janrhett v. Karl Co-D 

- City of Macon v. Otting D 

- St. Clairev. One West Bank Co-D 

- Texas v. Otting D 

- Ganz v. Otting D 

- St. Clair v. One West Bank Co-D 

- English v. Otting Co-D 

- Carson v. Indymac Mortgage Co-D 

- Anlhony v. Otting Co-D 

Do Defendant 

Co-D • Co-Defendant 

Dismissed 5/26/16 

Filed 10/6/14 

Dismissed 10/1/2014 

Dismissed 6/6/20 II 

Filed 2121/14 

Filed 4/27/15 

Dismissed 9/15/15 

Dismissed 8114115 

Dismissed 8113/15 

Dismissed 5128115 

Dismissed 4116/2015 

Dismissed 3125115 

Dismissed 1127/14 

Expunged 1/9/2014 

Di~missed 10/15/13 

DiSmissed I 0/22/13 

Closed 2/28n013 

No complaint served; Closed 11115/12 

Closed 9/21/12 

Dismissed 9/20/11 

Judgment for Defendants 3/30115 

2. Give the full de1ails of any proceeding, inquiry or investigation by any professional 

associalion including any bar association in which you were the subject of the 

proceeding, iDquiry or investigation. 

-Not Applicable 
45 


72717020.eps

Exhibit A 

Joseph M. Otting 

Statement« QuallfiCalions to Serve as the 

Comptroller of the Currency 

It is a great honor to be nominated to ser.<e our countty as the Comptroller of the Currency. I 

share the goals and values of the Office ol the Complroller of tile Currency wtllch are to operate 

the national banldng system In a safe and sound manner. In addffion, I am oommHted that tile 

OCC should promote oompetltion amongst the National Banks and ensure that all Amerieans 

have fair and equal aooess to financial services. 

As a y()Ung man growing up in a t.idwestern family, I was able to wffness the importanoe and 

C$$CIICCI of our banking eyutem. I81Ni how looel beonkel$ provided needed capital to small 

business OWnet'S, Including my father, as well as consumer and residential loans to families, 

including my own. I also saw the support and oommilment bank$ make to their commun ies by 

supporting hometown venues, nonprofit$ that provide valuable seNi<:es, little league teams. and 

other children's activities and programs. 

During the oourse ol my 30 plus yesrs as a banker, I have seen how a healthy and safe banking 

system can change people's lives. I have Observed dreams turn Into suooess as families are 

able to buy their first car, purchase a new home, start a new business, send their chRdnen to 

college and save for retirement • all dh the assistanca ol the banking system. I have also 

Observed ~n the brillg system does not work, lnc!udilg bank$ being sla!ved for capHal, 

which nesub in job losses, redudion of services for cients and bank failures. 

My banldng career has spanned the segments ol consumer, smaH business, middle market, 

COiporate lending, private banking, personal trust and Investing activities, regulatory 

compliance, legal, technology and operations and audit. I have been'regulated by the OffiCe of 

the Comptroller for the majorffy of my career. The lnst~utions I worked for and the areas under 

my leadership were held In high negaro and In compHanoe wffh laws and regulations. When 

issues were kfentif1ed or cited, we worked tirelessly to improve, correct and oompty wffh the 

regulations. As a leader of persoMel, I alWays emphasized to our teams the Importance of 

having a professional and respected relationship with our regulators. 

In addition to my wo11< as a banker, I have worked hard to suppolllocal oommunmes by 

development and overa!ght of Communffy Reinvestment Act plans and programs and my 

personal participation in local nonprofffs. A halima111 of my fife and career has been to.provide 

aeoess to communffy based organizations to teD their stoly and assist in their mission to allow 

all Americans to gain aooess lo financial services, housing, ecklcation, and employment. 

If oonllrrned as Comptroller ol the Currency, ff would be my great honollo join tha talented 

women and men of tile OCC, and blend their knowledge and experience with my banking 

industry and oommunlty experience, to ensure that we execute lhe mission of the 01ganization 

and fulfill our obligation to the America people. 
46 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDAL QUARLES 

TO BE A MEMBER AND VICE CHAIRMAN FOR SUPERVISION, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

JULY 27, 2017 

Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that the President 

has nominated me to serve as a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System and as the Board’s Vice Chairman for Supervision, and I am grateful to have the privilege of your consideration. I am also very grateful for the support of my family—my wife, Hope Eccles, our three teenage children, Randy, Spencer, and Hope, Jr., and my parents, Ralph and Beverly Quarles. 

The Federal Reserve System occupies a central position in our country’s policy infrastructure for promoting a strong economy and the stability of the financial system, and supporting robust job growth in a context of price stability. I can assure 

this Committee that, were I to be confirmed as a Governor of the Federal Reserve 

Board, I would be strongly committed to these objectives. 

The specific position for which I have been nominated—Vice Chairman for Supervision—has a particular role in ensuring the safety, soundness, and efficient operation of our financial system. As recognized by the Treasury report, regulatory policies enacted since the financial crisis have improved the safety and soundness of the 

financial system. But as with any complex undertaking, after the first wave of reform, and with the benefit of experience and reflection, some refinements will undoubtedly be in order. Former Governor Daniel Tarullo, who was one of the principal architects of many of these reforms, indicated as much himself in a valedictory 

speech that he gave in April on the occasion of his leaving the Board, stating that 

‘‘there are clearly some changes that can be made without endangering financial 

stability.’’ The key question will be ensuring that, as we continue to refine the system over time, we do so while maintaining the robust resilience of the system to 

shocks. 

I believe that I am well qualified to undertake this role. As this Committee 

knows, I have had experience over my career with the financial sector from many 

different points of view. I have been a practicing lawyer versed in the granular technicalities of the most complex aspects of the regulatory system; at the other end of 

the spectrum, I have been an investor in small, community banks, and am familiar 

with the particular benefits of those institutions and the challenges they face; and 

I have been a financial regulatory policymaker under two different presidents in two 

different decades. In fact, my first tour of duty in public service was during a similar period of response after a financial crisis—arriving in 1991 during the clean-up 

phase of the savings and loan crisis and facing the insolvency of the FDIC’s Bank 

Insurance Fund. 

While this long experience has given me substantive insight into the issues that 

the Federal Reserve’s Vice Chairman for Supervision will face, it has also reinforced 

my commitment to what I think is the single most important characteristic of a good 

policymaker: the need to be humble—humble about the constraints on our understanding of complex systems, humble about the fallibility of our judgments, and 

humble about how our own assumptions and views influence even what we believe 

to be our most data-driven and analytical conclusions. As a consequence, were I to 

be confirmed for this position, I would approach this undertaking—as I try to approach every task—with a continual openness to input from every source. In particular, I would look forward to working with the Members of this Committee on 

both sides of the aisle, and your staffs, to understand the challenges that face the 

financial system as they evolve over time. 

Thank you again for the honor of this hearing, and I look forward to responding 

to your questions. 

47 


72717001.eps

STATEMENT FOR COMPLm ON BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

Name: 

Quarles Randal Keith 

Position to wbith nominated: Member and VIce Chairman for Supervision 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 

Date of nomination: July 11, 2017 

Dateef birtb: 

os September 1957 

Plate of birtb: 

San Francisco, California 

Marital Status: Married FIIU name of spoDSe: Clista Hope Eccles 

Name aad ages of clilldren: Randal Eccles Quarles (18) 

Spencer Robert Eccles Quarles (16) 

Emily Hope Eccles Quarles (13) 

Edmtioa: Dates Degrees Dates of 

Institution attended received degrees 

Yale Law School g/81-6/84 J.D. 1984 

Columbia University 9f76-6m A.B. lg81 

l}So-6/81 

Brigham Young University Sfls-4/76 None N/A 

Hoaors List below all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, military medals, honorary 
48 


72717002.eps

audAwards: society memberships and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or 

achievement. 

Alexander Hamilton Award (Treasury Department's highest honor) 

Treasury Department's Meritorious Service Award 

A.B. degree awarded summa cum laude 

Phi Beta Kappa 

National Merit Scholar 

Sterling Scholar (Utah) 

Memberships: List below all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, business, 

scholarly, civic, charitable and other organizations. 

Organization Offioe held (if any) Dates 

Dates of 

Organization Position Affiliation 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter·day Saints Sunday SchoolTeacher From birth 

_(g/14- present) 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Member, Board of Directors _3109 • present 

(3/og-present) 

Baltic American Freedom Foundation Board Member 6/u · present 

(6/u-present) 

Association of the Bar of the City of New Member, Committee on 4195-2016 

York Banking law 

(4/95-gfg8) 

American Bar Assoc.iation None l/94-2016 

Center for Financial Stability Member, Board of Directors g/u-present 

(9/11-present) 

Financial Services Volunteer Corps Member, Board of Directors 7/16-present 

(7/16-present) 

Metropolitan Club (Washington DC) None 6/o6-present 

Alta Club (Salt Lake City) None 3/15-present 

Valley Club (Hailey, Idaho) None z/oz-j)resent 

Yale ClubofNewYork City None s/95-present 

Salt lake Country Club None 9/97-present 

2 
49 


72717003.eps

Employment record: List below all positions held since college, including the title or description of job, 

name of employment, location of work, and inclusive dates of employment. 

Employer Title Location Dates 

The Cynosure Group Managing Director 79 S. Main Street, Salt Lake City, lh4-present 

Utah 

Financial lndustry Member, Board of 1735 K Street, NW, Washington, 7/15-present 

RegulatOIY Authority Directors D.C. 

(FINRA) 

The Carlyle Group Managing Director 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 8/o7-12/13 

Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Department of Under Secretary for 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 8/05-10/06 

Treasury Domestic Finance Washington D.C. 

U.S. Department of Assistant Secretary 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 4fo2-8/o5 

Treasury for International Washington, D.C. 

Affairs 

International Monetary U.S. Executive 70019111 Street, N.W. 8/01-4/02 

Fund Director Washington D.C. 

Davis Polk & Wardwell Partner 450 Lexington Avenue, New 6/94-7/01 

York NewYork 

Davis Polk & Wardwell Assodate 450 Lexington Avenue, New l/93• 6/94 

York, New York 

U.S. Department of Deputy Assistant 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 2/92 ·l/93 

Treasury Secretary for Washington, D.C. 

Financial 

Institutions Policy 

U.S. Department of Special Assistant to 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, s/91· 2/92 

Treasury the Secretary of Washington, D.C. 

the Treasury 

Davis Polk & Wardwell Associate 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New 8/84-s/91 

York, New York 

Davis Polk & Wardwell Summer Assodate 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New 5183-9/83 

York, New York 

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley Summer Assoc.iate 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New sJS2- 9/82 

&McCloy York, New York 

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley Paralegal 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New sJS1- 9/81 

&McCloy York New York 

Government 

3 
50 


72717004.eps

Exptrieace: List any experience in or direct association with Federal, State, or local governments, 

including any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part time service or positions. 

Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Department ofT reasury (2oos-2oo6) 

Member, Air Transport Stabilization Board (2005-2006) 

Assi.stant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Treasury (2002-2005) 

Member, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (2003-2005) 

U.S. Executive Director, International Monetary Fund (2001-2002) 

U.S. Executive Director, European Ba~k for Reconstruction and Development (2002) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Policy, Department of Treasury (1992-1993) 

Special Assistant for Banking Legislation, Department ofTreasury (1990-1992) 

Published 

Writings: List the titles, publishers and dates of books, articles, reports or other published materials 

you have written. 

fitle Publisher Date 

•Focusing on Bank Size, Wall Street Journal March 31, 2016 

Missing the Real Problem• 

•Herding Cats: Collective Duke Journal of Law and Fall2o1o 

Action Clauses in Sovereign Contemporary Problems 

Debt-TheGenesisofthe 

Project to Change Market 

Practice in 2001 through 

2003. 

•Let Private Equity Help the Wall Street Journal June 30, 2009 

Banks" 

•Private Equity Can Save the Wall Street Journal May31, 2oo8 

Banks" 

Testimony before the Senate Congressional Record Julp8, 2006 

Banking Committee on 

Modernization of Insurance 

Requlation 

Comment on "The Euro and Institute for International Aprilloos 

The Dollar: Toward a Finance Economics 

G·2?" in The Euro at FNe: 

Ready for a Global Role 

Testimony before the House Congressional Record Map3,2004 

Committee on Financial 

Services on the US·EU 

Financial Markets Dialoaue 

Testimony before the Senate Congressional Record March 10, 2004 

Banking Committee on US 

4 
51 


72717005.eps

Political 

AJfdiations 

and activities: 

Economic and Financial 

Policy Toward Arqentina 

Testimony before the House Congressional Record April22, 2002 

Financial Services 

Committee on US·EU 

Financial Markets Dialogue 

"U.S. Law Considerations in Lexis Publishing 2000 

Foreign Bank Acquisitions of 

U.S. Banking Institutions' in 

Regulation of Foreign Banks 

"Door Opens Wider toE· International Financial Law October 2000 

Commerce for Financial Review 

Holdinq Companies' 

·us Banking Law International Tax Review July 2000 

Developments• 

"financial Services Reform in Davis Polk & Wardwell March 2000 

the United States- An 

Analysis of the Gramm· 

Leach· Bliley Act' 

"International Banking l*rnational Financial Law October 1989 

Activities• Review 

"A Religion of Clerks" Sunstone Magazine originally written August 

1g8o, republished May 1g85 

List memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or 

elec:tion committees during the last I 0 years. 

Delegate, Salt Lake County Convention, Utah Republican Party-2014 

5 
52 


72717006.eps

Political 

Contributions: Itemize all political contributions of$500 or mort to any individual, campaign 

organization, political party, political action committee or similar entity during the last 

eight years and identify specific amounts, dates, and names of rteipients. 

candidate I PAC I Organization Amount Year 

Free and Strong America PAC Inc. $ s,ooo 2009 

Free and Strong America PAC Inc. s 2,000 2010 

Majority Committee PAC $ 5,000 2010 

National Republican Senatorial Committee s 2,500 2010 

Portman for Senate Committee s 2,400 2010 

Bennett Election Committee Inc. s 2,400 2010 

·Free and Strong America PAC Inc. $ ),000 2010 

Romney for President Inc. $ 5,000 20U 

Hatch Election Committee Inc. $ 5,000 20U 

Restore Our Future, Inc. s ],500 2012 

Freedom Fund s s,ooo 2012 

Wendy Long for New York $ 5,000 2012 

Romney Victory Inc. $40,000 2012 

Romney for President Inc. s 2,500 2012 

Republican National Committee S30,8oo 2012 

National Republican Congressional Committee $ 1350 2012 

Kevin McCarthy for Congress s 2,500 2012 

Hatch Election Committee Inc. s 5,000 2012 

Ryan Prosperity Action, Inc. s 1,000 2013 

Taylor Griffin for Congress s 2,6oo 2013 

Mooney for Congress s 2,000 2014 

National Republican Senatorial Committee s 32,400 2014 

Marco Rubio for President s 2,]00 2015 

Kirk for Senate $ soo 2016 

Friends of Mike Lee Inc. s 2,]00 2016 

Cruz for President $ 2,]00 2016 

Portman for Senate Committee $ 2,]00 2016 

Wendy Long 2016 lnc. $ 5.400 2016 

6 
53 


72717007.eps

Mike Crapo for U.S. Senate 2016 

National Republican Senatorial Committee 2016 

Qualifications: 

Future employment 

State fully your qualifications to serve in the position to which you have been named. 

(attach sheet) 

See Attached Rider A 

relationships: 1. Indicate whether you will sever all connections with your present employer, business 

Potential conflicts 

of interest: 

firm, association or organization if you are confirmed by the Senate. 

Yes. 

2. As far as can be foreseen, state whether you have any plans after completing 

government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous 

employer, business firm, association or organization. 

No. 

3. Has anybody made you a commitment to a job after you leave government? 

No. 

4. Do you expect to serve the full term for which you have been appointed? 

Yes. 

1. Describe any financial arrangements or deferred compensation agreements or other 

continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers who will be affected 

by policies which you will influence in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Federal Reserve Board's designated agency ethics 

official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest 

will be resolved in accordance with the temns of an ethics agreement that I have 

entered into with the agency's ethics official and that has been provided to this 

Committee. I am not aware of any other conflicts of interest. 

7 
54 


72717008.eps

Civil, crimiual and 

2. List any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which might involve 

potential conflicts of interest with the position to which you have been nominated. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Federal Reserve Board's designated agency ethics 

official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest 

will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have 

entered into with the agency's ethics official and that has been provided to this 

Committee. I am not aware of any other conflicts of interest. 

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or fmancial transaction (other than tax 

paying) which you have had during the last 10 ye&S with the Federal Government, 

whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that might in any 

way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest with the position to which you 

have been nominated. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Federal Reserve Board's designated agency ethics 

official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest 

will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have 

entered into with the agency's ethics official and that has been provided to this 

Committee. I am not aware of any other conflicts of interest. 

4. List any lobbying activity during the past ten ye&S in which you have engaged in for the 

purpose of directly oi indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any 

legislation at the national level of government or affecting the administration and 

execution of national law or public policy. 

None. As listed above, I have testified before Congress several times, most recently 

in 2006. 

5. Explain how you will resolve any conflict of interest that may be disclosed by your 

responses to the items above. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Federal Reserve Board's designated agency ethics 

official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest 

will be re.solved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have 

entered into with the agency's ethics official and that has been provided to this 

Committee. I am not aware of any other conflicts of interest. 

8 
55 


72717009.eps

investigatory 

actioos: I. Give the full derails of any civil or criminal proceeding in which you were a defendant 

or any inquiry or investigation by a Federal, State, or local agency in which you were 

the subject of the inquiry or investigation. 

None. 

2. Give the full details of any proceeding, inquiry or investigation by any professional 

association including any bar association in which you were the subject of the 

proceeding, inquiry or investigation:. 

None. 

9 
56 


72717010.eps

RIDER A 

Randol Quortes 

Nomination Questionnaire 

Senate Committee on Bonking, 

Housing, arid Urban Affairs 

The Vice Chairman for Supervision of the Boord of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System requires someone with a range of diverse qualifications. He 

should hove: 

o deep technical expertise in financial services regulation; 

o a dear vision for financial services regulation that is based on the rule of law; 

o extensive experience with both the Federal Reserve and the larger financial services 

bureaucracy; 

o practical exposure to and understanding of the full range of financial services firms, 

large and small; 

o a dear vision for monetary policy for the Federal Reserve to promote a strong 

economy and price stability; 

o the leadership to advance the policy objectives of the United States in such 

international forums as the Basel Committee, Financial Stability Board, Financial 

Markets Regulatory Dialogue, and other international organizations affecting 

financial regulation. 

My career has prepared me in each of these areas. 

o Technical Expertise: In addition to my extensive government experience, I have 

been the co-head ofthe financial institutions group at Davis Polk & Wardwell, one 

ofthe leading financial services law firms in the country (and the youngest head of 

the group in the firm's history). There, I advised many of the most sophisticated 

financial institutions in the world on a wide range of regulatory matters. 

o Vision for Regulation: I have participated in orled comprehensive reviews of the 

financial regulatory structure in two different presidential administrations, which 

has given me a clear view ofthe sensible objectives of financial regulation and the 

means of achieving them. 

o Bureaucratic Experience: As the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic 

Finance, I coordinated financial regulatory policy with all the various regulatory 

agencie.s of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (the Fed, the OCC, 

the FDIC, the SEC, and others). 
57 


72717011.eps

Randal Quartes 

Nomination Questionnaire 

Senate Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs 

o Full Range of Financial Services Firms: My experience at Davis Polk and the 

Treasury was focused on large, complex institutions and questions of systemic 

vulnerability. At the Carlyle Group, by contrast, I focused on small and mid-sized 

financial institutions, where I gained valuable insight into the issues facing such 

institutions and their customers. 

o Monetary Policy: As the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International 

Affairs, I helped lead the area of the Treasury that coordinates dollar policy for the 

US. In this capacity, I worked closely with both members and staff of the Federal 

Reserve Board on monetary policy and financial stability issues. Thi.s collaboration 

gave me a keen appreciation of the range of policies that are likely to foster a strong 

economy in a context of price stability. I will bring a valuable perspective to FOMC 

deliberations based on my comprehensive work in both government and the private 

sector. 

o International: As U.S. Executive Director of the IMF and as Assistant Secretary of 

the Treasury for International Affairs, I was the lead US representative in a wide 

range of international discussions on financial structure and stability and cross· 

border financial regulation, leading the U.S.JE.U. financial regulatory dialogue and 

the U.S. delegations to the Financial Stability Forum throughout this period. In the 

execution of these responsibilities, I represented the Treasury on over uo different 

international missions to nearly so different countries and regularly worked with 

ministers, central bank governors, and the most senior officials of the finance 

ministries and central banks oftheG-7, G·S, G·10, and G-20. 
58 


72717012.eps

SOURCES OF INCOME LAST 3YEARS 

V.-: v-. Yw: 

Salary 

Fca, roydies 

Di•iclcnds 

lmete$1 

Gifts 

ReniS 

Odlcr-aceedita S500 

I 

Ttlll 
(59) 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR BROWN 

FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. If confirmed, will you commit to reply to every oversight or 

other letter and request for information from all Members of the 

Banking Committee in a timely manner? 

A.1. I am committed to furthering a constructive relationship between Congress and the OCC, and responsiveness to congressional 

requests for information is a critical element of that relationship. 

I believe that the OCC should provide appropriate, useful responses to all members of Congress. If confirmed, I will act accordingly. 

Q.2. In June, the Treasury put out a report suggesting many 

changes to the regulatory structure, and we know the impact of deregulatory policies advocated by Treasury in past Administrations. 

If confirmed, you will represent an independent agency. Do you 

commit to being independent from the Administration, including 

Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, and to speak out if you think a legislative or regulatory recommendation threatens the financial stability of our economy, consumer protection, or safety and soundness 

of our banking system? 

A.2. Yes. Treasury has put out a thoughtful and practical document in response to the President’s Executive order to guide the efforts to implement much needed change to the current financial 

regulatory system. The OCC has shared responsibility with the 

other banking and financial regulators on a significant portion of 

the Report’s recommendations. I understand that many of these are 

focused on the capital and liquidity rules and the Volcker rule. If 

confirmed, I look forward to carefully studying each recommendation and working with my fellow regulators and members of Congress. 

OneWest/CIT 

Q.3. As you know, despite numerous requests by many members of 

the Senate to Mr. Mnuchin, we have still not received State-byState data regarding OneWest’s foreclosures. Will you reach out to 

your former employer CIT and request that they provide this data 

to me and other Senators who have requested it? 

A.3. I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not have access to its internal records, including the information you are requesting. 

Q.4. Under the terms of the Independent Foreclosure Review that 

OneWest completed as part of consent orders issued by your regulator, how much did OneWest pay to service men and women for 

violations of the Servicemember Civil Relief Act? How many mortgages were recommended by the consultant for remediation? 

60 

A.4. I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not have access to its internal records. In April 2014, the OCC reported that 

the independent foreclosure review undertaken by OneWest had 

recommended 54 mortgages for remediation related to this issue. 

To the best of my recollection, a number of these errors were the 

result of inaccurate information we received when utilizing the Defense Manpower Data Center, or DMDC, which we later discovered 

routinely misstated active duty status, and OneWest paid restitution of $2,946,986 as recommended by the review. More information is available at the following link: https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-65a.pdf. 

Q.5. How many borrowers were not in default when OneWest initiated the foreclosure process, and how much did OneWest provide 

in compensation? 

A.5. In April 2014, the OCC reported that the independent foreclosure review had recommended 23 mortgages for remediation relating to this issue out of 178,886 mortgages tested. The review recommended compensation of $730,719 which, to the best of my 

recollection, OneWest paid. More information is available at the 

link above. 

Q.6. How many mortgage modifications were denied in error? 

A.6. In its April 2014 report, the OCC stated that the independent 

foreclosure review had recommended 43 mortgages for remediation 

relating to this issue out of 29,964 mortgages tested. More information is available at the link above. 

Q.7. According to the Form 8–K filed by CIT Group in July 2014, 

following its merger with OneWest, you would join CIT as CoPresident, and CEO of CIT Bank. This remained true in subsequent 8–K filings, including one made in July 2015. The CIT– 

OneWest merger was completed in August 2015. CIT then announced that it was terminating your employment in another 8–K 

filing in December 2015. Please describe the reason(s) for your sudden termination from CIT. 

A.7. The Board and CEO determined they wanted to consolidate 

the bank management and holding company structure and thus 

eliminated my position. 

Q.8. The redlining complaint against OneWest filed with HUD suggests redlining had been a problem since at least 2011. While you 

were CEO, were you aware of the bank’s low lending levels to African Americans, Latinos, and Asians, and low number of branches 

outside of majority white communities? If not, why not? If so, why 

didn’t you take steps to address the problem? 

A.8. This document was filed with HUD well after my departure 

from CIT. During my time at OneWest/CIT, I was not aware of any 

violations of the Fair Housing Act. 

Q.9. When you testified before the Federal Reserve during the consideration of the application for the merger between OneWest and 

CIT, you blamed current regulations for OneWest’s high foreclosure 

numbers. If confirmed, what regulatory changes will you propose to 

make it easier to modify mortgages? Do you support servicing reforms? 

61 

A.9. In my testimony, I was referring to a Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) policy under Mortgagee Letter 

2015–11, which required mortgagees to initiate foreclosure on reverse mortgages when borrowers were past due on certain property 

charges by de minimis amounts. I understand that HUD modified 

certain aspects of this policy when, on March 30, 2016, it issued 

Mortgagee Letter 2016–07. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with the OCC’s career staff to ensure that institutions supervised 

by the OCC operate in a safe and sound manner and that consumers have fair access to financial services. 

Q.10. 2014 Steven Mnuchin joined the Board of Relatively Media, 

a customer of OneWest Bank. Jim Wiatt was also on the Boards 

of OneWest Bank and Relatively Media. In the spring of 2015, Mr. 

Mnuchin resigned from the Relatively Media board, OneWest bank 

swept $50 million from Relativity Media accounts, and Relatively 

Media filed for bankruptcy. In bankruptcy proceedings OneWest 

was listed as an owed creditor, and CIT stated in its September filing that it was owed $38.5 million by OneWest. 

Did OneWest’s regulators ever raise concerns about the relationship between OneWest and Relatively Media, or the roles of Steven 

Mnuchin and Jim Wiatt on the Relatively Media Board? Where any 

concerns by the regulators raised since Mr. Mnuchin was also an 

investor in Relatively Media? Did the OneWest Board of Directors, 

which you were a member, ever discuss any of the transactions involving Relatively Media? If so, what was discussed? 

A.10. Relativity Media maintained a lending relationship through 

a syndicated bank facility that comprised a number of banks, including OneWest Bank. The lending relationship was reported as 

required under Regulation O to the OCC. 

To the best of my recollection, the OneWest Bank lending relationship with Relativity Media was approved at the Board level, all 

amendments or changes were also approved by the Board, and Secretary Mnuchin and Jim Wiatt recused themselves from any action 

at the bank as it related to Relativity Media. 

Wells Fargo 

Q.11. A little over a year ago, the OCC and CFPB took enforcement actions against Wells Fargo for creating over 1 million fraudulent accounts for their customers possibly going back as far as 

2007. We know now that the OCC had taken many steps prior to 

the enforcement action to get Wells Fargo to address these issues, 

yet somehow the former CEO and the Board of Directors were allegedly unaware of the issues at the national bank until late 2014 

or early 2015 when the LA Times wrote a story about the practices. 

If confirmed, as Comptroller what will you do to ensure that situations like the one at Wells Fargo which harmed consumers for 

over a decade don’t happen at other banks? Do you think that the 

OCC is aggressive enough in enforcing the law? 

A.11. The OCC and CFPB have taken enforcement action against 

Wells Fargo for the creation of the fraudulent accounts. Clearly, 

the creation of fraudulent accounts has no place in our banks. If 

I am confirmed as Comptroller, I will review the OCC’s internal 

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documentation concerning the Wells Fargo case and take any actions necessary going forward. 

Q.12. The enforcement action against Wells Fargo related to the 

fraudulent accounts is not the only OCC enforcement action 

against Wells Fargo. The OCC has taken 11 actions against Wells 

Fargo since 2005. And some of the misconduct that occurred at this 

bank took place while they were under consent orders issued by the 

OCC and other regulators for other misconduct, including violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. 

Unfortunately, this level of recidivism is not unique to Wells 

Fargo. This isn’t just about strong regulatory supervision and enforcement but also about the culture at banks where violations of 

the law are just one of the costs to do business. 

If confirmed, what will the OCC do to prevent the largest banks 

from engaging in repeated misconduct? 

A.12. If confirmed, I will use every available means to prevent 

banks from engaging in repeated misconduct. The OCC has a variety of tools that it can use, ranging from guidance to onsite supervision and examination to enforcement action, when warranted. 

I believe the OCC’s greatest resource is its staff of highly trained, 

professional bank supervisors and support personnel (including 

lawyers, analysts, policy experts, and economists). The OCC staff 

are very effective in conducting their examinations, identifying and 

communicating risks to bank management and boards of directors, 

and holding banks accountable for actions necessary to correct 

identified deficiencies. For examiners to succeed, as Comptroller, I 

will work to ensure they are empowered to make the important 

judgment calls necessary to ensure banks operate in a safe and 

sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. 

Further, I will ensure that they have the leadership, support, resources, guidance and policy, and world-class training necessary to 

ensure that the banks they supervise adhere to all appropriate 

laws and regulations. 

To help prevent banks from engaging in repeated misconduct, 

the Federal banking system also needs clear rules and standards. 

The OCC has implemented enforceable heightened standards for 

bank management and boards of directors. The standards require 

an effective risk governance framework, established guidelines for 

board responsibilities, and are enforceable under part 30 of the 

OCC’s regulations. 

When banks fail to comply with applicable laws and regulations 

or engage in unsafe or unsound banking practices, the OCC also 

has a variety of enforcement tools which it can use to hold banks 

accountable for their actions. 

At the same time, if the responsibilities of regulators and law enforcement agencies overlap, as Comptroller I would ensure the 

OCC maintains collaborative working relationship with other regulatory and law enforcement agencies who play an important role in 

ensuring our financial system operates as it should and benefits 

the consumers, businesses, and communities it serves. 

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Q.13. Do you think that the OCC is doing enough to hold the 

Board of Directors of the largest national banks accountable for 

misconduct? 

A.13. As mentioned above, the OCC established enforceable heightened standards that describe the responsibilities of Boards of the 

largest national banks and Federal savings associations. These 

standards include ensuring an effective risk governance framework, 

providing active oversight of management, and exercising independent judgment. If confirmed, I would ensure that OCC examiners continue to apply these standards to the largest banks and 

look for opportunities to improve these standards. 

Regulation and Supervision 

Q.14. You’ve been in the banking industry for nearly 40 years, but 

have no experience as a financial regulator. Why do you want the 

job as the top regulator of national banks? 

A.14. The U.S. banking system is the best in the world. I think we 

can make it even better to support economic growth, innovation 

and accessibility for all Americans while maintaining safety and 

soundness. I want to lead an effort to help make this happen. 

Q.15. You have only worked at banks regulated by the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency, the agency you are nominated to lead. 

Do you think the OCC is a fair regulator? What do you think it 

does well? What will you try to improve or change? 

A.15. The staff of the OCC have consistently been identified as one 

of the most talented, thorough, and advanced regulatory groups in 

Government. In my view, examiners in charge of the safety and 

soundness of the banking industry must constantly ask themselves 

and banks what risk they believe there is in the system and ensure 

that these risks do not impair the U.S. economy. If confirmed, I 

hope to harness technology to monitor and oversee the industry 

while minimizing the impact to banks. 

Q.16. One of the most significant accomplishments of the OCC 

after the 2008 financial crisis was its heightened supervision program for the Nation’s largest banks. If confirmed, will you continue 

and strengthen this program? How? 

A.16. To be clear, I support strong and effective regulation of our 

banking system. I would not support changes that would harm the 

safety and soundness of our banking system. It is important to 

keep in mind that the U.S. banking system today is dramatically 

better capitalized than it was before the financial crisis and that 

it is subject to a more rigorous set of regulations. If confirmed, I 

will engage in a continuous review of our regulatory framework to 

ensure our system is safe and sound and that regulations are efficient, effective, and appropriately tailored so that the financial sector can continue to foster economic growth. 

Q.17. Acting Comptroller Noreika has proposed that the OCC be 

given the authority to both charter and grant deposit insurance to 

national banks. The lesson from the 1980s on this is problematic. 

Do you support this proposal? What is the rationale for combining 

the deposit insurance and chartering decision in one agency? 

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A.17. The referenced proposal raises significant issues related to 

the relationship of chartering banks and insuring deposits, as well 

as interagency responsibilities. If confirmed, I will carefully review 

this matter and related issues. 

Q.18. The OCC has proposed issuing national bank charters to 

nonbank fintech firms. This proposal is controversial and is currently the subject of a lawsuit initiated by State regulators. Supporters believe this will encourage innovation. Critics of this effort 

have raised questions about its effect on the marketplace, the payment system, and potential consequences for small community institutions, as well as the tax payer. What do you think about a 

national charter for fintech firms? How do you propose to address 

concerns raised? 

A.18. I am supportive of initiatives that encourage economic 

growth and innovation, and believe this is an area that requires 

input and discussion amongst industry and Federal and State regulatory bodies to determine the appropriate path forward. 

Q.19. The OCC has a history of working to undermine strong 

State-based consumer protections through preemption—effectively 

making State mortgage and usury caps moot. This happened in 

Cleveland leading up to the financial crisis. Do you think the OCC 

should respect States’ authority to protect consumers from predatory bank products offered within their borders? Instead of attacking State consumer protections, should the OCC set minimum 

standards and allow States to improve upon them? 

A.19. I support appropriate preemption for national banks. States 

play a very important role in consumer protection when not preempted by Federal laws and should continue to do so. 

Q.20. Do you think that if a regulatory agency that is being consulted by another regulatory agency for a rulemaking had safety 

and soundness concerns about the rule under consideration that 

they would raise that concern as soon as possible? Does it make 

sense that an agency would wait 2 years into the rulemaking to 

raise these concerns? 

A.20. I believe the banking regulators can improve their coordination in the rulewriting process. During that process, issues should 

be raised within a reasonable period of time. 

Q.21. Will you commit to making policy based on fair and transparent analysis of data, and to make that analysis available to 

Committee Members for scrutiny? Specifically, will you share any 

and all analysis OCC staff or leadership has prepared on the safety 

and soundness impacts of the CFPB’s arbitration rule? 

A.21. If confirmed, I will work to make sure that the OCC continues to conduct rigorous analyses of data, and to share data 

where appropriate. 

Q.22. Will you provide community banks with the resources and 

technical assistance necessary to keep up with quickly changing cybersecurity threats? How do you plan to reduce the burdens that 

the threat of breaches poses to small institutions? 

A.22. Yes. Community banks are a vital part of our Nation’s banking system and as their regulator, we should continually seek ways 

65 

to support these banks in serving the consumers, businesses, and 

communities that depend on them. One significant challenge is cybersecurity. Supporting the Nation’s community banks with this 

and other issues would be a priority of mine. 

If confirmed, I would continue the OCC’s commitment to provide 

community banks with the informational resources and technical 

assistance necessary to keep up with cybersecurity threats. The 

OCC also has made it a priority to continually review and consider 

ways to reduce burdens on community banks that relate to regulatory or business requirements. 

Finally, while not exclusively focused on cybersecurity, one of the 

primary purposes of the OCC’s Office of Innovation is to support 

community banks to understand and take advantage of innovation 

in a safe and sound way to enhance the banking products and services available throughout our Nation. 

Q.23. At your nomination hearing, you said you agree with the 

June Treasury Report’s recommendations to provide regulatory relief to small banks and credit unions. What changes to law would 

do the most to lower compliance costs and other regulatory burdens 

for small banks and credit unions with assets under $10 billion 

without jeopardizing safety and soundness? 

A.23. I support the Treasury’s recommendations and am personally 

committed to improving the financial regulatory framework. I believe that regulations must be appropriately tailored to the risk 

posed by community banks and other banks to consumers, businesses, and the financial system. If confirmed, I will seek to improve the current regulatory system to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to banking regulation, which will help reduce burdens and 

costs on small banks that pose very limited risk to the safety and 

soundness of the banking and financial system. 

More specifically, if confirmed, I will work with my fellow regulators to continue their current efforts to reduce the burden on 

small banks from being required to obtain appraisals for relatively 

small commercial real estate and other loans in rural areas and 

other areas suffering a shortage of certified appraisers. I also believe that the frequency of examinations should be better tailored 

to banks’ CAMELS ratings and capital levels. If confirmed, I will 

also continue the ongoing work of the OCC and other banking 

agencies to reduce the size and content of quarterly Call Reports 

based on the size, complexity, and systemic riskiness of banks. Finally, the application of the Volcker rule to community banks 

should be reconsidered to exempt small banks with de minimis 

trading activities. 

Q.24. After the financial crisis, and the failure of the Office of 

Thrift Supervision to appropriately regulate thrifts, the agency was 

merged with the OCC. Are there any specific priorities you have regarding the regulation of thrift banks? 

A.24. Federal Savings Associations continue to play an important 

role in meeting the financial services needs of people across the 

country. There are 368 Federal savings associations with more 

than $760 billion in assets. 

The supervision of Federal savings associations is now fully integrated into the OCC, and the agency regulates all national banks 

66 

and Federal savings associations consistent with its mission. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to ensure the safety and soundness of both national banks and Federal thrifts. 

Q.25. If confirmed, you will be a voting member of the Financial 

Stability Oversight Council. What emerging financial stability risks 

would you want to focus on? 

A.25. If confirmed, I look forward to serving as a voting member 

of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and would collaborate 

with other Council members to identify potential emerging threats 

and vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system. The Council has 

focused on several areas that are critical to OCC-supervised institutions, including, for example, cybersecurity and the critical role 

of central counterparties. 

Q.26. If confirmed, you will also be a member of the FDIC’s Board 

of Directors. What do you think about the FDIC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority? 

A.26. The financial crisis showed us how necessary it is to have an 

effective resolution regime for failing banks. As for the OLA specifically, I understand that Treasury is working on a response to an 

April 2017 Presidential Memorandum that requires it to thoroughly review OLA and provide a report to the President on its 

findings. I would like to review that report fully before discussing 

the future of OLA. 

Miscellaneous 

Q.27. In your ethics disclosures you list your ownership of many 

residential properties in California and Nevada. Did you own these 

properties before the financial crisis? If not, when did you purchase 

each property, did you receive financing for any of these purchases, 

what bank(s) originated those loans? Were these arm’s length 

transactions? 

A.27. The Nevada properties were purchased between 2013–2016 

and the California properties were purchased in the timeframe of 

2006–2016. One of the Nevada investment purchases had a shortterm loan provided by UBS, which since has been paid off. My primary residence is the only Nevada property that has a loan against 

the property and that is with UBS. Three of the California properties have mortgages as identified in my financial disclosure, two 

from UBS and one from the Otting Family Trust. To the best of 

my knowledge and belief, these transactions were concluded on 

commercially reasonable terms. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SASSE 

FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. My constituents tell me that the EGRPRA report inadequately 

highlighted concrete ways to reduce the regulatory paperwork burden. What more can the OCC do to reduce the regulatory burden 

on community banks? 

A.1. The EGRPRA report provided to Congress in March 2017, describes ongoing steps the agencies plan to pursue jointly, and actions the OCC has taken independently to reduce the regulatory 

paperwork burden on supervised entities. I believe this report is a 

67 

good first step toward meaningful burden reduction, and work already has been accomplished to reduce burdens in certain areas. 

As Comptroller, I would continue to look for additional ways to 

reduce unnecessary burden and promote economic opportunity 

while ensuring that the Federal banking system continues to operate in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial 

services, treat customers fairly, and comply with applicable laws 

and regulations. 

Q.2. Our financial system has become increasingly consolidated as 

community banks and credit unions either close their doors or 

merge with larger institutions. 

Q.2.a. Are you concerned about this pattern? Why? 

A.2.a. I am concerned about the increasing consolidation of community banks and if confirmed I will examine this trend to ascertain 

if regulatory burden is a cause. These institutions play an outsized 

role in the economy, lending to small and mid-size businesses that 

fuel economic growth. 

Q.2.b. What services can these smaller institutions provide that 

larger institutions cannot provide? 

A.2.b. Community banks, due to their unique insight into the credit needs of their communities and close relationships with their 

customers, are able to deliver financial services in ways larger institutions cannot and thus play a vital role supporting economic 

growth in cities and towns around the country. Community banks 

serve as essential engines of ‘‘relationship’’ lending to small and 

mid-size businesses, farms, and consumers in individual communities. 

Q.3. Multiple anecdotes from my constituents make it clear that 

there are several Nebraska counties where mortgages are not originated because of over-regulation. What is the best way to address 

this problem from a regulatory standpoint? 

A.3. While I cannot comment on the particular challenges of the 

counties in Nebraska, I support Treasury’s findings from its June 

report to the President on how to better align our financial regulatory system with the needs of consumers and businesses. I understand that Treasury’s report made several recommendations to 

modify regulations that are negatively affecting the ability of creditworthy American families to gain access to affordable mortgages. 

Q.4. My understanding is that only two banks have opened since 

the passage of Dodd-Frank, including Bird in Hand Bank in Pennsylvania, which has a customer base that is around half Amish. 

Q.4.a. Why do you believe this is the case? The dearth of de novo 

banks is an important issue and adversely affects the availability 

of banking services. 

A.4.a. As Comptroller, I would work to identify opportunities to 

eliminate barriers to de novo banks, including looking for ways to 

make the chartering and deposit insurance approval process more 

efficient. 

There are a variety of factors contributing to the low number of 

de novo banks since 2008, including slow economic growth, a 

sustained period of historically low interest rates, industry 

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consolidation, competition from nonbank financial service providers, and challenges with obtaining deposit insurance. 

In his June 22 testimony, the Acting Comptroller discussed possible ways to make deposit insurance approvals more efficient by 

leveraging the chartering approval process conducted by the primary prudential authority. As Comptroller, this would be a subject 

that I would continue to explore. 

Q.4.b. What potential impacts does this have on our financial system? 

A.4.b. Consolidation of banks and the lack of de novo activity can 

reduce the availability of banking services where they are needed 

most and contribute to stagnation within the industry. A healthy, 

diverse Federal banking system requires an efficient process for 

new companies seeking to engage in the business of banking to become national banks. 

Q.4.c. Is there anything more the OCC can do to encourage the 

opening of new banks? 

A.4.c. In his June 22 testimony, the Acting Comptroller discussed 

possible ways to make deposit insurance approvals more efficient 

by leveraging the chartering approval process conducted by the primary prudential authority. As Comptroller, this would be a subject 

that I would continue to explore. I am hopeful that making the de 

novo process more efficient will result in more interest by new entrants into the national banking system. 

In addition, if confirmed, I would continue to be receptive to 

more innovative approaches to banking. De novo banks can be a 

source of responsible innovation and taking an affirmative stance 

toward innovation that enhances banking services, products, and 

operations can encourage more companies to explore opportunities 

to become banks. 

Q.5. As you know, in December of 2016 the OCC released a 

whitepaper discussing the possibility of a fintech charter, entitled, 

‘‘Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech 

Companies.’’ 

Q.5.a. Do you intend to move the OCC forward on finalizing a 

fintech charter? Why or why not? If so, please provide a timeline 

on these efforts. 

A.5.a. If confirmed, I look forward to evaluating the merits and 

value of the OCC’s proposed approach to chartering financial technology companies engaged in the business of banking. As financial 

technology accelerates, it is important to ensure that companies engaged in the business of banking have the appropriate oversight 

and regulatory structure in place. 

Companies engaged in the business of banking should have the 

option of pursuing their businesses as a federally chartered bank, 

if they meet the standards and criteria for becoming a national 

bank. Any company that earns a national bank charter should be 

held to the same high standards, laws, and regulations applicable 

to other national banks. 

Q.5.b. Does the OCC have sufficient statutory authorization to implement a fintech charter? Why or why not? 

69 

A.5.b. The authority to grant national bank charters and Federal 

thrift charters is well established and includes the authority to 

charter limited purpose national banks. 

The authority to grant special purpose national bank charters is 

described in 12 CFR 5.20 Section 520.(e)(1). I support the OCC in 

defending its authority against the challenge being brought by the 

Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the New York 

Department of Financial Services (NYDFS). 

While CSBS and NYDFS are challenging the OCC’s authority articulated in 12 CFR 5.20(e)(1) to grant special purpose national 

bank charters to uninsured, nondepository fintech companies engaged in the business of banking, the OCC has other authorities 

to charter full service national banks as well as trust banks, banker’s banks, and credit card banks, which may be chartered using 

the OCC’s broad authority under 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) and (b); 12 

U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D) and (F). 

Q.5.c. Under what legal circumstances is the OCC allowed to regulate fintech companies? 

A.5.c. The OCC can only regulate those fintech companies that 

choose to become a national bank or that provide services to a national bank as a third-party service provider. The OCC would have 

authority to regulate any fintech company that becomes a national 

bank under the same laws and regulations that grant the OCC authority to administer the Federal banking system. And the OCC 

would have authority to regulate fintech companies to the extent 

that the agency has authority to oversee third-party service providers to national banks, Federal savings associations, or Federal 

branches of foreign banks. The vast majority of fintech companies 

operate under State authorities and are likely to continue to do so. 

Q.5.d. What concerns, if any, do you have with the OCC’s fintech 

charter, as outlined in the previously mentioned December 2016 

whitepaper? 

A.5.d. The proposal by the OCC is a thorough and thoughtful proposal. It is important to ensure we have a Federal banking system 

that can adapt to the changing needs of the market and its customers. If confirmed, I will take the opportunity to carefully consider the proposal, its potential impact on products and services offered to customers of the Federal banking system, and the possible 

effects on other institutions that make up the Federal banking system. 

Q.6. As you know, the OCC recently released a bulletin entitled, 

‘‘Frequently Asked Questions to Supplement OCC Bulletin 2013– 

29,’’ which provided some regulatory guidance for banks that partner with fintech companies. However, I am told there is still confusion about such partnerships, including when fintech companies 

will be treated as third-party service providers, as well as the regulatory implications of this arrangement. 

Q.6.a. Should the OCC provide further guidance to banks about 

their partnership with fintech companies, including when fintech 

companies will be treated as third-party service providers, and the 

corresponding regulatory implications for banks? If so, please provide a timeline for such efforts. 

70 

A.6.a. This is a very important question, particularly as banks rely 

more upon third-party service providers and explore other partnerships to serve their customers better and enhance their operations. 

If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to enhance OCC guidance 

in this area. 

Communication is key to successful supervisory relationships. 

Banks with questions about partnering with fintech companies can 

always discuss their concerns with assigned supervisory staff or 

with staff within the OCC’s Office of Innovation. 

Q.6.b. Under what conditions have onsite bank examiners treated 

fintech companies as third-party service providers? 

A.6.b. In my experience as a bank executive, bank regulators treat 

a company as a third-party service provider when a bank contracts 

with the company to engage its services. OCC Risk Management 

Guidance defines a third-party relationship as any business 

arrangement between a bank and another entity, by contract or 

otherwise. The OCC expects a bank to practice effective risk management regardless of whether the bank performs the activity internally or through a third party. A bank’s use of third parties does 

not diminish the responsibility of its board of directors and senior 

management to ensure that the activity is performed in a safe and 

sound manner and in compliance with applicable laws. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR REED FROM 

JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. The Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC in 2016 published a 

joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) on cybersecurity, asking for comment, among other things, on whether boards 

of directors should have adequate expertise in cybersecurity. Citing 

the ANPR: ‘‘a cyber incident or failure at one interconnected entity 

may not only impact the safety and soundness of the entity, but 

also other financial entities with potentially systemic consequences.’’ Other than the solicitation of comments, we are not 

aware of any material progress on this ANPR. If confirmed, may 

I have a personal commitment from each of you that you will work 

with the FDIC and each other on advancing this cybersecurity 

ANPR? 

A.1. I support the fact that this Administration has made the security and resiliency of the U.S. financial system a key priority. Effective coordination and dialogue is vital to further promoting effective cybersecurity. If confirmed, you have my commitment that I 

will work with staff at the OCC to continue to pursue appropriate 

and productive work to help promote effective cybersecurity. 

Q.2. The OCC and the Federal Reserve are each authorized to enforce the Military Lending Act (MLA), which is a bipartisan law enacted in 2006 that sets a hard cap of 36 percent interest for most 

loans to the military. On July 22, 2015, the Department of Defense 

finalized MLA rules that closed prior loopholes that allowed unscrupulous lenders to prey upon servicemembers and their families. 

Do you support these stronger MLA rules? If confirmed, will you 

support and enforce these strong MLA rules to the fullest extent 

possible? 

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A.2. If confirmed, I would support and enforce strong MLA rules. 

Q.3. As part of its duties, the OCC is also expected to enforce the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), but SCRA enforcement of 

the 6 percent interest cap on loans incurred prior to active duty or 

the SCRA’s foreclosure protections has been inconsistent and subject to the discretion of our financial regulators. If confirmed, can 

you tell me how you will prioritize SCRA enforcement? 

A.3. If confirmed, I would be supportive of SCRA being part of the 

regulatory exam process and would endorse a horizontal review in 

the industry. 

Q.4. The Comptroller is supposed to be independent from the Administration and while it is part of the Treasury Department, it is 

an independent bureau. In the financial regulatory space, can you 

point to anything where you do not agree with the position taken 

by either the Trump administration or Secretary Mnuchin? 

A.4. If confirmed, I will carry out my duties consistent with applicable law, in a manner free from undue influence. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MENENDEZ 

FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. Please provide State-by-State numbers of the total number of 

foreclosures and loan modifications completed by OneWest. While 

you may not currently have direct access to this information, you 

can request that CIT provide this information prior the Banking 

Committee’s consideration of your nomination. 

A.1. I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not have access to its internal records, including the information you are requesting. 

Q.2. In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress enacted a provision, section 956 of Dodd-Frank, to require financial regulators to 

jointly issue rules to ban incentive pay practices at large financial 

institutions that encourage inappropriate risk-taking. In May of 

2016, the financial regulators including the Federal Reserve Board 

and the OCC proposed a rule to implement section 956. More than 

a year later, the rulemaking still has not been finalized. The Wells 

Fargo fraudulent account scandal uncovered last year, where senior 

executives were given bonuses for ‘‘successes in cross-selling,’’ underscores the need for rules regarding incentive-based compensation agreements. Last month, the Office of Management and Budget published updated regulatory agendas, and the rulemaking was 

removed from the OCC’s agenda.1

Q.2.a. Will you commit to prioritizing the section 956 rulemaking 

and ensuring that it is part of the OCC’s regulatory agenda? 

A.2.a. Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires financial regulators to jointly issue rules relating to enhanced compensation 

structure reporting. The OCC, together with the other designated 

Federal regulators, published a proposed joint rule on this matter 

72 

in June 2016. If confirmed, I would urge all the regulators to work 

together to finalize the rule as required by statute. 

Q.2.b. Will you commit to implementing section 956 of DoddFrank? 

A.2.b. As Comptroller, I would work to fulfill all of the statutory 

obligations of the office. 

Q.2.c. Will you commit to implementing all congressionally mandated rulemakings? 

A.2.c. As Comptroller, I would work to fulfill all of the statutory 

obligations of the office. 

Q.3. In 2015, while you were Chair of the California Chamber of 

Commerce, the organization placed a State bill, AB 244, on its ‘‘jobs 

killer’’ list and urged State legislators to oppose it. The bill would 

have protected from foreclosure surviving spouses who have a legal 

interest in a home but who were not listed on the mortgage. In the 

same year, you said at the public hearing regarding the merger of 

OneWest and CIT Group, ‘‘Let me be clear, we urge and fully support a moratorium on foreclosure of nonborrowing spouses.’’ When 

you were publicly representing OneWest, you took a sympathetic 

tone toward borrowers, but when you were making policy decisions 

for your association, you staked out a position that would harm the 

very borrowers you claimed to want to help. How do you reconcile 

these two positions? 

A.3. I had no direct involvement in the decision by the Chamber 

regarding AB 244. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. Your testimony raised a lot of important issues related to consumer rights and the proper balance of regulations in our economy. 

I think it’s important to remember that you are nominated for a 

position of public trust and with that comes a different set of priorities and obligations than what you might have experienced in the 

private sector. Your decisions will greatly impact not only the bottom line of the financial institutions that you regulate, but as we 

saw all too tragically during the financial crisis, regulatory decisions can have a dramatic impact on the well-being of individuals 

and their families. 

If confirmed, how do you intend to separate yourself from past 

conflicts and carry out your duties independently so that you can 

serve the public’s best interest? 

A.1. If confirmed, I will adhere to all applicable ethics laws, rules, 

and policies. Should I have a question concerning my ethical obligations, I will seek the counsel of appropriate ethics staff. 

Q.2. As you’re well aware Wells Fargo was fined $180 million last 

year by regulators, including the OCC, for setting up fraudulent accounts for its customers. 

I’m curious to know your views on the role the OCC should play 

in preventing these types of scandals? Do you believe more should 

be done in the future to avoid this type of systemic fraud, and if 

so, what would you recommend? 

73 

A.2. As a former bank executive, I can tell you the primary responsibility for preventing such abuse and ensuring incentives are properly aligned to motivate appropriate behavior and achieve business 

goals rests with the bank leadership and boards. As Comptroller, 

I would look for additional opportunities to ensure bank boards and 

management fully understand their roles and responsibilities in 

preventing this behavior. 

If confirmed, I believe it is critical to empower OCC’s cadre of 

professional community, midsize, and large bank examiners and 

ensure that they have the support, resources, and training necessary to exercise their responsibilities to ensure that the banks 

they supervise adhere to all appropriate laws, regulations and 

other issuances. Ongoing supervision is the most effective tool the 

agency has to affect change. 

Consumer fraud has no place in the Federal banking system and 

I believe in providing examiners authority to consider appropriate 

remediation activities, up to and including formal enforcement actions, when the circumstances warrant. 

The OCC conducted an internal review of its supervision of Wells 

Fargo, which included several recommendations. As Comptroller I 

will look to ensure these recommendations have been implemented 

effectively and continue to look for opportunities to enhance our supervision of large, complex banks. 

The OCC is also conducting a horizontal review of the sales practices among large and midsize national banks. I look forward to 

discussing the findings when that review is complete and working 

with staff to correct any deficiencies they identify. 

Q.3. During our one-on-one yesterday we covered some important 

ground as it relates to regulatory relief for community banks. I appreciate your comments on the need for relief in mortgage lending 

and rural appraisals. Another area that I believe is ripe for regulatory overhaul is small dollar lending. In North Dakota, we have 

several community banks that are trying to help extend small dollar credit to customers, but can’t because of regulatory uncertainty 

and onerous compliance standards. There’s analysis that shows 

banks and credit unions could offer safe loan alternatives at prices 

six times lower than payday lenders. I believe it’s far better to have 

these loans made by well-regulated community banks that know 

their customers and have their long-term financial interests in 

mind. 

• Will you commit to working with banks to enable them to offer 

new reasonable and safe installment loans to their customers 

that can be a true alternative to payday loans? 

A.3. Access to a diverse set of credit products is essential for consumers across America. I support adjustments to our regulatory 

approach designed to decrease our population of unbanked and 

underbanked consumers and bring more of these consumers into 

the financial mainstream. I also support innovation in banking and 

a marketplace with a level playing field for all financial institutions 

that will increase competition, which is ultimately beneficial to consumers. You have my commitment to work with your office on 

these matters. 

74 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SCHATZ 

FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. Mr. Otting, in our one-on-one meeting, you and I had a chance 

to talk about the Wells Fargo scandal. I was encouraged to hear 

your view that their behavior was totally unacceptable. I also agree 

with your assessment that the corporate culture, with its drive to 

cross-sell and an obsession with sales targets, was at the heart of 

the problem. Since that conversation, we have learned of yet another Wells Fargo scandal. This one involved charging consumers 

for high priced auto insurance that they did not need, without their 

knowledge. The high cost of the auto insurance pushed roughly 

274,000 Wells Fargo customers into delinquency and resulted in almost 25,000 wrongful vehicle repossessions. 

Q.1.a. What will you do to prevent these types of scandals from 

happening again? 

A.1.a. I understand that following the OCC’s enforcement action 

against Wells Fargo last September, the agency undertook a thorough review of its supervisory activities to determine any lessons 

learned that it could utilize going forward. The OCC made its lessons learned findings public on April 19, 2017. I believe that the 

OCC is in the process of institutionalizing the recommendations included in this report, which is intended to correct supervisory deficiencies identified. As Comptroller I will look to ensure these recommendations have been implemented effectively and continue to 

look for opportunities to enhance our supervision of large, complex 

banks. 

The OCC is also conducting a horizontal review of the sales practices among large and midsize national banks. I look forward to 

discussing the findings when that review is complete, working to 

correct any deficiencies staff identify, and determining what additional steps can be considered to prevent such practices from recurring. 

Consumer fraud has no place in the national banking system and 

I believe in providing examiners authority to consider appropriate 

remediation activities, up to and including formal enforcement actions, when the circumstances warrant. OCC examiners will have 

my strong backing to exercise their supervisory judgment, and take 

enforcement or other remedial actions to ensure banks operate in 

compliance with appropriate law and regulations. 

Q.1.b. At what point do these kinds of violations become a safety 

and soundness concern for the banks the OCC supervises? 

A.1.b. I do not have first-hand knowledge of the sales practices at 

Wells Fargo, but treating customers unfairly and failure to implement effective controls against fraud are safety and soundness 

issues. No bank can operate in a safe and sound manner for long 

if it abuses its customers and allows misaligned incentives to motivate improper behaviors. 

The OCC’s enforcement action against the bank (September 8, 

2016) states clearly that the agency found the bank’s sales practices to be unsafe or unsound. See https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-106a.pdf and https:// 

www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016- 

106.html. 

75 

Q.1.c. Do you think banks’ compensation practices are contributing 

to the problem of banks harming their consumers in order to increase profits? 

A.1.c. In the case of the OCC’s enforcement action against Wells 

Fargo for its sales practices violations, the OCC identified unsafe 

or unsound practices in the bank’s risk management and oversight 

of its sales practices and noted that the bank’s incentive compensation program and plans were not aligned properly and fostered unsafe and unsound practices. Based on my personal experience, it is 

critical that a bank’s sales culture and compensation be properly 

aligned to avoid any actual or perceived inappropriate incentives. 

Q.1.d. In the auto insurance scandal, consumers who fell behind in 

paying their auto loan or had their car repossessed likely have negative trade lines on their credit report that will haunt them for 

years. These errors on their credit report will lower their credit 

score, prevent them from getting loans in the future or increase the 

cost of borrowing, and make it harder for them to get hired or rent 

an apartment. 

What will you do as Comptroller of the Currency to ensure that 

(1) Wells Fargo works with credit reporting agencies to remove the 

negative trade lines on consumer credit reports as a result of the 

scandal, and (2) Wells Fargo helps impacted consumers verify that 

their credit reports no longer contain negative information related 

to this scandal? 

A.1.d. If confirmed, I will carefully review the OCC’s supervisory 

record and findings relating to Wells Fargo auto loan practices and 

ensure that appropriate action—up to and including formal enforcement action if necessary—is taken to ensure that any adverse impacts to consumers of such practices are fully addressed. 

Q.2. It does not require too much imagination to understand why 

the financial industry is lobbying against the CFPB’s new rule banning mandatory arbitration. They have been able to avoid all kinds 

of lawsuits by taking away consumers’ right to go to court. 

But it is very troubling that one of the most vocal opponents to 

the new rule was the Acting Comptroller of the Currency. He 

claims that the rule poses a safety and soundness risk to banks. 

However, he has not provided any evidence to support that claim. 

In fact, several of the largest banks do not use them. And those institutions that have chosen to stop using mandatory arbitration— 

Bank of America, Capital One, JPMorgan Chase—are no less safe 

or sound as a result. 

Q.2.a. What should the OCC’s role be when it comes to weighing 

in on rules issued by other financial regulators, like the CFPB’s arbitration rule? 

A.2.a. By statute, the CFPB has exclusive authority to prescribe 

regulations administering certain consumer protection laws, and is 

required to consult with the prudential regulators prior to proposing a rule and during the rulemaking process. If during the consultation process, a prudential regulator provides a written objection to all or any part of a proposed rule, the CFPB must describe 

the objection and how it is addressed. This process is critical to ensure meaningful input by the OCC into CFPB regulations and to 

76 

avoid any unintended consequences of a CFPB rule on the national 

banking sector and to ensure consistent application of the rules by 

multiple regulators. 

The statute also provides for the review and stay of rules for 

safety and soundness reasons under the Financial Stability Oversight Council. As member of the council and the primary prudential regulator of the Federal banking system, the Comptroller of the 

Currency has an important role to play ensuring rules do not adversely affect the safety and soundness of the Federal banking system. It is important for the agencies to maintain a positive collaborative relationship to ensure such concerns are addressed early and 

relevant data and information are shared so that each agency has 

the opportunity to fully consider such matters in exercising their 

independent authorities. 

Q.2.b. How would you evaluate whether the CFPB rule presents 

safety and soundness concerns? 

A.2.b. To evaluate whether the CFPB rule regarding arbitration 

agreements presents safety and soundness concerns, one would 

look at its potential effects on the Federal banking system as a 

whole as well as the institutions within that system. One would 

seek to ascertain the rules’ impact on the banks’ ability to mitigate 

risk and limit liability, on reserves, and on the availability and cost 

of the products and services it offers. The effects need to be evaluated in context to determine the cumulative impact, rather than in 

isolation. 

In general, as part of the OCC’s statutory consultative role, it is 

crucial that CFPB provide the OCC with adequate information, 

findings, and data that OCC economists, policy experts, and examiners may review in order to determine any safety and soundness 

or other potential implications of proposed rules. If confirmed, I 

will expect that the CFPB will engage with the OCC early and 

often as it develops regulations to ensure that the consultation 

process is meaningful, and that we have the information we need 

to provide feedback and recommendations to the bureau to accommodate any safety and soundness concerns that may arise. 

Q.3. If there is a lack of evidence that the CFPB rule undermines 

banks’ safety and soundness, will you retract Acting Comptroller 

Noreika’s opposition to the rule? 

A.3. I believe this is a complicated matter—one which I will give 

serious attention to if I am confirmed. If confirmed, I commit to 

work faithfully to help ensure the safety and soundness of national 

banks and Federal savings associations, and will work closely with 

the members of the FSOC to help assure U.S. financial stability. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CORTEZ 

MASTO FROM JOSEPH OTTING 

Q.1. How many foreclosure completions did OneWest (the Bank) 

engage in during your employment at the Bank? How many foreclosure completions were in Nevada? 

A.1. As I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not have 

access to its internal records, I do not have sufficient information 

to answer this question. 

77 

1https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-65a.pdf. 

2http://static.politico.com/bc/9e/81e33aa74b5980daa9ffdeb7cba9/steven-mnuchin-responsesto-senate-finance-committee.pdf. 3https://www.occ.gov/static/ots/misc-docs/consent-orders-97665.pdf. 

4http://4closurefraud.org/2009/11/15/full-deposition-of-the-infamous-erica-johnson-seck-reindymac-federal-bank-fsb-plaintiff-vs-israel-a-machado-50-2008-ca-037322xxxx-mb/. 

Q.2. An April 2014 report from the OCC indicated that OneWest 

improperly foreclosed on 54 servicemembers in contravention of the 

Service Member Civil Relief Act.1 How many of those 

servicemembers resided in the State of Nevada? 

A.2. As I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not have 

access to its internal records, I do not have sufficient information 

to answer this question. 

Q.3.a. Secretary Mnuchin in his questions for the record to the 

Senate Finance Committee following his confirmation hearing suggested that OneWest modified the loans of approximately 2,150 Nevadans. But his answer conflated modification offers with actual 

modifications. Everyone who has worked with homeowners understands that an offer from a bank to modify a loan is not the same 

thing as a modification. How many completed loan modifications 

did OneWest provide to Nevadans during your tenure?2 How many 

of those completed loan modifications included a reduction in the 

borrower’s principal amount? 

A.3.a. As I am no longer employed by OneWest/CIT and do not 

have access to its internal records, I do not have sufficient information to answer this question. 

Q.3.b. In your response to my question at your confirmation hearing, you said, ‘‘a lot of people have different definitions of ‘robosigning.’ ’’ What is your definition of what’s colloquially referred to 

as ‘‘robo-signing?’’ Do any of the Office of Thrift Supervision’s findings on pages 2 and 3 of OneWest’s 2011 consent order constitute 

what is colloquially known as robo-signing?3

A.3.b. I do not believe that OneWest Bank engaged in practices 

that are commonly associated with this term. I am also not aware 

of any legal definition of this term. 

Q.4. In response to one of my questions at your confirmation hearing, you seemed to suggest that because OneWest had a ‘‘process’’ 

in place to handle residential real estate mortgage foreclosures, 

that it was evidence that the Bank did not, in fact, ‘‘robo-sign’’ or 

engage in unsafe or unsound banking practices. Would you concede 

that a bank merely having a process in place is insufficient to 

guard against unsafe or unsound banking practices, and that such 

processes must actually be followed by employees of the bank? For 

example, a OneWest employee testified in a 2009 deposition that 

she signed 6,000 documents per week, mostly affidavits, and that 

she did not check the figures outlined in the affidavits.4 Does the 

behavior described in this deposition constitute ‘‘robo-signing?’’ Did 

OneWest’s ‘‘processes’’ prove sufficient to guard against this misconduct? 

A.4. Banks should take appropriate steps to comply with all applicable laws, rules, and policies, including those relating to safety 

and soundness. Often, this counsels in favor of adopting internal 

processes as well as implementing and, as necessary, updating, 

78 

reasonable controls to provide for adherence to those processes. As 

demonstrated by the independent foreclosure review, under the 

policies and procedures in place at OneWest, the bank experienced 

relatively low rates of irregularities associated with its mortgage 

activities. Additionally, it is my understanding based on the testimony you cite that the employee was not describing her individual 

workload but rather the activity of multiple employees. 

Q.5. Please elaborate on the answer you provided to me during 

your oral testimony and indicate why you signed the 2011 consent 

order between OneWest and the Office of Thrift Supervision if you 

believed that the findings in the consent order did not accurately 

reflect the practices of the Bank at that time. 

A.5. After due consideration, we believed that this was the most 

appropriate course of action at the time. 

Q.6. In your oral response to my questions at the hearing, you 

seemed to indicate that consent orders which do not require admissions of guilt are somehow invalid or coercive on the part of the 

Government. Given these views, if confirmed, will the OCC require 

admissions of guilt when entering into a consent order with a regulated institution? 

A.6. If confirmed, I look forward to considering this issue in consultation with career staff at the OCC. I believe that the OCC 

should take appropriate action to vigorously enforce the laws within its jurisdiction. 

Q.7. When asked about ‘‘dual tracking’’ at your confirmation hearing, you responded that OneWest’s behavior was not significant 

because it was ‘‘industry practice,’’ insinuating that it was permissible because it was common. Please elaborate on your views on the 

practice commonly known as ‘‘dual tracking.’’ Also please describe 

the relevance of whether or not it was industry practice in your answer. 

A.7. I did not testify that OneWest’s activities regarding these 

issues were ‘‘not significant’’ because they were ‘‘industry practice.’’ 

I believe that a bank’s actions regarding mortgage modifications 

and foreclosures must be undertaken consistent with applicable 

law. Thus, I do not believe that ‘‘industry practice’’ should necessarily be dispositive with respect to any determination by a bank 

regarding these issues. To the best of my recollection, OneWest initially implemented policies and procedures consistent with guidance set by Treasury and the Government-Sponsored Enterprises; 

Treasury performed regular audits of OneWest, which received industry-leading quality scores; and OneWest modified its policies 

and procedures over time based on new regulatory feedback and 

guidance. As a general matter, I believe that loss mitigation efforts—including loan modifications—as an alternative to foreclosure can be beneficial for both borrowers and financial institutions. 

Q.8. In 2015, the California State house considered legislation (AB 

244) that would’ve clarified that widowed homeowners were protected by the State’s Homeowner Bill of Rights. The purpose of the 

legislation was to protect surviving spouses living in a home that 

went to foreclosure after their spouse died. At that time, you were 

79 

5http://advocacy.calchamber.com/2014/12/16/calchamber-elects-2015-board-officers/. 

6http://advocacy.calchamber.com/policy/bill-tracking/job-killers/2015-job-killers/. 

Chairman of the California Chamber of Commerce.5 The Chamber 

lobbied against that bill, putting it on a list of ‘‘jobs killers.’’6 What 

was your role in placing this legislation on the ‘‘jobs killers’’ list? 

A.8. I had no direct involvement in this decision. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR BROWN 

FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. While at the Treasury Department you negotiated the financial services provisions of six free trade agreements and described 

‘‘liberalization of financial services’’ as ‘‘vital’’ to U.S. trade policy. 

Wall Street has sought to include financial regulation in trade 

agreements, most recently in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), as a backdoor way of weakening Wall 

Street reform. Secretary Lew, Governor Tarullo, and others pushed 

back on those efforts and argued that financial regulation should 

be addressed outside of trade policy. Do you agree that financial 

regulation should be negotiated outside of broader trade agreements? 

A.1. I continue to believe that liberalization of financial services 

through increased market access and national treatment for U.S. 

financial firms in foreign markets is vital to U.S. trade policy. Traditionally, the financial services provisions of our trade agreements 

have been negotiated separately from the other provisions. Rather 

than being led by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the negotiation of these provisions has been led by 

Treasury (which coordinates input from all the U.S. financial regulators), and the provisions are placed in separate chapters reflecting a recognition of all parties that the prudent and efficient 

operation of the financial sector has a foundational role for all 

other sectors of the economy and therefore should not be subject to 

compromises and tradeoffs with those other sectors. This insulation 

of the financial services provisions during the negotiating process 

also recognizes that discussions regarding financial regulation already occur regularly in various international bodies with financial 

services expertise, such as the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. 

The process I have described above was true of all the trade 

agreements for which I negotiated the financial services provisions, 

and this separation was scrupulously respected by USTR throughout the negotiating process. I support this bifurcation and believe 

it is well designed to ensure that the financial services provisions 

of trade agreements are calibrated to preserve financial stability 

while also providing a broader and fairer playing field for U.S. 

firms. 

Q.2. In September 2016, Governor Tarullo announced that the 

Board of Governors would be incorporating some modified form of 

the GSIB capital surcharge into the CCAR’s minimum common equity ratio that apply to the U.S. GSIBs. When Senator Rounds 

asked you about your position on this change, you responded that 

80 

you would want to look at the question in more depth, but that it 

is definitely worth looking at. Having had more time to consider 

the question, do you support this change for the 2018 CCAR process? 

A.2. I understand that the Federal Reserve has previously committed that any change to incorporate the globally systemically important bank (GSIB) surcharge into the Comprehensive Capital 

Analysis and Review stress testing would have to go through the 

normal notice and public comment process of rulemaking. If I were 

to be confirmed, I look forward to studying the issue more in-depth 

and working with members of the Federal Reserve Board (Board) 

to further evaluate the benefits and costs associated with adoption 

of such a measure. 

Q.3. In your 2016 Wall Street Journal op-ed you said: 

But the consequence of a dramatic increase in bank capital is an increase 

in the cost of bank credit, meaning higher interest rates across the board. 

Those who favor much higher bank capital argue this would not happen, 

because investors would accept lower returns if the banks they put their 

money in were safer. In the real world of capital markets, however, there 

are not enough natural investors in bank equity seeking utility-like returns. 

Q.3.a. Please provide all of the relevant literature upon which you 

are basing your assertion that a ‘‘dramatic increase in bank capital 

is an increase in the cost of bank credit[.]’’ 

Q.3.b. Do the prospective increased costs outweigh the associated 

benefits to increased financial stability, particularly when accounting for the cost of the recent financial crisis? 

Q.3.c. Please provide supporting evidence for your assertion that 

‘‘there are not enough natural investors in bank equity’’ should capital requirements be increased substantially. What is a ‘‘natural’’ 

investor, and what distinguishes them from other types of investors? 

A.3.a.–c. The stability of the U.S. financial system is supported by 

the safe and sound operation of banking institutions. One of the 

most important prudential measures for ensuring that stability is 

bank capital. Of course, there is a tradeoff between higher bank 

capital levels that increase the resiliency of individual institutions 

and the system as a whole, and the cost of that capital. A goal of 

regulation should be to balance to protection of financial stability 

in a way that promotes economic growth and business opportunity. 

Equity investors hold an institution’s riskiest securities and as a 

consequence demand a return for that risk that is higher than the 

institution’s debt holders in any given capital structure. Although 

in ideal conditions the return demanded on the equity should fall 

in proportion to increases in the firm’s equity and reductions in its 

debt, actual capital markets differ from ideal conditions in a variety of ways: there is a tax preference for debt; there are higher direct and indirect transaction costs for issuing equity; a material 

portion of a bank’s debt is insured (its deposits) and the insurance 

premium is not fully related to the risk covered; and both real and 

perceived asymmetries in information between an institution and 

its investors result in an underpricing of the riskiest securities and 

an overpricing of the less risky. As a result, equity financing is 

materially more expensive for a financial institution than debt 

81 

1 Cosimano, Thomas F. and Dalia S. Hakura (2009). ‘‘Bank Behavior in Response to Basel III: 

A Cross-country Analysis.’’ IMF Working Paper WP/11/119; ‘‘Euro Area Bank Lending Survey’’ 

(January 2015); de Ramon, Sebastian J.A., et al. (2012). ‘‘Measuring the Impact of Prudential 

Policy on the Macroeconomy: A Practical Application to Basel III and Other Responses to the 

Financial Crisis,’’ Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper Series, No. 42; Santos, Andre 

Oliveira and Douglas Elliott (2012). ‘‘Estimating the Costs of Financial Regulation.’’ IMF Staff 

Discussion Note SDN/12/11; Martin-Oliver, Alfredo et al. (2013). ‘‘Banks’ Equity Capital Frictions, Capital Ratios, and Interest Rates.’’ International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 9, No. 

1, p.183. 2Furfine, Craig (2000). ‘‘Evidence on the Response of U.S. Banks to Changes in Capital Requirements.’’ BIS Working Papers No. 88. 3 Berrospide, Jose M. and Rochelle M. Edge (2010). ‘‘The Effects of Bank Capital on Lending: 

What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?’’ Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics 

Discussion Series 2010–44. 4Francis, William B. and Matthew Osborne (2012). ‘‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior 

in the U.K.: Are There Lessons for International Capital Standards?’’ Journal of Banking and 

Finance, 36, 803–816. 5Martynova, Natalya (2015). ‘‘Effect of Bank Capital Requirements on Economic Growth: A 

Survey.’’ DNB Working Paper No. 467. 6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). ‘‘An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements.’’ 7 Brooke, Martin et al. (2015). ‘‘Measuring the Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of Higher 

U.K. Bank Capital Requirements.’’ Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 35. 8Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2016). ‘‘The Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big To Fail.’’ 

9Firestone, Simon, Amy Lorenc, and Ben Ranish (2017). ‘‘An Empirical Economic Assessment 

of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the U.S.’’ Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017–034. 

financing, and there is persuasive literature that relates this higher cost of financing to a higher cost of credit provided by banks 

(e.g., Cosimano and Hakura 2011; ECB 2015; de Ramon, et al. 

(2012); Francis and Osborne (2009)).1

Relatedly, there is a growing body of literature that analyzes the 

effect of bank capital levels on the quantity as well as the cost of 

credit. For example, Board Governors have cited the following studies. Furfine 2 analyzes data on large U.S. commercial banks between 1989 and 1997 and concludes that a 1-percentage point increase in capital standards reduces loan growth by 5.5 percent. 

Berrospide and Edge 3 find a more modest impact. Using U.S. bank 

holding company data from 1992 to 2009, the authors conclude that 

a 1-percentage point increase in capital requirements reduces loan 

growth by roughly 0.7 to 1.2 percentage points. Other studies tell 

a similar story using non-U.S. data. For instance, Francis and 

Osborne 4 find, using U.K. data, that a 1-percentage point increase 

in capital requirements reduces bank lending by approximately 1.2 

percent. Finally, Martynova’s 5 survey of the literature—mostly of 

studies using non-U.S. data—shows that an increase in capital requirements by 1 percentage point reduces loan growth by 1.2 to 4.6 

percentage points. 

As your question notes, however, whether the costs outweigh the 

benefits of higher capital is a separate issue. There is a growing 

body of research regarding the costs and benefits of bank capital 

that addresses the impact of capital standards on economic growth. 

A number of studies, also cited by Board Governors, including the 

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,6 the Bank of England,7

the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,8 and Firestone et al.9

suggest that higher bank capital requirements (up to a point) are 

good for long-term credit availability and economic growth, but that 

with levels of capital beyond that point, social welfare is decreased. 

While the optimal level of capital varies between studies, the basic 

framework is the same. 

Q.4. In the same op-ed, you said: 

82 

Focusing on bank size is politically appealing but diverts attention from the 

major source of systemic risk in the financial sector: a shortage of stable 

deposits. Banks are but one part of an interconnected financial sector providing over $40 trillion of credit to the economy, but that credit is supported 

by only about $11 trillion of bank deposits. 

The gap must be closed largely with professionally managed, ‘wholesale’ 

funding, such as short-term repurchase agreements. Wholesale funders are 

quick to pull their support by not rolling over short-term credit if they perceive those funds are at risk. This leads to periodic runs on financial institutions and the resulting demand for Government intervention to prevent 

the failure of those institutions. Substantial wholesale funding is necessary 

to sustain the current level of financial-sector credit that supports the economy. 

Whether there are 10 big banks in the country or 10,000 small ones, there 

will still be insufficient stable financing from deposits, and a resulting reliance on wholesale funds. 

In 2013, Governor Tarullo told this Committee that the ‘‘issue of 

short term, nondeposit, runnable funding’’ is ‘‘the one I think we 

should be debating in the context of too-big-to-fail, and in the context of our financial system more generally.’’ 

Q.4.a. Do you agree with Governor Tarullo that more needs to be 

done to address the issue of short-term wholesale funding? 

A.4.a. Since the time of Governor Tarullo’s testimony, the Board 

has undertaken several efforts to address banking organizations’ 

use of short-term wholesale funding. For example, the Board has 

implemented the liquidity coverage ratio and has proposed the net 

stable funding ratio to increase large banking organizations’ resilience to disruptions in short-term wholesale funding. In addition, 

the Board adopted the GSIB surcharge rule, which takes U.S. 

GSIBs’ reliance on short-term wholesale funding into account in 

the calibration of each GSIB’s capital surcharge, and adopted a 

long-term debt requirement for U.S. GSIBs. If confirmed, I look forward to further evaluating the benefits and costs associated with 

adoption of such measures. 

Q.4.b. In 2013, the GAO found that ‘‘the use of programs by institutions of various sizes were driven in part by differences in how 

institutions funded themselves,’’ and that large banks holding companies received a higher ratio of support relative to their total assets because they ‘‘relied less on deposits as a source of funding 

and more on short-term credit markets and participated more in 

programs created to stabilize these markets.’’ 

Do you agree that ‘‘focusing on size’’ may be an appropriate approach, to the extent that larger financial institutions (particularly 

bank holding companies) rely on more wholesale funding? 

A.4.b. Large banking firms tend to have more complex risk and 

funding profiles relative to smaller firms. Accordingly, for some 

regulations it may be appropriate to use size-based thresholds to 

determine their scope of application. For other regulations, it may 

be appropriate to consider factors in addition to size in setting their 

scope of application, given the considerable variation in risk and 

funding profiles and systemic footprints across large firms. 

Q.4.c. Do you support the following measures that have been proposed to mitigate the risks posed by short-term wholesale funding: 

i. The supplementary leverage ratio? 

83 

ii. The liquidity coverage ratio? 

iii. The net stable funding ratio? If so, will you making finalizing 

the net stable funding ratio rule a priority? 

iv. Uniform margin requirements for securities financing transactions? If so, will you make proposing a rule for uniform 

margin requirements for securities financing transactions a 

priority? 

A.4.c. As noted in the above response, the Board has undertaken 

several measures aimed at mitigating the risks of over-reliance on 

short-term wholesale funding, including the liquidity coverage ratio 

and the GSIB risk-based capital surcharges. The supplementary leverage ratio, while not specifically targeted toward short-term 

wholesale funding, also impacts firms’ funding decisions. The net 

stable funding ratio and margin requirements for securities financing transactions could further mitigate potential risks to financial 

stability associated with different types of short-term wholesale 

funding. I have not had the benefit of the extensive review and 

analysis conducted by the Federal Reserve in the course of developing these measures, and thus, if confirmed, I look forward to further evaluating the benefits and costs associated with adoption of 

such measures. 

Q.5. In January 2014, the Board announced an Advanced Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking on financial holding companies’ commodities 

activities. In September 2016, the report released by the Board, the 

OCC, and the FDIC pursuant to section 620 of Wall Street Reform, 

on banks’ securities activities recommended that Congress rescind 

two authorities under the Bank Holding Company Act—the merchant banking authority under section 4(k) and the grandfathered 

authority under section 4(o). Later that month, the Board released 

a proposed rule to limit some of the financial holding companies’ 

commodities activities. 

Q.5.a. While at the Treasury Department, did you have any involvement in the 2003 joint report with the Board of Governors on 

Financial Holding Companies under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 

or the 2005 Treasury Department report on the Impact of the 

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on Credit to Small Businesses and 

Farms? 

A.5.a. These reports were prepared by the Office of Domestic 

Finance of the Treasury. During the periods of their preparation, 

I was serving in the Office of International Affairs (as Assistant 

Secretary in 2003, and as Assistant Secretary and Acting Under 

Secretary during the first part of 2005). The Office of International 

Affairs has no policy responsibility for the matters discussed in 

these reports, and I was not involved in their preparation. 

Q.5.b. Do you support the Board’s recommendations in the section 

620 report? 

A.5.b. The Board’s recommendations in the 620 report were the result of an extended review of the history and operation of the provisions under consideration. Having not had the benefit of that 

review, my views on the 620 report are not yet formed. If confirmed, I would look forward to understanding and exploring these 

issues with the other Board members. 

84 

Q.5.c. Do you support the Board’s proposed rule, and will you make 

finalizing the rule a priority? 

A.5.c. The proposed rule invited public comment on additional prudential requirements and limitations on the physical commodities 

activities of financial holding companies (FHCs) to address the 

risks the activities may pose to FHCs and their subsidiary insured 

depository institutions. I understand that the Board received a 

wide range of comments from a variety of interested parties, including Members of Congress, academics, physical commodity end 

users and producers, public interest groups, and FHCs. I think it 

would be inappropriate for me to express a view in advance of reviewing all of these comments, and thus, if I am confirmed, I will 

review the proposal and comments to consider what future action 

may be appropriate. 

Q.6. In 2008, you editorialized in the Wall Street Journal against 

the restrictions on bank ownership imposed by the Board and the 

FDIC, and in 2009 you editorialized against aspects of the FDIC’s 

proposed rule imposing additional restrictions on bank ownership 

by private equity funds. Did you have any contact with the Board 

concerning rules governing bank ownership? If so, please provide 

such contacts. 

A.6. I spoke informally with Governor Randall S. Kroszner, at his 

request, in the fall of 2008 about potential safeguards to allow the 

safe expansion of the pool of bank capital given the need for such 

capital during the financial crisis, and had one formal meeting to 

discuss the issue with Governor Daniel Tarullo in March 2009. 

Q.7. As I mentioned during your hearing, in 2015 Bloomberg Television interview, you said: 

The Government should not be a player in the financial sector. It should 

be a referee. And both the practice and the policy and the legislation that 

resulted from the financial crisis tended to make the Government a player. 

It put it on the field as opposed to simply reffing the game. 

Please explain your views as to what distinguishes being a ‘‘player’’ 

from being a ‘‘referee,’’ as it relates to financial regulation. 

A.7. My approach to policymaking, and particularly to regulation, 

has been that the discretion of policymakers, and particularly of 

regulators, should be as constrained as possible. Where discretion 

remains, regulators should be as clear as possible about how they 

will exercise it in the future so that their actions are predictable 

and there is less uncertainty as to what the policy will be. 

Q.8. In 2011, at an Atlantic Council event, you said: 

I have come to believe that there is a fundamental problem with resolution 

mechanisms that allow substantial discretion for Governments to act in 

particular cases, which Dodd-Frank . . . does. The consequence of that is 

that it multiplies uncertainty in a time of crisis because you’re not going 

to act until you know what the Government is going to do . . . I think ultimately the only really workable solution, which is to sort of have something 

that is like a bankruptcy regime—a rules-based approach as opposed to 

something that says, ‘and then ‘Mr. Wizard’ will decide what to do.’ 

Q.8.a. Do you believe that Title II Orderly Liquidation Authority, 

as implemented by the FDIC’s Single Point of Entry approach, allows ‘‘substantial discretion’’ to regulators in the event of an orderly liquidation? 

85 

A.8.a. The Department of the Treasury is reviewing the authorities 

of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under the 

Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), and I will review the Treasury report on OLA. Where the law provides regulators with discretion, regulators should be as clear as possible about how they will 

exercise their discretion. Since my 2011 statement, the FDIC has 

provided additional clarity regarding the single point of entry 

(SPOE) strategy it may employ under OLA. In addition, the Board 

has issued rulemakings to facilitate the resolution of global systemically important banking organizations, including an SPOE resolution under OLA. Regulators should continue their efforts to provide 

as much clarity as possible regarding the resolution of systemically 

important financial institutions. 

Q.8.b. Do you believe that some sort of bankruptcy regime for 

large, complex financial institutions is the only ‘‘rules-based approach’’ to the failure of such an institution? 

A.8.b. Conceptually, there could be many ways to constrain the discretion of Government actors to improve the certainty and predictability of their actions in the event of a financial institution’s distress, of which bankruptcy is one but not the only one. An advantage of the bankruptcy process is that there is a long history of 

practice and interpretation that provides further clarity about how 

the system will operate in specific cases in the future. This is 

among the reasons it would be beneficial if the Bankruptcy Code 

could be amended so that a financial institution could fail in the 

same way that any other institution fails, and the rules surrounding that would be understood as they are for any other institution. 

Q.8.c. Do you believe that imposing different national bankruptcy 

regimes on the respective subsidiaries of a large, international financial institution multiplies uncertainty? 

A.8.c. Whether the entry of a subsidiary of a large, international 

banking organization into a separate insolvency proceeding 

impedes the orderly resolution of the organization depends on a 

number of factors, including the structure of the organization, the 

functions of the subsidiary, and the circumstances that cause the 

failure. The Board and the FDIC (agencies) are responsible for reviewing the plans of many large, international banking organizations for their orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 

The agencies have provided guidance to the internationally active 

firms that the firms should take steps to address resolvability obstacles related to their foreign subsidiaries. To further reduce uncertainty, large, international banking organizations and their domestic and foreign regulators should continue their efforts to plan 

for and coordinate the potential resolution of these organizations 

and should be as clear as possible as to how such resolutions may 

occur. 

Q.8.d. In your hypothetical scenario, is ‘‘Mr. Wizard’’ always a financial regulatory agency, or could such person also include a 

bankruptcy judge or trustee? 

A.8.d. In my view, a critical issue in the resolution of financial 

firms is to improve the predictability and certainty of the course of 

86 

resolution, and limiting the discretion of Government actors is an 

important element of that process. Accordingly, improving the 

speed and certainty of outcomes in the bankruptcy process, including the predictability of decisions made by judges in that process, 

is central to the improvements that should be made to the Bankruptcy Code for the resolution of financial institutions. The Board 

and FDIC have made progress through the resolution planning, or 

‘‘living will,’’ review process to make the largest banking organizations easier to resolve under the current Bankruptcy Code. I support improving the Bankruptcy Code so that the rules surrounding 

the bankruptcy of a large financial company would be understood 

as they are for any other company with as little exercise of discretion as possible. 

Q.9. Related to monetary policy, do you agree with the ‘‘unconventional’’ steps taken by Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke during 

the crisis? Since the crisis, do you think the Federal Open Market 

Committee has been on the right course of gradually increasing interest rates, and taking steps to begin to unwind their balance 

sheet later this year? 

A.9. The financial panic and associated steep economic downturn 

in 2008/2009 was the most severe financial and economic crisis 

faced by the United States and the world since the Great Depression. In those circumstances, Congress, the Administration, and 

many Federal agencies including the Federal Reserve took extraordinary steps to address the crisis. I am not in a position to judge 

the merits of every single action taken by the Federal Reserve over 

this period, but it is clear that the economy was in very serious 

trouble at the end of 2008. 

Regarding the current trajectory of monetary policy, if confirmed, 

I expect to benefit from interactions with colleagues on the Federal 

Open Market Committee (FOMC) in assessing the appropriate 

course of policy. Broadly though, it does appear that the FOMC’s 

approach to date in gradually raising the Federal funds rate and 

preparing to reduce the size of its balance sheet in a gradual and 

predictable fashion has been effective in fostering the goals of maximum employment and stable prices while at the same time returning the stance of monetary policy to a more normal setting. 

Q.10. If confirmed, you will be a member of the Federal Open Market Committee. What experience will you bring to this role? Are 

there any changes in how monetary policy is currently conducted 

that you will advocate for? 

A.10. Over the course of my career, I have gained broad experience 

in economic and financial issues, both from a private sector perspective in working with both large and small financial firms and 

from a policy perspective in serving in senior policy positions in two 

previous Administrations. Based on this experience, I have developed a mature understanding of the key monetary policy issues 

confronting the FOMC. Of course, if confirmed, I expect to add to 

this experience from interactions with colleagues on the FOMC. 

I support the basic framework for the conduct of monetary policy 

established by the Congress. The Congress has directed the Federal 

Reserve to promote two basic goals—maximum employment and 

stable prices. The Federal Reserve has an important degree of 

87 

operational independence in how it conducts policy to achieve these 

goals—but that operational independence comes with an obligation 

to be accountable and transparent to the public and the Congress. 

The Federal Reserve has taken many steps over recent years to 

enhance transparency and accountability in the conduct of monetary policy. I would certainly support any additional steps in this 

area that would both enhance Federal Reserve transparency and 

support the effective conduct of monetary policy. 

Q.11. You have said in the past that Federal Reserve should adopt 

a monetary policy rule, like the Taylor rule. As you know, the Federal Reserve currently uses a variety of monetary policy rules, 

including the Taylor rule, in its analysis and monetary policy decisionmaking, but does not rely solely on rules to determine interest 

rate adjustments. Do you agree with the Federal Reserve’s current 

approach, or are you advocating that the Fed use a single rule? 

A.11. The Federal Reserve has made substantial progress over the 

last 25 years in becoming both clearer and more consistent in explaining its monetary policy decisions. I believe, though, that there 

is still room for the Federal Reserve to do more in developing and 

explaining a clearly delineated and broadly measurable strategy 

that would improve current understanding and reduce future uncertainty concerning the expected course of monetary policy. My 

commitment to a greater focus on rules in the conduct of policy is 

not inconsistent with the Federal Reserve’s progress in improving 

its transparency, nor a dramatic change in direction, but a recognition that the Federal Reserve can and should continue to improve 

the clarity and consistency of the framework in which it conducts 

monetary policy. This discipline can improve the policy itself, and 

improve the understanding of that policy by markets and by the 

public. 

Q.12. How important is it for the U.S. central bank to be independent? 

A.12. I support the basic framework for the conduct of monetary 

policy established by the Congress. The Congress has assigned to 

the Federal Reserve the goals of monetary policy, and the Federal 

Reserve has an important degree of operational independence in 

how it conducts policy to achieve these goals. Independence of the 

central bank is critical in insulating the conduct of monetary policy 

from political pressures that can lead to ineffective policy and poor 

macroeconomic outcomes. Research has demonstrated that central 

banks that are subject to political pressures are generally less effective in achieving their macroeconomic objectives; for example, 

some historians have suggested that political pressures on the Federal Reserve may have contributed to policy mistakes and the 

‘‘Great Inflation’’ of the late 1960s and 1970s. 

While I am a strong supporter of the independence of the Federal 

Reserve, the Federal Reserve is a public institution and its 

independence comes with an obligation to be transparent and accountable to the Congress and the public in the conduct of monetary policy. Over time, the FOMC has made considerable strides in 

enhancing transparency. For example, it now issues statements following every meeting, the Chair holds a press conference four 

times each year, FOMC participants prepare quarterly economic 

88 

projections, detailed minutes of FOMC meetings are published 3 

weeks following each meeting, and full transcripts of meetings and 

supporting documents are released to the public with a 5-year lag. 

These steps have significantly enhanced Federal Reserve transparency and have also supported the effectiveness of monetary policy by allowing the public to better understand and anticipate the 

Federal Reserve’s policy decisions. If confirmed, I would support 

any additional steps that the Federal Reserve could take that 

would enhance both Federal Reserve transparency and the effective 

conduct of monetary policy. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SASSE 

FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. Our financial system has become increasingly consolidated as 

community banks and credit unions either close their doors or 

merge with larger institutions. 

Q.1.a. Are you concerned about this pattern? Why? 

Q.1.b. What services can these smaller institutions provide that 

larger institutions cannot provide? 

A.1.a.–b. Community banks play a critical role in our financial system and economy. While the consolidation trend in the industry 

has continued over the past 30 years, I believe that a number of 

factors in the post financial crisis environment have exacerbated 

the challenges facing these institutions, including the substantially 

increased cost of regulatory compliance. Despite this trend, community banks continue to support local economies and serve as a key 

source of financing to households and small businesses. 

Research conducted over many years has concluded that community banks provide several distinct advantages to their customers 

compared to larger banks. For example, given their smaller size 

and less complex organizational structure, community banks are 

often able to respond with greater agility to lending requests. In 

addition, reflecting their close ties to the communities they serve 

and their detailed knowledge of their customers, community banks 

are able to provide customization and flexibility to meet the needs 

of their local communities and small businesses. Community banks 

are particularly important for rural communities, where the closing 

of a bank can be associated with a material decline in local economic activity. 

Recognizing the important role of community banks in our diversified banking industry, if confirmed, I will work with my colleagues at the Federal Reserve to supervise and regulate community banks in a way that fosters safe and sound operation without 

limiting their capacity to support the financial needs of their communities. 

Q.2. Constituents in my State tell me that the EGRPRA report inadequately highlighted concrete ways to reduce the regulatory paperwork burden. What more can the Federal Reserve do to reduce 

the regulatory burden on community banks? 

A.2. As noted in my previous answer, community banks play a critical role in our financial system and economy. If confirmed, I will 

work with my colleagues at the Federal Reserve to supervise and 

89 

1https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum16/ 

SIlSummer16.pdf. 2https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014113pap.pdf. 

regulate community banks in a way that fosters safe and sound operation without limiting their capacity to support the financial 

needs of their communities. I believe more can be done to better 

tailor regulation and supervision for community banks in a manner 

that is appropriate to their small size and simplicity. I look forward 

to working with Congress and others at the Federal Reserve to 

identify further ways to effectively reduce burden. 

Q.3. Multiple anecdotes from my constituents suggest that there 

are several Nebraska counties where mortgages are not originated 

because of over-regulation. What is the best way to address this 

problem from a regulatory standpoint? 

A.3. I believe that we should make efforts to right-size regulations 

to reduce burden for community banks consistent with safety and 

soundness and consumer protection, so they can properly serve 

their communities. I understand that the financial regulators discuss compliance and supervisory issues related to the mortgage 

regulations on a regular basis. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in these interagency communications to seek ways to reduce burden and improve access to safe and appropriate mortgage 

loan products. 

Q.4. My understanding is that only two banks have opened since 

the passage of Dodd-Frank, including Bird in Hand Bank in Pennsylvania, which has a customer base that is around half Amish. 

Q.4.a. Why do you believe this is the case? 

Q.4.b. What potential impacts does this have on our financial system? 

Q.4.c. Is there anything more the Federal Reserve can do to encourage the opening of new banks? 

A.4.a.–c. Historically, new bank formations have been cyclical and 

have fallen after the financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s before 

recovering as economic conditions improved.1 Recent research has 

supported this and has shown that a portion of the decline in new 

charters since the crisis can be explained by factors such as a weak 

economy, low interest rates, and weak demand for banking services.2 Nonetheless, from my experience as an investor in community banks since the crisis, I know that the widely recognized 

increased cost of regulatory compliance is an important factor deterring many investors who might potentially contemplate the formation of a new institution. 

Potential impacts of fewer de novo bank entrants include lack of 

innovation, reduced competition, lack of local lending, and reduced 

availability of credit. 

The Federal Reserve does not have chartering authority for insured depository institutions, which is the responsibility of the 

States and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, nor does 

the Federal Reserve grant deposit insurance. If confirmed, however, I would expect to work with the other U.S. Federal and State 

banking agencies to prudently explore ways to increase new bank 

formation. 

90 

Q.5. I’m concerned that our Federal banking regulatory regime 

relies upon arbitrary asset thresholds to impose prudential 

regulations, instead of relying on an analysis of a financial institution’s unique risk profile. 

Q.5.a. Should a bank’s asset size be dispositive in evaluating its 

risk profile in order to impose appropriate prudential regulations? 

A.5.a. One of the important general themes of regulation is ensuring that the character of the regulation is adapted to the character 

of the institution being regulated, what has become referred to as 

tailoring. I fully support tailoring, and I think that it is not only 

appropriate to recognize the different levels of risk and types of 

risk that different institutions in the system pose, but that it also 

makes for better and more efficient regulation. Efficient regulation 

allows the financial system to more efficiently support the real 

economy. 

I believe a variety of approaches could be taken to determine 

which prudential regulations should apply to which banks in the 

U.S. banking system. For some regulations or for some bank populations, a simple fixed-asset threshold may work. For other regulations or bank populations, a more complex, multi-factor approach 

may be appropriate. If I were to be confirmed, I would stand ready 

to work with Congress and my colleagues at the Federal Reserve 

on appropriate tailoring thresholds. 

Q.5.b. If not, what replacement test should regulators follow? 

A.5.b. Broadly speaking, I support tailoring regulations in such a 

way that reduces the risk that financial distress in the banking industry would cause substantial harm to the U.S. economy, without 

imposing undue burden on smaller community and regional banking organizations whose failure would not cause notable harm to 

the U.S. economy. I understand that Congress is currently considering whether and how to raise existing statutory thresholds in the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and 

that the Federal Reserve has expressed support for increasing 

these thresholds. I, too, would support these efforts. As noted 

above, I believe a variety of approaches could be taken, and I would 

stand ready to work with Congress and my colleagues at the Federal Reserve on the design of such an approach, if I were to be confirmed. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR REED FROM 

RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. The Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC in 2016 published a 

joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) on cybersecurity, asking for comment, among other things, on whether boards 

of directors should have adequate expertise in cybersecurity. Citing 

the ANPR: ‘‘a cyber incident or failure at one interconnected entity 

may not only impact the safety and soundness of the entity, but 

also other financial entities with potentially systemicconsequences.’’ 

Other than the solicitation of comments, we are not aware of any 

material progress on this ANPR. If confirmed, may I have a personal commitment from each of you that you will work with the 

FDIC and each other on advancing this cybersecurity ANPR? 

91 

A.1. Cybersecurity continues to be a major concern for the financial 

sector. If I were to be confirmed, I would be committed to finding 

ways to strengthen the resiliency of the financial sector against 

cyber risks. 

One of my priorities would be to harmonize our supervisory expectations with those of other regulators in the financial sector as 

much as is practical. Therefore, an important step would be to 

reach a consensus on as many of the core elements of the advance 

notice of proposed rulemaking as possible. 

Q.2. The OCC and the Federal Reserve are each authorized to enforce the Military Lending Act (MLA), which is a bipartisan law enacted in 2006 that sets a hard cap of 36 percent interest for most 

loans to the military. On July 22, 2015, the Department of Defense 

finalized MLA rules that closed prior loopholes that allowed unscrupulous lenders to prey upon servicemembers and their families. 

Do you support these stronger MLA rules? If confirmed, will you 

support and enforce these strong MLA rules to the fullest extent 

possible? 

A.2. The Military Lending Act (MLA) provides special consumer 

protections for servicemembers and their dependents. In enacting 

the MLA, the Congress directed the Department of Defense to issue 

implementing regulations after consulting with the Federal Reserve and other agencies. I understand the Federal Reserve staff 

has worked with Defense Department staff to carry out that mandate and, if confirmed, I will support that effort and the Federal 

Reserve’s full enforcement of the MLA at the institutions it supervises. 

Q.3. Half of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate is to achieve maximum employment. How would you support this part of the dual 

mandate to ensure that Rhode Islanders have more jobs? 

A.3. The Federal Reserve System occupies a central position in our 

country’s policy infrastructure for promoting a strong economy and 

the stability of the financial system, and supporting robust job 

growth in the context of price stability. I can assure you that if I 

were to be confirmed, I would be strongly committed to all these 

objectives. With respect to the employment mandate, I believe it is 

an important element of the Federal Reserve’s obligation, and I 

would take it very seriously. 

If I were to be confirmed, in my capacity as a Federal Reserve 

Board member and as Vice Chair for Supervision, I would work to 

refine and enhance regulations in ways that promote a safe and 

sound financial system and that support the flow of credit to households and businesses. As I have noted on previous occasions, I believe there are opportunities to simplify and streamline regulations, particularly for smaller financial institutions, which have a 

particular role in supporting the small businesses that are the engines of job creation. Easing regulatory burdens can help to foster 

improved access to credit, as well as more business and employment opportunities, without sacrificing the gains of recent years in 

strengthening the financial system. 

If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with Federal Reserve 

Board members and staff to gain an accurate and complete picture 

as possible on overall and specific labor market conditions. 

92 

Q.4. The White House has asked the Treasury Department to 

review the orderly liquidation authority (OLA) established by the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The 

statutory purpose of OLA is ‘‘to provide the necessary authority to 

liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to 

the financial stability of the United States in a manner that 

mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.’’ I would like to 

highlight some existing OLA provisions and ask you whether you 

support them. 

In the case of a failure of a megabank, do you support the: 

• mandatory removal of the megabank’s executives and board 

members responsible for the failure? 

• FDIC’s authority to claw back compensation from executives or 

directors substantially responsible for the failure? 

• statutory mandate that ‘‘taxpayers shall bear no losses from 

the exercise of any authority’’ under OLA? 

A.4. Avoiding taxpayer loss and reducing moral hazard, which 

these provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) address, 

are important goals for the resolution of a large, systemically important financial company, and thus I fully support the objectives 

of these provisions. The Department of the Treasury is reviewing 

OLA, and if I am confirmed, I will give the resulting report serious 

review. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MENENDEZ 

FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. In January, the Minneapolis Federal Reserve published a report estimating that if the Federal Open Market Committee had 

been required to follow the Taylor Rule for the last 5 years, 2.5 million more Americans would be out of work today. 

Q.1.a. Do you accept the analysis that suggests strictly following 

the Taylor Rule would undermine the Federal Reserve’s ability to 

achieve its full employment mandate? 

Q.1.b. Assuming this analysis is correct, and adhering to a strict 

Taylor Rule or other monetary policy rule would result in the loss 

of a large number of jobs, would you still argue in favor of following 

such a rule? 

A.1.a.–b. Of course, in general, it is difficult to say how the economy would have behaved in the past if the Federal Reserve or any 

other part of the Government had followed a different set of policies. That basic difficulty is compounded many times over when examining the possible effects of alternative polices during a period 

that includes the aftermath of the most severe financial crisis since 

the Great Depression. 

My commitment to a greater focus on rules in the conduct of policy, however, is not a back-door effort to reduce the Federal Reserve’s commitment to its dual mandate. Rather, it is to acknowledge that there is still room for the Federal Reserve to do more in 

developing and explaining a clearly delineated and broadly measurable strategy that would improve current understanding and 

reduce future uncertainty concerning the expected course of 

93 

monetary policy. In determining whether a particular policy rule or 

strategy is effective, an important element of that assessment is 

whether it supports the Federal Reserve’s congressional mandates, 

including the full employment mandate. Thus, if the best analysis 

of a monetary policy rule’s projected effects were that it would be 

inconsistent with the dual mandate, the Federal Reserve should 

not adopt that rule. And if experience over time demonstrated that 

the practical application of a rule was leading to outcomes that 

were inconsistent with the dual mandate, the rule should be refined or replaced. 

The Federal Reserve has made substantial progress over the last 

25 years in becoming both clearer and more consistent in explaining its monetary policy decisions. My commitment to a greater 

focus on rules in the conduct of monetary policy is neither inconsistent with that progress, nor a dramatic change in direction, nor 

a prioritization of one element of the dual mandate over another, 

but rather a recognition that the Federal Reserve can and should 

continue to improve the clarity and consistency of the framework 

in which it conducts monetary policy. This discipline can improve 

the policy itself, and improve the understanding of that policy by 

markets and by the public. 

Q.2. In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress enacted a provision, section 956 of Dodd-Frank, to require financial regulators to 

jointly issue rules to ban incentive pay practices at large financial 

institutions that encourage inappropriate risk-taking. In May of 

2016, the financial regulators including the Federal Reserve Board 

and the OCC proposed a rule to implement section 956. More than 

a year later, the rulemaking still has not been finalized. The Wells 

Fargo fraudulent account scandal uncovered last year, where senior 

executives were given bonuses for ‘‘successes in cross-selling,’’ underscores the need for rules regarding incentive-based compensation agreements. 

Q.2.a. Will you commit to implementing section 956 of DoddFrank? 

A.2.a. Incentive compensation is important to attract qualified employees and executives to financial institutions. It is also important 

that compensation programs do not distort incentives for employees 

to act in the long-term interest of the institution. 

If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the other 

agencies to understand the issues raised in this rulemaking and 

fulfilling the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 

and Consumer Protection Act. 

Q.2.b. Will you commit to implementing all congressionally mandated rulemakings? 

A.2.b. If confirmed, I am committed to fulfilling the requirements 

of all laws to which the Federal Reserve has been given authority 

by the Congress. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. Looking through your past statements, it’s clear that you believe we need to have a financial system that takes on risk in order 

94 

to get innovation and growth in our economy. However, as we saw 

during the financial crisis, too much risky behavior can lead to outright fraud and manipulation of markets, which ultimately led to 

widespread systemic harm. I strongly believe that criminal penalties for executives can deter the type of fraud and market manipulation that led to the 2008 crisis. If an executive acts recklessly 

and that recklessness results in substantial economic harm to the 

economy, he should be held criminally liable. Do you believe 

thoughtful changes to our white collar criminal standards and penalties would be an effective tool for protecting our financial system? 

A.1. As the Federal Reserve has publicly stated, no individual and 

no institution should be exempt from prosecution when they commit a crime. The Justice Department has the sole authority to indict or seek Federal criminal fines or other sanctions and to criminally prosecute individuals for their actions. The Federal Reserve 

may bring enforcement actions against and remove an institutionaffiliated party in certain circumstances if they have violated a law 

or regulation or engaged in unsafe and unsound practices. When 

warranted, the Federal Reserve also has the authority to impose 

fines. I believe the Federal Reserve should take whatever action is 

appropriate to ensure individuals subject to the Federal Reserve 

Board’s (Board) jurisdiction comply with the law and act consistently with safety and soundness principles. 

Q.2. As I’m sure you’re aware the economy in North Dakota and 

rural America more generally is facing headwinds from a variety 

of factors including a strong dollar, potential trade restrictions and 

low commodity prices. 

Q.2.a. To take just the issue of trade, I’m interested to know how 

you would factor the Administration’s trade policies into your monetary policy decisions and efforts to achieve economic growth at the 

Fed? 

A.2.a. Monetary policy decisions should be based on an assessment 

of realized and expected progress toward the Federal Reserve’s employment and price stability objectives. International trade is an 

important part of the U.S. economy, so trade developments should 

be an important aspect of that assessment. In addition to the current state of trade and trade policy, monetary policy should also 

consider several factors that could affect the outlook for trade, including movements incurrency and commodity markets as well as 

prospects for economic growth abroad. 

Q.2.b. Do you believe that we can achieve economic growth at rates 

of 3 percent with a restrictive policy on trade? 

A.2.b. With the economy now close to full employment, a step-up 

from recent growth rates of around 2 percent to a sustained 3 percent growth rate would require some combination of a sustained increase in productivity growth from its recent weak trend or an improvement in the trend in labor force growth despite the downward 

pressures being exerted by the aging baby-boom cohorts. An assessment of a trade policy’s effect on growth would need to involve an 

assessment of its effect on these two factors. 

95 

Q.2.c. Beyond regulatory changes and taxes, what steps should we 

be taking to increase productivity and achieve more robust GDP 

growth? 

A.2.c. In my view, a combination of more encouragement for private investment, more-effective regulation, better education, and 

improved public infrastructure would contribute positively toward 

increasing productivity and improving GDP growth. I do not believe there is a single, unalterable combination of these proposals 

that would have to be followed to have a positive effect, and Congress could choose from a variety of specific policies addressing 

these issues in order to further this objective. 

Q.3. As part of the EGRPRA process, regulators identified access 

to timely appraisals—especially in rural America—as a major challenge for small lenders. Yet the report itself did little to address 

residential appraisal requirements. 

Q.3.a. Do you share my concerns that the appraisal system in rural 

America is broken? 

A.3.a. As both my wife and I come from families involved in agriculture in the West, I am very aware of concerns about the availability of appraisers in rural areas. I understand that the Board, 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the National Credit Union 

Administration recently issued an advisory addressing some of the 

ways institutions can address the issue of appraiser availability. If 

confirmed, I look forward to hearing from the industry stakeholders 

to understand their positions on this regulatory action. It is an 

issue I take very seriously. 

Q.3.b. What concerns would you have with raising the residential 

exemption threshold—which was last modified in 1994—above its 

current limit of $250K? 

A.3.b. I understand that the Federal banking agencies are in the 

process of evaluating the current threshold. The Board, OCC, and 

FDIC recently issued a proposal to increase the transaction size 

threshold for requiring appraisals for commercial real estate transactions, and in that proposal have requested comments on many 

aspects of the appraisal regulations, including whether the appraisal threshold for residential transactions should be raised to reduce burden, consistent with safety and soundness and consumer 

protection. If confirmed, I look forward to hearing what the public 

has to say about that proposal and better understanding the issues 

involved. It is also my understanding that the bulk of the residential mortgage market is subject to the appraisal rules of other Government entities, such as the Government-Sponsored Enterprises 

or the Federal Housing Administration. If confirmed, I would support working with those other entities to harmonize appraisal rules 

for residential mortgages. 

Q.4. On several occasions before the Banking Committee Governor 

Tarullo testified that the dollar asset thresholds in Dodd-Frank 

such as the $50 billion threshold for SIFI designation, is far too 

high. 

Q.4.a. Do you believe regulators could effectively address systemic 

risk if the threshold were raised above $50 billion? 

96 

A.4.a. One of the important general themes of regulation is ensuring that the character of the regulation is adapted to the character 

of the institution being regulated, what has become referred to as 

tailoring. I fully support tailoring, and I think that it is not only 

appropriate to recognize the different levels of risk and types of 

risk that different institutions in the system pose, but that it also 

makes for better and more efficient regulation. Efficient regulation 

allows the financial system to more efficiently support the real 

economy. 

I believe a variety of approaches could be taken to determine 

which prudential regulations should apply to which banks in the 

U.S. banking system. For some regulations or for some bank populations, a simple, fixed-asset threshold may work. For other regulations or bank populations, a more complex, multi-factor approach 

may be appropriate. If I were to be confirmed, I would stand ready 

to work with Congress and my colleagues at the Federal Reserve 

on appropriate tailoring thresholds. 

Q.4.b. Are there specific provisions in Dodd-Frank which you believe are particularly costly or unnecessary for a certain subset of 

banks above the $50 billion threshold? 

A.4.b. Broadly speaking, I believe that smaller community and regional banking organizations, whose failure would not cause notable harm to the U.S. economy, can be supervised in a way that promotes safe and sound banking without being subject to the enhanced regulations that apply to larger banking firms. I support efforts to consider whether and how specific regulations should be 

tailored in a way that reduces the risk that bank failures or distress will have a harmful impact on economic growth, without imposing undue burden. I support efforts to raise the $50 billion 

threshold in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 

Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) to reduce regulatory burden on 

some regional banks, and, if confirmed, I am open to discussing the 

best way to accomplish that goal. 

Q.4.c. Are there specific provisions in Dodd-Frank which you believe are necessary for all banks above $50 billion in assets that 

should be retained in order to mitigate systemic risk? 

A.4.c. If confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to engage in 

a comprehensive review of rules to ensure we have a system in 

place that promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, protects the stability of the U.S. financial system, and fosters 

economic growth and business opportunity. In advance of such a review, I do not have a final view on any specific provisions that 

should remain in place for all banks over $50 billion. However, I 

support efforts to raise the $50 billion threshold in the Dodd-Frank 

Act to reduce regulatory burden on some regional banks with assets over $50 billion, and, if confirmed, I am open to discussing the 

best way to accomplish that goal. 

Q.4.d. What concerns do you have with having a purely qualitative 

test for identifying systemic risk? 

A.4.d. I believe a variety of approaches could be taken to measure 

a firm’s ‘‘systemic footprint.’’ While there is merit to considering a 

qualitative test—since size is not a perfect proxy for risk—care 

97 

would have to be taken in crafting such a test to ensure that measuring an institution’s standing under the various qualitative elements did not itself become a burdensome compliance effort even 

for banks that ought clearly to be exempt. If I were to be confirmed, I would stand ready to work with Congress on the design 

of an approach to measuring firms’ systemic importance. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SCHATZ 

FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. This Administration’s narrative is that Dodd-Frank is constraining lending because compliance is so costly. However, Federal 

Reserve data shows that banks’ commercial lending is at an alltime high—far higher than pre-recession levels—and bank profits 

are also at an all-time high. The largest banks all passed their 

stress tests and were given the green light to increase dividend 

payments and stock buybacks. This is above the high levels we saw 

in 2016, when the largest banks had over $100 billion to spend on 

dividends. 

Q.1.a. Do you agree that these are signs that banks are thriving? 

A.1.a. The stability of the U.S. financial system is supported by the 

safe and sound operation of banking institutions. One of the most 

important prudential measures for ensuring that stability is bank 

capital. Of course, there is a tradeoff between higher bank capital 

levels that increase the resiliency of individual institutions and the 

system as a whole, and the cost of that capital. A goal of regulation 

should be to balance to protection of financial stability in a way 

that promotes economic growth and business opportunity. 

Since the financial crisis, banks have substantially improved 

their capital planning practices and their capital adequacy. Bank 

lending in the United States has grown steadily since the crisis 

and U.S. banks are providing significant support to U.S. economic 

activity. 

If confirmed, I will work with Congress and my colleagues at the 

Federal Reserve to ensure we have in place a financial regulatory 

system that protects U.S. financial stability and maximizes longterm economic growth and credit availability. 

Q.1.b. Do you think the amount of capital that banks are devoting 

to dividends and stock buybacks is a problem for our long-term economic growth? 

A.1.b. We need a resilient, well-capitalized, well-regulated financial 

system that promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, protects the stability of the U.S. financial system, and fosters economic growth and business opportunity. 

Having sufficient capital is essential to the resiliency of the largest banking organizations, as undercapitalized firms may be unable 

to lend and act as a financial intermediary during stress. Such 

undercapitalization impeded the ability of banks to lend and was 

a key contributor to the weakness in economic activity following 

the financial crisis. Nonetheless, higher levels of capital—at least 

at some point—may increase the cost of capital to banks, reduce 

lending, and potentially affect long-term economic growth. If confirmed, I will work with Congress and my colleagues at the Federal 

98 

Reserve to ensure that capital requirements are well-calibrated to 

the risks of the activities and exposures of the banking industry 

and are sensitive to the character of each institution. 

Q.2. In addition to the fake accounts scandal, we recently learned 

that Wells Fargo charged consumers for high priced auto insurance 

that they did not need, without their knowledge. The high cost of 

the auto insurance pushed roughly 274,000 Wells Fargo customers 

into delinquency and resulted in almost 25,000 wrongful vehicle repossessions. 

Q.2.a. What will you do to prevent these types of scandals from 

happening again? 

A.2.a. As I mentioned during my confirmation hearing, the robust 

enforcement of the consumer rules is important. I understand that 

the Federal Reserve has authority to address violations of law and 

unsafe and unsound practices at the institutions it supervises, and, 

if confirmed, I am committed to taking whatever action is appropriate based on the facts and circumstances. This would extend to 

the Board’s supervisory responsibilities for Bank and Financial 

Holding Companies, including for the governance structure and enterprise compliance risk management and controls of these holding 

companies. 

Q.2.b. At what point do these kinds of violations become a safety 

and soundness concern for the banks the Fed supervises? 

A.2.b. I understand that the Federal Reserve has authority to address violations of law and unsafe and unsound practices at the institutions it supervises, and, if confirmed, I am committed to taking 

whatever action is appropriate based on the facts and circumstances of each situation. The Federal Reserve has taken enforcement actions against firms for compliance and other risk management failures that demonstrated overall weaknesses in a firm’s 

risk management framework and internal controls. I consider robust and effective risk management, including compliance risk 

management, an essential aspect of safety and soundness. 

Q.2.c. Do you think banks’ compensation practices are contributing 

to the problem of banks harming their consumers in order to increase profits? 

A.2.c. While incentive compensation is an important tool in successful management of financial institutions and is critical to attracting qualified employees and executives, improperly structured 

incentive-based compensation arrangements may encourage inappropriate risk-taking at financial institutions. If confirmed, I look 

forward to engaging with Federal Reserve Board members and 

staff to better understand the impact of incentive compensation 

practices on the safety and soundness of financial institutions. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CORTEZ 

MASTO FROM RANDAL QUARLES 

Q.1. Please describe the steps you took as a Public Governor on 

FINRA’s Board of Governors to manage your conflicts of interest. 

A.1. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) asks all 

prospective Governors to disclose board and corporate affiliations 

99 

prior to service on its Board. Sitting Governors also have an ongoing obligation to update those disclosures annually and as circumstances warrant; FINRA circulates an annual questionnaire to 

which all Governors respond which identifies and records any 

changes to such affiliations. 

FINRA’s governance team (Office of the Corporate Secretary and 

Office of the General Counsel) reviews agendas prior to Board and 

Committee meetings to determine whether any items appear to be 

a conflict for a specific Governor based on the standards set forth 

in the FINRA Board’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (attached). If a potential conflict of interest is identified, the matter 

will be referred to the Board Conflicts Committee for consideration 

and determination of whether the matter requires recusal. If this 

review determines that there is an apparent conflict of interest, the 

Corporate Secretary will notify the Governor of the need to recuse 

himself or herself and notify the Board Conflicts Committee, and 

ensure that the affected Board member is recused from the discussion and voting. Board members are also asked to notify the Conflicts Committee if they are aware of a need for recusal that has 

not been identified through the process described above. 

During my tenure as a Governor, there were no matters identified by FINRA or by myself as being an actual or apparent conflict 

of interest. 

Q.2. During your tenure on FINRA’s Board of Governors, did you 

ever raise with FINRA ethics counsel any issues that may have 

raised the need to recuse yourself from Board decisionmaking? If 

so, how was that issue resolved? 

A.2. No. 

Q.3. Please provide copies of FINRA’s corporate governance guidelines and Board Member code of conduct. 

A.3. Attached is the Code of Ethics and Business Conduct and the 

Corporate Governance Guidelines. 

Q.4. Please identify and describe any board committees you served 

on while on FINRA’s Board of Governors. 

A.4. I serve on three Committees at FINRA: the Executive Committee, Management Compensation Committee, and the Regulatory 

Policy Committee. 

Executive Committee 

The Executive Committee is comprised of all Committee chairs 

and is authorized to exercise all the powers and authority of the 

Board in the management of the business and affairs of the Corporation between meetings of the Board. I began serving on this 

Committee effective July 15, 2016. 

Management Compensation Committee 

The Management Compensation Committee reviews and recommends changes to FINRA’s Compensation Policy with the primary objective that it attract, develop and retain high performing 

individuals who are capable of achieving FINRA’s mission of ensuring market integrity and investor protection. The Committee 

reviews the plans for the development, retention, succession and 

100 

retirement of key executives of the Corporation and its subsidiaries. I began serving on this Committee effective November 10, 

2015. 

Regulatory Policy Committee 

The Regulatory Policy Committee advises the Board with respect 

to the regulatory policies and strategy of FINRA programs. The 

Committee develops and/or adopts necessary or appropriate regulatory policies and strategy and makes recommendations to the 

Board on regulatory rule proposals. I began serving on this Committee effective November 10, 2015. 

101 


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Code of Ethics and Business Conduct for 

the Board of Governors of FINRA and 

the Board of Directors of its Subsidiaries 

[Adopted by FINRA Board on December 3, 2008; Amended September 19, 2013.) 

lN7'RODUCTION 

FINRA sttVes as the primary private-sector regulator of America's securities industry. Our 

focus and purpost is investor protection and market integrity. 

Becaust integrity and excellence sttVe as the foundation for everything we do, we have adopted 

a Code of Conduct for FINRA's employees, utcluding its offiCers. The Code explicitly applies to 

the activities of I'INRA's employees; but it also defines our expecl3tions of everyone who acts 

on our behalf, including the Governors of FINRA and the Directors of its subsidiaries. You, 

too, are amb..ssadors for FlNRA, and should at all times demonstrnte honesty, integrity, fairness 

and excellence. 

We have provided each of you with a copy of our Code of Conduct In addition, we have 

prepared this Code of Erltics and Business Conduct for the Board of Governors of FINRA and 

the Board of Directors of its Subsidiaries. This Code highlights those issues that are particularly 

relevant to your duties as Governors and Directors. Please review this Code and retain a copy 

where you can easily access and reference it. 

RESPONSIBILITIES OF FINRA GOVERNORS AND DIRECTORS 

AU Governors and Directors have a responsibility to: 

• Be familiar with, understand and comply wirl1 the expectations of all laws and regulations 

relevant to your duties as FINRA Governors and Directors. 

• Be &maiar with, understand and comply with the e'-pectations of this Code, as well as 

\\~th those expectations of FINRA's Employee Code of Conduct that are relevant to 

your ability to fulf~l your obligations to FINRA. 

• Seek guidance before taking action that you are uncertain about. Feel free to consult 

\\~th FINRA's Office of General Counsel about any questions or concems. 

• Promptly notiljr FINRA's OffiCe of General Counsel if you become aware of unethical 

conduct or violations of the law, FINRA's employee Code of Conduct, or this Code. 

• Promote and encourage ethical leadership and a culture of integrity throughout FINRA. 

• Embrnce and advocate FINRA's mission of "Investor Protection, Market Integrity" 

when making decisions or acting on behalf of rlte organization - as a Governor or 

Director, your fiduciary duty runs to !he corporation and all of its constituents, not to 

the members or parties responsible of your election or appointment to the Board. 
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CODE OF CONDUCT 

A. Avoiding Confiicts of Interest 

A conflict of interest exists when our private interests intecfere, could intecfere, or even apptorto 

tntecfere with the interests of PINR.il. We must act honestly and ethically in the handling of 

actual or apparent conflicts between our personal and/or professional interests and those of 

FINRA. 

Broadly speaking, this means we may not have direct or indirect interests in, or relationships 

with, any o<g~~nizacion where these interests or relationships could conceivably: (a) hinder our 

objectivity, independence of judgment or conduct in carrying out our responsibilities as FINR.>\ 

Governors and Directors, or (b) ernbarnss FINRA because of the opptrm~ll(t of a conflict of 

interest. 

Indeed, the appeamnce of a confltCt can be as hannful as an actual conflict. Therefore, while we 

discuss below severn! specific siruacions that you may fAce as Governors or Directors, the goal of 

this policy is to avoid the oppeomll« of impropriety, as \Vtllas siruations where independence is 

acrually unpaired. 

Some Helpful Definitions 

''Immediate family" (hereafter "f2111ily') includes a Governor's or Director's spouse, 

parent, stepparent, child. or stepchad; a member of a person's household; an individual to 

whom a person provides financial support of more than SO percent of his or her annual 

income; or a person who is claimed as a dependent for federal income tJL~ purposes. 

You are considered "affiliated" with a <egulated entity if you: 

• Currendy act as an officer, director or employee of the entity; or 

• Have been an officer, director or employee of the entity within the last year; or 

• Have a "family" member or close business associate, i.e. a partner, who is currently 

an officer or director of the entity. 

"Substantial fi.nancial interest" includes: 

• Being employed by or holding stock or another ownership interest io a regulated 

enriry or vendor which is equal to one percent or more of the outstanding stock of 

a publicly traded company or one pettent or mo<e of the total value of assets of the 

entity or which is equal to or greater than five percent of your total net worth. Qn 

determining your ownership inte<est, you should consider not only your own 

holdings, but also the holdings of any afftliate and any famtly member.) 

• A loan by you or a fAmily member, equal to or greater than five percent of your 

total net worth, to a regulated entity or vendor. 

• Accepcing or allowmg a f2111ily member or affiliate to accept a loan or other fonn 

of indebtedness equal to or greater than fn'e percent of your total net worth from a 

regulated entity or vendor. 

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1. Examples of Potential Connicts 

a. CorJiJicrs or Perceil'ed ConBicrs bwo}vjng Rules or Orber Marrers 

Presenred ro rlle Board 

If you or a family member has a "subslllntial financial interest" in a FlNRA 

member oare "aff~iattd" with a regulated enricy, you may not panicipate in: 

• Any regulatory matter, disciplinary action or investigorion which involves 

the regulated entity, or 

• Any decision regording an applic•non by that entily for an exemption or 

other special dispensation. 

Participation by Governors or Directors who are affiliated with regulated 

entities is an inherent and valuable incident of FlNRA's sllltus as an SRO. 

The compositional requirements of the Boards of FlNRA and its subsidiaries 

have been careful~ developed to ensure that a broad spe<:trum of industry 

and public views are represented. 

When you participate in the discussion related to and/or vote on a rule or a 

matter, which you believe may significantly and disproponionately impact an 

entily in which you or • family member has a "substantial financial interest'' 

or wid> which you or a family member are affiliated, you should always reveal 

the nature of your interest to the members of the Board prior to the 

discussion or vote. Under such circumstances, you also should consider 

recusing yourself from the discussion and the vote. Such situations can give 

rise to concerns about fairness and objectivity, and can create a pmtption of a 

conflict of in te res~ even if there is no actual conflict. 

b. Vendors, Poremial Vendors and Orber BusiJJess Partntts 

If you or a family member have a substantial financial interest in or are 

affiliated with a FlNRA vendor or a potential vendor, you may not 

participate in the consideration of a contract or other agreement that would 

be material to the oper:t~ting revenues of d>at vendor (frve percent of more of 

the vendor's gross revenues). Similarly you should not encour:t~ge member 

fiiDls or companies that do business with FINRA to buy supplies or services 

from fAmily members or entities ""th which you or a family member have a 

substantial financial interest or are afliliated 

c. Ourside AcrMries 

You should be sensitive to other commi1ments or activities (I.e., your duties 

to anodler Board) that may interfere with your ability to act in tile best 

interest of FINRA. If a situation arises where your commitments or other 

activities may conAict wirh your duties as a F!NRA Governor or Director, 

you should consult with the Office of General Counsel 

d. Corporate Opportuniries 

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You may not use FINRA property, infonnation or position for personAl gain 

unrelated to the perfonnance of your duties as a FINRA Governor or 

Director. Prohibited activities include, for elW!lple, profiting from business 

opporiUnities that you learn about through your service as a FINRA 

Governor or Director. 

e. Compensation 

You may not accept compensation in any fonn for services perfonned for 

FINRA from any source od1er thllll f11NRA. f1or example, you may nor 

accept from others a finder's fee, commission or other remuneration for any 

business transaction in which f11NRA is involved or for services rendered to 

FINRA. 

2. Relationships with the SEC 

Employees of the SEC are prohibited from soliciting or w:eiving gifts that have 

more than an incidenllll value from any entity rl1ey regulate, including FINRA and 

its member finns. With limited exceptions, SEC employees may not accept gifts 

from f11NRA Governors or Directors. The exceptions include: (I) reasonable 

food or refreshments offered at a meeting; (2) gifts given as a result of personal 

relationships (I.e., family members or close persoMI friends); (3) advertising 

materi•ls of incidental value; and (4) rea.sonable meals provided as part of an 

educatioMI program. You should be fiuniliar with, understand and comply with 

these restrictions. 

3. Change or Prospective Change in Employment 

If at any time during your tenure as a FINRA Governor or Director, you are 

changing or in the process of changing your place of emplo}menr, you should treat 

yourself as though the event has already occurred (..e., consider yourself to be 

"affdiated" with that entity), and should comport yourself in accordance with the 

app~cable provisions of this Code. 

4. Participation in FINRA Adjudicatory Proceedings 

f11NRA has long-established policies goveming participation by FINRA 

Govemors and Directors in adjudicatory proceedings. (Rtftr to FINRA's Po~cy on 

Participation in Adjudicatory Proceedings, adopted on January 28, 1997, and 

NASD Regulation's Policy on P•rticipation in Proceedings, adopted on January 27, 

1997, and modified on March 21, 2000.) Pursuant to these policies, you may not 

appear as an expert or consultant in any FINRA hearing or arbitration proceeding 

on behalf of any party, other than yourself or the member finn with which you are 

currently associated. Under certain circumstances, fonner Governors and 

Directors may participate as panelists in FINRA discipliMry proceedings or 

FINRA arbitration proceedings. If you appear as a wi1ness, expert or consultant in 

any FINRA hearing, any arbitration, any civil litigation, or any other adjudicative 

proceeding in connection with FINRA matters, you should make it clear to all 

parties, including rhe court or adjudicative panel, that you are not appearing on 

behalf of FINRA. 

Code of Ethics and Business Conduct 
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As a sitting Governor, Director, or member of the National Adjudicatory Council 

("NAC"), you may not appear as a leg,.l representative before any FINR.!\ 

Adjudicator on behalf of any parry other than yourself or the member firm with 

which you currently are associated. You may counsel clients up to the point at 

which you are required to file a Notice of Appearance, but may not file a Notice of 

Appearance to act in a representative capacity before an Adjudicator in any 

FINRA proceeding on behalf of any parry other than yourself or dte member firm 

with which you currently are associated. In addition, once you are elected or 

appointed Governor, Director or NAC member, and throughout your term, you 

may not appear before an officer or employee of FINRA in a representative 

capacity during on-the-record testimony, in negotiating any aspect of on-therecord testimony or in any subsequent s~ of a FINRA examination, 

investig:ltion or disciplutary action on behalf of any individual or finn, other than 

yourself or the member fum(s) with which you are currently associated and were 

associated before the firm was aware of the examination, investig,.tion or 

disciplinary action.' This proscription does not apply to former Governors, 

Directors or NAC members, and also does not apply to another member of the 

law ftnn wirlt which the Governor, Director or NAC member is associated. 

5. Participation in Educational Programs or Speaking Engagements 

FINRA recognizes that you may be invited to participate in educational programs. 

These activities are beneficial to investors, member fums and the general public. 

Such activities, however, may create real or apparent risks. In order to avoid this 

risk, FINRA expects you to follow these guidelines: 

• Take core that the speech or materials used do not include confidential or 

non-public infonnation or remarks concerning pending FINRA litig:ltion 

or disciplinary proceedings. 

• When you participate in educational programs or speaking eng,.gements as 

a representative of FINRA's Board, FINRA's Offtee of Corporate 

Communications is available to assist you in preparing your remarks or 

speech. 

• Except where rou are stating a policy, position or rule that has been finallr 

approved by FINRA, all speeches should contain a disclaimer indicating 

that you are expressing your own views and do not necessarily speak for 

FINRA. The General Counsel's office is available to review advance texts, 

riders, slides and other materials used for speaking eng,.gements. 

• If you are authorized by FINRA to appear as its representative at a public 

event or speaking eng,.gement, FINRA will pay your expenses, as provided 

in !he applicable FINRA travel policy. 

'This provision applies to any governor starting a new tenn after September 19, 2013. 

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B. Business Gifts, Entertainment and Courtesies 

Gifts, entert2inment and hospitlllity (colle<:tively referred to as business courtesies) can help 

build goodwill and working relationships. But while business courtesies are &idy common, they 

can also create serious ethical risks. For FINRA, this is particularly true of business courtesies 

from entities or individuals we regulate, and from current or potential vendocs (though all 

business courtesies can give rise to ethical risks). Be aware, as well, that even if ethical concerns 

are not well founded, business courtesies can create the approrontt of misconduct. Such 

perceptions alone, even if mistaken, can undermine your integrity and that ofFINRA. 

For this reason, FINRA has adopted the following limits on business courtesies for Governors 

and Dire<:tors. In order to avoid the appearance of any impropriety, you should be careful not 

to accept business courtesies from regulated entities or vendors if, in your best judgment, the gift 

is being offered to influence your actions as a FINRA Govemor or Director. 

We e'pe<:t you to report to the Office of the Secretllry the acceptllnce of any and all gifts, 

gratuities or other remuneration re<:eived in excess of$500 from a single regulated entity, vendor 

or potential vendor during any calendar year. 

C. Safeguarding Confidential Information 

FINRA Governors and Directors have access to a broad amy of sensitive, confidential or 

proprietllry information, including information about the firms FlNRA regulates, investigates or 

othero.~se has dealings u~th (as well as the 6rm's employees and customers), information about 

FINRA employees, and information about FINRA itself. Unless required by law or instructed 

by an appropriate member of FINRA's Board of Governors, you should maintain dte 

conf.dentiality of any and all such information. You may never use such information for 

pecsonal gain. 

D. Protecting FINRA Assets 

You may not use or seek to use FINRA's employees, supplies, equipmen~ buildings or other 

assets for your personal benefit except for legitimate business purposes or as part of an adopted 

or approved FINRA program or policy that is available to all Governors and Directors. 

E. Honest and Fair Dealing 

You should at all timts deal fairly with investors, FINRA member firms, suppliecs, employw 

and others with whom FINRA interacts. You should never tllke advantage of anyone through 

manipullltion, concealment, abuse of privileged information, misrepresentlltion of material facts, 

or any other unfair practices. 

F. Insider Trading 

As FINRA Govemocs and Directors, you may have access from time to time to non-public, 

conf.dential or proprielllry information about publicly traded companies. It is against FINRA 

policy for you to trade in the stock of any public company based on DI!J' non-public information 

obtllined through your service as a FINRA Governor or Director. Moreover, much of this nonpublic information is maltrial, meaning that a reasoMble investor would consider it imporlllnt in 

deciding to buy, sell, or hold onto a company's stock. It is against the law (as well as FINRA 

policy) for anyone to buy or sell the stock of any publicly rraded compony while in possession 

of materi.l, non-public information about that compony. This means you, but it also means 

Code of Ethics and Business Conduct 6 
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your spouse, your best friend, and anyone else you might intentionally or inadvertently tip off 

about material non-public information relating to a publicly traded company. 

WAIVERS 

Any waiver from any part of this Code requires the express approval of the Board following 

disclosure of all relevant information. 

ANNUAL REVIEW 

FINRA's Board of Governors, or a committee of that Board or its designee, will review and 

reassess the adequacy of this Cede annuaUy, and lhe Board may make any amendments that it 

deems appropriate. 

CER11FICA110N 

Each Governor and Director is required to certify annually, as long as he or she serves in such 

capacity, that he or she has received, read and understands the Code, and agrees to comply with 

its expectations, as follows: 

Signed; 

[ J hereby certify and 

acknowledge that (i) I am a member in good standing of the Board of Governors 

of FINRA and/or the Board of Directors of FINRA Regulation or FINRA 

Dispute Regulation; (l~ l have received, read and understood the Code of Ethics 

and Business Conduct for the Board of Governors of FINRA and the Board of 

Directors of its Subsidiaries; (li~ such Code has been and is applicable to my 

activities as a member of such lhe Board of Governors of FINRA or the Board 

of Directors of FINRA Regulation or FINRA Dispute Regulation; (IV) I have 

complied and am in compliance with such Cede; and (v) I am not aware of any 

non-compliance with such Code by others. 

Name Printed: 

Date: 

Code of Ethics and Business Conduct 
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Corporate Governance Guidelines 

Prepared for the FINRA Board of Governors 

Updated August 22, 2016 

The JWssion of the FINRA Board of Governors 

The FINRA Board is vested v.ith all powers necessary for the management and administration 

of FINRA and the promotion of its welfare. The Board has a function independent of 

management and is not responsible for the day-to-<lay affairs of the Corporation. It, homver, 

does have the responsibility to oversee management and be informed, investigate and act as 

necessary to promote FINRA's welfare, objectives and purposes. 

Board members need to have an understanding of the issues facing the organization and an 

abilfty to apply their knowledge and expertise to those issues. They must represent the best 

interests of FINRAand further FINRA's rrission and stated positions, consistent >Mth the 

Board's Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, and Board members need to have a full 

understanding of, and comply with, the FINRA's Restated CertWicate of Incorporation and Bylaws that form the governance base of FINRA. Board members must have adequate working 

knov.ledge of FINRA. as well as its members and services. Board members must regularly 

attend Board and committee meetings; participate effectively and in a collegial manner, in all 

deliberations, and gel enough information to make a reasonably informed decision. Board 

members must observe strict confidentiafity of all matters presented to the Board or their 

appropriate committees. Any possible conmct-of-interesl issues must be raised with the 

appropriate staff or the Chairman of the Board for prompt resolution. 

Guidelines on Significant Corporate Governance Issues 

Selection and Composition of the Board 

Board Membership Criteria 

II is the duty of the Governor to communicate and work professionally and effectively >Mth all 

members of the Board. Board members are expected to be unbiased and objective, voting on 

matters for the good of investors, industry and marketplace, regardless of the interest of their 

spec~ic organization, affiliation or ctassiftcation, as required by applicable law. 

The Board includes both lndusby and Public Governors. The Corporate Secrelllry of FINRA 

collects from each nominee for Governor such information as is reasonably necessary to serve 

as the basis for a determination of the nominee's qualification as an Industry or Public 

Governor. Board members have a continuing obligation to not~ the Corporate Secretary 

should such information change in any manner. 

The exact size of the FINRA Board is determined by the Board within a range set forth in the 

By-Laws. There are 10 required Industry Governor seats on the Board comprising: 

• three Small Firm Governors, 

• one Mid-Size Firm Governor, 
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72717037.eps

• three Large Firm Governors, 

• a Floor Member Governor, 

• an Independent Dealer/Insurance Affiliate Governor; and 

• an Investment Company Affiliate Governor. 

In addition, the By-Laws provide that the number of Public Governors on the board must exceed 

the number of Industry Governors on the board, which resuHs in a minimum of eleven Public 

Governors. One seat on the Board is also reserved for FINRA's Chief Executive OffiCer. 

Because of these restrictions the practical minimum number of Board members is 22. In April 

2013, the Board authorized three add~ional Public Governor seats to increase the Board's size 

to the maximum number of 25 governors. 

Selection and Orientation of New Governors 

The Nominating and Governance Committee identifies and norrinates candidates to run for 

election or be appointed to seats on the Board. Interested persons may subrrit a letter of 

interest and brief biography to the Corporate Secretary who -Mil forward the infonnation to the 

Committee. 

Governors who are required to be elected by the members 1 must be elected by a plurality of the 

votes of the members of FINRA present in person or represented by proxy at the annual 

meeting of members of the Corporation and entitled to vote for such category of Governors. 

Quorum, as established in the CerWcation of lnoorporation, is one-third of the members ent~led 

to vote at the meeting of members of the Corporation (i.e., Annual or Special Meetings) and, 

like-Mse, with respect to elections for elected Governors, one-third of the members of the class 

or group entitled to vote. 

Orientation of New Governors 

As soon as practicable after being elected or appointed to the Board, new Governors receive a 

new board member orientation, at I'Alich they meet with senior management and receive an 

overview of FINRA's primary programs, departments and operations. New board members are 

also provided a FINRA Board Member Reference Manuai,I'Alich sununarizes Board member 

duties and responsibil~ es. 

Board Composition 

Definitions of Industry and Public Board Members 

The defi ~ions of Industry and Public are set forth in the FINRA By-Laws and provide: 

• "lnduslfY Governor" or "Industry oommittee member" means the Floor Member Governor, 

the Independent Dealerltnsurance Affiliate Governor and the Investment Company Affiliate 

Governor and any other Governor (excluding the CEO of the Corporation) or oomrriHee 

member v.ilo: (1) is or has served in the prior year as an officer, director (other than as an 

independent director), employee or oontrolling person of a broker or dealer, or (2) has a 

The Small Firm ~rnors, Mid-Size Firm Governor and Lar~ Firm Governors are elected by members in 

the same firm-size category. However, vacancies with less than 12 months on the term may be filled by 

appointment 

Corporate Governance Gtidelines Page2ol7 
110 


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consutting or employment relationship v.ith or provides professional services to a sdregulatory organization registered under lhe Ad, or has had any such relationship or 

provided any such services at any time v.ilhin the prior year. 

• "Public Governor" or "Public conmittee member' means any Governor or committee 

member I'Alo is not lhe CEO of the Corporation or who is not an Industry Governor and who 

otherwise has no material business relationship with a broker or dealer or a seW-regulatory 

organization registered under the Act (other than serving as a public director of such a seHregulatory organization). 

Governors Who Change Their Professional Affiliations 

Changes to a Governor's professional affiliation may affect his or her eligibility to serve in the 

Board classification for which he or she was elected or appointed. A Governor I'Alo changes his 

or her job respons l~ es must notify the Corporate Secretary and provide an update to his or 

her Board questionnaire. The Governor's eligibil~y to remain on the Board in his or her current 

seat will be determined follov.ing a thorough analysis of the new information. 

Term Limits 

FINRA Governors, other than the CEO who serves by virtue of his or her posrtion, hold offiCe for 

a term of not more than three years, or until a suocessor is elected or qua lifted, or until death, 

disqualifiCation, resignation or removal. A Governor generally may not serve more than two 

consecutive terms on the FINRA Board. 

Board Compensation Review 

FINRA staff reports periodically to lhe Management Compensation Conmittee on lhe status of 

FINRA Board compensation in relation to other se~-regulatory organizations and large U.S. 

companies. Additionally, lhe Board directed the Management Compensation Committee toreevaluate the Board Compensation Schedule every five years taking into account appropriate 

cost of living adjustments and board pay comparators. Changes in Board compensation, if any, 

v.iD be recommended first by the Management Compensation Committee to the Nominating and 

Governance Committee, and then by the Nominating and Governanoe Committee to lhe full 

Board for discussion and approval. 

Board Operations and Conduct 

Attendance and Participation 

Board members are expected to attend and participate regularly in Board and Corrmitlee 

meetings consistent v.ith lhe general fiduciary standards and govemanoe needs of FINRA. 

Members should participate professionally and effectively, in a collegial manner, in all Board 

and conmittee deliberations and observe strict confidentiality of all matters presented to lhe 

Board or their appropriate committees. 

Standard of Conduct 

As a protector of investors and a guardian of market integrity, FINRA's Governors have a 

heightened duty to make certain that they act in the best interest of the company and that their 

conduct is beyond reproach. Pursuant to FINRA's By-Laws, the standard lhe Board uses to 

Corporate Governanoe Guidelines Page3ol7 
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determine 'htlether cause exists to remove a Board member is 'htlether continued seJVice 

affects the best interests of the corporation. 

Under this standard, actions by a Governor in his or her individual capacity that may cast doubt 

upon his or her honesty, integrity, fairness and excellence and/or attract adverse publicity may 

undermine FINRA's stakeholders' confidence in the organization and may ifllllicate this 

provision of the By-Law.;. In order to maintain the respect and confidence of investors, member 

firms, business partners, regulators, employees and lhe pub ~ is Board policy that any 

Governor 'htlo finds him/herseW facing personal, regulatory or legal issues that might implicate 

this standard must consuft 11-ith the Chairman of lhe Board, lead Director and/or CEO lo discuss 

'htlether resigning from the Board is in the best interest of the organization. 

Assessing Individual Governor's Performance 

The effectiveness and credibility of the Board depends on an evaluation of the Board as a 'htlole 

and of s individual members by lhe Nominating and Governance Committee. W'hen evaluating 

Governors up for renomination, the Nominating and Governance Committee considers, among 

other things, adherence to the Board's mission, guidelines and policies, active engagement and 

effective interaction among Board members. 

Review of Allocation of Powers 

The Board periodically review.; the allocation of powers between management and the Board as 

delineated in the Certiftcate of Incorporation and the By-laws, and determines 'htlether these 

grants of authority are consistent h the changing needs of lhe business. 

Board's Interaction with Interested Groups and the Media 

The Board believes thai Senior Management speaks for FINRA. If public comment from the 

Board is appropriate, these commenls should, in most circumstances, come from the Chairman 

or lhe CEO.Individual Board Members may, from lime to time, meet or otheMise communicate 

11-ith members and various other constituencies thai are involved \'~th FINRA allheir discretion, 

but in such circumstances they do so at their O'M'l expense and should make clear they do not 

formally represent FINRA or the FINRA Board. 

Board members must not disclose Board information lo the pubfic and must obseJVe the 

confidentiality guidelines. Sens~ive, non-public policy and proprietary information should not be 

disclosed lo anyone, including the media. This information may include FINRA internal 

personnel matters, investigations/examinations in progress, enforcement actions against 

members, detiberalions and contemplated actions of the Board, and information on systems 

developments. 

ff a Board member is contacted by the media, the Board member should comport him/herseW in 

a manner consistent h the preceding paragraphs. As a general matter, Board members 

should inform the FINRA Corporate Communications Department of any media inquiry or refer 

the inquiry to the FINRA Corporate Communications Department. 

Travel Policy 

Board members should ensure FINRA business travel conforms to the policy as outlined in the 

FINRA Board Travel Policy. 

Corporate Governance Guidelines Page4ol7 
112 


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Interaction Among Board Members 

Effective interaction among Board members ensures a v.llll-functioning Board. Board members 

should exercise judgment when communicating with fellow Board members. Board members 

are asked to be respectful of business and other professional comnitmenls of fellow Board 

members, and refrain from excessive and unnecessary electronic and hard-copy 

communications. 

Board Relationship to Senior Management 

Board Access to Senior Management 

Board members have complete access to FINRA's Senior Management. Board members are 

requested to direct questions and issues to these individuals andlor the Corporate Secretary. 

Individual Board members should not become involved in operational management, including 

regulatory matters and responsibilities of FINRA, except as requested by the CEO. The Board 

must focus on ils role as a policy-maker >Mthin FIN RA. 

Board members are requested to use good judgment to ensure that contact is appropriate and 

non-disruptive to the business operation of FINRA.In order to ensure appropriate follow-up 

action, the Corporate Secretary should be copied on written communications. Board members 

should be conscious of the might of their position and understand that contacls with staff 

members below the most senior level might be intimidating to such staff and might be 

interpreted as an attempt to unduly or improperly influence them. 

Governors regularly meet in executive session outside the presence of the CEO and other 

FINRA offteers or employees. The Chairman of the Board convenes and presides over these 

executive sessions and is responsible for communicating to the CEO issues discussed during 

such executive sessions. 

Meeting Procedures 

Selection of Agenda Items for Board Meetings 

The Chairman and the CEO establish the agenda for each Board meeting. With respect to 

matters from which the Chairman and the CEO recuse themselves, the Lead Governor may 

include matters on the agenda of a meeting of the Board. 

Each Board member is free to suggest the inclusion of item(s) on the agenda. Board members 

are requested to provide suggested agenda items to the Corporate Secretary at least three 

weeks in advance of the Board meeting. 

Board Materials Distributed in Advance 

lnformatiion and data that are important to the Board's understanding of operations >Mil be 

distributed in writing to the Board sufficiently in advance of Board meetings to pernit full review 

and consideration. FINRA management will make every effort to see that this material is as 

concise as possible while still providing the necessary information. 

Corporate Governance Guidelines Page5ol 7 
113 


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Providing materials to the Board in advance v,;11 generally conserve meeting time and focus 

discussion. On those occasions in v.llich the subject matter is too sens~ive to be presented in 

writing, the issue \'~II be presented and discussed in person. 

Board Meeting Order 

The Chairman establishes the rules of order and procedure of the meeting to ensure the 

meeting is conducted in an orderly fashion. The Chairman retains the right,~ necessary, to rule 

out of order any remarks or discussion. The Chairman may make add~ional meeting rules as 

appropriate or advisable. 

The Lead Governor shall convene and preside at all meetings of the Board at v.llich the 

Chairman is not present and all executive sessions~ the Chairman is recused. 

2 

Special Meetings 

Special meetings of the Board may be called by the Board, the Chairman, the CEO, or the Lead 

Governor. 

Committee Matters 

Number, Structure, and Independence of Committees 

The Board is authorized to appoint committees to facilitate and assist in the execution of the 

Board's responsibilities. At present, the committees of the Board include the: 

• Audft Comrrittee; 

• Executive Committee; 

• Finance, Operations & TechnologyComrrittee; 

• Management Compensation Committee; 

• Nominating & Governance Committee; 

• Regulatory Policy Comrrittee; 

• Small Firm Governor Committee; and 

• Large Firm Governor Comrrittee. 

The Management Compensation Committee exclusively comprises Public Governors. The 

Small Firm Governor Committee and the Large Firm Governor Comrrittee comprise the 

Governors filling those respective seats on the Board.

3 For each of the other committee's listed 

The 'lead Govern()(' is a member of the Board elected as such by the Board. 

The large firm G011ernor Commi~ and the Small firm G011ernor Committees are convened in the event 

of a vacancy among the Large firm Governo" or the Small firm G011ernors in which the term of office 

remaining Is less than 12 months. Such vacancy is only filled by the large firm GOYemor Committee in 

the case of a largefirmGOYernorvacancy, or the Small firm Governor Committee in thecaseofa Small 

firm G011ernor vacancy. Any such vacancy of the Mid-Size Governor is filled by the Board. In the event 

the remaining term of office of any Large firm, Mid-Size firm or Small firm Governor position that 

becomes vacant~ for more than 12 months, sud> vacancy is filled by the fiNRA membe" entided to vote 

for that category of Governorship. In all such nsta~s. nominations are made by the Nominating 

Committee. 

Corporate Governance Guidelines Page6ol7 
114 


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above, the number of Public Governors who serve on the COITITlittee must exceed the number 

of Industry Governors on the commttee. 

The Nominating & Governance Commttee is responsible for recommending the creation and/or 

elimination of Board Committees, and periodically reviev~ng and recommending changes to 

committee charters. 

Assignment and Rotation of Committee Members 

Board members may indicate their preferred committee assignmenls. The selection process, 

however, is subject to various compos~ional requirements set forth in the FINRA By-Lam, the 

SEC-approved Plan of Allocation and Delegation of Functions by FINRA to FINRA Regulation, 

Inc., and the Board-approved committee charters. In nominating individuals to serve on Board 

Committees, consideration is given to each Governors' backgrounds, experience, and existing 

responsibilities as members of the FINRA Board. 

Committee Meeting Order 

The Chairman of the committee establishes the rules of order and procedure of the meeting to 

ensure the meeting is conducted in an orderly fashion. The Chairman of the comnittee controls 

the meeting agenda and the order of issues to be presented to the Board. The Chainnan 

retains the ig ~ necessary, to rule out of order any remarks or discussion that does not 

comply with committee procedures. The Chainnan may make additional meeting rules as 

appropriate or advisable. 

Committee Agenda and Materials 

The Chairman of the committee, in conjunction v~th the Chairman and the CEO, 'hill establish a 

meeting agenda for each COITITlittee. Each COITITlittee member is free to suggest the inctusion of 

item(s) on the agenda. Committee members are requested to provide suggested agenda items 

to the Corporate Secretary at least three weeks in advance of the coiTITlittee meeting. 

Committee materials will be distributed in writing before the committee meeting. 

Leadership Development 

Formal Evaluation of the Chief Executive Officer 

Annually the Board, through the Management Compensation Committee, evaluates the CEO. 

This evaluation is communicated to the CEO by the Chairman of the Management 

Compensation CoiTITlittee. The evaluation should be based on objective crfteria including 

performance of the corporation, accomplishment of long-term strategic objectives and 

development of senior management. The evaluation ...nn be used by the Management 

Compensation CoiTITlittee when considering the compensation of the CEO. 

Succession Planning 

The Management Compensation CoiTITlittee and the Nominating and Governance Committee 

are jointly responsible for developing and updating a plan of succession for the CEO. 

Corporate Governance Guidelines Page 7ol 7 
115 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD

LETTERS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE NOMINATION OF JOSEPH 

OTTING 


72717021.eps
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sought to avoid compliance with state Jaw, arguing that state consumer protection Jaws did not 

apply to them.' 

These questions regarding Mr. Otting's record are especially important given the critical 

decisions before the ne~1 Comptroller, including: 

• how to implement and enforce the crucial public protections in the Dodd-Frank Act; 

• whether to resist bank pressure to unravel the OCC's guidance to banks regarding 

abusive payday loans; 

• whether to oppose efforts by national banks to usc preemption to ignore stale constuuer 

protection Jaws; 

• whether to abandon the OCC's plans to unlawfully charter nondepository institutions 

without Congressional authorization; 

• whether to disavow the Acting ComptroUer's radical proposals to obstruct other 

regulators authority to protect the financial system; and 

• whether to reject the Acting Comptroller's outlandish attempt to overtum the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau's arbitration mle based on unsupported assertions about the 

effect ofboldi11g banks accowJiable on their safety and soundness. 

We tl1ank you for yotlf allention, and urge you to oppose Mr. Otting's nomination. 

Sincerely, 

Americans for Financial Refonn 

4 Boyle 1'. Vesuv1o Hold~ B256055, 2016 WL 595675, at 7 (Cal. /lpp. 2 Dist Ocl 14, 2016), available at 

hllp: 'l"ww couns.ca.~v opimons'nonpub!B~560S5 PDF- Darn•in Bondgraham, Sm;ng the Homea.ntr BiU of 

Righ/s, East Bay E><prtss, Nov. 26, 2014, available at https:llwww.eastbivtx!Jf<':;s.COmlooklandlsavino-thehomeownor-bill-<lf-riohtsiContcnt oid ~t32390 
117 


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MBCA 

MID-SIZE BANK COAL ITION OF AM ERI CA 

Sen. Mike Crapo 

Chainnan, Senate Banking 

Committee 

239 Dirksen Senate Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Sen. Sherrod Brown 

Ranking Member, Senate Banking 

Committee 

713 Hart Senate Building 

Washington, DC20510 

Re: Support for Joseph Otti11g- Comptroller of the Curreucy 

Dear Chainnan Crapo and Ranking Member Brown, 

Joseph Otting's nomination to lead the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has the full 

support of the Mid-Size Bank Coalition of America (MBCA) and its 80 member banks. We 

encourage the United States Senate to act quickly on Otting's nomination. 

Founded in 2010, the MBCA is the only financial services industry group whose sole purpose it 

is to singularly and effectively represent mid-size banks within the overall banking industry, and 

to educate lawmakers about the financial regulatory issues and policies affecting the ability of 

mid-size banks to more fully support and contribute to the growth ofthe U.S. economy. The 

MBCA's effectiveness is rooted in the direct engagement of its member CEOs and their senior 

executives, who present policymakers with facts, with reasoned alternatives and with positive 

policy suggestions, reflecting the unique point-of-view of mid-size banks. MBCA-mernber banks 

average less than $19 billion in size and collectively serve customers and communities in all 50 

states, Washington D.C., and 3 U.S. territories. 

Mid-size banks have the best features of both big and small banks. Much like community banks, 

we are deeply invested in our local communities, maintaining a tried and true customer-focused 

business model through which we offer a high level of service and flexibility to our customers. 

Our business is straightforward: we take deposits, make loans, pro\~ de payments seMces, and 

offer modest wealth management capabilities to our customers. Because we're bigger and have 

more capital than community banks, we offer more product depth, technology, loan capacity, and 

increased stability. 

Because he led a mid-size bank, Joseph has an uncommon appreciation for these distinctions and 

he understands how complex, still-evolving regulatory requirements confront and challenge the 

mid-size bank business model by necessitating substantial investments in compliance, risk and 

capital management infrastructure. 
118 


72717024.eps

While the MBCA and its members support regulation that is necessary for national economic 

stability and holds bad actors to account, we think policymakers should focus attention, 

resources, and time on where risk lies and so as to not burden banks that are not systemically 

significant. The cost of regulating mid-size banks should not exceed its benefits. This is 

especially important during a slow and uneven economic recovery, concerns abroad and rising 

competition from outside the regulated banking industry. 

Mid-size banks strongly desire to do even more to support our communities and improve 

prospects for economic and job gro111h in them. Joseph shares this desire. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide this input and thank you also for 

considering it. Please let me know if the MBCA can be of any assistance to the Committee on 

this or any other matter. &f)-/ 

Chainnan and CEO, Old National 

Chainnan, Mid-Size Bank Coalition of America 

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119 


72717025.eps

OPERATION 

HOPE 

HOPE WOII:I Headquarters 

191 Poacl>tree Sir~ liE. 

Sw.e3840 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 

40<·941·2919 Ole 

HOPE Regional Olfu 

707 Wilshire Boule'iacd. 

'!if' Floor 

Honorable Michael (Mike) Crapo 

Chairman 

United States Senate 

239 Dirksen Senate Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

JOHN HOPE BRYANT 

Founder, Chairman and 

Chief Executive Officer 

July 25. 2017 

Los At>gtiet Cattomia 90017 Dear Senator Crapo: 

en -592-HOPE (4673) 

21J.439.7272Fax On July 27, 2017 the U.S. Senate Banking Committee will hold a nomination 

hearing for the U.S. OCC Comptroller Nominee Mr. Joseph Otting. I respectfully 

submit a letter of support on the tegr~y and community reinvestment work of Mr. 

Offing. As Founder Chairman and CEO of Operation HOPE, I have witnessed 

firsthand through our economic empowerment work the executive leadership by 

Mr. Otting and know him, personally, to be a good man. 

l et me share with you how we've worked with Mr. Offing and how his executive 

leadership has made a pos~ive impact with our HOPE clients. As an executive of 

One West Bank and a HOPE Board member, he has remained a committed and 

engaged impact leader which brokered a commitment of numerous HOPE Inside 

locations throughout the West Coast. 

Our HOPE Inside programs provides financial literacy, credit management, home 

ownership counseling, small business and entrepreneurship training, and assists 

Americans with a financial crisis as a result of disasters. The end result are 

economi(ally stabilized 700 credit score communities. 

Our HOPE Inside programs build upon the legacy of President Abraham lincoln 

and the Freedman's Bank of 1865, a landmark institution designed to teach freed 

slaves about money. As you know, the Freedman's Bank headquarters is located 

across from the White House, and I am proud to have played a role in the 

renaming of the Treasury Annex Building to the Freedman's Bank Building under 

the leadership of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Secretary lew in 

January, 2017. 

Operation HOPE has a 25-year history leading and shaping commun~y 

reinvestment. On the public policy front our efforts include: working with President 

Bush through executive order to establish financial literacy as public policy of the 

U.S. government: partnering with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and 

FEMA to pioneer the new public policy space of emergency financial disaster, 

preparedness, response and recovery; becoming the first non-profit entity allowed 

to operate within a bank branch; and encouraging Treasury to form a coal~ion to 

coordinate federal efforts on financial literacy, which resulted in the creation of the 

Financial Literacy and Education Commission (FlEC). President Bush actually 

featured an Operation HOPE success story during the ceremony held to create 

FLEC. I, and we, were able to work w~h President Obama on his President's 

Advisory Council on Financial Capacity and the Presidenfs Advisory Council on 

Financial Capacity of Young Americans, and with President Clinton as a founding 

member of Clinton Global Initiatives. 
120 


72717026.eps

Operation HOPE has transformed the lives of 2.9 million adults and 1.0 million 

youth. With the help of 28,000 volunteers, HOPE has uplifted communities through 

economic empowerment programs, directing more than $2.4 billion economic 

activity into underserved communrties, including $1 B in mortgages for 11,000 new 

homeowners. Operation HOPE provides financial inclusion at scale, and we are 

the only non-profit national financial services delivery model (urban and rural) for 

low wealth and struggling middle class communities domestically and 

internationally, including South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Morocoo and Saudi 

Arabia, empowering woman and youth. 

Our innovative HOPE 700 Credrt Score Community Program, bolstered by the 

HOPE National Credit Score Index, is tackling the consumer credit challenge and 

poverty through a holistic lens, including environmental, conlexlual, and behavioral 

factors. In partnership with FICO, HOPE examines and targets 500 credit score 

communrties for economic interventions and HOPE programs. Using credit score 

as a driver, the HOPE Credrt Score Index becomes a predictive index for poverty, 

crime, poor education, food deserts, low homeownership, GOP, as well as future 

aspiration. Best of all this approach is non-racial, non·polrtical, urban and rural, 

and inclusive. I would like to work with you and your team around this Credit 

Score Index as I believe it has significant public policy implications. I would also 

like to work with you and your team to build upon the policy created by President 

Bush, to expand this to be the policy of our nation; financial literacy education for 

every child at birth. 

The Credit Score Index is but one example of our progressive, outcome-based 

approach to CRA reform, focused on achieving key community-based objectives. 

After 40 years, the policy is in need of an overhaul. We believe that data and 

program impacts should guide the targets and assess the sucoess of CRA 

inmatives and organizations, creating a win for all stakeholders involved. We call 

this body of work the Silver Rights Movement. 

I stand ready to work with the Congressionally Confirmed OCC Comptroller around 

progressive, outcome· based, CRA reform. Thank you for your congressional 

efforts towards community reinvestment. 

cc: Acting U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Keith A Noreika 

HOPE Global Spokesperson Ambassador Andrew J. Young 
121 

LETTER SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE NOMINATIONS OF JOSEPH 

OTTING AND RANDAL QUARLES 


72717027.eps
122 


72717028.eps

I endorse both nominees v.1thout reservation and look forward to ~ing v.1th them once 

they are confinned. I urge the sv.ift approval of their oominations by the committee and 

the Senate. 

Thank you for your consideration. 

CC: Member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs 

The Nation~ Voice J&r Community Banks.' 

WASHUiCTON, DC I SAUK Cu.'TRE, MN I I Rvoo:, CA I TAMPA, FL I ~UMPHIS, TN 

16/JLS....MV.S.Utt~ W~DCZOO~J6V I 801)42U4J9( FAX:21JUj'J./4IJ r.-k"jleril.«f ( lllbr._..trf