*

Honorable Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior U.S. District

Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4708.

ISBRANDTSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC., a Connecticut Corporation,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

Florida Transportation Services, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff,

v.

M/V INAGUA TANIA, Her Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Freights, etc.,

in rem, Defendant-Intervenor-Defendant,

Zuki Teria Navigation, Inc., Claimant-Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellant,

Sea Road Shipping, Inc., Defendant.

Nov. 15, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court Southern District of

Florida. (No. 95-6206-CIV-WJZ), William J. Zloch, Judge.

Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and SIMONS*

, Senior

District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Zuki Teria is a Panamanian Corporation, which owned

the M/V INAGUA TANIA. Appellee Isbrandtsen Marine Services, Inc.

("IMS") provided bunkers and lube oil to the vessel on the order of

the vessel's charterers, Inagua Lines and Sea Road Shipping. IMS

thereby held a maritime lien against the vessel. Zuki Teria also

contracted directly with IMS to provide bunkers and lube oil to the

vessel, and agreed to pay IMS a consulting fee.

IMS made repeated demands for payment, but Inagua Lines, Sea

Road Shipping and Zuki Teria failed to pay for the bunkers and lube
oil. Zuki Teria also failed to pay for the consulting fees sought

by IMS.

IMS executed on its maritime lien and the M/V INAGUA TANIA was

arrested on March 1, 1995. Subsequently the District Court set the

bond necessary to secure the vessel's release at $294,560.00. IMS

purchased the vessel at the Marshal's sale on May 16, 1995. The

District Court confirmed the sale on June 21, 1995. IMS

subsequently sold the M/V INAGUA TANIA to Todds Point Marine, Inc.,

a party not involved in this action. There was no dispute that the

vessel thereafter sailed from Fort Lauderdale and is no longer in

the court's jurisdiction.

 Appellant Zuki Teria brought this Interlocutory Appeal

challenging the Order setting the bond amount, the Order for

interlocutory sale, and Orders denying Zuki Teria's Motions for

Reconsideration of those Orders. The Orders from which appellant

Zuki Teria appeals are not "final Orders under 28 U.S.C. Section

1291." Instead, Zuki Teria relies on 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(3)

to justify an Interlocutory Appeal.

Section 1292(a)(3) "provides jurisdiction of appeals from

"[i]nterlocutory decrees ... determining the rights and liabilities

of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final

decrees are allowed.' " Bradford Marine, Inc. v. M/V SEA FALCON,

64 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir.1995), citing Nichols v. Barwick, 792

F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1986). Here, because the Order setting

the bond does not determine the rights and liabilities of the

parties, we conclude that it is not subject to interlocutory appeal

under Section 1292(a)(3). City of Fort Madison, Iowa v. Emerald
Lady, 990 F.2d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir.1993); Silver Star Enterprises,

Inc. v. M/V SARAMACCA, 19 F.3d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir.1994).

 As for the Orders directing and confirming the sale of the

vessel, pursuant to the teachings of Bradford Marine, appellate

jurisdiction exists under Section 1292(a)(3). We conclude,

however, that these appeals became moot upon the departure of the

vessel from the court's jurisdiction, since all of Zuki Teria's

arguments concerning the sale focus on its claim to possession of

the vessel. See Fed.R.Civ.P.Supp.R. C(2); Mackensworth v. SS

AMERICAN MERCHANT, 28 F.3d 246, 252 (2nd Cir.1994); American Bank

of Wage Claims v. Registry of Dist. Court of Guam, 431 F.2d 1215,

1218 (9th Cir.1970).

For the reasons stated above, the appeal of the Order setting

the bond is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the remaining

issues are dismissed as moot.

DISMISSED.