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COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 7, 2017

Serial No. 115–103

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of State 4

The Honorable David J. Trachtenberg, Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .............................................................. 9

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John J. Sullivan: Prepared statement ......................................... 7

The Honorable David J. Trachtenberg: Prepared statement ............................... 11

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois: 

Identification of Counties Pursuant to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, 

U.S. Department of State, June 21, 2017 ....................................................... 59

Dissent Channel: Concern Regarding the Secretary of State’s Decision to 

Exclude Afghanistan, Burma, and Iraq from the 2017 Child Soldiers 

Prevention Act (CSPA) List ............................................................................. 67

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Lieu, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: 

Letter addressed to the Honorable James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, 

dated March 10, 2017 ....................................................................................... 71

‘‘On the Eve of Congressional Hearings, New Evidence About Alleged U.S. 

Massacre in Somalia,’’ by Christina Goldbaum, December 6, 2017 ............. 78

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 86

Written responses from the witnesses to questions submitted for the record 

by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 88

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 97

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 118

The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 119

The Honorable Bradley S. Schneider ................................................................. 121

(1)

COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN AFRICA 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. And before we 

begin I would like to welcome Representative John Curtis of Utah 

to the committee. He is a successful mayor and businessman, and 

he will serve on the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, and on the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa. So welcome, John. 

Today this hearing is on counterterrorism efforts in Africa. And 

we examine U.S. counterterrorism efforts across the continent. This 

committee has long advocated for strong, sustained relations between the United States and the countries in Africa. And from the 

Electrify Africa Act and the reauthorization of the African Growth 

and Opportunity Act to the End Wildlife Trafficking Act, we have 

worked on a bipartisan basis to provide the tools for greater engagement with a continent that is home to some of the world’s fastest growing economies, but also some major security challenges. 

As I said in our May hearing on U.S. interests in Africa, for our 

efforts on the continent to succeed, we must help our partners confront the threat of radical Islamist terrorism. From Al-Shabaab in 

Somalia, to Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, to al-Qaeda and ISIS 

in Libya, and their affiliates across the Sahel, terrorists seek to destabilize governments by threatening vulnerable communities, 

often by exploiting local grievances. This committee and Congress 

as a whole has supported our uniformed men and women in this 

fight, including by voting last year to require a strategy to defeat 

Boko Haram. 

The death of four U.S. soldiers in Niger in early October, and a 

Navy SEAL in Somalia last May are stark reminders of the danger 

inherent in these efforts. This is why the War Powers Resolution 

requires notification to Congress when forces equipped for combat 

are deployed abroad. 

AFRICOM is working with the FBI and other agencies on an investigation into what happened in Niger, which military officials 

expect to be completed in January. After the grieving families are 

briefed on the findings, Congress will be eager to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to lessen future risks to our forces. 

2

This hearing will take a broader look at U.S. counterterrorism efforts across Africa. While the Department of Defense often plays 

the most visible role in these efforts, the State Department is 

charged with developing the overall strategy. State also plays a significant role in security assistance, providing countries like Niger 

with armored vehicles and other equipment that they need to confidently take the fight to the enemy. 

In recent years, DoD funding for security assistance in Africa has 

surpassed that provided by State. However, thanks to a bipartisan 

effort by this committee, most of these authorities now require 

State Department concurrence, as well as joint development, joint 

planning, and joint implementation. Many also require efforts to 

bolster democratic values of partner forces, including civilian control of the military. Combating terrorism and building stability is 

as much a political as military challenge, so the State Department 

must lead on these efforts. 

It is important for members to understand that while successive 

administrations have used the 2001 AUMF to conduct strikes in 

Somalia and Libya, the majority of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Africa are carried out under other authorities that Congress has provided. Together these, as we call them, intelligence, 

surveillance, reconnaissance, and train and equip, and advise and 

assist missions build the capabilities of our partner forces while 

helping them to take on current threats. 

Of course, military efforts alone cannot defeat radical ideology. 

Severe poverty, lack of education, local grievances, and weak governance provide the ideal context for this hateful ideology to take 

hold in the first place. As AFRICOM’s first commander told the 

committee in May, it is in our best interest to focus on sustained 

development engagement, just as we focus on sustained security 

engagement. That is a long-term commitment but one in our security interests. And I look forward to hearing how both departments 

are working to support the development of strong, resilient African 

governments that deny terrorist groups room to grow. 

And let me turn now to our ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel of 

New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

hearing and thank you for leading CODEL to Africa. This committee realizes how important Africa is and I am glad that we are 

having this hearing this morning. 

Countering the terrorist groups in Africa is a clear foreign policy 

priority and it deserves this committee’s attention. Mr. Deputy Secretary, Mr. Acting Under Secretary, welcome to the Foreign Affairs 

Committee. 

Around the world hotspots are burning and American leadership 

is needed, but in the State Department with all the vacancies and 

all the cutbacks it seems the strategies are muddled or seem muddled, senior posts are vacant, partners and adversaries view the 

United States with uncertainty. So I hope you can both shed some 

light today on this phenomenally complex issue. 

I have a number of concerns about how we are dealing with terrorism in Africa, and the first is our military involvement there. As 

the chairman pointed out, the recent deaths of four American service members in an ambush in Niger thrust this issue into the spotVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Mar 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\120717\27758 SHIRL
3

light. There has also been an increase in the number of American 

air strikes in Somalia. For those strikes the administration uses 

the same legal authority to justify military action as it and other 

administrations have for many other counterterrorist operations all 

over the world, which is the post-9/11/2001 AUMF, Authorization 

for the Use of Military Force. 

I don’t think any of us who voted on that measure—and I did 16 

years ago—envisioned that it would be used as a blank check to 

justify sending our men and women in uniform into harm’s way 

whenever a terrorist threat emerges. We need a new AUMF. We 

need to have a serious debate about how, when, and where our 

military is currently fighting. 

And I need more answers about those four fallen heroes. I cannot 

help but wonder what happened to that thirst for oversight we saw 

a couple of years ago when several Americans died on the African 

continent in circumstances shrouded by uncertainty. Yet, our military’s role in dealing with these extremist groups should be only 

one aspect of our approach to fighting terrorism. 

I agree with the many national security experts who say our 

strategy must go far beyond fighting fire with fire. We must also 

look at the root causes that allow terrorism to take hold in these 

countries. The places in Africa where terrorists operate often face 

a underlying level of instability. Governments are unresponsive 

and ineffective in providing for the needs of their citizens. 

Some of our closest partners in this effort, Cameroon, Chad, and 

Uganda, are led by men who have clung to power for decades. In 

one recent study more than 70 percent of Africans surveyed reported mistrust of the police and military. And that is no great surprise given the behavior of some of our counterterrorism partners: 

Arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and torture in Cameroon; 

1,000 protestors killed and another 11,000 detained in Ethiopia; 

and in Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi civilians speaking up for their 

rights and demanding accountable leadership are met with violent 

crackdowns, bloodshed, and killing. 

These are the things that drive people toward violent extremism 

and that attract terrorists seeking to exploit vulnerable populations. When human rights, the rule of law, and justice systems 

are weak Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, and others find safe haven. And 

that is what we need to focus on. A military-heavy strategy means 

that we are pushing back against these groups after they are already established. Of course that is important and we should continue doing that, but we must also work to deny these groups the 

opportunity to flourish in the first place. 

The State Department and USAID have the expertise to do that. 

Our diplomats in development professionals work to promote justice and the rule of law, to build more inclusive societies through 

better education, healthcare, and economic opportunity, encouraging full participation in societies rather than withdrawing into 

extremism. These are indispensable tools in the fight against terrorism. 

That is why I am baffled that the administration wants to cut 

the budget for these agencies by a third. Frankly, I am frustrated 

that the State Department appears to be descending into dysfunction. Not the fault of anybody here, but if you cut back and don’t 

4

fill senior positions what else do you have? As we are reading day 

after day after day about the dysfunction. Foreign policy leaders, 

from former Secretaries Madeleine Albright to Ambassadors Nicholas Burns and Ryan Crocker, are all sounding the alarm. So I 

would like to hear how slashing the State Department and USAID 

helps us stop violent extremism. 

How does gutting vital efforts help us get at the root causes of 

this problem? Why would we cut resources for democracy promotion, for human rights, for foreign assistance when we know 

that these cost-effective investments will help us grapple with the 

problem of terrorism? 

What I don’t want to hear and I won’t accept is that we can’t afford it. The President is ready to sign legislation that will blow a 

$1.5 trillion hole in the budget to give tax breaks to corporations 

and billionaires, so ‘‘we can’t afford it’’ line doesn’t pass the test 

anymore. If we are serious about fighting terrorism, let the military tackle the security threats, but let’s make a serious effort to 

stop it before it starts. 

Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony. I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by a very distinguished 

panel. Mr. John Sullivan is the Deputy Secretary of State. And 

prior to this position he was a partner at the Mayer Brown law 

firm where he co-chaired its national security practice. Prior to 

that Mr. Sullivan served in senior positions at the Justice Department, Defense Department, and Commerce Department. 

The Honorable David Trachtenberg was confirmed by the U.S. 

Senate on October 17th. Dr. Trachtenberg is Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And he is currently serving 

as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to his 

work in the executive branch and private sector he served on the 

staff of the House Armed Services Committee. So it is good to see 

him again. 

And without objection the witnesses’ full prepared statements 

are going to be made part of the record. Members here are going 

to have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or questions to 

you, or any extraneous material for the record. 

And if you would, Mr. Sullivan, please summarize your remarks. 

We will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN J. SULLIVAN, DEPUTY 

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee for the opportunity 

to speak with you about U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa. 

Last month, Secretary Tillerson hosted an Africa Ministerial that 

included delegations from 37 countries, the African Union, and 

members of the private sector and civil society. Advancing our deep 

and expanding counterterrorism cooperation on the continent was 

a major focus of the ministerial, along with increasing trade, good 

governance, and protection of human rights. 

5

To reinforce these priorities, at Secretary Tillerson’s direction I 

traveled to Sudan, Tunisia, and Nigeria 2 weeks ago to engage our 

willing and increasingly capable counterterrorism partners. 

In Sudan, senior leaders stressed their interest in working with 

the United States to strengthen regional security, and promote 

greater peace and stability throughout the region and the world. 

We are encouraged by the Sudanese Government’s willingness to 

work with us to eliminate the threat posed by ISIS and other terrorist groups operating in the region, as well as the government’s 

commitment to cut all military and trade ties with North Korea. 

In Tunisia, I met with both the Tunisian and Libyan Governments. Tunisia, like Morocco and Algeria, has made significant 

strides in preventing the spread of ISIS and other terrorist groups 

within its borders through the implementation of military and 

paramilitary operations, greater law enforcement cooperation 

among allies and partners, and improved measures to reintegrate 

returning foreign terrorist fighters. 

Libya is perhaps our greatest counterterrorism challenge in Africa. ISIS and other terrorist groups have sought to exploit political 

instability and find safe haven in Libya’s vast ungoverned spaces, 

making the country both a source of and destination for foreign terrorist fighters. We continue to empower the Libyan Government to 

address these challenges. Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s 

government and its aligned forces have been reliable partners in 

countering these threats, and are in regular communication with 

the administration and with our Ambassador Peter Bodde. 

President Trump and Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis met with 

the Prime Minister just last week to discuss a range of issues, including counterterrorism. We also strongly back the efforts of U.S. 

Special Representative Salame to facilitate a political solution and 

prevent a civil conflict. 

Nigeria was the last stop on my trip, and it is a crucial, a critical 

U.S. partner that faces a number of threats. Nigeria leads the regional fight against Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and other terrorist groups that continue to fuel one of the worst humanitarian 

crises in the world. Since 2009, terrorist groups in the region have 

killed more than 20,000 people and abducted thousands of women 

and girls, causing at least 2 million people to flee their homes. This 

instability has affected the larger Lake Chad Basin region, prompting the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force comprised of 

Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, all partners that have asked 

for U.S. assistance to root out terrorism. 

We consider it in our national interest to support Nigeria and its 

neighbors in this fight. To ensure our continued cooperation, we 

have also underlined to these partners, and those across the continent, that their security forces must be professionalized, brought 

into an accountable chain of command, and held responsible for 

human rights abuses. 

These principles are also the backbone of our engagement in Somalia, where we are committed to helping Somalia reform its security sector and improve governance, with a focus on reducing corrupt practices and increasing transparency and accountability. In 

coordination with that effort, U.S. forces are committed to using all 

6

authorized and appropriate measures to protect Americans and to 

disable terrorist threats such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS. 

Somalia is also a prime example of how we are working with the 

African Union, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations to counter terrorism, promote stability, and support postconflict peace building. Regional cooperation has clearly produced 

results, as we have seen in the creation of the G-5 by Burkina 

Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2014. Last month Secretary Tillerson announced our commitment to provide an additional $60 million in support to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force countries. This is in addition to the more than $800 million in bilateral 

assistance we have provided to G-5 countries since 2012 to help develop effective security forces. 

In closing, I want to underscore a message that I made clear during all my stops on my trip: While the United States is the largest 

supporter of peacekeeping and counterterrorism across Africa, the 

Secretary and I firmly believe that traditional counterterrorism efforts alone are not enough. Economic reform, good governance, and 

a respect for human rights must be prioritized to establish and 

maintain peace and security throughout the continent. 

We will continue to support our partners’ efforts to strengthen 

democratic institutions; improve citizen security and justice; respect human rights; stimulate economic growth, trade, health, and 

investment; and promote development and education. The United 

States continues to emphasize respect for human rights as a fundamental part of our counterterrorism strategy, which includes thorough Leahy vetting of our security force partners. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak with you this 

morning. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]

7


27758a-1.eps

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN SlJLLIV AN 

REMARKS ON CT IN AFRICA BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

DECEMBER 7, 2017 

Good morning and thank you Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the 

Committee for the opportunity to speak with you about US. counterterrorism efforts in Africa. 

Last month, Secretary Tillerson hosted an Africa Ministerial that included delegations from 3 7 

countries, the African Union, and members of the private sector and civil society. Advancing 

our deep and expanding counterterrorism cooperation on the continent was a major focus of the 

ministerial, along with increasing trade, good governance, and protection of human rights. 

To reinforce these priorities, I traveled to Sudan, Tunisia, and Nigeria two weeks ago to engage 

our willing and increasingly capable counterterrorism partners. 

In Sudan, senior leaders stressed their interest in working with the United States to strengthen 

regional security, and promote greater peace and stability throughout the world. We are 

encouraged by the Sudanese government's willingness to work with us to eliminate the threat 

posed by ISIS and other terrorist groups operating in the region, as well as the government's 

commitment to cut all military and trade ties with North Korea. 

In Tunisia, I met with both the Tunisian and Libyan governments. Tunisia, like Morocco and 

Algeria, has made significant strides in preventing the spread of ISIS and other terrorist groups 

within its borders through the implementation of military and paramilitary operations, greater 

law enforcement cooperation among allies and partners, and improved measures to reintegrate 

returning foreign terrorist tighters. 

Libya is perhaps our greatest counterterrorism challenge in Africa. ISIS and other terrorist 

groups have sought to exploit political instability and find safe haven in Libya's vast ungoverned 

spaces, making the country both a source of and destination for foreign terrorist tighters. We 

continue to empower the Libyan government to address these challenges. Libyan Prime Minister 

Fayez al-Sarraj's government and its aligned forces have been reliable partners in countering 

these threats- and are in regular communication with the Administration. President Trump and 

Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis met with the Prime Minister just last week to discuss a range of 

issues, including counterterrorism. We also strongly back the efforts of UN Special 

Representative Salame to facilitate a political solution and prevent a civil conflict. 

Nigeria, the last stop on my visit, is a critical US partner that faces a number of threats. Nigeria 

leads the regional tight against Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and other terrorist groups that 

continue to tuel one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Since 2009, terrorist groups 

in the region have killed more than 20,000 people and abducted thousands of women and girls, 

causing at least 2 million people to flee their homes. This instability has affected the larger Lake 

Chad Basin region, prompting the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force comprised of 
8


27758a-2.eps

Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger -all partners that have asked for US. assistance to root out 

terrorism. 

We consider it in our national interest to support Nigeria and its neighbors in this fight To 

ensure our continued cooperation, we have also underlined to these partners -and those across 

the continent -that their security forces must be professionalized, brought into an accountable 

chain of command, and held responsible for human rights abuses. 

These principles are also the backbone of our engagement in Somalia, where we are committed 

to helping Somalia reform its security sector and improve governance, with a focus on reducing 

corrupt practices and increasing transparency and accountability. In coordination with that effort, 

US. forces are committed to using all authorized and appropriate measures to protect Americans 

and to disable terrorist threats such as al-Shabaab and ISIS. 

Somalia is also a prime example of how we are working with the African Union, the United 

Nations, and other multilateral organizations to counter terrorism, promote stability, and support 

post-conflict peacebuilding. Regional cooperation has already produced results, as we have seen 

in the creation of the G-5 by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2014. Last 

month, Secretary Tillerson announced our commitment to provide an additional $60 million in 

support to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force countries. This is in addition to the more than $800 million 

in bilateral assistance we have provided to G-5 countries since 2012 to help develop efTective 

security forces. 

In closing, I want to underscore a message that I made clear during my trip: while United States 

is the largest supporter of peacekeeping and counterterrorism efTorts across Africa, the Secretary 

and I firmly believe that traditional counterterrorism etTorts alone are not enough. Economic 

reform, good governance, and a respect for human rights must be prioritized to establish and 

maintain peace and security throughout the continent. 

We will continue to support our partners' efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; improve 

citizen security and justice; respect human rights; stimulate economic growth, trade, health, and 

investment; and promote development and education. The United States continues to emphasize 

respect for human rights as a fundamental part of our counterterrorism strategy, which includes 

thorough Leahy vetting of our security force partners. 

Thank you again for giving me the chance to speak with you. I look forward to your questions. 
9

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

David. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, 

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, and members of the committee. Let me begin by 

thanking you for the opportunity to appear here with Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan. This is my first testimony since assuming 

my position just a few weeks ago as the Principal Deputy and the 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. But as a former 

House committee staffer, I am keenly aware of the important oversight role Congress plays on national security issues, and I appreciate being here today. 

Before I go any further, I want to express on behalf of the entire 

Department of Defense our deepest sympathies to the families of 

the soldiers killed in the Niger ambush: Staff Sergeant Bryan 

Black, Sergeant La David Johnson, Staff Sergeant Dustin Wright, 

and Staff Sergeant Jeremiah Johnson. We also hope for the continued speedy recovery of both Captain Michael Perozeni and Sergeant First Class Brent Bartels. 

We honor the service and sacrifice of these Americans, and we 

owe it to them, their families, and their fellow soldiers to investigate the events of October 4th thoroughly. The death of any service member is something that has a profound effect on all of us at 

DoD, and the investigation is proceeding with due diligence and 

care. 

As we have briefed you and other committees, the investigation 

is ongoing. And we do not want to provide inaccurate or incomplete 

information. We must, therefore, wait for the investigation to be 

completed by AFRICOM before we can have the full picture of 

what happened. However, we will inform Congress on the conclusions of the investigation as soon as possible after the families are 

briefed. 

That said, we must remember that our efforts in Africa are vitally important. Today our African partners are confronting a complex and growing threat from multiple terrorist groups, including 

ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, and other extremist groups like Boko 

Haram. These groups exploit instability, weak governance, vulnerable populations, social media, and vast spaces to establish safe havens, spread their toxic ideology, and attack all who do not subscribe to it. 

While DoD maintains expert counterterrorism forces, the best in 

the world bar none, capable of conducting precision air strikes and 

complex raids to protect our interests, we are focused principally on 

helping our partners build their own capabilities and expand their 

capacity to fight these terrorist organizations and stem further violence and instability. 

Secretary Mattis has placed a significant emphasis on building 

and strengthening partnerships to both lessen the demand for U.S. 

forces and to ensure sustainable indigenous solutions to these problems. In the simplest terms, DoD seeks to work by, with, and 

through our partners in Africa to find African solutions to African 

10

problems. This means that military operations against terrorist organizations are conducted by host nation forces. U.S. forces work 

with our partners to train, equip, advise, enable, and accompany 

them on operations and improve their effectiveness and professionalism. And through this cooperative relationship, the United 

States and our partners in Africa achieve our shared strategic objectives. 

As we work to build partner capacity I want to note that we are 

not simply looking at military effectiveness, but we also place a 

high value of professionalization of our partners’ militaries and, 

specifically, to improving their adherence to norms for respecting 

human rights. 

In addition to bilateral partnerships we also seek to work closely 

with regional organizations like the African Union and the G-5 

Sahel Joint Task Force. We also partner with other nations like 

France, who have committed thousands of troops to share burdens 

on this vast continent. And, of course, our most important partners 

are the other departments and agencies of the United States Government. 

There is no purely military solution to the terrorism threat in Africa, and DoD is committed to promoting whole-of-government solutions. This requires that we leverage the full range of resources, 

talent, and expertise to address these problems. This is particularly 

true of our colleagues in the Department of State and USAID. And 

we are committed to working together with them to protect the 

United States, our citizens, and our interests in Africa. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify to this committee on a 

topic of such critical importance. The Department of Defense appreciates your leadership and oversight in this area, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg follows:]

11


27758b-1.eps

HEARING ON "US CT OPSIN AFRICA" 

DECEMBER 7TH, 10 AM, 2017 RHOB 2172 

Good morning Chaimmn Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and members ofthe 

committee. Let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to appear here with 

Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan. This is my first testimony since assuming my 

position just a few weeks ago as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

but as a fonner House committee staffer Tam keenly aware ofthe important 

oversight role Congress plays on national security issues and I appreciate being 

here today. 

Before we begin, I want to express- on behalf of the entire Department of Defenseout deepest sympathy for the loss of Staff Sergeant Bryan Black, Sergeant La 

David Johnson, Staff Sergeant Dustin Wright, and Staff Sergeant Jeremial1 

Johnson. We also hope for the continued speedy recovery of both Captain Michael 

Perozeni and Sergeant First Class Brent Bartels. 

We honor the service and sacrifice of these Americans, and we owe it them, their 

tamilies, and their fellow soldiers to investigate the events of October 4 

thoroughly. The death of any service member is something that has a profound 

effect on us at DoD, and it is with the upmost diligence and seriousness with which 

we are conducting our investigation. 

The investigation is ongoing, and we want it to be complete. We do not want to 

provide inaccurate or incomplete information, and we must wait for the 

investigation to be completed by AFRICOM before we can have the full picture of 

what happened. However, we will infom1 Congress on the conclusions of the 

investigation as soon as possible after the families are briefed. 

That said, we must remember that it is an important mission we are doing in 

Africa. Specifically, we are tlghting violent extremist organizations and 

addressing the terrorist threat in Africa. To that end, my remarks today will 

discuss: 

1. The changing threat landscape with respect to the Islamic State oflraq and 

Syria (ISIS) and al-Qa'ida in Africa; and 
12


27758b-2.eps

2 

2. Efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD) to counter terrorist threats 

within this changing threat landscape. 

1. Changing Threat Landscape 

• The United States has been involved in cOLmterterrorism efforts in Africa for 

the past 20 years. Today, we are confronting ISIS and al-Qa'ida affiliates 

across Africa, specifically in the Sal1el, the Maghreb, and the Hom of Africa, 

most of which either predated ISIS or initially emerged as unaffiliated extremist 

groups. These threats in Africa have changed in terms ofthe actors and 

the scale and scope of their tactics and activities. 

• Terrorist groups exploit instability and weak govemance in North, West, and 

East African countries, some of which rank among the most fragile in the world 

according to the Fragile States Index. Atllliate and adherent groups ofiSIS and 

al-Qa'ida transit porous borders, seek to establish safe haven in under-govemed 

spaces, recruit from vulnerable populations, and leverage conflict to spread 

their toxic ideology and attack all who do not subscribe to it 

• The United States and its allies and partners must remain committed to 

combating this threat through strong partnerships and a holistic approach to 

counterterrorism. We must deny ISIS and other terrorist organizations safe 

havens from which they can plot attacks and further destabilize the region. We 

must continue to work with credible voices who can effectively counter the 

narrative of harmful extremist ideologies used to recruit and radicalize at-risk 

populations. 

• To maintain pressure against terrorist groups in Africa, our successes in the 

field should be complemented by well-resourced stabilization and longer-term 

development efforts as provided by the Department of State and US AID. These 

efforts, principally led by non-military organizations, are critical to preventing 

terrorist organizations from regrouping andobtaining new safe havens. 

• We are applying major lessons leamed from the fight against terrorism: 

1. Defeating terrorists carmot be achieved through military efforts alone 

- it requires a whole-of-govenunent approach and will require 

resources for U.S. interagency stabilization efforts, particularly those 

supported by the State Department and USAID; our partner nations 

2 
13


27758b-3.eps

must address their own security issues and the tmderlying causes of 

conflict; 

2. DoD's "by, with, and through" approach with local partners is 

essential to building the local capacity needed to address security 

concerns in the long nm; and 

3. We must continue to leverage regional solutions to regional terrorism 

issues in Africa. 

2. DoD Efforts to Counter Terrorist Threats in Africa 

• Turning now to DoD's efforts in the counterterrorism realm, we must focus on 

promoting whole-of-government solutions that involve political, development, 

economic, military, law enforcement, and other elements. 

3 

• With respect to military efforts, DoD maintains the most capable special 

operations forces in the world, including our forces in Africa. These forces are 

capable of conducting focused direct action, including precision airstrikes, and 

other counterterrorism activities as required. I'd be happy to provide additional 

details, if needed, in a closed session. 

• However, DoD's main effort is the "by, with, and through" approach to 

countering terrorism which emphasizes working with key partners. This means 

that 

- Military operations against terrorist organizations are conducted by our 

partners or host-nation forces; 

- U.S. forces work with our partners to train, equip, advise, enable, and 

when authorized, accompany them on operations and improve their 

effectiveness and professionalism; 

- And through this cooperative relationship, the United States and our 

partners achieve our shared strategic objectives. 

• This approach allows us to build partner capacity to address their own security 

issues, which is absolutely essential for the long-term success of these efforts. 

This also allows us to minimize our own footprint on the continent. 

• As we work to build partner capacity, 1 want to note that we are not simply 

looking at military effectiveness, but we place a high value on 
14


27758b-4.eps

professionalization of our partners' militaries, and, specifically, to improving 

their adherence to norms for respecting human rights. 

• This foundational approach is being brought to bear in Africa's Lake Chad 

Basin, North Africa, and the Hom of Africa. Ultimately, filling the security 

void in these regions will advance our security objectives and protect our 

national security interests. 

4 

• Secretary Mattis has placed a significant emphasis on building and 

strengthening these partnerships. In addition to strong bilateral relationships 

with our partners, we also seek to work with regional security organizations, 

such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the G5 Sahel 

Joint Task Force. Our NATO Alliance also provides us a ready set of partners 

for a variety of counterterrorism efforts. We also work through other 

partnership initiatives, including Presidentially-directed and interagency 

programs such as Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 

Partnership for East African Cmmterterrorism (PREACT), Security Governance 

Initiative (SGI) and others. 

• All of these challenges require flexible, adaptable tools. We are grateful for 

Congress's efforts to provide DoD and the Department of State a variety of 

flexible authorities to support counterterrorism operations and build partner 

capacity. For instance, efforts to reform U.S. security cooperation authorities in 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 have led to a suite 

of streamlined authorities to fimd cmmterterrorism training, equipment, and 

other support for counterterrorism partner forces across the globe. 

• Regarding legal authorities, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 

(AUMF) remains a cornerstone for ongoing U.S. military operations and 

continues to provide the domestic legal authority needed to use force against aiQa'ida, the Taliban, and their associated forces and against ISIS. 

3. Closing 

• Thank you for the opporttmity to testify to this Committee on a topic of such 

critical importance. The Department of Defense appreciates your leadership 

and oversight in this area. 

• I'll be happy to address any additional questions. 

4 
15

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, David. 

Let me just say to Deputy Secretary Sullivan that we are very 

eager to hear about your trip to Tunisia, to Sudan, to Nigeria. All 

three of these countries are important in terms of our counterterrorism efforts. And while you were over there I know that Secretary Tillerson had several dozen African foreign ministers here 

for meetings in Washington. 

We also had the opportunity on the committee to sit down with 

Nikki Haley, Ambassador Haley, after her visit to Africa. And we 

ourselves on the committee have been engaged. We have been to 

these countries in order to discuss these issues as well. 

So we are very glad you made the trip. I think this high level 

engagement is important. But one point I would make is it can’t 

substitute for the day-to-day efforts of our Ambassadors on the 

ground there. And as you know, Ambassadors have expressed, and 

members here have expressed concerns about the redesign. So we, 

we want to maintain a robust presence overseas, including Africa. 

And having diplomats on the ground strengthens our counterterrorism efforts there. 

Can you and Under Secretary Trachtenberg walk us through the 

Department of State and Department of Defense on how you work 

together to build capabilities for our African partners? If you would 

explain some of that. 

And then maybe the other thing that I would like you to focus 

on is the greatest challenges that you face when working with African militaries and African governments. 

I will give you the floor. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, 

and in particular AFRICOM, General Waldhauser, and our Ambassadors in the 51 countries on the continent of Africa have developed a very close working relationship. I can give you a particular 

example that I spent a lot of time focused on during my trip, and 

that is the cooperation between our Ambassador to Libya Peter 

Bodde and General Waldhauser on not just counterterrorism but 

political and economic development, and stabilization in Libya. 

If I could for a moment just to address the concern you raised 

about having Ambassadors in the field, I will be the first to concede, as I have done before this committee, that we have not done 

enough to get appointees in place in positions at the Department 

and Ambassadors into posts. But in Africa we actually have 90 percent of our posts have Ambassadors in residence at posts, or they 

have been confirmed and are en route. So, 44 out of the 51 countries in Africa have an Ambassador. 

So that is what I can’t describe as a good news story for the Department across all regions, for Africa we do have 90 percent of our 

Ambassadors at posts. 

I will defer to Under Secretary Trachtenberg for further comment. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman, let me echo what Secretary Sullivan has said. In terms of the relationship between the 

Department of Defense and the Department of State on this particular issue the cooperation and coordination is extremely good. 

16

What I want to emphasize here is that in many respects the Department of Defense plays a supporting role to the Department of 

State and other agencies because the problems of terrorism that we 

are talking about on the African continent deal with, at their very 

heart, some of the issues that you mentioned in your opening statement: The issue of weak governance in some of these countries; 

poverty; exploiting local grievances. 

Our work within DoD and working with our partner nations is 

to help provide those partner countries with the capacity themselves to be able to, to be able to defend themselves against extremist organizations in terrorist capacities. But that is, of course, 

not the end of the story. And so that is why we work very closely 

with our State Department colleagues to make sure that once security is provided, effective tools can be put in place to improve governance and deal with some of the underlying issues that give rise 

to some of these violent extremist organizations in the first place. 

Chairman ROYCE. My time has expired. I will go to Mr. Eliot 

Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan, I appreciate all your hard work and your efforts at 

outreach. I sincerely do. And I think that you are doing an outstanding job. And I appreciate your contact with the committee and 

your accessibility. But, as you know, and as we have discussed, and 

as I just mentioned before you cannot pick up a newspaper these 

days without seeing a headline about how Secretary Tillerson is 

hollowing out the State Department, and particularly the Foreign 

Service. 

Mr. Secretary, when you testified before the committee in late 

September you acknowledged that morale at the Department was 

low. Let me ask you the same question, how is morale today? And 

what will you do to improve morale and better utilize our country’s 

diplomats? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congressman Engel. Morale hasn’t 

improved. It is not something that I am proud to say. But it is a 

problem that the Secretary and I have spoken about. He is now on 

a trip to Europe. He is getting back later this week. 

We will be coming up here to brief members of this committee 

and other Members of Congress and Senators on an update on the 

redesign which I have testified about previously, and also have a 

town hall with the employees, the women and men of the State Department to describe the work that has been done on the redesign 

in the 2 months since I last testified before this committee, but to 

renew his commitment to the Department. I think one of our greatest failings has been a lack of communication, communication particularly with our own career professionals, both at State and in 

the field, and a rededication to do a better job of that. 

And I, of course, with this committee commit that to you as well 

that I am committed both to communicating with our men and 

women about our plans and their value to us, and also to you and 

the members of the committee. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. As I have mentioned before, and I want 

to say it again on the record that I am very troubled by the redesign. I am worried that the redesign will be used as an excuse to 

cut back. And I don’t think that we should be cutting back at a 

17

time like this when, hopefully, we use diplomacy to prevent wars. 

And no matter where you go, no matter where you travel around 

the globe, Africa and any place else, people will pull you aside and 

tell you how demoralized they are, how they really feel that the administration is sort of going after the State Department. And it 

really bothers me a great deal. 

Those of us that have been on this committee for decades appreciate the good work that our diplomats do and that our people do 

all around the world, as I am sure you do. But you can’t cut back, 

in my opinion, at the rate that the administration has announced 

it would like to and have an effective workforce. It just can’t be 

done. 

So I raise this because I want to raise it every time because I 

am hoping that there will be policies that will be rethought and the 

cutbacks as, you know, we described on this committee, and it was 

on both sides of the aisle, there was chagrin about the cutbacks. 

So I just wanted to raise that with you, so. 

I am concerned about the imbalance between military and the 

non-military approaches to countering terrorism in sub-Saharan 

Africa. For one, expanding use of air strikes in Somalia obviously 

increases the possibility of civilian casualties, which runs the risk 

of creating more terrorists than we are able to eliminate in the first 

place. I said that in my opening remarks. 

In addition, while security assistance funding to sub-Saharan Africa partner nations has doubled in the past 5 years—though again 

31 percent cut that has been proposed, cutting the budgets at the 

State Department and USAID on the agencies best positioned to 

help prevent the emergence of terrorism in the first place, so it’s 

almost like no counterterrorism. And, you know, we worry that the 

redesign can be used as an excuse to just simply cut back. And that 

is what we are concerned about on both sides of the aisle. I don’t 

want to put words in anybody’s mouth but I have been here and 

know what our joint concerns are. 

So please tell me about slashing funding. I know you didn’t personally make this decision, but slashing funding for the State Department and USAID obviously doesn’t help us address the drivers 

of terrorism and violent extremists in the long term, so I would like 

to hear how we can fit one into the other? 

And what measures are we taking to improve civilian protection 

and reduce the risk of civilian casualties while conducting air 

strikes and other military operations? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Congressman Engel, I would agree with you 

that the root causes of counterterrorism, the situation we find ourselves in today, particularly on the African continent, the problems 

we see are not going to be solved by military action alone. In fact, 

I think Secretary Mattis has testified and made clear, as has Secretary Tillerson, that a focus on good governance, human rights, 

training for partner militaries are extremely important. 

Your question about how we are going to do that with our funding, we will do all we can with the funds that we have available. 

We advocate for the resources that we believe are necessary within 

the administration to meet our mission. We will do all we can to 

meet that mission, to develop those policies, support our partners 

and allies with the understanding that good governance, economic 

18

development, humanitarian assistance ultimately—and I will give 

you one example, Libya. We believe that solving the serious challenges we face in Libya is ultimately a political question. It is not 

going to be solved by military action or by counterterrorism alone. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. My time is up. But I will submit some 

other questions to you. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your testimony and leadership, gentlemen. 

Time is obviously very short, so I am going to focus on Ethiopia, 

South Sudan, and Nigeria. Ever since the Meles government, Ethiopia has asserted its role in combating terrorism as a cover for the 

ongoing systematic abuse of human rights. After a seriously flawed 

election in 2005 I met with President Meles in Addis Ababa and, 

as predicted, he just rolled out the terrorism card as cover, as to 

mitigate criticism, mine and many others, particularly human 

rights organizations, for the killings in the streets, the use of torture, the jailing. 

In response, I introduced the Ethiopia Human Rights Act. It was 

killed by lobbyists, frankly, and was not looked at favorably by the 

State Department even though the findings were accurate when 

Don Payne, my ranking member, and I introduced it. When the 

Democrats took control he took the lead on the bill and I was his 

co-sponsor. But there was also that pushback and people said, well, 

they are good on terrorism but awful on human rights. 

So, what are your thoughts on how, where, how often do we raise 

human rights with Ethiopia? We have a resolution pending now 

which probably may come up on the House Floor, I don’t know. But 

it seems to me, you know, they can’t say, oh, we are doing well over 

here while they abuse their own people and torture them. 

Secondly, twice in the last 15 months I have been to South 

Sudan, joined most recently by my good friend and colleague Karen 

Bass, and we raised with Salva Kiir his horrific record and his 

killings. And I am wondering, are we really pressing? I know the 

leadership, especially our Ambassador to the U.N., has really 

raised it very robustly. Kiir is a grave disappointment to everyone. 

What is being done there? Because I think that the potential and 

the reality of violence is very real. 

Finally, on Nigeria, I held a whole series of hearings, went there 

many times, kept saying why aren’t we training more of those who 

could be Leahy vetted? As a matter of fact, at one of my hearings 

the Department said at least half of the Nigerian military would 

gain muster under the Leahy process but very few were trained. 

If you could give an update how well or poorly we are doing in 

terms of training Nigerian military? 

It took years to get an FTO designation for Boko Haram. I held 

hearings on it and introduced a resolution. The day we were marking it up the Department reverses itself and says, oh, we are going, 

we are going to go ahead and do an FTO designation. Days late, 

years late and a dollar short. But how well is that working as well? 

Thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congressman Smith. 

First on Ethiopia, I met with the Ethiopian foreign minister in 

June on his trip here. It was one of my first meetings as Deputy 

19

Secretary of State. I raised with him human rights concerns in 

Ethiopia, specific cases of detainees, the state of emergency that 

has been declared, the need for it to be lifted. I specifically raised 

it with him. I will always raise those issues with you, sir. I guarantee it. 

Mr. SMITH. I deeply appreciate that. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. When I was in Sudan we are getting 

great cooperation from the Sudanese on counterterrorism. I raised 

human rights issues, religious liberty issues with Sudan, gave a 

speech on religious liberty at the largest mosque in Khartoum. It 

was not well received. Had a very unflattering press statement by 

an imam affiliated with ISIS that made some threats about me. I 

will always raise those issues. We, the Department and I, are committed to it. 

On South Sudan, as you know, Ambassador Haley was there before I. We sort of split responsibility: I went to Khartoum, she went 

to Juba. She has raised those issues in Juba. I raised concerns 

about Sudan’s influence in South Sudan with the government in 

Khartoum. Very important issue for us. 

Nigeria, I don’t know if Under Secretary Trachtenberg has more 

statistics to give. We are focused on Leahy vetting for as many of 

the forces as we can at the brigade level on down. The threat posed 

by not just Boko Haram but ISIS-West Africa in Northeastern Nigeria is acute. And we need to support those forces that can be 

trusted that are trained by us to meet that threat. 

I know that time is limited, so I will turn it over to my colleague. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Thank you, Congressman Smith. The only 

thing I would add to that is to say that the Department of Defense 

is no less committed than the Department of State is to ensuring 

that human rights practices are followed. We very strictly adhere 

to the Leahy law. We hold our partner forces, the partner forces 

that we engage with, to our same standards and expectations. 

We include human rights training in our security assistance programs. And we would cease providing——

Mr. SMITH. And that includes—if you don’t mind me interrupting—that would also include human trafficking where militaries so often are complicit? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. It includes various elements of human 

rights——

Mr. SMITH. Including trafficking? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG [continuing]. Involving human rights, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Including trafficking? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could get back to us on that? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Absolutely. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. But in the event there are human rights 

abuses we will then, we will stop under the Leahy law that training activity. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

But just in terms of that dialog, my hope is that we are robustly 

raising the trafficking issue as well included in that program. 

20

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Oh, absolutely. And I will be delighted to 

get back to you with the information. 

Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate it. Thank you so much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Greg Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, welcome back. Let me ask a quick question. I was 

just concerned or confused, and maybe you can have the answer. 

On November 28th there was an event at the Wilson Center where 

Secretary Tillerson said that President Trump’s draconian cuts to 

the international affairs budget were ‘‘reflective of an expectation 

that we are going to have success in some of these conflicted 

areas.’’

This to me, I don’t know, seemed extraordinarily naive. But can 

you tell me what specific conflicts do you think will be resolved in 

the coming year? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t have a crystal ball to give you a precise 

answer, Congressman. I take the thrust of your question about our 

prospects for being able to achieve success in Syria, Yemen, all of 

those places. I don’t think that that is something that is going to 

happen any time soon. 

We need to be focused on doing all we can to support our partners, our allies, and our military in the military fight but all the 

things that we can support on that we have discussed the non-military aspect. 

Mr. MEEKS. And I couldn’t agree with you more because that is 

why, you know, going on what Ranking Member Engel had talked 

about because if we are going to resolve some of these it is not 

going to just be militarily, we need to do it diplomatically also. And 

that is why I think on a bipartisan way we are disturbed when we 

see the draconian cuts and the reduction of personnel because we 

can’t do it without you at the State Department. I mean, if we are 

going to do this thing we need you and we need the people there. 

And that is my point. 

And I know you are under constraints but we need you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, and to give you a very precise example, Congressman. In Syria, in Raqqa; in Iraq, in Mosul where the military 

in supporting our partners and allies have done the job of defeating 

ISIS militarily, it is now up to the State Department to come in. 

We are not going to take over governance of those areas, but we 

are going to provide basic stabilization support for water, safety, 

getting internally displaced persons back; a key element for us. 

We could very easily lose the fight on those grounds that the 

military has done such a great job in winning on the battlefield for 

us. 

Mr. MEEKS. And I always salute the men and women of the State 

Department and the job that you are doing. And I hate to hear 

your honesty when you come back and talk about the lack of morale there. But they are serving our country in a very big way, in 

a most important way. If we are going to get through some of these 

conflicts it is going to only be with the help of the men and women 

of the State Department. So I take my hat off to them. 

Let me just ask another question because I want to know whether or not there is a connection. I am deeply disturbed when I hear 

about slave trafficking in Libya. And I am wondering whether 

21

there is a tie-in some way where there is a link to the exploitation 

tied to terrorists and terrorism with some of the slave trading that 

has been taking place in Libya today. Is there any tie-in that you 

see there? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe there is. The reports of what is happening in those camps where migrants, refugees are being abused, 

exploited, and slave traded are shocking. It is happening in areas 

of Libya that are largely ungoverned, which is why we are working 

hard along with the U.N. for a political solution to the situation to 

get more control over those areas. But in those ungoverned areas 

where ISIS and other terrorist organizations are able to operate 

they make money by engaging in activities like that. 

Mr. MEEKS. And you touched on this earlier, too. Because there 

was a recent survey that was conducted by the United Nations Development Programme that found that 71 percent of respondents 

pointed to an adverse interaction with state security forces as the 

factor of the tipping point in the decision to join a terrorist organization. So, and I know Mr. Smith talked about the Leahy vetting, 

and we talked about human rights training, are there other ways 

that the administration can or is seeking to ensure that the partner militaries that are accused of human rights violations pursue 

tangible measures of accountability for such actions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Two tracks, and you have highlighted both. One 

is through DoD and with the State Department’s support vetting 

those organizations, military organizations that we are going to 

work with and provide funding and support to. 

But second, working with the governments to provide that there 

is accountability, there is investigations, prosecutions, and accountability is a key component. 

It is similar with our approach on human trafficking, trafficking 

in persons. One of the pillars—there are several pillars—one is 

breaking up the networks. But the second is working with governments to make sure that those who are engaged are investigated, 

prosecuted, held accountable, and punished. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And thank you for 

your testimony today. And I know Chairman Royce has had a very 

keen interest in Africa since the day he arrived in the United 

States Congress, along with broadcasting. So we are actually paying more attention to Africa today because of his leadership. 

I would admit my limited knowledge of Africa. And but let me 

just note after, my response to what you are saying is that I am 

wondering how all of this fits in with an overall strategy of how 

you deal with the world. I would hope that the United States, I 

don’t think we will ever be able to afford what appears to be the 

development of an idea that we have a Pax Americana, that we can 

go all over the world and wherever there is problems we are going 

to come in and try to solve those problems. We are going to go 

broke if we try to do that. 

I mean just there was a Pax Britannica, and that was able to 

last a short period of time. And a Pax Americana will last a short 

period of time if we did that. 

22

We, for example, can we by being the grand decision makers end 

up making, yes, some good decisions and trying to help? We are 

good-hearted people trying to do the best. But, for example, Mr. 

Sullivan, do believe now that you just came back from Libya, do 

believe that it was right for us to break that compromise that had 

been reached with Qaddafi, for example. Would it have been—are 

we worse off today or better off today because America came in and 

decided we are going to get rid of Qaddafi and sided with the rebels 

who they wouldn’t have succeeded without our help? Is Libya better today or is the world better because we got rid of Qaddafi? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, in my remarks, comments to Congressman 

Meeks I spoke about the ungoverned areas in Libya. Libya is certainly today a place that has a significant focus of our counterterrorism for that very reason. What we don’t want is a place where, 

as there was in Sudan in the 1990s, or Afghanistan in the late ’90s, 

early 2000s, places where terrorist organizations can plant root, 

flourish, plan attacks against the United States. That is what we 

want to eliminate, in addition to supporting governments in the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And when we had Qaddafi there, you know, 

I think the greatest mistakes, there were two great mistakes made 

by the United States in my lifetime. One was to send combat troops 

into Vietnam, and the other is to send combat troops to get rid of 

Saddam Hussein. And Saddam Hussein was just benevolence; we 

had to bestow democracy on those people. And it has unleashed all 

of this chaos. 

I don’t believe that we can have a Pax Americana. We have to 

be really a little bit more thoughtful. For example, Congressman 

Smith just talked about Ethiopia where I have constituents who 

were ripped off by the Ethiopian Government, and the corruption 

there and the oppression now, even though we have been friendly 

to the Ethiopian Government. But there is a player in all of that 

that I see and I would like to ask you about, and that is money. 

These people who run these dictatorships, and also these groups 

that are terrorist groups, but mainly the authoritarian leaders in 

Africa, do they not have bank accounts someplace in the world? 

And can we prevent them—our bankers, we have got global bankers who are basically partners in the rip-off of the world’s poorest 

people. And we just never seem to focus on that part of the criminal element, the bankers. Could you? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is an extremely important point and relevant to my trip to Nigeria where the Nigerian Government is focused on recovering billions that has been looted from that country. 

We work with the Justice Department. When I was there 2 

weeks ago with our Justice Department, our Embassy, and the Nigerian Government trying to get back to the Nigerian Government 

that money that was in the United States that we could get control 

of. It is a small fraction. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t think I am just talking about United 

States banks. We have an international banking system. And quite 

frankly, the gang that runs Ethiopia——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

23

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Have bank accounts somewhere 

to the tune of billions, probably hundreds of millions of dollars. But 

that is true throughout Africa. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that if we are going to help, rather 

than just trying to be holier than thou about human rights violations, that this is our stance, let us agree and try to help them develop. We have got to prevent them from being ripped off and having the wealth sucked out by their corrupt leaders in partnership 

with banks. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You are absolutely right. And it is banks outside 

the United States——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. That is right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. That are principally the focus. 

We try to establish trust with the government by saying that 

money which we can immediately access here in the United States 

we are going to get back to you, but also work with them in other 

countries for those other banks elsewhere where we don’t have as 

much—we don’t have jurisdiction, frankly, but working to get that 

money back. 

It is a huge problem and a priority for those governments that 

are focused on good government. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We will be happy to work with you. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Mr. Albio Sires of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan, I just want to first thank you for your service to 

this country. You have served in many capacities and now you 

have got a real difficult job, and I thank you for your service. 

But I do not agree with you that the State Department morale 

is improving. I still see qualified people leaving. I still see the 

President still insisting on a 30 percent cut. The Secretary seems 

to be a little distant from everything. So I don’t know if I really 

agree with you that things are really improving there. 

You know, until we stop losing all these good people that have 

worked there so long and have given so much to the State Department, you know, it is going to be a job for you. 

So, go ahead. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I was going to say that I don’t think I said that 

morale was improving, if I did I misspoke. I testified here——

Mr. SIRES. I thought that is what you said. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I said it hasn’t improved. 

Mr. SIRES. It hasn’t improved. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It has not. 

Mr. SIRES. It must be my English then. I’m still learning it. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It’s my Boston accent. I’m sorry. 

Mr. SIRES. But, Mr. Sullivan, one of the things that I always 

pride myself on is freedom of speech. You know, I have been an advocate here for a long time, since I have been here. And I am disheartened by the President’s unrelenting effort, the State Department’s efforts to defend freedom of speech around the world. What 

24

is the rationale behind the administration’s putting money toward 

free press programs 

in places like Hungary, but yet when it comes to Cuba we cut 

it, when it comes to Venezuela we cut it? Who determines where 

this money goes? How is that, you know, for promoting free press 

in these countries? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, it is certainly the case that Secretary 

Tillerson and I in the Department are strong advocates for freedom 

of the press. I raised this issue on my travels in Africa 2 weeks 

ago. 

With respect to specific allocations, I would have to get back to 

you on Cuba and Venezuela. It may have to do with partners that 

we were supporting there. 

I am aware of the program in Hungary to which you reference. 

But I would be happy to get back to you on more specific information with respect to Cuba and Venezuela. 

Mr. SIRES. That would be great. 

And how concerned are you that the Libyan situation is going to 

spill over into Tunisia and Morocco? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very concerned, as are the Tunisians in particular. We spent a lot of time focused on border security for Tunisia. We work in partnership with DoD and AFRICOM on border security, and not just the land border but the maritime border as 

well. Very important. Tunisians are concerned about it. We are devoting a lot of resources to it. 

Mr. SIRES. And Morocco? 

Mr. SIRES. Morocco as well. Same situation. 

Libya is, as I said in my opening remarks, both a magnet for foreign terrorist fighters and a source. So we are doing all we can. 

And I would defer to Under Secretary Trachtenberg if he has other 

thoughts to offer. But border security for those North African countries on either side of Libya is extremely important. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would agree with that, Congressman, absolutely. 

Mr. SIRES. Do you see the hand of Iran in all these efforts? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think Iran is definitely a challenge, certainly regionally. And, yes, there are a number of malign activities 

that Iran is engaged in that we are focused on that I know the 

State Department is also focused on. And I do agree, we need sort 

of a whole of government approach for dealing with some of these 

issues. But definitely I would agree with you on that. 

Mr. SIRES. And I just read an article on Politico regarding 

Hezbollah, their increasing efforts in the Western Hemisphere. And 

I don’t know if you saw the article but it would be great if you 

could look at that because it really talks about how they have increased their presence in Central America and South America and 

in Venezuela. So I was just wondering if you can comment on that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I can in fact. The administration is working 

on specifically a Hezbollah strategy. And there are various aspects 

to it. There’s Hezbollah in Lebanon which has become in a sense 

a local governing entity in southern Lebanon in addition to a terrorist organization that are influencing events in Syria. But they 

are also projecting their malign influence elsewhere including, unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Mar 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\120717\27758 SHIRL
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fortunately, in this hemisphere. You are absolutely right. And this 

administration is aware of it and focused on it. 

Mr. SIRES. And I would like to apologize for not hearing correctly 

what you said before at the beginning. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes myself for questions. 

I chair the Homeland Security Committee and so I have been a 

student of counterterrorism for quite some time. Was a Federal 

prosecutor as well. I know Osama bin Laden was in Khartoum and 

Afghanistan. I saw the rise of ISIS and the Caliphate during the 

tenure of my chairmanship, unfortunately. We have crushed the 

Caliphate, and we have defeated ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 

But now I am seeing a new phenomenon. I went to Egypt and 

the Sinai and we saw the explosion in the mosque, the downing of 

the Russian airliner. I was in Tunisia, met the Libyan team. It is 

in chaos. 

Boko Haram is taking over in parts of Africa, AQIM and other 

terrorist organizations. 

What I am worried about is that as we squeeze the balloon they 

are going to pop up somewhere else. And Africa seems to be the 

safe haven. They seek chaos. They seek ungoverned territories and 

safe havens. And so I see if we are trying to look in the future it 

is actually happening now that Africa is going to be the spot. This 

is going to be the hotspot. 

There is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership that includes 11 African countries. I know State has worked very diligently on this. And, Mr. Secretary, I was just hopeful you could 

give me maybe an update on how that partnership is working. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the phenomenon you described is quite accurate, Congressman. And we are—and I will defer to Under Secretary Trachtenberg on this—but we are very focused on where 

those terrorist fighters that are leaving the Caliphate, what is left 

of it—and there isn’t much—in Syria and Iraq, where they are 

going. Certainly Africa, parts of Africa, Libya, Northeastern Nigeria, elsewhere seems to be a landing place. 

But we are also seeing that in other areas, in South Asia and in 

the Pacific as well, in the Philippines. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So it is a priority for us to not win the fight 

against the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq but lose track of where all 

those, where all of those foreign fighters are going. 

Unfortunately, Libya has been an attractive place for them because of the ungoverned areas that I described earlier, and that 

you mentioned and know so well. 

But I defer to my colleague Under Secretary Trachtenberg. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congressman, I think you put your finger on 

the crux of the problem here when you talked about victories in 

certain areas but yet leading to problems in others. 

I tend to look at this, the problem of countering terrorism and 

extremist organizations, as something like a balloon, if I could use 

that analogy. If you squeeze the balloon in a certain place you will 

narrow it and take the air out of that place, but it will also balloon 

in other area, will expand in other areas. I think to a certain deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Mar 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\120717\27758 SHIRL
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gree that is what we are seeing by the flow of foreign terrorist 

fighters from one area to another. 

I think our job is working by, with, and through our partners, 

and working with our colleagues at the State Department and elsewhere is to deflate the balloon in order to solve the problem of terrorists and extremist groups moving simply from one location to 

some other ungoverned space where they feel they have freedom of, 

more freedom of action. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Can you comment on the role of NGOs? I was at 

the Munich Security Conference. I met with Bill Gates, the Gates 

Foundation; they do some great work in Africa. Bono and the ONE 

Campaign. Is that helpful, Secretary? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. NGOs are not just helpful but essential. We partner with them everywhere, particularly for humanitarian assistance. PEPFAR relies on partnering with NGOs. Really key, key for 

us. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That may be key to stability. I think what we need 

is stability. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Stability. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And it is very fragile and unstable. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good governance, health, economic development, 

humanitarian assistance. Basic stability issues that we need in 

places like Raqqa or in Mosul for just water, sanitation, demining, 

medical services, all key things that need to be restored in places 

that have just been decimated. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I agree with Secretary Sullivan on that, sir. 

It is true again, again what DoD is doing is basically attempting 

to work with our partners in the region to establish the security 

conditions that will allow these other priorities to be put into place 

in order to deal with some of the underlying reasons for the rise 

of terrorists and extremist activities. So absolutely concur. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. I agree and thank you for that testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California Ms. 

Bass. 

Ms. BASS. And let me just say I appreciate your questions about 

NGOs. I am hoping that somewhere down the line we can look at 

how we do foreign assistance because I think in some instances 

some of the countries could do for themselves, and maybe we need 

to focus on infrastructure like electricity and roads and things like 

that. So I look forward in the future to working with you on that. 

A couple of quick questions. Mr. Sullivan, there were a few times 

that you kept referring to 51 African countries. Why? Is that because we are involved in 51 as opposed to 54? But why? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Fifty-four posts where we have, have Ambassadors. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, I see. There is three countries where we don’t? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Ms. BASS. I see. What is that? Eritrea? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Eritrea——

Ms. BASS. That is okay. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sudan we have a Charge ́ because we can’t deal 

with Bashir, the President. And there is a, there is a third. 

Ms. BASS. Well——

27

Mr. SULLIVAN. So there are three where we don’t. But I will get, 

get those for you. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. And since you mentioned Sudan, since we are, 

you know, in the process of changing our policies there, what is the 

trajectory? Do we see having more than a Charge ́ or? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t see that. That is not a near-term development that I foresee. 

Ms. BASS. You don’t see that changing? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. My hope is that it will. I am not counting on that. 

My visit there was to discuss all the work that we have to do with 

Sudan going forward. 

We took one step,——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. As we discussed in October. There 

are a lot more things that need to happen before we have full, normal relations with Sudan. 

Ms. BASS. And maybe in another setting I could hear some more 

details about that. I think that would be helpful. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As we discussed before my trip,——

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. I would be delighted to come talk 

with you and give you a little more detail. 

Ms. BASS. All right. And I, so I am wondering if you can—I 

wasn’t here when my colleague asked questions about Libya, but 

tomorrow representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus are 

meeting with the Ambassador from Libya, deeply concerned about 

the whole situation that CNN exposed regarding the slave trade. 

And in general, I mean once Qaddafi was overthrown the sub-Saharan Africans that were in Libya were mistreated from the beginning because they were viewed as pro-Qaddafi forces. 

And so I was just wondering if there is anything you might offer 

us in preparation for that meeting with the Ambassador tomorrow, 

what is your view on this, specifically around the slave trade that 

has been exposed? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Meeting with our Ambassador, with Ambassador 

Bodde? 

Ms. BASS. No. No, no, no, no, no, meeting with the Libyan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Libyan. Oh, I am sorry, the Libyan Ambassador. 

Ms. BASS. With the Libyan Ambassador tomorrow. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Oh. So, two aspects of it, two really. One is the 

camps themselves in Libya which are difficult for us to get to because they are in, as I have discussed, in ungoverned areas for the 

most part where neither the GMA, the government in Tripoli, 

Prime Minister Sarraj, or the Haftar group in Eastern Libya really 

have access to. So that presents a real problem for us in trying to 

directly address the problem. 

The larger issue for us, though, is the countries that those migrants, those refugees came from and addressing the situation in 

those countries, why they left, why they left Nigeria——

Ms. BASS. Right. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. In the first place. 

Ms. BASS. And, you know, on another note I want to ask you one 

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thing that we can do with the E.U., especially with this whole policy of sending people back and not knowing where they are going 

back to. 

I wanted to ask you a question about Chad. Chad’s decision in 

October to withdraw troops from the Multinational Task Force, 

some analysts believe that that is one of the things that led to the 

instability along the border and the attack on our Special Operation Forces. And I wonder if Mr. Trachtenberg can make a comment in that? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Thank you, Congresswoman. We, from a 

DoD perspective, we have not seen any impact, operational impact 

in terms of our ability to work with the Chadian forces as part of 

our partnership, counterterrorism partnership activities. 

Ms. BASS. Did we figure out why they were included in the Muslim ban, considering that they were our allies? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I, I do not have an answer. Do not have an 

answer. 

Ms. BASS. I mean that is what led to them pulling out of the 

Multinational Task Force isn’t it? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. All I can tell you, Congresswoman, is that 

at least operationally we see no impact in terms of our ability to 

work with them as partners. 

Ms. BASS. So you don’t think that had anything to do with the 

attack on our Special Forces? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I cannot—that is a question I would have to 

take for the record. I can’t, I can’t answer that. 

Ms. BASS. One last question. Do you know how many troops we 

have on the continent? I mean, after that attack that really raised 

a lot of questions because we thought it was a few hundred. How 

many U.S. troops are there on the continent of Africa? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think the issue of the troops that we have, 

the actual numbers and their locations is an issue that I would prefer not to address in an open session. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. CURTIS [presiding]. Thank you. 

We now go to Representative Ted Poe, chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations on 

being chair of this committee in such a few months. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I am not going to let you respond. 

I do want to comment on something the gentlelady Ms. Bass 

made a comment earlier. Just for the record, the committee has 

passed, and the House has passed, and it is the law of the land 

that there will be an audit of foreign aid. And we will have that, 

supposedly, audit in January to see what all those NGOs are doing 

all over the country, all over the world, whether they are working 

or not working. I think it is long overdue. So, I look forward, as 

you do, to that information. 

And I also want to follow up on the issue of Libya specifically. 

The United States in my opinion recklessly intervened in Libya in 

2011. We toppled the regime. We all thought we were doing such 

a great thing. But Libya turned into a failed state. Another failure 

29

in American foreign policy to topple a regime and then let it go into 

disarray. And because of that, now we have Libya with all of its 

different tribes, and groups, and governments all in Libya trying 

to control the Government of Libya. And a lot of these groups, in 

my opinion, are terrorist groups. 

And now we know that Libya is a center point for people who 

want to get out of their situation in Africa being fooled to think 

that they can get to Libya and then go across the Mediterranean, 

primarily to Italy. And people are being lied to that they will be 

smuggled, and get a job, and all of those things that we have heard 

about for years. And they are lied to, primarily women and children, and all of a sudden they are in the slave trade. 

They are being kidnaped by modern day slave masters. They are 

turned into slaves. They are sold on the marketplace of slavery and 

human trafficking, some for $100. And bad things only happen to 

them. 

Now it is not just the western part of Africa where the smuggling 

route takes place, it is taking place from many different areas of 

Africa, folks just trying to have a better life and then they are in 

the slave trade. 

I wouldn’t say that the United States is at fault of this, but we 

destroyed the regime. And it is chaos in Libya. I have a couple of 

questions. 

Specifically what terrorist groups are involved in the slave trade? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would have to get back to you for a specific answer. I can speculate. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will have to get back to you with a—I want to 

give you a precise answer. If I could take that for the record, because I don’t want to speculate. 

I don’t know if the Under Secretary may have more relevant information. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No. I would also, I would also want to take 

that for the record. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Well, we will hold you both accountable for that 

because we want to know who those, who those bad outlaws are 

and then develop a continuous policy of going after them. 

What is the United States’ foreign policy regarding Libya today? 

After all these years since 2011 tell us what our policy is? What 

is our goals? What are we trying to do? Who do we support in 

Libya? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We deal with Prime Minister Sarraj who is the 

head of the GMA, his government in Tripoli. There is a Libyan political agreement in place that has been negotiated by, as you have 

mentioned, all the relevant tribes and entities. 

There is a process in place, led by a U.N. representative, a representative of the Secretary-General. The United States supports 

that political process to bring all those disparate elements together, 

to come up with a political solution so that we can have elections, 

which are scheduled next year, and have a legitimate government 

in Libya that we can deal with. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Mr. Secretary, just to reclaim my time since I am 

just almost out of time. Now that we know about the slave trade 

and that Libya is a hub of the slave trade, what are we doing about 

30

that specific issue regarding Africans who are smuggled through 

Libya into Europe in the slave trade? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Two things. We have got a preexisting program, 

Trafficking in Persons. Libya has become a key focus of that. Trafficking in persons is a global problem. This is an acute problem we 

have to address in Libya. That is first. 

Second, we need to address the political and economic situations 

and support the governments in countries like Nigeria where those 

people are fleeing, leaving themselves open to be abused in camps 

in Libya. 

Mr. POE. I will look forward to that list of terrorist groups. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for that 

shout out as well. 

The Chair recognizes David Cicilline from Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you to our witnesses for being 

here. 

Mr. Sullivan, I want to begin with you. The President has declared his support for a tax bill that will add $1 trillion to the national debt, yet he, Secretary Tillerson, you, and others in the administration continue to use the deficit as an excuse for the deep 

cuts that have been proposed to the State Department and foreign 

assistance. So I am just wondering whether in light of this development whether your position has changed or whether you think it 

is still necessary or desirable to support a 30 percent cut in USAID 

and the State Department? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, as Secretary Tillerson has testified, we believe we can perform the mission of the State Department with the 

budget——

Mr. CICILLINE. So it is still the position——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Your position hasn’t changed though. We are 

going to add $1 trillion to the deficit for this tax bill but that we 

still need to make these devastating cuts to the State Department 

and USAID because of the deficit? Okay, your answer is yes? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. My—I didn’t take the position on the tax bill. 

I——

Mr. CICILLINE. No, no, but you take the position that the deficit——

Mr. SULLIVAN. On the budget. 

Mr. CICILLINE [continuing]. So the reason that we are making a 

30 percent cut in the State Department and USAID that you support as Assistant Secretary? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I support that budget. Yes, I do. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Now, and you don’t think there is any concern that our allies and partners around the world might not believe us next time we say we want to disengage from a program 

because we don’t have resources? You don’t think—do you think it 

has any impact on the perception of the world about U.S. leadership and global engagement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the Department, the President has made 

the case that we believe that it is important for countries that 

31

haven’t stepped up for these programs that they step up their commitment. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So I take it the answer is no. 

We are here to talk about counterterror operations in Africa. And 

you mentioned that 90 percent of our Ambassadors are in place 

now, which is terrific. But I think you will agree that counterterrorism operations in Africa and the Middle East are inextricably 

linked. And my first question is do you think you can achieve, or 

we can achieve our goals for the region without an Ambassador in 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen without an Assistant 

Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry, can we keep our policies——

Mr. CICILLINE. Can we achieve our objectives without these positions even being in place, doing the work that is required of each 

of those Ambassadors and each of those Secretaries? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Each of those positions is filled and we are doing 

the work. We could do it better if those positions were filled with 

Senate-confirmed individuals. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But they are not filled with Ambassadors, they 

are filled with acting individuals; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Charge ́s. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So, we have 50 percent of the positions in the 

State Department and USAID where an individual hasn’t even 

been nominated for the position; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will take that number, yes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe that is roughly accurate, yes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. 50 percent. That includes the, all of the Ambassadors I just mentioned and a number of additional positions. Fifty 

percent. You know, we keep hearing, oh, it is because the Senate 

is slowing down. The administration hasn’t submitted half the people for these positions that are necessary. What is the delay? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the delay in part is——

Mr. CICILLINE. And how are we expected to do, advance the work 

of the United States, and the national security interests, and the 

diplomatic work? We can’t engage in robust diplomacy without diplomats. Do you agree? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would agree with that. We have——

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. So I hope you will do everything you can 

to encourage the President to actually appoint people to these very 

important positions that the rest of the world is wondering what 

we are doing and why we are not engaged. I hope you will take 

that message back. 

Next I would like to ask you about a very serious issue with respect to child soldiers. There is serious concern in the Congress 

over reports that Secretary Tillerson acted in contravention of the 

Child Soldiers Prevention Act by not listing Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Burma among those countries who use child soldiers. We know 

that the State Department’s legal advisor, every relevant office and 

bureau, and even our Embassies abroad believe that these three 

countries were required by statute to be listed but they were not. 

As you know, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act requires the 

State Department to list any country, even if it is believed the 

countries were making progress, that used child soldiers during the 

32

year, without exception. Can you tell me why Secretary Tillerson 

chose to ignore the advice of so many State Department experts 

and the framework of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act and not 

list these three countries? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Based on the advice he got, he applied his judgment applying the statute to the facts that were presented to him, 

and made that decision——

Mr. CICILLINE. So the advice he got was to the contrary, it was 

to list the three countries. Do you know why he didn’t? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I, he, as I say, he applied his judgment, applied 

the law to the facts. 

Mr. CICILLINE. What does that mean? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That means that he applied his judgment based 

on the recommendation he got, the materials that were presented 

to him. It was his judgment to make. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Next, Mr. Sullivan, could you tell me, I recently visited the Central African Republic and saw the important 

work of the U.N. peacekeepers there. And I would be interested to 

know what we can do to better support the U.N. peacekeeping mission. I think in that particular place we are at a very sort of tipping point, and that mission we want to make sure is successful. 

And what can we be doing, what can the United States be doing 

to better support U.N. peacekeepers to be sure that they have both 

the training and the equipment that they need to be successful? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, CAR in particular has been an important 

topic for Ambassador Haley at the U.N. in working with the Secretary-General to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of 

peacekeeping operations generally, but in CAR in particular. It is 

a very important mission for us. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And my very last question, Mr. Sullivan. 

A recent survey conducted by the U.N. Development Programme 

found that 71 percent of respondents pointed to an adverse interaction with state security forces as the factor that was the tipping 

point in their decision to join terrorist organizations. Aside from 

Leahy vetting and human rights training, in what ways is the administration seeking to ensure that partner militaries accused of 

human rights violations pursue tangible measures of accountability 

for such actions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I testified earlier, accountability, not just vetting of the organizations, the particular military units or police 

units, but accountability, investigation, prosecution, and accountability by the government of those units is a key part of our program to ensure we are not enabling organizations that violate 

human rights. And not only just completely counter to our mission, 

which is to eliminate the terrorist threat rather than create, as the 

statistics you cite, having organizations that abuse people creates 

more terrorists rather than reducing the number of terrorists. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you. We go to Adam 

Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate both of you being here today. I know it is probably the joy of your week to look forward to coming and testifying 

33

in front of Congress. But we love having you here, and thanks for 

your service to your country. 

A couple of quick points and then I will get to my questions. The 

issue of Libya was brought up earlier by my good friend. And I do 

want to make the point because I think it is lost a lot. People say, 

well, look at Libya, intervention in Libya failed. I think it was the 

post-Libya intervention that failed. I think when you take out leadership and then you basically walk away from a country there is 

no doubt you are going to have issues with governance. 

But I do like to point out the fact that compare Libya to Syria. 

In Libya, as difficult as it is right now, and as challenging as it is, 

there is not 1⁄2 million dead Libyans right now. And there is not 

a generation that is being churned into refugee camps to the great 

extent that Syria is. 

So I think when you compare the idea of intervention and you 

look at Libya and you look at Syria, I would much rather have 

Syria look like Libya than Libya look like Syria. I think it is an 

important point. It doesn’t mean we didn’t fail at follow-up. I think 

follow-up we did fail. We basically walked away and said, here, fix 

it. 

The other point I think, and I know it is kind of a aggressive way 

to say it, but I think it is important. I think this fight on terror, 

this war on terror is basically the equivalent of a low grade World 

War III. And we are fighting an enemy all over the world. We have 

been—I am a veteran of the wars and so that, you know, I have 

been in the military now 13 or 14 years, and I expect that probably 

the next generation to follow me is still going to have to fight this 

war to some extent. 

So, Mr. Sullivan, my question on that is when we look at Africa 

and we look at the Iron Curtain of poverty, which I call it, and you 

look at this kind of lost opportunity, today there is 15 countries in 

sub-Saharan Africa where half of the population is under the age 

of 18. And combined with that tremendous youth bulge is the fact 

that about 60 percent of Africa is unemployed or under the age of 

25. And that demographic represents the prime recruiting pool for 

terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab. 

I was in Kenya and saw a USAID project where we built a milk 

co-op and, frankly, gave villages opportunity and hope. And they 

were extremely excited to meet me. They had never seen Adam 

Kinzinger, but they knew I was a guy from the United States Congress and they knew that we had changed their lives. And it is in 

villages like that where you will never, ever be able to recruit an 

enemy against the United States. 

And so, Mr. Sullivan, that is where I consider your job especially 

important is conflict mitigation, in denying terrorists recruits 

around Africa. Given that this administration has placed a huge 

priority in fighting terrorism, how is the State Department working 

to address underlying causes of radicalization, including lack of political opportunity, political marginalization, economic opportunity? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, it is extremely important for all the reasons 

you say. And one thing that I would point out and emphasize a 

point you made which is for our support—and I am focused, I am 

thinking now of particularly in programs in Iraq now—for large 

areas of Iraq that have been recovered from, from ISIS we found 

34

that the most effective programs are the small, are really small 

scale. 

Large-scale projects we have wasted huge amounts of money in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, elsewhere. Smaller scale projects on the village 

level. And we have got a number of projects, a large number because they are small but they total almost $150 million, for areas 

of Iraq that we need to contribute to stability so that internally displaced persons can go back. But the focus has to be on the local 

level. 

These large macro projects, in my opinion, where we invest, have 

invested billions it leads to corruption, graft, all of that. Focusing 

on the local level where there is a real impact on individual lives, 

that is where we need to be. 

Mr. KINZINGER. That is why I hope maybe the State Department 

can do a better job of, in essence, bragging about those achievements because, look, I am fighting people in my own party, some 

that want to zero out the entire State Department; right? And I 

think on the other side of the aisle, my friends over there sometimes think that any budget cut is going to lead to chaos all around 

the globe. 

What we want to do is have a State Department that is efficient 

and effective. And so I think those small-scale projects, conflict 

mitigation, a fight in a village in Iraq, for instance, that never happened because we brought two sides together and they learned to 

kind of live together is the stuff that we need to talk and brag 

about. 

Because I love DoD. I am a member of DoD as a reservist. I just 

want to use them less. And because when you have to use DoD it 

gets really expensive and people lose their lives. And, frankly, me 

and my fellow pilots are kind of tired of having to deploy all the 

time, but they are really good at what they do. 

So, I want to thank you both again for being here. And I would 

just encourage you to always think, in the State Department to always think in terms of, and frankly anybody listening, there is a 

lot of conflicts that are mitigated that we never hear about. And 

I think it is extremely important that you guys get that message 

out so the folks here sitting behind can support it. 

So thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. And thank you to the witnesses for 

being here. 

My concerns that I want to talk to you about today is the impact 

on the women of the world—and I know specifically we are talking 

about Africa—with some of the current action or inaction of the 

State Department. And just to pick off, pick up where Mr. 

Kinzinger, some of his comments which was that the population of 

Africa over 1 billion, 60 percent under the age of 25, 40 percent living in poverty, and obviously the poor governance, corruption, economic exclusion. And I want to pick up on the weak health systems. All which lead to terrorism and the recruitment of especially 

young men to be terrorists. 

And my concern is that there seems to be an obsession on the 

Republican side and our President with abortion. And because of 

that obsession and the failure to recognize that the Federal GovVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Mar 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\120717\27758 SHIRL
35

ernment does not fund abortion that we have taken the gag rule 

too far, we have taken, we have defunded programs at the U.N. 

which are cutting off health, reproductive, access to contraception, 

access to AIDS prevention to the women of these countries, which 

has large impact on what goes on. I am sure you would agree with 

that. 

So, my question to you is what are you doing about that? You, 

I think you were here one time, or Secretary Tillerson was here, 

he said there was going to be a review of the global gag rule to include assessments of any harm caused by the politics to women 

and the girls that receive U.S. global health assistance. 

I think I asked you about, I’m sorry, Mr. Sullivan, I asked you 

about the downgrading of the Office of Global Women’s Issues. We 

still don’t have an Ambassador and I still am concerned about that. 

So I would like to have your comment on those issues. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will have to get back to you on the effect of the 

gag rule. I will take that for the record and I will get back to you. 

We have—the process for selecting the Ambassador, we identify 

the person but then they have to go through vetting. It takes a 

while. That position is going to be filled. You have my word on 

that. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay, well, I appreciate that. In the meantime, 

what about downgrading the office? You serve the office—you report directly to the Secretary; is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And now that position is going to be downgraded? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, there were almost 70 offices, all of which reported directly to the Secretary. So we have tried to rationalize the 

system so that each of those offices is placed in a bureau that 

would provide support to that office because the Secretary, the Office of the Secretary is small, it is one person. So we don’t characterize it as a downgrade. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Well, my concern will be the ability of that bureau 

that you are talking about, the issues that involve women are so 

diverse you can’t, it is very hard to just put them in one little pocket. And you are dealing with economic issues. You are dealing with 

gender equality. You are dealing, obviously, with health issues, 

with child marriage, with sex trafficking, labor trafficking, all those 

issues that go across a lot of different components of the State Department. I want to be assured that this bureau is going to be able 

to access all of those areas. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Certainly. And on my trip to Africa, in Nigeria I 

saw all those issues. I went to a hospital, to a clinic, a PEPFAR 

clinic that was HIV positive women with babies born to them and 

because of PEPFAR their babies are not HIV positive. 

Economic empowerment, Secretary Tillerson has discussed that. 

The value of a dollar invested in a woman yields so much more 

that it is, it is really money well spent. 

All those issues you raised are extremely important, and particularly for our subject here which is Africa and counterterrorism in 

Africa. 

Ms. FRANKEL. All right. Well, just to let you know, we are going 

to be watching that and hope for some good progress. 

I yield back. 

36

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. Mr. John Curtis of Utah. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There has been a theme today expressed by a lot of my colleagues about human rights. And I don’t want to burden us with 

further questions other than to express my own personal concern 

and interest in this. And appreciate your efforts along these lines. 

I would like to ask Dr. Trachtenberg quickly, in your opening remarks you said African solutions to African problems. And I found 

myself wishing you had just a little bit more time to expand on 

that. Would you take just a minute and tell us what you meant by 

that? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Sure, Congressman. I think clearly it is not 

our role, certainly not the role of the Department of Defense to determine the outcomes for other countries in terms of governance, 

in terms of some of the issues that have been talked about here 

that serve as the underlying issues that lead to radicalization or 

terrorism. 

What we can do, and what we should be doing and what we are 

doing is working with these countries to help provide a secure environment so that they can then develop and establish the forms of 

governance and society that are important to their growth economically, politically, and what have you. We are not trying to impose 

our solutions on others is really what I meant there. 

Africa is a diverse, large and diverse continent, over 50 countries 

there. It is, it is absolutely huge. And the history of those countries, the cultures are all different. So what we are trying to do is 

we are trying to get at the problem that we are talking about here, 

countering terrorism and extremism in order to provide a security 

setting where others like the Department of State can come in and 

help assist those countries develop their own indigenous solutions, 

keeping in mind that each starts from a different place historically, 

culturally, and what have you. 

That is really what I meant. We are not trying to impose a solution on them. 

Mr. CURTIS. All right. I think it caught my attention because I 

think that is frequently an error we make in lots of problems, and 

I wanted to emphasize that. 

Thank you. I yield my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We have Ted Lieu of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for calling this important hearing. I appreciate it. And thank you, Secretary Sullivan and Secretary Trachtenberg for your service. 

Did I pronounce that right, sir? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LIEU. All right, thank you. 

I would first like to start off asking you, Secretary Trachtenberg, 

in your written testimony you stated that we need a whole of government approach to defeat terrorism. Does that include a State 

Department? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. LIEU. And I just want to say that the proposed massive cuts 

by Secretary Tillerson to the State Department, as well as President Trump’s failure to nominate individuals for high level State 

37

Department positions have hurt U.S. national security. If those 

things are not corrected it will further hurt U.S. national security. 

So, Mr. Chair, I would like to enter for the record a letter to Secretary Mattis dated March 10th, 2017. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

This letter is from national security experts and former government officials from across the political spectrum. And in it they 

state that ‘‘even small numbers of unintentional civilian deaths or 

injuries, whether or not legally permitted, can cause significant 

strategic setbacks. For example, civilian deaths from U.S. operations can cause partners and allies to reduce operational collaboration, withdraw consent, and limit intelligence sharing, increase 

violence for militant groups, and foster distrust among local populations.’’

I support the Department of Defense operations around the 

world to go after terrorists. I served on active duty in the military. 

When it comes to terrorists, I believe we should hunt them down 

and kill them. But we should also protect civilians because it will 

harm our U.S. national security if we don’t. So I have seen troubling rises in civilian casualties across DoD operations such as, for 

example, in Operation Inherent Resolve. This is not a partisan 

issue. That started under the Obama administration, civilian casualties started rising. It continues today. The New York Times did 

a very large expose on that. 

And I have before me two Daily Beast articles I would like to 

enter for the record as well at the appropriate time. And the first 

one is dated November 29th, 2017. It is titled ‘‘Strong Evidence 

that U.S. Special Operations Forces Massacred Civilians in Somalia.’’

The second is dated December 6th, 2017, saying ‘‘On the Eve of 

Congressional Hearings New Evidence about Alleged U.S. Massacre in Somalia.’’ And what the Daily Beast articles say is that 

they did an investigation and they state that U.S. Special Forces 

killed unarmed civilians in Somalia on August 25th. We have been 

in contact with Africa Command. They deny that. And they say 

they have done an assessment. Their assessment is that those casualty figures are incorrect, that everyone that was killed was essentially an enemy combatant. 

So my question for you is is there going to be any further investigation or assessment or is that, is that it? Is there going to be 

any further? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congressman Lieu, my understanding of 

that incident and AFRICOM’s response is precisely the way you 

have described it. 

I do want to make clear that we in the Department of Defense 

take any accusations of civilian casualties very seriously, and we 

work to avoid them at all costs. You are correct, AFRICOM recently conducted and concluded an assessment into this particular 

incident. The key finding from that was that the only casualties 

suffered were those of armed enemy combatants who had fired 

upon U.S. and Somali forces, and that the allegations of civilian 

casualty, the charges of civilian casualties were not credible. 

38

I will be happy to look into your question in terms of will there 

be a follow-on to this. But the information I have as of this time 

supports the conclusions of AFRICOM that you have mentioned. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

So, in light of this new Daily Beast article dated December 6th 

where they provide additional evidence, I strongly urge the Department of Defense to conduct a further investigation as to what actually happened on August 25th. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I will take that back. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

I have limited time remaining, so let me just again say that I 

want to thank both you and Secretary Sullivan for your public 

service and appreciate your being here today. 

Chairman ROYCE. Congressman Darrell Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Sullivan, I am 

going to direct my questions primarily to you. 

Currently, to use a term, you are dual-hatted. You have got the 

management portfolio and the conventional deputy; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That’s correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And in your opinion—well, let me rephrase that. 

The continent of Africa and its billion people have a number of 

problems we have talked about today, including a number of terrorist groups who now are aligning themselves with ISIS, obviously 

human trafficking, and the like. It was mentioned in opening statements that the Department of Defense’s budget to combat this is 

roughly equal to your budget. 

This is an area of great threat. It is larger than the United 

States, meaning that relief efforts for our men and women, your 

men and women of the State Department and affiliated organizations basically, it is tough. Benghazi was the closest point to Europe practically, and the relief effort took more than 13 hours. 

So I want to go through a couple of questions related to, if you 

will, your management hat as deputy. I was recently, Thanksgiving 

weekend, in Zimbabwe for the change that you only get once every 

37 years, so you take it when you can. And I want to thank the 

State Department for working so hard to make that mission possible. 

I also toured the new facility there, a $220 million facility arriving on time later next year. But I noticed that, first of all, it is an 

expensive facility. It was built at twice the size of our existing facility. And it was built based on a decision made during the last administration, which was to give up the standard design, in other 

words builds that are cookie cutters that allow for faster and less 

expensive facilities. 

Since this committee and the appropriators give you a limited 

amount of money, that facility, which took a long time, cost $220 

million, is an exception to the otherwise aging facilities that don’t 

meet Inman standards, that are not safe, and they are, many of 

them, are in Africa. And although this structure is beautiful and 

it has architect—by the way, it has completely curved walls, continuously curved walls which turns out to be really hard to do and 

a little bit impractical. 

39

So, what will you be doing to return to a process in which the 

dollars the American people invest specifically in facilities and security go further, particularly in dangerous areas like Africa? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. A very important question, Congressman Issa. 

And it is a phenomenon that we have seen, I have seen in the 7 

months that I have been in office where the length of time it takes 

for an Embassy to be—site to be picked, plans developed, built, and 

so forth, our mission will often change. 

For example, in Iraq we built an enormous Embassy in Iraq; 

much of it we don’t need now. So there is a lot we. We have had 

a——

Mr. ISSA. I was also in Baghdad——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. A couple weeks earlier. And what you, 

what you need is an overhead cover from things dropping into that 

Embassy. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So it is very important. It is part of the Secretary’s redesign looking at OBO and our planning for Embassies. 

It is a huge amount of money as a part of our budget that we 

spend. And I have spoken to our IG about this, IG investigations 

and how we have been spending money. Very important issue, particularly if, as we have discussed a lot today, the State Department 

budget getting cut or whether it will, making sure that those dollars we spend on our Embassies are spent effectively to promote 

the safety of our women and men, but also that we have the rightsized Embassy, right size building for the post we need. 

Mr. ISSA. So it is fair to say that one of the challenges is these 

lead times under these custom designs is so long——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. That often what you end up with is not 

what you need by that time? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Eventually, that is right. 

Mr. ISSA. Obviously you are still looking at Britain. We will talk 

offline at the problems of that billion dollar-plus facility. 

But one of the other last questions is would you consider bringing to this committee for authorization a revised grand plan of how 

you get to where every facility, at least in what we would call highstress or dangerous areas, can be upgraded in a timely fashion? 

In other words, I know with your budget you are looking our decades and, you know, where Papua New Guinea is getting one, 

places in Africa are not, would you consider bringing to us a comprehensive proposal and then allowing that increased speed with 

which you will be able to do it if you return to a standard design 

platform so that this committee could consider the additional funds 

leaped ahead to get us from a very dangerous area in which the 

next Benghazi could happen at any time, to an area in which the 

men and women who go around the world on behalf of us could be 

secure? 

And, Chairman, I appreciate the time but I would hope the Secretary could answer. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah, not only would I consider it, I would welcome it and look forward to having that conversation with you and 

members of the committee, including on our Embassy in London. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

40

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Adriano Espaillat. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Engel. Thank you for coordinating this hearing on the U.S. efforts 

to counter terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. I am glad both the 

State Department and the Department of Defense are here today. 

Given the October ambush of U.S. military personnel in Niger 

which took the lives of four U.S. soldiers, including Army Sergeant 

La David Johnson, David Johnson whose body was found days 

after the attack, as well as the expansion of Boko Haram across Nigeria’s borders, and even the current slave auction crisis in Libya, 

I think that all these warrant a more robust approach, more funding, more efforts both by the State Department and Department of 

Defense to expand its regional counterterrorism assistance programs in Africa. 

We need to be investing more in our peacekeeping operation and 

other State Department efforts like USAID. This is necessary not 

just in Africa but in the rest of the world as well. 

Yet, we have seen the Department of Defense expand its own en- gagement in sub-Saharan Africa and has spent over $1.7 billion for 

counterterrorism purposes in the past 10 years. Secretary of Defense Mattis said if we don’t fund the State Department fully then 

we need to buy more ammunition ultimately. And that is beginning 

to play itself out as we proceed with these major proposed cuts. 

And we see that there is plenty of truth to that statement. And so 

why would the State Department cut its own budget? 

I want to, Mr. Sullivan, go right straight to a question which has 

really been troubling me for a long, long time, because this crisis, 

the kidnap of the girls by Boko Haram which—and I must commend Congresswoman Wilson for sort of keeping the eye on the 

ball on that issue—once it left the media has somewhat been buried. And what is the status of these girls that are still held captive 

by Boko Haram? How many of them do we know there’s a possibility to rescue them, to get them back? What is the current status 

of these girls kidnaped by Boko Haram? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was a topic, an important issue for my trip to 

Nigeria, at our Embassy in Nigeria. And it may have left the front 

pages of the newspapers here in the United States but it has certainly not left the Embassy in Nigeria which is focused very acutely on this. 

There were, as you know, approximately 300 young women who 

were abducted, some of whom have been rescued or released or escaped. But there is a huge number that are still unknown. We 

don’t know where they are. We suspect that they are still held captive. They may have been given as brides. 

It is something that both the United States and the Nigerian 

Government is focused very acutely on. I met with our security 

staff at the Embassy. I met with our local staff, local Nigerians 

who came up to me when I did a town hall to tell me how important it was to them that we are not forgetting about them and we 

are still working to track them and do all we can to rescue them. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. It just baffles me that we can probably put a 

man or a woman on Mars soon and we can’t find out where these 

41

girls are. I am just very concerned that maybe too little too late 

when we get to them. So, I would encourage both the State Department and the Department of Defense to continue robustly looking 

for them. 

On the slave auction matter which is a horrible modern slave 

trade story, is there anything you can share with us on that? What 

is the magnitude of it? Who is involved in it? Who, who are the 

slave owners in this? 

We want to know who is engaged in this. Is there any, any country or any sector of our society in a country that is acutely and vigorously involved in this and benefitting from this? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So, the focus is in ungoverned areas in Libya. And 

I have already committed to get back to the committee with a report on more intelligence, specific intelligence that we could provide 

in a closed setting on what we know about those who are, are involved. 

But I would say the central problem is that these camps are in 

ungoverned areas, in enormous countries with ungoverned areas. 

And that also may explain why, to our first point that we discussed 

about the young women who are still missing, there are 

ungoverned areas where we don’t have a lot of access or intelligence. So it is something we need to work on. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. What about our allies? For example, Italy seems 

to be very concerned with the outlawness of Libya. And they are 

having a serious migration issue in Italy, and across Europe I may 

add because Italy will be the port of entry for that migration coming from Libya. Do they have any intelligence, do they have any 

information about this? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have met with the Carabinieri, actually the head 

of the Carabinieri to discuss the immigration problem from Libya. 

This was several months ago. Italy has a very close relationship 

with a number of groups in Libya and what is I am sure a source 

of intelligence that we can rely on. 

Chairman ROYCE. We need to move to——

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, sir. 

We need to move to Tom Garrett of Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go relatively quickly. Unless I address you, Mr. Trachtenberg, I apologize, my question is directed to the Deputy Secretary. I would hope 

that you would appreciate the fact that I have a finite amount of 

time. And if it is a yes or no question, give a yes or no answer. 

On the Sudan, I have also been there, I would commend this administration for the progress made in that country. And I point out 

that by virtue of the fact that we have heard so many doom and 

gloom stories from those who don’t understand the Vandenberg 

concept that politics stops at the water’s edge. Has Sudan historically in the last 30 years been a kind of bad actor? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so, have they also been listed on the State 

Sponsors of Terror List? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They still are. 

Mr. GARRETT. At some point they were accused of harboring a 

guy named Osama bin Laden; correct? 

42

Mr. SULLIVAN. They did indeed. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. And they harbored FBI bomb plotters as 

well back in the ’90s; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Many bad actors, yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so when I was there I had the opportunity to 

meet with Mr. Atta, who heads NISS there, a very powerful man. 

I was encouraged by some of the words and deeds. And while there 

is a long way to go yet, we are making progress at advancing 

human rights, religious freedom, and reducing their role in terror 

in the Republic of the Sudan. Is that a fair assessment? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so would you say that is a success story of 

this administration on foreign policy? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Partial success, yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Sure, there is a lot left to do. 

And so you have also spoken to the reduction in funds as it relates to the success of programs on small scales, things like school 

feeding programs, and water purifications in villages; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The need for those and the small scale programs 

are the most effective. 

Mr. GARRETT. It is a lot easier to lose money when we spend lots 

of it than it is when we address a specific issue; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well said. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. And so I have been a champion of things 

like school feeding programs. I would point out and ask you if you 

agree that there is a reduction in long-term radicalization when we 

see women get educations. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t think anybody could deny that. 

Mr. GARRETT. And there is an increase in economic achievement 

where we see school feeding programs and articulate, educated 

women as well; correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would think so. 

Mr. GARRETT. And these are things like McGovern-Dole feeding 

programs that aren’t massive programs but that we should spread 

out as small programs. They work; right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. So this is just a history for me. 

I spoke briefly earlier of Arthur Vandenberg. Are you familiar 

with Arthur Vandenberg? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. And so you are aware that Mr. Vandenberg 

was the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was 

running against Truman we thought when he was encouraged to 

attack Mr. Truman on foreign policy matters. Are you familiar with 

the story? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am. 

Mr. GARRETT. And Mr. Vandenberg said, ‘‘I simply won’t do that 

because politics should stop at the water’s edge.’’

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. I am disheartened by the fact that that 

doesn’t appear to be the case today. I was taken aback, and in fact 

wrote down the words verbatim of a member previously who said, 

and I quote, ‘‘Wherever you go anywhere in the world people from 

43

State pull you aside and tell you how upset they are, how they feel 

like the administration is really going after the State Department.’’

Did you hear that testimony earlier? Does that sound familiar? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe a member said that, yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. What I would submit is that this is actually 

the State Department going after the administration. So let me ask 

you this: The people in State who are complaining that the administration is going after them, who elected them? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Employees of the State Department are Civil 

Service and Foreign Service. 

Mr. GARRETT. So they are not elected by the people of the United 

States. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. GARRETT. And who are they held accountable to? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They are held accountable to the Secretary. 

Mr. GARRETT. And he works for? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The President of the United States. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. And is policy making vested in the individuals who complain about how they are being treated by the administration? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I——

Mr. GARRETT. They are not policy makers, correct, they are executioners of policy? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is hard for me to answer that because of defining who a policy maker is. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, I will submit this: I wore the uniform of the 

United States military for a number of years and oftentimes I was 

told to do things that I didn’t necessarily agree with on my ideological scale, but so long as they were lawful orders that didn’t violate 

the international laws governing the actions of military force I executed those orders without complaining to Members of Congress 

when they showed up, say for example, in the dining facility at 

Camp Dobol in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

And so I would ask you if you would be willing to convey to the 

members of the State Department that they were not elected, that 

they are not policy makers, that they are executioners of policy, 

and so long as the policy that they are asked to execute does not 

violate international laws that they should do their jobs or find 

some other place to go. 

Now, I say that with respect and regard to the fine professional 

individuals from the State Department who helped me extract nine 

Christian refugees from the Republic of the Sudan earlier this year. 

There are wonderful people at State. But when an administration 

changes it is not your job to grab us by the sleeve and complain 

that you don’t think the President is treating you well. It is your 

job, as Tennyson said, to do your job. 

And, finally, are you familiar with the statement made earlier in 

this hearing where an individual said it seems to be a Republican 

obsession with abortion? Do you recall that test—that question, 

line of questioning? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe so, yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. I would submit that perhaps it is not an obsession with abortion but an obsession with protecting the preeminent, God-given, human right which is the right to life. And I 

44

would submit that the obsession is on the part of those who believe 

that U.S. foreign policy hinges on funding abortions of people in the 

developing world. 

And so, candidly, I thank you for the good work you are doing. 

I appreciate the progress we are making in places like the Republic 

of the Sudan. I appreciate the great help that we receive from people in the State Department. But if you don’t agree with the policies coming out of the administration, please convey to the members of the staff that might disagree they should run for President. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Bradley Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. And again thank you to the witnesses for spending your time with us today and sharing your perspective. I am, likewise, going to spend most of my time with you, 

Mr. Sullivan. No disrespect to Mr. Trachtenberg. 

There are many reports out that say there are many vacancies 

within the State Department. Just as an example, the Ambassador 

to South Korea is vacant. There are reports out that morale is low. 

And you are hearing it from former policy makers who would know 

and have a perspective. 

We are managing in a world at a time when there is ever-increasing danger, ever-increasing complexity managing a larger, 

growing, significant number of priorities with a smaller staff and 

a requested smaller budget. So my question to you, Mr. Sullivan, 

is as you look at the world, as the State Department looks at the 

world as you are trying to manage your resources, what priorities 

have had to be moved to the outer ring or the back burner? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our priorities, defining our priorities——

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Sullivan, are you sure the button is 

pushed, sir? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. My apologies. It is my first—I usually forget to do 

that more often in a hearing. This is my first error. I apologize. 

We have defined our priorities as protecting the United States, 

promoting security of the United States, and also promoting U.S. 

economic prosperity, two principal, two principal goals of this administration. Everything else flows from that: Supporting our allies; working to address threats, whether it’s the DPRK——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So let me reclaim my time. And I appreciate 

that and protecting the United States’ interests——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER [continuing]. I would posit is more of a mission 

statement than priorities. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Within those priorities are there places around 

the world where we are going to dedicate more resources, whether 

it is working to make progress in Sudan, which I commend you for 

the progress that has been made. But we have concerns about what 

is happening in North Korea. We have concerns about losing 

ground to Iraq—or to Iran rather in Syria and Iraq and Yemen. We 

have concerns about what is happening in Latin America. 

The best way to fail is to try to do everything all at once with 

unlimited resources. We don’t have unlimited resources. We are 

pulling back resources. And so I would hope that within the broad 

45

context of the world with increasing challenges, we are putting at 

the top of the list the most significant, most important priorities, 

but with limited resources some have to drop. 

So, my question is what priorities are being pushed down the list 

because of loss of personnel, lack of resources, decisions to say that 

this is not where we are going to put our resources today? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, there is a process that is managed by the 

White House, the National Security Council, to prioritize our security and our foreign policy. And that process is ongoing in this first 

year of the administration. 

It is hard for me to say. There isn’t a, there isn’t a process that 

says we are not going to do X, Y, or Z. And it is hard for me sitting 

here to say we are not going to do something because we do have 

posts, you know, we are in 190 countries. We cover the world. So, 

we do cover everywhere. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So it is difficult for me to answer. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I hear you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. But the thrust of your question——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I mean, the concern, and I think this has been 

shared by many others with far more experience in foreign policy 

than I have, including former Secretaries of State, is that with the 

decision not to fill spots, with the decision not to commit resources 

we are putting at risk some of our interests and putting at risk 

America. 

But I want to change gears for 1 second and go back to a conversation you had with my colleague from Rhode Island. He asked 

you about the report in the context of the Child Soldiers Prevention 

Act. And you asserted to Mr. Cicilline that the memo and the decision to exclude three countries, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burma followed that. But there is a, through the proper channel, the dissent 

channel, a memo that says that that was not correct, that these 

three countries, Afghanistan, Burma, and Iraq have recruited, have 

used child soldiers. 

And if it is okay, I would like to have this included in the record. 

But could you touch on that a little bit? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sure. I am aware of the dissent channel message 

that you have mentioned. My description was the process that the 

Secretary went through 6 months ago when that decision was 

made, what he did. There has been a subsequent dissent channel 

message which you have which the Department responds to. 

And I don’t know, given the timing, whether the Department has 

submitted a response to that. But the usual process is that there 

is a response from the Department when a dissent channel message comes in because we take those very seriously. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. And, again, just emphasize the concern 

that the Secretary is not listening to some of the people who are 

in the field who have an understanding. This was a broad, this 

wasn’t just a few people, there were many people who signed on 

to this dissent memo. And without objection I would ask that this 

is included in the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

46

Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I first of all want to apologize for not being here for most of your 

testimony here today. We had the FBI Director in Judiciary; had 

to be over there for that and came back. 

But since she is still here, I would like to give credit to my colleague from Illinois Robin Kelly for introducing, along with myself, 

some legislation awhile back, the Protecting Girls’ Access to Education Act, which passed this committee thanks to Chairman Royce 

here, and went to the Floor and passed the full House of Representatives. And the Senate is considering it right now. We hope 

we will get this to the President’s desk. 

And in essence what this does is it says that in conflict areas, 

and God knows we have those in Africa, obviously Somalia comes 

to mind and others, it seems like a good idea to prioritize education 

and emphasizing that for children, especially girls but boys as well, 

so that we are able to give them the opportunity, alternatives to 

the extremism that exists, obviously oftentimes radical Islamic fundamentalist extremism, but other extremisms as well, and abuse 

that occurs, a whole range of abuses. And so I think it is great legislation and I want to once again publicly thank Ms. Kelly for her 

leadership on that issue. 

And would just ask the State Department are you aware of the 

legislation? Are you considering the implementation of it once it is 

passed by the Senate and signed by the President? And are there 

other education initiatives that the State Department currently has 

that could be beefed up in conflict areas to help too? And obviously, 

you know, this is only one small aspect when you are talking about 

the overall battle against extremism. But, Mr. Sullivan, if you 

could just comment? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am aware of the bill. I don’t know that there has 

been a SAP or an administration or even a Department view on it. 

It sounds like a terrific idea to me. But that is just me speaking. 

Be happy to take that back and seek more formal views for that 

for both of you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, we will make sure that our personal staffs and 

the committee staff get with the State Department folks to make 

sure that you are ready when it passes. I understand that there is 

lots, thousands of bills that get——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. CHABOT [continuing]. Introduced all the time. This one actually made it through the Floor. It is bipartisan. I think it has a 

great chance over in the Senate. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. And would be, at least play small role. 

Mr. Espaillat before was talking about a couple of things that I 

have also over the years been concerned about, and I know the 

public has been. Seems that there is an ebb and flow. When the 

media is interested in it people find out about it, they think it is 

horrible, they want to do something about it. You hear it for a few 

days or a few weeks and then it kind of goes away. And one of 

those is, obviously, Boko Haram and the kidnaping of the 300 girls. 

And you already talked about it at some length. But I, I share 

his frustration on this. And you expressed that also, Mr. Sullivan, 

47

so I am not going to again go into it in great length. But there are 

things which happen in Africa which are just horrific. The Lord’s 

Army with Joseph Kony is another one that got the attention of 

people on the Internet for a while there. But ultimately what happened? Did they bring the guy to justice? Did they destroy the 

army, et cetera? 

And there was a military aspect to this. So I don’t know if, Mr. 

Trachtenberg, if you wanted to talk a bit about what we are doing 

relative to these types of groups that are a danger not only to those 

countries but can, because they do cooperate with terrorist groups, 

whether it is ISIS or anybody else, if you could just talk about how 

our military forces are engaging? And maybe we are more active 

on that than perhaps we once were. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, Congressman, just generally let me reemphasize the point that our engagements with partner countries 

are done to bolster, primarily to bolster their capacities to provide 

for their own security and to deal with situations such as the one 

you described. I would say that what DoD does and how DoD operates, we are essentially an enabler. And I say that, in fact I would 

say we are a double enabler. 

On the one hand, our operations with partner countries are designed to enable their forces, their militaries to provide security 

and to deal with the threats that they face. I say we are a double 

enabler because on the other hand I think what we are doing and 

attempting to do helps to enable our interagency partners as well, 

including the State Department. And the issue of NGOs was mentioned earlier. But that is critically important. 

And I think the one thing that I am taking away from this hearing so far is the clear emphasis on the need for and sort of an 

intergovernmental approach to dealing with these issues. It is crystal clear. Our role is a part of that at DoD but in no means an exclusive, an exclusive role. 

Mr. CHABOT. Exactly right. If I could just conclude, that is why 

it is so important I think that our military folks and our State Department work together. And ultimately is what is in the best interests of the U.S., and that generally is we get constituents that 

will communicate, why do you care about fill in the country? You 

need to be working here. 

Those things that happen over there can affect us right here. 

And oftentimes when our military is involved it is a relatively 

small number of people and we are working to make those indigenous forces able to handle the terrorism so that it is over there and 

dealt with and not here on American soil. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to my colleague. 

I did want to follow up on what my colleague said because we 

had a meeting with Ambassador Haley and she talked about despite all the suffering, the hunger, the sexual assaults, and on and 

on and on, when they ask the, particularly the young people what 

they want and they say an education. So they see that as their 

ticket out of that situation. 

48

The United States and the Government of Niger recently agreed 

upon a memorandum of understanding that would allow the DoD 

to arm U.S. drones currently stationed in that country. And yet 

AFRICOM has stated the U.S. military does not have an active, direct combat mission in Niger. There seems to be a disconnect in 

some way. 

What is the time line for arming U.S. drones in that country? 

And how and under what authorities will they be used? And either 

one or you or both of you can answer. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I cannot address the specifics of that question here, Congresswoman, but I would be happy to take that one 

for the record. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay, thank you. 

And then, Mr. Sullivan, many of the security cooperation programs and activities include State Department involvement in the 

decision making process. Given all the vacancies that we have 

talked about over and over in the State Department, do you feel 

that State is having its voice heard during the interagency process? 

Do you feel like there is enough people there to speak at the table? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. And to address your question in two ways, 

first, specifically at post where there is coordination between the 

Ambassador, the Chief of Mission, and the U.S. military in Africa 

would be AFRICOM. There has been extraordinary cooperation between, for example, our Ambassador to Libya and General 

Waldhauser. 

So, at post I think there is—and it is something that both Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson stress a lot to everyone who 

works for them, so I think that is filtered down through the chain. 

Our voice in the interagencies here in Washington is something 

that I am largely responsible for, participating in the deputy’s committee meetings at the, at the White House, along with my colleague and partner here Under Secretary Trachtenberg. 

But the question, your question really gets to why we need those 

positions filled. And I want to correct a misimpression. We in this 

administration, we in the State Department didn’t set out to leave 

these positions unfilled. We haven’t done a good job of filling them 

for a number of reasons, including slow in picking nominees, slow 

in getting them through the vetting process. And then we run into 

the challenges with the Foreign Relations Committee. 

So, I discussed with another member earlier, I forget who asked 

or cited a figure that 50 percent of the slots are unfilled. I would 

say probably of that 50 percent, 40 percent we have a person identified. For example, I can’t announce the person’s name because the 

person hasn’t been announced yet, but we have a person picked to 

be our Ambassador to South Korea. But they haven’t gone through 

the clearance, and they have been in the clearance process it seems 

like forever. 

Ms. KELLY. I wanted to ask specifically for the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership, is funding and attention still being 

focused toward justice sector support, counter radicalization programs, and public diplomacy efforts? And are there any successes 

that you would like to share? Because I do agree with what my colleague from Illinois said that we need to hear more about, you 

know, the good things and the successes. 

49

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will have to get back to you with that to provide. 

I want to provide precise information, numbers and facts, which I 

have an impression but I want to give you precise information. So, 

if I could, I will take that for the record and get back to you. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay. And I yield back. And thank you very much. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Dina Titus of Nevada. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being 

here. 

In addition to being on this committee which I enjoy very much 

and I value, I am a member of the House Democracy Partnership. 

We work with our legislative colleagues around the world in developing democracies, including Kenya and Tunisia, to help build 

democratic institutions and encourage civic engagement. Our work, 

though, has to be backed up by USAID and the State Department. 

So when we see those programs being diminished, that hurts what 

we are trying to do. 

My colleague from Virginia seemed to suggest that the people 

who are concerned about what is happening in the State Department are just a bunch of carping employees. And that is certainly 

not the case. I meet with diplomats and parliamentarians from the 

around the world, and they consistently, no matter where they are 

from, tell me how concerned they are about the U.S.’s diminished 

role in world diplomacy. 

So, I want you to know that we believe those are real concerns. 

And we are hearing them not just from the employees of the State 

Department but from world leaders from all parts of the globe. 

I have a specific question though, and either one of you can answer. And I appreciate it. 

Earlier this year the U.S. decided to terminate what was called 

Operation Observant Compass that was to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa. And I am curious to hear if that 

decision has created a security vacuum in that part of the world 

where U.S. military used to operate and if that security vacuum 

has led to an increase in poaching and illegal ivory trade and trafficking. 

In November the President and our Interior Secretary Zinke announced the administration’s reversal of a ban on the importation 

of ivory that came from Zambia and Zimbabwe. That has been 

stopped, thank goodness. And I commend our chairman for weighing in on that and thank him very much. But we know that there 

has been shown a link between illegal poaching and ivory trafficking to gain funds to support terrorism. I just wish you two 

would comment on that and see if there is anything being done 

about it. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congresswoman, let me start on the termination of Operation Observant Compass. There is little that I can 

say to you on that other than it is my impression that it has not 

created a security vacuum. But I do not have the details here and 

would be happy to go back and try to gather a little more information on that. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. I would appreciate it. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would just add that one of the factors that we 

considered in our decision to partially lift sanctions on Sudan was 

50

the Government of Sudan’s cooperation in our pursuit of the LRA. 

I would defer to DoD on where that stands. 

But the other point I would make is transnational criminal organizations, those that traffic the way you described, they do support 

terrorism and they are a scourge. And we need to address them. 

Ms. TITUS. Do you have any specific plans to do that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we have, for example, for narcotics trafficking——

Ms. TITUS. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. We have, in the Western Hemisphere, we have a number of programs—INL, a bureau at the State 

Department—a number of programs to address that. But in subSaharan Africa wildlife trafficking is a problem that you have identified. I can’t say that we have devoted all that we should to address it, but it is not just a crime and participated in by 

transnational criminal organizations, but that money finds its way 

to bad actors who harm us in other ways. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, I would like to see you take a little more effort 

to address that because I think it was, as you say, that it is funding some of these terrorist activities, and you would be doing well 

by doing good. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Mr. Brad Sherman of 

California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Sullivan, your department spends pennies 

compared to Mr. Trachtenberg’s department spending dollars, and 

one of the major efforts of your department is that we don’t have 

failed states. When we are successful in that, then Mr. 

Trachtenberg doesn’t need to get involved. Which is why I would 

point out that when it comes to our foreign aid we gave foreign aid 

to Germany and France in the ’40s. Today they are donor countries. We gave foreign aid to Taiwan and South Korea in the following decades. Seems like foreign aid might be a very good investment. 

The one thing I would like to focus on in foreign aid is that in 

many countries—and I don’t have a list in front of me—if you want 

to send your kids to school you have got to pay for the books. Now, 

that is the rule at American colleges, but it is the rule in first 

grade in a lot of countries. And it occurs to me, and I hope you will 

go back and look at this, that if we paid for the books, first, we 

would have some say in the content. I am not saying that you ask 

the San Francisco School Board to tell you what the content should 

be but we would have some say in the content. 

And, second, it is kind of hard to steal a book, especially in a 

country where due to the generosity of the United States school 

books are free. What are you going to do if you steal the book? 

And then the third thing in foreign aid is what I call flag on the 

bag. We often give bags of food. And often I have talked to foreign 

aid workers and they say, look, you are giving food to people, but 

1 out of 20 people we are dealing with hate the United States. If 

we put the flag on the bag we have got a problem, we got this or 

that, so they hide it. Whereas, and of course they shouldn’t be 

doing that. If we are paying for the books, you put the gift of the 

51

people of the United States right there on the front page. You 

know, even if somebody crosses it out, that just emphasizes it. 

So I hope you will go back and look at that both in terms of 

books is a good way to invest. And I realize that I am old fashioned. I like books, paper. So the same concept would apply 

with——

Mr. SULLIVAN. I was having that same thought. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I prefer books but they probably want tablets. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There are still millions and millions of dollars——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Exactly. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. That people, poor people in Africa are 

paying to buy paper books for this so their kids can go to elementary school. 

Let’s see. Mr. Trachtenberg, the previous administration publicly 

released both the presidential policy guidance establishing procedures for approving direct action against terrorist targets and a 

comprehensive report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding 

the use of military force. Do these documents reflect the current 

administration’s policies? If anything has changed, will you release 

updated versions of these public documents? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congressman, I appreciate the question. I 

would like to get back to you, if I might, with a more definitive answer on that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You are burdened by the fact that I have been 

here a long time. And every time, almost every time someone says 

that I get back a nonsense answer. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, I would——

Mr. SHERMAN. Something that says, Congressman, we want to 

show you we are dedicated to helping the American people and the 

world. 

How comprehensive and clear and definitive is your future answer going to be? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. That is I understand the question, Congressman. I do not have the information now to be able to provide 

you with a detailed answer. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you commit to a detailed, clear, and definitive 

answer——

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I can commit——

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. In a reasonable amount of time? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I can commit to go back and to find the answer to the question and see what can be provided to you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You can see why asking me to accept your nonanswer is subject to some concern. I don’t think that we subpoenaed you here. I don’t think we can force you to answer the question. But I think the people in this room are aware that you are 

refusing, that you are not willing to answer the question now, and 

they will all be looking for your written answer. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Part of it, Congressman, is I think what you 

are asking for is a level of detail that I am not yet, that I do not 

yet have a full understanding but——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Now, what I——

Mr. TRACHTENBERG [continuing]. I would like to have an understanding of. 

52

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. What I hope that you don’t do is say, 

oh, it is classified, because you can get us a classified answer, too. 

But I will point out that the Government of the United States has 

officially released the fact that there are 5,000 to 6,000 U.S. troops 

in Africa. And there is a host of other either widely reported by respectable sources or officially reported. 

So I hope can you get back to me within 2 weeks? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I am happy to work with you and your staff 

to get back to you with a detailed answer, as detailed as we can 

provide in order to address your question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope it is definitive. And we haven’t worked personally together. Just so many other people sitting in that seat 

have failed to provide answers in the future. So I hope you change, 

hope you restore my faith in that chair. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to both, 

welcome back, Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. Trachtenberg, I am following up on my colleague and his 

concern that all too often we will have to get back to you for the 

record translates into deflection, and not-on-your-life, and it will be 

gobbledygook if it is anything at all. You were asked by my colleague Karen Bass of California a reasonable question, how many 

troops do we have in Africa? 

Now, there are published reports that say 5,000 to 6,000. Can 

you confirm that? And if not, is it classified? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congressman, the public number is between 

5,000 and 6,000. That is correct. 

I think my earlier hesitation was based on the fact that I didn’t 

want to get into specific numbers vis-a-vis specific countries. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. But you are exactly right on that issue. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. So the range is accurate? 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan, I had the opportunity to talk about terrorism in the 

Maghreb at a speech I gave at CSIS this week. And it forced me 

to come think about, well, what are the elements we need in the 

counterterrorism strategy to be effective? 

And I was very gratified at your opening statement or how you 

closed your testimony by saying that we believe that traditional 

counterterrorism efforts alone are not enough. Economic reform, 

good governance, and a respect for human rights must be 

prioritized. That was a very heartening thing to hear. 

And just to kind of engage you a little bit on that, one of the 

things I really believe we have made a mistake on historically as 

a country, arguably for what we thought were better reasons, is 

that we ignore the need for pluralistic political space. The Shah of 

Iran is a great example. So the Shah says, ‘‘I don’t want you talking with the political opposition,’’ to our Embassy, to our intelligence people, and we respect it. And as a result, you know, we 

haven’t got a clue what is really going on in the country. And the 

only alternative to the authoritarian regime of the Shah is Khomeini and his crap. 

53

And had maybe we had a little more elbow room in order to encourage other political expression, perhaps that wouldn’t have been 

the only alternative. And I think we repeated that similar mistake 

during the Mubarak years in Egypt. 

And we are looking now at the Maghreb, we are looking at Africa, we are looking at a lot of strongmen governments, how do we 

avoid making the mistakes of the past? What? Do you agree that 

political pluralism is also part of that good governance we have just 

got to foster and encourage? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Undoubtedly. It’s the sign of strength in the society of a culture. And you may not know this, I was smiling when 

you described the Shah. My uncle Bill Sullivan was the last U.S. 

Ambassador to Iran, so it may have been his failure. I apologize on 

behalf of my family if we weren’t doing as good a job as we should 

have been. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think it was really a U.S. failure and no one 

individual. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I think we were trying to respect a 

strong——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Ally who was going to make the Persian Gulf, you know, but we didn’t see the Shia revolution——

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. And the effect of it and how it 

spread. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Exactly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And it is simply not in our interest to, frankly, 

honor those kinds of requests. 

So let’s take Africa, which is what we are talking about today. 

Any hopeful signs in this regard in terms of good governance, civil 

society, political pluralism? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So two of the countries that I went to, obviously 

mixed records but not all bad. Tunisia, serious economic problems; 

they have got to get their economic house in order. Budget deficit, 

they need a lot of economic help. But their government, their commitment to democracy, it is real. 

Nigeria, Buhari, the President has got health issues, there, there 

are good prospects there. But there are challenges as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Parts of the government and the military, as you 

well know, where we have got issues. 

There are bright spots. There aren’t a lot but there are bright 

spots. And we need to encourage them. We need to show progress. 

And then we have precedents that we can cite to others. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There is one other thing I—I mean I have other 

things—but the other thing that I would highlight just for this purpose, I am running out of time and feel free, both of you, to comment but I will address it first to you, Mr. Sullivan, I am worried 

that we don’t seem to yet have our arms around the appeal on social media of the ISIS, al-Qaeda, radical narrative. It seems beyond 

us that anyone would be attracted to give up their whole lives and 

go fight and miss their lives, and so forth, but they do, in the thousands. 

54

And the only way to address that is to A) knock down the narrative convincingly and have an alternative narrative that is equally or maybe more attractive. I wonder if you could just comment 

on how well do you think we are doing? What do we need to do 

with respect to social media? 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, of course I will yield back my 

time. But I think it is a very important aspect of the counterterrorism fight. We are not doing well. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Agreed. We have established a Global Engagement Center to try to address this issue. We address it in two 

ways. The mission has expanded. We haven’t—it was originally established to address the issue you have raised for ISIS, al-Qaeda 

use of social media. As a result of what happened with Russia and 

the impact on the election, it has now been expanded to state actors as well. 

So my concern is that we are broadening the mission of the Global Engagement Center when we really haven’t gotten it focused on 

the more limited but extremely important topic of ISIS, al-Qaeda, 

those terrorist organizations which are using social media to recruit displaced, disadvantaged, disillusioned people. And I would 

say—you said thousands, I would say tens of thousands. A serious 

problem. 

I would defer to my colleague. 

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Congressman, I would agree with everything that Secretary Sullivan has said. And, in fact, his citation of 

the Global Engagement Center I think is one of those areas where 

both the State Department and the Department of Defense have 

worked well and collaborated together. But I would agree more 

work is needed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, and Secretary Sullivan and Under Secretary Trachtenberg for your testimony. 

As we have heard, State and the Defense Department provide 

critical training, equipment, operational support for our partner 

forces in Africa. So coordination between your agencies is going to 

be critical to success on these fronts. And our development of those 

systems is essential. 

The costs of our engagement on the continent in this battle 

against Islamists and other terrorism can be high. And we appreciate our servicemen and women and diplomatic personnel serving 

in very difficult and risky circumstances. But the threats are real, 

and our national security demands that we don’t ignore them. 

As a reference here the comments made by my friend Mr. 

Connolly, he mentioned governance. Well, we have an election coming up in Liberia. It is critical that these elections be free and fair. 

We all understand the cost in the past under Charles Taylor of 

what happened in Liberia and West Africa. And now we have an 

opportunity to build on some measure of success. So this requires 

our engagement. 

And again I thank you both. And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

December 7, 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

A±Iairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Oftice Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at httW.':'l'iW fureignAffairsj10U~_$QY): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, December 7, 2017 

9:30a.m. 

Counterterrorism E±Iorts in Africa 

The Honorable John J. Sullivan 

Deputy Secretary 

US Department of State 

The Honorable David l Trachtenberg 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

US Department of Defense 

By Direction of the Chairman 

Sf'<-?CI<lf 

reg,<.rdto 

may be 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MlNLTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARII\G 

Day __ ~T.~h~u~rs=d~a~Y--~D•re 12/07/2017 2772 

Starting Time --~9~:~3~5A=M~ __ Ending Time 12:08PJJf 

Recesses [~] ( __ to________) ( __ to~-) ( __ to________) ( __ to________) ( __ to __ ) ( __ to~-) 

Presiding Memher(s) 

Chairman Edward R. Royce, Repre.\'entative Michael .WcCaul, Repre.'tentatil•e .fohn Curti.,· 

Check all of the following tlzat app!v: 

Open Session [ZJ 

~:xecutive (closed) SeS8ion D I elevised [ZJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Counlerterrori.\·m Effort.\' in Africa 

COMMITTF.F. l\1F.MBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PllliSK'!T: 

Repre~·entative Frederic.·a Wfbmn 

Electronically Record~ taped) [ZJ 

Stenographic Record W 

HEARIKG WIT:'!ESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [ZJ No 0 

(If "no", please list helow and include title, agency, deparlment, or organizuiion) 

STATKI'U:NTS HJR TilE R};CORD: (List rmy statements submitted for the record) 

1FR- Representative Ted Lieu, Representative Brad Schneider 

QFR - Chairman Edward Royce, Rankin~ Member Eliot Engel, Representative Brad Sherman, 

Repre.\'entative Lob,· Frankel, Repre:\·entative Brad Schneider 

SFR- Representative Gerry Comwl(v 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE~---

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 12:()8P11f 
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l'Hl!SbNl' 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMJTllilo HMRJNG 

Ml!MlJl!H l'Hl!Sl!Nl' Ml!MlJbR 

Edward R. Rovce, CA X Eliot L. Engel, NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ X Brad Sherman. C A 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Dana Rohrabacher, CA X Albia Sires, NJ 

Steve Chabot OH X Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Joe Wilson. SC Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

Michael T McCaul, TX X Karen Bass, C A 

Ted Poe. TX X William Keating. MA 

Darrell Tssa. CA X David Cicilline, RT 

Tom Marino. PA X AmiBera. CA 

Mo Brooks. AL X Lois Frankel, FL 

Paul Cook. CA Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Scott Perrv, PA X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Robin Kelly. lL 

Mark Meadows, NC Brendan Boyle. PA 

Ted Yoho. FL X Dina Titus, NV 

Adam Kinzinger,IL Norma Torres. CA 

Lee Zeldin. NY X Brad Schneider. TL 

Dan Donovan, NY X Tom Suozzi. NY 

James F. Sensenbrenner. Jr .. WI X Adriano Espaillat. NY 

Ann Wagner. MO X Ted Lieu, CA 

Brian J. Mast. FL 

Brian K. FitLpatrick. PA 

Francis Rooney, FL 

Thomas A. Garrett. Jr ,VA 

John Curtis. UT 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS


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SENJ!lT!VE BUT !JNCLASSlflED 

·2· 

0 0) Y cmeu (Appro\'e/Disapprove by 61111!7) 

Background 

(SBV) The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of2008 (CSPA) requires that the Secretary of State 

include a list, for publication in the TIP Report, of countries that nave governmental armed 

forces or government-supported arn1ed groups that recruit or use child soldiers. The CSPA 's 

definition ofa child soldier is provided. The recruitment or use of one child soldier is all that is 

required to meet the threshold ofthe law. 

(SBU} Governments of countries listed under the CSPA are restricted as ofthe beginning of the 

next fiscal year from rec.elving U.S. assistance authorized under a of authorities 

and may not be issued U.S. licenses commercial saies of military eq1lipJne11t. 

However, these restrictions may be overcome by a Presidential national interest waiver, a partial 

waiver, applicable exception, or reinstatement of assistance pursuant to the terms of the CSPA. 

Thus, listing a country in the TYP report does not have any immediate effect and does not 

necessarily result in restrictions. 

(SBU) If you approve the recommendation to list the countries identified in this package, the 

bureaus and offices with equities in the furnishing of assistance to these countries will prepare 

recommendations for you regarding the !he exercise of waivers, or 

certification of exceptions, as permitted under the CSPA, for to the President in order 

that he may make a final decision prior to October I, 2017. Assistance subject to CSPA 

restrictions includes: intematiomd mi!il:llry education a.nd training, foreign military financing, 

excess deft-"JJse articles, peacekeeping operations, and issuance of licenses fur direct commeroial 

sales of military equipment. 

(SBU} The proposed listings for 2017 contain If countries. Ofinese, Burma, Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, Iraq, N!geria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were 

listed in lhe 2016 TIP Report pursuant to the CSPA. This is the first year Afghanistan and Mall 

are recommended for a listing. 

Attachments: 

Tab l ~Countries lden!ified to be Listed Pursuant lo the Child Soldiers Prevention Acl of 

2008. (Title IV of Public Law 110457) 

Tab 2 ~Background on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act 

SENS!T!V!'. SUT !JNCLASS!FlER 
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Potential Countries to be Listed Pursuant to the Cliild Soldiers Prevention Act 

(SBU) All relevant bureaus and offices agree tha! the foltowing countries had governmental 

armed forces or government-supported armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers within 

the mean.ing of section 404(a) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act {CSPA) of2008 (Title IV, 

P.L. I 0-457), during the repooing period of April J, 2016-Maroh 3!, 20!7, and support their 

inclusion on the CSI'A list that wHI be published In the introduction of the 2011 TIP Report. 

When the word "chHdren" is used without qualification below, it means persons under the age of 

!8. 

l. Afghanistan 

2. Mali 

3. Democratic Republic of Congo 

4. Iraq 

5. Burma 

6. Nigeria 

7. Somalia 

!t South Sudan 

9, Sudan 

HJ. Syria 

11. Yemen 

Afghanistan 

(SBU)ln 20 l ! , the Afghan government signed an action plan wilh the UN to prevent the 

recruitment and use of children in its national security forces, and a mad map to compliance was 

endorsed in August 20!4. As a part of the action plan, the Afghan govemment established Child 

Protection Units across the country to stop the recruitment of children in the security forces. 

There is credible evidence that a militia known. as the People's Uprising Movement or the 

Uprising Group (PUG), ofBaghlan, a government-supported armed group, recruited 

used a child a:; defined the CSPA. The l% Country Task Foroe on Monitoring and 

Reporting verified the and use of a boy as a guard by the Bnghlan provJnct~l PUG. 

The Baghtan PUO received financial and in-kind from the Afghan government Because 

the Afghan government provided support to the PUG, and the PUG recruited and used a 

person younger than 18 )'etws of age. Afghanistan for inclusion on the 2017 CSPA 

list. 

Mali 

(SBU) The Government of Mali prohibits the use and recrultment of children into its armed 

forces. In 20!3, the government and the UN signed a protocol agreement to protect children 

associated with anned conflict and established a procedure to transfer such children to an interim 

care center. During the reporting period, there is evidence that Inc Government ofl\<fali provided 

in-kind support to tmagltad Tuareg and A Hies Self-Defense Gtoup (GA TIA), a non-government 

militia. During the reporting period, reports established OA TIA recruited and used three 

children in hostilities. Thus- because the Governn1ent of Mali provided support to GAT! A, and 

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because GATIA recruited and used persons younger than !8 years of age- Mali is proposed for 

inclusion on the 2017 CSPA list. 

Democrallc Republic of the Congo {DR C) 

(SBU) Despite the DRC gm•ernmenl's progress towards eliminating the use and recruitment of 

children and purging them from the Armed Forces of tlu: Democratic Republic of Congo 

(F AROC}, there is evidence !hat FARDC units continued to provide material, logistical, 

intelligence, and personnel suppor! to armed groups operating in the DRC tltnt recruit children 

and use them in hostilities. UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) 

personnel reported that F ARDC commanders routinely provide funding, weapons, ammunition, 

and other resources, as we!l as advance warning of planned raids, to these <mned groups. This 

includes FARDC collaboration with the Mai Mai Simha, Mai Mal Charles, A !!led Democratic 

Forces, The Patriotic Union for the Defense of Innocents, Forces for the Democratic Liberation 

of Rwanda, and the Nduma Defense of Congo Renove. The UN Conntry Task Force on 

Monitoring and Reporting veritled cases of recruitment and use of children in hostilities by all 

these armed groups. Thus- because the FA ROC w01'ked with and provided support to these 

armed groups, Md bc.cause !he armed groups recruited and used in hostilities persons younger 

than 18 years of age- the DRC is pmposedfo1· inclusion on the 2017 CSl'A list. 

Iraq 

(SBU) The Popular Mobilizi~don Forces (PMF) are part ofthe Govemrnent ofirnq's military 

fotces, and are composed primarily ofShia units that generally support government security 

objectives but also- following !he passage ofthe Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC} Law 

in December 2016- Smmi and other tribal volunteers. Many PMF elements were formed in 

resPonse to Grand Ayatollah Sistanl's 2014 fatwa to defend Iraq against !SIS. There are also 

militias (many of which are partially supported by Iran) that describe themselves as part ofthe 

PMF, but which the Government oflraq does not include within the PMF. A February 2016 

order from the Iraqi prime minister declared the PMF 10 be formally affiliated with the Iraqi 

armed forces and, in December 2016, the prime minister signed lllaw that formalized the 

status ofl:he PMC, an umbrella organization the PMF, as a component ofthe Iraqi armed 

forces. This law is intended to solidif)' and enhance the Government oflraq's l>perational 

control OYer all PMF once the law is fully implemented. Both the UN and the NGO community 

reported that some Sunnl tribal forces, one of which the UN reported was part of the PMF, 

recruited and used p~:rsons younger than thee age of 18, including instances of children taking a 

direct part in hostilities. l11e UN reported five cases of recruitment and use of children by PMF 

units, including a !5-year-old boy who was sent to the frontline to tight for the Flags ofira:q 

Unit. The Government oflraq is aware of these reports and has committed to taking measures to 

ensure no child soldiers ~re among !he Sunni tribal forces or in the PMF ranks. Because this UN 

reporting attributes the recruitment and use of children to the PMF, although we cannot 

conclusively determine whether the reported recruitment and use ofperwns younger than 18 are 

attributable to groups that are actually part of the PMF, we assume this characterlzatio11 is 

credible. Beca\ll!C the PMF is an armed force of the Government and persons younger 

than tin: age of 18 took direct part in hostilities as members is propo$ed for 

inclusion on the 2017 CSPA list. 

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Burma 

SENSITIVE ftUT UUCLASS!F!BD 

-3-

(SBU) The Government of Burma continues to take steps towards implementing its UN-backed 

child soldier action plan. Over the course oftlte repol1ing cycle, Burma released 1 I2 child 

sotdioJs. Despite this, t\'ro contlrmcd cases of child recruitment by the Tatmadaw, !be military 

of Burma. we.re documented during the reporting period. Ofthe cases of n::cruitment confkmt;d 

by the UN Country Task Force on Monitorlng and Reporting, one incident involved a 

14-year-old boy, who was forcibly recruited by the Tatmc•daw to work as a porter during a road 

construction While the Burmese military has made progress on !heir action plan 

commitment~, the last y~ar and a half that progress has slowed due to lack of coordination in 

command am;!, control ln the milita1y and a slowdown in age verification procedures by !he 

Burmese military. Because Burma's armed forces recruited a! least one person young~rthun 15 

years of age, Burma is proposed for inclusion on lhe 2017 CSP A list. 

Nigeria 

(SBU) Doting the reporting period, although the Government of Nigeria has offldaUy prohibited 

the recruitment and use of children in the armed forces, the Nigerian military reportedly used 

chi.ldren as young as 12 years old in support roles, such as messengers, porters, and guards. The 

:nililary also conducted on-the-ground coordination with elements of the Civilian Joint 

Force (CJTF), a self-defense militia involved in fighting Boko Haram that is not part of the 

Nigerian govemmenl. An NGO noted that the term CJTF is now used to describe a number of 

self-defem;e vigilante groups operating in northeast Nigeria, some of which have tenuous ties to 

the Ma!duguri·based CJTF. Credible observers, induding NGOs and an intergovernmental 

organization, reported that the CJTF continued to recruit and use children. in hostllities, !XJssibly 

compulsorily, and used children as young as 12 ye;;rs old mostly lo staffeheck points, conduct 

patrols, spy, and apprehend suspected insurgents. Because govemmental armed forces used 

younger than ~he age of 15 itt support roles and a govemment•supported armed groupCJTF ~ recruited and used persons than 18 years of age, including iu hosti!ities, 

Nigeria is proposed for inclusion on the CSPA list. 

Somalia 

(SBU) Although such actions are not ofl:'icial!y sanctioned by the federal Government of 

Somalia, the Somali National Army continues to use and recruit children. The UN reported on 

the !'l:C!\litment am! use of 84 children by the Somali National Army, including recruitment of a 

13-year-old, the period of April through September 2016. Because the Somali 

governmental force·s recruited at least one person younger than I 5 years of age, Somalia is 

proposed for inclusion on the 2017 CSPA list 

Smith Sudan 

(SBU) Following the outbre:;k ofconflic.t in South Sudan i11 2013, recruitment and use of 

children by government forces increased. During the repmting period, there were wid<'.Spread 

reports government forces were recruiting children. According to the UN, several hundred 

children continued to be compulsorlly recruited into the ranks ofthc Sudnn P~ople's Libcra1ion 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
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Army (SPLA). South Sudan's governmental armed force, and government-affilillted militias. 

The UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) attributed incidents of 

recruitment and use of children affecting 281 beys to the SI'LA, many of•.vllom were used in 

armed hostlli!ies. UNMlSS Chi.ld Pmtection UniHpnnsored workshops in Bentiu identified a 

total of22 children at SPLA barracks. Children, some potential!)· younger than I 0 ye!li'S old, 

were observed by the CTFMR in SI'LA military or police unifurms manning chwkpoints, 

guarding military facilities, and as bodyguards for county commissioners or military 

commanders. Also, in Unity State, SPLA abducted for recruitment at least 

l 00 boys. They were given assault rifles lllld were forced the to the armed forces or have their cattle confiscated. Many were to Juba for military training. 

UNICEF estimated 17,000 child soldiers had been recruited in South Sudan since the conflict 

began in December 2013, aml blamed government, opp·oSilion, and militia forces. Because the SPLA continued to recruit persons younger than ! 8 years of age and many such persons were 

forcibly recruited or took a direct part in hostilities as members ofthe SPLA, South Sudan is 

proposed for indusion on the 2017 CSPA list. 

Sudan 

{SBU) According to several reports, particularly during the initial months oftbe CSPA reporting period, the Government of Sudan provided material and logistical suppo.tt within Sudan to the 

South Sudanese opposition group known as the SPLA ill Opposition (SPLM-10), which was 

widely reported to recruit and usc child soldiers. Reports of material and logistical by 

the Government of Sudan to the SPLM·IO declined .significantly during the course 

reporting period; however, because such support took place during the reporting period, Sudan is 

propos~<! for inclusion on the 2017 CSPA list. 

Syrla 

(SBU) The Syrian govemment maintained its compulsory recruitment into and use of children by 

its armed forces, subjecting children to extreme violence and retaliation by opposition forces; it 

also did not protect and prevent children from recruitment and use by pro-regime militias. The 

UN documented 22 confirmed cases of recruitment and use by Syrillll governmental armed 

tbrces and government-supported armed groups, many of whom were compulsory recruited. 

Reports an<l evidence suggest that the recruitment and use of children by both governmental 

armed forces and government-supported armed groups has been increllSing- the number of 

verified cases does not reflect the full scope of recruitment and use of children by parties to 

conflict !n Syria, but rather the cases the UN Country Task Force on !Vlonitoring and Reporting 

has been able to verifY will! in security and access constraints. Because the Syrillll armed forces 

compulso!'ily recruited persons younger than 18 years of age and government-supported militias 

recruited children, Syria is proposed for inclusion on the2017 CSPA list. 

Yemen 

(SBU) Although the government signed 11 Jo\m l\ction Plan with the UN to end the recruitm<:nt 

and use of child soldiers and took steps to implement it prior to the onset of the current conflict in September 2014, the implementation of the Action Plan stalled with the outbreak and 

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SENSlilVE BUT l'NCLASS!f!ED 

(SBU) Background on tl!e Child Soldiers Prevention Act 

(SBU) The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSP A), title l V ofthe William Wilberforce 

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 L. l !0-457), was signe<l into law 

on December 23,2008 and, to its terms, became June 21,2009. It was also 

amended in February 20!3. CSPA prohibits assistance under the following authorities to 

governments that are lde:n!lf1ed on the CSPA list: International Military Education and Training 

(JMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF}, Exces~ Defense ArtiCles (EDA), and Peacekeeping 

Operations (PKO). The prohibition does not respect to PKO programs iliat support 

mi..litary professionalization, security heightened respect for human rights, 

peacekeeping preparation, or the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers. In addition, 

no liceuses for direct cmn:mercial sales of military equipment may be issued. Finally, to the 

cxtem that DoD security assistru:Jce authorities incorporate restrictions applicable to State 

assistance authorities, such DoD authorities will be similarly restricted. Governments on the 

CSPA list have been identified as "having governmental armed forces or government-s!lpported 

ann<:d groups, including paratni!itari<:s, militias, or civil defense forces," that recruit or use child 

soldiers. 

(SBU) Evidentiary_ Standard 

(SBU) The CSPA, like most other statutes imposing sl!l'lctioos or restrictions on assistance, does 

uo! spec it)' the evidentiary threshold !hat must be reached in order to support a determination 

that sl!nclionahle has occurred. While the statute is drafted in a way that permits the 

Secretary some in this regard, a high evidentiary standard ls typically applied in 

sanctions determinations because mere are serious foreign policy, economic, and national 

security consequences that could arise from an erl'oneous determination. 

(SBU) lnapplying a high standard, the Department's typical approach has been that aetion must 

be taken to impose sanctions wl;ere. there is sufficient credible evidence that tbe decision maker 

is persuaded that each ofthe statutory elements for imposing the sanction has been established. 

Neither cam:lnsive proof nor absolute certainty is required, Both uln:ct evidenue and 

circumstantial information should be considered in maldn11 a sanctions determination_ 

(U) Definition of Child Soldier 

(U) The CSPA defined "child soldier" for the first time in U.S. law to mean, coosistent with the 

orc>vi;>iotlS ofthe Optional Protocol of the Rights of the Child, any person that falls into one of 

categories: 

• (U) Any person young~r than 18 years of age, who takes a direct part ln hostilities as a 

member of governmental armed forces; 

• (U) Any person younger ilian 18 years of age, who has been compulsorily recruited into 

governmental armed forces serving in any capacity, including a support role; 

• (U) Any person younger than !:5 years ofage, who has been voluntarily recruited into 

governmental armed forces serving in any capacity, including a support role; or 

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Note: This material has not been reprinted in its entirety but may be found at:

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106703

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had governmental armed forces or government-supported armed groups that 

recruited or used child soldiers within the meaning of section 404(a) of the Child 

Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) of2008 (Title IV, PL 110-457), during the 

reporting period of April l, 2016-March 31, 2017, and supported their inclusion on 

the 20 i 7 CSPA list. Based on those facts, it is dift1cult to defend the decision not 

to list those countries as a legal matter, 

(SBU) Per the CSPA, and generally consistent with the provisions of the Optional 

Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 

children in armed conflict-to which the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan 

acceded and to which Burma is a signatory-''child soldier" means any person 

under 18 years of age who takes a direct part in hostilities as a member of a 

govemme.nta! armed forces; (Ii) any person under 18 years who has been 

compulsorily recruited into governmental armed forces; {iii) any person under 15 

years of age who has been voluntarily recruited into governmental armed forces; or 

(iv) any person under 18 years of age who has been recruited or used in hostilities 

by armed forces distinct from the armed forces of a state. 

(SBU) After several months of research, legal assessments, collaboration among 

multiple bureaus within the Department, and dialogue with NGOs and international 

onmu'""·uuri~, the Department reached the conclusion that Afghanistan, Hurma, 

and Iraq be on the 2017 CSPA list. The supporting evidence for these consensus 

recommendations is provided in Tab 1 "Potential Countries to be Listed Pursuant 

to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act" ofthe Action Memo for the Secretary on the 

Identification of Countries Pursuant to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (Everest 

ID 201707779, transmitted on June 21, 2017). Please see Tab 1 attached. 

(SBU) ln the weeks following the June 27 publication of the 2017 TIP Report and 

CSPA list, the Department repeatedly attempted, both internally and externally, to 

ascribe the decision to exclude Afghanistan, Burma, and from the list for 

reasons outside of the legal parameters ofthe CSPA; 1) ongoing efforts to address 

the crime by all three governments and 2) flawed assessments that the cases were 

not indicative of broader child soldiering problems in each country. Neither is 

relevant for a legal determination of a country to be listed on the CSPA. 

(SBU) This Deeision Compromises U.S. Credibility 

(SBU) The Department's congressionally mandated annual TIP Report, as well as 

the Human Rights Report, are eagerly anticipated and heavily scrutinized by 

thousands of civil society activists and government interlocutors abroad. Both 

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SENSITIVE B'UT UNCLASSIFIED 

products offer extensive coverage of specific child soldier cases and the broader 

contexts in which they occur worldwide. 

(SBU) Th.is year, the Secretary's decision to exclude Afghanistan, Burma, and Iraq 

from the CSPA list directly contradicts information on the child soldier problem 

published in both reports on all three countries. This discrepancy has elicited a 

negative reaction and several questions from Congress and the broader public. The 

contradictory information between the TIP Report and the CSPA list damages the 

Department's credibility and engagement with governments we are trying to hold 

accountable. Furthertnore, this list discredits the Department in the eyes ofNGOs 

and international organizations, sources on whom the Department relies heavily for 

information about child soldiering around the world. 

(SBU) This Decision Undermines the Department's Work and Harms 

Children 

(SBU) The Secretary's decision to exclude Afghanistan, Burtna, and Iraq from the 

CSPA list-despite broad concurrence from subject matter experts in the 

Depru1:ment that the legal standard for their had been met-has weakened 

<me ofthe US. government's primary diplomatic tools to deter governmental 

armed forces and government-support to armed groups around the world from 

using child soldiers. 

(SBU) As human rights groups have noted, to list these countries when 

still have much to do in child demobilization preventative work harms children 

who are still in combat or military-induced forced labor worldvlide, and has global 

implications on our ability to continue advocating against these heinous human 

rights violations and abuses. It has risked a message to the authorities in 

all three countries-and to the international community-that minimal efforts are 

enough; that we as a government are not interested in upholding international 

norms, nor in holding countries accountable for ongoing abuses against children; 

and that we are willing to neglect the legal foundations and principles guiding our 

advocacy and diplomacy. 

(SBU) Recommendations for the Way I<'orward 

(SBU) To avoid these pitfalls in the coming it is critical that the Secretary 

ensure Department compliance with the listing requirements. Looking 

forward to future CSPA listing assessments, we recommend the Secretary heavily 

weigh these consensus recommendations as part of his review and maintain close 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
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communication with the and legal experts. In the event that the 

Secretary has questions or concerns about the consensus recommendations for 

CSPA country listings, we request the Secretary meet with relevant subject-matter 

and legal experts in the Department before making a final determination. 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
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Antony Blinken 

Former Deputy Secretary of State 

Rosa Brooks 

Former Counselor to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 

Former Special Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian Policy 

Department of Defense 

John Carlin 

Former Assistant Attorney General for National Security 

David Cohen 

Former Deputy Director 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Rajesh De 

Former General Counsel 

National Security Agency 

Mary DeRosa 

Former Deputy Assistant and Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs 

Former National Security Council Legal Advisor 

Brian Egan 

Former Legal Adviser to the Department of State 

Michele Flournoy 

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Christopher Fonzone 

Former Deputy Assistant and Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs 

Former National Security Council Legal Advisor 

Suzy George 

Former Deputy Assistant to the President, Chief of Staff and Executive Secretary, National 

Security Council 

Luke Hartig 

Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism 

National Security Council 

Amy Jeffress 

Former Counselor to the Attorney General 
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Frank Kendall 

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

David Kris 

Former Assistant Attorney General 

Jonathan L. Lee 

Former Director for Human Rights and National Security Issues 

National Security Council 

Marcel Lettre 

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence 

Thomas Malinowski 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

John E. Mclaughlin 

Former Deputy Director and Former Acting Director 

Central Intelligence Agency 

James Miller 

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 

Lisa 0. Monaco 

Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 

David Newman 

Former Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel to the President and Former 

Director for Counterterrorism, NSC Staff 

Matthew Olsen 

Former Director 

National Counterterrorism Center 

Steve Pomper 

Former Special Assistant to the President for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights 

Amy Pope 

Former Deputy Assistant to the President 

Former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor 
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Michael H. Posner 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

Samantha Power 

Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations 

Tommy Ross 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation 

Wendy Sherman 

Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 

Jeffrey Smith 

Former General Counsel 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Suzanne Spaulding 

Former Undersecretary for National Protection and Programs 

Department of Homeland Security 

Michael G. Vickers 

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence 

William F. Wechsler 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism 

Christine E. Wormuth 

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 

Cc: The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State 

The Honorable John F. Kelly, Secretary ofthe Department of Homeland Security 

Michael Dempsey, Acting Director of National Intelligence 

The Honorable General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, USA, Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs 

Thomas Bossert, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism 

The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General 

Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Representative Mac Thornberry, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services 
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Principles to Guide U.S. Counterterrorism Use of Force Policies 

In any counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign, public confidence and 

legitimacy are critical to strategic success. When such confidence breaks down, allies, partner 

forces, and local populations are less likely to provide cooperation, support, and vital 

intelligence; terrorist recruitment and propaganda efforts thrive; and attacks against U.S. 

troops become more likely. The United States has the most professional and experienced 

military in the world, and as such the American people and our allies rightly place a great deal 

of trust and confidence in U.S. military operations. As the United States continues to refine its 

policies on the use of force in counterterrorism operations, the following principles should 

guide policymakers. These principles, many of which are legally required, are designed to 

enable effective, nimble, and sustainable use of our military forces in the campaign to defeat 

ISIS, and other organized armed groups that pose a threat to the United States in Iraq, Syria, 

and other parts ofthe world. 

1. Continue to Prioritize Civilian Protection 

The United States has always put a strong premium on minimizing civilian harm in 

armed conflicts, both because it is the right thing to do and because doing so is strategically 

beneficial. However, even small numbers of unintentional civilian deaths or injuries-whether 

or not legally permitted-can cause significant strategic setbacks. For example, civilian 

deaths from U.S. operations can cause partners and allies to reduce operational 

collaboration, withdraw consent, and limit intelligence-sharing; increase violence 

from militant groups; and foster distrust among local populations that are crucial 

to accomplishing the mission. As a result, reducing civilian harm and appropriately responding 

to harm that does occur play an important role in helping the United States achieve its mission 

objectives. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has made important changes 

to the processes and procedures for reducing and responding to civilian harm-with clear, 

positive results. To that end, the United States should continue to: 

Take feasible precautions in conducting operations to reduce the likelihood of civilian 

casualties. In some situations-for example, outside of traditional war zones or when 

engaging in areas with high civilian density-rules of engagement that go beyond what is 

strictly required by the law of armed conflict may be strategically 

beneficial to accomplish the mission and secure the peace; 

Review or investigate incidents involving civilian casualties; 

Promptly acknowledge U.S. responsibility for civilian deaths; 

Provide remedies to civilians who are injured and family members of civilians who are 

killed; 

Work with foreign partners to share and develop best practices for reducing and 

responding to civilian harm; 

Maintain open channels of communication and engagement with the International 

Committee of the Red Cross and nongovernmental organizations in conflict zones to 

improve efforts to distinguish between military objectives and civilians. 
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2. Maintain Existing High Standards and Procedures for Uses of Force Outside Traditional 

War Zones 

The existence of terrorist organizations that orchestrate attacks from nations that lack 

the ability or willingness to address the threat posed by these armed groups has resulted in the 

use of armed force by the United States in self-defense in locations where it has minimal or no 

forces on the ground. The use of force outside traditional war zones, particularly using drone 

and other air strikes, raises complex legal, strategic, diplomatic, and humanitarian 

considerations that warrant continued use of heightened standards and procedures. To ensure 

that such operations are both strategically effective and lawful, the executive branch should, 

absent extraordinary circumstances: 

Ensure that there is an efficient and effective interagency legal and policy review 

process for approving such operations to ensure that the president has the full range of 

information, as well as the perspectives and advice of his relevant top national security and 

intelligence officials, needed to make a considered decision, and that all relevant 

government components are prepared for the various contingencies that may result; 

Use lethal force only when there is a near certainty-or a similarly high standard-that 

no civilian harm will occur; this standard has proven useful for maintaining support for 

kinetic operations among foreign governments and populations, and for minimizing the 

downsides and unintended consequences that occur when the United States accidentally 

kills or harms civilians. 

Require near certainty-or a similarly high standard-that the target has been 

accurately identified and is present; 

Use lethal force only in compliance with the requirements of domestic and international 

law and to address a threat that cannot be neutralized by other means, including capture by 

U.S. forces or local law enforcement, where feasible based on the risks and other factors 

associated with a potential capture operation. Capture operations offer the best 

opportunity for collecting vital intelligence needed for disrupting future terrorist plots. 

3. Commit to Meaningful Transparency and Oversight 

While certain kinds of information must remain secret in the interest of national 

security, transparency to the public and oversight by Congress enhances the legitimacy of U.S. 

actions. Public disclosure regarding the legal and policy frameworks pursuant to which the U.S. 

operates-and the effects of those operations-enables the 

United States to broadcast successes; restore credibility when mistakes 

occur; and correct erroneous allegations of civilian casualties or unlawful operations that fuel 

enemy propaganda and recruitment, and can turn allies, partners, and local populations 

against the United States. Effective congressional oversight helps maintain confidence in U.S. 

operations when certain details must be withheld from the public. The United States has 

already made important improvements in transparency and oversight, and the 

following steps would bolster confidence in the legality and effectiveness of U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts: 

Streamline congressional oversight and ease transparency by ensuring that the 

Department of Defense has primary responsibility for lethal operations; 

Continue to publicly report the number of civilians and combatants killed in U.S. strikes; 
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Consistent with national security, release to the public any updates or changes to the 

legal and policy frameworks that guide the United States' use of force and related national 

security operations; 

4. Evaluate the Strategic Costs, Benefits, and Consequences of lethal Operations 

Evaluating the strategic impact, including both costs and benefits, of lethal force 

operations is critical to ensuring that lethal strikes are used in ways that advance, rather than 

undermine, U.S. national security and other important national interests. The new 

administration should conduct a comprehensive interagency strategic review of the use of 

force, particularly outside of traditional war zones. The review should be ongoing and should 

specifically assess the impact of lethal operations on: 

o The nature and scope of the terrorist threat; 

o The ability of terrorist organizations to recruit new members, launch attacks, and garner 

support; 

Global, regional and local attitudes towards the United States and its allies; 

The availability and effectiveness of other means of countering terrorism; 

Long-term success in reducing the threat of terrorism. 
78

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED LIEU, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


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nearby shed. The U.S. soldiers began firing at others in the fanning village who came out 

of their homes. 

The account by the SNA soldier, who spoke on condition that his name not be used, 

corroborated earlier Daily Beast reporting and contradicts a U.S. Africa Command press 

release issued 30 minutes after The Daily Beast published its months-long investigation 

into the incident. 

The Daily Beast had chronicled in considerable detail the way in which a team of U.S. 

Special Operations fighters carried out a ground operation acting on human intelligence 

that came from local rivals of those killed on the farm, and against the advice of the 

commander of the African Union Peacekeeping contingent in this region in Somalia. 

The AFRICOM press release stated that, "After a thorough assessment of the Somali 

National Anny-led operation near Bariire, Somalia, on Aug. 25, 2017 and the associated 

allegations of civilian casualties, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) has 

concluded that the only casualties were those of anned enemy combatants." (The full text 

AFRlCOM's response denying the allegations of civilian casualties caused outrage 

among Somalis, few of whom doubt the farmers killed were civilians, and has put 

increased pressure on the Somali Federal Government to release the findings of its own 

investigation. According to multiple sources familiar with the Somali govenunent 

inquity, it determined the fmmers were civilim1s who were wrongly killed, but it was 

buried as the result of U.S. pressure. 

None of the over two dozen Somali National Army members, clan elders, surviving 

farmers, or security and government officials interviewed in the course of The Daily 

Beast investigation were contacted by U.S. investigators, raising questions in Somalia as 

to whether any of the investigation's sources included those outside the U.S. military. 
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"We've been fighting ai-Shabaab for a 

decade, why haven't we won?" 

- Question put to Pentagon by Trump transition team 

On Monday, citing The Daily Beast investigation and other concems, Rep. Ted Lieu (DCA) announced he had successfully called for a hearing by the House Foreign Affairs 

Conunittee to be held Thmsday moming to look at U.S. com1tertenorism efforts in 

Africa. "From combating AI Shabaab in Somalia to Boko Haram in Nigeria," Lieu said in 

a statement, "U.S. military personnel are deployed across the African continent with little 

public scrutiny or awareness. It is critical that we bring more transparency to the yearslong work of U.S Special Operations Forces in sub-Saharan Africa, their mles of 

engagement and the broader regional strategy." 

This yeaT alone: 

A t:.S. NHvy SEAL was killed in Somalia during a ground operation in May. It was the 

first U.S. combat death in the country since the infamous Black Hawk Down incident 

which occurred during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. 

In in October fom U.S. soldiers were killed in what had been described as a "low 

risk" mission when their convoy was ambushed by armed militants. (It is telling that after 

the incident U.S. senators said they had 1l9 id<;:.i! some 1,000 U.S. troops had been 

deployed in Niger). 

discovered the SEALs were pocketing cash from their informant fund in Mali. 

And U.S. Special Operators appear to have fired on civilians in Somalia, acting on 

intelligence that the operators had not sufficiently vetted in an operation tlmt had been 

advised against by local partners. 
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Each of these incidents has raised questions not only about oversight and effectiveness of 

U.S. militaty strategy in Africa, but also if a coherent strategy exists at all. 

TWO YEARS BEFORE U.S. Afi·ica Command was established in 2008 to centralize the 

structure for U.S. forces across Africa, just one percent of all U.S. Special Forces 

deployed overseas were operating on the continent. 

But with the new command stmcture came a new way of operating across Africa. 

As in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Gen. David Petraeus' revised counterinsurgency field 

manual, published in 2006, was perceived as an effort to turn U.S. soldiers into armed 

humanitarians building roads, digging wells, and constructing schools for local 

populations, AFRICOM officials imagined the troops they oversaw would act in a similar 

capacity; the continent had long been considered a backwater harboring terrorist groups 

and underdevelopment was assumed to be a major cause for recmitment. 

But in Iraq and Afghanistan the difficulties of implementing the armed humanitmian 

approach became apparent as millions were poured into projects that had little impact, 

and the same problems became evident in Africa. 

As a result, AFRlCOM's raison d'etre swung to the other end of the counterinsurgency 

spectrum to focus on building local militaty capacity atld supporting those troops with air 

su·ikes and in ground operations. 

In the course of a few years, AFRICOM had in effect jettisoned the idea of preventing 

terrorism and winning the hearts and minds of those on the African continent through 

development, instead assuming that local support would follow U.S. efforts to rid 

countries of their terrorists, the numbers of which had continued to spread across the 

Sahel. 

By March 2015, when Gen. David Rodriquez, then commander of AFRTCOM, addressed 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, the number of U.S. military u·ainings missions, 
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exercises and operations across the continent was 674, an astonishing 300 percent 

increase in the number of a:rmual operations and training exercises since AFRICOM was 

established. This year that number has skyrocketed to 3,500 total activities per year, a 

I, 900 percent increase from 2008. 

"Show me the strategy. We're waiting to 

see a strategy." 

-Skeptic attached to U.S. mission in Somalia 

But as military operations across Africa have rapidly increased, the creation of a new 

coordinated strategy across Africa, and political oversight over AFRlCOM's strategy on 

the continent, have not. Congress has not voted on engaging U.S. troops in these 

preventative war· effmts a:tld the House Committee hearing Thursday will be the first 

hea:r·ing to discuss U.S. counter-tenorism in Af1ica. 

WHEN PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP took office this year, his transition team 

seriously questioned the massive investment the Department of Defense had poured into 

the continent. In January, !he Ne1r York Times obtained a four-page list of questions 

related to U.S. involvement in Africa, which questioned the value of humanitarian aid as 

well as the purpose of U.S. military involvement. One question simply asked, "We've 

been fighting al-Shabaab for a decade, why haven't we won?" 

The question raises a compelling point. Al Shabaab is composed of an estimated 3,000-

5,000 soldiers operating on a shoestring budget with mdimenta:ty military equipment and 

operational capacity compared to groups like the so-called Islamic State. It has not shown 

the capacity to cany out terror attacks outside the East African region nor strong linkages 

to Al-Qaeda, to which it pledged allegiance in 2012. 

Yet the sa:tne lack of sophistication and strong international ties that defy the notion that 

the group is a direct threat to American lives also created the perception that the war 
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against Al Shabaab is a winnable one, according to an individual working with the U.S. 

mission in Somalia. 

So, rather than draw down U.S. troops in the country, Trump's administration doubled 

down on its effmts to defeat AI Shabaab. 

In addition to rapidly transfonning the U.S. military base in Baledogle, a fonner Soviet 

Airstrip now occupied by American forces ar1d the SNA Special Forces called Danab 

which the U.S. trains, in March the Trump administration also designated parts of 

Southern Somalia an "area of active hostilities" where war-zone targeting rules apply. 

The cha!lge in policy freed U.S. Special Operators from the Obaina-era drone strike rules 

known as the Presidential Policy Gnida!lce, which required interagency vetting of 

airstrikes a!ld that the target pose a direct threat to America!llives. 

The Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC had for years canied out such defensive 

drone strikes across Somalia, but with the new guidelines, as well as leadership by Lt. 

Gen. Austin Miller, who led a contingent of the Delta Force in the 1993 Battle of 

Mogadishu, the pace of strikes has increased drainatically. So far this year, the U.S. has 

conducted 31 confirmed drone strikes. with 10 in the last month. 

Still, drone strikes alone do not a coordinated strategy make. And though the U.S. plar1s 

to grow Danab's few-lnmdred-soldier battalion, to date Danab acts more as a 

supplementary force to U.S. Special Operators, with Americans planning operations, 

preparing Danab for those operations, and commanding Danab forces in the course of 

them. 

Whether the force has a future as ail independent entity which Ca!l drainatically tum the 

tide in the war against Al Shabaab remains unclear. But these two tactics-build up 

Da!lab a!ld rarnp up drone strikes-are the most visible facets of arw U.S. military 

strategy in Somalia. 
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Apart from that, the consensus among those working with the U.S. mission is that a 

coordinated strategy between the Department of State and Depmiment of Defense to 

defeat AI Shabaab in Somalia is scattershot, if one exists at all. "There is no U.S. strategy 

here,'' says one individual working with the U.S. mission in Somalia. "Show me the 

strategy. We're waiting to see a strategy." 

IN THE ABSENCE OF a coherent policy dictated from higher authorities, U.S. Special 

Operations Forces on the ground have inherited the de facto authority to create their own 

strategies when detetmining which operations to cm1y out in the countries to which they 

are deployed. 

As Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) told reporters in October, after Defense Secretary Jim 

Mattis briefed members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. military 

operations on the continent: ''You're going to see more actions in Africa, not less; you're 

going to see more aggression by the United States toward our enemies, not less; you're 

going to have decisions being made not in the White House but out in the field." 

Tt is likely for this reason that the team of U.S. Special Operators in Somalia was neither 

detened by nor in violation of any specific guidelines when undertaking the campaign to 

capture Bariire town and the sunounding area without the suppmi of the African Union 

peacekeeping force in the region, a11d using a partner force of regular SNA troops, widely 

known to be under-trained a11d under-equipped, rather tha11 Da11ab. 

The extensive Daily Beast investigation into the incident found that U.S. Special 

Operators had acted on hmna11 intelligence which, had they been aware of the local 

context, would have been obviously questionable if not directly misleading. 

"The briefing the interpreter gave us was 

that. .. we could start shooting to protect 

the Americans." 
85

Note: This material has not been reprinted in its entirety but may be found at:

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106703

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-Somali National Army soldier who participated in Aug. 25 incident 

Specifically. the U.S. Special Operations team had used information provided by 

Biyomal clan militia leaders who are active rivals to the Habar Gidr clan of the owners of 

the fann, which was later raided by U.S. and Somali troops. 

In light of additional reporting, new evidence has emerged regarding the collection of 

infonnation on which the U.S. team later acted, and what occmTed on the fann during the 

operation itself, an account which contradicts that offered by AFRICOM. 

According to two SNA soldiers who retook the town of Bariire alongside U.S. Special 

Operators on August 18, the day after the joint U .S.-Somali force retook the town a 

Biyomal clan militia approached the SNA commander, Sheegow Ali Ahmed, and the 

U.S. Special Operators, offering them camels and infmmation on AI Shabaab activities in 

the region. 

The meeting took place under a tree on the south side of Bariire town, where the Biyomal 

militia leader, ''Cornel," SNA Commander Sheegow, an estimated eight U.S. Special 

Operators, their interpreter called "Bashir," and a few Digil clan elders met to discuss the 

security landscape in the region. 

According to one SNA soldier present, Come! explained that all the fanns from the 

outskirts of Bariire town down the Shabelle River Conidor were havens for AI Shabaab 

and he requested anns and ammunition from the Americans to help fight the extremists. 

The Americans responded by telling Cornel they could not suppmi clan militias, but 

could only work Somalia's official national mmy. 

Locals in the region and in Mogadishu know the farms Cornel described are primarily 

Habar Gidr owned fanns, which Biyomal militias have been raiding for yem·s. It appem·s 

Come! was ttying to convince the Americans they were AI Shabaab tenitories in order to 

gain support in an effmt to drive the Habar Gidr out of the region. 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia 

Terrorism poses a grave threat to Afiican security and to U.S. interests in stability and prosperity 

across the continent. U.S counterterrorism efforts have mainly focused on building the capacity of 

African partner forces to prevent, counter, and respond to terrorist attacks. While govemment-togovernment cooperation is more extensive than at any previous time; the Trump Administration's FY 

2018 international affairs budget, disdain for diplomacy and foreign assistance, and reprehensible antiMuslim rhetoric and policies have severely handicapped U.S. efforts. 

The Trump Administration has proposed cutting bilateral U.S. military and economic assistance to 

sub-Saharan Africa by more than one-third. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has presided over an 

unprecedented hollowing out of the State Department, including an eight percent cut to the U.S. 

Foreign Service. Beyond slashing these financial and human resources, President Trump has spewed 

hateful Islamophobic ideology that severely undermines the U.S. approach ofpartnering with affected 

communities to eliminate these security threats throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 

Terrorist activity is concentrated in three main regions of sub-Saharan Africa: the Horn of Atiica, the 

Lake Chad Basin, and Mali/Sahel. Tn the Hom of Africa, Somalia-based AI Shabaab, an AI Qaeda 

affiliate, remains the dominant regional terrorist group and continues to threaten the Somali 

government's tenuous hold on security throughout the country. In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram 

has expanded its operations beyond Nigeria's borders into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad since 2015. 

Boko Haram has also split into two factions, one following Boko Haram's self-described leader, 

Abubakar Shekau, and another that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and now refers to itself as 

the Islamic State's West Atiica Province (ISIS-WA). 

AI Qaeda's oldest continuously operating affiliate in Africa is AI Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM), which recently expanded its areas of influence by exploiting popular uprisings in Tunisia and 

Libya in 2011 and the subsequent civil war in Mali. AQTM is responsible for a range of criminal 

activities, including kidnapping for ransom and smuggling, conducting attacks on local government 

entities and security forces, and directing a string of mass-casualty attacks targeting Western civilians 

across the Maghreb and Sahel regions. A number of other terrorist groups are operating in Mali, 

including the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (TSGS), which is likely responsible for the October 

2017 ambush of U.S. military personnel along the Niger/Mali border. 

The Niger incident is a perfect example of the way military operations can unwittingly snowball into a 

far larger, sustained engagement. At present, the United States has approximately 6,000 military 

personnel providing training and equipment to partner governments in Libya, Niger, Chad, Djibouti, 

and Somalia. In the wake of the Niger attacks, the Pentagon recently announced a major expansion of 

the U.S. military's efforts to counter terrorism in Africa by permitting armed American military drones 

for use againstjihadist terror groups in Niger. Instead of expanding our military footprint, this tragedy 

should inform a larger discussion of a comprehensive U.S. strategy in the evolving war on terrorism 
87

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that achieves the right balance among the allocation of military, diplomatic, and development 

resources. 

Earlier this week, I delivered the keynote address at a conference on security in the Islamic Maghreb. 

shared several lessons learned from US. counterterrorism experience in the region that are applicable 

across the continent. First, U.S. counterterrorism policy has been dominated by a hard power approach, 

employing our military resources at the expense of our diplomatic and development efforts. We must 

remember that all military and economic assistance is diluted in the absence of stable governments and 

strong democratic institutions, especially civil society. We need to create political space for opposition, 

so there is not just one radical extremist alternative to the status quo. And for those who may be 

attracted to extremist messaging or returning from radicalized environments, we need to aggressively 

ramp up efforts to counter such messaging on social media and develop viable programs for 

reintegration. 

At this time of increased challenges to global security and stability, we need all the tools in our 

national security toolbox to counter the threat of terrorism and protect US. interests in sub-Saharan 

Africa. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding the Trump Administration's strategy to 

improve security on the Atiican continent through both hard and soft power. 

2 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record from Chairman Edward Royce 

Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa 

December 7, 2017 

Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa: In June 2017, the Administration submitted their five-year 

interagency strategy to counter Boko Haram/ISIS-West Africa, Pursuant to PL 114-266. How did 

the Departments of State and Defense work together to develop this strategy? How are they 

working together to implement it? How will the recent sale of 12 A-29 Super Takano aircraft 

impact the ability of Nigerian forces to combat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The Department of State and Department of Defense worked closely alongside other agencies to 

create the comprehensive US Strategy for Countering Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (BH 

and ISIS-W A) The strategy provides a framework for the United States to employ diplomatic, 

development, defense, and other tools to assist and enable our African partners in the Lake Chad 

Basin region to lead the efTort to degrade and ultimately defeat BH and ISIS-W A, and also 

addresses the underlying drivers of violent extremism. The Department of State, Department of 

Defense and other relevant US. agencies attend weekly meetings to track the strategy's progress 

and contribute to quarterly discussions with our allies to address multilateral issues and objectives. 

The Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) has deployed a 

field representative to the region to assist with coordination and strategy implementation amongst 

the Embassies, US. military elements, and international partners. 

The pending sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft will assist Nigerian forces to more efTectively 

combat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa The A-29 Super Tucano is a modern, light strike 

aircraft designed for counter-insurgency operations in austere environments, making it an 

appropriate choice for the ongoing contlict in Northeast Nigeria. Upgraded air platforms and the 

specialized training program set to be included with this sale will improve targeting while reducing 

the risk of collateral damage. This capability will help the Nigerian military to respond rapidly 

and effectively to BH and ISIS-WA movements in an area the size of New York State. The 

platform will also provide much-needed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities. In addition to enhancing Nigerian military operations against terrorist organizations, 

these aircraft will improve Nigerian efforts to counter illicit tratlicking in Nigeria, along its land 

borders, and in the Gulf of Guinea. As part of the Foreign Military Sales process, we have worked 

alongside the Department of Defense with Nigeria to define its requirements for this capability, 

including maintaining a balance between military needs and defense budgets. Given both the 

gravity of the threat in the Northeast and the long-term importance of security sector 

modernization, the Government of Nigeria has made it clear that this purchase is a national priority. 

Equipment alone is insufficient to secure the type of transformation we wish to see in the Nigerian 

military. Equally critical to Nigeria's long-term success against BH and ISIS-WA is the military's 
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conduct on the battlefield, approach to respecting human rights, and etl'orts to protect civilians. 

Expanding our security cooperation with Nigeria does not diminish the emphasis we place on 

human rights and the protection of civilians, but rather generates opportunities to amplify these 

messages and support the development of a more professional Nigerian military. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

The Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DoD) worked closely alongside other 

US. departments and agencies to create the comprehensive US. Strategy for Countering Boko 

Haram and ISIS-West Mrica (BH and ISIS-WA). The whole-of-government approach seeks to 

enable our African partners in the Lake Chad Basin to etl'ectively counter BH and its otl'shoot 

ISIS-WA. The strategy provides a framework for the United States to employ diplomatic, 

development, defense, and other tools to assist and enable our African partners to lead the effort 

to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS-W A and BH. The strategy outlines how the United States 

will assist partner governments in the Lake Chad Basin to degrade ISIS-W A and BH and address 

the underlying drivers of violent extremism. The United States will continue to coordinate our 

approach to countering ISIS-W A and BH with allies, partners, and international organizations. 

DOS, DoD, and other relevant US. Government departments and agencies attend weekly meetings 

to track the strategy's progress and contribute to quarterly discussions with our allies and partners 

to address multilateral issues and objectives. DOS' s Bureau of Cont1ict and Stabilization 

Operations (CSO) has deployed a field representative to the region to assist with coordination and 

implementation of the strategy among the embassies, US. military elements, and international 

partners. 

The pending sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft will assist Nigerian forces to more etl'ectively 

combat BH and ISIS-WA The A-29 Super Tucano is a modern, light strike aircraft designed for 

counter-insurgency operations in austere environments, making it an appropriate choice for the 

ongoing cont1ict in northeast Nigeria. Upgraded air platforms and the specialized training program 

to be included with this sale will improve targeting while reducing the risk of collateral damage. 

This capability will help the Nigerian military respond rapidly and etl'ectively to BH and ISIS-W A 

movements in an area the size of New York State. The platform will also provide much-needed 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In addition to enhancing Nigerian 

military operations against terrorist organizations, these aircraft will improve Nigerian etTorts to 

counter illicit trafficking in Nigeria, along its land borders, and in the Gulf of Guinea. 

As part of the Foreign Military Sales process, DOS and DoD have worked with Nigeria to define 

its requirements for this capability, including maintaining a balance between military needs and 

defense budgets. Given both the gravity of the threat in northeast Nigeria and the long-term 

importance of security sector modernization, the Government of Nigeria has made it clear that this 

purchase is a national priority. 

Equipment alone is insufficient to secure the type of transformation we wish to see in the Nigerian 

military. Equally critical to Nigeria's long-term success against ISIS-WA and BH is the military's 

conduct on the battlefield, approach to respecting human rights, and efforts to protect civilians. 

Expanding our security cooperation with Nigeria generates opportunities to amplify the emphasis 

on human rights and protection of civilians and supports the development of a more professional 

Nigerian military. 
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Question: 

ISIS/AI-Qaeda Affiliates and the 2001 AUMF: In March 2015, Boko Haram's leadership 

fractioned, and Abu Musab al Barnawi and his followers pledged allegiance to ISIS, rebranding as 

Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISIS-WA) Another ISIS affiliate, the Islamic State of 

Greater Sahara, operates in the Sahel region and was founded by former members of Al-Qaeda in 

the Mahgreb (AQIM). In November 2017, the U.S. conducted two airstrikes targeting ISIS 

militants in Somalia. 

What is the practical significance of affiliations with ISIS andAl-Qaeda, in terms of these groups' 

strategic aims and tactical capabilities? Does "core" ISIS and Al-Qaeda exercise "command and 

control" over these groups or provide them with funding or other assistance? 

To what extent do AI Qaeda-aligned and IS-aligned factions in the Sahel-such as AQIM and the 

Islamic State-Greater Sahara faction, founded by former AQIM fighters-act in competition or 

cooperation with each other? 

Does the Department of Defense interpret the 200 I AUMF as providing authority to target Boko 

Haram, AQIM, ISIS-W A, Islamic State of Greater Sahara, or ISIS affiliates in Somalia? Reports 

indicate that the U.S. will soon send anned drones to Niger. Will these assets be used to conduct 

strikes under the 200 I AUMF? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

ISIS maintains branches and affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa, including ISIS-West Africa and 

ISIS-Somalia, that seek to conduct or inspire attacks on the continent, in Europe, and against U.S. 

interests. Al-Qa'ida's branches in the region include al-Shabaab and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), which remain a threat to civilians and government installations in the region as 

well as U.S. and western interests. The State Department closely monitors local terrorist groups 

that could adopt transnational causes, whether to gamer global recognition, inspiration, messaging 

expertise, or funding. Further details about the relationship of ISIS and al-Qa'ida with their 

affiliates and networks in Sub-Saharan Mrica would need to be discussed in a classified setting. 

ISIS and AI Qaeda afilliates generally remain distinct and separate entities in sub Saharan 

Atfica. However, there is evidence of coordination and cooperation at lower ''tactical'' levels in 

the Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso tri -border region. Many terrorist fighters in this region move 

from one group to another and back again. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

Across Atfica, we have observed a variation in the degree of affiliation to ISIS and al-Qa' ida by 

various terrorist groups. In general, we believe that many terrorist groups operating in Africa share 

the strategic aim of destabilizing legitimate governance structures, as well as facilitating illicit 

trafficking and conducting attacks within African countries and across borders. "Core" ISIS and 
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al-Qa'ida offer funding and other support, to varying degrees, to several groups currently active 

across Africa. 

We defer to the Intelligence Community to offer its assessment of the extent to which al-Qa'idaaligned and ISIS-aligned factions in the Sahel act in competition or cooperation with each other. 

Proposals for military direct action against al-Qa'ida- or ISIS-atliliated groups undergo an 

interagency review to determine whether the groups fall within the scope of the 2001 AUMF. DoD 

is currently conducting military direct action against ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the domestic 

legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. Although this does not mean that the other groups 

listed are not within the scope of the 2001 AlJMF, a detailed review of their status would be made 

only in the context of contemplated military action, and, as such, discussion should be conducted 

in a classified forum 

Question: 

War Powers Resolution: Pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the President reports to 

Congress every six months on deployments of US. forces equipped for combat. The most recent 

semiannual War Powers report describes a number of deployments in Africa: East Africa 

(including Somalia and Kenya), Djibouti, Libya, and the Lake Chad Basin region (including Niger 

and Cameroon). Chad and Nigeria are not listed in the July 2017 notification. Are US. troops, 

equipped for combat present in these countries? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The President provides a supplemental consolidated report to Congress consistent with the War 

Powers Resolution every six months with the stated purpose of keeping the Congress informed 

about deployments ofUS. Armed Forces equipped for combat. The most recent such consolidated 

report to Congress was provided on December 11, 2017, and indicate that US. military personnel 

are deployed to both Chad and Nigeria to support counterterrorism operations. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

The President provides a supplemental consolidated report to Congress consistent with the War 

Powers Resolution every six months with the stated purpose of keeping the Congress informed 

about deployments of US. Armed Forces equipped for combat. The next such consolidated report 

to Congress, will be provided on December 11, 2017, and will indicate that U.S. military personnel 

are deployed to both Chad and Nigeria to support counterterrorism operations. 

Question: 

Train and Eqnip, Advise and Assist: Congress tirst authorized the Defense Department, on a 

temporary basis, to train and equip foreign militaries globally for counterterrorism and other 

purposes in the FY 2006 Defense Authorization bill. The FY17 NDAA expanded and consolidated 
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the Department's ''train and equip" authority as 10 US.C. 333. Separately, Congress has 

authorized US. Special Forces to "provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or 

individuals" for counterterrorism purposes. This authority, 10 US C. 127e, is often known as 

"advise and assist.'' What are the advantages of deploying US Special Forces to work with partner 

forces in countries such as Niger and Somalia, compared to train and equip programs? How are 

these programs used to complement each other? How does "advise and assist" differ from a direct 

combat role? What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the forces carrying out these 

missions have sufficient support? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

"Train and equip'' programs in Niger and Somalia, whether authorized under Title 10 or Title 22, 

support our policy goal to work by, with, and through our African partners to achieve 

counterterrorism objectives and contain the spread of violent extremism. The train and equip 

programs are part of a strategic approach that supports partner country etl'orts to address immediate 

security crises and, in addition, builds the institutions and durable capabilities required for these 

countries to ultimately take greater responsibility for their own security over the longer term. 

We defer to the Department of Defense to answer questions related to "advise and assist" programs 

authorized under 10 US.C. 127e. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

Deploying U.S. forces to provide security force assistance to partners in strategically important 

locations significantly increases the effectiveness of the by, with, and through approach to 

counterterrorism that DoD employs in many areas. It also provides key placement and access to 

illuminate threat networks in areas where we would not otherwise have insight. An experienced 

and professional cadre of US. forces is key to developing foreign partners to ensure their success 

on operations. 10 US.C. Section 333 and Section 127e are two examples of express statutory 

authority that allow DoD to train and equip partner forces. These authorities may be used in 

conjunction with operational deployments of US. armed forces to "advise and assisf' partner 

forces in combined operations. Training and equipping partner forces and advising and assisting 

those same forces during combined operations are often complementary activities. Each 

Combatant Command continually assesses the security force assistance missions in its area of 

operations to ensure that US. forces are provided adequate support to accomplish the mission with 

minimum risk to the force. 

Question: 

Somalia: The US. has been a key supporter of the Atrican Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). 

In late 2013, the US. military, which had maintained a small contingent of personnel in Somalia 

for several years, also deployed a team of military advisors to liaise with Somali security forces. 

The United States has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. 

US. air strikes have increased in recent years, killing key senior al Shabaab operatives. 
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Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats testified in May that al-Shabaab's capacity to conduct 

attacks outside Somalia had "diminished after the deaths of many external plotters since 2015," 

but that the group continued to "pose a real threat to the region, especially Kenya." Does this 

remain the Administration's assessment? 

AMISOM has announced the withdraw of 1,000 troops by the end of the year and is expected to 

fully withdraw by 2020. Will Somalia forces be capable of securing the country by that point? 

What is the absorptive capacity of federal and regional forces in the Somalia? 

How etl'ective are our etl'orts to support government institutions in Somalia? What are the 

benchmarks for success and how are we monitoring our efforts? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

We remain concerned about al-Shabaab's operational capacity. The group's external attack 

capabilities have diminished due to the removal of several capable external plotters over the last 

two years. Nevertheless, despite losses in revenue, territory, and operatives-largely sustained as 

a result of regional counterterrorism operations and U.S. air strikes-al-Shabaab retains 

some capacity to commit terrorist attacks. In particular, al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant 

threat to Somalia and Kenya. In Kenya, the northeastern regions bordering Somalia are 

particularly vulnerable. While al-Shabaab's ability to conduct attacks outside of Somalia has 

diminished, we do not discount the possibility that the terrorist group may attempt external 

attacks outside of Somalia and Kenya in the future. 

The State Department assesses that AMISOM will remain in Somalia beyond 2020, 

notwithstanding likely incremental troop reductions and uncertainties regarding funding for 

AMISOM salaries. Somali forces are unlikely to be able to fill the security gap that would be left 

by a complete AMISOM withdrawal at that time; we advocate a conditions-based drawdown that 

reflects the pace of development of Somali security forces. The absorptive capacity of Somali 

federal and regional security forces ditl'ers significantly by unit and geographic location. The 

United States is focusing assistance to develop and sustain mentored units that have the capacity 

to efl'ectively utilize that support to combat al-Shabaab and other terrorists. We have suspended 

security assistance to non-mentored Somali National Army (SNA) units pending an agreement 

with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on measures to improve transparency, 

accountability, and oversight The FGS supports this decision, recognizes the urgency of 

developing Somali forces capable of backfilling. 

U.S. government efl'orts to support Somali government institutions, which focus on building 

governance capacity and strengthening Federal and sub-national government's credibility among 

the Somali people, are having positive effects. Stabilization programming has helped expand 

legitimate governance in 17 of Somalia's 18 regions. Democratic advisory support is 

strengthening the Somali parliament's oversight of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and 

played a critical role in improving the transparency of the 2016-17 Somalia electoral process, as 
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well as the 2017 Somaliland elections. U.S.-funded advisors in the Ministry of Defense supported 

the FGS in delivering a National Defense Strategy, and were integral in the design, execution, and 

analysis of the Operational Readiness Assessment of the Somali National Army. Given ongoing 

security restrictions, monitoring of these programs is generally conducted by third-party 

implementers. 

In December 2017, USAID signed a Development Objective Assistance Agreement with the FGS, 

the first comprehensive bilateral development agreement signed between the United States and 

Somalia in over 30 years. Programming efforts will be measured under the New Partnership for 

Somalia Mutual Accountability Framework, which will form the basis for jointly monitoring 

assistance programs against a shared set of policy commitments to be undertaken by the FGS, 

including key political milestones, more robust anti-corruption measurements, and the creation of 

a more conducive enabling environment for economic growth and investment. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

While al-Shabaab still poses a threat to the region, most planned attacks outside Somalia have been 

thwarted over the past two years due to etTective intelligence sharing and dismantling of external 

plotter networks. Although al-Shabaab attacks outside Somalia have been greatly reduced, alShabaab terrorist attacks remain a threat throughout the region, especially in AMISOM 

contributing nations, and the United States and its allies and partners must maintain pressure on 

the network. 

Although funding for AMISOM forces remains uncertain, DoD does not assess that conditions 

will permit AMISOM to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. Presently, Somali forces 

are not able to till the security gap that would be left by a complete AMISOM withdrawal. The 

absorptive capacity of Somali federal forces differs significantly by unit, which is why the United 

States has focused its support on mentored units that have demonstrated the ability to fight alShabaab. In December 2017, DOS infonned the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that the 

United States is pausing U.S. security assistance to non-mentored Somali National Army (SNA) 

units until a joint U.S.-Somali agreement is reached on measures to improve transparency, 

accountability, and oversight of U.S. security assistance. The FGS accepts this decision. 

Recognizing the urgency of developing Somali forces capable of backfilling AMISOM, the FGS 

is actively developing a new approach to improve the accountability and performance of nonmentored SNA units. The absorptive capacity of Somali regional forces is similarly locationdependent The United States is expanding its support for elite units within the SNA, "'Danab,'' 

incrementally in each sector. Recruitment for sector Danabs is being drawn from regional forces 

that meet certain titness, suitability, health, and human rights vetting criteria. 

US etTorts to support Somali government institutions face several challenges. Most government 

institutions are nascent and are being created from nothing. Despite many challenges, progress is 

being made, but this is a long-term etTort. Within the defense arena, examples of these etTorts 

include: in May 2017, the Somali Government adopted the internationally-supported National 

Security Architecture which lays out a roadmap to develop security institutions and processes, 

which donors are helping to implement; Department of State-contracted advisors provide 

mentorship within the Somali Ministry of Defense; and the U.S. Military Coordination Cell in 
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Mogadishu is working with other donors and the SNA to develop doctrine, unit structures and 

command and control mechanisms. Through on-the-ground military mentors, DoD monitors US. 

etiorts and resources and is able to make adjustments to maximize success. 

Question: 

Sudan: Despite the Administration's recent decision to lift significant sanctions on Sudan at the 

end of a process of engagement that began with the previous administration, the country remains 

designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. This places heavy restrictions on US. security 

cooperation. Serious concerns remain about human right in Sudan. Sudan remains designated as a 

State Sponsor of Terrorism How does this designation impact US engagement with Sudan? Is it 

being reviewed? Is the Administration prioritizing human rights in the US relationship with 

Sudan? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) is one of several restrictions on the 

United States government's provision of assistance to Sudan. Further, Commerce Department 

licenses are still required to export or reexport to Sudan certain items that are on the Commerce 

Control List. 

The Government of Sudan wants tull normalization of ties with the US., particularly rescission of 

its SST designation. Our next framework for engagement with the Government of Sudan, which 

we are calling "Phase If' and which remains in development, will provide Sudan an opportunity 

to address the statutory requirements and any other political conditions for the United States to 

consider rescission of its SST designation. We anticipate that the framework will require progress 

on a number of tracks, including human rights, counter terrorism, and regional security 

cooperation, as well as steps to address US. court judgments held by victims of terrorism, in order 

for the United States to consider rescinding Sudan's SST designation. 

Although the Five Track Engagement Plan (STEP), which we concluded in October 2017, did not 

include a human rights track, etiorts to identify and improve Sudan's poor performance regarding 

human rights and religious freedom has always been central in our engagement, and remained so 

through the STEP. As made explicit in our Human Rights and Religious Freedom reports, we are 

abundantly aware of the problems in these areas in Sudan, and we engage the Government frankly 

and clearly about the progress that needs to be made. The cornerstone of my November 2017 visit 

to Khartoum was a speech on human rights and religious freedom in Sudan. We used that speech 

to lay down some markers for what we will expect in our next phase of engagement ("Phase If') 

with Sudan. We believe it will be important to focus on a number of important but achievable 

goals in the area of human rights and religious freedom, with a focus on encouraging the freedoms 

of speech, assembly and religion, while discouraging the excessive use of force and related 

impunity on the part of security forces. 
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Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) is one of several restrictions on the 

United States Government's provision of assistance to Sudan. Sudan's inclusion on the SST list 

limits DoD's engagement options. Any DoD expenditures for the benetit of Sudan, including any 

type of training or equipping, are prohibited (without a Presidential waiver) However, there is 

room for DoD to conduct some advisory activities as well as conduct direct talks with the 

Sudanese. The Government of Sudan wants full normalization of ties with the United States, 

particularly the removal of its SST designation. DoD supports providing Sudan with an 

appropriate opportunity to address the statutory requirements and other conditions for the United 

States to consider removing its SST designation. 

Improvements on human rights and religious freedom will be a part of any further engagement. 

We believe it will be important to focus on a number of important but achievable goals in these 

areas, with a focus on encouraging the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion, and 

discouraging the excessive use of force and related impunity on the part of its security forces. 
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Questions for the Record from Ranking Member Eliot Engel 

Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa 

December 7, 2017 

Question: 

Human Rights Violations as Drivers of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: A recent survey 

conducted by the United Nations Development Program found that 71% of respondents pointed to 

an adverse interaction with state security forces as the factor that was the 'tipping point' in their 

decision to join terrorist organizations. Aside from Leahy vetting and human rights training, in 

what ways is the Administration seeking to ensure that partner militaries accused of human rights 

violations pursue tangible measures of accountability for such actions? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The Department diplomatically engages to reinforce the importance of rights-respecting security 

practices to avoid the syndrome described by UNDP. We urge and support partners to investigate 

and hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses. Failure to 

implement accountability measures exacerbates the threat, further undermining security in partner 

countries and, ultimately, in the United States. 

The Department also engages programmatically, particularly when partner countries have the 

political will to address those drivers, but lack human and financial resources. For example, the 

Department has supported and coordinated etTorts in Africa and the Middle East, including 

bilateral assistance programs in Kenya, Tunisia, and Iraq, to build the capacity of foreign 

governments to investigate security force personnel for credible allegations of a gross violation of 

human rights (GVHR), prosecute those responsible, engage community leaders, and strengthen 

democratic reform. Another example includes programs started through the US. interagency 

Security Governance Initiative (SGI) that seek to strengthen judicial systems, improve the capacity 

of foreign governments to pursue accountability, and support institutions that are working to 

address issues of accountability. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

This Administration recognizes that just governments and professional security forces must respect 

the fundamental liberty and dignity of people. We will hold perpetrators of genocide and mass 

atrocities accountable, and aid our partners in doing so. We are under no obligation to otTer the 

benefits of our free and prosperous community to repressive regimes and human rights abusers. 

We may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states, leaders, and security forces 

who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values. One such engagement 

tool is 10 U.S. C. 362. The "DoD Leahy Law" is more than just "vetting" and withholding of 

assistance to foreign security forces which have committed gross violations of human rights 

(GVHRs). The law also contains an exception to this restriction ifforeign governments have taken 

all necessary corrective steps in response to such a violation. In applying this aspect of the law, 
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the Department of Defense takes all reasonable etl'orts to assist partner militaries in taking and/or 

supporting remediation measures, including impartial and thorough investigations, credible 

judicial or administrative proceedings, and any appropriate and proportional sentencing or 

administrative action. In advancement of these remediation measures, Section 1206 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2015 allows the Department of Defense to 

provide human rights training to foreign security forces otherwise prohibited from receiving such 

training due to a human rights violation. Such training is for the purpose of improving the conduct 

offoreign security forces to prevent violations, support accountability, strengthen compliance with 

the laws of armed cont1ict, strengthen respect of civilian control over the military, promote and 

assist in the establishment of a military justice system, and prevent the use of child soldiers. The 

Department of Defense also proactively provides human rights and law of armed cont1ict training 

as a component of all 10 USC Section 333 (Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build 

Capacity) training, as well as through programs at the Defense Institute of International Legal 

Studies, and the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School. Another highly successful 

engagement tool is provided by Combatant Commands through their human rights programs, such 

as US Southern Command's Human Rights Initiative (HRI) which actively promotes human 

rights compliance by military and security forces in the Western Hemisphere. Since 2004, eleven 

nations have committed their military or security forces to internally implement initiatives that 

include human rights training, creation of human rights policies, establishment of human rights 

otiices and training centers, increased transparency and willingness to dialogue with civil society, 

cooperation with civilian-led investigations, and development of rules on the use-ot:force that 

include human rights norms. The Joint Doctrine on Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1) 

acknowledges the US. military's role for example-setting to partner nation on human rights 

standards. Through the conduct of key leader engagements, effective implementation of the DoD 

Leahy Law, training to both mitigate the risk of and response to human rights violations, and 

Combatant Command human rights programs, the Department of Defense encourages 

transparency and accountability by partner militaries. 

Question: 

Mali/Sahel: The United States and the Government of Niger recently agreed upon a Memorandtnn of 

Understanding that would allow DoD to arm US drones currently stationed in that country. What is 

the timeline for anning US. drones in Niger - and for what purposes will they be used (i.e., force 

protection, otl'ensive operations, targeted strikes)? How will the Administration keep this Committee 

apprised of related developments, and any change in the US military mission in Niger~ 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

For any operational details on ongoing military operations, please direct your questions to the 

Department of Defense (DoD). We will continue to work with DoD to ensure that the committee 

remains infonned about our multi-faceted engagement with Niger, including military activities. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 
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The Government of Niger and the United States stand firm in working together to prevent terrorist 

organizations from using the region as a safe-haven. The Department of Defense will continue to 

apprise the congressional Defense oversight committees of developments on specitic military 

authorities, permissions, and missions (including associated timelines) in classified sessions. 

Question: 

Nigeria/Lake Chad Basin: There have long been criticisms that the Nigerian government's approach 

to Boko Haram/Islamic State is too military-centric and has not addressed the governance-based 

grievances of the populations in the northeast. What are we doing to help the Nigerians develop nonmilitary approaches to countering the Boko Haram/Islamic State insurgencies? 

Boko Haram in Nigeria has pledged allegiance to ISIS. However, the previous administration 

determined that the 2001 AUJ\1F did not cover Boko Haram because the organization is not an 

associated force of al Qaeda or the Tali ban that is engaged in hostilities against the United States. 

In a recent Senate hearing, Secretary Mattis said that Boko Haram i§_considered an associated 

force under the 200 I AUJ\1F because it has pledged allegiance to ISIS and al Qaeda. Could you 

please contirm what the current administration's view is on whether Boko Haram is an associated 

force that is covered by the 2001 AUJ\1F? Has the Trump Administration changed the definition 

of ··associated force" from the definition used by the Obama Administration? If so, how has this 

definition changed and, if not, can you explain the change with respect to Boko Haram? If the 

administration wished to use force against Boko Haram, would it need to obtain authorization from 

Congress tirst? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

During my November 20 visit to Abuja for the annual U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission, 

senior Nigerian leaders shared the United States' view that military responses alone are insutlicient 

to resolve the crisis in Nigeria's northeast. We agreed that a holistic approach, which incorporates 

development initiatives and respect for human rights alongside the ongoing humanitarian, rule of 

law, and accountability efforts, is essential to addressing the root causes of the cont1ict. It is 

important to note, however, that retaking and adequately securing and accessing territories 

captured by the Boko Haram/Islamic State insurgencies are prerequisites to ensuring that this 

holistic approach is successful Ensuring civilian security will allow for the reestablishment of 

basic services and infrastructure, for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced 

persons to their homes, and for development and humanitarian etl'orts to ultimately succeed. 

The United States provides non-military assistance to Nigeria in the form of police training, 

rebuilding police stations and barracks, training prosecutors, judges, prison ot1icials, rebuilding 

schools and health facilities, and supporting agricultural development. We also work with 

communities to help strengthen early warning/early response mechanisms and build coalitions 

between key community voices, security forces, and the National Human Rights Commission to 

prevent and respond to human rights abuses. In October 2017, US AID announced a $45.5 million 
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fund to support stabilization and early recovery efl'orts to help those who have been afl'ected by 

violence in the northeast to rebuild their lives. 

Since FY 2016, the United States has provided over $741 million in humanitarian assistance to 

victims of the Boko Haram conflict, including to the people of Nigeria, mainly in the war-tom 

northeast, internally displaced persons across the Lake Chad region, and to Nigerian refugees in 

neighboring countries. The United States has also provided support to encourage disengagement, 

demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin to encourage 

Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa fighters to defect and leave the battlefield. The US 

government's ongoing program with the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), kuown as the Northern 

Governors Dialo1,'l!e, also illustrates our focus on state and local politics. In advance of the 2019 

elections, the program's goal is to support the 11 governors of Nigeria's northern states, relevant 

federal government otlicials, and representative civil society leaders in addressing conflict drivers 

and stabilization-related challenges. 

A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001 AlJMF is made at the most senior 

levels of the US. Government only after a careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each 

group's organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and participation in al-Qa'ida's or the 

Taliban's ongoing hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. The US. 

Government's definition of associated forces remains unchanged from the prior Administration. 

Any detailed discussion about Boko Haram and whether it is within the scope of the 2001 AUMF 

should be conducted in a classified forum. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

In late November 2017, at the US.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission, Deputy Secretary of State 

John Sullivan addressed this issue, praising the recent A-29 Super Tucano FMS case as an example 

of an increased security cooperation but stating that a military response alone in northeast Nigeria 

cannot lead to sustained peace. He discussed and gave specific examples of improving security 

cooperation; economic growth and development; and democracy and governance between the 

United States and Nigeria in the next year. 

For example, the United States is pushing forthe Nigerians to make improvements to the economy 

and governance ofl'the battlefield by formulating a comprehensive response to build a better future 

in northeast Nigeria, including changes to the political, economic, and social infrastructure. 

Additionally, the United States is urging the Government of Nigeria to ensure transparent and 

credible investigations of human rights violations and mechanisms to hold those found guilty 

accountable for their actions and to set conditions for the safe, dignified, and voluntary return of 

the more than two million individuals who have been displaced. The United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) will contribute an additional $45.5 million to support 

stabilization and early recovery efTorts to help those who have been afTected by violence in 

northeast Nigeria. DoD defers to other departments and agencies for specifics regarding various 

economic and development programs that help to improve the security environment (e.g., 

governance, justice, power, trade). 
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A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is made at the most senior 

levels of the U.S. Government only after a careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each 

group's organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and participation in al-Qa'ida's or the 

Taliban's ongoing hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. Generally, this 

occurs only when DoD is contemplating military direct action against an al-Qa'ida- or ISISaffiliated group. Therefore, an announcement by the Administration that the United States is 

conducting military direct action against particular groups because they are within the scope of the 

2001 AUMF does not mean that other groups not listed, such as Boko Haram, are not within its 

scope. 

The definition of "associated force" has not changed. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 

2015, and it continues to be a dangerous terrorist group. Any detailed discussion about 

contemplated military action against Boko Haram should be conducted in a classified forum 

Question: 

2001 AUMF Applicability to Niger: Recently, four US. service members were killed in an attack 

in Niger. Many Members of Congress are unclear on what the mission is there and have questions 

about what legal authority the executive branch is operating under. Last year, the Obama 

Administration listed all the groups it considered covered by a current AUMF and all the locations 

where military operations were being carried out under those AUMFs. The groups listed were: al 

Qaeda; the Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent groups atllliated with al Qaeda or the 

Taliban in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; individuals who are part 

of al Qaeda in Libya; al Qaeda in Syria; and ISIS. And the countries where the Obama 

Administration said the United States was using force under current AUMFs were Afghanistan, 

Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. Has this administration extended the 2001 AUMF to any 

new groups or geographic locations? If so, what is the full list of groups against which the 

administration is claiming the authority to use force under the current AUMFs and in what 

countries are these operations taking place~ Are any operations in Niger current! y considered 

covered under the 2001 AUMF? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The US military is currently taking direct action against the following individuals and groups 

pursuant to the domestic legal authority of the 2001 AUMF: al-Qa'ida; the Taliban; certain other 

terrorist or insurgent groups atllliated with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al-Qa'ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al-Qa'ida in Syria; and ISIS. 

During the Trump Administration, the United States has used military force pursuant to the 2001 

AUMF in Afghanistan, Cuba (detention operations), Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Niger, and 

Yemen. 

Specifically in Niger, U.S. forces were attacked on October 4, 2017, by a force believed to be a 

part ofiSIS, a group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF, and US. forces responded with force to 
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defend themselves. Although the U.S. team was deployed to train, advise, and assist Nigerien 

partner forces under the President's broad authority as Commander in Chief in Article II of the 

U.S. Constitution rather than the 2001 AUMF, and although U.S forces responded to the attack 

with force consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, that use of force can also be considered 

as conducted pursuant to the 200 I AUMF due to the composition and affiliation of the attacking 

force. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is made at the most senior 

levels of the U.S. Government only after a careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each 

group's organization, links with al-Qa-ida or the Taliban, and participation in al-Qa'ida's or the 

Taliban's ongoing hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. 

The U.S. military is currently taking direct action against the following individuals and groups 

pursuant to the domestic legal authority of the 2001 AlJMF al-Qa'ida; the Taliban; certain other 

terrorist or insurgent groups atliliated with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al-Qa'ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al-Qa'ida in Syria; and ISIS. 

During this Administration, the United States has used military force pursuant to the 2001 AlJMF 

in Afghanistan, Cuba (detention operations), Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Niger, and Yemen. 

Specifically in Niger, U.S. forces were attacked on October 4, 2017, by a force believed to be a 

part ofiSIS, a group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF, and U.S. forces responded with force to 

defend themselves. 

Question: 

Somalia/Horn of Africa: Some experts argue that AI Shabaab continues to thrive as a result of the 

continued weakness of the Somali government- in spite of military operations undertaken by the 

Somali National Anny and the African Union Mission in Somalia, supported by the United States 

and other members of the international community. What measures is the State Department taking, 

in cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia and the country's autonomous states, to 

improve governance and service delivery across the country? 

Two recent high-casualty attacks in Mogadishu in October indicate a serious intelligence failure and 

possible infiltration of Somali national security forces by al-Shabaab. What measures have we tal<en 

to address these weaknesses and build renewed resolve on the part of the Federal Government of 

Somalia to undertal<e an offensive to clear al-Shabaab from south/central Somalia? 

Recently, we have seen ''collective self-defense" cited as the reason for some uses of military 

force. What are the parameters ot: and the underlying domestic legal authorities for, military 

actions undertal<en in collective self-defense of Somali partners? Which collective self-defense 

actions were undertaken under legal authority provided in the 2001 AUMF? Were any collective 

self-defense actions undertal<en pursuant to any other sources of legal authority? If partner forces 

such as federal Somali forces or AMISOM forces come under attack from entities not associated 
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with AI Shabaab, AI Qaeda, or the Islamic State (including trom local rivals, as was reportedly the 

case on September 28, 2016) does the Administration view the 2001 AUMF as providing authority 

for collective self-defense actions against those attacking entities? Does the authority for collective 

self-defense allow for actions in defense of non-federal Somali armed actors? What reporting 

requirements under the War Powers Resolution would be triggered by collective self-defense 

actions undertaken in Somalia against entities that are not covered directly by the 2001 AUMF as 

associated forces of a! Qaeda? 

What roles do the State Department and the Intelligence Community play in seeking to ensure that 

US. military operations do not inadvertently draw the United States into local rivalries unrelated 

to Al Shabab? 

The more than 30 US air strikes conducted in Somalia in 2017 have raised many questions. How 

many strikes were conducted in collective self-defense? How many were conducted under the 

authority provided in the 2001 AUMF? Were the recent strikes against ISIS-aligned elements in 

northeastern Somalia conducted under the authority provided in the 2001 AUMF? What is the 

nature of the relationship between ISIS-aligned elements in northeastern Somalia and ISIS 

Central? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

We agree that the long term solution to defeating al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups in Somalia 

requires e±Iective and credible Somali governance and expansion of economic development, in 

addition to security. The United States is encouraging the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 

and the Federal Member States to work together to implement the political and economic 

commitments made at the May 2017 London Somalia conference to advance the federalism 

process and promote economic growth and opportunity. These commitments included completing 

a review of the provisional constitution and holding a constitutional referendum; preparing for 

one-person one-vote elections in 2020/21; rooting out corruption; reaching agreements between 

the national and state governments on resource sharing, delineation of! ega! authorities, and tlscal 

federalism; and improving revenue generation to pay for service delivery. 

US. assistance programs are underway to facilitate progress in all of these areas. In December 

2017, USAID signed a Development Objective Assistance Agreement with the FGS, the tlrst 

comprehensive bilateral development agreement signed between the United States and Somalia in 

over 30 years. Programming etiorts will be measured under the New Partnership for Somalia 

Mutual Accountability Framework, which will form the basis for jointly monitoring assistance 

programs against a shared set of policy commitments to be undertaken by the FGS, including key 

political milestones, more robust anti-corruption measurements, and the creation of a more 

conducive enabling environment for economic growth and investment. 

Developing capable and reliable Somali security forces that can counter al-Shabaab and other 

terrorist groups is among our top priorities in Somalia. To combat the threat from al-Shabaab in 

the near term, U.S. assistance to the Somali National Army is focused on the development of 
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advanced infantry units of the Somali National Army, known as "Danab", which are actively 

involved in the fight against al-Shabaab. On the civilian side, the United States supports the Somali 

Police Force Joint Investigations Teams (JIT), elite units that led the investigations of both October 

2017 bombings in Mogadishu. JITs have generated investigative leads to head offfuture attacks, 

as well as evidence for use in terrorism prosecutions in Somali courts. Over the longer term, we 

are pressing the Federal Government and Federal Member States to implement the agreed National 

Security Architecture, which will define the roles and responsibilities of all military and civilian 

security forces in the country. 

Both the Departments of State and Defense also provide robust support to AMlSOM forces that 

are operating jointly with Somali security forces to clear al-Shabaab tram south-central Somalia. 

This includes provision of a new aerial surveillance capability that will help secure main supply 

routes and facilitate civil-military coordination with Somali communities in areas atiected by alShabaab, as well as two new attack helicopters for Ugandan forces in AMISOM. President 

Farmaajo also has indicated that U.S. airstrikes have bolstered the Federal Government's position 

against al-Shabaab, particularly by disrupting improvised explosive devices networks. 

The President has directed operations against al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the 

domestic legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. We would refer you to the Department of 

Defense for any specitic details of their operations. The President has consistently reported the 

activities ofU.S. forces in Somalia consistent with the War Powers Resolution. 

The State Department regularly shares information on Somali political and clan dynamics with the 

Department of Defense. The U.S. Mission Somalia and U.S. Africa Command coordinate closely 

on U.S. military operations in Somalia. In Washington, the State Department coordinates closely 

with the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community re6'lllarly via regular working-level 

contacts as well as the fonnal interagency process. 

The U.S. military is taking direct action, including air strikes, in Somalia against al-Shabaab and 

ISIS pursuant to the domestic legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. This direct action 

includes recent airstrikes against ISIS in northeastern Somalia. In addition, as a necessary and 

appropriate measure under the 2001 AUMF, strikes were taken against al-Shabaab in the defense 

of partner forces who were engaged in hostilities against al-Shabaab. We refer you to the 

Department of Defense for any specitic details on their operations. 

ISIS in Somalia falls within the scope of the 2001 AUMF because it is part ofiSIS Any further 

discussion of that relationship should be conducted in a classified setting. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

DoD defers to the Department of State on this question about measures the Department of State is 

taking. 

Despite the high number of casualties in the aforementioned attacks, there is evidence to suggest 

that al-Shabaab was unable to penetrate Mogadishu security to reach its desired target locations, 

and the vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) were being pursued by security 
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personnel when detonated, indicating that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is slowly 

making progress. 

The United States continues to gather information and conduct counterterrorism operations to 

degrade the al-Shabaab networks responsible for these attacks, and we are making progress in this 

area. We continue to support AMISOM operations to secure key population centers. In a 

partnership between DoD and DOS, we are working to train and equip one Danab battalion in each 

sector to operate as a strike force against al-Shabaab. 

DoD is currently conducting operations against al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the 

domestic legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. The exercise of that authority pursuant to 

the 2001 AUMF also includes the authority to exercise collective self-defense to defend US., 

Coalition, and any partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat these groups to the extent such 

use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support ofthese counterterrorism operations. 

All engagements conducted in collective self-defense of partner forces in Somalia were conducted 

pursuant to the domestic legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. Yes. The authority provided 

by the 2001 AUMF to exercise collective selt:defense to defend partner forces in Somalia includes 

the authority to defend against any hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent, irrespective of the 

group or individual committing the hostile act or demonstrating hostile intent. Yes. The authority 

to exercise collective self-defense to defend partner forces extends to any partner forces, including 

Somali national security forces and other forces engaged in the campaign to defeat al-Shabaab and 

ISIS. The President has consistently reported the activity of US. forces in Somalia consistent with 

the War Powers Resolution. 

All DoD plans and operations are coordinated closely with US. Mission Somalia to integrate 

political and cultural analyses into decision making. Our military leaders are keenly aware that 

miscalculations in understanding the operational environment, clan dynamics, and local politics 

have detrimental strategic ramifications. We work closely with embedded cultural advisors and 

the Intelligence Community to understand second and third order effects of planned operations 

prior to deciding on a course of action. 

DoD is currently conducting operations against al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia pursuant to the 

domestic legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. The exercise of that authority pursuant to 

the 2001 AUMF also includes the authority to exercise collective self-defense to defend US., 

Coalition, and any partner forces (Somali national security forces and other forces) engaged in the 

campaign to defeat these groups to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate 

measure in support of these counterterrorism operations. 

In 2017, DoD has conducted two strikes in collective self-defense of partner forces in Somalia. All 

DoD strikes conducted in Somalia in 2017, including those taken in self-defense, collective selfdefense, and direct action, were conducted under the authority provided by the 2001 AUMF. Yes. 

ISIS-Somalia falls within the scope of the 2001 AUMF because it is part of ISIS. Any moredetailed discussion of that relationship should be conducted in a classified forum. 

Question: 
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Changes to Use of Force Policies and Legal Interpretations: The Presidential Policy Guidance 

from 2013, establishing procedures for approving direct action against terrorist targets, is currently 

available on the Department of Justice website. However, according to news reports, the President 

recently signed a new set of less stringent rules. Is the 2013 policy guidance still current? Since 

the 2013 b'llidance is public, will you make any changes to that b'llidance public as well? Can you 

describe any changes that have been made so far, including whether any changes have been made 

to requirements for ensuring that strikes are conducted in furtherance of a well-defined strategy 

and whether the Administration's policy still includes a preference for capture over lethal action, 

when possible? 

One year ago, President Obama released a comprehensive report on the legal and policy 

frameworks guiding the United States' use of military force and related national security 

operations. This report was released with a presidential memorandum that requires an updated 

version of the report to be publicly released on an annual basis. Do you plan to release this report? 

If not, why not? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

Any discussion of direct action should take place in a classified setting. 

The Administration believes in the importance of informing Congress and the public of the legal 

and policy issues raised by the United States' use of military force, including through hearings and 

briefings to Congress and reports consistent with the War Powers Resolution. 

The presidential memorandum issued by the previous administration calls for an updated report as 

appropriate. The Administration intends to consider whether an updated public report is 

appropriate at this time in the context of its preparation of the report provided for in section 1264 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

The Department of Defense will continue to keep Congress informed of its counterterrorism direct 

action operations in accordance with laws such as section 130f of Title 10 concerning notification 

requirements for sensitive military operations. I have no additional information to share at this 

time regarding updated presidential policies. 

The Department of Defense is aware of Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2018, which provides: "Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 

Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the legal 

and policy frameworks for the United States' use of military force and related national security 

operations." The Department of Defense will participate in developing the required report. 

Question: 
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Congressional Oversight: The 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance states that a "congressional 

notification shall be prepared and promptly provided to the appropriate Members of the Congress 

by the department or agency approved to carry out such actions" when a new operational plan for 

direct action is approved, authority is expanded, or an operation has been conducted. It also says 

that appropriate Members of Congress will be updated every 3 months on High Value Targets that 

are approved for lethal action. Given that the Foreign Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over 

authorizations for the use of military force, do you always provide these notifications to our 

committee when an action is taken under the authority provided in the AUMF~ Will you commit 

to always providing our committee with these notifications and notifications required by any 

similar, updated policy documents in the future? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

As the Committee on Foreigo Atlairs has jurisdiction over authorizations for the use of military 

force, the Department will continue to notify the Committee on AUMF related matters. The 

Department will continue to notify Congress in this manner. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

DoD will continue to keep Congress informed regarding military operations. 

Question: 

War Powers Resolution Reporting: We have seen a number of incidents in which US forces 

have been introduced into hostilities, or situations where hostilities are likely, to help defend, 

rescue, or search for other US forces or partner forces. The President's Article II powers, rather 

than an AUMF, are often cited as the source of authority for these actions. Our forces clearly have 

the right to defend themselves and other Americans. However, it seems that Congress is not always 

notified in accordance with the War Powers Resolution (WPR) requirements when these defensive 

actions occur. Section 4(a) of the WPR requires that, "[i]n the absence of a declaration of war, in 

any case in which United States Anned Forces are introduced (l) into hostilities or into situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the 

territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments 

which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or (3) in numbers 

which substantial! y enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a 

foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing" This text 

requires reporting anytime US forces are introduced into hostilities, and does not include 

exemptions for cases in which the introduction is unintentional or undertaken in response to an 

emergency. Could you clarify what WPR reporting requirements are triggered when U.S. forces 

are introduced into hostilities for any form of self-defense or other defensive action~ If U.S. forces 

are on a training mission under Title 10 authorities, where involvement in hostilities is not 

expected, and they end up in hostilities, does that trigger a report within 48 hours under Section 4 

of the WPR~ Similarly, if US forces are introduced into hostilities to help defend other US forces 
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or partner forces who unexpectedly end up in hostilities, does that trigger a report within 48 hours? 

Could you please provide, aside from operations conducted pursuant to an AUMF, a complete list 

of situations over the past 3 years in which US forces have been involved in hostilities or situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances? How do you 

assess whether imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances and 

how often do those assessments prove incorrect? 

Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution states that "the term 'introduction of United States 

Armed Forces' includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to command, coordinate, 

participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign 

country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat 

that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities." Can you please explain whether this 

definition for the introduction of United States Armed Forces applies to security assistance 

operations in which US forces are accompanying partner forces on operations that involve 

hostilities or where there exists an imminent threat of hostilities? Does the operation that resulted 

in the tragic death of four US service members in Niger fall under this definition? If not, why 

not? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The War Powers Resolution (WPR) provides that the President must report the deployment of US. 

forces consistent with Section 4(a), and it does not make a distinction on the basis of the purpose 

of the deployment, e.g., a "defensive action" or otherwise. Similarly, the WPR provides that the 

President must report when US. forces are "introduced into hostilities," and it does not make a 

distinction as to whether those hostilities were expected or unexpected, although not all violence 

involving US. forces necessarily amounts to "hostilities." Whether any specific measure in selfdefense constitutes introduction into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in 

hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances under section 4(a) and thus implicates a 48-

hour report will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a specific situation. To the extent that 

a deployment of U.S. forces equipped for combat or the occurrence of "hostilities" is not within 

the scope of previous reporting on activities conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, the War 

Powers Resolution provides that the President is to report the activity to the congressional 

leadership. 

Aside from operations conducted pursuant to an AUMF, on April6, 2017, the US. military struck 

Shayrat military airfield following the Syrian government's chemical weapons attack on the town 

of Khan Shaykhun. President Trump directed the strike on Shayrat airfield pursuant to his 

constitutional authority to conduct US foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief 

Executive. Congress was notified of this particular strike in a Presidential report consistent with 

the War Powers Resolution on April 8, 2017. Further, on October 12, 2016, President Obama 

directed missile strikes against radar facilities in Yemen that were involved in anti-ship cruise 

missile launches that threatened US. Navy warships in the international waters of the Red Sea. 

Congress was notified of this particular strike in a Presidential report consistent with the War 

Powers Resolution on October 14,2016. 
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Whether and under what circumstances security assistance operations would implicate section 8( c) 

of the War Powers Resolution would depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular 

situation. Section 8(c) clarifies that the War Powers Resolution applies not only to US. military 

operations, but also to the assignment of US. forces to accompany foreign military forces that are 

engaged in or there is an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities. When 

applying section 8(c), the relevant question remains whether US. forces are introduced into 

hostilities or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities. 

The Administration's assessment is that a group that is part of ISIS was responsible for the attack 

on US armed forces in Niger on October 4, 2017. Operations against ISIS are authorized by the 

2001 AUMF, and activities conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF have been previously reported 

to Congress consistent witb the War Powers Resolution. Thus, US. actions to defend against this 

attack would not require a separate 48-hour report under the War Powers Resolution. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

The War Powers Resolution (WPR) provides that the President must report the deployment of US. 

forces consistent with Section 4(a), and it does not distinguish the purpose of the deployment, e.g., 

a "defensive action" or otherwise. Similarly, the WPR provides that the President must report 

when US. forces are "introduced into hostilities," and it does not distinguish whether hostilities 

are expected or unexpected, although not all violence involving US. forces necessarily amounts 

to "hostilities." To the extent tbat a deployment of US. forces equipped for combat or the 

occurrence of "hostilities" is not within the scope of previous reporting on activities conducted 

pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, the War Powers Resolution provides that the President is to report 

the activity to the congressional leadership. 

Aside from operations conducted pursuant to an AUMF, President Trump directed military action 

pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority with respect to the April 2017 strike on tbe 

Shayrat military airtield in Syria. Congress was notified of this particular strike in a Presidential 

report consistent with the War Powers Resolution on April 8, 2017. In October2016, President 

Obama directed military action pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority with respect to 

missile strikes on radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen that were involved in 

anti-ship cruise missile launches that threatened US. Navy warships in tbe Red Sea. Congress 

was notitied of this particular strike in a Presidential report consistent with the War Powers 

Resolution on October 14, 2016 

Whether and under what circumstances security assistance operations would implicate section 8( c) 

of the War Powers Resolution would depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular 

situation. Section S(c) clarities that the War Powers Resolution applies not only to US military 

operations, but also to the assignment of US. forces to accompany foreign military forces that are 

engaged in or there is an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities. When 

applying section 8(c), the relevant question remains whether U.S. forces are introduced into 

hostilities or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities. 
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The Administration's assessment is that an ISIS-atliliated group was responsible for the attack on 

US. armed forces in Niger on October 4, 2017. Operations against ISIS are authorized by the 

2001 AUMF, and activities conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF have been previously reported 

to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. Thus, US. actions to defend against this 

attack would not require a separate 48-hour report under the War Powers Resolution. 

Question: 

Civilian Casualties: Civilian casualties from US. strikes are on the rise. What have you done to 

evaluate whether increased civilian casualties outside of active war zones will undermine our 

larger counterterrorism efiorts? How do civilian casualties affect support for terrorist organizations 

and our ability to defeat these organizations in the long-run? When assessing the risk of civilian 

casualties, how do we define civilians and members of terrorist organizations? Are all military age 

males in certain areas sometimes considered non-civilians? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The US. government continues to take extraordinary measures to minimize harm to civilians and 

there has been no relaxation of our efl'orts. The Department of Defense is best positioned to outline 

the specific measures it takes to protect non-combatants and assess trends. From the State 

Department, we continue to work closely with DoD to assist its investigations of allegations of 

civilian casualties reported by non-governmental organizations. 

In addition to humanitarian concerns, civilian casualties can have strategic implications, especially 

in connection with a broader contest for the hearts and minds of a local population. Terrorists and 

insurgents often exaggerate and capitalize on allegations of US.-caused civilian casualties to 

bolster their own recruitment and support, as well as anti-American sentiment. It is just one more 

reason why the U.S. government takes extraordinary measures to protect non-combatants. 

I refer you to the Department of Defense for their definitions on operational issues. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

DoD takes extraordinary measures to reduce and mitigate the likelihood of future incidents of 

civilian casualties. It is the legal, moral, and ethical thing to do, and is part of a sound military 

strategy. As stated in the July 2016 Executive Order related to civilian casualties, and consistent 

with long-standing DoD practices related to protecting civilians, minimizing civilian casualties 

can help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations and enhance the 

legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations critical to our national security. 

Civilian casualties can have strategic consequences. As we have learned, including in recent 

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian casualty incidents can turn the local population against 

U.S. forces, putting U.S. forces, or our partners or allies, at risk, and affect U.S. security interests 

and strategy at the national and international levels. 
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In armed conflicts against terrorist groups, individuals who are formally or functionally part of 

terrorist groups often do not wear uniforms or carry their arms openly. US. forces go to great 

lengths to distinguish between members of terrorist organizations and civilians, who are generally 

understood to be individuals who are neither part of nor associated with an armed force or group, 

nor otherwise engaging in hostilities. In particular, US. forces consider all available information 

to inform that assessment For example, this information may include the extent to which a person 

performs functions for the benefit of the group that are analogous to those traditionally performed 

by members of a country's armed forces; whether a person is carrying out or giving orders to others 

within the group; and whether a person has undertaken certain acts that reliably connote 

meaningful integration into the group. 

It is not the case that all military-aged males are automatically deemed combatants based solely 

on their age and gender. As noted above, individuals are assessed by U.S. forces to determine 

their status (i.e., as lawful targets or non-combatants) using all available information. This 

information can include age and gender, location, and activity. For example, it could be reasonable 

in certain circumstances to infer that males of military age at a terrorist group's remote training 

camp are combatants. On the other hand, such an inference would not be appropriate when 

observing interactions with a known terrorist in a more public area such as an urban market 

Question: 

Defense Institution-Building: In his 2017 Annual Posture Statement, General W aldhauser stated that 

"Training and equipping Atiican partners for the tactical fight is insufticient to achieve long-term 

stability. US. and international assistance must build our Atiican partners' ability to direct, manage, 

sustain, and operate their own defense sectors over time. Capable and sustainable defense institutions 

are critical in providing a secure environment for the deepening of democracy and broad-based 

development, which together can diminish some of the factors that attract vulnerable persons into 

violent extremism and criminality." How would you assess the progress of institutional capacitybuilding across the defense sectors in sub-Saharan Africa? Can you give us examples that demonstrate 

how the US. is improving defense institutions in Atiica? Do you think that there is still an imbalance 

in favor of tactical train and equip, as opposed to assistance focused at the strategic and operational 

levels? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The State Department does not believe there is a detrimental imbalance in favor of tactical train and 

equip. The Department considers both types of assistance to be valuable and uses both, as needed. 

Tactical train and equip programs, and assistance focused at the strategic and operational levels, are 

both key to developing the capabilities of partner nations at all levels. Tactical train and equip is 

essential to ensure partner nations have the basic military skills and equipment to address threats within 

their borders and when deployed abroad. At the same time, higher-level reform guarantees that the 

provided training and equipment can be sustained and effectively used by the partner nation. 
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Institutional reform complements and is often less costly than tactical train and equip, but it is a longterm effort tbat requires the political buy-in and commitment of the partner nation. 

The Department has successful programs that focus directly on institutional reform, such as the 

previously mentioned Atfica Military Education Program (AMEP) and tbe Security Governance 

Initiative (SGI); however, many of tbe Department's train and equip programs also successfully 

connect aspects of higher-level strategic and operational capability development For example, the 

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) increases the capacity of Troop 

Contributing Countries (TCCs) to deploy rapidly not only through training and equipping, but also 

through institutional engagements, such as logistics and deployment management advisors. Similarly, 

while the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East 

Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) programs focus on training and equipping nations for counter 

terrorism efforts, tbey have also funded logistics advisors in Kenya and Chad, and an aviation advisor 

in Uganda, to institutionalize tbe support being provided. Further, the Africa Maritime Security 

Initiative (AMSI) funds maritime security training and provides advisors to support Atfican countries 

in their development of national maritime security strategies and to help the Economic Communities 

of Central and West African States (ECOW AS) implement a regional maritime strategic framework. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

DoD has made noteworthy progress improving institutional capacity in a few sub-Saharan 

countries where we have implemented tailored, coherent programs and activities. DoD is working 

to improve a number of processes that would provide a more comprehensive, balanced analysis of 

the broad defense and military challenges our partners face, from the tactical to tbe ministerial 

levels. 

Over tbe last decade, DoD has created programs specifically aimed at defense governance and 

management issues. DoD is planning to grow these capabilities and integrate them more 

effectively into U.S. Atfica Command's planning processes to ensure country-specific plans 

address the full range of defense functions. In addition, DoD's implementation of its Assessment, 

Monitoring and Evaluation program will result in more rigorous monitoring of its etl'orts and 

independent evaluation of results. 

Kenya is a good example of how the United States is improving defense institutions in Africa over 

a sustained period of time. Within the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), DoD is making noticeable 

progress in the institutional capacity development of the KDF logistics system. In 2017, the 

Defense Governance Management Team (DGMT) conducted five engagements with the KDF 

regarding the Vertically Integrated Logistics Approach which holistically evaluates military 

logistics tram the tactical to the strategic level. Five more engagements are planned for 2018. 

DoD partnership with DOS logistics advisors has propelled progress on the ground in Kenya. The 

Kenyan Ministry of Defense has also made steady progress in institutional capacity development. 

In November 2015, Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Defense requested U.S. assistance to 

professionalize Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilians in areas such as policy and strategy; human 

resource management; and budgeting and procurement. In September 2016, the Cabinet Secretary 

visited the Pentagon for the first U.S.-Kenya security bilateral exchange, and expressed her 

appreciation for progress in this area, largely the result of DGMT etl'orts. In September 2017, 
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Kenya sent a delegation of senior MoD civil servants to the Pentagon for a successful workshop, 

during which DoD personnel shared best practices in areas of defense management and oversight. 

Despite this progress, there remains an imbalance in favor of tactical train-and-equip efforts as 

opposed to assistance focused at the strategic and operational levels, and a number of recent 

initiatives seek to create a more balanced approach. The current imbalance exists principally 

because most security assistance systems and processes were established for the train-and-equip 

mission and have not yet adapted to address requirements for defense institution building. A 

number of recent initiatives, including those stimulated by the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, are beginning to lay the foundation for improved planning 

and programming of security assistance to address defense governance and management in 

addition to tactical challenges. These include the DOS-led and DoD-supported Security 

Governance Initiative, the establishment of the aforementioned Defense Governance and 

Management Team, professionalization of the DoD security cooperation workforce, and the 

requirement in the NDAA for FY 2017 for joint DOS/DoD development and planning of trainand-equip efforts, which must include institutional capacity building. 

Question: 

Chief of Mission and Geographic Combatant Command Authority: We understand that there is 

often tension between Chief of Mission (CoM) and Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) 

authority for DoD personnel operating in many African countries. How have these tensions manifested 

in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility? How could this process be improved? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

In Somalia and Libya, our Chiefs of Mission in the tield coordinate closely with US Africa 

Command (USAFRICOM) on ongoing military operations and other policy issues. 

AFRICOM, through its Senior Defense Officials offices and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn 

of Africa Headquarters, has directed its military leadership to obtain COM approval for activities 

when required by law, Presidential directives, or DoD policy. Our Chiefs ofMission communicate 

regularly with Department of State leadership in Washington, and senior Department of State 

officials coordinate policy closely with Department of Defense and other interagency counterparts. 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

Decisions about military activities in a foreign country generally are subject to rigorous review to 

ensure military and diplomatic insights and views are understood and balanced. Although the 

Chief of Mission (COM) is not in the military chain of command, DoD works to keep COMs 

informed of all activities and seeks their advice and counsel. Overall, this relationship works 

extremely well. 

Question: 
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Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA): I am concerned by reports that Secretary Tillerson acted in 

contravention of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) by not listing Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burma 

among those countries who use child soldiers. Reporting indicates that State Department's legal 

adviser, relevant offices and bureaus, and relevant embassies abroad believed these three countries 

should be listed. The Child Soldiers Prevention Act requires the State Department to list any country 

-even if it believed the country was making progress -that used child soldiers during the year, without 

exception. Please explain what specific information the Secretary used to make his decision and why 

he chose to ignore the advice of State Department experts, and the CSPA's legal tramework, by not 

listing these three countries? How will this be rectified? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The United States takes the recruitment and use of child soldiers very seriously, and the 

Department agrees with the importance of using the annual CSPA list to focus international 

attention on the unlawtul recruitment and use of child soldiers. In making listing determinations 

under the CSPA, the Secretary considered the credibility of all of the information available to him 

tram multiple sources. He determined that eight countries -Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen - met the statutory requirements 

to be identified under the CSPA as unlawfully recruiting or using child soldiers. The Secretary 

thoroughly reviewed all of the most current and available information and made a determination 

about whether the facts justitied a listing pursuant to the law. 

Question: 

Staff Cnts: Please explain how the Secretary's plan to cut State Department staffing by 8 percent 

will make the Department more etl'ective. 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The initial target was set at a net personnel reduction level of 1,982, comprised primarily of 

workforce reductions of 1,362 (of which 511 in FY 2017 and 851 in FY 2018) achieved through 

hiring below projected attrition, with the balance to be achieved through voluntary separation and 

voluntary early retirement. The November 2017 proposal set a target of 641 personnel. The 

rationale is to move on a voluntary basis toward a more etliciently run Department. 

At this time, the Department is continuing to assess the workforce to allocate positions as 

etliciently as possible to meet our diplomatic and national security mission. 

The initial targets do not relate to or inform current Redesign or Impact Initiative planning. 

However, we anticipate that the Impact Initiative modernization projects will increase our overall 

effectiveness, which may result in future statling efficiencies. 

Question: 
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Embassy Security Following President Trump Retweets: According to CNN, the State 

Department communicated to the White House its concerns about potential protests at US. 

embassies abroad as a result of President Trump's November 29'" retweets of three inflammatory, 

doctored videos with anti-Muslim content. What specific concerns were raised by the State 

Department to the White House and to whom were they made known? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The Department of State does not comment on conversations it has had with the White House on 

security matters. 

Question: 

Honduras: On November 28'"- two days after a contentious presidential election in Honduras in 

which there have been serious allegations about vote tampering- the State Department certified 

that the central government of Honduras had made sufficient progress in several areas to warrant 

receipt of US. assistance. When asked about the timing of the certification at a December 5'" press 

briefing, State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert said, ''it was just done when it was done." 

Why was Honduras certified two days after the country's presidential election, precisely as the 

country's current political crisis began? What was the thinking behind the timing of this 

certification? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The Department undertook a thorough review of infonnation from various sources between 

October 2016 and September 2017, including US. government agencies, civil society, 

independent reporting, and the host government, in considering whether to certify and report to 

Congress under section 7045(a)(4)(B) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (Div. J, P.L. 115-31) (SFOAA) that the Government of 

Honduras took effective steps to meet the 12 required criteria. The Secretary signed the 

certification November 28 and it was subsequently transmitted with a Memorandum of 

Justification to Congress. This decision was not linked to the ongoing electoral process in 

Honduras. 

This certification is only one step in the effort to ensure Honduras is demonstrating continued 

action, commitment, and support onUS. priorities. The Department will assess whether the new 

government has tbe political will to follow through on those commitments. 

Question: 

Resolution of Conflicts: At a November 28'" event at the Wilson Center, Secretary Tillerson said 

that President Trump's draconian cuts to the international affairs budget are "reflective of an 

expectation that we're going to have success in some of these conflict areas." Can you please tell 

us what specific conflicts you think will be resolved in the coming year? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 
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Many ofthe world's crises emanate from conflict-affected and fragile states with poor governance, 

the absence of the rule of law, corruption, weak or nonexistent democratic institutions, and human 

rights abuses. Even with the reductions in funding, we will continue to be the leader in international 

development, global health, democracy and good governance initiatives, and humanitarian efforts. 

Our budget request in FY 2018 includes dedicated resources to support the U.S. government's 

etiorts to address the root cause of these issues in high priority countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. We anticipate seeing greater progress in many of these places 

as we press our national and local partners to step up their leadership and take greater responsibility 

for resolving political disputes that fuel these conflicts The United States is committed to doing 

our fair share, and will remain a leader particularly in providing life-saving humanitarian 

assistance, yet we are also asking our international partners to step up their efforts and contribute 

more. Finally, as both the Secretary and I have stressed before, we believe it is our people tirst 

and foremost- not the level of resources- that will determine our ability to succeed in addressing 

complex crises and conflicts across the world. 

Question: 

DoD Encroachment on State Department Authorities: With alarming speed, the Pentagon has 

duplicated almost all of the State Department's authorities to deliver Security Assistance and 

Counter-narcotics assistance, in spite of State Department's clear legal mandate to direct policy in 

this area. This has led, arb'l!ably to contusion, duplication and inefficiencies and waste, not to 

mention a distraction from DoD's core mission. How will you build up the capacities within State 

to ensure that these programs can be managed etiectively by the State Department rather than 

ceding this policy space to the Defense Department? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

It is the responsibility of the State Department to ensure that our security assistance aligns with 

and promotes U.S. objectives in light of the broader diplomatic and defense relationship, and that 

everything the various entities of the U.S. government are doing in foreign security sectors 

advances a single coherent strategy. The Department has longstanding practices for coordinating 

the deployment of its security assistance tunds, including processes such as the development of 

the Integrated Country Strategy, the development of the Mission Resource Request, vanous 

interagency planning forums, and program-specific proposal review processes. 

The State Department is also working with the Department of Defense to develop processes to 

synchronize security assistance planning and programming across the two departments, in light of 

DoD's expanded assistance authority. Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis have established 

a State Department-DoD Security Sector Assistance Steering Committee that is taking on this 

important task. The Steering Committee will oversee a process to ensure that State and DoD are 

optimizing our respective department resources and individual authorities to advance U.S. national 

security priorities and partnerships. Both State and DoD will benefit from this coordination, as 

close collaboration permits the agencies to maximize our limited resources and capitalize on each 

agency's unique expertise and authorities. 
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Secretary Tillerson has also designated the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs (PM) 

as the lead coordinator for State in the joint planning, development, and implementation of 

programs for DoD's section 333 assistance authority, which consolidated and codified several 

security sector assistance authorities -- including for counter-narcotics and counter-weapons of 

mass destruction --in the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. This is in line with the 

requirement for the Department to designate an individual responsible for program coordination 

at the lowest appropriate leveL In fulfilling its role as lead section 333 coordinator, PM manages 

a consultative and inclusive planning and approval process to ensure that Departmental priorities 

and policy concerns are reflected in security sector assistance plans and programs. In doing so, 

PM works in concert with all Department regional and functional stakeholders, including the 

Bureau oflnternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement A±Iairs. 

At the same time, the otllce of US Foreign Assistance Resources (F) maintains overall 

responsibility for ensuring the alignment of foreign assistance resources with Administration 

policy and strategies and exercises the delegated authority to concur with section 333 programs. 

Question: 

Vacant Positions: How, if at all, does the absence of a US. ambassador in Somalia since August 

or a lack of permanent Assistant Secretary for Atrican Affairs impact the State Department's 

ability to raise concerns regarding US. military activities in Somalia? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

There has been no impact on the close and consistent coordination between the State Department 

and Defense Department on US. military activities in Somalia since Ambassador Schwartz's 

retirement in October 2017. Deputy Chief of Mission Martin Dale, an experienced diplomat with 

extensive Somali experience, will be Charge d'A±Iaires ad interim until a new Ambassador is 

nominated and confirmed. Acting Assistant Secretary for African Ail'airs Donald Yamamoto has 

extensive experience in East Africa as US. Ambassador to Djibouti and then to Ethiopia, and as 

Charge d'Affaires for the US. Mission to Somalia in 2016. Charge Dale and Ambassador 

Yamamoto remain in close contact with Defense Department otlicials, including the Commander 

of US. Africa Command, regarding US. military operations in Somalia. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record from Representative Brad Sherman 

Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa 

December 7, 2017 

U.S. Troops in Africa: The previous Administration publicly released both the Presidential Policy 

Guidance establishing procedures for approving direct action against terrorist targets and a 

comprehensive report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding our use of military force. Do 

both of these documents reflect this Administration's current policies? If anything has changed, 

when will you release updated versions of these public documents? If you are not planning to 

publicly release changes, can you please describe why these previously public documents will no 

longer be public and how the American people will know that the Administration's policies have 

changed? 

In response to Representative Bass' question about troop presence in Africa, you indicated that 

you would prefer to discuss that in a classified setting. But there are open source government 

reports saying that there are 5,000-6,000 U.S. troops in Africa. Does your response mean that you 

are unaware of these reports or that the administration has decided to classify this information that 

has up until now been publicly available? 

Mr. Trachtenberg's Response: 

The Department of Defense will keep Congress informed of its counterterrorism direct action 

operations in accordance with laws such as section 130f of Title 10 concerning notification 

requirements for sensitive military operations. I have no additional information to provide 

regarding updated presidential policies. 

Although it is not appropriate in an open setting to discuss precise numbers and locations of 

military activities specifically related to counterterrorism etl'orts, I am aware of the number ofU. S. 

military personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors on the continent of Africa working to disrupt 

transnational threats, protect U.S. personnel and facilities, and promote regional stability. Broadly 

speaking, the published government reports ret1ect the number of personnel deployed to conduct 

a myriad of operations and tasks, including training exercises, U.S. forces deployed to build partner 

nation capacity, and logistical support to operational requirements throughout the continent. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record from Rep. Lois Frankel 

Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa 

December 7, 2017 

Global Gag Rule: The expanded Global Gag Rule threatens to harm millions of women and girls, 

and we've also defunded programs at the United Nations that will cause cuts to U.S. health, 

contraception and AIDS prevention funds. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has promised a sixmonth review of the Global Gag Rule. When will Congress receive this review? Will this review 

be made public? Will that review include assessments of any harm caused by this policy to women 

and girls in countries that receive U.S. global health assistance? Are there plans to conduct 

additional reviews to monitor ongoing impacts? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

As Secretary Tillerson testified in June 2017, the Department has committed to undertaking a 

comprehensive review of the effectiveness and impact of the Protecting Life in Global Health 

Assistance (PLGHA) policy's application since its implementation on May 15, 2017. The review 

results were shared with Congress on February 7, 2018. 

Yes, it is available on the Department of State website at 

www. state.gov/f/releases/other/2780 12. htm 

Yes, it is available on the Department of State website at 

www.state.gov/f/releases/other/278012.htm 

Yes, the U.S. government expects to conduct another review of implementation of the policy at 

the end of2018. 

Question: 

Office for Women's Issues: The Office for Global Women's Issues used to report directly to the 

Secretary of State, and now that Office is going to be downgraded. The issues that involve women 

are so diverse and cut across so many different sectors of the State Department- from economic 

empowerment, to gender equality, to health. Could you please assure me that the Office for Global 

Women's Issues will still be able to access all of those issues under the Under Secretary for 

Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, and also provide an update on filling the 

Ambassador-at-Large position7 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 
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The State Department remains committed to improving gender equality globally and recognizes 

the direct impact these efforts have on our national security and foreign policy objectives of 

stability, prosperity and security. The Otlice of Global Women's issues (S/GWI) will continue to 

work within the Department and interagency to empower women and girls socially, politically and 

economically in the communities and societies in which they live. The empowerment of adolescent 

girls; women's political and economic empowerment; women's participation in peace and security 

processes; and the prevention of and response to gender-based violence continue to be areas of 

focus where we will remain steadfast in our efforts. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record from Rep. Brad Schneider 

Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa 

December 7, 2017 

Child Soldiers Prevention Act: I am concerned that Secretary Tillerson violated US law, 

specifically the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA), when he did not list Afghanistan, Burma, 

and Iraq as countries who used or supported the use of child soldiers in 2016. As you know, the 

Child Soldiers Prevention Act requires the State Department to list any country- even if it believed 

the countries were making progress - that used child soldiers during the year without exception. I 

understand the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser and every relevant regional and 

functional otlice and bureau cleared the recommendation that the Secretary include these three 

countries in the 2017 CSPA list. When asked during the hearing why the Secretary chose to ignore 

the recommendation of the State Department and not include Mghanistan, Burma, and Iraq in the 

2017 CSPA list, you said the Secretary applied his judgement based on the recommendation and 

materials he received. What specific documents and facts did the Secretary use to make his CSPA 

determination? 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

The United States takes the recruitment and use of child soldiers very seriously, and the 

Department agrees with the importance of using the annual CSPA list to focus international 

attention on the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. In making listing determinations 

under the CSPA, the Secretary considered the credibility of all of the information available to him 

from multiple sources. He determined that eight countries- Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian, and Yemen- met the statutory requirements 

to be identified under the CSPA as unlawfully recruiting or using child soldiers. The Secretary 

thoroughly reviewed all of the most current and available information and made a determination 

about whether the facts justified a listing pursuant to the law.