Understanding Firearms Assaults against 

Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

by JOSEPH B. KUHNS, DIANA DOLLIVER, EMILY BENT, AND EDWARD R. MAGUIRE

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice
This project was supported by cooperative agreement number 2012-CK-WX-K037 awarded by the Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by 

the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion 

of the issues. 

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and 

websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity. 

Recommended citation:

Kuhns, Joseph B., Diana Dolliver, Emily Bent, and Edward R. Maguire. 2016. Understanding Firearms Assaults against 

Law Enforcement Officers in the United States. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Published 2016 
CONTENTS

Letter from the Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Introduction and Background Regarding the OSW Group and Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part One. Summary of OSW Group Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Part Two. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Crime types, calls for service, and other situational factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Geography and characteristics of place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Job-related risk factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Demographics of suspects and victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Weapons used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Part Three. The Current Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Purpose of the current study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Merging data on law enforcement officers killed and assaulted with UCR crime data . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Selection of low-risk agencies and matching process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Online survey process and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Section 1 Survey Results. Executive Views on Improving Officer Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Section 2a Survey Results. Organizational Policies and Practices around High-Risk Scenarios . . . . . . . . . 21

Section 2b Survey Results. Current Academy and In-Service Training Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix A. Summary Data for Selected Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix B. National Survey on the Use of Deadly Force and Firearms Against Police Officers . . . . . . . . . 37

How to respond to this survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Part 1. Police executive views on promoting officer safety and developing a culture of safety . . . . . . . . 37

Part 2. Understanding departmental policies and practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Part 3. Recruit and in-service/refresher training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

About the Bureau of Justice Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

About the Major Cities Chiefs Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

About the COPS Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

v

LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

Dear colleagues,

This publication attempts to answer important questions regarding firearm assaults against law enforcement 

officers. Initially prepared as a framework for discussion in the 2014 Officer Safety and Wellness (OSW) Group 

roundtable dedicated to identifying best practices for reducing firearm assaults and ambushes, this publication 

examines the policies, training, and other characteristics of police departments that have been shown to 

prevent injuries and deaths. 

Different approaches were presented by law enforcement leaders, line officers, members of the advocacy 

group Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA), and subject matter experts who shared their 

personal insights and experiences, while also engaging in vigorous debate on research findings.

What makes this publication particularly helpful is the addition of a literature review looking at 50 years of 

attempts to better understand the situational factors that lead to assaults, which is augmented by research 

conducted by the authors.

We are indebted to the practitioners, peer reviewers, law enforcement experts, and others who contributed 

substantively to the development of this publication. Their work can save many lives. I especially want to 

thank those representatives from law enforcement agencies who attended and shared their personal stories. 

We hope this publication will inform the field and be useful in enhancing the safety of the men and women 

who serve in law enforcement. Officer safety is community safety. When a police officer is assaulted, the 

community and the rule of law are also assaulted.

As a retired police officer, I’d like to close by thanking the men and women of law enforcement for their service 

and renewing our commitment to working collaboratively to support their efforts and enhance their safety.

Sincerely,

Ronald L. Davis

Director

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are indebted to the following practitioners, peer reviewers, and law enforcement experts, who contributed 

substantively to the development of this report by participating in a focus group meeting in December 2014 

in Washington, D.C. or reviewing the materials:

 Karen L. Amendola, Police Foundation

 Jim Baker, International Association of 

Chiefs of Police

 Paul Banach, Baltimore (MD) Police Department

 John Bennett, Tampa (FL) Police Department

 Melissa Bradley, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services

 Nick Breul, National Law Enforcement 

Officers Memorial Fund

 Patrick A. Burke, Washington (DC) 

Metropolitan Police Department

 Amanda Burstein, International Association 

of Chiefs of Police

 Brett Chapman, National Institute of Justice

 Nazmia E.A. Comrie, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services

 Dwayne Crawford, National Association of 

Black Law Enforcement Officers

 Michael Dalley, Las Vegas (NV) 

Metropolitan Police Department

 Alexander L. Eastman, Dallas (TX) 

Police Department

 Steven M. Edwards, Bureau of Justice Assistance

 Craig W. Floyd, National Law Enforcement 

Officers Memorial Fund

 Rick Fulginiti, Fraternal Order of Police

 Rick Gregory, Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research

 William Haskell, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health

 Dennis Hyater, Commission on Accreditation for 

Law Enforcement Agencies

 Hope D. Janke, Bureau of Justice Assistance

 William Johnson, National Association of 

Police Organizations

 Robert Kaminski, University of South Carolina

 William R. King, Sam Houston State University

 David Klinger, University of Missouri – St. Louis

 Drew Kosova, Boca Raton (FL) Police Department

 Charles Layton, Philadelphia (PA) 

Police Department

 Nancy Leach, K4 Associates, Inc.

 Ron Malega, Bureau of Justice Statistics

 Leonard Matarese, International 

City/County Management Association

 Brian McAllister, Federal Bureau of Investigation

 Deborah Meader, Bureau of Justice Assistance

 Lindsay Miller, Police Executive Research Forum

 Roger Miller, Federal Bureau of Investigation

 Maya Mitchell, Commission on Accreditation for 

Law Enforcement Agencies

 Brian Montgomery, National Institute of Justice

 Denise O’Donnell, Bureau of Justice Assistance

 Larry O’Toole, St. Louis (MO) 

Metropolitan Police Department

 Eugene A. Paoline III, University of 

Central Florida

 Timothy M. Richardson, National 

Fraternal Order of Police 

 Cornelia Sigworth, Bureau of Justice Statistics

 Deborah L. Spence, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services

 Darrel Stephens, Major Cities Chiefs Association

 Vincent Talucci, International Association of 

Chiefs of Police

 Jennifer Turner, Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research

 Sandra Webb, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services

 Patricia Williams, Major Cities Chiefs Association

 Fred G. Wilson, National Sheriffs’ Association 
1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND REGARDING 

THE OSW GROUP AND MISSION

In 2011, then U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. 

requested that the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services (COPS Office) and Bureau of 

Justice Assistance (BJA) form the Officer Safety and 

Wellness (OSW) Group. The group’s purpose is to 

bring together thought leaders, law enforcement 

practitioners, and researchers to compile, parse, and 

share information that reduces risks, increases safety, 

and enhances wellness among the ranks of policing 

professionals. This is a vital and yet complex charge 

with interrelated external and internal forces at play. 

Even without considering the environmental variables 

external to the agency that make the job inherently 

dangerous, leadership, policies, training, procedures, 

support services, and equipment as well as individual 

approaches to fitness, nutrition, and mental health all 

impact the levels of risk to officer safety.

With these issues in mind, the OSW Group amassed 

data, heard from experts and researchers in various 

areas, identified 16 priorities that would guide future 

meetings and the overall mission of the group, and 

began developing action plans to address those 

priorities as a profession and at the agency and 

individual levels. Of the following 16 priorities, 

the attorney general, the COPS Office, and BJA 

established the first three as top priorities:

1. Injuries and death due to gunfire

2. Premeditated and unprovoked ambush situations

3. Rifle/long-gun threats / assault weapons

4. Education and training

5. Leadership and safety practices

6. Emergency vehicle operation and safety

7. Physical health (e.g., fatigue, alcohol, 

weight, and nutrition)

8. Psychological health

9. Foot pursuit safety

10. Task force operations (federal and local)

11. Offenders (behavior during incident and history)

12. Court security

13. Deployment strategies 

and communications technologies

14. Maintaining good health

15. Equipment

16. Former military in law enforcement

This report serves as one step toward addressing two 

of these primary safety concerns in law enforcement: 

(1) injuries and deaths among officers and 

(2) premeditated and unprovoked ambushes of 

officers. It was initially developed for presentation 

at the December 2014 meeting of the OSW Group, 

where it served as a framework for the discussion. 

The meeting included use of force subject matter 

experts, organizational leaders from law enforcement 

associations, representatives from various federal 

agencies, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 

Assaulted (LEOKA) administrators, and project 

team members. This report examines the differential 

risks that are thought to influence the use of deadly 

force against police officers in the United States. 

We hypothesize that the risks to officer safety are 

neither uniform across the country nor static; instead, 

officers from particular agencies or jurisdictions are 

at a higher risk than officers from other agencies of 

becoming victims of firearms-related violence. Based 

on this research, representatives from three high-risk 

agencies and three low-risk agencies were invited to 

the OSW group meeting. Each agency representative 

was given the opportunity to talk about their 

department and their local organizational practices 

related to officer safety. 
2 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Existing research on this topic is not yet sufficient 

to determine what factors are responsible for this 

differential risk, but some likely explanations include 

variability in crime rates; population demographics; 

economic conditions; organizational training, policies, 

and procedures; and officer assignments. This report 

examines some of the jurisdictional and departmental 

characteristics in local police departments and 

sheriffs’ offices in the United States that may influence 

the risk of injury or death to police officers by 

firearms. More specifically, we examine the presence 

or absence of policies, practices, and training that are 

focused on improving officer safety during high-risk 

calls for service and on reducing the impact of firearm 

violence against officers.

In addition to the authors discussing this research 

with the OSW group, representatives from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also presented 

on their work with the LEOKA data collection 

program. This data set was not only key to the 

research discussed in this report but also the 

most comprehensive national level data we have 

about officer injuries and fatalities. However, it is 

not without limitations and weaknesses, and the 

attendees also discussed those as well as ideas for 

improving this valuable data. Some of that discussion 

is also captured in this report.

This report is divided into three sections. First is a 

summary of the OSW group meeting discussion that 

shares the important findings and recommendations 

of the group. Second is a literature review looking 

at 50 years of attempts to better understand 

the situational factors that lead to officers being 

assaulted. Third is a presentation of the methods 

and results of the research conducted by the authors.
3

PART ONE. SUMMARY OF OSW GROUP DISCUSSION

Discussion at the December 2014 OSW Group 

meeting offered some important insights regarding 

variations in the use of deadly force and firearms 

against police officers. From the presentations the 

attendees learned that it seems clear that police 

officers working in similarly situated cities and 

counties are at differential risk of becoming the 

victims of firearms violence. Also, the LEOKA data 

provide an opportunity to explore those variations 

over time and within cities and counties. 

Specific to this research, LEOKA allowed the authors 

to identify specific cities and counties where officers 

may be at increased risk of firearms-related violence. 

Further, merging five years of LEOKA and Uniform 

Crime Reports data confirms, first and foremost, 

that risks are sometimes higher for officers who are 

working in cities and counties with higher crime 

rates. However, even within high crime settings, there 

are substantial differences in the extent of risk for 

officers across comparable cities and counties. Simply 

stated, some cities and counties are more dangerous 

for police officers, and officers are at higher risk of 

being victims of firearms assaults in certain locations. 

As a starting point, the cities and counties identified 

in bold, blue italics in the tables located in appendix 

A should be more closely examined. The officer 

safety policies and practices in these agencies should 

also be carefully reviewed and improved safety 

solutions should be developed. To be clear, we are 

not suggesting that any particular agency’s past or 

current law enforcement practices and policies (or 

lack thereof) are placing their officers at increased risk. 

However, we are drawing attention to the fact that 

police officers in some of our nation’s cities have been 

assaulted with firearms substantially more often than 

officers in cities of similar size and with comparable 

mean homicide rates over a five-year time frame. 

The logical questions that follow are (1) Why are 

certain cities seemingly less safe for police officers? and 

(2) Why are citizens in certain cities more willing to 

use firearms in the course of assaulting police officers?

The presentations and group conversations were 

helpful to some degree and offered specific insights 

into potential explanations for variations in risk for 

officers. These explanations included (1) agency 

reporting practices related to firearms events (some 

agencies simply report differently than others, so 

what appear to be increased numbers of assaults 

against police may in fact reflect different reporting 

practices, (2) variations in definitions used for 

firearms-related incidents, (3) city-level demographic 

variations and changes, (4) variation in citizen 

firearm ownership rates, and (5) organizational 

training and safety practices.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for example, is rather 

densely populated, and the confined areas of 

operation may accelerate police-citizen encounters 

and potentially explain increased use of firearms 

against officers in that city. St. Louis, Missouri, on 

the other hand, has persistently high crime and 

homicide rates, so the officers working there are 

simply operating in a potentially more dangerous 

environment. Meanwhile, crime in Tampa, Florida, 

has dropped 70 percent since 2004, and the 

Tampa Police Department substantially increased 

their intelligence capacity and effectiveness in that 

time, so officers in that city are perhaps less often 

encountering dangerous offenders with insufficient 

intelligence about the potential danger. The Las 

Vegas (Nevada) Metropolitan Police Department 

has developed reality-based training and advanced 

firearms skills training that may be making a 

difference. Finally, the Baltimore (Maryland) Police 

Department proactively targets repeat offenders 

and emphasizes foot pursuit training, which may 

explain some of the firearms assaults against officers 

experienced by that agency. These are all anecdotal 

explanations that may account for some of the 

variability in firearms assaults against officers across 

cities, but clearly more focused research would be 

useful before we could draw meaningful conclusions. 
4 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

One of our subject matter experts suggested that 

changing socio-demographics and persistently 

high crime rates are the most important drivers of 

increased shootings against officers. To the extent 

that officers are already working in high crime areas, 

proactively focusing on highly prolific and violent 

offenders, and minimally engaging communities that 

are already distrustful, it follows that officers will be 

at increased risk of citizen-initiated violence against 

them. However, our study controlled for these 

factors and matched high- and low-risk agencies on 

population and homicide data over five years. We 

still find that firearms assaults are substantially higher 

in some cities, regardless of these contextual factors.

Given what we learned from prior research studies; 

merging and analyzing five years of LEOKA and 

UCR data; the national organizational survey on use 

of deadly force and firearms against officers; OSW 

Group discussions in Washington, D.C.; and subject 

matter experts, a series of recommendations is 

offered. These recommendations may serve as useful 

next steps for improving officer safety nationwide.

Recommendation 1

As an initial step, we encourage broader use 

of the LEOKA and UCR data to regularly and 

routinely identify high-crime and high-risk 

environments at the city and county levels. 

These two national datasets, which can be easily 

merged (even given the observed weaknesses 

discussed later), can routinely inform policy 

and funding decisions and should be more 

effectively integrated into federal research 

agendas, resource allocation decisions, and 

program design. The COPS Office merges a 

range of crime and other data sources to inform 

its programmatic and funding decisions, such as 

in selections for the COPS Hiring Program grant. 

We would encourage ongoing emphasis of datadriven funding decisions that rely on a broad 

range of data sources.

For example, in the interest of increased 

officer and citizen safety, funding agencies 

might consider funding cities and counties 

based on both high crime rates and high-risk 

scores associated with use of firearms against 

officers. Combining federal data sources to drive 

program and funding decisions offers a datadriven, scientifically sound approach to federal 

resource allocation. Further, using this kind of 

funding model could increase participation in 

LEOKA for some agencies and could potentially 

set the stage for the national development of 

other useful policing and crime data sources 

(discussed later).

Recommendation 2

A growing number of officer ambushes has been 

reported in recent years, and these reports have 

raised substantial concerns about officer safety, 

body armor, situational awareness training, and 

other factors. Despite the heightened current 

concerns, reducing and preventing officer 

ambushes is a particularly difficult challenge. 

However, there are two concrete steps that 

we can take to minimize the likelihood of 

ambushes. First, the dissemination of useful 

and actionable intelligence is paramount. 

Officers who are stopping cars on a highway, 

conducting stop-and-frisks, walking the beat, 

or investigating suspects all need to be fully 

informed with as much information as possible 

in a timely manner. There is no evidence that 

this is not currently occurring, but many of the 

law enforcement leaders recognized this as 

an important step toward reducing ambushes. 

Second, situational awareness, vigilance, and 

reality-based training are critical to officer 

safety and may help reduce officer ambushes. 

As an initial step, identification, evaluation, 

and expansion of best practices within current 

training academies and curricula are important.

Recommendation 3

The LEOKA data helped us identify high-risk 

calls for service and scenarios that should be 

prioritized in officer safety training, policy and 

procedure development, and organizational 

priorities. In short, (1) foot pursuits, (2) domestic 

violence calls, (3) responding to burglaries 

(or robberies) in progress, (4) handling mentally 

ill or emotionally disturbed individuals, 

(5) serving arrest warrants on violent offenders, 

and (6) responding to calls where shots have 

been fired or firearms are on scene are all 

high-risk events. These events directly contribute 

to officer assaults and casualties each year. 
Part One. Summary of OSW Group Discussion 5

Our survey results suggest wide variation in 

organizational policies and practices and in 

recruit and officer training that is specifically 

focused on preparing and responding to these 

high-risk calls for service. Regardless of the 

variation, some commonly accepted safety 

practices might be necessary and nationally 

encouraged.

As examples and building from our OSW group 

conversations, national model policies and 

practices for these six high-risk scenarios should 

be developed and disseminated, perhaps by the 

Major Cities Chiefs Association, the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, or the National 

Sheriffs’ Association. Within the six scenarios, 

certain safety practices might need to be 

considered mandatory:

h Responding alone to any of the high-risk 

events likely places an officer at unnecessary 

risk for lethal violence.

h Ongoing communication while responding to 

high-risk calls seems warranted.

h Fully defining the extent (or limits) of officer 

discretion while responding to high-risk 

events merits full and careful consideration.

h Effective safety training should be identified 

and expanded around each of the highrisk areas, and such training should 

be mandatory within and after training 

academies. Again, identification, evaluation, 

and expansion of best practices within 

current training academies and curriculums 

is important.

h Wearing adequate and approved body armor 

should be mandatory every time any officer 

responds to high-risk events.

h Finally, some of these events (e.g., domestic 

violence calls, responding to mentally ill or 

emotionally disturbed individuals, serving 

warrants) might need to be restricted to 

certain highly trained sworn specialists within 

the agency. These matters should be carefully 

deliberated by law enforcement leaders.

Recommendation 4

Focusing attention on officer deaths associated 

with firearms is important. However, it is equally 

important to focus attention on the broader 

category of firearms assaults and on shots 

actually fired at officers in general, whether 

those shots miss, hit and injure, or hit and kill an 

officer. Every shot fired at an officer is potentially 

lethal, so it would be a mistake to focus too 

much attention only on the small number of 

shots that result in an officer’s death.

As a reminder, there were 1,926 law 

enforcement agencies that reported at least 

one firearms assault against an officer during 

the five-year time frame examined here. More 

specifically, there were 1,014 firearms assaults 

that resulted in injuries to officers, 10,149 

firearms assaults against officers that did not 

result in injuries, and 148 deaths attributable to 

firearms use against officers from 2007 to 2011 

among the 1,926 agencies.

More of our research and policy attention 

should focus on the 10,149 firearms assaults 

against officers, particularly when shots are 

actually fired, and these events should be 

explored more carefully and systematically. 

We need to understand where, why, and under 

what conditions those shots were fired and to 

take active steps to reduce the frequency of 

those conditions while also seeking to reduce 

the number of officer deaths. Accomplishing 

these worthwhile goals may involve more careful 

exploration of variations in local firearms laws, 

the extent of legal and illegal access to firearms, 

and improved methods of identifying suspects 

who may be carrying illegal firearms (Jacobellis 

2007; Gallagher n.d.).

This project offered the opportunity to analyze 

the FBI’s LEOKA data and, for the first time to our 

knowledge, to combine LEOKA data with UCR crime 

data and organizational survey data. In spite of its 

promise, LEOKA and other police and crime data 

have some significant limitations that can limit their 

usefulness to law enforcement and the academic 

community (Uchida and King 2002; King and Sanders 

1997). Although for this project we relied primarily 

on firearms assaults data, which may have higher 
6 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

reliability and validity generally, we nevertheless 

observed three limitations in this project that should 

be addressed in the future. These limitations were 

also discussed with the OSW Group, with general 

consensus that these need to be addressed in order to 

realize the real power of the data.

1. The LEOKA report and data are released 

too slowly.

In an era characterized by the timely release of 

information to support effective decision making, 

reports and data sets from the LEOKA program are 

released rather slowly. The annual Law Enforcement 

Officers Killed and Assaulted report is usually released 

almost a year after the year on which it reports. For 

instance, the 2013 report was released on November 

24, 2014. The electronic data are released annually 

in a public archive and can be downloaded for 

secondary analysis by researchers. The data are 

typically released 16–18 months after the new 

year. The 2012 data, for instance, were released on 

April 16, 2014. When this report was being written 

(January–March 2015), the latest available data were 

from 2012. The timely availability of information is 

central to effective decision making.

2. The LEOKA data are incomplete.

Only 75.3 percent of the 18,295 agencies listed in 

the LEOKA database reported a full 12 months of 

data in 2012, 4.4 percent reported 1 to 11 months 

of data, and 20.3 percent reported 0 months of data. 

The 20.3 percent of agencies that did not report any 

data in 2012 represents missing data from 3,713 

American law enforcement agencies. Among them 

are some major agencies including the New York; 

Chicago; Washington, D.C., Metropolitan; San 

Francisco; and Columbus (Ohio) Police Departments.

It is difficult to produce valid and reliable analyses 

of officers killed and assaulted when some of the 

nation’s largest law enforcement agencies choose not 

to submit their agency data. Because the FBI’s LEOKA 

program is a voluntary reporting system, agencies are 

simply not compelled to participate, and some do not 

participate. As result, there is a serious missing data 

problem that makes it difficult to draw inferences 

about trends and patterns in law enforcement officers 

killed and assaulted nationwide. 

The FBI should develop mechanisms to encourage 

and improve law enforcement agency participation in 

the LEOKA reporting process.

3. The LEOKA data are not used very often for 

scientific research.

Critics have pointed out that there is a lack of focus 

by those who carry out and fund police research 

on the development of a systematic, cohesive, 

empirically defensible, longitudinal data collection 

strategy at the organization or the industry level. As 

a result, we are unable to measure, detect, or explain 

major changes (or continuities) in policing with 

any scientific confidence (Maguire and King 2004). 

The LEOKA data are a good example. Facilitating 

partnerships with researchers and improving data 

quality could go a long way toward improving the 

scientific knowledge base on officer safety.

What could help is if the research community and 

the law enforcement community (including the 

FBI) worked together to improve the quality of the 

LEOKA data and, as it improves, encourage broader 

use of the information for developing policies and 

practices to improve officer safety.

A growing number of police use of force cases—and, 

in some instances, use of excessive force cases—have 

generated substantial public and media concerns 

in 2014 and 2015. As a result, an important part of 

the national conversation in policing has recently 

focused on police use of force, police use of excessive 

force, and more specifically on the lack of a national 

database for tracking police use of force incidents 

nationwide. Given some of the observed systemic 

problems with the LEOKA data collection process, 

it would be prudent to address these concerns as 

a prerequisite for establishing another national 

data collection effort on police activities. We are 

hopeful that addressing the shortcomings of LEOKA 

will serve as a useful first step toward improving 

nationwide data collection processes overall. Once 

those problems are resolved, establishing a national 

use of force data collection system would be an 

important next step toward improving officer and 

citizen safety nationwide.
7

PART TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW

Some of the first studies related to police officer 

safety in the United States were conducted in the 

early 1960s based on data collected by students in 

police patrol classes at Los Angeles State College. 

These students gathered detailed case studies of 

police officers who had been injured or fatally 

wounded while on the job beginning in 1959 

(Bristow 1963; Nicol 1961). The preliminary 

report, released in early 1961, contradicted many 

assumptions made by police officers and popular 

media at the time.1

 For instance, while most officers 

believed the greatest dangers involved approaching 

suspects in vehicles, the preliminary report illustrated 

that the highest percentage of officers was shot (or 

shot at) while dealing with suspects in buildings 

(Nicol 1961). 

Bristow (1963) studied the completed dataset 

consisting of 110 cases, further supporting the 

findings released in the preliminary report. The 

validity of this study is questionable because of the 

use of convenience sampling methods rather than 

random sampling. Nonetheless, these two studies 

provide the foundation for later research of use of 

deadly force against police. The following sections of 

the literature review distinguish past research based 

on crime types, geography and characteristics of place, 

job-related factors, demographics of suspects and 

victims, and weapons used in attacks against officers.

1. It is important to note that the cases included in this study were not 

randomly selected. As a result, it is unknown to what extent the sample 

is statistically representative of instances in which police officers were 

assaulted by firearms in the line of duty. As noted by the authors, the data 

“were extremely hard to collect. When the local cases . . . were exhausted, 

it became necessary to proceed by correspondence on a nationwide basis” 

(Bristow 1963, 93). 

Crime types, calls for service, and other 

situational factors

Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, 

newspaper headlines featured stories of criminal 

homicides by police, painting pictures for the 

public of new threats by “hardened criminals and 

the emotionally disturbed or insane” (Margarita 

1980, 64). This was oddly reassuring for the public; 

it was easier to accept heinous acts against police 

as being carried out by people who were mentally 

incapacitated. However, emerging studies of officer 

deaths revealed quite the opposite. One study 

of New York Police Department (NYPD) officerrelated homicides (using data on 239 homicides 

from 1844 to 1978) revealed that the shooting 

of officers indicated “clear calculations made by 

both professional and amateur criminals who use 

violence against police only to avoid apprehension 

and to escape from the scene of some illegal activity” 

(Margarita 1980, 64; Kaminski and Sorensen 1995). 

In other words, the use of deadly force against NYPD 

officers was largely motivated by self preservation. 

Suspects employed violence most often during an 

escape attempt following the commission of a violent 

crime (Margarita 1980). 

Additional studies of use of deadly force against 

police have generally supported these findings, 

concluding that homicide deaths among officers 

occur most frequently during robberies in progress 

or when suspects are fleeing arrest (e.g., Takagi 1974; 

Garner and Clemmer 1986) and occur less frequently 

during traffic stops (Garner and Clemmer 1986; 

Lichtenburg and Smith 2001). The conclusions 

vary for crime types, however, in terms of nonlethal 

assaults on officers. A multiyear study published 

in 1994 (based on data from the city of Charlotte, 

North Carolina) found that, in addition to robbery 

calls, handling prisoners and responding to calls 

for service involving mentally deranged individuals 

significantly increased an officer’s risk of being 

assaulted or killed (Hirschel et al. 1994). Kaminski 

and Sorensen (1995) found that the offense category 

that generated the greatest risk for officer injury 

included general public disturbances. Yet regardless 

of the offense category, the risk for officer injury 

significantly increased when suspects were under 

arrest, attempting to escape, or fighting or arguing. 

Interestingly, recent studies have shown that the 

injury- or death-related risks to officers grow during 

incidents involving “a greater number of crimes and 

a greater diversity of offenses” (Bierie et al. 2013, 16). 
8 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

In other words, risks to officers may be less related 

to certain offense categories and more related to 

the number and range of offenses within a 

particular incident. 

Other studies have considered the manner in which 

police respond to various types of calls for service 

in terms of risks to officer safety. In the mid-1980s, 

motor vehicle pursuits came under scrutiny due to 

the potential for serious injury and death (Kaminski 

et al. 2012). This led to an increase in research on 

that topic with administrators generally concluding 

that the risks of such pursuits (for both suspects and 

responding officers) outweighed the benefits unless 

the driver was suspected of carrying out a violent 

crime (Alpert and Dunham 1988). In more recent 

years, discussion has centered on the risk of foot 

pursuits for officer-related injuries and fatalities (e.g., 

Graham 2009; OSW Group 2012). To address this 

concern, Kaminski and colleagues (2012) studied 

foot pursuits in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., 

Margarita 1980; Smith et al. 2007), their findings 

suggest that the odds of injury to officers increased 

when the suspect was assaultive rather than just 

resistant. The odds of injury to officers also increased 

when deputies used hard empty hand tactics.2

However, the foot pursuit itself was not found to 

pose a greater risk to officer safety than the risks from 

general, resistant (i.e., not assaultive) police-citizen 

encounters (Kaminski et al. 2012). 

A few studies have considered the role of accidental 

injuries to police officers while interacting with 

suspects. Using data from a large Midwestern police 

department in the United States, Brandl (1996) 

found that the majority of incidents resulting in 

injuries to officers (more than 92 percent) were 

accidental, and 40 percent occurred while the 

officer was trying to control or arrest the suspect. 

Further, nearly 60 percent of accidental officer 

injuries were not attributable to any actions of the 

suspects, indicating that most injuries either involved 

automobile accidents or occurred during physical 

training exercises.3

2. Hard empty hand tactics refers to the use of bodily force in the form of 

punching or kicking by the officer to gain control of a situation (NIJ 2015). 

3. Brandl’s (1996) findings, however, are not nationally representative as 

the data were only collected from one U.S. police department. 

 Indeed, based on analysis of 

national data from 1992 to 1997, Clarke and Zak 

(1999) found that highway crashes accounted for 

roughly one-third of law enforcement personnel 

fatalities. More recent data reveal that, depending 

on the year, traffic accidents rival felonious assaults 

as the leading cause of officer fatalities in the 

United States (Bierie et al. 2013, 2; Craun, Detar, 

and Bierie 2013; National Law Enforcement 

Memorial Fund 2015).

Wilson, Brunk, and Meyer (1990) argued that 

“perhaps the most obvious situational characteristic” 

that should be considered in assaults on police is 

the number of individuals present in addition to 

the suspect(s). The presence of bystanders or other 

witnesses during altercations may also influence 

both the officer’s and the suspect’s decision-making 

processes and may quickly escalate a situation 

(Rabe-Hemp and Schuck 2007; Toch 1969; Zimring 

1972). Findings from a study by Wilson and her 

colleagues (1990) support this conclusion. The 

percentage of officer injuries among one- and twoperson patrol units remained steady when zero or 

one civilian witnesses were present (roughly 42–46 

percent); however, the percentage of officer injuries 

jumped to approximately 50–56 percent when two 

or three witnesses were present and further increased 

to 72 percent when four or more were present (for 

single unit patrols) (see also Croft 1985). Further, 

the number of witnesses present was found to 

significantly predict the number of officer injuries, 

particularly for one-unit patrols, while demographic 

characteristics of the suspects, including race, were 

not significant. 

Geography and characteristics of place

Research has routinely shown that the southern 

(more specifically, southeastern) region of the United 

States experiences the greatest rate of police officer 

fatalities (Cardarelli 1968; Lester 1978a; Swedler 

et al. 2013). This region of the United States also 

experiences the highest rates of homicides in general, 

which has been correlated with the number of 

officer deaths (Lester 1978b; 1984). Between 1996 

and 2010, the states with the highest frequency of 

officer fatalities included California (n = 73), Texas 

(n = 69), and Florida (n = 37) (Swedler et al. 2013); 

however, the states with the highest rate of officer 

deaths per 100,000 population included Arkansas 

(32.5), Mississippi (29.8), and Alabama (20.6). 

When analyzed regionally, the “east south central” 

region (identified in the study as Alabama, Kentucky, 
Part Two. Literature Review 9

Tennessee, and Mississippi) experienced the highest 

rates of officer fatalities compared with other regions 

(Swedler et al. 2013).

Research on the relationship between the size of 

cities and officer injuries is limited because much of 

the past literature has not been nationally based or 

representative, so comparisons of city sizes could not 

be considered in many prior studies. However, some 

research (e.g., Cardarelli 1968) has found that larger 

urban settings constitute the greatest danger for 

police. Lester (1984) expanded on these studies by 

considering variations in population density within 

larger cities themselves and found that larger cities 

(particularly in the southern United States) with 

lower population densities had higher police officer 

fatalities. Lester (1984) also found that levels of gun 

violence and homicide rates in large cities were also 

moderately correlated with murders of police officers. 

Yet more updated comparative research is needed on 

city size and population density in relation to officer 

injuries and death. Further, the relationship between 

city or county size and violence against police may 

be more directly related to violent crime rates 

(Fridell et al. 2009).

Job-related risk factors

Some research has considered the impact of some 

job-related factors on officer injury or death. For 

instance, Cardarelli’s (1968) early study found 

that the majority of police officers killed between 

1961 and 1963 were younger than 40 years of 

age; 66 percent were killed before completing 15 

years of service; and 43 percent were killed before 

they had completed five years of service. Kaminski 

and Sorensen (1995) identified a more complex 

relationship between the odds of officer injury 

and years of service. That is, the odds of injury 

to officers in Baltimore County declined sharply 

during the first six years of service; however, further 

reductions in the odds occurred only after about the 

13th year of service.

Lester (1984) examined other characteristics of 

police departments across the United States with the 

highest rates of police officers murdered, including 

per capita police expenditures, personnel per capita, 

number of patrolmen, percent single officer units, 

and officer salaries (both minimum and maximum 

salary). However, only the expenditure per capita on 

the police department for all cities in the sample (33) 

was significantly correlated with the police murder 

rate (Lester 1984). Southwick (1998) did find a 

significant and negative relationship with police 

wages and felonious deaths of officers, indicating that 

the risk for death decreased as wages increased.

Earlier research launched a debate regarding the 

safety of one-officer versus two-officer patrols; 

Cardarelli (1968) found that 51 percent of police 

were alone on patrol when they were killed, while 

49 percent were on a two-man patrol. Data collected 

in the 1970s revealed that in nonlethal assaults on 

officers, most (57 percent) of the time the officers 

were not injured, regardless of whether the officers 

were riding single or double (Wilson, Brunk, 

and Meyer 1990). However, among the group of 

officers that were injured, officers in one-person 

units were slightly more likely to be injured than 

those in two-person units.

Demographics of suspects and victims

Data on suspect and officer race are often cited in 

earlier studies as being scarce (Cardarelli 1968). 

However, some studies were able to include race 

as a factor (Bierie 2015), either in terms of suspect 

race, officer race, or racial composition of the general 

population. Lester (1978b) found that the murder 

rate of police officers was correlated with higher 

percentages of Black citizens within larger cities. 

However, in a later, more robust analysis containing 

data from 57 cities spanning eight years, Lester’s (1984) 

findings did not support his earlier conclusions.4

4. Similarly, Lester’s (1978b) earlier study also showed correlations 

between poverty and police fatalities, but his later study in 1984 did not 

find the same significant correlations. 

Early reports from the FBI in the 1960s indicated 

that in California between 1960 and 1970, suspects 

accused of killing police officers were mostly White 

(55 percent), followed by Black (25 percent) and 

Hispanic (19 percent) (Takagi 1974). Interestingly, 

these percentages followed similar distributions 

of ethnic and racial groups in California’s prison 

population at the time. Updated statistics from the 

OSW Group report that African Americans were 

vastly overrepresented among “felons who murdered 

police” (OSW Group 2012, 5); African Americans 

constituted almost 60 percent of suspects involved 

in police fatalities in 2010. More robust studies, 
10 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

however, have had mixed findings in terms of 

uncovering significant relationships between suspect 

race and officer injury or death. Uchida and Brooks 

(1988) and other scholars found no significant 

relationship between officer injury and suspect race 

(e.g., Bierie et al. 2013). 

Weapons used

Studies of use of force against police overwhelmingly 

reveal that the majority of assailants use guns as the 

instrument of aggression in fatal attacks (Bierie et 

al. 2013; Clarke and Zak 1999; Kercher et al. 2013; 

OSW Group 2012; Swedler et al. 2013). According 

to FBI data spanning three years in the early 1960s, 

all but five officers killed feloniously in the United 

States were killed with firearms (Cardarelli 1968). 

In a 1980 study of NYPD officer homicides, 90 

percent of suspects used guns against police, with 

knives used second-most often (Margarita, 1980). 

The FBI (1986) further reported that between 1976 

and 1985, 90 percent of all police officer felonious 

fatalities were caused by gunshot wounds. However, 

some scholars (e.g., Wilson and Meyer 1990) have 

found that firearms play a smaller role in nonlethal 

assaults on officers than in lethal assaults. That is, 

across cities of all sizes, the most common type of 

weapon used in nonlethal attacks on officers was a 

“personal weapon,” which included hands, fists, feet, 

and teeth and most often resulted in minor cuts and 

scrapes to the officer. The authors argue the findings 

reflect the most common types of police work such 

as making traffic stops and enforcing traffic-related 

laws (Wilson and Meyer 1990). 

Scholars have noted, however, that “the choice of a 

particular weapon is determined by the offender’s 

original intentions” (Margarita 1980, 70; see also 

Wilson and Meyer 1990). For instance, robbers 

tend to arm themselves with guns to restrain victims 

without the use of physical force as well as to give the 

offender a sense of supremacy (Block 1977; Margarita 

1980; Toch 1992). If the gun is used during the 

robbery, it serves an instrumental purpose to ensure 

a safe getaway (Block 1977, 29). Indeed, Wilson 

and Meyer (1990) found that in nonlethal assaults 

on police, firearms were the weapon of choice for 

both robberies and ambushes. Margarita (1980) 

found that knife-wielding suspects often held goals 

of “angry aggression” and were often involved in 

public disturbances, domestic disputes, or “behaving 

erratically” (70). As Wilson and Meyer (1990, 34) 

stated, “undoubtedly the potential for serious officer 

sustained injury [including death] is vastly increased 

by the presence of firearms in the incident.”

A handful of studies have since directly addressed the 

relationship between gun laws and felonious deaths 

(e.g., Southwick 1998). Particularly, Mustard (2001) 

studied concealed weapon carry laws using statelevel data from 1984 to 1996, concluding that U.S. 

states allowing citizens to carry concealed firearms 

may “slightly lower” the risk of death for police 

officers. However, the analysis suffered from some 

methodological issues that have not yet been resolved 

in this body of research.5

 More rigorous research 

is needed to draw clearer conclusions about the 

influence of gun availability on risks to police officers. 

This review of the scientific literature reveals that on 

some occasions the use of weapons against police 

is not necessarily premeditated and is sometimes 

accidental (e.g., Brandl 1996; Hawkins and Ward 

1970; Margarita 1980). This notion fits with prior 

research that uncovered the unintentional nature 

(including death) of many injuries to police while on 

the job (Brandl 1996). However, the vast majority of 

studies on police injuries and deaths are from nonrepresentative samples (e.g., Brandl 1996; Cardarelli 

1963; Johnson and Saint-Germain 2005; Kaminski 

and Sorensen 1995; Margarita 1980; Nicol 1961; 

Rabe-Hemp and Schuck 2007; Smith et al. 2007; 

Wilson, Brunk, and Meyer 1990).

As King and Sanders (1997) observe, much 

of the prior research on deaths in the line of 

duty, including government reports, is based on 

methodologically limited research. As such, many 

of the prior conclusions cannot be generalized to 

agencies across the United States. Nevertheless, 

findings from these studies are useful for identifying 

potential organizational and officer characteristics 

and phenomena that may be useful for developing 

policies, procedures, and training that might improve 

officer safety nationwide and reduce the risk of 

deadly force against officers in the future. 

5. For instance, the economic analysis compared trends prior to and after 

the concealed carry laws went into effect without accounting for a lagged 

effect, and the findings were determined using significance levels of 0.10 

(see also Southwick 1998). 
11

PART THREE. THE CURRENT STUDY

Purpose of the current study

In an attempt to extend the efforts of past studies that 

employed national-level data (e.g., Bierie et al. 2013; 

Swedler et al. 2013), the current study first examines 

the links between violent crime rates and officer 

risk for injury and death associated with firearms. 

We then use a newly constructed dataset to identify 

agencies and jurisdictions where officers are at higher 

risk of being killed or assaulted with a firearm. We 

then matched those agencies, based on population 

and mean homicide rates over a five-year period, 

with agencies where officers were at lower risk. 

Finally, based on an online survey of law enforcement 

agencies, we explore how the high- and low-risk 

agencies might differentially train and respond to a 

range of high-risk events.

A basic premise underlying our approach to the 

research is the fact that some jurisdictions are riskier 

for police officers than others. In order to understand 

the role of police agencies in minimizing the level 

of risk and enhancing the level of protection among 

officers, it is necessary to control for jurisdictional 

differences in the level of risk officers face. The 

analytical challenge is somewhat similar to the study 

of mortality rates, in which researchers must control 

for the fact that some hospitals (like cancer centers) 

attract patients with more serious illnesses than 

others. In this case, the analytical challenge involves 

controlling for the fact that some communities 

experience more violence than others. Thus, the 

first step in the research process involved obtaining 

agency/jurisdiction-level data from throughout the 

United States on crime as well as law enforcement 

officers killed and assaulted. We then used these data 

to identify agencies facing similar levels of risk but 

having different levels of fatal and nonfatal firearms 

assaults against police officers. This process enabled 

us to identify low-risk and high-risk agencies that 

could then be compared using data from a survey 

carried out as part of this project.

Merging data on law enforcement officers 

killed and assaulted with UCR crime data

We began by obtaining the most recent five years 

(2007 to 2011) of data from the FBI’s LEOKA data 

series (Regents of the University of Michigan 2016). 

This data series forms the basis for the FBI’s annual 

LEOKA report, which provides national information 

about law enforcement officers who were killed 

feloniously or accidentally or who were assaulted 

while performing their duties. The FBI collects 

these data as part of the UCR program from nearly 

16,000 law enforcement agencies each year. We then 

obtained crime data for the same period (2007–

2011) from the UCR data series. These data are also 

available from the National Archive of Criminal 

Justice data website (Regents of the University of 

Michigan 2016).

We matched the two data sets at the agency level 

using the common ORI codes that are included in 

both datasets. This data integration and matching 

process resulted in a single database that included 

five years of data on UCR Part 1 crimes (homicide, 

robbery, sexual assault, aggravated assault, burglary, 

larceny, and motor vehicle theft), jurisdictional and 

agency demographics (population size, number of 

officers, state and region of the United States, etc.) 

and officer injuries and deaths as reported to LEOKA.

6

Next, we developed and considered several different 

risk thresholds for identifying high-risk agencies, 

with “high risk” being associated primarily with 

firearms assaults against officers over the five-year 

time frame as reported to LEOKA. Those various 

thresholds are summarized in table 1 on page 12.

6. The LEOKA dataset, like the UCR and other voluntary data collection 

initiatives, has some obvious and important limitations and methodological 

weaknesses. We explored these issues as part of this project and we 

discuss them in detail later in the report along with some recommendations 

for improvement.
12 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Table 1. Three sampling options for identifying high- and low-risk agencies

Scenario 1 Low risk High risk Total Thresholds for determining high risk

Not injured 159 159 318 10 or more officers assaulted with 

firearms without injury, 2007–2011

Injured or killed 36 36 72

5 or more officers killed feloniously 

or assaulted with firearms and 

injured, 2007–2011

Total 195 195 390

Scenario 2 Low risk High risk Total Thresholds for determining high risk

Not injured 105 105 210 15 or more officers assaulted with 

firearms without injury, 2007–2011

Injured or killed 36 36 72

5 or more officers killed feloniously 

or assaulted with firearms and 

injured, 2007–2011

Total 141 141 282

Scenario 3 Low risk High risk Total Thresholds for determining high risk

Not injured 74 74 148 20 or more officers assaulted with 

firearms without injury, 2007–2011

Injured or killed 36 36 72

5 or more officers killed feloniously 

or assaulted with firearms and 

injured, 2007–2011

Total 110 110 220

Considered collectively, there were 1,926 law 

enforcement agencies that reported at least one assault 

with a firearm against an officer during the five-year 

period.7

 There were 1,014 firearms assaults on officers 

with injuries, 10,149 firearms assaults against officers 

without injuries, and 148 deaths attributable to 

firearms use against officers from 2007 to 2011 among 

the 1,926 agencies. However, many of the agencies 

had more firearms assaults against officers and a 

large number had very few. As such, we had to make 

some decisions about what constituted “high risk” for 

purposes of our matching and survey process.

7. The FBI’s UCR definition for assault is “the unlawful attack by one 

person upon another.” In this study, we refer to firearms assaults on officers 

as “law enforcement officers assaulted with firearms” (with or without 

injury). For the FBI’s UCR program, an assault without injury is classified as 

such if a firearm was found at the scene of incident and the victim officer 

was assaulted (with or without injury) during the incident. If the victim 

officer felt threatened during the incident, it can be reported as an assault 

without injury. If a firearm is at the scene of the incident and was used by 

the offender during the incident to threaten the victim officer (pointing the 

weapon at the officer, struggling with the officer for his or her own weapon, 

reaching for a firearm, etc.) it is classified as an assault without injury with a 

firearm. Therefore, an assault without injury with a firearm does not always 

indicate that shots were fired at an officer.
Part Three. The Current Study 13

We ultimately chose the high-risk option that is 

detailed under scenario 1 in table 1. This meant 

that agencies were determined to be high risk if 

they reported 10 or more assaults with a firearm 

against officers, with or without injury, from 2007 

to 2011. To be clear, this means that all 10 firearms 

assaults (or more) could have occurred in one of 

those years or it could be the case that the agency 

reported the 10 firearms assaults at any time over 

the five-year time frame. Ultimately, we chose this 

level of risk because we wanted to have a potentially 

larger sample of high-risk agencies to survey and a 

corresponding larger pool of low-risk agencies. This 

decision resulted in a potential sample size of 390 

agencies (195 could be characterized as high risk 

and 195 could be characterized as low risk).

We ultimately identified 36 agencies in the high-risk 

group for officers assaulted with a firearm and either 

killed or injured and 159 agencies in the high-risk 

group for officers assaulted with a firearm but not 

injured. These 195 high-risk agencies, each of which 

reported at least 10 assaults with a firearm against 

officers between 2007 and 2011, with or without 

injury, were all invited to participate in the survey. 

Selection of low-risk agencies and 

matching process

We next used a partially automated and partially 

manual matching process to select a group of lowrisk agencies to serve as the comparison group based 

on population and mean homicide rates (homicides 

per 100,000 population) from 2007 to 2011. The 

automated portion of the matching process generated a 

rank-ordered list of low-risk agencies falling within a set 

confidence band around the populations and homicide 

rates of each individual high-risk agency. When this 

process generated a list of one or more matching 

agencies, we selected the highest-ranked agency (the 

closest match on population and homicide rate). When 

this process returned no matches, we incrementally 

adjusted the sensitivity levels (widening the confidence 

bands) until we arrived at a potential match.

Our goal was to match high- and low-risk agencies 

on population and mean homicide rates over a 

five-year time frame. Given the nature of our study 

and our interest in identifying the most at-risk 

agencies, our study ultimately focused primarily on 

law enforcement agencies serving the five largest 

population groups: (1) cities with populations of 

1,000,000 or more, (2) cities with populations from 

500,000 to 999,999, (3) cities with populations from 

250,000 to 499,000, (4) cities with populations 

from 100,000 to 249,999, and (5) counties with 

populations of 100,000 or more. To be clear, we 

matched high- and low-risk agencies based on actual 

populations. However, our surveys and analyses 

ultimately focused on cities and counties with larger 

populations and we therefore present some of our 

findings within population categories.

Table 2 on page 14 provides an example and a 

summary of the data that we used and the matching 

process that we relied upon. The table focuses on 

only agencies that were in the LEOKA and UCR 

datasets and that were serving cities with populations 

of 1,000,000 or more. Additional tables with 

summary data for agencies within other population 

categories are located in appendix A. Among the 

largest cities, high-risk municipal agencies such 

as the Philadelphia Police Department, the Los 

Angeles Police Department, and the Phoenix Police 

Department (where the number of firearms assaults 

against officers over the five-year period was above 

the mean for all agencies within that population 

category) were matched with low-risk agencies 

(e.g., Houston Police Department, Las Vegas 

Metropolitan Police Department, Dallas Police 

Department) serving populations of comparable 

sizes and with similar mean five-year homicide 

rates. Officers working in agencies identified in 

bold, blue italics. were at particularly high risk 

because the number of officers assaulted by firearms 

over the five-year period exceeded the mean by 

more than one standard deviation. We will offer 

recommendations for improving officer safety in 

those “highest high-risk” agencies in our conclusions 

and recommendations section.

In a few situations, a low-risk match was difficult to 

identify. As one example, Detroit had a particularly 

high mean homicide rate over the study time frame. 

For a small number of outliers like this, we needed 

to adjust the sensitivity of the matching algorithm 

so that we could identify the closest comparable 

low-risk match. Our impression is that, on their 

face, most matches appeared to be reasonable. In 

those instances where we had to adjust sensitivity 

levels considerably to find a match, the quality of the 

match was not as good. Ultimately, we were able to 
14 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

identify matched low-risk comparison agencies for 

all of the high-risk agencies. Our online survey was 

subsequently disseminated to every high-risk agency 

and at least one matched low-risk agency for each 

high-risk agency.

Agency online survey description

An agency survey was designed to gather information 

concerning how the characteristics of police agencies 

and perceptions of police leaders might influence 

the risks of officers being assaulted, injured, or 

killed with firearms. The survey included questions 

with a variety of response formats (e.g., Likert 

scales, short answer or open-ended questions) that 

were focused on how law enforcement agencies 

prepare for or respond to seven types of high-risk 

scenarios: (1) foot pursuits, (2) domestic violence 

incidents, (3) burglaries in progress, (4) shots fired 

or firearm on scene, (5) mentally ill or emotionally 

disturbed or suicidal suspects, (6) serving arrest 

warrants on violent offenders, and (7) traffic stops 

(see appendix B for an earlier copy of the survey, 

although formatting and word changes occurred as 

the survey was reformatted for online dissemination). 

Respondents were also asked what their agencies 

could do to mitigate the risk of firearms-related 

ambushes against their officers. These high-risk 

scenarios, derived from the LEOKA data, are 

disproportionately represented among the incident 

types in which officers are injured or killed.

The survey contained three sections. Section 1 

focused on police executive views on ways to promote 

officer safety and was intended to be completed 

by the primary law enforcement executive (e.g., 

chief, commissioner, sheriff). Section 2a focused on 

departmental policies and practices around the eight 

high-risk scenarios and could be answered by either 

the primary law enforcement executive or someone 

who was familiar with the agency’s policies and 

practices. Section 2b focused on the agency’s 

recruitment and in-service training practices and 

was typically completed by a training officer. The 

survey was peer reviewed by three subject matter 

experts and revised a number of times based on their 

recommendations as well as feedback received during 

the pilot survey process. Once the survey was finalized, 

we uploaded it to a web-based survey site so agencies 

could complete it online.

Table 2. Selected agencies serving populations of 1,000,000 or more

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100,000 

population)

Firearms assaults 

against officers over 

five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

Philadelphia Police Department* PA 1,530,873 22.34 880 57.5

Los Angeles Police Department* CA 3,837,207 10.24 313 8.2

Phoenix Police Department* AZ 1,466,097 10.57 311 21.2

Houston Police Department TX 2,143,628 13.83 218 10.2

Las Vegas Metropolitan 

Police Department NV 1,458,474 8.5 101 6.9

Dallas Police Department TX 1,223,021 13.72 92 7.5

San Diego Police Department CA 1,316,919 3.84 39 3.0

San Antonio Police Department TX 1,255,339 8.06 34 2.5

* Mean assaults for all agencies in this population group = 248.5; standard deviation = 278.7; numbers and rates more than one standard 

deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.
Part Three. The Current Study 15

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of law enforcement agencies responding to the survey

Online survey process and procedures

Because our survey needed to be completed by 

more than one person within some organizations, 

we split the survey into two sections. Section 1 was 

e-mailed directly to the law enforcement executives 

from SurveyMonkey. Sections 2a and 2b were sent 

to the same executives (or their designees) from a 

university e-mail address. The second section could 

be forwarded to others within the agencies, but the 

first section could not be sent to others. 

We assembled a list of e-mail addresses for law 

enforcement chief executives from multiple sources, 

including the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police, and a 

variety of other sources (including agency websites, 

phone calls to agencies, and through word-ofmouth). There is not a publicly available listing 

of primary law enforcement executives’ e-mail 

addresses, and we were unable to obtain such a 

list from the Federal Government. This survey, and 

others like it in the future, might have been launched 

to a much broader law enforcement audience (which 

could improve validity substantially) if the Federal 

Government were able to track and share e-mail 

addresses for law enforcement executives for research 

purposes. Ultimately we disseminated the survey to a 

total of 350 law enforcement agencies in the United 

States, approximately half of which were high-risk 

agencies and half of which were low-risk agencies.

The survey was officially launched in July 2014 and 

closed in October 2014. To keep track of which 

agencies responded and to what part of the survey, 

we maintained a database that listed all the agencies, 

their e-mail information, agency addresses, and 

whether or not they had answered section 1, section 

2, or both.8

After the data were cleaned, there were a total of 149 

agencies out of 350 who responded to the survey for 

an overall response rate of 42.6 percent. Of the 149 

agencies that responded to the survey, 12 agencies 

completed section 1 but not sections 2a and 2b, 11 

completed sections 2a and 2b but not section 1, and 

126 agencies completed all sections for a complete 

survey response rate of 36 percent.9

 Geographically, 

8. Five agencies requested a PDF or hard copy of the survey. These 

responses were later manually entered into the database containing the 

responses collected through SurveyMonkey.

9. Historically, response rates of at least 50 percent for other types 

of surveys (mail, fax, hand-delivered, etc.) were considered adequate for 

analytical purposes (Dillman 1999). However, evidence suggests that 
16 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

response rates for online surveys might be systematically lower and may 

be decreasing over time. Sheehan (2001) found that response rates to 

e-mailed surveys from 1991–1996 averaged 46.8 percent but decreased 

to 29.5 percent from 1997–2000. Hamilton (2003) reported wide variation 

in response rates at one online survey website, where half of the surveys 

generated at least a 26 percent response rate, the average response rate 

was 32.5 percent, and small targeted surveys tended to generate slightly 

higher response rates. Nulty (2008) summarized a series of online survey 

studies and found that those produced, on average, a 33 percent response 

rate in educational settings specifically. Finally, a meta-analysis calculated an 

average response rate of 39.6 percent from 68 surveys across 49 studies 

(Cook, Health, and Thompson 2000). These comparisons suggest that the 

response rate in this study is consistent with other online survey projects.

10. The 13 states that were unaccounted for were Arkansas (4 agencies 

were included, but one opted out and the rest did not respond); Iowa (four 

agencies were included, but one opted out and the rest did not respond); 

Maine (one agency was included but did not respond); Mississippi (two 

agencies were included, but we only found an e-mail address for one that 

one did not respond); Montana (0 agencies were included); Nebraska (two 

agencies were included, but neither responded); New Hampshire (one agency 

was included but did not respond); Rhode Island (one agency was included 

but did not respond); South Dakota (one agency was included but did not 

respond); Vermont (0 agencies were included); West Virginia (0 agencies 

were included); and Wyoming (0 agencies were included).

we invited agencies from 46 states and received 

responses from 37 of those states (see figure 1 on 

page 15).10 We received responses from four state 

police departments, 119 municipal or city police 

departments, and 26 county or sheriffs’ agencies. 

Once all the data were cleaned and coded, we 

uploaded each dataset into SPSS. We then merged 

the agency-level LEOKA and UCR data with section 

1 and section 2 survey data.
17

SECTION 1 SURVEY RESULTS. EXECUTIVE VIEWS 

ON IMPROVING OFFICER SAFETY

A total of 138 agencies completed section 1 of the 

survey (64, or 46 percent, high risk and 74, or 54 

percent, low risk), which explored law enforcement 

executives’ views of officer safety practices when 

responding to risky scenarios. This section of the 

survey was intentionally brief. We focused our 

questions on two primary topics: perceptions of 

officer safety and firearms-related ambushes.

Most law enforcement executives, in both high- and 

low-risk agencies, agreed or strongly agreed that their 

officers were more mindful of their own safety than 

officers in other agencies when responding to various 

types of high-risk calls (see table 3).11

11. None of the respondents answered “strongly disagree” to these 

questions, so that response option is not included in table 3.

Table 3. Compared with officers from other police agencies, officers in my agency are more mindful 

of their own safety when engaged in or responding to . . . (N = 138)

Scenario

Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree

Frequency 

N (%)*

Frequency 

N (%)*

Frequency 

N (%)*

Frequency 

N (%)*

Foot pursuits 5 (4) 25 (18) 56 (41) 52 (38)

Domestic violence 3 (2) 19 (14) 68 (49) 48 (35)

Burglary in progress 2 (1) 22 (16) 72 (52) 42 (30)

Firearms-related call 2 (1) 14 (10) 39 (28) 83 (60)

Mentally ill 4 (3) 23 (17) 49 (35) 62 (45)

Serving warrants 4 (3) 14 (10) 42 (30) 78 (56)

Routine traffic stops 7 (5) 31 (22) 66 (48) 34 (25)

* Rounding may cause percentages across rows not to add up to 100.
18 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

The mean responses for high- and low-risk agencies 

were not significantly different, suggesting that 

perceptions among law enforcement leaders 

regarding the safety precautions taken by their 

officers were similar regardless of whether they 

worked in low-risk or high-risk settings.12

As a reminder, significantly more officers in high-risk 

agencies were killed and assaulted by firearms over 

the last 10 years compared to officers in low-risk 

agencies. High-risk agencies were also located in 

communities with significantly higher average Part 

1 crime rates over a five-year period (these analyses/

statistics are available upon request).

If we collapse the “agree” and “strongly agree” 

responses into one agreement category, then a mean 

of 82 percent of law enforcement executives across 

high- and low-risk agencies agree that officers in 

their own agency are more mindful of safety than 

officers in other agencies. This may be a leader-level 

version of a well-known form of cognitive bias called 

“illusory superiority” in which people overestimate 

their own abilities relative to others (Hoorens 1993). 

This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the 

“Lake Wobegon effect” in reference to a Garrison 

Keillor (2010, 165) radio show that describes a 

mythical town where “all the children are above 

average.” Illusory superiority can be very dangerous 

in some circumstances, particularly in high-risk 

occupations like policing. If most police leaders rate 

their officers’ level of mindfulness about safety as 

above average, then some of these perceptions are 

likely to be inaccurate.

12. A series of t-tests was used to assess mean differences between

low-risk and high-risk agencies. While the low response rate in this study 

is consistent with response rates in other online surveys, it does present 

certain analytical challenges. Studies based on small samples often have 

low statistical power, which means they have difficulty detecting effects 

even when such effects are present. During the planning phase of this 

study, preliminary power analyses revealed that we would we be unable to 

detect small differences (d=.2) between the low- and high-risk agencies due 

to resource limitations that constrained the number of agencies we could 

survey. However, power analyses showed that we would be able to detect 

medium-sized differences (d=.5) between groups with a total achieved 

sample size of 210, or approximately 105 per group. Given our initial sample 

size of 380 agencies, reaching an achieved sample size of 210 would require 

approximately a 55 percent response rate to the survey. To detect a largesized difference (d=.8 or greater), our preliminary power analyses showed 

that we would only need a total sample size of 82, or approximately 41 per 

group (which would have required about a 22 percent response rate). Thus, 

with the achieved sample size of 138 in section 1 of the survey, our study is 

only able to detect moderate to large differences between groups because 

the small sample size limits the study’s power to detect smaller effects. 

We then asked the law enforcement executives 

to offer three recommendations for reducing 

officer ambushes related specifically to the use 

of firearms. Many respondents provided only 

one recommendation, so only the first of each 

agency’s narrative responses were content-analyzed, 

categorized, and coded. These are summarized in 

table 4. Enhanced training (specifically situational 

awareness training) and improved intelligence 

gathering and dissemination were the two most 

commonly reported recommendations by law 

enforcement leaders. The following narrative 

response encapsulates these suggestions:

I believe that creating a culture of police officer 

safety is paramount. Beginning in the police 

academy, the goal is to impart the importance 

of officer safety. It is at this juncture that 

recruits start to realize the nature of the 

profession they have chosen. We often speak 

of the need to be tactically aware of your 

surroundings, never to let your “guard” down, 

the avoidance of “tombstone courage,” and that 

any call, no matter the appearance of routine, 

may escalate into a life and death situation. 

It was perhaps expected that law enforcement leaders 

would focus on enhancing training in an effort to 

minimize ambush attacks. Admittedly, ambushes are 

difficult to anticipate and defend against across such a 

broad range of law enforcement activities, communities, 

and potential scenarios. The following quote from a 

midwestern police leader suggests as much:

There is no amount of training or equipment 

that’s going to keep a committed person from 

ambushing a police officer. But training and 

constant reminders for officers to be aware of 

their surroundings will help to reduce the risk 

and make it more difficult for a person to kill 

a police officer. It’s difficult for an officer to be 

constantly vigil[ant] of their surroundings, but 

officers can park their cars and eat lunch in 

places that would allow an officer to be 

aware of individuals around them, as well 

as maintaining some tactical advantage. 

As administrators we need to make sure 

officers wear their ballistic vests.
Section 1 Survey Results. Executive Views on Improving Officer Safety 19

Table 4. In your opinion, what steps can police leaders take to help reduce the number of fatalities, 

injuries, and near misses associated with firearms-related ambushes of police officers? (N = 138)

Frequency (N) Percent (%)

General training recommendation 29 21

Improve community relations 3 2

Stronger focus on officer safety 7 5

Situational awareness training 34 25

Gather and disseminate better intelligence 18 13

Increased firearms training 7 5

Focus on tightening firearms policies for citizens 4 3

Reality-/scenario-based training 13 9

Improve tactical training 8 6

Improve available equipment 4 3

Other responses 11 8

Total 138 100

Another law enforcement leader recognized the 

limitations associated with reducing firearms-related 

officer ambushes and commented as follows:

An ambush is one of the hardest things to 

train and prepare for. Leaders should train 

their officers to have an escape plan/route 

when responding to all calls for service. 

Officers need to remain vigilant on even the 

most routine sounding call. Suspects want 

officers to believe the call is routine when 

they make their ambush attempt. Tactical 

approaches, using a cover officer (when 

available), and using basic cover/concealment 

should be trained and practiced. Also, 

reference materials (officer involved shooting 

videos, written articles) regarding incidents 

that have occurred should be provided to 

officers for training purposes. Training to 

prepare for an ambush and to stay in the 

fight is critical.

These narrative responses represent some of 

our law enforcement leaders’ best suggestions 

for reducing firearms-related officer ambushes. 

Identifying effective situational awareness training 

and vigilance training seem to be important next 

steps. Once identified, those training protocols 

could be evaluated and, if found to be effective, 

expanded and replicated for use by other agencies 

nationwide. Certainly improvements in body armor 

and mandatory policies that require officers to wear 

armor are important safety steps. Most of the survey 

respondents indicated that their agency covered 

the costs of body armor. However, 23 agencies (17 

percent) acknowledged that their officers were not 

required to wear their body armor at all times while 

on patrol. Given the role of patrol officers in handling 

a wide range of calls and other activities that may 

place them at risk for being ambushed, it may be 

appropriate for these agencies to consider adopting 

mandatory wear policies. 

21

SECTION 2A SURVEY RESULTS. ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES 

AND PRACTICES AROUND HIGH-RISK SCENARIOS

Section 2 of the survey focused on departmental 

policies and training, particularly related to the 

seven high-risk scenarios introduced earlier. 

This part of the survey was either filled out by the 

primary law enforcement executive or forwarded 

to others within the agency (deputy chiefs, training 

officers, supervisors, etc.).

A total of 134 agencies (63 high risk, or 47 percent, 

and 71 low risk, or 53 percent) completed sections 

2a and 2b of the survey. Forty-four responses 

were from executives, 42 were from mid-level 

managers (lieutenants, captains, majors), 36 were 

from first-level supervisors (sergeants), and 12 

were from officers (training officers or officers and 

deputies). Consistent with earlier findings, analyses 

confirmed that the responding high-risk agencies 

had significantly higher crime rates than the lowrisk agencies from 2007 to 2011 and experienced 

significantly higher risks of officers being assaulted 

by firearms over that same time frame (analyses 

available upon request).

We first asked the agencies to report on whether their 

department had a written policy that guided officers 

and deputies on how they should safely respond to 

seven high-risk scenarios (see figure 2 on page 22). 

The 134 responding agencies were least likely to 

have written policies that guided officers on how to 

safely engage in foot pursuits and were most likely 

to have written policies for responding to mentally 

or emotionally unstable suspects and domestic 

violence calls. Only three departments did not have 

any written policies for how to respond to any of the 

high-risk scenarios. From this we can conclude that 

thousands of other law enforcement agencies likely 

do not have formal written policies for how officers 

should respond to risky calls for service or other 

high-risk scenarios.

The 63 high-risk agencies that responded to this 

section of our survey were equally as likely (or 

unlikely) to have established written polices for all 

of the seven high-risk scenarios as the 71 responding 

low-risk agencies. In other words, the level of risk of 

firearms assaults against officers within a jurisdiction 

was not significantly related to the likelihood of the 

department developing a written policy for how 

officers should respond to foot pursuits, domestic 

violence incidents, burglaries in progress, shots 

fired or firearm on scene, mentally ill or emotionally 

disturbed or suicidal suspects, serving arrest warrants 

on violent offenders, and traffic stops.13 Nevertheless, 

there was some observed variability in terms of 

policy development when considering all of the 

agencies in the sample.

This variability in departmental proactive 

preparedness for responding to risky scenarios can 

potentially be addressed. As one possible response, 

the major professional law enforcement organizations 

(such as the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the 

National Sheriffs’ Association) could work together to 

develop model officer safety policies for responding 

to high-risk scenarios. Those policies could then be 

widely disseminated, and academy and in-service 

training could be improved accordingly. Some 

such model policies are already available (e.g., foot 

pursuits, domestic violence response, motor vehicle 

stops; see International Association of Chiefs of 

Police 2015) and could be proactively distributed to 

high-risk agencies.

13. We used cross-tabulations with chi-square tests to assess these group 

differences. We tested the relationships using “policies in development” 

first as a separate response category (a 2 x 3 table) and then after recoding 

those answers to “Yes, the agency had a written policy” (a 2 x 2 table). The 

results were not statistically significant.
22 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Figure 2. Departmental policies on responding 

to high-risk scenarios

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Yes, our department 

has a written policy

Our department has a 

written policy in development

No, our department does 

not have a written policy

Routine Traffic Stops

Serving 

Arrest Warrants

Mentally Ill

Shots-Fired/

Firearms on Scene

Burglaries In-progress

Domestic Violence

Foot Pursuits

We next asked a series of questions about current 

departmental policies or practices regarding how 

agencies and officers respond to these high-risk 

scenarios. The questions were designed to gauge 

the extent of agreement about whether current or 

future policies or practices (if a written policy was 

not available at the time) should be designed to 

include a series of potential recommendations for 

improving officer safety. These recommendations 

might allow more or less officer discretion, permit 

officers to respond alone or require partners when 

responding to high-risk calls, require waiting for 

backup to arrive if the dispatched officer was alone, 

mandate continuous radio contact during the event 

(e.g., in a foot pursuit), limit partner splitting if 

partners are required, encourage specific types of 

training for those responding to high-risk calls, or 

only allow certain officers to respond to certain types 

of high-risk calls (e.g., some agencies might have 

a designated domestic violence officer or team of 

officers who have been specially trained, and only 

that officer or team of officers could respond; other 

agencies might do so for responding to emotionally 

disturbed or mentally ill citizens).

Figure 3 provides an example of the types of questions 

(with Likert-style response options ranging from 

strongly disagree to strongly agree) and the variation 

in responses that we received regarding preparing 

officers for foot pursuit response specifically. The 

results suggest that respondents from most of the 

agencies considered officer discretion to be important 

and correspondingly disagreed that partners should 

be required when engaging in foot pursuits. 

Figure 3. When engaging in foot pursuits, 

do you agree or disagree that . . .

0 20 40 60 80 100

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Only specific officers

can pursue on foot

New recruits receive formal

training on foot pursuits

Policy allows

partner splitting

Continuous radio contact

required for foot pursuit

Partner required

for foot pursuit

Officer has discretion

There was more agreement regarding the necessity 

of continuous radio contact, but respondents from 

all agencies also generally preferred to allow for 

partner splitting during foot pursuits. Respondents 

from most agencies generally agreed that new recruits 

should be formally trained to pursue suspects on foot 

but disagreed with the suggestion that only specific 

officers should be allowed to engage in foot pursuits.

Figure 4 on page 23 summarizes the responses to 

the same set of questions but focuses specifically 

on domestic violence call response. Again, 

fairly substantial variation is apparent, although 

respondents from most agencies agreed that 

specific, formal training on responding to domestic 

violence calls is needed for all new recruits. On the 

other hand, there was wide variability in opinions 

regarding whether officers should have discretion, 

maintain continuous radio contact, or respond alone 

or even whether only designated officers should 

respond to domestic violence calls.
Section 2a Survey Results. Organizational Policies and Practices around High-Risk Scenarios 23

Figure 4. When responding to domestic 

violence calls, do you agree or disagree that . . .

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Only designated

officers respond

New recruits receive

formal training

Officer must

wait for backup

Officer can respond

without a partner

Continuous radio

contact required

Officer has discretion

Figure 5 focuses the same set of questions on 

responses to burglaries in progress. Based on the 

levels of agreement, respondents seem to believe 

that these kinds of calls may offer more risk, given 

that more respondents agreed that all recruits 

receive formal training, that backup or continuous 

radio contact (or both) should be required, and 

that partners are necessary prior to responding to 

burglaries in progress. It also appears that most 

respondents support the idea that officers maintain 

discretion in how to respond.

Figure 5. When responding to burglaries in 

progress, do you agree or disagree that . . .

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Only designated

officers respond

New recruits receive

formal academy training

Officer required to

wait for backup

Officer can respond

without a partner

Continuous radio

contact required

Officer has discretion

Figure 6 focuses on how respondents indicated that 

their departments would respond to firearms-related 

calls. In this case, there was strong disagreement with 

the suggestion that only certain officers should be 

permitted to respond to these kinds of calls. Most 

respondents believed that all new recruits should 

be specifically trained to respond to firearms-related 

calls, and some suggested that waiting for backup to 

arrive was not necessary. Most respondents generally 

agreed that continuous radio contact was important 

during firearms-related calls, but there were some 

differences in terms of how much officer discretion 

should be allowed.

Figure 6. When responding to firearms-related 

calls . . .

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Only designated

officers can respond

New recruits receive

formal academy training

Officer required to

wait for backup

Officers without partner

are allowed to respond

Continuous radio

contact required

Officer has discretion

Figure 7 offers answers to the same set of questions 

but this time focuses on how the agency prepares or 

plans to prepare officers to responding to mentally 

ill, suicidal, or emotionally disturbed individuals. 

In these situations, respondents more consistently 

agreed that only designated officers should respond 

and that all new recruits should be trained in this 

area specifically. 

Figure 7. When responding to mentally ill, 

suicidal, or emotionally disturbed individuals . . .

0 20 40 60 80 100

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Only designated

officers respond

New recruits receive

formal academy training

Requires waiting for backup

Officers without a partner

can respond alone

Continuous radio

contact required

Officer has discretion
24 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

However, there was not universal agreement on 

whether waiting for backup to arrive should be 

required or whether officers can or should respond 

alone. Most respondents, but not all, indicated 

that continuous radio contact was important during 

these calls but most suggested that officers should 

have discretion.

Figure 8 summarizes the responses to the questions 

that focused on serving arrest warrants on violent 

offenders. In this case, there was more agreement 

that only designated officers should serve warrants 

on violent offenders specifically and that officers 

should not do so alone but should instead wait 

for backup. Most agreed that continuous radio 

contact was important while issuing arrest warrants. 

Nevertheless, there was broad support for training 

all officers to serve arrest warrants on violent 

offenders. On the other hand, there was some 

disagreement on whether officers should have 

discretion in these situations.

Figure 8. When serving arrest warrants on 

violent offenders . . .

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Only designated officers

can serve warrants

New recruits receive

formal academy training

Officer required

to wait for backup

Officers without a partner

can to serve warrants

Continuous radio

contact required

Officer has discretion

Bivariate statistical analyses (differences in means 

tests and cross-tabulation tests) comparing highand low-risk agencies again revealed no significant 

differences in current or anticipated departmental 

policies or practices regarding how the agencies 

and their officers responded (or would respond) to 

the high-risk scenarios. In other words, responding 

agencies operating in higher-risk environments 

(with increased numbers of firearms assaults against 

officers and higher crime rates) were no more likely 

to think that their officers needed more or less 

discretion, that radio contact or backup should be 

required, that specific training was needed, or that 

only designated officers should respond to any of 

the high-risk scenarios.
25

SECTION 2B SURVEY RESULTS. CURRENT ACADEMY 

AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING PRACTICES

The third section of our survey focuses on current 

academy and in-service training practices around use 

of force more generally and on the use of firearms 

specifically. Table 5 summarizes the number of 

academy hours that are devoted to use of force 

topics across various departments serving different 

populations. Generally, there appears to be a linear 

relationship between number of use of force training 

hours and the size of the population served. Stated 

differently, larger city and county agencies devote 

more time to use of force training.

Correlational analyses (not presented) confirm that 

the number of academy training hours devoted 

to use of force and to the use of firearms was 

significantly associated with population size and 

agency size (based on sworn force). As such, officers 

who are hired to work in agencies that serve larger 

populations receive more dedicated hours of use 

of force training. However, the average number of 

training hours devoted to use of force topics was not 

significantly higher for officers working in high-risk 

agencies than for those working in low-risk agencies. 

Stated more clearly, more hours of use of force 

training is common in larger agencies, regardless of 

crime trends or firearms assaults against officers.

Several questions remain regarding what specific 

types of training are offered, whether continued 

refresher or in-service training was available, and 

whether that training is effective at improving officer 

safety. Regarding the first question, table 6 on page 

26 summarizes the types of use of force training that 

are offered at training academies.

As a general rule, most agencies reported that 

their academies do specifically train new recruits 

on how to safely engage in foot pursuits; serve 

arrest warrants on violent offenders; respond to 

burglaries in progress, disturbance calls, domestic 

violence incidents, and shots-fired calls; and deal 

with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed citizens. 

However, again there were not any significant 

differences in the proportion of high- or low-risk 

agencies that offered academy training in any of 

these specific areas.

Table 5. Mean number of use of force training hours by population served

Population Group Average number of hours Responses (N)

Cities with populations ≥ 1,000,000 154 7

Cities with populations 500,000–999,999 135 14

Cities with populations 250,000–499,999 151 16

Cities with populations 100,000–249,999 94 38

Cities with populations 50,000–99,999 74 11

Cities with populations 25,000–49,999 40 4

Counties* with populations ≥ 100,000 112 21

* Because the county agencies were being compared to city agencies, the survey considered only agencies serving metropolitan (urban) 

counties rather than rural counties.
26 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

We also asked about specific forms of firearms-related 

training. There was some variation across respondents, 

but as a general rule respondents from most agencies 

reported that officers in their agencies are trained for 

a wide range of shooting situations as indicated in 

table 7. High- and low-risk agencies did not differ in 

the types of shooting training that is offered.

Table 8 provides a summary of average number 

of hours of in-service or refresher annual training 

in firearms and other use of force topics among 

responding agencies.

The results suggest that ongoing firearms-related 

training and in-service use of force training does 

occur in many, but not all, of our responding 

agencies. The annual number of in-service training 

hours devoted to these safety topics is rather modest, 

ranging from 0 to 40 hours for firearms training 

(with average hours ranging from 6 to 13 across 

varied population categories) and from 0 to 60 

hours for other use of force topics (with average 

hours ranging from 4 to 14 across varied population 

categories). Again, there were no significant 

differences in average training hours between 

high- and low-risk agencies.

Table 6. Types of use of force and high-risk scenario training delivered in academies

Did your most recent class of recruits receive training in the following areas No 

N (%)

Yes 

N (%)

Use of force continuum policy 6 (5) 111 (95)

Officer safety practices 0 (0) 117 (100)

Foot pursuit safety 12 (10) 105 (90)

Serving arrest warrants on violent offenders 20 (17) 97 (83)

Responding to burglaries in progress 5 (4) 112 (96)

Use of less-lethal weapons 4 (3) 113 (97)

Responding to domestic violence incidents 1 (1) 116 (99)

Responding to disturbance calls 2 (2) 115 (98)

Responding to “shots fired” calls 5 (4) 112 (96)

Arrest and control tactics 0 (0) 117 (100)

De-escalation and defusing techniques 0 (0) 117 (100)

Dealing with citizens with mental illness 2 (2) 115 (98)

Verbal and physical tactics that are used to identify suspects 

who may be carrying concealed firearms 6 (5) 111 (95)

Table 7. Types of firearms-related training 

offered in academies

Does your recruit academy 

training on use of firearms 

involve training in the following

No 

N (%)

Yes 

N (%)

Shoot while moving 7 (6) 110 (94)

Shooting at moving targets 31 (26) 86 (74)

Shoot/don’t shoot 3 (2) 114 (98)

Weak-hand shooting 4 (3) 113 (97)

Shooting at night 

or in low-light conditions 0 (0) 117 (100)

Shooting when 

physically fatigued 21 (18) 96 (82)

Shooting from a 

concealed location 6 (5) 111 (95)
Section 2b Survey Results. Current Academy and In-Service Training Practices 27

Finally, table 9 summarizes the specific types of 

in-service training that is offered across use of force 

topics more broadly and within the specific types of 

high-risk scenarios. As a general rule, the majority of 

responding agencies do offer some in-service training 

on high-risk scenario response. However, about a 

third of the agencies did not offer in-service training 

for engaging in foot pursuits, serving arrest warrants 

on violent offenders, or responding to burglaries in 

progress. In-service training opportunities did not 

differ across high- and low-risk agencies.

Table 8. Total hours devoted to in-service or refresher training on firearms and use of force (N=112)

Population group Firearms

(Range: 0–40 hours)

Other use of force topics 

(Range: 0–60 hours)

Cities with populations ≥ 1,000,000 (N=7) 7 14

Cities with populations from 500,000–999,999 (N=14) 9 10

Cities with populations from 250,000–499,999 (N=16) 11 7

Cities with populations from 100,000–249,999 (N=38) 13 12

Cities with populations from 50,000–99,999 (N=11) 12 8

Cities with populations from 25,000–49,999 (N=4) 6 4

Counties with populations ≥ 100,000 (N=22) 12 8

Table 9. Areas in which agencies offer in-service or refresher training

Does your agency offer in-service 

or refresher training in the following areas?

No 

N (%)

Yes 

N (%)

Use of force continuum policy 9 (8) 108 (92)

Officer safety practices 0 (0) 117 (100)

Foot pursuit safety 44 (38) 73 (62)

Serving arrest warrants to violent offenders 40 (34) 77 (66)

Responding to burglaries in progress 39 (33) 78 (67)

Use of less lethal weapons 1 (1) 116 (99)

Responding to domestic violence incidents 16 (14) 101 (86)

Responding to disturbance calls 31 (26) 86 (74)

Responding to “shots fired” calls 22 (19) 95 (81)

Arrest and control tactics 6 (5) 111 (95)

De-escalation and defusing techniques 11 (9) 106 (91)

Dealing with citizens with mental illness 4 (3) 113 (97)

Verbal or physical cues or tactics that are used to identify 

suspects who may be carrying concealed firearms 27 (23) 90 ( 77)

29

APPENDIX A. SUMMARY DATA FOR SELECTED AGENCIES 

The cities whose police agencies are included in this 

appendix were chosen from the larger data set to 

demonstrate how the data were examined, reviewed, 

and analyzed and to provide examples within each 

population group of cities or counties that have 

unusually high or low rates of firearms assaults 

against officers. Cities whose firearms assaults (both 

absolute numbers and rates per 100,000 population) 

are more than one standard deviation above the 

mean for their population group are identified with 

bold, blue italics and should be examined further.

Table A1. Selected agencies serving cities with populations of 1,000,000 or more

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100,000 

population)

Firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of firearms 

assaults against 

officers over 

five years (per 

100,000 population)

Philadelphia 

Police Department* PA 1,530,873 22.34 880 57.5

Los Angeles 

Police Department* CA 3,837,207 10.24 313 8.2

Phoenix Police Department* AZ 1,466,097 10.57 311 21.2

Houston Police Department TX 2,143,628 13.83 218 10.2

Las Vegas Metropolitan 

Police Department NV 1,458,474 8.5 101 6.9

Dallas Police Department TX 1,223,021 13.72 92 7.5

San Diego Police Department CA 1,316,919 3.84 39 3.0

San Antonio 

Police Department TX 1,355,339 8.06 34 2.5

* Mean firearms assaults against officers over five years for all agencies in this population group: 248.5; standard deviation: 278.7. 

Agencies denoted with asterisks had firearms assaults (both absolute numbers and rates per 100k population) above the mean; 

numbers and rates more than one standard deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.
30 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Table A2. Selected agencies serving cities with populations from 500,000–999,999

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100,000 

population)

Firearms 

assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

Memphis Police Department* TN 652,725 20.1 158 24.2

Detroit Police Department* MI 713,239 48.65 141 20.0

Baltimore (City) 

Police Department* MD 626,848 38.06 121 19.3

Louisville Metro 

Police Department* KY 665,152 9.77 116 17.4

Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department* NC 789,478 9.17 96 12.2

Albuquerque Police 

Department* NM 551,961 9.02 75 13.6

Jacksonville Police 

Department* FL 834,429 11.96 69 8.3

Oklahoma City 

Police Department* OK 586,208 11.02 57 9.3

Nashville Police Department* TN 612,789 11.72 56 9.1

Fresno Police Department* CA 500,480 8.59 54 10.8

Milwaukee Police Department WI 597,426 15.13 53 8.9

Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department IN 833,024 13.25 52 6.2

Washington Metropolitan 

Police Department DC 617,996 24.53 50 8.1

Tucson Police Department AZ 527,479 10.54 35 6.6

El Paso Police Department TX 662,780 2.75 31 4.7

Denver Police Department CO 610,612 7.37 22 3.6

* Mean firearms assaults against officers over five years for all agencies in this population group: 53.2; standard deviation: 44.6. Agencies 

denoted with asterisks had firearms assaults (both absolute numbers and rates per 100k population) above the mean; numbers and rates 

more than one standard deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.
Appendix A. Summary Data for Selected Agencies 31

Table A3. Selected agencies serving cities with populations from 250,000–499,999

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100,000 

population

Firearms 

assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

St. Louis Metropolitan 

Police Department* MO 320,454 45.06 274 85.5

Kansas City Missouri 

Police Department* MO 461,458 22.97 104 22.5

Atlanta Police Department* GA 425,533 23.59 91 21.4

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police* PA 308,609 17.17 87 28.2

Mesa Police Department* AZ 445,256 4.94 77 17.3

Long Beach 

Police Department* CA 467,691 8.38 55 11.8

Newark Police Department* NJ 278,064 31.29 48 17.3

Tulsa Police Department* OK 396,101 15.2 43 10.9

Wichita Police Department* KS 384,796 8.37 40 10.4

Anchorage Police Department AK 296,955 6.94 29 9.8

Lexington Police Department KY 297,847 5.77 27 9.1

Toledo Police Department OH 287,418 9.39 24 8.4

Aurora Police Department CO 330,740 6.05 23 7.0

Stockton Police Department CA 295,136 13.42 22 7.5

Tampa Police Department FL 340,284 8.64 21 6.2

Colorado Springs 

Police Department CO 423,680 7.18 20 4.7

Raleigh Police Department NC 409,014 5.13 20 4.9

* Mean firearms assaults against officers over five years for all agencies in this population group: 32.7; standard deviation: 49.1. Agencies 

denoted with asterisks had firearms assaults (both absolute numbers and rates per 100k population) above the mean; numbers and rates 

more than one standard deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.
32 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Table A4. Selected agencies serving cities with populations from 100,000–249,999

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100.000 

population)

Firearms 

assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

Kansas City, Kansas 

Police Department* KS 146,712 17.72 40 27.3

Baton Rouge 

Police Department* LA 231,592 31.18 38 16.4

Orlando Police Department* FL 241,548 13.08 36 14.9

San Bernardino 

Police Department* CA 295,207 7.32 32 10.8

Chattanooga 

Police Department* TN 169,187 11.94 31 18.3

Winston-Salem 

Police Department* NC 232,529 7.4 28 12.0

Knoxville Police Department* TN 180,488 13.52 28 15.5

St. Petersburg 

Police Department* FL 248,105 8.3 26 10.5

Rialto Police Department* CA 100,337 10.56 24 23.9

Clarksville Police Department* TN 134,128 7.6 22 16.4

Jackson Police Department* MS 174,170 28.71 22 12.6

Pasadena Police Department* CA 138,734 4.61 21 15.1

Scottsdale Police Department* AZ 220,462 2.63 18 8.2

Amarillo Police Department* TX 194,708 6.78 17 8.7

North Las Vegas 

Police Department* NV 218,790 8.56 16 7.3

Laredo Police Department* TX 241,059 5.48 15 6.2

Ontario Police Department* CA 165,851 4.82 15 9.0

Fort Lauderdale 

Police Department* FL 167,777 9.66 15 8.9

Independence 

Police Department* MO 117,255 5.8 14 11.9

Vallejo Police Department* CA 117,305 13.13 14 11.9

Palmdale Station (Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department)* CA 154,546 6.21 14 9.1

Lakewood Police Department* CO 145,470 4.12 13 8.9

Rockford Police Department* IL 153,331 15.78 13 8.5

Antioch Police Department* CA 103,575 8.88 13 12.6

Lubbock Police Department* TX 234,404 5.12 13 5.6
Appendix A. Summary Data for Selected Agencies 33

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100.000 

population)

Firearms 

assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

Salt Lake City 

Police Department* UT 190,038 8.21 13 6.8

Murfreesboro 

Police Department* TN 109,736 4.19 13 11.8

Wichita Falls 

Police Department* TX 106,753 5.43 13 12.2

Jersey City Department of Police* NJ 248,423 9.5 13 5.2

City of Fontana 

Police Department* CA 198,374 3.93 12 6.1

Flint Police Department* MI 102,357 41.81 12 11.7

Topeka Police Department* KS 128,283 9.51 11 8.6

Oxnard Police Department* CA 200,225 5.39 11 5.5

Pompano Beach District Office 

(Broward Sheriff’s Office)* FL 101,206 7.9 10 9.9

City of Surprise 

Police Department* AZ 119,181 1.34 10 8.4

Norwalk Station (Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department)* CA 106,790 6.74 10 9.4

Lancaster Station (Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department)* CA 158,474 6.18 10 6.3

Westminster 

Police Department* CO 107,962 2.59 10 9.3

Shreveport Police Department* LA 201,134 14.82 10 5.0

Glendale Police Department* AZ 229,931 7.65 9 3.9

Palm Bay Police Department* FL 104,596 4.21 9 8.6

Durham Police Department* NC 231,225 8.91 9 3.9

Tacoma Police Department* WA 201,510 7.05 9 4.5

Inglewood Police Department* CA 110,962 16.58 9 8.1

Clearwater Police Department* FL 109,153 9.16 9 8.3

Bridgeport Bureau of Police* CT 144,496 12.46 8 5.5

Tallahassee Police Department* FL 183,848 5.87 8 4.4

Brownsville Police Department* TX 178,706 2.69 8 4.5

Chesapeake Police Department* VA 224,864 5.51 8 3.6

Springfield Police Department MA 153,993 13.38 7 4.6

Columbus Division of Police OH 787,609 12.85 7 0.9

West Valley City Police Department UT 131,979 4.09 7 5.3
34 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Agency State Population

Five-year 

homicide rate 

(per 100.000 

population)

Firearms 

assaults 

against officers 

over five years (N)

Rate of 

firearms assaults 

against officers 

over five years (per 

100,000 population)

Hartford Police Department CT 125,006 24.64 7 5.6

Rochester Police Department NY 211,511 18.82 7 3.3

Odessa Police Department TX 102,043 5.88 6 5.9

* Mean firearms assaults against officers over five years for all agencies in this population group: 7.2; standard deviation: 7.5. Agencies 

denoted with asterisks had firearms assaults (both absolute numbers and rates per 100k population) above the mean; numbers and rates 

more than one standard deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.
Appendix A. Summary Data for Selected Agencies 35

Table A5. Selected agencies serving counties with populations of 100,000 or more*

Agency State Number of firearms assaults 

against officers over five years (N)†

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department CA 148

Harris County Sheriff’s Office TX 118

Miami-Dade Police Department FL 101

Prince George’s County Police Department MD 83

Riverside County Sheriff’s Department CA 58

St. Louis County Police Department MO 52

Orange County Sheriff’s Office FL 47

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office LA 43

Anne Arundel County Police Department MD 39

Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office FL 37

Baltimore County Police Department MD 32

Escambia County Sheriff’s Office FL 30

Greenville County Sheriff’s Office SC 28

Lee County Sheriff’s Office FL 28

Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office FL 28

New Castle County Police Department DE 26

Knox County Sheriff’s Office TN 24

Bernalillo Sheriff Department NM 23

Pasco County Sheriffs’ Department FL 22

Maricopa County Sheriffs’ Department AZ 21

Marion County Sheriffs’ Department FL 21

Polk County Sheriff’s Office FL 20

Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office TN 19

Brevard County Sheriff’s Office FL 19

Volusia County Sheriff’s Department FL 19

Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office TX 19

Sacramento County Sheriff Department CA 18

Sarasota County Sheriff’s Office FL 17

Pima County Sheriff’s Department AZ 16

Mean firearms assaults against officers over five years for all agencies in this population group: 13.45; standard deviation: 22.055. 

Numbers more than one standard deviation above the mean are denoted with bold, blue italics within the gray section.

* Because the county agencies were being compared to city agencies, the survey considered only agencies serving metropolitan (urban) 

counties rather than rural counties.

† Crime rates and firearms assault rates are not included or calculated for counties given their variability in population estimates 

and reporting practices

37

APPENDIX B. NATIONAL SURVEY ON THE USE OF DEADLY 

FORCE AND FIREARMS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS

This appendix has been slightly modified to adhere 

to COPS Office publication standards. Its text has 

not been changed.

We are asking for your agency to participate in the 

Major City Chiefs Association’s (MCCA) study on 

use of deadly force against the police. The MCCA 

has been emphasizing officer safety and wellness 

for the past several years, and recent concerns and 

increases in firearms-related deaths and injuries 

have raised national awareness about this growing 

threat to our law enforcement community. This 

project will increase our level of knowledge about 

how the characteristics of police agencies, and the 

communities in which they are located, influence the 

risks of officers being shot at, injured, or killed with 

firearms. Your responses will help us identify best 

practices that may reduce the use of deadly force and 

firearms against police officers in the future.

This project is being conducted by Dr. Joe Kuhns 

from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte 

on behalf of the Major City Chiefs Association. 

If you have any questions regarding this survey or 

the study, please call [phone number] or e-mail Dr. 

Kuhns at [e-mail address].

If you choose to participate in this project, all of your 

responses will be treated as confidential. Neither 

your individual names nor your agency name will be 

linked to your specific survey responses in the reports 

that are produced. We appreciate your contribution 

to this important project that is intended to help 

protect our nation’s officers from harm.

How to respond to this survey

There are two ways to respond to this survey. 

We prefer that you complete the survey online 

at www.SurveyMonkey.com. This survey method 

reduces postal costs, increases participation, and 

promotes data collection accuracy.

If you prefer, we can also provide an electronic 

(paper) copy that you can print and return it to us by 

mail, fax, or e-mail. If you prefer an electronic copy 

of the survey, please contact [name].

Part 1. Police executive views on 

promoting officer safety and developing 

a culture of safety

Note: The following questions should be completed 

by the primary law enforcement executive (chief, 

sheriff, or commissioner).

What do you believe are the three most important 

steps that law enforcement leaders can take to 

reduce the risk of officers being shot at, injured, 

or killed by firearms?

1.

2.

3.

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

_______________________________________

Compared with officers from other police

agencies, officers in my agency are more mindful

of their own safety when . . .

SD D N A SA

1. pursuing a suspect on foot.

2. responding to domestic violence incidents.

3. responding to a burglary in progress.

4. responding to a firearms-related call.

5. dealing with emotionally disturbed persons.

6. serving arrest warrants on violent felons.

7. making routine traffic stops.

In your opinion, what steps can police leaders

take to help reduce the number of fatalities,

injuries, and near misses associated with

firearms-related ambushes of police officers?

_______________________________________

_______________________________________
38 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Part 2. Understanding departmental 

policies and practices

Note: The primary law enforcement executive should 

designate someone knowledgeable about departmental 

policies and practices to complete part 2.

Please indicate the job title of the person completing 

part 2: _____________________________________

Does your department require patrol officers to wear 

body armor at all times while on patrol?

Yes___ No___

Does your departmental budget (including external 

sources) cover the cost of body armor for all sworn 

officers?

___

___

___

*Yes, all of the cost 

*Yes, some of the cost

*No

Are officers in your department required to fill out 

a use of force report after engaging in the following 

actions? If your department does not authorize 

certain weapons (OC spray, Tasers) for patrol officers, 

please check “NA” for not applicable.

Handcuffing

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint 

occurs

___

___

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Using physical, hands-on force without a weapon to 

subdue a suspect (takedowns, joint manipulation, etc.)

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Soft-empty hands techniques (e.g., grabbing, 

firm grips, shoving)

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Pain compliance techniques (e.g., pressure point 

controls, joint manipulation)

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Hard-empty hand techniques (e.g., strikes, takedowns)

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Using oleoresin capsicum (OC) or other chemical spray

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Pointing a conducted energy device or TASER®

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Using a conducted energy device or TASER®—

touch stun mode

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Using a conducted energy device or TASER®—

dart/probe mode

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force
Appendix B. National Survey on the Use of Deadly Force and Firearms against Police Officers 39

Using a baton or other personal impact weapon

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Removing a firearm from a holster

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Pointing a firearm at someone but not discharging

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Discharging a firearm at someone without injury

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Accidental discharge of a firearm

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

Releasing a K-9 officer (the animal specifically is 

released)

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force)

K-9 holds

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

K-9 bites

___

___

___

___

Yes, every time

Yes, but only if an injury or injury complaint occurs

No

NA—our agency does not authorize this type 

of force

6. Does your agency currently have a written policy 

that instructs officers who are responding to the 

following high-risk situations/scenarios?

Foot pursuits of suspects

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

Domestic violence incident response

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

Burglary in progress response

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

Shots fired or firearm on scene response

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

Mentally ill / emotionally disturbed / suicidal suspect 

response

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

Serving arrest warrants on violent offenders

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development
40 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Routine traffic stops

___

___

___

Yes, we have a written policy

No written policy at this time

Written policy is under development

7. What is the most important change your agency 

has implemented in the past five years to improve 

officer safety with regard to firearms violence 

against the police?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

The next set of questions focuses on six fairly 

common situations/scenarios that place officers at 

increased risk of deadly force (specifically firearms) 

being used against them in the line of duty.

Foot pursuit policy/practice. To what extent do 

you agree/disagree with the following statement(s) 

regarding your current foot pursuit policy or practice

(if you do not have a written policy):

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding when to 

engage in foot pursuits

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers are required to have a partner when engaged 

in foot pursuits

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required during 

foot pursuits or the pursuit must end

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

New recruits receive formal academy training on how 

to safely pursue on foot

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Only specific officers (e.g., vice, street unit) are 

encouraged to pursue suspects on foot

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to help 

them reduce the chances of officers getting shot or 

shot at during foot pursuits?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

Domestic violence response policy/practice. To 

what extent do you agree/disagree with the following 

statement(s) regarding your current domestic violence 

(DV) response policy or practice (if you do not have a 

written policy):

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding how to 

respond to domestic violence incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required when 

responding to domestic violence incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers working without a partner are allowed to 

respond alone to domestic violence incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers are required to wait for backup, if alone, before 

entering a domestic violence incident in progress.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

New recruits receive formal academy training on how 

to respond to domestic violence incidents in progress.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Some designated officers (e.g., domestic violence 

officers, second responders, etc.) receive enhanced 

training on how to respond to domestic violence 

incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD
Appendix B. National Survey on the Use of Deadly Force and Firearms against Police Officers 41

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to help them 

reduce the chances of officers getting shot or shot at 

while responding to domestic violence incidents?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

Burglary in progress response policy/practice. To 

what extent do you agree/disagree with the following 

statement(s) regarding your current burglary in 

progress response policy or practice (if you do not 

have a written policy): 

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding how to 

respond to burglaries in progress

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required when 

responding to burglaries in progress

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers working without a partner are allowed to 

respond alone to burglaries in progress

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers are required to wait for backup, if alone, 

before responding to burglaries in progress

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

New recruits receive formal academy training 

specifically on how to respond to burglaries in 

progress

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to help 

them reduce the chances of officers getting shot or 

shot at when responding to burglaries in progress?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

Shots fired or firearm on scene policy/practice. To 

what extent do you agree/disagree with the following 

statement(s) regarding your current shots fired or 

firearm on scene policy or practice (if you do not have 

a written policy):

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding how to 

respond to shots fired or firearm on scene incidents 

in progress.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required when responding 

to shots fired or firearm on scene incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers working without a partner are allowed 

to respond alone to shots fired or firearm on 

scene incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers are required to wait for backup, if alone, 

before responding to shots fired or firearm on 

scene incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

New recruits receive formal academy training 

specifically on how to respond to shots fired 

or firearm on scene incidents

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Specific officers (e.g., vice, SWAT, supervisors) are 

the only ones who authorized to respond to shots 

fired or firearm on scene incidents.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to help 

them reduce the chances of officers getting shot 

or shot at when responding to shots fired or firearm 

on scene incidents?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________
42 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

Serving arrest warrants on violent offenders 

policy/practice. To what extent do you agree/

disagree with the following statement(s) regarding 

your current policy or practice (if you do not have 

a written policy) for serving arrest warrants on 

violent offenders:

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding how to 

serve arrest warrants on violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required when serving 

arrest warrants on violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers working without a partner are allowed to 

serve arrest warrants on violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers are required to wait for backup, if alone, 

before serving arrest warrants on violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

All recruits receive formal academy training 

specifically on how to serve arrest warrants on 

violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Some designated officers (e.g., warrant, SWAT) 

receive enhanced training on how to serve arrest 

warrants on violent offenders.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to 

help them reduce the chances of officers getting 

shot or shot at while serving arrest warrants to 

violent offenders?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

Handling mentally ill / emotionally disturbed 

suspects. To what extent do you agree/disagree with 

the following statement(s) regarding your current 

policy or practice (if you do not have a written 

policy) for handling mentally ill / emotionally 

disturbed / suicidal suspects:

Officers have a lot of discretion in deciding how 

to handle mentally ill / emotionally disturbed / 

suicidal suspects.

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Continuous radio contact is required when handling 

mentally ill / emotionally disturbed / suicidal suspects 

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Officers working without a partner are allowed to handle 

mentally ill / emotionally disturbed / suicidal suspects

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

When handling mentally ill / emotionally disturbed /

suicidal suspects, the policy/practice requires waiting 

for backup to arrive before responding to the scene

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

New recruits receive formal academy training 

specifically on how to handle mentally ill /

emotionally disturbed / suicidal suspects

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

Specific designated officers (CIT, negotiators, etc.) 

receive enhanced training on how to respond to 

mentally ill / emotionally disturbed / suicidal suspects

___

___

SA ___

___

A 

D SD

What one policy or practice change would you 

recommend to other police departments to help 

them reduce the chances of officers getting shot or 

shot at while handling mentally ill / emotionally 

disturbed / suicidal suspects?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________
Appendix B. National Survey on the Use of Deadly Force and Firearms against Police Officers 43

Part 3. Recruit and in-service/refresher 

training

The primary law enforcement executive (chief, 

sheriff, commissioner) should designate someone 

knowledgeable about recruit and in-service/refresher 

training to complete part 3.

Please indicate the job title of the person completing 

part 3: _____________________________________

How many hours of training on use of force do 

recruits receive in the training academy? _______

Does the agency’s recruit academy training on 

officer’s use of firearms involve training in the 

following methods?

Shooting while moving Yes___ 

___ 

___ 

___ 

___ 

___ 

___ 

___ 

No___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

Shooting at moving targets Yes No

Shoot-don’t shoot training Yes No

Weak-hand shooting Yes No

Shooting at night or in 

low-light situations Yes No

Weapon malfunction drills Yes No

Shooting when 

physically fatigued Yes No

Shooting from 

a concealed location Yes No

Did your recent class of recruits receive training in 

the following areas?

a. Use of force continuum policy 

Yes___ No___

b. Officer safety practices 

Yes___ No___

c. Foot pursuit safety 

Yes___ No___

d. Serving arrest warrants 

Yes___ No___

e. Firearms training 

Yes___ No___

f. Use of less-lethal weapons 

Yes___ No___

g. Responding to domestic violence incidents 

Yes___ No___

h. Responding to disturbance calls 

Yes___ No___

i. Responding to “shots fired” calls 

Yes___ No___

j. Arrest and control tactics 

Yes___ No___

k. De-escalation and defusing techniques

Yes___ No___

l. Dealing with citizens with mental illness

Yes___ No___

Does your agency offer in-service/refresher training 

in the following areas?

a. Use of force continuum policy 

Yes___ No___

b. Officer safety practices 

Yes___ No___

c. Foot pursuit safety 

Yes___ No___

d. Serving arrest warrants 

Yes___ No___

e. Firearms training 

Yes___ No___

f. Use of less-lethal weapons 

Yes___ No___

g. Responding to domestic violence incidents 

Yes___ No___

h. Responding to disturbance calls 

Yes___ No___
44 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

i. Responding to “shots fired” calls 

Yes___ No___

j. Arrest and control tactics 

Yes___ No___

k. De-escalation and defusing techniques

Yes___ No___

l. Dealing with citizens with mental illness

Yes___ No___
45

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49

ABOUT THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) is a 

component of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 

Department of Justice, which also includes the 

Bureau of Justice Statistics; National Institute of 

Justice; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention; Office for Victims of Crime; and Office 

of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 

Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking.

BJA’s mission is to provide leadership and services 

in grant administration and criminal justice policy 

development to support local, state, and tribal 

justice strategies to achieve safer communities. BJA 

supports programs and initiatives in the areas of law 

enforcement, justice information sharing, countering 

terrorism, managing offenders, combating drug crime 

and abuse, adjudication, advancing tribal justice, 

crime prevention, protecting vulnerable populations, 

and capacity building. Driving BJA’s work in the field 

are the following principles:

 Emphasize local control.

 Build relationships in the field.

 Provide training and technical assistance 

in support of efforts to prevent crime, 

drug abuse, and violence at the national, 

state, and local levels.

 Develop collaborations and partnerships.

 Promote capacity building through planning.

 Streamline the administration of grants.

 Increase training and technical assistance.

 Create accountability of projects.

 Encourage innovation.

 Communicate the value of justice efforts 

to decision makers at every level.

BJA has four primary components: (1) Policy, 

(2) Programs, (3) Planning, and (4) the Public Safety 

Officers’ Benefits (PSOB) Office. The Policy Office 

provides national leadership in criminal justice 

policy, training, and technical assistance to further 

the administration of justice. It also acts as a liaison 

to national organizations that partner with BJA to set 

policy and help disseminate information on best and 

promising practices. The Programs Office coordinates 

and administers all state and local grant programs 

and acts as BJA’s direct line of communication 

to states, territories, and Tribal Governments by 

providing assistance and coordinating resources. 

The Planning Office coordinates the planning, 

communications, and budget formulation and 

execution; provides overall BJA-wide coordination; 

and supports streamlining efforts.
50

ABOUT THE MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION

The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) is 

a professional association of chief police executives 

representing the largest cities in the United 

States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. MCCA 

membership is composed of chiefs and sheriffs of the 

67 largest law enforcement agencies in the United 

States, the 10 largest in Canada, and the two largest 

in the United Kingdom. They serve 91.4 million 

people (70 million in the United States, 11.5 million 

in Canada, and 9.9 million in the United Kingdom) 

with a workforce of 241,257 (162,425 in the United 

States, 21,939 in Canada, and 56,893 in the United 

Kingdom) sworn officers and nonsworn personnel.

MCCA’s strategic goals are to

 guide national and international policy that 

affects public safety and major cities;

 develop current and future police executive leaders;

 promote innovation and evidence-based 

practices in policing.
51

ABOUT THE COPS OFFICE

The Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS Office) is the component of the 

U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing 

the practice of community policing by the nation’s 

state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement 

agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment 

to building trust and mutual respect between 

police and communities. It supports public safety 

by encouraging all stakeholders to work together 

to address our nation’s crime challenges. When 

police and communities collaborate, they more 

effectively address underlying issues, change negative 

behavioral patterns, and allocate resources. 

Rather than simply responding to crime, community 

policing focuses on preventing it through strategic 

problem solving approaches based on collaboration. 

The COPS Office awards grants to hire community 

police and support the development and testing of 

innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding 

also provides training and technical assistance to 

community members and local government leaders, 

as well as all levels of law enforcement. 

Another source of COPS Office assistance is the 

Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical 

Assistance (CRI-TA). Developed to advance 

community policing and ensure constitutional 

practices, CRI-TA is an independent, objective 

process for organizational transformation. It 

provides recommendations based on expert 

analysis of policies, practices, training, tactics, and 

accountability methods related to issues of concern.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than 

$14 billion to add community policing officers to the 

nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, 

support crime prevention initiatives, and provide 

training and technical assistance to help advance 

community policing.

 To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring 

of approximately 127,000 additional officers 

by more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 

law enforcement agencies in both small and 

large jurisdictions.

 Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, 

community members, and government leaders 

have been trained through COPS Office-funded 

training organizations.

 To date, the COPS Office has distributed 

more than eight million topic-specific 

publications, training curricula, white papers, 

and resource CDs.

 The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, 

roundtables, and other forums focused on issues 

critical to law enforcement.

The COPS Office information resources, covering 

a wide range of community policing topics—from 

school and campus safety to gang violence—can be 

downloaded at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is 

also the grant application portal, providing access to 

online application forms.
52 Understanding Firearms Assaults against Law Enforcement Officers in the United States

NOTES

This publication attempts to answer important questions regarding firearm assaults against law enforcement officers. Initially prepared 

as a framework for discussion in the 2014 Officer Safety and Wellness (OSW) Group roundtable dedicated to identifying best practices 

for reducing firearm assaults and ambushes, this publication reviews the group’s findings on law enforcement policies, procedures, 

training, and agency characteristics that can reduce officer deaths and injuries. It is divided into three sections: the meeting’s findings 

and recommendations, a review of 50 years of literature written about situational factors that could lead to assaults, and data 

identified through a current study.

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

145 N Street NE 

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details about COPS Office programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center 

at 800-421-6770.

Visit the COPS Office online 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Major Cities Chiefs Association 

1025 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1000 

Washington, DC 20036

To obtain details about MCCA programs, call the 

Major Cities Chiefs Association at 202-828-1260.

Visit the Major Cities Chiefs Association 

online at https://majorcitieschiefs.com.

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 Seventh Street NW 

Washington, DC 20531

To obtain details about BJA programs, 

call 202-616-6500.

Visit the BJA online at www.bja.gov.

e011607739

Published 2016