st 50 Years 50 Years of National Service

1947-1997

ENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

1947-1997
1

PECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

ONTENTS

ject

tial Charter for the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

uary 29, 1947

roduction

wn of the Atomic Age

41-1947

rly Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

47-1954

covery

54-1963

ategic Deterrence

63-1971

ategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

71-1981

rce Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

81-1991st-Cold War Priorities91-

ure Challenges

otograph Credits

ronym List

The First

50 Years

of

National

Service

A Brief History

1-1
he Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

* Reproduced text of January 29, 1947 AFSWP charter.

29 January 1947

SUBJECT: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations.

1. On 1 January 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission established by

the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress) took over

the organization and properties of the Manhattan Project.

2. There is established, effective midnight 31 December 1946, a

joint Army-Navy atomic energy organization which will discharge all military service functions relating to atomic energy and will be known as the 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Military personnel on duty with the 

Manhattan Engineer District at midnight 31 December 1946, and who are

excepted from service with the Atomic Energy Commission, will be assigned

to duty with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project as of 31 December

1946.

3. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project will operate under a

Chief who will be selected by mutual action of the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations. A Deputy Chief from the opposite service shall

be also selected by the mutual action of the Chief of Staff and the Chief

of Naval Operations. Both the Chief and Deputy Chief shall be members

of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. They 

will be assisted by an appropriate staff drawn from the War and Navy

Departments.

4. The Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project will:

 a. Assume responsibility for all military service functions

of the Manhattan Project as are retained under the control of the Armed

Forces, including training of special personnel required, military participation in the development of atomic weapons of all types (in coordination with the Commission), technical training of bomb commanders and 

weaponeers, and developing and effecting joint radiological safety measures in coordination with established agencies.

 b. Report directly to the Chief of Staff, United States Army,

and the Chief of Naval Operations.

5. Funds, other than for pay of military personnel, will be provided initially from those funds of the Manhattan Project which have not

been transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission. Pay of military personnel will be from appropriate War and Navy Department appropriations.

SECRETARY OF WAR SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 
3

Secretary of Defense William Perry

uly 16, 1945, at the TRINITY site 

the sands of New Mexico, the 

st atomic weapon was detonated.

ought the first glimpse of the

potential for destruction now in

f mankind. Soon that potential

rmed into two enormous nuclear

one in the hands of the Soviet

one in the hands of the United

ughout the Cold War, we lived

eat of nuclear holocaust hanging

ads like a dark cloud,

the extinction of all mankind.

It was during this period that

the agency we now know as the

Defense Special Weapons

Agency (DSWA) emerged as

one of the key stewards of

our nation’s nuclear

weapons capability. Chief

among its long history of

accomplishments is that

maintaining our nuclear

arsenal actually helped prevent that nuclearholocaust and the destruction of our nation.Today, the Cold War is over, the nucleararms race has ended, the dark cloud haslifted and all the world breathes easier. Butthe nuclear threat has not gone away.Instead, we face the threat of nuclearweapons, technology and materials fallinginto the hands of rogue nations or terrorists.We still must maintain and operate a smallerbut highly powerful nuclear arsenal as adeterrent. We have embarked on a bravenew era of nuclear arms reductions, boldnew safeguards and innovative nucleartechnologies, and we have an even greaterneed for DSWA.The men and women of DSWA are leadingthe way into this new era. Your dedicationand patriotism helped us survive nearly 50years of nuclear terror. It will be yourinnovation and your continued hard workthat will make the future safer and brighterfor all mankind.

No one knows what challenges the futuremight hold. But I do know that the people ofDSWA are equal to those challenges. Iextend my congratulations to them for theirimpressive contributions to our nationalsecurity, and offer my best wishes for evengreater achievements in the years ahead.William J. PerrySecretary of Defense

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TRINITY marker atAlamogordo, New Mexico.
— Dawn of the Atomic Age

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3-8

3-1. Los Alamos West Gate. 3-2. Churchill,Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945. 3-3. B-29

Superfortress "Enola Gay." 3-4. New York Times,

August 7, 1945. 3-5. VJ Day, August 14, 1945.3-6. Japanese surrender ceremony on board theU.S.S. Missouri. 3-7. J. Robert Oppenheimer andGeneral Leslie Groves. 3-8. The Gadget drawing

passed by David Greenglass to Soviets.

3-6

3-7
5

fore

1,

e

sed

er

o

his

lly

atomic fission. In a letter drafted byhis colleagues, Einstein wrote toPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt onAugust 2, 1939: “It may becomepossible to set up a nuclear chainreaction in a large mass of uranium, which would... lead to theconstruction of... extremely powerful bombs... .”➻ Preliminary GovernmentInvolvement: The National DefenseResearch Council, under VannevarBush, supported research in 1940-1941 that indicated weaponsdevelopment was not “remote.”Shortly before the attack on PearlHarbor, the Office of ScientificResearch and Development established an office (OSRD S-1) todevelop an atomic bomb. Dr. Bushproposed to transfer managementof the project to the Army in thesummer of 1942 to assure priorityand establish security.➻ The Manhattan EngineerDistrict: On August 13, 1942, theCorps of Engineers, issuing GeneralOrder 33, established the Manhat

the Atomic Age: The Manhattan

a with the means to terminate

nd decisively.

ed

nitiated

e operations

i bombed – War ends

tan Engineer District (MED), covername for the atomic bomb development project. Brigadier GeneralLeslie R. Groves served as commanding officer of the MED fromSeptember 23, 1942, through1946.➻ The Manhattan Project: General Groves selected Dr. J. RobertOppenheimer to lead the scientificeffort. Together, they chose the LosAlamos Ranch School in NewMexico as the site for the atomiclaboratories.➻ Dawn of the Atomic Era: OnDecember 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi’sgroup operated the world’s firstself-sustaining nuclear fissionreactor under Stagg Field, University of Chicago. Techniques for aerialdelivery of atomic weapons weredeveloped at Los Alamos, NewMexico and Wendover Field, Utah,between 1943 and 1945. MEDpersonnel worked with the ArmyAir Corps at Wendover to modifythe newly-produced B-29 bomberand refine bombing techniques.➻ TRINITY: 100 tons of highexplosives were detonated onMay 7, 1945, as a dress rehearsal for the TRINITY event.It also served to calibrateinstruments to measureTRINITY phenomena. Then,on July 16, 1945, Los Alamos personnel detonated animplosion-type plutoniumdevice, named TRINITY,near the remote town ofAlamogordo, New Mexico.

TRINITY High ExplosiveTest Stack.

TRINITY - July 16, 1945.

➻ Hiroshima andNagasaki: On August6, 1945, the 509thComposite Groupdropped Little Boyover Hiroshima, and,on August 9, Fat Manover Nagasaki. Soonthereafter the Japanese governmentagreed to surrender,ending World War II on September2, 1945.➻ Bombing Surveys and Postwar Planning: MED staff participated in initial bomb damage andradiation assessments, as well aspostwar surveys of both Hiroshimaand Nagasaki. They also participated in planning for internationalcontrols, including the BaruchLilienthal Plan that the U.S. presented to the United Nations.➻ Operation CROSSROADS: In1946, MED personnel organizedthe first postwar atomic test series

3-11

at the Bikini Atoll in the PacificOcean. These tests demonstratedthe effects of atomic weapons onsurface ships, including the hazards of long-term radioactivecontamination.➻ The Atomic Energy Act of1946: President Truman signedthe Atomic Energy Act of 1946 onAugust 1, transferring atomicweapons, production facilities, andpatent rights to a five-membercivilian Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), effective December 31,1946.➻ Transition to the ArmedForces Special Weapons Project:On January 29, 1947, Secretary ofWar Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestalestablished the Armed ForcesSpecial Weapons Project (AFSWP),the successor organization to theMED. It assumed all functions ofthe MED not transferred to theAEC. AFSWP assured readiness bytraining for both offensive anddefensive atomic warfare, assessingthe effects of these new weapons,and supporting postwar nationaldefense planning.

Dawn of the Atomic Age

3-10
orea map.

 Mk-6 bomb.

rd Teller.

d Eisenhower

ast.

— Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

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➻ Establishing a DeterrentForce: A March 1948 “war warning” cable from General LuciusClay, Commander in Chief, Europe(CINCEUR), in advance of massive

Russian troop maneuvers andaccess challenges along corridorsto Berlin, led to the first postwarU.S. plan for atomic bombardmentof Soviet targets.

➻ Weapons Effects Testing:AFSWP participated in all threefission weapon tests at EnewetakAtoll during Operation SANDSTONEin 1948, and prepared technicalreports on weapons effects. AFSWPdeveloped improved instruments tomeasure weapons blast and shockenvironments during futurenuclear weapon tests.➻ Accelerating Assembly TeamTraining: In April 1948, AFSWPaccelerated the pace of its assembly team training. After the SANDSTONE tests, General Groves, firstAFSWP Chief, urged acceleratedproduction of the Mk-4 bomb.

➻ Operational Storage:

AFSWP worked jointly with theAEC to establish three NationalStockpile Sites that were accessible to the 1st, 8th, and 2nd AirForces, respectively. These sitesbecame operational in 1949-1950.

➻ Nuclear Effects Documentation: In 1949, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assignedresponsibility to AFSWP forcollecting, reviewing anddisseminating data on the

effects of atomic weapons. Thisresulted in the first integratedreport, The Effects of AtomicWeapons (1950), prepared jointlywith the AEC.

➻ Extending DeterrenceThrough the Berlin Airlift: In June1948, the blockade of road andrail access to Berlin led to a jointAnglo-American airlift of foodstocks and supplies. President Truman approved the deployment ofB-29 bombers to British bases inJuly 1948, to signal a U.S. commitment to deter military agressionand the occupation of WesternEurope.➻ Signaling Readiness WhileProtecting the Atomic Arsenal:With a total stockpile of about 50atomic bombs and a shortage ofbomb assembly teams, the forwarddeployment of the U.S. atomiccapabilities seemed imprudent inthe absence of air defenses atprospective forward bases. In July1948, AFSWP supported the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and anAnglo-American deception plan insignaling a forward deployment ofatomic weapons two years before

ars of the Armed Forces Special

Berlin Blockade and the Korean

testing by the United States and

 stage for later Cold War relations.

 European Recovery Program

ins in April 1948 – ends in May 1949

– First Soviet nuclear test

South – U.S. leads military response

neral MacArthur

President

gned in July

elopment accelerated

Firing party prior to MIKE test.

GRABLE test explosion.

A U.S. tank rolls through

Chunchon, Korea.

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4-12

4-11

Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
e

e

f

pared for forward assem- bly operations in 1949- 1950, and deployed to Royal Air Force bases in the United Kingdom in 1951.➻ Coordinating Weapons Requirements:Sandia Pioneers within thelaboratory’s ordnancedivision began informallycoordinating weapons

requirements in 1947. The September 1949 detection of debris fromthe first Soviet atomic test, JOE-1,intensified U.S. efforts to maintainits technological lead. AFSWP’sChief briefed the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS) on the potential applications of thermonuclear weaponspreceding President Truman’sJanuary 1950 decision to approvedevelopment of these weapons.Jointly the AEC and AFSWPconducted research on weaponsvulnerabilities and nuclearweapons effects.

➻ Developing a Weapons Vulnerability Program: In March1950, the Military Liaison Committee, composed of Department ofDefense (DoD) and AEC staff,asked AFSWP to study and test thevulnerability of nuclear weapons.The results helped support thedesign of air-to-air and surface-toair weapons for air defense: NikeAjax, Nike Hercules, and Genie,among others. A formal AFSWPOperation GREENHOUSEat Enewetak.

Weapons VulnerabilityProgram emerged in 1955.➻ Test Planning: In1951, the JCS assigned toAFSWP responsibility for testplanning and coordinatingService needs for nucleartest data. The AFSWP and theAEC jointly searched for acontinental test site, settlingon the Nevada Test Site(NTS). AFSWP subsequentlysponsored many nucleareffects experiments at theNTS.➻ Accelerating Operational Readiness Duringthe Korean War: With United Nations (UN) forcesresisting the invasion ofSouth Korea and uncertaintywhether the war wouldspread to Europe, President Truman approved AFSWP support toSAC nuclear-capable units at overseas bases in July 1950.➻ Atomic Diplomacy and theKorean Armistice: After Chinaentered the Korean war, PresidentTruman decided in November 1950that the atomic bomb could beconsidered for use. AFSWP unitsdeployed aboard three U.S. aircraftcarriers in 1950-1951. Managersof nuclear component stockpiles atSandia Base went on alert status forairplane delivery of both nuclearinsertable-core components andassembly teams within 12 hours ofnotification, per AFSWP order ofApril 24, 1951.

➻ Preparing for Transfer ofWeapons Custody to the MilitaryServices: AFSWP’s July 1951 charter called for technical directives,standards for training, and procedures for nuclear technical inspections by the military Services.During the Korean War, AFSWPaccepted military personnel detailed from each of the militaryServices for training in weaponsassembly and maintenance, inoperational site storage, and intechnical inspection of weapons.AFWSP personnel strength reachedan all-time high of nearly 11,000 in1951-1952.➻ Test Implications for CivilDefense: In the 225-kiloton test,GREENHOUSE GEORGE, conducted 4-14 4-15

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rly Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Protective lead-glass cloth shroud beingplaced on sampler pilot.

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9

SWP tested the effects of blasts on structures.

Event MIKE (Operation IVY) detonation.

Washdown decontamination of B-17 aircraft.

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ical

uare

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tec

GLE,

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 and

 the

for

➻ Stockpile Surveillance: InAugust 1951, AFSWP and the AECagreed upon coordinated procedures at Operational Storage Sitesfor nuclear weapons. By 1952,Sandia and AFSWP Field Commandin Albuquerque, New Mexico, wereboth assisting the Services in conducting their own inspections butwere also conducting parallelAFSWP inspections of operationalsites.➻ Test Implications for Weapons Dispersal, IntercontinentalBallistic Missile (ICBM) Development, and Bomber Rebasing: Anearly thermonuclear device test,

IVY MIKE, produced a yield of 10.4megatons of TNT-equivalent energyin October 1952. A Russian 400-kiloton thermonuclear test inAugust 1953 (Dr. Andrei Sakharov’s Second Idea) acceleratedplans for the dispersal of U.S.Operational Storage Sites. Concurrently, the Teapot (Von Neumann)Panel recommended developmentof guided missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads. Other strategicdevelopments included radarwarning networks in Alaska andCanada (the Distant Early Warningor DEW Line) and rebasing ofsome SAC forces to interior basesin the continental U.S.

➻ A Nuclear Strategy of Forward Deployment and Readinessfor Use: The armistice in Koreapreceded Presidential approval of anew military strategy, called theNew Look (NSC 162/2) of October1953. The Eisenhower administration decided to expand forwarddeployments of nuclear weapons in Europe, and to declare a

readiness to usenuclear weapons fortactical defense andfor strategic bombardment.➻ Atomic WarfareStatus Center: OnOctober 16, 1953,the Secretary ofDefense directedAFSWP to maintain

Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

“a centralized system of reportingand accounting to ensure that thecurrent status and location” of

nuclear weapons “will be known atall times.” This critical functioncontinues to the present day.
— Discovery

5-1. Sputnik model. 5-2. Nixon/Kennedydebate. 5-3. Fallout shelter. 5-4. Kennedy.

5-5. New York Times. 5-6. Castro and

Khrushchev. 5-7. TRUCKEE Event atChristmas Island. 5-8. Astronaut John

Glenn. 5-9. U-2 surveillance aircraft.5-10. Berlin Wall. 5-11. Redstone missile.

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➻ Nuclear Force Survivabilityand Diversity: U.S. atmospherictests in 1954-1958 and 1962 werecritical to the definition of nuclearweapons effects for the design ofsurvivable U.S. offensive and defensive weapon systems, includingtheir basing modes. In this era, theU.S. maintained a substantial leadin the number and yield of deployed nuclear weapon systems,offsetting the Warsaw Pact conventional force advantage over NATO.➻ Effects of ThermonuclearWeapons: The CASTLE BRAVO teston Bikini Atoll on February 28,1954, was the first of six thermonuclear weapon development testsin the CASTLE series. It had a yieldof 15 megatons. The CASTLE seriesindicated that megaton-rangeweapons could be reduced in sizeand weight and deployed on ballistic missiles and aircraft.➻ Radiation Monitoring: Fallout from the BRAVO test exposed

Japanese fishermen aboard theFukurya Maru [Lucky Dragon].Fallout concerns on a global scalecaused the JCS in 1954 to taskAFSWP with monitoring and predicting worldwide fallout. AFSWPsponsored a High Altitude Sampling Program (HASP), using U-2aircraft, to determine the stratospheric burden of radioactivity.AFSWP also performed predictionand modeling of worldwide falloutafter the U.S. and Soviet atmospheric tests of 1961-1962.

➻ Dispersal of Storage Sites: In1954-1955, the Technology Capabilities Panel urged force dispersals and increased readiness toreduce vulnerabilities in the thermonuclear age. On December 1,1954, President Eisenhower approved JCS-proposed plans fordispersal to multiple nuclearOperational Storage Sites in thecontinental U.S. manned by Servicepersonnel. AFSWP trained militarystorage and maintenance staffs,

inspected Service sites, and managed National Stockpile Sites incoordination with the AEC.➻ Coordinating WeaponsRequirements Through AFSWP:AFSWP supported DoD in its determination of the Military Characteristics, suitability, and acceptabilityof nuclear weapons. Concepts forlow-maintenance “wooden bombs”and modular “building block”weapons emerged in the 1950s.➻ Understanding NuclearEffects for Air Defense: In themid-1950s, the AFSWP Air BlastPanel successfully advocated teststo assess blast and thermal effectson aircraft, missiles, and aircrews.In 1955, Test HA (High Altitude)employed a three-kiloton device at36,000 feet to explore options forair defense without prompt radioactive fallout. Nuclear air defensesystems deployed later includedGenie and Nike-Hercules missiles.

Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), andinitial development activities forICBMs and SLBMs that would carryMultiple Independently TargetedReentry Vehicles (MIRVs); (3) therapid spread in the use of semiconductor-based technology in weightand space-limited applications,such as satellites, missiles, anddigital computers; and (4), the1958-1961 moratorium on nuclear testing and the resumption ofatmospheric testing, initiated by theSoviets in 1961.

y: The U-2 Spy Plane and the

l Cold War tensions between the

n, while Sputnik heralds the dawn

monuclear weapons demonstrated

d

Soviet Union begin

s first space satellite, launched

rium begins

hev engage in “kitchen debate”

craft – Kennedy elected

– Soviets break test moratorium

eaty signed

s since 1955.

Nike-Hercules air defense missileused for launch of TIGHTROPE shot.

Premier Khrushchev.

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5-14

Discovery
Engineering (DDR&E) beganallocating the majority of DoDnuclear effects research and testfunds through AFSWP in 1958. Toreflect these increases in roles andmissions, AFSWP was redesignatedas the Defense Atomic SupportAgency (DASA) in 1959; the Agency began reporting to both JCS andthe Secretary of Defense that year.➻ Initial HA Nuclear EffectsProgram: In 1958, the Agency andthe AEC jointly conducted a series ofHA nuclear explosions: tests TEAKand ORANGE in Operation HARDTACK, launched by rockets fromJohnston Atoll in the Pacific, andthree tests over the South Atlantic inOperation ARGUS. TheSoviet Union conducted itsown set of HA experimentsin 1962.➻ Disturbance of Distant Communications:Test TEAK, fired at night atan altitude of 77 kilometers, resulted in a loss ofhigh frequency (HF) communications over much ofthe Pacific that lasted into

ring Event JUNIPER.

General Ludecke and GeneralStranathan with TEAPOT MET cloudbehind them.

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Operation CASTLE, Test BRAVO at Bikini Island in 1954.

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the next day as a result of disturbance of the HF-reflecting layers ofthe ionosphere.➻ Electrons Trapped in Magnetic Fields: Operation ARGUS,conducted in 1958 by the U.S. Navywith DASA and Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (ARPA) support,verified the “Christofilos effect” inwhich fission decay electrons become trapped, creating man-maderadiation belts. The idea of usingthese belts as a shield against potential ballistic missile attack wasnot feasible, since the earth’s magnetic field was too weak to formsufficiently intense radiation belts.ARGUS did, however, indicate thatsemiconductor circuits werevulnerable to degradation by recurring passage through trapped electron belts. Some space satellitesfailed in the aftermath of the 1958tests. DASA pursued techniques toreduce vulnerabilities of electroniccomponents and to improve theendurance of satellite communications and other space systems.

➻ Adaptive Research Duringthe 1958-1961 Moratorium: U.S.atmospheric testing ceased inOctober 1958 and did not resumeuntil 1962, after the Soviets brokethe test moratorium (the U.S.began conducting tests underground in 1961). To evaluateMinuteman silos, DASA and the AirForce sponsored high explosive(HE) tests in 1959-1960. Plans for

nuclear radiation effectssimulators also began toevolve in this period, andcomputer models of upperatmospheric chemistrywere refined between the1958 tests and those of1962.➻ Force Modernization:Dispersal of SAC bases andconstruction of early warning radar networks improved bomber force

survivability. The U.S. Navy commissioned the first operationalsubmarine carrying Polaris missiles, the George Washington, onDecember 30, 1959. The U.S. AirForce commissioned the firstMinuteman I missile wing on July15, 1961.➻ Doubling of Nuclear WeaponDeployments in Europe: After EastGermany constructed the BerlinWall in August 1961, the U.S.accelerated deployments of nuclearweapons to Europe. The totalNATO nuclear stockpile virtuallydoubled between January 1961 andMay 1965 to more than 5,900nuclear weapons.➻ Supporting the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS):DASA supported the JSTPS, established at SAC, beginning in 1960.DASA and its contractors developedcomputer models of nuclear effects, notably airblast. SAC, and itssuccessor, U.S. Strategic Command(STRATCOM), have routinely usedthe Agency’s expertise on nucleareffects to support war planning.➻ DoD Damage AssessmentCenter (DODDAC): DODDACbegan operating in the Pentagonand at the underground AlternateNational Military Command Center(ANMCC) at Fort Ritchie, Maryland,in 1961. In late 1961, at WhiteHouse request, DASA analyzed theeffects of a 100-megaton weaponon the ANMCC, and on proposedWashington, D.C. undergroundfacilities, after the Soviets tested a58-megaton device.

scovery
13

cking for

President Kennedy signs the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

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bearing weapons and improved storage site designs resulted.➻ X-Ray Effects on BallisticMissiles: Concern regarding thevulnerability of guidance systems,reentry vehicles (RV) and nuclearwarheads intensified as more waslearned about the effects of x-rayson materials and electronics. In the1962 DoD-sponsored test MARSHMALLOW, nuclear effects on sensitive components of space andmissile systems were confirmed. Anad hoc Committee on RadiationEffects, established under Dr.William G. McMillan, identifiedretrofit solutions for Minuteman II

systems and advocated designed-in hardening for futurestrategic missiles. AsMIRVed ICBMs andSLBMs entered development, their vulnerability to x-rays led toplanning for underground tests andsimulation of x-rayeffects, implementedlater in the 1960s.➻ Plasma Disturbances and Radar

Blackout: The exoatmosphericFISHBOWL tests, in 1962, causedauroral and ionospheric disturbances. In STARFISH PRIME,bomb-generated plasma becamestriated and spread thousands ofmiles along the magnetic meridianand across magnetic field lines ofthe earth. The implications of thesetests for the degradation of radio

and radar communications wereimportant to the design of U.S.communication satellites, and earlywarning and Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM) radars.➻ Electromagnetic Pulse(EMP): The FISHBOWL series alsoconfirmed distant EMP effects uponelectronics predicted by earlierDASA research. Street lamps shorted on Oahu, about 800 miles fromthe STARFISH PRIME test. DASAserved as the center of expertise inefforts to design enduring communications and command systemsthat could withstand EMP effects.➻ Operability-SurvivabilityTests for Complete WeaponSystems: In August 1962, FieldCommand, DASA recommendedthat “all components affecting anuclear weapon system” be fieldtested as a unit in an operationalenvironment. DASA solicited testpriorities from the McMillan Panel,a nuclear effects task force for theDDR&E. One of the first completesystems to be tested was the NikeHercules surface-to-air missile,

fired successfully in the last U.S.atmospheric nuclear test onNovember 4, 1962.

➻ Strategic Force Modernization: To assure weapon systemscould survive nuclear attacks,DASA designed experiments oncratering, airblast, and groundshock at the NTS and elsewhere. Inthe 1960s, DASA’s Strategic Structures Division supported the AirForce in designing hardened silosfor Minuteman II and III missiles.Initial silo construction for ICBMswas already underway before someof the lessons were learned.➻ Supporting Negotiations ofthe Limited Test Ban Treaty(LTBT): DASA supported ARPA insponsoring research to improvethe detection of nuclear tests inspace, in the atmosphere, andunderground. Interpretation of thefirst fully contained undergroundtest, RAINIER in 1957, led U.S.scientists to conclude that seismicsignals could be “decoupled” by

selection of appropriate soils andcavities. This conclusion hadadverse implications for monitoring a ban or yield limit on underground testing. The McMillanPanel, relying in part upon DASAresearch, briefed PresidentKennedy on options for nuclear testbans as the administration began toconsider potential treaties limitingnuclear testing.➻ The 1963 LTBT: The world

came perilously close to a nuclearexchange between the two superpowers during the 1962 Cubanmissile crisis. In ensuing months,both the U.S. and the Soviet Unionsought accommodations that wouldlessen, control, or avoid such perilin future relations. One of therealized accommodations was theLTBT, which prohibited nucleartests in the atmosphere, in space,and underwater. President Kennedycalled the treaty “...a shaft of lightcut into the darkness.” Eventually, italso eliminated worldwide fallout.

Discovery

5-19

Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
— Strategic Deterrence

6-1. John F. KennedyFuneral. 6-2. Antiwar poster. 6-3.Lyndon Johnson.6-4. Dr. MartinLuther King. 6-5.Vietnam soldier.6-6. Gunship inVietnam. 6-7. July21, 1969, New YorkTimes. 6-8. Buzz

Aldrin on the moon.6-9. Richard Nixon.6-10. Anti-wardemonstration.6-11. Protest button.

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SAGE Panel – August 1966.

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➻ Tests for Survival and Operability: From 1961 through 1965,the McMillan Panel urged survivability tests for weapons systems.DASA designed and funded many ofthese tests between 1964 and 1970as the centerpiece of the overalleffort. Of particular concern wasthe vulnerability of the MinutemanII guidance system to radiation.The DDR&E and the Air Forceagreed upon testing, redesign, and

retesting. Missile RV hardness, silodesign, and electronic systemvulnerability to EMP were also ofconcern. With DDR&E assent inOctober 1964, the DASA Directorbegan sponsorship of the McMillanPanel. From 1966 to 1993, thepanel was referred to as theScientific Advisory Group on Effects(SAGE). The SAGE Panel wasdisbanded after its 1993 meeting aspart of a government-wide move toreduce the number of federaladvisory groups.

➻ Underground Nuclear EffectsTest Planning: To implement a1962 AEC-DoD agreement withinthe constraints of the 1963 LTBT,AEC and DASA representativesparticipated in a Nuclear WeaponsEffects Coordinating Group to laythe groundwork for the nucleareffects testing advocated by theMcMillan Panel and subsequentlyreaffirmed by JCS action. In December 1963, U.S. scientists urgedpriority for nuclear effects testingof full-scale reentry systems. Overthe next two years, in Operation

SUGAR CANE, DASA and the AECexplored methods to test underground for effects on key components of weapon systems. DASAbegan designing line-of-sight shaftand tunnel systems for x-ray effectstests.

➻ Moscow-WashingtonHot Line: During theCuban Missile Crisis,President Kennedy andSecretary Khrushchevoften had difficulty conveying confidential messagesto one another. In 1963,DASA reviewed the survivability of technical designssupporting the June 1963agreement for a Heads-ofGovernment Hot Line.This Hot Line connectedthe White House, throughthe National MilitaryCommand Center in the

Pentagon, to the Kremlin. DASAalso supported the addition of HotLine Communications Satellite(COMSAT) links in 1971.➻ HA Effects Analysis: The SAGEPanel recommended priorities forHA effects analysis. In the 1960s,DASA advanced the understandingof both weapons effects and planetary physics through analyses oftests conducted in 1958-1962. TheSAGE Chairman also served asChairman of the Special WeaponsEffects Group (SWEG), whichanalyzed the 1962 Soviet highaltitude tests. Suspected nucleareffects, such as EMP disruption ofburied communication links, wereconfirmed by Russian scientists in1995.➻ Safeguards for the LTBT: Toprotect U.S. nuclear capabilities,four safeguards for the 1963 treaty

were to: (1) continueunderground testing; (2)maintain modern nuclear laboratories; (3)establish the NationalNuclear Test ReadinessProgram; and (4) improve methods to detectand monitor foreignnuclear detonations.DASA supported verification research for ARPA’snuclear detection (VELAHOTEL) satellites and forseismic detection ofdecoupled undergroundtests (VELA UNIFORM).

Spartan missile.

Secretary of Defense McNamara andSecretary of State Rusk.

c Deterrence: After the Cuban

ders seek to match and exceed U.S.

ents by 1970.

resident upon Kennedy’s assassination

d

North Vietnam

entry systems/underground nuclear test

480,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam

n Moon – Vietnam troops at 543,000

dia

ks with Chou En-Lai

Strategic Deterrence
6-19

6-18

SAILOR HAT test

– 500 tons of TNT.

Tritium facility at Savannah River.

tion and the treatment of radiation illnesses.➻ Tools for War Plans: In the1960s, DASA maintained andrefined models of nuclear effectsand radioactive transport, whichhelped SAC develop options for astrategy of controlled response.➻ Supporting NATO: Bilateralprograms of cooperation permittedforward basing of U.S. nuclearweapons and contingency planningfor allied use. After the 1962 Nassau Agreement, DASA and the AECsupported tests in Nevada of Britishwarheads. The U.S. sold Polaris A-3missiles to the British to carrythese warheads. DASA also supplied planning data to NATO’sNuclear Planning Group. Nuclearstockpiles in U.S. custody for useby allied forces increased to peaklevels in 1971.

6-16

6-17

➻ Integrating Nuclear-BasedScience and Technology: UnderDASA’s July 1964 charter, a civilianDeputy Director (Science and Technology) oversaw radiation, blastand shock, biomedical, and testplans and programs activities. Withjust four percent of DASA staff in1965 (290 positions), science andtechnology research and test staffmanaged more than three-quartersof the agency’s budget.In November 1964, DASA consolidated nuclear effects knowledgein the classified publication,Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons.A revised edition was published in1968. These publications precededthe two-volume Effects Manual-1(EM-1), first published in 1972.➻ Operational Tactics: InAugust 1964, the JCS establishedJoint Task Force-2 (JTF-2) atSandia Base to test and validatetactics to penetrate Soviet nucleararmed air defenses. The JTF-2tested low-level penetration tacticsin conjunction with Sandia Laboratory and the Air Force SpecialWeapons Center. Stand-off weaponsentered the stockpile in the late1960s.➻ Techniques for Testing andSimulation: From 1964 through1965, DASA surveyed effects-relatedrisks to weapon systems and developed testing and simulation options. These included: undergroundnuclear tests of airblast and groundshock; exposure of weapons, electronics, and materials to radiation;and development of radiation

simulators to assess EMP, gammaray, and x-ray effects.

➻ Modeling Global Impacts: Forforce exchange models and forprojecting the impact of nuclearwar on fallout and global climate,DASA sponsored software development at RAND, at the JSTPS, and atAEC laboratories.➻ HE Testing: When the LTBTprohibited nuclear detonations inthe atmosphere, DASA developedlarge-scale (kiloton-class) HE testbeds to generate airblast andground shock. In 1964, OperationSNOWBALL, a 500-ton HE event,was conducted in Alberta, Canada.The SAILOR HAT test was conducted the following year. These testssimulated nuclear airblast loadingof structures and underwatershock on ships. Subsequent DASAtests included PRAIRIE FLAT andDIAL PACK, both of which helpedthe Air Force assess and improvethe survivability of Minutemen IIsilos. As HE testing evolved, distributed HE arrays, such as the HighExplosive Simulation Technique(HEST) and the Direct-Induced

HEST (DIHEST), were developedby the Agency to test reverseengineered Soviet silos and toevaluate candidate silo basingmodes for Peacekeeper and theSmall ICBM. DASA also employedHE testing for evaluating the dynamics of crater formation.DASA conducted additional experiments on forest blowdown inAustralia and Canada. British andCanadian scientists played keyroles in the development andrefinement of HE simulation ofnuclear effects. The resultsachieved by those two countriesand the U.S. were coordinated andexchanged through The TechnicalCoordinating Panel (TTCP). TheTTCP played a major role in establishing a series of multinationalshock physics conferences on themilitary applications of airblast.➻ Stockpile Surveillance: During 1965-1966, DASA developedcommon nuclear stockpile reporting standards for all of the militaryServices. In 1966, the JCS taskedField Command, DASA with responsibility to account for the entireU.S. nuclear stockpile. With confi

rategic Deterrence
17

The SEDAN crater at NTS.

test

tho

tody

965,

l

le

war

ary

oa

950s

r

In

ent,

yed

.

ts

ed

ner

radiation sources for undergroundnuclear effects tests conducted byDASA.➻ Early DASA UndergroundNuclear Effects Tests: In 1965,DASA began a series of verticalline-of-sight tests that exposedelectronic components, circuits,and systems to gamma rays andneutrons. The first such test wasWISHBONE. The first exposure offull-scale reentry systems (Mk-11Cand Mk-12) was the DASA-sponsored DOUBLE PLAY event, executed in June 1966. Other testsmeasured shock propagation ingranite for stronger ICBM silos andnational command centers.➻ Supporting the JCS TestInitiatives: In 1966, the JCS approved a plan, drafted by the DASADeputy Director (Science andTechnology), for an intense seriesof underground tests to assure thehardness to nuclear effects of U.S.strategic offensive and defensive

missile forces. These tests wereexecuted in accordance with thedevelopment schedules of eachService System Program Office(SPO) and were the most comprehensive effects tests everconducted.➻ Testing Ballistic Missilesto Avert System Failures: Thefirst major test under the JCSapproved test program–MIDIMIST–was conducted by DASAon June 26, 1967. It involvedreentry systems and otherelements of Poseidon andMinuteman II and III, plus

components and materials for theSentinel ABM. DASA subsequentlycarried out an extensive series ofexposures of those four strategicsystems, with results that oftenrequired redesign for survivability.DASA staff briefed SAGE in 1969 onthe results of survivability testing toavert potential system failures.

➻ Responding to OverseasEmergencies: DASA coordinatedemergency response to removeradioactive debris and recoverMk-28 bombs near Palomares,Spain, in 1966. DASA oversawService decontamination effortsthat removed 237 tons of radioactive ice and debris after a B-52crash near Thule, Greenland, in1968. After the Thule crash, DASAprovided a database of nuclearaccidents to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In 1968,

OSD suspended

routine SAC airborne

bomber patrols

involving nuclear

weapons. DASA’s

databases and staff

expertise on matters of nuclear

safety remained

accessible to both

the military Services and OSD.

Access to DASA’s

expertise convinced Dr. Carl

Walske, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy),

that it was essential to retain DASAor a successor agency that wouldserve as the conscience of the DoDin matters of nuclear safety.➻ Assessment Methods forTarget Planning: DASA sponsoredfield tests, calculations, and algorithm development to improve theprobability-of-damage calculationsused in force exchange models.These models were developed bythe Air Force Intelligence Center,refined later by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and appliedby the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. The method is referredto as the VNTK system, denotingVulnerability Number/Type (oftarget)/K-factor. The “K-factor”accounts for weapon yield effectsand was formulated by the University of Illinois based on DASAexperimental data. Initially, DASAproduced slide rules that incorporated the VNTK system. Later, the Agency made the methodology available on programmable, hand- held calculators. Both the slide rules and the calculators were widely used by target planners throughout the DoD.

➻ Radiation Simulators: DASAsupported EMP simulator designand sponsored an EMP SimulatorPanel in 1967-1968. This workencouraged design of EMP simulators of different types for each ofthe military services. DASA fundedand the Air Force Weapons Laboratory initially operated ARES, anEMP simulator in Albuquerque,New Mexico. DASA also funded theTransportable EMP Simulator(TEMPS), built for the Army, andthe EMP Radiation Effects Simulator for Ships (EMPRESS), a simulator system built for the Navy.➻ Testing ABM Systems: 

A

megaton-range underground test(CANNIKIN) in 1971 verified Spartan warhead performance. Subsequently, the U.S. Army and theAgency tested full-scale Spartaninterceptor survivability in nuclearenvironments. These tests helpedconfirm U.S. readiness for ABMdeployments. System costs andeffects analyses were factors in theeventual negotiation of the 1972ABM Treaty.➻ Creating the Defense NuclearAgency: On March 29, 1971,Deputy Defense Secretary DavidPackard announced the creation ofthe Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)as successor to DASA.

Strategic Deterrence

6-21

6-22

Effects Manual.
— Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

7-4

7-9

7-1. Commemorative stamp.

7-2. Watergate finale.

7-3. Terrorist at Munich Olympics.

7-4. Jimmy Carter.7-5. Lech Walesa. 7-6. Khomeini.

7-7. The Concorde. 7-8. Three MileIsland. 7-9. Gas shortage signs.

7-10. America’s 200th BirthdayParade. 7-11. Vietnam evacuation.

7-12. Afghanistan rebel.

7-10

7-6

7-3

7-5

7-7

7-11 7-8
19

s

 has

f the

city

-a

SCS

ON

hen aated

➻ Improved Operational Safetyand Security in NATO: DNA supported an OSD site security initiative after terrorist attacks duringthe Munich Olympics in 1972. Results included non-lethal defensesat storage sites and site securitysurveys. New weapon storage vaultsincluded subsurface weapons storage within shelters of aircraft onalert status; these weapon vaultswere deployed beginning in the1980s. The buried storage vaultsafforded prompt access with improved site security and site safetyin event of fire or hostile attack.➻ Integrating Knowledge: In1972, DNA published a two-volumenuclear weapons effects manual

called Effects Manual-1 (EM-1).Two years later, DNA issued aNATO-releasable version of EM-1.

These volumes provided criticalplanning information for unifiedand specified CINCs, civilian civildefense activities, and NATOofficials.➻ New Directions for TheaterDeterrence and Defense: In 1973,the Secretary of Defense and theSupreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) asked DNA tomake a series of assessments ofmethods to provide a strong forward defense in Europe. This assessment was to be based on allsource information regarding Soviet force modernization and exercises. The integrated deterrentroles of strategic and theater nuclear forces were to be illuminated inthese assessments, and emphasiswas placed on means to provide amuch improved conventional forward defense. Suggested improvements included the views of all NATO allies. All of these goals were accomplished by DNA in conjunc- tion with many agencies of the U.S. government, including the Con- gress, as well as European allies and NATO. A major result was the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine that produced theater-specific force and strategy improvements for NATO, Korea, and Southwest Asia. In 1974, DNA supported the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) in identifying new tac- tics for the use of advanced con- ventional weapons in the defense of Korea. CINCPAC was able to reduce dependence upon early nuclear escalation in Korean contingency plans. In the mid-to-late 1970s, DNA supported CINCPAC’s effort to

ensure operability of command,control, and communications (C3)links in nuclear environments,including high-altitude bursts withEMP effects.

➻ Protective Structures: As ballistic missile accuracies improvedin the mid-1970s, DNA assessednew protective structures for U.S.strategic and theater force deployments and studied potential vulnerabilities of Soviet hardened targets.The Silo Test Program (STP), originally for Soviet target assessment,provided insights for superhardsilo designs for U.S. ICBMs.

c Deterrence with Nuclear Parity:

fueled by the Afghanistan invasion

S. embassy by Iranians lead to a

nd strategic modernization.

nderway

elected – Visits China

rd sworn inputers appear – South Vietnam falls

 Carter elected President

troversy

mbodia

anistan – Iranians seize U.S. embassy

ran/Iraq war begins

ges

Missile silo test configuration.

President Nixon andPremier Chou En-Laiin China (1972).

7-14

Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

7-13
y

d

d

for basing the Peacekeeper (MX)ICBM. DNA supported Air Forcestudies resulting in retrofitting ofMinuteman silos to improve survivability. Later underground tests(UGTs) led to changes for the Minuteman III Mk-12A RV and the Mk4 reentry body (RB) for the TridentI SLBM. Trident operability testingpreceded deployment of Ohio-classsubmarines, each carrying 24MIRVed SLBMs.➻ Aircraft Operability: Aircraftshelters built in Europe protectedaircraft against conventional weapon attack. DNA tested aircraft shelters and shielding against EMP.Assessments of nuclear barragesover air bases improved survivability of tankers supporting SAC operations.➻ NATO Theater Force Modernization: In October 1977, NATO’s

Nuclear Planning Group established a task force on theater nuclear force modernization. With DNA-sponsoredassessments, among others,NATO approved a two-tracktheater force modernizationand arms control strategy inDecember 1979.To preclude the overrunningof Western Europe, NATOsought the capability to attackrear echelon air bases andkey nodes in the Warsaw Pactresupply system. This required new classes of promptstrike weapon systems. Beyond DNA-sponsored studiesof theater force modernization, the Agency participated in

various Joint Working Groups thatprovided a forum with allies tomodel alternative force employment tactics and exercise new scenarios and force mixes. These activities helped to convince NATOallies of the importance of forcemodernization. Subsequent U.S.theater nuclear force initiatives inthe 1980s included deployment ofground-launched cruise missiles(GLCMs), Pershing II ballistic missiles, and other special purposeweapons. DNA supported hardening of the Supreme Headquarters,Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) atMons, Belgium; protective structures assessments for GLCMs; andPershing survivability exercises inthe field.

➻ Theater Force Deployments:To modernize theater nuclear and DoD satellite test chamber (HURON KING). INSET: Satellite

suspended inside test chamber.

CACTUS crater dome at Enewetak Atoll.

7-16

7-17

conventional forces, NATO forcesdeployed advanced technologysystems to offset the quantitativeadvantage of deployed Warsaw Pactforces. In the aftermath of NATO’sinitial deployment of modern theater nuclear forces and other actions, Soviet delegations walked outof all nuclear arms control negotiations in 1983.➻ Effects of Radiation: AFRRI

improved the understanding ofincapacitating effects of radiation.Among other applications, thisunderstanding influenced Armyplanning for use of, and responseto, enhanced radiation weapons.The AFRRI mission included troopand medical staff training, and theavailability of medical staff forresponse to radiologicalemergencies.

➻ Environmental Remediation:As part of its cleanup of radioactivedebris on Enewetak Atoll, DNAmoved tons of contaminated soil tothe CACTUS crater and entombed itunderneath a massive concretecover designed by the Army Corpsof Engineers. DNA also developedrobotic radiation monitoringequipment that has been used subsequently in site remediation activities at the NTS and at JohnstonAtoll.➻ Nuclear Effects Research andDevelopment: DNA employed acombination of UGTs, simulators,and analytical models to improvethe understanding of a spectrum ofnuclear effects important tosystems being developed or underconsideration during the era.

ategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

7-15
21

g tests at Cape Canaveral, Florida.

EMP simulation test setup.

Trident SLBM test shot.

7-18

7-20

7-21

ed

d or

he

.S.

et

d to

Vs

 and

wing

Helens’ volcanic cloud. Hardeningtechniques for system-generatedEMP (SGEMP) effects began to beapplied to spacecraft design.Satellite observations and modelingrefined the scientific understandingof communications degradationdue to nuclear effects on theatmosphere. DNA developed stepsto mitigate or otherwise cope withsuch degradation.➻ Nuclear Test PersonnelReview (NTPR): The statisticalassociation of leukemia with the

1957 SMOKY test and concernregarding the health of other testparticipants led OSD to establishthe NTPR in 1978. DNA publishedreports describing major nucleartests in the atmosphere, thendeveloped a database on testexposures for military nuclear testparticipants and occupation forcesat Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Subsequently, the NTPR programhas provided individual dosereconstructions to help theDepartments of Justice andVeterans Affairs adjudicateveterans’ claims of radiationrelated illnesses.

➻ Enduring C3: The ability tosurvive potential nuclear environments requires enduring C3 capabilities. In the 1970s, DNA assesseddistributed C3 network survivabilityafter both direct attack and exposure to EMP, and sponsored assessments of both satellite and groundstation design for prompt and delayed radiation events. DNA-supplied data on hardening againstradiation and EMP effects supported the design of more survivablespace systems, ground-based communications nodes, and C3 networks. In 1979-1980, the Carteradministration initiated new measures for continuity of governmentand military operations in nuclearenvironments.➻ Strategic Balance Assessments: DNA supported OSD-sponsored net technical and force balance assessments for the Office ofNet Assessment. Results impactedforce budgeting and arms controlplanning preceding the Strategic

Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I of1979.➻ Joint Exercises for Emergency Response and Site Remediation: Starting in 1979, DNA cosponsored, with the DOE, jointemergency response exercises.Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercise79 (NUWAX-79) was the first ofmany biennial emergency responseexercises. It simulated aircraft accidents and employed short-livedradioactive isotopes in dilute quantities for realistic training in hazardassessments and nuclear weapon/materials recovery operations.➻ Holding Soviet Targets atRisk: DNA, with DIA cooperation,reverse-engineered Soviet ICBMsilos and began subscale testing.The STP led to estimates of increased silo hardness. New DNAmodels aided JSTPS in SingleIntegrated Operational Plan (SIOP)adjustments as the 1971-1981 eraended.

Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

xplosive test event.
8-1

-8

8-3

— Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

8-1. Challenger explosion. 8-2. The Reagans.8-3. Tiananmen Square. 8-4. Delta II rocket.8-5. George Bush. 8-6. Berlin Wall.8-7. Gorbachev. 8-8. USS America. 8-9. Spaceshuttle launch.

8-2

8-6

8-7

8-5

8-4
23

odernization and the Demise of

wesome costs of the U.S./Soviet arms

Berlin Wall and communism in the

of the Cold War are replaced by a

s; and the proliferation of weapons of

 becomes a global concern.

d – Beginning of defense buildup

mits for SALT II

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

n a landslide

s General Secretary, Communist Party

talks stall over U.S. SDI program

ar Forces Treaty

dent – Iran-Iraq War ends

Afghanistan – Berlin Wall torn down

– Iraq invades Kuwait

d but attempted coup fails

a

n

e

 on

on

 for

n

e

eep

t,

 the

the

ith

ity.

Following the Commission’s report,DNA applied its expertise to:craters from tests in the Pacific toreevaluate crater dynamics andtheir application to silo survivability; non-ideal airblast and its simulation for tests of the HardenedMobile Launcher (HML) for theSmall ICBM; ground shock at highoverpressures for silo survivabilityand, later, for lethality againstdeeply buried and hardened underground structures; and superhardsilo design and testing. Many ofthese activities were accomplishedjointly with the Air Force’s BallisticMissile Office (BMO). The HMLconcept originated from DNA

airblast testing, which demonstrated the feasibility of anchoringvehicles under high dynamic pressure loading. DNA also assistedBMO in hardening Small ICBMelectronics to nuclear effects.➻ Operability Testing: Duringthe era, DNA executed UGTs thatdemonstrated the survivability ofthe Trident II guidance system,other in-flight missile electronics,and the Mk-5 RB. Separate UGTsverified the survivability of theMk-21 RV for the Peacekeepermissile. These systems, along withMinuteman III, will comprise thestrategic missile element of U.S.strategic forces into the foreseeablefuture.➻ Communications Connectivity: DNA sponsored summer studies on high altitude nuclear effectsin 1982 and 1986. Simulation of

exoatmospheric plasma striationsusing barium clouds coincidedwith communication and radarexperiments to test communications degradation. These testsemployed satellite transmissionsthrough the striated barium cloudphenomena. DNA sponsored threesatellites designed to explore thesephenomena: WIDEBAND in 1976,HILAT (high latitude) in 1983, andPOLAR BEAR in 1986.

➻ Microelectronics Hardening:Following the DoD Nuclear Survivability Directive in 1983, DNAreinforced its role in encouragingService SPOs to adopt radiationhardened microelectronics components. Re-analysis of SGEMP effectsled to early consultations withsystem designers to assure operability without large system retrofitcosts. As the semiconductor industry increased processing speedswithin smaller packages, miniaturized circuits exhibited reducedtolerances to radiation. DNA sponsored development of radiationtolerant satellite and computermicroelectronics, which subsequently demonstrated their endurance through solar flares thatdisrupted other unhardened satellites. DNA’s microelectronics hardening program has contributed toU.S. preeminence in long-livedreconnaissance, space exploration,and communication satellites.Deficiencies in understanding ofcertain radiation effects, especiallysource region EMP, led DNA todesign an underground test as part

of the DISTANT LIGHT programand to correlate results with aboveground test simulations and computer models.➻ Enhanced Conventional

Munitions: DNA sponsored tests ofenhanced conventional munitionsand their relative performancecompared to nuclear weapons. In afive-year development program withthe Air Force in 1983-1988, DNA cosponsored advanced conventionalmunitions tests at Eglin Air ForceBase, Florida.In 1986, the Johnson Task Forcereport to the Defense ScienceBoard on DNA management reaffirmed the application of DNA’sexpertise to non-nuclear weaponseffects. This action preceded theMarch 1987 charter authorizingDNA to pursue non-nuclear technology applications where theAgency’s nuclear-derived skillswere highly relevant. This initiativeserved to support precision strikeoperations in the Persian Gulf Warof 1990-1991 and laid the foundaPeacekeeper missile.

8-10

Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

8-11

Radiation hardened 64-kilobit staticRAM chip from the early 1980s.
e

e

d

iation test simulator.

funded research to improve theunderstanding of uncertaintiesregarding fire phenomenology andtransport models. These modelssupported assessments on theimpact of wartime fires, and weredocumented by the National Research Council in The Effects onthe Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange (1985), and in laterassessments of the more than 600concurrent Kuwaiti oil well firesduring Operation Desert Storm.➻ Strategic Defense: The SDIOffice assigned DNA responsibilityfor evaluating the lethality of all SDIweapons against their potentialtargets. The SDI Office co-sponsored survivability and operabilitytests and simulations. DNA con- SDI laser test.

Soviet Yankee/Notch class submarine.

8-13

8-14 select weapons for early

retirement, and to assurethe safety of an agingnuclear stockpile. Secretary of Defense Cheneytasked DNA to establish aweapons system safetyassessment capability.Working jointly with theServices, DNA applied aprobabilistic risk assessment methodology toquantify the likelihood ofplutonium dispersal inplausible accident scenarios. DNA’s inspectionsbrought discrepancies toService command attention, and ultimatelyhelped major commandsovercome deficiencies.➻ Environmental Cleanup: In1986, after the waste cleanup activities begun earlier were completed,the government returned Enewetakto the sovereignty of Marshall Island inhabitants. Concurrently,DNA began a plutonium wastemonitoring and sorting/collectionprogram to reduce Johnston Atollplutonium contamination that resulted from the pre-launch explosion of a nuclear-armed missileduring the 1962 atmospheric testseries. In operation from 1986 tothe present, the program hasachieved significant decontamination of plutonium mass on theAtoll. After the 1986 reactor fire atthe Chernobyl power plant inUkraine, DNA deployed a Chernobyl Site Restoration Assistance

Team from AFRRI to identify hazardmitigation options and participatein developing medical treatmentregimes.

➻ Hard Target Kill: DNA supported JCS initiatives to hold at riskstrategic relocatable targets andSoviet hardened underground C3facilities. DNA established a HardTarget Kill research program thatincluded consideration of earthpenetrating weapons.➻ Chemical Weapon Demilitarization at Johnston Atoll: Duringthe period when the nation maintained the option to resume atmospheric nuclear testing, DNA accepted custodianship of JohnstonAtoll, located 800 miles southwestof the Hawaiian Archipelago. DNAsupported users of the Atoll by

rce Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

ducted underground tests for SDIcandidate subsystems, includingdistributed sensor systems. DNAalso supported SDI Red Teams inassessments of adaptive responsesto candidate SDI systems.➻ Operational Safety andSecurity: A Titan II missile caughtfire and was destroyed duringroutine maintenance in the early1980s. Following the investigationof this accident, OSD reinstatedemergency response teams underthe coordination of DNA’s JointNuclear Accident CoordinatingCenter. The Agency published aNuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedure (NARP) manualin 1984.The Drell Report to the Congress in1990 urged improved hydrocodesand three-dimensional modeling toimprove hazard predictions, to
25

DNA EM rail gun being test fired.

Joint DNA/NavyEMPRESS EMP testing.

8-17

8-16

on.ruc

cal

an

e

rd

rred

pon

of

e

s

ary

offs:

d

s

alu

nge

ed a



ETC technology is also being considered for Army artillery and tankgun applications.➻ Arms Control Implementation: With NATO force modernization well underway, arms controltalks resumed in 1985. The Treatyon Intermediate Nuclear Forces(INF) of 1987 was the first successful effort to eliminate an entireclass of nuclear weapon systems inEurope; i.e., ground-based missilesof 500- to 5,500-kilometer range.DNA was assigned responsibility fordeveloping treaty verificationtechnology following the signing ofthe INF Treaty. Examples ofachievements in this enterprise arethe design and field testing of aperimeter and portal monitoringsystem and unique identifiers

(tags) to monitor solid rocketmotor and RV inventories.DNA provided contracting andadministrative support to thenewly-created On-Site InspectionAgency as it implemented inspections under the INF Treaty, theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START), and other treaties andbilateral agreements. DNA studiesprovided an analytical foundationfor the 40-percent reduction indeployed strategic warheads mandated by START I, and for deeperSTART II reductions.

➻ Dual-Use Technology: Federalpolicy encourages dual-use research to provide civilian benefitsfrom technologies developed fornational defense purposes. DNAapplied its expertise, developedprimarily to address Cold Warnuclear issues, to a number ofdual-use activities.DNA’s e-SCRUB program employedpulsed electron beams to removeoxides of sulphur and nitrogenfrom coal stack gases. This technique permits the use of highsulphur coal in electrical powerplants located in sensitive airbasins. DNA adapted nucleareffects models to predict damagefrom hurricanes and other naturalphenomena, thus assisting theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) and other relieforganizations in concentratingdisaster relief operations wheremost needed. DNA has also usednuclear effects ground shock

Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

research and tools to advise theconstruction industry on methodsto mitigate earthquake damage tobuildings. The results of the radiation-tolerant microelectronicsprogram have been applied to

civilian spacecraft operating innaturally disturbed environments.Finally, advanced numerics andcomputational mesh strategies havebeen employed to improve weatherforecasting.

Maintenance onICBM warheads.

8-15
ld War Priorities

9-8 9-7

9-9

9-6

9

9-4

9-5

9-2

9-3
27



wait

hal

c

transport supported target planning and consequence assessments during the war. The Agencydeployed expert teams to a DNAassessment facility, to DIA Headquarters, and to the Pentagon insupport of operational targetingfrom the start of the air campaignthrough the expulsion of Iraqiforces from Kuwait. DNA also setup a 24-hour command center to

assess the consequences of potential WMD warheads on the Scudmissiles Iraq launched againstSaudi Arabia and Israel. DNAprovided the results of theseassessments to Central Command.➻ Postwar Validation of Damage Modeling: DNA officers participated in post-war inspectionsto validate lethality and survivability models based on wartimeexperience. Battle damage assessments suggested new damageindicators, such as the temperature of target smoke. The

Agency incorporated lessonsfrom the Persian Gulf War inlethality, survivability, andcollateral effects modeling,especially for hardenedtargets.

➻ Proliferation andCounterproliferation: Thepost-Desert Storm revelations of the breadth andscope of the Iraqi quest toobtain nuclear weaponsspawned a heightenedawareness of WMD proliferation. DNA began counterproliferation initiatives in

1991. This early planning supported a review of all U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities that washeaded by the (then) Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch.DNA also supported counterproliferation planning by the Assistantto the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (ATSD(AE)), nowATSD (Nuclear and Chemical and

Biological Defense Programs, orNCB). That office was assignedcentralized responsibility for DoDcounterproliferation research anddevelopment activities.➻ Capabilities to NeutralizeWMD Proliferation: After theearly considerations of proliferation, the ATSD (AE) designatedDNA as the lead DoD agency forthe counterforce elements of thecounterproliferation supportprogram. The centerpiece ofDoD’s counterproliferation activities is an Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstration(ACTD), which involves the integration of research and development products with existingoperational assets to demonstratean improved capability to neutralize WMD targets with minimal andpredictable collateral effects. TheU.S. European Command(USEUCOM) is the Operational Manager of the ACTD withDNA as its DemonstrationManager. Service and DOElaboratories are also participating in the ACTD.Early ACTD activities in 1996involved live delivery ofinventory weapons againstsimulated biological weapontargets. Post-1996 ACTDactivities will includemore advancedweapons in attackson simulated chemical weapon production facilities that

are protected by hardened structures. Although the counterproliferation ACTD has prompt weaponapplications and high target killprobability in common with othersimilar activities, it is unique in itsfocus on predicting, minimizing,and measuring post-attack collateral effects. In common with allACTDs, the counterproliferationACTD will provide unified commands with weapons, sensors,and other assets that can be usedimmediately.➻ The Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) Program: Inresponse to the dangers associated with the potential breakdownof nuclear controls in the FormerSoviet Union (FSU), in late 1991the U.S. embarked on an innovative program of cooperativeassistance. Until 1993, the CTR

r Priorities: The collapse of

d by regional conflicts, prolifera

s destruction, and escalating

estic and international fronts.

 Kuwait – Soviet Union dissolved

sident

sraeli/PLO peace accord

r bombing

reaty extended – Oklahoma City bombing

nse Special Weapons Agency (DSWA)

0th Anniversary

Defense SecretaryPerry and UkraineMinister of DefenseShmarov signingtreaty. Destroyed Iraqi hardened shelter.

9-12

9-11

ld War Priorities
changes reflecting the end of theCold War. These changes includedwithdrawal of tactical nuclearweapons from Army bases, surfaceships, and attack submarines;cancellation of mobile basing programs for the Peacekeeper missile; cancellation of the ShortRange Attack Missile-II (SRAM-II)and the Small ICBM; and standdown from alert of strategicbombers and Minuteman ICBMs. AJanuary 1992 Presidential decisionlaid the groundwork for eventualelimination of all 50 Peacekeepers, reduced MIRV deployments, and the shift of bombers toconventional missions.The Clinton administration conducted a Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) in 1993-1994 that led to adefinition of an “enduring stockpile” of nuclear weapons. DNAsupported the NPR principalsthrough a DNA point-of-contactwho coordinated NPR requirements with DNA analyses and

other activities, and providedproducts to meet the NPR needs.In September 1994, PresidentClinton approved a reducedstrategic force comprised ofMinuteman ICBMs, Trident submarines (all with D-5 missiles),B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers,and a non-nuclear role for theB-1 bomber.

➻ Training for Reliability,Safety, and Security: Since 1993,DNA has operated the DefenseNuclear Weapons School (DNWS)at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, forall Services. DNWS has sincebroadened its curriculum toinclude courses in counterproliferation and counter-terrorism.Although the Army, Marines, andmost Navy commands are nolonger nuclear capable, ongoingtraining is essential to maintainService competency to operate innuclear environments.➻ Verification TechnologyExpands: The DNA verificationtechnology programs have expanded to include support tovirtually every arms control andbilateral agreement to which theU.S. is a party. Recent verificationtechnology achievements andactivities include sensors for Open

The HE Computational Aid for Windows.

Skies aircraft, unified databasesrelevant to arms control, analytical techniques and sensors forchemical and biological agents,gravity gradiometers to characterize START Treaty Limited Items,and improved seismic sensingcapabilities to verify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).➻ Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship: With the 1993 decision toconditionally cease U.S. nucleartesting, questions arose on maintaining the reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile that wasdefined by the NPR. The DOEadvocated “Science Based Stockpile Stewardship,” in which reliability would be preservedthrough stockpile surveillance,laboratory experiments, andimproved computational softwareand hardware.Subsequently, a DoD-DOE agreement called for “dual revalidation” of weapons remaining in theinventory through a process inwhich each DOE weapons laboratory independently and periodically examines all data relevant toa specific weapon type. The results are reviewed by DOE Headquarters and provided to theNuclear Weapons Council for finalaction. DNA is a participant in theprocess, with DNA militaryofficers located at all three national laboratories. These officerscontribute to the dual revalidationprocess and annual recertificationof the stockpile.

Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Kirtland Air Force Base.

9-14

9-13

War Priorities
29

Science & Technology Digest.

9-15

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ment (DARE) Program and Project Graybeard. The DARE Program locates, stores, and retrieves effects data from its inventory of waveforms, numeric tables, diagrams, reports, photo- graphs, and video media. Integra- tion and declassification of effects knowledge is underway in the new EM-1 Technical Handbook, scheduled for release in early 1997. This handbook will draw upon the authoritative 22-volume EM-1. The Agency also advances community technology and data preservation achievements in the publication Science & Technolo- gy Digest. The second DNA archival program, Project Gray- beard, identifies, locates, and interprets test data and lessons learned, and integrates the infor- mation into the DARE database.

➻ Technology Applications forCounterterrorism: As the breadthand scope of terrorism began toexpand in the 1980s, it becameapparent that much of the DNACold War expertise was applicableto efforts to counter terrorism. Inparticular, DNA expertise in C3facility survivability has directapplication to the safeguarding ofU.S. and allied facilities that arepotential terrorist targets. Forexample, the Agency has performed approximately 50 Balanced Survivability Assessments ofcritical DoD and federal agencyfacilities. Chief among the findingsare that the judgments regarding afacility’s vulnerability to terrorism

become virtual roadmaps to riskreduction measures. DNA hasperformed structural blast response calculations using codesand models originally developedfor nuclear applications. Thisanalytical support was provided tolaw enforcement agencies duringforensic investigations of terroristevents, including the WorldTrade Center and OklahomaCity bombings.

➻ DNA Transition toDSWA: In 1992 and again in1993, Congress mandatedreviews of DNA’s roles,missions, and functions.The eventual result was areaffirmation of the DoDcommitment to maintainnuclear competencieswith DNA as the center ofexcellence for the Department’s nuclearmatters, including CTRand activities in NuclearStockpile Stewardship.DNA also gained responsibility for nonnuclear development activitiesthat take advantage of the Agency’snuclear heritage. The traditionalDNA roles, along with the newtasks, were institutionalized in anew charter issued in 1995.Subsequently, the Agency reorganized to improve service to itscustomers, to implement totalquality management, to breakaway from Cold War traditions,and to foster coordination andteamwork. The Agency was retitled DSWA during ceremonies on June 26, 1996, culminating the Agency’s evolution in the Post- Cold War environment.

➻ Joint Science Programs:DSWA sponsors joint scienceprograms with scientific institutions in Russia, Ukraine, andKazakstan. These programs include an evaluation of the RussianTopaz reactor for thermionicenergy, applications of energeticmaterials, comparative findingson nuclear weapons effects, andthe use of advanced computational techniques.➻ Munitions Effectiveness:Munitions effectiveness assessment modeling uses empirical

data obtained from DSWA’s Permanent High Explosives Test Site(PHETS) at White Sands MissileRange, New Mexico. Since 1988,there has been more than a 30-fold increase in conventionaleffects tests. DSWA’s White Sandsfacilities were also employed bythe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccoand Firearms (ATF) in tests to

create a computerizeddatabase and investigative

protocol for law enforcement agencies to use in

large-scale vehicle bomb

investigations. The Large

Blast /Thermal Simulator

(LBTS), operated jointly by

DSWA and the Army at White

Sands since 1994, is the

largest shock tube in the

world. LBTS can replicate the

blast and thermal environments

of nuclear weapons with yields

from one to 600 kilotons.

➻ Current and Future Challenges: One of the hallmarks of

DSWA’s predecessors was effective

and timely response to the dynamics of the Agency’s internal and

external environments. Over thefive years of this era, DNA andDSWA successfully transitioned intothe Post-Cold War era. DSWA isnow postured for future achievements directly relevant to thecurrent and future national securityenvironment, including the preservation of core competencies sopainstakingly acquired over the last50 years.

ld War Priorities
at



major contingencies will necessarily have to consider the possibilitythat antagonists could have WMDcapabilities. Moreover, U.S. citizensmay find themselves exposed toWMD incidents, even though theU.S. is not involved as a protagonist.➻ Many Nuclear Futures arePossible: For the foreseeablefuture, there is little likelihood of aresurgence of the Cold War. However, some Cold War-related taskswill continue to engage our timeand resources for programs suchas CTR in the former Soviet Unionand remediation of the human andenvironmental legacies of nuclearweapons. Over the longer term,there are a number of scenarios,ranging from further proliferationand eventual use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict, to thealternative of success in armscontrol, making use of WMD apolitically unacceptable option.➻ Nuclear Weapons Will Continue to be Special Weapons:Throughout most of the world,nuclear weapons will continue tobe perceived as fundamentallydifferent. Current national policiesare likely to persist, with the declared position of the U.S. beingthat our nuclear capabilities are

relevant only in confrontations withother nuclear-weapons-capablestates. Our emphasis will continueto be on planning military optionsto support deterrence and termination of hostilities, with considerable emphasis on minimizingcollateral hazards. Safety, security,and positive political control willcontinue to be the highest imperatives.

➻ Others May Regard NuclearWeapons as Being Special in aDifferent Sense: Unable to matchU.S. economic strength, politicalpower or conventional weaponscapabilities, leaders in other statesmay regard the development andacquisition of nuclear weapons asan acceptable path to strategicequivalence or regional dominance. In a regional conflict, theymay be tempted to use nuclearweapons to disrupt communications and damage unprotectedelectronics (precluding U.S. information dominance) or to directlyattack critical nodes supportingconventional operations, such asports and airfields.➻ Nuclear Force Structures WillBe Less Prominent : The size ofthe U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles will decline. Fewer forces willhave nuclear delivery capability. Inthe absence of a Cold War strategicenvironment, a downsized DoD will

S

r.

STRATEGIC VISION FOR DSWA

➻ A Paradigm Shift: At the end

of the Cold War, DoD nuclearrequirements for the future weresharply reassessed. One of theresults from this reevaluation wasthe broadening of the Agency’s roleand its redesignation as DSWA. Inpreparing for its new role, theAgency adopted a new visionwhich emphasized the need for it“to serve as the DoD center ofexcellence for nuclear and otherspecial weapons matters, withemphasis on technical and operational support to the warfighter.”

➻ Center for Nuclear Expertise:

In a world environment in whichthere is less emphasis on nuclearmatters, the need to continueprotecting a core capability withinDoD is clear.

• In assuming that role, DSWA

will continue to perform acritical mission of safeguarding

nuclear core competencies.This will require continuedwork on modeling nuclearweapons effects, as well asunderstanding the variousaspects of nuclear hardness.

• Many of the key nuclear competencies are related directly to

non-nuclear advanced weaponprograms. For example, the use

invest a smaller percentage of itsresources in maintaining nuclearcapabilities. Developing newnuclear capabilities will be anunacceptable political option.Earlier, nuclear weapons testingwas already prohibited by Presidential direction. The United States

is now party to the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. Now, other meanswill have to be used to guaranteeconfidence in the stockpile and toensure forces can withstand thenuclear threats posed by proliferant nations or groups.

Dr. George Ullrich, DSWA Deputy Director

10-2
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• DSWA will provide support to

DoD components concerningreliability, safety, security, usecontrol, and explosive ordnance disposal of nuclearweapons.

• Members of the DSWA team will

provide emergency responsesupport for weapons-relatedincidents worldwide.

• DSWA Field Command will

provide nuclear weaponstechnical inspections, qualityassurance programs and logistics management support forthe stockpile under DoDcontrol.

➻ Warfighter Support: DSWAwill continue to provide stronganalytical support to the Servicesand Unified Commands worldwide.

• DSWA will push to develop

technologies that will facilitatecounterforce actions againstmobile and hardened targets,especially where WMD arelikely to be involved.

• Specific areas of emphasis are

likely to include peacetimeplanning assistance, as well asdirect technical support duringcontingencies, such as Desert

Storm, to identify what must bedone to defeat hardenedtargets, forecast collateralhazards, support counterproliferation, and provide counterterrorism technology.

• DSWA will also continue to

provide strong support for U.S.STRATCOM as it carries out itsnuclear contingency planningresponsibilities.

➻ National Security PolicyImplementation: Because of itsprogram management and contracting expertise, DSWA will continue to serve as the DoD agent fornumerous programs of nationalinterest.

• DSWA will be the principal

agent to carry out CTR programs to reduce the risksassociated with the FormerSoviet Union’s nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.As national policy evolves withrespect to CTR, so will DSWA’simplementation program. Ifother potential proliferantseliminate their WMD stockpiles,additional CTR programs maybe established.

• DSWA is likely to continue as

the lead DoD agency fordeveloping and validatingtechnologies for use in armscontrol monitoring.

• Technical collaboration with

other nations for work onmatters of mutual interest islikely to continue in line withnational policy direction.

• Finally, DSWA is likely to be

tasked to support the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense andother authorities in management of the human health andenvironmental consequencesthat have resulted from nuclearand other designated activities.


4-5: Computer, Dark Sun, Simon & Schuster,

New York, 1995, pg. 50.

4-6: Teller, Los Alamos National Laboratory

photo.

4-7: MacArthur, LIFE: The Fifties, pg. 423.4-8: Nixon/Eisenhower, UPI photo from Our

Glorious Century, pg. 270.

4-9: Event DOG blast, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-10: Firing party, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-11: GRABLE test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-12: Tank in Korea, Chronicle of America,

pg. 754.

4-13: Area 7, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-14: Personnel observing test, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

4-15: Operation GREENHOUSE, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

4-16: Pilot protection, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-17: Blast on structures, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

4-18: Blast on structures, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

4-19: MIKE, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).4-20: Aircraft washdown, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

Discovery5-1: Sputnik model, Our Glorious Century, pg.

290.

5-2: Nixon/Kennedy, Time-Warner Inc. photo

from Our Glorious Century, pg. 305.

5-3: Fallout shelter/sign, LIFE The First Fifty

Years, pg. 159.

5-4: Kennedy, UPI/Bettmann archives, from The

Way We Were, Caroll & Graff Publishers,Inc., New York, 1988, pg. 65.

5-5: New York Times, A Newspaper History of

the World, pg. 150.

5-6: Castro/Khruschev, Reader’s Digest, pg. 50.5-7: TRUCKEE Event, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-8: Glenn, Our Glorious Century, pg. 50.5-9: U-2, Our Glorious Century, pg. 295.5-10: Berlin Wall, American Forces in Berlin,

Department of Defense, GPO, 1994. pg.103.

5-11: Redstone missile, Reflections, pg. 8-35.5-12: SAC B-52, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-13: Nike-Hercules missile, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

5-14: Khruschev, Carl Mydans-LIFE, from The

Best of Life, pp. 84, 85.

5-15: RB-57D aircraft, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-16: BRAVO test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-17: TEAPOT MET, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-18: Decontamination, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

5-19: Johnston Atoll, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).5-20: Kennedy signs LTBT, The Way We Were,

pg. 158.

Strategic Deterrence6-1: JFK funeral, Our Times, pg. 464.6-2: Anti-war poster, Winds of Change: 1960-

1970, Time/Life, Alexandria, Virginia,1970, pg. 220.

6-3: Johnson, Bettmann archives, from Our

Times, pg. 819.

6-4: M.L. King, LIFE: The Sixties, Doris O’Neill

editor, Time Inc., 1989, pg. 50.

6-5: Vietnam soldier, LIFE: The Sixties, pg.

219.

6-6: Vietnam Huey gunship, The Vietnam War

(Helicopter War), Marshall Cavendish,Ltd., 1988, pg. 15.

6-7: New York Times, July 21, 1969, The New

York Times Company.

6-8: Aldrin on moon, NASA photo.

6-9: Nixon, Our Glorious Century, pg. 50.6-10: Protest, Jane & Michael Stern, Sixties

People, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,1990, pg. 195.

6-11: Anti-war button, Winds of Change:

1960-1970, pg. 31.

6-12: SAGE Panel, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-13: McNamara/Rusk, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-14: Spartan missile, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-15: UGT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-16: HUDSON SEAL RV, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

6-17: Tritium facility, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-18: SAILOR HAT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-19: SAILOR HAT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-20: DIAMOND SCULLS, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

6-21: SEDAN crater, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).6-22: Glasstone volume, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

Deterrence with Nuclear Parity7-1: Commemorative stamp, LIFE - The

Seventies, pg. 50.

7-2: “The Morning News,” Front Page History,

pg. 162.

7-3: Munich Olympics, Our Glorious Century,

pg. 50

7-4: Carter, The Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta,

GA, from The Official 1977 InauguralBook, Bantam, 1977, pg. 71.

7-5: Walesa, Our Glorious Century,

(Wesolowski/Sygma), pg. 421.

7-6: Khomeni, Harold Evans, Front Page

History, Salem House, Salem, NewHampshire, 1984. pg. 179.

7-7: Concorde, British Airways.7-8: Three Mile Island, Our Times, pg. 863.7-9: Gas shortage sign, Front Page History, pg.

161.

7-10: America’s 200th, Our Glorious Century,

pg. 369.

7-11: Vietnam evacuation, Dorothy and

Thomas Hoobler, Vietnam: Why WeForgot, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1990,pg. 177.

7-12: Afghanistan rebel, Front Page History,

pg. 50.

7-13: Nixon/Chou En-lai, 200 Years-A

Bicentennial Illustrated History, pg.282.

7-14: Silo test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).7-15: CACTUS crater dome, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

7-16: HURON KING, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).7-17: HURON KING inset, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

7-18: Pershing battery, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).7-19: HE event, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).7-20: Trident, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).7-21: EMP simulation, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Force Modernization8-1: Challenger, National Geographic, from

Our Glorious Century, pg. 417.

8-2: Reagans, Our Times, pg. 869.8-3: Tiananmen Square, Our Glorious

Century, pg. 421.

8-4: Delta II Rocket, Soviet Military Power,

Department of Defense, GPO, 1989, pg.93.

8-5: Bush, White House photo.8-6: Berlin wall, Our Glorious Century, pg.

29.

8-7: Gorbachev, Our Times, pg. 435.

8-8: USS America, Our Times, pg. 662.8-9: Space Shuttle, National Geographic, from

Our Glorious Century, pg. 417.

8-10: Peacekeeper missile, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

8-11: Microchip, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).8-12: BLACKJACK simulator, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

8-13: Soviet submarine, (DoD photo).8-14: SDI test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).8-15: ICBM warheads, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).8-16: Rail gun, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).8-17: EMPRESS test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).Post-Cold War Priorities9-1: Clinton, Reuters, from Our Glorious

Century, pg. 435.

9-2: Hussein, Nita M. Renfrew, Saddam

Hussein, Chelsea House Publishers,1992, pg. 80.

9-3: Powell, Associated Press, Wide World

photo.

9-4: F-117, (DoD photo).9-5: Oklahoma City bombing, by Jim Argo,

copyright 1995, Oklahoma PublishingCompany (from the April 20, 1995 issueof The Daily Oklahoman).

9-6: Yelsin, Our Glorious Century, pg. 423.

9-7: Bosnia map, Our Times, pg. 662.9-8: Soldier with laptop, Strategic Assessments

1996, National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,GPO, 1996, pg. 81.

9-9: Kuwait citizen, Santiago Lyon/Reuters/

Bettmann archives, from War in theGulf, Turner Publishing Inc., 1991, pg.212.

9-10: Schwartzkopf, War in the Gulf, pg. 104.9-11: Iraqi shelter, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).9-12: Treaty signing, (DoD photo).9-13: DNWS, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).9-14: Computational aids, (DSWA/DASIAC

photo).

9-15: S&TD (DSWA/DASIAC photo).Future Challenges10-1: Maj. Gen. Curtin (DSWA/DASIAC photo).10-2: Dr. Ullrich (DSWA/DASIAC photo).
33

ion

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cco

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f,

n

CTR - Cooperative Threat

Reduction

DARE - Data Archival and Retrieval

Enhancement

DASA- Defense Atomic Support

Agency

DASIAC - DoD Nuclear

Information Analysis Center(formerly Defense AtomicSupport InformationAnalysis Center)

DDR&E - Director, Defense

Research and Engineering

DEW - Distant Early WarningDIA- Defense Intelligence AgencyDIHEST - Direct-Induced High

Explosive SimulationTechnique

DNA - Defense Nuclear AgencyDNWS - Defense Nuclear Weapons

School

DoD - Department of DefenseDODDAC - Department of Defense

Damage Assessment Center

DOE - Department of EnergyDSCS - Defense Satellite

Communication System

DSWA - Defense Special Weapons

Agency

EM - ElectromagneticEM-1 - Effects Manual-1EMP- Electromagnetic PulseEMPRESS - EMP Radiation Effects

Simulator for Ships

ETC - Electrothermal Chemical

FEMA - Federal Emergency

Management Agency

FSU - Former Soviet UnionGLCM - Ground Launched Cruise

Missile

HA - High AltitudeHASP - High Altitude Sampling

Program

HE - High ExplosiveHEST - High Explosive Simulation

Technique

HF - High FrequencyHILAT - High LatitudeHML - Hardened Mobile LauncherHPC - High Performance

Computing

HPCC - High Performance

Computing andCommunications

ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile

INF - Intermediate Nuclear ForcesJCS - Joint Chiefs of StaffJSTPS - Joint Strategic Target

Planning Staff

JTF - Joint Task ForceLANL - Los Alamos National

Laboratory

LLNL - Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory

LBTS - Large Blast/Thermal

Simulator

LTBT - Limited Test Ban TreatyMC - Military Committee

MED- Manhattan Engineer DistrictMIRV - Multiple Independently

Targeted Reentry Vehicle

NARP - Nuclear Weapon Accident

Response Procedure

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

NCB - Nuclear, Chemical and

Biological

NPR - Nuclear Posture ReviewNSC - National Security CouncilNTPR - Nuclear Test Personnel

Review

NTS - Nevada Test SiteNUWAX - Nuclear Weapon Accident

Exercise

OSD - Office of the Secretary of

Defense

OSRD - Office of Scientific

Research and Development

PHETS - Permanent High

Explosives Test Site

psi - pounds per square inchRB - Reentry BodyRV - Reentry VehicleSAC - Strategic Air CommandSACEUR - Supreme Allied

Commander Europe

SAGE - Scientific Advisory Group

on Effects

SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation

Treaty

SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative

SGEMP - System Generated

Electromagnetic Pulse

SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters

Allied Powers Europe

SIOP - Single Integrated

Operational Plan

SLBM - Submarine Launched

Ballistic Missile

SPO - System Program OfficeSRAM-II - Short Range Attack

Missile-II

START - Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty

STP - Silo Test ProgramSTRATCOM - U.S. Strategic

Command

SWEG - Special Weapons Effects

Group

TAPS - Targeting and Planning

System

TEMPS - Transportable EMP

Simulator

TTCP - The Technical Coordinating

Panel

UN - United NationsUGT - Underground TestU.S. - United StatesUSAF - United States Air ForceUSEUCOM - United States

European Command

VNTK - Vulnerability Number/Type

(of Target)/K-factor

WMD - Weapons of Mass

Destruction
DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

50th Anniversary 1947-1997

— Defense Special Weapons Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3398 —

http://www.dswa.mil

0YEARS