SAND 2003-0754 

May 2003 

Cooperative Measures to Mitigate 

Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Commander Wen-Chung Chai 

Taiwan Navy 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/29 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated 

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of 

Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and technical 

experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze, 

and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative security measures. As part of its 

mission, the CMC sponsors research on cooperative security and the role of technology. Reports of that 

work are provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research is conducted by Sandia staff, 

international technical experts, and visiting scholars. (The CMC’s Visiting Scholars Program is 

administered by the Institute for Public Policy at the University of New Mexico.) For additional 

information on the CMC’s programs, visit the CMC home page on the World Wide Web at 

<http://www.cmc.sandia.gov> or write to: 

Cooperative Monitoring Center 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Mail Stop 1373 

Albuquerque, NM 87185-1373 

For specific information on this report contact: 

John Olsen at the above address. 

This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 

4
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Cooperative Measures to Mitigate 

Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Abstract 

The economies of East Asia are predominantly export based and, therefore, place special 

emphasis on the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Due to economic 

globalization, the United States shares these concerns. Cooperative measures by the concerned 

parties could reduce the potential for disruption by maritime conflicts. Primary threats against 

the SLOCs are disputes over the resources under the seas, disputes over some small island 

groups, disputes between particular parties (China-Taiwan and North-South Korea), or illegal 

activities like smuggling, piracy, or terrorism. This paper provides an overview on these threats, 

issue by issue, to identify common elements and needed cooperation. Cooperation on other 

topics such as search and rescue, fisheries protection, and oil spill response may help support 

improved relations to prevent maritime conflicts. Many technologies can help support maritime 

cooperation, including improved communications links, tracking and emergency beacon devices, 

and satellite imaging. Appropriate technical and political means are suggested for each threat to 

the SLOCs. 

5 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Acronyms 

AOE area of responsibility 

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

CBM confidence building measure 

CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Company 

CPC Chinese Petroleum Company 

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

EPIRB Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon 

GPS Global Positioning Satellite 

IMB International Maritime Bureau 

IMO International Maritime Organization 

INCSEA Incident at Sea Agreement 

NIE Newly Industrialized Economy 

nm nautical miles 

NOWPAP Northwest Pacific Action Plan 

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 

PRC People’s Republic of China 

ROK Republic of Korea 

SLOC sea line of communication 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

UNEP United Nations Environmental Program

VTS Vessel Traffic Services 

6
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 11 

2. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DISRUPTION OF SLOCS......................................................... 12 

2.1. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES ..............................................................................................12 

2.1.1. Northern Territories (Kuril Islands)................................................................12

2.1.2. Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands ..............................................................................13

2.1.3. South China Sea...............................................................................................15

2.2. TAIWAN STRAIT ..........................................................................................................16 

2.3. NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA ............................................................................17 

2.4. PIRACY AND TERRORISM.............................................................................................18 

3. BIPOLAR DISPUTES AND MARITIME STABILITY............................................................ 19 

3.1. CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT...............................................19 

3.1.1. Anti-smuggling.................................................................................................20

3.1.2. Oil Spill Control...............................................................................................20

3.1.3. Fisheries...........................................................................................................20

3.1.4. Maritime Resources Exploration and Exploitation .........................................20

3.1.5. Illegal Immigration ..........................................................................................21

3.1.6. Direct Trade.....................................................................................................21

3.1.7. Search and Rescue ...........................................................................................21

3.2. MARITIME ASPECTS OF NORTH-SOUTH KOREA DISPUTES ..........................................22 

3.2.1. Fisheries...........................................................................................................22

3.2.2. Shipping Routes ...............................................................................................22

3.2.3. Environmental Protection................................................................................22

4. TECHNICAL MEANS TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION OF MARITIME ISSUES................ 23 

4.1. SOUTH CHINA SEA ......................................................................................................23 

4.2. PROTECTION OF SLOCS ..............................................................................................23 

4.3. TAIWAN STRAIT ..........................................................................................................24 

4.4. NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA ............................................................................25 

5. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 27 

APPENDIX—PRINCIPAL TERRITORIAL DISPUTES OF EAST ASIA........................................ 29 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR .......................................................................................................................... 35 

Figures 

Figure 1. Areas affected by principal territorial disputes of East Asia.......................................14 

7 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

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8
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Cooperative Measures to Mitigate 

Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Executive Summary

An export-oriented economy is a common feature of Asia-Pacific nations. These nations 

export their products and merchandise around the world by sea and they also import raw 

material, energy (crude oil and natural gas), food, and other strategic materials by sea. Therefore, 

sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are a critical factor for the survival and prosperity of AsiaPacific nations. Cooperative measures by the regional parties may reduce the potential for 

maritime conflicts that might disrupt shipping. Maritime conflicts could arise from coastal 

states’ attempts to control freedom of passage, domestic instability in coastal states, and contention among neighboring countries regarding overlapping maritime claims. Protecting the 

security of the SLOCs becomes a high security concern shared by many countries of the Asia 

Pacific. 

Understanding the nature of potential maritime conflicts may help protect the SLOCs 

from disruption. Maritime territorial disputes over the Northern Territories (between Japan and 

Russia), the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands (China, Japan, and Taiwan) and the South China Sea 

(China, Taiwan, and some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)), 

reflect issues of overlapping resource claims and unresolved colonial history. These disputed 

areas sit astride major trade routes. The South China Sea is especially important because most of 

the oil imported to Japan and South Korea passes through these waters. Confrontation between 

China and the ASEAN claimants could escalate to involve warships of the United States or 

Japan that would seek to secure safe passage for the tanker traffic. The other island disputes 

could irritate regional relationships, but are shown to be less threatening, simply because less is 

at stake. 

Reunification is the core issue in relations between China and Taiwan and between North 

and South Korea. Because fundamental interests of the parties are at stake, tensions may be 

high. The Taiwan Strait or sea lines around the Korean peninsula could be disrupted by an 

outbreak of fighting over these core issues. Moreover, relatively minor maritime issues can be 

exacerbated by reunification tensions. In the Taiwan Strait, the maritime factors are smuggling, 

fisheries intrusions, oil spills, and illegal immigration. Between North and South Korea, 

maritime tensions exist over fisheries, shipping routes, and infiltration. 

The final threats are beyond state control: piracy and terrorism. Piracy is particularly a 

problem in Southeast Asia because of corruption and domestic instability of certain coastal 

states. Terrorism, which may be indistinguishable from piracy, also grows in the absence of 

stable and effective governments. 

Many forms of maritime cooperation could reduce tensions or the possibility of armed 

conflict. Some forms of cooperation could be useful in all of the areas: Search and rescue 

cooperation has a strong humanitarian aspect and can help improve maritime relations. Oil spill 

9 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

response also has promise, because no coastal country has adequate capability to deal with an 

accident involving a large tanker. 

Other options are particularly suited to one area or another. Anti-smuggling cooperation 

could be most important for the Taiwan Strait, where confrontations have been triggered by such 

operations. Likewise, protection of fisheries is most important to the Koreas where shooting 

incidents have occurred between patrol boats escorting fishing vessels in disputed waters. 

Finally, anti-piracy coordination might be best for the South China Sea, where many incidents 

have occurred off the coast of Indonesia. 

Other forms of potential cooperation include oceanic research, fisheries protection 

studies, and vessel traffic management in constricted waterways. 

This paper points out several technologies that could support maritime cooperation. The 

technologies are mostly commercially available, but not commonly utilized in certain regions. 

Several types of cooperation would benefit from high-bandwidth communications between the 

respective authorities. This is particularly the case in anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and search and 

rescue. Other measures such as vessel traffic control, fisheries protection, and search and rescue 

require wider use of tracking systems and automatic vessel identification devices. As a special 

case, tensions in the South China Sea might be reduced if all parties had better information about 

activities on disputed reefs and islets. Therefore, commercially available satellite imaging could 

be useful, especially if analyzed in a cooperative effort. 

10
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Cooperative Measures to Mitigate 

Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

1. Introduction 

The Asia-Pacific is a maritime community with numerous islands and islets in the farflung waters of the region. The sovereignty of many islands is unresolved. During the Cold War 

era, Asia-Pacific nations tended to avoid conflicts regarding the islands and offshore resources in 

order to focus on their mutual opposition to the Soviet Union. That is, in the event of maritime 

conflicts, the scope and degree was limited by the self-restraint and bipolarity of the East-West 

international system. In the post-Cold War era, various national interests gained importance. 

Expanded national self-consciousness provoked more maritime conflicts in the Asia-Pacific 

region. In addition, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which 

entered into force in 1994, empowered countries to claim Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). 

Unfortunately, the claimed EEZs in East Asia overlap in many cases, merely intensifying 

regional maritime conflict.1

 Moreover, the concept of the sea as national territory is a factor that 

drives Asia-Pacific nations to invest resources in naval force buildups in order to defend 

expanded national sovereignty and maritime interests.2

An export-oriented economy is another common feature of Asia-Pacific nations. These 

nations export their products and merchandise all around the world by sea and they also import 

raw material, energy (crude oil and natural gas), food, and other strategic materials by sea. 

Therefore, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are a critical factor for the survival and prosperity of Asia-Pacific nations. The protection of SLOCs is a common value of Asia-Pacific nations. 

The security of SLOCs in the Asia-Pacific region faces many threats and challenges. Professor 

Michael Leifer summarizes the potential threats to shipping through international straits as 

(1) coastal states’ attempts to control freedom of passage for national security; (2) domestic 

instability in coastal states; and (3) contention among neighboring countries regarding 

overlapping maritime claims.

3

 In fact, the same problems have appeared elsewhere in the AsiaPacific region. Therefore, strengthening and protecting the security of the SLOCs becomes a 

high security concern. 

Promotion of naval transparency and monitoring of maritime activities can help resolve 

maritime conflicts and protect freedom of navigation among the Asia-Pacific nations. Coopera-

 1 According to the UNCLOS, an EEZ may be established around islands only if these are capable of supporting 

human habitation. It can be argued that cays and sandbanks, some of which disappear at high tide and have no 

fresh water, cannot support a human community, but disputants would claim there is no bar to external support

for nationals placed on what they claim to be sovereign territory. This paragraph quoted in Brian Cloughley, “No 

Need for War in South China Sea,” International Defense Review, June 1995, p. 25. 

2 Michael W. Everett and Mary A. Sommerville, eds., Multilateral Activities in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 21; Sam Bateman, “Economic Growth, Marine Resources and 

Naval Arms in East Asia: A Deadly Triangle?,” Marine Policy, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 297. 

3 Michael Leifer, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January/February

1983), p. 16. 

11 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

tive monitoring, the obtaining and sharing of agreed information among parties,4 may help 

achieve these two objectives. Cooperative monitoring emphasizes the use of sharable technologies to obtain data, equal access among all participating parties to the resulting data, and the provision for procedures for dealing with anomalies that may occur. Cooperative monitoring can 

strengthen transparency among parties, support confidence building measures (CBMs), and help 

maintain regional security. 

This paper discusses the background of maritime conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region and 

the factors that influence SLOC security in order to find effective responses to resolve potential 

conflicts. The paper explores the threat posed by bipolar conflicts, specifically in the Taiwan 

Strait and between North and South Korea. Finally, the author applies the concept of 

cooperative monitoring to suggest measures to resolve maritime conflicts and protect the security 

of SLOCs. This paper promotes the concept of achieving regional stability through technical 

collaboration. 

2. Potential Sources of Disruption of SLOCs 

Nations have dissimilar security considerations, driven by differing circumstances and 

internal needs. For instance, Japan emphasizes energy, food, navigation, and shockproof safety, 

while nations that belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emphasize 

internal stability, national development, and social harmony as the core elements of national 

security. However, the economies of all Asia-Pacific countries place heavy dependence on seaborne exports and imports. Thus, the protection of merchant shipping is a task that no country in 

the region can ignore.5

 Currently, maritime territorial disputes (the Northern Territories dispute 

between Japan and Russia; the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute among China, Japan, and Taiwan; and 

the South China Sea dispute among China, Taiwan, and some ASEAN nations), bipolar disputes

(China-Taiwan and North-South Korea), and piracy and terrorism (particularly in Southeast 

Asia) threaten the safety of SLOCs. In the following, the author discusses the influence of these 

factors upon the safety of SLOCs. After first exploring the potential roots of disruption of 

SLOCs, the paper then identifies some effective measures for their protection. 

2.1. Territorial Disputes 

The following is a brief summary of the principal territorial disputes of East Asia. A 

more detailed discussion is available in the Appendix.

2.1.1. Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) 

Japan has identified the Northern Territories as Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and 

Habomai Islands, reaching northward to Kamchatka from the eastern end of Hokkaido (see 

 4 The author defines cooperative monitoring as the obtaining and sharing of agreed information among parties. 

For further information regarding cooperative monitoring, see Arian Pregenzer, “The Cooperative Monitoring 

Center: Achieving Cooperative Security Objectives Through Technical Collaborations,” quoted in J. Marshall

Beier and Steven Mataija, Verification, Compliance and Confidence Building: The Global and Regional 

Interface (Proceeding of the Thirteenth Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium) (Toronto, Canada: 

Center for International and Security Studies, 1996), p. 89. 

5

 http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp3306.html. 

12
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Figure 1).6 In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and then occupied the 

four islands. Since the end of World War II, the Kuril Islands dispute has been a stumbling 

block to Japan-Russia relations.7

 Before the Soviet Union collapsed, Mikhail S. Gorbachev 

offered to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, because these two islands were of lesser 

military value to the Soviet Union. Japan insisted that all four islands of the Northern Territories 

must return to Japanese sovereignty and refused the offer.8

 

In October 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Japan and he and then-Prime

Minister Morihiro Hosokawa signed the Tokyo Declaration. They agreed that the guidelines for 

negotiations toward resolution would be (1) based on historical and legal facts, (2) based on 

documents compiled with the agreement of the two countries, and (3) based on the principles of 

law and justice.9

 Currently, both sides are adhering to different strategies: Japan has asked 

Russia to recognize the Northern Territories as belonging to Japan and requires that Russia 

return the islands to Japan as soon as possible. On the other hand, Russia is focused on joint 

exploitation of the islands and links this issue to Siberian economic assistance by Japan. 

For the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States, the waters surrounding the Northern 

Territories are important strategic areas. Petropavlovsk is the most important naval base in the 

Soviet Pacific region. Located in the south of the Kamchatka Peninsula, its supply heavily 

depends upon Vladivostok. This supply line passes through Habomai Strait, northwest of 

Habomai Island. In addition, the Northern Territories are part of the definition of the Sea of 

Okhotsk apart from the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, the Northern Territories present Japan and 

Russia with a maritime sovereignty issue, but also involve important political, military, and 

economic issues. The sovereignty of the Northern Territories will probably not be successfully 

resolved in the short term.

2.1.2. Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are comprised of five islands and three rocks located 

about 120 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Taiwan, 200 nm east of mainland China, and 190 nm

southwest of Okinawa.10 The barren, uninhabited islands cover only about 6.3 square kilometers 

(see Figure 1). China, Taiwan, and Japan have adopted different approaches to dealing with the 

Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands issue. For example, Japan’s claim over the islands is based on the 

discovery that the islands were terra nullius (unclaimed). Taiwan declared that the Chinese 

discovered the “Diaoyutai Islands,” but Taiwan did not follow international common practice 

and declare sovereignty over the islands by national pronouncement or official activities. 

 6 Captain James F. Giblin, Jr., “National Strategies and Japan’s Northern Territories,” Naval War College Review, 

Winter 1987, p. 53. 

7

 “Islands May Bridge Russia-Japan Gap,” http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/03200. 8

 “Strategic Considerations: Northern Territories Disputes Continued,” United Daily, November 16, 1996, p. 10. 

9

 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html. 10 The five islands are Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima or Kobi Sho, Chiwei Yu/Taisho-jima or Akao-sho, Diaoyutai

Dao/Uotshuri-shima, Beixiao Dao/Kita Kojima, and Nanxiao Dao/Minami Kojima or Minami-ko-shima. The 

three rocks are Dabeixiao Dao/Okino Kitaiwa, Dananxiao Dao/Okino Minamiiwa, and Feilai Dao/Tobise. See 

Rear Admiral William L. Schachte, Jr., “The United States’ Role in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 

quoted in International Law Conference on the Dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands between Taiwan and 

Japan (I-Lan: I-Lan County Government, 1997), p. 2. 

13 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Figure 1. Areas Affected by Principal Territorial Disputes of East Asia 

14
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

In addition to Japan and Taiwan, China is also involved. Notably, China has not issued 

strong statements, using a restrained diplomatic approach to declaring sovereignty. Based on 

China’s continued desire for Japanese economic assistance and investment, China has adopted a 

low-key approach toward the Diaoyutai Islands issue.11 Nevertheless, with the expansion of 

Chinese naval capabilities and the belief in the concept of the sea as national territory, China has 

attached increased significance to the islands. For example, Chinese intelligence ships have 

appeared in the nearby waters. Under these circumstances, China and Japan may clash over the 

sovereignty issue. 

2.1.3. South China Sea 

The South China Sea includes four disputed archipelagos: Paracel Islands, Pratas 

Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratly Islands (see Figure 1). Of these, ownership of the 

Spratly Islands is the most contested. A 1995 study by Russia’s Research Institute of Geology of 

Foreign Countries estimated that the equivalent of 6 billion barrels of oil might be located in the 

Spratly Islands area, of which 70 percent would be natural gas. Moreover, some Chinese 

specialists have asserted that the South China Sea could contain as much as 130 billion barrels of 

oil and natural gas.12 It is perhaps inevitable that neighboring nations of the South China Sea 

would contest the rights to these enormous resources. Currently, the disputed areas are claimed 

all or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. 

Conflicts have occurred between China and Vietnam, China and the Philippines, the Philippines 

and Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, and the Philippines and China.13

The South China Sea and neighboring waters form the most important seaway in the 

world. Japan, Australia, and the nations of Southeast Asia send over 40 percent of their trade by 

sea through these waters, and the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, 

Taiwan, and South Korea send more than one-quarter of their imports and exports through these 

SLOCs. In consequence, the economic vitality of these nations – and their trading counterparts – 

clearly depends on these sea lines in the South China Sea.14 Therefore, the interruption of 

SLOCs in this region could have a major influence upon regional security and the global 

economy. 

 11 Chen Yeong-kang and Chai Wen-chung, “Modernization of the PLAN: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security,” 

p. 11. 

12 See United States Institute of Peace Special Report, “The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive 

Diplomacy,” http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/snyder/South_China_Sea1.html. 13 For a detailed description of related conflicts, see Lu Ru-chun et al., Hai Jun Shi (The History of People’s 

Liberation Army Navy) (Beijing: PLA Press, 1989), p. 335;

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schinatab.htm1#TAB2; Trevor Hollingsbee, “China Moves In On Mischief 

Reef,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1999, p. 5; Barbara Opall, “ASEAN Counters China Territorial

Claims,” Defense News, July 29 – August 4, 1996, pp. 4, 56; “Philippines Protests Attack By Vietnamese in 

Spratlys,” Taiwan News, October 29, 1995, p. 5; “China Fishing Boat Collided with the Philippine Naval Ship 

on the Huangyan Dao in the South China Sea,” United Daily, May 25, 1999, p. 13; “Philippine and Malaysia 

Fighting Aircraft Confrontation in the South China Sea Air,” United Daily, November 3, 1999, p. 11; Run Bei,

“What Does the Huangyan Dao Incident Represent?,” Jian Chuan Zhi Shi (Warships and Merchant Ships) 

(Beijing), No. 214 (July 1997), p. 10. 

14 John H. Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, 

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 4; “SLOCs in the Southeast Asia Are the Strategic and 

Economic Life Line,” United Daily, March 20, 1997, p. 10. 

15 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Sovereignty issues have led to armed clashes in the South China Sea area. In January 

1974, China used military force against Vietnamese troops to enforce its claim to the Paracels. 

China clashed with Vietnam again at Johnson Reef in March 1988. In addition, naval confrontations have often occurred. In February 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef (claimed by the 

Philippines) and naval vessels of both sides moved into confrontation.15 In April 1997, China 

and the Philippines confronted each other for sovereignty of the Huangyan Dao.16 In May 1999, 

China used naval forces to engage in provocative action versus the Philippines, triggering 

continued tension between the two nations.17 If China used military force again to assert sovereignty and to advance its maritime interests, conflict would appear likely. In these circumstances, shipping in the region would assume high risks. Detouring to avoid the South China Sea 

would expend more fuel and time, increasing transportation costs. 

2.2. Taiwan Strait

As with the South China Sea, tension in the Taiwan Strait may seriously impact the 

SLOCs. Because Taiwan is located at the juncture of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, most 

of Japan’s imported energy arrives by sea lines adjacent to Taiwan (see Figure 1).18 For

instance, Japan imports 700 million tons of raw materials and exports 70 million tons of 

manufactured products per year by sea.19 Forty percent of the imported material passes through 

the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and past Taiwan to Japan.20 In particular, 80 percent of 

Japan’s imported crude oil passes through the same SLOCs northwards. In the event of conflict 

in the Taiwan Strait, Japanese economic survival and prosperity would be threatened.21

Taiwan poses a strategic consideration for Japan. In September 1997, the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation adopted a loose geographical definition that includes 

Taiwan in the scope of “the areas surrounding Japan.” Later, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary 

publicly stated that the guidelines were relevant for the Taiwan Strait area.22 The same view had 

been prefigured by other Japanese officials who declared that maintaining peace and stability in 

the Taiwan Strait is in Japan’s vital interest.23 Some analysts claim that from the Japanese 

perspective, the revised guidelines were aimed primarily at Taiwan.24 In fact, in the early 1970s, 

 15 James L. George, “China: Paper or Potential Tiger?,” Naval Forces, February 1996, pp. 94-95. 

16 Run Bei, “What Does the Huangyan Dao Incident Represent?,” p. 10; Bei Fang, “The Truth of China and the 

Philippines Resolving the South China Sea Disputes,” Guangjiaojing Monthly, December 1998, pp. 17-18. 

17 Ian James Storey, “Manila Looks to USA for Help over Spratlys,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, 

p. 50. 

18 http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art4-aul.htm

19 Huang Chao-moa translation, Japan Will be a Military Superpower (Taipei: The Bureau of History and Translation of Ministry of National Defense, 1995), p. 215. 

20 John H. Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, pp. 24-25. 

21 Rodney Tasker, “Ways and Means,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 1995, p. 28. 

22 Rex Li, “Partners or Rivals? Chinese Perceptions of Japan’s Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1999, p. 11. 

23 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 9, 1997, p. 24. 

24 Chris Rahman, “Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters,” Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4 (Autumn 

2001), available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art4-aul.htm.

16
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Japan’s famous defense analyst, Hideo Sekino, advocated that Japan should have capabilities for 

maintaining the safety of SLOCs between the homeland and Indonesia.25

If conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, Japan would be seriously impacted. South Korea 

could be drawn in also. Notably, Taiwan is located in a central position along the mainland 

China coastline, and three of four important Chinese trade SLOCs go through the Taiwan Strait. 

Thus, unblocked access to the Taiwan Strait is important for the national economy and 

international trade of mainland China.26 Therefore, all states that rely upon sea lines have strong 

interests in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, if armed conflict occurs in 

the Taiwan Strait, disruption of the SLOCs would affect the economies of all states in the region 

and many outside the region.27

2.3. North Korea and South Korea 

The Korean Peninsula is another potential flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. For a 

long time, the isolation and alienation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

has been extreme. If the unresolved Korean conflict developed into war, it would endanger the 

SLOCs neighboring the Korean Peninsula. Even though the importance of the SLOCs in this 

region are less than those of the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, impeded or disrupted 

SLOCs would seriously impact South Korea, Japan, China, and even the Russian Federation.

These SLOCs are used to deliver crude oil to Japan’s west coast, South Korea, and China’s 

northern areas. Also, the most important seaways between China and Japan are located in this 

region. 

Pronounced symptoms of the potential for conflict are the maritime incidents that have 

occurred between the two Koreas, and between the DPRK and Japan. In the past, North Korea 

has exchanged gunfire with South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) over fishing boats and with 

Japan over alleged spy/drug boats. There have also been ROK Coast Guard intercepts of DPRK 

coastal shipping vessels in declared defense zones of the ROK. The two sides lay conflicting 

claims to the surrounding waters and dispute the North-South maritime boundary. Although 

North Korean ships that violate the ROK-claimed border usually retreat when challenged by the 

South,28 jurisdiction disputes and protection of fisheries may trigger intense conflicts between 

the two Koreas. 

In June 1999, a maritime incident involving North and South Korean ships sparked the 

first naval clash between the two Koreas since the Korean War. In this armed conflict, a North 

Korean torpedo boat was sunk and two other North Korean vessels were seriously damaged. 

About 30 North Korean sailors were believed killed.29 On July 29, 2002, two North Korean 

warships attacked one South Korean patrol vessel. The ensuing exchange left four South Korean 

 25 Peter J. Woolley and Mark S. Woolley, “The Kata of Japan’s Naval Forces,” pp. 63-64. 

26 Li Ya-qiang, “The Geographic Values for Maritime Strategic of the Taiwan Islands,” Jian Chuan Zhi Shi, 

January 1996, p. 16. 

27 http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art4-aul.htm. 28 http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/30/skorea.sailor.ap/index.html. 29 http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/korea.battle/index.html. 

17 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

sailors dead, one missing, and at least 19 injured.30 Due to the strong antagonism between the 

two Koreas, continued confrontations in the disputed waters could ignite tensions across the 

Korea Peninsula. If this situation deteriorates and develops into large-scale armed conflict, it 

would endanger the safety of SLOCs in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. 

2.4. Piracy and Terrorism 

Many piracy events have occurred in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly following the 

Asian financial crisis. Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS defines piracy as follows: 

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends

by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 

(1) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board 

such ship or aircraft; 

(2) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 

State; 

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge 

of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” 

Today, acts of maritime piracy range from the classic boarding and hijacking of a merchant vessel on the high seas to the more common act of stealing from the ship while it is 

anchored.31 In addition to the loss of crews and goods, piracy increases the operational and 

insurance costs. Environmental disasters could also be caused by piracy; if pirates attacked a 

fully loaded oil tanker, the result could be an oil spill that damaged marine life and other offshore resources and endangered the safety of maritime navigation.32

According to statistics compiled by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 262 cases 

of piracy occurred in the Asia-Pacific in the year 2000, about 56% of the worldwide total of 469. 

In 2001, piracy cases in this region numbered 170, about 51% of the worldwide total of 335.33 

However, the problem of piracy in global waters is far more serious than these figures suggest. 

According to the IMB, most shippers do not report pirate attacks against their vessels to avoid 

lengthy investigations, increased insurance premiums, and demands for extra crew pay.34

As indicated by past incidents, piracy has a transnational nature. Pirates take full advantage of the sensitivities over jurisdiction and sovereignty that continue to hamper concerted 

action against this crime.35 Therefore, the absence of law enforcement capabilities and 

resolution of sovereignty in the South China Sea exacerbates the piracy threat in Southeast Asia. 

 30 http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/30/korea.battle/index.html. 31 Dana R. Dillon, “Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1379, June 22, 2000. 

32 See http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/reports/rex92790.htm. 33 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 

Ships,” Annual Report, January 1 – December 31, 2001 (U.K.: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2002), p. 5. 

34 Professor Peter Chalk, “Maritime Piracy: A Global Overview,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2000, see 

http://www4.janes.com/search97cgi/s97_cgi?. 35 “Southeast Asia Remains a Risk,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1999, p. 5.

18
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

It is unrealistic to expect piracy to diminish soon. Due to economic hard times, lack of 

government law enforcement, and corrupt local officials, piracy may continue to spread. 

Terrorism is another serious threat to the safety of the SLOCs. Generally speaking, 

piracy involves crime for private gain, but terrorism is becoming an increasingly likely motive. 

To the victims, the results are indistinguishable. Incidents range from the capture of the cruise 

ship Achille Lauro by terrorists in 1985 to an attack by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on a 

Filipino passenger ferry in 1997.36 Naval vessels may also be targets: the USS Cole was 

attacked by terrorists on October 12, 2000.37 As another variation, if a tanker were hijacked by 

terrorists, it could be used as a weapon to burn and sink in a harbor or in an SLOC, a terrible 

event for the safety of SLOCs and for maritime ecology. 

For all of these reasons, protection of SLOCs in Southeast Asia must include strengthening the domestic stability of the ASEAN nations and resolving the South China Sea disputes. 

Cooperation on anti-piracy, anti-terrorism, and protection of SLOCs should integrate the efforts 

of governments, ship owners, and regional organizations to adopt appropriate measures to 

achieve these objectives. 

3. Bipolar Disputes and Maritime Stability

In this section, we will discuss the bipolar issues of China-Taiwan and North-South 

Korea that may not directly affect the rest of the region. These problems receive less attention 

because international relations studies tend to focus on the strategic issues, rather than local 

problems. However, maritime issues have many interrelationships. A bipolar issue could trigger 

either a dangerous incident that could have disastrous consequences or could provide an 

opportunity to cooperate on common interests. If both sides can cooperate to resolve an issue, 

the process may improve relations and remove a potential flashpoint. 

The following analysis suggests several opportunities for maritime cooperation between 

China and Taiwan. Currently, China and Taiwan have good relations in search and rescue and 

maritime resources exploration and exploitation. In addition to humanitarian reasons, other 

linkages could provide benefits, such as economic and environmental interests. For instance, oil 

spill control could provide for the collection of oceanographic data that could strengthen 

maritime scientific cooperation. Cooperating in nonmilitary areas could provide the groundwork 

for future opportunities to reduce military tension and promote stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

3.1. China-Taiwan Relations and the Taiwan Strait 

China and Taiwan are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Despite political antagonism, 

close civilian interactions, including cultural, social, and economic exchanges, still exist between 

China and Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait can either be the venue of a military confrontation that 

could develop into war or could provide opportunities for consultation to strengthen mutual trust 

and confidence. China and Taiwan are virtually island nations on trade issues. Therefore, both 

 36 David N. Griffiths, “Worldwide Piracy: Compiling the Facts,” Maritime Affairs, Fall 1998, p. 16. 

37 http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=138. 

19 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

sides can discuss many maritime issues on the basis of common interests, including antismuggling, oil spill control, fisheries, maritime resources exploration and exploitation, illegal 

immigration, direct trade, and search and rescue. 

3.1.1. Anti-smuggling 

China and Taiwan have recognized the common threat posed by smuggling activities. 

The most common commodities smuggled from China to Taiwan are firearms, heroin, and illegal 

immigrants. For instance, in 1998 in Taiwan, seizures of smuggled heroin and amphetamines 

were about 70 kilograms and 600 kilograms, respectively, accounting for more than 50 percent 

and nearly 70 percent of the total seizures of that year.38 Thus, for Taiwan, smuggling is a 

serious social and internal safety problem. Conversely, smuggling has seriously reduced tax 

revenues for China. According to statistics from China, Fujian Province (which lies across the 

Strait from Taiwan) authorities cracked 99 smuggling cases worth US$6.7 million in 1997. The 

corresponding lost customs duties cost China over US$2 million. Therefore, China and Taiwan 

would both benefit from anti-smuggling cooperation. 

3.1.2. Oil Spill Control 

The distance between China and Taiwan is only around 100 nm. If an oil spill occurred 

in the waters surrounding Taiwan, it might spread to China’s Fujian and Zhejiang coastlines. 

Conversely, if an oil spill appeared on the southeast coastal region of China, it could damage the 

Taiwanese offshore fishing grounds. Therefore, both sides might choose to cooperate to prevent 

and control oil spills. The Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) of the United Nations 

Environmental Program (UNEP) has been developing a cooperative framework for a regional oil 

spill response involving China, Russia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. This may provide a 

useful precedent for China and Taiwan. 

3.1.3. Fisheries 

Chinese fishing boats often attempt to trespass into Taiwanese fishing waters. There 

have been many disputes with Taiwanese fishing boats due to entangled nets, harassment, 

robbery, and collisions associated with trespassing ships. Moreover, some trespassing ships 

have engaged in the illegal use of electricity, poison, and dynamite for fishing. These 

trespassing boats have not only affected the Taiwanese fishermen’s livelihood, but they have 

also depleted Taiwan’s and China’s fishing resources.39 Cooperating to combat illegal fishing 

activities could protect the safety of fishermen and preserve shared resources. 

3.1.4. Maritime Resources Exploration and Exploitation 

Since China and Taiwan lack plentiful land resources, exploration and exploitation of 

maritime resources are important paths for future prosperity. Therefore, both sides may wish to 

cooperate to explore and exploit maritime resources to further their respective economic interests. Through a multiyear effort, the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) of China 

and the Chinese Petroleum Company (CPC) of Taiwan have entered into a petroleum contract 

covering areas of the Taiwan Basin and Chaoshan Trough. CNOOC and CPC complement each 

 38 http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/MacPolicy/880322.html. 39 Ibid.

20
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

other in this cooperation with their respective technology, management skills, and capital. Both 

parties expect to achieve mutual benefits.40 This pioneering example may provide a useful 

template for maritime resource cooperation. 

3.1.5. Illegal Immigration 

Due to asymmetry of economic development across the Taiwan Strait, many mainland 

Chinese use illegal means to enter Taiwan. In addition to economic reasons, some people enter 

Taiwan for intelligence gathering or illegal merchant activities. For Taiwan, stowaways from

the Mainland have caused a serious internal problem and may also affect the security of Taiwan. 

According to statistics from the Bureau of Immigration of the Ministry of Interior, 42,342 

stowaways were arrested from 1987 to May 2002.41 On the Mainland, China has arrested or 

detained many would-be illegal immigrants; for example, Fujian public security frontier guards 

detained 25 groups of illegal immigrants involving 3,265 persons in 1997. More effective 

coordination between Chinese and Taiwanese law enforcement organizations on this issue is 

another potential area of cooperation. 

3.1.6. Direct Trade 

For a long time, due to cross-Strait antagonism, both sides have had no direct postal, 

transportation, or commercial links. Current trade must route through transshipment ports, such 

as Hong Kong, increasing costs and decreasing economic incentives for cross-Strait industrial 

cooperation. As economic interactions have increased, China and Taiwan have recognized the 

important benefits of direct trade, by which both sides could sharply reduce transportation costs 

and personnel expenses. On January 1, 2001, Taiwan and China began the “Mini-Three Links” 

between Kinmen and Matsu of Taiwan and Xiamen and Fuzhou of China. As of June 30, 2002, 

388 ships and 22,427 persons used the Mini-Three Links. The long-awaited expansion to 

include direct shipments between Kaohsiung in Taiwan and Fuzhou in China had barely begun 

as of this writing and had not yet become a regular route for traffic. 

3.1.7. Search and Rescue 

The Taiwan Strait is an important seaway between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Many 

maritime calamities have occurred in the Taiwan Strait during periods of bad weather. Thus, 

search and rescue is a potential area for maritime cooperation. In November 1997, the Taipeibased China Rescue Association and its mainland counterpart, the China Marine Rescue Center 

(Beijing) reached an agreement to set up a hot line to facilitate marine rescue work in the Taiwan 

Strait. Under the agreement, when accidents involving the ships of either Taiwan or China occur 

in the Taiwan Strait, the ships in distress and the rescuing ships may use the hot line to ask for 

help and request permission to enter the waters and harbors of the other side.42 Recently, China 

sent two salvage ships to help with rescue work for the China Airlines crash on May 25, 2002.43 

 40 http://english.pravda.ru/comp/2002/05/17/28896.html. 41 http://www.mac.gov.tw/statistic/ass_lp/appm2t2.htm. 42 “Hotline to Facilitate Rescue Work in Taiwan Strait,” Central New Agency (FBIS-CHI-97-329), November 25, 

1997, quoted in Kenneth W. Allen, “Confidence-Building Measures and the People’s Liberation Army,” The 

International Conference of the PRC Reforms at Twenty: Retrospect and Prospects (Taipei: National Chengchi

University, 1999), p. 14. 43 http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2002-05-27/71190.html

21 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

Taiwanese rescue helicopters also saved 133 Chinese fishermen from a burning boat off the 

southern port city of Kaohsiung on July 9, 2002.44 Search and rescue has already proved to be a 

fruitful area in China/Taiwan maritime cooperation. 

3.2. Maritime Aspects of North-South Korea Disputes 

Unlike China and Taiwan, no maritime cooperation exists between North Korea and 

South Korea. Moreover, there have been serious armed conflicts in the disputed waters. These 

developments not only damage North-South relations, but also endanger the safety of SLOCs in 

Northeast Asia. If the North and South engage in maritime cooperation that shows pragmatic 

benefits, provocative fishing and shipping activities may gradually decrease. Despite the tense 

situation, both sides still have an opportunity to engage in maritime cooperation in some fields, 

including fisheries, shipping routes, and environmental protection. 

3.2.1. Fisheries 

In the past several years, North Korea and South Korea have had many fishery disputes 

as noted above; armed patrols often escort fishing boats. If both sides fail to control fishing boat 

movements, an unintended naval confrontation could develop into widespread armed conflict. 

For example, the Falkland Islands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina originally 

derived from a fisheries dispute. In order to prevent fishing disputes from developing into armed 

conflicts, North and South Korea could cooperate to negotiate fishing rights, catch amounts, and 

fishing grounds. North Korea has reached such an agreement with Japan already. 

3.2.2. Shipping Routes 

The DPRK has declared a 200-nm EEZ and, within this EEZ, a 50-nm area designated as 

a “military zone.” The DPRK restricts navigation within this military zone by prohibiting both 

overflight and navigation by foreign merchant ships and military vessels unless previous 

authorization has been granted. Similarly, South Korea also has established a “security zone” 

within the Sea of Japan (East Sea) adjacent to the border with North Korea, extending 150 nm

from east to west and up to 75 nm from north to south. Shipping operations are prohibited 

within the zone.45 The two Koreas could discuss allowing innocent passage in conformance with 

the UNCLOS to avoid future incidents. 

3.2.3. Environmental Protection 

Initial maritime cooperation for the two Koreas might focus on responses to spills of oil 

or hazardous chemicals. Because maritime environmental protection would be a technical collaboration, not involving sovereignty and jurisdiction, it may have a high probability of 

acceptance. As a first, unilateral step, South Korea might provide a modest amount of cleanup 

capability for hazardous waste and oil in a harbor, such as Nampo, or at the mouths of the Yalu 

or Tumen Rivers. Thereafter, the two Koreas could expand maritime cooperation based on 

environmental protection. 

 44 http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmp1=story&u=/020709/168/1tkd0.html

45 Mark J. Valencia, “Northeast Asia: Transnational Navigational Issues and Possible Cooperative Responses,” in

Michael Stankiewicz, Maritime Shipping in Northeast Asia: Law of the Sea, Sea Lanes, and Security (California:

IGCC of University of California, 1998), p. 26. 

22
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

In the long term, the two Koreas could cooperate to resolve potential maritime conflicts, 

including innocent passage, fishing rights, and disputed waters issues. Due to high political 

antagonism between North Korea and South Korea, more immediate cooperation might be based 

on maritime environmental protection, including oil spill control or chemical cleanup in harbors. 

Afterwards, both sides could discuss search and rescue, fishery agreements, and shipping routes. 

Finally, when both sides establish mutual trust and confidence, they could discuss sovereignty of 

disputed waters and negotiate an Incident at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) or naval code of conduct. 

4. Technical Means to Support Resolution of Maritime Issues 

This section discusses the use of technical means to support CBMs that can help defuse 

territorial disputes or help increase safety of the SLOCs. In the context of the bipolar disputes, 

technology can also support CBMs that could improve relations and help manage conflict either 

in the Taiwan Strait or between the two Koreas. Technical cooperation is a less politically 

charged approach that may not arouse strong opposition among participants. Moreover, it is a 

concrete and flexible approach to resolving maritime issues in the Asia-Pacific region. 

4.1. South China Sea 

Currently, territorial claimants have occupied islands and constructed landing strips, 

buildings, and facilities. This strategy is viewed as a method to establish a de facto presence, 

which they hope may become de jure ownership over time.46 To the extent that claimants agree 

to cease construction of new structures, a transparency regime may mitigate tension. 

The emerging generation of commercial observation satellites offer imagery with many 

of the qualities necessary for supporting regional transparency CBMs. Higher resolution and 

more timely acquisition of imagery could support detailed analysis of structures and occupation 

of claimants. The new commercial satellites have higher resolution, greater timeliness, and a 

broad range of spectral capabilities that could help build confidence by enhancing transparency 

in the South China Sea through unobtrusive means.47 Ideally, images might be shared and 

analyzed by regional experts working together with shared technical tools (i.e., software) and 

skills (i.e., training workshops). With the assistance of commercial observation satellite images, 

claimants could verify cessation of new occupation and thereby mitigate tension and strengthen 

regional stability. 

4.2. Protection of SLOCs 

Protection of SLOCs is a serious challenge for the Asia-Pacific countries. This issue 

involves many more factors than resolving maritime territory disputes. As previously noted, 

domestic instability, piracy incidents, and regional conflicts are influential factors that could 

 46 Scott Snyder, The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy. A Special Report of the United 

States Institute for Peace (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1996), p. 8, quoted in Vipin Gupta and Adam Bernstein, 

Keeping an Eye on the Islands: Remote Monitoring in the South China Sea, unpublished, p. 2. 

47 John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek, “Sat-images Could be Spratlys’ Salvation,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 

February 1999, pp. 51-52, 54. 

23 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

affect the safety of SLOCs in this region. Because these factors are interrelated, we cannot 

resolve the SLOC issue by any single method or simple approach. 

Tracking a vessel’s position or status is an anti-piracy/anti-terrorism method on the high 

seas. The SHIPLoc device uses satellite communications to send periodic location and 

identification to a central monitoring system. Through this system, the vessel owner can access 

the data via a password-controlled Internet page. If the owner detects diversion of the vessel, he 

may contact the IMB’s piracy center in Kuala Lumpur to activate regional police forces. Similar 

commercial tracking systems exist worldwide to fight piracy, hijacking, terrorism, and fraudulent 

operations. 

Regional countries can use other modern technologies to strengthen the safety of the 

SLOCs. For instance, the Internet and other forms of telecommunication can support the 

collection, analysis, and sharing of information among nations for intelligence and cooperative 

monitoring purposes. Direct communication and coordination between shipowners, states, and 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) bodies are concrete measures for protection of 

SLOCs. Establishing nongovernmental Technical Working Groups (which could include 

shipowners from Taiwan) to study SLOC security could be critical for the Asia-Pacific. 

4.3. Taiwan Strait 

Taiwan and China share the Taiwan Strait for shipping, fishing, and undersea resources 

and the two sides are committed to cooperation in trade. Reflecting their common interests and 

problems, both sides could expand the scope of maritime cooperation. 

Technical means are available to enhance maritime cooperation across the Taiwan Strait, 

including: 

• Anti-smuggling and prevention of illegal immigration: Law enforcement personnel on 

both sides need to verify bills of lading of each other’s vessels. Electronic customs forms, 

transmitted over the Internet, could expedite the processing of relevant information and 

thwart the use of altered and fraudulent documentation. Along with the credentials of the 

shipmaster, this information might help enforcement officials spot false declarations. For 

anti-smuggling purposes, both sides can establish a hot line and video conference link 

between their respective enforcement agencies. In addition, establishing coordinated patrols 

and shared training workshops could facilitate anti-smuggling activities on both sides. 

• Oil spills: China may wish to include Taiwan in the NOWPAP “Regional Oil Spill 

Contingency Plan.” During negotiations, China expressed the desire to name “parties” or 

“authorities,” rather than “states.” This may be an attempt to save a place at the table for 

Taiwan, or at least Taiwanese shipowners, and a good opportunity for both sides to engage in 

oil spill control and response through regional cooperation. Hot lines between response 

centers and oceanographic data exchanges are important components to containing and 

cleaning up oil spills in the waters adjacent to China and Taiwan. 

24
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

• Maritime scientific cooperation: Potential topics for cross-Strait maritime scientific cooperation include migratory animal protection, pollution monitoring, resource (particularly oil 

and natural gas) exploration and exploitation, meteorological data sharing, and archaeology 

for sunken ships. Maritime authorities on both sides can select topics for cooperation, then 

devise work to be done at an academic or scientific level. Environmental remote sensing, 

computer simulation and modeling, data collection buoys, and hydrographic studies are all 

potentially suitable for maritime scientific cooperation. 

• Search and rescue: As with oil spill control, search and rescue needs rapid response and 

highly coordinated operation. Therefore, Taiwan and China could establish hotline and 

videoconference capabilities that could facilitate communication in executing search and 

rescue operations. Both sides could assume areas of responsibility (AOEs) in the Strait and 

establish clear procedures for search and rescue. Installation of Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) on all fishing vessels for communication with international 

maritime satellites would be a technical measure to facilitate search and rescue operations in 

the Strait. In this cooperative process, both sides could cooperate in installing EPIRBs and 

conducting exercises as a precursor to eventual military-to-military exchanges. In the long 

term, the use of video conference capabilities could be developed into crisis management and 

crisis prevention capabilities when the political opportunity arises. 

• Vessel traffic management: When Taiwan and China fully develop the Three Links, maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait will increase year by year. In order to improve and 

maximize the safety and efficiency of maritime traffic, they may develop a cooperative 

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) system for the Taiwan Strait. It could be modeled after the 

systems successfully used across the Strait of Gibraltar between Spain and Morocco, and the 

Strait of Juan de Fuca between the United States and Canada.48 A typical VTS system might 

include separating the North-South SLOC traffic lanes and controlling the East-West, crossStrait vessels to avoid collisions. This safety cooperation would require a control and 

communication center on each side of the strait, in nearly constant communication with each 

other. 

4.4. North Korea and South Korea 

The DPRK has little trade beyond some shipping with South Korea and China. 

Therefore, North Korea and South Korea may not be interested in anti-smuggling. Nevertheless, 

the two Koreas had serious gunfire exchanges in 1999 and 2002 near the Northern Limit Line in 

the West Sea (Yellow Sea). Under these circumstances, they have specific reasons to cooperate 

with each other to improve relations. From practical considerations, prevention of incursions on 

fisheries, search and rescue, and maritime environmental protection are potential cooperation 

topics between the two Koreas. 

 48 For detailed information, see Abdellatif Abbassi, “Cooperative VTS in Morocco: Tangier Coastal VTS,” and 

Dan MacDonald, “Development of a Cooperative VTS: The Strait of Juan de Fuca Example,” in Maritime Safety 

Colloquium 2001 Proceedings, Aqaba, Jordan, August 5-9, 2001. 

25 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

• Prevention of incursions on fisheries: Serious maritime confrontations between North 

Korea and South Korea stand out as either acts of intentional policy, or at least poor management of individual fishing vessels. In addition, overlapping EEZs in the Yellow Sea present 

a difficult, long-term problem. Under these circumstances, tracking fishing vessels and 

delimitation of maritime boundaries are core approaches to managing maritime issues 

between the two Koreas. Real-time location and tracking systems, based on Global 

Positioning Satellite (GPS) transponders, can help track and control vessels of both sides to 

prevent fisheries incursions. In the disputed areas, GPS Boundary Mapper equipment on 

vessels and GPS Boundary Marking buoys in the waters could remind fishermen not to enter 

these areas. The South might offer to provide GPS systems to fishing vessels of the North as 

an incentive to accept this cooperation. 

• Search and rescue: Search and rescue operations are another means of developing the 

preliminary trust that might lead to development of an INCSEA for the two Koreas. 

Communication and tracking capabilities are necessary for executing search and rescue 

operations. As a side benefit, a tracking system could also allow the North to control 

operators who provoke incidents by fishing too aggressively or who intrude into disputed 

waters. Hot lines, video conferencing, and tracking systems are all applicable to search and 

rescue operations that could defuse North-South Korea tensions and strengthen mutual trust 

and confidence. 

• Maritime environmental protection: The NOWPAP of the UNEP includes Russia, China, 

Japan, and both Koreas. Two top issues in the action plan adapted in 1994 are pollution 

control and protection of fisheries. The NOWPAP oil spill cooperation provides a channel 

for North Korean participation in regional cooperation. While North Korea is said to have 

little or no capability to deal with oil spills, they are still vulnerable to the effects that a major 

event could have on their fishing areas. The first step toward involvement could be to assist 

North Korea to acquire and install some environment monitoring sensors. A next step might 

be to help with harbor pollution equipment or to include them as observers in a bilateral oil 

spill exercise between neighboring countries. 

In the preceding discussions, some technical means were identified to help resolve 

maritime disputes and facilitate maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Technical 

activities offer many politically acceptable opportunities to engage in cooperation. Except for 

sensitive maritime territorial disputes, other maritime issues can be approached as practical 

measures that can use technical means for resolution. Technologies offer flexible and practical 

options to support and achieve these objectives. 

26
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

5. Conclusion 

The Asia-Pacific region is a maritime community. Avoiding maritime conflicts and 

protecting SLOCs is a common value for every nation in the region. Therefore, strengthening 

maritime cooperation and establishing regional technical cooperation would be beneficial to the 

interests of the Asia-Pacific countries. Although maritime cooperation would not resolve 

maritime territorial disputes, it could be applicable to anti-piracy, anti-smuggling, search and 

rescue, and pollution control issues. Modern technologies, such as commercial satellite imaging 

and tracking, Internet communications, and pollution monitoring systems, can help to strengthen 

maritime cooperation among nations and pave the way for progress on core issues. 

In addition to diplomatic approaches, technical cooperation is a feasible approach to 

reduction of maritime disputes and protection of SLOCs. Through technical collaboration, we 

can reduce political and ideological obstacles among competing nations. Technical collaboration 

can enhance transparency and provide a neutral modality for mutually beneficial cooperation. 

Technology can offer the following advantages in applications to maritime cooperation: 

• reducing distrust and suspicion among parties by strengthening transparency regimes; 

• establishing a maritime code of conduct; 

• having issue linkage to enable the approach to more sensitive issues; 

• reducing conflict and war risk due to miscalculation or misjudgments; 

• having deterrent effects by increasing the cost and risk for breaking the status quo; and 

• monitoring to preserve the current situation as a sound foundation for peaceful resolution. 

Many maritime affairs have strong technical aspects. Therefore, maritime cooperation 

should involve technical issues as steps toward resolving maritime disputes. Under these 

circumstances, Asia-Pacific countries can convene appropriate technical workshop groups to 

discuss maritime issues of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, bilateral technical assistance also 

can mitigate the tense situations across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. A 

technical collaboration approach can facilitate cooperation on functional issues to pursue 

resolution of political issues in a step-by-step manner. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

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28
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

Appendix—Principal Territorial Disputes of East Asia 

Northern Territories 

Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai Islands, known as the Northern Territories, 

reach north to Kamchatka from the eastern end of Hokkaido.49 The Northern Territories have 

been a source of rivalry between Japan and Russia since the beginning of the 17th century.50 On

February 7, 1855, Japan and Russia signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which stipulated that the 

boundary “between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Uruppu” with 

those islands to the north belonging to Russia and those to the south to Japan.51 In May 1874, 

both sides signed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, ceding to the Meiji Emperor those Kuril Islands 

which Russia held in exchange for Japan’s withdrawal from Sakhalin.52

In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and then occupied the four 

islands claimed by Tokyo. Since the end of World War II, the Kuril Islands dispute has been a 

stumbling block to Japanese-Russian relations.53 In October 1956, Tokyo and Moscow signed a 

joint declaration that ended the state of war between them and the Soviet Union agreed that it 

would transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan on the conclusion of a peace treaty.54 However, 

when the United States and Japan renegotiated their Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, the Soviet 

Union informed Japan that it would return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan only after termination 

of all foreign base rights, the departure of troops from Japan, and after the two states had signed 

a peace treaty.55 Before the Soviet Union collapsed, Mikhail S. Gorbachev suggested the return 

of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, because these two islands were of little military value to the 

Soviet Union. Japan insisted that all of the Northern Territories be returned and refused the 

Soviet suggestion.56 The Northern Territories dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union 

involved political, strategic, and ideological aspects of the Cold War era, which were connected 

to the larger West-East confrontation. 

When the Cold War ended, Japanese and Russian bilateral relations gradually improved. 

In October 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Japan, and he and then-Prime Minister 

Morihiro Hosokawa signed the Tokyo Declaration. They agreed that the guidelines of negotiations toward resolution would be (a) based on historical and legal facts; (b) based on documents 

 49 Captain James F. Giblin, Jr., “National Strategies and Japan’s Northern Territories,” Naval War College Review, 

Winter 1987, p. 53. 

50 Ibid., p. 55. 

51 George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations 1697-1895 (Princeton, N.J.: 

Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 475. 

52 Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century: From Perry to 1970, 2nd ed. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1981), p. 

436. 

53 “Islands May Bridge Russia-Japan Gap,” http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/03200. 

54 Captain James F. Giblin, Jr., “National Strategies and Japan’s Northern Territories,” p. 59. 

55 Ibid. 56 “Strategic Considerations: Northern Territories Disputes Continued,” United Daily, November 16, 1996, p. 10. 

For the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States, the waters surrounding the Northern Territories are an 

important strategic area. Petropavlovsk is the most important naval base in the Soviet Pacific region, located in

the south of Kamchatka Peninsula. Its supply heavily depends upon Vladivostok. This supply line passes 

through Habomai Strait, which is northwest of Habomai Island. In addition, the Northern Territories separate the 

Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. 

29 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

compiled with the agreement of the two countries; and (c) based on the principles of law and 

justice.57 In July 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi declared that Japan and Russia would 

cooperate to exploit the Far East region. Obuchi advocated that both sides set aside the Northern 

Territories dispute – an important turning point for Japan towards Russia.58 In November 1997, 

Obuchi made an official visit to Russia as the first Japanese Prime Minister to do so in 25 years. 

A summit meeting with President Yeltsin resulted in both leaders signing an agreement to 

resolve the dispute by the year 2000 based on the Tokyo Declaration.59

In September 2000, when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Japan, people looked 

forward to a thorough resolution of the issue that had been pending for more than a half 

century.60 In March 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited Irkutsk. Mori and 

Putin confirmed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956 as the basic legal document to set a 

starting point for the negotiation process. In addition, they confirmed that, based on the 1993 

Tokyo Declaration, a peace treaty should be concluded by resolving the issue of the Four Islands 

(The Irkutsk Statement).61 Currently, different perceptions persist between both sides: Japan 

asks Russia to recognize Japanese sovereignty over the Northern Territories and requests that 

Russia return the Four Islands to Japan as soon as possible. On the other hand, Russia is focused 

on joint exploitation of the Four Islands and links this issue to Siberian economic assistance by 

Japan. Therefore, the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia is not only a 

maritime conflict, but also involves important political-economic issues. It does not appear that 

sovereignty over the Northern Territories will be resolved in the short term. 

Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are comprised of five islands and three rocks located 

about 120 nm northeast of Taiwan, 200 nm east of mainland China, and 190 nm southwest of 

Okinawa.62 The uninhabited islands cover only about 6.3 square kilometers. In 1941, Japan 

occupied Taiwan, and the then-Taipei State and Okinawa County disputed which should have 

jurisdiction over the Senkaku Islands. In 1944, the Tokyo Court awarded jurisdiction over the 

Senkaku Islands to the Taipei State. In 1945, the Republic of China recovered Taiwan and 

claimed that the Senkaku Islands were still a part of the Taiwan State and hence, of China.63

 57 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html. 58 “Obuchi Gives a Grand Gift to Russia: Japan and Russia Mutually Benefit,” China Times, November 3, 1997, p. 

10. 

59 “Japan’s Northern Territories,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/index.html. 60 Doug Struck, “Russia, Japan Oceans Apart on Islands,” Washington Post, September 5, 2000, p. 16. 

61 “Overview of the Issue of the Northern Territories,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/territory/overriew. 

Html. 62 The five islands are Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima or Kobi Sho, Chiwei Yu/Taisho-jima or Akao-sho, Diaoyutai

Dao/Uotshuri-shima, Beixiao Dao/Kita Kojima, and Nanxiao Dao/Minami Kojima or Minami-ko-shima. The 

three rocks are Dabeixiao Dao/Okino Kitaiwa, Dananxiao Dao/Okino Minamiiwa, and Feilai Dao/Tobise. See 

Rear Admiral William L. Schachte, Jr., “The United States’ Role in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 

quoted in International Law Conference on the Dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands between Taiwan and 

Japan (I-Lan: I-Lan County Government, 1997), p. 2. 

63 Zhou Yu-shan, “Diaoyutai Incident and People’s Republic of China,” Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly, 

Vol. 30, No. 10 (October 1996), p. 20. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

In the 1970s, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported with high 

probability that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the richest oil 

reservoirs in the world.64 They estimated that the deposit may be equal to that of the Persian 

Gulf. Later, when the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, Japan adopted more active 

measures and claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Thus, the Senkaku Islands 

sovereignty has become a maritime dispute among China, Taiwan, and Japan. This maritime 

dispute is still pending.65

China, Taiwan, and Japan adopt different approaches to deal with the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 

Islands issue. For example, Japan’s claim is based on the discovery that the islands were terra 

nullius (unclaimed). On the other hand, Taiwan declared that Chinese had discovered the 

“Diaoyutai Islands” and thereby were entitled to sovereignty. However, Taiwan did not follow 

international practice and declare the sovereignty by national pronouncement or official activities. In the disagreement between Taiwan and Japan, international political reality favored 

Japan, and Taiwan did not put forth much effort on this issue.66 In addition to Japan and Taiwan, 

China is also involved in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. In the 1970s and 1980s, China was 

preoccupied with internal issues and had insufficient naval capabilities to adopt a strong posture 

dealing with the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of the issue. Under these 

circumstances, China considered the Diaoyutai Islands dispute to be a sovereignty issue between 

Japan and Taiwan. 

With economic growth into the 1990s, China continued to introduce advanced weapon 

systems and increased its participation in international affairs. Gradually, China accumulated 

tremendous military strength and diplomatic capital that could enable it to deal with the 

Diaoyutai Islands dispute. From 1996 to the present, China and Japan have had several confrontations over the Islands. Notably, China has not adopted strong measures against Japan, but has 

only used a diplomatic approach to declaring sovereignty. It can be argued that China was 

 64 Kenneth Y. Choy, “Overview of Taiwan’s Legal and Jurisdictional Considerations in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku

Dispute,” quoted in International Law Conference on the Dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Between 

Taiwan and Japan (I-Lan: I-Lan County Government, 1997), p. 1. 

65 Chen Yeong-kang and Chai Wen-chung, “Modernization of the PLAN: Implications for Asia-Pacific Security,” 

Mainland China Studies, Vol. 42, No. 7 (July 1999), p. 11; Chen Yeong-kang and Chai Wen-chung, “A Study of 

Diaoyutai Islands Sovereignty,” R.O.C.N. Proceedings, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1997), p. 23. 

66 In addition to government declarations, civilian sectors launched “Protection of the Diaoyutai Islands” 

movements three times. The first occurred in February 1970, when Taiwanese students at the University of 

Chicago established the “Protect Diaoyutai Islands Action Committee.” They demonstrated and raised money to 

support sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. Several years later, “Protect Diaoyutai Action” was conducted 

domestically and abroad. In the second “Protect Diaoyutai Islands” movement in 1990, Wu Dun-yi, Mayor of 

Kaohsiung, declared that the Taiwan Regional Athletic Meet would transfer to the Islands to remove a 

navigation beacon placed by the Japanese Youth Association. At midnight, October 21, the Taiwan youths 

traveled by fishing boats from I-Lan County to the Diaoyutai Islands. On the afternoon of the same day, the 

fishing boats were intercepted and turned back by the Japanese Maritime Security Agency. The third occasion 

occurred in 1996, when the Japan Youth Association again erected a navigation beacon. These actions irritated 

ethnic Chinese around the world. Later, China quelled the “Protection of the Diaoyutai Islands” movement and 

this activity has concluded. See Zhou Yu-shan, “Diaoyutai Incident and People’s Republic of China,” pp. 20-21. 

31 
Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

concerned that if relations deteriorated, Japan might terminate economic aid to China. 

Therefore, China adopted a low-key and ambiguous attitude towards the issue.67

For China, the Diaoyutai Islands may be an important access point for the People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. 

Diaoyutai sovereignty affects huge potential EEZ claims for China and Japan. Okinawa 

is clearly Japanese territory, whether by application of UNCLOS Article 121 “Regime of 

Islands” or by practicing straight-line principles; however, the Japanese use of Diaoyutai and 

Yonaguni-jima as their base point for declaring the 200-nm EEZ is considered by some a serious 

infringement of Chinese interests.68 Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 

could invoke the principle of “equidistance” to share several hundred thousand square kilometers 

of continental shelf with China.69 China may dislike this development. Currently, China needs 

Japanese financial aid (i.e., low-interest loans) to support economic development,70 so China 

refrains from criticizing Japan and increasing tensions. Nevertheless, with Chinese naval capabilities expanding and the “Concept of Sea as National Territory” rising, China attaches 

increasing significance to the Islands. The best example of this is the appearance of Chinese 

intelligence ships in waters surrounding the islands. It is possible that China and Japan may 

clash over the sovereignty issue. 

South China Sea 

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea that extends from approximately 3 degrees 

south latitude to 23 degrees north latitude and is surrounded by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, 

Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The width of the South China Sea, from

Vietnam across the Spratlys to Balabac Island in the Philippines, is approximately 600 miles. Its 

surface area covers 1,148,500 square miles71 and includes four archipelagos, the Paracel Islands, 

Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratly Islands. The presumed existence of large oil and 

gas deposits in these waters and the strategic importance of shipping lines between the Pacific 

Ocean and the Indian Ocean have increased the risk of confrontations over disputed areas of the 

 67 Chen Yeong-kang and Chai Wen-chung, “Modernization of the PLAN: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security,” 

p. 11. 

68 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 7, “Straight baselines”; Article 47, “Archipelagic 

baselines”; Article 48, “Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusion 

economic zone and the continental shelf;” and Article 49, “Legal status of archipelagic waters, of their air space 

over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil,” United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law

of the Sea (New York: United Nations Publication, 1983), pp. 4, 15-6. 

69 Lieutenant Commander Duk-Ki Kim, “Cooperative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia.” See http://www.nwc. 

navy.mil/press/Review/1999/winter/art3-w99.htm. 70 http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art4-aul.htm. 71 “Competing Claims of Vietnam and China in the Vanguard Bank and Blue Dragon Areas of the South China 

Sea: Part I,” http://www.cov.com/publications/CLAGETT1.asp. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

South China Sea.72 Like the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea is one of 

the three contentious areas in the Asia-Pacific region.73

In the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are the most disputed area. A 1995 study by 

Russia’s Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries estimated that 6 billion barrels of 

oil resources might be located in the Spratly Islands area, of which 70 percent would be natural 

gas. Some Chinese specialists have asserted that the South China Sea could contain as much as 

130 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.74 Inevitably, the neighboring nations of the South 

China Sea will contest control of such enormous resources. Currently, the disputed areas are 

claimed all or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and 

Indonesia. Conflicts have occurred between China and Vietnam, China and the Philippines, the 

Philippines and Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, the Philippines and China.75

On February 25, 1992, the 7th National People’s Congress promulgated “The Law on the 

Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.” Article 2 identified the Spratly Islands and other midocean land features as Chinese territory. China unilaterally declared the Spratly Islands as its 

territory; in response, neighboring nations strongly protested China’s claim.

76 China based its 

claim on international law as the “historic occupation and/or use.” Other claimants refused to 

recognize China’s declaration, because China did not effectively occupy these islands.77

China and ASEAN countries approach the issue from different viewpoints. According to 

Chinese scholars’ points of view, the major cause of the dispute is that the ASEAN countries use 

contemporary international law to challenge China’s historic rights. China prefers to use 

bilateral negotiations to resolve the ownership, and not use multilateral or international 

approaches.78 China’s power projection capabilities (naval and long-range air forces) are 

probably not yet up to the task of combat operation such a long distance from the Chinese 

mainland. Under these circumstances, China depends upon appeals for peaceful bilateral 

negotiation to maintain their new status quo. 

 72 Richard E. Hull, “The South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in South East Asia?” Strategic 

Forum, No. 60, February 1996. 

73 Ding Zong-yu, “National Territories Disputes Between China and Nations Neighboring the South China Sea,” 

Studies in Communism, April 1995, p. 39. 

74 See United States Institute of Peace Special Report, “The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive 

Diplomacy,” http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/snyder/South_China_Sea1.html. 

75 For conflict descriptions, see Lu Ru-chun et al., Hai Jun Shi (The History of People’s Liberation Army Navy) 

(Beijing: PLA Press, 1989), p. 335; http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schinatab.htm1#TAB2; Trevor Hollingsbee, “China Moves in on Mischief Reef,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1999, p. 5; Barbara Opall,

“ASEAN Counters China Territorial Claims,” Defense News, July 29 – August 4, 1996, pp. 4, 56; “Philippines 

Protests Attack by Vietnamese in Spratlys,” Taiwan News, October 29, 1995, p. 5; “China Fishing Boat Collided 

with the Philippine Naval Ship on the Huangyan Dao in the South China Sea,” United Daily, May 25, 1999, p. 

13; “Philippine and Malaysia Fighting Aircraft Confrontation in the South China Sea Air,” United Daily, 

November 3, 1999, p. 11; Run Bei, “What Huangyan Dao Incident Present?,” Jian Chuan Zhi Shi (Warships and 

Merchant Ships) (Beijing), No. 214 (July 1997), p. 10. 

76 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements,” Pacific Affairs, Spring 1995, p.41; B.A. Hamzah, “China’s Strategy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug 13, 1992, p.22. 

77 Geoffrey Till, “China, Its Navy and the South China Sea,” RUSI Journal, April 1996, p. 48. 

78 Xiao Quan-zheng and Chen Zhi-ping, “The Introduction of the South China Sea Seminar,” National Policy 

Dynamic Analysis, No. 96 (October 1994), p. 2. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

In August 1990, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Peng visited Singapore 

and publicly stated that China will shelve the sovereignty dispute in favor of joint development 

of the South China Sea.79 In August 1995 at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Brunei, 

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen promised that the PRC would pursue a solution consistent 

with the UNCLOS, and further declared that the PRC claim did not contradict the right of safe 

passage through international waterways in the South China Sea.80 In December 1997, PRC 

President Jiang Zemin and the heads of ASEAN countries signed a Joint Declaration to 

“...renounce use of force or threat of use of force. Claimants should be in accordance with 

international law, including 1982 UNCLOS, to resolve the South China Sea disputes through 

peaceful consultation and negotiation.”81 Nevertheless, China has refused to adopt a multilateral 

approach to resolve the dispute. By pursuing the dual tactics of “sovereignty belongs to me” and 

“shelve the sovereignty dispute in favor of joint development,” China seeks to maintain freedom

of operation in the South China Sea issue. 

Many disputes concern the South China Sea. In August 1999, the Philippines drafted the 

South China Sea Code of Conduct for consideration at the ASEAN and China informal summit 

meeting in November of that year. Because China rejected the draft Code of Conduct, this code 

has not been transferred into concrete policy.82 In addition, the United States and Japan have 

been concerned with the situation in the South China Sea, particularly focusing on freedom of 

navigation.83 With PLAN power projection capability rising and in the face of competition to 

exploit oceanic resources, serious confrontations may appear in the South China Sea. A major 

conflict between the ASEAN nations and China could instigate intervention by outside powers to 

maintain freedom of navigation. As with the Balkan situation before World War I, the South 

China Sea may be a flashpoint84 in the Asia-Pacific region. 

 79 Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 

1996), p. 118; Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda, “Strategic Scenarios in the South China Sea,” National Policy 

Dynamic Analysis, No. 96 (October 1994), pp. 3-4.

80 http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/snyder/South_China_Sea1.html 

81 “PRC and ASEAN Heads Joint Declaration: Bilateral Cooperation toward the Twenty-First Century,” Jiefangjun 

Bao (PLA Daily), December 17, 1997, p. 5. 

82 Song Yann-huei, “ASEAN and PRC Negotiation with the South China Sea Code of Conduct Impact to the 

Taiwan Security,” Collection of Taiwan’s National Security and the South China Sea Dispute Conference

(Taipei: Division of Strategy and International Studies, Taiwan Research Institute, 2000), pp. 2.4-2.5. 

83 Joseph W. Prueher, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated: “If any claimants of the 

South China Sea sovereignty disputes endangered the freedom of navigation, the U.S. would adopt appropriate

response...but we don’t interpret what is, we use measures.” When Dennis C. Blair assumed that office he also 

stated: “Claimants should negotiate to solve differences among them, not use intimidation measures to achieve 

objectives.” See Song Yann-huei, “The Influence of Ratification 1982 UNCLOS by the South China Sea 

Claimants,” National Policy Dynamic Analysis, No. 171 (August 1997), pp. 8-9; “U.S. Urge to Guarantee 

Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea,” United Daily, June 19, 1997, p. 10; “Blair Appeals for Peaceful 

Resolution for the South China Sea Disputes,” China Times, May 23, 1999, p. 14. 

84 Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s Defense Modernization: Implications for Asia-Pacific Security,” Contemporary 

Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), p. 75; Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of 

China’s Earlier Territorial Settlement,” p. 41; James L. George, “China: Paper or Potential Tiger?,” Naval 

Forces, February 1996, p. 96. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts 

About the Author 

Commander Chai, Wen-Chung is a staff member of the Strategic Planning Department of the 

Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan. He received his MA in International Affairs and 

Strategic Studies at the University of Tamkang and a BA from the Chinese Naval Academy. 

Cdr. Chai has served on many naval vessels and in several shore positions for the Taiwan Navy. 

He is the author and co-author of numerous publications, including Taiwan Survival and 

Seapower Development, PRC Military Capabilities Assessment 2010, Revolution in Military 

Affairs, and Asia-Pacific Security: Theory and Practice. He is the author of several articles 

related to naval strategy, naval policy, military strategy, and military balance across the Taiwan 

Strait. 

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Cooperative Measures to Mitigate Asia-Pacific Maritime Conflicts

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