Shelton Alexander v. Tamara Alexander , No. 1320, September Term 2020. Opinion by

Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

.

CUSTODY AND VISITATION

– Under Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 9

- 105, the court can deny make

- up time to a parent wh o has unjustifiably been denied visitation access, if the court finds that such a denial is in the best interests of the child.Circuit Court for Frederick County

Case N o

. 10

- C

- 13

- 002794

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1320 September Term, 20 20

______________________________________

SHELT ON ALEXANDER

v.
TAMARA ALEXANDER

_______ ___________________ __ __________ Friedman , Ripken , Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) , JJ.

_________________________ _ ____________

Opinion by Salmon , J.

______________________________________ Filed: July 28, 2021Shelton Alexander ( “ Father ” ) and Tamara A le xander ( “ Mother ” ) were married in

2004. A son ( “ S

. ” ) was born to the marriage in August of 2006. The marriage was ended

on J uly 2 8, 20 14 when the Circuit Court fo r Frederick Cou nty , Maryland entered a final judgment of divorce. Fathe r appealed from t h e entry of that judg ment, but this Court

affirmed i t in an unreported o pinion

. Alexander v. Alexander , No. 2189, Sept. Term,

2 0 14 (file d July 1 6, 2015). More litigation followed, most of it concerning custody and visitati on issu es. In

2 017, Father m o v ed to modify custody , visitation and child support and in October of that

year, Mo ther filed a counter

- motion ask ing th e court t o grant her sole legal and primary physical custody of S. An eleven

- day merits hearing was held on th at matt er , which

ended on Au gust 8 , 2019.

On September 3 , 2019 , the Circuit Court for F rederick County file d a custody

order ( “ the final custody order ” ) that granted Mother sole legal and primary ph ysical custody of S. Father was grante d access to S

. every o ther weekend from af t e r schoo l o n Friday until Monday morning, plus every Wednesda y e vening from 6:30 P.M. to 8:15
P.M., so that S. c ould attend a c hurch youth group . The court set forth in its order a detailed holiday schedule and gra nted each party two

- we ek blocks of summe r a c cess in July , with th e orders of the bl ocks alternating year

- to

- year

. Father appealed that order , but we aff

irmed the judg m ent in another unr eported opinion

. Alex a nder v. Alexander , No. 1417, September Term, 20 19 ( filed June 1, 2 020 )

. While the las t

- m entioned a ppeal was still pend i ng, Mother , on March 18, 2020,

sent Father an email that read:2

Given [ S

. ’ s ] D iabetes and th u s his vulnerability to getting serious complications from COV ID

- 19 if he contracts the Coronavirus , I plan on ke eping him here a t hom e unt il the CD C C oronavirus gu i delines are li fted and schools are back in session. We can discuss make up ti me once it is
s afe to do so.

Dur ing the next few days , several emails betw een Father and Mother were exchanged. Fa ther to ok the pos ition th at Mother h ad no right to disobey a court or der

and that o beying th e visitation order would not endanger S. ’ s hea lth

. Mother m a intained

that because she had been given the author ity to make medical decisions for S

. , she had the right to ensure his safety by halti ng, temp orarily , Fat he r ’ s right to have visit ation with

his son. Therefore, she announc ed that Father ’ s weekend visita t ion with S., scheduled for
March 20, 2020, w ould be ca nceled as we ll as fu ture vi sitation until school reopened.

She wrote in a n e mai l to Father dated March 19, 2020 : I do agree wit h you that waiting for school to resume might be an unten able resolutio n , so I have come up with a creative solution to ensure you and [S.] stay connected, yet we keep him as safe as possible. I will g ive you extended Facet ime/virtual time w ith him o v er the weekend for gaming or for you to just spend time with him. This is a good way to put his health first , yet keep you two connected

. I a lso would like everyone in both households to get tested fo r the Coronavirus as soon as testing is ava i lable for the general public. R ight now, they are prioritizing testi ng for those w i th sy mptoms , so I am not sure when testing will become available. However, can we agree that we will al l get tested and share t he results when te sting bec omes available?

W e can cont inue to evaluate this situation on a daily basis.

Th e parties did n ot r esolve their differences and on March 27, 2020, Father filed

an “ E mergency M otion to E nforce C ourt ’ s O rder R egarding A ccess D u ring COVID [

- ] 19

P andemic ” ( “ th e emergency motio n ” ). In the emergency mot ion, Father had two main3

complaints. T he first was t hat alm ost i mm ediately aft er the September 3, 201 9 final custody order was d ocketed, Mother curtailed “ Wednesday evening access an d extra

cu rricular activities [

. ] ” Se condly, F ather alle ged that he was being depr ived of his right

to visitati o n beca use Fre d erick County public schools and all of Ma rylan d publ ic schools were currently closed until April 24, 2020 because of COV ID

- 19 , a nd Mother had

a dvised him by e mail that she was “ keeping [ S

. ] in [ her ] house until all restrictions are

lift ed an d the kids are allowed to go back to school

. ” Fa ther also all eged that d esp ite

Mo ther ’ s claims of “ health concerns, ” she had recently trav el e d t o New Orlea ns for

M ardi G ra s and had bee n “ diag n o sed with bronc hitis af ter her return ” from that city

. Father asked the cour t to grant his eme rgency motion and to sign an order : 1) requiring mother to immediately comply with the terms of the final cust o dy order ; 2) grant ing

Fa t her ex t ra visi tati on as “ m ake

- up ti me ” for the perio d that Mother had wi t hheld

visitatio n ; and, 3) gra n t hi m “ attorney ’ s fee s

. ” Mother, by counsel, filed an opposition to Father ’ s emergency motion in which

she alleged that she w as justified in w ithholding visitat i o n because of the ri sk to S. ’ s health presented by the COV ID

- 19 pan demic. S h e maintained t h at “ since the publi c schools were closed after March 13, 2020, ” “ neither [ she ] nor [ S. ] ha [ d ] left their

residence and no other in dividual (s) have ente red the residen c e. ” She also noted that Maryland Governor Lawrence Hog an , Jr. had, on M ar ch 30, 2020, i s sued an executiv e order for the safety of all citi zens that requi red , during the COVID

- 19 pandemic , all

“ non

- essential ci tizens to remain in their homes beginning on Ma r c h 30, 202 0 at 8:00

P.M. except for the performance of essential activit ies as further defined by th e O rder. ”4

Mother denied Father ’ s allegation that she had violated the provisi on of the final c ustody

order concer n in g Wednesday n igh t access. Lastly, Mo t h er allege d that she had offered

Father “ da y for day make u p time ” once t he pandemic pr o blem abated but Father had rejected t hat offer

. On April 1, 2020, Father filed a reply to Mother ’ s opposition. He alleged th a t S. ’ s
type 1 diab et es was we ll controlle d

. He also asserted that literature provided by the

Ame rican Dia b etes A ssociation mad e “ it clear that a diabetic is not at a greater r isk of having severe complications from COVID

- 19 than the general populatio n if th e diabetes is manag e d well. ”

The issue s r aised in the motion for an emergency order w ere hear d in the Circ ui t
Court for Fr e derick County on Sep te mber 1 0, 202 0

. The motions jud g e was the same judge w ho had conducted the eleven

- day hearing th at resulte d in the September 3, 2019

fi n al cust o dy order.

F ather cal led Mother as a n adverse witness and he also testifie d. Father als o
called two other witnesses, but their testimony is not relevant to the issue s raised in this appeal . At the conclusi on of the he aring, the motions judge de live red a n oral opinion , which was followed by a written order that was docketed on December 22, 2 0 20. T he
order read, in material part, a s foll ows:

ORDER ED, that Defendant ’ s [Fa ther ’ s] Emergency Motion to Enforce Court ’ s O rd er Regarding Access D u ring COVID [

- ] 19 P a ndemic be, and the same is hereby DENIED; an d it is further,
ORDERED, t hat on each F riday which begins Defe ndant ’ s weekend access, while th e mino r child is in school virtually, the Defendant shall pick up the min or child at 3:30 P.M., an d ther eafter , wh e n school resumes in the5

classroom, De fendant sh all pi ck up the m inor ch ild after scho o l on the Friday which b egins his weekend access, as pro vided in this [c] ou rt ’ s Final Order entered on Sept ember 3, 201 9; and i t is further,

ORDERED , that each party ’ s re q uest for an award of attorney ’ s fees be, and the same is hereby DENIE D; and it is f u rther,
ORDERED, that al l other provisions of this [c] ourt ’ s Fin al Order,
e ntered on Septemb er 3, 20 19 , no t in consist ent with t he provisions of this Order, s hall remain in f

ull for ce and effect. In this timely app eal, Father, acting pro se , raises th e following questions: 1
(1) Did th e circuit court err in d enying Fa ther mak e

- u p time based upon an incorrect legal premis e?
(2) Did th e motions judge abuse her discret ion when she con s ulted with a m agistrate judge prior to announc ing her decisio n that she
wou l d not award Father make

- up time ?
(3) Did the motions judge abuse her di screti on i n de nying the motion to e n f orce Wednesd ay

- night ac c ess , which Mother denied in part f or ov er a year?
(4) Did the circuit court err in modifying the court

- ordered access for Fa t her and a buse its discretion in den ying the motion to enforce th e w eek end

- a cc ess pick

- up time afforded Father ?
(5) Did t he motion s j udge abuse her discretion in denying a ttorn ey f ees to F ather ?

1 In his brief , Fath e r d i d not list any questi ons presented. But he d id make four arguments that we have converted into ques ti ons presented; th e arguments were : 1 ) “ The [c]ourt abused its disc retion in consulting with a [m] agistrate and den ying [a]ppe l lant make

- u p time based upon a n incorrect l egal premise ” ; 2) “ The [c]o urt erred in modifying the court

- ordered a ccess for [a]ppe ll ant a n d abused its dis cretion in denying t he motion to enforce Wedne sday

- night access, which [a]ppellee denied i n pa rt for ov e r a year ” ; 3 )

“ The [c]o u rt erred i n modifying the court

- or de red access fo r [a]ppellant and abused its discre tion i n denying the mo tion to enforce the week end

- access pi ck

- up t ime afforded [a]ppellant ” ; a nd 4) “ The [c]ourt abused its discretio n in d eny ing t h e awarding o f attorney f ees to [a]pp e llant

. ”6

Mother , pro se , filed a brief asking us to af firm the order filed on December 2,

2 020. 2

I
. Background Facts Both Father and Mother live in the city of Frederick. Since th eir d ivorce, t he parties h ave enga g e d in almost cons tant li t igati on concerni n g matters of custody and visitation. While they a re both very g o od parents, the trial j udge found that the two are incapable of cooperating with one another concerning child rearing i ssues

. A t t he time of the hearing, S

. was 14 years ol d and a student a t Tusc aro r a Hi gh

School in Frederick where he exce ls academicall y
. In 2018, S

. was diagn osed as suffering from t y pe 1 d iabetes , which , fortunately , has been kept under good control

. In Marc h o f 2020, Mother became concerned that S . wou ld c o n tr act the

c oronavirus . More specif ically, she feared that if he did contra c t that virus , he was more likely than others to have severe medical consequen ces due to his diabetes. She felt that

he r fear wa s s ubstantiated by medical literature that sh e r ev i ewe d. Beca u se of that fear, with one exception, M other and S

. did not leave their house for any reason from M arch

2 In her brief, Mother recites several “ facts ” that are unsupported by anything in the record. In his reply brief, Father does th e same, although to a lesser exten t. In this opinion we have i gnored all fac t ual allegat i ons by the p arties that are n ot supported by the record.7

18 to May 5 , 2020. 3 During that period, Frederick County public schools were clo sed

due t o t he COVID

- 19 pandemi c

. As mentioned, o n Mar ch 18, 2020, Mo t her informed Father that she was denying

him the visitation tha t he was entitled to unde r the final custody order. Under the terms

o f that order, Father w as entitled to have we ekend visitatio n w ith S. starting o n Friday , March 20, 202 0 aft er school until the following Monday at 8: 00 A.M. Father was als o
entitled to w eekend visitation on alte rnating week ends thereafter. As a consequenc e of

Mother ’ s actions , Father was also denied acc ess for t he 2020 Easter weekend 4 and S. ’ s Spring break fro m sch ool that y e ar. On May 14, 2 020, Governor Hogan announced that he was r e laxing the she lter in place order that previously was in effect. Mother notif ied Fat her on that da te that she

would al low S. to r e sume visitation with Father on Friday , Ma y 15, 2 020

. She also t o ld

Father at that time that because he had mi ssed 18 days o f access to S., she would allow

him to have 18 straight days of visitation , i.e., from May 1 5 , 2020 until June 8, 2020.

Father r ej e cted that of

fer

. At the hearing concerning Fa ther ’ s motion t o enf orce, counsel for Fath er attempted to unde rmine M ot her ’ s conten tion that she withheld access because she feared

3 The one exception occurred on May 3, 2020. On that da te , S. ’ s half

- sister , who lives with Father, celebr ated her first birthday

. On May 3, 2020, Mother drove S. past Father ’ s hous e with the h o pe of h a v in g S. participate in a “ drive

- by ” celebrat i on of his sister ’ s birthday. Because the parties di d not coope ra te, S. did not get to see his sister that day.

4 In 2 020, Easter Sunday w as on April 12, 2020.8

for S. ’ s health. Father ’ s counsel suggest ed, by his questioning , t hat Mo th e r had jeopardized S. ’ s health by going to M ardi G ras in New Orl e a ns in 20 2 0 d urin g the pandemi c where she caug ht bronchitis a nd thereafter, refus ed to quarantine in Maryland

when she returned from Louisiana . Mother t estified that she had bro nc hitis in F e b rua r y 2020, that M

ardi G ras ended on Februar y 25, 2020 and that she wa s in New Orleans after

t he Mardi Gras ce l ebration from March 5 to March 9, 2020. She also testified that to her knowledge, no person had contracted coronavirus in New Orlean s while s h e was there. 5

Mother testified that she cut off Father ’ s access b e cause , as t he p ar ent w ith decision making au thority concer n ing medical issues, she feared for S. ’ s sa fety. To compensate Father, she contended that she substantiall y inc reased S

. ’ s virtu al time with

Father. In that regard, Mother introduced a ch art whic h , if a ccura te , show ed extensive

virtual cont act be tween Fa t her a nd S. in the March 18 to May 1 5 , 2020 period

. According to Mother, in the last

- mentioned period, S. and Father sp ent many ho u rs virtually with one another ; i.e., on the te lephone, on Facebook or playi ng comp uter

games. Father testifie d that t he cha r t in troduced by Mother was inaccurate in that it

overstated the amount of virtual contact

. According to Father, there w ere ma ny d a ys during the appro ximate two

- month period when he was denied teleph o ne and othe r types
of virtual contact wit h S.

Mother t estified that when she offered 18 days make

- up time on May 14, 2020 , Father replied by email that she c ould “ p i ck [S.] u p on Mon da y [May 18] , as stated by the

5 The par ties stipulate d that t he f i rst “ presum p tive case relati ng to C OVID

- 19 ” in New Orleans wa s announced on March 9, 2020

.9

court order ” and that he would “ get dir e ctio ns from the [c]ourt on the ma k e

- up tim e

. ” In

his te s timo ny at the hearing , Father asked the court to award him access to S. for 10 weekends straight (rather than every oth e r weeken d ) , plus acc ess to S. for Ea ster 2021

. M oth er testified that she no l on ger b eliev ed t he court should award make

- up time.

She explained that her reasons were the same as those that her c ounsel talked about in his openi ng statement, viz

. :
I offe r ed him ba c k the 18 d ays [ 6 ] the mo ment that I could. He refused it, stopped all n egotiations, and said he wants t o go to litigati on an d have the [c]ourt decide. So, I just don ’ t think that that ’ s an appropriate way to , to
co

- parent. During Mother ’ s te s timony , c o unsel for Father ask ed several questions as to
whether Mother had abided by the f ollo wing provision in the fin al c ustody ord e r : ORDERED, that [Mother] be, and she i s h ereb y awarded the s ole physical care and custody of the minor child, subjec t to rig ht s of visitation, as expressly deli neated herein, afforded to [Father] as fo l lows:

* * * B. Every We d nes day evening from 6:30 P.M. until 8:15 P.M., f or the express purpose o f attend in g the Youth Group acti vity at [Father ’ s] church. [Mother] shall drop off and p ick up the m inor child at Church

. This access need not occur in the event of illness or inj ur y of th e minor chi ld ; u nforeseen emergent conditions; the imposition of a snow em er g ency p lan for Fre derick County

. . . . The youth group mentioned in the final custody orde r was one th at F athe r
condu c te d , i n his c apacity as the youth pastor for his churc h

. In response to Father ’ s

6 Previously, Mother i n her testimony spoke of 21 da ys of make

- up time but that off er in cluded three days of visitation ( st arting May 1 5, 2020) to wh i ch Father w a s alread y e n title d.10

complaint that Mother did not take S. to t he yout h g roup meetings at 6:30 P.M . but

instead de livered him to the meetings at 7:00 P.M

. , Mother te stified t hat becau se the

yo u th g r oup meeting sometimes started at 6:45 P.M. and som etim es at 7:00 P.M., h er
habit was to deliv er S. to the church at the a ctual s ta r ting time . Mother testifie d that currently the youth group meetings were being held v irtual ly due to the pand e mic and S.

“ a t tended those meet ings. ”

In re gard to the youth gr oup meeting, Father stress ed that Mother intentionally disobeyed the court o rd e r by ignoring the requirement that she s hould deliver S. to the meeting at 6:30 P

. M

. Neverthe less, he did not contradict Mo t her ’ s testimony as to when the youth meetings starte d no r did he contend th at S. w a s ever late for a youth gro up meeting

. Alth ou g h th e motions judge did not say so explic itly, s he i nd icated by her

comments at t h e evidentiar y hearing , that she did not co n sider M other ’ s “ l ate ” arrival at

the youth group meeting to b e a serious viol ation of the final custody order because ,

a c cording t o the judge, the intent of the provision was to e nsure that S. attend the

ch urch ’ s youth group meeting

– not to prov id e Fa the r with extra visitation rights

. Also , beca use at the time of the September 10, 20 20 h earing the Wednesday meetings were

b eing he ld virt ual ly , the issue of when Mother d elivered S. to the meetings did not appear

t o be a curren t problem.

At the hearing , i t was undisputed that Mother intentionally withheld visitation

from Father f

or abou t tw o months. Father contende d that M other w as no t justified in doing so. The motion s judge said that because of the pandemic, Mo t her should h ave filed11

a mo tion and requ e s ted a modification of the final order ; nevertheless, the judge indicated

that M othe r ’ s actions were perhaps understandab l e becau se at the time she withheld
visitation, the danger s posed by the pandemic wer e truly f r ightening an d at that poin t, no

one kne w the dangers posed by the C OVID

- 19 crisis. 7

T h ere was one other issue in cont ention at the September 10 hearing

. The f ina l

cu st o dy order provided that Father, b egin ning Sept ember 6, 2019, had a right of v isitation

with S. : [ E ] very other weekend from a ft er school on Friday until Mond ay at the beginning of the school day , i f schoo l is in sess ion that day or 8:00 A.M., wh i chever oc c urs first. The [F ather] . . . shall pick up the minor child from
s chool on Friday a nd d eliver the m inor child to school on M on day if school is in s ession th at date

. . . . In the summer, [Father] shall r e tri eve the minor child from the [Mother ’ s] resi de n ce at 3:30 P.M. o n Friday.

Father ’ s compl aint was that prior to the p andemic, at the s c ho o l that S. attend ed,

classes st o pped at 3:30 P.M. o n Friday, but since the pandemic , S. ’ s virtual classes ended

at noon but Mother refused to allow S. t o be pic ke d up until 3:30 P.M. Father ’ s position

was that this deprived him of over three hours o f v i sitation eac h w eeke n d that he had a

7 Af te r admonishing Mother fo r disobeying p rovisions of the final custody order by means of “ se lf

- help , ” the judge went on to say:
[t] hat being said, I reco gnize that we were facing something that was wh olly different than anyone had ever fa c ed before maybe in 191 9, or whate v er it was, with the f l u pandemic they had going around, but, in our li fe times, we had n ever experienced this. It was very scar y and I
u nders tand that. And I un derstand that [S.] is, in fact, in t h e very comp r omised grou p . He also is younger, which, you know, I thi nk is prov i ng out now that the younger you are the better o ff you are to some degree, but he is in the group that is more he avily affected by this vi rus as we know it today

.12

rig ht of access

. At the hearing , Mother ’ s testimony as to wh y she did no t al low Father to pick up S. earlier on Frida y s was b as e d on th e school schedule . That schedule provided

that between 8:30 A.M. and noon , classes and o ther a ct ivitie s were to b e c o nduc te d virtually ; thereafter, a one

- half hour lunch break was t o beg i n

. The school schedule then spelled out what was t o occur d u ring the periods between 12:30 and 1:45 P. M. U nder t he heading “ Student Support , ” the sch e dule for that time period rea d:

• Virtual F2F [Face to Face] Instruction

• Intervention

• On

- Line Resource and Service Delivery

• IEP/EL Skill Recovery

A cti v it i es for th e period between 1:45 P.M. and 3:30 P.M ., were listed under the heading
“Self

- Direc t ed Studen t Work Tim e ” a s fo llows:

• Readi n g and research ing

• Complet ing projects

• Responding to teacher feedback

• Engaging in online lessons and practice

Mother e x p l a ined t h a t she kept S. until 3:30 P.M. on Fridays because the school schedule

indicated that school wa s o pen until 3:3 0 P.M. In her w o rds, “ [i] f the y [the high school

authorities ] intended kids to stop at 12:00 , they would have ended at 12:00 . A n d , so , I just w an t to pr otect that ti m e , so [S.] has the ti me to do his work

. ” Put another way, according to Mothe r, t he school had i ssued a s chedule that states that between 1:45 and

3:30 P. M. , “ Monday through Friday there ’ s supposed to be self

- di rect ed s tudent work

ti me , ” and she abided by that sched ule. Father , in his testimony, contended that under the

s c hool schedule , betwee n 12:30 and 3: 3 0 P. M., S. was supposed to be doing homework ,13

and that S. could do his home work at Father ’ s house just as conveniently a s at Mot he r ’ s
residence.

Additional facts will be set forth in order to answer the question s presented.

I I
. Make

- Up Time

F ather c o n tend s that the motions judge abused her discretion in denying him

make

- up time because the court ’ s denial was based on “ an inco rr e ct legal premise. ” In

h er oral ruling co ncerning make

- up time, the tri al j udge said:

[Father] want s make

- u p time, and th a t ’ s w her e I ge t to this isn ’ t a contract case. If this were a contract case, I could say writ e a check for X amount of d ollars, a n d that will remedy this prob lem . My concer n is what is b est for [S.], and I g ave a cust o dy order that I belie ved was neces s a ry for [ S. ’ s] b est interest last year. I still believe that schedule is necessary for [S. ’ s] best interest. You [S. ’ s p a rents] ca n not communicate histor ically

. T hrough [man y] days of trial [in 2 019 , it has] be c ome very, ver y clear, even ab out basic medi c al decisions you can ’ t co mmunicat e, you ca n ’ t agree. I
can ’ t, in good conscience, say that in order to rectify this, I g o away fr o m what I already deci ded what was in [S. ’ s] best intere st

. So , therefore, I ’ m no t going to giv e you any mak e

- up time, bec a use it ’ s not about making yo u whole

. It is a bout [S. ’ s] daily life, and I understand [ S

. ] was harmed by not seeing you , I ’ m not d i sagreeing with that. We were all harmed [b y COVID

- 19] . All of these kids t hat are sitting at de s ks in their home are being ha r med. Some of that is there ’ s nothin g anyone can do a bout it. Nobody likes it, but there ’ s nothing anyone can do abo u t it, b ut I found previously that th e schedule I outl ined was what was necessary giv en th e le v el of distrus t and discord between the t w o o f you, and I still find that that ’ s accu rate

. So , th erefore, the motion for make

- up time is denied, but I am go i ng to caut io n [Mother] very strongly that a motion is requ ired [t o change the f inal custo dy or der]

. So le legal o r whatever , does not giv e you authority to say I ’ m ov err iding the visitation schedule that this [c] ourt ordered, that is not accurate. You must f ile a m ot i on, but, again, the acrim ony and distru st14

is s o great that I don ’ t find a mo di fi ca t ion o f the order I had ente red to mak e

- up visitat ion is appropriate. (Emphasis added.) Father takes issue with the part of the judge ’ s op inion wh ere she s aid , “ I ’ m n o t going to give you any make

- up t ime , because it ’ s [th e decision as to whether or not t o

a ward make

- up time ] not about making y ou whole. It i s about [S. ’ s] daily life [

. ] ” In

s upport of his contention that the aforementioned stateme nt was not “ su p po rted by law , ”

Father directs our attention to Maryland Code (20 19 Repl. Vol. ), Family Law Artic l e , §

9

- 105 , w h ich prov ides:
In any custody o r visitation proceeding, if the court determines that a party to a custody or visitati on orde r has u nju stif iabl y denied o r interfered with visitatio n granted by a custody or visit at ion ord er, the court may , in
a d dition to any other remedy availab l e to the court and in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child , take any or all of the follo wing actions : (1) ord er that the visitation be resch eduled;
(2) modify the custody o r vi sitatio n or der to require addi t ional terms o r con ditions design e d to ensure future compliance with the order; or
(3) assess costs or counsel fees against the party who has unjustifi ably d e nied or i n terfered with visitation rig hts

. (Emphasis added.)

As can be seen , i n en ac ting § 9

- 105, t he Ge neral As s em bly used the w o rd “ may. ”

“ T he w ord ‘ may ’ is generally c onsidered to be permissive, as o pposed to mandatory, langu age. ” Board of Physi c ian Qua li t y Ass uran ce v. Mulla n , 381 M d. 157, 166 (2004) ;

B rodsky v. Brodsky , 31 9 Md . 9 2, 98 (1990)

. S e e also Planni n g Comm. v
. Silk o r Development Corp ., 246 Md. 516 , 522

- 24 (1967) (absent clear legislative indication to15

the contrary, “ may ” is generally p resumed t o apply in a “ per missive sense. ” ). Because

the legislat u re used the wo rd “ may , ” and because t h ere is no ind i ca tion that the

l egislature di d not intend the word to be in terp reted as permissive, it w as not mandatory

that the court award make

- up ti m e when , a s here, one parent unjustifiably denies another

visitat ion. Th us, in o rder for Father to prev a il as to the fir st questi on pr e sented, he mu st
demonstrate that the motions judge abused her d i scretion in not granting him make

- up
time. The analyti c al para di g m by which we assess whether a trial court ’ s actions c onstitute an abu se o f discretion has bee n stated frequ en tly. In Wi lson v. John Cra ne, Inc. , 385 Md. 185 (2005), for example, we iterat e d
[t ]h e re is an abuse of discretion “ where no reasonable person would take the vie w adopted by the [tr i al] court[ ] ”

. . . o r wh en t he court act s “ without reference to any guiding principles. ” An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ru l ing u nder co ns i deration is “ clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inference s be fore the court[ ] ”

. . . or when t he ruli n g is “ v iolative of f act and logic. ”
Questions within the discretion of the trial court are

“ much better decided by th e tri al ju d ges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should be d istu rbed where it i s apparent tha t s ome serio u s er r or or abus e of discretion or autocratic action has occurred. ” In sum, to be reversed “ [t]he decision under consid eratio n has to b e well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and bey ond the fringe of wh a t that court [] deems mini m a ll y acceptable. ”

385 Md. at 198

- 99 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 , 347 Md. 295, 312

- 13 ( 1997 )). An abuse of disc re t ion, therefore, “ should only be found in the extra ordi nary, exceptional, or most e g regiou s case. ” Wi lson , 385 Md. a t 199

.

Pasteur v. Skevofilax , 396 Md. 405, 418

- 19 (2007).16

Relying on § 9

- 105, appellant contends that “ Maryland law spe cifi e s that or d ering

the reschedu ling of visitation is just one of the remed i es a va i lable to th e court for the

purpos e of mak i ng the party , whi ch was unjustifiably denied visitation, whole

. ”
( e mphasis added )

. Cont rary to what is implied in the above argume nt, the sta tu t e does not specify that the purpose of § 9

- 105 is to “ make whole ” t he party th a t is unjustifia bly

denied visit ation. The st a tute simply gi ves the court the option of ordering make

- up time , bu t the court is not required to exercise that option. In fact , t he st atute provi d es that in order to exercise the opt i on , such an award m us t be “ consiste n t with t he best inte rest s of

th e c h ild [.] ” Here, t he motion s judge explained that she did not believe it to be in the best

interest s of S. to order make

- u p time. T h e court ’ s decision was understandable . After
all, at the time of the Septem ber 10, 2020 hearing, approximatel y three and on e

- half months had expi r ed since Mother allow ed Father to resu me visi tation in accordance with

the court order. After tha t lapse of time , arguably at least, it mi ght well be disruptive t o
S. ’ s rout ine i f, rat her than keeping him on the every other week en d v i sita tion schedule

with Fa ther, t he court ordered that Father have access for ten straight weekends as Father requested.

It is t r ue, as the motions judge stat ed, that M other ’ s action s in denying visitation to
Father fo r almost two months w as harmful t o S

. But t hat does not necessari ly m ean that

the harm could be eras ed or even ameliorated by order in g make

- up time , nor do e s it me a n
that it would be in S. ’ s best interest s to do so

. Fa t her disagre es, arg uing that:17

The [c] ourt ma kes the co nf using argu me n t that withhol ding m ake

- up time fro m th e Defendant is in the best interests of the child b ecause the court believed the s chedule o r dered in September 2019 was in the child ’ s best interest s the previo us year and that the court could not go aw ay from what
w a s already deci ded a year earlier. Howe ver, this was not a modification of custody hearin g . This simple hearing wa s to e nforce th e court order and provide missed like

- time back to the Ap p ellant, whi ch the Appe llee initially
recomm ended to t he [c] ourt in i ts motion Plaint iff ’ s Preliminary Opp osit ion to Defendant ’ s Emergency Motion to Enforce Cou r t ’ s Order Re gar ding Access D u ring Co vi d [

- ] 19 Pandemic , “ that the [c] ourt provide for make

- up time bet w een the Def endant and the minor child, day

- for

- day. ”
(Refe r ences to transcript om itted. ) Contrary to t he i mplication in the above argument, the trial judge did not misinterpret t he stat ut e . It is clear that the trial judg e knew what remedies were availa b le

to her u nder § 9

- 10 5 of the Family Law A rticle . M oreo v er, there i s no indi ca tion that the judge w as confused as to whether she could change what had been p reviously ordered.

As earl ie r mentioned, t he wording of the statute m a kes it clear that it is w i thin the co urt ’ s
disc r etion as to whether t o uti lize any o f the remed ies set forth in § 9

- 10 5. And, whether,

as her e, b oth parties agreed at one time that make

- up time should be ordered , t he court

wa s not bound by an y such agreement

. For the above reasons, we hold that Father has

not met his heav y burden of sh o wing that the trial judge abuse d her discretion by refusing
to grant him make

- up time.

III.

The Judge ’

s Conversation w i th t

he Ma g istrate

I n her oral opi nion, the m otions judge expla in ed at length t hat the p artie s could not

com m unicate o r a tte mpt to work t hings out because they were “ entrenched in the fight

. ”

T he judge then said:18 I was talking to one of o ur m agis trates a bout th is case, and s he said, and I think it is real ly appropriate , t his isn ’ t a contract case where t he purpose of dama ges in a contr a ct case is t o mak e you whole ; that ’ s not the p urpose of a child custody case . The pu r pose of a c hild cus tod y cas e is [to decide w hat is in ] the best in terest [s] of [S.]

Father a rgues that the motions judge abused her discretion by “ consu lting with a
[ m ] agistrate ” p rior to r e ndering her decision. Appel lant ’ s precise argume nt in t his reg ard

is a s follows:

T he [c] ourt is requir ed to make its own independent decision as to the ultimate disposition of any case although it can be guided by a magistrate ’ s r ecommendatio n . The Do m ingue[s]

- K irchner standard, requi res the court to conduct an “ in d ependent re view of th e re cord and of the f acts found . . . and apply its independent judgment in r eaching its conclusions. ” In this
case , the court hear d both parties and then con s u lted wit h a magistrate behind closed doors to determine tha t “ this isn ’ t a contract ca se where th e purposes of dam ag es in a contract case is to make you (Appellant) whole. ” Besides the fact that the [m ] agistrate did not hear e ither party an d was not pre s ent in th e court room to hea r the ca se a nd could not logi cally or with integr i ty make an educated de ci sion in just a few minutes, the court ’ s decisi on to follow the recom mendations of a [m] agistrate that was neither present for the hearing no r known to ei t her party is an abuse of discr etion.
(Ref erence to transcript omitted. )

When the judge ’ s remarks ar e read in c on text, it is c lear that the judge made her own indepe ndent decision as to wheth er to award make

- up time. What th e m agistrate j u dge said was legally c o rrect and, i n essence, the trial j udge simply said that s he agreed

with the m agistr ate judge ’ s l egal anal ys is. In other w ords, contrary to Father ’ s argument,

the recor d does not suppor t his con tention that the trial j udge, rather t h an rendering an
inde pe n dent decision, allowed a m agistrat e judge to make the dec ision , as to wh e ther to

gra nt m ake

- up time , for he r.19 IV. Wednesday Night Youth Group Meeting Father argues that t he trial judge “ erred in modifying the court

- ordered acces s for
[Father] and abus e d its di scretion in denying the motion to enforce Wednesday

- nig ht

access, w h i ch [ Mother] denied in part f or over a year. ” This arg u ment concerns the fact

that Mother b rought S. to Father ’ s church ’ s youth group at 6:45 P.M. and some t imes at

7:00 P .M

. , rat h e r than at 6:30 P.M., which was the time set forth in the final custody

ord e r . It was c lear fr om the tes ti mony that , w ith one exception , Mother deliver e d S. to
the me eting s at the time those meetings actu ally started , which was alw a ys after 6:30

P.M. The one exception was on Wednesday, March 18, 2020, when Mother, due to the

pa n d emic, did n ot deli ver S. to th e meeting at all.

At the hea ring, Father never indica ted that S. was ever late for the youth group meetings

. I nstead , he t o ok the rigid p osition t h at Mother ’ s conduct cons tituted a

violat ion of h is right to access . But, in a collo quy w ith Fat her ’ s co un sel, the motions judge indicated that she believed , as the author of the order at iss ue, that th e purpose of

th at pro visio n w a s to e nsure t h at S. cou l d attend the m eeti ng of the youth group , which Father happ ened t o lead, but t h e provisi on was no t intend ed to grant additional vis i t at ion as that term is usually understood

. In this appeal, Father points out , accura tely , that the provision at i ssu e appe a rs in

the section of the final custody order that governs “ vi sita tion. ” Nev e r theless, e v e n

assu ming, ar

gu endo , that Mother was wrong in f ailing to deliver S. to th e yo uth gro up meetings at 6:30 P .M., by the time of t he September 2 0 20 hearing, t h ose meeti n gs were20

all being held virtually an d , as far as shown by the record, S. was o n time for t he virt ual

meet in gs. In other words, the problem had been resolved. Because S. never was late for the youth group meetings , it is impossible to see how it would be i n S. ’ s best interest s to
award make

- up time on the grounds that S. d id not ar r ive at the youth g roup mee ti ngs
earlier than th e sc hed u led start t i me

. And, aside from awarding make

- up time, there was nothing else the j udge could h av e done to reme d y this “ w r ong. ” 8
Father also argues that the trial judge erre d in “ mod ifying the court

- o r dered

acce ss ” ins ofar a s it concerns the Wednesda y night meetings. The short answer to that

contention is that t here was no such modifi cation in the c ourt ’ s Dece mb e r 22, 202 0 orde r. This is shown by the last paragraph of that order quoted, supra , at pa g e five.

V

. Friday Pick

- U

p Time Father next argues that the court “ erred in modifying the court

- ordered access fo r [Father] and abused its discretion in denying th e motion t o e nforce the weekend

- access pick

- up time afforded [ Father]. 9 This argument conc e r ns the p ar t of th e fin al custody
order ( see page 1 , supra ) stating that Father ’ s w eekend visitation started “ a f ter school ” on

“ Friday [ s ]

. ” Father co n tend s that si n ce visita t ion resumed on May 15, 2020, S. has been taught virtually and those virtual sessions e n d ed at noon ; t he r e f ore, he asserts that Mother

8 Father never asked the judge t o hold Mother in contempt.

9 I n his motion to enforce, Fat h er failed to allege tha t Mother denied him a ccess time by altering the Friday pick

- up hours. The reason for this failure is that the probl em did not arise until student s , such as S. , began att e nding s chool virtually

– which was after the date the Father filed hi s motion to enfor ce.21

acted improperly in not allowing him to pick S. up at noon

. But i f Mother ’ s testim o ny

was cre dit e d, authoritie s at S. ’ s s chool published a schedule that showed that S. ’ s school day was not finished at noon o n Fridays

. Studen t s were re quired t o do schoolwork until

3:3 0 P. M. on Fridays

. In this regard, the motions ju dge orally ruled as follows:

I l ooked at the [ final cus t ody] order. T he cour t order says that, when school is in session, he will retr iev e the child from sc hoo l. It does say in the summer it will be 3:30 . Right no w or maybe, I don ’ t know, he may have virtual face

- to

- fa c e instruction, he may have o n li ne reso u rce and
s ervice still over, he may have some of these blocks fill ed in that maybe
a r en ’ t being utiliz ed ri ght now, I ’ m not sure, but the school d ay e nds at 3:30 p.m. , and that is when the parties will exchange [S.]

. It doesn ’ t end at 12
o ’ clock

. It does n ’ t end at 11: 20

. The school day ends at 3:30, and th at is when the parties will ex c h ange [S.] ; that w as t he easier part.

Father complains that when his attorney was making his ope ning statement, the motions judge a gre e d that t h e school day e nded a t 1 2 :00 P. M. T he record shows that the judge did not make a ruling at that point

. Read i n conte x t, t he mot i o ns judge was simply making inquiry as to Father ’ s position as t o when the school day ended.

Father also conte nds that Mot he r ackno wledged that “ sc h o ol ended at 12:00 P.M

. ”

As can be seen from the re

- cap of Mother ’ s testimony set fort h ab ove , Mot her ma d e no such acknowledgment. She testified , based on the sch ool schedule , that th ere is

“ suppose d to be self

- direc ted student wo r k time ” Monda y through F riday between 1: 45

and 3:30 P.M. , and if the school intended the day to end at 12:00 P.M., the scho o l s y st em

wo uld not have it on its schedule that school e nded at 3:30 P.M.

There was merit in Mother ’ s position

. I f a student obe y ed the school schedule, it is clear that he or she was not allowed to play games or pursue other recreational

activit i es between 1 2:30 P.M. and 3:30 P.M

. on Fridays. In stead, unt il 3:30 P.M., the22

school day was not finished because students were supposed t o engage in s uch thing s as

“ V irtual F2F I nstruction s ” and [r]es ponding to teacher feedback. ” Because the school day was not fi n i shed, Father had no right to pick up S. at noon even if Father was correct
when he said that S. could do school wo rk at his ho m e just as wel l as at Mo t her ’ s. We

therefore ho ld that the judge was not clearly erroneous wh en she found that the pick

- up
time f o r Father ’ s weekend visitation was 3:30 P.M

. and not noon

. Fath er m akes a related argument that advances some of the same c o ntentions tha t
we have a lready considered and re j ected. He phrases his argument as follows :
As [Father] stated th at school en de d a t noon, and as [Mother] acknowledged that school ended at noon b ut d id not want to release him because the c h ild had homew o rk , and as th e court ac k nowledged that school ended at noon, the child should have been released to [Father] at noon per the cou rt or d er. The fact that the child may or may not have homewor k at th e en d of the school day is ir relevant to the pick

- up time o f the child. Fur thermo r e , the modification of the court order was not requested by either party in any motion a nd adds further co nfu s ion regarding the pick

- up time o f the child. Cur rently, there is more litigation of the pick

- up time [ 10 ] be cause school e n ds at 12PM as verified b y the child ’ s p rincipal and documentation , but the [Mother ] refuses to release the child to the [Father] , co m i ng up with her own arbitrary end

- of

- scho ol time of 2:30 P

. M. [ si c]

. The [c] ourt continues to be silent on the i ssue, dec l ining to rule on e way o r t he other, assumedly until t he school year is over and the motio n becomes moot. Mo difying the cou rt or de r abs e nt a motion to do so, so that [Father ’ s ] already limite d time wi th t he child is further reduced by 3 hour s ev ery

- other

- w eekend, is an abuse of d iscretion. The above argum ents are inconsistent in that Father contends , on the one hand , that the m ot ions j u dge decl ined to make a ruling as to the time the school da y ended a nd,

10 Wh ile his a ppeal was pending, Father, on February 5, 2021, filed a “ Motion to Modify Acces s / Pick

- Up Time. ”23

on the other han d, complains that the court , wi t hout request, modified t he prior order

insofar as it dea lt with the issue of the Friday pick

- up time. In any event , as already

me ntione d ( see page 5 , supra ) , the court , in its December 22, 2020 order, seco nd

p aragraph, d id decide the pick

- u p time issue a n d the court d i d so for g ood reason

inasmuch as Father ’ s atto rney specifically asked the c ourt to decide that issue. 11

C ontrary to Fathe r ’ s argument, the court did not modify the order in such a way as to gi ve Father less visi tation than tha t to which he w as entitled

. In stead, t he order simply

announced the co urt ’ s ruling concerning an issue that aro se after the motion for an

emer g e ncy or d er was filed and had de v eloped into a n other so urce of d isagree ment
b etween the parties

. After reviewing the school sc h edule that wa s introduc e d into evidence together with th e testimony o f th e parties , the motions judge concluded that the

school da y for S . ended at 3:30 P.M. on Fridays, which was the same time that i t ended in Septem ber 2019, when the final cust ody order was filed. T h e school s chedule
(d efendant ’ s exhibit 1) su pport ed the j udge ’ s conclusion that school ended at 3:30 P.M.

11 In his o pening stateme n t, Father ’ s c ounsel sai d : [F ather] has been asking if he could pick him up early on Frida ys. I t hink when the parties testif

ie d before you before at the custody trial , [M other] said she ’ s not wanting to d o anything to keep him from havin g time with hi s da d, and he ’ s been ask i ng if he could pick him up early on Friday. And, so, that ’ s someth ing [Fat her] would ask the [ c ] ourt to a ward

. [ Mother] has been indicating that she wants him to pick him up at 3: 30

. So , that ’ s the parties ’ positio ns, he ’ d like t he noo n, she ’ d like the 3:30, unless she ’ s changed since they last e

- mailed each other.24

We hol d that t h e judg e did not abuse her discretion when she resolved th is minor dispute or w hen she signed the Decembe r 22, 2020 ord e r that reflec t ed that r e soluti on

. VI. Attorney ’ s Fees

F athe r contend s th at the trial judge erred in failing to award him atto rn ey ’ s f e es. In support of that contention, he directs our attention to Family Law A r ticle, § 12

- 103 which provi des:
(a) The cou r t may awar d to either p arty the costs and counsel fees that a re j ust and proper under all the circumstances in any case in which a person:

* * * (2) files any form of proceeding:

* * *
(iii) to enforce a decree of custody or v isitation.
(b) Before a court may award costs and co unsel fees under this se ction, the court shall co ns ider : (1) t he financial sta tu s of e a ch party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial ju stifi c ation for bringing, maintai ning, or defen d ing the pr o ceeding.
(c) Upon a finding by the court that there was an absence of substantial justification of a party for prosecu ti ng or de f end ing the proceeding, and absent a finding by the court of good cause to th e cont rary, the court shal l award to the other part y costs and c ounsel fees. (Emphasis added.)25

Here , the motions j udge did not make a finding that Mother l acked sub st antial just i fication in defending against Father ’ s motion to enforce. Th e judge explained her

reason f o r denyi ng both partie s their req u est for att o rney ’ s fees , by say ing:

As to attorney ’ s fees, [Mother] sho uld have filed a motion [to modify custody or der ] and she di d not. [Father] should have communic ated with her, and he did not. When she said I ’ ll give you 18 days , I wo u ld n ’ t have d one that , w h ich is clear here today. He should have said, instead of, no, you took away Easter, and you took awa y m y time, and the f i rst birthday of my other child, so we ’ ll let the [c ] ourt decide. He should have said I want t h e next 10 week e nds straigh t , and I wan t next Easter, w ill you do that. She probably would have agree d, but he wanted to come to court, because , again, it ’ s about the fight, and it ’ s an awful expensive way to spend your life. It ’ s a horrible way for [S. ] to spe nd h is l i fe.
So, both reques t s f

or attorney ’ s fees ar e denied.

A s can b e seen , Family Law Article Section 1 2

- 103(a) (2)(iii) st ate s that the “ court

may aw a rd

. . . counsel fees ” in “ any form o f proceeding ” that a person files “ to enforce a

dec ree of c us tody or visitati o n. ” ( e mphas i s ad de d )

. Whether to award attorney ’ s fees
under § 12

- 103(a) is a decision that rests in the discret ion o f the trial or motions ju d ge.
Petrini v. Petrini , 336 Md. 453, 46 8 (1994).

Father contends that the judge a bused her disc r etio n in fa i ling to awa r d him

attor ne y ’ s fees because he “ provided a mple evidence that he attem pted to work out a

solution wit h [M other] prior to filing any p roceeding in court. ” The emails that were exchanged between the parties prior to M arch 27, 2020 , the date wh e n the emerg e ncy
motion was filed , pr ovided no evi dence that Father “ attempted to work out a solution ”

with Mot her. He offered no compromise. I n st ead, both parties announc ed their p ositions

and there after refused to budge . More important, an d as stresse d by the mot i ons judge,26

once the emergency moti on w as fi led , Father made no at tempt to resolve the mat ter
witho ut fur th er litigation . Mother off e red Father day

- for

- day make

- up time from M ay 1 5
to June 8, 2020, but Father did not even bother to mak e a coun t eroffer . T h e motions judge did not abuse her discret ion in finding, in effect , that by failing t o make a

cou nter of f er , Father did not have subs t antial justification for contin uing to litigate the

make

- up t ime issue , which was by far the main i ssu e t hat s e parat ed the parties

. Father argues that he was justified in filing the March 27, 2020 emergency motion.

This is t ru e. But t his does not necess a rily mean that M other , in light of the pandemic, did not have substantial justific ation in defen d ing a g ainst the emergen c y motion. After all, as the trial judge pointed out ( see page 11 note 7 , s upra ) , the COVID

- 19 pande mic cr eated

grave and deadly risks that co u ld not have been anticipated by anyone at the time the final custody ord er was signed. T he court fa u l t ed Mother only for what she failed to do, i.e., file a motion to modify the custody order ba sed on the health conc er ns th at arose
because of the pandemi c

. T he court , with ampl e support in the record, found that both parties fa iled to compro m ise because t h e y put th e urge to fight one another in court o ver
S. ’ s best i nter e s t s , and a s a consequence, bo th parti es were at f ault : Mother, becau se she

did not f i le a motion to modify , a nd Father , because once he filed the emergency mo ti on,
he made no attempt to r esolve t h e m atter

. Father also takes issue with the judge ’ s statement that Father “ did not

communicate with” Moth er . According to Father, this “ is c lear err or as [he] both testified to communicating with [Mother ] and exhibite d multiple ema i ls and text me ssage s
be t ween the two parties. ” There was evidence in t he record to support the motion judge ’ s27

statement that, p ri or to filing the emergency motio n , Fath er f ailed to commun icate with

Mother. F or example, in one of the emails that Mother s e nt to Fathe r sh ortly be f ore the emergency motion was filed, Mother expressed concern about the fact that Father ’ s
step son, who l iv ed with Father , worked at a McDo n ald ’ s restaurant. Mot her ’ s concern

was t hat because the st epson worked in suc h a public pla c e, the step s on might be exposed

to the coronaviru s , and S. , if he stayed in the same house wit h the s tep son , might contract
the vi rus. It turn ed out that by the ti m e Mother expressed concer n ab out the st epson ’ s

expos u re , the lat ter had alre ady stopped wo r king at McD o nald ’ s. Bu t in the email exchange that prece ded the filing of the emergen cy motion, Father nev er attempted to

allev ia te Mother ’ s concerns by sending her a n email telling he r this.
Next, Father takes issue with the following s e ntence set fo r th in the j u dge ’ s oral

o pi n ion

. The offending s ente nce is : “ when she [ Mother] said I ’ ll give you 18 days, I

wouldn ’ t have done th at, which is clear here today. ” Fath e r ’ s complaint is that th e trial judge gave no ex planation as to why she “ wo uld not do t h at. ” We d i s agree. In h er o ral opinion , the judge said that it was not in the be st interest s of S. , after regular vi sitation

ha d been r estored, to interrupt the rhyth m of the usual a lternate weekend (Friday to

M onday) visitation sc hedu le.

Last ly, Fat h e r takes iss u e wit h the s tatem e nt in the judge ’ s opinion in which she opined that Father : “ s h ould ha ve said I want the next 10 we ek ends straight, and I want
next Easter, w ill you do that? She [Mother] probably would ha ve agreed , but he wan te d

to come to c o urt , becaus e , again, it ’ s abo u t the fight and i t ’ s an awful expensive way to spend your life. ” Father ’ s precise criticism of th at statement is that it overlooked the fa c t28

that Father was compelled to file the emergency motion. The ju d ge p l ainly did not

o verlook tha t fact. She was s i mply making the point that once litigation had co mmenced , F ather showed no inclination to comp romi s e but just wanted to continu e to litigat e

. The history of this case and the trial transcript amply s upport ed t h e trial judge ’ s view of

Fa t her ’ s motiv e s

. I n summary, the motions judge had discretion as to whether to award attorney ’ s
fees to Father under § 12

- 103(a) of the Family Law A rticle. T o prove that the judge

abused her discretion in failing to award attorn ey ’ s fees , Fat h er was requ i red to show that

“ n o reas onable person would take the view adopted by the [t rial] court. ” Wil son v.
Crane , Inc ., 3 85 Md. 185 , 198 (200 5). In this ca s e, Father has not made such a showing

.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE P AID BY APPELLANT.The correction notice (s) for this opinion (s) can be found here:

https://mdcourts.gov/ sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/1320s20cn.pdf