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BORDER SECURITY GADGETS, GIZMOS, AND 

INFORMATION: USING TECHNOLOGY TO INCREASE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 24, 2016 

Serial No. 114–72 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

MARTHA MCSALLY, ARIZONA, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

KRIS CARLSON, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Ronald Vitiello, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Mr. Major General Randolph D. ‘‘Tex’’ Alles, (Ret.–USMC), Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Mr. Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Acquisition Executive, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

(1) 

BORDER SECURITY GADGETS, GIZMOS, AND 

INFORMATION: USING TECHNOLOGY TO INCREASE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND 

OPERATIONAL CONTROL 

Tuesday, May 24, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:53 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Duncan, Hurd, Vela, 

Torres, and Thompson (ex officio). 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine CBP’s procurement 

and use of technology to secure the Southern Border. I recognize 

myself for an opening statement. 

First, let me say thanks for your patience. I know we are now 

nearly an hour behind. We will try to be as expeditious as possible. 

We value your time, but you never know when votes are going to 

come up. So I appreciate your grace and your patience with that. 

The Southwest Border of the United States is home to nearly 

2,000 miles of majestic, yet rugged and often treacherous terrain, 

terrain that makes Border Patrol access in some remote areas a 

mere impossible proposition. Manpower alone, while essential, will 

never be enough to secure the border. In order to enhance situational awareness, we need to leverage technological force multipliers that provide persistent surveillance across wide swaths of remote areas along the border. 

Technology such as cameras, night vision goggles, motion sensors, and surveillance equipment have become critical elements of 

our border security operations. These technologies have enhanced 

agent safety, provide a constant monitoring of difficult-to-access 

areas, and extended situational awareness, and the ability to interdict criminal activity faster. 

Aviation assets, such unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, often 

considered UASs, unmanned aerial systems, equipped with advanced radar capabilities, have also refined our understanding of 

the significant threat that exists along the border, and help reposition and redeploy assets as the flow and the vulnerability shift. But 

technology cannot do any of these things if CBP’s acquisition and 

2 

procurement process cannot get these tools and the latest cuttingedge technology in the hands of the men and women on the ground 

in a timely fashion. 

Situation awareness is contingent on feeding information from 

centralized operation centers far from the border down to the individual agent level, so they can actually respond accordingly. Technology has to be focused on meeting the immediate needs of the 

agent, and not stovepiped into a command center. I speak to this 

from first-hand information. I have more experience than I would 

prefer to have in some cases on, you know, time-sensitive targeting, 

on operations centers in the military, and so these challenges are 

similar as far as merging together information providing a good 

common operational picture, situation awareness, but not just to 

the generals, but to the troops and those that are actually doing 

the mission. So that is always going to be my sort-of frame of mind. 

Although it is not the same as in the military, there are similar 

challenges as far as using technology, fusing information, and providing real-time, near-time decision quality information to leadership and to those that are out there on the front lines. 

CBP’s border technology procurement efforts, to put it mildly, 

have a bit of a checkered history of not delivering timely acquisitions that include more failures than successes, including the Secure Border Initiative, coastal interceptor vessel, ultralight aircraft 

detection, and mobile surveillance capability, which have all become synonymous with a deeply troubled acquisition process. These 

procurements have run over budget, behind schedule, been subject 

to litigation, and wasted a good deal of taxpayer dollars to boot. In 

this time of limited budgets, we cannot afford to waste $1 billion 

on a failed system to learn what not to do. Border security cannot 

continue to be held back by a system that has an astonishing lack 

of urgency in getting it done for the people on the ground. 

Our agents and officers in the field desperately need the capability they have asked for to do the job. But on the whole, I don’t 

believe CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, 

OTIA, has delivered. OTIA’s mission is to identify and acquire 

products and services to improve CBP’s performance in securing 

the borders. 

OTIA has been the lead agency responsible for acquiring technologies associated with the Arizona technology plant. As far as I 

can tell, the only procurement that is working well and is on budget is the integrated fixed tower program located principally in my 

district. However, this comes after chronic delays and the cancellation of SBInet. Now on track, Chief Vitiello recently certified to 

Congress that the program meets its operational requirements. 

With the exception of that outlier, industry officials we have spoken to tell us over and over again, CBP’s requirements are often 

poorly drafted, ill-defined, and, perhaps, most alarmingly not stable. Transparency is also a challenge as the CBP’s ability to forecast their needs so industry can spend the research and development dollars to mature technology for use in border security applications. 

The Government Accountability Office, GAO, has, on several occasions, criticized CBP for not following aspects of DHS’s acquisition management guidance with the Arizona border technology 

3 

plant and the lack of performance metrics to determine if the cost 

is worth the border security improvement. 

As a result of CBP’s troubling procurement record, I authored 

the Border Security Technology Accountability Act that ensures 

border security programs are meeting costs, schedule, and performance thresholds, and that technology is subjected to a rigorous 

independent verification and validation process. This legislation is 

vital to restore accountability, but it is being held up for reasons 

unknown in the Senate, even though it passed unanimously in the 

House. 

I am interested to hear from our witnesses on how CBP conducts 

market research, forges for emerging technology, repurposes existing Department of Defense equipment, and collaborates with DHS’s 

Office of Science and Technology to mature technology not quite 

ready for field deployment. Congress repeatedly asked a very simple question when it comes to border security: What will it take to 

gain situational awareness and operational control of the Southern 

Border? Up until now, the answer we received have been limited, 

or not backed up by a requirements process, similar to what the 

Department of Defense uses. In short, it was a guess. 

The Border Patrol and Air and Maritime Operations are involved 

in an effort called the ‘‘capability gap analysis process,’’ or CGAP. 

It is an aerial-based exercise designed to ferret out tactical weaknesses in our border security defenses and, hopefully, inform the 

technological budget process. Congress expects the Border Patrol 

and Air and Marines to be able to quickly identify and justify the 

resources needed to secure the border. I am optimistic the CGAP 

process is a much-needed step in that direction. 

Finding solutions to CBP’s procurement woes and quickly meeting the technology requirements of the men and women charged 

with securing the border is the reason I am holding this hearing 

today. I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. 

[The statement from Chairwoman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

MAY 24, 2016 

The Southwest Border of the United States is home to nearly 2,000 miles of majestic, yet rugged and often treacherous terrain. Terrain that makes Border Patrol 

access, in some remote areas, a near impossible proposition. 

Manpower alone, while essential, will never be enough to secure the border. In 

order to enhance situational awareness, we need to leverage technological force multipliers that provide surveillance across wide swaths of remote areas along the border. 

Technologies such as cameras, night vision devices, motion sensors, and surveillance equipment, have become critical elements of our border security operations. 

These technologies have enhanced agent safety, provided constant monitoring of difficult to access areas, and extended situational awareness and the ability to interdict criminal activity. 

Aviation assets, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, equipped with advanced 

radar capabilities, have also refined our understanding of the significant threat that 

exists along the border and has helped reposition and redeploy assets as flow and 

vulnerabilities shift. 

But technology cannot do any of those things if CBP’s acquisition and procurement process cannot get these tools and the latest cutting-edge technology in the 

hands of the men and women on the ground in a timely fashion. 

Situational awareness is contingent on feeding information from centralized operations centers, far from the border, down to the individual agent level, so they can 

4 

respond accordingly. Technology has to be focused on meeting the immediate needs 

of the agent and not stove-piped in a command center. 

CBP’s border technology procurement efforts, to put it mildly, have a checkered 

history of not delivering timely acquisitions that include more failures than successes, including the Secure Border Initiative, Coastal Interceptor Vessel, Ultralight 

Aircraft Detection, and the Mobile Surveillance Capability, which have all become 

synonymous with a deeply-troubled acquisition process. 

These procurements have run over budget, behind schedule, been subject to litigation, and wasted a good deal of taxpayer dollars to boot. In this time of limited 

budgets, we cannot afford to waste a billion dollars on a failed system to learn what 

not to do. 

Border security cannot continue to be held back by a system that has an astonishing lack of urgency in getting it done for people on the ground. 

Our agents and officers in the field desperately need the capabilities they have 

asked for to do the job, but on the whole, I do not believe that CBP’s Office of Technology and Acquisition or (OTIA) has delivered. 

OTIA’s mission is to identify and acquire products and services to improve CBP’s 

performance in securing the borders. OTIA has been the lead agency responsible for 

acquiring technologies associated with the Arizona Technology Plan. 

But as far as I can tell, the only procurement that is working well and on budget 

is the Integrated Fixed Tower program, located principally in my district, however, 

this comes after chronic delays and the cancellation of SBInet. Now on track, Chief 

Vitiello recently certified to Congress that the program meets its operational requirements. 

With the exception of that outlier, industry officials we have spoken to tell us over 

and over again that CBP’s requirements are often poorly drafted, ill-defined and, 

perhaps most alarming, not stable. 

Transparency is also a challenge, as is CBP’s ability to forecast their needs so industry can spend the Research and Development dollars to mature technology for 

use in border security applications. 

The Government Accountability Office has, on several occasions, criticized CBP for 

not following aspects of DHS’s acquisition management guidance with the Arizona 

Border Technology plan, and the lack of performance metrics to determine if the 

cost is worth the border security improvement. 

As a result of CBP’s troubling procurement record, I authored the Border Security 

Technology Accountability Act that ensures border security programs are meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and that technology is subjected to a rigorous independent verification and validation process. 

This legislation is vital to restore accountability but is being held up, for reasons 

unknown, in the Senate. 

I am interested to hear from our witnesses how CBP conducts market research, 

forages for emerging technology, repurposes excess Department of Defense equipment, and collaborates with DHS’s office of Science and Technology to mature technology not quite ready for field deployment. 

Congress repeatedly asks a very simple question when it comes to border security: 

What will it take to gain operational control and situational awareness of the Southern Border? 

Up until now, the answer we received was limited, or not backed by a requirements process similar to what the Defense Department uses. In short, it was a 

guess. 

The Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations are involved in an effort called 

the Capability Gap Analysis Process, or C–GAP, a scenario-based exercise designed 

to ferret out tactical weaknesses in our border security defenses and hopefully inform the technological budget process. 

Congress expects the Border Patrol and Air and Marine to be able to quickly identify, and justify the resource needs required to secure the border. I am optimistic 

that the C–GAP process is a much needed step in that direction. 

Finding solutions to CBP’s procurement woes and quickly meeting the technological requirements of the men and women charged with securing the border is the 

reason I am holding this hearing today. 

I look forward to the witness’s testimony. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a statement he might have. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am pleased to join 

you for today’s hearing, examining U.S. Customs and Border ProVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
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tection’s efforts to enhance border security through the use of technology. 

As a Member of Congress representing a district in the U.S.-Mexico border, I understand the importance of technology to achieving 

improved situational awareness, enhanced security, and improved 

facilitation of legitimate traffic along our Nation’s borders. 

The Department of Homeland Security has, for years, attempted 

to delay various kinds of technology to the borders with mixed results. To be fair, identifying, acquiring, and deploying the right mix 

of border security technology is no easy task. Technology evolves 

over time. The flow of border crosses and illicit traffic changes. 

America’s borders are varied places with different geography, terrain, and climate, meaning that what works in Arizona may not 

work in South Texas, and likely will not work on our northern borders. It is important that this committee conduct careful oversight 

of CBP’s on-going border security technology efforts, including the 

Arizona border surveillance technology plan, and deployment of integrated fixed towers in Arizona, procurement of mobile surveillance technologies, and the use of Predator B unmanned aircraft. 

The Government Accountability Office has reported on the Arizona border surveillance technology plan identifying management, 

scheduling, and cost concerns similar to those that contributed to 

SBInet’s problems. 

I hope to hear from our GAO witness today about whether and 

how those issues are being addressed by CBP. Given my particular 

interest in South Texas, I also hope to hear from our witnesses 

about the border security’s technologies in use or planned for the 

South Texas region. For example, I understand that there was a 

protest with a contract award for mobile video surveillance system 

units which consist of short- and medium-range mobile surveillance 

equipment mounted on telescoping masks mounted on Border Patrol vehicles. Many of the projected 297 units are slated for deployment in the Rio Grande Valley, and I hope to learn what the revised time line is for deployment. 

I also know that the weather in Corpus Christi has proven challenging for flying CBP’s Predator Bs prompting the agency to fly 

the aircraft from other locations. 

I hope to hear from CBP about how these issues have affected 

situational awareness along the border in South Texas, if at all. 

Finally, I hope we can have a frank discussion with our witnesses about how CBP can best position its on-going border security technology programs for success. I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 24, 2016 

This committee has conducted vigorous oversight of DHS’s attempts to deploy security technology along our Nation’s borders over the years—and with good reason. 

Beginning with the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), later the 

6 

America’s Shield Initiative (ASI), and more recently Project 28 and SBInet, DHS 

has consistently over-promised and underdelivered border security technology. 

For example, at the time then-Secretary Janet Napolitano canceled SBInet, the 

program had been deployed to only 53 miles of border in Arizona at a cost of about 

$1 BILLION. This committee has been fortunate to have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) engaged on each of these procurements, contributing significantly to our oversight efforts. 

With respect to its on-going program, the Arizona Border Security Technology 

Plan, 2 years ago GAO reported that CBP was not following best practices for scheduling, verifying cost estimates with independent sources, testing technology to determine effectiveness and suitability, or establishing performance metrics for the technology. In short, GAO’s initial work showed that the program suffers from some of 

the same deficiencies that ultimately led the Department to cancel the SBInet program. 

In March of this year, GAO reported on CBP’s Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) acquisition, a key component of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Announced in March 2012, the IFTs—53 fixed surveillance tower units equipped with 

ground surveillance radar, infrared cameras, and communications systems—were intended to address the capability gap left when SBInet was canceled. 

Unfortunately, DHS was forced to re-baseline the IFT program in December 2015, 

about 3 years after CBP determined the program could not meet its initial schedule 

goals. The program’s full operational capability date has so far slipped from September 2015 to September 2020, and acquisition costs have increased by $53 million. Those of us who participated in SBInet oversight had hoped CBP learned its 

lessons from that program and would be applying them to this newer effort in Arizona. I hope to hear from CBP and GAO today about the reasons for the cost, schedule, 

and performance changes for the IFTs. Similarly, I want to have a frank discussion 

about CBP’s other major border security technology acquisitions and assets, including Mobile Surveillance Capabilities (MSCs), aerostats, and Predator Bs. I continue 

to support using technology as a force-multiplier along our Nation’s borders. 

However, if there is anything our oversight of DHS’s efforts have shown, border 

security technology must be procured, deployed, and utilized in an appropriate, costeffective manner. Otherwise, CBP could be left with yet another border security 

technology system that fails to deliver as promised. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to be joined by 4 distinguished 

witnesses to discuss the important topic today: 

Ronald Vitiello, the acting chief of the U.S. Border Patrol. As a 

chief operating officer, he is responsible for the daily operations of 

the U.S. Border Patrol and assist the commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in planning and directing Nation-wide 

enforcement. Chief Vitiello began his Border Patrol career in 1985, 

and has served in the Swanson, Tucson, and Laredo sectors. 

Randolph Alles is the executive assistant commissioner for CBP’s 

Office of Air and Marine, a position he has held since January 

2013. 

In this role, Mr. Alles is charged with overseeing the AMO mission of using aviation and maritime assets to detect, interdict, and 

prevent acts of terrorism, and the unlawful movement of drugs and 

other contraband from entering the United States. 

Before joining the AMO, he spent 35 years in the United States 

Marine Corps—Semper Fi—retiring in 2011 as a major general. 

Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, or OTIA, at U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, in July 2010. In this role, 

he is responsible for ensuring technology efforts are properly focused on mission, and well-integrated across CBP. Prior to his appointment as assistant commissioner, Mr. Borkowski was the executive director of the Secure Border Initiative, SBI. 

Rebecca Gambler is the director in the House U.S.—sorry. Let 

me do this again—is a director in the U.S. Government AccountVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
7 

ability Office, Homeland Security and Justice team, where she 

leads GAO’s work on border security, immigration, and the Department of Homeland Security’s management and transformation. 

Prior to joining GAO, Ms. Gambler worked at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum or Democratic Studies. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Chief Vitiello for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD VITIELLO, ACTING CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. VITIELLO. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an 

honor to appear before you today on behalf of the dedicated men 

and women of the United States Border Patrol, and discuss the role 

of technology in our border security operations between the ports 

of entry. This Saturday, the 28th, marks the Border Patrol’s birthday. Since 1924, the men and women of this agency have made significant contributions to securing the homeland, from mounted 

watchmen riding the line in 1924; to guarding Nazi prisoners of 

war; in 1961, securing domestic air flights as marshals; and integrating universities in Oxford and Montgomery in 1962. 

Proven to be a versatile and effective workforce, our agents have 

helped to capture escaped felons in New York in June of last year. 

On our borders, we try to innovate and use technology that enhances agent effectiveness and keeps them safe. 

In 1935, we were advanced enough to install and use two-way radios in cars and stations. Today, the advanced technology deployed 

along our borders not only enhances the security of our Nation by 

providing us with increased situational awareness of illegal activity, it also significantly increases the safety of our front-line agents. 

While the basic Border Patrol mission is to secure the Nation’s border from illegal entry of persons and goods has not changed in the 

past 92 years, the operational environment in which we work and 

the threats we face have changed significantly. 

Today, our mission includes deterring acts of terrorism, detecting 

and intercepting human drug and weapon smuggling and trafficking, and preventing and responding to other criminal activity. 

The effective deployment of fixed and mobile technology is critical 

to the Border Patrol operations. With these resources, our frontline agents are better-informed, more effective, and safer. There is 

no doubt that technology is a critical factor of the Border Patrol 

strategic plan, which implements a security approach based on 

risk, and emphasizes unity of effort through integrated planning 

and execution with our partners. 

Detection technology extends the visual range and awareness of 

front-line agents. Ground sensors alert agents to movements and 

activity, while mounted cameras and sensors on fixed—on aircraft 

fixed towers and Border Patrol vehicles can be controlled remotely 

to verify a target. 

All of this technology works together, and ultimately enables the 

Border Patrol to gain situational awareness, direct a response team 

to the best interdiction location, and forewarn agents of any danger 

otherwise unknown along the way. 

8 

The Border Patrol continually evaluates our situational awareness posture, adjusts our capabilities as required to secure our borders. We work closely with our operational intelligence and acquisition colleagues within CBP and DHS to identify and develop technology, such as tunnel detection, and monitoring technology, small 

unmanned aircraft systems, tactical communication upgrades, and 

border surveillance tools tailored for the Southwest Border and 

northern borders. 

In coordination with the DHS joint requirements process, the 

Border Patrol will continue to use the capability gap analysis process to conduct mission analysis and identify capability gaps and potential operational requirements over the short, medium, and long 

term. 

With all our border technology, CBP works closely with agents 

on the ground to develop operational requirements, conduct testing 

and evaluation, and obtain user feedback to ensure the right tools 

are applied to the right capability gap. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to discuss how technology 

enhances the Border Patrol’s capabilities and strengthens our efforts in securing the border. I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Vitiello. 

The Chair now recognizes Major Alles for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ‘‘TEX’’ ALLES, 

(RET.–USMC), EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. ALLES. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally and Ranking 

Member Vela and Members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the critical role of technology, and 

specifically CPB’s Air and Marine assets in securing our Nation’s 

borders. CBP’s Air and Marine Operations, or AMOs as we call 

ourselves is a critical component of the CBP’s layered border security strategy. AMO’s 1,272 law enforcement agents operate 243 aircraft and 360 vessels, and has sophisticated domain awareness network across the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 

AMO’s critical aerial and maritime missions fall under 4 core competencies: Domain awareness, investigation, interdiction, and contingency operations and National taskings. AMO is a vital contributor to the security of our borders interdicting illicit traffic in the 

air, on the land, and the littoral waters of the United States 

through the coordinated use of integrated Air and Marine forces. 

All our highly-specialized law enforcement agents provide unique 

expertise and capability domains in which we operate. Since the 

consolidation of Air and Marine assets within AMO 11 years ago, 

we have transformed from a force composed primarily of light observation aircraft into a modern air and maritime fleet equipped 

with sophisticated surveillance sensors and communication systems. We are working to increase the connectivity and networking 

among all our Air and Marine assets. AMO is continuing the efforts 

to reduce the number of our aircraft types and position our assets 

for highest utilization, which will increase both efficiency and effectiveness of our operations. 

9 

I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a few of our key 

assets and describe how this technology furthers CBP’s capability 

to detect, identify, monitor, and appropriately respond to threats in 

our Nation’s borders. 

First, our multi-role enforcement aircraft are highly capable and 

equipped with sophisticated technology systems that enable it to be 

effective over both land and water. These aircraft are replacing several older single-mission assets and enhance CBP’s interdiction and 

investigative capabilities. 

Second, beyond our borders in the source and transit zone, CBP’s 

P–3 long-range aircraft has been instrumental in countering narcotic operations, transnational criminal organizations, and vessels 

thousands of miles from the homeland. I might mention, they have 

just completed a rewinging of 14 aircraft, a $410 million program 

which came in under cost and ahead of schedule. 

Third, in the maritime environment working in conjunction with 

the aviation assets, our new coastal interceptor vessels are physically designed and engineered with the speed maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and engage in a variety of suspect noncompliant vessels in offshore waters as well as the Great 

Lakes and on the Northern Border. 

Finally, a vital component of our doing awareness is the Intermarine Operations Center. IMOC leverages advanced surveillance 

systems, integrates information from Federal, State, local, international, law enforcement, and intelligence sources to detect, identify, track, and direct the interdiction of suspect criminal use of 

noncommercial air and maritime conveyances approaching, crossing, or operating inside the United States—operating inside the 

borders of United States and Puerto Rico. 

We work closely with our operation and acquisition colleagues at 

CBP, including the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to 

identify and develop surveillance and detection technology. AMO is 

also working with Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS to develop and test radiological and nuclear detection threats beyond— 

threats aboard our small vessels. 

Chairwoman McSally, and Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss AMO’s technology assets, capabilities, and efforts in securing our borders. I look forward to your questions in a few moments. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, General Alles. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Borkowski for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF 

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the committee. It is 

a pleasure to be back before you. 

As you suggested, Chairwoman McSally, it certainly has been a 

challenging few years, and I share your frustration with the delays. 

10 

The procurement system is very frustrating, I think, to all of us. 

I look forward to a discussion of that. 

When I was last here before you 2 years ago, we were just getting to the point where we were awarding contracts, and in many 

cases, there were 2 years of delays in getting to those contract 

awards. A number of reasons for that, some of it is cultural, some 

of it is structural, but that has been a continuing frustration. However, since that time, actually, the performance on these contracts 

has been relatively good. 

You cited the IFT, the Integrated Fixed Towers. As you may recall, that contract was awarded at a 75 percent cost savings compared to our original estimate and continues to perform consistently with that, and has performed pretty well against its schedule. 

The remote video surveillance system is the other large significant program in Arizona. That program also has clicked along 

with—it was awarded at a reduced cost compared to our estimate. 

We have already deployed 4 AORs, the fifth will be completed by 

this year, and it has performed well on its cost. 

The mobile surveillance capability is completely deployed to Arizona and is now extending its deployment outside of Arizona. That 

was awarded below its estimated cost and performed on cost. In addition, those systems have delivered on their performance. 

So I think one of the things I would say is that is as an acquisition person, I essentially have 4 degrees of freedom that I play 

with: Cost, schedule, performance, and risk. 

For the most part, I think we have not done well on schedule. 

I would have to acknowledge that. We have failed on schedule. We 

are trying to attack that. I am still looking for more ways to do 

that. But on the cost, schedule, and performance on these systems, 

I actually think we have done well once we got them going. 

So Arizona is well under way compared to the baseline. The next 

area of emphasis on the Southwest Border has been Texas. Because of the money we saved, we were actually able to free up resources to do what our—they started out as pilots with DOD reuse, 

Department of Defense reuse systems. I think the most visible of 

those are the tactical aerostats. We now have 6 flying in Texas. We 

are putting up 17 of the towers that are associated with those— 

with cameras and potentially radars in areas that, frankly, would 

not have had technology until probably 2018, 2019 because we 

were able to generate savings, and by working with the Department of Defense, we are able to get a little more speed in delivery. 

Having said that, though, that is not the long-term plan for 

Texas. The long-term plan for Texas has been remote video surveillance systems, mobile video surveillance systems. Those contracts 

are underway. The challenge in Texas has to do with environmental land clearances, land acquisition. Those are challenges. We 

are working through those, but that is an 18- to 24-month problem 

that we are working through. 

We have gotten tremendous support from Congress on funding 

for that. We are working our way through that. 

Sir, Congressman Vela, with respect to the mobile video surveillance systems, those are also, as you suggested, designated for 

Texas. They are very critical there. 

11 

The current contract will provide about 127 of those. The protest 

has been resolved in our favor. The contract is under way. We expect to deliver the first 4 of those toward the end of this year for 

testing, and then, over the next 2 years, deliver 127 that will be 

covered under the contract. 

So I think we have made some progress. Am I completely satisfied? No. We do have some work to do in terms of, how do we handle this very, very slow acquisition process? How do we improve 

that? I look forward to discussions on that. 

Having said that, I do think the programs that we have awarded 

have largely been successful once we have gotten over that procurement hump. I look forward to questions going forward. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Vitiello, Mr. Alles, and Mr. 

Borkowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD VITIELLO, RANDOLPH D. ‘‘TEX’’ ALLES, AND MARK

BORKOWSKI

MAY 24, 2016 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the 

committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today on behalf of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss the acquisition and deployment of border security technology between our Nation’s ports of entry (POE). 

Along the more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900 miles of border 

with Mexico, and approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline, CBP secures our borders 

and associated airspace and maritime approaches to prevent illegal entry of people 

and goods into the United States. The border environment in which CBP works is 

dynamic and requires continual adaptation to respond to emerging threats and 

changing conditions. We appreciate the partnership and support we have received 

from this committee, whose commitment to the security of the American people has 

enabled the continued deployment of advanced technology assets needed to secure 

the border. 

In the acquisition and deployment of border security technology, CBP ensures 

that investments are effective and that procurement processes are efficient, transparent, and compliant with Federal law and Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) policy. With all our programs, operations, and activities, we welcome oversight and embrace our responsibility as stewards of American taxpayer resources. 

When CBP was formed in 2003, it was an organization comprised of components 

that had different approaches, methods, and policies regarding acquisition and management activities. Although our operations had been integrated under one mission, 

CBP, and in a broader context DHS, lacked a standardized and unified acquisition 

structure, including governance and oversight, strong requirements development 

process, and centralized resource allocation. In order to strengthen and streamline 

acquisition management throughout the Department, Secretary Johnson launched 

the Unity of Effort initiative, which established a more collaborative process for decision making, including those that shape acquisition and resource allocation. 

A key element of the Unity of Effort initiative is the establishment of the Joint 

Requirements Council (JRC), designed to improve the quality and validity of the Department’s requirements generation and oversight process. The JRC creates a 

stronger focus earlier in the investment life cycle—at the requirements development 

stage—to better position DHS components, including CBP, to effectively and efficiently execute acquisition strategies and budgets that ultimately close capability 

gaps. 

As part of this initiative, CBP is the sponsoring component for DHS Joint Task 

Force West and a participating component in Joint Task Force East and Joint Task 

Force for Investigations. These Joint Task Forces are conducting the DHS Southern 

Border and Approaches Campaign Plan (SBAC), launched in early 2015, which put 

the assets and personnel of the Department to use in a combined and strategic way 

to collaboratively plan and execute multi-component DHS operations to better protect the border. Aimed at leveraging the range of unique Department roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, the Campaign enhances our operational capability to address comprehensive threat environments in a unified way. Together, the DHS 

Unity of Effort initiative and the Campaign will drive border security investments 

and direct DHS resources in a much more collaborative fashion to address the range 

12 

of threats and challenges, including illegal migration, smuggling of illegal drugs, 

human and arms trafficking, the illicit financing of such operations, and threat of 

terrorist exploitation of border vulnerabilities. 

Our testimony today will discuss CBP’s technology investments between the 

POEs, highlight some of CBP’s deployed border technology assets, and describe the 

agency’s path forward to ensure that CBP’s acquisition strategies and structure is 

in place to meet the challenge of a dynamic border threat environment. 

TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY

For CBP, the use of technology in the border environment is an invaluable force 

multiplier to increase situational awareness. Thanks to the support of Congress, 

CBP continues to deploy proven, effective technology to strengthen border security 

operations between the POEs—in the land, air, and maritime environments. With 

enhanced surveillance capabilities, CBP can improve its situational awareness remotely, direct a response team to the best interdiction location, and warn the team 

of any additional danger otherwise unknown along the way. As a result, these investments increase CBP’s visibility on the border, operational capabilities, and the 

safety of front-line law enforcement personnel. 

It is imperative that DHS and CBP promote operational agility by leveraging 

technological advances and innovative practices. A key element of CBP’s acquisition 

strategy, innovation is not simply the process of buying the newest technology; rather, it is the product of a collaborative culture that supports creativity, optimizes resource allocation and pursues the greatest return on investment and delivery of 

prioritized operational capabilities. 

This committee is familiar with the outcome of CBP’s SBInet program, an earlier 

component of the DHS Secure Border Initiative (SBI) that was designed as a comprehensive and integrated technology program to provide persistent surveillance 

across U.S. borders. The program experienced significant schedule delays and cost 

overruns because it did not allow necessary flexibility to adapt to differing needs 

in the various regions of the border. SBInet eventually delivered systems to 2 Areas 

of Responsibility (AORs) in Arizona that continue to operate successfully. Nevertheless, DHS cancelled SBInet on January 14, 2011, because it was too costly and the 

idea of one, all-encompassing program was unnecessarily complex for border technology. 

Since 2011, DHS and CBP have approached our border technology requirements, 

ranging from small to large, simple to complex, in more manageable pieces tailored 

to specific regions on the border. For example, CBP’s Arizona Technology Plan 

(ATP), which focuses on technology that specifically meets the needs of border conditions in Arizona, is the first of many phases in a multi-year effort to provide a costeffective mix of fixed and mobile technology across the Southwest Border. The ATP 

acquisition strategy leverages ‘‘non-developmental’’ technology to the greatest extent 

possible, providing more flexible, less risky, and less costly procurements and deployments. Using the non-developmental approach, most of the programs within the 

ATP are on contract and many systems have already been deployed. Although it is 

too early to declare complete success, the early indications of the acquisition strategy are quite positive and, in some cases, far exceed our expectations. 

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to border security technology acquisition. 

CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) works collaboratively 

with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) to develop requirements, test and evaluate technology, and deploy effective technology in 

support of CBP’s border security mission. 

Fixed, Persistent Surveillance 

Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems are one of the technologies that are in the 

process of being acquired and deployed to the Southwest Border in Arizona as part 

of the ATP. IFTs are fixed surveillance assets that provide long-range persistent 

surveillance. These systems cover very large areas and incorporate a Common Operating Picture (COP), a central hub that receives data from one or multiple tower 

units. The tower systems automatically detect and track items of interest, and provide the COP operator(s) with the data, video, and geospatial location of selected 

items of interest to identify and classify them. In February of this year, the USBP 

conditionally accepted the IFT system and is currently looking to develop improvements for the already-deployed system. 

Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) are another fixed technology asset 

used in select areas along the Southwest and Northern borders. These systems provide short-, medium-, and long-range persistent surveillance mounted on standalone towers, or other structures. The RVSS uses cameras, radio, and microwave 

13 

transmitters to send video to a control room and enables a control room operator 

to remotely detect, identify, classify, and track targets using the video feed. 

Without fixed-system technology such as IFT and RVSS, the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, identify, classify, and track illicit activity would be decreased. Fixed 

systems provide line-of-sight surveillance coverage to efficiently detect incursions in 

flat terrain. The Border Patrol integrates mobile and portable systems to address 

areas where rugged terrain and dense ground cover may allow adversaries to penetrate through blind spots or avoid the coverage areas of fixed systems. 

Mobile Capabilities 

The border environment between the ports of entry is dynamic. Working in conjunction with fixed surveillance assets, CBP’s mobile technology assets provide flexibility and agility to adapt to changing border conditions and threats. Mobile technologies are deployed in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas as well as several Northern Border locations. Along the Southwest Border, Mobile Surveillance 

Capability (MSC) systems provide long-range mobile surveillance and consist of a 

suite of radar and camera sensors mounted on Border Patrol vehicles. An agent deploys with the vehicle to operate the system, which automatically detects and tracks 

items of interest and provides the agent/operator with data and video of the observed subject. 

Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems (MVSS) provide short- and medium-range 

mobile surveillance equipment mounted on telescoping masts and consist of a suite 

of camera sensors mounted on Border Patrol vehicles. An agent deploys with the 

system, which detects, tracks, identifies, and classifies items of interest using the 

video feed. The agent/operator observes activity on the video monitor to detect intrusions and assist agents/officers in responding to those intrusions. 

Another system, which does not need to be mounted to a vehicle, is the Agent 

Portable Surveillance System (APSS). These systems provide medium-range mobile 

surveillance, and are transported by 2 or 3 agents and mounted on a tripod. Two 

agents remain on-site, one to operate the system, which automatically detects and 

tracks items of interest and provides the agent/operator with data and video of selected items of interest. 

In some areas along the Southwest Border, CBP also uses Unattended Ground 

Sensors (UGS), which provide short-range persistent surveillance. These sensors 

support our capability to detect, and to a limited extent, track, and identify subjects. 

Sensor capabilities include seismic, passive infrared, acoustic, contact closure, and 

magnetic, although these capabilities are not necessarily available in all deployed 

UGS. When a ground sensor is activated, an alarm is communicated to a data decoder that translates the sensor’s activation data to a centralized computer system 

in an operations center. Some UGS are used in conjunction with Imaging Sensors 

(IS). The UGS/IS include an imaging capability to transmit images or video back 

to the operations center. As with UGS, UGS/IS are monitored in a centralized system and geospatially tracked. 

CBP’s Tactical Aerostats and Re-locatable Towers program, originally part of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) Re-use program, uses a mix of aerostats, towers, cameras, and radars to provide Border Patrol with increased situational awareness 

through an advanced surveillance capability over a wide area. This capability has 

proven to be a vital asset in increasing CBP’s ability to detect, identify, classify, and 

track activity. 

The absence of mobile surveillance technology would limit the Border Patrol’s 

ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and rapidly respond to illicit activity. These 

technologies not only provide significant security benefits and multiply the capabilities of law enforcement personnel to detect, identify, and respond to suspicious activity, but they also assist with public safety along the border. Mobile surveillance 

technology systems enable agents to position the technology where it is needed at 

a specific moment, extend our observational capabilities, and increase the accuracy 

and speed of our response. 

Technology is critical to border security operations. A tailored blend of fixed, mobile, and portable surveillance systems that complement one another increases the 

Border Patrol’s effectiveness in targeting a response to high-risk areas, enabling 

rapid response strategies to maximize limited manpower, and adjusting to seasonal/ 

periodic traffic patterns. 

Air and Marine Capabilities 

AMO increases CBP’s situational awareness, enhances its detection and interdiction capabilities, and extends our border security zones, offering greater capacity to 

stop threats prior to reaching the Nation’s shores. Through the use of coordinated 

and integrated surveillance capabilities—including aviation, marine, tethered 

14 

aerostats, and integrated ground-based radars—AMO detects, interdicts, and prevents acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and 

other contraband toward or across the borders of the United States. These assets 

provide multi-domain awareness for our partners across the Department, as well as 

critical aerial and maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operational assistance to 

our ground personnel. 

AMO’s maritime assets are tailored to the conditions of the threat environment 

in which we operate, and equipped with the capabilities required to interdict attempted illicit smuggling of drugs and undocumented aliens. Often there is little 

time to interdict inbound suspect vessels and AMO has honed its maritime border 

security response capability around rapid and effective interception, pursuit, and 

interdiction of these craft. AMO employs high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels 

(CIV) that are specifically designed and engineered with the speed, maneuverability, 

integrity, and endurance to intercept and engage a variety of suspect non-compliant 

vessels in offshore waters, as well as the Great Lakes on the Northern Border. 

CBP’s aerial surveillance capabilities are enhanced through recent investments 

and deployments of Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA). The MEA has a multimode radar for use over water and land, an electro-optical/infrared camera system, 

and a satellite communications system. The MEA replaces several older, single-mission assets and remains the only asset customized to provide maritime support in 

the near-shore customs waters. With its sophisticated technology systems, the MEA 

is a highly capable, twin-engine aircraft and a critical investment in CBP’s maritime, land, and aerial surveillance capabilities. 

P–3 Long-Range Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft provide critical 

detection and interdiction capability in both the air and marine environment. Sophisticated sensors and high-endurance capability greatly increase CBP’s range to 

counter illicit trafficking. AMO P–3s are an integral part of the successful counternarcotic missions operating in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force— 

South. The P–3s patrol in a 42-million-square-mile area that includes more than 41 

nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches 

to the United States. In fiscal year 2015, CBP’s P–3s operational efforts led to the 

total seizure or disruption of more than 204,464 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value of $15.3 billion. 

Another important asset is the DHC–8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). It bridges 

the gap between the strategic P–3 and Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) assets and 

the smaller assets providing support in the littoral waters. This tool allows AMO 

an unprecedented level of situational awareness in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. 

AMO’s tactical resources have also received a number of technological upgrades 

to add to their utility. The AS–350 helicopter has received avionics upgrades to 

allow the operators to focus more of their attention on the mission, making them 

more effective. AMO has also added detection technology to its fixed-wing light observation aircraft, greatly increasing its tactical capabilities. 

Additionally, UAS are increasingly instrumental in CBP’s layered and integrated 

approach to border security. The UAS consists of an unmanned aircraft, sensors, 

communication packages, pilots, and ground control operators. UAS are used to 

meet surveillance and other mission requirements along the Southwest Border, 

Northern Border, Southeast coastal area, and in the drug source and transit zones. 

Four of CBP’s UAS are equipped with Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar 

(VADER) sensor systems, which are capable of detecting human movement along 

the ground and increase CBP aerial surveillance, enforcement, and security to prevent potential threats from illegally entering the United States. Since 2012, VADER 

has detected over 40,000 people moving across the Southwest Border. Since 2006, 

this versatile platform has been credited with interdicting/disrupting 13,144 pounds 

of cocaine and 321,330 pounds of marijuana worth an estimated $1.8 billion. The 

UAS program has achieved over 35,900 flight hours since program inception in fiscal year 2006. 

UAS and P–3 aircraft are equipped with technology that provides full-motion 

video capture and provides real-time and forensic analysis. This advanced detection 

and communication system enables CBP to disseminate images and other sensor 

data to operational users in real time, increasing response effectiveness and speed. 

Perhaps the most important advancements come in the area of data integration 

and exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system, allows AMO 

to provide a video feed and situational awareness to its law enforcement partners 

in real time. In addition, the Minotaur mission integration system will allow multiple aircraft to share information from multiple sources, providing a never-beforeseen level of air, land, and sea domain awareness. As the Minotaur system evolves, 

it will provide even greater awareness for a greater number of users. 

15 

1 AMOC partners include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Defense (including the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)), and the governments of Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas. 

AMO also combats airborne and maritime smuggling with an integrated longrange radar architecture comprised of ground-based radars and elevated radars deployed on tethered aerostats. AMO, in partnership with DOD, operates and maintains a large network of terrestrial radars to establish and maintain wide-area, persistent surveillance of commercial and non-commercial aircraft flying toward, arriving at, or passing through our borders. With the awareness generated by this sensor 

network, CBP can detect and respond to air and maritime movement anomalies that 

could pose a threat to our homeland, including trafficking organizations attempting 

to deliver contraband across the border by flying beneath the radar field of view of 

our ground-based radars. 

AMO’s Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) monitors the low-altitude approaches to the United States and denies this airspace for illicit smuggling. With 

8 aerostat sites—6 along the Southwest Border, 1 in the Florida Keys, and 1 in 

Puerto Rico—the TARS’ elevated sensor mitigates the effect of the curvature of the 

earth and terrain-masking limitations associated with ground-based radars, enabling maximum long-range radar detection capabilities. In fiscal years 2014 and 

2015 TARS recorded nearly 1,000 suspected cross-border attempts, approximately 

85 percent of all Southwest Border radar detections. 

A vital component of DHS’s domain awareness capabilities, CBP’s Air and Marine 

Operations Center (AMOC) integrates surveillance capabilities and coordinates with 

other CBP operational components, including the USBP, Federal, and international 

partners 1 to detect, identify, track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and 

maritime activity in the approaches to U.S. borders, at the borders, and within the 

interior of the United States. Coordinating with extensive law enforcement and intelligence databases and communication networks, AMOC’s command-and-control 

operational system, the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), 

provides a single display that is capable of processing up to 700 individual sensor 

feeds and tracking over 50,000 individual targets simultaneously. The 8 TARS sites 

represent approximately 2 percent of the total available radars in AMOSS, yet were 

able to account for detecting 53 percent of all suspect target detections. 

As we continue to deploy border surveillance technology, particularly along the 

Southwest Border, these investments in fixed and mobile technology, as well as enhancements of domain awareness capabilities provided by the AMOC allow CBP the 

flexibility to shift more officers and agents from detection duties to interdiction of 

illegal activities on our borders. 

CBP’S ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND REALIGNMENT

Since its establishment in 2010, OTIA has led CBP’s acquisition oversight and coordination efforts and has been recognized as the primary point of contact for CBP 

acquisition activities. While CBP’s intent was for all mission offices’ acquisition program management, requirement development, and oversight to be integrated and 

consolidated under OTIA, because of the broad scope of CBP’s mission and diversity 

of operating environments, the management of several of CBP’s large acquisition 

programs were not migrated to OTIA. However, in the past 5 years, OTIA has 

aligned CBP’s acquisition policies, procedures, and practices with DHS Department 

standards, consolidated CBP’s acquisition governance and accountability structure, 

brought multiple high-impact programs back on track, and has contracted, deployed 

and sustained critical border security technology assets. 

In 2015, as part of on-going headquarters realignment efforts, CBP Commissioner 

R. Gil Kerlikowske engaged the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to provide a 

review and recommendations of the state of CBP acquisition management. The key 

DAU alignment-related findings and recommendations included clarifying and 

strengthening the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) independent oversight 

authority on behalf of the Commissioner; separating OTIA’s key roles of oversight, 

requirements, and program management; and aligning programs and accountability 

with operational offices. To ensure that these recommended improvements are possible, and to ensure CBP’s acquisition construct aligns with the DHS acquisition 

oversight framework, CBP is in the process of redirecting acquisition, program, and 

requirements management responsibilities. 

This realignment is the next step forward in building off the achievements OTIA 

has made possible, including the standardization of acquisition policies, processes, 

and oversight and the development of acquisition expertise in the CBP workforce. 

The separation and redistribution of CBP’s acquisition functions—including requireVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
16 

ments development and program management—from OTIA to other areas within 

CBP’s operational structure, increases acquisition effectiveness and efficiency, and 

strengthens agency oversight of acquisition activities. CBP’s requirements function 

will be managed under the Operational Support (OS) division, where technical experts will work directly with front-line operators in the execution of a holistic, strategy-led requirements development program. The execution of acquisition programs 

will be aligned directly under CBP’s operational components—USBP, AMO, and the 

Office of Field Operations—to tighten the link between acquisition programs, users, 

and funding. Acquisition program oversight, policy and procedures promulgation, 

and acquisition workforce management—under the leadership of the Chief Acquisition Officer—will be part of CBP’s Enterprise Services (ES) division to create an 

even stronger alignment with the DHS acquisition framework. The realignment will 

result in stronger management much earlier in the acquisition investment life cycle, 

increased oversight, as well as better integration of CBP personnel and operational 

expertise. 

CBP works closely with other elements of DHS headquarters and fellow Department components to ensure strategy-led, operationally-informed requirements development. In coordination with the DHS joint requirements process, the USBP and 

AMO will continue to use the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) to conduct 

mission analysis and identify capability gaps. From this analysis, OS will work with 

USBP and AMO to identify and plan operational requirements over the short-, 

mid-, and long-term and to identify potential solutions, which may (or may not) include fencing, roads, or other solutions depending on the nature, scope, severity, and 

geographic location of a given capability gap. AMO began C–GAP in October 2015 

using best practices and lessons learned from the USBP process. The AMO process 

examines aviation and maritime mission spaces and capabilities, while taking advantage of the analytical models and processes the USBP has established. AMO and 

USBP gap analyses inform the OS-led requirements process and are prioritized and 

linked to Department activities and strategies. With all technology, CBP works 

closely with agents on the ground to develop operational requirements, conduct testing and evaluation, and obtain user feedback to ensure that the right tool is applied 

to the right capability gap. Terrain, threat, socio-economic, and political considerations vary greatly across sectors and regions, making a ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach 

ineffective. 

CBP works closely with the DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate to identify and develop technology to improve our surveillance and detection capabilities 

along our land and maritime borders. This includes investments in tunnel detection 

and tunnel activity monitoring technology; tactical communication upgrades, Small 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS); low-flying aircraft detection and tracking systems, land and maritime data integration/data fusion capabilities, and border surveillance tools tailored to the Southwest and Northern Border, including unattended 

ground sensors/tripwires, upgrades for mobile Surveillance Systems, slash camera 

poles, and wide-area surveillance. 

In addition to collaboration with our DHS partners, as part of CBP’s efforts to 

seek innovative ways to acquire and use technology, CBP formed a partnership with 

DOD to identify and reuse excess DOD technology. To date, CBP has acquired several types of technology, including thermal imaging equipment, night vision equipment, and tactical aerostat systems, which increase CBP’s situational awareness 

and operational flexibility in responding to border threats. We will continue to pursue additional opportunities to leverage DOD excess equipment. We will do this in 

a sustainable way by considering the full life-cycle costs of the DOD equipment we 

are considering before acquiring it. 

CONCLUSION

Technology is a primary driver of all land, maritime, and air domain awareness. 

The information obtained from fixed and mobile surveillance systems, ground sensors, imaging systems, and other advanced technologies enhances domain awareness, informs situational awareness, and better enables CBP to monitor, detect, 

identify, and appropriately respond to threats in the Nation’s border regions. 

As we look to sustain and recapitalize our border security technology assets, we 

will look to the DHS joint requirement process to validate our mission requirements 

and the strengthened DHS budget and acquisition processes to ensure we have the 

funding and sustainment to operate existing equipment to maximum capacity and 

that we receive new assets with the capabilities we require on time and on budget. 

While there is always more work to do, CBP has made significant strides to improve acquisition planning, management, and execution. These efforts have produced more effective governance and significant improvements to current and future 

17 

acquisitions. Going forward, CBP will work with its DHS management partners to 

improve oversight; develop and increase our acquisition workforce; and improve the 

quality, timeliness, and transparency of CBP contracting processes. 

Knit together by the DHS SBAC and the joint requirements processes, CBP’s acquisition and rapid deployment of technology allows us to achieve our strategic and 

operational objectives in effectively and efficiently securing U.S. borders and the approaches. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. We look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Borkowski. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gambler for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify at today’s hearing to discuss GAO’s work reviewing DHS’s efforts to acquire and deploy various technologies 

and other assets along U.S. borders. DHS has employed a variety 

of assets in its efforts to secure the Southwest Border, including 

various land-based surveillance technologies, unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, and tactical aerostats. 

My remarks today will summarize some of GAO’s past work on 

management and oversight of various surveillance technologies. I 

will also share some preliminary observations from our on-going 

work for this subcommittee reviewing CBP’s use of UAS and tactical aerostats. 

First, GAO has issued numerous reports on DHS’s efforts to plan 

for, deploy, and manage land-based surveillance technologies under 

the former Secure Border Initiative and the current Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan. 

CBP has made progress in deploying programs under the plan, 

including fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors, and these technologies have aided CBP’s 

border security efforts. However, we have also reported that CBP 

could do more to strengthen its management of the plan and technology programs and better assess the contributions of surveillance 

technologies to apprehensions and seizures. 

For example, CBP has previously experienced delays in some of 

its surveillance technology programs, and CBP’s planned dates for 

initial and full operational capability for the Integrated Fixed Towers, for example, have slipped by several years. 

We have previously reviewed CBP’s schedules and life-cycle cost 

estimates for the highest-cost programs under the plan, and compared them to best practices. Overall, the schedules and estimates 

for the plans programs reflected some, but not all best practices, 

and we found that CBP could take further action to better ensure 

the reliability of its schedules and cost estimates by more fully applying those best practices. 

CBP has taken steps towards addressing our recommendations 

in these areas, such as recently providing us with updated schedules for some of the planned programs, and we will be reviewing 

them going forward to determine the extent to which they address 

our recommendation. 

18 

Further, CBP has identified the mission benefits of its surveillance technologies such as improved situational awareness and 

agent safety. CBP has also begun requiring Border Patrol to record 

data within its database on whether or not an asset, such as a 

camera, assisted in apprehension or seizure. These are positive 

steps toward helping CBP assess the contributions of its surveillance technologies to border security. However, CBP needs to develop and implement performance measures and analyzing data it 

is now collecting to be able to fully assess the contributions of its 

technologies to border security. 

Second, with regard to UAS and tactical aerostats, based on our 

on-going work for the subcommittee, CBP is currently operating 9 

Predator B aircraft from 4 locations across the country. These aircraft may be equipped with video and radar sensors, and they are 

used for a variety of functions, including patrol missions to support 

Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies and to monitor 

natural disasters, like wildfires or floods. 

CBP operates the aircraft in designated airspace, and more than 

80 percent of flight hours from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 were associated with designated air space along border and coastal areas. 

CBP also operates 6 tactical aerostats along the border in South 

Texas, as Mr. Borkowski mentioned, and these aerostats assist 

Border Patrol in apprehension and seizures. 

CBP’s use of both UAS and tactical aerostat can be affected by 

various factors, such as airspace access and weather. 

In closing, we are continuing to examine CBP’s use of UAS, tactical aerostats, and other assets and technologies as part of our ongoing work. We will also continue to follow up on actions taken by 

CBP in response to our recommendations for improving management and measurement of technologies deployed under the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan, 

This concludes my oral statement, and I am happy to answer any 

questions Members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER

MAY 24, 2016 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–16–671T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

CBP employs surveillance technologies, UAS, and other assets to help secure the 

border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes 7 acquisition programs related to fixed and 

mobile surveillance systems, among other assets. CBP has also deployed UAS, including Predator B aircraft, as well as tactical aerostats to help secure the border. 

In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of CBP border security programs 

and operations. 

This statement addresses: (1) GAO findings on DHS’s efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and (2) preliminary observations related 

to GAO’s on-going work on CBP’s use of UAS and tactical aerostats for border security. This statement is based on GAO products issued from November 2011 through 

April 2016, along with selected updates conducted in May 2016. For on-going work 

related to UAS, GAO reviewed CBP documents and analyzed Predator B flight-hour 

data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the time period when all Predator B centers became operational. GAO also conducted site visits in Texas and Arizona to 

19 

1Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the 

United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, 

or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers and 

merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect persons 

applying for admission into the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law. 

view operation of Predator B aircraft and tactical aerostats and interviewed CBP 

officials responsible for these operations. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to improve its management 

of plans and programs for surveillance technologies and DHS generally agreed. 

BORDER SECURITY.—DHS SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

AND OTHER ASSETS

What GAO Found 

GAO reported in March 2014 and April 2015 that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had made 

progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan (the Plan), but could take additional actions to strengthen its management of 

the Plan and its related programs. Specifically, in March 2014 GAO reported that 

CBP’s schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its 3 highest-cost programs—which represented 97 percent of the Plan’s total estimated cost—met some 

but not all best practices. GAO recommended that CBP ensure that its schedules 

and cost estimates more fully address best practices, such as validating cost estimates with independent estimates, and DHS concurred. As of May 2016, CBP has 

initiated or completed deployment of technology for each of the 3 highest-cost programs under the Plan, and reported updating some program schedules and cost estimates. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided GAO with complete schedules for 

2 of the programs, and GAO will be reviewing them to determine the extent to 

which they address GAO’s recommendation. GAO also reported in March 2014 that 

CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness, but had not developed key attributes for performance 

metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended in November 2011. As of May 

2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics 

for deployed technologies and expected to complete its development of baselines for 

measures by the end of 2015. In March 2016, GAO reported that CBP was adjusting 

the completion date to incorporate pending test and evaluation results for recentlydeployed technologies under the Plan. 

GAO’s on-going work on CBP’s use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for border 

security shows that CBP operates 9 Predator B aircraft in U.S. airspace in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. Specifically, CBP’s 

Air and Marine Operations operates the aircraft in accordance with FAA certificates 

of waiver or authorization for a variety of activities, such as training flights and patrol missions to support the U.S. Border Patrol’s (Border Patrol) efforts to detect and 

apprehend individuals illegally crossing into the United States between ports of 

entry. Predator B aircraft are currently equipped with a combination of video and 

radar sensors that provide information on cross-border illegal activities to supported 

agencies. CBP data show that over 80 percent of Predator B flight hours were in 

airspace encompassing border and coastal areas from fiscal years 2011 through 

2015. CBP officials stated that airspace access and hazardous weather can affect 

CBP’s ability to utilize Predator B aircraft for border security activities. GAO’s ongoing work shows that CBP has deployed 6 tactical aerostats—relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with cameras for capturing full-motion video—along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support 

Border Patrol. CBP operates 3 types of tactical aerostats, which vary in size and 

altitude of operation. CBP officials reported that airspace access, hazardous weather, and real estate (e.g., access to private property) can affect CBP’s ability to deploy 

and utilize tactical aerostats. Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical aerostats to its mission activities. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy various technology and assets to secure U.S. 

borders. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing 

the National borders between U.S. ports of entry (POE).1 CBP’s Air and Marine Operations (AMO) has primary responsibility for detecting, interdicting, and preventing acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and 

20 

2These apprehensions were reported by CBP for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 in the Tucson, 

Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sectors. 3These seizures of marijuana and cocaine (in pounds) were reported by CBP for fiscal years 

2013 through 2015 in the Tucson, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sectors. 4 CBP uses the term ‘‘unmanned aircraft systems’’ for these assets. A UAS is composed of a 

remotely piloted aircraft, a ground control station, a digital network, and other ground support 

equipment and personnel required to operate and maintain the system. 

other contraband toward or across U.S. borders utilizing aviation and maritime assets. In the last 3 fiscal years, over 70 percent of all annual apprehensions of illegal 

entrants by Border Patrol have occurred along the Arizona and south Texas borders.2 Seizures of marijuana and cocaine (in pounds) along the Arizona and south 

Texas borders reported by Border Patrol, as a percentage of all annual seizures, has 

ranged between 88 to 91 and 24 to 55 percent over the last 3 years, respectively.3

DHS has employed a variety of technology and assets to assist with its efforts to 

secure the border. For example, in November 2005, DHS announced the launch of 

the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program, which was responsible for developing 

a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as the Secure 

Border Initiative Network (SBInet). In January 2011, in response to internal and 

external assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, cost, and 

schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems. After the cancellation of SBInet, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan 

(the Plan), in January 2011, which includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras 

to help provide security for the Arizona border to support Border Patrol. Additionally, AMO operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of Federal border 

security efforts, including surveillance through Predator B unmanned aerial systems 

(UAS).4 CBP also operates tactical aerostats along the border, which are relocatable 

unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with surveillance 

technologies. 

Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS faces in 

implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses our findings on: (1) 

DHS’s efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and 

(2) preliminary observations related to our on-going work for this subcommittee on 

the use of UAS and tactical aerostats for border security. 

This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 2011 through 

April 2016 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border. It also includes 

selected updates we conducted in May 2016 on DHS’s efforts to address our previous 

recommendations related to its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Our 

reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from various DHS components. More detailed information about our scope 

and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the updates on 

our Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan work, we reviewed documents 

from DHS on actions it has taken to address findings and recommendations made 

in our prior reports on which this statement is based. 

For on-going work related to UAS, we analyzed CBP policies, reports, requirements, and Predator B flight-hour data from fiscal year 2011 through 2015, covering 

the time period when all Predator B centers became operational. We also interviewed CBP officials responsible for Predator B and tactical aerostat operations. To 

assess the reliability of Predator B flight hour data, we reviewed guidance for reporting flight hours, interviewed CBP officials about their policies and procedures 

related to tracking flight hours, and compared monthly report data with data from 

other CBP flight hour reports. We found the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of reporting how CBP allocates its Predator B flight hours. As part of our 

on-going work, we also conducted site visits to Arizona in February 2016 and south 

Texas in March 2016 where we observed Predator B and tactical aerostat operations 

and interviewed CBP officials that operate and utilize these assets. 

We conducted our past and on-going work in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 

the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. 

21 

5GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen 

Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO–14–368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014), and Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO–15–171SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2015). 6The Plan’s 7 acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Its 3 highest-cost programs, which represent 97 percent of the 

Plan’s estimated cost are the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System 

(RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC). The IFT consists of towers with, among 

other things, ground surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is, 

stationary) towers. The RVSS includes multiple color and infrared cameras mounted on 

monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings and differs from the IFT in, among other things, the 

RVSS does not include radars. The MSC is a stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and 

cameras that provides a display within the cab of the truck. 7The baseline schedule is to represent the original configuration of the program plan and to 

signify the consensus of all stakeholders regarding the required sequence of events, resource assignments, and acceptable dates for key deliverables. The current schedule is to represent the 

actual plan to date. 8GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution 

and Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO–16–338SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016). 9 Initial operational capability is defined as the deployment of 7 IFT systems in the area of 

responsibility for the Nogales Border Patrol station. Full operational capability is defined as deployment of the IFT system in the additional areas of responsibility of the Sonoita, Douglas, 

Ajo, Casa Grande, and Wellton Border Patrol stations. 

CBP HAS MADE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE

TECHNOLOGY PLAN, BUT COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT OF THE PLAN

CBP Has Initiated or Completed Deployment of Technologies Under the Plan and 

Has Taken Actions To Update Program Schedules and Cost Estimates 

In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that 

CBP could take additional action to strengthen its management of the Plan and the 

Plan’s programs.5 As of May 2016, CBP has initiated or completed deployment of 

technology to Arizona for each of the programs under the Plan.6 Additionally, as discussed further below, CBP has reported taking steps to update program schedules 

and life-cycle cost estimates for the 3 highest-cost programs under the Plan. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided us with complete schedules for 2 of the programs, and we will be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address our recommendation. 

In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule for deployment of each of the 

Plan’s 7 programs, and that 4 of the programs would not meet their originallyplanned completion dates. We also found that some of the programs had experienced 

delays relative to their baseline schedules, as of March 2013.7 Further, in our March 

2016 assessment of DHS’s major acquisitions programs,8 we reported on the status 

of the Plan’s Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program, noting that from March 2012 

to January 2016, the program’s initial and full operational capability dates had 

slipped.9 Specifically, we reported that the initial operational capability date had 

slipped from the end of September 2013 to the end of September 2015, and the full 

operational capability to the end of September 2020. We also reported that this slippage in initial operational capability dates had contributed to slippage in the IFT’s 

full operational capability—primarily as a result of funding shortfalls—and that the 

IFT program continued to face significant funding shortfalls from fiscal year 2016 

to fiscal year 2020. 

Despite these delays, as of May 2016 CBP reported that it has initiated or completed deployment of technology to Arizona for each of the 3 highest-cost programs 

under the plan—IFT, the Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and the Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC). Specifically, CBP officials stated that MSC deployments in Arizona are complete and that in April 2016, requirements to transition sustainment from the contractor to CBP had been finalized. CBP also reported 

that the RVSS system has been deployed, and testing on these systems is on-going 

in 4 out of 5 stations. Further, CBP reported it had initiated deployment of the IFT 

systems and as of May 2016 has deployed 7 out of 53 IFTs in one area of responsibility. CBP conditionally accepted the system in March 2016 and is working to deploy the remaining IFT unit systems to other areas in the Tucson sector. 

With regard to schedules, we previously reported that CBP had at least partially 

met the 4 characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS schedules and 

partially or minimally met the 4 characteristics for the MSC schedule. Scheduling 

best practices are summarized into 4 characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically 

22 

10GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO–16–89G 

(Washington, DC: Dec. 2015). We developed this guide through a compilation of best practices 

that Federal agencies and industry use. According to this guide, for a schedule to be comprehensive, among other things, the schedule should: (1) Capture all activities, as defined in the work 

breakdown structure; (2) reflect what resources are needed to do the work; and (3) establish the 

duration of all activities and have specific start and end dates. To be well-constructed, among 

other things, a schedule should have all of its activities sequenced in the order that they are 

to be implemented with the most straightforward logic possible. To be credible, the schedule 

should reflect the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or outcomes, and 

activities in varying levels of the schedule map to one another. Moreover, a schedule risk analysis should be conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program’s completion 

date. For a schedule to be controlled, the schedule should be updated periodically using actual 

progress and logic to realistically forecast dates for program activities, and a baseline schedule 

should be maintained to measure, monitor, and report the program’s progress. 11GAO–14–368. 

updated and progress is monitored).10 We assessed CBP’s schedules as of March 

2013 for the 3 highest-cost programs and reported in March 2014 that schedules for 

2 of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half 

of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each 

characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion).11 For example, the 

schedule for the IFT program partially met the characteristic of being credible in 

that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis did not include the risks most likely to delay the project or how much contingency reserve was needed. For the MSC program, the schedule minimally met the 

characteristic of being controlled in that it did not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP could track progress. We recommended that 

CBP ensure that scheduling best practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC 

schedules. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP planned 

to ensure that scheduling best practices would be applied, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide, when updating the 3 programs’ schedules. In May 2016, CBP 

provided us with complete schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs, and we will 

be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address our recommendation. 

In March 2014, we also found that CBP had not developed an Integrated Master 

Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best practices. Rather, CBP had used separate schedules for each program to manage implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated that the Plan contains individual acquisition programs rather than integrated programs. However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP 

with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border 

with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs. According to scheduling 

best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is a critical management tool for complex systems that involve a number of different projects, such as the Plan, to allow 

managers to monitor all work activities, how long activities will take, and how the 

activities are related to one another. We concluded that developing and maintaining 

an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better understand how schedule changes in each 

individual program could affect implementation of the overall plan. 

We recommended that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan. 

CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained that an Integrated 

Master Schedule for the Plan in one file undermines the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the Plan, and that the implementation of this recommendation would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively create an aggregated ‘‘system of systems.’’ DHS further stated 

that a key element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of technology procurements. However, as we noted in the 2014 report, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used 

along the Arizona border with Mexico. Moreover, while the programs themselves 

may be independent of one another, the Plan’s resources are being shared among 

the programs. We continue to believe that developing an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan is needed. Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could allow CBP insight into current or programmed allocation of 

resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each program individually. 

In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimates for the 

Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices. Cost-estimating best practices are 

summarized into 4 characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and 

credible. Our analysis of CBP’s estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at 

the time of our review for the 2 highest-cost programs—the IFT and RVSS proVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
23 

12GAO, 2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO–15–404SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 14, 

2015). 13See GAO–14–368, and Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans 

and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO–12–22 (Washington, DC: Nov. 4, 2011). 

grams—showed that these estimates at least partially met 3 of these characteristics: 

Well-documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent cost estimates in accordance with 

best practices. We concluded that ensuring that scheduling best practices were applied to the programs’ schedules and verifying life-cycle cost estimates with independent estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the schedules and estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost estimates for the 

IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this recommendation, but stated then that it did not 

believe that there would be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost 

estimates and that if the costs realized to date continued to hold, there may be no 

requirement or value added in conducting full-blown updates with independent cost 

estimates. 

We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify the life-cycle cost 

estimates with the benefits to be gained from verification with independent cost estimates. CBP officials stated that in fiscal year 2016, DHS’s Cost Analysis Division 

would begin piloting DHS’s independent cost estimate capability on the RVSS program. According to CBP officials, this pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS in developing its independent cost estimate capability and that CBP selected the RVSS program for the pilot because the program is at a point in its planning and execution 

process where it can benefit most from having an independent cost estimate performed as these technologies are being deployed along the Southwest Border, beyond 

Arizona. CBP officials stated that details for an estimated independent cost estimate 

schedule and analysis plan for the RVSS program have not been finalized. CBP 

plans to provide an update on the schedule and analysis plan as additional details 

become available, and provide information on the final reconciliation of the independent cost estimate and the RVSS program cost estimate once the pilot has been 

completed at the end of fiscal year 2017. Further, CBP officials have not detailed 

similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe that independently verifying the 

life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability 

of the estimates.12

CBP Has Made Progress Toward Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies 

We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational 

awareness and agent safety. However the agency had not developed key attributes 

for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed as part of 

the Plan, as we recommended in November 2011.13 Further, in March 2014, we 

found that CBP did not capture complete data on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the impact of CBP’s surveillance technologies 

on CBP’s border security efforts, and inform resource allocation decisions. Although 

CBP had a field within its Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether 

technological assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and nontechnological assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other contraband, according to CBP officials, Border 

Patrol Agents were not required to record these data. This limited CBP’s ability to 

collect, track, and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol 

apprehensions and seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. We recommended that CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within 

its database, and once these data were required to be recorded and tracked, that 

it analyze available data on apprehensions and technological assists—in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate—to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. 

CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. Specifically, in June 2014, CBP issued guidance informing Border Patrol Agents that 

the asset assist data field within its database was now a mandatory data field. 

24 

14GAO–15–404SP. 15 AMO’s NASOCs perform specialized missions Nation-wide and in the Caribbean, eastern 

Pacific, and Central America, using Predator B, long-range patrol aircraft, and other aircraft. 

From 2010 to 2013, AMO operated a NASOC in Cape Canaveral, Florida, for UAS operations. 

Agents are required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other equipment before proceeding. 

Further, as of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for 

performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan. However, 

CBP officials stated that this set of performance metrics was under review as the 

agency continued to refine the key attributes for metrics to assess the contributions 

and impacts of surveillance technology on its border security mission.14 In our 

March 2016 update on the progress made by agencies to address our findings on 

duplication and cost savings across the Federal Government, we reported that CBP 

had modified its time frame for developing baselines for each performance measure 

and that additional time would be needed to implement and apply key attributes 

for metrics. According to CBP officials, CBP expected these performance measure 

baselines to be developed by the end of calendar year 2015, at which time the agency planned to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP 

planned to use the baseline data to establish a tool that explains the qualitative and 

quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the border environment by the end of fiscal year 2016. 

While CBP had expected to complete its development of baselines for each performance measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of March 2016 the actual completion is being adjusted pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies on the Southwest Border. Until CBP completes its efforts to fully develop 

and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed 

under the Plan, it will not be well-positioned to fully assess its progress in implementing the Plan and determining when mission benefits have been fully realized. 

CBP UTILIZES UNMANNED PREDATOR B AIRCRAFT AND TACTICAL AEROSTATS FOR A

VARIETY OF BORDER SECURITY ACTIVITIES

Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Predator B Aircraft 

Our on-going work shows that as of May 2016, CBP operates 9 Predator B from 

4 AMO National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) located in Sierra Vista, 

Arizona; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Jacksonville, Florida.15 Three Predator B aircraft are assigned to the NASOCs in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas while the NASOC in Florida remotely operates Predator B aircraft 

launched from the other NASOCs. AMO began operation of Predator B aircraft in 

fiscal year 2006, and all 4 NASOCs became operational in fiscal year 2011. See figure 1 for a photograph of a CBP Predator B aircraft. 

25 

16Predator B sensors include: Electro-optical and infrared camera that collects full-motion 

video, Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) which collects radar images of moving 

objects, synthetic-aperture radar that collects radar images that show terrain and structures 

and allow for analysis to detect change over time, and SeaVue radar which collects radar images 

of maritime vessels. 17See Federal Aviation Administration, Notice N JO 7210.889: Unmanned Aircraft Operations 

in the National Airspace System (Oct. 27, 2015). The National Airspace System is the network 

of United States airspace that includes the interconnected and interdependent network of systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft, and people. 

CBP’s Predator B aircraft may be equipped with video and radar sensors utilized 

primarily to support the operations of other CBP components, and Federal, State, 

and local law enforcement agencies.16 CBP’s Predator B operations in support of its 

components and other law enforcement agencies include patrol missions to detect 

the illegal entry of goods and people at and between U.S. POEs and investigative 

missions to provide aerial support for law enforcement activities and investigations. 

For example, CBP’s Predator B video and radar sensors support Border Patrol activities to identify and apprehend individuals entering the United States between 

POEs. CBP collects and tracks information on the number of assists provided for 

apprehensions of individuals and seizures of contraband, including narcotics, in support of law enforcement operations by Predator B aircraft. In addition, CBP’s Predator B aircraft have been deployed to provide aerial support for monitoring natural 

disasters such as wildfires and floods. For example, CBP’s Predator B were deployed 

in 2010 and 2011 to support Federal, State, and local Government agencies in response to flooding in the Red River Valley area of North Dakota. 

CBP’s Predator B aircraft operate in the U.S. National airspace system in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements for authorizing all 

UAS operations in the National Airspace System.17 In accordance with FAA requirements, all Predator B flights must comply with a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA). The COA-designated airspace establishes operational corridors for Predator B activity both along and within 100 miles of the border for the Northern Border, and along and within 25 to 60 miles of the border for the Southern Border, exclusive of urban areas. COAs issued by FAA to CBP also include airspace for training missions which involve take-offs and landings around a designated NASOC and 

transit missions to move Predator B aircraft between NASOCs. As of May 2016, 


h:\seals\114721.eps
26 

18See 14 C.F.R. pt. 101. These rules govern operation in the United States of, among other 

things, any balloon that is moored to the surface of the earth or an object thereon and that has 

a diameter of more than 6 feet or a gas capacity of more than 115 cubic feet. Id. at § 101.1(a)(1). 

CBP has utilized the NASOC in North Dakota as a location to train new and existing CBP Predator B pilots. For our on-going work, we analyzed CBP data on reported Predator B COA-designated flight hours from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 and 

found that 81 percent of flight hours were associated with COA-designated airspace 

along border and coastal areas. For more information on Predator B flight hours in 

COA-designated airspace, see figure 2. 

Based on our on-going work, we found that airspace access and weather can impact CBP’s ability to utilize Predator B aircraft. According to CBP officials we spoke 

with in Arizona, Predator B flights may be excluded from restricted airspace managed by the Department of Defense along border areas which can affect the ability 

of Predator B to support Border Patrol. CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona and 

Texas told us that Predator B missions are affected by hazardous weather conditions that can affect their ability to operate the aircraft. According to CBP officials 

we spoke with in Texas, CBP took steps to mitigate the impact of hazardous weather in January and February 2016 by deploying one Predator B aircraft from Corpus 

Christi, Texas, to San Angelo, Texas, at San Angelo Regional Airport which had favorable weather conditions. CBP’s deployment of a Predator B at San Angelo Regional Airport was in accordance with a FAA-issued COA to conduct its border security mission in Texas and lasted approximately 3 weeks. We plan to evaluate how 

these factors affect CBP’s utilization of Predator B aircraft as part of our on-going 

work. 

Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Tactical Aerostats in South Texas 

Our on-going work shows that as of May 2016, CBP has deployed 6 tactical 

aerostats along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support Border Patrol. 

Specifically, CBP deployed 5 tactical aerostats in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley 

sector and 1 tactical aerostat In Laredo sector. CBP utilizes 3 types of tactical 

aerostats equipped with cameras for capturing full-motion video: Persistent Threat 

Detection System (PTDS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), and 

Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID). Each type of tactical aerostat varies in 

size and altitude of operation. See figure 3 for a photograph of a RAID aerostat. 

CBP owns the RAID aerostats and leases PTDS and PGSS aerostats through the 

Department of Defense. CBP operates its tactical aerostats in accordance with FAA 

regulations through the issuance of a COA.18


h:\seals\114722.eps
27 

Tactical aerostats were first deployed and evaluated by CBP in August 2012 in 

south Texas. CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition manages aerostat technology and the operation of each site through contracts, while Border Patrol 

Agents operate tactical aerostat cameras and provide security at each site. As of 

May 2016, Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical 

aerostats to its mission activities. Specifically, agents track and record the number 

of assists aerostats provide for apprehensions of individuals and seizures of contraband and narcotics. 

Based on our on-going work, we found that airspace access, weather, and real estate can impact CBP’s ability to deploy and utilize tactical aerostats in south Texas. • Airspace access.—Aerostat site placement is subject to FAA approval to ensure 

the aerostat does not converge on dedicated flight paths. • Weather.—Aerostat flight is subject to weather restrictions, such as hazardous 

weather involving high winds or storms. • Real estate.—Aerostat sites utilized by CBP involve access to private property 

and land owner acceptance, and right of entry is required prior for placement. 

In addition, CBP must take into consideration any relevant environmental and 

wildlife impacts prior to deployment of a tactical aerostat, such as flood zones, 

endangered species, migratory animals, among others. 

We plan to evaluate how these factors affect CBP’s utilization of tactical aerostats 

as part of our on-going work. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, Ms. Gambler. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

I want to start off with Ms. Gambler. Are you familiar with our 

Border Security Technology Accountability Act? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I am, yes, Chairwoman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Can you share, from your perspective and your expertise, and whether that is going to assist in any of the challenges 

that you have raised in the past and continue to be issues? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Absolutely. That bill is very consistent with the 

findings and messages from GAO’s prior work looking at CBP’s efforts to deploy surveillance technologies. For example, the bill calls 

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lines in place, that the programs are monitored according to cost 

schedule and performance, and those address a number of the key 

findings that we have had related to CBP’s technology programs. 

I might also add that it is reflective of leading practices and best 

practices for acquisition management. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

I just want to say, again, this has unanimously passed in the 

House. It is being held up in the Senate. It was reported out of 

committee. I mean, we are hearing, you know, rumors that it is 

being held up because our colleagues don’t want us to have a win 

on any border security issue. I hope from, just your comments 

today and looking at the bill, that they would realize that this is 

a win for the taxpayers; this is a win for our improvement and 

processes for it being able to secure our border, and I hope we can 

get past the partisan bickering, and actually move this thing forward so we can put it into force. 

Okay. Next question I want to ask, really, Chief Vitiello, General 

Alles, Mr. Borkowski. As I opened up, I mentioned, I think, some 

of the initiatives you are doing are increasing a good common operational picture and providing good information that might be good 

for intelligence assessment to understand, kind-of, you know, 

where the cartels are operating. But if we are not getting it into 

the agent’s hand, if they are not getting the information that the 

people back in the operation center have, then, you know, we still 

have more steps to make, right? So that they can, not have information overload, but actually have the best situation awareness 

possible. 

So of the technologies mentioned, or maybe some that are under 

development, which ones are actually in the hands of the agents 

that are out there intercepting the activity, or are they getting information over a radio? I want to—I just want to have a sense of, 

like, where they are in getting that information and what other initiatives might be in the pipeline in order to improve situation 

awareness for the agents that are out there? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Thanks for that question. 

A lot of what the agents, and what we have invested in, and 

what we have been able to take from the DOD reuse, are association with the Department of Defense to take some of their excess 

material and equipment and put that in the hands of agents. So, 

obviously, the things that they use, the terminal binoculars, the 

long-range assistance to their vision, those are all hand-held. Some 

of those are truck-mounted, so those are all in the hands of the 

agents. So the agents that are operating that equipment can, in 

real time, inform response teams that are deployed with them in 

close proximity, the towers, the cameras, the RVSS. There is a 

combination of some of that being deployed at the sector level. So 

there is a command center in Tucson where the sector is, and that 

activity is then dispatched for response in that location. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But is that by voice? That is what I am trying to 

get at. You might have a ground sensor; you have got a predator 

flying; you have got the information from the IFTs. We have perfect situational awareness in the command center. Again, I have 

been there in the military, where you understate exactly where the 

traffic is, but then you are telling the poor guy, poor gal on the run 

29 

on a radio, like, here is what is happening. Are there tools that is 

actually getting that situation awareness to the agent that is not 

just a voice call? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Yes. So it is via voice, but there are precise measurements being taken by the hits that the sensors get on the aircraft. Our own towers, our own sensors are deployed. All of that 

material and those sensors are geo-referenced, and the agents are 

getting precise details about where that activity is occurring, and 

then the classification, you know, what kind of threat do they face, 

how big are the groups, et cetera, that does go over voice to them. 

But they are deployed in that same proximity as well. 

So there is a balance that has to be struck in terms of how much 

goes over the air and how much they get in their—in their hands 

as far as using tablets and all those kinds of things. We are doing 

some experiments about getting the information closer to them as 

it is occurring. There is also an information stream that they need 

to be aware of. Right? So when the classification comes through, 

that they prioritize the threat information versus just activity writ 

large. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

Is there anything, Mr. Borkowski, in the works? Again, when I 

was flying my A–10, I am actually talking to guys on the ground 

that are seeing what I am seeing, my targeting pod, so their situational awareness increased. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We are clearly, as you suggest, getting kind-of, 

demand for, give me blue force tracking, give me the picture that 

the camera is showing. We don’t have that today. There are a couple of reasons. One is we don’t have the infrastructure to send it. 

So that is one of the things we are struggling with. 

Having said that, both with DHS and with DOD, which has some 

of these technologies, our agents have been exposed and are piloting those things. I still have to figure out how to get the pipe, you 

know, to send it. But we are creating a demand from that. We are 

looking at technologies that DOD has. We have a project with DHS 

and border security awareness, which will look at this question. We 

have to handle the pipeline. 

One other thing I would add is, one of the things that broke 

badly on SBInet was there was a tremendous investment in this 

particular question that was not tightly defined. We actually had 

to pull away from that in order to build the hardware. Now that 

we have the hardware, we believe we are starting to get a tighter 

definition. But you are right. We need to crack that. There are a 

couple things that are really in the way. The biggest one that bothers me is the bandwidth to get the signal across. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. Okay. Thank you. 

All right, we are going to do a couple of rounds here, but I wanted to give opportunity for others, including the Ranking Member 

of the full committee. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Ranking Member. 

Some of us have been around a little while, and we have seen 

procurements come and go. I guess I will ask Ms. Gambler: Your 

review of the systems, can you share with the committee your analVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
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ysis of whether or not we are getting better at procurements? Or 

we are about where we have been all the time? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I think in this area, as it relates to border security, I think there has been some progress made, even relative to 

what we reported on 2 years ago as it relates to technologies under 

the Arizona Surveillance Technology Plan. 

CBP has been updating their schedules for some of the programs. 

They—what is called rebaselined the IFT program late last year. 

They are working on piloting an independent cost estimate for the 

RVSS program. So I think in certain areas, Ranking Member 

Thompson, they have made progress. I think there are still some 

key areas where we would like to see some additional progress, including for them to be able to assess what they are getting out of 

the systems. We are also, as we are starting some new work in 

these areas interested to see the results of some of the testing 

that’s been done on the systems that has been recently deployed. 

So that is still, I think, an open question for us. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. I would—Mr. Borkowski, were you 

around with SBInet? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. I was brought in to try to clean up SBInet, 

but yes, I was around for—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you know where I am going, right? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I have a suspicion, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you tell me if your clean-up has been complete? Can you give the committee assurance that the missteps 

made with SBInet won’t be made again? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, I could never assure you that we would 

never make another misstep. I can tell you that the odds of such 

a misstep are much lower, the risk of such a misstep is much lower 

than it was. 

We learned a lot from SBInet, and you know, we accommodated 

as much of that lesson as we could into this process. Having said 

that, we are still in the process of training people to be skilled acquisition program managers. They are getting better, but we are 

still in the process of training people. 

We are still—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. How much of a reliance—excuse me. Are we relying on outside contractors to do that? Have we been able to pull 

that capacity within the organization? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We do have contractors supporting us, but we 

have built organic, you know, Government employee skills that 

probably did not exist 4 years ago. 

So we do have program managers who are skilled. I wish I had 

more of them. I think that is part of the challenge is having enough 

people to meet all of the demands. So we have a mix of contractors, 

but in the past, we were much more reliant on those contractors 

to augment our own lack of skills. We have spent a great deal of 

time, both in CBP and in DHS in building up the Government employee workforce skills. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So is building up the Government workforce capacity an issue of you not being able to find the people, or you don’t 

have the money if you found them, to employ them? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I think it is both. But there are people out 

there. The money is a challenge. We compete, obviously, for Border 

31 

Patrol Agents, CBP Officers, and frankly, if you had to ask what 

the priority is, I think it is Border Patrol Agents and CBP Officers. 

So we compete. We come after that, as I think we should. Money 

is an issue. There is also the hiring process is very long for a whole 

variety of reasons. 

So when we do identify people, sometimes it is very difficult for 

them to wait out the hiring process. So there are those kinds of 

issues as well. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So how long does it take to hire somebody? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. It can take a year-plus in some cases, depending 

on where—you know, how many people are in the queue. We are 

talking about Border Patrol Agents, CBP Officers, our own mission 

support people. We have background investigations. There are a 

whole bunch of people who are competing for the resources to do 

background investigations, so it could be months, and go to a year. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Have you highlighted your lack of being able to 

get people in a reasonable period of time as one of the weaknesses 

in the operation? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I think as CBP corporately has spent a great 

deal of time on that question and issue about being able to hire 

people. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam Chair, I think at some point, we might 

order from a human resources standpoint look at it, because all of 

us running the people all the time who are very qualified, who 

want to work for the Government—— 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON [continuing]. But if you tell them it takes a year, 

something like that, we ought to be able to come up with a better 

way of vetting people and getting them into the system. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I agree. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I guess the last point is, it costs more to have 

outside contractors, right? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Not always, sir. It is actually a case-by-case, so 

not always. But I believe it is—if I had my druthers, I would have 

kind of a 2–1 ratio, Government-to-outside contractors, and right 

now I am about 50–50. There are some skills that are very difficult 

to get, frankly, at Government salaries, but it depends. It is not always cheaper to have Government than contractors. It depends on 

case-by-case. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you wanted two-thirds or one-third? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. My sense is that would be about ideal. The reason for that is I want the capacity to, first of all have, surge, right? 

Government employees are good, steady state. I want to be able to 

surge, and contractor employees are very good for that. 

The other reason that I think contractors sometimes help is there 

are some very kind of scarce highly technical skills that are more 

accessible through contractors in many cases than through Government employees. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. I want to thank the Ranking Member of 

the full committee. 

In our last hearing here in the District of Columbia, we highlighted some of these manning issues for the CBP Officers at the 

port of entry. It took about 18 months. The Border Jobs for VetVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
32 

erans Act, which we passed, such as my bill, supposed to fast-track 

our veterans. The goal would be 90 days, but there is still a lot of 

work to do and lot of concerns and challenges. But, really, everybody on the subcommittee and across the committee that we have 

heard, so I think we still have a lot of work to do. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. I am just trying to make sure that we 

don’t lose sight of the fact that that process is still—and what have 

you, and I would like my full statement to be admitted into the 

record. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Without objection. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, Mr. Vela. 

Mr. VELA. So General Alles, what can you tell us about the 

issues in Corpus Christi with the predator being the weather? 

Mr. ALLES. So for Corpus Christi, sir, that actually, for the predator overall, weather is a challenge for the system. 

Generally, it runs about a 20 percent higher cancellation rate 

than our manned aircraft for weather. So one of the efforts we are 

making currently, system-wide, is we are working with General 

Thomas on our automatic take-off and landing system which will 

improve the cross limitation of the aircraft. That is one. Then, second, we are looking at working out of divert fields, for instance, we 

used San Angelo this last year that are better winter weather operating locations. We have also deployed the asset to the transit zone 

during the wintertime. We get more effective operation out of the 

platform. We have two platforms right now in Columbia and Barranquilla operating. So that is how we look at the challenges there 

in Corpus Christi. We get efficiencies out of the site. It is a P–3 

site also, so the P–3 pilots not only fly the P–3, but they fly the 

predator UAS at the same time. That is a great efficiency force in 

terms of operations, and if we split those sites up, we lose that efficiency. So that is how we tackled it so far, sir. 

Mr. VELA. So is the fog the issue basically, or—— 

Mr. ALLES. Generally, it is ceilings. In the wintertime I went 

through flight school actually in Kingsville, and I remember on 

many days sitting there playing AC/DC in the waiting room while 

the fog and whatever it was hung over. So getting out of that kind 

of coastal interference zone, I think is advantageous. San Angelo 

has been a good location. 

Our challenge, honestly, has been the FAA there. We have 

worked through those issues with them. They are very adverse to 

us operating out of civilian airfields. That is the first time an unmanned aircraft has operated out of a civilian airfield. That has 

worked well. 

Mr. VELA. Now, with respect to these tactical aerostats, how are 

you dealing with the landowners? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So all of the sites need preparatory work, a little 

bit of what my colleague, Mr. Borkowski, said as it relates to our 

towers, real estate acquisition and permission to enter lands, et 

cetera. So all of the sites that are operating now are within—in 

conjunction with the landowners. Sometimes that is via a lease, 

sometimes that is a different kind of agreement. But it is all structured and scheduled so that they are aware of our presence. So far, 

we haven’t had any challenges. It was difficult to move a couple of 

33 

ones that were up north. There was a couple operational decisions, 

we wanted to move the ones closer to the border because of their 

effect, and the efficiency that the agents were getting, but all is 

going well so far. 

Mr. VELA. So, Chief, I think you are well aware of the challenges 

that we have on the other side of the border in Tamaulipas, Mexico 

with respect to cartel activity, kidnappings, and murders that have, 

you know, the State’s deteriorated, over, you know, the last several 

years. What I am curious about, is there anything that we can do 

from your standpoint, technologically, to help in that area? 

Mr. VITIELLO. It is a difficult challenge. We feel bad for the people who are a part of those communities. It is such—it is unfortunate that they face that situation. I think as it relates to help from 

here is to strengthen our relationship and provide Mexico with the 

mentorship, sharing of best practices, mechanisms to exchange information quickly, and then support their efforts to reform their domestic and their Federal law enforcement. 

Mr. VELA. So following up on that, what kind of shared practices 

are you currently using with law enforcement in Mexico? 

Mr. VITIELLO. In its best form, we have programs underway 

under the border violence prevention protocols. It is a systematic 

way for us to sit down and understand where the violence is taking 

place, what it means to our deployments at the border, between the 

ports and at the ports as well, and then sharing information where 

it is critical and then it is—in a deployment form, we do joint patrols with authorities in Mexico, in places where we know that violence or smuggling is occurring. It is a great benefit for them to 

have us close by on our side and then doing the same in Mexico. 

Those have worked out very well when they have the resources 

available to do it. 

Mr. VELA. Well, thank you. 

Before I yield, I would just add that I agree with, Madam Chair, 

with your perspective on the use of veterans. I think we need to 

have a much more robust approach around the country with respect to educating our veterans about the availability of these jobs. 

I think it is something that I surely look forward to working with 

you on. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I agree with the Ranking Member. As long as it 

doesn’t take 18 months for them to get a job. If we can get to that 

in less than 90 days and while they are still on active duty, that 

would be ideal. We have to keep working on that bill being implemented for the intent that it was supposed to be. So I appreciate 

it. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rogers from Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to revisit this issue of the aerostats. Can you tell me how 

many aerostats you have in—that are deployed at present? 

Mr. VITIELLO. We have 6 deployed in the South Texas area. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are they the same model or version or do they differ? 

Mr. VITIELLO. There are 2 separate versions, they are both what 

we call the tactical version. They are both supported by mobile towers that also work the border environment that give us cameras 

and—— 

34 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you mean supported by mobile towers? I 

see the tower on the truck here. Does that have to go somewhere 

closer to the aerostats? 

Mr. VITIELLO. The aerostats, it is a deployment package. They 

come with towers that could be put up remotely. So when the envelope is flying, when the balloon is up in the air, it has sensors 

hanging off of it, the EOIR and day cameras, high-definition cameras, and then there are towers that support in the area as well 

that can monitor the border for us that—— 

Mr. ROGERS. They receive signals from the aerostat? 

Mr. VITIELLO. The signals go to a small command post, and then 

the information that is obtained there is then dispatched to response units in the field. 

Mr. ROGERS. So it doesn’t go to the truck that is carrying the 

tower? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So there are other vehicles that we have that are 

Government equipment that are not DOD reuse; the MVSS, the 

MSS, which are—have similar equipment on masks in the back of 

mobile vehicles. Those are operated by Border Patrol Agents, who 

can then obtain the information from the screens and then distribute it via radio to response teams as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are all 6 of the aerostats deployed at present? 

Mr. VITIELLO. They are. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long do they stay up? 

Mr. VITIELLO. There is maintenance that is required, recurring 

maintenance that is required. We are constantly evaluating the 

readiness rate. They have to be brought down to change envelopes 

when something happens, when the wind is too high, things like 

that. But, generally, I think we talked about the other day, they 

are in the neighborhood of 80 percent up time, so while they are 

available. They are available 80 percent of the time that they are 

deployed. But there are conditions which cause us to either do 

maintenance or bring them down for weather events, et cetera. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you keeping these in a particular sector? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Right now they are deployed in South Texas, in 

what we call the Rio Grande Valley sector, which is the McAllen 

Rio Grande City area. They are there because as my colleague, Mr. 

Borkowski, said because we have a planned deployment there for 

integrated fixed towers for RVSS, for planned mobile trucks, et 

cetera. That stuff has to catch up our work on the ground to get 

those sites ready to purchase land, to do the environmental work 

is underway. In the mean time, we have deployed the aerostats to 

fill that gap given the activity levels that are in that part of the 

border. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are all 6 of these from the DOD? 

Mr. VITIELLO. They are all DOD reuse equipment that we have 

gotten from them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any remaining DOD aerostats available 

that you have not accepted? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I believe they have more, but I am not aware of 

any that they have that we are actually asking for. I think we have 

2 that we are getting ready to deploy elsewhere. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Sir, there are—there are 3—3 incarnations of 

this, 2 large ones. DOD owns them, has not accessed them, but baVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
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sically leases them to us. The smaller ones, which are called Raid. 

We own, I think, 8 of them. Two of them are deployed, so we have 

additional ones in storage. We also have towers that we can deploy 

independently of the Raid. So there are additional aerostats available that we have in storage. They cost, in like $3 million a year 

to run, so we are pretty judicious in how we apply them and where 

we apply them, but we do have smaller ones. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have a need for more than the 6? 

Mr. VITIELLO. We prefer to deploy the mobile technology that is 

on its way to us. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

Mr. VITIELLO. Excuse me? 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

Mr. VITIELLO. The aerostats are a good gap filler. We see them 

as a temporary asset. We may not continue to use them in south 

Texas as the technology plan, the fuller requirement gets deployed. 

We will take them and use them in a place where the technology 

has to catch up. So they are a good gap filler. But because of the 

expense of their operation, operations and maintenance is quite 

high, so we are looking forward to a time where we have a more 

permanent infrastructure that is not dependent on the kinds of 

costs that these bring to us. 

Mr. ROGERS. All of these are tethered, correct? 

Mr. VITIELLO. They are. 

Mr. ROGERS. At what altitude? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I believe there is one that is at 1,800 feet, and the 

other one is something less than that, 12—— 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The smaller ones are around 1,000 feet. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you all considered using some of the non-tethered aerostats, then they can loiter for a longer periods of time? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Like essentially blimps? 

Mr. ROGERS. Correct. The Marines use those? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We have looked at that. Right now, and the 

problem is we probably have to buy those. Those haven’t been assessed. The advantage of these tethered aerostats, is that although 

we have to pay the operation and maintenance, we didn’t actually 

have to buy the aerostat; we didn’t have to buy the tower; we didn’t 

have to buy the camera. That is why these were so attractive to 

us, and they seem to be the sensible thing for the time being. 

Mr. ROGERS. One of the reasons I am so focused on these, is in 

my trips to the Southwest Border, we have had just a world of 

trouble with cameras, whether cameras on poles or trucks or whatever. To my knowledge, those problems still exist. Also, I like the 

fact that they are up high, and you can see further across the border where there is people gathering. 

So I am just curious, and this would be my final question, I know 

my time has expired: What is the downside? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. There are two. One is the cost. We are trying 

to drive those costs down. But it is $3 million or more for the bigger ones a year for these things. 

The second thing is that they are very weather-dependent. The 

Chief talked about 80 percent, but there are times of the year 

where we can have availability down to 60 percent depending on 

the weather. So you really have to kind-of have to trade their availVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
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ability for the mission and their cost. So our sense is that there are 

probably areas where aerostats will make sense, but they are probably not the right long-term solution. We are using them like very 

high towers, as you suggested. And there are areas where they see 

over foliage, but in the areas where we are using them, we actually 

think the lower cost, more permanent, more highly-available fixed 

infrastructure makes more sense for the long term. We are still 

studying where the aerostats might have a long-term future, but 

it will probably be in spots. 

Mr. ROGERS. I won’t ask any more questions, but I would, 

Madam Chairwoman, like to, at some point, revisit the idea of 

micro sats to see if they are using any of those. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Torres of California for questions 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Chairwoman. 

How is CBP measuring the effectiveness of the technology deployed at the border, and what matrix are used and how does that 

compare over time? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we are collecting all—several elements of what 

you might call output measures, the number of arrests that have 

been made, how often in a particular area, agency assaults, the 

kinds of seizures that are being made, and we look at that in conjunction with the kinds of deployments that exist in those areas. 

As our colleague from the GAO reported, we are looking at systems 

that allow us at the time of arrest, as we are recording activity, to 

then attribute the—when there is a seizure or an arrest made, attribute the assist of the technology in those areas. Over time, you 

can start to look at the effect of certain kinds of deployments and 

how they contribute to seizures and arrests. That way, we can see 

which are the most valuable kinds of assets and how they are deployed or whether we need to make changes to those deployments. 

Mrs. TORRES. So over time, is this technology going to be able to 

utilize over actual manpower? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we—our experience is, is that when we deploy 

in an area with the technology, be it mobile or fixed, we start to 

see more activity, because we turn the information—the information is more available. You know more about an area once these 

deployments occur. So there is usually more activity in the beginnings of those deployments. 

But over time, smuggling patterns change. The activity changes, 

the arrest and the effectiveness of the deployments of the agents 

themselves and the responses start to change that activity, and the 

smugglers look for other locations to enter in. So we have seen that 

sort of a spike in activity in the immediate aftermath of a robust 

deployment, and then we see the traffic shift and move, and then 

we—that is why it is important to have these gap fillers, that is 

why it is important to have mobile technology so we can be assured 

to be in the right place at the right time. 

Mrs. TORRES. I understand that they are—there is a need to 

make a serious commitment, financial commitment, and it is going 

to be a lot more—it is a lot more costlier in the beginning, but over 

time, you know, my question really is, is it smart to spend this 

37 

much money upfront? Are we going to save it in having actual personnel costs, you know, a few years down the road, and how long? 

Are we really looking at that, at those statistics? 

Mr. VITIELLO. When you look at where we have gotten to on how 

we decided on the deployment, the Arizona Technology Plan is one, 

our plans for the other border deployments, we looked at—and 

Mark can speak more precisely about the analysis of alternatives— 

we looked at which technologies would be most advantageous. We 

used our experience and the feedback from users to decide in the 

CGAP process what technologies to use. 

But you are going to have to have—it is our opinion and our experience that you are going to have to have a mix. It might be more 

expensive on the front end to install the technology, but over time 

you see benefits of that. Sometimes that is fewer deployments in 

particular areas so that we can use the workforce more efficiently. 

Mrs. TORRES. Yeah. Over time, I can see where you can modify 

equipment a lot easier than personnel habits. 

How is CBP defining situational awareness and operational control? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So, on the situational awareness side, we are looking at the border in a couple of different ways. Situational awareness, as defined, is us being able to understand what is happening, 

have a predictive analysis, like, know where particular areas of the 

border are going to be problematic or where we know we are going 

to have traffic, and then have the kind of assets that are available, 

technology and the resources, agents on the line, in those locations 

to give ourselves real-time information about what is going on in 

that area. 

Mrs. TORRES. Are all of these metrics that you are utilizing public, made public, this information? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So, on the CBP site, the CBP.gov, there are output 

statistics about the kinds of activities, arrests. Those are usually 

posted at the end of each month, and so people can see that there. 

Mrs. TORRES. So this is where the public can better understand 

whether these investments are actually paying out in ensuring, you 

know, that we are minimizing the number of crossings? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So the statistics that are typically on the site don’t 

attribute the work to the technology. It is more sort of an output 

measure of what is happening month by month. 

Mrs. TORRES. Okay. 

Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. All right. Great. I am going to continue on with 

another round here. I have a lot of questions now that I have you 

all here. 

So I want to follow up, the Arizona Technology Plan, when fully 

complete—well, let me start with this, actually, Chief Vitiello. Our 

first hearing I had when I took over, you stated that, of the 2,000 

miles of the border, you have situational awareness of about 56 

percent of that border, Southern Border, right now. 

So for the Arizona Technology Plan, what percentage of that, of 

the miles of the Arizona border, did we have situational awareness 

of? Then, when complete, when it is fully rolled out, are we going 

to have 100 percent situational awareness so if it moves we see it, 

when the whole plan is implemented? 

38 

Mr. VITIELLO. Yeah, so last time I was here I might not have 

been as precise as I wanted to be as it relates to situational awareness. 

The 56 percent measure, at that time—and this changes quarter 

by quarter—was the areas of the border where the deployment 

itself advises the workforce, advises the response agents, advises us 

of what is happening in real time. So, at that time, about 56 percent of the border had a deployment that was responsive enough 

to know in real time when activity occurred at the border. 

So a response in real time—within, you know, a shift, agents 

knew about an entry and were able to mount a response. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. So I think maybe that is a definition issue. 

To me, that is operational control. Situational awareness is, if you 

see it—I mean, if it moves, you see it. That is, like, you know, metric No. 1. The second metric is, when you see it, you can get to it 

and stop it. That is the operational control piece, right? 

So we were just trying to get a sense of, of the 2,000 miles of 

the border, if it moves and it is coming across the border, it is trying to breach, you actually see it. You may not be able to get to 

it, but you at least see it. So is there a different number that is 

not 56 percent? 

Mr. VITIELLO. What we are trying do in this state of the border 

reporting that we are putting in our system and using for things 

like CGAP and using to inform our deployments, there is a level 

of situational awareness across the entire border. So the 56 percent 

number, that is happening in real time; the sensors, the agents 

themselves, the deployments are picking up that activity in real 

time and being able to respond to it. 

The rest of the border, we are using other technology to monitor 

it regularly, but there is not an immediate response in each of 

those cases. That other part of the border, where we are using 

GEOINT, where we are using change detection to monitor the border, it is not solely that. We have other methods of being able to 

monitor what is going on in those areas. But there is not necessarily a deployment or a sensor that picks up that activity. It is 

more of this change detection, using the UAS, using other assets 

to monitor the border. 

But I would say that, as it relates to situational awareness, how 

we see it, each and every zone of the border has some level of monitoring that occurs in it, whether it be our assets directly deployed, 

whether it be the community informing us of things that are going 

on or our own assets that are doing a monitoring that verify to us 

that there is or isn’t activity going on. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Yeah, I think we just have different definitions of situational awareness. I mean, I appreciate that some of 

the VADER stuff and change detection you are doing is, after the 

fact, being able to look back and kind of see some of the changes 

that have happened, which is really important for intelligence and, 

you know, predictive analysis and all that. 

Again, I am just a fighter pilot, and I am just trying to get down 

to, like, a simple metric of, if it is breaching, if it is about to cross 

the border, we see it in real time. In 2,000 miles of the border, 

where do we have—we may not be able to get to it, we may lose 

it, but we see it happening real time. 

39 

So, I mean, I don’t want to waste a lot of time going back and 

forth on this, but I think that is one of the frustrations, I would 

say, of this committee and definitely of my constituents, is we don’t 

know what the answer is as far as what can we see and then what 

can we actually get to? The price of drugs on the street is the best 

indication that supply and demand—there is still a lot of stuff that 

is getting through. I think that is fair enough. 

I think you said it yourself. Once we deploy technology, we all 

of a sudden see all the stuff that we didn’t see before. It is not that 

they just started coming; it is just you can now see it. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Mr. VITIELLO. I think it is fair as it relates to the state of the 

border reporting and when we are using the GEOINT and when we 

are using our own deployments. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yep. 

Mr. VITIELLO. So it is accurate to say that the 56 percent number, that is a real-time deployment, so we know when it is happening in real time and can respond directly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. VITIELLO. In those other parts of the border, you may or may 

not need that kind of deployment, but, in the aggregate, you are 

aware of what is occurring over time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

So, going back to my original question, when the Arizona Technology Plan is complete—which I definitely want to make sure I 

understand when that is going to be complete, based on all the different parts of it—what level of, what you are kind-of calling situational awareness, but I guess what I am calling operational control—like, what will you be able to—real-time, you can see it moving across the border, what percentage of the, I think it is, you 

know, 360 miles of the Arizona border—it is the Arizona Technology Plan, so you are focusing on better technology for situational 

awareness in the Arizona border. What is the end goal? What is 

the end state? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So that deployment is informed by agents on the 

ground that know how the technology works and know our own 

tactics for deployment and are aware of what the threat picture is. 

So, when those AORs are complete, we will have 100 percent monitoring of that border and being able to react in real time to all activity. 

Now, there are limits to the technology. There are deep canyons. 

You have been to these places in Nogales where it is really difficult 

to see on the ground even with the technology. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. VITIELLO. But those deployments are designed for us to be 

100 percent successful. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. So 100 percent is the goal. 

So can you give me the time line of when all of the elements of 

the Arizona Technology Plan will be complete, as of right now? 

I don’t know if that is for you to answer or you, Mr. Borkowski. 

Mr. VITIELLO. I think Mark is probably better—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. VITIELLO [continuing]. To tell us the precise detail. 

40 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The long and short of it is we believe Arizona 

will be done by fiscal year 2019. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The end of fiscal year 2019? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. That is due to 2 specific areas of responsibility 

in the Tohono O’odham Nation. Except for those, the remote video 

surveillance system will be done by the end of this year; 3 out of 

the 5 AORs in Arizona for IFT will be done by the end of fiscal year 

2017. Then it is those 2 areas of the Tohono O’odham Nation that 

lag in getting complete. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Just for expectations, too, for our constituents, in this fiscal year, 

what else is going in? I mean, the ranchers I was talking to last 

week—— 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. You know, the IFTs—can we just get 

a rundown of what is going in this fiscal year? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Sure. So all of the remote video surveillance 

system, which are cameras and towers, the last area for that is 

Yuma. That is the last one to go in. That will be done by the end 

of this year. 

For IFT, we are starting Douglas. Douglas should be complete toward the end of this year. Sonoita will start going contract this 

summer, so it should be done in about a year from that. So those 

are the key activities going on between now and, say, the summer 

of 2017. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

So, fiscal year 2019, if everything is on track, the Arizona Technology Plan will be complete. 

I know, Ms. Gambler, one of the points that you have pointed out 

is there has not been an integrated schedule. They have been sort 

of the piecemeal schedule. Is that still something you think is needed for the Arizona Technology Plan or for additional plans moving 

forward in Texas or other areas? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Yeah, two points there, Chairwoman McSally. 

No. 1, we still continue to believe that an integrated master 

schedule for the whole plan would help CBP better oversee the extent to which it is completing all of the programs under the plan 

within expected time frames. I know CBP disagrees with that. We 

continue to believe in that recommendation. 

Second, as I mentioned earlier, for 2 of the programs under the 

plan, CBP has updated their schedules just for those programs. We 

will be looking at those 2 schedules going forward—we just recently 

received them—to see the extent to which they meet best practices, 

which has been some of our other recommendations. So, again, that 

is sort of an open question for us, but it is progress that they have 

updated the schedules. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

I want to switch to a different topic, which is the use of tactical 

unmanned aerial systems or aerial vehicles. I know we talked 

about this in the first hearing I held. 

I realize the Predator provides situational awareness sort-of at 

the operational or strategic level, but there are tools that are out 

41 

there that we are currently using in the military where the agents 

could launch something that gives them situational awareness 

tactically. 

I know you all mentioned that it is being looked into, but can I 

get a very specific answer as to whether there is a requirement and 

a move to provide tactical UAVs to our agents on the ground to improve situational awareness? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we do have an operational requirements document. So the Border Patrol at CBP, our partners in CBP writ large 

are convinced that this is a technology that needs to go into the 

hands of agents. We have made an operational requirements document, sort-of the official recognition of that. We are working with 

OTIA to understand what resources are available and how we 

would deploy them. We are in discussions with CBP Air and Marine to make sure that we are not in conflict as it relates to the 

airspace issues. 

Then we have 2 projects, the same project underway with the 

Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, in which they have helped us identify what resources are 

available, what the limitations for some of that resource is, so we 

can start to narrow on which platforms will be available to us. 

We are in discussions for a memorandum of understanding with 

the FAA on the certificate of authorization. Again, that is part of 

the deconfliction piece. We are in a relationship with Naval Systems Command about contracting vehicles and about their own experience and best practices with using these elements. 

We believe that we are very well on our way to start these deployments, because we think they are necessary for agents in the 

field. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I agree. 

Is one of the options—I don’t know if there is any excess property 

from the DOD. Is one of the options excess property or just manufacturing capabilities that already are being deployed with the 

DOD as opposed to reinventing the wheel? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we are narrowing with S&T on what they call 

the RVSS program to decide which of the things are available either through DOD or through other vehicles for us to use. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So what is the time line we are looking at for 

that? 

Major General Alles, you can jump in. 

Then, Ms. Gambler, I want to make sure there is a—you know, 

we don’t want to have lessons identified that are actually lessons 

learned from past procurement buffoonery. So is this going along 

based on the lessons learned from previous procurement issues? 

General Alles, do you want to pipe in? 

Mr. ALLES. I was just going to mention one. We are going to do 

a near-term program with Border Patrol soon. But that is really to 

develop a COA in a particular area and apply the technology and 

see how it works before we move forward to any kind of procurement. So that would be step 1 in the process. 

Just to note, the main problem here is the FAA still. So we can 

probably work out a COA and carve out a piece of airspace to work 

these smaller platforms in, but there are still no rules issued to acVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
42 

tually operate these things, big picture, across the board. That still 

is coming and needs to be taken care of. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. 

Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Yep, this is something that we are touching on as 

part of some of our on-going work, looking at, you know, this kind 

of small UAS program. So that is something we can certainly follow 

up with you on and try to give you some more information on going 

forward. 

But it will be, you know, important for them to proceed, you 

know, in line with kind-of good acquisition management, you know, 

good testing, best practices, to ensure that, you know, to the extent 

that they do end up deploying some type of a system, that it meets 

requirements and that it is rolled out according to cost, schedule, 

and performance expectations. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

I know I mentioned it last time, but Cochise College in southern 

Arizona is co-located there, and they have a great UAV program on 

the civilian side. They really want to have a conversation to partner on anything that might be rolled out, just to be able to, you 

know—not again having to reinvent training schools and operations that they already have on-going. 

So I just want to lay that out there again, that I think these 

types of innovative partnerships like that would be really important if you are rolling anything like that forward. 

I want to switch to ultralight detection. I think it was my first 

week in office, when I went back home, I got a full day with the 

Border Patrol team in the Tucson sector, to include a Black Hawk 

ride where a radar picked up a potential ultralight crossing, and 

we flew around in circles trying to find it. I was helping looking 

out the window, using my fighter pilot eyes, trying to help. It was 

like, you know, a needle in a haystack. It is impossible, as you 

know, very difficult to be able to detect these low-flying lightweight 

ultralights. 

You know, the intended program to address that pretty much 

failed. So is there any additional technologies and programs we are 

looking at in order to solve this problem of the ultralight detection? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. 

First of all, the ultralight threat when we started was high-urgency. So we went after this program that was not successful. If 

the ultralight threat were as urgent as it was, though, we would 

probably use those, because they actually could detect the ultralights; it is just they were very labor-intensive. 

So we are looking for options to that. The urgency for the program is not as high as it was, but one of the things we are looking 

at is a DOD reuse system. There is a—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Why is it not urgent anymore? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We are seeing a tremendous decline in the number of ultralights. 

Mr. ALLES. I will just mention the numbers. The high was in fiscal year 2010, 235. So far this year, 19. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Do we know why that is? 

Mr. ALLES. There are other methods of crossing the border to 

move the drugs, ma’am. 

43 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. So, again, I think if it jacked back up, we would 

probably go pull those ultralight aircraft detection systems and use 

them, because they would be worth it for that threat, but the 

threat has gone down. 

Having said that, we have identified a couple of systems, one of 

which we have access to from DOD—it requires some modifications 

of software, and it is called a lightweight counter-mortar radar— 

that shows some potential here. 

We also continue to do market research with industry. I don’t always want to immediately go to DOD and, you know, foreclose opportunities for industry. There are other radars in industry as well. 

But that is what we are looking at, and that lightweight countermortar radar looks very promising. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thanks. 

Do we know—I guess this would be to Mr. Borkowski. 

Are there any other DOD excess property or any other technology 

that we know exists within the DOD that you all are looking at to 

get your hands on in order to help with the situational awareness? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. For situational awareness? Well, they obviously 

have kind-of common operating picture command-and-control-type 

systems that we look at. In fact, they have something called ART/ 

TSOA, if you are familiar with that—Adaptive Red Team—where 

they bring a bunch of these industries in and plug them in. So we 

participate in those, and we look at those technologies. 

With respect to, though, situational awareness, DHS S&T has 

what is called an Apex Program, because they are trying to get 

their arms around. As you can imagine, there is all kinds of stuff 

to sort through. So DHS S&T is doing a border situational awareness Apex Program basically to help us put all of that information 

together and to choose what is the right approach. I think that is 

where we will rely to make some smart decisions going forward. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thank you. 

Sorry. I am just firing off a bunch of questions here. 

But I think it was in our first hearing I also asked a question 

about looking at putting VADER on manned aircraft. This is something that has been done in the past in other departments. Is there 

any looking into that, due to the limitations, both airspace and 

weather, of, you know, the Predator ops? 

Mr. ALLES. So what we are looking at as an S&T effort is a lighter VADER-type system to put on our smaller aircraft, not necessarily the VADER operating on the UAS now. So that has been 

kind of the current direction we are looking at. We are looking at 

that, you know, through different, you know, technological venues. 

So nothing substantial yet on that. We are really exploring the 

options at this point. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thanks. 

Then, in between the tactical UAVs and the Predator, are there 

any other UAVs? There is a whole swath in that middle area there 

that are smaller and potentially cheaper. Is there any investigation 

or requirement that you are looking at to procure any, sort-of, midlevel UAVs? I just made up that terminology, but you know what 

I am saying—not quite the ones that the agents are deploying but 

not quite the Predator. 

44 

Mr. ALLES. So I think, to answer that, until we get full use out 

of the Predator in the airspace, I would actually not want to move 

in that direction. So, in my mind, the Predator actually fills the 

high and medium gap. What Chief Vitiello wants to do on the small 

side, which I think is a good effort, will fill the low-altitude gap. 

But the real issue is I can get a Scan Eagle or something like 

that, I can’t operate it in the airspace. The FAA won’t let me. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yep. 

Mr. ALLES. So the rules still prevent that. Until we can move beyond those and really get open use of the airspace with the Predator, that is going to be the limitation. 

We are moving in that direction with the due-regard radar. We 

have a single Predator now equipped with that. We are going to 

test that and see if that is going to help open up the envelope with 

the FAA. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

I want to move into the, kind-of, procurement process big picture. 

I know a lot of the things that Ms. Gambler, the GAO has pointed 

out, trying to move DHS more in line with practices in the DOD. 

Although I serve on the Armed Services Committee, and I will tell 

you, you know, there are good things about the DOD acquisition 

process, but that can also be quite painful and slow and bureaucratic and not nimble. By the time we get through all the machinations of the process, the technology has already changed, and, you 

know, we are late to the game. 

So we are actually putting in, you know, the defense bill and additional legislation some changes to that process. So you don’t necessarily want to mirror all of the DOD. You want to take the best 

of it but not the painful amounts of it. So, I mean, is that part of 

what is being looked at? Or are we just trying to mirror the DOD? 

One of the issues in the DOD is getting project managers, contracting officers. It is basically human resources, human development, making sure we are recruiting, training, equipping, and 

keeping, retaining, you know, those that have this unique expertise 

that, thank God, I never had to have in the Air Force myself. 

But on the manpower side and the development of expertise, I 

just wanted to hear perspectives on that and what is being done 

to address that issue. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Sure. 

So your first question first, on kind-of the DHS acquisition management process. I think the bottom line of GAO’s reporting on this 

has been that, across the Department, not just with CBP but 

across the Department, DHS has a fairly sound, knowledge-based 

process for managing its acquisition. So that kind of foundational 

process, from our perspective, is in place. 

Where DHS has fallen down has been on the execution. So what 

I mean by that is ensuring that acquisition programs go through 

that process, have approved acquisition documents before they 

move to the next phases in the process. That is where, kind-of, 

DHS has fallen down in terms of implementation. Again, they are 

making progress, but they still have a ways to go. 

I might add that DHS acquisition management challenges are 

part of the reason why DHS management more broadly is part of 

GAO’s high-risk list. So that is point No. 1. 

45 

The other point that I would make with regard to having the 

right acquisition management personnel in place to manage these 

programs, that also has been a challenge that GAO has reported 

on across the Department. It has also been something we have reported on related to CBP. 

Some of the challenges that we identified in our last report regarding why some of the programs under the Arizona Technology 

Plan were not meeting schedule had to do with CBP and OITA not 

always having the resources in place they needed to manage the 

acquisitions, review some of the proposals, and that kind of thing. 

So that, I think, has been a challenge in the past for DHS and 

for CBP. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Borkowski, do you want to add anything to 

that? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, I think that is exactly right. 

Now, certainly, obviously, DHS is working on this. So, for example, I understand this issue about documentation, but I will tell you 

that Under Secretary Deyo and Deputy Under Secretary Fulghum 

have, frankly, been beating the, you know, stuffing out of us. A lot 

of emphasis on getting that document current. We had a big push 

at the end of last year. Mr. Fulghum made a commitment to the 

Congress, and we all got that word, and we did that. So that is 

clearly an area of emphasis. 

This area of expertise in program management is a big threat 

issue. We have spent a great deal of time on it. We have a Homeland Security Acquisition Institute; we have sent people to school. 

But the experience is the big thing. 

A lot of my time is occupied on running reviews of programs, not 

so much to collect status but to start getting people to understand 

what it means to review a program. What does cost even mean? 

You know, for example, cost in acquisition really means, did you 

get for a dollar what you expected to get? But you will get a lot 

of conversation about, do I have the budget? That is a different 

question. So understanding what a baseline is, the basics of program management. 

I will tell you I think we have made tremendous progress over 

the last few years. But you can imagine what that does to acquisition, when you are doing the training while you are deploying. 

Those have been challenges. 

Then, of course, getting enough people and not burning people 

out, as we discussed with Mr. Thompson, is another issue. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Are you actively recruiting from the DOD those 

that are separating or retiring? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. In terms of acquisition positions, we don’t actually go to DOD and ask for people. However, we get a lot of DOD 

applicants to our open applications. So I think the word gets out. 

Ms. MCSALLY. It seems like that is where the experience would 

be, right? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So, I mean—although maybe they are leaving and 

they want to go do something else. But, certainly, if they have the 

experience in program management, that would be, you know, 

transferable skills. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right. 

46 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

I am going to keep going here. I have a couple more. 

Chief Vitiello, I don’t know if it is for you or General Alles or 

both. Can you let us know when the CGAP analysis is going to be 

available or to be shared with us here in Congress? 

Mr. VITIELLO. So we are happy to work with you on a schedule 

to catch you up to where we think we are. But CGAP, by its design 

and the work that we did with applied physics at Johns Hopkins, 

is an iterative process. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. VITIELLO. So what we have done up until now is sort-of learn 

the process and learn the best practices, which comes from our own 

experience plus what they have learned, along with DOD, to help 

us identify what the mission needs are, how to fill capability gaps, 

and what the use case is for identified technologies or changes in 

tactics, et cetera. 

So what we have done is we have trained a majority of the workforce that are deployed in an effort to understand the process, what 

CGAP is, how to apply it in their own AOR, and then feed us that 

information at the headquarters to then turn in to requirements. 

Then we can push over with our requirements folks in our office 

and then over to OTIA to move the process forward. 

So we would be happy to come back and give you sort-of a detailed brief about the number of people that have been trained, the 

kinds of discoveries that we have made, and asking agents for their 

feedback, how they would solve particular problems; look at the 

material resources, like we need a tower, we need a sensor, we 

need a tripwire, and then the other, the non-material things, like 

consequences and things that happen maybe post-arrest or information exchange with other departments, et cetera. 

So we would be happy to come back and give you sort-of the full 

range of what has been trained and what it is designed to do and 

then what the roll-up report looks like, but recognizing that it is 

iterative. As the threats change, as conditions change—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. VITIELLO [continuing]. We want to be able to update those 

plans so that we are not investing in last year’s problem but are 

working ahead. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

General Alles. 

Mr. ALLES. I think on the Air and Marine side we are in the 

early stages of it. We would expect our really first substantial output to be about a year away. So they are currently early in the 

process, as discussed. As the chief mentioned, it is an iterative 

process, but we would expect a more substantial output here really 

next summer. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thank you. Yeah, let’s follow up. I 

don’t know if some of it is Classified, but maybe with a briefing we 

could do later on, just to kind-of see where we are at. 

You mentioned it, Chief Vitiello, but the actual agents are part 

of that process, right? It is not just the sector leadership and 

above? 

Mr. VITIELLO. That is correct. So the people who are involved in 

the planning for their particular area. 

47 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. 

Mr. VITIELLO. So the station level, the people who are actually 

deploying on the ground, are taking feedback from the people who 

are making the arrests, who are deploying and they are looking at 

the line each and every day. That feeds up into the station, rolled 

up to the sector each, and then that comes back to us. People are 

trained in each of those processes to then feed to us. Then that 

turns into requirements, it turns into forecasts for budgets and programming, et cetera. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

General Alles, I want to follow up on my earlier question on getting information to the agents. I know the Big Pipe allows the 

Predator feed to get to a desktop, but is there something in the 

works to actually get it to an iPad or something that is more mobile for the agents? 

Mr. ALLES. Yes, ma’am. A couple things there. 

So, first off, we are pursuing the Minotaur system. This is a 

Naval Air Systems Command system that is used on their patrol 

aircraft to distribute information. So that is essential for us to take 

information off our platforms—radar information, the EOIR, signals information—and actually put it into a system that can redistribute it to other assets that have Minotaur. It goes back to the 

AMOC in Riverside and can be sent back out. 

In terms of local agents, part of that is what Chief mentioned in 

terms of looking down the Blue Force Tracker route. We can already send video. We can distribute what is called a carry viewer 

to agents on the ground so they can actually see video if that is 

desired. Typically, we are using, you know, actually, radio information to cue the agents. 

There is a system we are looking at, which the name eludes me, 

which will allow us to put that information on something like an 

Android phone or an iPhone, which can actually form its own local 

network, which could be advantageous for us in terms of sending 

video from aircraft down to actual agents on the ground. 

So those are the directions we are going. I would say there is a 

lot of work to be done there. 

I think on the, kind-of, investigation side, supporting his or 

those, we are able to move the video very easily in those areas and 

give it to agents on the ground. In the more remote areas, that is 

still an area that we need substantial work in. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

I also want to ask you, General Alles, about—the National Guard 

has been supplementing with, you know, some of the air assets, but 

this last year my understanding is that their number of hours or 

support was cut in half. 

When you guys are doing the CGAP analysis, are there assumptions made on National Guard capabilities that are a part of your 

plan, or are they assumed to not be there? How is that impacting 

your operations or the gaps? 

Mr. ALLES. So, I mean, from our standpoint, a couple things. 

First off, in the areas where we were using the National Guard 

hours, we have made a substantial move of our assets into those 

locations. So, in the south Texas area in particular, we have inVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:28 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0524\HM145111.TXT HEATH
48 

creased our assets by over 50 percent, along with our flight hours 

have gone up proportionally also. 

In actually doing the CGAP analysis, we are not necessarily 

counting on their support. As you are aware from the Armed Services side, they have had substantial cuts in the DOD budget. I 

mean, I have been reading the articles on the Marine Corps and 

getting 30- or 40-percent readiness rates on their aircraft. So they 

have major challenges there. 

So we aren’t necessarily looking for that in the analysis. We are 

looking to support the Border Patrol and our other operations with 

our own internal assets and analyze the gaps in that method. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thanks. 

Mr. Borkowski, can you talk about how you are sharing requirements with industry so they can spend their R&D dollars to meet, 

you know, agents’ needs? Or how do you engage with industry earlier in the process, you know, searching for new technology? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, we do that through a whole bunch of 

ways. So, first of all, when I am in town, I have probably a meeting 

a day with anybody who wants to come and talk to me. Sometimes 

they want to tell me what they have got; sometimes they want us 

to discuss generally our issues. 

We have reverse industry days, where we talk to industry about 

our requirements. We speak at any number of conferences, where 

we list our technology interests for industry. We also work very 

closely with DHS S&T that has a very extensive outreach program, 

including to nontraditional industry, right? Because it is kind of 

easy to get to the traditional people because they know how to connect with us, but the nontraditionals. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. So we have a whole bunch of ways that we talk 

to them. 

Now, the tricky thing is when we are getting ready for an acquisition. That is where we have a more focused discussion about: 

What are the requirements, how should we depict them, what 

would industry be able to respond to. Then things get a lot more 

detailed. 

But in advance of that, it is a more general discussion of, these 

are our interests in technology areas, this is what we think we plan 

to do over the next few years. We do that through a number of 

mechanisms. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

All right. I am about to wrap up, but I want to give the opportunity for all the witnesses, if there is anything else that you didn’t 

get to share in your opening statement or through the questions 

that came out. Is there anything else that any of you want to 

present on the record for the committee? 

Chief. 

Mr. VITIELLO. Well, thank you for this opportunity. Just to reiterate some of the testimony and what is in the prepared remarks, 

we are interested in having the most effective and efficient sustainable technology that is available. 

I think it is important—and I think we have heard this today— 

that we will never be as fast as the market to bring these things 

into the hands of agents. We have wonderful men and women out 

49 

there that have really great ideas about how to do the job more efficiently, but the bureaucracy doesn’t always support that rapid acquisition and putting those things in their hands as quickly as 

even we would like them to. 

But they are our best assets as it relates to that last—what we 

call the last 50 meters. You have to have people on the ground that 

support the technology, that the technology has to support them. 

But, at the end of the day, they are the ones that have to make 

contact with whatever that threat is. 

So we appreciate them for that work. We appreciate you, in your 

oversight role, in helping us prepare them to give us the tools that 

they deserve to be successful. So thanks for that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks, Chief. 

General Alles. 

Mr. ALLES. I would just like to thank the committee generally for 

the, you know, support they give to the agency in terms of us performing our mission. You know, not only the oversight part of it, 

but also the interest of the committee Members—multiple trips 

and, you know, looking at the stuff that we are working on. 

I could list a list of things that we want. We can provide that 

off-line. But just appreciate the participation of the committee. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. Thanks, General Alles. 

Mr. Borkowski. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I would just add that, recognizing the committee’s frustration, we certainly have appreciated the continued support despite the frustration. It has been very significant to us, and 

it has helped us a great deal. 

As we do go forward, I would like to have continued discussion 

about what do we do about the cultural and structural impediments, because the biggest beating I get is on time. Yes, cost and 

performance are important. I think we have done okay there. But 

the time is killing us all. 

Some of that, I think, will require a different thinking about how 

we accept risk. Because to innovate takes risk, and that means occasionally we will have failures. What is the right risk tolerance? 

Frankly, the community that works in this business is very riskaverse, and that is one of the things we really have to crack. 

But I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate the 

committee’s continued support. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. Those are the same types of discussions we are having, by the way, on the Armed Services Committee 

related to the DOD. 

Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I just want to say thank you for inviting us to testify today. 

Just some of the last items that we were talking about here, in 

terms of ultralight detection, the CGAP process, technology 

metrics, we do have on-going work for the subcommittee in a number of those areas. So we would be happy to follow up with you and 

your staff to brief you at any time, and look forward to that work 

coming out in the future here as well. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks, Ms. Gambler. I appreciate it. 

All right. I want to thank all the witnesses for your valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. 

50 

The Members may have some additional questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond to these, please, in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7(e), the hearing record will be held open 

for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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