I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 9769 

To ensure the security and integrity of United States critical infrastructure 

by establishing an interagency task force and requiring a comprehensive 

report on the targeting of United States critical infrastructure by People’s Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2024 

Ms. LEE of Florida (for herself, Mr. GREEN of Tennessee, and Mr. 

MOOLENAAR) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Homeland Security 

A BILL 

To ensure the security and integrity of United States critical 

infrastructure by establishing an interagency task force 

and requiring a comprehensive report on the targeting 

of United States critical infrastructure by People’s Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strengthening Cyber 

5 Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE AND REPORT ON THE 

2 TARGETING OF UNITED STATES CRITICAL IN3 FRASTRUCTURE BY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

4 CHINA STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ACTORS. 

5 (a) INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.—Not later than 120 

6 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec7 retary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director 

8 of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 

9 (CISA) of the Department of Homeland Security, in con10 sultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the 

11 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the heads of appro12 priate Sector Risk Management Agencies as determined 

13 by the Director of CISA, shall establish a joint interagency 

14 task force (in this section referred to as the ‘‘task force’’) 

15 to facilitate collaboration and coordination among the Sec16 tor Risk Management Agencies assigned a Federal role or 

17 responsibility in National Security Memorandum–22, 

18 issued April 30, 2024 (relating to critical infrastructure 

19 security and resilience), or any successor document, to de20 tect, analyze, and respond to the cybersecurity threat 

21 posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty22 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China by ensuring that 

23 such agencies’ actions are aligned and mutually rein24 forcing. 

25 (b) CHAIRS.— 


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1 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of CISA (or 

2 the Director of CISA’s designee) shall serve as the 

3 chairperson of the task force. 

4 (2) VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of the 

5 Federal Bureau of Investigation (or such Director’s 

6 designee) shall serve as the vice chairperson of the 

7 task force. 

8 (c) COMPOSITION.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall consist 

10 of appropriate representatives of the departments 

11 and agencies specified in subsection (a). 

12 (2) QUALIFICATIONS.—To materially assist in 

13 the activities of the task force, representatives under 

14 paragraph (1) should be subject matter experts who 

15 have familiarity and technical expertise regarding cy16 bersecurity, digital forensics, or threat intelligence 

17 analysis, or in-depth knowledge of the tactics, tech18 niques, and procedures (TTPs) commonly used by 

19 State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty20 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China. 

21 (d) VACANCY.—Any vacancy occurring in the mem22 bership of the task force shall be filled in the same manner 

23 in which the original appointment was made. 

24 (e) ESTABLISHMENT FLEXIBILITY.—To avoid redun25 dancy, the task force may coordinate with any preexisting 


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1 task force, working group, or cross-intelligence effort with2 in the Homeland Security Enterprise or the intelligence 

3 community that has examined or responded to the cyberse4 curity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, in5 cluding Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China. 

6 (f) TASK FORCE REPORTS; BRIEFING.— 

7 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 540 days 

8 after the establishment of the task force, the task 

9 force shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

10 committees the first report containing the initial 

11 findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the 

12 task force. 

13 (2) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than one year 

14 after the date of the submission of the initial report 

15 under paragraph (1) and annually thereafter for five 

16 years, the task force shall submit to the appropriate 

17 congressional committees an annual report con18 taining the findings, conclusions, and recommenda19 tions of the task force. 

20 (3) CONTENTS.—The reports under this sub21 section shall include the following: 

22 (A) An assessment at the lowest classifica23 tion feasible of the sector-specific risks, trends 

24 relating to incidents impacting sectors, and tac25 tics, techniques, and procedures utilized by or 


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1 relating to State-sponsored cyber actors, includ2 ing Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of 

3 China. 

4 (B) An assessment of additional resources 

5 and authorities needed by Federal departments 

6 and agencies to better counter the cybersecurity 

7 threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, 

8 including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Repub9 lic of China. 

10 (C) A classified assessment of the extent of 

11 potential destruction, compromise, or disruption 

12 to United States critical infrastructure by 

13 State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty14 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China in the 

15 event of a major crisis or future conflict be16 tween the People’s Republic of China and the 

17 United States. 

18 (D) A classified assessment of the ability 

19 of the United States to counter the cybersecu20 rity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber ac21 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

22 Republic of China in the event of a major crisis 

23 or future conflict between the People’s Republic 

24 of China and the United States, including with 

25 respect to different cybersecurity measures and 


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1 recommendations that could mitigate such a 

2 threat. 

3 (E) A classified assessment of the ability 

4 of State-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt 

5 Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China to 

6 disrupt operations of the United States Armed 

7 Forces by hindering mobility across critical in8 frastructure such as rail, aviation, and ports, 

9 including how such would impair the ability of 

10 the United States Armed Forces to deploy and 

11 maneuver forces effectively. 

12 (F) A classified assessment of the eco13 nomic and social ramifications of a disruption 

14 to one or multiple United States critical infra15 structure sectors by State-sponsored cyber ac16 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

17 Republic of China in the event of a major crisis 

18 or future conflict between the People’s Republic 

19 of China and the United States. 

20 (G) Such recommendations as the task 

21 force may have for the Homeland Security En22 terprise, the intelligence community, or critical 

23 infrastructure owners and operators to improve 

24 the detection and mitigation of the cybersecu25 rity threat posed by State-sponsored cyber acVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:13 Sep 25, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H9769.IH H9769

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1 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s 

2 Republic of China. 

3 (H) A one-time plan for an awareness 

4 campaign to familiarize critical infrastructure 

5 owners and operators with security resources 

6 and support offered by Federal departments 

7 and agencies to mitigate the cybersecurity 

8 threat posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, 

9 including Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Repub10 lic of China. 

11 (4) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after 

12 the date of the submission of each report under this 

13 subsection, the task force shall provide to the appro14 priate congressional committees a classified briefing 

15 on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations 

16 of the task force. 

17 (5) FORM.—Each report under this subsection 

18 shall be submitted in classified form, consistent with 

19 the protection of intelligence sources and methods, 

20 but may include an unclassified executive summary. 

21 (6) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified executive 

22 summary of each report required under this sub23 section shall be published on a publicly accessible 

24 website of the Department of Homeland Security. 

25 (g) ACCESS TO INFORMATION.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland 

2 Security, the Director of CISA, the Attorney Gen3 eral, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves4 tigation, and the heads of appropriate Sector Risk 

5 Management Agencies, as determined by the Direc6 tor of CISA, shall provide to the task force such in7 formation, documents, analysis, assessments, find8 ings, evaluations, inspections, audits, or reviews re9 lating to efforts to counter the cybersecurity threat 

10 posed by State-sponsored cyber actors, including 

11 Volt Typhoon, of the People’s Republic of China as 

12 the task force considers necessary to carry out this 

13 section. 

14 (2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DIS15 SEMINATION.—Information, documents, analysis, as16 sessments, findings, evaluations, inspections, audits, 

17 and reviews described in this subsection shall be re18 ceived, handled, stored, and disseminated only by 

19 members of the task force consistent with all appli20 cable statutes, regulations, and executive orders. 

21 (3) SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR TASK FORCE

22 MEMBERS.—No member of the task force may be 

23 provided with access to classified information under 

24 this section without the appropriate security clear25 ances. 


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1 (h) TERMINATION.—The task force, and all the au2 thorities of this section, shall terminate on the date that 

3 is 60 days after the final briefing required under sub4 section (h)(4). 

5 (i) EXEMPTION FROM FACA.—Chapter 10 of title 

6 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Fed7 eral Advisory Committee Act’’), shall not apply to the task 

8 force. 

9 (j) EXEMPTION FROM PAPERWORK REDUCTION

10 ACT.—Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (com11 monly known as the ‘‘Paperwork Reduction Act’’), shall 

12 not apply to the task force. 

13 (k) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT15 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com16 mittees’’ means— 

17 (A) the Committee on Homeland Security, 

18 the Committee on Judiciary, and the Select 

19 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep20 resentatives; and 

21 (B) the Committee on Homeland Security 

22 and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 

23 Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intel24 ligence of the Senate. 


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1 (2) ASSETS.—The term ‘‘assets’’ means a per2 son, structure, facility, information, material, equip3 ment, network, or process, whether physical or vir4 tual, that enables an organization’s services, func5 tions, or capabilities. 

6 (3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term 

7 ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given such 

8 term in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107–56 (42 

9 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 

10 (4) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘‘cy11 bersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given such term 

12 in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 

13 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

14 (5) HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE.—The 

15 term ‘‘Homeland Security Enterprise’’ has the 

16 meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

17 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

18 (6) INCIDENT.—The term ‘‘incident’’ has the 

19 meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

20 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

21 (7) INFORMATION SHARING.—The term ‘‘infor22 mation sharing’’ means the bidirectional sharing of 

23 timely and relevant information concerning a cyber24 security threat posed by a State-sponsored cyber 


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1 actor of the People’s Republic of China to United 

2 States critical infrastructure. 

3 (8) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

4 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

5 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security 

6 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 

7 (9) LOCALITY.—The term ‘‘locality’’ means any 

8 local government authority or agency or component 

9 thereof within a State having jurisdiction over mat10 ters at a county, municipal, or other local govern11 ment level. 

12 (10) SECTOR.—The term ‘‘sector’’ means a col13 lection of assets, systems, networks, entities, or or14 ganizations that provide or enable a common func15 tion for national security (including national defense 

16 and continuity of Government), national economic 

17 security, national public health or safety, or any 

18 combination thereof. 

19 (11) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.— 

20 The term ‘‘Sector Risk Management Agency’’ has 

21 the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

22 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

23 (12) STATE.—The term ‘‘State’’ means any 

24 State of the United States, the District of Columbia, 

25 the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Northern 


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1 Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, 

2 Guam, American Samoa, and any other territory or 

3 possession of the United States. 

4 (13) SYSTEMS.—The term ‘‘systems’’ means a 

5 combination of personnel, structures, facilities, infor6 mation, materials, equipment, networks, or proc7 esses, whether physical or virtual, integrated or 

8 interconnected for a specific purpose that enables an 

9 organization’s services, functions, or capabilities. 

10 (14) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United 

11 States’’, when used in a geographic sense, means 

12 any State of the United States. 

13 (15) VOLT TYPHOON.—The term ‘‘Volt Ty14 phoon’’ means the People’s Republic of China State15 sponsored cyber actor described in the Cybersecurity 

16 and Infrastructure Security Agency cybersecurity 

17 advisory entitled ‘‘PRC State-Sponsored Actors 

18 Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. 

19 Critical Infrastructure’’, issued on February 07, 

20 2024, or any successor advisory. 

Æ 


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