Eyes Behind the Li

 US Army Long-Range

 Reconnaissance and

 Surveillance Units 

 

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Major James F. Gebhardt, US Army (Retired)

 

 Global War on Terrorism

 Occasional Paper 10

Revised Edition
 Eyes Behind the Lines: 

 US Army Long-Range 

 Reconnaissance and 

 Surveillance Units

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

by 

Major James F. Gebhardt, US Army (Retired)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gebhardt, James F., 1948-

 Eyes behind the lines : US Army long-range reconnaissance and surveillance 

units / James F. Gebhardt.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. Military reconnaissance—United States. I. Title. 

 U220.G43 2005

 355.4’13’0973--dc22

 2005017615

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can 

be found at: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.
Contents

Foreword........................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments...........................................................................................v

Chapter 1. Introduction....................................................................................1

Chapter 2. USAREUR Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols, 1957-68..........5

Background........................................................................................5

Doctrine............................................................................................. 8

Organization.................................................................................... 17

Training............................................................................................18

Materiel............................................................................................22

Leadership....................................................................................... 24

Personnel......................................................................................... 25

Relocation....................................................................................... 27

The USAREUR Experience............................................................ 27

Passing the Guidon.......................................................................... 28

Chapter 3. LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966-72........................................................45

Chronology...................................................................................... 45

Doctrinal and TOE Baseline............................................................46

Doctrine of Employment................................................................. 49 

Organization.................................................................................... 59

Training........................................................................................... 64 

Materiel........................................................................................... 69 

Tactical Role of Leaders.................................................................. 76 

Personnel......................................................................................... 82

The Vietnam Experience..................................................................87

Passing the Guidon......................................................................... 90

Chapter 4. Long-Range Surveillance Units, 1981-2001............................. 111

Starting Over.................................................................................. 111

Doctrine......................................................................................... 112 

LRSU Organizations..................................................................... 118

LRS Institutional and Unit Training............................................. 122

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM......................... 126 

Post-DESERT STORM Organizational Changes.......................... 134

Doctrinal Adjustments................................................................... 135 

i
Contingency Operations................................................................ 140

Materiel Issues...............................................................................141

Doctrine Redux..............................................................................142 

From the Cold War to the COE..................................................... 145

Chapter 5. Conclusions................................................................................157

Doctrine......................................................................................... 157 

Organization.................................................................................. 158 

Training..........................................................................................159 

Materiel......................................................................................... 160

Leadership..................................................................................... 161

Personnel....................................................................................... 161

Future of LRSU............................................................................. 162

Bibliography................................................................................................ 167

ii
Foreword

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10thstudy in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an outgrowth of concerns identified by the authors of On Point: The United States 

Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called 

into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRS) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made 

about their continuing utility and means of employment. This revision contains some important additional information the author received after this 

book was originally published

Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this 

Occasional Paper with that end in view. In this study, Gebhardt surveys the 

US Army’s historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s 

Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use 

in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, to the advent of the 

GWOT. The paper’s analytical framework examines each era of LRS units 

in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS 

capability in the Army’s force structure. 

The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the 

military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence 

abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed 

Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.

Timothy R. Reese

 Colonel, Armor

 Director, Combat Studies Institute

iii

Acknowledgments

I first became involved in long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) 

issues in early September 1967, when I volunteered to attend the Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Recondo School at Nha Trang. 

At the time, I was a 19-year-old rifleman in a mechanized infantry company 

and badly wanted a change of venue for the remaining six months of my 

12-month tour. I was fortunate to graduate from MACV Recondo School, 

even more fortunate to survive the next six months as a novice LRRP team 

leader in a newly formed LRRP detachment and return home safely from 

the war in March 1968. Those six months of LRRP duty were my only 

exposure to this type of unit in my almost two decades of military service 

that followed Vietnam. But they have helped me better understand the issues included in this study. My own experience played a role in reflecting 

on several specific issues and is documented in textual reference endnotes 

when used.

Another group of LRRP veterans has made an enormous contribution 

to this study—the men who belong to the VII Corps LRRP Association. 

They not only have formed an association of USAREUR (United States 

Army Europe) LRRP veterans (both V and VII Corps) with an Internet presence that conducts periodic reunions, but they also have become archivists 

of a sort, sending all their clippings, orders, photographs, and other documents to one member, who in turn has loaded them onto a compact disk for 

public distribution. The current VII Corps LRRP Association president is 

Kirkland H. Gibson; the archivist is Anselmo Rodriguez. Behind these two 

men are scores of solid citizens who served in all ranks of the Army from 

private first class to colonel, in peace and war, many of whom who have 

shared their time and experiences with me over the Internet.

One of these men, Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham, the communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company from its inception in July 

1961 to October 1962, continued to lobby for the LRRP concept after his 

reassignment. Then Major Bingham had a vision for LRRP that was not 

realized until long after the Vietnam War. He saved his personal and official 

correspondence from that era and graciously loaned it to me for the writing 

of this study.

The Vietnam LRRP veterans have contributed to this study largely 

through their anecdotal histories. While their memoirs, primarily published 

in paperback editions beginning in the mid-1980s, lack the accoutrements 

of scholarly history (footnotes, bibliography, and so on), the consistency of 

v
their work is remarkable in a number of areas germane to this study. 

I owe a large debt to another group, the LRRP and LRSU (long-range 

surveillance unit) veterans who elected to complete a multi-page questionnaire based on their personal experiences. Their intimate knowledge of what 

happened at distinct places and times, in some cases more than 40 years 

ago, provided many points of light out of which the larger picture came 

into view. I was also fortunate to interview several veterans of Operation 

DESERT STORM, including a LRSD (long-range surveillance detachment) commander, a military intelligence battalion S3 and the VII Corps 

G3. These perspectives greatly enhanced my understanding of LRS performance in that operation.

The staff at Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library 

(CARL) has been indispensable in providing interlibrary loan and document-retrieval services to support this research. Dr. William G. Robertson, 

Dr. Donald P. Wright, Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy, and Ms. Catherine Shadid Small sat on the editorial board. My colleague, Lieutenant 

Colonel (Retired) David P. Cavaleri, provided needed critical review of 

key passages and many helpful research suggestions. Ms. Small was also 

responsible for the editing and layout of the study for publication. I am 

solely responsible for the analysis and opinions expressed in this work.

 James F. Gebhardt

 CSI, Fort Leavenworth

vi


Chapter 1

Introduction

This study, an examination of US Army LRRP doctrine and experience, generated from a comment made by one of the authors of On Point: 

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM:

The Army should also assess long-range surveillance 

units. Lightly equipped helicopter-inserted long-range 

surveillance units organic to conventional maneuver divisions and the corps military intelligence brigade did not 

produce great effect for the investment of talent and the 

risk to those involved. There may be nothing inherently 

unsound in the structure of long-range surveillance units. 

Perhaps the issue is whether the Army is prepared to risk 

these relatively fragile units in fast-moving, ambiguous situations. These same units might prove useful in 

some other environment, but in any case, assessing the 

utility and the means of employing these units makes 

sense based on their apparent lack of utility in [Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM] OIF.

The support for this remark is the fact that during OIF, long-range 

surveillance units (LRSU) of the 3d Infantry Division selected some 27 

deployment sites but used only three. Their parent division was moving 

too fast and there was great concern for the risk versus reward of using 

these teams. The On Point authors further tied this issue of questionable 

LRSU performance back to Operation DESERT STORM, asserting that 

“LRS units assigned to conventional maneuver units also produced very 

little in DESERT STORM, suggesting that their role and viability should 

be reassessed.”2

As this study was being prepared in the fall of 2004 and early 2005, 

that reassessment was ongoing; the Army was studying the size and composition of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) 

brigade. Even though at the time of this writing the proposed RSTA brigade included a long-range surveillance (LRS) company, its future may 

yet be in jeopardy. The purpose and goal of this work is to provide decision makers throughout the Army with a historical perspective that enables 

them to make a better-informed decision on the future of LRSU.

LRSU did not emerge in the force structure in the early 1980s without

antecedents. The Army itself, in the Vietnam era, drew long-range patrol unit 
lineages from a variety of seemingly unrelated sources, finally settling 

on the 75th Rangers in early 1969. Some researchers of long-range surveillance prefer as LRRP forebears Lieutenant General Walter Kruger’s

Alamo Scouts, an organization of hand-picked soldiers from throughout 

his Sixth Army that trained and operated from late 1943 to the end of the

war in the Pacific Theater.3 This study, however, looks closer to the modern era and finds important and useful antecedents to LRSU in the LRRP 

units of the US Army in Europe beginning in the late-1950s, and in the

Vietnam War itself.

This study is not a full-blown history of LRRP and LRSU; it is more 

like a survey.4 It strives to use the historical facts as bases for analysis. The 

framework both for organizing the research and presenting this study’s 

analysis is doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel (DOTMLP). These themes are used as headings throughout the 

four main chapters. This study examines the US Army’s LRRP doctrine 

through the lens of five field manuals, published between 1962 and 1995, 

with limited reference to a draft manual now scheduled for publication at 

the end of 2005. Where appropriate, this work compares the Army’s doctrine for LRRP employment with actual LRRP use in combat, specifically 

in Vietnam over several years and in Operation DESERT STORM.

LRRP organization is reflected in a discussion of the table of organization and equipment (TOE) in the three eras, with particular emphasis 

on changes in the structure of both the headquarters and patrol elements. 

Training for LRRP soldiers began at the unit level in USAREUR and 

was bolstered in the Vietnam and modern eras by formal training institutions. This work examines the influence of these two institutions on 

the LRRP soldiers and units of their respective generations. Materiel issues fall into the relatively distinct categories of vehicles, weapons, and 

communications/surveillance equipment. A look at LRRP-unit leadership 

as it pertains to the tactical (not the administrative) role of leaders is also 

included, with questions like: What tasks have relatively junior officers 

(field grade at most) and senior noncommissioned officers performed in 

LRRP units over time? Finally, this study looks at the soldiers who have 

manned LRRP units over the three eras—who these soldiers were and how 

they have been recruited and retained.

Three manifestations of LRRP units are recognized in this work: USAREUR from the late 1950s to the late 1960s (Chapter 2), Vietnam from 19

to 1972 (Chapter 3), and the LRSU era of roughly 1981 to the beginni

of the Global War on Terrorism in late 2001 (Chapter 4). The author has
chosen not to comment on most LRSU activities post-late 2001, in an effort to avoid compromising any LRSU tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) out of a genuine respect and concern for the soldiers who are still 

performing LRS missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locales. Those 

needing to study these most recent LRSU activities will find sources and 

means to do so in other venues.

In this study, each chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the DOTMLP trends noted for that period. Chapter 5 is a multi-domain analysis 

that seeks to synthesize the chapter conclusions. It ends with the author’s 

opinion on the future viability of LRSU for the contemporary operational 

environment (COE).
Notes

1. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army: 2004), 423.

2. Ibid., 164

3. For a brief but excellent description of this unit, see Major Billy E. Wells, 

Jr., “The Alamo Scouts: Lessons for LRSUs,” Infantry (May-June 1989): 26-32

4. The history of LRRP is largely contained in two works: in Michael Lee 

Lanning’s, Inside the LRRPS: Rangers in Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1988),

and in Shelby L. Stanton’s, Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam (New York: 

Orion Books, 1992). A comprehensive history of LRSU has yet to be written
Chapter 2

USAREUR Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols, 1957-68

Background

Military historians link the emergence of long-range reconnaissance 

patrol (LRRP) units in the US Army in Europe (USAREUR) in the early 

1960s to the tactical and operational issues arising out of the strategic

positioning of Soviet and US forces in Western Europe in the late 1950s

The need to acquire high-value targets for long-range artillery, air strikes, 

and even tactical nuclear-delivery means, coupled with the desire not to 

cause widespread physical destruction to Europe through indiscriminate 

use of firepower, led US Army commanders to experiment with longrange patrols. The technical intelligence-collection assets of that era were 

inadequate for locating or confirming the desired targets to the necessary 

degree of accuracy.

At least four long-range patrol organizations emerged from this experimentation: a reconnaissance platoon in the US Army Southern European 

Task Force (USASETAF or more commonly, SETAF) in northern Italy, 

two corps-level provisional LRRP units in the Seventh Army in Germany, 

and a division-level LRRP detachment in the 3d Infantry Division of V 

Corps in Germany.2

The SETAF reconnaissance platoon appeared in late 1957. Operating in the Italian Alps and adjoining lowlands of the Po Valley, this unit

developed TTP for long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition activities. This unit, informally called “sky cavalry,” but with the 

formal designation of Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon, 110th Aviatio

Company (Surveillance), remained in existence until disbanded in 1964.

It was stationed at Boscomantico Army Airfield, near Verona, Italy, which 

was at that time the site of SETAF Headquarters (HQ) and also HQ, 1st

Missile Command.3

V Corps, historically responsible for the defense of the Fulda-Frankfurt 

axis of West Germany, employed LRRP units in Exercise Sabre-Hawk in 

February 1958. Several lessons were drawn from this experience; one was 

that a special organization and special training were required for LRRP 

operations. V Corps HQ reported these lessons in a memorandum on 8 

March 1958, with the subject line “Battlefield Surveillance and Target 

Acquisition—Stay Behind and Long Range Patrols” and including four 

enclosures.5
The Seventh Army in Germany created provisional surveillance platoons in the reconnaissance squadrons of infantry and armored divisions in 

1958.6 These units participated in two separate field exercises in 1959. In 

April 1959, HQ, Seventh Army forwarded the results of a “LRRP study”

by its G2 (intelligence staff) to the Department of the Army with a recommendation for a LRRP organization.8

 HQ, Seventh Army followed this up 

with another memorandum, subject line reading “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Study,” in August 1959.

In preparation for the Seventh Army’s upcoming Winter Shield major 

field training exercise (FTX), the VII Corps commander (Lieutenant General Guy S. Meloy, Jr.) authorized the formation of a provisional LRRP 

company in the fall of 1959.10 This unit, which was organized and bega

training on 7 December 1959 and was disestablished on 10 March 196

was formed on the base of A Company, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 51st 

Armored Infantry Regiment, 4th Armored Division. An infantry combat 

veteran of the Korean War, Captain Philip D. Grimm, was the commander 

of this provisional LRRP company.

The company’s mission was to patrol the zone of the corps’ area of interest to a depth of 10 to 50 miles inside enemy-held territory, supplementing the technical target-acquisition capability available in the corps at that

time (side-looking airborne radar [SLAR] and aerial-drone photography).1

The unit was organized with a company headquarters; intelligence-operations, communications, supply, transportation and maintenance, and mess 

sections; and two patrol detachments. Operating in the field under the VII 

Corps G2’s control, the LRRP company was split between the corps main 

command post (company minus) and the corps alternate command post 

(communications and intelligence-operations sections). The communications section was quite large, with one officer and 55 enlisted men manning 

three base radio stations. Each patrol detachment contained eight patrols 

with six men in each patrol, one of whom was a radio operator.

Captain Grimm trained his LRRP company in two phases. The basic 

phase, which lasted approximately five weeks, emphasized individual soldier 

skills required for long-range patrolling, as well as physical hardening. This 

phase culminated in a 77-mile, 69-hour combination land-navigation, 

evasion and escape, and exfiltration problem. Radio operators were sent to 

the 10th Special Forces Group during this phase for practical training in how

to operate communications equipment in a field environment. Other special 

forces personnel came to the company for one week and presented training 

in aircraft terminal guidance, aerial resupply techniques, and survival. The 
advanced phase consisted of a two-week FTX, during which the company 

(minus the radio base stations) was fully operational.

The LRRP company was equipped with continuous wave (CW) radios, 

standard-issue cold-weather gear, and boots with German mountain-climbing soles; it also ate a US Air Force survival ration, favored for its light 

weight and low bulk, during field training and operations. Soldiers who met 

a specified training standard were authorized by the VII Corps commander 

to wear a black beret.1

Four CH-34 helicopters and their crews were attached to the LRRP 

company during its entire existence. The unit also had access to a U-6 

“Beaver” for resupply missions. In a photograph from the Grimm collection, LRRP soldiers are attaching a wooden ammunition box to the 

airplane’s wing shackles.1 This method worked well in training, but proved 

inadequate during the Winter Shield exercise due to poor weather conditions.

The LRRP company was handicapped during Winter Shield by the use 

of non-organic radio operators at the radio base stations, which resulted 

in a message-received success rate of only 45 to 50 percent. Nonetheless, 

according to Captain Grimm, “The LRRP company furnished over 85 

percent of the information VII Corps received during the entire course of 

WINTERSHIELD I.”1

Concurrent with the conduct of FTX Winter Shield, in late January 1960

a memorandum was published by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 

with the subject line: “Proposed Long Range Reconnaissance Organization.”16 FTX Winter Shield resulted in a recommended table of distribution

for long-range reconnaissance units and an addendum to an Army training 

directive on “stay-behind” operations.1

In September 1960, at the direction of Seventh Army, V and VII Corps

both formed provisional 80-man reconnaissance units. These units participated in Exercise Winter Shield II and “confirmed the effectiveness of 

long-range reconnaissance patrols in a special target acquisition role.”18

USAREUR approved the formation of two corps-level LRRP companies 

in March 1961, and these companies were activated in July of that year

The V Corps company was stationed at Wildflecken, just south of Fulda, 

and the VII Corps company was stationed at Nellingen Barracks near 

Stuttgart. 

The V Corps LRRP company moved to Frankfurt in 1963, first to Edwards 
Kaserne (January) and later to Gibbs Kaserne (May). Redesignated as 

Company D (LRP), 17th Infantry (Airborne) on 15 May 1965, it remain

in Frankfurt until June 1968, when it was redeployed back to Fort Benning,

Georgia. The company was renamed A Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry 

(Airborne) in February 1969 and moved to Fort Hood, Texas in February

1970, where it was deactivated in December 1974 after the formation o

1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Ranger Regiment, at Fort Benning and Fort

Lewis.20

The VII Corps LRRP company was redesignated as Company C (LRP), 

58th Infantry (Airborne) on 15 May 1965, and remained at Nellingen Barracks near Stuttgart until it was redeployed back to Fort Riley, Kansas i

1968. It subsequently was renamed B Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry

(Airborne), moved to Fort Carson, Colorado, and in June 1974 was moved

for the last time to Fort Lewis, Washington, where it was deactivated just 

as the 2d Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment was being formed.2 This 

study will focus on the V and VII Corps LRRP companies during their 

modest tenure in Germany.

The 3d Infantry Division, a subordinate unit of V Corps, also formed 

its own provisional LRRP detachment on 20 November 1961 and statione

it at Daley Barracks in Bad Kissingen. This provisional unit remained in 

existence until 14 August 1964, when it was disbanded and its soldier

returned to their units of assignment.22 Because it was a subordinate unit 

of V Corps, it will be discussed along with the V Corps LRRP company 

in this study.

Doctrine

Citing the Seventh Army LRRP initiative of April 1959, in August 196

the Commander, Continental Army Command (CONARC)—predecessor 

to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM)—directed the Commandant of the Armor School at 

Fort Knox to develop a “proposed doctrinal guidance statement,” “interim 

organizational and operational concepts,” and “interim training literature 

required to provide training to individual members and units of LRRP.”23 

The suspense dates for this project were  December 1960 for the propose

doctrinal guidance statement,  February 1961 for the interim organizational and doctrinal concepts, ad 1 June 1961 for the interim tra

literature.

Fort Knox produced a draft operational and organizational concept 

document in January 1961 and released a 44-page interim operational an
organizational concept document in April 196

24 Organizations that provided comments to the Fort Knox operational concept documents included 

the Intelligence Center, Command and General Staff College, Aviation 

School, Artillery and Missile School, and Infantry School. The training literature, a 100-page document, was published in July 19

25 The Department of Armored Operations at the Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas developed and published two drafts 

of a proposed TOE for the LRRP company in November 1961 and Januar

1962, about six months after the provisional corps LRRP companies had

been activated in Germany.26

A draft US Army Field Manual (FM) 31-18, Long Range Reconnaissanc

Patrols, Division, Corps, and Army, was published in December 1961

followed quickly in January 1962 by its final draft and then the approved 

version in June 1962. This thin field manual of just 26 pages contained the 

first Department of the Army-approved doctrine for the employment of 

long-range patrols.27 The supervisory responsibility for this manual, if not 

the authorship itself, resided in the Department of Armored Operations of 

CGSC. But as the historical record shows, the Armor School at Fort Knox 

had considerable input into the work products. Historical materials from the 

V and VII Corps LRRP veterans’ groups do not suggest that either company 

in Germany significantly participated in the writing of this doctrine.

The 1962 manual defines a long-range patrol as: 

. . . a military force organized and trained as an information gathering agency responsive to the intelligence requirements of the tactical unit commander. Patrols consist 

of specially trained personnel capable of performing reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, or combat 

raid operations within the field army area of influence.28

FM 31-18 describes the LRPs’ primary mission as “enter[ing] a specified area within the enemy’s rear to observe and report enemy dispositions

installations, and activities,” and then lists 10 specific missions:

•	 Determine strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, 

and movement of enemy forces, nuclear weapons delivery systems, reserves, command posts, and key installations

•	 Conduct surveillance of specific routes or areas

•	 Execute special demolitions missions

•	 Locate, exploit, destroy, or capture special intelligence targets
1

•	 Conduct post-strike nuclear-damage assessment and perform CBR 

(chemical, biological, radiological) surveying and monitoring

•	 Establish and maintain contact with special forces, guerrillas, and 

other friendly forces

•	 Assist in terminal guidance for delivery of pathfinders

•	 Adjust air strikes and artillery fires

•	 Perform target-acquisition or survey tasks

•	 Perform other ground-collection tasks as ordered.29

The 1962 doctrine envisions one LRP company per corps, with all or a

portion of the company attached to or placed in support of the corps’ subordinate units. FM 31-18 charges the commanders of all these units to employ the LRPs for the missions listed above. The LRP company was to b

organized into a company HQ and three patrol platoons. In the company 

headquarters was to be a small headquarters section (two officers and two 

enlisted men, 2/2), the administration, mess, and supply section (0/16),

transportation and maintenance section (0/12), operations section (3/7),

and communications section (1/22). Each patrol platoon was to consist of

a headquarters (1/4) and eight patrols (0/5). The total company strength

was to be nine officers and 191 enlisted men. Committed patrols, unless 

part of a detached platoon, were to operate directly under company control 

and report to the company operations section.30

FM 31-18 also provides for the creation of provisional LRP units b

divisions, missile commands, armored cavalry regiments, or separate brigades. According to the manual, factors that would influence the creation 

of provisional LRP units are range of weapons and depth of areas of influence, along with the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition 

capabilities inherent within organic combat units.3

Encrypted, CW radio was to be the primary means of communication 

between committed patrols and the three base radio stations operated by 

the LRP company. FM radio was to be used to communicate with uncommitted patrols and between the LRP company and its higher HQ, while 

wire was to be used for communications within the LRP company HQ 

and between its operations section and the intelligence section of higher 

HQ. According to the manual, messengers were to be used for carrying 

maps, overlays, sketches, and reports back and forth between headquarters. Visual means of communication were to be used by patrols for marking landing sites and in aiding terminal control of aircraft during delivery 

and recovery of patrols.32 Because the primary means of communication 
of committed patrols was CW radio, assigned radio operators had to be 

proficient at the intermediate level in sending and receiving International 

Morse Code. It was desirable that other patrol members also have some 

degree of proficiency.33

FM 31-18 discusses planning for a LRP operation as being conducte

by the intelligence or operations section of the higher HQ, with the participation of the LRP company commander or his representative. This planning would then result in the following minimum guidance being provided 

to the LRP company:

•	 specific mission statement for a patrol

•	 all available information on terrain, weather, enemy, and area of 

operation

•	 method of delivery and return, with provision for coordination with 

transportation unit

•	 friendly tactical information

•	 special instructions on use of electronic surveillance equipment

•	 method of obtaining special equipment for patrol’s use

•	 evasion and escape (E & E) procedures.34

The manual charges responsibility to the LRP company commander 

and operations section for the detailed preparation of the patrol plan, with 

help from the patrol leader and a representative of the unit providing transportation. FM 31-18 lists many specific elements of this plan, taken from 

FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling

35

It also requires the detailed patrol plan be coordinated with several 

staff elements of the controlling headquarters: intelligence and operations 

sections, fire-support elements (artillery, air defense, and tactical air support), and chemical, biological, and radiological elements. The controlling 

headquarters intelligence section was to be responsible for any further coordination required.36 The higher HQ was to exercise continuous and very 

restrictive control of the operations of committed patrols, using the LRP 

company chain of command and communications network.37

The “Operations” section of this field manual provides insight into 

LRP-unit tactics in 1962. From a LRP company command post (CP) located

somewhere near the corps or army main CP, LRPs were dispatched to confirm or amplify information acquired from aerial observation, photography, 

electronic surveillance, or radio intercept, or to enter an area about which 

nothing was known. In addition, the LRP could be used to locate targets 
1

for long-range weapons or to provide early warning about the movement 

of specific enemy weapon systems or units (reserves). LRPs could also be 

inserted in such a manner as to provide saturation or area coverage.38

In their patrol area of operations, LRPs could undertake route surveillance, reconnaissance of a specific area, detailed target acquisition to facilitate effective attack, nuclear damage assessment or CBR monitoring and 

survey, and combat raids. The brief paragraph on combat raids recommends 

using linguists for obtaining information as a by-product of a raid, and indigenous personnel knowledgeable of the target area. FM 31-18 does no

define or list what it considers legitimate targets for a LRP combat raid in 

1962. The 1962 doctrine envisions LRP operations in jungle, desert, mountain, and northern (arctic) terrain.

The manual illustrates that several factors governed the method of LRP 

delivery: mission, enemy situation, assets available, weather and terrain, 

depth of penetration, and target priority. Security and secrecy of movement 

were emphasized over convenience. The methods of delivery included: 

stay-behind, air-landing, parachute (static-line, not free fall), water, and 

land infiltration.40 Recovery was normally planned before the initiation of a 

patrol and, irrespective of what headquarters (the LRP company or a higher 

HQ) was controlling the patrol, responsibility for executing its recovery belonged to the LRP company commander. FM 31-18 views ground exfiltration by individuals or small groups as a normal means of LRP recovery.4

According to FM 31-18, LRP company personnel were to be volunteers and parachute qualified. The company commander, operations officer

platoon, and patrol leaders were to be Ranger qualified. It was desired that 

other personnel have Ranger or special forces qualification. All personnel 

were also to be cross-trained as radio operators and receive continuous 

training in a number of subjects: demolitions, combat surveillance, target-acquisition techniques, evasion, escape, survival, advanced first-aid 

procedures, map reading, tactical appreciation of terrain, and an extensive 

knowledge of enemy tactics, organization, weapons, and logistical systems. 

LRP units were to maintain proficiency by conducting frequent long-range 

reconnaissance and combat-raid exercises.42

Less than three years later, in January 1965, the second edition of FM

31-18 was published. Page-by-page comparison of these two manuals reflects the accumulated European experience in some areas. The purpos

and scope of the new manual was the same. However, the definition of a 

long-range patrol was slightly enlarged and refined.43
1

The actual mission list in the new manual was shortened by two: 

“execute special demolitions missions” and “establish contact, exchange 

information, and maintain liaison with special forces, friendly guerrillas, 

and other friendly forces” were both dropped.44 The direct-action mission 

from the 1962 manual (“locate, exploit, destroy or capture special intelligence targets”) was simplified and restated in 1965 as “execute combat

raids on a limited basis as required.”45 The capabilities of a LRP company 

increased by one (“be equipped and trained for employment in any theater 

of operations”), and the limitations decreased by one (“missions requiring 

offensive action subject the patrols to possible early discovery”).46 That is 

a curious deletion, since the 1965 mission list included combat raids on a

limited basis.

The “basis of issue” of a LRP company changed slightly in 1965 to

one per field-army headquarters and one per corps (the 1962 manual did 

not include the LRP company at field army). A 1965 LRP company had 

one less officer and one less soldier in the operations section, a 33 percent 

larger communications platoon (up from 22 to 35 soldiers), a 25 percent 

larger transportation and maintenance section (up from 12 to 15 soldiers)

and lost two soldiers from each patrol platoon headquarters, for a total 

company strength of eight officers and 200 soldiers.47 This significant 

increase in size of the communications element reflected the importance 

attached to reliable communications in the USAREUR LRRP experience.

The LRP company in 1965 had three patrol platoons, each platoon comprising a small headquarters element and eight patrols of five men each. A

patrol consisted of a patrol leader, two radio operators, and two observers. 

When committed, a patrol operated directly under company control and 

reported information to the company operations section.48 Each patrol was 

equipped with two radios, either AN/PRC-25 or -77, with an AN/GRA-7

burst transmission group coder. The soldiers of the patrols were all armed 

with the M14 semi-automatic rifle.49 Each patrol also had access to one 

observation telescope and one infrared metascope.50

While the LRP company owned five M60 machine guns, two were assigned to the company HQ section and then one went to each of the three 

base radio stations in the communications platoon for defense. The company also owned eight M2 .50-caliber machine guns, all of them assigned 

to the transportation and maintenance section. The single M79 grenade 

launcher in the company belonged to the HQ section. The company’s six 

3.5-inch rocket launchers were assigned one to the transportation and maintenance section, two to the operations section, and one to each of the three 
1

base radio stations, also for defense.

In 1965, the missions for LRPs were still derived from the intelligence-collection plan and the operations plan of the controlling HQ.

The patrols’ methods of operating, communicating, and reporting (TTP in 

today’s terms) were to come out of the patrol company standing operating 

procedures (SOP). In hindsight, it would have been helpful if the 1965 field 

manual had contained, even as an appendix, a recommended tactical SOP 

based upon the combined experience of the two LRRP companies in USAREUR. The minimum guidance issued by higher headquarters for a LRP 

mission was modified somewhat in 1965:

•	 designated patrol position or area to be kept under observation and 

information desired (mission)

•	 disposition of all friendly forces operating in patrol area

•	 method of delivery

•	 routes, primary and alternate, to patrol position, landing zone, or 

drop zone

•	 primary and alternate landing zone or drop zone locations

•	 restrictions regarding routes, specific areas, and times of delivery, 

so that they may be considered planning and deployment of the patrol

•	 special equipment required

•	 any other issues in accordance with the company SOP.5

The patrol plan’s list of essential elements was modified slightly in 

1965, adding reference to a flight plan and a logistical support plan and 

dropping references to a local security plan and provisions for operational 

readiness inspection and rehearsals.52

In 1965, as in 1962, higher HQ was responsible for maintaining continuous control during LRP operations, using the communication net an

chain of command of the LRP company. The field manual strongly emphasizes restrictive controls, including several graphic control measures, to 

avoid duplication of effort and ensure the safety of the patrol.53 This may 

appear to conflict with the previous statement that committed patrols operated directly under company control, yet what it really means is that higher 

headquarters did not issue orders and instructions directly to committed 

patrols, but rather controlled them through the chain of command.

While the mission list for LRPs in 1965 includes reconnaissance and

surveillance of areas, a careful reading of the operations section of FM 
1

31-18 suggests that patrols were preferred to observe from a static position, not while moving about an area of operations (AO). FM 31-18 (1

still emphasizes locating targets for long-range weapons and providing 

information or early warning about enemy reserves and special weapons 

delivery means. It recommends, as its method of employment, emplacing 

a patrol to observe a point target or a system of patrols to watch a larger 

area, each patrol monitoring a specific target or terrain feature within that 

larger area. The manual does acknowledge that an entire patrol might have 

to move to reconnoiter an area not under direct observation.54

The entire paragraph in the 1962 manual titled “Combat Raids” (paragraph 19) was dropped from the 1965 manual, leaving intact as the fo

primary missions of a LRP in 1965: reconnaissance, surveillance, target

acquisition, and tactical damage evaluation/CBR monitoring. In all likelihood, elimination of this paragraph reflected the USAREUR experience, 

wherein any suggestion of offensive activity in actual combat situations 

was anathema to the LRP concept. The mere firing of a weapon, it was 

felt, would compromise a patrol and prevent it from accomplishing the 

paramount missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. On the other hand, as was pointed out earlier, “execute combat raids 

on a limited basis as required” remained at the bottom of the 1965 list of

specific missions.

FM 31-18’s 1965 version added high altitude-low opening (HAL

parachute techniques to the possible methods of patrol delivery by parachute, clearly reflecting the USAREUR experience in both V and VII Corps 

LRRP companies.55 The use of ground vehicles for patrol delivery was also 

added. In 1965, just as in 1962, the LRP company commander was charge

with the issuance of orders and control of recovery operations.56

Finally, the training paragraph of the 1965 manual cites experience in

the Seventh Army, European Theater, when it suggests that “about eight 

months are required to produce an effectively trained and reliable long 

range patrol.”57 This prescription for well-trained long-range patrols would 

soon fly in the face of the 12-month tour length established for duty in 

Vietnam.

The planned and actual employment of LRP units in USAREUR, as recalled by those who served and trained in the units, coincides quite closely 

with the published doctrine of 1962 and 1965.58 The VII Corps LRRP company, for example, trained for six specific mission

•	 To locate artillery and air targets, specifically artillery pieces with 
1

a nuclear delivery capability, rocket launchers and guided missiles that 

could affect the corps, and large armored elements along major avenues of 

approach.

•	 To maintain continuous surveillance of primary avenues of approach and major target complexes.

•	 To conduct damage assessments of a nuclear, artillery, or air strike 

on large command posts and supply installations.

•	 To locate and identify enemy units and installations.

•	 To conduct chemical-biological-radiological surveys.

•	 To conduct limited area search and route reconnaissance.

The corps area of influence in the early 1960s was about 50 miles in 

front of the corps. LRRP-unit personnel anticipated that their deployed 

patrols would soon find themselves up to 300 miles behind the front line 

as the enemy forces advanced toward France and the English Channel. In 

their respective corps zones, LRRP companies had target folders for patrol 

missions to cover all the major avenues of approach in depth, every 10 to

20 miles whenever possible. The most probable methods of insertion would 

be stay-behind and air-landed initially, and by parachute subsequently.

Patrols had a radius of action of three to five miles and a duration of up 

to four days. Patrols trained in peacetime to remain in position for periods of 

up to 10 days. The command expected 50-75 percent of patrols to survive.5

A sighting of a nuclear-delivery system by a patrol would result in an encoded message being sent by burst-transmission method to the base station. 

The base station would forward this message to the company operations 

section, where it would be decoded and analyzed. If deemed worthy, the 

message would be forwarded in encoded form by point-to-point telephone 

to the corps combat-surveillance center, where a LRRP company liaison 

officer (LNO) would decode it and pass it to the G2 representative. This 

entire process, from patrol sighting to delivery to the G2 representative, 

required on average 30-40 minutes.

In addition to decoding and passing patrol messages, the LNO at the 

corps combat-surveillance center also advised the G2 or corps commander 

on the capabilities and limitations of the LRRP company, coordinated artillery and air-defense corridors through which LRRP-supporting aircraft 

could safely fly, and requested Army or Air Force aircraft support for special missions.

Related to its wartime mission, the VII Corps LRRP company 

conducted communications training missions along the Czechoslovakian 
1

border in 1962-63 and was briefly assigned a reconnaissance and 

surveillance mission there in the winter of 1963-64. A small LRRP team

occupied a tower on the west side of the border fence that permitted them 

to observe Eisenstein, Czechoslovakia, for the movement of rail cars and 

military equipment.60

V and VII Corps LRRP units planned another mission for wartime—the 

emplacement of atomic demolition munitions (ADM). The role of LRRP 

personnel was to draw the devices from their special storage areas and 

deliver them to designated emplacement sites (preferably by helicopter) 

in the company of an attached weapons technical specialist. While this 

mission is mentioned in the 1962 version of FM 31-18 (“execute speci

demolitions mission”), it did not appear in the 1965 version.61 In preparatio

for this mission in peacetime, LRRP personnel tested various methods of 

rigging and jumping with the devices, which were quite heavy.62

With the exception of the ADM-emplacement mission, the two LRRP 

companies in USAREUR were almost exclusively intelligence-gathering 

organizations. Their proposed wartime employment was consistent with 

the doctrine that they, in fact, helped rewrite in the 1964-65 time period.

As a later section of this study will show, their training program and activities also were consistent with the doctrinal emphasis on intelligence 

collection and reporting.

Organization

The SETAF provisional LRRP unit had a command element, 12 sixman patrols, and a rigger section in November 1961. The two officers in

the unit were the commander and patrol platoon leader. The unit reported 

directly to the SETAF G2/G3 staff on field-training exercises.63

The V Corps LRRP Company (Airborne) was established on 15 July

1961 and stationed in Wildflecken, near Fulda. It was initially assigned 

to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) for administration and

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction. After its move 

to Frankfurt in 1963, it was assigned to V Corps Special Troops. From

its creation in 1961 until it departed Germany in mid-1968, the compa

remained under the operational control of the Corps G2. The unit retained 

the V Corps LRRP mission even while it was stationed at Fort Benning 

from 1968 to 1970 and later at Fort Hood.

In 1964, while it was still a provisional unit, the company had two patrol platoons, a communications platoon, and a headquarters platoon with

clerks, cooks, armorers, and a rigger. For a time, the 2d Platoon was the 
1

training platoon while the 1st Platoon was the operational one. Four men

were assigned to a patrol. When TOE 7-157E was approved for the unit in

May 1965, the company was organized with three patrol platoons of eight

patrols each. Patrol strength increased from four to five men and the company received its own transportation section.65

The 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment was stationed in Bad 

Kissingen, about 20 miles from the East German border. It received its 

administrative and logistical support from the 10th Engineer Battalion in

Wurzburg and, for a time, was billeted with soldiers of the 14th ACR.66

The detachment was commanded by a captain with a first lieutenant as 

operations officer, a first sergeant, and an operations noncommissioned 

officer (NCO).67 A spring 1962 photograph of the detachment shows two

officers and 34 NCOs and enlisted men.68 The detachment headquarters, in 

addition to the command and administrative section, included the operations 

section, a small supply element, and a communications section. A standard 

patrol in the detachment was four men: patrol leader, radio operator, assistant 

radio operator, and scout. This detachment, therefore, could field five or six 

four-man patrols at any one time.69

When it was first formed, the VII Corps LRRP Company had a headquarters platoon with clerks, cooks, operations, and transportation sections; 

a communications platoon of three base stations, each operated by an eightman squad; and two patrol platoons consisting of six to eight four-man 

patrols each.70 The unit was assigned to VII Corps Special Troops.7

Training

A detailed view of the training program of the VII Corps LRRP Company is available for the period between  April 1963 and 30 June 1964.

This document provides insight into the intended combat employment of 

the unit. It states six general training objectives:

•	 To teach the individual soldier patrolling and reconnaissance techniques.

•	 To develop individual and unit proficiency in 12 listed areas.

•	 To develop the individual soldier physically for extended operations 

behind enemy lines.

•	 To teach and develop leadership and gain experience for the unit’s 

commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

•	 To develop self-confidence, self-discipline, and self-reliance among 

all unit personnel.
1

•	 To develop fully trained reconnaissance-patrol members.

The guidance shows 107 hours of mandatory training for the 14-mont

period, 50 hours of which are in CBR and 28 of which are in Soviet order 

of battle (OB). Patrol training is divided into 67 line items for a total of 

2,332 hours. The larger blocks of that training time are listed below, with 

time expressed in hours:

•	 Company field-training exercise 530

•	 Communications subjects 239

•	 Ski training 19

•	 Intelligence subjects (Soviet OB, equipment ID, and tactics) 17

•	 Land navigation, patrolling, E & E, day and night movement 17

•	 Airborne operations 14

•	 Commanders time 1

•	 Physical training 12

While 22 hours are set aside for helicopter training and terminal guidance, only 8 hours are allocated for water-borne operations. Almost as 

many hours are devoted to demolitions (38) as to weapons qualification 

(40). Language training is listed as a subject, but no specific hours are allocated. Although a combined 8 hours are devoted to Geneva Convention 

and enemy prisoner- of-war (EPW) handling, no training time is shown for 

conducting raids, ambushes, or other types of offensive combat in which 

prisoners might be captured. The six general training objectives and 67 

listed training subjects suggest that reconnaissance (target acquisition, 

identification, and reporting) was the primary training and mission focus 

of this unit.

Parachute operations played a large role in VII Corps LRRP Company 

training. VII Corps LRRP soldiers who arrived in the unit without parachute qualifications were sent to airborne training conducted at Wiesbaden 

Air Base by the 8th Infantry Division Airborne School.73 Many members 

of this unit belonged to a local skydiver club and performed HALO jumps 

both on and off duty.74

Training in the V Corps LRRP Company is described more generally in 

sources as communications exercises in the summer and tactical exercises in 

the winter.75 The patrols conducted an E & E exercise at least annually, with 

a special forces NCO as a grader with each patrol. One such exercise, conducted in December 1960 while the unit was still provisional, had LRRP
20

soldiers negotiating a snow-covered course that extended about 40 kilometers in an area between Wildflecken and Bad Kissingen. The four-man patrols had three days to cover the distance, find two “partisan checkpoints” 

to obtain rations, and evade both dismounted and mounted aggressor patrols.76 After the V Corps LRRP Company was formed, LRRP patrols were 

frequently used as aggressors against conventional units in large FTXs.77

LRRP soldiers maintained jump status by performing a parachute jump 

at least once every 90 days, using both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. On 

occasion, soldiers trained and jumped with German parachute units.78 In 

addition to the basic airborne course, the 8th Infantry Division Airborne 

School at Wiesbaden Airbase also conducted an eight-week, 262-hour 

course in military free-fall parachuting, which was attended by many 

LRRP personnel from both V and VII Corps.79 A photographic record 

exists of both V and VII Corps LRRP soldiers in attendance at a French 

free-fall school.80 Like in the VII Corps LRRP Company, many HALOtrained V Corps LRRP soldiers also belonged to the V Corps skydiving 

club.8 Weapons qualification was conducted with assigned weapons and 

the soldiers were also trained in the use and maintenance of common Warsaw-Pact small arms. Other areas of training included land navigation, 

small-boat handling, Morse-Code communications skills, and WarsawPact equipment identification.

Training in the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment included rigorous physical training, day and night patrolling, map reading and land 

navigation, forward-observer techniques, camouflage, explosives and 

demolitions, mountaineering skills, escape and evasion, path finding and 

helicopter operations, hand-to-hand combat, CBR, first aid, Soviet-Bloc 

weapons and equipment identification, and extensive radio field communications and Morse-Code instruction.82 The detachment participated in the 

division’s FTXs and war games, frequently as aggressors or guerrillas inserted behind the lines by helicopter. On occasion, the detachment worked 

jointly with the V Corps or VII Corps LRRP companies.

The SETAF LRRP unit conducted ski training in the winter of 196

62 and mountain training during the following summer. In addition to 

participating in regular parachute jumps, unit personnel trained in the operation of the then new AN/TRC-77 radio. During SETAF annual spring 

FTXs, the LRRP detachment played the role of aggressor troops against 

the artillerymen of the Corporal and Honest John missile units. In January 

1963, in anticipation of being phased out, the LRRP unit trained members

of the Italian Parachute Brigade in performing its LRRP mission.83
2

A notional combat patrol for the SETAF LRRP unit involved the 

last-light low-level parachute insertion of a team of five highly trained 

infantrymen some 30 kilometers behind enemy lines.84 Their mission was 

to confirm the location of an enemy tank-equipped force initially acquired 

by technical intelligence (aerial photography), and also to determine if a 

river was tank-fordable in the vicinity of a particular bridge. The team successfully parachuted from a U-1A Otter after a 50-minute flight. Approximately 4 hours after burying its parachutes in a patch of woods, the patrol

reached the intermediate reconnaissance objective—the tank-capable 

bridge—and established a patrol base. Two men from the patrol went out 

to determine if a ford site existed nearby while two other men slept. The 

patrol leader remained on radio watch.

Two hours later, the scouting party returned to the patrol base with the 

required information, and the radio operator immediately transmitted it to 

HQ using a brevity code. About 3 hours later the patrol had walked to within two miles of its primary objective and established another patrol base. 

Two 2-man scouting parties spent several hours maneuvering and observing enemy forces, equipment, installations, and activities in and around the 

target area. One scouting party returned to the patrol base in mid-afternoon, 

shortly after which the three men were compromised by a dog in the company of an old man. After assuring themselves that the man had not seen 

them, the three men quickly moved to an alternate patrol base, taking their 

equipment and two additional rucksacks with them. The second scouting 

party rejoined the patrol at this new location at 1830

After the two scouting parties synthesized their observations, the patrol leader prepared a report using a special format and the radio operator 

transmitted the report back to HQ. The patrol then set off on foot to reach 

a helicopter landing zone that was about 10 hours away. An H-34 Chocta

helicopter arrived near the pick-up zone at the appointed time and landed 

after an exchange of mutual-recognition signals. The description of this 

notional patrol closes with a tactical nuclear strike against the patrol’s primary surveillance target—an enemy unit with command post, at least 22 

tanks, 300-500 troops, and five antiaircraft positions.85

External training was available to SETAF and USAREUR LRRP units 

from a variety of sources. The 10th Special Forces Group at Bad Tolz

played a role in offering special-training opportunities to the LRRP units 

in Germany. An interesting inclosure to the August 1960 correspondence

from the CONARC commander to the Armor School commandant was a 

January 1959 “After Action Report on Long Range Patrol School” from
22

HQ, 10th Special Forces Group.86 A veteran of this era has identified a

communications-training course provided by the 10th Special Forces in

December 1958 or January 1959 to non-SF LRRP units.87 NCOs from 10

Special Forces participated in V Corps LRRP annual readiness tests and E 

& E exercises as graders.88

Radio operators from V Corps and the 3d Infantry Division LRRP 

Detachment received advanced instruction from signal corps units near 

their barracks.89 Sylvania Corporation civilian contractors provided on-site 

instruction in the operation and maintenance of the AN/TRC-77 CW radio.90 VII Corps LRRP soldiers completed airborne training with the 8th 

Infantry Division at Wiesbaden.9 Some V and VII Corps LRRP Company 

soldiers were also able to train with NATO counterparts at German Ranger 

School and Norwegian Mountain School.92 In Italy, SETAF LRRP soldiers 

attended technical mountain training conducted by Italian army mountain 

troops.93

VII Corps regularly sent its LRRP company to Nijmegan to participate in the 100-mile commemorative march. 3d Infantry Division LRRP

Detachment soldiers also participated in the Nijmegen march and the division-wide expert infantryman’s badge (EIB) competition in 1964.94 The

participation of LRRP units in the long-distance marching competitions 

is indicative of the high level of physical fitness maintained in the units 

across the board. In peacetime, the EIB was (and remains) the highest 

skill badge an infantryman could earn. LRRP soldiers rightly were granted 

access to these competitions to enable professional development in their 

primary MOS.

Materiel

Among the communications equipment used by all LRRP units in 

Europe were the man-portable AN/GRC-109 and AN/GRC-9 CW radios. Both of these were later replaced by the AN/PRC-74 and then the

AN/TRC-77 for long-range communications using Morse code. While the 

AN/GRA-71 burst encoder became available and was issued to units in the

spring of 1964, units tended to keep them locked in a secure place. Patrols

used the AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-25 FM radios for communications

within the patrol and for ground-to-air communications.95 The AN/GRC26 radio, normally mounted in a van or shelter, was used for communications between the base station and patrols.

The performance of LRRP communications was a matter of personal 

interest and concern of one VII Corps commander, Lieutenant General 
23

Charles H. Bonesteel, III.96 He familiarized himself with LRRP communications procedures and encouraged the efforts of the LRRP company communications officer to test and perfect base-station placement so that communications between deployed teams and the LRRP company and corps 

HQ would improve. In the opinion of this corps commander, the success 

of these communications techniques provided his corps “far more battlefield surveillance and even target acquisition than we thought we had.”97

European LRRP soldiers initially carried the M1 rifle, were among the 

first to receive the new M14 semi-automatic rifle, and later were early recipients of the full-automatic-capable M16 rifle in late 1964.98 At least one 

member of the V Corps LRRP Company was issued and carried a folding-stock AK47 for about 18 months.99 The 3d Infantry Division LRRP

Detachment was armed with M1 carbines.1

While early in its history the VII Corps LRRP Company did not have 

organic vehicles to move the unit, a veteran who served in the unit after 1964

indicates that this deficiency was corrected.1 The V Corps LRRP Company 

in 1964 did not have organic tactical transportation except for a handful of

M-151 jeeps for administration and light resupply. From mid-1965, wh

the new TOE became effective and the company was redesignated Co. D 

(LRP), 17th Infantry (Abn), it received an adequate number of 2 1/2-to

trucks.10

While European LRRP units used many items of standard US Army 

field gear, all detachments took liberties with the uniform. V Corps LRRPs 

wore French and German camouflage clothing for both summer and winter 

use. All patrol members had boots re-soled with German Vibram so their 

footprints looked German. The 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment 

wore German-army camouflage uniforms and carried rucksacks rather 

than standard load-bearing equipment (LBE) packs. The SETAF LRRP 

soldiers wore a US-Marine camouflage jacket and pants in the field.10

VII Corps, V Corps, and SETAF LRRP soldiers wore berets as distinctive 

headgear, maroon in the two corps units and black in Italy.

Rotary- and fixed-wing support was essential to LRRP-unit training and 

operations. In an interview conducted in 2002, Colonel (retired) Edward 

V. Maltese, the first commander of the VII Corps LRRP Company stated, 

“Our biggest problem was with helicopter support.” This was revealed to the 

corps commander during a visit to the unit, and shortly thereafter the corps 

aviation officer called the unit commander and the problem was resolved.104

Because it was attached to an aviation company, the SETAF LRRP unit had 
24

access to 15 UA-1 Otter fixed-wing and 15 CH-34 Choctaw rotary-win

aircraft.10

Leadership

While biographical information is difficult to obtain on all the early 

leaders of the LRRP units in Europe, it appears that some care was taken 

in their selection. Major Edward V. Maltese, the first commander of the 

VII Corps Company, was an infantry officer with combat experience in the 

82d Airborne Division in World War II and the 187th Parachute Infantry

Regiment in Korea. His first executive officer was Captain Edward M. 

Hunt, an enlisted combat veteran of World War II who earned a Silver Star 

while serving in the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. Hunt received a direct commission to second lieutena

in 1951 and subsequently served in both airborne and conventional unit

in Korea and the continental United States. He was a 1958 graduate of

Ranger training at Fort Benning. Hunt succeeded Major Maltese and became the second commander of the VII Corps LRRP Company. An early 

commander of the V Corps provisional LRRP unit was a Major George R. 

Jost, who “was in reconnaissance work during WW II in Germany and led 

patrols in Alaska and Korea.”10

While junior officers had important responsibilities in garrison, they 

did not generally participate in field activities as members of patrols.107 The

importance of these units as incubators for the professional development 

of young officers, however, should not be overlooked. All three officers 

who commanded the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment during its 

approximately three-year existence were airborne Rangers, as was the first 

operations officer. The first commander, First Lieutenant Edward M. Jentz, was promoted to captain while in command and in late 1962 departed

to the 10th Special Forces Group. He later served in Vietnam in the 173

Airborne Brigade, in 5th Special Forces Group, and MACV Studies and 

Observations Group (SOG), and retired as a colonel. A platoon leader in 

this unit, Lieutenant John Pipia, commanded a special forces A-team and 

an infantry company in Vietnam. Later, as a member of the 4th Infantry 

Division G2 staff, he supervised the employment of 4th Infantry Division 

LRRP teams in the central highlands of Vietnam.108 The operations officer,

Lieutenant John Peyton, served three tours in Vietnam with the 5th Special 

Forces Group, 1st Cavalry Division, and in MACV as an adviser to Vietnamese Army forces.109 Lieutenant David B. Tucker, operations officer o

the VII Corps LRRP company in late 1963, commanded the 1st Cavalr

Division’s LRRP unit in Vietnam in the summer of 1967 and was slated to
25

become the commander of the I Field Force LRP Company at the time of 

his death on  October 1967

The SETAF LRRP Detachment had two commissioned officers—the 

commander and a single lieutenant. The commander, Captain James Stamper, had served in Ranger, airborne, and special forces units as an enlisted 

man and was a combat veteran of the Korean War. He was a 1954 Officer 

Candidate School (OCS) graduate and came to SETAF after rotary-wing 

flight school. With the cooperation of the SETAF G2/G3 staff, he took 

over a moribund training program and re-energized the unit. His single 

second lieutenant platoon leader, James D. James, went on as a captain to 

form and command the LRRP company of 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam, beginning that assignment in November 1966.111 Major Stamper 

went to Vietnam, where he commanded an attack helicopter company.

Personnel

The first cohort of personnel for the VII Corps LRRP Company was 

formed from volunteers. Surprisingly, the European edition of Stars and 

Stripes published a small article listing the nine qualifications required to 

volunteer for assignment to the new unit: 

•	 volunteer

•	 airborne qualified

•	 minimum physical profile of 111121 1

•	 GT score of 10

•	  year retainabilit

•	 no special or general courts-martial action during current enlistment

•	 military occupational specialty (MOS) of 111.07 and 111.17 (infan

•	 working knowledge of communications

•	 confidential security clearance or statement of eligibility for same1

The assignments NCO at VII Corps “cherry picked” personnel and 

informed Major Maltese, the company commander, who would then interview and select the soldiers he wanted. Many of the unit’s first NCOs were 

World War II and Korean War veterans, some had American or German 

Ranger qualification, some had served in special forces. Others had served 

in foreign armies and spoke foreign languages fluently.

One typical volunteer was previously assigned as radio operator in a 

combat-engineer company. He volunteered for VII Corps LRRP Company 
26

as soon as he heard it was forming and became a charter member. When 

he was recruited, he spoke French and German and was an expert rifleman. He received airborne training in the unit.1

 Another soldier was later 

assigned to the V Corps LRRP Company involuntarily right out of Fort 

Benning jump school. He had an infantry rifleman (11B) primary MOS 

and earned radio operator (5B) as a secondary MOS while in the detachment.1

NCOs and personnel for the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment 

were recruited from battle group (BG) LRRP detachments that had been 

formed in the 4th and 15th Infantry Regiments.116 These personnel were a

volunteers and came with various military occupational specialties. Several of the NCOs were parachute and Ranger veterans, some with World 

War II combat experience and others with Korean War combat experience. 

Some also had instructor experience at the Fort Benning Ranger School or 

in other previous units of assignment. 

As is still common in the special-operations community, these sergeants tended to migrate back and forth between airborne, Ranger, and 

special forces units throughout their careers. Many of them later served in 

special-operations assignments in Vietnam and elsewhere. Some returned 

to the “mainstream” Army; a select few later occupied senior NCO leadership positions in LRRP units.1

During the relatively brief period of its existence, the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment experienced a phenomenon that was later to be repeated in many Vietnam LRRP units. At the beginning, all the patrol leaders were experienced middle-grade NCOs. As these men departed the unit 

at their date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS), young specialists 

fourth class (SP4s) and privates first class (PFCs) stepped forward to take 

their place. Although the young soldiers had the training and experience to 

assume leadership of LRRP patrols, they were not being promoted by their 

unit of assignment because they were detached for LRRP duty.11

One of the young LRRP sergeants from the VII Corps LRRP Company (1964-66), James R. Jackson, attended Infantry OCS at Fort Benning

in 1967 and, upon arrival in Vietnam in March 1968, was assigned as th

operations officer to F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry, 101st Airborne 

Division. In his second tour in 1969-70 he was a district senior adviser assigned to MACV.

 Craig Vega’s service with the VII Corps LRRP Company began in the early summer of 1966. In January 1967 he volunteere

to serve in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division LRRP Detachme

in Vietnam. Vega arrived in Vietnam in May 1967 and served 12 month
27

in the brigade and later (from November) in the division LRRP unit.120

Other enlisted veterans of the early European LRRP units met sadder 

fates in Vietnam. Sergeant Thomas O. Reyna, a member of the VII Corps 

LRRP company in 1967, was killed in May 1968 while serving in th

101st Airborne Division. Staff Sergeant Clifford N. Mize, who served i

the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment in 1962, was killed in Pleiku

Province on 23 June 1967 while assigned as an aeroscout in D Troop, 1-

Cavalry of the 4th Infantry Division.1 Staff Sergeant Glenn H. English, 

Jr., who served in the VII Corps LRRP Company in 1962-64, earned the

Medal of Honor posthumously on 3 September 1970 while assigned to

E Company, 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade.1

Relocation

In June 1968, the V and VII Corps LRP companies returned to the

United States, to Fort Benning and Fort Riley, respectively. D Company 

(LRP), 17th Infantry at Fort Benning was used to support three Ranger

training sites in Georgia and Florida while also supporting the Vietnam 

orientation training at Fort Benning proper. Manned in part by Vietnam 

combat veterans from the 101st Airborne Division and 173d Airbor

Brigade, this company also participated in training Company D, 151s

Infantry of the Indiana National Guard for its deployment to Vietnam as a 

LRP company.

About six months after returning to the United States from Germany, on 

1 February 1969 both LRP companies underwent another name change, t

A Company 75th Rangers at Fort Benning and B Company 75th Rangers 

at Fort Riley. A Company was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas in February 

1970 and B Company to Fort Carson, Colorado, with both units retaining

their USAREUR LRP missions. Both companies remained in existence 

until the 1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Ranger Regiment started up in mid- to

late 1974.

The USAREUR Experience

Modern LRRP was born in US Army units in Italy and Germany in 

the late 1950s out of the operational commanders’ need to see deep in

order to acquire high-value targets for their long-range conventional and 

tactical nuclear weapons. The doctrine written for these units in 1962 and

revised in 1965 and 1968 regarded the LRRP capability as an importan

adjunct of the intelligence staff of divisions, corps, and field armies. In 

their training and planning for combat employment, all these units avoided 

direct, offensive combat actions except in self-defense. The organization 
28

of LRRP units was built around a five- or six-man patrol, several patrols 

to a platoon, and a small number of patrol platoons in a detachment or 

company. The other critical organizational element of LRRP units was the 

communications section, comprised of two or three base stations.

Since no institutional training for LRRP existed, all training in this 

period was conducted in units and by sending personnel to special schools 

for specific MOS-related skill training. The primary focus of training was 

enemy equipment recognition, communications skills, and the TTP of 

surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, insertions, and extractions. LRRP 

units were among the first to receive the M14 and M16 rifles when they 

were issued, and had access to recently developed communications and 

encryption devices. LRRP units were adequately equipped with wheeled 

vehicles for administrative movements after their TOE was approved in 

1964

The officer and NCO leadership of early LRRP units were carefully 

selected, and frequently were World War II or Korea combat veterans or 

had special forces or Ranger training and experience. Enlisted soldiers 

selected for duty in LRRP units were almost without exception volunteers, 

primarily from infantry and communications career fields. While some of 

their missions and day-to-day training activities were classified, the two 

corps-level LRRP companies in USAREUR were high-profile units and 

well known to their commanding generals and the press. These units established a legacy that remains visible today in LRSU.

Passing the Guidon

While it is difficult to empirically measure the impact the European 

LRRP experience had on the US Army, subjectively one can postulate several important contributions whose effects can still be observed almost 50 

years later. All of the LRRP units in Europe (SETAF, 3d Infantry Division, 

V and VII Corps) were created because a need existed for information that 

could not be reliably provided by technical assets to local tactical- or operational-level commanders. All started as provisional units, were built “out 

of hide,” and were tested in major exercises as “proof of principle” while 

their commanders at several echelons worked on the necessary resourcing 

and documentation issues to attain full TOE status for them. By the time 

this was finally achieved in 1965, only the V and VII Corps LRRP companies had survived and prospered. These two companies then became a 

vital developmental laboratory for US Army long-range patrol doctrine, 

training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 1965 and 1968 edition

of FM 31-18 were based in large part on this USAREUR experienc
29

The lessons learned in this “LRRP laboratory” were disseminated at 

many levels. Starting at the bottom, soldiers who trained and operated 

as LRRP soldiers in Germany and remained in service took their special 

knowledge and skills to other units and passed them along. Limited numbers of these young men served in combat units in Vietnam and some 

distinguished themselves with valor and sacrifice. NCOs from LRRP units 

rotated into other special-operations units or back to the conventional 

side of the Army, where they also passed along both their leadership and 

tactical/technical skills and experience. Some of these NCOs served multiple Vietnam combat tours in conventional and special-operations units. 

Junior officers who served as lieutenants and captains in European LRRP 

units went to Vietnam as captains and majors, where a few actually commanded LRRP units in combat. Others occupied important positions in 

advisory units to Vietnamese forces and on staffs.

Not emphasized in this study, yet still important, is the support to 

LRRP organizations in Europe provided by such future notable Army leaders as Colonel Melvin Zais, Jr., Colonel William E. DePuy, Major General 

Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., and Lieutenant General General Charles H. Bonesteel, III. Colonel Zais helped give birth to LRRP as the G3 at Seventh 

Army in 1961; Colonel DePuy, as commander of 1st Battle Group, 30

Infantry, 3d Infantry Division at Schweinfurt in 1960-61, provided personnel to form the nascent LRRP detachment of 3d Infantry Division. Majo

General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., as commanding general of 3d Armored 

Division in V Corps in 1960-62, provided a platoon of soldiers to the provisional V Corps LRRP Company formed in 1961. Lieutenant Gener

Abrams nurtured that same LRRP company as V Corps commanding general in 1963-64. Lieutenant General Bonesteel became intimately familiar

with LRRP company operations as the VII Corps commander from August 

1962 to August 1963, and later was a patron of the LRRP concept fro

his position as Director of Special Studies, Office of the Chief of Staff, US 

Army in the Pentagon from September 1963 to September 196

The communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company, from 

its inception in July 1961 to late October 1962, did much to promote t

LRRP concept after leaving the unit. Captain Ellis D. Bingham was subsequently assigned to the US Army Signal Center and School, Department 

of Command Communications, at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. From this 

post and later as a student at CGSC, Captain Bingham mounted a one-man 

campaign to transfer the lessons he had learned in VII Corps to the larger 

Army and later to the Vietnam operating environment.

Bingham’s LRRP-related activities from May 1964 to April 1966 fel
30

into three distinct areas. First, as a signal corps officer with LRRP-communications experience, he was periodically asked by Colonel M.B. Dodson, 

Director of Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DRS), Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) in the Pentagon, to provide input on technical 

issues pertaining to specific communications systems the Army was developing and testing for use by special forces and LRRP units.12

Second, Captain Bingham also traveled to the Pentagon on at least two 

occasions to brief high-level Army staff officers on LRRP issues. On 15 

May 1964, he and Major Edward M. Hunt (who was the second commander

of the VII Corps LRRP Company, from May 1962 to June 1963) briefe

Lieutenant General Ben Harrell (Assistant Chief of Staff for Force 

Development), his one-star deputy, and several officers from his staff.124

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues pertaining to the TOE of 

the LRRP company, which was nearing approval at that time. (This TOE 

was published on 28 September 1964.) Representatives of the US Army

Combat Developments Command, Combined Arms Agency (CARMSA), 

Fort Leavenworth, were also at this meeting, and Hunt and Bingham were 

given the opportunity, over night, to comment on the draft FM 31-1

being developed at Fort Leavenworth. While Colonel Dodson at ACSIDRS was Bingham’s official host, in fact it was General Bonesteel who 

provided Hunt and Bingham access to this meeting and through it to the 

Fort Leavenworth manual-writing team.12

Now promoted to major, Bingham returned to Washington on 21-23

June 1964, this time to brief the ACSI, Major General Edgar C. Doleman,

and his deputy Brigadier General Charles J. Denholm on 21 June.126 Thi

was a classified briefing in which Bingham discussed general employment concepts for LRRP with an extended question-and-answer period. 

Bingham’s official sponsor for this travel was once again Colonel Dodson. 

On the way out of the Pentagon on 23 June, Bingham made an office call 

with General Bonesteel. Bingham returned to Washington on 4 August to 

respond to additional questions from General Doleman and his staff.12

Having been formally introduced to the Fort Leavenworth FM 31-1

writing team in May 1964, Bingham had subsequent telephone contact

and exchanges of views with this group throughout the remainder of 1964.

The project officer at Fort Leavenworth sent Major Bingham a copy of the 

soon-to-be published LRP company TOE and a draft of FM 31-18 on 

September 1964. Bingham was invited to comment on the field manual, 

which he did formally on 6 October 1964.128 Among these comments wer

the following:
3

At field army level, I envision the LRRP Company under 

the control of the Military Intelligence Battalion. This 

will insure a combined effort in addition to insuring the 

timely dissemination of intelligence information over existing intelligence nets.

In fact, as will be pointed out in this study’s third chapter, some 20 years 

later the Army eventually arrived at this same conclusion and placed both 

the division LRS detachment and the corps LRS company in MI force 

structures.

Major Bingham continued his conversations with the doctrine writers in December 1965 when, as a student at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, he

delivered a briefing to several CARMSA staff members on his favorite 

subject, LRRP.12

The third arena into which Bingham thrust himself was to generate 

and send unsolicited memorandums, staff studies, and other correspondence to General Bonesteel and Colonel Dodson at the Pentagon. The 

document trail for this activity begins on 13 May 1964, as Bingham wa

preparing for the 15 May briefing with the ACSFOR. On this occasion, 

for the first but by no means the last time, Bingham raised the issue with 

Colonel Dodson of creating a CONUS-based LRRP company that could 

send a small number of LRRP patrols to Vietnam to test survivability in 

that environment.130 This occurred a full year before the 173d Airborn

Brigade was committed to the Vietnam War and two years before the first 

divisional LRRP detachment was created in Vietnam.

Bingham followed up with another letter to Colonel Dodson on 14

May, in which he recommended study of the Navy and Marine Corps 

long-range reconnaissance capability.1 On 12 June 1964, Bingham sen

Colonel Dodson a letter containing “mini reviews” of five books on the 

subject of coast watching in the Pacific Ocean Theater during World War 

II.132 On 23 June 1964, Bingham acceded to Colonel Dodson’s advic

about organization and stated his intent “to start planning to insure the 

progression of employment concepts and equipment.”133 In this same letter, Bingham mentioned to Dodson that he had made an office call with

General Bonesteel that very morning saying, “He is still 100% behind the

concept.”

To further his quest, in September or October of 1964 Bingham wrote

a brief staff study (four-plus pages), whose purpose was “to determine 

whether long range reconnaissance patrols could be effectively employed 
32

in Vietnam.” He concluded “that a long range reconnaissance patrol platoon (airborne) . . . be committed in Viet Nam with minimum delay.”1343

Bingham mailed this document to Colonel Dodson in the weeks after its 

creation and Dodson acknowledged receipt of it in a reply letter on 18

November.13

Several months later, in July 1965, Bingham wrote General Bonesteel

to inform him he was going to Fort Leavenworth as a CGSC student, where 

he would continue to pursue his LRRP interest. Bingham also asked for an 

office call with General Bonesteel at his Pentagon office. He included with 

the letter a version of the “staff study” he had mailed to Colonel Dodson 

the previous fall.136 General Bonesteel replied on 12 July, extending a

invitation for the office call.137 Major Bingham visited with General Bonesteel on his way to Fort Leavenworth in July 1965 and discussed wit

him their common interests in LRRP matters.

On 3 February 1966, Bingham sent a letter to Bonesteel and included

with it his CGSC treatise titled “The Infantry Long Range Patrol Company,” completed in December 1965. The treatise concluded with five 

recommendations:

•	 Organize a LRP company training center in CONUS to facilitate 

training, research, and development of equipment and deployment techniques, and to provide US STRIKE Command with a LRP capability.13

•	 Organize and train a LRP company for employment in Vietnam as a 

test to determine effectiveness and survivability.

•	 Conduct study to determine feasibility of centralized and coordinated effort for all surveillance capabilities at corps and field army level.

•	 Conduct immediate testing of LRPs in CONUS in conjunction with 

and support of airmobile operations.

•	 Test LRPs as a ground guidance means for high-altitude bombing of 

jungle areas.139

General Bonesteel responded on 19 February with a letter, informing

Bingham that his letter and study had been sent to Brigadier General William DePuy, J3 on General William C. Westmoreland’s staff in Vietnam, 

and also to “Army Staff action level types here in the Pentagon.”140 About

two weeks later, Colonel Dodson sent Bingham a letter confirming receipt 

of the study from General Bonesteel.1 Colonel Dodson commended Bingham and informed him that he [Bingham] could be updated on the latest developments in the LRP area by perusing a classified memorandum Dodson 

had sent to the appropriate secure storage facility at Fort Leavenworth.14
33

In very late March or early April, 1966, Bonesteel forwarded to Bingham the original of a letter from General DePuy, dated 14 March 1966.

In this letter to Bonesteel, DePuy stated the following:

I appreciate your sending me Major Bingham’s study. We 

have indeed been working on some of these things, but 

much work remains to be done and we certainly are not 

the experts at this point in time.

Tomorrow I am taking command of the 1st Division

and I plan to do some work along these lines. Bingham’s 

suggestions have stimulated some additional thought.

 General DePuy assumed command of 1st Infantry Division on 1

March 1966, and true to his word, in April 1966 he caused the formation o

a LRRP detachment in the 1st Infantry Division, the first divisional LRRP 

detachment to be formed in Vietnam.14

The actions of Major Ellis D. Bingham, while not the proximate cause 

of the creation of LRP in Vietnam, certainly contributed substantially to the 

process. In his official capacity as a member of the Signal Center and School 

staff, he participated in technical evaluations and reviews of communications equipment destined for the LRP and special-operations community. 

He also interacted with the doctrinal community that was preparing the 

second edition of FM 31-18, the force-development community that wa

designing the organizational structures, and the intelligence community 

that was defining the LRRP mission in Vietnam. On a personal level, he 

made it his mission to expand the LRRP concept from the high-intensity 

war environment of Europe to the low-intensity (counterinsurgency) environment of Vietnam. The next chapter discusses the LRRP experience 

in Vietnam.
34

Notes

1. See, for example, Shelby L. Stanton, Rangers at War (New York: Orion

Books, 1992), 13-4, and David W. Hogan, Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: Th

Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada (Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press, 1992), 15

2. Other LRRP detachments may also have been formed. Just as this study 

was being completed, I learned of a LRRP platoon that was created in the headquarters of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (VII Corps, USAREUR) in the early 

fall of 1963. E-mail interview, Colonel (Retired) James S. Mathison, 21 Marc

2005. 36th Infantry Battalion, 3d Armored Division, formed and maintained a 

long-range patrol unit of two 4-man patrols from late 1959 until September 1960

See e-mail, Richard Cole to Kirk Gibson, forwarded to author on 27 July 2005, 

and written materials from Richard Cole to author received on 23 September 2005 

(hereafter referred to as “Cole collection”).

3. A description of the unit by its former commander can be found in James 

Stamper, “Southern European Task Force (LRRP),” Patrolling (newsletter of the 

75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc.) 12, no. IV (September 1999): 11-12.

Stamper commanded this unit from October/November 1961 until its inactivatio

in 1964

4. See Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. DeGraff, “LRRP and Nuclear Target 

Acquisition,” Military Review 40 (November 1960): 15-21, 15. DeGraff indica

that these personnel had been selected, organized, and trained before the exercise. 

Another source suggests that this training was 2-3 weeks in duration. See Major 

Edward M. Hunt, “Briefing 1300 Hours, 15 May 1964,” in VII Corps LRRP 

Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major Hunt’s Briefing.” 

Hunt served first as the executive officer and from May 1962 to May 1963 as the 

commanding officer of the VII Corps LRRP company. More about the context of 

Hunt’s Pentagon briefing is discussed in the text near the end of this chapter.

5. This memorandum is listed as reference 1.b. in Letter, ATINT-D&D 322

19(C) (8 Aug 60), from the Commander, United States Continental Army Command, to the Commandant, US Army Armor School, subject line: Long-Range

Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP)(U). While I have not seen the memorandum or 

its enclosures, it is highly likely that they contained a report on the use of LRRPs 

in the just-completed exercise.

6. Stanton, 14

7. DeGraff, 16

8. Memorandum, AETGB-TR 250/4, HQ US Seventh Army, Office of the 

Assistant Chief of Staff, GW, 28 April 1959, subject line: “LRRP Study (U),”

with inclosure: Subject Study. Referenced in paragraph 1.c and characterized in

paragraph 2 of Letter, ATINT-D&D 322/19(C) (8 Aug 60), CONARC commander

to Armor School commandant, 8 August 1960, subject line: “Long-Range
35

Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) (U).”

9. Memorandum, AETGB-TR 268/4, HQ US Seventh Army, 14 August

1959, subject line: “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Study (U),” with inclosure,

referenced in paragraph 1.d of letter 322/19 (8 Aug 60

10. The actual date the corps commander authorized the creation of this unit

is uncertain, but the planning and staff actions required to execute on this date 

would suggest the concept was briefed to the commanding general for a decision 

several weeks before 7 December. See undated draft letter (hereafter cited as Moe 

draft letter), Captain Philip D. Grimm to Colonel Moe, G3 of the US Military Assistance Group to the Federal Republic of Germany, contained in a collection of 

documents from the estate of Colonel Philip D. Grimm (Retired), hereafter cited 

as Grimm collection. These documents were provided to the author by Major 

Russell A. Grimm (Retired) on 3 August 2005.

11. For more details about Colonel Grimm’s long and distinguished career

see www.arlingtoncemetery.net/pdgrimm.htm; last accessed on 5 August 2005.

12. Moe draft letter

13. This was more an acquiescence than an authorization. According to Captain Grimm’s notes accompanying a photograph of an inspection visit, Lieutenant

General Meloy informally approved the black berets during his inspection of the 

unit; Grimm collection. Photographs of the men wearing these berets were widely 

published. See Henry B. Kraft, “Commando-Ranger Unit Gets Tough Training,” 

The Stars and Stripes, 16 February 1960, 1

14. Grimm collection. The “Beaver” was manufactured by de Havilland Canada in the post-World War II period. It could carry a pilot and five passengers or

1,080 pounds of cargo, and had a range of 5.5 hours and a top speed of 97 knots

15. Moe draft letter; Grimm collection

16. Memorandum, ACSI-CIDO, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 26

January 1960, subject: “Long Range Reconnaissance Organization (U),” with inclosure, referenced in paragraph 1.e. of letter 322/19 (8 Aug 6

17. DeGraff, 1

18. Stanton, 14-5. The V Corps provisional unit was comprised of volunteers

primarily from battle groups of the 3d Infantry Division.

19. The Seventh Army G3 at this time was Colonel Melvin Zais (who later

went on to command the 101st Airborne Division and then XXIV Corps in Vietnam). VII and V Corps LRRP company veterans credit the creation of these two 

companies to Major Edward V. Maltese, the operations officer in the G2 staff at 

Seventh Army. See the article “When the LRRPs were One,” VII Corps LRRP Association CD, 9 November 2004, in folder “VII Corps LRRP—The Officers/Col 

Maltese.”

20. This brief history is from the unit’s presence on the Internet: “The First 
36

and the Last LRRPs: A Short History of V Corps LRRP-A/75 Rangers 196

1974,” http://www.75thrra.com/history/a75-his.php; last accessed on 13 December 200

21. This brief history is from the unit’s presence on the Internet: “B/75 Rgr

& C/58 LRP & VII Corps LRP History,” http://www.75thrra.com/history/b75-

his.php; last accessed on 13 December 2004

22. See “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment” [3d 

Infantry Division], at http://www.75thrra.com/history/3id-his.php; last accessed 

on 13 December 2004

23. Letter, ATINT-D&D 322/19(C) (8 Aug 60), from the Commander, United

States Continental Army Command, to the Commandant, US Army Armor 

School, subject: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) (U), paragraph 

3.a., b., and c.

24. “Draft Manuscript, Interim Operational and Organizational Concepts, 

Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, Corps, and Army,” (Fort 

Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, January 1961); and “Interim Operational an

Organizational Concepts, Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, 

Corps, and Army,” (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, March 1961

25. “Training Text 17- ( ) [unnumbered in original text], Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol for the Division, Corps, and Army (U)” (Fort Knox, KY: July

1961

26. “Initial Manuscript, First Draft, Advance Plan Table of Organization and 

Equipment 31-57 (Proposed), Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company”

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 18

November 1961). A disposition form in the front of this document identifies the 

Department of Armored Operations as its source. “Final Manuscript, Draft, Advance Plan Table of Organization and Equipment 31-57 (Proposed), Long-Range

Reconnaissance Patrol Company” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command 

and General Staff College, January 1962)

27. US Army Field Manual 31-18, Long Range Patrols, Division, Corps, an

Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 18 June 1962

28. Ibid, paragraph 3.

29. Ibid., paragraph 4.

30. Ibid., paragraph 6 and figure 1.

31. Ibid., paragraph. 7

32. Ibid., paragraph 9.

33. Ibid., paragraph 10

34. Ibid., paragraph 12.a

35. Ibid., paragraph 12.b
37

36. Ibid., paragraph 13

37. Ibid., paragraph 14

38. Ibid., paragraph 15

39. Ibid., paragraphs 16-20

40. Ibid., paragraph 21

41. Ibid., paragraph 22

42. Ibid., paragraph 24.

43. FM 31-18, Infantry Long Range Patrol Company, 13 January 1965, paragrap

44. Ibid., paragraph 4, page 3.

45. FM 31-18 (1962), paragraph 4.d. on page 3; FM 31-18 (1965), para

4.g. on page 3.

46. FM 31-18 (1965) paragraph 5, pages 3

47. Ibid., organizational chart at figure 1 on page 5.

48. Ibid., paragraph 6.b., page 7.

49. The information about equipment comes from Table of Organization and 

Equipment (TOE) 7-157E, “Infantry Long Range Patrol Company” (Washington,

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 September 1964), Section III

50. The AN/PAS-6 metascope was a small (two pounds), hand-held device 

that emitted an infrared beam for illumination and featured a monocular viewer to 

observe objects and terrain thus illuminated. It was first issued to US Army troops 

in the early 1950s. Because it was an active device, it was subject to detection by

anyone equipped with a similar device, and could be used for signaling as well as 

observation.

51. FM 31-18 (1965), paragraph 12.a., pages

52. Ibid., paragraph 12.b., pages 15-

53. Ibid., paragraph 14, page 1

54. Ibid., paragraphs 15 and 16, pages 18

55. Ibid., paragraph 20.d., page 22.

56. Ibid., paragraph 22.a., page 23.

57. Ibid., paragraph 23, pages 24-5.

58. This description of LRP-unit employment is from a briefing given by 

Major Hunt, the second commander of the VII Corps LRRP company, at the 

Pentagon on 15 May 1964, found on the VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folde

“LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major Hunt’s Briefing.”

59. The veterans did not anticipate such a high survival rate. Those who discuss 
38

this issue among themselves suggest they planned to “go to ground” after their 

mission was accomplished.

60. E-mail interview with Kirk Gibson, 27-8 January 2004, and with Joseph 

T. Chetwynd on 3 March 2005. This town has the name Zelezna Ruda [“iron ore” 

translated] on Czech-language maps.

61. This mission to deliver ADMs was not mentioned in Major Hunt’s May

1964 Pentagon briefing.

62. This mission is discussed in several pieces of correspondence in the VII 

Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “Word Documents and EMAIL.”

63. Stamper, 1

64. “The First and the Last LRRPs,” 4, 5.

65. This information is from “The First and the Last LRRPS,” and also from 

a survey completed by unit veteran Robert Murphy on 30 November 2004 and an 

e-mail interview with Mr. Murphy, 1 December 200

66. This regiment was inactivated and replaced as the V Corp Armored Cavalry Regiment by the 11th ACR in 19

67. This commander was First Lieutenant Edward M. Jentz, from the 1st

Battle Group, 30th Infantry (Jentz was promoted to captain in January 1962). The

1st Battle Group commander was Colonel William E. DePuy. According to Jentz,

Colonel DePuy asked him to stay with the battle group, but upon realizing that 

Jentz was committed to the LRRP concept, then changed his mind: “He gave me 

his blessing and further told me that [for] any support I might need to call him. 

There was no doubt in my mind that he wanted one of his guys to command that 

unit.” E-mail correspondence between the author and Colonel (Retired) Edward 

M. Jentz, 9 February 2005. For a complete biographical sketch of General William 

E. DePuy, go to http://www3.sdstate.edu/academics/collegeofartsandscience/

militaryscience/alumni/distinguishedalumni/depuy/index; last accessed 8 February 2005.

68. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 9.

69. This description is based upon an e-mail interview with Mike McClintock, a former detachment member, on 16 December 2004

70. Kirkland H. Gibson survey, received 12 November 2004

71. Orders were issued by HQ, VII Corps Special Troops APO US Forces

09107 in the time period December 1964 to July 1966 for promotions, weapo

qualifications, and MOS actions and can be viewed on the VII Corps CD in the 

folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Orders.” 

72. US Army Long Range Reconnaissance Company (ABN), APO 46, US 

Forces, 7 March 1963, “Training Memorandum Number 3.” VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Capt Garbers LRRP Training
39

Memorandum.”

73. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact 

Sheets/Orders” for a copy of a 20 September 1966 order sending seven soldiers

from Company C (LRP), 58th Infantry to the 8th Infantry Division Basic Airborne 

Course, and see the same folder “/Jump School” for a copy of the school’s student 

guide.

74. The VII Corps newspaper Jayhawk, Friday, 4 March 1966 edition, shows

a photograph of a VII Corps LRRP Company soldier demonstrating HALO (highaltitude low-opening) equipment to visiting dignitaries on 23 February 1966. See

VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/News 

Articles.”

75. This description of V Corps training is from the Murphy survey.

76. See Private Ronald Kovan’s “The Long Rangers,” The Guardian (V 

Corps newspaper), 14 January 1961, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, fold

“V Corps LRRP.”

77. The sources do not specifically indicate why the LRRP company was used 

for the aggressor mission. My own experience suggests at least three reasons: The 

LRRP company, by the nature of its own mission and training, was cognizant of 

enemy tactics and could replicate them; LRRP soldiers used these taskings to 

maintain their own skills in small-unit infiltration tactics; and the LRRP company 

was subordinated to the corps G2 and could be easily tasked.

78. Evidence for this comes in the form of a group TDY order from HQ, 14th

Armored Cavalry, APO 26, dated 25 June 1962, sending an officer and eight men 

from the LRRP company to a German parachute unit for approximately 14 days

of training. See VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “V Corps LRRP.”

79. The course length of eight weeks/262 hours is shown on Special Orders 

Number 188 (extract) from Headquarters, 8th Infantry Division, APO 111,

Forces, dated 28 August 1962, provided by Robert Murphy

80. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “VII Corps LRRP—The Enlisted Men/James Jackson/Hanberry French Freefall School.”

81. Several members of this club are shown standing next to the open door

of a CH-34 Choctaw helicopter in a 1964 newspaper photograph. See VII Corps

LRRP Association, in folder “V Corps LRRP.” HALO-trained soldiers in the V 

Corps LRRP Company were also used to test new parachute systems and automatic-opening devices. Telephone interview with Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

82.This description of 3d Infantry Division training is from “Unit History, 

Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 5-6.

83. Stamper, 1

84. This notional patrol is described by Captain Joseph H. Devins, Jr. in 

“Long Range Patrolling,” Infantry (October-November 1960): 34-8
40

85. In 1959, SETAF’s 1st Missile Command was equipped with Corpora

and Honest John nuclear-capable missiles. See http://www.usfava.com/SETAF/

USAREUR_SETAF.htm#1stMsl; last accessed on 13 December 200

86. Some evidence suggests that Seventh Army operated a LRRP school at 

Gelnhausen or Schweinfurt during this period. The cadre included combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers from various USAREUR units, 

including 10th Special Forces. The course of instruction was at least four weeks,

with classes in Soviet military equipment and formation recognition, survival, escape and evasion, land navigation, and physical conditioning. See Cole collection, 

and also a facsimile of Cole’s Form DD214, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD,

folder “V Corps LRRP.” Cole remembers the school, which he attended in the 

summer of 1960, as being six to eight weeks in length, but his DD214 indicate

four weeks. 

87. E-mail from Lee Farley through Robert Murphy to author, 10 December

2004.

88. Murphy survey, 4-5.

89. Robert Murphy received intermediate-speed radio-operator training from 

32d Signal Battalion in Hoechst, Murphy survey. 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment radio operators received several weeks of radio and Morse-code training 

at the 123d Signal Battalion in Wurzburg, “Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP)

Detachment, ” 5. 

90. “The First and the Last LRRPs,” 2.

91. VII Corps LRRP CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Orders/9-20

66 TDY Jump School.”

92. Robert Clark and Glenn Rutherford, radio operators from the V Corps 

LRRP Company, attended German Ranger School from 25 May to 27 July 1963,

and were awarded German airborne wings and German “ranger” status upon 

graduation. E-mail and telephone interview of Robert Clark, 3 May 2005. 

93. Stamper, 1

94. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 7.

95. Gibson and Murphy surveys for VII and V Corps; Stamper, 1 for SETA

96. General Bonesteel discussed his VII Corps LRRP Company communications in an oral interview conducted on 9 November 1972 and published by the

US Army War College in 1973. See Project 73-2, “General Charles H. Bonesteel

III, USA Retired,” in the collection of the US Army Military History Institute at 

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 299-302.

97. Bonesteel interview, 301-2. The communications officer was Captain Ellis D. Bingham.

98. Gibson and Murphy surveys.
4

99. Murphy survey. He was issued this rifle as a training prop, but carried it 

in the field and also on parachute jumps. He had an “inexhaustible supply” of ammunition and regularly allowed other soldiers to fire this weapon for familiarization.

100. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 4

101. “We had cooks, motor pool, commo vehicles, etc., and could move all i

a moment’s notice,” Gibson survey.

102. Murphy survey

103. Stamper, 1

104. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, “When the LRRPs Were One,” in

folder “VII Corps—The Officers/Col Maltese.”

105. Built by deHavilland Canada, the Otter was a single-engine monoplane

with a cruise speed of 132 mph, service ceiling of 18,000 feet, and range of 87

miles with a full payload of 2,100 pounds. It had space for 14 passengers. Th

CH-34 Choctaw (Sikorsky S-58) was a medium-lift helicopter with a maximum 

speed of 138 mph, range of 260 nautical miles, and maximum takeoff lift of 13,00

pounds. It had two pilots and a crew chief and space for 12-16 passenger

106. See “The Long Rangers,” The Guardian, in VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder

107. “I am not aware of them going out on either patrol or base station (commo vehicle) missions, other than an occasional visit,” Gibson (VII Corps) survey.

“I never once operated with an officer in the field,” Murphy (V Corps) survey.

108. E-mail, John Pipia to author, 29 December 2004

109. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 8, fn

18

110. Tucker was killed by a .51-caliber machine-gun round while flying in a 

helicopter. See Kregg P. J. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands: 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966-67 (New York: Ivy Books, 1999), 222 for Tucker’s assumption of command from James D. James in June 1967, and 239-40 for an account o

Tucker’s death. His name is carried on the list of KIAs (killed in action) for both 

the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP Company and the I Field Force LRP Company.

The helicopter he was riding in had departed Pleiku, where he was recruiting 

soldiers for his new unit from the 101st Airborne Division LRRPs. The plan wa

for him to be the XO of E-20th Infantry (LRP), I Field Force, until the new CO, 

Major D.M. Malone was promoted, and then to assume command upon Malone’s 

departure. This was a field-grade position and Tucker was a promotable captain 

at the time of his death. Tucker had earlier escaped death in a jeep accident that 

killed his driver in Germany in November 1963. See VII Corps LRRP Association

CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/New Articles/PO35-b-1.

111. See Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 22; and Stamper
42

112. PULHES is a physical profile serial system used by the US Armed 

Forces for decades. It ranks service personnel at four levels in six areas: physical 

condition, upper extremities, lower extremities, hearing (ears), vision (eyes), and 

psychiatric. A ranking of  was the highest and 4 the lowest. A 2 in this position

indicates that the LRRP soldier-candidate could have less than perfect vision 

(eyes) but correctable to a defined standard.

113. VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheet

News Articles.”

114. Gibson surve

115. Murphy survey. He believes he was assigned to the unit because of hi

high GT (general-technical) score.

116. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,”2-3

mentions infantrymen, tankers, and artillerymen.

117. Staff Sergeant Wayne Edelen, a member of the V Corps LRRP Compan

in January 1963, in September 1966 was a sergeant first class and the senior drill 

sergeant of my advanced infantry training platoon (1/C/4/3d Training Brigade) at

Fort Polk, Lousiana. First Sergeant Gerald M Tardif, who was the first sergeant 

of the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment in the spring of 1962, was later

the first sergeant of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP), 173d Airborne Brigade 

in Vietnam in 1968. Rowe Attaway supervised Base Station No. 2 in VII Corps

LRRP Company during his tour in that unit (October 1961-January 1964); lat

he was the communications section chief and then acting first sergeant of B Company, 75th Rangers at Fort Carson, Colorado (January-September 1969); and after

that he served as a platoon sergeant in C Company, 75th Rangers (I Field Force) 

in Vietnam (September 1969-October 1970

118. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 

119. E-mail interview with James R. Jackson, 5 January 200

120. E-mail interview with Craig Vega, 14 March 200

121. Staff Sergeant Mize’s unit of assignment at time of death is listed at htt

//users2.ev1.net/~scoutsout/html/kia.htm; last accessed on 4 February 2005

122. Staff Sergeant English is buried at the Fort Bragg Post Cemetery. The

education center at Fort Campbell, Kentucky is named in his honor.

123. See, for example, Major Ellis D. Bingham, Memorandum(s) for Record

(MFR), subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 12 and 15 Jun

1964, and other MFRs with no subject line on 24 and 31 July 1964, all regardi

telephone conversations or meetings in which these technical issues were the main 

subject. See also Bingham, memorandum to Colonel M.B. Dodson [ASCI-DRS], 

subject line: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 28 May 1965, in which

Bingham reported the results of a conference at Fort Monmouth with technical 

experts on communications equipment issues, specifically radios and batteries; 

and Colonel M.B. Dodson, letter dated 13 July 1965 containing further referenc
43

to technical issues raised by Bingham in the 28 May memorandum. These memorandums and letters are contained in a collection of documents received from 

Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham on 9 February 2005, hereafter referred to as 

the “Bingham collection.”

124. For a detailed account of the meeting, see Bingham, MFR, subject line:

Interview with General Harrell on Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, 

dated 15 May 1964, Bingham collection. The full text of Hunt’s briefing is on the 

VII Corps LRRP Association CD, folder “LRRP History & Fact Sheets/Major 

Hunt’s Briefing.” On this and several other occasions, Major Bingham voiced his 

objection to the inclusion of the “raid capability” mission in LRRP doctrine.

125. Bingham e-mail to author, 30 December 2004

126. See Bingham, Letter to Colonel Dodson, subject: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 23 June 1964, paragraph 2, Bingham collectio

127. The 4 August meeting is referenced in a 27 July Bingham MFR of a telephone conversation with Major R.G. Shank, acting chief of Ground Branch, ACSIDSR, and another MFR written on 31 July, Bingham collection. Colonel Bingha

confirmed both that the 4 August meeting occurred and its subject in an e-mail to 

the author on 1 February 200

128. Bingham, MFR, telephone conference with Major Jean Burner, CARMSA; and memorandum to Major Burner, subject line: Employment of Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrols at Field Army Level, dated 6 October 1964, Bingham

collection.

129. Bingham, MFR (hand written) listing names of attendees, dated 16 December 1965. This list included representatives from several divisions (Comma

and Staff; Division Operations; Larger Unit Operations; Combined, Joint, Special 

Operations, and Special Weapons) and as well two officers from an unidentified 

intelligence agency, Bingham collection.

130. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 13 May 1964, paragraph 7, Bingham collectio

131. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Rang

Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 14 May 1964, Bingham collectio

132. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 12 June 1964, Bingham collectio

133. Bingham, memorandum to Colonel Dodson, subject line: Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrols, dated 23 June 1964, Bingham collection

134. Bingham, staff study titled “Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (Airborne), undated [date established by reference in later document], Bingham collection. Bingham’s recommendations at the end of this study were that

such a unit be created and he be placed in command of it.

135. Dodson, letter to Bingham, 18 November 1964, Bingham collecti
44

136. Bingham, letter to Lieutenant General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, 6 July

1965, Bingham collection

137. Bonesteel, letter to Bingham, 12 July 1965, Bingham collecti

138.The US STRIKE Command was established at MacDill AFB, Florida in

1961 as a unified command with integrated personnel from all branches of service 

capable of responding to a global crisis. It was redesignated the US Readiness 

Command in 1972, which was replaced by the US Special Operations Command

in 1987

139. Bingham, letter to Bonesteel, 3 February 1966; Treatise “THE INFANTR

LONG RANGE PATROL COMPANY,” December 1965, Bingham collection

140. Bonesteel, letter to Bingham, 19 February 1966, Bingham collecti

141. Dodson, letter to Bingham 11 March 1966, Bingham collec

142. Unfortunately, this document has not survived. But when asked to characterize it now, almost 40 years later, Bingham states that “DA was authorizing

the establishment of a LRRP training operation in Nam and authorizing a CONUS 

training base with the 75th Rangers.” These steps were similar to those Bingham 

had been advocating for for two years. Bingham, e-mail to author on 1 Februar

2005.

143. Brigadier General William E. DePuy, letter to General “Tick” Bonesteel,

14 March 1966, Bingham collectio

144. Stanton, 7
45

Chapter 3

The Vietnam Experience, 1966-72

Chronology

The conventional approach to the history of LRRP, LRP, and Ranger 

unit employment in Vietnam is first to acknowledge the three chronological 

periods of their existence: LRRP from late 1965 to December 1967, LR

from late September 1967 to February 1969, and Ranger thereafter to th

end of the war. The first period began in December 1965, with the creation 

of a provisional LRRP platoon by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Divisi

 The 1st Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade both forme

provisional LRRP units in April and the 25th Infantry Division in June 

1966. General William C. Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), officially authorized the creation 

of provisional LRRP units on 8 July 1966. Other divisions and brigades 

stood up provisional LRRP units during the ensuing months: the 4th and 

9th Infantry Divisions in November 1966, 196th Light Infantry Brigad

in January 1967, and 1st Air Cavalry Division in February 196 The 9th 

Infantry Division LRRP Platoon came into being in the fall of 1966 while

the division was still at Fort Riley, Kansas, and deployed to Vietnam in 

January 1967. This unit was expanded to a company in July 1967.5 Th

101st Airborne Division “main body,” while still at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, converted its divisional Recondo School into a provisional LRR

unit in the summer of 1967, before the division deployed to Vietnam. This

provisional company arrived in Vietnam in late November 1967.

 The second period began in late June 1967, when the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, authorized the formation 

of two long-range patrol companies for I and II Field Forces.7 Company 

E (Long Range Patrol), 20th Infantry (Airborne) was activated on 25 September 1967 and assigned to I Field Force with station at Phan Rang. The

nucleus of this unit came from the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Divisi

LRRP Platoon, along with soldiers from the replacement stream. Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry (Airborne) was activated on 25

September 1967 and assigned to II Field Force with station at Bien Hoa.

Its nucleus came from the LRRP platoon of the 173d Airborne Brigade,

along with soldiers from the replacement stream.8 Each of the two field 

force LRP companies had an authorized strength of 230, and was commanded by a major.9

In an apparent response to division commanders’ tactical requirements, 
46

and bolstered by the proven combat effectiveness of the provisional LRRP 

units, in the fall of 1967 the Army authorized separate company designations for LRRP units in divisions and detachments in separate brigades.1

The divisional LRP companies were authorized 118 men and the brigad

detachments 61 men. The wholesale renaming of existing divisional LRRP

units occurred on 20 December 1967 in the 23d (Americal), 1st Air Cavalry, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 9th Infantry, and 25th Infantry Divisio

LRP detachments were created in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade on 1

January 1968, in the 173d Airborne Brigade on 5 February 1968, and 

the 3d Brigade 82d Airborne Division and 1st Brigade 5th Mechanized

Division on 15 December 1968

On 1 February 1969, the final period of the existence of these units 

began when the Department of the Army redesignated the LRP companies and detachments as lettered Ranger companies of the 75th Infantry 

Regiment under the combined arms regimental system (CARS). All of 

the LRP companies and detachments were “reflagged” as Ranger companies on that date, except Company D (Ranger), which was formed on 20 

November 1969 upon the rotation of the Company D (Ranger), Indiana

National Guard back to its home state.13 The third period ended when the

Ranger companies were inactivated as their parent units were withdrawn 

from the war between November 1969 (Company O of 3d Brigade 82d

Airborne Division), and 15 August 1972 (Company H of 1st Air Caval

Division).1

Doctrinal and TOE Baseline

When the first US Army conventional forces (173d Airborne Brigade) 

entered Vietnam in May 1965, Field Manual (FM) 31-18, Infantry Lo

Range Patrol Company, was in its second edition.15 The Army had a wellestablished, somewhat concise doctrine for the employment of long-range

patrols. It was based on several years of experience in Europe, where both 

V Corps and VII Corps had organized, trained, and fielded LRP companies as early as 1960. The doctrine emphasized reconnaissance of specific 

routes, areas, or locations, and did not emphasize general reconnaissance 

of an area of operations (AO). While the LRP company had sufficient 

wheeled-vehicle transportation to move itself from the garrison to the 

field, it could only insert its own patrols by walking. Any other means of 

delivering a patrol to an operations area required external support. The 

G2/S2 staff exercised the greatest influence over LRP operations, followed 

closely by the G3/S3 staff. Finally, while higher headquarters exercised 

continuous control of a LRP operation, this control was accomplished 
47

through the LRP company commander, who also was responsible for the 

recovery of his patrols.

The US Army made modest revisions to this doctrine and published a 

new FM 31-18, Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, in Augus

1968. The title was modified slightly to Long-Range Reconnaissance 

Ranger Company in a change published in March 1969, a logical step after

the redesignation of all the existing LRP companies as Ranger companies.1

While the 1968 manual with 1969 changes contained many subtle alterations, the more significant ones deserve specific mentio

When reading the mission list provided in the new manual, one is 

struck by the fact that “execute combat raids on a limited basis as required,” which was the last item on the 1965 mission list, does not appear

at all in the 1968 mission list, despite that in late 1968 LRRP teams i

Vietnam were regularly assigned this type of mission. Two missions were 

added to the 1968 manual: “Deploy on periphery of area of operation (AO)

to detect enemy’s attempts to break contact and evade friendly forces,” 

(screen mission) and “maintain surveillance over suspected infiltration 

routes and avenues of approach.”18 Both of these missions were regularly

assigned to LRRP teams in Vietnam. On the subject of training, the 1968

doctrinal time standard for an “effectively trained and reliable LRRP unit” 

remained at eight months.1

Whereas in 1965 continuous control during LRP operations was to be

exercised by higher HQ, in 1969 “operational control” of LRRP company

operations was further delegated to the G2/S2 staff section of that higher 

HQ.20 The 1968 manual contains a new paragraph titled “Combat Support.”

 It discusses the responsibilities of the controlling HQ in providing 

combat support, the use of Army aviation for mobility, and the attachment 

of specially trained persons (linguists, indigenous guides, scout dog teams, 

and tracker teams) and equipment (long-range surveillance systems) to 

LRRP units for specific missions. This paragraph also strongly reflects 

Vietnam experience accumulated up to that time.

FM 31-18, 1968 contains another new section titled “Security.”22 Curiously, this section belies the common employment of ambush tactics 

LRRPs in the combat theater by stating that patrols possess “no offensive 

capability” and use weapons “only for self-defense or to break enemy contact.” This language strongly suggests that the manual’s authors did not 

advocate the offensive employment of LRRP patrols, a practice that was, 

in fact, widespread and growing in the combat theater in late 1968. While
48

it is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of the use of the administrative 

security measures advocated here, all of the tactical security and deception 

measures listed are readily visible in the Vietnam LRRP/Ranger memoir 

literature of the period.

Paragraph 4-2, “Reconnaissance and Surveillance,” mirrors the sametitled section in the 1965 manual with one exception: the words “or may

accomplish the [surveillance] mission using reconnaissance by movement” were added in 1968, both here and at the front of the manual where

the LRRP was defined.23 In the 1968 version, paragraph 4-6, “Methods of

Patrol Delivery,” contains a new subparagraph on the employment of the 

helicopter for LRRP insertions.24 It also contains a new paragraph titled 

“Debriefing,” which requires the debriefing of patrols as soon as possible 

upon return from mission and charges the responsibility to conduct this 

debriefing to the LRP company operations section.25

The most significant change to FM 31-18 was the addition of Chapter 

5, titled “Stability Operations.” It appears to have been included in this 

manual to acknowledge the extensive employment of provisional LRP 

units in Vietnam. While the base 1968 manual continued to maintain the

reconnaissance nature of the LRRP mission in this chapter, the March 1969

change added the following sentence to paragraph 5-2, “Planning Concepts”: “A secondary mission for LRRP is to conduct small-scale offensive 

actions, i.e., ambushes of small enemy patrols or units.”26 More than any 

other portion of the manual, chapter 5 clearly describes the responsibilities 

of various parties for the conduct of a LRP mission, from the controlling 

HQ to the LRRP company commander, operations officer, communications 

officer, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and patrol leader.

In tacit recognition of what had already occurred in Vietnam some 

two years before this manual’s publication, chapter 5 contains a paragraph 

titled “Provisional LRRP.”27 According to the manual, delineating command-and-staff responsibilities for LRRP activities is key in the following 

areas:

•	 identifying and recruiting leaders and soldiers

•	 logistical support

•	 training

•	 planning, preparing, and conducting operations

•	 other support actions

New to this manual are two appendices: patrol steps (one page) and 
49

a rudimentary LRRP SOP (two pages). A section later in this study will 

compare LRRP and Ranger employment in Vietnam to the doctrine contained in these two field manuals.

Doctrine of Employment

Depending on how one counts, two field-army (or corps-level) companies, eight divisional companies, and five brigade detachments were 

employed in Vietnam in the four-year period before their redesignation as 

Ranger companies. Eventually 13 Ranger companies were formed. Given

the geographical variance of the field force, division, and brigade operational areas, the average field force command-tour lengths of 15 months (I 

Field Force) and 10 months (II Field Force), division command-tour length

of approximately nine-10 months, and the changing tactical and operational situation over the course of the war, characterizing the employment

doctrine of any single LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit in Vietnam is problematic, 

let alone the doctrine of more than a dozen such units. But through examining both the primary and secondary sources, one can identify missions assigned to LRRP/LRP/Ranger teams and from that draw conclusions about 

their doctrinal employment.

Here, for example, is a list of missions assigned to LRRP teams of 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, by the brigade S2 during the peri

from June 1966 to November 1967: confirm enemy control of specific terrain, determine if enemy has moved back into an area vacated by brigade 

maneuver battalion, obtain intelligence on enemy resupply activity, confirm sightings of enemy troops and identify unit, capture enemy prisoner, 

conduct reconnaissance in zone to find enemy force (several iterations), 

support civil-affairs project, conduct road checkpoint, confirm intelligence 

information obtained from a PW interrogation, reconnoiter an area and 

establish ambush, provide extended-range listening post/observation post 

(LP/OP) for forward fire-support base, and establish blocking position 

for advancing infantry unit. One can also add to this a number of routine close-in ambush patrols around the brigade base camp, which were 

required of all combat units but also were used by LRRP units to train 

new personnel in patrol procedures.28 Two trends can be observed in this 

list: the brigade intelligence officer was assigning the missions, and the 

preponderance of LRP activity was intelligence-driven and not intended 

to result in combat.

The main body of the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Vietna

in November 1967. The division formed F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry (Airborne) in January 1968 by combining the forces of 1st Brigade
50

provisional LRRP platoon with the divisional Recondo School-based unit 

from Fort Campbell and soldiers from the replacement stream. The 101s

Airborne Division used this LRP company for a variety of defensive missions in southern and northern South Vietnam through the late spring of 

1968, when the division commander finally released it to the control of 

the division intelligence staff.29 Here is a list of missions assigned to this 

LRP unit’s teams from late March through November 1968: conduct area

reconnaissance to update intelligence information on enemy base camps 

and units (secondary—interdict and destroy rocket teams or sites), monitor junction of three high-speed trails (secondary—look for regimental 

base camp), deliver and install seismic-intrusion devices in remote area 

(multiple occasions), conduct area reconnaissance for suspected enemy 

base camp, find radar-controlled antiaircraft heavy machine gun, conduct 

saturation patrols of a border area (multiple teams inserted), find and 

eliminate rocket teams, observe enemy troop movement in zone (secondary—locate and destroy enemy radio transmitter), find and ambush small 

parties of enemy soldiers, and attempt to capture a prisoner.30

It is clear from the memoirs of soldiers who served in the 101st Airborne Division’s LRP unit that the division G2 assigned missions an

members of the G2 staff briefed LRP teams before departure on missions, 

debriefing them upon their return.3 An officer of this unit informed the 

USARV Long Range Patrol Conference in August 1968 that “the LRP

company receives its missions directly from the division G2, the Commanding General authorizes each mission, and the G3 provides the assets.”32 Of course, many of these patrols resulted in enemy contact, some 

of it initiated by patrols and more of it by the enemy upon their discovery 

of LRP teams in their midst. Many brave soldiers of the 101st Airborn

Division were killed and wounded in these actions. But the mission analysis alone leads to the conclusion that, in this division, LRP teams were 

employed more as an intelligence asset than a combat asset.

Like other LRP companies, the 101st Airborne Division’s F Company

58th Infantry was redesignated to a Ranger company (L Company) in early 

February 1969. Despite this change in designation, the unit continued to

maintain an intelligence-gathering focus. In February 1969, for example,

patrols were sent out to identify and call in indirect fire on enemy rocketfiring sites, implant remote sensors, monitor NVA infiltration routes, verify 

enemy activity in a particular area using saturation patrols, and monitor 

enemy sampan traffic on a river.33 In March 1969, missions included search

and rescue for downed helicopter crewmen, location of rocket-firing sites, 

and reconnaissance around a firebase. The latter resulted in the detection 
5

of a large enemy dismounted force’s approach to the firebase. The ensuing 

warning from the Ranger patrol gave the firebase defenders approximately 

2 hours to prepare for the ground assault, which resulted in a successful 

defense of the position.34 In October 1969, this unit inserted a four-man reconnaissance team into an area to confirm “people sniffer” sensor reports

of enemy presence for the division G2.35 In September 1970, a four-man

team from this Ranger company successfully installed a wiretap on an 

enemy land-line in the A Shau Valley.36

Indications of offensive, direct-action missions planned or conducted 

by this Ranger company include the insertion of a team to destroy suspected bridges in late March 1970, the forming and insertion of a heavy

team (11 men, equipped with an M60 machine gun) in early April wit

the mission to hunt and kill, and the reinforcing of a team with both a 

sniper rifle and M60 machine gun in later April.37 Meanwhile, in July and 

August 1970, a special cadre team from L Company (Ranger), comprised

of one officer and four enlisted men, performed duty as instructors for an 

eight-day “ranger strike operations course” taught to the reconnaissance 

company of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Infantry

Division. This team provided instruction at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Center and also followed the ARVN soldiers into the field for the 

field-exercise portion of the training.38

In the 18 months from May 1970 until its deactivation in Novembe

1971, teams of the 101st Airborne Division Ranger Company were employed for long-range reconnaissance of the jungle-covered mountains

northern South Vietnam adjacent to Laos. These patrols frequently relied 

on remotely sited radio-relay stations operated by other Ranger teams. Although the overarching purpose of these patrols was to acquire intelligence 

information on the enemy, the mission was often accompanied by contact 

with enemy forces and ensuing Ranger casualties. The Ranger company 

was also tasked on occasion to conduct raids, such as three unsuccessful 

platoon-size efforts in April 1971 to ambush an enemy motorized convo

in the A Shau Valley.39 Another company-size mission was launched in 

July 1971 to locate a suspected enemy hospital, but was suspended after 

night in the woods amid heavy enemy rocket fire.40

In this late period of the war, the pendulum in 101st Airborne Division was clearly swinging from the intelligence mission to the combat-rai

mission. As to why this was so, here is one explanation from a veteran of 

the 101st Airborne Division LRP Compan

In Vietnam, Rangers worked best in the capacity of their 
52

Long Range Patrol predecessors. Trained to operate in 

six- to 12-man teams, they were poorly tasked to perform

offensive operations. Their successes in small ambushes 

and in defending themselves even when heavily outnumbered by enemy forces often misled brigade and division 

commanders into believing they were capable of conducting large, more complex offensive combat operations.4

Major General William R. Peers’ 4th Infantry Division had four LRRP 

platoons in 1967, one assigned to each of three maneuver brigades and the

fourth to a cavalry squadron for use by the division G2.42 The platoons at 

brigade level were assigned to the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) but took their instructions directly from the brigade S2. These 

platoons had 40 assigned LRRP soldiers in eight teams of five men each, 

plus three “Hawkeye” teams of two US and two indigenous personnel 

each. Supporting each platoon were two officers, an intelligence sergeant, 

operations sergeant, and six communicators, for a total of 56 US and six 

indigenous personnel in each platoon.43

 The primary mission of these LRRP teams was observation. Negative observation reports—the absence of sightings of enemy units—were 

also considered important. LRRP teams were also used extensively to 

reconnoiter helicopter landing zones in preparation for combat assaults 

by larger units. The LRRP teams were inserted into an area three to five 

kilometers from a landing zone (LZ) two to three days ahead of a planned 

operation and would then walk into the LZ. The LRRP team would remain 

in position observing the LZ until the assault was executed. This practice 

saved large amounts of artillery ammunition that would have been expended firing preparations on undefended LZs, and gave infantry units 

greater confidence in the ground situation as they approached an LZ. This 

pathfinder-like mission came directly out of LRRP doctrine developed in 

USAREUR and published in 1962 and 1965.

Because the enemy in the 4th Infantry Division AO was aware of the 

use of LRRP teams, he frequently reacted quickly against them upon or 

shortly after insertion. The LRRP team thus functioned as a lure, and was 

quickly extracted and replaced by a much larger infantry force. LRRP 

teams were also employed as screening forces to detect enemy infiltration 

into specific areas.45

A soldier assigned to the LRRP platoon of 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during the first half of 1967 lists the following activities of his unit: 

combat and raid missions, special reaction teams to brigade headquarters 
53

for downed helicopters, rapid reinforcement of outposts, OP/LP outside of 

forward operating bases for early warning, local ambush patrols, reconnaissance of an LZ, search of a border area for an enemy base camp or headquarters, provision of security for a sniper team, and service as a radio-relay 

team for other deployed teams.46 Peers’ successor, Major General Charles 

P. Stone (January through November 1968), maintained the organization

and mission of the division’s LRP company as it had been developed by 

General Peers.47

Major General Donn R. Pepke, who commanded this division from 

30 November 1968 to 14 November 1969, on 6 October 1969 directed 

consolidation of all the brigade LRRP platoons into the division Ranger 

company. Up to this time, LRP activities in the division had been divided 

between the brigade LRRP platoons and the division-controlled Ranger 

company. Here is Major General Pepke’s description of the division Ranger 

company’s mission:

The mission of Company K (Ranger), 75th Infantry is to 

provide a long range reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition capability to the 4th Infantry Division; 

provide personnel and equipment to train, administer, 

plan for, and employ LRPs as directed; and conduct limited harassing activities.48

Upon this reorganization of division LRP assets, Pepke gave the division G3 responsibility for staff supervision of this asset and charged the 

G2 to recommend missions to the G3 according to weekly intelligence 

reports.49 The overall focus of 4th Infantry Division LRP and Ranger operations appears to have trended more toward combat actions.

The 9th Infantry Division LRRP units, deployed in the lowlands south 

of Saigon, had an entirely different problem—terrain that teemed in civilian 

population and lacked in concealment. Helicopter insertions were problematic due to the high likelihood of compromise of patrols. Regardless of the 

insertion method, patrols frequently had to be extracted after 24 to 48 hours 

on the ground. The missions performed by 9th Infantry Division LRRP 

units included general surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and suspected base-camp areas, terrain analysis of the many waterways and canals 

in their AO, providing security for underwater demolition teams (UDT) 

and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) while they removed enemy-placed 

ordnance, and point reconnaissance of designated locations.50

Upon the activation of the 9th Division’s long-range patrol company 
54

in December 1967, LRP teams continued to conduct both area- and pointreconnaissance missions east and south of Saigon. In January 1968, som

9th Division teams joined with US Navy SEAL teams to conduct ambushes and attacks in the waterways of the Mekong Delta, while others 

continued the reconnaissance of this water-logged terrain. The description 

of the LRP company’s operations through 1968 contains both reconnaissance and combat actions, performed by single LRP teams or in concert

with US Navy SEALS, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel, 

ARVN marine units advised by US Marines, and sniper trainers from the 

US Army Marksmanship Training Unit.5 The division commander from 

February 1968 to April 1969, Major General Julian J. Ewell, crypticall

characterized the employment of his Rangers with the words “Rangers 

(LRRP) as hunter-killers (or as recon parties)” in his post-command debriefing report.52

The period from  February 1969 to mid-September 1970, during whi

the 9th Infantry Division LRP unit carried the designation of Company E 

(Ranger), 75th Infantry, is characterized by a mix of reconnaissance and offensive combat operations. When the 3d Brigade of 9th Infantry Division 

was selected in June 1969 to stay in Vietnam while the remainder of the

division redeployed back to the United States, the Ranger company was 

transferred to that brigade and prepared for brigade-level reconnaissance 

tasks in the province southwest of Saigon.53 Even though the 3d Brigade 

itself moved north to the Tay Ninh area for the invasion of Cambodia in 

May and June 1970, the Ranger company remained in or near the former

9th Infantry Division base camp at Dong Tam or Tan An, both due south of 

Saigon. There, the Ranger company continued to conduct ambush patrols 

and, later in the summer, responded to reports from unattended electronicsurveillance and manned ground-surveillance radar systems. The Rangers’ 

mission was “to reconnoiter the exact nature of as many potential targets 

as possible.”54 Given the nature of the terrain south of Saigon, many of 

this unit’s activities were water-borne. During March through July 1970,

for example, Ranger teams used engineer-crewed small boats to conduct 

ambushes in the canals and tributaries of the area.55 In sum, 9th Infantry 

Division LRRP/LRP/Ranger teams conducted a combination of reconnaissance and combat missions, with a tendency toward the latter, that 

were influenced heavily by the densely populated terrain lacking means of 

concealment for inserted teams.

When it was stood up in February 1967, the 1st Cavalry Division LRR

unit was comprised of two six-man teams and a HQ element.56 For operations in the field, these teams were placed under the operational control 
55

of maneuver brigades, where the brigade S2 designated their missions.57

These missions emphasized reconnaissance over contact.58 A veteran of 

this unit cites the following accomplishments early in the unit’s history: 

correcting maps; finding numerous high-speed trails, bunker complexes, 

base camps, cache sites, and jungle hospitals; and monitoring movement 

of enemy units.59

From its designation as the 1st Cavalry Division Long Range Patrol Detachment in April 1967 through redesignation as Company E (Long Rang

Patrol), 52d Infantry in December 1967 until October 1968, the 1st Caval

Division LRRP teams remained parceled out to maneuver brigades, who 

used them in a variety of missions. These missions included close-in reconnaissance for maneuver infantry units and LP/OP duties around forward 

fire-support bases.60

In late October 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division was shifted from I t

II Field Force and headquartered at Phuoc Vinh, north of Saigon. The 

division’s AO extended along the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh, Binh 

Long, and Phuoc Long provinces. These areas contained significant routes 

for enemy infiltration into the Saigon area from Cambodia. In this new AO, 

Company E’s patrol teams continued to be tasked by the division G2 or 

brigade S2s.6 In an effort to ensure the proper use of his personnel, the E 

Company Commander communicated directly, in writing, with the division 

commander when he felt his teams were being improperly tasked.62 Another indication of the company commander’s intelligence focus is his maintenance of an enemy order of battle (OB) file in the company area, which was 

updated by every patrol upon its return from a mission.63 However, while 

missions may have had an intelligence or reconnaissance purpose, many of 

them resulted in contact with small and large enemy elements.

Examination of 1st Cavalry Division’s H Company (Ranger) mission

activities after its redesignation in February 1969 suggests that its repertoire

included both reconnaissance and direct-action activities. The unit’s two 

Ranger platoons were organized in five-man teams, and the available literature does not reference heavy teams (combined teams) for raids, strikes, or 

other small-unit offensive actions. However, Ranger patrols were sent out 

with instructions to conduct ambushes of small enemy elements, reconnoiter roads and trails that came out of Cambodia, employ anti-vehicular 

mines, search for enemy base camps, conduct bomb-damage assessment, 

search for enemy “rocket teams” proximate to US Army base camps, recover bodies and equipment from crashed helicopters, and capture enemy 

soldiers. In the summer of 1969, Rangers from four teams trained for a
56

POW-camp raid into Cambodia, but the mission was cancelled.64 The early 

reporting of a large enemy ground infiltration by a Ranger team in early 

November 1969 is credited with saving a 1st Cavalry Division forwar

fire-support base from being overrun.65

During the period from December 1969 to April 1970, as part o

the larger program of “Vietnamization” of the war, the Ranger company 

formed two joint teams with South Vietnamese paratroopers, three Americans and three Vietnamese on each team.66 H Company Rangers were 

employed extensively for ground reconnaissance during the incursion 

into Cambodia that occurred in May and June 1970.67 As some American

combat units were sent home from Vietnam, those that remained were 

repositioned and drawn in closer to protect strategic assets. The 1st Cavalry Division Ranger Company, reduced in size when large portions of the

division departed Vietnam in April 1971, was reassigned to the remainin

3d Brigade and moved to the Bien Hoa area. Here it continued to conduct 

surveillance missions northeast of the capital area and later to conduct 

combat missions to interdict enemy rocket teams firing into the capital 

area. These missions frequently were reactions to enemy activity brought 

to light by SLAR (side-looking airborne radar), infra-red, “sniffer,” or 

agent reports. If enemy activity was confirmed by a Ranger patrol, some 

type of offensive combat action was enjoined: an infantry assault, artillery 

fire, airstrikes, or combinations of these three actions.68

The difficulty of characterizing LRRP and Ranger missions in Vietnam as either “intelligence/reconnaissance” or “direct-action combat” in 

nature is driven home by the example of the 25th Infantry Division. Major 

General Harris W. Hollis, shortly after assuming command in September 

1969, changed the mission of the Ranger company from intelligence gathering to offensive combat

Beginning in October 1969 our Rangers’ method of

employment was oriented primarily to ambush and reconnaissance, to “snatch” missions, and “sniff” operations, 

and air rescue missions with sniper teams.69

To facilitate this mission shift, General Hollis gave responsibility for 

staff supervision of Ranger employment to the division G3 and placed a 

Ranger platoon in direct support of each maneuver brigade in the division. 

Further evidence of these teams’ offensive mission is the arming of each 

one with an M60 machine gun and the inclusion of at least one sniperqualified team member.
57

Just six months later, Major General Edward Bautz, Jr., the new division commander, about five weeks after assuming command, changed the 

division Ranger company’s mission back to acquisition of intelligence. 

This mission change was accompanied by the division intelligence staff’s 

increased reliance on electronic sensor fields and ground-surveillance radar acquisitions.70

Finally, Brigadier General Hubert S. Cunningham, commander of the 

173d Airborne Brigade from August 1969 to August 1970, used his Rang

teams “primarily as an intelligence gathering source and to further develop 

intelligence based on sonar readouts, Airborne Personnel Detector (Snoopy) 

readouts, and agent reports.”71His immediate successor, Brigadier General

Elmer R. Ochs, while acknowledging that the Ranger company’s mission 

was surveillance and reconnaissance, also ascribed to it the capability of 

“conducting small unit ambushes, limited raids, POW snatches, and pathfinder operations for heliborne and parachute operations.72

The general conclusion one can draw from this overview of LRRP/

LRP/Ranger employment by several maneuver divisions and a few separate brigades in Vietnam is that there was no single, standard approach to 

the issue. These units were employed for a variety of reconnaissance and 

combat missions, based on the terrain and enemy situation in a given division or brigade’s AO, the density of the civilian population, the tactical 

and operational imperatives of the division or brigade, and the desires of 

the controlling-unit commander and his G2/G3. One can also posit that the 

writers of LRRP doctrine in 1965 and 1968 probably did not envision th

amount of combat these units would engage in, given the reconnaissance 

focus of both fielded editions of FM 31-18.

Two additional LRP units in Vietnam bear examination—the LRP 

companies of the two corps-level headquarters, I and II Field Force. Both 

units were formed in the fall of 1967 by combining combat veterans from

other LRRP units with soldiers recruited from the replacement stream. In 

the case of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force), the combat 

veterans came from the 1st Brigade LRRP Platoon of the 101st Airbor

Division.73 Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) received the

bulk of its combat veterans from the LRRP platoon of the 173d Airborne

Brigade.74 Although the formation of these two companies was authorized 

in mid-September 1967, neither became fully operational until early December.7

On paper, the mission of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry, I Field 
58

Force was long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in the corps-level AO.76 In fact, the unit performed a broad spectrum 

of reconnaissance, combat, and training missions in its four-year period 

of existence.77 Platoons and teams of this company operated as standard 

rifle units, as attachments to special forces-led units, as training cadre 

for ARVN infantry divisions and the ARVN Ranger Training Center, as 

reconnaissance support to the Republic of Korea 9th Division, and as 

LRP and Ranger forces for the 4th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne

Brigade.78 General Peers, commander of I Field Force from March 1968

to March 1969, strongly supported the LRRP concept and used his own

LRPs to train ARVN soldiers for both long-range and medium-range patrolling.79 The memoir by two of this unit’s veterans describes its activities 

in the period September 1969 to September 1970 as much more incline

toward direct-action “hunter-killer” activities than reconnaissance.80 Their 

characterization is supported by the words of Lieutenant General Charles 

A. Corcoran, who commanded I Field Force from 16 March 1969 to 2

February 1970

The mission of the Corps Ranger Company . . . has 

also been modified. Rather than gathering intelligence 

by passive means, the Corps Ranger Company was employed in attacking small groups of enemy and in gaining 

intelligence by capturing personnel and documents. During the past calendar year, the Ranger Company achieved 

a 48:1 kill ratio, better than any of the other units in II

Corps.8

The pattern of activities of F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry, II Field

Force was somewhat more regular. This unit was stationed at Bien Hoa, 

near II Field Force HQ, and remained there except for an occasional foray 

to nearby Cu Chi or Phuoc Vinh, where it supported subordinate divisions 

or brigades.82 Whereas the I Field Force reconnaissance company spent 

its entire existence moving throughout the area of responsibility (AOR), 

performing a variety of reconnaissance, combat, and training missions for 

numerous allied and US Army divisions and brigades, the II Field Force 

reconnaissance company had one overriding mission from late 1967 to

early 1969—to provide reconnaissance and intelligence necessary for

the protection of the capital region. Despite its name and paper mission, 

F Company veterans paint a picture of a unit whose primary activity was 

seeking out and killing enemy soldiers, by ambush, indirect fire, or closeair and helicopter-gunship support.83 An officer who served in this unit recalls that it was subordinated to the higher HQ G3 (not G2) staff section.84
59

The II Field Force Commander during this early period was Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand. In his post-command debriefing report, 

he praised the effectiveness of his LRP company in “reconnoitering enemy 

base areas and lines of movement” and recommended the formation of 

more such units.85

F Company, 51st Infantry was inactivated in late December 1968

upon the arrival in Vietnam of its replacement, Company D (Long Range 

Patrol), 151st Infantry, Indiana National Guard.86 Through an administrative sleight of hand orchestrated between General William Westmoreland

Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Creighton Abrams, the MACV 

commander, Major George Heckman of F Company retained nominal command of the Indiana Rangers, as they came to be called, and combat operations continued as before with different faces in the patrol teams.

Upon the departure of the Indiana Rangers from Vietnam in November 1969, II Field Force quickly formed Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry to replace it. Its mission for the brief period of its existence (November

1969-April 1970) was “to provide corps-level Ranger support to II Fiel

Force Vietnam by collecting intelligence, interdicting supply routes, locating and destroying encampments, and uncovering cache sites.”87

It is clear from this broad overview of LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit missions in Vietnam that while high-level commanders may have been cognizant of the employment doctrine contained in FM 31-18, that knowledg

certainly did not inhibit their use of these units for missions unrelated to 

reconnaissance. LRRP/LRP/Ranger soldiers engaged in a great deal of 

combat in support of their controlling HQ.

Organization

A 230-man LRP company, such as existed in I and II Field Forces in 

the fall of 1967, was a surprisingly large organization. Commanded by a

major, this company had four line platoons plus headquarters, operations, 

communications, mess, and maintenance sections. The officer component 

included the commander, operations, intelligence, and communications 

officers, and platoon leaders. Each line platoon had up to seven patrols 

with six men in each patrol. In addition, the II Field force LRP Company 

had attached to it a dedicated Huey helicopter-lift platoon for insertions 

and extractions, a gunship platoon for fire support, a full ground-cavalry troop to act as a quick reaction force (QRF), a forward air controller 

(FAC) to coordinate and deliver air strikes, and artillery liaison officers 

to coordinate artillery support.88 This was a battalion-size force of up to 
60

500 personnel, all focused on a single LRP company and its training and 

combat operations.

While the I Field Force LRP Company was similarly structured, it 

was more often dispersed throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. In August 1968, for example, the company HQ with 2d Platoon was under the

operational control (OPCON) of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group. 

The 1st Platoon was OPCON to 4-503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade

the 3d Platoon was OPCON to 3-503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade,

and the 4th Platoon was OPCON to 3-506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division.89 Because this unit was often decentralized, it did not have dedicate

helicopter support but instead received aviation support from the units for 

which it was operating.

Both field-force LRP companies had regular access to fixed-wing FAC 

support for teams in the field. These aircraft were used for radio relay and 

for directing close-air support in II Field Force, and also for managing 

deployed teams in I Field Force.90 An August 1968 description of the FAC

support to the I Field Force LRP Company in that period uses the term 

“direct support” to describe the subordination of the FAC.9

The provisional LRRP units and their successor LRP companies at 

division were much smaller organizations. They typically had a captain 

commander and two or three lieutenants who served as operations officer 

and platoon leaders. The early 1st Air Cavalry Division LRRP unit had

two six-man LRRP teams and a headquarters element comprised of two 

medics, a communications section, and an operations section.92 When this 

unit was enlarged to a company in the spring of 1967, it was authorized

16 teams of six men each.93 Additional officer, operations, and communications personnel in the company HQ would round out this unit to a full

MACV-authorized strength of 118. This particular LRP unit was initiall

attached to the 191st Military Intelligence Detachment for logistical support, but remained under the operational control of the division G2.

Later, the LRRP detachment was attached to 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry

(Air) for logistic support, messing, and Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ).95

F Company, 58th Infantry (LRP), 101st Airborne Division, when i

was formed at Fort Campbell in the summer of 1967, had a headquarters

element with a strong communications section, and two patrol platoons 

with four or five six-man patrols in each.96 When it arrived in Vietnam 

and until August 1968, this company was administratively assigned to the
6

326th Engineer Battalion.97 In August 1968, the company looked roughly

the same: two line platoons, with six six-man teams in each. The company 

HQ section included the CO, XO, 1SG, two to three clerks, and a driver. 

The communications section consisted of a sergeant and eight to 10 communications specialists.98 The LRP company was collocated with and put

under the operational control of 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air), which

provided its lift and gunship helicopter support and QRF.99 Later, when 

this unit transitioned to a Ranger company, it had headquarters, supply, 

and communications sections and two field or line platoons.10

In the Americal Division in 1968, the LRP company HQ served as

an administrative, logistical, and training base for LRP teams that were 

parceled out to the operational control of the division’s three brigades. The 

division HQ maintained control over the use of the teams by requiring the 

commanding general’s approval of the teams’ missions.1

When it was formed in April 1966, the LRRP detachment of the 1s

Infantry Division had two officers—the commander and an XO/operations 

officer. The unit fielded six teams of five men each and was assigned to 

Troop D, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment for support (mess, barracks,

supply, and QRF).10

When General Peers established the 4th Infantry Division Recondo 

Detachment in June 1967, it was administratively assigned to the 1s

Squadron, 10th Cavalry. This provided the LRRP unit with both helicopter

support and a QRF from the aero-rifle platoon. This assignment was retained even when the detachment was a Ranger company in 1969.103 Similarly, the 25th Infantry Division’s LRRP Detachment, when it was forme

in June 1966, was attached to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry and collocated

with that unit at Cu Chi for messing and UCMJ matters.104

An early example of the organization of a brigade-level LRRP detachment is provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade in late April 1966. Thi

provisional platoon was commanded by a captain and had a lieutenant XO, 

intelligence and communications sergeants, two communications specialists, and a medic in the platoon HQ. The nine patrols each had six men: 

patrol leader and assistant, radioman, scout, and two assistant scouts. This 

particular platoon was attached to Troop E, 17th Cavalry (Armored).1

When the brigade formed the 74th Infantry Detachment (Airborne Long 

Range Patrol) in December 1967, its organization strength remained at

two officers and 59 men.106 Two years later, the brigade commander, considering the operational commitments of his Ranger company, increased
62

its strength from the authorized 61 to 115

In similar fashion, Company M (Ranger), formed from the 71st Infantry Detachment of 199th Light Infantry Brigade in February 1969, w

paired closely with Troop D, 17th Cavalry (Armored).108 The 196th Infantry Brigade Long Range Patrol Detachment, when it was formed in January 1967, was assigned to the brigade intelligence section but placed un

the administrative control of Troop F, 17th Cavalry (Armored).109 Whe

the successor to this detachment in the 23d Infantry Division (Americal) 

was redesignated as Company G (Ranger), 75th Infantry two years later, 

the Ranger company was “satellited with the 16th Aviation Group for administration, helicopter transport, and aerial or ground assistance.”

A clear pattern emerges from this overview: The bulk of LRRP/LRP/

Ranger units in Vietnam were operationally controlled by, assigned to, attached to, or collocated with an air cavalry or ground cavalry unit. These 

were marriages both of necessity and convenience, since the requirements 

for helicopter lift, gunships, and QRFs were certainly met by many of 

these affiliations. The LRRP units also needed mess and logistic support, 

along with someone to administer their UCMJ needs. They frequently 

gave back, in return, detail support to the mess hall (kitchen police—KP), 

soldiers to perform perimeter bunker guard and ambush patrols, and for 

the air cavalrymen, additional QRFs for downed helicopter rescue and 

retrieval operations (combat search and rescue—CSAR).

At the team or patrol level, one can find patrols as small as three and 

four men under special circumstances, but the generally adopted LRRP 

team strength was five or six.111 Special attachments for a specific mission might enlarge a standard patrol team to seven or eight men. The 9

Infantry Division LRP unit, operating in the Mekong River Delta region 

in 1968, used eight men because they divided evenly into two boats.112

The 25th Infantry Division Ranger company in late 1969-early 1970 wa

also organized around eight-man teams.1 The duty positions were variously named but included a team leader and assistant team leader, one or 

two radio-telephone operators (RTO), and two or three scouts. Whatever 

the team size, someone with experience had to walk “point” (lead) and 

“trail” (last man in column) to provide the required movement security. 

While some units may have had a few MOS-qualified medics assigned to 

them, the typical patrol did not, and one of the team members performed 

this function. Those units that engaged in offensive combat actions on a 

regular basis frequently combined two “light” teams into a single “heavy 

team” on an ad hoc basis to provide more firepower and security.
63

Indigenous Soldiers

Many LRRP, LRP, and Ranger units had indigenous soldiers assigned 

or attached to them, on a temporary or permanent basis. Indigenous soldiers came from three primary sources: the ARVN, Montagnard tribesmen, or former enemy soldiers from the Chieu Hoi program in the form 

of Kit Carson Scouts. In some units, such as the 1st Cavalry Division and

173d Airborne Brigade, indigenous personnel were recruited, trained, and

embedded in LRRP teams.114 The 1st Cavalry Division, which first bega

using indigenous personnel in May 1967, suffered one of the drawbacks

of employing indigenous personnel in early 1968. One of its Kit Carson

Scouts, a former North Vietnamese Army (NVA) lieutenant, deserted the 

unit while on patrol. He took with him all the TTP learned while assigned 

to the LRRP unit.11

The 101st Airborne had extensive experience working with indigenous personnel. A platoon of ARVN Rangers was assigned to F Compan

(LRP) in July 1968 and for about a month, two of these soldiers deployed

with each LRP team. The experiment was not well received by 101s

LRRP soldiers due to the tactical incompetence of the ARVN troops.116 

Company (Ranger) began using Kit Carson Scouts in the fall of 1969 with

better success.1 When L Company was again assigned a group of ARVN 

Rangers in the summer of 1970, the tactical ineptitude of the South Vietnamese contributed to the project’s demise.

Other units that employed indigenous forces at some time during 

the war included the LRRP or Ranger units of the 196th Light Infantry

Brigade, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, 173d Airborn

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 5th Infantry Division.

 General Peers 

strongly advocated for the use of indigenous forces when he was commander of I Field Force in 1968

I have found here in this environment that it is very advantageous to utilize one or two indigenous personnel 

with each of the LRP teams. The reason for this is that 

they are natives of these areas and know the patterns, the 

markings, the life within the jungle. They can see and 

hear things that the ordinary American ear or eye is not 

accustomed to seeing or hearing. They have proved most 

satisfactory.12

 Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force) not only trained South 
64

Vietnamese Rangers for several months in 1968 but also employed many of

them in LRP operations, along with Kit Carson Scouts.1 Its successor unit, 

C Company (Ranger) also employed soldiers from the Republic of Korea 

Army in late 1970 and early 19

122 Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (I

Field Force) also employed Kit Carson Scouts, as did its successor unit, 

Company D, 151st Infantry (Ranger) of the Indiana National Guard.

The advantages of employing indigenous personnel were obvious: 

they had language and cultural knowledge, better understood the terrain, 

knew enemy TTP, and by their non-American appearance bought a few 

moments of precious time for the remainder of the patrol to react appropriately during a sudden encounter with the enemy on a jungle trail. The disadvantages of employing indigenous personnel were equally obvious: unit 

security was compromised, communication within teams was difficult, 

standards of training and conduct differed, and mutual trust and cohesiveness were hard to build. Examples of these problems occurred throughout 

the war and in several units.12

Training

Training unit personnel was among the most difficult issues LRRPunit commanders faced in Vietnam. The two primary methods employed, 

singly and in combination, were training in the LRRP unit and training 

at the MACV Recondo School in Nha Trang. In a few exceptional cases, 

such as the 9th Infantry Division in 1966, 101st Airborne Division in 19

and Company D, 151st Infantry (Indiana National Guard) in 1968, uni

formed and trained before they arrived in Vietnam. But once in country, 

they were faced with training their own replacement soldiers like every 

other unit.

Unit Training

Several LRRP memoirs describe unit training in terms of a week to two 

weeks of classes, eight to 12 hours per day. In the 101st Airborne Division 

the summer of 1968, this week of training included classes in noise and light

discipline; hand signaling; escape and evasion; patrolling techniques; radio 

procedure; calling for fire missions and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); 

land navigation; immediate action drills (IAD); emergency medical treatments for various wounds, injuries, and ailments; camouflage of person and 

equipment; load packing; and helicopter operations. This week of classroom training was followed by training patrols just outside the perimeter of 

the base camp.12

In the 1st Cavalry Division in 1967, this training included classes i
65

map reading, identification of enemy weapons and equipment, marksmanship, terminal guidance of aircraft and helicopters, LZ selection, medical 

training, rudimentary language training, physical conditioning, ambush 

techniques, radio and communications procedures, combat-reaction drills 

(IAD by another name), and explosives and demolition.126 In 1968 this unittraining course lasted 10 to 12 days and was still at two weeks in length

year later, after the unit was converted to a Ranger company.127 In 1969 th

unit training ran for two weeks and included map reading, rappelling, radio 

maintenance and operation, aerial-rocket and gunship coordination, medic 

training, ambush techniques, enemy weapons familiarization, enemy unit 

identification, and physical conditioning.128

In the 173d Airborne Brigade in 1968, unit training for individua

soldiers lasted from one to two weeks and was followed by a trial mission.129 Another source describes training for the Ranger unit of the 173

Airborne Brigade as a minimum of 96 hours over the course of seven to 10

days.130 While the 173d Airborne Brigade used MACV Recondo School, i

also made a concerted effort to send personnel to the Malaysian Tracking 

School.1 Soldiers selected for assignment to E Company (LRP), 20th Infantry, I Field Force attended a 15-day course taught at An Khe by Rangerqualified instructors. Subjects included physical conditioning, rappelling,

radio procedures, first aid, day and night land navigation, patrolling tactics, ambushes, weapons familiarization, MEDEVAC procedures, artillery 

and gunship terminal guidance, and helicopter operations.13

The capstone of all unit-training programs was actual combat patrolling. When conditions permitted, ambush patrols that most LRRP units 

were tasked to perform outside their base camp perimeters as a matter 

of routine were used as training opportunities.133 These were generally

overnighters, for which a light (six-man) or heavy (12-man) patrol walked

out the main gate before last light to the nearest area of concealment, established an ambush on a road or trail leading toward the base camp, and 

returned just after first light in the morning. When soldiers had mastered 

this task and their leaders felt they were prepared, they were assigned to 

“break-in” long-range patrol missions, normally no more than two “newbies” to a six-man team. At times, however, the operational tempo did not 

permit the use of these missions and new team members were committed 

to combat patrols without them.13

Because soldiers were rotating into and out of LRRP units singly and in 

cohorts, training was both episodic and continuous. On several occasions, 

due to large personnel turnover, a LRRP unit would have to stand down 
66

from combat operations for several weeks to conduct unit training. An 

example of this occurred in the 101st Airborne Division in December 19

and January 1969.1

It is no coincidence that all these unit-training programs were remarkably similar in both content and length. The unit cadre who served as instructors were a somewhat homogeneous lot, being infantry NCOs with Ranger 

and special forces backgrounds. A second explanation for this commonality was the mission itself. While the terrain certainly varied between the 

central highlands and the delta, so much of what LRRP soldiers practiced 

and executed was the same in all places. A third reason for the similarity in 

unit training throughout Vietnam was the MACV Recondo School in Nha 

Trang.

MACV Recondo School

MACV Recondo School was a product of the 5th Special Forces 

Group, created expressly for the purpose of training soldiers from all the 

free-world forces in the art and science of long-range reconnaissance techniques.136 General William Westmoreland formally approved the school’s

creation in a message to the 5th Special Forces Group commander of 4 September 1966. The facilities and instructor group in Nha Trang had previously been used to train reconnaissance teams for Project DELTA, a special

forces and South Vietnamese Army enterprise that had conducted special 

operations in Viet Cong-controlled areas since late 1964

The course taught at MACV Recondo School was three weeks in 

length, with 260 hours of classroom and field instruction. It was made 

available to all free-world forces, resulting in the attendance of Vietnamese, Korean, Australian, Thai, and Republic of the Philippines soldiers and 

airmen, along with personnel from all branches of the US Armed Forces. 

The typical class size was 60 students, with a new class intake every two 

weeks. Due to the high academic and physical demands of the course, the 

dropout rate over time was about 30 percent. Graduates returned to their 

parent units and were then subject to being reassigned to a LRRP/LRP/

Ranger unit for the remainder of their in-country time.

The prerequisites for attendance at MACV Recondo School were 

listed in USARV Regulation 350-2:

•	 Must be a volunteer and possess a combat-arms MOS.

•	 Must have been in country for one month and have six months’ retainability after graduation.

•	 Assignment to a LRRP unit is anticipated.
67

•	 Must be proficient in general military subjects.

Because non-graduates and graduates alike returned to their parent units, 

it was in the best interest of units to fill their quotas with carefully selected 

students. On the other hand, many LRRP soldiers were not afforded the 

opportunity to attend MACV Recondo School. General Peers, 4th Infantry 

Division commander, briefing other senior commanders on LRRP issues 

in September 1967, stated that “due to the quotas for the school and to the

rapid turnover of personnel, only about one out of every five of our [4th 

Infantry Division] LRRP personnel ever attend the Recondo School.”13

Students arrived at the school with their personal assigned weapon 

and load-bearing equipment (LBE), and with a prescribed number of loaded magazines and hand grenades. The school provided a standard issue of 

required special equipment, along with a 30-pound sandbag. The sandbag 

was carried in the student’s rucksack at all times and was subject to being 

weighed by any instructor at any time. Students were formed into five-man 

teams and assigned an instructor/adviser, who advised and evaluated the 

team throughout the course.

Every morning began with physical conditioning before breakfast. 

In September 1967, this meant a modest period of calisthenics followed

by conditioning marches in week one. The marches began at a distance 

of two miles on Monday and increased to seven miles on Saturday, with 

a required completion time of under 90 minutes for the 7-mile march. 

Students carried their rifles and wore all of their LBE with rucksack, four 

full 1-quart canteens, and their sandbag for these marches. Students who

failed to make the grade physically were returned to their units after the 

first week. Physical conditioning during the second week employed a 

formation run in place of the forced march, and the weapons, LBE, and 

rucksacks with sandbags were left in the barracks.

MACV Recondo School’s curriculum contained the following major 

subject blocks and time allocation in the spring of 1967

•	 Administration–15:0

•	 Physical Training–14:2

•	 Medical–3:30

•	 Communications–8:30

•	 Intelligence–4:40

•	 Patrol Training–62:40

•	 Weapons Training–15:
68

•	 Air Operations–18:3

•	 Combat Operations–112:

•	 Land Navigation–15:3

•	 Quizzes, examinations, and critiques–6:30

•	 Commandant’s Time–13:0

Of the total 288 hours, 45:30 was concurrent training in patrolling, weapons training, and air operations.13

The first week of formal instruction was conducted in a classroom on 

the school compound. The second week was spent in training areas outside 

the compound on practical subjects, such as weapons firing, tower and helicopter rappelling, and other field activities. The third week was spent in 

preparing and conducting an actual instructor-led combat patrol in a relatively safe jungle environment. These patrols occasionally made contact 

with enemy forces and resulted in the wounding and death of both US and 

enemy personnel.

Upon completion of MACV Recondo School, graduates were awarded a certificate with a Recondo number and a Recondo patch to wear on 

their right pocket while in country, then were sent back to their parent unit 

for possible assignment to a LRRP/LRP/Ranger unit.13

While the typical Recondo School class was comprised of enlisted and 

NCO personnel from all services and a few foreign armies, company-grade 

officers were also permitted to attend. The list of graduates by class shows 

on average two or three lieutenants and the occasional captain in a graduating class of 40-45 students.

All seating in the school was set aside in October and November 1967

to train personnel for the LRP companies of Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (I Field Force) and Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force)

in four truncated classes. A total of 333 personnel were trained, but did 

not complete all the requirements for graduation and therefore were not 

awarded Recondo numbers.

MACV Recondo School graduated 2,700 US students and also trained 

the 333 additional personnel mentioned above, for a total of about 3,000 

US personnel between September 1966 and December 1970.140 But t

school’s training impact was far greater than sheer numbers. The training 

conducted in LRRP units around the country was inextricably linked to 

MACV Recondo School training. Most units required their soldiers to have
69

demonstrated aptitude and ability to conduct LRRP operations before they 

sent them to Recondo School. These units conducted training to qualify 

soldiers for LRRP duty and also to prepare them for success at Recondo 

School, based on their knowledge of its physical- and academic-training 

standards. This pre-screening provided the special forces instructors at Nha 

Trang with better students, and undoubtedly raised the standard of Recondo 

School graduates.

MACV Recondo School, in turn, with its comprehensive and detailed 

classroom and field curriculum and rigorous physical conditioning, defined a common set of TTP for all LRRP units in Vietnam, irrespective of 

their mission or operating terrain. The importance of this common set of 

standards cannot be overemphasized. Graduates left Nha Trang with their 

mental and physical rucksacks full of knowledge of the intimate details 

of LRRP activities. They took back to their units the paper handouts used 

by the school in academic instruction.1 They incorporated sandbags in 

their unit physical conditioning training.142 Primarily as a consequence of

Recondo School training, every LRRP unit in Vietnam spoke a common 

language of long-range patrolling.

Materiel

TOE 7-157E, the authorization document for a long-range patrol company during the Vietnam War, contains a list of all items of equipment that

should have been present in both of the Field Force LRP companies. For 

the purposes of this study, this TOE serves as a guide to the general types 

of equipment one might find in any LRRP unit in Vietnam. The several 

memoirs written by LRRP veterans are a better source to determine what 

weapons and equipment units actually had access to and used in the performance of their combat mission.

Outside of the two Field Force LRP companies, few LRRP units had 

assigned vehicles. At most, a unit might have a jeep for the commander 

and first sergeant, a 3/4-ton truck for the supply sergeant, and perhaps one 

2 1/2-ton truck to move personnel from the unit area to the helipad and

return. Because provisional LRRP units were not established on authorized 

TOEs, these vehicles were normally borrowed but sometimes stolen from 

other units (with commensurate modification to data plates and bumper 

markings). The practice of “liberating” a vehicle from its owning unit and 

repainting its bumper markings was common in Vietnam and should not 

surprise anyone. When a unit was relocated from one area in country to 

another, these “stolen” vehicles were frequently abandoned in place or returned to their rightful owners.14
70

Another method of requisition commonly used in Vietnam was the trading of commodities between units. When the 1st Cavalry Division stood

up its LRRP unit in late 1966, “horse-trading” was used to obtain exotic

weapons, radios, generators, and rucksacks.144 In addition to standard supply items, LRRP-unit personnel frequently possessed enemy weapons and

equipment that could be traded away in rear areas, with the full knowledge 

that more trophy items would be acquired on a reoccurring basis.

TOE 7-157E provided for a standard assortment of weapons: M1

rifles in large numbers, several M60 7.62mm and M2 .50-caliber machine 

guns, M1911A1 .45-caliber pistols, an M79 grenade launcher, and seve

3.5-inch rocket launchers. Replace the M14 with variants of the M16 rifle, 

drop the .50-caliber machine guns, replace the 3.5-inch rocket launchers 

with the M72 LAW, add several additional M79 grenade launchers (and 

late in the war the XM203), and the result is a fairly standard list of armaments found in virtually every LRRP unit by the late-war period. But this 

list does not begin to describe the total weaponry possessed by LRRPs. 

Other weapons abounded, some military and some of civilian origin. Here 

is a list of these other weapons:

•	 “exotic” weapons (unspecified) in the 1st Cavalry Division14

•	 Silenced Sten guns in multiple units14

•	 assortment of modified, unauthorized, classified, stolen, silenced, 

and otherwise illegal weapons in the 101st Airborne Division

•	 M2 (full-automatic capable) carbine in multiple units14

•	 M3 submachine gun in multiple units14

•	 Thompson .45-caliber submachine gun in 1st Infantry Division and

Americal Division15

•	 12-gauge shotgun in multiple units

•	 AK47 (common in many units for use by point man, who may also 

have been wearing black pajamas to provide the patrol greater reaction 

time to sudden enemy contact)15

•	 Simonov semi-automatic carbine (SKS)15

•	 CZ58 rifle in the 173d Airborne Brigade15

•	 silenced/unsilenced Swedish K submachine gun in multiple units15

•	 M79 with cut-off barrel and stock in multiple units15

•	 M14 with and without scope in multiple units1

•	 Winchester Model 70 bolt-action rifle in the 101st Airborne Division15
7

•	 high standard .22-caliber pistol (government-issue) or Ruger .22-

caliber pistol15

•	 numerous personal weapons16

Men carried personal weapons other than standard-issue M16 variants

for many reasons as diverse as the list itself. Perhaps the best reason was 

expressed by a veteran of the 1st Infantry Division LRRP Detachment:

“[We used] anything that made fire fights sound more like their weapons 

and gave no indication of the size of our force.”1 In general terms, these 

men understood that a non-standard weapon required them to carry their 

own irreplaceable ammunition supply. They also learned that silenced 

weapons were not always silent and that “sawed-off” weapons (M79, 

M14, even the M60 machine gun) did not perform to the same standard as

an unmodified weapon of the same type. Any submachine gun that fired 

the .45-caliber round was exceptionally heavy in combination with its ammunition supply. And a black-pajama-clad point man carrying an AK47 

did not want to be observed by a friendly patrol or helicopter. That could 

lead to a disastrous outcome.

Different units had various rationales for issuing and carrying the M72 

LAW. In II Field Force, the M72 LAW was initially viewed as a psychological weapon, used to shock and stun enemy soldiers and also to confuse 

them as to the size and identity of the American unit they had engaged.16

But on occasion the weapon was actually fired for its destructive effect, in 

one case at an enemy sampan.163 Infrequent mention of the M72 LAW is

made in 101st Airborne Division memoirs. In one case, the LRRP team’

mission was to find and destroy an enemy radio transmitter. In another 

mission, conducted in April 1969 in the A Shau Valley, a team carried a

LAW because of rumors of NVA armor using the road through the valley. 

In the third example, in March and April 1971, Ranger teams equippe

with claymores, shaped charges, and LAWs were inserted along a road to 

ambush and destroy enemy vehicular traffic.164 The LAW was occasionally used to break contact with the enemy in the 1st Cavalry Division LRR

company.165 The paucity of references to this weapon in memoir literature

suggests that its use was not widespread.16

The list of standard-issue items for a LRRP soldier looks about the 

same across all units, plus or minus a garment here and there or the different number of canteens (reflecting seasonal weather and terrain variations). If one inspected the personal gear and rucksack of any LRP soldier 

in any LRP unit in 1968, one would likely find the following items:

•	 personal weapon (M16 or CAR15) with at least 18 to 20 20-rou
72

magazines (18 rounds per magazine with ball-to-tracer ratio as per unit

SOP)

•	 fragmentation grenades (minimum four-six)

•	 smoke grenades (minimum 1

•	 white phosphorus grenades (frequently 1

•	 chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) grenades (frequently 1

•	 claymore mine (minimum 1

•	 map in protective plastic

•	 C4 or other explosive substance (1/4-pound block or more

•	 detonation cord, non-electric blasting caps

•	 dehydrated rations (two per day for anticipated duration of patrol)

•	 water (minimum two quarts) and purification tablets

•	 strobe light (team leader and assistant team leader)

•	 signal mirror, pen flare, signal panel (selected patrol members)

•	 PRC-25 or PRC-77 radio (selected patrol members), signal operating instructions

•	 URC-10 radio (selected patrol members

•	 extra radio battery (selected patrol members)

•	 Starlight scope (selected patrol member)

•	 Olympus Pen EE or Polaroid camera (selected patrol members) 

•	 serum albumin or other blood products (selected patrol members)

•	 binoculars (selected patrol members)

•	 drugs (morphine syrette, tetracycline, dextroamphetamine, darvon, 

codeine tablets, and others)

•	 large knife (issue survival knife or commercial knife)

•	 lensatic compass

•	 insect repellant

•	 camouflage stick

•	 rope (six-foot length) for rappelling seat, two snap links

•	 heavy-duty leather gloves

•	 clothing items (extra socks, poncho liner, sleeping sweater)

•	 extra ammunition for M79 or M60 (as required by mission)16
73

The AN/PVS-2 Starlight Scope weighed seven and one-half pounds 

and was about 18 inches long and eight inches high. This first-generation 

night vision device, intended to be attached to an M14 or M16 rifle as a 

sighting device but more often hand-held, was used by some units that 

operated in more open terrain. These included the LRRP/Ranger units in I 

and II Field Forces, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and the 

Airborne Brigade.16

Depending on the exact load configuration of a rucksack, particularly 

in heavy items such as water, ammunition, and communications gear, the 

overall combat load for a LRRP soldier could easily range from 70 to 

100 pounds. The physical demands on LRRP soldiers were great indeed.

LRRP soldiers’ tendency to load themselves down did not escape the attention of General Peers, who had intimate knowledge of LRRP activity 

from his own command experience in Vietnam:

It is my view that most of our LRPs go in too heavy. 

They’ve got everything but the kitchen sink hung on them. 

The mission that these people perform should determine 

the equipment that they take along. There are a few basic 

items and anything beyond that is pure impedimenta. First 

is the man himself; of course, he must take along food, 

but he should not have to take along water. In dry areas 

during certain seasons, maybe yes, because it may be a 

tremendous inconvenience and dangerous to go back and 

forth to a water hole. . . . He needs his weapon. He needs 

ammunition, and he perhaps needs a poncho. . . . In our 

environment we operate with the radio, so a radio has to 

go along. If they are going out on a surveillance mission, it 

would be advantageous to take along a pair of binoculars. 

. . . I would recommend to all of you that you cut down to 

the minimum what these men will take to the field.16

No discussion of the materiel aspect of LRRP/Ranger unit operations 

in Vietnam can be complete without mention of the helicopter and other 

dedicated aircraft. Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) had

dedicated helicopters. The former operations officer of this unit mentions a 

dedicated lift platoon and gunship platoon.170 Another source describes the

helicopter support to this unit as “one C & C, three Slicks [lift helicopters], 

and three to four gunships . . . for exclusive use by the company.” This 

same source’s description of the unit cantonment area includes a helicopter 
74

landing pad.1 A veteran of one helicopter-support unit recalls that whenever 

a LRP team was inserted, his unit kept a gunship team and a lift helicopter 

physically mission ready in a small field at the LRP compound. The crews 

for these helicopters slept in the LRP compound. This veteran, who flew a 

Huey UH-1C gunship, indicates that he was under the operational command

of the LRP company commander unless the cavalry’s ground platoon was 

also committed, at which time the helicopters reverted to the control of the 

cavalry troop commander.17

In one other LRRP unit, in the 1st Cavalry Division, there is a suggestion of a single dedicated helicopter and four crewmen for the LRRP-unit

commander.173 The time period for this particular source is very late in 196

or early in 1967, and the presence of four crewmen suggests a Bell UH-Iroquois Huey utility helicopter rather than a Hughes OH-6A light observation helicopter (LOH, but commonly called “loach”), which had a crew o

two (pilot and observer). In either case, one helicopter was insufficient to 

satisfy all the transportation requirements of a LRRP unit, even one with 

only two deployable teams.

In all other cases, helicopters were borrowed assets, provided by higher 

HQ on request of the LRRP-unit commander or by direction from the controlling HQ staff. To be sure, many LRRP units, particularly those operationally controlled by a cavalry squadron, had habitual relationships with 

their helicopter-support units. And within those helicopter units, some pilots 

appear to have become particularly adept at supporting LRRP insertions and 

extractions.

So what was the typical helicopter requirement for a LRRP team? A 

single UH-1, two if the unit SOP required it, was needed to conduct a premission air reconnaissance or overflight. The purpose of this flight was to

enable the LRRP company and reconnaissance team leadership to view the 

reconnaissance zone in its entirety from the air, to select primary and alternate insertion LZs and extraction pick-up zones (PZ), and to view possible 

movement routes or select observation positions for the patrol. Participants in this overflight were normally someone from the company chain 

of command (company commander, operations officer, or platoon leader), 

the reconnaissance team leader, and possibly his assistant. This overflight 

was normally executed about 24 hours in advance of the planned insertion 

time. Logically, the same helicopter pilot who flew the reconnaissance 

overflight would also fly the insertion mission on the following day.

The actual insertion of a six-man LRRP team was normally accomplished 
75

using five helicopters: a C & C helicopter for the LRRP company commander 

or his designated representative (operations officer or platoon leader), two 

UH-1s (one for the inserted team and the other to portray false insertions),

and two Huey or Cobra gunships. If a 12-man heavy team was being inserted,

at least one more UH-1 was required to carry the additional six men. If

helicopters were plentiful, additional lift helicopters could accompany the 

mission to portray the insertion of a larger force, or additional gunship 

helicopters could accompany the insertion to provide additional fire support 

and a safe extraction in the event of enemy presence in the LZ area.

Picture, then, a LRRP company commander attempting to insert a half 

dozen or more six-man teams in a brigade or divisional AO over a period 

of several hours to execute a “saturation” mission. Such an AO may be 

20 kilometers or more from the base camp, requiring refueling between 

insertion sorties. It could take a relatively limited number of helicopters a 

long time to insert all the teams, or conversely a relatively large number of 

helicopters a short time.

Once inserted into its reconnaissance zone, the LRRP team was then 

at the mercy of the weather and the chain of command for subsequent helicopter support. A notable example of a LRRP team in contact that could 

not be extracted because helicopters were not immediately available occurred on 20 November 1968. About an hour after springing an ambush on

a small enemy force in mid-morning of that day, a 101st Airborne Divisio

LRP heavy team (12 men) came under attack and spent the remainder of

the day pinned in its position by a larger enemy force. It could neither be 

extracted nor reinforced due to the unavailability of helicopter-lift support. 

By the end of the day the team had lost four KIA and several WIA, and 

were finally rescued by an ad hoc force of off-duty LRP company personnel followed by a QRF from the cavalry squadron.17

Lift helicopters used for emergency LRP-team extractions out of severe terrain or triple-canopy jungle typically had to be rigged with rope 

ladders, jungle penetrators, and McGuire rigs. Helicopter crews had to be 

trained in the use of all these devices, because their use severely affected 

control of the helicopter. By their very nature, these extractions were frequently conducted under enemy fire, sometimes at night, and often involving wounded personnel. It is no surprise that LRP units developed a special relationship with their habitual helicopter-support units and crews.

In a similar fashion, gunship pilots who routinely supported LRP units 

developed TTP intended to bring suppressing and killing fire in close to 
76

LRP-team positions. LRP teams identified their exact locations using panels, strobe lights in the open and in M79 grenade-launcher barrels, colored 

smoke, trip and pen-gun flares, and tracer fire. Skilled gunship pilots routinely delivered ordnance to within mere feet of LRP positions. Also on 

occasion LRP soldiers sustained injury from gunship fire.

Even though an enormous number of helicopters were present in the 

theater, they were a critical asset and, thus, strictly managed. In August 

1968, General Peers stated that “any time you get about five or six LRPs 

out you have to keep about two gunships, sometimes four gunships depending on the situation, and two to four slicks setting aside that you cannot use 

for anything else.”175 As the former commander of 4th Infantry Division

and at that time I Field Force commander, Peers knew well the aviation 

support required for LRP operations.

Other types of aircraft support to LRP teams included dedicated fixedwing O-1 (L-19A) “Bird Dog” light observation aircraft in both I and I

Field Force LRP companies. In both of these units, the aircraft flew above 

or off to the side of a reconnaissance zone in direct support of the LRP patrol. The pilot or observer had several functions: to serve as an aerial radio 

relay operator, to adjust artillery, to provide exact position coordinates to a 

patrol on the ground, to make visual contact with patrol for extraction, to 

provide information and warning to patrol of enemy activity, and to precisely locate a patrol in contact.176 The front-seat pilot was, of course, an

Air Force FAC, who was empowered to bring in and control close-air support (CAS) aircraft. When it first formed a LRRP detachment in October 

1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division made frequent use of

L-19A for airborne radio-relay with its LRRP teams.177 In 1968, the 1

Division LRP unit used FAC support for insertions.178 Other LRP units had

occasional access to fixed-wing aircraft support for radio-relay and other 

purposes; however, it was on a periodic rather than continuous basis.17

Tactical Role of Leaders

The administrative duties and responsibilities of small-unit leaders 

to sustain, shelter, promote, reward, punish, and in other ways provide 

for soldiers’ daily existence are constants in peace and war. This section 

examines the tactical role of the leadership component of LRRP units: 

the commander, operations officer or NCO, and platoon leadership. As in 

other areas of this study, one size does not fit all. Many LRRP units had 

inspired leadership; some did not. The focus of this section is more on 

what leaders did to contribute to their unit’s tactical mission than on how 

well or poorly they did it.
77

Doctrinally, in the tactical realm the LRRP/Ranger company commander was charged with specific responsibilities in 1965:

•	 Control the tactical employment of the long-range patrol platoons.

•	 Maintain close liaison with the staff of the controlling HQ.

•	 Participate in the initial planning for patrol operations.

•	 With assistance from company operations section, prepare detailed 

patrol plans.

•	 Issue orders and control patrol-recovery operations. 

•	 Report the information gathered to G2 staff.

With one exception, these same responsibilities were contained in the 

new FM 31-18 published in August 1968, but with the following add

company-commander tasks in stability operations:

•	 Issue warning order to patrol platoon.

•	 Assisted by operations officer, analyze mission and develop detailed plans for aerial reconnaissance, insertion, extraction, fire support, 

and communication.

•	 Continue preparation, planning, supervision, inspections, and follow-up actions to ensure the continuance of a high state of operational 

readiness.

The missing duty for LRRP company commanders in 1968 stability

operations was, “Issue orders and control patrol recovery operations.” This 

task was now shared by the controlling HQ (“initiates contingency plans 

for emergency extraction”) and the aviation-mission commander (“directs 

the emergency extraction”).18

The writings of several LRP/Ranger veterans give us some “keyhole” 

insights into the actual duties performed by LRRP/LRP/Ranger company 

commanders in the Vietnam War. In F Company (LRP) 51st Infantry, II

Field Force, the company commander is depicted as responding to the 

scene of LRP-team contacts in the C & C helicopter, bringing with him a 

pair of gunships to assist in the extraction of the team and its wounded personnel.1

 The company commander participated in both insertions and extractions of teams.182 On other occasions, the company commander issued

tactical orders by radio to deployed teams, telling them to stay in position 

or move, and approving or denying team requests to be extracted.183 The

company commander was also present when a team was debriefed upon 

completion of a mission.18
78

A partial picture of company-commander duties and responsibilities is 

available for the LRRP unit of 1st Cavalry Division. The first commander, 

a combat-experienced Ranger- and special forces-qualified officer, stood 

up the unit in November 1966 and guided it through recruitment, training,

and operational commitment until his date eligible for return from overseas 

(DEROS) in June 1967.185 Because this provisional unit’s teams initiall

were placed under the operational control of brigade HQ, little description 

exists of this commander’s tactical role. However, on one occasion he is depicted participating in the aerial reconnaissance overflight and on another 

as debriefing the division G2 about the results of a successful patrol.18

A later commander of E Company (LRP), 52d Infantry, 1st Cavalry

Division (which in time became H Company [Ranger]), participated fully 

in the tactical activity of his unit.187 He was brought into command of the

LRP company in the summer of 1968 to either resurrect it or bury it. At the

time, the commander of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, to which the LRP company was attached for logistic support and UCMJ authority, was attempting to make it into his E Troop. After the unit deployed from I Corps to

III Corps tactical zone in October 1968, this commander went on the first 

mission in the new AO as the “bellyman” in the extraction helicopter.188

The new commander made tactical misuse of his LRP teams by brigade 

S2 and S3 personnel more difficult by establishing a tactical SOP and by 

communicating in writing with the division commander.189 Occasionally,

this commander went on a combat patrol, once with the mission to plant 

anti-vehicular mines along an enemy infiltration route and another time to 

recover remains from a helicopter crash site.190 A successor to this commander is noted as giving tactical orders to a deployed team by radio (as

opposed to the S2 or S3).1

The history of the 101st Airborne Division’s LRRP, LRP, and Range

units is well told in nine or 10 separate accounts by seven different authors.

One of the early commanders of the1st Brigade’s LRRP Detachment was a

23-year-old OCS-graduate second lieutenant.192 In May and June 1967 h

planned and then participated in LRRP missions to capture enemy personnel.193 On at least one other occasion, this young officer went on a patrol

as team leader during which several large groups of enemy soldiers were 

observed.19

Almost a year later, in May 1968, the commander of F Company (LRP),

58th Infantry was in a C & C helicopter, circling above a team and controlling a pair of Marine F-4 Phantoms in an air strike on enemy troops spotted 

by the team.195 The company commander was also frequently present when
79

a team leader briefed back his mission order.196 In late June the company

commander was involved in directing the insertion of a patrol from his C 

& C helicopter.197 In late July 1968, after a “fragging” incident involvin

an unpopular new commander, a replacement commander was brought in 

to shape up the unit or disband it.198 The new commander made tactical

decisions about and participated in the insertion and extraction of teams.199

In October 1968 and February 1969, he ordered the tactical deploymen

of several teams to saturate patrol of an area of particular interest.200 The 

company commander was also a frequent participant in reconnaissance 

overflights to select helicopter LZs and PZs.20 These tactical activities, attributed to the early commanders, continued to be performed, in greater or 

lesser degrees, by subsequent commanders of the 101st Airborne Divisio

LRP and later Ranger company.202

Irrespective of the division of assignment, the LRP-unit commander 

was the most important interface to the supported unit and its staff regarding missions assigned to his company. The typical divisional LRP company commander was a captain and his mission taskings came from majors, 

lieutenant colonels, and colonels. Unless he had the ear of a higher-ranking officer, it was difficult for a LRP company commander to refuse or 

even negotiate a mission he felt was inappropriate for his unit.

The other area where the divisional LRP company commander had 

little tactical control was the availability of helicopter support. Even when 

LRP units were placed under the operational control of divisional air-cavalry squadrons, which had their own helicopters, the LRP captain was at 

the mercy of the aviation lieutenant colonel and his staff. The availability 

and tactical control of lift- and gunship-helicopter support was always an 

issue of concern when LRP patrols were in the field.

What tactical role did lieutenants perform in LRP units? Of course it 

varied from unit to unit and from commander to commander. But one can 

generalize based upon the available secondary sources. In the I Field Force 

LRP Company, lieutenants supervised patrol activities from the back seat 

of a light fixed-wing aircraft.203 Before the platoon leader could control 

patrols from the air, however, he was expected to participate in a few 

ground missions to gain an understanding of what teams were doing.204 A 

lieutenant also went to the field with his platoon when it was deployed to 

a forward base from which patrols were sent out.205 And lieutenants participated in the insertion of patrols.206 In F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry

in II Field Force, a platoon leader was killed while leading a patrol on 15

December 1967.207 It was a regular policy in this unit that a platoon leader
80

lead or accompany heavy teams in the field, and this was apparently done 

on many occasions.208

In the spring of 1967, the detachment commander of the 4th Infantry

Division’s 2d Brigade LRRP unit showed an interest in going on patrol, 

something “his predecessor did not do often, except to familiarize himself 

with what kind of conditions we worked under in the field.”209 A veteran of 

the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP/Ranger Detachment, without naming specific leaders, indicates that someone from the chain of command always

went to the scene to assist and control the extraction of teams that had 

been in contact.21 Another veteran of this unit, from the 1970-71 period

states that the lieutenants (platoon leaders) controlled the infiltrations and 

extractions.211 In the 1st Cavalry Division, a platoon leader in H Compa

(Ranger) was expected to accompany his team leaders on reconnaissance 

overflights and supervise the insertion and extraction of his platoon’s 

teams. He accompanied patrols to conduct special missions and also to 

confirm patrol-leader qualifications and performance.21 A new lieutenant 

was sent out on a mission to simultaneously expose him to patrol activities 

and expose the soldiers to him.21

The record of platoon-leader tactical duties in the 101st Airborne LR

Ranger companies is replete with examples. An account of this unit for 1968

credits the XO as the only officer to have taken a team out under his own 

command, which leads to the conclusion that platoon leaders were not doing 

so during that time period.214 Another account cites the need for field duty

and combat time to qualify a lieutenant for his Combat Infantryman Badge 

as the reason a platoon leader went on a patrol.215 According to a third

source, lieutenants in the 101st Airborne LRP unit went on reconnaissanc

overflights with their team leaders, participated in pre-mission briefings, 

and went on patrols in other-than-leader roles.21 Another task of the platoon 

leader, apparently routine, was to deliver artillery pre-plotted fire lists and 

operational overlays for upcoming patrol missions to the radio-relay team 

supporting the missions from its forward location.217 Platoon leaders also

flew insertions and extractions, sometimes in the C & C aircraft with the 

commander and other times as the bellyman in the extraction helicopter.21

Late in the war, in the period between April and July 1971, L Company (Ranger) of the 101st Airborne Division was ordered to conduct several offensive missions in platoon or larger strength. A platoon leader 

killed during a road-ambush mission on 16 April 19

219 A different platoon leader led his teams into the same area three days later and was forced

out by heavy contact. A third, stay-behind mission into the same area on 
8

23 April began with the helicopter insertion of the entire Ranger company 

(two platoons), followed a short time later by the planned extraction of one 

platoon. This mission also ended in failure as its radio-relay team on a ridge 

above the valley came under heavy attack.220

This same platoon leader accompanied one of his teams as a sixth man 

in a June 1971 mission, deferring to the leadership of the team’s sergean

E-5 team leader.22 Another platoon leader led a heavy team on a reconnaissance mission in mid-June that ended in contact and several Ranger 

casualties.222 In mid-July, both of these platoon leaders led the entire Ranger 

company in a raid operation that ended inconclusively.223 Generally speaking, the active participation of lieutenants in the 101st Airborne Divisio

Ranger Company in team-level patrols was a function of personality and 

expediency. Lieutenants were not required to go on patrols, but some did of 

their own volition. They actively participated in patrol preparation, insertion, and extraction.224

Active participation by platoon leaders in Ranger team actions also 

occurred in other divisions. In the 25th Infantry Division, a first lieutenant 

led a Ranger heavy team on a combat patrol on 2 April 1970 that ended in

heavy contact with the enemy. Two E-7 team leaders joined him in leadership of this patrol, one of whom was killed during the action.225

In many respects, the tactical role of platoon sergeants in LRRP units 

mirrored that of platoon leaders. They flew on pre-mission aerial-reconnaissance flights, supervised the team leaders as they prepared mission 

orders, and participated in insertions and extractions of teams as bellymen.226 A platoon sergeant in F Company (LRP), 51st Infantry of II Field

Force met with the controlling S2 and S3 daily, scheduled his teams for 

upcoming missions, managed team assignments, coordinated artillery for 

the team leader, coordinated with helicopter pilots, participated in reconnaissance overflights, insertions, and extractions, supervised controlled 

substances (issue and turn-in of drugs), helped the team leader with 

map and special equipment issue and turn-in, supervised team rehearsals 

and briefings, and supervised turn-in of all weapons and ordnance upon 

completion of missions.227 On occasion, one can find a reference to a platoon sergeant accompanying a patrol or in rare cases leading a patrol.228 

Whether they went as a “supernumerary” or led the patrol was a matter of 

personal choice. One can find references to two platoon sergeants in the 

101st Airborne LRP and Ranger companies who frequently led patrols

and another reference to a Ranger platoon sergeant who rarely went on a 

patrol.229
82

If platoon leaders and platoon sergeants had significant tactical roles in 

reconnaissance overflights and insertion and extraction of patrols in helicopter-supported operations, their tactical role was diminished in units that 

relied less on helicopters and more on other methods of insertion. In late 

1967 and early 1968, LRRP teams from the 25th Infantry Division LRR

detachment, which was attached to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, were sometimes used for extended LP/OP duty in support of one of 

the division’s maneuver brigades or battalions. These teams, both light and 

heavy, were inserted by walkout or stay-behind methods into LP/OP or 

ambush positions selected by the using unit, without any reconnaissance 

overflight or other LRRP-unit input. If the patrol was being conducted by 

a heavy team, its leader was the senior NCO of the two teams that comprised the patrol. The patrol would submit its periodic situation reports to 

the using unit and had to rely completely on the using unit for QRF and 

other combat support in the event of contact. Platoon leaders and platoon 

sergeants had no role whatsoever in the conduct of these patrols.230

In summation, LRRP- and Ranger-unit commissioned officers had 

important tactical roles to play that did not necessarily involve leading 

men on the battlefield. Effective company commanders participated in 

mission development and planning, personally supervised the insertion 

of teams, led reaction forces to the field when a team was in contact beyond its capability to withstand, and made the life-and-death decisions 

concerning extraction under fire. Platoon leaders, who frequently rotated 

to other assignments and units after just six months in position, conducted 

pre-mission reconnaissance, participated in insertions and extractions, and 

occasionally went on patrols as a team member, less often as a team leader. 

Late in the war, when Ranger units were more frequently assigned raidtype missions, lieutenants led heavy teams and platoons of Rangers into 

the field. Platoon sergeants assisted in preparing teams for combat, supported insertions and extractions, and on occasion led patrols to the field.

Personnel

With sufficient time and resources, one could examine the enlisted personnel who comprised the patrol teams and support elements in Vietnam 

LRRP and Ranger units from many perspectives: age, induction source 

(conscript or volunteer), formal civilian education, military occupational 

specialty, time in service, combat experience before LRRP assignment, 

ethnicity, urban or rural, and in other demographic, sociological, and psychological aspects. These perspectives, though interesting and no doubt 

informative, are beyond the reach of this study.
83

When one addresses the personnel issue as it relates to LRRP and 

Ranger units in Vietnam, the dominant theme is recruitment and retention 

of soldiers. In the words of a former company commander, “Proper recruiting is half the battle in developing a highly proficient Ranger company.”23

The reason is obvious—the “DEROS clock” of every soldier who volunteered for service in one of these units was already below one year and 

counting at the time of his assignment. The doctrine of the period, based on 

prewar experience of LRRP units in Germany, postulated that it took eight 

months to train an “effective and reliable LRRP unit.”232 In the early days, 

many soldiers arrived in LRRP detachments having already served up to 

six months in other units. Although these soldiers had valuable line-unit 

combat experience, the LRRP unit had scant time to take advantage of it. 

LRRP-unit commanders addressed this problem in a number of ways.

Some early LRRP commanders were permitted to “raid” line-infantry 

units for personnel.233 Line-unit commanders generally opposed this process, for a good reason expressed here in simple terms by General Peers:

Looking at it from a commander’s point of view. . . as a 

division commander or as a brigade commander, the LRPs 

are expensive and don’t forget it. Why are they expensive? 

You want to remember that you are dealing with select 

people. Where do you get select people? You get them from 

the units and when you take 200 select people from the 

combat elements of an infantry division, you have taken 

200 potential fire team and squad leaders. Believe me, that 

hurts a division.234

There was some reliance on volunteerism from ordinary soldiers in 

line units who were looking for a change of duty, but this required cooperation not necessarily forthcoming from the losing chain of command.235 A 

brigade LRRP unit of 4th Infantry Division generated a recruiting handbill 

in the early summer of 1967 and circulated it around line units.236 In August 1967, a notice was sent out to 25th Infantry Division units requestin

qualified volunteers for attendance at MACV Recondo School, with the 

possibility of subsequent assignment to the division LRRP detachment.237

Many LRRP units dispatched short-time NCOs to division or brigade incountry training centers to actively recruit new personnel directly out of 

the replacement stream.238 In at least one case, the LRRP-unit commander 

made this recruitment pitch.239

The benefit of this method was that the soldiers thus acquired had a 
84

full 12 months remaining in their tour of duty. On the downside, these soldiers typically had no combat experience and little relevant training, which

affected unit operational readiness and combat performance. Here, for example, is a report from a representative of the II Field Force LRP Company 

to the August 1968 Long Range Patrol Conference at Nha Trang

The company has been short on personnel. Because it 

needs a full 28 teams to accomplish its mission, it maintains this number by cutting down on the number of 

people in each patrol from six to five, sometimes to four. 

A limiting factor is turn around time. This has been as low 

as 36 hours per five-day patrol. It is not desirable to cut 

the turn around time that much, especially with the influx 

of untrained personnel directly out of the replacement 

pipeline.

A LRP operation requires trained, experienced people, 

but these replacements have been assigned directly to 

BCT, AIT, airborne school, then directly assigned to the 

Long Range Patrol unit. They do not even know squad 

tactics much less LRP tactics. Previously, every incoming 

individual had a training period of three months; now due 

to operational pressure, they have to learn in the field.240

In August 1968, the commander of the LRP detachment of 173d Airborne Brigade reported that about six weeks were required to “mold 

soldier into a LRP member”:

All the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP members are volunteers who have been in a rifle company at least three

months, pass a selection board, receive a week of training 

and then are integrated into an operational team. After a 

period of time, he attends the MACV Recondo School 

and if he graduates, is again integrated in the unit. . .24

The list of desired characteristics in a LRP soldier varied from one 

unit and recruiter to the next, but generally included high school education 

or above, 20 or 21 years old, rural as opposed to urban background, clean

police record, physically strong and healthy, psychologically stable, and 

able to work as a member of a team.242 General Peers spoke on this issue at 

the August 1968 Long Range Patrol Conference at Nha Trang

[A]n individual must be qualified both physically and 
85

psychologically. I would insist upon this. Physically, because LRP duties are very, very arduous and you never 

know when you are going to have to cover 10 to 15 kilometers on the ground in very short order. You must hav

the kind of people that are capable of doing this. . . The 

psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP are 

extremely difficult. You need somebody out there who has 

nerves of steel, who can stay in there along the side of a 

trail, can sit there and watch that trail with a large enemy 

formation going by and not have the slightest inclination 

to stand up and fire a rifle or even move. . . To do this, he 

has to be qualified mentally and physically.243

Divisions made a concerted effort to make duty in a LRRP unit attractive. Here, for example, is a list of the “emoluments” authorized by Peers 

in 1967 for his 4th Infantry Division LRRPs

•	 distinctive items to wear in base camp, including a bush hat with 

identifying band and a pocket patch

•	 priority consideration for promotion as he becomes eligible

•	 special attention on awards and decorations

•	 additional out-of-country R&R (every soldier was authorized one 

7-day rest-and-relaxation leave during a 12-month tour of duty

•	 minimum of 36 hours stand down following a mission to rest and 

recover

Apparently they were sufficient to attract an adequate number of soldiers to the LRRP unit: “With these emoluments a ready source of highly 

qualified volunteers is available. We have had no problem getting volunteers.”244

The outgoing commanding general of the 101st Airborne Divisio

raised the issue of the shortage of trained personnel for his Ranger company in his post-command debriefing report. Major General John M. Wright, 

Jr., who commanded the division from May 1969 to May 1970, opine

that “every man assigned to the company should be a graduate of the Army 

Infantry School’s Ranger Course.” The effort in his division to identify the 

Ranger qualification or lack thereof for incoming replacements was complicated by the Army’s use of only a single MOS identifier in personnel 

rosters, G for Ranger-qualified personnel and P for parachutist-qualified 

personnel. Because parachute qualification was a pay issue, that identifier 
86

took precedence over other identifiers. He concluded his discussion by 

recommending that “all replacements for the ranger companies in Vietnam 

be ranger qualified personnel.”245

A fair number of soldiers assigned to LRRP units stayed in them beyond their one-year DEROS by voluntarily extending their tours of duty.246

The standard extension increment was 180 days. Adding to the genuine desire of some soldiers to serve longer in an assignment they liked were two

other primary reasons for extending: the granting of a bonus 30-day home 

leave before serving the extension and the granting of an early release from 

active duty upon completion of the extension if their remaining time in 

service was below a stated threshold. This would enable these soldiers to 

avoid any stateside garrison duty, considered by many as onerous, upon 

the completion of their combat duty.

Other factors, aside from end-of-tour departure of soldiers, caused 

chronic personnel shortages in LRRP units: casualties, illnesses, training 

(primarily MACV Recondo School), 7-day R & R leave, emergency leave, 

and 30-day extension leave. The 9th Infantry Division LRRP unit, when the 

division was operating in the Mekong Delta region, suffered particularly 

high illness rates due to disabling skin disease and bacterial infections from 

prolonged exposure to water.247

The literature on specific LRRP and Ranger units clarifies the impact 

of personnel shortages across the entire span of the war. Virtually every 

LRRP unit had to run its own two- to three-week training program, either continuously or periodically, to train inexperienced replacements for 

combat duty. Units would also respond to the problem by reducing team 

size from six down to five and even four members, and then by reducing 

the number of fielded teams.248 On occasion, units stood down for periods 

of days or even weeks in order to rebuild teams.249 Before one such stand 

down, in December 1968 the 101st Airborne Division LRP Company h

two experienced men per team.250

Maintaining the NCO strength of a LRRP unit was as difficult, if not 

more so, than maintaining troop strength. Early in the war, junior and 

middle-grade NCOs had from two to 10 years of active-duty experience

with possible attendance at Ranger school. But by late 1967 it was not

uncommon to find LRP teams deployed to the field under the leadership of 

a specialist 4th class or very young sergeant with only several months of 

in-country experience. As the war dragged on, junior NCOs began arriving 

in LRRP and then Ranger units straight out of training- center schools with 
87

virtually no troop-leading experience in the real Army. 251These “shake ‘n’

bake” sergeants from Fort Benning were combined with combat-seasoned 

soldiers promoted to NCO rank from within. The following quote reflects 

this practice in the 1st Cavalry Division in the summer of 196

Lately there has been a lack of trained team leaders as 

most of the present team leaders are rotating in August. 

To get the new NCOs and potential team leaders more 

experienced, team integrity is being broken in an effort 

to get these people as much experience as possible in the 

field before the others rotate.252

In either case, teams tended to be led by younger and less-experienced 

NCOs as the war went on.253

The Vietnam Experience

The Vietnam War provides an excellent opportunity to study the combat experience of LRP units in an operating environment that in some ways 

resembles the current and predicted future operating environments. Even 

though Vietnam lacked the desert terrain that has characterized US Army 

combat operations since 1990, it was heavily populated with towns, agricultural areas, and rural villages. LRRP units operating in relatively open

terrain along the coast, in the delta region, or near Saigon always were in 

danger of compromise by civilians, innocent or otherwise. Vietnam was 

laced with rivers and canals that the enemy used for movement of troops 

and supplies. Vietnam had vast regions of jungle and forested mountain 

areas, beyond which were international borders with concealed infiltration 

routes. In Vietnam, the insurgent enemy soldier frequently demanded support from or hid amid the peaceable population. The conventional enemy 

soldier was typically well trained, competently led, and heavily armed. 

LRRP soldiers fought them both.

Infantry division and separate brigade commanders adapted their 

LRRP-unit tactical operations to the mission, enemy, terrain, and troops 

available. LRRP teams were inserted and extracted largely, but not exclusively, by helicopter. Other common methods of reaching the mission 

area were stay-behind or drop-off from conventional infantry units, some 

use of walk-out insertion from remote firebases, and use of US Navy or 

indigenous craft in areas best served by waterborne insertion. The preponderance of divisional LRRP units were in some degree controlled by or 

dependent on a ground or air cavalry unit for administrative, logistic, and 

UCMJ support. Their combat missions were largely assigned by brigade, 
88

division, or higher G2 staffs, and in some cases by G3 staffs.

LRRP units, and later Rangers, performed most of the routine missions for a standard rifle platoon in Vietnam, along with their doctrinal 

missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, damage assessment, and target 

acquisition. As the LRP companies transitioned into Ranger units, the 

tactical pendulum tended to swing over from covert reconnaissance and 

surveillance (human intelligence or HUMINT activities) to the direct-action combat side. Late in the war, Ranger units were conducting platoonand even company-size operations not directly related to reconnaissance 

(screens, raids, ambushes, et cetera). LRRP and Ranger-unit veterans criticize high-level commanders for this so-called misuse of a special capability. This criticism may fairly be applied to commanding generals who paid 

little attention to their LRRPs and Rangers or permitted them to be used 

for routine “palace guard” ambush patrols or extended LP/OP for firesupport bases or field tactical headquarters. However, those commanding 

generals who employed their LRRP or Ranger units for direct-action missions did so deliberately, each for his own reasons, and not necessarily out 

of ignorance of LRRP doctrine.

Whether organized as a company or platoon, most LRRP units functioned in six-man light teams or 12-man heavy teams, the latter most often

employed when enemy contact was sought or anticipated. These teams 

were primarily but not exclusively led by young NCOs, with platoon leaders and platoon sergeants occasionally accompanying or leading teams. 

Some LRRP units maintained their own around-the-clock tactical operations centers with assigned communications personnel, while others relied 

on the units to which they were attached.

Vietnam-era LRRP soldiers trained both at their units and at the MACV 

Recondo School in Nha Trang. While the doctrine of both the 1965 and

1968 versions of FM 31-18 postulated that more than eight months we

required to train a LRRP solider to proficiency, virtually no Vietnam-era 

LRRP soldiers were afforded that luxury. Early in the war many of them 

came to LRRP detachments with combat experience in conventional infantry units, but late in the war the bulk of LRRP soldiers were coming 

directly out of the replacement stream. They were introduced into combat 

after just weeks of training at the unit, with possible later attendance at 

MACV Recondo School for the select few.

LRRP soldiers went into combat equipped primarily with M16 rifle 

variants, but also were prone to carrying M60s, M79s, shotguns, standard 
89

sniper rifles, AK47s, and numerous other weapons. Their communications 

equipment was standard-issue PRC-25 and PRC-77 radios, with the occasional URC-10 in some units. They had access to night-vision devices

of that period, primarily the AN-PVS2 Starlight Scope, but found it bulky, 

heavy, and impractical in many terrain situations. In their medical-kit bags 

they carried blood products or substitutes, morphine, and an assortment 

of performance-enhancing drugs that were issued, sometimes abused, and 

later turned in after each patrol.

One of the unstated objectives of this study was to determine whether 

LRRP units of the Vietnam War benefited from the experience gained by 

LRRP units in USAREUR and Italy in the preceding years. The most tangible evidence of this benefit should be the field manual itself, but very 

few LRRP soldiers in Vietnam ever saw FM 31-18.254 Two examples exis

of officers with LRRP experience in Europe in command of LRRP units 

in Vietnam.255 A former acting first sergeant from the 3d Infantry Division 

LRRP Detachment served as the first sergeant of the Ranger unit of 173d 

Airborne Brigade several years later.256 And there are at least two isolated 

cases of USAREUR LRRP company enlisted men serving in LRRP units 

in Vietnam, both having volunteered for the duty.257 There does not appear 

to have been any official attempt by the Army personnel system to identify 

European LRRP-unit veterans for assignment to like units in Vietnam.

At higher levels of command, senior officers can be found in Vietnam 

who had some working knowledge of LRRP activities in Europe before 

the Vietnam War. Such a case is Major General Melvin Zais, Jr., who was 

a deputy commanding general of 1st Infantry Division in May-June 1966

later commanded 101st Airborne Division from July 1968 to late M

1969, and then XXIV Corps from June 1969 to June 1970. From July 

1959 to May 1962, Colonel Melvin Zais was the G3 of Seventh Army i

USAREUR, where he played a crucial role in the formation of the first 

provisional LRRP units in both V and VII Corps.258

General Creighton Abrams arrived in Vietnam in mid-1967, well after LRRP provisional units were authorized and were being formed. He

was familiar with LRRP doctrine from his own command experience in 

3d Armored Division (1960-62) and V Corps (1963-64). He was serving as Westmoreland’s deputy when all the provisional LRRP units wer

designated LRP companies and detachments in December 1968, and was

the Commanding General of MACV when all the LRP companies and 

detachments were redesignated as Ranger companies in early 1969. As

Chief of Staff of the US Army after the war, and undoubtedly influenced 
90

by Ranger-unit performance in Vietnam, General Abrams authorized the 

creation of Ranger battalions.

Passing the Guidon

What legacy, if any, did the Vietnam LRRPs and Rangers pass to LRSU 

soldiers when their units were formed in the mid-1980s, over a decade after

the Vietnam War’s end? This is a difficult question to answer. Certainly 

there were many NCOs and officers with Vietnam LRRP and Ranger experience still on active duty when LRSU were being established. But 

without written histories and personnel rosters of these LRSU to peruse, 

it is difficult to determine how many of the new LRSU NCOs were Vietnam LRRP- or Ranger-unit veterans. Certainly the officers assigned to a 

LRSU were unlikely to have served in Vietnam combat, except as enlisted 

men.259

On the other hand is the example of Lieutenant Colonel David Ohle, 

a Vietnam Ranger company operations officer and company commander 

in early 1971 who, in 1986, was commanding a cavalry squadron at Fo

Campbell, and had assigned to his operational control the LRSD of the 

101st Airborne Division.260 Lieutenant Colonel Ohle’s Vietnam experienc

certainly qualified him to mentor the LRSD commander and also those 

above him who may not have had previous exposure to LRRP or LRS 

activities. Brigadier General (Retired) David Grange also commanded a 

platoon in the 101st Airborne Division Ranger Company in Vietnam, i

the summer of 197

26

 Throughout his post-Vietnam career, which included several special-operations assignments before he commanded the 

1st Infantry Division in 1997, he would have had many opportunities t

draw upon his Vietnam Ranger combat experience.

The most tangible evidence of Vietnam influence in the post-Vietnam 

LRSU world is in doctrine, which will be reviewed in some detail in the 

following chapter. It is clear that LRSU doctrine developers studied the 

Vietnam LRRP and Ranger experience when developing the missions and 

TTPs for LRSU.

Finally, the Vietnam LRRP and Ranger soldiers left a legacy of courage 

and sacrifice that stands as an example to all current and future LRSU 

leaders and soldiers. Three hundred and thirty-three of them gave their lives 

in that war, hundreds more were wounded, and several remain among the 

missing in action; three earned posthumous Medals of Honor.262 The lessons 

they learned were paid for at a high price, indeed. The youngest veterans 

of Vietnam LRRP/LRP/Ranger units and operations are now approaching 
9

retirement age. Many of them have organized themselves in such a way as 

to be accessible via the Internet. Those Army agencies or commands with 

particular interests in regard to TTP for specific enemy, mission, or terrain 

conditions similar to those experienced in Vietnam will find a group of 

veterans that has been waiting almost four decades to share its experiences. 

As Chapter 4 will show, at least two LRSU tapped into their Vietnam roots 

for inspiration in the 1990s
92

Notes

1. For consistency, I am using Shelby L. Stanton’s, Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam (New York: Orion Books, 1992) for this chronology. Thi

work provides a concise history of the activation, redesignation, and deactivation 

of all of the LRRP, LRP, and Ranger units in the Vietnam War. The 101st Airborn

history begins at 161; the discussion of the formation of this first provisional 

LRRP platoon is on page 163

2. Stanton, 71, 186, and 1

3. Michael Lee Lanning, Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam (New York: 

Ballantine, 1988), 55-6. The text quotes from the message released by the MACV

operations officer, Major General John C. F. Tillson III.

4. Stanton, in order: 94, 115, 31, and 

5. Ibid., 11

6. The activity to form and train this LRRP unit at Fort Campbell is described in excellent detail in Kenn Miller, Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers

(New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 1-8, 

7. Stanton, 210

8. Ibid., 230.

9. The number 230 comes from Stanton, page 230. Its origin is uncertain, 

since TOE 7-157E authorized a strength of eight officers, 41 NCOs, and 159 soldiers (a total of 208).

10. Lanning discusses this transition on pages 60-62

11. Stanton, 37, 47, 77, 100, 123, and 143 respecti

12. Ibid., 246, 168, 191, 252, and 261 respecti

13. Ibid., 243. A brief history of the Indiana National Guard LRP/Ranger

company is at 236-42.

14. Ibid., 255 and 70 respectively

15. Field Manual (FM) 31-18, Infantry Long Range Patrol Company (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 13 January 1

16. FM 31-18, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (Washingto

DC: Department of the Army, 23 August 1968)

17. FM 31-18, C [chang] 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army

March 1969)

18. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 2-1.c.(6) and (7) on pa

19. Ibid., paragraph 2-6.b. on page 8

20. FM 31-18, C1, paragraph 2-
93

21. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 3-5 on pag

22. Ibid., paragraph 3-7 on page 15

23. Ibid., paragraphs 1-3.a on page 3 and 4-2.a. on page 1

24. Ibid., paragraph 4-6.d., page 18

25. Ibid., paragraph 4-8 on page 19 and paragraph 2-3.a.(3)(f) on page 6

26. FM 31-18, C1, 7 March 1

27. FM 31-18, paragraph 5-9 on page 2

28. This mission list was extracted from a textual analysis of James W. 

Walker, Fortune Favors the Bold: A British LRRP with the 101st (New York: Ivy 

Books, 1998); see also Reynel Martinez, Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers:

Book One (New York: Ivy Books, 1997). Both men served in this unit. The civilaffairs project was the resettlement of a large civilian population in the Song Ve

Valley, Quang Nhai Province, conducted in mid-June 1967. The brigade LRRP

platoon was inserted behind two sweeping maneuver battalions with the mission 

to maintain surveillance of egress routes. In addition to the descriptions in Walker 

and Martinez, the fact of LRRP involvement in this operation is stated in “Debriefing Report of Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, former Commanding General, 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division,” dated 2 March 1968, page E-2, acces

as Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) document AD879473.

29. Stanton, 168-9, uses the date of resumption of true long-range missions

as 4 May 1968. Miller, 14-54, describes this period wel

30. All these missions except the last are described by Miller, from page 54 

to the end of his book. The prisoner-capture mission is from Larry Chambers, 

RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 37.

Chambers arrived in the 101st Airborne LRP Company in September 1968 a

served in the unit until mid-summer 1969. John Burford, in LRRP Team Leade

(New York: Ivy Books, 1994), indicates on page 6 that the unit’s primary mission

was reconnaissance, with secondary missions to conduct small ambushes, bombdamage assessment, and downed-pilot rescue. Burford served in the unit for one 

year from July 1968. Gary Linderer describes his 12-month tour in this unit fro

June 1968 to June 1969 in Black Berets and Painted Faces (New York: Doubleday Books, 1991). He suggests that while prisoners were indeed captured, t

were often simply targets of opportunity or survivors of ambushes. The mission 

to capture prisoners was rarely assigned (page 109). The other missions described

by Miller, Chambers, and Burford are also listed in Linderer.

31. See, for example, Chambers pages 35-37 and 58, and Miller pages 81-

and 165

32. The officer was 1st Lieutenant Owen D. Williams; “Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM),” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 9-10 August 1968 (APO San Francisco 96375: Headquarte
94

United States Army Vietnam), 37.

33. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 277-300. 

34. Ibid., 374-400. This unusual mission was executed by a combined element of three six-man teams, with a fourth team inside the firebase acting as 

radio relay. One hundred and twelve enemy bodies were found in and around the 

perimeter the next morning. This action occurred at Fire Base Jack on the night of 

28-29 March 1969

35. Gary Linderer, Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers: Book Three (New 

York: Ivy Books, 1997), 154. The “sniffer” was an array of equipment mounte

into the cargo bay of a Huey helicopter and flown over the target zone. A photograph and description of this device can be found in Lieutenant General John H. 

Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1989), 80-8

36. Linderer, Six Silent Men, 237-40.

37. Frank Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger (New York: Ballantine 

Books, 2001), 68, 111, 140. Johnson was assigned to L Company from Septe

1969 to July 1970. Larry Chambers also describes the heavy-team mission i

Death in the A Shau Valley: L Company LRRPs in Vietnam, 1969-70 (New York: 

Ivy Books, 1998) on pages 142-1

38. “Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RZ) (U),” 15 Au

1970, paragraph 1.b.(2) on page 

39. Linderer, Six Silent Men, 286-303. The first attempt ended in the deaths 

of two Rangers, the second attempt in the serious wounding of a Ranger, and the 

third attempt in the deaths of 22 soldiers from a cavalry squadron quick reaction 

force (QRF), loss of two helicopters and several crewmen, and one KIA and two 

MIA Rangers from a supporting radio-relay team. The story of their failed mission is in Linderer, Six Silent Men, 304-15

40. Linderer, Six Silent Men, 329-32.

41. Ibid., 293

42. This description is from page 4 of “LRRP Briefing—Commander’s 

Conference, 24 Sept. 67,” a 16-page, double-spaced, typewritten document received from the US Army Military History Institute. It appears to be the script

used by General Peers for his conference presentation. It contains references to 

charts that were not preserved. The information in this document is supported by 

another, later document. See US Department of the Army, 4th Infantry Division, 

APO 96262, “Combat Operations After Action Report—Operation FRANCIS 

MARION,” dated 25 November 1969, page 9. William R. Peers, a native of Iowa,

was commissioned at UCLA in 1937. In World War II he was the operations and

training officer, and from December 1943 to July 1945 the commander of OSS 

Detachment 101 in Burma. During the Korean War he was seconded to the CIA t
95

run covert operations in China. In July 1965, Major General Peers was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) for Special Operations at the Pentagon. He

later commanded the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam from January 1967 to January 1968, and II Field Force from March 1968 to March 1969. He is most no

for chairing the Peers Inquiry, the formal US Army investigation into the My Lai 

massacre and its aftermath, the findings of which were released in March 1970.

43. The Hawkeye teams were “hunter-killer” teams, sent out to find and 

engage small-enemy elements. Depending on the terrain and mission, weapons a 

Hawkeye team might carry included the M16, M79, shotgun, or M14 with snipe

scope. The choice of Hawkeye team weapons was up to the team leader. “LRRP 

Briefing—Commander’s Conference, 24 September 67,” 6.

44. See FM 31-18, 1962, paragraph 4.d on page 3, and FM 31-18, 

paragraph 4.g on page 3.

45. Lanning, 60.

46. Frank Camper, L.R.R.P.: The Professional (New York: Dell, 1988), 1

15, 17-34, 139, 151, 182, 199, 215, 

47. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Major General Charles P. Stone, 

RCS-CSFOR-74 (U),” dated 15 November 1968, 2

48. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Donn R. Pepke, CG, 4th Infantry 

Division, Period 30 Nov 68 to 14 Nov 69 (U),” dated 19 December 1969, paragraph 4 of Inclosure 9, accessed as DTIC AD5067

49. Pepke, paragraph 5 of Inclosure 9.

50. Stanton, 118-2

51. Ibid., 123-30; see also the article by Specialist Tom Gable, “LRRP,” i

Infantry 59 (January-February 1969): 37-8. Another brief description of this unit’s

operations in 1968 is in “Synopsis of Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division,”

USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 31-2

52. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTG Julian J. Ewell, CG, 9th Infantry Division, Period 25 February 1968 to 5 April 1969 (U),” dated 24 Novembe

1969, page 6; accessed as DTIC AD505846

53. Stanton, 133

54. Ibid., 136

55. See the article by Captain Gerald W. Johnson, “Aquabush,” in Infantry

62, (January-February 1972): 50-53

56. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands: 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 

1966-67, 84-5.

57. Ibid., 91, 10

58. Ibid., 86-7.
96

59. Ibid., 106

60. Stanton, 49; Kregg P. J. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command: The Cav’s 

LRP/Rangers in Vietnam, 1968-1969 (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000), 68.

61. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 84, 89-90

62. Ibid., 90.

63. Ibid., 87.

64. Ibid. Jorgenson describes these missions and ensuing patrols in some 

detail from page 128 to the end of the book. The helicopter crash-recovery is

discussed in Chapter 29, and also in Stanton on pages 61-2. The POW-camp raid

training is from Jorgenson, Chapter 34. One of the trail complexes was called the 

Jolley Road. Ranger teams were used to monitor this trail system in early 1970.

See “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Elvy B. Roberts, CG, 1st Cavalry Division, Period 23 April 1969 through 5 May 1970 (U),” page 6; accessed as DTI

AD509767.

65. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 262-3. This was FSB Buttons, 

located next to the town Song Be, and the date was 4 November 1969

66. The intent of this program, called Operation DONG TIEN, was to train 

soldiers from the ARVN Airborne Recon Company in US Army LRRP/Ranger 

tactics. See “Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Co. H (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U),” dated 22 July 1970; accesse

as DTIC AD510331. This document contains a routine report from the Range

company commander to the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (AM),

dated 15 May 1970

67. The characterization of missions from December 1969 to the end of the

war is from Stanton, 64-9.

68. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet, RCS CSFOR-74,” dated 25 June 1972, 7; accessed as DTIC AD52351

69. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Harris W. Hollis, CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period 15 September 1969 to 2 April 1970 (U),” 33 and 39; access

as DTIC AD509875. General Hollis came to the 25th Infantry Division after 

about five months as commander of the 9th Infantry Division. “Snatch” missions 

were EPW-capture missions, and “sniff” operations involved the use of Rangers 

to respond to detections made by helicopter-mounted “sniffer” equipment.

70. Here is what General Bautz wrote in his end-of-tour report: “Ranger 

companies should be used primarily for intelligence. Teams should be allocated 

to Brigades on a mission basis. Ranger teams should be specifically trained for 

long-range reconnaissance patrols and not assigned normal combat patrol missions.” “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Edward Bautz, Jr., Assistant Chief 

of Staff for Operations, MACV & CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period March 

1969 to December 1970 (U),” dated 24 February 1971, page 5, accessed as D
97

AD51436

71. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG H. S. Cunningham, CG, 173d 

Airborne Brigade, Period 9 August 1969 to 10 August 1970 (U),” dated 10 November 1970, page 1, accessed as DTIC AD

72. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—Brigadier General E. R. Ochs,” 9 

March 1971, 7-8, accessed as DTIC AD5145

73. Stanton, 210.

74. Ibid., 230.

75. 3 December for E Company (Stanton, 211) and 2 December for F Company (Stanton, 23

76. Ibid., 210

77. These mission descriptions are from Stanton, 211-2

78. “Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force 

Vietnam for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1),”

August 1969, 9, accessed as DTIC AD505923

79. General Peers addressed this use of I Field Force LRPs in a presentation 

to the USARV Long Range Patrol Conference, 9-10 August 1968, at the MAC

Recondo School in Nha Trang. See “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long 

Range Patrol Conference Summary, 7-13, 13

80. For a detailed description of life in the I Field Force Ranger unit during 

this 12-month period, see John L. Rotundo and Don Ericson, Charlie Ranger

(New York: Ivy Books, 1989)

81. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, “Senior Officer Debriefing 

Report (RCS-CSFOR-74),” dated 23 February 1970, page 5, accessed as DTIC

AD508664.

82. Stanton describes the entire life cycle of this unit on pages 229-36. Teams 

from F Company on occasion worked for 25th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade 

101st Airborne Division, or 199th Light Infantry Briga

83. See Dennis Foley, Special Men: A LRP’s Recollections (New York: Ivy 

books, 1994), Gary Douglas Ford, 4/4: A LRP’s Narrative (New York: Ivy Books,

1993), and Don C. Hall and Annette R. Hall, I Served (Bellevue, WA: A.D. Hall

Publishing, 1994). All three of these memoirs are consistent in their description of

unit mission—it was to kill as many enemy as possible, even to the point of bringing their bodies back to the company area as “proof of kill,” and burying them in 

a cemetery maintained within the company compound.

84. Foley, 274 and 298.

85. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report of LTG Fred C. Weyand,” dated 4 

October 1968, page 8
98

86. Stanton describes the life cycle of this company on pages 236-242.

87. Ibid., 242-244.

88. Foley, 274. The nature of the helicopter support to this unit is described 

later in the study. The QRF was the aero-scout platoon of A/3-17 Cavalry until

June 1968, and after that rotating platoons from D Troop, 3-17 Cavalry. These platoons were physically barracked with the LRP company, relocating to Phuc Vinh

Cu Chi, Di An, and other locales as required to act as the ground reaction force 

for LRP teams when in contact. Author e-mail interviews with Bill Nevius, 30 

November and  December 2004. An excellent memoir of a helicopter pilot in this

unit that flew support missions for the LRP company is Charles E. Oualline, Flying Alligators and Silver Spurs (Collierville, TN: Instantpublisher.com, 2004). 

89. Major Paul F. Keefe, “Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 17-20, 17. Major Keef

was the I Field Force G2 at the time.

90. Ford, 147, 200; Hall, 468, 482; Rotundo and Ericson, 106, 20

91. “These FACs were placed under control of the LRP company commander

for further allocation as he saw fit,” Keefe, USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 18

92. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 82-4.

93. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 58-61

94. Unit History, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment, 1st Cavalry Division. www.75thrra.com/history/h75-his.php; last accessed on1 Decembe

2004.

95. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 10-11. The authorization of

men included three officers (commander and two platoon leaders), 17 enlisted 

men in the company headquarters, and two platoons of 49 enlisted men each (platoon sergeant plus eight six-man patrols per platoon). See Stanton, 324.

96. Miller, Six Silent Men, 2.

97. Ibid., 166

98. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 98.

99. Ibid., 127. It is unstated here, but the likelihood is great that the LRP

soldiers also messed with the cavalry unit. See also Miller, 18

100. Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger, 8

101. “Synopsis of Presentation of the Americal Division,” USARV Lon

Range Patrol Conference Summary, 33.

102. Stanton, 71-2; survey, David L. Casey, 9 December 200

103. Stanton, 97, 10
99

104. Ibid., 142. This unit continued in its “attachment” relationship with 3

Squadron 4th Cavalry even after redesignation as F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry in December 1968; author’s personal experience and surveys from Dennie

Callahan, 23 December 2004, and Ronald Elliff, 25 February 2005.

105. Stanton, 18

106. Ibid., 1

107. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG H. S. Cunningham, CG, 173d 

Airborne Brigade, Period 9 August 1969 to 10 August 1970 (U),” dated 10 November 1970, 11. Cunningham’s successor, Brigadier General Elmer R.

continued to maintain the company at the increased strength level; “Senior Officer 

Debriefing Report—Brigadier General E. R. Ochs,” 9 March 1971, 9.

108. Stanton, 247

109. Ibid., 3

110. Ibid., 3

111. An example of a three-man team in the 4th Infantry Division Recon

Detachment in October 1967 is given in Stanton, 98. In the summer of 1967

teams in the 196th Light Infantry Brigade were reduced to four men due to personnel shortages; see Stanton, 33. The LRRP platoon of 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry

Division operated with four- and five-man teams in the summer of 1967; see Stanton, 96 and 97. The 4th Infantry Division’s K Company (Ranger) also operated 

on occasion with a 4-man patrol; see Stanton, 108. The 101st Airborne Divisio

L Company (Ranger) used a 4-man patrol in the fall of 1969 due to personnel

shortages; see Chambers, Death in the A Shau Valley, 113. 101st Airborne Rangers used four- and five-man teams on occasion; see Linderer, Six Silent Men, 

154, and 238 (wiretap mission); and Chambers, Death in A Shau Valley, 11

Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (II Field Force) was using four-man teams due

to personnel shortages in the spring of 1968, just months after the unit was created; see Hall, 455. C Company (Ranger), I Field Force used a four-man team for

a mission in June 1970; see Rotundo and Ericson, 18

112. “Synopsis of Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division,” USARV Lon

Range Patrol Conference Summary, 31

113. Major General Harris W. Hollis, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 

39. Since Hollis had commanded the 9th Infantry Division for five months before 

assuming command of 25th Infantry Division in September 1969, it is possible he

brought the eight-man team concept with him from that previous assignment.

114. Stanton, on page 46, indicates that the 1st Cavalry Long Range Patr

Detachment had 18 Montagnard tribesmen and 18 South Vietnamese scouts i

April 1967. Jorgenson describes the recruitment process in The Ghosts of the

Highlands, page 71, and their role in the unit on pages 85-6. David C. Cummings

describes the use of Kit Carson Scouts in N Company (Ranger) during the period 

August 1970 to March 1971 in his survey, received 27 January 20
10

115. The first use of Rhade (Montagnard) tribesmen by this organization is 

explained on the unit’s Internet website, www.75thrra.com/history/h75-his.php; 

last accessed on 21 June 2005. The absconding of the Chieu Hoi is from Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 8-9

116. See Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 70, and Miller, 1

117. See Chambers, Death in the A Shau Valley, 

118. Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger, 134

119. Stanton, 32, 39, 95, 122, 126, and 143. See also Linderer, Pha

Warriors, 16, 72-84, 218-26, and 269-84. A brief description of the 4th Infantr

Division’s experience in training and integrating indigenous forces can be found 

in “Synopsis of Presentation of the 4th Infantry Division,” USARV Long Range 

Patrol Conference Summary, 29-30. This same document briefly describes the use 

of indigenous personnel by the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP unit on page 40

120. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

Summary, 9.

121. Stanton, 214, 221, 225; Rotundo and Ericson, 156; “Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary

122. Rotundo and Ericson, 237

123. Hall, 214, 362; Ford, 184, 191; Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 31

124. At the August 1968 USARV Long Range Patrol conference in Nh

Trang, the MACV J2 warned the attendees of the possible penetration of the Kit 

Carson Scout program by the enemy. See “Synopsis of the Presentation of the 

Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, MACV,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference 

Summary, 47.

125. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 33, 73. Similar training is

described for the 1st Brigade LRRP Detachment in Martinez, 11-15 and 2

126. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 66, 72

127. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 23, 71-2; and Acceptable Loss

23-4.

128. Jorgenson, Acceptable Loss, 23-4

129. Bill Shanahan and John P. Brackin, Stealth Patrol: The Making of a

Vietnam Ranger (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2003), 43-7.

130. Major Richard D. James, “Delta Team is in Contact,” Infantry 60 (November-December 1970): 12

131. Cummings surve

132. Rotundo and Ericson, 47-50 and 7
1

133. An example of this practice in the 101st Airborne Division is describ

in Miller, 177-8 and 272; Walker, 172-3; and Linderman, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 25

134. An example of this occurred in 101st Airborne Division in early 19

See Chambers, Death in the A Shau Valley, 16

135. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 241; and Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPS in the 101st Airborne, 

136. This summary comes from the excellent history of this school in Tom

Halliwell, A History of the MACV Recondo School (1966-1971), 2 volumes 

(Houston, TX: RADIX Press, 2002). This work also contains a complete listing 

of the school’s instructor staff and graduates.

137. Peers, “LRRP Briefing—Commander’s Conference, 24 September 67,” 

8.

138. Halliwell, volume 1, 7

139. After graduating from this course on 23 September 1967 (Recond

Number 681), I returned to my assigned unit, A/2-22 Infantry (Mechanized), 3d

Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Dau Tieng in III Corps Tactical Zone, and was 

immediately put in charge of a rifle squad. About two weeks later, I was assigned 

to the 25th Infantry Division LRRP Detachment at Cu Chi, and served there as a 

LRRP team leader until my 12-month tour ended in March 196

140. Among the additional 659 foreign graduates were 296 Koreans, 19

Thais, 130 Vietnamese, 22 Filipinos, and 18 Australians; Halliwell, volume 

40.

141. An example of this is in Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101s

Airborne, pages 158-9. Chambers used the pack list he received at Recondo

School when he returned to his unit.

142. See, for example, Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 71-2, and Acceptable Loss, 2

143. This occurred with 101st Airborne Division, for example, when its L

company relocated from Bien Hoa to Phu Bai (Camp Eagle) in early 1968. See

Miller, 20. Other references to stolen vehicles are in Jorgenson, LRRP Company 

Command, on pages 20-21 (1st Cavalry Division); and Ford, 70 (II Field Force

144. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 73-4; Miller, 67

145. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 73-4

146. Martinez, 80; Miller, 67; Burford, 8; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted

Faces, 410 for 101st Airborne Division; Ford, 215 for II Field Force. An official 

confirmation of the presence of silenced Sten guns in the 101st Airborne Division 

LRP unit is in “Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM),

USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 38.
10

147. Miller, 16

148. Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 16 and 59, and Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division; Camper, 117, 122, and 214 for 4th Infantry Division; Cu

survey for 173d Airborne Brigade

149. Walker, 193 and 223 for 101st Airborne Division; Camper, 196 for

Infantry Division; Ford, 130 in II Field Force; Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 16

80 for 173d Airborne Brigade

150. Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 16; and Johnny B. Starnes survey, receive

5 January 2005.

151. Walker, 223, and Burford, 8 for 101st Airborne Division; Camper,

for 4th Infantry Division; Ford, 98, for II Field Force; Cummings survey and Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 167-80 for 173d Airborne Brigad

152. Shanahan and Brackin, 136 and 252, Cummings survey, and Linderer

Phantom Warriors, 167-80 for 173d Airborne Brigade; Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division; Camper, 117, for 4th Infantry Division; Ford, 130, and Hall

for II Force; Burford, 8, and Linderer, Six Silent Men, 292 for 101st Airborn

Division; Starnes survey for Americal Division.

153. Casey survey for 1st Infantry Division, Starnes survey for America

Division.

154. Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 167-80. This weapon fires the same cartridge as the AK47 and the SKS (7.62 x 39mm), but differs greatly in design and

construction from both of those weapons.

155. Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne Division, 80, and

Death in the A Shau Valley, 17. Starnes survey for E Company (LRP), II Field

Force; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade; Specialist 4th Class (SP4)

Gregory Kelly, F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division carried 

a Swedish K (my personal observation). Kelly was KIA on a combat patrol on 

6 April 1968. This weapon’s official nomenclature is “Carl Gustav Model 45” 

submachine gun. It fired the 9mm parabellum cartridge out of a 30-round stick 

magazine, and was popular in the special forces at the time.

156. Rotundo and Ericson, 99 in I Field Force; Ford, 181, describing 25

Infantry Division LRP Company; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade

157. Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger, 140, for 101st Airborne Division; Rotundo and Ericson, 225, for I Field Force; Jorgenson, Acceptable Lo

55, and MIA Rescue, 7 for 1st Cavalry Division; Camper, 232, for 4th Infantry

Division; Stanton, 127-8, for 9th Infantry Division; Stanton, 217, for I Fiel

Force; Ford, 130, and Hall, 380 and 481 (sawed-off!), for II Field Force; Linderer

Phantom Warriors, 261-8, for 199th Light Infantry Brigade; Starnes survey fo

Americal Division; Cummings survey for 173d Airborne Brigade

158. Stanton, 16
10

159. Ford, 215, in II Field Forc

160. Examples: a .32-caliber pistol, Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger,

202 in 101st Airborne Division; snub-nose .38-cal. revolver in II Field Force

Hall, 229; .38-cal. revolver in 1st Infantry Division, Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 85-99; and Americal Division, Starnes survey; Browning Hi-Power (9mm

semi-automatic pistol) in II Field Force, Ford, 118, who also indicates there wer

approximately 50 privately owned handguns in this unit; Houser also reports “acquired personal pistols” in II Field Force, Houser survey; Browning Hi-Power in 

101st Airborne Division, Linderer, Six Silent Men, 177; .357 magnum revolver 

173d Airborne Brigade, Linderer, Phantom Warriors

161. Casey surve

162. Hall, 225; Houser survey confirms carry of the LAW in II Field Force.

163. Ford, 16

164. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 163 and 429; and Six Silen

Men, 275 and 296.

165. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 93. See also Linderer, Phantom

Warriors, 202-17

166. Feller mentions occasional carry of the LAW in Company O (Ranger),

82d Airborne Division, without reference to its intended use; Feller survey.

167. Equipment lists can be found in Halliwell, volume1 on pages 107-

Lanning, 195; Chambers, Death in the A Shau Valley, 90, and RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 28; Burford, 29; Miller, 77; Rotundo and Ericson, 54,

67-80; Shanahan and Brackin, 56; Camper, 117; and Ford, 2-

168. See Rotundo and Ericson, 113 for I Field Force; Hall, 358, and Ford, 2

for II Field Force; Stanton, 79 for 1st Infantry Division; Jorgenson, The Ghosts

of the Highlands, 120, and Linderer, Phantom Warriors, 85-99 and 202-17 fo

1st Cavalry Division; Camper, 33-4 and 85-6 for 4th Infantry Division; Linderer,

Phantom Warriors, 285-93 for 9th Infantry Division; Burford, 155, Chambers,

Death in the A Shau Valley, 20, Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 90 and 

302, and Six Silent Men, 112, and Walker, 194-202 for 101st Airborne Divis

and Stanton, 188 for 173d Airborne Brigad

169. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

Summary, 9-10

170. Foley, 274

171. Hall, 226 and 232. Hall, in an e-mail exchange with the author o

December 2004, indicates that at any one time there could be two C & C, five or 

six lift, and four or five gunship helicopters at the company helicopter pad. These 

helicopter assets came from A Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment from

December 1967 to June 1968. This unit maintained a gunship fire team (two helicopters) on standby status at F-51st Infantry headquarters (pages 191-2). Fr
10

June 1968 to April 1970, lift support came from the 117th Assault Helicop

Company, and gunship support from the 334th Assault Helicopter Company. Author e-mail interview with Bill Nevius, 30 November 2004.

172. Author e-mail interview with Bob Harrison, 30 November 2004

173. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 76.

174. This action, which resulted in the awarding of two Distinguished Service Crosses (Billy Walkabout and Albert Contreros) and two Silver Stars (Riley

Cox and Gary Linderer), is described in Miller, 227-52; Linderer, Black Berets 

and Painted Faces, 184-209; Burford, 120-44; and Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 40-52. The four KIA were Albert D. Contreros, Jr

(team leader), Terry W. Clifton, Arthur J. Heringhausen, and Michael D. Reiff. 

The Walkabout citation is General Orders Number 3945, Headquarters, United 

States Army Vietnam, dated 23 October 1969; and the Contreros citation is General Orders Number 476, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 20

February 1970. (Sergeant Contreros’ name is incorrectly spelled “Contreras” on

the citation order.)

175. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

Summary, 1

176. See Ford, 147, 200-07, and Hall, 356, 431, 468, and 482 for mention 

the “Bird Dog” in II Field Force. According to Hall, no one from his LRP unit 

rode in the aircraft; e-mail from Hall to author, 3 December 2004. See also “Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam,” in USARV Long Range Patrol 

Conference Summary, 21-23, 21. This source indicates that the LRP company ha

access to an O-1 for 6 hours each day. In I Field Force, a platoon leader from the

LRP company frequently rode in the back seat; see Rotundo and Ericson, 71-80,

106, and 203

177. Martinez, 40, 45, 59, 112, and 

178. “Synopsis of Presentation of the 101st Airborne Division (AM)

USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 38.

179. Shanahan and Brackin, 184, describe an aircraft appearing overhea

every 3-4 hours for radio relay in the 173d Airborne Brigade. Chambers, Death

in the A Shau Valley, 131-4, mentions liaison with the USAF Airborne Comman

and Control Center for a C-130 flying out of Thailand if required for radio relay 

(fall 1969). Linderer, Six Silent Men, 229, mentions a fixed-wing aircraft for radio-relay use during the night in May 1970, and on page 300, the use of a USA

“sniffer”-equipped C-130 used to support a patrol in contact in late April 19

180. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 5-4.g.(2) on page

181. Ford, 6-7; Hall, 3

182. Foley, 298

183. Ford, 142, 191-8; Hall, 458
10

184. Hall, 266-7

185. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, in several places describes the

activities of Captain James D. James, the first commander of this organization. 

James was a veteran of the SETAF LRRP Detachment in Italy.

186. Ibid., 91, 1

187. The description that follows is from Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, chapter 2

188. Ibid., 78-82. The “bellyman” rode in the cargo compartment of the helicopter and wore an aircraft-crewman helmet so he could communicate with the

aircraft commander and crew. His duties were to interface between the LRP team 

and helicopter crew, assist LRP team members in getting off or on the helicopter, 

deploy and secure rope ladders or McGuire rigs, secure weapons and equipment 

of wounded soldiers, assist in treating wounded during the flight back to base, 

help defend the helicopter and crew if the aircraft crashed or was shot down, and 

so on. This duty was common to most LRP detachments and was frequently performed by an operations sergeant, platoon sergeant, NCO on medical profile, or 

other unit mid-level leader.

189. Ibid., 89-90

190. Ibid., 152, 204-10; Stanton,

191. Jorgenson, Acceptable Loss, 4

192. Martinez, 12

193. Ibid., 153-4, 204-

194. Ibid., 243-50

195. Miller, 1

196. Ibid., 154; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 103

197. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 48

198. The fragging incident, which involved the placement of an M14 “toepopper” mine at the entrance to the company commander’s tent, is described i

Miller, 170-4; Burford, 9; and Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 80-4.

The company commander stepped on the mine and suffered serious injury to one 

foot. His replacement was Captain Kenneth R. Ekland.

199. Burford, 83; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 48, 103-4, 296

308; Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 28, 37.

200. Miller, 198-99; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 287

201. See, for example, Burford on 145-6; Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs i

the 101st Airborne, 42.

202. See, for example, Chambers, Death in the A Shau Valley, 18, 60-67, 68,
10

113, 116, 119, 120, 

203. Rotundo and Ericson, 71-80, 106, 20

204. Ibid., 203.

205. Ibid., 109-23

206. Ibid., 146

207. This was First Lieutenant John H. Lattin, Jr. The patrol action is described by Hall at 280 and Ford at 81. Ford attributes his death to friendly fire 

from the QRF.

208. Ford cites several heavy patrols accompanied or led by his platoon 

leader, First Lieutenant Albert Snyder, and later First Lieutenant Donald Peter. 

See 4/4: A LRP’s Narrative on pages 98, 103, 125, 182, and 225. Hall, on t

other hand, complains that while it was company policy that an officer lead heavy 

patrols, after Lattin’s death this policy was not followed. See I Served, 254, 313,

339, 353, 423, 458, and 495. Foley, who was the operations officer of this unit for 

a time in 1968, acknowledges this conflict between young combat-experienced 

NCO team leaders and equally young but relatively inexperienced lieutenants. He 

concludes that making the inexperienced lieutenants patrol leaders did not solve 

anything; see Special Men: A LRP’s Recollections, 294-5.

209. Camper, 188

210. Shanahan and Brackin, 250

211. Cummings surve

212. Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 145-

213. Ibid., 244-49; Acceptable Loss, 37

214. Miller, 16

215. Burford, 1

216. Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 25, 42, 44, and

194; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 98

217. Johnson, Diary of an Airborne Ranger, 19

218. Examples of these duties can be found in Linderer, Six Silent Men, on

pages 244, 253, and 271

219. Ibid., 286-94. First Lieutenant Paul Sawtelle, a 1969 West Point graduate, was a relatively inexperienced new arrival to the compan

220. Ibid., 297-315. Two men in the radio-relay team were killed and a third

was captured, to be released at the war’s end two years later.

221. Ibid., 320-22

222. Ibid., 323-8. The platoon leader was David Grange III, and he was later 

awarded the Silver Star for his actions during this fight.
10

223. Ibid., 329-32.

224. Telephone conversation between author and unit veteran Gary Linderer, 

2 December 2004.

225. Stanton, 156-8. Sergeant First Class Alvin W. Floyd, Sergeant Michael

F. Thomas, and Specialist 4th Class Donald W. Tinney were killed in this combat.

226. References to platoon sergeants participating in insertions or extractions 

can be found in Ford, 1; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 302; Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 42

227. Author interview of Don C. Hall, e-mail on 6 December 2004.

228. See, for example, Ford, 98; Hall, 254; Rotundo and Ericson, 196; Martinez, 240, 262-5; Miller, 165, 194; Chambers, RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101

Airborne, 41, 42; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 98

229. The two platoon sergeants who frequently led patrols were Platoon 

Sergeant (PSG) (later Command Sergeant Major [CSM]) Richard Burnell and 

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Brubaker. See Miller, 165 and 194 for comment

on Brubaker. Burnell is mentioned in Miller, 5, and Linderer, Black Berets and 

Painted Faces, on pages 184-204 and 302, and thoroughly discussed in Linderer,

Six Silent Men, 8-11. The platoon sergeant who had never been on a patrol i

mentioned in Johnson, 153. I personally met SFC Richard Burnell when he was

my senior tactical NCO at ROTC Ranger School, Fort Benning, in the summer of 

1973. He walked with a pronounced limp and in his personal demeanor matched

all the descriptions of these accounts.

230. I served in this unit (25th Infantry LRRP Detachment) from October 

1967 to March 1968, and led one such patrol as a 19-year-old E-5 in Februa

1968. I do not recall a platoon sergeant or platoon leader leading or accompanying

any patrol, even a routine base-camp perimeter- or extended- ambush patrol, during the six months I was assigned to this unit. See also Ronald L. Elliff survey.

231. James, “Delta Team is in Contact,” 1

232. FM 31-18, paragraph 2-6

233. Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the Highlands, 15-6, describes this process in

the 1st Cavalry Division. Michael Lanning has a good discussion of this issue on

pages 78-9.

234. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference, 1

235. Frank Camper volunteered for LRRP duty in the 4th Infantry Division 

on 13 December 1966 but was not allowed to leave his parent unit until Februar

1967. See L.R.R.P: The Professional, 84 and 

236. See Camper, 153-4 for the text of this handbill

237. I responded to this appeal from my mechanized infantry unit in August 
10

1967. Others recruited by this method include Hall, 163; Ford, 60; and Shanahan

36.

238. See, for example, Rotundo and Ericson, 33; Jorgenson, Acceptable Loss, 

21; Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 27; Burford, 6; Johnson, Diary of

an Airborne Ranger, 6; and Lanning, 80. Larry Chambers served as one of these 

recruiters; see RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne Division, 204. David 

Cummings was recruited by one of these NCOs at the 173d Airborne Brigade

training center; he and two other soldiers out of about 100 present volunteered

for Ranger (LRRP) duty; see Cummings survey. Ronald Elliff had two of these 

recruits on his LRP team in the 25th Infantry Division in early 1968; see Elliff

survey.

239. This was in the 1st Cavalry Division. See Jorgenson, The Ghosts of the

Highlands, 67.

240. “Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam,” USARV Long 

Range Patrol Conference Summary, 23.

241. “Synopsis of Presentation of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate),

USARV Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 39.

242. Lanning has a good discussion of these issues on pages 80-83.

243. “Presentation of LTG Peers,” USARV Long Range Patrol Conference 

Summary, 7.

244. Peers, “LRRP Briefing—Commander’s Conference, 24 Sept 67,” 13.

245. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG John M. Wright, Jr., CG, 101st 

Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period 25 May 1969 to 25 May 1970 (U),” 23-4

accessed as DTIC AD51012

246. Linderer indicates that in August 1969 about a third of the Ranger company in 101st Airborne Division was on extensions; see Black Berets and Paint

Faces, 99.

247. Stanton, 116-

248. See, for example, Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 59. His unit 

was authorized 16 six-man patrols but rarely had more than 12 and sometime

went down to five-man patrols. Walker, 179, discusses the impact of personnel 

rotations on team integrity in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Burfor

120, writes that his unit (F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry) in 101st Airbor

Division could never field more than eight teams at a time. Linderer indicates 

that F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry in 101st Airborne Division underwent internal reorganization of teams in October and November 1968; see Black Bere

and Painted Faces, 159 and 183. Miller, on page 196, writes that during Octob

1968 strong teams had a steady base of three to four men, but the remainder were

floated between teams and even platoons. Chambers indicates that in the fall of 

1969, L Company (Ranger), 101st Airborne Division, had four-man teams due 
10

personnel shortages; see Death in the A Shau Valley, 11

249. Larry Chambers, a member of F Company (LRP), 58th Infantry, 101s

Airborne Division describes this condition in his company in late 1968 or very

early 1969; see RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, 61-2. Linderer paint

an even grimmer picture for late December 1968 and January 1969: not enoug

experienced men to deploy more than three to four operational patrols; see Black 

Berets and Painted Faces, 241

250. Linderer, Black Berets and Painted Faces, 250.

251. This occurred in the 25th Infantry Division LRP Company in early

1968; see Elliff survey. In the 1st Cavalry Division, see Jorgenson, LRRP Company Command, 2

252. “Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM),” USARV

Long Range Patrol Conference Summary, 26-8, 27.

253. Lanning also provides an excellent discussion of the NCO manning 

problem on pages 83-4.

254. No Vietnam-era respondent to a survey claimed exposure to FM 31-18

and in fact “company SOP,” “oral tradition,” and “OJT” were frequently cited as 

the sources of doctrine and TTP in units. See surveys by Callahan, Casey, Cummings, Elliff, Feller, Houser, Nash, and Starnes.

255. These are James D. James, from SETAF to 1st Cavalry Division, and

Captain David B. Tucker, from VII Corps operations officer in late 1963 to commander of the 1st Cavalry Division LRRP Company in the summer of 196

256. This is Sergeant First Class Gerald M. Tardif, who was the acting first 

sergeant of the 3d Infantry Division LRRP Detachment when it was formed in 

November 1961. During one of his multiple tours in Vietnam, 1st Sergeant Tard

was 1SG of N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry. “Unit History, Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment,” 2, 8 (fn 18

257. Roy Boatman served in the V Corps LRRP Company in 1966 and later in

the 74th LRP Detachment and N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry (173d Airborne

Brigade) in Vietnam. Craig Vega served in the VII Corps LRRP company in 1966

and later in the LRRP detachment of 101st Airborne Division. E-mail interview

with Roy Boatman, 15 December 2004, and Craig Vega on 15 March 200

258. While Major General Zais did have personal interactions with the members of his division LRP company that are recorded in unit memoirs, his own oral 

history of the entire period does not reflect any musings or observations on the 

formation or employment of LRP units. See Melvin Zais, General Retired, Senior 

Officers Oral History Program Project 77-3 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army 

Military History Institute, 1977), four volumes, Volume II (376-418) for time a

Seventh Army G3, Volume II (447-74) for time in 1st Infantry Division, and Volume III (512-96) for time in command of 101st Airborne Divis
1

259. I was promoted to the rank of major in the summer of 1985 and, had I

been an infantry officer, I could have been selected to command a LRSC. I was an 

enlisted LRRP soldier in 1967-68. There could have been a few other officers with 

similar service backgrounds still on active duty in the US Army at that time.

260. See Linderer, Six Silent Men, 282, 295-6, 313-4, and 340-2. Lieutenant

Colonel Ohle’s command at Fort Campbell was 2-17 Cavalry Squadron, the same

unit to which his Ranger company was attached in 1971. Ohle later retired fro

the US Army at the rank of lieutenant general.

261. Ibid., 323-8. Grange earned both a Silver Star and a Purple Heart on the

mission described in these pages.

262. The number 333 is the total from lists found on the 75th Ranger Regiment Association Internet website. These lists are also reproduced at the back of 

Linderer, Phantom Warrior. Posthumous Medal of Honor recipients are Lazlow 

Rabel, 74th LRP Detachment, 173d Airborne Brigade; Robert J. Pruden, G Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 23d (Americal) Infantry Division; and Robert D.

Law, I Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. The missing in action are listed by Stanton in his Appendix A. Of the men on that list, one (Private

First Class Issako Malo) returned from captivity in March 1973; the remains of

three others (Private First Class Joseph E. Fitzgerald, Sergeant John A. Jakovac, 

and Private First Class Brian K. McGar) were returned in 1994 and identified and 

buried in 1997. The remaining men Stanton lists (James A. Champion, Deverton

C. Cochrane, Dickie W. Finley, Kenneth R. Lancaster, and Donald S. Newton) remain missing but their official status is “presumptive finding of death,” with various dates of this finding ranging from 20 August 1974 (Newton) to 25 September 

1978 (Champion)
Chapter 4

Long-Range Surveillance Units, 1981-2001

Starting Over

When the last Ranger company in Vietnam (Company H, 1st Cavalry

Division) was inactivated in August 1972, three TOE Ranger companies

remained in the active Army: Company A at Fort Hood, Texas (the legacy 

company of V Corps LRRPs in the 1960s); Company B at Fort Carson,

Colorado (the legacy company of VII Corps LRRPs in the 1960s); and

Company O (this was the designation of the Ranger company of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division in Vietnam, inactivated on 20 November 1969

and reactivated in Alaska in August 1970) Company O was deactivated 

in September 1972. Company A gave up many of its personnel to recruiters from 1st and 2d Ranger Battalions in the summer and fall of 1974 a

was deactivated in December of that year. Company B was moved to Fort 

Lewis, Washington in June 1974 and formed the nucleus of 2d Battalion,

75th Rangers when that unit was activated on  November 1974. No LR

companies existed in the active Army after late 1974

The requirement for a LRRP capability, however, did not go away. 

Four years later, in 1978, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Plans, Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, directed that a study be 

conducted to ascertain the organization, missions, and control of special 

forces and Ranger units in the 1980s. This study, large portions of which

remain classified, was completed and published in April 1979.2 Lieutenant 

General Meyer’s question about who would be assigned the LRRP mission in the 1980s was addressed in the study, which recommended that two

LRRP companies be activated for early deployment to Europe, where they 

would be organic elements of the corps combat electronic-warfare and 

intelligence (CEWI) groups (an MI unit).3

The suggested TOE for these units was the airborne infantry Ranger 

company (TOE 7-157), with a provision to vary the number of assigned

reconnaissance teams to meet specific mission requirements. Its mission 

would be to conduct long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition operations in support of the corps, to a depth of 50-150 kilometers. The study did not propose a similar unit to provide comparable

capability to a division.

The wheels of Army bureaucracy turned slowly and, over five years 

later, on 26 October 1984, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
1

published Pamphlet 525-42, US Army Operational Concept for LongRange Surveillance Units. This document listed the following mission 

tasks for a long-range surveillance unit (LRSU, pronounced lursue):

•	 Conduct long-range intelligence collection through reconnaissance 

and surveillance.

•	 Determine and report location, strength, equipment, disposition, 

organization, and movement of enemy forces; determine location of highvalue targets, to include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapondelivery systems, nuclear weapon storage sites, reserves, command-andcontrol elements, and key fixed and mobile installations.

•	 Conduct damage assessment and NBC monitoring.

•	 Emplace and employ unattended sensors and electronic intelligence, 

target acquisition, and designation equipment.

•	 Obtain information on possible drop and landing zones.

•	 Assess terrain and weather.

•	 Conduct pathfinder operations.

•	 Assess indigenous communications facilities for possible future allied use.4

Note the use of the words “surveillance unit” in the naming of this 

“new” organization. This was a deliberate choice of words to further emphasize the intelligence nature of these organizations and personnel. Its 

predecessors in names, titles, and doctrinal literature were “long-range 

reconnaissance patrol,” “long-range patrol,” and “patrol.”

While this TRADOC concept document envisioned the LRSC (company) to be organic to the corps, it stated that the LRSD (detachment) was 

organic to light- and heavy-division cavalry squadrons.5 This seemed to 

follow the practice established in Vietnam wherein most division LRRP 

companies and detachments were attached to divisional air and ground 

cavalry units.

Doctrine

A draft Field Circular (FC) 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, was published on  July 1985, followed in June 1987 by Fie

Manual (FM) 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. Both 

documents were authored by the TRADOC-designated proponent for 

LRSU—the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Because 

the 1987 field manual was clearly derived from the 1985 draft FC and the 
1

corrections made to it during the staffing process, this study will just discuss the field manual. Between the publication of these two documents, on 

20 May 1986, TRADOC determined that LRSU would be organic to the

MI brigade at corps level and to the MI battalion at division level.6 This 

decision in some measure determined that, in the future, LRSU would be 

used for intelligence collection and not for offensive combat activities, as 

had so often been the case with LRRP units in Vietnam.

It also fuelled the struggle for control of LRSU doctrine and proponency between the US Army Infantry School (USAIS), the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), and the John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center (JFK SWC).7 In the end, the USAIS and USAICS came 

to a formalized agreement that was included in a memorandum of understanding in February 1990. The Infantry School took responsibility for

LRS doctrine, unit training, TTP, and LRS TOE. USAICS retained responsibility for intelligence-related LRS-unit activities and the LRS-personnel 

authorizations in MI units.8

Careful study of FM 7-93 reveals that it was not created out of thin 

air—it was an expanded and elaborated evolution of the August 1968 version of FM 31-18. FM 7-93 contains many passages of text lifted direct

from its predecessor, establishing a clear doctrinal connection to the V 

and VII Corps LRRP companies of USAREUR in the early 1960s, whose

TTP and operational employment mission were the experiential basis for 

the 1968 LRRP doctrine. The new doctrinal manual did not ignore the

hard-won lessons of Vietnam either. Located in the very front of the new 

manual is the most important of those lessons, where the text emphasizes 

the HUMINT nature of the LRSU and strongly discourages their use for 

direct-action missions.9 This focus away from direct action and toward 

surveillance pervades the manual.

According to the terms of AirLand Battle, the doctrinal touchstone 

of the late 1980s, LRSU were placed in the force structure to enable the

corps commander to collect HUMINT as far out as 150 kilometers from

his forward line of troops (FLOT), and the division commander to collect 

HUMINT 50 kilometers from the FLOT by patrols lasting up to eight and 

six days respectively. Of the four basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine 

(initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization), LRSU supported all of 

them, but most of all supported depth. LRSU gave corps and division 

commanders the ability to see deep into the enemy’s rear.1

A USAREUR or Vietnam-era LRRP soldier would immediately recognize 
1

the 1987 LRSU organization in either company or detachment configuration. 

It looked about the same as a LRRP company or detachment of either vintage. 

The 1987 LRSC was comprised of a headquarters, communications, and

three surveillance platoons. In the HQ were the administrative, operations, 

and maintenance sections. The communications platoon included a small 

HQ and four base stations. Each of the three surveillance platoons had six 

surveillance teams with six men in each team. A 1987 LRSD was smaller,

having no operations or maintenance sections, only two base stations, and 

four six-man teams in its surveillance element. Like all the USAREUR 

LRRP soldiers but unlike most Vietnam-era LRRP soldiers, all LRSU 

members were required to be airborne qualified.

The capabilities and limitations of LRSU in 1987 varied only slightly

from LRRP units two decades earlier. The near-universal employment of 

helicopters for support of LRRP missions experienced in Vietnam obviated the need for the 1968 capability to “operate with austere support,”

and it fell out of the list in 1987. The difficulty of delivery and recovery 

operations in enemy-held territory, expressed as a limitation in 1968,

was dropped from the limitation list in 1987, also reflecting the Vietnam 

experience. The 1987 limitation, “Teams are lightly armed with limited

self-defense capabilities. They normally fight only to break contact,” was 

pulled out of the “Security” paragraph of the 1968 manual. This limitation hearkened back to the USAREUR early-1960s experience, when

LRRP teams viewed use of personal weapons as abhorrent except in selfdefense. It also coincided with the renewed focus in 1987 on the HUMINT

nature of LRSU.

The subordination of LRSU command and control (C & C) to the G2 

of corps and division was in keeping with long-established doctrine and 

practice. The placement of LRSU in MI brigades and battalions further solidified the pre-eminence of the intelligence mission over any other activity 

for LRSU. FM 7-93 for the first time in doctrinal history succinctly linked 

LRSU missions to the corps and division commanders’ priority intelligence 

requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR).1

FM 7-93 did maintain the four traditional missions for these units, albeit nuanced slightly: surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and 

damage assessment.14 Primary among these four missions was surveillance,

with emphasis on “static.” If reconnaissance was intended, the emphasis was 

on minimized movement. The statement of both of these missions brings to 

mind similar language in the 1962, 1965, and 1968 editions of FM 3

that attempted to limit the movement of a patrol. This is different than the 
1

common practice in Vietnam of inserting a LRRP team into an irregular 

box drawn on a map with the mission to reconnoiter the entire area. Such 

missions frequently resulted in a chance encounter (meeting engagement) 

followed by a brief fire fight and then emergency extraction.

The third mission, target acquisition, in 1987 included the emplacement

of sensors, also something commonly practiced in Vietnam. The fourth mission was damage assessment, sometimes a corollary to target acquisition 

but more often a response to ordnance delivered before the LRS insertion, a 

frequent mission during the Vietnam era.

What was considered a likely target for surveillance in 1987? The example list is interesting both for what it contained and what it ignored

•	 critical points along avenues of approach

•	 critical points along key lines of communication

•	 airfields

•	 bridges or rail junctions

•	 ordnance or logistical depots

•	 railyards

•	 known enemy command posts and or headquarters

•	 assembly areas1

This admittedly partial list is striking because, with the exception of 

“ordnance or logistical depots” and “command posts and headquarters” 

(which can also be categorized as locations), it did not reference enemy 

units or forces. Specifically, it did not refer to “special weapons delivery 

means” or “enemy reserves,” two vital concerns of the commander emphasized in previous LRRP doctrinal manuals.

While it was common in Vietnam for patrol-operated radio-relay stations to be established in the field to pass communications between a patrol 

and its controlling unit TOC, LRRP-unit tactical operations centers (TOCs) 

rarely strayed from their base camps. FM 7-93 introduced (or reintroduced 

after a 20-year hiatus) the concept of an operations base for the LRSU, located near the collection management and dissemination section of the MI 

brigade or the division tactical operations center (DTOC). This operations 

base encompassed living and working areas for the entire unit, including an 

enclosure for the isolation center, TOC, and base radio station.

In 1987, LRSU used high-frequency radio as the principal means of
1

communication. An AM/SSB (single sideband) radio with auxiliary bursttransmission equipment was used for communications from the teams to 

the base stations; an FM radio provided an alternate means. The communications procedure recommended in FM 7-93 mirrors that of FM 31-18

1968. The manual explains that the team should send its report to a designated station, but that all base stations monitored all frequencies in use. If

the designated station did not respond to the team’s report, another station 

that monitored the message should acknowledge receipt and then transmit 

the message to the company or detachment TOC.1

FM 7-93’s mission-development section borrows both text and organization from FM 31-18. New material added to the “Fundamentals” chapte

includes brief sections on operational security and electronic measures, 

the latter emphasizing Soviet capabilities to intercept electronic transmissions and conduct radio-direction finding. These capabilities threatened 

LRS-team mission and survival.

Chapter 3, “Operations,” re-emphasizes the primacy of the surveillance 

mission for LRSU. It resurrects a patrolling technique commonly practiced 

in USAREUR in the 1960s but much less used in Vietnam—splitting the

LRS team between a patrol base occupied by the radio operator and perhaps 

team leader and a forward observation position sited for maximum coverage of a point target. This chapter introduces the conceptual framework 

that still makes up the five phases of LRS operations: planning, insertion, 

execution, extraction, and recovery.

In 1987, the components of planning included contingency plans for

several unanticipated events, control measures, and isolation activities. 

Isolation was both a time and a place the team used for intensive mission 

preparation. The team entered isolation upon receipt of the warning order 

and remained there through the entire troop-leading procedures until the 

final inspection was completed. Upon leaving isolation, the team departed 

the operations base and began the insertion phase.

The methods of insertion practiced in 1987 were traditional: stay-behind; air insertion using a variety of delivery means, including HALO and

HAHO techniques; amphibious, using surface or sub-surface vessels; and 

land infiltration. All of these methods had historical antecedents in either 

conventional or special-operations forces, in USAREUR and Vietnam.

As evidenced in FM 7-93, the execution phase encompassed all the activities that occurred from the infiltration site through the surveillance site to 

the extraction site. This passage of text in Chapter 3 again emphasizes the 
1

use of a patrol base and observation positions, a tactic born in USAREUR 

but rarely used in Vietnam.1 The extraction phase in essence began as 

soon as the surveillance mission was complete, and at times also from the 

site where the surveillance was conducted, depending on the extraction 

means. While every LRS team had to plan for land exfiltration as a team, 

in small groups or as individuals, most extractions involved the use of air 

or water means to recover the team deep from within enemy territory and 

return it to friendly lines. Among the air extraction methods by helicopter 

discussed, Vietnam-era techniques of ladders, STABO rigs, and jungle 

penetrators were notable. The last phase of LRS operations was recovery—the return of the team to its operations base, debriefing, equipment 

maintenance, and stand-down.

FM 7-93’s final chapter contains an exposition of combat and combatservice-support requirements. According to the manual, combat support 

for LRS operations came in the form of aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing), 

fire support, air-defense artillery, engineer, and electronic support. Combat-service support came primarily in the area of various classes of supply 

and resupply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and several 

miscellaneous forms of support (riggers, finance, chaplain, and personnel 

replacement). A brief paragraph on personnel replacement emphasizes a 

hard lesson learned in Vietnam: Because of lengthy and arduous training 

requirements, LRS replacement soldiers do not come quick and easy. Care 

was required in managing the personnel system to preclude a loss of LRSunit effectiveness.1

Five appendices were added to FM 7-93: operational environments, 

communications and electronic warfare, and formats for standing operating 

procedures, briefbacks, and debriefings. With glossary and references, the 

1987 field manual is about three times the length of its 1968 predecessor.

Viewed in retrospect, FM 7-93 was an artful amalgamation of the 

USAREUR-derived LRRP doctrine of the early 1960s with the TTP gained

from the experience of the Vietnam War, applied to a target- and concealment-rich linear battlefield deep in the geographical sense. LRRP soldiers 

in Europe in the 1960s were viewed primarily as HUMINT collectors. In

the Vietnam era the pendulum swung sharply toward LRRP soldiers and 

Rangers as offensive weapons. The strongest doctrinal imperative of this 

first post-Vietnam articulation of LRS doctrine and TTP was that LRS soldiers once again were HUMINT collectors. Placing LRS companies and 

detachments in the TOEs of MI brigades at corps level and MI battalions at 

division level respectively further reinforced the intelligence-based nature 
1

of these units.

LRSU Organizations

Provisional Organizations

Even as the larger Army was engaged in the effort to redefine its longrange reconnaissance and surveillance mission requirement, at least three 

Army division commanders formed provisional reconnaissance units in 

the early 1980s: Major General Robert M. Elton in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Major General James J. Lindsay in the 82d Airborne

Division at Fort Bragg, and Major General Fred K. Mahaffey in the 3d 

Infantry Division in Germany.

The G2 of the 9th Infantry Division, in a 1981 staff study, identified the 

inability of existing divisional intelligence assets to collect required information on enemy activities in both the division’s area of interest and area 

of influence.19 To solve this problem, the staff study recommended creating

a divisional reconnaissance unit comprised of a small headquarters section 

and three patrol platoons, each with three 3-man patrols, for a total strength 

of 30 personnel.

The detachment would be tasked directly by the division G2, with 

several missions: operate in enemy-held territory to locate high-value targets for attack; perform reconnaissance and surveillance on specific sites, 

routes, or areas and determine enemy movement patterns; provide cueing 

information for other intelligence-collection resources; and conduct limited tactical damage assessment and chemical, biological, and radiological 

monitoring.

Led by tactically proficient military intelligence or infantry officers, 

the teams would be manned by rigorously trained personnel selected 

from within the division. These men would be armed with .45 caliber 

M3 submachine guns, intended for defensive combat only. They would 

be inserted by stay-behind methods, delivered by division air assets, or 

by ground infiltration. Patrol duration would be a minimum of five days; 

extraction would be accomplished by division air assets, linkup with advancing ground forces, ground exfiltration, or escape and evasion.

The division G1, G3, and G4 all nonconcurred with the recommendation, each for cogent reasons, while the division G2 concurred.20 In the

end, Major General Elton went with the advice of his G2, authorized the 

creation of the provisional reconnaissance detachment, and attached it to 

the 109th MI Battalion.
1

Among the training materials used by this provisional detachment was 

a document obtained from the Ranger battalion stationed at Fort Lewis, 

titled “Tips of the Trade/Lessons Learned.” The document contained 80 

numbered “tips” on 31 pages that were “written for Long Range Reconnaissance teams operating in Vietnam.”22 Use of this document for training

the 9th Infantry Division provisional reconnaissance detachment establishes a direct link between the Vietnam-era LRRPs and the post-Vietnam 

LRSU, across a chronological gap of almost 10 years.2

The commander of 82d Airborne Division, Major General James J. 

Lindsay, authorized the formation of a division reconnaissance platoon 

late in the late spring of 1983, shortly before he turned over command of

the division.24 In a letter to the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, General Lindsay stated the platoon’s mission and advantage:

To conduct early warning and intelligence reporting operations concerning the location, disposition, composition 

and activity of enemy forces within the division’s area of 

influence and interest. . . . The reconnaissance platoon provides the Division a HUMINT capability not significantly 

degraded by adverse weather or enemy electronic warfare 

measures.25

A group of approximately 40-50 men was selected through competition between several of the division’s parachute infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons, and assigned to B Company, 313th MI battalion.26

This LRS platoon was organized around six six-man surveillance teams 

with a headquarters consisting of a platoon leader and platoon sergeant, 

two medics, two communications men, and NCOs trained in operations, 

intelligence, fire support, and engineer specialties. Each six-man reconnaissance team comprised a patrol leader and assistant patrol leader, two 

riflemen, and two radio operators.

The reconnaissance platoon leader was responsible for training these 

teams, supervised and supported by his company commander and the MI 

battalion S3. The model for a portion of this training was the British Special 

Air Service (SAS), whose TTP were studied from an SAS training film 

obtained by the division. On  September 1983, three months after assumin

leadership of the unit, the platoon leader evaluated his men as strong in land 

navigation and map reading, patrolling and troop leading, physical fitness, 

and airmobile insertion/extraction techniques. He further concluded men 

needed additional training in use of communications equipment, NATOand Warsaw-Pact equipment identification, airborne skills, medical training, 
12

and marksmanship.27 In early 1984, the platoon’s training program was built

around a long-range reconnaissance platoon skill qualification test (LRRP 

SQT) that contained seven elements: land navigation, patrolling (planning 

phase), communications procedures, equipment identification, physical 

conditioning, advanced medical aid, and indirect fire. Soldiers who passed 

five of the seven tested elements were awarded a locally designed and 

authorized “Expert LRRP Patch” to be worn above their right fatigue jacket 

pocket while assigned to the unit.28

The teams were equipped with standard small arms (M16 rifles) for 

self-defense, with no machine guns, antitank rocket launchers, sniper rifles, 

or exotic weaponry or silencers. Because the patrols were to be inserted 

by walking, parachute, or air-assault means, they had neither tactical nor 

administrative vehicles. The platoon HQ was authorized a single 5/4-ton, 

4X4 tactical-shelter carrier with driver. Authorized communications gear 

included the AN/PRC-70 and AN/PRC-90 radio sets with speech-security, 

keying, and burst-transmission devices of that era. Other authorized team 

equipment included a still camera, telescope, infrared viewer, two nightvision sights (AN/PVS-4), and two radiac meters.

The 82d Airborne Division provisional LRRP platoon deployed to 

Grenada for Operation URGENT FURY in two contingents, the first on 

31 October and the second on 7 November 1983.29 Until the platoon redeployed to Fort Bragg on 2 December, it performed four reconnaissanc

missions for the division then, in turn, was attached to the 1-17th Cavalry

3d Brigade, and 2-505th Infantry. The platoon’s missions were assigned 

by the G2 at division level or the controlling unit’s S2 at lower levels. The 

sum total of assigned missions included executing a road block, searching 

houses, searching remote islands (Grand Etang, Green Island, and Ronde 

Island off the northern coast of Grenada), surveillance, and one characterized by the platoon leader as “a search and destroy mission.” During its 

brief stay on Green Island, a team exchanged fire with a force of unknown 

size and composition and suffered a few wounded men.

When a short time later the Department of the Army approved the 

TOE for the LRSC and LRSD, the 82d Airborne Division’s LRSD was 

initially assigned to the division’s cavalry squadron, but later returned to 

the 313th MI Battalion as Echo Company

TOE Organizations 

TOE LRS detachments and companies were created throughout the 

Army in 1985, 1986, and 1987, in all 18 divisions and in USAREUR’
1

and VII Corps.30 In V Corps, for example, E Company, 51st Infantry (LRS)

(Airborne) was activated and assigned to the 165th MI Battalion (Tactical

Exploitation).3 This company was comprised of an HQ platoon with supply (including arms room), NBC, training, and operations sections; a communications platoon; and three surveillance platoons. Each surveillance 

platoon had four LRS teams, with five to six men on each team. Early in its 

life, this unit did not have platoon leaders but was well-staffed by former 

Ranger Department instructors and Ranger battalion NCOs.32

This LRS company, along with two LRS detachments formed in the 

3d and 8th Infantry Divisions (V Corps subordinate elements), participated 

in Exercise Caravan Guard 88. Surveillance teams were inserted by UH60 Blackhawk helicopters during the exercise first phase, recovered and 

reinserted by helicopter in the exercise second phase, and recovered in the 

exercise third phase. V Corps LRS teams, which were the only around-theclock intelligence-collection asset in the exercise, transmitted more than 

300 reports and provided approximately 50 percent of the combat information received at the corps HQ.33

Experience gained in exercises such as Reforger and Caravan Guard

and other training activities revealed perceived shortfalls in LRSU organization, doctrine, force structure, personnel, and equipment. The LRSD of 

3d Infantry Division, for example, chose to collocate its LRS command 

post and forward-operating base with its parent MI battalion HQ rather than 

the DTOC, as suggested by FM 7-93.34 The MI battalion S2 identified the 

urgent surveillance reports and forwarded them to the DTOC by pulse-control modulation (PCM) means. This arrangement afforded the LRSD many 

advantages in C & C and support.

The former LRSD commander of 3d Infantry Division suggested that 

six teams were insufficient for his unit’s mission requirements and recommended that two additional teams be authorized in heavy divisions.35 The 

leadership of early detachments consisted of a detachment commander, detachment sergeant, base radio station section chiefs (two), and team chiefs 

(four in the light divisions and six in heavy and air mobile divisions). The 

3d Infantry Division augmented this cadre with an executive officer and 

supply sergeant, and also recommended the addition of an armorer, NBC 

NCO, supply clerk, operations sergeant, and intelligence sergeant to the 

TOE, and upgrading the detachment sergeant’s rank from platoon sergeant 

to first sergeant.36 

The 3d Infantry Division LRSD also experienced the personnel recruitment problems that became problematic in the LRSU community in the 
12

early and mid-1990s—an insufficient recruitment base of light-weapons 

infantry soldiers. This particularly occurred on installations where the pool 

of MOS-eligible personnel was relatively smaller. The two primary career 

fields of LRS soldiers have always been light-weapons infantrymen (11B) 

and radio operators (31C). Installations such as Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort

Riley, Kansas, and heavy divisions in Germany rich in armor crewmen and 

mechanized infantry soldiers were sorely lacking in 11Bs.37 LRS-unit commanders were forced by circumstances to retrain 11M and 11H soldier

also to recruit from the installation or larger-unit replacement stream.38 Because of personnel shortages in the 31 career field and the inability of many 

communications-trained personnel to meet the high physical demands of 

LRS-team duty, both the 1st and 3d Infantry Division LRSDs replaced the

31C radio operator on the surveillance team with an 11B

Another example of this persistent manning problem comes from the 

10th Mountain Division (Light). In April 1991, the commander of 1

MI Battalion wrote a memorandum addressed to the division’s G1, G2, and

G3.40 This memorandum strongly endorsed several concerns expressed earlier by the division’s LRSD commanders. One LRSD commander voiced 

two requests: that incoming soldiers be screened for possible assignment 

to the detachment, with specific listed criteria; and that those who met the 

screening criteria be attached to the LRSD for a 30-day assessment period.4

 The second LRSD commander requested that the division man the 

LRSD at 10 percent over strength in selected personnel.42 The MI battalion

commander specifically endorsed the request for 10 percent overage manning in MOS 11

Early LRS detachments had another serious deficiency—they lacked 

the capability to transport themselves, both for administrative and tactical 

purposes. The MI battalions to which they were assigned lacked a support 

platoon and thus were not equipped to provide them direct support. Not 

unlike many LRRP detachments in Vietnam 20 years earlier, LRSDs even 

had to borrow transportation to move teams to the airfield for helicopter 

insertion.43 This problem had not been solved before units deployed to 

Southwest Asia for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.44

LRS Institutional and Unit Training

Institutional Training

When the LRS units were brought back into the Army inventory in the 

mid-1980s, the Army immediately set about to create an institutional training program. This effort began in 1985 in the Ranger Department at For
12

Benning, with the convening of a series of conferences.45 Participants in 

these conferences included representatives from foreign-army units with 

similar missions (British and Australian SAS, German, French, and Italian 

special reconnaissance units), from the NATO reconnaissance school in 

Germany, from various US Army special operations institutions (Ranger 

and special-forces units), and from the conventional Army (medical experts, for example, to discuss special nutrition requirements).

The Ranger Department combined the conference results with the 

operational and organizational concepts contained in TRADOC Pamphlet 

525-42, US Army Operational Concept for Long-Range Surveillance Units

(October 1984), and developed two programs of instruction for a “trainthe-leaders” course: one of eight weeks’ duration that was taught as a pilot

course at Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School in March 

1986, and another of much shorter duration to be taught in the field by 

mobile training teams. In 1986, the long course was shortened from eight

weeks to five and moved to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, where it 

still resides.46 A reserve-component version of the course consisted of six 

weekend drills at home station followed by a two-week instructional phase 

at Fort Benning.

The curriculum of the active-component five-week course included 

major blocks of instruction in the following subject areas: command and 

control, reconnaissance operations, command-post exercises, field-training exercises, land navigation, threat subjects, and communications/electronics. The threat-subjects block, in essence Soviet equipment- and system-recognition training, was placed in the curriculum in agreement with 

the US Army Intelligence Center and School.47 The graduation exercise 

for the early course was constructed to replicate a real-world reconnaissance mission and was frequently conducted within a larger joint exercise 

or in support of a real-world mission.48

The classes of 31-36 soldiers were open to male officers and NCOs 

currently assigned or on orders to be assigned to LRSU in leadership positions down to surveillance team leader, or a member of a base radio station 

communications staff. The intent was to train LRSU leaders in the required 

TTP and thus enable them to return to their units and train LRSU soldiers. 

Anecdotal evidence suggests that while many LRSU NCOs availed themselves of this training over the ensuing years, too many commissioned officers did not.49

In early 2005, the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course 

(RSLC) now being taught at Fort Benning has two phases, the first lasting 
12

17 days and the second lasting 16 days.50 The course is split in this manner to enable reserve-component personnel to attend training during brie

periods of active duty. Six resident courses are scheduled for FY-05, along 

with two mobile training team (MTT) courses of equal duration. While the 

course curriculum has undergone many changes over the almost 20 years 

of its existence, its essence remains the same. The emphasized subject areas 

are physical training, vehicle identification, communications, operational 

techniques (TTP), and a graded seven-day FTX. Outprocessing and graduation occur on day 33.

The content and role of the RSLC at Fort Benning beg comparison to 

that of the MACV Recondo School in the Vietnam era. The RSLC differs 

from MACV Recondo School principally in two aspects: The Fort Benning course is significantly longer—five weeks versus three weeks—reflecting the increased complexity of modern LRS operations doctrine and 

materiel. The Fort Benning course also was established as, and remains, 

a leaders course, intended to prepare officers and NCOs to return to their 

units and train soldiers. MACV Recondo School, while it occasionally 

trained company-grade officers and senior NCOs, was established primarily to train junior NCOs and LRRP soldiers.

But in other aspects, the RSLC is very similar to MACV Recondo 

School. It drew its curriculum from, and remains in, the firm grasp of an 

assemblage of subject-matter experts, who were and still are responsible 

for writing LRSU doctrine. The RSLC has become the gold standard for 

LRSU training and operations, a place where lessons captured in worldwide training and operations are collected, collated, distilled, and incorporated into the training curriculum and doctrinal publications. Because the 

RSLC trains trainers, LRSU-training programs throughout the Army have 

a common-core-subject base, supplemented by local unit requirements. 

The importance of the RSLC as an institution of Army-wide LRSU quality 

control cannot be overstated.

Unit Training

An examination of the unit training experience of a few LRSUs during 

the current era reveals several interesting aspects. The LRSD of 1st Infantry Division, activated in the 101st MI Battalion in 1988, during its ea

existence participated in a Reforger exercise in Germany and deployed 

to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin for every brigade 

rotation.5 The NTC rotations were particularly useful in perfecting the 

detachment’s long-range communications skills, in that a training objective of each rotation was to transmit and receive messages from Fort Irwin 
12

to Fort Riley using the detachment’s assigned communications equipment. The communications section also developed a detailed no-communications drill that served the detachment well. Over time, several of the 

detachment’s soldiers were able to attend the RSLC at Fort Benning. The 

detachment accomplished its airborne training by bringing an MTT from 

Fort Benning to Fort Riley in the fall of 1990, and thereafter maintained

proficiency through permissive jump status.52 In garrison, this detachment 

conducted an annual competitive training event named “Law Stakes,” 

which pitted LRS soldiers against each other in individual proficiency 

skills.53 After returning from Operation DESERT STORM and before it 

was inactivated, the 1st Infantry Division LRSD used a counter-drug mission under Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) as a training opportunity to conduct

battle-focused training.54

The LRSD of 6th Infantry Division in Alaska jumped and conducted 

a field-training exercise monthly, conducted annual winter survival and 

glacier training, went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) every 

year or so, and participated in an exchange exercise with the 25th Infantry 

Division LRSD.55

The LRSD of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, conducted the following training in the 12-month period from May 1990 t

May 199

56

•	 German reciprocal exchange (May 1990

•	 Fuerzas Unidas (Paraguay Exercise) (July 1990

•	 Battle drill and live-fire exercise week (August 1990)

•	 Survival training week (September 1990

•	 Communications training week (September 1990

•	 4-21 Infantry Bold Thrust support (September 1990

•	 JRTC (3d Brigade) (October 1990

•	 Rappel insertion training week (November 1990

•	 Airborne insertion training week (December 1990

•	 Battle drill and live-fire exercise week (January 1991)

•	 Cascade Strike II CPX (January 1991)

•	 Threat ID training week (January 199

•	 Exercise support to 2d Brigade (February 199

•	 Communications training week (February 199

•	 Insertion training week (March 199
12

•	 Land navigation training week (March 199

•	 LRSD team certifications (April 1991)

•	 Counter-narcotics mission (May 199

The training forecasted for the subsequent six months included the following:

•	 NTC with 2d Brigade (June 199

•	 Expert Infantry Badge with 3d Brigade (June 199

•	 Threat ID training week (July 199

•	 Detachment certification (HUMINT external evaluation) (July 1991)

•	 Fuerzas Unidas (August 199

•	 JRTC (2d Brigade) (September 199

The LRSC of I Corps, assigned to the 14th MI Battalion and stationed

at Fort Lewis, Washington, participated in a variety of unit-training missions during the brief period of its existence.57 The unit deployed annually 

to Korea for Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, a large combined deployment and 

command-post exercise of US and Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units. 

A team of LRS soldiers competed in Exercise Cambrian Patrol in Wales, 

United Kingdom, against teams from several other NATO countries and 

earned a gold medal. Closer to home, I Corps LRSC teams assisted federal 

agencies in counter-narcotics operations on federally controlled lands of 

Arizona, Oregon, and California. Using their ground-tracking and counter-tracking skills, the LRS teams were able to deliver federal agents to 

specific locales in the forest undetected to perform their law-enforcement 

mission.58

While it can be established that many LRSUs have periodically trained 

at the NTC at Fort Irwin and the JRTC at Fort Polk over the years, available 

sources do not allow for detailed analyses of the specific missions trained or 

the results of training.59 For the period of the late 1990s, however, LRSUs

that exercised at the JRTC trained in the standard doctrinal deep-reconnaissance mission. They did not train or rehearse in direct-action missions, and 

in fact resisted some external suggestions that they do so.60

Personnel from LRSUs in Germany had ready access to US Army 

schools, to NATO facilities such as the International Long Range Patrol 

School in Weingarten, Germany, and to training exercises and courses of like 

organizations in individual NATO armies.6

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

In the XVIII Corps area of operations, LRSU were employed in both 
12

phases of the war: during DESERT SHIELD in an effort to detect the possible movement of Iraqi forces against the corps’ maneuver and logistic 

elements while they established their jumping-off positions, and during 

DESERT STORM to provide intelligence on enemy presence or activity 

on divisional intermediate objectives. All of the corps’ American divisions 

had LRSD and the corps HQ had an attached LRSU.62 Lieutenant General 

Gary Luck, the corps commander, issued guidance that “no teams would 

be inserted unless there were specific areas vital to the overall operation 

that could not be covered with other resources.”63

After arriving in theater, LRS teams of the 24th Infantry Division prepared for their combat mission under the supervision of the division G2 

and the 124th MI Battalion commander.64 The first issue to be resolved was

command and control of the LRSU. While doctrine provided for the G2 to 

have operational control of LRS teams in combat, in this division command 

and control was retained by the MI battalion and the G2 developed missions 

and coordinated division-level support.65 Major General Barry McCaffrey, 

the commanding general, retained authority to himself to approve all LRSD 

missions, resupply operations, and extractions.66 The 24th Infantry Division 

studied and then consciously avoided attempts to “mobilize” their LRSD 

at the last minute and focused on the standard, doctrinal hide-position dismounted employment of their LRS teams.67 

The most serious equipment shortfall was communications gear, both 

for the teams and the base stations. The division was able to provide additional radios for base stations but was unable to acquire redundant HF 

or tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios for the deployed teams. LRS soldiers 

trained in the desert for several consecutive days on terrain similar to their 

mission area, honing their survival and communications skills and building confidence in their TTP. While the division expected to insert LRS 

teams with ground vehicles during the defensive phase of the operation, 

helicopter crews that would later be used during the offensive phase flew 

practice insertions and extractions with the teams.68 During this phase, the 

LRSD commander rotated out of command and was elevated to the division staff to plan and coordinate LRS activities.69

When the division tactical command post (DTAC) deployed forward 

into a tactical assembly area in early January, LRS teams went along and 

were inserted into hide-sites on the border berm to keep Iraqi border guard 

posts under observation.70 At this time the teams were communicating with 

the division main command post (DMAIN) some 500 kilometers away. 

The teams were able to establish the normal pattern of activities of the Iraqi 
12

border guards, useful as baseline data when the division deployed forward a 

few weeks later. After these Iraqi posts were destroyed around 19-20 February, cavalry units were sent forward and the LRS teams were withdrawn to

their base near the DMAIN to prepare for their combat mission.7

The planning process for cross-FLOT employment of LRS teams in 

the 24th Infantry Division began in the division staff at nightly planning 

meetings, where the commanding general and others proposed potential 

LRS missions and targets. The division G2 passed these nominated targets 

to G2 and G3 planners for consideration and elaboration. The goal was to 

develop three targets for each available team. Work products were shown 

to the commanding general, who approved and prioritized them. Missions 

were further coordinated with the MI battalion and aviation brigade commanders who would later have to execute and support them. The estimates 

for each mission included the following components:

•	 general target sites

•	 mission times

•	 enemy, weather, and terrain

•	 information to be gained 

•	 other sources that could potentially acquire this information

•	 feasibility of insertion, extraction, resupply, and communications

•	 risks of compromise

•	 east of transition into future operations72

As G-Day (ground day, the day on which the ground attack would 

commence) approached, General McCaffrey narrowed the target list considerably while also extending it forward in time and space.

The LRSD commander and his staff participated with division staff 

elements in developing the target folder for each mission.73 For a given 

named area of interest (NAI), a terrain analyst selected several possible 

hide-sites based on all available imagery. He reviewed these with the 

LRSD personnel, and together they selected primary and alternate hidesites. Considerations in this selection included distance and visibility to the 

NAI, proximity of enemy activity, concealment for the team, and distance 

to possible helicopter landing zones (LZ). The terrain analyst then prepared 

a 1:50,000 scale overlay with a radius of 10 kilometers from the primar

hide-site, with all important positions recorded. This overlay was reviewed 

again by LRSD personnel before submission through the MI battalion commander and division G2 to the commanding general for final approval.
12

Because the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M), 

Brigadier General James T. Scott, had special-operations experience, he 

received a pre-brief on the final mission list.74 General McCaffrey received 

the final briefing on 21 February, with the ADC-M, commanders of the 

MI battalion, aviation company, and LRS detachment, the G2 LRS staff 

officer, and others in attendance. The three briefers were the LRS staff officer, LRS detachment commander, and aviation company commander. The 

commanding general approved six missions, three to be inserted after 2230 

on 22 February and three for 25 February.

The 24th Infantry Division inserted three teams on the night of 22 

February using Blackhawk helicopters from its own aviation assets, supported by Air Force electronic-warfare aircraft.75 About 160-220 kilometers from the line of departure, the three teams went into hide-sites on the

division’s first three brigade objectives. These teams remained undetected 

and submitted intelligence reports via HF radio until the division passed 

through them, and then were recovered by helicopter. This recovery occurred sometime on the morning of 25 February in the west portion of 

the division AO (Objective BROWN was secured by 0706) and later in 

the day of 25 February in the east portion of the division AO (Objective 

GREY was secured at 1501). The third team, on Objective RED (secure

at 1800), was recovered on the evening or during the night of 25 February.

These LRS teams had remained in hide-positions in enemy territory for 

approximately 54 to 72 hours, transmitting their reports on enemy movement into and out of the zone directly to the base station at the DMAIN.76 

While the division had planned for three additional LRS insertions on 25 

February, by that time the division had passed through the targets. No further doctrinal use was made of this division’s LRS teams.

The 101st Airborne Division inserted four LRS teams on the night o

23 February, three into forward operating base (FOB) COBRA and a fourth 

on main supply route (MSR) TEXAS northeast of As Salman. The three 

teams at FOB COBRA were to report on enemy activity there in advance of 

the division’s seizure of the terrain for subsequent use as a forward arming 

and refueling point (FARP) for its large helicopter force. The team on MSR 

TEXAS was to report on any movement into the French area. The depth of 

all these insertions was approximately 160 kilometers.7

The corps LRSU, Company D of 522d MI Battalion, was assigned a 

mission to conduct terrain reconnaissance in front of the corps. The unit 

spent considerable time and effort in the preparatory period developing 

and practicing mobile terrain-reconnaissance techniques using civilian 
13

pickup trucks delivered and extracted by CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The 

teams were to be inserted, conduct route reconnaissance along designated 

30-40 mile routes, and be extracted. Three teams, which along with their 

helicopter support were designated Task Force Stalker, conducted full-up 

rehearsals of this mission for about two weeks before G-day.78

Intelligence that came into the corps from other sources obviated the 

need for this mounted reconnaissance, and other missions of a more conventional nature were selected for the three teams. They would be inserted 

into an NAI from which they could monitor the movement of Iraqi forces 

toward the corps from the north or east. The teams were all inserted about 

130 miles into Iraq on the late evening of 23 February using UH-60 helicopters. Team 2 was compromised by Bedouins about 3 hours after insertion; Team1 was compromised by women and children on the afternoo

of 24 February; and Team 3 was compromised by a small group of deserting Iraqi soldiers (that they took control of) on the evening of 24 February. All three teams were recovered safely, along with the EPWs captured 

by Team 3, less than 24 hours after insertion. The mission was judged a 

failure in that the anticipated movement of Iraqi forces would likely have 

come during the subsequent 24-hour period.

In addition to his own corps assets, Lieutenant General Luck had the 

use of five special forces ODAs (operational detachment alpha) for longrange reconnaissance of avenues of approach into the corps area from the 

north. These avenues were outside of the corps’ area of operations but in 

the corps’ area of interest. The five teams were inserted north and south 

of the Euphrates River on 23 February by helicopters of 160th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and between them manned eight 

hide-sites. Only three of these eight sites remained in operation long 

enough to perform the assigned surveillance mission. The remainder 

were compromised by Iraqi civilian or military personnel and had to be 

abandoned, some under enemy fire. The terrain in the surveillance-objective area lacked sufficient concealment for the teams, and there were too 

many civilians, both villagers and Bedouins, wandering about the area. 

A participant in this operation also cited lack of training and inadequate 

intelligence as reasons for its overall failure.79

In the VII Corps AO to the east, limited employment of LRS units 

occurred before G-Day. F Company, 51st Infantry (LRS) was assigned to

the 511th MI Battalion but in OPCON to the 207th MI Brigade while it

parent battalion was fully engaged in planning to execute the corps’ EPW 

mission. F-51st Infantry was a highly trained unit that had participated in
1

corps-level exercises and maneuvers in Germany.80 The corps aviation unit 

that supported the LRS company, 11th Aviation Brigade, because of othe

out-of-country commitments, was generally not available for training, 

and consequently the LRS company used trucks for exercise insertions 

and extractions. The corps staff had not developed command-and-control 

expertise for the fixed- and rotary-wing aviation support required for deep 

insertions and extractions of LRS teams.

When the LRS company arrived in the desert, it undertook a rigorous 

training program to prepare for combat. It practiced helicopter operations with air crews of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

to develop insertion and extraction expertise. LRS teams tested various 

methods of digging hide-positions in the desert, finally arriving at the use 

of a pre-fabricated cover over which they laid the material excavated from 

the hide.81 The soldiers perfected reporting procedures and mastered the

technical use of a new antenna. And the entire LRS company continued its 

regular physical-fitness regimen in the desert.

The commander of 207th MI Brigade, which had OPCON of the corps 

LRS company, briefed General Frederick Franks on courses of action for 

employing his LRS teams. While General Franks knew his LRS soldiers 

were tactically competent in their surveillance and communications tasks, 

he was aware of their training shortfall, and that of his own staff, in the use 

of aviation assets. The briefing also informed him of the difficulty in constructing undetectable hide-positions. Because he felt that the LRS teams 

could not provide him intelligence he would be unable to acquire from any 

other source, Franks determined that VII Corps LRS assets would not be 

employed in the doctrinal manner, deep in enemy territory. In his final analysis, the risk of LRS failure outweighed the possible benefit of their use.

 F-51st Infantry was subsequently split into two parts: 10 teams wer

retained under 207th MI Brigade control and two teams were attached to 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (16 February 1991). Four VII Corps L

teams were truck-inserted into hide-positions on the border berm in late 

January 199

82 The teams were actually dropped south of the berm and 

walked to their positions several hundred meters north of the berm. Their 

mission was to provide surveillance of the terrain in front of the corps and 

report any sightings through their base station located at the corps TAC 

CP. While corps units in the area (in late January the 1st Infantry Division

cavalry screen) were aware of this mission, these units did not know the 

exact locations of the hide positions.

Due to a misunderstanding between a single LRS team and its base 
13

station on the procedure for using a duress code, the base station concluded that this team was under duress. Unable to communicate with the team 

using its assigned operating frequency and also an emergency frequency, 

the base station apprised the MI brigade TOC of the problem. After several hours of concerted effort by the MI brigade staff and elements of 1-4

Cavalry Squadron of 1st Infantry Division, the team was found intact and

unharmed. On order of the VII Corps commander, all four deployed LRS 

teams were pulled out about 24 hours after their insertion. The 10 teams

under VII Corps control were not redeployed before G-Day.

After G-Day, the VII Corps LRS Company performed two missions. A 

small number of teams were attached to maneuver units on the corps right 

flank and placed out during the advance as pickets, with the mission to detect possible Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait. These teams reported 

to the division in whose area they were operating. The other mission performed by the VII Corps LRS Company was to provide ground security 

for Task Force Sand Hawk. This force was comprised of an engineer unit, 

a tank platoon, a group of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight-control 

personnel, and the LRSC. The engineer platoon constructed a 1,600-foot

airstrip in Iraq behind the advancing American forces; the strip was to be 

used for the Pioneer UAV to extend its range deep into Iraq. While guarding this air strip, the LRSC took custody of, and built a makeshift cage for 

about 350 EPW.

The LRS unit of 1st Infantry Division, D Company of 101st MI Battalion, arrived in theater in mid-January 1991 and was assigned to Co

Command Carter in the desert north of Log Base Echo.83 After arriving in 

its assigned sector to the division’s front, D Company spent several days 

conducting rehearsals in the desert to the south, training its soldiers how 

to use the recently issued global positioning system (GPS) devices, and 

testing communications equipment to determine the best time for use and 

best frequency for AM radio transmissions. The company commander was 

determined not to replicate the experience of the VII Corps LRSC.

On 29 January Major General Thomas G. Rhame, the 1ID commander,

met with the commanders of the LRS company, 101st MI Battalion, and

4th Cavalry Squadron, and the division G2, chief of staff, and General Carter (ADC-M) to discuss two issues: operational subordination of the LRSU 

and its readiness to perform its assigned combat mission. After listening 

to a variety of suggestions, Rhame authorized the LRSU to continue in its 

operational subordination to the divisional cavalry squadron (1-4 Cavalry

Squadron) and approved the detachment’s operational plan.
13

The first two 1st Infantry Division LRS teams were inserted by M-3 

Bradleys at last light on  February. The LRS soldiers were dropped off

about three kilometers south of their hide-positions on the border berm and 

walked forward to these positions in darkness. They remained in position 

until picked up by M-3 Bradleys some 32 hours later, on the morning of 

3 February. During their designated communications séances, these teams 

sent encrypted reports by AM burst-transmission radios to the company 

operations center, operated by the company executive officer, which was 

collocated with the DMAIN. The company commander was located with 

the other base station in the TOC of the 1-4 Cavalry Squadron, the unit that

would provide direct and immediate support if a team was compromised. 

The six teams of D/101st MI Battalion executed a total of 14 missio

along the border berm from 1-23 February, providing the division and

corps early warning capability while they organized in the desert for combat. All teams were picked up by Bradleys except the two teams that were 

out at the time G-Day was announced. These two teams were recovered by 

UH-60s from an air troop of the divisional cavalry squadron. Upon return 

to their operating base, all teams were debriefed by the company XO in the 

presence of a representative from the division G2 staff.

For the duration of the 100-hour war, LRSU soldiers of this division

rode forward in the long column of support vehicles, halting on one occasion to assemble several score of EPWs into a manageable formation 

and issue them meals, ready-to-eat (MREs). After combat had ended, D 

Company/101st MI Battalion was tasked to provide long-range communications for the division support command (DISCOM) with one of its bas

stations while the division consolidated and reorganized for redeployment 

back to Fort Riley, KS.

To the left of 1st Infantry Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment

was slated to screen the west flank of VII Corps with XVIII Corps and to 

the front (along with the 1-4 Cavalry Squadron from 1st ID), and in th

attack to lead 1st and 3d Armored Divisions. 2d ACR arrived in tactical

assembly area (TAA) Richardson, about 35 miles south of Tapline Road, 

on 20 January 199

84 F Company (LRS), 50th Infantry (-) was attached to 

2d ACR effective 160600 February. The company commander arrived in

the 2d ACR area with several surveillance teams and two base stations just 

a few days before the 2d ACR’s displacement forward to its assigned area 

of operations forward of Tapline Road.

The LRS detachment was subordinated to the regiment G2, with the assistant G2 acting as the staff LRS coordinator.85 The LRSC commander and 
13

staff LRS coordinator together planned and coordinated the employment 

of LRS teams in the 2d ACR area sector before G-Day. Using his organic 

transportation (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV]), 

the LRSC commander would insert two or three teams in hide-positions on 

the border berm in 2d ACR sector, each team remaining in place for three 

to four days. Together, the two officers would select the general locations 

for these teams based on map reconnaissance, and the LRSC commander 

would make the final position determination at the time of insertion.

The staff LRS coordinator was responsible for coordinating with 2d 

ACR support elements: aviation units for emergency aerial extraction and 

ground (armored) units for a QRF. The LRSC commander would conduct 

insertions, resupply (primarily of water), and extractions using his organic 

vehicles. The LRSC surveillance teams linked up with the squadrons in 

whose sector they would operate on 17 February to accomplish final coordination, with the regiment’s forces now closed on forward assembly 

area (FAA) Garcia.86 The LRSC teams were inserted that day or the next 

and submitted negative reports of enemy activity twice daily thereafter 

to a base station collocated with the regimental main command post 

(RMAIN). A resupply of the LRS teams in position was accomplished on 

22 February, the same day they reported a tracked vehicle to their rear. It 

turned out to be a 1st Infantry Division M-88 tracked recovery vehicle,

lost in the desert.87 When the 2d ACR crossed the line of departure on 

24 February, the LRS teams were recovered by their commander and the 

LRSC fell in the column of advancing vehicles behind the RMAIN. About 

24 hours into the advance, the LRSC was released from attachment to 2d 

ACR and returned to the control of VII Corps.

This detachment executed no missions across the FLOT for at least 

three reasons. General Franks, the VII Corps commander, had decided 

early in the operation that no VII Corps LRS assets would be employed 

across the FLOT; the commander of 2d ACR, Colonel Leonard R. Holder, 

had an adequate intelligence picture of the terrain in his axis of advance 

from other sources, in particular from regular UAV flights; and the rapidity of the regiment’s advance outstripped the planning time required to 

execute any further LRS missions. 

Post-DESERT STORM Organizational Changes

The years immediately following Operations DESERT SHIELD/

STORM were tumultuous for the long-range surveillance community as 

a whole. Several LRS detachments disappeared with the inactivation of 

their parent divisions beginning in 1991: 2d and 3d Armored Division
13

and 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 24th Infantry Divisions. New LRS units 

emerged from the remnants of inactivating units. The flag for F Company 

(LRS), 51st Infantry (the LRSC of VII Corps) was transferred to XVIII 

Corps in 1993 after the inactivation of VII Corps. The LRSC of I Corps at

Fort Lewis was formed with the personnel from the 9th Infantry Division 

LRS Company when its parent unit, the 109th MI Battalion, was inactivated in late 1991. The new corps-level LRS company was assigned to t

14th MI Battalion.88 A new LRS company was activated in III Corps at

Fort Hood in 1995.8

Other LRSU were inactivated during this same period as a result of 

total army analysis (TAA) force structure reviews in 1991 and 1995. The

included the LRS detachments of all the remaining heavy divisions: 1st,

3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions, 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, and the 1s

Cavalry Division. These divisions’ requirements for LRS support were to 

be met by detachments from their corps LRSC. While that arrangement 

worked for V Corps divisions in Germany, which had a LRSC, both I and 

III Corps lost their active-component LRSCs in 1997 based on TAA-based

force reductions. The LRS mission for these two corps was handed off to 

the Army National Guard.90 Thus, as a result of force reductions and unit 

inactivations, in 1999 the active component of the Army had two LRSCs

(V and XVIII Corps) and five LRSDs (2d and 25th Infantry Divisions, 

10th Mountain Division, and 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions). T

101st Airborne Division LRSD was subsequently inactivated in a 200

reorganization of that division’s intelligence assets.

Doctrinal Adjustments

In October 1995, more than four years after Operation DESERT

STORM and amid wholesale reallocation of LRS assets throughout the 

Army, the Infantry School published a new edition of FM 7-93, Long-Range 

Surveillance Unit Operations.

91The doctrine contained in this new manual

was less a departure from the previous doctrine than a further elaboration of 

the same doctrine. It contained some new material that reflected changes in 

how the Army was being used by the national command authority and also 

reflected advances in communications and other technologies.

Following the less than totally successful across-the-board doctrinal 

employment of LRSU during Operation DESERT STORM, and the dissatisfaction with LRSU doctrine expressed in postwar after-action reviews, 

one might have expected some degree of retrenchment in the specific 

areas of LRSU organization, subordination, command and control, and 

mission.92 This notion was further reinforced by the inactivation of LRS 
13

detachments in armored and mechanized divisions during this time period, 

ostensibly undertaken solely for reasons of resource constraints.

However, the doctrine of LRSU organization and subordination remained unchanged, while command and control and mission employment 

changed slightly to reflect the contemporary operating environment (COE). 

LRS teams were still enjoined from conducting direct-action missions—surveillance remained their primary mission.93 The LRS company remained in 

the corps and was subordinated to the MI brigade.94 The LRS detachment 

remained in both heavy and light divisions and was subordinated to the 

division MI battalion.95 Mission requirements for LRSC and LRSD in wartime were still determined by the corps and division G2.96

Given the new field manual’s nod toward operations other than war, it 

is not surprising to see changes to the list of possible targets of LRSU surveillance. These new potential targets included: “economic activity, political and propaganda activity, drug-processing or drug-growing activity, and 

refugee flow.”97 It does not take an overactive imagination to postulate that 

“economic activity” could be “smuggling” or “possession and movement 

of contraband,” “political and propaganda activity” could be “insurgent 

information operations,” “drug-processing or drug-growing activity” could 

be “narco-terrorism resource development,” and “refugee flow” could also 

be “infiltration of border areas by illegal aliens,” “refugee-smuggling activity,” or “clandestine infiltration of human high-value targets via refugee 

flow.” All these new potential surveillance targets represent PIR reflective 

of the complex nature of the COE in 1995. They also reflect actual or potential employment of LRSU abroad in contingency operations and in the 

United States in support of federal law-enforcement agencies.98

In 1987, the corps and division G2s sat atop the process of formulating missions for LRSC and LRSD. Doctrine in 1987 was silent on the issue of who approved LRSC and LRSD missions. In practice in Operatio

DESERT STORM, corps and division commanders reserved to themselves 

the right of approval of LRSU missions. That command prerogative was 

written into the 1995 doctrine: corps and division commanders “normally”

approved LRSC and LRSD missions.99 The list of missions appropriate 

for surveillance teams expanded from the age-old surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and damage assessment to also include terrain 

and weather reporting and “collateral activities.”100 The latter is a catch-all

phrase for disaster relief, coalition support, combat search and rescue, and 

pathfinder operations. As a matter of fact, combat search and rescue and 

pathfinder operations are traditional LRRP/LRS activities conducted both 
13

in USAREUR in the early 1960s and in Vietnam

Chapter 2, “Fundamentals,” contains a new section titled “Task Organization.” While the concept of subordinating a LRSD or a portion of a 

LRSC to a brigade is not new, having been practiced frequently in Vietnam, 

it is new in the post-Vietnam era. The context of this section is that LRSU 

may come under operational control of a brigade task organization during 

a contingency operation or in an operation-other-than-war environment. 

At the time this doctrine was written, the LRSC of V Corps was the only 

LRSU remaining in Europe. It was not unusual for this unit to provide LRS 

teams to various units deploying from central Germany to the Balkans.1

Reflecting the growing complexity of detailed planning for LRS missions, FM 7-93 lists 19 essential details [emphasis in original] of a LRS

team plan, as compared to 12 in 1987. New elements include situationa

information; clearly stated PIR and associated SIR, and IR and associated 

SIR; mission statement and commander’s intent; plans for evasion and 

escape; actions to take in the case of captured enemy personnel and equipment; uniform and equipment for the team; and abort criteria for each 

phase of the mission.102 Chapters 3 (Operations) and 4 (Support) were not

substantially altered from the 1987 edition of the field manual.

The new manual contains two entirely new chapters: Chapter 5, “LRS 

in Operations Other Than War” and Chapter 6, “Infiltration and Exfiltration.” Chapter 5 is just two pages in length and lists four general categories 

of activities for possible LRS employment in operations other than war: 

support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peace 

enforcement, and peacetime contingency operations. The variety of missions a LRSU might have to perform in this environment is best illustrated 

in the following passage:

The primary differences between the activities of a LRSU 

in operations other than war and war consist of the targets 

it observes and the information it reports. It may observe a 

coca or marijuana field to discover who comes to tend or 

harvest the crop. It may observe a terrorist group’s safehouse to identify people who meet there. It may observe 

and report on economic activity such as land use, flooding, 

drought, salinization, forest-clearing, and similar activity. 

It may report on demographic activity such as migration 

of peoples, legally or illegally, or the racial or religious 

makeup of a political subdivision.10
13

This text wisely contains a warning to the LRSU commander to consult with 

a staff judge advocate before beginning any mission that may have legal 

restrictions or requirements.

Chapter 6 is a lengthy (41 pages) exposition of methods of infiltration 

and exfiltration using waterborne (rubber boat and helicopter), helicopter 

airborne (rappelling, SPIES, fast roping, and traditional air-assault insertion), airborne (static-line or free-fall parachute), stay-behind, vehicle, and 

foot-movement operations.104 It describes TTP developed over time by a

variety of conventional and unconventional military units. The stay-behind 

method of insertion is as old as LRRP doctrine itself, having been used by 

LRRP teams in USAREUR in the early 1960s and as well by many LRRP

teams in the Vietnam War.

Table 1

Page Count 1987 Appendices Page Count 1995 Appendic

 2 Personnel Recruitment and 

Selection (A)

 5 Long-Range Surveillance 

Reconnaissance (B)

 3 Operational Environments (A) 5 Geographic Environments (C)

 6 Communications and Electronic 

Warfare (B) 19 Communications (D

 2 Team Standing Operating 

Procedure Format (C)

 13 LRSU Hide and Surveillance

Sites (E)

 5 Tracking and Countertrack- ing, Evasion and Escape, and 

Survival (F)

 10 Intelligence (G

 22 Orders (H)

 4

 3

Briefback Format (D)

Debriefing Format (E) 12 Briefback and DebriefingFormats (I)

 12 Movement Techniques and

Battle Drills (J)

 9 Night Operations (K)

 18 Total 114 To

Much of FM 7-93’s increase in size and content in 1995 came from the

enlargement and addition of appendix material. The above table illustrates 
13

the greater than six-fold appendix page-count increase from 1987 to 199

and the nature of the new material.

Appendix A, “Personnel Recruitment and Selection,” addresses a longstanding problem of LRRP and LRS units—how to recruit and select qualified personnel. This appendix recommends, with the cooperation of the G1, 

a 30- to 60-day assignment probationary period for soldiers recruited to 

LRS units. The screening standards desired in a potential LRS recruit in 

1995 were

•	 airborne qualified (specialist four or corporal and below)

•	 airborne and ranger qualified (sergeant and above)

•	 GT score of 110 or abo

•	 must agree to volunteer for airborne and Ranger schools (if applicable)

•	 meet US Army height and weight or body fat standards

•	 no prior disciplinary problems

•	 no history of drug or alcohol abuse

•	 graduate One-Station Unit Training without waivers

•	 have at least two years of retainability in the unit

During the probationary period, the prospective LRS soldier was to 

meet the following minimum standards:

•	 pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (Ranger school standards)

•	 pass the Combat Water Survival Test

•	 complete a five-mile run within 40 minutes

•	 complete a 12-mile road march while carrying 35 pounds within 3 hour

•	 pass a written land navigation test

•	 complete a day and night land navigation practical exercise

•	 demonstrate proficiency in several listed basic LRSU team skills

•	 pass a comprehensive examination by the unit selection review board

Without any reference to the recruitment or retention standards themselves, this field manual addition is evidence the Army had become sensitive to personnel problems that had emerged since the creation of LRSUs 

in 1986.

Appendix B, “Long-Range Surveillance Reconnaissance,” hearkens 

back to an earlier age of LRRP—Vietnam. The authors of this appendix 
14

clearly understood and stated the risks associated with reconnaissance of 

an area, zone, or route. The appearance of this appendix suggests that the 

mission of LRSU in 1995 had already or would soon expand to encompass

more ground movement, which entailed greater risk of compromise.

Contingency Operations

This is a difficult area to discuss simply because while everyone in the 

LRS community knows that LRSU have been deployed in contingency 

operations in the decade between the end of Operation DESERT STORM 

in 1991 and the launching of the Global War on Terrorism in Septembe

2001, the exact nature of LRSU missions has been kept well hidden from

public disclosure or discussion. There have been, however, limited references to LRSU deployments and activities in official Army publications in 

both print and Internet formats.

In August 1996, soldiers of E-51st Infantry (LRS), V Corps conducte

a three-week joint military exercise, Operation Whetstone, with Hungarian army airborne soldiers.105 This exercise, designed to assist LRS soldiers

in maintaining their airborne skills, culminated with a jump from CH-47D 

helicopters. The E Company soldiers deployed to the exercise from Steel 

Castle Base Camp, Tuzla, Bosnia, where they were operating in support of 

1st Armored Division in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

A guarded glimpse of this unit’s activities in Bosnia comes from a soldier who participated in these operations for several months in 1997-98.10

A surveillance platoon (six teams) plus command and control elements of 

the company deployed from its Germany base to Bosnia. Their mission was 

covert surveillance of specific point targets, assigned by the division commander through his G2. The teams used light wheeled vehicles for insertions and extractions, with helicopters available for emergencies. Satellite 

communications (SATCOM) were the primary means of communication 

and long-wave radio was the backup. Teams were inserted with a basic load 

of ammunition, sleep and camouflage gear, special surveillance equipment, 

and several days’ supply of food and water. Mission duration was generally 

from three to five days. This source estimates that 80 percent of missions 

were accomplished without compromise.

While a portion of E Company’s soldiers were in Bosnia, others back in 

Germany upheld a long-standing LRRP/LRS tradition and went parachute 

jumping with a foreign army. In September 1998, a group of soldiers from

E Company took part in three days of parachute jumps at Wiesbaden Air 

Base, west of Frankfurt, with soldiers from France and Belgium.107 The
1

French soldiers belonged to the 13th Parachute Regiment and the Belgians

to their army’s LRRP detachment. The unit had plans, according to the 

article, to travel to France, Belgium, and Italy for a series of similar events. 

More germane to this discussion, however, is the article’s statement that 

over half of the company was deployed to Bosnia at the time of this jump 

(September 1998)

About 20 months later, in May 2000, elements of E Company deployed 

to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo to support Task Force Falcon (the US force 

component of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, the NATO presence in 

Kosovo or KFOR).108 The mission of E Company surveillance teams was

to “provide data to the TF by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance 

(R&S) operations.”109 Over a period of six months, nine teams conducted

more than 21 LRS operations, consisting of 48 team missions. Specific 

missions conducted by this unit include: surveillance of a suspected cache 

location and surveillance of indirect fire weapons being used inside the 

ground security zone (GSZ). Other indications of the unit’s mission in 

Kosovo come from this statement by Brigadier General Dennis Hardy, the 

former commander of TF Falcon:

The LRS detected and . . . documented a wide variety of 

real-time, subversive activities, including actual crossborder, guerrilla-type offensive operations, weapons and 

small unit training exercises, illegal smuggling and weapons caches.1

Clearly LRSU have an important mission to perform in the COE.

Materiel Issues

Materiel issues in the post-Vietnam LRSU era tend to fall into neat 

piles. The dearth of assigned vehicles to provide mobility to LRSU for 

both administrative and tactical needs is a long-standing problem that has 

already been mentioned. Recent experience in Southwest Asia has reinforced the need for additional vehicle support to LRSU, and apparently 

help is on the way. As long ago as Operation DESERT STORM, tactical 

commanders sought ways to provide LRSU wheeled tactical mobility for 

insertions and for reconnaissance in zone. That concept remains viable in 

many minds, particularly in the desert and mountain environment of Southwest Asia where LRSU are currently operating.

A second discernible materiel issue is the development and procurement 

of ever-more-sophisticated surveillance and communications equipment. 

These two types of gear, once separate, have now literally merged with 
14

the appearance of digital observation devices (still and video) that can be 

linked to satellite communications devices to transmit continuous, live-feed 

pictures during or immediately following surveillance. LRSU has the 

challenge, when using these devices, of accommodating for their weight 

and volume and of considering their electronic signatures when planning 

whether to purchase and use them.

A third materiel issue that has serious doctrinal implications is weaponry. For almost 20 years, conventional LRS surveillance teams have been 

equipped with standard small arms intended only for self-defense use. 

Squad automatic weapons and light machine guns in the TOE of LRSU 

have been assigned to headquarters elements and base radio stations for 

their static defense.1 A latent tendency has always existed in LRRP and 

LRS circles to desire a more powerful array of weapons for patrols and 

surveillance teams, whether they be pump-action or semi-automatic shotguns, silenced pistols and submachine guns, belt-fed light machine guns, 

grenade launchers, or sniper rifles.1 All of these and more were commonly carried and used by LRRP patrols in combat in the past. That wheel is 

coming around again, as evidenced by discussions at the 2004 LRS Conference. The RSLC staff at Fort Benning has committed to support TOE 

changes that will authorize a light machine gun (SAW) in the surveillance 

team and medium and heavy machine guns at the company. 

The RSLC staff is also proposing that sniper team(s) be added to LRS 

units, another idea whose time has come, again.1 As this study was being 

prepared, elements of the 42d Infantry Division were deploying to Iraq 

to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).115 Among the deployin

units is the 173d Infantry Detachment (LRS) of the Rhode Island Army

National Guard. In preparation for this mission, selected members of the 

unit attended the four-week National Guard Sniper School at Camp Robinson, Arkansas. Upon completing this training, the unit was issued an 

undisclosed number of M-21 sniper systems. The mission of the LRSD 

during this deployment, as described by its commander, will be “to observe areas for improvised explosive devices and indirect fire activity and, 

if ordered by the combatant commander, eliminate insurgents with their 

sniper rifles.”

Doctrine Redux

As of this writing, the US Army Infantry School is in the middle 

of preparing a new doctrinal field manual (FM 3-55.93) for LRSU. The 

new manual was released in a preliminary draft version for comments in 

November 2003 and is scheduled for camera-ready copy to be submitted for 
14

publication in December 2005. FM 3-55.93 does not contain revolutionary 

new doctrine for LRSU, but rather evolutionary changes to current doctrine.

These changes fall into two general areas: expansion and elaboration 

of current LRSU mission descriptions and increased content pertaining to 

the survivability issues of exfiltration, evasion, and recovery. The standard 

LRSU missions of surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and 

damage assessment remain as the basic mission-essential task list (METL) 

tasks.1 Special missions, for which LRSUs can be used by virtue of their 

specialized training, still include combat search and rescue (CSAR), pathfinders, NBC reporting, special escort, sensor emplacement, terrain and 

weather reporting, and stability and support tasks.1

An example of this new manual’s expanded level of detail is the section 

titled “Combat Assessment,” a mission traditionally called damage assessment.1

 Whereas both the 1987 and 1995 versions of FM 7-93 describe thi

mission in single sentences, the 2003 FM 3-55.93 uses almost 14 pages.12

The bulk of this expanded text explains to the LRS soldier the assessment 

criteria for specific objects: bridges, buildings, bunkers, dams and locks, 

distillation towers, military equipment, ground-force personnel, fuel-storage tanks, powerplant facilities, railroad facilities, roads, airfield facilities, 

satellite dishes, sea vessels, steel towers, transformers, and tunnel fixtures 

(entrances and air vents).

Not surprisingly, given the contingency experience of LRSU in the 

Balkans in the 1990s and subsequent deployments in Southwest Asia, FM

3-55.93 contains a substantial new section on the use of LRS teams in the 

urban environment.1 Surveillance remains the primary mission for LRS 

soldiers in urban terrain, followed by reconnaissance. “Operations Other 

Than War” was a standalone chapter of two pages in 1995. In 2003 it is

a section retitled “Stability and Support” and contains 18 pages of text.12

This section has the added task “arms control,” with specific reference to 

reconnaissance and surveillance of places where weapons of mass destruction could be stored.12

Chapter 6, “Communications,” is an enlarged (from 19 to 26 pages)

and technically updated version of Appendix D from the 1995 field manual. 

The goal of LRSU communications remains to ensure secure transmission 

of near-real time information over both digital and analog systems. Chapter 7, “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” brings material forward 

from Appendix G of the 1995 manual

Chapter 8, “Evasion and Recovery,” is a nine-page chapter of material 
14

pulled up and revised from Appendix F of the previous manual.124 This

chapter defines terms, identifies the evasion-recovery chain of command, 

and discusses basic principles of evasion. It is buttressed with a four-page 

Appendix M (“Evasion and Recovery”), which contains a sample evasion 

plan. The increased emphasis on this subject in the new draft field manual 

addresses a primary concern of all high-level commanders who approve 

LRSU missions—the safe return of LRSU soldiers from a mission. It clearly 

is an attempt by the LRS community to reassure high-level commanders—

we have knowledge, we have a plan, and we will return.

Table 2

Page Count 1995 Page Count 200

2 Personnel Recruitment and 

Selection (A)

3 Personnel Recruitment and 

Selection (A)

22

1

Orders (H)

Briefback and Debriefing 

Formats (I)

48 Orders and Briefs (B)

6 Mission Folder (C)

4 Isolation Area Procedures (D)

5 Geographic Environments (C) 4 Geographic Environments (E)

3 Contingencies (F)

6 Coordination for Army Aviation 

(G)

13 Hide and Surveillance Sites

(E)

6 Hide and Surveillance Sites (H)

12 Movement Techniques and

Battle Drills (J)

7 Battle Drills (I)

7 Reports (J)

16 Tracking and Counter-Track- ing, Evasion and Escape, and

Survival

8

6

Tracking and Counter-Tracking 

(K)

Evasion and Recovery (M)

9 Night Operations (K) 10 Night Operations (L

7 Fieldcraft (Z)

5 Long-Range Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (B)

8* Material moved to Chapter 4

19 Communications (D) 26 Material moved to Chapter 

10 Intelligence (G) 10 Material moved to Chapter

*Page count will increase when illustrations are inserted.
14

Table 2 compares the appendices for the 1995 and 2003 versions of the

LRSU field manual. While the overall size (page count) of the appendices 

of both manuals is the same (125 pages), note that subjects covered in Appendices B, D, and G in 1995 have been moved into the body of the 200

draft manual, and replaced by new or enlarged appendices. It is understood, 

of course, that page count provides only a quantitative, and not a qualitative, measure of the expansion of LRS doctrine. If page counts mean anything at all, the doctrine for the employment of LRSU continues to expand 

as the capability of these units is tested in the COE.

From the Cold War to the COE

Having been consigned to the dustbin of history at the end of the 

Vietnam War, LRRP units re-emerged during the mid-1980s with a new

name (long-range surveillance units) but still with the traditional primary 

missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The doctrinal focus of these new units was decidedly HUMINT collection on a 

Cold War linear battlefield. Organizationally, the LRSU looked much like 

their forebears, although no longer encumbered with motor pools and mess 

halls. LRSU have had access to a much broader array of communications 

and surveillance gear than their predecessors, while their weapons have 

largely remained conventional. Training looks similar as well, with a solid 

institutional foundation provided by the Reconnaissance and Surveillance 

Leaders Course at Fort Benning.

LRSU trained in Operation DESERT SHIELD and fought in Operation DESERT STORM with success in some missions to be sure, but also 

with frustration at the low frequency and brief duration of doctrinal missions. This was followed in rapid order by the inactivation of most division LRSDs and also of three active-component LRSCs, resulting from 

both the drawdown of the Army and the shifting of two corps-level LRSC 

missions into the reserve components. Small parcels of LRSU soldiers 

from various commands shuttled in and out of the Balkans during the 

1990s, doing their work quietly and, by the few accounts available, effectively. Doctrine written in 1987 was revised in 1995 and is current

in revision again. Left in the active component on the eve of the GWOT 

were two LRSC (V Corps in Germany and XVIII Corps at Fort Bragg) and 

five LRSD (2d, and 25th Infantry, 10th Mountain, 82d Airborne, and 101st 

Airborne [Air Assault] Divisions). These units, minus the 101st Airborn

detachment that was inactivated in 2004, soldier on in relative obscurity, 

seeking missions where they can find them and hoping to survive the ongoing reorganization of the Army.
14

Notes

1. Company O was reactivated at Fort Richardson, Alaska largely to serve as

a QRF to protect the recently discovered oil reserves and subsequently constructed 

facilities in Alaska. See Stanton, 255-61

2. Organization, Missions, and Command and Control of Special Forces 

and Ranger Units in the 1980s (Unclassified) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1979). Lieutenant General Meyer’s tasking letter is Appendix A of the study

3. Ibid., 104-5

4. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-42, US Army Operational Concept for LongRange Surveillance Units (Fort Monroe: VA, 26 October 1984), 3-4

5. Ibid., 16; and Field Circular (FC) 7-93, Long Range Surveillance Unit

Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985), vi

6. This date is from Lanning, Inside the LRRPS, 185. This assignment of the

LRSU to the MI battalion was first suggested 20 years earlier by Major Ellis D. 

Bingham, veteran communications officer of the VII Corps LRRP Company in 

1961-62 (mentioned in Chapter 3

7. See Major David P. Anders, “Long-Range Surveillance Unit Application 

in Joint Vision 2010,” MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 

8. Ibid. I was unsuccessful in finding and reviewing a copy of this agreement, signed by Major General Michael F. Spigelmire for the USAIS.

9. US Army Field Manual (FM) 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 9 June 1987), paragraph 1-

on pages 1-1 and 1

10. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-3.b.(2) on page 1

11. In the Vietnam era, only the two Field Force LRP companies (E-20th an

F-51st) and the 173d Airborne Brigade LRRP Detachment and their Ranger-designated successor units were maintained on jump status (in addition to the Range

companies back in the United States).

12. FM 31-18, 1968, paragraph 3-7 on page 15; FM 7-93, paragraph 1-7

page 1-7

13. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2 on pages 2-1 through 2-

14. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-3 on page 2-4

15. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2.a on page 2-2. I used the word “example” be I used the word “example” because the source text indicates that it identifies “some” of the targets

16. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-8 on page 2-1
14

17. FM 7-93, paragraph 3-5.b., c., and d., on pages 3-18 to 3-20

18. FM 7-93, paragraph 4-12.d. on page 4-

19. The staff study was initiated by Captain Russell A. Grimm, son of Colonel

Philip D. Grimm, commander of the first VII Corps provisional LRRP company 

in early 1960. See DA Form 2496, Subject: Division Reconnaissance Detachment,

dated 9 July 1981, with accompanying notes, Grimm collection. Captain Grim

had just moved up to the division staff from the 2d Battalion, 75th Rangers. In 

developing this proposal, he consulted with his then-retired father and several exLRRP members of the 2-75 Rangers who had served in B Company (Ranger) at 

Fort Carson. E-mail, Russell A. Grimm to author, 8 August 2005.

20. The division G3 at this time was Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Shelton, 

future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shelton, who had special forces 

combat experience in Vietnam, in his nonconcurrence acknowledged the need 

for HUMINT collection, but believed the long-range reconnaissance mission 

belonged to the Ranger battalions, one of which was stationed at Fort Lewis. He 

also cautioned against stripping well-motivated soldiers from conventional units.

21. Captain Grimm’s Officer Efficiency Report that closed out on 31 

October 1981 confirms, in both the rater’s and senior rater’s narratives, the 

formation of the division reconnaissance detachment during the period covered 

by the report; Grimm collection.

22. Headquarters, 2d Battalion (Ranger) 75th Infantry, Subject: Tips of the 

Trade/Lessons Learned, dated 5 April 1979, Grimm collection. The information

contained in this document was, in essence, TTP developed by LRRP/Ranger 

companies in combat in Vietnam. The quoted passage appears on the cover page.

23. Recall that the last Vietnam Ranger company (H Company, 1st Air

Cavalry Division) was inactivated in August 1972

24. This discussion of the 82d Airborne Division’s provisional reconnaissance 

platoon is based on author interviews with General (Retired) James J. Lindsay, 

25 January 2005, at Fort Leavenworth, KS; by e-mail with Major General Richard J. Quirk, III, 19 March 2005; by telephone with Colonel (Retired) Thomas

O’Connell, 20 April 2005; by telephone with Colonel James A. Davis, 21 April

2005, and on several documents provided by Colonel Davis that will be cited as 

the “Davis collection.” General Lindsay commanded the division from 6 February 

1981 to 24 June 1983, Colonel O’Connell was the commander of 313th MI Battalion, General Quirk was his battalion S3, and Colonel Davis was the initial plat

leader of this reconnaissance platoon, assigned to it on  June 198

25. Letter, subject line: Airborne Division Reconnaissance Platoon, Major 

General James J. Lindsay, 21 June 1983. The quoted passage is from pag 1 of 

8-page inclosure to the letter that describes the manning and equipping of this unit. 

At the time, the division’s organic “eyes” were its AN/PPS-5 ground-surveillance 

radars (GSR), with a maximum detection range of six kilometers for personnel and 

10 kilometers for moving vehicles
14

26. General Lindsay’s experience with cavalry units “evidently convinced 

him that non-intelligence units had been too quick to misuse these kinds of units. . 

. . He believed that assignment to an MI unit would provide the highest assurance 

that the unit would engage in intelligence collection” (Quirk interview). General 

Lindsay had served as both an infantry battalion commander and the division G3 

in the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.

27. Letter, subject: 82d Airborne Division Reconnaissance Platoon Goals for 

FY 84, First Lieutenant John A. Davis,  September 1983, pages 6-7, Davis collectio

28. DA Form 2496, subject: Request for Authorization of “Expert LRRP 

Patch,” with attachments, First Lieutenant John A. Davis, 20 January 1984. An

additional DA Form 2496 among the inclosures, dated 6 February 1984, indicates

awarding of this patch to 13 individuals out of 26 tested, Davis collection

29. Letter, subject: Lessons Learned—Operation URGENT FURY, First 

Lieutenant John A. Davis, 06 January 1984, Davis collection

30. This statement is based on Ronald Matty, “Memorandum from the Office 

of Infantry Proponency, United States Army Infantry School, to Major General 

Carl Ernst, Commandant, United States Army Infantry School, November 1997,”

cited in Major David P. Anders, “Long-Range Surveillance Unit Application in 

Joint Vision 2010,” MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command

and General Staff College, 1999), 11. The actual date of activation or inactivati

of each LRSD was a function of when the TOE for this unit was authorized to or 

withdrawn from the parent MI battalion. This information, while available in the 

files at the Center for Military History, was not accessed for this study.

31. E Company (LRP), 51st Infantry was activated in Vietnam in Decembe

1968 as the LRP company for the 23d (Americal) Infantry Division. Soldiers

currently assigned to E Company (LRS) in V Corps trace their lineage to that 

earlier unit, and honor a Medal of Honor recipient of the follow-on G Company 

(Ranger), 75th Infantry. The Pruden Competition is a tactical field-skills competition for the unit’s soldiers. It is named after Staff Sergeant Robert J. Pruden, who 

was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions on 29 November 

1969 while assigned to G Company. Pruden is buried at Fort Snelling National

Cemetery in Minnesota; Pruden Hall, which houses the Ranger Hall of Fame at 

Fort Benning, was named in his honor.

32. Survey completed by Master Sergeant (Retired) Mark S. Elliot, a member 

of this unit from 1986-89, survey received 25 January 2005

33. Captain Stephen Powell and Captain William Soderberg, “Eyes Behind 

the Lines,” Military Intelligence 14 (July 1988): 44-

34. Major Thomas M. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” Infantry (January-February 1990): 11-2. Major Jordan commanded the 3d Infantry Division

LRSD for almost 30 months during this period.

35. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 12
14

36. The Army did authorize an executive officer, operations sergeant, supply 

sergeant, and armorer in subsequent LRSD TOEs, but did not enlarge the detachment to eight surveillance teams or upgrade the rank of the detachment sergeant. 

See TOE 07209C000, Long-Range Surveillance Detachment, 21 January 1993

at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/toe/07209L000.htm; last accessed on

January 2005.

37. One of the roots of this problem was the necessary training and designation of large numbers of infantry soldiers to serve as drivers, track commanders, 

and gunners on Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. These soldiers carried the 

MOS identifier 11M.

38. Lieutenant Colonel John Schatzel, former commander of the LRSU of 

1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley before Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM,

stated that while he was able to acquire NCOs from the two mechanized infantry 

battalions at Fort Riley, almost all of his soldiers came directly from the replacement stream. Their initial selection was made on the basis of physical appearance, 

records screening, and volunteerism. Schatzel interview, 18 January 2005. General

Lindsay stated that during the mid-1990s every infantry soldier assigned to Fort

Hood, Texas was viewed as a potential LRS soldier. Lindsay interview, 25 January 2005. See Major Thomas M. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” Infantry (January-February 1990): 12. In his 30 months as commander of the LRSD o

3d Infantry Division, Jordan had to recruit for 11B positions among both soldier

and NCOs who lacked adequate light infantry experience.

39. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 12. Captain John A. Schatzel,

“RSD: Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome,” Infantry (January-February 1993): 38

41, 38. The Army also made this change later in the TOE

40. 110th MI Battalion, Memorandum, Subject: LRSD Manning and Support, dated 29 April 1991, Grimm collec

41. Long Range Surveillance Detachment (Airborne), 110th MI Battalio

Memorandum, Subject: Manning the LRSD, dated 5 September 1990, Grimm

collection.

42. Long Range Surveillance Detachment, Memorandum, Subject: 

Strengths/Weaknesses in the LRSD, undated, Grimm collection.

43. Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 12.

44. After 1st Infantry Division LRS teams were extracted from their OPs on the

border berm, they were transported in the advancing division logistic column in a 

borrowed five-ton dump truck. Schatzel interview.

45. This description of the genesis of the Long Range Surveillance Unit Leader 

Course is from an e-mail exchange with a participant, Arthur A. Durante, 26 January 2005. In 1985 Mr. Durante worked in the S3 section of the Ranger Department

at Fort Benning.

46. An excellent description of this early course is in William Lyde, Jr., 
15

“LRSU Course,” Infantry (November-December 1986): 37-8. Five active-component and five reserve-component courses were scheduled for FY 1987

47. Major Curtis L. Devan, “The HUMINT Connection: LRSD and the 

Heavy Division,” Military Intelligence 13 (October 1987): 43-4, 43. MI branch’

primary concern was that LRS soldiers be able to identify equipment and systems 

that analysts considered to be high-value targets (HVT). 

48. This exercise sometimes was conducted in support of Joint Task Force 

South along the southwestern border to observe drug-smuggling operations. Durante e-mail.

49. Over a period of about 30 months, from November 1989 to mid-1992, no

a single LRSU commander rotating through the Joint Readiness Training Center 

at Fort Polk was a Fort Benning LRSLC (leaders course) graduate. During the 

same time period, about one-half of surveillance team leaders had attended training 

at Fort Benning. See Captain David A. McBride, “Selecting and Training Long 

Range Surveillance Unit Commanders,” Infantry (July-August 1992): 42-4, 43

50. See the course Internet site at www-benning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/

default.htm; last accessed on 31 January 2005

51. Schatzel interview, 18 January 2005. Also see Captain John A. Schatzel

“LRSD: Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome,” Infantry (January-February 1993): 38

41

52. After achieving parachute qualification, the unit’s soldiers were permitted 

to conduct on-duty training parachute jumps from military aircraft, but were not 

officially on jump status and did not receive the commensurate jump pay.

53. The event was named in honor of Specialist 4th Class Robert D. Law, a 

posthumous Medal of Honor recipient from the 1st Infantry Division’s I Company

(Ranger), 75th Infantry during the Vietnam War. Specialist 4th Class Law threw 

himself on an enemy grenade during a firefight and was killed on 22 February 

1969. He is buried in Mount Olive Cemetery, Fort Worth, Texas

54. Captain Christopher Paul McPadden, “LRS Unit METL Training: The 

JTF-6 Solution,” Military Intelligence (January-March 1993): 29-30. McPadden

commanded the 1st Infantry Division LRSD after Operation DESERT STORM

55. Survey, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Hyneman, 15 November 2004. Hyneman commanded the LRSD of 6th Infantry Division (C/106th MI Battalion) fo

12 months as a captain

56. Memorandum, 107th MI Battalion, Subject: Command and Control of

the 7ID(L)’s Long Range Surveillance Detachment, dated 6 June 1991, Grim

collection.

57. Telephone interview, Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, 24 January 

2005.

58. Survey, Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, received 1 Februar
1

2005. The Oregon activity would have been under the auspices of Operation 

GHOST DANCER, a joint federal law enforcement agency and state National 

Guard activity to eradicate drug crops cultivated on federal land.

59. Exercise reports from the combat training centers (CTC) are prepared 

in two copies—one that is kept on file at the CTC for historical reference by the 

observer/controllers (OCs) to monitor trends, and the other that is provided to the 

unit commander. Only the training unit commander can release the exercise report 

for his unit.

60. Telephone interview with LTC (Retired) Thomas P. Odom, military analyst in the JRTC CALL Cell at Fort Polk, 15 March 2005

61. An example of the latter is attendance at a special-operations course

conducted by the 23d Regiment of the British SAS. Master Sergeant Mark Elliot 

survey, 25 January 2005.

62. XVIII Corps did not have an organic LRSC at this time and received the 

LRSD from 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, 2d Armored Division (which 

was in the process of deactivating) on 26 September 1990. This unit was attached

to 525th Military Intelligence Brigade for the duration of the operation.

63. Charles Lane Toomey, XVIII Airborne Corps in DESERT STORM: From 

Planning to Victory (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2004), 292.

64. This description is from two sources: a postwar oral interview conducted 

by LTC Richard J. Quirk, III, who was the division G2 before and during the 

operation described; and a study Colonel Quirk later wrote when he was a student 

at the US Army War College: Intelligence for the Division—A G2 Perspective

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 27 April 1992). This document

contains many references to the 24th Infantry Division’s LRSU performance during 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

65. Quirk describes the run up-to-war period in Intelligence for the Division, 

116-

66. Ibid., 116, 2

67. Ibid., 116, 216

68. Ibid., 118, 20

69. Ibid., 119, 20

70. Ibid., 15

71. Ibid., Quirk describes this process in detail on pages 218-2

72. Ibid., 219

73. Ibid., Quirk describes this process in detail on pages 220-1

74. In prior assignments, General Scott had commanded a Ranger battalion 

and the Special Operations Command in Europe.
15

75. In his postwar interview, LTC Quirk mentioned an EF-111, “Radar Jammer Birds,” and Wild Weasels (F4G Phantom), along with an Army “quick f

helicopter” (EH-60A Blackhawk) for jamming and intelligence capability while 

inserting the LRS teams, page 49. See also Quirk, Intelligence for the Division, 

290.

76. This time approximation is the author’s estimate based upon secondary 

accounts of when each position was secured by friendly forces. These times are 

shown in Toomey, 352-5. Quirk, in Intelligence for the Division, 290, uses the 

more general expression “for two to four days.”

77. Toomey, 294.

78. This account of the corps LRSD’s training and mission is in Toomey, 

294-5.

79. A brief description of this mission is in Toomey, 298-9.

80. The author conducted three interviews to inform this discussion of VII 

Corps LRS use: Brigadier General (Retired) Stanley F. Cherrie (formerly the 

corps G3) on 17 January 2005; Colonel (Retired) Gary E. Phillips (formerly the

S3 of 207th MI Brigade) on 20 January 2005, and Major (Retired) Kendall D. 

Gott (formerly the 2d ACR Assistant S2) on 20 January 2005.

81. During this training in building a desert hide, the soldiers discovered that

camels could smell water, even if it was in containers stacked in the hide-position. 

This further increased the danger of compromise by herdsmen. Phillips interview.

82. In the sector of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment on the corps left flank, this 

insertion date was 26 January. See Kendall D. Gott, In Glory’s Shadow: In Service 

With the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment During the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991

(Leavenworth, KS: by the author, 1997), 107. (A copy of this document is available from the special collections section of the Combined Arms Research Librar

[CARL] at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.)

83. The location and actions of this combat command are described in Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 2002), 149-53. This description of the actions of

the LRS detachment is based on an oral interview conducted with its former commander, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Schatzel, on 18 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS

84. This date is from Gott, In Glory’s Shadow, 100.

85. This staff officer was then-Captain Kendall Gott, with whom the author 

conducted an oral interview on 20 January 2005.

86. Gott, In Glory’s Shadow, 128

87. Ibid., 133

88. Interview (telephone) with Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn, 24 
15

January 2005. SGM Chunn was command sergeant major of the 109th MI Battalion at the time and then command sergeant major of the 14th MI Battalio

89. I cannot confirm, but suspect that the III Corps LRS Company was built 

from the remnants of inactivating LRS detachments from other Fort Hood units, 

such as 1st Cavalry Division and 2d Armored Division

90. As of this writing, the I Corps mission is assigned to F Company, 425th 

Infantry (LRS) of the Michigan Army National Guard and the III Corps mission 

is assigned to H Company, 121st Infantry (LRS) of the Georgia Army Nationa

Guard.

91. FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, DC:

Department of the Army, 3 October 1995)

92. Here are some sample recommendations culled from Operation DESERT 

STORM after-action review comments: “The LRSD should either be removed 

from the division TO&E or be placed as a subordinate unit with the divisional cavalry squadron.” “Consider elimation of LRSU in heavy divisions. Retain LRSU in 

light, airmobile, and airborne divisions. . . . If the decision is made to retain LRSU 

in the heavy division, . . . move LRSU from the CEWI battalion to the cavalry 

squadron.” “The LRSD should either be removed from the division TO&E or be 

placed as a subordinate unit of the divisional cavalry squadron. . . . there is a serious question as to whether this element is really needed at division level.” “Look 

at removing from Div MI Bn, place Corps LRSD with Regimental Cav organizations.” “LRSDs at the Corps level need to be under the control of the Corps cavalry 

regiment.” CALL Restricted Archives, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, 

various sub-files made available to author under subject heading “Long Range 

Surveillance Units in Desert Shield/Storm,” 18 January 2005

93. FM 7-93, paragraphs 1-2.b and Chapter 1, Section I

94. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-6

95. FM 7-93, paragraph 1-7

96. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-1

97. FM 7-93, paragraph 2-2.a. These items are at the end of a list of 14 possible targets

98. The LRSD of 1st Infantry Division participated in counter-drug missions

with Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) in 1992. See McPadden, “LRS Unit METL Training: The JTF-6 Solution,” 29-30. Similarly, the LRSC of I Corps supported federal law-enforcement agencies in drug-enforcement activities in California and

Oregon during the same time period. Chunn interview, 25 January 2005.

99. FM 7-93, paragraphs 2-2.a.(1) and (2)

100. Ibid, paragraphs 2-3.a through f

101. This conclusion is based on anecdotal evidence. One can find occasional 

references in print and on the Internet to deployment of teams from E-51st Infantry
15

(LRS) (the V Corps LRSC) to the Balkans, but these references do not clearly 

indicate the actual mission performed. When I have interviewed participants, they 

did not disclose specific LRS activities, citing classification issues.

102. The statement of “actions to take in the case of captured enemy personnel and equipment” may reflect the experience of one XVIII Corps LRS team in

Operation DESERT STORM, which took control of five deserting Iraqi soldiers 

and was recovered along with its prisoners. But the mission to capture EPW and 

their equipment was commonly assigned to LRRP teams in Vietnam.

103. FM 7-93, paragraph 5-3

104. SPIES is an acronym for “special patrol infiltration/exfiltration system.” 

This emergency-extraction system includes a purpose-built harness for the soldier 

and equipment to anchor a single long rappelling rope into the floor of a helicopter. One rope with multiple hook-up points is dropped from the helicopter to a 

team properly positioned on the ground. Each soldier hooks up to a primary and 

alternate hook-up point. When all team members are hooked to the rope, the signal is given to the SPIES master in the helicopter who instructs the pilot to ascend. 

When the lowest soldier on the rope is at a safe altitude, the helicopter transitions 

to horizontal flight. Use of this system is fully explained in Training Circular 21-

24, Rappelling, 24 September 1991 and subsequent edition

105. Sergeant Andrew Aquino, “Airborne Soldiers Drop into Hungary,” The

Talon 2, no. 35 (13 September 1996): 

106. Survey A, received on 4 January 2005

107. “Partnership Jump,” V Corps PAO at www.army.mil/soldiers/sep199

news/news07.html; last accessed 19 January 2005

108. The unit’s participation in this operation is discussed in some detail

in Major Robert L. Chamberlain and First Sergeant Ralph Kluna, “Long-Range 

Surveillance Operations in Kosovo—Complementing Existing Capabilities,” 

Military Intelligence 27 (January-February 2001): 47-52

109. Ibid., 48-9

110. Ibid., 5

111. The mobility issue was discussed at a recent LRS Symposium at Fo

Benning. The RSLC staff is working with the Infantry Center on proposed TOE 

changes that will result in light-medium tactical vehicles (LMTV) and ground 

mobility vehicles (GMV) at the unit level and all-terrain vehicles (ATV) at the 

team level. See “Commander’s Corner” at the LRSC Internet website: wwwbenning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/Commander%20Corner.htm, last accessed 

on 31 January 2005

112. The earliest TOE for LRRP companies in Europe made provision fo

Browning M2 heavy-barreled machine guns in the company HQ and base radio 

stations and one M79 grenade launcher in the company HQ. See TOE 7-157E,
15

“Infantry Long Range Patrol Company” 28 September 1964

113. This tendency was amply discussed in the Vietnam section of this study

In the current era, it publicly surfaced as long ago as 1990. See Jordan, “Improving the Division LRSU,” 12. There, Jordan recommends “a silenced weapon fo

each team.”

114. See “Commander’s Corner” at the RSLC Internet website: wwwbenning.army.mil/RTB/New_LRSC/Commander%20Corner.htm; last accesse

on 31 January 2005. The use of sniper teams and weapons with LRRP units in

Vietnam is well documented and has been discussed earlier in this study.

115. Staff Sergeant Raymond Drumsta, “Rainbow Division Trains IntelligenceSnipers,” Army News Service. This article can be viewed at www.42id.army.mi

newsstory/marksman_story.htm; last accessed on 19 January 2005

116. Ibid. While the text of this article repeatedly uses the descriptor M14 f

the sniper rifle, the accompanying photograph shows an M21 sniper rifle minus 

scope being fired from a bipod at a Fort Drum, New York training range. The M21 

sniper system, based on the M14 semi-automatic rifle, was used by the US Army 

from 1969 to 1988, when it was replaced by the bolt-action M24 sniper syste

117. FM 3-55.93 (Preliminary Draft), Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, November 2003), paragrap

1-5.a

118. Ibid., paragraph 1-5.b. There is no further elaboration in the new field 

manual about the special escort and sensor emplacement tasks.

119. Ibid., Section IV of Chapter 

120. “The LRS team members are trained and equipped to conduct tactical

damage assessment,” FM 7-93, 1987, paragraph 2-3.d. on page 2-4; FM 7-93,

1995, paragraph 2-3.d. FM 3-55.93, Section IV, pages 4-25 through 39

121. FM 3-55.93, Section VI of Chapter 4, pages 4-41 through 

122. FM 7-93, 1995, Chapter 5, “LRS in Operations Other Than War.” F

3-55.93, Chapter 4, Section VII. “Stability and Support,” pages 4-48 through 67.

123. FM 3-55.93, paragraph 4-48.b

124. FM 7-93, 1995, Appendix F, “Tracking and Countertracking, Evasio

and Escape, and Survival,” paragraph F-2.

15

Chapter 5

Conclusions

This study has examined US Army long-range reconnaissance patrol 

(LRRP) doctrine and experience in three periods and environments: USAREUR from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, Vietnam during the perio

of 1966-72, and the post-Vietnam era from approximately 1984 to the ev

of the Global War on Terrorism in September 2001 The paradigm around 

which the study was conducted—DOTMLP—will also serve as a roadmap for this concluding analysis.

Doctrine

 LRRP doctrine in the periods studied has been reflected in a series of 

field manuals published in 1962, 1965, 1968, 1987, and 1995, with another 

revision due for publication in late 2005. The published doctrine has remained remarkably stable, despite its expansion from a 26-page field manual in 1962 to more than 225 pages in the current (1995) field manual. The 

bulk of this expansion has been devoted to elaborating on the TTP LRRP 

units have developed over time to perform their missions and survive on an 

increasingly lethal battlefield.

The mission list of LRRP units has been less stable, reflecting the tendency of local commanders to employ their assets as required by each unit’s 

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). During the 

USAREUR period, from 1961 and lasting just under a decade, LRRP companies and detachments in 3d Infantry Division, SETAF, V Corps, and VI

Corps were primarily focused on deep surveillance and target-acquisition 

tasks on a linear battlefield. If “mission creep” occurred in USAREUR, 

that label may apply to the VII Corps LRRP company’s brief mission to 

monitor the Czech border, the mission to deliver atomic demolition munitions assigned to both V and VII Corps LRRP companies, and perhaps the 

V Corps LRRP company’s mission to act as aggressor troops in large exercises. The European experience was particularly important in establishing 

communications procedures and structures that remain a vital component 

and strength of current LRRP operations.

In the Vietnam War, the mission list of LRRP units was expanded greatly. 

The phrase “mission creep” does not do justice to the gross enlargement of 

LRRP missions that occurred during the course of the war. LRRP units and 

soldiers were subject to a broad spectrum of doctrinal and non-doctrinal uses, 

from the traditional reconnaissance and surveillance tasks of an intelligence 
15

nature to mundane security activities in and around base camps, along with 

myriad other tasks normally assigned to standard infantry units. LRRP 

soldiers also performed combat search and rescue (CSAR), sensor planting 

and servicing, missions to confirm sensor-derived intelligence, POW-camp 

raids (or training for such raids), damage assessment after B-52 Operation 

ARC LIGHT missions, and raids to destroy active radio transmitters, to 

name just a few. Over time, the mission emphasis of LRRP operations 

in many units shifted from intelligence gathering to offensive combat 

operations. This increasingly became the case after units were Rangerdesignated in early 1969. Late in the war, heavy-team and even platoonsize missions were not unusual in some divisions, belying the intelligencegathering roots of early LRRP doctrine

Doctrine in the post-Vietnam era returned initially to the 1960s USAREUR model—linear (deep) and intelligence-focused—but after Operation

DESERT STORM broadened to encompass a variety of less-traditional 

missions. The testing grounds for these new missions were right here in the 

United States, in the forests and deserts of the West and Southwest where 

soldiers worked for federal counter-narcotics agencies, and in the Balkans 

where they supported peace-enforcement operations. In some ways, this 

expansion mirrors the broadening of LRRP employment doctrine that occurred in the Vietnam era, from rather narrow intelligence-focused missions in USAREUR in the 1960s to manifold intelligence and direct-action

missions in Vietnam within the same decade. These alterations to LRS 

missions in the 1990s occurred in response to changing controlling-unit

missions and, simply, to changes of controlling-unit commanders. Just as 

their Vietnam-era predecessors did 40 years ago, current LRSU commanders and soldiers are adapting and adjusting to an expanded mission list. If 

they are to remain viable as a force, future LRSU will have to continue 

to adapt and adjust to non-traditional and sometimes non-doctrinal missions.

Organization

LRRP unit organizations have changed remarkably little over the three 

examined periods. Remove the mechanics and cooks from a 1960s USAREUR LRRP company and, minus the uniform changes, it looks much

like a full-strength, 1968 LRP company in Vietnam or a LRS company

at Fort Bragg in 1998. The foundation elements of the LRRP unit have

always been, and remain, a small headquarters command-and-control element, a communications section or platoon, and two to four patrol platoons 

comprised of six to eight teams of generally six men each. If the LRSU of 
15

the next generation receive the vehicles they seek for administrative and 

tactical mobility, their organizations will look more, not less like the USAREUR LRRP companies of 40 years ago.

Training

The USAREUR LRRP companies, out of necessity, survived on their 

own internal training programs. Other than the airborne schools run by 

Fort Benning and the 8th Infantry Division in theater and communications 

classes taught by neighboring signal units, the V and VII Corps LRRP companies had to plan and execute most of their own training. They took this 

responsibility seriously, as illustrated by the training program established 

in the VII Corps company. Largely based on the USAREUR experience, 

LRRP doctrine in 1965 and still in 1968 was predicated on the premise tha

it took about eight months to produce a well-trained LRRP soldier.

The Vietnam-era LRRP units all developed unit training programs 

that were both modeled after and in support to the training provided by 

the MACV Recondo School. Because of constant personnel turnover, unit 

training in Vietnam was near continuous and focused on the tasks required 

to send soldiers on combat patrols as soon as possible. Many, but by far not 

all, LRRP soldiers in Vietnam were privileged to attend the MACV Recondo School. Whether a soldier went to Nha Trang or not, he was trained 

to a standard using a curriculum largely derived from the MACV Recondo 

School. It is doubtful any Vietnam LRRP soldier was ever afforded eight 

months of training before he was sent out to do battle with the enemy.

The modern equivalent of MACV Recondo School, but expanded and 

improved, is the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) 

at Fort Benning. The institution that operates this course, which was established in 1985 and now has a 20-year history of operations, is currently

responsible for LRSU doctrine and leader training. It therefore is both 

repository and disseminator of all knowledge about LRRP activities in 

the modern era. This course is an important stabilizing force in the LRSU 

community; its entrance and graduation requirements serve to shape LRS 

unit training throughout the Army. Its importance to the development and 

propagation of LRS TTP cannot be overstated. LRSU in the future cannot 

exist without a CONUS training institution like the RSLC.

At least three LRSUs in the modern era (of the 1st, 7th, and 9th Infantry

Divisions) used counter-narcotics operations with federal agencies as 

training opportunities. As long as the legal requirements of our Constitution 

are observed (they are addressed in current doctrine), this practice may 
16

continue. In addition, there may be future training opportunities of a 

similar nature in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security. 

There does not appear to be much difference between the TTP for 

conducting surveillance on a forest road or trail in Kosovo and in Vermont, 

for that of a desert or mountainous border region in Iraq and in Texas, 

or for surveilling along the Iraqi/Syrian border and along an Arizonan or 

New Mexican border.

Materiel

The operative phrase in this realm is “technological advances.” LRRP 

soldiers of all three eras have been the users of much new technology, particularly in the areas of communications and surveillance devices. Where 

the LRRP soldier in Vietnam may have carried an Olympus Pen-EE halfframe, semi-automatic camera, with film needing several hours to develop 

and process, the current and future LRS soldier may be equipped with a 

digital still or video camera and the supporting communications equipment to feed live or near-live images to commanders and analysts in the 

rear. LRRP soldiers have never been in competition with technology, but 

rather have been complementary to technology. That will not change in the 

future.

The LRRP soldier’s worth independent of his equipment was never 

more evident than in Vietnam, where LRRP soldiers were sent out to deliver and service sensor devices, to confirm acquisitions made by “sniffer” 

helicopters, or to find an enemy radio transmitter identified and generally 

located through technical means. Current and future LRS soldiers will perform similar missions to confirm information acquired by these and other 

far more advanced technical means. The constant in this equation is that 

commanders will nearly always require confirmation by a soldier on the 

ground. There is no better soldier in our inventory to accomplish that confirming mission than a LRRP soldier.

The standard weaponry of LRRP units over the three eras has remained relatively static: M14s, then M16s and variants thereof, and M79

and their successor M203s in the patrols; heavy and light machine guns 

plus the 3.5-inch rocket launcher/M72 LAW/AT-4 at the base stations and 

company headquarters. When given the opportunity, Vietnam LRRP units 

expanded this list to include friendly and enemy weapons of every caliber, 

size, and shape, as much out of indiscipline as in response to mission requirements. That small-arms proliferation tendency does not appear to be 

evident in the current era. But just recently an effort has been announced 

to reintroduce light machine guns and sniper rifles to surveillance teams. 
1

Young infantry soldiers, however well-disciplined and trained they are, 

will have a tendency to use these weapons if they are issued. The addition 

of such offensive weapons to surveillance teams suggests the mission pendulum might be moving back toward offensive combat.

The other materiel constant of LRRP organizations across three eras is 

a shortage of vehicles at the unit level for both administrative and tactical 

use. This became so acute in the Vietnam era that LRRP soldiers frequently 

resorted to “misappropriation” of other units’ equipment, something that 

would not be tolerated currently. The problem surfaced again in Operation 

DESERT STORM, where one LRS unit found itself riding in the back of 

a dump truck. Modern LRSUs are assigned to MI battalions that lack support platoons and therefore do not have excess vehicles to parcel out on a 

regular basis. No one is expecting LRSU to have their own helicopters, but 

certainly future force designers must give greater consideration to providing LRSU with adequate transportation in order to move both administratively and tactically.

Leadership

This study has examined the tactical role of leaders in LRRP units and 

identified core tasks that leaders have performed across the three eras of 

LRRP activity. These tasks fall into the general areas of receiving missions 

from controlling headquarters and issuing appropriate planning guidance 

to subordinate leaders, receiving brief backs from patrol and team leaders 

before mission execution, supervising the insertion and routine or emergency extraction of patrols, monitoring and often controlling the minuteby-minute actions of a patrol in contact, and receiving post-mission briefings from returning patrols. With the exception of Vietnam where a few 

platoon leaders and platoon sergeants went on or, in rare cases, led patrols, 

the practice was not common in USAREUR, nor is it standard today. The 

leader most responsible for mission accomplishment has always been and 

remains the patrol or team leader, a middle-grade NCO. The US Army has 

traditionally produced outstanding NCOs with excellent tactical skills and 

leadership ability, and will continue to do so.

Personnel

From the very beginning of LRRP in Italy and Germany, the two primary skill sets required of soldiers wanting to be LRRPs were infantry and 

communications. While there have long been low-density-MOS soldiers 

in LRRP units of all three eras (supply, maintenance, and medics, for example), infantry and communications soldiers have remained the building 
16

blocks of LRRP units through Vietnam and into the modern era. These 

soldiers have almost always been volunteers, coming both from other units 

and out of the replacement stream. During the Vietnam War, unit recruiters and first sergeants frequently had the luxury of looking over a soldier’s 

MOS if he met other qualifications and was a willing participant.

What kind of soldier made a good LRRP? In 1964, coming out of the

USAREUR experience, Major Ellis D. Bingham said that success would 

depend, in part, “on personnel so effectively trained, physically qualified 

and mentally inured, that they possess the ultimate degree of self confidence.”2

 Just four years later, in Vietnam in 1968, General Peers expressed

similar requirements using expanded prose:

The psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP 

are extremely difficult. You need somebody out there who 

has nerves of steel, who can stay in there along the side of 

a trail, can sit there and watch that trail with a large enemy 

formation going by and not have the slightest inclination 

to stand up and fire a rifle or even move. . . To do this, he 

has to be qualified mentally and physically.3

And in 1991, about a year after the conclusion of Operation DESER

STORM, the former G2 of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Quirk, said this about LRRP soldiers:

What you’re looking for are feisty, young characters who 

are willing to take their life in their hands. What you train 

them to be is very mature, quiet, soft-spoken guys. It’s a 

strange conversion that takes place when a man becomes 

a LRS surveillance soldier, a good one.4

These passages describe the essence of a LRRP soldier across all three 

generations of the organization’s existence. To be sure, LRRP soldiers in 

the future will have to be as comfortable with digital devices as they have 

been with small arms in the past, given the advances of technology.

Future of LRSU

While the doctrine writers are currently working toward a final text 

of the new field manual, force developers are evaluating the need for 

LRSU and their place in the structure of the future force. The discussion 

about the utility of LRSU centers around three key issues: the increasing 

capability of alternate means (technical devices and systems) of reconnaissance and surveillance, high-level commanders’ concern for the battlefield 
16

survivability of LRSU, and the age-old problem of resources. In the case 

of LRSU, the resource problem is exacerbated by the long-standing split 

proponency between Infantry and Military Intelligence branches. The US 

Army Infantry School has been the proponent for LRSU doctrine since the 

revival of LRSU in 1985, but the personnel spaces for LRSU soldiers are

found in MI battalions, whose doctrine and organizational structure are 

controlled by the US Army Military Intelligence Center and School.

Since their first fielding as provisional units in the mid-1950s and into 

the Vietnam era, LRRP units were employed to compensate for gaps not 

covered by technical means, to confirm information derived from technical means (for example, to find and destroy radio transmitters or confirm 

“sniffer” reports), or to deliver and service the technical means (as in the 

case of ground sensors). Used in this way, LRRP units were not competing with technology but rather complimenting it. The provisional LRRP 

platoon of the 82d Airborne Division that was fielded in 1983, a decade 

after Vietnam and two years before the advent of LRSU, was specifically 

created to cover a gap in technical reconnaissance and surveillance means 

identified by the division commander. In the ensuing two decades, LRSU 

soldiers routinely embraced emerging observation and communications 

technologies. In the same manner that these soldiers, no matter how well 

trained and physically fit, have never replaced technology, neither should 

technical means alone be viewed as the sole provider of timely and accurate battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. This important principle 

was revalidated in recent military operations in Southwest Asia involving 

small ground-reconnaissance teams.5

Approximately seven years elapsed between the appearance of the first 

LRRP unit in Italy in 1957 and an approved TOE in 1964. The USAREURbased capability remained on scene in Germany and in the United State

until 1974. The second generation in its three permutations (LRRP/LRP

Ranger) was born in Vietnam in 1966 and died six years later in 1972. Th

current generation, LRSU, also required about seven years of gestation to 

birth, from 1978 to 1985; it has now matured to the ripe age of 20 year

The authors of On Point correctly surmised that one of the key issues 

in LRSU employment, both in 1991 in Operation DESERT STORM an

more recently in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, was the environment. This 

study has shown that all three generations of LRRP, whether in the highly 

urbanized broken terrain of central and southeast Europe, in the variegated 

terrain of southeast Asia, or in the forested and desert terrain of the continental western United States, have proven that small teams of men can 
16

perform the deep reconnaissance and surveillance mission and survive. At 

this time, our Army’s leaders do not know where future operations in the 

Global War on Terrorism will be conducted. It should not be assumed they 

will be in relatively unconcealed areas such as southwest Asia. If GWOT 

operations occur in any other theater where more concealment is available, 

LRSU will be an important combat multiplier. The LRS mission, however 

it evolves in doctrine to meet the requirements of the COE, is unlikely ever 

to go away. The Army must retain long-range surveillance units and soldiers to perform this critical mission.
16

Notes

1. To facilitate ease of discussion in this chapter, the terminology “longrange reconnaissance patrol” and the acronym “LRRP” will be used as a descriptor for all of the soldiers, units, and activities described by the acronyms LRRP,

LRP, and LRS, and Rangers as applied to long-range patrol units in the Vietnam 

era.

2. Major Ellis D. Bingham, letter to Major Jean Burner, 6 October 1964;

Bingham collection.

3. Lieutenant General William R. Peers, “Presentation of LTG Peers,” 7.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Quirk, III, draft transcript of oral interview 

conducted on 16 April 1991 with Major William H. Thomas, 317th Military History Detachm

5. On  March 2002, in Operation ANACONDA, a US Navy SEAL groundreconnaissance team (Mako-31), while moving into its observation position, spotted a tent and a DShK .51-caliber heavy machine gun sited where it could ha

destroyed the CH-47 Chinook helicopters of TF Rakkasan flying into the Shahikot 

Valley the following day. The enemy weapon was on terrain that had purportedly 

been overflown and photographed in preparation for the operation. “This was a 

lesson for anyone who thought the U.S. military’s billions of dollars’ worth of spy 

satellites and surveillance aircraft obviated the need for ground reconnaissance,” 

Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda

(New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 173-4. Two days later, on 3 March, an MH47E Chinook carrying another SEAL ground-reconnaissance team was disabled

by small-arms fire and subsequently made a forced landing on Takar Ghar peak. 

The pre-battle overhead imagery of this position showed it suitable to land the 

large helicopter, but did not enable the team leader to see the DShK .51-caliber

heavy machine gun sited there nor the enemy soldiers who manned and supported 

it. See Charles H. Briscoe, et al, Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations 

Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004), 297-8.

16

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Books

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Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. 

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1969-70. New York: Ivy Books, 1998

________. RECONDO: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne. New York: Ivy Books, 

1992

Foley, Dennis. Special Men: A LRP’s Recollections. New York: Ivy books, 

1994

Ford, Gary Douglas. 4/4: A LRP’s Narrative. New York: Ivy Books, 1993

Gott, Kendall D. In Glory’s Shadow: In Service With the 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment During the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991. Leavenworth, KS: by 

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Hall, Don C. and Annette R. Hall. I Served. Bellevue, WA: A.D. Hall Publishing, 1994

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Hogan, David W. Jr. Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. 

Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 

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Johnson, Frank. Diary of an Airborne Ranger. New York: Ballantine Books, 

2001

Jorgenson, Kregg P. J. Acceptable Loss. New York: Ivy Books, 1991

________. The Ghosts of the Highlands: 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966-67. 

New York: Ivy Books, 1999

________. LRRP Company Command: The Cav’s LRP/Rangers in Vietnam, 
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1968-1969. New York: Ballantine Books, 2000.

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Books, 1988

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1989

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New York: Ivy Books, 1998

Author Interviews

(In Person)

Brigadier General (Retired) Stanley F. Cherrie on 17 January 2005 at Leavenworth, KS

Major (Retired) Kendall D. Gott on 20 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.
17

General (Retired) James J. Lindsay, 25 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Colonel (Retired) Gary E. Phillips on 20 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Schatzel, 18 January 2005 at Fort Leavenworth,

KS.

(Telephone)

Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Scott Chunn, 24 January 2005.

Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

Colonel John A. Davis, 21 April 2004

Gary Linderer, 2 December 2004.

Colonel (Retired) Thomas W. O’Connell, 20 April 2005.

(E-mail)

Colonel (Retired) Ellis Bingham, 30 December 2004, 1 February 200

Roy Boatman, 15 December 2004

Robert Clark, 3 May 2005.

Kirk Gibson, 27-28 January 2005.

Major (Retired) Russell Grimm, 5 August 2005.

Don Hall, 1, 6 December 2004

James Jackson, 5 January 2005.

Colonel (Retired) Edward Jentz, 9 February 2005.

Colonel (Retired) James S. Mathison, 21 March 2005

Mike McClintock, 16 December 2004

Robert Murphy, 10-11 December 20

Bill Nevius, 30 November,  December 2004

Thomas P. Odom, 15 March 2005

John Pipia, 29 December 2004.

Major General Richard J. Quirk, III, 19 March 2005

Craig Vega, 16 March 2005

Special Collections

The collected papers of Colonel (Retired) Ellis D. Bingham.

The collected papers of Richard Cole.
17

The collected papers of Colonel John A. Davis.

The collected papers of Colonel (Retired) Philip D. Grimm and Major (Retired) Russell Grimm.

Surveys

Completed information questionnaires were received from the following individuals on the dates indicated:

Dennie Callahan, 23 December 2004; F Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 

25th Infantry Division.

David J. Casey, 9 December 2004; LRRP Detachment, D Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Divisio

Scott C. Chunn, 14 February 2004; 109th MI Battalion, 9th Infantry Divisio

David C. Cummings, 27 January 2005; N Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 

173d Airborne Brigade

Ronald L. Elliff, 23 February 2005; F Company (LRP), 50th Infantry, 25th 

Infantry Division.

Mark S. Elliot, 25 January 2005; E Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry (LRS),

V Corps.

Michael L. Feller, 1 December 2004; O Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 3

Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

Kirkland H. Gibson, 12 November 2004; US Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (Airborne) 3780, VII Corps

William J. Houser, 9 December 2004; F Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry

(LRP), II Field Force, and O Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

Kevin Hyneman, 15 November 2004; C Company (LRSD), 6th Infantry Division

Robert T. Murphy, 30 November 2004; D Company (Airborne), 17th Infantry

(Long Range Patrol), V Corps.

Johnny B. Starnes, 7 January 2005; E Company (Airborne), 51st Infantry

(LRP), 23d (Americal) Infantry Division.

Thomas J. Nash, 4 February 2005; LRRP Detachment, F Troop, 17th Cavalry,

196th Light Infantry Brigade

Victor D. Valeriano, 4 February 2005; LRRP Detachment, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 196th Light Infantry Brigad
17

Internet Sources

Defense Technical Information Center, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD505923;

last accessed on 4 February 2005.

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17

About the Author

James F. Gebhardt retired from the US Army in 1992, having served as

an infantry enlisted man, armor officer, and Soviet foreign area officer. He 

fought in the Vietnam War as a rifleman in a mechanized infantry platoon 

and as a long-range patrol team leader, then was a drill instructor at Fort Dix. 

After commissioning through ROTC in 1974, he served in armor units at

Fort Benning and Mainz, Germany, where he commanded an M-60A3 tank 

company in 1982-3. In his last active duty assignment he escorted Soviet

military, scientific, and diplomatic personnel throughout the western United 

States to conduct disarmament inspections for the On-Site Inspection 

Agency.

A native of Grand Forks, North Dakota, Mr. Gebhardt earned a B.A. in 

political science from the University of Idaho in 1974 and an M.A. in history

from the University of Washington in 1976. While assigned to the Combat

Studies Institute (CSI) in 1986-88, he researched and wrote Leavenworth

Paper No. 17, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and

Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944. His other published works include 

several book-length translations about Soviet army and navy operations in 

World War II, a series of translated technical manuals for Soviet-era small 

arms, and numerous Internet-based article-length translations on Soviet 

military history subjects. He rejoined CSI as a civilian contractor in 2004 

and researches and writes historical studies of current interest to the Army. 

His first study in the Global War on Terrorism series was Occasional Paper 

6, The Road to Abu Ghraib: US Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience, 

published in March 2005.
 CSI Press

 Global War on Terrorism

 Occasional Paper 10

 Revised Edition