PROFESSOR RICHARD B. LILLICH (1933-1996)

Photograph courtesy of University of Virginia School of Law

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INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES

VOLUME 77

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INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES

Volume 77

Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals A

In Memory of Professor Richard B. Lillich

Thomas C. Wingfield

James E. Meyen

Editors

Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

2002

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lillich, Richard B.

Lillich on the forcible protection of nationals abroad : in memory 

professor Richard B. Lillich / Thomas C. Wingfield, James E. Mey

editors.

p. cm.--(International law studies ; v. 77)

Includes index.

ISBN 1-884733-23-9 (alk. paper)

1. Intervention (International law) 2. Diplomatic protection. 

Wingfield, Thomas C. II. Meyen, James E. III. Title. IV. Series.

JX1295 .U4 vol. 77

[KZ6368]

341.5'84--dc21

20020

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Contents

Lillich on the

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abro

FOREWORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INTRODUCTION .........................................

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

RICHARD B. LILLICH (1933–1996): A TRIBUTE

Professor Robert F. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Author’s Note ..........................................

I. The Classical Publicists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Grotius ......................................

B. Wolff .......................................

C. Vattel .......................................

II. The Traditional Writers on International Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Phillimore....................................

B. Bluntschli....................................

C. Bonfils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

D. Pradier-Fodere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

E. Westlake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

F. Oppenheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

G. Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

H. Stockton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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J. Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

K. Borchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

L. Fauchille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

M. Hyde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

N. Winfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

O. Offutt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

P. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Q. Hindmarsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

R. Accioly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

III. State Practice During the Pre-United Nations Period. . . . . . . . . 

A. French Blockade of Argentina. 1838–1840. . . . . . . . . . 

B. Great Britain, Spain and France in Mexico. 1861. . . . . 

C. Great Britain and Abyssinia. 1867–1868. . . . . . . . . . . . 

D. Great Britain in Honduras. 1873. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

E. Great Britain and France in Egypt. 1876–1879. . . . . . . 

F. France and Portugal. 1893–1894. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

G. Boxer Rebellion, China. 1900.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

H. Franco-Turkish Conflict. 1901.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I. Great Britain, Germany and Italy in Venezuela. 1902.. 

J. Italian Invasion of Corfu. 1923.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

K. French Bombardment of Damascus. 1925. . . . . . . . . . . 

L. Japan and China. 1931–1932. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

M. Germany in Czechoslovakia. 1938. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IV. Contemporary Case Studies of United States Forcible Protectio

of Nationals Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Lebanon. 1958. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B. The Congo. 1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C. The Dominican Republic. 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

D. Iran. 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

V. Contemporary Case Studies of Non-United States Forcible Protec

of Nationals Abroad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Suez Crisis. 1956. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B. Belgium in the Congo. 1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C. France in Mauritania. 1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

D. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1978.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

E. France in Mauritania. 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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F. France in Chad. 1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

G. France in Chad. 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

H. France in Mauritania. 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I. France in Gabon. 1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

J. France and Belgium in Rwanda. 1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

K. France in Chad. 1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

L. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1991.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

M. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1993.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

N. Multinational Evacuation Operation in Rwanda. 1994.

O. France in the Central African Republic. 1996. . . . . . . . 

Appendix I:

A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of Unit

Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad 

World War II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix II:

A History of United States Navy Regulations Governing the U

Force to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad 

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ix

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Foreword

The International Studies “Blue Book” series was initiated by the N

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises, and articles that contrib

broader understanding of international law. With this, the sevent

volume of the historic series, we honor the late Professor Richard B. 

publishing his final book, a long-awaited volume on the use of for

protection of nationals abroad.

Professor Lillich is part of the Naval War College family. He 

Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law from 1968-1969, an

ued to support the Naval War College after his tenure. He was the co

Volumes 61 and 62 of the Blue Book series: Readings in International 

the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, vols.1&2. As the Stockto

sor, he would engage his colleagues in discussions of the proper use o

Navy and Marine Corps in one of their most enduring missions, en

safety of U.S. citizens overseas. This volume experienced a long gesta

then, with years of meticulous research and thoughtful analysis culm

a manuscript shortly before Professor Lillich’s untimely death in 1996

clusions, while not necessarily official positions of the United State

ment, are firmly supported by exhaustive historical research an

presented case studies, and are an invaluable contribution to the fie

On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Opera

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend to the family, friend

leagues of Professor Lillich, our gratitude for this, his final serv

country.

RODNEY P. REMPT

Rear Admiral, U.S. N

President, Naval Wa

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Introduction

The Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law was established at 

War College in 1951. Over the past half-century, the Stockton Chair 

held by many esteemed professors of international law. Professor Richard 

was one such Chairholder. Volume 77 of the International Law Studies 

Book”) series, Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, me

Professor Lillich and his work. The commentary and case studies he wr

show that foreign intervention to protect one’s citizens has always been 

and dynamic part of international law, and will continue to be so.

This volume was made possible only through the efforts of its principal ed

tenant Commander Thomas Wingfield, U.S. Navy Reserve. Tom was in 

place at the right time at the Naval War College while serving his annual 

stint as a reservist. He shepherded the process of turning rough notes, docu

papers into a published book. Working closely with Tom as the co-editor w

ant Colonel James Meyen, USMC, of our International Law Department.

Funding for this book was made possible by Dean Alberto Coll, C

Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College. His leadership an

are key to the Blue Book Series. Invaluable contributions were also m

tired Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain Ralph Thoma

USN, (Ret.), who volunteered many hours of their personal time in 

manuscripts and offering advice. Further assistance was provided by 

the staff of the International Law Department.

Volume 77 will serve as a standard reference work of case stud

area, continuing the solid, scholarly tradition of the “Blue Books.” Th

published by the Naval War College and distributed throughout the 

academic institutions, libraries, and both U.S. and internationa

commands.

DENNIS MANDSAGER

Professor of Law

Chairman, International Law De

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Preface

“It was only one life. What is one life in the affairs of a state?”

Benito Mussolini, after running down a child in his automobile (as repo

General Smedley Butler, 1931)1

Richard Bonnet Lillich—lawyer, professor, human rights ex

advocate—spent his life answering that question. The results of his 

have proven very troubling for the Mussolinis of the world, in that n

done more to chart the limits to which a State may go in protecting its 

This particular work, Professor Lillich’s last, had an unusually lo

tion. As early as 1980, he wrote in the introduction to another volu

series, Readings in International Law from the Naval War Colleg

1947-1977, vol. 2: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General Intern

gal Issues: “[t]his Introduction is not the place to discuss the Entebb

detail. Interested readers will find it considered at some length in my 

ing monograph in the “Blue Book” series—Forcible Self-Help to Pr

tionals Abroad.”2 As Professor Lillich continued writing through the 

into the 1990s,3 he kept this manuscript close at hand, continually re

updating the text to reflect each new example of State practice. Wi

timely death in 1996, his colleagues gathered the largely com

uncompiled work, and set about preparing it for its long-awaited pub

It was my honor to be entrusted with overseeing this task during th

years. Long a student of Professor Lillich’s work (if, sadly, not the 

himself), I had already published two articles based on his work in 

The first begins with a statement of why Professor Lillich’s work in th

lar area mattered so much:

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[P]erhaps the best criterion for discriminating tyrannies 

democracies is the sincere, proven emphasis placed upon the val

single human life. The forcible protection of nationals abroad

undertaken for non-pretextual reasons, is the clearest expression 

distinction in state practice. The academic challenge in evaluatin

uses of force is to distinguish such protection from other legitimate 

force, and then to distinguish the uses from other, illegitimate 

force.5

In this volume, Professor Lillich rose to this challenge, and set the 

for future scholars to match. It was decided against including addit

studies covering the post-1996 period to “update” his work. Their 

value did not justify making the text not purely Lillich. Without th

word, except for the Conclusion, is Professor Lillich’s, which is more 

ate for a memorial volume such as this one. To say more about the t

follows is unnecessary, as its scope, depth, and clarity speak for th

There is also no need to say more about Professor Lillich himself, bec

fessor Robert Turner, also of the University of Virginia, has written 

about his lost friend and colleague in the personal memoriam which 

Editing a Blue Book is as far from a solo undertaking as any could 

to thank first Professor Michael N. Schmitt, now of the George C. Ma

ropean Center for Security Studies, for introducing me to the world o

val War College, allowing me to assist him in the editing of an ea

Book, and advocating to the College’s Oceans Law and Policy De

(now the International Law Department (ILD)) that I be given a cra

project. Mike is one of the finest men I know, and to the extent that 

can approach the level of his intellect, passion, humor, and thoughtf

do so only asymptotically. The College was indeed lucky to have h

George Marshall Center is lucky now.

I would also like thank Commander Dean Markussen, USNR, 

burst of academic insight, set this chain of events in motion by dispa

to the College for a two-week period of active duty training as a reserv

thanks are also due to the faculty of ILD—particularly Professor Eme

Grunawalt, his successor, Professor Dennis Mandsager; Capta

Thomas, JAGC, USN (Ret.), his successor, Colonel Frederic Borch, 

Lieutenant Colonel James Duncan, USMC, and his successor, Lieute

onel James Meyen, USMC, for accepting me into the ILD family and 

all the support and guidance an editor could need. Their faith in th

and in me, is greatly appreciated.

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Professor Robert Turner, author of this text

s true introduction, is 

of special praise. Given his already hectic schedule of writing, teac

speaking—made all the more demanding in wake of the recent attac

nation—he could have declined this writing project with a clear co

However, drawing on his limitless reserves of energy, he made time to 

friend with the thoughtful tribute which follows. Bob Turner is livin

Professor Lillich’s talent for friendship.

No acknowledgments would be complete without thanking the pe

actually undertook the steps to physically produce a hardcover boo

LtCol Jim Meyen, my official co-editor and whom I mentioned abov

ing the finished manuscript through the process of publication in 

The sheer number of steps in such a task—from word processing to p

ing, from indexing to printing—make their coordination a ch

time-consuming, and sometimes frustrating task. For handling the en

ect with grace under pressure, Jim is to be sincerely complimented. 

mous debt is also owed to Captain Donald C. Hill, USNR, wh

two-week training period, and a considerable amount of his own tim

nizing Professor Lillich’s manuscript. The book’s current organization 

of Captain Hill’s vision, and it is no overstatement to say that the pro

not have moved forward without his dedication and patient work. M

Goodrich, of the Naval War College Press, is also to be commended fo

fessional editorial assistance; as is the technically adept staff in the Pu

Office, who made this volume a reality. Last, but certainly not least, i

ant David Poff, USNR, who put considerable time and effort into upd

fessor Lillich’s work for publication. His contribution, completed afte

to active duty in the current hostilities, may be seen throughout this 

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at Aegis 

Corporation, Georgetown University Law Center, and the Univers

ginia School of Law for their patience, understanding, and support. 

and studying with such fine people is one of life’s greatest rewards, an

I now know was enjoyed just as deeply by Professor Richard Bonnet 

THOMAS C. WINGFIELD

Counsel and Principal Natio

Security Policy Analyst

Aegis Research Corporation

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NOTES

1. Benito Mussolini, quoted by Gen. Smedley Butler, reprinted in THE POCKE

QUOTATIONS 379 (Henry Davidoff ed., 1952).

2. READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLE

1947-1977 (V. 2), THE USE OF FORCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTER

LEGAL ISSUES (NAV. WAR C. INT’L L. STUD., v. 62, Richard B. Lillich & John No

eds. 1980), at xi.

3. For the most complete listing of Professor Lillich’s writings, see Samuel Pyeatt 

Tribute to Richard B. Lillich: a Bibliography of the Legal Publications of Professor Richa

(1933-1996), 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 85 (1997).

4. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. 

(2000) [hereinafter FORCIBLE PROTECTION], and Thomas C. Wingfield, Lillich o

Law: U.S. Naval Regulations, Star Trek, and the Use of Force in Space, 46 S. D. L. REV

[hereinafter INTERSTELLAR LAW].

5. See Wingfield, Forcible Protection, supra note 4, at 439.

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RICHARD B. LILLICH (1933-1996):

A Tribute

Robert F. Turner

Richard Bonnot Lillich was born in Amherst, Ohio, on January 22, 19

undergraduate training at Oberlin College, he earned his LL.B. at Co

went on to earn his LL.M. and S.J.D. (academic law doctorate) at N

University. He served ten years on the faculty of Syracuse University

was Director of International Legal Studies. During 1968-69, he 

prestigious Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the U

War College. He then joined the faculty of the University of Virginia 

Law, where he served as the Howard W. Smith Professor of Law 

untimely death twenty-seven years later, from a heart attack at t

sixty-three.

To that, one might add his Ford Foundation and Guggenheim Fe

in London; service as Thomas Jefferson Visiting Fellow at Downin

Cambridge; other fellowships at Oxford and the Max Planck Institu

delberg; and assorted short-term teaching assignments at Indiana, G

Louis, and Florida State—where at the time of his death he al

part-time as the Edward Ball Eminent Professor of International Law

We can’t forget his leadership positions: a dozen years on the 

Council of the American Society of International Law, twenty-six ye

Editorial Board of the American Journal of International Law, foundin

of The Procedural Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute, f

the Washington, DC-based International Human Rights Law Grou

mention some of the highlights. He was also a prolific writer, co-editi

tion’s first law school casebook on human rights law among his more 

books, sixty chapters in books edited by others, and more than one 

published articles.

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Then there was his role as valued adviser to the Office of the Lega

at the State Department and to numerous non-governmental organi

the United States and around the globe. As an advocate, he was of

upon by the United States Government and by numerous private clie

gue before international tribunals.

These are the data that inevitably make their way into New York T

uaries, and they are important. They tell us that Professor Richard Lil

man of remarkable professional accomplishment and ability. But t

capture the full measure of the man whose early experiences as an 

child may have contributed to the loyalty and friendship he display

leagues as an adult. In a tribute that appeared in the American Journ

national Law, University of Iowa Law School Professor Burns Westo

approaching Professor Lillich about sharing some materials he had co

an unwritten study of the British Foreign Compensation Commissio

[H]e not only said yes, but invited me to Syracuse where he was then te

provided me free room and board at home with his family, found me 

office, gave me all his research cards and notes to examine, and authorize

Xerox whatever I needed, asking only that I put things back in the orde

found them. And I barely knew him! Richard Lillich always def

conventional wisdom of jealously guarding one’s hard-won unpu

research. He was uniquely generous and trusting in a profession not know

deference to could-be rivals.

I first met Dick Lillich while a student in his first seminar on inte

human rights at the University of Virginia School of Law. The 

text—International Human Rights: Problems of Law and Policy, the ca

had just co-authored with Judge Frank C. Newman—did not arrive 

tle-Brown until several weeks into the term.

I enrolled in that seminar with some trepidation. Even then, Dick h

lished a well-deserved reputation as one of the nation’s foremost auth

both international claims and human rights law. But he had also bee

opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and my involvement on 

side of that debate was no secret. Never one to withdraw from a g

ment, I anticipated that our different perspectives would surface and 

sure of the potential effect on my grade point average.

I was right about one thing. Not only in his human rights seminar, 

other courses I later took from him, our divergent points of view surf

peatedly. He was outraged over human rights abuses in South Korea

sponded that cutting aid could play into the hands of the regime in Py

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whose human rights record was incomparably worse across the board

spect, perhaps we were just describing opposite ends of the same 

While it seemed to me that we disagreed about everything of sign

knew even then that we were both deeply committed to the cause 

rights and human dignity.

When the time came to pick topics for our research papers, I info

Director of the International Human Rights Law Group, who wa

Dick in the seminar, that I was leaning towards doing a comparative 

human rights in the two Koreas. She cautioned me that might be a m

view of Professor Lillich’s strong views on the topic. I guess my passio

bit intense, too, as I wrote instead about human rights in the two V

Given my views on the issue, I can only imagine the impact it had on 

Lillich’s blood pressure.

I knew Dick would get the last shot in our duel, and when grade

was hoping for an “A-” and convinced that if he gave me below a “B

reflect his political biases. To my shock, in that seminar and the t

quent courses I took from him, Dick gave me “A”s. At the time, Vi

on a strict 3.0 curve, and to give an “A” required a professor to awar

student a “C” or to downgrade several papers to balance off the 4.0. 

thus uncommon. I honestly don’t think I earned three “A”s from Di

and my only explanation for his behavior is his strong sense of pr

honor. He wanted there to be no question that he was not penalizing m

strong disagreements in class. When I applied for admission to the gra

program, Dick served on the admissions committee that decided to 

LL.M. requirement and admit me directly into the S.J.D. program, ev

I still think he viewed us as being at opposite ends of the political spe

key issues.

After several years working in Washington, I returned to Virgini

and as an additional duty volunteered to teach the introductory inte

law course in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs 

could fill that faculty vacancy. When it came time to discuss interna

man rights, I asked Dick if he would come over as a guest lecturer—

us realizing that I had scheduled him for Wednesday of Thanksgiving 

accepted, and year after year he returned on the same day to shar

knowledge of international human rights law with a couple of hundr

graduates. He never received a penny for his efforts, and twice he br

young daughter with him so they could head off on the brief vacatio

delayed to do me a favor.

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We talked a lot over the years, until I departed in 1994 for Newp

cupy the Stockton Chair that Dick had held twenty-five years earlie

took part in several conferences where I could hear his views as a 

The more I listened to him, the fewer points of disagreement I could 

knowledge of the law was superb. As the present volume reflects, he 

strong belief in the importance of using original sources, of understa

historical development of legal rules through the writings of people lik

and Vattel, and the importance of careful research. The values he ex

I grew older were largely my own. And on issue after issue, our bottom

clusions were fully in accord.

To this day, I do not pretend to know what happened. Perhaps th

was within me, and as I matured over the years my own views moved 

towards where Dick had always been. Perhaps the end of the Cold 

moved some filters that had influenced our vision during that controv

haps Dick changed. I don’t know, but, in the end, my perceptio

gradually changed. The man who at first appeared to be an exceptio

teacher who was wrong on the issues but honorable and fair almost 

had become a cherished friend and colleague—a world-class schola

policy preferences on more and more issues I strongly shared.

Dick Lillich was perhaps best known for his work on internation

and State responsibility. I thought of him as a “Liberal” and on occasi

early days, a man of the “Left.” But, in retrospect, he did not champi

positions in either of these fields. Dick believed that it was important 

to be held responsible for their conduct, irrespective of any perceived 

in their past, and he believed that when they took the property of o

had a duty to pay fair compensation.

Few issues have more divided international lawyers than that of 

intervention by one State in the territory of another for the purpose o

ing nationals. Once again, Dick Lillich rejected the “anti-imperiali

doxy of the Left, arguing that when one State violated the clear rights 

nationals and endangered their safety, in the absence of an effective 

tional remedy the victim State had a legal right to use necessary an

tional force to safeguard its nationals. This was clearly the majority v

pre-Charter era, and I share Dick’s view that the doctrine survive

2(4). Whether one reasons that an intervention limited to protecting 

of one’s own nationals is not a use of force against the territorial integ

litical independence of the host State, or argues that the rights set for

are predicated upon the host State abiding by its own duties not to th

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use force improperly and are qualified by the right of self

defense, the 

is the same.

Dick also did groundbreaking work on the issue of humanitarian 

tion. He understood that human dignity and human freedom are of fu

tal importance, and that people needed to be protected against at 

most flagrant abuses of internationally recognized human rights norm

this should be done by a united world community under the leadersh

rection of the United Nations Security Council. But Dick understoo

Security Council could be blocked from acting by the negative vote

five Permanent Members. And when the United Nations was unwill

able to act, Dick understood that individual States—or, preferably

tional coalitions—had a right and duty to act to prevent the most 

violations of human rights.

Another dear friend, Professor R. J. Rummel, has in recent years 

tention to the problem he defines as “democide”—the slaughter of h

ings outside of war by their own governments. I first learned of this 

1987 while serving as the first President of the congressionally-creat

States Institute of Peace. Part of our statutory mandate was to make 

institutions and scholars to do research and write books; and when I 

Rudy Rummel’s initial proposal I could not believe his thesis. Surely

right, we would have known this before now. But as I examined his pr

work and contemplated his thesis over time, I became persuaded th

correct and was delighted when our Board of Directors voted to supp

search. Quite properly, he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Pr

groundbreaking scholarship on Democide and the Democratic Peac

Rudy Rummel has argued—very persuasively, in my view—that d

Twentieth Century, at least three times as many people were kille

own governments unrelated to war than were killed in every war a

globe during the same period. This includes Stalin’s purges of class 

Mao’s land reform and other campaigns to kill class enemies, Hitl

caust, Pol Pot’s butchery of an estimated two million Cambodians, an

lesser crimes. And very importantly, Rummel has shown that there is 

dous inverse correlation between democide and democratic govern

mega-murderers are all totalitarian tyrants.

Arguably the two most important developments in international l

the Twentieth Century were the outlawing of aggressive war thr

Kellogg-Briand Treaty and UN Charter, and the recognition in th

and subsequent instruments that sovereign States have a duty to pr

tain human rights of both their own nationals and aliens who are u

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control. In both categories, the primary violators have been the wor

tarian regimes—whether from “Left” or “Right.”

The world’s leading scholars of international law are very much d

whether it is permissible for any State, or any group of States in the a

Security Council authorization, to use lethal force inside the territ

other State to protect human rights—even if the alternative is mass

cide. This debate is much like the dispute over the scope of th

self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and for much the sam

The scholars who oppose “humanitarian intervention” do so not bec

favor genocide, but because they fear that if left unconstrained sovere

will use the excuse of such intervention to justify aggression. Thus, 

1990, Saddam Hussein could easily have pointed out human rights s

ings in Kuwait to excuse his desire to take control of that country. F

reasons, they want to narrow the right of States to use lethal force in 

fense” because they recall that when Hitler went into Poland, and Ki

invaded South Korea, both told the world they had been attacked fi

One can acknowledge and even share these concerns and yet still 

that States must be able to defend themselves when attacked—even 

attack is masked by the use of paramilitary forces and accompanied 

ganda designed to mislead the world. Ultimately, the world comm

usually ascertain the facts and pass judgment upon the resort to let

And, similarly, the world should be able to tell between genuine hum

intervention and the use of that doctrine as a façade to mask aggres

At its core, the theory that there can be no lawful exercise of hum

intervention places international law on the wrong side. Its primary 

to promote peace and justice. If it holds that the world communit

back in silence if another Hitler surfaces and begins slaughtering mill

nocent people because of their race, religion, or similar factors, then 

tional law has become part of the problem and must be changed. Fo

rules that preordains such a result deserves the respect of civilize

women. Dick Lillich understood this.

I am honored to be able to write a few words in tribute to this grea

friend and colleague who, in retrospect, was throughout our years of 

also a cherished mentor. I commend the Naval War College for its d

bring out this important volume even after the untimely death of i

Like so many other volumes in this extraordinary series, it will be a 

tool for legal scholars for generations to come. Finally, I am deeply in

my friend Tom Wingfield, who agreed to undertake the importan

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completing this manuscript when it became apparent to everyone tha

schedule would preclude my doing so.

Dick Lillich was a remarkable man to whom all who cherish the r

are indebted. His untimely death by heart attack on August 3, 199

world poorer for the loss. But those of us who knew and admired him 

solace in the knowledge that his scholarship and ideas will live on bot

the work of his former students and in the remarkable body of professi

ature he has left behind. This will presumably be his final publication

flects the exceptional talents that helped make Dick Lillich such a re

scholar and human being. As with all of us who have had the dist

hold the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the N

College, Dick cherished that association. I am confident that he wo

lighted to know that the commitment he made more than three deca

write a Blue Book has been satisfied. I am all the more certain tha

work will be welcomed by scholars around the globe.

Charlottesvill

November 21

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Author’s Note

The development and implementation of the State’s right of forci

tion, is the primary focus of this document.

As with many international law norms, the juridical origins of a St

to protect the lives and property of its nationals abroad may be trac

views of the early, classical publicists. Their writings routinely in

State’s right of diplomatic protection of its nationals abroad. The va

State’s right of forcible protection of its nationals abroad necessarily g

the practical aspects of the right of diplomatic protection of a State’s 

Although often addressing the subject indirectly, the classical public

significant impact upon the development of the State’s right of forcib

tion of its citizens abroad.

To the contributions of the classical writers, the later traditional 

international law added descriptions of the evolving practice of Sta

vening to protect their nationals transiting or living in other States. O

of writers, including Phillimore, Bluntschli and Westlake, viewed th

protection as limited primarily to the use of diplomatic measures. Re

the justifications offered by the classical writers, as well as the develo

practices, a second group of writers, including Bonfils, Pradie

Oppenheim and Fauchille, asserted an established principle justifyin

measures of protection as well. A third group of writers, primarily 

United States, including Moore, Stockton, Clark, Hodges, Borchard, 

Offutt, also recognized the then established principle of using forc

sures, supplementing their theoretical reasoning with extensive appe

tailing instances of such protection, primarily in the form of prior US p

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A fourth group of traditional writers, including Dunn and Hindm

world crisis imminent, grudgingly admitted the existence of the pr

forcible protection, but made clear their disapproval of its exercise 

creasingly interdependent international community.

Following the summary of the classical and traditionalist historica

the State’s right of forcible protection of its nationals abroad prior to 

ing of the United Nations Charter, the impact of post-World War II S

tice will be discussed.

With the signing of the United Nations Charter and its broad proh

the use of force found in Article 2(4), the right of forcible, as opposed 

matic, protection entered a new phase as the provision seriously que

concept of forcible protection of nationals abroad. However, the hum

rience in dealing with the practicalities of traversing a foreign State h

ferent laws, socio-economic experience and political differences, will 

keep the issue of the State’s protection of its representatives and 

abroad, a very timely and dynamic topic for some time to come.

Richard 

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Chapter I

The Classical Publicists

To facilitate an understanding of the historical development ocept of the right of forcible protection, the earliest publicists are 

nated herein as the “classical” writers. This group, spanning the Sev

and Eighteenth Centuries include Grotius, Wolff and Vattel. Durin

torical period the European State system assumed a preeminent posit

world.

A. Grotius. Grotius, the “father of international law,” developed tw

mental principles that have influenced much of the later thinking on 

ject of the protection of the lives and property of nationals abroad.

First, he maintained that a sovereign’s concern for his subjects mus

mount. “[T]he first and particularly necessary concern,” argued Grot

subjects, either those who are subject to authority in a family, or thos

subject to a political authority.”1

Second, Grotius contended that under the law of nations there 

principle that “for what any civil society, or its head, ought to finish 

fulfilling the law, for all this there are held and made liable all the co

incorporeal possessions of those who are subject to such a society or i

Grotius viewed this latter principle, which countenanced collective 

bility, as pragmatic, the “outgrowth of a certain necessity, because o

great license to cause injury would arise.”3

As a corollary to this forerunner of State responsibility, Grotius c

at least two remedial measures open to the protecting sovereign: the “

persons” and the “seizure of goods.” As to the former, Grotius cited th

of the ancient Greeks, in the form of Attican law which stated: “If a

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by a violent death, for his sake, it shall be right for his relatives and n

to proceed to apprehend men, until either the penalty has been pa

murder, or the murderers are given up.”4 Grotius extended this ap

justify a sovereign’s resort to self-help to protect his subjects from po

jury, stating that “there is nothing in this that is repugnant to nature

the practice not only of the Greeks, but of other nations also.”5

Grotius also discussed briefly “the right of detention of citizens o

state in which a manifest wrong has been done to a national, in order 

his recovery.”6 While admitting the existence of such a right, Grot

theless rejected its utility. In this regard, he described the reasons 

against the seizure of Ariston of Tyre by the Carthaginians. The princ

ment was that if Ariston were seized “(th)e same thing will h

Carthaginians both at Tyre and in the other commercial centers to w

go in large numbers.”7

With reference to the “seizure of goods,” Grotius’ second remedia

he cited, without discussion, the “withernam” of the Saxons and A

the “letters of marque” authorized by the King of France.8 Additi

pointed to Homer’s description in the Iliad of Nestor’s seizure of “

and herds of the men of Elis in revenge for the horses stolen from his 

Finally, Grotius recounted an instance from Roman history 

Aristodemus, the heir of the Tarquins, held Roman ships at Cumae as 

sation for Tarquin property seized by the Romans.10

For Grotius, the sovereign’s right to use self-help to protect his subj

far-reaching one, justifying resort to force. As he put it: “Seizure by 

may be understood to be warranted not only in case a judgment cann

tained against a criminal or a debtor within a reasonable time, but a

very clear case (for in a doubtful case the presumption is in favor of t

have been chosen by the state to render judgment) judgment has 

dered in a way manifestly contrary to law; for the authority of the jud

the same force over foreigners as over subjects.”11

However, such resort to force did not include the taking of life. Ac

the “law of love,” “particularly for Christians, the life of a man ough

greater value than our property. . . .”12

Thus, although Grotius did not directly address the question of th

tion of the lives and property of nationals abroad, he did adopt certain 

that influenced subsequent writers in the development of theoretica

tions for such protection. Subsequent to Grotius, the importance of t

to the sovereign, as well as the recognition of the right of a sovereign 

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a citizen, by force if necessary, became recurrent themes in the lite

this subject.

B. Wolff. Wolff, writing in the mid-Eighteenth Century, elaborated 

duty of a nation to preserve itself, a topic that had also been consider

by Grotius. “Every nation is bound to preserve itself,” wrote Wolff, “fo

who make a nation, when they have united into a state, are as in

bound to the whole for promoting the common good, and the whole is 

the individuals to provide for them those things which are required as 

tency for life, for peace and security.”13Thus, although Wolff did not 

mention the protection of nationals abroad, it can be inferred that, 

tent that such protection was required “as a competency for life, for 

security,” he believed that a State was obliged to extend its protection 

tionals abroad.

Moreover, Wolff recognized as valid the use of force to enforce a Sta

“The right belongs to every nation to obtain its right against anoth

by force, if the other is unwilling to allow that right. For the right belo

ery nation not to permit any other nation to take away its right, con

also not to permit it not to allow that right. Therefore it is necessary, 

does not wish to allow a right, that the other compel it by force to 

Therefore the right belongs to the one nation against the other nation 

its right by force, if the other does not wish to allow it.”14

Indeed, a State had the right to defend itself and its rights agains

State15 and to punish another State, by force, which had injured it.16 

forcible protection of nationals abroad can be brought under eithe

concepts, especially the latter, without much difficulty.

C. Vattel. The first writer to focus directly upon the protection of 

abroad was Vattel. Amplifying Grotius’ concern for the citizen, as w

justification for a State’s enforcement of its rights against another Sta

argued that:

Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquillity, or d

prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and 

himself to be justly punished for it. Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly 

the state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of th

should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige 

make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the gr

of the civil association, which is, safety.17

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Thus, building upon the Grotian premise that a State has a right 

its citizens, Vattel argued that forcible protection not only was jus

that it was an obligation owed by States to their citizens.

To illustrate the breadth of the principle of protection, Vattel us

hypothetical and real examples. For instance, “[t]he sovereign who 

cause reparation to be made for the damage done by his subject, or 

the offender, or, finally, to deliver him up, renders himself in some m

accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.”18 Vattel cit

ample of King Demetrius’ imputed responsibility for the murder of 

ambassador by one of the King’s subjects in this regard.19 In that c

King Demetrius delivered the guilty persons to Rome for appropriat

ment, the Roman Senate sent them back, “resolving to reserve to th

the liberty of punishing that crime, by avenging it on the King himself

dominions.”20 It is interesting to note that Vattel, although agreein

King ultimately was responsible for the acts of his subject, found th

conduct unjust, as appropriate reparation had been offered by se

guilty persons to Rome. Vattel’s analysis of this incident, applicable t

the instances of forcible protection described herein, was that the Se

cision was “but a pretext to cover their ambitious enterprises.”21

Another instance, described by Vattel, where forcible protection m

ercised is when a State “accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscr

to plunder and maltreat foreigners. . . .”22 In the face of such a situatio

tions have a right to enter into a league against such a people, to rep

and to treat them as the common enemies of the human race.”23 As 

of this use of the principle of protection, Vattel cited the “guilt” of the 

the Usbecks for the robberies its citizens had committed, as well as 

thetical justification for a Christian confederacy against the Barbary S

order to destroy those haunts of pirates, with whom the love of plund

fear of just punishment, is the only rule of peace and war.”24

Vattel’s seeming endorsement of a broad right of forcible prote

tempered somewhat by his concern with the concept of sovereig

should not only refrain from usurping the territory of others,” argu

“we should also respect and abstain from every act contrary to the rig

sovereign. . . . We cannot, then, without doing an injury to a state, en

ritories with force and arms.... This would at once be a violation of 

of the state, and a trespass on the rights of empire or supreme author

in the sovereign.”25 Thus, “[t]he prince . . . ought not to interfere in t

of his subjects in foreign countries, and grant them his protection, e

cases where justice is refused, or palpable and evident injustice don

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and forms openly violated, or, finally, an odious distinction made, to 

dice of his subjects, or of foreigners in general.”26

Being the first of the classical international law writers to express

the protection of nationals abroad, Vattel’s analysis is not pa

far-reaching. The right to protection that he initially developed is qu

his later emphasis on the rights of the sovereign. The fact remains, 

that Vattel recognized a State’s right (obligation) to forcibly protect i

abroad by avenging the wrongs done to them and punishing their agg

least in cases of flagrant injustice.27

NOTES

1. H. Grotius, De Juri Belli Ac Pacis Bk. II, Ch. XXV, at 578 (F. Kelsey trans

2. Id., Bk. III, Ch. II, at 624.

3. Id.

4. H. Grotius, De Juri Belli Ac Pacis Bk. III, Ch. III, at 625 (F. Kelsey trans. 1

5. Id.

6. Id. at 626.

7. Id.

8. Id. at 626-27

9. Id. at 627

10. Id. at 628

11. Id. at 627

12. Id. at 628

13. C. Wolff, Jus Gentium 22 (J. Scott ed. 1934).

14. Id. at 138-39.

15. Id. at 139.

16. Id.

17. E. Vattel, The Law of Nations 161 (J. Chitty ed. 1883) (emphasis added).

18. Id. at 162.

19. Id. at 163.

20. Vattel, however, also offered justifications for forcible measures direc

culpable States in the hypothetical situations of the “robber-nation” of the Usbe

pirate-ridden Barbary States. See E. Vattel, The Law of Nations 163 (J. Chitty ed. 1

21. Id.

22. Id. at 163.

23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Id. at 169.

26. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).

27. Id.

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Chapter II

The Traditional Writers on Internationa

The classical writers were followed by the “traditional writers” o

tional law of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries

clude Phillimore, Bluntschli, Bonfils, Pradier-Fodere, Westlake, Op

Moore, Stockton, Clark, Hodges, Borchard, Fauchelle, Hyde, Winfie

Dunn, Hindmarsh and Accioly.

These writers witnessed the developing State practices which pr

interesting counterpoint to the theoretical foundations developed b

lier classical scholars.

A. Phillimore. Phillimore, an English publicist writing in 1854, buttr

theoretical premises of the “classical” textwriters with the actual p

States as it had developed by the mid-Nineteenth Century. The gen

clusion he reached was that “[t]he state, to which the foreigner belong

terfere for his protection when he has received positive maltreatment

he has been denied ordinary justice in the foreign country.”1 

Phillimore specified certain preconditions that must be met before suc

could be undertaken. “[I]t behooves the interfering State to take th

care,” he cautioned, first, that the commission of the wrong be clea

lished; second, that the “denial of the local tribunals to decide the que

sue be no less clearly established.”2 In addition to citing Grotius, P

supported his assertion with a reference to the reply of Great Britain to 

of Prussia in 1753, wherein it was maintained that a State may exerci

tion only “in cases of violent injuries directed or supported by the Stat

tice absolutely denied . . . by all the tribunals, and afterwards by the 

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Phillimore also distinguished between domiciliary and transient na

foreign countries. The essence of the distinction was that, while a n

one State who becomes domiciled in another State accepts conditio

State for what they are, the transient national does not. Acc

Phillimore, the domiciliary

“must be held to have considered the habits of the people, the laws 

country, and their mode of administration, before he established the

household gods [sic] and made it the principal seat of his fortunes. He 

therefore expect, that every complaint, which he may be disposed to ur

his native Government, with respect to these matters, will of nece

considered as requiring national interposition.”4

Phillimore devoted an entire chapter to the then topical aspect o

tection and collection of debts owed by one State to another State’s 

Citing Vattel, Phillimore stated that “[t]he right of interference on th

State, for the purpose of enforcing the performance of justice to its cit

a foreign State, stands upon an unquestionable foundation, when th

state has become itself the debtor of these citizens.”5

Building upon this theoretical foundation, Phillimore invoked 

State practice, exemplified by the famous Palmerston Circular of 18

statement of policy by the British government recognized that it had 

to bring claims on behalf of British subjects who held public bonds a

securities of defaulting foreign States, but that the decision whether 

assert such a claim was entirely within its discretion. “It is therefor

question of discretion with the British Government,” wrote Pa

“whether [a] matter should or should not be taken up by diplomati

tion, and the decision of that question of discretion turns entirely up

and domestic considerations.”7 The circular suggested that only in ex

cases would the government’s discretion be exercised in the subject

Phillimore, drawing upon the theoretical foundations of Grotius an

substantiated his assertions with examples from ongoing State pract

his discussion, it would seem that Phillimore was contemplating prim

diplomatic protection of nationals abroad. In any event, he conside

principle of international law had developed, both in theory and in 

which justified a State’s protection of the lives, property and debts ow

tionals living abroad, perhaps even by the use of forcible measures.

B. Bluntschli. To Bluntschli, writing in 1874, the right of a State to p

nationals abroad appeared unquestionable. Bluntschli wrote:

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gy py 

means authorized by international law:

a) When the foreign state has proceeded against them in violation 

principles of this law.

b) When ill treatment or injuries received by one of its nationals was no

directly by the foreign state, but it did nothing to oppose such ill treat

injuries.

Each state has the right to request reparation for the injustice, reimbursem

the injuries caused, and to demand, according to the circumstances, gua

against the commission of similar acts.8

Bluntschli illustrated this principle with several examples, in

State’s enslaving of another State’s nationals, depriving them of thei

destroying their goods, treating them with cruelty, violating treatie

merce, and not respecting the law of nations governing the relation

States.9 As an example of State practice in this regard, Bluntschli 

British military expedition against the King of Abyssinia in 1867 who 

free British nationals whom the king illegally held.10 According to B

this example involved an exercise of the right of forcible prote

excellence.

Bluntschli expanded his examination to the situation where th

State citizen, and not the State itself, commits the injurious act. In su

he argued, the allegedly injured person or persons first must seek a 

the courts of the State in which the injury occurred. However, if tha

fuses or otherwise fails to render justice, the State of which the injured 

national may intervene.11

At the same time, Bluntschli limited the principle of protection

non-forcible protection—to times where there was no internal stri

war in the foreign State.12 His rationale for this position appears to 

State should not be held responsible for acts over which it has no con

likely to be the case in such circumstances. As is apparent, this reaso

trates Bluntschli’s assumption of the inseparability of the corollary pr

the right of diplomatic protection and State responsibility.

In support of this limitation upon the right of protection, Blunts

several examples, including the Don Pacifico case in 1849; the notes 

Schwarzenberg on 24 April 1850 and Prince Nesselrode on 2 May 18

effect that a State forced by revolution to take one of its cities con

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insurgents should not be obliged to indemnify foreigners who by chan

jured in the process; the refusal of the United States to indemnify Sp

tionals injured in New Orleans in 1851; the U.S. Civil War; and the d

the Great Powers in resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict on 15 Janua

In contrast to Phillimore, Bluntschi made no reference to the 

writings of Grotius and Vattel. Instead, he merely stated that a right a

protection existed and cited several supporting examples. As can be 

the above discussion, however, Bluntschli—like Phillimore—a

viewed the right of protection as involving principally diplomatic, ra

forcible, measures.

C. Bonfils. Writing in 1894, the Frenchman Bonfils similarly recog

right of a nation to protect its nationals abroad stating, “To recomme

tionals to the authorities of the country in which they have establi

residence, to defend their interests in diplomatic notes, to demand r

for the wrongs which they have suffered . . . is not to intervene; on the 

it is to recognize the sovereignty of the State addressed.”14

Although the above formulation may appear to support only the p

diplomatic protection, it is clear from Bonfils’ description of State pra

his principal concern lay with forcible protection. As examples, Bo

the French blockade of Argentine ports in 1838-1840,15 as well as 

stages of the combined action of England, Spain, and France against 

1861.16 According to Bonfils, this latter example began as a joint eff

tain reparation for damages to nationals of the three States and to en

ico’s compliance with its international agreements. When the effo

into an attempt by Napoleon to install an empire under Maximilian o

the character of the action changed from the protection of nationals 

flagrant intervention.17

Turning to the question of the right to protect nationals who are c

foreign governments, Bonfils again relied on State practice, c

Palmerston Circular.18He observed that “[i]n fact, the European Gov

have intervened in favor of their nationals who had lent money to fo

ernments, against weak states, incapable of resisting, but not again

States. . . .”19 As an example of such intervention, Bonfils cited the c

erted by France and Britain over Egypt in 1876 to protect the inves

their nationals.20 Clearly, for Bonfils the right of forcible protection 

to both creditor and property rights of a State’s nationals as well as th

tion of their lives.

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D. Pradier

Fodere. The Frenchman PradierFodere, writing in 1885, 

the right of forcible protection of nationals and their property abroad 

in the writings of the “classical” publicists, particularly Vattel. Acc

Pradier-Fodere, “[i]t is the duty of all states to protect their nationals 

countries by all means which international law authorizes.”21 Citing 

stated further that States possess “the right to obtain justice by force

not be done otherwise.”22

Pradier-Fodere, however, recognized certain restrictions upon th

of the right of protection. Thus, a foreigner who had become dom

State had less justification to call upon his government for protecti

transient foreigner.23 In addition, he observed that in most cases prote

accomplished more effectively by diplomatic demands for compensa

by forcible self-help.24 Nevertheless, he pointed to certain examples 

sort to force or the threat thereof was justified as a protective measu

regard he cited the Anglo-French control of Egypt in 1876 to protect 

ests of British and French creditors,25 as well as the threatened Ang

intervention in the Ottoman Empire in 1859 to remodel its financia

E. Westlake. Westlake, an Englishman writing in 1904, offered an exte

cussion of the right to protect nationals abroad under the heading of 

justice.” “If [foreign States] are wanting either to the judicial or to the 

trative department,” he argued, “the state to which a foreigner belo

claim to step in for his protection which often has this in common wit

claims, that the justice which the foreign power demands for its sub

measurable by definite rules.”27 In support of this somewhat amorpho

sition, Westlake cited Vattel,28 the “general conscience of the people

pean civilization,”29 and several statements by officials of 

government.30 Westlake, like Bluntschli, recognized an important 

on the right to protect nationals abroad. “During an insurrection,” h

“the best will on the part of the state government, backed by the best 

often unable to prevent or to punish regrettable occurrences. In 

circumstances it is not usual for a state to indemnify its own subjec

foreigners can have no better claim than nationals in a matter not g

recognized as one for indemnity. . . .”31

Westlake also considered the right of protection in the case of co

claims. Examining, first, U.S. practice in this regard, he noted the ado

cautious policy. Citing statements by Secretary of State Seward in 

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Secretary of State Fish in 1870, Westlake concluded that U.S. nation

ing in foreign States had “assumed the risk” of such ventures, and tha

government normally would not intervene on their behalf.32 Here ca

the developmemt of the concept that in financial matters, (

debtor-creditor relationships) that States would not intervene with fo

half of a national who had contracted with a foreign State or one of it

F. Oppenheim. Oppenheim, another Englishman writing in 1905, r

the validity of the right of forcible protection. According to Oppenh

a universally recognized customary rule of the “Law of Nations” ev

holds a right of protection over its citizens abroad. . . .33 In his view, 

was discretionary, not obligatory.34 Oppenheim recognized several 

which the right might be enforced, including diplomatic notes, reto

reprisals, and intervention or war where necessary.35

Oppenheim offered little guidance about which protective techn

appropriate in a particular case. Instead, he merely stated that “[e]

depends upon the merits of the individual case and must be left to t

tion of the State concerned.”36 However, he did mention certain crit

State might consider in exercising its discretion, including “wh

wronged foreigner was only traveling through or had settled down in 

try, whether his behavior has been provocative or not, how far the for

ernment identified itself with the acts of officials or subjects, and the 

G. Moore. Writing in 1905 on the subject of U.S. diplomacy, Joh

Moore also addressed the question of whether forcible self-help cou

to protect nationals and their property abroad.38 Underlying his discu

the proposition that ‘‘[a]mong the rules of conduct prescribed for th

States by the statesmen who formulated its foreign policy, none was c

to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that w

bade intervention in the political affairs of other nations.”39 Howev

maintained that “[t]he right of the government to intervene for the p

of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted

such action withheld in proper cases.”40 Moore supplemented this bri

with a careful description of a large number of instances of interve

such protective purposes.41

H. Stockton. A brief discussion of the right of forcible protection of the 

property of nationals abroad is afforded by the work of Charles H. St

U.S. naval officer and legal scholar writing in 1911. Departing 

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traditional emphasis upon diplomatic pressures to protect nationa

Stockton proposed that special measures be utilized in situations 

“weak states with unstable governments.” In such situations, he arg

times occurs that citizens abroad must be protected at once, not by d

representation; there is not time for that, but by the employmen

force.”42 Stockton invoked as authority for his position the appropr

regulations governing the use of naval force.43 Stockton also discuss

measures that might be justified in the case of another class of gov

the “semi-civilized or barbarous.” In these situations, “intervention b

behalf of citizens domiciled or sojourning there is a more common m

these countries the employment of naval forces is the principal mea

protection, added thereto at times by landing of military detachmen

I. Clark. The right of a State to protect its nationals and their proper

was spelled out in considerable detail by J. Reuben Clark, writing a

for the U.S. Department of State in 1912.45 According to Clark, the 

of such a right often was obscured by the tendency that many interna

writers exhibited to apply the same strictures to the protection of 

abroad that they applied to political interventions.46 When a State’s 

employing forcible self-help was simply “the protection of citizens or s

until the government concerned is willing or able itself to afford th

tion,”47 he believed it not subject to the same criticisms as a purely po

tervention. From an analysis of the writings of the many authorities c

study,48 Clark concluded that:

There is considerable authority for the proposition that such interposition 

State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of affording a

protection to its citizens resident in the other, as well as for the protectio

property of such citizens, is not only not improper, but, on the contrary, 

upon, is in accord with, and is the exercise of a right recognized by intern

law.49

The remainder of Clark’s study comprises an extensive listing of in

which the United States had acted in accordance with this right o

protection.

J. Hodges. Henry Hodges, a U.S. author writing in 1915, discussed th

forcible protection under the rubric of “non-political intervention.”50 

fiable rationales for such intervention consisted of the protection o

the denial of justice and the protection of missionaries. All three 

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categories include situations, which could fall within the principle o

protection.

Regarding his rationale for the protection of citizens, Hodges st

“[w]hen order is neglected by, or is impossible for the foreign governm

the more advanced state has a right to intervene for the protection 

and property of its citizens.”51 According to Hodges the measures a p

State could take might involve, “the establishment and enforcemen

degree of law and order in that community.”52

With reference to the “denial of justice” justification for inte

Hodges adopted the view of Secretary of State Bayard, who had stat

the State to which a foreigner belongs may intervene for his protect

he has been denied ordinary justice in a foreign country, and also in t

a plain violation of the substance of natural justice is a proposition u

recognized.”53 In contrast to the protection of citizens justification

discussion of denial of justice appears to be geared more to diplomat

forcible measures of protection.54

“Respecting the protection of missionaries,” Hodges noted, “th

States shows about the same consideration as she does in respect 

classes of citizens resident abroad.”55 Thus, according to Hodges, “[t]

States does not go so far in these matters as do some of the Europ

which undertake to assume a limited protectorship over Christian c

ties, especially in Turkey.”56 In addition, the examples cited by Hod

regard, such as the Caroline case and Pelew Islands dispute in 1893

that such protection under those facts is limited to diplomatic as o

forcible measures.58

K. Borchard. In discussing U.S. practice, Edwin Borchard observed in 

‘‘[t]he army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of c

their property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the 

ernment has failed, through inability or unwillingness, to afford adeq

tection to the persons or property of the foreigners in question.”59 H

consisted primarily of a description of U.S. practice with a minimum o

ical discussion. The closest he came to justifying such forcible protect

international law was to cite the Memorandum of J. Reuben Clark wh

that “when confined to the purpose of assuring the safety of citizens 

exacting redress for a delinquent failure to afford local protection, t

must be considered not as a case of intervention, but as non-belliger

position.”60

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Borchard listed at least five purposes for which U.S. military pers

been landed for “non-belligerent interposition” reasons: (1) the pro

U.S. citizens in “disturbed localities”; (2) the punishment of natives f

to U.S. citizens; (3) the suppression of local riots; (4) the collection of 

ties; and (5) the seizure of custom houses as security for the pa

claims.61 He observed that most of these landings had occurred in La

ica as the result of the “hegemony of the United States on this cont

the force of the Monroe Doctrine....”62 Borchard indicated that such 

had not always been against the will of the local government; inde

times they actually had been carried out in response to an express invi

As examples of “non-belligerent interposition” involving the use 

Borchard cited the joint action of the United States and other nation

in 1900 at the time of the Boxer Rebellion,64 as well as the landing of 

troops in Nicaragua in 1910.65 He maintained, however, that such 

tions were “by accident or unavoidable consequence. . . , rather than 

pal design.66 This statement however, seems to be more political t

pronunciation.

Borchard concluded his analysis with an examination of whethe

sional action was required to authorize the use of the armed forces fo

tection of U.S. citizens abroad.67 His conclusion was that such auth

was unnecessary given the then-predominant view that “the Executiv

limited authority to use the armed forces of the United States for p

purposes abroad in any manner and on any occasion he considers exp

Thus, in contrast to most of the writers discussed previously, Borchar

any detailed justification of the right of protection under internation

stead, he analyzed U.S. practice as it had developed and attempte

generalizations therefrom. What emerged was the view that forcible p

was justified, at least for certain “non-belligerent” objectives.

L. Fauchille. In a discussion of intervention and international law, th

man Fauchille, writing in 1922, noted that the use of force to protect 

abroad was a recognized exception to the established principle of inte

law condemning intervention. He noted that many writers thought it 

vention “to force a state, either by reprisals or the force of arms, to fu

ternational obligations or to compensate for an injustice or an insult

then, according to these writers, coercion, violence, but not interve

As an example of such use of force, Fauchille cited the combined 

Great Britain, Spain and France against Mexico in 1861 to obtain c

tion for injuries to their nationals and to ensure the fulfillment by M

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contractual obligations vis

àvis the respective governments.In 

Fauchille cited the combined action against the Chinese during the 

bellion in 1900 to protect the diplomatic representatives and nation

countries concerned,71 as well as the 1902 blockade of Venezuela by G

ain, Germany and Italy to obtain payment on behalf of their nationals 

victims of civil wars in Venezuela.72 Thus the views of Fauchille repre

ther recognition of the right of forcible protection at the levels of bo

and State practice.

M. Hyde. Recognition of the right of forcible protection is evident in 

of Charles Cheney Hyde, writing in 1922.73 Starting from the premise 

ible intervention by one State in the affairs of another was illegal, Hy

nized several exceptions, including self-defense and the prot

nationals.74 With reference to the latter principle, Hyde wrote that “

be shown . . . that . . . acts [of a foreign State] are immediately injuri

nationals of a particular foreign State grounds for interference by it 

acknowledged.”75 It is interesting to note, however, that Hyde seemed 

collective, rather than individual, measures to accomplish such int

“It is the mode of collective interference, through an established a

which characterize[s] the existing tendency and afford[s] hope of the 

ment of a sounder practice than has hitherto prevailed.”76 Hyde’s pr

“collective interference” proved to be the cornerstone of present d

Nations and NATO actions throughout the world.

Hyde noted several instances in which U.S. military forces have e

such interference for the protection of nationals, notably the collec

sures in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900,77 the unilateral action of U.S. na

in the punishment of natives on Formosa in 1867,78 and the landin

forces in Nicaragua and Honduras in 1910 and 1911.79 A common 

present in most of the cases noted by Hyde was that such landings we

eign territory which, in most instances, has been that of a country no

with European civilization, and not, at the time, recognized for all pur

member of the family of nations.80 This comment suggests that, in Hy

forcible protection was easier to justify in instances involving acts in 

adhering to the standards of conduct observed by the more “advanc

pean States.

N. Winfield. In his discussion in 1924 of both valid and invalid groun

tervention in international law, Winfield, an Englishman, rejected a

the use of nationality as a justification for intervention. He observed 

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arguments tend to present themselves in two forms: 

(i) Where the in

are of a nationality identical with that of the party for whose benefit t

vene . . . [and] (ii) Where the grievance is not that there exists such a

as between the interveners and the party, but that it is lacking as be

latter and the State of which it forms a constituent part and from whi

violently to dissociate itself.”81

As to the first, Winfield saw only a moral justification, as internati

tice did not recognize any legal justification. He cited the interventi

tor Emmanuel II and Garibaldi in Sicily in 1860 in this regard.82 

second, Winfield similarly saw no legal justification, citing two serio

tions to its validity. The first was that, if admitted “war might be raise

corner of the world in its vindication.”83 Second, Winfield argued, “[i

lematical whether a single one of the above interventions would... b

of the assisted races, much more whether the remote and doubtful g

derived from them would outweigh the evils of what must almost 

prove a long and bloody struggle.”84

Thus, while it is somewhat unclear whether the situations p

Winfield exactly correlate with the right of protection situations dis

other writers, his general conclusion as to the doctrine’s invalidity c

in marked contrast to their views.

O. Offutt. In his study of instances in which the armed forces of th

States have been used for the protection of U.S. nationals and thei

abroad, Milton Offutt, writing in 1928, offered a brief discussion of th

tional legal principles justifying such use of force. He began by noting 

ous, namely, that “[t]he right of a state to protect by force its citizens 

foreign country when sudden disturbances in the foreign state thr

safety of their lives and property, and when the government under wh

diction they reside has shown itself unable or unwilling to afford the

able protection, is a question which has engaged the attention of mo

on international law.”85

His analysis, like that of most previous writers,86 concluded th

viewed as “non-political” intervention, the use of force for the protect

tionals may be justified. Thus, Offutt observed that “[w]hen, howeve

tinction between political and non-political intervention has been ap

some authorities have held that the use of force for the protection of i

abroad becomes not only a right but, in certain cases, a duty of a 

state; and that the state against which such force is used may not justl

itself aggrieved.”87 In support of this assertion, he relied upon a num

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authorities discussed previously in this chapter, including Oppenheim

and Pradier-Fodere.88

P. Dunn. Frederick Dunn, writing in the decade preceding World W

fered another perspective on the right of forcible protection.89 Alth

central focus of his work was on a State’s right to protect its nation

diplomatically, he did recognize the existence of a right to forcible pro

certain circumstances. “It is only occasionally,” observed Dunn, “wh

are placed in a situation of grave danger from which the normal meth

plomacy cannot extricate them, or where diplomatic negotiation 

other reason is believed to be useless, that forceful intervention is a

place.”90

Although there can be detected in Dunn’s work an undercurren

proval of this type of forcible self-help, he recognized its validity given 

ing international legal and political context. According to Dunn, 

present stage of organization of the international community, the enf

of legal obligations is still left in large measure to the individual stat

what is called ‘self-help’ (a situation that naturally favors the stronger 

the weaker states). Armed intervention is only one of various mea

forcement that have been developed.”91

Thus, although the primary focus of Dunn’s work was on the righ

matic protection, he recognized the existence of a right of forcible pro

cases where the former proved ineffective. It is important to note, 

that Dunn viewed this right not as an absolute one, but as one formed 

exigencies of the existing international legal and political system.

Q. Hindmarsh. Representative of the thought on forcible protection 

als abroad in the decade preceding World War II are the observation

marsh writing in 1933.92 His analysis was two-fold, the first step 

recognition of the frequent use of military and naval forces to accom

protection, and the second step being an exposition and critique of th

tional legal principles allegedly justifying such actions.

Hindmarsh recognized that ‘‘[t]he use of military or naval force a

offending state to compel recognition of alleged international oblig

been a frequent practice of powerful states.”93 As examples, he sing

representative a number of instances of forcible protection by th

States, particularly those instances analyzed by Offutt.94 In addition, 

Hindmarsh pointed to the actions of other powerful States of the day, 

the Italian bombardment of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923 9

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Japanese occupation of Chinese territory in Manchuria in 1931.

H

concluded his survey of State practice with the sound observation th

in a very primitive stage of law can such self-help sanctions be tolera

exercise permits the confusion of law and vengeance, evades impa

ment, and retards the free development of an international legal sys

continuation of self-help in modern international law is as much an 

nism as private vengeance in the legal relations of individuals.”97

Hindmarsh’s analysis of the legal underpinnings of the right of p

was characterized by his rejection of precedent as a justification for th

ued validity of the right of protection in the modern international po

legal system.

Measures of force short of war were constantly employed d

Nineteenth Century and were justified as reprisals. Thus, after a c

practice the validity of such measures became recognized as part of c

international law. States which employed reprisals defended them as n

ultimate sanctions, short of war, for the enforcement of internation

Finally, the practice of reprisals received some support from vague t

concepts such as the rights of existence, self-defense, and independe

custom, necessity, and fundamental right were appealed to in order 

continued resort to State self-help in time of peace. Little thought wa

jurists to the possibility that new conditions of international life mig

custom obsolete and devoid of practical justification, that new and m

tive means of enforcing law might be found, and further, that fun

rights are always conditional upon fundamental duties.98

Hindmarsh argued that such a rationale, while applicable to the N

Century system of independent political units, was no longer approp

System increasingly characterized by interdependence rather than i

ence among States. Accordingly, in his view, the development of an 

tional organization to settle disputes among States, rather than the N

Century principles of unilateral forcible self-help, would best serve m

ternational legal and political conditions.99

R. Accioly. Yet another pre-World War II view of the right of prote

that of the Brazilian jurist Accioly, writing in 1940.100 Following a t

exposition of the right of a State to protect its nationals abroad 

diplomacy, Accioly proceeded to discuss a State’s remedies when su

matic efforts fail. “Should the local authorities declare themselves po

grant the claimed protection or demonstrate their indifference to th

an international conflict may arise; and if there is shown the impossib

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amicable solution to the dispute, the claimant State has the right of re

coercive measures.”101

Thus, Accioly, on the eve of World War II, demonstrated the con

ceptance of the broad right to use forcible protection, not limited to 

wherein the lives and property of a State’s nationals were immediate

As the preceding discussion reveals, the juridical underpinnings o

tional legal principles justifying the use of force to protect nationals 

property abroad are rooted in the writings of the “classical” writers o

tional law, given the many references to the views of Grotius relative 

portance of the citizen to the State and the right of one State to e

rights against another State, by force if necessary.102

Similarly, Wolff’s thoughts, particularly with reference to the valid

use of force to enforce a State’s rights,103 also have influenced many o

writers on the subject of forcible protection.104 Vattel’s position on t

obligation to protect its citizen, albeit limited by a concern for the 

other States,105 finds restatement in the views of subsequent writers o

tection of nationals abroad.106

From this cursory survey of some of the leading publicists, there ca

the gradual development of a principle justifying the forcible protect

tionals and their property abroad. Nevertheless, by the outbreak of W

II the desirability of forcible protection was being questioned by 

number of writers.

NOTES

1. 2 R. Phillimore, International Law 24 (1854).

2. Id. at 25.

3. Id.

4. Id. at 26. See the similar views of Pradier-Fodere at note 21 infra.

5. Id.

6. 42 Brit. & For. State Papers 385 (1852).

7. Id.

8. J. M. Bluntschli, Le Droit International Codifie 223 (1874) (author’s tran

9. Id. at 223 n.1.

10. Id. See the discussion of this incident at page 27 infra.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 224.

13. Id. at 224 n.1.

14. H. Bonfils, Manuel de Droit International Public 159 (1894) (author’s tra

15. Id. at 158. See discussion of this incident at page 25 infra.

16. Id. See the discussion of this incident at page 26 infra.

17. Id. at 158-59.

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p

19. Id.

20. Id. See the discussion of this incident at page 29 infra.

21. F. Pradier-Fodere, Traite de Droit International Public 614 (1885

translation).

22. Id. at 615.

23. Id. at 619. See the similar views of Phillimore at note 1 supra.

24. Id. at 620.

25. Id. at 629-30. See the discussion of this incident at page 29 infra.

26. Id. at 630.

27. 1 J. Westlake, International Law 313 (1904).

28. Id. at 314.

29. Id.

30. Id. at 314-15.

31. Id. at 216. For the views of Bluntschli, see note 8 supra.

32. Id. at 317-18.

33. 1 L Oppenheim, International Law 374 (1905).

34. Id. at 374 n.3.

35. Id. at 375.

36. Id.

37. Id.

38. J.B. Moore, American Diplomacy (1905).

39. Id. at 131.

40. Id.

41. Id. at 132-67.

42. C. Stockton, A Manual of International Law for the Use of Naval Officers 1

43. Id. at 139-41. For a more detailed discussion tracing the development of U

Navy Regulations authorizing the use of force to protect United States nationals 

Appendix II infra. The regulations in force at the time Stockton published his book m

at pages 210-12 infra.

44. Id. at 143. For a similar discussion justifying forcible protection in und

countries, citing the examples of the Boxer Rebellion and revolutionary disturban

America, see Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 Am. J. 

(1910).

45. J. Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces 

1934) (quotes identical to 1912 edition).

46. Id. at 24.

47. Id. at 25.

48. Authorities relied upon by Clark include Bluntschli, Bonfils, Pra

Phillimore, Oppenheim and Westlake. See id. at 25-34.

49. Id. at 25.

50. H. Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention 58 (1915).

51. Id. at 58-59.

52. Id. at 58.

53. Id. at 66.

54. Id. at 65-74.

55. Id. at 74 (emphasis deleted).

56. Id. at 74-75.

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58. Id. at 75-80.

59. E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 448 (1915).

60. Id. See J. Clark, supra note 45, at 24.

61. E. Borchard, supra note 59, at 449.

62. Id. at 451.

63. Id. at 450.

64. Id. at 452. See the discussion of this incident at pages 31-32 and 141-42 in

65. Id. This incident is discussed in Appendix I, at page 149 infra.

66. Id.

67. Id.

68. Id.

69. 1 P. Fauchille, Traite de Droit International Public 582 (1922) (author’s t

70. Id. See the discussion of this incident at page 26 infra.

71. Id. at 583. See the discussion of this incident at pages 31-32 and 141-42 in

72. Id. See the discussion of this incident at page 33 infra.

73. 1 C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the U

(1922).

74. Id. at 117.

75. Id. at 121.

76. Id. at 118.

77. Id. at 350-51. See the discussion of this incident at page pages 31-32 and 14

78. Id. at 352 n.1.

79. Id. at 352 n.2. This incident is discussed in Appendix I, at pages 149-50 in

80. Id. at 351-52.

81. Winfield, The Grounds of Intervention in International Law, 5 Brit. Y.B. 

160 (1924).

82. Id.

83. Id.

84. Id.

85. M. Offutt, The Protection of Intervention in International Law, 5 Brit. 

149, 160 (1924).

86. Id. at 160 n.2.

87. Id. at 2-3.

88. Id. at 3.

89. F. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932).

90. Id. at 19.

91. Id.

92. A. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace: Force Short of War in International Relatio

93. Id. at 75.

94. Id. at 75 n.1.

95. Id. at 79. See the discussion of this incident at pages 33-34 infra.

96. Id. at 80. See the discussion of this incident at pages 35-36 infra.

97. Id. at 82.

98. Id.at 85.

99. Id. at 107-08.

100. H. Accioly, Traite de Droit International (1940).

101. Id. at 289-90 (author’s translation).

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gpJp

supra note 89, at 46-48; and A. Hindmarsh, supra note 92, at 87 n.1.

103. Wolff, Jus Gentium 138-39 (J. Scott ed. 1934).

104. Although not cited directly, Wolff’s justification for the use of force finds su

works of Bonfils, Pradier-Fodere, and Oppenheim, among the authors discussed in th

105. E. Vattel, The Law of Nations 161 (J. Chitty ed. 1883).

106. See e.g., F. Pradier-Fodere, supra note 21, at 615; 1 J. Westlake, supra note 

J.B. Moore, supra note 38, at 131-32; F. Dunn, supra note 89, at 48-53; and A. Hindm

note 92, at 87 n.1.

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Chapter III

State Practice During the

Pre-United Nations Period

The State practices reviewed in Chapter III provide the ba

against which many of the traditionalist writers based and just

pronouncements of the era.

A. French Blockade of Argentina. 1838-1840.

1 Following the adoption 

tremely restrictive import and export tariff policy by the Argentine go

in the 1830s, many European powers whose nationals were trading wi

tina grew quite concerned. Under Article IV of the Treaty of Am

merce, and Navigation between Great Britain and the United Provin

de la Plata, signed at Buenos Aires on 2 February 1825, British merc

been accorded most-favored-nation status.2 In 1836, when a frustrat

diplomat trying to negotiate a similar agreement with the Argentin

ment threatened naval intervention to roll back stiff duties, as well 

edy the alleged mistreatment and imprisonment of French n

Argentina responded with an even more stringent tariff law. Th

France suspended diplomatic relations and several years later sent a f

Admiral Leblanc to initiate a blockade of the capital, Buenos Aires. T

ade was lifted after two years pursuant to a Convention between F

Argentina that was signed on 29 October 1840.4 While the specific 

France with respect to the protection of her nationals went unmentio

States agreed to accord the nationals of each other most-favored-nat

ment in the future.

The French blockade had a severe impact on Argentina. Betwee

ond half of 1837 and the second half of 1838, imports dropped in valu

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to 4 million paper pesos. Indirectly, however, the blockade, togethe

earlier blockade by Brazil in 1826 and a subsequent joint blockade 

and Great Britain in 1845, had a beneficial effect on the Argentine b

try. When the slaughter of animals for export stopped, cattle herds 

greatly. Where there had been an estimated 3 to 4 million cattle in 

heads increased to 10 to 12 million head by 1850.5

Although Bonfils cited this incident as illustrative of a doctrine p

forcible protection,6 from the perspective of France it appears that t

ade was merely a military measure with the political and economic ob

advancing France’s commercial interests in Argentina. Perhaps mo

tantly France was defending a “point of honor” by not submitting to th

of the Argentine government. The claims of French nationals were 

importance.7

B. Great Britain, Spain and France in Mexico. 1861.8 During the intern

ongoing in Mexico in the late 1850s, foreign nationals were indiscrim

sulted, robbed, injured, and murdered. Moreover, various financial o

owed foreign nationals by the Mexican government were not met. T

major States that had nationals injured and debts unpaid—Grea

Spain, and France—collectively agreed in the Convention of Londo

31 October 1861,9 to intervene in Mexico with forces of sufficient si

and occupy different fortresses and military positions on the coast o

Article II of the Convention specified that:

The High Contracting Parties engage not to seek for themselves, thro

employment of the coercive measures contemplated by the present conv

any acquisition of territory, nor any particular advantage, nor to exercis

internal affairs of Mexico any influence tending to abridge the right 

Mexican nation freely to decide upon and establish the form of its governm

The signatories of the Convention agreed that the expedition

should consist of 6,000 Spaniards and 3,000 Frenchmen, with Gre

contributing a naval division and a landing force of 700 Marines.

On 14 December 1861, the Spanish fleet sailed into the harbor of V

and three days later disembarked troops that entered the city. The 

French and British expedition arrived at Vera Cruz on 7 January 18

once began to disembark more troops.11

Subsequent conferences between the three Powers revealed growi

sion over the purpose of the intervention. France revealed intention

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the mere exaction of damages for wrongs done to its nationals, wh

Britain and Spain continued to adhere to Article II of the Conventio

don. Nevertheless, negotiations were initiated with the Mexica

ment.12 As the negotiations proceeded, however, the lack of consen

parties to the Convention emerged. France sent substantial reinforce

legedly to guard against any disaster to the French troops as they mar

the interior of the country. Additional disputes arose over France’s 

tion back into the country of exiled Mexicans who had supported 

monarchy in opposition to the two ruling Constitutionalists.13

The final rupture occurred at a conference held between the thr

on 9 April 1862. Great Britain and Spain declared that, if France did 

sociate herself from the exiled Mexicans and continued to support 

determination not to take part in pending negotiations with the Mex

ernment, they would withdraw their troops from Mexico. When the F

fused, the British and Spanish terminated their role in the inte

lowering their flags at Vera Cruz at sunset on 24 April 1862. France 

ated an independent policy aimed at the installation of a French-c

monarch under Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria.14

Both Bonfils and Fauchille cited this incident as an example of the 

ble use of force by States to rectify injustices to their nationals.15 It do

pear, however, that the intervening States ever justified their action

legal terms. Implicit in the Convention of London, though, was the n

an intervention for such purposes was permissible if conducted with

limits. That is to say, forcible intervention to rectify wrongs was leg

long as it did not severely impair the sovereignty of the country agai

the action was undertaken.16

C. Great Britain and Abyssinia. 1867-1868.

17 Following a period of 

Theodore (Kassa) became Emperor of Abyssinia on 7 February 1855. 

lishmen, Walter Plowden, who later was named British Consul to A

and John Bell, aided Theodore’s rise to, and consolidation of, pow

Plowden and Bell, however, were killed during an uprising against Th

1860. After their deaths, the Emperor began to lose hold over his ar

ing in his “killing and burning alive thousands in a desperate attem

face by his frightfulness.”18

In November 1861, the British government, having scant inform

garding the situation in Abyssinia, decided to send Captain C

Cameron as Plowden’s successor.19 Upon receiving Cameron in Ju

the Emperor told the British consul the persons that had murdered 

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and Bell had been slain and that he intended to crush the Turks and 

tians.21 In a letter to Queen Victoria, Theodore suggested the establi

an Abyssinian Embassy in Great Britain.22 When this letter, delay

mails, elicited no reply,23 Theodore took it as an insult to himself an

tion, summarily imprisoning Cameron and certain other Englishmen

In May 1864, the British government sent Hormuzd Rassam, an a

Colonel W. L. Merewether, Political Resident at Aden, to obtain the 

Cameron and his fellow prisoners.25 After many delays,26 Rassam 

Theodore on 28 January 1866, and the latter announced the 

Cameron and his companions the following day.27 In July 1866, how

King again imprisoned Cameron, along with Rassam and 60 other E

“on the pretext that . . . [the British] Government ha[d] an intentio

ing troops to make war against him.”28

The British government responded to Theodore’s actions by send

cue expedition under Sir Robert Napier that arrived in Abyssinia 

Overcoming the rugged terrain, Napier’s expedition finally encounte

dore’s army at Arogee on 10 April 1868. The British, possessing mod

ons with superior firepower, soon overwhelmed Theodore’s forces an

the fortress at Magdala on Easter Monday, 1868. Theodore committ

upon their entry.30

Although the Emperor’s rivals urged Napier to settle the successio

contented himself with the rescue of the prisoners and began his marc

the coast.31 When Napier left Abyssinia, in May 1868, the country im

plunged into civil war among rival chieftains.

Bluntschli cited this incident as illustrative of a “state’s right an

protect its nationals abroad by all means authorized by internation

and in this case by the use of force. Great Britain, however, did not 

mention this international law argument in its ultimatum to Theo

stead, it advanced the broad rationale that

[i]t is impossible for the Queen any longer to endure such conduct on th

your Majesty, and Her Majesty has therefore given orders that a military f

should without delay enter your dominions, and obtain from you by 

concession which you have hitherto withheld from friendly representati

The clear import of this language, of course, is that Great Britain c

its decision to use force to be a legitimate alternative to “friendly re

tion” and/or diplomacy.

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D. Great Britain in Honduras. 1873.

In the summer of 1873, Hondu

under the command of a General Stracber seized the castle at Omoa

ras, imprisoned the British subjects resident there and destroyed mo

property. In August 1873, when the British Man-of-War Niobe 

Omoa, its Captain made several demands of General Stracber, in

$100,000 indemnity for the losses sustained by British subjects, the i

surrender of the British subjects held prisoner and a 21-gun salute to 

lish flag.

General Stracber replied that the demands were unjust, as he had n

was not responsible for the British subjects and that responsibility res

Honduran government. The captain of the Niobe thereupon reduc

demnity portion of the demand to $50,000, giving General Stracb

p.m. on 19 August to comply with it and the other two demands. If 

fied, the Captain warned that the Niobe would bombard the castle. W

isfactory response was not forthcoming, the bombardment began at 

continuing until the following day when General Stracber, at last acc

British demands, turned over the British prisoners and signed a d

binding the Honduran government to pay all the losses claimed.

Clark listed this incident as an example of the use of force to prote

als by States other than the United States.35 Again, although Great B

parently offered no international law argument in support of its use of 

circumstances of this incident illustrate the readiness with which a d

employ force to protect British subjects abroad was reached, a read

sumably buttressed by the belief that such an action was compatible 

norms of international law.

E. Great Britain and France in Egypt. 1876-1879.

36 Under the rule of M

Said, Egypt in 1854 granted a concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps, a re

cial of the French diplomatic service, for the construction of a ship ca

the Isthmus of Suez. The grant of the Suez Canal concession was th

sode in an era of extravagant development and foreign speculation 

Egyptian rulers, in their rush to encourage foreign merchants, who 

them with short-term loans and acted as import and export agents for 

government monopolies, greatly extended the freedom of European

processes of Egyptian civil and criminal law. The privileged position 

them naturally acted as a powerful magnet to attract persons from al

rope to Egypt. Between 1854 and 1874, the number of European nati

dent in Egypt increased from roughly 15,000 to 85,000. More impor

the numerical increase, however, was that European interests—in m

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assisted by diplomatic intervention

acquired a virtual strangleho

economic life of the country.

Ismail, who succeeded Mohamed Said in 1863, sought simultan

modernize Egypt, to enrich his own extensive private estates and to 

an enlarged Egyptian Empire. He attempted to accomplish these g

money borrowed from foreign merchants and through long-term l

tracted with foreign banking houses. However by 1875 Ismail’s finan

tion had deteriorated so greatly that he asked the British governmen

for assistance in managing the receipts and revenues of Egypt, but a

vice on all financial matters.

The British government sent, as an envoy to Egypt, the Paymaster

Stephen Cave. Cave’s report recommended that a substantial loan b

aid Egyptian finances. Following additional negotiations between Gre

and France, which also had a large number of nationals who were cr

Egypt, a joint proposal was presented to the Egyptian government

agreement being reached on 14 November 1875. Under the settlem

stantial portion of the Egyptian debt was liquidated and British and F

tionals were appointed to a number of high financial posts within the 

government. Pradier-Fodere cited this incident as a “very striking e

foreign intervention in the internal affairs of another state with a vi

protection of the nationals of the intervening powers.”37

Although the example follows a discussion of the right to use force 

nationals, it is clear that the actions of Great Britain and France invo

diplomatic, rather than forcible, measures. Bonfils also referred to thi

in his discussion of the protection of nationals abroad.38 For him it 

the fact that “European Governments have intervened in favor of the

als who had lent money to foreign governments, against weak states, 

of resisting, but not against strong States. . . .”39 Certainly this inc

though not illustrative of the principle of forcible protection, indic

again that strong States were inclined to intervene with weaker on

cially as well as forcibly, to protect the interests of their nationals.

F. France and Portugal. 1893-1894.

40 Pursuant to a decree of 9 Novem

the Portuguese government declared the liquidation of the Portugues

Company, many of whose creditors were foreigners, including 

French citizens. Although the decree provided that a commission 

formed to direct the disposition of the company’s assets, only two o

members represented the interests of the foreign creditors. Coinciden

commission’s decision, published on 5 January 1894, had the effect o

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the Portuguese government and certain preferred creditors to the de

the foreign creditors.

Frustrated by this turn of events, the French creditors asked the

ment for assistance in obtaining a fair share of the company’s as

French government promptly adopted their claims and vigorously co

to Portugal.41 Indeed, France went so far as to threaten the use of for

the wronged creditors not be compensated satisfactorily.42 The P

government quickly acceded to the French demands and compen

French creditors in a more equitable manner. Thus, although forc

was not employed in this instance, it certainly was contemplated by 

the ultimate means of obtaining redress for its creditors.

Bonfils referred to this incident as an example of the use by Sta

threat of force to protect their nationals who were creditors of foreig

ments.43 He viewed this type of protection as peculiarly susceptible to 

nate consequences in terms of popular resentment against foreigner

straining of international relations.44

G. Boxer Rebellion. China. 1900.

45 The last decade of the Nineteenth 

was marked by violent anti-colonial agitation in China. Behind mu

turbulence was the Society of Harmonious Fists, or “Boxers.” Alth

posed to Christianity and Europeans, the Boxers’ prime goal was to 

Manchus from the Throne and end the Ching dynasty that seemed 

of preserving the Chinese Empire intact. By 1899, however, the Boxe

ingly directed their attacks against the “foreign devils,” who they beli

the real source of China’s ills.

During the spring of 1900, attacks on foreigners in China, largely 

stigation of the Boxers, became increasingly frequent. By 9 June the 

the foreign legations located in the capital, Peking, had become very r

of such danger prompted the governments affected (primarily Grea

France, Russia, Germany, the United States, Japan, Italy, and Aus

gary) to direct their naval forces in the area of China to take any actio

necessary to save the legations. Admiral Seymour, the commander o

ish fleet, assembled an international force of about 2,000 men on 1

proceed to Peking to defend the legations. The force made extre

progress toward Peking, however, as the Boxers had destroyed the rail

On 15 June, when it had become apparent that the relief force could 

no further, the decision was made to fall back to the coast.

Meanwhile, the attacks on the legations in Peking had increased 

sity, with the German Minister having been killed. Upon hearing this 

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allied military forces attacked and captured Chinese government for

in order to establish a coastal beachhead. Next, in mid-July, they cap

city of Tientsin, where another group of foreigners was endangered. 

part of July and early August were spent in building up an expeditio

to rescue the legations. On 4 August, a relief column, numbering abo

men, left Tientsin for Peking, arriving on 14 August, 1900.

The aftermath of the rescue included a number of punitive expe

areas with a reputation of anti-foreignism. The most noted of the pun

sures was the destruction of the city of Pao Ting Fu by a joint expediti

ish, German, and French forces.46 Moreover, a series of trials wer

punish persons responsible for the atrocities committed by the Box

executions and fines followed. Finally, on 1 February 1901, the Box

was dissolved and membership in any “anti-foreign” society was decl

a crime punishable by death. Later that same year, China agreed to p

indemnity and to prohibit the importation of arms for a period of tw

This incident was cited by Borchard,48 Fauchille,49 and Hyde50 as 

ple of the forcible protection of nationals abroad. Probably the fact t

was viewed as semi-barbarous by most Western States, plus the exi

the moment, accounted most directly for this use of force, which 

commentators all regarded as permissible under international law.

H. Franco-Turkish Conflict. 1901.

51 During the last decade of the N

Century, several French creditors had difficulty with the Turkish gov

Under a contract dated 7 November 1890, a French corporation agre

struct docks in Constantinople. As soon as the docks were comple

ever, the Turkish government seized them without compensating th

builders. Negotiations between the French and Turkish governmen

matter proved unsatisfactory to the French. In addition, substantial lo

to the Turkish government by two French banking concerns wen

Finally, the Turkish government refused to honor a concession it mad

to cede territory to a French group in return for destroying malari

mosquitos in an area of Turkey.

By 1901, it had become apparent to France that diplomatic measu

were not going to resolve the claims. The French government the

cided to employ forcible measures by seizing the customs house on th

island of Mytilini and retaining the funds and goods contained therein 

Turkish government honored its commitments. A French fleet was s

Mediterranean which seized and occupied the customs house on 7 N

1901. Little force was involved in this action, since the governor of 

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actually acquiesced in the occupation and sent the Turkish garrison 

land’s interior to avoid any encounter with the French forces. Th

government promptly agreed to the French demands and the occupa

ended.

Bonfils referred briefly to the Mytilini incident in his discussion o

ible protection of nationals who are creditors of foreign governmen

the obvious, however, that such intervention “excites the resentm

people against foreigners [and] complicates international relations.”

the effects of this incident, one of many, it illustrates that the use o

protect nationals abroad and enforce creditor’s rights in such situa

common at the turn of the century.

I. Great Britain, Germany and Italy in Venezuela. 1902. As the result o

in Venezuela from 1898 to 1900, British, German and Italian nati

tained large amounts of property damage.53 The strenuous protests 

Britain and Germany yielding no results, on 13 November 1902, the 

agreed on joint action.54 In the event that Venezuela failed to acced

demands, they agreed to utilize coercive measures.55

On 2 December 1902, the diplomatic representatives of the British 

man governments at Caracas presented an ultimatum to the Venezu

ernment which made clear that in the event of an unsatisfactory 

forcible measures would be employed.56 On 3 December, Italy asked 

lowed to join in the ultimatum against Venezuela as an ally of Great B

Germany, a request quickly granted.57 The demands not having bee

10 December the three States imposed a blockade under which they 

disabled four small Venezuelan ships.58 Three days later the Venezu

ernment, through the U.S. Embassy in London, requested arbitrat

claims in question, proposing certain conditions. The allies finally 

this method of settlement.59

Fauchille referred to this incident as an example of the justifiable u

by a State to compel another State “to fulfill its international obligat

compensate for an injustice or an insult.”60 However, it does not ap

the three States justified their use of force in legal terms at the time

J. Italian Invasion of Corfu. 1923.

62 The establishment of Albania foll

Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 left the delimitation of its borders as one 

resolved issues facing the Great Powers when World War I comm

1914. Following the war, with Albania’s frontiers still unfixed and b

putes increasing, the British government proposed that a Conf

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Ambassadors fix the frontiers. On 9 November 1921, that conferenc

to delimit the Albanian borders on the basis of lines drawn up befor

with a special delimitation commission to mark the borders. The co

arrived in Albania on 7 March 1922. The relationship of the comm

its Italian President, General Enrico Tellini, to the Greek governmen

Greek delegate attached to the commission, was extremely strained 

out. On 27 August 1923, General Tellini and his staff were murdered 

Greek-Albanian frontier, in Greek territory.

Mussolini, by then in control of Italy, instructed his ambassador in 

make “the most energetic protests” to the Greek government. Follo

eral communications with the Ambassador, on 29 August Mussolin

series of demands to the Greek government. These demands include

ogy by the highest Greek military authority, a funeral service in th

Catholic Cathedral in Athens to be attended by all the members of 

government, a criminal investigation to be completed within five day

arrival of an Italian military attache, capital punishment for those p

sponsible for the murders, an indemnity of 50 million Italian lire paya

five days; honor to be shown the Italian flag, and military honors to 

the corpses on the occasion of their transfer to an Italian vessel.

The following day the Greek government rejected the bulk of 

mands, specifically, the investigation by the Greek authorities, capit

ment for the murderers, and the indemnity. Orders were issued im

from Rome to Admiral Emilio Solari, commander of the Italian navy

ceed at once to the occupation of [the Greek island of] Corfu.”63 O

gust, Italian naval units bombarded and occupied the island, an o

lasting until 27 September 1923.

Hindmarsh cited this incident as an example of the practice of 

States to employ military force against offending weaker States to co

ognition of alleged international obligations.64 The incident, on its 

volved a “point of honor” in the protection of nationals abroad

remained following their murder.

K. French Bombardment of Damascus. 1925.65 The peace settlement 

World War I included the division of parts of the Ottoman Em

“mandates” of the League of Nations under the tutelage of the victori

One such area was Syria, which was placed under French control u

time as it was deemed ready to take its place as an independent natio

rule proved oppressive to the Syrian population, however, and the 

discontent led to full-scale revolution in 1925.

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Originating with the Druzes, a fiercely nationalistic sect living in t

tains southeast of Damascus, the revolt quickly gained momentum. B

tober 1925, Damascus was severely threatened, the revolutionari

entered and occupied a part of the city.

At this point the French authorities, “without notice or declaration 

law, and without warning to foreign residents other than French,”66 first 

French troops and then proceeded to bombard the city with artillery an

The bombardment, which continued for 24 hours and caused extensiv

ceased only when the city officials agreed to pay an indemnity of £100,0

and 3,000 rifles. The indemnity, in fact, never was paid. The bombardm

creased the resistance of the rebels that the revolt was not put down un

Bowett has cited this incident as a classic example of a reprisal, di

ing it from the use of force to protect the lives and property of nationa

which he characterizes as a permissible action of self-defense.67 The 

tion offered by France at the time centered on the contention that 

rebellion was merely “banditry and brigandage,” and hence any mea

to suppress it were merely police actions clearly within the exclusiv

tion of France, the legally constituted authority in Syria.68 France 

other principle of international law to support its actions. In fact

French nationals were being protected by the use of force, it seems 

that France was merely re-establishing its control of the city in accord

its mandate by the League of Nations.

L. Japan and China. 1931-1932.

69 On 18 September 1931, an exp

curred on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway in southe

The Japanese argued that Chinese soldiers had caused the incident, a 

(albeit actually untrue) claim because at the time there was serious fr

tween the Chinese and Japanese in the Japanese-leased territory alon

way zone. Additionally, the Chinese authorities’ desired the reducti

elimination of Japanese interests in Manchuria. Within 24 hours aft

plosion, Japanese forces occupied Mukden and several other import

in South Manchuria.70

The Japanese army, which soon controlled all of Manchuria, pro

set up an “independent” State of Manchukuo with a former Empero

at its head. On 25 August 1932, the Japanese government recognized 

of Manchukuo and concluded a treaty of alliance with it. The Manch

ernment assumed control over the custom houses of its ports and th

came self-sufficient. The League of Nations formed an investigat

named the “Lytton Commission,” to investigate the situation. It issue

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on 1 October 1932, condemning the Japanese invasion as an illegal 

gression in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations.71

The Japanese government responded to these charges of aggres

several arguments,72 one of which was that the purpose of the inv

merely to protect Japanese nationals and treaty rights in China. To su

claim, the Japanese government asserted not only that such a use 

fense was recognized as an accepted principle of customary internat

but also that it was not prohibited by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 

lawed war as an instrument of national policy.73

Hindmarsh concluded that the Manchurian invasion illustrate

proper use of the forcible protection rationale by powerful States as 

achieve control over weaker States.74 His characterization prove

given Japan’s subsequent resort to the “forcible protection” argume

face of facts rather clearly indicating that its motives were essentia

sive, and by Japan’s subsequent actions leading up to, and during, Worl

M. Germany in Czechoslovakia. 1938.

75 Coincident with the rise of N

Germany in the 1930s was an intense nationalism on the part of th

ethnic community in the Sudetenland, an area of Czechoslovakia. B

in 1937, Germany’s support for the “Sudeten Germans” became in

overt. In April 1938, at Berlin’s urging, the German nationalist 

Czechoslovakia presented the Czech government with a number of 

popularly known as the “Karlsbad Program,” relating chiefly to auto

the Sudetenland. Following the Czech government’s rejection of 

mands, Germany began to escalate its propaganda attacks against C

vakia for alleged mistreatment of its German ethnic minority.

During the next several months, intense negotiations were conducte

Germany and Czechoslovakia and the latter’s allies, Britain and France. T

matic activity culminated in the Munich agreement of 30 September 193

slovakia ceded the Sudetenland to Germany and the Western governmen

Britain and France acknowledged that Czechoslovakia was both politicall

nomically within Germany’s sphere of influence. Confronted by a stron

and with weak allies, the Czech government and its armed forces had litt

tive but to acquiesce in the German demands. German troops subsequen

and occupied the Sudetenland on 1 October 1938, meeting no resistanc

The Munich crisis clearly illustrates the abuses to which the princip

ible protection may be put.76 Indeed, as Brownlie has argued, the crisis 

several incidents that led to the drafting of Article 2(4) of the Unite

Charter—which purports to prevent States from using force for such pu

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NOTES

1. An extensive discussion of the French blockade of Argentina may be found 

Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata: 1838-50, at 22-91 (1929). See also Y. R

Argentine Republic 54-55 (1945); H. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteen

241-80 (1960).

2. 3 L. Hertslet, Commercial Treaties 44, 45 (1841). Cady stated that this t

British merchants “on a status of absolute equality with Argentine citizens in th

trading privileges, port and tonnage dues, etc.” J. Cady, supra note 1, at 18.

3. According to Cady:

[t]he specific claims... were neither numerous, important, nor particular

founded. Two of them concerned instances of enforced service in the Argentin

Another was the case of a French sutler in [the Argentine] army . . . who ha

summarily imprisoned for six months for possession of property belonging 

Government. The most serious claim was that of the widow of a Swiss printer 

Bacle, claiming French protection, who died at his home in January 1838, from 

contracted while serving a prison term for revolutionary intrigue. A fifth con

an acknowledged claim of a French citizen named Despony, who had sustained

disorder of 1821, considerable damage to his business.

Id. at 26-27.

4. Convention Between France and Buenos Ayres for the Settlement of Diffe

29, 1840, 29 Brit. & For. State Papers 1089 (1840-1841).

5. Y. Rennie, supra note 1, at 55.

6. H. Bonfils, Manuel de Droit International Public 158 (1894).

7. “The particular merits of the claims were never . . . the primary subject of the 

With a will for peace on either side, a settlement might easily have been arranged; 

became a point of honor with each party not to surrender to the formal demands of t

Cady, supra note 1, at 27.

8. A detailed discussion of this incident may be found in J. Musser, The Estab

Maximilian’s Empire in Mexico chs. 1-4 (1918).

9. Convention Between Great Britain, Spain and France Relative to 

Operations Against Mexico, Oct. 31, 1861, 51 Brit. & For. State Papers 63 (1860-

10. Id. at 64 (author’s translation).

11. J. Musser, supra note 8, at 33.

12. The terms of the joint note were vague. Its apparent purpose was sol

negotiations with Mexico. See 53 Brit. & For. State Papers 411-12 (1862-1863).

13. J. Musser, supra note 8, at 41.

14. Id.

15. See H. Bonfils, supra note 6, at 158; 1 P. Fauchille, Traite de Droit Internat

582 (1922). Both authors noted, however, that France’s subsequent conduct 

“flagrant intervention.”

16. J. Musser, supra note 8, at 16.

17. A detailed description of the British intervention in Abyssinia may be found 

The March to Magdala: The Abyssinian War of 1868 (1970). See also A. Jones & E

History of Ethiopia 129-34 (1970); A. Moorehead, The Blue Nile 257 (1962).

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Jp

19. See 53 Brit. & For. State Papers 51-54 (1852-63); 54 id. at 1153-55 (1863-

20. 55 id. at 1423 (1864-65). Cameron was delayed in reaching Gondar, wher

resided, when the Foreign Office ordered him to accompany the Duke of Saxe C

excursion into the northern frontier of Abyssinia.

21. 53 id. at 55.

22. Id. at 62-63.

23. Cameron, who was to deliver the letter, was stopped on his way to the coa

chief in Tigre. The stop delayed the transmission of the letter, which did not reach G

until February 1863. 55 id. at 1424. Rather than responding to the letter, the British g

apparently uneasy about an alliance with Theodore in a crusade against Islam, chose 

masterly inactivity.” See F. Myatt, supra note 17, at 38-39.

24. Cameron had returned to Gondar in July 1863. Id.

25. Rassam arrived at Massowah in August 1864, and dispatched two letters t

requesting an audience with the Emperor in Gondar. Id. at 1425.

26. Theodore did not respond to Rassam until August 1865. The latter was fur

when he was ordered to Egypt for instructions. Id.

27. 60 id. at 1036-37 (1869-70).

28. Id. at 1066. The Emperor apparently had heard that “a railroad had bee

between Egypt and Kassala, for the purpose of transporting British, French and Tu

thereon, for the purpose of invading Abyssinia.” Id. at 1067.

29. Id. at 1088.

30. A. Jones & E. Monroe, supra note 17, at 133-34.

31. The victorious troops plundered Magdala “in the best traditions of the Brit

the time.” Apparently little of the loot remained in private hands, however, f

practicable way out of the fortress was “in the hands of the provost, backed by a guard 

Regiment.” F. Myatt, supra note 17, at 165. The loot was auctioned for a total of 5

pounds, which was then distributed to the soldiers according to rank. A. Moorehead

30, at 272. Upon his departure from Magdala on 17 April 1868, Napier ordered the f

mined with explosives; by the next morning it had burned to the ground. Id. at 271

32. M. Bluntschli, Le Droit International Codifie 223 (1874) (author’s transla

recent scholars have criticized this use of force in view of the apparent lack of pro

between the injuries suffered by the imprisoned Europeans and the substantial 

inflicted upon the Abyssinians by the British. See A. Moorehead, supra note 17, 

Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, in H

Intervention and the United Nations 149 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). On this issue of pro

however, it should be kept in mind that mid-Nineteenth Century Ethiopia was no

which one could send a few troops to rescue imprisoned nationals. The distance 

probably justified the sending of a force the size of Napier’s, if not all of its actions on

in Ethiopia.

33. 60 Brit. & For. State Papers 1088 (1869-1870).

34. For a description of this incident, see Correspondence Respecting the Bom

the Fortress of Omoa, Honduras, by the British Man-of-War Niobe, the 19th and 20t

1873, 67 id. 959-60 (1875-1876).

35. J. Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces 37 

1934) (quotes identical to 1912 ed.).

36. A description of Egypt during this period may be found in J. Marlowe, Crom

ch. 1 (1970).

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() (

38. H. Bonfils, supra note 6, at 159.

39. Id. (author’s translation).

40. For a brief discussion of this incident, see Chronique des Faits Internation

Gen. de Droit Int’l Pub. 291 (1894).

41. Id. at 294, citing the Statement of Foreign Minister Casimir-Perier of Marc

42. Id., citing the Letter of M. Edmon Villey of January 10, 1894.

43. H. Bonfils, supra note 6, at 159.

44. Id. at 160.

45. A detailed discussion of the Boxer Rebellion may be found in L. Giles, The 

Peking Legations (L. Marchant ed. 1970). See also V. Purcell, The Boxer U

Background Study (1963) and the factual summaries of the U.S. role in the i

contained in Appendix I, at pages 141-42.

46. W. Martin, The Siege in Peking 139-40 (1900).

47. Settlement of Matters Growing Out of the Boxer Uprising (Boxer Protoc

1901, 1 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the Unite

America 1776-1949, at 302 (1968).

48. E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad 452 (l915).

49. 1 P. Fauchille, supra note 15, at 583.

50. 1 C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the U

350-51 (1922).

51. A detailed analysis of this incident may be found in Moncharville, Le Coflit F

de 1901, 9 Rev. Gen. de Droit Int’l Pub. 677 (1902). The facts found in the fo

paragraphs of the text are taken therefrom.

52. H. Bonfils, supra note 6, at 160.

53. The British claims involved principally the destruction of British shipping 

companies. See 95 Brit. & For. State Papers 1076-77 (1901-1902). The German clai

injuries to German merchants and landowners through forced loans, the appr

supplies without payment, and the plundering of their houses and the devastation of 

Id. at 1120-21. The Italian claims involved personal injuries and damage to property 

by the Civil War, as well as many claims by bondholders. See The Venezuelan Arbitr

the Hague Tribunal, 1903, at 848, 851 (1905) [hereinafter The Venezuelan Arbitr

54. 95 Brit. & For. State Papers at 1083-84.

55. Id. at 1085.

56. Id. at 1100.

57. Id. at 1101.

58. Id. at 1110.

59. Id. at 1123-26.

60. 1 P. Fauchille, supra note 15, at 582 (author’s translation).

61. The legal arguments that Great Britain, Germany, and Italy made at the 

arbitration of the dispute concerned the priority over other creditors in the claims pr

the three States contended they deserved. See The Venezuelan Arbitration, supra 

759, 815, 857.

62. A detailed discussion of this incident may be found in J. Barros, The Corfu 

1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations (1965). The facts found in the fo

paragraphs of the text are taken therefrom.

63. Id. at 67.

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(1933).

65. For descriptions of this incident, see G. Haddad, Fifty Years of Moder

Lebanon 75-78 (1950); S. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate 157

Wright, The Bombardment of Damascus, 20 Am. J. Int’l L. 263 (1926).

66. S. Longrigg, supra note 65, at 159.

67. D. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 99 (1958).

68. Wright, supra note 65, at 265. Professor Wright disagreed with the French p

argued that international law should not countenance such a disproportionate u

Instead, he argued that a formal demand for discontinuance of the allegedly illegal 

have been made and then, if such a demand had not been heeded, a monetary fine 

been imposed proportionate to the alleged crimes. Id. at 274.

69. For detailed discussing of this incident, see R. Storry, A History of Modern J

(1960), and I. Nish, A Short History of Japan 157-61 (1968). The facts found in th

two paragraphs of the text are taken from these accounts.

70. The explosion and subsequent invasion were part of a plan hatched by Jap

officers, apparently without orders from the military high command, and certainly n

approval of the Japanese government, whose “weak diplomacy” Japanese military 

criticized. See R. Storry, supra note 69, at 186-87.

71. See generally Lauterpacht, “Resort to War” and the Interpretation of th

during the Manchurian Dispute, 28 Am. J. Int’l L. 43 (1934).

72. These arguments are discussed in W. Willoughby, Japan’s Case Examined 17

73. Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand P

Pact of Paris), Aug. 27, 1928, 2 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreem

United States of America 1776-1949, at 732 (1969).

74. A. Hindmarsh, supra note 64, at 81-82.

75. For detailed analyses of the events surrounding the Munich agreem

Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (1948), and V. Mastny, The Cz

Nazi Rule (1971).

76. See R. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World 161 (1968):

To vindicate intervention under certain circumstances [including the forcible pro

of nationals abroad] raises some serious world order problems. Any authoriza

intervention creates a manipulative nexus that can itself be used as a justification 

abusive intrusion upon the legitimate autonomy of another state. An intervenin

may claim to protect human rights so as to hide its dominant motive which is 

from altruism. One need only recall that Hitler explained his invasi

Czechoslovakia and Poland by the need to rescue German minorities from aggr

77. Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in Humanitarian Interven

United Nations, supra note 4, at 139, 143.

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Chapter IV

Contemporary Case Studies of United S

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abro

As the views of the publicists and the evidence of State practice 

in the preceding chapters reveals, traditional internationa

sanctioned a State’s use of force to protect the lives and property of its 

abroad. With the adoption in 1945 of the United Nations Charter, h

new set of international norms governing the use of force emerged to 

this traditional right. The impact of these norms and subsequent deve

upon the right of forcible protection will be considered in the 

chapter. The present chapter focuses instead upon those instances 

United States, in the post-Charter period, has claimed to act pursua

right.

Although occasionally invoked by France and other States durin

riod,1 most prominently by Israel involving Entebbe, the main instan

the protection of nationals rationale has been used to justify forcible p

since 1945, involve the United States.

These case studies warrant extensive treatment not only because 

cal events surrounding many of the instances attracted great interna

tention. The legal debates they generated also shed considerable ligh

one may characterize as a developing international consensus just

forcible protection of nationals abroad, on the grounds that it is a legi

ercise of a State’s inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 o

Charter.

The question then arises as to how one squares the tenets of Ar

the broad prohibition of the use of force, with Article 51? Can the 

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self

defense of a State be properly extrapolated to extend protection b

a national living or transiting abroad?

A. Lebanon. 1958.

The spring of 1958 was a period of intense internal unrest for the s

dle East country of Lebanon. By midsummer, the convergence of in

gional and international factors produced a situation where the Uni

deemed itself compelled to mount a medium-scale military interv

Lebanon which lasted just over three months.

This brief treatment of the Lebanese crisis of 1958 will attempt 

the most significant causative factors as well as the various legal exp

offered by the United States in support of its decision to intervene.2 

emphasis will be given to the protection of nationals rationale, both 

enced the initial decision to intervene and as it colored the subseque

cations of this action.

Like many of the countries achieving independence during and af

War II, Lebanon was an artificially constructed State, in that historic

no definite population or territory. An autonomous province of the 

Empire until World War I, it originally consisted of the relatively s

surrounding Mount Lebanon on the Mediterranean coast. Under a 

from the League of Nations, granted in 1920, France transferred 

Syria to increase Lebanon to its present size. The population, alway

verse, was and to this day remains bitterly divided along religious, e

political lines. Officially, slightly more than one-half of the populatio

tian, while several Muslim sects make up the remainder.3 However, 

first and only official census was held in 1932, the continued valid

breakdown is open to question.4

With the termination of the French Mandate in 1943, Lebanon 

sovereign State, its political foundation resting upon the “National C

an “unwritten understanding, or gentlemen’s agreement,” between t

tian and Muslim segments of the population.5 Under the National C

the contending elements agreed that “(i) the Christians would not lo

West for ‘protection,’ (ii) the Muslims would not aspire for merger 

neighboring Arab States, (iii) Lebanon was to co-operate with all 

States but not to take sides in Arab disputes, and (iv) political and ad

tive offices would be equitably distributed among the recognized co

groups.”6 Pursuant to the last requirement, the President was to be a 

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Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the President of t

ment a Shi’a Muslim.7

Following an initial period of political instability, Camille Cham

elected President of Lebanon in 1952 as a reformist. For the next few 

anese politics were reasonably stable and the Lebanese economy g

prosperous.8 By 1957, however, a number of factors began to appear 

mately led to the crisis the following year. Internally, political opposit

to mount against Chamoun. The parliamentary elections saw the surp

feat of many important opposition leaders. Rumors began to circulat

President wanted to have the Constitution amended so that he migh

himself. Charges of political corruption increasingly surfaced. The 

came to believe that they were being treated as “second class citizen

manded a larger role in the government. As the result of these interna

pressures, the opposition forces that had combined to form a “Nation

Front” renewed their efforts to oust Chamoun as President.

Several regional developments during this period also contributed 

sis in 1958. Relations with Lebanon’s neighbor, Syria, became in

strained during the 1950s. The disagreement between the two Ar

stemmed primarily from Syria’s adoption of socialist and nationalist 

contrast to Lebanon’s laissez-faire capitalism. In addition, the presen

numbers of Syrian political refugees in Lebanon led to increased fr

tween the States.9 Further, by 1957 Lebanon had adopted policies 

tions varying from the ones held and taken by most other Arab State

the Suez crisis, for instance, Lebanon, unlike the other Arab States, 

neutral and refused to sever diplomatic relations with France and G

ain.10 Increasingly, Lebanon seemed to be veering in a pro-Western 

in contrast to the pan-Arab approach advocated by President Nasse

and by the leaders of Syria.11

These regional stresses produced conflicting reactions in Leban

The Christian population regarded Arab unity as a threat to its Chris

tity. The Muslims, on the other hand, supported Arab nationalism a

of bettering their position in Lebanese politics and society. As 

Chamoun, through his public statements, increasingly became ident

opponent of Arab unity, he accordingly lost what popularity he had 

with the Muslim population.12

The crisis in 1958 also was fueled by developments on the inte

level. By 1957 the United States and the Soviet Union, antagoni

“Cold War,” had begun to look for potential allies in the Middle Eas

viet Union viewed Arab nationalism as a vehicle for gaining influen

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area, while the United States, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, sou

list Middle East nations in its efforts to block Soviet inroads into the 

basic thrust of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which took the form of a Join

tion of Congress, was that the United States, upon the request of an

the Middle East, would use its “armed forces to assist any such nation 

of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from 

try controlled by international communism....”13 The only State to a

doctrine, as it turned out, was Lebanon.14 President Chamoun’s decis

regard sparked severe criticism from his opponents on two grounds. 

argued that Lebanon’s acceptance of the doctrine violated the Natio

nant’s requirement that the State remain completely neutral. Second

gued that it brought Lebanon’s policies squarely into conflict with E

Syria, countries which a large number of Lebanese supported. While 

not accept Garnet’s over-generalized assertion that “the dissension 

by the proposed ideological alliance led directly to the civil war and 

intervention a year later,”15 it cannot be denied that President Cham

thusiastic acceptance of the doctrine caused him more problems than 

The above internal, regional and international factors combined t

an extremely volatile political situation in Lebanon by the spring of 

lowing the murder, on 8 May 1958, of Nasib il al-Matni, the editor o

ing opposition newspaper in Beirut, the anti-Chamoun leaders called 

strike and a wave of violence spread throughout the country.16 

pro-government and opposition forces soon were engaged in open wa

6,000-man Lebanese army under General Chebab remained neutr

large extent the army’s neutrality prevented the civil strife from turn

full-scale civil war.18

With the country in turmoil, President Chamoun on 21 May 19

plained to the Arab League that Egypt and Syria, now comprising th

Arab Republic, were intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon.

following day, 22 May 1958, Lebanon lodged a similar complaint b

United Nations Security Council.20 Both complaints, in essence, al

the United Arab Republic was infiltrating men and arms into Leba

that it was conducting an intense propaganda campaign aimed at 

throw of the Lebanese government. When recourse to the Arab Leag

fruitless, Lebanon, on 6 June 1958, pressed its case in the Securit

where Foreign Minister Charles Malik argued that:

. . . there has been, and there still is, massive, illegal and unprovoked in

tion in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic . . .;

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g, , 

pendence of Lebanon . . . ; [and]

. . . the situation created by this intervention which threatens the indepe

of Lebanon is likely, if continued, to endanger the maintenance of intern

peace and security.21

After a bitter debate, during which the United Arab Republic den

allegations,22 the Security Council, on 11 June 1958, adopted a reso

tablishing the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (U

whose principal task was “to ensure that there is no illegal infiltrati

sonnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese bord

While UNOGIL’s findings, according to an exhaustive survey of its o

“indicated that the Lebanese government had exaggerated the degre

tration that might have been taking place . . ., the Group’s observat

not be regarded as conclusive evidence of the degree and nature of i

since its failure to achieve anything more than a highly limited access 

infiltration routes prevented any thorough investigation of the Leban

tions.”24

During this period, U.S. policy towards the Lebanese crisis rema

cially “hands off.” According to President Eisenhower, however, pos

intervention was mooted as early as May 1958, when President Cha

informed that in such an eventuality “the mission of United States 

Lebanon would be twofold: protection of the life and property of A

and assistance to the legal Lebanese government.”25 As a precautio

sure, the Department of State on 16 June 1958, advised U.S. citize

travel in or through Lebanon except for “imperative reasons.”26 The p

of its nationals clearly was secondary as revealed by President Eisenh

scription of the atmosphere in which his 14 July 1958, meeting with 

sional leaders took place: “The time was rapidly approaching, I believ

we had to move into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon, t

trend toward chaos. An additional factor in my deep concern was the 

in Lebanon of a relatively large number of American citizens whose li

be endangered.’’27

The coup d’etat which took place in Iraq on 14 July 1958, trigger

change in U.S. policy towards Lebanon. The leftist revolutionaries 

over the country murdered the Iraqi royal family and dragged their 

bered bodies through the streets of Baghdad. In addition, a number o

ans, plus at least three U.S. citizens, also were murdered.28 Fearful tha

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coup was the forerunner of similar coups against other pro

Western 

in the area, President Eisenhower now readily acceded to President C

renewed request for military assistance. At about 3 P.M. on 15 July 19

2,000 Marines in full battle gear waded ashore near Beirut. “In the un

of the Lebanese civil war,” recounts Kerr, “they were greeted at th

edge by curious bathers and by soft drink vendors.”29 Although a nea

occurred when the Marines moved down the highway toward Beirut

mediation by Ambassador Robert McClintock overcame this set-b

convoy proceeded into Beirut: a Lebanese army jeep in the lead, fo

the Ambassador’s limousine flying both Lebanese and American 

bearing both [General] Chehab and the Ambassador, followed finally 

tingent of American marines.”31 No shots were fired and no casua

incurred.

On the same day that US troops landed in Lebanon, legal justific

their use began flowing from Washington. Although Whit

decisionmakers evidently accorded the protection of nationals aspe

problem a fairly low priority,32 a press release issued in the President’s 

phasized the plight of the 2,500 US citizens still in Lebanon, statin

Marines had landed “to protect American lives and by their presenc

encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovere

integrity.”33 A contemporaneous Message to Congress paraphrased 

statement,34 as did a subsequent radio and TV broadcast by the Pres

evening.35 However, UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, addressin

convened meeting of the Security Council, invoked protection of US 

only as an ancillary argument.36 Thereafter, the “protection of nation

nale justifying for US intervention was heard no more. Instead, th

States placed exclusive reliance upon the fact that the intervention 

pursuant to a request from the recognized government of Lebanon, a

constituted an act of collective self-defense permitted under Article 

United Nations Charter.37

By 25 July 1958, ten days after the initial landing, “the Americ

ashore numbered at least 10,600 men—4000 Army, 6600 Marin

than the entire Lebanese Army.”38 By 8 August 1958, the number ha

a peak of 14,357 troops—8,515 Army and 5,842 Marines—from whi

started to recede.39 The troops, deployed exclusively in the vicinity o

engaged in routine patrols with their Lebanese counterparts.41 Oth

troops saw no real action.42 By all accounts their conduct was exempl

cal are the remarks of Qubain, who mentions:

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gy py, [] p

modern times. In the first place, the main body of troops remained st

outside Beirut. Only a very small number were assigned duty inside the ci

these were restricted mainly to guard duty at such places as the harbor, Am

institutions, and certain areas where American citizens lived. Areas co

by the opposition were completely out of bounds to troops whether o

duty.43 Second, at no time did Americans interfere in the internal conflic

support to government forces against the opposition. American force

abstained from supporting one faction against another.44

Although occasionally the targets of snipers, the US forces held thei

and inflicted no casualties upon the local population.45 In turn, the

only two casualties, both army sergeants, one of whom was wounde

second killed.46 With a political accommodation that permitted th

transfer of power from President Chamoun to his successor work

Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, relative calm retur

country permitting the withdrawal of all US troops during the 

October.47 The Lebanese crisis of 1958 was over.

While some commentators have criticized the action of the Uni

on political grounds,48 few observers have registered legal objectio

landing of US troops.49 The strongest basis for their introduction into 

of course, was the existence of a formal invitation from Lebanon’s r

government.50 The right of a State to furnish military assistance t

State pursuant to a request from the latter is universally recognized 

ternational law. Provided that the right is not abused, as in the cas

non,51 it affords ample legal justification for the landing of troops. C

self-defense under the United Nations Charter also justified the act

by the United States.52 It must be noted, however, that the factual ba

voking this right was questioned in some quarters.53

Finally, the “protection of nationals” rationale, relied upon initia

United States54 but subsequently ignored by it and most commen

well,55 arguably provided additional support for the decision to se

Marines.

Contrasting legal views about the availability of the protection of 

rationale in the context of Lebanon are set out in forthright fashion 

by the late Professors Potter and Wright, apparently the only two aut

have considered the legal issues involved in a systematic fashion. Prof

ter, in an article entitled Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, suggests 

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[] p, 

such cases, is to be found in the right to use force for the protection of na

and their property, of the intervening state, in absence of ability or willin

the local state to perform this function. While well established in pr

however, such a right obviously depends upon proof of the need for such 

under the conditions cited. In the present case there seems to have been 

and serious danger to United States citizens and their interests, an

inability, though not unwillingness, on the part of the Lebanese Govern

protect them. President Eisenhower did not fail to invoke this basis for 

States action at Beirut.56

On the other hand, Professor Wright in The United States Intervent

anon, concentrates exclusively upon the UN Charter norms which h

as dispositive of the case stating:

[I]t has been suggested that the “self” which must be immediately men

permit self-defensive action [under Article 51 of the Charter] includes n

territory but also agencies of the government and its citizens in foreign t

There have been many cases in which states have landed forces in 

territory to protect embassies or other government agencies, as in th

affair in 1900, or to protect the lives of their citizens. It is difficult to brin

extensions within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. The Unite

has, however, referred to the protection of American citizens in the Leb

one reason for its intervention in that country. To support this conten

would be necessary to show that immediate danger to government age

American citizens in the Lebanon constituted “an armed attack” up

United States.57

Wright’s remarks urge that even if US citizens had been in clear an

danger, their country had no right to intervene forcibly to protect th

is true, then is it necessary to revisit and redraft Art. 51 and Art. 2(4

States to intervene with force to protect their nationals and consula

To place the threat to US citizens into perspective, it must be rem

that for two months prior to the landing of Marines, civil strife had b

pant in Lebanon.58 With 2,500 American nationals scattered throu

country,59 the possibility always existed that US citizens would get ca

the fray.60

The coup d’etat in Iraq and the death of several citizens there61 

United States all the more reason for concern over the fate of its citiz

Middle East.62 Murphy, who arrived in Lebanon several days after the 

tingents of Marines, records that “[s]ince Berlin in 1945, I had not 

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more trigger

happy place than Beirut was at that time. Wild fusillad

ings and arson were the order of the day and more especially the 

Given this state of affairs, it is a happy, and indeed a near miraculou

no instances of harm to US citizens were recorded.64

The attitude of the US Embassy in Beirut, while admittedly self-

some extent, also affords a significant insight into the situation in 

prior to the landing of US troops. Like all embassies, it had an emerg

for such situations, which consisted of a three-phrase evacuation pr

after the initial alert,

. . . the situation further deteriorated, Phase A would be put into operatio

called for the voluntary evacuation at government expense of depend

members of the staff. At the same time the embassy would discreetly reco

that dependents of the local American community also be sent out 

country. Phase B called for the mandatory evacuation of all none

government personnel and their dependents, with a similar recommenda

the private American community. Phase C contemplated the evacuatio

American citizens from the crisis area.65

The Embassy placed Phase A into effect on 15 June, when the 

worsened, and declared Phase B operative immediately after the 

d’etat.

66 Had Phase C thereafter been invoked, obviously a strong

predicate would have been laid to justify the measures of forcible p

subsequently taken. Yet simply because Phase C was not invoked, o

cause no US citizens actually were harmed, does not mean that on 

July, the key dates in question, US decisionmakers were not present

threat to US citizens sufficiently grave to justify, at least to themselv

tion they took.67

B. The Congo. 1964.

The summer of 1960 saw the Congo (now Zaire) achieve inde

from Belgium. Unhappily, within a week the Congolese Army mutini

its Belgian officers and, following a complete breakdown of law an

Belgium, on 10 July 1960, sent paratroopers into the country to p

lives and property of its nationals and other Europeans.69 Shortly t

the UN Security Council, calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troop

a temporary security force whose mission was to cooperate with the C

government in the restoration of order.70 This temporary force gradu

morphosed into the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONU

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between July 1960 and its withdrawal on 30 June 1964 attempted th

able tasks of controlling civil strife, ending the secession of Katanga, 

try’s largest province, and creating conditions conducive to the esta

of a strong and viable modern State.71

While ONUC achieved its second objective—ending the sec

Katanga—it was unable to fashion a strong central government c

maintaining civil peace by the time of its withdrawal.

Indeed, in the spring of 1964 several separate revolts had broken 

most serious in the Eastern Congo, where in late May, Albertville fell 

Thereafter events moved rapidly. On 30 June 1964, the fourth anni

the Congo’s independence, the UN force withdrew and the gover

Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula resigned. Nine days later a new gov

headed by Moise Tshombe, took office. As the tempo of rebellion 

however, the rebels on 5 August seized Stanleyville and, two we

Paulis. Proclaiming a revolutionary regime, they named Christophe 

former Minister of Interior, as President. An unending round of e

thereupon began,72 during which:

[w]ave after wave of ‘intellectuals’ or ‘counterrevolutionaries’ or ‘Am

agents’ were assassinated in all the main towns held by the rebels. The 

cohesion and control permitted diverse groups to seize the occasion to li

their rivals on various pretexts. Many of the executions were public, pe

in front of Lumumba monuments, with grotesque cruelty, in

disemboweling of still living victims, consumption of the heart, liver an

portions, and various tortures.... In Stanleyville, Paulis, and Kindu alo

executions totalled close to 10,000; in all, there were probably at least 20,

This reign of terror apparently was as purposeless as it was despica

mediocre talents and often pathological character of [the] rebel lead

fessor Young has noted, “rendered them incapable of directing or c

social tensions which they unleashed, even in the interest of con

their own newly won power.”74

After six weeks, the tide began to turn. The forces of the centra

ment, the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), “reinforced by Kat

darmes and spearheaded (in most but not all cases) by small cont

mercenaries,”75 put the rebel army to rout. Seeking to snatch victo

least a stalemate—from the jaws of defeat, Gbenye announced on 26 

ber that the approximately 1,600 foreigners remaining in the Stanley

made up of “500 Belgians, 700 people of other European nationalitie

Indians and Pakistanis,”76 would not be allowed to leave; his 

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obviously was to use them as hostages for political bargaining purpos

the rebels thus holding “sixteen hundred trump cards,”78 a feverish 

negotiations began involving not only the rebels and the central gov

but also the United States, Belgium, Kenya, an Ad Hoc Commissi

Congo of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Inte

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).79 Progress was not forthcoming 

sions heightened. By early November, the ANC, continuing its 

neared Stanleyville.

When the ANC, preceded by white mercenary contingents, seized 

6 November, the plight of the hostages worsened still further, with Gb

claiming that “all Belgian and American civilians would be treated as 

of war’ in retaliation for the bombing of our liberated territory.”80 O

vember, during a radio broadcast, Gbenye stated that “the British, A

Belgians and Italians must get ready to dig their own graves.”81 T

later, utilizing the rebel newspaper LeMartyr, he threatened that “‘we 

our fetishes with the hearts of the Americans and Belgians, and we 

ourselves with the skins of the Americans and Belgians.”82 On the 

Radio Stanleyville announced that Dr. Paul Carlson, a U.S. medical m

held by the rebels, had been sentenced to death for espionage.83

The above threats, moreover, were not just rhetoric. As Am

Stevenson subsequently recounted to the UN Security Council, by 

vember “the total of those thus already tortured and slaughtered am

35 foreigners, including 19 Belgians, 2 Americans, 2 Indians, 2 Gree

lishman, 1 Italian, 2 Portuguese, 2 Togolese and 4 Dutch, many of 

sionaries who had spent their lives in helping the Congolese peop

grim prospect that other hostages would meet a similar fate was stre

by a captured telegram from a rebel general to an officer in charge o

tages that had been held in Kindu. It ended: “‘In case of bombing of r

terminate all [Americans and Belgians] without requesting further ord

With the ANC now nearing Stanleyville, negotiations reached an 

Thomas Kanza, the representative of the rebels who had been in dire

with the US Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood, made it cry

that, in Professor Grundy’s words, “the rebels were not about to surre

only major bargaining lever.”86 According to Attwood, Kanza woul

cuss evacuating the hostages, whom he termed “prisoners of war,” 

ANC advance had been stopped and a cease-fire put into effect.87 Th

of innocent civilians flatly violated the Geneva Conventions88 did n

the rebels, who considered themselves not bound by international ag

“written by whites.”89 Thus, political and legal arguments havin

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became increasingly apparent that military measures would have to b

extricate the hostages from their three month ordeal.90

These measures actually had been put in train in mid-November 

military planes transported the 545-man Belgian First Paratroop Ba

Ile Ascension, where it was quartered by the British government.91 

ther unavailing efforts to secure the release of the hostages,92 the par

with the express authorization of the central government,93 l

Stanleyville at dawn on 24 November and undertook an emergency re

sion,94 evacuating an estimated 2,000 people over a four-day period.95 

in this number were several hundred foreigners rescued during a 

landing at Paulis, 225 miles to the north.96 The evacuees included “A

Britons and Belgians; Pakistanis, Indians, Congolese, Greeks, Frenc

Germans, Canadians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Swiss, and Italians; as w

zens of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Republic.”97

To justify US participation in the rescue operation,98 the Depa

State initially expressed the view that the action was taken “in exerc

clear responsibility to protect United States citizens under the circu

existing in the Stanleyville area.”99 At the United Nations, Am

Stevenson extended the rationale behind the action stating that, ‘‘[w

primary obligation was to protect the lives of American citizens, we 

that the mission rescued so many innocent people of eighteen other 

ties from their dreadful predicament.”100 Finally, President Johnso

case in its broadest humanitarian terms when he assumed “full resp

for those [decisions] made for our planes to carry the paratroopers i

this humanitarian venture. We had to act and act promptly in orde

hundreds and even thousands of people from being massacred.”101

Of course, the Congo rescue operation, as the Department of St

ated several times, was carried out “with the authorization of the Go

of the Congo,”102 and hence, technically, was not a case of unilater

protection at all.103 Nevertheless, viewing the operation in its total co

hard to avoid the conclusion that the United States treated the Cong

tation more as an additional argument justifying its action than as th

non of its legitimacy. The statement issued by the Department of Sta

was designed to show not only reliance upon an express invitation b

tral government of the Congo, but also in compliance with all the req

of the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention.104

This operation is humanitarian—not military. It is designed to 

bloodshed—not to engage the rebel forces in combat. Its purpos

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pqy 

Personnel engaged are under orders to use force only in their own defen

the defense of the foreign and Congolese civilians. They will depart fr

scene as soon as their evacuation mission is accomplished.

We are informing the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Commission 

Organization of African Unity of the purely humanitarian purpose of thi

and of the regrettable circumstances that made it necessary.105

Add to this statement the acknowledged fact that both the United Na

the OAU were unable to cope with a situation which by mid-N

required immediate action,106 and one reaches the inescapable concl

if ever there was a case justifying the forcible protection of lives, t

rescue operation was it.

Reviewing the operation in retrospect, perhaps the United States s

have been as surprised as it was at the criticism heaped upon it for its r

humanitarian venture.107 In the debates that the operation engende

United Nations, the virulence of many African delegates can be attr

varying degrees, to four principal factors.108 First, they argued that t

operation was rife with racism, in that not until the lives of the white 

had been threatened did the United States become concerned,109 

while most of these hostages had been rescued hundreds of blacks 

slain.110 When one considers what the world community’s reaction w

been had the United States or other Western powers introduced troo

diately after the United Nations’ withdrawal to protect those Congole

ened by the rebels, however, such criticism must be regarded, to say th

unfair.

Since intervening earlier to protect Congolese surely would h

branded as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, this supposed optio

really a viable one. Accordingly, the United States should not be crit

ther expressly or impliedly, for failing to intervene earlier on.111 Mor

fact that the ANC slaughtered hundreds of blacks when it reached St

shortly after the airdrop is no argument that racist considerations m

the rescue operation itself. The paratroopers, it should be noted, evac

Indians and Pakistanis as well as more than 200 Congolese,112 and 

geance meted out by the ANC while mopping up Stanleyville har

have been less had it reached the city hours or days later, especially 

tages had been massacred in the meantime.

A second factor underlying the criticism put forth by many Afr

gates was the disrespect the rescue operation allegedly showed for 

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and its mediation efforts.

Coming at a time when PanAfricanism 

high on the African continent, the failure to work through the region

zation to secure the release of the hostages engendered considerabl

airdrops, according to the delegate from the Congo Republic (Br

were clearly an attempt to humiliate the OAU.114

Such an attitude, while understandable, also is unjustified. Both t

States and Belgium had turned repeatedly to the OAU for assistance 

ing the hostages release, but in every instance the OAU had proved to 

ineffective or uncooperative or both. This failure stemmed not only 

inherent weakness of the organization itself, but also, and perhaps 

from the resentment many African States had for the Tshombe gove

regime which they wished to see toppled. Given this anti-Tshombe 

the airdrops obviously would not have been approved had the Uni

and Belgium sought OAU authorization.115 Moreover, seeking such a

tion not only was unnecessary, given the central government’s appro

would have removed the surprise element from the airdrops and thu

dized the success of the entire rescue operation.

The third factor causing much African criticism was the memory o

injustices still fresh in the minds of many delegates. Such memories 

were exacerbated by the dropping of paratroopers of the former colon

assisted by logistical support from one of the superpowers. As Attw

passage worth quoting at length, put it:

We saw the Stanleyville rescue operations as a dramatic effort to save h

of helpless, innocent people. It was humanitarian, and it was necessary, 

other attempts to release them had failed. And the operation had to tak

before the ANC column entered the city, for the panicky Simbas would p

have mowed down the hostages before fleeing from the mercenaries.

But if you could put yourself in the shoes of an average educated African, 

a quite different picture. When he looked at the Congo, he saw 

government in Stanleyville being attacked by a gang of hired South 

thugs, and black people being killed by rockets fired from American pla

did not know about the thousands of blacks who were tortured and murd

the Simbas, but he did know that the mercenaries and their Katangan au

left a trail of African corpses in their wake.

Even more galling to the educated African was the shattering of so man

illusions—that Africans were now masters of their own continent, that th

was a force to be reckoned with, that a black man with a gun was the eq

white man with a gun. For in a matter of weeks, two hundred swaggerin

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g, 

and captured their capital; and in a matter of hours, 545 Belgians in Am

planes had defied the OAU, jumped into the heart of Africa and taken ou

two thousand people—with the loss of one trooper.

The weakness and impotence of newly independent Africa had been hars

dramatically revealed to the whole world, and the educated African fel

humiliated: the white man with a gun, the old plunderer who had ensla

ancestors, was back again, doing what he pleased, when he pleased, w

pleased. And there wasn’t a damn thing Africa could do about it, exc

rape.117

Just what the United States could have done to avoid this v

tack—short of foregoing participation in the rescue operation altog

difficult to imagine. Generalities to the effect that “it should have tak

account of African sensitivities”118 are fine, but they offer little gu

decisionmakers, past or present. In sum, given the legacies of the colo

the United States could not have avoided African criticism for its p

rescue operation, no matter how humanitarian its motives may have 

Finally, the fourth factor disturbing many African delegates was th

United States was playing in supporting the Tshombe governme

which included the supplying of military equipment and advisers, th

intelligence and transport as well as occasional combat missions, and 

eral underwriting, through the US Embassy and the CIA, of the ANC

nary-led efforts to reestablish the central government’s authority 

Congo.119 African leaders, who originally had opposed the return of 

and subsequently had condemned his central government, naturally 

any bolstering of his power, which was the inevitable by-product of t

operation.120 As Grundy observes, “Africans hostile to Tshombe’s ca

naturally seek to discredit the legitimacy of an operation that re

Tshombe’s increased power.”121

The four factors discussed above naturally exacerbated the critic

operation leveled at the United States and Belgium during the Unite

debates. Replying to accusations in the Security Council that often 

on and sometimes reached the slanderous, Ambassador Stevenson fla

that:

. . . [w]e have no apologies to make to any state appearing before this C

We are proud of our part in saving human lives imperiled by the civil wa

Congo.

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ppy pp

We violated no provision of the United Nations Charter. Our action 

threat to peace or to security; it was not an affront—deliberate or otherw

the OAU: and it constituted no intervention in Congolese or African affa

His views, of course, received support from Belgium123 and Great 

with Bolivia,125 Brazil,126 and the Republic of China127 also approvin

stance of forcible protection. Admittedly, most States condemned t

operation, generally because they regarded it, in retrospect, either to h

counterproductive in lives saved128 or to have served as a “pretext” 

they regarded as an illegal intervention in the Congo’s affairs.129 In 

they grounded their complaints more upon its political than its legal 

The vague resolution finally adopted by the Security Council, ‘‘[d]ep

recent events in [the Congo],”131 not unsurprisingly contains no of

demnation of either Belgium or the United States.132 Indeed, one w

ally has suggested that the resolution constitutes an implied if not a

approval of the rescue operation.133

Two issues relevant to any forcible protection action for human r

poses, and especially to the Congo rescue operation, warrant further 

cussion. Namely, whether in the present case the operation 

counterproductive insofar as the saving of lives was concerned, and 

the operation was not used to impose or preserve a preferred gover

the Congo.134

Insofar as the first issue is concerned, of the approximately 1,600 

in the Stanleyville area only 27 were killed during the initial Stanle

drops, and all 22 white hostages found dead at Paulis two days later 

killed by the rebels prior to that follow-up operation.135 Having fled 

minute, few if any of the rebels who carried out the massacre in Stanl

parently were killed by the paratroopers,136 who themselves lost 

man.137 The rebels and their supporters, it is true, suffered appalling 

when the mercenary-led ANC troops who subsequently entered St

ran amok,138 but such atrocities hardly can be attributed to the resc

tion itself and, in any event, would have been no less severe had 

fought its way into the city without the airdrop having taken place.

Similarly, although from the Stanleyville airdrop through the end o

ber “more than three hundred whites, eight of them Americans, were 

by the rebels, these deaths, which occurred throughout the entir

Congo, cannot be attributed solely to the rescue operation hav

place.140 On balance, then, while admittedly a matter of specul

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susceptible of absolute proof either way, the Congo rescue operati

appear to have saved far more lives than it lost.141

Insofar as the second issue is concerned, there is little doubt, as 

commentators have pointed out in their respective fashions,142 that t

operation’s success contributed to the eventual downfall of the reb

Since the rebels, contrary to international law, were using the hostage

to prevent central government attacks but also to gain time to reple

depleted arsenals, the rescue operation, by its very nature and succ

ously constituted a severe blow to their cause. However, the fact 

Stanleyville airdrop appears to have been coordinated with the ANC 

upon the city, frequently cited as authoritative evidence that the resc

tion was undertaken for political rather than humanitarian reasons,14

does not overcome the strong evidence that its primary objective ac

humanitarian in nature.144 The reason for synchronizing the airdrop 

ANC advance was to reduce casualties and to avoid the rebels fleein

hostages. “The main purpose of the coordination,” concludes Weissm

to assure the safety of the maximum number of hostages with the 

cost.”145 The fact that a by-product of the rescue operation was the c

the rebel regime should not be read back to taint the entire mission

Ambassador Stevenson rightly stated was designed to save human li

C. The Dominican Republic. 1965

On 30 May 1961, an assassin’s bullet struck and killed Rafael Truj

tor of the Dominican Republic for over three decades. Trujillo’s death 

a period of unrest within the Dominican Republic that culminated 

later in violent revolution followed by forcible intervention by US (a

quently Organization of American States [OAS]) forces. The purpo

case study is to assess, in the context of the facts now available, the 

the initial legal justification advanced by the United States in suppor

tervention, that being the need to protect the lives of US nationals

the US argument in perspective, a short description of the events 

and surrounding the crisis of 1965 is required.147

Following Trujillo’s assassination, Dominicans, in the first free 

held in the country in nearly 40 years, elected as their President, Ju

founder of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). 

nedy Administration welcomed Bosch’s election, dispatched Vice 

Johnson to his inauguration in February 1963, and increased Alliance 

ress (AID) programs in an effort “to construct a ‘showcase of democr

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Caribbean as a contrast to neighboring Communist Cuba.

Bosc

pily, proved to be an ineffective leader once in office and soon ca

heavy attack by opposition critics, especially for allowing Dominican 

nists to return from exile and reenter political life.149 After just seven 

office he was ousted by an anti-communistcoup d’etat on 25 Septembe

The Kennedy Administration reacted to the coup d’etat by suspend

matic relations with the Dominican Republic and halting all econ

military aid.151 Such pressures had little effect upon the three-man j

had replaced Bosch, however, and by mid-December the United St

the Johnson Administration now in office, reversed its policy, recog

new government, and resumed foreign assistance.152

Despite this development, the junta, which soon came to be dom

Donald Reid Cabral, an anti-communist holding decidedly conservat

lost popularity steadily during 1964. Reid, in an effort to stave off dom

icism and improve the junta’s reputation abroad, scheduled “free elec

15 September 1965, but his subsequent announcement that he intend

for the presidency and would win constituted the “final straw.”153 B

winter and early spring of 1965, only the timing and not the occurre

other coup d’etat, this time to oust Reid, was in doubt.154

The uprising began in the early hours of Saturday, 24 April 1965

small group of young colonels acting in concert with PRD leaders s

imprisoned the Army Chief of Staff and declared themselves in revo

the government.”155 The rebels, calling themselves the “constitutiona

cupied the government radio station in Santo Domingo, the ca

broadcast appeals calling for the ouster of Reid. When thousands o

took to the streets, the constitutionalist officers passed out arms to t

apparent attempt “to broaden the base of the movement and counter 

ble reaction from the bulk of the armed forces.”156 Actually, they ha

to fear from the regular forces at this point, since the military’s leaders

sponding to Reid’s request for assistance with pledges of support, 

were waiting for the dust to settle before committing either themselv

troops.157 Certainly they did nothing to crush the uprising against Rei

latter, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain US military interventi

morning of Sunday, 25 April,158 resigned and went into hiding.159

Later that afternoon, reportedly after conferring by telephone with 

who at the time was living in Puerto Rico, the constitutionalists nam

Molina Urena, President of the Chamber of Deputies during Bosch’s 

Provisional President.161 Molina’s subsequent announcement that he 

to hold office only until Bosch’s return, which reflected a pro-Bos

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than merely the anti

Reid view held by a majority of the constitution

the unfortunate effect of alienating many revolutionary leaders and d

a few wavering military commanders into the anti-constitutionalist 

came to be known as the “loyalist”) camp. For, according to Slater:

there no longer could be much doubt that a victory of the revolution wou

in the direct return of Bosch to the Presidency, rather than in new elec

had originally been planned.[162] This was another matter, for the 

military detested and feared Bosch, judging, undoubtedly correctly, 

triumphant Bosch backed by the defecting constitutionalist military an

amounted to a well-armed civilian militia would probably seek to destr

power and position in the Dominican Republic. As a result, by late 

afternoon the bulk of the military, particularly the key San Isidro Air For

dominated by [General] Wessin y Wessin, had decided to actively re

revolution.163

The bombing of the National Palace and constitutionalist military 

ments by planes from the San Isidro Air Base began about 4:30 P.M.

the Dominican Republic into civil war.164

By the following morning—Monday, 26 April—the military situ

reached a stalemate and civil authority had broken down complete

sensational reports of atrocities allegedly committed by the constitu

subsequently proved to be wildly exaggerated,165 the carnage in the 

Santo Domingo nevertheless was great,166 with an estimated 2,000 p

ing their lives in the fighting during a four day period.167 The militar

prompted loyalist leaders to make their first request for US military 

tion, a request that the United States denied.168 The Department 

however, instructed the US Embassy “to inform both sides in Santa 

that the US government had received requests from American citizen

to be evacuated, and that the U.S. requested an immediate ceasefire 

a safe and orderly evacuation.”169 Preparations for this voluntary e

operation, which had been contemplated since the uprising began

menced Monday evening with the assembling and registering of US 

foreign nationals who wished to leave the country. Their actua

tion—by land to the nearby port of Haina, from whence they were to 

aboard two ships of a US navy task force lying offshore, or by helico

the grounds of the Hotel Embajador to the decks of the USS Boxer—w

uled for the following day.

On that day—Tuesday, 27 April—an unarmed detachment of 

Marines was sent ashore to secure the hotel grounds, establish a h

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landing area therein, and to generally facilitate the evacuation pr

went reasonably smoothly and by 3:15 P.M. the operation, which inv

rying out 1,172 of the 2,500 US nationals supposedly in the country, 

completed.171 The only hitch occurred when a small band of constitu

arrived on the scene and engaged in a brief exchange of fire with un

persons on several upper story balconies of the hotel. Then, as Slat

they suddenly “burst into the hotel, lined the Americans [gathered in 

waiting to be evacuated] against the wall, and fired a number of mac

bursts over their heads.” No one was hurt, and it later turned out that 

had not been seeking deliberately to terrorize the Americans but we

for an extreme right-wing propagandist who had taken shelter in th

This incident, however, caused considerable concern at the US 

whose “overwrought reporting” of it to Washington obviously influen

dent Johnson’s thinking and strengthened the hand of those officia

ready were urging a much larger US military intervention.173

As the evacuation took place that Tuesday, the military tide slow

against the constitutionalists. Under continuous attack from Genera

planes since Sunday, they now had to contend with a force of tanks 

Isidro attempting to enter the city. Faced with impending defeat, th

constitutionalists, including Provisional President Molina Urena, so

from the US Embassy to mediate the conflict. Ambassador W. Tapley 

no fan of ex-President Bosch and ever-fearful of a leftist takeover,17

fused, advising the constitutionalists to surrender.175 Although they ig

advice, a number of them, including Molina Urena, apparently con

feat, for they immediately sought political asylum at various Latin 

embassies.176 One did not. Surprisingly, Francisco Caamano, a care

who had served as chief of the police riot squad under Trujillo and 

was not known as a Bosch supporter, after a dramatic reply to 

rushed from the embassy to rally the constitutionalist forces 

Wessin’s tanks at the Duarte Bridge.177 Miraculously, the tide t

again: the tanks were driven back, the police stations fell, and by m

noon of the next day—Wednesday, 28 April 1965—the city belong

constitutionalists.178

During this surprising turnaround, US helicopters continued to ai

uees from the Hotel Embajador to the Boxer.

179 As the constitutional

fied their control of the city, however, Colonel Benoit, the head of a 

conducting the loyalist’s operations, informed Ambassador Bennett 

junta was in no position to guarantee the safety of Americans or othe

ers in Santo Domingo.”180 Accordingly, “the junta was requesting 

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States intervention.

While the juntas formal written request, 

about 4 P.M. on the afternoon of the 28th, actually made no ment

need to protect US nationals,182 Bennett relied upon this argume

now-famous “critic” telegram recommending the immediate landing o

rines, which arrived in Washington about 5 P.M.183 Shortly thereaf

dent Johnson decided to land a contingent of armed Marines,184 536 

came ashore in the early evening.185 In an address to the nation later t

the President reported that military authorities in the Dominican Rep

informed the United States that the lives of its nationals were in da

that the assistance of US military personnel was necessary to guara

safety.186 As a result, the President stated, he had ordered the Secret

fense “to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give p

to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic 

cort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be av

the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already aske

help.”187

The following day—Thursday, 29 April—additional Marines w

equipment landed, bringing total US forces in Santo Domingo to 1,70

The next day military transports ferried two battalions of the 82nd 

Division to the San Isidro Air Base. They immediately took up positi

the east bank of the Ozama River, an area in which there were no U

foreign nationals to be evacuated.189 Yet, in his address to the nation 

ning, 30 April, President Johnson again invoked the protection of na

gument that he had made two nights earlier, noting that over 2,40

other foreign nationals already had been evacuated from the Domi

public.190 More significantly, however, the President, for the first 

vanced a new argument for US intervention, namely, that “peop

outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control” of the 

While not saying so explicitly, Johnson clearly intended to leave the im

that “outside” communists threatened to take over the Dominican 

In the face of this potential threat, he continued, the Organization 

can States (OAS) had the “immediate responsibility” to take prom

to achieve a ceasefire before such an “international conspiracy” c

control.191

On 1 May, after the apparent failure of a tenuous ceasefire betwee

opposing factions, President Johnson ordered additional troops flow

ing the number of US forces to 6,200. They proceeded to enter const

ist (but apparently not loyalist) territory in an attempt to en

ceasefire.192 Nevertheless, in a written statement issued the same 

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President once again maintained that the mission of the troops wa

protect and evacuate US and other foreign nationals.193

Warning of a “tragic turn” of events, President Johnson addresse

tion for a third time the following day. The President now publicly ass

the Dominican revolution had been “seized and placed in the hands 

of Communist conspirators . . . [m]any of them trained in Cuba. . 

counter this alleged new development, the President reported that h

dered an additional force of 6,500 men to proceed to the Dominican 

He did not attempt to justify their dispatch by continued reliance upo

tion of nationals arguments. Instead, the President proclaimed what c

known as the “Johnson Doctrine,” namely, that “[t]he American na

not, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another C

government in the Western Hemisphere.”195 To prevent such an oc

he announced, the United States was consulting with the OAS rega

posals for a multilateral response to this new threat posed by the D

crisis.196

In the event, on 6 May 1965, the OAS, which much earlier had 

resolution calling for a ceasefire and the establishment of a neu

“within which the nationals of all countries will be given safe have

proved a US-sponsored resolution creating an InterAmerican Forc

force, largely made up of US troops that numbered over 23,000 by the 

May, eventually ended hostilities, established a provisional govern

supervised general elections before finally departing the Dominican 

on 21 September 1966.199 During this time, the OAS legal umbrell

protection of nationals rationale, gradually became the principal, if n

sive, US justification for the continued presence of its troops in the D

Republic.200

Whether the OAS officially legitimized or merely acquiesced in 

duction of US troops has been the subject of much scholarly debate

been the legitimacy of the OAS operation itself.202 While both issu

yond the scope of the present study—which focuses upon the curren

the right of forcible protection—it should be underscored that the O

criticized, much less condemned, the initial US action of sending tro

Dominican Republic to protect the lives of its nationals and other f

Nor, for that matter, did the United Nations.203

Criticism of the US action in general, however, was widespread

Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who dra

broke with President Johnson over the Dominican Republic even 

took issue with the latter’s policy in Vietnam, argued in the Senat

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Administration had 

cooked upan invitation to intervene on the 

able grounds that the lives of US nationals were endangered.204 Wh

ting that “Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in th

of April 1965,” the Senator contended that the “danger to American 

more a pretext than a reason for the massive US intervention. . . .”20

protection of US and other foreign nationals been the real reason f

tion, he argued, the United States could have sent in troops “prom

then withdrawn them and the incident would soon have been forgo

Scholarly comment almost unanimously agreed with the Sen

praisal.207 Although regarding “[t]he initial landing of four hundred 

[to be] a permissible self-defense measure to protect the United Stat

als,”208 Professor Nanda pointed out the obvious, that:

the United States’ action was not limited in its objective [to] protecting the 

its nationals; furthermore, it was not limited in its scope or duration either. 

there are serious doubts that it met the required criterion of proportion

justify the United States’ claim that since it had dispatched armed forces p

to protect its citizens, the United States’ use of coercive measures 

Dominican Republic should be considered a permissible use of self-defens

Professor Friedmann took much the same view, although his concl

a much harder edge. While acknowledging, like Nanda, that “[t]h

spectable authority for the view that the original limited interventio

tect US citizens from imminent danger, in a situation of anarchy

violate international law,”210 he believed the massive build-up and c

presence of US forces in the Dominican Republic to be “patently, by 

of international law, an illegal action. . . .”211

The present writer and almost all other participants at a 1972 c

that subsequently debated the Dominican crisis also expressed simila

essentially supporting the continued existence of a limited right of for

tection,213 while at the same time recognizing and warning against the 

ties of the doctrine’s misuse.214 Today, three decades after Presiden

ordered in US troops, one still may conclude, as a minimum com

nominator, that “it is far easier to justify the initial American respo

it is the prolonged American presence in the Dominican Republi

D. Iran. 1980.

On 4 November 1979, several hundred armed Muslim fundamen

dents overran the US Embassy in Tehran and took more than f

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diplomatic and consular staff, Marine guards and other US citizens h

The Iranian government did nothing to prevent the takeover217 

quently, to secure the release of the hostages.218 The militant studen

other demands, requested the United States to return the former Sh

on 22 October had been allowed to enter the United States from h

Mexico to receive medical treatment—to Iran for trial, a demand 

United States rejected.219

The United States immediately protested the seizure of the Emba

staff, but when Prime Minister Bazargan, a secular moderate opposed 

ligious extremists, resigned on 6 November, it found itself with no o

to negotiate. Thereafter President Carter dispatched two emissaries 

private sector—former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and forme

Service officer William Miller—on a secret mission to Tehran in an a

open up channels of communication. Carrying a letter from the Pre

White House stationery addressed “Dear Ayatollah Khomeini,” C

Miller got no further than Istanbul, Turkey, by which time the Ayat

learned of their trip and ordered that no one in Tehran should see th

ter a week in Istanbul, during which time they made dozens of fruitle

Tehran, they concluded that there would be no movement on Iran’s 

a new constitution had been adopted and a new government put in 

thereafter returned to Washington.221

While this mission and other efforts to secure the return of the 

were under way, the United States requested that the UN Securit

meet to discuss ways to obtain the hostages release. Eventually it did 

cember unanimously approving a resolution that called for the hosta

diate release.222 When this resolution went unheeded by Iran, the Co

again and on 31 December, adopted another resolution demanding 

should free the hostages.223 It also decided to reconvene in January 19

event of continued Iranian non-compliance, to discuss the impositio

tions under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter. The Council me

13 January 1980, to consider a US draft resolution that would have 

broad economic sanctions against Iran. A veto cast by the Soviet U

vented its adoption and effectively removed the Security Council fro

tlement process.224

In the meantime, the United States on 29 November 1979, instit

ceedings against Iran before the International Court of Justice, requ

Court, pending its final Judgment in the case, to indicate certain p

measures, first and foremost being that “the Government of Iran im

release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the pr

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safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States 

dignified and humane circumstances.”225 Acting with commendabl

the Court took the case, heard oral argument by the United States (Ir

appear at the hearing), and on 15 December unanimously ordered I

store the Embassy to US control and to ensure the:

immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United 

nationality who are or who have been held in the Embassy . . . or have be

as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such pers

accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with 

international law.226

The Court also enjoined both the United States and Iran not to ta

tion “which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or r

existing dispute more difficult of solution. . . .227 As it had in the case 

Security Council resolutions,228 Iran refused to obey the Court’s Ord

Diplomatic efforts during the winter and early spring of 1980 wer

successful in achieving the hostages’ release.229 Most prominent am

efforts was the establishment of a five-member UN Commission of In

was to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran’s grievan

allow for an early solution of the crisis. . . .”230 The Commission tr

Tehran in early March but returned without having made any pr

seemingly promising initiative involving the transfer of the hostages 

militants holding the Embassy into Iranian governmental contro

through in early April when religious elements within Iran’s Revo

Council thwarted the efforts of President Bani-Sadr and Prime 

Ghotbzadeh to end the crisis.231 Thus, by mid-April 1980—over fiv

after the Embassy had been overrun and the hostages seized—“mom

a negotiated solution seemed to have run out.”232

On 24 April 1980, some days after the beginning of the sandstor

and the “mission cut off” date recommended by the Joint Chiefs of St

the possibility of sandstorms, with knowledge that a main highway ran 

to Desert I, in the face of the failure to secure their release through d

or judicial means, the United States launched a rescue mission design

the hostages and return them to the United States.233 That even

time) eight Sea Stallion RH-53 helicopters lifted off from the USS N

tioned in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Iran. They were to fly unde

darkness over 500 miles inland to a previously-prepared airstrip co

“Desert I,” there to rendezvous with six Hercules C-130 cargo aircraf

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90 commandos. After refueling and loading the commandos and th

ment, the helicopters were to proceed to a remote site in the mount

of Tehran, where they would be camouflaged to avoid detection the 

day. That evening, 25 April, “Delta Force” was to enter Tehran in 

and trucks, free the hostages at the Embassy, and then be evacuated b

ter to an abandoned airport outside of Tehran codenamed “Desert II

the helicopters, they would get aboard transport aircraft waiting for 

be flown out of Iran under heavy US air cover.

Unfortunately, while operating through a sandstorm, two of the e

copters encountered mechanical and navigational difficulties a

reached Desert 1.234 A third helicopter experienced hydraulic proble

upon inspection at the desert site proved incapable of on-site repair. W

five workable helicopters at hand and knowing that a minimum o

needed to accomplish the actual rescue the following night, the mis

mander decided to abort the operation. Tragically, during refueling o

prior to the withdrawal, one of the helicopters collided with a C-130 a

sulting explosion and fire killed eight crew members and wounded an

The force thereupon withdrew in the remaining C-130s. Evidenc

that Iran was not even aware that US forces had been in the territory u

ident Carter officially informed it of the failed rescue operation sev

later.235

In a nationally televised broadcast at 7 A.M. that morning, Preside

in describing the aborted rescue operation characterized it as a “hum

mission” and specifically disavowed any hostility towards the Iranian 

According to the President, he “ordered this rescue mission prepared 

safeguard American lives, to protect America’s national interests, and 

the tensions in the world that have been caused among many natio

crisis has continued.”237 The following day, in a report to the Con

President reiterated the humanitarian nature of the mission and b

plained why he considered it justified under international law, st

“[i]n carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly 

right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 

and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in whic

located is unable or unwilling to protect them.”238 The United States

temporaneous report to the UN Security Council, also relied upon th

tion of nationals rationale, claiming that the rescue operation was a p

“exercise of its inherent right of self-defense, with the aim of extricatin

can nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian 

tack on our embassy.”239

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The US legal argument, based upon the inherent right of self

de

States still enjoy under Article 51, is a reprise of the argument th

States first advanced in the case of the seizure of the Mayaguezin 1975 

sequently developed in the UN Security Council to justify Israel

Entebbe in 1976.

Since Iran never took the failed US rescue operation to the Secur

cil, that body did not have the opportunity to debate or pass on either 

ity of the operation or the validity of the US legal argument. More

reactions of States, while generally supportive of the United States,24

tle light on their views regarding the legal basis of the US action unde

tional law.241

In the case of Iran, however, unlike the other incidents discuss

Chapter, the International Court of Justice had the opportunity to co

least in passing, the question of what legal arguments, if any, were av

support such rescue operations. This opportunity arose from the fact

recalled, that in its Order on provisional measures of 15 December 

Court had instructed both Iran and the United States not to take a

that might exacerbate the dispute between the two countries.24

tempted rescue operation, of course, took place on 24 April 1980, ove

after the Court had held three days of hearings on the merits of the 

while it was in the course of preparing its Judgment issued exactly 

later. Thus, it could be argued that the operation constituted the inte

law equivalent of contempt of court, especially if the Court were to h

that it violated the UN Charter.

In the event, as the late Judge Dillard remarked, “[w]hat the Cou

very gentle. It chided the United States for its rescue operation but d

judgment on it.”243 While stating that it could not “fail to express its c

regard to the United States’ incursion into Iran,” the Court neverthe

edly passed up the opportunity to question its legality, noting mer

considered itself “bound to observe that an operation undertaken in 

cumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to unde

spect for the judicial process in international relations . . . .”244 This m

the wrist, as the late Professor Stein notes in his perceptive critique 

pect of the Court’s Judgment, “was coupled with an express disavow

finding that the rescue attempt was unlawful.”245 To quote from its Ju

[T]he Court must point out that neither the question of the legality 

operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations an

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g

, y pqpy 

it, is before the Court.246

Thus, as Stein aptly concludes, the Court:

[L]eft to another day, a day one suspects will never come, a definitive sta

of its views regarding the law governing the use of force in defense of the 

nationals abroad.247

Should the day ever arrive when the Court addresses this question, 

its decision may well turn on its acceptance or rejection of the US arg

the Hostages Case—that the forcible protection of nationals abroad i

exercise of the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack auth

Article 51 of the UN Charter—rather than on whether such actions 

an exception to the prohibition against the use of force found in Artic

are otherwise permissible under general international law.248

This characterization of the legal question, after all, seems to have 

cepted without question by the Court,”249 which not only mentions it

serted by the United States before the Security Council,250 but also re

to the “armed attack on the United States Embassy”251 and the “arm

by the militants ... and their seizure of Embassy premises and staff....”

sor Stein has called attention to what he labels the Court’s:

tantalizing suggestions that the category of “armed attacks” under Artic

the UN Charter extends well beyond major armed assaults.... If, inde

Court’s references to “armed attack” were studied rather than casual, op

such as the rescue mission are lawful not because the right of self-defens

the UN Charter is coextensive with the preexisting customary law 

self-defense, which extended beyond defense against ‘armed attack’ . 

because the right of self-defense against armed attack has arisen.253

The two dissenting judges in the Hostages Case appear to have accep

majority’s analytical framework as well. Thus, Judge Morozow, after cr

“the so-called rescue operation,” which he labeled “an invasion of the ter

the Islamic Republic of Iran,”254 maintained that the Court should hav

attention to the undeniable legal fact that Article 51 of the Charter esta

[sic] the right of self-defense, may be invoked only “if an armed attack 

against a member of the United Nations.” It should have added that... 

no evidence that any armed attack had occurred against the United Sta

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Judge Tarazi, who prefaced his remarks on this score with the ob

that “[i]t is not my intention to characterize [the rescue] operation o

any legal value judgment in this respect,”256 nevertheless reflected in 

ion some of Judge Morozow’s concerns about attempts to treat the op

a self-defense response to an armed attack.257 The legal framework f

on the question is in place should the issue arise in some future case

Surprisingly, scholarly comment on the legality of the rescue ope

been relatively sparse. One US writer declared categorically that it w

grant violation of international law,”259 while another of his colleague

to be “preemptively illegal.”260 A German scholar, rejecting the US se

argument, concluded that “it was from the very beginning nothing b

tion of the prohibition of the use of force and of Iran’s territorial int

Professor Ronzitti, who repeatedly refers to the rescue operation and 

tages Case in his monograph,262 presumably holds the same opinion

reaches the general conclusion that “the right to intervene to pro

own citizens abroad does not exist.”263

Two more detailed legal studies of the rescue operation reach the 

conclusion, each perhaps by a different legal path. In the first, while fi

US self-defense argument “subject to considerable difficulties,”264 a B

thor nevertheless regards the operation as legally justified pursuant 

strictive” interpretation of Article 2(4), i.e., that it was not a use of for

the political independence or territorial integrity of Iran, or in any o

ner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.265

In the second, Professor Schachter, who also believes that “an arm

action to save lives of nationals . . . is not prohibited by article 2(4) 

territorial government is unable or unwilling to protect them and th

instant action is manifest,”266 applies this test to the rescue operation 

cludes that “the action taken did not violate the U.N. Charter or inte

law.”267

It is not entirely clear from his exposition, however, whether his fin

Article 2(4) was “no problem” is grounded upon the belief that the re

ation represented “an exception to the prohibition of article 2(4)”268 

natively, that it constituted an exercise of legitimate self-defen

balance, both the approach and language of his seminal chapter on t

are somewhat confirmed by his subsequent writings.270 It is suggested 

fessor Schachter justifies the Iranian rescue operation not by a restric

ing of Article 2(4), but rather by an expanded concept of the 

self-defense under Article 51.

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Finally, as in the case of the Lebanese crisis discussed earlier in t

ter,271 some mention of the factual predicate behind its invocatio

United States during the Iranian crisis seems warranted here. While 

has not received much attention in Iranian crisis postmortems,272 an 

factual showing that the lives or safety of the hostages were in immi

ger—that, technically, the requirement of the “necessity” of the resc

tion had been met273—is the sine qua non of its being a valid exercise o

of forcible protection. Put more pointedly by former Under Secretar

Christopher, the question becomes: “was the United States legally j

undertaking the rescue mission in April 1980 . . . even though the ho

that moment, may not actually have been in imminent danger?”274

The answer to this question is made more difficult in the case of I

fact that the real or apparent threat to the lives and safety of the hos

not short-lived, requiring a decision as to whether to undertake a re

sion to be made once and for all within a relatively narrow time frame

tinued for a period of many months. Thus, this case differs markedly 

other instances surveyed in this Chapter, especially the Dominican 

crisis, where US decisionmakers had relatively little time to assess th

fore deciding whether or not to mount a rescue mission. It also di

these other instances in that here the foreign government involved w

unable, but blatantly unwilling, to do anything to protect the lives an

US nationals, thus accentuating the actual and potential danger to 

Since, as the Hostages Convention reaffirms in its Preamble, hosta

is par excellence an “act which endangers innocent human lives,”275 it 

to deny the fact that the US hostages at the Embassy were in “immi

ger” immediately after their seizure on 4 November 1979, a seizure th

be recalled, was endorsed and confirmed by the Ayatollah Khomein

fortnight. They were bound, blindfolded, paraded before TV cam

threatened with trial and possible execution. Clearly the “necessity

ment permitting a rescue mission could have been satisfied easily at th

If once satisfied, however, must the necessity requirement be satis

on 24 April 1980, when the actual rescue operation took place? 

Christopher’s rhetorical question, perhaps shaped by the fact that it 

in the context of his summary and evaluation of Professor Schachte

bution to a joint publication effort, implies an affirmative answer.27

ter’s analysis takes the position that:

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[

]gy [pg] 

organs to obtain their release should not be enough to legitimize the use 

to effect their release. To allow the use of force in the absence of immine

would imply a “necessity” to use force to redress a legal wrong [which 

Charter does not permit]. It would be significantly different from the nec

self-defense to repel an attack or to save lives.277

Professor Schachter’s attempt to transmute a permissible exerc

right of forcible protection into an illegal use of force to redress a leg

using the passage of time and possible improvement in the treatme

hostages as an alchemist’s converter, is not persuasive on a number o

The taking of hostages being a wrongful act under international law

deny the State of the hostages’ nationality the right to forcibly protec

tages simply because the State that has seized the hostages has le

threat to the hostages’ lives or limbs—evidenced, perhaps, by havi

them in an ordinary prison or permitted Red Cross access—is to elim

important sanction against the hostage-taking State. It improves th

takers negotiating position, and thereby encourages similar acts in th

Second, if “any taking of hostages is so grave a criminal act that a 

tion is instantly justified in law,” (a position Professor Schachter appa

jects but admits has “appeal” since to him “[i]t appears rea

practical’’278), why should any remedial steps taken by the hosta

State—short of the unconditional release of all hostages—in effect, r

wrongfulness of the hostage-taking State’s act.

Finally, although there appears to be little if any State practice 

there is no data that suggests that any State has acknowledged a dim

its right to protect its nationals who have been illegally detained b

State merely because they have been held for some time and the thre

lives and safety may have diminished somewhat since their wrongful 

commenced. Certainly the United States never took this position d

Iran crisis. Indeed, as Professor Stein perceptively points out, “[i]n th

case, the United States made no effort to demonstrate to the Cour

rescue mission was undertaken in response to a new or more immine

the hostages’ lives.’’279

Even assuming, in arguendo, that international law required th

States to demonstrate that the hostages actually were in imminent 

the time of the rescue operation, that burden of proof certainly would 

have been met. As President Carter noted when initially explaining h

for ordering the mission, “the steady unraveling of authority in Ira

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mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages th

made the attempt “a necessity . . . .”280 Secretary of Defense Brown 

the President’s remarks, stressing the “danger posed to the hostages 

teriorating security situation in Iran.”281 Furthermore, he added, “

considerable concern for the physical and psychological effects on th

of prolonged captivity.”282 Secretary Christopher, who subsequently 

what he had believed to be the risks to the hostages “not in retrospect

benefit of hindsight, but at the time of the crisis, when decisions actua

be made,” spelled out US concerns in far more detailed fashion before 

ing that, “[b]y any objective measure, it was certainly reasonable for t

States to operate on the assumption that the hostages were in grave, e

tal, peril at the time of the rescue mission.”283

Professor Schachter, who believes the question of whether the 

were in imminent danger at the time of the rescue operation to be u

able, even with hindsight, takes a “margin of appreciation” approa

matter. “The pertinent point,” he observes, agreeing with Christoph

is whether, at the time, the US government had reason to fear that 

emotional atmosphere of Iranian revolutionary ferment the hostages w

executed, with or without a trial. As a general rule, it seems reason

recognize that the state whose nationals are imprisoned as hostages shou

wide latitude to make the decision whether they are in extreme danger.

Applying this approach to the publicly available facts, he conclud

whether or not the hostages were actually in extreme danger, the con

were such as to lead the US government to believe they were. Faced with 

and the not unrealistic conclusion at the time that peaceful means off

promise of release, the United States had reasonable grounds to consider 

action necessary to effect a rescue. On these premises, the action taken 

violate the Charter or international law.285

With this conclusion, if not with all his reasoning in reaching it, fe

able observers can disagree. Moreover, by spelling out and applying 

of appreciation” approach to the determination of whether the requi

necessity was satisfied in the case of the rescue operation in Iran, 

Schachter has made an important contribution towards refining one 

teria that will be used in judging the validity of future claims by State

cise the right of forcible protection of their nationals abroad.

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Fundamentally, as in the Iran case, a state

s embassy and/or consu

stitutes the sovereign property of the foreign state which occupies it. 

bassy or consulate is attacked by foreign nationals, it constitutes an 

the occupying state (the United States in the Iran case).

An attack on a state justifies a “self-defense” response against th

ers/occupiers of the state’s embassy or consulate to secure the buildin

rescue of its nationals per Article 51 of the UN Charter.

NOTES

1. Information about the forcible protection of nationals abroad by States oth

United States — principally France — is hard to obtain and often fragmentary or 

Moreover, with the one exception of Entebbe, such instances appear to have gen

legal debate either on the international level or within the States concerned. For a 

cursory and undoubtedly incomplete series of case studies of non-US forcible p

nationals abroad, see Chapter V.

2. Background information about the crisis as well as detailed descriptive ac

may be found in M. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958 (1965); L. Meo, Lebanon: 

Nation (1965); and F. Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon (1961) [hereinafter cited as Q

differing views on the legal issues involved, compare Potter, Legal Aspects of the Beirut 

Am. J. Int’l L. 727 (1958) with Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon

(1959). For a useful monograph, prepared under the supervision of the present write

upon throughout this chapter, see R. Osborne, The Lebanese Intervention and In

Law, 31 Mar. 1969 (unpublished thesis in US Naval War College Library). See also 

Diplomat ch. III (1959) for a vivid account of the actual intervention.

3. According to the official census, Lebanon’s population consists of 392,000 Ch

383,000 Muslims. L. Meo,supra note 2, at 229 n.1. But seetext at and accompanying no

4. The most recent estimates place the population at 2,800,000. The Midd

North Africa 1989, at 617 (36th ed. 1990). With a higher birthrate and lower emig

informed observers believe that Muslims now account for about 60% of the total po

5. Qubain, supra note 2, at 17.

6. M. Agwani, supra note 2, at 1-2.

7. Qubain, supra note 2, at 18.

8. “The people of Lebanon enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the M

Id. at 3.

9. Id. at 35-37.

10. Id. at 38.

11. Id. at 38-44.

12. Id. at 42.

13. Joint Resolution of 9 March 1957, § (1957). 2, 71 Stat. 5, reprinted in 36 DEP

481.

14. See L. Meo, supra note 2, at 117-20.

15. R. Garnet, Intervention and Revolution 140 (1968).

16. The violence began in Tripoli, where according to unsubstantiated rep

opposition, 168 of their members were killed. Qubain, supra note 2, at 74. It soon s

succinct account, see R. Osborne, supra note 2, at 22-23:

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py g

by a burning of the US Information Library. On 12 May the violence reached 

Barricades were set up with burning oil drums. The road to Damascus was barr

a curfew was introduced. Commerce and industry came to a standstill and th

volume of tourists disappeared from the country. When the news of the uphe

Tripoli reached Beirut, the United National Front held a meeting and the d

was made for armed revolt. On 13 May the United National Front attack

Presidential Palace at Bayt al-Din. The Cairo radio began urging Lebanese M

to seize areas where they were in control and accede to the United Arab Re

The country was sliding toward anarchy.

17. Despite Chamoun’s demands that the army promptly put down the rebell

the strike, General Fuad Chebab, the commander-in-chief, refused to commit the a

what he considered a mass protest rather than subversion. From May to July 

6,000-man army to patrol the streets and to prevent clashes between Christians and M

wanted at all costs to keep the army, which was about two-thirds Christian an

Muslim, above the political fray that threatened to split the county. R. Garnet, supra 

144.

18. While the civil strife which occurred in Lebanon from May through July o

well beyond Garnet’s “mass protest,” see text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra, it 

degenerated into civil war. Moreover, throughout the crisis an element of unreality, 

often prevailed. Thus, according to Qubain:

[h]ad the Lebanese crisis not had such tragic aspects, it could have been 

described as a comic opera. There was something unreal about the whole 

succession of scenes taken virtually in toto from Ruritania: an army that wou

fight; opposition leaders officially declared ‘rebels,’ with warrants out for their 

blandly walking the streets of Beirut in broad daylight with no one laying so mu

finger on them; pitched battles between the army and ‘rebel’ forces stopped, 

army trucks could bring water to the rebels and move their wounded to hosp

president virtually a prisoner in his own palace for over two months; a parliame

could not meet; opposition leaders, each with a private army of his own, estab

virtually independent government in his locality—levying taxes and admini

justice; and a crisis that was long on bitter words, but short on actual casualti

19. For President Chamoun’s statement to the press reiterating such charges, see 

supra note 2, at 74-76.

20. For the Lebanese complaint to the Security Council, see 13 U.N. SCOR Supp

1958) at 33, U.N. Doc. S/4007 (1958), reprinted in M. Agwani, supra note 2, at 120-2

21. 13 U.N. SCOR (823d mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. StP.V. 823 (1958), reprinted in 

supra note 2, at 124.

22. 13 U.N. SCOR (823d mtg.) at 22-23, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 823 (1958), rep

Agwani, supra note 2, at 147-59.

23. 13 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-Jun. 1958) at 47, U.N. Doc. S/4023 (1958), rep

Agwani, supra note 2, at 198.

24. Curtis, The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 18 Int’l Org. 738, 75

Other observers are much more critical of UNOGIL’s operations. SeeKerr, The Lebane

in The International Regulation of Civil War 65, 85-89 (E. Luard ed. 1972); 

Diplomat Among Warriors 402 (1964); and Qubain, supra note 2, at 143-52.

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gg 

26. 39 DEP’T ST. BULL. 31 (1958).

27. D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 270 (emphasis added). See also text infra ac

note 32.

28. Qubain, supra note 2, at 115. See Baghdad Reports Americans Slain, N.Y. 

16, 1958, at 15, col 1. See also C. Thayer, supra note 2, at 27.

29. Kerr, supra note 24, at 77.

30. For a graphic description, see C. Thayer, supra note 2, at 33-36.

31. Kerr, supra note 24, at 77.

32. See supra text at note 27. According to one key official who thereafter was i

in achieving a settlement of the crisis, President Eisenhower did not even mention 

protect nationals when in a White House briefing he:

elaborated a little on his purpose in ordering US Marines to land in Lebanon. H

that sentiment had developed in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, that Am

were capable only of words, that we were afraid of Soviet reaction if we atte

military action. Eisenhower believed that if the United States did nothing now

would be heavy and irreparable losses in Lebanon and in the area genera

wanted to demonstrate in a timely and practical way that the United Stat

capable of supporting its friends.

R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 398.

33. 39 DEP’T ST. BULL. 181 (1958) (emphasis added).

34. Id. at 182.

35. Id. at 184.

36. Explaining the landing of Marines he argued that:

[t]heir presence is designed for the sole purpose of helping the Governm

Lebanon at its request in its efforts to stabilize the situation brought on by the 

from outside, until such time as the United Nations can take the steps neces

protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon. They will also 

security to the several thousand Americans who reside in that country. 13 U.N. 

(827th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 827 (1958), reprinted in 39 DEP’T ST. BU

(1958) (emphasis added).

37. Ambassador Lodge’s statement before the Security Council on 18 July 1958, 

that the “[f]orces of the United States now in Lebanon at the specific request of 

constituted Government of Lebanon would not remain if their withdrawal were r

that Government,” 13 U.N. SCOR (833d mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 833 (1958)

39 DEP’T ST. BULL. 196 (1958), demonstrates beyond doubt that the protection 

rationale had been discarded after three days of use. One explanation for the s

justifications, of course, might be that over the 15-18 July period the safety of US n

been secured, thus depriving the United States of the factual basis for continued re

this rationale.

38. R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 399-400. See supra note 17. Cf. D. Eisenhower

25, at 265, who places the Lebanese army at 9,000 men.

39. D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 286. “In support of these troops, the entire 

consisting of about 70 ships with 40,000 men, moved to the east Mediterranean.” Q

note 2, at 115.

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and its airfield was:

...a political one which I adhered to over the recommendations of some 

military. If the Lebanese army were unable to subdue the rebels when we had s

their capital and protected their government, I felt, we were backing up a gover

with so little popular support that we probably should not be there.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 275 n.8. Would that subsequent Presidents had tak

approach when committing United States forces to the assistance of various gov

later years!

41. Qubain, supra note 2, at 120.

42. For a description of their “low profile” activities, see Kerr, supra note 24, at 

43. In one semi-humorous incident, “two American soldiers in a jeep lost th

strayed into the rebel-held quarter of Beirut called El-Basta. Local irregulars surro

car, disarmed them and took them to their chief, Satib Salam, who served them Co

gave them a kindly lecture about interference in the domestic affairs of foreign cou

were then sent off in their jeep, minus their weapons.” Id. at 90 n.12.

44. Qubain, supra note 2, at 119-20. See also id. at 130.

45. “Two other points should perhaps be emphasized in this connection: (1) tha

occasions American troops, while on duty, were shot at by snipers, but in mo

accordance with their instructions, did not return the fire and (2) that not a sing

suffered any injury of any kind—whether in his person or property—as a result of 

action.” Id. at 121.

46. Schulimson, Marines in Lebanon: 1958, at 32 (Historic Branch, G

Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1966). Accord, Kerr, supra note 24, at 90 n.13; 

supra note 24, at 408; and Qubain, supra note 2, at 120.

47. The withdrawal began on 8 October 1958, and was completed in less than t

39 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 650-51 (1958).

On October 25, 1958, the final withdrawal of United States troops took place, 

without public notice. This lack of attention contrasted vividly with attitudes 

early days of our intervention when some international critics were cryin

America’s purpose was to establish a permanent and imperialistic foothold 

Middle East.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 288.

48. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 24, at 754.

49. But see Wright, supra note 2.

50. “The most plausible ground for the recent landing of military forces of the U

near Beirut is to be found in the invitation of the duly elected Government of Leb

Potter, supra note 2. According to Wright, “[t]he American declaration that it wou

when requested by Lebanon and its actual withdrawal when so requested indicate t

the justification mainly relied upon.” Wright, supra note 2, at 124 n.38. See supra 

accompanying note 37.

51. Responding to the argument that the right to intervene by invitation may be 

of abuse, Qubain concludes that:

[t]his was clearly not the case with respect to the landing of American tro

Lebanon. Free elections had already taken place without the slightest interf

from the troops, and a new President, supported and accepted by all faction

elected. Furthermore, . . . the presence of American troops did serve a const

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the area. Qubain, supra note 2, at 101.

52. See generally supra text at notes 32-37. President Eisenhower, who recogni

action by the United States must conform “with the Charter of the United Nations

relied upon the concept of collective self-defense. D. Eisenhower, supra note 

Describing his briefing of Congressional leaders, he notes that at one point Secret

Dulles “had to explain Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which permitted 

act on an emergency basis pending the first opportunity to turn the problem over as 

United Nations was able to act.” Id. at 272.

53. See supra text at note 24. For a strong argument supporting the collective 

thesis, see Qubain, supra note 2, at 123-26.

54. See supra text at notes 32-37.

55. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 24, and Qubain, supra note 2.

56. Potter, supra note 2, at 728.

57. Wright, supra note 2, at 117.

58. See supra text at and accompanying notes 16-18. Of course, this fact cut

Questioning the motives for the action of the United States in a debate in the British 

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the opposition, tellingly remarked “that if it [the just

US action] was simply the lives of Americans, then they have been in some danger 

all these last weeks while the civil war has been taking place in Lebanon.” 591 Parl

(5th ser.) 1249 (1958).

59. See supra text at note 33. “In addition to our embassy personnel and other 

employees, a good many Americans lived in Lebanon, most of them as teachers, m

and businessmen. Beirut also was a popular seaside resort which attracted Americ

throughout the Middle East and many tourists.” R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 398.

60. For instances of US citizens being trapped by crossfire, see, e.g., C. Thayer, s

at 23. That they were not intentionally the targets of the anti-Chamoun forces see

from the statement of Mr. Sa’ib Salam, the opposition leader, made immediate

landing of US troops. “Our national Lebanese liberation movement is proud of the fa

not threatened foreigners or their property in the two months of an all-out bloody 

because its only aim is to get rid of [President Chamoun]. . . .” See M. Agwani, supra no

61. See supra text at note 28.

62. It is worth noting in this regard, however, that, while the United States cha

commercial aircraft to provide transportation for Americans who wish[ed] to lea

apparently never contemplated forcible action to protect them at that time. Indee

after the coup d’etat the US Ambassador seemed quite content with assuranc

revolutionary regime “that they will honor their promise to protect American lives a

Assurances have also been given that those Americans wishing to leave Iraq will b

depart freely and that all necessary precautions shall be taken to assure safe departure

ST. BULL. 199 (1958).

Also worthy of note is the fact that Great Britain, while accepting the protection 

rationale advanced by the United States in the case of Lebanon, 591 Parl. Deb., H.

1243 (1958) (Mr. Lloyd), did not adopt it herself when justifying the subsequent 

British troops to Jordan. Id. at 1438-39 (Prime Minister). But see the remarks of an 

spokesman to the effect that “[t]here would, in my view, be only one justification 

Jordan with troops. That is if British personnel were in danger and it was our duty to 

lives of British persons in Jordan. Then, I can visualize our putting troops in f

purpose.” Id. at 1304 (Mr. Crossman).

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64. R. Osborne, supra note 2, at 61-62.

65. C. Thayer, supra note 2, at 9-10.

66. Id. at 20, 28. See supra text at note 26.

67. R. Osborne, supra note 2, at 74-75 (emphasis deleted):

Although a stronger case could be made if “Phase C” had been set, which requi

evacuation of all Americans from the crisis area, it appears that a mom

deliberation did not exist and an immediate danger did exist after the Iraqi c

which Americans were killed. The rebels in Lebanon had clearly announce

intent to violently overthrow the western aligned government and therefore it 

be reasonable to assume that Americans would be harmed. The threat 

although no Americans were harmed, but a threat is sufficient to justify the exe

a reasonable degree of self-defense.

68. For a description of this breakdown and a day-by-day account of its afterm

Merriam, Congo: Background of Conflict ch. VI (1961).

69. For Belgium’s legal justification of this action, see McNemar, The Postindepe

in the Congo, in The International Law of Civil War 244, 273 (R. Falk ed. 1971), 

Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens as stating that:

The Belgian troops intervened when there was imminent danger and the gover

found itself in a situation of absolute necessity. The Belgian government li

government has a duty to observe a rule of international ethics and internatio

which imposes upon a country the protection of its nationals. The B

government intervened solely to prevent bloodshed and to offer the protection 

was necessary for the preservation of human lives.

The above author, who acknowledges the continued existence of the right 

protection in such cases, nevertheless concludes that:

The Belgian case was weak on two grounds. The failure to seek Congolese c

was a violation of a specific treaty commitment and the aggravation of an ext

sensitive colonial issue. Second, the Belgian actions in Katanga were more ex

than necessary for the protection of nationals and significantly contributed 

province’s ability to remain independent.

Id. For discussion of the question of consent and the principle of proportional

text at notes 102-104 & 142-146.

70. S.C. Res. 143, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/43

71. For a succinct account of ONUC’s operations, see L. Miller, World Orde

Disorder 66-116 (1967).

72. “One [witness] said the rebels carried out thousands of executions d

occupation of Stanleyville. He said that ‘every day, any time of the day, some Co

being dragged to the Lumumba monument and executed.’ Their hands were tied b

backs and they were hacked to death with machetes. The more illustrious of thos

their hearts cut out and eaten in public by the rebels.” The Times (London), Nov. 

12, col 2.

73. Young, The Congo Rebellion, Africa Report 6, 11 (April 1965). Another co

concludes that “[a]t least 18,000 Congolese were executed by the rebels.” G

Stanleyville Rescue: American Policy in the Congo, 56 Yale Rev. 242, 247 (1967).

74. Young, supra note 73, at 11.

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see I. Colvin, The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe ch. XII (1968); D. Reed, 1

Stanleyville ch. 10 (1965). There is little doubt that, like most mercenary contin

quickly filled their quotas in the looting and wanton murder departments. One m

reported to have admitted that “in Kindu we must have shot at least three thousan

be honest with you: most of them unnecessarily.”Id. at 180. See also infra text accomp

138.

76. D. Reed, supra note 75, at 8.

77. Case Studies In African Diplomacy, No. 1, The Organization of African U

Congo Crisis 1964-65, at 32 (C. Hoskyns ed. 1969). See infra text at note 86.

78. See the title of Chapter 4 of D. Reed, supra note 75.

79. For an insider’s view of these negotiations, see W. Attwood, The Reds and 

195-217 (1967).

80. I. Colvin, supra note 75, at 190.

81. Id.

82. 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964) (A

Stevenson), reprinted in 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 18 (1965).

83. D. Reed, supra note 75, at 192.

84. 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1174 (1964), 

American Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 777 (1967). See 

accompanying note 90.

85. Id. at 16, reprinted in 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 18 (1965). Fortunately, “the me

column captured Kindu, 300 miles south [of Stanleyville], just in time to preve

murder of twenty-four Europeans. (Hundreds of Congolese ‘intellectuals’ had a

burned alive there by the... [rebels].)” W. Attwood, supra note 79, at 207. Compa

accompanying note 75.

86. Grundy, supra note 73, at 247. See supra text at notes 77-78.

87. W. Attwood, supra note 79, at 213. Attwood states that he was not authoriz

military operations, but points out that in any event it would have been impossible 

cease-fire so late in the day. “I doubt if... [Kanza] realized that nothing now could h

the gung-ho mercenary-led column from taking Stanleyville—not even Tshom

standing in the road and waving his arms.” Id.

Compare Attwood’s recollection that Kanza “said the ANC advance had to be st

cease-fire put into effect before we could talk about the hostages,” Id. (emphasis a

Garnet’s inaccurate and misleading assertion that “[t]here is little doubt from Att

account that had the United States ordered Tshombe to stop bombing Stanleyville

Belgian hostages would have been released.” R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 251 (emph

Attwood’s “own account,” of course, indicates nothing of the kind.

88. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person

War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 UST. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. “The rebels’ action in 

threatening hostages is in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions an

humanitarian principles.” 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 189, U.N. D

(1964) (statement by US Government), reprinted in 12 M. Whiteman, Digest of In

Law 212 (1971).

89. On 25 September, when an ICRC delegation flew to Stanleyville for two d

with the rebels about releasing the hostages, Gbenye and his associates professed n

“what the International Committee of the Red Cross was. When told about 

Conventions and particularly the ban on holding people as hostages, they said th

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the Geneva rules. The conventions, they scoffed, were ‘written by whites.’ ” D. Reed

75, at 115.

90. On their ordeal, see generally id. passim. Ambassador Stevenson subseque

what he termed “the astonishing thesis” that the threats to their lives were not real

The threats were very real indeed; they had been carried out in the past and 

every reason to expect that they would continue to be carried out in the future

mid-August onward after the rebel forces had taken Stanleyville, seizing and h

foreigners as hostages became a deliberate act of rebel policy, and in the fo

months this medieval practice was widely applied. Many of those hostage

deliberately killed. By the time the Belgian paratroopers arrived in Stanleyvil

before the outlaws even knew of their impending arrival, the total of tho

already tortured and slaughtered amounted to 35 foreigners. . . .

19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964), reprinted in 5

BULL. 18 (1965). See supra text at note 84.

91. The Belgian Foreign Ministry confirmed this development on 20 Novembe

way of explanation that “[t]he Belgian and American Governments have consid

duty in view of the threat to their nationals and civilians in general in the region of St

take preparatory measures in order to be able to effect, if necessary, a humanita

operation.” 51 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 840 (1964), reprinted in American Foreign Polic

Documents 1964, at 767 (1967).

92. See W. Attwood, supra note 79, at 209-14.

93. Prime Minister Tshombe, in a note to the United States dated 21 Nove

stated that the Congo Government had decided:

to authorize the Belgian government to send an adequate rescue force to carry 

humanitarian task of evacuating the civilians held as hostages by the rebels, 

authorize the United States Government to furnish necessary transport f

humanitarian mission. I fully appreciate that you wish to withdraw your forces 

as your mission is accomplished.

19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 187-88, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964), 

American Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 768 (1967).

According to his biographer, Tshombe recalled that three weeks earlier “’the U

and Belgium, fearing that the army advance would be too slow to rescue the hos

asked my authorisation to organise a parachute attack on Stanleyville.”’ I. Colvin, su

at 189. Thus, as in the case of the Dominican Republic, see infra text at notes 1

accompanying note 186, an invitation to undertake a rescue operation apparently wa

94. For a vivid description of the actual operation, see D. Reed, supra note 75, c

and Colvin state that 22 white hostages were killed and at least 40 wounded (Id. at 25

supra note 75, at 194), while Attwood places the number of dead at 27. W. Attwood

79, at 217. Apparently the discrepancy stems from the fact that five of the wounded l

Reed, supra at 259. Three of the dead, including ironically Dr. Paul Carlson, were U

nationals. American Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 772 (1967).

95. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 16 (1965) (Ambassador Stevenson), reprinted in Ameri

policy—Current Documents 1964, at 776 (1967).

96. 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 195, U.N. Doc. S/6068 (1964) 

Ambassador Stevenson to the President of the Security Council), reprinted in Ameri

Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 771 (1967). For a description of this opera

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text at note 97.

Subsequent estimates of the total number of hostages rescued during the four 

ranged even higher than the figures given in the text. “The rescue operation was un

November 24. As a result, more than 1,300 non-Congolese and over 1,000 black A

rescued from Stanleyville. In subsequent air and ground rescues, another 1,600 non

were saved.” 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 222 (1965) (Assistant Secretary of State William

97. See supra note 95. The Times (London), Nov. 28, 1964, at 8, col 1, reported 

four day operation 80 white hostages had been killed in Stanleyville and Paulis. Co

text accompanying note 94 and at infra notes 135-136.

98. For a comprehensive treatment of Belgium’s legal justification of its particip

operation, see Gerard, L’Operation Stanleyville-Paulis Devant le Parlement Belge et les N

3 Revue Belge De Droit International 242 (1967). According to the author, 

Government consistently maintained that the right of self-defense guaranteed State

51 of the United Nations Charter included the right of forcible protection of a Stat

abroad. Id. at 254-56. See supra text accompanying note 69. The British governme

was the same. 702 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 911 (1964) (Mr. Thomson): “We take t

under international law a state has the right to land troops in foreign territory to 

nationals in an emergency if necessary.”

99. 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 188, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964), re

M. Whiteman, supra note 88, at 211.

100. 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964), rep

DEP’T. ST. BULL. 17 (1965).

101. 51 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 846 (1964).

102. See supra note 99. See also Cleveland, The Evolution of Rising Responsibility, 5

BULL. 7, 9 (1965). For the Congolese note authorizing the operation, see 

accompanying note 93.

103. A point repeatedly made by Professor Brownlie and other critics of the 

humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted G

Humanitarian Intervention and The United Nations 139, 143-44 (R. Lillich ed. 19

104. These requirements have been summarized conveniently by Farer, The R

Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 Recueil Des Cours (Hague A

International Law) 297, 394 (1974-II), as follows:

(1) that there be an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human 

(2) that all other remedies for the protection of those rights have been exha

extent possible within the time constraints posed by the threat;

(3) that an attempt has been made to secure the approval of appropriate a

the target State;

(4) that there is a minimal effect on the extant structure of authority (e

intervention not be used to impose or preserve a preferred regime);

(5) that the minimal requisite force be employed and/or that the interve

likely to cause greater injury to innocent persons and their property than wo

the threatened violation actually occurred;

(6) that the intervention be of limited duration; and

(7) that a report of the intervention be filed immediately with the Security 

where relevant, regional organisations.

105. 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 189, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964), re

M. Whiteman, supra note 88, at 212-13.

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themselves that further delay would have meant an even greater number of wanto

killings. Time, for the lives of those people, was calculable only in minutes.” 19 U.N. S

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 195, U.N. Doc. S/6068 (1964) (Letter from Ambassador Steve

President of the Security Council),reprinted in American Foreign Policy—Current Docu

at 771 (1967). Accord, 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 194, U.N. Doc. S/

(Letter from the Belgian Ambassador to the President of the Security Council): “

hostages] stress their conviction that they owe their lives only to the intervention in ex

Belgian paratroops.”

See also the statement by Under Secretary of State Ball that prior to the airdrop “

was deteriorating to the point where we felt that it couldn’t hold very much longer, and

Hoyt, who is our consul in Stanleyville and who has been one of the hostages for 3 mon

us, first of all, that it was the opinion of everyone there that if this had gone 24 hours 

would all have been executed—they were going to be lined up against the wall—and, se

only the airdrop saved their lives.” 51 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 843 (1964).

107. A quarter century ago the present writer, perhaps unduly reflecting official U

remarked that “the criticism heaped upon the United States for its role in this humanita

comes as something of a surprise.” R. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 Mc

214 (1969) But see R. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World 326 (1968).

108. These factors are taken from an excellent review of the UN debates found in 

Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention, 12 Va. J. Int’l L. 261, 26

written by Howard L. Weisberg, Esq., Class of 1973, University of Virginia School 

Member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars, under the supervision of the pre

109. The following quote from a speech by the delegate from the Congo Republic (B

illustrative: “Why, in a conflict in which the Congolese are fighting between themselves, 

be no concern for the safety of the civilian population in general and why should the fate 

be the sole consideration?” 19 U.N. SCOR (1170th mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1170 

writer, reviewing the operation, has suggested, somewhat cynically, that “[t]he State D

humanitarian concerns were aroused only when it appeared that Americans and Europe

the next victims.” R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 249. See infra text at note 111.

110. They were slain, of course, not by the Belgian paratroopers, but by the white m

ANC that reached Stanleyville several hours after the airdrop began. The time of the A

has been put at “soon after nine o’clock” by I. Colvin, supra note 75, at 194, and as “[a]

by D. Reed, supra note 75, at 261. See infra text at and accompanying note 138.

111. Garnet’s criticism of the United States’ slowness in acting (see supra text accomp

109) seems particularly unfair in view of his caustic comments on the rescue operation 

Garnet, supra note 15, at 250-51. One can imagine what his reaction to an earlier h

intervention would have been!

112. 19 U.N. SCOR (1173d mtg.) at 12, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1173 (1964). See generally 

notes 95-97.

113. See supra text at note 79. See also supra text at notes 86-90.

114. 19 U.N. SCOR (1175th mtg.) at 23, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1175 (1964).

115. When Attwood informed President Kenyatta of Kenya, who was chairman of t

Hoc Commission on the Congo, “that the paratroopers might have to mount a humani

operation as a last resort,” the latter “look pained” and replied that “’that would be very 

Attwood, supra note 79, at 214. Later, in response to Attwood’s plea to remain frien

frankly that “’[w]e can be friends. . . only if you stop being friends with Tshombe.” Id. a

116. See supra text at and accompanying note 102.

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above quote are parentheses containing the following sentence: “The orgy of looting an

followed the capture of Stanleyville by the ANC was so bad that the Belgian paratroop 

was glad to pull his men out of the city for fear they’d start fighting the mercenaries.” Id

infra text at and accompanying note 138.

118. R. Falk, supra note 107, at 326. In a clause preceding the extract quoted in th

notes that the adverse African reaction “does not mean that the United States should ha

join in the rescue. . . .” Id. Elsewhere he observes that “[t]he case for intervention is no

capricious since the alternative may be to allow one’s countrymen to be slaughte

cause.” Id. at 329. Although his view is less than crystal clear on this point, it appears 

troubled less by the legality than by “the appearances of the Stanleyville Operation. . . .”I

Grundy, supra note 73, at 251, who affirms the operation’s legality more explicit

nevertheless criticizes it from from a political perspective, concluding that the United 

fortunate in getting off as easily as it did in the Congo.” Id. at 255.

119. See generally S. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-196

passim (1974).

120. Whether it actually was a by-product of the rescue operation or one of its princip

is discussed at infra notes 142-146.

121. Grundy, supra note 73, at 251.

122. 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964), reprinted 

Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 777 (1967).

123. 19 U.N. SCOR (1173d mtg.) at 3-10, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1173 (1964). Se

accompanying note 98.

124. 19 U.N. SCOR (1175th mtg.) at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1175 (1964). Se

accompanying note 98.

125. 19 U.N. SCOR (1183d mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. (1964). “Bolivia thinks 

clearly a rescue operation, regrettable from the political point of view of sovereignty, 

morally and duly authorized by the legally responsible Government of the Congo.”

126. 19 U.N. SCOR (117th mtg.) at 19-20 U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1177 (1964):

Such an operation finds its justification in the very objective which inspired it

was to frustrate the perpetration of a crime, recognized as such by internatio

and by all the norms of conduct governing relations among States, which con

the use of innocent civilians as hostages, as a bargaining point in wartim

Therefore the humanitarian action taken to save the lives of the hostages 

legitimate to the delegation of Brazil, both in regard to its means and 

motivations.

127. 19 U.N. SCOR (1177th mtg.) at 26, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1177 (1964): “In the cir

my delegation is fully satisfied with the statements made in this Council by the repe

Belgium and the United States that the operation was necessary to save the lives of the h

that it was a humanitarian mission, and nothing more.”

128. See infra text at notes 135-141.

129. “[I]t is repugnant to use as a pretext the uncertainty of the fate of some 1,500 

order to attack a country and to interfere in its domestic affairs. . . .” 19 U.N. SCOR (117

10, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1178 (1964) (Morocco). Several other States used the sam

language. “The use of the term ‘pretext,’ ” as has been pointed out, actually “suggests a re

the concept of humanitarian intervention [or forcible protection], for such a charge tacit

legitimacy of the subject matter to which that pretense is applied.” Note, supra note 108

infra text at notes 142-146.

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Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in Law and 

The Modern World 229, 243 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974), Professor Farer states that “t

significance for [Lillich, the African complaints] would apparently have to have assume

flat claims of illegality.” Farer, supra note 104, at 396. This characterization of the pre

views obviously goes too far and reveals Farer, as is his wont upon occasion, once again 

straw man for easy demolition. Surely the fact that only a handful of States condemne

operation on legal grounds is notentirely irrelevant to an assessment of its legality under i

law, which after all is the issue at hand.

131. S.C. Res. 199, 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 328, U.N. Doc. S/

(100-1), reprinted in American Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 786 (196

132. Replying to a suggestion by the Ghanaian delegate that the resolution impliedly 

the rescue operation, Ambassador Stevenson stated: “I think it is quite clear from th

made during this debate that the overwhelming majority of the members of this Coun

interpret that paragraph of the resolution. The fact that my delegation has voted for the 

amended makes it perfectly clear that we do not so interpret it.” 19 U.N. SCOR (1189th 

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1189 (1964), reprinted in American Foreign Foreign-Current Docum

789 (1967).

Farer faults the present writer for “[finding] comfort in the failure of the Security 

condemn Humanitarian Intervention as such or the United States and Belgium, a

Council condemnation of those States were a conceivable option in the world of 1964.” 

note 104, at 396-97. His point may be well-taken, but it does not take one very far. The 

Security Council condemned neither the operation nor the States undertaking it certa

relevance. Even in “the world of 1964” the censure of a permanent member of the Secu

for an illegal use of force was not out of the question, as witness the formal condemnat

Britain the same year for a reprisal it had undertaken against Yemen. S.C. Res. 188, 19 

Supp. (Apr.-Sept. 1964) at 9, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (1964) (9-0-2). See Lillich, supra note 

133. “After the Congo debates, the legal principle of Article 2(4) remains, but what 

means has been altered by political evaluation. There is now an unwillingness on the part 

community to read Article 2(4) as an absolute prohibition on the use of force in h

intervention.” Note, supra note 108, at 274.

134. Compare the fifth and fourth requirements, respectively, of the traditional 

humanitarian intervention, as summarized by Farer in the supra text accompanying no

135. D. Reed, supra note 75, at 268.

136. According to Ambassador Stevenson, “only a very small number of rebels we

consequence of that operation and these only in self-defense or because they were at 

resisting attempts to rescue the hostages.” 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 12, U.N. 

1174 (1964), reprinted in American Foreign Policy—Current Documents 1964, at 776 (

Reed, supra note 75, at 259: “As far as anyone could tell, none of the Simbas who ca

massacre was killed by the paratroopers. They all ran at the last minute.” Compare infr

accompanying note 138.

137. Id. at 264. “Two men were wounded by gunfire and three were injured in the d

the American airmen was hurt.” Id.

138. See supra text accompanying note 117. See also D. Reed, supra note 75, at 264

The mercenaries and the ANC were running wild in Stanleyville. They sho

Congolese they saw. They looted homes and stores. ...A mercenary patrol paid 

to the city zoo. They found that the lions were ravenously hungry. Gleefull

released the lions, who ran off into the city.

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was horrified. “I never saw such a bloodbath in my life,” he said. “No prisoners were 

They were shot up, cut up or beaten to death. It was brutal.”

Laurent did not want the young paratroopers to see what was going on. He ordered his m

to the airfield as soon as they had rescued everyone.

139. Id. at 273.

140. Although one “revisionist” historian, misciting Reed for support, has conten

airdrops themselves “resulted in the execution of perhaps 300 whites. . . .” S. Weissma

119, at 248.

141. In response to a complaint about “the terrible massacre” that occurred at Stan

British minister responsible replied that “[i]n my view, if the troops which were advanc

to Stanleyville had advanced without the intervention of this aerial operation, I am co

the loss of life would have been much greater than it has been.” 702 Parl. Deb., H.

1278-79 (1964) (Mr. Thomson). For further speculations pro and con, see S. Weissma

119, at 253.

Colvin concludes that “[a] parachute drop was probably necessary,” but that instead 

that were adopted “[t]he parachute drops should have been planned in triple strength wi

each other at Stanleyville, Paulis and Bunia.” I. Colvin, supra note 75, at 196. As event

the delay in mounting the Paulis airdrop caused many additional casualties there; 

contemplated airdrop on Bunia never took place. D. Reed, supra note 75 at 271-72.

142. See, e.g., R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 250; R. Falk, supra note 107, at 333; Fare

104, at 394-96; Grundy, supra note 73, at 250-52; and S. Weissman, supra note 119, a

143. See, e.g., Professor Frey-Wouters, Remarks, in Humanitarian Intervention and 

Nations, supra note 103, at 58 n.5.

144. Even Weissman acknowledges that “[t]he rescue motivation seems to 

predominant. . . .” S. Weissman, supra note 119, at 252 n.106. See also id. at 251, where 

that a “secondary objective” of the rescue operation was to help the ANC recapture St

145. Id. at 250. See supra text accompanying note 106.

146. See supra text at note 122.

147. For background information about the crisis as well as detailed descriptive acco

T. Draper, The Dominican Revolt (1968); D. Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned 

Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (1972); J. Slater, Intervention and Negotia

and T. Szulc, Dominican Diary (1965). See also J. Moreno, Barrios In Arms (1970). 

views on the legal issues involved,compare Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention 

Self-Defense, 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 64 (1966), with Bohan, The Dominican Case: Unilateral I

60 id. 809 (1966). For a useful monograph, prepared under the supervision of the presen

drawn upon throughout this Section, see J. Tuttle, The Case Study of the Dominican C

The Legality of the United States Action (1969) (unpublished thesis, U.S. Naval W

Library).

148. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 13. How much assistance actually was given, as oppo

authorized, is not entirely clear. See J. Slater, supra note 147, at 13-14 and accompanyi

149. For a sampling of opposition criticism—reasoned, biased and vitriolic—see J. M

note 147, at 18-19.

150. Slater absolves Bosch of serious charges of maladministration, observing that “

clear that anyone could have survived [as President], at least without making such 

concessions to the forces of reaction as to make survival almost pointless. As Jose Figuer

‘God Himself would have done a bad job in the Dominican Republic.”’ J. Slater,supra no

151. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1963, at 322 (1967).

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“Thus, the usual interpretation of this period, seeing great significance in the fact t

recognized the Dominican junta only three weeks after the assassination of Kennedy 

the sharp contrast between the Kennedy and Johnson policies toward the coup, is qui

Slater, supra note 147, at 16-17.

153. Id., at 19.

154. Indeed, US Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, who had become increasingly con

the deteriorating situation in the Dominican Republic, wrote prophetically to the De

State in early April that “[l]ittle foxes, some of them red, are chewing at the grapes....A 

of our effort or failure to act will result in a bitter wine.” Quoted in R. Stebbins, The Uni

World Affairs 1965, at 74-76 (1966). Both Bennett and Reid were in receipt of intellig

about planned coups, but they did not anticipate one before June, when campaig

presidential election was scheduled to start. Center for Strategic Studies (Georgetown 

Dominican Action—1965: Intervention or Cooperation?, at 9 (1966).

155. J. Slater, supra note 147, at 19.

156. Id at 22.

Until that point, the civilians working with the constitutionalists were 

middle-class, college-educated students, lawyers, engineers, technicians, and 

businessmen, frustrated by a system in which they had no purpose and no mea

future. With the passing out of the arms large sectors of the urban lower class 

the ranks, giving the movement something of a mass base as well as providing m

the actual combatientes.

157. The case of General Wessin, who commanded most of the Dominican Republi

1,500 of its Army’s crack troops, best illustrates the response of the military leaders to R

Neither the tanks nor the troops moved from the San Isidro Air Base while Reid remain

Center for Strategic Studies (Georgetown University), supra note 154, at 11.

158. Draper, supra note 147, at 55-56.

159. Id. at 57; J. Slater, supra note 147, at 22.

160. J. Slater, supra note 147, at 23 note.

161. T. Draper, supra note 147, at 57.

162. In 1968, Antonio Martinez Francisco, the Secretary General of the PRD dur

revolution, said that the original agreement between Bosch and sympathetic m

men called for a military junta to rule the country temporarily after the overth

the Reid government, pending the holding of new elections within ninety days

Reid had fallen, Martinez charges, Bosch ignored the agreement and calle

return to ‘constitutionality,’ that is, the immediate restoration of his Presiden

J. Slater, supra note 147, at 23 note.

163. Id. at 23-24.

164. Id. at 25.

165. See infra text at notes 172-173. President Johnson, relying upon such reports, 

claimed that “some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads 

Johnson, An Assessment of the Situation in the Dominican Republic, 53 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 1

As Slater observes:

not only was not a single American attacked but there were remarkab

constitutionalist atrocities of any sort. What few attacks did occur were 

selective, aimed almost exclusively at a few extreme rightists, and then mainly 

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bombing and strafing than at the hands of the constitutionalists.

J. Slater, supra note 147, at 33.

166. For a graphic description of the scene in Santo Domingo at about this time, see 

note 147, at 18:

[I]n the ancient Dominican capital blood was flowing freely. Rebel army units and 

bands were firing across the city at the positions of the Wessin forces. Planes s

overhead, machine gunning the streets and dropping bombs on the rebels and the 

population. Casualties were mounting and hospitals were filling up with the wou

167. Id. at 18 (four day period of April 25-28); J. Moreno, supra note 147, at 29 (four 

April 27-30).

168. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 20-21.

169. A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 85.

170. Johnson,supra note 165, at 21. “The Commander of Task Group 44.9, Captain D

ordered as early as 25 April to proceed to the vicinity of the Dominican Republic an

evacuate approximately 1,200 United States nationals if this action should become neces

supra note 147, at 28, citing Dare, Dominican Diary, 91 US Naval Institute Proc. 37, 38 

Moreover, on the following day—26 April—the Department of Defense had put on al

brigade at Camp Lejeune and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. T. Szulc,supra no

171. See generally T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 31-34, and Dare, supra note 170, at 3

172. J. Slater, supra note 147, at 33.

173. Szulc concludes that:

[T]he embassy’s reports on this incident must have been greatly exaggerated b

President Johnson later spoke of armed rebels running up and down the hotel’s co

firing into rooms and closets. Actually, nothing of the sort had occurred, b

overwrought reporting by the embassy evidently helped increase the President’s c

and pushed the United States closer to the ultimate decision to intervene militaril

Dominican Republic.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 33-34. Other accounts reinforce Szulc’s views. See T. Drape

147, at 105-06, and A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 90 & 204 n.27.

174. US policy even before the revolution had frowned on the return of Bosch to the 

and after the revolution began nowhere was that policy more faithfully implemented th

Embassy:

[T]he State Department had assigned the two top embassy positions to conservativ

instinctively distrusted not only Bosch but the PRD in general, and who had almost 

with even the moderate left. ‘Tap didn’t seem to know anyone to the left of the 

Club,’ one embassy official is quoted as remarking, while William Connett, the 

Chief of Mission, ‘seemed to be ill at ease with people who were not correctly dress

J. Slater, supra note 147, at 25.

175. Although there is absolutely no doubt that Bennett refused US mediation an

the accusations mentioned in the text [accusations that PRD officials had a

“communists” to take advantage of the movement and had tolerated looti

atrocities], the former Ambassador has denied he told the constitutiona

surrender. However, not only the constitutionalists but Martin [J. Martin, Ove

By Events 653 (1966)] maintain that he did so.

J. Slater, supra note 147, at 227 n.24.

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177. A participant at the now famous embassy confrontation vividly recalls that 

moment when Bennett labeled the revolution ‘Communist’ and told the lea

surrender, a big, barrelchested man whom he had never seen before jumped to 

and said, ‘Son of a bitch! I know what I’m going to do.’ It was Francisco Caamano, 

was not going to strangle Bennett on the spot as the startled assemblage for a m

feared, but was on his way to the bridge to rally his forces for a last-ditch stand.

Id. at 29-30.

178. For a succinct account of this turn of events, see id. at 30.

179. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 42.

180. Id. at 44.

181. Id. Needless to say, in making their second request for US intervention th

motivated by factors beyond just the protection of US nationals. One such factor w

personal safety. “That night, when the first contingents of the 82nd Airborne Division a

Isidro, they found the ‘strong man’ of the Dominican armed forced, the dreaded Wessin 

tears: ‘If you had not come,’ he cried, ‘they would have killed us.”’ J. Slater,supra note 147

182. A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 101-02. See infra text accompanying note 18

183. Id. at 102-03; T. Draper, supra note 147, at 118-21; and J. Slater, supra note 14

184. Speaking of this decision at a news conference on 17 June 1965, the Presiden

“[i]t was a decision we considered from Saturday until Wednesday evening. But once w

the neighborhood of 6:00 or 6:30 that evening, they landed within one hour.” Johnson

165, at 21.

185. Dare, supra note 170, at 42. The President, according to one commentator, au

landing of only 500 Marines. A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 103. Other commenta

number of Marines landed that evening as about 400. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 73.

186. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 738 (1965), American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 

(1968) [hereinafter cited as American Foreign Policy - 1965]. Actually, although Colone

made such representations to Ambassador Bennett, they were not contained in the ju

request. See supra text at notes 180-182. Their omission so concerned Under Secre

Thomas Mann that, following President Johnson’s decision to land US troops, he purpo

Bennett and asked him to obtain from Benoit “a written statement for the record a

military assistance to restore order and specifically mentioning the need to protect Am

A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 104. Accordingly, by early Thursday morning, 29 

Benoit dispatched a follow-up communication to the US Embassy:

Regarding my earlier request, I wish to add that American lives are in dang

conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide adequate protec

therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order 

country.

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Organization of American State

Reports on Communist Subversion 114 (Comm. Print 1965).

As Szulc notes—and as Mann, of course, well knew—Benoit’s request, “if nothing 

legal justification for a United States landing if Washington chose to play it that 

somewhat reminiscent of the 1958 situation in Lebanon, where United States Marines l

request of President Camille Chamoun to help him restore order.” T. Szulc, supra not

Compare supra text at and accompanying notes 37, 50 & 93, and infra text at and accomp

204.

187. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 738 (1965), American Foreign Policy-1965, supra note 18

188. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 73.

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190. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 742 (1965), American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 

According to the President, US troops eventually evacuated 5,600 people from 46 count

Dominican Republic. Johnson, supra note 165, at 20.

191. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 742, American Foreign Policy - 1965,supra note 186, at 956

Representative to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, had made a similar argument befo

Council of Ministers earlier the same day. Id. at 957-58.

192. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 90.

193. 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 743 (1965), American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 1

194. Id. at 745, American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 186, at 962-63.

195. Id. at 746, American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 186, at 963.

196. Id., American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 186, at 963-64.

197. For the text of this resolution, see Senate Comm. on For. Rels., 89th Con

Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic 52 (Comm. Print 1965)

198. For the text of this resolution, see 52 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 862 (1965). The 

resolution, which required a two-thirds majority, was 15 for, 5 against (Chile, Ecuador, M

and Uruguay), and one abstention (Venezuela). Id.

199. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1966, at 3, col 1.

200. See, e.g., the remarks of the Legal Adviser along these lines in Meeker, Th

Situation in the Perspective of International Law. 53 DEP’T ST. BULL. 60, 62 (1965):

We landed troops in the Dominican Republic in order to preserve the lives of 

nationals — nationals of the United States and many other countries. We con

our military presence in the Dominican Republic for the additional purp

preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by th

Charter.

201. See generally Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, supra note 1

passim.There is no doubt that “the US attempted to legitimize its military action by secur

of the OAS.” Frey-Wouters, The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs, in 1 The F

International Legal Order 463, 536 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969). Whether the v

resolutions constituted legitimation or merely acquiescence, however, is another m

Frey-Wouters believes the Dominican intervention an example of how the United Sta

sought OAS approval to provide “a multilateral legitimacy for essentially unilateral US a

539.

202. See e.g., A. Thomas & A. Thomas, Working Paper, in The Dominican Crisis 

Aspects 1 (Hammarskjold Forum, J. Carey ed. 1967); McLaren, The Dominican 

InterAmerican Dilemma, 4 Canadian Y.B. Int’l L. 178 (1966); and Nanda, The United St

the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order - Part II, 44 Denv. L.J. 225 (1967).

203. On 21 May 1965, the United States, Great Britain, Bolivia, China, Neth

Northern Ireland all voted against a Soviet Union-sponsored resolution initially subm

Security Council on 4 May that would have condemned what it labeled US armed int

the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. 20 U.N. SCOR (1214th mtg.) at 22

S/6328 (1965). Great Britain stated it “fully understood the reasons for the United State

action” and thanked the United States for evacuating British subjects from the cou

Monthly Chron., No. 6 at 6 (1965), while France, acknowledging US interest in p

nationals there, cautioned that “such operations must be limited in objective, duration, 

run the risk of becoming armed intervention, for which there appeared to be no need in 

at 7. France’s position seemed to recognize the necessity of the US action, while gently qu

proportionality. On these two limitations on the right of forcible protection, see “Nanda

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who concludes that “while the necessity of the [US] action can be defended on h

grounds, the proportionality cannot be justified.” Id. at 479. Compare infra text at note 

204. 111 Cong. Rec. 23855, 23857 (1965):

In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which ha

hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for US troops on the ground t

was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the 

inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and 

was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said h

not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus 

effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would int

And that is precisely what happened.

Compare supra text accompanying note 186.

205. 111 Cong. Rec. 23857 (1965).

206. Id. at 23858.

207. But see, e.g., Fenwick, supra note 147.

208. Nanda, supra note 203, at 471.

209. Id. at 472. Compare supra text accompanying note 203.

210. Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 Am. J. Int

(1965), citing Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Internati

Recueil des Cours (Hague Academy of International Law) 451, 467 (1952).

211. Friedmann, supra note 210, at 869. He subsequently reiterated and elaborated 

follows:

There was a general consensus on the original US position of intervening to 

American lives and property and the sending in of a battalion; that is, it can be just

in the limited sense that it is strictly limited to nationals, and therefore it is an exten

national interests intervention. That had been previously stated by international 

as a justifiable cause of intervention....

Then came the radical shift which Johnson made by his famous statement that 

altered the situation and made it clear, I think, beyond a shadow of a doubt, t

subsequent massive and prolonged intervention was contrary not only to th

Charter but to the OAS Charter; namely, intervention in the internal affairs of a

small power by a big power, in order to effect a change of political regime.

Remarks, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, supra note 103, at 81-8

212. Lillich, Remarks, in id. at 10:

When you are talking about evacuating citizens, this is a limited objective, and, of 

you must evacuate them as rapidly as possible. Applying this to the Dominican cont

it would, I would assume, justify perhaps the first day or so, but it wouldn’t jus

22,000 Marines for six months.

For the views of other participants, see id. at 76-82.

213. See text accompanying note 211.

214. For a particularly outspoken warning, see Rogers, Remarks, in Humanitarian 

and the United Nations supra note 103, at 72:

We see the constant misuse of the excuse of protection of one’s own nationals fo

power purposes, most recently, of course, in the movement of the Sixth Fleet into 

of Bengal—which was justified for a short moment by Kissinger’s preposterous ide

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great power ploy.

215. R. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 Iowa L. R

(1967).

216. For background information about the hostage crisis as well as detailed descript

of it, see,e.g., J. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relation

Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (1985)[herein

Christopher]; G. Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (1985). 

Iranian Hostage Crisis: A Chronology of Daily Developments, Report Prepared for the 

on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Servic

Congress, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

217. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 

(Merits), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 30-33 (Judgment of May 24)[hereinafter cited as Hostages Cas

218. Id. at 33-35. On 18-20 November 1979, however, Iran did release 13 wome

hostages “not considered spies.” Their release was a unilateral Iranian gesture, not 

negotiations. “[It] was probably seen in Tehran as a step to portray the regime as huma

intent only on exposing the US government and its ‘nest of spies.’ ” Saunders, Diplomacy 

November 1979-May 1980, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 79. Although another 

became ill was released in July 1980, Saunders, The Crisis Begins, in Christopher, supra

continued to hold the remaining 52 hostages until their release on 20 January 1981 f

so-called Algiers Accords, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981).

219. The Ayatollah Khomeini, the de facto head of Iran’s revolutionary governme

the students’ demands in a decree issued on 17 November expressly declaring that “th

the Embassy and the hostages would remain as they were until the United States had 

the former Shah for trial and returned his property to Iran.” Hostages Case-Merits, supra 

34.

220. He learned of their trip from a report on the NBC evening news that Press Se

Powell had attempted to dissuade the network from carrying. Saunders, Diplomacy and 

Christopher, supra note 216, at 76. Saunders is justifiably critical of NBC’s action, taken 

knowledge that it might jeopardize a sensitive mission.

221. Id. at 76-77.

222. S.C. Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dec. at 24, U.N. Doc S/RES/457 (1979

223. S.C. Res. 461, 34 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dec. at 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/RES/461 (1

States voted for the resolution, with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and 

abstaining. 80 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 68 (Feb. 1980).

224. The text of the draft resolution may be found in 80 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 70-71. Ten 

for the resolution, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic vote

Bangladesh and Mexico abstained, and China did not participate. Id.

225. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 

(Provisional Measures), 1979 I.C.J. 7, 12 (Order of Dec. 15)[hereinafter Hos

Provisional Measures]. See generally Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection an

Force by States, in The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 337 (A. Cassese e

226. Hostages Case-Provisional Measures, supra note 225, at 21.

227. Id.

228. See supra text at notes 222-223.

229. They are described in considerable detail in Saunders, Diplomacy and 

Christopher, supra note 216, at 102-45.

230. Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 21.

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After an 8-3 vote in the Revolutionary Council, the issue was taken to Khomeini o

6. Confirmed reports told us that Khomeini had asked whether the recommenda

the Revolutionary Council [to transfer the hostages] was unanimous. When he w

that there were three negative votes—Ayatollah Beheshti and two 

clerics—Khomeini refused to approve the Council’s recommendation.

232. Id.

233. For inside descriptions of the rescue operation and why it failed, see C. Beck

Knox, Delta Force (1983); P. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (1985); S

Operations and Constraints, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 154-64. See also the 78 p

the Special Operations Review Group, headed by Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, enti

Mission Report,” distributed in Washington, D.C., during the summer of 1980.

234. The first landed in the desert, with its crew being taken aboard another he

proceeded to the landing site. The second returned to the USS Nimitz. Sick, Military O

Constraints, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 158.

235. Id. at 159. At 1 A.M. [EST] on 25 April the White House issued an announc

operation’s failure, whose purpose and timing was “intended to insure that Iran would 

the events at Desert I for an invasion attempt and retaliate against the hostages.” Id.

236. 80 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 38 (June 1980).

237. Id. (emphasis added).

238. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Te

Senate, 80 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 42, 43 (Jun 1980).

239. 35 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-Jun.) at 28, U.N. Doc. S/13908 (1980) (

Ambassador McHenry to the President of the Security Council).

240. Great Britain, Italy and the other European Community Member States suppo

action, as did Australia, Canada, Egypt, Israel and Japan. See N. Ronzitti, Rescuing Natio

Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity 45-47 (1985). In 

Iran, the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, as well as India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, co

Id. at 47-48.

241. But see the Italian statement justifying the action under international law w

“hardly a model of legal logicality,” appears to reject the US self-defense argument and 

upon a State’s purported inherent right to resort to self-help in such cases. Id. at 46. As 

Professor Ronzitti, the Italian view seems to be that:

The Charter does not abrogate a State’s right to resort to self-help, including th

armed force, which belongs to it under customary international law. The Charter 

suspends the right to resort to self-help, since it entrusts the Security Council w

task of safeguarding the rights of member States. Whenever this mechanism d

function, for example when the action of the Security Council is paralysed by ve

States are free to resort to self-help, under the terms permitted by customary intern

law.

Id. at 46-47. For evaluation of the viewpoint reflected in the Italian statement, one that 

support in the past from legal commentators, including the present writer, but has n

widespread, if any, support from States, see text at supra notes 54-57.

242. See supra text at note 227.

243. Dillard, Remarks, in The Iran Crisis and International Law: Proceedings of the 

Moore Society of International Law Symposium on Iran 33 (R. Steele ed. 1981) [herein

The Iran Crisis and International Law].

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245. Stein, Contempt, Crisis, and the Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue 

Am. J. Int’l L. 499, 500 (1982). While the Court did not expressly find the rescue ope

lawful, a slight tilt towards the recognition of a right of forcible protection of nationals ab

discernible, at least to some observers, from its failure to condemn the US action per se

Remarks, in The Iran Crisis and International Law, supra note 243, at 29 & 32. This p

and discussed in N. Ronzitti, supra note 240, at 61. In view of the Dissenting Opinio

Morozov and Tarazi that condemned and challenged its legality respectively, see infra 

254-257, one might have expected the Court to have denounced the rescue oper

substantial number of the 13 judge majority believed that it violated the UN Charter. Th

case of the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, the Court’s silence on th

whether a right of forcible protection exists may not be entirely without signifcance. Cf

supra, at 67-68:

The silence of the Court certainly does not imply that it acquiesces in the theory 

legality of a rescue mission through the use of force. However, the Court did not bl

process leading to the creation of a new rule legitimizing recourse to force to 

nationals abroad, which would have been the case if it has censured the use of f

those circumstances.

246. Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 43.

247. Stein, supra note 245, at 500 n.7.

248. The two main and several other arguments are canvassed in this chapter.

249. Jeffery, The American Hostages in Tehran: The I.C.J. and the Legality of Rescue Mis

& Comp. L. Q. 717, 723 (1981).

250. Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 18. See supra note 239.

251. Id. at 29.

252. Id. at 42.

253. Stein, supra note 245, at 500-501 n.8. This reading, of course, may require rea

light of the Court’s later pronouncements on armed attack in the Case Concerning 

Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 1

of June 27).

254. Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 55.

255. Id. at 56-57.

256. Id. at 64.

257. “One can only wonder, therefore, whether an armed attack attributable to 

Government has been committed against the territory of the United States, apart from 

and Consulates in Iran.” Id. at 64-65.

258. But see supra text accompanying note 253.

259. Schweppe, Iran: World Court Ruling of December 15, 1979 and May 24, 1980, 

529, 529 (1980).

260. Boyle, International Law as a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy: 1979-

J. World Pub. Order 103, 130 (1982). See also F. Boyle, World Politics and Internatio

(1985).

261. Schweistfurth, Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Us

Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23 German Y.B. Int’l L. 159, 179 (1980).

262. N. Ronzitti, supra note 240, at 12, 41-49, 57 & 61-62.

263. Id. at 65.

264. Jeffery, supra note 249, at 725.

265. Id. at 725-26, citing L. Henkin, How Nations Behave 142 (2d ed. 1979).

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gpp

Much of the material in Professor Schachter’s chapter is taken, often in haec verba, fro

earlier articles. See Schachter, Self-Help in International Law: US Action in the Iranian Ho

37 J. Int’l Affairs 231 (1984). See also Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force

Rev. 1620, 1628-33 (1984).

267. Schachter, International Law in the Hostage Crisis, in Christopher, supra note 21

268. Id. at 331.

269. Professor Schachter introduces his discussion of the topic with the proposition 

51 seems on first blush to provide an adequate legal basis for the employment of milita

the seizure,”id. at 328, and later devotes considerable space to considering whether the 

of “necessity” for self-defense had been met, i.e. whether the hostages were actually 

danger at the time of the operation. See infra text at notes 284-285.

270. See e.g., O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 126, 128, 144 

271. See supra text at notes 56-66.

272. But see Lillich, Remarks, in The Iran Crisis and International Law,supra note 243

Stein, supra note 245, at 522-23 & n.99. See also Professor Schachter’s consideration 

discussed infra at notes 277-285.

273. “The requirement of ‘necessity’ for self-defense is not controversial a

proposition,” Schachter, International Law in the Hostage Crisis, in Christopher, supra 

329, and it long has been thought applicable in the context of the forcible protection 

abroad. See,e.g., Waldock, supra note 210, at 467, who formulated three requirements g

right of forcible protection as follows: “There must be (1) an imminent threat of injury 

(2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them and (3) 

protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them against injury.” He adds 

under customary [international] law only an absolute necessity could justify an int

protect nationals.” Id.

For an unusual but interesting examination of the necessity requirement a

necessity and not self-defense is the proper legal justification of the right of forcible 

see Raby, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals, 26 Can. Y.B

(1988).

274. Christopher, Introduction, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 12.

275. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the International Convention Against th

Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245

A/34/46 (1980), incorporates G.A. Res. 31/103, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 186

A/31/39 (1977), which in Paragraph 4 of its Preamble contains the language quoted in 

276. See infra text at note 274.

277. Schachter, International Law in the Hostages Crisis, in Christopher,supra note 2

278. Id.

279. Stein, supra note 245, at 522-23. In a footnote to the statement in the text, he g

further:

None of the documentation submitted to the Court suggested the existence o

threat to the hostages; indeed, the US assertion that the mission had been carr

“in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense with the aim of extricating Am

nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack 

Embassy,” [1980] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 32, tends to negate the existence of a new th

the hostages.

Id. at 523 n.99.

280. See supra note 236.

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282. Id.

283. See supra note 274.

284. Schachter, International Law in the Hostage Crisis, in Christopher, supra note 216

285. Id. He pointedly adds: “Whether or not the rescue action was wise in a political 

sense is, of course, a different matter.”

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Chapter V

Case Studies of Non-United States Forc

Protection of Nationals Abroad

There have been at least 15 instances since the adoption of th

Nations Charter in 1945 where legal commentators have cla

the doctrine of “protection of nationals abroad” has, or could have

voked by States other than the United States to justify forcible measu

taken in other States.1 In most of these cases, the State involv

primarily upon a government request or an international agreement 

secondarily, if at all, upon the protection of nationals doctrine to jus

tions. Moreover, even when a State invoked the doctrine it rarely 

specific international law arguments justifying it. The principal exce

curred during the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Great Britain claimed, 

that its actions against Egypt were taken to protect the lives and p

British nationals and as such was an exercise of its inherent right of se

under Article 51 of the UN Charter.2

Since the Suez crisis there has been very little discussion in intern

national forums about the legality of a State’s use of forceful means 

its nationals in another State, aside from various U.S. forays in

countries. The extended debate over Israel’s Entebbe operation be

exception.

While the international law discourse emanating from these in

scant, and the data about them often fragmentary, they serve to roun

international perspective showing that the United States is not alon

porting and, more importantly perhaps, actually invoking the “forcib

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A. Suez Crisis. 1956.

Great Britain has justified its 1956 action in the Suez Crisis as nec

the protection of its nationals. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Fo

fairs, argued that “self-defense undoubtedly includes a situation wher

of the State’s nationals abroad are in imminent danger.”4 Asked wh

attack had occurred against Great Britain to justify the invocation of 

of the UN Charter, Mr. Lloyd maintained that the British governmen

foreclosed from taking action to “protect the lives of British subjects a

less and until they are expressly authorized by the United Nations t

He countered that “it would be a travesty of the Charter to say that 

vention can take place until our nationals are actually being attacked 

haps killed.”6 His comments included three criteria for when a pro

nationals operation would meet the requirements of customary inte

law. “The first is where there is an imminent threat of injury to ou

als. . . . The second is where there is a failure or inability on the part o

torial sovereign to protect the nationals in question. The third is w

measures of protection are strictly confined to the object of protectin

tionals against injury.”7 These situations are reflected in the self-de

tions of articles 39, 40 and 41 of the UN Charter.

During UN debates, however, other goals also were emphasized, 

Great Britain consistently invoked the protection-of-nationals ration

words of Sir Pierce Dixon, the British representative to the United 

“British and French lives must be safeguarded. I again emphasize. . 

should certainly not want to keep any forces in the area for one mom

than is necessary to protect our nationals, to help bring the fighting 

and to deal with the very real danger of fighting across the Canal.”8 T

cation for the British operation at Suez has been dismissed by almos

mentators as utterly without merit and illustrative of how the right 

protection may be open to abuse.9

B. Belgium in the Congo. 1960.

The Congo gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 19

July, Congolese troops mutinied and attacked Belgian subjects and ot

peans. Belgian paratroops entered the Congo on 10 July to evacuat

nationals and other foreigners.10 The next day, the provincial gove

Katanga proclaimed its independence. The central government, in 

the UN Secretary-General reacting to the Belgian action and the K

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secession, requested military assistance from the United Nations an

that the dispatch of Belgian troops to the Congo violated the treaty 

ship that the two countries had signed on 29 June 1960. Under th

that treaty, Belgian troops could intervene only at the express requ

Congolese government.11

In the Security Council, M. Pierre Wigny, the Belgian Foreign 

cited numerous reports of rape and other atrocities by Congolese troo

Belgian nationals. He stated that “we had a right to intervene whe

question of protecting our compatriots, our women, against such exc

had the most imperative duty to do so.”12 He explained that the op

the Congo was purely humanitarian and strictly proportionate to the 

of protecting Belgian lives,13 and that Belgium would withdraw its 

soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations effectively en

maintenance of order and the safety of all foreigners.14

On 14 July 1960, the Security Council adopted a resolution cal

Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congolese territory.15 Subseque

tions urged the Belgian government to withdraw with haste and requ

all States refrain from actions that might undermine Congo’s territo

rity or political independence.16

Prime Minister Lumumba of the Congo, in a letter dated 31 July 

formed the Security Council that UN troops, with the help of the C

army, could protect all foreign nationals removing the need for th

presence.17 The Security Council thereupon once again demanded 

gium withdraw its troops from Katanga “under speedy modalities de

by the Secretary-General.”18

The Belgian actions in the Congo seem to be a legitimate use of for

protection of nationals. The French, British, and Italian governmen

proved and expressed their appreciation.19 The French represent

Berard, stated that “[t]heir mission of protecting lives and property is 

result of the failure of the Congolese authorities and is in accord wit

nized principle of international law, namely, intervention on hum

grounds.”20 Several nations were critical. Predictively, the Soviet Unio

eral other States, including Tunisia, Poland and Argentina, denounced t

tion-of-nationals rationale as a device to mask an illegal armed interven

C. France in Mauritania. 1977.

On 1 May 1977, Polisario guerrillas took six French nationals hosta

an attack on the city of Zouérate, an important mining town in nor

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Mauritania. Over the course of 1977, the rebels made advances and 

vital economic centers in Mauritania and on 25 October they took 

French nationals as hostages. Consequently, in November 1977 Franc

Jaguar bombers to Mauritania in support of the approximately 12,00

troops who were assisting the Mauritanian army in its fight against th

Front.22 This extensive French military operation in support of the M

government, known as Operation Lamentin, continued until May 19

The first air strikes by the French planes occurred on 12-13 Decem

after Polisario forces attacked a train carrying iron ore from Zouér

port of Nouadhibou. France responded with a second air strike on 1

ber after a Polisario assault on a Mauritanian garrison near the bo

Western Sahara.23On 23 December, negotiations between French of

Polisario representatives led to the Polisario release of the eight Fr

tages to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in Algiers.24

France invoked humanitarian justifications for the air strikes th

undertaken at the request of the Mauritanian government.25 A let

Jacques Leprette, the French representative to the UN, to the presid

Security Council, stated that “[i]n the face of the persistent threat

against our compatriots in undisputed Mauritanian territory. . . it is t

the French government, as it would be the duty of any Governmen

spect to its nationals abroad, to provide protection for them.”26 T

were dual-purposed. They were a response to the abduction of Frenc

als, and were also a part of Operation Lamentin to combat the Polis

in Mauritania.27 Because no rescue mission occurred, however, the in

of the forcible-protection doctrine seems primarily a pretext for the F

of force to support the Mauritanian government.

D. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1978.

As in 1964,28 the lives of numerous European citizens, primarily Be

French, were put at risk in Katanga during disturbances caused by ac

the “gendarmes kantangais” who fought for the independence of 

ince.29 On 11-12 May 1978, Katangese rebels had entered the provin

ing from Angola through Zambia, and occupied the city of Kolwezi. D

operation and its aftermath, they killed about 900 people, includin

mated 120 Europeans.30 The lives of French and Belgian citizens, 

were obviously endangered.31

On 19 May French troops were air-dropped just to the north o

with Belgian troops landing in a separate operation the following d

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France and Belgium justified their actions as responses to the reques

tary assistance by the Zairian government.33 Indeed, Belgian Prime 

Tindemans actually stated before the Belgian Parliament that Zaire “

ereign State where Belgium could not simply interfere at will and th

quently, an authorization from the Zairian authorities was requir

Belgium could proceed with its rescue operation.”34 This statement r

a far more restrictive approach to the forcible-protection-of-national

than the Belgian Foreign Minister had taken during the 1960 Con

tion.35 On the other hand, French president Giscard d’Estaing justifi

eration as a normal exercise of the legitimate and inalienable right of 

protect its citizens abroad.36

Most Belgian troops withdrew on 22 May, by which time they had e

2,269 people to Europe.37 The French operation, however, continue

June.38 Neither action was debated in the Security Council, althou

European countries expressed their appreciation to France and Bel

plicitly endorsing their actions.39 There seems little doubt that the o

undertaken were justifiable under the protection-of-nationals ration

E. France in Mauritania. 1978.

In May 1978, French Jaguar bombers struck Polisario rebels near 

Zouérate during the final stages of Operation Lamentin. In June 197

Minister Louis de Guiringaud of France stressed that the location 

strikes against the Polisario forces had occurred on Mauritanian territ

French nationals were endangered.40 Although the 1978 operation d

volve an evacuation of French nationals, presumably the nationals w

rectly protected by the assistance to the Mauritanian government in 

the Polisario Front.

As in case of the 1977 French air strikes in Mauritania, discussed i

C, France did not mount a rescue operation, but rather sought to assi

ognized Mauritanian government against Polisario insurgents throug

measures. The 1978 French air strikes, again then appear pretext

claim is humanitarian intervention.

F. France in Chad. 1978.

Visible Chadian unrest began in July 1977, mainly in the area of 

northern Chad, caused by the rebel group Frolinat (Front de libérat

nale du Tchad).41 By February 1978, the rebels controlled the strateg

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Faya

Largeau and Fada. According to M. Olivier, the French Secreta

to the Foreign Minister, the 4,000 French nationals in Chad, the m

whom lived in the capital city N’Djamena, and in southern Chad, were 

mediate danger.42 He informed the French Parliament that the Cha

ernment had extended measures to ensure their safety, with the h

French “coopérants” who were present in Chad under the terms of a 

tion accord that the two States had signed on 6 March 1976.43

French Cooperation Minister Robert Galley, however, did not ru

possibility that the Frolinat propaganda campaign being diffused o

Chadian radio stations might necessitate a rescue operation to 

French nationals.44 When the rebels approached to within 25

N’Djamena in April 1978, he invoked the 1976 cooperation accord 

any French action taken against the rebellion, which was lead a

largely from outside the country.45 At the request of the Chadian gov

France also increased the number of coopérants to help train the Cha

and sent supplementary units to protect the army training center

gether, France deployed 2,500 troops to Chad as part of this actio

Operation Tacaud, including a regiment of parachutists, two infant

nies, one Marine infantry company, and several supporting tactical 

and Jaguar bombers.47 Foreign Minister Guiringaud described th

tive as helping the legitimate government find a political comprom

rebellion.48

After three French coopérants were killed, the French govern

acted vigorously.49 As Foreign Minister Guiringaud indicated, th

presence in Chad was both at the request of the government and 

French civilians and coopérants were in danger.50 Although Fren

closely guarded the army training centers and communities with l

centrations of French nationals,51 they made no attempt to stage a

tion. On 27 April, French Jaguars provided air cover to Chadi

defending the city of Salal,52 and on 19 May over 100 French troop

cisive help to Chadian forces opposing Frolinat advances at Ati.

forces lent support to Chadian forces in other battles, although the n

French actively engaged never exceeded 200 to 300 troops.54 Becau

troops deployed in Operation Tacaud made no effort to evacuate F

tionals but, rather simply helped the Chadian army turn back Froli

in several important battles, to classify the French operation as a ca

ible protection is tenuous.

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G. France in Chad. 1979.

The relations between the Chadian government and rebel facti

ened over the winter of 1978-79, so again the Chadian government 

the assistance of France in its defense against armed rebellion.55 Acc

the Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud, on 15 February F

gan preparations to evacuate its nationals.56 This time, after four F

tionals in Chad were killed in the fighting, the French forces in N

helped repatriate about 2,500 French nationals, virtually the enti

population of Chad. Nationals from many other countries were als

ated.57 Because this operation was carried out exclusively b

“coopérants” already in Chad at the request of its government, this e

does not warrant categorization as an instance of forcible protection

H. France in Mauritania. 1979.

In 1979 France again conducted an air operation over the 

nian-ruled area of the Western Sahara. The French Minister of Forei

Guiringaud advised Parliament that involvement occurred to co

armed-rebel operations that violated the Mauritanian border and no

the Saharan people.58 “One cannot claim that our military action in 

nia, which was in conformity with article 51 of the UN Charter in p

has been contrary to the international obligations of France, nor to th

ments of international law,” he stressed.59

The government of Mauritania in this instance had requested sup

France against outside aggression. Although the French Foreign Min

phasized that France needed to protect its citizens,60 the safety of fo

tionals in Mauritania was, at best, a secondary factor in France’

Almost consistently, France’s actions are difficult to justify by exclu

ence to the protection-of-nationals-abroad doctrine.

I. France in Gabon. 1990.

Riots erupted in Libreville, the Gabonese capital, when opposition 

ers accused the government of having killed Joseph Rendjambe, the 

the P.G.P. (Parti gabonais du progrès) opposition party, who was foun

22 May 1990.61 Order also collapsed in Port-Gentil, where 10 forei

cluding seven French nationals who were working at the Elf-Aquita

finery, were taken hostage for 12 hours on 23 May.62 On 24 Ma

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deployed approximately 600 Marines from their permanent sta

Libreville who were there under the terms of a defense and military 

treaty signed by the two countries on 17 August 1960.63 France disp

additional 200 troops to Gabon, including parachutists based at 

Corsica, and infantrymen based at Nîmes. All these acts were in c

with the treaty:64which required that the Gabonese government issue 

request before France could deploy its forward-deployed forces, or 

new troops into the country.65 By 25 May the fighting had largely ce

on 29 May oil production resumed at the Elf refinery. The threat to F

tionals in Gabon having passed, and on 1 June France withdrew m

forces.66

French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas stated that th

mission in Gabon was solely to protect the nearly 2,500 French natio

in Port-Gentil and to repatriate those who wished to leave.67 By the 

rescue mission, named Operation Requin,68 approximately 1,800 F

tionals had been evacuated to Paris.69 Despite the fact that there 

been other reasons for the French action, the evacuation of over two

the French nationals living in Port-Gentil identifies this as being a 

case of forcible intervention.70

J. France and Belgium in Rwanda. 1990.

On 1 October 1990, several thousand armed soldiers of the Rwan

otic Front invaded Rwanda from Uganda. As the rebels approached K

capital, where they sought to overthrow President Habyarimana, the 

government requested military assistance from France and Belgiu

countries responded immediately to the request. On 4 October, Be

patched 540 Belgian paratroops and France dispatched 300 French F

gion paratroops to Rwanda,72 where approximately 650 French a

Belgian citizens were living.73 The Rwandan government then s

asked Belgium to help protect the airport in Kigali. After securing i

French Foreign Legion troops and 150 Belgian paratroopers74 evacua

1,000 European and US nationals.75 Belgium withdrew its troops on 

ber 1990,76 with France withdrawing its forces a few weeks thereafte

Belgian Prime Minister Martens subsequently explained before 

missions on Foreign Affairs and National Defense of the Belgian P

that the government’s concern had been the security of the Belgian 

Rwanda, which had led to the humanitarian action for their protecti

they chose to leave, evacuation.78 Although the widespread an

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Rwanda led to an extended Belgian and French military presence, th

actions, taken at the request of the Rwandan government, certainly q

legitimate case of forcible protection.

K. France in Chad. 1990.

On 10 November 1990, the Chadian opposition leader Idriss Déby

the Commander-In-Chief to the dictatorial president Hissène Habré

against the Habré regime.79 France, which considered the affair an 

Chadian matter,80 nevertheless proceeded without a request from the 

government to transfer a company of 150 parachutists on 16 Novem

N’Djamena, the capital, to Abéché, in eastern Chad. These men rein

350 French troops stationed there and combined they were expected 

the security of French citizens should Déby’s forces approach.81They 

this objective. When Abéché fell to the rebels on 29 November, Fran

a company of parachutists from Corsica, as well as Foreign Legion tr

the Central African Republic, to protect both French nationals and 

eigners in N’Djamena82 and prepare for their evacuation.83 By earl

ber,84 they had evacuated approximately 1,600 foreigners, including 

960 and 1,120 French nationals.85 France made no effort to oppose D

having entered N’Djamena on 1 December, had installed himself as 

Habré having fled the country.86

Unlike the 1978 and 1979 French actions in Chad (discussed in S

and G respectively), in this instance neither followed a request by the 

government nor was it pursuant to the cooperation accord. It surely c

tified under the protection-of-nationals abroad doctrine, however.

L. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1991.

Zairian soldiers mutinied in September 1991 when hyperinflation 

their paychecks worthless.87 Although Europeans were not targets

them fell victim to random pillaging. France thereupon dispatched 1

eign Legion troops aboard military transport planes on loan from th

States; Belgium sent 500 paratroopers.88 These forces arrived in Braz

the Republic of the Congo, on 23 and 24 September and, after cro

Zaire River, proceeded to Kinshasa, Zaire.89

After securing the airport, the forces shuttled French and Belgian 

from Kinshasa to safety in Brazzaville. They then proceeded to Kolwe

mining center in the Katanga region 1,500 km southeast of Kinshas

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mission was to begin the evacuation of the 3,500 French nationals 

Belgians in Zaire,91 of whom 650 and 2,000 respectively lived in Katan

evacuation of over 9,000 foreign nationals from over 30 European, A

Middle Eastern countries was completed on 2 October.93 This was n

plete evacuation. Some foreigners chose to remain.

Violence in Zaire resumed on 22 October when President Mob

trarily dismissed Prime Minister Tshisekedi, at which point the Belgia

and U.S. authorities strongly recommended a complete evacuation

done and France withdrew its last soldiers on 31 October, with the la

troops leaving on 4 November 1991.94

According to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the foreigners’

depended on the temporary presence of French and Belgian troop

President Mobutu accused France of seeking to destabilize Zaire,96Ka

then the leader of the United Opposition Parties, acknowledged the 

tarian nature of the rescue operations.97 Like the 1978 operation in Z

cussed in Section D) the 1991 actions of both France and Belgium 

appear to be a legitimate case of forcible protection.

M. France and Belgium in Zaire. 1993.

In late January 1993, the Zairian army began an armed mutiny, wi

foreigners being killed during ensuing riots.98 In mysterious circums

lated to the mutiny, the French Ambassador to Zaire, Philippe Bar

killed. At the time, 3,000 Belgian and 1,000 French nationals still re

Zaire. Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes recommended 

gians leave the country for Brazzaville, in the Republic of the Congo

gian government also stated that any decision regarding the evac

foreign nationals from Zaire would be made in coordination with 

member States of the European Community, and that Belgium an

would furnish the majority of any troops that might be dispatched

quently, Belgium decided to send 550 troops to Kinshasa. According 

Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, the operation was coordinated with 

Foreign Minister Claes emphasized that the joint action was limit

evacuation of civilians, primarily the 1,500 Belgians living in Kinsha

While Zairian Prime Minister Tshisekedi, recently reinstated to 

quested Belgian military assistance, President Mobutu strongly opp

Belgian presence by deploying air-defense forces to the N’Djili 

Kinshasa to prevent Belgian military planes from landing. Mobutu ev

presidential yacht at the disposal of those foreigners seeking evac

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Brazzaville, in an effort to make any Belgian action unnecessary.

event, the Belgian evacuation forces remained in Brazzaville and nev

into Zaire.

On 29 January, however, France deployed 150 Marine infantry tr

their station in Bangui, in the Central African Republic, to Kin

Brazzaville. The same day, 12 of these Marines secured the French 

and evacuated 400 French nationals from Kinshasa.103 French troop

withdraw on 4 February after Zairian troops loyal to Mobutu had q

mutiny. Belgian forces left Brazzaville the next day. While the latter 

tively engaged in any rescue operation, the French did, making the

seem a proper case of forcible protection. Interestingly, the French 

their involvment on such grounds.

N. Multinational Evacuation Operation in Rwanda. 1994

Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993 authorized a 1

multinational force to monitor peace between the Rwandan govern

rebel forces.104 By early April 1994 the UN contingent included 2,5

from over 20 countries.105 When armed bandits threatened to kill any 

unable to prove that he was not Belgian106 and the UN peacekeeper

casualties, including 10 Belgian peacekeepers who were hacked to 

Rwandan soldiers,107 seven Western States organized an operation t

on 8 April, with the purpose of evacuating Rwanda’s foreign commu

The number of States involved and the scale of the evacuation ef

the multilateral action in Rwanda unique. France sent 460 troop

transport planes,108 while Belgium sent 750 troops (in addition to th

gian troops already participating in the UN operation)109 and nine 

including seven C-130 transport planes and two Boeing 747s.110 Ita

troops and three C-130 transport planes. Germany and Canada each 

transport plane and the Netherlands sent four planes.111 Additio

United States kept one ship with 330 Marines on alert off the Kenyan 

also provided two transport planes to assist in the evacuation.112 By 

1994 Belgian, French and Italian troops had withdrawn after evacu

3,900 foreigners from Kigali.113 Although the number of participat

distinguishes this rescue operation from other ones considered in thi

in essence it constituted a legitimate case of collective, albeit not UN

protection.

107

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O. France in the Central African Republic. 1996.

On 19 May 1996, fighting broke out in Bangui, the capital of the C

rican Republic, between government forces and mutineers who were 

a governmental decision to place the armory under the command of 

dential guard.114 At the behest of President Félix Patassé, France in

ployed 800 troops of its 1,400 troops currently stationed in the c

Bangui.115 On 20 May, these forces were supplemented with 550 m

the French Foreign Legion and additional French paratroopers sta

Gabon.116

The stated mission of the French forces was to protect the 2,500 F

tionals in the country, 1,500 of whom were in Bangui. By 23 May, how

situation had so deteriorated that M. Jacques Godfrain, French Minis

operation, announced that the objectives of Operation Almandin II 

expanded to include protecting the democratically-elected gover

President Patassé.117 French Defense Minister Charles Millon justifie

cision under the defense agreement with Central African Republic.1

France received political support of its expanded mission from C

Gabon, and Senegal, all of which are former French colonies with d

cally-elected presidents.119 In the streets of Bangui, however, Fren

faced violent protests against their efforts to support President Patass

theless, France eventually employed 2,300 troops to evacuate 3,000 f

primarily French but also including US, Japanese, and Lebanese na

Because the French actions were in response to an invitation by the 

of the Central African Republic and consistent with the defense agre

tween the two countries, they shed little light on the forcible-protecti

tionals-abroad doctrine per se.

NOTES*

*The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Ms. 

LL.M., Class of 1996, and Mr. Michael Coco, Class of 1998, University of Virgin

Law, in the preparation of this Chapter.

1. The situation in the Congo (Belgian and US rescue operations) and the Is

Entebbe in 1976 are not considered in this Chapter, but are discussed in the Conclu

instances that have been mentioned in the literature provide little guidance becaus

of nationals abroad arguments either were not raised or were not relevant. See, e.g., L

where French citizens, taken hostage in Somalia, were freed when French soldiers r

Somali fire but remained within the territory of Djibouti, then a French colony; Moga

where the Somali government consented to the use of German commando uni

German citizens taken hostage on a Lufthansa airplane; Larnaca, 1978, where Eg

108

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pjy pyp

taken hostage aboard a Cypriot airplane, but simply explained its action as neces

terrorism; and Bangkok, 1981, where Thai authorities permitted Indonesian forces 

Indonesian airplane to rescue civilians taken hostage by terrorists.

2. See infra text accompanying notes 4-8.

3. For an instructive account of the political context of the French, Belgian 

military presence in Africa, see generally A. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires (1994).

4. 558 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1565 (1956).

5. Id. at 1566.

6. Id.

7. Id.

8. 11 U.N. SCOR (749th mtg.) at 24, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 749 (1956).

9. Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in The International Regulat

Wars 169, 175-76 (E. Luard ed. 1972).

10. 15 U.N. SCOR (873d mtg.) at 34-35, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 873 (1960).

11. 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960).

12. 15 U.N. SCOR (877th mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 877 (1960).

13. Id. at 30. The Belgian representative to the Security Council cited the fact t

had only 1,400 troops present in Leopoldville as evidence that Belgian objectives did 

beyond the protection of its nationals, since the number of troops would have been in

subdue and control that city’s population of 350,000. Id. at 29.

14. Id. at 30.

15. S.C. Res. S/4387, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 8

16. S.C. Res. S/4405, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) at 34-35, U.N. Doc. 

(1960). The Secretary-General, reporting on the implementation of these resolutio

to a letter of the Belgian Foreign Minister that summarized the position of his 

regarding the legal justification for the intervention:

Belgian troops were obliged to intervene solely in order to save the l

fellow-countrymen who were in great danger, lacking any of the protection w

State must afford to private individuals.

This intervention implies no interference in the internal affairs of the Cong

temporary in nature.

These rescue duties come to an end as soon as United Nations troops arrive in 

region to take over and, at the same time, to assume responsibility for the sa

individuals.

Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council 

S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) 

Doc. S/4417 (incorporating Doc. S/4417 Corr.1) (1960).

17. 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) at 38-39, U.N. Doc. S/4414 (1960).

18. S.C. Res. S/4426, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Dec.) at 92, U.N. Doc. S/

(1960).

19. For praise of Belgian efforts in the Congo by the French representative to th

U.N. SCOR (873d mtg.) at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 873 (1960); for approval by 

representative, see id. at 25-27; and, for approval by the Italian representative, see i

20. Id. at 28.

21. Id. at 37 (Soviet representative); id. at 12 (Tunisian representative); id. a

representative); and id. at 32 (Argentine representative).

109

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23. Id.

24. Les otages du Polisario sont libérés: M. Waldheim les reconduit d’Alger à Paris

Dec. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 6.

25. 32 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec.) at 103, U.N. Doc. S/12503 (1977).

26. Id.

27. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 167-68.

28. For a description of the 1964 US-Belgian intervention in the Congo, see 

Section B.

29. C. Alibert, Du Droit de se faire justice dans la société internationale depuis 

(1983).

30. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 336.

31. French President Giscard d’Estaing estimated the composition of th

population in Kolwezi to be about 1,700 Belgians, 400 French, 150 Italians, 150 

Greeks and a few other foreign nationals. Manin, L’Intervention française au S

Annuaire Français de Droit International 159, 165. The Belgian Prime Minister Léo 

stated that 1,800 Belgians lived in Kolwezi and more than 6,000 in the province 

Salmon & Vincineau, La pratique du pouvoir exécutif et le contrôle des chambres l

matière de droit international (1977~1978), 15 Revue Belge de droit internation

(1980), citing A.P., Sénat, séance du 22 mai 1978, at 1424,-25 and A.P., Chambre, 2

at 2113. Underscoring the purely humanitarian nature of the rescue operation tha

took place, the Belgian Prime Minister also asserted that Belgium would not le

nationals of other countries who wished to leave Kolwezi. Id.

32. As in the Congo in 1964, both the French and the Belgians were suppo

United States, which furnished logistical assistance and C-141 planes. These US air

used for the long-range transport of heavy equipment, such as helicopters and mob

units, thereby greatly facilitating French and Belgian evacuation efforts. See Rouvez

3, at 338.

33. Manin, supra note 31, at 171.

34. Salmon & Vincineau, supra note 31, at 632, quoting A.P. Sénat, séance du 2

at 1424-25 (author’s translation).

35. See supra text accompanying note 12.

36. Manin, supra note 31, at 169.

37. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 336. No figures are available as to the nationalities o

evacuated by the Belgians.

38. No figures are available as to the number or nationalities of the people evac

French.

39. See, e.g., Secretary of State Genscher: “[T]he [German] federal governm

expressly, and as one of the first, expressed its thankfulness towards the French 

governments for their commitment to the saving of lives.” 93. Sitzung, den 1. 

Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 8. Wahlperiode, Stenografische Ber

106, Plenarprotokolle 8/87-8/101, 26 Apr.-23 Jun. 1978, at 7320.

40. Guiringaud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, J.O. Sénat, séance du 16 juin 19

Article 3 of the Convention of Military Training Between France and Mauritani

10 and 27 December 1977, provided that French troops in Mauritania rema

French jurisdiction but “could not in any case be associated with the pre

execution of war operations, or with the maintenance of order.” J.O. du 6 novem

110

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French nationals.

41. For a description of France’s strategic interests in Chad and the Cold War 

Rouvez, supra note 3, at 151-64.

42. J.O. Sénat, séance du 19 mai 1978, at 892.

43. Id. “Coopérant” refers to French military personnel who are stationed in, 

technical assistance to, States with which France has cooperation agreements

coopérants come from all branches of the French military, the majority are from th

44. Id.

45. J.O. Sénat, séance du 12 mai 1978, at 817.

46. Id.

47. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 154.

48. J.O. Sénat, séance du 16 juin 1978, at 1448.

49. Id. at 1446.

50. Id. at 1448.

51. Id.

52. Id.

53. J.O. Assemblée Nationale, 3e séance du 9 novembre 1978, at 7417.

54. J.O. Sénat, séance du 16 juin 1978, at 1448.

55. J.O. Assemblée Nationale, 3e séance du 9 novembre 1978, at 7417.

56. Charpentier, Pratique française du droit international, 1979 Annuaire Franç

International 905, 908, citing ’Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Q.E 

14007,’ J.O. Assemblée Nationale, 10 mai 1979, at 3612.

57. Id. No figures are available as to the number or nationalities of the othe

evacuated by the French.

58. Response to question of Mr. Odru, no. 3859, J.O. Assemblée Nationale, 

avril 1979, at 2438.

59. Id. (author’s translation). For a discussion of the defense cooperation 

between France and Mauritania, see supra text accompanying note 40.

60. Response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Vivien, no. 9548, and t

no. 5239, J.O. Assemblée Nationale, séance du 3 mars 1979, at 1380.

61. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 180.

62. Gabon: émeutes et pillages à Libreville et à Port-Gentil, Le Monde, May 26

cols. 1-5.

63. Renforts français au Gabon, Le Monde, May 25, 1990, at 1, col. 6. The Franc

defense accord had been revised in 1974. Rousseau, Chronique des faits interna

R.G.D.I.P. 1035, 1071 (1990).

64. Rousseau, supra note 63.

65. Deux accords de sécurité avec Paris, Le Monde, May 26, 1990, at 3, cols. 3

66. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 181.

67. Plus des deux tiers des Français ont quitté Port-Gentil, Le Monde, May 29, 199

1-4.

68. Guérivière, Mission presque accomplie, Le Monde, June 1, 1990, at 6, cols. 3

69. Le Monde, supra note 67.

70. No figures are available as to the nationalities of other foreigners evacu

French.

71. Des accrochages entre forces régulières et rebelles on eu lieu dans la capitale, Kigali

Oct. 6, 1990, at 4, cols. 3-6. Rwanda did not have a defense accord with eithe

111

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ggppy gpy 

logistical assistance. Guérivière, Le geste “humanitaire” de la Belgique, Le Monde, Oct

4, col. 3.

72. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 343. The French Foreign Legion troops were flown 

from their station in Bangui, in the Central African Republic. Des accrochages 

régulières et rebelles on eu lieu dans la capitale, Kigali, Le Monde, supra note 71.

73. Des accrochages entre forces régulières et rebelles on eu lieu dans la capitale, Kigali

supra note 71.

74. Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux, 95 R.G.D. I. P. 439, 479 (1990

75. Foreign Missions In African Lands, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1994, at A13, 

breakdown of this figure by nationalities is available.

76. Vincineau & Ergec, La pratique du pouvoir exécutif et le contrôle des chambres l

matière de droit international (1988-1990), 24 Revue Belge de droit international 132, 

77. Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux, 95 R.G.D.I.P. 721, 746 (1991). W

seized part of the city of Ruhengeri near the Ugandan border on 22 June 1991, 

paratroopers returned to Rwanda to evacuate French nationals and other foreign

supra note 3, at 345.

78. Vincineau & Ergec, supra note 76, at 207-08, citing A.P., Chambre, 6 octo

3-4.

79. L’entre-deux-guerres, Le Monde, Dec. 4, 1990, at 3, cols. 5-6.

80. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 163.

81. La France renforce son dispositif “Epervier” au Tchad, Le Monde, Nov. 17, 1990, a

82. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 163.

83. ’On a laissé faire Idriss Déby’ reconnaît le ministre français de la coopération, Le M

5, 1990, at 4, cols. 4-6.

84. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 163.

85. Le Monde, supra note 83. No figures are available as to the number or nation

people evacuated by the French.

86. Decembre 1990 dans le monde, Le Monde, Jan. 9, 1991, at 14, cols. 1-4.

87. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Comm. 

Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) (Statement of Herman J. Cohen, Assistant 

State for African Affairs) [hereinafter Hearing].

88. N.Y. Times, supra note 75.

89. Le président Mobutu demande aux militaires de rentrer dans les casern

France Presse, Sept. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Presse File.

90. Id.

91. Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux 96 R.G.D.I.P. 369, 403 (1992).

92. Supra note 89.

93. Stegic, Un deuxième français tué à Kinshasa, Agence France Presse, Jan

available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Presse File. Specific figures as to the number or n

of the people evacuated are unavailable for either the French or Belgian rescue ope

94. Supra note 89.

95. Hearing, supra note 87, at 3.

96. Supra note 93.

97. Supra note 89.

98. Supra note 93.

99. Navarro, La garde presidentielle prend le contrôle d’une partie de Kin

Bruxelles, Agence France Presse, Jan. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, 

112

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101. Id.

102. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 352.

103. Id.

104. 48 U.N. SCOR (3288th mtg.) at 102, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).

105. The number of UN peacekeepers had been increased pursuant to Secu

Resolution 893, which was adopted on 6 January 1994. S.C. Res. 893, 49 U.N. SC

mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/Res/893 (1994).

106. Most Foreigners out of Rwanda, AP Online, Apr. 15, 1994, available in L

Library, Arcnws File.

107. Belgium admits it had more troops in Rwanda, Reuters World Service, Ap

available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.

108. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 355. However, the N.Y Times, supra note 75, re

France sent 700 troops to Rwanda to protect foreigners.

109. Reuters World Service, Apr. 16, 1994, supra note 107. Rwanda, howev

given permission for Belgium to send 400 paratroopers, according to Belgian Col

Hertoghe. Id.

110. Rouvez, supra note 3, at 355.

111. Id.

112. Id.

113. Rwanda Slaughter Continues, AP Online, Apr. 15, 1994, available in L

Library, Arcnws File. According to a Belgian government source, it was unclear 

foreigners chose to remain in Rwanda. Shaw, Most Foreigners out of Rwanda, Reb

Foreign Troops, AP WorldStream, Apr. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, A

Figures are unavailable as to the nationality of the evacuees.

114. Paris says ’necessary measures’ taken in Bangui, Reuters World Service, M

available in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File.

115. These 1,400 French troops were present in the Central African Republic a

the terms of a 1960 defense treaty between the two countries. Representing the se

permanent French military presence in Africa, after that in Djibouti, they were not a

participate in the maintenance of law and order, but were permitted to protect foreig

1,400 soldats français, Le Monde, May 21, 1996, at 4, cols. 2-3.

116. France sends more troops to Central African Republic, Deutsche Presse-A

20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File.

117. US, French Troops Protect Westerners Caught in Mutiny, Wash. Post, May 

A38, cols. 3-4. President Patassé was elected in 1993 in the Central African Rep

free elections. Mutiny Rocks Africa Republic: US, French Evacuate Capital, Ne

22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File. The Minister of Cooper

that France had a duty to honor the request for assistance from President Patassé b

defense agreement between the two countries. See Le Monde, supra note 115. This 

however, like many such agreements between France and its former African coloni

that the purpose of the French presence in the country is to protect foreign nationa

positions around sensitive points such as airports, and to assist the Central Afric

against external aggression. Id. Nevertheless, Minister of Cooperation Jacque

declared in 1995 that France now “[w]ill intervene [in Africa] each time 

democratic power is overthrown by a coup d’état if a military cooperation agreeme

113

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cols. 1-4.

118. M. Millon: ’assurer la libre circulation et la sécurité,’ Agence France Pres

1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Presse File.

119. Intervention militaire française a Bangui: Les expatriés quittent le Cent

Monde, May 24, 1996, at 1, cols. 5-6.

120. Specific figures as to the number or nationalities of the people ev

unavailable for the French rescue operation.

114

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Appendix I

A Chronological List of Cases Involving 

Landing of United States Forces to

Protect the Lives and Property of

Nationals Abroad Prior to World War 

This Appendix contains a chronological list of pre-World W

in which the United States landed troops in foreign countri

tect the lives and property of its nationals.1 Inclusion of a case doe

essarily imply that the exercise of forcible self-help was motivated 

even primarily, out of concern for US nationals.2 In many instance

room for disagreement as to what motive predominated, but in all 

cluded herein the US forces involved afforded some measure of p

to US nationals or their property.

The cases are listed according to the date of the first use of US 

case is included only where there was an actual physical landing t

nationals who were the subject of, or were threatened by, immedi

tential danger. Thus, for example, cases involving the landing of 

punish past transgressions, or for the ostensible purpose of prote

tionals at some remote time in the future, have been omitted. Wh

fort to isolate individual fact situations has been made, there a

number of situations involving multiple landings closely related i

context which, for the sake of convenience, have been treated her

gle episodes.

The list of cases is based primarily upon the sources cited follo

paragraph. Additional sources are noted occasionally under i

cases. In those relatively few instances where the authorities are i

* The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by George T

Esq., Member of the California and New York Bars, in the preparation of this Appe

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about the character or details of a particular landing, the majority 

erally has been followed. In each case, moreover, an attempt has b

to provide information as precise as possible about the nature of t

to US nationals, the size of the force landed, the duration of its 

number of troops, nationals and other persons killed or wounded

extent of property loss or damage.

Sources

1. Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy [hereinafter cited as Annual R

2. T. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (7th ed. 1965) 

cited as Bailey].

3. S. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (1936) [hereinafter cite

4. J. Clark (U. S. Solicitor of the Department of State), Right to Protect 

Foreign Countries by Landing Forces (3d rev. ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as Clar

5. 117 Cong. Rec. S5637-47 (daily ed. April 26, 1971) (remarks of Senator G

6. Department of State Historical Studies Division, Research Project No. 80

Actions Taken by the United States without a Declaration of War 1789–19

[hereinafter cited as Dep’t of State].

7. Dictionary of American History (J. Adams ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as D

8. H. Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800

Marine Corps Historical Section 1934) [hereinafter cited as Ellsworth].

9. G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) [hereinafter cited as H

10. D. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (1936) [hereinafter cited a

11. Message of the President and Accompanying Documents, Part I, Papers 

Foreign Affairs, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. (1868-69) [hereina

Message and Documents].

12. W. Miller & J. Johnstone, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps 

(US Marine Corps Historical Branch 1965).

13. J. B. Moore, International Law Digest (1906) [hereinafter cited as Moore

14. M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the U

(1928) [hereinafter cited as Offutt].

15. C. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778–1

[hereinafter cited as Paullin].

16. J. Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution (1945) [hereinafter cited a

17. R. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rot

18. O. Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace (1937) [hereina

Spaulding].

19. Staff of House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 

Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries (Comm. 

[hereinafter cited as Background].

20. U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.–Jun. 1965) at 89, U.N. Doc. S/6331 (1965) 

Ambassador Stevenson to the President of the Security Council).

116

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Case No. 1, 1831

1832 Falkland Islands

In July and August 1831, Louis Vernet seized three American ships 

the Falkland Islands, while acting as the civilian and military gover

islands under the authority of the Government of Buenos Aires

November, Captain Duncan, sailing on the U. S. sloop Lexington, 

Buenos Aires and notified its American consul of his intention to p

the Falkland Islands to protect American citizens and commerce. A

protested claiming that the United States had no right to use the Fa

its surrounding territorial waters.

Despite the protest, Duncan set sail for the Falklands, upon lear

Vernet had plundered the schooner Harriet, arriving off Berkley Sou

December 1831. The American force remained inactive until 1 Janu

On that day the Lexington proceeded to the port of St. Louis, whe

landing force of 17 men went ashore to release the American vessels 

crews, and arrest their captors. A reinforcement party landed from 

boats a short time later. The two parties took seven prisoners and disp

other inhabitants.

Since nearly all the American citizens in the islands wished to le

tain Duncan agreed to give them passage to Montevideo. He sent a g

Marines ashore to protect the Americans and their property while 

making preparations to depart. This force returned aboard ship on 

1832. A smaller force landed daily until 5 January. On 21 January, 

Americans consisting of 20 men, 8 women, and 10 children bo

Lexington, which sailed the same day.

Upon reaching Montevideo on 7 February 1832, Duncan surren

prisoners on the condition that the Buenos Aires Government assum

sibility for their acts.

Sources: Ellsworth 76; Offutt 20-22; 1 Moore 298-99.

Case No. 2, 1833 — Argentina

In October 1833, insurrection broke out in Argentina. Violence was 

severe in the area around Buenos Aires. Although the United Stat

diplomatic officers or consular agents in Buenos Aires, there w

American citizens residing in the city. Daniel Gowland, an 

businessman, informed the commander of an American naval vessel 

in the harbor of the situation’s gravity and requested that the Nav

protection for both US citizens and any foreign nationals not then re

by naval forces.

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Five days later, on 21 October, an American flagship commanded 

modore M. T. Woolsey arrived at Buenos Aires. Since the United S

no political agent on shore, Woolsey immediately sent Comman

McKeever to reside in the city so as to keep him informed of deve

Until 31 October there were only occasional outbursts, but on that da

spread disturbance began. Woolsey landed a force of 43 officers, Ma

seamen, putting them under McKeever’s command. They remained a

til 15 November 1833, when peace was restored to the city.

Source: Ellsworth 9-10.

Case No. 3, 1835–1836 — Peru

The revolution which began in Peru in February 1835 led to 

intervention by the end of the year. General Salaverry, anxious to ga

of the government, induced disturbances to distract attention from 

organization of a revolutionary army. He deposed President Obre

proclaimed himself Head of State on 25 February 1835. Obregoso pro

more entrenched than Salaverry expected. He was able to reorgan

forces which remained loyal to him and then opposed Salaverry. Th

conflict created deplorable conditions throughout Peru, especial

capital city, Lima, and the chief port, Callao.

On 6 December 1835, several American citizens in Lima petition

chargé d’affaires for a landing party to protect them and their prop

chargé d’affaires did not take any action until 10 December, when he 

that a force from the frigate Brandywine be landed at Callao and sen

the US consulate at Lima; four men landed on the same date. Sh

their arrival, both factions temporarily withdrew from the city, leavin

out military or civil government for several days. Under these circu

the chargé d’affaires requested that more Marines be sent to protect fo

idents. On 17 December, the rest of the Marine guard from the B

came ashore. Several days later the British and French also made 

These forces prevented a general plunder of the city, especially in th

quarter — where no houses were disturbed. The American force 

aboard ship on 24 January 1836.

On 31 August 1836, the Brandywine returned to Callao to land 

who then proceeded to Lima to guard the American consulate. He 

ashore until 2 December 1836.

Source: Ellsworth 137-38.

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Case No. 4, 1841 

Peru

In 1841, Lieutenant A. Bigelow, commander of the US schoon

intervened between two warring factions in upper Peru to save the 

property of Americans and other foreigners.

Source: Knox 159.

Case No. 5, 1852 — Argentina

Early in 1852, revolution again swept the Republic of Argentina

chargé d’affaires at Buenos Aires, John S. Pendleton, believed 

American naval presence was needed urgently. In response to Pe

communications, Commodore Isaac McKeever marshaled a force o

and proceeded from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. On 2 February, M

the British admiral, the senior naval officers of France, Sardinia, and 

and all the accredited diplomats in Buenos Aires met. At the mee

decided to apply to the local authorities for permission to land such 

the circumstances might require. Permission was not granted.

On the next day, when it became known that the rebels had won 

over the forces of General Rosas and were marching toward Buen

panic spread throughout the city. Permission to land forces was ur

and this time granted. British, French and American forces were sta

guards for various foreign residents and diplomats. Pillagers plundere

Disorder was widespread. During the transitional period American 

and sailors patrolled the streets, killing four pillagers. This ended th

By 12 February, with the new provisional government in control and 

stored, the Americans withdrew to their ships.

Source: Ellsworth 10-13.

Case No. 6, 1852–1853 — Argentina

A small disorder arose in Buenos Aires on 11 September 18

insurrection was not nearly as violent as the one earlier in t

Nevertheless, American interests were endangered so on 17 Sep

Marine guard landed to protect the US consulate. This force rema

about April 1853.

Source: Ellsworth 13.

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Case No. 7, 1853 

Nicaragua

In 1852, a dispute arose between the local government of San Juan 

(Greytown) and the Accessory Transit Company, an Americ

company chartered in Nicaragua, over the title to a piece of property 

Arenas. On 8 February 1853, the city council ordered the compa

land. Before either side had taken any further action, the America slo

arrived in San Juan on 10 March. An armed force of 24 Marines 

ashore to protect American citizens and their interests. After severa

controversy apparently was settled and the landing party was recal

March. Shortly thereafter the Cyane sailed north.

Sources: Clark 58-59; Ellsworth 120; Offutt 32.

Case No. 8, 1854 — China (Shanghai)

Commodore Perry visited Shanghai, after his first visit to Japan in 1

September 1853, the Taiping rebellion had become full blown; th

captured by the insurgents and skirmishing near Shanghai was co

response to these events, Perry left behind the US sloop-of-war Plymo

sailing to Japan in 1854.

The Imperial Chinese forces were encamped around the city, and 

was anchored in the river. They committed petty hostilities toward f

with the army tearing down structures at construction sites and steal

ing materials, and the navy firing without warning and searching al

the river. The general in command of the Imperial troops advised 

that he was no longer able to protect foreign interests and that they 

tect themselves.

On 8 March 1854, a privately owned American pilot boat was fi

The Imperial forces seized the vessel, hauled down the American flag 

treated the crew. In response, Commodore Kelly of the Plymouth thre

kill the commanding officer of the Imperial vessel. This threat resul

release of six prisoners and the return of the American boat.

The attacks on foreigners continued, however, and by 3 April mor

tive action was necessary. A small body of British Marines moved on 

rialists but was driven back. The British immediately landed ano

seamen and Marines, and the Americans landed about 60 the follo

These men were joined by about 30 volunteers from American merc

sels, as well as volunteers from the foreign quarter of the city. On the 

ning, the United States sent ashore an additional force of 11 men to 

American mission grounds. This combined force succeeded in drivin

perial troops into their encampments.

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On 4 April, the British and Americans sent a note to the Imper

vising them that if by 4 P.M. they did not evacuate their encampme

vicinity of the Race Course, the scene of the most recent hostilities

forces would be obliged to destroy them. The Chinese ignored the 

and the attack began at the appointed hour. The combined forces w

rious over the Imperialists, who left a number of men dead and wo

their retreat. The American casualties included two killed and four 

The British lost one man with three others wounded. The bulk of th

can force withdrew; however, two guard forces, 35 men at the Amer

sulate and 11 at the American mission, remained ashore until 15 J

last of the joint forces patrolling the Race Course area reembarked 

later.

Sources: Clark 57-58; Ellsworth 21-22; Knox 185; Offutt 28-31.

Case No. 9, 1854 — Nicaragua

Shortly after the departure of the USS Cyane from Nicaragua in Mar

the dispute between the city of San Juan del Norte and the American 

flared once again. The local authorities set afire some of the Accesso

Company buildings on the Puntas Arenas property and stole some of 

goods. In May 1854, in trying to seize the US minister to Central 

Solon Borland, a mob cut his face. The American consul demanded r

for these wrongs, but to no avail.

The Cyane returned to San Juan on 9 July to force reparations. S

to obtain any satisfactory response, Commander Hollins, of the Cya

landing party of 18 seamen and Marines ashore on 12 July to seize 

and ammunition of the town and to post a proclamation declaring 

town would be bombarded the following day if the demands were 

The Cyane opened fire at 9 A.M. on 13 July. There were three diffe

bardments during the day. At 4 P.M., the landing party from 12 

ashore to complete the destruction by fire. The force then with

though most of the town was destroyed, no lives were lost because t

itants had fled.

Subsequently Nicaragua asserted claims for the damage incurred d

bombardment of Greytown. The following is a portion of Secretar

Marcy’s response to the Nicaraguan minister, dated 2 August 1854:

If Nicaragua chooses to maintain the position you assume in your note 

that her citizens who incorporated themselves with the community 

Juan are still in friendly relations with her and entitled to her protectio

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ppy py y [

that political establishment planted on her own soil and becomes resp

for the mischiefs it has done to American citizens. It would be a 

inconsistency for Nicaragua to regard the organization at San Ju

hostile establishment on her territory and at the same time claim the 

clothe with her nationality its members.

The United States also refused to pay the claims of French citizen

out of the bombardment.5

On 4 December 1854, President Pierce communicated the facts 

cident to the Congress in his annual message. The President, the C

and the Secretary of the Navy approved Commander Hollins’ co

fact, he was commended for the prompt and efficient executi

duties.

Sources: Clark 59; Ellsworth 121-22; Knox 183-84; 2 Moore 414-18.

Case No. 10, 1854 — China (Ning-Po)

The United States made another landing in China at Ning-Po in 18

July, two armed boats landed to deliver letters to the American con

missionary. Believing some disturbance was about to occur at Nin

Americans landed an additional 12 Marines the following day. Th

remained ashore for two days, acting as a guard. When it became 

that no disorder was going to take place, they returned to the sh

July.

Source: Offutt 31.

Case No. 11, 1855 — China

The United States, dissatisfied with the failure of the Chinese auth

provide adequate protection for American citizens in that country, m

naval vessels in the area so that assistance might be rendered when n

On 8 March 1855, one such vessel put in to Shanghai, where local c

were reported to be chaotic. No landing was made until 19 May, whe

went ashore to protect the lives and property of American citize

reembarked two days later.

Source: Ellsworth 23.

Case No. 12, 1855 — Uruguay

An uprising in 1855 brought severe fighting to Montevideo, Urugua

25 November 1855, Commander W. F. Lynch of the sloop-of-war Ge

landed a force of seamen and Marines to protect the lives and p

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American residents. Britain, France, and Spain, who had warships 

the harbor, also sent detachments to protect their nationals. Notab

fact that Captain Lynch, an American and the senior naval officer 

foreign forces, assumed the command of a joint column which occ

customshouse without resistance. As the fighting intensified, more A

were called ashore on 27 November, bringing the total to about 

reinforcements withdrew the same day.

By 29 November, the Uruguayan Government had succeeded i

down the revolution and the original American landing force ree

the following day. During reembarkation the American comma

ticed that the Uruguayan Government forces were preparing to k

surgents, even though the latter had capitulated and had been d

The Marines commanded by Lieutenant Nicholson interposed th

between the Government troops and the insurgents, thereby preve

slaughter.

Subsequently, Lynch received a note from the Uruguayan Go

thanking him for his action in protecting the customhouse and the 

property of the foreign residents.

Sources: Ellsworth 160-61; Offutt 36-37.

Case No. 13, 1856 — Colombia (Panama)

On 19 September 1856, a disturbance occurred in the Panamanian 

assembly which seemed certain to lead to armed conflict between 

political factions. Commodore Mervine, commander of the Pacific S

requested that the American consul inform Governor Fabriga that 

to land some men to protect American citizens during the impendin

The Governor granted the request and Mervine sent ashore 160 m

field gun to occupy the railroad station.6 The American presence h

dampening effect that the battle never occurred. The Americ

reembarked on 22 September.

Source: Offutt 37-38.

Case No. 14, 1856 — China

In the autumn of 1856, fighting between the British and the auth

Canton seemed inevitable. Fearing injury to Americans and their 

the American consul requested that Commander A. H. Foote of 

Portsmouth send a force to look after these interests. Foote sent 83 

the Portsmouth who landed at Canton about 23 October. When 

force proved inadequate, an additional force of about 67 men w

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from the sloop

ofwar Levant around 27 October. On 28 Nov

supplementary force of 29 Marines was landed from the steam sloop 

Jacinto. This detachment remained ashore only two days. About thi

decision was made to withdraw the forces because several Amer

participated in a British assault on the Chinese without orders

United States wished to maintain its neutrality.

While Foote was arranging the American withdrawal, his boat wa

five times as he passed Chinese installations on the river. On the 

day, 16 November, the sloop Portsmouth was brought up from Wh

the nearest fort and the Americans immediately opened fire in re

The fighting escalated, and on 20 November, Foote landed 287 

took one fort by assault. When about 3,000 Chinese soldiers attemp

take the fort, the American forces repulsed them. On the following 

more forts were captured, and on 22 November, the last fort sur

The landing party returned to their ships that afternoon, but landed 

following day to occupy the forts and complete their destruction. T

continued until 6 December 1856, when the entire force withdrew

casualties amounted to about 250, while the Americans had 29 men 

wounded.

Sources: Clark 60-61; Ellsworth 24-27; Knox 186-87; Offutt 38-39.

Case No. 15, 1858 — Uruguay

When a revolution broke out in Uruguay in January 1858, the Gove

Uruguay requested that foreign troops be landed to protect the 

property of foreign residents. Detachments from the frigate USS St. 

and sloop-of-war Falmouth landed on 2 January 1858, and joined Bri

forces in holding the two consulates and the customhouse in Montev

American forces showed strict neutrality toward both political fac

confined themselves to protecting foreigners. On 27 January, abou

after the revolutionary movement fell apart, the Marines withdrew 

incident. On the day of the American withdrawal, an increased Br

landed.

Sources: Ellsworth 161; Offutt 39-40; Rogers 103.

Case No. 16, 1859 — China

In the summer of 1859, it was reported among the Chinese at Shan

some coolies had been kidnapped and taken aboard a French mercha

These reports led to a general disturbance directed against foreigner

time the side-wheel steamer USS Mississippi had arrived off Woosun

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American consul and several American merchants requested ass

protecting their lives and property. On 31 July, the captain of the 

sent ashore an armed party of 60 Marines to offer protection and rest

Having accomplished their objective, the Americans reembarked on 

1859.

Sources: Clark 62; Ellsworth 27-28; Knox 189; Offutt 41.

Case No. 17, 1860 — Angola (Portuguese West Africa)

When it appeared that the natives would attack the Portuguese sett

Kisembo, Angola (Portuguese West Africa), the American residents 

assistance from the sloop-of-war USS Marion which was lying in the h

1 March 1860, several officers and about 40 seamen and Marines we

to guard the American factories during the night. The force was with

following day.

On 3 March, another force of 50 men was landed to protect Ameri

ests during a battle between the natives and the Portuguese. The nat

several attempts to burn the American factories, but the force from t

prevented them from achieving their objective. The next day, the na

ing been defeated, the Americans withdrew. It should be noted that th

cans remained neutral throughout the conflict, their only function b

of a guard force.

Sources: Clark 62; Ellsworth 7; Offutt 41-42.

Case No. 18, 1860 — Colombia (Panama)

On 27 September 1860, an insurrection began in the outskirts of Pan

After consulting with the American consul, and at the request of th

intendente and the agent of the Panama Railroad, Commander W

Porter of the sloop-of-war USS St. Mary’s landed a Marine guard 

railroad traffic and American interests. The necessity of the 

demonstrated by the fact that six white inhabitants already had been 

three wounded by stray bullets. The force landed and occupied th

station without opposition. The Governor of Panama turned over t

the joint occupation of American and British forces the following d

September 1860, an additional force of 50 seamen landed to rein

Marine guard. These forces were not withdrawn until 7 October, 

insurrection had come to an end.

Sources: Clark 62-63; Ellsworth 46; Knox 189; Offutt 42.

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Case No. 19, 1864 

Japan

In the summer of 1864, Robert H. Pruyn, United States minister to Ja

to Yedo (Tokyo) to negotiate a settlement of American claims for se

of hostility committed by Japan against the United States. A force of 6

and Marines from the sloop USS Jamestown was landed on 14 July 18

as a guard for Pruyn during the three weeks of negotiations, the Japan

unable to guarantee his safety. According to Pruyn, however, he requ

guard not only to insure his safety but also to facilitate his work.

Source: Offutt 44-45.

Case No. 20, 1865 — Colombia (Panama)

Although the revolution which erupted in Panama on 9 March 

unanticipated by American officials, it so happened that the USS S

was anchored in the harbor ready to render assistance to protect A

lives and property. The American consuls who requested that a for

ashore first sought permission from Vice President Calancha, t

Head of State. Since it was his government that was about to be ov

he readily granted permission. A detachment of Marines was sent 

the American consulate overnight. When foreign residents wer

object of any violence, the Marines returned to their ship the 

morning.

Source: Offutt 48.

Case No. 21, 1868 — Japan (Hiogo)

Subsequent to the opening of the ports of Osaka and Hiogo on 1 Janu

Japanese hostility toward foreigners became so noticeable that certa

of the Asiatic Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral 

stationed in the area so that they could offer assistance if American 

were threatened.

On 27 January, war broke out between two Japanese factions, on

greater commercial relations and the other wishing to restrict comm

other nations. The leader of the former faction, the Tycoon, was defe

on 31 January he sought shelter for the night on board the steam slo

USS Iroquois.

7 On the following day, the foreign ministers were com

leave Osaka and they went aboard the Iroquois to Hiogo.

Hiogo also was experiencing trouble at this time. On 4 February

soldiers attacked a group of foreign residents and wounded a crew m

the screw sloop-of-war USS Oneida. In order to protect the foreign se

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the treaty powers present at the time made a joint landing. The Amer

withdrew on 8 February 1868.

Sources: Clark 64-65; Ellsworth 103-04; Offutt 50-51.

Case No. 22, 1868 — Uruguay

Two landings were made at Montevideo, Uruguay, in February 186

time two-thirds of the city’s 70,000 inhabitants were foreigners. In co

with the actions of commanders of other foreign squadrons,8 and at th

of Governor Flores, Rear Admiral Davis landed a force of 50 Ma

seamen on 7 February, to protect foreign residents as well as the cus

during a political disturbance. The force withdrew the following 

another force of 50 officers and men had to be landed on 19 February 

foreign residents from the rioting which occurred after the assass

Flores. This force did not reembark until 26 February 1868, when the 

of the Republic requested their withdrawal.

Sources: Ellsworth 161-63; Offutt 52.

Case No. 23, 1868 — Japan (Nagasaki)

At the request of the American consul in Nagasaki, a small force 

sloop-of-war USS Shenandoah landed on 8 February 1868 to pr

consulate during demonstrations against foreigners in that city.

Sources: Ellsworth 104; Offutt 51.

Case No. 24, 1868 — Japan (Yokohama) (April)

Antiforeign feeling was so strong in Yokohama that the foreign d

officers in the city, representing France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia

United States sought protection for the foreign settlement fr

respective naval vessels then present in the harbor. The commander

vessels held a conference and decided upon a joint landing, which t

on 4 April 1868. The American contribution was a party of 25 Mar

the side-wheel gunboat USS Monocacy and the USS Iroquois. Two w

another detail of Marines reinforced them. The entire Marine guard 

on 12 May 1868.

Sources: Ellsworth 104; Offutt 51.

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Case No. 25, 1868 

Colombia (Panama)

On 7 April 1868, while local police and Colombian troops were ab

Aspinwall (Colon), a crowd gathered in the streets of that city maki

seem probable. An agent of a steamship company requested 

commanding officer of the screw gunboat USS Penobscot land a 

protect passengers and goods in transit. In compliance with this reque

of two officers and 12 seamen went ashore. They were withdrawn as s

need for protection had passed.

Source: Offutt 52.

Case No. 26, 1868 — Japan (Yokohama) (July)

Attacks on foreigners in Yokohama continued. At a meeting on 8 J

the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherland

and the United States decided that in view of the city’s disturbed stat

it would be necessary to establish four posts of foreign guards. The

were to assist foreigners who might be attacked or who migh

assistance, and observe the state of affairs in the foreign settlement. 

circumstances, however, were the guards to interfere with the activi

Japanese, except to defend foreigners. France, Great Britain, The Ne

and the United States each had the responsibility to maintain one 

number of men furnished by each country was: France 11; Great B

The Netherlands 16; and the United States 21. All these measures w

with the approval of Higashi Kuze Chiujio, the Japanese Minister o

Affairs. The American force arrived in Yokohama about 13 July 

remained until the danger ceased.

Sources: Letter from R.B. Van Valkenburgh to Hon. William H. Seward (July 

reprinted in Message and Documents 780-1; Offutt 52.

Case No. 27, 1868 — Japan (Niigata)

The Marine guard of the screw steamer USS Piscataqua went ashore 

on about 25 September 1868 to protect the lives of some America

during local riots. They remained for several days.

Sources: Letter from R. B. Van. Valkenburgh to Hon. William H. Seward (Septembe

reprinted in Message and Documents 823-5; Offutt 52.

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Case No. 28, 1873 

Colombia (Panama) (May)

In 1873, at the request of the American consul and several American 

foreign residents, American forces landed in Panama to protect 

citizens and their property during revolutionary disturbances. On 7 M

as opposing political factions fought over control of the government, 

100 men with two field guns went ashore to occupy the Panama 

station. This force’s orders restricted its activity to the protectio

railroad and its property. When the consul requested that an addition

150 Marines be sent into the city to protect foreign residents, 

Steedman refused because he lacked consent from the local author

next day, having obtained the consent of both contending factions, 

sent a force of 100 men into the city to protect the foreigners. T

withdrew on 11 May when open hostilities ceased. The detachme

railroad station remained until 22 May 1873.

Sources: Ellsworth 46-47; Offutt 60-61.

Case No. 29, 1873 — Colombia (Panama) (September)

By 24 September 1873, it seemed certain that the same factions w

clashed in May would renew hostilities.9 The Panamanian Governo

the US consul that his government was no longer able to protect th

Railroad as guaranteed by the 1846 Treaty.10 Under these circu

Admiral Almy landed 130 men to occupy the railroad station, reinfo

party with another 60 men during the night. These troops reassured t

residents and secured safe transit of the isthmus for the passengers, fr

specie carried by four steamship lines, two of which were not America

American forces boarded trains as necessary to ensure this vital co

between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Hostilities ended on 6 Oct

two days later all American forces withdrew, save for a detail of 30 m

remained to guard the railroad station for several more days.

Sources: Ellsworth 47-48; Offutt 61-62.

Case No. 30, 1874 — Hawaii

A dispute over accession to the throne of the Sandwich Islands led to 

12 February 1874. In compliance with the request of the Hawaiian M

Foreign Affairs, Commander Belknap of the screw sloop USS Tuscaro

a force of 150 officers and men. The force’s mission was to protect no

interests of American citizens, but also to help restore order. The 

presence did dispel the disorderly crowds, and the inauguration of K

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proceeded without further incident. A portion of the U. S. forces wit

16 February, and the remaining 33 men left on 20 Februa

Subsequently, the Hawaiian Government extended a resolution of t

the American effort. This act was unsurprising as many consider King 

have owed his throne to the American intervention—Dowager Que

having had such strong support that she may well have ascended ot

Sources: Ellsworth 92; Offutt 62-64.

Case No. 31, 1876 — Mexico

General Gonzalez, leader of revolutionary forces, informed the U. S. 

Matamoros, Mexico, that he intended to abandon that city becau

forces were approaching. There being no other civil authority, t

requested that a small force from the screw sloop-of-war USS Lacka

landed to police Matamoros and protect foreign interests until 

authority could be restored. The force landed on 18 May 1876, and 

until after the arrival of the federal forces.

Sources: Clark 67-68; Offutt 64.

Case No. 32, Egypt — 1882

During the summer of 1882, trouble developed between the Britis

Egyptians, and on 11 July 1882, the British bombarded Alexandria

fires raged in the city, mobs began looting and destroying what rema

while the Arabs sought to kill every Christian they could find. Scores 

were slaughtered. In an attempt to restore order, the British landed 1

on 13 July.

Either that day or the following day the United States landed 70 M

seamen and 6 officers to protect American interests. A portion of 

guarded the US consulate while the remainder, as well as a small de

of Germans which had been landed to protect the German hospital, 

British forces. One of the major tasks was to extinguish the many fire

ture the numerous incendiaries who roamed the streets.

Most of the Americans were recalled on 15 July, the remainder b

drawn on 18 July, save for one detail of Marines that remained ashor

July. Two of the three American vessels departed from Alexandria o

when the British reported that they had the city completely under con

third vessel did not depart until 29 August.

Sources: Ellsworth 75; Offutt 65-66.

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Case No. 33, 1885 

Colombia (Panama) (January)

Early in 1885 a revolution in Panama threatened transit on the 

Railroad. In January 1885, the President of Colombia announced 

provincial government was no longer capable of protecting the 

property. At the request of the general superintendent and the US 

Colon, Commander Clark of the screw gunboat USS Alliance l

Marines to guard the railroad station on 18 January. They with

following morning.

Sources: Ellsworth 48; Offutt 66-67.

Case No. 34, 1885 — Colombia (Panama) (March)

A more serious revolution than the one of January 1885 took place i

in March of that year. On 16 March 1885, insurgents led by Aizpuru 

Panama City, whereupon Colombian troops stationed at Colon m

drive out the revolutionaries. In their absence from Colon, howeve

revolutionary force under the leadership of Prestan took over that c

not until 1 April that the Colombian forces returned to Colon and 

Prestan. By this time Aizpuru had reoccupied Panama City and suc

cutting off rail traffic; he controlled most of the city and the isthmus 

railroad line.

A force of seamen and Marines arrived in Colon, acting under the 

Admiral Jouett, the commander of the US Atlantic Squadron. The fir

can landing force of 17 Marines went ashore 16 March 1885 to prote

can interests after the Colombian forces had departed for Panama Cit

the foreign residents of Colon without adequate protection. Later the 

an additional 13 men landed. Then again on 17 and 19 March 1885, 

went ashore.

On 30 March, a group of insurgents at Colon seized the America

Colon of the Pacific Mail Line. A small force from the wooden stea

Galena recaptured the ship and returned her to her owners on the 

The following day, 31 March, a force of 140 seamen and Marines fro

lena landed to guard American property and fight the fires that were 

over much of Colon. Unfortunately, most of the town could not be 

about the same time, a landing party went ashore at Panama City.

On 10 April 1885, Admiral Jouett sent a force to open the railroa

occupy the cities of Colon and Matachin. The expeditionary force

750 seamen and Marines who had been sent from New York, landed 

in two sections on 11 and 15 April. As soon as the first section of th

tionary force arrived it went to Panama City, and by the followin

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restored the trains to service. The second section relieved the forces 

while two more companies of Marines under Commander McCal

from Colon to Panama City.

When McCalla arrived in Panama City it was occupied by 

Fearing that a battle between his forces and the national troops w

stroy Panama City, McCalla, on 24 April, ordered up the garrison 

lon and the reserve battalion of Marines from the squadron to occ

of the city. After arresting Aizpuru, he compelled him to sign an a

that fighting should not take place in Panama City. No fighting en

this is likely the result of a conference between the nationalis

Aizpuru and Admiral Jouett, on 29 April, where Aizpuru and his 

pitulated. As the national authority of Colombia was reestabli

American forces began to withdraw, the last Marines leaving the 

on 25 May.

Sources: Ellsworth 48-51; Offutt 67-70.

Case No. 35, 1888 — Korea

Unsettled political conditions in Korea kept American naval vessels 

territorial waters throughout 1888. One landing was made in Ju

request of the US Minister to Korea who feared a disturbance in 

detachment of 25 seamen and Marines from the third USS Essex, 

screw steamer, landed at Chemulpo on 19 June and marched to the 

protect American residents. On 30 June, when the city was again 

American force withdrew.

Sources: Clark 68; Ellsworth 59; Offutt 71.

Case No. 36, 1888–1889 — Samoa

In September 1888, there was a revolt in Samoa against the Gover

Tamasese. Mataafa, leader of the opposition, proclaimed himself Kin

war ensued. The subsequent fighting endangered the lives and prop

foreign residents, the former especially in jeopardy conside

cannibalistic customs of some of the natives.

By November the situation had become so serious that the US 

quested that the commander of the gunboat USS Nipsic, which was th

harbor at Apia, land a suitable force of Marines for the protection of 

citizens and the US consulate. A landing party of 11 Marines went ash

November 1888, remaining until 20 March 1889. The Germans a

landings during the disturbance.

Sources: Clark 68-69; Ellsworth 146.

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Case No. 37, 1889 

Hawaii

There was a revolution in progress in the Hawaiian Islands in 1889. B

the situation had so declined that the American Minister feared for 

of foreign residents and legations. Therefore, the second USS Adams, 

screw gunboat, landed a guard of Marines on 30 July 1889, to protect 

interests. They were stationed at the American legation and return

ship the following day.

Source: Ellsworth 92-93.

Case No. 38, 1890 — Argentina

There was a revolution in the area around Buenos Aires in July 

small detachment of Marines landed to protect the American cons

the U. S. Minister’s residence. They remained ashore until 30 Jul

Source: Ellsworth 13.

Case No. 39, 1891 — Haiti (Navassa Island)

For several years the Navassa Phosphate Company, an Amer

engaged in gathering guano from Navassa Island, suffered fr

troubles with its native workers. In the spring of 1891, those 

expanded to threaten American lives. When the commander o

USS Kearsarge, a screw sloop-of-war, reached the island, he de

that the situation demanded prompt action. He landed a detac

Marines on 2 June to protect American lives and property. On 20 J

most of the laborers had returned to work, the Marines returne

ship.

Sources: Clark 69-70; Ellsworth 119; Offutt 71.

Case No. 40, 1891 — Chile

In 1891, civil war broke out in Chile between the supporters of 

Balmaceda and the Congressional party. After the Congres

captured the city of Valparaiso, they endangered the lives and pr

foreign residents: even foreign legations and consulates were bein

with contempt. The American Minister, Patrick Egan, applied to 

George Brown for a suitable guard for the American consulat

August, Brown sent ashore 30 seamen and 18 Marines from the cr

San Francisco and 36 seamen and 18 Marines from the fourth USS 

(C-3) to protect the consulate and its refugees. These forces with

days later.

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Eventually the Congressionalists were victorious. They were als

sentful of the American intervention because US neutrality during th

had worked to the advantage of Balmaceda. They were especially irri

the American Minister had given asylum to Balmaceda’s supporters. 

cidents followed, including one in which two Americans were kille

wounded. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the governments of Chi

US reached a peaceful settlement of their differences.

Sources: Annual Report 1891, at 158-59; Bemis 757-58; Ellsworth 16-20; Knox 326-27

Case No. 41, 1893 — Hawaii

When Queen Liliuokalani informed her cabinet that she pl

promulgate a new autocratic constitution by royal edict, some of her 

informed the prominent American residents of the islands. These A

requested the support of the US Minister, John H. Stevens, and the p

of the US Navy. Stevens arranged to have a detachment from the 

Boston, a protected cruiser, land at Honolulu on 16 January 189

ostensible purpose of protecting American lives and property. Curiou

stated purpose, the Americans were not stationed near American pro

rather were located where they might most easily intimidate the Qu

The American presence served its function and on 17 

Liliuokalani’s opponents deposed her and established a provisiona

ment under the presidency of Sanford B. Dole. The provisional gover

quested that the United States assume the role of a protectorate 

islands. Mr. Stevens complied with the request and raised the Americ

1 February. The Boston landed another detachment of Marines that 

increasing the number of American forces in Honolulu to about 150 m

sequently, there was a change of administrations in Washington, w

dent Cleveland disavowing the actions of Mr. Stevens. On 1 April 

American flag was hauled down and the landing force withdrew.

Sources: Baily 429-33; Ellsworth 93; Offutt 72-73.

Case No. 42, 1894 — Brazil

On 6 September 1893, a large section of the Brazilian navy revolted a

Brazilian Government. Initially, the insurgents were quite succe

maintained close control over the harbor at Rio de Janeiro. During t

Admiral da Gama succeeded Admiral Mello as commander of the 

naval forces at Rio de Janeiro. Once in power, on 1 December 1893, 

vainly attempted to blockade the port. Since he was unsucc

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maintaining a blockade, da Gama then sought to prevent vessels from 

the docks.

The United States had assembled a powerful squadron at Rio de Ja

der the command of Rear Admiral Benham, and on 29 January 189

these cruisers, the third USS Detroit (C-10), stood in toward the doc

side several American steamers. The insurgents had forbade Americ

from going to the city piers. Benham advised the commanders of the 

steamers that, since the insurgents lacked the status of belligerents, 

ultra vires in interfering with commerce. He announced that he wou

those American vessels which wished to go alongside the wharves. 

promise, a vessel moved toward the pier. When one of the insurgent 

suddenly fired at this American merchant vessel, Benham fired a sh

struck under the insurgent’s bow. This shot was followed by another e

after which Benham advised the insurgents that he would sink the

they fired again. There was no more firing and the American merchan

loaded without loss of life or property. Subsequently, the revolt faile

Sources: Knox 327; 6 Moore 438-39; Offutt 74-75.

Case No. 43, 1894 — Nicaragua

The unsettled political conditions surrounding José Santos Zelaya’s o

of President Roberto Sacasa in 1893 presented a further occasion for 

intervention in Nicaragua. Once the lives and property of all 

residing in the country were in jeopardy, two American cruisers, t

USS Columbia (C-12) and the USS Marblehead (C-11), were sta

Nicaraguan waters to lend aid in case of an emergency.

Early on the morning of 6 July 1894, the US consul at Bluefields 

that a force be landed for the protection of American interests. A de

of Marines from the Marblehead landed the same day, and on 31 July

tional landing party from the Marblehead, the Marine guard and a co

seamen from the Columbia, reinforced the original landing party. Bo

withdrew on 7 August.

Source: Ellsworth 122.

Case No. 44, 1894–1896 — Korea

Much of the fighting during the Sino-Japanese War took place on th

peninsula. The USS Baltimore (C-3) was instructed to proceed to C

the port of Seoul, in order to watch developments and give ass

American missionaries living in the area. On 23 July 1894, the US M

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Seoul sent telegrams requesting an armed guard to protect the legatio

of 55 men landed and arrived in Seoul in two sections on 25 and 26 J

reported that the situation in the capital was critical. The Marine f

men remained until 26 September, when it was relieved by 

detachment of 18 Marines. The latter force withdrew on 29 October

days later on 2 November 1894, the Marine guard of the sec

Charleston (C-2) landed.

Although the war between China and Japan ended in 1895, th

guard remained. The force from the Charleston served until 25 Ma

when a force from the USS Detroit (C-10) relieved them. After the f

the Detroit departed on 19 June, there was no guard until 11 Octo

when the Marine guard from the gunboat USS Yorktown (PG-1) land

November, a force of Marines from the first USS Machias (PG-5)

ner-rigged gunboat, landed and the next day the Yorktown force with

Machias force remained ashore until 3 April 1896, when the Unit

ceased to maintain a legation guard at Seoul.

Sources: Background 53; Ellsworth 59-60; Offutt 75-76.

Case No. 45, 1894–1895 — China (Newchwang)

In October 1894, the third USS Petrel (PG-2), a fourth-rate gun

dispatched to Newchwang (also known as Yingtze and Yenkow), 

order to protect the city’s foreign residents. Special problems arose be

city is located on the Liao River, which is closed to navigation from N

until April by ice floes. Since it was necessary to remain there all wi

beached the vessel and constructed a fortress around it large enough 

all the foreign residents.

It was reported that, although the American force never confront

Chinese or the Japanese forces, its presence prevented the outbreak 

on several occasions, and strengthened the local governor’s autho

governor, the foreign consuls, and residents agreed that “Fort Petrel” 

them a significant advantage in their efforts to protect life and prop

The Petrel arrived at Newchwang on 12 November 1894, just as t

freeze was setting in, and it departed with the spring thaw on 24 Ap

Source: Offutt 77-79.

Case No. 46, 1894–1895 — China (Tientsin)

A force of 51 Marines left the USS Baltimore (C-3) at Chefoo on 4 D

1894, and proceeded in the direction of Tientsin. They were to gua

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legation if rioting should erupt in Tientsin during the Sino

Japanese W

precaution was taken in view of the rioting which had occurred in 

the approach of the Japanese army. The force reached the US 

Monocacy on 6 December, and remained alongside a Tientsin dock 

war ended. Germany, Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy and Spain 

similar forces. The American force withdrew on 16 May 1895, six 

peace was declared.

Sources: Ellsworth 30-32; Offutt 76-77.

Case No. 47, 1895 — Colombia (Panama)

In March 1895, the US consul at Panama reported that a Mexican 

Garcia had landed in Colombia, at the border of Costa Rica, with the 

of capturing the town of Bocas del Toro. The second USS Atlanta, a 

cruiser, was dispatched from Colon, arriving on 7 March. Having 

with Colombian authorities, Captain Cromwell of the Atlanta determ

the national forces had the situation under control and he stood of

following day.

Upon his return to the town late on the afternoon of 8 March 189

well learned that Garcia’s attack of the town during the day had me

feat at the hands of the nationalists. Beaten but not dissuaded, Garcia 

to return and ignite the town that night, leading the American cons

at Bocas del Toro to request that a force be sent ashore for the protect

consular agency and American property. Cromwell sought permission 

local governor who failed to respond. Still, Cromwell sent 70 men as

night to occupy the consulate and an American warehouse. (The 

who was at the consulate when the landing force arrived, expresse

proval the following day.) The night passed without incident, and on 

with assurance from local authorities that they could handle the pro

force withdrew at noon that day.

Sources: Ellsworth 51-52; Offutt 79-81.

Case No. 48, 1896 — Nicaragua

When Zelaya’s first term as President of Nicaragua expired in 1896, 

his reelection, causing a new wave of political unrest. At Corinto, th

the disorder, the Nicaraguan commandant, after informing the 

consul that his forces were inadequate to protect foreigners and their 

requested that the British and Americans land forces for the protectio

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nationals. Both countries followed this advice. The American landin

34 Marines and sailors went ashore on 2 May, and there remained unt

Source: Ellsworth 122-23.

Case No. 49, 1898 — Nicaragua

The fighting between Zelaya and his political opponents continue

February 1898 there was another landing of American forces for the p

of the lives and property of American citizens. A party of 33 sea

Marines went ashore at San Juan del Sur on 7 February. They rema

the following day when the commander of the Nicaraguan Governm

gave assurances that his forces were capable of protecting th

community.

Source: Ellsworth 123.

Case No. 50, 1898 — Spain (Spanish-American War)

The Spanish-American War (21 April–10 December 1898) has been 

prime example of American intervention for humanitarian reason

the American people were aroused by reports of Spanish acts of inhu

Cuba. Most poignant were tales of the concentration camps. The cam

response to the Spanish military authorities’ conclusion in 1896 tha

be impossible to suppress the on-going revolution as long as the rebel

the aid of civilians throughout the country. Therefore, they ord

populace placed in camps surrounded with barbed wire fences. Unfo

proper hygienic precautions were not observed and many thousands 

American press reported numerous incidents of cruel and i

treatment. The “yellow” press in particular maintained that Spain w

“uncivilized” war.

In his war message to the Congress on 11 April 1898, President 

summarized the reasons for US intervention as follows:

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, blo

starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the partie

conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answe

this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefo

of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

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p

indemnity for life and property which no government there can or wil

and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them 

protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injur

commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destru

property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition o

in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Governm

enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so 

and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when t

and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property de

and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure 

seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation, the expedi

filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the ir

questions and entanglements thus arising — all these and others that I n

mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace 

peace, and compel us to keep on a semiwar footing with a nation with w

are at peace.

Despite Spain’s frantic, last-minute efforts to avoid it, the US 

voted to declare war on 19 April. On 25 April, McKinley signed the 

declaring war to have existed since 21 April 1898.

Sources: Bailey ch. 31; Message from the President to the Congress, [1898] Foreign R

757-58 (1901); 6 Moore 211-36.

Case No. 51, 1898–1899 — China

At the end of the Sino-Japanese War, a movement against the “

spirit of Western civilization” swept through China. Antiforeign feelin

so strongly that the diplomatic community in Peking became concern

safety of foreigners in the country. The US Minister to China reques

force be landed to guard the legation in Peking and the consulate in 

On 4 November 1898, a force of 18 Marines landed and proceeded 

Another landing party of 30 Marines went to Tientsin on 12 Novemb

middle of the following March, conditions had improved significant

Marines withdrew on 15 March 1899.

Source: Ellsworth 32-33.

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Case No. 52, 1899 

 Nicaragua

On 4 February 1899, a new revolution led by General Juan P. Reye

Nicaragua. President Zelaya requested that an American naval ship 

San Juan del Norte on 9 February. By this time the British consul had 

government requesting that a vessel be sent to San Juan and Bluefie

When the second USS Marietta (PG-15), a schooner-rigged gun

rived at San Juan del Norte on 12 February 1899, the revolutionarie

ready in possession of the town. The situation grew tense wh

attempted to compel foreign merchants to pay custom charges and po

his agent. Consular agents of the United States, Great Britain, No

Sweden refused to sanction such payments. At the request of the for

chants, a force of about 17 Marines and sailors from the Marietta an

force from a British vessel landed at San Juan del Norte. The revol

lapsed within a few days and the force from the Marietta reembar

March 1899.

By the end of March, however, there was again trouble over the p

duties at San Juan and Bluefields. The Zelaya government was atte

collect duties under threat of “action,” this time from foreign merch

had already paid duties to the insurgents under protest. Martial law 

posed. The cruiser USS Detroit was sent to Bluefields and soon th

peaceful settlement was reached.

Sources: Clark 72; Ellsworth 123-24; [1899] Foreign Rel. U. S. 554, 560 (1901); Off

Case No. 53, 1899 — Samoa

A disturbance in the Samoan Islands over succession to the thron

basis for American intervention for the protection of the US cons

other American interests in the islands. The struggle was between 

the former king, Malietoa Tanu, favored by the British and Ameri

Mataafa, the candidate preferred by the Germans.

When the fourth USS Philadelphia (C-4) reached Apia, Samoa, on 

1899, the situation ashore was menacing. Indeed the British alr

landed a force to protect their consulate. Rear Admiral Albert Ka

mander of the Pacific Squadron, landed a force of 25 men from the cr

adelphia on 13 March to protect the US consulate in view of the Ma

warlike preparations. A force of Marines landed to relieve the seame

lowing day. The group of seamen, increased to 65 men, took over def

sitions outside Apia, with smaller parties being stationed inside the t

Mataafa forces attacked on 15 March, and both the Philadelphia and t

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cruiser HMS Royalist bombarded the hills behind the town. During th

the American vessel boarded numerous refugees. Amidst scattered fir

March, Malietoa was installed as King. British and American reinfo

landed on 24 March, bringing the total of the combined forces to 250 

On 1 April, a joint party of 60 Americans and 62 Britons, accom

four interpreters, two Mormon missionaries, and about 150 friendl

reconnoitered the island to plan a breaking up of one of Mataafa’s ca

Vailele. In the engagement that followed, four seamen were killed, tw

American and two British. The wounded included two British 

American seamen. Subsequently, the British and American forces c

reprisals against the hostile natives. Hostilities ceased on 13 May 1899

days later the Americans reembarked.

Sources: Clark 72; Ellsworth 146-49; Knox 369-71; Offutt 83-85.

Case No. 54, 1900 — China (Boxer Rebellion)

The Boxer uprising of 1900 was by no means a sudden, unanticipat

Chinese resentment against foreign encroachment was longstan

there had been an increasing number of attacks on foreigners ne

century’s end. During the winter of 1898–1899, the legations of the 

nations and the United States were compelled to call upon their 

governments for guards. These forces were largely withdrawn by the 

1899.

The Boxers were, in fact, only one of several patriotic groups esp

sentful of foreign exploitation. The common goal of such groups w

out “the barbarians” and their Christian converts. Eventually, they 

the support of the Dowager Empress and the Imperial Army. Initially 

fined their acts of pillage and murder to missionaries and other for

dents located in outlying provinces, but by 1 June 1900, they were bo

to attack the foreign legations in Peking.

The situation in Peking was critical. The United States force of 5

sent ashore in May,11 was inadequate. Much larger forces were ne

tween 24 June and 24 July 1900, 231 foreigners were killed. For a 

communication between Peking and the outside world was severed. T

ern Powers and Japan agreed that the situation demanded 

interventionary force. While more than 15,000 American troops wer

to China, only some 5,000 or 6,000 had arrived prior to Peking’s captu

gust 1900. Other nations also had increased their ranks gradually, so 

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August, a column of more than 19,000

soldiers began the adva

Tientsin13 to Peking.

The relief expedition engaged the Chinese in a fierce battle near 

13 August. On the following day the Allies entered the city and e

siege. Negotiations between the Chinese and foreign representatives 

more than a year, and on 7 September 1901, the final protocol was sig

withdrawal of foreign troops began ten days later.

Sources: Bailey 481-82; Bemis 486-87; Ellsworth 33-39; Offutt 85-89; Spaulding 390-

Case No. 55, 1900–1941 — China (Peking)

In response to the US Legation’s request for assistance at Peking 

outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion,14 a force of 56 Marines from the US

Battleship No. 3, and USS Newark (C-1), a protected cruiser, landed

at Peking on 29 May 1900. After the rebellion ended, the Unit

decided to maintain a permanent guard of soldiers at the American 

American officials justified this action under Articles VII and IX of 

Protocol of 1901,15 which had been negotiated after the Boxer Rebe

size of the guard was increased during times of trouble, as during th

revolution which lasted from 11 October 1911 until 5 July 1912.

On 25 November 1941, President Roosevelt announced that th

States would withdraw all American troops from China, including th

guard. However, the outbreak of war with Japan on 7 December 19

what delayed the implementation of this order.

Sources: Ellsworth 38-39; [1941] 5 Foreign Rel. U. S. 583, 589 (1956); Offutt 86, 89

Case No. 56, 1901 — Colombia (Panama)

Revolution swept Panama once again in 1901. By November the stat

was so precarious that the Governor advised Lieutenant Commande

of the gunboat USS Machias (PG-S) that his forces could no longer 

safety of Americans and their property or the free transit of the 

Thereupon, McCrea landed a force at Colon to occupy the prope

Panama Railroad on 20 November. Two days later another force of 

landed from the second USS Iowa (BB-4) at Panama City. These forc

with British and French forces which also were present. Troops es

trains, and contending factions entered into agreements to assure th

passengers and property on the trains. On 29 November, about 300 

seamen and Marines and a detachment from the French cruiser 

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occupied Colon. American forces began to reembark on 2 December

December all of them had withdrawn.

Sources: Ellsworth 52-53; Offutt 89-92.

Case No. 57, 1902 — Colombia (Panama) (April)

During the Panamanian revolution of April 1902, the United States s

neutral intermediary. The United States’s services were varied. On 

one section of a company of seamen from the USS Machias (PG-5) 

Bocas del Toro to protect American residents and their property. On 

of 17 April, the insurgent Liberals and the Colombian Nationalists me

the Machias, at which time all agreed that the Nationalist forces would 

the city to Commander McCrea, who in turn would surrender it to th

Once this agreement was carried out on the 18th, the Americans wi

their ship, leaving a small guard of Marines to protect American prop

the Liberals could guarantee its safety. With the arrival of more N

troops on 20 April, the situation reversed itself and McCrea transferre

back to the Colombian Nationalist authorities, maintaining the p

they were established. All US forces withdrew on 22 April 1902.

Sources: Ellsworth 54-55; Offutt 92-93.

Case No. 58, 1902 — Colombia (Panama) (September)

Due to the continued activity of the revolutionary forces in Panama d

1902 disturbances continued. By September the United States was c

to intervene once again to restore and maintain free transit of the Ist

17 September, a detachment of seamen from the second USS Cincin

went ashore at Colon, while another force landed at Panama City. 

they were able to guard all the trains crossing the Isthmus. Reinfo

from the first USS Panther (AD-6), an auxiliary cruiser, and the USS 

(BB-9) landed on 23 and 30 September, respectively. All troops were 

protect the lives and property of Americans, and assist in mainta

traffic. By 12 November, the Nationalist forces having begun to m

gains over the rebels, the Colombian Government was able to assure 

of American interests. On that date the Americans began to withdra

18 November 1902, the last Marine battalion embarked. A pea

between the opposing political parties was signed on board the 

Wisconsin three days later.

Sources: Ellsworth 55-56; Offutt 94-96.

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Case No. 59, 1903 

 Honduras

The political unrest which beset Honduras in 1903 was the result of a

President Bonilla’s political opponents, both within his own count

Nicaragua, to oust his government, or at least discredit it, pri

presidential election.

During this period of unrest, the United States stationed a squadr

naval vessels in Honduran waters to protect American interests. At th

of the American consul at Puerto Cortés, a guard of 13 Marines lan

March 1903 to guard the U. S. consulate in that city. The guard wit

30 or 31 March. Another detachment of 30 Marines landed at Puerto 

guard the steamship wharf on 24 March. They embarked on 26 Mar

Source: Ellsworth 94-95.

Case No. 60, 1903 — Dominican Republic

A revolutionary outbreak occurred in the Dominican Republic duri

and April 1903. The cruiser USS Atlanta was dispatched to Santo 

City to protect US interests during the insurrection. The vessel arri

March, and two days later a party of 29 Marines went ashore. The de

was quartered in the house of the American consul general. Its pre

intended to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. The revolution soon e

the Marines returned to the ship on 21 April 1903.

Sources: Clark 73; Ellsworth 66; Offutt 96.

Case No. 61, 1903 — Syria

Both the Moslem and Christian communities experienced difficultie

in September 1903. Two American vessels, the second USS Brooklyn 

heavy cruiser, and the cruiser USS San Francisco, were in the harbor o

the time. Admiral Cotton of the Brooklyn, believing an uprising likely

to land a force to protect the US consulate. The need for the force th

contemplated did not arise, but at the request of the American cons

of Marines and a few sailors did land on 7 September 1903, remaini

five days.

Source: Ellsworth 155.

Case No. 62, 1903-1914 — Panama

It is unclear whether the United States landed troops in Panama d

revolution of 1903 more to protect the lives and property of its citiz

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encourage the on

going revolution. However, there is no doubt 

United States welcomed the change of governments, having had 

proposal for the construction of a Panamanian canal rejecte

Colombian Senate in August 1903.

By the autumn of 1903, the United States anticipated a revolu

Navy Department instructed its ships to keep in readiness. The r

which began on 3 November was successful. On that day, the re

tured the 500 Colombian troops who landed at Colon and sent the

cial train to Panama. The Colombians, so outraged at this u

American-controlled railway to aid the revolutionaries, notifie

consul on 4 November that, if the two generals who were in charg

troops were not released by 2 P.M., the Colombians would bomba

and kill every American citizen in the town. Just prior to the a

hour, 42 men were landed with instructions to occupy a stone 

owned by the railroad. Many Americans sought refuge there, wh

boarded two steamers made available for their protection. Alt

seemed certain that the Colombian troops would attack, their com

Colonel Torres, changed his mind and offered to withdraw his tro

American landing party were reembarked. The Americans conse

returned to their ship.

On the following morning, 5 November, when it was discovered 

Colombians had not withdrawn as far as had been promised, the US fo

went ashore. The American commander protested the breach of t

ment, asserting the United States’s neutrality and stressing that its o

ests were protecting American citizens and maintaining rail traffic 

Isthmus. With effort, officials of the new Panamanian Government c

Torres to withdraw his troops. During his preparations, a second 

Marines landed. The first landing party returned to their ship and the 

rived force reembarked the next day, 6 November.

Marines were stationed on the Isthmus almost continuously from 

ber 1903 to 21 January 1914 in order to protect American interests, 

the construction of the Panama Canal.

Sources: Background 54; Ellsworth 134-36; Knox 374-76; Offutt 96-99.

Case No. 63, 1904 — Dominican Republic

When revolution erupted in the Dominican Republic in 1904, Co

Dillingham of the USS Detroit (C-10) arrived with orders to ne

peaceful settlement, and to protect Americans and their property. 

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there is scant proof, it seems that Dillingham also was told to su

incumbent regime as much as possible.

Upon his arrival at Puerto Plata on 2 January, Dillingham discove

British vessel was already present. Small detachments from both s

ashore to prevent any fighting in the city. After an engagement just o

city ended in defeat for the rebels, they quickly retreated from Puert

On 11 February, the American Clyde Line steamer New York, was 

cargo at Santo Domingo when the insurgents fired upon her. Two 

naval vessels were present. While one of them opened fire on the r

tachments from both ships gave chase. They secured a written pledge 

rebels that they would not further molest the New York, after which th

cans returned to their ships.

It was largely through the presence of the American naval vessels a

fers of diplomatic offices by the naval commanders that the conten

tions reached settlement. The peace conference terminating the r

held on board the Detroit in June.

Sources: Clark 73-74; Ellsworth 66-69; Knox 376; Offutt 99-100; Annual Report 190

Case No. 64, 1904–1905 — Korea

On 5 January 1904, a force of 102 Marines landed in Korea and pro

Seoul, where they established a guard for the American legation d

Russo-Japanese War. The force returned aboard ship 11 November 1

two months after the peace treaty had been signed.

Source: Ellsworth 60.

Case No. 65, 1904 — Morocco

In 1904 the United States intervened upon learning that a bandit, R

kidnapped Ion Perdicaris, an alleged American citizen and his s

British subject, from their villa three miles from Tangier on the even

May. Christians residing in the area feared that this event presaged 

hostilities against them.

When the American naval squadron, under Rear Admiral F

Chadwick, arrived in Tangier, the Admiral and the American cons

met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Morocco. Since the sit

mained tense, three or four Marines landed on 30 May to protect the c

On 22 June, Secretary of State Hay, at the direction of President R

sent a telegram to the consul advising that the US Governmen

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Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.

Subsequently it was discovered that 

knew that Perdicaris was not an American citizen.

Raisuli released the hostages upon payment of a ransom. The Mar

drew to their ship on 26 June 1904.

Sources: Bemis 576; Ellsworth 8; [1904] Foreign Rel. U. S. 503 (1905).

Case No. 66, 1904 — Panama

In 1904 an insurrectionary movement in Panama posed a threat to A

and their property. On 17 November, the force of Marines that w

Ancon, Panama, occupied several houses, thereby inserting thems

strategic position should there be serious rioting. Their protectio

become necessary because the revolt collapsed, and the Marines 

without incident on 24 November.

Source: Offutt 101-02.

Case No. 67, 1905 — Dominican Republic

In 1905, while the patrol yacht USS Scorpion (PY-3) was anchored in 

off Santo Domingo, her commander, Lieutenant Commander Hilary 

went ashore alone and unarmed, to quiet the unruly crowd w

threatened the life of the Dominican President and the American 

The crowd acted in response to a false rumor that an armed force of 

seamen was about to seize the city.

Source: Knox 376-77.

Case No. 68, 1906–1909 — Cuba

Immediately following Thomas Estrade Palma’s election as Preside

Republic of Cuba in August 1906, his political opponents revolted a

government. In this moment of turmoil Palma requested that the Uni

send warships to Havana and Cienfuegos in order to protect the 

property of foreign residents.16 President Roosevelt sent Secretary of 

to Cuba. By 29 September, he had established a provisional governm

the authority of the American President.

On 13 September, the American chargé d’affaires at Havana order

ican forces to land at Havana and Cienfuegos as rioting seemed imm

he feared that American interests and property might be endangered

seamen and Marines who landed at Havana withdrew the next day at 

of President Roosevelt. The situation at Cienfuegos being more se

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force landed and there remained, being reinforced on 24 Septemb

mission was to guard American sugar plantations. These men returne

ships when a larger force arrived on 30 September.

The Marines remained active throughout the early stage of the c

Marine forces serving in Cuba in 1906 numbered 2,892 men. On 1 N

1906, all the Marines, save for one regiment, withdrew and army 

sumed their functions.

The US Army then played the main role in this intervention in 

force of 5,394 men, designated as the Army of Cuba Pacification, w

Cuba in October 1906. These men patrolled the island and worked w

cal authorities. The presence of this force effectively restored the p

force remained until 23 January 1909.

Sources: Background 54; Ellsworth 62; 2 Hackworth 327; Knox 377; Offutt 102-0

401-02.

Case No. 69, 1907 — Honduras

American naval vessels were sent to the eastern coast of Central Am

the protection of American interests when Honduras and Nicaragu

war in 1907. The USS Marietta (PG-15) arrived at Trujillo, Hondu

March, and discovered that the town, occupied by Nicaraguan tr

likely to be attacked by the Hondurans at any moment. A force of 10 

the gunboat Marietta went ashore to protect American interests, incl

consulate. The commanding officer of the Marietta instructed the 

command of the guard “to extend protection to the citizens of oth

powers if asked to do so by their consular representatives.” The N

general, Estrada, was advised of the detail’s assignment and assu

neutrality.

Another force from the Marietta landed at Ceiba on the same d

March, a somewhat larger detachment landed at Puerto Cortés and p

to San Pedro on 5 April, where the men served as a guard for Ameri

ests. On 10 April, reinforcements from the USS Paducah (No. 18), we

Trujillo and Ceiba and a small party landed at Puerto Cortés. Fina

April, a body of Marines went to Laguna.

All of these forces withdrew by 21 May, except for the Marines a

who remained until 23 May. On that date they removed to Cholma, w

were stationed for the protection of foreign property until 8 June 19

Sources: Ellsworth 95-96; 2 Hackworth 328; Offutt 103-04.

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Case No. 70, 1910 

Nicaragua

The armed revolt led by General Juan J. Estrada against José Madriz, 

of Nicaragua, which began about the time of Madriz’s inaugurati

December 1909, alarmed the American residents of Bluefields, and 

the basis for American intervention in Nicaragua.

The Estrada forces controlled Bluefields, where numerous fore

sided. The gunboats USS Paducah (No. 18) and USS Dubuque (No. 1

anchor off Bluefields during this period of unrest. When the Nicarag

boat Maximo Jeraz arrived at the city on 16 May 1910, the comman

Paducah, W. W. Gilmer, issued a proclamation advising both faction

fighting would be tolerated within Bluefield’s city limits. (His object

safeguard the lives and property of foreign residents and other noncom

In pursuit of calm, he further advised both factions that no more than 

men would be allowed in Bluefields; the number sufficient to police an

order. Finally, he warned that the United States would not allow bom

of the city, since such destruction would not serve any military end.

On 18 May, Gilmer landed a force of 100 men to enforce his decr

structed them to use “every effort to maintain peace and order, re

force only in the case of absolute necessity.” This landing party bein

ered inadequate, Gilmer sent the Dubuque to Colon, Panama, on 2

embark another 206 Marines. The vessel returned to Bluefields on 30 

Gilmer landed the newly arrived Marines the following day. All of 

reembarked on 5 June 1910.

There was one more landing during the 1910 crisis. On 9 August 19

of 29 men landed at Bluefields and remained on shore until 4 Septem

Although Gilmer was instructed to maintain US neutrality and is c

to have followed orders, the Madriz faction protested bitterly to th

States about the American involvement. In Madriz’s opinion Gilme

at Bluefields clearly helped the Estrada forces to maintain control ove

Sources: Clark 75-77; Ellsworth 124-25; 2 Hackworth 328; Offutt 104-07.

Case No. 71, 1911 — Honduras

The United States, Great Britain and Germany made landings in 

following its revolutionary disturbances that began on 22 July 1

uprising was so severe that on 3 November, the President of Hondur

Dávila, requested American assistance for the protection of fore

Amapala. In accord with this request, the unarmored protected cr

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Tacoma (CL

20) and the gunboat USS Marietta (PG15) were disp

Honduras.

On 26 January 1911, the Tacoma arrived at Puerto Cortés and land

of 60 men. By this time, the threat to foreigners had been manifest

death of one American noncombatant during the capture of Ceiba 

before. The commander of the Tacoma, learning that the insurg

marching toward Puerto Cortés, and anxious to prevent any fighting w

city, issued an order prohibiting hostilities within the city limits. H

both factions that he would forcibly enforce the prohibition. To 

mander of the Government troops which occupied Puerto Cortés, h

that if a superior revolutionary force should appear, the commande

pected to surrender the town or wage battle outside. On 28 Jan

Marietta and the British second-class protected cruiser, HMS Brillian

to enforce these policies.

The United States was successful in preventing much loss of life 

erty through the establishment of neutral zones, and the peaceful t

towns between factions. On 31 January, the Government forces e

Puerto Cortés, leaving it under the control of the combined (British a

ican) forces, who then allowed General Christmas, leader of the revo

forces, to occupy the town on 1 February. A joint force of 72 Ame

British seamen went by train to San Pedro, where they executed a sim

fer of San Pedro to the insurgents. Once guards were aboard on all tra

disturbed area, peace was soon restored. It is not clear exactly how lon

can forces remained ashore, but it appears that most of them withdrew 

ary 1911, the day that the Marietta sailed from Puerto Cortés.

On 28 January 1911, President Dávila requested American interv

order to terminate the war. The United States, offering mediation, s

cial commissioner, Thomas C. Dawson, to arrange the terms of a pea

tlement. Conferences were held on board the Tacoma, the final a

being reached on 4 March.

Sources: Annual Report 1911, at 99; Clark 77-78; Offutt 107-09.

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Author’s Note

Incidents Related to the Chinese Revolution of 1911

and the Establishment of the Chinese Republic:

Case Nos. 72-84; 87-88; 90-91; 96-97; 100; 106;

108-111; 113-116; 118-120; 122; 124-126;

128-130; 132; 134-136; 138-145

The Chinese revolution of 1911 against the Manchu Dynasty resu

widespread mistrust among the Chinese people of the Central Go

and a fear that China was about to be divided among foreign pow

specifically, the people were concerned about the Government’s str

with regard to the construction and control of the main railroad lin

provinces, the conclusion of foreign loans, and the refusal of Go

officials to convene an extra session of the National Assembly to d

budget and loans. In short, the Government appeared insensitive t

demands.

Open revolt broke out in September 1911, and by year’s end the re

ary military leaders had established a new government in southern C

the Yangzte provinces. The revolutionary government convened a 

tional assembly whose members unanimously elected Dr. Sun Yat-s

sional President of the Republic of China on 29 December 1911. At 

the year Yüan Shinkai, commander of the Manchu forces, agreed to 

stice and entered into negotiations with the republican leaders. The 

abdicated on 12 February 1912. Subsequently, Sun Yat-sen resigned 

dency and Yüan was elected in his place. The Nanking Parliamen

gated a provisional constitution in March 1912, and in April the go

was transferred to Peking.

Revolutionary disturbances threatening foreign nationals and thei

began in 1911 and continued throughout most of the decade. Outbre

lence intensified in 1920, and reached a climax in 1927.

Sources: Dep’t of State 7-8; [1912] Foreign Rel. U. S. 46-48 (1919).

Case No. 72, 1911 — China (Wuchang)

On 11 October 1911, the day before the revolutionaries seized W

landing party of 11 armed men, accompanied by the American consu

attempted to go ashore to evacuate some American missionaries. 

soldiers on the shore, however, initially prevented them from landin

they did land on 11 October, a Chinese rebel officer informed t

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neither ingress nor egress would be permitted, but that all foreigners 

protected. The force then returned aboard ship.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No. 73, 1911–1912 — China (Peking)

The disorder of the Chinese revolution of 1911 caused the US to rein

guard at its legation in Peking with several companies of Marine

October 1911 until 5 July 1912. On 15 October 1911, the force num

men, 10 days later the total was 220. The American Minister 

requested a further increase, and on 2 December 1911 another 100 

landed, bringing the total to 320.

Early in 1912 the US became concerned that Peking’s railway link 

sea might be severed. Therefore, the commanding general of the Phil

vision was ordered to dispatch more than 500 men from the Philip

make them available according to the wishes of the American Minis

king. Many of these troops had arrived at Wuhu and Nanking by 2

On 3 March, the American Minister requested that they be sent t

shortly thereafter they arrived. By 6 March, the American Minister 

graphed for additional troops.

On 8 March, a company of Marines was dispatched from Taku to 

relieve the army troops in that city.17 About 11 March, after the dis

in Taku had quieted, the remaining company of Marines stationed in 

were ordered to Peking to relieve another detachment of troops.18 T

brought the total number of Marines in Peking to about 500.

Around 27 April, the American force in Peking was reduced by 

companies, but this condition did not last long. By 22 May 1912, the 

Minister at Peking had requested that the former force of 500 men b

lished, since general uneasiness prevailed in the city. The next day tw

nies of expeditionary troops were dispatched from Manila to Peking

Sources: Clark 84-86; Offutt 89.

Case No. 74, 1911 — China (Hankow)

On 13 October 1911, the US chargé d’affaires at Peking reported 

native population of Hankow had been engulfed by the revolution, 

serious outbreak until that time. On the same day a force of 10 m

ashore at Hankow to guard the works of the Standard Oil Comp

among this number stood guard at the US consulate.

Sources: Clark 83; [1912] Foreign Rel. U. S. 49 (1919).

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Case No. 75, 1911 

China (Foochow)

A landing party went ashore at Foochow on 7 November 1911, to p

US consulate and the property of American citizens.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No. 76, 1911 — China (Nanking)

On 7 November 1911, a force of 11 unarmed men went ashore at Na

proceeded to the US consulate; another 30 men remained at the w

The entire force withdrew shortly after landing.

On 16 November 1911, an unarmed guard was stationed at the 

consulate in Nanking. The guard, whose presence was necessitated 

tled conditions, remained until the American citizens had been e

from the city.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No. 77, 1911 — China (Woosung)

Guards were sent to Woosung to protect the American Cable Compa

hut around 7 November 1911.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No. 78, 1911 — China (Chinkiang)

Two American landings occurred at Chinkiang on 9 November 1911

USS Decatur(DD-5) landed one section of infantry, and, second, the 

Orleans, a protected cruiser, landed a force for the protection o

consulate and American citizens and their property.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No. 79, 1911 — China (Wuhu)

Both the gunboat USS Helena and the supply ship USS Supply were 

about 17 November 1911. The Supply landed a force as a prec

measure because, even though there was no disorder, it was reported 

were many robbers in the area. Protection was extended to all foreig

force withdrew on 22 November 1911.

Source: Clark 84.

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Case No. 80, 1911

1912 China (Taku)

At the request of the American Minister, at Peking, the fourth USS 

(CA-2) left Shanghai on 29 November 1911 for Taku, where one co

Marines landed for the protection of the Methodist Mission.

On 4 March 1912, the American Minister telegraphed the Comm

the Asiatic Fleet:

The situation in north China is very grave, practically no government. M

troops have been rioting in Peking, Tientsin and elsewhere. Local aut

[in] Tientsin19 have requested foreign powers to police [the] city. Can y

a vessel to Taku?

Two days later the Asiatic Commander reported to the Secret

Navy that two companies of Marines on board the second USS 

(C-7) and U.S.S. Abarenda (AC-13) had been dispatched to Taku. 

pany on board the collier Abarenda remained in Taku until 8 March, w

were sent to Peking. By 11 March, the Taku disturbances had quiet

the remaining company of Marines for dispatch to Peking.20

Source: Clark 84-85.

Case No. 81, 1911 — China (Yochow)

One officer and 12 armed men landed in the vicinity of Yochow on 4 D

1911, to escort a group of missionaries to that city.

Source: Clark 84.

Case No. 82, 1912 — China (Kiukiang)

A landing force from the USS Elcano (PG-38) went ashore at Kiuk

March 1912, to protect concessions.

Source: Clark 85.

Case No. 83, 1912 — China (Swatow)

The second USS Monterey (BM-6), a monitor, landed a force at Swa

March 1912, to save a woman and some children who were enda

fighting between government and revolutionary forces. The governm

allowed the Americans to extract them safely.

On 3 April 1912, another force of nine men landed at Swatow to 

“Butterfield & Swire’s residence,” and the German consulate.

Source: Clark 86.

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Case No. 84, 1912 

China (Nanking)

The USS Pompey (AF-5), a torpedo boat tender, landed a force o

Nanking on 12 April 1912, to protect American interests. T

withdrawn after a short time, even in advance of the order 

Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do so. Their speedy w

suggests that the perceived threat to American interests proba

materialized.

Source: Clark 86.

Case No. 85, 1912 — Cuba

In May 1912 there was a revolt of blacks in Cuba, organize

“Independientes de Color.” The uprising quickly became more seriou

Cuban Government wished to admit. When Cuban officials seemed 

control the situation, the United States asserted its right to interve

maintenance of order, pursuant to Article III of the 1903 Trea

American Government expressed concern for the safety of the 

property of the large number of US citizens residing in Cuba.

The disturbances centered in the far eastern part of the island ne

Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, to which the United States had s

2,000 additional men by the end of May. While many of them remain

base, there were several landings during the crisis. Cuban President Jo

Gómez requested that there be no landings, even for the protection 

can citizens, because he felt that such action by the United States w

to discredit his government at home and abroad. Nevertheless, four c

of Marines were sent into the province of Oriente on 5 June, despit

that there had not yet been any injury to Americans or their prope

with the fait accompli, Gómez left the American forces to protect fore

erty interests and then withdrew his own troops so that they coul

against the rebels. At the request of the British chargé d’affaires in 

ton, the US Department of State requested that “such American pro

might be available to American lives and property should likewise be 

to British subjects.”

There also were two landings at Nipe Bay, Cuba. On 10 June 1912

28 Marines landed there and then traveled by rail to the site of 

ish-American Iron Works at Woodfred, Cuba, to protect American 

Two days later, a similar detachment landed to relieve the first for

then reembarked. This second detachment remained until 14 July. O

detachment went ashore on 19 June 1912, at El Cuero, Cuba, 

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remained until 1 July. Apparently all the American forces on Cuban 

withdrew near the middle of July 1912.

The Cuban Government began to assert its reign in the area by t

June. The gradual withdrawal of the American reinforcements from t

States base at Guantánamo Bay was under way by the middle of July, 

them reembarking 5 August 1912.

Sources: Bailey 499-500; Clark 98-101; Ellsworth 62-63; 2 Hackworth 328-29; Offut

Case No. 86, 1912–1925 — Nicaragua

The revolt of 1912, one of the most serious in the history of Nicaragu

by the Minister of War, General Luis Mena, who had obtained con

most of the country’s military supplies before the uprising. Ther

rebellion, which actually began 29 July 1912, when Mena attempte

the capital city, Managua, was especially hard fought.

As the revolt progressed, widespread fear among foreigners for th

their lives and property grew. The British consul general asked the US 

to Nicaragua for US assistance in protecting his nationals. Requests f

tion also came from two American corporations, one of which alread

fered property losses at the hands of the insurgents. When these f

presented to the Nicaraguan Government, the Minister of Foreign A

plied to the US Minister that his government was fully occupied with 

lution and would be unable to afford protection to foreigners. He 

that the United States land forces to protect the lives and property 

zens, and, indeed, to extend protection to all the inhabitants of the 

On 3 August 1912, the first American force of 102 men landed a

and traveled to Managua to guard the American legation and prote

can interests. As the situation worsened, there were many more land

the time the last ship arrived on 14 September, 2,350 seamen and Ma

ashore in Nicaragua. In the words of the acting Secretary of State, H

Wilson, the United States intended “to take the necessary measures f

quate legation guard at Managua, to keep open communications, an

tect American life and property,” as well as “to contribute its influe

appropriate ways to the restoration of lawful and orderly governmen

that Nicaragua may resume its program of reforms unhampered by t

elements who would restore the methods of Zelaya.” Admiral Suth

ported that his forces had extended their protection not only to Amer

other foreigners, but also to “all reputable Nicaraguans.”

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Apparently, the American presence did help curtail what might ha

more lengthy struggle. Most of the fighting ended early in Novembe

American force had been largely withdrawn by the time that the new 

was elected on 14 November. Two battalions were withdrawn on 21 N

and the last battalion on 13 January 1913. However, on 9 January 19

tion guard of 105 men was detailed for duty at Managua. This guard 

tained at the legation until 3 August 1925.23

Sources: Clark 119-22; Ellsworth 125-27; 2 Hackworth 331; Offutt 111-17.

Case No. 87, 1912 — China (Kentucky Island)

During the four years that he ruled, Yüan was able to delay th

disintegration of China. He faced formidable opposition, however. O

occasions the United States found it necessary to land forces t

American lives and property.24 When Yüan died on 6 June 191

succeeded by Li Yüan-hung, who was deposed during World War I.

On 24 August 1912, Admiral Nicholson ordered one company o

from the submarine tender USS Rainbow (AS-7) to go ashore on Ke

land to protect American lives and property. They withdrew two da

Source: Ellsworth 40-41.

Case No. 88, 1912 — China (Camp Nicholson)

On 26 August 1912, Admiral Nicholson deemed it necessary to land 

Marines at Camp Nicholson for the protection of American lives and 

during a disturbance. The landing party remained ashore until 30 A

Source: Ellsworth 41.

Case No. 89, 1912 — Turkey

Rioting broke out in the Turkish capital in the autumn of 19

victorious Balkan troops began to push the Turks back to Const

These events endangered the lives and property of all Christi

Diplomatic Corps decided to land about 2,500 men and 26 guns 

foreign residents and their interests. Among troops who lande

November 1912, were detachments from British, French, German

and Italian warships. There was also a small detail from the USS 

(PY-3), which landed to guard the US legation. According to a comm

of the Navy Department to the Secretary of State, the men from th

reembarked on 3 December 1912.

Sources: [1912] Foreign Rel. U. S. 1352, 1353 (1919); Offutt 109 n. 112.

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Case No. 90, 1913 

 China (Shanghai)

Civil war in China continued. When the southern forces attacked th

at Shanghai on 28 July 1913, the naval forces of several countries, inc

United States, landed troops for the protection of foreign citizens 

property. Vice Admiral Nawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy was t

officer present. By 12 August, most of the members of the landing p

returned to their ships without ever having engaged either sou

northern forces.

Source: Clark 87.

Case No. 91, 1913 — China (Chapei)

Fighting between the Chinese and the Indians at Chapei endangered 

and property of foreign residents. After the Chinese drove out t

police, who were protecting the Indian settlement, the foreign cons

July 1913, warned both sides that they would have to cease firing into 

the settlements. On the next day, the consuls called forth a force of M

preserve order in the city. On the same day, the Chinese Minister o

Affairs expressed his appreciation to the Minister in Pehng, advising 

the American presence in Chapei had rendered protection to all the 

that locality. The American force withdrew 17 August 1913.

Source: Clark 86.

Case No. 92, 1913 — Mexico

In 1913 Mexico underwent another period of political unrest, accom

considerable fighting among various factions. The United States ha

American citizens to leave the country, but unfortunately not al

followed this advice. The situation became so severe by Septemb

rescue operation was deemed necessary to assist the stragglers who no

to depart.

On 5 September 1913, the USS Buffalo, an auxiliary cruiser, la

Marines and an American consular agent at Ciaris Estero. These 

ceeded to the Richardson Construction Company’s headquarters in 

Valley to escort to the coast those Americans and foreigners who 

leave. Twelve Americans and 83 others availed themselves of the op

The landing party and the refugees returned to the ship two days lat

Source: Ellsworth 115-16.

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Case No. 93, 1914 

 Haiti (January)

The United States landed forces in Haiti to protect Americans 

property during a period of political unrest that led to the abd

President Oreste on 27 January 1914, as General Zamor came to 

three separate landings on 27-29 January, a total of 120 seamen an

went ashore at Port-au-Prince to guard the U.S. consulate and prote

interests. At the same time the French and Germans landed 15 and 

respectively. The French force was reinforced on 6 February. Al

international forces reembarked on 9 February, the day after Gener

the successful revolutionary leader, was elected President of Haiti.

A landing party of Marines from the composite gunboat USS 

(PG-14) subsequently went ashore at Port-de-Paix, Haiti, on 16 Fe

protect American and foreign interests. They remained ashore for si

Théodore, one of the minor rebel leaders who had been defeated, e

Cap-Haïtien on 20 February, leaving no force to maintain order in 

At the request of the foreign consuls, who feared looting and widespr

der, the commander of the Wheeling landed an armed force of 65 m

protection of all foreigners and their property on the same day. On 21 

the landing party returned aboard ship, save for a small guard of Ma

remained several days longer at the American consulate. Théodore a

continued to fight, the former succeeding to the presidency in Octo

Sources: Clark 111-12; Ellsworth 88; Offutt 117-18; Rotberg ch. IV.

Case No. 94, 1914 — Haiti (October)

The Zamor government, which came to power in Haiti in February 19

itself faced with revolution in October. The revolution began in the 

part of the country and quickly spread to the other regions. On 19 

1914, the US Minister at Port-au-Prince reported that the comman

cruiser USS Tacoma (CL-20) had landed an armed force of 11

Cap-Haïtien for the protection of foreigners and their property. M

Zamor and his followers had been given refuge at the US consulate in 

Reinforcements were sent to the city on 24 October, but they were w

the same day. A portion of the original force at Cap-Haïtien, 24 men

aboard ship on 28 October, the others remaining ashore until 7 Nov

By 29 October, the US Minister reported heavy fighting and lootin

quested that naval vessels be sent for the protection of foreign inte

cordingly, the third USS Hancock (AP-3), with an armed force of 800 

was dispatched to the city, arriving there 30 October. The Departmen

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instructed the American Minister to land such Marines from this vess

necessary to protect life and property. He was informed that the U

(BB-21) had been dispatched to Port-au-Prince, and instructed that 

arrival of that vessel he should make similar dispositions for the pro

life and property in Gonaïves and Saint-Marc. Apparently, no land

necessary.

The French Minister at Port-au-Prince gave refuge to some of th

members of the fallen government. Fearing a mob attack, he requeste

American Minister make arrangements to assist in the defense of th

legation should it become necessary. Thus, the American Minister c

detail of signalmen from the transport Hancock and stationed the

French legation on 2 November. Order finally was restored by 6 No

Sources: Clark 112; Ellsworth 88-89; [1914] Foreign Rel. U.S. 354-57, 386 (1922); O

Case No. 95, 1915–1934 — Haiti

President Théodore was ousted by Vilburn Guillâume Sam in March 

latter holding office only four months before a new revolution occu

forces of the revolution proved too strong for Sam and he sought ref

French legation. This action did not deter his opponents, who forcib

the legation on 28 July, seized Sam and dragged him into the street w

decapitated him.

On 9 July 1915, prior to Sam’s death, the United States had sen

landing party from the cruiser USS Washington (CA-11) at Cap-H

quell a disturbance in that city. While the Washington was en 

Port-au-Prince on 27 July, the commander of the vessel received word 

American Minister of the serious state of affairs in the capital. The W

arrived at Port-au-Prince on 28 July, after Sam’s execution. Two ba

Marines, about 140 men, landed immediately to protect foreigners 

property. Admiral Caperton of the Washington found his force insuff

called for reinforcements. Another 100 Marines landed at Port-au-

29 July to preserve order and protect legations. On the next day a par

tians attacked the American forces and killed two men. Thereupon, 

500 Marines was dispatched to Haiti, landing at Port-au-Prince in 

gust. With the addition of two more forces landed on 15 and 31 Augu

tal number ashore amounted to nearly 2,000 Marines. The Americ

took no offensive action against the Haitians unless provoked. Howe

were numerous confrontations with the Cacos, or hill bandits, who tr

off supplies and communications.

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On 12 August 1914, Haiti elected Dartiguenave its new presiden

States forces remained in the country to assist in its stabilization. Th

proved effective and a large portion of the American occupation fo

withdrawn in May 1916. American casualties in Haiti, from the time 

landing in 1915 until October 1920, were 13 killed and 28 wounded. 

about 500 Marines remained in Haiti until 15 August 1934, when 

Franklin Roosevelt ordered their withdrawal.

Sources: Clark 112-13; Ellsworth 89-91; 2 Hackworth 329-30; Knox 380; Offutt 124

ch. IV

Case No. 96, 1916 — China (Nanking)

A landing party of seamen from the USS Quiros (PG-40), a schoon

composite gunboat, went ashore at Nanking on 29 March 1916 to q

on the premises of the International Export Company. The seamen re

their ship when the riot was under control.

Source: Clark 88.

Case No. 97, 1916 — China (Swatow)

A few Marines were stationed at the US consulate at Swatow during 

of 30 March 1916, to safeguard the chief of police, the Taoyin’s famil

assistant salt commissioner of Chacchowfu, all of whom had soug

there. A few Marines also were sent to the German consulate, t

meeting place of foreign residents in case of trouble. Although severa

were killed, the disorders were not as great as had been feared, there b

minor looting. The American force withdrew the following day.

Source: Clark 87-88.

Case No. 98, 1916 — Dominican Republic

In 1916 General Desiderio Arias, Dominican Secretary of War, la

rebellion against the government of President Juan Isidro Jimén

thrust the Dominican Republic into a state of anarchy. Since an 

objective of both factions was to gain control over Santo Domingo, m

fighting took place in the capital city. The U.S. legation, being in the 

of fire, was struck by shells several times. Thereupon, the American 

requested that a naval force be sent for the protection of American 

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A force consisting of two companies of Marines (about 280 men) 

Santo Domingo on 5 May 1916. By this time, the rebels had succeed

peaching Jiménez and were in control of the capital. There was w

fighting, however, as the President’s forces tried to regain the city. So

bers of the first landing parties guarded the US legation, while other

the Haitian legation — where many foreigners had taken refuge. O

the American minister reported that the President’s forces had been 

take the city, and that the situation had become so chaotic that the 

forces were preparing to occupy the capital and disarm the rebels. Th

States soon landed another seven companies of Marines and the city 

pied without serious difficulty on 15 May 1916, the rebels having with

the interior to establish a new headquarters at Santiago.

Having quieted the capital, the Americans made plans for the paci

the interior. Several landing parties of Marines were transferred fro

Plata and Santo Domingo to Monte Cristi. Another regiment of Ma

the United States landed at Monte Cristi on 21 June. Five days later, a

tion started toward Santiago. Fortunately, a peaceful settlement w

ated before the Marines reached the city, enabling the American forc

Santiago without opposition on 6 July. The peak strength of America

tion forces was three regiments, or approximately 3,000 men.

American occupation forces remained in the Dominican Republi

September 1924. During this time 140 Marines were killed or died 

ease, accident and other causes. Another 55 men were wounded in 

Sources: Clark 109-10; Ellsworth 69-71; 2 Hackworth 331; Knox 380.

Case No. 99, 1917–1922 — Cuba

In February 1917, there were disorders in Cuba arising from a disput

results of the presidential election of 1 November 1916. The 

maintained that their candidate had won, but the Conservatives, wh

power, contested the election and refused to surrender the office

began on 11 February 1917, resulting in widespread looting and dest

property, most American-owned. There was evidence of organized r

in Camagüey and Santa Clara provinces.

From 12 February onward there were numerous landings in Cuba 

can forces.25 Most of the fighting had subsided by 20 May, the date of 

guration. While the majority of the American forces had withdrawn b

on 4 June there were about 600 Marines and sailors in Cuba. The nu

high because three additional regiments had landed after 24 Ma

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August, the remaining forces withdrew with the exception of 22

Camagüey and 120 men at the US Naval Station at Guantánamo 

force at Camagüey withdrew on 15 February 1922.

Sources: Clark 101-07; Ellsworth 63-64; 2 Hackworth 330; Offutt 133-37.

Case No. 100, 1917 — China (Chungking)

A landing party from an American gunboat went ashore at Chung

December 1917, to guard the US consulate during a period of politic

The guard remained for two days and two nights. British and Japane

also landed at the same time to guard their respective consulates d

crisis.

Source: 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 101, 1918 — Soviet Union

The Russian revolution of 1917 eventually brought turmoil to all pa

Russian Empire. The effects of the overthrow of the Czarist Governm

Bolsheviks spread to the far eastern part of the country including Vla

where the almost constant fighting between the Czech and Bolshe

exposed the foreign residents of Vladivostok to considerable danger

On 29 June 1918, the Czechs occupied the city and assumed com

trol, arresting members of the Red Guard, Austrians and German

same day, the United States established a guard of 32 Marines at the 

consulate. Britain and China also landed forces. Conditions in th

mained unstable, and on 6 July representatives of Japan, Great Brita

France and the Czechoslovak Army issued a proclamation stating t

the authority of the Czechs still would be recognized, the Allied Forc

bled intended to take measures to defend the city against all dangers

ternal and external. The American consulate guard remained until 1

1918.

Sources: Ellsworth 141-42; 2 G. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920, at ch

Case No. 102, 1918–1920 — Soviet Union

In August 1918, the United States landed about 7,000 men at Vlad

assist in the city’s occupation. Their mission was to enforce the procla

6 July 1918,27 and maintain order in Vladivostok. This force rema

January 1920.

Source: Background 55.

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Case No. 103, 1919 

 Soviet Union

A landing party of 32 Marines from the USS New Orleans, a protecte

went ashore at Tyntuke Bay, near Vladivostok, on 30 July 1919, 

American interests during new disturbances. This force returned abo

August 1919.

Source: Ellsworth 142.

Case No. 104, 1919 — Honduras

During August and September 1919, there was much political 

Honduras and revolution loomed. On 8 September, a landing force 

USS Cleveland (C-19) went ashore at Puerto Cortés to protect the 

property of Americans and other foreign residents. They cooperated 

forces of Honduras in maintaining order in a neutral zone, designat

Military Commander of Puerto Cortés, which the armed forces of bot

were forbidden to enter. The revolutionary forces captured the towns 

Cortés, La Curva and La Laguna on 11 September. There was n

fighting or disorder and the Americans began to return to their 

remainder of the force withdrew on 12 September 1919. Both factio

to a truce, and free elections were held in October. General Lopez 

the revolutionary leader, was elected President with more than 75 p

the votes.

Sources: Clark 114; [1919] 2 Foreign Rel. U. S. 377-95 (1934).

Case No. 105, 1920–1922 — Soviet Union

The United States landed a force of 18 Marines on 16 February 1920

the American radio station on Russian Island in the Bay of Vladi

guard similar to this one was maintained until 19 November 1922.

Source: Ellsworth 143.

Case No. 106, 1920 — China (Kiukiang)

On 14 March 1920, the commanding officers of the gunboats U

(PG-38) and Samar (PG-41), having consulted with the British cons

a force to quell a local riot at Kiukiang and protect lives. The force 

ashore about two hours.

Sources: Clark 88; 2 Hackworth 332.

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Case No. 107, 1920 

 Guatemala

Civil war between the Government and Unionist forces caused th

States to intervene in Guatemala in 1920. Fearing a bombar

Guatemala City and concerned about the threat both to the foreign 

and US property, the US Minister, on 9 April 1920, requested 

commander of the gunboat USS Tacoma (PG-32) (ex-CL-20) send a 

the legation. On the same day the Tacoma landed a force of 

supplemented by an additional force of 50 men from the sixth US

(SP-136), an armed patrol yacht. The forces arrived at Guatemala C

April. Both warring factions approved of the American presence. On 

the Tacoma landed another force of 13 men at the request of the 

consular agent to guard the cable station. This guard reembarked the 

On 20 and 21 April, the United States withdrew 29 sailors, t

remaining ashore until 27 April 1920. Two naval vessels were sta

Guatemalan waters for several days thereafter.

Sources: Clark 111; 2 Hackworth 331.

Case No. 108, 1920 — China (Lakeside)

The USS Quiros (PG-40) landed a force to guard the property of the 

Mission at Lakeside, apparently church-owned property, on 25 June 1

American missionary was killed and property valued at about $

looted and destroyed. The force returned aboard ship two days later

Source: Clark 89.

Case No. 109, 1920 — China (Wuchow)

The Kwantung forces attack of Wuchow in June 1920 endangered t

foreign residents. To protect them a force of six men landed on 26 J

The men escorted the wife and child of Dr. Levell and three nurses, al

were associated with the Wuchow People’s Mission Hospital, to a 

safety. Most of, if not all, of these five people were American citizen

Source: Clark 89.

Case No. 110, 1920 — China (Yochow)

On 30 June 1920, the patrol commander of the first line destroyer US

(DD-144) reported his landing of a force to guard the American 

Compound at Yochow. The mission was church-owned property.

Source: Clark 89.

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Case No. 111, 1920 

 China (Tungchow)

At the request of the American Mission at Tungchow, a force of 1

landed on 20 August 1920 to guard the mission for a few days.

Sources: Clark 89; 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 112, 1922 — Nicaragua

In early 1922 political conditions in Nicaragua became unsettled, an

legation at Managua required an increase in the Marine guard t

anticipated disturbances. On 25 January 1922, a landing party of 3

went ashore. A second party of 53 men reinforced the first group on 2

An additional force of 47 Marines landed on 8 February and pro

Managua. Apparently the situation improved because all but 40 of th

returned aboard ship on 11 February.

A revolt actually broke out in May 1922. The legation guard play

portant role in preventing loss of life as the rebels had contemplate

tion of Managua. The United States offered its good offices, enablin

parties to reach a peaceful settlement without bloodshed.

Source: Ellsworth 128.

Case No. 113, 1922 — China (Peking)

A new phase of the civil war in northern China began on 28 April 1

fighting commenced near Machang between the Chang Tso-lin and Ch

The fighting ended in June with the restoration of Li Yüan-hung to the pre

At the commencement of the fighting, there were about 800 Americ

in and around Peking outside the legation quarter. Anticipating danger 

can citizens and their property, a force of 156 seamen and Marines from t

USS Albany (CL-23) landed at Chinwangtao on 27 April 1922. When th

in Peking the following day, they were added to the legation guard, b

strength to more than 500 men. The force remained until 25 May 192

Sources: Clark 89; Ellsworth 41; [1922] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 681, 694-96 (1938).

Case No. 114, 1922 — China (Shanghai)

On 5 May 1922, a battalion of Marines commanded by Captain Roy 

landed from the USS Huron (CA-9) at Taku and proceeded to Sh

protect American interests. They remained there until 11 May 1922

Source: Ellsworth 41.

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Case No. 115, 1922 

 China (Tientsin)

The American Minister at Peking received reports on 4 May 1922

Chihli forces had won victories at Kuan and Machang and were withi

of Tientsin. Fearing possible violence in the city, Admiral Strauss o

Huron landed about 150 Marines armed with machine guns at Tie

following day. The force withdrew on 15 May 1922.

Source: [1922] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 698-99, 705 (1938).

Case No. 116, 1922 — China (Tungchow)

Fearing possible violence from retreating Fengtien forces, the 

Minister at Peking sent a detachment of Marines to Tungchow on 5 M

Their mission was to protect American citizens and their property.

Sources: Clark 89; 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 117, 1922 — Smyrna (Izmir, Turkey)

During the war between Turkey and Greece in 1922, the United State

necessary to intervene for the protection of American lives and 

including the consulate, at Smyrna. As the Turkish forces advance

Greeks withdrew, much of the city was burned and the US cons

destroyed. A total of four naval vessels were dispatched to Smyrna 

landings. In three landings from three different vessels on 7, 8 and 9 S

1922, about 55 men went ashore. Both the Greek and Turkish a

consented to the landings. The men withdrew in three groups on 13, 

September. A fourth vessel landed a guard for the American consul

September. These men reembarked on 2 October, their ship departin

on 21 October 1922.

Sources: Background 56; Clark 129-30; 2 Hackworth 333.

Case No. 118, 1922 — China (Foochow)

The American consul at Foochow requested a landing force on 4 

1922, when a threat of military invasion by the southern forces arose. 

party of 48 men from the light minelayer USS Rizal (DM-14) went a

next morning. Later the same day, they were joined by about an equ

of British and Japanese troops. The force withdrew within a few day

On 11 October 1922, a force of 30 men and 2 officers from the R

landed at Foochow after the city was captured by the southern forces

Anderson held a conference with fleet officers and local 

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representatives and together they formulated a joint plan for the pro

American nationals in Foochow and Nantai. According to a rep

American consul, “[t]his plan provided for the stationing of a fo

Marines at the consulate, with the forces of the naval vessel in port at 

a reserve; and for the concentration of all Americans, in case of d

three concentration centers on Nantai Island, where they woul

military protection.”

Source: Clark 89-90.

Case No. 119, 1923 — China (Masü Island)

A party of four Marines from the first USS Asheville (PG-21) landed 

Island on 14 February 1923, to protect Americans who were thre

bandits. The force withdrew 19 February 1923.

Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 120, 1923 — China (Tungshan)

On 15 November 1923, a detachment of eight Marines went to Tu

suburb of Canton, to protect American missionaries during fighting 

Chinese forces. The guard withdrew after several days.

Source: 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 121, 1924 — Honduras

A contest for the presidency of Honduras in 1924 brought much 

unrest to that country. Fearing an outbreak of violence, the Unit

dispatched several vessels, one of which landed a small force at Ama

force traveled to Tegucigalpa, the capital, to protect the American l

There were numerous landings in February and March. Fearing th

surgents would attack the town of La Ceiba, the United States landed 

59 men on 28 February, to protect the American consulate. This forc

the compound of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company neutr

and gave refuge there to Americans and other foreigners. Both of the 

ing factions were notified of this action and advised that the United 

tended to remain neutral in the conflict.

On 29 February, a force of 35 men from the USS Denver (C-14) lan

Ceiba, remaining ashore until 3 March. A combined force of 41 men 

vessels was landed at Tela and established a neutral zone on 3 Mar

men returned to their ships on 7 March.

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At the request of the American consul at Puerto Cortés, who rep

the situation was critical, the Denver landed a force of 167 men 

Cortés on 4 March to establish a neutral zone. These men returned ab

6 March. On the day after this force departed, a force of 70 men land

mained two days.

Several more landing parties went ashore at La Ceiba. A party o

landed on 8 March. Another force of 86 Marines and seamen went as

Ceiba and proceeded to Mazapon to establish a neutral zone. A force 

from the Denver landed on 9 March. All three of these forces return

their ships on 13 March.

Fighting temporarily ended early in March, but events necessi

more landing. On 18 March, the American Minister at Tegucigalpa 

widespread looting, the loss estimated at $400,000. Among foreign 

the British and Chinese suffered the greatest property losses, but at 

American-owned stores were looted. The American legation and 

were fired at and the American Minister believed that the lives of a

cans in the city were in imminent danger. Having obtained the perm

the Commandante, an American force of 176 men landed at San L

18 March. Part of the force proceeded to Toncontín and establishe

station, while the remainder traveled to Tegucigalpa. That city fell to 

on 28 April, and shortly thereafter order was reestablished. The force 

aboard ship 30 April 1924.

Sources: Clark 115-17; Ellsworth 96-98; 2 Hackworth 331.

Case No. 122, 1924 — China (Shanghai)

Beginning 3 September 1924, there was intermittent fighting bet

Chekiang and Kiangsu forces in the vicinity of Shanghai, the near

taking place about nine miles from the city. This fighting was the begi

new civil war in northern China, one that resulted in the ove

President Tsao Kun and the establishment of a provisional governm

As a precautionary measure, several foreign nations with naval ves

harbor landed forces on 9 September. These forces included approxim

Americans, 360 Britons, 500 Frenchmen, 400 Japanese and 100 Ital

present was a force of about 1,000 men from the Shanghai Volunte

These troops took-up stations in the city so that they could protect 

in the event that fighting occurred. Many refugees also sought protect

city, there being from six to seven thousand new arrivals daily beg

August 1924. By 23 October 1924, the danger having passed, the 

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began returning to the rural districts. The American force withdrew 

day.29

Sources: Clark 90; [1924] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 361, 371, 383 (1939); 2 Hackworth 3

Case No. 123, 1924 — Honduras

Disorder returned to Honduras in September 1924. Threats of murde

and burning endangered American lives and property. On 10 Septe

second line cruiser USS Rochester (CA-2) landed a force of 111 m

Ceiba and then proceeded to Tela. The Governor, believing that the 

of American forces would ensure the preservation of order, requeste

Marines be left ashore, but they withdrew 15 September 1924.

Source: Clark 117.

Case No. 124, 1924 — China (Tungchow)

By 24 October 1924, the Kiangsu forces having captured Peking

successful coup d’état against the government of President Tsao K

unsettled political condition and a report that the Shensi troops at T

were acting lawlessly caused the US legation at Peking to send a fo

Marines that day to protect about 100 American citizens in Tungch

Sources: Clark 90; [1924] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 385 (1939).

Case No. 125, 1924 — China (Peking)

The unsettled state of affairs following the overthrow of President T

caused the American legation in Peking to request that the Comm

Charge of the Asiatic Fleet provide reinforcements for the legation 

landing party of 125 Marines arrived in Peking on 28 October 1924. 

detachment of 100 men arrived on 4 November 1924.

Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 126, 1924–1926 — China (Shanghai)

By 1925 it became apparent that the provisional government o

established in 1924, had not successfully unified the country, incl

northern region. The Chihli forces retained much power in the Yang

and Chang Tso-lin was the virtual ruler of Manchuria, having estab

headquarters at Tientsin in the autumn of 1924. On 2 January 

American Minister at Peking reported that the provisional gover

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Marshal Tuan, Provisional Chief Executive and Prime Minister 

could not endure much longer without Chang’s support. 

consideration was Inspector General of the Chinese Army, Feng Yu

seizure of Peking in October 1924. In short, the political situation in 

China remained quite unstable.

The various factions clashed regularly around Shanghai as early a

1925, and the lives and property of foreigners in the city were in gre

The American consul general at Shanghai reported that the United S

others landed sailors in the city on 15 January 1925. The American fo

position with the French as guards of interned Chinese soldiers at the 

serve School. (The force withdrew 24 January). On 19 January, the 

Legation to China met at a meeting in Peking:

Resolved, that with a view to maintaining the neutrality of Shanghai and 

protection of foreign life and property therein the consular body are aut

as an emergency measure and during the continuance of fighting a

presence of bodies of troops near Shanghai (but no longer) and without r

the matter to the diplomatic body, in their discretion to expel fr

International Settlement (or to refuse admissions thereto to) Chinese 

leaders (being any officer with the rank of general now or recently havin

command of troops) and political chiefs who serve the internal affairs 

militarists who may, in the opinion of the consular body, use the Settlem

fitting out military expeditions or otherwise as a base of military operation

political agitation.

The United States landed several forces at Shanghai to protect A

and other foreigners residing in the city’s International Settlement

party to land was a Marine detachment of 28 men from the gunboat U

mento (PG-19) which went ashore 15 January, and remained there un

uary. The Second Expeditionary Force, which was organized in the Ph

landed at Shanghai on the day that the first force departed, remaini

February. A period of relative calm ensued until 2 June, when a landin

127 men went ashore at Shanghai to protect foreign residents. They 

aboard ship 29 August. A Marine detachment of reinforcements from 

ond line cruiser USS Huron (CA-9) landed on 1 July, and remained a

til 29 July. For the next five months there were no incidents. Th

December 1925, new outbreaks necessitated the landing of still an

tachment of 69 men at Shanghai. They withdrew 12 March 1926.

Sources: Background 56; Ellsworth 42-43; [1925] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 588-89, 595-96 

2 Hackworth 332-33.

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Case No. 127, 1925 

 Honduras

An uprising in Honduras in April 1925 again resulted in 

intervention. American lives and property at La Ceiba were endange

threat of Red Ochoa, some insurgent forces, to attack the city. The U

(C-14), with the permission of the Governor and the Commandan

165 men on 20 April. The American forces quickly declared the city 

zone: as hoped, all subsequent fighting took place outside the city. Af

been ashore about 30 hours, the force reembarked the following day

Source: Clark 117.

Case No. 128, 1925 — China (Nanking)

The revolutionary unrest in China was accompanied by labor dis

strikes. On the morning of 7 June 1925, a large crowd, apparently com

the International Export Company’s striking workmen, gathered o

company’s facility at Nanking and attempted to “rush” for the wate

which the company’s river water intake was located. At the requ

company’s manager and the British and American consuls, the US

Ford (DD-228) landed a small party at the plant. The striker

abandoned the rush.

Source: Clark 91.

Case No. 129, 1925–1926 — China (Hankow)

In 1926, Cantonese forces invaded the Yangtze Valley and disru

region’s organized government. Demonstrations and rioting, often 

against foreigners, were widespread. The situation of all foreigners r

the area became perilous, especially since local authorities often were 

to provide adequate protection. Therefore, the United States aga

forces on several occasions to preserve American lives and proper

before the above invasion the United States landed a force of 2

Hankow on 16 June 1925 as a part of the International Defense For

men were stationed in the former Russian Concession of the city.)

The city of Hankow fell into a state of disorder when the Canto

poised to move upon it in early September 1926. At the request of Ch

thorities, several landing parties from American naval vessels landed 

order on 3 September. British, French, and Japanese forces also lande

the American forces withdrew on 16 September; a small guard rem

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some time thereafter. As a precautionary measure, British, Japa

American naval units landed at Hankow on 5 November 1926, and 

three days.

Sources: Background 56; Clark 91; Offutt 141-42.

Case No. 130, 1925 — China (Kiukiang)

The second USS Stewart(DD-224) landed a force of 20 armed men at 

on 17 June 1925, to protect American citizens during a period of revo

fighting in that city.

Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 131, 1925 — Panama

Rent increases in Panama City led to rent strikes and haras

landlords. Tenants combined in order to hinder the collection 

increased rents. The disorder spread as various groups of workers 

secondary strike. When rioting broke out the Panamanian Go

found it impossible to control the situation, much less afford prot

foreign residents. Many Americans appealed to the America

d’affaires in Panama and the Governor of the Canal Zone for p

against the threats of mob violence.

On 12 October 1925, at the request of the Panamanian Minister 

Affairs, 600 American troops entered the city of Panama. Within t

relative peace was restored and the force was reduced to one battali

was quartered in the jail and police station in order to keep them fr

view. The situation continued to improve and the remainder of t

withdrew 23 October 1925.

Source: Clark 128-29.

Case No. 132, 1925–1926 — China (Tientsin)

During the period of revolutionary unrest in 1925 and 1926, Ameri

landed at Tientsin to protect Americans and their interests. At the 

the American legation, a force of 100 men was sent to Tientsin on 2

1925. An additional force of 127 men landed in the city on 9 Novem

remained until 9 June 1926.

Sources: Clark 91; Ellsworth 42-43.

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Case No. 133, 1926 

 Nicaragua

Shortly after the American legation guard withdrew from Mana

August 1925, a new period of political unrest began in Nicaragua.31 

government troops favoring the Conservative Party arrested vario

leaders, including the Minister of Finance. Their avowed purpo

liberate the President from the alleged domination of the Liberal elem

leader of the revolutionary forces, General Chamorro, steadily incr

pressure on the Nicaraguan Government. The disturbances inc

number and intensity, except for an 11-day period in Septem

American naval vessels were present in Nicaraguan waters. Throu

questionable political maneuvering, General Chamorro succeeded 

executive power on 14 January 1926. The United States refused to 

his government.

In May 1926, fighting erupted on the east coast of Nicaragua as th

violence increased in their opposition to Chamorro. The American 

Bluefields reported that the lives and property of all foreigners we

gered and requested the dispatch of an American naval vessel. On 

force of 213 men went ashore at Bluefields. Beginning on 28 May, 

gradually was withdrawn, the final group reembarking on 6 June. Int

landings of US forces for the protection of foreign lives and property t

throughout the remainder of 1926.

Sources: Clark 122-24; Ellsworth 128-31.

Case No. 134, 1926 — China (Kiukiang)

When Kiukiang fell to the Cantonese forces on 4 November 

inhabitants of the city resisted little. However, as a precautionary 

British, Japanese and American naval units landed forces for the pro

foreigners. Subsequently, British sources reported further fighting d

Northern forces’ counterattack at Kiukiang. By 6 November 

Cantonese completely occupied the city and all was quiet. Consequ

American forces returned aboard their ships.

Sources: Clark 91; [1926] 1 Foreign Rel. U. S. 650 (1941); 2 Hackworth 333; Offutt 

Case No. 135, 1926 — China (Chingwangtao)

In the latter part of 1926 the fighting among the various Chinese revo

factions intensified to such an extent that the Commander of the As

found it necessary to land a force at Chingwangtao, the center of tro

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force of 127 Marines from the USS Gold Star (AG

12) landed on 7 N

1926, and remained five days.

Source: Ellsworth 43.

Case No. 136, 1926 — China (Ichang)

On 17 December 1926, a small force from the American gunboat U

(PG38) landed at Ichang to protect US citizens and their property 

battle between the Cantonese and Northern forces. The men return

ship when the conflict ended.

Source: Offutt 142.

Case No. 137, 1926-1933 — Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan Congress named Adolfo Díaz President of Nicarag

November 1926. Six days later, the United States recognized his gov

There were signs of rebellion from the beginning of his administra

called on the United States to provide protection for Americans 

foreigners in Nicaragua from the activities of the revolutionists. 

officials believed that Díaz’s real motive was to employ US assistance 

of his government. The American chargé d’affaires informed Díaz 

United States was not obligated to protect his government by physica

But, in view of the many requests from American citizens for prote

United States did land a force of Marines and sailors on 23 Decemb

Bluefields and Rio Grande Bar. The next day, additional forces went 

Puerto Cabezas, a stronghold of the Liberal revolutionaries. The Uni

established neutral zones in all these cities and required all Ni

therein to disarm. The American force even censored radio transm

these zones until the Liberals registered a complaint with the U. S. De

of State. By 10 January 1927, the American force had established th

neutral zones at Pearl Lagoon, Prinzapulka and Rama. By month’

American forces ashore and in the territorial waters of Nicaragua n

about 5,000 men.

Having been obstructed from fighting in the eastern region of the c

the establishment of neutral zones, the Liberals turned their attentio

Managua. When it began to appear that the Liberals would succeed 

the capital city off from the sea, a force of 600 seamen landed at Cori

February to guard the railroad link to Managua. The United States 

established more neutral zones at Corinto, Managua and Grenada.

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President Coolidge sent Secretary of State Stimson to Nicaragua 

sonal representative. Stimson arrived 17 April 1927, and promptly 

American officials, Nicaraguan Government officials, and various 

the Liberal party in search of a peaceful settlement. In May, when it 

that a settlement loomed, the US troops stationed themselves betwe

posing factions so that their arms might be received in case of an a

An additional force of 800 Marines was landed to arrest the terrorism 

rauding which was contributing to the general state of anarchy.

Consensus emerged, and on 15 May 1927, Stimson reported tha

war in Nicaragua was over. Yet, the entire American force did not 

immediately. American troops remained to supervise elections and 

establishment and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional de Nica

deed, the last of the American forces in Nicaragua did not depart un

ary 1933.

Sources: Clark 124-27; Ellsworth 129-33; Offutt 137-40.

Case No. 138, 1927 — China (Hankow)

Although the entire city of Hankow had fallen to the Cantonese fo

September 1926, there were subsequent disturbances that the C

could not control. On 3 January 1927, for instance, serious rioting 

along the edge of the British concession at Hankow. The British a

called on the local police, including several hundred Cantonese so

protection, but the police were unable to assert firm control over the 

even with the assistance of British ships on the river. That ev

American landing force of 50 Marines went ashore to protect 

citizens and their property until evacuation could be arranged.

The American consul general reported on 5 January that the si

Hankow was critical, with 20 or 30 American and British citizens ha

evacuated already and three more fully-loaded ships scheduled to sai

ning. The next day about 60 more American and British women and 

went aboard the Kutwo, an American naval vessel. American naval v

assisted in evacuating refugees from Kiukiang and Ichang via H

Shanghai. By 19 January 1927, approximately 583 people had been e

from Hankow, including 83 Americans.

Sources: Clark 91; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. U. S. 237, 239, 240, 248 (1942); Offutt 142

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Case No. 139, 1927 

 China (Shanghai)

Violence broke anew in the International Settlement of Shanghai in 

Expeditionary Battalion, consisting of three companies of Marines, 

Shanghai on 9 February 1927, to reinforce the forces guarding the Se

A dramatic increase came when 1,250 Marines arrived 24 February. 

a few small parties went ashore for brief periods prior to 16 March, 

force did not land until that date. With this addition, the total numb

in the foreign forces available for service at Shanghai numbered appr

13,000, of whom approximately 7,000 were British.

On 21 March, the US consul general at Shanghai reported that o

International Settlement in Chapei, turmoil existed. Laborers had 

Chinese police stations. He also reported demonstrations in the stre

Settlement. The Municipal Council declared a state of emergenc

quested that foreign naval forces join local volunteers and police in 

the Settlement. American, Japanese and Dutch naval forces landed 

day. Approximately 1,500 Marines landed for the protection of Ame

and property.

The disorder continued on 22 March. There were armed uprising

merous incidents of looting and burning in the Chinese territory adjo

Settlement. The forces of General Pi Shu-cheng, commander of the 

Troops in the Shanghai area, shot and killed a number of the agitat

foreigners, including Americans, were evacuated under police escort. 

sul general at Shanghai reported that he was attempting to evacua

cans in isolated areas without the use of military force. Nearly all for

the northern area were evacuated by 23 March.

On 25 March a landing party of 62 Marines went ashore at Shang

trol the Settlement. They returned aboard ship the following day. Th

once again on 31 March, and remained ashore until 3 April 1927.

Sources: Clark 91-92; Ellsworth 43; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. U. S. 89, 90 (1942); 2 

333.

Case No. 140, l927 — China (Nanking)

On 22 March 1927, when the entry of the Cantonese forces into t

Nanking appeared imminent, the United States landed a force of 11 

the USS Noa (DD-343) to protect the American consulate during an

disturbances. It seemed quite likely that the Northern forces would r

they be defeated or forced to withdraw. A signalman also was sent to 

Oil Hill, the residence of Earle Hobard of Standard Oil Comp

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measure insured communication between the consulate and the N

times.

Trouble had been anticipated at Nanking many weeks before the a

break of violence on 23 March. The foreign consuls at Nanking had b

uating their nationals out of the danger zone to other cities, 

Shanghai. By 23 March, around 100 American women and children 

but 68 men, 153 women and 88 children still remained. As Nationali

began to enter the city, 104 women and 69 children were sent a

American destroyers, Noa and USS Preston (DD-327). In addition to 

sels, the British light cruiser HMS Emerald and three Japanese destro

present.

Six seamen from the Preston also were stationed at the Hill reside

March. Looting and rioting broke out about 6 P.M. that night wh

10,000 defeated Northern soldiers, passing through the city to th

River, returned again to the city, having discovered it would be imp

cross the river. The following day, Dr. J. E. Williams, an American c

Vice President of Nanking University, was killed. On the same day

ese troops attacked the American, British and Japanese consuls, w

the latter two. The American consular staff and 24 refugee foreig

were under their protection escaped to the Hill residence before th

ate was looted.

During this entire time, Mr. Davis from the American consulate h

vain to contact a responsible Cantonese official to ensure the safety 

eigners. The US forces were hesitant to move because they had been i

to act only to protect life and not merely property. Therefore, when 

tonese approached the Hill residence, the Americans did not requ

tance from the Noa and the Emerald until attack was imminen

thereafter, the Cantonese attacked and the occupants requested land

from the ships.

When it appeared that the landing force would be unable to reac

residence in time to save the occupants from the Cantonese, the Em

and Preston shelled the area. The Noa and Preston then sent a landin

rescue the 52 Americans and foreign refugees in the house.32 Howeve

group missed the landing force and was picked up by the British destr

Wolsey (D-98). There were no fatalities.

Immediately afterward, a conference of British and American nav

was held on board the Emerald. They drew up a set of demands to th

ese requiring: (1) the protection of all foreigners still ashore and the

tion by 10 A.M. the next day; (2) orders to protect foreign property; a

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presence of the Cantonese general commander on board the Emerald 

P.M. that night to arrange for the protection of foreigners.

Negotiations took place that night and the next afternoon. The 

replies were insolent and evasive. Indirectly, word came that Gener

Kai-shek was coming to Nanking to take charge of the situation. 

Americans (45 women, 90 men and 20 children), 17 British and se

eign nationals were still left in the city. Most of the Americans ass

Nanking University. It finally was decided that if all foreign natio

not released by late in the afternoon of 25 March, the USS Isabel (PY

Noa, the Emerald and the Wolsey would begin firing on salient milit

in Nanking. The Chinese general became alarmed, and by 4:30 P.M

Marines and all but two British civilians were returned. The Amer

were released from the University and by 8 P.M. all were aboard th

During the incident, American ships had fired 34 rounds and th

had fired 76. Six Chinese civilians and some soldiers had been killed. 

business men and two missionaries remained in the city. A great part 

eign population of Nanking, including people of many nationalities, 

saved by the American action.

Sources: Clark 92-93; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. U. S. 146-70 (1942); 2 Hackworth 

142-49.

Case No. 141, 1927 — China (Hankow)

At the request of the manager of the Standard Oil Company, a landin

24 seamen went ashore at Hankow on 27 April 1927, to quell a “fra

Source: Clark 93.

Case No. 142, 1927 — China (Chinkiang)

On 22 May 1927, landing parties from the destroyers USS John 

(DD-228) and the HMS Wolverine (D-78) went ashore at Chinkiang 

fire which began when a shell hit a Socony fuel oil tank. Apparently 

had been fired by the Northern forces from the northern bank of 

during revolutionary disturbances in that city.

Source: Clark 94.

Case No. 143, 1927 — China (Tientsin)

By June 1927, the Southern forces had pushed the civil war to the 

part of China. It seemed certain that the area around Tientsin wou

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next target of their attack. The American Minister to China reporte

lives and property of all US citizens were in danger. He sugge

additional forces be sent to Tientsin to afford Americans complete p

and ensure that there would be no repetition of the serious incidents w

occurred recently in South China.33

On 2 June 1927, a force of Marines about the size of one regim

from Shanghai, arriving at Taku Bar two days later. On 6 June 1927

reached Tientsin, where they remained until the danger had passed

Sources: Ellsworth 44; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. U. S. 124-27 (1942).

Case No. 144, 1927 — China(Canton)

A two-day revolt supported by the Communists began in Cant

December 1927. The same day, a force of nine Marines landed and p

to the Hackett Medical College to evacuate U. S. citizens whose 

endangered by the rebellion. Evacuated persons were taken to anoth

the city where the rebels had not been active.

Source: Clark 94-95.

Case No. 145, 1932 — China (Shanghai)

Following the outbreak of war between Japan and China, the Americ

at Shanghai, fearing for the lives and property of Americans in 

requested that additional forces be landed to assure their protecti

February 1932, the U. S. transport USS Chaumont (AP-5) arrived at 

and landed a force of 1,178 men. They remained ashore until 1 July 

Source: Clark 97.

Notes

1. Omitted are the instances considered at length in Chapter IV, where the U

has taken similar action in the post-World War II period.

2. Some readers may regard this Appendix as too inclusive. Prior lists, for ins

contained as few as 69 cases compared to the 145 listed herein. See Wormuth, 

Theory of the War Power: A Critique,” 60 Calif. L. Rev. 623, 654 (1972). But 

Appendix A to Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 53, 88 111 (1

present compilation errs in this respect, the reader can separate the wheat from the 

easily.

3. See Case No. 5.

4. See Case No. 7.

5. See Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543 (1868).

6. The United States took the position that American forces could be sent to 

railroad stations of the Panama Railroad Co. in the event of revolution under th

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y yg

Granada (United States of Colombia):

And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment o

advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages and 

favours they have acquired by the 4th, 5th and 6th articles of this Treaty, the 

States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the p

stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before mentioned Isthmus, with the vie

the free transit from the one to the other sea, may not be interrupted or emba

in any future time while this Treaty exists.

6 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 

1776–1949, at 879-80 (1971).

7. The executive officer of the Iroquois was none other than Alfred T. Ma

Mahan, from Sail to Steam 242-47 (1907).

8. Brazil, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain.

9. See Case No. 28.

10. See Case No. 13.

11. See Case No. 55.

12. Of these forces, 8,000 were Japanese; 4,800 Russian; 3,000 British; 2,500 Am

French; 40 Italian and 25 Austrian.

13. Tientsin fell to the Allies on 14 July 1900.

14. See Case No. 54.

15. Article VII

The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the legation

be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their ex

control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which may b

defensible.

Article IX

The Chinese Government has conceded to the Powers, in the protocol annexed 

letter of the 16th of January 1901, the right to occupy certain points, to be dete

by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication b

the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the powers are:

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chum-liang Ch’eng, Tang-ku

Lu-tai, Tangshan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch’in-wang tao, Shan-hai Kuan.

1 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 

1776–1917, at 306-07 (1968).

16. The United States had the right to intervene under Article III of the 1903 

Cuba, which stated:

The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the r

intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenanc

government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liber

for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of P

the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of 

6 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 

1776-1949, at 1118 (1971).

17. See Case No. 80.

18. See id.

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follows: about 575 American, 1,200 British, 1,500 Japanese and 100 Germ

respectively, and about 200-225 Russian, Austrian, French and Italian troops comb

20. See Case No. 73.

21. See Case No. 68 for the text of Article III.

22. American landings in Nicaragua, 1912:

(1) 3 August — A force of 102 men landed at Corinto and traveled by rail to 

guard the American legation and protect American interests.

(2) 14 August — Reinforcements numbering 354 men disembarked at C

proceeded to Managua, arriving there 15 August. This force also was used 

legation.

(3) 28 August — A force of 351 seamen and Marines landed at Corinto for fie

(4) 29 August — A force of 120 men landed at Corinto for duty ashore. Th

aboard ship 24 and 25 October 1912.

(5) 30 August — A force of 25 men went ashore at San Juan del Sur to prote

station and American interests from 30 August to 6 September 1912, a

September to 27 September 1912.

(6) 4 September — A provisional regiment of 781 Marines disembarked at 

(7) 5 September — An additional force of 323 sailors and Marines landed at 

duty in the field.

(8) 19 September — Another 50 men landed at Corinto.

(9) 3 November — A force of 21 men landed at San Juan del Sur. Twelve o

were withdrawn on 5 November and the balance on 8 November.

23. See Case No. 112 for more information about the activity of the legati

Managua.

24. See also Case Nos. 82, 83, 84, 90 and 91.

25. Landings by American forces in Cuba, 1917:

(1) 12 February — A force of 32 men landed at Jobabo Anchorage to pro

plantation near Trinidad. They reembarked 13 February.

(2) 13 February — A landing party of 17 men from the USS Tucker(DD-57) 

at Manzanillo to protect the American consulate. They were relieved on the 

a similar force from the USS Dubuque(PG-17). The guard was withdrawn 15 

(3) 17 February — A force of 29 men from the USS Paducah (PG-18) disem

was quartered on the Cuban gunboat 24 de Febrero until 20 February.

(4) 20 February — The 29 men quartered on board the Cuban gunboat 2

landed and occupied a house at Casilda until 22 March.

(5) 25 February — A force of 218 men landed at Guantánamo Bay. 

transported by water to Caimanera, where they embarked by train for Guant

With the exception of one detachment of Marines, they reembarked 6 Mar

(6) 25 February — A force of more than 200 Marines from three different 

ashore at Guacanayabo Gulf at the dock of the Francisco Sugar Company of N

protect the lives and property of American citizens. Each of the three d

returned to their ship on a different date: 3, 4 and 7 March.

(7) 27 February — A force of 32 men landed at Nuevitas Bay and remain

February.

(8) 5 March — A force landed at Santiago.

(9) 7 March — A force landed at Rio Canto to protect the Rio Canto Sugar 

They returned aboard ship on 11 March.

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endangered by the revolutionaries’ bombardment of the city. About 120 o

returned to their ship on 17 March.

(11) 8 March — A force of 153 Marines and seamen went ashore at Santiag

to their ship 18 March.

(12) 8 March — A detail of 12 men landed at Santiago to guard the El Cob

(13) 9 March — A company of Marines went ashore at Santiago and rema

until 21 March.

(14) 9 March — A party of 122 men landed at Guantánamo Bay and 

Guantánamo City where they remained until 24 March.

(15) 9 March — Two companies of Marines landed at Santiago.

(16) 9 March — Additional men landed at Santiago to reinforce the party 

landed there on 5 March. This force was relieved on 10 March.

(17) 10 March — Eight men from the USS Montana (ACR-13), a first-cl

cruiser, landed and returned to ship daily at Caimanera until 23 March.

(18) 10 March — Another company of Marines landed at Santiago, remai

until 18 March.

(19) 10 March — Small detachments landed at Preston and Lacajo where th

until 12 March, when they were relieved by another landing party.

(20) 11 March — A force of 13 men landed at Guara and remained there unt

(21) 12 March — A force of 25 sailors and Marines was stationed at Ban

Jeronimo to protect American interests. Part of the force reembarked on 15 

remainder on 20 March.

(22) 12 March — A landing party from the USS Machias (PG-5) r

detachments which had landed at Preston and Lacajo on 10 March.

(23) 13 March — A detachment of 20 Marines from the U. S. Nava

Guantánamo Bay was sent to Boquerón to protect American property. Th

until 24 March.

(24) 15 March — A small detachment landed at Nipe Bay to protect lives a

at San Jeronimo. They returned to ship on 18 March.

(25) 17 March — A force landed at Batey to guard the mill of the Manti Suga

They reembarked 21 April, when they were relieved by a detachment of M

(26) 19 March — A detachment of 20 men landed at Santiago to protect t

mines. They returned aboard ship 22 March.

(27) 19 March — A force of 100 men landed at Guantánamo Bay and p

Guantánamo City, where they remained until 22 March.

(28) 20 March — A company of Marines went ashore at Daiquiri, where th

until 23 May.

(29) 20 March — A force of 41 men landed from the USS Machias for duty 

of the force re-embarked the same day, with the remainder reembarking on 

(30) 21 March — A landing party of 18 Marines and sailors went ashore an

until 23 March.

(31) 21 March — For several days small detachments were landed daily at 

protect the Aguadores railroad bridge and the El Cobre mines.

(32) 22 March — A force of two infantry companies and special detai

Santiago to relieve a detachment of Marines, re-embarking 23 March.

(33) 22 March — A company of Marines was sent to Guantánamo City. Th

aboard ship 23 May.

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ashore until 30 March.

(35) 22 March — A force of 46 men landed to relieve forces at Preston, Gua

Bay. They returned aboard ship 25 March.

(36) 24 March — Fifty seamen landed at Cienfuegos, reembarking the sam

(37) 24 March — A detachment of 18 Marines landed at Santiago to guard t

mines. They reembarked 28 March.

(38) 24 March — A small detachment landed at Santiago each night throug

to protect the Aguadores Bridge.

(39) 25 March — A detachment of 13 men landed at Guara, returning ab

April.

(40) 27 March — A detachment of 10 men landed at Pelton, remaining un

(41) 28 March — A small detachment landed daily at Cienfuegos for the p

the Aguadores Bridge. Another force of 21 men landed there to protect t

mines. These men were relieved 15 April by a company of Marines.

(42) 31 March — A company of Marines landed at Nipe Bay to reli

detachments. It reembarked 24 May.

(43) 15 April — A company of Marines landed to relieve a detachment at 

(44) 25 April — A small force landed at Preston, returning aboard ship 26 

(45) 27 August — The Marine 7th Regiment disembarked at Guantána

remained there until 28 August 1919.

26. From the beginning of World War I, the Czechs had fought in a special 

Russian army called the Druzhina. The Czech Corps was in the Ukraine when th

resumed their offensive against Russia in February 1918. The Czechs made arrang

Bolshevik leaders to evacuate the Corps via the Trans-Siberian Railway and V

Subsequently, the Bolsheviks changed their minds and decided to draft the Czec

Soviet army. The Czechs resisted and hostilities broke out on 26 May 1918.

27. See Case No. 101.

28. See Case No. 87.

29. See also Case Nos. 124 and 125.

30. See Case No. 124.

31. The U. S. Government announced its intention to withdraw the legation gu

months prior to the actual date of withdrawal. At the request of President Ma

apparently believed that the guard was necessary to preserve order, the United 

delayed the withdrawal. Martinez sought to reverse the American decision but m

success.

32. The occupants of the house included Mr. and Mrs. Hobart, several Americ

two officers from the Emerald, five British civilians, two Scandinavians, two Ru

Signalmen from the destroyers and the guard of six seamen from the Preston.

33. For example, the Nanking incident of March 1927. See Case No. 140.

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Appendix II

A History of United States Navy Regula

Governing the Use of Force to Protect 

Lives and Property of Nationals Abroa

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I. Regulations and Instructions Relating

to His Majesty’s Service at Sea (llth Ed. 1772). . . . . . . . . . . 

II. Rules for the Regulation of The Navy

of The United Colonies of North America (1775) . . . . . . . 

III. An Act for The Government of the

Navy of the United States (1799) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IV. United States Navy Regulations (1802). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

V. United States Navy Regulations (1814) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VI. United States Navy Regulations (1818) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VII. United States Navy Regulations (1821). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VIII. United States Navy Regulations (1841) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IX. United States Navy Regulations (1853). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

*The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Stephen T. B

Class of 1972, University of Virginia School of Law and Member of the Ohio Bar, an

Ashley Roach, USN, Office of the Legal Adviser, US Department of State, in the pr

this Appendix. Punctuation and capitalization has been standardized to modern us

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X. United States Navy Regulations (1858). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XI. United States Navy Regulations (1863). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XII. United States Navy Regulations (1865) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XIII. United States Navy Regulations (1869) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XIV. United States Navy Regulations (1870). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XV. United States Navy Regulations (1876) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XVI. United States Navy Regulations (1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XVII. United States Navy Regulations (1896) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XVIII. United States Navy Regulations (1900 and 1905) . . . . . . . 

XIX. United States Navy Regulations (1909) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XX. United States Navy Regulations (1913) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XXI. United States Navy Regulations (1920) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XXII. United States Navy Regulations (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XXIII. United States Navy Regulations (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XXIV. United States Navy Regulations (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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Introduction

The United States has long viewed military intervention in fore

tries to protect the lives and property of US nationals as a pro

naval power.1 US Navy Regulations dating back to 1775 have provi

commanders with the authority to undertake such action. Ad

throughout much of this period the accepted norms of international 

tenanced such activity under such headings as self-preservation or no

intervention.2

In recent years, however, the international political and legal co

changed drastically. With the emergence of the United Nations 

post-colonial proliferation of independent States, new norms and n

have been generated. For instance, under Article 2(4) of the UN C

use of force is proscribed, except when used in self-defense or when s

by the United Nations. Article 51, however, preserves the possibil

valid use of force in situations involving self-defense. At the same tim

gent nations have demonstrated an anti-colonial attitude bent on th

tion of many formerly accepted practices, such as intervention 

protection of foreign nationals and their property, which are now 

tools of imperialistic control.3

Despite this substantial shift in international norms, the regulation

ing the conduct of the US Navy in this area remained essentially u

until 1973. With the promulgation of the 1973 and 1990 Regulations 

it appears that the Navy Regulations have become more congruent w

alities of present-day international life, thus attenuating much of t

criticism regarding their compatibility with contemporary internatio

This Appendix constitutes a textual analysis of the regulations w

guided and continue to guide the US Navy in its use of force to protec

and property of US nationals abroad. The analysis proceeds with a 

those regulations in each edition of US Navy Regulations that relate t

tection of nationals and then following each by a brief commentary 

to the question of how each edition fits in with the overall developm

current Navy regulations.

The regulations analyzed in this study begin with the British Navy R

of 1749 and 1772 and continue with their offspring,5 the US Navy Regu

1775, 1799, 1802, 1814, 1818, 1821, 1841, 1853, 1858, 1863, 1865, 18

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1876, 1893, 1896, 1900, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1920, 1948, 1973 and 1990

of the various editions of British or US Navy Regulations until 1973 are 

able, for reasons partially explained in the paragraph that follows.

Although the Constitution grants Congress sole authority to issu

tions for the armed forces,6 Congress, except for the first three Regu

1775, 1799 and 1800, merely ratified the rules compiled by the Pres

the Secretary of the Navy.7 Even this limited supervisory rule was ab

1862, when Congress gave the Secretary of the Navy the authority to 

ulations subject to the approval of the President.8 As a practical m

delegation probably ensured that regulations were written and revi

behest of senior naval officers.9 In any event, records of the administr

cess in the formulation of US Navy Regulations prior to 1973 are un

Therefore, authorship and the intended results remain unclear for ea

lations. This leaves the actual language of the regulations and the in

tions subsequently given to them by naval commanders as the only 

interpretative standards.

As noted above, the regulations in force until 1973 did not diff

from those regulations in force during the nineteenth century. The 

1990 Regulations vary considerably from their predecessors by 

out-of-date passages from earlier regulations. It is the purpose of the 

analysis to examine the extent to which these new revisions have br

US Navy Regulations into line with contemporary international law

I. Regulations And Instructions Relating To His

Majesty’s Service At Sea (llth ed. 1772)

The Flag-Officer or Commander-in-Chief

Article VI. To direct the Naval Officers abroad, according to th

the Navy. When he is in Foreign Parts, where Naval or other Officers 

lished, he is to conform himself, as much as possible, to the standin

the Navy, in such Directions as he shall have Occasion to give them; 

to put them upon any extraordinary Expenses, unless the Service s

lutely require the same.

The Captain or Commander

Article XLII. Not to go into Port unnecessarily. He is not to go 

other Port than such as his Orders direct him, unless by inevitable N

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and then to make no unnecessary Stay there. If he is employed in a cru

tion, he is to keep the Sea the Time required by his Orders; but if h

pelled by any Accident to return sooner into Port, he is to send in W

Reasons thereof to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and also to 

mander-in-Chief, if any such be there, and to put to Sea again so so

Ship’s Wants are supplied.

Article XLV. To demand English Seamen out of foreign Ships. 

meets with any Foreign Ship or Vessel, he is to send a Commission 

inquire if any Seamen, who are His Majesty’s Subjects, be on Board h

demand all such, obliging their Masters to pay them their Wages to 

But this is to be done with civil and friendly Behavior on the Part of 

esty’s Officers, who are to be very careful not to offer any Violence or 

ment to the Subjects of His Majesty’s Friends or Allies.10

Commentary

The Eleventh Edition of Regulations and Instructions Relating to His 

Service at Sea, established by His Majesty in Council in 1772, is the 

cestor of all subsequent editions of US Navy Regulations. This text is 

ment of the Sixth Edition, published in 1749 to update Brit

Regulations from a code which originated during the reign of Henry 

three articles cited above are identical in both the Sixth and Eleventh 

Article VI is concerned with the relationship between a Flag-O

Commander-in-Chief and the agents of the British government alre

lished in foreign ports. The “unless” clause at the end of the article qu

instructions to conform to the “Rules of the Navy” and the rule agains

dinary expenditures placing the needs of the service paramount. The 

cer, as the senior officer present in foreign waters, is the person best-q

determine the needs of the service.

On the other hand, according to Article XLII, a Captain or Comm

ing independently may not even enter a foreign port without orders u

evitable necessity” forces him to do so. Again the Captain is the pe

determines whether inevitable necessity exists. The second sentenc

with a return from cruising station, refers to the home port of the sh

Article XLV was the cause of much hostility in the United State

was the legal justification used for impressment of American sailors d

Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. While this rule provided 

whereby British sailors could be liberated from foreign employmen

was used to conduct a forced draft.

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II. Rules For The Regulation Of The Navy Of The

United Colonies Of North America (1775)

Article 21. If any ships of the Thirteen United Colonies shall h

come into port in want of provisions, the warrant of a Commande

shall be sufficient to the agent or other instrument of the victualling 

the quantity wanted; and in urgent cases where delay may be hurtful

rant of the Captain of the ship shall be of equal effect.11

Commentary

As stated in the Introduction to this Appendix,12 for the most p

rules were copied from the British Regulations of 1749 and 1772. The

cerned with the prerogatives and responsibilities of command and m

fecting supply, discipline and conduct in action. Articles VI and X

British Regulations were not included. The only provision which mig

to govern conduct in foreign ports short of an actual engagement is A

which corresponds roughly to Article XLII of the British Regulatio

ence to purchases in foreign ports, however, is omitted. This omission 

sistent with the coastal character of the continental Navy.

III. An Act for the Government of the Navy of the United State

Article 18. Warrant for supply of provisions. If any ships of the Uni

shall happen to come into port in want of provisions, the warrant of 

mander of the squadron, or of a captain where there is no comma

squadron present, shall be sufficient to procure the supply of the 

wanted, from the agent, or navy agent at such port.13

Commentary

Article 18 is based on Article 21 of the 1775 Rules for the Regulat

Navy of the United Colonies of North America, amended to reflect 

pendence won two decades earlier. Perhaps in recognition of the infa

engagement in an undeclared war with France in the West Indies, a

ron commander’s warrant was now sufficient even in non-urgent ca

This provision was not included in the 1800 revision, which rep

1799 statute entirely.14 No reason for this omission is apparent.

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IV. United States Navy Regulations (1802)

Of the Duties of a Commander-in-Chief, or Commander of a S

Article 16. When he is in foreign parts where naval or other offic

tablished, he is to conform himself as much as possible to the standin

the navy, in such directions as he shall have occasion to give them, 

to put them under any extraordinary expenses, unless the service sho

lutely require the same.

Of the Duties of a Captain or Commander

Article 40. He is not to go into any port, but such as are directed 

ders, unless necessitously obliged, and then not to make any unnece

if employed in cruising, he is to keep the sea the time required by his 

give reasons for acting to the contrary.15

Commentary

Of the Duties of a Commander-in-Chief, Article 16, is almost an 

production of Article VI of the 1772 British Regulations for the Flag-

Commander-in-Chief. It allows an American Commander-in-Chief 

discretion as to expenditures as his British counterpart, and similar

the situation of where provisions are located in a port where naval a

are not established. It is reasonable to assume that both the British a

ican regulations were concerned more with the possibility of com

putting into port too often or making extravagant purchases than 

danger of intervention by force in foreign countries.

Of the Duties of a Captain or Commander, Article 40, succeeded 

of the 1799 Rules. It is a close paraphrase of Article XLII of the 17

Regulations for the Captain or Commander.

The reinsertion of both these articles may be explained by the 

the US Navy by this time had become transoceanic and had begu

of engagements in the Mediterranean using ships of substantial size 

power. Visitation of foreign ports by necessity was thus a distinct p

There is no indication, however, that the necessity standard refe

thing other than matters concerning the administration and ope

the vessel itself.

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V. United States Navy Regulations (1814)

Of the Duties of Commander of a Squadron

Article 16. When he is in foreign parts, where naval or other agen

tablished, he is to conform himself, as much as possible, to the standin

the navy, in such directions as he shall have occasion to give them; 

never to put them under any extraordinary expenses, unless the serv

absolutely require the same.

Of the Duties of a Captain or Commander

Article 41. He is not to go into any port, but such as are directed 

ders, unless necessitously obliged, and then not to make any unnece

if employed in cruising, he is to keep the sea the time required by his 

give reasons for acting to the contrary.16

Commentary

Article 16 is repeated from Article 16 of the 1802 Regulations gove

duties of a Commander-in-Chief or Commander of a Squadron wi

clarifying changes. “Agents” is substituted for “officers” who may be 

parts. The words “he is” are added at the beginning of the last clause, 

eral commas.

Article 41 repeats Article 40 of the 1802 Regulations governing t

of a Captain or Commander.

VI. United States Navy Regulations (1818)

Commanders of Fleets or Squadrons

Article 15. Conform to established rules. He shall conform to t

ing rules of the navy, in such directions as he shall give to es

agents, and incur no expense that the public service does not ren

lutely necessary.

Regulations for the Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness, e

Article 28. To visit no port without orders. He [the Captain] is not 

any port, but such as may be directed by his orders, unless by absolute 

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and then not to make any unnecessary stay. If employed in cruisin

keep the sea, the time required by his orders, or give reasons for act

contrary, to the Secretary of the Navy.17

Commentary

Article 15 repeats the substance of Article 16 of the 1814 Regula

erning Squadron Commanders but with significant differences.

The section of the regulations was entitled “Commanders of 

Squadrons” to reflect the increased size of the Navy in the preceding f

The language referring to “foreign parts” was omitted, applying the r

everywhere there were “established agents.” This latter term rep

phrase “where naval or other agents are established.” “Extraordinary

leted from the last clause, which was reworded for clarity.

Article 28 is derived from Article 41 of the 1814 Regulations gove

duties of a Captain. The subject matter is now under the heading “Re

for the Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness, etc.,” perhaps also refl

expanding navy. The remaining changes are for purposes of clarifica

report of reasons for not keeping to sea as required is now specified to 

to the Secretary of the Navy.

VII. United States Navy Regulations (1821)

Commanders of Fleets or Squadrons

Article 15. He shall conform to the standing rules of the navy, in s

tions as he shall give to established agents, and incur no expense that 

service does not render absolutely necessary.

Regulations for the Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness, e

Article 28. He is not to go into any port but such as may be directed 

ders, unless by absolute necessity, and then not to make any unnece

If employed in cruising, he is to keep the sea the time required by his 

give reasons for acting to the contrary to the Secretary of the Navy.

Commentary

The 1821 Regulations are identical to the 1818 Regulations with 

these articles.

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VIII. United States Navy Regulations (1841)

Commanders of Vessels

Article 186. When directed to cruise, he is to keep the sea the tim

by his orders, or produce satisfactory reasons for acting to the contra

Article 187. He is not to go into any port but such as may be desi

permitted by his instructions, unless from necessity, and then to ma

necessary stay.19

Commentary

The 1841 edition of the regulations was never approved by Congre

idently the Navy adhered to them as if they had been.

Article 28 of the 1821 Regulations concerning the Promotion of D

Cleanliness, etc. was split into two articles, 186 and 187, in the 184

tions. Reasons for failure to keep to the sea (Article 186) are no long

cally to be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy. Entering an und

port is now permitted merely “from necessity.” The other changes ar

poses of clarity.

The direction to conform to the standing rules of the Navy in Ar

the 1821 Regulations governing the duties of Commanders of Fleets 

rons is omitted from this and succeeding editions.

IX. United States Navy Regulations (1853)

Commanders of Vessels

Article 21. When directed to cruise, he is to keep the sea the tim

by his orders, or produce satisfactory reasons for deviating from them

Article 22. He is not to go into any port but such as may be desi

permitted by his instructions, unless from necessity, and then to ma

necessary stay.20

Commentary

Articles 21 and 22 are identical to Articles 186 and 187 of the 1

Regulations, except for a clarifying change to Article 21. If a Comma

not keep to the sea the time required by his orders, he must now 

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satisfactory reasons for 

deviating from themrather than for act

contrary.”

X. United States Navy Regulations (1858)

Commanders of Vessels

Article 28. To keep the sea the time required by his orders. When 

to cruise, he is to keep the sea the time required by his orders, or prod

factory reasons for deviating from them.

Article 29. To visit no port not designated in his instructions. He i

into any port but such as may be designated or permitted by his ins

unless from necessity, and then to make no unnecessary stay.21

Commentary

Articles 28 and 29 are identical to Articles 21 and 22 of 

Regulations.

XI. United States Navy Regulations (1863)

Article VI.

General Duties of Line Officers

The Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet or Squadron

To place himself in communication with the diplomatic agen

United States.

On arriving within the limits of his station on foreign service, he 

himself in communication with the diplomatic agents of the governm

United States thereabouts, and he is to afford them, on his own resp

such aid and cooperation in all matters for the benefit of the gover

they may require, and as he may judge to be expedient and proper.

Officers Commanding Vessels

To keep the sea the time required by his orders.

When directed to cruise, he is to keep the sea the time required by h

or produce satisfactory reasons for deviating from them.

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To visit no port not designated in his instructions.

He is not to go into any port but such as may be designated or pe

his instructions, unless from necessity, and then to make no unnecess

Commentary

That portion of the 1863 Regulations governing the duties of offi

manding vessels is identical to Articles 28 and 29 of the 1858 Re

However, that portion of the 1863 Regulations governing the dut

Commander-in-Chief of a fleet or squadron reflects the different Nav

In contrast to Article 15 of the 1821 Regulations concerning comm

fleets or squadrons, there is no mention of the “rules of the navy” or “e

but rather “co-operation in all matters for the benefit of the governm

emphasis shifted from the simple maintenance of ships in foreign wa

implementation of foreign policy through the use of naval forces.

Moreover, the actions of the Commander-in-Chief are “on his ow

sibility” and as he judges to be “expedient and proper.” The regulatio

individual commander with the discretion to aid and cooperate w

matic officials in foreign ports as he sees fit. Presumably, he may ex

recommendations if he feels such action to be appropriate. This articl

the first instance where naval commanders were given the authori

matters into their own hands and intervene in foreign lands to prote

tionals under the umbrella phrase “for the benefit of the governmen

XII. United States Navy Regulations (1865)

General Duties of Line Officers

The Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet or Squadron

Article 310. On arriving within the limits of his station on foreign ser

to place himself in communication with the diplomatic agents of the go

of the United States thereabouts, and he is to afford them, on his own 

bility, such aid and cooperation in all matters for the benefit of the go

as they may require, and as he may judge to be expedient and proper.

Officers Commanding Vessels

Article 346. Should he find it necessary to go into a port not desi

permitted by his instructions, he will make no unnecessary stay, and w

the cause of the necessity and of any delay that may occur.23

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Commentary

These 1865 Regulations are the last of the original sailing instruc

were closely related to the 1775 and 1802 editions of the Regulation

Article 310 repeats verbatim that portion of Article VI of the 186

tions pertaining to the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet or squadron p

quoted.

Article 346 is based on that portion of Article VI of the 1863 Re

pertaining to the duty of officers commanding vessels to keep to sea th

quired by his orders. The revised version no longer prohibits entr

undesignated port. The change in tenor reflects the Navy’s increased 

the first time, however, the commanding officer must report the ca

necessity for entering the undesignated port and of any delay that m

No longer is there a requirement to keep to the sea when directed t

XIII. United States Navy Regulations (1869)

Instructions for Officers, Afloat: Commander-in-Chief

Article 52. The Commander-in-Chief is not to attempt the arres

serter, whatever may be his class, by sending an officer under his com

ter him, but he is to make the proper application to the civil authori

place where he may be.

Article 53. No Commander-in-Chief is ever to take upon himself 

of inflicting punishment upon the subjects of any civilized nation, w

we have treaties, for any alleged violation of treaties or internationa

Article 54. In the absence of a United States Minister he is to ente

lomatic discussions on all matters of this kind, with the nation whi

posed to be the aggressor, and will take the earliest opportunity 

correspondence before the United States Government.

Article 157. A Commander-in-Chief is on all occasions to do his 

protect American commerce in all quarters.

Article 165. If he finds an American seaman employed on board 

vessel who complains that he is there contrary to his will, he will in

necessary inquiries, and if he finds that the said seaman is improperly 

the Commander-in-Chief will apply to the proper authority to hav

leased and will give him a passage to the nearest American port.

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Article 169. The Commander

inChief should observe himself th

der his command comply with the laws of blockade when a harbor 

blockaded by a nation with whom we are at peace.

Article 170. He is to observe the strictest neutrality, and afford 

tance to either party not called for by the interests of humanity.

Article 171. He is at the same time to make every effort to protec

and property of American citizens that may be within the lin

belligerents.

Article 172. In time of war, a Commander-in-Chief will cause all t

neutrality to be strictly observed by those under his command.

Article 173. A Commander-in-Chief will also take upon himself t

particular authority over all American letters-of-marque and priva

come within the limits of his command, and will ascertain if they h

any fraudulent seizures or captured vessels belonging to neutral pow

they had no right to capture.

Article 174. He will exercise his judgment as to what disposal to ma

privateers or letters-of-marque.

Article 175. In every case investigated by the Commander-in-Chi

send a report to the Secretary of the Navy as soon as possible.

Article 176. When on a foreign station, it is desirable that the be

should exist between the Commander-in-Chief of a United State

squadron and the American Minister, Chargés and Consuls, but w

courtesy should be paid to these officials, it must be understood that 

mander-in-Chief is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy alon

acts.24

Commentary

These regulations, which Secretary of the Navy George M. Rob

mulgated after the Civil War, are direct ancestors of the 1990 Regula

rently in effect. The most obvious explanation for the break between 

and 1869 Regulations is the emergence of a powerful ironclad US Na

the Civil War. Although the Royal Navy resumed its role as the mos

afloat in the decade after the Civil War, the United States had becom

icant force. Navy Regulations from 1869 to the present day have refl

fact, dealing extensively with the duties of commanders in foreign w

ports.

This edition of the regulations was in effect for only one year. Yet 

ancestors of the articles quoted below from the 1990 Regulations all 

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the first time in 1869. Textually, these articles are the first 

modern

ulations. Geopolitically, they are an extension of the 1865 Regulatio

they reflect the Navy’s increased awareness of its new foreign relatio

Article 52 is a clear prohibition against sending forces ashore in 

land to pursue and arrest a deserter from a US ship, such matters are 

local civil authorities.

Article 53 is repeated in conjunction with Article 54 in several 

tions. The prohibition against retorsion or reprisal by a nav

mander-in-Chief acting on his own authority is restricted to 

nation[s], with whom we [the United States] have treaties.” Presuma

lized” States meant European or Latin American ones. In any event, 

lation contains an open invitation to ignore treaties or internationa

regard to “savage” nations such as Hawaii, most African tribal kingd

most East Asian kingdoms. The article is thus narrow in its scope and 

Commander-in-Chief to punish in most instances.

Article 54 requires diplomatic discussions with an alleged civilized 

with whom the United States has treaties. Those areas excluded fro

53 are similarly excluded here. These articles establish th

mander-in-Chief as the arbiter of whether there has been a breach o

violation of international law towards the United States. They furth

to him to determine whether a nation is civilized. Freedom to use for

tingent on these determinations.

Article 157 appears in one form or another in all succeeding editi

Regulations. It makes the US Navy the guardian of US commerce bo

high seas and in foreign waters. There is no element of discretion

mander-in-Chief must do everything he can to protect American co

Article 165 corresponds roughly to Article XLV of the 1772 Britis

tions. The US counterpart does not allow boarding, and it becomes 

only when a complaint is received. It may be implemented only by fo

thorities. The only affirmative actions a Commander-in-Chief may 

such a case are “necessary inquiries” and passage of the seaman to th

American port.

Article 169, in conjunction with the following seven articles, is re

some form in all succeeding editions of the regulations. In this editio

169 through 176 should be read together.

Article 169 specifically requires compliance with the laws of block

the United States is at peace with the blockading nation. Article 

mands that US naval forces shall remain neutral in the face of a bloc

cept where assistance is called for in the interests of humanity. A

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gives the Commander

inChief the responsibility to protect the 

property of American citizens within the lines of the belligerents.” A

commands US forces shall remain neutral “in time of war” when th

States is not a party. Article 173 gives American Commanders-in-C

diction over letters-of-marque and privateers operating in areas un

command and makes them a prize court of original jurisdiction. Artic

thorizes judgment on letters-of-marque and privateers within the ju

of a Commander-in-Chief. Article 175 requires that a report of such 

sent to the Secretary of the Navy. Article 176 makes the Commande

solely responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for his acts while o

station.

The thrust of these seven articles is that Commanders-in-Chief ar

respect blockades by friendly nations and to comply with the laws of 

when the United States is not at war. At the same time, Commander

are authorized, on their own initiative, to intervene in wars to w

United States is not a party on humanitarian grounds. Commanders

are also obliged to engage in forcible self-help for the protection o

can lives and property, at least with respect to wars to which th

States is not a party. They must justify such actions only to the Secre

Navy.

XIV. United States Navy Regulations (1870)

Duties of Commander-in-Chief

Section 52. He will preserve, so far as in him lies, the best feelin

most cordial relations with the ministers and consuls of the United 

foreign stations, and will extend to them every official courtesy. H

duly consider such information as they may have to give him relating 

terests of the United States, but he will not receive orders from suc

and he will be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, in the first pla

acts.

Section 53. He will not take upon himself the power of inflictin

ment upon the people of any civilized nation with whom we have 

for any violation, alleged or otherwise, of such treaties or of inte

law.

Section 54. In the absence of a diplomatic representative of th

States, he will enter into correspondence on matters of this kind wi

thorities of the nation which may be supposed to have been the aggr

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will take the earliest opportunity to communicate all the informat

possession to the government of the United States.

Section 55. He will do his utmost on all occasions to protect the c

of the United States.

Section 94. During wars to which the United States is not a party

himself observe the strictest neutrality between the belligerents, an

quire every one under his command to practice the like observance.

Section 95. He shall comply with the laws of blockade, when a harb

is blockaded by a nation with whom the United States is at peace, an

quire the like compliance by all under his command.

Section 96. He shall at the same time make every effort to protec

and property of citizens of the United States within the line

belligerents, and will so instruct the Commanding Officers of hi

squadron.

Officers Commanding Vessels

Section 247. When not acting under the orders of a superior offic

be governed by the regulations for the Commander-in-Chief, so far as 

be applicable to his case.25

Commentary

Section 52 repeats the substance of Article 176 of the 1869 Re

Sections 53 through 55 repeat the substance of Articles 53, 54 and 

1869 Regulations. Section 94 generally repeats Articles 170 and 1

1869 Regulations. The regulation clarifies the scope of responsibility 

the context as “[d]uring wars to which the United States is not a party

wise, it is a combination of the two earlier articles.

Section 95 repeats Article 169 of the 1869 Regulations, while Sect

peats Article 171 of the 1869 Regulations. In addition, t

mander-in-Chief is to extend his responsibility to the commanding 

his squadron or fleet.

Section 247 incorporates the regulations for a Commander-in-Chie

ence, the first instance of such an incorporation, and there is no indic

captain’s responsibilities while on foreign station except as mentioned p

The most interesting aspect of the 1870 Regulations is what they 

clude. Omitted from the 1869 Regulations are Article 52 on the arr

serters, Article 165 on American seamen held aboard foreign ve

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Articles 173, 174 and 175 on letters

ofmarque and privateers. The 

nations” distinction is retained in Section 53, however, so that the rig

duct reprisals in many areas of the world remains along with th

self-help to protect American lives and property.

XV. United States Navy Regulations (1876)

Instructions for Officers, Afloat: Commanders-in-Chief

Article 21. Punishment of people of any civilized nation. He will 

punishment upon the people of any civilized nation with whom th

States has treaties, for any violation, alleged or otherwise, of such tre

international law; but in the absence of a Diplomatic Representativ

enter into correspondence with the authorities of the nation, and wi

earliest opportunity to communicate all the information in his possess

Navy Department.

Article 22. Protection of commerce of the United States. He will 

most on all occasions to protect the commerce of the United States

Article 49. Neutrality of the United States; Protection of lives and 

During wars in which the United States are neutral, he will observe th

neutrality and require the same of everyone under his command. He 

ply strictly with the laws of blockade, when a harbor or port is block

nation with whom the United States is at peace, making every effort 

the lives and property of citizens of the United States within the li

belligerents, and will so instruct the commanding officers of the ves

fleet or squadron.

Officers Commanding Vessels.

Article 101. Acting singly. When acting singly, he will be govern

regulations for the Commander-in-Chief, so far as they may be applic

case.26

Commentary

Article 21 consolidates Sections 53 and 54 of the 1870 Regulation

22 repeats Section 55 of the 1870 Regulations. Article 49 consolidate

94, 95 and 96 of the 1870 Regulations. Article 101 repeats in substanc

247 of the 1870 Regulations.

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XVI. United States Navy Regulations (1893)

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 276. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. He shall a

tection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant ves

United States and to those of allies.

Article 277. Duties during a war between civilized nations at peac

United States. During a war between civilized nations with which th

States is at peace, he, and all under his command, shall observe the la

trality and respect a lawful blockade, but at the same time make ever

effort that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve 

tect the lives and property of citizens of the United States wherever 

Article 278. To observe the principles of international law and trea

tions. When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his 

to observe the rules of humane warfare and the principles of internat

When dealing with neutrals, he shall cause all under his command t

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expe

act a like observance from others.

Article 283. Intercourse with Foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. He shall exercise great care that all unde

mand scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilize

in amity with the United States.

2. No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise, targe

funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permission fr

cal authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to visit 

without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed to capture des

3. No target practice within. Great-gun target practice, even at flo

gets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters or at any p

which shots may fall therein, without permission.

Article 284. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of th

States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, report

diately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibili

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action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the comman

cer thereof.

Article 285. Use of force. The use of force against a foreign an

State, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. Th

self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well 

viduals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the 

honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens ag

trary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens m

irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of th

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to 

judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in th

with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be ex

time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-pre

as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting pu

for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and 

to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end re

Article 286. Landing an armed force in foreign territory. Whene

application of the above-mentioned principles it shall become ne

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political di

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection t

property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, sh

obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

Article 288. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships sha

all merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and 

the commercial interests of their country, always acting in accordanc

ternational law and treaty obligations.

Article 289. Dealings with foreigners. He shall impress upon of

men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all possible ca

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference must be 

them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that i

ings with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be displayed; a

feeling of good will and mutual respect should be cultivated.27

Commentary

This edition of the regulations is the earliest to use the text still fou

1948 Navy Regulations, which remained in force until 1973. The art

ing with conduct and intervention in foreign lands reflect the polic

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discretion intended to promote maximum flexibility expressed in 

1870 and 1876 editions.

This edition, however, is even more insistent on the duty to inte

foreign land when an American interest is threatened. Article 285 in 

sets forth the right of self-preservation as the justification for self-h

United States. Although the doctrine of self-preservation must be re

the background of the times—1893 falls in the midst of the age of 

ism—it also must be remembered that similar language was retaine

the 1948 edition of the regulations, which until 1973 were the l

Navy.28

Article 277 corresponds in substance to Article 49 of the 1876 Re

For the first time the “civilized nations” qualification is applied to the 

and blockade rule, no longer confined to the punishment rule. See Ar

the 1876 Regulations. The responsibilities the article imposes upo

mander-in-Chief remained unchanged.

Article 284 corresponds roughly to Article 21 of the 1876 Regulat

thrust of the article is changed from punishment to prevention. The 

port here is that the Commander-in-Chief is to take only such action 

essary to forestall injury to the United States or its citizens or to put 

harmful acts in progress. The necessity to report to the Secretary of th

unchanged, but the responsibility for any action taken rests entirely 

Commander-in-Chief himself.

Article 285 is similar to Article 277 in that it is designed to g

manders-in-Chief the authority to intervene in situations where US 

are threatened. Unlike Article 277 and its predecessors, Article 285 

voked in peacetime. All previous regulations permitting intervention 

countries to protect American lives and property either refer to a war

ation or call for consultation with local authorities before action is t

cept in the most extreme circumstances. While the exercise o

judgment of responsible officers” may give rise to the use of force on

resort, and then only to the degree necessary to end the threat to Am

terests, the breadth of the right of self-preservation means that any p

violence that could threaten the United States or its citizens may be 

grounds for intervention by a naval force.

It is noteworthy that the “civilized nations” qualification is not in

this article. Instead, mention is made in the first sentence of “a fo

friendly state.” There is no indication, however, that application of A

is in any way limited to friendly States. The essential prerequisite is 

to US interests, wherever they are.

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Article 286 requires the Commander

inChief to seek the assent o

thorities before he lands an armed force pursuant to Article 285. Th

of this article makes it clear that “local authorities” can mean any o

tions which might claim to rule a city or country. Also, assent is to be 

only if it does not involve further danger to US interests. Thus, thi

not an important limitation on the discretion of the Commander-in-C

ticle 286 is otherwise interesting because it is the first to mention 

rather than consultation when dealing with the prospect of armed 

tion. If nothing else, it reflects a desire on the part of the United State

its actions through the consent of the authority structure in the l

which it is intervening.

Article 288 repeats in substance Article 22 of the 1876 Regulat

duty to protect the commerce of the United States is narrowed to inc

merchant vessels in lawful occupations. Advancement of the comm

terests of the United States, which involves the policing of sea lanes 

tasks which ensure the free flow of commercial traffic, must be accom

accordance with international law and treaty obligations. The effect 

ticle is to make the protection of commerce a less-aggressive task. T

attempt to hold all American ships inviolate, no matter what actions 

as might be inferred from the earlier regulations.

Article 289 is a new rule requiring moderate conduct on the part o

personnel while in foreign ports as invitees.

XVII. United States Navy Regulations (1896).

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 277. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. He shall a

tection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant ves

United States and to those of allies.

Article 278. Duties during a war between civilized nations at peac

United States. During a war between civilized nations with which th

States is at peace, he, and all under his command, shall observe the la

trality and respect a lawful blockade, but at the same time make ever

effort that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve 

tect the lives and property of citizens of the United States wherever 

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Article 279. To observe the principles of international law and trea

tions. When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his 

to observe the rules of humane warfare and the principles of internat

When dealing with neutrals, he shall cause all under his command t

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expe

act a like observance from others.

Article 284. Intercourse with Foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. He shall exercise great care that all unde

mand scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilize

in amity with the United States.

2. No armed forces to be landed. No armed force for exercise, ta

tice, funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permis

the local authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave t

shore without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed t

deserters.

3. No target practice without permission. Great-gun target practic

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters 

point from which shots may fall therein, without permission.

Article 285. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of th

States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, report

diately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility f

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the command

thereof.

Article 286. Use of force. The use of force against a foreign an

State, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. Th

self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well 

viduals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the 

honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens ag

trary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens m

irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of th

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to 

judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in th

with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be ex

time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-pre

as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view of inflicting pu

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for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and 

to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end re

Article 287. Landing an armed force in foreign territory. Whenev

application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become ne

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political di

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection t

property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, sh

obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

Article 289. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships sha

all merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and 

the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordanc

ternational law and treaty obligations.

Article 290. Dealings with foreigners. He shall impress upon of

men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all possible ca

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference must be 

them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that i

ings with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be displayed; a

feeling of good will and mutual respect should be cultivated.29

Commentary

Articles 277, 278, 279, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289 and 290 of the 189

tions are identical to Articles 276, 277, 278, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288 

respectively, of the 1893 Regulations.

XVIII. United States Navy Regulations (1900 and 1905

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 297. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. He shall a

tection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant ves

United States and to those of allies.

Article 298. Duties during a war between civilized nations at peac

United States. During a war between civilized nations with which th

States is at peace, he, and all under his command shall observe the la

trality and respect a lawful blockade, but at the same time make ever

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effort that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve 

tect the lives and property of citizens of the United States wherever 

Article 299. To observe the principles of international law and trea

tions. When the United States is at war, he shall require all under 

mand to observe the rules of humane warfare and the prin

international law. When dealing with neutrals, he shall cause all 

command to observe the rules of international law and the stipulatio

ties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 304. Intercourse with Foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. He shall exercise great care that all unde

mand scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilize

in amity with the United States.

2. No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise, targe

funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permission fr

cal authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to visit 

without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed to capture des

3. No target practice without permission. Great-gun target practic

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters 

point from which shots may fall therein, without permission.

Article 305. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of th

States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, report

diately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility f

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the command

thereof.

Article 306. Use of force. The use of force against a foreign an

State, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. Th

self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well 

viduals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the 

honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens ag

trary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens m

irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of th

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to 

judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in th

with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be ex

time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-pre

as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then o

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extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end requir

never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for ac

committed.

Article 307. Landing an armed force in foreign territory. Whenev

application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become ne

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political di

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection t

property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, sh

obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

Article 309. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships sha

all merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and 

the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordanc

ternational law and treaty obligations.

Article 310. Dealings with foreigners. He shall impress upon of

men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all possible ca

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference must be 

them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that i

ings with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be displayed; a

feeling of good will and mutual respect should be cultivated.30

Commentary

These articles of the 1900 and 1905 Regulations are identical to t

counterparts.

XIX. United States Navy Regulations (1909)

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 333. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. He shall a

tection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant ves

United States and to those of allies.

Article 334. Duties during a war between civilized nations at peac

United States. During a war between civilized nations with which th

States is at peace, he and all under his command shall observe the law

trality and respect a lawful blockade, but at the same time make ever

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effort that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve 

tect the lives and property of citizens of the United States wherever 

Article 335. To observe the principles of international law and trea

tions. When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his 

to observe the rules of humane warfare and the principles of internat

When dealing with neutrals, he shall cause all under his command t

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expe

act a like observance from others.

Article 340. Intercourse with Foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. He shall exercise great care that all unde

mand scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilize

in amity with the United States.

2. No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise, targe

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission 

local authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to 

shore without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed t

deserters.

3. No target practice without permission. Great-gun target practic

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters 

point from which shots may fall therein, without permission.

Article 341. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of th

States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, report

diately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility f

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the command

thereof.

Article 342. Use of force. Self-preservation. The use of force aga

eign and friendly State, or against anyone within the territories there

gal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to 

well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protect

State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of i

against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State 

zens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the app

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but mus

the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their 

this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall fo

ercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of th

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self

preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last r

then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish t

quired. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishmen

already committed.

Article 343. Landing an armed force in foreign territory. Whene

application of the above-mentioned principles it shall become ne

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political di

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection t

property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, sh

obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

Article 345. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships sha

all merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and 

the commercial interests of their country, always acting in accordanc

ternational law and treaty obligations.

Article 346. Dealings with foreigners. He shall impress upon of

men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all possible ca

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference must be 

them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that i

ings with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be displayed; a

feeling of good will and mutual respect should be cultivated.31

Commentary

The substance of these articles is identical to that of the 1900 

Regulations.

XX. United States Navy Regulations (1913)

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 1632. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. T

mander-in-Chief shall afford protection and convoy, so far as it is w

power, to merchant vessels of the United States and to those of allie

Article 1633. Duties during a war between civilized nations at p

the United States. During a war between civilized nations with w

United States is at peace, the Commander-in-Chief and all under his 

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shall observe the laws of neutrality and respect a lawful blockade, b

same time make every possible effort that is consistent with the rules o

tional law to preserve and protect the lives and property of citize

United States wherever situated.

Article 1634. To observe the principles of international law and tr

gations. When the United States is at war, the Commander-in-Chie

quire all under his command to observe the rules of humane warfar

principles of international law. When dealing with neutrals, he shal

under his command to observe the rules of international law and th

tion of treaties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 1645. Intercourse with Foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. The Commander-in-Chief shall exercise 

that all under his command scrupulously respect the territorial autho

eign civilized nations in amity with the United States.

2. No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise, targe

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission 

local authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to 

shore without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed t

deserters.

3. No target practice without permission. Target practice with gun

does shall not take place without permission from the government of 

try concerned within foreign territorial waters or at any point from wh

may fall or torpedoes enter therein.

Article 1646. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

the Commander-in-Chief shall consult with the diplomatic represe

consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of th

mands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the fac

sponsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wh

the commanding officer thereof.

Article 1647. Use of force. Self-preservation. The use of force aga

eign and friendly State or against anyone within the territories there

gal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to 

well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protect

State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of i

against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State 

zens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the app

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but mus

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the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their 

this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall fo

ercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of th

self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last r

then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish t

quired. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishmen

already committed.

Article 1648. Landing an armed force in foreign territory. Whenev

application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become ne

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political di

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection t

property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, sh

obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

2. Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can be comm

with from all parts of the world, no Commander-in-Chief, division com

or commanding officer, shall issue an ultimatum to the representat

foreign Government, or demand the performance of any service from 

representative that must be executed within a limited time, without 

municating with the Navy Department, except in extreme cases w

action is necessary to save life.

Article 1650. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief, division commanders, 

manding officers of ships shall protect all merchant vessels of the Uni

in lawful occupations, and advance the commercial interests of this co

ways acting in accordance with international law and treaty obligati

Article 1651. Dealings with foreigners. The Commander-in-Chie

press upon officers and men that when in foreign ports it is their dut

all possible causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that d

ence must be shown by them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, 

lations; that in all dealings with foreigners moderation and courtesy 

displayed, and that a feeling of good will and mutual respect should 

vated.32

Commentary

Articles 1632, 1633, 1634, 1645, 1646 and 1647 repeat Articles 

335, 340, 341 and 342 of the 1909 Regulations. Article 1648(1) repea

343 of the 1909 Regulations. Article 1648(2) was added by Change 

September 15, 1916. It takes into account the Navy’s use 

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communications. The sentence forbidding ultimatums to foreign gov

without prior consultation with the Navy Department restricts the 

Commander-in-Chief to apply the self-preservation doctrine. Hence

right to self-preservation can be invoked by a Commander-in-Chief, 

his own, only when it is a life-or-death situation calling for immedia

Article 1650 repeats Article 345 of the 1909 Regulations, excep

words “division commanders, and commanding officers” are substitut

word “captains.” This change reflects organizational growth in the N

Article 1651 repeats Article 346 of the 1909 Regulations, excep

phrase “The Commander-in-Chief” is substituted for the pronou

change for clarity’s sake only.

XXI. United States Navy Regulations (1920)

A Commander-in-Chief

Duties in Time of War

Article 714. To protect and convoy merchant vessels. T

mander-in-Chief shall afford protection and convoy, so far as it is w

power, to merchant vessels of the United States and to those of allie

Article 715. Duties during a war between civilized nations at peac

United States. During a war between civilized nations with which th

States is at peace, the Commander-in-Chief, and all under his comm

observe the laws of neutrality and respect a lawful blockade, but at 

time make very possible effort that is consistent with the rules of inte

law to preserve and protect the lives and property of citizens of th

States wherever situated.

Article 716. To observe the principles of international law and trea

tions. When the United States is at war, the Commander-in-Chief sh

all under his command to observe the rules of humane warfare and t

ples of international law. When dealing with neutrals he shall cause 

his command to observe the rules of international law and the stip

treaties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 721. Intercourse with foreigners.

1. Territorial authority. The Commander-in-Chief shall exercise 

that all under his command scrupulously respect the territorial autho

eign civilized nations in amity with the United States.

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2. No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise, targe

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission 

local authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to 

shore without a similar permission; nor shall men be landed t

deserters.

3. No target practice without permission. Target practice with gun

does shall not take place without permission from the Governme

country concerned within foreign territorial waters or at any point fr

shots may fall or torpedoes enter therein.

Article 722. Violation of international law and treaty obligations. 

sions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is com

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or tre

the Commander-in-Chief shall consult with the diplomatic represe

consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of th

mands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the fac

sponsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wh

the commanding officer thereof.

Article 723. Use of force. Self-preservation. The use of force aga

eign and friendly State, or against anyone within the territories t

illegal.

The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to 

well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protect

State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of i

against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State 

zens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the app

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but mus

the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their 

this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall fo

ercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of th

self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last r

then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish t

quired. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishmen

already committed.

Article 724. Landing an armed force in foreign territory.

1. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned principles, 

come necessary to land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions 

disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate pro

life and property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them

be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involve

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2. Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can be comm

with from all parts of the world, no Commander-in-Chief, flag office

manding officer shall issue an ultimatum to the representative of an

Government, or demand the performance of any service from any su

sentative that must be executed within a limited time, without first c

cating with the Navy Department, except in extreme cases where su

is necessary to save life.

Article 726. To protect the commerce of the United States. So 

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief, division commanders, 

manding officers of ships shall protect all merchant vessels of the Uni

in lawful occupations, and advance the commercial interests of this co

ways acting in accordance with international law and treaty obligati

Article 727. Dealings with foreigners. The Commander-in-Chief 

press upon officers and men that when in foreign ports it is their duty t

possible causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due 

must be shown by them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and re

that in all dealings with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be 

and that a feeling of good will and mutual respect should be cultivate

Commentary

Articles 714, 715, 716, 721, 722, 723, 724, 726 and 727 repeat Arti

1633, 1634, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650 and 1651 of the 1913 Regu

XXII. United States Navy Regulations (1948)

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders

Article 0505. Observance of International Law.

1. In the event of war between nations with which the United S

peace, a commander shall observe, and require his command to ob

principles of international law. He shall make every effort consistent w

principles to preserve and protect the lives and property of citize

United States wherever situated.

2. When the United States is at war, he shall observe, and require 

mand to observe, the principles of international law and the rules o

warfare. He shall respect the rights of neutrals as prescribed by inte

law and by pertinent provisions of treaties, and shall exact a like o

from neutrals.

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The Senior Officer Present

Article 0613. Violations of International Law and Treaties. On 

where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed 

ened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty righ

nior officer present shall consult with the diplomatic or 

representatives of the United States, if possible, and shall take such 

the gravity of the situation demands. The responsibility for any action 

a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the senior officer present

immediately report all the facts to the Secretary of the Navy.

Article 0614. Use of Force Against a Friendly State.

1. The use of force by United States naval personnel against a fri

eign State, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

2. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belong

as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the pro

the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of i

against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State 

zens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the app

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but mus

the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their 

this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall fo

ercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of th

self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last r

then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish t

quired. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishmen

already committed.

3. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned principl

become necessary to land an armed force in a foreign territory on oc

political disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give 

protection to life and property, the assent of such authorities, or o

them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to th

involved.

Article 0620. Protection of Commerce of the United States. So 

within his power, acting in conformity with international law and trea

tions, the senior officer present shall protect all commercial vessels an

of the United States in their lawful occupations, and shall advance 

mercial interests of this country.

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Article 0622. Territorial Authority of Foreign Nations.

1. The senior officer present shall, in the exercise of his comman

lously respect the territorial authority of nations in amity with th

States.

2. Unless permission has been obtained from local authorities:

a. No armed force for exercise, target practice, funeral escort, or o

poses shall be landed.

b. No persons shall be allowed to visit the shore, except as necessa

duct official business.

c. No men shall be landed to capture deserters.

3. Target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets, guided missile

weapons shall not take place, without permission from the governm

country concerned, within foreign territorial waters and at any p

which projectiles, torpedoes, or missiles may enter therein.

Article 0623. Dealings with Foreigners. The senior officer pre

uphold the prestige of the United States. He shall impress upo

and men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid al

causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due d

must be shown by them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, an

tions; that in all dealings with foreigners, moderation and courte

be displayed; and that a feeling of good will and mutual respect s

cultivated.34

Commentary

Article 0505 restates in substance Articles 715 and 716 of the 192

tions. The old term “civilized nations” is finally dropped. The phra

anachronism and had become offensive to many countries by 1948. T

“principles of international law” takes the place of “the laws of neut

respect a lawful blockade.” This change is not significant, since Articl

mentioned the “rules of international law.” In short, Article 0505 re

same rules that had been used since 1893.

Article 0613 is a restatement of Article 722 of the 1920 Regulat

minor alterations. “[T]he senior officer present” is substituted for t

mander-in-Chief” in the first sentence. Consultation with diplomat

sular representatives is to be had “if possible. . . .” The facts of the pr

to be reported to the Secretary of the Navy immediately, as in Articl

the change in priority is obvious. Again, this article is fundamentally 

as its 1893 counterpart.

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Article 0614 repeats in substance Article 723 of the 1920 Regulat

phrase “by United States naval personnel” is inserted in section 

words “friendly” and “foreign” are reversed. Section 2 repeats the sec

graph of Article 723. Section 3 repeats verbatim Article 724 of 

Regulations.

Article 0620 is a close paraphrase of Article 726 of the 1920 Re

Enforcement is now in the hands of the “senior officer present” and p

is extended to “all commercial vessels and aircraft. . . .” Otherwise th

identical to its predecessor.

Articles 0622 and 0623 repeat the substance of Articles 721 and 

1920 Regulations.

XXIII. United States Navy Regulations (1973)

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders

Article 0605. Observance of International Law. At all times a co

shall observe, and require his command to observe, the principles o

tional law. Where necessary to fulfillment of this responsibility, a 

from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

The Senior Officer Present

Article 0914. Violations of International Law and Treaties. On 

when injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed 

ened in violation of the principles of international law or in violation 

existing under a treaty or other international agreement, the sen

present shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representativ

United States, if possible, and he shall take such action as is demand

gravity of the situation. In time of peace, action involving the use of 

be taken only in consonance with the provisions of the succeeding 

these regulations. The responsibility for any application of force re

upon the senior officer present. He shall report immediately all the fa

Secretary of the Navy.

Article 0915. Use of Force Against Another State.

1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval personn

another nation or against anyone within the territories thereof is ille

as an act of self-defense. The right of self-defense may arise in order t

either the use of force or an immediate threat of the use of force.

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2. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self

def

not be precisely defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound ju

responsible naval personnel who are to perform their duties in this re

all possible care and forbearance. The right of self-defense must be 

only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely ne

accomplish the end required.

3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting punishment f

ready committed.

Article 0916. Territorial Integrity of Foreign Nations. The sen

present shall respect the territorial integrity of foreign nations. Unle

sion has been obtained from foreign authorities:

a. No armed force for exercise, target practice, funeral escort, or o

poses shall be landed.

b. No persons shall be allowed to visit the shore, except as necessa

duct official business.

c. No men shall be landed to capture deserters.

d. No target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets, guided missile

weapons shall be conducted within foreign territorial waters or at 

from which projectiles, torpedoes or missiles may enter therein.

Article 0917. Dealings with Foreigners. The senior officer presen

hold the prestige of the United States. He shall impress upon officers 

that, when in foreign ports, it is their duty to avoid all possible cause 

to the authorities and inhabitants; that due deference must be show

to local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that moderation 

tesy should be displayed in all dealings with foreigners; that a feelin

will and mutual respect should be cultivated.

Article 0920. Protection of Commerce of the United States. Actin

formity with the international law and treaty obligations, the sen

present shall protect, insofar as lies within his power, all commercial c

United States in their lawful occupations; and he shall advance the 

cial interests of this country.35

Commentary

Article 0605 is a rough paraphrase of Article 0505 of the 1948 Re

Its thrust, however, is somewhat different. By deleting the sentence 

the commander “to preserve and protect the lives and property of 

the United States wherever situated,” the Article becomes less self-se

appears to place primary emphasis upon observance of the prin

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international law. Further evidence of this shift in emphasis is the 

that the commander is authorized to ignore other provisions of Nav

tions where necessary for the fulfillment of his general responsibility t

the principles of international law. Thus, the effect of the article i

more explicit the subordination of Navy Regulations to the principle

national law.

The administrative history of this article clearly establishes that su

dination was the drafter’s intent.

The first sentence [of Article 0605] is a simple and straight forward sta

reflecting the traditional Navy position with regard to international la

second sentence provides necessary flexibility in those areas where a con

or treaty ratified by the United States might make other specifi

Regulations inapplicable or inappropriate in a given circumstance. Beca

present world situation is one in which rules in the international arena ch

rapidly, and because the United States often takes a leading role i

changes, it is felt that flexibility is necessary in this general article.36

The second paragraph of Article 0505 was deleted from the 197

tions “to make clear that Commanders shall observe international l

times. The 1973 revisers felt that “as currently phrased, [Article 05

support an interpretation which restricts the application of internatio

situations of war or armed conflict.” They correctly pointed out that 

this is true and has never been the Navy position.”37

Article 0914 restates in substance Article 0613 of the 1948 Re

The only substantial change made is the insertion of a sentence em

that in time of peace action involving the use of force is proscribed 

self-defense, as described in Article 0915.

Article 0915, defining the criteria by which a commander may be j

the use of force in self-defense, roughly parallels Article 0614 of the 19

lations. However, both the language and the thrust of the article hav

tered somewhat. The more modern phrase “self-defense” is substitute

of “self-preservation.” The 1973 Regulation states that the right of se

“may arise in order to counter either the use of force or an immediate 

the use of force.” The 1948 Regulation states a much broader rationa

ing “the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the 

property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending

the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury.” The deletion in 

Regulation of language specifically authorizing the forcible protect

lives and property of US nationals abroad indicates that the circu

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under which a commander may justifiably resort to force for such pu

greatly restricted today.

The administrative history clearly indicates that the above change

signed to bring the regulations into conformity with contemporary 

tional law. Article 0614.1, Navy Regulations 1984, according to the 

discusses restraints on the use of force against a friendly State. It could be 

by implication then that there are no prohibitions on the use of force ag

unfriendly State. Such a distinction has no foundation in international l

Further, the drafting history refers to the applicable provisions o

Charter and to Security Council practice prescribing the permissib

force as the basis for these revised articles.

Article 0916 is a modernization of Article 0622 of the 1948 Re

The first sentence of Article 0916 is based on Article 0622, section 1

for the territorial integrity of foreign nations is now properly extended 

tions, and is no longer limited by implications to those nations “in a

the United States.” Such was the drafters’ intent:

[Article 0622, section 1] contains a phrase limiting the article’s 

applicability to nations “in amity” with the United States. Such a gram

construction could lead to the interpretation that the principles of this ar

not apply to nations not in amity with the United States. This 

inconsonant with international law and the view of the United States.39

In the second sentence of Article 0916, “foreign” has been subst

“local” to make clear just whose permission is required to do the sub

listed acts. Subparagraphs a, b and c are duplicates of Article 0622, 

subparagraphs a, b and c of the 1948 Regulations. Subparagraph d is 

Article 0622, section 3, only grammatical changes have been made.

Article 0917, other than a minor repositioning of words in the pe

clause, is almost a verbatim copy of Article 0623 of the 1948 Regula

Article 0920 restates in substance Article 0620 of the 1948 Re

The thrust of both articles is identical.

XXIV. United States Navy Regulations (1990)

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders

Article 0705. Observance of International Law. At all times, com

shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the prin

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international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a 

from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

The Senior Officer Present

Article 0914. Violations of International Law and Treaties. On 

when injury to the United States or citizens thereof is committed or th

in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rig

ing under a treaty or other international agreement, the senior offic

shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representatives of th

States, if possible, and shall take such action as is demanded by the 

the situation. In time of peace, action involving the use of force may 

only in consonance with the provisions of the succeeding article of th

lations. The responsibility for any application of force rests wholly up

nior officer present. The senior officer present shall report immediat

facts to the National Command Authority, keeping the operationa

command and the Secretary of the Navy informed.

Article 0915. Use of Force Against Another State.

1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval personn

another nation or against anyone within the territories thereof is ille

as an act of self-defense. Naval personnel have a right of self-defen

hostile acts or hostile intent (imminent threat to use force). This righ

defending themselves, their subunits and, when appropriate, defendi

izens, their property and US commercial assets in the vicinity.

2. The conditions calling for application of the right of self-defen

be precisely defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgm

sponsible naval personnel who are to perform their duties in this res

all possible care and forbearance. The use of force must be exercised 

last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary 

plish the end required.

3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting unlawful pu

for acts already committed.

Article 0916. Territorial Integrity of Foreign Nations. The sen

present shall respect the territorial integrity of foreign nations. Unle

sion has been obtained from foreign authorities:

a. No armed force for exercise, target practice, funeral escort or o

pose shall be landed.

b. No persons shall be allowed to visit the shore, except as necessa

duct official business.

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c. No persons shall be landed to capture deserters.

d. No target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets, guided missile

weapons shall be conducted within foreign territorial waters or at 

from which projectiles, torpedoes or missiles may enter therein.

Article 0917. Dealings with Foreigners. The senior officer presen

hold the prestige of the United States. He or she shall impress upon of

enlisted personnel that, when in foreign ports, it is their duty to avoid 

ble cause for offense to the authorities and inhabitants; that due 

must be shown by them to local laws, customs, ceremonies and re

that moderation and courtesy should be displayed in all dealings wit

ers; and that a feeling of good will and respect should be cultivated.

Article 0920. Protection of Commerce of the United States. Actin

formity with international law and treaty obligations, the senior offic

shall protect, insofar as lies within his or her power, all commercial c

United States in their unlawful occupations.40

Commentary

Article 0705 is a nearly verbatim repetition of Article 0605 of the 

ulations, the only difference being the substitution of the pronoun “

the pronoun “his.” Similar changes in the interest of gender neutra

throughout the 1990 regulations, will not be mentioned below.

Article 0914 repeats in substance Article 0914 of the 1973 regula

der the 1990 Article, the senior officer present reports to the “Natio

mand Authority, keeping the operational chain of command and the 

of the Navy informed.” The 1973 Article requires a report only to the 

of the Navy.

Article 0915 includes a broader description of the right to use forc

of self-defense than was found in Article 0915 of the 1973 Regulatio

the 1990 Regulations, “[n]aval personnel have a right of self-defen

hostile acts or hostile intent (imminent threat to use force),” while 

1973 Regulations the right “may arise in order to counter either the u

or an immediate threat of the use of force.” Further, under the 199

tions, naval personnel may defend “themselves, their subunits and, 

propriate, . . . US citizens, their property and US commercial ass

vicinity.” In comparison, Article 0915 in the 1973 Regulations does n

the ambit of the right of self-defense.

Articles 0916 and 0917 are exact replicas of Articles 0916 and 091

tively, in the 1973 regulations.

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Article 0920 omits the requirement that the senior officer present 

vance the commercial interests of this country” but is otherwise a verb

etition of Article 0920 in the 1973 regulations.

Summary

In summary, it can be seen that for nearly a century — between 

1973 — the Navy Regulations governing the use of force to protect U

als and their property abroad remained virtually unchanged. With th

gation of the 1973 Regulations, however, a shift in attitude toward 

forcible self-help in such cases is evident. Omission of phrases relatin

to the protection of nationals, as well as the inclusion of positive state

lating to the supremacy of international law, indicate that th

interventionary practice sanctioned by prior regulations no longer pa

ter. The 1990 Regulations make no change in this regard. Just what 

of forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad remain permissible 

controversial question, upon which it is hoped Chapters IV and V h

some light.

NOTES

1. See Woods, US Navy Regulations, International Law, and the Orga

American States, 22 Naval War College Rev. 66 (Feb. 1970).

2. See Chapter I. See also Woods, supra note 1, at 74-76.

3. See generally A. Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (19

4. For a pre-1973 discussion of ways to update US Navy Regulations in th

Woods, supra note 1, at 80-81.

5. Admiral Strauss notes that the 1775 Rules for the Regulation of the Navy o

Colonies of North America, “were in the main based on the Regulations and 

Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea (1772) and on An Act Relating to the Gov

His Majesty’s Ships... Vessels, and Forces by Sea (1749)." Admiral Strauss furthe

“[e]ntire articles from these were taken verbatim; others were converted only to the 

American political philosophy demanded; a few, but very few, were original.” See R

Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies, Introductory Note, Naval Historical 

Reprint Series I, No. 1.

6. US Const. art. I, § 8.

7. Bolander, A History of Regulations in the United States Navy, 73 US Na

Proceedings 1355, 1360 (1947).

8. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 164, § 5, 12 Stat. 565 (1862) (codified as amended a

6011 (1988)).

9. In 1981, Congress struck the words “with the approval of the President” fro

§ 6011 (1988), leaving with the Secretary of the Navy sole authority to issue the 

See id.

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gg jy

Majesty in Council 2-3, 33, 34 (llth ed. London 1772).

11. Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of North Ameri

3 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, at 380-81 (Ford ed. 1905).

12. See note 5 supra.

13. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 711.

14. An Act for the better government of the Navy of the United States, Apr. 2

33, § 11, 2 Stat. 53 (1856).

15. Naval Regulations issued by Command of the President of the United States 

January 25, 1802, at 3, 10 (date and place of publication unknown).

16. Naval Regulations, issued by command of the President of the United States 

3, 9 (Washington, 1814).

17. Rules, Regulations and Instructions for the Naval Service of the United S

(Washington, 1818).

18. “Rules, Regulations, and Instructions, for the Naval Service of the United 

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, at 20, 37 (Washington, 1821).

19. General Regulations for the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States, 

(Washington, 1841).

20. Orders and Instructions for the Direction and Government of the Nava

the United States, and for the Exposition of the Duties and Relations of Office

in the several branches thereof 70-71 (Washington, 1853) (ruled “destitu

validity or effect” by the Attorney General on April 5, 1853, 6 Op. Atty G

[1856]).

21. “A Code of Regulations for the Government of the Navy,” in Annual R

Secretary of the Navy, at 78 (Washington, 1858). This Code was prepared and 

Congress for its approval pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1857, ch. 111, § 7, 11 Stat. 

Such approval never was given. See Bolander, supra note 7, at 1360.

22. Regulations for the Navy of the United States, 1863, 55, 60-61 (Washingto

23. Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy, 1865, 

(Washington, 1865).

24. Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy, 1868, 

(Washington, 1869).

25. Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy, 1870, at 7

(Washington, 1870).

26. Regulations of the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1876, a

35-36 (Washington, 1877).

27. Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1893, 

(Washington, 1893), as amended, US Navy Regulation Circular No. 13 (Aug. 15, 1

28. Other authorities have dealt at length with the changes in internation

practice between 1893 and recent times, especially as they affected the mea

regulations. See Woods, note 1 supra. See also Hallo, The Legal Use of Force . . . Shor

US Naval Institute Proceedings 88 (1966).

29. Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1896, 

(Washington, 1896).

30. Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1900, 

(Washington, 1900) and Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the Un

1905, at 75, 76-77 (Washington, 1905).

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gy 

(Washington, 1909).

32. Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States (Navy R

1913, at 161R, 162R-163R (Washington, 1913), as amended, Change No. 7 of Se

1916.

33. United States Navy Regulations, 1920, at 219, 220-22 (Washington, 1920)

34. United States Navy Regulations, 1948, at 66, 73, 74 (Washington, 1948).

35. United States Navy Regulations, 1973, at 11, 28, 39 (Washington, 1973).

36. Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Memorandum from In

Law Division to Administrative Law Division, JAG: 102, para. 2 (Sep. 9, 1970).

37. Id.

38. Id. at para. 8 (emphasis in original).

39. Id. at para. 10.

40. United States Navy Regulations, 1990, at 39-40, 71-72 (Washington, 1990

228

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Conclusion

At the time of his death, Professor Lillich’s manuscript was lacking 

concluding statement of the contemporary law governing the forcible pro

of nationals abroad. Although we were determined to present his work 

substantive alteration, we did want this volume to be as comprehen

possible. An editorial consensus emerged that we should append a chap

complementary snapshot of the law as it exists today. The following 

written by a co-editor of this volume and originally published in the Di

Law Review in the Spring of 2000, fit the bill. It is reproduced here with t

permission of The Dickinson Law School of The Pennsylvania State Univ

We hope that it is an appropriate punctuation mark for Professor 

research and analysis, and that it may serve as a point of departure fo

scholars who will build on his impressive body of work

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad

Thomas C. Wingfield

“It was only one life. What is one life in the affairs of a state?”

—Benito Mussolini, after running down a child in his automobile (as reported 

Smedley D. Butler in address, 1931)1

“This Government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.”

—Theodore Roosevelt, committing the United States to the protection 

Perdicaris, kidnapped by Sherif Mulai Ahmed ibn-Muhammed er Raisuli (

Department telegram, June 22nd, 1904)2

† Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner, The Dickinson School of 

Pennsylvania State University.

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Introduction

As the two epigraphs above demonstrate, perhaps the best cri

discriminating tyrannies from democracies is the sincere, proven 

placed upon the value of a single human life. The forcible prot

nationals abroad, when undertaken by a sovereign for non-pretextua

is the clearest expression of that distinction in state practice. The 

challenge in evaluating such uses of force is to distinguish such protec

other legitimate uses of force, and then to distinguish these uses fr

illegitimate uses of force. Such an examination is heavily dependent 

historical context of the threat, and of the acting state. For, as the 

Jackson has stated, “a text without a context is a pretext.”3

To properly understand the “text” involved, it is important to have 

definition as possible. Arend and Beck define “protection of nationa

use of armed force by a state to remove its nationals from another st

their lives are in actual or imminent peril.”4 Arend and Beck add four 

tions to this definition. First, consent obviates the analysis, rendering 

ation something other than coercion or intervention.5 Second, the th

nationals need not be within the territory of the threatening stat

within its exclusive jurisdiction. The classic example of this would b

from a ship flying the threatening state’s flag.6 Third, a Chapter VII a

tion would, like consent of the territorial state, obviate the analysis. 

the Security Council is not acting ultra vires, a use of force pursuant t

authorization is almost by definition lawful.7 Fourth, and finally, an 

tion to protect the citizens of the threatening state is a humanitarian 

tion, not the protection of nationals abroad. While the primary discri

the nationality of the victims rescued, the dimensions of the two type

vention can vary significantly. The use of force in the protection of 

abroad is, at its most pure, a rescue operation, lasting no longer than t

ation itself. Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, ca

lengthy nation-building or even government-replacement in the 

state.8 A lengthier, but more precise, definition would then read: “

threat of imminent use of armed force by a state to safeguard, and u

move, its nationals from the territory or exclusive jurisdiction of ano

without the consent of that state or the authorization of the UN 

Council, where the lives of those nationals are in actual or imminen

This article will briefly examine the historical foundation for th

protection of nationals abroad, recount a number of post-Charter us

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to protect nationals, describe and evaluate alternate modern theorie

ing such actions, and conclude with a description of the law today.

Historical Development

While an exhaustive historical review of the legality of the use of fo

protection of nationals could consume several volumes, the views of t

licists provide a firm basis for the subsequent, principally post-Charter 

Vattel wrote what is perhaps the seminal paragraph on the pro

nationals:

Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquility, or d

prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and 

himself to be justly punished for it. Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly 

the State, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of th

should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige 

make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the gr

of the civil association, which is, safety.9

The justification for intervention in such a case is more than just 

becomes a duty of the sovereign. The duty, however, is tempered by 

for the sovereignty of other nations:

The prince . . . ought not to interfere in the causes of his subjects in 

countries, and grant them protection, excepting in cases where justice is 

or palpable and evident injustice done, or rules and forms openly viola

finally, an odious distinction made, to the prejudice of his subject

foreigners in general.10

This duty, and this tension, has been echoed by all subsequent t

commentators.

Hall, writing at the end of the 19th Century, returned to the fun

nature of this duty: “At the root of state life lies the circumstance 

bond which exists between a state and its subjects is not severed 

latter issue from the national territory.”11 However, Hall adds wi

understatement, “the clashing laws of states of European civiliz

place many persons in situations that are frequently difficult and oc

serious.”12 It is at this point that the sovereign’s duty to protect h

emerges:

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y pgg

the maintenance of the bond between a state and its subjects while t

abroad implies that the former must watch over and protect them with in 

limit of the rights of other states. ... It enables governments to exact rep

for oppression they have suffered, or for injuries done to them otherwise 

process of law; and it gives the means of guarding them against the e

unreasonable laws, laws totally out of harmony with the nature and d

civilization by which a foreign power affects to be characterized, and fina

administration of laws bad beyond a certain point. When in these dire

state grossly fails in its duties; when it is either incapable of ruling, or ru

patent injustice, the right of protection emerges in the form of dip

remonstrance, and in extreme cases of ulterior measures.13

The nature and extent of these “ulterior measures” were principally 

concern in the 19th Century, but became an American concern early 

Century, as the United States Navy and Marine Corps extended 

ability to respond to “laws bad beyond a certain point.”

Borchard, an American writing early in the 20th Century, addre

textbook matter-of-factness the use of such force in the protection of 

abroad:

The display of force and the threat to use it... have frequently pro

effective means of obtaining redress .... This display of force usually ta

form of a national war-ship appearing before the port of the foreign 

alleged to be in default. The moral influence exerted by the presence o

vessel is great, and . . . in quarters of the world subject to frequent d

disorder has served not only to prevent an abuse of aliens’ rights, particu

the nationals of the country to which the vessel belongs.14

Although such displays were frequently effective, they occasionally 

to actual uses of force:

The army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of citizens 

property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the local gove

has failed, through inability or unwillingness, to afford adequate prote

the persons or property of the foreigners in question.15 . . . The occas

which troops have been landed have varied, although it has always bee

circumstances where the protective faculties of the local government ha

so weakened that the security of aliens, particularly nationals of the int

state, seemed so precarious that some measure of self-help was 

necessary.16 . . . While the landing of troops in the cases above mentio

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py p, y y

operations to effect their purpose.17

Vattel, Hall, and Borchard describe a legal regime which existed 

early 17th Century until the middle of the 20th Century. It was only wi

try into force of the U.N. Charter that an entirely new analytical f

was put into place, ostensibly outlawing the aggressive use of force, bu

ing the “inherent” right of self-defense. Although centuries of stat

were not entirely irrelevant, future uses of force to protect nationa

would have to be justified within the new Charter paradigm.

The first step in understanding this new framework is to review t

cant uses of force in the Charter era (post-1945), providing the fac

ground for testing theory and examining state practice.

Uses of Force in the Charter Era

United Kingdom Threatens Intervention in Iran—1946

When rioting broke out in Iran in the summer of 1946, less than a yea

Charter had entered into force, the British government was concern

safety of British residents working for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Compa

the permission of the Iraqi government,18 Britain dispatched a con

troops to Basra, Iraq, near the Iranian border. The U.K. also ord

warships to anchor off Basra. They did this “in order that they may b

for the protection, should the circumstances demand it, of Indian, B

Arab lives, and in order to safeguard Indian and British interests 

Persia, troops are being sent from India to Basra.”19 The rioting subs

no entry was necessary. The Iranian government still protested the 

force as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and an infrin

Iranian sovereignty.20 Britain responded that it would have interven

of a “grave emergency,”21 that is, if the Iranian government had been 

unwilling to protect the lives of British residents.

Second Threat of Intervention in Iran by U.K.—1951

The Iranian government precipitated another crisis when it nation

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. The British government o

feared that the heightened tensions between the two countries m

British residents in Iran at risk. Accordingly, the U.K. dispatche

warships to Iraqi waters, and deployed a number of combat aircraft 

bases within Iraq.22 British policy statements on the move were unusu

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and to the point. Foreign Secretary Morrison stated that Britain h

right and indeed the duty to protect British lives.”23 He went on to 

before the House of Commons:

As I have repeatedly informed the House, His Majesty’s government 

prepared to stand idly by if the lives of British nationals are in jeopardy. 

responsibility of the Persian government to see to it that law and or

maintained and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protecte

violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met it would equally 

right and duty of His Majesty’s government to extend protection to 

nationals.24

Iran, on the other hand, saw the positioning of air and naval forces ju

its own borders as a threat of force unwarranted by the situation. Ir

that the U.K. had no right to “intimidate” Iran,25 and that Iran was “c

the master of the situation.”26 Iran took this policy position one ste

and declared before a meeting of the Sixth Committee of the UN 

Assembly that even if British nationals had been mistreated, any 

intervene and protect them could not be justified as a lawful e

self-defense.27

The Cairo Riots—1952

A more subtle response to a more serious threat occurred in Janu

when large-scale rioting broke out in Cairo. This time, British pro

damaged and British lives were lost.28 In response, the U.K. dev

contingency plan to use its troops in the Suez Canal zone to move in 

and Alexandria to protect endangered British residents.29 Th

government communicated its willingness to take action in a diplom

on January 27th, stating that it held the government of Egypt fully re

for all damage to British property and any threat to the safety 

residents in Egypt. Further, the note warned, the U.K. reserved th

take whatever action was required to safeguard the lives and prop

nationals.30 The note had the desired effect, and the previously 

Egyptian army moved in to put down the rioters. Then-Foreign Secre

explained, “the belief that we had the forces and the conviction tha

prepared to use them were powerful arguments in prodding the Egyp

to quell the riots.”31

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Anglo

French Intervention in Egypt in 1956 (the Suez Crisis)

Fearing that their nationals were threatened by Israeli-Egyptia

October, 1956, Britain and France made a series of diplomatic ent

the belligerents to cease hostilities. When this course failed, the Britis

French bombed Egyptian airstrips near the Suez Canal and, four d

inserted a contingent of troops to occupy key points along the can

France emphasized other rationales, Britain relied heavily on the 

protect its own citizens abroad.32 The British Representative to 

speaking before the Security Council, said:

In Egypt there are many thousands of British and French nationals. The 

events which began with the Israel [sic] moves into Egypt has develop

hostilities and hostilities have created a disturbed situation. In 

circumstances, British and French lives must be safeguarded. I again em

. . . that we should certainly not want to keep any forces in the area 

moment longer than is necessary to protect our nationals.33

Then-Prime Minister Eden stated before the House of Commons tha

nothing . . . in the Charter which abrogates the right of a Governme

such steps as are essential to protect the lives of their citizens.”34 He w

explain that, when the Security Council was paralyzed by a veto (a

this case), that states had the right to intervene “in an emergency,” 

the lives of nationals abroad.35 He added that this right was base

inherent Article 51 right to self-defense,36 and that this right could be 

anticipatorily—that is, the injured state need not first receive the equ

an armed attack against its citizens before moving preemptively a

threat.37

Foreign Secretary Lloyd outlined three criteria for the lawful exer

right of protection of nationals abroad within the larger right of sel

first, that the nationals of the intervening state be under “an immin

of injury;” second, that there is a “failure or inability” by the local so

protect foreign citizens; and third, that the action of the intervenin

“strictly confined to the object of protecting the nationals against in

Finally, the Lord Chancellor, before the House of Lords, stated 

defence undoubtedly includes a situation in which the lives of a State’s 

abroad are threatened and it is necessary to intervene on that territor

protection.”39

In addition to this rationale, the British and the French also pursue

itary operation to maintain international freedom of navigation th

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canal, and to stop hostilities between Egypt and Israel.

The problem 

lapping justifications will reappear frequently in state practice.

The Belgian Intervention in the Congo—1960

Immediately upon declaring its independence from Belgium in July 

Congo’s army mutinied and touched off a week of rioting, loo

atrocities against foreign nationals.41 As the Congolese governm

completely unable to maintain order, Belgium ordered a cont

paratroopers already in the Congo to protect Belgian and other th

foreign nationals.42 Before the Security Council, the Belgian Amba

the UN stated that his government had “decided to intervene with 

purpose of ensuring the safety of European and other membe

population and of protecting human lives in general.”43 This ration

pure self-defense (protecting a state’s own nationals), collective se

(protecting other foreign nationals within another state), and hum

intervention (protecting the citizens of the threatened state).

In Security Council debate, France argued that the Belgian troops

of protecting lives and property is the direct result of the failure of th

lese authorities and is in accord with a recognized principle of inte

law, namely, intervention on humanitarian grounds.”44 Argentina 

support of the Belgian intervention not on the legality of self-defen

the moral imperative of the situation:

Now, we are convinced that the protection of the life and honour of ind

is a sacred duty to which all other considerations must yield. We cannot r

the Belgian government for having assumed this duty when Belgian n

were in danger. Any other State would have done the same thing.45

The United States was more guarded in its statements, and urged 

gium should withdraw once the UN had provided military forces to st

situation. In an interesting gloss on the doctrine of humanitarian inte

Belgium actually adopted the U.S. position in a statement that is a 

concise legal advocacy: Belgium would withdraw “its intervening 

soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations ensures the maint

order and the safety of persons.”46

United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic—1965

In April, 1965, the Constitutional Party forced the resignation of D

President Reid Cabral. Cabral’s National Reconstruction Go

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immediately organized to regain control of the country. By the e

month, the situation was sufficiently out of hand that the United S

compelled to land 400 Marines to evacuate American citizens a

foreign nationals from the country.47 According to U.S. Ambassador 

Adlai Stevenson,

In the absence of any governmental authority, Dominican law enforcem

military officials informed our Embassy that the situation was completel

control, that the police and the Government could no longer give any gu

concerning the safety of Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that 

immediate landing of United States forces could safeguard and protect t

of thousands of Americans and thousands of citizens of some thirt

countries.48

This introduces a hybrid form of invitation—less than the pure 

rendered by an invitation from the de jure sovereign, but more than 

unilateral decision to intervene based on an external analysis of the 

The warnings and requests of mid-to-high level officials of the def

arguably still lawful government fall squarely within this gray area. W

type of request does not forestall a legal analysis of the grounds for in

(as would an invitation from the sovereign), it does add weight to t

arguments establishing the state of chaos in a country, and there

weed out instances of purely pretextual intervention.

However valid the basis for forcible protection of nationals may ha

the outset, U.S. involvement quickly escalated and policy diversi

number of troops increased, their stay in-country was extended, a

quent government statements announced that the United States wa

prevent the establishment of a second communist government in the 

Hemisphere.49 To no one’s surprise, Britain supported the initial de

France was ambivalent, and Cuba was opposed.50

The Mayaguez Incident—1975

On May 12th, 1975, Cambodia seized an American merchant ship. C

claimed the Mayaguez was in its territorial waters, and on a spy mis

United States insisted that the ship had been in international wat

time of its seizure, and that it had not been on a spy mission. On Ma

U.S. demanded she be released within 24 hours. Cambodia did not c

the United States launched an airstrike against the facility at wh

being held. The Cambodians still did not comply, so on May 14th

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mounted a heliborne Marine infantry assault against the ship. This d

the desired result, and the ship and crew were freed.51

Between the airstrike on the 13th and the assault on the 14th, th

quested the assistance of the Secretary General of the UN in securi

lease of the ship. In the request, the U.S. reserved the right to t

measures as may be necessary to protect the lives of American cit

property, including appropriate measures of self-defense under Art

the UN Charter.”52

Cambodia condemned the assault, claiming it was “a brutal act 

sion.”53 Cambodia also stated that the attack was not militarily nec

that it had already begun preparations to release the ship.54 China s

Cambodia, labeling the assault an “act of piracy.”55 Algeria and Tha

condemned the attack, the latter because its bases had been used as 

area for the assault team.56

The Evacuation of U.S. Citizens from Lebanon—1976

When the long-running civil war in Lebanon reached a threshold th

the lives of the few Americans remaining in the country, the Unit

evacuated a small group to a warship on June 28th, 1976, and aga

27th.

57 Interestingly, the U.S. consulted no domestic authority befor

evacuation, but pursued a different course before the second. I

requesting the approval of the de jure Lebanese government, whose 

over events asymptotically approached irrelevance, the U.S. coordin

those actually in control of the territory—the PLO and seve

Palestinian groups.58 While this coordination, like that with the D

quasi-authorities eleven years earlier—had little influence on the 

legality of the operation, it did provide an improved chance of condu

operation with as few casualties as possible. In this case, no U.S. serv

Lebanese civilians were killed.59

The Israeli Raid on Entebbe—1976

On June 27th, 1976, a French airliner enroute from Tel Aviv to 

hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists. After a brief stop in Libya, th

flew to Uganda, where it was joined by six additional terrorists. The 

freed all of the non-Israeli passengers, and specifically threatened th

those who remained. The government of Uganda was at best uncoop

attempts to negotiate a settlement, and appeared to be providing supp

terrorists.60

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The evening of July 3

and 4, Israeli commandos stormed the m

nal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Killed were all of the terrorists 

holding 96 Israelis hostage, along with several hostages who stood 

middle of the melee, a number of Ugandan soldiers, and one Israeli co

To prevent pursuit, the Israelis also destroyed the operational Uganda

(approximately 10) on the tarmac.61

The unique aspect of this raid was that the nationals in question w

to the foreign country against their will.62 This suggests that the foreig

als concerned were less responsible for weighing the risks involved in 

to and living in the dangerous country in question. It is also more d

the intervening state to fashion a pretext in the rush of a terrorist e

over the course of a long-deteriorating civil situation. Finally, the a

quired to rescue people in a confined hostage setting are necessarily 

sive than to secure an area with a foreign capital against riots. Th

reasons appear to make intervention in the case of a terrorist event 

lematic than even traditional protection of nationals abroad.

Israel made a forceful case for its rescue mission at a meeting of th

Council on July 9th. It claimed that it had the right “to take military 

protect its nationals in mortal danger.”63 This right, Israel claimed, 

on the inherent right of self-defense, “enshrined in international law 

Charter of the United Nations,” and supported by state practice.64 Isr

that this exercise of self-defense met the standard of the Caroline case

sity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of mea

moment for deliberation.”65 Finally, Israel explained that the use of 

not directed at Uganda per se, and employed only as much force as w

sary to secure and extract its nationals.66

The United States was the only country to make a clear statemen

ing the legality of the Israeli raid. At the same Security Council me

U.S. first stated that the intervention was “a temporary breach of the 

integrity of Uganda.”67 While this sort of breach is normally considere

tion of the UN Charter, this case, the U.S. argued, fit within an e

“There is a well-established right,” said the U.S., “to use limited for

protection of one’s own nationals from an imminent threat of injury o

a situation where the State in whose territory they are located is eith

ing or unable to protect them.”68 The U.S. stated that this right flow

inherent right of self-defense and allows “necessary and appropriate

protect a nation’s own citizens.69 By these criteria, the U.S. conclude

on Entebbe was a lawful use of force under international law. The U

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the force used to be proportional to the limited goal of freeing the p

and the use of force had ended once this goal had been achieved.70

France also supported the Israeli intervention, in a manner of 

While stating that “at first sight . . . the surprise attack by an armed 

foreign airport for the purpose of achieving by violence an objective” 

to violate international law, the Israeli action had not been designed t

the territorial integrity or political independence of Uganda, but mere

lives.71 The French brought up an additional legal point, that the UN 

Assembly’s Resolution on the Definition of Aggression listed acts w

only prima facie evidence of acts of aggression, and that it was up to th

Council to determine if, “in the light of other relevant circumstance

sion had actually been committed.72

The French Threat to Intervene in the Western Sahara—1978

On October 25th, 1978, two French technicians were captured in M

by Polisario guerillas. Two days later, the French Defense Minister 

rule out a military raid to free them. A French parachute corps was 

Senegal, and French aircraft participated in airstrikes on Polisari

formations on December 12th, 13th, and 18th. On December 23rd

technicians were turned over to the UN Secretary General in 

Although the force was not applied in the form of a rescue mission, i

application had the desired result.

The Egyptian Raid on Larnaca—1978

The first non-Western use of force to protect nationals abroad was, 

learning experience for all involved. Egypt sent a planeful of comm

Larnaca, Cyprus, on February, 19th to free Egyptian and other hosta

the day before. Although the Egyptians received permission to land

not receive permission to storm the aircraft. The Cypriot author

successfully concluding negotiations with the terrorists, and the passe

begun to leave the aircraft, when the Egyptians decided to attack. Th

military opened fire on the Egyptians, arrested the terrorists, and h

hostages to safety.74

The Egyptians defended their actions less as the protection of 

abroad (although several of the hostages were Egyptian, and an Egy

been killed by the terrorists in the initial seizure of the hostages), an

an amorphous commitment “to fight terrorism and to bring all thos

such methods to justice.”75

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The U.S. Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran

1980

On the evening of 24-25 April, 1980, the United States launched a c

raid into Iran to rescue 50 hostages who had been held since Novem

the previous year. The raid ultimately failed due to weather, e

malfunction, and bad luck.

Although the hostage incident preoccupied the United States 

1979 to early 1981, and was responsible for an enormous amount of d

maneuvering, the specific question of using force in the protection of 

abroad was fairly straightforward. The ICJ decision in the hostages 

dered on May 24th, characterized the actions of the “students” holdin

tages as fairly educible to the Iranian government: “[T]he approva

these nacts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iran

and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupat

Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.”76 T

spective linking of the “students” actions to the Iranian State permit

against that state as though it had perpetrated those actions in the f

President Carter stated:

I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard America

to protect America’s national interests, and to reduce the tensions in th

that have been caused among many nations as the crisis continued. . 

mission . . . was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran

not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any fe

hostility toward Iran or its people.77

In his report to Congress, he declared: “In carrying out this oper

United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with A

of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens w

government of the territory in which they are located is unwilling or 

protect them.”78

While usual countries supported or condemned the raid in politi

the Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, echoing Reisman, provided 

nating legal comment:

There was . . . on the part of Iran alone an extremely serious infringemen

rules of international law. The State which falls a victim to such an infrin

has the power, under international law, to resort to self-help. Even the 

Nations Charter recognizes this right as inherent, the exercise of w

subordinate to the powers and duties conferred on the Security Coun

restoring the rule of law. But the Charter also recognizes the right 

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p

y p

must be aware of the responsibility it takes upon itself when vetoing a re

of the Security Council, by pointing the way to self-help.79

U.S. Intervention in Grenada—1983

On October 25th, 1983, the U.S. launched Operation Urgent Fur

amphibious and air assault on the island nation of Grenada. Th

response to an increasingly anarchic situation, precipitated earli

month by a coup d’etat against the island’s Marxist Prime Minister

Bishop, by hard-line members of his own government. On October 19

and scores of others were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to regain 

the island’s government. Later that same day, General Hudson Austi

the new “Revolutionary Military Council,” announced a four-day, 

shoot-on-sight curfew. Concerned for the safety of American tou

medical students on the island, and alarmed by the presence of a larg

of armed, Cuban paramilitary construction workers on the island (c

work on an airstrip large enough to support heavy military aircraft), t

States took action.80

Although the Grenadian operation appeared to have the class

predicate for a traditional forcible protection of nationals scenario, 

for two specific reasons. First, the operation was conducted at the 

the Governor-General of Grenada, whose constitutional authority, pa

in the absence of any other de jure government, was unsurpassed by 

claimant to power.81 Second, the operation was a textbook example 

tive self-defense, in that the United States’ assistance was forceful

gently requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

the fact that there appear to be three independently sufficient lega

tions for the U.S./OECS intervention, 79 governments expressed som

disapproval of the operation, and on November 2nd, the UN General 

voted 108 to 9 to condemn the intervention as a “violation of inte

law.”83 This was somewhat offset by the overwhelming support for t

tion shown by the people of Grenada.84

The U.S. Intervention in Panama—1989

Six years later, another small nation in the Western Hemisphere h

democratic election invalidated by a military strongman, and the lat

to local citizens and foreign nationals gradually escalated to una

levels. As Arend and Beck describe:

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, , 

code-named Operation ‘Just Cause.’ In a special press briefing given th

Secretary of State James Baker emphasized that the ‘leading objective’ of 

military action had been ‘to protect American lives.’ [footnote omitted] 

on D-Day, President Bush had tersely explained the rationale for his dec

use force: ‘Last Friday, [General Manuel] Noriega declared his 

dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and 

threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.’ On Saturday, ‘forces un

command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded a

arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman and then 

interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That, said the pr

‘was enough!’ [footnote omitted] It was time to act.85

Two factors make the analysis of the intervention more difficult. F

sheer scale of the operation: ten thousand American troops eventu

control of the entire country, removed the de facto head of state to 

trafficking charges in the U.S., and reinstalled the de jure, demo

elected government.86 Second, President Bush cited four overlapping 

tions for the intervention: “to safeguard the lives of Americans, to d

mocracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the in

the Panama Canal Treaty.”87 Of these, claimed Secretary of State B

protection of American lives was “the leading one.”88

Reaction to the invasion was generally negative—mildly so in Eu

stridently so in Latin America.89 The communist world was also co

tory, with the Soviet Union calling the operation “a violation of the U

tions Charter and of the universally accepted norms of behavior 

sovereign states.”90 China simply labeled it “a violation of internal la

United States, Britain, and France vetoed a Security Council resolu

demning the invasion.92

The U.S. Intervention in Liberia—1990

On August 5th, 1990, the United States landed 255 Marines in the 

capital of Monrovia to evacuate U.S. and any other nationals desirin

the country. This was in immediate response to an announcemen

before by rebel leader Prince Johnson, who called for the arrest of 

nationals in the capital. Johnson apparently wished to attract inte

attention to his rebel faction, and provoke an international respon

seven-month-old rebellion.93 In this, he was successful.

Without seeking or receiving permission from embattled Presiden

K. Doe or either of the rival rebel faction leaders, the Marines e

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approximately one thousand foreign nationals from Monrovia over a 

period.94 On August 24th, a West African peacekeeping force a

Monrovia to enforce a cease-fire.95

Professor Lillich drew this conclusion from the international com

reaction to the evacuation:

[T]he renewed assertion by the United States of the right of forcible pro

of its nationals during the Liberian disorder, the fact that hundreds o

foreign nationals from dozens of States were evacuated with what mu

been the enthusiastic (if not explicit) approval of their governments, 

near-complete absence of legal or other criticism of the rescue opera

combine to indicate that the international community, now more than 

the post-Cold War period, is prepared to accept, endorse or, at the ve

tolerate the forcible protection of nationals abroad in appropriate cases.

Theoretical Bases for Action

The two major theories addressing the legality of the use of for

protection of nationals abroad are the “restrictionist” theory, which 

such use of force as unlawful, and the “counter-restrictionist theory,” 

its name implies, holds the opposite view. Within the counter-res

theory, there are several intermingled sub-theories supporting th

premise of allowing intervention.

The Restrictionist Theory

This theory, which states that there is no lawful basis for the forcible p

of nationals abroad, rests on three assumptions. First, it assumes tha

principal goal of the United Nations is the maintenance of internatio

and security. Second, it holds that the UN has a monopoly on the law

force, with the narrow exception for self-defense in the case of armed 

the territory of a state. Third, it maintains that if states were permit

force to protect their nationals abroad, or for any other reason bey

individual or collective self-defense, they would broaden this narrow 

using it as a pretext for any desired policy ends.97

Restrictionists concede that, under the pre-Charter legal regime, 

have the right to use force unilaterally in the protection of their 

However, they say, this right was often abused, placing weak states at 

of stronger ones wishing to advance national policy through violenc

this practice, they conclude, the framers of the UN Charter specifi

lawed the unilateral use of force, except for the most obvious cases o

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self

defense against armed attack, and then only to the extent that th

Council had not yet acted. According to Ian Brownlie, “[t]he whole 

the Charter was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defens

to UN control.”98

Arend and Beck concisely summarize the textual basis for the res

argument:

For their rendition of the jus ad bellum, the restrictionists draw heavi

Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. In their view, the language of 

2(4) clearly indicates a general prohibition on the use of force by states. [f

omitted] No state is permitted to threaten or use force ‘against the te

integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inco

with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ Article 51, which prov

‘individual and collective self-defense,’ constitutes merely a narrow exce

the general prohibition of 2(4). [footnote omitted] States may 

themselves, restrictionists argue, but only after an actual ‘armed attac

state territory has occurred. [footnote omitted] Typical of the restriction

is that described by Waldcock, himself a counter-restrictionist: ‘2(4) p

entirely any threat of use of armed force between independent States ex

individual or collective self defense under Article 51 or in execution of co

measures under the Charter for maintaining or restoring peace.’ [f

omitted] The UN Charter’s prohibition, the French restrictionist 

suggests, has the broadest range it is possible to imagine.’ [footnote omi

The restrictionist theory, in its purest form, allows no use of force a

terrorist or other groups who are using force below the invasion-leve

mored column crossing a national border.

The Counter-Restrictionist Theory

The counter-restrictionist theory is actually a constellation of four ov

nonexclusive subtheories.

The first subtheory involves the survival or revival of the pre-Ch

tomary rule allowing forcible protection of nationals abroad. Derek B

gues for the survival of the customary rule. He believes that a read

Charter’s travaux preparatoires shows that the framers intended to pr

“inherent” right of self-defense, with the contours acquired from cust

ternational law up to that point. More persuasively for Bowett, stat

since the Charter was ratified has confirmed that a significant numbe

have exercised the right to protect nationals abroad, extending the c

international law norm into the present.100

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The other version of this subtheory holds that the norm has been 

the modern era. Arend and Beck explain:

In their view, the UN founders mistakenly assumed that ‘self-help’ w

longer be necessary ‘since an authoritative international organization 

now] provide the police facilities for enforcement of international 

[footnote omitted] Unfortunately for the international system, submit M

Reisman, Richard Lillich, and other scholars, the UN enforcement mech

have been confounded at virtually every turn by dissension among the S

Council’s permanent membership. [footnote omitted] Article 2(4)’s pro

on the threat or use of force, they assert, must hence be conditioned 

United Nations’ capacity to respond effectively. When the UN fails to 

customary law revives and states may intervene to protect nationals. [f

omitted]101

In summary, this subtheory posits that, whether it survived the 

force of the Charter, or was extinguished by it and later revived by 

mis-, or nonfeasance, the customary norm under international law p

the use of force in the protection of nationals abroad is alive today.1

The second subtheory describes the protection of nationals abroa

missible use of force below the Article 2(4) threshold. The article itse

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independen

state, or in any way inconsistent with the UN’s purposes.”103 Here, 

that Article 2(4) has two dimensions: a quantitative aspect rega

amount of violence or coercion, and a qualitative aspect regarding t

which the violence or coercion is directed. An oversimplified reading 

2(4) may leave the impression of a simple, and low, threshold, forb

uses or even threats of force not flowing from self-defense or Ch

authorization. The two-dimensional approach, however, keys on the 

“. . . against the territorial integrity or political independence of any s

A legitimate use of force in the protection of nationals abroad does n

hold territory, or threaten the government elected, or tolerated, by th

Such a use of force is qualitatively different, and not the type which th

of the Charter, with fresh memories of German and Japanese a

sought to circumscribe. A brief operation which, at its conclusion, ha

neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the 

ing state would not appear to have violated the qualitative prong of t

2(4) prohibition.104

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The third subtheory is a complement of the second; it holds that a 

even a single national abroad is the equivalent of an “armed attack” a

nation, allowing for a protective, and not punitive, response propo

the injury received or threatened. That is, the forcible protection of 

abroad is permissible self-defense under Article 51.105 Since Article 5

not to create, but to simply recognize, “the inherent right of self-defense,

restrictionists believe the Charter provides “a local habitation and a 

the customary right of the first subtheory. The problem with this subt

pears to be that, like Article 2(4), Article 51 has both qualitative and 

tive aspects. The former fits well with the first subtheory, in that an “

right could quite plausibly follow the contours of customary internat

The latter, however, suggests that there is a high threshold, “armed at

low which the use of force is inappropriate.

The counterargument to this last point is that it is difficult to im

the framers of the Charter would create a legal no-man’s land, where

state would be able to inflict violent injury, but the aggrieved state w

be able to respond in self-defense.106 The key to reconciling this 

lacuna is proportionality: self-defense operates across the spectrum of 

and a small “armed attack” against a national abroad may be met wit

sary and proportional nonpunitive response designed to protect t

from further harm. To the extent that Article 51 permits reactio

less-than-overwhelming uses of force, it demands a reciprocal limitati

scope, duration, and intensity of the protective response. The custom

national legal doctrines comprising the law of armed conflict—milit

sity, proportionality, and chivalry—provide these limitations eve

absence of an absolute prohibition by Article 51.

Finally, the fourth subtheory is grounded in a respect for human ri

cifically, McDougal and Reisman reject the restrictionist premise tha

has one overriding purpose, the maintenance of international peace 

rity. They argue that the UN has two such fundamental premises, eac

ing equal weight: the maintenance of international peace and securit

protection of human rights.107

This view is grounded in the Preamble, Articles 1, 55, and 56, a

and growing corpus of human rights law.108 Under this view, human 

lations are themselves threats to international peace and security. If 

rity Council fails to act under Chapter VII, McDougal and Reisman a

cumulative effect of articles 1, 55, and 56 [would be] to establish the 

unilateral self-help.”109

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Conclusion

This article defined forcible protection of nationals abroad, 

commentary on the concept by publicists from the late 18th Century 

of the pre-Charter era, and then surveyed the major uses of for

protection of nationals abroad during the Charter era.

Lessons of State Practice

Arend and Beck provide an outstanding structural review of state p

the Charter era. They examine four broad areas—the nature of in

states, the circumstances of intervention, the scope of intervention, 

justification for intervention—and explore subcriteria within each. F

analysis emerge several fascinating points about how states have 

nationals beyond their borders.110

The nature of the intervening states reveals two patterns: they hav

most exclusively Western, and there have been very few of them. Of t

sodes they describe, 13 involved the use of force by just four coun

United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. Generally, the

have been the only ones in a position to effectively project military p

troubled region.111

The circumstances of the intervention have varied considerably. T

ber of endangered nationals has ranged from the thousands (in the C

the Dominican Republic) to just two (in the Western Sahara). Th

mental situation has also varied, from the anarchy of no government 

beria, the Dominican Republic) to a malevolent government 

threatening the nationals concerned (Uganda, Iran). The nationalit

wise varied, from the rescue of own-country nationals (Entebbe, Ma

the evacuation of all foreign nationals in a troubled area (the Cong

Grenada). Interestingly, almost all such operations have occurred in 

were, until the Charter era, under “Great Power” protection, usually 

colonies. Iran, Palestine, Egypt, Cambodia, the Congo, the Dominica

lic, Lebanon, Uganda, the Western Sahara, Grenada, Panama—all w

varying degrees of Great Power control until recently. This resulted in 

ations: the turbulence which often accompanies recent independen

power which is both familiar with and, in a moral sense, responsible fo

mer territory.112

The scope of the intervention ran the gamut from brief excursions 

in minutes (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to months-long stays (the Dominica

lic, Egypt). The longer-term operations, however, were only initially 

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ized as the protection of nationals abroad. Once that phase of the 

had passed, new missions with new justifications took their place. The 

tective missions were extremely limited in the territorial scope, temp

tion, and military intensity of their effects.113

Finally, the state justifications for the interventions varied as w

states have relied on multiple rationales for their operations, with th

tion of nationals near the top of the list in most cases. However, as o

lengthened or diversified, new justifications would be advanced onc

tionals sought to be protected were secure.114

A Coherent Legal Model for the Protection of Nationals Abroad

The four subtheories advanced by the counter-restrictionists eac

helpful elements. A model which includes the most authoritative por

four would provide a solid legal basis for undertaking such operatio

Charter era.115

The first subtheory, regarding the survival or revival of the c

norm allowing protection of nationals, is perhaps best understood as 

sis of the two. To the extent that such an understanding does not ru

the plain language of the Charter, it appears that a narrowly const

of self-defense did survive the entry into force of the Charter, and t

line of customary international law informs its use today. The secon

of this argument, however, is the more controversial. To the exten

UN did not deliver on the security it promised in return for a limitati

national exercise of self-defense, that inherent right must necessari

to meet the new threats. Without violating the plain meaning of the 

nations should and must protect their citizens when no another 

national or international, is willing or able. In this sense, this addit

tion of the inherent right of self-defense has been revived as the UN 

proved incapable, as an organization, of maintaining international p

security.

The second subtheory, that such actions are below the qualitative 

of Article 2(4), is a close call, but, in the case of a pure rescue operat

cord with the facts. If no territory is held, and if the political structure 

terially threatened, it is difficult to argue that a rescue operation b

2(4) threshold.

The third subtheory, that such operations are lawful exercises of 

ent right of self-defense, guaranteed by Article 51, is perhaps the str

gument. By allowing the threshold of an “armed attack” to float at th

the provocation, a militarily necessary, proportionate, and chivalrou

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will guarantee compliance with international law. If a single citizen is 

harm’s way, and only that force necessary to bring her to safety is e

then the protecting nation has gained no military advantage over the 

ing nation, the status quo is maintained, and international peace an

are preserved. Again, it is difficult to see how such an outcome violat

ject and purpose of the Charter, or the intentions of its framers.

Finally, the fourth subtheory argues for the equality of human righ

ternational peace and security. Since the framing of the Charter

learned more and more about the nature of regimes which threaten 

tional peace and security. None of these governments have the req

spect for the individual which is the basis for civil protections agains

Far from being in tension with international peace and security, hum

are very much the foundation of international peace and security. A 

the Charter which places these two concepts in opposition is, cons

not, of greater service to the Benito Mussolinis of history than the 

Roosevelts.

Notes

1. Benito Mussolini, quoted by Gen. Smedley D. Butler, reprinted in THE POCKE

QUOTATIONS 379 (Henry Davidoff ed., 1952).

2. Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in BARBARA TUCHMAN, PRACTICING HISTORY 

3. Rev. Jesse Jackson, remarks on Nightline, December 15, 1987.

4. ANTHONY CLARK AREND AND ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AN

OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 94 (1993).

5. Id. Ronzitti further restricts the scope of consent with several criteria:

First of all, consent must come from an authority whose expression of will is asc

to the local State. ... Secondly, the expression of will of the local State must b

not vitiated by the so-called ‘vices de volonte.’. . . [T]he consent of the injure

must not only not be given by error, obtained by fraud, or procured by coerc

must also comply with the territorial sovereign’s internal provisions reg

competence to be bound. ... Thirdly, the action by the intervening State m

strictly confined to the limits of the consent given by the local sovereign. Th

whose nationals are in mortal danger, even if it is permitted to enter foreign te

is not automatically allowed to resort to force, if it lacks authorization to do 

Moreover, the action of the intervening State must not infringe upon the r

which a State is duty bound not as regards a particular subject of international 

as regards the international community as a whole. ... [T]he consent of th

cannot function as an erga omnes defence. ... Finally, the consent must 

contrary to a peremptory rule of international law. [footnotes omitted]

NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY 

AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 84-86 (1985). Ronzitti contin

that treaties are a valid vehicle of consent: “Practice shows that, by virtue of a trea

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gy yg y 

without the treaty so providing, is sometimes given. [footnote omitted] Id. at 

examination of treaty-based intervention, see David Wippman, Treaty-Based Interve

Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1995).

6. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 94. See also RONZITTI, supra note 5 

Ronzitti also addresses the use of force against pirates and slavers. Id. at 137-141.

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (J. Chitty ed. 1883). See also Lo

International Law and Basic Human Rights, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOH

MOORE EDS, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: RE

INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, V

588 (1980). Professor Sohn traces the use of force in the protection of nationals abr

far as the 11th Century. Id.

10. E. VATTEL, supra note 9 at 165.

11. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL,ATREATISE ON THE FOREIGN POWERS AND JU

OF THE BRITISH CROWN 2 (1894). Hall continues, describing the connection b

sovereign and the subject, and the sovereign’s power over the subject:

The legal relations by which a person is encompassed in his country of bir

residence cannot be wholly put aside when he goes abroad for a time; many of t

which he may do outside his native state have inevitable consequences within 

may for many purposes be temporarily under the control of another sovereign t

own, and he may be bound to yield to a foreign government a large mea

obedience; but his own state still possess a right to his allegiance; he is still an i

member of the national community. A state therefore can enact laws, enjoin

forbidding acts, and defining legal relations, which oblige its subjects abr

common with those within its dominions. It can declare under what condition

regard as valid acts, done in foreign countries, which profess to have legal effect

visit others with penalties; it can estimate the circumstances and facts as it ch

Id.

12. Id. at 3.

13. Id. at 4.

14. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS A

(1928).

15. Id. at 448.

16. Id. at 450. Borchard lists the bases for intervention:

Among the various purposes for which troops and marines have been landed, 

following: [footnote omitted] (1) for the simple protection of American citi

disturbed localities, the activity of the troops being in the nature of police duty; [fo

omitted] (2) for the punishment of natives for the murder or injury of American 

in semi-civilized or backward countries; [footnote omitted] (3) for the suppression 

riots, and the restoration and preservation of order; [footnote omitted] (4) 

collection of indemnities, either with or without the delivery of a previous ultim

[footnote omitted] (5) for the seizure of custom-houses, as security for the paym

claims; [footnote omitted] and for purposes such as the maintenance of a 

government, the destruction of pirates infesting certain areas, and other objects.

Id. at 449-50.

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18. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 95.

19. RONZITTI, supra note 4, at 26.

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id. at 26-27.

24. Id. at 27.

25. Id.

26. Id.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 27-28.

29. Id. at 28. The troops were present in the Canal Zone pursuant to a trea

government of Egypt, signed on August 26, 1936. Id.

30. Id.

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. Id. at 29.

35. Id. Foreign Secretary Lloyd echoed this comment before the House of Com

added that the Security Council was, in any case, incapable of taking swift and decisive 

36. Id.

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 96.

41. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 30.

42. Id

43. Id.

44. Id. at 31.

45. Id. at 32.

46. Id. at 31. Two other instances in Africa, both in 1964, do not meet th

protection of nationals abroad in that they were undertaken with the approval 

sovereign. This, of course, renders the action a cooperative one between nations, 

intervention with adversary sovereigns.

The first was the evacuation of British citizens in Zanzibar, following a coup d’eta

sultan. The new government quietly invited the British, who had dispatched a wa

area, to evacuate its own citizens. Id. at 32.

The second incident was a joint U.S. – Belgian operation, again in the Congo, to re

nationals from rebels. AREND AND BECK supra note 4, at 97. According to Profe

diplomacy and alternative measures had gotten nowhere: “[T]he United Nations 

down in debate upon it. They finally decided to let the Organization of African Unit

do something: they tried and they were very, very unsuccessful.” Richard B. Lilli

Self-Help Under International Law, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON M

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTER

LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, VOL. 62, 587, 

[hereinafter Forcible Self-Help]. The subsequent intervention was highly succ

conducted with the permission of the Congo’s government. However, this situatio

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pgg

operation, but after it had been set in motion, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba ov

The practical effect of the post hoc withdrawal of permission was negligible, but it d

emphasize the role of timing in such operations. M. Akehurst, The Use of Forc

Nationals Abroad, INT’L REL. 5: 7 (1977). Professor Sohn noted that, while the s

mission was strictly limited to rescue of the hostages, a certain amount of force was 

effect their release: “In the process of rescuing them, the army of rebellion was m

destroyed, but that was purely incidental.” Sohn, supra note 9, at 597.

47. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 33. Ronzitti states that “ the island was, to all ef

throes of anarchy.” Id.

48. AREND AND BECK, supra note 5, at 397-98.

49. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 33.

50. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 98.

51. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 35-36.

52. Id. at 36.

53. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 98.

54. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 36.

55. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 98.

56. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 36.

57. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 97-98.

58. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 99.

59. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 37.

60. Id.

61. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 99.

62. Id.

63. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 37.

64. Id.

65. Id.

66. Id.

67. 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976), quoted in 

Lillich, Introduction to Volume II: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General In

Legal Issues, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS, U.S. N

COLLEGE INTERNATIONAl LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, VOL. 62, IX, XI (1980) [hereinafter Int

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Id.

71. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 38.

72. Id.

73. Id. at 40.

74. Id. at 40-41.

75. Id. at 41.

76. Id. at 44.

77. Id. This Presidential Statement places an unusual emphasis on feelings. The 

present at a White House conversation, when a participant in the rescue mission wa

would have killed the Iranian “student” guarding the three Americans he had been 

recover. “Let’s just say,” replied the commando, “that meeting me would have been 

emotional event in his life.” Notes of conversation on file with the author.

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[Under Reisman’s theory,] [t]he Charter does not abrogate a State’s right to re

self-help, including the use of armed force, which belongs to it under cus

international law. The Charter simply suspends the right to resort to self-help, 

entrusts the Security Council with the task of safeguarding the rights of m

States. Whenever this mechanism does not function, for example when the ac

the Security Council is paralysed by veto, the States are free to resort to se

under the terms permitted by customary international law.

Id.

79. Id. at 46.

80. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 101. See generally John Norton Moore, G

the International Double Standard, 78 A. J. I. L. 145 (1984) and Ronald M. Riggs, T

Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1985).

81. Moore, supra note 80, at 148 and 159-61. Moore explains:

Constitutional niceties of internal authority are difficult to construct when th

general Constitution of a nation has been previously suspended in express viola

its provisions and a subsequent attempted coup has announced the dissolution 

Government that suspended the Constitution but was unable to consolidate ef

power. It does seem clear in this setting, however, that the authority 

Governor-General to represent Grenada was stronger than that of anyone els

Id. at 159.

82. Id. at 147-48.

83. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 101. President Reagan reporte

condemnatory General Assembly vote had not “upset my breakfast at all.” Id.

84. Moore, supra note 80, at 151-53. Moore quotes the results of a CBS 

conducted on November 6th: 62% felt the Americans had come “to save the lives o

living here,” 65% said they believed the airport under construction was being built fo

Soviet military purposes, 76% stated they believed Cuba wanted to take con

Grenadian government, 81% said the American troops were “courteous and consid

stated they felt they or their family were in danger while General Austin was in pow

they felt the American purpose in invading was to “free the people of Grenada from t

and 91% were “glad the Americans came to Grenada.” Id. at 152.

85. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 93. Professor Lillich recommended th

additional sources on the invasion of Panama:

Compare Abraham Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Pana

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 28

Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Vio

in: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 199

See also Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Respo

Tyranny, in AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 516; Tom Farer, Panama: Beyond the C

Paradigm, in: AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 503; Ved Nanda, The Validity of the United 

Intervention in Panama Under International Law, in: AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 49

Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, in: Yale JIL, v

1990, 276; James P. Terry, The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Pol

Naval War College Review, vol. 43, 1990, no. 4, 110; Panel, The Panama Revo

in: American Society of International Law Proceedings (ASIL Proc.), vol. 84

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of Panama, in: Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. ILJ), vol. 31, 1990, 

Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian “Incid

1990, 35 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 206 

[hereinafter Liberia].

86. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 102.

87. Id.

88. Id.

89. Id.

90. Id.

91. Id.

92. Id.

93. Id.

94. Id. Included in the evacuated were French, Canadian, Italian, Lebanese, an

citizens. Id.

95. Id. at 102-103. For a more in-depth treatment of the incident, see Richa

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian “Incident” of 1990, 3

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1993). Lillich, supra note 85, at 205.

96. Lillich, Liberia, supra note 85, at 222-23.

97. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 105. See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 2

98. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 106.

99. Id.

100. Id. at 107.

101. Id. Reisman himself continues: “A rational and contemporary interpreta

Charter must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self-help [only] insofar as the o

can assume the role of enforcer.” When the UN fails in its mission “self-help prerogat

[footnote omitted]. Any interpretation which fails to take this into account w

provide “an invitation to lawbreakers who would anticipate a paralysis in the Securi

decision dynamics.” Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in C. Black and R

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 3: 850 (1971), quoted in A

BECK, supra note 4, at 107-08.

102. Professor McDougal summarized this position eloquently:

[T]he first important fact is that the machinery for collective police 

projected by the Charter has never been implemented. We don’t have the 

forces for the United Nations, the collective machinery that was expected to 

self-help. In other words, there has been a failure in certain of the major provisi

implementing the Charter.

If, in the light of this failure, we consider how we can implement the pr

purposes of minimizing coercion, of insuring that states do not profit by coerci

violence, I submit to you that it is simply to honor lawlessness to hold th

members of one state can, with impunity, attack the nationals—individuals

aircraft or other assets—of other states without any fear of response. In the abs

collective machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would sugge

the principle of major purpose requires an interpretation which would honor se

against prior unlawfulness. The principle of subsequent conduct would ce

confirm this. . . .

255

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ygy g

28-29 (Dec. 1967), quoted in Lillich, Introduction, supra note 67, at XI.

103. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 108.

104. But see RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 8-9.

105. Riggs, supra note 80, at 24.

106. Ronzitti acknowledges the problem of assuming that an “armed attack” can 

aggressive international war:

[P]ractice shows that, when a State intends to wrongfully use armed coercion, 

so in one of two ways: i) by using force against the territory of another State, o

exerting armed coercion within its own territory against foreign instrumentaliti

embassies) or citizens (individuals or State organs, such as foreign represent

Whereas in the former case the victim may react in self-defence, in the latter 

not possible, since it is declared that there has been no ‘armed attack’.

RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 66. He continues:

[I]n recent years, particularly unpleasant episodes have repeatedly occurred, 

the taking of hostages, and transnational terrorism. These events are the cau

continual state of danger. Unless the international community acquires s

instruments, capable of preventing and representing [sic] such criminal 

resorting to unilateral armed force is likely to continue to increase on the part o

States whose nationals become the victims of terrorist attacks, in order to 

vacuum created by the lack of effective control mechanisms.

Id.

107. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 23

108. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. Arend and Beck summarize Mc

Reisman’s position:

The Preamble’s “repeated emphasis upon the common interests in human 

argue Reisman and McDougal, “indicates that the use of force for the 

protection of such rights is no less authorized than other forms of self-help,” [fo

omitted] Under Article 1(3), they suggest, “promoting and encouraging resp

human rights” is set out as a fundamental purpose of the United Nations. [fo

omitted] Similarly, Article 55 of the Charter points to the UN objective of pro

“human rights” observance, while Article 56 authorizes “joint and separate act

Members] in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the pu

set out in Article 55.” [footnote omitted]

Id.

109. Id. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. See also RONZITTI, supra note 5

110. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 103.

111. Id.

112. Id. at 103-04.

113. Id. at 104.

114. Id.

115. Riggs, supra note 80, at 25-33.

256

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Bibliography

Akehurst, M., The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, INT’L REL. 5: 7 (1977

AREND, ANTHONY CLARK AND ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND T

FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 94 (1993)

Borchard, Edwin M., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 446 (1928)

D’Amato, Anthony, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, A

1990, 516

Davidoff, Henry ed., THE POCKET BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 379 (1952)

Farer, Tom, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 503

HALL, WILLIAM EDWARD, A TREATISE ON THE FOREIGN POWERS AND JURISD

THE BRITISH CROWN 2 (1894)

Henkin, Louis, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gros

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 293

Jackson, Rev. Jesse, Remarks on Nightline, December 15, 1987

Lillich, Richard B., Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian “Incide

35 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1993)

Lillich, Richard B., Introduction to Volume II: The Use of Force, Human Rights, a

International Legal Issues, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOOR

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNAT

FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, Vol. 62, IX, XI (1980)

Lillich, Richard B., Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, in RICHARD B. L

JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LA

READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 

VOL. 62, IX, XI (1980)

Moore, John Norton, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AJIL. 14

Nanda, Ved, The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama Under In

Law, AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 494

Panel, The Panama Revolution, American Society of International Law Proceed

Proc.), vol. 84, 1990, 182

Quigley, John,The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, Yale JIL, vol. 15

Recent Developments, International Intervention—The United States Invasion 

Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. ILJ), vol. 31, 1990, 633

Reisman, Michael, Sanctions and Enforcement, in C. Black and R. Falk (eds) The F

International Legal Order, 3: 850 (1971)

Riggs, Ronald M., The Grenada Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L. REV. 

Ronzitti, Natalino, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and I

on Grounds of Humanity 26 (1985)

Sofaer, Abraham, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, Columbi

Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 281

Sohn, Louis B., International Law and Basic Human Rights, in Richard B. Lillic

Norton Moore eds, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies: R

International Law from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, Vol. 62, 587, 5

Terry, James P., The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, Naval W

Review, vol. 43, 1990, no. 4, 110

Tuchman, Barbara, Practicing History 115 (1981)

Vattel, E., The Law of Nations 161 (J. Chitty ed. 1883)

Wippman, David, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev

257

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Index

A

Abarenda, USS: 154

Abéché, Chad: 105

Abyssinia: 9, 27–28

Accessory Transit Company: 120, 121–22

Accioly, H.: 19–20

Act for The Government of the Navy of the United States, An (1799): 188, 190

Adams, USS: 133

Adoula, Cyrille: 50

Aizpuru: 131, 132

Al-Matni, Nasib il: 44

Albania: 33–34

Albany, USS: 166

Alexandria, Egypt: 130, 234

Algeria: 237, 240

Alliance, USS: 131

Almy, Admiral: 129

Amapala, Honduras: 149–50, 168

American Cable Company: 153

American Mission compounds in China: 165–66

Ancon, Panama: 147

Anderson, Admiral: 167

Angles: 2

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: 233

Angola: 125

Apia, Samoa: 132, 140–41

Arab League: 44

Arab nationalism: 43–44

Arend, Anthony Clark: 230, 242, 244–45, 247

Argentina: 10, 25–26, 99, 117–18, 119, 133, 236

Arias, General Desiderio: 161

Aristodemus: 2

Ariston of Tyre: 2

Army of Cuba Pacification: 148

Asheville, USS: 168

Asiatic Fleet: 154, 155, 170, 174–75

Asiatic Squadron: 126

Aspinwall (Colon), Panama: 128

Atlanta, USS: 137, 144

Atlantic Squadron: 131

Attican law: 1–2

Attwood, William: 51, 54–55

Austin, General Hudson: 241

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Austria-Hungary: 31

B

Baker, James: 106, 242–43

Balmaceda: 133–34

Baltimore, USS: 133, 135–37

Bani-Sadr: 65

Barbary States: 4

Barnard, Philippe: 106

Basra, Iraq: 233

Bayard, Secretary of State: 14

Beck, Robert J.: 230, 242, 244–45, 247

Beirut, Lebanon: 44, 46–47, 48–49, 144

Belgium: 247

and the Congo: 49–57, 98–99, 235–36

and Rwanda: 104–05, 107

and Zaire: 100–101, 105–07

Belknap, Commander: 129–30

Bell, John: 27–28

Bell, Rear Admiral: 126

Benham, Rear Admiral: 135

Bennett, W. Tapley: 60–61

Benoit, Colonel: 60

Berard, M.: 99

Bigelow, Lt. A.: 119

Bishop, Maurice: 241

Blockades: 199–200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208–09, 210–11, 212–13, 215, 219

of Argentina: 25–26

of Venezuela: 33

Bluefields, Nicaragua: 135, 140, 149, 174, 175

Bluntschli, J. M.: 7, 8–10, 28

Bocas del Toro, Panama: 137, 143

Bond, Karl I.: 106

Bonfils, H.: 10, 18, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33

Bonilla: 144

Borchard, Edwin: 14–15, 32, 232

Borland, Solon: 121

Bosch, Juan: 57–59, 60

Boston, USS: 134

Bowett, Derek: 35, 245

Boxer, USS: 59, 60

Boxer Protocol of 1901: 142

Boxer Rebellion: 15–16, 31–32, 141–42

Brandywine: 118

Brazil: 26, 134–35

260

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British Navy regulations: 188–89, 190, 191, 199

Brooklyn, USS: 144

Brown: 72

Brown, Admiral George: 133

Brownlie, Ian: 36–37, 244

Buenos Aires, Argentina: 25, 117–18, 119, 133

Buffalo, USS: 158

Bush, George: 242–43

Butler, General Smedley D.: 229

Butterfield & Swire’s residence (China): 154

C

Caamano, Francisco: 60

Cabral, Reid: 236

Cairo, Egypt: 234

Calancha: 126

Callao, Peru: 118

Camagüey, Cuba: 162–63

Cambodia: 237, 248

Cameron, Capt. C. Duncan: 27–28

Cameroon: 108

Camp Nicholson, China: 157

Canada: 107

Canton, China: 123–24, 168, 180

Cap-Haïtien, Haiti: 159, 160

Caperton, Admiral: 160

Caracas, Venezuela: 33

Carlson, Paul: 51

Caroline case: 14, 239

Carter, Jimmy: 64, 66, 71–72, 240–41

Carthage: 2

Cartiguenave: 161

Cave, Stephen: 30

Central African Republic: 108

Chad: 101–02, 103, 105

Chadwich, Rear Admiral French E.: 146

Chamorro, General: 174

Chamoun, Camille: 43, 44, 45–46, 47

Chang Tso-lin: 170–71

Chapei, China: 158, 177

Charleston, USS: 136

Chaumont, USS: 180

Chebab, General: 44, 46

Chemulpo, Korea: 132, 135–36

Chiang Kai-shek: 179

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Chin Kiang, China: 153, 179

China: 237, 243. See also particular cities

interventions in during the Boxer Rebellion: 15–16, 31–32, 141–42

interventions in during the Chinese Revolution of 1911: 151–55, 157, 158, 161

165–68, 169–71, 172–73, 174–75, 176–80

Japanese occupation of: 18–19, 35–36

and Russia: 163

U.S. intervention in: 120–21, 122, 124–25, 136–37, 139, 151–55, 157, 158, 161

165–68, 169–71, 172–73, 174–75, 176–80

Chinwangtao, China: 166, 174–75

Chiujio, Higashi Kuze: 128

Cholma, Honduras: 148

Christians

and the Barbary States: 4

in Lebanon: 42–48

missionaries: 14

protection of: 13–14, 135–36, 151–52, 154, 157, 165–66, 168

and right of forcible protection: 2

Christmas, General: 50

Christopher, W.: 70, 72

Chung King, China: 163

Ciaris Estero, Mexico: 158

Cienfuegos, Cuba: 147–48

Cincinnati, USS: 143, 154

Civil war or insurrection and right of protection of nationals in the affected State: 

Civil War (United States): 10, 198

Civil wars

in China: 15, 16, 31–32, 141–42, 151–55, 157, 158, 161, 163, 165–68, 169–71, 

174–75, 176–80

in the Congo: 49–57

in the Dominican Republic: 59–63

in Guatemala: 165

in Haiti: 159–61

in Lebanon: 44, 46–47, 48–49, 238

in Nicaragua: 175–76

in Venezuela: 16, 33

Claes, Willy: 106

Clark, Commander: 131

Clark, J. Reuben: 13, 14, 29

Clark, Ramsey: 64

Cleveland, Grover: 134

Cleveland, USS: 164

Cold War: 43–44

Colombia: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131–32, 137, 142–43, 144–45

Colombo: 241

Colon: 131

262

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Columbia, USS: 135

Concentration camps

in Cuba: 138–39

Congo: 49–57, 98–99, 235–36, 247–48

Congo Republic (Brazzaville): 54

Constantinople, Turkey: 32, 157

Contractual claims, right to protect nationals in foreign countries regarding: 11–12

Convention of Lebanon (1861): 26–27

Coolidge, Calvin: 176

Corfu: 18–19, 33–34

Corinto, Nicaragua: 137–38, 156, 175

Cotton, Admiral: 144

Covenant of the League of Nations: 36

Creditors of foreign governments, right to protect nationals who are: 8, 10, 11–12, 15

32–33

Cromwell, Captain: 137

Cuba: 138–39, 147–48, 155–56, 162–63, 237, 241

Cumae: 2

Cyane, USS: 120, 121

Cyprus: 240

Czechoslovakia: 36–37, 163

D

da Gama, Admiral: 134–35

Damascus, Syria: 34–35

David, King of the Sandwich Islands: 129–30

Dávila, Miguel: 149, 150

Davis, Rear Admiral: 127

Dawson, Thomas C.: 150

de Lesseps, Ferdinand: 29

Déby, Irdiss: 105

Decatur, USS: 153

Dehaene, Jean-Luc: 106

Demetrius, King: 4

Denver, USS: 168–69, 172

Detroit, USS: 135, 136, 140, 145–46

Díaz, Adolfo: 175

Dillard: 67

Dillingham, Commander: 145–46

Diplomatic personnel, protection of

in Argentina: 119, 133

in China: 15, 16, 31–32, 120–21, 122, 136–37, 141–42, 152, 153, 154, 161, 163

170, 171, 177–78, 180

in the Dominican Republic: 161–62

in Egypt: 130

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in Haiti: 159, 160

in Hawaii: 133

in Honduras: 168–69

in Nicaragua: 156, 157, 166

in Panama: 126, 137

in Peru: 118

in Russia: 163

in Samoa: 140–41

in Smyrna: 167

in Turkey: 157

Dixon, Pierce: 98

Doe, Samuel K.: 243

Dole, Sanford B.: 134

Dominican Republic: 57–63, 70, 144, 145–46, 147, 161–62, 236–37, 248

Don Pacifico case: 9–10

Dubuque, USS: 149

Dumas, Roland: 104

Duncan, Capt.: 117

Dunn, Frederick: 18

E

Eden, Anthony: 234, 235

Egan, Patrick: 133

Egypt: 10, 11, 29–30, 43, 44, 97, 98, 130, 234–35, 240, 248

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 45–46, 48

Eisenhower Doctrine: 43–44

El Cuero, Cuba: 155–56

Elcano, USS: 154, 164, 175

Elf-Aquitaine oil refinery: 103–04

Elis: 2

Emerald, HMS: 178–79

Emma, Dowager Queen of the Sandwich Islands: 130

Entebbe, Uganda: 41, 67, 97, 238–39, 248

Essex, USS: 132

Estaing, Giscard d’: 101

Estrada, General Juan J.: 148, 149

European State system: 1

Evacuations of foreigners

from the Central African Republic: 108

from Chad: 105

from China: 151–52, 153, 154, 176, 177, 178–79, 180

from the Congo: 49–57, 98–99, 105–06

from the Dominican Republic: 59–63, 236–37

from the Falkland Islands: 117

from Lebanon: 238

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from Mexico: 158

from Rwanda: 107

from Samoa: 141

from Zaire: 106–07

F

Fabriga: 123

Falkland Islands: 117

Falmouth: 124

Fauchille, P.: 16, 27, 32, 33

Fish, Hamilton: 11–12

Flores: 127

Foochow, China: 153, 167–68

Foote, Cmdr. A. H.: 123–24

Forcible protection of nationals abroad

Belgium in the Congo: 49–57

collective action to provide: 16, 19, 41–42, 46, 47, 52, 107, 127, 242

drawbacks to: 10, 31, 33

definition of: 30

Great Britain in China: 120–21, 123–24, 137

Great Britain in Egypt: 234–35

Great Britain in Iran: 233–34

Great Britain in Nicaragua: 140

Great Britain in Panama: 126

Mayaquez incident: 237

need for congressional authorization of: 15

United States in Angola: 125

United States in Argentina: 117–18

United States in Brazil: 134–35

United States in Chile: 133–34

United States in China: 120–21, 122, 123–25, 136–37, 139, 141–42, 151–55, 1

161, 163, 164, 165–68, 169–71, 172–73, 174–75, 176–80

United States in Columbia: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, 142–43

United States in the Congo: 51–57

United States in Cuba: 147–48, 155–56, 162–63

United States in the Dominican Republic: 57–63, 144, 145–46, 147, 161–62, 23

United States in Egypt: 130

Unites States in Grenada: 241–42

United States in Guatemala: 165

United States in Haiti: 133, 159–61

United States in Hawaii: 133, 134

United States in Honduras: 144, 148, 149–50, 164, 168–69, 170, 172

United States in Japan: 126–27, 128

United States in Korea: 132, 135–36

United States in Lebanon: 42, 45–49, 238

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United States in Mexico: 130, 158

United States in Morocco: 146–47

United States in Nicaragua: 120, 135, 137–38, 140, 144, 149, 156–57, 174, 175

United States in Panama: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, 142–43, 144–45, 147, 1

242–43

United States in Peru: 118, 119

United States in Russia: 163–64

United States in Samoa: 132, 140–41

United States in Soviet Union: 163–64

United States in Syria: 144

United States in Turkey: 157

United States in Uruguay: 122–23, 124, 127

used as an excuse for political and/or economic intervention: 26, 35–36, 62–63

237, 242–43, 248

in Zaire: 100–101, 106–07

Formosa: 16

France: 2, 36, 41, 42, 43, 99, 163, 236, 237, 239, 243, 247

action against Mexico: 10, 15–16, 26–27

and Argentina: 119

blockade of Argentina ports: 10, 25–26

and the Central African Republic: 108

and Chad: 101–02, 103, 105

and China: 31–32, 137, 169, 171, 172–73

and Egypt: 10, 11, 29–30, 234–35

and Gabon: 103–04

and Haiti: 159, 160

and Japan: 127, 128

and Mauritania: 99–100, 101, 103, 239–40

and the Ottoman Empire: 11, 34–35

and Panama: 142–43

and Portugal: 30–31

and Rwanda: 104–05, 107

and Turkey: 32–33, 157

and Zaire: 100–101, 105–07

Friedmann: 63

Frolinat (front de libération rationale du Tchad): 99–100

Fulbright, William: 62–63

G

Gabon: 103–04, 108

Galena, USS: 131

Galley, Robert: 102

Garcia: 137

Garibaldi, Giuseppe: 17

Garnet, R.: 44

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yp

Germantown: 122–23

Germany: 16, 31–32, 33, 36–37, 107, 130, 132, 137, 140, 149–50, 157, 159, 161

Ghotbzadeh: 65

Gilmer, Commander W. W.: 149

Godfrain, M. Jacques: 108

Gold Star, USS: 174–75

Gómez, José Miguel: 155

Gonaïves, Haiti: 160

Gonzalez, General: 130

Gowland, Daniel: 117

Great Britain: 36, 43, 99, 146, 237, 243, 247

and Abyssinia; 9, 27–28

action against Mexico: 15–16, 26–27

and Argentina: 25, 26, 119

and China: 31–32, 120–21, 123–24, 137, 163, 167, 169, 172–73, 174, 176, 177, 

and Corfu: 33–34

and Egypt: 10, 11, 29–30, 97, 98, 130, 234–35

and Honduras: 29, 149–50

and Iran: 233–34

and Japan: 127, 128

and Nicaragua: 137–38, 140

and the Ottoman Empire: 11

and Palmerston Circular of 1848: 8

and Panama: 125, 142–43

reply to the King of Prussia (1753): 7

and Russia: 163

and Samoa: 140–41

and the Suez Canal: 29–30, 43, 97, 98

and Turkey: 157

and Uruguay: 24

and Venezuela: 16, 33

Greece

conflicts with Turkey: 10, 167

and Corfu: 18–19, 34

early law: 1–2

Grenada: 241–42, 248

Grenada, Nicaragua: 175

Greytown, Nicaragua: 120, 121–22

Grotius, H.: 1–3, 4, 7, 8, 20

Grundy: 51, 55

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: 155–56

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua: 176

Guatemala: 165

Guatemala City, Guatemala: 165

Guiringaud, Louis de: 101, 102, 103

Gutierrez, General Lopez: 164

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Habré, Hissène: 105

Habyarimana: 104

Hackett Medical College: 180

Haig Reserve School: 171

Haiti: 133, 159–61

Hall, William Edward: 231–32

Hancock, USS: 159–60

Hankow, China: 152, 172–73, 176, 179

Harriet: 117

Havana, Cuba: 147–48

Hawaii: 129–30, 133, 134

Hay, John: 146–47

Helena, USS: 153

Henry VIII: 189

Hindmarsh, A.: 18–19, 34, 36

Hiogo, Japan: 125–26

Hobard, Earle: 177–78

Hodges, Henry: 13–14

Hollins, Commander: 121, 122

Homer: 2

Honduras: 16, 29, 144, 148, 149–50, 164, 168–69, 170, 172

Honolulu, Hawaii: 134

Hostages

Americans held as: 50–57, 63–73, 240–41

attempted rescues of: 65–73, 240–41

Belgians held as: 50–57

British subjects held as: 50–52

Egyptians held as: 240

French held as: 99–100, 103–04, 239–40

Indians held as: 50–51, 52, 53

Italians held as: 50–52

Israelis held as: 238–39

Pakistanis held as: 50–51, 52, 53

rescues of: 523–57, 103–04, 238–40

taken in the Congo: 50–57

taken in Gabon: 103–04

taken in Iran: 63–73, 240–41

taken in Mauritania: 99–100, 239–40

taken in Morocco: 146–47

Human rights violations: 247, 249

Humanitarian missions: 230, 235–36

in the Congo: 52–53, 54–55, 57, 99

in Iran: 66

in Mauritania: 100

and the Spanish-American War: 138–39

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in Zaire: 106

Huron, USS: 166, 167, 171

Hyde, Charles Cheney: 16, 32

I

Ichang, China: 175, 176

Iliad: 2

Impressment of sailors: 189

India: 158, 233

International Committee of the Red Cross: 51

International Court of Justice: 64–65, 67–68, 71, 240

International Defense Force (in China): 172

International Export Company: 161, 172

International law, principles of justifying a state’s protection of nationals abroad. 

forcible protection and international law; United Nations Charter.

Iowa, USS: 142

Iran: 63–73, 233–34, 240–41, 248

Iraq: 45–46, 48, 233

Iroquois, USS: 126, 127

Isabel, USS: 179

Ismail: 30

Israel: 41, 67, 97, 234–35, 238–39, 248

Italy: 16, 18–19, 31, 33–34, 99, 107, 127, 128, 137, 157, 169, 241

Izmir, Turkey: 167

J

Jackson, Jesse: 230

Jamestown, USS: 126

Japan: 18–19, 31, 35–36, 108, 126–27, 128, 136–37, 139, 141, 158, 163, 167, 169, 

174, 177, 178, 180

Jiménez, Juan Isidro: 161–62

John D. Ford, USS: 172, 179

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 52, 57–58, 60, 61–63

Johnson, Prince: 243

Johnson Administration: 58

Johnson Doctrine: 62

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 65

Jones, Lieutenant Commander Hilary P.: 147

Jouett, Admiral: 131–32

Justice, denial of, as basis for protection of citizens abroad: 1–2, 4–5, 7, 9, 11, 13–1

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Kansas, USS: 160

Kanza, Thomas: 51

Karlsbad Program: 36

Katanga: 49–50, 98–99, 100–101, 105–06

Kautz, Rear Admiral Albert: 140

Kearsarge, USS: 133

Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928: 36

Kelly, Commodore: 120

Kennedy Administration: 57–58

Kentucky Island, China: 157

Kerr: 46

Khomeini, Ayatollah: 64, 70, 240

Kigali, Rwanda: 104, 107

Kindu, the Congo: 50, 51

Kinshasa, Zaire: 105, 106–07

Kisembo, Angola: 125

Kiukiang, China: 154, 164, 173, 174, 176

Kolwezi, Zaire: 100–101, 105–06

Korea: 132, 135–36, 146

Kuan, China: 167

Kutwo: 176

L

La Ceiba, Honduras: 148, 150, 168, 169, 170, 172

La Curva, Honduras: 164

Lackawanna, USS: 130

Laguna, Honduras: 148, 164

Lakeside, China: 165

Larnaca, Cyprus: 240

Latin America, U.S. intervention in: 15. See also particular countries.

Law of Nations: 12

Le Suchet: 142–43

League of Nations: 34, 35–36, 42

Lebanon: 42–49, 108, 238, 248

Leblanc, Admiral: 25

Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, by Potter: 47–48

Leprette, M. Jacques: 100

Letters-of-marque: 2, 198, 200, 201–02

Levant: 123–24

Levell, Dr.: 165

Lexington: 117

Li Yüan-hung: 157, 166

Liao River: 136

Liberia: 243, 248

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Liliukalani, Queen of Hawaii: 134

Lillich, Richard B.: 229, 243, 245

Lima, Peru: 118

Lloyd, Selwyn: 98, 235

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 46

Lumumba: 99

Lynch, Cmdr. W. F.: 122–23

Lytton Commission: 35–36

M

Machang, China: 166, 167

Machias, USS: 136, 142, 143

Madriz, José: 149

Malietoa Tanu: 140–41

Malik, Charles: 44–45

Managua, Nicaragua: 156, 157, 166, 174, 175

Manchu Dynasty: 151

Manchuria: 18–19, 35–36, 170–71

Marblehead, USS: 135

Marcy, Secretary of State: 121

Marietta, USS: 140, 148–50

Marion, USS: 125

Martens: 104

Masü Island, China: 168

Mataafa: 132, 140–41

Matachin, Panama: 131–32

Matamoros, Mexico: 130

Mauritania: 99–101, 103, 239–40, 247–48

Maximilian, Archduke Ferdinand, of Austria: 10, 27

Maximo Jeraz: 149

Mayaguez: 67, 237, 248

Mazapon, Honduras: 169

McCalla, Commanderr: 132

McClintock, Robert: 46

McCrea, Lieutenant Commander: 142, 143

McDougal, Myers: 247

McKeever, Commodore Isaac: 118, 119

McKinley, William: 138–39

Mello, Admiral: 134–35

Mena, General Luis: 156

Merchant vessels, protection of: 203, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 

Merewether, Col. W. L.: 28

Mervine, Commodore: 123

Methodist missions: 154

Mexico: 10, 15–16, 26–27, 130, 158

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Millon, Charles: 108

Missionaries

murdered in China: 141

murdered in the Congo: 51

protection of: 13–14, 135–36, 151–52, 154, 165–66, 168

Mississippi, USS: 124–25

Mobutu: 106–07

Monocacy, USS: 127, 137

Monroe Doctrine:15

Monrovia, Liberia: 243

Monte Cristi, Dominican Republic: 162

Monterey, USS: 154

Montevideo, Uruguay: 122–23, 124, 127

Moore, John Bassett: 12

Morocco: 146–47

Morozow, Judge: 68–69

Morrison, Herbert: 233

Mukden, China: 35

Munich agreement of 30 September 1938: 36

Murphy, Robert: 47, 48–49

Muslims in Lebanon: 42–43

Mussolini, Benito: 34, 229

Mytilini: 32–33

N

Nagasaki, Japan: 127

Nanda: 63

Nanking, China: 152, 153, 155, 161, 172, 177–79

Nantai, China: 168

Napier, Robert: 28

Napoleon: 10

Nasser, Gamal: 43

National Command Authority: 224, 225

Nationals in foreign countries

diplomatic protection of: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 30, 32, 33, 36, 65

domiciliary: 8, 11, 29–30

transient: 8, 11

Naval force, right to use to protect nationals abroad: 13, 14–15, 16, 18–19. See also U

Navy Regulations.

Navassa Island: 133

Navassa Phosphate Company: 133

Navy of The United Colonies of North America, Rules for the Regulation of The (

Navy of the United States, An Act for The Government of the: 190

Nawa, Vice Admiral: 158

N’Djamena, Chad: 102, 103, 105

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Nestor: 2

Netherlands: 107, 128, 177

New Orleans, Louisiana: 10

New Orleans, USS: 153, 164

New York: 146

Neward, USS: 142

Newchwang, China: 136

Niagara, USS: 165

Nicaragua: 15, 16, 120, 121–22, 135, 137–38, 140, 144, 148, 149, 156–57, 166, 174

Nicholson, Admiral: 157

Nicholson, Lieutenant: 123

Niigata, Japan: 128

Nimitz, USS: 65–66

Ning-Po, China: 122

Niobe: 29

Nipe Bay, Cuba: 155

Nipsic, USS: 132

Noa, USS: 177–79

Noriega, Manuel: 242

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 16

Norway: 140

O

Obregoso: 118

Offutt, Milton: 17–18

Olivier, M.: 102

Omoa, Honduras: 29

Oneida, USS: 126

Operation Almandin II: 108

Operation Just Cause: 242–43

Operation Lamentin: 100, 101

Operation Requin: 104

Operation Tacaud: 02

Operation Urgent Fury: 241

Oppenheim, L.: 12, 18

Oregon, USS: 142

Oreste: 159

Organization of African Unity: 54–56

Ad Hod Commission on the Congo: 51

Organization of American States (OAS): 57, 61, 62

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States: 242

Ottoman Empire: 11, 34–35, 42

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Pacific Mail Line: 131

Pacific Squadron: 123, 140

Paducah, USS: 148, 149

Pagoda, China: 168

Palestinians: 238–39, 248

Palma, Thomas Estrade: 147–48

Palmerston Circular of 1848: 8, 10

Panama: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131–32, 137, 142–43, 144–45, 147, 173, 242–43

Panama Canal: 145, 173

Panama City, Panama 125, 131–32, 142–43, 173

Panama Railroad: 125, 129, 131–32, 142–43, 145

Panther, USS: 143

Pao Ting Fu, China: 32

Patassé, Félix: 108

Paulis, the Congo: 50, 52, 56

Pearl Lagoon, Nicaragua: 175

Peking, China: 31–32, 137, 139, 141–42, 152, 154, 166, 167, 170–71

Pelew Islands: 14

Pendleton, John S.: 119

Penobscot, USS: 128

Perdicaris, Ion: 146–47, 229

Perry, Commodore Matthew C.: 120

Peru: 118, 119

Petrel, USS: 136

Philadelphia, USS: 140–41

Philippine Division: 152

Phillimore, R.: 7–8

Pierce, Franklin: 122

Piscatagua, USS: 128

Plowden, Walter: 27–28

Plymouth: 120

Poland: 99

Pompey, USS: 155

Potential injury, right of a State to protect citizens abroad against: 2, 235

Port-au-Prince, Haiti: 159, 160

Port-de-Paix, Haiti: 159

Port-Gentil, Gabon: 103

Porter, Cmdr. William D.: 125

Portsmouth: 123–24

Portugal and France: 30–31

Portuguese Railway Company: 30–31

Portuguese West Africa: 125

Potter: 47–48

Pradier-Fodere, F.: 11, 18, 30

Prestan: 131

Preston, USS: 178

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Property rights and State’s right of forcible protection: 10, 33, 138

Prussia: 127, 128

Prussia, King of: 7

Pruyn, Robert H.: 126

Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua: 175

Puerto Cortés, Honduras: 144, 148, 150, 164, 169

Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic: 146

Puntas Arenas, Nicaragua: 120, 121

Q

Qubain, F.: 46–47

Quiros, USS: 161, 165

R

Railroads, U.S. intervention to protect in Panama: 125, 129, 131–32, 142–43, 145

Rainbow, USS: 157

Raisuli, Sherif Mulai: 146–47, 229

Rama, Nicaragua: 175

Rassam, Hormuzd: 28

Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea (1772): 188–8

199

Reid Cabral, Donald: 58–59

Reisman, Michael: 241, 245, 247

Remedial measures open to a protecting State: 1–2

Rendjambe, Joseph: 103

Reprisals: 12, 19, 35, 141, 199, 202

Retortion: 12, 199

Reyes, General John P.: 140

Richardson Construction Company: 158

Right of forcible protection

acceptable measures that may be taken: 14

and Accioly: 19–20

and Arend: 230, 242, 244–45, 247

and Beck: 230, 242, 244–45, 247

and Bluntschli: 8–9

and Bonfils: 10

and Borchard: 14–15

and Clark: 13

counter-restrictionist theory: 243–44, 245–49

criteria for exercise of: 4–5, 7, 9, 12, 18, 98, 231–32, 235, 239, 247

and Dunn: 18

and Fauchille: 15–16

Grotius and: 2–3, 4

and Hindmarsh: 18–19

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and Hodges: 13–14

and Hyde: 16

and international law: 8, 9, 13, 14–16, 17–19, 20, 28, 29, 32, 41–42, 47–49, 62–

97, 98, 187–88, 232–33, 234–35, 236, 239, 241, 242,243–49

and Moore: 12

and Offutt: 17–18

and Oppenheim: 12

potential abuses of: 18–19, 36–37, 63, 70–71, 98

and Pradier-Fodere: 11

restrictionist theory: 243–45

and Stockton: 12–13

and Vattel: 3

and Winfield: 16–17

and Wolff: 3

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 134–35

Rio Grande Bar, Nicaragua: 175

Rizal, USS: 167–68

Robeson, George M.: 198

Rochester, USS: 170

Roman Empire: 2, 4

Ronzitti, N.: 69

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 142, 161

Roosevelt, Theodore: 146–48, 229

Royalist, HMS: 140–41

Rules for the Regulation of The Navy of The United Colonies of North America 

190

Russia: 31, 137, 157

Russian Island: 164

Russian Revolution of 1917: 163

Russo-Japanese War: 146

Rwanda: 104–05, 107

S

Sacasa, Roberto: 135

Sacramento, USS: 171

Said, Mohammed: 29

St. Lawrence, USS: 124

St. Louis, Falkland Islands: 117

Saint-Marc, Haiti: 160

St. Mary’s, USS: 125, 126

Salaverry, General: 118

Sam, Vilburn Guillâume: 150

Samar, USS: 164

Samoa: 132, 140–41

San Francisco, USS: 133, 144

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San Jacinto, USS: 124

San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua: 120, 121–22, 140

San Juan del Sue, Nicaragua: 138

San Lorenzo, Honduras: 169

San Pedro, Honduras: 148, 150

Sandwich Islands: 129–30

Santiago, Dominican Republic: 162

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: 58, 59, 60, 63, 144, 146, 147, 161–62

Saratoga, USS: 154

Saxons: 2

Schachter, O.: 69, 70–71, 72

Schwarzenberg, Prince: 9–10

Scorpion, USS: 147, 157

Second Expeditionary Force: 171

Secretary of the Navy: 154, 188, 193, 194, 198, 200, 203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 

219, 220, 224, 225

Senegal: 108, 239–40

Seoul, Korea: 132, 135–36, 146

Seward, William: 11–12

Seymour, Admiral: 31

Shanghai, China: 120–21, 122, 124–25, 158, 166, 169–71, 176, 177, 178, 180

Shanghai Volunteer Corps: 169

Shark: 119

Shenandoah, USS: 127

Ship transportation, U.S. protection of in Panama: 128, 129

Shu-cheng, General Pi: 177

Siciliy: 17

Sino-Japanese War: 135–37, 139

Slater, J.: 59, 60

Smyrna: 167

Solari, Admiral Emilio: 34

South Manchurian Railway: 35

Sovereign, rights of the: 2–5

Soviet Union: 43–44, 64, 99, 163–64, 243

Spain

action against Mexico: 10, 15–16, 26–27

and China: 137

and the Spanish-American War: 138–39

Spanish-American Iron Works: 155

Spanish-American War: 138–39

Standard Fruit and Steamship Company168

Standard Oil Company: 152, 177–78, 179

Stanleyville, the Congo: 50–51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57

State responsibility to protect citizens abroad: 1–2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 17–18, 20, 99, 23

Steedman, Admiral: 129

Stein: 67–68, 71

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J

Stevenson, Adlai: 51, 52, 55–56, 57, 236

Stewart, USS: 173

Stimson, Henry: 176

Stockton, Charles H.: 12–13

Stracber, General: 29

Strauss, Admiral: 167

Sudetenland: 36–37

Suez Canal: 29–30, 43, 97, 98, 234–35

Sugar plantations: 148

Sun Yat-sun: 151

Supply, USS: 153

Sutherland, Admiral: 156

Swatow, China: 154, 161

Sweden: 140

Swink, Captain Roy C.: 166

Syria: 34–35, 42, 43, 44, 144

T

Tacoma, USS: 149–50, 159, 165

Taft, William Howard: 147–48

Taku, China: 31–32, 152, 154, 166, 180

Tamasese: 132

Tangier, Morocco: 146

Tarazi, Judge: 69

Tarquins: 2

Tegucigalpa, Honduras: 168, 169

Tehran, Iran: 63–64, 66

Tela, Honduras: 168, 170

Tellini, General Enrico: 34

Terrorist operations: 238–39, 240, 245

Thailand: 237

Théodore: 159, 160

Theodore, Emperor of Abyssinia: 27–28

Tientsin, China: 31–32, 136–37, 139, 142, 154, 167, 170–71, 173, 179–80

Tindemans: 101

Tokyo, Japan: 126

Toncontín, Honduras: 169

Torres, Colonel: 145

Trujillo, Honduras: 148

Trujillo, Rafael: 57

Tsao Kun: 169, 170

Tshisekedi: 106

Tshombe, Moise: 50, 54, 55

Tuan, Marshal: 170–71

Tungchow, China: 166, 167, 170

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Tunisia: 99

Turkey: 10, 14, 32, 33, 157, 167

Tuscarora, USS: 129–30

Tyntuke Bay, Russia: 164

Tyre: 2

U

Uganda: 104, 238–39, 248

United Arab Republic: 44–45

United Nations: 16, 244

Commission of Inquiry: 65

and Dominican Republic: 62

multinational force in Rwanda: 107

Secretary General: 237, 240

United Nations Charter: 41, 223, 232–33, 235, 239, 243, 244, 247, 248–49

Article 2(4): 36–37, 41–42, 48, 68, 69, 187, 233, 244, 245–46, 249

Article 39: 64, 98

Article 40: 98

Article 41: 64, 98

Article 51: 41–42, 46, 47, 48, 66–67, 68, 69, 73, 97, 98, 103, 187, 235, 237, 241

246–47, 249

Chapter VII: 246, 247

United Nations General Assembly

meetings: 234

Resolution on the Definition of Aggression: 239

votes: 242

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 45

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC): 49–50, 236

United Nations Security Council

and the Congo: 49–50, 51, 52, 53, 55–56, 98–99, 235–36

and Egypt: 234–35

and Entebbe: 239

failure to act: 244, 245, 247, 248–49

and forcible protection of nationals: 130, 239, 241, 243

and Iran: 64, 66, 67

and Israel: 239

and Lebanon: 44–45, 46

and Mauritania: 100

and Panama: 243

Resolution 872: 107

United Province of Rio de la Plata: 25

U.S. consulates

guards for: 18, 119, 120–21, 122, 126, 127, 130, 132, 133–34, 135–37, 139, 140

144, 146–48, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159, 161–62, 163, 165, 166, 167–68, 170,

177–78, 180

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U.S. Department of State

and Cuba: 155

and the Dominican Republic: 59

and Haiti: 159–60

and Lebanon: 45

and Nicaragua: 175

and rescue of hostages in the Congo: 52

and right to forcibly protect nationals abroad: 13

United States Intervention in Lebanon, The, by Wright: 48

U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: 155–56, 163

United States Navy Regulations: 187, 189

1802: 191

1814: 192, 193

1818: 192–93

1821: 93–94, 196

1841: 194

1853: 194–95

1858: 195

1863: 195–96, 197

1865: 196–97, 199

1869: 197–200, 201–02, 204–05

1870: 200–202, 204–05

1876: 202, 204–05, 206

1893: 203–06, 208, 219

1896: 206–08, 210

1900 and 1905: 208–10, 212

1909: 210–12, 214, 215

1913: 212–15, 217

1920: 215–17, 219, 220

1948: 204, 217–20, 221, 222, 223

1973: 187, 188, 220–23, 225–26

1990: 187, 188, 198–99, 223–26

Upshur, USS: 165

Urena, Rafael Molina: 58, 60

Uruguay: 122–23, 124, 127

Usbecks: 4

V

Valparaiso, Chile: 133–34

Vattel, E.: 1, 3–5, 8, 11, 20, 231, 232

Venezuela: 16, 33

Vera Cruz, Mexico: 26, 27

Vernet, Louis: 117

Victor Emmanuel II: 17

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Vladivostok, Russia: 163, 164

W

Waldcock: 245

Waldheim, Kurt: 100

Washington, USS: 160

Weissman, S.: 57

Wessin, General Wessin y: 59, 60

Western Sahara: 239–40, 247–48. See also Mauritania.

Westlake, J.: 11–12

Wheeling, USS: 159

Wigny, M. Pierre: 99

Williams, J. E.: 178

Wilson, Huntington: 156

Winfield: 16–17

Wingfield, Thomas C.: 229

Wisconsin, USS: 143

Wolff, C.: 1, 3, 20

Wolsey, HMS: 178, 179

Wolverine, HMS: 179

Woodfred, Cuba: 155

Woolsey, Commodore M. T.: 118

Woosung, China: 124–25, 153

World War I: 33–34

Wright: 47, 48

Wuchang, China: 151–52

Wuchow, China: 165

Wuchow People’s Mission Hospital: 165

Wuhu, China: 152, 153

Y

Yangtze Valley, China: 170–71, 172

Yedo (Tokyo), Japan: 125

Yenkow, China: 136

Yingtze, China: 136

Yochow, China: 154, 165

Yokohama, Japan: 127, 128

Yorktown, USS: 136

Young: 50

Yu-hsiang, Feng: 171

Yüan Shinkai: 151, 157

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Zaire: 49–57, 100–101, 105–07

Zamor, General: 159

Zelaya, José Santos: 135, 137–38, 140, 156

Zouérate, Mauritania: 99–100, 101

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