OCTOBER 2001

Designing for

Security in the

Nation’s Capital

A REPORT BY THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE OF 

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION
Message from Richard L. Friedman

Chairman, Interagency Task Force

I

n recent years, the proliferation of makeshift security measures has had an alarming effect

on the historic beauty of the Nation's Capital. Even before the 1995 bombing in

Oklahoma City, Washington's streets and public spaces had become an unsightly jumble of

fences and barriers. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the situation has only become

worse with more street closings and more concrete barriers. The National Capital reflects the

spirit of America, but today in Washington we look like a nation in fear. We now have a

condition that must be addressed to protect our values as an open and democratic society.

We urgently need a comprehensive urban design plan that provides adequate security while at

the same time enhances the unique character of the Nation's Capital. Efforts in the recent past

in Washington have been piecemeal attempts to provide security for individual buildings or

small enclaves. The Interagency Task Force has, over the last seven months, looked closely at

the full range of interrelated planning issues and has formulated an approach that can correct

years of neglect of critical urban design and security needs in a comprehensive manner. In

preparing its recommendations the Task Force, which has had broad representation from both

the federal and District governments and private interests, has sought solutions in the

Monumental Core that provide the necessary security; that are compatible with the needs of

the larger city; and that enhance the extraordinary planning tradition that for more than 200

years has made Washington a capital reflective of a great nation. We believe that the

recommendations offered in this report will set the standard for 21st-century security design

and will restore our public realm to one that sends a positive message to millions of people

who live in, work in, and visit Washington each year.

We encourage the President and the Congress to consider these recommendations with all the

urgency appropriate to the current state of security design. In the months ahead, the National

Capital Planning Commission, along with its planning partners who have participated in the

Task Force, looks forward to working with the President, the Congress, appropriate entities,

and the public in developing and implementing the proposed Urban Design and Security Plan.

I want to thank Task Force members and participants who, in developing these

recommendations and in coming to our many meetings with open minds and a common goal,

have demonstrated not only creativity in resolving complex design and organizational issues,

but also courage and optimism in forging a shared vision of Washington's future as the

paradigm of a great nation's capital.
Table of Contents

1 SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSIONS

3 INTRODUCTION

3 Task Force Formation and Participants

4 Scope of Work

5 SECURITY NEEDS OF THE CAPITAL CITY

5 The Call for Security

5 Interim Responses to the Dilemma

7 DESIGN SOLUTIONS FOR THE MONUMENTAL CORE

7 Urban Design Framework

10 General Security Design Solutions

14 Monumental Core Urban Design and Security Plan

17 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE AND THE WHITE HOUSE — 

A CASE STUDY

17 The Closing of Pennsylvania Avenue

18 Impacts on Historic Resources

18 Impacts on Traffic

18 Impacts on the Downtown Economy

19 Prior Proposals for Pennsylvania Avenue

19 Threat and Security Measures Studied

20 Traffic Alternatives Studied

22 Assessment of Traffic Alternatives

24 Decision Making for Pennsylvania Avenue

25 President’s Park Promenade and Park Plan Concepts

26 Tunnel Portal Design Options

27 Circulator System

28 Outstanding Issues and Further Studies

29 NEXT STEPS

29 Public Review of Report

29 Implementation

33 REFERENCES

34 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

35 APPENDIX

CONTENTS
1

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

■ Based on legitimate security concerns, the Task Force recommends that Pennsylvania Avenue

remain closed to normal city traffic at this time. If in the future, there are major positive

changes in the security environment and/or risk detection technology is improved to the

satisfaction of the relevant government agencies, this recommendation should be 

reconsidered by the Task Force.

■ The Task Force recognizes, however, that this closure removes a major east-west artery from

Downtown's transportation network, causing inconvenience and hardship to many DC

businesses, visitors, workers and residents. The Task Force concludes that traffic congestion

can be improved through a variety of transportation system management (TSM) initiatives,

such as traffic signal synchronization, intersection improvements, and more active enforcement of parking regulations. The Task Force recommends immediate implementation of

TSM initiatives in cooperation with city agencies. TSM measures have been successfully

employed in other cities with significant beneficial results and, as stated in our comprehensive

traffic study, can be accomplished within a matter of months.

■ The Task Force recommends the immediate design and construction of a landscaped, civic

space along the Pennsylvania Avenue right-of-way in front of the White House that respects

and enhances the historic setting and views of the White House. The street would be

maintained in a redesign that reflects a clear memory of its historic use and would not preclude

reopening the street, staging inaugural parades, or possible construction of a tunnel. The Task

Force finds that Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House has been unsightly and

unresolved for too long. Therefore, the Task Force recommends that the street right-of-way be

improved immediately; provided, however, that the federal government in allocating funds for

such immediate improvements recognizes that these improvements may need to be modified or

removed to permit construction of a tunnel if one is approved. Further, the federal government should recognize that the decision with respect to a tunnel option will not be negatively

impacted by the cost of the improvements installed on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the

White House prior to a build/no build decision.

■ The Task Force recommends implementation of a Circulator, a new transit service being

planned for the downtown area on routes to be determined. A Circulator would permit a

partial and limited use of Pennsylvania Avenue to allow for controlled and secure vehicular

traffic in front of the White House. A Circulator would also help 

to mitigate the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue by

restoring a cross-town transportation link

and once more offer to both visitors

and residents the experience of riding

in front of the White House without

undue security risks. The formal

entrances to the White House and

other public buildings in the

immediate vicinity would remain

accessible to approved vehicles, and

the Inaugural Parade would be able to

follow its traditional route.
■ The Task Force finds that replacement of lost east-west transportation capacity will be required

to support the city's continued growth and vitality on a long-term basis. In order to address this

need, the Task Force recommends serious consideration of a tunnel within the Pennsylvania

Avenue or the E Street corridors, combined with a Circulator and wider application of TSM

measures. This recommendation will require detailed traffic studies (including TSM impacts),

engineering, environmental, historic preservation, urban planning and cost benefit analyses in

order to conclude the decision-making process. These studies should be undertaken

immediately and concluded within 18 to 24 months.

■ The Task Force recommends the reopening of E Street, which was closed after the September

11, 2001 attack, as soon as possible. In the future, street closures should not be relied upon as

a primary security measure.

■ The Task Force recommends that the National Capital Planning Commission prepare an

integrated Urban Design and Security Plan for Washington's entire Monumental Core to create

a secure and distinguished public realm. The plan, to be prepared in the next six months, will

identify permanent security and streetscape improvements to be developed over the next three

to five years. It will include a "kit of parts" - an array of landscape treatments, street furniture,

bollards, etc. - and recommend design solutions for Pennsylvania Avenue, President's Park, the

Federal Triangle, and the National Mall. The plan should be coordinated with City officials and

with appropriate governmental agencies.

■ The Task Force recommends that the planning and concept design of streetscape, landscape,

and security for Pennsylvania Avenue and the Monumental Core be undertaken by the

National Capital Planning Commission together with one or more nationally recognized

urban designers. Project design and construction would be accomplished by an appropriate

agency, such as the General Services Administration, the National Park Service, or the

District of Columbia government. This unified approach will assure that the work is done

properly, professionally, and not in a piecemeal fashion. It will also ensure this world class

Monumental Core is built so as to be functional, attractive, cost effective and reflective of

democratic values.

■ The Task Force recommends that the federal government fund all costs associated with the

development and ongoing implementation of the Urban Design and Security Plan, TSM

measures (as identified in the traffic study), a Circulator, and tunnel environmental assessments,

design, and engineering. If a tunnel is built, it should be a federal obligation to fund 

its construction.

2

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL
3

INTRODUCTION 

With the spread of terrorism in recent decades,

security has become an inevitable feature of

modern urban life, particularly for those who

live and work in the Nation's Capital. Government is now

obliged to take the appropriate precautions to protect

against terrorist attacks of many sorts. The September 11,

2001 strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon

have only served to underscore the public's recognition

that security has become a fundamental requirement of

American life.

In recent years, the federal government's response to the

threat of terrorism has profoundly affected Washington's

historic urban design and streetscape. Street closures have

disrupted local business activities and increased traffic

congestion. The hastily erected jersey barriers, concrete

planters, and guard huts that ring our buildings and line

our streets mar the beauty of the Nation's Capital. These

installations communicate fear and retrenchment and

undermine the basic premise that underlies a democratic

civil society. Along with the general public and other

federal and local agencies, the National Capital Planning

Commission has become increasingly concerned about the

hodge podge of solutions that have no aesthetic

continuity or urbanistic integrity as each federal agency

responds to its own individual security needs.

Task Force Formation 

and Participants

In October 2000, the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations, acknowledging NCPC's "unique statutory

role in planning for the Nation's Capital, including the

White House," requested the Commission to provide

professional planning advice to Congress, the

Administration, and other federal agencies on the future

use of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.

In response to this Congressional request the Task Force

evaluated both Pennsylvania Avenue and more generally

the impact of federal security measures on the historic

urban design of Washington's Monumental Core.

National Capital Planning Commission members serving

on the Task Force are:

Richard L. Friedman, Task Force Chairman 

Member, National Capital Planning Commission

John V. Cogbill III

Chairman, National Capital Planning Commission

The Honorable Gale A. Norton 

Secretary of the Interior

represented by John Parsons, Associate Regional Director, Lands,

Resources and Planning, National Park Service

The Honorable Stephen A. Perry

Administrator of General Services 

represented by Anthony E. Costa, Assistant Regional

Administrator, and Michael McGill, Senior Project Manager,

Public Buildings Service 

The Honorable Anthony A. Williams

Mayor of the District of Columbia 

represented by Ellen McCarthy, Deputy Director, 

Office of Planning

The Honorable Linda W. Cropp

Chairman of the District of Columbia Council

represented by Robert Miller, 

Legislative Counsel to the Chairman 

The Task Force solicited and carefully considered the widest

possible range of views on security and design matters.

Heads of other federal agencies or their representatives

offered invaluable input as participating, nonvoting

members of the Task Force. This report reflects the views

of the Task Force, but does not necessarily speak to the

opinion of all who participated in this process. Participating

agencies include the Department of Justice, the U.S. Secret

Service, the Department of Transportation, the Commission

of Fine Arts, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Advisory

Council on Historic Preservation. NCPC also engaged the

services of nationally recognized security, transportation,

and urban design consultants.

The hastily erected jersey barriers,

concrete planters, and guard huts

that ring our buildings and line our

streets mar the beauty of the

Nation's Capital.
Scope of Work

The Task Force began its work with an initial focus on

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. It

quickly became apparent, however, that the future of the

Avenue was only one part of a much larger issue: the

urban design impacts of security measures throughout

the Monumental Core. Successful solutions for

Pennsylvania Avenue could only be reached in the

context of a comprehensive design framework for the

entire Core. Task Force Members determined that their

objective was to identify urban design solutions that

would set a benchmark for security design throughout

the federal city.

The Task Force first convened on March 23, 2001 and has

met 13 times to examine a wide range of security and

design issues. Rand Corporation representatives presented

their assessment of security measures in Washington and

technical experts led the Task Force through tutorials on

blast dynamics, state-of-the-art technologies, and buildinghardening techniques. The Task Force's urban design

consultants evaluated the visual impact of existing and

alternative security installations in the city's Monumental

Core. The Task Force examined security design studies for

the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center,

the Justice Department Buildings, and the U.S. Capitol and

evaluated new design prototypes for security installations.

Federal security agency officials briefed the Task Force on

potential threats to the White House. Numerous

individuals and organizations, including representatives of

the National Park Service and the Federal City Council,

shared with the Task Force their ideas for the future of

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.

Alternatives for both reopening the Avenue and for its

continued interim and long-term closure were developed

and analyzed. Transportation consultants provided

detailed analyses of the impacts of all alternatives. A

noted White House historian, representatives of the

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the

Commission of Fine Arts presented their views on the

potential effects these alternatives would have on the

White House and other historic properties.

This report summarizes the findings of the Task Force

regarding both Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White

House and the design of security measures throughout the

Monumental Core. Based on these findings, the Task

Force outlines recommendations for an Urban Design and

Security Plan that will promote the safety of those who

live in, work in, and visit the Nation's Capital while

preserving the openness and historic design that have

made Washington an expression of American ideals and

one of the world's most admired capital cities.

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Delta barrier at the vehicular

entrance to the National Archives

Increasing security as a result of the

September 11th attacks.

4
SECURITY NEEDS OF

THE CAPITAL CITY

The Call for Security

The catastrophic September 11 attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon are the most recent

in a series of events of the past decade that have

focused public attention on a growing national problem. A

1993 truck bomb in the garage at the World Trade Center;

a 1994 single engine airplane crash into the south side of

the White House; and a 1995 truck bomb at the Alfred P.

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City are among the

incidents that prompted the General Services

Administration, the State Department, the Department of

Defense, the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and other

federal law enforcement agencies to work together and

with independent researchers to develop security measures

in the Nation's Capital.

Terrorist activity can take many forms: personal attacks,

truck and car bombs, air assaults, electronic sabotage, and

biological and chemical weapons. Clearly, the physical

perimeter security measures affecting streetscapes in the

Nation's Capital as proposed in this report address only

some of these threats. The Task Force recognizes the

need for design solutions to establish stand-off zones

around federal buildings in Washington's Monumental

Core. These zones would provide the space for both

security barriers designed to protect against vehicle threats

and also for check points to screen individuals, property,

and vehicles.

Interim Responses 

to the Dilemma

Many temporary or interim security measures installed

throughout the Monumental Core have or threaten to

become, permanent fixtures in the city's landscape.

Temporary security surrounds national monuments and

public buildings and lines major avenues. Barriers and

planters have been placed in response to heightened

security requirements with little regard for the important

streetscapes, landscapes, and other urban design factors

unique to their location in the Core. For the most part,

elements more suitable for a highway construction site

have been used to secure sensitive historic areas of the

Nation's Capital.

No location better illustrates the problem than the

Washington Monument. Recently renovated to much

acclaim, the Washington Monument is currently

surrounded by a ring of concrete jersey barriers, and a

visitor screening trailer has been placed at the entrance to

the monument. These security measures severely

compromise the appearance of one of our Nation's most

important landmarks. The jersey barriers have been in

place for half a decade with no permanent solution in

sight, illuminating the difficulty of providing security in

such a prominent location.

Within the historic Federal Triangle, security elements such

as jersey barriers, concrete planters, and delta barriers –

operable barriers that are raised and lowered to permit

entry by authorized vehicles – have been used and parking

lanes have been restricted or eliminated to further enhance

security. Although the design of the Ronald Reagan

Building incorporated thoughtfully planned security

elements such as guard booths and planting beds,

temporary barriers and planters have been placed around

the site in response to heightened security requirements.

GSA has recently proposed streetscape designs for this

precinct in an attempt to ensure an attractive and secure

permanent environment.

5

Jersey barriers line

23th Street, adjacent to

the Harry S Truman

Building (Department

of State).

Security measures at the

Washington Monument include

a ring of jersey barriers and a

temporary visitor screening

facility.
6

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

The majestic vista envisioned by L'Enfant, from the Capitol

to the White House, currently culminates in a tangle of

jersey barriers, highway cones, and security vans south of

the Department of Treasury Building. This disparate set of

solutions compromises the unity achieved through the

Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation's

streetscape plan, developed over 25 years ago.

Existing Policies and Guidelines

GSA Security Criteria

GSA's 1997 report titled "Physical Security Criteria and

Standards," forms the basis of the current federal

policies and guidelines for the assessment of security

risks. The report developed classifications for new

construction and major alterations of federal buildings

and also assigns one of five "protection levels" based on

factors that include symbolic importance, the critical

nature of operations, and consequences of an attack.

This approach, in conjunction with a detailed risk

assessment, identifies the level of appropriate protective

measures to be applied to any federal facility. The levels

range from A, which ascribes a "Low Level of

Protection Needed"– generally used when a building is

of low consequence and has no known threat – through

Level E, which is defined as "Extreme Level of

Protection Needed." Most of the buildings in the

Monumental Core are classified as Level C or D.

The Threat

The specific threat used as the design parameter for GSA

protection Levels C and D is either a bomb-laden

moving vehicle or a stationary (parked) bomb-laden

vehicle with a time delay or remote control detonation

device. GSA suggests criteria for moving and stationary

exterior vehicle bombs in the form of various stand-off

distances and the design of site perimeter barriers as

effective deterrents. Specific criteria are included in

GSA's report.

For example, requirements specified for Level D, such as a

national headquarters building, include:

■ A 100-foot setback from all parking or the use of

compensating design measures.

■ Elimination of parking and incorporation of the curb

and parking lanes as a part of the stand-off distance

where the 100-foot stand-off distance cannot be met.

■ Perimeter barriers that stop a 12,000 lb. vehicle

traveling at 50 mph.

■ Vehicle arresting devices to protect garage and 

service areas.

GSA has developed further specifications for security

zones around federal buildings falling within these

protection levels. These zones correspond to building and

site relationships and are discussed within the "General

Security Design Solutions" section of this report.

Retractable bollards at the main entrance

to the Harry S Truman Building

(Department of State)

Following the September 11 attacks,

New Jersey Avenue was closed in front

of the Longworth and CannonHouse

Office Buildings.
7

DESIGN

SOLUTIONS FOR THE

MONUMENTAL CORE

Urban Design Framework

Planning and Design for Security

S

ecurity measures help to protect citizens, elected

officials, and the environments that honor and house

our democracy, but they should neither dominate

nor mar the appearance of the Nation's Capital – a city

admired around the world for the openness and

accessibility symbolized in its architecture. Indeed, the

underlying premise of the following guidelines is that

security measures should enhance the public environment

of the city. They may do so when conceived with

sensitivity and imagination, and implemented with good

urban design as one of their major objectives.

This is a matter of design intent and civic ambition. A

bench is expected to be comfortable to sit on, can be

quite attractive, and can be engineered to withstand the

force of a moving vehicle. A jersey barrier achieves the

latter, but makes for a poor place to sit and is hardly

admired for its beauty. Of course, a concrete barrier is less

expensive than a beautifully designed bench that is also

hardened to act as a security barrier. To incorporate design

quality into security planning will necessitate additional

funding, but will ultimately be justified on the basis of

achieving a more hospitable and pleasing streetscape.

Our Nation's Capital not only requires adequate security

but also deserves more robust and beautiful streetscapes.

Why not combine these two worthy agendas to produce

both a secure and a more distinguished public realm?

Special Streets and Contextual Zones

The Task Force recommends a framework of clearly

defined special streets and contextual zones in which

customized security design can be applied. Streets are the

great linear connectors of our cities, the creators of

important addresses, and in themselves can be active and

beautifully designed spaces. Contextual zones may be

understood as neighborhoods or urban communities of

similar buildings, blocks, and streets. These zones are

familiar to anyone who lives and works in the city; they

follow traditional boundaries and major precincts. The

identification of special streets and contextual zones

ensures a consistent and thoughtful design for the public

realm, yet avoids a one-size-fits-all approach.

“America’s Main Street” – Pennsylvania Avenue from

the White House to the Capitol

Creative combinations of lighting, trees, and hospitable

amenities such as benches can produce secure streetscapes

worthy of the Capital.
8

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Special Streets

Pennsylvania Avenue, one of L'Enfant's great symbolic streets radiating

from the U.S. Capitol, is America's pre-eminent public way. It is the 

address of the President and the route of the inaugural parade. The

breadth and scale of the Avenue provide continuity to the varying array 

of uses, buildings, and architectural styles that are represented along this

special street, but recent responses to the need for heightened security 

have resulted in a variety of styles of planters, bollards, streetlights, and

barriers. The success of the original Pennsylvania Avenue Development

Corporation (PADC) streetscape plan in unifying the Avenue has been

undermined by the ad hoc implementation of security measures.

The 25-year-old streetscape plan is in need of updating to include 

these security requirements.

Symmetrically located across the Mall, Maryland Avenue extends southwest from the Capitol through the Southwest Federal

Center toward the Jefferson Memorial. Unlike Pennsylvania Avenue, Maryland Avenue does not have a unified and consistent

streetscape. Mid-century modern architecture and varying setbacks from the sidewalk characterize current development along

Maryland Avenue. As with Pennsylvania Avenue, interim security elements, such as planters, barriers, and a disparate collection

of other structures, have been placed along Maryland Avenue to protect federal office buildings. Large setbacks and generous

landscaping require a different approach than that applicable to Pennsylvania Avenue and offer the opportunity to consider a

cohesive design for this special street.

Contextual Zones

The identification of six distinct contextual zones allows for the formation of overall design guidelines that are

responsive to these distinct areas of the District. While similar elements may be applied to each zone, their frequency,

scale, and detail may change to reflect the unique urban design and architectural character of the zone.

Special Streets

PRESIDENT’S PARK

CAPITOL HILL

THE MALL

FEDERAL TRIANGLE

PENNSYLVANIA AVE

CONSTITUTION AVE

INDEPENDENCE AVE

SW FEDERAL CENTER

DOWNTOWN

WEST END

Contextual Zones in the Monumental Core

MARYLAND AVE
9

President's Park

President's Park, a historic name in use more than two

hundred years ago, is the precinct and grounds comprising

the White House, the Eisenhower Executive Office

Building, the Department of the Treasury, Lafayette Park,

the Ellipse, Sherman Park, and the First Division

Monument. The zone is well defined and historically

distinct. Design guidelines incorporated in the

"Comprehensive Design Plan for the White House and

President's Park" will guide streetscape and security design

for this area. Many existing significant security

improvements are consistent with the Design Plan;

however, interim security measures have compromised the

character and setting of President's Park.

Capitol Hill

The Hill consists of the U.S. Capitol

Building, the House and Senate

office buildings, the U.S. Supreme

Court Building, and the Library of

Congress buildings. The Capitol is a

unique building with landscaping that

is an extension of Olmstead's 19th-century design of the

Capitol grounds. The historic character of this zone has

been well documented and design guidelines are well

respected. Security elements appropriate for President's

Park could also be used in this zone.

The Mall

The Mall zone consists of the green panels and National

Park Service (NPS) parkland that comprise the National

Mall and includes the major monuments and memorials

contained within. The landscapes included in this zone vary

in character from the rigid axes and neo-classical geometry

of the mall to the picturesque setting of the Tidal Basin

and West Potomac Park. The security requirements

associated with these monuments and memorials are high

and the special character of this zone must be considered.

Elements appropriate to more urban zones are out of place

in this context.

Federal Triangle

The Federal Triangle is a fully built-out urban precinct of

federal office buildings that followed the development of

the McMillan Plan. With the exception of the turn-of-thecentury Old Post Office building and the recently

constructed Ronald Reagan Building, all of the buildings

within this zone are of the same time period and

architecture. These buildings uniformly hold the street wall

and are set back only to create a unique plaza or pedestrian

way. Planted areas and building plinths are ever present. A

wide variety of barriers, planters, bollards, and guardhouses

are currently in place, but the uniform character of this

precinct calls for coherent and equally uniform streetscape

guidelines to accommodate a variety of security needs.

Streetscape designs for this precinct must also be

compatible with the treatment of Pennsylvania Avenue

between 3rd and 15th Streets.

Southwest Federal Center 

and the “West End”

The Southwest Federal

Center is located on the

south side of the Mall

and is roughly bounded

by Independence Avenue

and the Southwest

Freeway. The initial

development of this area

reflects the McMillan

Plan and the architecture

of the Federal Triangle. However, the majority of the

buildings are better characterized as mid to late 20thcentury modern architecture. Large setbacks from the

sidewalk are typical as are large landscaped plazas.

Security elements and streetscape design have the

potential to unify the appearance of this district.

A federal office enclave also exists in an area west of

President's Park to approximately 23rd Street, NW, from

Constitution Avenue north to the E Street Expressway.

This area contains large federal headquarters buildings,

including the Department of State, and other large

institutional and association headquarters. Although

somewhat disjointed, this zone contains many buildings of

distinction and affords an opportunity for the

establishment of a unified character and identity through

the design of a consistent streetscape.

Downtown

The downtown area is roughly bounded by Pennsylvania

Avenue on the south, Massachusetts Avenue on the north,

and runs from approximately 3rd Street, NW to 25th

Street, NW. It is characterized by a consistent grid block

structure, radiating avenues, a mix of commercial office

and retail uses and a variety of architectural styles.

The design of security measures within this zone, must

carefully consider the varying uses, business interests,

pedestrian circulation,

and traffic and parking

requirements that 

exist throughout this

employment area to avoid

any negative impacts.
General Security 

Design Solutions

Building Security Zones

The "Urban Design Guidelines for Physical Perimeter

Entrance Security: An Overlay to the Master Plan for the

Federal Triangle," prepared by GSA, presented the

concept of security zones. Each of these zones, ranging

from the building's interior to the public streets around

the building, have different security risks and responses.

These can be translated into different architectural,

landscape, and streetscape responses to meet these

security needs.

GSA's security zones include:

■ Zone 1: Building Interior

■ Zone 2: Building Perimeter

■ Zone 3: Building Yard

■ Zone 4: Sidewalk

■ Zone 5: Curb or Parking Lane

■ Zone 6: Street

Zones 1 and 2 are related exclusively to the architecture of

the building, and are not the subject of these guidelines

for physical perimeter security. Zone 6 is not subject to

these guidelines, except insofar as a decision in the case of

Pennsylvania Avenue near the White House must be made –

whether to open the street or to keep it closed.

Zones 3, 4, and 5 are related to both the public right-ofway and the surrounding design context of the building.

Design guidelines are recommended for these zones.

Zone Prototypes

Extending GSA’s concept of security zones, the Task

Force developed prototypes for the exterior zones of

buildings.

Building Yard (Zone 3)

The building yard is that portion of the site located

between the building wall or façade and the sidewalk or

public right-of-way. The following are recommended

guidelines for security measures to be implemented in the

building yard security zone:

■ Design security measures, such as gatehouses and

other entry facilities, to relate primarily to the design of

the building.

■ Design other security measures to relate to the

character of the surrounding area.

■ Do not impede pedestrian access to building entries or

pedestrian circulation on adjacent sidewalks.

■ Use raised planter or building terrace as vehicular

barrier, and integrate landscaping and seating.

■ Use bollards, light standards, planters, or other

furnishings to secure gaps and limit vehicular access

through pedestrian access points.

■ Plant trees in the yard adjacent to the sidewalk to

create a double row of trees flanking the sidewalk.

■ Incorporate furnishings and amenities into the

building yard.

10

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

ZONE 3

Building Yard

ZONE 5

Parking Lane

ZONE 2

Building Perimeter

ZONE 4

Sidewalk

ZONE 6

Street

ZONE 1

Building Interior
11

Sidewalk (Zone 4)

The sidewalk zone is located between the building yard

and the curb or parking lane. The following are

recommended guidelines for security measures to be

implemented in this zone:

■ Design security measures to relate primarily to the

character of the adjacent special street or 

contextual zone.

■ Incorporate security design within the design of

street lighting, planters, bollards, streetscape amenities

(seating, trash receptacles, flagpoles, kiosks, signage,

drinking fountains, water features, etc.) and

landscaping.

■ Do not impede pedestrian access to entries or

pedestrian circulation on the sidewalk.

■ Integrate planters and bollards into the overall

streetscape design.

Curb Lane (Zone 5)

The curb or parking lane is that portion of the street

adjacent to the curb. The following are recommended

guidelines for security measures to be implemented in the

curb or parking lane security zone:

■ Eliminate parking in this lane where warranted by the

security risk assessment.

■ Eliminate curbside loading zones and service access.

■ Incorporate the curbside lane into a widened 

sidewalk zone.

■ Reserve sections of the curb lane for exclusive agency

use where such use can be controlled and monitored.

A sidewalk that incorporates security

measures should not look like a

sidewalk to which security has been

added. Instead, security measures

should be incorporated into the overall

design of the streetscape.

Removed

Parking Lane

Curbed planter with

railing in place of

parking lane

Widened sidewalk

incorporating

trees, planters, and

other streetscape

elements.

ZONE 3

Building Yard

Raised building plinth or planter with second row

of trees can provide building security.

ZONE 4

Sidewalk

ZONE 5

Curb Lane
A Kit of Parts for Urban Design

The Zone Prototypes can guide the development of a kit

of parts comprised of a variety of site design and security

elements. Designers and planners will be able to select

elements from this kit of parts to develop a design

appropriate to the conceptual setting and security needs of

a specific building or site. A kit of parts may include

design elements for:

■ Gatehouses

■ Terraces, walls, and raised planting beds

■ Trees and planters

■ Walls and fencing

■ Posts and bollards

■ Other site furnishings and amenities

Supporting documentation on the kit of parts is available

from NCPC.

Gatehouses

Gatehouses are ancillary structures to buildings that 

have vehicular access for pick-up, drop-off, service,

or parking.

Walls, Terraces, 

and Raised Planting Beds

One critical measure of security is stand-off distance.

To achieve adequate stand-off distance, the method has

been to ring a site or building with jersey barriers. A wall

to prevent vehicles from approaching a building can be

established at the property line on the building side of the

sidewalk, typically in the public right-of-way.

Other stand-off devices include terraces and planting

beds. A terrace is a flat or stepped area, usually paved, that

typically surrounds a building. A raised planting bed is

similar to a terrace, and is generally an extension of the

elevation of the first floor of the building into the

surrounding site.

Walls, terraces, and raised planting beds should be

designed to integrate into the building such that they

appear to be an extension of the building itself.

12

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

A gatehouse in President’s Park that responds to the

urban context and surrounding architecture.

Walls and fences can be simple

or ornate and appropriate to

their context.

The gatehouse at the Reagan Building is

integrated into the site with planter walls

that tie to the building.

The planter wall at the

Department of Interior

Annex is low enough that it

does not present a visual

barrier and high enough to

act as a vehicular barrier.
13

Trees and Planters

Trees and planters can be used to enhance and beautify a

site and streetscape and to create a security barrier. Trees

can also be used as security elements, assuming the tree is

of sufficient size to withstand the impact of the identified

vehicle threat. Most of the street trees on Pennsylvania

Avenue have matured to the point where they contribute

to the security of the federal buildings on the Avenue.

Trees and planters should be designed so they appear

permanent and coordinated to form a unified streetscape.

Walls and Fencing 

A variety of wall and fencing types can be employed as

security elements. Commonly found in streetscapes as a

complement to the architecture of adjacent buildings,

small knee walls are often located in conjunction with

planters and gardens. The design of such walls can vary

greatly from solid stone or masonry to open iron or steel

designs. They can be simple or ornate. Decorative fencing

and ironwork, prevalent throughout Washington's historic

districts, can be applied in new contexts and strengthened

to meet security requirements.

Posts and Bollards 

Posts and bollards are the most ubiquitous security

elements found in the Nation's Capital as well as in all

major cities of the world. They can vary greatly in design

and function. Curbside bollards are an effective means of

keeping vehicles away from the building walls. They provide

ease of pedestrian circulation, meet accessibility

requirements, and can significantly enhance the character of

the streetscape. The design of bollards, fences, lightposts,

and other streetscape and landscape elements should form

an urban ensemble that helps create a sense of unity and

character appropriate to the Nation's Capital.

Site Furnishings and Amenities

Many other items typically found in the urban streetscape

can be "hardened" to act as security measures. Elements

such as news kiosks, trashcans, benches, and water

fountains can be beautifully designed, well placed, and

secure. While they do not look like security devices, they

can function as such. Their daily character would disguise

their potential protective role. This urban ensemble of

streetscape elements, while flexible enough to reflect the

distinct character of identified zones, can also provide a

component of continuity within the public realm.

Bollards should vary

in design and

function.

Fences and walls can be

appropriate to their

context and enhance the

streetscape environment.

Beautifully designed bollards currently

exist within the Monumental Core.Those

identified in the "Design Guidelines for

the White House and President's Park"

provide protection and are appropriate to

their surroundings.
14

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Urban Design and Security Plan

Building on the current planning and design work prepared for the Task Force, NCPC, along with its

partners, will prepare a plan for the design of perimeter security and streetscape improvements for

special streets (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Constitution, and Independence Avenues) and contextual zones

(President's Park, Capitol Hill, the Mall, Federal Triangle, Southwest Federal Center, and the West End)

identified in the Urban Design Framework.

The following outlines the work plan for the Urban Design and Security Plan:

■ Prepare and approve a memorandum of understanding for planning, design, and implementation.

■ Identify ownership and jurisdictions of special streets and contextual zones.

■ Document architectural and urban design features of study areas.

■ Complete designs for streetscape/security "kit-of-parts."

■ Prepare concept plans for special street and contextual zone study areas:

■ Pennsylvania Avenue and Federal Triangle

■ National Mall/Constitution and Independence Avenues

■ Southwest Federal Center and Maryland Avenue

■ West End and Downtown

■ Identify specific improvement projects within each study area.

■ Prepare concept design for Phase I priority projects to include:

1. Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House (15th to 17th Streets)

2. Washington Monument (National Mall)

3. Pennsylvania Avenue Streetscape (3rd to 15th Streets)

4. Department of Justice (Federal Triangle)

■ Prepare cost estimates and budgets for improvement projects within the Monumental Core.

Phase I

The Task Force recommends that NCPC, together with one or more nationally recognized urban

designers, undertake the planning and concept design of streetscape, landscape, and security for

Pennsylvania Avenue and the Monumental Core. Although federal agencies have identified numerous

projects in need of physical perimeter security improvements, four have been judged to be high priority,

for these projects will set the standard in quality and execution for the design and construction of all

subsequent projects. Phase I should be ready to move toward completion with willing agencies and

active clients currently investigating designs for streetscape improvements.

Monumental Core Urban Design and Security Plan 

The Task Force recommends that the National Capital Planning Commission prepare an integrated Urban Design and

Security Plan for Washington's Monumental Core within the next six months. The plan will identify permanent security and

streetscape improvements and recommend design solutions for Pennsylvania Avenue, President's Park, the Federal Triangle,

and the National Mall.
15

Pennsylvania Avenue 

in front of the White House

This project is described in detail in subsequent sections

of this report.

Washington Monument

The Washington Monument is one of the nation’s most

prominent and visible symbols and one of Washington's

most visited attractions. The Monument has also been the

site of numerous threatening incidents, and could be the

target of a future terrorist attack. Temporary security at the

Washington Monument includes a ring of jersey barriers

and a temporary visitors screening facility that is attached to

the monument entrance.

One possible security design approach is to locate the

perimeter at the minimum stand-off distance,

approximately 200 feet, from the base of the monument.

This would place the perimeter within the open lawn area

of the Mall and would result in a ring of security

approximately 1,300 linear feet in length. The security

barrier could be established with a ring of bollards colocated with a circular walkway surrounding the

monument. Furnishing the walkway with benches and

other amenities typically associated with pedestrian

circulation could result in an attractive and functional

addition to the Mall.

Another approach is to establish a security barrier at the

perimeter of the site, along 15th Street, Constitution

Avenue, 17th Street, and Independence Avenue. Such a

barrier would be less visible from the monument, but it

could result in a greater overall impact and visibility due

to its length. This solution could employ the use of the

President's Park bollard in a manner similar to its use in

Lafayette Park – mounted on a low granite curb and

retained by a very deep and robust structural foundation

for impact resistance.

Temporary security at the Washington Monument

includes a ring of jersey barriers for required stand-off

distance and a temporary visitor screening facility that

is attached to the monument entrance.
Pennsylvania Avenue Between 

3rd and 15th Streets

Security needs and pedestrian conditions along the length

of Pennsylvania Avenue from the Capitol to the White

House vary greatly. While some locations require

maximum security, others require none; while some

buildings are set back with wide sidewalks, others are not.

The key to a redesign or updating of the Pennsylvania

Avenue streetscape is to provide consistency within this

variation while building upon the previous Pennsylvania

Avenue Development Plan. A thorough inventory of

existing streetscape elements will facilitate the creation of

a plan that is able to improve upon this previous effort.

All elements in place will be assessed for their application

to security needs and, where possible, incorporated into

the new streetscape design.

Bollards, posts, site furnishings, and amenities should

predominate on this special street as differentiated from the

expansive planter beds or raised planting beds employed on

the north-south streets. Security elements and streetscape

improvements should be coordinated along the length of

the Avenue and varied accordingly to provide a consistent

and graceful appearance, regardless of changing security

needs. Here, the creation of an appropriate and dignified

public realm is paramount.

Federal Triangle

Representatives from the Department of Justice have

expressed a desire that their facility be included as a Phase

I project. The design of plans for the Department of

Justice Building, a Federal Triangle Project, are

substantially advanced. Both the Department of Justice

and Pennsylvania Avenue (3rd to 15th Streets) projects

would share design prototypes and application of the kit

of parts identified earlier in this report.

Streetscape elements deployed in the Federal Triangle

should respond both to the existing strong architectural

character and the successful design plans that have guided

development within this zone. Site furnishings and

security elements should be designed to respond to the

predominant neoclassical style of this area.

16

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Security measures and streetscape elements along Pennsylvania

Avenue are proposed to be composed of the most formal elements

from the contextual kit of parts.

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House is closed to all but

security and emergency vehicles.
17

PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE

AND THE WHITE HOUSE—

A CASE STUDY

The Urban Design and Security Plan proposed by

the Task Force is a comprehensive design program

for security measures throughout Washington’s

Monumental Core; Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the

White House is one part of that larger plan. However,

because this precinct is arguably the most historic and

symbolically sensitive in the country, and because its

closure has had wide-ranging effects, the Task Force

examined the future use of the Avenue in considerable

detail. In its examination, the Task Force studied the

current and future security needs of the White House

and the impacts of the closure on the symbolism and

historic resources of Pennsylvania Avenue. It reviewed

past proposals for either reopening or permanently

closing the street, and it carefully evaluated a number of

traffic alternatives along Pennsylvania Avenue. Finally,

the Task Force evaluated options for a new design for

President’s Park.

The Closing of

Pennsylvania Avenue

On September 12, 1994 a single engine private airplane

crossed the South Lawn of the White House and crashed

into the south side of the executive mansion. Following

this and other incidents, the Department of the Treasury

initiated the White House Security Review to conduct a

comprehensive review of the security measures at the

White House complex.

The May 1995 “Public Report of the White House

Security Review” states, “After careful consideration of

the information, the Review is not able to identify any

alternative to prohibiting vehicular traffic on Pennsylvania

Avenue that would ensure the protection of the President

and others in the White House complex from explosive

devices carried by vehicles near the perimeter.” On May

19, 1995, the Secretary of the Treasury issued an Order

to the Director of the Secret Service to implement the

recommendations of the Security Review and, on May

20, 1995, the Director of the Secret Service, pursuant

to the Order, closed Pennsylvania Avenue in front of

the White House to vehicular traffic.

The primary security objective was to establish

appropriate security measures for the protection of the

President and the White House complex, addressing

reasonable threat scenarios within the context of an

acceptable level of risk. It is widely understood that it is

not possible to protect the President or the White House

from all possible threats.

Temporary security measures first implemented on

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House 

shut down the Avenue to vehicular traffic by blocking

Pennsylvania Avenue at 15th and 17th streets with

trucks and other vehicles. Once closed, subsequent

temporary measures, consisting of guardhouses,

operable delta barriers, and precast concrete planters 

in a wide variety of sizes, colors, styles, and

landscaping, were implemented and are increasingly

permanent in appearance.

These interim security measures ensure the required

stand-off distance from the White House and establish

checkpoints for controlling access for authorized vehicles

onto Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.

A positive consequence of these actions is the creation

of a safe and convenient pedestrian zone for the large

numbers of tourists that gather and view the north side

of the White House.

Since 1995, the Secret Service and other law enforcement

agencies have continued research and analysis to identify

possible solutions to the security requirements but, to date,

they have found no alternative to the street closing.

Temporary guardhouses, delta barriers, and concrete planters

on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.
18

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Impacts on 

Historic Resources

President’s Park has evolved from L’Enfant’s placement of

the White House and grounds at the juncture of New York

and Pennsylvania Avenues and at the opposite end of

Pennsylvania Avenue from the U.S. Capitol. Thomas

Jefferson allowed some of the land, now known as

Lafayette Park, to be used by the public for its enjoyment,

and a public way was created in front of the White House.

The symbolic significance of the open, radiating streets

projecting from the front door of the White House is

discernible today. The relationship of the White House and

its grounds to the city plan for the capital continues to hold

symbolic and functional significance. The public use of

Pennsylvania Avenue and E Street through President’s Park

has contributed to its identity as a public place. These

streets connect the White House to the city at large.

Proposals for changes within President’s Park must carefully

consider the symbolic setting of the White House within its

precinct and within the city. The Guiding Principles of the

Comprehensive Design Plan for The White House and

President’s Park are the guidelines for assessing change

within this precinct. The setting of the White House and its

related buildings must be retained as an understandable,

cohesive ensemble.

Impacts on Traffic 

Traffic movements in the city of Washington are

accommodated on the street system that was designed by

Pierre L’Enfant in 1791. It is a grid system with the

addition of diagonal avenues.

Grid systems allow traffic to move around the city along

multiple combinations of north-south and east-west streets,

and drivers tend to choose routes that provide the least

amount of delay. When a segment of the roadway grid

system is removed, drivers will select alternate routes that

reduce their delay. When Pennsylvania Avenue was closed

to through traffic, 13 bus lines were rerouted and 25,000-

30,000 vehicles were forced onto adjacent streets,

prompting the District of Columbia to quickly implement

system modifications that would better accommodate the

traffic demand. This included converting H and I Streets to

one-way streets, thereby increasing their capacity.

In light of very limited traffic data for the pre-closure

roadway system, there has been much debate concerning

the impacts on traffic movement that resulted from the

closure of Pennsylvania Avenue. The Task Force

understood that, while it was impossible to accurately

measure the impact of the Avenue’s closure on previous

traffic operations, it was possible to evaluate the anticipated

impacts of infrastructure improvements designed to ease

current traffic congestion in this part of the city. The Task

Force studied several potential design alternatives with the

goal of improving the movement of traffic in the vicinity

of the White House and reconnecting the areas east and

west of President’s Park. The study alternatives included

Transportation System Management (TSM) strategies as

well as improvements to provide additional east-west

capacity, predominantly by the use of tunnels along the

Pennsylvania Avenue and E Street alignments.

Impacts on the 

Downtown Economy 

Within the past five years, the District of Columbia,

through a coordinated effort, has made tremendous

strides in transforming its downtown into a lively center

for business, residences, arts, entertainment, and retail. In

addition to the new MCI Center, downtown Washington

has been witnessing the development of a new convention

center, new office and residential buildings, and innovative

mixed-used projects.

The closure of Pennsylvania Avenue placed a strain on

downtown businesses. Based on projections by the

District's Department of Public Works, if the pace of

development continues at its current rate, the total volume

of traffic downtown will be increasing 2 percent per year,

and therefore could create additional hardship. Those

who live in, work in, or visit Washington depend upon the

central thoroughfares that carry them from one part of the

city to the next. If getting around becomes too

burdensome, then living in, working in, or visiting the city

may become less palatable to a growing number of people,

hindering recent efforts to revitalize Downtown DC.

L’Enfant’s placement 

of the White House and

grounds at the juncture 

of New York and

Pennsylvania Avenues.

Early White House

facing a public way.
19

Prior Proposals for

Pennsylvania Avenue

After examining the impacts of the Pennsylvania Avenue

closure, the Task Force considered proposals that had

already been made for the future of Pennsylvania Avenue.

These included John Carl Warnecke’s 1963 plan, the

Interagency Plan of 1996, the recent Federal City Council

Plan, a plan by Washington Architect Arthur Cotton Moore,

and a plan prepared by the firm of Franck Lohsen &

McCrery. Further information on each of the plans is

appended to this report. The Task Force’s assessment of

these proposals took into account each proposal’s response

to security, symbolism, vehicular and pedestrian circulation,

cultural resources, historic preservation, urban design, and

the environment.

The Task Force found that none of the past plans to

reopen Pennsylvania Avenue were determined adequate in

meeting the security requirements associated with the

White House complex. Likewise, all plans were considered

to be adverse to the historic character and setting of the

White House.

Threat and Security

Measures Studied

As part of its examination of the threat to the President and

the White House, the Task Force received several special

security briefings. The Task Force determined that federal

law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ assessment of the

threat had not changed since the 1995 street closing, and that

recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon have heightened that level of threat. In its study, it

was apparent to the Task Force that it is not possible to

identify and deter all potential threats to the White House,

but that a vehicle bomb posed the threat of catastrophic

damage to the Complex. Further, the Task Force found that

existing countermeasures, other than stand-off distance, are

not currently available to mitigate the blast effects of a

vehicle bomb attack against the White House Complex.

It is therefore necessary to establish a physical security

perimeter to provide the necessary stand-off distances.

The Task Force’s work included a review of standard security

measures including stand-off distances, vehicular barriers,

blast walls, building hardening, and exploration of the latest

technologies. Federal law enforcement, military, and

independent researchers have conducted tests, which have

determined that a stand-off distance is necessary to provide

a reasonable blast effect mitigation zone around the White

House. On the north side of the White House, this distance

extends to the north side of Lafayette Park near H Street;

on the south, this distance is approximately that of the

existing E Street perimeter of the South Grounds.

Although some consider the existing stand-off distance to

be excessive, practical experience indicates differently. The

Oklahoma City bombing resulted not only in the catastrophic

collapse of the Murrah Federal Building, but also caused

extensive structural damage to many other buildings 1,000

feet away.

On Pennsylvania Avenue, vehicular barriers are used to

prevent an explosive laden vehicle from violating the

stand-off security zone perimeter. Security barriers consist

of fixed elements, such as a wall or bollards, and flexible

elements in conjunction with security check points to clear

authorized vehicles.

After reviewing all of the proposals that would allow the

Avenue to be reopened to unrestricted public vehicular

traffic, the Task Force could identify no currently available

technologies, including blast walls, remote detection sensors,

or other blast countermeasures, other than sufficient standoff distance, that could provide a practical means of

protecting the White House from a catastrophic vehicular

bomb attack. Blast walls are designed to reflect the pressure

of a blast wave, which radiates out from the blast and is

then reflected off surrounding structures. In order for a

blast wall to be effective, it has to be no farther from the

target than the height of the wall. If not, the blast wave will

reform between the wall and target. At the White House, the

blast wall would need to be located approximately fifty feet

in front of the north wall and be fifty feet in height.

The hardening of any target is viewed as the last line of

defense. The White House could be difficult to harden due

to its basic structural features and historic significance.

Effective hardening of the White House may require major

reconstruction and temporary displacement of the First

Family and the White House staff, and would entail

significant operational issues.

The Task Force concluded that maintaining an effective

stand-off distance is the only currently workable measure

to provide an effective security environment for the

White House.

The White House

Dotted circle represents stand-off distance zone.
20

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Traffic Alternatives Studied

The Security Task Force identified several traffic and circulation options that have the potential to restore some of the

transportation capacity lost with the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. These options included

the possibility of constructing a tunnel within either the Pennsylvania Avenue or E Street corridors. For each of these

options, state-of-the-practice traffic simulation software was used to evaluate their relative capabilities to handle the existing

levels of traffic demand. The results of this evaluation are included in a detailed report titled “Pennsylvania Avenue Traffic

Alternatives Analysis.” Following is a summary of the alternatives included in this study.

No Build (Pennsylvania Avenue remains closed)

This option retains the existing closed condition on Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th Street and 17th Street and

serves as a baseline to measure the relative benefits of each of the traffic alternatives.

Pennsylvania Avenue remains closed with 

Transportation System Management (TSM) Improvements Implemented

This option considers the impact of several TSM improvements in the study area, but does not reopen

Pennsylvania Avenue to ordinary through traffic. The TSM improvements include retiming and improved

synchronization of the traffic signals, improved parking management (including both enforcement and parking

restrictions), and intersection improvements. These actions could be implemented in a very short time period

and have proven, historically, to be very cost-effective in improving traffic flow.

The Task Force study indicates that the implementation of appropriate TSM strategies would result in a significant

improvement to traffic flow as measured by total vehicle delay. Delay is estimated to be reduced by approximately

20 percent in the morning peak hour and 12 percent in the afternoon peak hour. These projected improvements

are similar to the benefits measured by other cities as a result of their implementation of TSM strategies.

Pennsylvania Avenue is reopened (including TSM improvements)

This option considers reopening the Avenue between 15th Street and 17th Street at-grade to vehicular traffic on a

four-lane roadway (two lanes in each direction). In combination with appropriate TSM strategies, this option is

estimated to reduce total vehicle delay in the study area by approximately 22 percent in the morning peak hour and

20 percent in the afternoon peak hour.

Short Tunnel Alternative 

(including TSM improvements)

This option includes a tunnel under Pennsylvania Avenue with the west

portal between 17th Street and Jackson Place and the east portal between

Madison Place and 15th Street. This tunnel would be approximately 870

feet long and would incorporate the maximum acceptable entrance and exit

grades. Ventilation for a tunnel of this length could be accommodated

without above-grade ventilation structures. Construction is expected to last

approximately two years and, in that the street is already closed, there

would be no impacts to existing traffic movements.

The traffic handling capability of this option is similar to reopening the street

at-grade. In combination with appropriate TSM strategies, this option is

estimated to reduce total vehicle delay in the study area by approximately 

21 percent in the morning peak hour and 21 percent in the afternoon peak hour.

Short Tunnel with portals within President’s

Park (15th to 17th Streets)
21

Intermediate Tunnel Alternative (including TSM improvements)

This option considers a tunnel under Pennsylvania Avenue with the west portal between 17th and 18th Streets and the east

portal between 15th Street and Madison Place. This tunnel would be approximately 1,470 feet long and would require abovegrade ventilation structures. Construction is expected to last two and a half to three years, with associated traffic impacts

related to construction across 17th Street and along Pennsylvania Avenue for the portal construction.

While this option would remove the traffic conflict at the intersection of 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, the

improvements to traffic flow within the study area is expected to be similar to the other Pennsylvania Avenue tunnel

options. In combination with appropriate TSM strategies, this option would reduce total vehicle delay in the study area by

approximately 23 percent in the morning peak hour and 21 percent in the afternoon peak hour.

Long Tunnel Alternative (including TSM improvements)

This option locates the west portal between 17th Street and 18th Streets and 

the east portal on New York Avenue between 14th and 15th Streets. This

tunnel would be approximately 1,860 feet long and would require above-grade

ventilation structures. Construction of this alternative is expected to last more

than three years with associated traffic impacts related to construction across

17th Street and along Pennsylvania Avenue for the western portal

construction, and across 15th Street and along New York Avenue for the

eastern portal construction.

While this option would remove the traffic conflict at the intersections of

15th and 17th Streets with Pennsylvania Avenue, the improvements to traffic

flow within the study area, as measured by total vehicle delay, would be

similar to the other Pennsylvania Avenue tunnel options. In combination

with appropriate TSM strategies, this option is estimated to reduce total

vehicle delay in the study area by approximately 21 percent in the morning

peak hour and 22 percent in the afternoon peak hour.

Split-Portal Tunnel Alternative 

(including TSM improvements)

This option combines features of the intermediate and long tunnels. The west portal is located

between 17th Street and 18th Street, while on the east end, the eastbound portal is located at

the intersection of 15th Street, and the westbound portal is located at the intersection of 14th

Street. This tunnel would be approximately 1,860 feet long and would require above-grade

ventilation structures. The time required for construction would be approximately three years

with associated traffic impacts related to construction across 17th Street and along

Pennsylvania Avenue for the western portal construction, and across 15th Street and along

New York Avenue for the eastern portal

construction. It is expected that utility relocations for

this option would be less complicated than the long

tunnel option.

While this option would provide some safety and

turning movement benefits compared to the long

tunnel option, improvements to traffic flow within

the study area would be similar to the other

Pennsylvania Avenue tunnel options. In

combination with appropriate TSM strategies, this

option would reduce total vehicle delay in the

study area by approximately 24 percent in the

morning peak hour and 22 percent in the

afternoon peak hour.

Long tunnel alternative with portals outside of President’s

Park (15th and 17th Streets)

Split tunnel alternative

WESTBOUND PORTAL

EASTBOUND PORTAL
22

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

E Street Tunnel and Pennsylvania Avenue reopened 

(including TSM improvements)

This option considers the E street tunnel in combination with reopening Pennsylvania Avenue at-grade. It would

provide the most additional east-west capacity, and a free-flowing movement along E Street. As such, the benefits to

traffic flow are the greatest. In combination with appropriate TSM strategies, this option is estimated to reduce total

vehicle delay in the study area by approximately 24 percent in the morning peak hour and 34 percent in the

afternoon peak hour.

E Street Tunnel/No Build (including TSM improvements)

This option includes a tunnel south of the White House 

(approximately under E Street) with the east portal on E Street

between 14th and 15th Streets and the west portal connecting to the

E Street Expressway, west of 20th Street. This option would provide

a direct connection from Pennsylvania Avenue east of 15th Street to

both Georgetown and Virginia, via the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge.

This option would provide relief to Constitution Avenue and could

measurably alter traffic patterns beyond the evaluated study area. The

tunnel would be approximately 3,000 feet long, requiring several

above-grade ventilation structures. Construction of this alternative is

expected to last three years to four years with associated traffic

impacts related to construction along the E Street corridor.

While this option would provide relief to different traffic

movements, as compared to the Pennsylvania Avenue tunnel

options, the improvements to traffic flow within the study

area, as measured by total vehicle delay, would be similar to

the Pennsylvania Avenue tunnel options. In combination with

appropriate TSM strategies, this option is estimated to reduce

total vehicle delay in the study area by approximately 22

percent in the morning peak hour and 23 percent in the

afternoon peak hour.

Assessment of

Traffic Alternatives

The traffic analysis evaluated the relative ability of each of the traffic and circulation options to handle existing

traffic demand in the identified study area for the morning and afternoon peak hours. In the short term, the Task

Force concludes that traffic congestion can be significantly improved through a variety of transportation system

management (TSM) initiatives, such as traffic signal synchronization, intersection improvements, and more active

enforcement of parking regulations. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of similar projects

across the country. These measures are also relatively inexpensive and could be implemented

in a matter of months.

This study found that the congestion levels in the morning peak hour could

be substantially relieved (an approximate 20 percent improvement) through

implementation of TSM strategies. For this reason, and the fact that the

north-south traffic is substantially higher than the east-west traffic,

neither reopening Pennsylvania Avenue nor implementing the tunnel

options, which add additional east-west capacity, would measurably

reduce total vehicle delay within the study area. During the

afternoon peak hour, when congestion is measurably higher,

One of several E Street tunnel alternatives by FHWA

Closed E Street at West Executive Avenue
23

implementation of the TSM strategies had somewhat less

of an impact on reducing total vehicle delay (an

approximate 12 percent improvement). In the afternoon

peak hour, the inclusion of additional east-west capacity,

as provided by the various tunnel options, is estimated to

further improve traffic flow and reduce vehicle delay by

an additional 9 percent.

Each of the tunnel alternatives studied resulted in similar

levels of improvements to traffic flow within the study area.

While each alternative had advantages or disadvantages

associated with individual traffic movements, the overall

reduction in total vehicle delay was found to be similar.

While transportation systems are typically designed to

accommodate morning and afternoon peak demands, in

some instances, evaluation of midday demands can be

important. While midday traffic volumes are estimated to

be about one-third lower than the rush hour volumes,

movements can be complicated by the fact that many 

parking restrictions are not in place, truck deliveries tend

to be more frequent, and traffic patterns are more

random. In some instances, mid-day traffic needs may not

be adequately satisfied through solutions designed

specifically for the morning and afternoon rush hours.

The Task Force finds that replacement of lost east-west

transportation capacity will be required to support the

city's continued growth and vitality on a long-term basis.

In order to address this need, the Task Force recommends

serious consideration of a tunnel within the Pennsylvania

Avenue or the E Street corridors, combined with a

Circulator and wider application of TSM measures. This

recommendation will require detailed traffic studies

(including TSM impacts), engineering, environmental,

historic preservation, urban planning and cost benefit

analyses in order to conclude the decision-making process.

These studies should be undertaken immediately and

concluded within 18 to 24 months.

Comparative Effectiveness of Potential Traffic Improvements
24

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Decision Making for

Pennsylvania Avenue

The Task Force sought to get beyond the somewhat

artificial dichotomy between security versus traffic that has

long dominated debate on the closing of Pennsylvania

Avenue in front of the White House. Security as the

dominant variable has resulted in the present unacceptable

circumstance of a public corridor made far less public or

approachable. The symbolism of gates and checkpoints is

hardly congruent with our traditional pride in being an

open, barrier-free society. So long as security and traffic

optimization are each held as an absolute value and

assumed to be antithetical to the other, no wise consensus

about the future of Pennsylvania Avenue can emerge.

In reaching its conclusions about the future use of

Pennsylvania Avenue, the Task Force gave careful

consideration to security imperatives and traffic implications

for the District, but also to heritage and preservation

criteria, urban design and streetscape considerations, and

financial resources. The Task Force also focused on the less

precise but more meaningful criteria of ‘quality of place.’ It

began to view security, which initially led to the closing of

Pennsylvania Avenue, as a catalyst for the creation of a

more pleasant, a more hospitable, more graceful, and more

beautiful stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue. The Task Force

determined that there was an opportunity, through the

beautification of Pennsylvania Avenue, to achieve the

necessary level of safety for the White House as well as

actual improvements to traffic management.

The Task Force noted Americans, and the world at large,

have come to associate the Nation’s Capital with qualities

such as openness and grace, public access, and an absence

of fear. Secure in the knowledge that the civic environment

belongs to all, the public feels entitled to move about it

freely. Such confidence is precious and worth holding onto,

especially during an era that calls for heightened security.

The Task Force concluded, however, that this freedom to

occupy and to move about the capital does not depend

upon maintaining a daily flow of 25,000 plus vehicles along

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.

Task Force members agreed that while lively streets are a

frequent measure of the vitality of their cities, they do not

have to be major traffic arteries. A stretch of Pennsylvania

Avenue closed to vehicles, but made into a welcoming,

beautiful, pedestrian realm, is likely to become a superior

public environment, one whose democratic aura of

openness and accessibility is undiminished. It is the present

condition of the street, crudely barricaded for security

without other modification that offends and sends

messages of insecurity. The Task Force concluded that to

approach, stroll by, or sit and contemplate the magisterial

presence of the White House; to inhabit President’s Park

without impediments—including cars—speaks to the

symbols of freedom and openness.

In light of the very real security threats that reopening

Pennsylvania Avenue to traffic poses to the White House,

and with the firm belief that the setting of President's Park

can be greatly enhanced through redesign, the Task Force

concluded that the preferred option for the present time is

that Pennsylvania Avenue remain closed to normal city

traffic. If in the future, there are major positive changes in

the security environment and/or risk detection technology

is improved, this recommendation should be reconsidered

by the Task Force.

There exists an opportunity 

to create a civic plaza in

front of the White House

that is appropriate to this

prominant location
President’s Park Promenade

and Park Plan Concepts

Maintaining Pennsylvania Avenue free of through traffic,

at least for the foreseeable future, opens up a variety of

design opportunities to expand upon the distinguished,

pedestrian-oriented, public environments so characteristic

of our Capital. Such an outcome is superior to the present

condition of a street crudely barricaded by security

checkpoints. And, from a pedestrian perspective, it may

well be superior to the pre-1995 condition of a six-lane

wide thoroughfare in which pedestrians maneuvered

around a steady flow of automobile, bus, and truck traffic.

The qualities to be evident in an enhanced public realm

along Pennsylvania Avenue should be:

A setting that is welcoming and better scaled for pedestrian

movement and visitor enjoyment of the overall environs of

President’s Park.

A setting in which landscape elements characterize the visitor’s

experience—a landscape congruent with the nearby grace of

Lafayette Park and the White House grounds themselves.

A setting in which vistas and views along the axis of Pennsylvania

Avenue and towards the White House would be reinforced by treeplanting and similar landscape devices.

A setting in which strolling—promenade-like—along the Avenue

becomes an enjoyable and memorable experience.

A setting in which the historic integrity of a street is maintained

while changes in its use are acknowledged.

A setting in which the Inaugural Parade can follow its traditional

route in front of the White House.

A setting in which a future transit Circulator can be accommodated

without taking away from the generally pedestrian character of the

Avenue.

A setting in which gatherings of school children or tourist groups at

the gates to the White House would be naturally and generously

accommodated rather than awkwardly constrained by a traffic artery.

A setting in which a host of pedestrian amenities, including

handsome and well-designed lighting, paving, seating, and similar

streetscape components would contribute to the overall ambiance of

President’s Park.

A setting in which security for the White House is achieved

without the physical components of security systems that visually

dominate the experience of the environment. 

A future transit Circulator could be

accommodated without taking away

from the generally pedestrian character

of the Avenue.

The redesigned space in front of

the White House would reflect

a clear memory of the avenue.

25
26

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

It is possible to conceive several designs for

Pennsylvania Avenue that would accommodate such

characteristics. One concept might reinforce the

historically linear nature of the Avenue with few added

features—emphasizing a new “President’s Walk” between

15th and 17th Streets. Another concept might take

advantage of the wide curb-to-curb right-of-way to plant

an additional row or two of street trees, making the

Avenue more boulevard-like. The tradition of reinforcing

the Capital’s streets with tree planting dates back to

Thomas Jefferson, who authorized the planting of

Poplars along several major avenues. Yet another concept

might emphasize greater continuity of planting and

design features with Lafayette Park, creating a more

park-like atmosphere along the Avenue.

Each of these conceptual directions is worthy of

additional detailed exploration and public comment during

a process leading to a final design. Each, however, must be

evaluated against the qualities of place described above.

The Task Force recommends the immediate design and

construction of a landscaped, civic space along the

Pennsylvania Avenue right-of-way in front of the White

House that respects and enhances the historic setting and

views of the White House. The street would be

maintained in a redesign that reflects a clear memory of

its historic use and would not preclude reopening the

street, staging inaugural parades, or possible construction 

of a tunnel.

Tunnel Portal 

Design Options

The Task Force is aware that in any design alternative to

President’s Park and the surrounding area that includes a

tunnel, extraordinary care must be given to the location

and design of the tunnel portals. Tunnels are

commonplace in many cities. They exist both for traffic

and pedestrians, under busy intersections and spacious

parks. In the District, they stretch beneath the Mall, and

below Dupont, Thomas, and Washington Circles,

allowing efficient movement of traffic through the city

and preserving vehicle-free open spaces. These

advantages are, however, often offset by disadvantages

associated with their portals. Long ramps can disrupt

the urban setting and views and prohibit mid-block

street crossings.

The Task Force determined that a covered tunnel can be

designed to meet security requirements under

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. The

tunnel would be strengthened to withstand any blast that

might occur within that portion of the tunnel located

within the required stand-off distance from the White

House. In addition, if an explosion were to detonate in

the tunnel, the blast effects, including ground shock,

would likely result in damage to foundations and utility

infrastructure. Venting would also occur at the two ends

of the tunnel. There are blast mitigation strategies to

address these issues and they will require further study.

A tunnel portal

appropriate to its

context. (Paris)

Architectural elements of the portals would 

be designed to ensure visual compatibility with 

the historic character of President’s Park.
27

The dimensions of the portals for the Pennsylvania

Avenue tunnel options were established by the

requirements of a 7 percent roadway vehicular slope and

the need to accommodate four lanes of traffic. The fourlane portal width of 50 feet is used for study purposes in

all options except for the staggered tunnel option, which

splits the wide portal into two narrower portals, each

accommodating two lanes of traffic and reducing the

portal widths to 25 feet.

Within President’s Park the 90-foot curb to curb avenue can

accommodate tunnel portals as well as needed surface

circulation and parking lanes. West of 17th Street,

Pennsylvania Avenue remains wide enough to comfortably

accommodate a tunnel portal without loss of sidewalk or

parking lanes. East of 15th Street, however, the limited

width of New York Avenue would require the loss of

parking and a narrowing of the sidewalks to accommodate

a four-lane tunnel portal. A narrower portal would be less

intrusive within President’s Park and New York Avenue.

The Task Force carefully reviewed the location of the

tunnel portals and their impacts on surrounding buildings.

Closest to the White House, the successful combination of

benches, planting beds, and railings would mitigate the

presence of the portal edges, rendering the tunnel all but

invisible from the park north of the White House. The

short and intermediate tunnels directly impact the Renwick

Gallery and Blair House to the west, and the Treasury

Building to the east. The long tunnel would eliminate the

impact on President’s Park, but it would have a more

adverse impact on New York Avenue than the staggered

tunnel option – an option that also lessens the impact of

the 15th Street portals on the immediate environment.

While the tunnel options do pose certain problems, the

advantage of minimizing large areas of pavement in front

of the White House should not be overlooked. At the

portal, paving materials could be extended from the

sidewalks to the edge of the portal opening. With limited

vehicular access in this area, such paving could greatly

increase and improve the pedestrian realm of

President’s Park.

All architectural elements of the portals need to be visually

compatible with the historic character of President’s Park.

The streetscape elements surrounding the Old Executive

Office Building and the Treasury Building can incorporate

the bollards, railings, and benches identified in the Design

Guidelines for President’s Park.

Circulator System

One of the initiatives designed to improve circulation

and reduce congestion in the heart of the city is a

Circulator transit system. The concept of

a Circulator, which would conveniently and efficiently

transport residents, visitors, and workers in the

Monumental Core, was included in NCPC's Legacy Plan

and is strongly supported by City and civic leaders.

Initial implementation would make use of specially

designed buses to move people between Downtown,

the Mall and concentrated employment sites. While the

routes are yet to be determined, one of these routes

should provide service on Pennsylvania Avenue in front

of the White House.

One of the Circulator routes should provide service along

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.

The White House

U.S. Capitol

The Mall

Union Station

New Convention Center
Outstanding Issues 

and Further Studies

The Task Force believes that at least two additional areas

of security technology should continue to be explored.

Building Hardening

Although hardening of the White House is viewed as the

last line of defense, further exploration into the feasibility

of strengthening the building sufficiently is recommended.

The extent of the hardening required is determined by the

ability of the existing structure to withstand a specific type

of attack combined with the desired level of protection.

The feasibility of effectively strengthening or rebuilding

the West Wing should also be explored.

Effective hardening/rebuilding of the White House

complex may require major construction and the

temporary displacement of the First Family and the White

House staff. Significant operational issues would also need

to be addressed.

Future Technologies

Although technologies are not sufficiently developed for

current use, some hold promise for the future. Explosives

detection technologies, for example, have made great

strides recently. However, they are not developed to the

point where they can operate in an open air environment

as exists on a city street screen to thousands of vehicles.

There are also new technologies under development to

address a broad range of security issues including

explosives detection and blast mitigation. Structural

composite materials are being produced for use in new

construction and upgrades that can significantly improve

blast resistance. New metal compositions are being

developed for blast and ballistic countermeasures.

Another developing technology is the use of electronic

surveillance equipment. Surveillance and monitoring

equipment may assist in identifying suspect vehicles or

individuals. However, where this technology has been

tested it has raised serious questions of privacy.

28

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL
29

NEXT STEPS

Public Review of Report

This report transmits the professional planning

recommendations of the Interagency Task Force

to the National Capital Planning Commission. The

Task Force recommends that the Commission approve

these proposals and forward them to the President and

Congress for their consideration and possible action. The

Task Force expects that the Commission will not

incorporate public testimony into this report. However,

the Task Force strongly believes that the public should

have the opportunity to express its views on the design

and impact of security measures taken on its behalf.

Consequently, the Task Force recommends that during the

45 days following the release of this report, the

Commission hold one or more public information

meetings and solicit public comment on these

recommendations. The Task Force recommends that at

the conclusion of the 45-day period, the Commission

forward the public comments it has received to the

President and Congress.

The public is invited to comment on this report, which is

posted on NCPC’s website at www.ncpc.gov, by mail,

email, or fax:

National Capital Planning Commission

401 9th Street, NW, Suite 500, North lobby

Washington, D.C. 20576

Email: info@ncpc.gov

Fax: 202-482-7272

These recommendations were formulated by a Task Force

representing the federal and District of Columbia

governments and reflect their general consensus on the

important issues of security design in the Nation’s Capital.

In arriving at their conclusions, Task Force members

consulted closely with numerous federal and local

government agencies including the Department of Justice,

the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Transportation,

the Commission of Fine Arts, the Architect of the

Capitol, and the Advisory Council on Historic

Preservation. In addition, Task Force members briefed

Members of Congress during the course of their work.

The Task Force expects that implementation of these

recommendations will be undertaken in consultation with

a broad coalition of business, community, historic

preservation, and federal and local government partners.

Implementation

Urban Design and 

Security Improvements

The Task Force recommends that the National Capital

Planning Commission prepare an integrated Urban Design

and Security Plan for Washington’s Monumental Core to

create a secure and distinguished public realm.

As the federal government's central planning agency in the

Nation's Capital, the National Capital Planning

Commission is appropriately suited for this responsibility.

The Task Force further recommends the establishment of

a single and dedicated funding source for full

implementation of the Urban Design and Security Plan.

The programming and expenditure of all funds for

priority project design and construction would require

approval by NCPC, in much the same manner as the

Commission reviews and approves the six-year Federal

Capital Improvements Program for the National Capital

Region, conducts an annual review and approval of each

federal agency's capital budget requests and makes its

recommendation to the Office of Management and

Budget. Each agency would be required to design priority

projects in accordance with the Urban Design and

Security Plan.

In addition to performing in its normal role as approving

body for individual projects, NCPC would work with

each agency to ensure that implementation is consistent

with the guidelines specified in the approved Urban

Design and Security Plan. The Task Force further

recommends that the preparation of construction

documents, bidding and construction of the projects be

undertaken by an appropriate single agency (such as the

National Park Service, the General Services

Administration, or the D.C. government) as designated

by Congress and the Administration.

As an additional step to ensure full implementation of the

Urban Design and Security Plan, NCPC will work with

each agency to formulate its budget estimates and conduct

a review of individual plans for physical security

improvements. We recommend that funding for each

project be included as a part of a complete package,

and that a single request be forwarded to the Office of

Management and Budget and to Congress for

immediate approval.
30

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

IMPLEMENTATION 

PHASE I URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLANS LEAD/SUPPORT COMPLETE

1. Prepare Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) .....................................NCPC/GSA/NPS/DC .......................11/01

for planning, design, and construction

2. Prepare funding request to OMB for Plan ....................................................NCPC/OMB ................................11/01

(begin w/3-year program, 2002-2004; include

construction estimate for Phase 1 priority projects)

3. Identify ownership and jurisdictions .....................................................................NCPC.......................................12/01

4. Document architectural and urban design features ............................................NCPC.......................................12/01

5. Complete prototype designs for ............................................................................NCPC.......................................12/01

streetscape/security "kit-of-parts"

6. Prepare concept plans for study areas:..................................................................NCPC........................................3/02

a. Federal Triangle and Pennsylvania Avenue .....................................NCPC/GSA/NPS

b. National Mall/Constitution & Independence Avenues......................NCPC/NPS

c. Southwest Federal Center and Maryland Avenue ........................NCPC/GSA/Others

d. West End and Downtown ...............................................................NCPC/GSA/Others

7. Prepare concept design and preliminary cost estimates ...................................NCPC........................................4/02

for Year I priority projects, to include:

a. Pennsylvania Avenue (in front of the White House)...................NCPC/NPS/others

b. Department of Justice (Federal Triangle).......................................NCPC/GSA/DOJ

b. Pennsylvania Avenue (Capitol Hill to White House)..........................NCPC/NPS

c. Washington Monument (National Mall)................................................NCPC/NPS

8. Establish overall costs for implementing Urban Design and Security Program.

9. Prepare summary Urban Design and Security Plan report...............................NCPC........................................4/02

10. OMB/Congressional briefings/public review.....................................................NCPC........................................4/02

PHASE I PROJECT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION LEAD/SUPPORT COMPLETE

1. Confirm Agency approval of concept designs .........................................NCPC/Agencies ..............................5/02

for Phase 1 priority projects

2. Prepare 30% design documents for priority projects ......................Designated Agency/NCPC .....................6/02

3. Prepare 60% design documents for priority projects ......................Designated Agency/NCPC .....................7/02

4. Prepare 95% design documents for priority projects ......................Designated Agency/NCPC .....................9/02

5. Prepare final cost estimates and construction schedules.................Designated Agency/NCPC .....................9/02

6. Prepare budget requests for FY 2003 construction funding..........Designated Agency/NCPC .....................9/02

7. Secure funding for Phase 1 projects ...................................................NCPC/Designated Agency ....................10/02

8. Complete EIS/Sec.106 Documentation....................................................Designated Agency ...........................12/02

9. Begin construction for Phase 1 projects ...................................................Designated Agency ............................1/03

PHASE II PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUCTION

1. Identify future priority projects (Years 2, 3) ...............................................NCPC/Agencies .............................10/02

2. Concept plan and final design for Phase 2 priority projects ..........NCPC/Designated Agency ...............10/02-9/03

3. Secure funding for Phase 2 projects ...................................................NCPC/Designated Agency ....................10/03

4. Begin construction for Phase 2 projects ...................................................Designated Agency ............................1/04
31

PHASE I FUNDING REQUEST

The Task Force recommends that the federal government fund all costs associated with the development and ongoing

implementation of the Urban Design and Security Plan, TSM measures (as identified in the traffic study), a Circulator,

and tunnel environmental assessments, design, and engineering. If a tunnel is built, it should be a federal obligation to 

fund its construction.

PROJECT COSTS ($ millions)

1) Urban Design and Security Plan $ 1.0

Integrated urban design and security plan for 

federal precincts within the Monumental Core.

2) Transportation Systems Management Capital Improvements $ 1.0

Cost-effective operational improvements to transportation system,

including signal optimization, intersection improvements and signage,

to improve traffic flow.

3) Pennsylvania Avenue Streetscape/Landscape (15th to 17th) $ 15.0

Landscape improvements to create pedestrian-friendly and

welcoming environment in front of White House

4) Circulator (capital costs) $ 15.0

Cost of vehicles and improvements at stops (such as signs and benches)

5) Tunnel/Design & Engineering/EIS $1.5

Costs of preliminary design, and evaluation of environmental 

and historic impacts; preparation of EIS

6) Department of Justice Perimeter Security $ 5.0

Streetscape improvements incorporating perimeter security.

7) Pennsylvania Avenue Streetscape, 3rd to 15th $ 50.0

Update PADC/Pennsylvania Avenue streetscape design to

incorporate appropriately designed security measures.

8) Washington Monument Exterior Security $ 10.0

Total $98.51

OTHER ONGOING COSTS ($ millions)

1) Transportation Systems Management (TSM) Maintenance $1.5

Annual TSM maintenance costs, including $1.05 million for traffic control 

personnel and $450,000 for retiming of signals, management of lane restriction

due to building construction and improved parking enforcement.

2) Circulator $11.0

Annual operating costs for system, estimated by Downtown Business

Improvement District (BID) and NCPC.

1 In addition, annual TSM maintenance and Circulator operating 

costs should be supported by the federal government.
32

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

Transportation Improvements 

Implementation of the Task Force's recommendations for

Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House will

require the President's concurrence and Congressional

approval of funds to design, implement and maintain the

proposed Transportation Systems Management (TSM)

program; to conduct a detailed assessment of

Pennsylvania Avenue and E Street tunnel options and, if

approved, to design and construct a tunnel. Similar

approvals and funding will also be required to implement

the Circulator and to design and construct the landscape

and security improvements associated with the closure of

the Avenue within President's Park.

In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), constructing a tunnel at this site would require

preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

and an historic preservation Section 106 review. That

process would be followed by final design and

construction. Depending on the alternatives selected,

the process would require five to six years before the

tunnel could be opened to traffic. Estimated construction

costs for the split portal, long tunnel and E Street tunnels

described previously range from $112 million to $135

million (in 2001 dollars).

The Task Force finds that Pennsylvania Avenue in front of

the White House has been unsightly and unresolved for

too long. Therefore, the Task Force recommends that the

street right-of-way be improved immediately; provided,

however, that the federal government in allocating funds

for such immediate improvements recognizes that these

improvements may need to be modified or removed to

permit construction of a tunnel if one is approved.

Further, the federal government should recognize that the

decision with respect to a tunnel option will not be

negatively impacted by the cost of the improvements

installed on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White

House prior to a build/no build decision.

Design and Construction Schedule
33

REFERENCES

Department of Justice. Vulnerability Assessment of

Federal Facilities. June 1995

Executive Order 12977. Interagency Security Committee.

October 1995

General Services Administration, Public Buildings

Service. Security Criteria. January 1997

General Services Administration. Urban Design

Guidelines for Physical Perimeter and Entrance Security: 

An Overlay to the Master Plan for the Federal Triangle.

July 1998

General Services Administration, Public Buildings

Service. Balancing Security and Openness.

November 1999

Interagency Security Committee. Security Design

Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major

Modernization Projects. September 1998

National Park Service. Long-term Design Alternatives for

Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House. May 1996

National Park Service. Monuments and Memorials

Security Study. 2001 National Park Service.

Comprehensive Design Plan and Final Environmental Impact

Statement for the White House and President’s Park. 

April 2000

RAND. Security in the Nation’s Capital and the Closure of

Pennsylvania Avenue: An Assessment. November 2000.

U.S. Secret Service. Public Report of the White House

Security Review. May 1995
34

DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Members of the Interagency Task Force

(Voting)

Richard L. Friedman, Task Force Chairman 

Member, National Capital Planning Commission

John V. Cogbill III

Chairman, National Capital Planning Commission

The Honorable Gale A. Norton

Secretary of the Interior

represented by John Parsons, Associate Regional Director, Lands,

Resources and Planning, National Park Service

The Honorable Stephen A. Perry

Administrator of General Services 

represented by Anthony E. Costa, Assistant Regional

Administrator, and Michael McGill, Senior Project Manager,

Public Buildings Service 

The Honorable Anthony A. Williams

Mayor of the District of Columbia

represented by Ellen McCarthy, Deputy Director, 

Office of Planning

The Honorable Linda W. Cropp

Chairman of the District of Columbia Council

represented by Robert Miller, 

Legislative Counsel to the Chairman 

Participating Members (Non Voting)

The Department of State

represented by Rod Walters and George Bailey

The Department of the Treasury

represented by Peter Schwartz

The Department of Defense

Represented by Jerry Shiplett

The Department of Justice

represented by Anna Franz and Domonic Jerry Rubino

The National Security Advisor

Represented by Richard Clark

The Central Intelligence Agency

represented by Bob Bacon and Charles Phalen

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

represented by James Jarbow

The U.S. Secret Service

represented by Barbara Riggs, Thomas Dougherty, Robert Baer, and

Joseph DiPietro

The National Park Service

represented by James McDaniel and Ann Bowman Smith 

The Federal Highway Administration

represented by Tony Caserta, Gary Henderson, Douglas Laird, and

Edward A. Sheldahl

The Architect of the Capitol

represented by James Powers

U.S. Capitol Police

represented by Robert Howe

The Commission of Fine Arts

represented by Charles Atherton and Frederick Lindstrom

The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

represented by John Fowler and Martha Catlin

District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department

represented by Captain Larry McCoy and Lieutenant Fitzgerald

District of Columbia Historic Preservation Office

represented by David Maloney

District of Columbia Department of Transportation

represented by Dan Tangherlini and Ken Laden

Chairman, Committee on Government Reform,

U.S. House of Representatives

represented by Jennifer Hall

Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

represented by Cynthia Gooen and Kevin Landy

The Federal City Council 

represented by Terry Golden and Kenneth R. Sparks

The Downtown BID

represented by Stephanie Bothwell

Consultants

Parsons Transportation Group, Transportation 

Alex Krieger, FAIA, Chairman of the Department of

Urban Planning and Design, Harvard University, Martin

Zogran, Chan Krieger and Associates, Urban Design

Theodore Wolff, Craig Farnsworth, Wolff, Clements and

Associates, Ltd., Landscape Architecture 

John R. Smith, U.S. Security, Inc., Security

Contributing Experts

John Carl Warnecke

Art Lohsen, Principal, Franck Lohsen McCrery, Architects

David Perry, Deputy Director, Federal City Council 

Arthur Cotton Moore, FAIA, Principal,

Arthur Cotton Moore Associates

Gary Haney, Partner, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill

Bruce Hoffman, Director Washington Office, RAND

Theodore Krauthammer, Director, Protective Technology

Center of Pennsylvania State University

William Seale, Architectural Historian and former 

White House Historian

NCPC Staff Members

Patricia E. Gallagher, Executive Director

Marcel C. Acosta, Acting Deputy Executive Director

Connie M. Harshaw, Chief Operating Officer

Ash Jain, General Counsel and Congressional Liaison

William Dowd, Director, Office of Plans Review

George Toop, Project Officer

David Levy, Community Planner

Denise Liebowitz, Public Affairs Officer

Marybeth Murphy, Writer/Editor

Paul Jutton, Graphics Designer
APPENDIX

Prior Proposals for

Pennsylvania Avenue in

front of the White House

John Carl Warnecke

In 1963, as part of his involvement with the preservation

of the historic townhouses around Lafayette Park and the

location and design of the New Executive Office

Building, architect Warnecke proposed that Pennsylvania

Avenue be closed between 15th and 17th Streets and

replaced with a park-like promenade with a landscaped

median and ornamental water features at the intersections

of Jackson and Madison Places.

The Warnecke plan included increased stand-off distances,

the potential for security checkpoints at 15th and 17th

Streets, a safe and convenient pedestrian zone, and

unification of the White House, Pennsylvania Avenue, and

Lafayette Park into “President’s Park.”

Interagency Plan of 1996

After the 1995 security action – closing Pennsylvania

Avenue – the National Park Service led an interagency

effort to develop a plan that maintained the physical

characteristics and appearance of a street so that it could be

easily “reversible.” This plan would allow the street to be

reopened to traffic in the event that the security

environment or terrorist threat changed. The plan included

a realignment of Pennsylvania Avenue to the north between

Jackson and Madison Places. This so-called “Jefferson

Bow,” named after a sketch prepared by Thomas Jefferson

suggesting a curved alignment of Pennsylvania Avenue

north of the White House, would marginally increase the

stand-off distance from the White House in the event that

the street were reopened to traffic.

Advantages of this plan include increased stand-off

distances, the potential for security checkpoints at 15th

and 17th Streets, a safe and convenient pedestrian zone,

and unification of the White House, Pennsylvania Avenue,

and Lafayette Park into “President’s Park.” Disadvantages

include interruption of the street grid and the related

traffic impacts; an adverse impact on Lafayette Park from

the Jefferson Bow realignment of the Avenue;

interruption of the L’Enfant “vista” along the Avenue;

and inconsistency with the McMillan Plan.

Federal City Council

The Federal City Council plan, as described in the RAND

Corporation study, is one of a number of streetscape and

urban design plans that were proposed to reopen the

Avenue. The plan was prepared by the architectural firm

of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill.

This plan proposes that Pennsylvania Avenue be reopened

to limited automobile traffic between 15th and 17th

Streets. The premise is that traffic could be restricted to

automobiles by the introduction of pedestrian bridges

immediately east and west of Jackson and Madison Places.

The limited clearance of the bridges would prevent trucks

and other vehicles taller than automobiles from using the

Avenue in front of the White House. The plan also

incorporates the “Jefferson Bow” in a realigned

Pennsylvania Avenue.

The Federal City Council plan includes reopening

Pennsylvania Avenue to limited automobile traffic and

restoring the street grid, as well as providing a slightly

greater stand-off distance between the realigned

Pennsylvania Avenue and the Executive Mansion.

However the minimal increase in stand-off distance does

not accommodate security requirements in that the

overhead pedestrian bridges would not deter SUVs or

heavily-loaded or multiple bomb laden automobiles. The

bridges would also require ramping into both the White

House and Lafayette Park (for ADA compliance) and

,together with the Jefferson Bow, would be adverse to the

historic character and setting of the White House.

Other Plans

Other architects, including Arthur Cotton Moore and the

firm of Franck Lohsen & McCrery, prepared plans in

response to the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue. Their

proposals were similar in concept and different in detail

from the Federal City Council plan in the incorporation of

fences and gates and the design of other security

measures. The Moore plan proposed the innovative use of

technology including vehicle weight sensors that would

activate gates or retractable bollards to prohibit vehicles

with excess weight. The plan also included a transparent

glass “blast wall” inside the fence on the White House

grounds. The plan by Franck Lohsen & McCrery also

called for the reopening of Pennsylvania Avenue, but the

firm retracted that plan in the wake of the terrorist attacks

on September 11, 2001.

35
Commission Members

John V. Cogbill, III, Chairman

Richard L. Friedman

Robert A. Gaines

Arrington L. Dixon

Patricia Elwood

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Gale A. Norton

Secretary of the Interior

The Honorable Stephen A. Perry

Administrator of General Services

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform

The Honorable Anthony A. Williams

Mayor of the District of Columbia

The Honorable Linda W. Cropp

Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia

Executive Director

Patricia E. Gallagher, AICP

The National Capital Planning Commission is the federal government’s planning agency in the District of Columbia

and surrounding counties in Maryland and Virginia. The Commission provides overall planning guidance for

federal land and buildings in the region. It also reviews the design of federal construction projects, oversees longrange planning for future development, and monitors capital investment by federal agencies.

National Capital Planning Commission

401 9th Street, NW

North Lobby, Suite 500

Washington, DC 20576

Telephone | 202 482-7200

FAX | 202 482-7272

Web Site | www.ncpc.gov