### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 450 -CR

Da vid Al le n Sawy e r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 421S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 2005 -15 1 , HO NORAB LE TODD A. B LOM ERTH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
We o v e r r u le Sa w y e r ’ s mo ti o nf

o r r e h e ar in g , w it

h dr aw o u r

o p in io nan d

ju d g me nt issued Aug ust 20, 2008, and substitut e the f ollowing in its place

. Appellant Da

vid Sawy er w as indicted for driving while i ntox icated ( DWI ), enha nced by two prior DWIco n v ictions, a third-deg ree felony

. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04(a) (West 2003), § 49.09(b)( 2) (West Supp. 2008). After the trial cour

t overrul ed S aw y er ’s pretrial motion to s uppress e vidence , he plea ded guilty to a Class B misdemea

nor DWI , see id. § 49.04(b), purs ua nt t o a wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt. Th e c ourt

a sse sse d p un ish me nt a

t 18 0 d ay s’ c onfine me nt, pr ob a te d f

or 12 mon ths , a

nd a $7 50 fi ne . Sa

wy e r a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

to suppress, asse rting that the trial court err ed in denying his motion beca use (1) the ar

resting office r did not have rea sonable suspicion to detain him for dr iving while intoxicated, (2) the detention and

arr est occ urre d outside of the off ice r’ s j u risdiction, and (3) suppr ession was re quiredWhil e Rane y testified at the suppre ssion hearing , seven months af ter the inc ident, that he 1 tho u g h t th e v e h ic le h e h a d o b s e r v e d w a s a “ b la c k F o r d E s c o rt, ” th e 9 1 1 d is p a tc h lo g , which wa s admitted into evidenc e at the he aring , ref lects that Raney

descr ibed the vehic le as a For d Ex plorer. When que stioned about this discr epanc y at the suppression hear ing, Raney answe red, “I rea lly don’t reme mber. I

know it was a bla ck F ord.” 2 under a rticle 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

. S e e T ex . C o d e C ri m. Proc. Ann.
ar t
. 3 8
. 2 3 (W es t 2 0 0 5 ). S aw y er fu rt h er ar gu es t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i n fa i l i n g t o m ak e f i n d i n gs of fa ct and c onclusions of law afte r denying his motion to suppr ess. We will affirm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
. BACK GR OUND

On J anuar

y 1, 2005, Donald Rane y

and his wife were driving west on I nterstate 10, tr a ve lin g fr om H ou sto n to B and e ra , Te xas. At a pp ro xima te ly 1:1 5 p.m. , Ra ne y ob se rv e d a

ve hic le in his rear -vi ew m i rr o r ru n off of the roa d and then dr ive bac k on ag ain. Raney testified at the suppression hea

ring t h at he c ontinued to watch the ve hicle as it trave led at a hig h rate of spee d, pa ssi ngano the r v e hic le a s w e ll a s h is o wn . Ra ne y fu rt he r t e sti fi e d tha t he saw t

he ve hic le ve e r i nto the median, a lmost flip over, and then re turn to the interstate. B ased on his obser vations, Raney
ca ll e d 9 1 1 to a le rt a

u th o r it ie s th a t h e s u s p e c te d th e v e h ic le w a s b e in g dr iv e n b y a drunk driver

. Raney , who i dentified him self and provided his cell phone number to the 911 di spatche r, desc ribed the vehicle as a late m o d el Ford Ex plorer, solid blac k in color, that he e stimated was traveling 85 mil e s p e r h our w e st- bo un d a lon g I nte rs ta te 10 , a bo ut 1 9 mi le s f

rom L ul ing , T e xas. The 911 1 dis patc he r r e lay e d Ra

ne y ’s inf or ma tio n r e g ard ingthe ve hic le to t he Luli ngPol ic e De pa

rtme nt.Raney also testified that about 30 minutes a fter he place d the ca ll to 911, he observed the 2 vehicle that he had pr eviously repor ted pulled over onto the side of the interstate next to a police ca r. 3 Th e Luli ngPol ic e De pa

rtme nt dis patc he d on e of

its patr ol o ff

ic e rs , Joh n Wh ise na

nt, to r espond to the call. Wit hin minutes, Whis enant arr ived at I nterstate 10 and positioned his patrol

u n i ti nt h e c ro s s o v er

at t h e w es t -b o u n d

6 3 2 m i l e m ar k er , i n s i d e t h e c o rp o ra t e ci t y l i m i t s o f Lul i n g. Acc ording to Whi senant’s te stimony , he then wa ited about five minutes until a n Ex plorer f

itting the descr iption given in the 911 call passed his ve hicle. Whis enant proce eded to f ollow the vehicle f

or roug hly three to four minutes, during which time h e p er s onally observe d the Expl orer

weaving within its own lane. J ust be fore Whis enant initiated the traff ic stop, he saw the vehicle c ross over t h e f o g l i n e o f t h e r o a dw ay. Upon stopping the Ex plorer, Whisenant intervie wed Sawy er, the sole occupa nt of the
ve hic le , an d d e t e c t e d t h e o d o r o f an a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e c o m i n g f r o m h i m . W h i s e n an t d e c i d e d to

a d m i n i s t e r

f i e l d

- s o b r i e t y

t e s t s an d , a f

t e r c o n c l u d i n g t h e t e s t s , p l a c e d S aw y e r u n d e r ar r e s tf o r D W I. 2 I n his moti on to suppress, Sawy er soug ht to suppress all evidenc e obtaine d b y the po lic e , a rguin g that Whi se na

nt d id n ot h a ve re a so na

ble su spic ion

to d e ta in h im f

or dr ivi ngwh ile i n t ox icated a

nd that the stop was illeg al bec ause it occ urre d outside Whi senant’s g eog raphic al jurisdiction. The trial court de nied Sawy er’ s motion, st ating that “ther e wa s rea sonable suspicion to make an inve stigatory

stop, ba sed upon a citizen c omplainant who had identified himself.” A fter Sawy e r’ s c on vic tio n, the tr ia l c ourt c e rt if ie d h is r ig ht t o a

pp e a l th e mot ion

to s up pr e ss, and

thi s appea l followed.4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW W h e nr e v i e w i n g a

t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o n o na m o t i o nt o s u

p p r e s s , w e a

p p l y a bifurca ted standard of revie w, g iving almost total defe renc e to a trial court’s deter mination of historical fa cts and re viewing the cour t’s application of se arc h and seizure law de novo. Maxw ellv. Stat e , 7 3 S. W.3 d 2 78 , 2 81 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Gu zm an v . S tat e , 9 5 5 S. W. 2 d

85, 88-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). The district cour t is the sole judge of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses and their te stimony

. Ma

x we ll , 73 S.W .3d at 281.

DI SCU SSIO N I n his firs t issue, Sawy er c omplains that the trial court e rre d in refusingto provide
wr itt e n f ind ing s o f f

a c t a nd c on c lus ion s o f law a ft e r b e ingre qu e ste d to do so , th e re by pr e ve nti ngthi s Court from conduc ting a meaning ful revie w of the trial court’s decision to ove rrule Saw y er’ s motion to s up pr e ss. T h e tr ia l c o u rt h e ld th e h e ar in g o n th e mo ti o n to s u p p r e s s o n Ju ly 2 9 , 2 0 0 5, and

an n o u n ce d

i t s ru l i n g at t h e c o n cl u s i o no f t h at h ea ri n g. S aw y er , h o we v er , d i d n o tre qu es tfi n d i n gs of fa ct and c onclu sions of law until more than a y ear later, a nd only afte r the Court of Criminal Appea ls decided State v. Cullen , 195 S.W .3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I n Cullen , the cour t held:
Effe ctive fr om the date of this opinion, the require ment is: upon the re quest of the losing pa rty on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court sha ll state its essential fi n d i n gs . By

“e s s e n t i al fi n d i n gs , ” w e m ea nt h at t h e t ri al co u rt m u s tm ak e f i n d i n gs of fa c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw a de qu a te to pr ov ide an a pp e llate c ou

rt wi th a ba sis upon which to re view the tria l court’s a pplication of the lawto the fac ts.As a result of t his deter mination, we need not rea ch the issue of whe ther a reque st made 3 mor e tha n a y e ar a ft e r t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on

the mot ion

to su pp res s is su ff

ic ie ntl y tim e ly to invoke Cullen ’s re quirements reg arding finding s of fac t a nd conclusions of law. See State v . Cullen , 195 S.W .3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Simi larly , we need not de cide whe ther the holding of Cullen may

be applied r etroa ctively

to rulings made prior to the date of the opinion. 5 Id. a t 69 9. F ur

the r, the c ourt ru le d that the “ fi nd ing s and c on c lus ion s ne e d to be re c or de d in so me way , whether

written out and filed by

the trial cour

t, or stated on the r ecor d at the hea ring .” Id. Rely ing on Cullen , Sawy er requeste d that the t rial court provide written f indings of fa c t and c on c lus ion s of la w re g ard ingits de c isi on on the mot ion

to s up pr e ss. I n a

le tte r t o th e pa

rt ie s, the trial cour

t responded by noting that it wa s unclea r whe ther Cullen wo uld

e ve n a pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly to a hea ring held a y ear befor e the decision but that a transcr ipt of the hear ing would be order ed for revie w. Ultimately , the trial cour t did not file written finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. Sawy e r c omp la ins that th e tr ial c ourt ’s fa ilure to m a ke the re qu e ste d f ind ing s is
reve rsible er

ror. We disag ree . Even if we wer e to find that t he trial court erre d in failing to make written finding s, the proper reme dy would be abatement, rather than r ever sal. See Bl oc k e r v . S tat e , 231 S.W
. 3 d 5 9 5 , 5 9 8 ( T e x. A p p . —Wa c o 2 0 0 7 , n o p e t. ) ( a b a ti n g a p p e a l w it h in s tr u c ti o n s to trial court to file f

indings of fac t and conclusions of law r eg ardingmotion to s uppress); State v. Guzman , 240 S.W .3d 362, 365 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (same) . I n this case, howe ver, it is not
nece ssary to r eturn the ca se to the trial cour t for wr itten findings be cause we have dete rmined that the trial cour

t clear ly enunciated its factua l and leg al conc lusions on the recor d. 3 At the suppression hea

ring , the trial cour

t cited a r ece ntly

decid ed ca se, Brother

v . S tat e , 1 66 S.W. 3d

25 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 20 05 ), tha t in vo lve d f

a c ts a nd iss ue s si mil ar t o th os e prese nted in Saw y er’ s case . I n Brother , a cit ize n ca lle d in to 9 11 to r e po rt wh a t sh e tho ug ht w a s aAs previously noted, the trial court stated in a letter to the pa

rties that it would reviewthe 4 repor ter’s r ec o rd o f the suppre ssion hearingand pre pare written finding s, althoug h no written finding s were ever

issued. The tr i al court may well have deter

mined, afte r re viewing the hea ring transcr ipt, that its finding s and conc lusions had been suff iciently established on the r ecor d. 6 drunk driver , and the police relied on the i nformation provided by the caller t o locate a nd identify the vehicle

. Id. at 258. I n the pre sent ca se, t h e t ri al co u rt , afte r discussing the applica bility of Brother , s ta te d:
Wel l, I ’m g oin g to o ve rr

ule y our m oti on . I

be lie ve that he ha d a t le a st a re a so na ble suspicion to make an investigatory stop, ba sed upon a citizen c omplainant who was ide nti fi e d a

nd ide nti fi e d h ims e lf

and , o bv iou sly , w a s a

ble to b e identi fie d b e c a

us e he’s testified in this open court, enoug h so that the officer was able to at least make a b ri ef i n v es t i gat o ry

s t o p . An d

t h at ’s m y ru l i n g.
As the cour

t of criminal appe als stated in Cullen , “ We do no t int e nd to c re a te ad d i t i o n al wo rkfo r t h e t ri al co u rt s ; we ar e s i mp l y as k i n g t h e t ri al co u rt s t o i n fo rm u s o f t h e f i n d i n gs of fact up on wh ic h th e ir

c on c lus ion

is b a se d, ” in o rd e r t o “ pr ov ide an a pp e llate c ourt

wi th a ba sis upon which to re view the trial court’s application of the law to the fa cts.” 195 S.W.3d at 699. Here , the trial cour

t expl icitly

stated its fac tual finding s on the rec ord, as well as the leg al authority it relied up on in deny ing the mot ion

to s up pr e ss. We hold that such statements are sufficie nt to satisfy

4 Cullen ’s r e qu ir e me nt t

hat a tr ia l c ourt

make fi nd ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw i n o rd e r t o provide an adequa

te basis for appellate revie w. Se e Sta te v . G e rst e nk or n , 239 S.W .3d 357, 358 n.1 (T ex . Ap p . — S an An t o n i o 2 0 0 7 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Cullen and noting that “explicit ver bal finding s at the e nd of the he ari ng ” c on sti tut e fi nd ing s of fa c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw) . A s a re su lt, we ov e rr

ule Sawy er’ s first issue.7 I n his se cond issue on appea l, Saw y er contends that the traff ic stop wa s u nlawful beca use Whis enant did not have re asonable suspicion to stop S awy er’ s vehicle a nd detain him for purpose s o f m ak i n g a DWIinvestigation. A police offic er ma y conduct a

brief inve stigative d e t e n t i o ni f

h e h a s r e a s o n a

b l e s u s p i c i o nt o b e l i e v e t h a tani n d i v i d u a l i s i n v o l v e d

i nc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. Fo rd v . S tat e , 1 58 S.W. 3d

48 8, 49 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); State v. Griffey , 241 S.W .3d 700, 703 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref ’d). The rea s o n ablene ss of a tempora ry detention must be examined in terms of the t otality of t he circumstance s at i ts inception and will only be jus tified if the office r ca

n point to specific ar

ticulable fa cts that, when c o m b i n ed with rational infere nces from thos e fa ct s, would lead him to rea sonably suspect that a spe cific pe rson had e ng ag ed in or

w a s o r s o o nw o u ld

b e e n g a g in g in

c r im in a l a c ti v ity

. Gar cia v. Sta te , 43 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

“The fac t u al basis for stopping a vehic le nee d not arise f rom the off

icer ’s per sonal observation, b u t m ay b e supplied by information ac quired fr om another pe rson.” Brother , 166 S.W .3d at 257. Reasona ble suspicion may

be esta blished based on infor

mation give n to police office rs by

citizen informants, provided the f acts a re adequately

corr oborate d by

the offic er. Id. at 258-59. Corroboration does not mean that the off icer must personally

observe the conduc t giving ri se to r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion , b ut m e re ly re qu ir e s the of fi c e r to c on fi rm e no ug h fa c ts t o r e a so na bly conclude that the informant’ s information is reliable. Id. at 2 5 9 n. 5; see al so Alab am a v . W

hit e , 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990).

Texas courts have often he ld that a citizen-informant’s tip re g ardingerr atic driving can be used to establish rea sonable suspicion t o make a traff ic stop. See, e .g. , Brother , 166 S.W .3d8

a t 25 8- 26 0 ( up ho ldi ngsto p ba se d o n c iti zen ’s re po rt of e rr a tic dr ivi ng ); Ga ns k

yv . S tat e , 180 S.W .3d 240, 247 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2005, pet. ref’ d) (holding that stop was re asonable when ba sed
on c iti zen s’ re po rt

tha t c ar w a s tr a ve lin g on

wr on g sid e of

int e rs ta te ); Pi

pk in v. Sta te , 114 S.W .3d 649, 653, 656 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, no pet.) (up h o l d i n g stop when citizen observe d de fe nd ant d

ri vi ng erratic a lly

wh ile smo kin g c ra c k p ipe ); Ha wes v . S tat e , 125 S.W .3d 535, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (upholdingstop based on tow truc k driver’ s repor t of su bje c t’ s e rr a tic dr ivi ng ); Hi mev . S tat e , 998 S.W .2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. re f’d) (upholding stop ba s e d o n call fr om citiz en who obse rved subjec t driving e rratically ). I n State v. Fudge , 42 S.W .3d 226 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2001, no pe t.), this Court upheld a stop based
on a ca b driver’ s unsolicited fac e-to-f ace repor t to the police that the dr iver of a vehicle, w hich the cab dr iver pointed out to the office r, “couldn’ t sta y on the road” and that he be lieved the dr iver wa s intox icated. Id. at 229. Ba sed sol ely on the report from the citizen informant, the officer stopped the vehicle , detaining the driver on a re asonable suspicion of DWI

. Id. Sawy er contends t hat R aney ’s t ip was insufficient to establish rea sonable suspicion in this case bec ause a

completely

anony mous tip i s the least re liable of c itiz en-info rm ant i n fo rm ation, see G riffey , 2 4 1 S. W. 3 d a t 7 0 4 , an d Wh is e n an t d id n o t kn o w , a t th e ti me o f the detention, that R an ey h ad provide d his name and c ontact information to the 911 dispatcher. Ho we ve r, the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n a n a no ny mou s ti p f

ro m an unk

no wn inf or mant and a tip fr om a kn ow n, re lia

ble inf or mant “ is f

ar l e ss s ig nif

ic ant w he re the ano ny

mou s ti p h a s b e e n s ub stan tia lly
corr oborate d” by

police, as it has in the pr esent c ase. An gu lo v . S tat e , 727 S.W .2d 276 , 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).Whil e the 91 1 di sp atc h log re fl e c ts that Ra ne y de sc ri be d th e ve hic le ’s dr ive r a s a wh ite 5 fe ma le , Ra

ne y te sti fi e d at the su

pp re ssi on he ari ngthat he did no t r e me mbe r m a kin g su c h a state me nt. Raney further testified, howeve r, that he mig ht have done so, stating, “I can’ t see re al g ood.” In any event, Wh is e n an t te s ti f

ie d a t Sa w y e r ’ s li c e n s e - r e v o c a ti o n h e ar in g

—th e tr an s c r ip t o f w h ic h was admitted into evidence— t h at h e d id not reca ll whether the 911 dispatcher g ave him information re g ard ingthe dr ive r’ s g e nd e r, and no su c h in fo rm a tio n a

pp e ars in Wh ise na

nt’ s in cid e nt r e po rt
. Be cause the re cord doe s not indicate that Whisenant was told that Raney had desc ribed the dr iver as a f em al e, t h e fa ct that Raney may have done so has no bea ring on whether

Whis enant ha d rea sonable suspicion to detain Sawy er.
9

Sawy er a rg ues that Raney ’s tip was insufficie ntly corr oborate d beca

use, unlike the citizen informant in Brother , Raney did not provide a license plate number to the 911 dispatcher , and failed to c ontinue following the vehicle —which, ac cordingto Raney ’s testim o n y , was moving at approximately

85 miles-per- hour—in order to keep it in sight until police ar rived. However, we know of no require ment that a citizen infor mant must e ng ag e in a high- speed car chase , or any

other form of vig ilante justice, in order for his information to be deemed r eliable. Raney provided the dispatcher w ith the model, make, and c olor of the ve hicle, whe re it was last located, it s ap proxi mate spee d, the direc tion it was traveling , and a de scription of the
erra t i c d ri v i n g. Rely ing on Ra ney ’s information, Whisenant positioned his patrol car i n a plac e 5 wher e he expected t o encounte r t he described vehicle and, in a ti me frame consistent with R aney ’s
re po rt , in te rc e pte d th e ve hic le

. F ur the rm or e , the inf

or ma tio n Whise na

nt obt a ine d f

ro m Ra ne y ’s tip
was c orrobor ated by Whis enant’ s own observations, after he followed the ve hicle for three to four minutes, of the vehicle wea ving within its own lane and then c rossing the fog line. Whil e Sawy er contends that the vide o footag e fr om Whi senant’s in-c ar c amer a is in co n s istent with W hisenant’s testimony beca use the video doe s not refle ct any traff ic violation, we d i s ag ree . Whis enant ne ver claimed that he observe d Sawy er commit a traff ic violation, but rather testified, “ Iwasn’t lookingSawy er also argues t hat W hisenant’s personal observations are inconsistent with Raney ’s 6 repo rt t hat the vehic le was spe eding and we aving on and off the roa d. Howeve r, it would not be unrea sonable to assume that even a n impaired drive r mig ht slow down an d at t em pt to drive more sa fe ly up on se e inga po lic e c ar f

oll ow ingbe hin d h im.

10 to pull him over f

or a spe cific traff

ic law violation. I was followingbehind him to see if he a ppear ed to be intox icated to me, if he wa s g iving me an y indication of that.” We conclude that under the 6 totality of the circ umstances, Sawy er’ s detention was justified by rea sonable suspicion. Sawy er’ s second point of e rror

is overrule d. I n his th ir d

p o in t o f e r r o r , Sa w y e r c la im s th a t t

h e o f f ic e r ’ s d e te n ti o nw a s u n la

w f ul beca use it occur

red be y ond Whis enant’ s g eog raphic al jurisdiction. At the t ime of the stop, Off icer W h i s e n an tw a s a

l i c e n s e d p e a c e o f f i c e r f o r t h e C i t y o f

Lu l i n g , w h i c h i s l o c a t e d

i nC a l dw e l l C o u n t y, T e x a s , w h i l e t h e s t o p o c c u r r e d o u t s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s o f Lu l i n g , i nn e i g hb o r i n g G u a d a l u p e C o u n t y. As a g e ne ra l r ule , c ity po lic e of fi c e rs may

no t st op and

arres t perso ns fo r t

ra ff ic violations commit ted outside the off icer ’s g eog raphic al jurisdiction. See T ex . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art . 1 4. 03 (g ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 8) . U nd e r a

rt icle 14 .0 3( g ), a

pe a c e of fi c e r o uts ide of

his jurisdiction “may

arr est without a war

rant a person who c ommits any offe nse within the offic er’ s prese nce or view” other t han viol ations of t he transportation code. Id. Whis enant stopped Saw y er ba se d o n a

re a so na ble su sp ic ion

that Sawy e r w a s c omm itt ingthe of fe ns e of DWI , ra

the r tha n a tr a ff ic
o ff en s e . As a r es u l t , W h i s en an twa s au t h o ri z edt o s t o p an d arre s tS aw y er

u n d er ar t i cl e 1 4
. 0 3 (g) wh e n Sa wy e r c omm itt e d a

n o ff e ns e , ot her than

a vio la tio n o f t

he tr a ns po rt a tio n c od e , w ith in W h i s e n an t ’ s p r e s e n c e o r

v i e w , w h i c h i nt h i s c a s e w a s a D W I. See B rother , 166 S.W .3d at 260. I n addition, article 14.03( d) spec ifically provides that an office r may make an extrajurisdictional arre st for, amongother thing s, intox ication offe nses under chapte r 49 of the penal code11

that are committed within the office r’s view

. See art. 14.03(d) . Be cause Whis enant initiated the stop and arrest based on rea sonable suspi cion of DWI , an intox ication offe nse under chapte r 49, see T e x. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04, the stop wa s authorized by article 14.03(d) of

the code of cr iminal proce dure. Saw y er’ s third issue is overruled.

I n his fourth issue, Sawy er state s, “The tr ial court err ed in failing to gr ant Sawy er’ s motion to s uppress as re q u i re d by Article 38.23 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e.” Howeve r, this fourth issue is not briefe d separ ately from the rema ining issues, other than Sawy er’ s
acc urate asser

tion that the t rial court was bound by article 38.23 to exclude any evidenc e obtained in violation of feder al or state la w or the U .S. or Texas constituti ons. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. ar t. 38.23. I n light of our

resolution of Sawy er’ s first three issues and our holding that the trial court did not err

in denying the motion to s uppress, we also overr ule Sawy er’ s fourth issue.
CO NC LU SION Be cause we have d et er mined that the trial cour t did not err in deny

ing Saw y er’ s mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e , w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: Mar ch 19, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh