FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS,

Debtor.

CAROLYN L. DAVIS,

Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK, N.A.; ONEWEST BANK;

and ELIZABETH F. ROJAS,

Appellees.

No. 12-60069

BAP No.

11-1692

OPINION

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Kirscher, Markell, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 12, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed February 17, 2015

Before: Susan P. Graber, Ronald M. Gould,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber
2 IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS

SUMMARY*

Bankruptcy

On appeal from a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel, the panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of

a petition under chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The panel held that the appellant was ineligible to be a

chapter 12 debtor because her “aggregate debts” exceeded

the statutory limitation of $3,792,650. The panel held that

appellant’s “aggregate debts” included unsecured portions

of creditors’ claims, even though those liabilities had been

discharged in an earlier chapter 7 proceeding, because a

creditor’s claim remains a “debt” so long as it is enforceable

against either the debtor or the debtor’s property.

COUNSEL

Richard L. Antognini (argued), Law Offices of Richard L.

Antognini, Lincoln, California, for Appellant.

Richard W. Esterkin (argued), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

LLP, Los Angeles, California; and Joshua A. del Castillo

(argued) and David R. Zaro, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble

Mallory & Natsis LLP, Los Angeles, California, for

Appellees.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS 3

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Debtor Carolyn L. Davis appeals from a decision of the

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming an order of

the bankruptcy court that dismissed her voluntary petition

under chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy

court dismissed Davis’ petition because her “aggregate debts”

exceeded $3,792,650, the statutory limitation for chapter 12

eligibility in effect at the time that Davis filed her petition. 

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A) (2010). The BAP affirmed,

concluding that Davis’ “aggregate debts” included her

liabilities for the unsecured portions of her creditors’ claims,

even though those liabilities had been discharged in an earlier

chapter 7 proceeding. Davis v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re

Davis), No. CC-11-1692-MkDKi, 2012 WL3205431 (B.A.P.

9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). We agree and, therefore, affirm

the dismissal of Davis’ petition because she is statutorily

ineligible to be a chapter 12 debtor.

Davis owns parcels of real property in California, three of

which are relevant to this appeal. According to the schedules

that she attached to her chapter 12 petition, Davis owns a

110-acre ranch in Paso Robles, a residence in Cayucos, and

a triplex in Paso Robles. Each of those properties is

encumbered by a deed of trust (and, with respect to the ranch

and the residence, an equity line of credit) in an amount

exceeding the property’s appraised value. Davis manages the

operations on her properties and, in 1997, undertook to

establish a vineyard on the ranch. In 2006, however, her

efforts failed, and she defaulted on each of the three loans.
4 IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS

In July 2010, Davis filed a voluntary petition under

chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Thereafter she received a

discharge, which released her from personal liability for the

unsecured claims associated with the properties. See

11 U.S.C. § 727(b). The “Explanation of Bankruptcy

Discharge” issued by the bankruptcy court “prohibits any

attempt [by a creditor] to collect from the debtor” any of the

discharged debts. But the creditors retained the “right to

enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest,

against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy.”

In March 2011, Davis filed a second voluntary petition,

this time under chapter 12 of the Code, which contains

special provisions for family farmers whose “aggregate

debts” do not exceed a statutory dollar amount. See

11 U.S.C. §§ 101(18)(A), 109(f). At the time of the second

petition, the statutory limit was $3,792,650, and the appraised

value of Davis’ properties totaled about $1.6 million, but the

amount of the liens encumbering the properties totaled about

$4.1 million. Thus, on the schedules that she attached to her

petition, Davis listed debts of $4.1 million; of that amount,

$2.5 million was unsecured.

The bankruptcy court dismissed Davis’ petition on the

ground that she had “aggregate debts” of $4.1 million,

exceeding the statutory limitation for chapter 12 eligibility. 

Davis appealed to the BAP, arguing that the unsecured

portion of each of her secured creditor’s claims should not be

included in her “aggregate debts” and, therefore, should not

bar chapter 12 eligibility, because her personal liability for

those claims had been discharged in her earlier chapter 7

case. According to Davis, because the secured portions of her

creditors’ claims were limited to the value of the secured

collateral, the value of her “aggregate debts” fell well below
IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS 5

the statutory limitation for chapter 12 eligibility. The BAP

affirmed. Applying our decision in Quintana v.

Commissioner (In re Quintana) (“Quintana II”), 915 F.2d

513 (9th Cir. 1990), the BAP concluded that “obligations

enforceable against the debtor’s property but for which the

debtor has no personal liability are nonetheless ‘claims’ and

‘debts’ within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.” In re

Davis, 2012 WL 3205431, at *5.

Davis timely appeals. We review de novo the BAP’s

decision and “apply the same standard of review that the BAP

applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling.” AmeriCredit Fin.

Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160

(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(f), “[o]nly a family farmer . . .

with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter

12.” Even assuming that Davis, by operating her vineyard,

qualified as a “farmer” who had “regular annual income,”

§ 101(18)(A) further limits her eligibility to be a chapter 12

debtor by mandating that her aggregate debts not exceed

$3,792,650 and that those debts arise mostly out of the

farming operation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A) (2010) (emphasis

added).1 Our cases have not yet addressed the precise

question presented here: whether the term “aggregate debts”

in § 101(18)(A) includes the unsecured portion of a creditor’s

1 The version of § 101(18)(A) currently in effect limits chapter 12

eligibility to individuals with aggregate debts not exceeding $4,031,575. 

The statutory limitation changes periodically pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 104(a); the current limitation took effect in April 2013. See Revision of

Certain Dollar Amounts in the BankruptcyCode, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,089-01,

12,090 (Feb. 12, 2013).
6 IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS

claim from which the debtor has been discharged in an earlier

chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.

To answer that question, we first turn to the text of the

Bankruptcy Code. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Plant

Insulation Co. (In re Plant Insulation Co.), 734 F.3d 900, 910

(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1901 (2014). As

noted, at the time Davis filed her chapter 12 petition the Code

limited chapter 12 eligibility to family farmers “whose

aggregate debts do not exceed $3,792,650.” 11 U.S.C.

§ 101(18)(A) (2010). A “debt” is “liability on a claim.” 

11 U.S.C. § 101(12). The term “claim” means—

(A) right to payment, whether or not such

right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,

unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,

equitable, secured, or unsecured; or

(B) right to an equitable remedy for

breach of performance if such breach gives

rise to a right of payment, whether or not such

right to an equitable remedy is reduced to

judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or

unsecured.

11 U.S.C. § 101(5). “The plain meaning of a ‘right to

payment’ is nothing more nor less than an enforceable

obligation, regardless of the objectives [sought] in imposing

the obligation.” Davenport, 495 U.S. at 559. In light of those

definitions, the Supreme Court has noted that “the meanings

of ‘debt’ and ‘claim’ [were intended by Congress to] be

coextensive.” Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS 7

495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(12); H.R.

Rep. No. 95-595, at 310 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 23

(1978)). The Code does not define the term “aggregate.”

In Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), the

Supreme Court considered the related question of whether a

debtor must include a mortgage lien in a chapter 13

reorganization plan after the obligation secured by the

mortgage had been discharged in an earlier chapter 7

proceeding. Relying on the text and legislative history of the

Code, the Court characterized the definition of the word

“claim” in § 101(5) as “the broadest available definition.” Id.

at 83 (citing Davenport, 495 U.S. at 558, 563–64); see also

Davenport, 495 U.S. at 558 (noting the “expansive language”

that Congress used in the definition of the word “claim”);

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (describing the definition of

“claim” as the “broadest possible” and noting: “By this

broadest possible definition, and by the use of the term

throughout title 11, . . . the bill contemplates that all legal

obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or

contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy

case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy

court.”). Applying Davenport, the Court had “no trouble

concluding that a mortgage interest that survives the

discharge of a debtor’s personal liability is a ‘claim’ within

the terms of § 101(5).” Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84. According

to the Court, a “claim” can be an enforceable obligation

against either the debtor or the debtor’s property:

Even after the debtor’s personal obligations

have been extinguished, the mortgage holder

still retains a “right to payment” in the form of

its right to the proceeds from the sale of the

debtor’s property. Alternatively, the
8 IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS

creditor’s surviving right to foreclose on the

mortgage can be viewed as a “right to an

equitable remedy” for the debtor’s default on

the underlying obligation. Either way, there

can be no doubt that the surviving mortgage

interest corresponds to an “enforceable

obligation” of the debtor.

Id.

Johnson and Davenport teach that the meaning of “debt”

is coextensive with the meaning of “claim” and, in turn, that

“claim” is broadly defined to include any right to payment or

any right to an equitable remedy giving rise to a right of

payment. A creditor retains a right to payment, enforceable

in rem, on the unsecured portion of a loan for which in

personam liability may have been discharged. We therefore

agree with the BAP that Davis’ “aggregate debts” include the

unsecured portions of the undersecured mortgage loans that

remain enforceable against Davis’ property, even though the

loans are not enforceable against Davis personally.

Our own precedent likewise supports that reading of the

Bankruptcy Code. In Quintana v. Commissioner (In re

Quintana) (“Quintana I”), 107 B.R. 234, 235–36 (B.A.P. 9th

Cir. 1989), aff’d, Quintana II, 915 F.2d 513, the debtors had

borrowed $1 million, which was secured by real property

valued at $600,000. The debtors defaulted on the loan, so the

creditor brought an action in Idaho state court for a decree of

foreclosure and an order of sale. Id. at 235. In that action,

the creditor waived its right to seek a post-sale deficiency

judgment. Id. at 236. The state court entered summary

judgment in favor of the creditor, and the debtors

subsequently filed a chapter 12 petition. Id.
IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS 9

The question for the BAP in Quintana I, then, was

whether the creditor’s decision to waive its right to seek a

deficiency judgment had the effect of limiting the value of the

debtors’ “aggregate debts” to the value of the secured

collateral. Id. The BAP held that it did not, reasoning that

the word “claim” should be construed broadly to include all

rights to payment, id. at 237, and that “[a]lthough, as a

practical matter, [the creditor] will only be able to collect the

value of the property, it has the right to payment of the entire

obligation if under some circumstance, the property is sold

for more than its present value,” id. at 239. We agreed,

noting further that, “[u]pon the sale of the property, . . . [the

c]reditor will be entitled to all sale proceeds up to the

[amount of the loan], plus costs of foreclosure and sale; [the

c]reditor will not be limited to the $675,000 scheduled value

of the property. . . . Therefore, . . . the amount of the debt is

the full $1,527,861.89 of adjudged indebtedness.” Quintana

II, 915 F.2d at 516 (citations omitted).

Our decision in Quintana II thus confirms the distinction,

established in Johnson and Davenport, between in rem and in

personam liability in this context, and likewise compels us to

conclude that a creditor’s claim remains a “debt” so long as

it is enforceable against either the debtor or the debtor’s

property. Accordingly, the debtor’s “aggregate debts”

include the amount of that claim, even after a prior discharge

from personal liability under chapter 7.

Our decision in Scovis v. Henrichsen (In re Scovis),

249 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2001), is not to the contrary. In

Scovis, we resolved issues that we had avoided in Quintana

II—namely, whether and to what extent the schedules

attached to a bankruptcy petition should be used to determine

the debtor’s eligibility for relief. 249 F.3d at 981. The
10 IN RE CAROLYN L. DAVIS

debtors in Scovis had petitioned for chapter 13 bankruptcy. 

We held, among other things, that a debtor’s eligibility under

chapter 13 “should normally be determined by the debtor’s

originally filed schedules, checking only to see if the

schedules were made in good faith.” Id. at 982.

Davis relies on Scovis to argue that her originally filed

schedules demonstrate her eligibility under chapter 12. As

noted, those schedules list the total “amount of claim[s]

without deducting value of the collateral” as $4.1 million. 

This amount is also referred to on her schedules as her

“liabilities.” The schedules go on to list the “unsecured

portion” of Davis’ total debts as $2.5 million. According to

Davis, those figures demonstrate that her secured debts total

only $1.6 million, well below the statutory limitation for

chapter 12 eligibility. That may be true but, as we have

explained, for the purposes of chapter 12 eligibility the

amount of a debtor’s “aggregate debts” includes the entire

amount of her creditors’ claims, whether secured or

unsecured, and whether enforceable against the debtor or only

against the debtor’s property.

Davis’ schedules list claims (liabilities) totaling $4.1

million, which is above the cap for chapter 12 eligibility in

effect at the time that Davis filed her petition. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 101(18)(A) (2010). As in Scovis, we rely on the schedules. 

They show that Davis is not eligible to be a chapter 12 debtor. 

The bankruptcy court properly dismissed Davis’ petition.

AFFIRMED.