APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN



CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs
Improvement

Adequate

Not
Strong Applicable

4. Individual Tactics

4.1 Were the best available cover
and concealment used appropri-
ately?

4.2 Were selected firing positions
tactically sound?

4.3 Was minimum exposure maintain-
ed during firing?

4.4 Were danger areas crossed
tactically?

4.5 Was noise and light disci-
pline maintained?

4.6 Was key terrain appropriately
utilized?

Standard:

Overall, did individual

tactics contribute to or
detract from the resolution
of this contingency?

H-1-7

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


reinforcements arrive, then assign them when and where they are needed as
they become available. However, responding off-site forces should not be
introduced piecemeal into situations involving hostile fire from
organized adversary forces. The rules of mutual support apply here, as
they do for other on-site response elements.

3.1.3.2 Use of Tactical Response Team Personnel. Regulations require
that normal duties of TRT personnel not interfere with their
responsibility to fulfill TRT functions. TRT personnel should be trained
to perform TRT functions in addition to regular duties as security
personnel. TRT personnel execute their normal duties until they are
called upon to perform TRT missions. Duties not related to TRT functions
should not interfere with the ability of TRT members to provide immediate
response. TRTs should not be held in reserve for special missions and
excluded from initial actions. They are expected to be the best trained,
armed, and equipped security personnel and are to be dedicated to the
immediate, time-critical response actions necessary to thwart adversary
attacks.

3.1.3.3 Outside Assistance. Outside agencies that are able to provide
assistance in safeguards contingencies may constitute an integral part of
the site's overall security capability. Based on pre-existing
agreements, LLEA may provide this function. Outside assistance from
other sources, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, adjacent
nuclear site security forces, or state police may be pre-arranged. Types
of outside assistance available may include Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) teams, air support, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and canine
support. The nature of this support varies from site to site.

Integration of outside support into site tactical operations requires
site familiarization, planning, and training. Effective planning before
a crisis provides greater assurance that actual response will be
effective during a safeguards contingency. Managers and supervisors of
organizations providing outside assistance may take part in tactical
planning. Specific agreements should be formalized concerning the type,
scope, and time span of the expected support, jurisdiction, lines of
authority, and other operational factors. No time exists to resolve
these issues during a crisis. If they participate, those off-site
personnel providing assistance should be familiar with the facility, site
operational procedures, and site security responsibilities. Where
possible, they may participate periodically in security force and
security management exercises, and be provided applicable security
planning documents.

3.2 Specific Guidance

Upon completion of the site vulnerability analysis and all response and
reinforcement planning, the stage is set for the development of scenarios
and exercise control plans designed to test the effectiveness of security
forces and the overall security system.

17


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

8. Security Force Discipline

8.1 Were security force members X
responsive to supervisors?

8.2 Were pre-exercise prepara- X
tions conducted in a pro-
fessional manner?

8.3. Were exercise conduct and X
safety rules observed?

8.4 Did security force members X
maintain a positive, confident
attitude and professional
conduct?

Standard:

Did security force discipline xX
contribute to or detract from
the overall resolution of
this contingency?

H-2-14

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

5. Team Tactics

5.1 Did the security force work xX
together as a team?

5.2 Did responders complement xX
security force personnel
already on the scene?

5.3 Were covered and concealed x
routes used in the response?

5.4 Were alternate response X
routes planned or used? :

5.5 Were tactical formations and x
dispersion used?

5.6 Did movement techniques X
provide for dispersion and
mutually supporting fire?

5.7 Were supporting fires used X
effectively?
5.8 Were security vehicles used xX

effectively to block or pursue
the escaping adversaries?

5.9 Did the security force gain x
control over key terrain?

H-2-9

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


AVAILABILITY NOTICE
Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications

Most documents cited in NRC publications will be avallable from one of the following sources:
1. The NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555

2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington,
DC 20013-7082

3, | The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161

Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, It Is not
intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room
Include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
bulletins, circulars, information notices, Inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; ven-
dor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and corre-
spondence.

The following documents In the NUREG serles are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program:
formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and
brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations In the Code of Federal Regulations, and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances.

Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG serles reports and
technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Documents avaliable from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as
books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register notices, federal and state legisla-
tlon, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC conference pro-
ceedings are avallable for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.

Single coples of NRC draft reports are avaliable free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the
Office of Information Resources Management, Distribution Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555.

Coples of Industry codes and standards used In a substantive manner In the NRC regulatory process are
maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are avaliable there for refer-
ence use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the
originating organization or, If they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards
Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government.
Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty,
expresed or implied, or assumes any legal liability of responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of
such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use
by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.



CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

2. Planning

2.1 Were prior response plans
developed for the security
force to deal with this
type of contingency?

2.2 Were these plans specific?

2.3 Were prior plans developed
for use of LLEA?

2.4 Was available time used for
planning?

2.5 Were plans mission-oriented?

2.6 Were all plans viable?

2.7. Were necessary improvised
plans rapidly developed?

2.8 Did all personnel understand
the plans?

2.9 Were plans clear, complete
and concise?

2.10 Were available contingency
checklists appropriately
utilized?

H-1-3

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


5.6.6 Sequence of Events

Time Event Location

1600-1700 Evaluator Briefing Building 601 Classroom

1700-1800 Joint Evaluator and Building 601 Classroom
Controller Briefing

2000-2200 Adversary and Security Small Arms Range
Force Equipment Issue and
Checks

2200-2230 Adversary Control Building 601 Classroom
Plan Briefing

2230-2300 Joint Safety and Building 601 Classroom
Rules of Conduct
Briefing

2300-2330 Security Force Control Building 601 Classroom
Plan Briefing

2300-2330 Adversary Positioning Exercise Area

2330-2400 Security Force Positioning Exercise Area

0100- Exercise Window Opens Exercise Area

-0600 Exercise Window Closes Exercise Area

(LATEST)

TBA Post Exercise Critique Building 601 Classroom

5.6.7 Messages
a. Message #1
Time: As announced after fence PIDAS alarms.
From: CAS Controller/Evaluator
To: CAS Supervisor

vas IS A DRILL - YOU HAVE JUST LOST THE PICTURES ON CAMERAS 27A
and 27B."

C-8


LA ICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

The use of deadly force was appropriate in this case, as the adversaries had

penetrated a vital facility and were using deadly force themselves.

However, although the level of force (deadly) was appropriate, the manner in

which that force was applied was sometimes excessive. At times the security

force delivered a heavy volume of fire which was not always directed at a

specific, identified target. At least one TRT member was disabled by

friendly fire due to lack of positive target identification during the

firefight. There was excessive firing around the facility, most of

it_unnecessary, and security force leaders did not appear to have

control over who was firing. Had this occurred during full shift operations,

many plant workers as well as quards would have been endangered.

H-2-12

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


APPENDIX E
EXAMPLE _FORCE-ON-FORCE SAFETY PLAN



2.2.2 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Components,
and Procedures: Section 73.46

a. Paragraph 73.46(b)(3)(i) (Security Organization)

The revision of this paragraph requires that written procedures detailing
duties of the TRT be developed and retained, in conjunction with other
requirements for security procedures. Since new responsibilities and
duties must be assigned to these personnel, it is the intent of the
rulemaking to assure that detailed procedures are written to cover all
aspects of TRT operations, including organization, training, weaponry,
equipment, tactics, command and control, relationship of tactical
response duties to normal assigned duties, relationship to other site
security personnel, and any site-specific considerations.

b. Paragraph 73.46(b)(4) (Security Organization)

The revision of this paragraph references the requisite training,
equipment, and qualification requirements for members of the TRT,
referencing special requirements in Paragraphs 73.46(b) (6) and (b)(7).

c. Paragraphs 73.46(b)(6) and (7) (Security Organization)

Weaponry, and weapons training and qualification requirements are
specified for members of the TRT. TRT personnel shall be armed with 9mm
semiautomatic pistols and shotguns or individually assigned semiautomatic
rifles. The use of a larger caliber rifle (.30 caliber or 7.62mm)
carried by at least one member of the TRT provides additional
effectiveness against the design basis threat. The decision to require
semiautomatic pistols and larger caliber semiautomatic rifles is
supported by a number of police upgrades nationwide, in response to
recent encounters with adversaries using more sophisticated weapons.

d. Paragraph 73.46(b)(8) (Security Organization)
TRT members are required to successfully complete training in response
tactics, in addition to meeting other applicable training requirements of
10 CFR Part 73. Guidance on these training requirements is published
separately.

e. Paragraph 73.46(b)(9) (Security Organization)

Tactical response exercises are to be conducted to demonstrate the
ability of the security force to perform response and contingency plan
responsibilities and demonstrate individual skills in assigned team
duties. The exercises are intended to provide the security force the
opportunity for practice in performing response procedures and to
indicate whether additional training or security system improvements are
required.

During the first year of compliance, licensees are required to perform at
least one quarterly (at least once every three months) exercise per
security force shift. At least half of these quarterly exercises for

7


ASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-12

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

10. Physical Security Systems and
Geography

10.1 Do physical security systems
complement the tactical capa-
bilities of the security
force?

10.2 Do sensor and alarm systems
provide for sufficiently early
detection of penetration to
allow effective security force
response?

10.3. Do assessment systems provide
sufficient information about
adversaries to allow security
forces to interdict adversary
actions?

i0.4 Are tactical communications
equipment systems adequate?

10.5 Are security force vehicles
and weapons appropriate,
capable, serviceable, and
functional?

10.6 Do barriers provide denial
or sufficient delay to allow
successful security force
deployment?

10.7. Do response team-to-target
distances provide time for
security forces to interdict
an adversary?

H-1-18

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED




4. EVALUATION DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE

Benefits derived from any exercise are largely determined by the quality
and thoroughness of the evaluation that is conducted. The preferred
evaluation method uses a systematic approach emphasizing the general
goals and objectives for a successful security system. The intent of
this evaluation is to determine overall strengths and weaknesses.
Evaluation should not focus on participants as individuals, but rather
as elements of the security system.

The finding that a security force member failed to accomplish a required
function (e.g., locking a gate or responding to the proper location)
which allowed adversaries to escape is of little analytical value. The
logical conclusion might be that a particular individual needs counseling
or additional training, or may be the wrong individual to perform that
task. This conclusion would not accurately reflect the posture of the
overall security system. A more constructive finding would be that the
security force did not accomplish functions required to thwart an
adversary. This could then be explored to determine the root problem.
Were plans sufficiently detailed to specify all required functions? If
not, plans should be revised. If so, why were plans not followed?

This evaluation philosophy breaks down security system requirements into
the following general categories:

* Coordination, command, and control

* Planning

* Communications

* Individual tactics

° Team tactics

Application of force
Intelligence

Security force discipline
Response and containment/denial

* Physical security systems and geography

* Other considerations

* Overall evaluation.
See Appendix H for samples of blank and completed evaluator checklists
that address each of these categories. Objectives and standards in the
following sections can be used to accomplish necessary evaluation using
the evaluator checklists.

24


ATTACHMENT 3
TO
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE CONTROLLER BRIEFING LESSON PLAN

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Personal introductions.
b. Purpose of briefing.

c. Purpose of exercise (read verbatim from Exercise Control
Plan).
2. EXERCISE CONCEPT (READ VERBATIM FROM EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN)

3. CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Exercise simulation.
b. Participant control.

c. Safety.
4. SCENARIO

a. Review adversary description and proposed actions.
b. Cover allowable and prohibited variations.

c. Questions and discussion.

5. SIMULATION

a. Adversary prepositioning.

b. Tactical Response Team holding area and release times.
c. Vault delay times.

d. Messages.

e. Miscellaneous.

G-3-1


* Overall success by the security force does not necessarily mean
that everything was done correctly. Conversely, adversary
success does not mean that everything was done wrong.
Evaluators should look for strengths and weaknesses of
subsystems so that deficiencies and corrective actions can be
identified at that level.

Exercise evaluation begins when the exercise ends. Meaningful evaluation
requires that proper critiques be given. In general, an exercise should
be followed by two critiques, one involving all participants (including
controllers and evaluators), and a second involving only the evaluators
and the Exercise Coordinator (or individuals responsible for writing the
exercise report). The first critique should be held immediately
following the exercise, as soon as all participants can be assembled and
normal security is reestablished. The purpose of this critique is to
share observations and exchange other information for the general benefit
of all concerned. A typical critique would be conducted as follows:

* The Exercise Coordinator begins the critique and ensures that
controller/evaluator comment sheets (see Appendix I) and
participant critique sheets (see Appendix y are distributed.
The purpose of the critique and the proposed agenda should be
included.

The adversary leader presents a perception of the exercise from
the adversary's viewpoint, including original plans, any
modifications, problems encountered, and apparent factors
contributing to success or failure. All questions presented by
evaluators, controllers, and security force participants should
be answered.

The security force leader presents a perspective of the
exercise, including response plans, modifications to the plans,
problems encountered, and apparent factors contributing to
success or failure. Any questions that controllers or
evaluators have regarding exercise events should be answered.
If separate special response teams, LLEA, or other mission-type
forces were involved, their leaders should make similar
presentations.

Each evaluator presents a general critique of the portion of the
exercise observed. Each should follow the general outline of
the evaluator checklist and respond to questions from the
assembled group regarding any observations.

Controllers are given an opportunity to clarify points based on
their observations. However, it is not necessary for all
controllers to offer comments.

If appropriate, observers may be afforded the opportunity to
make comments.

31




5. EXERCISE CONTROL

5.1 Exercise Participants, Vehicles, and Equipment

5.1.1 Adversaries

The adversary force will wear nondescript, locally acceptable clothes and
MILES harnesses. However, prior to the onset of hostilities, they may
cover MILES harnesses with coveralls or smocks. Once hostilities have
been initiated, they must have MILES harnesses and headbands on and
uncovered at all times. They will be armed with MILES submachine guns,
automatic rifles, and handguns. They will have one vehicle which, in
order to remain inconspicuous, will not be MILES-equipped. No member of
the adversary force may attempt to enter B Complex or approach closer
than the perimeter fence prior to the opening of the exercise window.

Once clear of the exercise area, all adversaries will unload their
weapons and place them on the floor boards of the escape vehicle. No
weapons will be discharged, displayed, or handled outside of the exercise
area. If exercise adversaries are stopped by an LLEA patrol either
before or after the assault, they are to immediately identify themselves
as exercise participants and cooperate fully with LLEA officers.

5.1.2 Security Forces

All potential responders will wear normal uniforms and MILES harnesses,
and will be armed with MILES-equipped handguns in addition to their
normally assigned rifle or shotgun. Only those weapons that are normally
carried or available will be used.

The CAS and SAS will be outside the exercise boundary insofar as engaging
or being engaged in the firefight. CAS/SAS personnel will not be MILES-
equipped or armed with MILES-equipped weapons. However, they will
participate fully insofar as observation, communication, coordination,
command and control, and reporting are concerned.

Door 3A and 3B EECP guards in Building 905 will participate actively in
this exercise. They will be armed with MILES-equipped normal weapons. A
Complex EECP quards will not participate in this exercise. LLEA
personnel will participate only insofar as proceeding to and establishing
roadblocks and identifying and stopping the adversary escape vehicle.
They will not draw sidearms, display shoulder-fired weapons, or
physically arrest the adversaries (adversaries will cooperate fully if

stopped by LLEA).

5.2 MILES-Specific Instructions

All potential participants in the firefight portions of this exercise
will wear MILES harnesses which will be checked and set prior to the
exercise window. All MILES-equipped weapons will be checked and bore-
sighted prior to the exercise. No buildings, structures, or vehicles
will be MILES harness equipped.

C-4


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

Two guards were disabled by a sniper because they were not using cover which

was readily available. This created a hole in the inner containment and

allowed the adversaries to reach the fence. Several quards and one TRT

member crossed open areas without making use of available cover and without

covering fire. Others were observed making good use of cover. Noise

discipline was good except for radio sound. The TRT had EARCOM, but quards

did not and I was able to locate the positions of 3 quards by sound because

their radios were too loud. Light discipline was excellent. It was a very

dark night, and with all the personnel and vehicles involved, I did not

observe one case where improper light discipline compromised the friendly

situation. The above weaknesses in basic individual tactics handicapped the

security force efforts at dealing with the adversaries but did not directly

affect overall mission accomplishment.

H-2-8

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


Standard: Did security force discipline contribute to or detract
from resolution of the safeguards contingency?

4.9 Response and Denial or Containment

Objective: Security forces can respond in a timely manner in
appropriate numbers to contain or deny access to
intruders and to preclude the adversary's escape and the
removal of SSNM.

Standard: Did response and denial or containment contribute to or
detract from resolution of the safeguards contingency?

4.10 Physical Security Systems and Geography

Objective: Physical security systems and tactical capabilities of
the security force effectively merge. These elements
provide for detection of penetration, accurate
situational assessment, and sufficient adversarial delay
to allow effective security force response. The
security force is provided with vehicles, adequate
routes throughout the site and its facilities,
communications equipment, and weapons that will
facilitate an appropriate response.

Standard: Does the physical plant security equipment contribute to
provide a credible opportunity for the security force to
accomplish its mission?

4.11 Qther Considerations

Objective: None specified. This general category serves to
evaluate factors that do not fit in other categories.

Standard: Did factors other than those described above have a
significant impact on the achievement of the overall
security objective? If so, what were they and what was
their impact?

4.12 Overall Evaluation

Objective: The security system is capable of protecting against
theft or diversion of SSNM.

Standard: Did the exercise demonstrate that overall security
performance was strong and effective, adequate, or in
need of improvement? If improvement is needed, did the
exercise indicate exactly what actions would remedy the
situation?

27


b. Adversary Forces: EGG two-channel radios on channel 1.
Adversary forces will also have access to a hand-held
frequency scanner.

c. Controllers: GG multichannel radios on channel 8.
5.6.3 Uniform and Equipment
a. Security Force: Duty uniform plus MILES

b. Adversary Forces: No restrictions or requirements other than
MILES.

c. Evaluators and Controllers: Traffic vests will be worn by
all. Adversary controllers may conceal traffic vests until
the onset of hostilities.

5.6.4 Exercise Initiation

The exercise will be initiated (window opened) by the Exercise
Coordinator at 0100 hours or when all positioning and safety requirements
have been met. If delays are encountered, the start time will be
adjusted. The opening of the exercise window will be announced over all
radio nets. Controllers will ensure that players in their vicinity are
aware that the exercise window has opened.

5.6.5 Exercise Termination

The exercise will be terminated by the Exercise Coordinator when one or
more of the following occur:

a. All adversaries are neutralized or have given up the mission
and escaped.

b. The escape vehicle has been "captured" at an LLEA roadblock.

c. The escape vehicle clears all outer containment roadblocks.

d. XYZ management determines that an actual condition exists
(i.e., safety, security, or operations) which cannot be

quickly corrected and is of such magnitude as to preclude
continuation of the exercise.


10.

ll.

12.

13.

RULES OF CONDUCT (READ VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)

SAFETY (READ SAFETY PLAN VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)
OFF-LIMITS AREAS (COVER ON-SITE DIAGRAM AND DISCUSS)
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

CONTROLLER ASSIGNMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(FROM EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN)

PAIRING UP WITH ASSIGNED FORCES
QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION

a. Importance of controller function.
b. Controller responsibilities.

c. Safety responsibilities.

G-3-2


APPENDIX J
EXAMPLE PARTICIPANT CRITIQUE SHEET



LASSIFICATION WHEN PLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

Standard:

Overall, did team tactics
contribute to or detract from
the resolution of this
contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-10

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


6.1.3 Adversaries

A "normal" mix of adversary weapons, equipment, and ammunition would
include the following:

Item Quantity
MILES-Modified .357 Revolvers 1 ea*
MILES-Equipped M-16s 1 ea*
MILES-Equipped Sniper Rifles (7.62mm or .30 Caliber) 2
Personnel Detector Harnesses 1 ea*
Radios with Discrete Frequencies 1 ea*
Hand-Held Frequency Scanner lea
5.56mm Blank Ammunition 120 rds ea *
-357 Caliber Blank Ammunition 18 rds ea *
7.62mm or .30 Caliber Blank Ammunition 200 rds

Miscellaneous Backpacks, Bolt Cutters,
Gloves, Simulated Explosives, Etc.

*These are quantities for each individual adversary. For the total
required for an exercise, multiply these numbers by the total number of

adversaries assigned the equipment specified for the exercise, plus a ten
percent reserve of spares.

37


APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE PREPARATION CHECKLIST

DATE

1. PLANNING AND COORDINATION
a. Adequate provision to equip all
appropriate forces, facilities,

and vehicles with MILES?

b. Adequate exercise communications
equipment available?

c. Actual environment adequately
simulated by test environment?

d. Adequate provisions to ensure
safety?

e. Adequate provisions to ensure
facility security during test?

f. Exercise rating system provided
to security forces?

g. Adequate overall planning and
coordination?

2. SCENARIO REALISM AND CREDIBILITY

a. Adversary force representative of
design basis threat?

b. Security force mission appropriate?

c. Success-failure criteria clearly
established?

d. Success-failure criteria mission-
specific?

e. Exercise fair and impartial
(i.e., no predetermined outcome)?

F-1




ABSTRACT

This Handbook provides guidance for the development, conduct, evaluation,
and critique of security force tactical response exercises. Background
information pertinent to the development of the Handbook and the intent
of rulemaking that revises 10 CFR Part 73 to require tactical response
exercises is provided. Step-by-step instructions on exercise
development, conduct, evaluation, and critique are furnished to assist
licensees in meeting regulatory requirements. Needs and resource
requirements estimates are addressed in terms of personnel, staff-hours,
equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Appendices provide examples of all
documents required to plan, conduct, critique, and evaluate the
exercises.

iti


LASSTFICATION WHEN COMPLETE!

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable
Standard:
Overall, did team tactics x

contribute to or detract from
the resolution of this
security contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

There were no realistic covered or concealed routes to the target area.

However, the TRT did reconnoiter the route with ground vehicles. Alternate

routes were known, but not considered viable options because of the increased

distances. Once on foot, the TRT generally used good routes with cover or

concealment. TRT formations and dispersion were generally good. However

upon arriving at the scene, the occupants of one TRT vehicle momentarily

clustered at the rear of their vehicle, where a burst of hostile fire

disabled one of them. Generally speaking, TRT efforts were coordinated,

their tactics were good, and their efforts were effectively directed against

the adversaries.

H-2-10

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


Evaluators should be drawn from security, supervisory, and management
positions. They should have basic tactical background that enables them
to make sound judgments regarding security system and security force
performance, using an evaluation checklist similar to that provided in
Appendix H. Prior to an exercise, evaluators should participate in an
evaluation briefing (of approximately one hour) with the Exercise
Coordinator (see example briefing outline in Appendix G). They should
also participate in briefings on the Exercise Control Plan, Rules of
Conduct, and the Safety Plan, also requiring approximately one hour.
After the exercise, evaluators prepare for, and participate in, two
critiques requiring approximately three hours. The time needed by a
single evaluator is approximately two hours for pre-exercise preparation,
seven hours for the exercise window (this time period may vary according
to the time allotted for the exercise window), and three hours for post-
exercise activities; for a total of a maximum of 12 hours each. «Assuming
an average of six evaluators per exercise, this equals a maximum of 72
hours of evaluator time needed for each NRC-observed exercise.

6.1.1.3 Controllers. Exercise controllers should be provided at the
shadow force holding area, the visitor and observer area, portals at
which explosive entry is simulated, and any other location at which the
Exercise Coordinator may need to exert control and at which no evaluator
is positioned. No special background is required for controllers and
they may be drawn from either security or operational staffs. Exercise-
specific training for controllers parallels that of the evaluators, with
the exception of the evaluator briefing and the second critique session.
(See controller briefing outline, Attachment 3 to Appendix G.)
Therefore, approximately nine hours per controller would be needed for an
exercise of this type. With few exceptions, four controllers (in
addition to the Exercise Coordinator and the six evaluators) would be
sufficient for an NRC-observed exercise. Thus, a total of approximately
36 hours of controller time is normally needed.

6.1.1.4 Security Forces. The number of security force personnel
participating in an exercise will vary greatly depending on the site and
the scenario involved. However, it is unlikely that any exercise would
require active participation of more than one normal shift complement of
security force members plus off-duty call-ins. Off-duty call-ins are
normally simulated during an FOF because these additional personnel would
receive minimal training benefit. If an off-duty call-in is to be
exercised, it can be more economically done separately from the FOF,
using a random sampling technique for recall. Exercise-specific training
is discussed in Section 6.4. Each security force member should be
allotted approximately two hours for weapons and equipment issue and
checks, one hour for a security force briefing including safety and Rules
of Conduct, one hour for positioning, up to seven hours (which may vary
according to the time allotted for the exercise window) for the exercise
window, and one hour for equipment turn-in and critique; for a total of a
maximum of 12 hours, exclusive of training time addressed in Section 6.4.
Thus, for 30 on-duty personnel, a maximum of 360 hours of time could be
needed for an NRC-observed exercise involving outside response.

34


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

12. OQverall Evaluation
Standard:

Did overall security per- X
formance indicate effective-
ness in dealing with a
contingency of this particular
type?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

The security force demonstrated some solid skills and capabilities. However,

significant weaknesses were evident. The most serious were deficiencies

in communications and application of force, with some weaknesses

detected in tactical techniques. Physical facilities do not

provide sufficient delay to quarantee the TRT will have adequate

time to react. Although the security system was able to accomplish its

mission during this exercise, it did so by a very narrow margin.

Evaluator's Name and Signature

H-2-21

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION

ATTACHMENT 1

RESPONSE
FORCE
HOLDING
AREA

ics

XYZ SITE MAP

CLASSIFICATION

C-1-1


2.2 Personnel Safety

2.2.1

2.2.2

2.2.3

2.2.4
2.2.5

2.2.6

2.2.7

No attempt will be made to disarm an adversary by grabbing his
or her weapon.

All ascents to or descents from elevated positions shall be by

ladder, stairway or other safe method, to the extent possible.

There shall be consideration in planning the exercise to assure
that, to the extent possible, there is no jumping from elevated
positions.

Al] XYZ health physics regulations and procedures shall be
followed.

All construction and excavation areas shall be avoided.

Each player must monitor his or her own condition for signs of
overexertion.

All injuries shall be reported immediately to the nearest
controller or evaluator.

Any person observing an injured player or one who obviously is
il] shall immediately cease problem play and render assistance.

2.3 Vehicle Safety

2.3.1

2.3.2

2.3.3

2.3.4

3.

3.1
3.1.1

3.1.2

3.1.3

No vehicle shall be driven in a manner that posted speed limits
are exceeded or safe driving rules are violated.

Only those vehicles involved in the exercise shall be used for
movement.

Vehicles may not be mounted or dismounted until they come to a
full stop.

Players should be careful to avoid the vicinity of the flash-
bang simulators on vehicle systems if the vehicles are MILES-
equipped.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Individual

Inspect and load his/her own ammunition after it has been
approved by a safety officer.

Personally and individually take responsibility for the safe use
of his/her weapon.

Personally and individually take responsibility for monitoring
his/her own physical condition.

E-2 .


NUREG/CR-5081
BMI-2162

Tactical Exercise
Planning Handbook

eee)

Prepared by W.D. Telfair, D.A. Moul,
J.W. Klingelhoefer, W.R. Leonard

Battelle Columbus Division
Prepared for

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission


3. EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS

a. Organization - one standard and its supporting criteria per
page.

b. Criteria Elements
(1) Each has sub-elements (questions).
(2) Sub-elements are indicators, things to look for.

c. Ratings
(1) A place is allotted to rate each sub-element.

(2) Overall (last line) is the rating for entire standard (as
evidenced by the criteria on the checklist).

d. Comment/Justification - at end of each section.
4. STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND RATINGS

a. General

(1) Criteria are essentially the same as used for several
years in DOE performance evaluations.

(2) Now more formalized and modified for NRC licensees.
(3) Removes some subjectivity, but not all.

b. Objectives of System - The purpose or objective of a system or
system element. What it is supposed to do (what, not how).

c. Criteria
(1) The elements of performance in a particular area.

(2) Things to look for to help decide if, and how well the
standard has been achieved.

(3) Criteria stated as questions on checklist.
d. Rating Statements
(1) Discuss what level of performance or quality of
performance is required to achieve the various ratings
(strong, adequate, etc.).
(2) Communications, planning (read and explain as examples).

(3) Overall FOF (read and explain - different from others).
G-4-2


LASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-15

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

10.8 Are alternate routes-to-target X

areas available?
10.9 Are any inadequate systems or X

equipment compensated for by

the strength of other systems?
Standard:

Does overall physical plant xX

and security equipment provide
a credible opportunity for the
security force to accomplish
its mission?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

Alarm assessment systems are not sufficiently engineered to assist security

force response. Consequently, responding personnel may not initially have

the benefit of remote assessment. The delay provided by physical barriers

is not sufficient to assure build up of forces for adequate containment. As
demonstrated by this exercise, when adversaries begin their escape while

containment is still "thin," they can easily escape. This is critical, as

the distance the TRT may have to travel requires initial inner containment to

delay the adversary until the TRI can arrive. If inner containment is broken

prior to the arrival of the TRT, the mission of the TRT changes from

containment to search and pursuit. This causes a problem of much greater

magnitude with a seriously diminished chance of success. The size of the

site and associated response times exceed the delay provided by physical

facilities. The lack of delay was evident during this exercise and must be

considered a factor in a real emergency situation.

H-2-19

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED




5. COMPLETING EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS

a. Ratings - assigned as explained.

b. Not Applicable - use if appropriate - do not guess.

c. Criteria - evaluate each criterion possible, but remember
rating of the overall standard is only real rating for each
category.

d. Overall Category Rating - not a mathematical average of the
criteria.

e. Comment/Justification
(1) Must fully explain every rating in space provided.

(2) Note good and bad, and explain to what degree the
standard was met.

(3) Each rating must be explained/justified or it will be
disregarded in after action report.

(4) Narrative comments are also important to the after action
report writing process.

f. Influence of Exercise Outcome

(1) Rate separate standards independently as much as
possible.

(2) Don't let success or failure of security system in the
test unduly influence separate standard area ratings.

g. Conformity - any rating not in line with established standard
and rating statements, or not substantiated, will be
discarded.

h. Example Evaluator Checklist

(1) Has examples of each possible rating.

(2) Narrative gives approximation of the kind of information
and level of detail needed.

6-4-3


© The Exercise Coordinator should be designated as the exercise
safety officer and be assigned direct responsibility for
development of a Safety Plan and the safe conduct of exercises.
Controllers and evaluators are assistant safety officers who,
along with the Exercise Coordinator, have authority to hold or
terminate an exercise in the interest of safety. All active
exercise participants and other on-duty security personnel
should be thoroughly briefed on their individual safety
responsibilities.

During FOF exercises in which MILES equipment is used,
absolutely no live weapons or ammunition should be permitted
within the exercise area except when the weapons are secured so
‘as to be inaccessible to participants. Blank adapters for
rifles and live round excluder barrels for shotguns should be
installed on any weapons which are MILES-equipped. Multiple
safety checks of all MILES weapons are essential prior to
commencement of an exercise.

A shadow force is normally employed as a compensatory measure
during FOF exercises to provide response capability for an
actual contingency. Shadow forces will generally not be
necessary for non-FOF exercises. This force should be under
direct supervision of controllers at all times. Release of the
shadow force to respond to alarm conditions or emergencies
should be coordinated between the security force shift
supervisor and the Exercise Coordinator. The exercise must be
interrupted or terminated whenever the shadow force is released
to respond to an alarm. The controllers for the shadow force
should be licensee security personnel whose authority is
recognized and accepted. In some cases, fixed security posts,
such as guard towers, are manned by security officers who are
both exercise participants and shadow force personnel. In such
situations, a controller must be assigned to each post at which
live weapons and ammunition are present.

When an FOF exercise involves only part of a facility, a buffer
zone should be created to separate exercise areas from other
portions of the site in which on-duty security forces are
assigned. Exercise areas should be clearly demarcated by tape,
cordons, or other means so that exercise participants and on-
duty security force personnel are not inadvertently commingled.
Exercise participants should respond to alarms within the
exercise area only, and the on-duty armed security force should
respond to all alarms outside the exercise area.

For non-FOF exercises, during which live weapons and ammunition
are carried, special instruction on weapons safety should be
given to all on-duty security force personnel. The following
safety precautions should be observed: (1) handguns should
never be unholstered, (2) magazines should not he inserted into
rifles, (3) a round should not be chambered in a shotgun, and
(4) no weapon should ever be pointed at anyone. After the

22


APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE BRIEFING LESSON PLANS





The Handbook is designed to assist licensees in developing and conducting
exercises required by the revised rule, establishing evaluation criteria
for assessing performance of security systems during the exercises, and
identifying tactical training needs for security program enhancements.

1.3 Limitations

The Handbook is intended to be a comprehensive guide. However, its use
should not restrict licensees in developing exercises, particularly with
respect to site-specific concerns and safety. .

Site-specific scenarios and their supporting control plans and evaluation
criteria are dependent on accurate and current information on physical
security configurations (e.g., alarms, barriers), guard procedures, and
weaponry. The general guidance provided must be used in conjunction with
these and other site-specific concerns to develop effective exercises.

1.4 Methodology

To reasonably assure NRC/DOE comparability, while tailoring guidance to
specific licensee needs, this Handbook was developed in distinct stages.
First, DOE exercise preparation and conduct methodologies were reviewed
to obtain a general understanding of how exercises have evolved in that
environment. Second, visits were made to three NRC Category I fuel
facilities to understand the environment in which the NRC-mandated
exercises are to be conducted. Finally, the data were assimilated into a
format suitable for use by licensees.

To capitalize on DOE experience, personnel] who were involved in the
original development of the DOE exercise program, and who have remained
active in it were selected for this project.

The first exercise scenarios and control plans written for DOE were
derived from U.S. Army Operational Readiness Training Tests (ORTTs) and
Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) which incorporated the use
of Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES). Over the years,
these models have been modified and refined for use by civilian security
forces protecting nuclear security interests. Just as the military model
was modified for use by DOE, so it has been modified for NRC use. To
ensure that the models used were appropriate to NRC licensee needs, site
visits followed the sequence indicated below:

© An introductory session was held to define the purposes of the
project and answer licensee questions.

© Briefings and tours were conducted to obtain an understanding of
facility and security operations.

© Document reviews and interviews were conducted.

© Data were validated through discussions with facility personnel.




(Classification When Completed)

4. OTHER COMMENTS

(Participant's Name) (Signature)

J-3

(Classification When Completed)


4.

10.

ll.

SIMULATION

a. Pre-positioning.
b. Vault delay times.

c. Miscellaneous.

RULES OF CONDUCT (READ VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)

SAFETY (READ SAFETY PLAN VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)
OFF-LIMITS AREAS (COVER ON-SITE DIAGRAM AND DISCUSS)
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

CONTROLLER ASSIGNMENTS

QUESTIONS/DISCUSSION

CONCLUSION

a. Play role realistically.
b. Play safely.
c. Play by rules.

G-1-2


(Classification When Completed)
2. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND RESOLUTIONS (As applicable to the role

you were playing. Examples: radio failure, weapons malfunction,
coordination problems, etc.)

3. SELF EVALUATION (How well do you think you and your organization
functioned during this exercise? What went wrong? What went
right? Please indicate an overall rating and explain.)

NEEDS IMPROVEMENT ADEQUATE STRONG

J-2

(Classification When Completed)


APPENDIX D
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE RULES OF CONDUCT



5. EXERCISE CONDUCT AND CRITIQUE GUIDANCE
5.1 Conduct

The majority of the work that goes into a successful exercise is
accomplished before the exercise is initiated. After all plans and
arrangements have been made and all documents have been prepared, the
Exercise Coordinator must accomplish the appropriate actions indicated in
the following sections. The guidance that follows applies to all
tactical response exercises required by the rule. Since the NRC-observed
and FOF exercises are more complex, they require more formal control and
critique; and the guidance that follows should be used to the maximum
extent. LSPEs are not as complicated, therefore, the exercise conduct
and critique guidance for these exercises may be scaled down, as long as
exercise control, safety, site security, and effective evaluation are not
adversely affected.

5.1.1 Adversary Briefing

Prior to the exercise, adversary participants should receive an exercise
briefing. This briefing will normally be presented by the Exercise
Coordinator. It should consist of appropriate sections from the Exercise
Control Plan, the Rules of Conduct, and the Exercise Safety Plan. The
only portions of the Exercise Control Plan that should not be briefed to
the adversaries are those that apply to specific security force plans and
procedures to which an adversary would not normally have access. A
sample Exercise Control Plan, Rules of Conduct, and Safety Plan are
provided in Appendices C through E. A sample adversary briefing lesson
plan is found in Attachment 1 to Appendix G.

5.1.2 Security Force Briefing

Prior to the exercise, security force participants should receive an
exercise briefing. An example is found in Attachment 2 to Appendix G.
This briefing will normally be presented by the Exercise Coordinator. It
should consist of all appropriate sections of the Exercise Control Plan,
the Rules of Conduct, and the Safety Plan. The only portions of the
Exercise Control Plan that should not be briefed to security force
participants are those that apply to specific adversary plans and
activities. Depending on facility requirements, it may be desirable to
have the facility safety manager present the briefing for the Safety
Plan.

5.1.3 Controller Briefing

Prior to the exercise, all controllers must be briefed on exercise
control, rules of conduct, safety, and on their general and specific
duties (see Attachment 3 to Appendix G). The contents of the Exercise
Control Plan, Rules of Conduct, and Safety Plan should be discussed in
this briefing.

28


6.2.2 Equipment Requirements

Exercise Control

Item and Security Forces Adversaries Total
MILES-Modified .357 Revolvers 22 lea *
Blank Modified .556 Magazines 60 4 ea *
AR-15 Transmitters 15 -- *
AR-15 Blank Adapters 15 -- *
Shotgun Barrels with Transmitters 7 -- 7
MILES-Equipped M-16s** -- lea *
MILES-Equipped Sniper Rifles -- 2 2
MILES-Modified 7.62mm or .30

Caliber Rifle 1 -- 1
Controller Radios 12 -- 12
Adversary Radios -- lea *
Frequency Scanner -- 1 1
Personnel Detector Harness 22 lea *
MILES Controller Guns 4 -- 4
5.56mm Blank Ammunition 1,560 rds 120 rds ea *
-357 Caliber Blank Ammunition 360 rds 18 rds ea *
12 Gauge Shotgun Blank

Ammunition 100 rds -- 100 rds
7.62mm or .30 Caliber Blank

Ammunition 100 rds 200 rds 300 rds
Grenade Simulators 6 -- 6
Miscellaneous Equipment - As Required --

6.3 Limited Scope Performance (Non-Force-on-Force) Exercises

LSPEs, sometimes referred to as card exercises, require almost no assets
beyond coordination, control, and evaluation. An Exercise Coordinator is
required to develop the scenario, write the Exercise Control Plan, and
conduct the exercise and critique. Evaluators and controllers are
required, but to a lesser extent than in an FOF. Security forces that
may be involved are those which are already on duty. No adversary force
is required. Those actions accomplished in a FOF by adversaries are
simulated during an LSPE by controllers. No special equipment, other
than identification vests and controller/evaluator radios, are required.
For LSPEs, existing site radio equipment and nets will normally suffice
for exercise control. A suggested allocation per LSPE is as follows.

*To determine total numbers required, multiply the number in the
Adversaries column by the number of adversaries assigned the equipment
specified. Add the total adversary quantity to the quantities under the
Exercise Control and Security Forces column to determine the total.

**adversary force M-16s should be supplied with MILES transmitters and
blank adapters. If they are not, the appropriate number of additional
AR-15 MILES transmitters and blank adapters (identical to M-16 MILES
transmitters and blank adapters) will be required.

40


ATTACHMENT 1
TO
APPENDIX H

EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST (BLANK)

Evaluation

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

1. Coordination, Command and
Control

1.1 Was coordination and command
authority within the sec-
curity force clear and effective?

1.2 Was coordination between
security and LLEA clear and
effective?

1.3. Were plans and procedures
made for authority in depth?

1.4 Did all personnel know and
understand the lines of
authority?

1.5 Were supervisors able to con-
trol security forces?

1.6 Were exchanges of authority
and/or transfer of respon-
sibilities appropriate, timely
and effective?

H-1-1

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A. Regulatory Guides and Staff Studies

Regulatory Guide 5.61, "Intent and Scope of the Physical Protection
Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, June 1980.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Review of Safeguards Regulations
and Guidance: Category I Nuclear Fuel Facilities-Physical
Security," Safeguards Interoffice Review Group, June 1986.

B. NUREG Reports

D.G. Baehr, et al., "Tactical Improvement Package," NUREG/CR-2400,
Sandia National Laboratories, August 1982.

J.B. Stewart, et al., "Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary
Report," NUREG-0459, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1979.

C. Other Contractor Reports

G. Bass, B. Jenkins, et al., The Rand Corporation, "Motivations and
Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear
Programs," R-2254-SL, Sandia National Laboratories, February 1980.

B. Hoffman, P. deLeon, et al., The Rand Corporation, "A Reassessment
of Potential Adversaries to U.S. Nuclear Programs," R-3363-D0E,
prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, March 1986.

B. Jenkins, et al., The Rand Corporation, "Attributes of Potential
Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs," R-2225-SL, Sandia
National Laboratories, February 1978.

W.D. Telfair, et al., Criterion Referenced Consultants, Inc.,

"Advanced Tactical Training for the Security Force Supervisor," TTM
1-II, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 1985.

A-1




6.3.1 Personnel Requirements

Approximate
Title Persons Total Hours
Exercise Coordinator 1 24
Exercise Evaluators 4 16
Exercise Controller 3 12

6.3.2 Equipment Requirements

None

6.4 Training Needs

No exercise-specific training is required for the exercises. However, it
is recommended that all armed security force personnel undergo a minimum
of eight hours of MILES familiarization and basic MILES-enhanced
individual and team tactical training prior to participating in a FOF
exercise. Since exercises are required on all shifts, training
requirements will be based on the number of assigned personnel. If all
personnel on each shift receive this training, at least eight hours per
person should be allocated until all personnel are trained. Annual
training is not required. Tactical training to meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 73 can be accomplished during the course of the exercises.

41




f. Time-and-event lines realistic and
supportable?

g- All aspects of test discussed
among evaluators, adversary
representatives, and security
personnel to fullest extent
practical?

EXERCISE CONTROL AND EVALUATION

a. Adequate control plan?

b. Adequate control personnel
and deployment?

c. Adequate evaluation personnel
and deployment?

d. Adequate pre-exercise briefings?

e. Adequate control during exercise?

f. Adequate overall exercise control
and evaluation?

EXERCISE ADMINISTRATION

a. Adequate written scenarios?

b. Adequate written exercise
control plan?

c. Adequate written rules of conduct?
d. Adequate written safety plan?
e. Adequate evaluator checklist?

f. Adequate post-exercise data
analysis?

g. Adequate post-exercise documentation?

h. Adequate critiques?

F-2


No actual staff-hours are required for simulated call-ins. If the call-
in is actual, two to four hours per security force member should be
allocated.

6.1.1.5 LLEA. Normally, LLEA participation is voluntary and should be
limited to attendance at the security force briefing, the establishing of
roadblocks, conduct of pursuit or other appropriate missions during the
exercise window, and the critique. In such instances, no particular
training is needed other than the attendance at the pre-exercise
briefing. During the majority of the exercise window, LLEA personnel can
go about their normal duties. If, on the other hand, am appropriate LLEA
mission exists in support of the site Physical Security or Safeguards
Contingency Plans, in which LLEA may be involved in a firefight, and if
LLEA is to actively participate, all training provided to security force
members should also be provided to LLEA participants (including the eight
hour MILES familiarization, if MILES equipment is used, and tactical
training discussed in Section 6.4).

6.1.1.6 Adversary Participants. The number of adversaries should be
determined in accordance with the exercise scenario and should not exceed
the design basis threat. They should be drawn from site security forces,
preferably those with TRT training.

Generally, two full days of training should be allocated to the adversary
force prior to the exercise to provide for scenario-specific planning,
rehearsals, and training. Thereafter, they would be involved in the same
12 hours of exercise preparation, conduct, and post-exercise activities
as security force participants. Therefore, each adversary can be
expected to need 28 hours for preparation and participation for an
exercise of this type.

6.1.1.7 Shadow Forces. In general, a maximum of one shift is needed to
cover actual security requirements for any given FOF exercise. These
personnel form the shadow force that is positioned in one or more holding
areas that are off-limits to problem play. The shadow force is normally
drawn from an off-duty shift. No special training is required.
Approximately eight hours for each member of the shadow force will be
needed.

6.1.2 Equipment for Security Forces and Exercise Control*

6.1.2.1 Weapons. The revolver is a MILES-dedicated weapon. Existing
security force revolvers cannot be modified by the addition of an
external laser transmitter, as is the case with AR-15s, shotguns, and
7.62mm rifles. Generally speaking, one MILES revolver is required for
each participant, plus a 10 percent reserve. Additional revolvers may be
required if LLEA is to participate actively in a MILES-enhanced exercise.

*The use of laser enhanced weapons such as MILES equipment or other
suitable weapons simulation equipment is recommended, but not required.
See Sections 2.3.3.b and 3.1.

35


LASSIFICA WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

7. Intelligence

7.1 Was immediately available
intelligence exploited?

7.2 Was intelligence immediately
disseminated to the security
force and to the CAS/SAS and
supervisors?

7.3. Was all available and appro-
priate intelligence passed to
LLEA?

7.4 Did the security force recog-
nize important intelligence and
take advantage of it?

(e.g., adversary description,
weapons, escape routes, etc.)

Standard:

Did intelligence gathering

and dissemination contribute
to or detract from the overall
resolution of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-13

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


APPENDIX H
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS

Attachments 1 and 2 to this appendix provide a blank checklist and a
completed checklist, respectively. These checklists should be referred
to by evaluators in completing the exercise evaluation.

H-1


LASSIFICATION WHEN PLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

Standard:

Did communications
contribute to or detract
from the overall resolution
of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-6

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

6. Application of Force

6.1 Was the minimum necessary
level of force used to pre-
vent facility penetration?

6.2 Was the minimum necessary
level of force used to pre-
vent adversary escape?

6.3 Was the use of excessive
force avoided?

6.4 Was the applied force effec-
tive in minimizing danger to
security force and non-hostile
personnel?

6.5 Did all personnel maintain
fire control and fire disci-
pline, using appropriate
tactics, target acquisition
and selective fire?

6.6 Did conditions justifying the
use of deadly force reasonably
appear to exist before deadly
force was applied?

Standard:

Overall, did the application of
force contribute to or detract
from the resolution of this
contingency and was it applied
in accordance with applicable
aw?

H-1-11

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

6. Application of Force

6.1 Was the minimum necessary x
level of force used to pre-
vent facility penetration?

6.2 Was the minimum necessary x
jevel of force used to pre-
vent adversary escape?

6.3. Was the use of excessive xX
force avoided?

6.4 Was the applied force effec- x
tive in minimizing danger to
security force and non-hostile
personnel?

6.5 Did all personnel maintain X
fire control and fire disci-
pline, using appropriate
tactics, target acquisition
and selective fire?

6.6 Did conditions justifying the X
use of deadly force reasonably
appear to exist before deadly
force was applied?

Standard:

Overall, did the application of x
force contribute to or detract
from the resolution of this
contingency and was it applied
in accordance with applicable
aw?

H-2-11

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

Confidence, morale and enthusiasm were high. Supervisors obviously had the

respect _and confidence of their people. I saw no evidence of anything but

immediate response to orders. There was no hesitation or grumbling about
"playing games," _and_all seemed eager to demonstrate their capabilities.

All_personnel complied with exercise rules. At the post-exercise

critique, personnel maintained a professional manner and seemed concerned

with learning from their mistakes rather than trying to fix blame for

problems which were experienced. The self-evaluation which surfaced during

the critique could have only occurred in a confident, disciplined

s 2%
organization.

H-2-15

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


NUREG/CR-5v81
BMI-2162

Tactical Exercise
Planning Handbook

Manuscript Completed: November 1988
Date Published: April 1989

Prepared by
W.D. Telfair, D.A. Moul,
J.W. Klingelhoefer, W.R. Leonard

Battelle Columbus Division
505 King Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201-2693

Prepared for

Division of Safeguards and Transportation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

NRC FIN D2055

This report imposes no requirements



CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

3. Communications

3.1 Were communications between X
CAS/SAS and security forces
effective?

3.2 Were communications between Xx

supervisors and the security
force effective?

3.3 Were communications between x
security force members
effective?
3.4 Were communications between xX

CAS/SAS and LLEA effective?

3.5 Were radio communications x
relied on too heavily?

3.6 Were alternate means of com- Xx
munications used appropriately?

3.7. Was communications security xX
discipline maintained?

3.8 Was radio circuit discipline X
maintained?
3.9 Were codes and authentication X

systems used where appropriate?

3.10 Were all communications under- X
standable and efficient?

H-2-5

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED




5.4.6 Vault Controller: Mr. Evanson
Location: 905 vault door

Equipment: Traffic vest, controller radio, and simulated
target material.

Responsibilities: Hold adversary force for four minutes after
they have arrived at vault door to simulate explosive entry.
After delay, provide adversary force with simulated target
material. Notify CAS evaluator of adversary progress for message
distribution.

5.4.7 Visitor-Controller: Mr. Fullbright
Location: Building 901 roof

Equipment: Traffic vest, controller radio, and security force
radio.

Responsibilities: Visitor and observer control.
5.4.8 Shadow Force Controller: LT Schmidt
Location: Building 915 with shadow force commander

Equipment: Traffic vest, controller radio, and tactical
response force radio.

Responsibilities: Maintain all armed shadow force members inside
Building 915. Release shadow force to control of CAS and Site
Security Supervisor on order from the Exercise Coordinator.

5.5 Visitors and Observers

All visitors and observers must attend the controller briefing.
Thereafter, they will proceed directly to Building 905 escorted by Mr.
Fullbright. All visitors and observers will be restricted to the roof of
Building 905 for the duration of the exercise.

5.6 Coordinating Instructions
5.6.1 Evaluation

Use evaluator checklists provided and Section 2 of this plan, insofar as
security system objectives are concerned. Evaluators will participate in
an exercise critique to be held immediately following exercise
termination and an exercise report preparation meeting the following day
at 1000 hours in the security force training room.

5.6.2 Communications
a. Security Force: Tactical radios on channel 2 (DVP secure

voice)

C-6




NRC FORM 335 ‘US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | 1. REPORT NUMBER (Ansigned by TIDG, add Vol, No,, it any)

(2-84)
ba0in 3202 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG/CR-5081
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE. BMI-2162

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE “3. LEAVE BLANK

Tactical Exercise Planning Handbook

“4, DATE REPORT COMPLETED

MONTH YEAR
“Wl. D. Telfair, Dale A. Moul, John W. Klingelhoefer, November ___1988
dames J. Davis, William R. Leonard WONTH | YEAR
April 1989
7, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (include Zip Code) 8, PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNIT NUMBER
Battelle Columbus Division . NMS-87-009
505 King Avenue 3-Fin OR GRANT NUMBER
Columbus, Ohio 43201-2693 02055-7
70. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (include Zip Code) Tia, TYPE OF REPORT
Division of Safeguards and Transportation . :
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Final, Technical
U. & Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8. PERIOD COVERED Mfnctusive dates)

Washington, D. C. 20555 September 1987-November 1988

12, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

13, ABSTRACT (200 words or less}

This Handbook provides guidance for the development, conduct, evaluation, and
critique of security force tactical response exercises at Category I fuel fa-
cilities licensed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Background in-
formation pertinent to the development of the Handbook and the intent of rule-
making that revises 10 CFR Part 73 to require tactical response exercises is
provided. Step-by-step instructions on exercise development, conduct, evalua-
tion, and critique are furnished to assist licensees in meeting regulatory re-
quirements. Needs and resource requirements estimates are addressed in terms
of personnel, staff-hours, equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Appendices pro-
vide examples of all documents required to plan, conduct, critique, and evaluate
the exercises.

14, DOCUMENT ANALYSIS — a, KEYWORDS/DESCRIPTORS TS, AVAILABILITY,

STATEMENT

Category I Fuel Facilities Security System Performance Testing
Security Forces Unlimited
Tactical Response Exercises aan er
Tactical Response Teams —
b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN-ENDEO TERMS Uncl assified
Trae report

Unclassified

17, NUMBER OF PAGES

ie. PRICE



ATTACHMENT 3
TO
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE CONTROLLER BRIEFING LESSON PLAN



This section details the elements of a typical Exercise Control Plan,
including the scenario. It parallels and expands on the example Exercise
Control Plan provided in Appendix C. An Exercise Coordinator designing
an initial exercise may find the examples overly complex. However, it is
usually best to start with fully developed exercise control plans and
scale them back after on-site experience has been gained. Exercise
control plans and scenarios may then be abbreviated, provided that no
essential elements are omitted, particularly for LSPEs.

3.2.1 Exercise Purpose

This is the introductory section of an Exercise Control Plan. It should
cover the essential questions (who, what, when, where, and why) of the
exercise. Essential objectives of the exercise must be clear if the
exercise is to attain its intended purposes.

3.2.2 Exercise Concept

This section describes the type of exercise and how, in general, it is to
be conducted and controlled. It should clearly detail the simulation
concepts, actual security requirements (such as the makeup and location
of all members of the security shadow force), control measures, and other
essential descriptive information concerning the exercise.

3.2.3 Scenario

This section is divided into two major subsections: adversary
description and adversary actions.

3.2.3.1 Adversary Description. This subsection describes the adversary
in terms of numbers, attributes, motivations, weapons, equipment,
intelligence sources, and similar factors. Detailed descriptions are
essential to ensure that actions are planned to realistically portray the
adversarial group involved.

3.2.3.2 Adversary Actions. This subsection of the Exercise Control Plan
is the heart of the scenario. It should include a complete description
of all planned adversary actions including:

© Approach to the site

* Entry path and method

* Target

Dealing with alarms, barriers, towers, and patrols
Use of adversary security teams

Use of diversionary actions

Alternate plans

18


© Non-security-related barriers

Security-related barriers

Entrance and egress controls

Interior and exterior intrusion detection systems
Central and Secondary Alarm Stations

Assessment systems [e.g., closed circuit television (CCTV) and
guard towers!

* Security force deployment.

A comprehensive list of site targets should be arranged by priority of
the attractiveness of each target to potential adversaries. It should be
derived from the results of the specific target analysis and a total
security system review. Licensee Physical Security and Safeguards
Contingency Plans should be consulted for data useful in conducting the
vulnerability assessment. The selection of a particular target by an
adversary should be based on both the target desirability and the
difficulties that must be overcome in achieving theft.

3.1.2 Response and Denial/Containment Planning

Exercises are designed to test specific aspects of licensee Physical
Security and Safeguards Contingency Plans aimed at defeating adversary
attempts against identified targets. It is recommended that response
plans exist as specific plans or as part of licensee implementing
procedures to address all targets identified in the vulnerability
analysis phase. These plans or procedures can then be used to develop
scenarios and exercise control plans to test the effectiveness of
response planning. If detailed response plans or procedures do not
exist, it is suggested that they be developed before conducting site-
specific exercises. This section deals with methods for developing
response plans.

Response and containment/denial plans should be written for security
force response to plausible adversary actions. A separate plan or
procedure should be developed for each target identified during the
vulnerability analysis. €ach target should be analyzed to determine
potential denial of access to or containment of an adversary, in the
event that denial fails. Questions to be considered include:

© What essential positions adjacent to the target must be occupied
so an adversary can be denied physical access, or so an
adversary can be contained and all routes of entry or egress
covered by effective observation and weapons fire?

What essential positions, away from the target, must be occupied
to provide a second echelon of denial or containment?

14


ATTACHMENT 4
T0
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE EVALUATOR BRIEFING LESSON PLAN




(Classification When Completed)
APPENDIX I

EXAMPLE CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR COMMENT SHEET

(In addition to completing evaluation sheets, Controllers and Evaluators
should feel free to make any comments or observations that might clarify
issues or have a bearing on exercise outcome.)

DATE

NAME

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR POSITION

COMMENTS

(signature)

I-1

(Classification When Completed)


(Classification When Completed)
APPENDIX J

EXAMPLE PARTICIPANT CRITIQUE SHEET

DATE:

POSITION:
SPECIFIC DUTIES (if applicable):

1. IMPRESSIONS OF EXERCISE (Realism, Problems with Exercise
Constraints, Appropriateness of Evaluation)

J-1

(Classification When Completed)


4.5 Team Tactics

Objective:

Standard:

Capability is provided to move and deliver fire in a
coordinated team effort that provides for mutual
support; minimizes exposure to adversary observation,
detection, or fire; and brings the maximum available
force to bear on the adversary at the optimum time and
place for mission accomplishment.

Did team tactics contribute to or detract from
resolution of the safeguards contingency?

4.6 Application of Force

Objective:

Standard:

4.7 Intelligence
Objective:

Standard:

Minimum force required is applied in a timely manner
sufficient to deny adversaries access to vital areas,
vaults, and MAAs; to prevent their escape with target
material; or to neutralize an unacceptable penetration.
Danger to security forces, non-hostile personnel, and
adversaries is minimized consistent with requirements
for containment, denial of access, prevention of escape,
and threat neutralization. The unlawful taking of human
life is prevented in all cases. Unnecessary escalation
resulting from excessive force is avoided.

Did the application of force contribute to or detract
from response to the safeguards contingency and was it
applied in accordance with applicable law?

Maximum use is made of all appropriate resources to
gather needed information concerning the adversary and
the environment, and to communicate pertinent
information to the appropriate command element.

Did intelligence gathering and dissemination contribute
to or detract from resolution of the safeguards
contingency?

4.8 Security Force Discipline

Objective:

Security force personnel are mentally prepared and
conditioned for professional conduct and timely
obedience to orders under both routine and crisis
situations. While a level of discipline is necessary to
ensure proper professional conduct under routine
conditions, individual and organizational discipline is
strong enough to allow the individuals and the
organization to continue functioning properly under
extreme stress and crisis conditions.

26




ATTACHMENT 1
TO
APPENDIX H

EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST (BLANK)



LASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

11. Qther Considerations

Standard:

Did factors other than the
previously listed consider-
ations have a significant
impact on the achievement of
the overall security objec-
tive of this exercise? If
so, explain and estimate
impact.

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-20

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


10.

ll.

12.

13.

Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) - Duly constituted law
enforcement agency which has the responsibility to respond to
safeguards contingencies which involve criminal actions. LLEA may
include local and state police, and sheriff's departments which have
jurisdiction in the location of a licensee site.

Rules of Conduct - The rules which govern and limit the actions of
participants in the exercise to minimize interference with facility
operations and allow for meaningful exercise evaluation.

Safety Plan - The document which prescribes measures to be taken to
assure safe conduct of tactical response exercises. The plan
addresses weapons safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and
responsibilities for safety.

Scenario - A general description of targets and adversary actions
which are critical to conduct of the exercise. The scenario
provides a "script" for the exercise. Details are omitted from the
version of the scenario included in the Exercise Control Plan to
avoid compromise of critical information which should not be
revealed to participating security force personnel.

Security Force Tactical Response Exercises - Any of several types of
NRC-required training and evaluation exercises designed to assess

the armed response capabilities of site security forces. These
include FOF exercises, which may employ MILES or other comparable
equipment and adversary forces, and LSPEs which do not use MILES or
other comparable equipment and which simulate adversary actions.
This term is used interchangeably with “tactical response exercises”
and "exercises" throughout the Handbook.

Shadow Force - A group of security force personnel, equipped with
live weapons and ammunition, present during a tactical response
exercise to provide armed response in the event of an actual
safeguards contingency.

Tactical Response Team - The primary response force for each
security shift, who can be identified by a distinctive difference in
uniform, who are armed with specified individual response weapons,
and whose other duties permit immediate response.

B-2






controllers, evaluators, and observers. A separate subsection may be used
to deal with instructions for visitors and observers.

3.2.5.5 Coordinating Instructions. This subsection provides general
instructions common to all exercise participants, controllers, and
evaluators. It should include discussion of holding areas,
communications, evaluation procedures, exercise initiation and
termination, uniforms and equipment, sequence of events, and any other
special instructions. Key concerns are as follow:

* Evaluation - Coordinating instructions for evaluation and
critique should be indicated.

Holding Areas - If holding areas are used for response
personnel, shadow forces, or LLEA, they should be discussed.
Holding areas should be centrally located and in an area that
does not interfere with exercise play. Holding areas for shadow
forces must be out of the exercise play area, but located so
that actual response is facilitated, if required.

Uniform and Equipment - Clothing and equipment required by
security forces, adversaries, controllers, evaluators, and
observers should be specified. Items generally provided include
special identifiers such as headgear, vests or arm bands, and
exercise radios and controller guns, if MILES equipment is used.

Communications - Radio frequencies and/or channels for use by
all participants should be specified.

Exercise Initiation - This subsection indicates when, under what
circumstances, and by whom the exercise will be initiated.

Exercise Termination - When, under what circumstances, and by
whom the exercise will be terminated should be discussed.
Provisions for emergency termination should be clearly stated.

Sequence of Events - This subsection should describe the
chronological listing of all events that are programmed,
including exercise initiation, planned activities, preprogrammed
message input, termination, and critique.

Messages - This subsection includes a discussion of all
preplanned messages that are to be used to simulate actual
alarms, sightings, or other exercise events. All such messages
shall be preceded by the phrase "THIS IS A DRILL."

3.2.6 Safety

This section of the Exercise Control Plan addresses general safety
concerns. It refers to the Safety Plan that is part of the overall
exercise package, as well as general facility safety procedures. It
should make specific reference to any fire and medical support required
for the exercise. The Safety Plan developed for the exercise contains

20




TACTICAL EXERCISE PLANNING HANDBOOK
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Revised portions of 10 CFR Part 73 require, among other things, that

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) non-reactor licensees possessing
formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) conduct
security force tactical response exercises to assure the adequacy of
security force capabilities. This Handbook, which incorporates guidance
from a similar U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program, was developed to
provide assistance to licensees in developing, conducting, and evaluating
the exercises and to provide comprehensive guidance in the general
factors that should be taken into account when developing security system
performance exercises for security force tactical response teams.

To assure that the guidance for conducting tactical response exercises
had direct applicability to NRC licensee fuel facilities, visits were
made to three licensee sites: Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, United
Nuclear Corporation, Montville, and Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg. Based
on site-specific information obtained during these visits, the DOE
exercise methodology was modified to suit NRC requirements and licensee
needs.

Section 2 covers the scope and intent of the regulatory requirements for
security force tactical response exercises and discusses the revised
regulations that are pertinent to the guidance provided in the Handbook.
Clarification of regulatory intent in the form of answers to specific
questions is also found in Section 2.

This Handbook provides a step-by-step approach to developing site-
specific scenarios, exercise control plans, and evaluation guidance for
the NRC-mandated exercises. An annotated exercise control plan and
evaluation guidance section is provided in the text along with resource
requirements listings for the various types of exercises. The appendices
provide examples of all required exercise documents including an exercise
scenario and control plan, rules of conduct, a safety plan, an exercise
preparation checklist, exercise briefing lesson plans, an evaluator
checklist, a controller comment sheet, and a participant critique sheet.


10.

ll.

12.

APPENDIX D
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE RULES OF CONDUCT

The adversaries must actually escape with simulated target material

in order to succeed. Effective escape is defined as getting outside
of police road blocks without being subjected to direct fire or hot

pursuit.

Both sides may use vehicles. If the vehicles are not MILES-
equipped, hits will be scored by evaluators or controllers.

Players will follow all instructions given by controllers.
All players should avoid unnecessarily damaging property.

If it is necessary to halt problem play, an announcement will be
made over all radio nets and a signal may be given by means of the
continuous sounding of a vehicle horn.

If problem play is temporarily halted, all players will stop in
their locations and cease fire, movement, communication, and other
action.

No player may have access to an opponent's radio prior to the
initiation of the exercise.

Once disabled, a player must immediately cease fire, movement,
communication, and other action. The player should turn off
his/her weapon, silence his/her harness, and remain in place until
the test is terminated.

If a vehicle is destroyed, all occupants are considered out of
action. They cannot dismount the vehicle, continue firing, or make
radio calls.

No physical contact between opponents is permitted. No two
opponents are permitted to approach within five feet of each other
except that if one has been "killed," the other may approach to
take the fallen opponent's radio, weapon, ammunition, vehicle keys,
etc.

CAS and SAS personnel may not engage in exercise-related
intelligence-gathering efforts prior to the exercise window.

Persons deliberately attempting to circumvent these rules or gain
an unfair advantage by any unrealistic tactic (such as coverin
laser sensors, hiding behind cardboard, and removing headbands
will be taken out of action by a Controller. Persons ignoring
safety rules likewise will be taken out of play.

D-1


3.2 Team Leaders

3.2.1 Personally inspect all weapons, magazines, and ammunition
assigned to members of their team for compliance with Section 2
of this plan.

3.2.2 Report the results of these inspections to the Force
Control ler/Evaluator.

3.2.3 Ensure that all personnel under their control comply with the
requirements of this plan and with common sense safety
practices.

3.2.4 Correct, either by personal intervention or by reporting to a
controller/evaluator, any unsafe act that occurs during the
test.

3.3 Controllers/Evaluators

3.3.1 Report the results of force commander safety inspections to the
Exercise Coordinator prior to the beginning of the exercise.

3.3.2 Ensure that all personnel on the force to which they are
assigned comply with the requirements of this plan and with
common sense safety precautions.

3.3.3 Correct, either by personal intervention or by reporting to the
Exercise Coordinator, any unsafe act that occurs during the
exercise.

3.3.4 Suspend exercise play any time that an uncorrectable safety
hazard appears.

4. SAFETY SUPPORT

XYZ Safety Department will ensure that adequate medical coverage, to

include an immediately available ambulance, is provided for the duration
of this exercise.

E-3


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
licensees at Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin; United Nuclear Corporation,
Montville; and Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, who contributed freely and
candidly to the information base used to write this handbook. Their
cooperation and assistance have been invaluable.

Many individuals contributed to the effort. The initial and final drafts
were prepared by Lydia Atkinson of Battelle and Marilyn Fugate of
Criterion Referenced Consultants, Inc. (CRC). The comments of Kristina
Z. Jamgochian, C.K. "Bob" Nulsen, and Charles E. Gaskin of the NRC Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards were particularly helpful.

Battelle Columbus Division wishes to acknowledge the major contributions

of its subcontractor, CRC; W. Dan Telfair, CRC's primary contributor; and
William R. Leonard, a Battelle consultant.

vii


APPENDIX H
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS



APPENDIX E

EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE SAFETY PLAN
1. INTRODUCTION

This exercise will be conducted within the rules set down in this plan
and in the accompanying FOF Exercise Control Plan and Rules of Conduct.
The Exercise Coordinator is the senior safety officer, and all
controllers and evaluators are specifically designated as assistant
safety officers. Any safety officer or assistant safety officer
observing any unsafe act or condition will immediately take corrective
action or cause exercise play to be suspended until corrective action can
be taken.

2. SPECIFIC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Weapons and Munitions Safety

2.1.1 No live-fire weapons of any type will be allowed in the exercise
play area, unless the personnel having such weapons are under
the direct observation and supervision of a controller.

2.1.2 All weapons used in the exercise shall be equipped with blank-
fire adapters.

2.1.3 All 5.56mm magazines shall have live-round excluders installed.
2.1.4 Shotgun barrels shall have live-round excluders installed.

2.1.5 MILES-modified revolvers are the only handguns allowed in the
exercise play area.

2.1.6 No live ammunition of any type or caliber will be brought into
the exercise play area, unless it is under the direct
supervision of a controller or is secured so as to be
inaccessible during the exercise, unless an actual security
emergency arises during such exercise.

2.1.7 No LAW will be fired until the area 30 feet behind and five (5)
feet to each side of the weapon is cleared.

2.1.8 No gas, smoke, simulator, or other types of exploding or burning
munitions, other than approved blank ammunition, will be used.

2.1.9 No weapon shall be intentionally fired when the muzzle is within
five (5) feet of another person.

2.1.10 Players shall not point a weapon toward another player's eyes
within 10 feet of that player.


ATTACHMENT 4
TO
APPENDIX G

EXAMPLE EVALUATOR BRIEFING LESSON PLAN

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Personal introductions.

b. Purpose - familiarization with evaluation procedures--not an
exercise briefing.

c. Evaluator's job - observe performance of security system and
make objective judgments on how well the system accomplished
its mission.

d. Evaluator importance - much time and money being spent to
allow you to observe and evaluate.

2. EVALUATION PHILOSOPHY
a. Goal - an objective, performance-based evaluation.
b. Guidelines

(1) Evaluate based on what you see, hear, or can reasonably
infer. Don't guess.

(2) Remain neutral.
(3) Do not influence the outcome (be invisible and silent).
(4) Position or reposition yourself for best observation.

(5) Don't judge by your method or tactic, or by how you would
have done it.

(6) Judge on how well the job is done, not how it is done.
(7) Give objective, performance-based evaluation.

(8) Success doesn't mean everything was done right. Failure
doesn't mean everything was done wrong.

G-4-1








throughout the guidance that MILES equipment will be
used to enhance realism since this equipment is the
most readily available, most widely used, and the
current state-of-the-art. However, other means to
make the tactical exercises more realistic, and
hence more effective, can be substituted for MILES
equipment. Licensees are responsible for funding
either the purchase or lease of whatever equipment
is used.

c. Paragraph 73.46(b) (9)

Question:

Answer:

Will adversary role players actually scale, go
under, or breach barriers, and destroy some
equipment?

They may, within limits and at the discretion of the
licensees. If damage to property or physical
security equipment is done during an exercise,
maintenance and repair should be accomplished
immediately following the exercise and compensatory
measures should be taken during and immediately
following exercise play to assure that security is
not degraded.

d. Paragraph 73.46(b) (9)

Question:

Answer:

What is the relationship of the NRC-observed
exercises to the NRC's inspection and enforcement
responsibilities?

The purposes of the NRC-observed exercises are
discussed in Section 2.2.2.e. Other than
determining whether or not the exercises are being
accomplished in accordance with regulations, the
exercises are not part of the NRC's inspection and
enforcement program, and security force and/or
security system performance involved in the
exercises will not be subject to NRC enforcement
action. All other aspects of security performance
not directly related to a given exercise are subject
to enforcement. The fact that an exercise is being
conducted will not relieve the licensee of the
responsibility for citable conditions or of its
responsibility to report weaknesses that exist,
irrespective of whether they are discovered as part
of the licensee's activities to comply with exercise
requirements. However, elements of security system
performance revealed to be weak as a result of the
exercises, but which are in accordance with approved
security plan commitments, are not subject to NRC
citation.

10


NOTE: The figures addressed in this section are for the exercise only.
They do not include the eight hour familiarization training that is
recommended (see Section 6.4). For the familiarization training,
approximately 200 rounds of 5.56mm, 36 rounds of .357 Caliber, and 20 rounds
of 12 gauge shotgun blanks would be required for each participant. The
number of weapons and personnel harnesses required depends on the number of
participants in a given training session.

6.2 Force-on-Force Exercises

There is no clear-cut difference between a periodic FOF exercise and an NRC-
observed exercise that includes outside response other than the shorter
duration of the exercise window, a generally smaller security force
involvement, and the degree of participation by LLEA. Generally speaking, a
two to three hour exercise window will suffice for the FOF exercises, there
is no LLEA participation, and a smaller portion of the security force is
involved. As a rule of thumb, needs and requirements for a FOF exercise may
be reduced by approximately one half to one third from the estimates for an
NRC-observed exercise addressed in Section 6.1. These general economies can
result in considerable savings in terms of both manpower and equipment. A

suggested allocation per FOF exercise is as follows (assuming MILES training
has been accomp! ished) :

6.2.1 Personnel Requirements
Approximate Total

Title Persons Hours
Exercise Coordinator 1 100
Exercise Evaluator 4 32
Exercise Controller 3 24
Security Forces 20 160
Adversaries As Determined 8 ea
Shadow Forces 10 80

39


APPENDIX A
REFERENCES





CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

1.7. Were exchanges of authority X
and/or transfer of responsi-
bilities accompanied by adequate
situation briefings?

Standard:

Did overall coordination, com- X
mand and control contribute to
or detract from the resolution
of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

The Area Supervisor was clearly in command of the quards in the problem

area, and the TRI Cdr was clearly in charge of the TRT response. Both

seemed to be aware of the assets at their disposal and attempted to use

them best advantage. The TRT Cdr decided to take charge of the overall

situation prematurely, without being fully briefed about the on-scene

situation. His decision to assume command was not clearly understood or

widely disseminated. Consequently, some quards were issued conflicting

instructions from the TRT Cdr and Area Supervisor, resulting in confusion

for about 10 minutes, during which time some positions the TRT Cdr thought

were manned were in fact not occupied. The confusion was recognized and

identified by an alert quard, and the problem was corrected before it

resulted in any adverse impact on the mission. Overall, command and

control were effective, and security assets were used in a coordinated

manner.

H-2-2

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

10.8 Are alternate routes-to-target
areas available?

10.9 Are any inadequate systems or
equipment compensated for by
the strength of other systems?

Standard:

Does overall physical plant
and security equipment provide
a credible opportunity for the
security force to accomplish
its mission?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-19

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


Following the site visits, the site-specific information was integrated
into the proposed model, and generic guidance and example documents were
developed.

1.5 Organization of the Handbook

Section 1 provides a general description of the purposes, background, and
methodology, and identifies considerations applicable to the guidance
material that follows. Section 2 addresses the scope and intent of the
regulatory requirements related to security force tactical response
exercises. Sections 3, 4, and 5 deal with general aspects of tactical
planning that should be addressed during scenario development; exercise
coordination, control, and evaluation; and the conduct and critique of
exercises. Section 6 deals with personnel, equipment, training, and
other needs and requirements for conducting FOF exercises and LSPEs.
Appendices to the report include example documents that can be used by
licensees in developing plans for their

exercises.


SSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

12. Qverall Evaluation

Standard:

Did overall security per-
formance indicate effective-
ness in dealing with a
contingency of this particular
type?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

Evaluator's Name and Signature

H-1-21

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS







APPENDIX I
EXAMPLE CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR COMMENT SHEET





* Exit path from the site

* Departure plans.

All scenarios should involve a plausible target and a set of actions for the
postulated adversary force. It is not necessary that all adversary actions
actually be carried out, as simulation can be used effectively. However,
the scenarios must be complete and detailed. It is not sufficient to simply
say that a specific number of adversaries were observed crossing a fence.
Other factors must be addressed including why they are crossing the fence,
where they are going, whether their route leads to a logical target area,
and how they plan to escape.

3.2.4 Systems To Be Exercised

This section of the Exercise Control Plan should list all subsystems that
are involved in protecting the exercise target. It should list the
appropriate barriers, sensors, lighting, CCTV, central and secondary alarm
stations, towers, entry and exit control points (EECPs), vaults, material
access areas (MAAs), and personnel involved. This information is necessary
for a complete evaluation so all strengths and weaknesses can be identified.
Evaluator checklists (Appendix H) provide for evaluation of both the
security force and security system performance.

3.2.5 Exercise Control

This section of an Exercise Control Plan provides the details of how the
exercise is to be controlled while assuring that realism is attained. It
should not allow exercise constraints or artificialities to affect the
outcome. The following five subsections should be included.

3.2.5.1 Engagement Simulation Instructions for Participants, Vehicles, and
Equipment. This subsection describes in detail all buildings, doors,
fences, alarms, vehicles, personnel, weapons, and other aspects of the
exercise that will be subject to simulation. It should be sufficiently
clear so participants fully understand the rules of the exercise in order
that simulations do not affect the exercise outcome.

3.2.5.2 MILES-Specific Instructions. This subsection addresses all issues
involving MILES gear, if it is used. Information should include types of
MILES-equipped weapons to be used, any structures or vehicles to be MILES-
equipped, equipment settings, and any restrictions regarding the use of
MILES equipment. This section is necessary to ensure that if MILES
equipment is employed, it will be used to best advantage.

3.2.5.3 Off-Limits Areas. Off-limits areas and the boundaries of the
exercise play area should be identified in complete detail in this
subsection.

3.2.5.4 Controller and Evaluator Assignments, Equipment, and
Responsibilities. This subsection contains detailed duties, respon-
sibilities, and locations of everyone involved in controlling,
evaluating, or observing the exercise, including the Exercise Coordinator,

19




CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable
Standard:
Did communications x

contribute to or detract
from the overall resolution
of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

The TRT relied exclusively on radio due to their mobile status. Planning and

training resulted in good circuit discipline. However, there was too

much unnecessary talk by quards. There were frequent “body counts" to see

if everyone was OK, and constant checking and rechecking to see if people

were in position and if they saw any adversary activity. This hampered

communication between the TRT Cdr and Area Supervisor, and was partially

responsible for the confusion over who was in command. Security discipline

was unsatisfactory. Instructions and friendly positions were given in the

clear. This may have resulted in the adversaries locating and eliminating at

least one guard. Some codes were used by the TRT; no authentication was

attempted by anyone. Lack of authentication procedures resulted in a

portion of the TRT being diverted when an adversary used a captured radio to

announce "three charlies over the north fence." Although the security force

was_able to communicate sufficiently to resolve the immediate contingency,

that outcome was placed in jeopardy by weaknesses in communications

security and discipline.

H-2-6

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


vault door locking bolt was severed, the adversaries would return to the
vault door and open it using the normal throw-bolt handle. Two members
of the adversary team would enter the vault and select five cans each of
highly-enriched U-235 oxide weighing approximately two kilograms each.
They would load the target material into backpacks and withdraw. They
would then rejoin the main adversary force at the vault face and retrace
their route back over the B Complex fences and the 900 Area perimeter
fence and thence to the escape vehicle. Once the main adversary force
was clear of the 900 Area perimeter fence, the two adversary security
teams would withdraw along the same route providing cover and delay for
the main force. Once all surviving members of the adversary force
arrived at the escape vehicle, they would travel overland back to County
Road 139, and make their escape by means of public roads and highways
(see site diagram, Attachment 1).

4. SYSTEMS TO BE EXERCISED
The following systems and personnel will be exercised and/or evaluated:

a. Responding guards will be exercised in all aspects of cover
concealment, tactical movement, fire, and communications.

b. CAS and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) personnel will be
exercised in communication, coordination, LLEA
notification/coordination, off-duty recall, and all other
response-related functions.

c. Supervisory personnel will be exercised in coordination,
direction, communication, and all other aspects of their
leadership duties under emergency situations.

d. EECP personnel will be exercised in lock-down, response (as
applicable), and all other aspects of their duties under
emergency situations.

e. Perimeter lighting will be evaluated as to its adequacy for use
in locating and identifying the adversary forces.

f. Sensors and alarm systems will be evaluated on the B Complex
perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) as
to its adequacy in detecting and assessing the adversary
penetration.

g. The tactical communication system at XYZ will be evaluated
concerning its effectiveness in a security contingency.

h. LLEA effectiveness in isolating the XYZ facility with outer
containment road blocks will be evaluated.

C-3


3. SCENARIO AND EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE
3.1 General

There are two general motivations for conducting tactical response
training. The first is to train and evaluate individual and team
tactical skills irrespective of the specific security environment. This
training, evaluation, and subsequent retraining do not require complex
scenarios or exercises. However, each situation presented must coincide
with the tactical duties assigned to security forces during a safeguards
contingency.

The second motivation for tactical response training is to train and
evaluate individual and team skills in their site-specific security
environments. Training and evaluation of this type require highly
specific and detailed scenarios to ensure that the exercises provide
training in site-specific tactical response skills at the individual and
team level. The guidance in this section is designed to assist licensees
in developing the necessary site-specific approaches to conducting
security force tactical response exercises.

Properly developed exercises should reveal strengths and weaknesses in
both physical security systems and the security force training program.
Licensees should use the exercises to reveal strengths that can be
exploited and weaknesses that need correction.

The use of laser enhanced weapons, such as MILES equipment, in FOF
exercises is recommended to achieve a high degree of realism for the
exercise participants. Use of MILES equipment is not required, however,
and other comparable alternative methods to enhance realism may be used.
For the purposes of this document, MILES equipment is used as an example,
and Chapter 6, "Needs and Requirements," provides information on the
types and quantities of equipment needed for MILES-enhanced exercises.
The use of MILES equipment is recommended because it is currently state-
of-the-art, the most readily available, and the most widely used weapons
fire simulation system for FOF tactical engagement exercises. The use of
other equipment now and in the future as new technologies emerge is an
acceptable alternative to provide exercise realism.

Both detailed scenarios and Exercise Control Plans should be developed if
an exercise is to accomplish its intended goals and assure safety and the
security of the plant. This section provides guidance on the preparation
of scenarios and Exercise Control] Plans (see Appendix C for an example
Exercise Control Plan including attendant scenario). The guidance that
follows applies to all tactical response exercises required by the rule.
Because FOF exercises are more complex, they require the most detailed
planning and the guidance in Section 3 should be used to the maximum
extent for these exercises. LSPEs are not as complicated; therefore, the
planning and contro] documents developed for these exercises may be
scaled down by licensees as long as exercise control, safety, and site
security are not adversely affected.

12


5.1.4 Evaluator Briefing

Evaluators should get essentially the same briefing as controllers, plus
a detailed briefing on evaluation procedures and responsibilities (see
Attachment 4 to Appendix G). It is generally a good practice to provide
evaluators with evaluator checklists and go over sample completed
evaluations (see Appendix H) with them at this briefing.

For purposes of clarity, the four sample lesson plans for each briefing
are presented separately in appendices to this Handbook. However, it is
usually possible to save significant preparation time by combining
briefings. Adversaries, security forces, controllers, and evaluators can
all be jointly briefed on the Rules of Conduct and Safety Plan.
Evaluators and controllers can be jointly briefed on the Exercise Control
Plan. However, adversaries and security force participants should
receive separate briefings on the Exercise Control Plan, and evaluators
should be briefed separately on evaluation responsibilities.

5.1.5 Positioning of Forces
After all briefings have been accomplished, forces must be positioned
within the exercise area. This includes the following actions:

e

The exercise area must be cleared of all security personnel
actually armed with live weapons.

Adversaries must be moved to their exercise start positions
(normally outside of the facility boundary).

Security force participants must be moved to their normal duty
positions.

Off-site LLEA responders, if participating, should be positioned
in holding areas outside of the protected area.

Shadow force personnel (who provide actual security during the
exercise) should be positioned where their response will be most
effective.

Each of the above groups should be accompanied by a minimum of one
controller who is in radio contact with the Exercise Coordinator. Prior
to exercise initiation, all controllers must notify the Exercise
Coordinator and report that all forces are in position, all safety checks
have been completed, and that the forces they have accompanied. are ready
to begin the exercise.

5.1.6 Exercise Initiation

The Exercise Coordinator announces the opening of the exercise window (or
the beginning of exercise activities) once all participants are reported
as ready. This announcement should be made over the exercise control
radio net and repeated over the security force and adversary radio nets.
Exercise initiation announcements should be acknowledged by all parties.

29


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

Initial internal containment forces arrived as quickly as possible, but were

spread too thinly. Adversaries were able to penetrate the containment

and reach the outer fence. The TRT arrived as quickly as could be

reasonably expected. However, since internal containment had been broken,

they were able to prevent only a portion of the adversaries from leaving the

protected area. Only through intelligent employment of the police

helicopter, the skill and endurance of the TRT, and a little luck, were

security forces able to locate, engage, and stop the remaining adversaries

with the SSNM. Mission success was tenuous. (NOTE: When the main group of

fleeing adversaries was neutralized, pursuit efforts stopped, even though

there was no way of knowing if_all the adversaries had been found or

all_of the SSNM recovered.)

H-2-17

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS

Controller - An individual assigned to assist in the conduct of the
exercise. General responsibilities are to enforce safety rules and
rules of conduct. Specific responsibilities may include opening
doors, gates, etc., either after forcible entry actions have been
simulated, or following a previously developed timeline; and,
maintaining control of shadow force personnel, live weapons, and
ammunition. Controllers may be facility operations, support,
security, or other qualified persons.

Evaluator - An individual assigned to assess security force and TRT
performance during security force tactical response exercises.
Evaluators are normally assigned to evaluate each major response
element participating in the exercise.

Exercise Coordinator - A person assigned primary responsibility for
planning, conducting, and reporting on the exercise.

Exercise Control Plan - The overall plan used to govern the conduct
of FOF and non-FOF exercises. This plan includes a Safety Plan,
Rules of Conduct, Exercise Scenario, and control procedures.

Force-on-Force (FOF) Exercise - An exercise during which all aspects

of an attack on a facility are performed, within the limits of
safety and maintenance of site security. The facility security
force is exercised in normal shift configuration, either in whole or
in part, depending on the scope of the exercise, and an adversary
team is used. A FOF exercise can include both on-site and off-site
responders, or be limited to only the on-site security force shift,
or part of a shift, on duty. MILES or other comparable equipment
may be used by participants to provide the maximum degree of
realism, as well as to ensure accurate assessment of the results of
tactical engagements and of the effectiveness of the security
system.

Limited Scope Performance Exercise (LSPE) - This type of exercise

does not use an actual adversary team. Instead, adversary actions
are hypothetical. A time-line is developed by exercise planners to
detail adversary actions and event sequences throughout the scenario
to its endpoint (i.e., final capture or escape of adversaries). The
timeliness of security force response can be evaluated against this
time-line to determine if responders arrived in sufficient time and
numbers to effectively interrupt the sequence of adversary actions.
Security force response is initiated and affected by ongoing alarm
and assessment information simulating adversary actions. This
information is given to appropriate on-duty security force personnel
by controllers. This type of exercise can be conducted with minimal
or no notice to on-duty security force personnel. It is used
primarily to evaluate the timeliness and adequacy of initial
security force response.


© What routes of egress beyond the facility's protected area
boundaries must be covered to minimize an adversary's
opportunity to escape, should primary and secondary levels of
containment be breached?

After these questions have been answered for a given target, each denial
and containment position should be plotted on a site map. Primary and
alternate approach routes to each position should also be selected and
displayed on the map. The map should then be included in the response
plan or procedures.

Each response plan should also address security force deployment. A
complete plan will contain detailed instructions specifying where, when,
in what order, and for what particular mission(s) specific security
elements are to be employed. Although these decisions will be determined
to a limited extent by the physical layout and security system at a site,
they are generally influenced by a few basic characteristics.

First, upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of an intrusion,
human or electronic assessment should be immediate and ongoing. Security
forces should be repositioned to deny access to the target and to contain
the adversary. This assures maximum safety of response personnel, while
controlling the target area through denial and containment actions.

Second, regardless of the order in which they are employed, provisions
should be made for separation of response elements (persons, teams,
vehicles) and for mutual support between elements. Whether the response
elements are moving to a denial or a containment position, it is
desirable that a minimum of two security elements be employed. The
response elements should be separated sufficiently to reduce
vulnerability to adversary fire, yet close enough to provide mutual
support. The same principle of mutual support applies to security
elements occupying containment positions. They should be positioned so
an adversary cannot escape by eliminating just one member or element of
the security force.

Next, security force deployment must anticipate and provide for the use
of diversionary tactics by adversaries. Where multiple targets exist,
the adversary force can be expected to use diversionary tactics at one
target to cover activity at the primary objective. Consequently,
response plans for any target should provide for surveillance of other
potential targets on site.

Finally, no matter how detailed plans are or how completely they are
rehearsed, there always will be some requirements for redirection during
an engagement. Such redirection can be enormously simplified and
communications security can be considerably enhanced if response plans
provide for a classified checkpoint and/or grid system. Checkpoint and
grid systems are references superimposed upon site maps that are
distributed to security forces. These references are handled,
controlled, and changed in the same manner as any other secure code.
They permit rapid and secure redirection of responding elements to

15


LA’ ATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable
Standard:
Did overall planning con- X

tribute to or detract from the
resolution of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

The TRT had well thought-out and tested contingency plans for all potential

targets. This allowed a rapid response, with all TRT members knowing what

to do initially. From what I could see_and hear, the quards who made the

initial response did so on the basis of established contingency plans.

While enroute to the scene, the TRT Cdr monitored reports from the scene

and adjusted his plans accordingly. TRT plans were specific to each

potential target area but general enough to allow adjustment to the specific

situation. Prior and ad hoc planning was timely, mission oriented,

and allowed the TRT to respond and function in a smooth, organized, and

effective manner.

H-2-4

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED






6.1.2.2 MILES Equipment. The following list identifies the specific
items of equipment needed for a MILES-enhanced exercise. Vehicle harness
systems are available, but can be eliminated from these exercises by the
expedient of having controllers decide and announce vehicle and structure
"kills." For economy purposes, vehicle harnesses are not included in the
equipment listings throughout the Handbook. A ten percent reserve of
spares should be provided to replace malfunctioning units.

Item Quantity
7.62mm or .30 Caliber Rifle with 1
Transmitter and Blank Adapters
AR-15s with Transmitters and Blank Adapters* 22
Shotgun Barrels with Transmitters* 11
Personnel Detector Harnesses 33
MILES Controller Guns 5

6.1.2.3 Ammunition and Pyrotechnics. The following list provides for
bore-sighting, equipment checks, and a complete basic load of ammunition
for each participant for one exercise. These quantities are established
as a maximum possible inventory need and reflect basic load allocations.
Very little ammunition is actually used in most exercises. A
conservative figure would be that approximately 20 percent of available
ammunition and pyrotechnics are consumed during a given exercise.

Item Quantity
7.62mm or .30 Caliber Blank Ammunition 100 rds
5.56mm Blank Ammunition 2,400 rds
-357 Caliber Blank Ammunition 540 rds
12 Gauge Shotgun Blank Ammunition 200 rds
Grenade Simulators 12

6.1.2.4 Communications Equipment. The only additional communications
equipment required for an exercise (in addition to that which is
available for normal operations) is for exercise control. Generally
speaking, the Exercise Coordinator, and each evaluator and controller
should have a multi-channel radio on a frequency separate from the
security force and adversary radio nets. All security forces should use
their normally assigned radios. For an exercise of this nature, 12
controller radios are generally sufficient.

*This assumes that AR-15s and shotguns in the licensee's inventory will
be converted for MILES use, and that there are sufficient numbers of
these weapons in the licensee's inventory to equip both exercise
personnel and the shadow force.

36


APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE PREPARATION CHECKLIST



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

[SPECIAL FOURTH-CLASS RATE]
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
USNRE

PERMIT No. G-67



them to accomplish their normal security functions during the exercise.
Additionally, a "shadow force" of fully armed guards will be
strategically located outside of the problem play area to fulfill armed
response security functions normally accomplished by those guards who are
involved in the exercise. The shadow force holding area will be in the
ground floor foyer of Building 915.

The adversary objective for this exercise is to obtain a formula quantity
of highly enriched U-235 from the SSNM vault in Building 905 of the B
complex at XYZ.

Although a general exercise window and general target area will be
announced, security forces will not be informed of the exact time,
target, or method of entry of the adversary forces.

At the conclusion of the exercise, all participants (including security
force members, LLEA, adversaries, evaluators, controllers, and observers)
will assemble for a post-exercise critique.

3. SCENARIO
3.1 Adversary Description

The adversary team personnel are members of a radical group of right-wing
extremists with survivalist training and strong sympathies with anti-
Zionist movements in the U.S. and abroad. They have been contacted by a
third world Arab bloc country in order to acquire weapons-grade SSNM with
which to build a limited technology nuclear weapon. One member of this
group is regularly employed at XYZ and works within the 905 MAA in the B
Complex. This assignment makes the gathering of intelligence relatively
simple and leads to the targeting of the material in the 905 Vault.

3.2 Adversary Actions

The approach to the target area is planned to be made by a four-wheel-
drive vehicle from the south along County Road 139. The vehicle would
travel approximately 1.7 miles over logging trails to a vehicle drop
point approximately 800 meters east of the 900 area fence. From there,
the adversary forces would travel on foot to the perimeter of the 900
area. After spotting and timing all site roving patrols, the adversary
forces would covertly cross the unalarmed outer Protected Area perimeter
fence and continue to the inner alarmed Protected Area fence of the B
complex. There, they would split, with two two-man security teams moving
to ambush positions on Roads 117 and 118 where these routes lead into the
B Complex. With security teams in place to interrupt or delay responding
site security forces, the main adversary party would cross the outer
Protected Area fence, rush across the cleared area, and cross the inner
fence into the B Complex.

Once inside, the adversaries would immediately destroy closed circuit
television (CCTV) cameras numbers 27A and 27B which monitor the SSNM
Vault. They would place prepared flexible linear shaped charges (FLSCs)
over the locking mechanism bolt on the vault door and withdraw behind the
concrete apron skirting of the vault. Once the charge detonated and the

C-2




CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

3. Communications

3.1 Were communications between
CAS/SAS and security forces
effective?

3.2 Were communications between
supervisors and the security
force effective?

3.3 Were communications between
security force members
effective?

3.4 Were communications between
CAS/SAS and LLEA effective?

3.5 Were radio communications
relied on too heavily?

3.6 Were alternate means of com-
munications used appropriately?

3.7. Was communications security
discipline maintained?

3.8 Was radio circuit discipline
maintained?

3.9 Were codes and authentication
systems used where appropriate?

3.10 Were all communications under-
standable and efficient?

H-1-5

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


LASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-8

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


exercise is terminated, a security force officer should inspect
each rifle and shotgun to ensure that a round was not
inadvertently chambered.

Exercise radio traffic should begin and end with the words "THIS
IS A DRILL" to assure that all security personnel can
differentiate exercise play from actual security response
information. This procedure applies to Central and Secondary
Alarm Station traffic as well as simulated alarm or assessment
information transmitted by controllers.

Exercise participants should be in good physical condition and
have received medical examinations required by 10 CFR Part 73.
Significant physical and emotional stress is encountered during
exercises, particularly FOFs. It is recommended that first aid
treatment be immediately available, as well as an ambulance,
which should be on site. The nearest fire department should
also be advised of the exercise.

Plant operations personnel should be informed by public address
announcement or other suitable means that an exercise is to be
conducted in a specific area.

Participants who are designated as off-site responders should be
staged in a holding area and released to participate only at the
direction of a controller. Observers should be confined to
specific locations and not be allowed to enter and remain in the
exercise area without an escort. All] controllers and evaluators
should be clearly designated through the use of armbands or
other readily observable measures. In addition, security force
personnel and exercise participants should meet and be able to
personally recognize evaluators and controllers prior to
commencing the exercise.

23


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

9. Response and Denial or
Containment

9.1 Was response timely? xX

9.2 Was denial or contain- X
ment effective?

9.3 Were there provisions for xX
denial or containment in
depth?

9.4 Were all appropriate forces x
used?

9.5 Was LLEA containment effec- x
tive?

9.6 If initial containment per- X
sonnel were relieved by
responders, was transfer of
responsibility effective?

9.7 If containment failed, was X
pursuit timely and effective?

Standard:

Did response and denial or X
containment contribute to or
detract from the overall
resolution of this contingency?

H-2-16

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CAS
CCTV
DOE
EECP
FOF
Kg
LAW
LLEA
LSPE

MILES
NRC
PIDAS
SAS
SSNM
TRT

ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

Central Alarm Station

Closed Circuit Television

U.S. Department of Energy

Entry and Exit Control Point

Force-on-Force

Kilogram

Light Anti-Tank Weapon

Local Law Enforcement Agency

Limited Scope Performance Exercise

Material Access Area

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System
Secondary Alarm Station

Strategic Special Nuclear Material

Tactical Response Team

ix


ATTACHMENT 2
TO
APPENDIX H
EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST (COMPLETED)



CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

4. Individual Tactics

4.1 Were the best available cover x
and concealment used appropri-
ately?
4.2 Were selected firing positions X

tactically sound?

4.3 Was minimum exposure maintain- xX
ed during firing?

4.4 Were danger areas crossed X
tactically?
4.5 Was noise and light disci- X

pline maintained?

4.6 Was key terrain appropriately x
utilized?

Standard:
Overall, did individual X

tactics contribute to or
detract from the resolution
of this contingency?

H-2-7

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

7. Intelligence

7.1 Was immediately available xX
intelligence exploited?

7.2 Was intelligence immediately Xx
disseminated to the security
force and to the CAS/SAS and

supervisors?

7.3. Was all available and appro- X
priate intelligence passed to
LLEA?

7.4 Did the security force X

recognize important intelligence
and take advantage of it?

(e.g., adversary description,
weapons, escape routes, etc.)

Standard:

Did intelligence gathering X
and dissemination contribute

to or detract from the overall
resolution of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

This situation occurred too rapidly to permit demonstration of a real

intelligence-gathering effort. Some basic information, such as number and

location of adversaries, was sought, and available information was

passed to appropriate people. Since there was no opportunity for real

intelligence-gathering, this section is not applicable.

H-2-13

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


6.1.4 Summary of Equipment Requirements

Equipment Addressed in Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 for the NRC-observed
exercise is as follows:

Exercise Control

Item and Security Forces Adversaries Total
MILES-Modified .357 Revolvers 33 lea *
Blank Modified 5.56mm Magazines 88 4ea *
AR-15 Blank Adapters** 22 -- *
AR-15 Transmitters** 22 - *
Shotgun Barrels with Transmitters** 11 -- 11
MILES-Equipped M-16s*** -- lea *
MILES-Equipped Sniper Rifles -- 2 2
MILES-Modified 7.62mm or

-30 Caliber Rifle 1 -- 1
Adversary Radios -- lea *
Frequency Scanner -- 1 1
Controller Radios 12 -- 12
Personnel Detector Harnesses 33 lea *
MILES Controller Guns 5 -- 5
5.56mm Blank Ammunition 2400 rds 120 rds ea *
-357 Caliber Blank Ammunition 540 rds 18 rds ea *
12 Gauge Shotgun Blank

Ammunition 200 rds -- 200 rds
7.62mm or .30 Caliber Blank

Ammunition 100 rds 200 rds 300 rds
Grenade Simulators 12 - 12
Miscellaneous Equipment -- As Required --

*To determine total numbers required, multiply the number in the
Adversaries column by the number of adversaries assigned the equipment
specified. Add the total adversary quantity to the quantities under the
Exercise Control and Security Forces column to determine the total.

**This assumes that AR-15s and shotguns in the licensee's inventory will
be converted for MILES use and that there are sufficient numbers of these
weapons in the licensee's inventory to equip both exercise personnel and
the shadow force.

***adversary force M-16s should be supplied with MILES transmitters and
blank adapters. If they are not, the appropriate number of additional
AR-15 MILES transmitters and blank adapters (identical to M-16 MILES
transmitters and blank adapters) will be required.

38




° The Exercise Coordinator makes closing remarks and provides
instructions on completing and returning evaluator checklists,
participant critique sheets, and controller/evaluator comment
sheets.

The second critique should be scheduled for the day following the
exercise and should involve only the exercise evaluators and the Exercise
Coordinator. Before this critique, the Exercise Coordinator should
collect and review all participant critique and controller/evaluator
comment sheets and then should be prepared to share this information with
the evaluators.

Evaluators should be given the opportunity to complete their checklists
at this time. Evaluators should review their checklists and share all
observations and conclusions with the other evaluators and with the
Exercise Coordinator. Disparities in observations and conclusions should
be resolved and evaluators should modify their checklists accordingly.

The Exercise Coordinator should then summarize strengths and weaknesses
observed during the exercise and solicit suggestions that evaluators may
have for improving either the security system evaluated or the design of
future exercises.

All documents should be assembled in a historical file once the second
critique is completed. The Exercise Coordinator should then write a
report summarizing the exercise conduct and its results. Report formats
will vary according to the requirements of each facility. However, each
report should briefly describe the exercise conduct and outcome, list
strengths and weaknesses observed, and provide recommendations for
improvement. The report should be provided to facility and security
management for their information and necessary action.

32


LA ICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

Standard:

Did overall planning con-
tribute to or detract from the
resolution of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-4

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


2.3.4 General Concerns

a. Relationship of Exercise Requirements to Use of Force, as
Prescribed in 10 CFR 73.46(h) (4)

Question: Will the rule be accompanied by any changes in
procedures regarding the use of force?

Answer: Yes. A generic letter is being issued. Further
guidance may be published later in conjunction with
subsequent rulemaking.

b. Concern for Removal of SSNM through Material Access Area
Boundaries and Portals [10 CFR 73.45(e)]

Question: Does the rule revise the guidance published in
Regulatory Guide 5.61, Section C, where the major
concerns for removal of SSNM through Material Access
Area boundaries and portals were discussed?

Answer: No.
c. The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Question: Does the rulemaking alter 10 CFR 73.46(h)
requirements regarding the role of LLEA and are the
provisions for LLEA response changed?

Answer: No.
d. Follow-on evaluation directed by the Commission

Question: Are there any particular concerns which will be
evaluated after the present physical security
upgrades have been in effect?

Answer: Yes. The Commission directed that action be
deferred on three items of comparability, pending
results of performance testing programs at licensed
facilities. It is believed that tactical training,
coupled with performance testing, will demonstrate
whether or not further action is appropriate for
these issues which involve differences between the
DOE and NRC approaches to (1) passive delay
mechanisms at vaults, (2) the philosophy of using an
in-house maintenance program and repair
capability, and (3) the need for multiple intrusion
detection sensor systems at the protected area
boundary.

11


2. SCOPE AND INTENT OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
2.1 General

The NRC has amended its regulations for fuel facilities possessing
formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) regarding
physical protection and personnel performance. The changes were prompted
by a determination that physical protection measures should be enhanced
based on reviews of NRC physical security inspection reports, licensing
actions, the results of physical security Regulatory Effectiveness
Reviews (RERs), and the results of a recent study which compared the
NRC's security requirements for protecting SSNM with those of DOE's
recently upgraded security program. The findings from the most recent
joint NRC/DOE comparability review (1986) indicated that DOE has placed
increased emphasis on guard weaponry, training, and tactical response
exercises, among other considerations. This Section provides information
to assist licensees in understanding the requirements for enhancing
security system performance through tactical response exercises set forth
in Sections 73.2 and 73.46 of the amendments. The overall intent of the
requirements for tactical response exercises is to indicate whether
additional training or security system improvements are required and to
increase assurance that security force capabilities are effective and
comparable to those at DOE facilities. It is also the NRC's intent to
assure that these exercises are conducted in a safe manner, do not
interfere with maintaining normal security on-site, and do not endanger
personnel or interfere with plant operations.

2.2 Discussion

The following subsections discuss the purpose and scope of the
requirements of the rulemaking that apply to tactical response exercises
and the use of Tactical Response Teams (TRTs).

2.2.1 Definitions: Paragraph 73.2 (new) (Tactical Response Team)

TRT members designated for each shift may perform duties other than
response, provided that these duties do not interfere with the ability of
each member of the team to immediately respond to safeguards
contingencies. TRTs are armed with individually assigned, upgraded
weaponry [indicated in Paragraph 10 CFR 73.46 (b3 (6)] and wear a
distinctively different item of uniform from the rest of the security
force. The requirement for a TRT replaces the more general requirement
for an armed response force. The term “armed response personnel," as
defined in 10 CFR 73.2, is replaced by the term “Tactical Response Team"
for fixed site non-reactor licensees possessing formula quantities of
SSNM.


6. NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS ..... Pe er
6.1 NRC-Observed Exercise... 2. eee eee eae ae
6.2  Force-on-Force Exercises .. 1+ + ee ee eevee

6.3 Limited Scope Performance
(Non-Force-on-Force) Exercises... .. ee ee eee
6.4 Training Needs 2... eee eee eee se eee
APPENDIX A - REFERENCES . . 2 ee ee eee eevee we wees
APPENDIX B - DEFINITIONS . . . «2 ee we ee ee ee ee eee
APPENDIX C - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN see

APPENDIX D - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE RULES OF CONDUCT. ......

APPENDIX E - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE SAFETY PLAN ......
APPENDIX F - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE PREPARATION CHECKLIST
APPENDIX G - EXAMPLE BRIEFING LESSON PLANS. ..... see eee

ATTACHMENT 1
ATTACHMENT 2
ATTACHMENT 3
ATTACHMENT 4

EXAMPLE ADVERSARY TEAM BRIEFING LESSON PLAN
EXAMPLE SECURITY FORCE BRIEFING LESSON PLAN
EXAMPLE CONTROLLER BRIEFING LESSON PLAN . .
EXAMPLE EVALUATOR BRIEFING LESSON PLAN. . .

APPENDIX H - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS .....

ATTACHMENT 1 - (BLANK) FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST
BLANK) . . 2 ee ee eee ee ee ee

ATTACHMENT 2 - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON- FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST
(COMPLETED) ©... ee ee ee ee ee ee

APPENDIX I - EXAMPLE CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR COMMENT SHEET .....~
APPENDIX J - EXAMPLE PARTICIPANT CRITIQUE SHEET .......-.-

vi


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED
Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

9. Response and Denial or
Containment

9.1 Was response timely?

9.2 Was denial or contain-
ment effective?

9.3 Were there provisions for
denial or containment in
depth?

9.4 Were all appropriate forces
used?

9.5 Was LLEA containment effec-
tive?

9.6 If initial containment per-
sonnel were relieved by
responders, was transfer of
responsibility effective?

9.7 If containment failed, was
pursuit timely and effective?

Standard:

Did response and denial or
containment contribute to or
detract from the overall
resolution of this contingency?

H-1-16

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED




b. Message #2

Time: As requested by Vault Controller
From: CAS Evaluator/Controller

To: CAS Supervisor

"THIS IS A DRILL - YOU HAVE JUST RECEIVED A DOOR ALARM FROM THE
905 VAULT. YOU ARE NOW RECEIVING INTERIOR INTRUSION ALARMS."

6. SAFETY

This exercise will be conducted in accordance with the accompanying
"Force-on-Force Exercise Safety Plan" and with the XYZ Plant Safety SOP.
Responding security force and adversary leaders are responsible for
ensuring that all participating forces conduct themselves in a safe
manner and in accordance with XYZ Plant safety procedures. The
Administration and Services Division will ensure that plant fire and
medical sections are alerted to the exercise.

Approved: (signature)
Exercise Coordinator

(signature)
XYZ Security Manager

(signature)
XYZ Safety Manager

(signature)
XYZ Manager's Representative

C-9


alternate positions in the likely event that the adversary force is
monitoring security force radio communications.

In summary, separate response plans should be developed for each target
that is included on the site target list. Each plan should include:

* Target description

* Denial and containment position locations

* Response routes

Security force deployment instructions
Provisions for diversionary actions on the part of adversaries

Checkpoint and/or grid system.

3.1.3 Reinforcement Planning

Plans should provide for introduction of additional forces into the
tactical area and their integration into the response and overall
security effort. Introduction of reinforcements into any confrontation
poses certain difficulties. Although their capabilities must be brought
to bear quickly, integration must not create undue risk to friendly
security forces. Reinforcement can be accomplished efficiently and
safely only where prior planning clearly identifies authority, allocation
of missions, zones of responsibility, tactical radio frequencies,
reporting points, and similar factors.

3.1.3.1 Use of Reinforcements. All on-duty security forces not engaged
in the immediate confrontation can be regarded as reinforcements.
However, such forces have other security functions and must also serve as
a general reserve for the entire site. If these forces are ordered into
action, other areas may be stripped of protection and vulnerable to
adversary actions. Given the potential for diversionary action, it is
important that only the senior security force representative responsible
for response operations be granted authority to modify normal deployment
of security forces or commit security reserves during an emergency. At
no time should response actions be permitted to degrade overall on-site
security.

Preplanning to introduce and integrate off-duty and off-site security
reinforcements into a prolonged tactical situation is an important
consideration. The number of guards available for reinforcement should
be based on commitments made in the Physical Security and Safeguards
Contingency Plans. The general responsibilities that reinforcements wil]
assume as they enter the situation should be determined before a crisis
occurs. It is not essential to preplan where the reserve forces will be
committed since their specific placement will depend upon the developing
situation. The senior security force representative in charge should
have time to ascertain the location and nature of the problem before

16


-10

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Planning

Were prior response plans
developed for the security
force to deal with this
type of contingency?

Were these plans specific?

Were prior plans developed
for use of LLEA?

Was available time used for
planning?

Were plans mission-oriented?
Were all plans viable?

Were necessary improvised
plans rapidly developed?

Did all personnel understand
the plans?

Were plans clear, complete
and concise?

Were available contingency
checklists appropriately
utilized?

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

X

Xx
X

Xx
X
X

Xx
X
XxX

H-2-3

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED




ATTACHMENT 2
TO
APPENDIX H

EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST (COMPLETED)

Evaluation

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

1. Coordination, Command and
Control

1.1. Was coordination and command X
authority within the se-
curity force clear and effective?

1.2 Was coordination between X
security and LLEA clear and
effective?

1.3. Were plans and procedures X

made for authority in depth?

1.4 Did all personnel know and X
understand the lines of
authority?

1.5 Were supervisors able to con- xX
trol security forces?

1.6 Were exchanges of authority xX
and/or transfer of respon-
sibilities appropriate, timely
and effective?

H-2-1

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


detailed instructions that address the safety concerns identified in
Section 3.4.

3.2.7 Approval Signatures

All exercise plans should be reviewed and approved by security, safety,
and operations management. The person who has approval authority should
be determined by facility management. A typical approval chain would
include:

° The Exercise Coordinator
° The Security Manager
° The facility Safety Manager

° A facility management representative.

3.3 Additional Documents Required

In addition to the basic Exercise Control Plan, other documents are
required to assure adequate exercise planning. Examples of each are
included as appendices to this document. They include:

° Rules of Conduct - These govern and limit the actions of
participants in the exercise to minimize interference with
facility operations and allow for meaningful exercise
evaluation. Specific actions to accomplish this are detailed in
Rules of Conduct developed specifically for each exercise (see
Appendix D).

Safety Plan - This document prescribes measures to be taken to
assure safe conduct of exercises. The plan addresses safety for
weapons, personnel, and vehicles, and responsibilities for
safety (see Sections 3.2.6 and 3.4, and Appendix E).

Exercise Preparation Checklist - This is an aid for the Exercise
Coordinator in assuring that all necessary preparatory measures
are taken prior to the exercise (see Appendix F).

3.4 Planning for Safety and Site Security During Exercises

Safety of personnel and operational equipment, as well as maintenance of
security during the exercises, should be given utmost consideration in
Planning for tactical response exercises. The Exercise Control Plan
Appendix C), FOF Rules of Conduct (Appendix D), and Safety Plan
Appendix E) should all address these issues.

Specifically, the following precautions should be taken to assure safety
and security needs are not compromised during tactical response
exercises:

21








APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE BRIEFING LESSON PLANS

Thorough pre-exercise briefings for all exercise participants,
controllers, and evaluators are crucial to successful and safe conduct
of tactical response team exercises. Attachments 1 through 4 to this
Appendix provide sample briefing lesson plans for adversary team
members, the security force, controllers, and evaluators, respectively.

G-1


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has amended 10 CFR 73.46 for
Category I fuel facilities to include, among other changes, requirements
which address:

© Establishment of security force Tactical Response Teams (TRTs)
© Increased tactical training

© Development of an overall performance testing plan by licensees
© Conduct of periodic security force tactical response exercises

© Conduct of an NRC-observed security force tactical response
exercise.

The amendments were directed by the Commission following a joint
comparability review of safeguards programs at NRC and U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) fuel facilities.

These changes require that affected licensees conduct security force
tactical response exercises, which are intended to provide the security
force the opportunity for practice in performing response procedures and
are not to be viewed in terms of a pass or fail rating. One exercise, to
be observed by the NRC on an annual basis, is also required at each site.
These exercises are designed to provide realistic training, and to
ascertain whether additional training or security system improvements are
required.

Periodic exercises should be of brief duration, include one exercise per
security force shift, and, during the course of a year, be conducted
during both day and night conditions. A number of these exercises will
involve force-on-force (FOF) scenarios. The NRC shall observe one FOF
exercise each year. The other periodic exercises may simulate adversary
iigees) and are referred to as limited scope performance exercises
LSPEs).

1.2 Purpose and Scope

This Handbook provides uniform guidance and identifies essential criteria
for constructing scenarios for use by NRC licensees of Category I fuel
facilities in complying with the revised requirements of 10 CFR 73.46 for
security force training and system performance evaluation through
security force tactical response exercises. It also provides information
on resources, equipment, personnel training, and other needs and
requirements pertinent to the successful execution of these exercises.
Emphasis is placed on guidance to assure the safety of personnel and
continuity of plant operations during the exercises.


ATTACHMENT 2
TO
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE SECURITY FORCE BRIEFING LESSON PLAN

EI IRE EN EES OU FLAN





CLA: CATION WHEN L

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

1.7. Were exchanges of authority
and/or transfer of responsi-
bilities accompanied by adequate
situation briefings?

Standard:

Did overall coordination, com-
mand and control contribute to
or detract from the resolution
of this contingency?

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-2

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


5.3 Off-Limits Areas

A Complex, and the entire facility south of West Gate Road and west of
County Road 139 are off-limits to all participants except for travel from
the security force holding areas. All off-site areas are off-limits for
handling or displaying weapons.

5.4 Controller and Evaluator Assignments, Equipment and
Responsibilities

5.4.1 Exercise Coordinator: CPT Cosgrove
Location: CAS
Equipment: Traffic vest, controller radio, and adversary radio.

Responsibilities: Overall exercise control, initiation, and
termination.

5.4.2 CAS Evaluator: LT Simms
Location: CAS
Equipment: Traffic vest and controller radio.
Responsibilities: CAS evaluation and message distribution.
5.4.3 SAS Evaluator: LT Smith
Location: SAS
Equipment: Traffic vest and controller radio.
Responsibilities: SAS evaluation.
5.4.4 Security Force Controllers-Evaluators: CPT Rogers, LT Johnson
Location: With response force supervisors

Equipment: Traffic vests, controller radios, and controller
guns.

Responsibilities: Security force control and evaluation,
security force safety checks, and release of security forces into
target when called by CAS or SAS.

5.4.5 Adversary Controllers-Evaluators: SGT Adams, SGT White
Location: With adversary forces

Equipment: Traffic vests, adversary radios, and controller
radios, controller guns.

Responsibilities: Adversary control, security force evaluation,
adversary force safety checks.

C-5


ATTACHMENT 1
TO
APPENDIX C
XYZ_SITE MAP



each shift should involve FOF scenarios. The remaining exercises may be
LSPEs that emphasize response to threat scenarios. The exercises should
be of brief duration (two to three hours including preparation and
critique) and the scenarios for them should take into account site-
specific configurations, weapons, personnel, and necessary training
requirements. They should involve only on-site security personnel, be
constructed to exercise various segments of the licensee security system
over the period of a year, be performed under representative lighting
conditions throughout a 24 hour day, and emphasize the direction of
future training, as opposed to being viewed as a pass/fail exercise.
Beginning with the second year of compliance and thereafter, the
frequency of the exercises shall be one per shift every four months, one-
third of which are to be FOF.

One of the FOF exercises will be observed by NRC representatives during
each year. The NRC-observed exercises may involve off-site response
personnel (local law enforcement agencies [LLEA] and other supporting
agencies, as prescribed in physical security and safeguards contingency
plans). The exercise typically may be four to six hours in duration.

The purposes of the NRC-observed exercises are to determine whether
requirements for conducting the exercises are being met jn accordance
with the regulations, and to provide the NRC an opportunity to evaluate
the effectiveness of NRC requirements and guidance related to the
tactical response exercise requirement. These observations will assist
the NRC in determining whether the requirements for training and
exercising security system performance need to be modified. This
determination will take place over time, as exercises are conducted, and
will not be related directly to a single facility. Exercise design,
conduct, control, evaluation, critique, and reporting is the sole
responsibility of the licensee. See Section 2.3.3.d for further
clarification of the relationship of this requirement to inspection and
enforcement concerns.

f. Paragraph 73.46(h)(3) (Contingency and Response Plans and
Procedures)

This section revises the requirement to have a minimum of five guards
available to fulfill assessment and response requirements, by indicating
that these guards must be members of the TRT, and be supported by
additional guards as necessary.

2.3 Rationale and Clarification

This section provides further clarification (in question and answer form)
of the intent of particular requirements found in the amendments to
10 CFR Part 73 addressed above.


LASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

ll. Other Considerations
Standard:

Did factors other than the x
previously listed consider-
ations have a significant
impact on the achievement of
the overall security objec-
tive of this exercise? If
so, explain and estimate
impact.

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

NONE OF SIGNIFICANCE NOTED

H-2-20

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


ATTACHMENT 2
T0
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE SECURITY FORCE BRIEFING LESSON PLAN

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Personal introductions.

b. Purpose of briefing.

Cc. pre of exercise (Read verbatim from Exercise Control
Plan).

2. ADVERSARIES

a. Who they are.
b. What their role is.

c. What rules they play by.
3. SCENARIO

a. Exercise area.
b. Exercise window.

c. Potential adversary targets.
4. SIMULATION

a. Potential prepositioning.
b. MILES equipment.
c. Tactical Response Team holding area.

d. Miscellaneous.

5. RULES OF CONDUCT (READ VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)

G-2-1


3.1.1 Vulnerability Analysis

The first major step in planning a tactical response exercise is to
analyze site vulnerabilities. This step should include an analysis of
specific targets and a review of the site's total protective system. The
product of a site vulnerability analysis is a complete site target list
in order of priority based on attractiveness to the adversary and the
difficulties that must be overcome to defeat the protection measures for
each target.

A vulnerability analysis conducted prior to exercise planning ensures
that the exercise scenarios are based on plausible safeguards
contingencies. A wide range of potential scenarios should be considered,
but emphasis should be placed on the most plausible scenarios.

Before planning to defeat a threat, an understanding of the threat itself
is required. NRC threat guidance defines the design basis threat and its
general parameters. Other sources, which discuss the potential
characteristics of threats against NRC licensed facilities are identified
in the References (Appendix A). This literature should be consulted to
understand adversary characteristics so the exercises can accurately
portray realistic behavior. These sources provide descriptions of the
characteristics of general types or classes of potential adversaries,
which should be considered during exercise planning, as applicable to a
particular site and its immediate environment. Sites have differing
target potentials for various facilities/targets. Similarly, the design
basis threat applicable to an entire site may not apply to every
potential target area within that site. An armed assault may be the most
likely adversary act at some locations, while at other sites covert theft
attempts are the most plausible threat. Regardless, each site's most
plausible threats should form the basis for initial exercise planning.

The next step in the vulnerability analysis is a specific target
analysis. This is accomplished through an overall review of site
missions and functions. Consideration should be given to what is used,
produced, or stored at the site that would be a likely theft or diversion
target and where these materials or matter are located.

Effectively answering target analysis questions creates a list of the
site's most plausible targets. The next step is to rank these potential
targets according to their attractiveness based on both their usefulness
to an adversary and vulnerability to adversary action. Usefulness may
include form, configuration, and suitability for conversion into a
nuclear device. Ranking requires a thorough review of the entire
physical protection system to determine the vulnerability of attractive
targets to adversary actions.

This review should take the following factors into account:
° Geography of the site

* Natural barriers

13




ATTACHMENT 1
TO
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE ADVERSARY TEAM BRIEFING LESSON PLAN

ee —_—EE——__ oe

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Personal introductions.

b. Purpose of briefing.

c. pee of exercise (read verbatim from Exercise Control
Plan).

2. ADVERSARY ROLE

a. Goal is to improve system.

b. Try to defeat system but play by rules.

c. Play part as described to best of ability.
d. Behave realistically (no suicidal actions).
e. Play part in fair, objective system test.

f. Provide realistic training for fellow security force
personnel.

g. "Remember, next time you may be on other side."

3. SCENARIO

a. Review adversary description, goals, and motivation.
b. Review proposed actions.
c. Cover allowable and prohibited variations.

d. Final discussion of adversary plans.

G-1-1


4.1 Coordination, Command, and Control

Objective:

Standard:

4.2 Planning
Objective:

Standard:

Clear, effective, and in-depth control, coordination,
and utilization of security forces and other security
assets assist in mission accomplishment.

Did coordination, command, and control contribute to or
detract from the resolution of the contingency?

Predetermined plans and procedures provide for
accomplishment of the security mission for any
contingency that could reasonably be anticipated. They
provide for the expeditious and orderly development of
ad hoc plans to address unanticipated situations and
enable security forces to act and react in a timely,
effective, and successful manner.

Did planning contribute to or detract from the
resolution of the safeguards contingency?

4.3 Communications

Objective:

Standard:

Capabilities exist to rapidly, accurately, and clearly
exchange essential information between security force
members, the TRT, and appropriate command and control
personnel. Emphasis includes assurance that
communications can be accomplished without compromising
information relating to friendly forces or allowing
adversaries to successfully inject spurious
information.

Did communications contribute to or detract from the
resolution of the safeguards contingency?

4.4 Individual Tactics

Objective:

Standard:

Capabilities exist to move, occupy positions, observe,
and deliver fire in a manner that is effective in
neutralizing the effect of adversary observation,
movement, and fire.

Did individual tactics contribute to or detract from
resolution of the safeguards contingency?

25




LASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

COMMENTS AND EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION

H-1-17

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


2.3.1 Purpose and Scope: Section 73.1(a) (Threat Statement)

Question:

Answer:

2.3.2 Definitions:
Question:

Answer:

Is there any change in the threat statement and its
meaning, as published originally and as discussed in
Regulatory Guide 5.61, Section C?

Yes. 10 CFR 73.1(a)(2)(i)(E) adds consideration of
land vehicles used for transporting adversary
personnel and their hand-carried equipment to commit
a theft. Therefore, transport vehicles should be
included in some exercise scenarios. Other portions
of the threat statement have not been modified.

Section 73.2 (new) Tactical Response Team

Does the rule change the guidance provided in
Regulatory Guide 5.61, Section C [relative to

10 CFR 73.46(h)(3)] where it was indicated that
armed response personnel (now TRT members) may have
other duties?

No. However, these other duties must not interfere
with the ability of TRT members to provide immediate
response.

2.3.3 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems,
Components,and Procedures: Section 73.46

a. Paragraph 73.46(b) (9)

Question:

Answer:

Does the rule revise the guidance provided in
Regulatory Guide 5.61, Section C [relative to 10 CFR
73.20(b)(3)], where it was stated that the testing
program does not imply the need for adversary type
testing?

Yes. It is the intent of the revisions to the rule
that scenarios developed for the exercises include
individuals who play the role of adversaries.

b. Paragraph 73.46(b) (9)

Question:

Answer:

To what extent is MILES or similar equipment
required for the FOF exercises and who is
responsible for procuring and funding the use of the
equipment?

Laser enhanced weapons, such as MILES equipment, are
not required by regulation, but the guidance
recommends that a number of the periodic exercises
and the NRC-observed exercises be MILES enhanced and
employ FOF scenarios. It is generally assumed

9


APPENDIX C

EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN

(MILES-Enhanced)
7 Dec 1989
1. EXERCISE PURPOSE

The purposes of this exercise are to provide site-specific response
training for the SHIELD contract security forces at XYZ Plant and the
supporting local law enforcement agency (LLEA) officers from the Mill
City Police Department (MCPD) and Forrest County Sheriff Department
(FCSD), and to provide XYZ and SHIELD security management with
opportunities to evaluate the XYZ security system in general and SHIELD
response training in particular. This exercise is not a part of the
formal SHIELD contract performance evaluation program. Deficiencies
noted will be used only to form the basis for improving security system
effectiveness and security force response training. Exercise
development, control, evaluation, and critique responsibilities will be
shared between XYZ and SHIELD security management with SHIELD having
primary responsibility and XYZ having final approval authority. This
exercise will be conducted on and around the XYZ plant site. It is
tentatively scheduled for 0100 to 0600 on the morning of 10 December,
1989. :

2. EXERCISE CONCEPT

The primary objective of the security system at XYZ is the protection of
strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) against theft or sabotage.
This exercise will provide for response training and evaluation against
on overt theft attempt of SSNM.

To accomplish its objectives, an NRC-approved security system is designed
to provide five basic functions: detection, delay, assessment,
communication, and response. This exercise will provide for training and
evaluation in all five functions. It will be a MILES-enhanced exercise
involving a maximum design-basis threat adversary force. All vehicles
that might come into play, with the exception of the adversary escape
vehicle, will be MILES-equipped. All personnel who fully participate in
the exercise will wear MILES harnesses and will be armed exclusively with
laser-equipped weapons. Security personnel who are not involved in the
fire-fight portions of the exercise, (such as Central Alarm Station (CAS)
Operators and Material Access Area (MAA) entry and exit control point
(EECP) guards outside of the exercise play areas) will actively observe,
Communicate, and coordinate but they will not participate in any fire-
fight that might develop during the exercise. If there are any personnel
with live weapons within the exercise area who are not participating in
the exercise, they shall be under the direct observation and supervision
of a controller to assure safety. Any live weapons or ammunition within
the exercise area should be under the direct supervision of a controller
or be secured so as to be inaccessible during the exercise, unless an
actual security emergency arises during such exercise. This will allow

C-1


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

8. Security Force Discipline

8.1 Were security force members
responsive to supervisors?

8.2 Were pre-exercise prepara-
tions conducted in a pro-
fessional manner?

8.3 Were exercise conduct and
safety rules observed?

8.4 Did security force members
maintain a positive, confident
attitude and professional
conduct?

Standard:

Did security force discipline
contribute to or detract from
the overall resolution of
this contingency?

H-1-14

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED






6. NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS . 2. ee ee ee eee eee oe
6.1  NRC-Observed Exercise. . 2. ee ee eee eens .
6.2  Force-on-Force Exercises ...... +e se eee
6.3 Limited Scope Performance
(Non-Force-on-Force) Exercises . 2... 6 es ee eee
6.4 Training Needs . 1.2. ee. e eee wee ewe
APPENDIX A - REFERENCES . 2. 2 ee eee eevee eee ewe
APPENDIX B - DEFINITIONS . 2. 1 eee ee ee ee ee ee ee
APPENDIX C - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE CONTROL PLAN

APPENDIX D - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE RULES OF CONDUCT .. . an

APPENDIX E - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE SAFETY PLAN .........
APPENDIX F - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISE PREPARATION CHECKLIST
APPENDIX G - EXAMPLE BRIEFING LESSON PLANS... ~~... .

ATTACHMENT 1
ATTACHMENT 2
ATTACHMENT 3
ATTACHMENT 4

EXAMPLE ADVERSARY TEAM BRIEFING LESSON PLAN
EXAMPLE SECURITY FORCE BRIEFING LESSON PLAN
EXAMPLE CONTROLLER BRIEFING LESSON PLAN . .
EXAMPLE EVALUATOR BRIEFING LESSON PLAN. . .

APPENDIX H - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLISTS .... .~

ATTACHMENT 1 - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST

(BLANK) ....... Pree ee
ATTACHMENT 2 - EXAMPLE FORCE-ON-FORCE EVALUATOR CHECKLIST
(COMPLETED)... 2 ee eee ee eee eee

APPENDIX I - EXAMPLE CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR COMMENT SHEET .... ~
APPENDIX J - EXAMPLE PARTICIPANT CRITIQUE SHEET ........-

vi


ATTACHMENT 1
TO
APPENDIX G
EXAMPLE ADVERSARY TEAM BRIEFING LESSON PLAN



5.1.7 Exercise Progression

The Exercise Coordinator monitors the overall exercise and should not be
encumbered with specific exercise control functions. Specific exercise
contro] functions should be accomplished by exercise controllers. The
Exercise Coordinator should be free to monitor the exercise progress by
monitoring the exercise control, security forces, and adversary radio
nets. The Exercise Coordinator should take an active part only if some
aspect of the exercise appears to be going awry; and, at that point,
ensure that the exercise progresses toward its intended outcome in a
safe, realistic, and secure manner.

5.1.8 Exercise Termination

The Exercise Coordinator should terminate the exercise when the exercise
conditions stated in the Exercise Control] Plan have been met, when an
uncorrectable safety condition arises, when an actual security condition
arises, or when management determines actual operational conditions exist
which preclude continuation of the exercise. Prior to termination, under
normal conditions (i.e., completion of exercise conditions for
termination), the Exercise Coordinator should check with all controllers
and evaluators to ensure that exercise objectives have been fully
achieved.

5.2 Exercise Critique and Evaluation

Critique and evaluation of tactical response exercises is one of the most
important steps in the exercise process. Improvement in the security
system will not be derived from the tactical response exercise program
without effective evaluation of what occurred during the exercise and
identification of strengths and weaknesses. Standardized planning
procedures and checklists enhance these goals. The following points
should be considered when evaluating tactical response exercises and
included in the after-action critique:

* Evaluation should be based on what is actually observed or can
be reasonably inferred.

Evaluators must remain neutral regarding the outcome of the
exercise.

Evaluators must avoid influencing the outcome of the exercise by
their presence. They should be as inconspicuous as possible.

Evaluation should be performance-based. Evaluators should not
judge events by how they personally would have performed a
particular action. The evaluation standard should be whether or
not a particular result was achieved, not necessarily by how the
action was accomplished to achieve the objective.

30


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

10. Physical Security Systems and
Geography

10.1 Do physical security systems xX
complement the tactical capa-
bilities of the security
force?

10.2 Do sensor and alarm systems nf
provide for sufficiently early
detection of penetration to
allow effective security force
response?

10.3 Do assessment systems provide X
sufficient information about
adversaries to allow security
forces to interdict adversary
actions?

10.4 Are tactical communications Xx
equipment systems adequate?

10.5 Are security force vehicles X
and weapons appropriate,
capable, serviceable, and
functional?

10.6 Do barriers provide denial X
or sufficient delay to allow
successful security force
deployment?

10.7. Do response team-to-target X
distances provide time for
security forces to interdict
an adversary?

H-2-18

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED

Needs Not
Improvement Adequate Strong Applicable

5. Team Tactics

5.1 Did the security force work
together as a team?

5.2 Did responders complement
security force personnel
already on the scene?

5.3 Were covered and concealed
routes used in the response?

5.4 Were alternate response
routes planned or used?

5.5 Were tactical formations and
dispersion used?

5.6 Did movement techniques
provide for dispersion and
mutually supporting fire?

5.7 Were supporting fires used
effectively?

5.8 Were security vehicles used
effectively to block or pursue
the escaping adversaries?

5.9 Did the security force gain
control over key terrain?

H-1-9

CLASSIFICATION WHEN COMPLETED


6. SAFETY (READ SAFETY PLAN VERBATIM AND DISCUSS)

7. OFF-LIMITS AREAS (COVER ON-SITE DIAGRAM AND DISCUSS)
8. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

9. CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS

10. QUESTIONS/DISCUSSION

11. CONCLUSION

a. Play realistically.
b. Play safely.
c. Play by rules.

G-2-2


6. NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS

This section deals with the personnel, training, equipment, and support
requirements for conducting FOFs and LSPEs. It is divided into separate
subsections for the NRC-observed exercises (which are one of the periodic
FOF exercises), the periodic FOF exercises, and the periodic limited
scope (non-FOF) exercises . Differences exist in the number of security
personnel assigned at various sites, and numbers at a given site depend
on the particular scenario involved. Therefore, generic requirements are
addressed without specifying exact numbers of personnel involved. The
estimated hours allocations are for planning purposes only and may vary
from those needed in actual practice.

6.1 NRC-Observed Exercise

The most complex and resource intensive exercise envisioned could be the
NRC-observed exercise if the licensee decides to expand the FOF exercise
to include outside response. If this is done, it would involve the
longest exercise window, the greatest number of participants, the most
equipment, and the most extensive planning and coordination. However,
outside response for an NRC-observed exercise is not required. This
Section discusses maximum needs should the licensee elect to conduct an
exercise that includes outside response.

6.1.1 Personnel Requirements

Personnel needed to plan, conduct, and participate in an exercise of this
type include exercise coordinators, evaluators, controllers, security
force participants, adversaries, shadow forces, and possibly LLEA.

6.1.1.1 Exercise Coordinator. The Exercise Coordinator should normally
be a senior member of the security operations and training staff. No
particular training is required, although it is beneficial to have
exercise coordinators participate as assistant exercise coordinators on
several exercises, in order to familiarize them with the requirements
involved. In the absence of such opportunities, any qualified security
operations or training officer should be capable of planning and
conducting an exercise.

The time required to develop, conduct, and follow up on an exercise will
also vary. However, an estimate is approximately 120 to 200 staff-hours
per NRC-observed exercise. These hours include those for the Exercise
Coordinator and other supporting staff members.

6.1.1.2 Evaluators. Exercise evaluators should be provided at the
Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), and with
all major elements of the responding security forces. Additionally, at
least one evaluator should be in a tower or other elevated position from
which a general view of the exercise can be gained. Depending on the
scenario, it may also be desirable to have an evaluator with the
adversary force. Generally, six evaluators are sufficient for an
exercise of this type.

33