HAMMER DOWN

The Battle for the

Watapur Valley, 2011

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph. D.

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Photos in this publication provided by Major Christopher Bluhm, 

US Army, in February of 2014. Photo permission for use in this 

study is provided by Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley and Battalion Sergeant Major Jones.

Graphics are author and CSI generated.

CGSC Copyright Registration #14-0480 C/E, 0481 C/E, 14-

0482 C/E, 14-0483 
HAMMER DOWN

The Battle for the Watapur Valley, 

2011

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph. D.

Volume III of the Vanguard of Valor series

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

HAMMER DOWN: The Battle for the Watapur Valley, 2011

Vanguard of Valor III

p. cm.

1. Afghan War, 2001---Campaigns. 2. Counterinsurgency--Afghanistan. 

3. United States. Army--History--Afghan War, 2001- 4. Afghanistan--

History, Military--21st century. I. Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D. 

DS371.412.V362 2012

958.104’742--dc23 

2014

 CGSC Copyright Registration #14-0480 C/E, 0481 C/E, 14-0482 C/E, 14-0483 

Second printing: Fall 2014

Editing and layout by Carl W. Fischer, 2014

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications 

available for downloading can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

 With this third installment of the Vanguard of Valor series, the Combat 

Studies Institute transitions from the anthology format of the previous two 

volumes to one that focuses on the actions of a single unit and operation. 

HAMMER DOWN is the story of a tactical operation conducted by the 

Soldiers of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, of the 3d Brigade 

Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division, in partnership with units 

of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Known as Task Force 

Cacti, this unit’s experience in the Watapur Valley of Nuristan Province 

in June 2011 well illustrates the challenges of combat in the mountains of 

Regional Command-East, where the terrain was a constant and at times a 

more formidable enemy than the Taliban, HiG, or al Qaeda fighters. 

 Coalition forces executed Operation HAMMER DOWN in an area 

immediately to the east of the Waygal River valley. Among the enemy 

fighters who squared off against TF Cacti, some undoubtedly were men 

who had fought the Coalition in the adjacent Pech and Korengal valleys 

since 2005, including men who participated in the coordinated attack on 

Combat Outpost Kahler at Wanat three years earlier. Just as likely, TF Cacti

included veterans of previous deployments to Nuristan, who were well 

acquainted with the unique challenges involved in attempting to pacify 

this region. It is important for the reader to remember these connections 

and understand the role that past experience played in determining the 

actions of both sides during the fighting in and around the village of 

Gambir. By June 2011, both sides understood the other’s capabilities quite 

well. Tactical surprise was difficult for either side to achieve, which meant 

that every engagement was essentially a meeting engagement. In such an 

environment, logistical preparation, integration of enablers, and above all 

small-unit leadership must provide the margin for victory. 

 For nearly 35 years, CSI has used historical studies such as this one 

to help leaders everywhere benefit from the experiences of a very few. 

Vanguard of Valor III fully delivers on that promise. I am confident readers 

will find personal inspiration in this story, as well as professional leadership 

lessons applicable well beyond the scope of operations in Afghanistan.

Colonel Thomas E. Hanson

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Author’s Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I thank the men and women of Task Force Cacti, 

2-35 Infantry for their willingness to cooperate so fully with this study. 

They proved very forthcoming in their interviews, and always made 

themselves available for follow-up questions or to provide maps and other 

information. The history in these pages is theirs. 

As this study expanded to include a history of previous deployments to 

the Watapur Valley, I sought out personnel from Marine and Army infantry 

battalions who served there. Many of those interviewed had to recall 

places and events about which they had not thought for some time, yet all 

provided a wealth of detail. Their time and support of this effort greatly 

enriched this study, and I thank them for their valuable contributions. 

I also must thank my colleagues on the Afghanistan Study Team at the 

Combat Studies Institute. We each brought a diverse set of experiences 

and knowledge to a rapidly-assembled team and learned how to adjust as 

a group to an ever-changing array of circumstances. I am extremely proud 

of the professionalism and productivity of our short-lived team. Each 

member provided insights, edited drafts, or offered support during the 

writing and assembly of this study, so this project bears their fingerprints 

too. 

The rest of the Combat Studies Institute, including former director 

Colonel Rod Cox, Dr. Donald P. Wright and the rest of the Research 

and Publications Team, the Contemporary Operations Study Team, and 

the Staff Ride Team also helped shape this study. Their contributions are 

certainly recognized and appreciated. 

I also thank my wife Jenny. She followed me to Missouri and provided 

invaluable love and support throughout our time there and continues to 

make everything worthwhile. 
vi

To Those Who Served

In memory of First Lieutenant Dimitri del Castillo, Sergeant Nigel 

Kelly, and Specialist Kevin Hilaman. May they rest in peace.
vii

Contents

Foreword..................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements................................................................................... v

Dedication................................................................................................ vi

Table of Contents.................................................................................... vii

Figures....................................................................................................viii

Symbols.................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2: US Operations in the Watapur Valley, 2002-2011................... 9

Chapter 3: Planning and Opening Moves............................................... 33

Chapter 4: The Battle for the Strongpoints, 26-30 June ......................... 63

Chapter 5: Conclusion............................................................................. 97

Glossary ................................................................................................ 105

About the Author................................................................................... 107
viii

List of Figures

Figure 1: Kunar Province - Major Rivers and Valleys............................. 4

Figure 2: The Watapur Valley, 2002-2011 ...............................................11

Figure 3: Coalition Bases in Kunar Province, 2011................................ 34

Figure 4: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 24-25 June 2011.................... 38

Figure 5: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 25 June 2011 ......................... 42

Figure 6: Bravo Company at HLZ Honey Eater preparing to move....... 43

Figure 7: Bravo Company Soldiers moving toward Gambir, 25 June.... 45

Figure 8: Bravo Company’s view of Gambir from the east.................... 46

Figure 9: Chinook crash site ................................................................... 54

Figure 10: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 1200 to 2400, 25 June 2011 56

Figure 11: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 26 June 2011........................ 64

Figure 12: The Situation Upon Enemy Contact, 26 June 2011............... 68

Figure 13: The Retaking of Strongpoint Cat, 1500, 26 June 2011 ......... 69

Figure 14: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 27 June 2011 ....................... 73

Figure 15: Bravo Company defending Strongpoint Bastard................... 78

Figure 16: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 28 June 2011 ....................... 81

Figure 17: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 29 June 2011 ....................... 85

Figure 18: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 30 June 2011 ....................... 91
ix

Symbols for operations recounted in this work.

SYMBOLS KEY

American unit

Afghan Army (ANA) unit

infantry

ANA commando

UNIT TYPE UNIT SIZE

OBJ ALPHA

AMAZON

1

TERRAIN FEATURES

GRAPHIC CONTROL 

MEASURES

MISCELLANEOUS

strongpoint

helicopter landing zone

objective

planned movement

actual movement

company

company team

platoon 

ANA section 

squad

foliage

elevation point

village

Coalition base

enemy contact

operational phase marker

ANA Afghan National Army 

COP combat outpost

FOB forward operating base

HLZ helicopter landing zone

OBJ objective

ODA Operational Detachment A

(Special Forces) 

SCT scout

SP strongpoint

VPB vehicle patrol base

ABBREVIATIONS

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

On the afternoon of 25 June 2011, the Soldiers of Bravo Company, 

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 25th 

Infantry Division, also known as Task Force (TF) Cacti, entered an 

area of Afghanistan known as the “Gambir Jungle” as part of Operation 

HAMMER DOWN. The men of Bravo Company were far from the first 

Coalition force to try to clear the Watapur Valley. Situated at the northern 

end of the valley in Kunar Province and nicknamed after the imposing 

trees that cover the mountainside upon which the village of Gambir rests, 

the “Jungle” had been a focal point of several prior Coalition operations. 

Previous American units had attempted to forge ties with Gambir’s elders 

with only limited success. The previous November, a US Special Forces 

(SF) unit had forcibly cleared the village but conditions in the valley 

deteriorated yet again. 

At approximately 1300, as Bravo Company closed on the outskirts 

of Gambir to begin clearing the village, the forest came alive with gunfire. 

Within minutes, the senior leadership of Bravo Company suffered severe 

blows as the leader of 1st Platoon, First Lieutenant Dimitri del Castillo, 

died in the initial onslaught and the company’s commander and fire 

support officer (FSO) both suffered injuries requiring their evacuation that 

night. The aggressive resolve of the insurgents near Gambir compelled the 

commander of TF Cacti, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Tuley, to rewrite the 

plan for Operation HAMMER DOWN. Originally a two-day mission to 

clear suspected insurgent training camps near Gambir and disrupt the flow 

of hostiles into the Pech River region, the operation became a weeklong 

fight to control key terrain and relieve the pressure on Bravo Company. 

Over the following seven days, the men of TF Cacti found themselves in 

a serious battle that tested their training as well as their courage. 

For Operation HAMMER DOWN, US forces massed an unprecedented 

amount of combat power in the remote Watapur Valley. The action served 

as the culmination of years of combined US and Afghan operations in 

the area. During the decade-long campaign in Afghanistan, US forces 

rotated regularly to keep their manpower fresh and to maintain morale. 

The history of these operations in the Watapur serves as a particularly 

valuable account of how tactical level commanders applied lethal and 

non-lethal methods to control a valley. The valley had not received the 

same level of official or popular attention as the neighboring Waygal and 

Korengal Valleys. Yet, no US unit could afford to overlook the Watapur 
2

valley and all US commanders in its vicinity deemed the area important 

enough to mount frequent operations there. The main reason for this was 

the fact that Pakistani-based criminals, terrorists, and insurgent groups 

often used the northern reaches of the Watapur to train fighters and to 

funnel men into the Pech Valley. The rough terrain and the transient and 

often-hostile population provided additional challenges to units intent on 

bringing stability to a restive region.

The Watapur’s residents and foreign fighters active in the valley tested 

many of the key assumptions and limitations of the US counterinsurgency 

(COIN) strategy in Afghanistan. This study examines Operation HAMMER 

DOWN, the attempt by TF Cacti to mass its forces in an insurgent hotbed 

and apply lethal force to the problem, leading to the largest operation in 

the Watapur since the war began. Ultimately, TF Cacti’s Watapur operation 

served as a microcosm through which the most basic dilemma facing 

tactical leaders in Afghanistan, or any counterinsurgency campaign, can 

be better understood: as to how can commanders apply lethal operations to 

best achieve the campaign’s objectives? Since the beginning of the Afghan 

campaign, many tactical level leaders faced this issue and found a variety 

of solutions but in isolated regions like the Watapur, where the physical 

conditions were arduous and the population often antagonistic, enduring 

success often eluded the Coalition. 

The study that follows will first provide a general overview of the 

geographic, cultural, and historical factors which shaped the Watapur 

Valley and its population. In the chapter that follows, this account will 

detail the ways in which Coalition forces attempted to use both lethal 

and non-lethal operations to solve the problems posed by the Watapur 

between 2005 and 2010. HAMMER DOWN, TF Cacti’s focused offensive 

operation against insurgent elements in the valley, becomes the focus of 

the remaining chapters. The conclusion seeks to provide key factors that 

highlight the experience of US Soldiers in the Watapur during HAMMER 

DOWN, and by extension, offer general insights about how the US Army 

attempted to engage the isolated regions of Afghanistan that resemble the 

Watapur.

The Watapur Valley to 2001 

Long before the execution of Operation HAMMER DOWN, the 

Watapur Valley and the Pech River region of Afghanistan had a long history 

of armed conflict. The mountainous terrain physically and culturally 

isolated the populace from the outside world but did not completely 

prevent other groups from periodically entering the region. 
3

The Watapur is one of hundreds of valleys found in northeastern 

Afghanistan in what are essentially the southwestern foothills of the Hindu 

Kush range. The collision of tectonic plates and the flow of water courses 

occurring over millions of years combined to create a very mountainous 

region, cut by narrow gorges and small valleys. Over millions of years, the 

flow of the Hezerbagh River (also known as the Gambir River) had carved 

out a valley approximately 18 kilometers in length and varying from 5-10 

kilometers wide. The flat valley floor lays in the shadows of a series of 

mountains and ridgelines that surround it and frequently top 3,000 meters 

in elevation. Where the Hezerbagh/Gambir empties into the Pech River, 

the valley floor was nearly one kilometer wide but narrows dramatically 

farther to the north, restricting passage by wheeled vehicles. The village 

of Shamir Kowt lies at the mouth of the valley, with the other prominent 

valley floor villages of Qatar Kala, Qowru, and Shahid situated farther to 

the north. The steep western slope of the valley limited human settlement 

on that side of the valley but Afghans had established several settlements 

on the somewhat gentler eastern slope. From south to north, the villages on 

the eastern slope: Tows Kala, Tsangar, Katar Darya, Sero Kalay, Gambir, 

and Zawardiwuz, contained most of the valley’s population of between 

10,000 and 20,000 people.1 

This physical environment profoundly affected the lives of the 

people who lived there. The terrain and isolation limited the economic 

opportunities available to the locals with subsistence farming and small 

scale goat herding remaining the most common occupations into the 21st 

century. The oldest known cultures in the region spoke Persian and Dardic 

languages that survived in this isolated environment into the 20th century. 

The first Western invaders, Alexander’s Greeks and Macedonians, visited 

the area during the 4th century BC followed over the next millennia by 

Arabs, Turks, and Mongols. The Arab conquest of the 7th century AD 

brought Islam to present-day Afghanistan, although the conversion of 

local peoples to the Muslim faith took many centuries. Just to the north of 

the Pech Valley, the Afghan government in the late 19th century forcibly 

converted the Nuristanis, including those who live in the northern Watapur, 

to Islam.2
4

Figure 1: Kunar Province - Major Rivers and Valleys.

Source: author/CSI generated.

Afghanistan as a unified political kingdom began to coalesce in 

the 16th and 17th centuries as a distinct Pashtun culture which took 

root and formed the core of the new state. While the larger Ghilzai and 

Durrani Pashtun tribes jockeyed for power in Afghanistan over several 

centuries, the more isolated inhabitants of the Pech area instead belonged 

to the smaller Safi Pashtun group of the Ghurghusht Tribe. The Safis 

demonstrated a willingness to resist forces attempting to exert control over 

their homeland, especially when they constituted one of the key factions 

supporting the rebellion of Khushal Khan Kattack against the Mughal 

emperor Aurangzeb in the late 17th century. Later, the British split of 

the Pashtun tribes along the Durand Line in the 19th century created the 

border between modern Afghanistan and Pakistan.3

 
5

Three developments occurred during the mid-20th century that 

profoundly shaped life in the Pech Valley. First, Safi Pashtuns in what is 

today Kunar province briefly revolted against King Mohammed Shah’s 

reforms in 1945 and 1946, but the king quickly and successfully put down 

the revolt. Perhaps not coincidentally, in the 1950s, a fundamentalist 

Wahhabi strain of Islam brought by missionaries from Pakistan’s Bajaur 

Agency spread throughout the Pech and began to radicalize political and 

social attitudes. The king maintained power until 1973, at which point a 

long running internal struggle between advocates of modernization and 

their opponents devolved into open conflict. A series of coups allowed 

the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan to take power in 

1978 and the new rulers promulgated a series of reforms, including land 

redistribution and the granting of equal rights to women. The policies 

provoked a strong backlash among conservative Afghans, prompting the 

Safi Pashtuns of the Pech Valley and neighboring Nuristanis to revolt 

against the newly created Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. By March 

1979, Pech residents had expelled all Afghan government forces from the 

valley. Other regions followed suit, and the Marxist government quickly 

lost legitimacy in these areas.4

The Soviet Union viewed the chaos in Afghanistan as a threat to its 

central Asian interests and initiated a military intervention in December 

1979. After installing a new Afghan leader, Soviet forces fanned out into 

the countryside to suppress the rebellion. In a series of engagements from 

10 to 15 May 1980, Soviet forces quelled the antigovernment elements 

in the Pech. Soviet troops air assaulted into several key locations in the 

valley, including Qatar Kala at the heart of the Watapur Valley. The Soviet 

incursion into the area scattered many of the mujahedeen, although some 

of the insurgents rallied to destroy a Soviet force at Khaki Banday on 

the Pech to the west of the Watapur. This success proved short lived, 

however, as Soviet reinforcements in the western Pech broke the back of 

the rebellion. Leaders of the mujahedeen fled with their families and many 

other Pech residents, first seeking sanctuary in the more rugged regions 

of Nuristan, then eventually moving eastward into Pakistan where they 

worked to rebuild their movement. With this one operation, the Soviets 

had effectively quashed the insurgency in the Pech, and most subsequent 

fighting in the region primarily occurred in the large Kunar River Valley 

to the east.5

Between 1980 and 2002, little large-scale conflict occurred in 

the Pech. A Soviet force returned to the area briefly in 1986 to combat 

a resurgent mujahedeen. A decade later, the ultra-conservative Taliban 
6

movement spread into eastern Afghanistan after rising to power in the 

country’s southern provinces in 1994 and 1995. The Taliban took nominal 

control of Kunar province but militias affiliated with the Gulbuddin 

Hekmetyar’s Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and other local forces 

prevented a full military takeover and deterred Taliban forces from 

entering Kunar. The Pech region and much of Nuristan province existed in 

a no-man’s land between Taliban strongholds in the south and the seat of 

Northern Alliance power in the Panjshir Valley to the immediate west, and 

neither side saw value in a large scale military intervention. This state of 

precarious calm existed until the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the 

United States and the subsequent American intervention, which upset the 

balance of power in the country.6

Over the centuries, the population of the Watapur Valley developed 

fitfully as they came into contact with the myriad powers and cultural 

forces that swept through the region. Over time, however, the people of the 

region adopted a very conservative form of Islam and stood in opposition 

to elements of their own government, the Soviet Union, and the Taliban. 

By 2001, they had shown themselves ready and willing to resist any 

outside force they perceived as a threat to their faith and their way of life. 
7

Notes

1. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 42-49, 52-53; Captain Willard 

Hayes, Sergeant Clayton Henry, Sergeant Eric Jones, interview by Ryan Wadle, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 July 2012, 14-15.

2. Barfield, Afghanistan, 25; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military 

History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban, rev. ed. 

(Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), 100-107, 218. 

3. Tanner, Afghanistan, 65, 113; Barfield, Afghanistan, 90-95, 232-233. 

4. Barfield, Afghanistan, 321; Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan 

Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War (Philadelphia: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 62. David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies 

of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 139-145. 

5. Edwards, Before Taliban, 158-161. 

6. Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, 64-5; Staff of the Combat Studies 

Institute, Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 2-3.

9

Chapter 2

US Operations in the Watapur Valley, 2002-2011

During the first ten years of ENDURING FREEDOM, the Watapur 

Valley grew increasingly important over time as the size and scope of 

Coalition operations in the entire Pech region expanded in response to a 

growing insurgency. This chapter will examine the situation in the Watapur 

after 2001 and the evolution of the Coalition’s approach to achieving its 

objectives in the valley. While a succession of US Army battalions focused 

increasing time and energy on the valley to suppress the insurgent fighters 

and win support of the population, no single unit was successful. Lack of 

progress in the Watapur in this period would shape TF Cacti’s decision to 

go into the valley with overwhelming lethal force in 2011.

The US Military in the Watapur, 2002-2007

Coalition operations in Kunar Province gradually increased over 

the course of the campaign in Afghanistan. In the first year of Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM, US military forces made only sporadic 

appearances in the province. In 2002, however, American Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) units began operating in the area to hunt for senior 

Taliban and al Qaeda figures who had escaped from the Coalition. These 

searches were soon overshadowed when locals in Kunar province, upset by 

the controversial death of a local man named Abdul Wali while in Coalition 

custody and angered by corruption in the new Afghan government, began 

opposing the Coalition with HIG and al Qaeda foreign fighter support.1

That fall, the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat 

Team, 82d Airborne Division moved into the province and established 

a permanent outpost at Asadabad at the junction of the Kunar and Pech 

Rivers. In November 2003, during Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE, the 

first large scale foray into the Pech valley, the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry 

Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, established 

the first permanent outpost in the Pech Valley just west of the village of 

Nangalam. Initially named Firebase Catamount, when Soldiers from the 

2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (2-75 Rangers) began using the base 

in December to search for high value targets (HVTs), they renamed the 

outpost Camp Blessing in honor of Sergeant Jay Blessing, a Ranger killed 

nearby in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack a month earlier.2

In late 2003, the Coalition approach to the Afghan campaign changed 

significantly. Lieutenant General David Barno assumed command of the 

Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and initiated a strategic review 

of the campaign in Afghanistan concluding that the Coalition should 
10

reorient its focus away from simply destroying remnant insurgent forces 

and towards building popular support for the Afghan government. Three 

years before the drafting of the US military’s official counterinsurgency 

(COIN) doctrine, Field Manual 3-24, US forces in Afghanistan began 

waging a COIN campaign intended to provide the security necessary to 

allow a stable government to operate and for economic opportunities to 

grow. This change in approach pushed US forces into previously untouched 

parts of the country. By 2004, US Army Special Forces (SF) Operation 

Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams and a platoon of Marines operating from 

Camp Blessing, began efforts to extend the influence of Afghanistan’s 

central government over a heretofore unreached population. The ODA 

team used a “carrot-and-stick” approach in which villages that refused to 

harbor Taliban or al Qaeda fighters or whose residents voluntarily turned 

over their weapons to the Americans received construction projects and 

other forms of aid. The villages who refused to do either of these things 

received nothing.3 

Between 2004 and 2006, the American presence at Camp Blessing 

expanded significantly as Marine units assumed responsibility for the 

region. These forces, in combination with other US and Coalition assets, 

operated frequently in the Pech Valley. In particular, 2d Battalion, 3d 

Marine Regiment (2/3 MAR) which was the last Marine battalion to be 

fully responsible for the Pech, conducted several operations in the Pech’s 

tributary valleys during their deployment from April 2005 to January 2006. 

During Operation PIL in late October 2005, 2/3’s Fox Company under 

Captain Kelly Grissom visited Kur Bagh and Panjgal just to the west of 

the Watapur. Meanwhile, Captain Peter Capuzzi’s Golf Company went to 

Tsangar in the center of the valley. Capuzzi’s Marines found the residents 

of Tsangar indifferent to the Coalition presence. The Marines reported 

receiving very sporadic fire from isolated gunmen and suffered no major 

casualties during the operation. This was the first major movement into 

the Watapur by a US conventional maneuver unit and remained the largest 

operation conducted by an American unit in the valley until 2007.4

 

In March 2006, the Marines transferred control of the Pech region to 

the Army’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment (1-32 IN), also known 

as Task Force Chosin. Three significant factors shaped TF Chosin’s 

deployment to Kunar. First, the battalion had responsibility for a very 

large area of operations (AO) spanning the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, 

Laghman, and part of Nuristan. In total, these provinces contained a 

population of more than 1.9 million people and covered 25,737 square 

kilometers. While this number was only a fraction of Afghanistan’s overall 
11

population of 25 million, covering such a large area with a single infantry 

battalion constituted an economy of force mission. Second, and more 

specific to the Pech region, US forces initially only had two significant 

bases in central Kunar Province: Camp Blessing at Nangalam and Camp 

Wright at Asadabad. 

Figure 2: The Watapur Valley, 2002-2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.

The paucity of bases was indicative of the size of the Coalition 

commitment to Afghanistan from 2001 through 2005 but even with the 

meager forces at hand, expanding the military presence became a top 

priority for TF Chosin because of the third factor – a greater emphasis 

on population-centric COIN.5

 The commander of TF Chosin, Lieutenant 

Colonel Christopher Cavoli, had been charged by his leadership to secure 

population centers in the region from insurgent influence and further 

the reach of the central Afghan government. This meant expanding the 

footprint of the Coalition presence in Kunar, Nuristan, and Nangarhar 

provinces.

An opportunity to establish a larger and more lasting presence in 

the Pech came about early in TF Chosin’s tour. From January through 

May 2006, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3 MAR) operated in northeast 

Afghanistan with TF Chosin. To take advantage of the extra military 
12

strength, 1-32 IN, 1/3 MAR and Afghan units conducted Operation 

MOUNTAIN LION between 14 March and 15 May 2006. This combined 

force worked to extend Afghan influence into Kunar and Nuristan provinces 

to defeat insurgent networks and facilitate economic development in the 

region. During the operation, TF Chosin’s Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company secured the entirety of the Pech River Road and other forces 

began pushing into many of the Pech’s capillary valleys, including the 

Waygal just west of the Watapur and the Korengal and Shuryak valleys that 

flowed into the Pech from the south. Prior to MOUNTAIN LION, travel 

from Asadabad to Nangalam took hours because of the poor condition of 

the Pech River Road and the insurgent and IED threats. Securing the road 

meant that American forces could transit the valley much more rapidly and 

eventually work began to pave the road.6

Lieutenant Colonel Cavoli saw an opportunity that MOUNTAIN LION 

had made possible. In previous operations, the insurgent operations in the 

area resumed once Coalition forces returned to their bases thus limiting 

the effectiveness of any attempt to secure areas that had been cleared of 

insurgents. Cavoli now decided to stay in those areas that constituted 

population centers. The Soldiers from TF Chosin who ventured into the 

Pech during MOUNTAIN LION reported that the local residents responded 

quite favorably to their presence. Based on these reactions, Cavoli’s unit 

constructed a series of small outposts along the river road to maintain a 

more permanent presence. From these positions, the battalion hoped to 

spread Coalition influence into the capillary valleys and eventually to the 

more isolated villages found on the ridgelines above the valley floors.7

 

As part of this flurry of activity, the battalion’s leadership decided to 

build an outpost at or near the head of the Watapur Valley. Based on the 

positive contacts that US forces had with the people of Semitan, a small 

village just to the west of the mouth the Watapur Valley along the north 

bank of the Pech River, Charlie Company constructed Vehicle Patrol Base 

(VPB) Florida on vacant land immediately outside the village. The VPB 

lay next to the Pech River Road or ROUTE (RTE) RHODE ISLAND as 

Coalition forces called it and allowed the troops to interact freely with 

local residents without significantly disrupting their daily routines. From 

the new base, the Soldiers conducted multi-day patrols during which they 

visited nearby villages, met with the local elders, and then moved on to the 

next village only returning to their small bases for resupply.8

During the late spring and early summer, the commander of Charlie 

Company, Captain Robert Stanton, received intelligence on enemy activity 

in the Watapur Valley and began tracking the flow of foreign fighters into 
13

the valley’s northern end. The need to secure RTE RHODE ISLAND 

and the wide dispersion of the battalion’s assets, however, meant that the 

Watapur remained a relatively low priority for Stanton. Only once, in 

early July 2006, did TF Chosin conduct a major operation into the valley 

region. The battalion commander sent two platoons, one from Stanton’s 

company and the other from Alpha Company (about 80 Soldiers), into the 

Watapur in an attempt to interdict the movement of insurgents across the 

ridgelines. Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon led by First Lieutenant Raymond 

McPadden moved onto the high ground above Tsangar while Captain 

Stanton led a platoon from Charlie Company from VPB Combat Main 

through Kur Bagh towards Shuban Sar peak to the northwest. Once on 

Shuban Sar, Stanton’s men secured a landing zone to allow the battalion’s 

scout platoon to land via helicopter and then advance northward along 

suspected insurgent trails.9

Stanton’s platoon met no major enemy resistance during their portion 

of the mission. Meanwhile, McPadden’s platoon near Tsangar was not so 

lucky. On 5 July, the third day of the operation, the platoon established 

a patrol base approximately 500 meters below the top of the ridgeline 

and approximately a kilometer above Tsangar. However, the site chosen 

included some unobservable areas between fighting positions and an 

unarmed villager wandered through the patrol base virtually undetected. 

Soon afterwards, an insurgent force hiding in the brush around the base 

attacked the American platoon. McPadden’s force called in field artillery 

and mortars but there was no reserve available to provide reinforcements 

on the ground. The 3d Platoon killed at least six insurgents but the long 

firefight and the large number of men wounded in the fight, left the unit 

unable to pursue the enemy force. Only on 10 July, five days after the 

firefight, did an Afghan Army platoon relieve McPadden’s force allowing 

his men to return to their normal outpost in the Korengal Valley. The 

remnants of the insurgent element, however, continued westward and 

attacked the battalion’s scout platoon in the mountains north of Shuban 

Sar, bringing the operation to a close.10 

TF Rock into the Valleys, 2007-2008

Initially slated for a 12 month long deployment to Afghanistan, the 

1-32 IN had its tour of duty extended and remained in place until relieved in 

May 2007 by 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (2-503 IN) which was nicknamed 

TF Rock. Beginning with this deployment cycle, the number of American 

Soldiers in Afghanistan increased and forces realigned within the country. 

As a result, where TF Chosin’s AO had covered parts of four provinces, 

TF Rock only deployed to Kunar and parts of Nuristan. Lieutenant Colonel 
14

William Ostlund, the battalion commander, hoped to engage insurgents 

deep in the Pech’s capillary valleys including the Watapur in order to 

improve security along the Pech River Road. Within TF Rock’s AO, part of 

Captain Louis Frketic’s Alpha Company occupied VPB Florida and several 

other outposts along the road. Almost immediately upon his unit’s arrival, 

Frketic implemented Ostlund’s strategy in the Watapur area by sending 

reconnaissance patrols up the valley and meeting with local village elders 

as far north as Qatar Kala. These initial patrols allowed Frketic to gain a 

greater understanding of the valley’s political and social dynamics in order 

to better execute the battalion campaign plan.11

In late June, Frketic began pushing elements of his company farther 

up the Watapur. On 27 June, Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon reached Qowru 

approximately one kilometer north of Qatar Kala. After patrolling the 

village, the Soldiers began returning southward to exit the valley when they 

made contact with a group of insurgents. The ensuing firefight was short but 

it served as a catalyst for further American action in the Watapur. Frketic 

had received warnings from his predecessor, Stanton, about the hostility of 

Tsangar’s residents. Intelligence gathered during the early months of the 

2-503 IN’s deployment indicated that the insurgents operated a training 

camp in that village and others in the valley. This training camp consisted 

of a number of compounds that reportedly housed both foreign fighters and 

Afghan insurgents as they organized and learned a variety of techniques. 

Frketic noted that the camps provided a “summer internship” whereby 

new insurgent fighters could train, receive their first taste of combat by 

engaging US forces in the Watapur, and then return to their home areas 

prepared to continue the fight against the Coalition. Based on the attack in 

Qowru and the intelligence on Tsangar, Frketic received approval from his 

battalion commander to mount Operation ABLE ATTACK. Scheduled for 

4-5 July 2007, the operation called for an air assault into Tsangar to clear 

the village in order to eliminate the training camp.12

On 3 July, the day prior to ABLE ATTACK, an ad hoc platoon-sized 

element drawn from across Alpha Company attended a meeting with local 

Afghans in Qowru, this time with Captain Frketic leading. Yet again, as 

the Soldiers left the village, insurgents fired at the Americans. This second 

encounter was far more intense than the first firefight. An estimated 30-

40 enemy fighters had moved down the ridgelines from Tsangar to fire 

upon the Americans with small arms, machine guns, and rocket propelled 

grenades (RPGs). The paratrooper platoon quickly regained the upper hand 

and forced the insurgents to withdraw but the incident only reinforced the 

need to clear Tsangar.13
15

The following night, Alpha Company’s 1st and 3d Platoons, each 

partnered with Afghan Army platoons, air-assaulted into positions near 

Tsangar. The 1st Platoon and its Afghan partners landed at Helicopter 

Landing Zone (HLZ) Proposed, located south and west of Tsangar and 

established a blocking position. Meanwhile Frketic, his 3d Platoon, and 

an Afghan platoon landed at HLZ Chiefs, east of Tsangar, intending to 

clear the village and push any suspected insurgents towards 1st Platoon’s 

blocking position. Soon after landing, the Afghan platoon made contact 

with insurgents at the presumed training campsite and a firefight ensued. 

The Afghan unit suffered two wounded, one of which was First Lieutenant 

Jeff Colunga, leader of their US Marine Corps Embedded Training Team 

(ETT). They successfully fought through the insurgent fire, however, 

and then destroyed the camp. The next morning, the 3d Platoon pushed 

through the steeply terraced terrain to clear the village and linked up with 

the 1st Platoon at their blocking position.14

After the rendezvous at the blocking position, the 1st Platoon began 

searching nearby caves for hidden caches when the entire combined 

force began receiving heavy fire from all directions. An enemy force 

estimated at more than 100 fighters had occupied positions surrounding 

the Americans and the Afghan National Army platoons and a long firefight 

ensued. The paratroopers suffered several casualties, including Private 

First Class Christopher Honaker and Specialist Joseph Miracle who were 

killed. Despite the fierce enemy fire, Alpha Company held its own, and 

eventually, a torrent of 155-mm artillery rounds, 60-mm mortar rounds, 

500-lb. bombs, missile strikes from Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs), and a pass by an orbiting Air Force AC-130 gunship stopped the 

enemy attack. Alpha Company remained in their positions throughout 6 

July and exfiltrated from HLZ Proposed back to Combat Outpost (COP) 

Able Main late that night.15

Over the long term, ABLE ATTACK had a decidedly mixed effect 

on the security situation in the Watapur Valley. The number of valley 

residents providing information on insurgent activities to Coalition forces 

significantly increased and led to a greater understanding of the nature of 

enemy activity in the area. Unfortunately, the firefight also strengthened 

the enemy’s resolve in the face of what they viewed as an insidious 

American threat. Insurgent forces had suffered heavy losses but this did 

not prevent other local or foreign fighters from taking up arms against the 

Coalition. In fact, Frketic noted that nearly all future patrols north of Qatar 

Kala met with some enemy resistance.16 The operation was the largest in 

the Watapur since the 2/3 Marines’ Operation PIL in 2005 and revealed an 

enemy willing and able to resist Alpha Company’s moves into the valley. 
16

Undeterred by the increased hostility shown by many locals after ABLE 

ATTACK, Captain Frketic continued to operate in the valley. Lieutenant 

Colonel Ostlund had built his campaign plan based on that of TF Chosin 

but he adjusted his overall array of forces in the area of operation. First, he 

wanted to consolidate the string of small outposts in the Pech. During this 

consolidation, Ostlund desired to move VPB Florida, the main Coalition 

outpost in the area, closer to more populated parts of the Watapur District in 

order to facilitate population-centric counterinsurgency operations. Even 

by the standards of the region, Semitan was an extremely small village, 

incapable of influencing the region. Tactically, VPB Florida’s location in 

the shadow of the ridgeline on the west side of the valley left it exposed 

to direct fire from insurgents. Runoff from rainfall also streamed down the 

ridgeline and frequently inundated the small base, much to the discomfort 

of the Coalition forces stationed there.17 

Moving the American base in the Watapur farther to the east could 

solve these problems but the question became where to place the outpost 

to achieve the maximum effect. Ostlund briefly considered establishing 

an outpost in the northern reaches of the Watapur but experience with 

the Korengal Outpost and COPs Bella and Ranch House deep in the 

nearby Waygal Valley demonstrated that such an outpost would require 

air assets to remain supplied. More worrying was the fact that an outpost 

in the northern Watapur would not guarantee that relationships with the 

valley’s residents actually improved; the Korengal had remained restive 

even after more than a year of close contact with American forces and 

the population of the Waygal remained neutral at best. Ostlund set aside 

this option and chose to build a new outpost at a site scouted by Frketic 

just outside the village of Shamir Kowt at the mouth of the Watapur that 

promised to remedy VPB Florida’s problems. First, the location at Shamir 

Kowt would avoid the problems caused by flooding and, by virtue of the 

increased distance from the ridgelines, made the new site more secure. 

Second, Shamir Kowt’s bazaar was the economic hub for the entire 

Watapur District and because it attracted customers from miles around, the 

new location would allow the Coalition to observe and influence Watapur 

Valley residents more easily.18 

Captain Frketic initially attempted to secure permission and a formal 

lease from Shamir Kowt’s elders to build the new base. The Americans 

hired surveyors from a local engineering firm to determine a suitable site 

and they also held several meetings in the village to resolve local land 

conflicts so that construction could begin. The elders of Shamir Kowt 

and the district government, however, mired the proposal in red tape and 
17

it soon appeared unlikely that any local entity would formally grant the 

Americans a lease. Wishing to wait no further, Frketic moved elements of 

Alpha Company into the new site in late July and seized the land. While 

seemingly contradicting Alpha Company’s goal of better connecting with 

the local population, this move ultimately benefitted both the Coalition 

and the people of Shamir Kowt. The survey process and the resolution 

of the land disputes gave the Americans a much deeper understanding 

of the social, political, and financial ties between individuals and the 

different tribal clans who inhabited the Watapur Valley. Seizing the land 

also provided political cover for the elders of Shamir Kowt who could 

now reap the rewards of increased security without having to give official 

sanction to a Coalition presence in their village.19

The new outpost, named COP Honaker-Miracle, began with a triplestrand concertina wire perimeter in late July. Over the next several months, 

heavy construction equipment arrived and erected permanent structures on 

the site. Its large size of approximately 24,000 square meters included 

a helicopter landing zone capable of accommodating CH-47 Chinook 

helicopters and the space to house up to a reinforced battalion of US 

and Afghan Soldiers. Over time, the COP accommodated two 155-mm 

howitzers, increasing the amount of supporting fires available to Coalition 

forces operating in the vicinity. Concurrent with the COP’s construction 

and in an effort to facilitate closer ties between security forces and the 

local government, the Americans built a new district center just outside the 

COP to replace the older makeshift structure previously in use.20

As the construction of COP Honaker-Miracle progressed, the men of 

Alpha Company participated in another major operation into the Watapur 

named SNAKETOOTH. Conducted in late September, the intent of 

SNAKETOOTH, just as with ABLE ATTACK, was to cordon and search 

Tsangar. The operation involved SF units air-assaulting into positions on 

the ridgeline above Tsangar to clear the village while elements from Alpha 

Company occupied a blocking position in Qowru. The bulk of enemy 

resistance, however, came not against the units around Tsangar but against 

a small force occupying a position on the west side of the Watapur Valley. 

This platoon-sized force under the command of First Lieutenant Gregory 

Ambrosia, Alpha Company’s executive officer, came under heavy fire 

on the morning of 25 September. A pitched battle ensued that day as the 

insurgents closed to within hand grenade range of the American position. 

Ambrosia and his paratroopers repulsed the attack and used smoke to mark 

locations for fires and gun-runs by helicopter gunships that successfully 

drove off the insurgent force.21 
18

Following Operation SNAKETOOTH, Alpha Company continued 

to conduct routine patrols in the valley and met with village elders. In 

the spring of 2008, Captain Frketic transferred command to Captain 

David Nelson who continued to engage local Afghan leaders. Nelson 

specifically intended to gain Afghan support for the planned conversion 

of an abandoned building between Qatar Kala and Qowru on the valley 

floor into a clinic capable of providing regular medical care and to support 

periodic Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) missions by US units. 

The clinic promised to bring the benefits of development deep into the 

Watapur and convince skeptical locals of the need for a stronger Afghan 

government presence. After one meeting about the clinic in a Watapur 

village, insurgents fired on Nelson and his 2d Platoon as they departed. 

Soon afterwards, Nelson entered the village of Shahid to meet with 

another set of local leaders bringing a mounted force including the 2d and 

3d Platoons, an Afghan Army company, and a Route Clearance Package 

(RCP), an engineer platoon equipped with specially outfitted vehicles and 

other equipment tasked with finding and neutralizing IEDs. Nelson had 

coordinated fire support from mortars, artillery, and Apache gunships in 

case of another ambush. After the meeting, Nelson’s force was met by 

heavy fire from multiple directions. A five hour long battle ensued that saw 

Alpha Company bring all of its firepower to bear on the insurgents. More 

than 20 insurgent fighters died in this engagement before the enemy force 

withdrew into the mountains.22

The insurgents’ willingness to stand and fight was likely driven, at 

least in part, by their belief that the clinic posed a threat to their ability to 

control the northern end of the valley. They thus opposed Nelson’s efforts 

to promote the clinic among village elders. TF Rock however was intent 

on gaining some influence over the Watapur’s population. Accordingly, 

Able Company escorted the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team 

(PRT) – a combined civil/military unit engaged in economic development 

missions – north of Qatar Kala to a meeting to discuss the clinic and 

distribute humanitarian aid. As before, insurgents fired on the Coalition 

force as it left the Watapur. Nelson, learning from the two prior incidents, 

had placed a scout sniper team onto a ridgeline for additional cover and 

held his AH-64 Apache gunships out of auditory range of the insurgents. 

The aggressive enemy tried to suppress Alpha Company’s fire while an 

insurgent maneuver element attempted to move down and block the road. 

The scout sniper team, however, forced these insurgents to withdraw. 

Eventually, the enemy’s enthusiasm for the fight waned and they broke 

contact.23
19

Captain Nelson now sought to use the insurgent’s aggressiveness 

against them with a fourth foray into the northern Watapur. On 24 June 

2008, 1st and 3d Platoons air-assaulted into the eastern and western sides 

of the valley respectively, with signals intelligence (SIGINT) teams to 

pinpoint insurgent locations. Nelson led his 2d Platoon and Afghan Army 

platoon north of Qatar Kala bringing earth-filled HESCO barriers and told 

local elders that he intended to build a COP in the valley. The news spread 

like wildfire and soon the SIGINT equipment began intercepting insurgent 

communications that indicated that they intended to prevent the Americans 

from establishing a permanent combat presence in the valley. Over the 

next 36 hours, an enemy force estimated at a strength of 20 separate 

squads converged on the Watapur only to encounter massed indirect fires 

and close air support. The insurgents suffered heavy casualties before 

withdrawing from the field. Nelson hoped that the battle would disrupt 

the insurgents long enough for TF Rock’s replacements, due to arrive the 

following month, to establish in the Watapur.24 

Constrained Counterinsurgency Efforts in the Watapur Valley, 

2008-2010

The two units that deployed to the Pech between mid-2008 and 2010 

reduced their emphasis on the Watapur Valley in order to focus on the 

virulent insurgency that had erupted in the nearby Korengal Valley. In July 

2008, TF Rock was replaced by the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment 

(1-26 IN), nicknamed TF Blue Spader. The new unit’s Alpha Company, 

commanded by Captain Nicholas Bilotta, assumed responsibility for 

Watapur District and part of the Pech District along RTE RHODE ISLAND. 

When Bilotta first arrived in Afghanistan, he initially continued Nelson’s 

aggressive operations in the Watapur. The company regularly patrolled the 

valley and routinely visited Qatar Kala and Qowru. The RCPs typically 

led these mounted patrols up the Watapur’s main road, but in the year 

that Bilotta’s Company spent in the valley, they never found any IEDs. 

These patrols, however, frequently made contact with the enemy, actions 

that would lead to Bilotta’s Soldiers calling in indirect fires to suppress 

insurgent elements.25 

Plans for a company-sized operation to clear Tsangar or Gambir never 

materialized, eclipsed by other priorities and a lack of available support 

assets. Instead, the largest operation in the Watapur during TF Blue

Spader’s deployment was conducted in November 2008 by US Special 

Forces and their partner Afghan Army units. While Bilotta’s company 

occupied blocking positions at the valley floor, SF and Afghan Army 

forces cleared Tsangar. Unfortunately poor weather limited air support 
20

(especially from helicopter gunships) and Alpha Company never made 

contact with the enemy.26 

Within the Blue Spaders’ AO, the battalion commander, Lieutenant 

Colonel Brett Jenkinson, called for full spectrum operations that balanced 

offensive, defensive, and stability operations in an effort to tie down 

insurgents in Kunar Province while garnering popular support from the 

population.27 In the Watapur by late 2008, Bilotta began prioritizing 

stability missions to quell discontent in the valley. While routine and 

aggressive patrolling had visibly displayed the American presence in the 

area and led to the deaths of many insurgents, the patrols had failed to 

decrease the enemy presence or win over the residents. Bilotta compared 

the seemingly incessant stream of fighters in the Watapur to ants flowing 

out of an anthill. He reasoned that patrolling had distracted him and his men 

from engaging with the local government and the civilian population of 

the Watapur. Therefore by middle of the deployment in winter 2008/2009, 

Alpha Company shifted towards nonlethal operations and aggressively 

expanded its outreach towards the locals. By better addressing the 

population’s needs, Bilotta believed that he could build support for the 

legitimate Afghan Government.

Alpha Company exhibited this change of emphasis in several ways. 

First, Bilotta moved the company headquarters from COP Able Main to 

Honaker-Miracle so that he could forge better ties with the population and 

the local government. This shift also demonstrated American recognition 

that the Watapur Valley was critical to securing the Pech River Valley. 

Second, Alpha Company participated in a number of development 

projects and initiatives designed to generate support for the Coalition and 

Afghanistan’s government. These included completing the clinic between 

Qatar Kala and Qowru. Bilotta benefitted from the support that TF Rock

had generated for the project but the insurgents responded by destroying 

the clinic after it was built. Alpha Company participated in a program called 

“Kicks for Kids in Kunar” which distributed thousands of pairs of shoes to 

local children. Other projects helped bring solar and hydro power to Qatar 

Kala. Perhaps the most popular of these efforts was Captain Bilotta’s 

procurement of a large supply of cement for local projects proposed by 

community leaders.28

In June 2009, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment (2-12 IN) also 

known as Task Force Lethal Warrior, deployed to northeast Afghanistan 

to replace TF Blue Spader. Charlie Company, 2-12 IN arrived in the 

Watapur to relieve 1-26 IN’s Alpha Company. As with its predecessors, 

TF Lethal Warrior focused its attention on the Korengal culminating in 
21

the closing of the Korengal Outpost (KOP) the following spring. During 

the relief process in the Watapur Valley, the new company commander, 

Captain Shaun Conlin, accompanied Captain Bilotta, his friend and 

classmate from the United States Military Academy at West Point, to meet 

with local elders in Qowru. The pair stopped in Qatar Kala so that Bilotta 

could introduce Conlin to the elders there, but as they walked through the 

village, the Americans noticed that the local civilians had begun to flee 

the village en masse, an indicator of an imminent attack. The Soldiers 

managed to take up fighting positions on the outskirts of the village before 

the insurgent assault began. The brazenness of the enemy attack surprised 

the Americans and the ensuing firefight lasted nearly six hours before the 

surviving enemy fighters withdrew back up the ridgelines.29 Bilotta later 

recalled telling Conlin after their return to COP Honaker-Miracle, “Hey, 

welcome to the Watapur. This isn’t how it is, you know.”30

While the enemy never proved quite so bold in future months, the 

attack Conlin witnessed in Qatar Kala on his first day set the tone for 

much of Charlie Company’s deployment. Most of the combat endured by 

the company took place in locations in the southern end of the Watapur 

Valley. Soon after the start of the 2-12 IN’s deployment, Conlin sent troops 

to Qatar Kala, this time led by elements from their partner Afghan Army 

unit. At the start of the return trip, an insurgent marksman began firing at 

the convoy. The sniper distracted the Americans and Afghans long enough 

to allow an insurgent force to maneuver into an attack position and open 

fire. The Coalition force soon drove the insurgents off. This attack in 

concert with the earlier firefight in the town demonstrated to Conlin how 

dangerous the valley remained.31

Later patrols moved up the sides of the Watapur’s steep ridgelines to 

destroy insurgent positions located on the high ground. Conlin learned of an 

insurgent presence in the hillside village of Maidon and began dispatching 

regular patrols to the vicinity. The first operation in Maidon occurred in 

late July 2009 when Soldiers from Conlin’s 3d Platoon hiked to the top of 

Pund Sar Peak southwest of Tows Kala to observe the village. Insurgents 

spotted the force and surrounded it, closing to within a few dozen meters 

before opening fire. They wounded several Soldiers, prompting Conlin to 

commit much of the rest of his company and request reinforcements from 

a Delta Company platoon to neutralize the insurgent force.32 

In spite of stiff enemy resistance, Conlin continued to send regular 

patrols into the valley in late 2009. These patrols focused primarily on 

Qatar Kala. Further up the ridgelines, Charlie Company troops conducted a 

small air assault on Maidon to destroy a suspected recoilless rifle position. 
22

A later operation searched an area between Tows Kala and Tsangar for 

a suspected enemy mortar location. During these actions, the enemy 

stealthily observed the American movements and struck when the terrain 

gave them the best chance of success. To disrupt the persistent insurgent 

threat, Conlin proposed executing a battalion-sized operation, but the main 

effort of 2-12 IN was in the Korengal Valley.33 

During the early months of 2010, Conlin’s unit shifted its attention to 

the western end of its area of operation by conducting operations near Kur 

Bagh, Dand, and Khaki Banday to the west of the Watapur along the Pech 

River Road. Only at the end of the deployment did Charlie Company again 

conduct operations in the Watapur itself. Conlin’s men located insurgents 

moving from Tsangar to attack traffic along the Pech River Road between 

Asadabad and Shamir Kowt, and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike 

destroyed the enemy force. Just prior to the end of their tour of duty, Charlie 

Company conducted two more patrols to Maidon that made contact with 

some insurgents and necessitated the use of Close Air Support (CAS) and 

helicopter gunships to destroy suspected enemy positions.34 

Captain Conlin and Charlie Company had spent significant time 

conducting non-lethal operations as well as patrols but local resistance to 

these outreach efforts had grown. Like his predecessors, Conlin had called 

for meetings to forge closer ties between village elders and the Coalition 

forces. Whereas elders from Gambir, Tsangar, and other notorious trouble 

spots had attended past meetings, they now refused to travel to the 

southern end of the Watapur to meet with other elders or the Americans. 

Plans to carry out Veterinary Civil Action Program (VETCAP) missions 

to care for local animals, implement agriculture programs, and conduct 

flood control construction all met with resistance because the locals feared 

insurgent reprisals. Late in Charlie Company’s tour of duty, the unit began 

receiving Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds 

that they quickly used to start worthy projects. Will Hall, a civilian from 

the US Agency for International Development (USAID) located at the 

Watapur District Center, worked with local elders and helped them shape 

their project proposals to make them more likely to receive funds. Only 

by ceding control of these projects to these elders did Conlin spot any 

noticeable increase in support for the Coalition.35

The endemic corruption in Afghanistan stymied several initiatives 

designed to improve the quality of life for the people of the Watapur 

District. For instance, one local development project installed solar 

lights in Qatar Kala. The new lights met with universal praise from the 
23

locals but the technology soon fell victim to persistent corruption and 

theft. After installation, thieves immediately tore down the lights and 

sold off the valuable parts for profit. Another project started by TF Rock

and continued by Captain Conlin was the delivery of desks and other 

furniture to schoolhouses in Qatar Kala and Qowru. The program required 

schoolmasters to travel to the district center to pick up the furniture 

because they could find no contractor willing to do it. Soon after the desks 

arrived, however, someone stole them, forcing the schools to close. One 

empty schoolhouse would eventually function as an impromptu hotel for 

insurgent fighters passing through the Watapur.36

Operation BULLDOG BITE, 2010

In 2010, the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment (1-327 IN) or TF 

Bulldog, relieved 2-12 IN. Captain Robert Reynolds’ Alpha Company 

occupied COP Honaker-Miracle and assumed responsibility for the 

Watapur District. The first several months of the company’s rotation 

focused on Operation CROP DIVERSIFICATION, an attempt to improve 

the agricultural productivity of the region. Alpha Company participated in 

this effort along the Pech River Road and persuaded local farmers to alter 

their crop selections. As the project continued, Alpha Company Soldiers 

patrolled in the Watapur Valley as far north as Qatar Kala but generally 

maintained a low profile there and gathered intelligence on the insurgent 

networks in the area. The one exception came that summer when elements 

from the company searched for weapons caches near Pund Sar Peak to 

prevent insurgents from firing mortars at Honaker-Miracle. The search 

failed to uncover anything significant but it reinforced TF Bulldog’s belief 

that securing the Watapur required more attention and resources.37

TF Bulldog’s early emphasis on nonlethal operations continued 

through summer 2010 but circumstances soon changed, allowing the 

battalion to begin planning a series of combat operations later in the year. 

In June, Bulldog’s sister battalion, 2-327 IN or TF No Slack, had conducted 

Operation STRONG EAGLE in Marawara District to the east, tying up air 

support and other key assets for several weeks and restricting operations in 

the Pech. In September, Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections required TF 

Bulldog and other US units to focus all their resources on securing polling 

sites and government centers. After the elections, TF Bulldog’s parent 

brigade headquarters ceded operational control for Laghman Province to 

another brigade, freeing up a number of brigade-level assets. The situation 

allowed TF Bulldog to become the brigade’s main effort during the fall 

months and the battalion hoped to maximize the opportunity afforded 

them.38
24

Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Ryan and his 

staff planned an ambitious operation, BULLDOG BITE, which entailed 

large clearing operations in different parts of the Pech Valley. Beginning 

in October, phase one of BULLDOG BITE cleared the Korengal and 

Shuryak valleys southwest of the Watapur followed by a second phase of 

clearing operations in the Chapa Dara District at the western end of the 

Pech Valley. The actions proved successful in reducing the threat posed by 

these trouble spots. However, they also mobilized and attracted insurgents 

throughout the region by the time the third phase of the operation began. 

This part of BULLDOG BITE was focused on the Watapur Valley and 

would be the largest operation by an Army unit in the valley since ABLE 

ATTACK in 2007.39 

For this phase, Captain Reynolds’ Alpha Company became the 

battalion’s decisive effort. The operation called for the company to move 

by helicopter into positions east of Tsangar to clear the village of insurgent 

activity. Once through Tsangar, Alpha Company would then advance 

down the ridgeline to Qowru and then south to Qatar Kala. Elements 

from TF Bulldog’s Bravo, Charlie, and Delta companies would assume 

blocking positions in the valley below Tsangar to intercept any fighters 

that attempted to flee Alpha Company’s movements. In addition to the rifle 

companies, SOF elements would operate at the north end of the valley. An 

Afghan commando battalion, advised by an American ODA, planned to 

clear Katar Darya, and a special operations task force that included several 

US Army Ranger units would clear Gambir.40

Reynolds, his headquarters element, and his 1st and 3d Platoons 

landed at HLZ Chiefs to the northeast of Tsangar on the morning of 12 

November. Delta Company’s 3d Platoon with its Afghan National Army 

(ANA) partners occupied an overwatch position to the north of the village. 

The 1st Platoon’s clearance of Tsangar began at daylight and met with 

no enemy resistance. Meanwhile, however, multiple groups of enemy 

fighters attacked the overwatch position from the north. Unfortunately, the 

overwatch element was not on the highest ground in the immediate vicinity 

and the enemy exploited this weakness. The massive firepower advantage 

of the Coalition forces saved the position as OH-58D Kiowa Warrior 

helicopters and other aviation assets suppressed the insurgent fire. The US 

suffered one fatality, Specialist Shannon Chihuahua, and the Afghan Army 

unit had two additional soldiers killed in action. Enemy fire wounded 10 

other US Soldiers in their attack, requiring multiple MEDEVAC flights.41

As the operation proceeded near Tsangar, a number of insurgents 

located south of COP Honaker-Miracle began directing machinegun fire 
25

onto the outpost. The timing was anything but a coincidence and indicated 

the insurgents hoped to limit the ability of forces in the COP to reinforce or 

otherwise support operations near Tsangar. At one point, the commander 

of 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Colonel Stephen Townsend, visited 

Honaker-Miracle to observe the operation. When a Blackhawk helicopter 

attempted to land to pick Townsend up and return him to the BCT main 

command post, the insurgents drove it away with heavy fire, effectively 

stranding Townsend at the COP for several hours42

Reynolds and his two platoons linked up with the beleaguered Delta 

platoon on the evening of 12 November. After nightfall, the battalion took 

advantage of the darkness to provide reinforcements. With much of the 

Delta Company platoon rendered combat ineffective during the afternoon 

firefight, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan moved Reynolds’ 2d Platoon from its 

base to the west at COP Able Main to Tsangar. Reynolds now had all three 

of his platoons on hand plus the remnants of the Delta platoon. With this 

augmented force, Reynolds moved north to Katar Darya on 13 November 

to pursue the remnants of the insurgent force encountered the previous 

day. Ryan believed that an aggressive movement to the north would allow 

his men to finish off the enemy but he later second guessed this decision 

and recognized that he may have ceded the initiative to an enemy lying in 

wait for an American response.43

Alpha Company began its movement northward on the morning of 13 

November but, well short of reaching Katar Darya, it came under attack 

by enemy fighters. Yet again, the insurgents proved skillful and especially 

tenacious foes. They fired on the Alpha Company force from higher 

ground to the east and only after several CAS strikes did the insurgents 

withdraw. In this action, accompanying Afghan Army units sustained 

three KIAs, and several American Soldiers were wounded and required 

evacuation. The northward advance halted for the night and the combined 

force prepared to resume its movement in the morning.44

The next morning, Alpha Company went north and discovered 

evidence of an insurgent training camp in the valley, finding a newly built 

structure with a sturdy metal roof directly along the path to Katar Darya. 

Inside the building, the troops found sleeping bags and a substantial 

stockpile of ammunition. Captain Reynolds called in a CAS strike that 

completely destroyed the site as the company continued its advance.45

When Alpha Company drew closer to Katar Darya, the captain 

dispatched an element to reconnoiter the village and sent his 3d Platoon 

to high ground between two creek beds approximately 250 meters to the 

northeast to provide overwatch for both his reconnaissance force and his 

main element. Just as Reynolds began to confer with the leaders of 1st 
26

and 2d Platoons to plan their clearance of the village, multiple groups 

of fighters opened fire on both the main element and the 3d Platoon’s 

overwatch element. The firefight began suddenly as machinegun and RPG 

rounds struck the American positions. The main element found shelter in 

a small qalat (a small adobe compound common to Afghanistan) but the 

3d Platoon, out in the open, took the brunt of the enemy fire. During the 

daylong engagement that only ceased when the light faded, four members 

of the 3d Platoon were killed and seven wounded. The 1st and 2d platoons 

did not emerge unscathed, losing one KIA. Reynolds’ force remained 

outside the village through the night of 14 November, the enemy having 

extracted a heavy toll from Alpha Company. 46

Alpha Company’s heavy firefight made Lieutenant Colonel Ryan issue 

new orders to his other companies moving up the valley floor, and on the 

next day, the bulk of TF Bulldog pushed up the valley to Shahid to the west 

of Alpha Company’s location and established blocking positions. To the 

north, a Ranger unit successfully cleared Gambir that day, sustaining one 

Ranger fatality in the operation. Afghan commandos cleared Sero Kalay 

without incident and the beleaguered Alpha Company successfully pushed 

through Katar Darya. The Coalition forces left the Watapur Valley by the 

end of the day, bringing that phase of BULLDOG BITE to a close. An 

estimated 50 insurgents had been killed in the operation. In the days ahead, 

BULLDOG BITE concluded as other forces from TF Bulldog cleared the 

area near Kur Bagh, encountering no enemy resistance.47 

In the months following BULLDOG BITE, Alpha Company continued 

to patrol the southern end of the valley but the unit did not conduct another 

major operation in the Watapur Valley. In early 2011, larger changes in the 

Coalition campaign in the Pech Valley began to affect the American effort 

in the Watapur. In February, Coalition leaders decided to turn over military 

responsibility for the entire Pech Valley west of the Watapur to the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF), and TF Bulldog conducted Operation 

BULLDOG BLITZ to facilitate the Afghan assumption of the security 

mission. This changeover included the transfer of the longtime American 

manned bases: FOB Blessing, COP Michigan, and COP Able Main to 

Afghan units. As a result, COP Honaker-Miracle became the western-most 

American outpost during the last few months of TF Bulldog’s tour of duty. 

The decision pleased Lieutenant Colonel Ryan, who, after operating in 

the region for nine months, viewed the Pech area as a strategic dead end 

and downplayed the region’s importance in facilitating the movement of 

insurgents into the Afghan interior. 48
27

The central assumption underlying the Coalition decision to withdraw 

from the Pech was that the ANSF had reached a sufficient level of training 

and operational efficiency to shoulder the security burden in the area and 

such a move would serve as a model for other ANSF units. The ANSF 

units in the western Pech, however, quickly proved incapable of providing 

security and the situation rapidly deteriorated. The Afghan Army battalion 

at Nangalam Base, the new name for Camp Blessing, bore the brunt of 

these problems and, in mid-April, the battalion commander deserted 

his unit, creating a leadership vacuum. The battalion’s S2 Intelligence 

Officer took command at Nangalam but the unit was unable to counter 

a strengthened insurgency. Soon the insurgents were moving freely in 

the western Pech and brought COP Honaker-Miracle under mortar fire 

for the first time since the conclusion of BULLDOG BITE. Thus, by the 

end of 1-327 IN’s tour in Afghanistan in April 2011, the Pech Valley had 

become much more dangerous and any progress made by Coalition forces 

in previous years began eroding.49 

Conclusion

As of spring 2011, several clear patterns began to emerge regarding 

the American presence in the Watapur Valley. First, every American unit 

responsible for the area since 2005 believed the valley sat along a “rat 

line” that allowed insurgent forces to move from Pakistan through the 

Pech on their way into the heart of Afghanistan around Kabul. Intelligence 

reports consistently indicated that Gambir and Tsangar housed insurgent 

training camps. While every unit in the valley generally took an approach 

that was based on COIN principles, each battalion employed a different 

mix of lethal and nonlethal operations. The Marines, TF Rock, and TF 

Bulldog all mounted company- or battalion-size operations in the Watapur. 

TF Rock in particular adopted the approach that fighting insurgents deep 

in the capillary valleys prevented the enemy from taking the fight to the 

Pech River Road where economic progress was underway. By contrast, 

TF Chosin, TF Blue Spaders, and TF Lethal Warrior conducted smaller 

and less frequent operations against the insurgents while attempting to 

win support of the population through nonlethal operations. TF Chosin

had been responsible for a sprawling area of operation consisting of four 

provinces. The units that followed TF Chosin, while less spread out, 

directed most of their resources toward the Korengal and Pech Valleys. In 

comparison, the Watapur Valley received little attention. 

The accounts and experiences of the Americans stationed in the 

Watapur from 2005 into 2011 vary in a number of ways but four 

characteristics remained constant throughout the deployments. First and 

perhaps most important was the attitude among the valley’s population 
28

toward development and security initiatives. Troops at COP HonakerMiracle rarely faced a serious insurgent threat and those who ventured 

out on patrols into the valley found the population generally receptive 

to Coalition initiatives, at least as far as north Qatar Kala. Beyond Qatar 

Kala, however, the level of control and security fell off dramatically. Some 

units found movement safe as far north as Qowru but only TF Rock’s 

Able Company, under Captain Frketic, reported making regular nighttime 

patrols to Shahid at the northern end of the valley. American units found 

virtually no support for the Afghan government in the villages on the 

Watapur’s eastern ridgeline. In particular, the villagers of Gambir and 

Tsangar consistently showed hostility towards any attempt to neutralize 

the insurgent threat. 

The second enduring characteristic was the presence of a formidable 

foe in the valley which was aggressive and tactically proficient, especially 

in the use of terrain. The Safi Pashtuns and Nuristanis in the area had 

a long history of resistance to outsiders. Afghanistan had been in a near 

constant state of civil war since 1979 and many Afghans knew nothing but 

conflict. Afghan males had taken up arms against each other, the Soviet 

Army, and the Coalition’s western forces, exposing them to a wide variety 

of tactics, techniques, and procedures. In this environment, young men 

could acquire political and social status, valuable commodities in an area 

with few economic opportunities, by proving themselves on the battlefield. 

This mixture of motive, opportunity, and experience made for an enemy 

willing to endure heavy losses but also possessing extensive firsthand 

knowledge of modern small unit operations. 

The third characteristic was the commonality of key elements in many 

of the firefights between Coalition and insurgent forces in the Watapur 

area. US forces possessed advantages in firepower, logistics, and in all but 

a few rare instances, numbers. Terrain, however, exerted a strong influence, 

sometimes mitigating superiority in firepower and numbers. The high 

ridgelines overlooking the valley floor offered the insurgents numerous 

places from which to fire upon Coalition forces and outposts. The rugged 

terrain and the fighters’ innate knowledge of it allowed them to often avoid 

the effects of the firepower that US forces could rain down upon them. 

The terrain even limited nonlethal stability operations as the height and 

isolation of the eastern villages made it difficult for the residents to see 

any benefits from the central Afghan government. American forces could 

rely upon helicopters to penetrate the mountains and occupy tactically 

dominant terrain but air assets in eastern Afghanistan were relatively 

scarce and required detailed planning and careful scheduling to ensure 

their use in large operations.
29

Finally, the US combat experiences in the Watapur Valley 

demonstrated that operations in the Afghan campaign, as with all other 

major military endeavors, were driven by access to resources, most 

importantly manpower. For several years, Coalition leaders recognized the 

Pech Valley as a resource priority and the Watapur received some share 

of that allocation. The number of forces available in the Pech increased 

between 2005 and 2011 but the US Army and Marines never had enough 

forces to occupy the northern end of the Watapur permanently. To be 

sure, the insurgents in the Watapur feared the construction of a COP in 

the valley, an anxiety that Captain Nelson from TF Rock’s Able Company 

used with devastating effect in June 2008. As long as the Americans 

could not physically occupy the valley itself, it appeared that only lethal 

operations on the scale of ABLE ATTACK and BULLDOG BITE offered 

the Coalition the possibility of controlling the valley. 
30

Notes

1. “Lawyer: Detainee died due to heart attack, not assault” USAToday 18 

June 2004. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-06-18-afghanassault_x.htm. Accessed 8 April 2014.

2. Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, 65-6; Herschel Smith, “Assigning 

Blame in the Battle of Wanat,” The Captain’s Journal, 3 January 2011, http://

www.CPTsjournal.com/2011/01/03/assigning-blame-in-the-battle-of-wanat/ 

(accessed 9 July 2012). 

3. Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, 

Lieutenant Colonel (Lieutenant Colonel) Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler 

Garcia, and Dennis F. Van Wey, A Different Kind of War: The United States 

Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001-September 

2005 (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 242-7; Michael 

Ware, “Inside The Manhunt: War On Terrorism: Where’s Bin Laden in 

Afghanistan?,” Time, 29 March 2004 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/

article/0,9171,993688,00.html (accessed 9 July 2012).

4. Major Scott Westerfield, United States Marine Corps, interview by 

Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 July 2012, 2-9. 

5. “OEF and RC-East” in Spartan Review Interim Draft, May 2007, 4. 

6. “Operations Overview” in Spartan Review Interim Draft, May 2007, 

10-1; “Unit OEF VII Histories” in Spartan Review Interim Draft, May 2007, 

7-10.

7. Major Robert Stanton, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 2012, 6-8; “Unit OEF VII Histories,” 

10-4.

8. Stanton, interview, 8-12

9. Stanton, interview, 24-27. 

10. James Christ, Tsangar (Amazon Digital Services, 2011), Kindle 

e-book, location 332-1468. 

11. Colonel William Ostlund, “Read Ahead Questions for Colonel William 

Ostlund,” February 2009, 4; Major Louis Frketic, interview by Ryan Wadle, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 2012, 2-3.

12. Frektic, interview, 7-8.

13. Frektic, interview, 8.

14. Frektic, interview, 8-10; “Captain Frketic OPN ABLE ATTACK 

Statement,” 1-2. 

15. Frektic, interview, 10; “Captain Frketic OPN ABLE ATTACK 

Statement,” 2-5.

16. Frektic, interview, 10-11. 
31

17. Frektic, interview, 4-5. 

18. Colonel William Ostlund, email message to Donald P. Wright, Combat 

Studies. Institute, 12 October, 2012.

19. Frketic, interview 5-6; Major Louis Frketic, e-mail message to Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 21 June 2012. 

20. Frektic, interview, 5-6.

21. Frektic, interview, 21-22; Michael J. Carden, “Mullen Presents Medals 

for Valor to 12 Paratroopers in Afghanistan,” US Department of Defense News, 

12 July 2008,

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50485(accessed 9 July 2012). 

22. Major David Nelson, e-mail message to Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, 27 July 2012, 1-2. 

23. Nelson, e-mail, 3. 

24. Nelson, e-mail, 3-4. 

25. Major Nicholas Bilotta, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2012,

26. Bilotta, interview, 9-10. 

27. Lieutenant Colonel Brett Jenkinson, interview by Contemporary 

Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 

and 11 February 2011, 6.

28. Bilotta, interview, 6-7, 10, 18-19. 

29. Bilotta, interview, 16-7. Major Shaun Conlin, interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 2012, 2-3. 

30. Bilotta, interview, 17.

31. Conlin, interview, 2-3.

32. Conlin, interview, 3-4.

33. Conlin, interview, 4-6. 

34. Conlin, interview, 8-12.

35. Conlin, interview, 14-18. 

36. Conlin, interview, 15-16. 

37. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Ryan and Captain Robert Reynolds, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 

March 2012, 3, 13-14. 

38. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 4-6. 

39. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 6-7. 

40. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 15-16

41. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 16-17. 
32

42. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 18. 

43. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 18-20.

44. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 18-21.

45. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 22.

46. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 23-24.

47. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 25-27.

48. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 29-31.

49. Ryan, Reynolds, interview, 27, 29-31; 2-35 IN Leadership, group 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 

April 2012, 2.
33

Chapter 3

Planning and Opening Moves

In April 2011, Soldiers from the 3d Brigade Combat Team (3d BCT), 

25th Infantry Division (TF Bronco) assumed responsibility for Nuristan, 

Nangahar, and Kunar Provinces. The brigade traces its lineage to the preWorld War II Hawaiian Division that in 1941 became part of the 25th 

Infantry Division. That unit served with distinction during World War 

II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. The 3d BCT had previously deployed 

to Afghanistan in 2004 and then to Iraq in 2009. In 2010, the brigade’s 

Soldiers learned they would be returning to Afghanistan for a tour that 

would begin in 2011.1

Colonel Richard Kim, the TF Bronco commander, was notified that 

his forces would be operating in northeast Afghanistan. Kim quickly 

identified the Pech River valley as a priority during the early months of 

his brigade’s deployment. In his assessment, the instability in the region 

had worsened, facilitating the transit of a greater number of insurgents 

from the Pakistani border through the Pech valley, and its smaller capillary 

valleys, and into the vital security zone around Kabul. Task Force Bronco, 

accordingly, needed to re-establish a viable Coalition presence in the Pech 

and eliminate the security vacuum that had emerged after the transfer of 

security responsibility and the transfer of previously US manned bases to 

Afghan National Security Forces in February and March 2011.

 The Soldiers of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (2-35 IN), known as TF 

Cacti, relieved TF Bulldog and assumed responsibility for the southern 

half of Kunar Province and the Pech Valley. The responsibility for 

restoring security in the western Pech Valley fell upon this battalion task 

force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Colin Tuley. Before mounting 

a major push into the western Pech. However, TF Cacti needed establish 

conditions to prevent the insurgents from disrupting the American re-entry 

into the region.2

 In fact, the first two months of TF Cacti’s deployment 

consisted of gathering and assessing information about the insurgent 

threat in the western Pech Valley and constructing a campaign plan. Initial 

intelligence indicated that enemy fighters used the village of Kur Bagh on 

the north side of the Pech River to mount indirect and direct fire attacks on 

COP Honaker Miracle, the westernmost US base in the Pech Valley that 

would serve as the launching point for TF Cacti’s operations. To suppress 

this threat, the unit devised a shaping operation, codenamed Operation 

HAMMER DOWN, to clear Kur Bagh.3
34

Figure 3: Coalition Bases in Kunar Province, 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.

As the battalion leaders and staff received more intelligence, however, 

they began to understand that the Watapur Valley was critical to securing 

the Pech. The years of conflict had created a transient population in the area 

and many families migrated seasonally based on the patterns of agriculture 

and animal husbandry. Additionally, the lack of firm local government 

control and apathy from those that remained facilitated the movement of 

insurgent groups through the valley.4 Pakistani-based separatist groups 

that hoped to wrest control of Kashmir Province from India, mostly 

notably Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), trained in the Watapur area so frequently 

that Major Patrick Stich, TF Bronco’s S3 Operations Officer, referred to 

the valley as the “NTC [National Training Center] for LeT.”5 Because of 

the presence of foreign fighters and training camps in the Watapur, the 

battalion decided that an operation to eliminate those threats could help 

pave the way for their eventual push into the western Pech area. The 
35

primary objectives for HAMMER DOWN accordingly shifted to Gambir 

and Tsangar. Destroying the suspected training camps at the northern end 

of the Watapur promised to interdict the flow of insurgents through the 

valley and deny the enemy the capacity to increase their manpower in the 

western Pech. Task Force Cacti planners, led by the assistant S3 Captain 

Loren Crowe, considered attempting to clear Gambir, Tsangar, and Kur 

Bagh simultaneously but dismissed the idea as beyond their resource and 

manpower capabilities. TF Cacti would keep its focus on the Watapur.6

The inhospitable terrain in the Watapur meant that the forces clearing 

these villages would have to be air-assaulted into position. Fortunately, 

TF Cacti had access to the After Action Reports (AARs) of the preceding 

units and could incorporate the accumulated years of experience into 

its operational plan. From these experiences, the TF Cacti commander 

and his staff decided to base the concept of HAMMER DOWN on the 

fundamental tactical principle of seizing and retaining key terrain. Any 

successful clearance of Tsangar and Gambir, the planners believed, must 

begin by seizing the high ground, in this case the peaks of the ridgeline 

to the east of the villages. The insurgents had previously used this 

high ground effectively to launch attacks against Coalition forces. For 

HAMMER DOWN, TF Cacti would not only insert forces on this ridge 

but also establish several strongpoints that would control the terrain and 

also support the clearance of the villages below. Further, by beginning the 

operation from this ridge, the clearance operation would proceed downhill 

from east to west. Maneuvering downhill while enjoying direct fire support 

from strongpoints on the high ground would place any enemy force at a 

tactical disadvantage.7

To facilitate the seizure of the ridgeline, TF Cacti’s planners wanted 

to employ helicopter landing zones different from those used in prior 

operations. For instance, in 2010, TF Bulldog had reused HLZ Chiefs near 

Tsangar that TF Rock had first designated back in 2007. While the return to 

this HLZ did not seem to have had any significant bearing on the conduct 

of BULLDOG BITE, TF Cacti’s planners wanted to take all measures 

necessary to retain tactical surprise. The rugged terrain on the eastern 

side of the Watapur, however, offered few large flat open areas that could 

accommodate CH-47 helicopters. Still, the TF staff also chose to rely 

almost solely on satellite imagery and analysis when choosing the new 

HLZs rather than sending out reconnaissance flights that could visually 

inspect the landing areas but might also alert the enemy to the imminent 

operation. In this way, the planners’ emphasis on operational security for 

HAMMER DOWN left open the possibility for significant disruptions to 
36

the operation should the helicopter pilots find the HLZs too small, too 

steep, or otherwise unsuitable.8

For its deployment, Lieutenant Colonel Tuley augmented his maneuver 

companies by assigning one platoon from its weapons company to each 

infantry company. The weapons company’s platoons were equipped with 

tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) Improved Target 

Acquisition Systems (ITAS) and Javelin Close Combat Missile System 

anti-tank missiles, MK 19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, and M2 .50 

caliber machine guns. The creation of four company teams, each with 

two rifle platoons and one weapons platoon, ensured that each company 

commander had both maneuver and direct fire elements within his unit.9

 TF 

Cacti reassigned platoons from the infantry companies and their weapons 

company to create a uniform organization for each of the four company 

teams that had responsibilities for geographic areas of operations. The 

battalion used this team task organization while training in Hawaii and 

at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. By the time the 

battalion arrived in Afghanistan, the platoons in each of the teams had 

ample experience working with one another.10

During their training, the men of TF Cacti learned that they would 

also form the core of the brigade’s Focused Targeting Force (FTF) for the 

duration of the deployment. Captain Christopher Bluhm, the commander 

of TF Cacti’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company, also served as 

commander of the FTF, which included one of TF Cacti’s rifle platoons 

and one platoon from the weapons company of its sister battalion in 

Kunar Province, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (2-27 IN) also 

nicknamed TF No Fear. The FTF concept originated with units deployed 

to Iraq and proved successful in identifying and neutralizing insurgent 

networks. Brigade commanders deploying to Afghanistan after 2008 

began incorporating the concept into their units. Unlike the other units 

in TF Cacti, the FTF had no designated area of operation. Based at FOB 

Joyce in the Kunar Valley south of Asadabad, the FTF dedicated itself to 

neutralizing high value targets in TF Bronco’s AO and served as a quick 

reaction force (QRF) during major operations.11

The plan for Operation HAMMER DOWN called for Captain Jacob 

Hughes’ Bravo Company to conduct the battalion’s decisive operation 

by air assaulting into HLZ Honey Eater on the ridgeline east and high 

above Gambir (Objective ARENA) and clear through the village. Forces 

from Captain Padraic Heiliger’s Alpha Company would insert into HLZ 

Hillstar high up and to the southeast of Gambir and establish Strongpoint 

Danube north of the HLZ on the ridgeline to interdict the movement of 
37

insurgent forces to or from Gambir. To provide additional protection for 

the clearance of Gambir, the Scout Platoon led by Captain Patrick Kerins, 

would insert into HLZ Cowbell near Zawardiwuz (Objective CYPRESS) 

and provide support-by-fire from Strongpoint Amazon on the ridgeline to 

the north of Gambir. 

To clear Tsangar (Objective BONSAI) farther to the south, Captain 

Brian Kalaher’s Delta Company would air-assault into HLZ Monarch and 

then proceed northwest toward the village. To cover Delta Company’s 

movement, First Lieutenant Andrew Simmons would lead Alpha 

Company’s 3d Platoon to provide overwatch from Strongpoint Elbe on 

the ridgeline above Tsangar. For the duration of the operation, every rifle 

platoon would be accompanied by a similar-sized Afghan National Army 

(ANA) element. The Afghan presence was particularly important to Bravo 

and Delta Companies who needed their partner Afghan platoons to lead the 

clearing of any Afghan structures in Gambir and Tsangar. Finally, a platoon 

from Charlie Company manned a traffic control point at COP Honaker 

Miracle to facilitate the anticipated flow of civilians out of the valley and 

was prepared to respond to insurgent attacks elsewhere. For a reserve, 

TF Cacti had the brigade FTF and a company of Afghan commandos 

advised by a US Army Special Forces ODA based at Jalalabad Airfield 

in Nangarhar Province. On 24 June, the day before the operation began, 

Colonel Kim informed Captain Michael Kolton, the commander of Bravo 

Company, 2-27 IN, that Kolton’s company would serve as an additional 

reserve force. In total, the plan called for the commitment of three company 

teams and the scout platoon, while at least three rifle companies waited in 

reserve. It was to be the largest commitment of American combat power to 

the Watapur Valley since Coalition’s campaign began in 2001.12

Opening Moves, 24-25 June

Just after dark on 24 June, the first CH-47s from the 6th Squadron, 

6th Cavalry Regiment, began moving Soldiers toward the ridgelines 

overlooking the Watapur. Captain Kerins’ Scout Platoon went in first, 

intending to land at HLZ Cow Bell north of Gambir. After making several 

passes, the Chinook pilot determined that the helicopters could not safely 

land on the unexpectedly steep slope, so he immediately flew Kerins and 

his men back to COP Honaker-Miracle. Kerins held a short conference 

with Major Marcus Wright, the battalion S3, who decided to divert the 

Scout Platoon to its alternate insertion point at HLZ Honey Eater. Once 

there, the Scouts would proceed south to establish Strongpoint Indus atop 

Hill 3181 and disrupt the flow of insurgents from the neighboring Chigal 

Valley into the Watapur. To reach the higher altitude of HLZ Honey Eater, 
38

the CH-47s needed to lighten their loads. Kerins removed the eight men of 

Sergeant Christopher Galloway’s Recon Team One from one CH-47 and 

eight ANA soldiers from the second helicopter. With more than a third of 

his force left behind, Kerins re-boarded the CH-47 and set off again for the 

northern Watapur.13

Figure 4: The plan for Operation HAMMER DOWN, 24-25 June 2011

Source: author/CSI generated.
39

At approximately 2330, the Scout Platoon landed at HLZ Honey Eater. 

The reduced force secured the HLZ and awaited the arrival of other units. 

Just after midnight, Captain Heiliger’s Alpha Company began arriving at 

Honey Eater after the CH-47 pilots assessed HLZ Hillstar to the south 

along the ridgeline as unsafe for landing. The movement caught some 

Alpha Company Soldiers off guard as one of the company’s squad leaders 

briefly raised his weapon after leaving the helicopter because they expected 

to be the only unit at Hillstar. Very quickly, the Alpha Company Soldiers 

realized that they and the Scouts had been diverted from their primary 

landing zones. Around 0200, as Captain Heiliger finished organizing his 

men for their movement, Bravo Company began its scheduled landing at 

HLZ Honey Eater. The CH-47 lifts that carried in Bravo Company also 

carried Sergeant Galloway’s team from the Scout Platoon, thus bringing 

Kerins’ unit back to full strength. As the operation unfolded, these late 

arrivals would prove vital for the Scout Platoon’s ability to accomplish its 

mission.14

Because Bravo Company planned its movement to Gambir to occur 

in daylight, Hughes immediately established a temporary strongpoint 

near Honey Eater while Alpha Company and the Scout Platoon set out 

for their objectives in the darkness. Heiliger’s Alpha Company troopers 

set off for Strongpoint Danube just after 0200 followed 20 minutes later 

by the Scouts. Both units soon found the nighttime movement arduous. 

The terrain atop the ridgeline proved extremely rough forcing the units 

to take winding paths and making it difficult for the squads to maintain 

consistent contact with one another. In some places, the terrain forced the 

Soldiers to their hands and knees to maintain their balance. The ANA units 

lacked Night Optical Devices causing them to move even slower than 

their American counterparts. In spite of the precautionary measures, some 

Soldiers suffered breathing problems due to the 2,000-meter difference in 

altitude between the ridgeline and their COPs. One of Alpha Company’s 

mortarmen had to be evacuated out of the valley by helicopter because of 

altitude sickness. During the movement, Kerins spotted several recently 

abandoned logging campsites and directed his squads to travel using 

bounding movements in case they made contact with enemy elements he 

now suspected were in the area.15

Despite the difficulties, both groups successfully reached their 

assigned strongpoints. Kerins stopped the Scout Platoon just before dawn 

at 0400 to establish Strongpoint Indus but the leader of Recon Team Two, 

Staff Sergeant Nicholas Stetzel, reconnoitered another position 50 meters 

to the south that sat higher than their current position. Because this was 
40

a superior location, Kerins immediately shifted the entire platoon to the 

new location. The new site offered appropriate elevation and large rock 

formations, making it a dominant position with significant cover. Kerins 

established his headquarters element in the center of the position with the 

60mm mortar squad nearby while each of the three recon teams occupied 

rock formations on the northeast, east, and west side of the perimeter. The 

nine Afghan soldiers attached to the Scout Platoon split into groups of 

three and augmented each of the American teams. By 0700, the Scout 

Platoon completed its fighting positions and waited for Hughes’ men to 

move on Gambir.16

Farther to the south, Heiliger’s Alpha Company arrived at the location 

of Strongpoint Danube at 0500 and established fighting positions in a 

perimeter defense. The team’s position ultimately spanned close to 500 

meters from north to south but was only 150 meters east to west. The 

Alpha Company commander believed the eastern, southern, and western 

portions of his perimeter to be strong but worried about the northern side 

because the terrain there was less advantageous. Shoring up this sector of 

his perimeter would have to wait until later.17 

Farther to the south along the ridge, the other units of TF Cacti that 

arrived also had to revise their plans quickly. Just before 0200, Lieutenant 

Simmons from Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon learned from his CH-47 

pilot in mid-flight that HLZ Monarch, their intended landing zone, had 

been deemed unusable. Simmons’ men instead landed at HLZ Dollar Bird, 

approximately two kilometers farther to the south. Simmons immediately 

understood that landing at Dollar Bird had significantly lengthened the 

movement to Strongpoint Elbe, so he elected to leave behind his .50 

caliber machine guns on their Skedcos (man-pulled pallets capable of 

transporting equipment or wounded Soldiers) aboard the CH-47. Once on 

the ground, Simmons had to reorganize his men for the movement because 

their chalks aboard the helicopters did not correspond to his squads. As 

Simmons assembled his men, Captain Kalaher’s Delta Company also 

began landing at HLZ Dollar Bird. Delta Company, like Alpha Company, 

had also been diverted from HLZ Monarch. In the darkness, the squad 

leaders from both Alpha and Delta companies began flashing strobe lights 

at different points in the clearing to rally their men. One of the Afghan 

soldiers partnered with Simmons’ platoon briefly went missing in the 

darkness until he was discovered sitting behind a bush. It took more than 

30 minutes for everyone to find their units.18

Simmons wanted to move off the HLZ as fast as possible so that he 

could use the darkness to conceal his platoon’s movement. Major Wright, 
41

the battalion S3, radioed to Simmons that ISR platforms showed no sign 

of enemy activity between HLZ Dollar Bird and Strongpoint Elbe. With 

this information, the 3d Platoon set off for their strongpoint but the rough 

terrain and altitude made the travel difficult. Captain Kalaher waited for 

two hours to allow Simmons’ platoon to get a head start before having his 

company set out for their strongpoints at 0430. Even with this head start, 

the lead elements from Delta Company occasionally caught up to the rear 

of Simmons’ platoon, forcing the latter company to slow its progress.19

As daylight began flooding into the Watapur and found both elements 

still on the move, Simmons began moving his squads using bounding 

overwatch. Eventually, the platoon reached Strongpoint Elbe and began 

building its fighting positions. Meanwhile, to the south, Kalaher’s advance 

was delayed significantly when, at 0630, Sergeant Jason Grammo’s point 

team spotted an unarmed young male. An Afghan soldier insisted that he 

could catch the young man and ran after him but he quickly lost sight of 

the fleeing man. One of the company’s interpreters warned that insurgents 

used children as scouts in order to take advantage the Americans’ Rules 

of Engagement (ROE) restrictions that prohibited firing upon children. 

Soon afterwards, radio traffic picked up by the Low Level Voice Intercept 

(LLVI) team indicated that the insurgents were aware of Delta Company’s 

presence and planned to attack. Kalaher decided to halt the company and 

establish temporary fighting positions. The company waited anxiously 

for two hours but the threat never materialized and the company began 

moving to its strongpoints again, arriving finally at 1100.20

Each of Kalaher’s platoons quickly set up in adjacent platoon 

strongpoints. First Lieutenant Tyler Martin established his platoon at 

Strongpoint Bear to the north while First Lieutenants Matt Snyder and 

Tyler Overcash set up their platoon positions at Strongpoints Cat and Dog 

respectively. The Delta Company positions were arrayed triangularly with 

Strongpoint Cat the apex of the triangle pointed westward towards the 

heart of the valley. The platoons on each of the strongpoints could support 

each other due to their proximity. The company focused its attention on 

the western slope of the valley because dense brush and a series of ravines 

beneath their positions prevented easy observation into the near ground, 

providing some cover for an approaching enemy. The eastern slope of the 

ridgeline faced the neighboring Chigal Valley and appeared too steep for 

any insurgents to reach the American positions.21 
42

By 1100, the Scouts, Alpha Company, and Delta Company had all 

reached their strongpoints on the ridgeline and provided overwatch for 

Hughes’ Bravo Company as it moved down the ridgeline from HLZ Honey 

Eater towards Gambir. Designated as the battalion’s decisive effort, Bravo 

Company boasted the greatest combat power of the three company teams. 

Hughes had all three of his platoons, each numbering approximately Figure 5: Operation HAMMER DOWN to 1200, 25 June 2011. Source: author/CSI generated.
43

20 Americans, partnered with a platoon of 15 Afghans. In addition, 

Hughes had his headquarters element that included Joint Terminal Attack 

Controllers, a 60mm mortar section and a sapper team that would defuse 

and destroy any IEDs or other dangerous explosives found in Gambir.22

Also attached to the company headquarters was a Combat Camera Team 

and a Female Engagement Team (FET) prepared to work with any Afghan 

women found in Gambir.

Figure 6: Bravo Company at HLZ Honey Eater preparing to move. First 

Lieutenant Dimitri del Castillo,1st Platoon, is facing the camera on the right.

Source: 2-35 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

Starting at 0500, Bravo Company left its temporary strongpoint and 

began trekking down the steep ridgeline toward Gambir. Several hundred 

meters separated the platoons as each moved toward the town to start 

their clearance missions. Once they reached the village, 2d Platoon, led 

by First Lieutenant Colin Brodmerkel, was to clear the northern third of 

Gambir. First Lieutenant Dimitri del Castillo’s 1st Platoon, accompanied 

by Captain Hughes, intended to clear through the center of the village. 

First Lieutenant Cody Mossberg’s 3d Platoon would clear the southern 

end of Gambir accompanied by Bravo Company’s First Sergeant, First 

Sergeant Paul de Lemos.23 

Once the team began moving, it became apparent that many of TF 

Cacti’s planning assumptions were incorrect. Hughes’ men quickly found 

the “Gambir Jungle” to be an unforgiving environment through which to 

move. Gambir lay 1,000 meters below HLZ Honey Eater and the steep slope 
44

was rocky and heavily forested. In fact, the American Soldiers compared 

the area to the Rockies, Adirondacks, and other high mountain ranges 

they had visited in the United States. The rugged slope took its toll on 

the Soldiers as they began sustaining a high number of injuries, including 

multiple twisted ankles. The sergeant leading the FET attachment suffered 

torn knee ligaments and required a MEDEVAC. Captain Hughes himself 

tore tendons in both ankles but stayed with his team.24

The terrain caused two problems for Bravo Company. First, the plan 

had called for the unit to reach Gambir by the afternoon and clear through 

the village on the same day. By mid-morning, doubts began to grow 

whether the team could reach the village on schedule. 

Second, the steep slope and broken ground made the team’s movement 

far more difficult than expected. Hughes had intended for the platoons to 

move down the slope using the bounding overwatch technique, a form of 

maneuver that ensured at least one platoon was always ready to provide 

fire support while the other platoons moved. The trees, gullies, and small 

ridges along their path, however, made it impossible for each of the 

platoons to maintain visual contact with one another, even when spaced 

only a few hundred meters apart.25

At approximately 0900, Lieutenant Brodmerkel’s 2d Platoon on the 

north side of the formation made first contact with insurgents. The Afghan 

Army platoon had taken the lead during the descent because the Afghans 

proved especially adept at navigating their way through the mountains. 

The three American squads arrayed themselves in wedge formations 

approximately 50 meters behind the Afghans and 2d Platoon’s platoon 

sergeant, Sergeant First Class Joel Babb, helped coordinate the movements 

of the two platoons. Babb noticed three men to the northwest of their 

position carrying RPGs. Babb and the Afghan platoon set out to intercept 

the two insurgents as they fled into an open field. Informed of the sighting, 

Captain Hughes called in support from an AH-64 Apache gunship, which 

promptly engaged and killed the insurgents.26

With this threat dispatched, the company continued its advance toward 

Gambir. At 1000, approximately one hour later, the 3d Platoon made 

contact with another insurgent group. The space between the platoons 

was farther than intended because the terrain had forced Mossberg’s 

men to deviate from their planned route. As the platoon attempted to 

get back on track, it exited the tree line and entered an area of scrub 

brush that offered little cover or concealment. Insurgents hiding behind 

a large rock formation began firing on First Lieutenant Mossberg’s unit, 
45

forcing everyone to find cover. The Afghan soldiers with the 3d Platoon 

spotted the insurgent position first and opened fire on it. Staff Sergeant 

Mike Nickerson’s first squad, which was moving across higher ground, 

lay exposed to the enemy fire and took the brunt of the contact. AH-64s 

attempted to attack the enemy position but the gunners refused to open 

fire without positive identification of friend and foe. The infantrymen 

then marked the insurgent position with 40mm smoke and high-explosive 

rounds, allowing Alpha Company to attack. The first gun run hit the target 

but the pilots decided to make a second pass. First Sergeant Paul de Lemos, 

Sergeant First Class Ricky Reibsome, and the platoon medic stood at the 

center of the American position awaiting the gun run when rounds starting 

hitting near their position. de Lemos and Reibsome quickly realized that 

the rounds were from the Apache gunship and they immediately called a 

cease-fire over the radio. No one died but the shrapnel from ricochets hit 

the medic in the leg and a rifleman’s wrist, cutting a tendon. 

Figure 7: Bravo Company Soldiers moving toward Gambir on 25 June.

Source: 2-35 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

With the volume of insurgent fire greatly diminished, the platoon 

called in a MEDEVAC to evacuate the two wounded Soldiers. The UH60 sent down a lift basket to pull the two men out, but as the helicopter 

hovered over the 3d Platoon’s position, the insurgents increased their fire, 

forcing the helicopter to fly away with the two Soldiers dangling in the 

basket below. Soon after, the insurgents withdrew from the 3d Platoon’s 

vicinity.27 
46

By midday on 25 June, only Bravo Company had made contact with 

the enemy. Soldiers on Strongpoints Indus and Elbe had seen civilians 

nearby, but a direct threat had yet to materialize. This situation began to 

change along the ridgeline, however, during the afternoon. Just after 1200, 

a force of squad size attacked Alpha Company’s Strongpoint Danube 

from the west with small arms and machine gun fire. Coalition forces at 

the strongpoint responded with mortar and small arms fire, causing the 

insurgents to withdraw after a 10 minutes fighting. Meanwhile, the Scouts 

at Strongpoint Indus had attempted to stay hidden among the rocks on 

their position. They believed that the shepherds seen earlier in the morning 

had spotted their position but the LLVI traffic indicated that the Scouts’ 

location remained unknown to the enemy. However, at 1230 when Deputy 

Commanding General in RC-East, Brigadier General Gary Volesky, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Tuley attempted to land at Strongpoint Indus in 

a clearing the Scouts had marked off, the Blackhawk pilot thought the 

landing zone unsafe and flew away. The translator with the Scouts soon 

reported LLVI traffic indicating that the insurgents were now fully aware 

of their position.28

Figure 8: Bravo Company’s view of Gambir from the east during the movement 

on 25 June.

Source: 2-35 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

Between 1300 and 1500, insurgent forces attacked every element of 

TF Cacti in the Watapur. The first and most important attack came against 

Bravo Company. Already delayed by earlier contact, by early afternoon, 
47

the company was still nearly a kilometer east of (and above) Gambir. 

As First Lieutenant del Castillo’s 1st Platoon moved through a heavily 

forested area, it came to a large spur jutting out of the sloping ridgeline 

and pointing due west. To move around the obstacle, the platoon split into 

two elements with one half moving down the north side of the spur and 

the other half on the south side. As the spur ended overlooking a small 

gulch, the platoon found a small qalat that had been built into the high 

ground. At approximately 1300, Captain Hughes received radio intercepts 

indicating that there was an insurgent force of unknown strength nearby. 

Almost immediately after receiving the report, a hail of gunfire erupted. 

Insurgents armed with PKM machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles had 

escaped detection by US thermal sensors and successfully sprang an 

ambush on the 1st Platoon. The insurgents had established positions to the 

north, south, and west of the platoon’s avenue of approach and caught the 

Coalition force in a deadly crossfire.29 When the firing started, the platoon 

Radio Telephone Operator (RTO), Specialist William Jenks, called out 

over the radio, “They’re everywhere! We don’t know where we are getting 

shot at from!”30

Within a few minutes, enemy rounds had hit four Coalition Soldiers. 

One round struck First Lieutenant del Castillo’s chest just above his armor 

plate, mortally wounding him. He died within minutes, long before any 

MEDEVAC helicopter could reach him. Insurgent bullets grazed squad 

leader Staff Sergeant Eric Hinson’s lip and the neck of Squad Automatic 

Weapon (SAW) gunner Specialist Richard J. Perkins. One of the ANA 

Soldiers also received a wound to his leg. Since the insurgent positions 

allowed them to place enfilade fire on the 1st Platoon in its entirety, 

everyone scrambled for cover during the opening minutes of the firefight. 

The company HQ element, moving with 1st Platoon, came under fire as 

well. When Specialist Jenks tried to avoid the hail of gunfire, he dove 

onto Captain Hughes’ lower legs, causing further injury to the company 

commander’s ankles and virtually immobilizing him. Nearby, the fire 

support officer (FSO), First Lieutenant David Hoffmaster, wrenched his 

back while trying to avoid fire from a PKM gunner. Thus, within the 

first few minutes of battle, Bravo Company’s leadership had suffered 

significant loss.31

Once the surprise of the ambush passed, the men of Bravo Company 

tried to pinpoint enemy locations and return fire. Some Soldiers spotted a 

group of women in front of a small cluster of qalats to the north of their 

position directing fire for insurgents taking cover inside the dwellings. The 

insurgents did this knowing that the Coalition ROE forbade units firing 
48

into qalats without first confirming that no civilians were inside. Despite 

the team’s precarious position, Hughes refused to authorize direct fire on 

the buildings, deciding that he did not want to risk harming any civilians.32

With the platoon under heavy fire, Sergeant Shane Olney’s squad 

near the head of the formation attempted to find cover. While under fire, 

the men moved towards the qalat at the end of the spur with the goal of 

clearing and occupying it. One Soldier tossed a fragmentary grenade into 

the structure. The squad then entered the building and cleared it room by 

room, finding inside only the dwelling’s owner, an elderly Afghan male. 

With the qalat now under American control, troops from the rest of the 

platoon moved towards the more protected position.33 

As the Soldiers made their way toward the structure, insurgents shot 

the platoon’s interpreter in the back of the head, killing him and causing 

the body to roll down the gulch in front of the qalat. Several Soldiers, 

including Olney, Team Leader Sergeant Tony Kennard, Specialist Derrick 

Dickerson, Staff Sergeant Kazimieras Urbonavicius, and an engineer, 

Sergeant Nigel Kelly, worked their way down into the gulch to collect the 

interpreter’s body. Before they could do so, however, a round hit Sergeant 

Kelly’s hip, immobilizing him. Since Kelly remained conscious, the others 

switched their focus from recovering the dead Afghan interpreter to moving 

the wounded engineer to cover for eventual evacuation. A pair of Kelly’s 

fellow engineers moved down to provide assistance but the steep bank and 

the withering enemy fire left them trapped in the gulch with the wounded 

Kelly. For most of the afternoon, they laid low, trying not to draw attention 

from nearby insurgents who might easily have killed them.34

Farther up the hill, Sergeant First Class Niobel Santos, now the 1st 

Platoon leader after First Lieutenant del Castillo’s death, entered the qalat

and established a Command Post (CP). Other Soldiers moved out of their 

exposed positions to rally at the building. Sergeant Ridge Kaaekuahiwi, 

the 2d Squad Leader, rounded the bend of the spur and saw Specialist 

Carlos Ackerman, combat cameraman Sergeant Elwyn Lovelace, and 

Private First Class Herrick providing cover from the ground in front of the 

qalat. As Kaaekuahiwi moved towards the qalat’s doorway, an insurgent 

sniper began firing on the Soldiers, causing Kaaekuahiwi to take cover 

inside the qalat. He brought his weapon to bear to return fire but a round 

flew through the window and struck him in the arm. Outside, Ackerman, 

Weapons Squad Leader Staff Sergeant David Ngo, and others returned 

fire so that more Soldiers could enter the qalat. As Herrick followed this 

group inside, a round ricocheted off the dirt floor of the qalat, striking him 

in the jaw.35 
49

As the men of the 1st Platoon returned fire, Bravo Company’s other two 

platoons made contact with many of the same insurgents. As soon as Jenks’ 

radio call came over the net, First Lieutenant Brodmerkel immediately 

halted his 2d Platoon and established a temporary fighting position. Squad 

Leader Staff Sergeant Travis Watson and Team Leader Sergeant Cameron 

Hawkins moved over a nearby spur to locate insurgent positions, which 

they discovered approximately 80 meters away. The enemy had chosen 

their location well enough that Watson and Hawkins could not pinpoint 

any individual fighting positions. Unknowingly, the Americans had taken 

cover next to a cliff face atop which was an insurgent fighting position, with 

another insurgent fire team just to their east. The enemy fighters fired on 

Watson and Hawkins, and their position was close enough to the insurgent 

locations that rounds from American M240 machine guns and three-round 

bursts from Afghan soldiers AK-47 assault rifles, presumably fired from 

1st Platoon’s position, also struck all around them. An orbiting OH-58D 

Kiowa Warrior gunship believed Watson and Hawkins to be insurgents 

and lined up for a gun run but their frantic signaling with VS-17 panels, 

chemical lights, and radio calls stopped the run before it started. Under 

covering fire, the squad returned to its previous position. 

In this chaotic situation, with the three platoons separated by hundreds 

of meters of extremely difficult terrain and the helicopters continuing to 

fire at suspected enemy positions, maneuver in support of 1st Platoon was 

extremely difficult. Captain Hughes directed Brodmerkel’s platoon to 

move his unit to the 1st Platoon’s position and Brodmerkel prepared his 

Soldiers for the maneuver but the intensity of the fire from the OH-58Ds 

as well as small arms fire from both enemy and friendly units nearby, kept 

2d Platoon pinned down. The situation for 2d Platoon worsened when one 

Soldier fell with severe heat stroke. Burdened by the heat casualty and 

effectively suppressed by enemy fire, First Lieutenant Brodmerkel had 

to tell his commander that he could not move without risking additional 

casualties.36

To the south, the 3d Platoon had taken cover on a spur approximately 

500 meters from 1st Platoon’s position. From there, First Lieutenant 

Mossberg and First Sergeant de Lemos could observe the 1st Platoon’s 

fight and provide support. Some insurgents occupying positions between 

the American platoons fired on the 3d Platoon’s position but rounds 

from the 3d Platoon’s M320 grenade launchers suppressed the insurgent 

fire. Almost immediately, Mossberg and de Lemos began assisting their 

beleaguered sister platoon. Their mortar squad remained out of position 

during the fight but de Lemos assisted First Lieutenant Hoffmaster, the 
50

FSO, in directing the OH-58D pilots onto their targets. Understandably 

nervous after the near-fratricide incident earlier that morning, the Kiowa 

pilots demanded positive identification of positions before initiating any 

gun runs. Once the men displayed their identification panels, the Kiowas 

began attacking the insurgents. Throughout the afternoon, Hoffmaster 

remained in close contact with the helicopters, including the AH-64 

Apache pilots who relieved the Kiowas on station. From Hoffmaster’s 

previous experience, such gun runs should have broken the insurgents’ 

will to fight and forced them to withdraw. Instead, the insurgent showed 

an uncommon steadfastness, remaining in place and continuing to block 

the American advance on Gambir.37

 While the insurgents continued the fight into the late afternoon, their 

volume of fire had reduced to the point that Hughes felt confident enough 

to call in MEDEVAC helicopters. When the Blackhawks arrived over 

the 1st Platoon’s position and attempted to lift out Sergeant Kelly, the 

insurgents fired multiple RPGs at the helicopter and came within meters 

of hitting it. The RPGs signaled other insurgents to increase the volume 

of small arms fire, driving the MEDEVAC away without recovering Kelly 

and forcing Hughes to suspend any further flights until the team could 

reduce the enemy’s combat effectiveness. Unfortunately, Sergeant Kelly 

succumbed to his wound before another helicopter could arrive.38

Dusk brought relief for Bravo Company as the insurgents lack of night 

vision equipment forced them to withdraw. An Apache helicopter fired 

rockets on a suspected insurgent position to assist the rest of 1st Platoon 

to consolidate at the qalat. Olney, Kennard, and the other Soldiers at the 

bottom of the gulch finally managed to move up the embankment and into 

the qalat. They brought along the bodies of the interpreter and Sergeant 

Kelly, leaving them in the CP until a helicopter could retrieve them. With 

three dead, several other key personnel wounded, and the three platoons 

short of their objective, Bravo Company’s mission was in jeopardy.39

The Fights on the Ridgelines

As the fight raged near Gambir, insurgent forces attacked each of 

the strongpoints on the ridgeline above Gambir. A squad-sized enemy 

group attacked the Alpha Company position at Strongpoint Danube at 

approximately 1400. As with the earlier engagement, the insurgents 

withdrew after a brief firefight with the Coalition forces. At 1430, an 

insurgent team attacked the eastern and northeastern sides of Strongpoint 

Indus but fled once fire from the Scouts and an Afghan Army unit began 

pinpointing their positions. As the insurgents withdrew, the Scouts’ 
51

Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) called in close air support to attack 

suspected insurgent exfiltration routes. At 1500, approximately 20 

insurgents operating in three or four separate teams attacked the line at 

Strongpoint Bear-Cat-Dog manned by Delta Company at the southern end 

of the battlefield. The insurgents used the draws, ravines, and dense brush 

to the west of the strongpoints to conceal their approach and their greater 

strength allowed for a sustained attack of approximately 45 minutes, more 

than those their comrades mounted against the other strongpoints. Delta 

Company Soldiers responded with 60mm mortars fire and M320 grenade 

launchers but also called in an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior for strafing runs. 

The insurgents attempted to rally in the face of Coalition firepower but two 

CAS attacks forced them to withdraw.40 

Intelligence gathered from LLVI intercepts and other sources indicated 

that the insurgents that attacked the strongpoints during the afternoon had 

not coordinated their activities. All the enemy elements relied on one 

common technique of launching their assaults with RPGs for the maximum 

amount of surprise and shock. The RPG fire rarely caused significant 

damage but it did lead to momentary confusion in the American units, an 

opportunity that was exploited by enemy marksmen using well aimed fire. 

An insurgent group repeated these methods when they attacked Strongpoint 

Indus at 1700. As in the earlier attacks, the insurgents assaulted the betterdefended eastern and northeastern positions and virtually ignored the 

western side of the strongpoint. Staff Sergeant Stetzel’s positions on the 

northeastern perimeter took the brunt of the attack as the insurgents used 

fire and maneuver tactics to reach a rock formation only 50 meters from 

the perimeter. The small Scout Platoon employed its available firepower 

to forestall any chance of being overrun, using 40mm grenades liberally 

to cover the dead space between positions. As Stetzel’s squad engaged in 

an intense firefight, a three-man Afghan Army PKM team with Sergeant 

Galloway left its position to find a better vantage point. As they fired on 

the enemy, an insurgent round hit the PKM gunner near his collarbone. 

The platoon medic attempted to treat the Afghan Soldier but he died very 

quickly. Even with the loss, the Scouts managed to retake the initiative, 

especially behind Specialist Jenkins’ accurate M320 fire. After 20 minutes, 

the insurgents broke off the attack, and the Scouts again called in a CAS 

strike on the enemy as they withdrew.41
52

Fallen Angel

During the afternoon and evening of 25 July, Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley and the rest of TF Cacti’s leadership took stock of the progress 

of Operation HAMMER DOWN. The battalion tactical command post 

(TAC) at COP Honaker-Miracle closely monitored the flow of civilians 

out of the Watapur Valley throughout 25 June. Soldiers from the 2d 

Platoon, Charlie Company, had driven up from FOB Joyce at 1800 on 

24 June and established a traffic control point at Shamir Kowt later that 

night. The Americans provided assistance to the Afghan National Police 

detachment running the TCP and screening civilians. Throughout the day, 

a large number of trucks carried women and children out of the Watapur. 

The Afghan police screened the few military aged males encountered 

throughout the day, questioning anyone whose name appeared in their 

database as a suspected insurgent. The traffic increased steadily throughout 

the day and the Americans estimated that thousands had fled the valley by 

dusk when the flow of civilians began to decrease. The flight of the civilian 

populace would factor heavily into Tuley’s later decisions.42

As the battalion commander reviewed the operation, he understood that 

ambushes had completely stalled Bravo Company’s advance on Gambir 

and blunted the effectiveness of its leadership. Elsewhere, the strongpoints 

manned by the blocking forces and by Delta Company, awaiting the 

signal to clear Tsangar, had likewise come under attack. Because of 

these challenges, Tuley and his staff elected to activate elements of the 

battalion reserve. As TF Cacti had become the brigade’s priority for the 

duration of the operation, there were troops, aircraft, and other assets made 

available from elsewhere in TF Bronco’s AO. Therefore, at 1500, Tuley 

notified Captain Christopher Bluhm that the FTF would reinforce Bravo 

Company that night. Bluhm and his 60 Soldiers would consolidate at the 

1st Platoon’s position outside Gambir. With the additional forces, Bluhm 

would then lead the combined force to clear the village the next day. The 

brigade alerted the Afghan commando element and Captain Kolton’s B/2-

27 IN Company to prepare to reinforce the operation.43 

That afternoon and evening, Captain Bluhm prepared his force for 

action. Initially, the plan called for the FTF to land at HLZ Carolina a few 

hundred meters to the west of the current position of Bravo Company’s 1st 

Platoon. Given the likely insurgent presence in the area, Bluhm elected 

instead to land at Honey Eater and retrace Bravo Company’s route down 

the ridgeline. To ease his Soldiers’ burden and to make the movement 

quicker, Bluhm insisted that his men pack lightly and limit the amount of 

food, water, and ammunition they carried. He also had an Afghan platoon 
53

at his disposal and planned to have it clear the village once the combined 

element reached Gambir.44

The FTF began loading onto Chinooks late in the evening of 25 June, 

although not without incident. To keep the helicopters under the weight 

limit, the pilot of the first Chinook insisted that the FTF further lighten their 

load. As a result, five Afghan Soldiers stayed behind at FOB Joyce. Bluhm 

had intended to board the CH-47 carrying Chalk One but he accidentally 

found himself on board Chalk Two’s helicopter. Once the helicopters were 

loaded, they set out for HLZ Honey Eater. Chalk One, including the 1st 

Platoon leader First Lieutenant Nathan Peterson, landed there at 2300. 

Since no American units had been at Honey Eater for almost 24 hours, 

Peterson immediately dispatched his squads to secure the perimeter and 

await the landing of Captain Bluhm and Chalk Two.45 

Aboard the second helicopter, Bluhm and the troops prepared to land 

at the HLZ. Sergeant Arturo Bedoy recalled that the helicopter swayed 

in flight more than usual and the crew chief yelled out multiple “one 

minute” warnings. As the CH-47 neared the landing zone, the helicopter 

hit a pocket of “dead air” and dropped suddenly toward the ground below. 

Bluhm heard a crash and saw men thrown out of their jump seats. On the 

ground, First Lieutenant Peterson had spotted the Chinook heading for a 

different part of the landing zone than he expected. Soon, the sound of 

metal twisting and scraping together reverberated across the landing zone. 

Peterson had the foresight to yell to his RTO to duck as a chunk of debris 

flew just over their heads. The helicopter carrying Chalk Two had crashed 

at HLZ Honey Eater.46 Peterson recalled thinking, “Why does this have to 

happen to us?”47

Aboard the helicopter, a fire had broken out when the fuselage crashed 

against the mountainside. Several Soldiers, including Bedoy and Sergeant 

First Class William Smith, lost consciousness upon impact. Other 

passengers felt for broken bones or screamed in pain, eventually waking 

Sergeant Bedoy. Disoriented by the crash, Bluhm gradually regained 

enough of his faculties to realize that a fire had started inside the downed 

aircraft and that his Soldiers were not trying to get off the helicopter. He 

sprang to action and shepherded his injured and dazed men out of the 

helicopter. Bedoy, now more alert, tried to help Private First Class Mendez 

and Sergeant Smith through the Chinook’s front door but found it blocked. 

As he moved towards the open back ramp, he noticed the helicopter’s crew 

chief and door gunner slumped over and believed they were both dead.48
54

Figure 9: Chinook crash site. 

Source: then First Lieutenant Nathan Peterson.

The concussions sustained by most of those on the helicopter created 

much confusion. Bluhm asked his JTAC (Staff Sergeant Beversdorf) to 

determine their exact grid coordinates and for his RTO, Specialist Jasper 

Cothran, to relay information back to the battalion headquarters. When 

Cothran tried to follow his commander back into the wreckage, Bluhm 

snapped for him to stay “right f---ing there!”49 Bluhm returned to the 

Chinook’s interior and exhorted his dazed men to get off of the helicopter. 

Several Soldiers remained unconscious and had to be carried off the aircraft. 

Bluhm believed later that he should have given his Soldiers a few minutes 

to clear their heads, given that many had likely suffered concussions but 

the need for safety trumped all. Bluhm himself had suffered a concussion, 

blurring his judgment, but he only realized this when he returned to 

Cothran’s position, discovering that he had foolishly ordered the RTO to 

remain in a position next to a burning piece of the helicopter’s engine.50

By this time, First Lieutenant Peterson and the others from Chalk One 

arrived to help. Peterson expected to find a scene of mass carnage, and 

was confused by the sight of men walking around the wrecked helicopter, 

initially believing them to be part of his chalk. He soon found Captain 

Bluhm who gave Peterson temporary command of the unit. Peterson’s 
55

RTO, Specialist Kohl McLeod, took over communications duties and 

began talking with the battalion TAC. Bluhm returned to the helicopter to 

find the crew chief (Bedoy) he had previously assumed to be dead alive 

and on board the wreckage with another Soldier. Bluhm promptly got 

them out of the helicopter.51

As Bluhm and Peterson worked to restore order, the CH-47 carrying 

Chalk Three, including the FTF’s executive officer, Captain Daniel 

Lennox, the first sergeant, First Sergeant Shawn Burnah, and First 

Lieutenant Denis Campbell’s 2d Platoon, landed nearby. While in flight, 

Lennox and Burnah had heard the “fallen angel” radio calls, warned 

their medic to prepare for casualties, and directed their squad leaders 

to move immediately to secure the perimeter. Burnah left the Chinook 

first and observed the surreal picture of one of the crew chiefs coaxing a 

wounded man to crab walk down the hill.52 Burnah then moved down to 

the impromptu command post established near the crash site and met with 

a still-dazed Captain Bluhm who excitedly told Burnah, “I just fell out of 

the sky!”53 As Burnah conferred with Bluhm, they heard the pilot of the 

downed Chinook, Captain Buddy Lee, asking everyone where he could 

find Captain Bluhm. Once he did so, Lee, who had suffered significant 

head trauma, apologized profusely for the crash.54

Burnah helped to sort through the wounded, determining the severity of 

injuries and the priority of evacuation needed. Meanwhile, First Lieutenant 

Peterson convinced the crew of Chalk Three’s CH-47 to remain at the 

landing zone long enough to evacuate the injured. The Chinook stayed at 

Honey Eater long enough for the FTF to assist 13 wounded Soldiers aboard 

the helicopter. The evacuees included a platoon sergeant, a team leader, 

and nearly all of Sergeant Bedoy’s squad save for a medic. Another squad 

leader, Staff Sergeant Cipriano Castaneda, stayed behind even though the 

medics determined that his spinal cord had suffered damage in the crash. 

Captain Lee and the other Chinook crewmen left on a separate MEDEVAC 

flight.55 Miraculously, no one died during the crash despite the rotor blades 

having ripped into the upper portion of the Chinook’s fuselage, tearing it 

open “like a sardine can.”56 The helicopter had crashed on sloping terrain 

but its left side landing gear stayed upright and prevented the aircraft from 

rolling down the ridgeline.57

After the evacuation of the injured, Bluhm dispatched his Soldiers to 

occupy positions on high ground around the landing zone. The crash left 

him with only 47 Americans, with several of those limited by their injuries. 

The crash had thrown the mission to assist Bravo Company into doubt. 

Most importantly, Captain Bluhm realized that he needed to secure the 
56

crash site to prevent the insurgents from seizing any sensitive electronic 

equipment from the helicopter. In addition to the security requirements, 

experiences from the “Black Hawk Down” incident during the Battle 

of Mogadishu in Somali in 1993 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

demonstrated the propaganda value that insurgent groups attached to 

images of downed American aircraft. The wreck of the Chinook needed 

to be secured.58

Figure 10: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 1200 to 2400, 25 June 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.
57

As 25 June came to a close, events in the Watapur had caused several 

significant changes to Operation HAMMER DOWN. The terrain had 

proven far more difficult than anticipated and led to several of the major 

shifts in the operation. The ambush of Bravo Company outside of Gambir 

had forced the TF Cacti commander to commit a portion of his reserve and 

the lost Chinook at HLZ Honey Eater had then placed that reserve force 

in jeopardy. The second day of the operation was now ending with the 

outcome of HAMMER DOWN hanging in the balance.
58

Notes

1. 25th ID history. http://www.25idl.army.mil/history.html (accessed 11 

July 2012). 

2. 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 1-5, 47-9; Major Patrick Stich, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 

May 2012, 3.

3. 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 9-10; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, 

group interview, 1-2. 

4. 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 4-5, 7. 

5. Stich, interview, 5. 

6. 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 9-10; First Lieutenant Matthew 

Baca, First Lieutenant Trey Van Wyhe, First Lieutenant Chad Gaulin , group 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 26 

April 2012, 1-2.

7. 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 6, 39-40. 

8. Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group interview, 2-3, 10. 

9. Each of the task-organized teams in TF 2-35 used nicknames as 

desigations: Apache (Alpha) Team, Bastard (Bravo) Team, Charlie Rock 

(Charlie) Team, and Gundogs (Delta) Team. This study will refer to these units 

by their official designations for these companies: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and 

Delta.

10. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.12 (Fm 7-8), 

The Infantry Weapons Company (Headquarters, Department of the Army: 

Washington, DC: 2008), 1-4 to 1-5; Captain Brian Kalaher, interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 2012, 4-5.

11. Major Christoper Bluhm and First Sergeant Shawn Burnah, interview 

by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 24 April 

2012, 1-4 ; Captain Daniel Lennox, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 March 2012, 8; Stich, interview, 12-13.

12. Captain Jacob Hughes and Sergeant First Class Paul de Lemos, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 

25 April 2012, 1-4;Captain Padraic Heiliger and Sergeant First Class Acania 

Puletasi, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield 

Barracks, HI, 25 April 2012, 1-2; First Lieutenant Aaron Heaviland and First 

Lieutenant Andrew Simmons, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 25 April 2012, 14; Captain Patrick Kerins, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

3 May 2012, 2-3; Kalaher, interview, 2, 5-6; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group 

interview, 8-9; Charlie Company Non-Commissioned Officers, group interview 

by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 26 April 
59

2012, 4-5; 2-35 IN Leadership, group interview, 17; Captain Michael Kolton, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 27 

April 2012, 1. 

13. Kerins, interview, 5, 7; Scout Platoon Non-Commissioned Officers, 

group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, 

HI, 27 April 2012, 2, 5.

14. Kerins, interview, 5, 7; Scout NCOs, group interview, 5; Heiliger and 

Puletasi, interview, 3; Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 7; Hughes and de 

Lemos, interview, 5. 

15. Kerins, interview, 7-9; Alpha Company Non-Commissioned Officers, 

group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, 

HI, 25 April 2012, 5-6; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 7, 22, 29; Heaviland and 

Simmons, interview, 9.

16. Kerins, interview, 9-10; Scout NCOs, group interview, 6-9.

17. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 6-8, 10; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 13.

18. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 6, 8-10, 12; Heiliger and Puletasi, 

interview, 8; Delta Company Non-Commissioned Officers, group interview by 

Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 26 April 2012, 

9-13. 

19. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 11-12; Kalaher, interview, 6; Delta 

NCOs, group interview, 14. 

20. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 12; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 14; Charlie NCOs, group interview, 9-13; Kalaher, interview, 6. 

21. Kalaher, interview, 8-9; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group interview, 11; 

Captain John Cheatwood and Sergeant First Class Matthew Bartel, interview by 

Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 26 April 2012, 7; 

Delta NCOs, group interview, 17, 20-21; Charlie NCOs, group interview, 15. 

22. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 2-4; First Lieutenant Colin 

Brodmerkel, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield 

Barracks, HI, 25 April 2012, 5. 

23. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 2-3.

24. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 4, 7-9, 19-20; First Lieutenant 

Scott Stoppelbein, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 2012, 11; Brodmerkel, interview, 2. 

25. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 4, 9.

26. Brodmerkel, interview, 12-14; Bravo Company Non-Commissioned 

Officers, group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Schofield 

Barracks, HI, 25 April 2012, 7. 
60

27. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 10-13; Bravo NCOs, group 

interview, 7-10. 

28. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 11-2; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 

10; Kerins, interview, 11-12; Scout NCOs, group interview, 12. 

29. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 14-16; Bravo NCOs, 14-17, 19-20.

30. Stoppelbein, interview, 10. 

31. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 14, 18-9; First Lieutenant 

David Hoffmaster, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 2012, 10-11.

32. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 16. 

33. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 11-12. 

34. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 12-14. 

35. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 13-14, 17-18. 

36. Brodmerkel, interview, 15-17; Bravo NCOs, group interview, 23; 

Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 17.

37. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 15, 21-22; Hoffmaster, interview, 

8-10. 

38. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 17-18; Hoffmaster, interview, 11; 

Bravo NCOs, group interview, 14. 

39. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 18-19; Bravo NCOs, group 

interview, 25.

40. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 11-12; Kalaher, interview, 7-10; 

Charlie NCOs, group interview, 16, 18; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group 

interview, 12-13, 5; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 2; Cheatwood and Bartel, 

interview, 8-9; Delta NCOs, group interview, 28.

41. Kerins, interview, 14-15, 18; Scout NCOs, group interview, 16-17.

42. Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group interview, 8-9; Charlie NCOs, group 

interview, 4-17, 19, 27-29. 

43. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 5-6; Kolton, interview, 1. 

44. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 6-7; Focused Targeting Force NonCommissioned Officers, group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 24 April 2012, 3. 

45. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 8-9; First Lieutenant Nathan Peterson 

and First Lieutenant Zeke Clayson, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 24 April 2012, 8-9. 

46. FTF NCOs, group interview, 5, 7; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 9-10, 

13; Peterson and Clayson, interview, 9.
61

47. Peterson, quoted in Peterson and Clayson, interview, 9. 

48. FTF NCOs, group interview, 5-6; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 10-11. 

49. Bluhm, quoted in Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 12.

50. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 12.

51. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 14.

52. Lennox, interview, 16; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 10, 14-15.

53. Bluhm, quoted in Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 15-16.

54. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 15-17.

55. Peterson and Clayson, interview, 10-11, 13; Lennox, interview, 17; 

FTF NCOs, group interview, 9-10. 

56. Sergeant Arturo Bedoy, quoted in FTF NCOs, group interview, 7. 

57. Peterson and Clayson, interview, 15. 

58. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 17-18; Lennox, interview, 18. 

63

Chapter 4

The Battle for the Strongpoints, 26-30 June

As dawn broke over the Watapur Valley on 26 June, the complexion 

of HAMMER DOWN had changed markedly. What had started as an 

operation to clear two notoriously insurgent infested villages at the northern 

end of the valley, instead became a series of static battles for a series of 

strongpoints on the battlefield. Bravo Company remained pinned down 

outside the village of Gambir but the remainder of TF Cacti’s strongpoints 

lay along the top of the eastern ridgeline in a north-south line spanning 

almost seven kilometers in length. During the second day, the operation’s 

emphasis shifted to the north so that all units would directly or indirectly 

support Bravo Company and the FTF. This refocusing on the strongpoints, 

while certainly affecting the battle’s outcome, put the battalion’s logistical 

network under great strain. Moreover, the lengthening of the operation 

from 48 hours to six days and the variable weather patterns caused by the 

high elevations would tax both man and machine. 

26 June, Shifting Forces

Overnight, the men of Bravo Company’s 1st Platoon built up fighting 

positions around the qalat they had occupied during the ambush, a location 

they now called Strongpoint Bastard. A pair of insurgents attempted to 

approach the position in the darkness but the American thermal equipment 

spotted them on their approach and they were killed. The rest of the night, 

however, found the men of Bravo Company recovering from the firefight. 

Under orders from Lieutenant Colonel Tuley, Captain Hughes was 

evacuated after turning over command of the company to his executive 

officer, Captain Angel Rosario. A later MEDEVAC flight brought out 

First Lieutenant Hoffmaster and the body of First Lieutenant Dimitri del 

Castillo. First Lieutenant Brodmerkel successfully led the 2d Platoon to 

the strongpoint during a nighttime movement, arriving at 0300 just before 

daybreak. Brodmerkel’s Soldiers reinforced the tired and dazed men of the 

1st Platoon, and the 20 to 25 sandbags that each carried in their rucksacks 

helped strengthen the fighting positions around the qalat. Lieutenant 

Mossberg attempted to move the 3d Platoon to Strongpoint Bastard as 

well but one of the senior NCOs had twisted his ankle severely enough to 

require a MEDEVAC request. By the time the helicopter arrived well after 

daybreak, 3d Platoon had cancelled its movement.1

Three kilometers away up the ridgeline at HLZ Honey Eater, the FTF 

likewise spent the night establishing fighting positions and recovering 

from its own ordeal. With only 47 Soldiers, the FTF occupied a perimeter 

500 meters wide around the Chinook crash site and the rest of HLZ Honey 

Eater.2

 The terrain facilitated a strong defense but the men of the FTF
64

worried about the small numbers of personnel securing such a large 

perimeter in an area that First Sergeant Burnah referred to as, “the Alps, 

just with bad neighbors.”3

 The north side of the perimeter faced a trafficable 

draw, requiring a strong security presence from Peterson’s 1st Platoon 

(designated FTF1). The Afghan Army units dug in on several rocky Figure 11: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 26 June 2011. Source: author/CSI generated.
65

outcroppings on the west side of the perimeter, while the bulk of First 

Lieutenant Campbell’s 2d Platoon (FTF2) guarded the southern end of the 

strongpoint. In these sectors, six to eight Soldiers often had responsibility 

for 200 meters of the perimeter.4

Throughout the night and into the morning, Bluhm remained in close 

contact with the battalion TAC and prepared part of his force to continue 

its relief mission to Strongpoint Bastard. Many of the FTF’s wounded 

Soldiers remained at HLZ Honey Eater, now referred to as Strongpoint 

Havoc, because they could not traverse the rough terrain between the 

HLZ and Gambir. Captain Bluhm, the force commander, would remain 

at Honey Eater while First Lieutenant Peterson would lead a platoon-size 

force down the ridgeline to reinforce Strongpoint Bastard. Just minutes 

before their 0800 departure, squad leader Sergeant Kyle Moreno spotted 

several men moving along the ridgeline approximately 100 meters outside 

the perimeter. Moreno and one of his men conducted a recon and security 

patrol to gather more information but their search revealed nothing and 

they returned to the strongpoint. Soon afterwards, the platoon left the 

perimeter, but after walking only 20 meters, eight RPG rounds streaked 

out of the northern wood line towards Strongpoint Havoc. Because the 

insurgents fired uphill, the rockets hit the trees above the Coalition positions 

but they forced everyone to take cover. The insurgents followed up with 

AK-47 and PKM fire. Moreno saw eight insurgents moving toward the 

northwest corner of the perimeter and fired M320 grenade rounds in their 

path. These enemy fighters, however, remained undeterred by the 40mm 

grenades and shifted their fire to the northeast corner of the strongpoint 

toward Sergeant David Sherlock’s squad. This complex and disciplined 

direct fire attack, previously seen by other American units in the Watapur 

area, demonstrated that there were still well trained enemy forces in the 

valley willing to fight. The Coalition firepower advantage carried the 

day as machine guns, M320s, and 60mm mortars forced the enemy to 

withdraw. The brief firefight surely alerted any insurgents in the area not 

yet aware of the Coalition presence. As a result, the battalion cancelled the 

FTF’s movement to Strongpoint Bastard and First Lieutenant Peterson’s 

element remained in the perimeter.5

At this point in the battle, all Lieutenant Colonel Tuley could do to 

reinforce Strongpoint Bastard was to consolidate the entire company on 

the position. The earlier arrival of Brodmerkel’s 2d Platoon certainly 

added to the security presence and greatly reduced the friendly fire risk 

in the rough terrain. Despite the increased force and the mission to clear 

Gambir, Bravo Company remained at the strongpoint on 26 June. The 
66

company continued to occupy the qalat, occasionally interacting with the 

elderly man who owned the dwelling. The insurgents tested the defenses 

at 1000 that morning with RPGs and machine guns. Bravo Company’s 

organic firepower and available support made the enemy quickly break off 

their fires, but some men found their positions particularly uncomfortable. 

Sergeant Kaaekuahiwi and Sergeant Olney occupied a point along the 

perimeter near several beehives. Unfortunately for them, the insurgents’ 

RPGs enraged the bees, giving the Soldiers an added distraction during 

the firefights.6 

Due to the precarious situation at Strongpoint Bastard, Tuley revised 

the operation’s overall objectives. Of all of his subordinate units, Delta 

Company was affected the most. Overnight, the battalion commander 

cancelled the company’s clearance of Tsangar and ordered Captain 

Kalaher to move his unit to a new position, Strongpoint Firehole, located 

approximately one kilometer to the north of Strongpoint Bear. From 

the new position, Delta Company could better interdict insurgent forces 

attempting to cross the ridgeline and attack Strongpoint Bastard outside 

Gambir. Kalaher had intended to use the darkness to mask his movement 

but the hot temperatures of nearly 100 degrees Farenheit recorded at the 

high altitudes, surprised the Soldiers and caused them to consume their 

water at a higher rate. Before setting out, Kalaher waited to receive a 

resupply of water but no helicopters could fulfill the resupply request. At 

approximately 0700, the three platoons under Kalaher’s command were 

forced to begin their move to the new position.7

First Lieutenant Simmons’ platoon from Alpha Company at 

Strongpoint Elbe also received orders to move during the second day. 

Strongpoint Elbe had received no enemy contact during the first day of 

fighting as nearly all of the enemy activity focused on Gambir and the 

northern part of the battlespace. Moreover, no intelligence collected by 

LLVI or other sources suggested that insurgents were in that area. With 

Delta Company’s clearance of Tsangar cancelled, Tuley ordered Simmons’ 

troops to reinforce Strongpoint Danube farther north. To facilitate his 

platoon’s movement northward, Simmons coordinated with Captain 

Kalaher, the commander of Delta Company. Since Simmons’ platoon had 

a longer distance to travel, Kalaher intended for the unit to pass through his 

unit’s lines and push ahead of his three platoons.8

 As Delta Company and 

Simmons’ platoon began their movement, the level of insurgent activity 

increased on the ridgeline. Intercepted communications now revealed that 

that the enemy had detected the Coalition force and intended to strike. For 

several hours, however, no enemy attack materialized. 
67

Meanwhile, the situation for the Scouts at Strongpoint Indus and 

Alpha Company at Strongpoint Danube remained quiet throughout 26 

June. However, both units began to observe hostile movement near their 

strongpoints. The Scout Platoon, as part of its standard equipment load, had 

carried enhanced optical equipment including stabilized binoculars and 

Long Range Thermal Video imagers that greatly enhanced their ability to 

monitor the surrounding terrain. At approximately 1200, Specialist Calvin 

Smackey used the equipment to spot five insurgents moving through open 

terrain to the south of Strongpoint Indus, only 500 meters from Strongpoint 

Danube. Further examination by Sergeant Galloway, identified that two of 

the insurgents were carrying a third wounded man. The Scouts’ Air Force 

JTAC called in a CAS strike that arrived 15 minutes later, killing at least 

two of the insurgents.9

At Strongpoint Danube, Alpha Company used information from 

the LLVI team to identify a suspected eight-man insurgent force armed 

with RPGs moving along the west side of the perimeter. First Lieutenant 

Heaviland led a squad-sized patrol of Americans and Afghans down the 

ridgeline to spring an ambush on the insurgents but the enemy force 

never materialized. Since the patrol had already left the perimeter of the 

strongpoint, Captain Heiliger ordered Heaviland to move his element to 

the south side of Strongpoint Danube to await a linkup with Simmons’ 

platoon. As they waited for their comrades to arrive at the strongpoint, a 

series of fierce firefights developed on the ridgeline.10

During the mid-afternoon, the enemy became very active and 

aggressive. A small insurgent fire team probed the defenses of Strongpoint 

Havoc, only to be driven away by the FTF’s weapons. Most of the contact 

that afternoon took place farther to the south. By 1500, some of Kalaher’s 

lead elements had reached Strongpoint Firehole with the rest of the company 

spread out as far back as Strongpoint Cat where Simmons’ platoon was 

currently located. Then, Simmons’ platoon left Strongpoint Cat and started 

to move northward toward Strongpoint Danube. First Lieutenant Tyler 

Martin’s platoon, attached to Delta Company, had assumed a position on a 

hilltop to the north of Strongpoint Cat to overwatch Simmons’ movement 

during the first leg of their trek. Almost simultaneously, the threatened 

insurgent attack materialized. The enemy had moved onto the top of the 

ridgeline and fired on the spread out Coalition force. Staff Sergeant Jason 

Felton’s 60mm mortar squad began engaging insurgent positions.11

As this firefight started, Sergeant Jason Grammo from Martin’s 

platoon heard voices and saw two groups totaling eight insurgents 

moving into the recently vacated Strongpoint Cat. Instead of moving 
68

up the western side of the ridge as the previous day’s enemy force had 

done, these fighters had scaled the seemingly impassible cliffs on the 

eastern side of the ridge from the Chigal Valley. They were also dressed 

differently than their predecessors. Instead of the local dress common to 

many fighters, these insurgents wore red turbans and camouflage similar 

to the American multicam pattern, making it possible for the Americans to 

confuse the enemy fighters with the members of ANA units. The insurgents 

quickly established a defensive position on the hilltop and opened fire on 

Simmons’ platoon with AK-47 assault rifles and a PKM machine gun. The 

accidental but fortuitous timing of the insurgent assault on Strongpoint Cat 

allowed the enemy to seize key terrain and catch the American platoon in 

the open.12

Figure 12: The Situation Upon Enemy Contact, 1st Platoon, Charlie Company. 

1500, 26 June 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.

When the enemy opened fire, Simmons halted his platoon and 

immediately shifted his men to oppose the new threat that had materialized 

to their rear. In order to neutralize the insurgent fires and retake the hilltop, 
69

he split his force into three separate maneuver elements. First, he directed 

the attached Afghan Army platoon to assume a support-by-fire position, 

directing its three machine guns on the enemy position. Next, Simmons 

told Sergeant Faldherbe Richelieu’s 2d Squad to move and secure the 

left flank, taking up a position between Strongpoint Cat and the hilltop 

occupied by Martin’s platoon. Third, the platoon leader had Staff Sergeant 

Antwain Robinson’s 1st Squad, which had moved the farthest from the 

strongpoint, to retrace its steps to assist the 2d Squad in an assault. That 

assault began with Simmons also using his 60mm mortar squad near the 

Afghan Army unit to provide additional fire support.13

Figure 13: The Retaking of Strongpoint Cat, 1500, 26 June 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.

The 3d Platoon conducted its attack primarily relying on organic 

weapons with little outside support. Martin’s platoon provided some 

limited fire support but was cautious in its fires in order to avoid any 

possibility of fratricide. Martin’s RTO tried to obtain fire support from 

OH-58D Kiowa Warriors but there were none available at the time. 
70

Undeterred by the enemy fire, Simmons and his RTO moved to join the 2d 

Squad as it assaulted the crest of the hill. While Sergeant Richelieu’s teams 

advanced, Specialist Kevin Hilaman took cover at the base of a pine tree 

30 meters from the insurgent positions. The tree unfortunately provided 

inadequate protection. Multiple rounds struck Hilaman in the neck and 

chest. Almost immediately, the platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class 

Dominador Rubang and the platoon medic, Private First Class Conway, 

went to Hilaman’s position and began to treat his wounds. The rest of the 

2d Squad cleared the summit, finding two dead insurgents and recovering 

the insurgent commander’s phone book that contained information on 

dozens of insurgent fighters. The surviving enemy fled into the wood line 

to the west and southwest of the hilltop.14

With this fight over, the emphasis shifted towards treating the casualties. 

At some point during the fight, a bullet had pierced Staff Sergeant Daniel 

Charette’s shoulder but he remained unaware of the wound for several 

hours. A MEDEVAC helicopter soon arrived and lowered its medic to the 

ground to aid in the treatment of Hilaman. Before the wounded man could 

be evacuated, however, enemy small arms fire from the trees to the west 

forced the helicopter to depart, leaving the medic behind. With Kiowas 

now on station, Simmons directed gun runs on the enemy positions, killing 

two more insurgents. Unfortunately, Specialist Hilaman’s wounds proved 

too severe and he succumbed on the battlefield. Due to the exertions of the 

firefight, Major Wright at the TAC at Honaker-Miracle ordered Simmons to 

remain at his present position and postpone the rendezvous at Strongpoint 

Danube.15

By dusk on 26 June, the battlefield had become quiet. Delta Company 

had reached Strongpoint Firehole and prepared fighting positions. Sometime 

after First Lieutenant Simmons’ fight on the ridgeline, the enemy fired on 

Strongpoint Bastard for a second time that day, again relying heavily upon 

machine guns and RPGs. As with the morning engagement, the company 

drove off the insurgents, suffering only one WIA when a bullet ricocheted 

into Staff Sergeant Urbonavicius thigh. 16 

Supply shortages threatened to hinder the operation, as TF Cacti

had repositioned its forces that afternoon. Except for the FTF, every unit 

had brought 72 hours worth of the most essential supplies: water, food, 

and ammunition. The high altitude, day-night temperature variations as 

extreme as 60 degrees, and the high operating tempo all combined to use 

up supplies faster than anticipated. Some of the companies also began to 

run low on batteries needed to power radios and other essential gear.17
71

Exacerbating the logistical situation was the almost total dependence 

on CH-47 Chinooks to deliver the needed supplies. The difficulties 

experienced in reaching the high-altitude HLZs on the first day and the 

crashed helicopter on the night of 25 June illustrated the challenges of 

flying in support of HAMMER DOWN. Weather now also began to affect 

the supply situation. The venerable Chinook, the earliest variants of which 

first entered Army service in the mid-1960s, served as the backbone of 

Army aviation transportation support during the Coalition campaign in 

Afghanistan. Their powerful engines allowed the helicopters to reach 

higher altitudes than many smaller aircraft and their large cargo capacity 

made them especially useful. TF Cacti could ill-afford to lose any of the 

limited air assets earmarked for the operation. The Chinook crash forced 

the battalion to request another CH-47 to fill the gap during the operation. 

Even with the new helicopter on hand, poor weather and a wariness of 

further missions at high altitude made it difficult for Captain Thomas 

Campeau, the commander of TF Cacti’s Forward Support Company 

(FSC), and Captain Matthew Webb, the battalion S4 Logistics Officer, to 

resupply the combat units using planned sling-loads from the Chinooks. 

Frustratingly for all involved in the resupply efforts, the weather was often 

“green” or good at FOB Joyce but “red” or poor in the Watapur, forcing 

the helicopters to remain on the ground.18

There was a means of delivering supplies in emergency situations. 

In advance of the operation, TF Cacti, like its predecessors in Kunar, had 

prepared “speedballs” which are body bags filled with supplies protected 

by Styrofoam. The unit packed each bag to fulfill specific supply needs 

prior to an operation and required no special equipment for loading and 

unloading. Unfortunately, the attempts to use speedballs during HAMMER 

DOWN failed. The smaller UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters typically 

carried the speedballs but dropping them properly required their pilots 

to hover, a maneuver that required stability and high power. The twin 

threats of high altitude and insurgent fire led the Blackhawk pilots to make 

quick, low-level passes over the strongpoints, the crew chiefs kicking the 

speedballs out the side of the aircraft as it passed overhead. The drops 

often resulted in broken bags, destroying food and water supplies and 

damaging precious ammunition.19

On 26 June, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morrow, the commander of 

TF Bronco’s Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), met with Captain 

Campeau and Captain Webb and offered a solution to TF Cacti’s resupply 

problems. Morrow proposed using C-23 Sherpa fixed-wing airplanes, 

designated by the call sign “Slowpoke,” to air-drop pallets of essential 
72

supplies. The idea carried much risk because the pilots could not launch 

their cargo as accurately as the helicopter crews and lacked the ability to 

communicate directly with Soldiers on the ground. This would also make 

the airspace in the Watapur, which was already filled with helicopters, 

fixed-wing aircraft, and artillery rounds, more crowded. In spite of these 

challenges, the aircraft stood a better chance of dropping the required 

amounts of supplies than other proposed methods.20

The first attempted Slowpoke supply drop occurred on the afternoon of 

26 June. Campeau decided to use Bravo Company’s 3d Platoon strongpoint 

as the test site. First Lieutenant Mossberg received no advance warning of 

the Slowpoke drop. However, when the aircraft approached, he quickly 

deduced the aircraft’s intentions but could do nothing but watch helplessly 

as the parachute bundles fell to the ground more than 500 meters from the 

platoon. Anytime one of his Soldiers attempted to leave the position, he 

attracted enemy fire, and the supplies remained unrecovered.21

Despite such failures, the supply situation had yet to reach critical 

levels by the end of 26 June. Unfortunately, the fog that night prohibited 

any helicopter resupply and Campeau and Webb decided to press the 

Slowpokes into action yet again the next day. Without supplies, the 

operation could fail. 

27 June, Defending the Strongpoints

By dawn on 27 June, all four of TF Cacti’s maneuver companies had 

safely ensconced themselves inside the protection of their strongpoints. 

This included First Lieutenant Simmons’ 3d Platoon which had 

rendezvoused with the rest of Alpha Company at 0700 after a four hour 

long movement from Strongpoint Cat. Captain Heiliger decided to give 

the weary Soldiers a brief rest at the center of the strongpoint, during 

which time Staff Sergeant Charette finally discovered the severity of his 

shoulder wound. Once the men had rested, Captain Heiliger dispatched 

them to defend the northern side, extending the perimeter northward by 

200 meters. This move allowed Alpha Company to cover the high ground 

just to the north of their position effectively.22

The civilian exodus from the valley had greatly diminished by 

27 June, indicating to TF Cacti leaders that the large majority of 

noncombatants had already left the area. Lieutenant Colonel Tuley told 

his company commanders that the conditions in the valley had changed. 

More specifically, he directed them to consider anyone probing the 

perimeters of their strongpoints as insurgents.23 This was critical because 

insurgent activity was on the rise and almost every Coalition strongpoint 
73

reported enemy contacts during the day. Delta Company continued to man 

Strongpoint Firehole at the southern end of the line of Coalition positions

but the enemy largely ignored that position. American marksmen armed 

with M14 rifles identified and killed three insurgents to the west of the 

strongpoint who were moving towards Strongpoint Danube but this was 

Delta Company’s only contact with the enemy on 27 June.24 

Figure 14: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 27 June 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.
74

The insurgents focused their attacks on the northern positions instead. 

Enemy fighters attacked Strongpoint Danube on three separate occasions 

on 27 June. The enemy chose to avoid the northern sector occupied by 

Simmons’ recently arrived platoon, instead directing their attacks on 

the eastern and western sides of the perimeter. None of the three attacks 

lasted longer than several minutes and never seriously tested the defenses 

that Alpha Company had constructed. Still, Captain Heiliger wanted to 

monitor the approach of insurgents toward the strongpoint. A fire team left 

the west side of the perimeter to the lower ground beneath the strongpoint 

in hopes of preventing any surprise attacks on Strongpoint Danube from 

this direction. The effort proved short lived, however, as the insurgents 

engaged the fire team with heavy small arms fire, forcing the Soldiers back 

inside the strongpoint.25

During the night, a thick blanket of fog covered Strongpoint Indus, 

reducing the Scouts’ visibility to only 50 meters. The insurgents used the 

fog to conceal their movements and attacked the strongpoint early in the 

morning. Yet again, the enemy force focused on Staff Sergeant Stetzel’s 

position, using RPGs, machine guns, and small arms fire to suppress the 

American fire. Stetzel’s team heard more than saw the insurgents but 

returned fire and forced the enemy to withdraw back down a goat trail. 

Captain Kerins, relying upon target reference points fixed during the 

platoon’s first hours at its strongpoint, called in CAS to neutralize the 

insurgents during their retreat.26

A second enemy force attacked the Scouts during the afternoon. While 

Staff Sergeant Stetzel’s team had taken the brunt of most previous attacks, 

the insurgents now targeted Sergeant Galloway’s position. The position 

was located near a group of trees and did not provide the same level of 

cover and concealment as did Stetzel’s. An initial volley of RPG rounds 

suppressed the Americans as fighters moved along a goat trail that snaked 

through a series of boulders in front of Galloway’s position. The squad 

had an MK 48 7.62mm machine gun trained on the trail and the gunner 

began firing rapidly, expending nearly 500 rounds, to beat back the attack. 

Even after 15 minutes of sustained small arms fire and 60mm mortar 

rounds, the insurgents remained undeterred and continued the fight. Three 

men, including two Soldiers from the US Army’s Asymmetric Warfare 

Group (AWG) who were present as observers, left their own positions 

and reinforced Galloway. The enemy advanced to within 25 meters of the 

position, close enough that the defenders detonated two Claymore mines, 

while another Soldier began tossing hand grenades at the insurgents. 

Finally, an RPG gunner from the ANA platoon came over from Staff 
75

Sergeant Brown’s sector and fired at the insurgents, causing the enemy to 

withdraw. Captain Kerins called in an air strike targeted on the insurgent 

withdrawal route and killed several insurgents. No more attacks fell on 

Indus that day but two of Staff Sergeant Brown’s men later climbed atop 

the rocks at their position and spotted two armed insurgents in a rock 

formation approximately 1,500 meters away. Kerins called in his first and 

only 155mm artillery fire mission of Operation HAMMER DOWN in 

response and an Air Force F-15 fighter later came in to further suppress 

the enemy element in the area.27 

Several hundred meters north of Strongpoint Indus, the FTF at 

HLZ Honey Eater had settled into their positions and made the most of 

their situation. Since the FTF had expected to move quickly into lower 

elevations, its members had not prepared for the cooler weather found 

on the ridgelines. Sergeant Bedoy and others initially used gauze from 

their first aid kits to wrap around their faces. Other men cut up spare pairs 

of socks and slid them over their arms for the added warmth. Several 

enterprising men had scavenged the crashed CH-47 for any useful 

materials, including the helicopter’s insulation, which they then stuffed 

inside of their uniforms. Another Soldier guarding the perimeter had found 

the bare rock he occupied uncomfortable, so he removed the pilot’s seat 

from the Chinook wreck and set it among the rocks. The men of the FTF 

took pride in the fact that, by the time the Downed Aircraft Recovery 

Team (DART) arrived on 28 June, they had already effectively stripped 

the helicopter.28

The enemy sought to break up the little comfort found by the FTF 

and attacked HLZ Honey Eater in the morning and again in the afternoon. 

During the morning, Staff Sergeant David Sherlock checked his men 

along the the northern end of the strongpoint. As he made his rounds, a 

force of approximately 20 insurgents advanced from the north through a 

draw facing the American positions. First Lieutenant Peterson had worried 

he had too few men to adequately defend the large portion of the perimeter 

for which he was responsible. The M240 machine gun in Sherlock’s squad 

was not in position to fire on the attackers and only two men armed with 

M4 rifles could initially engage the enemy. From his position on the west 

side of the perimeter, Sergeant Bedoy could not easily see the insurgents. 

The insurgent force quickly closed to within hand grenade range of the 

Coalition positions and pinned down the defenders for the first 30 minutes 

of the fight. Eventually, the Americans were able to shift positions and 

bring more firepower to bear. Sergeant Bedoy fired the remainder of his 

M320 grenade rounds at the enemy, and Private First Class Ruben Valle 

killed four men with his M14 rifle. Meanwhile, First Sergeant Burnah 
76

directed mortar rounds at the insurgents, and the JTAC, Air Force Staff 

Sergeant Christopher Beversdorf, called in several air strikes. FTF leaders 

supervised the redistribution of 40mm rounds and other ammunition from 

the quiet southern and eastern positions to those under fire. Finally, after a 

firefight lasting 90 minutes that severely tested the defenders, the enemy 

force withdrew.29

With the continued enemy attempt to overrun HLZ Honey Eater, the 

TF Cacti commander and staff reached an important conclusion. The 

intensity of the attacks on both HLZ Honey Eater and Strongpoint Indus 

had pressured the Scout Platoon and the FTF but the other strongpoints had 

been largely left alone by the insurgents. Battalion planners realized that 

HLZ Honey Eater, which did not originally figure as an objective in the 

operation, lay astride the primary foot trail that insurgents used to transit 

to and from the Watapur Valley. The eastern slope of the ridgeline facing 

the Chigal Valley sloped much more gently near Honey Eater, making it 

a natural crossing point between the two valleys. The top of the ridgeline 

also continued on to the north into Nuristan. The Chinook’s crash had 

unwittingly placed an American force in position to disrupt the primary 

enemy line of communication in the northern Watapur Valley. As it became 

clear that there was a relatively high concentration of enemy forces near 

HLZ Honey Eater, Kerins received permission from Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley to move from Strongpoint Indus to Honey Eater the next night to 

reinforce the FTF.30

Near Gambir, Strongpoint Bastard came under renewed heavy attack. 

The insurgents fired RPGs at the Coalition position sending metal and 

stone fragments into the air and causing Sergeant Olney to briefly rip off 

his helmet when he thought shrapnel hit his neck. The well-built defenses 

constructed by the men of Bravo Company over the past two days 

withstood the barrage, allowing the Soldiers to return fire. The tenacious 

enemy closed to within hand grenade range of the strongpoint, causing the 

defenders to set off the Claymore mines emplaced along the perimeter. 

Some of the insurgents took cover in nearby qalats but the Americans 

had closely watched the structures and observed no civilians inside or 

nearby. Thus, the insurgents received a nasty surprise when M320 grenade 

rounds and Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW) rockets struck the qalats.

31

Bravo Company began inflicting more casualties on their attackers and 

the insurgents found it much more difficult to gain a positional advantage 

against the Americans. Bravo Company took great satisfaction from 

intercepted enemy communications which revealed the insurgents 

complaining, “We can’t move anywhere because they shoot us, they kill 

us.”32
77

Amidst all of the fighting during the day, the Forward Supply 

Company sought to resupply TF Cacti. Captain Campeau again relied on 

the Slowpoke aircraft to drop pallets on multiple strongpoints but none of 

the loads landed close enough for the Americans to retrieve the supplies 

safely. In fact, Alpha Company at Strongpoint Danube only learned through 

communications intercepts that their supplies landed two kilometers to the 

west of their position and into the hands of the insurgents. The insurgents 

had hoped the Americans so desperately needed the supplies that they 

would move off the ridgeline to retrieve the pallets. Captain Heiliger 

ignored the clumsy attempt to lure the Americans into an ambush and 

continued to wait for more effective resupply methods.33

That day, Chinooks from FOB Joyce brought sling loads to 

Strongpoint Bastard, Strongpoint Indus, and HLZ Honey Eater. During 

the third resupply run, the pilots flying a Chinook with a sling load became 

disoriented as they flew through a cloud bank. Rather than risk another 

crash, the crew jettisoned the load. After this incident, the commander of 

the aviation unit cancelled the remaining supply runs. After multiple days 

of aborted missions due to weather in the valley, the supplies began to back 

up at FOB Joyce. That evening, Captain Campeau, the Forward Support 

Company commander, emphasized to the TF Cacti staff that shortages 

in food, water, and ammunition might force a premature conclusion to 

Operation HAMMER DOWN.34

Signs of strain appeared elsewhere on the battlefield. Discipline 

among the Afghan Army units began to erode noticeably by the end of the 

third day. The Afghan company partnered with Captain Heiliger’s Alpha 

Company at Strongpoint Danube had an almost complete breakdown in 

leadership. Heiliger enjoyed good relations with the Afghan company 

commander but the ANA force included a platoon attached from a different 

company. As a result, the leader of the attached Afghan platoon refused to 

follow the orders of the company commander.35

Even Americans who later praised the ANA for their role in the 

operation noticed that their partner units began to lose effectiveness. 

Some Soldiers believed that the Afghan units lacked the mental focus and 

discipline needed to operate for longer than a few days at a time and the 

supply situation only exacerbated the problem. Delta Company’s Afghan 

partners became restless as the supply of meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) 

began to run low on 27 June. At one point during the day, a stray goat 

wandered into the position. Almost in unison, the Afghans left their 

defensive positions to chase the goat and eventually succeeded in killing 

and slaughtering the animal. With no regard for the combat conditions, 
78

the Afghans then proceeded to start a large fire to roast the goat meat. 

The Afghan platoon partnered with First Lieutenant Martin’s platoon 

demanded opium the same day. The Americans, unsurprisingly, declined 

to add the opium to their resupply requests. Actions such as these did little 

to endear ANA units to some US Soldiers.36

Figure 15: Bravo Company defending Strongpoint Bastard.

Source: 2-35 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel Tuley, having shifted the battalion’s emphasis 

towards Gambir and cancelling the supporting operation in Tsangar, 

decided that Delta Company’s position at Strongpoint Firehole was no 

longer necessary and ordered helicopters to pick up Captain Kalaher’s unit 

that night at HLZ Hillstar. The HLZ was positioned 200 meters down a 

steep incline from the strongpoint. The battalion decided to try and use 
79

the HLZ again because Delta Company had several men suffering from 

injuries and heat exhaustion who could not move long distances. After 

dark, the company occupied the HLZ. A Kiowa Warrior inspected the HLZ 

and declared it suitable but when the Chinook arrived, the pilot refused to 

land because a large tree sat in the middle of the landing site. Engineers 

attached to Delta Company tried to blow the tree with C4 plastic explosive 

but did not have enough of the explosive on hand. Therefore, Delta 

Company could not leave that night and the men returned to their original 

fighting positions to wait and try and destroy the tree again the next day.37

28 June, Reinforcements and Consolidation

Early on 28 June, reinforcements finally reached Strongpoint Bastard. 

First to arrive was the brigade reserve of Bravo Company, 2-27 IN. On a 

four hour alert since 25 June, Captain Michael Kolton decided to bring 

only part of his unit: his 2d Platoon, led by First Lieutenant Anthony 

Ferrara; his 3d Platoon, led by First Lieutenant Jon Brown; and a skeleton 

headquarters element. No ANA attachments accompanied the company.38

On the evening of 26 June, Kolton’s unit was to fly to FOB Joyce to 

conduct an insertion the next night. Instead, once in the air, the pilots told 

Kolton that they intended to land his company at HLZ Honey Eater. While 

the changed mission took Kolton by surprise, poor weather prevented the 

landings and the company went on to FOB Joyce as initially planned. 

During the day on 27 June, Kolton acquired grid coordinates and satellite 

images of the area from the head of the Downed Aircraft Recovery Team, 

Captain David Fitzgerald. Later, Kolton met with Captain Hughes, recently 

evacuated from the valley, and gained a fuller picture of the situation at 

Strongpoint Bastard.39

After catching several hours of sleep, Kolton learned that his company 

would now land at HLZ Carolina just to the west of Strongpoint Bastard 

and clear the village of Sero Kalay. The Afghan commandos, held in reserve 

since the beginning of HAMMER DOWN, would land at the same HLZ 

just ahead of Bravo, 2-27 IN and clear Gambir. The commandos would 

operate independently of other units, meaning that Kolton would not have 

direct command over the Afghans. Because of the NATO requirement that 

ANA units lead all clearance operations, an Afghan Army platoon was 

attached to Kolton’s command for the mission. His 1st Platoon, left back 

at COP Monti, found time that day to rigorously train the designated ANA 

platoon at a facility constructed specifically to prepare forces for clearance 

missions. The ANA platoon flew from COP Monti to FOB Joyce at 2130 

on 27 June. With his complete force now assembled, Kolton loaded men 

and equipment onto the Chinooks and lifted off for the Watapur.40 
80

At 2230, Bravo Company, 2-27 IN disembarked from the helicopters 

at HLZ Carolina. After a brief meeting between Kolton and a US SOF 

advisor with the Afghan commandos, the company set out for Strongpoint 

Bastard. The HLZ Carolina was only 150 meters west of Strongpoint 

Bastard but a cliff of 50 meters deep separated the two positions. A layer 

of fog added to the difficulties, making the movement to the strongpoint a 

two and half hour ordeal.41

As Kolton’s company moved toward Strongpoint Bastard, the 

3d Platoon from Bravo Company, 2-35 IN also set out to reinforce the 

strongpoint. At approximately 2130 hours, the platoon’s leader, First 

Lieutenant Mossberg, ordered his squads to leave their defensive positions 

and to begin moving in file through the rough terrain. Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley and his staff assumed the movement would take two to three hours 

to complete but midnight came and went with the platoon still not at 

their destination. At 0100 on 28 June, the 3d Platoon received enemy 

communications intercepts indicating that the insurgents had spotted 

their movement and intended to attack it. Helicopters were covering the 

commandos’ clearance of Gambir but the Bravo Company First Sergeant, 

First Sergeant de Lemos, requested and received an Apache gunship to 

escort the platoon during his move. An AC-130 gunship also orbited 

overhead, providing the men with fire support. The enemy threat to 

Mossberg’s platoon never materialized and the unit reached Strongpoint 

Bastard at 0330 without any contact.42

Once Bravo Company, 2-27 IN also arrived at the strongpoint, Kolton’s 

Soldiers immediately noticed several men with gunshot and shrapnel 

wounds who had not yet been evacuated. The men of Bravo Company, 

2-35 IN initially believed that the new force had arrived to relieve them 

but Captain Kolton informed them that his unit only planned to remain at 

Strongpoint Bastard for the day. Kolton resupplied the strongpoint with 

ammunition and ordered his fresh Soldiers to man the perimeter. The 

firepower used by Bravo Company, 2-35 IN combined with the insurgent 

focus on Honey Eater had drawn the enemy away from Strongpoint 

Bastard. Kolton’s company had no contact that day.43

The Afghan commandos entered Gambir on 28 June, finally attaining 

the operation’s primary objective. By the time the Afghans entered the 

village, most of the residents had fled. Searches yielded only one or 

two caches of any significance. The insurgents had managed to remove 

anything of value from the village in advance of the arrival of Coalition 

forces.44
81

After the helicopter pilots had deemed HLZ Hillstar unusable the 

night before, Delta Company occupied itself with trying to clear a landing 

zone so that the Chinooks could safely land that evening. The large tree 

in the center of the HLZ, however, continued to defy all attempts to bring 

it down. At one point, a Soldier fired a LAW rocket at the trunk with no 

effect. The insurgents only complicated matters as small groups of enemy Figure 16: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 28 June 2011. Source: author/CSI generated.
82

fighters fired at the men at HLZ Hillstar multiple times. Each time the 

insurgents attacked, the Americans had to fall back to Strongpoint Firehole 

because the open terrain around the HLZ lacked any cover or concealment. 

Delta Company, however, had a major success when the JTAC, Air Force 

Staff Sergeant Dan Garner, and the Joint Fires Observer (JFO), Sergeant 

First Class Thomas Manes, identified a foot trail used by enemy fighters 

on the steep eastern slope of the ridgeline. CAS and artillery rounds fell 

onto the trail, killing numerous insurgents and deterring the remainder 

from using the same route.45

The amount of enemy contact at the other positions varied widely. 

The insurgents presumably used a trail that ran along the southern end of 

Strongpoint Danube to launch three small probing attacks at that position 

during the morning, at midday, and in the late afternoon, but none of 

these three attacks seriously tested the defenses of the strongpoint. By 

contrast, since the Scouts had successfully repulsed every previous enemy 

attack and then directed artillery rounds and air strikes onto the retreating 

insurgents, the enemy did not attack Strongpoint Indus on 28 June. 

Instead, the insurgents continued to probe HLZ Honey Eater, attacking the 

strongpoint in the morning and then again that afternoon.46

The supply situation also began to improve on 28 June for two reasons. 

First, after the previous failures of the Slowpoke aircraft to deliver their 

cargo consistently, Captain Campeau demanded better aircraft to perform 

the task. He happily received support from C-130 cargo planes based at 

Kandahar equipped with GPS. One of these aircraft delivered a pallet of 

supplies to Strongpoint Danube, dropping it just outside the perimeter. The 

supplies allowed Captain Heiliger to distribute two bottles of water, a bottle 

of Gatorade, and an MRE to each man at the strongpoint. In Heiliger’s 

estimation, the supplies staved off a mutiny by the ANA platoons, still 

resentful at the Americans for having stopped their feast of roasted goat 

the day earlier.47

Secondly, improved weather finally allowed more Chinooks to fly into 

the valley and deliver sling loads of supplies to Coalition positions. The 

Soldiers in the Forward Support Company lengthened the slings so that 

they better penetrated the thick tree cover in the valley. By this method, 

the helicopters could bring in supplies, especially ammunition, that might 

be damaged or that were too important to be included in a pallet drop. The 

Chinooks and the Slowpokes finally enabled Captain Campeau to supply 

the operation indefinitely.48
83

TF Cacti further consolidated its fighting positions during the night 

as the Scout Platoon moved from Strongpoint Indus to HLZ Honey Eater. 

Because the high altitude had prevented any helicopters from landing 

at Strongpoint Indus or providing any fire support, the Scouts and their 

Afghan partners had to carry down the body of the Afghan Soldier killed 

in the first day of fighting. After tearing down their positions and burning 

their trash with a thermite grenade, the Scouts headed for HLZ Honey Eater. 

Staff Sergeant Stetzel’s team took the point but the steep terrain slowed 

their movement. The platoon made multiple stops to check its bearings 

and to give the Afghan soldiers carrying their deceased comrade time to 

rest. Along the way, the group passed by a rock overhang that showed 

signs of recent enemy occupation and likely served as an assembly area for 

insurgent attacks over the previous four days. The Scouts and the Afghans 

completed their movement without incident and arrived at HLZ Honey 

Eater before dawn. Once there, the men stocked up on ammunition and 

reinforced the FTF’s fighting positions. While the Scouts had acquitted 

themselves well at Strongpoint Indus, its members were greatly relieved 

to have joined forces with the larger FTF.49

During the same night, more troops arrived at Strongpoint Bastard. 

Lieutenant Colonel Tuley had First Sergeant de Lemos lead Bravo 

Company’s 1st Platoon and all other wounded men at the position, to HLZ 

Carolina for evacuation from the valley. At the southern end of the Watapur 

Valley, the ANA had assumed full control over the TCP at Shamir Kowtso. 

The TF Cacti thus decided to send First Lieutenant Jarrod McCleary’s 

2d Platoon, Charlie Company to reinforce Strongpoint Bastard. The 

movements were coordinated so that the Chinooks landing McCleary’s 

platoon could take de Lemos and the other men out.50

First Sergeant de Lemos and 1st Platoon set out at nightfall and 

encountered, just as Bravo Company had the previous night, the deep 

gorge that ran between the strongpoint and the HLZ. The platoon reached 

the clearing at 2200 to find no helicopters there as the Chinooks had landed 

McCleary’s platoon at a clearing farther up the hill. After 15 additional 

minutes of climbing, Bravo Company’s 1st Platoon reached the new 

pick up point and the helicopters quickly took them away. Meanwhile, 

McCleary’s men moved to the strongpoint, arriving at approximately 0100 

on 29 June and had assumed positions on the perimeter by dawn.51 

29 June, Continued Contact and Clearance of Sero Kalay

Late in the night, Captain Kolton’s company set out from Strongpoint 

Bastard to establish a makeshift strongpoint in a farmhouse on the 
84

outskirts of Sero Kalay. From that position, they would prepare clearing 

the village the following day. During the first hours of the movement, 

cloud cover prevented any Apache or Kiowa gunships from supporting 

Bravo Company, greatly worrying the accompanying Afghan platoon. 

The Afghans, lacking night vision devices and trying to move down a 

steep incline, refused to move any farther until Kolton allowed them to 

move from the rear of the formation to just behind the lead element. As 

the company neared the farmhouse, Kolton, his FSO, and his RTO lost 

their footing and slid down the slope towards a sheer cliff. Their rucksacks 

caught on the rocks as they slid, preventing the three men from falling over 

the cliff. Weather conditions had improved enough for a Kiowa to guide 

the three men back to the trail while the rest of the company continued on. 

Just before dawn, Kolton and his men established Strongpoint Baker, and 

after receiving a load of supplies from a Chinook, conducted the clearance 

operation.52

At dawn on 29 June, Captain Kalaher, stymied by the tree at HLZ 

Hillstar, moved his Delta Company from Strongpoint Firehole to HLZ 

Monarch two kilometers to the south with First Lieutenant Martin’s 

platoon in the lead. No enemy force contested the movement but they 

came upon a pair of men with donkeys carrying supplies and let them pass. 

The company arrived at the old Strongpoint Dog position overlooking the 

HLZ later that morning. 

Captain Heiliger’s Alpha Company also received orders to move to 

HLZ Monarch for extraction. That same morning, they left Strongpoint 

Danube and followed the same trail south toward the HLZ. Unlike the 

movement of Delta Company, the shift of Alpha Company did not occur 

without incident. Heiliger split his force into three elements to move along 

the ridgeline using bounding overwatch. As First Lieutenant Heaviland’s 

platoon moved forward, it encountered the two men that Delta Company 

had let pass. When questioned, the men claimed to be carrying several 

weeks’ worth of food and supplies for their families. Heaviland’s Afghan 

platoon discounted the story, noting that civilians with nothing to hide had 

no reason to traverse the top of the ridgelines in this manner. The ANA 

soldiers suspected that the two men were transporting drugs, heroin most 

likely, but lacked cause to detain them. Reluctantly, Heaviland’s Soldiers 

let the two men and their donkey continue on their journey.53 

Soon after the civilians disappeared from sight, a small group of 

insurgents started firing at Heiliger’s 2d Platoon at the rear of the column. 

The platoon reacted quickly, returning fire with LAW rockets and M320 

grenade rounds. An Apache gunship swiftly appeared over 2d Platoon 

and conducted several gun runs. This prompt application of firepower 

suppressed and dispersed the enemy fighters, allowing the company to 
85

continue its southbound movement. Simmons’ 3d Platoon also engaged 

insurgents during the movement, firing at a small enemy force on the 

eastern slope of the ridge that had used folds in the terrain to provide 

cover and concealment. The platoon neutralized the insurgent elements 

and Alpha Company eventually reached the old Strongpoint Cat and 

established a hasty defense.54

Figure 17: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 29 June 2011.

Source: author/CSI generated.
86

At roughly the same time, a group of insurgents most likely from 

Tsangar fired on Strongpoint Baker from 600 meters to the south. Captain 

Kolton’s force engaged the enemy with machine gun and sniper fire and 

ultimately called in CAS that destroyed the fighters. Nearby, the men at 

Strongpoint Bastard only encountered sporadic contact with the enemy. 

Snipers began firing on the position just after dawn but ceased once 

McCleary’s men responded with M320 grenade rounds. Later in the day, 

more snipers fired at the strongpoint but CAS ended the harassment.55

Early that morning at HLZ Honey Eater, an element from the DART 

team tasked with taking out all of the sensitive equipment from the crashed 

Chinook helicopter arrived. Led by Staff Sergeant Bryce Venom, the 

five-man team brought buzz saws, axes, and other tools to remove the 

communications gear, laser-tracking gear, and anything else that could 

not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. The task took several hours to 

complete and made a terrible racket, much to the consternation of the FTF 

members defending the HLZ.56

Out on the perimeter of the HLZ, the scout platoon’s LLVI equipment 

and enhanced optics gave the FTF enhanced situational awareness. That 

awareness in fact gave the Scout Platoon early warning of a major insurgent 

attack on HLZ Honey Eater on the morning of 29 June. Communications 

intercepts indicated that the insurgents had finally realized there was a 

crashed Chinook at HLZ Honey Eater and had started massing forces to 

capture the wreckage. In the intercepts, the enemy began discussing a 

weapon they referred to as “the big one,” leading to some concern among 

the men of the FTF. The “big one” turned out to be a large, homemade 

rocket. The rocket lacked an aiming system and when fired, exploded 50 

meters from Sergeant Bedoy’s position but harmed no one. The insurgents 

also used mortars in the attack and some rounds struck very close to the 

CP at the center of the position but ultimately, the enemy indirect fire was 

ineffective. 

This show of insurgent firepower did not deter the FTF which 

responded with its organic weapons systems and some 15 CAS missions 

during the fight. That fire support successfully drove off the insurgents. A 

short time later, Major General Volesky briefly visited the strongpoint. His 

helicopter drew more enemy fire to HLZ Honey Eater. Captain Bluhm then 

coordinated for several additional CAS missions to destroy the insurgent 

force, including a strike called against a group of armed men inspecting 

previous US positions atop Hill 3181.57

At mid-afternoon, Strongpoint Dog came under attack by an enemy 

force using high ground just to the south of the strongpoint. Yet again, the 
87

insurgents used hitherto unseen foot trails on the east side of the ridge to 

move into position. Delta Company responded with mortars and 40mm 

rounds and Captain Kalaher called in 155mm artillery to hit the trail and 

the enemy positions. CAS strikes followed up, removing the threat of the 

insurgent force. Delta Company suffered one of its few casualties during 

the operation, a wounded Afghan Soldier who was quickly airlifted to the 

hospital.58

During the afternoon, Bravo Company, 2-27 IN left the confines 

of their strongpoint and conducted the clearance of Sero Kalay. Kolton 

ordered his marksmen to set up atop high ground north of the village 

and provide overwatch as the rest of the company cleared through the 

settlement. The marksmen killed an enemy crew attempting to fire a 

DShK 14.5mm heavy machine gun at a Chinook making a supply run but 

otherwise made no contact with the enemy. Communications intercepts 

revealed that the insurgents were watching the operation but declined to 

interfere. The clearance proceeded smoothly, although the company found 

no significant caches and narrowly avoided a fratricide incident when a 

few of the Afghan commandos in Gambir strayed into Bravo Company’s 

field of fire. With the village cleared, the force moved back up the hill 

toward Strongpoint Baker and waited for extraction.59

Exfiltration of the Task Force – The First Attempt

During the afternoon of 29 June, Lieutenant Colonel Tuley decided 

that the operation had run its course. The commandos and Bravo Company, 

2-27 IN had cleared Gambir and Sero Kalay, completing the battalion’s 

decisive operation. With these tasks now accomplished, orders went out to 

each of the companies and platoons to prepare for exfiltration that night. 

After dark, the force at Strongpoint Bastard tore down their fighting 

positions and prepared to move. They left behind their stocks of water and 

MREs for the elderly man in the qalat but they destroyed their leftover 

ammunition and other supplies before leaving the strongpoint. A light rain 

began falling on the men as they moved towards the HLZ, causing some 

to wonder if the Chinooks would be able to fly into the Watapur that night. 

Fortunately, the conditions remained acceptable at lower elevations and 

the helicopters picked up the Soldiers and flew them back to FOB Joyce.60

That same night, helicopters withdrew the Afghan commando unit 

from an HLZ just below Gambir. Once the commandos left, the helicopters 

returned to pick up Kolton’s Bravo Company near their strongpoint 

outside Sero Kalay. Kolton left behind their mini-HESCO barriers for 

the locals to salvage but his men destroyed their other remaining supplies 

before boarding the helicopters. His ANA partners left behind a note and 
88

money in the farmhouse to pay for rice that they had appropriated from the 

owners during the stay. This simple act paid dividends as the homeowner, 

surprised by the graciousness of the Afghan Soldiers, made contact with 

the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and began providing 

information on insurgent activities in the area.61

While the Chinooks successfully retrieved all of the troops at lower 

elevations, the plan did not work out as well for those occupying the 

ridgeline strongpoints. As fog descended, the Soldiers of Alpha and 

Delta Companies waited near HLZ Monarch for the helicopters to arrive. 

When the weather briefly cleared, a Chinook approached the HLZ. The 

pilot refused to land however, believing a tree stump in the clearing could 

damage the helicopter. The helicopter flew away into the darkness. Fog and 

precipitation resumed soon afterwards, forcing both companies to trudge 

back up the hill into their fighting positions and wait for another attempt. 

The thought of spending one more day in the cold and rainy conditions 

sapped the morale of many men in both companies. Unfortunately, there 

was no choice but to remain overnight.62

Events unfolded similarly at HLZ Honey Eater farther to the north. At 

2200 Captain Bluhm ordered everyone to dismantle their fighting positions 

and to move into pickup zone posture while waiting for the Chinooks to 

arrive. Unfortunately, the cloud cover and rain proved thicker and heavier 

at that altitude, preventing the helicopters from landing. Frustratingly for 

the cold and wet troops on the HLZ, they could see the helicopters flying 

near Gambir and Sero Kalay 1,000 meters lower down the ridgeline. The 

poor weather conditions persisted throughout the night, and at 0200 Bluhm 

ordered his men to reoccupy their fighting positions. Sergeant Bedoy, a 

survivor of the Chinook crash, was frustrated to find out they would not 

leave the ridgeline that night but helped man the perimeter.63

30 June, Ending HAMMER DOWN

On 30 June, the sixth and final day of Operation HAMMER DOWN, 

TF Cacti still had two positions in the Watapur Valley: Alpha and Delta 

Companies near HLZ Monarch and the FTF and Scouts at HLZ Honey 

Eater. None of these units expected to be in the field another day but they 

all remained in position to continue to disrupt insurgent activity in the 

Watapur. 

To enable another day of operations on the ridgeline, aircraft made 

supply runs to both positions. A Chinook sling load arrived at HLZ Honey 

Eater that morning after the sunlight drove off the cloud cover. Ammunition 

was the priority item but the men also received replacement uniforms, the 

originals reduced to rags by days of combat in the unforgiving terrain.64
89

Alpha and Delta Companies received pallets of supplies dropped by 

Slowpoke aircraft. One of Delta Company’s pallets landed outside the 

perimeter and proved somewhat difficult to retrieve but the second landed 

in the center of the position and knocked a Soldier’s helmet off his head 

and down the hillside. Alpha Company’s pallets arrived without incident 

and the new supplies, combined with recovered stocks abandoned by 

Delta Company during its movement to Strongpoint Firehole three days 

earlier, gave the Alpha Company Soldiers a small measure of comfort. 

Several men ingeniously reused the parachutes from the pallets to fashion 

makeshift tents that some referred to as the “Waianae Projects” after a 

development found near their home station at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 

Now resupplied, the troops manned their positions and waited.65

The Americans knew from communications intercepts that the 

insurgents lacked the capability to sustain a fight for more than two or 

three days. Evidently, the enemy’s exhaustion from the previous days’ 

exertions limited insurgent actions against the Alpha Company and Delta 

Company positions. A three-man insurgent team probed Alpha Company’s 

position from a cluster of nearby qalats in the woodline. Captain Heiliger 

dispatched a fire team to root out the enemy force but the insurgents 

avoided decisive contact. Accordingly, Heiliger called in Apache 

helicopter gunships that were more successful, killing the insurgents as 

they attempted to move between buildings. After this small engagement, 

there was no further enemy contact near HLZ Monarch. Later that day, 

First Lieutenant Martin and Staff Sergeant Richardson led a small team 

onto the HLZ with explosives and destroyed the stubborn tree stump. The 

clearing was now set to receive helicopters.66

At Strongpoint Havoc, the forces there likewise fought off a small 

insurgent band probing the perimeter during the morning. At 1315 that 

afternoon, however, the Scout Platoon sighted a pair of men with donkeys 

approaching the southern perimeter. Based on the assessment that no 

civilians remained in the valley, Sergeant Smith engaged the men, killing 

one of the donkeys. 67 Several Soldiers left the perimeter and searched the 

men, who were the same pair who had wandered through Delta and Alpha 

Companies’ formations the previous day. The Scouts wrote a claim receipt 

for the donkey and sent the men on their way. Just like Alpha Company’s 

encounter with the men, an insurgent attack soon followed the departure 

of the two Afghans. The FTF and the Scouts held back this larger assault 

long enough for 155mm artillery rounds to tear into the insurgents’ ranks 

and force them to withdraw.68
90

Since weather conditions had prevented the planned extraction of the 

entire battalion on 29 June, the unit adjusted the lift plans to ensure that 

everyone could get out of the valley that night. To shorten the time between 

sorties, the Chinooks would land at COP Honaker-Miracle instead of each 

unit’s home outpost. The companies also took precautions to compensate 

for sudden shifts in the weather and the possibility that the withdrawal 

might have to be delayed another day. Captain Heiliger arranged his Alpha 

Company chalks so that the last group scheduled to board had night vision 

devices, RTO, and the 60mm mortar. If the lift at HLZ Monarch failed, 

they still had HLZ Dollar Bird just to their south as a potential extraction 

point.69 

For Captain Bluhm and the FTF, the situation was not as simple. 

HLZ Honey Eater was at a higher elevation than HLZ Monarch and much 

deeper in the Valley. Bluhm also still had several men who, while perfectly 

capable to defend the perimeter, could not move over long distances due 

to injuries sustained in the Chinook crash. Rumors circulated among the 

men that the battalion intended to drop in HESCO barriers and erect a COP 

at their present position. In actuality, TF Cacti ordered Bluhm to lead 40 

Soldiers (mostly the Scout Platoon), his JTAC, and a mortar team from 

HLZ Honey Eater to HLZ Dollar Bird if the weather deteriorated during 

the extraction operation. Approximately eight kilometers of rough terrain 

and hostiles separate the two HLZs, but the battalion preferred that the 

troops make the grueling walk rather than remain at Honey Eater at the 

mercy of the poor weather.70

These contingency plans were fortunately unnecessary. The battalion 

scheduled the Chinooks to pick up the FTF and Scouts first and the 

operation proceeded relatively smoothly. It took six trips with 20 men 

aboard each helicopter to lift out the forces at HLZ Honey Eater. First 

Sergeant Burnah accounted for every man as each boarded the helicopter. 

A few tense moments occurred as the Apache gunships covering the 

extraction fired on a small group of insurgents moving towards the north 

side of the HLZ. The last chalk waited on the HLZ without air cover for a 

Chinook to return but boarded the last helicopter safely.71

Before leaving the HLZ, the DART Team set phosphorous grenades 

aboard the wrecked CH-47 to burn out the fuselage. Even still, the 

Coalition did not want to take any chances with the downed helicopter. 

After exiting his helicopter at COP Honaker-Miracle, Bluhm and several 

of his men stood on the helipad and watched in the distance as F-15 jets 

dropped multiple bombs on the CH-47 crash site, creating a fireball in the 

night sky. The bombs prevented the insurgents from using the wreck as a 

propaganda coup.72
91

The withdrawal also proceeded smoothly at HLZ Monarch. Alpha 

Company and Delta Company had taken positions to the north and south 

of the HLZ respectively and awaited the Chinooks then lifting out the 

FTF. At 2230, the last of Delta Company left HLZ Monarch but not before 

the JTAC called in a CAS mission to suppress a small group of fighters Figure 18: Operation HAMMER DOWN, 30 June 2011. Source: author/CSI generated.
92

who had advanced too close to the HLZ. The Chinooks then returned and 

brought out Heiliger’s Alpha Company. Most of the company stood and 

watched the bombing of HLZ Honey Eater in the distance as they boarded 

the CH-47s. Just after midnight on 1 July, the last helicopter carrying 

Heiliger and several of his troops landed at Honaker-Miracle. With the exit 

of the last of the Coalition forces from the Watapur, Operation HAMMER 

DOWN ended.73
93

Endnotes

1. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 20; Hoffmaster, interview, 11-14; 

Brodmerkel, interview, 17-18. 

2. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 18; FTF NCOs, group interview, 9-10. 

3. Burnah, quoted in Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 26.

4. Peterson and Clayson, interview, 13-14. 

5. Lennox, interview, 20-1; Peterson and Clayson, interview, 16; FTF 

NCOs, group interview, 11-3; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 18-19. 

6. Brodmerkel, interview, 19-20; Bravo NCOs, group interview, 25-26. 

7. Kalaher, interview, 10-13. 

8. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 12-13; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 16-18, 22. 

9. Kerins, interview, 17-8; Scout NCOs, group interview, 20-21.

10. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 21. 

11. Lennox, interview, 23; Kalaher, interview, 12-13; Baca, Van Wyhe, 

Gaulin, group interview, 17-19; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 3-4. 

12. Charlie NCOs, group interview, 23-24; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 18. 

13. First Lieutenant Andrew Simmons, e-mail message to Ryan Wadle, 

Combat Studies Institute, 13 July 2012; First Lieutenant Andrew Simmons, 

e-mail message to Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 9 August 2012.

14. Alpha NCOs, group interview, 11-12; 1LT Andrew Simmons, e-mail 

message to Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 27 July 2012; Heaviland and 

Simmons, interview, 18-19; Delta NCOs, group interview, 24-25, 33; Simmons, 

e-mail, 9 August 2012.

15. Delta NCOs, group interview, 30-31; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 19; Simmons, e-mail, 9 August 2012.

16. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 29.

17. Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 10-11; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 

3; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group interview, 17; Hughes and de Lemos, 

interview, 5-6.

18. Captain Thomas Campeau, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 2012, 14-15, 18. 

19. Sergeant First Class Ronald Strietzel, interview by Ryan Wadle, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 April 2012, 10; 2-35 IN 

Logistics, group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 24 April 2012, 20. 
94

20. Campeau, interview, 15-17; 2-34 IN Logistics, group interview, 20. 

21. Captain Thomas Campeau, e-mail message to Ryan Wadle, 14 August 

2012. 

22. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 14, 20-21; Heiliger and Puletasi, 

interview, 14-15; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 15. 

23. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 26; Bravo NCOs, group interview, 

27-28. 

24. Staff Sergeant David Miller, 4.

25. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 19-20, 26; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 23.

26. Kerins, interview, 19-20. 

27. Kerins, interview, 21-22, 24, 26. 

28. FTF NCOs, group interview, 20, 24-25. 

29. FTF NCOs, group interview, 17-21; Peterson and Clayson, interview, 

21-2, Lennox, 26. 

30. Kerins, interview, 24-25.

31. Bravo NCOs, 26-29.

32. Hawkins, quoted in Bravo NCOs, group interview, 27.

33. Campeau, interview, 18; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 17; Alpha 

NCOs, 14-15.

34. Campeau, interview, 19-20. 

35. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 8-9; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 13-14.

36. Delta NCOs, group interview, 4-5. 

37. Executive Summary; Kalaher, interview, 13-14; Baca, Van Wyhe, 

Gaulin, group interview, 21-22; Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 21-22; 

Charlie NCOs, group interview, 35.

38. Kolton, interview, 1-4, 17. 

39. Kolton, interview, 5-8. 

40. Kolton, interview, 8-12. 

41. Kolton, interview, 12-13, 15-16.

42. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 24, 26-28. 

43. Kolton, interview, 17.

44. Cacti Leadership, group interview, 18. 

45. Kalaher, interview, 15, 17-18; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 5; Delta 

NCOs, group interview, 27-28, 40-41. 
95

46. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 26; Heiliger and Puletasi, 

interview, 19-20; Lennox, interview, 26; Kerins, 26. 

47. Campeau, interview, 21-23; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 17-18; 

Alpha NCOs, group interview, 13. 

48. Campeau, interview, 23-24. 

49. Kerins, interview, 26-27; Scout NCOs, group interview, 23-26, 37. 

50. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 25

51. Bravo NCOs, group interview, 33-37; Charlie NCOs, group interview, 

41-43. 

52. Kolton, interview, 17-25.

53. Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 28; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 

15-6; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 24-25.

54. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 24; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 18. 

55. Lennox, interview, 30, Kerins, interview, 28; Bluhm and Burnah, 

interview, 28; FTF NCOs, group interview, 28. 

56. Staff Sergeant Kurt David Mackiewicz, interview by Ryan Wadle, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2012, 3-4.

57. Lennox, interview, 21-23; Scout NCOs, group interview, 28, 33. 

58. Kalaher, interview, 15; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group interview, 26; 

Staff Sergeant David Miller, 6.

59. Kolton, interview, 26-27, 29. 

60. Hughes and de Lemos, interview, 35; Bravo NCOs, group interview, 

401; Charlie NCOs, group interview, 44-47.

61. Kolton, interview, 30-31. 

62. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 25; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 29; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 19; Kalaher, interview, 20; 

Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 22; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 7. 

63. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 24; Lennox, interview, 31-32; Scout 

NCOs, group interview, 40-41; FTF NCOs, group interview, 30.

64. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 24.

65. Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 17; Charlie NCOs, group interview, 

45; Delta NCOs, group interview, 12; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 17-18, 

23, 25; Alpha NCOs, group interview, 17.

66. Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 19; Baca, Van Wyhe, Gaulin, group 

interview, 27; Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 26-27; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 30-31. 

67. Kerins, interview, 31. 
96

68. Lennox, interview,33, 37-38; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 30-32; 

Scout NCOs, group interview, 45-47; Kerins, interview, 31. 

69. Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 26; Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 31-32. 

70. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 25; Lennox, interview, 33-35; Peterson 

and Clayson, interview, 23-24; FTF NCOs, group interview, 31. 

71. Lennox, interview, 35; Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 35; Scout NCOs, 

group interview, 42; FTF NCOs, group interview, 31-32.

72. Bluhm and Burnah, interview, 34; Mackiewicz, interview, 13-14. 

73. Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 22; Staff Sergeant David Miller, 7-8; 

Heiliger and Puletasi, interview, 27; Heaviland and Simmons, interview, 31-32. 
97

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Many of the Soldiers of TF Cacti believed that the days they spent 

conducting Operation HAMMER DOWN were the hardest of their yearlong tour. According to Delta Company’s First Sergeant Matthew Bartel, 

the operation’s six-day length and the high altitude made the operation a 

severe challenge.1

 An intransigent enemy ready and willing to fight made 

HAMMER DOWN even more difficult. The most painful result of the 

combat in this operation was the loss of five Coalition soldiers – of three 

Americans and two Afghans. Dozens more were wounded or injured, 

including those on the CH-47 that crashed on second day of the mission. 

Still, the men of TF Cacti responded well to the adversity. First 

Lieutenant Andrew Simmons, the leader of 3d Platoon, Alpha Company, 

recognized how the difficult conditions affected his Soldiers but stated, “I 

was just proud of everyone.”2

 Because the operation occurred relatively 

early in the task force’s deployment, the hard fight gave the battalion a 

wealth of experience from which to draw for the remainder of the tour. For 

leaders new to combat, the challenge of controlling men and understanding 

a quickly changing situation while under fire was a formative experience. 

First Lieutenant Colin Brodmerkel, Bravo Company’s 2d Platoon Leader, 

recalled the insurgent ambush on the first day of the operation:

It was very chaotic and that’s where I will always remember...

when they say in the history books about war is, you know, war 

is hell and all...officers and NCOs try to control chaos, and that’s 

what it comes down to is war is controlling chaos. And that’s what 

I fully understand now after being in that.3

First Lieutenant Brodmerkel’s insight on combat leadership was echoed 

by many in TF Cacti who found the six days of fighting on the dangerous 

ridgelines of the Watapur Valley physically and mentally exhausting.

HAMMER DOWN would have been a difficult operation even if it 

had proceeded as planned but few military operations adhere closely to the 

template created by planners and HAMMER DOWN was no exception. 

The TF Cacti commander and staff originally envisioned a mission focused 

on eliminating the insurgent threat in the Watapur Valley by clearing the 

villages of Gambir and Tsangar where they suspected enemy training 

camps were located. Contact with insurgents was deemed possible but 

the operation was directed more at the enemy infrastructure than at the 

insurgents themselves. 
98

Once HAMMER DOWN began, however, the initial objectives became 

secondary in importance as it became clear that TF Cacti had essentially 

launched an attack against a concentrated force of insurgents, most of 

whom were willing to stand and fight. While the combat in the valley was 

arduous, the Coalition force ultimately killed approximately 120 enemy 

fighters and wounded 50 more, striking a significant blow to the insurgent 

networks that operated in the region. The clearances of Gambir and Sero 

Kalay did not yield the expected insurgent leaders, weapons caches, or 

other infrastructure, partly because Coalition forces were delayed by the 

fighting on the high ground allowing time for enemy leadership to escape 

the valley.

Aftermath

Coalition success against the enemy formations on the ridges did 

interrupt enemy activities in the northern Watapur Valley for months. 

Perhaps the most important result of HAMMER DOWN’s success was 

that the operation relieved much of the pressure on COP Honaker-Miracle, 

allowing the planned expansion into the western Pech valley to proceed. 

Insurgents were able to place harassing fire on the COP during the several 

weeks that followed the operation but these attacks stopped completely for 

the last four months of the year.4

The combined effects of the operation had other long term effects on 

the region, introducing discord to the insurgent hierarchies in the area. 

Key insurgent leaders who had held positions of authority for many years 

in the Watapur suddenly fell from power after HAMMER DOWN. In at 

least one instance, an insurgent leader lost face because fighters under his 

command contributed little to the resistance against TF Cacti’s incursion 

into the valley. This infighting in the insurgent ranks, which lasted through 

the end of 2011, likely contributed to the end of the attacks on HonakerMiracle during the same time period.5

The success of HAMMER DOWN also paved the way for the battalion 

to execute Operation DIAMOND HEAD during July and August 2011. 

During this month-long operation, TF Cacti relieved the beleaguered ANA 

forces in Nangalam, re-established a firm Coalition presence in the western 

Pech Valley, and secured the length of the Pech River Road from Asadabad 

to Nangalam. The battalion also moved northward into the Waygal Valley, 

becoming the first Americans to visit the village of Wanat since the battle 

there in July 2008.6

HAMMER DOWN achieved several key goals and allowed for further 

successes in the Pech but it did not completely destroy the insurgency in 
99

the Watapur. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy began rebuilding 

forces in the Watapur soon after the conclusion of Operation HAMMER 

DOWN. Fighters entered the valley through the traditional rat lines and 

established themselves in the same villages that had caused problems for 

Cacti and nearly all of its predecessors: Gambir and Tsangar. The insurgent 

leadership struggles certainly altered the nature of this resurgence but the 

insurgency continued throughout the remainder of the Cacti’s tour. The 

Assistant Battalion S2 at the time of HAMMER DOWN, Captain Willard 

Hayes, noted, “the Watapur [was] the one valley really in the Pech that we 

thought you can go in there multiple times and it’s going to continue to 

refill.”7

 

Any analysis of HAMMER DOWN must also note that the TF Cacti

leadership did not view large operations as the best solutions to the 

problems found in the Watapur and Pech valleys. The battalion continued 

to conduct operations in its AO through the end of 2011 but in the final 

months of the tour, Lieutenant Colonel Tuley shifted his unit’s operational 

priorities. One of the lessons he and his staff took from HAMMER 

DOWN and their other major operations was that these missions required 

a significant amount of time and resources to accomplish. Tuley described 

the larger effect of these operations on the battalion in the following way: 

Each one of these operations, as you well know, it’s not just those 

seven days or those six days, it’s the preceding weeks of reforming 

and rebuilding the teams and getting them set for the operation, the 

whole nine yards. Post ops - it takes us a week just to dismantle 

the operation, just to get everybody out and get them back into 

their FOBs and COPs everywhere and then go through their own 

small recovery for a couple of days. Then it takes another week 

for them just to figure out what’s going on in their districts and 

their AOs.8

Rather than plan a series of large scale operations, Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley and his staff decided to refocus their company teams to designated 

AOs where they conducted lethal and nonlethal operations to secure their 

areas and train Afghan security forces. Concentrating on specific AOs 

allowed for much greater outreach with the local populations and earned 

dividends for the battalion. The intelligence gathered during the latter 

phases of the deployment allowed TF Cacti to conduct small targeted 

missions to kill or otherwise neutralize insurgent leaders in its AO. These 

operations tore into the upper echelons of local and foreign fighter cells 

in the Pech region in an effort to cause organizational chaos and reduce 

insurgent operational effectiveness. 9
100

The Dynamics of the Battle

In the first ten years of the Coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan, 

the Watapur Valley proved especially difficult to control. Populated by 

a conservative minority tribal group that historically resisted external 

influences, the valley served as a gateway through which foreign fighters 

entered the larger Pech Valley region. Attempts by Coalition forces to 

conduct lethal and nonlethal operations in the Watapur met with resistance 

by skilled and determined foes that used the mountainous ground to 

maximum effect. Only on the valley floor could wheeled vehicles travel 

safely, any major movements into the surrounding ridgelines required 

helicopter transport or for Soldiers to move on foot. In a long war waged 

with limited resources, US forces found it difficult to suppress the 

insurgency or to prevent the flow of foreign fighters into the valley largely 

because it was extremely difficult to sustain the immediate effects of any 

operation, however large. 

TF Cacti encountered many of the same issues that the units which 

preceded it had when they entered the valley. The inhospitable landscape 

directly affected nearly every important aspect of Operation HAMMER 

DOWN. TF Cacti tried to develop new HLZs because the planners 

believed that the constant reuse of landing zones since 2007 eliminated 

the possibility of surprise. Some of these new HLZs proved unusable and 

led several units to immediately alter their scheme of maneuver. The shifts 

ultimately had little effect on the operation’s outcome, and, in the case 

of the Scout Platoon diverting from Strongpoint Amazon to Strongpoint 

Indus, unwittingly benefited the operation by placing this force in a more 

valuable location. 

Equally important to the course of the operation was the nature of the 

terrain between the ridgeline and the valley floor. While the seizure of the 

high ground was a sound tactical decision, to reach their objectives, TF 

Cacti’s teams were forced to move down and across extremely steep terrain 

covered with dense forest and broken up by ravines and cliffs. During the 

planning for HAMMER DOWN, Cacti’s staff made assumptions about 

the terrain and the ability of the task force’s units to move at a specific 

rate. The terrain was far more difficult than expected and not only slowed 

movement and caused injuries but also hindered maneuver once contact 

was made with the enemy. 

While the terrain posed a significant challenge, Lieutenant Colonel 

Tuley’s bold decision to occupy several strongpoints along a six-kilometer 

line on the ridge proved vital to the operation’s success. Like moths to 
101

flames, the insurgents moved uphill towards well defended positions 

supported by mortars, artillery, attack helicopters, and close air support. 

These positions greatly reduced the risk to Coalition personnel; only one 

of the five Coalition fatalities during the operation lost his life inside an 

established strongpoint. Most importantly, the strongpoints successfully 

interdicted insurgent movements during the fight from the Chigal Valley 

and other nearby communities into the Watapur. The crash of the CH47 on HLZ Honey Eater on 25 June was transformed into a beneficial 

accident in its result in a company-size force blocking a key enemy ground 

line of communication into the Watapur. 

 Despite the operation’s success in directly engaging a major insurgent 

force on the ridgeline during the six days of HAMMER DOWN, the enemy 

did disrupt the plan to achieve the original objective of the operation – 

the clearance of the villages on the valley floor. This was mostly a result 

of the insurgents’ willingness to fight on terrain they knew well. Even 

though TF Cacti had seized many of the dominant terrain features, the 

enemy still proved adept at exploiting the ground to deadly advantage. 

The most conspicuous example was the ambush of Bravo Company as it 

neared Gambir, but this was not the only one. At several points during the 

operation, the enemy traversed the steep cliff face on the eastern ridgeline 

facing the neighboring Chigal Valley to attack Coalition forces. This 

avenue of approach caught Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon by surprise on the 

afternoon of 26 June and the ensuing firefight to expel the insurgents from 

the dominant terrain resulted in the death of Specialist Kevin Hilaman. A 

second attempt to use the cliff face as the launch point for an attack proved 

less successful on 29 June as Alpha Company moved from Strongpoint 

Danube to HLZ Monarch but the skill of the insurgents in exploiting their 

home terrain cannot be overlooked. 

Operation HAMMER DOWN highlighted short term weaknesses of 

the insurgents operating in the Watapur but also their long term resilience. 

The ability of American forces to bring incredible amounts of combat 

power to bear in the valley wrought havoc on the enemy. After six days 

of fighting and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, the Coalition 

forces nearly exhausted the insurgents in the valley. While the operation 

led to significant turnover among key leadership positions within the 

insurgent networks and resulted in a loss of combat capability for some 

time afterwards, the networks ultimately re-established themselves. The 

relationships between the northern Watapur villages and Pakistani-based 

insurgent groups remained intact and foreign fighters returned to the valley. 
102

The Watapur Valley and COIN 

The foreign fighters persisted in the Watapur in spite of seven years 

of sustained lethal and non-lethal operations by Coalition forces to 

eliminate them. As developed and practiced in Afghanistan, America’s 

COIN approach required flexibility, adaptability, bountiful resources, and 

most of all, time and patience. Although the Coalition had committed to 

operations in the Watapur over a course of six years, the overall effort took 

a step backward each time a new unit arrived in Kunar Province and had 

to learn about the people and the land on which they lived. Over the course 

of this period, even with the Coalition achieving some successes in its 

COIN effort, the insurgency never entirely disappeared. Moreover, none 

of the units that had responsibility for the Watapur Valley in this period 

established a permanent presence in the northern end of the valley . A 

combat outpost in this area would have been costly in resources, especially 

troops, but might have had beneficial results.

Operation HAMMER DOWN highlights an important facet of the 

larger war in Afghanistan that often escapes notice. The popular perception 

of a COIN campaign is that it is conducted on a local level, with small 

units living among the people they seek to protect and patrolling an area 

in a manner akin to a police officer. Local development projects aimed at 

“winning hearts and minds” solidify relationships between the Soldiers and 

the people and when successful, separate the populace from the insurgents 

and build legitimacy for the host nation. The US forces certainly practiced 

many of these elements in the Pech region but, as the amount of forces 

on hand expanded, especially in 2009 and after, battalion- and brigadesized operations reminiscent of conventional warfare became more 

common. These operations allowed Coalition forces to temporarily reduce 

security threats to a significant extent. However, as TF Cacti discovered, 

these operations sometimes undermine many of the local initiatives that 

undergird COIN campaigns. 

The ability of the insurgency in the Watapur Valley to come back 

after HAMMER DOWN raises several interesting questions. First, what 

could have ensured the elimination of the insurgency in the valley? Every 

Coalition unit in the region had many areas that required their attention 

so focusing the lion’s share of resources on one valley would have been 

unwise. A new COP in the northern Watapur would have guaranteed a 

military presence nearer to Tsangar and Gambir but that would have raised 

an entirely new set of issues including how to balance the benefits and the 

risk offered by the base. The 2008 attack on the nascent outpost in Wanat 

and the 2009 assault on COP Keating suggest that a fortified COP in the 

northern Watapur would likely have met with strong resistance. 
103

Second, did the insurgency in the Watapur require complete 

elimination to ensure the attainment of the Coalition objectives, especially 

the expansion of Afghan governmental influence? Some battalions 

conspicuously avoided conducting large security operations in the 

northern valley and instead focused their attention on nonlethal methods 

of engagement. Meetings with elders, sponsoring economic development 

projects, and providing medical assistance all provided some limited gains 

but, like the combat operations in the valley, did not greatly reduce the 

insurgent presence on their own. In fact, enemy fighters remained active 

throughout the period under study here and COP Honaker-Miracle took 

fire consistently since the time of its construction in late 2007. The COP 

sat near the Pech River Road, the primary mover of people and commerce 

through the Pech. So long as the COP remained under fire, the road was 

vulnerable, too.

When faced with these questions, after HAMMER DOWN, the 

Soldiers of TF Cacti adopted a middle ground approach that mixed 

nonlethal operations with efforts to train their Afghan partners to assume 

a larger security burden. Doing so allowed the battalion to emphasize 

focused targeting missions against insurgent leadership that reduced their 

operational burden and maintained significant pressure on the enemy. This 

approach built upon years of observed experience acquired by units in 

the Pech and it met with some success before TF Cacti deployed home 

in spring 2012. Whether or not this effort had any long term effect on 

the insurgency’s hold on the Watapur and Pech valleys remains an open 

question. 
104

Endnotes

1. Cheatwood and Bartel, interview, 23. 

2. First Lieutenant Andrew Simmons, quoted in Heaviland and Simmons, 

interview, 33. 

3. First Lieutenant Colin Brodmerkel, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat 

Studies Institute, Schofield Barracks, HI, 25 April 2012, 17.

4. Executive Summary, 4. 

5. Hayes, Jones, and Henry, interview, 15-18.

6. Cacti Leadership, group interview, 35-36.

7. Captain Willard Hayes, quoted in Hayes, Jones, and Henry, interview, 

3. 

8. Lieutenant Colonel Colin Tuley, quoted in Cacti Leadership, group 

interview, 35-36.

9. Hayes, Jones, and Henry, interview, 20-21.
105

Glossary

AARs After Action Reports 

ANA Afghan National Army

AO Area of Operations 

AWG Asymmetric Warfare Group

CAS Close Air Support 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

CP Command Post 

DART Downed Aircraft Recovery Team

ETT Embedded Training Team 

FOB Forward Operating Base

FSB Forward Support Battalion

FSC Forward Support Company

FSO Fire Support Officer 

FTF Focused Targeting Force 

HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone 

HVTs High Value Targets 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

ITAS Improved Target Acquisition Systems 

JFO Joint Fires Observer 

JTAC Joint Tactical Air Controller 

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba 

LAW Light Anti-tank Weapon

LLVI Low Level Voice Intercept 

MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program 

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 

MREs Meals ready to eat 

NDS [Afghan] National Directorate of Security 

NTC National Training Center
106

ODA Operation Detachment Alpha 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Qalat a fortified place or fortified village

QRF Quick Reaction Force 

RCP Route Clearance Package 

ROE Rules Of Engagement 

RPGs Rocket Propelled Grenades

RTE ROUTE 

RTO Radio Telephone Operator 

SAW Squad Automatic Weapon 

SF Special Forces 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

TAC Tactical Command Post 

TF Task Force

TOW Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided 

(missile)

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USAID US Agency for International Development 

VETCAP Veterinary Civil Action Program 

VPB Vehicle Patrol Base 
107

About the Author

Ryan D. Wadle is currently the Course Director for Research Electives 

and Airpower Studies in the Department of Distance Learning at the Air 

Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He 

formerly served as a historian with the Afghanistan Study Team at the US 

Army Combat Studies Institute. Dr. Wadle received his Ph.D. in History 

from Texas A&M University and is currently working on a book-length 

manuscript titled The Fourth Dimension of Modern Naval Tactics: U.S. 

Navy Public Relations, 1919-1939.


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