88

An	Analysis	of	Russia’s	‘New	Generation	Warfare’	

						and	Implications	for	the	US Army

By	John	Chambers

October	18,	2016

COUNTERING	GRAY-ZONE	HYBRID	THREATS

Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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Captain	John	Chambers	is	an	instructor	of	American	politics	in	the	

Department	of	Social	Sciences	at	the	US Military	Academy	at	West	Point.	He	

is	an	Engineer	officer	with	ten	years	of	service	including	a	combat	

deployment	to	Baghdad,	Iraq,	during	the	2007	“surge” and	a	no-notice	

deployment	to	Haiti	as	part	of	the	Global	Response	Force	following	the	2010	

earthquake.	He	served	as	the	Task	Force	Engineer	for	2-325	AIR,	a	Sapper	Platoon	Leader	and	Executive	

Officer	in	2	BCT,	82nd Airborne,	and	commanded	the	US Army’s	Sapper	Leader	Course	and	the	509th

Clearance	Company	at	Fort	Leonard	Wood,	MO.	He	holds	a	BS	in	Civil	Engineering	from	the	US Military	

Academy,	an	MS	in	Engineering	Management	from	the	Missouri	University	of	Science	and	Technology,	

and	a	Masters	in	Public	Policy	from	Harvard’s	Kennedy	School	of	Government. He	is	also	a	certified	

Project	Management	Professional.	The	views	in	this	report	reflect	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	

represent	the	views	of	the Department	of	Defense	or	the	US Army.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... 4

I.	Executive	Summary .................................................................................................................................. 4

II.	Describing	Hybrid	Threats	and	the	Gray	Zone......................................................................................... 8

Contemporary	View	of	Hybrid	Threats..................................................................................................... 9

The	Spectrum	of	Conflict:	Hybrid	Threats	vs.	the	Gray	Zone ................................................................. 12

Characteristics	of	Contemporary	Hybrid	Threats................................................................................... 15

Gray-Zone	Hybrid	Threats....................................................................................................................... 16

Open-Warfare	Hybrid	Threats ................................................................................................................ 22

Findings	and	Recommendations............................................................................................................. 22

III.	Identifying	and	Adapting	to	Challenges	Posed	by	Gray-Zone	Hybrid	Threats	Due	to	Laws,	Norms,	and	

Processes................................................................................................................................................... 23

Challenges	Posed	by	Gray-Zone	Hybrid	Threats..................................................................................... 23

Russia’s	“New	Generation	Warfare”	vs.	US	Doctrine ............................................................................. 25

Findings	and	Recommendations............................................................................................................. 30

IV:	Improving	US	Army	Capacity	to	Counter	Gray-Zone	Hybrid	Threats ................................................... 31

Identifying	and	Understanding	the	Threat ............................................................................................. 31

Reducing	Risk .......................................................................................................................................... 35

V:	Summary:	The	Future	of	Hybrid	Threats............................................................................................... 41

Appendix	A:		Select	Definitions.................................................................................................................. 44

Appendix	B:		US	Operational	Phases	from	Joint	Publication	5-0, Operational	Art	and	Design ................. 46

Appendix	C:		Ukraine	Crisis	Maps.............................................................................................................. 47
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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Appendix	D:		Ethnic	Russian	Populations	in	Eastern	Europe ..................................................................... 48

Appendix	E:	Methodology &	Acknowledgements..................................................................................... 49

Bibliography............................................................................................................................................... 50

List	of	Figures:

Figure 1:	Spectrum	of	Conflict 											5

Figure	2:	US vs.	Russian	Operational	Phases 									26
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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Abstract

The	 gray	 zone is	 an	 operating	 environment	 in	 which	 aggressors	 use	 ambiguity	 and	 leverage	 nonattribution	to	achieve	strategic	objectives	while	limiting	counter-actions	by	other	nation	states.	Inside	the	

gray	zone,	aggressors	use	hybrid	tactics	to	achieve	their	strategic	objectives.	While	hybrid	threats	have	

historically	been	associated	with	irregular	and	conventional	warfare,	their	use	in	the	gray	zone leads	to	a	

dichotomy	between	two	types	of	hybrid	threats	that	can	mainly	be	attributed	to	the	need	for	ambiguity	

and	non-attribution	in	the	gray	zone.	The	two	types	of	hybrid	threats	are	“open-warfare	hybrid	threats”	

and	 “gray-zone hybrid	 threats.”	 A	 case	 in	 point	 is	 Russia’s	military	 actions	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 part	 of	

what	the	Kremlin	calls	its	“New	Generation	Warfare.”	In	this MWI	report,	Captain	John	Chambers	draws	

on	this	case	study	to	recommend	ways	the	US Army	can	improve	its	capacity	to	counter	ongoing	as	well	

as	future	gray-zone hybrid	threats.		

I.	Executive	Summary	

The	 gray	 zone is	 the	 “space”	 between	 peace	

and	 war	 on	 the	 spectrum	 of	 conflict.	 It	 is	 an	

operational	 environment	 “churning	 with	

political,	 economic,	 and	 security	 competitions	

that	 require	 constant	attention.”1 On	 the	 heels	

of	 Russia’s	 military	 actions	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	

and	 China’s	 expansion	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea,	

the	 military	 and	 academic	 communities have	

attempted	 to	describe	conflict	in	 the	gray	zone

to	 create	 shared	 understanding	 and	 spur	

discussion	 on	 conflict	 and	 competition	 in	 this	

space.	

Toward	the	mid-to-late	2000s, a	similar	

effort	was	underway	to	describe	the	integration	

and	 fusion	of	irregular	and	conventional	 tactics	

on	 a	 single	 battlefield.	 This	 became	 known	 as	

 1 Nadia	Schadlow,	“Peace	and	War:	The	Space	

Between,”	August	18,	2014,	War	on	the	Rocks.

hybrid	 warfare	 and	 was	 best	 described	 by	

retired	 Lt. Col. Frank	 Hoffman	 as	 when	 “an	

adversary	 simultaneously	 and	 adaptively	

employs	 a	 fused	mix	 of	 conventional	 weapons,	

irregular tactics,	terrorism	and	criminal	behavior	

in	 the	 battle	 space	 to	 obtain	 their	 political	

objectives.”2

Describing	 the	 current	 state	 of	 warfare	

is	 not	 just	 important	 to	 academic and	 military	

strategists,	 it	 is	 also	 essential	 to	 helping	

policymakers	 and	 civilian	 leaders	 understand	

the	 changing	 nature	 of	 warfare.	 Ultimately,	

being	 able	 to	 describe	 the	 challenges	 faced	 by	

the	military	helps	 the	Army	organize	and	equip	

itself	with	 the	 capabilities	 necessary	 to	achieve	

 2 Frank	Hoffman,	“The	Contemporary	Spectrum	of	

Conflict:	Protracted,	Gray	zone,	Ambiguous,	and	

Hybrid	Modes	of	War.”	2016	Index	of	US	Military	

Strength.	The	Heritage	Foundation	(October	2015).	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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its	 strategic	 objectives.	 Without	 describing

threats	 and	 defining	 the	 current	 state	 in	 the	

evolution	 of	 warfare,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 achieve	

shared	 understanding	 among	 the	 military,	 the	

public,	and	policymakers.

To	 that	 end,	 this	 report	 pursues	 three	

lines	of	effort:	(1)	describing	hybrid	threats	and

the	 gray	 zone,	 (2)	 identifying	 challenges	 that	

gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 pose	 for	 the	US Army	

due	 to	 laws,	 norms,	 and	 processes,	 and	 (3)	

recommending	 ways	 that	 the	 US Army	 can	

improve	 capacity	 to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	

threats.	To	develop	 these	solutions,	I	use a	mix	

of	 research,	 interviews,	 and	 working-group	

participation.	 The	 interviews	 were conducted

with	experts	 from	across	 the	United	States	and	

focused	 on	 unconventional	 warfare,	 hybrid	

warfare,	 military	 strategy,	 non-violent	 civil	

resistance,	 and	 Russian	 affairs.	 Finally,	 the	

working	groups,	hosted	by	the	Strategic	Studies	

Institute at	 the	 Army	 War	 College	 (AWC),

focused	 on	 hybrid	 warfare	 and	 the	 gray	 zone.	

Participants	 included	 AWC	 professors and	

students,	scholars,	and	strategists.	

The	 Army	 must	 adequately	 define	

hybrid	 threats	 and	 the	 gray	 zone in	 order	 to	

achieve	 shared	 understanding	 amongst	

strategists,	 leaders,	 and	 policymakers.	 When	

doing	 this,	 the	 Army	 should	 consider	 that	 the	

gray	zone is	not	a	specific	type	of	conflict	but	an	

operational	 environment	 as	 defined	 in	 Joint	

Publication (JP) 1-02, Department	 of	 Defense	

Dictionary	 of	 Military	 and	 Associated	 Terms.	

Finally,	the	Army	must	recognize	that	there	is	a	

distinct	 difference	 between	 hybrid	 threats	 in	

the	gray	 zone and	open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats	

(See	Figure	1):

Figure	1:	Spectrum	of	Conflict

This	 report	 posits	 that	 hybrid	 threats	 in	

the	gray	zone are	dependent	on	ambiguity	and	

non-attribution.	 This	 creates	 a	 dichotomy	 and	

breaks	hybrid	threats	into	two	types:	gray-zone

hybrid	threats	and	open-warfare	hybrid	threats.	

This	 report	 will	 address	 the	 characteristics	 of	

gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 in depth.	 These	

characteristics	 include:	 (1)	 Ambiguity,	 (2)	

Exploitation	 of	 Adversary	 Weaknesses	 through	

DIME,	 (3)	 Attacks	 in	 Five Domains,	 (4)	 Use	 of	

Hybrid Threats

Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats Open-Warfare Hybrid Threats

Gray Zone Conflict Irregular Warfare Limited 

Conventional

Theater 

Conventional
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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Criminal	 Organizations	 and	 Networks,	 and	 (5)	

Using	 Laws	 and	 Cultural	 Norms	 as	 a	 Weapons	

System.	 Open-warfare	 hybrid	threats	 are	 what	

are commonly	 thought	 of	 today	 as	 hybrid	

tactics/warfare.	 Consequently,	 this	 report	 will	

not	 address	 them	 in-depth,	 as	 there	 is	 a	 large	

amount	 of	 literature	 already	 written	 on	 the	

subject.	

Hybrid threats and the gray zone are 

issues that have existed in warfare for 

centuries. However, their recent 

emergence in the discussion of conflict 

amongst strategists, scholars, and 

policymakers highlights their renewed 

importance.

Gray-zone hybrid	threats	take	advantage	of	

the	US government’s bureaucracy	by	exploiting	

the	 fact	 that	 the	 Department	 of	 Defense	 is	

often	not	the	lead	agency	operating	in	the	gray	

zone as	 they	 would	 be	 during	 large-scale,	

conventional	 conflict.	 Specifically,	 “New	

Generation	Warfare”	conducted	by	the	Russians	

is	 focused on	 taking	 action	 and	 achieving	

strategic	 objectives	 within	 Phase	 0	 of	 US

military	operations.	Phase	0,	the	“Shape”	phase,	

of	 US military	 operations, is	 defined	 as	 “Joint	

and	 multinational	 operations—inclusive	 of	

normal	 routine	 military	 activities—and	 various

interagency	activities	.	.	.	performed	to	dissuade	

or	 deter	 potential	adversaries	and	 to	assure	 or	

solidify	 relationships	 with	 friends	 and	 allies,”

3

and	 is	 ultimately	 where	US doctrine	 addresses	

gray-zone conflict.	The	Russians	target	this	area	

because	 it	 is	 where	US bureaucracy	 is	 greatest	

and,	consequently,	the	reaction	time	is	slowest.	

To	 counter	 adversary	 actions	 within	

Phase	 0	 of	 US Army	 operations,	 the	 US Army	

must	recognize	and	adapt	to	the	challenges	that	

gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 pose	 due	 to	 existing	

laws,	 norms,	 and	 processes.	 This	 entails	

conducting	 an	 analysis	 of	 gray-zone doctrine	

from	 the	 most	 likely	 gray-zone adversaries	

(Russia,	China,	and	Iran)	and	then	evaluating	the	

US phasing	 construct	 and	 options	 for	 action	

within	Phase	0	to	decide if	they	are	appropriate	

to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats.	 Secondly,	

the	 US Army	 needs	 to	 look	 at	 systems	 and	

processes	 used to	 fuse intelligence	 and	 create	

shared	 understanding	across	multiple	agencies.	

If	 the	systems	and	processes	are	inadequate	 to	

quickly	 and	 efficiently	 share	 information,	 then	

these	 systems	 and	 processes	 must	 be	 changed	

to	increase	speed	and	efficiency.	

The	US Army	must	improve	its	capacity	

to	counter	gray-zone hybrid	threats.	To	do	this,	

the	 Army	 must	 take	 actions	 to	 better	 identify	

and	 understand	 the	 threat	 as	 well	 as	 reduce	

risk.	To	identify	and	understand	 the	 threat,	 the	

 3 The	Joint	Staff,	“Joint	Publication	5-0, Joint	

Operational	Planning,”	August	2011.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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US Army	 must	 rebuild	 unconventional	 warfare	

capacity	 within	 the	 special	 operations	 forces

(SOF).	This	capacity	has	atrophied	over	the	past	

15	 years	 as	 SOF,	 in	 particular	 the	 US Army	

special	 forces,	 have	 focused	 more	 on	 counterterrorism,	 direct	 action,	 and	 foreign	 internal	

defense	 operations.	 While	 the	 special	

operations	community	has	 recently	 taken	steps	

to	 rebuild	 this	 capacity,	 it	 will	 take	 time	 to	

reconstitute institutional	 knowledge	 and	 this	

must	 remain	 a	 priority.	 Secondly,	 the	US Army	

should	 increase	 broadening	 opportunities	 for	

education	 among	 special	 operations	 junior	

officers	 and	 non-commissioned	 officers.	 These	

opportunities	 will	 improve	 the	 critical	 thinking	

skills	 of	 personnel	 operating	 in	 the	 gray	 zone,

allowing	 them	 to	 put	 individual	 actions	 of	 an	

adversary	into	the	context	of	a	broader	strategy	

and	US foreign	policy.	This	will,	in	turn,	help	our	

soldiers	 on	 the	 ground	 better	 identify	 and	

understand	 the	 threat	 and	 communicate	 that	

threat	 upwards	 and	 across	 the	 multiple	

agencies	involved	in	gray-zone operations.		

Finally,	 to	reduce	risk,	 the	US Army	can	

take	 three	 concrete	 actions.	 First,	 the	 Army	

must	 move	 to	 pre-position	 forces	 in	 at-risk	

countries	 and	 develop	 unconventional	 warfare	

campaign	 plans.	 Pre-positioned	 forces	 not	 only	

bolster	 the	 militaries	 of	 countries	 they	 are	

working	with,	but	act	as	a deterrent	and	change	

the	 calculus of	 gray-zone aggressors.	

Additionally,	 pre-positioning	 forces	 reduces the	

risk	 that	 moving	 US soldiers	 into	 a	 region	

involved	in	a	gray-zone conflict	will	inflame	 the	

situation.	 Developing	 unconventional	 warfare	

campaign	 plans	 staffed	 and	 approved	 through	

all	 relevant	 agencies	 and	 organizations	

decreases	the	negative	effects	that	slow-moving	

US bureaucratic	 processes	 have	 on	 quickly	

reacting	 to	 new	 threats	 in	 a	 fast-moving,	 fluid	

environment	 such	 as	 the	 gray	 zone.	 Secondly,	

the	US Army	should	work	with	 the	Department	

of	State	and	host	nations	to	better	integrate	atrisk	 ethnic	 populations	 into	 the	 host	 country.	

These	populations	are	at risk	for	subversion	and	

coercion	 by	 gray-zone aggressors.	 By	 better	

integrating	 them	with	 the	 host	 country,	 the	US

Army	 can	 limit	 this	 risk	 and	 their	usefulness to	

gray-zone aggressors.	 Thirdly,	 the	 US Army	

should	work	with	 the	Department	 of	State	and	

host	 nations	 to	 introduce	 and	 expand	 nonviolent	 civil	 resistance	 programs	 in	 at-risk	

countries.	 By	 building	 non-violent	 civil	

resistance	networks,	the	United	States creates	a	

mechanism	 for	 resisting	 aggressors	 in	 the	 gray	

zone.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 event	 that	 an	

aggressor	takes	territory,	these	networks	can	be	

activated, which	buys	time	for	policymakers	and	

international	 institutions	 to	 determine	 an	

appropriate	response	to	the	aggressor.	Finally,	if

necessary,	 these	 networks	 can	 be	 used	 to	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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identify	 potential	 allies	 for	 an	 unconventional	

warfare	campaign.

Since	 1918,	 less	 than	 20 percent of	 all	

conflicts	have	been	 state-on-state	conventional	

conflicts	 and	 there	 is	 nothing	 hinting	 that	 this

will	 change	 in	 the	 future.4 Therefore,	 we	 can	

posit	that	gray-zone hybrid	tactics	will	continue	

to	 play	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 future	 conflict.	

Consequently,	 the	US Army	must	ensure	 that	it	

is	 appropriately	 postured	 to	 counter	 gray-zone

hybrid	threats.	To	do	this,	the	US Army	must (1)	

accurately	describe	hybrid	 threats	and	 the	gray	

zone,	(2)	identify	ways	that	it	can	align	doctrine	

to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats,	 and	 (3)	

improve	 capacity	 to	 do	 so.	 Doing	 these	 things	

will	 give strategists,	 scholars,	 and	 policymakers

a	 shared	 understanding	 of the	 complexities	 of	

gray-zone conflict.	 Additionally,	 it	 will	 ensure	

that	 the	 Army	 is	 ready	 to	 achieve	 its	 strategic	

objectives wherever	called	upon	to	do	so.

II.	Describing	Hybrid	Threats	and	the	Gray	Zone

Warfare	 is	 “the	 mechanism,	 method,	 or	

modality	of	armed	conflict	against	the	enemy.”5

 4 David	Maxwell,	“Congress	Has	Embraced	

Unconventional	Warfare:	Will	the	US	Military	and	

The	Rest	of	the	US	Government?,”	Small	Wars	

Journal,	December	29,	2015.

5 The	Joint	Staff,	“Joint	Publication	1, Doctrine	for	the	

Armed	Forces	of	the	United	States,”	March	25,	2013.

While	 war	 hasn’t	 changed	 for	 thousands	 of	

years,	warfare,	specifically,	the	technology	used	

to	 conduct	 war,	 is	 constantly	 changing.	 It	

evolved	 from	 soldiers	 with	 broadswords	 and	

bows,	 to	soldiers	 on	 horseback	 with	 repeating	

rifles,	 to	 soldiers	 with	 machine	 guns,	 driving	

tanks,	and	calling	in	airstrikes	from	drones.	Due	

to	 this	 continuously	 evolving	 nature,	 one	must	

understand	 the	 most	 current	 tactics,	

techniques,	 procedures,	 and	 technology	 of	

warfare	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 and	 employ	 the	

appropriate	 capabilities	 needed	 to	 achieve	

tactical,	operational,	and	strategic	objectives.	

According	 to	 Joint	 Publication	 (JP)	 1,	

Doctrine	 for	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 of	 the	 United	

States,	 there	 are	 two	 forms	 of	 warfare,

traditional	 and	 irregular, and	 “each	 serves	 a	

fundamentally	 different	 strategic	 purpose	 that	

drives	 different	 approaches	 to	 its	 conduct;	 this	

said,	 one	 should	 not	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 fact	 that	

the	conduct	of	actual	warfare	is	seldom	divided	

neatly	into	these	 subjective	categories.”	Hybrid	

threats	 bridge	 the	 gap	 and	 combine	 aspects	 of	

these	two	types	of	warfare	in	a	single	space	and	

time.

Hybrid	 threats	 are	 when	 “an	 adversary	

simultaneously	and	adaptively	employs	a	 fused	

mix	 of	 conventional	 weapons,	 irregular	 tactics,	

terrorism	 and	 criminal	 behavior	 in	 the	 battle	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

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space	to	obtain	their	political	objectives.”	 6 The	

objective	 of	 hybrid	 threats	 is	 to	 attack	 the	

seams	 in	 policy,	 organization,	 and	 doctrine	 to	

create	 leverage	 and	 exploit	 vulnerabilities.	

Consequently,	it	is	important	for	the	US Army	to	

understand	 what	 hybrid	 threats	 are	 and	 how	

they	 may	 be	 employed	 to	 attack	 our	

weaknesses.	 Defense	 planners	 tend	 to	 try	 to

place	modes	 of	 conflict	 into	 boxes	 or	 bins	 that	

define	the	type	of	conflict	and	help	identify the	

correct	 resources	and	capabilities	 to	defeat	 the	

threat.	However,	 hybrid	 threats	asymmetrically	

attack	the	seams	between	these	boxes	and	look	

to	 exploit	 the	 vulnerability	 and	 inadequacy	 of	

incorrectly	applied	capabilities.	

Though	 hybrid	 threats	 are	 not	 new	 in	

the	 history	 of	 warfare	 (arguably,	 American	

colonists	used	 hybrid	 tactics	 against	 the	 British	

in	 the	 Revolutionary	 War),	 their	 recent	 use by	

the	 Russians	 in	 Ukraine	 in	 2014,	 Hezbollah	 in	

their	 war	 with	 Israel	 in	 2006,	 and	 Russia’s	

release	 of	 the	 “Gerasimov	 Doctrine”7 has	

 6 Frank	Hoffman,	“Hybrid	vs	Compound	War,”	Armed	

Forces	Journal,	October	1,	2009.

7 The	“Gerasimov	Doctrine”	refers	to	a	vision	for	the	

future	of	warfare	outlined	by	the	Chief	of	the	Russian	

General	Staff,	Gen.	Valery	Gersimov,	in	a	FEB	2013	

issue	of	a	Russian	Military	Journal	(VoyennoPromyshlennyy	Kurier).	Many	of	the	concepts	

outlined	in	the	paper	were	seen	during	Russian	

actions	in	eastern Ukraine.	However,	there	is	some	

debate	as	to	whether	or	not	the	Gerasimov	Doctrine	

is	actually	Russian	doctrine	and	the	way	the	Russians	

plan	to	fight	in	the	future	or	just	Gen	Gerasimov’s	

view	of	the	evolution	of	warfare.	

brought	 them	 to	 the	 forefront	 of	 discussion	

within	the	military	and	academia.	Consequently,	

it	 is	 important	 that	 military	 scholars	 and	

strategists	 re-examine	 hybrid	 threats	 to	

determine	 how	 they	 will	 evolve,	 what	

characteristics	 they	 possess,	 and	 how	 the	 US

Army	can	counter	their	employment.

Describing	 the	 current	 evolutions	 in	

warfare	 is	 not	 just	 important	 to	 academia	 and	

military	strategists,	it	is	also	essential	in	helping	

policymakers	and	civilian	leaders	understand	its	

changing nature.	 Ultimately,	 being	 able	 to	

describe	 the	 challenges	 faced	 by	 the	 military	

helps	 the	 Army	 organize	 and	 equip	 itself	 with	

the	 capabilities	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 national	

strategic	 objectives.	Without	 describing	 threats	

and	 defining	 the	 current	 state	 in the	 evolution	

of	 warfare,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 shared	

understanding	amongst	the	military,	the	public,	

and	policymakers.	Consequently,	describing	and	

understanding	 hybrid	 and	 gray-zone threats	

employed	against	the	United	States,	our	friends,	

and	our	allies	is	vital	to	US national	security.

Contemporary	View	of	Hybrid	Threats

Currently,	 there	 is	 little	 consensus among	 the	

military,	 scholars,	 and	 strategists	 as	 to	 what	

constitutes	 a	 hybrid	 threat	 or	 how	 to	 define	

them.	 While	 retired	 Lt.	 Col. Frank	 Hoffman	

views	 hybrid	 threats	 as	 “simultaneously	 and	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

10

adaptively	 employ(ing)	 a	 fused	 mix	 of	

conventional	 weapons,	 irregular	 tactics,	

terrorism	 and	 criminal	 behavior,”

8 retired	 Col.

David	 Maxwell	 argues	 in	 his	 2012	 testimony	

before	 the	 House	 Armed	 Services	 Committee	

that	“hybrid	warfare”	is	 really	just	a	new	name	

for	 irregular	 warfare	 and,	 in	 particular,	 its	

subset	 of	 unconventional	 warfare.	 The	 Joint	

Staff,	in	JP 1-02,	defines	irregular	warfare	as	“a	

violent	 struggle	 among	 state	 and	 non-state	

actors	 for	 legitimacy	 and	 influence	 over	 the	

relevant	 populations,”	 and	 unconventional	

warfare	 as	 “activities	 conducted	 to	 enable	 a	

resistance	 movement	 or	 insurgency	 to	 coerce,	

disrupt,	 or	 overthrow	 a	 government	 or	

occupying	 power	 by	 operating	 through	 or	 with	

an	 underground, auxiliary,	and	 guerilla	 force	 in	

a	denied	area.”9

However,	 JP	 1-02	 fails	 to	 define	 hybrid	

warfare	 or	 hybrid	 threats.	 Additionally,	 Army	

Doctrine	 Publication	 (ADP)	 3-0,	 Unified	 Land	

Operations, defines	 hybrid	 threats	 as	 “the	

diverse	 and	 dynamic	 combination	 of	 regular	

forces,	irregular	forces,	terrorist	forces,	criminal	

elements,	or	a	combination	of	these	forces	and	

elements	 all	 unified	 to	 achieve	 mutually	

 8 Frank	Hoffman,	“Hybrid	vs	Compound	War,”	Armed	

Forces	Journal,	October	1,	2009.

9 The	Joint	Staff,	“Joint	Publication	1-02, Department	

of	Defense	Dictionary	of	Military	and	Associated	

Terms,”	November	15,	2015.

benefitting	 effects.”10 Finally,	 Michael	 Kofman	

and	 Matthew	 Rojansky	 argue	 that	 the	 term	

“hybrid”	 “denotes	 a	 combination	 of	 previously	

defined	types	of	warfare,	whether	conventional,	

irregular,	 political	 or	 information”	 and	 its	

“analytical	utility	is	limited.”11

Disagreements	 over	 what	 hybrid	

threats	are	or	aren’t	or	whether	they	are	a	new	

phenomenon	 or	something	 as	 old	 as	 war	 itself	

aside,	it	is	important	that	this	emerging	trend	is	

identified	 and	 discussed.	 Ultimately,	 hybrid	

threats	attack	 the	 seams	 of	 conventional	views	

of	warfare	and	the	strong	capabilities	developed	

by	 the	 United	 States	to	 fight	 conventional	 and	

irregular	 warfare.	 For	 example,	 the	 United	

States	 began	 Operation	 Iraqi	 Freedom	 (OIF)	

with	 a	 strong	 set	 of	 conventional	 warfare	

capabilities	 that	 provided	 strategic	 overmatch	

against	 the	 Iraqi	 Army.	 When	 the	 Iraqi	 Army	

collapsed	 and	 the	 country	 became	 gripped	 by	

an	 insurgency,	 the	 US military	 had	 a	 difficult	

time	 adjusting	 its	 strategy	 and	 bringing	 the	

appropriate	assets	to	the	battlefield	in	order	to	

fight	 a	 growing	 insurgency.	 Ultimately,	 the	

United	 States applied	 a	 counter-insurgency	

strategy	 during	 “the	 Surge”	 under	retired	Gen.

 10 Headquarters,	Department	of	the	Army,	“ADP	3-0:	

Unified	Land	Operations” (HQDA,	October	2011).

11 Michael	Kofman	and	Matthew	Rojansky,	“A	Closer	

Look	at	Russia’s	‘Hybrid	War,’”	Kennan	Cable	

(Kennan	Institute	at	the	Woodrow	Wilson	Center,	

April	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

11

David	 Petraeus and	 was	 able	 to	 beat	 back	 the	

insurgency	 and	 dramatically	 reduce	 violence	 in	

order	 to	 buy	 time	 for	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 to	

establish	 security	 before	 the	 United	 States

ended	its	combat	mission	in	2010.

Looking	 at	 OIF,	 the	 US Army	

participated	 in	 both	 traditional	 and	 irregular	

warfare	and	 the	characterization	of	 the	conflict	

fell	 into	 different	 “bins”	 as	 the	 conflict	

progressed, rarely	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 It	 started	

out	 as	 a	 traditional	 conflict	 with	 offensive	

operations	to	take	down	the	regime	of	Saddam	

Hussein	and	stability	operations	to	re-constitute	

the	 Iraqi	 government.	 It	 then	 moved	 into	 the	

realm	 of	 irregular	 warfare	 with	 the	 counterinsurgency	 campaigns	 against	 Al-Qaeda	 in	 Iraq	

and	 Iranian-backed Shiite	 militias.	 However,	

these	 different	 types	 of	 warfare	 involved	

different	 adversaries	 (i.e.	 different	 state	 and	

non-state	actors)	and,	for	the	most	part,	did	not	

occupy	the	same	time	period.	

When	faced	with	these	different	phases	

of	 warfare	 in	 the	 conflict,	 US military	 leaders	

and	 strategists	 were	 able	 to	 tailor	 their	 forces,	

capabilities,	 and	 strategies	 to	 fight	 and	 defeat	

the	 enemy	 (though	 not	 without	 significant	

difficulties).	 What	 led	 to	 the	 prolonged	 nature	

of	 OIF	 was	 the	 military’s	 difficulty	 in

transitioning	 from	 offensive	 combat	 operations	

to	 stability	 operations	 and	 then	 to	 counterinsurgency	 operations	 while	 trying	 to	 find	 the	

correct	 strategy	 to	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 in	

each	 phase.	 Where	 hybrid	 threats	 draw	 their	

utility	and,	ultimately,	their	effectiveness	is	their	

ability	 to	 exploit	 the	 seams	 between	 these	

“bins”	 by	 fusing	 different	 tactics	 from	 different	

subsets	of	warfare	(e.g.	high-intensity,	guerrilla,	

cyber,	 information,	 etc.)	 together	 in	 a	 single	

space	and	time.	

When	taking	Mosul,	the	Islamic	State	in	

Iraq	 and	 Syria	 (ISIS) isolated	 enemy	 combat	

units,	disrupted	effective	command	and	control	

and	 sustainment,	 and	 simultaneously	 attacked	

multiple	 forces	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 the	

city.12 This	 type	 of	 strategy	 is	 conventional	 in	

nature.	 However,	 ISIS	 executed	 it	 using	

weaponry	 typical	 to irregular	 warfare	 (e.g.	

suicide	 vehicle-borne	 improvised	 explosive	

devices),	 conventional	 weapons	 such	 as	 RPGs,	

mortars,	 and	 armored	 vehicles,	 as	 well	 as	

tactics	 more	 akin	 to	 terrorism	 such	 as	

kidnapping	 and	 operating	 in	 small	 teams	 or	

cells.13 This	 fusion	 of	 the	 conventional,	

unconventional,	and	the	criminal	highlights	how	

hybrid	 threats	 occur	 across	 multiple	 “bins”	 of	

warfare.	 When	 a	 conventional	 force,	 such	 as	

 12 TRADOC	G-2	Intelligence	Support	Activity	–

Complex	Operational	Environment	and	Threat	

Integration	Directorate,	“Threat	Tactics	Report:	

Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	the	Levant,”	NOV	2014:	3.

13 Ibid.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

12

the	US Army,	faces	these	type	of	threats, it	has	

difficulty	 transitioning	 between	 different	 types	

of	operations	and	calibrating	its	force	levels	and	

tactics	 to	 effectively	 counter	 these	 operations	

and	achieve	its	objectives	in	each	phase.	

Because	 hybrid	 threats	 occur	 across	

multiple	domains,	they	pose	a	distinct	threat	for	

US Army	 strategist	 who	 must	 understand	 the	

threat	 and	 then	 ensure	 the	 proper	 campaign	

plan,	 resources,	and	capabilities	are	in	place	 to	

counter	 the	 threat.	 This	 mix	 is	 difficult	 to	 get	

correct	because	strategists	must	strike	the	right	

balance	 between	 forces	 dedicated	 to	 fighting	

each	threat.	For	example,	artillery	is	essential	in	

a	 high-intensity	 conflict.	 However,	 artillery	 is	

largely	 ineffective	 in	 stability	 or	 counterinsurgency	 operations.	 Conversely,	 special	

operations	 forces	 such	 as	 civil	 affairs	 and	

military	 information	 support	 operations are	

more	effective	in	 stability	operations	 than	 they	

are	 in	 high-intensity	 conflict.	 In	 a	 hybrid-threat	

environment,	where	both	high-intensity	combat	

and	 stability	 operations	 may	 exist	

simultaneously,	 planners	 must	 get	 the	

force/capability	 mix	 right	 within	 the	 limits	

imposed	 by	 civilian	 political	 leaders	 in	 order	 to	

effectively	counter	the	threat.

Further	 enhancing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	

hybrid	 threats	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 nation	 states	 to	

use	 them	 across	 the	 peace–war	 continuum.	

Hybrid	threats	can	use	one	or	more	of	a	nation’s	

instruments	 of	 power	 (diplomatic,	 information,	

military,	 and	 economic)	 to	 influence	 an	

adversary	 and	 achieve	 strategic	 objectives,	

often	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	 war	 in	 the gray	

zone.	In	essence,	hybrid	threats	in	the	gray	zone

are	 often	 implemented	 to	 achieve	 objectives	

without	 violating	 international	 norms	 and/or	

crossing	 arbitrarily	 established	 thresholds	 (e.g.	

President	Obama’s	“red	line”	on	Syrian	chemical	

weapons	 use)	 that	 would	 lead	 to	 the	

intervention	 of	 an	 adversary.	 For	 example,	

Russia	 used	 hybrid	 tactics	 to	 achieve	 its	

strategic	objectives	in	destabilizing	Ukraine	and	

annexing	 Crimea	 without	 crossing	 a	 threshold	

that	 would	 draw	 other	 global	 powers	 into	 the	

conflict against	 the	 Russians.	 It	 is	 important	 to	

note	that	it	is	difficult	to	define	these	thresholds	

as	they	are	often	arbitrarily	established	and	are	

highly	 dependent	 upon	 situational	 context,	 the	

international	standing	of	the	countries	involved,	

and	domestic	politics	(e.g.	the	United	States did	

not	 initially	 intervene	 during	 the	 Rwandan	

genocide	 in	 1994	 nor	 did	 the	 United	 States

intervene	in	Syria	when	 the	Assad	 regime	used	

chemical	weapons	against	civilians	in	2013).	

The	Spectrum	of	Conflict:	Hybrid	Threats	vs.	the	

Gray	Zone

Recently,	 the	 concept	 of	 gray-zone conflict	

emerged	 amongst	 scholars,	 strategists,	 and,	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

13

particularly,	 members	 of	 the	 United	 States	

special	 operations	 community.	 	 In	 their	 recent	

article	 in	 Joint	 Forces	 Quarterly Gen. Joseph	

Votel,	 commander	 of	 US Special	 Operations	

Command,	 retired	 Lt.	 Gen. Charles	 Cleveland,	

former	 commander	 of	 US Army Special	

Operations	 Command (USASOC),	 Col. Charles	

Connett,	 director	 of	 the	 Commander’s	

Initiatives	 Group	 at	 USASOC,	 and	 Will	 Irwin,	 a	

resident	 senior	 fellow	 at	 the	 Joint	 Special	

Operations	 University,	 defined	 gray-zone

conflicts	as	a	segment	of	the	conflict	continuum	

“characterized	 by	 intense	 political,	 economic,	

information,	 and	 military	 competition	 more	

fervent	 in	 nature	 than	 normal	 steady-state	

diplomacy, yet	 short	 of	 conventional	 war.”14

Essentially,	 gray-zone conflict	 encompasses	 the	

space	 between	 peace	 and	 war.	 Or,	 as	 defense	

analyst	Nadia	Schadlow	described	it,	“the	space	

between	peace	and	war	is	not	an	empty	one—

but	 a	 landscape	 churning	 with	 political,

economic,	 and	 security	 competitions	 that	

require	constant	attention.”15

Contrary	 to	 what	 many	 academics	 and	

strategists	 have	 posited,	 the	 gray	 zone is	

actually	an	operational	environment	(OE),	albeit	

 

14 General	Joseph	Votel	et	al.,	“Unconventional	

Warfare	in	the	Gary	Zone,”	Joint	Forces	Quarterly 80,	

no.	1st	Quarter	(January	17,	2016):	101–9.

15 Nadia	Schadlow,	“Peace	and	War:	The	Space	

Between,”	August	18,	2014,	War	on	the	Rocks.

not	 a	 physical	 one.	 Additionally,	 gray-zone

conflicts	 are	 those	 in	 which	 nation	 states	 and	

non-state	actors	use	hybrid	threats/tactics,	such	

as	 fusing	political	and	information	warfare	with	

non-violent	civil	 resistance,	 to	achieve	 strategic	

objectives	without	violating	international	norms	

or	 crossing	 established	 thresholds	 and	 leading	

to	 open	 war.	 Joint	 doctrine	 defines	 an	

operational	environment	as	“a	composite	of	the	

conditions,	 circumstances,	 and	 influences	 that	

affect	 the	employment	 of	 capabilities	and	 bear	

on	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 commander.”16 As	 the	

gray	 zone encompasses	 the	 space	 between	

peace	 and	 war	 in	 which	 aggressors	 use	 hybrid	

threats	 to	 shape	 the	 battlefield	 and	 achieve	

strategic	 objectives	 short	 of	 all-out,	 declared	

conflict,	it	is,	by	description,	a	set	of	conditions,	

circumstances,	 and	 influences	 that	 affect	 the	

ability	 of	 the	 US Army	 to	 employ	 capabilities	

and	 US Army	 commanders	 to	 make	 decisions.	

Consequently,	the	gray	zone is	an	OE	and	not	a	

type	of	conflict,	in	 the	 same	way	 that	urban	or	

desert	 warfare	 refers	 to	 the	 OE	 in	 which	 the	

conflict	takes	place	and	is	not	a	distinct	form	of	

conflict.	 Though	 the	 tactics,	 techniques,	

procedures,	 and	 strategy	 used	 in	 each	 OE	 may	

differ,	 these	areas	are	 not	a	 type	 of	warfare	in	

the	 same	 vein	 as	 irregular	 or	 conventional	

warfare.	Irregular	and	conventional	warfare	can	

 16 The	Joint	Staff,	“Joint	Publication	1-02,

Department	of	Defense	Dictionary	of	Military	and	

Associated	Terms,”	November	15,	2015.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

14

occur	 in	 any	 type	 of	 operational	 environment	

and	 are	 characterized	 by	 distinctly	 different	

employment	 of	 capabilities, whereas	 the	 gray	

zone describes	 conflict	 in	 an	 ambiguous

operating	environment	in	 the	“space”	between	

peace	and	war.	

Further,	hybrid	threats	take	place	across	

the	 spectrum	 and	 in	 each	 of	 the	 “bins”	 of	

conflict	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	 an	 independent	

type	of	conflict	on	the	spectrum.	As	such,	on	the	

spectrum	of	irregular	conflict, hybrid	threats	are	

present	 throughout	 the	 spectrum	 but	 are	

broken	into	two	types:	gray-zone hybrid	threats	

and	 open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats.	 While	 each	

type	 encompasses	 the	 principles	 outlined	 by	

Frank	Hoffman,	each	is	distinctly	different	in	its	

characteristics.	For	example,	ambiguity	is	much	

more	 important	 in	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats	

than	open-warfare	hybrid	 threats.	More	on	 the	

individual	 characteristics	 of	 gray-zone hybrid	

threats	 and	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 the	 two	

types	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.

Some	 people	 argue	 that	 the	 difference	

between	 gray-zone conflict	 and	 hybrid	 conflict	

is	 that	 gray-zone conflict	 does	 not	 involve	

kinetic	 activity.	 Others	 argue	 that	 gray-zone

conflicts	 can	 only	 be	 executed	 by	 states,	 while	

states,	 non-state	 actors,	 and	 proxies	 can	

execute	 hybrid	 threats.	 While	 these	 ideas	may	

hold	 water	 at	 first	 glance,	 they	 are,	 ultimately,	

incorrect.	First,	hybrid	warfare	does	not	exist	in	

the	vein	that	it	is	a	separate	form	of	warfare	on	

par	 with	 irregular	 and	 conventional	 warfare.	

Hybrid	 threats	 exist	 and	 are	 best	 described	 as	

tactics	 used	 throughout	 the	 modes	 of	 warfare	

to	 achieve	 gains	 through	 the	 use	 of	

“simultaneously	 and	 adaptively	 employ(ing)	 a	

fused	 mix	 of	 conventional	 weapons,	 irregular	

tactics,	 terrorism	 and	 criminal	 behavior”17 in	 a	

single	 space	 and	 time.	 Secondly,	 non-state	

actors	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	

Importantly,	states	often	use	proxies	or	work	in	

combination	with	proxies	while	operating	in	the	

gray	 zone in	 order	 to	 maintain	 ambiguity	 that	

contributes	 to	 the	 confusion	 of	 actions	 in	 the	

gray	 zone.	For	example,	in	 Crimea,	Russia	used	

criminal	networks	to	help	set	the	conditions	for	

annexation,

18 and	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea,	 the	

Chinese	use	 fishermen	 to	lay	 claim	 to	 disputed	

waters	 and	 disrupt	 US naval	 activities.19

Consequently,	 hybrid	 tactics	 and	 grey-zone	

conflict	are	not	independent	of	each	other;	they	

are	 inextricably	 linked	 and	 aggressors	 use	

hybrid	tactics	across	the	spectrum	of	conflict	to	

achieve	their	desired	ends.

 17 Frank	Hoffman,	“Hybrid	vs Compound	War,”	

Armed	Forces	Journal,	October	1,	2009.

18 Dmitry	Gorenberg,	(January	15,	2016).

19 Harry	J.	Kazianis,	“China’s	50,000	Secret	Weapons	

in	the	South	China	Sea,”	Text,	The	National	Interest,	

accessed	February	7,	2016.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

15

Characteristics	of	Contemporary	Hybrid	Threats

First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 no	 two	

conflicts	 and	 no	 two	 adversaries	 are	 alike.	 For	

example,	 if	 Russia	 were	 to	 use	 hybrid	 tactics	

against	 a	 Baltic	 state,	 they	 would	 be	 different	

than	 those	 used	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	 much	

different	than	those	used	by	China	in	the	South	

China	Sea	or	by	Hezbollah	against	Israel	in	their	

2006	conflict.	Tactics	and	strategy	used	in	each	

situation	 are	 based	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	

situation	 on	 the	 ground	 (or	 sea)	 and	 available	

capabilities.	 Consequently,	 the	 contemporary	

characteristics	 of	 hybrid	 threats	 are	 a	

generalization	 and	 should	 be	 applied	 to	

individual	situations	differently	in	order	to	help	

understand	 the	 situation	 on	 the	 ground	 and	

develop	an	appropriate	response.	Furthermore,	

when	 preparing	 to	 counter	 hybrid	 threats,	 it	 is	

important	 to	 “not	 fight	 the	 last	 war.”	 To	

paraphrase	 retired	 Lt.	 Gen. James	 Dubik,	 “We	

need	to	fight	the	war	we’ve	got,	not	the	one	we	

want.”20

Hybrid	 threats	 break	 down	 into	 two	

distinct	 categories:	 gray-zone hybrid threats	

and	 open-warfare hybrid threats.	 Gray-zone

hybrid	 threats	 take	 place	 to	 the	 left	 of	 limited	

conventional	 conflict	 on	 the	 spectrum	 of	

 20 James	Dubik,	“Winning	the War	We’ve	Got,	Not	

the	One	We	Want,”	ARMY	Magazine,	January	12,	

2016.

conflict	 (Figure	 1).	 They	 comprise	 political	

warfare,	 unconventional	 warfare,	 and	 irregular	

warfare.	 Open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats	 happen	

to	 the	 right	 of	 irregular	 warfare	 on	 the	

spectrum.	 The	 major differences	 between	 the	

two	 types	 are	 the	 overt	 use	 of	 conventional	

weapons/formations/tactics	 and	 a	 lack	 of	

ambiguity	in	open-warfare	hybrid	threats.	Grayzone hybrid	threats	are	characterized	by	the	use	

of	 special	 operations	 forces,	 irregular	 forces,	

and	 criminal	 networks	 employing	 a	 mix	 of	

conventional	weapons	and	irregular	tactics	in	a	

single	 space	 and	 time	 while	 striving	 for	

ambiguity	and	non-attribution.

A	 recent	 example	 of	 this	 dichotomy	 is	

Russian	 actions	 in	 Ukraine.	 In	 eastern	 Ukraine,	

the	 Russians	 used	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 to	

take	 terrain	 and	 destabilize	 a	 pro-Western	

government.	They	used	Russian	troops	in	green	

uniforms	 without	 insignia,	 took	 over	

government	buildings	and	 turned	 them	over	 to	

unarmed	 civilians,	 and	 used	 “humanitarian”	

convoys	 to	 move	 supplies	 into	 the	 country.21

However,	 in	 Crimea,	 Russia	 used	 much	 more	

overt	 hybrid	 threats	 to	 annex	 the	 region	 and	

secure	 the	 “protection”	 of	 ethnic	 Russians.	

Russia	 openly	 moved	 troops	 from	 its	 base	 in	

 21 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental	

Studies,	March	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

16

Sevastopol	 into	 Crimea	 to	 “protect	 fleet	

positions,”	 facilitated	 a	 vote	 in	 the	 regional	

government	 to	 secede	 from	 Ukraine,	 and	

publicly	 discussed	 their	 actions	 to	 “answer	 the	

call	 of	 its	 compatriots	 who	 ‘feared	 for	 their	

safety.’”22 While	 not	 entirely	 considered	 a	

limited	 conventional	 war,	 Russia’s actions	 to	

secure	 Crimea	 were	 overt	 enough	 to	

differentiate	 them	 from	 gray-zone hybrid	

threats,	as	Russia	did	not	seek	to	hide	its	actions	

or	 to	 avoid	 violating	 international	 norms,	 such	

as	annexing	a	part	of	another	sovereign	country,	

that	would	entangle them	in	a	 broader	 conflict	

with	 Ukraine	 and	 upset	 the	 international	

community.	

Gray-Zone Hybrid	Threats

Hybrid	 threats	 in	 the	 gray	 zone are	 unique	 in	

that	 they	 stay	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	

conventional	 conflict	 between	 states.	 While	

there	 may	 be	 some	 shooting	 between	 states,	

state	 proxies	 and/or	 non-state	 actors,	 hybrid	

threats	 in	 the	 gray	 zone will	 stay	 below	 the	

threshold	 of	 open,	 conventional	 conflict.	 The	

main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 aggressors	 in	 the	

gray	 zone seek	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 nonattribution	 to	 shape	 the	 battlefield	 to	 achieve	

their	 strategic	 objectives	 with	 minimal	 cost	 in	

 22 Center	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	

“The	Ukraine	Crisis	Timeline,”	n.d..

terms	 of	 responses	 by	 other	 nations.	 	This	was	

most	 recently	 seen	 in	 Russia’s	 initial	 foray	 into	

eastern	Ukraine	and	is	also	observed	in	Chinese	

actions	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	 Though	 not	

addressed	 as	 a	 separate	 characteristic	 in	 this	

report,	 operations	 in	 the	 human	 domain	

(defined	 in	 US Army	 Special	 Operations	

Command’s	 ARSOF	 Operating	 Concept	 2022	 as	

“the	 totality	of	 the	physical,	cultural,	and	social	

environments	that	influence	human	behavior	to	

the	extent	that	success	of	any	military	operation	

or	 campaign	 depends	 on	 the	 application	 of	

unique	 capabilities	 that	 are	 designed	 to	 fight	

and	 win	 the	 population-centric	 conflicts”)23 are	

a	 key	 component	 of	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats	

and	 are	 interwoven	 throughout	 the	 following	

characteristics	of	gray-zone hybrid	threats:

Ambiguity: In the	 gray	 zone,	 ambiguity	

is	 essential	 to	 keeping	 conflict	 in	 the	

space	 between	 peace	 and	 war.	

Therefore,	 when	 a	 nation	 takes	 action	

in	 the	 gray	 zone the	 goal	 is	 often	 to	

achieve	 strategic	 objectives	 without	

overtly	 violating	 international	 norms	 or	

crossing	 thresholds	 established	 by	

political	 leaders	 which	 would	 lead	 to	

open	 warfare.	 Aggressors	 try	 to	

maintain	 ambiguity	 through	 the	 use	 of	

 23 United	Sates	Army	Special	Operations	Command,	

“ARSOF	Operating	Concept	2022,”	26	September	

2014,	p.	52.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

17

proxies	 such	 as	 criminal	 networks	 or	

militias,	 special	 operations	 forces,	

intelligence	 operatives,	 or	 through	 the	

use	 of	 civilians	 to	 achieve	 objectives	

through	non-violent	means.	The	goal	of	

ambiguity	 is	 to	 maintain	 plausible	

deniability	 and,	 thus,	 limit	 the	

responses	 of international	 actors	 and	

institutions	such	as	the	United	States	or	

the	 United	 Nations.	 This	 allows	 the	

aggressor	state	to	achieve	its	objectives	

while	 minimizing	 diplomatic,	 military,	

and/or	 economic	 consequences.	 It	 is	

important	 for	 aggressors	 to	 maintain	

ambiguity	 throughout	operations	in	 the	

gray	 zone.	 Once	 ambiguity	 is	 lost,	 the	

aggressor	is	open	 to	conflict	escalation,	

often	 towards	 a	 larger,	 more	

conventional	 conflict,	 and/or	 sanctions	

and	 other	 negative	 diplomatic	 and	

economic	actions	from	the	international	

community	writ	large.

A	 recent	 example	 of	 an	

aggressor	 using	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 gray	

zone is	 Russia	 using	 “unidentified	

troops”	in	eastern	Ukraine	to	secure	key	

government	 buildings.	 Once	 secure,	

these	 “unidentified	 troops”	 brought	 in	

unarmed	 civilians	 to	 set	 up	 barricades	

and	 stage	 demonstrations.24 While	 it	 is	

very	 likely	 that	 these	 “unidentified	

troops”	 were	 Russian	 soldiers	 not	

wearing	 uniforms,	 it	 was	 ambiguous

enough	as	to	whom	they	were	that	the	

Ukrainians,	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world,	

could	 not	 say	 for	 sure	 who	 was	

occupying	 the	 buildings	 prior	 to	 the	

arrival	 of	 civilians.	 Thus,	 ambiguity	

played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 Russians	

achieving	 their	 objectives	 in	 eastern	

Ukraine	 without	 drawing	 significant	

negative	 actions	 from	 the	 international	

community,	 and	 it	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	

gray-zone hybrid	threats.

Exploit	 Weaknesses	 of	 the	 Adversary	

Through	 DIME: When	 using	 hybrid	

tactics	in	 the	gray	 zone,	aggressors	use	

a	 whole-of-government	 approach	 to	

exploit	 their	 adversary’s	 weaknesses	

through	 the	 use	 of	 diplomatic,	

information,	 military,	 and	 economic	

instruments	 of	 power.	 Often,	 this	 is	

more	 effective	 in	 autocratic	 regimes	 in	

which	 the	 leadership	 focuses	 the	

government	 on	 a	 single	 objective.	

Russia’s	 organization	 is	 especially	

 24 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental	

Studies,	March	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

18

effective	 in	 this	 regard.25 Using	 all	 of	 a	

nation’s	 instruments	 of	 power	 is	 an	

especially	 effective	 tactic	 against	 large,	

democratic	 bureaucracies	 such	 as	 the	

United	 States,	 because	 of	 the	

bureaucracy’s	 inability	 to	 synchronize	

efforts	 and	 information	 flow	 across	

multiple	 branches	 and	 departments.	

Because	 of	 the	 inherent	 inflexibility,	

lack	 of	 information	 sharing,	 and	 timeconsuming	 interagency	 processes,	

autocratic	 governments	 who	 execute	 a	

synchronized	 approach	 using	 all	

instruments	of	power	are	able	to	shape	

the	 battlefield	 and	 achieve	 their	

objectives	 within	 the	 decision	 cycles	 of	

the	larger,	more	unwieldy	bureaucracy.	

This	 penchant	 for	 speed	and	 the	ability	

to	 fuse	 different	 instruments	 of	 power	

in	 a	 single	 time	 and	 space	 provides	 a	

huge	 advantage	 to	 the	 aggressor.	 It	

often	allows	the	aggressor	to	achieve	its	

objectives	 while	 the	 adversary	 or	 its	

allies	 are	 trying	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	

situation,	 formulate	 a	 policy	 response,	

and	 allocate	 appropriate	 resources	 to	

react	to	the	aggression.	

In	the	case	of	the	United	States,	

our	government	 is	 built	 on	a	 system	 of	

 25 Dmitry	Gorenberg,	January	15,	2016.

checks	 and	 balances	 and	 separation	 of	

powers	 which	 prevents	 a	 single	 branch	

of	 government	 from	 becoming	 too	

powerful.	With	 respect	 to	 defense,	 this	

system	 is	 most	 apparent	 in	 the	

relationship	between	the	president	and	

Congress:	while	the	President	can	wage	

war	and	is	the	commander	in	chief,	only	

Congress	 can	 declare	 war	 and	

appropriate	 funds	 to	 finance	 military	

operations.	 This	 system	 is	 designed	 to	

take	time	and	involve	multiple	agencies	

in	 order	 to	 prevent	 rash	 decisions.	

While	this	system	is	useful	in	large-scale	

conflict	 where	 there	 is	 little	 ambiguity	

and	 a	 more	 easily	 recognized	 threat,	 it	

is	 hugely	 disadvantageous in	 the	 gray	

zone where	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	

conflict	 is	 murky,	 the	 situation	 is	

changing	 rapidly,	 and	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	

develop	 a	 true	 common	 operating	

picture	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 shared	

understanding	across	multiple	agencies.		

In	 April–May	 2014	 in	 eastern	

Ukraine,	 the	 Russians	 used	 their	

“unidentified	 troops”	 to	 seize	

government	 buildings	 in	 Donetsk,	

Luhansk,	 and	 Kharkiv,	 had	 their	

separatist	 allies	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	

declare	 independence	 as	 “people’s	

republics,”	 and	 gathered	 uniformed	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

19

troops	on	the	border	of	eastern	Ukraine	

in	 a	 threat	 to	 annex	 the	 separatistcontrolled	 territory	 (See	 Appendix	 C).26

This	 fusion	 of	 the	 instruments	 of	

national	power	allowed	 the	Russians	 to	

destabilize	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	

ultimately	 led	 to	 a	 ceasefire	 and	 the	

retention	 of	 territory	 by	 Russian	

separatists	backed	up	by	Russian	forces.

(Of	 note	 is	 that	 at	 this	 point	 in	 the	

conflict	 Russia’s	use	 of	 hybrid	 tactics	in	

the	 gray	 zone began	 to	 transition	 to	

open-warfare	 hybrid	 tactics	 as	 the	

Russians	 began	 to	 openly	 back	 the	

separatists	 with	 artillery	 and	 some	

conventional	ground	forces.	An	example	

of	 this	 is	 the	 use	 of	 Russian	 military	

artillery	to	target	the	strategic	Ukrainian	

town	 of	 Debaltseve	 in	 support	 of	

separatist	 forces	 leading	 up	 to	 the	

February	 2015	 ceasefire.)

27	 	During	 this	

time	 period,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 its	

allies	 were	 unsure	 (at	 least	 publicly)	 as	

to	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	

eastern	 Ukraine.	 There	 was	 little	

understanding	of	who	was	operating	in	

eastern	 Ukraine	 other	 than	 “civilians”	

 26 “Ukraine	Crisis	in	Maps,”	BBC	News,	accessed	

February	7,	2016.

27 Naftali	Bendavid,	“Images	Appear	to	Show	Russian	

Artillery Targeting	Ukrainian	Town,”	Wall	Street	

Journal,	February	14,	2015,	sec.	World.

who	 were	 revolting	 against	 the	

government	 and	 Russian	 troops	

massing	 on	 the	 border.	 There	 was	

widespread	 suspicion	 that	 the	 Russians	

were operating	 in	 Ukraine	 but	 no	

tangible	 proof	 until	 pictures	 of	

suspected	Spetnaz	soldiers	and	 Russian	

military	equipment	were	crowd-sourced	

and	 identified	 at	 multiple	 locations	

throughout	 eastern	 Ukraine.	

Furthermore,	 the	 main	 concern	 of	 the	

US Congress	 at	 this	 point	 was	 the	

massing	 of	 Russian	 troops	 on	 the	

border,	 not	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	

Russians	 inside	 of	 eastern	 Ukraine.28

This	 is	 a	 great	 example	 of	 gray-zone

actions	 moving	 faster	 than	 the	

bureaucracy	can	react	and	the	difficulty	

in	 achieving	 shared	 understanding	 of	

the	 true	nature	of	 the	conflict	amongst	

all	parties	involved.

Attack	 in	 Five	 Domains:	 Land,	 Sea,	 Air,	

Cyber,	 Information/Propaganda: In	 the	

gray	 zone,	 aggressors	 will	 use	 hybrid	

threats	 in	 five domains	 (land,	 sea,	 air,	

cyber,	and	information)	to	achieve	their	

objectives.	 Given	 the	 uniqueness	 of	

 28 Bill	Gertz,	“Russian	Troop	Movements	Near	

Eastern	Ukraine	Trigger	Fears	of	Imminent	Invasion,”	

The	Washington	Free	Beacon (accessed	September	

11,	2016).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

20

each	 situation,	 aggressors	 will	 conduct	

an	 exhaustive	 analysis	 of	 each	

operational	environment	and	determine	

where	 they	 can	 achieve	 the	 most	

leverage	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 This	 analysis	

will	 lead	 to	 the	 aggressor	 determining	

the	 best	 domain(s)	 in	 which	 to	 use	 his	

hybrid	 threats.	 Examples	 of	 operations	

in	 each	 of	 these	 domains	 include	 using	

proxies	 and	 criminal	 networks	 on	 land,	

using	 swarms	 of	 attack	 boats	 or	

fisherman	 at	 sea,	 using	 reconnaissance	

drones	 or	 civilian	 aircraft	 in	 the	 air,	

shutting	 down	 electrical	 grids	 or	

conducting	 denial	 of	 service	 attacks	

over	 networks,	 and,	 finally,	 using	

information	warfare	and	propaganda	to	

influence	 the	 population.	 The	 goal	 of	

using	 all	 available	 domains	 is	 to	 fuse	

multiple	 tactics	 and	 techniques	

together	 in	 a	 single	 space	 and	 time	 to	

strain	 the	 opponent’s	 resources	 and	

take	advantage	of	where	he	is	weak.

Use	 of	 Criminal	 Organizations	 and	

Networks: In	 the	 gray	 zone,	 aggressors	

will	 use	 criminal	 networks	 to	 create	

ambiguity, shape	public	perception,	and	

move	 supplies	 around	 the	 battlefield.	

Criminal	 organizations,	 especially	 those	

focused	 on	 smuggling	 and	 the	

distribution	 of	 narcotics,	 have	 readybuilt	 distribution	 networks	 inside	 their	

areas	of	operation.	These	resources	are

susceptible	 to	 use	 by	 gray-zone

aggressors	 because	 of	 their	 efficiency,	

built-in	operational	security,	and	ease	of	

activation.	 For	 a	 price,	 gray-zone

aggressors	 can	 use	 these	 organizations	

and	networks	to	supply	proxies,	disrupt	

adversary	operations,	distract	adversary	

police	 forces,	 and	 intimidate	 or	 coerce	

target	populations.	

While	 the	 notion	 of	 using	

criminal	 networks	 and	 organizations	 is	

uncomfortable	 for	 the	American public,	

it	isn’t	 for	many	of	our	adversaries.	For	

example,	Russia	used	criminal	networks	

during	its	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	

current	 prime	 minister	 of	 Crimea,	 who	

is	 supported	 by	 Russian	 President	

Vladimir	 Putin,	 has	 extensive	 ties	 to	

organized	 crime.29 Consequently,	 we	

must	 recognize	 that	 criminal	 networks	

pose	 unique	 advantages	 to	 adversaries	

operating	in	the	gray	zone and	we	must	

work	with	our	partners	to	mitigate	their	

effects	 and	 understand	 whom	 they	 are	

working	for.

 

29 Simon	Shuster,	“Putin’s	Man	in	Crimea	Is	Ukraine’s	

Worst	Nightmare,”	Time,	March	10,	2014.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

21

Laws	and	Cultural	Norms	as	a	Weapons	

System: When	 operating	 in	 the	 gray	

zone,	aggressors	 try	to	use	 the	law	and	

international	and	cultural	norms	to	their	

advantage.	 Understanding	 where	 the	

“red	lines”	are	and	taking	actions	within	

those	 boundaries	 to	 achieve	 strategic	

objectives	 epitomizes	 gray-zone

conflict.	 Multi-national	 organizations	

such	 as	 the	 UN	 and	 NATO	 are	

institutions	based	on	laws	and	common	

understanding.	 Furthermore,	 societies	

have	their	own	cultures	and	beliefs	that	

affect	 how	 they	 act.	 For	 example,	 the	

sanctity	of	human	life	is	much	different	

in	 eastern	 Europe	 than	 it	 is	 in	 ISIScontrolled	 territory	 in	 the Middle	 East.	

While	 these	 laws	 and	 norms	 have	

tremendous value	 and	 are	 the	 bedrock	

of	 our	 society,	 these	 same	 laws	 and	

norms	 can	 be	 used	 against	

organizations	 and	 cultures	 to	 prevent	

them	 from	 taking	 action.	 Furthermore,	

as	 large	 bodies	 comprised	 of	 many	

actors,	 the	 reaction	 speed	 of	 many	 of	

these	 institutions	 is	 inherently	 slow.	

Consequently,	 gray-zone actors	

conducting	 operations	 with	 speed	 and	

autonomy	 are	 able	 to	 exploit	 the	

bureaucratic	 processes	 inherent	 in	

these	 institutions	 and	 achieve	

objectives	 before	 the	 institutions	 are	

able	 to	 decide	 upon	 and	 take	

appropriate	action.	

For	 example,	 during	 Russia’s	

actions	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 Vladimir	

Putin	 openly	 talked	 about	 using	

Ukrainian	 citizens	 to	 shield	 Russian	

troops.30 Then,	 they	 used	 the	

unwillingness	 to fire	 on	 unarmed	

citizens	 to	 stage	 occupations	 and	

demonstrations,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 seize	

Ukrainian	 army	 garrisons.31

Furthermore,	once	Russian	involvement	

in	 Ukraine	 became	 more	 overt	 (and	

Russian	actions	 began	 to	 shift	 to	 openwarfare	 hybrid	 tactics),	 the	 Russians	

used	legal	systems	and	frameworks	(e.g.	

parliamentary	 approval	 of	 Crimea’s	

annexation)	 to	 justify	 their	 actions.32

Consequently,	 gray-zone actions	 are	

highly	 influenced	 and	 shaped	 by	

culture,	laws,	and	beliefs.

 30 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental	

Studies,	March	2015).

31 Ibid.

32 Janis	Berzins,	“Russia’s	New	Generation	Warfare	in	

Ukraine:	Implications	for	Latvian	Defense	Policy”	

(National	Defence	Academy	of	Latvia	Center	for	

Security	and	Strategic	Research,	April	2014).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

22

Open-Warfare	Hybrid	Threats

Open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats	 are	 unique	 from	

gray-zone hybrid	threats	because	they	bring	the	

full	 spectrum	 of	 conventional	 and	

unconventional	operations	to	bear	on	a	conflict.	

Open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats	 consist	 of	 all	

instruments	 of	 national	 power,	 proxies,	

terrorism,	 conventional	 tactics,	 unconventional	

warfare,	 and	 criminal	 elements	 employed	 and	

fused	 in	 a	 single	 space	 and	 time.	While	 not	 all	

elements	 need	 to	 be	 fused	 together	in	a	 single	

space	 and	 time	 to	 qualify	 as	 hybrid	 tactics,	

multiple	elements	must	be	fused	for	the	tactics	

to	 qualify	 as	 hybrid.	 Open-warfare	 hybrid	

threats	 are	 considered	 “traditional”	 hybrid	

warfare.	 They	 occur	 when	 countries	 are	

involved	 in	 open	 conflict	 and,	 while	 there	 may	

be	 some	 instances	 where	 ambiguity	 is	 helpful,	

for	 the	 most	 part	 aggressors	 are	 not	 trying	 to	

hide	 their	 involvement	 in	 conflict.	 Recent	

examples	 of	 open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats	

include	 the	 2006	 war	 between	 Hezbollah	 and	

Israel	 as	 well	 as	 Russian	 actions	 during	 the	

annexation	of	Crimea.	In	this	report,	I	will	not	go	

into	 the characteristics	 of	 open-warfare	 hybrid	

threats,	as	 there	is	a	large	amount	of	literature	

already	 written	 on	 them.	 Chief	 among those	 is	

Frank	 Hoffman’s	 2009	 article	 in	 Armed	 Forces	

Journal	titled	“Hybrid	vs.	Compound	War.”33

 33 Frank	Hoffman,	“Hybrid	vs	Compound	War,”	

Armed	Forces	Journal,	October	1,	2009.

Findings	and Recommendations	

Hybrid	threats	and	the	gray	zone are	important	

concepts	 to	 define	 as	 they	 allow	 strategists,	

leaders,	 and	 policymakers	 to	 achieve	 shared	

understanding	 regarding	 the	 complexity	 of	

modern	 conflict	 and	 the	 capabilities	 needed	 to	

fight	 and	 win	 in	 a	 complex	 world.	 While	

previously	 well	 documented,	 hybrid	 threats	

have	not	been	applied	to	gray-zone conflict	and	

their	description	thus	needs	to	be	updated.	

The	 gray	 zone is	 the	 space	 between	

peace	 and	 war.	 It	 is	 an	 operating	 environment	

in	which	aggressors	use	ambiguity	and	leverage	

non-attribution	 to	 achieve	 strategic	 objectives	

while	 limiting	 counter-actions	 by	 other	 nation	

states.	 Inside	 the	 gray	 zone,	 aggressors	 use	

hybrid	 tactics	 to	 achieve	 their	 strategic	

objectives.	 While	 hybrid	 threats	 have	

historically	 been	 associated	 with	 irregular	 and	

conventional	warfare,	their	use	in	the	gray	zone

leads	 to	 a	 dichotomy	 between	 two	 types	 of	

hybrid	 threats	 that	 can	mainly	 be	attributed	 to	

the	 need	 for	 ambiguity	 and	 non-attribution	 in	

the	 gray	 zone.	The	 two	 types	 of	 hybrid	 threats	

are	 “open-warfare	 hybrid	 threats”	 and	 “grayzone hybrid	threats.”	

The	 characteristics	 of	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats	

include:	 (1)	 ambiguity	 (2)	 exploitation	 of	

adversary	 weaknesses	 using	 all	 elements	 of	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

23

national	 power	 (3)	 attacks	 from	 land,	 sea,	 air,	

information,	 and	 cyber	 (4)	 use	 of	 criminal	

organizations	 and	 networks,	 and	 (5)	 the	use	 of	

laws	 and	 cultural	 norms	 as	 a	 weapons	 system.	

While	 some	 of	 these	 can	 be	 found	 throughout	

the	 spectrum	 of	 conflict,	 ambiguity,	 the	 use	 of	

criminal	 organizations	 and	 networks,	 and	 the	

use	 of	 laws	 and	 cultural	 norms	 against	 an	

adversary	differentiate	gray-zone hybrid	threats	

from	tactics	used	in	limited	or	conventional	war.	

Furthermore,	ambiguity	distinguishes	gray-zone

hybrid	threats	from	open-warfare	hybrid	threats	

as	it	allows	 the	aggressor	 to	maintain	 plausible	

deniability	and	achieve	its	goal	of	accomplishing	

strategic	 objectives	 without	 causing	 the	United	

States to	intervene.	

Moving	 forward,	 the	 Army	 needs	 to	

evaluate	if	its	definition	of	hybrid	threats	in	ADP	

3-0,	 “the	 diverse	 and	 dynamic	 combination	 of	

regular	 forces,	 irregular	 forces,	 terrorist	 forces,	

criminal	 elements,	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 these	

forces	 and	 elements	 all	 unified	 to	 achieve	

mutually	 benefitting	 effects,”	 is	 sufficient	 to	

address	the	complexity	of	hybrid	threats	both	in	

and	out	of	 the	gray	zone.	It	must	also	decide	if	

this	 definition	 is	 too	 broad	 and	 does	 not	 allow	

leaders,	 strategists,	 and	 policy	 makers	 to	

achieve	 shared	 understanding	 with	 respect	 to	

the	nature	of	hybrid	threats	and	the	capabilities	

needed	to	defeat	them.	Finally,	the	Army	needs	

to	 decide	 if	 the	 gray-zone concept	 is	 worth	

defining	 in	 our	 doctrine	 and,	 if	 so,	 how	 it	 fits	

into	the	overall	scheme	of	Army	operations.		

III.	 Identifying	 and	 Adapting	 to	 Challenges	

Posed	 by	 Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats	 Due	 to	

Laws,	Norms,	and	Processes

Challenges	Posed	by	Gray-Zone Hybrid	Threats

Hybrid	 threats	 pose	 a	 myriad	 of	 challenges	 to	

the	 US Army, as	 they	 are	 specifically	 designed	

by	 the	 aggressor	 to	 exploit	 the	 weaknesses	 of	

the	adversary.	In	 the	case	of	 the	United	States,	

our	 biggest	 weakness	 in	 the	 gray	 zone is	 our	

bureaucracy	and	our	inability	to	understand	and	

react	 quickly	 to	 adversary	 actions	 in	 the	 gray	

zone.	While	bureaucracy	can	be	an	advantage	in	

getting	 a	 large	 organization	 to	 accomplish	 its	

mission,	 it	 is	 generally	 unwieldy,	 slow,	 and	

inflexible.	As	a	result,	adversaries	are	realigning	

their	organizations	and	developing	doctrine	and	

capabilities	 targeted	 at	 exploiting	 our	 slow	

reaction	 time	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 This	 slow	

reaction	 time	 ultimately	 stems	 from	 our	

bureaucratic	 processes	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	

difficulties	in	getting	large	organizations	to	work	

together	to	identify	actions	and	trends	and	then	

come	 to	 a	 common	 understanding	 about	 what	

is	 happening	 and	 developing	 and	 executing	 an	

appropriate	 response.	 This	 problem	 is	

compounded	when	multiple	large	organizations,	

for	 example	 the	 Department	 of	 Defense,	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

24

Department	 of	 State,	 and	 the	 Central	

Intelligence	 Agency,	 are	 involved	 in	

understanding	 and	 solving	 a	 problem.	 In	

essence,	 the	 new	 capabilities	 and	 tactics	

developed	 by	 our	 adversaries	 are	 designed	 to	

operate within	 our	 decision	 cycle, exploit	 our	

inability	 to	 react, and	 allow	 them	 to	 reach	

strategic	objectives	before	we	can	counter	their	

actions.	

The	solution	to	this	problem	is	outlined	in	

ARSOF	 2022,	 the	 US Army	 Special	 Operations	

Command’s	 strategic	 blueprint	 for	 the	 future:

“Dealing	 with	 transnational	 and	 hybrid	

organizations	 requires	 a	 high	 level	 of	 ongoing,	

real-time	 cooperation	 with	 JIIM	 (Joint,	

Interagency,	 intergovernmental	 and	

multinational)	 organizations	 reliant	 on	

established	 responsibilities	 understood	 by	 all	

participants.	Hybrid	teams	consisting	of	military,	

law	enforcement,	and	composite	authorities	will	

become	the	new	norm	to	counter	transnational	

and	 hybrid	 threats.	 SOF	 operational	 design	 will	

be	 optimized	 in	 the	 human	 domain	 and	 in	

operations	 not	 led	 by	 the	 Department	 of	

Defense	(DOD).”34

An	 example	 of	 an	 adversary	 creating	

doctrine	 to	 exploit	 weaknesses	 of	 large	

 34 United	Sates	Army	Special	Operations	Command,	

“ARSOF	Operating	Concept	2022,”	26	September	

2014,	p.	8.

bureaucracies	is Russia’s	hybrid	threat	doctrine,	

known	 as	 “New	 Generation	 Warfare”	 or	 the	

“Gerasimov	 Doctrine.”	 This	 doctrine	 was	

designed	 to	 take	 place	 in	 the	 gray	 zone and	

within	adversaries’ decision	cycles.	This	strategy	

was	designed	around	the	weaknesses	of	Russian	

adversaries	to	include	the	United	States.35 In	an

article	 for	 the	Russian	military,	Russian	Chief	of	

the	General	Staff	Valery	Gerasimov	the	doctrine

based	on	his	views	on	the	future	of	warfare:

Wars	are	no	longer	declared	and,	having	

begun,	 proceed	 according	 to	 an	

unfamiliar	 template...	 [A]	 perfectly	

thriving	state	can,	in	a	matter	of	months	

and	 even	 days,	 be	 transformed	 into	 an	

arena	 of	 fierce	 armed	 conflict,	 become	 a	

victim	 of	 foreign	 intervention,	 and	 sink	

into	 a	 morass	 of	 chaos,	 humanitarian	

catastrophe,	 and	 civil	 war.... The	 very	

“rules	 of	war”	 have	 changed. The	 role	 of	

nonmilitary	 means	 of	 achieving	 political	

and	 strategic	 goals	 has	 grown,	 and,	 in	

many	 cases,	 they	 have	 exceeded	 the	

power	 of	 force	 of	 weapons	 in	 their	

effectiveness... The	 focus of	 applied	

methods	 of	 conflict	 has	 altered	 in	 the	

direction	 of	 the	 broad	 use	 of	 political,	

economic,	 informational,	 humanitarian,	

and	 other	 nonmilitary	 measures	 —

applied	 in	 coordination	 with	 the	 protest	

potential	 of	 the	 population.	 All	 this	 is	

supplemented	 by	 military	 means	 of	 a	

concealed	 character,	 including	 carrying

out	 actions	 of	 informational	 conflict	 and	

the	 actions	 of	 special-operations	 forces.	

The	open	use	of	forces	— often	under	the	

guise	 of	 peacekeeping	 and	 crisis	

regulation	 — is	 resorted	 to	 only	 at	 a	

 

35 David	Maxwell,	January	8,	2016
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

25

certain	 stage,	 primarily	 for	 the	

achievement	 of	 final	 success	 in	 the	

conflict.

36

In	 Gerasimov’s	 description	 of	 the	 future	

of	warfare, hybrid	 threats	in	 the	gray	 zone	will	

play	a	big	role.	Gerasimov	sees	the	non-military	

elements	 of	 national	 power	 as	 an	 important	

part	 of	 achieving	 Russian	 strategic	 objectives.	

Further,	he	highlights	the	 fact	that	non-military	

means	 will	 be	 supplemented	 by	 the	 use	 of	

military	force	either	covertly	through	the	use	of	

special	 operations	 forces	 or	 overtly	 “under	 the	

guise	of	peacekeeping	and	crisis	regulation.”	

Russia’s	 “New	 Generation Warfare”	 vs.	 US	

Doctrine

Russia’s	 “New	 Generation	 Warfare”	 can	 be	

organized	and	broken	down	into	an	eight-phase	

planning	 construct.	 US	 planning	 processes,	 by	

comparison,	 generally	 use a	 six-phase	

construct.	The	alignment	of	these	two	doctrines	

against	 each	 other	 (Figure	 2) is	 problematic	

because	the	Russian	operational	process	allows	

for	multiple	actions	within	a	single	phase	of	the	

US	 operational	 process.	 Essentially,	 Russia	 can

act	within	the	decision	cycle	of	 the	US	military,	

resulting in	greater	Russian	agility	and	 reduced

US	ability	to	react	to	Russian	aggression.

 36 Mark	Galeotti,	“The	‘Gerasimov	Doctrine’	and	

Russian	Non-Linear	War,”	In	Moscow’s	Shadows,	

accessed	December	2,	2015.

The	 six-phase	 vs.	 the	 eight-phase	

construct	 is	 not	 problematic	 on	 the	 surface.	

However,	 the	 first	 four	 phases	 of	 New	

Generation	Warfare	fall	within	a	single	phase	of	

US	 operational	 planning:	 Phase	 0.	 This	 is	 an	

issue	 because	 there	 are	 more	 stringent	

authorities	 and	 coordination	 required	 with	

other	 government	 agencies	 when	 the	 US	

military	seeks	to	operate	within	Phase	0.	To	put	

it	 bluntly,	 the	 Russian	 construct	 codifies	 their	

ability	 to	 operate and	 be	 agile	 in	 an	 area	 in	

which	the	US	military	is	constrained	in	its	ability	

to	 operate	 due	 to	 the	 bureaucracy	 of	 the	

interagency	process	and	its	lack	of	authority	 to	

operate	 freely	 and	 independently.	 While	 this	

does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 US	 military	 cannot

request	 and	 receive	 these	 authorities,	 it	 does	

mean	 that	 the	 US	 Army	 must	 work	 harder	 to	

achieve	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 situation	 on	

the	 ground	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 and	 to	 ensure	

common	 understanding	 across	 all	 involved	

agencies	 in	 order	 to	 move	 quickly	 enough	 to	

receive	authorities.	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

26

Figure	2:	US	vs.	Russian	Operational	Phases

Russian “New Generation Warfare” 

Doctrine37

Hybrid 

Threat

US Operation Planning Doctrine38 (See 

Appendix B)

Phase 

1:

Non-military asymmetric 

warfare to establish favorable 

political, economic, and 

military set up

GrayZone 

Hybrid 

Threats

Phase 0: 

Shape

Joint and Multinational operations—

inclusive of normal routine military 

activities—and various interagency 

activities performed to dissuade or deter 

potential adversaries and to assure or 

solidify relationships with friends and 

allies

Phase 

2:

Special operations to mislead 

political and military leaders

Phase 

3:

Intimidating, deceiving, and 

bribing government and 

military officers to make them 

abandon their service duties

Phase 

4:

Destabilizing propaganda to 

increase discontent among 

population; arrival of Russian 

militants

Phase 

5:

Establishment of no-fly zones 

over country to be attacked, 

imposition of blockades, use of 

private military companies

Phase 1: 

Deter

Deter undesirable enemy adversary 

action by demonstrating capabilities and 

resolve; includes activities to prepare 

forces and set conditions for 

deployment and employment of forces

Phase 

6:

Commencement of military 

action

OpenWarfare

Hybrid 

Threats

Phase 2: 

Seize 

Initiative 

Seize initiative through application of 

appropriate joint force capabilities

Phase 

7:

Combination of targeted 

information, electronic warfare, 

space operations, combined 

with use of high-precision 

weapons

Phase 3: 

Dominate

Break the enemy’s will for organized 

resistance or control the operating 

environment

Phase 

8:

Destruction of remaining 

enemy points of resistance

Phase 4: 

Stability

Stabilize environment when there is no 

fully functional, legitimate civil 

government authority present

Phase 5: 

Enable 

Civil 

Authorities

Support legitimate civil governance in 

theater; enable viability of civil 

authority

 37 Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy” (National 

Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014).

38 The Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning,” August 2011.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

27

Some	 may	 argue	 that	 comparing	 the	

Gerasimov	Doctrine	to	the	US phasing	construct	

is	unfair	because	the	US phasing	construct	does	

not	 always	 take	 place	 in	 a	 linear	 fashion.	

Furthermore,	 the	 most	 likely	 US elements	 to	

operate	in	 the	gray	zone are	special	operations	

forces,	 in	 particular	 US Army	 special	 forces.	

Consequently,	 comparing	 the	 Gerasimov	

Doctrine	 to	 the	 phases	 of	 unconventional	

warfare	(Preparation,	Initial	Contact,	Infiltration,	

Organization,	 Buildup,	 Employment,	 and	

Transition)39 may	 seem	 like	 a	 better	 way	 to	

identify	issues	relating	to	operations	in	the	gray	

zone.	However,	viewing	the	Gerasimov	Doctrine	

through	 this	 lens	 does not	 provide	 the	 proper	

insight	 into	 the	 misalignment	 of	 US doctrine	

with	 Russian	 doctrine.	 In	 order	 to	 execute	 an	

unconventional	warfare	campaign,	the	US Army	

must	 staff	 its	 proposal	 through	 the	 National	

Security	 Council	 and	 have	 its	 operations	

approved	by	 the	president.	The	difficulties	 that	

arise	 in	 the	 gray	 zone from	 the	 Gerasimov	

Doctrine	 come	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 US

bureaucracy	 can’t	 act	 quickly	 enough	 to	 get	 to	

this	 approval	 in	 new	 theaters	 of	 operation.	

Thus,	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	 Gerasimov	

Doctrine	 and	 the	US phases	 of	 unconventional	

warfare	 would	 only	 be	 appropriate	 for	 grayzone conflict	 in	 which	 the	 United	 States has	

 39 United	States	Army	Special	Operations	Command,	

“Unconventional	Warfare	Pocket	Guide,”	April	2016.	

already	received	approval	from	the	president	to	

conduct	 an	 unconventional	 warfare	 campaign	

and	 would	 already	 have	 the	 authorities	 and	

shared	 responsibilities	 in	 place	 to	 execute	

operations	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 The	 fundamental	

problem	with	countering	operations	in	the	gray	

zone takes	place	when	the	United	States cannot	

clearly	 identify	 gray-zone actors	 and	 actions	

(ambiguity)	 nor	 develop	 a	 clear	 common	

operating	picture	of	actions	taking	place.	In	this	

case,	the	United	States will	be	constrained	by	a	

bureaucracy	 that	 will	 likely	 not	 authorize	

operations	 until	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 threat.	 At	 this	

point,	 it	 is	 too	 late	 and	 the	 adversary	 has

already	used	gray-zone operations	to	shape	the	

battlefield	and	achieve	its	strategic	objectives.	

Further,	 without	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	

coordinate	actions,	fuse	intelligence,	and	have	a	

well-developed	 and	 shared	 common	 operating	

picture	 across	 multiple	 agencies	 (e.g.	

Department	 of	 Defense,	 Department	 of	 State,	

National	 Security	 Council,	 Central	 Intelligence	

Agency,	 etc.),	 the	 US military	 would	 be	 hardpressed	 to	 take	 action	 prior	 to	 Phase	 5	 of	

Russian	operations	(i.e.	the	deterrence	phase	of	

US operations,	 Phase	 2).	 At	 this	 point,	 the	

Russians	 will	 have	 already	 set	 the	 conditions	

needed	 to	 commence	 military	 action	 through	

the	 use	 of	 hybrid	 tactics	 encompassing	 all	

elements	 of	 national	 power	 to	 include	 covert	

military	actions.	Additionally,	any	US actions	 to	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

28

deter	the	Russians	at	this	phase	may	be	seen	as	

provocative	 and	 inflame	 the	 situation	 as	 the	

Russians	 have	 already	 begun	 transitioning	 to	

overt	operations	(e.g.	a	“no-fly”	zone).

For	example,	lets	use	a	 fictional	scenario	

using	Latvia,	a	Baltic,	NATO	member	state	with	

a	 large	 number	 of	 ethnic	 Russians	

(approximately	 26 percent).40 Russia	 has	

publicly	 stated	 that	 it	 will	 defend	 its	

“compatriots”:	 ethnic	 Russians,	 Russian	

speakers,	 their	 families,	 and	 others	 who	 have	

cultural	 or	 other	 connections	 with	 the	 Russian	

federation.41 Furthermore,	 it	 has	 historically	

pursued	 a	 strategy	 of	 defense-in-depth	 and	

shown	 a	 willingness	 to	 disrupt	 and/or	

overthrow	 pro-Western	 governments	 such	 as	

that	 in	 Ukraine. 42 While	 Latvia	 is	 a	 NATO	

member	 state and	 could	 use	 Article	 IV	 or	 V	 to	

counter	 Russian	 aggression,	 Russia	 could	

execute	 New	 Generation	 Warfare	 in	 the	 gray	

zone if	it	viewed	Latvia	as	a	large	enough	threat	

to	 Russian	 interests.	 Russian	 operations	 would	

attempt	 to	 destabilize	 the	 country	and	achieve	

 40 Central	Intelligence	Agency,	“CIA	World	Fact	

Book,”	February	5,	2016.

41 Vera	Zakem,	Paul	J.	Saunders,	and	Daniel	Antoun,	

“Mobilizing	Compatriots:	Russia’s	Strategy,	Tactics,	

and	Influence	in	the	Former	Soviet	Union”	(Center	

for	Strategic	Studies,	November	2015).

42 Janis	Berzins,	“Russia’s	New	Generation	Warfare	in	

Ukraine:	Implications	for	Latvian	Defense	Policy”	

(National	Defence	Academy	of	Latvia	Center	for	

Security	and	Strategic	Research,	April	2014).

strategic	 objectives	 without	 causing	 Latvia	 to	

invoke	 Article	 V.	 To	 do	 this,	 Russia	 could	

execute	something	like	the	following	scenario:

Phase	 1: Russia	 engages	 ethnic	 Russian	

politicians	 and	 political	 groups	 to	

mobilize	and	protest	against	Latvia’s	proWestern	 government.	 Additionally,	

Russian	agents	or	proxies	get	pro-Russian	

businesses	 to	 work	 against	 Latvia	 and	

Russia	 uses	 cyber	 operations	 to	 disrupt	

the	 economy	 and	 electrical	 grid	 in	 proRussian	 enclaves,	 thus,	 sowing	 discord	

against	the	Latvian	government.

Phase	 2: Russia	 conducts	 information	

operations	 through	 special	 operators,	

diplomats,	 social	media,	and	pro-Russian	

print,	 radio,	 and	 TV	 media	 to	 discredit	

the	 Latvian	 government	 and	 begin	 to	

foment	resistance.

Phase	 3: Russia	 bribes	 military	 officers	

and	 government	 officials	 to	 abandon	

their	 duties	 or	 to	 sabotage	 counterRussian	operations/narratives/legislation.

Phase	 4: Russia	 floods	 Latvia’s	 proRussian	 population	 with	 propaganda	

alleging	 atrocities	 and	 repression	 by	 the	

Latvian	government.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

29

Phase	5: Russia	establishes	a	no-fly	 zone	

over	 pro-Russian	 territory	 in	 Latvia	 in	

order	 to	 protect	 their	 “compatriots.”	

Though	 some	 may	 view	 this	 as	 an	 act	

sufficient	to	trigger	NATO	Article	V,	if	the	

Russians	 are	 defending	 their	

“compatriots”	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 largescale	 Latvian	 forces,	 it	 may	 not	 be	

enough	 to	 tip	 the	 scales	 of	 international	

condemnation	and	lead	to	the	invocation	

of	Article	V.

Obviously,	 these	 phases	 may	 happen	

concurrently	 and	 may	 take	 months	 or	 years;	

success	 wouldn’t	 be	 instantaneous.	 However,	

why	 hybrid	 tactics	 in	 the	 gray	 zone are	 so	

effective	is	that	Russia	has	set	the	conditions	for	

a	 successful	 “defense”	 of	 its	 ethnic	 population	

in	 Latvia	 through	 the	 use	 of	 all	 elements	 of	

national	 power	and	without	 firing	any	 shots	 or	

crossing	 any	 “red	 lines”	 which	 would	 create	

conflict	 and	 could	 possibly	 result	 in	 the	

invocation	 of	 NATO’s	 Article	 V.	 Furthermore,	

the	majority	of	these	actions	were	taken	within	

Phase	 0	 of	 US military	 operations.	 It	 is	 likely	

that,	 given	 the	 current	 authorities	 and	

interagency	 construct,	 the	 US military	 would	

not	 be	 authorized	 to	 move	 larger	 numbers	 of	

troops	 or	 implement	 a	 counter	 to	 Russian	

aggression	 until	 Phase	 4	 of	 the	 Russian	

operations.	 At	 this	 point,	 any	 large	 movement	

of	 US forces	 would	 likely	 be	 seen	 as	 a	

provocation	 and	 an	 attempt	 to	 seize	 territory	

held	 by	 Russian	 “compatriots.”	 As	 a	 result	 of	

this	provocation,	it	is	possible	that	Russia	would	

quickly	 move	 to	 establish	 a	 no-fly	 zone	 (Phase	

5)	 which	 would,	 in	 turn,	 further	 provoke	 the	

United	States and	NATO.	

Clearly,	 Russia	 is	 able	 to	 accomplish	 its	

objectives	in	Latvia	 (seize	 territory	held	by	proRussian	 populations,	 create	 a	 buffer	 between	

itself	 and	 a	 NATO	 state,	 and	 disrupt	 a	 proWestern	 government	 on	 its	 border)	 without	

firing	 a	 shot	 or	 provoking	 the	 West.	

Furthermore	 any	 overt	 action	 taken	 by	 the	

United	 States and/or	 NATO	 could	 actually	 be	

seen	as	a	provocation	and	inflame	the	situation.	

The	 “sweet	 spot”	 for	 engaging	 an	 adversary	 in	

the	 gray	 zone is	 towards	 what	 the	 Russians	

would	classify	as	Phase	4.	However,	in	order	 to	

take	 action	 here	 the	 United	 States must	 have	

the	 right	 conditions:	 a	 common	 understanding	

of	 what	 the	 Russians	 are	 doing	 amongst	 all	

agencies	 in	 both	 the	 United	 States and	 hostnation	 governments,	 a	 solid	 campaign	 plan	

prepared	 to	 be	 executed,	 the	 appropriate	

authorities	 to	 act	 within	 the	 affected	 country,	

and,	most	importantly,	 the	requisite	number	of	

US forces	 in	 place	 with	 the	 capabilities	 and	

equipment	necessary	to	execute	their	mission.	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

30

Findings	and Recommendations

The	 Russian	 concept	 of	 “New	 Generation

Warfare”	 is	 designed	 to	 use	 gray-zone hybrid	

threats.	 It	 is	 focused	 on	 using	 non-military	

means	 of	achieving	 political	and	 strategic	goals	

as	 well	 as	 military	 means	 “of	 concealed	

character”	 to	 include	 the	 open	 use	 of	 forces	

“often	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 peacekeeping	 and	

crisis	 regulation”	 to	 accomplish	 objectives.	

These	 tactics	 and	 techniques	 are	 particularly	

effective	 against	 the	 United	 States in	 the	 gray	

zone due	 to	 laws	 and	 regulations	 affecting	 our	

ability	 to	 act	 in	 Phase	 0.	 Specifically,	 our	

bureaucracy	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 agility	 in	 the	

interagency	 process	 allow	 the	 Russians	 to	

execute	 their	 doctrine	 and	 get	 within	 our	

decision	cycle.

Without	 concerted	 efforts	 to	 coordinate	

actions,	 fuse	 intelligence,	 and	 develop	 a	

common	 operating	 picture	 across	 all	 agencies,	

the	 US Army	 will	 have	 difficulty	 responding	 to	

Russian	 gray-zone actions	 prior	 to	 Phase	 5	 of	

Russian	operations	(i.e.	the	deterrence	phase	of	

US operations,	Phase	2	as	outlined	in	Figure	3).	

This	 is	 problematic	 because	 introduction	 of	US

troops	 into	 the	 region	 during	 this	 phase	 may	

escalate	 the	 situation	 instead	 of	 deterring	

Russian	aggression.	Consequently,	 the	US Army	

needs	 to	 work	 with	 interagency	 partners	 to	

understand	 the	 threat	 and	 take	 actions	 to	

dissuade	and	deter	 the	 threat	as	early	in	Phase	

0	as possible.	Ideally,	this	would	happen	prior	to	

or	 early	 in	 Phase	 4	 of	 Russian	 operations—the	

use	 of	 propaganda	 and	 introduction	 of	 Russian	

militants.

In	order	 to	align	doctrine	with	gray-zone

hybrid	 threats,	 the	Army	 first	needs	 to	conduct	

an	analysis	of	gray-zone doctrine	from	the	most	

likely	 gray-zone adversaries	 (Russia,	 China,	 and	

Iran).	If	commonalities	are	found	in	the	doctrine	

related	to	actions	in	Phase	0	of	US operations,	it	

would	 be	 pertinent	 to	 look	 at	 the	 US phasing	

construct	and/or	likely	actions	within	Phase	0	to	

see	 if	 they	 are	 adequate	 to	 counter	 actions	 by	

these	likely	aggressors	and	address	current	and	

future	 threats.	Secondly,	 the	US Army	needs	 to	

look	 at	 systems	 and	 processes	 used	 to	 fuse	

intelligence	 and	 create	 shared	 understanding	

across	 multiple	 agencies.	 If	 the	 systems	 and	

processes	 are	 inadequate	 to	 quickly	 and	

efficiently	 share	 information,	 then	 these	 issues	

need	to	be	addressed.	

Finally,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 gray-zone

operations,	 more	 academic	 research	 and	

thought	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 to	 determine	where	

countries	 cross	 the	 line	 between	 competition	

and	 conflict.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 South	 China	

Sea,	China	is	finishing	the	construction	of	islands	

that	may	include	lucrative	fisheries	and	mineral	

deposits	 within what	 it	 claims	 as	 its exclusive	

economic	 zone.	 Is	 this	 considered	 competition	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

31

between	 China	 and	 its	 South	 China	 Sea	

neighbors	or	conflict?	As	it	currently	stands,	it	is	

unclear	where	this	line	is	and	it	appears	that	the	

international	community	is	upset	with	China	but	

unwilling	 to	 take	 action	 that	 would	 lead	 to	

conflict.	However,	what	is	clear	is	the	transition	

between	the	gray	zone and	open	conflict:	when	

ambiguity	 disappears,	 shooting	 starts,	 and	

countries	 begin	 to	 conduct	 limited	 or	 theater	

conventional	war.	Therefore,	 the	 right	 limits	 of	

the	 gray	 zone are	 clearly	 defined	 but	 the	 left	

limit,	 the	 transition	 between	 competition	 and	

conflict,	 is	 still	 unclear.	 Consequently,	 it	 would	

benefit	 the	 US Army	 to	 clearly	 define	 this	

transition	 from	 competition	 to	 conflict	in	 order	

to	best	posture	itself	to	counter	emerging	grayzone hybrid	threats.	

IV:	Improving	US Army	Capacity	to	Counter	

Gray-Zone Hybrid	Threats

In	 addition	 to	 the	 recommendations	 given	 in	

previous chapters,	 there	 are	 five	 things	 the	US

Army	can	do	to	improve	its	capacity	to	counter	

gray-zone hybrid	 threats.	 These	

recommendations	are	based	on	identifying	and	

understanding	 the	 threat	 in	 order	 to	 create	

shared	understanding	and	a	common	operating	

picture	as	well	as	 reducing	 the	 risk	 undertaken	

by	 the	 United	 States	 and	 its	 allies	 in	 the	 gray	

zone.	 Furthermore,	 the	 majority	 of	 these	

recommendations	 lie	 in	 the	 human	 domain.	 As	

countering	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 is	 largely	

dependent	 on	 stripping	 an	 aggressor	 of	

ambiguity	 and,	 thus,	 reducing	 his	 ability	 to	

operate,	 improving	 capacity	 in	 the	 human	

domain	 is	 essential	 to	 building	 networks,	

relationships,	and	systems	necessary	to	identify	

and	 communicate	 aggressor	 actions	 upward	

and	across	multiple	organizations.	

Identifying	and	Understanding	the	Threat	

Special	 operations	 forces	 are	 essential	 in	

providing	 understanding	 of	 the	 human	 terrain.	

They	are	able	to	engage	early,	understand	what	

is	 happening,	 and	 identify	 options	 to	 shape,	

deter,	 and	 influence	 actors	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.

43

This	 is	 essential	 to	 identifying	 and	

understanding	 aggressor	 actions	 in	 the	 gray	

zone and	stripping	the	aggressor	of	ambiguity,	a	

key	 component	 of	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats.	

Because	 of	 their	 unique	 capabilities,	 special	

operations	 forces	 are	 the	 quintessential	 force	

for	 actions	 in	 the	 gray	 zone and	 the	 US Army	

must	 continue	 to	 build	 upon	 their	

unconventional	warfare	 capabilities	 in	 order	 to	

 43 Howard	Altman,	“‘Gray	zone’	Conflicts	Far	More	

Complex	to	Combat,	Says	SOCOM	Chief	Votel,”	

Tampa	Tribune,	November	28,	2015,	

http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zoneconflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socomchief-votel-20151128/.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

32

successfully	 counter	 aggressive	 actors	 in	 the	

gray	zone.	

The	 two	 missions	 of	 US Army	 special	

operations	 are	 special	 warfare	 and	 surgical	

strike.44 Surgical	 strike	 is	 as	 it	 sounds:	 “the	

execution	of	activities	in	a	precise	manner	 that	

employ	 special	 operations	 forces	 in	 hostile,	

denied,	 or	 politically	 sensitive	 environments	 to	

seize,	 destroy,	 capture,	 exploit,	 recover	 or	

damage	 designated	 targets,	 or	 influence	

threats.”45 Special	 warfare,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	

“is	 the	 execution	 of	 activities	 that	 involve	 a	

combination	 of	 lethal	 and	 non-lethal	 actions	

taken	by	a	specially	trained	and	educated	force”	

and	 includes	 unconventional	 warfare,	 foreign	

internal	 defense,	 counter-insurgency	

operations,	 stability	 operations,	 special	

reconnaissance,	and	security	force	assistance.46

Unconventional	warfare	(UW)	is	defined	

as	 “activities	 conducted	 to	 enable	 a	 resistance	

movement	 or	 insurgency	 to	 coerce,	 disrupt,	 or	

overthrow	a	government	or	occupying	power	by	

operating	 through	 or	 with	 an	 underground,	

auxiliary,	and	guerilla	 force	in	a	denied	area.”47

 44 Headquarters,	Department	of	the	Army,	“ADP	3-

05:	Special	Operations”	(HQDA,	August	2012),	

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/p

df/adp3_05.pdf.

45 Ibid

46 Ibid

47 Ibid

In	 the	 gray	 zone,	 many	 of	 the	 tactics,	

techniques,	procedures,	and	capabilities	needed	

to	 counter	an	aggressor	are	 the	 same	as	 those	

needed	 to	 enable	 a	 resistance	 movement	 to	

disrupt	 or	 overthrow	 a	 government	 using	

unconventional	warfare.	

Recent	 uses	 of	 UW	 by	 the	 US Army	

special	forces	 include	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	war	

in	Afghanistan, when	US special	forces	enabled	

the	Northern	Alliance	to	overthrow	the	Taliban,

and	working	with	 the	 Kurds	in	northern	Iraq	in	

2003.	However,	the	majority	of	US Army	special	

forces	 operations	 over	 the	 past	 fifteen	 years	

were	 focused	 on	 counter-terrorism,	 stability	

operations,	 or	 foreign	 internal	 defense.	 It	

wasn’t	until	the	recent	operations	against	ISIS	in	

Syria	that	US special	forces	regularly	conducted	

unconventional	 warfare.	 Consequently,	 their	

ability	 to	 conduct	 UW	 has	 atrophied	 and	 the	

institutional	 knowledge	 about	UW	 that	 resided	

among enlisted	 special	 forces	 members	 has	

largely	 disappeared.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 US Army	

Special	Operations	Command	and	 the	US Army	

Special	 Forces	 Command	 have	 worked	 to	 reestablish	 unconventional	 warfare	 capabilities	

within	 the	 special	 forces	 by	 adjusting	 force	

structure	 and	 creating	 units	 that	 focus

specifically	on	unconventional	warfare.48

 48 Joseph	Trevithick,	“The	US	Army	Has	Quietly	

Created	a	New	Commando	Division,”	Medium,	

November	26,	2014,	https://medium.com/war-is-
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

33

In	 addition	 to	 the	 special	 forces,	 the	

Army	must	prevent	further	cuts	and,	if	possible,	

increase	its	civil	affairs	and	military	information	

support	operation	capabilities.	Similar	to	special	

forces,	these	members	of	the special	operations	

community	 are	 able	 to	 go	 into	 environments,	

build	 networks,	 identify	 organizations	 that	

would	 be	 helpful	 in	 resisting	 an	 aggressor,	 and	

conducting	 operations	 to	 influence	 at-risk	

populations.	 Consequently,	 they	 possess	 skill	

sets	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 countering	 hybrid	

threats	 in	 the	 gray	 zone and	 the	 Army	 should	

work	to	preserve	them	in	any	future	changes	to	

force	structure.	

Additionally,	the	Army	should	continue	to	

increase	 broadening	 opportunities	 focused	 on	

advanced	 civil	 schooling	for	 officers	 and	 senior	

non-commissioned	 officers	 serving	 in	 special	

operations forces.	 Hybrid	 threats	 in	 the	 gray	

zone,	 and	 operations	 in	 the	 gray	 zone in	

general,	 pose	 significant	 challenges	 to	 the	

United	 States.	 Because	 these	 techniques	 allow	

adversaries	to	operate	within	the	constraints	of	

international	 norms	 and	 laws,	 often	 in	 an	

ambiguous manner,	it	is	difficult	 for	 the	United	

States	 to	 attribute	 actions	 to	 a	 specific	 nation	

and	even	more	difficult	to	piece	multiple	actions	

together	 and	 understand	 them	 as	 a	 campaign	

plan	 to	 achieve	 specific	 objectives	 without	

 

boring/the-u-s-army-has-quietly-created-a-newcommando-division-2b90961b4821.

conflict.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 we	

have	 highly	 competent,	 educated	 personnel	

who	 can	 think	 critically	 and	 put	 individual	

actions	 of	 an	 adversary	 into	 the	 context	 of	 a	

broader	 strategy while	 operating	 in	 the	 gray	

zone.	 Furthermore,	 these	 individuals	 must	 be	

able	to	communicate	their	findings	upwards	and	

across	multiple	agencies	in	order	to	achieve	the	

shared	understanding	necessary	to	react	in	time	

to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats.	 Given	 the	

current	 force	 structure	 and	 where	 the	 US

Army’s	unconventional	warfare	capacity	resides,	

it	is	likely	that	the	soldiers	operating	in	the	gray	

zone will	 be	 NCOs	 and	 officers	 serving	 in	

military	 intelligence,	special	forces,	 civil	 affairs,	

and	 military	 information	 support	 operations	

specialties.	

Institutional	 training,	 such	 as	 the	

Special	 Forces	 Qualification	 Course	 and	 the	

respective	 courses	 for	 civil	 affairs	 and	 military	

information	 support	 operations	 soldiers, are	

important.	 However,	 institutional	 training	 is	

limited	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 provide	 depth	 on	

different	subject	areas	due	to	time	and	resource	

constraints.	 A	 way	 to	 acquire	 depth	 in	 specific	

subject	 areas	 and	 improve	 critical	 and	 creative	

thinking	 skills	 is	 the	 advanced	 civil	 schooling	

program	 (ACS).	 ACS	 provides	 the	 opportunity	

for	 officers	 to	 become	 fully	 immersed	 in	 an	

academic	 environment	 and	 focus on	 specific	

areas	of	expertise.	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

34

However,	 the	ACS	 program	is	 relatively	

limited	 as	 it	 is	 only	 open	 to	 officers	 and	 offers	

the	 opportunity	 to	 only	 412	 students	 each	

year.49 Outside	of	the	ACS	program, there	are	a	

few US Army	 broadening	 opportunities that	

provide	 the	 opportunity	 for	 a	 very	 limited	

number	 of	 officers and	 non-commissioned	

officers	 to	 receive	 an	 advanced	 degree.	

However, there	 are no	 widespread	 programs	

which	offer	advanced	degrees	 to	junior	officers	

prior	 to	 company	 or	 detachment	 command,	 to	

non-commissioned	 officers,	 or	 that	 allow	 noncommissioned	 officers	 time	 to	 complete	 an	 inresidence	 bachelor’s	 degree.	 This	 is	 an	 issue	

because,	 in	 the	 gray	 zone,	 the	soldiers	 on	 the	

ground	making	the	majority	of	assessments	and	

executing	 US policy	 are	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 field	

grade	officers	with	advanced	degrees	but	young	

officers	serving	as	special	forces	and	civil	affairs	

team	commanders	and	their	non-commissioned	

officers.	 While	 capable	 and	 competent,	 the	

soldiers	 at	 this	 level	 serving	 in	 the	 gray	 zone

would	 be	well	 served	with	more	advanced	 civil	

schooling	 as	 it	 increases	 critical	 thinking	 skills	

and	 provides	 expanded	 opportunities	 for	

cultural	 immersion	 and	 developing	 social	

networks	 comprised	 of	 both	 foreign	 and	

domestic	entities.		

 49 United	States	Army,	“My	Army	Benefits:	Advanced	

Civil	Schooling,”	n.d..

Furthermore,	 in	 accordance	 with	

current	Army	policy,	the	officers	that	lead	these	

teams	 hold	 those	 positions	 for	 only	 12–24	

months.	 During	 this	 timeframe,	 the	 maximum	

time	that	the	leader	could	be	deployed	is	twelve	

months.	 Consequently,	 the	 most	 educated	

member	 of	 the	 team	 serving	 in	 the	 gray	 zone

has	 little	 time	 to	 develop	 the	 cultural	 nuances,	

relationships,	and	institutional	knowledge	of	the	

country	he	or	she	is	serving	in.	The	backbone	of	

these	 teams,	 who	 have	 multiple	 deployments	

and,	 sometimes,	 years	 of	 deployed	 time	 in	

countries	where	gray-zone aggressors	may	take	

action	 are	 the	 non-commissioned	 officers.	

Consequently,	it	would	be	advantageous,	and	a	

tremendous force	 multiplier,	 for	 the	 Army	 to	

expand	the	educational	opportunities	for	senior	

non-commissioned	 officers	 with	 a	 focus on	

those	senior	non-commissioned	officers	serving	

in	special	operations	forces.	

Some	 may	 argue	 that	 educational	

programs	 are	 too	 expensive	 and that,	 given	 a	

shrinking	 Army	 budget,	 there	 are	 competing	

priorities	 for	 funding.	While	 I	 acknowledge	 the	

shrinking	 budget,	 the	 comparative	 cost	 of	

educating	 officers	 and	 non-commissioned	

officers is	little	and	 the	return	on	investment	is	

large.	 For	 example,	 a	 program	 that	 sent	 1,000	

officers	 and	 non-commissioned	 officers	 to	 a	

two-year	 academic	 program	 at	 a	 major	

university	 in	 the	United	 States costing	 $30,000
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

35

per	 year	 to	 attend	 would	 cost	 the	 Army	 $30

million	 per	 year, without	 taking	 into	 account	

any	 increases	 in	 basic	 allowance	 for	 housing	

rates	 (the	median	cost	of	in-state	tuition	 for	an	

undergraduate	 degree	is	 $9,410/year50 and	 the	

average	 cost	 for	 a	 master’s	 degree	 in	

international	 relations	 is	 $50,000/year51).	 This	

cost	 is	 less	 than	 one	 Apache	 helicopter	 ($35

million)	 and	 a	 little	 more	 than	 one	

Paladin/FAASV	 Integrated	Management	system	

($25	 million).52 However,	 the	 return	 on	

investment	 for	 the	 education	 of	 these	 officers	

and	 senior	 non-commissioned	 officers	 is	

tremendous.	While	the	Apache	and the	Paladin	

system	 may	 not	 be	 used	 in	 the	 gray	 zone,	 a	

large	 cohort	 of	 soldiers	 with	 advanced	 critical	

and	 creative	 thinking	 skills	 who	 have	 an	

expertise	 in	 the	 area	 in	 which	 they	 are	

operating	 would	 bring	 tremendous capabilities	

to	 interpreting	 and	 countering	 gray-zone

actions	 by	 adversaries	 of	 the	 United	 States.	 As	

ARSOF	 2022	 so	 eloquently	 states	 in	 its	 “SOF	

Truths,”	 humans	 are	 more	 important	 than	

 50 “2015-16	In-State	Tuition	and	Fees	at	Public	FourYear	Institutions	by	State	and	Five-Year	Percentage	

Change	- Trends	in	Higher	Education	- The	College	

Board,”	accessed	March	18,	2016.

51 “How	Much	Does	a	Master’s	in	International	

Relations	Cost?	- CostHelper.com,”	CostHelper,	

accessed	March	18,	2016.

52 Office	of	the	Undersecretary	of	Defense	

(Comptroller)/Chief	Financial	Officer,	“Program	

Acquisition	Cost	By	Weapon	System”	(US	

Department	of	Defense,	March	2014).

hardware53 and,	 consequently,	 the	 investment	

in	their	education	is	well	worth	the	cost.

Additionally,	 some	 may	 argue	 that	

conventional	 forces	 are	 finding	 themselves	

operating	in	the	gray	zone at	a	much	higher	rate	

and,	 as	 a	 result,	 also	 deserve	 increased	

opportunities	 for	 advanced	 civil	 schooling.	

While	this	is	true,	special	operations	forces	are	a	

better	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	

ACS	 program	 to	 junior	 officers	 and	 noncommissioned	 officers	 due	 to	 the	 relative	

complexity	of	their	mission	set	compared	to	the	

average	conventional	force	unit	operating	in	the	

gray	 zone.	 Additionally,	 special	 operations	

forces	 non-commissioned	 officers	 are,	

generally,	 more	 educated	 and	 have	 a	 greater	

probability	of	successfully	completing	a	rigorous

collegiate-level	 education	 program	 than	 their	

conventional	counterparts.	

Reducing	Risk

As	 outlined	 in	 the	 challenges	 posed	 by	

hybrid	threats	in	the	gray	zone,	one	of	the	main	

issues	 is	 the	 risk	 of	 escalation	 once	 the	United	

States has	 identified	 an	 adversary	 is	 taking	

actions	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 In	 order	 to	 minimize	

the	 risk	 of	 escalation,	 it	 is	 prudent	 for	 the	 US

 53 United	Sates	Army	Special	Operations	Command,	

“ARSOF	Operating	Concept	2022,”	26	September	

2014,	p.	23.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

36

Army	to	position	forces	in	countries	susceptible	

to	 gray-zone incursions	 by	 adversaries.	 The	

number	 of	 US forces	 in	 susceptible	 countries	

does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 great	 as	 they	 act	 as	 a	

deterrent	 just	 by	 being	 there.	 The	 presence	 of	

US forces	in	an	at-risk	country	amplifies	the	risk	

for	 a	 potential	 aggressor	 because	 they	 will	 be	

worried	 about	 a	 miscalculation	 resulting	 in	 an	

engagement	of	the	US forces.	An	action	such	as	

this	 would	 result	 in	 a	 loss	 of	 ambiguity,	 the	

crossing	of	a	“red	line”	with	 the	most	powerful	

actor	in	 the world,	and	a	possible	escalation	of	

the	 conflict.	 Consequently,	 the	 presence	 of	US

forces	greatly	changes	the	calculus employed	by	

aggressors	in	the	gray	zone.	

Some	 may	 argue	 that	 pre-positioning	

US forces	 in	 at-risk	 countries	 may	 needlessly	

increase	tensions	with	adversaries.	This	may	be	

the	case,	but,	pre-positioning	US forces	in	at-risk	

countries	before	gray-zone actions	begin	is	less	

likely	 to	 increase	 the	 chance	 of	 conflict	 due	 to	

their	pre-positioning	than	moving	in	forces	after	

gray-zone actions	are	well	 underway	 (e.g.	after	

Phase	 4	 of	 Russian	 operations).	 Consequently,	

the	pre-positioning	of	forces	incurs	less	risk	than	

positioning	 forces	 when	 conflict	 is	 already	

underway.

An	 example	 of	 what	 positioning	 US

forces	 in	 at-risk	 countries	 could	 look	 like	 is	

Operation	 Atlantic	 Resolve	 (OAR).	 OAR	 is	 a	

multitude	of	multinational	 training	and	security	

cooperation	 activities	 taking	 place	 throughout	

Eastern	 Europe	 in	 support	 of	 US and	 NATO	

allies.54 The	presence	of	US forces	amplifies	the	

risk	 involved	 for	 the	 Russians	 in	 executing	

operations	 in	 the	 gray	 zone because	 of	 the	

consequences	 of	 potential	 miscalculations	

and/or	 the	 potential	 loss	 of	 ambiguity.	 As	 a	

result,	 these	 forces	 serve	 as	 a	 deterrent	 to	

Russia	aggression	by	changing	the	calculus used	

to	 decide	what	actions	 the	 Russians	are	willing	

to	take	in	Eastern	Europe.

However,	positioning	of	US forces	in	atrisk	countries	does	have	some	drawbacks.	First,	

it	 is	 expensive.	 The	 European	 Reassurance	

Initiative,	 which	 pays	 for	 Operation	 Atlantic	

Resolve,	 cost	 the	 Department	 of	 Defense	 $985	

million	 in	 FY	 2015	 with	 another	 $789	 million	

requested	 for	 FY	 2016.55 Secondly,	 positioning	

forces	 in	 at-risk	 countries	 to	 serve	 as	 a	

deterrent	 obviously	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 not	

deterring	 an	 aggressor.	 If	 the	 aggressor	 still	

takes	 action	 that	 engages	 the	 US forces,	 then	

the	United	 States will	 have	 little	 choice	 but	 to	

engage	in	further	conflict	against	the	aggressor.	

 

54 US	Army	Europe,	“Operation	Atlantic	Resolve,”	

n.d..

55 Office	of	the	Undersecretary	of	Defense	

(Comptroller)/Chief	Financial	Officer,	“European	

Reassurance	Initiative,”	Department	of	Defense	

Budget	FY	2016	(US	Department	of	Defense,	n.d.).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

37

This	creates	an	issue	if	the	forces	are	engaged	in	

a	country	in	which	 the	political	environment	at	

home	 in	 the	 United States	 does	 not	 support	

going	to	war	over.	Though	the	risk	of	US forces	

being	 engaged	 in	 an	 at-risk	 country	 is	 low,	 it	

does	 exist	 and	 these	 consequences	 should	 be	

considered	prior	to	deploying	forces.	

If	 pre-positioning	 forces	 is	 not	 feasible	

due	to	cost or	political	constraints,	the	US Army	

should,	at	a	minimum,	create	an	unconventional	

warfare	campaign	plan	for	at-risk	countries	that	

is	 staffed	 and	 approved	 by	 all	 relevant	

organizations	 and	 authorities	 (e.g.	 Department	

of	State,	intelligence	agencies,	National	Security	

Council,	etc.).	The	plan	should	clearly	delineate	

and	outline	responsibilities	and	authorities	in	an	

at-risk	 country	 should	 an	 adversary	 begin	 to	

take	action	in	the	gray	zone.	The	purpose	of	this	

advance	planning	should	be	 to	reduce	 the	 time	

needed	for	the	US governmental	bureaucracy	to	

approve	 operations	 to	 counter	 adversary	

actions	 in	 the	 gray	 zone and,	 thus,	 greatly	

improve	 the	 ability	 of	 US forces	 to	 counter	

adversaries	in	the	gray	zone.

In	 addition	 to	 pre-positioning	 forces	 in	

at-risk	 countries,	 the	 United	 States	 should	 also	

work	 with	 host	 nations	 to	 integrate	 minority	

ethnic	groups	and	 other	at-risk	 populations.	As	

outlined	 in	 the	 challenges	 posed	 by	 gray-zone

hybrid	threats,	ethnic	groups,	especially	Russian	

ethnic	 groups	 which	 are	 marginalized	 and	 not	

integrated	 into	 society,	are	at	 particular	 risk	 to	

be	 engaged	 and	 manipulated	 by	 an	 adversary	

when	 conducting	 operations	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	

These	 ethnic	 groups	 are	 at	 risk	 because	 they	

share	cultural,	language,	and	historical	ties	with	

a	 potential	 aggressor	 and	 are	 located	 in	 a	

country	 that	may	be	a	 target	 for	hybrid	 threats	

in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 An	 aggressor,	 such	 as	 Russia,	

may	 exploit	 these	 ties	 in	 order	 to	 manipulate	

the	 population	 to	 help	 it	 achieve	 its	 strategic	

objectives.	 An	 example	 of this	 was	 in	 Crimea	

where	 Russia	 used	 cultural	 and	 historical	 ties	

with	 ethnic	 Russians	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	

denounce	 the	 government	 of	 Ukraine	 and	

legitimatize	 Russia’s	 annexation	 of	 Crimea.56

Additionally,	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 the	 Russians	

used	 an	 “unidentified	 military	 force”	 to	 take	

over	 key	 buildings	 and	 then	 brought	 in	

unarmed,	 pro-Russian	 civilians	 who	 set	 up	

barricades	 and	 staged	 sit-ins	 and	

demonstrations.57

Examples	of	pro-Western	countries	with	

large	 Russian	 ethnic	 minority	 populations	

include:	 Estonia	 (25 percent),	 Latvia	 (26

 56 Janis	Berzins,	“Russia’s	New	Generation	Warfare	in	

Ukraine:	Implications	for	Latvian	Defense	Policy”	

(National	Defence	Academy	of	Latvia	Center	for	

Security	and	Strategic	Research,	April	2014).

57 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental	

Studies,	March	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

38

percent),	 Kazakhstan	 (23 percent),	and	Ukraine	

(17 percent)	 [See	 Appendix	 D].58 In	 some	 of	

these	 countries,	 particularly	 Kazakhstan	 and	

Latvia, the	 ethnic	 Russian	 minorities	 feel	 that	

the	 government	 discriminates	 against	 them	 by

pressuring	 them	 to	 not	 speak	 their	 native	

language	 (Russian)	 and	 that	 they	 are	

underrepresented	 in	 political	 positions	 of	

power.59 By	 discriminating	 against	 the	 ethnic	

Russians,	or	at	best,	making	them	feel	as	if	they	

aren’t	 natives	 and	 part	 of	 that	 country,	 these	

states	 are	 creating	 ripe	 opportunities	 for	

aggressors	 to	 manipulate	 and	 subvert	 these	

marginalized	 ethnic	 populations	 to	 take	 action	

to	 disrupt	 their	 governments	 in	 order	 to	 give	

Russia	an	advantage	in	the	gray	zone.	To	further	

demonstrate	 this	 point,	 a	 recent	 example	 of	

marginalized	 ethnic	 groups	 being	 undermined	

and	 taking	 actions	 against	 the	 government	 are	

Muslims	 in	 Belgium.	 Members	 of	 this	 minority	

group	 were	 subverted	 by	 ISIS	 and	 are	

responsible	 for	 the	 2015	 terror	 attacks	 in	 Paris	

and	Brussels.	

Integrating	ethnic	minorities	takes	away	

significant	 capabilities	 for	 adversaries	

attempting	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 First,	

 58 Central	Intelligence	Agency,	“CIA	World	Fact	

Book,”	February	5,	2016.

59 Michael	Birnbaum,	“In	Kazakhstan,	Fears	of	

Becoming	the	next	Ukraine,”	The	Washington	Post,	

(May	1,	2015).

their	 ability	 to	 mobilize	 civic	 groups	 and	

organizations	 through	 propaganda	 and	

misinformation	is	severely	limited.	Furthermore,	

their	 ability	 to	 achieve	 ambiguity	 by	 posing	 as	

an	 ethnic	 minority	 group	 upset	 with	 the	 hostnation	 government	 is	 severely	 hindered.	 If	 the	

ethnic	 minority	 population	 is	 well	 integrated	

and	 accepted	 in	 society,	 protests	 and	

demonstrations	 against	 the	 host	 nation	 will	 be	

out	 of	 the	 ordinary	 and	 quickly	 arouse	

suspicion.	

In	order	to	decrease	the	vulnerability	of	

these	ethnic	groups	the	US Army	needs	to	work	

with	 the	State	Department	and	host	nations	 to	

encourage	 governments	 to	 integrate	 these	 atrisk	 ethnic	 groups.	 By	 integrating	 them	 into	

society	 and	 respecting	 their	 ties	 to	 their	

countries of	 origin,	 the	 host	 nation	 is	 actually	

ensuring	 that	 the	 ethnic	 minorities	 feel	

accepted	 and	 represented	 in	 society.	 If	 this	 is	

the	case,	 they	will	 feel	a	part	of	society	and	be	

much	 more	 difficult	 to	 subjugate	 and	

manipulate	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 setting	 the	

conditions	 for	an	adversary	to	achieve	strategic	

objectives	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	 Furthermore,	

research	 has	 shown	 that	 increasing	 social	

integration	 decreases	 the	 ability	 of	 minority	

groups	 to	 undertake	 collective	 action.60

 60 Rahsaan	Maxwell,	Ethnic	Minority	Migrants	in	

Britain	and	France:	Integration	Trade	Offs

(Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

39

Consequently,	integration	reduces	the	ability	of	

aggressor	 states	 to	mobilize	minority	groups	 to	

take	 collective	 action	 to	 achieve	 strategic	

objectives	for	the	aggressor.

On	 a	 strategic	 level,	 working	 to	

integrate	at-risk	ethnic	groups	could	involve	the	

State	Department	working	with	the	host	nation	

to	ensure	better	political	 representation	 for	atrisk	 ethnic	 groups	 or	 encouraging	 the	 host	

nation	 to	 be	 more	 inclusive	 of	 ethnic	 and	

religious minorities.	 In	 nations	 in	 which	 the	

military	 has	 a	 stronger	 relationship	 with	 the	

host	 nation,	 the	 Army	 could	 take	 the	 lead	 on	

these	initiatives	with	 the	support	and	advice	of	

the	 State	 Department.	 On	 the	 tactical	 level,	

working	to	integrate	at-risk	ethnic	groups could	

include	 providing	 civil	 affairs	 or	 conventional	

soldiers	 (i.e.	 manpower)	 to	 help	 run	

outreach/integration	 programs	 supported	 by	

the	 host	 nation	 and/or	 working	 with	 the	 State	

Department	 to	 provide	 funding	 for	 local	

programs	which	encourage	better	integration	of	

at-risk	ethnic	and	religious minorities.	

Additionally,	 the	 United	 States	

government	 should	 work	 to	 build	 non-violent

civil	resistance	capabilities.	In	the	gray	zone it	is	

possible	 that	 an	 aggressor	 may	 move	 to	 seize	

territory	 before	 the	United States can	 respond	

or	 has	 the	 political	 will	 to	 respond.	In	 order	 to	

help	 undermine	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 aggressor	 to	

seize	 and	 hold	 this	 terrain,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	

build	capabilities	in	countries	that	may	not	have	

the	military	 force	 to	resist	 the	aggressor	nation	

(for	 example,	 small	 countries	 in	 Eastern	

Europe).	 One	 way	 to	 do	 this	 is	 to	 build	 the	

capacity	to	conduct	non-violent	civil	resistance.	

Non-violent	civil	resistance	is	the	use	of	

non-violent	 actions	 such	 as	 protests,	 sit-ins,	

traffic	jams,	work	stoppages	or	slows,	and	other	

types	of	disturbances	to	disrupt	the	activities	of	

an	 occupier	 and	 achieve	 strategic	 objectives	

without	the	use	of	violence.	Studies	have	shown	

that	non-violent	 resistance	is	 twice	as	effective	

as	violent	resistance	in	achieving	stated	goals.61

Strategic	 goals	 of	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	

can	include	preventing	or	delaying	an	adversary	

from	 achieving	 campaign	 objectives,	

undermining	 an	 adversary’s	 willingness	 or	

ability	 to	 continue	 a	 campaign,	 and	 unifying	

occupied	 territories and	 society.62 Examples	 of	

successful	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	

campaigns	 in	 the	 past	 include	 the	 Danish	

resistance	of	 the	Nazis	in	World	War	II	and	 the	

 61 Erica	Chenoweth	and	Maria	Stephan,	“Why	Civil	

Resistance	Works:	The	Strategic	Logic	of	Nonviolent	

Conflict,”	International	Security 33,	no.	1	(2008):	7–

44.

62 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental	

Studies,	March	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

40

people	 of	 Czechoslovakia’s	 resistance	 of	 the	

Soviets	in	1968.63

In	 order	 to	 build	 capacity	 for	 nonviolent	civil	resistance,	the	US Army	would	have	

to	 work	 with	 the	 State	 Department	 and	 at-risk	

nations	 to	 develop	a	 concept	 for	implementing	

non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 should	an	aggressor	

invade	 them.	 Some	 of	 the	 main	 challenges	 of	

implementing	 a	 plan	 of	 non-violent	 civil	

resistance	 include	 getting	 government	 officials	

and	 citizens	 to	 understand	 that	 an	 armed	

approach	may	 not	 be	effective,	 communicating	

the	plan	prior	to	hostilities	and	then	executing	it	

without	 clear	 channels	 of	 communication,	 and,	

finally,	 convincing	 the	 population	 that	 nonviolence	is	not	a	 sign	of	weakness,	but,	a	more	

effective	 way	 of	 reasserting	 unity	 and	

opposition	to	the	aggressor	state.64

Special	forces	Operational	DetachmentAlpha’s	 (ODAs)	 and	 civil	 affairs	 teams	 are	 in	 a	

unique position	 to	 help	 build	 capacity	 for	 nonviolent	 civil	 resistance,	 as	 one	 of	 their	 core	

missions	 is	 unconventional	 warfare.	 The	 main	

goal	 of	 unconventional	 warfare	 is	 to	 enable	 a	

resistance	 movement	 to	 disrupt	 a	 government	

or	 occupying	 power.	 As	 such,	 special	 forces	

ODAs	 are	 uniquely	 equipped	 and	 trained	 to	

facilitate	non-violent	civil	resistance.	In	order	to	

 63 Ibid.

64 Maciej	Bartkowski,	January	8,	2016.

build	 capacity	 within	 host	 countries,	 special	

forces	ODAs	and	civil	affairs	teams	should	work	

with	 host	 nations	 to	 develop	 plans	 for	 nonviolent	 civil resistance,	 identify	 and	 build	

relationships	 with	 community	 leaders	 and	

organizations	 that	 could	 be	 mobilized	 to	

implement	 a	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 plan,	

and	 train	 host-nation	 military	 forces	 in	

conducting	unconventional	warfare.	This	can	be	

done	 either	 overtly	 or	 covertly	 depending	 on	

the	 specific	 country	 situation	 and	 political	

landscape.	

On	 a	 positive	 note,	 steps	 have	 been	

made	 to	 implement	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	

techniques	 in	 some	 NATO	 countries	 in	 Eastern	

Europe.	 In	 particular,	 Latvia	 introduced	 a	

manual	in	2015	that	highlights	what	institutions	

can	 do	 and	 what	 actions	 civilians	 can	 take	 to	

non-violently	 challenge	 an	 aggressor	 who	

occupies	 their	 territory.65 The	 US Army	 should	

build	 on	 this	 manual	 and	 help	 distribute	 it	 or	

recreate	it	in	states	at risk	of	being	occupied	by	

an	 aggressor.	 This	 will	 help	 build	 the	 capacity	

within	those	countries	to	disrupt	aggressors	and	

buy	 the	 United	 States time	 to	 come	 to	 a	

diplomatic	solution	or	deploy	forces	to	oust	the	

aggressor.	

 65 Maciej	Bartkowski,	“Nonviolent	Civilian	Defense	to	

Counter	Russian	Hybrid	Warfare”	(The	Johns	Hopkins	

University	Center	for	Advanced	Governmental

Studies,	March	2015).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

41

In	addition	to	enabling	countries	to	help	

resist	an	aggressor	should	it	take	action	and	try	

to	 occupy	 territory,	 building	 networks	 capable	

of	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 bears	 other	 fruit.	

First,	 building	 relationships	 between	 the	 host

nation	and	the	network	decreases	the	likelihood	

that	an	aggressor	can	subvert	these	segments	of	

the	 population.	 This	 inherently	 decreases	 the	

capacity	 for	 a	 gray-zone aggressor	 to	 use	

cultural	 norms	 and	 laws	 as	 a	 weapons system.	

For	 example,	 if	 an	 aggressor	 tries	 to	 use	

unarmed	 civilians	 to	 protect its	 gains,	 those	

civilians	are	less	likely	 to	 participate	if	 they	are	

part	 of	 a	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 network.	

Furthermore,	 networks	 developed	 ahead	 of	

hostilities	 for	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 could	

be	 used	 for	 unconventional	 warfare	 against	 an

aggressor	 if	 an	 objective	 cannot	 be	 achieved	

through	non-violent	means.	For	example,	if	time	

is	 of	 the	 essence,	 special	 operations	 forces	

could	 tap	 in	 to	 the	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	

network	to	organize	action	against	an	aggressor	

or	 facilitate	 infiltration	 of	 friendly	 forces	 into	

enemy	territory.	

Building	 capacity	 for	 non-violent	 civil	

resistance	 may	 not	 be	 as	 sexy	 as	 other	

responses	 to	 hybrid	 threats	 in	 the	 gray	 zone.	

However,	it	is	a	relatively	low-cost	initiative	that	

can	 be	 achieved	 with	 minimal	 troop	

commitment	 and	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	more	

successful	 than	 armed	 conflict.	 Furthermore,	 it	

is	 a	 strategy	 that	 buys	 the	 United	 States	 and	

international	 institutions	 time	 to	 formulate	 a	

response	 and/or	 build	 the	 political	 will	 before	

undertaking	operations	to	counter	an	aggressor	

who	has	taken	actions	that	are	incongruent	with	

international	norms	and	laws.

V:	Summary:	The	Future	of	Hybrid	Threats

Hybrid	threats	will	continue	to	dominate	future	

conflict.	 States	 and	 non-state	actors	 have	 seen	

the	 success	 of	 hybrid	 threats	 in	 places	 such	 as	

Ukraine,	 Lebanon,	 and	 the	 South	 China	 Sea.	

Because	of	this	success,	aggressors	will	continue	

to	pursue	these	tactics	to	achieve	their	strategic	

objectives.

In	 the	 gray	 zone,	 hybrid	 tactics	 have	

been	and	will	continue to	be	the	tactic	of	choice	

moving	 forward.	 Since	 1918,	 less	 than	 20

percent of	all	conflicts	have	been	state-on-state	

conventional	 conflicts	 and	 there	 is	 nothing	

hinting	 that	 this	 will	 change	 in	 the	 future.66

Consequently,	the	US Army	must	take	action	to	

counter	 hybrid	 threats	 by	 working	 with	 at-risk	

states	to	integrate	vulnerable	ethnic	minorities,	

building	the	capacity	to	execute	non-violent	civil	

resistance,	 improving	 unconventional	 warfare	

 66 David	Maxwell,	“Congress	Has	Embraced	

Unconventional	Warfare:	Will	the	US	Military	and	

The	Rest	of	the	US	Government?,”	Small	Wars	

Journal,	December	29,	2015.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

42

capabilities,	 expanding	 educational	

opportunities	 for	 officers	 and	 noncommissioned	 officers,	 positioning	US forces	 in	

at-risk	countries	 to	act	as	a	deterrent	 to	hybrid	

actions	 in	 the	 gray	 zone,	 and	 developing	

unconventional	warfare	plans.	

In	 order	 to	 be	 effective	 in	 countering	

hybrid	 threats	in	 the	gray	zone,	 the	Army	must	

do	 three	 things:	 (1)	 adequately	 define	 hybrid	

threats	and	the	gray	zone; (2)	identify	and	adapt	

to	challenges	posed	by	gray-zone hybrid	threats	

due	 to	 laws,	 norms,	 and	 processes; and (3)

improve	 capacity	 to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	

threats.	 These	 three	 lines	 of	 effort	 will	

effectively	posture	the	US Army	to	counter	grayzone hybrid	 threats	 and	 achieve	 its	 strategic	

objectives	 as	 outlined	 by	 US defense	

policymakers.	

The	 Army	 must	 adequately	 define	

hybrid	 threats	 and	 the	 gray	 zone in	 order	 to	

achieve	 shared	 understanding	 amongst	

strategists,	 leaders,	 and	 policymakers.	 When	

doing	 this,	 the	 Army	 should	 consider	 that	 the	

gray	zone is	the	space	between	peace	and	war.	

Furthermore,	the	gray	zone is	not	a	specific	type	

of	 conflict,	 but	 an	 operational	 environment	 in	

which	 the	 United	 States and	 aggressor	 states	

operate.	The	Army	must	recognize	that	there	is	

a	 distinct	 difference	 between	 hybrid	 threats	 in	

the	gray	zone and	open-warfare	hybrid	threats.	

The	 characteristic	 of	 ambiguity	 causes	 this	

dichotomy.	 In	 the	 gray	 zone,	 aggressor	 states	

strive	 to	 remain	 ambiguous and	 achieve	 their	

strategic	 objectives	 without	 adversaries	 or	

international	institutions	being	able	to	attribute	

their	 actions	 to	 the	 aggressor.	 Finally,	 in	

defining	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats,	 the	 Army	

should	 study	 the	 following	 characteristics:	

ambiguity,	 exploitation	 of	 adversary	

weaknesses	 through	 DIME,	 attacks	 in	 five

domains,	 use	 of	 criminal	 organizations	 and	

networks,	and	using	laws	and	cultural	norms	as	

a	weapons	system.	

Gray-zone hybrid	 threats	 take	

advantage	of	the	US government’s	bureaucracy	

and	the	fact	that	multiple	agencies	have	a	say	in	

how	operations	are	conducted	in	the	gray	zone.	

Specifically,	 “New	 Generation	 Warfare,”	

conducted	 by	 Russia, focuses on	 taking	 action	

and	 achieving	 strategic	 objectives	 within	 Phase	

0	of	US military	operations.	To	counter	this,	the	

US Army	must	align	its	doctrine	to	combat	grayzone hybrid	 threats.	 This	 entails	 conducting	 an	

analysis	 of	 gray-zone doctrine	 from	 the	 most	

likely	 gray-zone adversaries	 (Russia,	 China,	 and	

Iran)	 and	 then	 looking	 at	 the	 US phasing	

construct	and	options	for	action	within	Phase	0	

to	 decide	 if	 they	 are	 appropriate	 to	 counter	

gray-zone hybrid	threats.	Secondly,	the	US Army	

needs	to	look	at	systems	and	processes	used	to	

fuse	 intelligence	 and	 create	 shared	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

43

understanding	 across	 multiple	 agencies.	 If	 the	

systems	 and	 processes	 are	 inadequate	 to	

quickly	 and	 efficiently	 share	 information,	 then	

these	issues	need	to	be	addressed.	

Finally,	 the	 US Army	 must	 improve	 its	

capacity	 to	counter	gray-zone hybrid	 threats.	It	

can	 do	 this	 by	 focusing	 on	 identifying	 and	

understanding	the	threat	through	the	rebuilding	

of	 unconventional	 warfare	 capacity	 within	 the	

special	 operations	 forces	 and	 increasing	

broadening	 opportunities	 for	 education	 among	

special operations	 junior	 officers	 and	 noncommissioned	 officers.	 Secondly,	 the	 Army	 can	

reduce	 risk	 by	 pre-positioning	 US forces	 in	 atrisk	 countries,	working	with	 the	Department	 of	

State	and	host	nations	to	integrate	at-risk	ethnic	

populations,	and	working	with the	Department	

of	 State	 and	 host	 nations	 to	 introduce	 and	

expand	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance	 capabilities	

in	at-risk	countries.	

Hybrid	 threats	 and	 the	 gray	 zone are	

issues	that	have	existed	in	warfare	for	centuries.	

However,	 their	 recent	 emergence	 in	 the	

discussion	 of	 conflict	 amongst	 strategists,	

scholars,	 and	 policymakers	 highlights	 their	

renewed	 importance.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	

important	 that	 the	 US Army	 accurately	

describes	 these	 concepts,	 aligns	 doctrine	

against	 them,	 and	 ensures	 it	 is	 properly	

postured	to	counter	the	threats	they	pose.	
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

44

Appendix	A:		Select	Definitions

Combined	 Arms	 Maneuver: The	 application	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 combat	 power	 in	 unified	 action	 to	

defeat	 enemy	 ground	 forces;	 to	 seize,	 occupy,	 and	 defend	 land	 areas;	 and	 to	 achieve	 physical,	

temporal,	and	psychological	advantages	over	the	enemy	to	seize	and	exploit	the	initiative	 (ADP	3-0,

Unified	Land	Operations).

Decisive	 Action: Actions	 conducted	 through	 the	 simultaneous combination	 of	 offensive,	 defensive,	

and	 stability	operations	(or	defense	 support	of	civil	authorities)	appropriate	 to	 the	mission	and	 the	

environment	(ADP	3-0, Unified	Land	Operations).

Irregular	Warfare: A	violent	 struggle	among	 state	and	 non-state	actors	 for	legitimacy	and	influence	

over	the	relevant	population(s)	(JP 1, Doctrine	for	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	United	States).

Operational	 Environment: A	 composite	 of	 the	 conditions,	 circumstances,	 and	 influences	 that	 affect	

the	employment	of	capabilities	and	bear	on	the	decisions	of	the	commander.	Also	called	OE.	(JP	1-02,

Department	of	Defense	Dictionary	of	Military	and	Associated	Terms)

Special	Warfare: The	execution	of	activities	that	involve	a	combination	of	lethal	and	nonlethal	actions	

taken	by	a	specially	trained	and	educated	force	that	has	a	deep	understanding	of	cultures	and	foreign	

language,	 proficiency	 in	 small-unit	 tactics,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 build	 and	 fight	 alongside	 indigenous

combat	 formations	in	permissive,	uncertain,	or	hostile	environment	 (ADRP	1-02:	Terms	and	Military	

Symbols)

Traditional	 Warfare: a	 violent	 struggle	 for	 domination	 between	 nation-states	 or	 coalitions	 and	

alliances	 of	 nation-states	 typically	 involving	 force-on-force	 military	 operations	 in	 which	 adversaries	

employ	 a	 variety	 of	 conventional	 forces	 and	 special	 operations	 forces	 against	 each	 other	 in	 all	

physical	domains	as	well	as	the	information	environment.	(JP 1, Doctrine	for	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	

United	States)
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

45

Unconventional	 Warfare: Activities	 conducted	 to	 enable	 a	 resistance	 movement	 or	 insurgency	 to	

coerce,	 disrupt,	 or	 overthrow	 a	 government	 or	 occupying	 power	 by	 operating	 through	 or	 with	 an	

underground,	 auxiliary,	 and	 guerilla	 force	 in	 a	 denied	 area.	 (JP	 1-02, Department	 of	 Defense	

Dictionary	of	Military	and	Associated	Terms)

Unified	 Land	 Operations: How	 the	 US Army	 seizes,	 retains,	 and	 exploits	 the	 initiative	 to	 gain	 and	

maintain	 a	 position	 of	 relative	 advantage	 in	 sustained	 land	 operations	 through	 simultaneous

offensive,	defensive,	and	stability	operations	in	order	to	prevent	or	deter	conflict,	prevail	in	war,	and	

create	the	conditions	for	favorable	conflict	resolution	(ADP	3-0, Unified	Land	Operations).

Wide	 Area	 Security: The	 application	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 combat	 power	 in	 unified	 action	 to	 protect	

populations,	 forces,	infrastructure,	and	activities;	to	deny	the	enemy	positions	of	advantage;	and	to	

consolidate	gains	in	order	to	retain	the	initiative	(ADP	3-0, Unified	Land	Operations).
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

46

Appendix	B:		US Operational	Phases	from	Joint	Publication	5-0, Operational	Art	and	Design
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

47

Appendix	C:		Ukraine	Crisis	Maps

67

68

 67 “Ukraine	Crisis	in	Maps,”	The	New	York	Times,	February	27,	2014.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

48

Appendix	D:		Ethnic	Russian	Populations	in	Eastern	Europe

69

 68 Ibid.

69 “Ethnic	Russian	Population	in	Eastern	Europe,”	OneEurope,	accessed	February	7,	2016.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

49

Appendix	E:	Methodology &	Acknowledgements

This	analysis	uses	a	mix	of	research,	interviews,	and	working	group	participation.	The	research	consisted	

mainly	 of	 reading	 and	 analyzing	 scholarly	 journal	 and	 newspaper	 articles	 written	 by	 members	 of	

academia,	think	tanks,	and	military	strategists.	Additionally,	the	analysis	uses	extensive	research	on	the	

Russian	 military’s	 use	 of	 hybrid	tactics	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Gerasimov	

Doctrine also	 known	 as	 “New	 Generation	Warfare.”	 Interviews	 for	 the	 project	 focused	 on	 experts	 in	

unconventional	 warfare,	 hybrid	 warfare,	 military	 strategy,	 non-violent	 civil	 resistance,	 and	 Russian	

affairs.	Finally,	 participation	in	 two	working	groups	at	 the	US Army	War	College	played	a	large	 role	in	

thinking	 about	 the	 problem	 and	 developing	 concepts	 and	 findings	 of	 the	 report.	 Participants	 in	 the	

working	 groups	 consisted	 of	 Army	 War	 College	 students,	 academics,	 and	 military	 strategists. When	

evaluating	 possible	 solutions	 for	 the	 US Army	 to	 counter	 gray-zone hybrid	 threats,	 the	 analysis	 only	

looked	 at	 options	 that	 the	 chief	 of	staff	 of	 the	 Army	 could	 reasonably	 implement.	 For	 example,	 his	

ability	 to	 influence	 and	 change	 federal	 law	 or	 command	 relationships	 between	 the	 Department	 of	

Defense	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 State	 is	 relatively	 limited.	 However,	 his	 ability	 to	 improve	 the	

capabilities	of	the	Army	to	conduct	unconventional	warfare	is	significant.	Consequently,	the	solution	set	

was	narrowed	by	these	constraints.	

The	 author would	 like	 to	 thank	 everyone	 who	 helped	 contribute	 to	 this	 project	 and	 without	

whom	it	would	not	have	been	possible.	There	are	countless	people	who	provided	interviews,	reviewed	

drafts,	and/or	shared	discussions	about	Hybrid	Warfare	and	the	Gray	Zone	throughout	the	length	of	this	

project.	Specifically,	he	would	like	to	thank	his Policy	Analysis	Exercise	advisors	at	the	Harvard	Kennedy	

School,	Mr.	William	Tobey,	Dr.	Robert	Piccard,	and	Dr.	Thomas	Patterson,	and	Mr.	Nathan	Freier of	the	

Strategic	Studies	Institute	at	the	Army	War	College.	Additionally,	he would	like	to	thank	the	staff	of	the	

United	States	Military	Academy’s	Modern	War	Institute,	particularly Dr. Lionel	Beehner and	John	Amble,	

for	 their	support	in	bringing	 this project	 to	 fruition.	Finally,	he	would	like	 to	 thank	his wife,	Stacie,	 for	

putting	up	with	all	the	long	hours	needed	to	finish	this	project.
Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats

50

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