BORDER SECURITY

Progress and Challenges 

with the Use of 

Technology, Tactical 

Infrastructure, and 

Personnel to Secure the 

Southwest Border

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland 

Security & Justice 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET

Thursday, March 15, 2018

GAO-18-397T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-397T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

March 2018

BORDER SECURITY

Progress and Challenges with the Use of Technology, 

Tactical Infrastructure, and Personnel to Secure the 

Southwest Border 

What GAO Found

The U.S. Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has made progress deploying 

surveillance technology—a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras—along the 

southwest U.S. border. As of October 2017, the Border Patrol had completed the 

planned deployment of select technologies to several states along the southwest 

border. The Border Patrol has also made progress toward assessing 

performance of surveillance technologies, but additional actions are needed to 

fully implement GAO’s 2011 and 2014 recommendations in this area. For 

example, the Border Patrol has not yet used available data to determine the 

contribution of surveillance technologies to border security efforts.

CBP spent about $2.3 billion to deploy fencing from fiscal years 2007 through

2015 and constructed 654 miles of fencing by 2015. The Border Patrol has 

reported that border fencing supports agents’ ability to respond to illicit crossborder activities by slowing the progress of illegal entrants. GAO reported in 

February 2017 that CBP was taking a number of steps in sustaining tactical 

infrastructure—such as fencing, roads, and lighting—along the southwest border. 

However, CBP has not developed metrics that systematically use data it collects 

to assess the contributions of border fencing to its mission, as GAO has 

recommended. CBP concurred with the recommendation and plans to develop 

metrics by January 2019. Further, CBP established the Border Wall System 

Program in response to a January 2017 executive order that called for the 

immediate construction of a southwest border wall. This program is intended to

replace and add to existing barriers along the southwest border. In April 2017, 

DHS leadership gave CBP approval to procure barrier prototypes, which are 

intended to help inform new design standards for the border wall system. 

Physical Barriers in San Diego, California, April 2016

The Border Patrol has faced challenges in achieving a staffing level of 21,370 

agents, the statutorily-established minimum from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. 

As of September 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had about 19,400 agents. 

GAO reported in November 2017 that Border Patrol officials cited staffing 

shortages as a challenge for optimal deployment. As a result, officials had to 

make decisions about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number 

of agents available.

View GAO-18-397T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS has employed a variety of 

technology, tactical infrastructure, 

and personnel assets to help secure 

the nearly 2,000 mile long southwest 

border. Since 2009, GAO has issued 

over 35 products on the progress 

and challenges DHS has faced in 

using technology, infrastructure, and 

other resources to secure the border. 

GAO has made over 50 

recommendations to help improve 

DHS’s efforts, and DHS has 

implemented more than half of them.

This statement addresses (1) DHS 

efforts to deploy and measure the 

effectiveness of surveillance 

technologies, (2) DHS efforts to 

maintain and assess the 

effectiveness of existing tactical 

infrastructure and to deploy new 

physical barriers, and (3) staffing 

challenges the Border Patrol has 

faced. This statement is based on 

three GAO reports issued in 2017, 

selected updates conducted in 2017, 

and ongoing work related to DHS 

acquisitions and the construction of 

physical barriers. For ongoing work 

GAO analyzed DHS and CBP 

documents, interviewed officials 

within DHS, and visited border areas 

in California. 

What GAO Recommends

In recent reports, GAO made or 

reiterated recommendations for DHS 

to, among other things, assess the 

contributions of technology and 

fencing to border security. DHS 

generally agreed, and has actions 

planned or underway to address 

these recommendations.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work reviewing the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to deploy surveillance 

technology, tactical infrastructure, and personnel resources to the 

southwest border. This area continues to be vulnerable to illegal crossborder activity. The U.S. Border Patrol reported apprehending almost 

304,000 illegal entrants and making over 11,600 drug seizures along the 

southwest border in fiscal year 2017. In January 2017, an executive order 

called for, among other things, the immediate construction of a southwest 

border wall and the hiring of 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents, 

subject to available appropriations.1

The Border Patrol, within DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), is the federal agency responsible for securing the national borders 

between U.S. ports of entry.2 The Border Patrol divides responsibility for 

southwest border security operations geographically among nine sectors, 

and each sector is further divided into varying numbers of stations. To 

respond to cross-border threats, DHS has employed a combination of key 

resources, including surveillance technology, tactical infrastructure (which 

includes fencing, roads, and lighting), and Border Patrol agents. For 

example, DHS has deployed a variety of land-based surveillance 

technologies, such as cameras and sensors, which the Border Patrol 

uses to assist its efforts to secure the border and to apprehend individuals 

1

Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13767, §§ 

2, 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795 (Jan. 30, 2017). The executive order 

defines “wall” as a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and 

impassable physical barrier. 

2

See 6 U.S.C. § 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c) (enumerating CBP’s duties), (e) 

(establishing and listing duties of the U.S. Border Patrol within CBP). Ports of entry are 

facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. 

Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land 

border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers and 

merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect 

persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United States pursuant to 

U.S. immigration law and travel controls. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-397T Border Security

attempting to cross the border illegally.3 In addition, CBP spent 

approximately $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2015 to deploy 

tactical infrastructure, including about $2.3 billion on fencing, at locations 

along the nearly 2,000 mile long southwest border. The Border Patrol 

deploys agents along the immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles 

from the border as part of a layered approach the agency refers to as the 

defense in depth strategy, and the Border Patrol reported it had 16,605 

agents staffed at southwest border sectors at the end of fiscal year 2017.4

Since 2009 we have issued over 35 products on the progress DHS and 

its components have made and challenges it faces in using surveillance 

technology, tactical infrastructure, personnel, and other resources to 

secure the southwest border.5 As a result of this work, we have made 

over 50 recommendations to help improve DHS oversight over efforts to 

secure the southwest border, and DHS has implemented more than half 

of them. My statement describes (1) DHS efforts to deploy and measure 

the effectiveness of surveillance technologies, (2) DHS efforts to maintain 

and assess the effectiveness of existing tactical infrastructure and deploy 

new physical barriers, and (3) staffing challenges the Border Patrol has 

faced.

This statement is based on three reports we issued in 2017, and on 

selected updates we conducted in November and December 2017 on the 

Border Patrol’s efforts to address some of our previous 

 3

In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) to develop a 

comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as the Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet). Under the SBInet program, CBP acquired 15 fixed-tower 

systems at a cost of nearly $1 billion, which are deployed along 53 miles of Arizona’s 387-

mile border with Mexico. In January 2011, in response to internal and external 

assessments that identified concerns, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the 

cancellation of further procurements of SBInet surveillance systems. That same month, 

CBP introduced the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. In June 2014, CBP 

developed the Southwest Border Technology Plan, which incorporates the Arizona 

Technology Plan, and plans to extend land-based surveillance technology deployments to 

the remainder of the southwest border. 

4

As part of this strategy, the Border Patrol deploys some agents to activities along the 

immediate border while other agents may be assigned to activities further from the border, 

such as immigration checkpoint operations that are generally located on highways 25 to 

100 miles from the border.

5

See Related GAO Products page. 
Page 3 GAO-18-397T Border Security

recommendations.6 This statement also includes preliminary observations 

and analyses from ongoing work related to the construction of new and 

replacement physical barriers along the southwest border and our fourth 

annual assessment of select DHS major acquisition programs.7 Our 

reports and testimonies, along with selected updates, incorporated 

information we obtained and analyzed from officials at various DHS 

components, and during site visits along the southwest border. More 

detailed information about our scope and methodology can be found in 

our published reports and testimonies. For ongoing work, we reviewed 

acquisition documents, such as CBP’s Concept of Operations for 

Impedance and Denial, the Wall System Operational Requirements 

Document, and the Border Wall Prototype Test Plan. We also met with 

officials from DHS components, including CBP’s Office of Facilities and 

Management and the Border Patrol, from September 2017 to January 

2018. Further, in December 2017 we conducted a site visit to California to 

view existing tactical infrastructure and border wall prototypes that will 

inform the design of future physical barriers along the southwest border. 

All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 6

GAO, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance Technologies 

but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-18-119 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 30, 2017); Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better 

Assess Fencing’s Contributions and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps, 

GAO-17-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.16, 2017); Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent 

Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints, GAO-18-50 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

8, 2017).

7

We plan to complete the current annual assessment of DHS major acquisition programs 

in spring 2018. For the most recently published report, see: GAO, Homeland Security 

Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions 

Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress, GAO-17-346SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2017). We 

plan to complete the review related to the construction of new and replacement physical 

barriers along the southwest border later this year. 
Page 4 GAO-18-397T Border Security

On multiple occasions since 2011, we have reported on the progress the 

Border Patrol has made deploying technologies along the southwest 

border. Figure 1 shows the land-based surveillance technology systems 

used by the Border Patrol.

CBP Has Made 

Progress Deploying 

Surveillance 

Technology along the 

Southwest Border, 

but Has Not Fully 

Assessed 

Effectiveness
Page 5 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Figure 1: Border Surveillance Technology Systems Used by the Border Patrol
Page 6 GAO-18-397T Border Security

In November 2017, we reported on the progress the Border Patrol made 

deploying technology along the southwest border in accordance with its 

2011 Arizona Technology Plan and 2014 Southwest Border Technology 

Plan.8 For example, we reported that, according to officials, the Border 

Patrol had completed deployments of all planned Remote Video 

Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Capability systems, 

and Unattended Ground Sensors, as well as 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed 

Tower systems to Arizona. The Border Patrol had also completed 

deployments of select technologies to Texas and California, including 

deploying 32 Mobile Surveillance Capability systems. In addition, the 

Border Patrol had efforts underway to deploy other technology programs, 

but at the time of our report, some of those programs had not yet begun 

deployment or were not yet under contract. For example, we reported 

that, according to the Border Patrol officials responsible for the RVSS 

program, the Border Patrol had begun planning the designs of the 

command and control centers and towers for the Rio Grande Valley 

sector in Texas. Further, we reported that the Border Patrol had not yet 

initiated deployments of RVSS to Texas because, according to Border 

Patrol officials, the program had only recently completed contract

negotiations for procuring those systems. Additionally, the Border Patrol 

initially awarded the contract to procure and deploy Mobile Video 

Surveillance System units to Texas in 2014, but did not award the 

contract until 2015 because of bid and size protests, and the vendor that 

was awarded the contract did not begin work until March 2016.9 Our 

November 2017 report includes more detailed information about the 

deployment status of surveillance technology along the southwest border 

as of October 2017.

We also reported in November 2017 that the Border Patrol had made 

progress identifying performance metrics for the technologies deployed 

along the Southwest Border, but additional actions are needed to fully 

implement our prior recommendations in this area. For example, in 

November 2011, we found that CBP did not have the information needed 

to fully support and implement the Arizona Technology Plan and 

recommended that CBP (1) determine the mission benefits to be derived 

 8

GAO-18-119.

9

A bid protest, filed with GAO, is a dispute in which the protester alleges that a federal 

agency has not complied with statutes and regulations controlling government 

procurements. A size protest, filed with the Small Business Administration, is a challenge 

of the determination that an awardee of a small business set-aside contract meets the 

definition of “small business” in order to be eligible for the set-aside.
Page 7 GAO-18-397T Border Security

from implementation of the Arizona Technology Plan and (2) develop and 

apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation.10 CBP 

concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. 

Specifically, in March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission 

benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along the 

southwest border, such as improved situational awareness and agent 

safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for 

performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed.11

Further, we reported in March 2014 that CBP did not capture complete 

data on the contributions of these technologies. When used in 

combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, these 

data could be used to better determine the impact of CBP’s surveillance 

technologies on CBP’s border security efforts and inform resource 

allocation decisions. Therefore, we recommended that CBP (1) require 

data on technology contributions to apprehensions or seizures to be 

tracked and recorded within its database and (2) subsequently analyze 

available data on apprehensions and technological assists—in 

combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as 

appropriate—to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies. 

CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of 

them. Specifically, in June 2014, the Border Patrol issued guidance 

informing agents that the asset assist data field—which records assisting 

technology or other assets (canine teams)—in its database had become a 

mandatory data field.

While the Border Patrol has taken action to collect data on technology, it 

has not taken additional steps to determine the contribution of 

surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. In April 2017, 

we reported that the Border Patrol had provided us a case study that 

assessed technology assist data, along with other measures, to 

determine the contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission.12

We reported that this was a helpful step in developing and applying 

 10GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).

11GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to 

Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

3, 2014).

12GAO, 2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-17-491SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 26, 2017).
Page 8 GAO-18-397T Border Security

performance metrics; however, the case study was limited to one border 

location and the analysis was limited to select technologies. In November 

2017, we reported that Border Patrol officials demonstrated the agency’s 

new Tracking, Sign Cutting, and Modeling (TSM) system, which they said 

is intended to connect between agents’ actions (such as identification of a 

subject through the use of a camera) and results (such as an 

apprehension) and allow for more comprehensive analysis of the 

contributions of surveillance technologies to the Border Patrol’s mission. 

One official said that data from the TSM will have the potential to provide 

decision makers with performance indicators, such as changes in 

apprehensions or traffic before and after technology deployments. 

However, at the time of our review, TSM was still early in its use and 

officials confirmed that it was not yet used to support such analytic efforts. 

We continue to believe that it is important for the Border Patrol to assess 

technologies’ contributions to border security and will continue to monitor 

the progress of the TSM and other Border Patrol efforts to meet our 2011 

and 2014 recommendations.

We have reported on the significant investments CBP has made in 

tactical infrastructure along the southwest border. The Illegal Immigration 

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), as amended, 

provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take actions, as 

necessary, to install physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the

border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry.13 The 

Secure Fence Act of 2006, in amending IIRIRA, required DHS to 

construct at least two layers of reinforced fencing as well as physical 

 13Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 

No. 104-208, div. C, tit. I, subtit. A, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-554 (classified, as 

amended, at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note).

CBP Is Planning to 

Construct New 

Physical Barriers, but 

Has Not Yet 

Assessed the Impact 

of Existing Fencing

Fencing Is Intended to 

Assist Agents in 

Performing Their Duties, 

but Its Contributions to 

Border Security 

Operations Have Not 

Been Assessed
Page 9 GAO-18-397T Border Security

barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors on certain segments of the 

southwest border.14 From fiscal years 2005 through 2015, CBP increased 

the total miles of primary border fencing on the southwest border from 

119 miles to 654 miles—including 354 miles of primary pedestrian fencing 

and 300 miles of primary vehicle fencing.15 In addition, CBP has deployed 

additional layers of pedestrian fencing behind the primary border fencing, 

including 37 miles of secondary fencing.16 From fiscal years 2007 through 

2015, CBP spent approximately $2.4 billion on tactical infrastructure on 

the southwestern border—and about 95 percent, or around $2.3 billion, 

was spent on constructing pedestrian and vehicle fencing. CBP officials 

reported it will need to spend additional amounts to sustain these 

investments over their lifetimes. In 2009, CBP estimated that maintaining 

fencing would cost more than $1 billion over 20 years.17 CBP used 

various fencing designs to construct the 654 miles of primary pedestrian 

and vehicle border fencing. Figure 2 shows examples of existing 

pedestrian fencing deployed along the border.

 14See Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638-2639. Under the Secure Fence Act 

of 2006, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to achieve and maintain operational 

control over the borders of the United States through surveillance activities and physical 

infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens and facilitate CBP’s 

access to the borders. See id. § 2, 120 Stat. at 2638 (classified at 8 U.S.C. § 1701 note). 

Subsequently, the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, rewrote the border fencing requirements 

section of IIRIRA to require that DHS construct not less than 700 miles of reinforced 

fencing along the southwest border where fencing would be most practical and effective, 

and to provide for the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, 

and sensors to gain operational control of the southwest border. IIRIRA § 102(b), 110 

Stat. at 3009-554 to -555, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, tit. V, § 

564(a)(2)(B)(ii), 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2007) (classified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note). 

IIRIRA § 102(b), as amended, also gives the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to 

install tactical infrastructure in particular locations along the border, as deemed 

appropriate. Id.

15See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (notwithstanding fencing requirements, DHS is not required to 

install fencing or other resources in a particular location along the border if the Secretary 

of Homeland Security determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the 

most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control over the border at 

that location).

16The first layer of fencing, the primary fence, may include both pedestrian and vehicle 

fencing and is the first fence encountered when moving north from the border; the 

secondary fence, located behind the primary fence, consists solely of pedestrian fencing; 

and the third layer, or tertiary fence, is primarily used to delineate property lines rather 

than deter illegal entries.

17CBP’s 2009 life cycle cost estimate estimated operations and maintenance costs for 

fencing would be approximately $1.4 billion from 2009 through 2029.
Page 10 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Figure 2: Selected Designs of Existing Pedestrian Fencing on the Southwest Border

Note: For the purposes of this statement, we refer to fencing constructed prior to January 2017 as 

“existing” fencing or barriers. A January 2017 executive order called for the immediate construction of 

a “contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier”

and CBP is assessing prototypes to inform future designs of barriers. See Exec. Order No. 13767, § 2 

(Jan. 25, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Page 11 GAO-18-397T Border Security

In February 2017, we reported that border fencing had benefited border 

security operations in various ways, according to the Border Patrol.18 For 

example, according to officials, border fencing improved agent safety, 

helped reduce vehicle incursions, and supported Border Patrol agents’

ability to respond to illicit cross-border activities by slowing the progress 

of illegal entrants. However, we also found that, despite its investments 

over the years, CBP could not measure the contribution of fencing to 

border security operations along the southwest border because it had not 

developed metrics for this assessment. We reported that CBP collected 

data that could help provide insight into how border fencing contributes to 

border security operations. For example, we found that CBP collected 

data on the location of illegal entries that could provide insight into where 

these illegal activities occurred in relation to the location of various 

designs of pedestrian and vehicle fencing. We reported that CBP could 

potentially use these data to compare the occurrence and location of 

illegal entries before and after fence construction, as well as to help 

determine the extent to which border fencing contributes to diverting 

illegal entrants into more rural and remote environments, and border 

fencing’s impact, if any, on apprehension rates over time. Therefore, we 

recommended in February 2017 that the Border Patrol develop metrics to 

assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border 

security along the southwest border using the data the Border Patrol 

already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making 

investment and resource allocation decisions. The agency concurred with

our recommendation. As of December 2017, officials reported that CBP 

plans to establish initial metrics by March 2018 and finalize them in 

January 2019.

 18GAO-17-331.
Page 12 GAO-18-397T Border Security

In February 2017, we also reported that CBP was taking a number of 

steps to sustain tactical infrastructure along the southwest border; 

however, it continued to face certain challenges in maintaining this 

infrastructure.19 For example, CBP had funding allocated for tactical 

infrastructure sustainment requirements, but had not prioritized its 

requirements to make the best use of available funding, since CBP also 

required contractors to address urgent repair requirements. According to 

Border Patrol officials, CBP classifies breaches to fencing, grates, or 

gates as urgent and requiring immediate repair because breaches 

increase illegal entrants’ ability to enter the country unimpeded. At the 

time of our February 2017 review, the majority of urgent tactical 

infrastructure repairs on the southwest border were fence breaches, 

according to Border Patrol officials. From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, 

CBP recorded a total of 9,287 breaches in pedestrian fencing, and repair 

costs averaged $784 per breach.

While contractors provide routine maintenance and address urgent 

repairs on tactical infrastructure, certain tactical infrastructure assets used 

by the Border Patrol—such as border fencing—become degraded beyond 

repair and must be replaced. For example, in February 2017 we reported 

that CBP had provided routine maintenance and repair services to the 

primary legacy pedestrian fencing in Sunland Park, New Mexico. 

However, significant weather events had eroded the foundation of the 

fencing, according to the Border Patrol officials in the El Paso sector, and 

in 2015 CBP began to replace 1.4 miles of primary pedestrian fence in 

this area. We also reported on several additional CBP projects to replace 

degraded, legacy pedestrian fencing with more modern, bollard style 

fencing. For example, in fiscal year 2016, CBP began removing and 

replacing an estimated 7.5 miles of legacy primary pedestrian fencing 

with modern bollard style fencing within the Tucson sector. In addition, 

from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, CBP completed four fence 

replacement projects that replaced 14.1 miles of primary pedestrian 

legacy fencing in the Tucson and Yuma sectors at a total cost of 

approximately $68.26 million and an average cost of $4.84 million per 

mile of replacement fencing. We plan to provide information on additional 

fence replacement projects in a forthcoming report.

 19For the purpose of this statement, sustainment refers to the maintenance, repair, and 

replacement of tactical infrastructure. 

CBP Faces Challenges in 

Sustaining Tactical 

Infrastructure and Has Not 

Provided Guidance on Its 

Process for Identifying and 

Deploying Tactical 

Infrastructure
Page 13 GAO-18-397T Border Security

In 2014, the Border Patrol began implementing the Requirements 

Management Process that is designed to facilitate planning for funding 

and deploying tactical infrastructure and other requirements, according to 

Border Patrol officials. At the time of our February 2017 review, Border 

Patrol headquarters and sector officials told us that the Border Patrol 

lacked adequate guidance for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical 

infrastructure needs as part of this process. In addition, officials reported 

experiencing some confusion about their roles and responsibilities in this 

process. We reported that developing guidance on this process would 

provide more reasonable assurance that the process is consistently 

followed across the Border Patrol. We therefore recommended that the 

Border Patrol develop and implement written guidance to include roles 

and responsibilities for the steps within its requirements process for 

identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure assets for border 

security operations. The agency concurred with this recommendation and 

stated that it planned to update the Requirements Management Process 

and, as part of that update, planned to add communication and training 

methods and tools to better implement the process. As of December 

2017, DHS plans to complete these efforts by September 2019.

In response to the January 2017 Executive Order, CBP established the 

Border Wall System Program to replace and add to existing barriers along 

the southwest border. In April 2017, DHS leadership authorized CBP to 

procure barrier prototypes, which are intended to help refine requirements 

and inform new or updated design standards for the border wall system. 

CBP subsequently awarded eight contracts with a total value of $5 million 

for the construction, development, and testing of the prototypes. From 

October to December 2017, CBP tested eight prototypes—four 

constructed from concrete and four from other materials—and evaluated 

them in five areas: breachability, scalability, constructability, design, and 

aesthetics. CBP officials said the prototype evaluation results are 

expected by March 2018.

CBP has selected the San Diego and Rio Grande Valley sectors for the 

first two segments of the border wall system. In the San Diego sector, 

CBP plans to replace 14 miles of existing primary and secondary barriers. 

The primary barriers will be rebuilt to existing design standards, but the 

secondary barriers will be rebuilt to new design standards once 

established. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, CBP plans to extend an 

existing barrier by 60 miles using existing design standards. CBP intends 

to prioritize construction of new or replacement physical barriers based on 

threat levels, land ownership, and geography, among other things. We 

CBP Has Tested Barrier 

Prototypes and Plans to 

Construct New Barriers in 

San Diego and Rio 

Grande Valley Sectors
Page 14 GAO-18-397T Border Security

have ongoing work reviewing the Border Wall System Program, and we 

plan to report on the results of that work later this year.

In November 2017 we reported that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, 

the Border Patrol had statutorily-established minimum staffing levels of 

21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but the Border Patrol has 

faced challenges in staffing to that level.20 Border Patrol headquarters, 

with input from the sectors, determines how many authorized agent 

positions are allocated to each of the sectors. According to Border Patrol 

officials, these decisions take into account the relative needs of the 

sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and the flow of illegal activity. 

Each sector’s leadership determines how many of the authorized agent 

positions will be allocated to each station within their sector.

At the end of fiscal year 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had over 

19,400 agents on board nationwide, and that over 16,600 of the agents 

were staffed to sectors along the southwest border. As mentioned earlier, 

the January 2017 executive order called for the hiring of 5,000 additional 

Border Patrol agents, subject to available appropriations, and as of 

November 2017 we reported that the Border Patrol planned to have 

26,370 agents by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Acting Commissioner 

of CBP reported in a February 2017 memo to the Deputy Secretary for 

Homeland Security that from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016, the 

Border Patrol hired an average of 523 agents per year while experiencing 

 20GAO-18-50. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 

Pub. L. No. 112-10, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 946 (2011); Consolidated and 

Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D, tit. II, 127 Stat. 

198, 345; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 

Stat. 5, 249; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-

4, tit. II, 129 Stat. 39, 41; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. 

F, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2495 (2015). For fiscal year 2017, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2017, did not include the provision from prior years mandating a 

workforce floor for Border Patrol agents, but the accompanying explanatory statement 

directed CBP to continue working to develop a fully justified workforce staffing model that 

would provide validated requirements for all U.S. borders and to brief the appropriations 

committees on its progress in this regard within 30 days of the enactment of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act (enacted May 5, 2017). See Explanatory Statement, 163 

Cong. Rec. H3327, H3809-10 (daily ed. May 3, 2017), accompanying Pub. L. No. 115-31, 

131 Stat. 135 (2017).

The Border Patrol 

Has Continued to 

Face Staffing 

Challenges
Page 15 GAO-18-397T Border Security

a loss of an average of 904 agents per year.21 The memo cited 

challenges such as competing with other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement organizations for applicants. In particular, the memo noted 

that CBP faces hiring and retention challenges compared to DHS’s U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (which is also planning to hire 

additional law enforcement personnel) because CBP’s hiring process 

requires applicants to take a polygraph examination, Border Patrol agents 

are deployed to less desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol agents 

generally receive lower compensation.

In November 2017, we reported that the availability of agents is one key 

factor that affects the Border Patrol’s deployment strategy. In particular, 

officials from all nine southwest border sectors cited current staffing levels 

and the availability of agents as a challenge for optimal deployment. We 

reported that, as of May 2017, the Border Patrol had 17,971 authorized 

agent positions in southwest border sectors, but only 16,522 of those 

positions were filled—a deficit of 1,449 agents—and eight of the nine 

southwest border sectors had fewer agents than the number of 

authorized positions. As a result of these staffing shortages, resources 

were constrained and station officials had to make decisions about how to 

prioritize activities for deployment given the number of agents available.

We also reported in November 2017 that within sectors, some stations 

may be comparatively more understaffed than others because of 

recruitment and retention challenges, according to officials. Generally, 

sector officials said that the recruitment and retention challenges 

associated with particular stations were related to quality of life factors in 

the area near the station—for example, agents may not want to live with 

their families in an area without a hospital, with low-performing schools, or 

with relatively long commutes from their homes to their duty station. This 

can affect retention of existing agents, but it may also affect whether a 

new agent accepts a position in that location. For example, officials in one 

sector said that new agent assignments are not based solely on agency 

need, but rather also take into consideration agent preferences. These 

officials added that there is the potential that new agents may decline 

offers for stations that are perceived as undesirable, or they may resign 

their position earlier than they otherwise would to pursue employment in a 

more desirable location. We have ongoing work reviewing CBP’s efforts 

 21The Acting Commissioner’s memo outlines plans and requests to assist the Border 

Patrol in hiring more agents, including the additional 5,000 agents called for in the 

Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. 
Page 16 GAO-18-397T Border Security

to recruit, hire, and retain its law enforcement officers, including Border 

Patrol agents.

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at 

(202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

are Jeanette Henriquez (Assistant Director), Leslie Sarapu (Analyst-inCharge), Ashley Davis, Alana Finley, Tom Lombardi, Marycella Mierez, 

and Claire Peachey.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 17 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance 

Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess 

Effectiveness. GAO-18-119. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2017. 

Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and 

Immigration Checkpoints. GAO-18-50. Washington, D.C.: November 8, 

2017. 

2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-17-

491SP. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017. 

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and 

Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing 

Progress. GAO-17-346SP. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017. 

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess 

Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for 

Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-331. Washington, D.C.: February 

16, 2017. 

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess 

Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for 

Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-167SU. Washington, D.C.: 

December 22, 2016. 

Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial 

Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 

2016. 

2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-16-

375SP. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, 

but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess 

Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2016.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 18 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement 

and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 13, 2015.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and 

Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes. GAO-15-541T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington, 

D.C.: April 22, 2015. 

2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-15-

404SP. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015. 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed 

to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014. 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed 

to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014. 

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013. 

Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.

Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013. 

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to 

Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25. 

Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, 

Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. GAO12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011. 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.
Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and 

Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2011.

Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. 

Southwest and Northern Borders. GAO-11-508T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2011.

Border Security Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest 

Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington, D.C.: March 

15, 2011.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and 

Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October 

18, 2010.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, 

Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan. GAO10-877R. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010. 

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 

Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340. Washington, D.C.: 

May, 5, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 

Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges Put 

Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-511T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 18, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and 

Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk.

GAO-10-158. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-18-397T Border Security

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but 

More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could 

Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.

Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 

2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009.

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