Filed 11/12/13 In re Julienne B. CA2/7 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

In re Julienne B. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B245265 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK91713) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

ALEXIS K.T. et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 APPEALS from orders of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Mark A. Borenstein, 

Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, 

Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant, Alexis K.T. 

 Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant, S.B. 

_____________ 
2 

Alexis K.T. (Mother) and S.B. (Father), the parents of 16-year-old Julienne B. and 

three other children, appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

order declaring Julienne a dependent child of the court under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivision (c) (serious emotional damage),

1

 removing the child from 

Father’s care and custody and placing her with Mother under the supervision of the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). The 

Department cross-appeals from the court’s dismissal of the sexual abuse allegations in the 

dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual 

abuse) and (j) (abuse of sibling), and its dismissal of the petition as to Julienne’s 10-yearold sister J.B. We affirm the dismissal as to J.B., reverse the subdivision (c) jurisdiction 

findings and disposition order regarding Julienne and remand the matter for further 

proceedings in the juvenile court. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On February 3, 2012 the Department filed a dependency petition on behalf of 

Julienne, J.B. and their two brothers (one then 16 years old, the other 15 months old), 

alleging Father had been sexually abusing Julienne since she was seven years old, 

including fondling her breasts, digitally penetrating her vagina and forcibly raping her. 

The petition additionally alleged Mother knew of the sexual abuse and failed to protect 

Julienne. The Department alleged the ongoing sexual abuse placed all four children at 

risk of serious harm under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). The petition further 

alleged Julienne’s three siblings were at risk that they would be abused or neglected 

pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j). 

Julienne had disclosed instances of sexual abuse by Father to her older brother and 

several of her friends and described the abuse in detail to police officers who interviewed 

her following the initial referral of the matter to the Department through its child abuse 

hotline. She confirmed the abuse in sessions with the Department’s investigator and 

 1

 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

indicated. 
3 

social workers and to mental health professionals, providing consistent descriptions of 

Father’s improper actions. Father denied the allegations. Mother also denied any sexual 

abuse of Julienne or her younger sister had occurred. 

The children were detained from Father and Mother and then released to Mother 

once the Department could verify Father had moved out of the family home. By 

March 31, 2012 Julienne had recanted her abuse charges, explaining she was angry with 

Father, who was very strict and disapproved of her clothing, dating boys and use of social 

media late at night; she was also upset by the continuing arguments between Mother and 

Father about their increasingly desperate financial situation following the failure of the 

family business (a donut shop). Mother reported to the dependency investigator she had 

examined Julienne’s journal after the children had been detained and found no mention at 

all of sexual abuse, only Julienne’s notes that she hated Father and thought her parents 

did not belong together. Mother believed Julienne was fabricating the sexual abuse 

allegations to force Father out of the home. Father described himself as a conservative, 

strict Asian parent and attributed Julienne’s false charges to her anger at his attempts to 

discipline her and control her behavior by setting rules. 

At the jurisdiction hearing held over several days in September 2012, the 

Department introduced into evidence its detention report dated February 3, 2012 with 

attachments including the police reports made following the initial sexual abuse 

allegations, its jurisdiction/disposition report dated March 28, 2012 and a March 13, 2012 

report of forensic interview of Julienne by Dr. Lydia Joseph-Hernandez, a clinical 

psychologist affiliated with Los Angeles County-University of Southern California 

Medical Center. The Department also submitted a DVD and transcript of the interview. 

All of this material predated Julienne’s recantation on March 31, 2012. Finally, the 

Department introduced an interim review report dated May 7, 2012, which attached a 

multidisciplinary assessment team (MAT) report. The Department’s position was that 

Julienne’s original charges of sexual abuse were true and her retraction the result of 

pressure and lack of support from Mother. 
4 

Julienne, called by Father, was the only witness at the hearing. She testified in 

chambers, yet again stating the abuse allegations were not true and insisting no one had 

coached her or encouraged her to recant the charges. She explained her desire for more 

freedom in her personal life, her frustration with Father’s strictness and her unhappiness 

with her parents’ arguing led her to research what she could do to use against Father. 

One of her friends told her about another girl who had been raped by her stepfather, 

which gave Julienne the idea of making the sexual abuse allegations that precipitated the 

dependency petition. She subsequently learned the consequences of her false allegations 

were far more serious than she had anticipated and was now telling the truth. 

After the close of evidence and argument of counsel on September 21, 2012, the 

court ruled the Department had not met its burden of proof with respect to the 

section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j) counts. The court explained, after viewing the 

DVD recording of her forensic interview, which occurred several days before she 

recanted, and observing Julienne’s demeanor during her live testimony and while in court 

as counsel and the court discussed what had or had not occurred, it found her to be 

“exceptionally intelligent, but manipulative and immature. . . . I think based on the 

evidence and burdens of proof that Julienne concocted a plan that included the most 

violent, offensive and repulsive allegations one can make against a parent, especially by a 

daughter against a father. And I don’t believe that any of these allegations were true.” 

The court determined the statements Julienne made during the forensic interview were 

not believable, noting her unemotional, matter-of-fact demeanor when describing years of 

alleged sexual abuse by her father. And it emphasized that, when still asserting in the 

recorded interview that Father had raped and otherwise violently abused her for years, 

Julienne showed no anger or disgust toward Father and no desire to have him sent to 

prison or even kept away from her or her younger sister. 

Although dismissing the three counts alleged by the Department in its section 300 

petition, the court on its own motion found, based on the evidence presented during the 

hearing, that Julienne was suffering from severe emotional damage, as evidenced by her 
5 

severe anxiety and aggressive behavior toward Father, and that Father and Mother had 

failed to recognize the substantial need for appropriate mental health care for Julienne. 

Accordingly, the court ordered the petition amended to conform to proof to add a new 

section 300, subdivision (c), allegation and sustained the amended petition as to Julienne. 

The petition as to J.B. and the other two siblings was dismissed. 

At a contested disposition hearing on October 26, 2012 both Father and Mother 

requested that Father be allowed to return to the family home. In addition, Father 

objected to the requirement in the proposed case plan that he participate in individual 

counseling and a parenting class since the sustained allegation related to Julienne’s 

mental health, not disciplinary issues. He did not object to participating in conjoint 

counseling with Julienne. Julienne’s counsel joined the Department’s recommendation 

that Father not be allowed to return home at that time and that family members engage in 

both individual counseling and conjoint counseling before reuniting “to make sure that 

the family dynamics are not such that something like this would happen again.” 

The court acknowledged that, by keeping Father out of the house, it was “doing 

exactly what Julienne had planned inappropriately to do, and that is disturbing.” But the 

court emphasized its belief that, “even though she has some measure of satisfaction for 

her ill-conceived plan, it did uncover deeper concerns that I think need to be addressed.” 

Accordingly, the court ordered Julienne removed from the custody of her father and 

returned to her mother under the supervision of the Department. Mother was ordered to 

participate in individual counseling to address case issues and conjoint counseling with 

Julienne. Father was ordered to participate in individual counseling and conjoint 

counseling with Julienne, but not parenting class; his visitation with Julienne was to be 

monitored. The court additionally ordered family preservation services.

2

 2 On October 8, 2013 the juvenile court terminated the home-of-parent-mother order 

and placed Julienne with both parents under the supervision of the Department. We take 

judicial notice of the court’s October 8, 2013 minute order pursuant to Evidence Code 

sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459. 
6 

Father and Mother each filed timely notices of appeal from the jurisdiction and 

disposition findings and orders under section 300, subdivision (c). The Department filed 

a cross-appeal challenging dismissal of the sexual abuse counts alleged under section 

300, subdivisions (b) and (d), as to Julienne and J.B. and subdivision (j) as to J.B., and 

the dismissal of the dependency petition as to J.B. 

DISCUSSION 

1. The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Dismissing the Sexual Abuse 

Counts After Finding Julienne’s Recantation Credible 

The Department’s reports and Dr. Joseph-Hernandez’s forensic interview of 

Julienne, introduced into evidence at the jurisdiction hearing, would reasonably support a 

finding that Julienne’s accusations of sexual abuse by Father were credible and her 

recantation false, the result of pressure from Mother and concern for the welfare of her 

younger siblings if Father were removed from the family home. As the Department 

argues, her statements regarding the alleged sexual abuse were highly detailed and 

consistent over time whether she was speaking to friends, law enforcement officers, the 

social worker or forensic psychologist, all of whom found her believable. Yet the 

juvenile court, the sole finder of fact, saw and heard Julienne’s testimony denying any 

abuse had occurred and explaining why she had lied; the court found her recantation 

credible and accepted her testimony as true. It is not within our province to substitute our 

evaluation of Julienne’s credibility for that of the juvenile court. (In re Ana C. (2012) 

204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“[t]hat the dependency court reasonably could have 

assessed [the minor’s] credibility less favorably or that our court could reasonably make a 

different assessment of credibility is not sufficient grounds for reversal”]; see In re 

Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 [appellate court defers to juvenile court 

on all issues of credibility]; In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733-734 [same]; see 

generally People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 [reviewing court neither reweighs 

evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility].) 

 To be sure, if a witness’s testimony is physically impossible or patently false on its 

face, we are not obligated to accept it. (In re Ana C., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329; 
7 

see People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 124 [“[t]he standard for rejecting a 

witness’s statements on this ground requires ‘“‘either a physical impossibility that they 

are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or 

deductions’”’”]; see generally People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585 [“[u]nless it 

describes facts or events that are physically impossible or inherently improbable, the 

testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction”].) Here, although the 

evidence marshaled by the Department in support of the cross-appeal tends to impeach 

the credibility of Julienne’s denial of any abuse by Father, “impeachment is not 

impossibility.” (In re Ana C., at p. 1329.) Julienne’s explanation of why and how she 

fabricated the charge of sexual abuse certainly was not physically impossible, and there is 

nothing about it that marks it as patently false or even implausible. The juvenile court’s 

decision to accept her testimony and to dismiss the sexual abuse counts was well within 

its discretion.

3

 

 3

 The Department misstates somewhat the appropriate standard of review. The 

question before us is not whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

decision to dismiss the sexual abuse counts, as the Department contends, but whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the Department on this issue as a matter of law: 

When “‘the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a 

reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the 

appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the 

appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was 

insufficient to support a finding.”’” (Sonic Mfg. Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466; see generally Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare 

County Employees’ Retirement Assoc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 [“[a]lthough the 

issue on this appeal has been framed as whether there is substantial evidence in the record 

to support the trial court’s conclusion that [employee] had not met his burden to show a 

real and measurable connection between his psychiatric disability and his employment, 

there is a conceptual and substantive distinction within the substantial evidence analysis 

depending on who has the burden of proof on a particular issue, which party prevailed on 

that issue and who appealed”].) 
8 

2. The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion by Amending the Petition To 

Conform to Proof Without Providing Mother and Father Advance Notice and 

an Adequate Opportunity To Be Heard 

 a. Discussion regarding a section 300, subdivision (c), count

Julienne completed her testimony on the second day of the jurisdiction hearing. 

No party had any other evidence, and the court pronounced the evidence closed. 

Counsel for the Department urged the court to sustain the sexual abuse allegations 

notwithstanding Julienne’s complete recantation and insistence that no abuse had 

occurred. Arguing next, Jennifer Lorson, counsel for J.B. and the other two siblings, 

asked the court, “How can we guaranty that my clients are going to be safe in the home? 

If the court takes the position that these are lies, then how do I protect my children from 

this yet happening again and being pulled out? [¶] . . . [¶] Now, my children are at grave 

risk of being detained again if she decides he’s too strict again. And they get all detained 

again.” The solution Ms. Lorson proposed was to amend the petition to conform to proof 

to add a new subdivision (b) (failure to protect) or subdivision (c) (serious emotional 

damage) count. Responding to that suggestion, the court asked how it would amend if it 

were to conclude from the videotaped forensic interview and the MAT assessment that 

Julienne had “a serious emotional numbing and persistent avoidance such that her 

conduct and her mental health puts the children at risk.” Ms. Lorson suggested a new 

subdivision (b) count, alleging the parents did not address the needs of Julienne 

adequately.

4

 

The court initially expressed skepticism, noting “I have limited jurisdiction. It’s 

not a family court, it’s a dependency court. I can’t just say, oh, I think they need 

counseling, which they do, whatever the outcome, and just order counseling. I mean I 

have to find a jurisdictional basis to find the children are subject to [section] 300.” 

Continuing with the theme presented by Ms. Lorson, Julienne’s counsel, although 

 4

 Ultimately the court and counsel recognized that section 300, subdivision (b), does 

not provide for jurisdiction based on emotional harm or damage. (In re Daisy H. (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 713, 718.) 
9 

emphasizing she could not argue the sexual abuse counts should be sustained because her 

client’s position was to the contrary, agreed the family needed services. “Julienne is 

adamant that it didn’t happen. I don’t think anyone could say that they don’t need 

services and that there’s not something abusive going on in this home, whether it’s sexual 

abuse or some other kind of abuse. . . . I can’t argue for it to be sustained because my 

client wishes for it to be dismissed, but I can’t argue for dismissal because I don’t believe 

it would be safe for my client to have this entire petition dismissed.” 

Father’s counsel acknowledged the court had the power under appropriate 

circumstances to amend a petition to conform to proof—giving as an example changing 

the details of a domestic violence count from hitting to slapping. But Father’s counsel 

argued that a change from a charge of sexual abuse to failure to address the emotional 

problems of the child required advance notice to allow Father and Mother to present 

different evidence regarding what they did or did not do on that issue. 

After further argument, including the Department’s counsel’s request that the 

court amend to conform to proof by including a subdivision (c) count if it did not find the 

evidence sufficient to sustain the sexual abuse counts actually alleged in the petition, the 

court tentatively concluded, “although not pled, the evidence amply shows that the 

parents failed to, in the words of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(c), to 

recognize that she was suffering from emotional injury evidenced by anxiety and what I 

can only characterize as aggression toward others, primarily her father, and that as a 

result of the parents failing to take steps to address that emotional damage, she was 

injured and so were her siblings.”

5

 The court continued the jurisdiction hearing for 10 

days to permit counsel to confer with their clients regarding its tentative decision. 

 5

 Following the court’s tentative ruling, counsel for the Department reminded the 

court that a sustained section 300, subdivision (c), count did not provide a basis under 

subdivision (j) for jurisdiction over the siblings. (See § 300, subd. (j) [court may adjudge 

child a dependent of the court if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected as 

defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child 
10 

At the continued jurisdiction hearing counsel for Mother and Father argued the 

notice for the putative subdivision (c) count was inadequate and the evidence as 

presented insufficient to demonstrate Julienne was suffering from severe emotional 

damage caused by the parents’ conduct. As discussed, following further argument from 

counsel for the Department and Julienne, the court dismissed the subdivision (b), (d) and 

(j) counts, and amended the petition to conform to proof and sustained the newly drafted 

subdivision (c) count. 

b. The addition of a new and different basis for asserting dependency 

jurisdiction after the close of evidence prejudiced Father and Mother by 

depriving them of fair notice and an opportunity to respond to the charge 

A juvenile court may amend a dependency petition to conform to the evidence 

received at the jurisdiction hearing to remedy immaterial variances between the petition 

and proof. (§ 348; Code Civ. Proc., § 470.) However, material amendments that mislead 

a party to his or her prejudice are not allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 469-470; 

In re Andrew L. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 683, 689.) “Given the haste with which 

petitions are sometimes drafted . . . , the ability to amend according to proof plays an 

important role in the overall dependency scheme. If a variance between pleading and 

proof—to use the traditional term of art from civil law [citation]—is so wide that it 

would, in effect violate due process to allow the amendment, the court should, of course, 

refuse any such amendment. . . . [¶] The basic rule from civil law, however, is that 

amendments to conform to proof are favored, and should not be denied unless the 

pleading as drafted prior to the proposed amendment would have misled the adversarial 

party to its prejudice.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1041-1042 

(Jessica C.); accord, In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1640 [“[o]nly if the 

variance between the petition and the proof offered at the jurisdictional hearing is so great 

that the parent is denied constitutionally adequate notice of the allegations against him or 

 

will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions”]. The court acknowledged 

the petition as to Julienne’s three siblings would be dismissed. 
11 

her should a juvenile court properly refuse to allow an amendment to conform to 

proof”].) 

In In re Andrew L, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 683 the court held it was not 

prejudicial error to conform the petition to proof by striking entirely a section 300, 

subdivision (a), count, as well as the specific allegation of a diagnosis of a subdural 

hematoma caused by trauma in the subdivision (b) count, when the remaining subdivision 

(b) allegations that the child was at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness 

were proved. (Id. at pp. 689-690.) In In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1626 the 

court held a petition under section 300, subdivision (a), that alleged the child had suffered 

serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by his mother could properly be amended 

to conform to the proof presented at the hearing that the child faced a current substantial 

risk of harm if returned to the mother’s custody. (Id. at pp. 1644-1645.)

6

 In Jessica C., 

supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1027 the court held it was error for the juvenile court to refuse to 

permit an amendment that modified the description of the sexual abuse by substituting 

the word “touching” for “penetrating” the child’s vagina. (Id. at p. 1042.) Thus, in each 

of these published decisions endorsing a liberal rule for allowing amendments to conform 

to proof, the gravamen of the dependency petition remained the same. Unlike the case at 

bar, in none did the proposed amendment effect a fundamental change in the harm to the 

child or the parental misconduct alleged. (Cf. In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 

481 [“the juvenile court has discretion to permit amendment of a juvenile court wardship 

petition to correct or make more specific the factual allegations supportive of the offense 

charged when the very nature of the charge remains unchanged”].) 

 6

 Although ruling it would have been permissible on the record before it to amend 

the petition to conform to the proof presented of a current risk of substantial harm to the 

child, the court in In re David H., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1626 held past infliction of 

serious physical harm was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (a), whether or not there was also proof of a current risk of harm. (See In re 

David, at pp. 1641-1644.) 
12 

Here, in contrast to the cited cases, it is impossible for us to reconcile the juvenile 

court’s radical change in the basis proffered for dependency jurisdiction with Mother’s 

and Father’s fundamental right to notice and a fair opportunity to respond to the actual 

grounds upon which the petition was sustained. (See In re Wilford J. (2005) 

131 Cal.App.4th 742, 751 [“a parent whose child may be found subject to the 

dependency jurisdiction of the court enjoys a due process right to be informed of the 

nature of the hearing, as well as the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is 

predicated, in order that he or she may make an informed decision whether to appear and 

contest the allegations”]; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 [“[d]ue 

process requires that a parent is entitled to notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise 

him or her of the dependency proceedings and afford him or her an opportunity to 

object”]; In re C.P. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 270, 271 [due process requires that parents be 

afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard at a jurisdiction hearing]; see generally 

Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 117-118 [juvenile court 

safeguarded parent’s rights to procedural and substantive due process by providing him 

notice and an opportunity to be heard, including the right to present evidence and to 

confront witnesses].) Although Julienne’s mental health and possible emotional 

problems were discussed in the various reports submitted by the Department, Mother and 

Father had no notice evidence should be presented concerning (a) the nature and severity 

of any emotional damage she may be suffering;

7

 (b) Father’s or Mother’s responsibility, 

if any, for the initial onset of such emotional damage; or (c) their responsibility, if any, 

for Julienne continuing to suffer emotional damage because they minimized or denied the 

seriousness of it or refused to seek appropriate care for her mental suffering. (See 

generally In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1381-1382 [when a child is well-

 7

 Section 300, subdivision (c), provides, in part, a child may be adjudged a 

dependent child of the juvenile court if she “is suffering serious emotional damage, or is 

at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, 

depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result 

of the conduct of the parent or guardian . . . .” 
13 

adjusted except for a deep fear or dislike of one parent, the court lacks a basis for 

assuming jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (c), even when parents have subjected the child 

to a rancorous family law dispute]; In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 557 

[“[T]he parental conduct branch of subdivision (c) seeks to protect against abusive

behavior that results in severe emotional damage. We are not talking about run-of-themill flaws in our parenting styles—we are talking about abusive, neglectful and/or 

exploitive conduct toward a child which causes any of the serious symptoms identified in 

the statute.”].) 

Indeed, Presiding Justice Sills writing for the court in Jessica C., supra, 

93 Cal.App.4th 1027—the case relied upon by the Department to support the juvenile 

court’s addition of a new subdivision (c) count after the close of evidence—condemned 

as a due process violation the very type of amendment to conform to proof at issue here: 

“[S]uppose a petition only alleges, under subdivision (d) of section 300, a variety of 

specific sexual acts perpetrated by a parent, but the trial judge does not find these are 

true. The county then attempts to amend the petition to allege serious emotional damage 

under subdivision (c) of section 300, based on the idea that any child who would make 

such allegations, even if false, has obviously been subject to emotional abuse. Such a 

tactic would be nothing more than a cheap way to establish dependency without giving 

the parent adequate notice of dependency jurisdiction under an emotional abuse theory.” 

(Id. at p. 1042, fn. 14.) We understand the juvenile court’s action as a well-meaning 

attempt to protect Julienne and to provide services to her and her parents, rather than a 

“cheap tactic.” Nonetheless, we agree with the Jessica C. court that the amendment to 

add a subdivision (c) count, first suggested by counsel for Julienne’s siblings after the 

close of evidence that was directed only to sexual abuse allegations, should have been 

refused. Alternatively, the evidentiary portion of the hearing should have been reopened 

to allow (after an appropriate continuance) Father and Mother to present evidence to 

refute the amended allegations. 
14 

c. A remand for further proceedings, rather than dismissal of the case, is the 

appropriate relief on appeal 

On the record before us the jurisdiction findings under section 300, 

subdivision (c), must be reversed, and the disposition order removing Julienne from 

Father’s care and custody vacated. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 833; 

In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391.) Given the procedural posture of the 

case—that is, the failure of the Department, Julienne or Mother and Father to specifically 

address whether Julienne is properly found a dependent child of the court under section 

300, subdivision (c)—we decline Mother’s and Father’s invitation to dismiss the 

dependency proceedings at this point. Our conclusion that the amendment to conform to 

proof should have been refused for lack of adequate notice does not mean the Department 

cannot try again or that it may not be in Julienne’s best interests for her to be removed 

from the custody of Father. (See Janet T., at p. 392.) However, we recognize 

circumstances may have arising during the pendency of this appeal that could affect the 

juvenile court’s evaluation of any new petition filed by the Department. Accordingly, in 

any further proceedings on remand the juvenile court should give appropriate weight to 

Julienne’s and the family’s current situation. 

DISPOSITION 

The order dismissing the petition as to J.B. is affirmed. The jurisdiction findings 

and disposition order as to Julienne are reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile 

court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

 PERLUSS, P. J. 

 We concur: 

 WOODS, J. ZELON, J.