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21-1336-cr

United States v. Figueroa

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 15th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

ALISON J. NATHAN,

Circuit Judges.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee, 21-1336-cr

v.

FELIX FIGUEROA,

Defendant-Appellant.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Felix Figueroa, pro se, Bradford, PA.

FOR APPELLEE: Charles M. Kruly, Assistant United States 

Attorney, for Trini E. Ross, United States 

Attorney for the Western District of New 

York, Buffalo, NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New 

York (Frank P. Geraci, Jr., Judge).
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the May 5, 2021 decision and order of the District Court be

and hereby is AFFIRMED.

Following Defendant-Appellant Felix Figueroa’s plea of guilty, the District Court 

adjudicated him guilty of “possession with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 40 grams or more 

of fentanyl” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and sentenced him to 96 months’ 

imprisonment to be followed by four years’ supervised release. Gov’t App’x at 34–36 (capitalization 

normalized). On March 11, 2021, Figueroa, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for compassionate 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking to “reduce [his] sentence to time served,” 

conditioned on an increase in his period of supervised release equal to “the amount of time to be 

excised from [his] sentence of incarceration.” Gov’t App’x at 41. By written order dated May 5, 

2021, the District Court denied Figueroa’s motion because, “even if [Figueroa] could establish that 

extraordinary and compelling reasons favor a sentence reduction,” those reasons “do not outweigh 

the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] that support his sentence.” Gov’t App’x at 120.

We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for “abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

A district court may grant a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) only if (1) the inmate 

has exhausted administrative remedies, (2) the district court has considered the § 3553(a) factors, and 

(3) the inmate has demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence 

reduction. United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Because each 

prerequisite is necessary to granting the requested relief, a district court may “den[y] relief solely in 

light of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.1

The District Court did not “abuse its discretion” in denying Figueroa’s motion based on the 

§ 3553(a) factors. In its consideration of those factors, the District Court noted that Figueroa “pled 

guilty to a very serious charge,” had a “significant criminal record and, at the time of the 

offense, . . . was on parole supervision for a weapons offense,” and (at the time of his motion) still 

had over three years—more than half—of his sentence to be served. Gov’t App’x at 123. The 

District Court then concluded that, based on its balancing of the factors, “[a] reduction of 

1 We need not address Figueroa’s argument that the District Court “misstated the relief that [he] 

sought.” Figueroa Br. at 15. No matter whether Figueroa sought only a reduced term of 

imprisonment, a reduced term of imprisonment to be offset by an increased term of supervised 

relief, or both, the District Court still had to consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining whether a 

sentence reduction was warranted. As explained below, the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that those factors did not support a sentence reduction here.
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[Figueroa’s] sentence in these circumstances would undermine the need for his sentence ‘to reflect 

the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for 

the offense,’ ‘to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,’ and ‘to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’” 

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(2)(A)–(B), (6)). 

Based on the District Court’s reasoned analysis, we conclude that it did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Figueroa’s motion for compassionate release based on its assessment of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73.

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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by Figueroa on appeal and finding

them to be without merit, we AFFIRM the May 5, 2021 decision and order of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2 Figueroa contends that the District Court committed reversible error by stating that he “is 

currently incarcerated at FCI McKean, a medium-security federal correctional institution in 

Pennsylvania.” Gov’t App’x at 119. We do not agree. Although, according to Figueroa, he is 

currently incarcerated in a minimum-security camp annexed to FCI McKean, the fact remains that 

(1) FCI McKean is classified as a medium-security federal correctional institution and (2) Figueroa is 

incarcerated there, albeit at an annexed minimum-security camp. Moreover, Figueroa’s security 

status does not appear to have affected the District Court’s balancing of the § 3553 factors.