AD 1979 

CO MBATSTUIESINSTITUTE

E T

PROLOGUS

AN TEACTS

LITTLE BIGHORN RIVER 

WEIR POINT 

MEDICINE TAIL COULEE

CEDAR COULEE

LUCE RIDGE 

AtlasoftheSiouxWars


SecondEdition
 Edition

Charles Charles D.Collins, Collins, Jr.


North 

Sgt Kanipe 

(1515) 

THE 

FLATS 

RENO 

1443 

FORD 

A 1453 

CUSTER 

1513 - 1515 1503 

Tptr. Martin 

1523 - 1534 (1534) 

Custer 7(-) 

1505 

SCT 7 1520

Custer THE VALLEY 

1513 

Reno 7 

SCT 7 

Pony FORD B Herd 1 

Dr.WilliamGlenn Robertson, Robertson, Consulting Consulting Editor


D

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 

U

S
Cover Photos: “Portrait of Maj. Gen. (as of 15 April 1865) George A. Custer, Officer of the Federal Army.” Between 

1860 and 1865. Selected Civil War Photographs, 1861–65, American Memory Collections, Library of Congress. 

Portrait of Sitting Bull, National Archives, National Park Service website. 
AD 1979 

CO MBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

Atlas of the Sioux Wars


Second Edition


by


Charles D. Collins, Jr.


Consulting Editor


Dr. William Glenn Robertson


Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 

October 2006 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Collins, Charles D., 1955­

Atlas of the Sioux wars / by Charles D. Collins, Jr. ; consulting editor, Dr. William Glenn Robertson. -- 2nd ed. 

p. cm. 

1. Indians of North America--Wars--1862-1877--Maps. 2. Dakota Indians--Wars--1862-1877--Maps. I. Robertson, William Glenn, 1944- II. Title. 

G1201.S55C6 2006


978.004'97--dc22


2006042407 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office


Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800


Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001


ISBN 0-16-076845-4
Foreword


In June 1992, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) conducted the first Sioux 

Wars Staff Ride for Brigadier General William M. Steele, Deputy Commandant 

of the US Army Command and General Staff College. In September 1992, 

Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Dr. Jerold E. Brown, Major William M. Campsey, 

and Major Scott R. McMeen published the first edition of the Atlas of the Sioux 

Wars . Their work represented a modest effort to rectify the omission of 

the Indian Wars in the West Point atlas series by examining the Army’s 

campaigns against the Sioux Indians, one of the greatest Indian tribes of the 

American West. The atlas has since served as an educational reference for 

hundreds of students of US Army campaigns against the Sioux during the 

conduct of dozens of Sioux Wars staff rides. 

In 1992, CSI and the authors believed that soldiers serving in the post-Cold 

War Army could easily identify with the situation faced by soldiers of the postCivil War Army. In both cases, the most serious threat to the nation’s 

security had suddenly vanished, and the Army’s very purpose was energetically 

debated. Meanwhile, many in political life and in the US Congress saw the 

change as an opportunity to reduce funding and other resources for a standing 

army—a longstanding trend in American political life. The Army’s senior 

leaders, therefore, coped with the twin problems of mission definition and 

Draconian resource constraints. The Army’s junior leaders of that era struggled 

to prescribe and execute proper training. Yet, conflict generated by civilian 

encroachment on Indian lands as part of America’s rapid Westward expansion 

increasingly dragged the Army into conflict with the Indian tribes. 

The Army found itself pulled in many directions as it was simultaneously 

directed to protect Indian lands from civilian encroachment while ordered to take 

strong measures to protect civilians against Indian tribes who desperately fought 

to maintain their land and culture. Combat veterans of the Civil War quickly 

discovered that finding and fighting Indian warriors was dramatically different 

from forming large battle lines across relatively confined battlegrounds. Having 

spent the past 4 years waging a conventional, high-intensity conflict, the Army 

suddenly had to learn techniques of warfare suited to an unconventional, lowintensity environment. 

The relevance of the Sioux Wars for today’s Army is even more evident in 

2006 than it was in 1992.As with the campaigns against the Sioux from the 1860s 

to the 1890s, early 21st century operations array the conventional forces of the 

US Army against the unconventional forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Sioux 

campaigns are replete with valuable lessons for the professional soldier. The 

operations were operationally and tactically complex, unfamiliar terrain and 

logistics dramatically affected the multiphase engagements, and every operation 

took place in a complex political and cultural environment of shifting priorities. 

A serious study of the campaigns offers today’s officers the opportunity to 

compare, contrast, and, most importantly, to discover the threads of continuity 

linking the unconventional warfare of the 21st century with that of their 19th 

century forebears. 

The Atlas of the Sioux Wars, Second Edition , could not have been completed 

without the diligence of the original authors. As with the First Edition , section I 

deals with the difficulties of using volunteer forces to quell the rebellion of a 

suppressed people in the 1862 Minnesota Campaign. Additional material has 

been added for the Grattan Affair of 1854 and the continuation of the Minnesota 

Campaigns in 1863 and 1864. Section II, as before, deals with the 1866–68 Sioux 

War in Wyoming and Montana. It is the story of securing a fixed route of travel 

through hostile territory with limited resources. In this section, we have 

expanded the discussion of the Connor Expedition and added new material on the 

Fetterman and Wagon Box Fights not available in 1992. Section III discusses the 

conflict of 1876 and encompasses one of the largest and most ambitious missions 

conducted by the Army during the Indian Wars. Again, new material which was 

not available to the 1992 authors has been added. A closing section was added to 

discuss the Army’s final operations against the Sioux in 1890 and the tragic 

encounter at Wounded Knee. The most notable addition to the Second Edition of 

the atlas is the inclusion of 37 all new, color maps. 

While historical analogies are always fraught with danger, many of the 

difficulties faced by US soldiers fighting today parallel the tactical and 

operational dilemmas faced by soldiers fighting during the Indian Wars. Our goal 

is to learn from the experiences of these 19th-century soldiers. Thus, reflecting 

on the words of respected Indian Wars Historian Robert M. Utley, “A century of 

Indian warfare should have taught us much about dealing with people who did 

not fight in conventional ways, and our military tradition might reasonably have 

been expected to reflect the lessons thus learned.” CSI—The Past is Prologue! 

Timothy R. Reese 

Colonel, Armor 

Director, Combat Studies Institute 

Acknowledgments


I wish to acknowledge many people who made the publication of this work 

possible and thank them for their efforts. First, because this is an update of the 

original atlas published in 1992, I thank Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Dr. Jerold 

E. Brown, Major William M. Campsey, and Major Scott R. McMeen for a strong 

foundation on which to build. I would also like to thank my two editors: first, my 

wife, Judy, who made the careful initial edit of my very rough first drafts and 

continually encouraged clarification and other needed improvements, and, of 

course, Ms. Betty Weigand, Combat Studies Institute editor, who diligently and 

good-naturedly combed the drafts of the text and remarkably improved the 

narratives and maps. I also thank Mr. Charles A. Martinson III, a graphic artist 

with the Fort Leavenworth Multimedia/Visual Information Service Center, who 

polished the final draft into a professional package for publication. 

I would also like to thank Dr. Robertson for his years of mentoring me during 

my study of the Sioux Wars. Without his help and insights, I would not have been 

able to complete this work or, more importantly, successfully teach the Sioux 

Wars elective at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). In 

addition, I would like to thank all of the members of the Staff Ride Team for their 

support and help in this project, especially Lieutenant Colonel Paul Gardner. 

Paul and I spent countless hours walking the rolling hills of Wyoming and 

Montana, reading the words of the battle participants, and discussing the events 

of the Sioux Wars. Likewise, I express my gratitude to all of the personnel 

involved in researching, interpreting, and preserving the various battlefields 

included in the ride. This group includes the members of the National Park 

Service (NPS), specifically those from the Little Bighorn Battlefield and Fort 

Laramie; the Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks Department for the Rosebud 

Battlefield; and the tremendously helpful professionals at the Fort Phil Kearny 

State Historic Site. Finally, I offer my special thanks to the many Wyoming and 

Montana ranchers who allowed us access to their land for this study and 

generously allow us each year onto their property for the conduct of the CGSC’s 

annual Sioux Wars Staff Ride. 

On a personal note, I offer my heartfelt thanks to my family, who have always 

supported me with my many staff rides to the Sioux Wars battlefields and other 

great battlefields. It has been such a great experience that it is hard for me to think 

of it as work. 

Charles D. Collins, Jr.


Historian, Combat Studies Institute


Contents


Foreword 

Acknowledgments 

I.	 Introduction


Map 1. The Sioux and the Great Plains


Map 2. The Grattan Affair, 1854–55


Map 3. Minnesota Sioux Uprising, August 1862


Map 4. The Sioux Campaigns of 1863 and 1864


II.	 The Sioux War of 1866 –
68


Map 5. The Bozeman Trail and the Connor Expedition


Map 6. The Bozeman Trail Forts, 1866 – 68


Map 7. Fort Phil Kearny Besieged 

Map 8. The Fetterman Fight: The Approach 

Map 9. The Fetterman Fight: The Pursuit and Ambush 

Map 10. The Fetterman Fight: The Cavalry Fight and Fetterman’s Last Stand 

Map 11. The Hayfield Fight, 1 August 1867 

Map 12. The Wagon Box Fight, 2 August 1867 

III. The Great Sioux War of 1876 – 77


Map 13. The Northern Plains, 1868 –
75


Map 14. Sheridan’s Campaign Plan


Map 15. Crook’s March to the Powder River


Map 16. Battle of Powder River


Map 17. Converging Columns, 1 April–9 June 1876


Map 18. Crooks Advance to the Rosebud


Map 19. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Sioux and Cheyenne Attack, 0800 to 0830


Map 20. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crook’s Counterattack, 0830 to 0930


Map 21. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crook’s Dilemma, 0930 to 1030


Map 22. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Strike for the Village, 1030 to 1130


Map 23. The Battle of the Rosebud: The End of the Battle, 1130 to 1330


Map 24. Terry’s Campaign, 10–24 June


Map 25. Custer’s Approach to the Crow’s Nest


Map 26. Custer’s Approach to the Little Bighorn


Map 27. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Reno’s Attack in the Valley, 1500 to 1533


Map 28. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Losing the Initiative, 1533 to 1553


Map 29. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Disaster in the Valley, 1553 to 1627


Map 30. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Weir’s Advance and Reno Hill


Map 31. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Custer’s Last Stand


Map 32. The Sioux Dispersal, July – September 1876


Map 33. The Battles of Cedar Creek and Dull Knife, October –
November 1876 

Map 34. The Fort Peck Expedition, November –
December 1876


Map 35. The Final Actions, January – May 1877


IV. Wounded Knee, 1890


Map 36. The Ghost Dance


Map 37. The Battle of Wounded Knee, 29 December 1890


Suggested Reading 

About the Author 

I. Introduction


AD 1979 

CO MBAT CO MBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE INSTITUTE

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS
Map 1. The Sioux and the Great Plains


One ofthemostrecognizable of allIndian tribal namesisthe Sioux.Although

numeroustribesspoke a Siouan dialect, the tribal name Sioux only applied to the

largest of those tribes. The name originated with the Chippewa Indians who

modified the French term nadouessioux meaning “little snakes” and applied it to

their enemy—the Sioux.

The Sioux originally lived as Woodland Indians along the upper Mississippi

River and dominated portions of present-day Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

In the early 1700s, the Chippewa, armed with French guns, gradually pushed the

Sioux further West. By the mid-18th century, many of the Sioux had migrated

across the Missouri River both to avoid the Chippewa and to seek areas richer in

fur and game. In their migration to theWest, the Sioux separated into three major

divisions: the Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota establishing three principal Sioux

dialects,respectively: Santee,Yankton, andTeton. Each division name translated

tomean “ally” in its own dialect.

The Dakota remained in the Upper Midwest and primarily lived in parts of

present-day Minnesota. Because of their dialect, they are also referred to as the

Santee or Eastern Sioux. It wasthe Santee Sioux who were primarily involved in

the 1862 Minnesota uprising.

The Nakota occupied a territory farther west in the prairie country of western

Minnesota and the eastern portion of the Dakotas. The Nakota divided into two

major bands, the Yankton and the Yanktonai. In reference to their Yankton

dialect, they are often referred to asthe Yankton or Middle Sioux.

The Lakota branch, which was the largest and best known of the Sioux

divisions, made its homeland in the Northern Great Plains. The Lakota division

was composed of seven bands or council fires: Brulé, Sans Arc, Hunkpapa,

Oglala, Miniconjou, Blackfeet, and Two Kettles. All seven were bands of

nomadic hunters whose primary food staple was meat, especially buffalo. All

spoke a common Teton dialect and are commonly referred to as the Teton or

Western Sioux. These bands made up a powerful confederation that, at first, did

little more than harass the wagon trains passing over the Great Plains. Later, as

the advance of white civilization increasingly threatened their way of life, the

harassment escalated into fierce resistance. The Lakota were the US Army’s

primary opponentsin the Sioux War of 1866–68, the Sioux War of 1876–77, and

again in the final 1890 tragedy atWounded Knee.

Numerous other tribes, besides the Sioux, also occupied the Great Plains of

North America. To establish some meaningful convention for this atlas, the

Indian tribes have been grouped into three categories: those in the course of the

Indian campaigns,specifically the Crow and Shoshone, who were allied with the

US government (text in blue), those who at some point in the course of these

campaigns were enemies of the US government (text in red), and those who did

not participate (text in black). The term “Sioux” will be used asit wasin the 19th

century and will invariably refer to tribesin armed opposition to US government

policies.

Since warfare was a central part of the Plains Indian culture, it is easy to

understand their violent resistance. It took massive force of arms to seize and

occupy their lands. As warfare was deeply imprinted in the American settlers’

culture as well, the stage was set for long periods of violence, broken only by

intermittent lapses of peace, until one side finally achieved permanent

dominance.
UT 

CO 

NM TX OK AR 

TN 

KS 

WY 

MT 

ID 

OR 

MN 

WI 

IN 

KY 

IL 

IA 

NE 

ND 

SD 

MO 

CANADA 

HIDATSA 

MANDAN 

PONCA 

CROW 

PAWNEE 

SHOSHONE 

ARIKARA 

TETON 

YANKTON 

SANTEE 

N. CHEYENNE 

S. CHEYENNE 

ARAPAHO 

KIOWA 

ASSINIBOINE 

OSAGE 

GROS VENTRE 

OMAHA IOWA 

The Sioux 

Miles 

0 200 400 

US ALLIES 

OCCASIONAL US ENEMIES 

NONINVOLVED INDIAN TRIBES 

Great American Plains 

N 1 

CDC
Map 2. The Grattan Affair, 1854–55


In 1851, the US government negotiated a treaty with the Sioux and their allies

at Fort Laramie, Wyoming, to assure safe passage for emigrants traveling west

along the Oregon Trail. The peace wastenuous, at best, byAugust 1854 when an

emigrant reported to the commander of Fort Laramie that a Sioux warrior had

stolen and butchered a stray cow. The inexperienced but enthusiastic Brevet

Second LieutenantJohn L. Grattan requested permission from his commander to

take a detachment out to arrest the guilty warrior. The commander yielded to

Grattan’s request and authorized the young officer to take 29 men and 2 artillery

pieces to a large Indian encampment where the violator was believed to be. The

encampment the young lieutenant marched against consisted of a series of

villages along the Platte River. Each year the Brulé, Miniconjou, and Oglala

Sioux gathered near the fort to receive their annual annuity issue. The combined

villagesmay have contained asmany as 4,000 inhabitants.

Chief Brave (Conquering) Bear, the US appointed head chief of the Brulé,

attempted to placate the over-eager lieutenant with an offer to buy the cow.

However, Grattan demanded that the guilty warrior be handed over for

punishment. At that point, it is unclear whether Grattan ordered his men to open

fire or whether a nervous soldier panicked and fired into the gathering crowd.

Regardless of how it began, the ensuing fight was brutally brief. Though the

detachment’s poorly sighted artillery caused little damage to the Indian village, it

did mortally wound Brave (Conquering) Bear. The swift counterattack of the

angry Sioux completely overwhelmed Grattan’s small command killing the

lieutenant and all but one of his men. Subsequently, overthe nextseveral months,

the Sioux launched intensified retaliatory raids against emigrants along the

Oregon–CaliforniaTrail.

In retaliation for the massacre and attacks against emigrants, the US

government ordered Brevet Brigadier General William S. Harney to punish the

Sioux. InAugust 1855, Harney led a 600-man force of infantry and dragoons out

of Fort Kearny, Nebraska, toward Fort Laramie. On 2 September, he located the

Sioux village of Little Thunder (Brave Bear’s successor) on Blue Water Creek

near present-day Ash Hollow, Nebraska. Harney rejected Little Thunder’s offer

to negotiate and demanded that all those who had participated in the attacks

against Grattan and the emigrant trail be turned over to the Army. The next day

the village attempted an escape, but the soldiers cut them off, and Harney ordered

an immediate attack. Little Thunder’s warriors attempted to fight a rearguard

action to allow their women and children time to escape. Even so, the soldiers

quickly overwhelmed all resistance and utterly destroyed the village. The Sioux

suffered 85 killed and 70 women and children captured; less than half of the 250

Sioux villagers escaped. Harney lost only five killed with another seven

wounded.

Having avenged the destruction of Grattan’s command, Harney then

commenced to secure safe passage along the Oregon Trail. Threatening a repeat

of the heavy-handed methods used against Little Thunder, Harney pressured the

other Sioux leaders into agreeing to meet at Fort Laramie to negotiate an end to

the hostilities.At Fort Laramie, Harney demanded that the Sioux stop interfering

with traffic along the Oregon Trail and insisted they surrender all individuals

involved in the Grattan Massacre. At the time, the Sioux had very little recourse

but to accede to Harney’s demands. Nevertheless, the affair would not be

forgotten; the Sioux left in bitter anticipation of a day to avenge Harney’s actions.

Many of the Sioux bands also decided to move further west into the Powder

River country and away from the troublesome emigrant trails. Their Westward

migration displaced the Crow from the rich hunting groundsin the Powder River

Basin and set the stage forfuture conflicts between the Sioux and the whiteman.
FT BENTON 

Missouri R iver 

FT LARAMIE Laramie Mountains 

NEBRASKA TERRITORY 

Sun River 

Missouri River 

Missouri River 

Missouri River 

Niobrara River 

White River 

James 

River 

Moreau River 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Grand River 

Cannonball River 

Heart River 

Sheyenne River 

Musselshell River 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn 

River 

Tongue River 

P o wder River 

Bighorn River 

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Bighorn M

ountains 

Black Hills Little Missouri 

River 

James River 

Otter Creek 

Wind River 

Rocky 

Mountains 

Powder River 

North Platte River 

Elkhorn River 

2 

Platte Road 

(Oregon Trail) 

Grattan Massacre 

19 August 1854 

Blue Water 

3 September 1855 

The Grattan Affair 

1854–55 

Miles 

0 50 100 150 

FT PIERRE N 

Powder 

River 

Country 

CDC
Map 3. Minnesota Sioux Uprising, August 1862


By 1862, the Santee Sioux had given up their traditional homelands, which

comprised most of southern Minnesota, in exchange for a narrow reservation on

the southern bank of the Minnesota River. As compensation for their lands, the

Sioux were to receive cash annuities and supplies that would enable them to live

without the resources from their traditional hunting grounds. Because of

administrative delays, however, both the cash and food had not arrived by the

summer of 1862. Crop failures the previous fall made the late food delivery

particularly distressing to the Indians. Encroachment by settlers on reservation

land and the unfair practices of many American traders also fueled Sioux

suspicions and hatred. Furthermore, the Sioux were emboldened by the

Minnesotans’ relative weakness, brought on by the departure of many of their

young men to fight in the Civil War. This combination of hunger, hatred, and the

perceived weakness of the Minnesotans and the local military created an

explosive situation that needed only a spark to bring on a full-scale war.

The spark came on 17 August 1862 when four Sioux warriors murdered five

settlers near Acton, Minnesota. On 18 August, Indians at the Lower Sioux

Agency rebelled, killing most of the settlers on their reservation. A few escapees

managed to reach Fort Ridgely and warn its commander, Captain John S. Marsh,

of the rebellion. Marsh and 47 men subsequently sortied from the fort only to be

ambushed at Redwood Ferry, where half of them, including Marsh, were killed.

Twenty-foursoldiersmanaged to return to FortRidgely.

News of the rebellion spread quickly through the settler and Indian

communities. For the Sioux, this was a catharsis of violence; for the settlers, a

nightmare had come true. Most settlers in the Minnesota River Valley had no

experience with warring Indians. Those who did not flee fast enough to a fort or

defended settlement were at the Indians’ mercy. The Sioux killed most of the

settlers they encountered but often made captives of the women and children. In

response, the Army marshaled its available strength, 180 men, at Fort Ridgely,

where well-sited artillery helped the soldiers fend off two Sioux attacks. At the

town of New Ulm, a magnet for settlers fleeing the rebellion, defenders also

repulsed two Indian attacks. The stout resistance of the settlers and soldiers

effectively halted the spread ofthe rebellion.

Now, the military seized the initiative. A relief expedition under Colonel

Henry H. Sibley arrived at Fort Ridgely on 27 August 1862. Sibley’s command

consisted largely of green recruits with second-rate weapons. The Sioux

surprised and inflicted a tactical defeat on Sibley’s men at Birch Coulee on 2

September. This minor setback, in any case, did not change the course of the

campaign. From 2 to 18 September, Sibley drilled his soldiers and received

supplies and reinforcements, including 240 veterans of the 3d Minnesota

InfantryRegiment. On 19 September, Sibley resumed his advance.Thistime, the

expedition encountered and defeated the Sioux at Wood Lake on 23 September

1862. Three days later, hostilities ended when some of the Santee Sioux

surrendered and released their 269 captives. However, many of those that had

participated in the uprising fled west into the Dakotas. Outraged over the

uprising, state authorities executed 38 Indian prisoners and banished the other

captive Sioux to reservations outside Minnesota.
Missouri 

FT PIERRE 

(Trading Post) 

FT ABERCROMBIE 

FT RIPLEY 

FT 

SNELLING 

FT RIDGELY 

FT BERTHOLD 

(Trading Post) 

FT UNION 

(Trading Post) 

FT RANDALL 

River 

Cannonball R iver 

White River 

Belle Fourche R iver 

Cheyenne River 

Black Hills 

Heart R iver 

Little Missouri River 

Yellowstone River 

Red 

River 

Red Lake 

Devils Lake 

Mille Lacs 

Lake 

St. 

Croix 

River

Mississippi 

River

Big S tone Lake 

Lake T raverse 

James River 

Big 

Sioux 

River 

Sioux City 

St. 

Paul 

New Ulm Mankato 

Lower Sioux Agency 

Upper Sioux Agency 

Acton 

Redwood 

Ferry 

Birch 

Coulee 

Wood 

Lake 

Minnesota Sioux Uprising 

August 1862 

Miles 

0 50 100 150 

Indian Reservation 

Battles 

3 

Sheyenne River 

DAKOTA 

TERRITORY 

Niobrara R iver 

NEBRASKA 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

WISCONSIN 

MINNESOTA 

N 

CDC

Minnesota River 
Map 4. The Sioux Campaigns of 1863 and 1864


In late 1862, the Army lacked the resources to pursue the Santee Sioux who

fled west into the Dakotas. It wasn’t until the summer of 1863 that General John

Pope, Commander of the Department of the Northwest, managed to collect

enough resources to continue the campaign. He directed his subordinates to

conduct a two-pronged campaign to find and punish the fugitive Santee Sioux

and to threaten both theYankton and Teton Sioux who had begun to support their

Eastern brethren. Pope’s overall goal was to secure Minnesota’s western border

fromany Indian threat.

Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley commanded a 3,000-man column that

marched west from Camp Pope, Minnesota. Brigadier General Alfred Sully

commanded the second column. His command of about 1,200 men consisted of

volunteer cavalry units from Iowa and Nebraska and some supporting artillery.

He marched north from Fort Randall, South Dakota. The plan called for the two

columnsto rendezvous near DevilsLake in North Dakota.

Sibley’s large column departed Camp Pope on 16 June 1863 and reached the

vicinity of Devils Lake around mid-July. There he established a base camp and

then commenced pursuit of a large band of Santee and some Yankton moving

toward the Missouri River. On 24 July, Sibley’s column caught up with the Sioux

at Big Mound. The Indians escaped after fighting a desperate rearguard action

that lasted most of a day. On 26 July, Sibley came close to overtaking the Sioux

again at Dead Buffalo Lake when the Santee, reinforced with someTeton buffalo

hunting groups, attacked Sully’s column. Sully’stroops cutshort the Sioux attack

with howitzer fire and then counterattacked driving them from the field. Sully

pursued and caught up with the Sioux at Stony Lake on 28 July.Again, the Sioux

fought a desperate rearguard action that allowed their familiesto escape over the

Missouri River. In the course of the three fights, the Indians had lost an estimated

150 warriors and a large portion of their food supplies and equipage—a devastating loss. Though Sibley’s losses at Big Mound had been minor, he was critically

short ofsupplies. So after 3 days ofsearching unsuccessfully for Sully’s column,

Sibley decided to return to Minnesota reaching Fort Snelling on 13 September.

Delayed by low water on the Missouri River, Sully’s command didn’t arrive

at the campaign area until the end ofAugust at which time he learned that Sibley

had returned to Minnesota. He also gained information that the uncaptured

Santee Sioux hadmoved to the vicinity ofthe JamesRiverto hunt buffalo.Taking

pursuit again, Sully caught up with the Indians near Whitestone Hill on the

evening of 3 September. There he found a large village that may have contained

as many as 1,000 warriors. In the confusion of a chaotic night battle, most of the

Sioux managed to escape. However, the fighting was fierce; Sully lost 20 killed

and 38 wounded, and the Army estimated Indian casualties at 150 to 200. In the

ensuing pursuit, the Indians lost the majority of their equipage and 250 women

and children captured. Sully had achieved a major victory and, being low on

supplies, decided to return to FortRandall.

In 1864, despite the decisive victories scored against them, a collection of

free Santee, Teton, and some Yankton gathered together on the Little Missouri

River and once again threatened the eastern Dakota settlements. In June 1864,

Sully gathered over 3,000 men and marched up the Missouri River to disperse

this conjoined band of Sioux. After establishing Fort Rice near present-day

Bismarck, he turned his column west and commenced his pursuit. On 28 July

1864, he attacked the large Sioux contingent at Killdeer Mountain. During the

battle, Sully formed his command into a British-style square and slowly

advanced against the Indian encampment. In the day-long fight, the Indians

suffered heavy casualties and were forced to abandon their village and most of

their supplies. After the battle, Sully continued west to the Yellowstone River to

intimidate theTeton, then returned to FortRidgely, Minnesota, in early October.

The campaigns of 1863 and 1864 had been highly successful in pushing the

frontier further to the West. With the Santee Sioux decisively crushed, the

Minnesota settlements no longer had any fear of an Indian threat. Anyway, the

Teton Sioux participation in the hostilities had been minor. Only 2 years later,

along the Bozeman Trail, the US Army directly challenged the Teton with very

differentresults.
Missouri 

FT PIERRE 

(Trading Post) 

FT SULLY (1863) 

FT WADSWORTH 

(1863) 

FT ABERCROMBIE 

FT RIPLEY 

FT SNELLING 

FT 

RIDGELY 

FT RICE 

(1864) 

FT BERTHOLD 

(Trading Post) 

FT UNION 

(Trading Post) 

FT RANDALL 

River 

Cannonball River 

White River 

Belle F ourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Black Hills 

Heart R iver 

Little Missouri River 

Yellowstone

River 

Red 

River 

Red Lake 

Devils Lake 

Mille Lacs 

Lake 

St. 

Croix River 

Mississippi 

River 

Big S tone Lake 

Lake T raverse 

James River 

Big 

Sioux 

River 

Sioux City 

St. 

Paul 

New Ulm Mankato 

4 

SIBLEY 1863 

Big Mound 

Dead Buffalo Lake 

Stony Lake 

SULLY 1863 

Whitestone Hill 

Sully 

Killdeer 

Mountain 

1864 

DAKOTA 

TERRITORY 

N 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

Niobrara R iver 

NEBRASKA 

The Sioux Campaigns 

of 

1863 and 1864 

Miles 

0 50 100 150 

Battles 

1863 1864 

WISCONSIN 

MINNESOTA 

CAMP 

POPE 

CDC

Minnesota River 

II. The Sioux War of 1866–68


AD 1979 

CO MBAT CO MBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE INSTITUTE

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS
Map 5. The Bozeman Trail and the Connor Expedition


The discovery of gold in western Montana in 1862 around Grasshopper Creek

brought hundreds of prospectors to the region. Nearly all of these fortune seekers had

come up the Platte Road, the northern fork of the old Oregon–California Trail, and

moved into Montana from the west. Others worked their way up the Missouri River as

far as Fort Benton, then came down into the goldfields from the northeast. In 1863, two

entrepreneurs, John Bozeman, a Georgian who had arrived on the frontier only 2 years

earlier, and John Jacobs, a veteran mountain man, blazed a trail from the goldfields to

link up with the Platte Road west of Fort Laramie. Thisroute cut through Bozeman Pass

east of Virginia City, crossed the Yellowstone and Bighorn Rivers, ran south along the

east side of the Bighorn Mountains, crossed the Tongue and Powder Rivers, then ran

south through the Powder River country to join the Platte Road about 80 miles west of

Fort Laramie. It reduced by nearly 400 miles the distance required by other routes to

reach the goldfields. However, the trail cut through prized hunting land claimed by the

Teton Sioux and their allies along the Powder River. Travelers along the Bozeman Trail

soon found themselves underfierce attack by hostile Indians.

In 1865, responding to an Indian attack against the Platte Bridge near modern

Casper, Wyoming, and to demands by the emigrants for protection, the US Army sent

three converging columns under the command of General Patrick E. Connor into the

region. Colonel Nelson Cole commanded the Omaha column that consisted of 1,400

volunteer cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Walker commanded the second column

with 600 volunteer cavalry.Connor commanded the third column. Hisforce consisted of

558 soldiers and another 179 Indian scouts. The strategy called for the three columns to

rendezvousin early September onRosebudCreek.

Connor reached the Upper Powder River by mid-August. He established Fort

Connor then continued northwest in pursuit of the Indians. On 29 August he found and

attacked the Arapaho village of Black Bear on the Tongue River near modern

Ranchester, Wyoming. His attack overran the village and captured the pony herd.

However, after completing the destruction of the village, several spirited Indian

counterattacks convinced Connor that he should withdraw his outnumbered troops.

Then, in the midst of early winter storms, Connor moved north to locate Cole’s and

Walker’s columns.

Meanwhile, Cole had marched just north of the Black Hills and headed up the Belle

Fourche River where he linked up with Walker’s column on 18August. Initially, the two

columns continued to push deep into Indian lands until they grew dangerously low on

supplies and decided to move toward the Tongue River and link up with Conner. On 1

September, a large Cheyenne war party attacked the columns altering Cole’s decision to

move toward the Tongue River. Instead, they headed down the Powder River hoping to

replenish their supplies with the abundant game known to be in the Yellowstone River

valley.The night of 2 Septemberinflicted early winterstorms on the columns. More than

200 of Cole’s horses and mules, already weakened by hunger, died from exposure and

exhaustion. Again, Cole changed his direction of march and decided to return to Fort

Laramie for provisions. On the morning of 5 September, Cole and Walker unknowingly

stumbled into the vicinity of a large village near the mouth of the Little Powder River.

The village was an unprecedented gathering of Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and

Southern Cheyenne. More than 1,000 Sioux, Cheyenne, andArapaho warriorsswarmed

out of the village to attack the columns. The battle raged for 3 hours before the still

undiscovered village moved safely out of the way, and the Indians broke off the fight.

Then again on 8 September, the exhausted and starving troops unwittingly threatened

the village. The Indian rearguard easily delayed the soldiers and the village escaped a

second time.

Over the course of the next 12 days, the columns continued to plod along. Each day

dozens of horses and mules died ofstarvation. The Indians hovered around the columns

like vultures and, had it not been for the detachment’s artillery, probably would have

been more troublesome to the troops. On 20 September, Cole and Walker’s troops

straggled into Fort Connor. Connor’s equally exhausted troops joined them on 24

September. The expedition had failed to subdue the tribes and, instead, had emboldened

the Sioux to continue their determined resistance to any white incursion into Powder

River country. Nonetheless, the presence of Fort Connor on the Bozeman Trail

encouraged increased immigrant travel along the route and further amplified their

demandsfor protection.
Missouri River 

DAKOTA 

TERRITORY 

Missouri River 

Missouri River 

Niobrara River 

James 

River 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Cannonball River 

Heart River 

Musselshell River 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn Ri 

e River 

Powder R i ver

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntains 

Little 

Missouri River 

James River 

Otter Creek 

Rocky 

Mountains 

Powder 

North Platte River 

Elkhorn River 

FT MCPHERSON 

Bozeman

Trail 

5 

Platte Road 

COLE

WALKER 

COLE 

CONNOR 

CDC

COL 

nd WALKER 

FT SHAW 

FT BENTON 

Missouri River

FT LARAMIE 

Laramie 

Mountains 

FT CONNOR 

FT RANDALL 

FT RICE 

FT PECK 

WYOMING 

TERRITORY 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

DAKOTA

TERRITORY

NEBRASKA 

Virginia 

City 

Sun River 

Missouri River 

Missouri River

Missouri River

Niobrara River

White River 

James

River

Moreau River 

Belle Fourche River

Cheyenne River

Grand River 

Cannonball River

Heart River

Sheyenne River 

Musselshell River

Yellowstone River

Little

Bighorn Ri

e River

Powder River

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntains

Little

Missouri River

James River

Otter Creek

Rocky

Mountains

Powder

North Platte River

Elkhorn River

FT MCPHERSON

Bozeman

Trail

5

Platte Road

Black Hills 

IDAHO 

TERRITORY 

FT CASPER 

FT MITCHELL 

Bozeman Trail 

Battles of 

1 and 5 September 1865 

Battle of 

8 September 1865 

Battle of 

Tongue River 

29 August 1865 

Battle of Platte Bridge 

26 July 1865 

N 

Bozeman 

Pass 

CO 

nd WALKER 

ver 

To

ver

COLE

WALKER

COLE

CONNOR

CDC

ngu

E a

horn River 

Big 

To u

L 

The Bozeman Trail 

and the 

Connor Expedition 

Miles 

Battles 

Connor 

Cole 

Walker 

Cole and Walker 

Bozeman Trail 

0 50 100 150 
Map 6. The Bozeman Trail Forts, 1866–68


The failure oftheConnor Expedition prompted the government to seek a diplomatic

solution, and, in June 1866, while a number of the Powder River chiefs were at Fort

Laramie negotiating a treaty to allow safe passage through the Powder River country,

Colonel Henry B. Carrington led the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, toward the Bozeman

Trail. His orders required him to garrison Fort Reno, formerly Fort Connor (built the

previous year by General Connor), and to establish two new forts along the Bozeman

Trail. From those forts, he was to provide protection and escort for emigrant travel into

the Montana Territory. Considering the number of chiefs participating in the peace

negotiations, the prospect for an early settlement seemed good, and the Army did not

expect Carrington’s mission to involve significant combat actions. Consequently, in

addition to the 700 troops of the 18th, more than 300 women, children, sutlers, and

civilian contractors accompanied Carrington. The column included 226 mule-drawn

wagons, the 35-piece regimental band, 1,000 head of cattle to provide fresh meat for the

force, and all the tools and equipment necessary to create a community in the wilderness.

Carrington left Fort Laramie fully confident that he would be able to accomplish his

mission without difficulty. He seemed to be well suited for his mission based upon his

proven merit as a planner and organizer. A graduate of Yale, he was a practicing attorney

when the Civil War began in April 1861. He volunteered immediately for service and

secured a commission as colonel of the 18th Infantry on its organization in May 1861.

He was brevetted brigadier general in November 1862. Although he saw no action with

the 18th, he performed numerous staff duties efficiently and retained command of the

18th at the end ofthe war.

On 28 June 1866, Carrington’s column arrived at Fort Reno. Here, Carrington spent

10 daysrepairing, provisioning, and garrisoning the fort with a company of infantry. On

9 July, the remainder of the 2d Battalion left Fort Reno with all its impedimenta. Four

dayslater,Carrington selected a site forthe construction of his headquarters post.

Carrington’s chosen site lay justsouth of the point where the Bozeman Trail crossed

Big Piney Creek. The large valley in which the fortsat wassurrounded on three sides by

high terrain. To both the north and south, the Bozeman Trail passed over ridges out of

sight of the fort. To the west, the valley stretched 5 or 6 miles along Little Piney Creek

before giving way to the foothills oftheBighorn Mountains.It was up this valley that the

woodcutters and log teams would have to travel to provide the all-important building

materials and fuel for the post’s cooking and heating fires. Carrington’sselection of this

position has long been questioned. One weakness of the site was that the Sioux and

Cheyenne continuously dominated the high ground and observed all movement into and

around the fort.

Construction of Fort Phil Kearny began assoon as Carrington’s column arrived and

continued almost until it was abandoned. The main post (map B) was an 800-foot by

600-footstockade made by butting together 11-foot-high side-hewn pine logsin a trench

3 feet deep. The stockade enclosed barracks and living quarters for the troops, officers,

and most of their families; mess and hospital facilities; the magazine; and a variety of

other structures. An unstockaded area encompassing shops, stables, and the hay corral

extended another 700 feet from the south palisade to Little Piney Creek, the primary

watersource for the fort. Two primary entrances provided accessfor wagonsto the post,

themain gate on the east wall and a sally port on the westside ofthe unstockaded area.

In July, Carrington detached two companies under Captain Nathaniel C. Kenney to

move even farther up the Bozeman Trail to build a third fort, Fort C.F. Smith, 91 miles

north of Fort Phil Kearny near present-day Yellowtail, Montana. The Army also

established two additional forts along the trail in 1867: Fort Fetterman near the trail’s

starting point and FortEllis on the westside ofBozeman Pass.
FT BENTON 

FT RENO 

FT CF SMITH FT ELLIS 

FT RANDALL 

FT PECK 

NEBRASKA 

Virginia 

City 

Missouri River 

Niobrara River 

Musselshell River 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn River 

Tongue River 

Powder R i ver 

Bighorn River 

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Otter Creek 

Wind River 

Rocky 

Mountains 

Powder River 

N o rt h P l a tte Ri ver 

Elkhorn R iver 

FT MCPHERSON 

FT SEDGEWICK 

Union Pacific R. R. 

June 

1867 

June 

1866 

1865 

1866 

1867 

Bozeman Trail 

(CONNOR) 

CDC

Bozeman 

Pass 

FT SHAW 

FT BENTON

Missouri River 

FT LARAMIE 

FT RENO

FT CF SMITH FT ELLIS

FT PECK

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

Virginia

City

Sun River 

Missouri River

Niobrara River

Musselshell River

Yellowstone River

Little

Bighorn River

Tongue River

Powder River

Bighorn River

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Otter Creek

IDAHO 

TERRITORY Wind River

Rocky

Mountains

Powder River

North Platte River

Elkhorn River

FT MCPHERSON

June

1867

June

1866

1865

1866

1867

FT MITCHELL 

Bozeman Trail

(CONNOR)

Bozeman

Pass

Map A 

The Bozeman Trail Forts 

1866–68 

Miles 

0 50 100 150 

Black Hills 

Little Piney Creek 

Big Piney Creek 

6 

N

Bozeman

Trail 

FORT N

PHIL KEARNY 

FORT

Feet 

0 500 1000 

Feet

Piney Creek

Bozeman

Trail

PHIL KEARNY

0 500 1000

Map B 

Hay Corral 

Main Post 

Main Gate 

Sally Port 

FT PHIL 

KEARNY 

FT

1866

PHIL

KEARNY

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntains 

1867 

Bozeman

Trail 

Platte Road 

FT CASPER 

1867

WYOMING 

TERRITORY 

ntains

FT FETTERMAN 

Laramie Mountains 

FT

June 

1868 

June

FETTERMAN

Laramie Mountains

1868

Bozeman

Trail

Platte Road

FT CASPER
Map 7. Fort Phil Kearny Besieged


Red Cloud, an influential Oglala Sioux chief, was strongly opposed to the US

Army’s efforts to build forts along the Bozeman Trail. He had become convinced by

episodes such as the Grattan Affair and Brigadier Harney’s retaliation that his Oglala

Sioux could no longerlive in the PlatteRiverRegion near Fort Laramie.Therefore, in the

late 1850’s, the Oglala Sioux pushed west into the Powder River country hoping to stay

away from the continuing US migration. He saw the Powder River country as his

people’slastrefuge fromthe encroaching whites.

Almost as soon as Carrington began construction on his Bozeman Trail forts,

hostilities commenced between theArmy and the Sioux. Carrington concentrated all his

limited resources on building Fort Phil Kearny. He applied little emphasis on training or

offensive operations and only reacted to Indian raids with ineffectual pursuits. On the

other hand, Red Cloud concentrated most of his efforts on sporadic harassments against

Fort Phil Kearny and traffic along the Bozeman Trail. His warriors became very adept at

stealing livestock and threatening the woodcutting parties. The Sioux avoided all

unnecessary risk and easily avoided most Army attempts at pursuit, which demoralized

the soldiers because of their inability to bring the Indiansto battle. Red Cloud’s warriors

also presented a constant threat of attack along the Bozeman Trail. The forts’ garrisons

barely had the resources to protect themselves, so emigrant travel along the trail all but

ceased. In essence, the trail became a military road, and most of the traffic waslimited to

military traffic bringing in supplies. Red Cloud’s strategy of a distant siege had negated

the shortcut to the Montana gold fields.

In November, Carrington received a small number of reinforcements. They

included: Captain (Brevet Lieutenant Colonel) William J. Fetterman and Captain

(Brevet Major) James Powell—both experienced combat veterans of the Civil War. The

very aggressive Fetterman quickly joined with other frustrated officers to push

Carrington for offensive action against the Indians. Unfortunately, like most of his

fellow officers at the fort, he had no experience in Indian warfare.

In December 1866, the Indians were encouraged by their success in harassing the

forts and decided to attempt to lure an Army detachment into an ambush. During that

same time period, having completed essential work on the fort, Carrington decided to

initiate offensive operations. Carrington planned to counter the next raid with his own

two-pronged attack. He instructed Captain Fetterman to pursue the raiders and push

them down Peno Creek. Carrington would then take a second group of soldiers over

Lodge Trail Ridge and cut off the withdrawing warriors. On 6 December 1866, the

Indians attacked the wood train and Carrington executed his planned counterattack. In

the fight, Lieutenants Bingham and Grummond disobeyed orders and pursued Indian

decoy parties into an ambush that resulted in the death of Bingham and one

noncommissioned officer. Only stern discipline and timely action taken by Captain

Fetterman who advanced toward the sounds of the guns prevented a larger tragedy on

that day.

The 6 December skirmish influenced Carrington to suspend his plans for offensive

actions and to concentrate on training instead. Conversely, the Sioux were encouraged

by their success and continued to refine their ambush strategy. On 19 December, they

made another attempt to lure an Army detachment into an ambush with an attack on the

wood train. Captain Powell led the relief force and prudently declined to pursue the

raiders.The Sioux quickly planned their next attack for 21 December.
5250 Feet 

5000 Feet 

5500 Feet 

6250 Feet 

6000 Feet 

5750 Feet 

4750 Feet 

4500 Feet 

4250 Feet 

Lodge Trail Ridge 

Sullivant Hill 

Pilot 

Big Horn Mountains 

South Piney Creek 

North Piney Creek 

Piney Creek 

Little Piney Creek 

Little Piney Creek 

Knob 

Peno Creek 

Bozeman Trail 

Bozeman Trail 

Massacre 

H

ill 

Wood 

Camp 

Wood 

Camp 

Wood Road 

Miles 

0 1/2 1 

Fort Phil Kearny 

Besieged 

N 

Army 

Movement 

Indian 

Movement 

Skirmishes on 

6 December 

1866 

CDC

Attack 

Against 

Wood Train 

Hill

South Piney Creek

North Piney Creek

Piney Creek

Little Piney Creek

Little Piney Creek

Pilot Knob

Peno Creek

Bozeman Trail

Bozeman Trail

Massacre

H

ill

Wood Road

Attack

Against

Wood Train

Big Horn Mountains 7

FT PHIL KEARNY 

Bingham and 

one NCO killed 

Grummond 

Bingham 

Fetterman 

Bingham 

30 cavalry 

Carrington 

Grummond 

24 mounted soldiers 
Map 8. The Fetterman Fight: The Approach


Friday morning, 21 December 1866, dawned cold and gray around Fort Phil Kearny.

The temperature hovered below freezing, and snow blanketed the valleys, pine woods,

and ridgesin the foothills of the Bighorn Mountains.At about 1000, Colonel Carrington

ordered the wood train to proceed to the pinery for the daily woodcutting detail.

Knowing that an attack on the wood train was likely, he sent an especially strong escort

with the wagons. Within an hour, the lookout on Pilot Knob signaled that the wood train

was under attack, and firing could be heard at the fort. As he had done on similar

occasions, Carrington immediately ordered a column to relieve the besieged detail.

Captain Powell had successfully carried out a similar mission just 2 days earlier.But that

morning,Captain Fetterman insisted on commanding the relief column.

There is considerable controversy about Carrington’s orders to Fetterman. Most

secondary sources agree that Carrington told him to relieve the wood train and then

return to the fort. Under no circumstances was he to go beyond Lodge Trail Ridge. On

the other hand, there is no contemporary evidence that Carrington ever gave the

controversial order not to go beyond Lodge Trail Ridge. It is possible that Carrington’s

consent to Fetterman’s request to lead the large relief force was another preplanned

offensive movement designed to catch the wood train raiders as they withdrew into the

Peno Creek drainage. The story of the order may be a postbattle fabrication intended to

focus the blame for the tragedy on disobedience of orders instead of the failure of a

planned offensivemovement against the Indians.

At 1115, Fetterman moved out of the southwestern sally port of the fort with 49

handpicked men from 4 companies of the 18th Infantry Regiment armed with muzzleloading Springfields (A Company: 21, C Company: 9, E Company: 6, and H Company:

13). A small number of the infantry, possibly the 13 men with H Company, may have

been mounted. Afew minutes later, Lieutenant George Grummond followed Fetterman

with 27 mounted troops from the 2d Cavalry Regiment, mostly armed with Spencer

repeating riflestaken from the regimental band.Captain FrederickBrown, a close friend

of Fetterman, volunteered to join the column. James Wheatley and Isaac Fisher, two

civilians armed with repeating rifles, also volunteered to go. Although Fetterman

probably never uttered the phrase attached to his legacy, “With 80 men I could ride

through the entire Sioux nation,” he was, likemost otherArmy officers, contemptuous of

hisIndian foes. Nevertheless, Fetterman did embark with 80men.

Fetterman’s route is also controversial. However, it is probable that he led his force

directly north, passing to the east of Sullivant Hill before crossing the creek and

ascending Lodge Trail Ridge. Fetterman’s infantry most likely paralleled the road with

the cavalry along the slopes on each side as flankers. Whether or not the order not to

cross the ridge was factual, it was clear to all those watching from the fort that

Fetterman’smovement would take himoverLodgeTrailRidge.
5250 Feet 

5000 Feet 

5500 Feet 

6250 Feet 

6000 Feet 

5750 Feet 

4750 Feet 

4500 Feet 

4250 Feet 

Lodge Trail Ridge 

Big Horn Mountains 

South P

Trail 

Massacre 

H

ill 

Wood 

Camp 

Wood 

Camp 

Wood

South iney Creek 

North Piney Creek 

Piney Creek 

Little Piney Creek 

Pilot Knob 

Peno Creek 

Bozeman Trail 

Bozeman

Road 

Miles 

0 1/2 1 

N 

Army 

Movement 

Indian 

Movement 

CDC

Sullivant Hill

Piney Creek

North Piney Creek

Piney Creek

Little Piney Creek

Little Piney Creek Little Piney Creek

Pilot Knob

Peno Creek

Bozeman Trail

Bozeman Trail

Massacre

H

ill

Wood Road

Big Horn Mountains 8

FT PHIL KEARNY 

The Fetterman 

Fight 

(The Approach) 

Indian 

Attack 

Attack 

Against 

Wood Train 

Fetterman’s 

Approach 

Indian 

Decoys 
Map 9. The Fetterman Fight: The Pursuit and Ambush


Although the details ofthe fight are uncertain, it appearsthat the mounted troops and

the foot infantry became separated (see map A). Whether Fetterman gave the order or

Grummond was acting on his own will never be known, but the cavalry, along with a

small detachment of mounted infantry and two civilians, moved ahead of the infantry

soon after passing over Lodge Trail Ridge. Indian decoys demonstrated tauntingly

before the relief column and lured them toward Peno Creek. Based on his past tendency

forimpetuous action, Grummond was probably anxiousto come to grips with the foe.

At the foot of the slope, however, hundreds of Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho

Indians sprang their trap (see map B). Indian accounts indicate that the Cheyenne were

hiding to the west ofthe ridge in the trees,scrub, and depressions around PenoCreek and

that the Sioux and Arapaho were in hiding to the north along Peno Creek and to the east

ofthe road behind the nextridge.

Grummond’s mounted detachment retreated back up the hill. Wheatley and Fisher,

the two civilians, along with several veterans, dismounted and defended a small outcrop

of rocks. These experienced frontiersmen understood that it was fatal to attempt a

mounted retreat from attacking Indian horsemen. Wheatley and Fisher apparently used

their repeating rifles to good effect before succumbing. Carrington later claimed in his

report that there were 60 pools of blood surrounding the position. Nevertheless, the two

civilians bought with their livesthe time Grummond needed to rally his mounted troops

at the top ofthe hill.
o Miniconj u 

Sioux 

Arapaho 

Cheyenne 

Oglala

Sioux 

Oglala

Sioux 

Map A The Fetterman Fight N Map B The Fetterman Fight N 

21 December 1866 21 December 1866 9

Indian Retreat The Pursuit Indian Retreat The Ambush


Indian Attack Miles Indian Attack Miles


Army Attack 0 1/4 1/2 Army Attack 0 1/4 1/2 

Army Retreat Army Retreat 

CDC CDC

Indian 

Decoy C 2 Signal Grummond 

C 2

Grummond 

18

Fetterman 

18 

Fetterman 

5200 Feet 5100 Feet 5000 Feet 4900 Feet 4800 Feet 4700 Feet 4600 Feet 4500 Feet 4400 Feet 5200 Feet 5100 Feet 5000 Feet 4900 Feet 4800 Feet 4700 Feet 4600 Feet 4500 Feet 4400 Feet 
Map 10. The Fetterman Fight: The Cavalry Fight and Fetterman’s Last Stand


The mounted troops retreated southward up the ridge to take cover behind a small

hill (see map A). It appears that Grummond fought a dismounted delaying action here.

Their skirmish line fired to the north and down the ridge to both sides. At some point,

Grummond attempted to fall back to the south along the road toward the infantry.

Nevertheless, the retreat disintegrated into a rout, and most ofthe mounted soldiers were

chased down by the Indians before they could rejoin the Infantry (see map B).

Grummond’s body and several others were found scattered along the road between the

cavalry skirmish line and the final infantry position. Indian accounts speak of a “ponysoldier chief” who was killed on the road and whose men then gave way and fled up the

ridge. Other Indian accountsspeak of a soldier chief on a white horse that fought a brave

delaying action, cutting off an Indian’s head with a single stroke of his saber. One of the

last soldiers to die along the cavalry skirmish line was Adolph Metzger, a German-born

bugler and Army veteran since 1855. Metzger fended off his assailants with his bugle

until the instrument was a battered, shapeless mass of metal and his body was bleeding

froma dozen wounds.

Fetterman, Brown, and 47 other soldiers, mostly infantry armed with Civil War era

muzzle-loading rifle muskets, rallied at a cluster of large rocks further up the ridge.

American Horse and Brave Eagle, both Oglala Sioux warriors, claimed that the soldiers

fought hard and resisted several attempts to overrun their positions. However,

Fetterman’sinfantry were hopelessly outnumbered and had little chance of holding out.

Eventually, they were overwhelmed, and all were killed. At the fort, Carrington heard

the heavy firing beyond the ridge. Fearing the worst, Carrington ordered Captain

Tenador Ten Eyck to take what men could be spared from the remaining garrison to

assist Fetterman. By the timeTen Eyck reached the hills overlooking the fight, it wastoo

late to save Fetterman’s doomed command.

After the battle, Carrington displayed remarkable determination in recovering the

bodies of Fetterman’s men even though he feared that the Indians would attack and

overrun the drastically undermanned fort. He asked for and received a volunteer to carry

news of the disaster to Fort Laramie. Arriving at Fort Laramie during a Christmas night

ball, the volunteer,John “Portugee” Phillips, had ridden 235 milesin 4 daysto report the

disaster. On 26 December, General Phillip St. GeorgeCooke,Carrington’s commanding

officer, ordered LieutenantColonel HenryW.Wessells,Carrington’ssubordinate at Fort

Reno, to take command of the relieve expedition and assume overall responsibility for

all three forts on the Bozeman Trail. The new commander diligently applied himself to

improving morale at Fort Phil Kearny, but the garrison suffered greatly from the lack of

supplies and the intense cold. The Indians also suspended their operations against the

fort because of the extreme winter conditions.Both sides waited forspring to resume the

contestfor control oftheBozemanTrail.
10 

Miniconjou

Sioux

Arapaho 

Cheyenne 

g O lala 

Sioux 

Oglala 

Sioux 

Arapaho Cheyenne 

Oglala

Sioux 

Miniconjou

Sioux

Oglala 

Sioux 

Map A The Fetterman Fight N Map B The Fetterman Fight N 

21 December 1866 21 December 1866 

Indian Retreat The Cavalry Fight Indian Retreat
 Fetterman’s Last Stand

Indian Attack Miles Indian Attack Miles


Army Attack 0 1/4 1/2 Army Attack 0 1/4 1/2


Army Retreat Army Retreat


CDC CDC CDC CDC

Wheatley & 

Fisher Rocks 

C 2

Grummond 

18 

Fetterman 

Fetterman 1300 Hrs 

1330 Hrs 

18 

Ten Eyck 

5200 Feet 5100 Feet 5000 Feet 4900 Feet 4800 Feet 4700 Feet 4600 Feet 4500 Feet 4400 Feet 5200 Feet 5100 Feet 5000 Feet 4900 Feet 4800 Feet 4700 Feet 4600 Feet 4500 Feet 4400 Feet 
Map 11. The Hayfield Fight, 1 August 1867


In the spring and summer of 1867, the Indians resumed their harassment against

Forts C.F. Smith and Phil Kearny. None of the attacks had been seriously pressed, and

neither side had sustained significant casualties. In July 1867, Red Cloud gathered his

coalition of Indian tribes in the Rosebud Valley for the sacred Sun Dance and to discuss

the next move against the Bozeman Trail forts. The tribal leaders probably fielded as

many as 1,000 warriors, but the loose confederation of tribes could not agree on which

fort to attack and ended up splitting their forces. The majority of the Cheyenne, with

some Sioux, moved against Fort C.F. Smith while the rest of the Sioux and some

Cheyenne decided to attack a woodcutting party near Fort Phil Kearny.

Probably because action against the forts had been sporadic, the Indians were

unaware that, early in July, a shipment of new M-1866, Springfield-Allin, .50-70­

caliber, breech-loading rifles had arrived at the forts. The Springfield-Allin was a

modification of the .58-caliber Springfield muzzle-loader, the standard shoulder arm of

the Civil War. Although single shot, the new weapon, which used the Martin bar-anvil,

center-fire-primed, all-metallic .50-caliber cartridge, was highly reliable and could be

fired accurately and rapidly. Along with the rifles came more than 100,000 rounds of

ammunition.

Both forts, C.F. Smith and Phil Kearny, were sufficiently strong, having no fear of a

direct attack against their bastions. However, the forts did have exposed outposts. At

Fort C.F. Smith, it wasthe hayfield camp located 2.5 milesto the northeast of the fort.At

the hayfield camp, the contract workers had erected an improvised corral out of logs and

brush as a protected storage area for their equipment and animals and as a defensive

position, if needed. Nineteen soldiers, commanded by Lieutenant Sigismund Sternberg,

guarded the six haycuttersin the hayfield.

On the morning of 1 August 1867, the Indians attacked the detail working the

hayfield. The combined Army and civilian force quickly took refuge in the corral and,

exceptforthe lieutenant, took cover behind the logsthat lined the perimeter ofthe corral.

Lieutenant Sternberg, with formal European military training and experience in both the

Prussian and Union armies, did not consider it proper military protocol for officers to

fight from the prone position and so decided to fight standing up. The 29-year-old

lieutenant had only been at Fort C.F. Smith for 7 days and had no prior experience

fighting Indians.

Though the actual Indian strength is unknown, it probably approached 500. The

initial attack occurred sometime around noon. The Indians made several dashes at the

corral hoping to lure the soldiers into chasing them. After that tactic failed, they

conducted a mass charge on the corral. The warriors expected a volley of fire from the

soldiers followed by a pause for the soldiers to reload their clumsy muzzle-loaders.

During that pause, the attackers planned to rush in and overrun the corral. However, the

pause never occurred, because the soldiers were able to quickly reload their new rifles.

Even though the soldiers had not become thoroughly accustomed to their new weapons,

their mass firepower threw back the attack. During the attack, Indian fire killed

Lieutenant Sternberg with a shot to the head. Indian fire also seriously wounded

Sternberg’s senior NCO in the shoulder. Therefore, command was assumed by Don A.

Colvin, one ofthe hayfield civilians who had been an officer during theCivilWar.

With the failure of the first attack, many of the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors took

cover on the bluffs 300 yards south of the corral and, from that position, kept the corral

under fire until late into the day. The second attack came from the bluffs and was again

repelled by the soldiers’ massed fire. Twice more that afternoon the Indians launched

mounted assaultsfrom the high ground hoping to overrun the defenders. Each sweeping

charge was stalled by the defenders’ continuous fire forcing the Indians to retreat. The

Indians commenced their final attack against the south wall of the corral on foot. The

attackers managed to wade the shallow creek but were unable to force their way up to the

corral wall.

Back at the fort, Colonel Luther P. Bradley, with 5 companies of available Infantry

(10 officers and 250 soldiers), could neithersee nor hear the fighting at the corral. News

of the attack came sometime after lunch when the wood train, which had been working

southwest ofthe fort,reported that they could see a large number ofIndians attacking the

hay detail.Atfirst, the colonel wasreluctant to send help. Perhaps he feared a Fettermanlike ambush was awaiting the relief party. However, he did send out a mounted

reconnaissance at about 1530 which quickly returned to the post and reported the

seriousness of the situation. The reconnaissance report, along with a desperate plea for

help from a courier who had managed to break out ofthe hayfield corral and make a dash

for the fort, prompted the colonel to organize a two-company relief force to send to the

aid of the hayfield fighters. The appearance of reinforcements, at about 1600, and

especially the exploding case shot of their accompanying howitzer, convinced the

attackersto give up the assault and withdraw.Colvin and his outnumbered defenders had

held their position for more than 6 hours. The combined Army/civilian force had

sustained three killed and three wounded. Although the Army estimated 18 to 23

warriors killed, the Indians only acknowledged 8 killed and several wounded.
Miles 
Map 12. The Wagon Box Fight, 2 August 1867


The exposed outpost at Fort Phil Kearny wasthe pinery located 6milesto the west of

the fort. Captain James Powell’s C Company, 27th Infantry provided the guard for the

civilian woodcutters at the pinery.The soldiers guarding the wood camps operated out of

a corral located on a plateau between Big and Little Piney Creeks. The corral was made

by removing the boxes from atop the running gear (wheels and axles) of wagons. The

running gear would then be used to haul logs from the pinery to the fort. The boxes,

approximately 10 feet long, 41⁄2 feet wide, and 21⁄2 feet high, were then placed in a

rectangular formation approximately 60 feet by 30 feet. Two wagon boxes, with canvas

still attached, held the rationsfor both soldiers and civilians and sat outside the corral.

The Indians, their martial ardor stirred by the recent religious ceremony, attacked

the soldiers at the corral on the morning of 2 August 1867. Powell had already sent out

the working parties when the Indians attacked. A small number of warriors crossed the

hills to the west of the corral and attacked the woodcutter camps on the Big and Little

Piney Creeks. The warriors then raced onto the plateau and captured the mule herd. The

war chiefs had hoped the soldiers at the corral would rush out from their improvised

wagon box fortress to be ambushed in the open. Instead, Captain Powell kept his men

under control and by 9 o’clock had 26 soldiers and 6 civilians gathered into the corral.At

this point, the war chiefs had no choice other than to attempt a mass attack against the

soldiers. While Indian spectators gathered on the surrounding hills, mounted warriors

made the first attack charging the corral from the southwest. The warriors expected the

soldiers to send one volley of fire followed by a pause to reload their muzzle-loaders,

allowing plenty of time for the Indiansto overwhelm the defense. However, the soldiers

were able to reload their new rifles quickly, and their continuous fire blunted the attack.

The Indians, instead of closing in, circled around the corral using their horses as shields

and then quickly withdrew behind the ridge to the north.

After the mounted charge failed, the war chiefs organized their warriors for an

assault on foot. The second attack came from behind the ridge to the north. Thistime the

warriors charged on foot while mounted warriors demonstrated to the south. The foot

charge surged to within a few feet of the corral before itstalled under the continuousfire

of the soldiers and fell back to take cover.At the same time,snipers hidden behind a rim

of land fired into the corral. It was these snipers who inflicted most of the casualties

suffered by the soldiers in the day-long fight. One of those casualties was Lieutenant

John C. Jenness who had been repeatedly told to keep his head down. His reply that he

knew how to fight Indians echoed just moments before he fell dead with a head wound.

The third attack came up and overthe rim ofland just to the northeast ofthe corral.In this

attack, the Indians’ charge almost reached the wagon boxes before the soldiers’ heavy

fire forced them back again. The fourth and final attack came from the southeast. In this

attack, the warriors attempted another mounted charge, but again failed to close with the

soldiers.

The fight lasted into the early afternoon.The garrison at Fort Phil Kearny could hear

the firing, but fearing an ambush, was reluctant to send support. Major Benjamin Smith

did finally leave the fort with a relief column of 102 men and a mountain howitzer.

Nearing the wagon box battleground, Smith fired his howitzer which resulted in the

dispersal of the Indian attack. At a cost of three soldiers killed and two wounded in the

wagon box perimeter, the soldiers had held off hundreds of Indian braves. Powell

modestly credited hissuccessful defense to the rapid fire ofthe breech-loading rifles, the

coolness of his men, and the effectiveness of his position. The Indians also claimed

victory in the fight.Their warriors had successfully destroyed the woodcutter camps and

burned several wagons. They had also captured a large mule herd and killed several

soldiers. Precise Indian casualties are unknown; Powell estimated 60 dead and 120

wounded.The actual casualties were probablymuch less.

In spite of theArmy’ssmall victories at the wagon box corral and the hayfield fight,

the days of the Bozeman Trail were numbered. After 8 months of negotiations, the

majority of the Indian chiefs finally agreed to the terms of a new treaty, but it was not

until November 1868 that Red Cloud signed the document at Fort Laramie. The 1868

treaty met almost all of the Sioux demands, including the abandonment of the three forts

in the contested area and the closing of the Bozeman Trail. In August 1868, the last US

Army units departed Forts Phil Kearny and C.F. Smith. Even before the Army columns

were out of sight, the Sioux and Cheyenne set fire to the remaining buildings and

stockades and burned themto the ground.
Miles 

III. The Great Sioux War of 1876–77


AD 1979 

CO MBAT CO MBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE INSTITUTE

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS
Map 13. The Northern Plains, 1868–75


The Sioux War of 1866–68 clearly established the dominance of the Oglala Sioux

over US forces in northern Wyoming and southern Montana east of the Bighorn

Mountains. The treaty of 1868 between the Sioux nation and the United States thereby

recognized the right of the Sioux to roam and hunt in a vast tract of unceded territory.

This territory was called unceded in recognition of the fact that although the United

States did not recognize Sioux ownership of the land, neither did it deny that the Sioux

had hunting rightsthere.The treaty also established a reservation in the DakotaTerritory

wherein “the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons except those herein

designated and authorized so to do...shall ever be permitted to pass over,settle upon, or

reside in the territory described in this article . . . and henceforth the [Indians] will, and

do, hereby relinquish all claims or right in and to any portion of the United States or

Territories, except such as is embraced within the limits aforesaid, and except as

hereinafter provided.” This provision clearly established the solemn rights of the Sioux

to perpetual ownership ofthe reservation.

Although the treaty held the peace on the Northern Plains for several years, it was

doomed by the seemingly irresistible march ofsettlersto theWest.The entire region was

the responsibility of Major General Philip H. Sheridan, the commander of Military

Division of the Missouri. His area of responsibility extended from the Missouri River to

the Rocky Mountains and from Canada to Mexico. In 1873, the Sioux rejected overtures

for a right-of-way for the Northern Pacific Railroad. Their resistance to the survey

parties led Sheridan to the dispatch of a large military expedition under Colonel David

Stanley up the Yellowstone Valley. During that expedition, Lieutenant Colonel George

A. Custer’s 7th Cavalry fought two large skirmishes with the Sioux on 4 and 11 August

1873. Then in the spring of the next year, he directed hissubordinate, Brigadier General

Alfred H.Terry, commanding the Department of Dakota (present-day states of Montana,

North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota), to send a reconnaissance party into the

Black Hills to ascertain the suitability of establishing an Army garrison there. This

reconnaissance party, commanded by Custer, not only determined the adequacy of the

ground for a garrison but found evidence of gold. The news flashed through the nation,

triggering a gold rush to the Black Hills of what is now South Dakota. The difficulty was

that the Black Hills region was inside the territory reserved to the Sioux in the treaty of

1868. Nevertheless, no American government, no matter how progressive, would have

attempted to restrain such a great number of citizens in their pursuit of happiness (as

manifested by their dreams of gold). The predicament faced by President Ulysses S.

Grant wasthat he could not preventAmericansfromentering theBlack Hills; at the same

time, he could not legally allow themto go there.

Rationalizing an excuse for war with the Sioux seemed to be Grant’s only choice to

resolve thematter.Ifthe governmentfought the Sioux and won, theBlack Hills would be

ceded as a spoil of war. But Grant chose not to fight the Sioux who remained on the

reservations.Rather, he was determined to attack that portion ofthe Sioux roaming in the

unceded land on the pretext that they were committing atrocities on settlers beyond the

Indians’ borders. Accordingly, Grant ordered the Bureau of Indian Affairs to issue an

ultimatum to the Indians to return voluntarily to their reservation by 31 January 1876 or

be forced there bymilitary action.

There were two categories of roamers outside the reservation, most of whom

ignored the ultimatum. One category, called winter roamers, spurned all sustenance

from the white man and lived in the unceded area. Those in the other category, called

summer roamers, took the white man’s dole in the winter but pursued their old ways in

warmer weather. When Sheridan received the mission to mount a campaign against the

Indians in the unceded area, he believed he would be fighting the winter roamers only.

Asthe weatherturned warmer, the number ofsummerroamers grew in the unceded area,

creating a greaterthreat to the soldiers.
Niobrara Niobrara River

James

River

Heart

e River 

Little

BighornRiver

BighornRiver

Little

MissouriRiver

amesRiver

NorthPlatteRiver

Elkhorn Elkhorn River

CannonballRiver

Department Department ofDakota

Department Department ofthePlatte

rthernPacificR.R.

Missouri Rive

Musselshell

River

r

Sheyenn Sheyenn

J

No 

Rosebud Creek 

Tongue River 

Otter Creek 

Powder River 

Little 

Powder 

River 

Belle Fourche 

Missouri River 

Cheyenne River 

Yellowstone River 

Bi

ghornM

ou

ntains

Rocky

Mountains

Rock 

i

Shoshone

Reservat on 

Wind River 

11August1873

FTPECK Missouri Missouri River FTBUFORD

DevilsLake FT BENTON 

Reservation Missouri River 

FTTOTTEN

Sun River 

FT SHAW 13
 Sioux-Assiniboine MONTANA

TERRITORY Reservation

Bismarck

StanleyExpedition Expedition (1873) Arickaree, Arickaree, Mandan, FTABRAHAM LINCOLN

CAMP BAKER GrosVentre FTRICE

FTPEASE Reservation

(1875) DAKOTA 

Standing TERRITORY

Rock 

Bozeman 4August 1873 Agency N

Crow Grand River

FTELLIS Reservation

CrowFTCF SMITH


Agency Virginia Agency (Abandoned)
 (Abandoned) BlackHillsExpedition Expedition (1874)

City Moreau River 

Cheyenne River Agency 

CDC

Powder River 

FT PHIL KEARNY River Crow Creek

(Abandoned) Agency Great Sioux


Reservation
 Black


FT RENO Hills
 Lower Brule Agency

(Abandoned) 

White River 

IDAHO 

TERRITORY 

FT RANDALL 

Spotted 

Tail 

Agency TheNorthern Plains, 1868–75 FTFETTERMAN

Red Cloud Agency 

1868–75 NEBRASKA

Laramie Laramie Mountains FT LARAMIE ArmyExpeditions Skirmishes WYOMING

TERRITORY

Indian Reservations 

Unceded Territory 

FTMCPHERSON Miles UnionPacific Pacific R.R.

0 50 100 150 CDC

FTSEDGEWICK
Map 14. Sheridan’s Campaign Plan


By 1876, the frontier Army had accumulated years of experience on the Great

American Plains. However, most of the Army’s offensive warfare experience was

acquired on the Southern Plains against the Cheyenne, Comanche, and Kiowa. General

Sheridan had successfully orchestrated two major campaigns on the southern plains, the

Southern Plains War (1868-69) and the Red River War (1874). In the Southern Plains

War, Sheridan implemented a bold winter campaign. He recognized that the highly

mobile, nomadic Indian tribes were very difficult to catch and reasoned that the winter

would weaken the grass-fed Indian ponies making them more susceptible to being

caught by theArmy’s grain-fed horses.

Overall, the Southern Plains War was a success for the Army. In the campaign

Sheridan launched three converging columns into what is now western Oklahoma with

orders to put into practice a technique of total war in which he targeted entire Indian

villages for destruction. His strategy was that, even if an advancing column did not find

the hostile Indians, it would help to drive the Indians into the other columns. His field

commanders managed to surprise and overrun Indian villages in the war’s three most

significant engagements: the battles of Washita (November 1868); Soldier Springs

(December 1868); and Summit Springs (July 1869). The destruction of these three

villages was amajorlossforthe Southern Plainstribes; they could no longer count on the

vastness ofthe territory and winter conditionsto protect them from the soldiers. Many of

the tribes acknowledged the futility of the struggle and grudgingly resigned themselves

to life on the reservation and a temporary peace that lasted only four years.

Sheridan’s next opportunity to coordinate a fight against the Plains Indians came in

1874 when theCheyenne,Comanche, and Kiowa, angered by the slaughter ofthousands

of buffalo and the failed delivery of treaty annuities, began to launch a series of vengeful

raids throughout the Texas Panhandle. Sheridan decided to punish the raiders and

ordered five Army columns into western Texas. In the ensuing campaign, the Army

fought as many as 20 engagements with the Southern Plains Indians. Most were small

skirmishes, but the three largest fights again involved Indian villages. At the battles of

Red River (30 August 1874) and Sweetwater Creek (12 September 1874), Indian

rearguard actions managed to hold the Army units at bay long enough for their families

to get most of the camp equipment out of danger. Then in late September, Colonel

Ranald S. Mackenzie’s 4th Cavalry took up the chase. In his dogged pursuit of the

Indians, he overran two hastily abandoned villages and burned more than 500 lodges.

Later, at theBattle of Palo DuroCanyon (28 September 1874), he located approximately

five Indian villages hidden in the canyon and routed the defenders in a surprise dawn

attack. The soldiers destroyed all the captured lodges and slaughtered more than 1,000

horses. Eventually, the onset of winter curtailed offensive operations. However, the

many months of military operations, especially the destruction ofso many Indian ponies

and lodges, proved too much for the Indians to bear. The campaign forced the Southern

Plains tribes to give up their nomadic lifestyle and accept life on the reservation.

Sheridan had validated his converging column strategy. At the tactical level, Sheridan’s

key subordinates(MajorAndrew Evans, 3d Cavalry; Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, 4th

Cavalry; Major EugeneA.Carr, 5thCavalry;Colonel NelsonA. Miles, 5th Infantry; and

Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeA. Custer, 7th Cavalry) established a formula for battlefield

success: relentless pursuit, attack from multiple directions to confuse and panic the

enemy, disciplined firepower to hold the undisciplined Indian warrior at bay, and

offensive action tomaintain the initiative.

Sheridan fully intended to apply the same techniques used in the conquest of the

Southern Plains against the Sioux on the Northern Plains. From that experience,

Sheridan and the professional military officer corps he commanded held several

assumptions to be fundamental truths when fighting Indians. First, they believed the

Indians would not stand against organized forces: in any situation where US forces met

Indians—no matter the numbers—the Indians would run. A second belief was that the

Indians would never seek battle with US troops unless the soldiers were in proximity to

their villages. Finally, officers were convinced that even the meager opposition

ordinarily offered by the Indians would be greatly reduced in the winter when the

Indians were just barely surviving. On the foundation of these assumptions, Sheridan

formed his campaign plan.

Sheridan directed Terry and Brigadier General George Crook, commanding the

Department of the Platte, to find and defeat the Indians. Sheridan’s communications

with his generals clearly indicated that he wanted to conduct the campaign in the winter,

catching the Indians in their worst circumstances. Unfortunately, the orders to these

coequal department commandersspecified no overall commander for the operation, nor

did they even specify coordinating instructions between the two. Sheridan’s own words

in his annual report demonstrate the sparse attention he devoted to coordination:

“General Terry was further informed that the operation of himself and General Crook

would be made without concert, as the Indian villages are movable and no objective

point could be fixed upon, but that, if they should come to any understanding about

concertedmovements, there would be no objection at division headquarters.”

There was a practical consequence to Sheridan’s vague instructions. Terry

instructed Colonel John Gibbon, his subordinate commanding the District of Montana,

to gather all of hisscattered detachments and begin a march from the west.Terry himself

would command a column moving from the east. Each of these forces was to follow the

YellowstoneRiver and unite. Meanwhile,Crook wasto form his own column and march

from the south. Together, all these separate operational plans constituted what have

commonly been referred to as Sheridan’s campaign plan, and indeed, all of them flowed

logically from hisinstructions. However, the final pincer movement was never clarified

in any set of orders. Sheridan’s disregard for coordination between hisseparate columns

providessome indication of his contemptforthe fighting capabilities ofthe Sioux.It was

a contempt that would lead to ineffective combat operations throughout the winter and

well into the summer of 1876.
FT BENTON 

Missouri River 

FT PEASE 

(Abandoned) 

FT BUFORD FT PECK 

NEBRASKA 

Missouri River 

Niobrara River 

Heart River 

Sheyenne River 

Musselshell River 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn River 

Tongue 

River 

Powder R i ver

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntains 

Little 

Missouri River 

James River 

Otter Creek 

IDAHO 

TERRITORY 

Rocky 

Mountains 

Powder

River 

North Platte River 

Elkhorn River 

FT MCPHERSON 

FT SEDGEWICK 

Wind 

FT RANDALL 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Cannonball River 

Missouri River 

Shoshone

Reservation 

Department of Dakota 

Department of the Platte 

CDC

Bismarck Northern Pacific R. R. 

FT SHAW 

FT BENTON

Missouri River

FT LARAMIE 

FT RENO 

(Abandoned) 

FT PHIL KEARNY 

(Abandoned) 

Devils Lake 

Reservation 

Crow 

FT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

FT BUFORD

FT TOTTEN 

FT PECK

WYOMING 

TERRITORY 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

DAKOTA 

TERRITORY 

NEBRASKA Red Cloud Agency 

Spotted 

Tail 

Agency 

Bozeman 

Missouri River

Niobrara River

Heart River

Sheyenne River

Musselshell River

Yellowstone River

Little

Bighorn River

Tongue

River

Powder River

Bighorn River 

FT ELLIS Reservation 

Crow 

Virginia Agency

City 

Bighorn River

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntains

Black Hills 

Little

Missouri River

James River

Arickaree, Mandan, 

Gros Ventre 

Reservation 

Otter Creek

Rocky

Mountains

Powder

River

North Platte River

Elkhorn River

FT MCPHERSON

FT SEDGEWICK

Union Pacific R. R. 

FT FETTERMAN 

Laramie Mountains 

Lower Brule Agency 

Crow Creek 

Agency 

Standing 

Rock 

Agency 

White River 

Moreau River 

Grand River 

Cheyenne River Agency 

FT CF SMITH 

(Abandoned) 

Sioux-Assiniboine 

Reservation 

Great Sioux 

Reservation 

14 

CROOK 

WINTER 

ROAMERS 

N 

Missouri

Wind

FT RANDALL

Belle Fourche River

Cheyenne River

Cannonball River

Missouri River

Shoshone

Reservation

Department of Dakota

Department of the Platte

CDC

Bismarck Northern Pacific R. R.

River i

CAMP BAKER 

Sheridan’s Campaign Plan 

Indians 

Army Column 

0 50 100 150 

Miles 

Sun River 

James 

River 

James

ver

TERRY 

GIBBON 
Map 15. Crook’s March to the Powder River


Crook was the first to depart for the field. Anticipating the coming campaign, he

secretly had been gathering unitsfrom scattered poststhroughout his department. When

the order to fight came, he was nearly ready to start his northward march from Fort

Fetterman (near present-day Douglas, Wyoming). When Crook’stroops marched out on

1 March 1876, the weather was clear and bitterly cold. Having placed Colonel Joseph J.

Reynolds in command of the column, Crook was nominally an observer. Crook,

however, retained practical control, and Reynolds was largely a supernumerary.

Marching with Crook and Reynolds were 10 cavalry companies, 2 infantry companies,

and 62 civilian packers. These units, plus Crook’sstaff, the guides, and reporterstotaled

883 men. Crook, a master of efficient and effective pack trains, had his column well

prepared forits winter campaign.

Trouble began almost immediately. Soldiers spotted Indian spies every day, and the

frequency of smoke signals suggested that their advance was being observed. On the

second night out, the Indians successfully stampeded the livestock herd, depriving the

troops of their only source of fresh meat. On 5 March, the Indians boldly staged a raid

against the soldiers’ camp. Crook, tired of marching under the watchful eye of the

Indians, on the morning of 7 March ordered the infantry companiesto make a greatshow

of marching back to the abandoned Fort Reno site (near present-day Sussex, Wyoming)

with the trains.At the same time, the cavalry,stripped down to minimum subsistence for

15 days, would hide that day and resume itsmarch that evening.

The ruse worked; the 10 cavalry companies escaped the Indian spies and roamed

unnoticed for the next 10 days. The problem wasthat Crook and Reynolds could not find

the Indians. Finally, Frank Grouard, the most knowledgeable of the scouts, suggested

that while the cavalry wassearching along the Tongue River, the Indianslikely would be

sheltered in the Powder River Valley. Crook accepted Grouard’s opinion and had him

guide the force to the Powder River. True to his word, Grouard found signs of a village

just north of present-day Moorhead, Montana. Crook now detached Reynolds (putting

himtruly in command of a combat expedition) with six companies of cavalry andmost of

the scouts. Grouard, exhibiting brilliant scouting, led the detachment through a blizzard

to the vicinity of a Cheyenne village. The circumstances were now right for Crook to

strike the first blow in the 1876 Sioux War and for Reynolds to display his prowess as a

combat leader.
Missouri River

Niobrara Niobrara River

James

River

HeartRiver

Sheyenne Sheyenne River

MusselshellRiver

Yellowstone River

Little

BighornRiver

Tongue River

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Little

MissouriRiver

JamesRiver

Otter

Creek

Rocky

Mountains

Powder River

NorthPlatteRi

Elkhorn Elkhorn River

BelleFourche Fourche River

Cheyenne River

CannonballRiver

Missouri River

Shoshone

Reservation

Department Department ofDakota

Department Department ofthePlatte

ver

Bighorn River

NorthernPacificR.R.

Crook 

FT PEASE 

TERRITORY 

(Abandoned) 

FT PECK Missouri Missouri River FT BUFORD

Devils Lake FT BENTON 

Missouri River Reservation

FT TOTTEN 

SunRiver

FTSHAW Sioux-Assiniboine 15


Reservation 

MONTANA
 Bismarck 

Arickaree, Arickaree, Mandan, FT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

GrosVentre

Reservation

CAMP BAKER TERRY
 (Abandoned) DAKOTA


GIBBON


Bozeman 

Standing TERRITORY

Rock 

Agency N 

Crow Grand River 16March– Crook and Reynolds Reynolds separate

FT ELLIS Reservation 

Crow FT CF SMITH 

Virginia Agency 

City Moreau River Cheyenne Cheyenne VillageonthePowderRiver)

Cheyenne River Agency 

Powder River

FT PHIL KEARNY

er

(Abandoned)

Crow Creek 

Agency Great Sioux


Reservation


FT RENO BlackHills Lower Brule Agency

(Abandoned)

WhiteRiver

IDAHO 5March–Indian raid

TERRITORY 

FTRANDALL

2March–Indians Indians run off herd

FT FETTERMAN 

Departs

1March

Spotted

Tail

Agency

NEBRASKA
 Crook’s March Red Cloud Agency March to the Powder River

CROOK FT LARAMIE Indian Village 

WYOMING Indian Fights


TERRITORY


Army Column 

FTMCPHERSON Miles Union Pacific R. R. 

0 50 100 150 CDC

FTSEDGEWICK
Map 16. Battle of Powder River


Reynolds sortied from Crook’s command with three two-company battalions of

cavalry: E and M Companies, 3d Cavalry, commanded by CaptainAnson Mills; I and K

Companies, 2d Cavalry, commanded by Captain Henry E. Noyes; and E Company, 2d

Cavalry, and F Company, 3d Cavalry, commanded by Captain Alexander Moore. Also

accompanying the expedition was LieutenantJohn Bourke, Crook’s aide-de-camp, who

joined the detachment as Crook’s observer. Most of the scouts also went with Reynolds.

This was a discontented command; the officers had no confidence in their commander’s

tactical abilities nor his physical and moral courage. Perhaps it was a self-fulfilling

prophesy, butReynolds proved true to the low esteemin which his officers held him.

Through driving snow and temperatures that ranged as low as 80 degrees below

zero, scout Grouard literally felt his way along the trail that led to the Powder River. At

about 0230 on 17 March, he halted the column until he could locate the Indian village.

While the troops waited in the bitter cold, Grouard successfully pinpointed the Indians’

location. This was the grand opportunity to strike the Indians that US commanders had

been awaiting. Reynolds formulated his plan of attack based on a misunderstanding of

the actual location of the village. His attack orders were inexact, but he did issue a

general outline of his tactical plan (see map A). Captain James Egan’s company of

Noyes’ battalion was to approach the village quietly and assault it on being detected.

Meanwhile, Noyes and his remaining company would drive the Indian pony herd away

from the village. On its part, Moore’s battalion was to dismount and move to the bluffs

overlooking the village to support Egan’s assault. Mills was initially given no mission,

but eventuallyReynolds had himfollow Moore to assist where practical.

Approaching the village took much longer than expected because of the rough

nature of the terrain and the village happened to be a mile north of its assumed position.

Noyes and Egan moved into position and initiated the attack satisfactorily (see map B);

however, Moore was not yet in position. Consequently, the Indians were able to flee to

the bluffs that commanded a view of the soldiers now occupying the village. At this

point, Egan’s company wasin great danger of being cut off, but Mills’battalion wassoon

available to reinforce it. When Moore’s battalion belatedly entered the valley, it was

added to the forces occupying the village. Noyes, who had successfully captured the

pony herd, was resting his unsaddled horses when he was urgently ordered to join the

fray in the village. Throughout the fight, Reynolds had become increasingly anxious

about the safety and protection of his detachment. Fearing the loss of his command, he

ordered the rapid destruction of the Indian village so that he could withdraw. Some

Indian property was destroyed, but Reynolds’ demand for haste caused much to be

overlooked. The battle was a hollow victory for the Army. During the poorly managed

withdrawal, the units left all their dead and one wounded soldier behind. The Indians

also managed to retake most of their pony herd during the Army’s march south. In

exchange for the loss of four and the wounding of six troopers, Reynolds had gained

virtually nothing beyond warning the Sioux of the government’s intentions. Beaten and

ashamed, Reynolds’ force rejoined Crook at the mouth of Lodgepole Creek. Then, 26

days after its departure, the entire force returned to Fort Fetterman—worn, weary, and

defeated.
d)

nted)

Egan

Noyes

Her

Pon

H

P

The Attack 16 

Army Attacks Army Attacks 

Indian Attacks 

Fleeing 

Actual Village Location Indians 

(Dismounted) 

5 

Moore 

1 Pony 

Mills Herd 

(Dismounted) 

5 

Egan Moore 

Noyes 

1


Mills


3 3


Noyes Assumed Village Noyes


Location (Mounted)


Map B

Map 17. Converging Columns, 1 April–9 June 1876


Gibbon’s column from the west was next into the field. Gibbon chose to gather his

widely separated companies at Fort Ellis. Accompanying him on his march from Fort

Ellis on 1April were 4 companies ofthe 2dCavalryRegiment and 5 companies ofthe 7th

Infantry Regiment, comprising a total of 450 men. After marching down the

Yellowstone River and briefly halting at Camp Supply to improve his sustainment

capability, Gibbon arrived near the mouth of Tullock Creek on 20April. It was here that

Crook’s movementsfar to the south affected Gibbon’s actions. Since Crook did not plan

to take to the field again until mid-May, Terry ordered Gibbon to halt until his

movements could be coordinated with the other columns. Thus, Gibbon waited at his

camp between 21April and 9 May.

In this 19-day period, Gibbon sent outseveralreconnaissance patrols, most of which

found no trace of the Sioux. However, in attempting to track Sioux horse thieves, on 16

May Gibbon’s remarkable chief of scouts, Lieutenant James H. Bradley, pinpointed the

location of a major Indian village on the Tongue River. On learning of Bradley’s find,

Gibbon ordered his command to march down the Yellowstone, cross to its south bank,

and attack the village. Unfortunately, Gibbon’s men proved unequal to the task of

crossing the Yellowstone. After unsuccessful efforts lasting 1 hour, Gibbon canceled

both the movement and the attack. Following this abortive attempt, Gibbon reported to

Terry neitherBradley’sfinding nor his own failure to crosstheYellowstone. Meanwhile,

this large Sioux village continued to send parties of warriors to harass Gibbon’s camp

until 23 May, when all contact with the hostile Indians ceased. Again, it was the

enterprising Bradley who found the Sioux, this time on Rosebud Creek. Once again,

Gibbon reported neitherthe Indians’harassment norBradley’s discovery oftheRosebud

camp.

During Gibbon’s movements, inclement weather had delayed the departure of

Terry’s column for the field. In the interim, Terry busily collected supplies and planned

river transport to support his overland march. The river route wasto follow the Missouri

River northwest, then turn southwest up theYellowstone, and end at Glendive Depot.At

last, on 17 May, Terry’s overland column departed from Fort Abraham Lincoln. His

force consisted of 12 companies of the 7th Cavalry Regiment under the command of

Custer and 31⁄2 companies ofinfantry.Terry’s column totaled 925men.

Through a misreading of intelligence, Terry expected to find the Indians along the

Little Missouri River, far to the east of where they actually were. Discovering no Indians

at the Little Missouri, he moved farther west, camping on Beaver Creek on 3 June. Here,

Terry received a dispatch from Gibbon (dated 27 May) that vaguely referred to sightings

of hostile Indians but gave no specific details and skeptically dealt with Bradley’s

discovery only in a postscript. Because of this dispatch, Terry turned south on Beaver

Creek and resolved to travel west to the Powder River. To facilitate his further

movement, he instructed his base force at Glendive Depot to send a boat with suppliesto

the mouth of the Powder River. Reaching the Powder River late on 7 June, Terry

personally went downstream to the Yellowstone the next day, hoping to consult with

Gibbon. He was pleasantly surprised to find several couriers from Gibbon’s force at the

river. Here, he finally gained the intelligence that Gibbon had not heretofore reported.

Terry now took personal control of both columns.

Meanwhile, Crook assumed direct command of the Bighorn and Yellowstone

Expedition at Fort Fetterman. Crook had drawn together an impressive force from his

Department of the Platte. Leaving Fort Fetterman on 29 May, the 1,051-man column

consisted of 15 companiesfrom the 2d and 3dCavalry, 5 companiesfrom the 4th and 9th

Infantry, 250 mules, and 106 wagons. Grouard, an experienced scout who had worked

with Crook on earlier campaigns, rode ahead of the column to recruit Crow warriors as

scouts. On 2 June, in spite of the poor weather, Crook pushed his force northward to the

site of Fort Reno,supremely confident that he would redress Reynolds’previousfailure

on the PowderRiver.At this point, Sheridan could finally say that all three columns were

in the field.
FT SHA

June 

V Lt 

Bradley on 16 May 

CDC

FT W 

FT BENTON 

Missouri River 

FT LARAMIE 

FT FETTERMAN 

FT RENO 

(Abandoned) 

FT PHIL KEARNY 

(Abandoned) 

FT CF SMITH 

(Abandoned) 

FT ELLIS 

Sioux-Assiniboine 

Reservation 

Devils Lake 

Reservation 

Crow 

Reservation 

FT BUFORD 

FT TOTTEN 

FT PECK 

WYOMING 

TERRITORY 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

DAKOTA 

TERRITORY 

Red Cloud Agency 

Spotted 

Tail 

Agency 

Crow Creek 

Agency 

Cheyenne River Agency 

Standing 

Rock 

Agency 

Crow 

Virginia Agency

City 

Bozeman 

Sun River 

Missouri River 

Missouri River 

Missouri River 

Niobrara River 

James 

River 

Moreau River 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Grand River 

Cannonball River 

Heart R i ver 

Sheyenne River 

Musselshell River 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn River 

Tongue 

River 

Powder R i ver 

Bighorn River 

Little 

Powder 

River 

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntain 

Black Hills 

Little 

Missouri 

James River 

Arickaree, Mandan, 

Gros Ventre 

Reservation 

IDAHO 

TERRITORY 

Rocky 

Mountains 

Powder River 

CAMP BAKER 

North Platte River 

TERRY 

1 April–9 June 1876 

Camp 

Supply 

9-12 April 

Powder River 

Depot 

Glendive 

Depot 

April 

25-28 

April 30 

-

May 5 May 

12-16 

May 

17-20 

May 

• 21-24 

• 25-28 

• 29 

May 30 

-

June 3 

June 

4-7 

21 April-9 May 

14-19 May 

20 May- 4 June 

8 June 

7-10 June 

3 June 

2 June 

Departed 

29 May 

6 

illage found by 

Tongue 

River 

Rosebud

Creek 

SHAW River

FT BENTON

Missouri River

FT LARAMIE

FT FETTERMAN

FT RENO

(Abandoned)

FT PHIL KEARNY

(Abandoned)

Crow

Reservation

Great Sioux 

Reservation 

FT RANDALL 

FT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

FT BUFORD

FT TOTTEN

FT PECK

WYOMING

TERRITORY NEBRASKA Red Cloud Agency

Spotted

Tail

Agency

Lower Brule Agency 

Crow Creek

Agency

Cheyenne River Agency

Standing

Rock

Agency

Sun River

Missouri River

Missouri River

Missouri River

Niobrara River

White River 

James

River

Moreau River

Belle Fourche River

Cheyenne River

Grand River

Cannonball River

Heart River

Sheyenne River

Musselshell River

Yellowstone River

Little

Bighorn River

Tongue

River

Powder River

Bighorn River

Little

Powder

River

Bi

ghorn M

ou

ntain

Black Hills

Little

Missouri

James River

Arickaree, Mandan,

Gros Ventre

Reservation

IDAHO

TERRITORY

Rocky

Mountains

Powder River

North Platte River

TERRY

GIBBON 

Powder River

Depot

Glendive

Depot

April

25-28

April 30

-

May 5 May

12-16

May

17-20

May

• 21-24

• 25-28

• 29

May 30

-

June 3

June

4-7

17 

14-19 May

20 May- 4 June

8 June

7-10 June

3 June

2 June

Departed

29 May

Departed 

1 April 

Departed 

17 May 

6 June

s 

5 June 

s

5 June

Village found by Lt

Bradley on 16 May

Village found by Lt 

Bradley on 27 May 

Movement of Main 

Indian Village 

CDC

N 

Terry’s 

Suspected Winter 

Roamer Location 

Tongue

River

Rosebud

Creek

River

Reconnaissance 

Miles 

0 50 100 150 

Converging Columns 

1 April–9 June 1876

Army 

Movement 

CROOK
Map 18. Crook’s Advance to the Rosebud


When Crook arrived at the ruins of Fort Reno, Grouard and the scouts were absent.

Many of the Crow braves had balked at serving with the Army, and only extensive

negotiations and Grouard’s offer ofsubstantialrewards would eventually convince them

to join Crook. The day after arriving at Reno, Crook’s column headed north without the

Indian allies and camped the night of 5 June on the abandoned site of Fort Phil Kearny.

Lacking Grouard’s guiding hand, the expedition soon became lost. On 6 June, mistaking

the headwaters of Prairie Dog Creek for Little Goose Creek, Crook led his column down

the wrong water course. The next day, Crook’s command moved to the confluence of

Prairie Dog Creek and Tongue River, where it camped for the next 4 days. At this time,

several Black Hills prospectors asked for permission to travel with Crook’s column.

Within a week, Crook’s civilian contingent grew to approximately 80 men. On 9 June,

Sioux or Cheyenne warriors raided the encampment on the Tongue River. Four

companies of Crook’s cavalry quickly repulsed the attackers. Although Crook’s

casualties were insignificant, the attack was evidence that the Indians were in the area

and prepared to fight.

Finally, on 11 June,Crook led the column 11miles back up Prairie DogCreek, then 7

miles to his original destination at the forks of Goose Creek (present-day Sheridan,

Wyoming), where he established a permanent camp.Asthe officers and men enjoyed the

excellent hunting and fishing in the area, Crook prepared for the final phase of the

campaign. On 14 June, Grouard arrived with 261 Shoshone and Crow allies to join the

expedition. Based on intelligence from Grouard, Crook now ordered his entire force to

lighten itself for a quick march. Each man was to carry only 1 blanket, 100 rounds of

ammunition, and 4 days’rations.The wagon train would remain at Goose Creek, and the

infantry would be mounted on the pack mules. The infantrymen, many of whom were

novice riders, received only a day’s training on the reluctant mules, much to the delight

ofthe cavalry spectators.

At 0600 on 16 June, Crook led his force of more than 1,300 soldiers, Indians, and

civilians out of the encampment at Goose Creek. Major Alexander Chambers’ 5

companies of mule-mounted infantry organized into 2 small battalions led the main

column. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall’s cavalry followed the infantry. His 15

companies of cavalry were organized into 4 battalions each commanded by a senior

captain: Anson Mills (3d Cavalry), Guy Henry (3d Cavalry), Frederick Van Vliet (3d

Cavalry), and Henry Noyes (2d Cavalry). The civilian contingent, organized into an

auxiliary battalion called the Packers and Miners, brought up the rear.The Shoshone and

Crow allies moved to the front and flank of the column. Crossing the Tongue about 6

milesto the north, the column proceeded downriver until early afternoon, when it turned

west and crossed the divide to the headwaters of Rosebud Creek. At 1900, the lead

elements of the force reached a small marshy area, near the source of the Rosebud, and

bivouacked.

Map 19. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Sioux and Cheyenne Attack, 0800 to 0830


On 17 June, Crook’s column roused itself at 0300 and set out at 0600, marching

northward along the south fork of Rosebud Creek. Again the infantry took the lead but

were soon passed by the faster moving cavalry. The holiday atmosphere that prevailed

since the arrival of the Indian scouts on 15 June was suddenly absent. The Crow and

Shoshone scouts were particularly apprehensive. Although the column had not yet

encountered any sign of Indians, the scoutsseemed to sense their presence.The soldiers,

on their part, were apparently fatigued from the previous day’s 35-mile march and their

earlymorning reveille, particularly themule-riding infantry.

At 0800, Crook stopped to rest his men and animals. The Crow scouts reported

evidence of Sioux and recommended thatCrook keep the column concealed in the valley

while they examined the area.Although he was deep in hostile territory, Crook made no

special dispositions for defense and only posted a few pickets in the hills to the north.

The troops merely halted in their marching order and took advantage of the opportunity

to brew morning coffee. The battalions of Mills and Noyes led the column, followed by

Captain Frederick Van Vliet’s battalion and Major Alexander Chambers’ battalion of

mule-borne foot soldiers, Captain Guy V. Henry’s battalion and a provisional company

of civilian packers andminers brought up the rear.

A few of the Crow and Shoshone were well ahead of the column searching for the

Indian village; fortunately, the allied Indiansthatstayed with the column remained alert

while the soldiersrested. Severalminuteslater, the soldiersin camp could hearthe sound

of intermittent gunfire coming from the bluffs to the north. At first, they dismissed the

noise as nothing more than the scouts taking potshots at buffalo. As the intensity of fire

increased, a scout rushed into the camp shouting, “Lakota, Lakota!” The Battle of the

Rosebud was on. Major George Randall and his Crow and Shoshone auxiliaries quickly

reinforced the thinArmy picket line north ofthe camp.By 0830, the Sioux andCheyenne

were hotly engaged withRandall’sIndian allies. Heavily outnumbered and supported by

only a few Army pickets, the Crow and Shoshone warriors were slowly pushed back

toward the camp, but theirfighting withdrawal gaveCrook time to deploy hisforces.

Map 20. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crook’s Counterattack, 0830 to 0930


In response to the Indian attack, Crook directed his forces to seize the high ground

north and south of Rosebud Creek. He ordered Van Vliet, with C and G Companies, 3d

Cavalry, to occupy the high bluffs to the south. Van Vliet scaled the hill just in time to

drive off a small band of Sioux approaching from the east. In the north, the commands of

Chambers (D and F Companies, 4th Infantry, and C, G, and H Companies, 9th Infantry)

and Noyes with three of his companies (B, E, and I Companies, 2d Cavalry) formed a

dismounted skirmish line and advanced toward the Sioux. Their progress was slow

because of flanking fire from Indians occupying the high ground to the northeast. To

accelerate the advance, Crook ordered Mills to charge this group of hostiles with a

portion of his battalion (A, E, and M Companies of the 3d Cavalry). Lieutenant Colonel

William Royall, Crook’s second in command, supported Mills with another three

companies (B, I, and L of the 3d Cavalry). Mills’mounted charge forced the Indians to

withdraw northwest along the ridgeline, not stopping until they reached the next crest

(now called Crook’s Ridge). Here, Mills quickly reformed his companies and led them

in another charge, driving the Indians northwest again to the next hill (Conical Hill).

Mills was preparing to drive the Indiansfrom Conical Hill when he received ordersfrom

Crook to cease his advance and assume a defensive posture.

Royall, after supporting Mills’ initial charge, moved to the west end of the field to

oppose Indians that were attacking the rear of Crook’s camp. His force consisted of

Henry’s reduced battalion (D and F Companies, 3d Cavalry) and the three companies

brought from the east end of the battlefield. Royall advanced rapidly along the ridgeline

to the northwest,finally halting his advance nearthe head of KollmarCreek.
20 

Mills

3 Vliet 

4&9 

D, F, C 

D, F 

Henry 3 

A, E, M 

3 Mills

Noyes 

B, E, I 

(Dismounted) 

2 

9 

G, H 

2 Dewey 

A 

C, G 

Van 

2 Swigert 

D 

Moore 

Packers & Miners 

B, I, L 

Royall 3 Crook’s Counterattack 

0830 to 0930 
Map 21. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crook’s Dilemma, 0930 to 1030


Chambers and Noyes led their forces forward and soon joined Mills on top of the

ridge. The bulk of Crook’s command, now joined by the packers and miners, occupied

Crook’s Ridge. Establishing his headquarters there at approximately 0930, Crook

contemplated his nextmove.

Crook’s most pressing concern was that Royall’s detachment was a mile from the

main body and in some danger of being cut off and destroyed. Sensing this vulnerability

and exploiting theirsuperb mobility, the Sioux andCheyenne warriorsshifted their main

effort to the west and concentrated their attacks onRoyall’stroopers.Crook,recognizing

the danger, wanted Royall to withdraw to Crook’s Ridge. However, the order delivered

to Royall directed that he extend his right until he connected with the rest of the

command at Crook’s Ridge. In reply, Royall sent only B Company to join Crook. That

one company did nothing to cover the 1-mile gap. Instead, it significantly reduced the

forceRoyall had available to defend his exposed position. He should have withdrawn all

five companies. He later defended his decision and claimed that heavy pressure from the

Indiansmade withdrawing the entire command too risky.

In addition to the danger to Royall’s command, Crook faced a significant dilemma.

His initial charges secured key terrain but did little to damage the Indian force. The

bluecoats’assaultsinvariably scattered the Indian defenders but did not keep them away.

After falling back, the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors returned to snipe at the soldiers

from long range. Occasionally, single warriors or small groups of Indians demonstrated

their valor by charging forward and exchanging a few close-range shots with the

troopers; when pressed, the Indians sped away on their nimble ponies. Crook soon

realized his charges were indecisive.

Casting about for a way to defeat his elusive opponent, Crook returned to his

original campaign plan. Since the Indians had been fighting him with unprecedented

tenacity, it suggested that they might be fighting to defend their families in a nearby

village. Thus, Crook decided to advance down the Rosebud Valley where he hoped to

find the hostile encampment and force the enemy to stand and fight. At about 1030,

Crook ordered Mills and Noyes to withdraw their commands from the high ground and

prepare for an attack on the Indian village presumed to be somewhere to the north on the

Rosebud.To replace the cavalry,Crook recalledVanVliet’s battalion from the south side

oftheRosebud.
21 

i Ind ans 

Indians 

nI dians 

3 Andrews Moore (Packers & Miners) 

I (-) 

4&9 3 Royall 

3 D, F, C 2 

HQ Crook 

D, F Noyes , L
 Meinhold 3 Mills B, E, I B 

A, E, M 2 Swigert 

Scouts D

Crow &


3 Shoshone
 Foster 

I (-) 

9 

G, H 

2 Dewey 

A 

Indians

Crook’s Dilemma 

0930 to 1030 

3 Van Vliet 

C, G 
Map 22. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Strike for the Village, 1030 to 1130


One mile to the west, Royall’s situation continued to deteriorate. Royall tried to

withdraw across Kollmar Creek, but found the Indians’ fire too heavy. Instead, he

withdrew southeast along the ridgeline to a more defensible position. In an attempt to

further isolate and overwhelm Royall’s force, a large group of Indians charged boldly

down the valley of Kollmar Creek, advancing all the way to the Rosebud. The fortuitous

arrival of Van Vliet’s command checked the Indians’ advance. Crook then ordered his

Crow and Shoshone scoutsto charge into the withdrawing warriors’flank, throwing the

hostilesinto great confusion.

Troubled by the fire from Indians on Conical Hill and to cover Mills’movement into

theRosebudValley,Crook orderedChambers’infantry to drive the Sioux away.The foot

soldiers promptly forced an enemy withdrawal, but to little avail. It was a repetition of

the same old pattern; the soldiers could drive the Sioux away at will, but they could not

fix and destroy them.

At about 1130 Crook sent another message to Royall directing his withdrawal to

Crook’s Ridge. However, he decided not to wait for Royall’sreturn and directed Millsto

execute his drive for the village. He could only hope that Mills’advance down the valley

would be successful.
22 

Indians 

Indians 

Indians 

Indians 

3


Moore (Packers & Miners)


Meinhold 

4&9 B 

D, F, C 

9
 3
Royall HQ Crook 

I, L
 G, H Scouts

Crow & 2


Shoshone Noyes 3
Henry A, B, D, E, I


D, F


3


Mills


A, E, M 

The Strike for the Village


1030 to 1130 3


Van Vliet 

C, G 
Map 23. The Battle of the Rosebud: The End of the Battle, 1130 to 1330


Mills’ advance on the suspected Indian village did nothing to suppress the Indians.

Crook’s assumption about the presence of an Indian encampment proved totally false;

there was no nearby Indian village. The most important consequence of Mills’ action

wasto leaveCrook withoutsufficientforce to aidRoyall and his hard-pressed command.

While Millsmade his way down theRosebud,Royall’ssituation grew worse.

At approximately 1130, Royall withdrew southeastward a second time and assumed

a new defensive position. From here, he hoped to lead his command across Kollmar

Creek and rendezvous with Crook. Meanwhile, the Sioux and Cheyenne assailed him

from three sides, growing ever bolder in their attacks. Observing the situation from his

headquarters, Crook realized that Royall would need help in extricating himself.

Consequently, Crook sent orders to Mills canceling his original mission and directing

himto turn west to fall on the rear ofthe Indians pressingRoyall.

At approximately 1230, Royall decided he could wait no longer and began

withdrawing his troopers into the Kollmar ravine to remount their horses. From there,

his men would have to race through a hail of fire before reaching the relative safety of

Crook’s main position. As they began their dash, the Crow and Shoshone scouts

countercharged the pursuing enemy, relieving much of the pressure on Royall’s men.

Two companies of infantry also left the main position to provide covering fire from the

northeast side of the ravine. In spite of this gallant assistance, Royall’s command

suffered grievous casualties. Nearly 80 percent of the total Army losses (10 killed, 21

wounded) in the Battle of the Rosebud came from Royall’s four companies of the 3d

Cavalry (9 killed and 15 wounded).

While the last of Royall’s men extricated themselves, Mills digested his new

instructions from Crook. Since Mills’ command had driven off a small party of Sioux

near the bend in the Rosebud, it apparently led him to believe that the Indian village was

nearby. He wanted to continue the attack on the suspected Indian village, but obeyed his

orders. Mills climbed out ofthe canyon and proceeded westward towardConical Hill.

Mills arrived too late to assist Royall’s withdrawal, but his unexpected appearance

on the Indians’ flank caused the Sioux and Cheyenne to break contact and retreat.

Concentrating his mounted units, Crook now led them up the Rosebud in search of the

nonexistent Indian village. However, the scouts refused to enter the narrow canyon,

forcing Crook to abandon the pursuit. The Battle of the Rosebud was over. By the

standards of Indian warfare, it had been an extremely long and bloody engagement.

Never before had the PlainsIndiansfought with such ferocity, and never before had they

shown such a willingnessto accept casualties. The Sioux and the Cheyenne left 13 dead

on the field and Crazy Horse later stated that the Indian losses were 36 killed and 63

wounded.Theirsacrifice was not in vain. Concerned for his wounded,short on supplies,

and shaken by the Indians’ ferocity, Crook returned to his camp on Goose Creek. His

Shoshoni allies soon departed when they saw Crook had no intention of continuing the

fight.

Crook’s report of the battle, dated 19 June, reached Sheridan’s headquarters on 23

June (remarkably fast considering the technological limitations of the day). In his

message, he claimed victory with respect to his retention of the battlefield but then

acknowledged that he lacked the resources to continue without re-supply and

reinforcements. He stopped short of estimating the number of Indians that opposed his

column, but he did state they were sufficiently determined and strong enough to fight for

several hours against his 1,300-man column. Sheridan forwarded the message to Terry

thatsame day. Unfortunately, Crook’s warning that the Indians were determined to fight

did not reach Terry until 30 June, 5 days after the Battle of Little Bighorn. Crook and his

command stayed at Goose Creek for 7 weeks awaiting reinforcements. They played no

role in themomentous events atLittleBighorn.
23 

Indians 

Indians 

Indians 

Indians 

Moore (Packers & Miners) 

3 Meinhold 

4&9 B 

D, F, C 

HQ Crook 

Scouts 

9 Crow & 

Shoshone 

G,H

3 Royall 

D, F, I, L 

2 Noyes 

3 A, B, D, E, I Mills 

A, E, M 

The End of the Battle 

1130 to 1330 
Map 24. Terry’s Campaign, 10–24 June


Unaware of Crook’s activities but armed with the information furnished by

Gibbon’s messengers, Terry finally had specific, if somewhat stale, intelligence

regarding the Indian locations which he believed to be somewhere on Rosebud Creek.

This new information called for new orders, which Terry issued on 10 June (see mapA).

Major Marcus A. Reno of Custer’s command was to take six companies of cavalry on a

reconnaissance ofthe valleys ofthe PowderRiver, MizpahCreek, andTongueRiver and

confirm that the Sioux had not moved to the east. Under no circumstances was he to

venture west of the Tongue River so as not to alarm the Indians believed to be on

Rosebud Creek. Reno was to finish his reconnaissance at the mouth of the Tongue,

where he was to rejoin Custer and the rest of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Following

Reno’s reconnaissance, Terry intended to drive southward in parallel columns, Custer’s

cavalry on theTongue and Gibbon’s predominantly infantry force on the Rosebud.After

ascending the Tongue for an appropriate distance, Custer’s more mobile command

would turn west toward the Rosebud and descend that creek pushing the Sioux toward

Gibbon’sforce.

While Reno failed to scout all of Mizpah Creek, he essentially followed Terry’s

orders until 15 June.After descending theTongueRiverfor only 8 miles, he then decided

to turn west to investigate enemy signs on the Rosebud. Although he disobeyed Terry’s

direct instructions by advancing up the Rosebud, Reno was able to determine that

Terry’s plan of parallel columns would not work; the Indians had already traveled

beyond the area encompassed byTerry’s pincermovement.

The information generated by Reno’s reconnaissance caused Terry to formulate yet

another plan (see map B). While all of his forces gathered at the mouth of the Rosebud,

he designed a second pincer movement similar to the first. Terry’s written orders

provided full latitude for Custer to diverge from them; paradoxically, they also

enumerated a specific set of instructionsfor Custer to follow.Whether Custer disobeyed

ordersis a controversy that continuesto this day.Terry’s orders directedCusterto ascend

the Rosebud and follow the trail of the Indians. If the trail diverged from the Rosebud to

the west, he was, nonetheless, to continue up that creek to ensure the Indians would not

escape to the south. Near the headwaters of Rosebud Creek, Custer was to cross the

divide into the Little Bighorn River drainage. Meanwhile, Gibbon’s force was to move

up the Yellowstone River, turn south up the Bighorn, and establish itself at the mouth of

theLittleBighorn.

On 21 June, Custer departed with his regiment of 12 companies (652 men). Shortly

thereafter, Terry and Gibbon led the remaining forces, 4 cavalry companies and 5

infantry companies (723 men), westward along the Yellowstone on their route to the

mouth of the Little Bighorn. Each of these two columns followed Terry’s plan to the

letter until the evening of 24 June.
June

Y e llowstone Riv e r 

Tongue River 

Muddy Creek 

Rosebud C reek 

Tullock

Creek 

Sarpy 

Creek 

Armell’s Creek 

Lame Deer Creek 

Reno 

Creek 

Otter C reek 

Pumpkin Creek 

M i zpah Creek 

11 

June 

12 

June 

13 

June 

14 

June 

15 

June 

16 

June 

17 

June 

18 

June 

8-11 June 

19-23 

June 

17-20 

May 

21-24 

May 

16-17 

June 

19 June 

Davis

Creek 

Map A (Terry ’s First Plan) 

4-7 June 

30 May - 3 June 

12-14 June 

16­

Powder River 

Yellowstone River

Little

Bighorn R. 

Little

Bighorn R.

Tongue River

Rosebud Creek

Tullock

Creek

Sarpy

Creek

Armell’s Creek

Lame Deer Creek

Reno

Creek

Otter

Creek

Pumpkin Creek

Mizpah Creek

11

June

12

June

13

June

14

June

15

June

16

June

17

June

18

June

17-20

May

21-24

May

16-17

June

19 June

Map A (Terry ’s First Plan)

Muddy Creek

Davis

Creek

Powder River

Crook’s 

Goose Creek 

Camp 

CUSTER 

TERRYGIBBON 

Davis

Creek

Muddy

17 June Creek

15 June 

Presumed 

location of 

Indians 

Upper Rosebud 

Camps found by 

Gibbon in late May RENO 

Y e llowstone Riv e r 

Little Bighorn River 

Tongue River 

Muddy Creek 

Tullock Creek 

Sarpy 

Creek 

Armell’s Creek 

Lame Deer Creek 

Otter C reek 

24 

June 

8-11 June 

12-14 June 

15 June 

16-17 June 

Y

Davis

Creek 

Map B (Terry’s Second Plan) 

4-7 June 

Davis

23 

June 

22 

June 

24 

June 

23 

June 

22 

June 

23

CDC

Reno 

Creek 

Rosebud C reek

Bighorn 

River 

Reno

N 

21June

ellowstone River

Little Bighorn River

Tongue River

Muddy Creek

Tullock Creek

Sarpy

Creek

Armell’s Creek

Lame Deer Creek

Otter

Creek

24

June

8-11 June

12-14 June

15 June

16-17 June

TERRYGIBBON 

Creek

Map B (Terry’s Second Plan)

4-7 June

24-26 

June 

Crook’s 

Goose Creek 

Camp 

Presumed 

location of 

Indians 

Upper Little Bighorn 

CUSTER 

Abandoned Camps 

found by Reno in 

mid June 

24 

19-23 

June 

Gibbon’s 

assigned 

blocking 

position 

0 25 50 

Miles 

Terry’s Campaign 

10–24 June 

Reno’s reconnaissance 

Terry-Gibbon 

Custer 

Indian village 

Abandoned Indian village site 

Planned movement 

June

22

June

24

June

23

June

22

June

Creek

Rosebud Creek

Bighorn

River

June
Map 25. Custer’s Approach to the Crow’s Nest


At 1945 on 24 June 1876,Custer camped at what is now theBusbyBend ofRosebud

Creek. Throughout that day’s march, he, hissoldiers, and hisscouts had seen increasing

signs of the Sioux village. Still unclear was whether the Indians had continued up the

Rosebud or had turned west toward the Little Bighorn River.At 2100, four Crow scouts

returned to camp with news that the Sioux trail led westward out of the Rosebud Valley.

Custer now faced a dilemma. Terry’s orders directed him to continue up the Rosebud to

its head, then turn west toward the Little Bighorn. Through this maneuver, Terry

intended to trap the Indians between Custer’s force and Gibbon’s column. On the other

hand, continuing up the Rosebud entailed several risks: possible discovery by Indian

scouts, the loss of contact with the Indian village, and the possibility ofleaving Gibbon’s

force to fight the Indians alone. After weighing his options, Custer chose to maintain

contact by following the Sioux trail overthe divide.

At 2120, Custer sent his chief of scouts, Lieutenant Charles A. Varnum, to a natural

observation point called the Crow’s Nest to pinpoint the location of the Sioux village.

While Varnum was absent, Custer decided to move his column at night to the divide

between Rosebud Creek and the Little Bighorn River. His force would then hide there

throughout the day of 25 June in a small pocket nestled at the base of the Crow’s Nest.

That evening, he planned to approach the village, assume attack positions before dawn

on 26 June, and attack the Indians atfirst light.

At 0030 on 25 June, Custer led his soldiers out of the Busby Bend camp toward the

divide.After a slow, dusty, and disagreeable nightmarch lasting nearly 3 hours, he halted

his column about an hour before sunrise to cook breakfast. At 0730, Custer received a

message from Varnum at the Crow’s Nest. Although Varnum had not personally seen

signs ofthe Sioux village (now in the LittleBighornValley), hisIndian scouts claimed to

have seen it. Unwilling to act without making his own observations, Custer and a small

party left at 0800 fortheCrow’s Nest, whileReno brought the regimentforward.

During Varnum’s wait for Custer at the Crow’s Nest, his scouts saw two groups of

hostile Indiansthat appeared to notice Custer’s column. Custer reached the Crow’s Nest

at 0900, but like Varnum, he was unable to identify any signs of the Sioux village.

Varnum’sIndian scouts, however, convinced Custer of its presence in the Little Bighorn

Valley. The scouts further argued that the column’s movement had been compromised

and that a stealthy approach to the village was now impossible. Custer adamantly

rejected this advice while at the Crow’s Nest and decided to continue with his plan to

hide the regiment and attack atfirst light.
3500

sebud

Creek

alt 1 (hard tack box

kfast

s Intel on village

Nest

t 1

w’s Nest

1

Varnum

3500

3500

4000

4250

4000

3750

3750

3750

Rosebud

Creek

0

Indian Trail

25 

Davis

Davis

Creek

Creek

Custer’s Custer’ Approach to the Crow’s Nest

Indian Trail 7 Main Column 

Miles 

SCT 7 Army Scouts Custer 1 2 3

4000 Elevation in Feet 

N 

Six Sioux seen Custer and the Main Column


24th


Headwaters • 1945: Main column arrives Busby Bend
 7 

ofTullock 25th 

Creek Busby Bend Camp • 0030: Main column departs Busby Bend camp SCT 7 

• 0325: Main column arrives at Halt 1 (hard tack box 

lost en route) 

Varnum and the Scouts • 0415: Main column cooks breakfast 

• 2120: Scouts depart Busby Bend camp for • 0800: Custer leaves for Crow s Nest 

24th • 0730: Custer receives and reads Intel on village 

’ 

Crow ’ s Nest • 0845: Main column departs Halt 1

25th • 0900: Custer arrives at the Crow ’ s Nest

• 0250: Varnum and scouts arrive at Crow’s 

Nest 

• 0340: Scouts sight Sioux village from 

Crow’s Nest (13 miles to the west) 

• 0500: Scouts sight main column ’ s breakfast

smoke 4000

• 0520: Varnum sends courier to Custer 

• 0540-0900: Various sightings of Sioux from Varnum 

the Crow ’ s Nest Halt 1 

4000

Custer 

Tw o Sioux seen

westof divide

3750

Custer’s Decision 

• Hide main column at the Crow’s Nest 

• Attack at first light, 26 June 4000

3750

Village sighted 13 Planned 4250 Regimental Hide Position miles to the west 4420X

42504500 CDC
Map 26. Custer’s Approach to the Little Bighorn


During Custer’s absence, Reno had moved the column forward to a position just

north of the Crow’s Nest. On his return, Custer learned of a further threat to his force’s

security. During the night march, one of the pack mules had lost part of its load. The

detail sent to retrieve it discovered several hostile Indians rummaging through its

contents.The soldiersfired on the Indians,scattering them but not killing them.Coupled

with the observations of Varnum’s scouts, this latest breach of security forced Custer to

discard his original plan for a stealthy approach. Instead of concealing his command

throughout the day of 25 June, he would have to approach and attack the village

immediately. Ironically, none of the Indians who spotted the column reported their

findingsto the village until afterthe battle, butCuster had no way of knowing that.

At 1050, Custer gathered his officers and detailed his new plan and the organization

of the column. He directed each company commander to assign one noncommissioned

officer and six men to accompany the pack train. The companies would depart in the

order in which they finished preparations to move. The troopers resumed their march at

1145, withCaptain FrederickW.Benteen’s company in the van.They had not proceeded

more than one-half mile past the divide when Custer ordered another halt. There, he

reorganized his command into four parts: Benteen’s battalion with D, H, and K

Companies (120 men); Reno’s battalion with A, G, and M Companies (175 men);

Custer’s battalion with C, E, F, I, and L Companies (221 men); and Captain Thomas M.

McDougall’s augmented company (B) with the pack train (136 men). Custer now

detached Benteen, ordering him to scout southward to determine whether the Indians

were escaping in that direction.As soon as Benteen concluded that the Indians were not

escaping, he was to rejoin the command as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, Custer and

Reno continued their advance down what is now Reno Creek, with Custer’s battalion on

the right bank andReno’s on the left.

Benteen began his reconnaissance enthusiastically, but after crossing a series of

ridges without finding any trace of the Indians, he concluded that he was being

deliberately excluded from the fight.As a result, he lost his previoussense of urgency. In

the meantime,Custer andReno had proceeded downRenoCreek until they united on the

right bank at a lone tepee containing the body of a warrior mortally wounded in the

Rosebud fight.At the tepee, Custer’s scouts reported that they could see the Sioux pony

herd and Indians running in the distance. At 1415, Custer and Reno departed the lone

tepee location at a trot and advanced nearly 3milesto a flat area betweenRenoCreek and

its north fork.There, more Sioux were seen, two of whom rode to a hill to give the alarm.

Custer now ordered Reno to follow Reno Creek to the Little Bighorn, ford the river, and

assault the fleeing village in a mounted charge. Custer promised Reno that he would

support the attack with the remainder of the command. After Reno’s departure, Custer

briefly followed Reno’s trail, reaching the north fork of Reno Creek at 1500. There, he

received a series of surprising reports from Reno indicating that the Indians were not

running as expected. Once again,Custer wasforced to revise his plans.
3500

3500

3500

3500

3500

3500

3250

3250

3250

3750

3750

3750

3750

4000

4250

4500

Reno Creek

No

Name

Creek

(Valley 3)

Valley 2

Valley 1

DavisCreek

Ridge B

Ridge C

Ridge A

Reno

Little

Bighorn River

Custer 

Reno 

X Custer 

1400: Main column passes Morass 

X

1400: Main column passes Morass

• 1432: Benteen rejoins Custer 

Custer’s Approach to the Little Bighorn 26 

Miles Indian village Custer and Reno 

0 123 

4000 Elevation in Feet Benteen 

Lone Tepee No Name Creek & Morass Halt 3 • 1415: •

o Main column passes Lone Tepee • 1205: Main column arrives Halt 3 

• 1212: Columns separate Halt 2 The Flats o Scouts report Sioux in Little Bighorn route • 1232: Pack train passes through • 1007: Main column 

Valley • 1437: Benteen halts at Morass to Halt 3 arrives Halt 2 • 1445: Boston Custer passes Lone Tepee water horses • 1020: Lost pack report • 1512: Benteen passes Lone Tepee • 1437: Boston Custer passes • 1035: Custer rejoins • 1532: Pack Train passes Lone Tepee Morass Custer’s Decision at Halt 3 • 1050: Officer call • 1457: 

Custer’s Decision at the Lone Tepee • Columns separate • 1145: March resumed 

o Benteen departs Morass • Movement to contact • 1200: Crosses divide • Reno lead (at trot) o Pack train arrives Morass (at walk) • Movement to contact • 1517: Pack train departs Morass 

LoneTepee Custer’s Decision at Halt 2 

• Movement to contact 

(at walk) 

• Scouts lead 

• Reinforced pack train N
 Little Bighorn
 Halt 3

Valley


The Flats 

• 1443: Morass

o Custer and Reno vicinity of the Flats 

o Scouts report village village is fleeing fleeing

• 1451: Custer waters horses at North Fork 

• 1453: Reno waters horses at Little Bighorn River 

3250

Halt2 Custer’s Decision at the Flats Benteen 4000

(Hasty Attack) TheDivide • Reno pursue and bring to battle fleeing village 

• Custer support Reno 

The Flats Benteen’s Benteen’s Advance Guard

1501: Scouts and Adjutant Cook report atRidge C High ground above

Sioux Attacking Reno the Crow’s Nest

13 Miles CDC

7 
Map 27. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Reno’s Attack in the Valley, 1500 to 1533


After receiving his instructions and leaving Custer for the last time, Reno crossed

again to the left bank of Reno Creek and followed the stream to its confluence with the

Little Bighorn where he briefly stopped to water the horses. Five minutes later, Reno’s

battalion forded the Little Bighorn and deployed into a line acrossthe valley. For the first

time,Reno could see the edge of what now appeared to be an enormousIndian village.

At 1503, Reno ordered his men to advance down the valley. As their horses

accelerated to a fast trot,several officers andmen in the advancing line could see troopers

from Custer’s battalion on the bluffs to the east beyond the Little Bighorn. They could

also see a swarm of Indian warriors gathering at the southern edge of the village. At the

same time, Reno’s Indian scouts, who initially formed the left flank of his line, veered

westward toward the Indian pony herd on the bench above the Little Bighorn. Their task

was to drive off as much of the herd as possible to prevent the Indians’ escape. At 1513,

officers andmen in the charging line once again saw soldiers on the crest ofthe hill across

the LittleBighorn. Several ofReno’s men latertestified that they could clearly seeCuster

waving his hat to the line of horsemen in the valley. Within a few minutes, Reno

concluded that, without immediate support, his 135-man force could not attack through

the village and hope to survive.

At 1518, Reno ordered his men to dismount and form a skirmish line. One of every

four troopers was designated to hold the horses.While the horses were secured in a stand

of timber on the right flank of the line, the remaining 95 men spread 400 yards acrossthe

valley to the low bluff on the west. Within minutes, the entire line was under pressure

fromhundreds of warriorsspilling out ofthe village.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the river, Custer was faced with a situation that

imposed a change of plans. From the orders he had given Reno, it appears that Custer

originally had intended to reinforce Reno’s charge in the valley. On being informed that

the Indians were fighting rather than running, he may have felt he needed to support

Reno by attacking the Sioux village from a different direction. While he hoped at any

moment to see Benteen’s command riding into sight, the urgency of the situation meant

he could not wait.Consequently,Custerturned his battalion northwest to follow the bluff

line on the right bank of the Little Bighorn River. Apparently, he was seeking access to

the riverfarther downstreamtomake a flank attack on the village.

Custer’sforce climbed to the crest of Reno Hill, where he gained hisfirst glimpse of

the valley. He could see Reno’s command still making its charge and could view the

southern edge of the largest Indian village any of the veteran soldiers had ever seen. In

fact, the village contained up to 1,000 lodges and 7,120 people, including approximately

1,800 warriors. The sight of so many fighting warriors convinced Custer that he needed

Benteen’s command and the extra ammunition on the pack train immediately. He

detached Sergeant Daniel Kanipe to find McDougall, commander of the pack train, with

the message to move the train hurriedly cross-country: “If packs get loose, don’t stop to

fix them, cut them off. Come quick. Big Indian camp,” and an added postscript for

Benteen, if seen, to come quickly. But he had no time to wait for Benteen and the pack

train; he had to continue his trek northwest. Just beyond Reno Hill, he descended into

Cedar Coulee still attempting to gain access to the river and hoping that his approach

would be shielded fromthe Indians’view.

Halting the command at a bend in the coulee, Custer rode to the high ground

overlooking the valley (possibly Sharpshooter Hill or Weir Point) with several scouts

including MitchBoyer and the Indian scout,Curly. Fromthe high ground, the small party

could see that Reno’s command had dismounted and was forming a skirmish line. If

Reno could hold his position, Custer’s command might gain enough time to become

engaged. From the high ground, Custer could also see that Cedar Coulee joined another

ravine (MedicineTailCoulee) which would, at last, give himaccessto the river.

From the high ground, it is most likely that Custer also saw the dust cloud of

Benteen’s battalion and the pack train descending Reno Creek. He left Curly and Boyer

on Weir Point to watch Reno’s fight and then rejoined his command. After sending a

trumpeter, John Martin, with another message for Benteen to bring the ammunition

packs forward, he led the command down Cedar Coulee and into Medicine Tail Coulee

to attack.
27 

The Battle of the


Little Bighorn


Reno’s Attack in the
 Valley


1500 to 1533


Army Movements 

Messenger 

Army Scout 

Movements 

Indian Attacks Village 

Skirmish Line 

3450 Feet 

3400 Feet 

3350 Feet 

3300 Feet 

3250 Feet 

3200 Feet 

3150 Feet 

3100 Feet 

Miles 

0 1/4 1/2 
Map 28. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Losing the Initiative, 1533 to 1553


In the valley, Reno’stroopers were outnumbered five to one. Threatened with being

flanked and overwhelmed on hisleft, at 1533 Reno ordered the line to withdraw into the

timber. In the trees, Reno tried to form a perimeter using an old riverbank as a natural

breastwork. However, the area was too large for his small command to secure. In less

than 30 minutes, the warriors worked their way through the brush and threatened to

surroundReno’s command.The timber was a good defensive position. However,Reno’s

most serious concern was that some of his companies were also running low on

ammunition, and the only remaining supply was with the pack train somewhere to the

rear.Reno was quickly coming to the decision that he needed to leave the timber and find

the rest ofthe regiment.

In Cedar Coulee, Custer was unaware of Reno’s deteriorating situation. His primary

concern wasto get his battalion offthe high ground and into the fight to supportReno. He

more than likely intended to attack down Medicine Tail Coulee into the village, the

frontier Army’s accepted tactic of hitting a village from multiple sides to cause surprise

and panic. At approximately 1549, Custer received a valuable update from his younger

brother, Boston Custer. Boston had abandoned his assignment with the pack train and

ridden forward to join his brother for the fight. The younger brother would have been

able to inform his brother that the back trail was open and confirm that Benteen had

joined Custer’s route. Boston may also have been able to verify that Reno was still

heavily engaged in the valley, a confirmation for Custer that there wasstill time to move

against the village’sflank.
28 

The Battle of the


Little Bighorn


Losing the Initiative 

1533 to 1553 

Army Movements 

Messenger 

Army Scout 

Movements 

Indian Attacks Village 

Army 

Defensive 

Perimeter 

3450 Feet 

3400 Feet 

3350 Feet 

3300 Feet 

3250 Feet 

3200 Feet 

3150 Feet 

3100 Feet 

Miles 

0 1/4 1/2 
Map 29. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Disaster in the Valley, 1553 to 1627


Reno’ssituation in the valley was critical. The Indiansthreatened to surround Reno

and soon set the woods afire. In response, Reno ordered his men to mount and move

upstream where they could cross to high ground on the east bank.At 1553, Reno led the

retreat out of the timber, but the movement quickly degenerated into a rout. Many men

did notreceive the order or were unable to withdraw and were left in the timberto fight in

small pockets or hide until they could escape. Those who made it out of the woods were

forced to cross the Little Bighorn at a narrow, deep ford that caused them to cluster.

Meanwhile, the Indians vigorously pressed their attack, inflicting heavy casualties on

the panic-stricken soldiers struggling to reach safety beyond the river. At 1610, the first

troops reached the hill that would later bear Reno’s name. More than 40 dead and 13

wounded troopers attested to the bloody fighting in the valley. Seventeen officers and

men remained temporarily hidden in the trees west ofthe river.

Curly and Boyer, the scouts that Custer left behind on the high ground, witnessed

Reno’s disastrous retreat. Knowing the importance of this information, the two scouts

descended Weir Point to rendezvous with Custer’s column. Custer, having learned from

Boyer and Curly that Reno’s force was in serious trouble, knew that he had to act

immediately.Apparently intending to distract the Indians at his end ofthe village,Custer

split his battalion into two parts: E and F Companies (76 men) under the command of

Captain George W. Yates and C, I, and LCompanies(134 men) under Captain Myles W.

Keogh. He sent Yates’ command down Medicine Tail Coulee to the ford to make a feint

against the village. Custer led the remainder of the force up the north side of Medicine

Tail Coulee to Luce Ridge. From there, Keogh’s three companies could support Yates

should he get into serioustrouble, and at the same time, Custer could wait for Benteen’s

battalion and the pack train.

Yates made his charge toward the river and startled the village. Briefly, as the

Indians recovered from their surprise, Yates’ command was able to fire across the river

relatively unopposed. The Indians soon rallied, however, and some began to pressure

Yates frontally while others ascended Medicine Tail Coulee. From his position on Luce

Ridge,Custer’smen poured a heavy volley offire into the advancing warriors.
Pack 7 

Train 

1627 29 

The Battle of the


Little Bighorn


Disaster in the Valley 

1553 to 1627 

Army Movements 

Messenger 

Army Scout 

Movements 

Indian Attacks 

Village 

3450 Feet 

3400 Feet 

3350 Feet 

3300 Feet 

3250 Feet 

3200 Feet 

3150 Feet 

3100 Feet 

Miles 

1/4 1/2 

Tptr. Martin 

Meets Benteen BENTEEN 

(1558) 

1604 

1620 

1610 Benteen 7 

Reno 7 Reno’s Total Losses: 

• 40 KIA and 13 W 

• 17 Missing 

RETREAT 

Keogh 

(Custer) 7 FORD

CUSTER 1616 

BoyerUpdate(1604)

Boyer & Curly 

(1553-1558)	 Retreat to the High Ground 

(1553 - 1610) 29 KIA and 5 W 

1618 

RENO Yates 7 

0 
Map 30. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Weir’s Advance and Reno Hill


Having suffered grievous losses in the valley, Reno withdrew his men to the bluffs

on the east bank ofthe LittleBighorn.The Sioux pursued them briefly, but by 1630, most

of the warriors had broken contact with Reno and moved off to assist in the fight against

Custer’s force. Benteen’s battalion and the pack train soon joined Reno atop the bluffs.

From there, they could hear heavy and continuous firing to the north. While Reno and

Benteen pondered their next move, Captain Thomas B. Weir initiated an advance by

most of the command to a high point 1 mile to the northwest.Although this prominence

(now known as Weir Point) offered an excellent view of the surrounding terrain, the

cavalrymen learned little aboutCuster’sfate.To the west, they could see the valley ofthe

Little Bighorn filled with tepees. To the north, they could see distant hills and ridges

shrouded in dust with occasional glimpses of Indians in the dust cloud riding about and

firing. They did not realize they were witnessing Custer’s destruction (see map 31). By

1710, most of the firing had ceased. Now dust clouds appeared all over the area as the

Sioux and Cheyenne warriors converged on the remainder of the 7th Cavalry. It appears

that neither Reno nor Benteen provided any overall direction to the command; the

company commanders decided independently to fall back to the original position on the

bluffs. Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, commander of K Company, saw the danger of a

disorderly retreat and, on his own initiative, acted as the rearguard. By 1810, Reno and

Benteen had their battalions back on the bluffs and had formed a perimeter defense.

Animals and wounded men were gathered in a circular depression in the center of the

position. The Indians rapidly surrounded the bluecoats and began long-range sniping at

Reno’s men. While vexing, the Indians’ fire caused few casualties, and the soldiers’

firepower stopped all enemy charges. Darkness finally stopped the fighting at 2100.

While the Indians withdrew to the village to celebrate their great victory, the troopers

strengthened their position with improvised tools.

The fighting at Reno Hill would persist for the next 2 days. On the 26th the Indians

continued their long-range sniping, supplemented by occasional charges. This time,

Indian fire inflicted considerably more casualties. (On the hill, Reno lost 48 men killed

and wounded on the 26th, compared to just 11 on the 25th.) Improved Indian fire may

have persuaded Benteen to conductsome limited counterattacks. Seeing a large band of

Indians massing near the south end of his position, he led H Company in a charge that

quickly scattered the attackers. Benteen then persuaded Reno to order a general advance

in all directions. This attack also succeeded in driving the Indians back and gained some

relief from enemy fire, but the relief was only temporary. As the sun rose and the day

grew warmer, the lack of water became a serious problem, especially for the wounded

men lying without coverin the hot Montana sun.Aplea from Dr. HenryR. Porter, the 7th

Cavalry’s only surviving physician, prompted Benteen to seek volunteers to go for

water. Covered by sharpshooters, a party of soldiers made its way down what is now

called Water Carriers’Ravine to the river and succeeded in bringing water back for the

wounded.

By late afternoon, the Sioux and Cheyenne appeared to be losing interest in the

battle. Frustrated by their inability to finish off the bluecoats and apparently satisfied

with what they had already accomplished, the Indians began to withdraw. While some

warriors kept the soldiers pinned down, the Indians in the valley broke camp and set the

prairie grass afire to hinder pursuit. At approximately 1900, Reno’s men saw the huge

band move upriver toward a new campsite in the Bighorn Mountains. Although

unmolested following the Indian withdrawal, Reno stayed in his hilltop position the

night of the 26th. The following morning, Terry’s column arrived and informed Reno

andBenteen ofCuster’sfate.
30 

The Battle of the


Little Bighorn


Weir’s Advance Advance


and


Reno Hill


Army Movements 

Army 

Defensive 

Perimeter 

Indian Attacks 

Village 

3450 Feet 

3400 Feet 

3350 Feet 

3300 Feet 

3250 Feet 

3200 Feet 

3150 Feet 

3100 Feet 

Miles 

1/4 1/2 

Reno Hill Defensive Perimeter


(1810, 25 June to 1030, 27 June)


Hospital Area 

Ammo Arrives 

(1719, 25 June) 

B Co & Pack Train 

Arrive A, B, G, and pack train Pack 7 (1725, 25 June) march to join Weir Train 

(1752, 25 June) A Ammo Mules B 7 

McDougall G 

D 

Reno marches to join Weir 7 Water Carriers’ Ravine 

(1740, 25 June) A, B, G K (26 June) 

M 

B 

Benteen marches to join


Weir


(1723, 25 June)


Benteen 7


H, K, M
 Weir leaves to 25 June 1876 

find Custer THE DECISION TO ADVANCE 

D 7 (1705, 25 June) • Heavy firing heard in Custer’s 

Weir direction (1625) 

Custer Hill (3 Miles) • Reno and Benteen regroup on 

Reno Hill (1627-1652) 

• Reno sends courier to speed up 

ammo mules (1652) 

• Custer volleys heard (1655) 

THE DECISION TO RETREAT 

• Last Heavy Firing Heard from 

Custer’s Fight (1710 – 1712) 

• Weir observes end of fight 

(1725) 

• Companies see Sioux coming to 

attack (1735) 

• Reno, Benteen, and Co H return 

to Reno Hill (1800) 

• Cos D, M, A, B, G and pack train 

return to Reno Hill (1802) 

• Co K arrives at Reno Hill (1810) 

0 
Map 31. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Custer’s Last Stand


As Yates began to withdraw up Deep Coulee, Custer saw the necessity of reuniting

his command. While Yates ascended Deep Coulee, Custer left Luce Ridge and crossed

both Nye-Cartwright Ridge and Deep Coulee to the reunion point near Calhoun Hill.

After the five companies rejoined on Calhoun Hill, the pressure from the Indians

intensified. At this point, Boyer convinced Curly to leave the doomed command while

he stayed with Custer. After Curly’s exit, descriptions of Custer’s fight are necessarily

conjecture. However, the accounts by Richard A. Fox, John S. Gray, and Gregory F.

Michno offer reasonable hypotheses about the battle from this point and are buttressed

by the physical evidence: the placement of bodies, the location of artifacts, Indian

testimony, and the terrain.

One of the most plausible theoriesisthat Custer continued offensive movement, but

delayed making a decisive thrust while he waited for Benteen’s arrival (see map A). To

support this maneuver, he positioned Keogh’s wing (Companies C, I, and L) at Calhoun

Hill as a rearguard. Yates’ wing (Companies E and F) then maneuvered further to the

north to threaten the noncombatants who had collected near Squaw Creek. Custer’s

movements were initiallymade withoutserious opposition fromthe Sioux ortheir allies;

it took time for the warriorsto reposition from their fight in the south against Reno to the

new threat at the north end ofthe camp.

Calhoun Hill was a good defensive position. From this dominant location, the

soldiers’ fire controlled the Indian movement up Deep Ravine. Lieutenant James

Calhoun’s(Custer’s brother-in-law) Company Land at least one platoon of Company C

skirmished with the Indiansfor about 45 minutes. However, the surrounding ground was

very broken, giving the Indians a myriad of concealed approachesfrom which to launch

attacks. The mounting pressure on the soldiers ultimately overwhelmed the rearguard

and forced the survivors off the hill in the only reasonable direction, northwest along

what is now called Custer Ridge. Keogh’sI Company occupied a support position to the

rear ofLCompany and was probably overrun before it could deploy (seemapB).

Meanwhile, Custer’s other two companies continued the attack toward the vicinity

of the North Ford (see mapA). Custer probably aimed at corralling a large number of the

noncombatants that would have caused the warriors to hold back in fear of causing

further threat to their women and children. Although the number of warriors opposing

Yates’ battalion, at first, was not significant, it appears from Indian accounts that they

were uncharacteristically aggressive. Instead of fighting a rearguard and shepherding

their families out of harms way, they maneuvered against Yates’ battalion. More than

likely, Custer decided that his two small companies were insufficient to overcome the

large number of noncombatants and turned back to link up with Keogh’s wing to waitfor

Benteen.

Yates’ wing fought a series of rearguard actions back up Cemetery Ridge toward

Custer’s Hill against increasing pressure as more warriors abandoned the fight against

Reno and moved north to oppose Custer. It appearsthat the collapse of the Calhoun Hill

position caused a similar disintegration of Yates’ wing. The majority of the remaining

soldiers in companies E and F retreated to Last Stand Hill (see map B). A small number

ofsurvivorsfromKeogh’s wing joined them, but againstsuch enormous odds no amount

of gallantry could have saved the command. As the Indians swarmed about Custer’s

small force, the intense pressure forced some of the men to withdraw southwest toward

Deep Ravine, forming what has been called the south skirmish line. From there, the few

remaining troopers fled in isolation and were cut down, one by one, until no one

remained alive. Custer’s battle was over, but the legend of Custer’s last stand was only

beginning.
Custer Ridge 

g 

Cemetery Rid e 

The Battle of the Army Movements Map B Where They Fell 

Little Bighorn Indian Attacks 

Indian Noncombatants Custer and Staff 2000 Feet 31

Custer’s Last Stand Village Company F LAST STAND HILL 

Custer’s Force 

Collapses 

(1720–1750)

Companies I and C 

Company E 

DEEP CALHOUN HILL 

RAVINE 

Company L 

Portion Company C 
Map 32. The Sioux Dispersal, July–September 1876


News of Custer’s debacle at the Little Bighorn paralyzed Crook’s and Terry’s

columnsfor over a month. The great Sioux camp dispersed shortly after the battle. Most

of the bands withdrew to the southwest toward the Bighorn Mountains, satisfied with

their great victory. After a few weeks of celebration in the mountains, the major bands

headed northeast onto the plains. Sitting Bull’s band traveled to the northeast, Long

Dog’s people eventually moved northwest, and Crazy Horse’s people returned eastward

to theBlack Hills.

With the possible exception of Crazy Horse’s band, which launched a few smallscale raids against miners in the Black Hills, the Sioux and Cheyenne appeared to have

little interest in continuing the fight. Most of the Indians assumed that their

overwhelming victory over Custer would cause the Army to give up the campaign—at

least for a time.The inactivity of Crook andTerry following the battle seemed to support

this view. Of course, the disaster at the Little Bighorn would have precisely the opposite

effect on the USArmy’sintentions.

Both Crook and Terry called for and received substantial reinforcements. They

finally got underway again in earlyAugust, but only after Indian trailsin their respective

vicinities had aged amonth ormore. On 10August, the two forcesmet along the banks of

Rosebud Creek, after initially mistaking each other for the enemy. The two commanders

combined their already ponderous columns into a single expedition and proceeded

northeast down the Tongue River Valley. This huge host quickly exhausted its rations

and halted along the PowderRiverto await additionalsupplies.

With their commands partially re-supplied, the two commanders could not agree on

how next to proceed and worked out a rough comprise.Basically,Terry would follow the

Indians moving north deeper into his Department of Dakota, and Crook would follow

those Indians most likely to turn south toward his Department ofthe Platte.Crook set out

due east on 22August in one last attempt to salvage something from the campaign. By 8

September, Crook had succeeded only in exhausting and nearly starving his troopers.

But on the morning of 9 September, a small detachment commanded by Captain Anson

Mills found a small Indian village at Slim Buttes and promptly attacked it (see map B).

Mills’troopersinflicted few casualties, butsucceeded in capturing the camp and a small

but welcome supply of buffalo meat. That afternoon, 600 to 800 warriors from Crazy

Horse’s band counterattackedCrook’s now consolidated force of about 2,000 effectives.

Although badly outnumbered, the Sioux occupied the high ground and fought Crook’s

exhausted men to a standstill. Following this inconclusive engagement, Crook made no

effort to pursue the Indians but concentrated solely on getting his command back to a

regular supply source. On 13 September, Crook finally obtained supplies from Crook

City in the Black Hills, ending his men’s ordeal. Meanwhile, Terry’s force proceeded

north to the Yellowstone, pursuing another cold trail. Terry encountered no Indians and

quickly gave up the chase. A detachment under Reno briefly pursued Long Dog’s band

north ofthe Missouri, butsoon abandoned the effort and proceeded to FortBuford.

Perhaps the most important developments of the campaign took place far from the

scene of action. Shocked by news oftheBattle ofthe LittleBighorn,Congress passed the

Sioux appropriation bill, which forced the Sioux to cede their remaining lands and

withdraw to a specified reservation on the west bank of the Missouri. At the same time,

Sheridan dealt harshly with the agency Indians, confiscating all of their weapons and

ponies. Without guns or horses, the agency Indians could no longer reinforce the hostile

bands.
Missouri River

HeartRiver

Sheyenne Sheyenne River

MusselshellRiver

Yellowstone River

Little

BighornRiver

Tongue

Bighorn River

Little

Powder

River

RosebudCreek

Little

MissouriRiver

JamesRiver

OtterCreek

Powder

River

WindRiver

BelleFourche

River

CannonballRiver

MissouriRiver

BighornMountains

c c R. R. Northern Pa ifi 

Rocky

Mountains

FT PEASE 

TERRITORY

3100 

Feet 

3075 

Feet 

3225 

Feet 

3200 

Feet 

3275 

Feet 

3250 

Feet 

3050 

Feet 

3025 

Feet 

3000 

Feet 

FT PECK FT BUFORD 

MapA
 Devils Lake FT BENTON 

Missouri Missouri River Reservation

FT TOTTEN

Sun River 

FT SHAW LONG DOG
 32


SITTING BULL


MONTANA
 Bismarck 

TERRY
 FT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CAMPBAKER FT RICE 

(Abandoned) DAKOTA 

Standing TERRITORY

Rock 

Agency N 

Grand River 

Bozeman 10 August


FT ELLIS CRAZY


Crow FT CF SMITH HORSE
 (Abandoned) Virginia Agency 

City Moreau River 

Cheyenne River Agency 

Powder River Powder

Crook SITTING BULL
 City Black FT PHIL KEARNY CRAZY HORSE
 Hills (Abandoned) 

LONG DOG
 Battle of Slim Buttes Crook’s column reinforces Mills at noon 

9 September CROOK
 Miles

0 1/4 1/2 IDAHO 

TERRITORY 3 US Mills’ early morning attack North 

Mills

Pony


Herd


The Sioux Dispersal
 Crook’s 

afternoon July–September 1876
 attacks 

FT FETTERMAN Gap Creek Fleeing Crook’s Column
 Indians Siege Laramie Laramie Mountains Ravine Terry’s Column 

Indian Movement WYOMING

TERRITORY

Indian Fights Crazy Horse counterattacks 

Miles Map B late afternoon 

CDC

0 50 100 150 
Map 33. The Battles of Cedar Creek and Dull Knife, October–November 1876


While Crook and Terry no longer pursued the Indians, Colonel Nelson A. Miles,

commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment, established a cantonment at the mouth of the

Tongue River and, in accordance with orders, continued operations against the Sioux. In

early October, a large coalition of Hunkpapa, Miniconjou, and Sans Arc under the

direction of Sitting Bull moved west from the Little Missouri River Valley into the

region between the Glendive and Tongue River Cantonments. On 11 and 15 October,

they skirmished with Miles’supply trains in the vicinity of Spring Creek. Soon after the

skirmish, Miles gained intelligence on Sitting Bull’s movements and marched northeast

with the 5th Infantry, approximately 500 strong, to intercept the Sioux. Hisfootsoldiers

marched hard and overtook the Sioux nearthe headwaters ofCedarCreek on 20 October.

That day, and the next, Miles and Sitting Bull negotiated between the lines. Sitting Bull

demanded that all white men leave the region, and Miles demanded that the Sioux

surrender and report to the agency—neither was willing to compromise. Miles broke off

the negotiations when the Sioux began to break down their village and move away (see

map B). At first, both sides maneuvered without shots being fired, but when the Indians

set fire to the prairie grass to screen the village’s movement, the soldiers opened fire.

Approximately 400 to 600 warriors attempted to delay the soldiers. However, the steady

advance of the soldiers forced the village into a hasty withdrawal and the abandonment

ofsignificant quantities of camp equipment and supplies.

Miles pursued the village for two days. During the Indian retreat, the large

encampment broke into two groups. Sitting Bull, with an estimated 240 people and 30

lodges, headed north, and another 200 or more lodges retreated south toward the

Yellowstone River. Miles caught up with the large group on 27 October. Several

Miniconjou and SansArc chiefs negotiated a surrender with Miles. In the long run, only

about 40 lodges actually reported to the agency; the remainder moved up the Powder

River and joined with Crazy Horse’s band. Though disappointed that he had failed to

capture SittingBull, Miles had severely damaged SittingBull’sIndian coalition.

While Miles harassed the northern bands with only 500 men, Crook launched a

massive expedition from Fort Fetterman on 14 November. His large column included

elements of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Cavalry, and 4th, 9th, 14th, and 25th Infantry.

Altogether, Crook had about 1,500 Regulars, 400 Indian scouts, and about 300 civilians

responsible for 168 supply wagons and 400 pack mules. On 22 November, his scouts

located a large Cheyenne village at the base of the Bighorn Mountains. The principal

chiefs of the village were Dull Knife and Little Wolf, with about 200 lodges and 400

warriors. Crook ordered Colonel Ranald Mackenzie to take all the scouts and 10 troops

of cavalry, about 1,100 men, and make a strike for the village. On 24 November, the

detachment made a difficult night approach march and attacked early on the morning of

25 November, achieving complete surprise (see map C). The Cheyenne fled for their

lives, leaving their ponies, tepees, and food. Having exposed the Cheyenne to the

elements, Crook returned to Fort Fetterman and let freezing temperatures and starvation

finish the job ofsubduing the hostiles. Despite the seriouslosses at the Dull Knife battle,

the Cheyenne refused to give up the fight and struggled north to join with Crazy Horse’s

band of Sioux.It would now be up to Milesto finish the campaign.
Missouri River 

FT RENO 

(Abandoned) 

FT PHIL KEARNY 

(Abandoned) 

FT PEASE 

(Abandoned) 

FT BUFORD FT PECK 

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

Missouri

River 

Musse lshe ll R i ver 

Yellowstone River 

Little 

Bighorn River 

Powder R i ver

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Black Hills 

Little 

Missouri 

Otter Creek 

Powder

River 

Moreau River 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Grand River 

Cannonball 

FT CF SMITH 

(Abandoned) 

Deadwood 

Crook 

City 

Tongue River 

TONGUE RIVER 

CANTONMENT 

GLENDIVE 

CANTONMENT 

Bighorn 

CANTONMENT 

MILES 

11 and 15 October 1876 

(Spring Creek) 

Map A 

Missouri River

FT FETTERMAN 

MONTANA

TERRITORY

Red Cloud Agency 

Spotted 

Tail 

Agency 

Missouri

River

Musselshell River

Little

Bighorn River

Powder River

Bighorn River Bighorn River

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Black Hills

Little

Missouri

Otter Creek

Powder

River

Moreau River

Belle Fourche River

Cheyenne River

Grand River

Cannonball

Deadwood

CROOK 

Crook

City

Tongue River

Bighorn Mountains Bighorn Mountains

GLENDIVE

CANTONMENT

MILES

SITTING BULL 

Miles 

Crook 

Indian Fights 

Miles

Crook

Indian s

Miles 

0 50 100 150

The Battles of Cedar Creek and Dull Knife 

October–November 1876 N 

11 and 15 October 1876

(Spring Creek)

North 

SCT

6000 

Feet 

5750 

Feet 

6250 

Feet 

6750 

Feet 

6500 

Feet 

5500 

Feet 

SCT

SCT

Gordon

Mauck

Route of Cheyenne 

withdrawal 

The Dull Knife Battle 

25 November 1876 

0 1/4 1/2 

Miles 

0 1/4 1/2

Miles

Red F ork 

Powder River 

Cheyenne 

rearguard 

fight 

Map C 

Routes of Indian 

scout attacks 

Route of cavalry 

attacks 

Fleeing 

Cheyenne 

x00 Feet 

Battle of 

Cedar Creek 

21 October 1876 

0 1/2 1 North

3200 

Feet 

3150 

Feet 

3250 

Feet 

3300 

Feet 

3100 

Feet 

3050 

Feet 

3000 

Feet 

East Fork Cedar Creek 

Sitting Bull’s 

Village 

A5

B5

C5

I5

K5 E5

F5

H5

G5

D5

Route of Sioux 

withdrawal 

Army 

pursuit 

Map B 

33 

Miles 

Army attacks 

Sioux delaying 

actions 

Sioux delaying 

actions 
Map 34. The Fort Peck Expedition, November–December 1876


Miles, during the Cedar Creek negotiations with Sitting Bull (20–21 October), had

warned the Sioux that he would continue the campaign against them through the winter

if they did not surrender. Holding true to his word, Miles maintained his chase of the

northward-bound Sioux with steadfast determination. Setting out on 5 November,

Miles’ troops began a search for the remnants of Sitting Bull’s band in the expanse

between the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers. Unlike other units, the soldiers of the 5th

Infantry were thoroughly conditioned and equipped for their winter campaign on the

harsh Northern Plains. Milesmarched north to Fort Peck on the MissouriRiver butfailed

to find the elusive SittingBull.

At Fort Peck, Milesre-supplied his command and made preparationsto continue the

winter campaign. He divided his command into three columns and proceeded to comb

the countryside again. On 7 December, a detachment under Lieutenant Frank D.

Baldwin, operating under extreme winter conditions, located a recently abandoned

Indian camp on Porcupine Creek and desperately sought to catch the fleeing Sioux. He

needed to catch them before they could cross the frozen Missouri River to the south

bank. Near Bark Creek, Baldwin’s infantry closed with the Sioux and skirmished with

the Indian rearguard just minutes after their families had crossed the river. The skirmish

with Sitting Bull’s warriors continued forseveral hours, and, at one point, Baldwin even

pushed one company across the Missouri River. However, the grueling chase and

excessive cold had exhausted Baldwin’s soldiers and he decided to return to Fort Peck

for supplies. Although Baldwin had failed to defeat Sitting Bull, he had forced the

Indians into a continuing movement that was fatiguing the Indian families and

exhausting the Indian ponies.

The tenacious Baldwin re-supplied his small command of about 150 men at Fort

Peck and then began collecting information from reservation Indians on Sitting Bull’s

location. On 10 December, he learned that Sitting Bull was located to the southeast,

moving toward the Yellowstone River. He sent word to Miles and then mobilized his

troops to resume the chase. The deep snow, rough terrain, and bitter cold took its toll on

Baldwin’s troops; at times up to 40 men were riding in the wagons suffering from

exhaustion and frostbite. On 18 December, at about 1300, Baldwin caught up with

Sitting Bull’s village camped along Ash Creek (see map B). The village contained

approximately 122 lodges and could have fielded as many as 240 warriors. However,

most ofthe warriors were out hunting, andBaldwin’sthree small infantry companiesin a

matter of minutes overran the entire village, capturing most ofthe camp equipage and 60

ponies.

Baldwin re-outfitted his men from the village supplies, burned what he could not

carry, and then made the difficult march to the Tongue River Cantonment. Sitting Bull’s

people were destitute. They had lost most of their lodges and the majority of their winter

food supply. The Indians had also lost about 20 percent of their ponies, and those

remaining were dying of hunger. To escape Miles and his inexhaustible “walk heaps,”

SittingBull andLong Dog would eventually lead their people intoCanada.
Missouri River 

FT RENO 

(Abandoned) 

Missouri

River 

Heart River 

Little 

Bighorn River 

Powder R i ver

Little 

Powder 

River 

Rosebud Creek 

Little 

Missouri 

Otter Creek 

Powder

River 

Moreau River 

Belle Fourche River 

Cheyenne River 

Grand River 

Cannonball River 

FT CF SMITH 

(Abandoned) 

Tongue River 

TONGUE RIVER 

GLENDIVE 

CANTONMENT 

Bighorn 

CANTONMENT 

Map A 

Missouri River

FT FETTERMAN 

FT BUFORD FT PECK 

NEBRASKA 

Spotted 

Tail 

Agency 

Missouri

River

Heart River

Little

Bighorn River

Powder River

Bighorn River 

Little

Powder

River

Rosebud Creek

Black Hills 

Little

Missouri

Otter Creek

Powder

River

FT MCPHERSON 

Moreau River

Belle Fourche River

Cheyenne River

Grand River

Cannonball River

FT CF SMITH

(Abandoned)

Deadwood 

Crook 

City 

Tongue River

BighornMountains 

Mountains 

GLENDIVE

CANTONMENT

The Fort Peck Expedition 

November–December 1876 

0 50 100 150 

Miles 

Miles 

Indian Fights 

N 

MONTANA 

Musse 

TERRITORY

lshe ll R i ver Musselshell River

FT PEASE 

(Abandoned) Yellowstone River 

CANTONMENT 

FT PHIL KEARNY 

(Abandoned) 

7 December 1876 

(Bark Creek) 

Sitting Bull’s 

Village 

5 

Baldwin 

Sioux Fleeing 

’s 

Baldwin’s attack Ash 

Creek 

Ash

Creek 

North

3100 

Feet 

3150 

Feet 

3050 

Feet 

Battle of 

Ash Creek 

18 December 1876 

Miles 

Battle of

Ash Creek

18 December 1876

0 1/4 1/2 

Miles

34 

Map B 

3000 

Feet 

2950 

Feet 

Baldwin’s 

advance 
Map 35. Final Actions, January–May 1877


Having knocked Sitting Bull and those Indian bands north of the Yellowstone River

out of the war, Miles could now redirect his attention toward Crazy Horse and the bands

south of the Yellowstone. Ironically, earlier in December, these same bands had become

discouraged because of the harsh weather and the defeat of the Cheyenne at the Dull

Knife battle and were actually considering surrender. However, Crow scouts murdered

their peace delegation as they were approaching the Tongue River Cantonment, and

Crazy Horse used the incident to embolden his people to continue their resistance. The

war chief initiated an active campaign of harassment against the cantonment to lure the

soldiersinto a chase. His plan wasto lure Miles up the Tongue River valley and ambush

his column. On 29 December, Miles accepted the challenge and marched up the Tongue

River valley tomake a strike againstCrazy Horse’s village. He estimated that the village,

reinforced with the refugees from the Dull Knife fight, numbered possibly 3,000

inhabitants with maybe 600 to 800 warriors. Miles fought several skirmishes with the

Sioux in his march up the Tongue River and openly acknowledged that the Indians were

trying to lure him into an ambush. Nevertheless, he was confident that his 350

disciplined infantry could overcome the odds against them. On 7 January 1877, his

scouts captured a small group of Cheyenne women and children. He encamped his men

that night near a prominent butte fully expecting the Sioux to attack the next day. The

next morning, with three feet of snow on the ground, Crazy Horse attacked with

approximately 500 to 600 Sioux and Cheyenne warriors (see map B). Crazy Horse

needed a major victory to encourage his disheartened people. Both sides maneuvered to

gain the advantage, and Miles used his artillery to break up the concentration of warriors.

Blizzard-like conditions hampered visibility, and, as with most Indian war battles,

casualties were light. Steadily worsening weather forced both sides to break contact at

midday. The Sioux retreated to their village 20 miles to the south, and Miles returned to

theTongue River Cantonment.The Battle of the Butte was Crazy Horse’slast battle, and

he had failed to deliver the victory his people needed. Miles and Crook spent the

remainder of the winter sending messengers to Crazy Horse to persuade him to

surrender. Although Crazy Horse and his band held out until spring, starvation and

exposure causedmany Sioux to drift back to the agencies.

In late April 1877, a Sioux chief named Lame Deer vowed never to surrender. He

and his band with 51 Miniconjou lodgesseparated from Crazy Horse and moved north to

hunt buffalo. Having been reinforced with elements of the 2d Cavalry, Miles learned of

Lame Deer’s movement and again mobilized his forces for the chase. Ironically, Miles’

column contained many prominent Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, who had only

recently surrendered and were now serving as scouts for the Army. Miles’scouts found

Lame Deer’s village on a tributary of Rosebud Creek and Miles launched a surprise

attack early in the morning on 7 May 1877, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Indians

(see map C). His troops captured nearly 500 ponies and some 30 tons of meat and killed

at least 14 warriors including Lame Deer himself. Crazy Horse and his band had

surrendered the day before the Lame Deer Fight. Even though Sitting Bull and his

followers managed to survive in Canada for a time and did not finally surrender until 19

July 1881, the Great Sioux War was over; all the Sioux within the United States were

now confined to the reservation.
Missour Missouri

River

MissouriRiverHeartRiver

LittleBighornRiver

LittlePowderRiver

Rosebud Creek

LittleMissouri

OtterCreek

PowderRiver

Belle

Fourche Fourche

River

Cheyenne Cheyenne RiverCannonballRiver

Tongue River

Bighorn River

BighornMountains 

FT PECK FT BUFORD 

Map A Musselshell River Musselshell River

MONTANA 

TERRITORY 

GLENDIVE

CANTONMENT

TONGUE RIVER


CANTONMENT
 FT PEASE 

(Abandoned) 

Yellowstone River 

Bighorn 

CANTONMENT 

Grand River 

FT CF SMITH 

(Abandoned) 

Moreau River 

Cheyenne River Agency Map C CDC

Powder Rive Powder ver

FT PHIL KEARNY 

Great Sioux (Abandoned) 

Reservation FT RENO 

(Abandoned) 

Black

Hills

Spotted
 Tail


Agency
 FT FETTERMAN NEBRASKA 

Final Actions 

N January–May 1877 

Miles 

Indian Fights 

Miles Map B CDC

0 50 100 150 FT MCPHERSON 

IV. Wounded Knee, 1890


AD 1979 

CO MBAT CO MBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE INSTITUTE

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS

EST

PROLOGUSPROLOGUS

AN TEACTUSAN TEACTUS
Map 36. The Ghost Dance


In the late 1880’s the Western Plains tribes grew increasingly discouraged over their 

confinement to the reservations and the disappearance of their traditional cultures. A 

Paiute prophet named Wovoka delivered a message of hope that prophesied of a future 

free from the influence of the white man. He preached a philosophy of nonviolence and 

promised that the Great Spirit would bring back the buffalo. His followers danced a slow 

shuffling dance that invited the return to life of dead Indians; thus, it became known as 

the Ghost Dance. 

The once powerful Teton Sioux, who had dominated the northern plains from 1850 

to 1876, were especially bitter and discouraged. They had lost all access to the Unceded 

Territory which became the states of Montana (1889) and Wyoming (1890). Their Great 

Sioux Reservation (see map 13) had been broken into several smaller reservations and 

they now laid claim to less than half of what they had controlled in 1876. Militant leaders 

among the Teton Sioux capitalized on their peoples’ discontent and the general 

acceptance of the Ghost Dance to preach a violent overthrow of the white man. They also 

promised that sacred ghost shirts would protect them from the soldiers’ bullets. 

Government officials feared an impending uprising on both the Pine Ridge and the 

Rosebud Reservations. Nearby settlements demanded that theArmy provide protection. 

Therefore, President Benjamin Harrison ordered the War Department to contain the 

situation and position troops at agencies. The Army in turn used railroads to move units 

to the region from posts scattered across the nation; a major deployment that included 

elements of the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 8th Infantry, and the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Cavalry. 

The Sioux were at odds among themselves over how to proceed and divided into two 

factions. The friendlies wanted no trouble, and the hostiles (or militants) preached that 

the whites must be driven from Indian land. In December 1890, some of the hostile ghost 

dancers gathered in the northwest corner of the Pine Ridge Reservation. They numbered 

approximately 500 to 600 men, women, and children. Bands of threatening Sioux also 

began to be identified on other reservations. Notably, Sitting Bull, at the Standing Rock 

Reservation, and Big Foot, at the Cheyenne River Reservation, refused to cooperate 

with agency officials. 

Major General Nelson A. Miles, now commander of the Military Division of the 

Missouri, hoped to avoid violence and initiated negotiations with the Pine Ridge 

militants. He also ordered the arrest of Big Foot and Sitting Bull to contain the spread of 

militant activity on the northern reservations. However, the death of Sitting Bull, killed 

by Indian policemen attempting to arrest him, further inflamed the situation. The 

militants at the Pine Ridge Reservation were more emboldened than ever to resist. 

Without their leader, the majority of Sitting Bull’s Hunkpapa band abandoned the 

militant cause, but a few joined with Big Foot. 

Though previously aligned with the militants, over time Big Foot came to recognize 

the futility of any armed struggle and began to build a reputation as a peacemaker among 

the other bands and local Army commanders. The friendlies at Pine Ridge Reservation 

asked him to come to Pine Ridge to help calm the situation. Big Foot and his band used 

the cover of night and quietly slipped away for Pine Ridge. Unfortunately, Miles failed 

to recognize Big Foot as an emissary for the friendlies on his way to mollify the hostility 

at Pine Ridge. Mistaking him, instead, as an advocate for the militants, Miles took 

personal charge of the situation and directed the 6th and 9th Cavalry to block Big Foot’s 

movement to Pine Ridge. 
NEBRASKA 

SOUTH DAKOTA 

NORTH DAKOTA 

MONTANA 

WYOMING 

Powder River 

Little 

Powder River

Crazy Woman Creek 

Little 

Missouri Belle Fourche River 

Tongue River 

Otter 

Creek 

Sheridan 

Buffalo 

Casper 

Douglas 

North Platte River 

Rapid City 

Pierre 

FT YATES 

FT BENNETT 

FT NIOBRARA` 

FT MEADE 

FT McKinney 

Niobrara River 

Wounded Knee

Creek 

Wounded Knee 

Cedar Creek 

Grand River 

Moreau River 

Cheyenne River 

Bad River 

White River 

South Fork Cheyenne River 

Missour i 

River 

Black Hills 

FT 

ROBINSON 

Pine Ridge 

Agency 

Rosebud Agency 

Cheyenne River Agency 

Rosebud 

Reservation 

Pine Ridge 

Reservation 

Crow Creek 

Reservation 

Lower Brule 

Reservation 

Cheyenne River 

Reservation 

Standing Rock 

Reservation 

Ghost Dance Gathering 

Badlands 

9 

6 

7 

Chicago & Northwestern 

Railroad 

7 

8 

2 

8 

Chicago & Northwestern 

Railroad 

Powder River

Little

Powder River

Crazy Woman Creek

Little

Missouri Belle Fourche River

Tongue River

Otter

Creek

Sheridan

Buffalo

Casper

Douglas

Rapid City

Pierre

FT YATES

FT BENNETT

FT NIOBRARA`

FT McKinney

Niobrara River

Wounded Knee

Creek

Wounded Knee

Cedar Creek

Grand River

Moreau River

Cheyenne River

Bad River

White River

South Fork Cheyenne River

Missouri

River

Black Hills

FT

ROBINSON

Pine Ridge

Agency

Rosebud Agency

Cheyenne River Agency

Lower Brule

Reservation

Cheyenne River

Reservation

Standing Rock

Reservation

Ghost Dance Gathering

Badlands

Chicago & Northwestern

Railroad

8

8

36 

N 

Death of Sitting Bull 

15 December 1890 

Deployed from FT Robinson, NE 

1

Deployed from Omaha, NE Deployed from FT RILEY, KS

Big Foot ’ s Villag

Deployed from FT WINGATE, NM 

Rushville

Chadron

Fremont, Elkhorn & 

Missouri Valley Railroad 

Deployed from FT LOGAN, CO Deployed from San Francisco, CA 

The Ghost Dance 

Army Movements 

Big Foot’s Movement 

0 50 100 

Army Deployments by Rail 

Miles 
Map 37. The Battle of Wounded Knee, 29 December 1890


Big Foot eluded the cavalry patrols trying to prevent his movement to Pine Ridge by 

traveling through the Badlands. Therefore, Miles ordered the 7th Cavalry, commanded 

at the time by Colonel James Forsyth, to intercept Big Foot’s band, disarm them, and 

march them to a railhead for movement to Omaha. On 28 December 1890, advanced 

elements of the 7th Cavalry located the elusive Sioux and escorted them to a campsite 

along Wounded Knee Creek. The remainder of the regiment arrived at the campsite that 

night. The Sioux awoke the next morning to find themselves surrounded by 500 soldiers 

and 4 field pieces. Big Foot’s Sioux, with perhaps 120 men and about 200 women and 

children, recognized the hopelessness of their situation and agreed to be escorted to the 

railhead for transportation back to the reservation. The old chief was stricken with 

pneumonia, so theArmy provided a heated tent for his care. 

Forsyth did not expect resistance when he deployed his units to disarm the Indians. 

However, the Indians grew increasingly upset as the soldiers searched the lodges and 

clothing of both men and women. The situation suddenly grew more volatile when a 

medicine man named Yellow Bird called for the warriors to resist. During one search, a 

soldier and an Indian scuffled for a rifle and the weapon accidentally discharged. Both 

sides opened fire at brutally close range as the women and children scattered in panic. 

The artillerymen on the hilltop added to the mayhem when they opened fire on the 

fleeing Indians. 

The fighting ended when the Indians fled the battlefield. On the field lay 150 dead 

Sioux, including Big Foot. The immensity of the tragedy was magnified in that at least 

62 of the dead were women and children. The Army suffered 25 officers and soldiers 

killed and another 39 wounded. Other than the Fetterman Fight and the Little Bighorn, 

the Battle of Wounded Knee was one of the Army’s most deadly encounters on the 

plains. Miles was furious over the whole mismanaged affair. He relieved Forsyth of 

command (the decision was later overturned) and skillfully avoided further violence 

with the bands associated with the Ghost Dance. The influence of the Ghost Dance soon 

waned, and Wounded Knee marked the end of organized Indian resistance on the plains 

and the Army’s last large deployment against the Indians of the Great Plains; the Sioux 

Wars were over at last. 
Wounded Knee Creek 

Post Office 

and Store 

I Troop

K Troop B 

Troop 

A Troop 

G Troop 

C & D Troops 

Indian Scouts 

Wire Fence

Wire Fence

Wire Fence

Road 

to 

the 

Pin

e 

Ridge 

Agency 

Fast Horse Road 

Porcupine and 

Medicine

Root Road

Wounded Knee Road 

N 

Wounded Knee Creek

Post Office

and Store

I Troop

K Troop

B

Troop

A Troop

G Troop

C & D Troops

Indian Scouts

E Troop Battery 

Council Area 

Cavalry Camp 

3300 

Feet 

3260 

Feet 

3220 

Feet 

3180 

Feet 

3340 

Feet 

37 

The Battle of Wounded Knee 

29 December 1890 

Indian Village 

Cavalry Camp 

7th Cavalry 

Unit 

Artillery Battery 

Army Fire 

Indian Fire 

Indians Fleeing the 

Area 

0 1/4 1/2

Miles 

Big Foot’s Village 

Wire Fence

Wire Fence

Wire Fence

Road

to

the

Pin

e

Ridge

Agency

Fast Horse Road

Porcupine and

Medicine

Root Road

Wounded Knee Road

Suggested Reading


Andrist, Ralph K. The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian. New York: Macmillan 

Co., 1964. 

Apopular, vividly written history of the subject. 

Bradley, James H. The March of the Montana Column. Edited by Edgar I. Stewart. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1961. 

One of the finest primary sources available describing Gibbon’s and Terry’s 

campaign along theYellowstone and down the Bighorn Rivers. 

Brown, Dee A. Fort Phil Kearny: An American Saga. New York: Putnam, 1962. 

Not definitive, but still the best account to date of events surrounding this 

beleaguered post. 

Brust, James S., Brian C. Pohanka, and Sandy Barard. Where Custer Fell: Photographs of the 

Little Bighorn. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005. 

Afascinating look of the Little Bighorn Battlefield then and now. 

Calitri, Shannon Smith. “Give me Eighty Men, Shattering the Myth of the Fetterman Massacre.” 

Montana: The Magazine of Western History (Autumn 2004): 44–59. 

Anew look at the Fetterman Massacre. 

Carley, Kenneth. The Sioux Uprising of 1862. St. Paul: The Minnesota Historical Society, 

1976. 

Abrief, illustrated overview of the 1862 Sioux War. 

Darling, Roger. A Sad and Terrible Blunder: Generals Terry and Custer at the Little Big Horn: 

New Discoveries. Vienna, VA: Potomac-Western Press, 1990. 

Focuses primarily on Terry and his campaign instead of Custer. 

Frazer, Robert F. Forts of the West . Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965. 

Akey resource to identify forts west of the Mississippi River. 

Fox, Richard A. Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Battle . Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1993. 

Aconvincing study of Custer’s last battle. 

Gray, John S. Centennial Campaign, the Sioux War of 1876. Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1988. 

The most thoroughly researched and objectively presented book on the 1876 Sioux 

War. 

_________. Custer’s Last Campaign. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991. 

Thoroughly accounts for all of the available evidence, encompassing Custer’s 

approach to the Little Bighorn through his death on Last Stand Hill. 

Greene, Jerome A. Yellowstone Command: Colonel Nelson Miles and the Great Sioux War, 

1876–1877. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991. 

Amasterful survey of Miles’operations in the Great Sioux War. 

Hagan, Barry J. Exactly in the Right Place: A History of Fort C.F. Smith, Montana Territory, 

1866–1868. El Segundo, CA: Upton & Sons Publishers, 1999. 

The definitive history of Fort C.F. Smith. 

Hardorff, Richard G. Indian Views of the Custer Fight . Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 

2005. 

Arequired source book for any serious study of the battle. 

Hebard, Grace Raymond, and E.A. Brininstool. The Bozeman Trail. 2 vols. Cleveland, OH: 

Arthur H. Clark Co., 1922. 

Auseful mix of primary and secondary sources. 

Johnson, Dorothy M. The Bloody Bozeman: The Perilous Trail to Mountain Gold. New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1971. 

Amodern account that updates Hebard and Brininstool. 

Keenan, Jerry. The Wagon Box Fight. Sheridan, WY: Fort Phil Kearny/Bozeman Trail 

Association, 1990. 

The best short study of this action. 

Liddic, Bruce R. Vanishing Victory: Custer’s Final March. El Segundo, CA: Upton & Sons 

Publishers, 2004. 

An in-depth study of the Battle of Little Bighorn. 

Mangum, Neil C. The Battle of the Rosebud: Prelude to the Little Bighorn. El Segundo, CA: 

Upton and Sons, 1987. 

The most readable account available on the Battle of the Rosebud. 

Michno, Gregory F. Lakota Noon: The Indian Narrative of Custer’s Defeat. Missoula, MT: 

Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1997. 

The Indian perspective on the Battle of Little Bighorn. 

Mills,Anson. My Story. Washington, DC: Press of Byron S.Adams, 1918. 

Apersonal account of the Battle of the Rosebud by one of the primary participants. 

Morgan, Kent R. Our Hallowed Ground, Guide to Indian War Battlefield Locations in Eastern 

Montana. Bloomington, IN:Author House, 2004. 

A useful guide book for anyone interested in visiting Montana’s Indian Wars battle 

sites. 

Nichols, Ronald H., ed. and comp. Reno Court of Inquiry: Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in 

the Case of Major Marcus A. Reno. CrowAgency, MT: Custer Battlefield Historical and 

MuseumAssociation, Inc., 1992. 

An unabridged transcript of the Reno inquiry—not for the casual reader but a must 

for the serious researcher. 

________. In Custer’s Shadow: Major Marcus Reno. Fort Collins, CO: OldArmy Press, 1999. 

Adetailed biography of Custer’s second in command. 
Scott, Douglas D., Richard A. Fox Jr., Melissa A. Connor, and Dick Harmon. Archaeological 

Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1989. 

Uses archaeological data to revise speculative accounts of Custer’s final battle. 

Sklenar, Larry. To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn. Norman: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 2000. 

A well-researched, passionately-argued, and often-engaging examination that 

makes Custer the victim of cowardly, jealous, or disobedient subordinates. 

Terrell, John Upton. Faint the Trumpet Sounds: The Life and Trial of Major Reno. New York: D. 

McKay Co., 1966. 

Treats Reno as a victim but has some utility. 

________. Sioux Trail. NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1974. 

An anthropological outline of the origin of the Sioux nation and the development of 

the Sioux tribes. 

Utley, Robert M. Cavalier in Buckskin. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 

The most judicious recent biography of George Custer. 

________. Custer Battlefield: A History and Guide to the Battle of the Little Bighorn. 

Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, 1988. 

Asuccinct account by a master of the historical craft. 

________. Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865. Lincoln: 

University of Nebraska Press, 1967. 

Amasterful survey of the frontierArmy prior to 1865. 

________. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891. 

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. 

Amust read for anyone interested in the post-CivilWar frontierArmy. 

Varnum, Charles A. Custer’s Chief of Scouts: The Reminiscences of Charles A. Varnum. Edited 

by John M. Carroll. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 

Varnum’s own account of the campaign. 

Vaughn, J.W. Indian Fights: New Facts on Seven Encounters. Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1966. 

Afascinating study based on physical evidence discovered with metal detectors. 

________. The Reynolds Campaign on Powder River. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 

1961. 

The most detailed study of this obscure action. 

________. With Crook at the Rosebud. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956. 

One of the most detailed secondary accounts of the Battle of the Rosebud. 

Werner, Fred H. The Soldiers Are Coming. Greeley, CO: Werner Publications, 1982. 

Ashort, informal pamphlet on Reynolds’Powder River battle. 

Wilson, Robert C. A Self-Guided Tour of Fort Phil Kearny, Fetterman Battle, and the Wagon Box 

Fight. Sheridan, WY: Fort Phil Kearny/Bozeman TrailAssociation, 1988. 

Aquick, efficient overview of the actions in and around Fort Phil Kearny, 1866–68. 

Wooden Leg. Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer. Translated by Thomas B. Marquis. 

Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1931. 

One of the few Indian accounts that can be cross-checked against known facts. 
About the Author


Mr. Charles D. Collins, Jr. is an assistant professor and the Sioux Wars course author for the 

Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. in 

History from Southwest Missouri State University and an MMAS in History from the US Army 

Command and General Staff College. While on active duty, Mr. Collins served in various armor 

and cavalry assignments. He retired from the Army in 1996. Mr. Collins’ published works include 

The Corps of Discovery: Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition and numerous 

articles on a wide variety of military topics.