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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL B.*

(AC 36418)

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Bishop, Js.

Argued November 16, 2015—officially released April 5, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, White, J. [motion for disclosure];

Hudock, J. [motion to preclude; judgment].)

A. Paul Spinella, with whom were Philip Russell

and, on the brief, Caitlin Trow, for the appellant

(defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state’s

attorney, and Maureen Ornousky, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Daniel B., appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a. On appeal, the

defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction, (2) the trial court unduly

restricted his access to certain information regarding

a confidential informant who testified at trial, (3) the

court improperly limited the cross-examination of a

witness by the defendant, and (4) the court provided

improper instructions in its jury charge. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. The defendant married the victim in 2005. By late

2009, the marriage had begun to deteriorate. Approximately one year later, the defendant filed for divorce.

During the relevant period, the defendant and the victim

lived in the same residence in Stamford.

On June 9, 2011, the defendant called John Evans, a

childhood friend, to arrange a meeting. At approximately 3 p.m., the defendant and Evans met in a Dunkin

Donuts. At the outset of the meeting, the defendant

asked Evans if he ‘‘knew anybody that could murder

his wife as a hit man.’’ The defendant told Evans that

he was getting a divorce and explained that his wife

was ‘‘getting the house, the kids . . . and . . . trying

to get some money . . . .’’ Although Evans tried to

dissuade him,the defendant stated that had been ‘‘thinking about it for two years, and he [had] made up his

mind . . . [that] he needs [his wife murdered] . . .

before his next court date.’’ The meeting concluded

with Evans agreeing to ‘‘talk to a couple of people in

New York and . . . see if [he] could arrange [a meeting

with a hit man].’’On the same day, Evans called John

Evensen, a retired Stamford police officer.1 Evans told

Evensen that the defendant had requested that he find

a hit man; Evensen urged Evans to ‘‘do the right thing’’

because it was ‘‘somebody’s life.’’ Evensen then told

Evans that he would call someone to ‘‘see what he

could do.’’

Later that evening, Evensen telephoned James

Matheny, then commander of the bureau of criminal

investigations of the Stamford Police Department, to

convey the information provided by Evans. Matheny

then spoke with Evans directly. After this conversation,

Matheny developed a plan in which the defendant would

meet with an undercover police officer feigning to be

a hit man.As part of the plan,Evans called the defendant

to inform him that he had found a hit man from New

York who wanted to speak with him that night. The

defendant agreed to meet with the purported hit man,

who was in fact Officer Michael Paleski, Jr., of the

Branford Police Department.
The meeting between the defendant and Paleski took

place at a rest stop off Interstate 95 near Darien. The

plan consisted of Paleski following Evans to the rest

stop in a vehicle equipped with a hidden video camera.

Paleski and Evans arrived first and waited forthe defendant, who arrived shortly after midnight on June 10,

2011. Evans introduced the defendant to Paleski and

then returned to his car. The defendant entered

Paleski’s vehicle where the hidden video camera

recorded the murder for hire plot. After the meeting

ended and Paleski had departed, the defendant was

arrested.

The defendant was charged with attempt to commit

murder and violating a criminal protective order.2 Following an eight day jury trial, the defendant was found

guilty of the attempt to commit murder charge and not

guilty of the violation of a protective order charge. The

court sentenced him to twenty years of incarceration,

suspended after fifteen years, followed by five years of

probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues

that the state failed to prove that his conduct constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended

to culminate in a murder. Thus, he claims that an essential element of § 53a-49 was not established.3 We do

not agree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The entire meeting between the defendant and

Paleski lasted slightly more than sixteen minutes. During the meeting, three major points were discussed in

the murder for hire plot. First, the defendant agreed to

pay $10,000 for Paleski to murder his wife. The defendant also agreed to deliver $3000 as a down payment

and $800 for a firearm the following morning because

obtaining the money that night would create suspicion.4

Second, when asked for information about the victim,

the defendant readily provided his wife’s name, home

address, place of employment and work schedule,5 as

well as a photograph, explaining to Paleski that his

wife’s hair color was different from what was depicted

in the photograph.6

The final point discussed at the meeting focused on

the method by which Paleski was to murder the defendant’s wife. The defendant had voiced his concern that

he needed to be cautious in this illicit endeavor because

he was ‘‘obviously the first person [that] . . . [was]

going to be looked at [after his wife was murdered].’’

Paleski, then, explicitly asked the defendant how he

wanted the murder accomplished. The defendant noted

that his wife’s place of employment was in a ‘‘rough

section’’ of the city and that she drove a ‘‘nice car.’’
This information prompted Paleski to suggest that he

could ‘‘make it look like a [carjacking] or something,’’

to which the defendant acknowledged, ‘‘[s]omething

like that . . . take the car . . . [it] is going to get

[found] and it kind of like explains it.’’ Paleski then

sought clarification as to the result desired by the defendant, ‘‘[Y]ou want her completely out of the picture,

right? Morte.’’ The defendant replied, ‘‘[T]hat’s where

it’s getting to . . . .’’ The defendant then suggested a

Thursday as a possible day for the murder because he

would be with his children at his aunts’ house. Paleski

concurred that he could ‘‘take the bitch off’’ when the

defendant was with his aunts, and the defendant

replied, ‘‘exactly.’’

The meeting concluded with the defendant and

Paleski agreeing to meet the following day at 10 a.m.

at the same location. The defendant iterated that, to be

cautious, he was not going to use his phone. Rather,

he would purchase a prepaid mobile phone to contact

Paleski. After confirming the time and place of the meeting where the defendant would bring the money, the

defendant thanked Paleski, exited the vehicle, and

promptly was taken into custody as soon as Paleski

left the rest stop.

The defendant’s claim on appeal is that his conduct

was not a ‘‘substantial step in a course of conduct

planned to culminate in his commission’’ of murder.

General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2). He argues that in

Connecticut, a ‘‘substantial step’’ requires an overt act

that ‘‘must be more than mere preparation,’’ and such

act ‘‘must be in close proximity to the actual crime and

‘come pretty near’ to completing the crime but for some

interference.’’ Thus, in contemplating what act constitutes a substantial step, ‘‘the focus is on what is left to

be done not what has already been done.’’ Applying

this reasoning, the defendant contends that the meeting

with Paleski was ‘‘merely preparatory and did not constitute a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of

murder.’’ At best, the defendant argues, the meeting

was a ‘‘mere solicitation, which, by itself, is never an

attempt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We are

not persuaded.

We begin by recognizing that ‘‘[a] defendant who

asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an

arduous burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Leandry, 161 Conn. App. 379, 383, 127 A.3d

1115, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015).

As to the standard of review for this claim, this court

applies a two part test. ‘‘We first review the evidence

presented at the trial, construing it in the light most

favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . . [Second, we]

then determine whether the jury could have reasonably

concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative

effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. . . . In this process of review, it does not

diminish the probative force of the evidence that it

consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . The issue is whether

the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to

justify the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Hanks, 39 Conn. App. 333, 338–39, 665 A.2d

102, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 926, 666 A.2d 1187 (1995).

The law relevant to an insufficiency of the evidence

claim teaches that ‘‘the jury must find every element

proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the

defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of

the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the

jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may

consider it in combination with other proven facts in

determining whether the cumulative effect of all the

evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements

of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 280

Conn. 779, 808, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007). We, however, are

mindful that ‘‘[w]e do not sit as a [seventh] juror who

may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our

feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold

printed record. . . . Rather, we must defer to the jury’s

assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on

its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor

and attitude.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Damato, 105 Conn. App. 335, 344, 937 A.2d 1232, cert.

denied, 286 Conn. 920, 949 A.2d 481 (2008).

Turning to the statutes applicable here, § 53a-54a (a)

defines murder, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘A person

is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death

of another person, he causes the death of such person

or of a third person . . . .’’ Section 53a-49 (a) defines

criminal attempt, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘A person

is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with

the kind of mental state required for commission of the

crime, he . . . (2) intentionally does . . . anything

which, under the circumstances as he believes them to

be, is an act . . . constituting a substantial step in a

course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’ Furthermore, ‘‘[c]onduct shall not

be held to constitute a substantial step . . . unless it

is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-49 (b). It is noteworthy that ‘‘[w]hat constitutes a substantial step in any

given case is a question of fact.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Osbourne, 138 Conn. App. 518,

528, 53 A.3d 284, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 937, 56 A.3d

716 (2012). Thus, in this case, to prove the defendant

guilty of violating §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, the state had

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
with the intent to cause the death of his wife, committed

an act that was a substantial step aimed at achieving

her death.

A

To dispose of the defendant’s argument and resolve

his sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must review

Connecticut’s criminal attempt statute. As implicitly

acknowledged by the parties, our Supreme Court and

this court have conflicting authority on what conduct

constitutes a substantial step: specifically as to whether

the focus is on ‘‘what the actor has already done and

not on whatremains to be done.’’(Emphasis in original.)

State v. Lapia, 202 Conn. 509, 515, 522 A.2d 272 (1987).7

In resolving this apparent contradiction in our case

law, we begin with a review of § 5.018 of the Model

Penal Code because § 53a-49 was modeled after it. See

State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 317 Conn. 292, 303, 118

A.3d 26 (2015); see also id., 304 n.5 (comparing General

Statutes § 53a-49 and Model Penal Code § 5.01).

Because § 53a-49 stems, in part, from the Model Penal

Code, the code’s comments are pertinent. See State v.

Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 372, 757 A.2d 36, cert.

denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 764 (2000). The comments state that the Model Penal Code formulation of

criminal attempt ‘‘shifts the emphasis from what

remains to be done . . . to what the actor has already

done.’’ 1 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries

(1985) § 5.01, comment 6 (a), p. 329 (Model Penal Code

and Commentaries). The significance, then, is that this

‘‘approach will broaden the scope of attempt liability.’’

Id.; see also 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d

Ed. 2003) § 11.4 (e), p. 226 (‘‘[the Model Penal Code

approach] will broaden the scope of attempt liability

in a way which is consistent with the purpose of

restraining dangerous persons, as: (1) the emphasis is

upon what the actor has already done rather than what

remains to be done; (2) liability will be imposed only

if some firmness of criminal purpose is shown’’ [footnote omitted]).

Although conflicting decisions exist in both appellate

courts, we nonetheless find support in recent Connecticut case law to frame our criminal attempt formulation

in conformance with the Model Penal Code, i.e., the

focus is on what the defendant has already done and

not what remains to be done.9

In State v. Carter, 317

Conn. 845, 848, 858, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015), the defendant

was convicted of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree for aiming a firearm at a police officer’s midsection, followed by ‘‘position[ing] himself in a shooting

stance and put[ting] his finger on the trigger guard.’’

The defendant challenged the conviction by claiming

that it was not established that he had the requisite

intent to commit this crime. Id., 848. One of the defendant’s arguments was that ‘‘there was insufficient evidence of intent because he never attempted to rack the
gun, and thus the gun would not have fired even if he

had pulled the trigger.’’ Id., 860. In disposing of this

argument, our Supreme Court made the following

observation: ‘‘[W]hether the gun was racked or not

seems to be beyond the point. The defendant’s claim

that he did not rack the gun, even if true, would only

support the proposition that he did not take the next

step to complete the crime which, of course, is irrelevant to the inquiry whether he took a prior substantial

step to commit the offense. Because the defendant was

charged with attempt to commit assault, it was only

necessary for him to take a substantial step under the

circumstances as he believe[d] them to be . . . .’’

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 861. Our Supreme Court’s analysis thus

focused on what the defendant already had done and

not what remained to be done.

Similarly, this court in State v. Osbourne, supra, 138

Conn. App. 528, explained that the standard for the

substantial step element of criminal attempt ‘‘focuse[d]

on what the actor has already done and not what

remains to be done. . . . The substantial step must be

at least the start of a line of conduct which will lead

naturally to the commission of a crime. . . . What constitutes a substantial step in any given case is a question

of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We further

clarified that ‘‘[t]he ultimate measure of the sufficiency

of the defendant’s conduct to constitute a substantial

step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in

the commission of assault in the first degree is not, to

reiterate, how close in time or place or final execution

his proven conduct came to the consummation of that

crime, but whether such conduct, if at least the start

of a line of conduct leading naturally to the commission

of the crime, strongly corroborated his alleged criminal

purpose.’’ Id., 530. Our reasoning in Osbourne, reinforced by the majority of appellate cases, our reading

of Carter, and the Model Penal Code, support our determination that to dispose of the defendant’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim before us, we must focus on ‘‘what

the actor has already done and not what remains to be

done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 528.

B

We now turn to the merits of the claim. The evidence

before the jury included Evans’ testimony and the video

in which the defendant and Paleski plotted a murder

for hire scheme. Through Evans, the state presented

evidence that, if credited by the jury, established that

the defendant sought his help to attain the services of

a hit man. Furthermore, Evans testified that he tried to

dissuade the defendant, but the defendant stated that

he had been contemplating this course of action for

‘‘two years, and he [had] made up his mind . . . [that]

he needs [his wife murdered] . . . before his next

court date.’’
The state also presented the video recording of the

meeting between the defendant and Paleski. The video

allowed the jury to observe the conduct, demeanor, and

attitude of the defendant as he agreed to hire Paleski

to kill his wife. In a little more than one-quarter of an

hour, the defendant agreed to a price (to include a down

payment and money for the murder weapon), provided

Paleski with key information, namely, his wife’s name,

home and work address, her work schedule, a description of her vehicle, and suggested a day, location, and

manner for the murder to ensure that the defendant

would have an alibi. Finally, the jury also saw the defendant twice confirm to Paleski that he wanted his

wife murdered.

The defendant argues that because he did not pay

Paleski his conduct was merely preparatory. Indeed,

Paleski did state that he ‘‘can’t do shit without that

money.’’ The defendant’s argument, however, is flawed

for two reasons. First, the substantial step standard

focuses of what he has already done, i.e., agreeing to

hire a hit man and providing critical information about

the victim, and not what remains to be done, i.e., paying

the purported hit man. See State v. Osbourne, supra,

138 Conn. App. 528. Moreover, the mere fact that the

defendant did not make a payment is not dispositive.

See State v. Servello, supra, 59 Conn. App. 373 (‘‘Our

Supreme Court has stated that the essential element of

a hiring relationship is an agreement to compensate the

[agent] for his services. . . . In interpreting the relevant section pertaining to hiring an agent to carry out

a murder, we are concerned principally with adopting

a construction . . . that effectuates the legislative

intention, not with the technical niceties of contract

law.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also Model Penal Code and Commentaries,

supra, § 5.01, comment (6) (a), p. 329 (‘‘[t]hat further

major steps must be taken before the crime can be

completed does not preclude a finding that the steps

already undertaken are substantial’’). ‘‘To constitute a

substantial step, however, consummation of [paying the

hit man] is not required. Any other interpretation would

impose a requirement of a more stringent standard of

proof for attempt than is provided by § 53a-49.’’ State

v. Servello, supra, 375.

Second, what constitutes a substantial step in any

given case is a question of fact; State v. Osbourne, supra,

138 Conn. App. 528; a point never addressed by the

defendant. Mindful that we are not jurors and our role

is limited to determining whether the jury reasonably

could have concluded that the defendant took a substantial step that was strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose, we must defer to the jury’s assessment

of Evans’ credibility and evaluation of the video. We

determine that it was reasonable for the jury to have

concluded that the defendant took a substantial step
in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the

murder of his wife.10

The defendant’s second argument that his conduct, at

best, amounts to solicitation warrants little discussion.

The state presented sufficient evidence concerning the

defendant’s conduct that the jury reasonably could have

concluded that it constituted a substantial step. See

State v. Griggs, 288 Conn. 116, 131 n.18, 951 A.2d 531

(2008) (‘‘[a] conviction for attempted murder does not

require a showing of actual injury, but only intentional

conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward causing the death of another’’).

Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

sustaining the verdict, we determine that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to have reasonably concluded

that the cumulative effect of Evans’ testimony and the

video established beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant, with the intent to cause the death of his

wife, committed a substantial step aimed at achieving

his wife’s death when he sought to hire a hit man, agreed

to a price, provided critical information about the victim, and suggested the method by which to commit the

murder to ensure his alibi. Accordingly, the defendant’s

first claim must fail.

II

The defendant next claims that the court, White, J.,

abused its discretion by unduly restricting access to

certain records regarding Evans’ role as a confidential

informant. Specifically, the defendant contends that the

court should have made the confidential records available to him. We disagree.

The following procedural history is relevant to this

claim. In a letter sent to the state, the defendant sought

‘‘all pertinent information pertaining to [Evans],’’

namely, records that detailed Evans’ assistance in any

investigation, a complete list of financial payments or

benefits in connection with the defendant’s case and

any other case in which the informant was involved,

and all information listing ‘‘illicit activities’’ and ‘‘allegations of wrongdoing’’ connected to Evans. Although the

state objected, the court ordered the state to ‘‘confer

with the Stamford Police Department and hand over,

under seal, any records it has in connection with . . .

Evans.’’ The court directed that those records were to

include, but not be limited to, ‘‘any financial payments

made by [the] Stamford Police Department to . . .

Evans in connection with his work as a [confidential

informant] for the Stamford Police Department’’ and

the supervisor’s log. Upon receipt of the sealed records,

the court conducted an in camera review and, at a

hearing, disclosed to the defendant that ‘‘Evans worked

as a [confidential informant] for the Stamford Police

Department on eight occasions between . . . August

of 2006 and June of 2011.’’ The court, however, noted
that these records failed to indicate whether Evans had

been paid. Therefore, the court ordered the state a

second time to determine whether Evans had been paid

anything, observing that ‘‘the defense is entitled to

that information.’’

The state complied with the court’s second order.

The Stamford Police Department sent a letter that was

reviewed in chambers and not shown to defense counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the court explained that

the letter indicated that there were ‘‘no written records

regarding payments made to . . . Evans over the

period of time for which he worked as a [confidential

informant]. . . . [T]he letter [also] indicate[d] that

there were payments made to . . . Evans for gas and

food. None of the payments exceeded thirty dollars.

The payments [were] not broken down as to each time

. . . Evans worked as an informant.’’ Importantly, the

court stated that the letter indicated that Evans ‘‘didn’t

receive any payment in connection with [the defendant’s] case.’’

When the court ruled that the records were to be

sealed, defense counsel objected. He wanted to question the police officers who furnished the information

contained in the sealed letter. The court denied this

request and noted to defense counsel that, ‘‘for most

part, [the court] granted [defense counsel’s disclosure]

motion,’’ which had not sought a disclosure of who

were the police officers involved in the undercover

operation. The court, while addressing defense counsel,

summarized its ruling as follows: ‘‘You know who the

person you claim is a [confidential informant], you

know the person’s identity. You know how often

[Evans] worked with the Stamford Police Department.

. . . You know something about the payments that

were made . . . .’’

The defendant claims on appeal that because Evans’

credibility was essential to the case, the records ‘‘might

[have] contain[ed] exculpatory information especially

relevant to Evans’ credibility.’’ Therefore, the defendant

argues, he needed full access to the confidential

records. We have reviewed the sealed records, and we

do not agree with the defendant.

The standard of review and principles of law that

guide our analysis are well established. We review a

court’s decision to not release confidential records

under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v.

Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 256, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116

(2005); see also State v. Delgado, 64 Conn. App. 312,

319, 780 A.2d 180 (2001), aff’d, 261 Conn. 708, 805 A.2d

705 (2002).

‘‘This court has the responsibility to conduct its own

in camera review of the sealed records to determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to release those records to the defendant. . . . The

linchpin of the determination of the defendant’s access

to the records is whether they sufficiently disclose

material especially probative of the ability to comprehend, know and correctly relate the truth . . . so as

to justify breach of their confidentiality . . . . Whether

and to what extent access to the records should be

granted to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation

must be determined on a case by case basis.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado, supra, 64 Conn. App. 319; see also State v. Webb,

75 Conn. App. 447, 458, 817 A.2d 122 (asserting that this

court has responsibility to conduct its own in camera

inspection of sealed records), cert. denied, 263 Conn.

919, 822 A.2d 244 (2003). ‘‘At this stage in the proceedings, when the court has reviewed the records in camera, access to the records must be left to the discretion

of the trial court which is better able to assess the

probative value of such evidence as it relates to the

particular case before it . . . and to weigh that value

against the interest in confidentiality of the records.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado,

supra, 320.

We have conducted our own in camera inspection of

the sealed records. On the basis of that review, we

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

The court properly disclosed the relevant information

to the defendant, namely, that Evans had worked as a

confidential informant on eight occasions, and that,

although the sealed records did not list the specific past

instances, Evans was previously compensated a petty

amount and not compensated for his participation in the

defendant’s case. Moreover, the sealed records failed to

contain any exculpatory evidence. Our review of the

records reflects that the court properly exercised its

discretion in denying the defendant access to the confidential records. See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411,

436, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (‘‘[a] criminal defendant does

not have the right to conduct a general fishing expedition into privileged or sensitive records’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the defendant’s claim

must fail.

III

The defendant also argues that the court improperly

limited his cross-examination of Evans regarding his

relationship with certain police officers.11 The defendant contends that this ruling violated his federal and

state constitutional rights to confrontation and his right

to present a defense, or, in the alternative, was an abuse

of discretion resulting in harmful error. Because the

defendant had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine

Evans to challenge his credibility and potential bias,

we reject the defendant’s argument.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant here. After the court, White, J., ordered certain
records regarding Evans’ status as a confidential informant sealed; see part II of this opinion; the state filed

a motion in limine on the eve of trial requesting certain

limitations on the defendant’s cross-examination of

Evans. Specifically, the state sought, inter alia, that the

defendant ‘‘be limited to inquire about [Evans’] contact

with the Stamford police in this case alone.’’

On the second day of trial, the court, Hudock, J., held

a hearing on the state’s motion. The state requested

that the court have defense counsel ‘‘delineate the questions he plan[ned] to ask . . . Evans regarding his prior

contact with the Stamford Police Department and rule

whether or not those require him to be less specific in

order for the court not to run into a conflict with the

public policy interests in this case . . . .’’ Defense

counsel stated that he sought to inquire into Evans’

expectation of monetary compensation or other consideration in connection with this case. The court explicitly

stated that it did not ‘‘have a problem with [defense

counsel] asking about expectations . . . [or]

payments.’’

Defense counsel also argued that the defendant’s confrontation rights afforded him wider latitude in crossexamining Evans. Citing a 1977 case from the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit12 and its

progeny, the defendant argued that because Evans was

a confidential informant, he had ‘‘an open door on credibility and on expectation of payment’’ during the crossexamination. Specifically, the defendant sought to question Evans about a specific police officer by name and

‘‘one particular unit . . . within the Stamford Police

Department.’’ The court denied this request.

After the arguments concluded, the court observed

that it needed to balance the defendant’s right to confront Evans against public policy concerns, namely, the

police department’s need for information from confidential informants as well Evans’ safety. Ultimately, the

court ruled that the defendant could inquire as to the

following: (1) ‘‘the fact that . . . Evans was engaged in

criminal investigations’’; (2) ‘‘how many investigations

there were, over what period of time’’; (3) ‘‘moneys

received from the Stamford Police Department’’; (4)

‘‘expectation [of financial reward] in this particular

case’’; and (5) ‘‘[any] other consideration, [if there was]

. . . a good faith basis.’’

At trial, the defendant extensively cross-examined

Evans. He established that Evans had worked as a confidential informant for the Stamford Police Department.

When pressed by the defendant, Evans could not recall

when he first worked as an informant for the Stamford

police department, or on how many occasions he provided the police with information.Regarding compensation, Evans testified that he had been compensated only

with ‘‘gas money,’’ and was adamant that he had ‘‘never

[taken] any money from [the police] besides [gas
money].’’ Evans did concede that a member of the police

department had ‘‘ripped up’’ a speeding ticket. Also,

Evans testified that a police officer had written him a

letter of recommendation in support of his bail enforcement agent license application.13 Finally, when asked—

on two separate occasions—whether he had been paid

or expected to be paid in either money or some other

form of compensation, Evans unequivocally answered

in the negative.

The standard ofreview to determine whether a defendant’s right of cross-examination has been unduly

restricted is well settled. ‘‘The general rule is that

restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are

within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . but

this discretion comes into play only after the defendant

has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment. . . . We must, therefore,

conduct a two-step analysis, determining first whether

the cross-examination permitted to defense counsel

comported with sixth amendment standards . . . and

second, whether the trial court abused its discretion in

restricting the scope of that cross-examination. . . .

The constitutional standard is met when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from

which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reeves, 57 Conn.

App. 337, 346, 748 A.2d 357 (2000).

‘‘To establish an abuse of discretion, [the defendant]

must show that the restrictions imposed upon [the]

cross-examination were clearly prejudicial. . . . Once

it is established that the trial court’s ruling on the scope

of cross-examination is not constitutionally defective,

this court will apply [e]very reasonable presumption

. . . in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling

in determining whether there has been an abuse of

discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 346–47.

Our analysis is also guided by the following principles. ‘‘The primary interest secured by confrontation is

the right to cross-examination . . . and an important

function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying. . . . Cross-examination

to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and

prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly

restricted.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 343–44. We are mindful that, ‘‘[g]enerally

speaking, the [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees an

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to

whatever extent, the defense might wish.’’ (Emphasis

in original.) Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106

S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).

Thus, ‘‘[i]n determining whether a defendant’s right
of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we

consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether

the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other

questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of

the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues

actually litigated at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Reeves, supra, 57 Conn. App. 345–46.

The defendant’s reliance on State v. Santiago, 224

Conn. 325, 618 A.2d 32 (1992), is misplaced. Our

Supreme Court in Santiago held that the trial court had

violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation by improperly limiting his cross-examination of

one of the state’s witnesses. Id., 326. The witness in

that case was a former Hartford police officer who

testified to knowing two of the detectives who

responded to the shooting incident in which the murder

at issue had occurred. Id., 330. When the defendant

sought to question the witness ‘‘as to what relationship,

if any, he presently had with the Hartford police department,’’ the state objected and the court sustained the

objection. Id. The court in Santiago concluded that

the trial court ‘‘improperly prohibited inquiry into a

legitimate area of cross-examination . . . [because]

[i]t is always relevant to the issue of bias that a witness

may have a relationship to the prosecuting authorities

in a criminal case.’’ Id., 332. Our Supreme Court further

explained that because the witnesses’ testimony was

critical to the finding of guilt, the trial court’s ‘‘improper

limitation on the defendant’s cross-examination . . .

require[d] reversal . . . .’’ Id., 334. The facts of this

case, however, are distinguishable and do not require

a similar result.

Unlike the defendant in Santiago, the defendant here

was allowed to inquire into Evans’ past connections

with the Stamford Police Department. Although Evans

was uncertain as to when he first worked as a confidential informant and as to how many instances he did so,

the defendant was allowed to cross-examine Evans on

his previous work as a confidential informant for the

Stamford Police Department. More importantly, the

defendant elicited testimony that the Stamford Police

Department, in the past, had bestowed Evans with

favorable treatment by ‘‘ripp[ing] up’’ a speeding ticket,

as well as providing him a letter of recommendation

for his bail enforcement agent license application. As

the sole trier of fact, the jury was free to believe Evans’

claim that he received only ‘‘gas money’’ as compensation for his efforts as a confidential informant and that

he had not been paid or expected compensation in

connection with this case.

We conclude that the defendant’s cross-examination

of Evans satisfied the constitutional requirements. The

record demonstrates that the defendant was given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Evans regarding his

motive and bias for testifying. The record is clear that
the defendant elicited a sufficient amount of information to aid the jury in assessing Evans’ credibility. Thus,

the jury was presented with sufficient facts from which

it could determine the reliability of Evans’ testimony.

Furthermore, the court did not unduly restrict the

defendant’s cross-examination of Evans. Thus, the

court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the inquiry

as it did. The court was faced with balancing the probative value of the evidence that could have been elicited

from Evans against the state’s public policy concerns,

namely, the police department’s need for information

from confidential informants as well as ensuring Evans’

safety. The court’s ruling provided sufficient latitude

forthe defendant to cross-examine Evans on the ‘‘issues

[that were] actually litigated at trial’’; State v. Reeves,

supra, 57 Conn. App. 346; by affording him the opportunity to inquire into Evans’ relationship with the Stamford Police Department as evidenced by Evans’

testifying to two occasions of favorable treatment.14

Therefore, this argument must fail.

IV

The defendant’s final claim is that the court provided

improperinstructions to the jury. Specifically, he argues

that the court failed to properly instruct the jury on the

crime of attempt to commit murder and on the defense

of entrapment. We address each in turn.

We first set forth the relevant law governing the

defendant’s improper jury instruction claim. The standard of review for claims of instructional impropriety

is well established. ‘‘When reviewing the challenged

jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled

rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its

entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect

rather than by its individual component parts. . . .

[T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as

accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court

of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to

the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either

party under the established rules of law. . . . As long

as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the

issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . .

we will not view the instructions as improper.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griggs, supra, 288

Conn. 124.

‘‘We will reverse a conviction only if, in the context

of the whole, there is a reasonable possibility that the

jury was misled in reaching its verdict. . . . A jury

instruction is constitutionally adequate if it provides

the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements

of the crime charged, and affords them proper guidance

for their determination of whether those elements were

present. . . . An instruction that fails to satisfy these

requirements would violate the defendant’s right to due

process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States constitution and article first,

§ 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . The primary

purpose of the charge is to assist the jury in applying

the law correctly to the facts which they might find to

be established. . . . The purpose of a charge is to call

the attention of the members of the jury, unfamiliar

with legal distinctions, to whatever is necessary and

proper to guide them to a right decision in a particular

case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 125–26.

A

The defendant claims that the court’s charge to the

jury ‘‘lacked sufficient guidance . . . on what constitutes a ‘substantial step’ . . . .’’ Specifically, he argues

that he was found guilty because the court did not

‘‘explicitly define and give examples’’ of what constitutes a ‘‘substantial step’’ by listing those examples provided in § 53a-49 (b).15

The following facts provide the context forthis claim.

After both parties submitted their requests to charge,

the court provided the parties with the proposed charge

for the attempt count at the charging conference.

Defense counsel took a ‘‘strenuous exception,’’ arguing

that the proposed charge—by leaving out the specific

examples provided in the statute—would confuse the

jury because it could not ‘‘appreciate the level of proximity to the death of the victim and the severity of the

conduct toward achieving that goal.’’ As a result, the

defendant argued, it would be a ‘‘miscarriage of justice

not to read’’ the examples.

On appeal, the defendant relies on State v. Washington, 15 Conn. App. 704, 546 A.2d 911 (1988), for the

proposition that he was ‘‘entitled to fact specific

requests to charge, as well as a definition, or at least

guidance from the trial court as to what does and what

does not constitute a substantial step under the attempt

statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The state

counters that the jury instruction was accurate and

almost verbatim to the criminal jury instruction provided by the Judicial Branch; thus, the jury charge did

not mislead the jury. Moreover, the state argues, it was

within the court’s discretion not to provide the examples listed in the statute. We agree with the state.

The defendant’s contention that State v. Washington,

supra, 15 Conn. App. 704, entitles him to his requested

jury charge is faulty. The defendant in Washington

argued on appeal that the court erred in reading § 53a49 (b) in its entirety to the jury because only three of

the seven listed examples were relevant to his case.

Id., 708–709. Thus, the defendant contended, the jury

was ‘‘misled and confused’’ when it had to consider

irrelevant statutory examples because the instructions

‘‘invited [the jury] to considertheories of liability unsupported by the evidence.’’ Id., 709. The court in Washington did not agree, noting that it had ‘‘no doubt that the
court’s instructions . . . aided the jury in understanding the difficult concept of what constitutes a substantial step.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 710.

Washington holds that it is permissible, but not mandatory, for a court to read the ‘‘irrelevant statutory

examples [provided in § 53a-49 (b)] . . . as illustrations’’ because those examples are not intended to be

‘‘various statutory bases of liability . . . .’’ Id. In the

fourteen appellate decisions citing Washington as ofthe

date of this opinion, not one suggests that it mandates

courts to read the statutory examples provided in § 53a49 (b). We decline the defendant’s invitation to expand

our holding in Washington.

We conclude that the charge was proper. The court’s

instructions mirrored the language of the statute.16 See

General Statutes § 53a-49 (a); see also State v. Lo Sacco,

11 Conn. App. 24, 29–30, 525 A.2d 977 (finding no error

in jury charge when judge read statute verbatim), cert.

denied, 204 Conn. 812, 528 A.2d 1158 (1987). Also, the

charge was taken nearly verbatim from the criminal

jury instruction provided by the Judicial Branch.17 ‘‘This

court has noted that [w]hile not dispositive of the adequacy of the [jury] instruction, an instruction’s uniformity with the model instructions is a relevant and

persuasive factor in our analysis.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Leandry, supra, 161 Conn.

App. 396–97. Moreover, the commentary to the jury

instruction advises the court that it ‘‘may, if it so

chooses, and if supported by the evidence, provide an

example of what is a ‘substantial step.’ ’’ Connecticut

Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2008) § 3.2-2, commentary (Rev. to December 1, 2007 [modified November

17, 2015]), available at http://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/

Part3/3.2-2.htm (last visited March 23, 2016).

The defendant’s argument that the jury’s deliberations were ‘‘clouded by speculation’’ because the court

did not provide the statutory examples is itself speculative. ‘‘Jurors are expected to bring their common sense

and common experience to the deliberation process.’’

State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 159, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).

In applying its own reasoning, the jury reasonably could

have concluded that the defendant’s conduct, namely,

‘‘seeking a shooter, meeting with him to plan the murder

of his [wife], and establishing a time later . . . to make

the first of three payments pursuant to the defendant’s

plan,’’ constituted more than mere preparation. The

charge was proper and the jury was not misled. Therefore, this claim must fail.

B

The defendant next claims that the court provided

an inadequate jury instruction on the defense of entrapment in contravention of General Statutes § 53a-15.18

The following facts are necessary to resolve this

claim. Late on the sixth day of trial, after the court
provided both parties with a preliminary charge and

discussed it in chambers, the court held a charging

conference. At that time, the court acknowledged that

the defendant was using entrapment as a defense. Specifically, the court noted that the defendant was arguing

that because Evans was a bail enforcement agent and

a previous confidential informant, he should be considered a ‘‘government agent for purposes of this prosecution.’’ The following day, after the court read the

entrapment charge to the jury,19 the defendant objected

on the ground that the court, in substituting ‘‘government agent or police officer’’ in its charge, would confuse the jury. The defendant argued that ‘‘public servant

or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant’’ should have been read throughout the charge.

The state countered that the charge, as given, followed

the model jury instruction and provided proper guidance to the jury. The court ruled that the charge, as

given, was proper.

On appeal, the defendant makes a similar claim. Specifically, he argues that the jury charge was defective

because it excluded Evans from the category of persons

who may have ‘‘induced’’ the defendant to commit the

crime. As characterized by the defendant, this charge

was ‘‘constitutionally infirm [because] . . . [the]

court’s jury instruction unconstitutionally narrowed the

breadth of the statute to exclude Evans.’’ Thus, the

defendant argues, the jury was misled. We disagree.

In resolving this final issue, we are guided by the

following principles. ‘‘A defendant’s right to present a

defense is of constitutional dimension. Thus, [w]here

the legislature has created a legally recognized defense

. . . [due process requires] a proper jury instruction

on the elements of the defense . . . so that the jury

may ascertain whether the state has met its burden of

disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . When

the evidence presented at trial, construed in the light

most favorable to the defendant, supports such a

defense, a charge on the defense is obligatory.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Riley, 159 Conn. App. 462, 477–78, 123 A.3d 123, cert.

denied, 319 Conn. 949, 125 A.3d 528 (2015).

Our review of the jury charge, read as a whole, leads

us to conclude that it was proper. First, the court began

its instruction by reading a nearly verbatim version of

the statute on the defense of entrapment. Second, the

charge followed the model jury instruction,20 which we

have stated is ‘‘a relevant and persuasive factor in our

analysis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Leandry, supra, 161 Conn. App. 397. Third and finally,

the defendant provides no case law, nor did we find

any Connecticut case, supporting his argument that the

term ‘‘government agent or police officer’’ in the context

of an entrapment charge misleads a jury. There are,

however, Connecticut cases that use the term ‘‘govern-
ment agent’’ to explain our entrapment law. See State

v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 79, 640 A.2d 553 (1994) (‘‘[w]here

the [g]overnment has induced an individual to break

the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue . . .

the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal

act prior to first being approached by [g]overnment

agents’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v.

Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5, 89 A.2d 219 (1952) (‘‘if the

evil intent and the criminal design originate in the mind

of the government agent and the accused is lured into

the commission of the offense charged . . . no conviction may be had’’); State v. Nero, 122 Conn. App. 763,

784–85, 1 A.3d 184 (2010) (‘‘[i]n their zeal to enforce

the law . . . [g]overnment agents may not originate a

criminal design, implant in an innocent person’s mind

the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then

induce commission of the crime so that the [g]overnment may prosecute’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, in this case, the jury instruction on the

elements of the defense of entrapment was proper and

did not mislead the jury. Accordingly, the defendant’s

final argument must fail.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interest of the

victim of a criminal violation of a protective order, we decline to identify

the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.

1 The men were acquainted because Evans previously had been a confidential drug informant and worked with Evensen in his capacity as a police

officer.

2 A criminal protective order was issued against the defendant on March

7, 2011. It is not a part of this appeal.

3

In his reply brief, the defendant contends for the first time that the

evidence did not demonstrate that he acted with the ‘‘specific intent to

cause the death of his spouse.’’ Because ‘‘[i]t is a well established principle

that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 373 n.36, 857 A.2d

808 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 845, 126 S. Ct. 94, 163 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2005);

we decline to address this claim. See also State v. Jose G., 102 Conn. App.

748, 755, 929 A.2d 324 (2007) (‘‘Claims of error by [the defendant] must be

raised in his original brief . . . so that the issue as framed by him can be

fully responded to by the [state] in its brief, and so that we can have the

full benefit of that written argument. Although the function of the [defendant’s] reply brief is to respond to the arguments and authority presented

in the [state’s] brief, that function does not include raising an entirely new

claim of error.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), aff’d, 290 Conn. 331,

963 A.2d 42 (2009).

4 Although the defendant stated that he could get the $800 that night, he

was hesitant to do so because ‘‘for [him] to get it, [he] had to . . . disturb

people, [and] [he did not] want to [do] anything out of place [that night].’’

The defendant assured Paleski that he could get the money the following

day ‘‘without doing anything . . . out of character.’’

5 At Paleski’s behest, the defendant provided the following information

on a piece of paper: (1) the victim’s name; (2) the color, make, and model

of the victim’s car; (3) the victim’s place of employment; and (4) the victim’s

home address.

6 The colloquy discussing his wife’s photograph was as follows:

‘‘[Paleski]: [Y]ou . . . have a picture of her or anything?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I do have a little bit older [picture because] she’s not

fucking big on pictures. . . .

‘‘[Paleski]: [T]hat’s a picture . . . of her, that’s how she looks now?

‘‘[The Defendant]: [U]h, her hair is more mixed in colors.
‘‘[Paleski]: [W]hat color?

‘‘[The Defendant]: [S]he got all fucking crazy highlights . . . like brown

and blond and a little bit of black.’’

7 For example, from our Supreme Court one can compare State v. Lapia,

supra, 202 Conn. 515 (focus is on ‘‘what the actor has already done and

not on what remains to be done’’ [emphasis in original]), with State v. Green,

194 Conn. 258, 277, 480 A.2d 526 (1984) (‘‘[the substantial step] standard

shifts the focus from what has been done to what remains to be done’’),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 964, 83 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1985).

From this court’s case law, one can compare State v. Hanks, supra, 39

Conn. App. 341 (‘‘To constitute a substantial step, the conduct must be

strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. . . . This standard

focuses on what the actor has already done and not [on] what remains to

be done. State v. Lapia, [supra, 202 Conn. 515].’’ [Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.]), with State v. Campfield, 44 Conn. App. 6, 25,

687 A.2d 903 (1996) (‘‘[Section] 53a-49 [a] [2] requires an accused to have

undertaken a substantial step toward committing the intended crime. This

standard focuses on what act remains to be done to commit the intended

crime and not what acts have been done.’’), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 916,

692 A.2d 814, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 823, 118 S .Ct. 81, 139 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1997).

We also take this opportunity to correct a misapplication of a legal principle as enunciated in Campfield. In that case, this court cited to Hanks for

the proposition that the substantial step ‘‘standard focuses on what act

remains to be done to commit the intended crime and not what acts have

been done.’’ State v. Campfield, supra, 44 Conn. App. 25. The court in

Campfield, however, appears to have misspoken when citing Hanks. The

court in Hanks, quoting State v. Lapia, supra, 202 Conn. 515, explicitly

stated that the substantial step ‘‘standard focuses on what the actor has

already done and not what remains to be done.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Hanks, supra, 39 Conn. App. 341.

8 Section 5.01 of the Model Penal Code provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1)

Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime

if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of

the crime, he:

‘‘(a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the

attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or . . .

‘‘(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances

as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial

step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of

the crime.

‘‘(2) Conduct That May Be Held Substantial Step Under Subsection (1)

(c). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step . . . unless

it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. . . .’’ Model

Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01 (1) and (2), pp. 295–96.

9 A review of our Supreme Court’s case law reveals that the majority of

cases follow the Model Penal Code formulation. Compare State v. Wilcox,

254 Conn. 441, 469, 758 A.2d 824 (2000) (focusing on what actor has done

and not what remains to be done as applied to facts of case), State v.

Milardo, 224 Conn. 397, 404, 618 A.2d 1347 (1993) (same), State v. Anderson,

211 Conn. 18, 27–28, 557 A.2d 917 (1989) (same), State v. Lapia, supra, 202

Conn. 515 (‘‘[t]his standard differs from other approaches to the law of

criminal attempt in that it focuses on what the actor has already done and

not on what remains to be done’’ [emphasis in original]), and State v. Zayas,

195 Conn. 611, 620, 490 A.2d 68 (1985) (focusing on what actor has done

and not what remains to be done as applied to facts of case), with Small

v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 730, 946 A.2d 1203 (‘‘[t]his

standard shifts the focus from what has been done to what remains to be

done’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied sub nom. Small v.

Lantz, 555 U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008), and State v.

Green, supra, 194 Conn. 277 (same).

This court’s jurisprudence provides a similar result. Compare State v.

Carter, 141 Conn. App. 377, 387, 61 A.3d 1103 (2013) (focusing on what

actor has done and not what remains to be done as applied to facts of case),

aff’d, 317 Conn. 845, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015), State v. Osbourne, supra, 138

Conn. App. 528 (‘‘[t]his standard focuses on what the actor has already done

and not what remains to be done’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), State

v. Robinson, 127 Conn. App. 1, 9, 15 A.3d 648 (focusing on what actor has

done and not what remains to be done as applied to facts of case), cert.

denied, 300 Conn. 942, 17 A.3d 477 (2011), State v. Andrews, 114 Conn. App.

738, 747–48, 971 A.2d 63 (same), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 901, 975 A.2d 1277

(2009), State v. Towns, 114 Conn. App. 155, 161–62, 968 A.2d 975 (same),

cert. denied, 293 Conn. 901, 975 A.2d 1278 (2009), State v. Damato, supra,

105 Conn. App. 345 (same), State v. Fauntleroy, 101 Conn. App. 144, 152,
921 A.2d 622 (2007) (same), State v. Morocho, 93 Conn. App. 205, 215, 888

A.2d 164 (‘‘[t]his standard focuses on what the actor has already done and

not what remains to be done’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert.

denied, 277 Conn. 915, 895 A.2d 792 (2006), with State v. Campfield, supra,

44 Conn. App. 25 (misspeaking when defining substantial step standard as

stated in State v. Hanks, supra, 39 Conn. App. 341).

10 We note that our Supreme Court has stated that the drafters of the

Model Penal Code ‘‘belie[ved] that the proper concern of the law of attempts

is the dangerousness of the actor, as a person manifesting a firm disposition

to commit a crime, not the dangerousness of his conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 181 n.29, 891 A.2d

897, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006); see

also Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment (3) (b),

pp. 315–16 (‘‘[t]he law of attempts . . . should be concerned with manifestations of dangerous character as well as with preventive arrests’’). With this

principle in mind, it was reasonable for the jury to have concluded that a

person, with the intent to commit murder who hires a hit man has demonstrated his dangerousness to society.

11 The defendant also made two additional arguments in this claim. He

contended that the court abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of Evans regarding a prior conviction and evidence that his wife allegedly

operated an unlicensed day care. In crafting his argument, however, the

defendant’s main brief contained only four passing, conclusory statements

regarding the prior conviction and unlicensed day care claims. We note that

his reply brief also made no reference. We do not suggest that a minimum

number of statements or references must be reached before we review a

claim. We do, however, assert that ‘‘[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract

assertion[s], is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to

brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pink,

274 Conn. 241, 244 n.3, 875 A.2d 447 (2005); see also State v. Wragg, 61

Conn. App. 394, 395 n.1, 764 A.2d 216 (2001) (‘‘[a]n issue merely mentioned

will be deemed abandoned’’). Accordingly, we decline to review the portion

of the defendant’s claim pertaining to Evans’ prior conviction and the allegation that Evans’ wife was operating an unlicensed day care.

12 The defendant cited to United States v. Leja, 568 F.2d 493 (6th Cir.

1977). In that case, the government informant was employed by the federal

Drug Enforcement Agency. Id., 498. With the agency’s permission, the informant cooperated with the defendant to manufacture drugs and introduced

the defendant to the undercover agent posing as a customer. Id., 494. At trial,

the defendant elicited testimony from the informant that he had received a

substantial monetary payment for his work in that case. Id., 495. The court,

however, did not allow the defendant to cross-examine the informant on

payments from past services. Id., 497.

The defendant argued on appeal that the informant ‘‘fabricated the facts

of [the defendant’s] involvement in order to collect the $1000 per head

bounty offered by the government in addition to its regular retainer.’’ Id.,

495. In its analysis reversing the judgment of the District Court, the court

in Leja calculated that the informant was ‘‘receiving payment at an annual

rate of $42,000 and $56,000’’ in 1975. Id., 498. Therefore, the court in Leja

reasoned that ‘‘surely the evidence of how much [the informant] was receiving from the government for past services and might therefore expect in

the future was highly relevant to the question of his potential bias and

interest.’’ Id., 499.

The facts from Leja are easily distinguished. Evans was not acting as a

paid informant in the present case. As testified by Evans, he neither received

any form of payment nor expected any future payment or consideration.

Evans also testified to being remunerated only for his fuel expenses when

acting as a confidential informant, a very different situation from that of

the informant in Leja, whose livelihood appeared substantially impacted by

working as a government informant.

13 During direct examination, it was established that Evans worked as a

bail enforcement agent. On cross-examination, it was then established that

a bail enforcement agent must be licensed in Connecticut. See General

Statutes § 29-152f (‘‘[a]ny person desiring to engage in the business of a bail

enforcement agent shall apply to the Commissioner of Emergency Services

and Public Protection for a license’’).

14 The defendant’s contention that the court’s ruling limiting his crossexamination of Evans was harmful error is also without merit. Although

Evans was a key witness for the prosecution, the jury had the benefit of

reviewing the video recording the defendant’s plot to have Paleski murder
his wife. Even had the jury not credited Evans’ testimony, the video was

compelling evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

15 The examples provided in § 53a-49 (b), in relevant part, are as follows:

‘‘Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly

corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient

as a matter of law: (1) [l]ying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated

victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3)

reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4)

unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated

that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed

in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such

unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the

circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be

employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated

for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves

no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an

innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.’’

16 The court charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘Element two,

conduct. The second element is that the defendant intentionally did anything

that under the circumstances as he believed them to be was an act constituting a substantial step in the course of conduct planned to culminate in his

commission of the crime of murder. To be a substantial step the conduct

must be strongly corroborative of the defendant’s criminal purpose.

‘‘The state need not show that its conduct progressed so far as to constitute

the final step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission

of a crime had the circumstances been as he believed them to be; however,

the act or acts must constitute more than mere preparation.

‘‘The defendant’s conduct must be at least the start of a line of conduct

that will lead naturally to the commission of a crime. In other words, it

must appear to the defendant that it was at least possible that the crime of

murder could be committed if he continued on his course of conduct.

‘‘You may recall the state’s claim that the defendant’s conduct between

the afternoon of—mid-afternoon of June 9, 2011, and morning of June 10

rose to the level of substantial steps, including seeking a shooter, meeting

with him to plan the murder of [his wife] and establishing a time later in

the morning of the tenth to make the first of three payments pursuant to

the defendant’s plan.

‘‘However, you will also recall that the defendant claims that the state

has failed to prove each element of the crime of attempted murder beyond

a reasonable doubt in that the defendant neither possessed the specific

intent to commit the murder, nor did he perform a substantial step before

his arrest.

‘‘If, upon all of the evidence, you conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant had formed in his mind a specific intention of murder

as it has been defined for you, you must next consider whether he intentionally did anything that would constitute a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.

‘‘In other words, the state must prove both the specific intent to commit

murder and substantial conduct beyond a reasonable doubt in order to

obtain a conviction.

‘‘If you unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crime of murder and took

a substantial step toward the commission of that crime, then you shall find

the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the

state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either of these elements,

you shall then find the defendant not guilty.’’

17 Section 3.2-2 of the Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions provides in

relevant part: ‘‘The second element is that the defendant intentionally did

anything that, under the circumstances as (he/she) believed them to be, was

an act constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to

culminate in (his/her) commission of the crime of <insert substantive

offense>. To be a substantial step, the conduct must be strongly corroborative of the defendant’s criminal purpose. The act or acts must constitute

more than mere preparation. The defendant’s conduct must be at least the

start of a line of conduct that will lead naturally to the commission of a

crime. In other words, it must appear to the defendant that it was at least

possible that the crime could be committed if (he/she) continued on (his/

her) course of conduct. . . .

‘‘If, upon all the evidence, you conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had formed in (his/her) mind the intention to commit <insert

substantive crime> as it has been defined for you, you must next consider

whether (he/she) intentionally did anything that would constitute a substantial step towards the commission of the crime. In other words, the state

must prove both intent and conduct beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain

a conviction.

‘‘If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant intended to commit <insert substantive crime>

and took a substantial step toward the commission of that crime, then you

shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find

that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either of these

elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.’’ (Emphasis omitted;

footnote omitted.) Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2008)

§ 3.2-2 (Rev. to December 1, 2007 [modified to November 17, 2015]), available

at http://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Part3/3.2-2.htm (last visited March 23, 2016).

18 General Statutes § 53a-15 provides: ‘‘In any prosecution for an offense,

it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct

because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting

in cooperation with a public servant, forthe purpose of institution of criminal

prosecution against the defendant, and that the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct.’’

19 The court’s charge of entrapment, in its entirety, is as follows: ‘‘Now,

I’ll discuss entrapment. The evidence in this case raises the issue of the

defense of entrapment as it relates to the crime of attempted murder in

count one.

‘‘The statute defining entrapment reads in pertinent part. In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the

prescribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant

or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant for the purpose

of institution of criminal prosecution against the defendant and the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such

conduct.

‘‘Entrapment exists only if the defendant was not predisposed to committing the crime of attempted murder. If the criminal intent or the willing

disposition to commit the crime originates in the mind of the defendant

and the criminal offense is completed, it is no defense that the opportunity

is furnished or that the defendant is aided in the commission of the crime

in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute the defendant.

‘‘On the other hand, it is entrapment if the criminal design originates in

the mind of the government agent or police officer and the defendant is

induced into the commission of the offense when the defendant would not

have committed it except for the urging of the government agent or officer.

‘‘The vital factor in determining if there has been entrapment is whether

the defendant was induced by the urging of a governmental agent or police

officer to commit a crime that the defendant would not otherwise have committed.

‘‘Inducement means more than a simple request by a governmental agent

or police officer to break the law. There is a clear distinction between

inducing a person to commit a crime and setting the stage to catch that

person in the execution of criminal designs of the person’s own volition.

‘‘If the government agent or officers of the law induce an innocent person

to commit a crime that that person would not otherwise commit, it is

entrapment and a defense to the crime charged.

‘‘It is for you to determine on the basis of all the evidence whether the

state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not induce the

defendant to commit the offense for which he is charged in count one.

‘‘If you unanimously find that the state has proved all of the elements of

the crime of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt and have proved

the claim of entrapment—disproved the claim of entrapment, excuse me,

beyond a reasonable doubt, you must return a verdict of guilty on this count.

‘‘If you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove one or more

of the elements of the crime of attempted murder or failed to disprove the

claim of entrapment, you must return a verdict of not guilty on this count.’’

(Emphasis added.)

20 The model jury instruction provides in relevant part: ‘‘Entrapment exists

only if the defendant was not predisposed to committing the crime at issue.

If the criminal intent orthe willing disposition to commit the crime originates

in the mind of the defendant and the criminal offense is completed, it is no

defense that the opportunity is furnished or the defendant is aided in the

commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute the defendant. On the other hand, it is entrapment if the criminal

design originates in the mind of the government agent or police officer and

the defendant is induced into the commission of the offense when the

defendant would not have committed it except for the urging of the officer

or government agent.

‘‘The vital factor in determining if there has been an entrapment is whether

the defendant was induced by the urging of a governmental agent or police

officer to commit a crime that the defendant would not otherwise have

committed. Inducement means more than a simple request by a government

agent or police officer to break the law. There is a clear distinction between

inducing a person to commit a crime and setting the stage to catch that

person in the execution of criminal designs of the person’s own volition. If

officers of the law induce an innocent person to commit a crime that that

person would not otherwise commit, it is entrapment and a defense to

the crime charged . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Criminal Jury

Instructions (4th Ed. 2008) § 2.7-4 Rev. to December 1, 2007 [modified to

May 20, 2011]), available at http://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Part2/2.7-4.htm (last

visited March 23, 2016).