U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

28–655PDF 2018

ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE

ADMINISTRATION’S PEACE PLAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 14, 2018

Serial No. 115–112

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Clifford D. May, founder and president, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 10

Mr. Ghaith al-Omari, senior fellow, Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-

Israel Strategic Relationship, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy .......................................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Daniel B. Shapiro, distinguished visiting fellow, Institute for 

National Security Studies (former United States Ambassador to Israel) ....... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Clifford D. May: Prepared statement .............................................................. 12

Mr. Ghaith al-Omari: Prepared statement ............................................................ 32

The Honorable Daniel B. Shapiro: Prepared statement ....................................... 42

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 74

(1)

ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE 

ADMINISTRATION’S PEACE PLAN 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The members of the subcommittee will come 

to order. 

Boy, I really hustled from our Lady Members American Heart 

Health photo. And I get over here, and Ann Wagner is already 

here, you know, with her fourth Cuban cafecito, and I hustled. I 

have got to get in shape. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for our 

opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. I apologize, 20 minutes 

late and more. And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared 

statements will be made a part of the record, and members may 

have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. The chair now recognizes 

herself. 

During the campaign and since he took office, President Trump 

has repeatedly stated that it is his mission to achieve the ultimate 

deal. A negotiated peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, a simple task, as anyone who has ever heard of the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict can tell you. Administration after administration, Secretary of State, after Secretary of State, all have 

had their eyes on the prize. Broker a peace deal between the 

Israelis and Palestinians and your name will be etched in the history books for all time. 

At this point in any previous administration, we would convene 

and ask ourselves the very same questions we always ask. Does the 

administration have a legitimate chance of brokering peace? What 

will it take to bring the parties to together to the negotiation table? 

What will the peace process look like? And can we build enough 

support and momentum to move the process forward? 

I am sure we would inevitably hear many of the same things: 

The status quo has not changed, the negotiation partners remain 

the same. But we remain hopeful, always hopeful, despite the fact 

2

that the players remain the same and we keep trying the same approach. Only this time, for better or for worse, we don’t have the 

answers. 

We can’t say for certain how we expect things to go because this 

administration has fundamentally changed the status quo. First, 

the administration allowed the waiver on the PLO office to lapse 

in November, limiting Palestinian activity in their DC office to 

strictly peace process-related activity. 

This was the first time an administration had done this. Then in 

December, the administration announced that the U.S. officially 

recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and that we would 

be moving our Embassy to the capital. This was the right decision. 

It wasn’t just morally right, but it was also implementing longstanding U.S. law, which mandated that U.S. recognized Jerusalem 

as Israel’s capital. 

Then the administration withheld U.S. contributions to UNRWA, 

a decision I support, and I hope we go further until we see muchneeded reforms at this agency. 

These are the steps that no previous administration has taken, 

yet I believe they are long overdue, and I believe they are rooted 

in solid policy, ultimately aimed at wielding the leverage we have 

to further our own interests, but also to achieve peace between 

Israelis and Palestinians. 

Every administration that has come before has always operated 

in the same space,strictly diplomacy. This is an agreement between 

two parties, one a sovereign state, and the other, a people aiming 

to realize their own statehood. So the only way to resolve this, according to the conventional wisdom, is through diplomacy. 

But the Trump administration has approached this like a business deal. Not only has this upset the status quo, but it has thrown 

the Palestinian leadership into a ‘‘what?’’ kind of mode. They knew 

how to respond to every approach we made. Now, they are in unchartered territory. And this may work to our advantage, and ultimately, to the advantage of peace for the region. 

Some observers have stated that the administration has no real 

peace plan, and that it is making it up as it goes along. I am not 

so sure, and I think that we can see a pattern with the administration’s decisions in recent months. 

It is unlikely that the President would make such clear statements about his desire to achieve the ultimate deal if he had no 

real intent to do so. After all, this is a man who prides himself on 

his deal-making skills. But critics are right to be concerned. The 

administration should have done more groundwork, presented a 

plan before making unilateral decisions. It would have given us a 

better chance to not only build our own case, but to build support 

from other actors, particularly the Arab states. 

It is hard to imagine getting an agreement without our being 

able to get support from these Arab states. And it should make 

clear to us, and to the parties, what its blueprint for peace is, because right now, all parties are uncertain what to expect from the 

administration, and at any given moment, the administration may 

change its objectives. We have seen that before. 

What we need now is a clear and decisive statement of intent 

from the administration. I hope that our panel can elaborate on 

3

what the administration can do to advance the prospects of peace, 

a peace we all have long pursued. 

Thank you again. And now I am so proud to yield to my friend 

and ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to examine an issue that you and I have worked very 

closely on for many years. Support for Israel and peace and security in the Middle East has always enjoyed deep bipartisan support 

in Congress. And it is my hope that today we continue to affirm 

that support. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing. I want to especially 

thank Ambassador Shapiro for coming in from Israel to offer his 

unparalleled insight into these issues after 6 years as our American Ambassador to Israel. 

Madam Chairman, I must say that I am struck by the title of 

today’s hearing because we don’t, in fact, know what the administration’s peace plan is. And to the extent we are aware, no such 

plan exists. We have seen the President’s envoy for international 

negotiation spend considerable time in the region getting to know 

the parties. That is positive. We have seen the President’s son-inlaw travel the Gulf, apparently trying to persuade our Arab allies 

to buy into some kind of push for peace. All of this is well and good. 

And this is certainly not the first administration to struggle with 

how to proceed here. 

What concerns me, and what I hope we have the opportunity to 

discuss today, is how approaching this issue without a strategy is 

potentially damaging to the prospects for peace and, ultimately, to 

U.S. interests. 

In February 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the 

White House. During public remarks, President Trump indicated 

that he would support whatever solution the parties agreed upon, 

saying, I am looking at two states and one state, and then he said 

he can live with either one. 

This marked a serious departure from longstanding U.S. policy 

backed by multiple international resolutions, but the only path to 

lasting peace is two states for two peoples, a safe and secure Israel 

living side-by-side with a prosperous Palestinian state, achieved 

through direct negotiations between the two parties. 

And that is challenging now, but this distancing has rightfully 

alarmed many, myself included, who believe that without American 

leadership working toward a two-state solution, our own security 

interests may be at risk as well. 

Israel is our strongest ally in the region. The security cooperation 

between our two countries is a vital component of our national security and of Israel’s security. And there must be no question that 

the U.S. is committed to Israel security, as evidenced by the signing of an unprecedented new 10-year, $38 billion MOU negotiated 

by the Obama administration. 

It is really unsettling that when asked in an interview this week 

if Israel has the right to defend itself if Iran establishes permanent 

basis in Syria and Lebanon, the President said, ‘‘I don’t want to 

comment on that right now.’’

I fear that the current administration is playing fast and loose 

with diplomacy. In December, the President recognized Jerusalem 

4

as Israel’s capital. And I want to join you, Madam Chairman, in 

stating unequivocally, that Jerusalem is and always will be the 

capital of Israel. But the decision to recognize Jerusalem didn’t 

seem to be accompanied by any broader plan from the administration. 

In an interview this week, President Trump said that he has 

taken Jerusalem off the table. He also said that both sides would 

have to make hard compromises. Again, this just begs the question, 

what is the administration’s plan and what is it ultimately hoping 

to achieve? 

The administration has worked hard to cultivate support from 

the Gulf. And the idea that those countries will play a role in pushing the Palestinians to negotiations, and, in turn, a deal, would see 

a new normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab 

states. That is not new. But the administration seemed to give a 

good faith effort to getting the Saudis and others on board. 

Then on Monday, the President tweeted that the U.S. has so stu- pidly spent $7 trillion in the Middle East. Well, we have spent 

money in the Middle East. We have spent it, obviously, in Israel; 

we have spent it in Jordan and Egypt to protect our mutual security interests, including Israel’s security; we spent it to bolster our 

allies and our joint fight against ISIS and to counter Iranian 

threats. None of this spending is ‘‘stupid.’’

Further, even as his envoys talk up Palestinian economic development, the President seems to be ignoring a potential humanitarian crisis in Gaza that most in Israel have expressed deep concern about, and instead, has haphazardly cut off humanitarian assistance. 

Now, no one can argue that the best thing to ensure Israel’s security is peace, but that is exceedingly more difficult when President Abbas, in his 14th year of a 4-year term, continues to desperately try to avoid direct negotiations, going to every capital looking for support and suggesting that he may leave Oslo. 

Now, I am not naive to the challenges at this moment facing the 

two-state solution. When we have conflicting and confusing messages coming from the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, the President’s 

special envoy and the President himself, it makes it easier for 

members of Israel’s Parliament to push a bill calling for the annexation of the West Bank, or for a prominent minister to say that 

Israel should ignore the U.S. on the issue of annexation. 

These are really difficult issues. Calls to cut off all humanitarian 

assistance and security assistance to the Palestinians has a very 

real impact on the lives of Palestinians, on their security, and on 

Israel’s security. 

That said, we cannot look the other way when the PA continues 

to pay terrorists who carry out attacks against Israeli citizens. 

That is why the House passed the Taylor Force Act, and we urged 

the Senate to do the same. 

Madam Chairman, this committee has typically taken a bipartisan approach on foreign aid, on assistance that promotes human 

rights, on economic development, and security. We had bipartisan 

support for the Taylor Force Act and for Iran sanctions. Bipartisan 

support for Israel as it faces new threats along its northern border 

from Iranian presence in Syria and Lebanon, and we have historiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Mar 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\021418\28655 SHIRL
5

cally had bipartisan support for a two-state solution for two peoples 

living side-by-side in peace and security. 

I just ask that as we hear from our very well-informed and insightful witnesses, that we keep this spirit of bipartisanship in 

mind as we go forward here, and in particular, as we address these 

issues in Congress. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

And that would be my intention as well. Thank you, my good 

friend. 

And now we will hear from our members. And I apologize again 

for being so late. And we will start with, keeping the Florida delegation groove going, Mr. DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The President’s decision to recognize Jerusalem was long overdue. It was the right decision. People had said, oh, you have to 

have a final settlement. But we have been doing this for 25 years. 

It has been the same outcomes over and over again. This shakes 

it up. It sends a direct signal to Palestinian Arabs: You are not 

going to drive Israel into the sea. You need to recognize their right 

to exist as a Jewish state, which you have never been willing to 

do. You need to stop funding the families of terrorists who murder 

Israelis. And then we will see if there is progress to be made. 

But I think the President’s posture is right. He is basically saying he is going to support our strong ally Israel. He is not going 

to, hopefully, shoehorn them into making decisions that are going 

to be detrimental to their security. And I think that is the posture 

that we have to take. 

I am glad that we are having this hearing. I want to hear what 

the witnesses have to say. But at the end of the day, history has 

shown the Israelis have been willing to make really strong sacrifices, make really strong concessions—heck, concessions I probably wouldn’t have been willing to make. But the Palestinian Arabs 

have never been willing to accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state 

in the Middle East. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ron. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for holding this hearing today. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here. 

I have to say, like Ranking Member Deutch, I was really surprised when I saw the title of this hearing, ‘‘Israel, the Palestinians, and the Administration’s Peace Plan.’’ I was surprised and excited to hear that the administration has a peace plan for the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I can’t wait to see it. But I am left wondering if it is one of those secret plans the President seems to be 

so fond of or one that we will ever get to see. 

And while I am thrilled to be welcoming such a distinguished 

and knowledgeable panel to testify before us today, I have to wonder, if we are going to have a hearing about the administration’s 

peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would it not make 

sense to have someone from the administration here to testify 

about it? 

6

But then I have to wonder, who would we have testify? Who exactly within the administrationis driving the policy on the IsraeliPalestinian issue? Is it Jared Kushner? Ambassador Friedman? 

Vice President Pence? Secretary Tillerson? The President himself? 

And, in the meantime, the position of Assistant Secretary for the 

Near Eastern Affairs Bureau remains unfilled. 

As much as I appreciate the hearing today, I think it highlights 

the fact that this administration has so far articulated no coherent 

policy for dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, the 

competing voices, incoherent policy decisions, and lack of seniorlevel appointees only serves to further muddle this already complex 

issue. 

I hope our witnesses can shed some light on what is happening 

within the administration and whether a reasonable observer can 

discern any coherent policy out of the statements made and the 

steps that the administration has taken thus far. And I remain 

ever hopeful of that. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, David. 

Mr. Donovan of New York. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

A path to peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is a 

complex process but one that is necessary to bring stability in the 

Middle East. I want to see all people thrive, but Hamas and the 

Palestinian Authority both make this impossible, with their infighting and a policy of paying out terrorists and terrorist families. 

Terrorism breeds violence and resentment, and the United States 

must do everything in its power to end it. The only simple part of 

this difficult issue is reconciliation cannot start until terrorism supported by Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and other groups 

ends. 

I thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I yield the remainder of 

my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Donovan. 

And Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you both 

to you and to the ranking member for having this hearing; to our 

witnesses for being here today. 

As has already been said, I have spent my entire life praying for, 

working for, peace for Israel and her neighbors, a peace that would 

be two states, living in prosperity, with security. A Jewish state of 

Israel, with Jerusalem as its capital, as it has been for the Jewish 

people for 3,000 years. 

It is critical that the U.S. has a role in this. Over the course of 

my lifetime, I remember in the 1970s first when Sadat went to Jerusalem and the role the United States had in achieving peace between Israel and Egypt; in the 1990s, as the dynamic was changing, the role the United States played in ensuring and delivering 

peace between Israel and Jordan. 

And so, if there is to be peace, it must come with a U.S. role—

a U.S. role that recognizes Israel is our strongest, most important 

ally in the region, recognizes that Israel must have security as a 

Jewish state, but recognizes that without the United States, Israel 

can’t have the confidence to proceed. 

7

I look forward to the testimony today. And, with that, I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Brad. 

Mr. Mast of Florida. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, madam. 

You know, peace has been elusive, but it is my opinion that it 

is closer and more attainable than it has ever actually been, and 

that is because of the blunt honesty that is finally being applied 

to our foreign policy. 

You look at what has gone on year after year. The Palestinian 

Authority, much of the Middle East, much of the world, they pretend, because of the sensitivities of a few, that Jerusalem is not 

Israel’s capital. America has said, ‘‘We will no longer pretend.’’

And you look, year after year, the Palestinian Authority’s chief 

negotiating tool is terror—bombings, stabbings, shootings, driving 

over people, rocket attacks. They do that with one hand, while with 

the other hand they shop around the United Nations for anybody 

that will naively view them as a victim, all while receiving U.S. 

aid, only to turn it over as blood money to the terrorists and the 

families who attack Israel. Congress and the President have said, 

‘‘No more blood money.’’

I believe that peace is more possible than ever because, finally, 

our foreign policy is reflecting that we are not going to pursue 

peace and negotiate peace with our enemies. We are only going to 

pursue peace with those who can declare and demonstrate that 

they are a former enemy, and that is the place that we need to be. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Brian. 

Mr. Suozzi of New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. 

Missing from the table, however, are the administration officials. I 

do hope that one day Congress can get a clear picture of the administration’s plan from our colleagues over at the executive branch. 

Palestinians have spent the past 2 months complaining about the 

President’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. I 

supported that decision then, and I still support it now. It was the 

long overdue recognition of a reality. Jerusalem has been the seat 

of Israel’s Government for decades and the focal point of Jewish life 

for millennia. And, in many ways, it was a symbolic decision. It 

hasn’t changed the realities on the ground, and any effort to blame 

that decision for ending a peace process that was defunct to begin 

with is disingenuous. 

But exactly that is the plan of the Palestinians. For almost a 

year, the Palestinians met with the President’s team over 20 times. 

Mr. Abbas himself met with President Trump personally on four 

occasions. And now, before we have even heard what the administration’s peace plan is, the Palestinians have pulled out of the process. 

Recently, Mr. Abbas was in Sochi meeting with Vladimir Putin. 

He wants the Russians to take over the negotiations, the same 

Russians who have backed a murderous regime in neighboring 

Syria. A regime that just this weekend, allowed Iran to menace 

Israel with a military drone and then shot down an Israel jet. 

8

Sadly, this is the same double game that is not new, and it has 

always been played. For too long, they say they want to resume negotiations with Israel even as they pursue unilateral diplomatic 

moves against Israel. They say they oppose violence even as the 

Palestinian Authority pays millions of dollars to families of terrorists, a demented practice that this Congress is trying to end. 

We all want to see an end to this endless conflict. We need to 

know the administration’s plan, and we need the Palestinians to 

stop playing games. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Tom. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I am very happy to discuss the new policies, even though they 

are yet to be defined, because at least we know that we are going 

to replace the policies of the last administration that created havoc 

in the Middle East, undermined all the moderate forces in the Middle East, and unleashed radical Islamic terrorists throughout the 

region. Yeah, whatever we do to discard those policies, that is a 

good policy, in my mind. 

You know, we have Israel always under attack in situations like 

this. They are always under attack because supposedly they are to 

blame for not giving up more to the Palestinians. And let’s just 

note: Israel over the last three decades has given up the West 

Bank, they have given up authority there, all of Gaza. They have 

withdrawn totally from the Sinai Desert. All they want is not to 

be attacked, and they can’t even get that agreement enforced. 

Right now we understand the Palestinians have given up nothing. If there is a roadblock to peace, let’s focus on trying to pressure the Palestinians instead of trying to pressure Israel, and let’s 

reward Israel, the way our President has just done. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dana. 

Mr. Lieu of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for calling this 

hearing. 

I do want to echo what some of my colleagues have said, which 

is that it is not helpful to have zero administration officials here 

talking about the administration’s peace plan. 

Jared Kushner in December said that we know the details in the 

plan. I actually don’t believe him. I don’t believe there is a plan. 

But we should have him here to testify under oath about what the 

plan is. It is also important to note: Does he run Middle East policy, or is it the Secretary of State, or is it somebody else? 

So we don’t have administration officials here to talk about what 

is in a plan and we don’t even know who is running Middle East 

policy. It is not helpful, I think, very much for this hearing to just 

sort of guess at what is actually happening in the White House. 

I do appreciate the witnesses being here. I do look forward to 

hearing what you are going to guess about. But, ultimately, we are 

going to have to have administration officials here. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ted. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

9

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be very quick, 

which is this—and I appreciate everything all my colleagues have 

said. 

This is such a contentious Congress, we fight about everything. 

I think it is very important that there is one thing we do not fight 

about, the peace and security of Israel. And I hope it maintains 

itself as a bipartisan issue. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And seeing no—Mr. Zeldin of New York. I apologize. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just to share some thoughts, after hearing some of my colleagues 

speaking about, with curiosity, as to the administration’s chain of 

command inside of the White House. My understanding is that 

Jared Kushner, Jason Greenblatt, and H.R. McMaster, the Secretary of State—in charge of the State Department policy—Ambassador Haley as the Ambassador to the United Nations—doing 

whatever is in her lane as the United States Ambassador to the 

United Nations—are all under a chain of command reporting to the 

President of the United States. Make the decisions as it relates to 

moving the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, choosing to better leverage our aid 

that we provide to the United Nations, and cutting off aid to the 

Palestinians as long as they continue to incite violence and financially reward terrorism. 

So that is the chain of command that reports to the President of 

the United States. Those are the people running it inside the White 

House, in the State Department, and at the United Nations. It is 

pretty clear to me and to others who have been paying attention. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Lee. 

And now it is my honor to introduce our panelists. 

Thank you again for your patience. 

First, we are delighted to welcome back Mr. Clifford May, founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Prior to this post, Mr. May was a foreign correspondent and editor 

for The New York Times and other publications. And in 2016, Mr. 

May was appointed to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom by Senator Mitch McConnell. 

Thank you for being here today, Clifford, and we look forward to 

your testimony, sir. 

Then, we will be delighted to welcome Mr. Ghaith al-Omari—did 

I do okay? Thank you, Ghaith. Ghaith is the senior fellow of the 

Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Relationship at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to this 

position, he served in various roles within the Palestinian Authority, including as adviser to the negotiation team during the 1999 

to 2001 permanent status talks. 

We are very excited for your testimony. Thank you so much for 

joining us. 

And, finally, we are so delighted to welcome to our subcommittee 

a good friend of most of us here in the subcommittee, Ambassador 

Daniel Shapiro. He is currently the visiting fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Institute of National Security Studies. And prior to this 

10

position, of course, Ambassador Shapiro served as our Ambassador 

to Israel during the previous administration. Among his many 

other positions, Ambassador Shapiro has also served as Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa on the National Security Council. 

Thank you. It is great to see you again. And you always made 

time to visit with all of the delegations that came over to Israel. 

It is so great to have you here. 

So we will begin with you, Mr. May, and then work down the 

line. Thank you, Cliff. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CLIFFORD D. MAY, FOUNDER AND 

PRESIDENT, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. MAY. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members 

of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

As you pointed out just now, there have been significant changes 

in U.S. relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority—among 

them, U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish 

state, the withholding of some assistance from UNRWA until it 

provides greater transparency, and an attempt to counter actions 

at the U.N. intended to demonize and delegitimize Israel. 

All this is taking place as the Trump administration attempts to 

build their new regional framework with the Arab Sunni states, 

threatened by the hegemonic ambitions of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran. These states now recognize that their security interests with 

Israel coincide. 

Despite these developments, all deserving of your support, I am 

going to argue that any new peace process should be seen as only 

preliminary—small steps, but in the right direction. It is unlikely 

that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be resolved in the foreseeable future. 

One of the reasons why became vivid last weekend when Iran 

provoked a clash with Israel. Note that no Palestinian leader condemned this Iranian provocation, no Palestinian leader has ever 

condemned the Iranian regime, whose intentions toward Israel are 

openly exterminationist. 

Hezbollah, Tehran’s proxy, has tens of thousands of missiles 

pointing at Israeli targets from Lebanon, a country that it now effectively rules. Hezbollah is openly genocidal toward both Israelis 

and Jews. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has said, ‘‘If the 

Jews will gather from all parts of the world into occupied Palestine, 

there the final and decisive battle will take place.’’ Hamas, the 

major power in Gaza, holds identical views about Israelis and 

Jews. 

In this environment, it would require a Palestinian leader of 

enormous independence, charisma, and courage to negotiate a resolution of the conflict with Israel. Mahmoud Abbas is not that leader. 

Elected to a 4-year term as Palestinian Authority President in 

2005, Mr. Abbas has remained in that position without benefit of 

reelection. In recent statements, he made it clear that he does not 

accept the basic premise of a two-state solution, two states for two 

peoples, one of those peoples being the Jewish people. He does not 

11

recognize that the Jewish people have a right to self-determination 

in any part of their ancient homeland. He recently said that Jerusalem is Arab, Muslim, and Christian, conspicuously omitting Jerusalem’s Jewish roots. 

It has been years since Mr. Abbas has been willing to negotiate 

with Israelis. Instead, he has taken part in a campaign to 

delegitimize Israel. This includes U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2334, which asserts that Israel has no rights in eastern Jerusalem—not even the Jewish quarter of the old city; not even Judaism’s holiest sites, the Western Wall and the Temple Mount. 

The administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital 

has at least helped halt the momentum of this very destructive 

narrative. It is important to understand, this campaign has the 

strategic intent of justifying attacks against Israel by Iran, 

Hezbollah, Hamas, and others as a resistance to an illegitimate regime that sooner or later is to be fatally poisoned by a cocktail of 

violence, economic warfare, and diplomacy. 

At some point after Mr. Abbas leaves the scene, a new peace 

process may be developed, but that will depend on who succeeds 

him. According to Palestinian basic law, after 60 days there are to 

be free elections. How likely is that? And if, as has been the pattern in the Middle East for centuries, power is taken by force of 

arms instead, who is likely to prevail? Hamas? Hezbollah? Other 

jihadi groups? 

Working with Saudi Arabia and other partners, perhaps it may 

be possible to develop a next generation of Palestinian leaders who 

do not view peaceful coexistence with Israel as tantamount to defeat, but the magnitude of this challenge cannot be overstated. 

I elaborate on these and other issues in my written testimony 

and offer more than a dozen recommendations—small steps in the 

right direction. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. May follows:]

12


28655a-1.eps

Israel, the Palestinians, 

and the dministration's 

Peace. Plan 

'vVasHit}gk)n, DC 

F~brt1arj 

DEFE?~SE OF Dh..'\!OCF.ACIES 

1h vv ,,, .defendderr. ocm:z-:'. ore; 
13


28655a-2.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Chainnan Ros-Lrhtinen, Member Deutch, members of the subcommitlre, on behalf of 

the foundation for Defense ·"'n.,.~.,····· thank you for the opportunity tu testify. 

Over the past year, there have been changes in U.S. relations with both Israel and the 

Palestinian Authority US. recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the 

Jewish state, threats to 

refonns_ and the 

(UNRWA) unless it 

from the Palestinian Authority unle&s it undertakes 

of some assistance to the United Nations Relief and \:Vorks Agcnq' 

In addition, there has been an atTempt to 

:'l..nd demonb:e Israel 

administration endeavors to build a nev. 

with the states who are threatened the 

ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 

less hostil~ to Israel- the enemy of their enemy- Ehan ever 

President Trump has hoped to utilize this changed architecture to revive the Palestinian-Israeli 

peace process and make the ·'ultimate deal." Despite these steps and developments- all positive 

and deserving of your support and encouragement -I am going to argue that any new peace process 

should be seen as only preliminary. It is unlikely that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be resolved 

in the foreseeable future 

That was true a week ago for reasons I will endeavor to explain. But initiating a new and improved 

peace process has become even more problematic following what transpired over the weekend. 

Iranian forces, operating from an airbase in Syria, sent a drone into Israeli airspace. An Israeli 

Apache helicopter downed it Israel then sent eight F-16s to destroy the Iranian command center 

in Syria. One of the jets was overwhelmed by what the Israelis describe as "massive Syrian antiair fire.'' The pilot of that plane returned to Israeli airspace where he and his navigator ejected 

Both survived. Their plane crashed on Israeli territory. 1 The region is on high alert; more conflict 

may lie ahead. 

You will note that no Palestinian leader condemned this Iranian provocation No Palestinian leader 

has ever condemned the Iranian regime, whose intentions toward Israel are openly annihilationist 

Hezbollah, Tehran's proxy militia, has tens of thousands of missiles pointing at Israeli targets tram 

Lebanon, a country it now e!Iectively rules. Hezbollah is openly genocidal toward both Israelis 

and Jews. The leader of the "Party of God,'' Hassan Nasrallah, has said: if''the Jews will gather 

from all parts of the world into occupied Palestine there the final and decisive battle will take 

place'' 2 

Hamas, the major power in Gaza, and a not insignificant presence in the West Bank, receives 

funding and arms from Tehran, and holds identical views about Israelis and Jews. (See the Hamas 

1 Oliver Holmes. "Israel launches 'large-scale' attack in Syria after fighter jet crashes.·· The Guardian (UK), 

10. 20 18. (biTl2~.i./I-Y1YYYJhGJ.!ll:Edi:tn_.Qf:i!J}f..lwrklj]J)_l fYtS;b_!_i QiiEr!l~Li_-fiJ-_:;J_u:_-::_r_-J_gt~slJp_i .gQ~0.l~~\lT:.S.IDJm:-tlr-.;._~ 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
14


28655a-3.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Covenant3) Hamas believes that any territory conquered by Muslims must never be surrendered 

to non-Muslims. This is not a negotiating position. It is a matter of ideology and theology. Barnas 

has never been and never will be part of a serious peace process 

In this environment, it would require a Palestinian leader of enormous independence, charisma, 

and courage to negotiate a resolution of the conflict with Israel. Mahmoud Abbas, president ofthe 

Palestinian Authority which (loosely) governs the West Bank, is not that leader 

Elected to a four-year term as PA president in 2005, he has remained in that position without 

benefit of reelection. In recent statements, he made it abundantly clear that he does not accept the 

basic premise of a two-state solution: two states for two peoples- one of those peoples being the 

Jewish people. 

He does not recognize that the Jewish people has a right to self-determination in any part of its 

ancient homeland. He recently said that Jerusalem "is Arab, Muslim and Christian"' -

conspicuously omitting Jerusalem's Jewish roots, implicitly rejecting what historian Barbara 

Tuchman once pointed out: that Jewish Israelis are living in the same land, speaking the same 

language, and worshipping the same God as did their ancestors 3,000 years ago. Few peoples can 

say the same 

It has been years since Mr. Abbas has been willing to sit down and negotiate with Israelis. Instead, 

he has taken part in a campaign to delegitimize Israel. This includes UN Security Council 

Resolution 2334, 5 which passed in late 2016 and claimed that Israel has no rights in the eastern 

sections of Jerusalem- not even the Jewish Quarter of the Old City: not even Judaism's holiest 

sites, the Western Wall and the Temple Mount The current administration's recognition of 

Jerusalem as Israel's capital has at least helped halt the momentum of this damaging narrative 

It is important to understand: This campaign has the strategic intent of justifying attacks against 

Israel - by Iran, Hezbollah, Barnas, and others- as "resistance" to an "illegitimate regime" that 

sooner or later is to be fatally poisoned by a cocktail of violence, economic warfare, and 

diplomacy. So long as that goal appears even remotely realistic, no Palestinian leader can settle 

for less without painting a target on his back 

Mr. Abbas opposes what he calls "normalization" with Israel, effectively preventing Israelis and 

Palestinians from working together, getting to know one a11other, perhaps discovering that they 

need not be enemies forever 

Divestment, and Sanctions - is an integral pari of this "antielements play an i1nportant role. BDS does not benefit Palestinians 

3 "Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covennnt of the Islamic Resistance Mmement:· Yale l~aw School. August 18, 1988 

{b1.1Q.; 1fm aioitliJ.l.L.) ak:.cdu120i1Lgn.tJ_J!)'/hJllt1S a:m) 

-l Dov Lieber, ·'US blasts Abbas for failure to mention Jcmsalcm"s Jc\Yishconncction." 

Fcbumry 8. 2018 

2016 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
15


28655a-4.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

On the contrary, it is an important eausc or the high unemployment and poverty within the VVest 

Bank 

Tn a serious peace process, political leaders on both sides would work toward peaceful coexistence 

even as negotiations proceeded on borders, security, economic relations, and other issues. That has 

not been the case in peace processes of the past 

At some point, after Mr. Abbas leaves the scene, a new peace process may be developed. But that 

will depend on who succeeds l\1:r. Abbas, on who next leads Palestinians. According to Palestinian 

Basic Law, Article 37, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council is to ''temporarily" 

assume the powers and duties of the PA president.'' Right now, that position is held by a Barnas 

leader who, according to the Israelis, has been involved in "terrorist activities.'' 

After 60 days, there are to be "free and direct elections to elect a new President" Considering how 

long it has been since there have been any elections in the West Bank and Gaza, how likely is that? 

And if balloting fails, if instead- as has been the pattern in the Middle East for centuries- power 

is taken by force of arms, who is likely to prevail? Hamas" Hezbollah? Other jihadi groups? 

I predict with regret The next Palestinian president will not be Salam Fayyad, the former 

Palestinian Authority prime minister who, I believe, did contemplate ending the conflict v.;ith Israel 

so as not to sacrifice another generation of Palestinians to the dream of wiping Israel off the map 

He also made a serious attempt to build the institutional foundations necessary for the 

establishment of a Palestinian nation-state that would not be a terrorist-supporting despotism and 

penn anent ward of the international ''donor community." 

Mr. Fayyad never had broad support on the West Bank orGaza7 Hamas despised him. And, in the 

end, Mr. Abbas forced Mr. Fayyad out of office. He now lives in the US. 

Working with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan. and other Sunni Arab partners, as well as 

any pragmatic elements that can be found within the Palestinian Authority, it may be possible for 

the administration and Congress to develop a next generation of Palestinian leaders who are serious 

about resolving the conflict, and who do not see peaceful coexistence with Israel as a euphemism 

for defeat But this challenge cannot be overestimated 

I \1\·ill elaborate on these and other issues and provide recommendations in further testimony below. 

jf'rusal~?m: On December 6, 20 l7, the president announced that it is U.S 

Jerusalem as the capital of I~rael. This announcement does not predetermine the staUls of 

JerusaJem as decided through bilateral negotiC!lions bet\veen Israeli and Palestinians. It does not 

rule out the of a Palestinian capital in or near eastern Jerusalem. Tt does, however, 

recognize as Israeli sovereignly. 

0 The Palcstini<m Basic La\Y. Article 37. issued on March 18. 2003, accessed Fcbmmy 12, 2018. 

O~ttp.?J.::!."+.lTI}-_:p.J)_._,:~'Iint_<J_t_"!ll<J_'0Q_;r'>:Y,911~l!5i~-:-J:liV?J!QJ_:;-i_m.f!lQ_(JFb.<JSi~':'l;:r~:) 

~Clifford D. Ma~ ... May: lnlhe West Bank. peace and prosperity are mllikely:· New~day. February 6, 2013. 

(hrtos:i/'."."\YVi'.liGVlSililY.com'opillicn/ovcd/in-tllC-\YCST-bank-pc:J;::c-m:d-pro::r(~rity-arc-unlikclY~clifford..J-nuJYL:t~7:-IJ+:D 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
16


28655a-5.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

I need not remind you that Democratic and Republican members of Congress, by a \vide 

voted for the Jen1salem Acr of 1995 on Oct 24, 1995 ft recognizes that Jerusalem is 

ofhrael.R The law was the Senate 93-5, and the House tally was 374-37 9 The 

became public lao,v 1995. It is fair to that President Trump has done 

more than operationalize this overwhelming .;;entiment 

Jerusalem 

abide by its 

this bipartisan sentiment again in 20J 7. Senate Resolution 176- a resolution 

the 50th of the reunification of Jen1salem - was 

2017. 10 It fsrael's commitment to 

sites in Jerusalem. The resolution reatllnnod. 

the pcm1ancnt status of Jerusalem remains a matter to 

final status negotiations towards a two-state ;:.,o1ution: and 

1995 as US law. and calls upon the pre<ident and allli.S 11 The vote was 90-0 

Congressional leaders have been ruticulato about the need to ensure that U.S. policy 

Jerusalem as the capital of Israel One example: On Oct 24, 1995, Rep. Peter Deutsch, a 

Democrat rose "in support of H.R. 1595, which is a piece of legislation that will facilitate a long 

overdue movement of the United States Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This is the 

only Embassy in the world, American Embassy, that is not in the capital that is designated by the 

country that the Embassy is in." 12 

He added: "[F]ailure to get the two-thirds vote on this bill today would be sending an exactly 

wrong message because it would be sending a message that there is not resolve in this Congress in 

support of the peace process and that there is an opening in terms of what could happen in terms 

of Jerusalem, that the United States Congress has weakened its supports for this peace process." 

And Chuck Schumer, then a House member, today Senate Minority leader, noted that whenever 

"Israel has had control of any portion of Jerusalem, it has been open. The world's holy places have 

been open. When the Arab nations had control of Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, no Jew was 

allowed to visit any of those holy places, and many are important to the Jewish religion, as well as 

the Christian and Islamic religions. Mr Speaker, whenever I went to Israel and would have to meet 

with American ofticials and leave Jerusalem and go to Tel Aviv, it was embarrassing. It was 

humiliating. It was wrong. As has been said before, it is a nation's sovereignty to choose its capital. 

Israel has chosen Jerusalem. It is about time the United States went along." 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 4 www.defenddemocracy.org 
17


28655a-6.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

President Trump already has instructed the State Dcpattment to begin preparations to move the 

American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Je1usalem Recent reports suggest that the move could take 

place as soon as ue:<t year. 13 

the announcement led to v..idespread condemnation of the lLS. in the Arab 

I. rN Security Council voted to condemn the decision, but Haley cast 

America's veto 

sometimes called 

that there would be another intif"ada in Gaza and the 

attempted to incite such an But \vhilc protests vvere 

reported in a number of countries- Paki&tan, and among them- their size and 

duration did not live up to the predictions 

Tn the ""'rest Bank, the dominant Fatah 

strike two days aftcr. 17 On the 

declared that the two-state 

outcome." Mr. Abbas called recogniti:on 

Palestinian Aid: The Tmmp admini~tration has expressed concern about hm:v the Palestinian 

Authority has been fundlng by the ·united States. On January 2, 2018, the 

cut part $700 million in annual aid it the Palestinian 

Authority. 20 President Trump lamented that despite thr hundreds 

1

' Mark Landler. "U.S. Presses to Reloc<lle Embassy Lo Jerusnlembv 2019,'' Jhe New York J'nnn, Jnnunry 18. 2018 

(http~:i/v, \> \Y.J.n:.tim~-;.co;uflQll.:.&.lll~illYQQ1ilic;;;/t;·umn-israel-eiu"iaso;\ -jet'~J..,.~Jem.hlml) · 

H Nahal Toosi, ··State Department Wmns of Violence Ahead ofTmmp Jerusalem Decision," Poltttco, December 4. 

2017. (htto<;://\-n-YW polltku.com/story/20 17:'1 '2/0-t/mnnp-isrnd-i:.:ms<1l(;m-\iolcncc-2i9i'l;)) 15 Muhnmmad Shehada. "Palestinian Rage 0\er Tnunp's Jerusalem mO\e Won't Tum into n Third lntiradn.'' 

Haaretz (Israel), December 6, 2017. Omn~://v,'""" f}illl.retz_f21r./mlddle~st-nel~~mium-desmte-tn:ul1ll: 

palcStU.lli.\!]):HYOH-(-St<.JJt -U-thiiJ-intihtda-1. 562. 789~.) 

Jr, Alastair Jamieson. "Trump Jerusalem move sparks more protests across Muslim \\Orld." NRC New.1. December 8. 

2017. (https·/fw\\ w .!<.bene\• s com/ He'\\ s/\\ orld/mnup-jentsalem-move-sparks-more-prolests-across-muslim -world .. 

nS2762_ii) 

1- Loveday Manis and RuU1 Eglash. '"Palestinians Clash with Israeli Troops Ahead of 'Da) of Rage· at Trump· s 

JemsalemMove." lhe Washington Post, December 7, 2017. (Jm:PSLL!">""',1\T.}}"D...iliUJ.~~'t.Com/n:orkllh;lt11.as-caDs: 

f.PJ.::JJ.prit,illg-:J5:1llil~WiJJEi:llrotc~t:.LllJJ!.!P.Jt:.is;Mi.!k.Oi-St:ii1CC/2(l! "LJ_2107/ccc~.;9l..;(l-d.aca-l i c 7-;J241-:: 

O/?-l13315(!PdQ sjon html~\1tm ie<)W~,tl11'h:,56_3c00 

18 No~ .L~.&t~ ;;.d-J~~k-Kt~~t~--:.T~,o~S-tat~ -S;iuti~n is Over.' Top Palestinian Diplomat Sa) s After Trump's 

Jcmsalcm Speech.," Haaret;: (lsmcl), December 7, 2017. (bJ!y~lL1'-'\tW haard.z.com/nJiddl.::-.;;.,~tnc\'iSiuakstiTii<llts/.prcn!iun~-two-st:Jt·:.:-solut1m;-is-{)YCr -t\.'Q-Q<IksthJian-dipkmmt -savs-! .56:.:7973) 19 Adam Rasgon. "Abbas Slams Trump's Jemsalem MO\e as 'Condemned, Umcceptable.'·' Jhe Jerumlem J>o.11 

(lsrael), December 6. 2017. (1J!m:i/\\ '" \\ .ii!9.hl.£mn/Aw._Q:J£r.~Ji-C..n.lli}jsJL..;.'Jba~.::.~1lli:Irump-.Jen .lWem-n!i!.\ e-a">-

-.:ondcmm:d-umF..:c~;.·uttblc-:' l7)) 1) 211 Anne Gearan "Tmmp threatens to take away more U.S. aid from Palestinians if they don't negotiate vvith Tsracl. .. 

11w January 25. 2018. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
18


28655a-7.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Palestinian coffers, the U S. gets '"no appreciation orn:spect'' 21 He further stated 

negotiate a long overdue peace treaty with Israel" Palestinian officials 

calling W1r. "not a serious man Abbas advisor Ahmed Majdalani 

reportedly ''f\V-je vvill ties v.rith the Americans,'' and ''this means the end of the peace 

process and tbe U.S role there 

Since this initial between the administration and the Palestinian Authority, the White 

House has \YithhelU million in assistance to the United Nations Relief \Vorks Agency 

(UN~\VA), which is the prhnary vehicle for administering aid to Palestinians in refugee camps 

acro5s the reg:ion. More on that immediately belmv. 

also has hcen expressing opposition to the PA's continuing incitement to terrorism and 

of tenorists. The Taylor Force Act, 25 named after the U.S veteran v..ho was 

murdered by a Palestinian in 2016 while on a Yisit to Israel, v....-ould require ro rake 

steps to condemn violence and to stop providing salaries to rerro1ists imprisoned after 

attacked Americans and Israelis. The House of Representatives passed the legislation 

unanimously. The bitt has not yet been brought to a vote in the Senate. Congress should support 

such and as a requirement for the foreign aid it provides Taxpayer 

dollars -:hou!d not used by to encourage or reward terrorism 

lTNR\YA: The admmistrat]on's decision to-withhold part of the assistance ir provides to L~KVlA 

has iUrther infuriated the PA. The Palestinians apparently view American to l~"'RV.l A 

a& an entitlement. The administration views such payments as charitable by Ammican 

taxpayers 

Among the largest impediments to a workable two-state solution is the 

Palestinians that ha"\.~·e been status by LTl'\"'RWA Since 1950. 

operations, the number claiming refugee status has risen from 

800,000 to more than 'i million. 

after the l9r~8 \var, vve know that the vast majori1y of those UNR\V A 

of the kind. Rather, they are descendants of refugees - children, 

who have been kept in a state of 

"ill be &cttled 

1 Zeke I\.1iller and Jill Colvin, .. Tnunp Threatens to Cut Off US Aid to Palestinian Authority," Associated f'ress, 

January]. 2018. (]}ttQ'i:iiYVW\Y.{)U11C\YS.C•Jm/0l..J.dbbflfi5J 1+29Q2<.;()i)c~1Sa7£f::-8cQ) 

~ Adam Rasgon. "Abbas Ad, iser: Tnnup·s T\\iller Stann on Aid Has Absolutely No Justification_'· The Jeru.1alem 

1-'vsf (Israel). January 3. 2017. (http://\~\\ v, .ioosLcoirtf.A.rab-l!!raeli-ConilicUAbb:J!'.-advJser-Innnps-TY.iller-slonnllik.!JlQ-h ts-at lc;o intc.LY=!lli.:"iustificaiit 11 J.: 53 2 §J_jj 23 Grant Rumley. "Mahmoud Abbas Doesn·t Have a Trump StratC6'J·;· 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
19


28655a-8.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

aclmclwled,<eti that "[i]n truth, the vast 

have or ""reintegratecl"' and that 

from ceasing to he "refugees" is Ul'\"'RW A-s unique 

If UNRWA continues its practice of designating the descendants of refugees as refugees, there will 

be an estimated 14.7 million Palestinian "refugees'' by 2050 27 That exceeds Israel's current 

population of8 million, 28 with minorities- the largest being Arab Muslims- currently constituting 

as much as 25 percent. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which deals with all non-Palestinian refugees around 

the world, does not award refugee status to the descendants of refugees. The UNRWA definition 

has no non-political logic. That said, utilizing the UNHCR definition of refugee does not imply 

the U.S. should cease assisting impoverished Palestinians vvith the goal of helping them become 

productive and self-supporting (a goal UNRWA has not seriously attempted to achieve). 

The UNR\VA claims to serve 2 I million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, 1.3 million in Gaza_ 

800,000 in the West Bank, 543,000 in Syria, and 463,000 in Lebanon. rhe UNRWA 702 

schools, 143 healthcare facilities, and overall facilities. lJNR\NA is 

to 31.000 local plus 178 By contrast, tbe Ul\'HCR operates with a 

10,000-person millions upon millions of refugees around the world. 

The UNR\VA has into a mas-:ive self-sustaining bureaucracy that allows the Palestinian 

Authority to shirk responsibilities to provide basic services to i1s m.vn in the \.Vest Bank 

and Gaza and dela:ys the permanent integ1ation of millions into states. 

The agency's overall incfficie11Cy administrative costs make the Uh"RWA 

us currently constructed - a dubious invcsimcnt 

brazen usc of the descendants as pavms in a vvar of 

deserve American suppmi. How spends its limited 

impoverished Palestinians through aid programs has merit, but 

term interests of the United States while impeding any 

r~considered. 

At the least, its 

does not 

This rcrninder In the late 1940s and !950:::, the nurnber of Jews forced from Arab and 1\luslim 

countries was about the same as the number of Palestinians (as noted above, roughly 800,000) who 

.zr; Asaf Rmnirm\sky and Alexander Joffe ... The True Obstacle to Peace Bet\',een Israelis and Palestinians." i'orbes. 

:March 26. 2013. (llJ!Q~Jh.ITI~lY .fotbcb comh;itcs1l:-.:alspilJ/!0 13 /i)}/ 26/th.:-trlJc-ohstadc-t0-p~acc-Q_chYccn:ismcjj.s.: 

and-ual~stinians!:tff:lhh.;:! CJ53f0d) 2

- Jonathan Schmu.er. "Defining Palestinian refugee status and the consequences ... The Hr/1, May 22. 2012 

@JQ:!i! hclJijl.conJJbk·gs/cQJJ.fW~s-b log/foreign-polk\ 12 2:)~77 ~eflx~ng::lli!!estinffin:ffi!~.1;').tns-and-t~ 

~OH'.iCQli_CJ.J~ 

~ Central Tntclligcncc 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
20


28655a-9.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

fled from what became israel. Not one oft he Jews exiled from those Middle Eastern countriesin which their f~1milies had liv~d for millennia- remains a refugee today. Nor are any demanding 

a '·right ofretmn'' to their birthplaces in Arah and ~1uslim countlies 

The need for is clear. That has to mean the tra.11siti on of ersatz refugees to 

to those who for generations 

Authority, new infrastructure 

and government mstitutions vvill be 

under tl1eir control 

with little to show for it. Over the last 

to audit expenditures, crack down on the usr of 

terrorists, snd ren10ve anti-Semitic textbooks fron1 UNR \VA schools have 

5ure, pushing back against the inertia of a 70-ycar-old bureaucracy tb(1t lives 

a refugee crisis is an up-hill the Depmiment of 

the past defended the status quo while underlying problems. 

With that in mind, the administration's recent decision to withhold funds from th0 UNR Vv1 A marks 

an opportunity that would be wise to seize. The elected of American 

taxpayers should take in agency 

rhe United Nationii for the first time to lJN~\VA oversight and reform. now is 

the time for Congress to work \vith the administration to make changes long 

overdue 

UN I~Pform: The administration is working to mute the anti-Israel dmmheat at furtle Bay One 

priority has been to mitigate the damage done by UNSCR 2334, 30 v,..·hich the Obama administration 

declined to veto, and which calls UN member states to differentiate betvveen the of 

the State ofTsrael and the territory to I&rael in 196 7 vvhen it a defensive 

its Arab neighbors. That the Six-Day War was defensive is lH<J"I'u""uJc. 

Then-Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser declared at the time that the grievance he intended 

to address was the "existence of Israel." He promised that the war would result in "Israel's 

destruction" Cairo radio declared Israel would be "liquidated." Syrian dictator Hafiz ai-Assadfather of Syria's current dictator, Bashar ai-Assad- vowed '·a battle of annihilation." Then-Iraqi 

President Abdul Rahman Arefsaid the opportunity must be seized "to wipe Israel olfthe map. 

to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948.'' Ahmed Shukairy, a representative 

of the then three-year-old Palestine Liberation Organization, was asked what would happen to 

Israelis after the war. "I estimate that none of them will survive,'' he said. 31 

then the occupying pov .. er. It seized the West Bank from Jordan, 

Prior to ~hose occupatiolls, iht: West Bank-- previously known as 

-had been mled by the Brit1sh Empire and, for centuries before that, by the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
21


28655a-10.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Ottoman Empire. !\'ever have these or any other territories constituted resembling a 

Palestinian srate Through negotiations with Israelis, the opponunity to create a state could 

be opened for the first time in history. In ;:etum, however, Palestinians need to resolve their ccmf1icr 

with the Jmvish state. 

UNSCR 2334 calls the Israeli presence in eastern Jerusalem a violation of international law 

Included within eas!em Jerusalem the Jewish Quarter of the Old and the most ancient and 

holy sites ofthe Jewish people the Westem Wall, or Korel, and the Mount During and 

immediately after lsrael's VVar Jordanian forces Jews from those areas 

and destroyed or desecrated Jewish s1tes. 

It is virtually 

Jerusalem as a! 

a UNSC resolution The administration's 

makes clear rha! the U S 

of 

on 

of history: and international law- as any objective measure it is 

The U.S. Congress, to its credit, 

Still. it remains in place and 

the United Nations and beyond. 

FNSCR 2334. Legislators condemned it immediately. 

to provide fodder for anti-Israelism and an(i-Semitism at 

US. Ambassador to the UN Nikki HaJey has called for an end to the riYer of resolutions 

condemning Israel, fast flovvlng even at ?\fiddle East is engulfed in far more lethal 

cri&es: hundred-. of thousands of Syrians killed and millions turned into refl1gees; 

1vith jihadis in Sinai; a devastating civil vvar in Yemen the list goes on. About these the 

U ·" says little and docs less 

Ambassador Hale'y bas threatened to cut ald to the United Nations over actions taken in the General 

Assembly to condemn U.S recogmt;1on of J ern salem as Israel's capital. In December, Ambassador 

I-ialey announced that the U.S. negotiated a $285 reduction to the UN'& coffers. 

BDS: Boycott, Divestment, and represent another impediment to 

nmmalization and, not just of Palestinians building a viahle 

economy. Joint ventures, and growing of products 

for have empowered Palesriuians nnd provided much-needed more often lhan not, 

two to fourtimes Lhe wages ofi'ercd at the small number t'actories. 12 BDS 

however, have attempted Lo isolate these companies and intimidate those who attempt 

such interactions 

One example· Daniel Bimbamn is an T~racli entrepreneur, the founder oflhe intematicnal compcny 

Soda Stream, which manufacJurcs devices that let yQn tum tap water into sparkling W<Jfcr 

··Ho"\Y Soda Stream :Makes-and Markets-Peace:· Bloomberg 

Reuters, 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
22


28655a-11.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

In an interview a few years ago, he told me that one day he had an idea· He wanted to ·'employ 

Palestinians.'' 

So he bought a factory on the \Vest Bank - \'vhere unemployment runs about 30 

hired more than 5(f0 Palestinians. He alsG hired 350 Israeli /uabs and 300 

then1 all "·Israel! wages:' roughly f~•ur times higher than lhc \Vest Bank 

Paleslinians are noi Israeli citizens and theren.)re do not qualify for L-:rridi h~ahh care, 

private insurance for them, vs \Vell as for their dependent;;;, knov,;ing full well that "each employee 

':>upports about ten family me-mbers " 33 

""G"or a '~"·hile he thought he VdlS succeeding: He 1vas 

jobs for Palcstinia~ls and mos~ important -tOr him, 

Israelis and Arabs, !'v1us~ims and Je'.vs, men and women. to V~.ork together, respect 

even leam to like one another 

Of c0ursc, the BDS campaign v,:as soon accusing him of stealing land and 

o..::cupation" That \.vas among the reasons his in the \Vest Banl down. 

Efforts by BDS activists have resulted in the loss of other Palestinian Leaders 

of BDS organizations the very existence of Israel. They ~eek to students on 

college campuses that is an "apartheid" - even as they do everything they can to 

separate hraelis and PaJestlnians, to keep them developing anything resembling nonnal 

relations betVYt2t:n neighbors. 

One of the key BDS organizations on<erati11<J in 

It orchoJstrates HDS campaigns delerriti11r1izino and waging economic warfare 

State of Israel 

Several individuals now working for or on behalf of AMP once worked for or on behalf of the 

Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), the Islamic Association for Palestine 

(lAP), and/or KindHearts for Charitable Development All three organizations were implicated by 

the federal government for financing the Ham as, a designated terrorist group, between 200 I and 

2011. Moreover, several of ANIP's donors were involved in organizations implicated in funding 

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even al-Qaeda34 

The Blacklist: On March 24. 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to create a 

blacklist of companies that in the Golan the West Bank, and eastem Jemsalem 

voted in such a Fifteen countries abstained from the 

some members of the European UniorL35 

33 Clifford D. :May. '"Jobless and dcspcmtc Palestinians,'' The Washington Times, October 27,2015 

( https: I !v·, '.\',Y. Tnl s hi mrtmlt i 1 nc s. ,;orn;'n..:"\Y~ '2 (I ! :5! ~)C rfJ i / c! itford -m(JY m i ob !css-;n ld-d;;sp(.; rate ~p:J lcsti nl<.l!lli) 

~ Jonathan Schmu.er .. E.xmnining Current Terrorist Financing Trends and the Threntto the Homeland." 

th& House Homeland Securil)' Commillee Counlaferrunsm and lnlef/ig('nce 

(http //docs.hmJSL'.!;U\.;mcct.iu_gs/HMiHI\i_Q,_"ii201QQ~)_2/lG-!2Q.j{HHRG-ll4-HM05-

})'T,st.o1_Lc_-:-5_::J~~tnz_g:J -_2J2t!iQ~_L 2_nQD 35 United Nations Human Rights CounciL Resolution 31/36. "Israeli seHlemenls in the Occupied Palestinian 

Tcnitory. and in the April20. 2016. (htms://doClnncms-dd~~ 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 10 www.defenddemocracy.org 
23


28655a-12.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

On Janumy' 26, 2018, the United Nations Human Rights Council released ;:m intetim that 

highlighted the actions mken to investigate companies in these tenitories lJN 

identified 206 companies that it believes may be these areas. So far, the ENHRC has 

contacted 64 in an attempt to ascertain their companies' in these tenitories 

rhe report did not 11ame specific companies hut rather indicated the number of entities it v.·as 

pursuing m1d where those organizations were domiL:iled The indicated that 143 

included in the list were b<:~sed in I~raeL vvhile 22 were 

companies operating from Germany. 

Israel is an attractive place for investors hecause of its 

cuiture. But the list meant to have a chi !ling effect on 

high tech sector and statt-up 

Israeli It yet 

oflJN" bias and disctimination. Israelis are willing to help ra''"'·•mru" 

sell:'-d<etermrnatron and a sustainable economy- if Palestinians are willing to 

with Israelis. Keep in mind. The Chinese are not willing to do the same tix Tibetans, the 

are not willing to do the same for Chechens, nor will :r\1iddle Eastern do the same :for 

the Kurds -to name just three Yet the UN no interest in the of these 

~tateless nations. and no interest in who oppress them. The 

hardly be more obvious and egregious 

Palestinian Leadership: The rhetoric from Pale:;;tinian leaders in the adrninistration's 

policies can be characlerized as combative. "AJnerica can no longer 1he stmvard of the peace 

on its own. We hav·e had enough of !hat.:' declared Mahmoud Abbas' ad\,isoc Nabi1 36 In addition. the Palestinian leadership announced it would seek recognition in more 

intemational bodies, it appeaJed to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to start a "judicial 

inquiry into Israeli settlements." and (ieclared rhar it was reconsidering its recognition of Israel 

This so-caJled recognition is misleading. Israel is not recognized by PaJestinlan leaders as the 

homeland ,)f the Jewish Furthennore, their demand that there be a of return'' fOr 

mi111ons of Pale&tinian is intended to tum israel into an f:tatc, 

.a minority It is unlikely they would b~ a equal 

In no Arab/l\1u~lim majority country do minorities anythmg to 

By contrast, T&rael'& many minorities - Muslims, Druze, etc. -

and ±ieedoms unavailable anywhere else in the region. 

-'>r> AdamRasgon, "Abbas Advisor: U.S. Can Play Role in Multilaleral Peace Process:· The Jerusalem Pus! (lsrael). 

December 11,2017. Ch!ln:l/v.''.Y't~Q.~QJ.Lt.LAmcrican-Pol.ills.iLPai.cstiliiill.l:.a.9~isor-US-o.lJ1:.ill.ill' .. :.l:Q..h;-in-ru.utti_lqt~m!: 

pcacc~proccss-5 t 76() 1) 3 Jack Khoul). ··Abbas Declmes Oslo Accords Dend: 'Trump· s Peace Plan is a Slap .. We ·n Slap Back.··· Haarefz. 

(lsrael), Janual) 15.2018. (ill}.ps:/:\\\\\\ h!l_::i.EJLCOlli/nJ.iddle-e;J-;t-nenf./palc:s1iujons/abbas-.. D .. tGiare5.::.Q_slo-<lcco..ffi~ 

dr.:ad-t.ill!Jll!::~.::Q.Q,!££::Ulfm-is-a.2!;m:L"'i_Zdf.l750): "PLO says it "\Yill seck action in UNSC. Gcncml Assembly and 

Tee;· Wafa News Agency (Palestinian Tcnitorics). Fcbmary 3. 2018. 

Cl!UQ; ',~ellgli.sh.,..Y!M'IlJ2SIIJ.R&.~ .. Q-.W~;,_j_d~~..lJS~h IdJJq~(;j}_~:HJ.l_{~~qmj,.X ill{): "PLO lo stud) revoking ils recognition of 

Tsracl_-- .Vflddle East F-ye, Fcbmary 3. 2018. (hrtp·("\V'.V\Y.rniddlcLa.stcYc.nct/nc\Y~;inlo-stndv-Jc,\·o!<inr~irs~rcco!rmtirlllJBfiJ~!:6'2('•~?:~ l~~) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies II www.defenddemocracy.org 
24


28655a-13.eps

Clifford D. May 

In recent vveeks, thr Palestinian position on Arncrican mediation 

Palestinian officials are novv saying they would accept an .American 

long as other international ac[ors are involved:>t; However, 1t 

be acceptable to Israel. Just days after President Trump's 

would join more than 20 international organizations, 

consecutive Monday. 39 But nearly t\\'O months later, not 

hovvever, he has taken to deploying vitriolic language and anti-Semitic tropes 

and disturbing speech before the Palestinian Central Council 

February 14, 2018 

Israel and Zionism for over two hours. He blr.mcd the problem& on 

connection to the 1and 

nothing to do with Judaism.'"H 

Churchill." He dismissed the 

This was nor his first descent into serious anti-Semitism: Just this past December, at the 

Organization of Islamic 

counterfeiting and 

Palestinian water 

summit in Turkey, he accused Jews of "faking and 

In 2016, Abba~ accused Israeli rabbis of poisoning 

to the European And recall his PhD thesis, 

which Jrwish victims of Holocaust and suggested an alliance 

and Nazis -1--l 

Nevertheles~, it was an astoni:3hing performance for a man once heralded by many as a moderate 

and a peaccmaker, 4

'i lVIr. Abbas' recent comments and actions make clear that he is not a viable 

pmtner for any peace process As President Obama' s fanner ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro, 

>R '·Arabs seck ·multilatcrar process to rcYive midcast peace talks:· The Daily Star (Lebanon), Febmary 1, 2018 

O!Ltp;!.L'1~t y._.lll~dpi_l;_:stflr,~_t;'P_D_c};.mlli..G&1.mb.?:: s~,;,:}.~m:vJU !nLe_ral-pr_Qc;;;~~--ITsh:~=rni_de_;~sl· p~Q~~H.Dlk~·-:.1 :j2:lli9JD "'Ben Lynfield. ·'Abbas Says Palestinians to Seek Full United Nations Membership:· The Jerusalem 1-'ost (Israel). 

December 19, 2017. (Mp./i'>Y>YtY .j nost.~·oJ.ll!1sw"l-N\.:vvsf Abbas-sa_ys-Palcstmians-t.Q:.';:C':k -lull-T;J-.J -m\.:mbcrsl@..:: 

5L~H2l 

1

" '·Mahmoud Abbas: The PLO Should ReeAamine its Agreements \dth Israel; We Will No Longer Accept the U.S. 

as Mediator., . . \4iddle East .\4edia Research Institute. Jmmary 1-1-, 2018. (https'i/ri'\Y\Y TIK_Wf_L'lf.!ILTI.i:lli1.h-ill9.1ld-abbaso1o-sho ctld-ree>.£lmiilt-a~meJliS-\\ nil-israel-\\ e- \\ !ll-110l-accept -america-as-medutorhranscrip!) 41 Do~.- Lieber. "Rewriting History, Abbas Calls Israel a ·Colonial Project' Unrelated to Judaism," The 1'11nes of 

Israel. Janmuy 15. 2018. Cillm~~:~:YJIJ:LiiillQ>.!Jfi-smcl.comlrcYiTili!U£-histo_r;-;Jboas-cillJ2:.iB.lK~l-a-colt)uLttl::UI.\2h&!: 

JJJL~lill~"..;i:lQ_jlJ-.dJi"iF!D 

~ Yair Rosenberg, "Palestinian President Accuses Je,.,s of 'Counterfeiting History and Religion,· Claims Qur'an 

Says they ·Fabricate Tmth' ''Tablet, December 14,2017. (Jill.Q.;.!/\v\-..v •. tablctmQ.K..illJ!l/scrotl!_~lli:.Q:!:illJ.lf2in.i.ml:_ 

prc.,idcm-accJL<>t:s-jc\YS~of-coumcrfciting-hisroJY-:Jndmr~iil'iOII-cbilns-qur;Jn-~;rr~~thcy-fabric<Jtc-tmrh) 

'

13 Robin Emmott and Dan Williams. '·Abbas says some Israeli rabbis called for poisoning Palestinian \'tater:· 

Reu/ers, June 23, 2016. 0~ \\" .reulcrs..com/J.rtide/!)s-na1es!iniat~ismd/abba3-S:l.ys-:;ome-i.smeli-r-Jbhis­

~ll.ikQ.:fQI.:.l2.oisonin;;-palcstim_gu-wu1cr-1Q.!,L~;~'iQ.Z2.1.1ID 

44 Ronen Bergman. "Abbas· book rcycals: The 'Na7i-Zionist plof oft he Holocaust" YNet News (Tsracl). Noycmber 

26. 201-1-. GlUp_s;/!.Y\Y!. y .... ).~l~!U~~'-S'-G9.J.Jy'<!(~k1c;,~N,]~{{! ,_.l,.,·.:...J.J20l2L!2.QJlJll1D ~ Grant Rumley. "The Tragedy of Mahmoud Abbas,"· The Atlantir. January 21. 2018. 

(]_!J[p&;/l\)_\~_\vJ1!~D.Jl<Jni.!.QSQt_n/jgt~~_r.@_tlq!l<]]fDt:.c:hhs!::..iiJ~i~l_lln.!IlllW9•I\l:Jh!:ns.::.[LDl~s~ir:s:J~ra~1-me~o;;,ll£?.~!D!.?/) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 12 www.defenddemocracy.org 
25


28655a-14.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

stated after the speech: "'[T]hc United States must conclude that there is no reason to believe Abbas 

has it \Vi thin him to take the necessary decisions to reach a peace deal with Tsrael." 46 

Recently, Jason Greenblatt, President Trump's chief envoy to the Middle East peace process, 

addressed Mr. Abbas in a series of tweets. "Pres. Abbas states about Jerusalem: 'it is Arab, Muslim, 

and Christian,' and makes no mention of any Jewish ties Nothing peaceful or productive can come 

from statements like this."47 

He added: "Lasting peace will not be achieved by denying Judaism's thousands of years of ties to 

Jerusalem. Jerusalem is holy to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Peace can ONL Ybe based on truth, 

and what [President Trump] said is the truth: 'Jerusalem is today, and must remain, a place where 

Jews pray at the Western Wall. where Christians walk the Stations of the Cross. and where 

Muslims worship at AI-Aqsa Mosque."' 

Congress should now give serious consideration to what -..·:vill follow -rvir Abhas who, at 82, is in 

rhe 13th year of his four-year elected tem1 in offJce. A succession crisis is coming. A leadership 

crisis is already here. 

The Future of tlw Peace Process: If there is to be a revived peace process, the next Palestinian 

leader \Viii need to do what :tv1r. Abbas did not do: begin to the Palestinian people for 

coexistence That means tolerance, not hatred and violence 

and Jev,s, not opposing to "normaliLe'' relations between Israelis and ru'"""'"""• 

and exploring economic cooperation, 

1i means telling Palestinians that peace will require difficult compromises, that the extcm1ination 

of Israel is no longer the goal, that the Je\VS will not be driven out of Jerusalem, and that rhere is a 

Jewish people who have lived in the Middle East for thousands of years, and who have a right to 

selt~determination in part of their ancient homeland. 

Once a majority of Palestinians embrace these views. the peace process will proceed rapidly 

toward the desired end. However. so long as Palestinian leaders and a majority of Palestinians 

regard compromise with Israelis and acceptance of the Jewish state as defeat, the peace process is 

certain to lead nowhere- as it has in the past 

Much depends on v.:ho succeeds ~1r. Abbas. But establi&hing a reliable succession process is one 

of the many nation-building tasks he failed to tackle during his years in pm.ver 

There are to peace. As noted abo-ve, Barnas remains a ~trong force and Barnas 

of Palestinians living in peace alongside a Je\\ish state. Its intentions aie 

16 Daniel Shapiro. "Abbas Exits with One FinaL Outrageous Perfonnance. Now. America Must Contain the 

Damage,·' Haaretz (Israel), Jmmary 17,2018. (https:l/tnl_!LP...aarctz.comiommollf.prcnlium-.attcr-abb<<s-outr~Q11'i:: 

s:_-.::it:_<lmiTi;:tt-:J.!111~b~_9I!L~lil_l'1_h:-,~-:_~l!!l_]gQ:'j :!._7"}l)_fi_;:J) 

·I- rvtichael Wih1er. .. Greenblatt Criticizes Abbas' Slalemenl on Jerusalem's Hoh Status:· J'he Jeru~afem Pus! 

(Tsracl ), F cbmary 8. 20 l 8. (hrtv:J/y.,"VV\V .iposr. em 11i Arabw Tsracti~Conf1t::t/Grcc11bi:1 ft -c!1Tc:rs-~xar-of~,,YNds-\Yith­

_t\_b_t!1.l_:;,_-t,teJ1}, lJ]_g~-!Jip~Ql_l}!1j_iQ.-j:i/~1lC;:-~-!_2 m:J: ·:_IJ(lll__iQ_ttfQ;'";_ = i:(J:-.Tti~U[}ll_!D_t~r;l_i_lU}_)_-_-_!_}~_ilj~r) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 13 www.defenddemocracy.org 
26


28655a-15.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

candidly annihilationist and genocidal It continues to spend intcmational aid money building 

rockets to tire into Israeli cities and constn1cring tnnnels so that terrorists can invade Israeli tmvns 

Changing Regional Architecture: Relations between Israel and several of its Sunni/ Arab 

neighbors have been improving. Driving this detente: the common threat posed by the Islamic 

Republic. The Saudis and Emiratis in particular appear to recognize that security cooperation with 

Israel is essential if Tehran is to be kept at bay 

At the same time, Israel is actively assisting Egypt in Sinai where jihadis have been waging a 

terrorist war. Israel's military and intelligence cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan 

is essential to that country's security as well. 

Israel's capabilities in cyber warfare, agriculture, and the science of producing clean and abundant 

fresh water could benefit all its neighbors"' 

It is useful for Congress to encourage rapprochement in every way possible. That said, I think we 

can expect only incremental improvements at this juncture. The Saudis and Emiratis cannot afford 

to be accused by Tehran of betraying the Palestinian cause. Iran's mullahs are only too eager to 

call the Saudis Zionists. Keep in mind that the Islamic Republic's position on Israel is identical to 

that of Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State no conflict resolution, no peaceful 

coexistence- only a jihad to extenninate the Jewish state 

Wall Srreet lou mal columnist Y aroslav Tro±imov recently noted that ''any Saudi opening to Israel 

is guaranteed to be exploited by the kingdom's rivals, and may even include a boycott of the hajj, 

or pilgrimage, to Mecca, a senior Saudi official cautioned.""" 

"Palestine is not an easy issue," he quoted the official as saying. "Saudi Arabia is expecting to hold 

Islamic leadership, and will not let it go easily. And, if you need Israel in anything, you can do it 

anyway, without having a relationship." 

Still, with at least some of Israel's neighbors no longer eager to see the Jewish state wiped off the 

map, there is a glimmer of hope that Israelis and Palestinians can eventually find their way toward 

peaceful coexistence, even as terrible sectarian wars rage throughout much of their region. While 

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot, I believe, be solved anytime soon, much can be done to 

stabilize the situation and prepare for opportunities that may arise in the future. 

Such preparation will require significant work on the part of both Congress and the administration 

But if Americans do not shoulder this responsibility, no one else v.;ill 

With this as background, permit me to suggest a few ideas and actions . 

.JR Clifford D. :May. '"Unexpected mimclc in the Holy Land.'' The Wasllington Times, December L 2015. 

{l!till5_:_/,~\'0:')~~-:\:}:<J,~l1JI!.~tQ1ltill1_G~'--c:9.rrlfilcw~.{Ji) _l)/fl~~i_l/~hftQr~l:-rn;;s.:Y:·utc_[-.:hl~}E1".il~lL) 

"

19 Y arosla\' Trofimo\ ... For Saudis and Israelis, Cosl of Open Ties Out\',eighs the Benefits.'' The Wall Street 

1. 201 8. ( https://\H'l.'r".\YSj .C01Hh-l11!Cic~/for-sandism<Jnd ~isntclis-.:;cst '"0f~opcn~ti:snout,vci vhs~thcn 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 14 www.defenddemocracy.org 
27


28655a-16.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Policy Recommendations: 

Congress ~hould demand that the State Depruiment declassify a mandated 

report that t;NRW A's underlying myth- so that 

much of actually suppmi refugees from 1948 

welfare payments to Palestinians \Vho should be helped instead to find 

employment in an economy not indefinitely dependent on America and other members of 

the .. international donor communi1y." 

Congress should insist on an independent audit of the tJ.NRWA. As the major funder, the 

U.S. has the right to know how American spent The l~ vvill 

resist, but Congress E.hould insist- establishing continued fi.mding 

and laying out a timeline for transitioning UNRWA sen·iees to the Palestinian Aurhority. 

host-nation Arab states, and the LTN B:igh Commissioner for Refugees, the office in charge 

of all refugees except Palestinians 

Congress should review the definition of'·refugee'' used by the LJNR \VA, which currently 

includes the descendants of refugees and has exacerbated the problem and will continue to 

do so over the years ahead. A definition based on the actual number of refugees would 

make cont1ict resolution much more achievable. 

Congress needs to begin the long-overdue process of serious reform at the UN. The United 

Nations Human Rights Council along with the lJNRW A and other lJN bodies are inciting 

hatred against Israel and passing reams of biased resolutions condemning Israel while 

ignoring the egregious human rights abuses being committed by the world's worst human 

rights violators- Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Russia, China, and Cuba among 

them 

Congress should take action to require greater economic transparency and integrity at the 

UN. American funding should depend on results. 

Congress should pass the bipartisan Israel Anti-Boycott Act. 50 This legislation would make 

implementation of the UNHRC blacklist of Israeli companies illegal under U.S law and 

reaffinn that boycotts of this nature run afoul of the U.S. Export Administration Act. The 

legislation also would require the Export Import Bank to consider whether an entity 

complies with BDS when evaluating potential credit applications. 

• BDS groups operate on college campuses in the U.S. and promote commercial boycotts of 

Israel in many U.S. states. Twenty-five states have enacted laws or executive orders 

opposing boycotts of Israel. Congress should support these efforts by passing the bipartisan 

Combatting BDS Act, 51 which would provide states additional legal protections to reject 

boycotts of Israel. 

511 Tsmcl Anti-Boycott Act, S. 720. 115Lh Congress (2017). 01tt]1_~:j{}Y""iYJ\.~Q!!gl"~_S_'il';P':!H5.,'h.i.il~h>TW/f3Jl:·~-S.­

l _l2sJ JQi~,p41J 

"'1 Combating BDS Act of20 17, S 170, 1151

h Congress (20 17). (httos·/,\YiV\Y.congrcss !'OY/1 !5/hills/s! 7!)/BILLS~ 

_LlS~slZQi~-124D 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 15 www.defenddemocracy.org 
28


28655a-17.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

Congress should pass the Taylor Force Act. 52 The act passed the House but has not yet 

been brought to a vote in the Senate. The legislation would limit funds to the Palestinian 

Authority if it continues to pay terrorists salaries after they are captured, prosecuted, 

convicted, and imprisoned in Israel. The legislation also would restrict aid if the Palestinian 

Authority does not take steps to end violence against American and Israeli citizens 

should support such accountability as a requirement for the foreign aid it 

The administration, with congressional support, should attempt to work with Saudi Arabia, 

the UAE, and other Sunni Arab partners, as well any pragmatic elements within the 

Palestinian Authority, to create a leadership succession plan, one that will empower 

Palestinian leaders who are open to conflict resolution and do not see peaceful coexistence 

with Israel as tantamount to defeat Without such a plan in place, the possibility of chaos, 

violence and instability following Mr Abbas' passing looms large 

A two-state solution implies two states for two peoples - one of those people being the 

Jewish people. The Palestinian side must accept that premise prior to negotiations in pursuit 

of a two-state solution. The theory that acceptance of that premise will emerge at the end 

of talks has failed in the past and is likely to fail in the future. 

ln a revived peace process, the U.S. should insist that political leaders on both sides take 

active steps toward normalization of relations and peaceful coexistence even as 

negotiations proceed on borders, security, economic relations, and other issues This, too, 

has not been the practice in past peace processes. 

In September 2016, the Obama administration reached a Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) with Israel guaranteeing $38 billion over a ten-year period from FY 2019 to FY 

2028. The memorandum would give Israel $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

and an additional $5 billion in missile defense assistance. The funds are to be allocated in 

$3.8 billion increments annually. 53 The agreement handcuffs the ability of Congress to 

appropriate funds for Israel above the $3.8 billion level. The Israeli government agreed in 

a letter to return any additional funds that Congress provided for two years. 54 Congress 

should have the ability and flexibility to provide funds to Israel should it decide Israel needs 

additional resources to defend itself from the Islamic Republic and other enemies. Israel 

also should have the ability to use the funds for fuel in emergency situations rather than 

strictly limiting the funds to FM.F and missile defense resources. Congress has appropriated 

~ Taylor Force Act. H.R. 110-.J.. 1151

h Con,grcss (20 17). (httns:/,\\"'.HY.com.'TCss.goY!i l51btllsfhr1 !04/BTLLS~ 

Jl~hrLL6Jn;s_p.!tf) 

~~The White House, Press Release. "FACT SHEET: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with lsraeL"' 

September 1-1-, 2016. OJit.i.2.!2.2"i~Qmr!m:JJilcbousc aiD'li,·c5.guy/thc:~;L-oti;cci2QJtit09QJ.Lf<Kt-dlG£1:!Ll...;Iillllill!ilUJJ!: 

,. The Wwhmglon f'osf. September l--1-. 2016. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 16 www.defenddemocracy.org 
29


28655a-18.eps

Clifford D. May February 14, 2018 

an additional $75 million for Israel above the $3.8 billion in the latest appropriations bill. 55 

Congress should continue to exercise its appropriations powers to provide Israel with 

assistance within the tenns of the MOU and beyond, if necessary. 

Congress should support the transfer of the US. Embassy to Jerusalem without delay. 

Congress and the administration should recognize Israel's sovereignty over the Golan 

Heights, as FDD has previously suggested 56 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. 

If! have missed any issues you wish to cover, please let me know. I look forward to your questions. 

"':Michael Wilner. "Tmmp Supports $75M. Additional Aid to lsmcl Beyond Obama-Era MOu:· Tile Jerusalem 

T'o~t (Tsracl). September II. 2017. (Li.Itp;//~Ul .. Wll2Q~(_c_Q_gtfl~<;_Jl!gl'.:.l~l">)_F"r:_fll_~I!l1-g).IJJ2QlT5_":.7_~r!l:-J;mJ:Rt(!.D1(!_!1Etl.:-_:nd:-t9m 

l~_r_ill:'l-b~F4l:t-_Ql;l<1_n_1:1 ~_r;t-l'vU)_U:5_V:+_S_0_f}) 

"'6 Jonathan Sch<-ln7.cr and Mark Dubowitz, "Standing With Tsracl on the Golan Heights:' The Wall Street Journal. 

Febm<ll) 16. 20 17. (btlfi_G:f/J}._\\ _\2: . ~~.L_cp_t_<J:~<Jiiicl~-~~~'!im!£1il!£_.-"'>:1llr:.LSIJ~-QJ~::-Ll!s:.:£,Q_hD_l::l~~L£Dt~:-H~7Z?}_?:-!: l) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 17 www.defenddemocracy.org 
30

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, sir. 

Mr. al-Omari. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GHAITH AL-OMARI, SENIOR FELLOW, 

IRWIN LEVY FAMILY PROGRAM ON THE U.S.-ISRAEL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR 

NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. AL-OMARI. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member, esteemed members. It is an honor to be here. 

The administration seems intent on presenting a peace plan. 

There has been a lot of speculation, particularly in the Arab press. 

The reality is we do not know what is in this peace plan. It is being 

held very close in a very small circle. 

Yet I would submit that, no matter what the peace plan looks 

like, no matter how balanced, no matter how well thought through, 

right now it is going to fail. And it is going to fail because of domestic politics among Palestinians, Israelis, and the region. 

In Israel, the coalition of Prime Minister Netanyahu very strongly constricts his ability to make decisions. His legal troubles, that 

we saw yesterday, do not make things easier. 

On the Palestinian side, President Abbas has a 30-percent approval rating. Seventy percent of the Palestinians want him to 

leave. He is not a leader who is capable of making the difficult decisions that we need to see. 

The decisions by the administration on Jerusalem in particular 

but also UNRWA have complicated things for the Palestinians and 

for the Arab states. 

For the Palestinians, as a matter of principle and as a matter of 

political expedience, Abbas thought that he has to take a hardline 

position. Some of the policies he is adopting are questionable. Some 

of the statements that he made are unacceptable, especially those 

that deny the Jewish connection to the land. Yet he is in a difficult 

position. 

On the Arab side, the Jerusalem decision, in particular, has diminished the ability of Arab states to pressure and to leverage the 

Palestinians because they have to be seen on the same side of this 

issue. 

All of this does not bode well for the success of a peace process. 

And failure in this particular case comes with a price, particularly 

seeing how tense things are on the ground. This price could be a 

price in terms of security and a price in terms of the potential collapse of the P.A.—in no one’s interest. 

That said, I do not believe that it is a wise approach to totally 

neglect the peace process. Instead, the administration needs to 

have less ambitious objectives that are achievable. In particular, I 

think there are four areas that need to be focused on. 

One, and the foremost and most important, is security. Security 

and security cooperation between the Palestinians and the Israelis 

is probably one of the very few success stories we have seen from 

that region over the last few years. We saw it in action only this 

last weekend. The Palestinian security forces, under American support, have become professional, reliable partners by the admission 

of Israeli security leaders. We need to continue doing this. Specifically, we need to continue directly supporting the Palestinian secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Mar 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\021418\28655 SHIRL
31

rity forces and the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator, the 

three-star general, who has been doing a fantastic job in supporting 

security and security cooperation. 

Second, the West Bank. Things in the West Bank are tense. 

Emotions are high. Things are volatile. Luckily, because of the security cooperation, the Israeli defense establishment has actually 

conceptualized a number of projects to support the West Bank. 

Many of these projects, though, got stuck in Israeli internal political wranglings. We should engage Israel to see how we can apply 

some of these particular projects, approved and suggested by the 

IDF, particularly when it comes to Palestinian access to Area C 

and to giving Palestinians more building and zoning rights around 

urban Palestinian areas. 

Three, Gaza. Gaza is—the situation there is, from a humanitarian point of view, unconscionable. This could lead to a war. 

Ideally, aid to Gaza should come through the Palestinian Authority. However, reconciliation has failed, and it is likely to fail in the 

foreseeable future. 

So, in the immediate term, I think there are three things that 

need to be done. A, we directly and through our allies should pressure the Palestinian Authority to remove some of the punitive 

measures they have put on Gaza in the last year. This is key to 

bring a degree of stability. We need to work with Israel and the 

U.N. to finetune how we provide aid to Gaza. And, finally, we need 

to engage Arab countries, particularly those that have negative 

perceptions of Hamas, to get them to be more active. I am thinking 

United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, working through Egypt. 

Fourth, and quite importantly in my view, is the issue of Palestinian reform. This is an issue that has been on the back burner 

since the days of George W. Bush. This is key. When 80 percent 

of the Palestinians believe that their government is corrupt, it is 

very hard to see how they will trust this government to make the 

kind of concessions that need to be made. 

In conclusion, I would say, none of the above will bring peace. 

Peace can only come in a two-state solution that is negotiated between the parties. What these measures, though, can do is that 

they can stabilize the situation on the ground, buy us time, and if 

the sides are wise and employ the right kind of political messaging, 

they can start reversing some of the negative perceptions that each 

side has of the other. 

Thank you very much. And I am looking forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. al-Omari follows:]

32


28655b-1.eps

Israel, the Palestinians, and the Administration's Peace Plan 

Ghaith al-Omarl 

Senior Fellow, Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Relationship 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

February 14, 2018 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Israel, the Palestinians aud the Administration's peace 

plan. My testirnuny vvill examine the regional implications uf recent developments in the peace process, 

particularly as they relate to the Palestinian Authority and Arab states. It will further louk intu a potential peace plan by the Administration and will conclude with recommendations for practical steps to 

advance the peace process. 

INTRODUCTION 

In recent weeks, the Middle East peace process has witnessed a number of rapid developments. Yet in 

the absence uf a frarnewurk and sense of direction, much of this energy has been wasted ur even negative. 

\Xlithout a clear articulation by the administration uf a direction and a diplomatic strategy, the current 

state of drift is likely to continue and worsen. Nonetheless, as the administration formulates a plan, it 

needs to be careful not to overreach. C:nrrent political realities in both the Palestinian Authority (PA) 

and Israel make it diHlcult to envisage a peace plan that will meet the minimum needed substantively 

and politically by both parties to reengage in negotiations. Given the volatility of the situation on the 

ground, presenting a plan with a high likelihood of failure could trigger sharp deterioration. Instead, the 

United States should develop more modest objectives for the immediate term ami engage Arab ami European partners to build a wide U.S.-led coalition capable of navigating the current crisis. Most important, the United States can support security, economic, and governance improvements on the 

ground that will create conditions conducive to the resumption of meaningfl1l negotiations. 

BACKGROUND 

The peace process has been oHlcially suspended since 2014, bnt even before that-and despite intensive 

efforts by former secretary of state John Kerry-it was clear that the negotiations were heading to hi!-
33


28655b-2.eps

ure. Since coming to office, President Donald J. T rnmp has signaled his intent to pursue a resolution of 

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Trnmp entrnsted his senior advisor Jared Kushner to oversee the effort 

and appointed longtime associates as well as established foreign policy professionals to oversee the process. On the diplomatic front, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu ami Palestinian president 

Mahmoud Abbas, as well as key regional leaders, were received in the \Vhite House, ami'fmmp, in turn, 

visited Israel and the PA. Substantively, the U.S. peace team remained largely in "listening mode" during 

the first year, conducting wide-ranging meetings but giving no hint as to the administration's policies 

ami strategy beyond its intention to present a plan at some point.1 

THE JERUSALEM DECISION 

'fhis quiet diplomacy changed on December 6. Delivering on a campaign promise, Tmmp recognized 

J ernsalcm as Israel's capital.' This action was undeniably within the sovereign right of the United States; 

ti.mhermore, there had been no question throughout all past negotiations that in any llnal peace agreement West Jemsalem, as well as mutually-agreed parts of East Jemsalem, would be under Israeli sovereignty. Given Jerusalem's sensitivity, however, the PA and Arab states were bound to react negatively. 

Had the decision been coordinated with Arab allies, some of their concerns could have been reflected in 

the tfaming of the decision, which would have provided them with some political breathing space vis-itvis those seeking to titrther inflame emotions. i\1oreuver, conflicting messages frurn the administration 

ti.mher complicated efforts to manage diplomatic fallout in the region. Trnmp's December 6 speech 

stated explicitly that the United States is "not taking a position ron l any final status issues, including the 

specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jernsalem, or the resolution of contested borders." Yet 

the administration's public messaging, did not highlight this, and 'fmmp's subsequent statements that 

he "took Jerusalem off the table" made it difficult for moderate voices to argue that the decision did not 

prejudge llnal peace tallcs.' 

Predictably, the Palestinian leadership vehemently opposed the decision. A combination ofJerusalem's 

centrality to the Palestinian narrative and its diplomatic position, as well as the political weakness of 

President Abbas-with current approval ratings of only 31% among his public' -meant that Abbas 

felt-as a matter of both principle and political calculation-that he had to take hardline positions lest 

Farah rivals and Hamas fi:1es accuse him of abandoning Jerusalem. Abbas issued harsh statements that in 

some instances crossed into the unacceptable territory of denying Jewish connection to the land.' 'fhe 

United States should continue to insist that Abbas retract such statements. 

Diplomatically, the PA suspended cuntact with the United States on peace-process-related matters, and 

resorted to the UN, eliciting a U.S. veto in the Security Council but securing a General Assembly resolution critical of the U.S. decision. Furthermore, the PLO made a number of decisions calling for severing 

rclations-inclLJding security cooperation-with Israel and abandoning the Oslo Accords framework" 

It should be noted, though, that similar decisions made in the past were not implemented. \Vhile the PA 

is likely to continue its internationalization campaign, security cooperation with Israel continues. 

Arab states were bmmd to be critical of the decision both ollt of genuine disagreement with its substance 

and for political reasons. Jordan, with its longstanding special role as custodian of Muslim holy sites in 

Jerusalem-a role recognized by Israel in the two countries' 1994 peace treaty' -was particularly affected by the decision. Yet some moderate Arab states-particularly Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the 
34


28655b-3.eps

United Arab Emirates (UAE)-are trying to ensure that this docs not develop into a !LJI!-blown crisis. 

These states are now seeking to isolate the issue ofJerusalem from their bilateral relations with the United States" while emphasizing that U.S. leadership of the peace prucess is indispensable.' 10 

'fhese efforts, however, are complicated by other regional actors who are using the decision to score political points. Iran and Qatar-in the context of their ongoing tensions with moderate Arab statestried to cast the latter as complicit in the decision," 12 while Turkey president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is 

capitalizing on angry public sentiment to pusition himself as leader of the 1vfuslim vvorld. 13 ~1oreover, 

this decision has weakened the leverage of the moderate Arab states vis-a-vis the P A. While some of 

these states have privately urged the Palestinians to tone down their reaction, they feel they have to be 

carefiJI in public f{)f fear ofbeing accused of abandoningJerusalem and the Palestinian issue. 

Washington can support moderate Arab states by highlighting that the Jerusalem decision does not 

prejudice the outcome of negotiations. The president14 ami administration11 have recently begun to do 

su, but only a more robust outreach to Arab media \vill convey this message tu Arab audiences. 

PRESSURING THE PA 

The Palestinian statements and actiuns following the Jerusalem decision elicited strong U.S. reactions, 

including threats of cutting off aid to pressure the PA, particularly regarding the United Nations Relief 

and \'Vorks Agency (UNRWA). On Januaty 2, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley 

indicated that \'Vashington will cm aid to UNR\'VA ''em til the Palestinians agree to come to the table,"" 

and on January 16 the United States withheld $65 million of the $120 million installment liJr "fi1ture 

consideration."17 President 'fmmp also indicated that the administration may cut other forms of aid to 

apply pressure on the PA/ 8 although it is not yet clear yet what this will mean. 

Witham question, UNR\'VA needs significant reform-a point recognized by the organization itself" 

furthermore, it is not appropriate that the United States bear a disproportionate share of flnancial support to the organization. Indeed, the decision to withhold a portion of the U.S. flmding has already 

prompted international actors to take action. For example, Jordan's foreign minister recently called on 

Arab states to "shoulder uur responsibilities" in supporting UNR\\TA. 20 Moreuver, using aid to pressure 

the PAis a legitimate tool that could, if deployed properly, be effective in changing Pi\ behavior. 

In reality, however, these attempts to pressure the PA have so far not been effective. Fundamentally, it is 

not clear to what end U.S. pressure is being applied. Although the president and administration urge the 

PA to "come to the table" and "negotiate peace," there are, at this point, no negotiations, nor is there, at 

least for now, a concrete U.S. proposal to restart them. Therefore the PAhas been able to cast this pressure in a punitive light. 

f-urthermore, the lack uf cuordinatiun between the LJnited States and key international actors has allowed the PA to evade pressure. In the past, leverage on the PA was successful when a coalition of relevant allies shared U.S. objectives, a reality vividly demonstrated during the George W. !lush administration. The PA realized it has no choice but to engage in reform or face regional and global isolation only 

when the U.S. message was amplified by European and Arab allies who reli1sed to break ranks with 

Washington. 
35


28655b-4.eps

More specifically, dcfimding UNR\VA-apart from its humanitarian implications-is unlikely to make 

a difference to the PA. Public discontent over cuts in UNRWA services will likely be directed, not 

against the PA, but against the United States, Israel, and UNR\V A itself-and the PA can side with its 

public in expressing uutrage. Furthermore, the PA is aware that Israel21 also does not vvant to see deterioration in the West Bank and will likely, along with Arab states, lobby the United States against immediate cuts ofUNR\V A aid. 

Instead, any significant reduction of UNRWA aid would must seriously harm Jordan, where UNRWA 

provides services to more than 2 million ret,>istered refi.Jgees, including 120,000 students and health [;cilities that processed 1.5 million patient visits in 2016. Transferring these responsibilities to Jordan will 

put pressure on an already strained infrastructure. But the concern is not only economic. Since the Arab 

protests in 2011, refugee camps in Jordan have remained quiet, including during the current wave of 

protests against the recent lifting of subsidies. Cutting UNRWA services will likely cause protests in 

Palestinian rdi.1gee camps. 

AN AMERICAN PEACE PLAN? 

The administration has repeatedly stated that it is working on a peace plan to be unveiled at some point 

in the tiJture. Although, a U.S.-brokered plan to prompt negotiations and bridge differences ultimately 

has value, in practice, any plan presented in the short term is likely tu f:1il due to the domestic politics of 

both Israel and the PA. Prime minister Netanyahu presides over a coalition that gives him an extremely 

narrow margin in which to maneuver. Members of his coalition who have been unwilling to allow for 

even the limited steps recommended by the Israel Defense Forces to alleviate the humanitarian situation 

in the West Bank" are unlikely to be willing to endorse the "hard compromises for peace"" envisioned 

by President Trump. 

On the Palestinian side, Abbas's margin for maneuvering is alsu extremely limited. Failure uf the peace 

process, corruption, and puor governance combined have severely eruded the PA's legitimacy among its 

public. Recent polls show that 77% ofl'alcstinians believe that the PAis corrupt,'' and 70% want Abbas 

to resign." Add to that the split between the \Vest Bank and Gaza, and the hardening of positions in the 

wake of the Jemsalem decision, then Abbas currently lacks the political credit needed to be able to engage with a peace plan that requires signiflcant compromise. 

Arab states, whose participation will be key, may be able to privately pressure Abbas to engage an American peace plan if its terms are reasonable. Bur even at the best of times, Arab leaders have been reluctant 

tu break ranks with the PA in public, and this is further exacerbated by the negative public mood in the 

region following the Jerusalem decision. 

A tailed peace plan that is rejected by one or both parties will be costly. Among both the Palestinian and 

Israeli public, belief in peace is eroding'" and another t;1iled peace initiative will only solidify such skepticism. Among the Palestinians, given the tension and volatility on the t,>rotmd and the weakness of the 

PA, another failed peace initiative cm1ld lead to an array of concrete negative results ranging from a 

sharp deterioration in the security situation to a potential collapse of the P A. Needless to say, severe disruption on the ground is not in the interest of the Palestinians, Israel, the region, or the United States. 
36


28655b-5.eps

RECOMMENDATIONS 

While a full-fledged American peace plan may he premature, neglect is eqmlly cormterproductive. It 

may be more feasible at the moment tu f(JCus instead on less ambitious but more achievable goals that 

can stabilize the diplomatic scene ami the situation on the ground. This would eventually create comlitions conducive to the rcsmnption of meaningful negotiations. 

Diplomatic Steps 

The diplurnatic priurity now is tu break the current escalatory dynamic and provide a LJ.S.-led framework within which all parties, including the PA, can resume dialogue. A multilateral approach can provide an effective vehicle to that end. For example, despite the PA's decision to not engage the United 

States, Palestinian officials participated in a recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 

(AHLC)-the international grouping dealing vvith economic and humanitarian aid tu the PAalongside the United States, Israel, Arab States and other international donors.27 

Building on that precedent, the International Quartet (composed of the United States, the UN, the 

European Union, and Russia) should be reenergized to provide an umbrella under which the PA can 

reengage in U.S.-led peace diplomacy. Expanding the Quartet to include Jordan and Egypt would give it 

a regional dimension, and including Norway, which chairs the AHLC, would help better integrate political and ecunomic issues. 

Practical Steps 

Important as diplomacy is, it is by nature slow-acting and ill-suited for responding to concrete, immediate developments on the grormd, particularly as these realities remain prone to rapid deterioration. 

Therefore, as Washington continues to explore diplomatic options, administration attention in the immediate term should be turned toward creating practical, positive developments on the ground. \\Thile 

such developments are no replacement for diplomatic negotiations, positive developments on the 

ground will help stabilization and can start addressing each public's mistrust and negative view of the 

other. 

In that regard, the United States should focus on the following areas: 

1. SECURITY: Security is the sine qLJa non for any diplomatic, economic, or governance progress. 

Over the last decade, the security situation in the \X"T est Bank remained manageable, due to nu small 

part to actions of the PA security forces (PAS!'), and their cooperation with their Israeli counterparts. 'fhe United States, through the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has been instrumental in reforming and professionalizing the PASF, and in shepherding security cooperation. The United States shuuld continue to focus on the primacy of security and help support this virtuous dynamic. 

Specifically, the United States shm1ld continue directly supporting the PASF, maintain and 

strengthen the USSC, and engage Israel on ways to allow the continued gruwth of the PAST' without endangering Israel's security, including increasing the PASFs jurisdiction to additional West 
37


28655b-6.eps

Banlc areas. Finally, the United States, directly and through allies, should impress upon the PA the 

need to stop threatening to sever security cooperation, as such threats-even if not intended for implementation-delegitimize the PAST' and demoralize its members. 

2. CAZA: The situation in Gaza is fdst approaching a humanitarian crisis.2s Apart frurn its obvious 

ami catastrophic human implications, such deterioration could lead to a new war. Ideally, assistance 

to Gaza should be channeled through the Pi\, to avoid Hamas benefiting from such aid. However, 

the recent Egyptian-led "reconciliation" talks-or, more acmratcly, talks aimed at reintroducing the 

PA intu Gaza-have t;lltered. This vvas due to a large extent to the PA's unwillingness to assume authority over Gaza as long as Ha1nas continued to refi.Jse to disann. At the nwment, Egypt, due to internal developments, is not actively pursuing Palestinian reconciliation talks. \Vhen Egypt reengages, however, the United States should contim1e to support its efforts to create-at a minimum-a 

measure ofPA presence in Gaza to fddlitate international aid. 

That point, however, seems distant at the moment. In the immediate term, the United States 

should foms specil!cally on the following: 

pressuring Abbas-directly and through allies-to reverse his recent sanctions against the 

coastal Strip, including limiting electricity supply and other forms of payments to Gaza; 29 

continuing to work with Israel and the U.N. to fine-tllne existing mechanisms for humanitarian aid delivery; and 

engaging Egypt and Arab states to increase support to Gaza that bypasses Ham as' government. 

3. JHE \VEST BAl'\fK: While Gaza's immediate concerns need to be addressed, the West Bank 

should not be taken for granted. "l"he continuation of the Israeli occupation, the increased disbelief 

in the possibility of diplomatic progress, and eroding legitimacy of the PA due in part to poor governance and political stagnation has created an increasingly tense situatiun. Recent development regarding Jerusalem have fi.mher increased the tension. Yet due to the relative stability and the effective Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation, the Israeli defense establishment is supportive of a 

munher mcasmes to case life on the ground. Some of these projects, however, fell victim to manCLlverings among Israeli politicians30. 

"l"he United States should urge Israel to implement-am\ to the extent possible avoid politicizingsuch IDF-approved measures, specil!cally those which provide the Palestinians with economic access to Area "C'' of the \Vest Bank and grant the PA additional planning and zoning powers around 

congested Palestinian urban areas. 

4. l'ALESTINIA.c'\f REFO!Uv!: Finally, the United States should refocus on promoting Palestinian 

reform. Besides the desirability, in its own right, of creating clean, effective governance in the PA, 

the vvidespread perception of corruption in the PA and general dissatisfdction with its performance 

has implications for the peace process. It erodes the legitimacy of Palestinian leaders, reducing their 

ability to reengage in negotiations, let alone make the necessary compromises for peace. As demonstrated under President George \"Xi. Bush, sustained U.S. prioritization of Palestinian reform can 
38


28655b-7.eps

produce dramatic results that increase the !'A's legitimacy among its public and Israel's trust of the 

P A as a peace partner. 

In addition to direct U.S. engagement on the issue, the administration should explore a role for Arab states in Palestinian reform, especially roles in which some-like the UAE and jordan-have developed significant capacity as they undertook their own processes of reform and institution 

building. 

1 http :j /www. j post. co m/1 nternatio na 1/Li berman-Trump-ad mini strati o n-sti II-i n -I isten in g-a nd-lea rn i ngmode-497453 

2 https :/ /www. whitehouse. gov /b ri efings-statem ents/statem ent -president-trump-jeru salem/ 3 https:f/www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/rernarks-president-trump-prime-rninistern eta nya h u-israel-b i latera 1-m eeti ng-davos-switzerla n d/ 4 http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2066%20full%20text%20English%20Dec%202017.pdf 

5 https :/ /www. ti rn esofi sra el. com/rewriting-history-abba s-ea lis-i srae 1-a-co I on ia 1- project -unrelated-tojudaism/ 

6 http://www. j post. com/ Ara b-lsrael i-Co nfl ict/P a lesti n ian-Centra 1-Cou ncil-ca II s-u po n-P LO-to-endrecognition-of-lsrael-536845 

7 http://www.mfa.gov.il/rnfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-jordan%20peace%20treaty.aspx 

8 https :/ /www. reute rs.co m fa rticle/u s-usa -i sra el-pence-jord an/pence-says-he-an d-jo rda n s-ki ng-a bd u II a hagreed-to-disagree-on-jerusalem-idUSKBN1FAOV5 

9 https ://in. reuters.co m/a rticl e/usa-tru m p-sa u d i/u-s-mid east-peace-pI an-not-fin a I ised-but -effortsserious-says-saud is-j u bel r-id IN KBN 1 E81PX 10 https://www.politico.corn/story/2018/02/04/jordan-abdullah-jerusalem-israel-389573 11 http://washin.st/2CfSiiA (Arabic) 12 http://washin.st/2o233tB (Arabic) 13 https :/ /www. a I araby. co. u k/ eng li sh/news/20 17/12/13/ erd oga n-seeks-to-unite-rn u sl i rn-1 ea ders-overjerusalem 

14 http://www.israelhayom.corn/2018/02/11/trump-to-israel-hayom-palestinians-are-not-looking-tomake-peace/ 

15 https :// useu. u sm iss ion. gov I rem a rks-ad-h oc-li a i son-committee-meeting/ 16 https :/ /www. ti mesofisra el. com/us-warns-it-wont-fun d-refugee-agency-if-pa I esti n i a ns-re ject-ta I ks/ 17 https :/ jwww. n pr .org/ section s/thetwo-way /2018/01/17/5 785 71424/ u-s-freezes-more-than- h a If-of-aidto-u-n-agency-for -palestinian-refugees 18 https :/ fwww. whitehouse .gov /b riefi ngs-statem ents/re rna rks-presid ent-tru m p-p rime-min isle rn eta nya h u-israe 1-b il atera 1-m eeti ng-davos-switze rl and/ 19 https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are/reforming-unrwa 20 https://twitter.com/ Ayman Hsafadi/status/959800386285600768 21 http:/ /www.jpost.com/ Arab-lsraeli-Conflict/Trump-cuts-U N RWA-fund ing-arnid-Abbas-assau lt-536917 22 https :/ fwww. ti mesofisra el. com/ cabinet- puts-tern para ry-freeze-a n-q a I q ilya-expa nsio n-pla n/ 23 https :/ /www. ti mesofisra el. com/trump-tells-israel-it -wi 11-have-to-rna ke- hard-compromises-for -peace/ 24 http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/715 25 http://lhww.pcpsr.org/en/node/715 26 http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/717 27 https:f/www.norway.no/en/indonesia/norway-indonesia/news-events/news2/extraordinary-meetingof-the-intern ati on a 1-d on or-group-for -pa I esti ne-a h le-i n-brussels/ 28 https ://www. ti mesofisra el. com/idf-ch i ef-sa id-to-wa rn-gaza-wa r -I ikely-if-h u rna nita ria n-crisi s- persists/ 29 http:/ /www.da i lysta r.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2017/ Aug-07/415205-abbas-pledges-to-rarnp-up-gazastrip-sa nction s. a shx 30 https :/ /www. ti mesofisra el. com/ cabinet- puts-tern para ry-freeze-a n-q a I q ilya-expa nsio n-pla n/ 
39

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. You must be a favorite on the speaking circuit, because you are brief, to the point, and 

boom, boom, boom. Thank you so much. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. That is my legal education. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is your schtick. All right, thank you. 

Ambassador Shapiro, welcome, and thank you so much for being 

with us. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL B. SHAPIRO, DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY STUDIES (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR 

TO ISRAEL) 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, it is 

good to see you both. Members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on a subject that is really what motivated me to get involved in public life and, indeed, brought me to 

my first job, on the staff of this very committee, 25 years ago. 

It was my judgment then and remains my judgment now that 

the two-state solution is the only outcome that can serve Israel’s 

interests in security, recognition, and maintaining its Jewish and 

democratic character, Palestinian legitimate aspirations for self-determination and an independent state of their own at peace with 

Israel, and American interests in ensuring those outcomes and contributing to regional stability. 

Now, despite many predictions to the contrary, for the most part, 

the Trump administration has pursued an approach, if not a defined policy, well within the mainstream of traditional U.S. policy 

on this issue. While the President does not speak clearly in support 

of a two-state solution as the goal of U.S. policy, as I believe he 

should, his description of what he wants included in the ‘‘ultimate 

deal’’ leaves no doubt that there is no other outcome that would 

achieve all of those objectives. 

Other familiar elements of the policy include positive meetings 

with leaders of both sides, envoys who have earned goodwill and 

credibility throughout the region, a commitment to Palestinian economic development, and a clear, if somewhat more muted, effort to 

restrain Israel settlement construction. 

I agree, as has been stated, that there has been a lack of clarity, 

and it has been compounded by some of the President’s confusing 

tweets. But I have to say that, while I have had many, many profound disagreements with the Trump administration on a wide 

range of issues, the issue that concerns me the least is their efforts 

to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. 

But they have missed important opportunities and hit some 

bumps. The poor management of the decision regarding Jerusalem 

made things harder. Now, I strongly support recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the immediate relocation of our Embassy there. But had the decision been described in the broader 

context of the U.S. vision of a two-state solution, including addressing Palestinian aspirations in East Jerusalem, it would have both 

acknowledged an obvious fact and helped advance our strategic objective. 

None of that justifies the Palestinian overreaction, including the 

outrageous speech President Abbas delivered to the PLO’s Central 

40

Council that has already been referenced. In my judgment, in that 

speech, President Abbas signaled the end of his own personal participation in efforts to achieve the two-state solution. 

This chain of events has left the Trump administration in a bind, 

with no way to get their plan out, at least until tempers cool somewhat, without it being dead on arrival. 

But, in fairness, there is currently no chance for an immediate 

breakthrough toward a peace agreement or even the resumption of 

negotiations. That is partially due to domestic political crises on 

both sides that have been referenced, partly due to the deep mutual mistrust, the waves of Palestinian terrorist attacks, the continued incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders, and Hamas’ continued construction of rockets and tunnels. 

Those are all factors. So is the timidity of Arab states in beginning 

normalization with Israel. So is the Israeli settlement expansion, 

including in areas well beyond the settlement blocs near the 1967 

lines, which makes a viable map of the two-state solution more difficult over time. 

In addition to Abbas’ negative turn, it should also be recognized 

that the current Israeli Government is dominated by voices who 

openly oppose a two-state solution. That poses a major challenge to 

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who, while he is more ambiguous than 

he was in the past, has not walked back his famous 2009 Bar-Ilan 

University speech endorsing two states. 

So, in the current circumstances, I do not recommend that the 

administration try to bring the parties back to the negotiating table 

in the near future. Any talks they could arrange would almost certainly collapse, perhaps spectacularly. 

Rather, the administration should focus on preserving the twostate solution as a viable and achievable goal for the future, but 

postponing any actual negotiations until the atmosphere and the 

leadership dynamics have improved, almost certainly including 

new Palestinian leadership. 

First, keeping the two-state solution alive requires clarity from 

the United States that that is the outcome that remains our strategic objective. 

Then we should work with all relevant parties to take practical 

steps that put down anchors to help arrest the slide toward a binational reality: For Israel, expanding the areas in which Palestinian 

Authority can operate, permitting greater Palestinian economic development, and limiting construction in West Bank settlements to 

areas that can be accommodated in equivalent land swaps in a 

final status agreement. 

For Palestinians, continuing and upgrading their effective security cooperation with Israel and conducting a consistent campaign 

against incitement of violence and glorification of those who commit acts of terror. The Taylor Force Act will hopefully hasten the 

end of those unacceptable payments. 

For Arab states who already see Israel as a strategic partner 

against common enemies, beginning now to engage Israel in steps 

toward normalization. 

Finally, I hope the committee will support continuing those elements of our Palestinian assistance program that support security 

cooperation between Israel and the P.A. And contribute to improvVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Mar 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\021418\28655 SHIRL
41

ing humanitarian conditions for the Palestinian people. Congress 

should also consider additional approaches such as broader support 

for people-to-people programs and investing in the Palestinian 

high-tech sector. 

But looking a bit beyond the immediate policy questions, no matter how much Congress or the administration do, we should recognize that trends on the ground pose the danger of an unarrested 

drift toward a binational state. Many younger Palestinians say 

they are no longer focused on the goal of a two-state solution. Rather, they advocate holding out for full equal rights, with one person, 

one vote, in a single state. We should hear those voices. 

I also listen closely to the views of many of the ministers in the 

current Israeli Government, people with whom I have worked and 

consider friends even when we disagree, who oppose a two-state solution. They are very open about it and very sincere in favoring 

other options. I believe these options actually deserve greater 

study, because we might end up in one of them. 

But all of them are worse than a two-state solution. All of them 

would pose challenge to Israel’s status as a Jewish and democratic 

state and its ability to maintain its security. Any could lead to renewed and sustained conflict. None deliver on Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations for independence. And they would squander the 

real opportunity that exists for normalization between Israel and 

the Arab states. For all of those reasons, they would be worse from 

the point of view of U.S. interests. 

I worry about the implications of those outcomes for the bilateral 

U.S.-Israel relationship as well, which is both a strategic asset and 

a moral obligation. I have spent virtually my entire life working to 

build, support, and strengthen that relationship, including in the 

negotiations to produce the $38 billion memorandum of understanding. I agree with former Vice President Biden, who said, ‘‘If 

Israel did not exist, we would have to invent it’’ because of the benefit this partnership provides for U.S. interests. 

So if we find ourselves drifting toward some version of the binational state, we should study carefully what would be the impacts 

on our relationship. If we go down that road, I favor doing it with 

our eyes open, as allies, trying to steer toward the least bad outcome. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to address the committee, 

and I look forward to answering any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro follows:]

42


28655c-1.eps

Testimony of Daniel B. Shapiro 

Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa 

"Israel, the Palestinians, and the Administration's Peace Plan" 

February 14,2018 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, Members of the Committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today on cmrent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, 

prospects for renewed negotiations, and the Trump Administration's efforts and policies 

on this issue. 

1 should note at the outset that l remain an unabashed promoter and supporter of a twostate solution as the only solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict That is the issue that 

motivated me to get involved in public life, and indeed, brought me to my first 

government job on the stafi of this Committee under its then-Chairman, Lee Hamilton, 

just after the signing of the Oslo Accords nearly 25 years ago. 1 hoped then, and 1 

continue to hope today, that I could make some small contribution to achieving this 

elusive but important goal. 

It was my judgment then and throughout a career of increasingly intensive involvement 

in these negotiations that the two-slate solution is the only outcome that can serve Israel's 

interests in security, recognition, and maintaining its Jewish and democratic character; 

Palestinian legitimate aspirations for self-determination in an independent stHte of their 

OWTl at peace with Israel; and American inter<:sts in ensuring those outcomes and 

contributing to regional stability, For all the difflculties, that remains my judgment 

today. 

The cmrent outlook is quite bleak Two weeks ago. at the annual conference of the 

Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. where T am a visiting fellow, the 

Tnunp Administration's special envoy expressed some fi11stration with the cunent 

stalemate. It was impossible for me not to feel sympathy. I've been there. A long line of 

American negotiators, with goodwill, good ideas, and good intentions, have run agrmmd 

on the shoals ofisraelis' and Palestinians' mistrust of one another. waves of Palestinian 

terror, paralyzing domestic politics, timidity on the part of Arab states, and Israeli 

settlement expansion, So the current sense of a diplomatic effort with no realistic 

prospect of a breakthrough is depressingly familiaL 

Following our presidential election and during my flnal months serving as Ambassador, I 

heard many predictions that President-elect Trump would end US advocacy for a twostate solution, lend suppmt to Israeli annexation of some or all of the West Bank, cut off 
43


28655c-2.eps

relations with the Palestinian Authority, and end U.S. opposition to Israeli settlement 

construction. 

None of those have turned out to beth~ case. Throughout most of20l7, the 

Administration pursued an approach that was well within the mainstream of traditional 

U.S. policy. The President hosted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian 

Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in a warm, productive atmosphere. He made a 

successful visit to the region in May, convincing leaders on all sides of his desire to 

achieve a peace agreement His envoys. Jason Greenblatt and Jared Kushner. !Taveled the 

region and built up considerable goodwill and a positive impression of their empathy, 

creativity, and realism about what a peace agreement required. Parties throughout the 

region and elsewhere waited expect<mtly for the President to publish his plan. 1 !ad he 

done so at a couple of key junctures in 2017, when his leverage was at its highest he 

would have been very hard to say no to. 

True, the President avoided a clear commitment to a -m~o-state solution, talking of "the 

ultimate deal" and sa::r1ng first that he would suppmi whatever the parties could agree to, 

and then making clear that the options for the parties' agreement included a two-state 

solution. But despite that lack of clarity- a mistake, in my view- he nevertheless 

described his aspiration to achieve a peace agreement reached in direct negotiations 

between Israelis and Palestinians, that delivered secmity for Israelis, provided self· 

dctenni:nation for Palestinians, and would enable the opening ofisracl's relations with 

much of the Arab world. \Vith three decades of experience in the region behind me, l 

feel confident in saying that there is no outcome other than a two-stale solution that 

would achieve all those objectives. 

Other familiar elements of the policy included an oft-stated commitment to Palestinian 

economic development, and a clear effort to restrain Israeli settlement construction. The 

latter eff011 was more muted than in the past and perhaps more flexible. hut there is no 

question that the expectations of some settlement advocates in Israel that a Tmmp 

Administration would herald the end of American concern about that issue, were not met 

-to the point that these advocates have complained vocally to Prime Minister 

J\ etanyalm about the lack of constmction approvals. As recently as this week, in an 

interview with the Israeli newspaper israel HuYom, the President said that settlements 

"'complicated making peace", and that "'Israel has to be very careful with the settlements". 

Since the day he was inaugurated, I have had many profound disagreements with the 

Tnunp Administration on a wide range of issues. But through most of 2017. the issue 

that concerned me the least wa:; their efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. 

Having said that, they have hit several significant bumps recently, including through selfinflicted mistakes, that have set back much of what they achieved in the early months. 

2 
44


28655c-3.eps

Most notable was the poor management of the decision regarding Jerusalem. Now, l 

want to be clear: I strongly support recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and the 

immediate relocation of our embassy there. Such recognition acknowledges an obvious 

fact, and om: which we accept functionally in our work with the Israeli govemment in its 

offices in Jerusalem. It also helpfully punctures a myth too-often trafficked by 

Palestinians that there is no historic Jewish connection to Jerusalem, an element of the 

broader campaign of delegitimization ofisrael's vc1y existence. 

On October 211, several weeks before the decision. I published in the Wall Slrcel Journal 

an op-ed describing what I considered the smart way to do the right thing- namely, to 

recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the embassy to \-\Test Jerusalem, and 

simultaneously to describe those moves in the broader context of the U.S. vision of a 

lwo-state solution, including acknowledgment that East Jerusalem has a different status, 

must be negotiated, and must, in the end, include the capital of a Palestinian state in at 

least some of its Arab neighborhoods as part of a lmified city. 

At a minimum, it made little sense to make this announcement before the 

Kushner I Greenblatt plan had been presented, and without placing the Jemsalcm issue in a 

broader context. Sequenced properly, recognition of Jemsalem as Israel's capital would 

have both righted a historic ~Nrong and helped advance our strategic objective. The 

strategic objective is not where our embassy sits. It is the end of the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict in a two-state solution with peace, security, and mutnal recognition for both 

sides. 

President Trump did none of those things. Evidently motivated by the deadline reqniring 

him to issue ;mother waiver of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, by all accmmts be 

surprised his own staff and overrode the concerns of his cabinet secretaries in insisting on 

immediate recognition. A poorly prepared and clumsily rolled-out decision, without 

prior consultation with a range of key regional parties, compounded the problem. Even 

important caveats, clarifying that the borders of sovereignty in Jerusalem would need to 

be negotiated, were ignored in the shuffle, and then 1mdermined by the President's 

imprecise comments that be had ''taken Jerusalem off the table". before he got around to 

reiterating them in his l5rae! HaY om inteniew this week. The decision would never have 

been welcomed by the Palesti1nans, but the President did everything possible to make it 

difficult for them to absorb. 

None of that justifies the Palestinian overr-eaction. On Janumy 14, 2018, President Abbas 

delivered a truly outrageous speech to the PLO Central Com1cil in which he bizarrely 

described Israel as the product of a European colonialist plot, repeated the canard that 

Israel has no organic cmmection to Jewish histoty, and shamefully accused Israel of 

importing drugs to poison Palestinian children. He also unrealistically demanded that the 

l inited States be replacecl as the mediator of Middle East peace talks. 
45


28655c-4.eps

In my judgment in this speech, President Abbas signaled the end of his personal 

participation in effmis to achieve a two-state solution. If, in earlier stages of his career, 

he was conflicted --- both pmticipating in negotiations toward that end and authorizing 

impressive secmity coordination with Israel, and finding it difficult to tell hard tmths to 

his people about Israel's permanence and legitimacy and the unacceptability of tenorhe now appears to have cast his lot As the succession struggle for the Palestinian 

leadership following Abbas unfolds, he seems determined to end his career as one who 

refused to relinquish key Palestinian dogmas about Israel. 

This chain of events has left the Trump Administration paralyzed. With Abbas high up in 

a tree, the Administration has made no effort to find a ladder to help him climb down. 

The President's tweets complaining about the Palestinians' refusal to negotiate- oddly 

out of sequence, in that he has still not presemed his plan that was intended to be the 

basis for negotiations -and his threat to cut off U.S. assistance programs to the 

Palestinians, only sent Abbas higher. 

So in the current circumstance, the Administration has no way to get their plan out, at 

least until tempers cool somewhat, without it being dead on anival. I hope the 

Administration will resist the advice they are getting from some quarters to msh out a 

one-sided plan in full knowledge that the Palestinians will reject it out of hand. That 

would deal yet another blow to the ah·eady battered prospects for two states. 

The truth is that a realistic assessment tells us that the cun-ent sitnation offers no chance 

for an immediate breakthrough toward a peace agreement. or even the resumption of 

negotiations. The weight of the failnre of the negotiations of 20 l 0 and 2013-14 remains 

heavy, deepening the near total mistmst that existed between Netanyabu and Abbas even 

before they started those talks. Several waves of Palestinian stabbing and car-ramming 

teJTorist attacks. and Hamas' continued constmction of rockets and tunnels to attack 

Israel have done much to engender doubts among Israelis that there is a viable partner for 

peace. So bas the continued incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinians 

leaders, including the tmconscionable salaries paid to Palestinian terrorists with blood on 

their hands in Israeli prisons. Israeli settlement expansion, including in areas well 

beyond the settlement blocs near the 1967 lines which could be accommodated in 

territorial swaps. continues to make a viable map of a two-state solution more difficult 

over time. And Arab states, even those who perceive a strategic aligmnent with Israel 

vis-a-vis the common threats ofiran and Sum1i extremists, have been far too timid about 

signaling to Israelis and Palestinians about what a post-peace regional alignment could 

look like, including by beginning steps of normalization with Israel. 

1 have already spoken about the tum that Abbas has taken away from being a viable 

partner for two states. His own domestic wcalmess, including his perpetual competition 

for influence with l-lamas, makes it unlikely that will change. 

4 
46


28655c-5.eps

Prime Minister Netanyahu faces his own challenges. including a spate of corruption 

investigations which he has responded to politically by pulling in close with his 

wing base. Reports that the Prime Minister told his party members he has been 

discussing annexation of West Bank settlements with the Administration are the most 

recent evidence of this trend. Needless to say. unilateral Israeli annexation. even of areas 

Israel could reasonably be expected to keep in the land swaps envisioned in a two-state 

solution, especially if disconnected limn other final status issues, would deepen the crisis 

we find ourselves in, and make even more distant the needed resumption of negotiations. 

SoT was encouraged that the 'vVhite House denied that any such conversations had taken 

place. 

It also should be recognized, as the President suggested in his interview this week in 

Israel HaYom, that the cunent Israeli govemment is dominated hy voices who openly 

oppose the two-state solution. Netanyahu, who endorsed that outcome in 2009, has more 

recently remained ambiguous about the end-state he seeks. But most members of his 

government are clear in their opposition. 

I do not recommend that the Administration make any effort to try to bring the 

parties back to the negotiating table in the near future. These parties are so far apart, 

and their history with and attitudes about one another are so toxic, that, even if the 

Administration managed, somehow, to drag them back to the table, the talks would 

almost certainly collapse, perhaps spectacularly. And such a collapse could easily be 

punctuated by ~nother round of violence. 

Rather, the Administration should approach this challenge with a view toward 

preserving the two-state solution as a viable and achievable goal for the future, but 

postponing any actual negotiations until the atmosphere has improved and there are 

appropriate changes in the leadership dynamic- almost ceriainly new Palestinian 

leadership and all east a different Tsraeli coalition. 

A stt·ategy aimed at keeping the two-state solution alive would sta1·t with clat'ity 

from the United States that that outcome remains our stt-atcgic objective, the end 

state that would best serve U.S. interests. Then, it would work with all relevant 

parties to take practical steps that put down anchot·s to help arrest the slide towat·d 

a binationalt·eality, 

For Israel, those steps include expanding the areas in which the Palestinian Authority 

can operate. by creating contiguity between disconnected areas of PA control (Areas A 

and B), and permitting greater Palestinian economic development in portions of Area C 

that would likely become part of a Palestinian state in a final status agreement Israel 

should also define a policy on West Bank settlements that freezes construction in areas 

east of the security barrier and limits it to those areas within settlement blocs that can be 

accommodated in equivalent land swaps in a final status agreement. The important thing 

5 
47


28655c-6.eps

is to dcmonsh·ate. in word and deed. and by clear expressions of intent about ''here 

Israel intends to remain present and not to remain. that a two-state solution. including a 

viable Palestinian state, remains a realistic goal, even if it cmmot be achieved anytime 

soon, and even if it will require new Palestinian leaders to accept and teach their public 

about Israel's legitimacy and permanence in ways they have not done heretofore. 

For Palestinians, preserving the possibility of a two-state solution means continuing, and 

upgrading, the effective security coordination the PA Security Forces have been engaged 

in with their Israeli counterpa1is. including expanding their presence to agreed parts of 

Area B. It also requires a consistent campaign against inci1ement to violence and 

glorification of those who commit acts of terror. These outrageous practices. which teach 

ymmg Palestinians that violence against civilians is acceptable, must stop. The Taylor 

Force Act, which is advancing through Congress, will hopefully hasten the end of the 

unacceptable payments to tenorists with blood on their hands. One additional gesture 

Palestinians should take is to S\Year off efforts to gang up on Israel and isolate it in 

international fomms. 

Arab states can make a significatlt contribution toward preserving the viability of twostates by beginning to act now, not waiting for later, on the recognition of the alignment 

of their interests and Israel's. Israel is already a strategic pmtner. openly acknowledged, 

to Saudi A.rabia, the U nitcd Axab Emirates, and other moderate Sum1i states - in 

addition to its peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. Those states should begin now to 

engage israel in steps toward nonnalization- official diplomatic visits and meetings: 

academic and cultural exchanges: opening economic and trade links; permitting the 

overflight ofTsraeli commercial aircraft: and so on. Those gestures now will send signals 

to the Arab and Israeli publics about the benefits that can fully blossom in the context of 

a two-state solution. They should also be accompanied by signals to the Palestinians 

setting realistic expectations about final slatus issues like refugees retuming !o a 

Palestinian state but not to Israel itself: and the need to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. 

~~<'inally, it is important in the same period to continue to seek to improve the 

economic and humanitar·ian circumstances of Palestinians in the \Vest Bank and 

Gaza. Doing so serves both the need to relieve su±Iering a11d upgrade living standards, 

which contributes to stability, and helps to build the foUildations of the economy of an 

independent Palestinian state. U.S. assistance contributes greatly to these efforts. with 

ve1y little actually reaching the accounts of the Palestinian Authority. That is why the 

President's tweets made little sense. The consequences of cutting off U.S. assistm1ce 

would be to harm vulnerable Palestinians, including many children, and to impose a 

greater economic and security burden on israel, which would have to fill the gaps in 

funding a11d services and deal with the secmity fallout. 

Thankfully, it appears Special Envoy Greenblatt understands those dynamics. His 

continued visits to aid projects, partnership with Israeli military leaders in charge of civil 

6 
48


28655c-7.eps

and economic affairs, and, most recently, his presentation at the Ad-Hoc Liaison 

Committee (AHLC) donors meeting in Brussels last month indicate that the U.S. 

approach is not, in fact to cut ofT assistance, but rather to continue it and seek other 

partners to increase their contributions. The Israeli minister represeuting the Govemmcnt 

of Israel a! the meeting. Tzachi Hanegbi. was no less enthusiastic about the importance or 

pressing forward with economic and infrastmcture projects in the West Bank and Gaza to 

improve the quality of life for Palestinians. And the attendance of Palestinian Authority 

Prime Minister Rami Hamadallah indicates that the diplomatic stalemate need not 

prevent cooperation on economic advancement. 

l'vJost worrisome is the situation in Gaza. where years ofHamas' mismanagement and 

squandering of resources on rockets, tunnels. and fmitless wars with israel. and 

Palestinian Authority ambivalence about taking on the responsibilities of govemance 

where it would need to challenge Hamas militatily- has left the population in 

significant distress. with crumbling electricity, water. and and wastewater treatment 

infrastructure and massive unemployment. The imperative of addressing the urgent 

situation in Gaza is about relieving significant human misety, heading off health atrd 

sanitation crises that no know borders, and easing tensions that could become the spark 

for the next war between lsrael and Harnas. 

My recommendation to the Committee is ensure the continuation ofthose elements 

of our Palestinian assistance program thnt support security cooperation between 

Israel and the 1-'A, and contribute to impmving humanitarian conditions to the 

Palestinian people. Those programs can be accommodated within the bounds of the 

emerging version of the Taylor Force Act. It is simply a fact that a cut-off of U.S. 

economic assistm1ce would make it much harder, politically, for Palestinian security 

partners to continue accept our security assistance. The breakdown of those programs, 

and a humanitmian crisis in Gaza, are the most likely near-tenn causes of another wave 

of violence or round of conflict in Gaza, which both pose significant security risks for 

Israel. That is why the IDF leadership is so clear on the importat1ce of continuing those 

programs. 

One mnre contribution Congress can make is to increase funding for creative 

approaches to sustaining prospects for two-states outside oftraditional assistance 

programs. We have seen the impact of people-to-people pt·ograrns, like the 

Congressionally-mandated Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) grants. which 

suppmi NGOs that build people-to-people ties between Israelis and Palestinians, atld 

between different groups within each society. These programs build grassroots suppmt 

for reconciliation and conflict resolution, and increase support for and belief in a twostate solution among those who take pmi. 

Another opportunity would be to invest in the emerging Palestinian hi-tech sector, 

which would create high quality jobs and expand existing channels of Israeli-Palestinian 

7 
49


28655c-8.eps

hi-tech private sector collaboration. l refer the Committee to the article, ''Start-Up 

Palestine: How to Spark a West Bank Tech Boom" by Yadin Kaufmann in the 

July/August 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs, for details on a proposal to pair Palestinian 

sta1i-ups with established U.S. partner companies and receive grants to support R&D 

costs. modeled on the successful U.S.-lsrael Binational Industrial Research and 

Development Foundation. 

Any reduction in Palestinian assistance programs could be directed toward these e±Iorts, 

without putting any money in the hands of the Palestinian Authority, and helping sustain 

the viability of the two state solution. 

But no matter how much Congress contributes, and no matter much the Administration 

urges all pa1iies to take the steps that will keep the two-state solulion viable for the 

fun1re, we shouldn't deceive ourselves. The situation on the ground, the periodic waves 

of violence, the political incentives for the main actors. the continued expansion of 

settlements, and the hardening of attitudes all point in the other direction. The danger we 

face is an unarrested drift in the direction of what the Prime Minister has called - and 

says he does not want- a binational state: a situation in which similar-sized Jewish and 

Arab populations live between tbe Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea in the 

framework of one state. Even if you exclude Gaza from that calculation, the numbers 

point in that direction. 

Today, many younger Palestinians say they are no longer focused on the goal of a twostate solution: rather_ they advocate holding out for fully equal rights, with one-person 

one-vote, in a single state. We need to hear their voices. 

I also listen closely to the views of many of the ministers in the current Israel government 

-people T have worked with and consider friends, even when we disagree- who 

oppose a two-state solution. They are very open about it, and are very sincere. Whether 

motivated by the Jewish people's historic and religious tics to the West Bank, the security 

challenges ofwithdTawal from those areas, the lack of confidence in the Palestinian 

leadership that will follow, or the chaos of the region that suJTounds Israel on every side, 

they do no believe hvo states is desirable or workable, and they are working to prevent it. 

Because of the prominence of these views in the israeli government and influential 

constituencies, I have tmdettaken to study some of the alternatives to a two-state solution 

that those who hold these views propose. They include proposals to: am1cx all of the 

West Bank or the 60 percent that comprises Area C; apply civilian Israeli Jaw to West 

Bank settlements that currently answer to the lsraeli military; provide local autonomy to 

most Palestinians under overall Israeli sovereignty and security control; provide all, 

some, or no Palestinians in the West Bank with Israeli citizenship and voting rights in 

national elections; or make West Bank Palestinians citizens of Jordan. 

8 
50


28655c-9.eps

l believe these options deserve greater study because we might end up in one of them. 

Or, there might he a determination to just try to muddle through with the status quo, 

which, of course, is not static. But all of these options are worse than a two-state 

solution. All of lhem would pose challenges to Israel's status as a Jewish and democratic 

state. and its ability to sustain its security. Many of them could lead to renewed and 

sustained conl1ict in a virtual civil war scenario. None of them deliver on Palestinians' 

legitimate aspirations for independence in a state that is at peace with J srael. They would 

very likely squander the real opportunity that exists today for normalization between 

Israel and Arab states. busting the inational exuberance of some who believe the Arab 

states will normalize with Tsrael without regard to a stalemate on the Palestinian issue. 

And all of them would be worse from the point of view of U.S. interests. 

1 am particularly wonied about the implications of these outcomes for the bilateral U.S.-

Israel relationship. I have spent vi1tually my entire life trying to build, suppmt, and 

strengthen that relationship, which encompasses extensive security coordination. the 

common values of two democracies, and a burgeoning economic partnership. L am proud 

of the extraordimuy commitment of the United States to Israel's secmity- both a 

strategic asset and a moral obligation- which I was privileged to help advance in the 

negotiations that produced the $38 billion Memorandum of Understanding for the next 

decade of U.S. military assistance. l am in the school of fonner Vice President Joe 

Bid en, who has said that if Israel did not exist, we would have to invent it, because of the 

benefit this partnership provides for U.S. interests. 

But if we find ourselves drifting toward some version of the binational state, we should 

study carefully what would be the impacts on our relationship. Advocates for the 

alternatives should be asked to explain their perspective, heing clear and honest about the 

impact of what they propose. My own worry is that if, over time, many in the world, 

quite a few Americans, and not a smallnnmber ofTsraelis raise questions about whether 

Israel continues to be the Jewish and democratic slate it has always been and which is the 

fulfillment of the Zionist vision. when at knst one of those aspects of its identity is under 

stress, it will put pressures on our bilateral relationship, which will begin to chtmgc in 

ways that are hard to predict. If we go down this road, T favor doing it with our eyes 

open, trying, as allies, to steer toward the least bad outcome. 

Madam Chainnan. Ranking Member Deutch. thank you again for the opportunity to 

address the Committee. I look forward to answering any questions. 

9 
51

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. 

And we are thrilled with all of your testimonies. 

And we will begin our question-and-answer period with Mr. 

DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. May, in the lead-up to the President’s announcement of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, there were a lot of people 

saying that this would just light the world on fire, everything was 

going to end. He made the announcement. Obviously, there were 

some people that weren’t happy, but we did not see the reaction 

that many people predicted. Is that correct? 

Mr. MAY. Yes, that is correct. It was nothing like the predictions. 

There were announced 3 days of rage in the West Bank, but it was 

all fairly muted. 

I think what is very important to recognize is, first of all, this 

is a recognition of reality. Second, this is a recognition of Israeli 

sovereignty. And it is very important to push back against the narrative produced by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2334 that you 

will hear, that Israel has no rights to be in Jerusalem whatsoever. 

It is important to disabuse Palestinians of the notion that the 

Jews will eventually be driven from Jerusalem, that eventually the 

Jewish state will be wiped out. If there is to be a Palestinian state, 

it must coexist peacefully with the Jewish state and recognize that. 

And there hasn’t been that recognition on the part, certainly, of 

Hamas, but also Mahmoud Abbas has not. And he has, in his most 

recent tirade, made very clear that he does not recognize the rights 

of a Jewish state to exist. 

So this was an important bit of honesty. We should have recognition that Jerusalem will continue to be the capital before the peace 

process begins, not at the end. And the peace process should include a process of normalization of relations. We can’t wait until 

the diplomats have shaken hands. The Palestinian people must 

learn that they are going to live with Israel, not wipe Israel off the 

map. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yeah. I mean, I think you are right. I mean, this 

is a recognition of reality. And, first of all, the Jordanians, when 

they occupied it, that was not a legitimate sovereignty, after 1948. 

And I think only two countries recognized Jordanian sovereignty 

over Jerusalem and over the West Bank. 

And I think one thing that we have seen since 1967, Jerusalem 

is really a jewel of the world. All faiths can go and pray and worship in the old city. That was not the case when the Arabs occupied 

Jerusalem. Jews were systematically excluded. Christians were 

treated as second-class citizens. And so Israeli sovereignty, they 

have a good track record, and the stewardship has been great. 

In terms of moving forward, Mr. May, what has changed—has 

anything changed in Palestinian Arab society in terms of their 

views of the legitimacy of a Jewish state, in terms of their views 

of the Israelis? 

I look at the textbooks in these schools. I look at them naming 

streets after terrorists. I look at the payments to the families of 

terrorists. And that seems to me to be something that is widely embraced by the Palestinian Arab society. 

What are your thoughts on that? 

52

Mr. MAY. You are exactly right, Congressman. There has been 

nothing productive that has taken place. It has gone in the wrong 

direction, I would say. We do not have Palestinian leaders attempting to prepare their people for the idea of peaceful coexistence. The 

anti-normalization campaign makes this very difficult. 

In my testimony, I talk about SodaStream, Daniel Birnbaum. All 

he wanted to do was employ Palestinians and Israelis and Israeli 

Arabs, men and women, together in one place. And he found that 

he could do that, produce a good product, give good salaries. The 

BDS movement, or campaign, which is really what it is, was one 

of the reasons that factory, which was paying salaries four times 

what Palestinians could get elsewhere, was eventually shut down. 

If there is to be a peace process, it needs to start with the idea 

that we are going to develop neighborly and normal relations. And 

we don’t have that at this moment. We don’t have Palestinian leaders who are trying to prepare their people for peace. We have the 

celebration and incitement of terrorism and the rewarding of terrorists, that needs to change. And only then can a productive and 

realistic peace process, one that doesn’t fail, as previous peace processes have, only then can it begin. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Ambassador Shapiro, you alluded to Netanyahu’s 

support for a two-state solution. But if you listen to what he says, 

I mean, he does say that, but he wants, really, a neutered—something less than a state, it seems to me. Israel would still control 

the Jordan Valley. It would be a demilitarized state. So there 

would be perhaps some sovereignty, but they would not be permitted to exercise the full range of sovereignty. 

Is that a fair reading of what Netanyahu has proposed? And 

what do you think of that vis-a-vis a full sovereignty? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I think his more recent statements have tended in 

the direction you are describing. He has sometimes used the 

phrase, ‘‘state minus.’’ He has been more specific about the presence of the IDF after the end of that process than he had been previously. He has been clear that he doesn’t envision the removal of 

Israeli settlements from any part of the West Bank, and definitely 

something far less than a fully sovereign state. 

In his earlier statements, going back to the Bar-Ilan University 

speech, he was less specific and spoke about a demilitarized Palestinian state that recognizes the Jewish state. Perfectly reasonable 

and understandable conditions for the establishment of that state. 

And I think everyone understands that the emergence of a Palestinian state after full recognition and with the full commitment to 

Israel’s security needs will be sovereignty compromised to some degree, and its leaders would have to agree to that as part of the 

agreements and treaties establishing that state. 

But there is probably a limit to what a Palestinian leader can 

sell to their own people as the achievement of Palestinian aspirations. And how it is described and what the specific functional aspects of those sovereignty limitations that are voluntary, that 

maybe include outsiders to help meet the security needs of all 

sides, is something that, actually, a lot of work has been done on. 

Former General John Allen was a leader of an extensive effort 

between the U.S. military and the IDF to define the security requirements of a two-state solution and start to come up with soluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Mar 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\021418\28655 SHIRL
53

tions—technological, training, joint operations with Jordan, Palestinian forces, Israeli forces, perhaps outside forces as well. 

There is a lot of work that has been done on that that is available the next time there are serious negotiations. And I believe solutions can be achieved that will ensure Israel’s security and ensure that Palestinians have a sufficient degree of sovereignty that 

they can absorb it within their own politics. 

Mr. DESANTIS. My time has expired. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ron. 

And now our ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Shapiro, as an Ambassador, you know the importance of every word that comes out of the President of the United 

States or his representatives in Israel. 

So the President acknowledges Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 

We have talked about the importance of that statement. The President wasn’t willing to commit to Israel’s ability to defend itself 

from potential Iranian bases in Syria. The President backs the end 

of the martyr payments, then in that same interview said he didn’t 

want to comment on BDS. His Ambassador says settlements are 

part of Israel. The President then says that settlements are something that complicate and have always complicated making peace. 

The President threatened to cut off aid to Palestinians, but the 

Secretary of State, who is in the region visiting Jordan and Lebanon but not Israel, today says, ‘‘I understand President Abbas, his 

concern about certain steps and decisions taken by the United 

States.’’

As someone who was sent to represent the United States by a 

United States President, how does the Israeli Government and the 

Israeli public decipher what has seemed to be a whole array of different messages? And in what direction does that lead us, when 

there are so many messages out there? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Mr. Deutch, I believe the Israeli public and the 

Israeli Government perceive the Trump administration as very 

friendly, as very supportive, and I think rightfully so. Obviously, 

the President’s own visit, Vice President Pence’s visit, the support 

Ambassador Haley has provided in the United Nations are ample 

evidence of that degree of support. 

At the same time, what you have just described are a litany of 

statements that do create a lot of confusion about what indeed is 

the U.S. policy. People have been, for a year now, trying to decipher what the President means when he talks about the ultimate 

deal, which, as he describes in other statements that, if you piece 

together, includes a peace agreement reached between Israelis and 

Palestinians in direct negotiations that meets Israel’s security 

needs, provides self-determination to Palestinians, and opens 

Israel’s relations to the Arab world. Those are the elements that I 

think can only be achieved in a two-state solution, and yet he has 

resisted providing that clarity. 

That has led, as you noted earlier, some Israeli leaders to believe 

that, in fact, he is giving support to move toward annexation or 

moves that would in other ways make the emergence of an independent Palestinian state later, after there is different and more 

flexible Palestinian leadership, impossible. And yet there are others 

54

who hold on to what he says and say, no, no, he still intends to 

be the one who will bring about the ultimate deal, as they understand the two-state solution. 

More broadly in the region, you mentioned there is confusion and 

a sense of American withdrawal. I know some people will say that 

began in the Obama administration. Nevertheless, we are now 

dealing with a year of the Trump administration. 

Secretary Tillerson’s trip this week visiting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Gulf states right after this very dramatic event on 

Israel’s northern border and not coming to Israel has certainly 

raised questions about what is the U.S. role in supporting Israel’s 

need to defend itself against Iran and Syria. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And when—and this is for the panel. Since we don’t 

have someone from the administration to respond to this, I will ask 

the three of you to speculate. 

The question the President was asked, will Israel have to give 

something in return for the decision on Jerusalem, and his response was, ‘‘I think both sides will have to make hard compromises to reach a peace agreement.’’ What do you think he is referring to? 

Mr. May? 

Mr. MAY. Recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel does not 

preclude the possibility that a future Palestinian state could have 

its capital either in eastern Jerusalem or near eastern Jerusalem. 

I think the President has been clear that that is to be worked out 

between the two parties. 

Mr. DEUTCH. That is the hard compromise? 

Mr. al-Omari, what do you think he is referring to? 

Mr. MAY. Can I just say I don’t think there needs to be a compromise for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital, which it is and 

which this committee and others has said it is for years and that 

I know you have. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And I have as well. I am just trying to decipher the 

President. When the President talks about both sides having to 

make hard compromises, I am just trying to understand what that 

might mean. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. Again, there is no clarity, so we have to basically 

piece together some of the disparate statements out there. 

And it seems to me, on the Israeli side, the difficult compromises 

they have in mind is, one, you know, two capitals in Jerusalem. 

And this was lost in the messaging, which was, I think, as was referred to, confused and sometimes contradictory, but, actually, if 

you look at the fine print, it is there. And I think this is one of 

the first compromises. 

The second is when the President started talking about settlements. He talked about it earlier in his term, and he talked about 

it this weekend in an interview with an Israeli newspaper in which 

he said these are not helpful for peace. 

These are the kind of compromises that he might be thinking of. 

But, frankly, we will not know unless there is a plan. And the 

problem is, in the absence of a plan, others get to fill the void. We 

have seen messaging coming from Iran, from Qatar, from other 

countries, that is basically throwing the worst possible light on a 

future American plan, which has already hardened positions. So 

55

there might be some wisdom in withholding a plan, but if we create 

an expectation and leave a void, others will fill this void in ways 

that are not good for us. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And, Madam Chair, just if I may, Ambassador Shapiro, having served as Ambassador in the Obama administration, 

where many had expressed concern about the administration laying out a plan and then forcing Israel to accept certain provisions 

of a plan that most of us believe can only be achieved at the negotiating table, is that exactly what President Trump is contemplating 

here? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, I would be going well beyond my understanding if I told you what President Trump is contemplating. 

I do believe that, at some point, greater clarity would actually be 

helpful. Certainly clarity about the end state of a two-state solution. I believe the clarity about the recognition of Jerusalem as 

Israel’s capital actually was very helpful for all the reasons that 

have been stated, recognizing a fact and pushing back on a Palestinian myth about the illegitimacy of Jewish history and Jewish 

presence and sovereignty in Jerusalem. 

I think it would have been even better had the other parts of the 

statement been highlighted to make clear that a Palestinian capital 

in east Jerusalem as part of the ultimate disposition of this conflict 

can also be possible. 

I think, frankly, the President’s—rather, the White House’s clarity this week that moves toward annexation of parts of the West 

Bank would not be helpful and it does not support them was another point of useful clarity. 

But, again, we are trying to pull out pieces of this, when, at some 

point, a presentation of greater clarity on end states and principles, 

even if we are not moving into immediate negotiations, I do think 

would be helpful for setting expectations and keeping two states 

alive for a later negotiation. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ted. 

Mr. Zeldin of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I appreciate the conversation here. I have heard ‘‘clarity’’ used a 

lot as it relates to messaging, policy, and chain of command. 

And, Ambassador Shapiro, I am very appreciative of your service 

to our country. I saw it firsthand in Jerusalem, how well respected 

you were and the amount of time and energy that you put toward 

your duties. 

I might have a few uncomfortable questions for you, just continuing the conversation of clarity of messaging, policy, and chain 

of command. 

Are you familiar with a meeting that the former Secretary of 

State had with Hussain Agha in London recently? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I have read press reports about that meeting. That 

is as much as I know, what everybody else has read in the press. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. So you are unable to confirm the accuracy of 

anything that was allegedly said? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Absolutely unable. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Well, I appreciate that. 

And I guess, you know, for the panel, what kind of a message, 

what kind of impact does it have if all of the reports are true? 

56

What happens if Secretary Kerry had asked Agha to convey to 

Abbas, ‘‘Hold on and be strong,’’ to tell Abbas that he should stay 

strong in his spirit and play for time, that he will not break, and 

that he will not yield to President Trump’s demands. Reportedly, 

the former Secretary wanted to convey the message that Trump 

will not remain in office for a long time. It was reported that Kerry 

said that within a year there was a good chance that Trump would 

not be in the White House. 

Any reflections from anyone in the panel as far as how that relates to this conversation of clarity on messaging, policy, and chain 

of command? 

Mr. MAY. One hopes that Mr. Kerry’s remarks were misreported. 

If he actually said that, if he actually urged the Palestinians not 

to negotiate, not to be flexible, not to look for a solution, I think 

he was very misguided. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. Again, I mean, there is—I don’t know about the 

veracity of the reporting, so I can’t comment on it. 

All I would say is, actually, the Palestinians right now are hearing a different message from some of the U.S. allies in the region. 

What they have heard from King Abdullah from Jordan, from 

President Sisi, and from Mr. Jubeir of Saudi Arabia is the fact that 

there can be no leader but the United States for the peace process. 

The challenge now is how do you create a diplomatic framework 

in which we can walk them down from that tree and actually resume some sort of negotiation, and there are some interesting ideas 

out there. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I would just say, again without knowing anything 

about it other than what has been written in the press, that I do 

think President Abbas went way, way over the line of acceptable 

discourse in the speech he gave on January 14th and, really, I believe, signaled the end of his role as a potential participant in negotiations for a two-state solution. 

I think this subsequent Palestinian search for an alternative mediator besides the United States is fruitless. I don’t believe there 

is another actor in the international community that can play the 

role that only the United States has historically played and, I believe, can play in helping even Palestinians achieve their aspirations in a negotiation. It may be that there are roles for others to 

play, but it is going to be a U.S. leadership role or it is not going 

to happen. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you all for that. 

And, Ambassador, are you familiar with how it got into the MOU 

provision that the United States can’t provide any more aid than 

what was agreed upon? Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. As with previous MOUs, the understanding by both 

governments was that the levels agreed to in that MOU would be 

adhered to unless both governments, together, came to the Congress to seek additional funding. That was a provision in previous 

MOUs, and it was included in the one signed in 2016. 

Mr. ZELDIN. So your understanding of that interpretation is that 

if Congress wants to provide additional aid to Israel nothing in the 

MOU would prevent it? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, my understanding is that Congress is a coequal branch of government and has the power of the purse and 

57

can obviously legislate accordingly in negotiations with the executive branch. 

What that MOU committed both governments to was to adhere 

to those levels of funding unless they mutually agreed that they 

should be changed. And it was certainly contemplated that in a 

time of extreme emergency or extreme need that there would be 

easily the possibility that they could be adjusted, but that the 

agreement exists so that both sides have predictability of expectation of those levels. 

Mr. ZELDIN. A real quick question. Do you believe that the 

United States should have vetoed U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2334? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I am on record saying that was not what I recommended. We do at the time—I believe it would have been—I 

would have preferred we had ended up with something like the 

Quartet report of 2016, which was a more balanced document. 

Many things have been said about that resolution that I think 

are not true or very, very highly exaggerated. I don’t think it has 

had anywhere near the effects that people have said. But I am on 

record saying I had recommended we take another path. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. 

I really thank you all for being here. 

And thank you again, Ambassador, for answering a few tougher 

questions. 

And, again, from my experience firsthand with the Ambassador, 

seeing him interacting with the Israelis in country, he certainly left 

a very positive impact on behalf of our country from those efforts 

and those relationships. 

So thank you again for your service. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you, Congressman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I echo those remarks. Thank you, Lee. 

And Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, again, to our witnesses. 

I would like to first associate myself with the remarks of my colleague Congresswoman Frankel, that our support of Israel has always been a bipartisan approach; it is very longstanding in this 

committee and this Congress and this country. I think it is because 

of the shared values between our two countries. And it makes the 

absence of a coherent policy in this area particularly alarming to 

many of us. 

I would like to report that Secretary Tillerson, at a press conference just moments ago in Jordan, said that he has seen elements of President Trump’s plan for peace in the Middle East and 

that the proposal is fairly well-advanced. And he wasn’t able to 

give a timeline but says it has been under development for several 

months. So who knows? There may actually be a plan, which hopefully we will learn about someday. 

But I hear from the really thoughtful testimony of the three witnesses that there is a recognition that this is not a moment—Ambassador, you said that there is no chance for breakthrough or even 

resumption of negotiations. 

Do the other two witnesses agree? Yes. 

58

So, while there is a lot of talk about the big deal that is secretly 

being planned, it seems like the people who actually know the most 

about this conflict in this region think that we have to be much 

more pragmatic and find some small steps in the right direction, 

as the Ambassador said, that will preserve the viability of a two 

state, two people living side-by-side in peace and prosperity. 

And I am wondering, what are those steps? What can we do, 

what can the United States do, to promote the viability and try to 

preserve that? 

And I know a lot of the testimony, your written testimony, talks 

about succession planning and, kind of, the leadership that is required. And, in fact, Mr. May, in your written testimony, you said, 

‘‘The administration, with congressional support, should attempt to 

work with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Sunni Arab partners, 

as well as any pragmatic elements within the Palestinian Authority to create a leadership succession plan, one that will empower 

Palestinian leaders who are open to conflict resolution and do not 

see peaceful coexistence with Israel as tantamount to defeat. Without such a plan in place, the possibility of chaos, violence, and instability following Mr. Abbas’ passing looms large.’’

So I just wonder what the panel’s thoughts are. I think everyone 

agrees that leadership in the Palestinian Authority is necessary. It 

seems unlikely, in this moment, that there will be leadership that 

will actually be serious about the peace process. But what is your 

assessment of that? And what is the likelihood that some of the 

changes in the region, particularly with Saudi Arabia and potential 

new partnerships or cooperation with Israel, provide some leverage? Is there anything that we can do to promote that? 

Maybe start with you, Ambassador, and then just go down the 

line. I know there are a lot of questions there. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Sure. 

I do believe that the now open secret of the strategic cooperation 

that exists between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, other 

Gulf states, other moderate Sunni states, and Israel is a real opportunity. It is an opportunity for those states to demonstrate to 

the Israeli public, to the Palestinian public, to their own publics 

that this is not something to be kept hidden and to actually demonstrate what the future can look like of a region in which there 

are open borders and open trade and exchanges of all kinds. That 

should be able to be done now, regardless of what is happening on 

the Israeli-Palestinian arena directly. 

I believe they also can be partners in helping, let’s say, put Palestinian expectations in a reasonable frame of mind, that it will 

have to include recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, that it will 

have to end the myth of a mass return of refugees to the state of 

Israel, pre-1948 Israel. 

So there are things that they can do, and those don’t need to 

wait for the resumption of negotiations. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. 

Mr. May? 

Mr. MAY. Yes. Look, I think that we have a leadership crisis 

now. I think we all agree on this panel, and I think you do as well 

in the subcommittee, that the Israelis cannot make peace with 

Hamas, that is not realistic. And that Mahmoud Abbas has taken 

59

himself out of the running as a partner for peace. So we have a 

leadership crisis now. We have a succession crisis on the horizon. 

I think it is important to begin to address that now. What happens when Mahmoud Abbas, who is 82, not in great health, a 

heavy smoker, what happens when he passes from the scene? As 

I say in my testimony, under Palestinian basic law, initially somebody from Hamas takes over. 

And then the idea of free elections—we haven’t had free elections. We haven’t had, I think, free elections ever. The last elections were a long time ago. As we said, Mahmoud Abbas is in the 

13th year of a 4-year term. 

I think honesty is important. I agree with the Ambassador. In 

the beginning, not at the end, of the negotiation process, certain 

things should be established: One, that ‘‘two states’’ means a Jewish state and a Palestinian state. That absolutely is important. 

I think it is important, too, that UNRWA provide transparency. 

We do not have 5 million refugees who must be settled in Israel, 

the Israelis will never accept it. We have probably 20,000 or 

30,000. There is a report that makes this clear. That report should 

be unclassified so Congress gets to see it. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. al-Omari? 

Mr. AL-OMARI. If I may, the issue of succession and the issue of 

the Arab states, but I would start, maybe, with a disagreement 

with my colleague. I think President Abbas can be a partner for 

peace, but he has to retract and walk back the unacceptable statements that he made. But, ultimately, we have to make peace between Israelis and Palestinians with the current—or with the leaders that they have. 

Now, that said, when it comes to succession, the first thing about 

it is what not to do. We cannot pick a successor for the Palestinians. We have never been good in managing other people’s politics, 

and I don’t think we should do this right now. 

Instead, we should take our cue from President George W. Bush 

when he pushed for reform in the Palestinian Authority. And he 

pushed very hard, and he created an international coalition, European and Arab. That was key in creating a political space. That political space allowed new leaders to emerge, including Salam 

Fayyad and people like Salam Fayyad. We have to do the same. We 

have to prioritize reform, both governance and political, and let the 

Palestinian system produce its own. And there are plenty of talented people right there. 

In terms of the Arabs, I do believe that expecting open ArabIsraeli relations right now is unrealistic. Desirable as it may be, it 

is unrealistic, for a simple reason: The Arabs are getting what they 

need from this relationship under the table. Why should they pay 

the price to go over the table? 

Instead, we should test the Arabs’ resolve in terms of how they 

approach the Palestinians, and that is two things. First of all, they 

have to be a key actor in managing the issue of succession. They 

tried that a couple of years ago but walked back because they felt 

there was no American cover. We should give them that cover. 

And, two, to actually get them in private, not in public, because 

they won’t do it in public, in private to engage in conversations 

with Abbas to lower the expectations. And when I say ‘‘conversaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Mar 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\021418\28655 SHIRL
60

tions,’’ that, of course, includes pressure. We can bring them in—

again, don’t have an objective that is too high, they will not come 

in. Have a realistic one, test them on that, and lock them in the 

process. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you so much. 

I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, David. 

Ambassador Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I am a proud supporter of the democratic state of Israel. Israel 

is a beacon of peace and human rights in the Middle East. And 

though I am increasingly pessimistic that peace negotiations are 

going to progress in the near term, I am adamant that we continue 

building the bilateral relationship and also rejuvenate our efforts 

to promote Palestinian reform. 

Mr. May and Ambassador Shapiro, very quickly, you both mentioned in your testimonies that Israel and Palestine have thriving 

high-tech sectors. Do you think this is an area where both sides 

can cooperate? 

Mr. MAY. Well, in theory, I do, and I think it is very necessary. 

I think a viable Palestinian state, a Palestinian state that would 

not be a permanent ward of the international donor community, 

must have economic cooperation with Israel, and that would include the high-tech sector. 

But, in order to do that, you have to have a Palestinian leadership that favors economic normalization and other forms of normalization. You can’t have BDS. 

Right now, what you are describing, which is very necessary, as 

necessary for Palestinians, who should have jobs and prosperity, as 

it is for Israel. But right now we do not have a Palestinian leadership that favors that or encourages that. We should press for that. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Shapiro? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Congresswoman, there is already engagement between the emerging Palestinian high-tech sector, where there is a 

lot of talent, and the very, very vibrant Israeli high-tech sector. In 

fact, I think one finds that the Palestinians who engage in those 

professions are among the least politicized and among the most 

pragmatic and the most forward-leaning in terms of engagement 

with Israeli colleagues that there are. 

There are some good examples, Israeli companies that have set 

up R&D centers in Palestinian towns, such as the new city of 

Rawabi. 

In my written testimony, I highlighted an article in Foreign Affairs magazine from last summer which lays out an approach the 

United States could take to support the emergence of that Palestinian high-tech sector, completely bypassing the Palestinian Authority and, in fact, I think, empowering the most—the elements 

of Palestinian society that are most forward-leaning and the ones 

we want to work with. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I have a lot of questions and a short amount of 

time. 

Mr. al-Omari, you spoke about prospects for engagement with 

moderate Arab states. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 

61

Egypt, and the UAE have much to gain from a coalition with the 

U.S. and Israel on security coordination against Iran. 

But when Iran sent a drone into Israeli airspace on Saturday, 

prompting counter-strikes against Iranian-built targets in Syria, in 

which Israel lost an F-16 fighter, only—only—the United States of 

America expressed support for Israel. 

Is this representative of the way Arab states will try to navigate 

the Israeli-Iranian rivalry, sir? 

Mr. AL-OMARI. These Arab states have their own public opinion 

to take into account, so when it comes to official messaging, most 

of them were silent. But what is very interesting this time, is if you 

look at the state media, or the state-controlled media in these Arab 

countries, if you look, for example, at Qatari-controlled media, it 

celebrated the downing of the F16. It celebrated it. If you look at 

the Saudi-owned media, which is active in the UAE and Egypt, in 

particular, there was almost no mention highlighting the Iranian 

intrusion into Israeli sovereignty. So you are not going to see it 

now in terms of official opening. They still have to be very careful 

about the public, but we are seeing a very different tone when it 

comes to public messaging. That is important. That needs to be encouraged, I believe. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. Ambassador Shapiro, and I want to 

thank you for your service, too, also, sir. I appreciated that you 

highlighted the reprehensible remarks Abbas made in January regarding the Jewish people’s historic connection to Israel. That behavior is wildly inappropriate in a leader charged with participating in serious peace talks. You have a deep familiarity with actors on both sides of the conflict. 

Looking beyond Abbas, as we have talked a little bit, and Mr. 

May has mentioned this, too, is there a new generation of thoughtful and proactive Palestinian leaders who are willing to work with 

the United States and Israel? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. There is certainly an emerging generation, but I 

have to say, one of the great flaws of the current generation of Palestinian leaders is their failure to really empower a next generation. 

People often ask me what is the succession for Abbas, and I say: 

It is the biggest black box in the Middle East. I don’t know any 

Palestinian who really knows. I don’t know any Israeli who really 

knows. I don’t know any other Arab in other countries who really 

knows either. We can all name eight or 10 people who might have 

a role. I agree strongly that we will not be able to pick a successor 

to Abbas, and if we try, we will probably screw it up. 

There are actors in the region who might be able to help steer 

that succession in the first instance toward some of the more moderate possibilities, and in the second instance, try to help build up 

that more moderate, business-minded, pragmatic Palestinian generation, which has, so far, really been excluded from politics. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time is expired. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ambassador. 

And now, Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks again 

to the witnesses. 

62

As I said before, not a day goes by that I don’t pray for peace 

for Israel. To my core, I believe peace is only going to be realized 

by a two-state solution, the Jewish democratic state of Israel living 

in peace and security side-by-side, an Arab state. 

Unfortunately, I personally don’t believe such a peace is on the 

near horizon. Now we heard earlier, one of my colleagues said 

something different, so I have a number of questions. 

Do any of the three of you believe that we are closer to peace 

today than at any other time in the last 70 years? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I do not. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. It is almost ironic in the sense that politically, we 

certainly are not. The content of what peace looks like has never 

been clearer than it has been in the past. This is different from the 

1990s and the early 2000s, where we had to guess what peace looks 

like. We know what it looks like. What we don’t have are the leaders who will get us there. 

Mr. MAY. But I would also say that we have never been close to 

peace. We have never been close to peace for coexistence or to a 

resolution of the conflict. We need to learn from the mistakes of 

past peace processes if we are going to get anywhere this time 

around. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Fair enough. I am thinking how to best put that 

in words. I am going to put it in my own words. 

Do you believe that the Israeli people want peace? 

Mr. MAY. Profoundly. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Absolutely. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. I would say it is actually opinion polls, for what 

it is worth, show an erosion of support for peace. An erosion based 

on the belief that peace is not attainable. If you ask Israelis, and, 

by the way, Palestinians, they will tell you: We want peace. We 

don’t think the other side wants it. Therefore, it is not going to 

happen. So we are starting to see an abandonment out of despair, 

not out of rejection of the idea. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So I will draw a distinction between confidence 

that peace is on the horizon, Bashana Haba’ah, and the difference 

between wanting peace. Having lived in Israel 30 years ago, having 

been to Israel countless times, all the Israelis I know want peace, 

want peace for their children, want peace for their neighbors. 

Who, if anyone, is positioned to be Israel’s partner for peace at 

this moment, within the Palestinians? 

Mr. AL-OMARI. In theory, you see the position of the PA continue 

to support the two-state solution. In practice, we have seen many 

policies and statements that makes it very difficult. What I would 

say is, again, we saw this during the Bush presidency where if we 

push for the kind of reform that allows voices—and these voices exists—to come out, whether on reform or in terms of promoting 

pragmatic peace-loving policies, they will emerge. 

However, if we allow the current trend of despotism, of totalitarianism, to continue in the PA, these voices are scared. These 

voices feel that they are persecuted and, therefore, they will not 

emerge. A lot depends on our ability to create and help create this 

political space for these voices to emerge. And as the Ambassador 

said, the political mechanism for them to be empowered and to actually be well-positioned to become effective political actors. 

63

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. Mr. May. 

Mr. MAY. I don’t disagree with my colleague. I would just say 

this: There are no voices in the Palestinian Authority who say, not 

only do we want our own state, they do, but we want that state 

to no longer be in conflict with the state of Israel. Gaza was—as 

you know, in 2005 the Israeli left Gaza, it did not become Singapore in the Mediterranean; it became a basis for terrorism, missiles 

and terror tunnels against Israel. The West Bank could do that, 

too. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And thousands of rockets over the years. I am 

going to shift gears a little bit. 

With Iran establishing a permanent presence in Syria, Iran 

building indigenous rocket missile capability in Syria and in Lebanon, and the humanitarian crisis brewing in Gaza, Hamas. Abbas’ 

message delivered a few weeks ago, and as was said, earlier Abbas, 

in the 13th year of his 4-year term, increasing terrorism activity 

in Sinai. 

I was going to ask a question, but I will make a statement. I 

think it is fair to say that Israel faces more threats now on its borders than it has in a while, and it is of grave concern. This is highlighted, obviously, in the incursion this past weekend of an Iranian 

drone into Israeli territory, and an F16 shot down over Israeli territory. 

My question is, and I am going to start with you, Ambassador 

Shapiro, what signal does it send to Israel and the region that 

while Secretary of State Tillerson is in the region, he hasn’t found 

it convenient to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Israelis and 

send a message to the world that we will protect, we will work with 

Israel, we will help Israel defend herself? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. It is a missed opportunity. Not because it means 

the administration does not support Israel’s right to defend itself. 

It stated that clearly. But the demonstration of that commitment 

in real time, during crises, that the security coordination—where 

the strategic level, the tactical level, and the diplomatic level is 

taking place is always beneficial. Frankly, I think it would have 

even been more beneficial for Secretary Tillerson, for his credibility 

on his other stops in the region, to show that he stood shoulder to 

shoulder with our closest ally. 

When he showed up in Cairo and Amman and the Gulf, and now 

in Beirut, and cannot report directly to them on the conversations 

he has had, and the ability to say where we are backing certain 

Israeli security requirements and red lines, I think it makes him 

less credible and, therefore, it harms the United States. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. al-Omari. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. In terms of actual support for Israel, I think this 

administration is clearly supporting Israel. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Absolutely. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. Yet in terms of the messaging, I believe, and I 

agree with the Ambassador, this is a missed opportunity. In general, this administration has not yet managed to fine-tune its messaging to the region. This was an important message to be sent. 

They missed it. However, we have a bigger problem. If you zoom 

out a little bit, many of the strategic situations that you described 

are a result of a vacuum in the region. And the vacuum that we 

64

have not filled yet. We hear a lot of great pronouncements, but as 

of yet, these have not been translated into a policy. And until we 

see a policy and a strategy, I fear that not only for Israel, but also 

for other U.S. allies in the region, the strategic outlook will remain 

quite grim. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. May. 

Mr. MAY. I will just say that I agree with my colleagues on this 

point. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. And just for the record, with my colleague, let me first associate with what my colleague Ms. Frankel 

said, the support for Israel has always been bipartisan. It is critical 

that it always remains bipartisan. The loss of that would be a terrible loss for the U.S.-Israel relationship and security of both our 

nations. 

My colleague, Mr. Mast, and I sent a letter to Secretary of State 

Tillerson asking him to stop in Israel to make a clear statement. 

As was said, the U.S. stands with Israel. That remains as true 

today as it was before. At this moment, the more we can demonstrate it, I think the better it will be. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Brad. Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just say I think the administration is 

doing well in projecting those policies that will bring peace rather 

than the 8 years we have had that have brought chaos and a rise 

of power of radical Islam, the undermining of moderate forces in 

the Middle East, and the elimination of secular governments. That 

is what the last administration, which was so definable and so coherent, gave this administration. 

And let me just say, I think the policy is really good. That is, we 

are going to do things. Specific things, the policies will be recognized as supporting Israel, as long as the Palestinians are unwilling to do those things that will bring peace. For example, suggesting that we are not going to give aid to the Palestinians if they 

continue to attack Israel, and we are not going to give aid to those 

countries that are participating in that. 

For example, we are recognizing Jerusalem for the first time as 

the capital of Israel. Those are tangible. Those aren’t incoherent. 

And those send a signal. They send a signal to those people who 

would rely on bloodshed and terrorism to achieve their goal. Those 

people will get that message as we continue with specific policies 

that makes sense to achieving peace in that region, by eliminating 

those people who believe in violence and terrorism from their position of leverage. 

I used to believe in the two-state solution. I was a backer of a 

two-state solution. I thought, there you go. I don’t dislike the Palestinian people, I think they are wonderful. I think most people in 

this world are good people. But there is a conflict here that we 

have to face as adults, and unless we do, we are not going to bring 

peace any closer, either for the Palestinians or the Israelis. 

But as I mentioned earlier, Israel gave up authority on large 

parts of the West Bank, totally in Gaza, withdrew from the Sinai, 

did so many of these things, and only two demands: Don’t use violence and terrorism against us, and, please, recognize our right to 

exist. Well, the Palestinians have done neither of those. So what 

65

have they given up? Nothing. And we are suppose to put pressure 

on Israel and blame them when they have given up nothing and 

Israel has given up all of this? 

Yeah, all we need from the Palestinians is a recognition that 

they don’t have a right of return. By claiming the right of return—

please correct me, and I am putting this out to the panel—isn’t the 

right of return basically someone who says that we don’t believe 

Israel has a right to exist? Isn’t that what it really says, if someone 

refuses to say: No, we don’t have a right to send in millions of Palestinians into what is now Israel? 

And number two, of course, we should expect, the Palestinians 

to say and do, we are not going to sponsor terrorist attacks from 

those territories that Israel gave up authority on, whether the 

Gaza Strip or the West Bank. 

Yes. 

Mr. MAY. Mr. Congressman, I think this gets back to my point 

about UNRWA. The U.N. High Commissioner for refugees recognizes refugees as people who fled from a land. UNRWA has a different definition; the son, the grandson, the great grandson, the 

great, great grandson can be a refugee. So you have gone from 

about 700,000 refugees—about the same number as Jews who fled 

and were made refugees from Arab and Muslim lands in the same 

period, late 1940s-early 1950s—to today, about 15 million so-called 

refugees, who are not refugees under the normal definition. 

You would have 14 million in just a few years based on current 

demographics. At that point, the population of Israel now is only 

8 million. About 20 to 25 percent are minorities now. So what you 

are saying, if you are saying these refugees—so-called—more than 

5 million of them, have to be settled in Israel, you are saying that 

Israel will become a Palestinian majority state, Hamas will remain 

as an entity, and Jordan would be what it is, a Palestinian majority state in eastern Palestine. 

Yes, this is why we need honesty. If we know that there are 

20,000 or 30,000 people who left in 1948, we can figure out something to do with them. Five million people, that is a way to say 

Israel cannot exist as a Jewish state. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Can we have a two-state solution as long as 

one side says, we have a right to send in millions of people into 

your country? 

Mr. AL-OMARI. First of all, when it comes to a right of return, I 

think it was very clear from the early stages of negotiations. We 

saw it in Camp David, and ever since that, the Palestinians would 

not ask for implementation of a right of return. We saw this clearly 

in the Arab Peace Initiative, which was produced in Beirut——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are saying the Palestinians’ position 

is not that they are not demanding a right of return? 

Mr. AL-OMARI. What I am saying is that in negotiations and in 

the Arab Peace Initiative, it was made very clear that any return 

would be subject to agreement with Israel——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I talked to a lot of Palestinians—and as I 

say, I am open-minded to their arguments, they are human beings, 

and should be treated that way—and none of them will agree that 

they don’t have a right of return. 

66

Mr. AL-OMARI. Except this is, again, is the official position. But, 

if I may, on the one issue of security—I mean—this is something 

that I have heard in some interventions. Palestinian Israeli Security Cooperation is, at its best, since the 1990s, and by the recognition of military and security establishment. We heard, actually, the 

Israeli chief of staff only 2 weeks ago talk about it. This weekend, 

two Israelis strayed into a Palestinian city, Jenin, and Palestinian 

security forces actually extracted them. 

We see a lot of security support. There is one thing to be said 

for Abbas, he is against violence, and he has been persistently 

against violence. When it comes to security, I think the track 

record is good. And by the way, great, great credit goes to the U.S. 

through the Office of the Security Coordinator which did this, and 

to Jordan which was shepherding this point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We can talk at length, but when you condense it down to, do you believe that millions of people should be 

able to go into Israel, and they refuse to say, no, we are not demanding that, well that is the stumbling block. And I would hope 

that we, as I say, I had faith in the two-state solution, but I am 

not stupid. And certainly, the Israelis, after suffering casualties 

from this situation, aren’t stupid. If people believe in peace there, 

they should say, we don’t believe in the right of return for millions 

of people, and we are going to cease killing a bunch of Israelis with 

rockets and terrorists attacks. That is all. That would bring peace. 

But we don’t see it. 

And so that is why this administration is not pressuring Israel, 

but instead, is doing some things to show we are willing to back 

up Israel because they are open to these solutions, but we don’t 

have any fear about cutting the Palestinians off if they are not 

going to go in that direction. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Congressman, if I may. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. When Prime Minister Netanyahu in his Bar-Ilan 

University speech in 2009, spoke about a two-state solution for the 

first time, a demilitarized Palestinian state that recognize the Jewish state, he was essentially hitting on the two issues you have 

raised: Ceasing to call into question Israel’s status as a Jewish 

state, including through the perpetuation of the myth of the return 

of many millions of Palestinian refugees and their descendants; 

and the demilitarization as the one-word description of a security 

regime in which Israel can be guaranteed that what happened in 

Gaza after they left is not repeated in the West Bank, which would 

be a completely unacceptable outcome. 

Every negotiation that the United States has been involved in, 

including the ones I participated in, recognized those requirements 

and tried to steer toward those outcomes. And I absolutely agree 

with you, those are essential components of a two-state solution. 

And it may be, for the reasons we have been discussing, that at 

this point, there is no Palestinian leadership, and it may be that 

there is no Israeli coalition at the moment that is really committed 

to the same outcomes. 

My only concern as a matter of U.S. interest, is if, while waiting 

for that Palestinian leadership to emerge and that Palestinian 

change of attitude to emerge, the two-state solution sort of falls off 

67

the cliff to where once they are there, it is impossible to achieve 

it, that, too, will call into question Israel’s status as a Jewish and 

democratic state. That, too, will pose long-term security risk to 

Israel. And that, too, will pose a real harm to U.S. interest. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Don’t hold your breath while you are waiting 

for it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dana. 

And Ms. Frankel of Florida. Thank you, Lois. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wanted to start off 

where I ended my earlier remarks, which were how important I 

think it is that we look at this issue of the peace and security of 

Israel, and maintaining Israel as a democratic Jewish state in a bipartisan way. 

That does not mean that we are not allowed to question the policies and the actions of different administrations. I think, though, 

that intent and motive, I don’t question the intent and motive of 

this administration, nor our past administration in terms of wanting to accomplish this goal. And in that regard, I just—I want to 

thank our chairwoman, and also our ranking member, who has left 

the meeting because of a very serious emergency in his district, but 

they are an example to me of just phenomenal leadership in trying 

to get a grasp on these issues. And I want to thank you, Madam 

Chair. I really do. And I thank Representative Deutch. 

We heard, and I don’t know, maybe Madam Chair, you would remember this, but we heard the testimony within the last few years 

of Robert Wexler, who, I believe, works for the Abraham Center for 

Peace. I want to try to paraphrase what I remember him saying, 

and then I would like to have your comment. 

‘‘The Jewish population from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River will soon be a minority.’’ I would, as I said before, I believe it is a bipartisan desire here to see Israel with secure borders 

that endures a democratic and Jewish state. The demographic 

trends are not working in Israel’s favor. And it just seems to me 

that time is on the side of the Palestinians. I would just like you 

to comment on that observation. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Congresswoman, I think those demographic figures 

are well known and fairly well understood. And I, indeed, think it 

very much underscores why Prime Minister Netanyahu, after many 

years in which he did not support that outcome, did support a twostate solution. And more specifically, said what he wants to avoid 

is a binational state. And that is what you are, I think, referring 

to. A situation which under the framework of one state, you have 

basically equivalent Jewish and Arab populations. And then Israel 

faces some very, very profound choices about whether to focus on 

maintaining the Jewish character or the democratic character, and 

it is very difficult, maybe impossible, to do both. 

And so for all the reasons we have been stating, including much 

responsibility that falls on the Palestinian side, or at least on the 

Palestinian leadership side, we aren’t close to solving that. But if 

we reach a stage where that becomes impossible, then those really 

terrible choices that face Israel and face us as Israel’s closest ally 

and where our interest is bound up in those choices come into play. 

68

Mr. AL-OMARI. The one-state outcome, and I don’t call it a solution because it is not a solution. A one-state outcome is in no one’s 

interest. And in that regard, time is not on anyone’s side. This onestate construct means the end of Zionism, which is really about the 

right of the Jewish people to their own state. You would have a binational state, no longer a Jewish state, but it is also the end of 

Palestinian nationalism. The desire of the Palestinians to have 

their own state and their own representation. 

Time will kill both ideas. And in the meantime, more and more 

people will die, more and more people will suffer. That is why I am 

still a believer that the two-state solution is the only option. The 

question now is how do we do it? In a smart way, in a way that 

will get the objective and actually get us there in a measured way 

that understands the political constraints of the reality today. 

Mr. MAY. I think, Congresswoman, that there is some debate 

over the demographics, but I think we can put that aside. The pivotal question seems to me, when you say that time is on the Palestinian side, what does that mean? 

Does that mean Israel needs to make concessions that would sacrifice and compromise its security? I don’t think so, I think the 

Israelis are open to a two-state solution. I think we have seen that. 

But it has to be, again, two states for two peoples with the Palestinians recognizing that one of those peoples is the Jewish people. We don’t have that at this moment. 

Failing that, there will not be movement. And I don’t think one 

can assume that, therefore, they will be moving to a one-state outcome because a one-state outcome would mean that the Israelis are 

making citizens of millions of people who believe that they will be 

martyrs if they plunge a knife into the throat of a Jew. I do not 

see Israelis doing that, now or ever. I think they are resolute that 

they are going to protect what they built, which is a Jewish state 

in part of their ancient homeland. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Lois. 

I just had a question about U.N. action. What we think will happen or not happen. And as we know, Abu Mazen has always approached his goal of realizing a Palestinian state on a dual track, 

direct negotiations, supposedly, with Israel, and then unilateral 

statehood schemes at the U.N. And I would argue that he only 

feigns interest in the former in order to place greater emphasis in 

the latter. 

So he will be at the U.N. Security Council next week, likely 

pushing for U.N. action. We can’t predict what will happen, but we 

can expect that he will push resolutions at UNESCO, and mirroring his speech that we have all talked about where he claims 

that Jews have no historical or cultural ties to Jerusalem. 

So given his efforts on unilateral statehood, should we even try 

to engage him at this point, bring him to the table? And what do 

you think will happen, if anything, at the U.N. in this coming session? 

And we will start with you, Mr. al-Omari. 

Mr. AL-OMARI. In the U.N., I suspect he will do what he has been 

doing so far, which is actually playing a balancing act. On the one 

hand, he wants to create noise back home. This is a political tool 

69

for raising his political popularity back home. We will hear a tough 

speech, though I hope that he will not, again, cross these lines. But 

what he will not do is join any U.N. agency which triggers American cuts of support for the agency. 

After UNESCO, he got under a lot of pressure from many to say 

not do that again. So he will join treaties, et cetera. I suspect he 

will also ask to join the U.N. in order to get a U.S. veto, because 

a U.S. veto looks good for him. He sounds tough to his population. 

He will do that. There is no doubt. 

What we need to do is a two-track strategy. On the one hand, 

we need to make it very clear that there is a red line that he cannot cross, and I think we need to deliver this through our allies, 

not only directly. But also, start constructing a ladder to get him 

down from that tree. And that ladder is a quartet with the addition 

possibly of Jordan and Egypt with American leadership. I think if 

we create that, I think we can start bringing him down from that, 

and we can resume normal diplomacy. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Anyone else? Thank you, Cliff. 

Mr. MAY. Let me just say, Madam Chairman, the U.N. has not 

and I think we can expect, will not play a positive role in terms 

of trying to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And the U.N. 

Human Rights Council is probably the worst agency within the 

U.N. 

It is a collection of chronic and egregious violators of human 

rights that bashes Israel constantly. This is something else I would 

urge the Congress to look at and see what can be done about it. 

U.N. reform, reform of this agency and of UNRWA, I think is imperative, and I have recommendations along those lines in my testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good. Thank you so much. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I think as was stated, President Abbas will probably try to play some of the same cards he has played before. And 

I think the U.S. position needs to remain that something that recognizes that a Palestinian state that has not emerged through negotiations is not something that we can support. I think that will 

continue to be the U.S. position. 

I actually think, though, where he may find a more fertile 

ground to make some progress, in his mind, is by going to European governments and trying to promote recognition of a Palestinian state there. Of course, many other countries around the 

world already recognize a Palestinian state. We do not. And that 

has not been brought about by negotiations. But the European governments are sort of the prize for him. It may be that that is where 

he will seek to try to counterpressure what he feels he is getting 

from the United States, and I think there are some governments 

that are considering that. That is obviously going to be an important diplomatic challenge for the administration to focus on. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. And 

thank you to our excellent row of panelists, thank you to the audience, and all the members who visited today. 

So with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you to all. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(71)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

72

f


28655n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

February 7, 2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Otlice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

h llpjiw1vv, For~igrLI\JT<eirs.h u;;eg(ll/). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, February 14, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

Israel, the Palestinians, and the Administration's Peace Plan 

Mr. Clifford M. May 

Founder and President 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Mr. Ghaith al-Omari 

Senior Fell ow 

Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Relationship 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

The Honorable Daniel B. Shapiro 

Distinguished Visiting Fellow 

Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv 

(hm11er United Stutes Ambassador to israel) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
73

f


28655m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ~------k_11_rh'-lle_' E_•'a_s_t r_m_d_N_o_rt_h~Afic_r_lc_n _____ ~HEARING 

Day Wednesdav Datc. ___ .,O;e:2."'1_,.4!.e,l-"8'---__ Room, ___ ~2"'1.<c72"'-------

Starting Time __ 2~· 2w5'-Jia> um~_Ending Time 4:05p.m. 

Recesses ( __ to __ ) (_to __ ) (_to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) (_to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Cllairmau Ros-Lehtiuen 

Check all of/he following that apply: 

Open Session [Z] Electronicall 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised [Z] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

y Recorded (taped) [Z] 

Stenographic Record [Z] 

Israel, the Palestinians (1/ld the Administration's Peuce Plun 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP- Chair Rus-Le!Jtinen, Reps. Chabot, DeSantis, Zeldin, Donovan, Wagner, Mast, Fitzpatrick, Curtis 

Dem- RK Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Cicilline, Frankel, Schneider, Suozzi, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark ll'ilh an* if/hey are no/memhers offid/ committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ No 0 

(If "no", please list below and include Ntle, agency, department, or organizafwn.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record.) 

Rep. Connolly's Statement for the Record 

TIME SCHIWULIW TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME AD.JOURNED 4:05p.m. 
74


28655d-1.eps

Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connofly of Virginiu 

Support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been longstanding, bipartisan 

U.S. policy in the Middle East. During his ±lrst year in office, Trump has issued statements and taken 

steps that erode widespread, bipartisan support for a two-state solution. The Trump Administration's 

actions have pushed the Israelis and Palestinians further away from peace, undermined U.S. credibility 

as a mediator of this conflict, and threatened U.S national security interests in a critical and unstable 

part of the world. 

Trump designated his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as his personal envoy for Middle East peace. But 

Kushner's efforts have been dogged by a steep learning curve for a man with zero experience in highstakes diplomatic negotiations. Authorities have an ongoing investigation into credible allegations 

against Kushner involving national security issues, and yet the White House has refused to explain its 

decision not to suspend his security clearance, per protocol, despite a request from all Democratic 

members of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. 

The Trump Administration has repeatedly refused to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a two-state 

solution, including at a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last 

February. In response, I led a letter with Rep. David Price and 189 other members of Congress urging 

Trump to clarify the United States' continued support for a negotiated settlement that leads to a 

sustainable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There can be no substitute for direct, 

bilateral negotiations between the two parties to achieve a sustainable two-state solution. And let's be 

clear, a two-state solution is the only option that would allow Israel to maintain its identity as a Jewish 

and democratic state. 

In December, Trump announced that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital 

and begin the process of moving our embassy from Tel Aviv. When President Jimmy Carter sat down 

at the negotiating table with E1,;yptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 

Begin at Camp David in 1978, he reiterated that Jerusalem's final status would not be decided 

unilaterally. Every successive U.S administration since then has upheld that approach. President 

Trump's declaration abandoned that commitment, sparked a wave of protests and unrest throughout the 

region, and brought his own Administration's efforts to achieve peace to a standstill. There has been 

zero engagement between the Trump Administration and Palestinian officials since the Jerusalem 

announcement. 

This week, the Trump Administration's FY 2019 budget proposed to cut U.S. assistance to the West 

Bank and Gaza by 14 percent. Last month, the State Department notified the U.N. Relief and Works 

Agency, which provides humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, 

thatthe U.S. was reducing its contribution by 83 percent. Reducing aid for the Palestinians, especially 

at a time when prospects for peace are so dim, is a recipe for disaster that is likely to further destabilize 

the region. By providing aid, the United States and its allies are laying the groundwork in the hopes 

1 
75

Æ


28655d-2.eps

that a future, long-lasting peace is viable. Cutting off aid suddenly could have severe consequences for 

responsible governance, humanitarian needs, and the future of Middle East peace. That is why, when 

the full Committee considered H.R. 1164, the Taylor Force Act, I was glad to successfully otTer an 

amendment that would protect funding to the Palestinian Authority for programs that provide 

vaccinations to children. 

The United States and Israel have a special bond rooted in shared values and national security interests. 

The continuation of this relationship and the prospect of a sustainable end to the conflict require finn, 

yet balanced, leadership from the United States. The U.S. has pursued peace negotiations, blocked onesided United Nations Security Council Resolutions, condemned Israeli settlements in the West Bank, 

conditioned aid to the Palestinian Authority in order to combat violence, and helped build institutions 

within Palestinian society that facilitate progress towards a negotiated, two-state solution. We must do 

everything in our power to foster peace and prosperity for our greatest friend and ally in the Middle 

East. 

Maintenance of the status quo is one of the greatest threats facing Israel today Rather than positioning 

the United States as a supporter and honest broker of a lasting peace, the Trump Administration has 

charged a diplomatic neophyte with striking "the ultimate deal," and undermined the prospects for 

peace between Israel and the Palestinians at every tum. Besieged on all sides and locked in conflict in 

perpetuity is not a future we should accept for the United States' closest ally in the Middle East. 

2