SAND 2005-1981P 

Unlimited Release 

April 2005 

Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste 

Management of DPRK Nuclear 

Facilities 

Professor WHANG Jooho 

Kyung-Hee University 

Seoul, Republic of Korea 

and 

Dr. George T. Baldwin 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM USA 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by 

Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, 

for the United States Department of Energy's 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and 

technical experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, 

design, analyze, and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative security 

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of technology. Reports of that work are provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research 

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For specific information on this report contact: 

George Baldwin at the above address. 

This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 iii 

Abstract 

One critical aspect of any denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) involves dismantlement of its nuclear facilities and management of their 

associated radioactive wastes. The decommissioning problem for its two principal 

operational plutonium facilities at Yongbyun, the 5MWe nuclear reactor and the 

Radiochemical Laboratory reprocessing facility, alone present a formidable challenge. 

Dismantling those facilities will create radioactive waste in addition to existing 

inventories of spent fuel and reprocessing wastes. 

Negotiations with the DPRK, such as the Six Party Talks, need to appreciate the 

enormous scale of the radioactive waste management problem resulting from 

dismantlement. The two operating plutonium facilities, along with their legacy wastes, 

will result in anywhere from 50 to 100 metric tons of uranium spent fuel, as much as 

500,000 liters of liquid high-level waste, as well as miscellaneous high-level waste 

sources from the Radiochemical Laboratory. A substantial quantity of intermediate-level 

waste will result from disposing 600 metric tons of graphite from the reactor, an 

undetermined quantity of chemical decladding liquid waste from reprocessing, and 

hundreds of tons of contaminated concrete and metal from facility dismantlement. 

Various facilities for dismantlement, decontamination, waste treatment and packaging, 

and storage will be needed. The shipment of spent fuel and liquid high level waste out of 

the DPRK is also likely to be required. 

Nuclear facility dismantlement and radioactive waste management in the DPRK are all 

the more difficult because of nuclear nonproliferation constraints, including the call by 

the United States for “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement,” or “CVID.” 

It is desirable to accomplish dismantlement quickly, but many aspects of the radioactive 

waste management cannot be achieved without careful assessment, planning and 

preparation, sustained commitment, and long completion times. The radioactive waste 

management problem in fact offers a prospect for international participation to engage the 

DPRK constructively. DPRK nuclear dismantlement, when accompanied with a 

concerted effort for effective radioactive waste management, can be a mutually beneficial 

goal. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

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Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

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Contents 

Abbreviations & Acronyms ................................................................................................ 1 

Units of Measurement......................................................................................................... 1 

1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 3 

1.1. Background......................................................................................................... 3 

1.2. Objectives of Dismantlement.............................................................................. 4 

1.3. Consequences of Dismantlement........................................................................ 4 

1.4. Need for Technical Work in Advance ................................................................ 5 

1.5. Contribution of this study ................................................................................... 5 

2. Plutonium-Relevant Nuclear Facilities....................................................................... 7 

2.1. 5MWe Nuclear Reactor .................................................................................... 10 

2.1.1. Characteristics........................................................................................... 10 

2.1.2. Operational History and Status ................................................................. 12 

2.1.3. Spent Fuel Arising .................................................................................... 12 

2.2. Radiochemical Laboratory................................................................................ 13 

2.2.1. Characteristics........................................................................................... 13 

2.2.2. Operational History and Waste................................................................. 16 

3. Decommissioning the 5MWe Reactor and Related Facilities .................................. 19 

3.1. Decommissioning Options................................................................................ 20 

3.2. Decommissioning the 5MWe Reactor.............................................................. 20 

3.2.1. Nuclear Graphite Waste............................................................................ 21 

3.2.2. International Status of Graphite Reactor Decommissioning .................... 21 

3.2.3. Cost ........................................................................................................... 22 

3.2.4. Decommissioning of Key Elements.......................................................... 22 

3.3. Decommissioning the Radiochemical Laboratory............................................ 27 

3.3.1. International Precedents for Reprocessing Facility Decommissioning .... 27 

3.3.2. Decommissioning of Key Elements.......................................................... 28 

3.4. Basic Schemes for Decommissioning............................................................... 31 

3.4.1. Spent Fuel and the 5MWe Reactor ........................................................... 31 

Liquid HLW, Chemical Decladding Waste, and the Radiochemical Laboratory..... 34 

3.4.2. Facilities Required for Waste Management in the DPRK........................ 36 

4. Strategic Alternatives................................................................................................ 39 

4.1. Fast Track Decommissioning ........................................................................... 39 

4.2. Decommissioning Supported by International Cooperation............................. 40 

5. Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................... 41 

Appendix I: Status of Graphite Reactor Decommissioning.............................................. 43 

UK................................................................................................................................. 43 

France............................................................................................................................ 44 

Italy ............................................................................................................................... 44 

Japan ............................................................................................................................. 45 

Appendix II: International Precedents for Reprocessing Facility Decommissioning....... 47 

Eurochemic Facility Decommissioning........................................................................ 47 

France............................................................................................................................ 48 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

vi 

Figures 

Figure 1. Map of North Korea ............................................................................................ 8 

Figure 2. Satellite image of Yongbyun site ........................................................................ 9 

Figure 3. Cutaway schematic of Magnox-type reactor..................................................... 10 

Figure 4. Principal steps in the Purex process .................................................................. 15 

Figure 5. Schematic flow for spent fuel: from defueling the 5WMe reactor to disposal 

of HLW .............................................................................................................. 32 

Figure 6. Schematic flow for solid wastes from dismantling the 5WMe reactor ............. 33 

Figure 7. Schematic flow for liquid HLW stored at the Radiochemical Laboratory........ 34 

Figure 8. Schematic flow for Chemical Decladding Waste stored at the Radiochemical 

Laboratory.......................................................................................................... 35 

Figure 9. Schematic flow for solid wastes from the Radiochemical Laboratory.............. 36 

Tables 

Table 1. Status of Nuclear Facilities in the DPRK ............................................................. 7 

Table 2. Characteristics of the 5MWe reactor (estimated) ............................................... 11 

Table 3. Estimate of the waste generated from the Radiochemical Laboratory ............... 17 

Table 4. Decommissioning Cost for Selected Reactor Types........................................... 22 

Table 5. Spent Fuel Cost based on LWR Fuel Cycle Unit Prices..................................... 25 

Table 6. Facilities needed to manage the wastes from decommissioning the 5WMe 

reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory........................................................ 37 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 1 

Abbreviations & Acronyms 

BWR Boiling Water Reactor 

CANDU Canadian Deuterium Uranium (reactor type) 

CVID Complete, Verifiable & Irreversible Dismantlement 

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 

GCR Gas Cooled Reactor (In all cases discussed in this report, these are 

equivalently “graphite-moderated” reactors.)

HLW High Level (Radioactive) Waste 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

ILW Intermediate Level (Radioactive) Waste 

LLW Low Level (Radioactive) Waste 

LWR Light Water Reactor 

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency (unit of OECD) 

NGO Non-Governmental Organization 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US) 

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Europe) 

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 

RDD Radioactive Dispersal Device 

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) 

UK United Kingdom 

US United States 

WAGR Windscale Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor 

Units of Measurement 

BF Belgian Franc 

Ci Curie (measure of radioactivity) 

DM Deutsch Mark 

g Gram 

g/cm3 Gram per cubic centimeter (measure of density) 

kgU kilogram-Uranium 

kWe kilowatt-electric 

m Meter 

MW Megawatt 

MWD/tU Megawatt-days per tonne Uranium (measure of reactor fuel burnup) 

MWe Megawatt-electric 

MWth Megawatt-thermal 

SWU Separative Work Unit (measure of enrichment) 

t metric ton 

tU metric tons uranium 

USD US Dollar ($) 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

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Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

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1. Introduction 

1.1. Background 

The North Korean nuclear weapons program has drawn serious international attention 

since the early 1990s. In 1994, North Korea (DPRK) agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons 

program in exchange for energy and economic aid by the United States (US) and South 

Korea (ROK), including the provision of two Light Water Reactor (LWR) units and 

arrangement for interim energy alternatives. According to the so-called “Agreed 

Framework” between the US and DPRK, the DPRK agreed eventually to dismantle its 

graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. The US and DPRK were supposed to 

cooperate in finding a method to store the spent nuclear fuel, and to dispose of it in a safe 

manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK. The dismantlement was 

supposed to be accomplished within ten years from the conclusion of the agreement. 

However, the technical and economical aspects of dismantlement had not been treated in 

detail. 

The main facilities of concern include the 5 MWe graphite moderated reactor that had 

been operated since 1986 for the primary purpose of producing plutonium for nuclear 

weapons. Larger units, rated at 50 MWe and 200 MWe, were constructed but never 

operated. A large reprocessing facility (the “Radiochemical Laboratory”) has been 

operated to recover plutonium from the reactor spent fuel. All of these facilities are 

located within several kilometers of each other, near Yongbyun, DPRK. 

Unfortunately, the DPRK ignored international norms and eventually broke the Agreed 

Framework, which has increased tensions. Monitoring by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) was suspended when inspectors were expelled in 2002, and the 

DPRK is suspected to have resumed its push to develop nuclear weapons. 

In 2002, negotiations resumed at the “Six Party Talks,” which involve the DPRK, South 

Korea, the US, China, Russia, and Japan. The Six Party Talks went through a third round 

in June 2004. North Korea declined to participate in the fourth round of talks that had 

been scheduled for September 2004. Although continuation of the talks remains in limbo 

as of this writing, it is nevertheless very possible that the talks could resume at any time. 

Denuclearization of the DPRK, especially disposition of nuclear materials and spent 

nuclear fuel, is a critical component of improving regional stability. Many papers have 

dealt strategically1,2,3 with how the North Korean nuclear weapon program would be 

frozen and eliminated in a complete, irreversible, and verifiable manner, if an agreement 

 

1

 Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Princeton University Press 

(1999). 

2

 Duk-ho Moon, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: Verification Priorities and New Challenges,

Cooperative Monitering Center Occasional Paper, SAND 2003-4558, Sandia National Laboratories (2003). 3

 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Verifiable, Irreversible, Cooperative Dismantlement of the 

DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program,” Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 45th

Annual Meeting (2004). 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

4 

can be reached. Technical papers4,5 have mostly been concerned with how to verify and 

reveal the status and history of its nuclear weapons program. 

1.2. Objectives of Dismantlement 

Denuclearization could involve several related issues or objectives. One objective is to 

discontinue current production of nuclear weapon usable material, particularly plutonium. 

Another objective would be to prevent future production of the material. An additional 

objective would be to enable forensic analysis to determine the past production of 

material. Further objectives include finding and accounting for all existing material, and 

then removing or otherwise disposing of that material. 

A serious concern related to denuclearization is preventing the use of radioactive waste as 

source material for a radioactive dispersal device (RDD, or “dirty bomb”). Cleaning up 

the environmental mess associated with the nuclear program is still another important 

issue, and would be of particular concern to reunification advocates. 

A political agreement would decide which of these objectives are encompassed. 

Whatever the eventual settlement is, it is certain that radioactive waste management will 

be a critical issue. 

1.3. Consequences of Dismantlement 

Key steps in denuclearization include disposing nuclear materials and dismantling the 

facilities. Each step consists of many procedural components for which technologies to 

be applied should be sought in economically viable and proliferation-resistant ways. 

Many issues associated with denuclearization need to be dealt with in advance. These 

include preparing and conditioning nuclear materials and the spent nuclear fuel for 

interim storage and shipping, reprocessing the spent fuel, solidifying high-level waste 

(HLW) stored in tanks, and storing and disposing of solid waste from dismantlement. 

Dismantling the nuclear facilities will generate a large volume of radioactive waste 

containing various levels of radioactivity to be treated and disposed of safely. 

Considering that it may have inherited the poor radioactive waste management practices 

of the former Soviet Union, the DPRK may not be operating nuclear facilities in 

compliance with international safety standards. 

We do not foresee North Korea, unlike South Africa, including the radioactive waste 

problem as part of the denuclearization process. South Africa dismantled its weapons 

program and managed the resultant radioactive waste without foreign assistance. 

Verification of South Africa’s dismantlement by the IAEA was complicated by lack of 

knowledge of the nuclear weapons program infrastructure, and took approximately two 

years. 

 

4

 Jared S. Dreicer, “How Much Plutonium Could Have been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?” Science 

and Global Security, vol 8, pp 273-286 (2000). 5

 David Albright, “North Korea's Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks,” ISIS Issue 

Brief, Institute for Science and International Security, January 15, 2003. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 5 

1.4. Need for Technical Work in Advance 

Dismantling nuclear facilities and safely disposing of spent nuclear fuel are two main 

topics in the nuclear field, since they take the most time to accomplish and require large 

resources of money, manpower, technology, and regulatory work. Dismantling the 

infrastructure of a nuclear weapons program involves a long listing of contents that are so 

complicated, technically as well as economically, that allocation of responsibilities 

among the interested parties may take too long to be finalized in an expected time frame. 

After reaching a strategic dismantlement agreement, substantial issues regarding roles 

and responsibilities would remain and would require extensive discussion to resolve. 

Allocating these responsibilities to the participants will be decided at the working level of 

the Six Party Talks, so estimating in advance the resources needed to dismantle the 

facilities and to treat the radioactive waste from the nuclear facilities will help prepare for 

the talks. As a spin-off benefit, creating a good scheme for cooperation would be a 

starting point for, or component of, multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle in 

East Asia. This will consequently enhance the nonproliferation regime. 

1.5. Contribution of this study 

The scope of this work is limited to the plutonium-relevant nuclear facilities in the 

DPRK, specifically the 5MWe graphite reactor and the associated Radiochemical 

Laboratory. These key plutonium-producing DPRK facilities are relatively well-known, 

which makes estimation possible. Less is known about the suspected uranium enrichment 

program, which makes estimating the associated radioactive waste management from 

dismantlement difficult. It can be safely assumed, however, that such consequences only 

add to the consequences we deal with in this study, namely those from the plutonium 

program. From a technical point of view, the plutonium program dismantlement would 

probably be the most problematic. 

The objectives of this study are to address key issues and critical paths for dismantling 

the two plutonium generating facilities in the DPRK from the radioactive waste 

management perspective. We will examine the substantive issues that estimate the 

amount of waste resulting from dismantling the DPRK nuclear facilities, and, based upon 

international experiences, estimate the time it would take to dismantle, which would help 

generate strategies for the future. We will develop various scenarios or alternatives for 

comparison, including final disposition of nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel, 

emphasizing technical aspects. 

This study should help anticipate the barriers that the participants at the Six Party Talks 

may encounter while proceeding to reach an agreement. We expect to provide technical 

information that can be useful in evaluating policy options with respect to the stated goal 

of “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID). 

Government entities from all of the six-party countries need to consider the technical 

implications of any forthcoming political agreement and should be interested in the result 

of this study. In the US, both the Departments of State and Energy are directly involved. 

In South Korea, the list includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of 

Unification, and Ministry of Science and Technology. In addition, government-affiliated 

research institutes, non-governmental organizations dealing with security policy, strategy 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

6 

studies, or Korean unification, as well as professional technical societies, are an extended 

audience for this work. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 7 

2. Plutonium-Relevant Nuclear Facilities 

The known nuclear facilities in the DPRK are listed in Table 1. Only the two research 

reactors and the 5MWe power reactor have been operational. Construction of the other 

reactors has not been completed. These reactors would be new threats if their 

construction resumed and operations began, but otherwise their decommissioning would 

not be a major issue. 

Table 1. Status of Nuclear Facilities in the DPRK 

Type Location (number) Remarks

Nuclear Power Reactor Yongbyun(2) 

Taechon(1) 

Shinpo(2) 

5 MWe, 50 MWe 

200 MWe 

1000 MWe 

Research Reactor Pyungyang(1) 

Yongbyun(1) 

for education 

IRT-2000, radioisotope production 

Fuel Fabrication Facility Yongbyun(1) 

Radiochemical Laboratory 

(reprocessing plant) 

Yongbyun(1) two processing lines 

Uranium Mine 

Uranium Milling 

Pyungsan(1), Sunchun(1) 

Pyungsan(1), Pakchun(1) 

 

290 tU/year, 210 tU/year 

Isotope Processing Facility Yongbyun(1) 

The nuclear facility locations can be found on the map in Figure 1. A commercial satellite 

image of the Yongbyun facilities is in Figure 2. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

8 

Figure 1. Map of North Korea 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 9 

Figure 2. Satellite image of Yongbyun site6

 

6

 IKONOS 1-m commercial satellite image of Yongbyun nuclear site, DPRK, in early 2000, as cited by 

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein in Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, Chapter 3, Institute for 

Science and International Security [ref: http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/figures2_3.html]. 

50 MWe 

Reactor Site 

Radiochemical 

Laboratory Site 

5 MWe 

Reactor Site 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

10 

2.1. 5MWe Nuclear Reactor 

2.1.1. Characteristics 

The 5MWe graphite reactor at Yongbyun is a Magnox-type reactor. Magnox reactors (see 

Figure 3) have a graphite-moderated reactor core that is cooled by carbon dioxide gas. 

The uranium fuel can be loaded and unloaded from the top of the reactor while the 

reactor is in operation. Fresh fuel is supplied from a fuel fabrication plant located at the 

same site. Spent fuel withdrawn from the reactor is transferred to a storage pool. 

Figure 3. Cutaway schematic of Magnox-type reactor 

The name “Magnox” comes from the cladding of the uranium fuel, which is an alloy of 

magnesium. The fuel itself is uranium metal, which corrodes much more easily than 

uranium oxide fuel found in light water reactors. When in contact with water, metallic 

uranium converts to uranium oxide and uranium hydride. Both uranium metal and 

uranium hydride are pyrophoric, which presents a fire hazard. 

Exact design features of the 5MWe reactor have not been released by the DPRK, but it is 

reported to have adopted the design of the UK “Calder Hall” reactors. The Calder Hall 

reactors began operation in 1956, producing weapons-grade plutonium and electricity on 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 11 

a small scale. Researchers estimate the design characteristics of the 5MWe reactor as in 

Table 2.7

Table 2. Characteristics of the 5MWe reactor (estimated) 

Power, thermal 

Power, electric 

20 MWth 

5 MWe 

Burnup8, maximum 

Burnup, average 

1,370 MWD/tU 

635 MWD/tU 

Initial Fuel Loading 

Graphite Moderator 

Graphite Reflector 

50 tU 

300 t 

300 t 

Reactor Core 

 Effective Height 

 Effective Diameter 

 Number of Fuel Channels 

 Fuel Elements/Channel 

590 cm 

643 cm 

812 

10 

Fuel Elements 

 Core 

 Cladding 

 Diameter 

 Length 

Uranium Mass 

natural uranium-0.5% aluminum 

magnesium-0.5% zirconium 

3.0 cm 

60 cm 

6.24 kg 

Reactor Vessel (steel) 

Inner Diameter 

Height 

 Thickness 

880 cm 

1,680 cm 

4.0 cm 

Shield 

Thermal Shield (steel) Thickness 

Upper Concrete Thickness 

Radial Concrete Thickness 

7.0 cm 

450 cm 

300 cm 

 

7

 David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, ed., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, The Institute for 

Science and International Security, Washington D.C., 2000, 161-2. 

8

Specific burnup of the fuel is termed as the fission energy released per unit mass of the fuel, usually 

expressed in megawatt days per metric ton or per kg, i.e., MWD/tU or MWD/kgU. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

12 

2.1.2. Operational History and Status 

The operational history is a key factor with regard to nonproliferation purposes to 

determine the amount of spent fuel discharged and, consequently, the amount of 

plutonium contained in the spent fuel. 

The DPRK began construction of the 5MWe reactor in 1980. It started operation in 1986, 

and had been in operation for eight years when the freeze began in 1994. The operation 

history of these eight years is not known, except that it had experienced some 

abnormalities. Verifying the operational history of the 5MWe reactor from 1986 to 1994 

has been a concern to many investigators. Inconsistency between the DPRK’s report to 

the IAEA and the independent findings of the IAEA made investigators speculate various 

operation options the DPRK might have taken. 

In normal operation, the 5MWe reactor is expected to discharge one-fifth of the fuel in 

the core per year. This portion of the core contains about 6 kg of plutonium. Based upon 

all available information, and with many assumptions made to figure out the amount of 

spent fuel withdrawn and reprocessed, experts generally conclude that the DPRK has not 

drawn out more than two full cores (16,000 fuel elements). 

The DPRK restarted the 5MWe reactor in February 2003. It is now claimed to operate at 

full power. 

2.1.3. Spent Fuel Arising 

Following the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 5MWe reactor was stopped and its full core 

of about 8,000 fuel elements was withdrawn. The 8,000 spent fuel elements were 

packaged into 400 stainless steel cans with inert gas and stored under water. IAEA 

inspectors sealed the cans to detect possible tampering. The spent fuel canning operation 

began in April 1996 and finished in mid-1999. Canning took longer than expected due to 

acquisition of required tools, purification of pool water, and removal of sludge from the 

pool bottom. Since December 2002, when the IAEA inspectors were dismissed by 

DPRK, nothing has been learned about what happened to the spent fuel storage cans or 

their contents. 

Recent US visitors to the Yongbyun site confirmed that there are no longer any cans in 

the pool.9 The DPRK claims that they removed all 8,000 spent fuel elements from the 

storage pool and reprocessed them, starting in mid-January 2003 and finishing by the end 

of June 2003. The visitors were not able to determine that the Radiochemical Laboratory 

had been operated during the first half of 2003. Two possibilities are that all 8,000 spent 

fuel elements were reprocessed as they claimed, or that they simply moved the spent fuel 

elements to another storage area. A third possibility is that the DPRK reprocessed only 

some of the spent fuel elements, while storing the remainder elsewhere. 

The number of spent fuel elements discharged from the 5MWe reactor is a serious 

question from the viewpoints of both nuclear material non-proliferation and radioactive 

waste management. If the DPRK did not reprocess the spent fuel removed from the 

storage pool, and just stored it without special care in a dry pit or another water pool, the 

 

9

 Sigfried Hecker, testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 Jan 2004. 

[http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/HeckerTestimony040121.pdf] 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 13 

spent fuel may have undergone severe corrosion. Magnox spent fuel presents a 

spontaneous fire hazard due to uranium hydride, and may leak fission products through 

corroded cladding, eventually contaminating the surroundings. 

The spent fuel from the 5MWe reactor has a relatively low average burnup 

(635 MWD/tU), which is about one-tenth that typical of CANDU reactors. Although the 

fuel should be less radioactive than CANDU spent fuel, it still needs a thick layer of 

water or concrete for radiation shielding. 

2.2. Radiochemical Laboratory 

2.2.1. Characteristics 

The Radiochemical Laboratory is the main reprocessing facility at Yongbyun. The 

building is 192 m long, 27 m wide and 6 stories high. In the reprocessing building, six 

process cells are located on the first floor and three sampling cells are on the second 

floor. Spent fuel is processed in batch mode in two process lines, each with the following 

major components: 10

• cladding dissolver 20 spent fuel elements per batch 

• fuel dissolver 5 spent fuel elements per batch 

• 30 mixer-settlers each 80 liter capacity 

• 5 glove boxes for further processing of plutonium 

Construction began in 1984. In 1992, the IAEA experts saw that one process line was 

almost completed, lacking only the final step to reduce the volume of waste. In 1994, the 

construction of the second process line was observed to be complete. Since then it has not 

been known whether the DPRK added the final step for waste volume reduction. If the 

HLW passes through the volume reduction step, most of the aqueous part of the waste is 

removed, but the radioactivity carried by the solids remains the same. Thus, the HLW 

becomes more concentrated in radioactivity. 

Different opinions exist regarding the Radiochemical Laboratory’s capacity. One is that 

the facility is capable of reprocessing 220 to 250 metric tons of uranium, i.e. Magnox 

fuel, per year using two process lines;11 the other is based on a statement the DPRK made 

to a visitor that the capacity of the Radiochemical Laboratory is 110 metric tons of 

uranium per line per year.12

An analysis laboratory is located to the north of the reprocessing building, and several 

waste-related tanks and buildings are within the facility boundary. A suspicious building 

was found by satellite images to connect to the reprocessing building. Its large 

containment structure, 67 m by 24 m by 9 m, is probably used for storing waste from the 

reprocessing building. Half of the volume may be for liquid waste storage and the other 

half for solid waste. 

 

10 Albright and O’Neill, 154-6.

11 Albright and O’Neill, 149. 

12 Hecker. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

14 

The Purex method, a solvent extraction process, was adopted for separating plutonium. In 

a solvent extraction process, specific solutes dissolved in aqueous phase move to an 

organic solvent, due to their higher dissolution coefficients. The Purex method is 

commonly adopted by commercial reprocessing facilities for slightly enriched uranium 

fuel from power reactors. 

Figure 4 shows the principal steps of the Purex process. The basic method is as applied to 

fuel clad with stainless steel or zircaloy, but the figure shows a possible modification for 

Magnox fuel that may be used by the DPRK Radiochemical Laboratory. Based on 

discussions so far, the DPRK-modified Purex process may include the following 

differences: 

• In the basic Purex process, fuel with cladding is put into the fuel dissolver, shown 

in Figure 4 as the direct path between Step 1 and Step 2. Only the fuel material is 

dissolved and the cladding hull is left out. But in the DPRK case, fuel with 

cladding is put into a dissolver where only the cladding dissolves (Step 1.5). The 

solid fuel material moves to Step 2 for dissolution. 

• The HLW from Step 4 is a large volume of nitric acid containing dissolved 

radioactive materials. In commercial reprocessing plants, nitric acid recovery 

systems are added to reduce the volume of the HLW, as is depicted in Step 11. 

• For light water reactors with enriched uranium fuel, impure uranyl nitrate 

partitioned at step 5b in Figure 4 undergoes purification and conversion to recover 

enriched uranium. In the DPRK case, the uranium in the uranyl nitrate has no 

enrichment value, so Steps 8, 9, and 10 may be omitted. 

This simplified process may include only the steps needed to produce plutonium, 

excluding auxiliary steps for waste volume reduction (Steps 8–12), which the DPRK 

might not have added to the process lines of the Radiochemical Laboratory. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 15 

Figure 4. Principal steps in the Purex process13

1.

Preparation for 

Dissolution

2.

Fuel Dissolution

3.

Feed Preparation

4.

Primary 

Decontamination

5a.

Plutonium

Partition

14.

Off-Gas

Treatment

8.

Uranium 

Purification

6.

Plutonium 

Purification 7.

Conversion to 

Oxide

13.

Solvent

Cleanup

9.

Conversion to 

Oxide

11.

Nitric Acid 

Recovery

10.

Conversion to UF6

Fuel & cladding

Dissolved

fuel

Liquid HLW

Uranium &

Plutonium

in solvent

Plutonium

Nitrate

Uranyl Nitrate

12.

Vitrification

Recovered Solvent

5b.

Uranium

Partition

Off-gases

Effluent gas

Solvent:

Tributyl

Phosphate

Nitric

Acid

Recovered Nitric Acid

(Solid)

Cladding hulls

Liquid HLW

(Interim

Storage)

Solid

HLW

LLW

LLW

Plutonium

Product

Cleaned Solvent

Recovered

Nitric Acid

(Recycle)

1.5

Cladding

Dissolution

Off-gases

Fuel only

Off-gases

Chemical Decladding Waste

 

13Adapted from: Manson Benedict, Thomas Pigford, and Hans Wolfgang Levi, Nuclear Chemical 

Engineering, 2d ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

16 

2.2.2. Operational History and Waste 

The DPRK reported to IAEA in early 1989 that fresh fuel was used for a “cold test” of 

the reprocessing facility, followed by a hot test with 86 irradiated fuel elements. IAEA 

investigation found a discrepancy between the DPRK’s report and sample analysis. 

Experts suspect, based on the results of sampling and analysis, that DPRK might have 

reprocessed 25 to 50 metric tons of spent fuel, corresponding to 4,000 to 8,000 spent fuel 

elements, during 1989 to 1991. 

During Dr. Hecker’s visit to the nuclear facilities of North Korea, the DPRK insisted that 

they had removed 8,000 canned spent fuel elements from the storage pool and 

reprocessed all of them. 

Reprocessing generates wastes of all kinds—gaseous, solid and liquid—and of varying 

degrees of radioactivity. Wastes can be categorized in many ways. The criteria may be 

the level of radioactivity, concentration in the waste, the nature of the radionuclides 

present in the waste, and the properties of the material that carries the radioactivity. Three 

classifications, high-, intermediate-, and low-level waste (HLW, ILW, and LLW, 

respectively), are adopted in this report. 

Figure 4 shows various waste streams involved in the Purex process: 

• The aqueous waste stream from the primary decontamination step, Step 4 in 

Figure 4, is characterized as HLW. The first step in the solvent extraction 

separates 99–99.9% of fission products from the uranium and plutonium. 

• The ILW consists of the LLW concentrate, contaminated aqueous solutions from 

solvent washing, and many other streams with appreciable solid content. 

Solutions from the cladding dissolver (hereafter termed chemical decladding 

waste) can be characterized as ILW.14

• The low-level liquid waste arises from the plutonium purification step and other 

decontamination steps. In this report, the LLW streams are ignored to highlight 

the two important types of waste, HLW and chemical decladding waste. 

The DPRK is assumed to have operated the Radiochemical Laboratory for two main 

series of campaigns—the first from 1989 to 1991 as experts suspect, and the second 

during the first six months of 2003 as the DPRK insists. Further, it is assumed that each 

series reprocessed 50 metric tons of spent fuel, and that there is no facility or process line 

to reduce waste volume (denitration of HLW, acid recovery, etc.). A rough estimate of 

the maximum volumes of waste, characterized as above, is shown in Table 3. 

 

14 Jean-Marc Wolff, Eurochemic 1956–1990: Thirty-five years of international co-operation in the field of 

nuclear engineering: The chemical processing of irradiated fuels and the management of radioactive wastes, 

NEA/OECD, Paris, 1996. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 17 

Table 3. Estimate of the waste* generated from the Radiochemical Laboratory 

HLW 500,000 liters See Note 1 

ILW 300,000 liters See Note 2 

Uranyl nitrate about 100 tU See Note 3 

1. 5,000 liter/tU × 50tU/campaign × 2 campaigns 

In a typical Purex process with pulse columns (cf. the DPRK uses mixer settlers), per 1 

ton uranium basis, Step 4 in Figure 4 is given 2,830 liters as feed, 17,000 liters of 

solvent. 4,220 liters of HLW will be sent to Step 11.15 Roughly, 5,000 liters of HLW is 

estimated to be generated. 

2. 3,000 liter/tU × 50tU/campaign × 2 campaigns 

The source is mainly from chemical decladding. Chemical decladding of Mg-clad fuel at 

the Eurochemic plant generated 3 m3/tU.16

3. Impure uranyl nitrate from step 5b in Figure 4. 

*These are minimum estimates 

 

15 O.J. Wick et at., Plutonium Handbook: A Guide to Technology, American Nuclear Society, Illinois, 1980. 16 Wolff. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

18 

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Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 19 

3. Decommissioning the 5MWe Reactor and Related 

Facilities 

The US and the DPRK agreed in 1994 to complete dismantling the 5MWe reactor and 

related facilities in ten years, when a project to supply two LWRs would have been 

completed. The word “complete” was used in the agreement, but it was not precisely 

defined. It is not clear whether the word “complete” can be a qualitative goal for 

dismantling the 5MWe reactor and its related facilities and whether the time period of ten 

years is enough. International practices are referenced in this report for helpful hints and 

to provide a technical basis for the Six Party Talks. 

To date, 90 commercial power reactors, more than 250 research reactors, and many other 

nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide have been shut down. Some of them have been 

fully dismantled. Most of the Magnox-type reactors in UK, France, Italy, and Japan have 

also been shut down, some as far back as the 1980s. Shutting down Magnox reactors has 

sometimes been delayed in order to determine decommissioning strategies. 

The IAEA, OECD/NEA, and the World Nuclear Association have compiled the amount 

of experience countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycles have with decommissioning 

reprocessing plants. Generally, proven techniques and equipment are available for 

decommissioning such nuclear facilities. More effort is required to compare cost data 

from many countries in a standard format. 

Factors to be taken into account when developing a strategy from available options for 

decommissioning include: 

• Safety and environmental issues, 

• Requirements for possible reuse of the plant and/or site, 

• Quantity and types of waste produced, 

• Availability of waste disposal sites, 

• Worker dose, 

• Cost and availability of funding, 

• Consideration of sustainability and intergenerational equity arguments and 

stakeholder views. 

In the DPRK case, special consideration has to be given for the decommissioning strategy 

to support nuclear nonproliferation and security issues. 

In this section, we review technical options for decommissioning the key elements of the 

5MWe reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory. Considering both technical feasibility 

and international experiences, strategic alternatives will be sought in a later section. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

20 

3.1. Decommissioning Options 

Three options for decommissioning have been defined by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency: DECON, SAFSTOR, and ENTOMB.17

DECON 

DECON involves “immediate” dismantlement. Soon after the nuclear facility closes, 

equipment, structures, and portions of the facility containing radioactive contaminants are 

removed and decontaminated to a level that permits release of the property and 

termination of the license. 

SAFSTOR 

SAFSTOR is a delayed DECON. A nuclear facility is maintained and monitored in a 

condition that allows the radioactivity to decay; afterwards it is dismantled. 

ENTOMB 

Radioactive contaminants are encased in a structurally sound material, such as concrete, 

and appropriately maintained and monitored until the radioactivity decays to a level 

permitting release of the property. 

The US NRC requires that the decommissioning of a facility be completed within 60 

years, whatever the option or combination of options is taken. On the other hand, the 

strategy for most UK reactors involves deferrals of up to 100 years, until the radioactivity 

decays to a level that permits direct handling or removal work. 

Of the above options, DECON best matches the concept of “complete dismantlement 

within ten years” called out in the 1994 Agreed Framework. 

3.2. Decommissioning the 5MWe Reactor 

Since the 5MWe reactor is a graphite moderator type and is known to be modeled after 

the Calder Hall reactors in the UK, it would be beneficial to review the status of Magnox 

or graphite reactor decommissioning. There are more than 100 graphite reactors, 

experimental as well as plutonium production reactors, worldwide. Most of the older 

graphite reactors are already shut down and waiting to be decommissioned. While 

decommissioning nuclear reactors, about 99% of the radioactivity is safely contained in 

the fuel, which is withdrawn from the reactor following permanent shutdown. Besides 

surface contamination of the plant, the remaining radioactivity is from structural and 

piping materials, steels, and concrete that have been exposed to neutrons. In Gas Cooled 

Reactors (GCRs), a large amount of graphite, used as a neutron moderator and reflector, 

also becomes radioactive. 

 

17 IAEA, decommissioning of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Safety Standards Series, No. WS-G-2.2, 1991, 

Vienna, Austria. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 21 

3.2.1. Nuclear Graphite Waste 

A typical graphite-moderated reactor contains a few thousand tons of “nuclear-grade” 

graphite18 to moderate and reflect neutrons during reactor operation. The 5MWe reactor 

has 600 metric tons of graphite (see Table 2). Graphite has different characteristics than 

other radioactive waste due to its physical and chemical properties and radioactive 

content. Waste graphite contains tritium, C-14, corrosion/activation products (Cl-36, 

Co-57, Co-60, Mn-54, Ni-59, Ni-63, Na-22), fission products (Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, 

Eu-152, Eu-154, Eu-155, Ce-144), and small amounts of uranium and transuranium 

elements (Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Am-243). 

Carbon-14 (half life: 5730 years) is usually the dominant contributor to the graphite 

activity. Fission products and transuranium elements exist in the graphite of reactors that 

have experienced fuel failure. Activation products arise from trace-level impurities. 

Chlorine-36 (half life: 300,000 years), the activated residual chlorine from graphite 

purification, is another contaminant of importance due to both its long half life and poor 

retardation by geologic medium. Radioactivity of graphite depends on the type of 

graphite reactor, extent of fuel failure, impurities or residues left at graphite manufacture, 

and time of operation. 

As it exists, graphite would seem to meet most of the general disposal requirements for a 

solid radioactive waste form, since graphite keeps most of its good mechanical properties 

after many years of irradiation. It is relatively insoluble and not chemically reactive. 

However, studies evaluating the radioactivity of graphite and other detailed 

characteristics show that the graphite from nuclear reactors cannot be accepted “as-is” by 

existing disposal sites. Special treatment is required to increase its resistance to leaching 

and to remove specific radionuclide content. Thus, countries that have dismantled GCRs 

just store the graphite that is removed.19 Various research and development is underway 

to increase the retention capacity of radioactive isotopes contained in graphite, to pack 

more volume of graphite in a waste package, and to study the behavior of graphite in 

contact with cement or concrete. 

3.2.2. International Status of Graphite Reactor 

Decommissioning 

Most GCRs built in the era of nuclear introduction were shut down in the 1980s. Before 

decommissioning began, or even before the decommissioning planning phase, owners or 

stakeholders of some of the reactors seemed to have iterated through many reviews to set 

up optimized strategies considering technical, safety, and, consequently, economic 

factors. The decommissioning plans and experiences of several countries with GCRs 

were reviewed (details are in Appendix I). Common findings include the following: 

 

18 According to the IAEA Model Additional Protocol (InfCirc 540, corrected), “nuclear grade” graphite has 

“a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and a density greater than 1.50 g/cm3

.” 

19 Countries having large volumes of radioactive graphite are UK with 60,000 metric tons, the former 

Soviet Union with 50,000 metric tons, and France and the US with a similar amount. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

22 

• they spend long lead times, usually more than 10 years, before setting up a 

decommissioning plan, 

• the decommissioning phase before reaching SAFSTOR takes 15 to 20 years, and 

• decommissioning requires waste management facilities for packaging, storage and 

disposal. 

3.2.3. Cost 

According to a report by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic 

Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA),20 the cost of decommissioning depends 

upon the type of reactor (see Table 4). 

Table 4. Decommissioning Cost for Selected Reactor Types 

Type USD/kWe

(most) western PWR 200–500

VVER ~ 330

BWR 300–550

CANDU 270–430

UK Magnox ≤ 2,600

Tokai-121 ≤ 4,700

GCRs show much higher cost due to the greater amount of radioactive material involved. 

The estimate for Tokai-1, the only Japanese Magnox reactor, also includes the estimated 

cost for developing a disposal site. 

3.2.4. Decommissioning of Key Elements 

3.2.4.1. Spent Fuel 

Defueling and canning requirements 

Once it is decided to shut down the 5MWe reactor, the fuel would be removed (the 

reactor would be “defueled”) according to a decommissioning plan. Areas near the 

reactor, especially the spent fuel handling areas, are first decontaminated to facilitate 

defueling. The radiological situation of the reactor may be characterized, which would 

take several years, either before or at the same time as defueling. 

The US and the DPRK agreed in 1994 to dispose of the spent fuel from the 5MWe 

reactor without reprocessing it in the DPRK. The Six Party Talks may lead to a similar 

 

20 OECD/NEA, The Economics of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, NEA/EFC/DOC(93)1, Paris, June 1993. 21 World Nuclear Association, Decommissioning Activities: Tokai-1, http://www.worldnuclear.org/wgs/decom. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 23 

decision on spent fuel, i.e., to remove it from the DPRK. What is not clear is how long it 

would take before the fuel could be shipped and reprocessed. Magnox-type spent fuel is 

not easily stored for extended time, even with carefully monitored, inert dry storage.22

If the eventual destination of the spent fuel is determined promptly, the spent fuel may be 

stored in canisters for a relatively short period. Although this will not require long-lasting 

canisters, much effort will be given to decontaminate the fuel and the surroundings before 

starting the canning process. Since the preparation itself may take years, ensuring the 

safety of the stored spent fuel during preparation for shipping is essential. 

If the situation requires a longer period of time for storing spent fuel before reprocessing, 

then the spent fuel will have to be placed in long-lasting canisters following a similar 

procedure that was taken after the Agreed Framework in 1994. Canning at that time took 

about five years, due to complications from contamination in the storage area and the 

lack of proper equipment. 

International practices for the regular transport of Magnox spent fuel from one country to 

another for reprocessing (e.g., from Japan’s Tokai-1 reactor to the UK, or from Italy’s 

Latina reactor to the UK) should be considered to determine the availability and capacity 

of packaging and transportation and their technical applicability to the DPRK case. 

HLW, storage and disposal 

Countries with commercial reprocessing facilities receive spent fuel from their customer 

countries and return the vitrified HLW to the country of origin, i.e., the customer 

countries. Applying the experience of Eurochemic reprocessing plant to the DPRK case, 

reprocessing the DPRK’s 16,000 spent fuel elements from the 5MWe reactor will result 

in about 27 cubic meters of high-level liquid waste. This HLW will be vitrified into glass 

blocks weighing 37 metric tons in 260 stainless steel containers. These stainless steel 

containers have to be returned to the DPRK. The DPRK will receive and store 260 

stainless steel containers in a facility until a disposal repository is operational. 

There are two generic interim storage options for the containers of vitrified high-level 

waste: air cooled and water cooled. The air storage option is typical of that in use at 

Marcoule, France, and at Rokkasho-mura, Japan. The storage facility requires a 

ventilation system to keep the glass in the waste container and concrete structures at safe 

temperatures. The time for the interim storage phase depends upon availability of a 

repository and the heat and radioactivity loads that the repository can accept. Whether air 

cooled or water cooled, a facility is needed to store the 260 stainless steel containers for 

about 30 to 50 years before they are sent to a disposal site. The capacity of the storage 

facility should be about 400 containers to accommodate the containers from the 

vitrification of the liquid HLW that may already exist in the site. This topic is covered 

later in section 3.3.2.1. 

Although the HLW from the 5MWe reactor is only about one tenth as radioactive as the 

HLW from a CANDU reactor, the time required for it to decay to a safe level is still 

 

22 (UK) Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on: The Radioactive 

Waste Implications of Reprocessing (November 2000), Annex 4: Dry Storage and Disposal of Magnox 

Spent Fuel, http://www.defra.gov.uk/rwmac/reports/reprocess/16.htm. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

24 

several tens of thousands of years. Thus for HLW disposal, a deep and stable geological 

formation is required to ensure long-term safety. 

Thorough characterization of a candidate site is expensive and time-consuming. 

Internationally, the US is the most advanced country in developing a geological 

repository for HLW. The Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada, which has been 

explored for many years, recently obtained congressional approval for HLW. The Yucca 

Mountain repository is considered to be the fruit of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 

1980. Japan, Canada, France, and the UK have either passed legislation for the 

procedures to investigate and acquire sites for HLW repositories, or established the 

organization(s) to undertake long-term procedures for HLW disposal. 

Detailed stages for spent fuel management 

The details of spent fuel treatment, from initial defueling to final disposal, can be grouped 

with respect to flow and activities as follows: 

• Defueling stage Defueling, including decontamination of necessary 

surroundings 

Decontaminating the spent fuel storage pool 

Manufacturing canisters for interim storage 

Canning spent fuel for interim storage 

• Reprocessing 

stage 

Manufacturing or leasing transportation casks/canisters 

Transferring spent fuel into the transportation casks 

Transporting the spent fuel casks abroad 

Reprocessing the spent fuel, including vitrifying liquid 

HLW 

• HLW storage 

stage 

Transporting vitrified HLW back to the DPRK 

Constructing and operating a storage facility for vitrified 

HLW 

• HLW disposal 

stage 

Planning the HLW disposal system 

Investigating sites for a HLW repository 

Characterizing sites and applying for license 

Constructing and operating the HLW repository 

In reality, the detailed stages listed above may be spread over a wide range of milestones. 

If properly scheduled and agreed upon, the defueling and reprocessing stages may take no 

more than ten years. The HLW storage stage lasts for several decades, and the HLW 

disposal stage is even longer. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 25 

Costs for stages 

It is difficult to estimate cost for each stage in the DPRK case. Comparisons of individual 

cost estimates for decommissioning a specific facility or activity show relatively large 

variations. A standardized costing method23 has been sought for decommissioning 

internationally, which can be applied to the DPRK case in the future. 

The cost of defueling can be estimated based on the experience from the spent fuel 

canning that was done in the DPRK in the 1990s. The reprocessing stage may be difficult 

to estimate using published cost data, since those figures are based on long-term contracts 

between commercial reprocessing companies and customers, and they assume massive 

amounts of material. The cost of the HLW disposal stage is the most difficult to estimate, 

since it occurs over a very long time. 

Nevertheless, it may be possible to get a rough estimate of costs for the spent fueltreating stages for the DPRK case by applying unit cost figures for the back-end of the 

fuel cycle “Reprocessing Option” given by OECD/NEA for light water reactors.24 In 

Table 5, the estimated cost is attained by scaling the OECD/NEA reference unit price to 

100 tU of spent fuel.25

Table 5. Spent Fuel Cost based on LWR Fuel Cycle Unit Prices 

 Reference 

Unit Price24

(USD / kgU) 

Uncertainty 

(range in unit price, 

USD / kgU) 

Estimated Cost 

(USD) 

Transporting spent 

fuel 

50 20-80 5,000,000 

Reprocessing spent 

fuel 

720 540-720 72,000,000 

Disposing HLW 90 90-580 9,000,000 

The OECD/NEA estimates are based on transportation within Europe; estimates for 

transportation between continents will likely be much greater. It is assumed that 

transportation casks are already available. If a specific design for the transportation cask 

is needed for the DPRK case, additional cost must be considered. 

 

23OECD/NEA, A Proposed Standardised List of Items for Costing Purposes in the Decommissioning of 

Nuclear Installations, Interim Technical Document, OECD/NEA-IAEA-EC, Paris, 1999, available at 

http://www.nea.fr/html/rwm/reports/1999/costlist.pdf. 24 OECD/NEA, “The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” NEA EFC DOC (93)1, June 1993, Paris, 

available at http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/reports/efc/EFC-complete.pdf. 25 All prices were money values as of early 1991, and assume a 1:1 exchange rate at that time between 

European Currency Units (ECU) and USD. Spent fuel cost seems to be independent of corrosion state of 

fuel elements. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

26 

Spent fuel reprocessing includes the disposal cost for LLW and ILW, the vitrification 

cost for HLW, and the interim storage cost of the vitrified waste until shipped back to the 

country of origin. 

As seen in Table 5, this cost has a wide range of uncertainty: up to 6 times the reference 

unit price. Moreover, there are additional uncertainties because disposal of HLW has so 

far never been done, and it will occur in several decades later. Also, if a repository is to 

be constructed only for this amount of HLW, the basic investment for site 

characterization and construction will increase the unit price unpredictably. 

3.2.4.2. Graphite Moderator and Reflector 

The total amount of graphite that would need to be removed from the 5MWe reactor after 

defueling is reported to be 600 metric tons, or about 400 cubic meters, in approximately 

equal amounts from the moderator (reactor core) and reflector (surrounding the reactor 

core). 

The graphite is in the form of blocks, usually stacked in several layers. The graphite 

blocks may be held together by steel restraint bands and interlaced by thermocouple 

wires and neutron flux measuring detectors. To remove graphite blocks from the reactor 

vessel, custom remote handling equipment must be used for cutting, clamping, and 

grabbing steel wires, plates, and graphite blocks. Designing and manufacturing the 

necessary remote operation equipment can take about two years, assuming a full 

knowledge of reactor core design specifications. This is normally done during the initial 

phase of decommissioning. 

Since the graphite blocks may have various activity levels and different contaminations, 

sorting them based on their activity levels may help reduce the amount of graphite 

requiring the greatest decontamination effort. 

Graphite blocks removed from the GCRs of the UK, France, and other countries are 

encapsulated in concrete and placed in specially designed storage buildings. They must 

be stored in that way until proper repositories, conforming to regulations, can be 

constructed. 

Besides the absence of proper repositories, waste-form stabilization is another issue. 

There have been many studies on how to prevent or reduce radionuclide leaching from 

graphite during storage. Metallization of the graphite surface using several methods has 

been investigated as one promising option for efficient leaching resistance. No method, 

however, has been selected for mass application to graphite stabilization. 

For the time being, graphite blocks removed from the 5MWe reactor should follow the 

same procedure as in the UK and other countries: packaging and storing. Specially 

designed containers will be needed to hold the graphite. Both a packaging building and a 

storage building should be built near the reactor site. The storage building will have to be 

under regular surveillance and monitoring to detect radionuclide leaks. 

3.2.4.3. Reactor Vessel, Steel Structures, and Concrete 

Steel structures, such as the pressure vessel and thermal shield, are radioactive, having 

been activated by exposure to neutrons during normal reactor operation. Activation 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 27 

products include the radioisotopes 60Co, 55Fe, 59Ni, 63Ni, and 94Nb. Concrete surrounding 

the reactor vessel also undergoes neutron activation, and contains the activation products 

3

H, 14C, 36Cl, 152Eu, and 154Eu. Because some of these activation products have long halflives, the steel structures and concrete cannot generally be treated as LLW. 

As activation depends on the location of the material and its distance from the core, a 

detailed survey of the content of each radionuclide at different depths and locations 

should be performed. With the precise data of radioactivity distribution on and in the 

steel structures and concrete materials, one may set up a strategy to reduce the volume of 

ILW. An estimation study of decommissioning a GCR26 shows that about 30% of the 

steel structure could be released through measurement and decontamination and another 

30% was packaged for ILW. Similarly, 97% of concrete could be released free. 

The 5MWe reactor will generate about 300 metric tons of steel (excluding pipes that were 

not subject to activation) and several thousand tons of concrete bioshield as waste. To 

reduce the volume of ILW, a sophisticated facility to segregate the waste according to its 

activity content should be provided. If this facility is equipped and operates as shown in 

the reference, one may reduce the intermediate-level steel waste to about 30% and 

concrete waste to about 3%. 

By any means, a repository for ILW to accommodate 100 metric tons of steel and several 

hundred tons of concrete should be available. An interim storage facility for intermediatelevel steel and concrete waste should be operating until a long-term repository is 

available. A waste packaging method for long-term storage should also be provided. 

3.3. Decommissioning the Radiochemical Laboratory 

3.3.1. International Precedents for Reprocessing Facility 

Decommissioning 

Most reprocessing facilities built during the early period of nuclear introduction have 

been shut down, and some of them are still undergoing decommissioning. For some 

nuclear reactors, such as GCRs, deferring the final dismantling may be beneficial in 

reducing the cost related to radiation risks. In the case of a reprocessing plant, deferring 

decommissioning does not help with respect to radiation hazard reduction. 

Through international programs set up by OECD/NEA and IAEA, the countries with 

reprocessing facilities have shared information, experience, and personnel and have 

cooperated in the decommissioning of reprocessing facilities. The Eurochemic 

reprocessing plant is a good example of international cooperation. Although many 

differences exist, the Eurochemic plant is reported to be a model for the DPRK’s 

Radiochemical Laboratory. Appendix II reviews the Eurochemic experience and also 

considers two decommissioning cases for French reprocessing plants. 

 

26 R.J. Printz, U.Quade, & J. Wahl, Packaging Requirements for Graphite and Carbon from the 

Decommissioning of the AVR in consideration of the German Final Disposal Regulations: Technology for 

gas cooled reactor decommissioning, fuel storage, and waste disposal. Proceedings of Technical Committee 

meeting held in Jurich, Germany, pp 275–285. IAEA, 8–10 September, 1997. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

28 

3.3.2. Decommissioning of Key Elements 

3.3.2.1. Liquid High-Level Waste 

Characteristics 

The volume of liquid waste from reprocessing depends on the mass of spent fuel, whether 

it is low-or high-burnup fuel. However, the amount of radioactive material (fission 

products and actinides, components of high-level waste, HLW) contained in the spent 

fuel, and therefore also in the liquid waste, depends mostly upon burnup. To obtain 

weapons grade plutonium, the DPRK operated the 5MWe reactor for a very low burnup, 

averaging 635 MWD/tU, so the fuel contains a relatively small portion of fission products 

and actinides. Once vitrified, the liquid HLW from reprocessing the 5MWe reactor fuel 

may result in much smaller solid volume than what would result from waste vitrification 

associated with high burnup fuel. 

Nothing is known about the status of the liquid HLW in the DPRK. To remove the traces 

of their past nuclear activities, the DPRK might have mixed the liquid HLW with other 

type of waste or with something else, which will not only cause difficulties in reducing 

volume as a preparatory step for vitrification, it may also be totally impossible to 

segregate the liquid HLW from the mixed state. Thus, although the burnup of the spent 

fuel is quite low and the resulting volume of vitrified waste would be relatively small, it 

would be safe to assume that the liquid HLW in the DPRK contains almost the same 

amount of radioactive material as does the liquid HLW from high burnup fuel. 

Reducing the volume 

The liquid HLW, as listed in Table 3, has to be immobilized for the ease and safety of 

long-term storage and final disposal in a repository. Immobilization is done by vitrifying 

concentrated liquid HLW. If a process line is provided to recover nitric acid and 

concentrate the HLW as is stored now, the waste volume can be reduced to less than onetenth of the original volume. 

Shipping the liquid HLW 

Liquid HLW would need to be shipped in 200-liter drums with good shielding, leak 

tightness, impact- and fire-proved. If no volume concentration is done, the liquid HLW 

will require 2,500 drums. Usually reprocessing facilities are co-located with vitrification 

facilities, removing the chances of accidents occurring during transportation. 

Eurochemic, however, shipped about 50 cubic meters of HLW to a vitrification facility in 

Germany, PAMELA, in the 1980s. 

Vitrification 

As with the case of Eurochemic, the vitrification of the HLW—concentrated during the 

course of reprocessing 100 metric tons of natural uranium fuel—will result in 260 

stainless steel containers filled with 37 metric tons of glass. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 29 

Shipping back and storing the vitrified HLW 

The 260 stainless steel containers will be shipped back to the DPRK, where they must be 

stored until the final repository is available. 

Cost 

Waste volume reduction is a part of the reprocessing process in which a breakdown cost 

is not readily available. If the large amount of liquid HLW is shipped, it will be a one-ofa-kind experience for which pricing is impossible. If the safety concern of shipping the 

liquid HLW is comparable to that of spent fuel, the spent fuel case may be referenced. 

For vitrification, if the Eurochemic case is applied, it will cost about 5.2 million USD. 

Storage and disposal of this HLW will be done at the same facility for the HLW from 

reprocessing the spent fuel. 

3.3.2.2. Liquid Waste from Chemical Decladding 

Characteristics 

The Radiochemical Laboratory in the DPRK is reported to have operated a process to 

dissolve fuel cladding. In the Eurochemic plant, magnesium cladding was dissolved in 

sulfuric acid, resulting in three cubic meters of waste solution per metric ton uranium. It 

is categorized as ILW, for which storage is the only management solution until a specific 

repository is acquired. In the DPRK case, there would be 300 cubic meters of cladding 

waste solution after reprocessing 100 metric tons of fuel. To store the waste safely for a 

relatively long time, the solution has to be immobilized by applying a solidification 

agent. 

Solidification methods 

Bitumen (asphalt) was used in the Eurochemic plant for immobilizing the chemical 

decladding waste. Bitumen is highly leach-resistant, has a low operating temperature, and 

possesses a good degree of plasticity. At its operating temperature, 99% of the water 

evaporates, resulting in a volume reduction of up to fivefold compared with conventional 

cementing techniques. Although some technical improvements have been added to the 

bituminization process, inherent drawbacks of the bitumen are its potential fire hazard 

and weak radiation resistance, resulting in the release of hydrogen gas. Typical bitumen 

products contain 40 to 60 weight percent waste solids. 

Immobilization of radioactive waste by incorporating it into hydraulic cement has been 

practiced worldwide for many years. It does not present a fire hazard and has good 

radiation resistance. Its drawbacks are low leach-resistance and low content of waste 

solids. The addition of sodium silicates or polymers has been studied and applied in other 

commercial fields to improve its characteristics. 

Glass is a good medium to contain chemical decladding waste. Glass has high radiation 

resistance and leach resistance. It does not present a fire hazard. Vitrification, the process 

of embedding the waste in glass, is expensive, and therefore is usually applied only to the 

solidification of HLW, rather than ILW. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

30 

Solidification of a type of radioactive waste with a specific medium requires thorough 

study of possible interactions between the waste and the medium. Selecting the method to 

apply and developing the process takes a long time before an actual process is put into 

operation. 

Costs, storage and disposal of solidified chemical decladding waste 

It is difficult to estimate how much solidified volume of chemical decladding waste will 

result from each solidification method. Since Eurochemic had combined various kinds of 

chemical decladding waste for solidification, segregating the bituminized volume for the 

magnesium decladding waste seems to be impossible. From the estimated mass of the 

magnesium involved27 and with proper chemical reactions assumed, one could calculate 

the volume of solidified chemical decladding waste. 

According to a report in 1976, costs for Eurochemic bituminization plant, including the 

storage of the solidified wastes, were as follows: 

• Treatment installation (Eurobitume): 

 basic investments USD 5M 

 modifications, cold tests USD 0.37M 

 operation USD 2,500-3,000 per m3 of treated 

effluents 

• Storage 

 basic investments USD 3.25M, including the reception station 

for waste produced outside the 

bituminization plant, handling equipment, 

and two storage bunkers with capacity of 

10,000–12,000 drums. 

For storage and disposal, the solidified waste from chemical decladding may share the 

same facilities with other waste streams, such as the graphite, steel, and concrete from the 

dismantling of the 5MWe reactor. 

3.3.2.3. Steels and Concrete 

It is foreseeable that the decommissioning of the Radiochemical Laboratory and its 

related buildings will result in a large amount of steel and concrete waste. Most of the 

steel and concrete wastes from a reprocessing facility involve surface contamination, 

rather than activated bulk material. The contamination is largely high alpha radioactivity, 

which must be disposed of in a deep geological formation like the HLW. 

The similarity of the Radiochemical Laboratory and the Eurochemic plant enables us to 

estimate the volume of materials to treat from the Radiochemical Laboratory. The 

Radiochemical Laboratory should produce roughly one-half to two-thirds as much solid 

waste: 500 to 1,000 metric tons of steel/metal and 16,000 to 24,000 metric tons of 

 

27 Each fuel element is clad with about 100 g magnesium. Considering a total of 16,000 spent fuel elements, 

the mass of magnesium involved in chemical decladding is about 1.6 metric tons. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 31 

concrete (6,000 to 9,000 cubic meters). Assuming the same level of decontamination 

technology as was available for the Eurochemic plant, much of it can be released without 

any restriction: about 66% of metal (330 to 660 metric tons) and 93% of concrete 

(roughly 15,000 to 23,000 metric tons; 5,600 to 8,400 cubic meters). The rest will require 

special consideration for storage or disposal, and some portions of them will need to be 

disposed of as HLW. 

3.4. Basic Schemes for Decommissioning 

The decommissioning schemes described in the following sections and depicted in the 

accompanying figures are based upon the following assumptions. 

• All the tasks required for decommissioning are performed in harmony with each 

other. The proper investment for those activities and infrastructure that require 

long lead times is done on time. 

• The spent fuel withdrawn from the reactor is shipped to another country for 

reprocessing, while the vitrified HLW is then shipped back to the DPRK. 

• Liquid HLW already generated by reprocessing in the DPRK will be shipped to 

another country for vitrification, and then returned to the DPRK in vitrified form. 

• Storage and final disposal of LLW, ILW, and vitrified HLW will be done in the 

DPRK. 

Economic feasibility is not taken into consideration. 

3.4.1. Spent Fuel and the 5MWe Reactor 

Figure 5 shows a decommissioning scheme for treating the spent fuel from the 5MWe 

reactor. In this scheme, a key issue will be the timely shipping of the spent fuel out of the 

country, provided that a place to reprocess the spent fuel is secured. The vitrified HLW 

from both the reprocessing of the spent fuel and the vitrification of the liquid HLW will 

require interim storage upon return to the DPRK. Eventually a small disposal repository 

for the HLW, with the capacity of about 400 disposal casks of HLW, will have to be 

provided as the final step of the scheme. 

Figure 6 shows how the solid wastes are categorized and how much of each type of waste 

will be generated from dismantling the 5MWe reactor. Some metal and concrete waste 

containing long-lived radionuclides should follow the same path as that for graphite. 

Special packaging methods have to be sought for long-term leak-free waste forms for the 

graphite as well as for a relatively small amount of metal and concrete. A storage facility 

will serve until the disposal site for this waste is found. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

32 

Figure 5. Schematic flow for spent fuel: from defueling the 5WMe reactor to 

disposal of HLW 

Plan decommissioning

Characterization radioactivity inventory

~2 years

Partial decontamination

& defueling

~1 year

Storage

Options

Canning

Inert gas fill

Dry Storage

5-10 years

Canning

Inert gas fill

In-pool Storage

1-3 years

Long Term Short Term

Packaging for

Transport

(transport casks

for Magnox fuel)

None

Reprocessing &

Vitrification

Interim Storage

30-50 years

International

Transport

Return

to DPRK

HLW Conditioning

for Disposal

Disposal in

HLW Repository

Site Preparation

for HLW Disposal

30-50 years

Additional

HLW from

Radiochemical

Lab
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 33 

Figure 6. Schematic flow for solid wastes from dismantling the 5WMe reactor 

Planning and Preparation for

Decommissioning

Characterize radioactivity inventory

Develop tools for remote operation

2-5 years

Decontaminate

Metal

~2 years

~200 tons ~100 tons

Decontaminate

Concrete

~2 years

(?) x 100

tons

(?) x 1,000

tons

Characterize Graphite

~2 years

600 tons

Packaging

LLW disposal

or

free release

Interim

Storage

30-50 years

Disposal in

ILW Repository

Site Preparation

for ILW Disposal

30-50 years
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

34 

Liquid HLW, Chemical Decladding Waste, and the 

Radiochemical Laboratory 

Liquid HLW will follow the scheme in Figure 7. This assumes that the required 

preplanning has been done before deploying an HLW volume reduction facility. 

Analysis of this HLW is so critical in revealing the past history of reprocessing in the 

Radiochemical Laboratory that may take longer than 1–2 years. The current impasse with 

regard to waste treatment will be whether we have enough experience in long-distance 

transport of HLW in liquid form. If the volume matters, a process line for volume 

reduction may have to be added to the existing facility, which may delay dismantling the 

Radiochemical Laboratory. Two years (shown in the figure) is an aggressively optimistic 

estimate for incorporating a volume reduction facility, but possible. Once the liquid HLW 

is vitrified, it will be stored in the interim HLW storage facility with the reprocessed 

spent fuel HLW until a disposal repository is available. 

Figure 7. Schematic flow for liquid HLW stored at the Radiochemical Laboratory 

Collect, characterize &

store liquid HLW

1-2 years

Reduce

Volume?

Pretreatment &

volume reduction

Add Volume Reduction

facility to the Radiochemical

Lab & operate

~2 years

International

Transport

Packaging

HLW

Tank

LLW Disposal

Vitrification Return Transport

to DPRK

HLW Interim

Storage

Now

Later

HLW

Tank

HLW

Tank

?
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 35 

The chemical decladding waste should be solidified for interim storage and final disposal 

as depicted in Figure 8. This will take a somewhat long time in characterizing the waste 

and selecting and constructing the solidification process. 

Figure 8. Schematic flow for Chemical Decladding Waste stored at the 

Radiochemical Laboratory 

Collect, characterize &

store chemical

decladding waste

1-2 years

Select solidification method

Construct & operate

Disposal in

ILW Repository

Interim Storage

30-50 years

Storage

Tank

Storage

Tank

Storage

Tank

?

Figure 9 shows the disposition of solid waste from decommissioning the Radiochemical 

Laboratory. After surface decontamination, most of the concrete and metal may be 

released free or as LLW. Several hundred tons of concrete and metal remain as 

intermediate waste due to high alpha radioactivity after decontamination. A relatively 

small amount with very high activity of alpha emitting radionuclides may have to be 

treated along with HLW. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

36 

Figure 9. Schematic flow for solid wastes from the Radiochemical Laboratory 

Planning and Preparation for

Decommissioning

Characterize radioactivity inventory

Develop tools for remote operation

2-5 years

Special Waste

(sludge) with high

plutonium content

amount ?

Decontaminate Concrete

16,000-24,000 tons total

(?) x 10

tons

(?) x 100

tons

Decontaminate Metal

500-1,000 tons total

(?) x 100

tons

Packaging

metal & concrete

Packaging for

sludge, metal,

concrete

Interim

Storage

30-50 years

Disposal in

ILW Repository

Site Preparation

for HLW & ILW

Repositories

30-50 years

LLW disposal

or

free release

(?) x 10

tons

66%

330-660 tons

93%

15,000-23,000 tons

Interim

Storage

30-50 years

Disposal in

HLW Repository

HLW ILW

3.4.2. Facilities Required for Waste Management in the DPRK 

Reviewing the basic schemes shown in Figures 5 through 9, one may realize that 

operating and dismantling those facilities call for a wide range of activities, including 

treatment, packaging, storage, and disposal. Table 6 lists the facilities needed to manage 

the waste that results from decommissioning the 5MWe reactor and the Radiochemical 

Laboratory. 

In the initial phase of decommissioning, the processes of decontamination, canning, and 

packaging require dedicated facilities and the development of tools and package forms. 

Canning tools used during 1994-1996 may not exist anymore. Facility operation should 

be supported by precise analytical capability. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 37 

Table 6. Facilities needed to manage the wastes from decommissioning the 5WMe 

reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory 

Facility Location Application Capacity 

Immediate Needs 

Canning Station at the 5 MWe 

reactor 

Spent fuel is canned; cans filled 

with inert gas 

Requires decontamination 

before canning; special tools 

for broken fuel rods; shielding 

50 or 100 tU 

(8,000 or 16,000 fuel elements) 

Temporary Dry 

Storage Pit 

5 MWe reactor Storage of canned spent fuel 

for 5–10 years 

50 or 100 tU 

Packaging Station 5 MWe reactor Canned spent fuel prepared for 

overseas transport

50 or 100 tU 

 Requires transport casks for spent fuel 

Packaging Station Radiochemical 

Laboratory 

Liquid HLW packaged for 

overseas transport

250,000 or 500,000 liters HLW 

 Requires transport casks for liquid HLW 

Mid-Term Needs 

Metals: decontaminate 300 t from the reactor; 

500–1,000 t Radiochemical Lab 

 package for ILW storage ~100 t from the reactor; 

(?)x100 t Radiochemical Lab 

Concrete: decontaminate (?)x1,000 t from the reactor; 16–

24,000 t Radiochemical Lab 

 package for ILW storage (?)x100 t from the reactor; 

(?)x100 t Radiochemical Lab 

Decontamination 

& Packaging 

Station 

Yongbyun 

Nuclear 

Research Center 

Graphite: 

 characterize and package 

Requires waste package form 

600 t from the reactor 

Disposal Site for 

LLW 

DPRK LLW from decommissioning 

both reactor & Radiochemical 

Lab 

depends on the free release limit 

Long-Term Needs 

Interim Storage 

Facility for solid 

HLW 

Yongbyun 

Nuclear 

Research Center 

Store HLW returned from 

overseas after vitrification, 

including HLW from both the 

reprocessed spent fuel and the 

existing liquid HLW inventory. 

390 HLW canisters 

+ special waste, metal, and concrete 

from the Radiochemical Lab 

decommissioning 

 Dry storage requires heat removal; storage for 30–50 years 

 Metal Graphite Concrete 

reactor decommissioning ~100 t 600 t (?)x100 t 

Chemical decladding ? -- -- 

Radiochemical Lab 

decommissioning 

(?)x10

0 t 

-- (?)x100 t 

Interim Storage 

Facility for solid 

ILW 

Yongbyun 

Nuclear 

Research Center 

Requires waste package form; storage for 30–50 years 

for vitrified HLW from 

reprocessed spent fuel and 

liquid HLW inventory 

Disposal Site for ~390 HLW disposal casks 

HLW 

DPRK 

for special waste from the 

Radiochemical Lab 

Requires a very long lead time

? 

 Metal Graphite Concrete 

reactor decommissioning ~100 t 600 t (?)x100 t 

chemical decladding ? -- -- 

Radiochemical Lab 

decommissioning 

(?)x10

0 t 

-- (?)x100 t 

Disposal Site for 

ILW 

DPRK 

Requires a long lead time 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

38 

In the middle phase, interim storage facilities for HLW and ILW must be provided. The 

length of the storage period may depend on how soon the disposal sites can be acquired, 

which normally takes 30 to 50 years. A LLW disposal site should already be operating 

during this phase. 

In the final phase, repositories for final disposal of both HLW and ILW are required. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 39 

4. Strategic Alternatives 

Planning to decommission the nuclear facilities in the DPRK, being limited in this report 

to the 5MWe reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory, should be based on two strategic 

principles. 

• Decommissioning for CVID 

Decommissioning the two nuclear facilities should adequately answer the proposition 

of CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling). To come as near to CVID as 

possible, we have to consider all possible technical means. The technical means, 

however, may also have to be selected according to their effectiveness in revealing 

past activities. 

• Decommissioning for the safety of the environment 

A premise for decommissioning is also the safety of the environment. Planning to 

decommission the two nuclear facilities in accordance with international practices and 

standards of safety will be persuasive in drawing cooperation not only from the 

DPRK, but also from other parties. 

Many additional factors can also play a role in developing the decommissioning strategy, 

such as cost and availability of funding, sustainability, and intergenerational equity 

arguments, stakeholder views, worker radiation health and safety, and others. 

4.1. Fast Track Decommissioning 

If an outcome of the Six Party Talks requires that the reactor and Radiochemical 

Laboratory be decommissioned as quickly as possible, we need to consider how soon the 

decommissioning project can be accomplished. For example, the 1994 Agreed 

Framework had stipulated ten years. Such a “fast track” approach may accept minimum 

achievement of decommissioning goals, rather than allow for long lead times and 

adequate investment for infrastructure. 

We assume that the spent fuel from the 5MWe reactor will be shipped out of the country. 

It will either be reprocessed or just stored for a long time in the country that receives the 

spent fuel. If the destination is selected and agreed upon, the spent fuel may be shipped 

out of the country in ten years. To finish this in ten years, canning the spent fuel for shortterm storage before it is shipped should be done without any delay; shipping should also 

be prepared for well in advance with regard to packaging for overseas transport. To avoid 

difficulty in sustaining support, they have to agree that the HLW will not be shipped back 

to the DPRK after reprocessing. 

Dismantling the 5MWe reactor to a level of irreversibility may be done in ten years, but it 

will generate various volumes and types of radioactive waste. The reactor and its cooling 

system may be the key components for irreversible dismantling. After dismantlement, the 

reactor must be periodically maintained and monitored to prevent radioactive leakage. 

Analyzing the liquid HLW for traces of past activities can be done in a relatively short 

time. Dismantling the key components of the Radiochemical Laboratory—such as 

dissolver, mixer-settler, and hot-cells—to render it obsolete may be accomplished in less 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

40 

than ten years; however, managing the resulting waste problems cannot be finished in 

that short time. 

Liquid HLW and ILW left at the site could be a serious problem. Liquid wastes may not 

only leak to the environment, but they could be attractive to those who would desire 

source material for a “dirty bomb.” The Radiochemical Laboratory must be well 

decontaminated to prevent radioactivity from leaking. It also requires periodic 

maintenance and monitoring. 

Decommissioning activities that can be undertaken within ten years are limited. In 

considering CVID, the goal of verification via analysis of the liquid HLW, spent fuel, and 

swipe samples may be achieved. Although the goal of irreversibility of the facilities can 

be reached, much of the waste problem would remain unsolved. Thus the goal of 

completeness is not achievable through a fast-track approach. The waste problems that 

arise from the two facilities require additional investment of time and resources. 

4.2. Decommissioning Supported by International 

Cooperation 

The largest uncertainty in decommissioning is how to determine, fairly early, the 

responsible country (or countries) for long-term storage or reprocessing of spent fuel. 

That country should also be responsible for the vitrified HLW. Also, the verification of 

the decommissioning is a multilateral issue. Hence, decommissioning should be 

supported by international cooperation. Experts from the Six Party Talks countries and 

international organizations should be convened to provide technical support for the 

estimation activities. 

The tasks for international cooperation should include: 

1. Finding nonproliferation-supportive solutions. 

2. Recognizing present technical status for waste treatment with regard to 5MWe 

and the Radiochemical Laboratory. 

3. Estimating the amount of work. 

4. Reporting economically feasible paths for decommissioning. 

Regional sharing of responsibility for the decommissioning and the management of 

radioactive waste is the only practical approach, considering the need for and importance 

of cost-sharing, technical experience, regional security and nonproliferation concerns. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 41 

5. Conclusions and Recommendations 

The DPRK’s plutonium relevant facilities were reviewed from the viewpoint of waste 

management that should be a key factor of decommissioning. The amount of spent fuel 

from the 5MWe reactor and the amount of liquid HLW and intermediate-level waste 

were estimated. It was found that decommissioning these two facilities would generate 

the solid and liquid wastes with a wide range of radioactivity. 

The international status of decommissioning the nuclear facilities similar to the two 

DPRK facilities was reviewed. Most of the graphite reactors shut down in 1980s and 

1990s in the UK, France, Italy, and Japan are found to still be in the planning phase, or at 

best in an initial phase of decommissioning. For reprocessing facilities, the Eurochemic 

reprocessing plant, which has been undergoing decommissioning for about 20 years, 

provided a good reference. In trying to estimate costs, it was found that we may not apply 

available reference data to the DPRK case, since we have to deal with many kinds of 

small-volume waste. What is clear, however, is that decommissioning graphite reactors is 

about an order of magnitude more costly than light water reactors, due to a larger volume 

of waste and the types of waste. 

Provided that the destination is found, the spent fuel and the liquid HLW have to be 

shipped out of the country to reduce the threat and hazard. This will partly fulfill the goal 

of CVID. Fast-track decommissioning alone, implying the removal of key components 

and spent fuel in ten years by partly dismantling the facilities, would generate wastes and 

leave the waste problem unsolved. 

No matter how we limit the activities of the decommissioning just to achieve the 

minimum goal of CVID, we cannot prevent the spent fuel and large volume of various 

types of waste from arising. To handle the wastes, the following facilities are needed: 

• Immediate needs: canning station, dry storage pit, packaging station for overseas 

transport, decontamination facilities, and LLW storage 

• Mid-term needs: decontamination and packaging stations for metal, concrete and 

graphite, LLW disposal site 

• Long-term needs: interim storage facilities for HLW and ILW, disposal repository 

for HLW and ILW 

CVID should be pursued together with a radioactive waste management plan, which 

includes technology, sharing of responsibility, and resources. Task-by-task approaches 

should be tried for successful results. The tasks for CVID are as follows: 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

42 

Task 1. Spent fuel and HLW 

• plan to remove the spent fuel and liquid HLW and overcome technical hurdles as 

well as find the responsibility party to receive; 

• receiver of the spent fuel and the liquid HLW will store and dispose of vitrified 

HLW; and 

• need to investigate the issues including technical, political, legislative matters and 

public acceptance. 

Task 2. Supporting early SAFSTOR 

• need to investigate in advance radioactivity inventory estimation, removal tool 

development, canning and packaging of spent fuel and HLW, classification and 

segregation of waste, cost, etc. 

Task 3. ILWs 

• need to investigate the feasible ways to provide for interim storage and a disposal 

repository. 

Despite the formidable scope of the radioactive waste management problem resulting 

from DPRK nuclear dismantlement, it is clear that there are also encouraging 

opportunities. Effective radioactive waste management is intrinsically a mutuallydesirable goal. Concerted efforts by other countries, not only the other regional players, 

but also those with technical resources and capabilities, and those with extensive 

experience in dealing with the similar dismantlement issues, can be brought to bear in a 

coordinated, cooperative engagement.
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 43 

Appendix I: 

Status of Graphite Reactor Decommissioning 

GCR decommissioning has begun in several countries and is instructive in considering 

options for the DPRK. The key information is summarized here: 

UK 

The UK government policy has two essentials for decommissioning: progressive and 

systematic reduction in hazards, and incorporating the flexibility to consider all relevant 

factors in determining the strategic timing of the process. The UK finds the technical and 

safety benefits upon which the strategic timing is based and the financial advantage of the 

strategic timing. 

After many years of consideration and modifications, the UK’s final strategy for 

decommissioning GCRs is based upon early SAFSTOR and a long deferral time (up to 

100 years). In this strategy fuel is withdrawn after reactor shutdown and most plant 

systems are removed. The ILW (graphite and other waste with long-lived radionuclides) 

is packaged and stored on-site until a proper disposal repository is available. The site 

remains under constant surveillance and is subject to a rigorous program of inspection 

and maintenance. After a period of at least 85 years from end-of-generation, the reactor is 

finally dismantled and the site is remediated for reuse. 

The UK shut down 14 of its 26 Magnox reactors during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

The Calder Hall reactors were shut down in 2003. 

Decommissioning the Windscale Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (WAGR), shut down 

since 1981, began in 1998 after many reviews and modifications on decisions. WAGR, 

which operated from 1963 to 1981 with a rated power of 32MWe, had served as a test 

bed for development of fuel and other components for commercial reactors. It has since 

become a demonstration project for power reactor decommissioning. Although not a 

Magnox reactor (it used uranium dioxide fuel in stainless steel cladding), WAGR has a 

huge graphite moderator, 15 ft in diameter and 14 ft high, housed in a cylindrical reactor 

vessel with hemispherical ends. A preliminary study for decommissioning started in 

1975. In 1981, when the reactor was shut down, it was decided that WAGR 

decommissioning would restore the area occupied by the facility to a condition of 

unrestricted re-usability. In 1993 a project review to relieve the government financial 

burden redefined the project objectives to complete the core and reactor vessel 

decommissioning, but defer the demolition of the bioshield and containment building. As 

part of the WAGR decommissioning, many remote handling machines were developed, a 

waste packaging plant for LLW and ILW was built, and a waste storage building for ILW 

was also built pending acquisition of a disposal site for ILW. The removal of the core and 

pressure vessel was divided into a series of 10 campaigns, which began in 1998 and is 

expected to be finished by 2006. WAGR will then become the first GCR to be 

decommissioned to the level of SAFSTOR. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

44 

France 

France’s strategy involves restoring GCR sites after decommissioning, allowing up to 50 

years from the start of the decommissioning phase to the final restoration of a site. France 

needs to build a disposal repository for the specific waste from GCRs. 

France once owned nine GCR nuclear power plants. All have been shut down, mostly 

during the 1980s and early 1990s. Apart from research reactors, they were G1, G2, G3 at 

Marcoule (Gard), Chinon A1, A2, and A3 (Indre-et-Loire), Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux A1 

and A2 (Loir-et-Cher), and Bugey 1 (Ain). The first GCR reactor, G1, was put into 

service in 1956, the last, Bugey 1, in 1972. At the end of the 1960s, Electricite de France 

(EDF) decided to abandon the GCR line and instead use pressurized water reactors. 

Chinon A1 has been partially dismantled to “level 1” and the core confined within a 

steel-concrete envelope. The building that houses it, a metallic sphere, has been 

transformed into a museum that is open to the public. It was estimated that the total 

quantity of contaminated or radioactive materials to be taken apart amounts to 3680 t plus 

1600 drums of technological waste. The 3680 t includes 1100 t of contaminated graphite. 

Complete dismantling is planned for 2027. 

Chinon A2 was partially dismantled to level 2 in 1992. The reactor block, which contains 

1800 t of graphite, is confined. Four buildings on the site house steam generators and the 

primary coolant circuit, which has been cut up. The estimated mass of all the radioactive 

or contaminated material, including graphite, is 7945 t, plus 2000 drums of technological 

waste. Total dismantling is planned for 2039. 

Partial dismantling of Chinon A3 to level 2 began in 1997. The mass of contaminated and 

activated materials, including 2500 t of graphite, is estimated to be 7560 t plus 3700 

drums of technological waste. The activity of the graphite is estimated at 7800 TBq. Total 

dismantling is planned for 2044. 

G2 and G3 have been dismantled to level 2. They cannot be dismantled to level 3 without 

a means of dealing with the graphite. The wastes stored at G2-G3 include 24.1 t of 

technological solid waste packed in drums, 544 t of slag packed in drums, 4 t of fines 

from the melting process also in drums, 4060 t of metal blocks and ingots resulting from 

melting, 902 t of containers made from melted metal, and seven casks with control rods 

(4.1 TBq). The cores of G2-G3 contain 2400 t of graphite (0.83 PBq) and 2900 t of 

activated steel. 

Italy 

The Latina nuclear power plant was a Magnox reactor with a net capacity of 153 MWe. It 

was shut down in 1987 after operating for 24 years. After reactor shutdown, the fuel was 

removed and sent to Sellafield (UK) for reprocessing. The decommissioning plan for 

Latina consists of four major stages: site preparation, core retrieval, construction of a 

waste management facility, and site clearance. The main decommissioning work will 

begin in 2005, with current plans to finish by 2020. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

 45 

Japan 

In 1966, Japan started Tokai-1, the country’s first commercial and only Magnox-type 

power reactor, which operated for 32 years at a rated power of 159MWe. Japan now 

plans to dismantle Tokai-1 under the option DECON (restoring the site). Japan Atomic 

Power Company (JAPCo), the owner of the plant, estimated the decommissioning project 

would last about 17 years. 

In the first phase, from 2001 to 2005, preparatory work will be done, including draining 

the spent fuel pools and removing the turbines. In the second phase, from 2006 to 2010, 

auxiliary facilities, such as heat exchangers, will be removed. In the final phase, from 

2011 to 2017, the core and reactor building will be removed. Prior to beginning the final 

phase, JAPCo plans to develop a disposal site for specific waste from Tokai-1. The 

project is expected to cost 93 billion yen (about USD 750 million). 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

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Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

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Appendix II: International 

Precedents for Reprocessing Facility Decommissioning 

In considering the DPRK Radiochemical Laboratory, it is helpful to review how 

decommissioning the Eurochemic plant was planned and has progressed. French 

reprocessing facility decommissioning is also reviewed. 

Eurochemic Facility Decommissioning 

The decommissioning activities at the Eurochemic reprocessing plant highlight the fact 

that an industrial scale decommissioning can be carried out by adopting commercially 

available technology with special emphasis on waste minimization and extensive 

decontamination for unconditional release. 

From 1966 to 1974, the Eurochemic reprocessing facility in Belgium was operated as a 

demonstration plant for a consortium of 13 OECD countries. 180 metric tons of natural 

and low-enriched uranium and 30 metric tons of high-enriched uranium fuel were 

reprocessed. In 1986, Belgium decided not to resume reprocessing. 

In 1987, a report on the technical and financial aspects of decommissioning the 

Eurochemic reprocessing facility was submitted. The total cost of the decommissioning 

operation was estimated at about 300 million USD, of which about 156 million USD 

represented the first stage of the work to be done. The first stage included the 

reprocessing plant, its analytical laboratory, the storage facilities for the final products of 

reprocessing and storage tanks for high- and intermediate level liquid waste. In addition, 

the cost of managing all the waste was estimated at 10 billion BF, spread over a period of 

about fifty years. This cost does not include construction or operation of a geological 

repository. 

For the first stage of decommissioning, a detailed estimate was made of the quantities of 

radioactive waste to be generated. Waste was categorized as either primary or secondary. 

The primary waste is of two kinds: 

• one to be disposed of in deep geological formations (content of alpha emitters 

above 10 Ci/ton of conditioned waste), including 230 metric tons of metal, 

30 metric tons of concrete, and 12 cubic meters of special wastes; 

• another to be buried at shallow depth (content of alpha emitters below 10 Ci/ ton 

of conditioned waste), including 3,235 metric tons of concrete and 180 cubic 

meters of special waste. 

The secondary waste represents low activity liquid wastes, combustible wastes, and 

compactable wastes. 

The main process building is large: 80 m long, 27 m wide, and 30 m high. About 106 cell 

structures had to be dismantled, estimated at 1500 metric tons of metal structure and 

12,500 m3

 of concrete (55,000 m2 concrete surface area) to be removed or 

decontaminated. 

A pilot decommissioning project on two small storage buildings for end products from 

reprocessing was finished, and concluded that emphasis should be put on automating the 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

48 

decontamination of metal components and concrete. The two buildings were demolished 

and the remaining concrete was disposed of as industrial waste. The site attained “green 

field” conditions. 

Industrial scale decommissioning of the main building was started in 1990, after 

completion of the pilot project, and is expected to last until mid 2006. As of the end of 

2001, 90 of the 106 individual cells have been subject to decommissioning work. Of the 

90 cells, 33 cells were completely dismantled and decontaminated; removal of 

components was being undertaken with the rest of the cells. 550 metric tons of metal and 

about one million m3

 of concrete were generated as waste. Much effort has gone into 

decontamination and the unconditional release of solid material: 66% of metal, 94% of 

heavy concrete and about 40% of other materials were decontaminated to be released 

unconditionally. 

Apart from the operational liquid waste coming from decommissioning work, high level 

liquid radioactive waste needed special treatment, i.e., vitrification. A type of high-level 

liquid waste from reprocessing of natural and slightly enriched uranium fuel was 

transferred to PAMELA, a vitrification facility in Germany. The transferred waste 

amounted to 48.9 m3

 from the 181 metric tons of reprocessed uranium fuel, and was then 

about 7.9 million Ci. A series of campaigns lasting between October 1985 and May 1986 

produced a total of 540 containers, of which 440 contained glass blocks and 100 

contained glass beads called VITROMET. Each glass block weighs about 154 kg and 

shares about 0.11 cubic meters of waste, corresponding to 18,000 Ci. The total volume of 

glass produced was 30 cubic meters and weighed 77.7 metric tons. Through vitrification, 

the volume of waste was reduced: one liter of high-level liquid waste produced 0.68 liter 

of glass, weighing 1.77 kg. The cost of vitrification was about 9.4 million USD (191 

USD per liter) in 1986. 

France 

AT1 was built for the reprocessing of fuel from Rapsodie and fast reactor fuel, and had 

been operated from 1969 to 1979. Nominal capacity was 1 kg-U/day. Dismantling began 

in 1983 and completed in 2001 to restore the site. 

UP1 was built to reprocess fuels from the gas cooled graphite reactors, G1, G2 and G3. 

From time to time during the period of its operation from 1958 to 1997, UP1 also 

received fuel from the reactors of EDF, Phoenix and some other research reactors. Since 

its commissioning in 1958, UP1 has handled 18,600 metric tons of fuel. Process lines 

have been added and modified to meet the various requirements for reprocessing. Since 

1998, UP1 has been in the final shutdown phase. This will be followed by the beginning 

of decommissioning operations, which involves retrieval and repackaging of historical 

waste. The decommissioning of UP1 is scheduled to last about thirty years. 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities 

About the Authors 

Jooho Whang is Professor of Nuclear Engineering with special expertise in Radioactive 

Waste Management and Radiation Engineering. He is currently General Secretary of the 

Korean Nuclear Society; he is also a member of the American Nuclear Society, the 

Korean Association of Radiation Protection, and the Committee for Enhancement of 

Nuclear Power Plant Technology in the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 

Energy. From 1999-2001, he served as the Nuclear Program Coordinator for the Korean 

Institute of Science and Technology, Evaluation and Planning, where he was entrusted by 

the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology with evaluation, planning and 

management for the Korean national nuclear R&D program. He has worked previously 

for the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). His PhD (Nuclear 

Engineering) is from Georgia Tech.. 

George Baldwin is a member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories and 

the Cooperative Monitoring Center. At the CMC, his major interest is in technical 

verification and confidence building measures for nuclear nonproliferation, including 

international safeguards, the Additional Protocol, fissile material cutoff, disposition of 

excess materials, and related issues. His principal expertise is in radiation detection, 

nuclear instrumentation and measurements applied to reactors, particle accelerators, and 

inertial fusion machines. George worked previously for the Safeguards Department at the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria. He is a member of the 

American Physical Society and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. He holds 

a B.A. degree in physics from Kalamazoo College and Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from 

the University of Michigan. 

Distribution 

350 MS 1371 CMC Library, 6929 

1 MS 9018 Central Technical Files, 8945-1 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 9616 
Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Nuclear Facilities

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