The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

Maryland 

Fredericksburg 

Camp igns

1862–1863

The 

and
CMH Pub 75–6

Cover: Detail from Battle of Antietam, by Thure de Thulstrup (Library of Congress)
by

Perry D. Jamieson 

Bradford A. Wineman

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

Maryland 

Fredericksburg 

Camp igns

1862–1863

The 

and

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART, PH.D.

 Chief of Military History
The Maryland and 

Fredericksburg Campaigns

1862–1863

Strategic Setting

By the late summer of 1862, the American Civil War had 

dragged on longer than anyone on either side had expected 

when the first volunteers marched to war in April 1861. After 

losing the opening battles at First Bull Run and Wilson’s 

Creek, U.S. forces enjoyed a measure of success. Union armies 

and navies had advanced along the Tennessee and Mississippi 

Rivers and won significant victories at Forts Henry and 

Donelson, and at Shiloh, Pea Ridge, and Glorieta Pass. They 

had captured the important cities of Memphis and Nashville, 

Tennessee; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Corinth, Mississippi. 

Most importantly, for the Union they had secured Maryland, 

Missouri, Kentucky, and the New Mexico Territory, as well 

as areas of Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, North and South 

Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 

Although 1862 began with promise elsewhere, Federal 

armies failed to make substantial gains in Virginia. Between 

March and June, Confederate forces defeated troops of Maj. 

Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks’ Department of the Shenandoah 

and Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont’s Mountain Department for 

control of the Shenandoah Valley. From March to May, Maj. 

7
8 

Gen. George B. McClellan sluggishly advanced the Army of the 

Potomac, the principal U.S. land force in the Eastern Theater, to 

the outskirts of the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, 

but faltered on the verge of success. After General Robert E. 

Lee assumed command of the Confederate Army of Northern 

Virginia from the wounded General Joseph E. Johnston on 1 

June, he took advantage of McClellan’s hesitation. In the Seven 

Days’ Battles from 25 June to 1 July, Lee launched a series 

of fierce attacks that forced McClellan to retreat down the 

Virginia Peninsula to his bases on the James River. Although 

the Army of the Potomac halted the rebel onslaught at Malvern 

Hill, President Abraham Lincoln ordered a withdrawal to safeguard Washington in August, thereby bringing the Peninsula 

Campaign to an inglorious end. Having secured the Confederate 

capital, Lee continued his offensive and defeated Maj. Gen. John 

Pope’s Union Army of Virginia—reinforced with elements from 

the Army of the Potomac—at the Second Battle of Bull Run, 

twenty-five miles southwest of Washington, D.C., on 28–30 

August. The Union battle cry “On to Richmond!” had thus far 

proved hollow as Confederate forces wrested the initiative in 

the East. 

On 3 September, Lee 

sought Confederate President 

Jefferson Davis’ approval to 

cross the Potomac River and 

invade the North. The general 

believed that the weakened and 

demoralized state of Union 

forces following their recent 

defeats provided his army an 

ideal opportunity for offensive action. Operationally, Lee 

sought to destroy the Baltimore 

and Ohio Railroad, a vital eastwest Union supply line; impose 

the burden of sustaining his 

army on Northern farmlands, 

possibly into Pennsylvania; 

and encourage Maryland to 

secede. Davis recognized the 

merits of Lee’s proposal, and 

General McClellan

(Library of Congress)
9

considering that an immediate invasion might enhance the 

chances for gaining French and British recognition of an independent Confederacy, Davis quickly gave his assent (see Map 1).

On 4 September, as bands played “Maryland, My Maryland,” 

an anthem written by Marylander James Ryder Randall, whose 

lyrics implored his native state to secede, the first units of Maj. 

Gen. Daniel H. Hill’s Confederate division crossed the Potomac 

River into Maryland at Point of Rocks. They cut the Baltimore 

and Ohio Railroad’s line, disrupted communications between 

Washington, D.C., and Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and advanced 

toward Frederick, Maryland. The next day, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. 

“Stonewall” Jackson’s Left Wing command crossed the river at 

White’s Ford, while Maj. Gen. James E. B. “Jeb” Stuart’s cavalry, 

screening the army’s right flank, crossed on 5 September. By 6 

September, Jackson occupied Frederick, where he was joined 

by Lee and Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s Right Wing one day 

later. When darkness fell on 7 September, most of the Army 

of Northern Virginia was camped near Frederick. The force 

numbered about 50,000 men.

From his position at 

Frederick, Lee could move to 

break up the Baltimore and 

Ohio Railroad just south of 

town at Monocacy Junction; 

disrupt the Chesapeake and 

Ohio Canal, whose course ran 

parallel to the Potomac; advance 

into Pennsylvania, feint toward 

Baltimore or Philadelphia; and 

threaten Washington. Despite 

his proclamation to the people 

of Maryland, however, the 

largely pro-Union population gave the invaders a cool 

reception. A small number of 

Southern sympathizers turned 

out with muted enthusiasm, but 

the Confederate army attracted 

few recruits and the expected 

popular uprising never materialized. Local farmers and 

General Jackson

(Library of Congress)
11 Sep

11 Sep

13 Sep

10 Sep

LO NGS T R E E T

JAC K S O N

JAC K S O N

WAL K E R 

WAL K E R

B L U E R I D G E M

O U N T A I N S

S O U T H M O 

Maryland Heights

Loudoun Heights

Bolivar Heights

P l e a s a n t V a l l e y

S h e n a n d o a h V a l l e y

Shenandoah R

Antietam Cr

Potomac R

Blackford’s Ford

Dam

Dam

Dam

Dam

Baltimore & Ohio RR

Sharpsburg

Rohrersville

B

Williamsport

Sheperdstown

Kernstown

Berryville

New Market

Boonsboro

Keedysville

Snickersville

Berkeley Springs

Halltown 

Middleburg

Winchester

Leesburg

Harpers Ferry

Charlestown

Hagerstown

Martinsburg

VIRGINIA

VIR

Map 1
7 Sep

9 Sep

13 Sep

13 Sep

13 Sep

9 Sep

9 Sep

9 Sep

M c LAWS R . H . A NDE R S O N

D.H.HI L L

LEE

L E E

From Chantilly

I

IX

BURNSIDE

II

XII

SUMNER VI

FRANKLIN

M cCLELLAN

to Baltimore

O U N T A I N

P A R R ’ S R I D G E

Monocacy R

Catoctin Cr

Seneca Cr

Potomac R

Chesapea k e & Ohio Canal

White’s Ford

Noland’s Ferry

Cheek’s

Ford

Monocacy Junction

Baltimore & Ohio RR

Burkittsville

Middletown

New Market

Poolesville

Brookeville

Middlebrook

Darnestown

Seneca

Dranesville

Point of Rocks

Frederick

Rockville

Westminster

WASHINGTON, D.C.

GINIA

MARYLAND

3–13 September 1862

INVASION OF MA R Y LAND

0 5 10

Miles

Union Movement

Confederate Movement
12 

millers even demanded that Confederate purchasing agents pay 

them in U.S. currency. 

Meanwhile, in Washington, the task of rebuilding Federal 

forces after the twin debacles of the Peninsula and Manassas 

Campaigns occupied the attention of Union leaders. Over 

Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton’s objections, on 2 September 

President Lincoln placed McClellan in charge of the defenses of the 

capital with the specific task of putting the army back into fighting 

shape. Despite all his faults, McClellan seemed the best and most 

readily available choice. As the president told his secretary, John 

Hay, no one could “lick these troops of ours into shape half as well 

as” McClellan. 

McClellan met the challenge. He unquestionably remained 

popular with the men, prompting Lincoln to remark to Secretary 

of the Navy Gideon Welles, “McClellan has the army with him.” 

With a minimum of delay, the general integrated the new recruits 

coming to Washington, merged the units of the former Army 

of Virginia into the Army of the Potomac, and organized a new 

cohesive force of eight army corps. Despite the misgivings of 

Confederate troops in Frederick, Maryland

(Historical Society of Frederick County)
13

his critics, McClellan restored 

the Army of the Potomac to 

combat efficiency in less time 

than many—including Lee—had 

thought possible. Yet, by the time 

news of Lee’s invasion reached 

Washington, Lincoln still had 

not decided who should lead 

the army in the field. After the 

leading candidate, Maj. Gen. 

Ambrose E. Burnside, declined 

the president’s offer, McClellan 

took it upon himself to assume 

command of troops in the field.

Directing Maj. Gen. Samuel 

P. Heintzelman to guard the 

capital with the III and XI Corps, 

McClellan began marching 

north on 4 September with about 

84,000 men. He formed the 

six remaining corps into three 

subordinate commands and a 

reserve. Burnside commanded the Right Wing, which consisted of 

the I Corps and his own IX Corps; Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner—

the oldest active corps commander in the Civil War at age sixtyfive—commanded his own II Corps and the XII Corps in the 

Center Wing; and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s VI Corps, reinforced by an additional division, constituted the Left Wing. Maj. 

Gen. Fitz-John Porter followed with the V Corps as a reserve. By 

7 September, as the last Confederates crossed the Potomac to join 

the rest of Lee’s army at Frederick, Union advanced units reached 

Rockville, Maryland, just twenty-five miles away. 

Loyal Marylanders cheered and raised the troops’ spirits as 

the Army of the Potomac marched through their communities. 

Unsure of Lee’s intentions, Union leaders were concerned that the 

Army of Northern Virginia would advance on Baltimore. “Ever 

since the war began,” the Baltimore American and Commercial 

Advertiser newspaper asserted in its 8 September edition, “and the 

[Union naval blockade] made effective, [the Confederates] have had 

their eager eye on the supplies to be secured in this city. This has 

been avowed.” McClellan therefore had Burnside advance his wing 

General Burnside

(Library of Congress)
14 

north to Brookeville to be in 

position to intercept an advance 

in that direction. The General 

in Chief of the Union Army, 

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, 

warned McClellan that Lee 

might also recross the Potomac 

to strike Washington from the 

southwest. McClellan, therefore, 

kept Franklin’s command on 

the north bank of the Potomac 

near Seneca Creek to block that 

possibility. Meanwhile, Sumner’s 

column took the direct route 

toward Frederick and reached 

Middlebrook on Tuesday, 9 

September. McClellan then held 

a sixteen-mile front just east of 

Parr’s Ridge, halfway between 

Washington and Frederick, and 

much closer to the Army of 

Northern Virginia than Lee realized. The stage had been set for a 

great confrontation.

Operations

As McClellan’s vanguard marched into Middlebrook on the 

ninth, Lee contemplated his next move. He had assumed that when 

he invaded Maryland that the Union garrisons at Martinsburg and 

Harpers Ferry, Virginia, would retreat, thus allowing him to shift 

his line of communications west to the cover of the Shenandoah 

Valley. Those forces had not acted as he had anticipated, however, 

and he was reluctant to advance farther north while the two posts 

threatened his rear. He confidently believed that he could deal with 

the 10,000 men that held Harpers Ferry and a smaller number at 

Martinsburg, and decided to eliminate them before resuming the 

advance. On 9 September, he completed his plan for a new phase 

of the campaign.

The Confederate general developed an operation in which he 

divided his army into four parts. Jackson was to take three divisions west through Middletown, recross the Potomac to take the 

General Sumner

(Library of Congress)
15

post at Martinsburg, and then move eastward to capture Harpers 

Ferry. Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws would lead his own and Maj. 

Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s divisions south to occupy Maryland 

Heights and capture any Union troops attempting to retreat north. 

Brig. Gen. John G. Walker would seize Loudoun Heights, on the 

Virginia side of the Potomac, and support McLaws and Jackson. 

Meanwhile, Longstreet’s wing would advance north to Hagerstown 

via Boonsboro to await completion of the Harpers Ferry encirclement. Lee assigned D. H. Hill’s division to initially follow Longstreet, 

but to remain at Boonsboro to protect the army’s reserve artillery 

and logistical trains. After the detached commands accomplished 

their tasks, the Army of Northern Virginia would concentrate at 

either Boonsboro or Hagerstown. Despite the daring division of 

forces and the ambitious timetable, Lee was confident of the plan’s 

success. Lee counted on McClellan’s customary caution and the 

belief that the Army of the Potomac was in a very demoralized and 

chaotic condition, and would probably not be prepared for offensive operations for another three or four weeks. If all went well, by 

the time his opponent moved, Lee could be on the Susquehanna 

River threatening Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Col. Robert H. 

Chilton, Lee’s assistant adjutant general, copied Lee’s plan as 

Special Orders 191, sending them on to the principal subordinate 

commanders involved.

The Confederates began leaving Frederick on 10 September. 

Jackson’s divisions initially marched northwestward as if heading 

toward Pennsylvania, to mask the army’s true intentions, then 

turned west to Williamsport. On the afternoon of the next day, 

his command recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. As Jackson 

approached Martinsburg, Union Brig. Gen. Julius White ordered 

his 2,500 troops to evacuate to Harpers Ferry, fifteen miles away, 

where he, despite his rank, subordinated himself to Col. Dixon 

S. Miles. As the Confederates converged, Colonel Miles did not 

evacuate as Lee expected, but prepared to hold the town. By 

evening on 11 September, McLaws had gained Maryland Heights 

from the northeast, Walker occupied Loudoun Heights to the 

south, and Jackson approached Bolivar Heights from the west, thus 

surrounding the Union garrison. Lee then traveled to Hagerstown 

with Longstreet’s command on the twelfth, while D. H. Hill’s five 

brigades halted at Boonsboro to act as rear guard and to watch, as 

noted in Lee’s orders, “all the roads leading from Harper’s Ferry, to 

intercept any Union forces that might escape.” 
16 

As Lee entered Hagerstown, the lead Union unit in McClellan’s 

army—the IX Corps of Burnside’s wing—reached Frederick to a 

popular reception after marching from Brookeville via New Market. 

One New York infantryman wrote his family that “the place was 

alive with girls going around the streets in squads waving flags, 

singing songs & inviting the soldiers in for hot suppers.” Franklin’s 

column arrived from the south, followed on 13 September by the II 

and XII Corps of Sumner’s wing, and all cheered as joyously as had 

their IX Corps comrades. McClellan’s uncharacteristically prompt 

advance to Frederick and the Confederates’ inability to meet Lee’s 

stringent timetable put the divided Confederate army in a vulnerable situation. Lee later acknowledged to Davis that McClellan had 

moved “more rapidly than was convenient.”

When elements of the XII Corps arrived at Frederick, Cpl. 

Barton W. Mitchell and Sgt. John M. Bloss of the 27th Indiana 

Infantry found an envelope containing a copy of Special Orders 

191 wrapped around several cigars meant for General D. H. Hill. 

Sergeant Bloss realized that the document detailed Lee’s plan of 

attack “and what each division of his army was to do.” The two 

noncommissioned officers took it to their regimental commander, 

Col. Silas Cosgrove, who immediately carried it to Brig. Gen. 

George H. Gordon, their brigade commander. Gordon said what 

they found “was worth a Mint of Money & sent it to General 

McClellan.”

The intelligence gained from the document disclosed that 

Lee intended to operate against Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, 

but ruled out Halleck’s fear that the foray into Maryland was 

meant only to draw the Army of the Potomac north and leave 

Washington vulnerable to a rapid strike from the southwest. 

Discovery of the orders, at least temporarily, raised McClellan’s 

confidence. “I have all the plans of the rebels,” he informed 

Lincoln, “and will catch them in their own trap if my men are 

equal to the emergency. . . . Will send you trophies.” McClellan 

then boasted to Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, a brigade commander in 

the I Corps, “Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip ‘Bobbie 

Lee,’ I will be willing to go home.” Still, McClellan found room 

for uncertainty. The captured orders were now four days old and 

may have been canceled, modified, or superseded. Moreover, 

the orders disclosed nothing about the strength of the opposing 

army. McClellan continued to overestimate, believing that he 

faced “not less than 120,000 men.”
17

South Mountain

In order to reach Lee, McClellan needed to cross a major 

barrier, South Mountain, which was the northern extension of 

Virginia’s Blue Ridge Mountains. The South Mountain range, some 

70 miles long with elevations exceeding 2,000 feet, could only be 

crossed in a few places. Three of these passes—Turner’s, Fox’s, and 

Crampton’s Gaps from north to south—thus became McClellan’s 

immediate objective. On the morning of Sunday, 14 September, 

Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno’s IX Corps of Burnside’s wing moved west 

from Middletown and began reconnoitering Fox’s Gap, where the 

Old Sharpsburg Road crossed South Mountain (see Map 2). 

Reno’s corps opened the bitter engagement when it encountered Confederate Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland’s brigade of D. H. 

Hill’s division. During the fighting, Garland was fatally wounded 

and his brigade suffered more than a third of its numbers in casualties. The fighting escalated in the afternoon when seven IX Corps 

brigades contested with seven brigades from Hill’s, Brig. Gen. 

David R. Jones’, and Brig. Gen. John B. Hood’s divisions. Late in 

the action, Reno was mortally wounded as the combat ended in a 

tactical draw. Union casualties approached 900, and Confederate 

losses were more than 1,100. Although they had to retreat from 

Fox’s Gap, the Southerners had bought Lee some time. 

 Battle of South Mountain, by A. A. Fasel

(Library of Congress)
F RANK L IN

SU M NE R

BURNS I D E

HARPERS FERRY 14-15 Sep

CRAMPTON’S GAP 14 Sep

15 Sep

FOX’S GAP 14 Sep

TURNER’S GAP 14 Sep

White’s Ford

Noland’s Ferry

Cheek’s Ford

Blackford’s Ford

Monocacy Junction

Maryland Heights

Loudoun Heights

Bolivar Heights

P l e a s a n t V a l l e y

SOUTH MOUN T A I N

Shenandoah R

Antietam Cr

Monocacy R

Catoctin Cr

Potomac R

Chesapeake & Ohio Canal

Baltimore & Ohio RR

Sharpsburg

Rohrersville

Burkittsville

Williamsport

Shepherdstown

Middletown

Boonsboro

Keedysville

Poolesville

Snickersville

Halltown

Point of Rocks

Frederick

Leesburg

Charlestown

Hagerstown

VIRGINIA

MARYLAND

14–15 September 1862

SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND VICINIT Y

Union Movement

Confederate Movement

Battle

0 5 10

Miles

Map 2
19

Another sharp engagement took place one mile north near 

Turner’s Gap, where the National Road crossed South Mountain. 

Sometime after 1630 on 14 September, Maj. Gen. Joseph “Fighting 

Joe” Hooker led the I Corps of Burnside’s wing into action on the 

high ground east and north of the gap. When Union troops began 

their advance, an elderly woman who lived in the area waved her 

hands to warn the colonel of a New York regiment, “Don’t you go 

there. There are hundreds of ’em up there. Don’t you go. Some of 

you will get hurt!” The I Corps soldiers encountered Confederate 

brigades from the divisions of D. H. Hill and Brig. Gen. David 

R. Jones, and the separate South Carolina brigade of Brig. Gen. 

Nathan G. “Shanks” Evans. Late in the engagement, Union General 

Gibbon’s 4th, or “Black Hat,” Brigade of the 1st Division advanced 

along the National Road into a head-on fight that sputtered out in 

the gathering darkness. The losses in the fighting near Turner’s Gap 

were roughly even with around 900 Union and 1,000 Confederate 

casualties. Although the Southerners still held the pass when the 

fighting ended, their position had become untenable. 

Meanwhile, five miles south of Fox’s Gap, the Union VI 

Corps advanced toward Crampton’s Gap. Franklin, an overly 

cautious corps commander, thought he faced more than the 1,000 

men—largely from McLaws’ division—who held the gap under 

the command of Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb. However, Maj. Gen. 

Henry W. Slocum felt differently. At about 1600, he led his Union 

1st Division up the slope into the gap. The attack dislodged the 

Confederates from behind the cover of a stone fence. At that point, 

even the arrival of reinforcements could not stem the Union tide. 

The remaining rebels retreated down the western slope of South 

Mountain and left the VI Corps in possession of Crampton’s Gap. 

With daylight fading, Franklin halted his column for the night, just 

six miles from Harpers Ferry. The Confederates suffered almost 

900 and the Union about 500 casualties.

After darkness fell, Lee met with wing commander Longstreet 

and division commanders D. H. Hill and Brig. Gen. John B. Hood 

near Boonsboro. With the Union forces pressing into the South 

Mountain passes, Lee decided to break off the Harpers Ferry operation, end the offensive, and return to Virginia. Concerned that a 

Union advance threatened to outflank McLaws’ command, he sent 

a dispatch at 2000 to inform him, “The day has gone against us.” He 

continued, “This army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the [Potomac] 

river.” He then instructed McLaws, “It is necessary for you to abandon 
20 

your position tonight.” Upon learning of the defeat at Crampton’s 

Gap about two hours later, the Confederate commander informed 

McLaws that the elements of the army deployed to his north would 

retreat to Keedysville, between Boonsboro and Sharpsburg, to 

protect McLaws’ withdrawal. When Lee arrived in Keedysville early 

on Monday, 15 September, he sent yet another order to McLaws 

stating, “We have fallen back to this place, to enable you more 

readily to join us. . . . [W]ithdraw immediately from your position 

on Maryland Heights, and join us here.” Lee soon decided, however, 

that the terrain at Keedysville was unsuitable, and he opted instead 

to make a stand on the high ground around Sharpsburg, three miles 

away. After sunrise, the army retreated along the Boonsboro Pike 

and across Antietam Creek, where Lee concentrated D. H. Hill’s, 

Hood’s, and Jones’ divisions, and Evans’ brigade, in a defensive 

position on the farmland just east of the Potomac River. 

Harpers Ferry

Meanwhile, on Sunday, 14 September, as the battles for 

the South Mountain gaps unfolded, Confederate forces pressed 

the Union troops at Harpers Ferry from three directions. That 

afternoon, Southern gunners opened a heavy fire, with those of 

Walker’s command on Loudoun Heights proving particularly 

effective against the Union batteries. Jackson then ordered the 

divisions of Brig. Gens. John R. Jones and Alexander R. Lawton 

to demonstrate against the Union positions on Bolivar Heights as 

a diversion, while that of Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill shifted to the 

right toward the Shenandoah River and advanced along its west 

bank. As darkness fell, Hill’s men were positioned to turn the 

Federal left flank.

When the morning fog lifted on 15 September, Confederate 

artillery resumed firing. After about an hour, Hill’s infantry 

advanced against the Union flank. Sometime before 0800, 

Federal battery commanders began reporting that they had 

expended all their long-range ammunition. At a council of war 

with his subordinate commanders, Miles decided to surrender. 

Before the white flag rose, artillery fragments mortally wounded 

Miles—he would die the next day—leaving it to General White 

to surrender the 12,500-man garrison. Although Lee was not 

yet aware of the fall of Harpers Ferry, the victory had removed 

a threat to his rear and freed up a sizable portion of his army 

for other duties. 
21

Also unknown to Lee, General McLaws had chosen 

to ignore his army commander’s order to retreat across the 

Potomac. Since Franklin moved slowly on the night of 14–15 

September, McLaws shifted two brigades from Maryland 

Heights into two strong lines in Pleasant Valley, a mile and a half 

south of Crampton’s Gap. Franklin overestimated the number 

of rebels before him, and at 1100 on 15 September reported 

to McClellan: “The enemy is in large force in my front, in two 

lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of 

artillery and infantry on the right of the valley looking toward 

Harper’s Ferry.” Franklin continued, “It will, of course, not 

answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances.” By 

that time, it was too late to go to the relief of Harpers Ferry. 

The events of 14–15 September—stiff Southern resistance at 

South Mountain, Jackson’s capture of Harpers Ferry, McLaws’ 

unilateral decision to further delay the Federals rather than 

withdraw, and Franklin’s prevarication—would prove critical 

in the battle that was to come.

Antietam

While Franklin moved hesitantly through Crampton’s Gap 

on the fifteenth, other elements of the Union army responded 

to McClellan’s order to pursue Lee’s army. The Federals marched 

through Fox’s and Turner’s Gaps, down South Mountain’s slope to 

Harpers Ferry

(Library of Congress)
22 

Boonsboro and toward Sharpsburg. Having decided that the wing 

structure used during the march from Rockville had served its 

purpose, McClellan disbanded the wings and directed Burnside, 

Franklin, and Sumner to resume command of their respective 

corps. Burnside, however, at first refused to accept the new assignment, believing the change had resulted from Hooker’s request for 

an independent command. The Army of the Potomac began to 

deploy on the high ground of the east bank of the Antietam Creek 

that afternoon. Although it already presented an impressive sight 

to the Confederates, much of the Union army was still arriving 

from South Mountain and Keedysville when darkness fell. By 

1700, McClellan had established his headquarters in the two-story 

brick home of Philip and Elizabeth Cost Pry. Located on a hill 

about 300 yards up a lane from the Boonsboro Pike, the position 

offered a view of the Antietam Valley. From there, McClellan and 

Porter studied the Confederate lines until 1730. 

As Union forces concentrated against him, Lee had only three 

divisions—D. H. Hill’s, D. R. Jones’, and Hood’s—at hand, with the 

other six still well to the south. Longstreet arrayed all his wing’s 

field guns in clearly visible positions on the hills to discourage 

an immediate Union attack. Lee, suffering from the effects of 

a previous injury, had thus far traveled by ambulance for much 

of the campaign. After he spent the night of 15 September at the 

Jacob Grove house on Sharpsburg’s town square, his staff erected 

the headquarters tents in a grove of trees on the north side of 

the Shepherdstown Pike just west of town on the morning of 16 

September. That morning, Lee mounted his horse for the first time 

since late August. With the capture of Harpers Ferry completed, 

five of the six detached divisions began returning to the army. 

Jackson arrived with those of Lawton, and J. R. Jones, followed 

by Walker’s division that afternoon. McLaws’ and Anderson’s divisions would not reach Sharpsburg until daybreak of the seventeenth. Regardless of when they arrived, most of the reinforcements arrived exhausted after a hard march. The sixth division, A. 

P. Hill’s, remained at Harpers Ferry, to parole the prisoners.

Meanwhile, shortly after 1300 on 16 September, McClellan 

ordered Hooker’s I Corps across the Antietam Creek to be in 

position to assault the Confederate left, or northern, flank the 

following morning. If Lee had entertained any plans of continuing 

the campaign toward Hagerstown or Williamsport, Hooker’s three 

divisions, about 10,900 men, had effectively cut the Hagerstown 
23

Pike to close Lee’s route northward by 1800. The XII Corps, about 

8,800 men commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, then 

crossed the Antietam Creek and deployed about a mile to Hooker’s 

left rear. As the day closed, one of Hooker’s brigades engaged 

elements of Hood’s Confederate division in a confused firefight in a 

stand of trees that veterans later called the East Woods. “We got all 

mixed up until we hardly knew each other apart in the darkness,” 

a member of the 5th Texas Infantry recalled. The fighting ended 

inconclusively in the darkness with neither side suffering heavily. 

Hooker’s advance left Lee only two options: retreat or assume 

the defensive. Since retreating would admit defeat and relinquish 

the initiative to McClellan, he chose to remain and fight on the 

Maryland side of the Potomac. He resolved not to fight a passive 

battle but to conduct an active defense, making strong counterattacks and seeking opportunities to wrest back the initiative and 

resume the offensive. 

As day broke on the morning of 17 September, Lee stood 

greatly outnumbered. A diet of green corn and apples, exhausting 

marches, straggling, and casualties sustained at South Mountain 

had severely reduced Confederate numbers to about 38,000 men 

present and fit for duty. The rebels were in a serious position with 

their backs against the Potomac River. If the battle went badly, 

retreat would prove perilously difficult, as the only viable route 

back into Virginia crossed at what the local residents variously 

called Boteler’s, Blackford’s, Pack Horse, or the Shepherdstown 

Ford (see Map 3).

Lee’s line ran roughly north to south along a six-mile front, 

with Jackson commanding the divisions on the left, or north, and 

Longstreet those on the right. Most of Stuart’s cavalry division 

screened beyond Jackson’s left flank to the Potomac River. The 

Confederates had positioned both horse and mounted artillery 

batteries on the high ground called Nicodemus Heights—on the 

farm owned by Joseph and Mary Anne Poffenberger—to support 

the infantry of J. R. Jones’ and Lawton’s divisions in that sector. 

After Hood’s division had retired following the skirmish in the East 

Woods, it took a reserve position behind the simple white brick 

house of worship belonging to a congregation of German Baptist 

Brethren, or “Dunkers.” In Longstreet’s sector, D. H. Hill’s division 

and Evans’ independent brigade held the center of the Confederate 

line as it continued southward. On the right, D. R. Jones’ division 

deployed below the Boonsboro Pike, with one brigade forward 
to Blackford’s Ford

H O O D

J.R. JONES

LAWTON

D . R . J O N E S

R.H. ANDERSON

McLAWS

EVANS

STUART

MUNFORD

J

A

C

K S O N

D . H . H I L L

W A L K E R

L O

N

G S T

R E E T

LEE’S

 HEADQUARTERS

H O O K E R

( I )

M A N S F I E L D

( X I I )

McCLELLAN’S

HEADQUARTERS

PORTE R

( V )

BURNSID E

(IX)

SUMNER

(II)

Antietam Creek

Potomac River

Dunker

Church

Ground Squirrel Church

Nicodemus

Homan

Roulette

Mumma

M. Miller

Jos. Poenberger

H. Rohrbach

D.R. Miller

H. Piper

Lower Bridge

Middle Bridge

Upper Bridge The North Woods

The Corneld

The

West Woods

The East Woods

H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

S M O K E T O W N R O A D

B O O N S B O R O P I K E

SHEPHERDST OWN PIKE

HARPERS FERRY R O A D

SHARPSBUR G

0 1000 2000

Yards

EARLY MORNING

17 September 1862

B AT TLE OF ANTIE T A M

Confederate Position

Union Position

Map 3
25

to cover a three-arched stone bridge, alternately called the Lower 

Bridge because it stood the farthest downstream or the Rohrbach 

Bridge for its proximity to Henry Rohrbach’s farm. Walker’s 

division anchored the extreme right of Lee’s line, with Col. Thomas 

T. Munford’s cavalry brigade screening beyond Longstreet’s flank. 

McLaws’ and Anderson’s divisions initially constituted a reserve, 

while A. P. Hill’s remained at Harpers Ferry.

McClellan later wrote that he planned “to make the main 

attack upon the enemy’s left—at least to create a diversion in 

favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by 

assailing the enemy’s right—and, as soon as one or both of the 

flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with 

any reserve I might then have on hand.” The Army of the Potomac, 

like Lee’s, had lost men to straggling and combat, and although 

about one-fourth of them were inexperienced, McClellan still had 

about 72,700 effective men. After initiating the action the previous 

afternoon, he decided to attack on 17 September and not wait for 

all of his units to arrive. Franklin’s VI Corps would march in from 

Pleasant Valley at about noon, but would remain in reserve. The 

single division of the IV Corps would not reach the battlefield 

until 1100 the day after the battle, and Brig. Gen. George Sykes’ 2d 

Division of the V Corps would not get there until 19 September. 

Battle of Antietam, depicting the Union charge, 

by Thure de Thulstrup

(Library of Congress)
26

When the sun rose at 0543, 17 September, the sporadic 

skirmishing became more sustained, and Union guns opened a 

heavy fire that tormented the Confederates all day. D. H. Hill 

later recalled that “all the ground” in his front “was completely 

commanded by the long-range artillery of the Yankees . . . which 

concentrated their fire upon every gun that opened and soon 

disabled or silenced it.” As the sun burned away the morning 

ground fog, a soldier in McLaws’ division noted in his diary that 

the day became “clear and warm.” Col. John B. Gordon, a regimental commander in D. H. Hill’s division, recalled that it “was 

clear and beautiful, with scarcely a cloud in the sky.”

At about 0600, Hooker’s I Corps attacked Lee’s left with three 

divisions. One advanced southeast through the East Woods and 

another pressed south down the Hagerstown Pike, with the third 

in reserve. “We had not proceeded far,” Hooker reported, “before 

I discovered that a heavy force of the enemy had taken possession of a corn-field . . . in my immediate front, and from the sun’s 

rays falling on their bayonets projecting above the corn could see 

that the field was filled with the enemy, with arms in their hands, 

standing apparently at ‘support arms’ ” (Map 4). 

As the I Corps struck J. R. Jones’ and Lawton’s divisions 

with terrible force, the savage fighting covered the East Woods, 

the Cornfield and the pasture below it on David R. and Margaret 

Miller’s farm, and the northern part of the West Woods. In a little 

less than an hour, Hooker’s attack shattered the two Southern divisions and drove Lee’s left to the brink of disaster. Summoned to 

stem the onslaught, the hungry men of Hood’s small, two-brigade 

division doused their cooking fires before they could eat breakfast. 

The angry veterans stormed out of the West Woods in a headlong 

attack along the Hagerstown Pike and into Hooker’s reserve 

division at the northern end of the Cornfield. The counterattack 

restored the left of the Confederate line, but at a frightful price. 

Col. William T. Wofford’s brigade, for example, lost almost twothirds of its numbers, while the 1st Texas Infantry suffered a staggering 82 percent casualties. Hood later characterized this fight as 

“the most terrible clash of arms, by far, that has occurred during 

the war.”

Hooker’s corps had also taken heavy losses, possibly more 

than a quarter of its members killed or wounded, and needed help. 

Mansfield’s two-division XII Corps moved to its support, about 

the same time, or 0730, that A. P. Hill’s division left Harpers Ferry 
H O O D

J.R. JONES

D . H . H I L L

STUART

J

A

C K S O N

L A

W

T

O

N

H O O K E R

( I )

M A N S F I E L D

( X I I )

M E A D E ( - )

M E A D E ( - )

D O U B L E D AY

R I C K E T

T

S

Antietam Creek

Dunker

Church

Ground Squirrel

Church

Nicodemus

Roulette

Mumma

M. Miller

Jos. Poenberger

D.R. Miller

The North Woods

The

Corneld

The West Woods

The East Woods

H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

S M O K E T O W N R O A D

B O O N S B O R O P I K E

0 1000

Yards

MORNING

17 September 1862

HOOKER’S AT TA C K

Confederate Position

Confederate Counterattack

Confederate Retreat

Union Position

Union Attack

Map 4
28 

for Sharpsburg. When Hooker was wounded, Brig. Gen. George 

G. Meade of the 3d Division assumed command, but the I Corps 

was fought out and could do no more. 

When the XII Corps advanced against the remnants of J. R. 

Jones’, Lawton’s, and Hood’s divisions, D. H. Hill detached three 

of his five brigades from the center to bolster the endangered 

flank as stunned survivors of the earlier battle retreated out of 

the Cornfield. As soon as his corps entered the fight, Mansfield 

received a fatal wound, and despite the confusion that ensued 

until Union 1st Division commander, Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. 

Williams, took over the corps, its 7,600 soldiers, many of whom 

lacked previous combat experience, performed well. One division 

pressed into the Cornfield and drove some of Hill’s infantrymen 

into the West Woods. The other division advanced down the 

Smoketown Road. Two of its brigades turned the right flank of 

Hill’s three brigades and forced back some of the Confederate 

batteries. By 0900, after taking heavy casualties, this attack had 

run its course as well, and halted.

A relative quiet settled over the devastated fields with the 

armies in a stalemate. Federal forces had driven the Confederate 

left back a short distance but had failed to make meaningful gains, 

a pattern that would repeat throughout the tragic, frustrating day. 

Union troops had hit the rebels hard enough to cause horrific 

Confederate dead on Hagerstown Pike (Library of Congress)
29

casualties, but not enough to 

achieve decisive results. 

At about 0900, the axis of 

Union attack shifted, as General 

Sumner’s II Corps advanced 

from east to west. With its 

three brigades deployed in 

close order, Maj. Gen. John 

Sedgwick’s 2d Division led 

the way. It pressed across the 

Hagerstown Pike during the 

quiet period and entered the 

West Woods opposed only 

by the broken remnants of 

Jackson’s divisions that had 

engaged in the morning fight. 

General Williams wrote shortly 

after the battle: “Not an enemy 

appeared. The woods in front were as quiet as any sylvan shade 

could be.” After it had advanced to the far edge of the West Woods, 

Sumner halted the division facing west. Sumner later stated that he 

intended to move Sedgwick’s division south against the exposed 

Confederate left, but before he could initiate the maneuver, Lee 

sent McLaws’ and Walker’s divisions hurrying north toward the 

West Woods. After McLaws’ division moved into position on 

Sedgwick’s exposed left, or southern, flank at around 0920, the 

Confederates opened a withering fire. Lt. Henry W. Sanford and 

his comrades of the 34th New York Infantry found themselves 

“flanked and enfiladed by a vastly superior force.” Lt. Col. Francis 

W. Palfrey of the 20th Massachusetts Infantry attested, “The result 

was not doubtful. . . . In less time than it takes to tell it, the ground 

was strewn with the bodies of the dead and wounded, while the 

unwounded were moving off rapidly to the north.” Pvt. Roland E. 

Bowen of the 15th Massachusetts Infantry admitted, “All hands 

ran for dear life.” Sedgwick’s 5,700-man division lost 2,200 total 

casualties, of which 373 were killed, within a matter of minutes in 

the West Woods (see Map 5).

Although McClellan had planned for simultaneous attacks 

against his opponent’s left and right, so that a third assault could 

break the center, he did little to ensure that the maneuver was 

carried through. Instead of sending strong forces against multiple 

General Meade

(Library of Congress)
30

points on the thin Confederate line, Union attacks repeatedly 

struck limited sectors with only one or two divisions at a time. 

McClellan thus permitted Lee to reposition his outnumbered and 

widely separated units to meet each threat in succession. By the 

time the fighting on the northern battle area quieted down at 1030, 

Union troops had suffered some 7,280 casualties out of 26,000 

troops engaged, with the Confederates losing 6,500 of the 20,100 

they had committed to the fight. 

Shortly after Sedgwick’s 2d Division entered the West Woods, 

the main action shifted southward. Union Brig. Gen. William H. 

French’s 3d Division of Sumner’s corps came upon the two brigades 

of D. H. Hill’s division that had remained in the Confederate center. 

Hill’s men were posted along a farm lane that years of heavy wagon 

use, erosion, and repair had transformed into a depression, which 

the local populace called the Sunken Road and which offered its 

defenders a ready trench. As French’s division reached the high 

ground overlooking the lane, volleys of musketry tore into their 

ranks. Despite the fire, French’s attack made progress until General 

Anderson’s division went to Hill’s assistance at about 1000, and was 

later joined by some of Walker’s men. Meanwhile, the II Corps’ last 

uncommitted unit, Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson’s 1st Division, 

arrived on French’s left. Its lead element, Brig. Gen. Thomas F. 

Meagher’s 2d Brigade, better known as the Irish Brigade, entered 

the savage fight for the road later named the “Bloody Lane.” 

The arrival of Richardson’s troops proved too much for the 

rebels, and several of their regiments broke. The two Union divisions cleared the retreating Confederates from the trench. In two 

hours of fighting, Union forces suffered more than 2,900 casualties, including the mortally wounded Richardson, from their 

10,000 engaged. The Confederates suffered even more severely, 

losing 2,600 out of 6,800 engaged. By 1300, except for the artillery not silenced by counterbattery fire, all organized Confederate 

resistance in that sector had ceased, but the Union advance had 

also ground to a halt. Although it offered his best opportunity to 

drive a wedge into the Confederate center, McClellan was unable 

to discern the situation amid the smoke of battle as he watched 

from his headquarters. 

Around 1000, while the vicious fight for the Bloody Lane took 

place, Burnside received an order, issued at 0910, that directed 

him to attack Lee’s right. Although McClellan had ended the 

wing organization two days before, Burnside continued to regard 
L A W T O N

W A L K E R

M c L A W S

J . R . J O N E S

R. H. A N D E R S O N

D . H . H I L L

S E D G W I C K

F R E N C H

H O O K E R

S U M

N

E

R

(I I)

(I)

R I C H A R D S O N

M E A G H E R

Antietam Creek

Nicodemus

Roulette

Mumma

Dunker

Church

M. Miller

Jos. Poenberger

D.R. Miller

H. Piper

The North Woods

The Corneld

The West Woods

The H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

East Woods

B O O N S B O R O P I K E

S U N K E N R O A D

S M O K E T O W N R O A D

SHARPSBUR G

0 1000

Yards

MID-MORNING

17 September 1862

SUMNER’S AT TA C K

Union Position

Union Attack

Confederate Position

Confederate Counterattack

Map 5
32

himself as a wing commander. The resulting delay in Burnside 

passing McClellan’s order to Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, whom he 

still considered in command of the IX Corps, slowed the Union 

operation to seize the Rohrbach Bridge. If the disputed command 

arrangement caused the Federals a minor problem, the terrain 

made the assault across Antietam Creek and up the steep bluffs 

under fire even more difficult. Although the IX Corps’ 12,000 

Federal soldiers outnumbered Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs’ 500 

Georgians defending the west bank, the latter held a commanding 

position on high ground (Map 6).

As the main effort, Col. George Crook would lead his 2d 

Brigade of the IX Corps’ Kanawha Division in a charge down the 

hill facing the bridge and force a crossing. Although the narrow 

span would canalize its advance, the stream’s depth, current, and 

its steep, slippery banks made it the best option for the brigade’s 

success. The 11th Connecticut Infantry, commanded by Col. 

Henry W. Kingsbury, was to advance and act as skirmishers to 

support Crook’s attack by firing against the Confederate positions on the opposite bank. Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis’ 2d 

Division stood ready to exploit the successful crossing and storm 

the heights. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman’s 3d Division 

and Col. Hugh B. Ewing’s 1st Kanawha Brigade were to cross the 

creek at a ford that engineers had located two-thirds of a mile 

downstream to take Toombs in his right flank. Cox initially held 

the 1st Division, under Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox, as the 

corps’ reserve. 

At about 1000, following a short artillery preparation, 

Kingsbury’s regiment advanced to the riverbank under heavy 

Confederate fire and formed a skirmish line to support Crook’s 

assault. Having not examined the terrain beforehand, Crook led 

his men through the woods and became lost. When his unit finally 

found the creek, 350 yards above the bridge, part of the brigade 

took cover behind a snake-rail fence and began to exchange fire 

with the Confederates, while the rest were forced back into the 

Rohrbach orchard. Fully engaged, he informed General Cox that 

he could not reach the bridge. With losses amounting to nearly 

30 percent, and after being hit four times himself, Kingsbury 

ordered his regiment to retreat. He died shortly after being carried 

to the Rohrbach farmhouse. One half hour after the attack began, 

Rodman led his division downstream, only to find that the ford 

McClellan’s engineers had scouted could not be used. While he 
T O O M B S

A . P . H I L L

D. R. J O N E S

R O D M A N

BURNSID E

(IX)

W I L L C O X

R O D M A N

S T U R G I S

K A N AW H A ( - )

K A N AW H A ( - )

Antietam Creek

H. Rohrbach

H. Piper

J. Otto

Lower Bridge

Middle Bridge

Snavely’s Ford

H A G E R S T O W N P I K E

B O O N S B O R O P I K E

H A R P E R S F E R R Y R O A D

R O H R E R S V I L L E R O A D

SHARPSBUR G

0 1000

Yards

17 September 1862

BURNSIDE’S AT TA C K

Union Position

Union Attack

Union Movement

Confederate Position

Confederate Counterattack

Confederate Retreat

Map 6
34 

sent units to find a suitable place to cross, the fight at the bridge—

like those elsewhere on the battlefield—became a stalemate. 

At 1100, Sturgis’ 2d Division took over the task of securing 

the bridge. With a longer artillery preparation and covering fire 

from the rest of the 1st Brigade, Federal Brig. Gen. James Nagle 

sent the 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire Infantry advancing 

at the double-quick in columns of four with bayonets fixed toward 

the bridge. Using the Rohrersville Road, which ran along the creek 

from the southeast, the units came under plunging and flanking 

fire from the Georgians. Col. Ezra A. Carman of the 13th New 

Jersey Infantry later wrote that “fully one third of the Maryland 

men went down” and the 6th New Hampshire “was badly shattered.” The units in the column lost cohesion, and another attack 

ended in failure. 

At about 1300, Sturgis ordered Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, 

commanding his division’s 2d Brigade, to press the attack on a tworegiment front. Led by the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania 

Infantry, the brigade charged the bridge and captured it. 

Meanwhile, General Rodman’s Federal division had finally crossed 

the Antietam Creek at Snavely’s Ford, about two miles downstream, 

and turned the defenders’ right flank. The Georgians of Toombs’ 

brigade retreated west and joined D. R. Jones’ division, the only 

division of the Army of Northern Virginia present that had not yet 

engaged in the battle. Lee had no other reserves available.

After it had secured what became known as the Burnside 

Bridge, the IX Corps rested and replenished its ammunition. At 

1500, it advanced westward with two divisions abreast and a third 

in reserve. If the corps succeeded in driving the Confederate right, 

it would block the Harpers Ferry Road and cut the Southerners’ 

only route of retreat to Boteler’s Ford and across the Potomac River. 

As the Union troops pressed hard against D. R. Jones’ 

division and threatened the Army of Northern Virginia with 

destruction, A. P. Hill’s “Light Division” reached the battlefield. 

After marching about seventeen miles from Harpers Ferry, Hill’s 

division attacked the Union IX Corps in the left flank. Confederate 

Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolina brigade collided with 

Col. Edward Harland’s 2d Brigade of Rodman’s 3d Division in the 

cornfield of John Otto’s farm. A veteran of the 1st South Carolina 

Infantry described the Union troops as “in a crouching disorderly 

line” as his regiment “poured into them volley after volley, doubtless with terrible execution.” In the ensuing battle, Rodman fell 
35

from his saddle after receiving a mortal wound in his chest, while 

Confederate Brig. Gen. Lawrence O. Branch died instantly of a 

fatal head wound. As the sun set toward the Potomac River, the 

IX Corps retreated to positions that covered the hard-won bridge 

as the fighting came to an end. Out of the 7,150 men in Jones’ 

and A. P. Hill’s divisions, the Confederates suffered 1,120 casualties, while those of the IX Corps exceeded 2,600 out of the 13,800 

engaged. All told, Union forces had suffered 2,100 dead, 9,500 

wounded, and 750 captured or missing, for a total of about 12,400 

casualties. The Confederates lost 1,550 killed, 7,750 wounded, 

and 1,020 captured or missing, for about 10,400 total casualties. 

Put another way, the bloodiest single-day battle in United States 

history claimed 22,720 American soldiers as casualties. 

When the sun rose on Thursday, 18 September, the two 

exhausted armies faced each other across the battlefield. The 

Army of Northern Virginia had no fresh divisions. The continued 

presence of the battle-weary Army of the Potomac, albeit 

stationary, exerted enough pressure to force Lee out of Maryland. 

McClellan sent a telegraph message to Halleck, “The battle of 

yesterday continued for fourteen hours, and until after dark. 

We held all we gained, except a portion on the extreme left.” He 

informed Halleck that the army had suffered heavy losses, “especially in general officers.” Although he concluded by predicting, 

The charge at Burnside Bridge, by Edwin Forbes (Library of Congress)
36 

“The battle will probably be renewed today,” it remained quiet. 

That night, the Southerners retreated across Boteler’s Ford into 

Virginia. Purportedly, one unit crossed as a regimental band 

began to play “Maryland, My Maryland,” but the soldiers quickly 

shouted it down.

Lee withdrew toward Martinsburg in the northern 

Shenandoah Valley, leaving a rear guard consisting of his reserve 

artillery and some infantry to discourage pursuit. A detachment from Porter’s V Corps crossed the Potomac to probe the 

Confederate defenses and captured four artillery pieces before the 

end of the day. On the morning of 20 September, A. P. Hill attacked 

the bridgehead just east of Shepherdstown and forced the Union 

troops back across the river. One unit in combat for the first time, 

the 118th Pennsylvania Infantry, or Philadelphia “Corn Exchange” 

regiment, found to its horror that a large number of its 1853 

Pattern Enfield rifles proved defective, and suffered 269 casualties, 

more than a third of its numbers. After giving brief consideration 

to recrossing the Potomac at Williamsport, Lee conceded that his 

invasion of the North had failed. He decided that his army badly 

needed to recuperate and to collect and force its many stragglers 

back into the ranks. The Maryland Campaign thus came to an end.

Despite his strategic victory, McClellan was reluctant to move 

until he had received all the supplies he thought necessary for a new 

campaign. As he gathered strength, news arrived that Federal forces 

under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell had rebuffed the Confederate 

invasion of Kentucky at the Battle of Perryville on 8 October. Buell, 

however, was no more aggressive than McClellan, and a frustrated 

President Lincoln labored to get his generals to seize the initiative. After paying a personal visit to McClellan’s headquarters in 

the field, and waiting a week for the general to obey his order to 

advance, the president tried to prod him by letter. Weeks passed, 

and after repeated assurances that the army would move, it finally 

did so, albeit slowly, on 2 November. Three days later, convinced 

that McClellan would not wage a vigorous campaign, the president 

directed General in Chief Halleck to relieve him and to appoint 

General Burnside in his place. On 7 November, carrying the necessary orders from Secretary of War Stanton, the War Department’s 

adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Catharinus P. Buckingham, boarded a 

special train from Washington for the Army of the Potomac’s field 

headquarters. Meanwhile, left unmolested in the Shenandoah Valley 

for nearly two months, the Army of Northern Virginia had recov-
37

ered its strength and spirits as conscripts and recruits had arrived 

and stragglers and convalescents returned to their units (see Map 7).

Burnside Takes Command

Arriving at Burnside’s headquarters, General Buckingham 

presented him the appointment orders. To “my surprise, the shock, 

&c.,” recalled Buckingham, Burnside resisted accepting, partially 

out of loyalty to McClellan and partially due to his own lack of 

self-confidence, having twice before declined. After the adjutant 

general informed him that McClellan would be relieved anyway 

and that the only logical choice after Burnside was his rival Hooker, 

Burnside reluctantly accepted the command. Perhaps Burnside 

had known best. Although he had enjoyed some success with 

an independent command in operations on the Carolina coast, 

his performance at Antietam had left much to be desired. Once 

he took command of the Army of the Potomac on 7 November, 

however, he asserted his authority immediately. 

Burnside reorganized the Army of the Potomac into 

three subordinate commands called Grand Divisions, each 

consisting of two corps, to emulate the structure used by 

Napoleon Bonaparte. He appointed Generals Sumner, Hooker, 

and Franklin to command the Right, Center, and Left Grand 

Divisions, respectively. He then planned an operation in which 

Lincoln and McClellan meeting after the Battle of Antietam

(Library of Congress)
27 Oct

22 Nov

2 Nov

5 Nov

23 Nov

1 Dec

L E E

JACKSON

L O NGSTREET

19 Nov

26 Oct

6 Nov

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

V Corps

VI Corps

IX Corps

XII Corps

XI Corps

BURNSIDE

M cCLELLAN

Blackford’s

Ford

Potomac R

Antietam Cr

Monocacy R

Potomac River

Shenandoah R

North Fork

South Fork

Rap p ahannock R

Rapidan R

North Anna R

Martinsburg

Sharpsburg

Williamsport

Sheperdstown

Charlestown

Kernstown

Berryville

Middletown

Front Royal

New Market

Luray

Warrenton

Manassas

Junction

Centerville

Poolesville

Culpeper

Falmouth

Bowling Green

Spotsylvania

Orange Court House

Gordonsville

Strasburg

Harpers

Ferry

Halltown

Winchester

Frederick

Leesburg

Charlottesville

Fredericksburg

VIRGINI A

VIRGINIA

MARYLAND

0 20

Miles

25 October–1 December 1862

FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

Union Movement

Confederate Movement

Map 7
39

he intended to deceive Lee and move on Richmond. Part of 

the army would first feint toward Culpeper, while the rest 

marched quickly to cross the Rappahannock River and seize 

Fredericksburg. Using the town as a logistical base, he would 

push on to capture the Confederate capital—and possibly end 

the war. Burnside presented his plan to Lincoln and Halleck. 

The president and the general in chief preferred that Burnside 

advance rapidly against Lee’s scattered forces along the line 

McClellan had initiated, but they reluctantly approved the new 

army commander’s plan. Burnside issued the necessary orders 

for the delivery of pontoon bridges and stockpiles of supplies 

for the upcoming campaign to the ports of Aquia Harbor and 

Belle Plain on creeks off the Potomac River about fourteen and 

ten miles north of Fredericksburg, respectively.

The plan initially enjoyed surprising success. Burnside had 

completely deceived Lee, compelling him to rush most of his army 

south of the North Anna River in an effort to get in position from 

which he could block the way to Richmond. When Sumner’s Right 

Grand Division arrived at Falmouth on the Rappahannock opposite 

Fredericksburg on the night of 17 November, only a Confederate 

cavalry regiment, four infantry companies, and a light battery of 

artillery—about 400 men in all—defended the city. However, the 

pontoon bridges had not yet arrived, and with the water level too 

high for wagons and artillery to ford the river, Union forces could 

not exploit the opportunity the situation presented. When the 

rest of the Army of the Potomac arrived two days later, Hooker 

suggested crossing at United States Ford, just a few miles upriver. 

Burnside, aware of the problems McClellan had experienced when 

a river had divided his forces on the Virginia Peninsula, worried 

that the high water would only permit part of his army to cross, 

and so he chose to wait. 

Lee used the delay to his advantage and moved the first units 

of his army to the high ground behind the Rappahannock, instead 

of some twenty miles to the south along the North Anna, as he 

initially intended. Although uncomfortable with this deployment 

behind Fredericksburg, President Davis rejected Lee’s suggestion to hold the more tenable line farther south and closer to the 

capital, lest it be viewed as a retreat before the advancing enemy. 

In consequence, Lee ordered “Stonewall” Jackson to move his Left 

Wing of the army with all possible speed from the Shenandoah 

Valley to join him on the Rappahannock. 
40 

Bad roads, poor planning, a shortage of draft horses, and 

miscommunication with the Quartermaster Department further 

delayed the arrival of Federal pontoons at Falmouth until 25 

November. By that time, Confederate forces had prepared positions that covered all the key crossing points. In the town of 

Fredericksburg, Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s Mississippi 

brigade of 1,600 men dug rifle pits and cut loopholes in houses 

and other buildings to contest the Union engineers’ bridging 

operation. Meanwhile, President Lincoln met with Burnside 

aboard a steamer at Aquia Harbor to discuss the army’s next 

move. The president proposed moving two smaller forces to 

Port Royal and the Pamunkey River southeast of Fredericksburg 

to threaten Lee’s flank and rear. Burnside argued, with Halleck’s 

support, that such a move would be logistically more difficult and require too much time and an unnecessary amount 

of coordination between forces to prove successful. Instead, 

Lincoln, Halleck, and Burnside examined the possibility of 

crossing at Skinker’s Neck, about twelve miles downstream from 

Fredericksburg. An engineer officer reconnoitered a suitable 

and lightly defended crossing site. However, the plan came to 

naught when Burnside learned that elements of Jackson’s wing 

of the rebel army had begun to arrive in the area, and they would 

now oppose a crossing. With his 120,000 men facing 73,000 

Confederates across the Rappahannock, the Union commander 

realized that he had lost all the advantages his army’s quick 

advance had achieved. 

Burnside’s subordinates offered alternative courses of action, 

which were considered and discussed for days, allowing the 

Confederates even more time to improve their robust defenses. 

As the first week of December drew to a close, with discontent in 

Washington as well as within the ranks increasing, retiring into 

winter quarters was not a politically feasible option. Burnside had 

to attack Lee before the weather grew any worse. Where and how 

remained the questions. 

On the evening of 9 December, Burnside called his subordinate commanders together at General Sumner’s headquarters 

at Chatham Manor to present his plan of attack. The army 

would cross at three sites simultaneously. Sumner’s Right Grand 

Division would cross via two pontoon bridges at the northern 

end of town and on a third at the southern end of the city. 

Once across, Sumner would clear Fredericksburg and advance 
41

to dislodge the Confederates from their defensive positions on 

Marye’s Heights, which dominated the Telegraph and Plank 

Roads. Franklin’s Left Grand Division would cross using two 

bridges about two miles below town near the mouth of Deep 

Run and take control of the Richmond Stage Road. Burnside 

planned to hold Hooker’s Center Grand Division in reserve, 

ready to exploit the success of either of the other two. The chief 

of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, placed the army’s 312 

guns, with 147 of them on the advantageous high ground of 

Stafford Heights, to support the crossing. 

Burnside offered very few specifics on what he expected them 

to do next, and when his subordinates expressed a lack of confidence in the plan, he rebuffed their criticism. Despite the lack of 

detail, they reluctantly agreed to execute the plan to the best of 

their abilities. Units began moving into position on the evening of 

the tenth.

Fredericksburg

With so many men, horses, and equipment in motion, maintaining secrecy became impossible. At 0300 on the morning of 11 

December, soldiers from the 50th New York Volunteer Engineers 

regiment began moving their heavy pontoon boats down the 

muddy banks of Stafford Heights and into the icy waters of the 

Union artillery battery at Antietam (National Park Service)
42 

Rappahannock. Alarm guns sounded on the opposite bank, 

sending Confederate soldiers scrambling to their rifle pits and 

fortified cellars. As the unarmed engineers struggled to erect 

their bridges, rebel sharpshooters took them under fire. As the 

light increased and fog dissipated, the heavy musketry of the 

rest of Barksdale’s Mississippians drove the engineers back. With 

Union infantry able to offer little support, the engineers retreated, 

regrouped, and tried again (see Map 8).

At noon, Burnside ordered Hunt to support the engineers 

with as many heavy artillery batteries as possible to suppress the 

resistance. The cannonade provided temporary relief and damaged 

many of the town’s structures, but as soon as the firing ceased, the 

rebels returned to their positions and continued harassing the 

bridge builders. Finally, at 1400, volunteers from the 7th Maine 

and 19th Massachusetts Infantry crossed the Rappahannock in 

three pontoon boats. They established a beachhead and drove the 

defenders from the riverbank, taking several dozen prisoners. The 

rest of the units and the 20th Massachusetts Infantry followed 

across in short order, and the three regiments began to clear the 

Mississippians from Fredericksburg. 

Union infantrymen took heavy casualties as they fought 

street by street and house to house, but they forced Barksdale’s 

Battle of Fredericksburg, Laying the Pontoon Bridges, by Thure de Thulstrup 

(New York Public Library)
43

Confederates to retire to Marye’s Heights. With the infantry 

having secured a lodgment, the engineers completed all three of 

Sumner’s bridges—collectively referred to as the upper bridges—

with much less interference; and Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’s 2d 

Division of Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch’s II Corps and Willcox’s IX 

Corps crossed by nightfall. As Sumner’s lead elements entered the 

damaged town, frustrated and vengeful soldiers began looting the 

abandoned and destroyed houses. When stories of the depredations reached the Confederate lines, many swore revenge. 

The Union troops of Franklin’s Left Grand Division encountered much less resistance farther down the river. Since Lee had 

expected them to cross at Skinker’s Neck and Port Royal, their 

actual crossing near Deep Run caught him somewhat by surprise. 

Union troops built and began crossing the three lower bridges by 

1600. However, Franklin neither moved to assist Sumner’s crossing 

at Fredericksburg nor brought over the remainder of his units. 

Instead, believing he had to coordinate further forward movement 

with that of the Right Grand Division, he waited for Burnside’s 

orders. As a result, both assaulting grand divisions had not entirely 

crossed until the next day, which allowed Lee to again reposition 

forces to meet them after learning Burnside’s intent.

On 12 December, Burnside issued verbal instructions for 

a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the Confederate line. 

He envisioned that Franklin, supported by Hooker, would lead 

the main effort and attack the Confederate right anchored on 

Prospect Hill and take control of Hamilton’s Crossing. A transportation hub, the latter feature was the location where the 

Mine and Military Roads joined with another road to cross the 

Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad and connect 

with the Fredericksburg–Bowling Green–Richmond Stage Road. 

Sumner’s Right Grand Division would conduct a secondary effort 

by assaulting the left of Lee’s line to take Marye’s Heights and 

drive the enemy off the high ground. Burnside, however, did a 

poor job of communicating this concept to the two commanders 

most responsible for the plan’s execution. Franklin received a 

handwritten order early in the morning of 13 December that 

offered only an ambiguous explanation of Burnside’s intent. The 

order stated for him to “send out at once a division at least to pass 

below Smithfield and seize, if possible, the height near Captain 

Hamilton’s, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep 

it well supported and its lines of retreat open.” After waiting all 
R . H . A N D E R S O N

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13 December 1862

B AT TLE OF FREDERICKSBUR G

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M c L A W S

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 Plantation

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 Plantation

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46 

night for the order, Franklin did not take the time to pursue clarification and moved forward according to his own interpretation, 

albeit as cautiously as possible.

Just as the heavy fog lifted at 0900 on 13 December, Franklin 

followed Burnside’s orders and called for the I Corps commander, 

Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, to send forward one division toward the 

Confederate position. The veterans of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s 

3d Division marched forward from the Richmond Stage Road to 

begin the attack, with General Gibbon’s 2d Division to his right and 

Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday’s 1st Division to his left in support. 

They advanced against nearly 40,000 Confederate troops of Jackson’s 

wing spread along the wooded ridge from Hamilton’s Crossing to 

just south of Fredericksburg, and General Stuart’s cavalry protecting 

their right flank between Massaponax Creek and the Rappahannock 

River. On the far right of his line, Jackson had deployed his men up 

to four brigades deep with several batteries of artillery covering the 

open approaches from the river. 

As Stuart observed Meade’s Pennsylvanians forming to 

assault the Confederate position, Maj. John Pelham proposed 

posting one artillery section far forward so that its enfilading fire 

would slow the Union advance. After Stuart approved his artillery 

commander’s recommendation, the major rushed two of his guns 

to the Richmond Stage Road and opened fire on the left flank of 

Meade’s advancing troops. By skillfully moving each piece after it 

fired, the Confederate gun crews avoided counterbattery fire, while 

they inflicted severe casualties and delayed the Union advance for 

nearly an hour. Pelham ignored several orders to retire until the 

exhaustion of all his ammunition and increasingly effective retaliatory fire compelled him to do so, thus earning him the nickname, 

“the Gallant Pelham.”

Once Pelham withdrew, Meade pushed his troops forward 

again, but when they moved within 1,000 yards of the enemy line, 

heavy Confederate artillery fire from the ridge slowed his advance 

once again. Union batteries soon replied in earnest, initiating an 

intense artillery duel. For over an hour, Federal cannons from 

along the Richmond Stage Road and from across the river endeavored to silence the rebel guns. The Union cannonade ceased when 

the Pennsylvanians resumed their advance, only to be hindered 

by the marshy ground and dense undergrowth they had to cross 

in front of the Confederate lines. The terrain, however, provided 

them a serendipitous tactical opportunity. 
47

Confederate division commander Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill chose 

not to defend this section of his line due to its impassability, but 

he neglected to tell his subordinate Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg. 

Believing there to be other Confederate troops to his front, Gregg 

had ordered his brigade to stack arms at their position along the 

Military Road so that they would not accidentally fire on other 

units of Hill’s division. When Meade’s Pennsylvanians stormed 

through his line, Gregg told his men not to fire for fear of hitting 

fellow Confederates. Attacking Union infantry inflicted heavy 

casualties on the South Carolinians and mortally wounded Gregg. 

Meanwhile, Union Col. William Sinclair’s 1st Brigade wheeled 

right and surprised Brig. Gen. James H. Lane’s unsuspecting 

rebel brigade, while Brig. Gen. Conrad F. Jackson’s 3d Brigade 

wheeled left and shattered the line of Confederate Brig. Gen. 

James J. Archer’s brigade. Meade’s assault had punctured a gap 

several hundred yards wide in Jackson’s line and placed the entire 

Confederate position on Prospect Hill in jeopardy. 

The advantage would prove short-lived. “Stonewall” Jackson 

rushed the divisions of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early and Brig. Gen. 

William B. Taliaferro into the breach to halt Meade’s advance. 

Officers rallied the broken Confederate brigades and joined the 

counterattack. Meanwhile, the three brigades of Union General 

Gibbon’s 2d Division that had advanced as far as the railroad 

embankment on Meade’s right began to lose ground as Confederate 

pressure mounted against them. An enraged Meade repeatedly 

sent messages to the rear calling for support from Brig. Gen. 

David B. Birney’s 1st Division of Brig. Gen. George Stoneman’s III 

Corps, which had just crossed the river. Birney, however, remained 

idle, on the premise that Meade exercised no command authority 

over him. He asserted that he would only obey orders from either 

Stoneman or Reynolds. 

The Confederates now had the momentum and pushed 

Meade’s and Gibbon’s divisions back. As the retreat became increasingly chaotic, some Union troops surrendered. The Confederates 

pressed forward until Birney’s Federal division finally arrived and 

collided with Lawton’s brigade of Georgians, commanded at the 

time by Col. Edmond N. Atkinson. The battle surged back and 

forth between the rail line and stage road with such intensity that 

the soldiers called the area the “Slaughter Pen.” Despite the heavy 

casualties, the Union soldiers fought their way back to the railroad 

embankment by 1400. Union troops had suffered 4,830 casual-
48 

ties in the failed assault, but still maintained a tenuous toehold in 

front of Prospect Hill. Franklin sent positive reports to Burnside 

regarding the progress of the attack that conveyed a false sense of 

hope for the second phase of the plan. 

At the same time the morning fog had lifted to allow Franklin 

to launch his attack on the Confederate right, Sumner had begun his 

attack on the Confederate left. The Union troops filed through the 

streets of Fredericksburg and formed into line of battle just beyond 

the town. They observed the enemy defenses on a low-rising ridge 

known as Marye’s Heights across 500 yards of open plain in their front. 

About one-third of the way lay a deep canal, known as the Mill Race, 

which required the army to cross via a series of narrow foot bridges 

in column before re-forming in ranks for the assault. At the far end of 

the field, Confederate forces waited. The plain over which they had to 

march offered the attackers little protection, except for a handful of 

random farm structures and the occasional topographical rise. The 

advancing troops would have to brave both small arms and artillery 

fire from the Confederates who crowned the heights with more than 

a dozen artillery batteries and several ranks of infantry positioned in a 

sunken road behind a stone wall that sat at the base of the hill. 

Burnside believed that Lee had weakened his position on 

Marye’s Heights in order to shift forces to contend with Franklin’s 

attack to the south. Once 

Sumner’s men penetrated Lt. 

Gen. James Longstreet’s wing 

on Marye’s Heights, they would 

split the Army of Northern 

Virginia in two and force it to 

retreat in disarray as the Army of 

the Potomac continued to press 

toward Richmond. Burnside 

decided to remain at his headquarters on the opposite side of 

the river, allowing Sumner to 

coordinate the assault. Sumner 

chose General French’s 3d 

Division of General Couch’s II 

Corps as the lead element in the 

grand attack. 

The 1st, or “Gibraltar,” 

Brigade of French’s division, 

General Longstreet

(Library of Congress)
49

commanded by Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, marched through the 

town and over the Mill Race bridges in column and deployed into 

line of battle in the open fields west of Fredericksburg. The brigade 

was immediately struck by Confederate artillery fire, killing several 

men from the 88th New York Infantry. Undeterred, Kimball’s 

troops fixed bayonets and advanced toward the enemy position 

on Marye’s Heights until they were met by a hail of Confederate 

artillery and rifle fire. Kimball lost over one-quarter of his men 

dead and wounded, and the attack stalled just one hundred yards 

in front of the stone wall. Union Col. James Andrews’ 3d brigade 

followed. It endured the same horrific fire and lost nearly half of 

its men, but got no farther. French then sent in his 2d, and last, 

Brigade under the command of Col. Oliver H. Palmer to the aid 

of the rest of his division. Confederate musketry forced Palmer’s 

men to seek cover in the swales and small buildings that dotted 

the open plain. Seeing his attack falter, French called for reinforcements to help his troops continue the attack. 

Couch ordered Union Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock’s 1st 

Division to support the stalled assault. Riding fearlessly among 

his men, Hancock urged Col. Samuel K. Zook’s 3d Brigade to 

press forward, but it too faltered under the heavy fire in front 

of the stone wall. Minutes later, General Meagher’s 2d, or 

“Irish,” Brigade marched courageously into the fray with sprigs 

of boxwood stuck in their forage caps and green flags flying 

in remembrance of their native homeland. In one of the most 

valiant charges of the battle, the Irishmen pushed through the 

withering fire to within a few dozen paces of the Confederate 

position before being hurled back. Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell’s 

1st Brigade, the last of Hancock’s division, pushed its way 

through the survivors of the previous assaults and struggled 

to maintain formation in the face of the Confederate fire, and 

losing more than half of its men in the process. Hancock’s men 

came the closest to reaching the stone wall, but it cost them 

nearly 42 percent casualties in the hopeless effort. 

After watching from the cupola atop the Fredericksburg town 

hall, General Couch surmised that another frontal assault across 

the same ground to relieve the first two divisions would prove 

equally futile. Instead, he committed his 2d, and final, Division 

under General Howard to attack the enemy position at different 

locations along the stone wall from north of Hanover Street, in 

an attempt to turn the Confederate left. But when French and 
50 

Hancock desperately called for relief for their pinned-down forces, 

Couch rescinded the original orders and rushed Howard’s division 

to their assistance. Col. Joshua T. Owen’s 2d, or “Philadelphia,” 

Brigade threw itself into the fray only to discover that the troops 

that they had rushed to support had melted away under enemy 

fire. The men immediately dropped to the ground to avoid a 

similar fate. Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully’s 1st Brigade and Col. Norman 

J. Hall’s 3d Brigade pushed forward to positions on Owen’s right 

and exchanged fire with the Confederate defenders as they held 

their ground, but could make no gains.

The Confederate brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. 

Thomas R. R. Cobb maintained a murderous rate of fire from 

behind the stone wall into the repeated Federal assaults. Still, Lee 

and Longstreet worried that their position might crumble under 

the sustained attack. Longstreet therefore shifted part of Brig. Gen. 

James B. Kershaw’s brigade from its position south of the town and 

Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom’s brigade just to its north to support 

Cobb’s men. At about the same time, Cobb fell mortally wounded, 

and Kershaw took command of that sector. With the recent reinforcements, the Confederate defenders now stood four ranks deep 

as they continued delivering their deadly fire. 

Responsibility for carrying the position at Marye’s Heights now 

passed to the other corps of Sumner’s Grand Division, the IX Corps, 

commanded by Maj. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox. From its position 

at the southern end of Fredericksburg, General Sturgis’ 2d Division 

rushed into the assault. Sturgis sent forward General Ferrero’s 

2d Brigade. It failed to make serious headway, but despite being 

composed of mostly new recruits, the brigade tenaciously held the 

ground it did manage to take. Sturgis then pushed his heretofore 

uncommitted 1st Brigade, under General Nagle, farther to the left of 

the main attacks to strike the enemy’s right flank from an angle. But 

as Nagle’s men filed in adjacent to Ferrero’s, they took to the ground 

because standing upright invited certain death. Suffering just over 

1,000 casualties, Sturgis’ division had come to a halt in a matter of 

minutes. Although each Union attack had failed, Longstreet feared 

that the persistent assaults would eventually succeed. To meet a 

renewed threat, Lee shifted more troops from less engaged sectors 

to the line at the foot of Marye’s Heights.

Exasperated by the situation in front of Marye’s Heights, 

Burnside mulled options to try to break the stalemate. At 1400, 

Burnside ordered Franklin’s Left Grand Division to attack the 
51

Confederate right at Prospect Hill with every available unit. 

Success would render Longstreet’s position at Marye’s Heights 

untenable and cause the whole rebel line to collapse. The 

demoralized Franklin, having lost faith in both the plan and his 

commander, chose to ignore the order, and replied that eight 

of the nine divisions available were already engaged. Franklin’s 

refusal demonstrated that Burnside was quickly losing control 

of the situation. On the opposite side of the field, “Stonewall” 

Jackson sought to change the course of the battle with a counterattack to trap Franklin’s Union forces against the Rappahannock 

River. Intense Union artillery fire, however, convinced Jackson to 

cancel the plan. 

Meanwhile, General Hooker, commander of the Center 

Grand Division, arrived at the scene to assess the situation and 

to prepare his units to support Sumner’s attack. He observed the 

results of the earlier efforts against Marye’s Heights, consulted 

with Couch and Hancock, and concluded that any further assaults 

would prove senseless. He returned back across the river to give 

Burnside his assessment personally. Meanwhile, his subordinate 

commanders continued to move reinforcements behind the Union 

line. Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys’ 3d Division from the V 

Corps hurried across the pontoon bridge and through the streets 

The Union attack on Marye’s Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg, 

13th December 1862, by Frederick Carada

(Bridgeman Art Library)
52 

of Fredericksburg to form into line of battle for an attack on the 

stone wall. On the left, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin’s 1st Division 

deployed to relieve Sturgis’ stalled attack. 

Griffin led the three brigades of his division, reinforced 

with a fourth from Brig. Gen. Amiel W. Whipple’s 3d Division 

of III Corps, to relieve Ferrero’s brigade, still pinned down in 

front of the stone wall. Many of Griffin’s troops had heard false 

reports that Sturgis’ division had pushed the Confederates off 

the heights and charged the enemy position, not expecting to 

meet any resistance. The Southerners leveled a devastating 

blast into Griffin’s brigades and compelled them to halt and lie 

down next to Sturgis’ survivors. Shortly thereafter, just north of 

Hanover Street, Humphreys deployed his regiments, many of 

which were composed of recent recruits, as they crossed the Mill 

Race under deadly fire from Confederate artillery. Humphreys 

rode forward to inspire his inexperienced troops, encouraging 

them not to halt and fire, but to continue pressing forward 

and to give the enemy the bayonet. Surviving troops from the 

previous attacks, still lying prone, shouted for them to go to the 

ground as well, lest they be killed. Their comrades’ warning 

and the murderous Confederate fire thwarted the momentum. 

After suffering over 1,000 casualties, and having two horses 

shot dead from under him, Humphreys ordered his troops to 

withdraw to the canal ditch to reorganize. After Humphreys’ 

assault faltered, Hooker returned to the Fredericksburg side 

of the river having failed to convince Burnside that Marye’s 

Heights could not be taken. 

Back on the left of Sumner’s Grand Division, Willcox desperately sought to overcome the resistance that had stymied the 

assault of his IX Corps. He called Col. Rush Hawkins, commander 

of his 3d Division’s 1st Brigade, which had been guarding the 

middle pontoon site, into battle. Fortunately for Hawkins’ troops, 

the setting sun reduced visibility and therefore the accuracy of the 

Confederate fire. Hawkins’ men, many of whom were inexperienced, soon found it difficult to move across the swampy ground 

around Hazel Run under fire. The resulting confusion prompted 

Hawkins to withdraw his troops. As Humphreys’ attack faltered, 

the V Corps commander ordered General Sykes’ 2d Division 

forward to hold a defensive line at the Mill Race. Although Hooker 

had decided not to continue the assault, Sykes’ men would block 
53

any attempted Confederate counterattack and cover the withdrawal of Howard’s and Humphreys’ forces. 

Burnside finally crossed the river that evening to survey the 

battle lines. Despite the carnage that surrounded the scene of his 

army’s debacle, he was encouraged by the numerous units that 

still maintained a foothold in front of the stone wall. Receiving 

reports, such as that from Sturgis telling him that “our men 

are only eighty paces from the crest and holding on like hell,” 

contributed to his optimism. He returned to his headquarters and 

gathered his commanders to plan a new attack. He announced that 

the assault on Marye’s Heights would resume the morning of the 

fourteenth, spearheaded by his former command, the IX Corps, 

which he would personally lead in the charge. Sumner vehemently 

protested, arguing the plan’s futility. As other corps commanders 

joined in Sumner’s disapproval, the army commander finally 

conceded failure and canceled the attack. As the Union units that 

had not attacked dug entrenchments to defend against a possible 

Confederate counterattack, their comrades in front of the heights 

waited impatiently for orders.

Sunday, 14 December, proved uneventful. Aside from scattered firing, the battle did not resume. As the sun set, a Union 

messenger brought the recall order from Burnside’s headquarters. 

The Union troops formed ranks under the cover of darkness and 

conducted an orderly march back to Fredericksburg, leaving their 

dead and many wounded comrades on the field. On the afternoon 

of the fifteenth, Burnside sent a party of officers under a flag of 

truce to negotiate a time to bury the dead and recover the wounded 

who had managed to survive. 

Late in the evening of 15 December, the Union army withdrew 

back across the pontoon bridges to its camp on the opposite side 

of the Rappahannock, with units of the II and V Corps defending 

Fredericksburg as a rear guard. The next morning, these too were 

ordered back across the river, leaving no Federal troops on the 

Confederate side of the Rappahannock. By the afternoon of 16 

December, the entire Army of the Potomac was back in the same 

position from which it had begun the battle less than a week before 

and had nothing to show for its efforts. The Battle of Fredericksburg 

was over.

The list of casualties for the Union forces was staggering. 

The Army of the Potomac had suffered 12,653 casualties, over 

half of them sustained in the attacks against Marye’s Heights. 
54 

The Confederates suffered just over 5,400. The battle had been 

a catastrophic defeat for the nation and the Lincoln administration. Burnside publicly accepted responsibility for the loss, 

although he continued to believe that one last push would have 

carried Marye’s Heights. Despite the losses that wrecked many 

units, however, the continued and repeated assaults on Lee’s 

left flank had arguably prevented the Confederate commander 

from wresting the initiative, and possibly inflicting an even 

deadlier blow on the Army of the Potomac as it stood with the 

Rappahannock River at its back. 

Eager to redeem himself, Burnside developed a new plan 

to defeat the Confederates. This time, the Army of the Potomac 

would move several miles up the Rappahannock, cross the river, 

and advance along a course that put him behind the Confederate 

entrenchments at Fredericksburg. As Burnside prepared his 

army to move on 30 December, he received a message from 

President Lincoln who lamented about not being informed of 

the new plan. This puzzled Burnside because he had not told 

anyone in Washington about it. Without his knowledge, two 

general officers from Franklin’s Right Grand Division had 

taken leave and traveled to the capital. In an audience with the 

president, they had complained about Burnside’s incompetence 

and divulged the latter’s new campaign plan. Burnside immediately canceled the operation. 

Fredericksburg as seen from across the Rappahannock (Library of Congress)
55

Three weeks later, with Lincoln’s tepid support, Burnside 

again committed to the flanking march. As soon as the Union 

army began its movement on 20 January 1863, an icy rainstorm descended that lasted three days. The deluge inundated 

the roads and made them impassable. With men, wagons, and 

artillery mired in deep mud, the army could barely move. A 

frustrated Burnside halted the infamous “Mud March” and 

ordered the army back to camp. Glumly the army reversed 

course, enduring the taunts of rebel sentries posted along the 

opposite bank of the Rappahannock. By that time, Burnside had 

completely lost the confidence of nearly all his subordinates, as 

well as the soldiers in the ranks. 

Disparaging comments and rumors about Burnside spread 

like wildfire after the Mud March. General Hooker gave the 

most pointed criticism as he questioned his superior’s competence in the press. Incensed, Burnside issued General Orders 8 

on 23 January, which condemned Hooker and any other officer 

who disparaged his leadership and recommended that they be 

dismissed from the service. Burnside traveled to Washington 

and demanded that Lincoln either remove the offending officers 

or accept his resignation. The president chose the latter, and 

replaced the maligned Burnside with Hooker on 25 January 1863. 

Burnside’s Mud March, by Alfred R. Waud (Library of Congress)
56 

Analysis

Although the Battle of Antietam had ended in a tactical draw, 

strategically it was a great victory for the Union. The Army of the 

Potomac had fended off a Confederate threat to the U.S. capital 

at Washington, D.C., had prevented the rebels from penetrating 

into Pennsylvania, and had forced the Army of Northern Virginia 

out of Maryland. In the wake of the Confederate retreat, Union 

forces had reoccupied Harpers Ferry and restored Federal control 

of the vital east-west transportation and supply corridors represented by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Chesapeake and 

Ohio Canal, and the National Road. Not only had Lee failed to 

achieve any tangible gain, but he also had actually lost something 

most precious—the reputation of invincibility that had troubled 

Northerners and buoyed Southerners over the past several months. 

Unfortunately, McClellan’s slowness to exploit Lee’s repulse did 

little to bring the war closer to a successful conclusion. 

If McClellan had a terminal case of what Lincoln termed “the 

slows,” the president was not about to allow the victory of Antietam 

to go unexploited. For months, Lincoln had been looking for an 

opportunity to change the nature of the war. Not wanting the 

government to appear to be acting out of desperation, members 

of his cabinet had persuaded him not to act until a victory framed 

the scheme he wished to implement in a positive light. Antietam 

had finally provided the occasion Lincoln was looking for. On 22 

September, five days after the battle, President Lincoln issued the 

preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. In it, he declared that all 

slaves in any state or part of any state that was still in rebellion at 

the end of one hundred days—namely on 1 January 1863—would 

be “then, thenceforward, and forever free.” He considered the 

measure a military necessity for ending the rebellion. Although it 

would require an amendment to the Constitution to finally abolish 

the “peculiar institution,” Lincoln stated that with the proclamation “it became clear that the Confederacy stands for slavery 

and the Union for freedom.” The proclamation gave the North a 

moral cause larger than simply preserving the Union, struck at the 

underpinnings of the Confederate economy, greatly strengthened 

the diplomatic position of the United States, and discouraged 

European governments from ever recognizing, assisting, or intervening on behalf of the rebels. The Battle of Antietam thus became 

one of the turning points, not only in the war, but in America’s 
57

social and political history. Yet, the proclamation by itself could 

not end the war. Indeed, unless Northern armies successfully 

penetrated the Confederacy, not a single slave would be freed. 

Ultimately, then, preservation of the Union and the termination of 

human bondage in North America would rest on the same factors 

that had determined the course of the conflict thus far—weapons, 

courage, and leadership. 

The Battle of Fredericksburg illustrated just how true this 

was. After the events of September 1862 inspired optimism in the 

North, the Battle of Fredericksburg three months later represented 

the nadir of the Union war effort. Burnside’s indecisiveness and 

poor judgment, coupled with the one-sided casualties, squandered 

what advantage the success at Antietam had gained. The defeat 

even led some Northerners to urge Lincoln to delay implementation of the Emancipation Proclamation—something he refused to 

do. Meanwhile, the results boosted Confederate morale, burnished 

Lee’s already legendary reputation, and gave the South hope that 

its rebellion might succeed. 

Militarily, the Fredericksburg Campaign held positive 

and negative consequences for both armies. The demoralizing 

losses it had suffered at Marye’s Heights and in the Slaughter 

Pen notwithstanding, the Union army had neither retreated in 

First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation by President Lincoln, 

by Francis Bicknell Carpenter

(U.S. Senate Collection)
58 

disorder nor lost its cohesiveness. For all his faults, McClellan 

had succeeded in creating a tool well-tempered for battle. It only 

awaited someone skilled enough to wield it effectively. Burnside 

had misused the instrument. It remained to be seen what General 

Hooker could do with it during the coming year. 

On the other side of the Rappahannock, tactical victory 

at Fredericksburg had not transformed the war for the South. 

The Federal army remained encamped on the north bank of 

the river, occupying much of Northern Virginia and situated 

within striking distance of the Confederate capital at Richmond. 

Although the victory had lifted Southern spirits, Lee’s soldiers 

would endure a harsh winter at Fredericksburg with inadequate 

supplies for their already deficient forces. With Northern arms 

gaining more strength every month and with the Emancipation 

Proclamation now threatening the very foundations of Southern 

life, it was becoming even clearer to General Lee and President 

Davis that remaining on defense would not achieve a Confederate 

victory. The South would have to take the war to the North if it 

was going to protect its resources and shake Northern confidence 

sufficiently to persuade its antagonist to end the conflict on 

terms acceptable to the Confederacy. By halting the Army of 

the Potomac’s drive on Richmond in December 1862, the Battle 

of Fredericksburg had set the stage for a second Confederate 

invasion of the North in 1863, a campaign that would irrevocably 

change the course of the American Civil War. 
59

The Authors

Perry D. Jamieson is the senior historian emeritus of the U.S. 

Air Force. He is the author of two volumes on Air Force history, 

and four on the Civil War and the U.S. Army during the late 1800s. 

His most recent book in the Great Campaigns in the Civil War 

series is Spring 1865: The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War.

Bradford A. Wineman is an associate professor of military 

history at the United States Marine Corps Command and 

Staff College. He earned his doctorate in history at Texas A&M 

University and has published several essays on the Civil War in 

Virginia. His current research focuses on military education in the 

antebellum and Civil War South.
60 

Further Readings

Maryland Campaign

Clemens, Thomas G., ed., and Ezra A. Carman. The Maryland 

Campaign of September 1862. 2 vols. New York: Savas Beatie, 

2010 and 2012. 

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam Campaign. Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate 

Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ohio: Kent State 

University Press, 1999. 

Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign 

of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2012. 

McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam. New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2002.

Murfin, James V. Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and 

Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign, September 1862. Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004. 

Rafuse, Ethan S. Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A 

Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 

Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. 

New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1983. 

Fredericksburg Campaign

Brooks, Victor. The Fredericksburg Campaign: October 1862–

January 1863. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on 

the Rappahannock. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 

Press, 2008.
61

O’Reilly, Francis A. The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on 

the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 

Press, 2003.

Rable, George C. Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).


PIN : 103165–000

The

Civil

War Sesquicentennial