IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 9769 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 11, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To ensure the security and integrity of United States critical 

infrastructure by establishing an interagency task force 

and requiring a comprehensive report on the targeting 

of United States critical infrastructure by People’s Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strengthening Cyber 

3 Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE AND REPORT ON THE 

5 TARGETING OF UNITED STATES CRITICAL IN6 FRASTRUCTURE BY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

7 CHINA STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ACTORS. 

8 (a) INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.—Not later than 120 

9 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec10 retary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director 

11 of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 

12 (CISA) of the Department of Homeland Security, in con13 sultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the 

14 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the heads of appro15 priate Sector Risk Management Agencies as determined 

16 by the Director of CISA, shall establish a joint interagency 

17 task force (in this section referred to as the ‘‘task force’’) 

18 to facilitate collaboration and coordination among the Sec19 tor Risk Management Agencies assigned a Federal role or 

20 responsibility in National Security Memorandum–22, 

21 issued April 30, 2024 (relating to critical infrastructure 

22 security and resilience), or any successor document, to de23 tect, analyze, and respond to the cybersecurity threat 

24 posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty25 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China by ensuring that 


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1 such agencies’ actions are aligned and mutually rein2 forcing. 

3 (b) CHAIRS.— 

4 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of CISA (or 

5 the Director of CISA’s designee) shall serve as the 

6 chairperson of the task force. 

7 (2) VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of the 

8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (or such Director’s 

9 designee) shall serve as the vice chairperson of the 

10 task force. 

11 (c) COMPOSITION.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall consist 

13 of appropriate representatives of the departments 

14 and agencies specified in subsection (a). 

15 (2) QUALIFICATIONS.—To materially assist in 

16 the activities of the task force, representatives under 

17 paragraph (1) should be subject matter experts who 

18 have familiarity and technical expertise regarding cy19 bersecurity, digital forensics, or threat intelligence 

20 analysis, or in-depth knowledge of the tactics, tech21 niques, and procedures (TTPs) commonly used by 

22 State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty23 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China. 


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1 (d) VACANCY.—Any vacancy occurring in the mem2 bership of the task force shall be filled in the same manner 

3 in which the original appointment was made. 

4 (e) ESTABLISHMENT FLEXIBILITY.—To avoid redun5 dancy, the task force may coordinate with any preexisting 

6 task force, working group, or cross-intelligence effort with7 in the Homeland Security Enterprise or the intelligence 

8 community that has examined or responded to the cyberse9 curity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, in10 cluding Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China. 

11 (f) TASK FORCE REPORTS; BRIEFING.— 

12 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 540 days 

13 after the establishment of the task force, the task 

14 force shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

15 committees the first report containing the initial 

16 findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the 

17 task force. 

18 (2) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than one year 

19 after the date of the submission of the initial report 

20 under paragraph (1) and annually thereafter for five 

21 years, the task force shall submit to the appropriate 

22 congressional committees an annual report con23 taining the findings, conclusions, and recommenda24 tions of the task force. 


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1 (3) CONTENTS.—The reports under this sub2 section shall include the following: 

3 (A) An assessment at the lowest classifica4 tion feasible of the sector-specific risks, trends 

5 relating to incidents impacting sectors, and tac6 tics, techniques, and procedures utilized by or 

7 relating to State-sponsored cyber actors, includ8 ing Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of 

9 China. 

10 (B) An assessment of additional resources 

11 and authorities needed by Federal departments 

12 and agencies to better counter the cybersecurity 

13 threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, 

14 including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Repub15 lic of China. 

16 (C) A classified assessment of the extent of 

17 potential destruction, compromise, or disruption 

18 to United States critical infrastructure by 

19 State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty20 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China in the 

21 event of a major crisis or future conflict be22 tween the People’s Republic of China and the 

23 United States. 

24 (D) A classified assessment of the ability 

25 of the United States to counter the cybersecuVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:56 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H9769.RFS H9769

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1 rity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber ac2 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

3 Republic of China in the event of a major crisis 

4 or future conflict between the People’s Republic 

5 of China and the United States, including with 

6 respect to different cybersecurity measures and 

7 recommendations that could mitigate such a 

8 threat. 

9 (E) A classified assessment of the ability 

10 of State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt 

11 Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China to 

12 disrupt operations of the United States Armed 

13 Forces by hindering mobility across critical in14 frastructure such as rail, aviation, and ports, 

15 including how such would impair the ability of 

16 the United States Armed Forces to deploy and 

17 maneuver forces effectively. 

18 (F) A classified assessment of the eco19 nomic and social ramifications of a disruption 

20 to one or multiple United States critical infra21 structure sectors by State-sponsored cyber ac22 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

23 Republic of China in the event of a major crisis 

24 or future conflict between the People’s Republic 

25 of China and the United States. 


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1 (G) Such recommendations as the task 

2 force may have for the Homeland Security En3 terprise, the intelligence community, or critical 

4 infrastructure owners and operators to improve 

5 the detection and mitigation of the cybersecu6 rity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber ac7 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

8 Republic of China. 

9 (H) A one-time plan for an awareness 

10 campaign to familiarize critical infrastructure 

11 owners and operators with security resources 

12 and support offered by Federal departments 

13 and agencies to mitigate the cybersecurity 

14 threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, 

15 including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Repub16 lic of China. 

17 (4) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after 

18 the date of the submission of each report under this 

19 subsection, the task force shall provide to the appro20 priate congressional committees a classified briefing 

21 on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations 

22 of the task force. 

23 (5) FORM.—Each report under this subsection 

24 shall be submitted in classified form, consistent with 


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1 the protection of intelligence sources and methods, 

2 but may include an unclassified executive summary. 

3 (6) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified executive 

4 summary of each report required under this sub5 section shall be published on a publicly accessible 

6 website of the Department of Homeland Security. 

7 (g) ACCESS TO INFORMATION.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland 

9 Security, the Director of CISA, the Attorney Gen10 eral, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves11 tigation, and the heads of appropriate Sector Risk 

12 Management Agencies, as determined by the Direc13 tor of CISA, shall provide to the task force such in14 formation, documents, analysis, assessments, find15 ings, evaluations, inspections, audits, or reviews re16 lating to efforts to counter the cybersecurity threat 

17 posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, including 

18 Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China as 

19 the task force considers necessary to carry out this 

20 section. 

21 (2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DIS22 SEMINATION.—Information, documents, analysis, as23 sessments, findings, evaluations, inspections, audits, 

24 and reviews described in this subsection shall be re25 ceived, handled, stored, and disseminated only by 


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1 members of the task force consistent with all appli2 cable statutes, regulations, and executive orders. 

3 (3) SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR TASK FORCE

4 MEMBERS.—No member of the task force may be 

5 provided with access to classified information under 

6 this section without the appropriate security clear7 ances. 

8 (h) TERMINATION.—The task force, and all the au9 thorities of this section, shall terminate on the date that 

10 is 60 days after the final briefing required under sub11 section (h)(4). 

12 (i) EXEMPTION FROM FACA.—Chapter 10 of title 

13 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Fed14 eral Advisory Committee Act’’), shall not apply to the task 

15 force. 

16 (j) EXEMPTION FROM PAPERWORK REDUCTION

17 ACT.—Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (com18 monly known as the ‘‘Paperwork Reduction Act’’), shall 

19 not apply to the task force. 

20 (k) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT22 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com23 mittees’’ means— 

24 (A) the Committee on Homeland Security, 

25 the Committee on Judiciary, and the Select 


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1 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep2 resentatives; and 

3 (B) the Committee on Homeland Security 

4 and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 

5 Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intel6 ligence of the Senate. 

7 (2) ASSETS.—The term ‘‘assets’’ means a per8 son, structure, facility, information, material, equip9 ment, network, or process, whether physical or vir10 tual, that enables an organization’s services, func11 tions, or capabilities. 

12 (3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term 

13 ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given such 

14 term in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107–56 (42 

15 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 

16 (4) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘‘cy17 bersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given such term 

18 in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 

19 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

20 (5) HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE.—The 

21 term ‘‘Homeland Security Enterprise’’ has the 

22 meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

23 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 


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1 (6) INCIDENT.—The term ‘‘incident’’ has the 

2 meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

3 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

4 (7) INFORMATION SHARING.—The term ‘‘infor5 mation sharing’’ means the bidirectional sharing of 

6 timely and relevant information concerning a cyber7 security threat posed by a State-sponsored cyber 

8 actor of the People’s Republic of China to United 

9 States critical infrastructure. 

10 (8) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

11 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

12 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security 

13 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 

14 (9) LOCALITY.—The term ‘‘locality’’ means any 

15 local government authority or agency or component 

16 thereof within a State having jurisdiction over mat17 ters at a county, municipal, or other local govern18 ment level. 

19 (10) SECTOR.—The term ‘‘sector’’ means a col20 lection of assets, systems, networks, entities, or or21 ganizations that provide or enable a common func22 tion for national security (including national defense 

23 and continuity of Government), national economic 

24 security, national public health or safety, or any 

25 combination thereof. 


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1 (11) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.— 

2 The term ‘‘Sector Risk Management Agency’’ has 

3 the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

4 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

5 (12) STATE.—The term ‘‘State’’ means any 

6 State of the United States, the District of Columbia, 

7 the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Northern 

8 Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, 

9 Guam, American Samoa, and any other territory or 

10 possession of the United States. 

11 (13) SYSTEMS.—The term ‘‘systems’’ means a 

12 combination of personnel, structures, facilities, infor13 mation, materials, equipment, networks, or proc14 esses, whether physical or virtual, integrated or 

15 interconnected for a specific purpose that enables an 

16 organization’s services, functions, or capabilities. 

17 (14) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United 

18 States’’, when used in a geographic sense, means 

19 any State of the United States. 

20 (15) VOLT TYPHOON.—The term ‘‘Volt Ty21 phoon’’ means the People’s Republic of China State22 sponsored cyber actor described in the Cybersecurity 

23 and Infrastructure Security Agency cybersecurity 

24 advisory entitled ‘‘PRC State-Sponsored Actors 

25 Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. 


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1 Critical Infrastructure’’, issued on February 07, 

2 2024, or any successor advisory. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 10, 

2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


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