SAND 2005-4957 

July 2005 

________________________________________________________________________ 

The Role of Transparency in 

Achieving Strategic Stability in 

South Asia 

Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf 

Islamabad, Pakistan 

and 

Dr. Arpit Rajain 

New Delhi, India 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 

________________________________________________________________ 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by 

Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, 

For the United States Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

4 

The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists 

political and technical experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based 

tools they need to assess, design, analyze, and implement nonproliferation, arms control, 

and other cooperative security measures. As part of its mission, the CMC sponsors 

research on cooperative security and the role of technology. Reports of that work are 

provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research is conducted by Sandia staff, 

international technical experts, and visiting scholars. (The CMC’s Visiting Scholars 

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on the World Wide Web at <http://www.cmc.sandia.gov> or write to: 

Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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Mail Stop 1373 

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For specific information on this report contact: 

Michael Vannoni at the above address. 

This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

5

Abstract 

According to international relations theory, deterrence can be used as a tool to achieve 

stability between potentially hostile nations. India and Pakistan’s long history of periodic 

crises raises the question of how they can achieve deterrence stability. “Transparency” 

describes the flow of information between parties and plays a key role in establishing a 

deterrence relationship. This paper studies the balance needed between opacity and 

transparency in nuclear topics for the maintenance of deterrence stability between India 

and Pakistan. States with nuclear weapons are postulated to implement transparency in 

four categories: potential, capability, intent, and resolve. The study applies these 

categories to the nuclear components of the ongoing India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue 

Working Group for Peace and Security including CBMs. To focus our efforts, we defined 

four scenarios to characterize representative strategic/military/political conditions. The 

scenarios are combinations of these two sets of opposite poles: competition – 

cooperation; extremism – moderation (to be understood primarily in a religious/ 

nationalistic sense). We describe each scenario in terms of select focal areas (nuclear 

doctrine, nuclear command and control, nuclear stockpile, nuclear delivery/defensive 

systems, and conventional force posture). The scenarios help frame the realm of 

possibilities, and have been described in terms of expected conditions for the focal areas. 

We then use the conditions in each scenario to prescribe a range of information-sharing 

actions that the two countries could take to increase stability. We also highlight the 

information that should not be shared. These actions can be political (e.g., declarations), 

procedural (e.g., advance notice of certain military activities), or technologically based 

(e.g., seismic monitoring of the nuclear test moratorium). 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

6 

Acknowledgements 

This research assignment began as a challenge in many ways: firstly, this is probably the 

first focused attempt at bringing the theoretical concepts of transparency and opacity into 

the realm of tangible practicality; secondly, most of the collaboration had to be 

undertaken from a distance via video and teleconferences, with the two principal 

researchers never getting an opportunity to be together; and, thirdly, the situation on the 

ground in South Asia has been in such a state of flux that the research group had to 

continuously keep abreast of these developments for fear of drifting into irrelevance and 

obsolescence. It must be highlighted here that though only two members of the research 

team have been indicated as the authors of this report, it would be seriously remiss on our 

part if the immense intellectual and administrative contributions of Mike Vannoni, Laura 

McNamara, and Gaurav Rajen in conditioning the final shape of this paper were not 

acknowledged and appreciated. 

 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

7

Table of Contents 

Table of Contents................................................................................................................ 7 

Preface................................................................................................................................. 9 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 10 

1. Opacity and Transparency—Relevance to Strategic Stability..................................... 13 

1.1 The Concept of Opacity and Transparency ............................................................ 13 

1.2 Opacity / Transparency and Nuclear Deterrence.................................................... 15 

1.3 Ongoing Nuclear Transparency in South Asia ....................................................... 16 

2. Current State of India-Pakistan Relations..................................................................... 19 

2.1 Salient Past India-Pakistan Accords, Pacts, and Agreements................................. 19 

2.2 The Current India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue................................................... 20 

2.3 Assessment of the Composite Dialogue ................................................................. 21 

3. A Future View of India-Pakistan Relations and Strategic Stability ............................. 23 

3.1 Scenario Building for Insight into Future Trends................................................... 23 

3.2 Defining Criteria for Future India-Pakistan Relations............................................ 23 

3.3 Focal Areas in the ‘Peace and Security including CBMs’ topic............................. 25 

3.4 Descriptions of Expected Focal Area Conditions for Each Scenario ..................... 25 

3.4.1 Extremism and Competition Scenario ................................................................. 25 

3.5 Moving Toward Strategic Stability......................................................................... 29 

4. Options for Using Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability ............................... 30 

4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 30

4.2 Scenario 1: Extremism and Competition ................................................................ 31 

4.3 Scenario 2: Extremism and Cooperation ................................................................ 33 

4.4 Scenario 3: Moderation and Competition............................................................... 35 

4.5 Scenario 4: Moderation and Cooperation ............................................................... 38 

5. Conclusions................................................................................................................... 43 

Appendix A Elaborated Description of Select Topics in the............................................ 45 

Composite Dialogue Process ............................................................................................ 45 

Appendix B Summary of Current Status of...................................................................... 47 

Composite Dialog Working Groups ................................................................................. 47 

Appendix C Joint India-Pakistan Statements.................................................................... 49 

on the Composite Dialog .................................................................................................. 49 

Tables 

Table 1: Salient Aspects of India-Pakistan Agreements and Accords.............................. 19 

Table 2. Extremism and Competition Scenario ................................................................ 26 

Table 3. Extremism and Cooperation Scenario ................................................................ 27 

Table 4. Moderation and Competition Scenario............................................................... 28 

Table 5. Moderation and Cooperation Scenario .............................................................. 29 

Table 6. Conditions Selected for Analysis for Various Scenarios.................................... 31 

Table 7. Scenario: Extremism and Competition............................................................... 33 

Table 8. Scenario: Extremism and Cooperation ............................................................... 35 

Table 9. Scenario: Moderation and Competition.............................................................. 37 

Table 10. Moderation and Cooperation ............................................................................ 40
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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Figures 

Figure 1: How Transparency Supports Stable Nuclear Deterrence.................................. 15 

Figure 2: The Current Balance of Opacity/Transparency for India and Pakistan in Each 

Transparency Category ..................................................................................................... 17 

Figure 3: Progress on various issues in the CD ................................................................ 21 

Figure 4: Scenario Determinants and Possible Scenarios................................................. 24 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

9

Preface 

When Henry Kissinger went to India in 1974 after the first Indian nuclear test, he said to 

Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister at the time, “You have the bomb. Now what do 

we do to keep from blowing up the world?” Since then, the cold war has ended and India 

tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. In response, Pakistan promptly conducted its own 

series of nuclear tests. Kissinger’s question now has even more resonance in the region. 

After the May 1998 tests, some analysts thought that the overt possession of nuclear 

weapons by India and Pakistan would actually be beneficial for the region. The clarity of 

this knowledge would make conflict between the two long-term rivals obsolete. 

Unfortunately this was not the case. India and Pakistan fought a small-scale war in the 

Kargil sector of Kashmir in 1999. In 2002 both countries mobilized their entire militaries 

along their border for nearly a year. Diplomatic relations were nearly broken while each 

country engaged in signaling, using statements, missile tests, and military deployments. 

In both of these confrontations, the potential for the use of nuclear weapons was a 

dangerous possibility that both countries and the world had to contend with. There were 

concerns and allegations that both countries had prepared nuclear weapons and mobilized 

delivery systems. Third parties—particularly the United States—acted in a facilitating 

role and outright war was avoided. 

India and Pakistan have a long history of periodic crises caused by a number of factors, 

but a recurrent theme is the perception (or misperception) of a military threat by the 

other. The role of third party facilitation in these crises—particularly the selective 

provision of information and the transmission of national intent—raises a larger question 

of strategy. How should nations define and implement their national defense strategies to 

maximize the potential for stability? 

The Cooperative Monitoring Center of Sandia National Laboratories is devoted to 

defining how the cooperative sharing of information can play a constructive role in 

national security. Technology for monitoring, authenticating, and transmitting 

information can play an important facilitating role. This project unites a pair of regional 

security experts to research how a strategy for stability in nuclear South Asia can be 

achieved by selectively sharing security-related information (i.e., the use of 

“transparency” and “opacity”). 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

10 

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Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

How should nations define and implement their national defense strategies to maximize 

the potential for stability? India and Pakistan have a long history of periodic crises caused 

by a number of factors, but a recurrent theme is the perception (or misperception) of a 

military threat by the other. “Deterrence” is defined in international relations literature as 

a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that 

the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits. 

“Transparency” describes the flow of information and knowledge between parties. The 

level of transparency that a state maintains, however, is a double-edged sword—while a 

certain degree of transparency can stabilize a situation by reinforcing deterrence, too 

much transparency could be destabilizing as it might expose vulnerabilities and tempt an 

opponent to consider a preemptive strike. Similarly, total opacity can also be 

destabilizing, because it would not allow a sufficient sharing of information regarding a 

state’s strengths to deter an adversary. Countries must balance transparency and opacity, 

but how to do so is a strategic conundrum. 

In South Asia, the India-Pakistan relationship has a history of mistrust and confrontation, 

and so opacity rather than transparency characterizes their relationship. India and 

Pakistan have, however, used transparency in four categories of national nuclear strategy 

to bolster deterrence stability. 

• Potential: Both countries conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. 

• Capability: Both countries are conducting numerous missile tests and 

establishing nuclear-oriented command and field units within the military. 

• Intent: India has publicly circulated documents related to a draft nuclear doctrine 

in 1999, as well as enunciated the broad contours of its official doctrine in 2003. 

Pakistani leaders have made comments and statements that provide some insight 

as to what their doctrine might include. 

• Resolve: President Musharraf made various statements about Pakistan’s readiness 

to use nuclear weapons during the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan crises. Indian Prime 

Minister Atal Vehari Bajpayee and the Defence Minister George Fernandes made 

similar statements. 

On January 6, 2004, India and Pakistan began a diplomatic process of talks aimed at 

creating a durable peace. They have re-initiated the Composite Dialogue (CD) made up 

of eight working groups (these were first begun in late 1998, and stopped during the 1999 

Kargil crisis). The CD categories are: 1) Peace and Security including CBMs; 2) Jammu 

and Kashmir; 3) Siachen Glacier; 4) Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; 5) Sir 

Creek Land/Maritime Boundary; 6) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; 7) Economic and 

Commercial Cooperation; and 8) Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields. 

Although progress has occurred, there is a difference of opinion within India and Pakistan 

(and between the authors) as to how substantive the progress is (the Pakistani view 

generally being more pessimistic). The use and acceptance of transparency plays a role in 

all these negotiations. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

12 

This study focuses on the role for transparency in the Peace and Security including CBMs

CD topic. The authors used a scenario-building process originally developed for strategic 

business planning to identify driving forces affecting the future and the characteristics of 

these scenarios. The major drivers are the degree to which India and Pakistan are 

governed by religious/nationalist versus secular parties and the tendency to compete or 

cooperate. These drivers were combined to define four scenarios that characterize 

representative strategic/military/political conditions. The scenarios were used to assess 

the effects on key focal areas in the Peace and Security including CBMs CD topic. 

Scenarios Focal Areas 

• Competition and Moderation 

• Competition and Extremism 

• Cooperation and Moderation 

• Cooperation and Extremism 

• Nuclear doctrine 

• Nuclear command and control 

• Nuclear stockpile and nuclear 

delivery/defensive systems 

• Conventional force posture 

The scenarios are described through sets of expected conditions for each focal area. We 

then select for each scenario a set of these descriptive conditions and suggest actions that 

would help stabilize that condition. These actions could be incorporated into national 

nuclear strategic policies within the context of each scenario. These actions can be 

political (e.g., declarations), procedural (e.g., advance notice of certain military 

activities), or technologically based (e.g., seismic monitoring of the nuclear test 

moratorium). 

A significant amount of discussion, negotiation, and planning needs to be done at the 

working group level of the CD or other bilateral forum to implement these options. The 

region must break the optimism/pessimism cycle of relations by achieving a “basic 

minimum level” of stability. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

13

1. Opacity and Transparency—Relevance to Strategic 

Stability 

1.1 The Concept of Opacity and Transparency 

According to Berkhout and Walker, “Transparency is about the flow of information and 

knowledge between parties.”1

 It essentially deals with making something visible or 

providing information to another party. Two vital questions that emerge are, “who sees?” 

and “what do they see?”2 Since transparency relates to information that is shared, 

“opacity” describes information that is not shared. Opacity is thus the complement to 

transparency. 

Transparency is a subtle concept. It is not necessarily synonymous with “confidence 

building” although the two concepts are linked. For example, two competitive states with 

no trust in each other may choose to make declarations or conduct actions to demonstrate 

their resolve and capability. These actions seek to deter or coerce the other. However, in 

the absence of any information, a competitor may make a misjudgment to the detriment 

of both. The relationship between the US and USSR during the Cold War of the 1950s is 

an example of this situation. Hence, we make the seemingly paradoxical observation that 

the right level of transparency is even more important when relations are bad than when 

they are good. This is not to say that transparency is not important in a relationship that is 

improving or relatively favorable and stable. In the first case, selective transparency 

reassures the other party—it is a confidence-building measure. In the latter, it reaffirms to 

the other party that conditions and assumptions about behavior have not changed. The 

relationship between the US and USSR in the 1980s and the relationship between the US 

and the Former Soviet States today are examples of the former and latter situations 

respectively. 

The level of transparency, or its openness, that a state maintains is a double-edged sword. 

While a certain degree of transparency can stabilize a situation or relationship, too much 

transparency could be destabilizing because it might expose vulnerabilities and tempt an 

opponent to consider aggressive actions. Similarly, total opacity can also be destabilizing, 

as it would not allow a sufficient sharing of information regarding a state’s strengths and 

intentions to deter an adversary. Although countries must balance transparency and 

opacity, “it is unclear where an ideal demarcation between transparency and secrecy 

should lie.”3

The strategic conundrum is how to blend the use of transparency and opacity in order to 

gain the benefits of both. As Berkhout and Walker point out, “Opacity was one of the 

 

1

 Frank Berkhout and William Walker, “Transparency and Fissile Materials.” Disarmament Forum, Issue 2 

(1999): 73. 

2

 Ibid, 76. 

3

 Annette Schaper, “Looking for a Demarcation between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy.” 

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) Reports No. 68 (2004): 1. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

14 

founding principles of the nuclear age.”4

 Over time, the US and the USSR were able to 

establish an environment of selective transparency, but the same is not yet true of the 

newest nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan. 

During a recent Pugwash conference on nuclear stability in South Asia,5 delegates could 

be divided into two groups—the deterrence optimists and the deterrence pessimists—in 

regards to their opinions on the roles of transparency and opacity. As participant Samina 

Ahmed wrote: 

Nuclear optimists supported opacity on the grounds that declared thresholds and 

redlines undermine operational flexibility and increase nuclear risks during crises. 

Proponents of opacity also argued that transparency only works in the absence of 

conflict and with at least a semblance of communications between nuclear 

adversaries. Absent these preconditions, as in the case of India and Pakistan, 

transparency can be counterproductive. In any case, nuclear doctrines are often 

misleading and at variance with operational plans. By keeping deterrence vague and 

by avoiding explication of red lines, Pakistan can also avoid a nuclear arms race 

with India and keep its weapons un-deployed.6

The strategic use of opacity and transparency is thus linked to deterrence. Michael 

Howard has defined deterrence as a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through 

the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political 

conflict will outweigh the benefits.7 For a policy of deterrence stability to work, there 

must be an understanding of national intent and capability on both sides of the divide. 

Deterrence also represents an evolutionary relationship that can build confidence through 

reciprocity.8

 As an evolving strategy, actions for opacity and transparency must strike a 

balance among three somewhat conflicting requirements: 

• what a state wants its adversaries to know 

• what a state can afford to disclose 

• what potential adversaries want to know about capabilities and potential. 

In this study, for brevity we use “transparency” to describe information that is 

deliberately shared between states on security topics and assume that all information not 

included in the description of sharing is “opaque.” Therefore anything that is not stated to 

be transparent is opaque. 

 

4

 Berkhout and Walker, op. cit., 73. 

5

 Samina Ahmed, Workshop Report on Pugwash Meeting No. 280 held at Lahore, 11-12 March 2003, on 

the theme of “Avoiding an India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation.” Complete text of the report is available 

at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/march2003/pakistan2003-workshop-report.htm 6

 Ibid. 

7

 Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980’s,” Foreign Affairs, 61, no. 

2: 315 

8

 Samina Ahmed, op. cit. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

15

1.2 Opacity / Transparency and Nuclear Deterrence 

There are four key demonstrations a country might make about its nuclear weapons 

program once the country has gone overtly nuclear. These are transparency of potential, 

transparency of capability, transparency of intent, and transparency of resolve. These are 

four distinct “pillars” on which stable nuclear deterrence rests, as illustrated conceptually 

in Figure 1. Shaun Gregory and Maria Sultan make a similar assessment. They describe 

deterrence stability as follows: “that each side is credibly deterred (in relation to threats to 

core norms, values, and interests) by the other and thus there is no uncertainty in the 

minds of parties about the pillars upon which deterrence rests: (a) possessing the means 

to deter; (b) ability to undertake a deterrent threat; (c) willingness to undertake deterrent 

threat; (d) assured control of deterrent forces; (e) rational adversary making expected 

cost-benefit calculus.”9

Transparency of Potential: Conducting nuclear tests and displaying the potential to 

weaponize demonstrate this capability. Prior to this state, a country’s nuclear weapons 

program exists in complete opacity. 

Transparency of Capability: Conducting actions (e.g., missile tests) that demonstrate 

the capability of delivering nuclear weapons. 

Transparency of Intent: The controlled and public announcement of nuclear doctrine 

and/or nuclear policy indicating how, why, when, and under what circumstances a 

country is likely to resort to using nuclear weapons demonstrates intent. 

Transparency of Resolve: Resolve is demonstrated by statements by national leaders 

indicating the will to employ nuclear weapons or increasing the readiness of strategic 

forces during a crisis. 

Figure 1: How Transparency Supports Stable Nuclear Deterrence 

 

9

 Shaun Gregory and Maria Sultan, “Towards Strategic Stability in South Asia: Framework paper for the 

launch conference of the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit,” Department of Peace Studies, University of 

Bradford, UK, October 7–8, 2004. POTENTIAL

CAPABILITY

INTENT

RESOLVE

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STABILITY CAPABILITY INTENT RESOLVENUCLEAR DETERRENCE STABILITY STABLE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

16 

For each of the “pillars” in Figure 1, if the right mix of transparency and opacity is not 

achieved, the pillar becomes unstable and fails. In this descriptive model, we assume that 

if even one pillar fails, then stable nuclear deterrence cannot exist. 

1.3 Ongoing Nuclear Transparency in South Asia 

In South Asia, the India-Pakistan relationship has a history of mistrust and confrontation, 

and so opacity rather than transparency characterizes the regional environment.10

However, India and Pakistan at times have taken some steps towards greater 

transparency. 

India and Pakistan demonstrated their nuclear potential after conducting nuclear tests in 

May 1998. 

India and Pakistan have demonstrated capability by conducting over 50 missile tests and 

announced the establishment of dedicated military organizations for command and 

control of units equipped with nuclear weapons. 

India has demonstrated intent by publishing a draft nuclear doctrine for public comment 

in 1999.11 Although Pakistan has not publicly presented its nuclear doctrine, statements 

by officials have provided a sense of its characteristics. In addition, military leaders have 

demonstrated intent in the formulation of service branch doctrines. For example, the 

Indian Navy recently announced its Maritime Doctrine,12 which clearly enunciates the 

imperative for a nuclear triad in India’s nuclear arsenal. None of the three military 

services of Pakistan have released any similar documents that address the issue of nuclear 

weapons development or employment. Even the revised second edition of the Pakistan 

Air Force’s Basic Air Power Doctrine issued in January of 2004 skirts this issue. 

With respect to resolve, President Musharraf made various statements about Pakistan’s 

readiness to use nuclear weapons during the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan military standoff 

(referred to by India as Operation Parakaram). Similar statements were made by the 

former Indian Prime Minister Atal Vehari Bajpayee and the former Indian Defence 

Minister George Fernandes. Although there have been some unconfirmed reports that 

 

10 Samina Ahmed, op cit. 

11 In 1999, India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) prepared a report for India’s National 

Security Council that dealt with options for India to consider in creating a nuclear doctrine. The document 

is called the “Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine.”

The report was widely circulated by the government to generate dialogue and discussion, and came to be 

known as India’s “Draft Nuclear Doctrine.” This report, however, was never officially accepted; it has been 

superseded by an official pronouncement on January 4, 2003. On this day, the Prime Minister’s Office 

distributed a press release that described conclusions reached by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 

operationalizing India’s nuclear doctrine. This press release defines the broad contours of India’s official 

nuclear doctrine. 

12 Tariq Ashraf, “Indian Maritime Doctrine,” Defence Journal (Karachi) August 2004: 72-86. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

17

Pakistan and India had brought nuclear forces to a higher level of readiness towards the 

later part of the Kargil conflict of 1999, these were never officially substantiated. 13

Potential Capability Intent Resolve 

Pakistan’s state of opacity/ transparency 

India’s state of opacity/ transparency 

India’s and Pakistan’s states of opacity/ transparency are the same 

Figure 2: The Current Balance of Opacity/Transparency for India and Pakistan in Each 

Transparency Category 

Figure 2 presents a chart summarizing the authors’ assessment of India’s and Pakistan’s 

current positions for each pillar of the stable nuclear deterrence model. India and Pakistan 

are equally transparent (and therefore opaque) for the pillars of potential and capability. 

In the case of potential, they are now almost totally transparent. In the case of capability

they are partially transparent. In the case of intent and resolve, the two countries differ 

quite a bit, with India being much more transparent. 

Figure 2 expresses the divergence that exists between India and Pakistan on the 

acceptance and use of transparency. The gap between the two countries in expressing 

their intent and resolve increases the risks of misperceptions and miscalculations. 

 

13 Bruce Riedel was an Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asia 

Affairs in the National Security Council at the White House from 1997 to 2001. He has published a Policy 

Paper at the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania on “American 

Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House.” (May 2002). In this paper, Reidel reports that 

President Clinton informed the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the US was aware that Pakistani 

nuclear forces had been brought to a higher state of readiness. In the case of India, according to Raj 

Chengappa, India had activated its three types of nuclear delivery vehicles during the Kargil Crisis and kept 

them in what is known as Readiness State 3 (meaning that some nuclear bombs would be ready to be mated 

with the delivery vehicle at short notice). Weapons of Peace, (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), 437 

Totally transparent 

Mostly transparent 

Partially opaque and 

selectively transparent 

Mostly opaque 

Totally opaque 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

18 

The use of transparency/opacity in implementing a nuclear deterrence strategy is highly 

situational. Actions that worked between particular countries or in a specific region may 

not be applicable in other circumstances. A nuclear deterrence strategy must reflect the 

balance of power among the parties, and unique political, cultural, economic, and 

geographic characteristics of the region. 

India and Pakistan have not yet achieved a stable deterrence relationship. This paper 

takes a systematic approach to identifying the topics and options for transparency that 

could facilitate the development of such a relationship. To evolve from the present to a 

new relationship built on stable nuclear deterrence, we must understand the current state 

of bilateral relations and postulate how the relationship could evolve in the future. Within 

the context of these postulated future states, we can define objectives that shift the 

relationship toward stability. Once objectives are defined, we can then identify options 

for the use of opacity/transparency to achieve the objectives. 

The following chapters elaborate on this process. Chapter 2 assesses the current state of 

India-Pakistan relations with emphasis on the ongoing CD process. Chapter 3 analyzes 

the dominant forces affecting bilateral relations and defines several future scenarios. 

Chapter 4 focuses on specific actions that use transparency to achieve the desired future 

conditions that support strategic stability based on deterrence. Chapter 5 provides some 

concluding remarks. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

19

2. Current State of India-Pakistan Relations 

2.1 Salient Past India-Pakistan Accords, Pacts, and Agreements 

Ever since the partition of British India into the two independent states of Pakistan and 

India in 1947, the subcontinent of South Asia has been one of the most volatile regions of 

the world. Disputes and memories resulting from the process of partition, the rivalry 

between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and other contentious issues have erupted into 

three major wars between India and Pakistan. The war in 1971 ended with the 

dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh out of the eastern wing of 

Pakistan. In 1999 and 2002, the two countries again came close to outright war. 

Yet interspersed within the lingering India-Pakistan atmosphere of hostility have been 

instances where India and Pakistan have gone to the negotiating table and signed binding 

agreements. Most of these agreements have successfully weathered the vicissitudes of 

time. Although these accords have not ushered in lasting peace or stability, they have 

served to bring about periods of relative peace. Table 1 presents a list of these accords 

and agreements. 

Table 1: Salient Aspects of India-Pakistan Agreements and Accords 

Accord / 

Agreement 

Precipitating 

Event 

International 

Involvement 

Role Of 

Transparency 

UN Resolution 

on Kashmir 

India-Pakistan war 

of 1948 

Yes 

(United Nations) 

Low 

Liaqat-Nehru 

Agreement on 

Minorities (1950) 

The Partition of 

India/Creation of 

Pakistan 

No None 

Indus Waters 

Treaty 

Water distribution 

dispute 

Yes 

(World Bank) 

High 

Tashkent Accord India-Pakistan war 

of 1965 

Yes 

(Soviet Union) 

None 

Simla Agreement India-Pakistan war 

of 1971 

No None 

Agreement on 

Prevention of 

Airspace 

Violations and 

for Permitting 

Over Flights and 

Landings by 

Military Aircraft 

(April 1991) 

Conventional CBM, 

possibly with 1986 

and 1990 crises in 

mind 

No None 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

20 

Table1 (continued): Salient aspects of India-Pakistan agreements and accords 

Agreement on 

Advance Notice 

of Military 

Exercises, 

Maneuvers, and 

Troop 

Movements 

(April 1991) 

Crises of 1986 and 

1990 

No Low-Medium 

Agreement on 

non-attack of 

each other’s 

nuclear 

installations 

(1991) 

Probable realization 

by both that they 

had developed 

nuclear weapons 

capability 

No Medium 

Joint Declaration 

on the Complete 

Prohibition of 

Chemical 

Weapons 

(August 1992) 

Negotiation of the 

international 

Chemical Weapons 

Convention 

Yes None 

Lahore 

Memorandum of 

Understanding 

(Feb. 1999) 

Nuclear weapon 

tests of 1998 

Indirect 

international 

pressures 

Low-Medium 

A survey of these accords and agreements highlights the following significant common 

aspects: 

• India-Pakistan dialogues/agreements have generally followed major regional 

conflicts or events and global factors. 

• Most India-Pakistan dialogues leading to agreements have involved either direct 

international intervention or indirect international pressures. 

• Most India-Pakistan agreements have tended to be issue-specific and focused 

rather than being wide-ranging. 

• The stipulations of these agreements have been adhered to by both India and 

Pakistan even during periods of hostility, tension, and war. 

2.2 The Current India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue 

The level of animosity and mistrust engendered by this history is still high. However, 

since January 6, 2004, India and Pakistan have begun a diplomatic process called the 

Composite Dialogue (CD). The CD first began in late 1998, but stalled by mid-1999 

because of the Kargil crisis. The CD is attempting to resolve the most pressing concerns 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

21

in eight working groups, building upon past agreements and treaties. The CD topics that 

the two countries have agreed to address through working groups are: 

• Peace and security including CBMs 

• Jammu and Kashmir 

• Siachen Glacier 

• Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project 

• Sir Creek Maritime Boundary 

• Terrorism and drug trafficking 

• Economic and commercial cooperation 

• Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. 

Appendix A provides a brief description of those topics whose titles are not selfexplanatory. 

The issues being addressed are not directly interlinked. Therefore progress on one is not 

necessarily tied with progress on another. While most of the issues included in the CD are 

specific and focused, the issue of Peace and Security including CBMs is wide ranging 

and broad based. The issues of Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek (that are related to 

territorial disputes) could well be described as sub-issues of the same. 

2.3 Assessment of the Composite Dialogue 

Despite the fact that both India and Pakistani are genuinely interested in pursuing the CD 

and the fact that a significant number of meetings have already been held, substantial 

progress has yet to occur. This is not to say, however, that no progress has been made on 

any of the issues. Appendix B summarizes activity in each of the eight topical working 

groups. Using a scale of 1–10 with one representing minimum progress and ten depicting 

maximum, the current state of progress of the negotiations on each issue can be depicted 

as shown in Figure 3. 

 Progress 

Issue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 

Peace, Security, and CBMs 

Jammu and Kashmir 

Siachen 

Wullar/Tulbul Project 

Sir Creek 

Terrorism/Drugs 

Economic and Commercial 

Cooperation 

 

Friendly exchanges 

 Tariq Ashraf’s (Pakistan) opinion regarding progress 

 Arpit Rajain’s (India) opinion regarding progress 

Figure 3: Progress on various issues in the CD 
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Several themes emerge from our analysis of the progress achieved so far in the CD: 

• Both Ashraf and Rajain have fairly divergent views on the degree of progress that 

has been achieved during the negotiations held so far on the issues included in the 

CD. 

• Neither of the two authors thinks that any significant progress has been made in 

any of the eight issues. Rajain rates friendly exchanges the highest at 6. 

• Progress in the CD remains a function of the dynamic political-strategic 

environment, which in turn is affected by several variables. Relations could 

change drastically if there were a shock to the system. 

• Ashraf emerges as being the pessimist out of the two while Rajain exhibits 

significantly more optimism. 

• Only on one issue do both Ashraf and Rajain have a similar assessment of the 

progress achieved so far (Issue 3: Siachen). 

Among all of the issues addressed in the CD, it is the issue of Peace and Security 

including CBMs that involves nuclear stability. The issues of Jammu and Kashmir and 

the Siachen glacier have a major bearing on the possibility of conventional military 

conflict; so, indirectly, these two issues are also linked to the issue of nuclear stability (as 

a conventional conflict once started could escalate into a conflict with a nuclear 

dimension). 

Consequently, this paper focuses only on the CD topic of Peace and Security including 

CBMs. India and Pakistan have held a series of meetings on possible nuclear CBMs. 

These CBMs could include a role for an opacity/transparency strategy. These meetings 

involved experts and the Foreign Secretaries of both countries. Appendix C provides the 

joint statements issued after the most recent meetings. 

In the next chapter, we analyze the forces affecting future bilateral relations and the 

prospect for cooperation. We used the technique of building scenarios of future IndiaPakistan relations to identify the desired conditions associated with strategic stability. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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3. A Future View of India-Pakistan Relations and 

Strategic Stability 

3.1 Scenario Building for Insight into Future Trends 

Scenario development and analysis is a thinking technique used very effectively by Peter 

Schwartz, one of several founders of the Global Business Networks (GBN).14 The 

scenario development process was implemented extensively by Royal Dutch Shell in the 

1980s, as company leaders were trying to address the problem of decision making for 

long-term, expensive capital investments under conditions of high uncertainty in the oil 

industry. It is best applied as a group elicitation and brainstorming technique. 

The scenario development process is a purely qualitative method for structuring thinking 

about the future. Groups of decision makers and/or analysts are led by a skilled facilitator 

in identifying major drivers for the future of the domain in which decisions must be 

made. Drivers that can be identified and analyzed with a high level of certainty are 

excluded from the discussion (e.g., demographic trends). Discussants focus on drivers 

that are more uncertain and difficult to quantify or predict, but that can be identified as 

major trends towards change. These trends are used to create a two-axis grid that bounds 

four quadrants for further discussion and exploration. 

3.2 Defining Criteria for Future India-Pakistan Relations 

We selected two prime defining criteria related to the structure of future Indian and 

Pakistani governments and their behavior toward each other. The four determinants were 

used to construct scenarios associated with the Peace and Security including CBMs CD 

topic. The determinants are 1) whether the future Indian and Pakistani governments are 

likely to be dominated by extremist religious elements or by moderate and secular forces; 

and 2) whether future relations are likely to be shaped by competition or whether 

elements of cooperation are going to influence India-Pakistan relations. 

Based on these determinants, we created a coordinate grid with moderation and 

extremism along one axis, and cooperation and competition along another. The two sets 

of axes then create four quadrants that can be typified in four sets: 1) extremism and 

competition; 2) extremism and cooperation; 3) moderation and competition; 4) 

moderation and cooperation. Figure 4 graphically depicts the two axes and the four 

quadrants. 

 

14 Peter Schwartz, Art of the Long View, (New York: Doubleday, 1991). 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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Figure 4: Scenario Determinants and Possible Scenarios 

We describe each of these determinants below: 

Extremism: Islamist political parties control Pakistan’s national government, and similar 

Hindu-dominated political parties are in power in India. We anticipate that this possible 

future will involve frequent sectarian and communal violence in both countries. 

Moderation: A moderate and liberal government is in power in Pakistan, and a moderate 

and secular government in India. There is greater religious harmony in both countries. 

Competition: The two countries view each other as interacting in a zero-sum game, 

where gain on one’s own objectives can only come through loss for the other. Each 

particularly tries to project greater power in military and economic spheres with each 

other as well as other states. 

Cooperation: Progress on the CD improves trust and paves the way for a relationship 

between India and Pakistan that involves reciprocity to friendly overtures made by the 

other. The two countries begin to work to resolve disputes through peaceful means and 

compromise. 

MODERATION 

EXTREMISM 

EXTREMISM 

& 

COOPERATION 

EXTREMISM 

& 

COMPETITION

MODERATION 

& 

COOPERATION

MODERATION

& 

COMPETITION

COMPETITION COOPERATION 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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3.3 Focal Areas in the ‘Peace and Security including CBMs’ topic 

We used the four scenarios to assess likely progress in the key CD topic of Peace and 

Security including CBMs. To do this, we first listed focal areas that should be considered 

and possible outcomes within the context of each scenario. The focal areas we selected 

are: 

• Nuclear doctrine and operations 

• Nuclear command and control 

• Nuclear stockpile 

• Nuclear delivery/defensive systems 

• Conventional force balance 

For each of the four scenarios we have defined, we describe the expected conditions for 

each of these focal areas. The scenario of extremism and competition involves the most 

dangerous behaviors by India and Pakistan, and there is little expected progress on 

resolving contentious issues. The scenario of moderation and cooperation imagines a far 

more benign future. The other two scenarios are bracketed by these two extremes. 

3.4 Descriptions of Expected Focal Area Conditions for Each 

Scenario 

From the perspective of India-Pakistan relations, the two scenarios that include 

“extremism” as one of the determining attributes could be described as negative 

scenarios. In contrast, the ones that incorporate “moderation” as a determinant could be 

considered as positive or constructive scenarios that represent a comparatively more 

optimistic outlook for the CD. 

3.4.1 Extremism and Competition Scenario 

This is the most difficult from the point of view of incorporating an element of 

transparency in India-Pakistan relations. The expected conditions of the defined focal 

areas and the possible results for each in the Extremism and Competition scenario are 

described in Table 2. 
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 Table 2. Extremism and Competition Scenario 

Focal Area Expected Condition Effect on Stability 

Nuclear doctrine 

and operations 

• India reconsiders no-first-use pledge Nuclear thresholds 

lowered 

Nuclear command 

and control 

• Reduced military role in Pakistan’s 

nuclear command and control 

infrastructure; ascendancy of extremist 

(civilian and military) elements 

Decreased mutual 

confidence 

Nuclear stockpile • Both countries undertake new series of 

nuclear tests 

• Both countries competitively increase 

numbers of nuclear weapons 

• India and Pakistan develop and deploy a 

nuclear triad, i.e., nuclear weapons at sea 

• India develops and deploys thermonuclear 

weapons while Pakistan accelerates 

efforts to develop these weapons 

Nuclear arms race 

Nuclear delivery/ 

defensive systems 

• India deploys missile defenses 

• Both countries conduct missile tests, 

improve missile capabilities, and increase 

inventories 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft 

Increased nuclear 

instability, nuclear 

arms race. and 

lowering of 

Pakistan’s nuclear 

threshold 

Conventional force 

posture 

• Conventional force imbalance increases 

• Both countries seek qualitative 

improvements in their forces 

• Inclusion of limited conventional conflict 

below nuclear threshold in military 

doctrines 

Lowering of 

Pakistan’s nuclear 

threshold and 

increased chances 

of limited nonnuclear conflict 

3.4.2 Extremism and Cooperation Scenario 

The situation is better in this scenario than in the previous scenario. In this case, while 

both India and Pakistan are likely to further harden their respective stances on key issues, 

they might be amenable to some improvement of relations on the peripheral issues that 

bedevil their bilateral relations. The expected conditions of the defined focal areas and 

the possible results for each in the Extremism and Cooperation scenario are described in 

Table 3. 
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Table 3. Extremism and Cooperation Scenario 

Focal Area Expected Condition Effect on Stability 

Nuclear doctrine 

and operations 

• India maintains no-first-use pledge Nuclear thresholds 

maintained 

Nuclear command 

and control 

• Reduced military role in Pakistan’s nuclear 

command and control infrastructure; ascendancy 

of extremist elements 

Decreased mutual 

confidence 

Nuclear stockpile • Continued moratorium on nuclear tests 

• Both countries increase numbers of nuclear 

weapons but at a slower pace than in the 

extremism and competition scenario 

• India and Pakistan research a nuclear triad, i.e., 

nuclear weapons at sea 

• India and Pakistan research thermonuclear 

weapons 

Nuclear weapons 

development 

continues at a 

controlled pace 

Nuclear delivery/ 

defensive systems 

• India begins development of missile defenses 

• Both countries conduct missile tests, improve 

missile capabilities, and increase inventories but 

at a slower pace than in the extremism and 

competition scenario 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft 

Increased emphasis 

on conventional 

military operations 

with minimum 

credible nuclear 

deterrence potential 

being maintained 

Conventional force 

posture 

• Conventional force imbalance remains at status 

quo 

• Both countries slowly make qualitative 

improvements in their forces 

• No inclusion of limited conventional conflict 

below nuclear threshold in military doctrine 

Reduced chances of 

non-nuclear limited 

conflict 

3.4.3 Moderation and Competition Scenario 

This scenario envisages both India and Pakistan being governed by moderate and liberal 

regimes but they are competitive in political and economic spheres. The expected 

conditions of the defined focal areas and the possible results for each in the Moderation 

and Competition scenario are described in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Moderation and Competition Scenario 

Focal Area Expected Condition Effect on 

Stability 

Nuclear doctrine 

and operations 

• India maintains no-first-use pledge Nuclear 

thresholds 

maintained 

Nuclear 

command and 

control 

• Military maintains control of Pakistan’s nuclear 

command and control apparatus with some 

liberal civilian oversight 

Mutual 

confidence stays 

the same as today 

Nuclear stockpile • Continued moratorium on nuclear tests 

• Both countries maintain current growth rates of 

nuclear weapon stockpiles 

• India and Pakistan develop but do not deploy a 

nuclear triad, i.e., nuclear weapons at sea 

• India develops but does not deploy 

thermonuclear weapons while Pakistan 

continues efforts to develop these 

Nuclear weapons 

development 

continues at a 

controlled pace 

Nuclear delivery/ 

defensive systems 

• India researches missile defenses 

• Both countries conduct missile tests to maintain 

current forces 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft 

Increased 

emphasis on 

conventional 

military 

operations with 

minimum 

credible nuclear 

deterrence being 

maintained and 

existing nuclear 

arsenal being 

upgraded 

Conventional 

force posture 

• Conventional force imbalance does not increase 

• Both countries slowly make qualitative 

improvements in their forces 

• No inclusion of limited conventional conflict 

below nuclear threshold in military doctrines 

Reduced chances 

of non-nuclear 

limited conflict 

3.4.4 Moderation and Cooperation Scenario 

This is the most positive of the four scenarios and offers the most potential for 

incorporating transparency in India-Pakistan relations. The expected conditions of the 

defined focal areas and the possible results for each in the Moderation and Cooperation 

scenario are described in Table 5. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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Table 5. Moderation and Cooperation Scenario 

Focal Area Expected Condition Effect on Stability 

Nuclear doctrine 

and operations 

India maintains no-first-use pledge, and 

Pakistan actively considers a similar pledge 

Nuclear thresholds raised 

Nuclear command 

and control

Increased liberal civilian involvement in 

Pakistan’s nuclear command and control 

structures; ascendancy of moderate elements 

Increased mutual 

confidence 

Nuclear stockpile • Continued moratorium on nuclear tests 

• Both countries freeze their existing 

numbers of nuclear weapons, with 

stockpiling of fissile materials 

• India and Pakistan cease research and 

development of a nuclear triad, i.e., 

nuclear weapons at sea 

• India and Pakistan cease thermonuclear 

weapon research and development 

Nuclear weapons 

development continues at 

a controlled pace 

Nuclear delivery/ 

defensive systems 

• India researches missile defenses 

• The two countries limit missile tests, and 

enter into a missile restraint regime 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft 

at a slow delivery schedule 

Increased emphasis on 

conventional military 

operations with minimum 

credible nuclear 

deterrence potential 

being maintained, and 

with existing nuclear 

arsenal being upgraded 

Conventional force 

posture 

• Conventional force imbalance remains at 

status quo 

• Both countries slowly make qualitative 

improvements in their forces 

• No contemplation of limited conventional 

conflict below nuclear threshold in 

military doctrine 

• A non-offensive and in-depth deployment 

of army strike elements 

Reduced chances of nonnuclear limited conflict 

3.5 Moving Toward Strategic Stability 

The expected conditions and possible results listed for each focal area under each 

scenario form the basis for developing a strategy to increase stability through the proper 

mix of transparency and opacity. In the next chapter, we will examine possible actions for 

implementing the appropriate level of transparency within the CD topic Peace and 

Security including CBMs. 
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4. Options for Using Transparency in Achieving 

Strategic Stability 

4.1 Introduction 

In Chapter 3, we defined four scenarios in terms of expected conditions in the CD topic 

Peace and Security including CBMs. This chapter suggests a range of Indian and 

Pakistani transparency/opacity actions that could help stabilize the expected conditions 

resulting from the scenarios. 

For each scenario, we have selected for further analysis a subset of the expected 

conditions that we presented in Chapter 3. In several scenarios, some of the expected 

conditions are similar, and so need not be discussed repeatedly. Our selection criteria are 

also based on what we believe is the relative importance of stabilizing the selected 

condition compared with stabilizing other conditions that describe the pertinent scenario. 

Finally, we also select conditions for analysis based on the likelihood of progress in 

information sharing; if little progress can be expected, the conditions are not selected for 

detailed analysis. 

In the two scenarios with moderate governments, we can postulate greater progress on a 

range of contentious issues. Therefore, for these two scenarios, we select a wide range of 

expected conditions that could be stabilized through information-sharing actions. For the 

two scenarios with extremist governments, we postulate far more limited progress. For 

these two scenarios we select just one condition each. Table 6 provides a list of the 

conditions selected for each scenario. 

The information-sharing (or not sharing) actions that we suggest could be implemented 

either as unilateral declarations, or more formal and binding treaties and agreements. For 

the Extremism and Competition scenario, formal agreements related to specific 

information-sharing actions will not be possible. All that can be expected is that the two 

sides make unilateral declarations. Also, in the Extremism and Cooperation scenario, 

formal agreements may not be possible. However, each side could make declarations, and 

additional data and information could be provided to lend credence to the declarations. In 

the Moderation and Competition scenario, formal agreements with limited verification 

measures are possible. In the Moderation and Cooperation scenario, formal agreements 

can be reached. The agreements have comprehensive provisions to verify the information 

being shared. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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Table 6. Conditions Selected for Analysis for Various Scenarios 

Scenario Expected conditions selected for analysis 

Extremism-Competition • India reconsiders its no-first-use pledge 

Extremism-Cooperation • Reduced military role in Pakistan’s nuclear command 

and control infrastructure; ascendancy of extremist 

(civilian and military) elements 

Moderation-Competition • Continued moratorium on nuclear tests 

• Both countries maintain current growth rates of nuclear 

weapon stockpiles 

• India and Pakistan develop but do not deploy a nuclear 

triad, i.e., nuclear weapons at sea 

• India develops but does not deploy thermonuclear 

weapons while Pakistan continues efforts to develop 

these 

Moderation-Cooperation • India researches missile defenses 

• The two countries limit missile tests and enter into a 

missile restraint regime 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft at a slow 

delivery schedule 

• Conventional force imbalance remains at status quo 

• Both countries slowly make qualitative improvements 

in their forces 

• No contemplation of limited conventional conflict 

below nuclear threshold in military doctrine 

• A non-offensive deployment of army strike elements 

For each of the expected conditions that we analyze, we present potential actions grouped 

on the basis of the four pillars for strategic stability that we presented in Chapter 1: 

potential, capability, intent, and resolve. For each scenario, and for each condition 

selected, we present actions involving information sharing. We identify the type of 

information that should not be shared and be kept opaque. We also present the modalities 

that will allow the implementation of the actions we suggest. These modalities are 

grouped in terms of political, procedural, or technological actions. 

4.2 Scenario 1: Extremism and Competition 

Condition Analyzed: India Reconsiders Its No-First-Use Pledge 

This condition’s effect on stability has been postulated as nuclear thresholds lowered. As 

both countries will be moving towards a first-use posture, ensuring that deterrence will 

hold in a crisis becomes increasingly important. 
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Potential

As both countries have extremist governments and are in a state of competition, it will be 

important for each to establish for the other that their nuclear potential remains intact in 

order to maintain deterrence. This will require demonstrating that their nuclear weapons 

technology base is intact and there are requisite mechanisms in place for continuity. This 

demonstration could involve unilateral declarations, and/or the unilateral/bilateral sharing 

of information. 

Establishing that each side’s nuclear potential remains intact increases deterrence, as 

neither side perceives a new advantage through the apparent degradation of the other’s 

potential. 

If any degradation in potential has actually occurred, this information should be kept 

opaque. A perceived weakness in one could motivate coercive actions by the other. 

Capability

For the case of competitive, extremist governments, it is important to establish one’s 

strengths, and share enough information on capabilities (weapons and delivery systems) 

and survivability in order to deter the adversary. Excessive sharing of information, 

however, could drive an arms race. Therefore, information on sophisticated systems and 

future acquisition plans should remain opaque. 

Information sharing could involve unilateral declarations, and/or the bilateral sharing of 

information. 

Intent

Each side should make clear its intent to use nuclear weapons only in a defensive mode. 

This is a measure that leads to increased stability, as the perceived threat of a preemptive 

strike is lessened. However, if “red” lines are present that, if crossed, will necessitate a 

nuclear response, they should remain unclear. Too much clarity on this subject could 

tempt the adversary to undertake conventional military actions under the nuclear 

threshold, with the risk of a breakthrough to uncontrolled escalation to a nuclear level. 

Information on a country’s intent could be made clear through official interactions by the 

foreign ministries. 

Resolve

Extremist governments should expect the other country to have the resolve to carry out 

retaliatory strikes. Reiterating this in declarations and bilateral negotiations would be 

stabilizing. However, the rhetoric must be measured and not be overly hysterical (as has 

sometimes been the case in the past). There is no need to be opaque on this subject. For 

an adversary to be deterred, resolve has to be made totally transparent. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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Table 7. Scenario: Extremism and Competition 

Condition Analyzed: India Reconsidering its No-First-Use Pledge 

Purpose: Raise the nuclear threshold by increasing transparency in Capability and Intent

Information to be 

shared 

Modalities Information to 

be kept opaque 

Establish for each 

other that nuclear 

potential remains 

unchanged. 

Political: Make unilateral declarations (formal 

treaties are unlikely between extremist 

governments) 

Procedural: None 

Technological: None 

Do not share 

information on 

any degradation 

in potential. 

4.3 Scenario 2: Extremism and Cooperation 

Condition Analyzed: Reduced Military Role in Pakistan’s Nuclear 

Command and Control Infrastructure; Ascendancy of Extremist 

(Civilian and Military) Elements 

The effect of this condition on stability has been postulated as creating decreased mutual 

confidence between India and Pakistan. Given the rise of extremist elements in each 

country, it will be important for each to reassure the other that there is a robust and 

reliable command and control system with internal checks and balances to counter the 

potential for unauthorized use. 

Potential

Similar to the steps suggested for the condition discussed in Section 4.1.1, demonstrating 

that there is no degradation in potential is important when extremist governments are in 

power in both countries. The steps to be taken are the same as those presented in Section 

4.1.1. 

Capability

Extremist governments are concerned that the other side may not have adequate control 

over its nuclear weapons. Establishing improved technologies for control and sharing 

some information on their implementation could provide reassurance. To enhance their 

capabilities in nuclear weapons safety and control of authorization for use, India and 

Pakistan should implement the following technologies: 

• Equipment pertaining to the robustness and security of the nuclear 

communications network 

• Use-control technology to ensure that only the authorized individuals in both 

countries can order a launch 

• Personnel reliability mechanisms to screen the personnel who are actively 

involved in their respective nuclear hierarchies. 
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Information announcing the establishment of these programs and qualitative descriptions 

of technologies used should be shared. Information that might compromise the security of 

the command and control networks or otherwise create vulnerabilities should not be 

shared. 

Intent

Both the countries should continue to formalize their respective nuclear command and 

control structures, ensuring that these are broad-based and include civilian leadership as 

well as representation from the nuclear scientific community. These structures should 

then be declared and described generally. Geographical and technical descriptions, 

however, could lead to the potential for pre-emptive first strikes. 

Resolve

Resolve in this section is similar to that in Section 4.1.1 for the Extremism-Competition

scenario. A hotline between the heads of state (that takes precedence over all others) is 

useful to provide information that demonstrates resolve during a crisis.15 At this time, the 

two countries have agreed to a hotline between the Foreign Secretaries to discuss nuclearrelated crises, and are in the process of establishing it. A hotline between the Directors 

General of Military Operations of the armies of the two countries already exists. 

Communication from multiple, and potentially contradictory, sources presents an 

unfocused view of resolve. 

 

15 While there have been numerous instances when the two heads of state have spoken to each other, a 

pattern that emerges is that at times of crisis, rhetorical diplomacy through media has more often than not 

ensured hardened stances and less frequent dialogues. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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Table 8. Scenario: Extremism and Cooperation 

Condition Analyzed: “Reduced military role in Pakistan’s nuclear command and control 

infrastructure; ascendancy of extremist (civilian and military) elements” 

Purpose: To qualitatively describe the Capability, each side has to control its nuclear 

forces 

Information to be 

shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Establish that a 

robust command 

and control 

structure exists and 

that unauthorized 

elements cannot 

control nuclear 

forces. 

Political: Establish a hotline between heads of 

state. 

Procedural: Information announcing the 

establishment of the checks on the command 

and control capabilities and qualitative 

descriptions of technologies used should be 

shared. 

Technological: 

(1) Implementation of use-control 

technologies to ensure that only 

authorized individuals can authorize a 

launch 

(2) The hotline between heads of state 

that takes precedence over all other 

official communication links during 

crises 

Information that 

might compromise 

the security of the 

command and 

control networks, 

or otherwise create 

vulnerabilities 

should not be 

shared. 

4.4 Scenario 3: Moderation and Competition 

Conditions Analyzed: All Conditions Associated with the “Nuclear 

Stockpile” Focal Area 

The conditions that we analyze for the scenario of Moderation-Competition are those 

associated with the focal area of “Nuclear stockpile.” These (as listed in Table 4) are: 

• Continued moratorium on nuclear tests 

• Both countries maintain current growth rates of nuclear weapon stockpiles 

• India and Pakistan develop but do not deploy a nuclear triad 

• India develops, but does not deploy, thermonuclear weapons while Pakistan continues 

efforts to develop them. 

These conditions’ effects on stability are that nuclear weapons development continues at 

a moderate growth rate. 
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Potential

The development of a nuclear triad (i.e. nuclear weapons at sea), and the development of 

thermonuclear weapons relate to Potential. Unilateral declarations disavowing the 

deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons, and disavowing the deployment of 

thermonuclear weapons would be stabilizing. A regime to verify these declarations would 

likely involve intrusive monitoring and would not likely be acceptable even with 

moderate governments. Information on the capabilities of the weapons being developed 

could drive an arms race and should not be shared. 

Capability

In this scenario, we have postulated that the two countries would continue a moratorium 

on new nuclear tests. The two moderate governments could formalize an agreement to 

ban nuclear tests. This agreement could involve establishing monitoring stations and 

related actions. The following could be transparency actions: 

• Create and link seismic monitoring stations in one’s or the other’s territory to 

monitor test sites 

• Share geologic information at test sites to better interpret seismic signals 

• Conduct reciprocal site visits. 

Monitoring and/or sharing information about radionuclides may reveal the characteristics 

of facility operations and should not be shared. 

Intent 

Moderate governments must demonstrate their intent for domestic, political purposes to 

prevent the impression that they are weak and indecisive. 

In this scenario, we have postulated that the growth rates of each country’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile will not increase. This policy decision should be shared, because it 

reinforces the commitment of each side to possessing a minimum deterrent. Specifics on 

fissile material stocks and production rates should not be shared to avoid creating 

perceptions that might foster an arms race. 

Resolve 

Moderate governments will need to make their resolve as clear as possible to the other. 

There is not reason to be opaque in this topic, but it should not be done in a provocative 

manner. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

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Table 9. Scenario: Moderation and Competition 

Conditions Analyzed: All conditions associated with the nuclear stockpile focal area 

Purpose: Capability of each side stays at current levels to avoid an arms race. 

Information to be 

shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Disavow the 

deployment of seabased nuclear 

weapons and 

thermonuclear 

weapons. 

Political: Unilateral declarations could 

be made. 

Procedural: None. 

Technological: None. 

Information on the 

capabilities of the 

weapons being 

developed would not 

be shared. Sharing 

such information 

could drive an arm’s 

race. 

Purpose: Demonstrate that Capability is not increasing 

Information to be 

shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Formalize an 

agreement to ban 

nuclear tests. 

Political: A formal agreement could be 

signed. 

Procedural: Reciprocal site visits. 

Technological: Create and link 

seismic monitoring stations in one’s or 

the other’s territory to monitor test 

sites. 

Share national geologic information 

(including at test sites) to better 

interpret seismic signals. 

The monitoring 

stations should not 

include the 

capabilities to test for 

specific 

radionuclides. 

Purpose: Clarify that Intent is defensive 

Information to be 

shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

State that the 

growth rates of 

nuclear weapons 

stockpiles will be 

kept low. 

Political: Unilateral declarations could 

be made. 

Procedural: None. 

Technological: None. 

Specifics on fissile 

material stocks and 

production rates 

should not be shared. 
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4.5 Scenario 4: Moderation and Cooperation 

Conditions Analyzed: All Conditions Associated with the Focal Areas 

of “Nuclear Delivery/Defensive Systems” and “Conventional Force 

Posture” 

The conditions that we analyze for the scenario of Moderation-Cooperation are those 

associated with the focal areas of nuclear delivery/defensive systems and conventional 

force posture. These conditions are: 

• India researches missile defenses 

• The two countries limit missile tests and enter into a missile restraint regime 

• Both countries acquire new strike aircraft at a slow delivery schedule 

• Conventional force imbalance remains at status quo 

• Both countries seek qualitative improvements in their forces slowly 

• There is no contemplation of limited conventional conflict below nuclear threshold in 

military doctrine 

• Both countries engage in non-offensive deployment of army strike elements. 

The effects on stability of these conditions have been postulated as follows: 

• Increased emphasis on conventional military operations with minimum credible 

nuclear deterrence being maintained, but with the existing nuclear arsenal being 

upgraded 

• Reduced chances of non-nuclear limited conflict. 

Potential

Currently Indian doctrinal thinking is leaning towards a doctrine called “cold start.” In 

this doctrine, eight or so integrated battle groups involving the Air Force, Army, and 

Navy, if needed, would deploy rapidly to conduct high intensity operations. Strike corps 

might be moved to forward locations during peacetime so as to facilitate their being 

brought into action quickly. Transparency in the Potential for conventional warfare 

should demonstrate that the deployment of strike corps is not offensive. This could be 

achieved by pre-announcing major activities and hosting on-site visits by the other side. 

Other information would not be shared. Any movement of these Corps within a zone of 

50 km from the border on either side must be intimated to the other well in advance, even 

if such moves are for exercise purposes. In sectors where recognizable ground features 

are available, these might be stipulated as no-cross lines for the strategic army 

formations. 

Capability

The two sides could selectively limit their military capability in a number of ways: 

• Take steps to increase the time required to activate nuclear weapons and their 

delivery systems 

• Formalize an agreement to limit missile tests 

• Agree not to deploy missile defense systems, although continuing research on 

their function 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

39

• Balance conventional military forces using an agreement based on the 

Conventional Forces in Europe agreements. 

Intent

The sharing of strategic doctrines and thinking through official defense white papers 

could help demonstrate national intent in raising the nuclear thresholds. Red lines should 

not be specified because a certain measure of ambiguity will remain a restraining factor 

for both countries. 

 

Resolve 

As for the previous moderate government scenario, each side should make its resolve 

clear but avoid provocative rhetoric. 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

40 

Purpose: Limit the Capability of each side 

Table 10. Moderation and Cooperation 

Conditions Analyzed: All conditions associated with the Focal Areas of “Nuclear 

Delivery/Defensive Systems” and “Coentional Force Posture” 

Purpose: Reduce the risks of conventional conflict by stabilizing the Potential of each 

country’s military forces 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Describe nonoffensive 

postures for 

conventional 

forces. 

Political: Reaffirm steps to reduce the risks of 

conventional conflict. 

Procedural: Pakistan’s two and India’s three 

strike corps could be based a significant 

distance from the border (e.g., 100 km) during 

peacetime. 

Do not share 

doctrines, 

operational plans, 

facility 

descriptions, 

communications 

and equipment 

capabilities because 

this information 

could create 

vulnerabilities. 

Purpose: Reassure the other that the Intent of troop movements in border areas is 

benign 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Share 

information 

that assists 

each side 

calibrate their 

national 

systems used 

to monitor 

troop 

movements. 

Technological: Both sides should procure 

ground-based or balloon-borne ground 

surveillance radar systems that have the 

capability of scanning up to 100 km inside the 

other country’s territory. 

Do not share 

information on the 

detection limits of 

the monitoring 

systems. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

41

Purpose: Clarify that the Intent of each side is defensive 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Share 

strategic 

doctrines on 

conventional 

conflict and 

threat 

perceptions. 

Political: None. 

Procedural: Share strategic defense plan white 

papers including missile defense plans. 

Maintain enough 

ambiguity on red 

lines (nuclear 

thresholds) to deter 

limited 

conventional 

conflict. 

Purpose: Clarify that the Intent of each side is defensive 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Report border 

crossing 

incidents and 

national 

efforts to 

restrain them. 

Political: Certain unilateral steps, such as the 

partial redeployment of troops from the 

Kashmir valley. 

Procedural: Reports from border monitoring 

systems could be shared at the sector level. 

Technological: Share reports from border 

monitoring sensors and security barriers in 

Kashmir.16 

Do not describe 

details of border 

monitoring 

systems, such as 

locations of 

sensors, and sensor 

capabilities. 

Purpose: Limit the Capability of each side so that nuclear thresholds are raised 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Share 

qualitative 

information 

describing 

nuclear 

postures. 

Political: Reaffirm commitment to raise 

nuclear thresholds. 

Procedural: Store warheads away from 

delivery systems. 

Do not deploy missiles in ready-to-launch 

condition. 

Limit zones of deployment for mobile 

missiles. 

Do not provide 

sufficient 

information on 

missiles and 

warhead locations 

to enable a preemptive strike. 

 

16 The Indian author has observed that electrified fences and sensors have improved security and reduced 

cross-border infiltration across Punjab and Rajasthan.
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

42 

Table 10 (Continued): Scenario: Moderation and Cooperation 

Conditions Analyzed: All conditions associated with the Focal Areas of “Nuclear 

Delivery/ Defensive Systems” and “Conventional Force Posture” 

Purpose: Limit the Capability of each side’s missile forces 

Information 

to be shared 

Modalities Information to be 

kept opaque 

Provide 

advance 

notification of 

missile tests. 

Cap and 

declare 

numbers of 

missiles by 

type. 

Political: Conclude a treaty on prior 

notification of missile tests. 

Formalize agreements restraining 

missile deployment. 

Procedural: Limit missile tests. 

To reassure Pakistan that a missile 

defense system would not be deployed 

by India, the two countries could 

include theater missile defense 

missiles in missile testing restrictions. 

Eliminate certain classes of missile 

systems. 

Technological: None. 

Do not share 

sufficient data on 

missile systems, 

such as basing 

locations, that the 

other side may seek 

to exploit 

vulnerabilities. 

Provide 

information 

on existing 

conventional 

force 

strengths as 

well as 

planned 

growth rates. 

Political: Enter into an agreement on 

limiting conventional forces. The 

agreement could lay down specific 

limits on the quantities of various 

weapon systems such as combat 

aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, 

armored vehicles, etc. The agreement 

would also limit the geographical 

locations where the weapon systems 

are based. 

Procedural: The agreement would 

allow for on-site inspections, with a 

specified number of these being 

challenge inspections. 

During on-site 

inspections, shroud 

sensitive equipment 

and restrict certain 

areas of the base 

being inspected. 

While doing so, 

reassure the 

inspecting party 

that the restricted 

areas and shrouded 

equipment do not 

conceal a violation 

of the agreement. 

 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

43

 

5. Conclusions 

All nations seek stability. The quest for stability is incorporated into their regional, 

global, political, military, and economic policies. These policies involve sharing some 

information about plans, intensions, capability, and resolve. There is a distinction in 

national policy between information that is shared (transparency) and not shared 

(opacity). Nations use different balances of opacity and transparency in their foreign 

relations. North Korea, for example, shares virtually no information about its strategic 

intentions. In contrast, the nations of the European Union tend to share a great deal of 

information about their plans and policies. 

This study is an investigation of why nations choose or do not choose to share strategic 

information. Theoretical concepts from the political science and international relations 

literature are summarized with the goal of transitioning these concepts to the realm of 

tangible practicality within the context of the relationship between India and Pakistan. 

India and Pakistan are perhaps the best example of both the problem and potential of 

achieving the right balance of opacity and transparency in national policy. Mutual lack of 

trust is a chronic dilemma. Since independence, India and Pakistan have sought, but 

failed, to achieve a stable and lasting bilateral relationship. Bilateral relations have varied 

from high optimism to tense military confrontation. The introduction of nuclear weapons 

makes this cycle even more dangerous. The recent thaw in bilateral relations and the 

establishment of the CD, however, are encouraging signs and present a window of 

opportunity which, if grasped, could contribute to significantly improved conditions in 

both countries. 

India’s and Pakistan’s quest for stability is a journey that could take multiple paths. We 

defined the beginning of the journey to stability by assessing the current conditions in the 

ongoing CD. We then defined desired end states for the Peace and Security including 

CBMs CD topic, with an emphasis on nuclear CBMs. To focus our efforts on defining the 

role of transparency and the balance with opacity, we defined four future scenarios to 

characterize representative strategic/military/political conditions. These scenarios helped 

frame the realm of possibilities and enabled us to formulate modalities to achieve the 

desired end states. 

Modalities can be political (e.g., declarations), procedural (e.g., advance notice of certain 

military activities), or technologically based (e.g., seismic monitoring of the nuclear test 

moratorium). For some end states, the same modality can be used in all four scenarios; in 

others a modality may be feasible with only one or two. In yet others, the same basic 

modality can be used in all scenarios if implemented in somewhat different ways.

National policy makers need options. This study, the first of this type of which the 

authors are aware, defines the context for implementing a balanced strategy of opacity 

and transparency to achieve India-Pakistan strategic stability. It defines practical and, we 

believe, achievable modalities under a number of political circumstances. The research 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

44 

team sincerely believes that if the concepts and policy options presented in this report 

were pursued and implemented, South Asia would be on its way to a more peaceful and 

prosperous future. We recognize that not all these recommendations can be implemented 

right away and that a significant amount of discussion, negotiation, and planning needs to 

be done at the working group level of the CD or other bilateral forum. 

South Asia will continue to provide theoretical and policy challenges for both academics 

and officials. The region must break the optimism/pessimism cycle of relations by 

achieving a basic minimum level of stability. With political will this is possible. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

45

Appendix A 

Elaborated Description of Select Topics in the 

 Composite Dialogue Process 

Jammu and Kashmir 

Almost five hundred and sixty-five kingdoms existed within British India, usually called 

Princely States. When the British vacated India and Pakistan in 1947, and the two 

countries came into being through a partition of British India, the rulers of the Princely 

States had a choice to accede to either union. The ruler of the state of Jammu and 

Kashmir, Hari Singh, offered a standstill agreement instead, and vacillated between 

joining either India or Pakistan. Hari Singh was a Hindu, while a majority of his subjects 

were Muslim. An invasion by irregular and regular forces from Pakistan in 1948, and the 

subsequent hasty accession by Hari Singh to India, led to the first India-Pakistan war. The 

war ended with a cease-fire agreement brokered by the UN on January 1, 1949 that left 

India controlling about two-thirds of the disputed territory and Pakistan the remainder. 

The territory was divided by a Cease-Fire Line (CFL). The UN had proposed that a 

plebiscite be held to determine the wishes of the people of the state, as to whether they 

wished to join India or Pakistan, once Pakistani forces withdrew from the territory they 

occupied. Neither the withdrawal of forces nor the plebiscite has occurred. In 1965, India 

and Pakistan again fought a brief war over the region then returned to the 1949 CFL. The 

1971 war, in which India intervened in a civil war between East and West Pakistan that 

led to the creation of Bangladesh, also involved fighting in Kashmir. After this war, the 

CFL in Kashmir came to be called the Line of Control. The Pakistani and Indian armies 

continued to face each other across this line and sporadic, limited exchanges of firing and 

shelling continued. A tenuous, year-old cease-fire now exists along this line. In the 

1990’s an insurgency started in the Indian-administered portion of Jammu and Kashmir. 

India accuses Pakistan of fomenting and supporting this “terrorist-led” insurgency with 

weapons, finances, training, and manpower; meanwhile Pakistan says that it only 

provides moral and political support to the “freedom movement” in Indian-occupied 

Kashmir. The two sides are now attempting to resolve this issue through negotiations. 

Siachen Glacier 

“The northern extreme boundary between India and Pakistan lies along the Saltoro 

mountain range in an area named for its most prominent feature, the Siachen Glacier. 

Since 1984, the two nations have battled over a 2,500-square-km triangle of contested 

territory. The dispute arose over differing interpretations of a provision of the 1949 

cease-fire, as well as the subsequent 1972 Simla agreement, which left a portion of the 

cease-fire line undefined. The boundary was delineated only to map coordinate NJ9842 

and vaguely referenced the direction from there as “thence north to the glaciers”—

leaving a distance of about 65 kilometers un-demarcated and disputed, but untouched. 

Differences arose when in 1984 Indian troops occupied the watershed line along the 

Saltoro range northwesterly from NJ9842. Conflict erupted and has remained for over 20 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

46 

years with Pakistani troops holding positions across from Indian troops. Pakistan claims 

a northeasterly line to the Karakoram pass from NJ9842 towards the Chinese border.”17

Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project 

Pakistan has objected to India constructing a barrage near Wullar Lake in Jammu and 

Kashmir, because it could obstruct the flow of waters allocated to Pakistan under the 

Indus Water Treaty. India’s position is that the barrage is meant for the temporary storage 

of water to be released to maintain sufficient water levels for river boat navigation 

downstream during the lean season between October and February. 

Sir Creek 

Sir Creek is a tidal creek that forms the last part of India’s and Pakistan’s land border at 

the coast. India claims that the boundary lies along the middle of the creek, while 

Pakistan says the border should lie along the eastern bank of the creek. The inability to 

define the border at the coastline also prevents a complete demarcation of the maritime 

boundary between the two countries. 

 

 

17 Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Kent L. Biringer, Reducing Risk in South Asia: Managing India - Pakistan 

Tensiosn, SAND98-0505/2., Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 2001 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

47

Appendix B 

Summary of Current Status of 

 Composite Dialog Working Groups 

A summary of the present situation including the results of the Foreign Ministers meeting 

in Islamabad in February 2005 is given below: 

• Parallel working groups on conventional and nuclear CBMs were revived in the 

summer of 2004. In the nuclear sub-group, nuclear doctrine and security concepts, 

commitment to undertake measures to reducing risk of accidental or unauthorized 

use of nuclear weapons, and a consultative mechanism for implementation review 

were discussed. In addition, the establishment of a hotline between the Foreign 

Secretaries was agreed upon. The two sides also reaffirmed their commitment to 

their existing moratoria on the testing of nuclear weapons. A missile test launch 

notification treaty was also discussed. Expert-level talks on nuclear CBMs were 

again held in December 2004 in which it was agreed to create a favorable 

environment for the operationalization of the nuclear CBMs agreed to earlier. 

• Negotiations are still going on for resolving the Kashmir dispute. Both the sides 

discussed the Kashmir issue during June 2004 and agreed to continue their 

“sustained and serious” dialogue to find a peaceful, negotiated, and “final” 

settlement of the issue. In February 2005 they agreed to start a bus service from 

Srinagar (capital of Indian Administered Kashmir) to Muzaffarabad (capital of 

Pakistan Administered Kashmir). This bus service has begun from April 2005. A 

set of Kashmir-specific proposals on transport links, trade, cultural cooperation, 

tourism, environment, and people-to-people contacts has also been made. 

• On the Siachen Glacier issue, negotiations have progressed from discussions 

between the two Foreign Secretaries to Defense Secretaries. There was a meeting 

of the Defense Secretaries in August 2004 to discuss the Siachen issue. 

• On the Wular Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project nine rounds of talks have 

been held until now. Both the countries have reaffirmed the Indus Waters Treaty, 

and have agreed to negotiate the issue further. 

• On Sir Creek, a Joint Survey of the boundary pillars in the horizontal segment of 

the international boundary started in January 2005. 

• On the issue of terrorism and drug trafficking, the two countries have stated 

their “determination to combat terrorism and the need for its complete 

elimination” and that they “agreed to work towards an MOU to institutionalize 

cooperation in information sharing between the Narcotics Control Authorities of 

the two countries and designate nodal officials in their respective High 

Commissions to liaise on drug control issues.” 

• On the economic and commercial cooperation issues there have been several 

initiatives including (a) establishing a Committee of Experts to consider issues 

related to trade, (b) conducting a meeting between railway authorities on the 

Munnabao–Khokhrapar rail link, (c) adding a new category of Tourist Visa 

between the two countries and promoting group tourism, and (d) creating a 

Bombay-Karachi ferry service, which is being talked about in unofficial quarters 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

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but is likely many years away. The two sides have also discussed opening of the 

Attari trade route, resumption of shipping services, and the supply of petroleum 

products to Pakistan. Talks on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline have also 

begun to progress. 

• In the promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, the two sides have 

been discussing various issues including promotion of investment in joint 

ventures and cultural exchanges. Cricket matches between the two countries have 

also restarted. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

49

Appendix C 

Joint India-Pakistan Statements 

on the Composite Dialog 

December 2004 Joint Statement on the meeting between the Foreign 

Secretaries of India and Pakistan 

1. The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India met in Islamabad on 27–28 December 

2004 to review overall progress, commence the next round of the CD and discuss the 

issues of Peace and Security including CBMs, and Jammu and Kashmir. Foreign 

Secretary of Pakistan Mr. Riaz H. Khokhar, led the Pakistan delegation while the Indian 

delegation was led by Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran. The talks were held in a 

frank, cordial, and constructive atmosphere. 

2. Recalling the solemn and categoric reassurance contained in the Joint Press Statement 

of 6th January, they expressed their determination to carry the process forward. 

3. On the issue of Peace and Security including CBMs, the two Foreign Secretaries, 

reviewed the progress made during the meetings of Experts on Nuclear and Conventional 

CBMs. Building upon the existing contacts between DG MOs, they agreed to promote 

regular contacts at the local level at designated places and explore further CBMs along 

the international boundary and the LoC. They discussed and narrowed further their 

differences on the draft agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic 

missiles, and agreed to work towards its early finalization. 

4. Both sides discussed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to carry forward the 

process in the light of the Joint Statement issued after the meeting between President of 

Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh in 

New York on September 24, 2004. 

5. The meetings on the other six subjects under the CD, i.e. Siachen, Wullar 

Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, Terrorism & Drug Trafficking, Economic 

& Commercial Cooperation, and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields 

would be held on mutually agreed dates between April and June 2005. 

6. The two sides also agreed that technical meetings including the Joint Study Group on 

Trade matters headed by the Commerce Secretaries, Indian Coast Guards and Pakistan 

Maritime Agency, Pakistan Rangers and Border Security Force of India, Expert level 

dialogue on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs, technical level meeting on bus service 

between/through Amritsar and Lahore, and the meeting between the Narcotics Control 

Authorities would be held between January and June 2005. 

7. They also discussed issues related to apprehended fishermen, civilian prisoners, and 

missing defence personnel. It was agreed that: 
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50 

(i) Immediate notification would be provided to the respective High Commissions 

through the Foreign Ministries of arrested Pakistani/Indian nationals; 

(ii) Consular access would be provided within three months of apprehension; 

(iii) Repatriation would be done immediately after completion of sentence and nationality 

verification; 

(iv) A mechanism would be introduced for early repatriation, without sentencing of 

inadvertent crossers; 

(v) A similar mechanism would be established for early release, without sentencing of 

those under 16 apprehended by either side. 

8. The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries would meet in New Delhi to review the 

overall progress in the CD in July-August 2005. 

9. The Foreign Ministers and the Prime Ministers of the two countries would meet during 

the SAARC Summit in Dhaka in January 2005. The External Affairs Minister of India 

Mr. K. Natwar Singh would visit Islamabad in February 2005 for bilateral discussions. 

10. The Foreign Secretary of India called on Prime Minster Shaukat Aziz and Foreign 

Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri of Pakistan during the course of his visit to Islamabad. 

Islamabad 

28 December 2004 

December 2004 Joint Statement on the Second Round of India-Pakistan 

Expert Level talks on Nuclear CBMs 

15/12/2004 

In accordance with the agreement between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and India in 

September 2004, the second round of the Expert Level talks on Nuclear Confidence 

Building Measures was held in Islamabad on 14–15 December 2004. The Indian 

delegation was led by Ms. Meera Shankar, Additional Secretary (UN), Ministry of 

External Affairs. The Pakistan delegation was led by Mr. Tariq Osman Hyder, Additional 

Secretary (UN&EC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The visiting Indian delegation called 

on the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Khurshid M. Kasuri. 

2. The two sides held discussions in a cordial and constructive atmosphere, in the 

framework of the Lahore MoU of 1999 and the Joint Statement of 20 June 2004. Both 

sides reiterated their desire to keep working towards elaboration and implementation of 

Nuclear CBMs, within the agreed framework. 
Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia 

51

3. Detailed consultations were also held on the early operationalization of the decisions 

taken during the last round of Expert Level talks on Nuclear CBMs held in New Delhi on 

19–20 June 2004, especially on the upgrade of the existing hotline between the DGMOs, 

and the establishment of a dedicated and secure hotline between the two Foreign 

Secretaries. These measures are intended to prevent misunderstanding and reduce risks 

relevant to nuclear issues. 

4. Both sides agreed the future periodic Expert Level talks on Nuclear CBMs would 

discuss, review, and monitor the implementation of Nuclear CBMs as called for by the 

Lahore MoU of 1999. 

5. They also agreed to report the progress made in the present round of the talks to the 

respective Foreign Secretaries, who are scheduled to meet on 27–28 December 2004, and 

decide on the date and venue of the next Expert Level meeting on Nuclear CBMs. 

Islamabad 

December 15, 2004
Cooperative Monitoring Center 

52 

About the Authors: 

Air Commodore Tariq Ashraf is a fighter pilot by profession and has served in the 

Pakistan Air Force since 1973. He has been deployed on the Faculty of the Pakistan 

National Defence College in Islamabad since April 2003 and is concurrently enrolled for 

MPhil classes in Defence and Strategic Studies at the Quaid-i-Azam University in 

Islamabad with a plan to continue this into a PhD. 

He has authored one book, Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension (2002), 

and has contributed over 60 articles and papers to various journals of repute in Pakistan 

and abroad. He holds a Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies and is a graduate of the 

RAF Advanced Staff Course from UK and Pakistan’s National Defence Course. In 

addition to his varied command, staff, and operational assignments, he has also served as 

Pakistan’s Defense Attaché to Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, and South Korea from 

1995–1998. 

Arpit Rajain is a Senior Policy Analyst at the New Delhi office of the Centre for Global 

Studies, Mumbai. Prior to joining the Centre, he was a Research Fellow at the ORF 

Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi. He has also worked at the Institute of Peace and 

Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, on WMD issues for six years and been part of 

projects with the Ministry of External Affairs and the Office of the Integrated Defence 

Staff, Government of India. 

He has previously co-edited Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia (2003), Biological 

Weapons: Issues and Threats (2003), and Working Towards a Verification Protocol for 

Biological Weapons (2001). He has also published more than 55 research papers on 

WMD issues in reputed journals, as chapters in edited volumes, as issue briefs, and as 

monographs, as well as more than 75 articles in newspapers/websites in India and abroad.