[Cite as State v. Reilly, 2020-Ohio-850.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SENECA COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-19-28 

 v. 

LOUIS A. REILLY, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 19 CR 0019 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 9, 2020 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

W. Alex Smith for Appellant 

 Angela M. Boes for Appellee 
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ZIMMERMAN, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Louis A. Reilly (“Reilly”), appeals the July 31, 

2019 judgment entry of sentence the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. We 

affirm. 

{¶2} The facts of this case begin with the arrest of Reilly’s roommate, Adam 

Barto (“Barto”), on January 24, 2019. Barto—who was the subject of a criminal 

investigation by the Seneca County Drug Task Force METRICH Enforcement Unit 

(“drug task force”)—was arrested outside of the residence that he shared with 

Reilly. Subsequent to Barto’s arrest, law enforcement entered the residence without 

a warrant after hearing persons inside the residence “scurrying” about the residence 

when they were alerted to law enforcement’s presence. Law enforcement entered 

the residence (without a warrant) over the concern that those persons inside the 

residence may destroy drug evidence. Once inside the residence, law enforcement 

located Reilly exiting a bathroom and saw drugs in plain view on the (bathroom) 

floor and in the (bathroom) toilet. Thereafter, law enforcement obtained a search 

warrant to search the residence and discovered, in particular, drugs and tools 

commonly associated with the drug trade. 

{¶3} On February 20, 2019, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Reilly 

on five criminal charges: Count One of permitting drug abuse in violation of R.C. 

2925.13(B), (C)(3)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Counts Two and Three of aggravated 
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possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), third-degree 

felonies; Count Four of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), 

(C)(2)(a), a fifth-degree felony; and Count Five of tampering with evidence in 

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), (B), a third-degree felony. (Doc. No. 2). Reilly 

appeared for arraignment on March 6, 2019 and entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. 

No. 12). 

{¶4} On March 18, 2019, at Reilly’s request, the trial court ordered Reilly to 

be evaluated for his competency to stand trial. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15). On April 24, 

2019, after a hearing on April 23, 2019, the trial court concluded that Reilly was 

competent to stand trial, which Reilly does not challenge. (Doc. No. 18). 

{¶5} On May 20, 2019, Reilly filed a motion to suppress evidence in which 

he argued that law enforcement “made entry into [his] house without a search 

warrant and then secured the house and occupants before seeking a search warrant” 

and that law enforcement “then used evidence observed in the illegal search of the 

house to bolster the affidavit.” (Doc. No. 21). After a hearing on June 24, 2019, 

the trial court on July 9, 2019 denied Reilly’s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. 

No. 25). 

{¶6} On July 30, 2019, Reilly withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered 

pleas of no contest with a “consent finding of guilty,” under a negotiated plea 

agreement, to the counts in the indictment. (Doc. Nos. 39, 40, 41). In exchange for 
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his change of pleas, the State agreed to a joint-sentencing recommendation. (Doc. 

No. 40). The trial court accepted Reilly’s pleas of no contest and found him guilty. 

(Doc. No. 41). The trial court held its sentencing hearing that same day and 

sentenced Reilly (based on the parties’ joint-sentencing recommendation) to: 10 

months in prison as to Counts One, Three, and Four, respectively, and 18 months in 

prison as to Count Two and Five, respectively. (Doc. No. 42). The trial court 

ordered Reilly to serve consecutively the prison terms imposed as to Counts Three 

and Five. (Id.). The trial court further ordered that the prison terms imposed as to 

Counts One, Three, and Four to be served concurrently to the consecutive sentences 

under Counts Three and Five for a total term of 36 months in prison. (Id.). 

{¶7} On August 8, 2019, Reilly filed a notice of appeal, and raises one 

assignment of error. (Doc. No. 47). 

Assignment of Error 

The Trial Court Erred When it Denied the Defendant’s Motion to 

Suppress 

{¶8} In his assignment of error, Reilly argues that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress evidence. Reilly argues that law enforcement’s 

entry into his residence (and subsequent search) was conducted without a warrant 

and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment. Further, he contends that law enforcement improperly used evidence 

obtained from its warrantless search to obtain a search warrant. For the reasons 
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below, we conclude that law enforcement’s warrantless entry into Reilly’s residence 

was lawfully conducted under the exigent-circumstances exception—namely, the 

need to prevent the destruction of evidence—to the Fourth Amendment. 

Standard of Review 

{¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions 

of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a 

suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is 

in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See 

also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a 

motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact 

if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State 

v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of 

law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently 

determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. 

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). 

Analysis

{¶10} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied 

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ohio Constitution, Article I, 

Section 14, protects individuals against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the 

government and protects privacy interests where an individual has a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy.” State v. Fielding, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 13AP-654 and 

13AP-655, 2014-Ohio-3105, ¶ 15, quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 

99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979). See also State v. Steinbrunner, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-11-

27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 12. “An expectation of privacy is protected by the Fourth 

Amendment where (1) an individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of 

privacy, and (2) that expectation of privacy is one that ‘society is prepared to 

recognize as “reasonable.”’” Fielding at ¶ 15, quoting Smith at 740, quoting Katz 

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 

“Generally, any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well 

as any evidence seized subsequent to such violation, must be suppressed as ‘fruit of 

the poisonous tree.’” Id., quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 

S.Ct. 407 (1963). See also State v. Jenkins, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-10, 2010-

Ohio-5943, ¶ 9 (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly provide “that 

violations of its provisions against unlawful searches and seizures will result in the 

suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such violation, but the United States 

Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the 

Fourth Amendment”), citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961) 

and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 

{¶11} “A warrantless search of a person’s home is presumed unreasonable 

unless an exception to the warrant requirement is shown.” State v. Yost, 5th Dist. 
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Perry No. 18-CA-00024, 2019-Ohio-5446, ¶ 23, citing State v. Diaz, 5th Dist. Stark 

No. 2016 CA 00113, 2017-Ohio-262, ¶ 16, citing State v. Angelo, 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 24751, 2009-Ohio-6966, ¶ 10. “At a suppression hearing, the State bears the 

burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the 

exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment 

standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 

Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio 

St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). 

{¶12} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

27340, 2017-Ohio-6903, ¶ 13, citing State v. Berry, 167 Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-

Ohio-3035, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). See also State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio 

St.3d 49, 51 (1985). 

The exigent or emergency circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement applies in a variety of situations, including when entry 

into a building is necessary to protect or preserve life, to prevent 

physical harm to persons or property, or to prevent the concealment 

or destruction of evidence, or when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a 

fleeing suspect or someone inside poses a danger to the police 

officer’s safety. 

(Emphasis added.) Byrd at ¶ 13, citing State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498, 2008-

Ohio-267, ¶ 48 (2d Dist.) and Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849 

(2011). “‘In order to justify an exception to the warrant requirement, the costs 
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involved in obtaining a warrant must be sufficiently significant to justify avoiding 

the delay inherent in procuring a warrant.’” Id., quoting Sharpe at ¶ 29. See also

State v. Garrett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27630, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 34 (“‘[U]nder 

the rubric of exigent circumstances, a true emergency must exist which excuses the 

failure to obtain a warrant[.]’”), quoting State v. Burchett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

20166, 2004-Ohio-3095, ¶ 17. 

{¶13} “Whether exigent circumstances are present is determined through an 

objective test that looks at the totality of the circumstances confronting the police 

officers at the time of the entry.” State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 08AP184 and 08AP-318, 2010-Ohio-5623, ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald, 916 

F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir.1990). “‘[A]n important factor to be considered when 

determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for 

which the arrest is being made.’” Garrett at ¶ 43, quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 

U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984). “‘The duration of the intrusion and the scope 

of the search are governed by the constitutional command of reasonableness, which 

will be evaluated in terms of the emergency. Once the emergency conditions have 

been alleviated, further intrusion must be sanctioned by a warrant.’” State v. Bethel, 

5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 10-AP-35, 2011-Ohio-3020, ¶ 26, quoting Katz, Ohio 

Arrest, Search and Seizure, Section 10.5, at 185-186 (1999). See also State v. Kulyk, 

5th Dist. Guernsey No. 01 CA 13, 2002 WL 491849, *4 (Apr. 1, 2002) (noting that 
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“the duration and scope of that intrusion and search are evaluated in terms of the 

emergency, and once that emergency has been alleviated, further intrusion must be 

sanctioned by a warrant”). 

{¶14} “It is well established that a warrantless entry is justified under exigent 

circumstances where there is imminent danger that evidence will be lost or 

destroyed if a search is not immediately conducted.” Garrett at ¶ 36, citing State v. 

Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 52 (2000). See also King at 460; State v. Benvenuto, 3d 

Dist. Allen No. 1-17-39, 2018-Ohio-2242, ¶ 22. “‘This need may be particularly 

compelling where narcotics are involved, for “narcotics can be easily and quickly 

destroyed while a search is progressing.”’” United States v. Johnson, 457 

Fed.Appx. 512, 516 (6th Cir.2012), quoting United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 

859 F.2d 1501, 1511-1512 (6th Cir.1988), quoting United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 

1439, 1444-1445 (D.C.Cir.1988), and citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 

331-332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001) and Modrell v. Hayden, 436 Fed.Appx. 568, 578-

579 (6th Cir.2011). See also Moore at 52 (“Because marijuana and other narcotics 

are easily and quickly hidden or destroyed, a warrantless search may be justified to 

preserve evidence.”). 

{¶15} “‘[A] warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is 

justified if the government demonstrates: “(1) a reasonable belief that third parties 

are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon 
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become aware the police are on their trail, so that the destruction of evidence would 

be in order.”’” Enyart at ¶ 21, quoting United States v. Lewis, 231 F.3d 238, 241 

(6th Cir.2000), quoting Sangineto-Miranda at 1512, and citing State v. Russell, 4th 

Dist. Athens No. 97 CA 37, 1998 WL 357546, *18 (June 30, 1998), quoting United 

States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir.1996). However, “warrantless entry to 

prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable” only when law enforcement “did 

not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates 

the Fourth Amendment.” King at 462. 

{¶16} At the suppression hearing in this case, the State offered the testimony 

of Officer Justin Nowak (“Officer Nowak”) of the Tiffin Police Department, who 

was assigned to the drug task force. (June 24, 2019 Tr. at 17). Officer Nowak 

testified that the drug task force was tracking Barto through a GPS tracking device 

affixed to Barto’s vehicle. (Id. at 18, 23). Based on the drug task force’s monitoring 

of Barto’s movements, it was determined that Barto was residing at 55 East New 

Haven Street, Bloomville, Ohio (the “residence”). (Id. at 19, 23-24). (See also id.

at 28). Officer Nowak testified that, on January 24, 2019, the drug task force was 

awaiting Barto’s to return the residence to arrest him. (Id. at 24-25). Specifically, 

law enforcement had warrants for Barto’s arrest and to search the vehicle being 

operated by Barto. (Id. at 26-27). 
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{¶17} Office Nowak testified that, when Barto arrived around 7:30 a.m., 

“there were officers staged at the rear of the residence. There was a private drive 

that was at the rear of [the residence] that pulled into a garage and backyard area. 

Officers were staked around the garage, the alleyway, as well as around the rear of 

the residence.” (Id. at 25). According to Officer Nowak, while law enforcement 

waited for Barto to arrive, “officers had heard residents inside the home” and 

“determined that [their] cover had * * * been detected at that time * * * .” (Id.). 

Specifically, “the officer staged at the rear of the residence” “heard voices inside 

that indicated that someone knew someone was outside, and * * * heard * * * 

scurrying, or moving abruptly throughout the residence.” (Id. at 26). 

{¶18} After Barto was arrested, “[o]fficers made entry into the residence.” 

(Id. at 27). More specifically, “[o]fficers knocked at the rear door of the residence. 

When no one answered the door, entry was made. Four subjects were located inside, 

and a cursory search was conducted and they were detained.” (Id.). 

{¶19} Importantly, Officer Nowak testified that it was necessary for law 

enforcement to enter the residence because it was believed that the persons inside 

the residence could be destroying evidence. (Id. at 28-29). That is, “[t]he noises 

that the officers heard inside where they stated that it sounds as if people knew 

someone was outside and was scurrying about the residence, and then by knocking 

on the door and nobody answering or responding” led law enforcement to believe 
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that those persons could be destroying evidence. (Id. at 29). Indeed, Officer Nowak 

testified that, because law enforcement surveilled Barto at the residence, it was 

likely that Barto was conducting illegal-drug activity inside the residence.1

 (Id. at 

28-29). 

{¶20} Moreover, according to Officer Nowak’s testimony based on his 

training and experience, it is likely that other persons present at locations at which 

suspected illegal-drug activity is occurring are “affiliated or known associates” of 

the principal offender. (Id. at 29). Therefore, law enforcement concluded that it 

was likely that the persons inside the residence could be destroying drug evidence. 

(Id. at 29-30). And, on entering the residence, law enforcement found Reilly exiting 

the bathroom where drugs were on the floor and in the toilet in plain view. (Id. at 

30-31). Thereafter, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and searched the 

residence. (Id. at 33-34). 

{¶21} Here, the trial court denied Reilly’s motion to suppress evidence after 

concluding that “[s]ufficient exigent circumstances existed to allow law 

enforcement to enter the residence to ensure their safety, and the safety of others on 

the scene.” (Doc. No. 25). In other words, the trial court concluded that law 

enforcement’s warrantless entry and search was justified under the protective-sweep 

 

1

 Barto admitted to law enforcement—prior to its obtaining a search warrant for the residence—that drugs, 

drug paraphernalia, and a firearm would be found in his bedroom. (June 24, 2019 Tr. at 33). 
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doctrine.2

 Notwithstanding the trial court’s conclusion, we conclude that, based on 

the totality of the circumstances of this case, exigent circumstances existed to justify 

the warrantless entry and limited search of the residence because competent, 

credible evidence exists in the record reflecting that it was reasonable for law 

enforcement to believe that the drug evidence was at risk of being destroyed if the 

officers did not immediately enter to secure the scene. See King, 563 U.S. at 457; 

 

2

 Although a difference of opinion exists whether the protective-sweep doctrine permits limited searches of 

a person’s home “if there is a likelihood that another person may be on the premises who may destroy 

evidence,” we decline to extend the protective-sweep doctrine to prevent the destruction of evidence here. 

Jackson v. United States, 479 U.S. 910, 107 S.Ct. 308 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the 

conflict between courts “allowing a protective sweep when the police only suspect that another person on the 

premises may destroy evidence” and courts permitting only “the more stringent safety-based approach”). 

Compare State v. Koon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26296, 2015-Ohio-1326, ¶ 16, fn. 1 (“The State also 

argues that a warrantless entry into Koon’s residence was justified to prevent the destruction of evidence. 

Just like a protective sweep, however, a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence still requires 

a reasonable belief that someone remains inside the residence.”) with State v. Yost, 5th Dist. Perry No. 18-

CA-00024, 2019-Ohio-5446, ¶ 53 (Wise, J., dissenting) (concluding that “exigent circumstances did not exist 

to justify a protective sweep of the residence to prevent removal or destruction of evidence”). “‘A “protective 

sweep” is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of 

police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a 

person might be hiding.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27340, 2017-Ohio6903, ¶ 15, quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990). See also State v. Adams, 

144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 188. Indeed, “‘[t]he scope of the protective sweep must not exceed 

that reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the officers.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Chavez, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27840, 2018-Ohio-4351, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Lyons, 83 Ohio App.3d 525, 534 (2d 

Dist.1992). Moreover, because we conclude that law enforcement’s entry into the residence was justified 

under the exigent-circumstances exception to prevent the destruction of evidence, we need not address 

whether the protective-sweep doctrine could justify a warrantless entry into a home. See State v. Mickey, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82844, 2003-Ohio-6878, ¶ 17 (noting that “the instances in which law enforcement can 

lawfully perform warrantless protective sweeps” has been extended “to include situations where the arrest 

was made outside of, but near, the home”), citing United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C.Cir.1995) and 

United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (D.C.Cir.1996). See also State v. Adams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 

MA 246, 2011-Ohio-5361, ¶ 41, citing U.S. v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir.1990) (permitting a 

protective sweep of a home even where the arrest occurs outside), rev’d in part on other grounds, 144 Ohio 

St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954. Under the protective-sweep doctrine, “as an incident to the arrest the officers 

could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other 

spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Buie

at 334. Beyond that, “protective sweeps are permitted when officers possess ‘a reasonable belief based on 

specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the 

arrest scene.’” Chavez at ¶ 31, quoting Buie at 337. 
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Benvenuto, 2018-Ohio-2242, at ¶ 25; Johnson, 457 Fed.Appx. at 515; United States 

v. Waide, E.D.Ky CR No. 5:18-116-KKC, 2019 WL 1521973, *7 (Apr. 8, 2019). 

{¶22} Moreover, law enforcement’s warrantless entry was justified because 

it had a reasonable belief that third parties were inside the residence and a reasonable 

belief that those parties were aware of law enforcement’s presence making the 

destruction of evidence probable. Specifically, Officer Nowak testified that the law 

enforcement officers positioned outside the residence not only heard third parties 

inside the residence, but heard those parties acknowledge law enforcement’s 

presence. See State v. Melvin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27248, 2017-Ohio-7938, 

¶ 13 (concluding that law enforcement’s warrantless entry into the residence was 

justified under the exigent-circumstances exception because law enforcement was 

“concern[ed] that evidence would be destroyed or weapons obtained” after law 

enforcement was “discovered outside the house while preparing to execute the 

warrant”). Further, Officer Nowak testified that those law enforcement officers 

heard those third parties begin to scurry or move abruptly through the residence. 

See Gaston v. Toledo, 106 Ohio App.3d 66, 77 (6th Dist.1995) (noting that 

“particularized reasons can involve evidence of any unusual activity, noise or 

conduct indicating the destruction of evidence is being attempted”). Importantly, 

Officer Nowak testified that, based on these facts, and the knowledge that it is likely 

that third parties who share a residence with a known drug offender also engage in 
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illegal drug activity, law enforcement concluded that drug evidence was at risk of 

being destroyed if law enforcement did not immediately enter and secure the 

residence. See Benvenuto at ¶ 25. See also Waide at *10. Indeed, once inside the 

residence, law enforcement discovered Reilly actually trying to destroy evidence—

that is, law enforcement found drugs in the toilet immediately after Reilly exited 

that bathroom. 

{¶23} Once inside the residence, law enforcement properly limited the scope 

of their intrusion to only what was necessary to secure the premises and ensure that 

evidence would not be destroyed.3

 State v. Martin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C040150, 2004-Ohio-6433, ¶ 41 (holding that law enforcement “properly limited the 

scope of their intrusion into [the residence] to only that necessary to secure the 

premises and to ensure that evidence would not be destroyed”). See also State v. 

Brewster, 157 Ohio App.3d 342, 2004-Ohio-2722, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.). 

{¶24} For these reasons, the trial court did not err by denying Reilly’s motion 

to suppress evidence obtained from law enforcement’s warrantless entry into his 

residence or its subsequent search of the residence under the search warrant (albeit 

for a different reason than stated in the trial court’s decision). See State v. Holland, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-790, 2014-Ohio-1964, ¶ 20 (affirming the trial court’s 

 

3

 Because we conclude that law enforcement’s search of the residence in this case was within the scope 

necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, we need not address the application of the protective-sweep 

doctrine in this case. 
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denial of Holland’s motion to suppress evidence “for a different reason than stated 

in the trial court’s decision”). 

{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr