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NATO: REVIEWING THE AGENDA AND ASSESSING 

THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE WARSAW 

SUMMIT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 23, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 2 

Chollet, Hon. Derek, Counselor and Senior Advisor, Security and Defense 

Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Brzezinski, Ian, Resident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC ....................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

NATO: REVIEWING THE AGENDA AND ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE 

WARSAW SUMMIT 

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:48 a.m. in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Rubio, Gardner, Cardin, Menendez, 

Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee 

will come to order. 

In just a couple weeks, NATO will meet in Warsaw for the biennial meeting of the Alliance heads of states. Never has there been 

a more critical or opportune moment to discuss and recommit to 

the central tenets of the Washington Treaty—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 

Threats to the Alliance have not diminished. Rather, they have 

grown more complex and dispersed. The Russian Federation has 

repeatedly, it would appear, intentionally bombed innocent civilians in Syria, begun remilitarizing the Arctic, violating both the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies 

Treaty. Russia adds to this continuing collection of abuses in the 

cyber domain and along NATO’s eastern flank where Russian 

forces continue to occupy portions of Ukraine and Georgia that 

were invaded at least in part to keep those aspiring NATO members from joining the Alliance. 

Additionally, the Islamic State has begun targeting civilian populations and NATO members, attacking both Paris and Brussels. 

And finally, the flow of asylum seekers into Europe, both through 

NATO member Turkey and across the Mediterranean, has placed 

numerous pressures on NATO, its members and their operational 

capacities. 

The Alliance remains committed to and involved in the Resolute 

Support Mission in Afghanistan. Just last week, I called on President Obama to clearly articulate his intentions for U.S. troop 

strength for this mission prior to the summit in order to deliver a 

clear message about U.S. leadership and the efforts to secure a staFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

ble and democratic Afghanistan and generate essential support for 

our NATO allies in this endeavor. 

At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Alliance began to lay the 

groundwork for changes that will ensure NATO’s preparedness to 

act. The NATO readiness action plan was approved to bolster 

NATO’s air, naval, and ground forces’ presence along the eastern 

flank. This included the establishment of a very high readiness 

joint task force capable of deployment within a few days to respond 

to threats against any ally. This force should be fully operational 

by the end of 2016. 

The Alliance also agreed to and had increased the scale and 

scope of military exercises to improve the preparedness in a combined operating environment. 

At the Wales Summit, allies also recommitted to halting the decline in defense spending and move towards a target of spending 

2 percent of GDP on defense within a decade. This has been an 

issue that has been with us for a long time. We have got to overcome this. It is a problem with our Alliance that again has got to 

be taken seriously. 

It is encouraging that 16 of the allies have increased or maintained steady defense budgets since that time. However, only five 

nations currently meet the 2 percent target: the United States, Estonia, Greece, Poland, and U.K. The Warsaw Summit must call for 

and build upon plans to improve burden sharing across the Alliance. 

More importantly, the Warsaw Summit must assure a larger 

transition from simply reassuring allies to actively deterring aggressors; such a shift requires difficult discussions of force posture, 

readiness, authorities, and planning. 

Today we will examine the opportunities available at the upcoming summit. We need to address a number of issues, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and certainly the questions that will follow. 

With that, our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very, 

very timely hearing. 

First, we apologize to our two witnesses for the delay because of 

the business meeting. But that is the way we get our work done 

in this institution, and we were able to move a lot of legislation 

today and resolutions. 

As I said, this is very timely with the Warsaw Summit taking 

place next month. 

As I said in the comments on the resolution that we just passed 

in the committee, NATO has challenges. It has challenges in dealing with Russia’s aggression. It has challenges dealing with the terrorism threats. It has challenges dealing with the migration issues 

and immigrants. It has the Warsaw Summit dealing with expansion of membership of countries that desire to become part of 

NATO. One is ready. Others are very much interested in furthering 

the progress towards membership with NATO. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

It is interesting. I would say the two most important organizations for security of Europe is NATO and EU. And EU is having 

a major vote today in Great Britain with Brexit, and I know we are 

all anxious to see how that turns out. I certainly hope that ‘‘remain’’ wins and that Great Britain remains part of EU. The EU 

clearly needs to reform, but I think it is in England’s interest as 

well as Europe’s interest for them to work out their problems collectively and not separately. So we will see how that goes, but it 

is certainly a matter of great international interest, what is happening in Europe today. 

But it does underscore the point, whether it is EU or NATO, that 

we too often take these institutions for granted, and it is important 

to take a moment and remind ourselves why they are important 

and why they exist and to remind ourselves we helped establish 

and build these institutions to begin with. These institutions are 

fundamental to preserving peace, stability, and promotion of these 

values that we hold dear. 

So I hope at this hearing we will have a chance to take a look 

at what we expect to accomplish in NATO. 

First, is NATO achieving the appropriate balance between its efforts to address Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern borders and 

its efforts to address the complex security challenges posed by instability and violence from the south. 

Second, all NATO members must fulfill their budgetary commitments to dedicate 2 percent of their GDP to defense. Our chairman 

has mentioned that at every meeting we have had with a NATO 

ally, publicly, privately, and has been very consistent about our expectations. We are patient people. Well, maybe we are not that patient. But we expect to see greater progress. I know we have seen 

some progress, but it is something that is critically important, we 

believe, for NATO’s future. 

Finally, we should view the aspirations of potential member 

states like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. We know that there is 

going to be action taken on Montenegro. There has already been action taken. But in addition, that has already been done in regards 

to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. What is expected in this summit 

that will help those countries in their goal to become our allies in 

NATO? 

In preparation for the summit, I am concerned about the potential disputes that have emerged among member states. I was glad 

to work with the chairman on a resolution we just passed which 

emphasizes unity. I hope that other legislatures across the Alliance 

will consider passing similar measures before the summit. Public 

support expressed through its elected representatives is the best 

message that we can send as Russia attempts to erode the support 

or the Alliance. One such measure came from the parliament of 

Montenegro last week which passed a resolution expressing strong 

support for NATO membership. 

Both of our witnesses today recently joined with 32 national security leaders on an important open letter calling on the administration to move forward with the ratification of the protocols for 

Montenegro. I agree with this letter. It is time for the administration to quickly send the protocols to the Senate for consideration. 

There is no reason for delay. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

I would close with a note of caution. As we look at the strategic 

and short-term threats that face the Alliance, we can never stop 

the process of reexamining our assumptions. One of the reasons 

why a strong, agile, and flexible NATO is necessary for the 21st 

century is precisely because it is a critically important tool for 

shaping our relationship with Russia so that we can build a constructive relationship with Russia that we all seek to have. We all 

seek to have a positive, constructive relationship with Russia. 

In my assessment, that is not possible now given Russia’s leadership, orientation, and behavior. Our goal is to seek to influence and 

change that behavior and to build a productive relationship. We 

are not looking for needless confrontation, and we should not take 

decisions which would not allow us to change our course if Russia 

changes its course. 

Do not get me wrong. We must be tough and work to establish 

a legitimate deterrent to support our friends in Europe. But we 

also should be smart in defining our long-term security interests of 

the United States. And I hope at this hearing we can have further 

help as to how we can develop those goals. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for those comments and 

the way that you work with us on the committee. 

Our first witness is the honorable Derek Chollet who serves as 

Counselor and Senior Advisor on Security and Defense Policy at 

The German Marshall Fund. From 2012 to 2015, Mr. Chollet was 

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs where he managed U.S. defense policy towards Europe, including NATO, the Middle East, Africa, and the western hemisphere. 

Our second witness, Mr. Ian Brzezinski, currently serves as Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has more than 2 

decades of experience in U.S. national security matters, having 

served in senior policy positions at the U.S. Department of Defense 

and the U.S. Congress, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO policy from 2001 to 2005. 

We thank you both very much for being here. We thank you for 

your patience. We look forward to you summarizing your comments, and without objection, your written testimony will be entered into the record. And if you would just begin in the order I 

introduced you, I would appreciate it. Again, thank you for being 

here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, COUNSELOR AND 

SENIOR ADVISOR, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, THE 

GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CHOLLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Cardin and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity 

to be back before you to talk about the priorities for the upcoming 

NATO Warsaw Summit. 

The summit next month comes at a critical time for the Alliance, 

perhaps the most perilous moment in the 25 years since the end 

of the Cold War. With so many challenges testing the transatlantic 

partnership from the east, to the south, and indeed from within, 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

Warsaw must be successful. And I very much commend the resolution that you passed earlier this morning both on NATO, as well 

as the resolution on Russia. I think those are important statements, and I hope the full Senate would pass those soon. 

So what would success at Warsaw look like? I will briefly discuss 

four priority areas. 

First, the Warsaw Summit needs to consolidate the reassurance 

measures that NATO has taken to shore up its eastern flank and 

to set a road map for what it can do in the future. Russia’s aggression and reckless behavior has brought back serious questions 

about the credibility of NATO’s deterrent. Since 2014, the U.S. and 

its partners have taken important steps to reassure our most vulnerable allies about our common commitment to their security. 

Now we must transition from reassurance to deterrence. 

Before the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO’s actions were about 

crisis response. Today the Alliance has taken meaningful steps toward sustained support. The U.S. has acted with a request to significantly boost its funding for the European Reassurance Initiative 

and by augmenting its force presence. 

Now, it is important to note that NATO allies have stepped up 

as well, contributing a more credible deterrent force in the Baltics 

and Poland, with a proposal for four battalions stationed in the 

east on track to be approved at Warsaw. 

There has also been considerable augmentation of our exercises 

and training in Europe, as exemplified by the recent Anakonda exercise in Poland and the Baltops maritime exercise, and enhanced 

NATO command and control in eight new small headquarters in 

the east. 

Second, the Alliance must also grapple with the threats from the 

south and the confluence of crises emanating from the Middle East 

and North Africa. 

Now, I do not think that we can expect that this will ever become 

a NATO-only mission like Afghanistan, but NATO countries have 

a vital role to play. NATO has been training Iraqi forces in Jordan 

and appears close to conducting training in Iraq. Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Carter mentioned last week after the NATO defense ministerial, a decision will likely be taken at Warsaw to deploy such key NATO assets as AWACS aircraft to the anti-ISIL 

campaign. 

The Alliance also needs to continue to deepen its relationships 

with key partner countries in the region, and I welcome the announcement this week for Israel to open an office at NATO headquarters. 

Third, beyond these important military steps to enhance deterrence, the Alliance must reaffirm its open door. While the question 

of how much further NATO should enlarge will remain contentious 

within the Alliance, Montenegro’s pending membership is a real opportunity to demonstrate a clear continued commitment to the open 

door. 

And this is why, as Senator Cardin mentioned, earlier this week 

I joined with over 30 of my former government colleagues, including by colleague to the right, to sign an open letter to the Obama 

administration and the U.S. Senate to ratify Montenegro’s accession protocol as quickly as possible, ideally by the end of this year. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

But we must also be clear that this will not be the last word on 

the open door, and I believe it is imperative to continue to explore 

ways to deepen our cooperation with Georgia, as well as get more 

member states involved in helping Ukraine enhance its security 

and defense reform. 

And finally and most important, yet perhaps most difficult, the 

Warsaw Summit must be a moment to galvanize support for the 

Alliance among our publics, the kind of support necessary to make 

the required sacrifices, whether that is deploying troops or spending the necessary resources on defense. Indeed, it is fair to ask if 

NATO allies will not step up now, given all the threats that they 

face, when will they. 

Now, the U.S. is not immune from such pressures, and we have 

seen some question whether NATO is worth it. I think it is important to note that NATO continues to enjoy significant support 

among the American people. A recent poll by the Pew Research 

Center showed that 77 percent of Americans believe that being a 

member of NATO was a good thing for the U.S. I agree. Yet, in a 

climate of decreased budgets and increased demands globally, European members of the Alliance will need to be seen as carrying 

their fair share of the burden. 

Now, although there has been some positive movement toward 

increased European spending since the 2014 summit in Wales, 

there is still reason to be concerned. Europe remains mired in its 

own internal struggles whether from migration, the rise in populism, its enduring economic crisis, and the future of the EU itself, 

which only makes it harder for European leaders to think strategically and muster the political will for shared sacrifice. And depending on the outcome of today’s vote on Brexit, this challenge may 

only become harder. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, these are just a few of the priorities for the upcoming summit. There are many other agenda items from boosting cyber defense to the enduring mission in Afghanistan, to helping bring security to Libya that I would be happy to discuss with you further. 

Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

this morning, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Mr. Chollet’s prepared statemend follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK CHOLLET

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of this committee, I 

greatly appreciate for the opportunity to be back before you to discuss the priorities 

of the NATO Warsaw Summit. The Summit next month comes at a critical time for 

the Alliance—perhaps the most perilous in the quarter-century since the end of the 

Cold War. With so many challenges testing the Transatlantic partnership—with 

threats from the East, the South, and indeed from within—Warsaw must be successful. So what would success look like? I’d like to discuss briefly four priority 

areas. 

First, the Warsaw Summit needs to consolidate the reassurance measures NATO 

has taken to shore up its Eastern flank, and set a road map for what can be done 

in the future. Russia’s aggression and reckless behavior has brought back questions 

about the credibility of NATO’s deterrent. Since 2014, the U.S. and its partners 

have taken important steps to reassure our most vulnerable allies about our common commitment to their security. Now, we must transition from reassurance to deterrence. 

On that score, I believe the Alliance is on track. Before the 2014 Summit in 

Wales, NATO’s actions were about crisis response; today, it has taken steps toward 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

sustained support. The U.S. has acted with a significant boost in funding to its European Reassurance Initiative and by augmenting its force presence in Europe. It 

is important to note that NATO allies have stepped up as well, creating a more 

credible deterrent force in the Baltics and Poland, with the proposal for four battalions stationed in the East on track to be approved at Warsaw. I think it is important that these front-line forces have what they need and are ready to fight. There 

has also been considerable augmenting of our exercising and training in Europe (as 

exemplified by the recent Anakonda and Baltops exercises), and improved readiness 

and responsiveness of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (NATO’s spearhead force) and NATO’s command and control in eight new small headquarters in 

the East. It is also important that NATO update its military planning. 

Second, along with these challenges in NATO’s East, the Alliance must also grapple with challenges to its South, and the confluence of crises emanating from the 

Middle East and North Africa. I don’t think we can expect that this will ever become 

a NATO fight—like Afghanistan—but NATO countries have a vital role to play. And 

increasingly we are seeing the Alliance step-up. NATO has been training Iraqi officers in Jordan and appears close to conducting training in Iraq. Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Carter indicated at last week’s NATO Defense Ministerial, a decision will likely be taken at the Warsaw Summit to use NATO Airborne Warning 

and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIL campaign. Additionally, NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea has been essential in responding to the refugee and migrant crisis. NATO is also exploring the transformation of Operation Active Endeavour into a broad maritime security operation. 

Furthermore, as a recent GMF Advisory Panel Report for the Warsaw Summit argued, to respond to today’s challenges it is important that the Alliance continues 

to deepen its relationships with key partner countries—and I welcome the announcement this week for Israel to open an office at NATO headquarters. 

As NATO considers these challenges to its East and South, it cannot see these 

issues as zero-sum. We must avoid the danger of a split in the Alliance between 

the Eastern and Southern partners in terms of which priority deserves more attention and resources. We must do both. After the end of the Cold War, when the moment of a Europe whole, free and at peace seemed upon us, there were questions 

about NATO’s future role. During this time, a common refrain was the Alliance 

needed to go ‘‘out of area or out of business.’’ Today, at a moment in which we must 

again confront threats to Europe’s security order, NATO experts and officials are 

embracing a new mantra: ‘‘in area or in trouble.’’ 

Third, beyond these important military steps to enhance deterrence, the Alliance 

must reaffirm its open-door policy. While the question of how much further NATO 

should expand will remain contentious within the Alliance, Montenegro’s pending 

accession is a real opportunity to demonstrate a clear, continued commitment to the 

open-door. This is why earlier this week I joined with over 30 of my former government colleagues in a bipartisan open letter urging the Obama Administration and 

U.S. Senate to ratify Montenegro’s accession protocol as quickly as possible, ideally 

by the end of this year. But we also must be clear that this will not be last word 

on the open-door; I believe we must continue to explore ways to deepen cooperation 

with Georgia, as well as get more member states involved in helping Ukraine enhance its security and defense reform. 

Finally, and most important—yet perhaps most difficult—the Warsaw summit 

must be a moment to try to galvanize support for the Alliance among our publics— 

the kind of support necessary to make the required sacrifices, whether that is deploying troops or spending the necessary resources on defense. Indeed it is fair to 

ask: if NATO allies will not step up now, will they ever? The US is not immune 

from such pressures, as we’ve seen some question whether NATO is ‘‘worth it.’’ It 

is important to note that NATO continues to enjoy significant support among the 

American people—a recent poll by the Pew Research Center showed that 77% of 

Americans believed that ‘‘being a member of NATO was a good thing for the U.S.’’ 

Yet, in a climate of decreased budgets and increased demands, European members 

of the Alliance will need to be seen as carrying their fair share of the burden. 

Although we have seen some positive movement toward greater European spending since the 2014 Summit in Wales, there is still reason to be concerned. Europe 

remains preoccupied by its own internal struggles—whether from migration, the rise 

in populism, its enduring economic crisis or the future of the EU itself—which only 

makes it harder for European leaders to think strategically and muster the political 

will for shared sacrifice. And depending on the outcome of today’s vote on Brexit, 

this challenge may only become harder. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, 

members of this Committee, these are a few of the priorities for the upcoming summit. There are many other agenda items—from boosting cyber defense to possibly 

helping in Libya—that I would be happy to discuss further. Once again, I thank you 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, 

BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, 

members of the committee, it is a privilege to participate in this 

hearing addressing the challenges confronting the NATO alliance. 

NATO’s summit next month portends to be its most significant 

since the end of the Cold War. No previous summit in this era has 

had to address a set of challenges as complex, as proximate, and 

as forbidding as those now present on the Alliance’s eastern and 

southern frontiers. 

The most urgent of these challenges is the destabilizing combination of Russia’s geopolitical assertiveness and growing military 

power. The decisions NATO promulgates in Warsaw must present 

a credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize the vision of 

a Europe whole, free, and secure, and ensure that all allies share 

equitably in the burdens that flow from these objectives. These are 

three criteria by which to measure success or failure at the Warsaw Summit. 

Last winter, as you pointed out, the Alliance committed itself to 

establishing an enhanced forward presence in central Europe and 

appears to be on track to deploy battalion level units in each of the 

Baltic states and Poland. Battalions, roughly 800 to 1,000 troops, 

are small units when juxtaposed against the airborne, mechanized, 

and tank divisions deployed in Russia’s western military district. 

This is an environment where the opponent’s advantages include 

proximity, speed, and massed fire power. 

In order to be an effective deterrent, these NATO units must be 

able to survive for a limited amount of time amidst an intense attack. They will require reconnaissance and surveillance assets to 

mitigate the risk of surprise and air defense assets to enhance 

their survivability. They must have sufficient lethality to impose 

costs on an aggressor even if the expectation is not to defeat that 

adversary. These units must bristle with anti-armor capabilities 

and perhaps even their own artillery and tanks. And here I would 

urge you to look at the history of the Berlin Brigade because that 

was a heavily armed, forward-deployed unit. 

The war plans that guide these units will have to be integrated 

with those of their host nations, and that synchronization will have 

to be exercised regularly. 

The Alliance has to be postured to reinforce in real time these 

forward-based battalions. Toward that end, NATO will need to conduct in the very near future brigade- and division-level exercises to 

refine and demonstrate that capability. 

And NATO will need to delegate to its commanders the authorities necessary for them to martial in real time the Alliance’s military assets in the event of provocation or aggression. There may be 

no time for North Atlantic Council deliberations. 

Moscow can be expected to closely observe the capability that accompanies NATO’s new force posture. It will be very readily apparFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ent whether or not this force is a steely reflection of Alliance commitment to its collective defense mission. 

A second critical issue that will define the Warsaw Summit is the 

Alliance’s relationship with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The reinforcement of NATO’s eastern frontier should be accompanied by 

a significant deepening of the Alliance’s relationship with these nations, particularly Ukraine. This is an important requirement if we 

are to reanimate the vision of an undivided and secure Europe and 

erase the red line that Moscow has been allowed to draw across the 

continent. 

Toward these ends, NATO leaders at the Warsaw Summit should 

embrace Ukraine and Georgia’s European and transatlantic aspirations. They should be given a clear road map to NATO membership, recognizing it will take time for them to meet the criteria of 

membership. 

The Alliance should incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the security initiatives it is developing to reinforce the Black Sea region. 

Their territories could be used for anti-submarine, air defense, surveillance, and other operations useful to counter Russia’s militarization of occupied Crimea. 

And the Alliance should expand the security assistance it provides Ukraine. The time is long overdue to grant Ukraine the lethal defensive equipment it has requested, be it anti-tank, air defense, and other weapons. None of these actions would threaten 

Russia’s territorial integrity, but they would complicate Russian 

military planning and increase the risks that would come with further aggression. Nor are they inconsistent with an effort to normalize relations with Russia. In fact, these steps are necessary to 

prompt a de-escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West. 

And finally, our NATO allies must demonstrate commitment to 

share in all the burdens that come with addressing the full spectrum of challenges before the Alliance. Washington has wisely reversed course on mistaken withdrawal of U.S. combat capability 

from Europe. It will deploy an armored brigade back to Europe. It 

committed to preposition in Europe an equipment set for a second 

armored brigade, and this is on top of two army brigades and all 

the air and naval assets the U.S. has long stationed in Europe. 

Reports that allies are only able or willing to contribute three 

battalions to this effort in contrast to our contribution is disturbing. An absence of a robust West European force presence 

along NATO’s eastern frontier risks transforming a demonstration 

of Alliance resolve and determination into a reanimated and divisive burden-sharing issue. 

Mr. Chairman, Russia is, of course, not the only challenge before 

the Alliance today, but the threat posed by Russia is distinctive for 

its urgency and its proximity, the scale of Russian conventional 

forces, and the risk of nuclear escalation. 

Presenting a unified and credible commitment to the Alliance’s 

core defense mission and the vision of a Europe whole and free 

must stand at the top of the NATO agenda in Warsaw. This will 

require strong leadership from the United States, but success in 

this regard will ensure the vibrancy and relevancy of NATO and, 

most importantly, reinforce the prospects of peace. 

Thank you. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

[Mr. Brzezinski’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN J. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Committee, I am 

honored to participate in this hearing addressing the challenges now confronting the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the decisions the Alliance will 

make during its summit meeting in Warsaw on July 8 and 9th. 

NATO is the institutional cornerstone of transatlantic security. This Alliance 

serves our national interests by leveraging the political legitimacy and military capacity of its European and North American members. It is history’s most successful 

military Alliance, and it remains as relevant today as it has ever been. 

NATO’s meeting Warsaw next month portends to be its most significant summit 

since the end of the Cold War. No previous summit in this era has had to address 

a set of challenges as complex, proximate, and forbidding as those now present on 

the Alliance’s eastern and southern frontiers. 

The most urgent of these challenges is the destabilizing combination of Russia’s 

geopolitical assertiveness and growing military power. The decisions NATO promulgates in Warsaw must present a credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize 

the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure, and ensure that all allies share equitably the burdens that flow from these objectives. These are three criteria by which 

to measure success or failure at the Warsaw summit. 

THE CHALLENGE FROM RUSSIA

President Putin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is but one element of a revanchist 

policy that he has articulated and exercised since taking office in 1999. His central 

objective is clear—the reestablishment of the power, territorial control, and hegemony of the former Soviet Union. Putin’s campaign history includes Moscow’s attempt 

to subvert Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia, the separatist movement in Moldova, energy embargoes against Lithuania and 

Ukraine, and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. 

His strategy is multifaceted, leveraging the full scope of Russian economic and political power. It integrates information warfare as well as extensive intelligence and 

criminal networks to exploit the weaknesses of neighboring states. 

Putin’s strategy ultimately rests on a foundation of Russian military power. 

Under his personal direction, the Kremlin has driven forward a determined modernization of Russia’s armed forces. Some $700B has been dedicated over this decade to expand the Russian fleet, introduce 5th generation aircraft, deploy new missiles, increase his nation’s special forces capabilities, and militarize the Arctic. 

This modernization effort has been effective. It has increased the ability of Russian forces to rapidly mobilize and deploy in mass over great distances. It has integrated into Russian operations the use of long-range precision strike weapons—as 

was recently demonstrated by Russia’s use of Kalibr cruise missiles to destroy targets in Syria. It features a significant investment into Russia’s tactical and strategic 

nuclear arsenals. And, it has yielded a military more capable of conducting sophisticated combined arms operations. 

These capabilities have been demonstrated and refined through an aggressive 

array of large scale exercises, a good number of which have involved between 

100,000 and 160,000 personnel. They feature rapid deployments over Russia’s vast 

territory and the integration of nuclear and conventional warfare. Among the more 

notable exercises have been no-notice snap drills that have simulated the seizure 

of territory of NATO allies and partners across the Baltic Sea, as far West as Denmark. 

The contingency the Alliance’s political leadership must address today is Russia’s 

ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy significant forces for the seizure of limited 

swaths of territory along its periphery. NATO must counter Russia’s increased ability to undertake such a mission and complete its execution before the Alliance’s political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, has had a chance to 

achieve consensus on what had transpired and whether or not it would be worth 

the costs and risks of reversing that aggression. 

DEFINING SUCCESS AT THE NATO SUMMIT

Addressing this contingency and the geopolitical ramifications of Moscow’s ambitions and military power has emerged as a, if not the, principal focus of this July’s 

NATO summit. The strategy and actions Alliance leaders promulgate in response 

to this challenge must a present credible deterrent to Russian aggression, revitalize 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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the vision of a Europe whole, free and secure, and ensure that all allies contribute 

equitably to the missions that flow from these objectives. 

ASSESSING NATO’S EMERGENT FORWARD ENHANCED PRESENCE

Last winter, the Alliance committed itself to establish an ‘‘enhanced forward presence’’ in Central Europe. NATO leaders appear to be on track to approve plans for 

the deployment battalion level units in each of the Baltic States and Poland and 

an improved force posture in the Black Sea region. 

Battalions—roughly 800-1000 troops—are small units when juxtaposed against 

the divisions of Russian airborne, mechanized, and tank units deployed in Russia’s 

Western Military District and the sophisticated aircraft, air defense systems, helicopters, ships, submarines, and missiles that reinforce them. 

If these NATO battalions are to be an effective deterrent against a force of this 

magnitude, they must be able to survive for at least a limited amount of time 

amidst an aggressive attack. They must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on 

an aggressor—even if the expectation is not to defeat that adversary. And, the Alliance must demonstrate readiness and determination to quickly reinforce these battalions. To be credible, NATO’s forward enhanced presence will require the following: 

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets: These forward deployed units will need ISR to mitigate the advantages proximity provides Russian forces. Advance warning will be key to minimizing the risk of surprise by 

aggressor forces, enabling time needed to hunker down and move to defensive 

positions. 

• Air Defense: In an environment where air and missile threats are significant 

and proximate, air defense, and possibly missile defense, capabilities will be 

needed to protect these battalions. 

• Lethality: As previously noted, such limited deployments alone cannot be expected to defeat the large combined arms assault Russia can unleash across its 

border. But, these units can bristle with the firepower necessary to impose costly losses upon an aggressor. These battalions will need robust anti-armor capabilities, perhaps even their own artillery and tanks. 

• Integrated NATO-Host Nation War Plans: The war plans that guide these forward deployed elements will have to be integrated with those of their host nations. This is to ensure full synchronization of effort by NATO and national 

forces in time of crisis and conflict. Exercising this integration is critical not 

only to refine these plans, but also to demonstrate combat readiness to an adversary. 

• Reinforcement: The Alliance must be postured so that it can reinforce on short 

notice these forward based assets. Some progress is being made on this front. 

This month, two large multinational exercises featured scenarios focused on the 

logistical and combat challenges of reinforcing forward deployed forces amidst 

a high intensity conflict. Poland hosted ANEKONDA 16, the largest air, ground, 

and sea exercise conducted by NATO allies and partners in Central Europe. It 

featured 31,000 troops, including 14,000 U.S. personnel. The U.S. Sixth Fleet 

hosted BALTOPS 16, a large scale multinational maritime exercise demonstrating the Alliance’s capability to secure sea lines of communication and 

conduct amphibious operations in the Baltic Sea. 

These exercises were important first steps, but they were nationally 

hosted, not NATO hosted, exercises. The Alliance will have to launch in the 

near future brigade and division level exercises focused on the plans it finalizes for its forward enhanced presence. 

• NATO Command Authority: In an environment featuring an aggressor whose 

advantages include proximity, speed, and massive firepower, NATO must delegate to its commander the authorities necessary for them to marshal in real 

time Alliance military assets in the event of provocation and/or aggression. The 

North Atlantic Council is not likely to have the decision-making speed necessary for the full spectrum of contingencies these forward deployed assets must 

address. 

During the Cold War, NATO’s generals and admirals were entrusted with 

the authority to deploy forces and engage opponents in analogous scenarios. 

This trust needs to be returned to the Alliance’s military chain of command. 

Over the decades of that by gone era, the Berlin Brigade served as an effective 

deterrent. It was a forward-based fighting force equipped with tanks, artillery and 

armored personnel carriers. A massive deployment of NATO forces on the border beFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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tween the two Germanys stood ready to reinforce the Berlin Brigade on a moment’s 

notice. These forces were regularly exercised to make clearly evident the war plans 

the Soviets would ‘‘trip’’ into action if the Allied outpost in Berlin was attacked. 

Moscow will closely observe the capability and preparations that accompany 

NATO’s emergent enhanced forward presence. It will be will be readily apparent 

whether or not this force is a steely reflection of Alliance commitment to its collective defense mission. 

ROLLING BACK THE GREY ZONE

A second critical issue that will define the Warsaw summit is NATO’s relationship 

with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Russia’s incursions into Ukraine and Georgia 

and its continued occupation of Moldova’s Trans-Dniester region is a direct threat 

to the vision of a Europe whole, free, secure, and at peace. Putin’s aggression 

against these countries was triggered simply by their desire to join the West. 

To date, the West’s responses to this aggression has not caused President Putin 

to change course. His forces continue to occupy Ukrainian, Georgian, and Moldovan 

territory. In Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, they are being reinforced and in the latter they continue to attack Ukrainian forces. In Georgia, Moscow has been encroaching upon Georgian territory through limited land grabs, informally called 

‘‘borderization.’’ 

The failure of the West to more forcefully leverage its economic weight, political 

power and security assistance against this aggression has allowed a grey zone to 

emerge in Europe’s strategic landscape consisting of nations whose efforts to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community continue to be challenged by Moscow’s territorial and hegemonic aspirations. 

A reinforcement of NATO’s eastern frontier should be accompanied by a significant deepening of the Alliance’s relationship with these nations, particularly 

Ukraine. The NATO summit presents an opportunity to reanimate the vision of an 

undivided and secure Europe and erase the red line Moscow has been allowed to 

redraw across the continent. 

Toward this end, NATO leaders at the Warsaw Summit should embrace Ukraine’s 

and Georgia’s European and transatlantic ambitions, including their desire to join 

NATO. These nations should be given a clear roadmap toward that goal, recognizing 

it will take them time to meet the political and military criteria necessary for membership. 

Second, the Alliance should incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the maritime, 

air, and ground force initiatives it is developing for the Black Sea region. Their territories would be useful for anti-submarine, air defense, surveillance and other operations necessary to counter Russia’s effort to leverage its occupation of Crimea into 

an anti-access/area-denial bastion spanning across that sea. The firsthand experiences of Ukrainian and Georgian troops defending against Russian battlefield tactics should be integrated into the Alliance’s training and exercises. 

Third, the Alliance should expand the security assistance it provides Ukraine. The 

time is long overdue to grant Ukraine the ‘‘lethal defensive equipment’’ it has requested, including anti-tank, air defense and other weapons. Russia’s large scale exercises, the base it is building next to Ukraine’s eastern frontier, and its military 

build-up in Crimea underscore the challenges Kyiv would face should Putin decide 

to drive deeper into Ukraine, a possibility that cannot be discounted in light of Moscow’s rhetoric and belligerent military posture. 

NATO should also conduct exercises and ISR operations in Ukraine to signal solidarity, train the Ukrainian armed forces, and provide them better situational 

awareness. 

None of these actions would threaten Russia’s territorial integrity, but they would 

complicate Russian military planning and increase the risk that would come with 

further aggression deeper into Ukraine. They would help erase the red line that 

Moscow has been allowed to draw across Europe. 

Failure to transform the NATO-Ukraine partnership in this way will not avoid 

conflict with Russia, it will only ensure that Ukraine remains weak in the face of 

Russian aggression. That is not only an enticement for Putin’s revanchist ambitions, 

it is yet another recipe for an enduring military confrontation with Moscow. 

TRANSATLANTIC BURDENSHARING

Finally, in order for the Warsaw Summit to be a success, our NATO allies must 

demonstrate commitment to share in all the burdens that come with addressing the 

full spectrum of challenges before the Alliance. 

Today, as part of its response to Russian aggression and other military provocations, Washington has reversed course on a mistaken withdrawal of U.S. combat 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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capability from Europe. It deployed an armored brigade combat team on a persistent, rotational basis to Central Europe. It committed to preposition in Europe 

an equipment set for a second armored brigade. That is on top of the two army brigades and the air and naval assets the U.S. has long stationed in Europe, not to 

mention the ongoing construction of the European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense system. 

It will be important for Europe, particularly Western Europe, to make a significant contribution to the Alliance’s forward enhanced presence. Reports that Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom are the only allies able and/or willing to 

contribute battalion level elements to this effort is disturbing. France (whose generals command NATO’s second strategic command, Allied Command Transformation), Italy, Spain and others need to make similar contributions. Failure to 

incorporate a robust West European element into NATO’ enhanced forward presence 

would risk transforming a needed demonstration of Alliance resolve and determination into a reanimated and divisive issue of burden-sharing. 

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman my remarks focused on the NATO-Russia relationship. The Warsaw summit, of course, includes other pressing matters, including the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan and chaos that defines the Alliance’s southern front. But, the 

threat posed by Russia is distinctive for its urgency and proximity, the scale for 

Russian conventional forces, and the risk of nuclear escalation. 

For these reasons, presenting a unified and credible commitment to the Alliance’s 

core defense mission and the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure must stand 

at the top of the Summit agenda. This will require strong leadership from the 

United States, but success in this regard will not only ensure the vibrancy and relevancy of NATO, it will reinforce the prospects of peace. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for your testimony. 

I am going to reserve my time for interjections and defer to the 

ranking member. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both 

our witnesses for their contribution to this hearing. 

I do note, Mr. Chairman, that we do have the Montenegro Ambassador with us today. Welcome, Mr. Darmanovic. It is wonderful 

to have you here. 

I want to sort of focus in on the Russian issue for one moment, 

if I may, on the eastern front. Russia, of course, regularly performs 

military exercises to show its force. My staff tells me that included 

80,000 personnel, 12,000 pieces of heavy equipment, 65 warships, 

15 submarines, 220 aircraft. 

Recently NATO conducted war games in eastern Europe last 

month that included 31,000 troops, far less than what Russia does 

in its military exercise. And there were comments made by the 

German foreign minister characterizing those exercises as war 

mongering. And Bulgaria refused to participate in NATO’s fleet in 

the Black Sea. 

So my question is, do we have unity here? Russia understands 

strength. Do we have unity within NATO to recognize that Russia 

represents a real threat to NATO’s security? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I can start with that. I think we do have 

unity, but I do not think we can just assume it. And I think the 

examples you cited are very good because they do show that there 

is politics in all these countries. The Russians are playing quite aggressively in all of these countries in the media markets and by 

funding opposition groups to try to stir up these kinds of reactions. 

I think it is just important to note that a lot of the measures that 

NATO has taken in the last 2 years since the Wales Summit that 

both Ian Brzezinski and I mentioned were things we were not 

dreaming of 3 years ago. I mean, they were very much in response 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

to Russia’s aggression: the four brigades that I think will be agreed 

to in Warsaw, the U.S. augmentation of our presence, for the first 

time German troops in Poland as part of the BJTF. So I think this 

is significant. 

But there is going to be an enduring question that we are going 

to face that Warsaw will not answer, that we are going to have to 

face moving forward. How much is enough to achieve deterrence? 

It is not realistic that we will ever achieve what you would call deterrence by denial, having equal amount of forces on either side of 

the border. And what Defense Secretary Carter has talked about 

is the need to have a new kind of playbook. What we are most worried about—and I am sure we will get into this later—is hybrid 

warfare, not a Russian invasion en masse across the borders of the 

Baltics or into Poland but something that looks more like Ukraine, 

which is harder to figure out initially, but deeply destabilizing and 

very dangerous. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Brzezinski, I want you to respond, but let 

me just add at least my concern of what is happening between Russia and our NATO allies. When you look at Russia’s activities of 

aggression in Ukraine, in Moldova, Georgia, they are intentionally 

causing an unrest supported by military that causes our NATO allies to say, gee, are these countries ready for membership in 

NATO. So in a way, NATO is encouraging Russia’s aggression because if they continue their engagement, it is less likely that NATO 

will expand sooner to more members. 

So is NATO aware of this? Does NATO recognize that countries 

such as Georgia that really want to become members of NATO, 

that they are falling into a Russian trap to be more aggressive because it means it is less likely they will get membership? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, to answer your last question, there is general awareness, but also an unwillingness to recognize the reality 

that Russia uses a full spectrum strategy to undermine the preparedness of NATO aspirant nations and to create division and 

skepticism within the Alliance about the readiness of those aspirants for membershiip. So there is no question that there is a hybrid dimension to President Putin’s strategy to fulfill his ambitions 

to recreate Moscow’s control over the former Soviet space. 

But with that said, I think it is important while we focus on the 

hybrid threat to also remember that Russia’s strategy of hybrid 

warfare rests on a foundation of conventional and nuclear military 

power. That is what it falls back on. 

If you look at the invasion of Ukraine, and specifically the seizure of Crimea, that was complemented by a massive 100,000 to 

150,000-man exercise in Russia’s Western Military District along 

Ukraine’s eastern frontier. And while we remember Crimea as a 

hybrid engagement because it featured ‘‘the little green men,’’ we 

often forget that soon after those little green men started their operations, they were followed by 20,000 to 30,000 Russian special 

forces. So that event was actually pretty conventional. That is an 

important point to remember. 

My fear, on your point about unity, is that while we do have 

some unity, I am not sure we have sufficient unity. That is reflected in the debate we have seen recently in the EU over the 

sanctions imposed on Russia. Yes, the EU is on course to extend 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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those sanctions by 6 months, but the debate between the west Europeans and the central Europeans has intensified on this subject, 

and that to me is disconcerning. 

Look at the difficulty the Alliance has had in generating the 

forces for its forward enhanced presence. The fact that the Alliance 

could only get European nations to come up with two battalions to 

me is troubling. The forward enhanced presence was meant to extend from the Baltic Sea all the way down to the Black Sea, and 

include Romania and Bulgaria. We are not getting a forward enhanced presence in Romania and Bulgaria because our allies could 

not generate another two battalions. We do not have the will or the 

capability to come up with those battalions. That is disturbing. 

And finally, sir, regarding your point on exercises, not only have 

Russian exercises been massive, but there have also been SNAP exercises that I think are disturbing. Why? Because they demonstrate 

the Russians’ ability to mobilize rapidly large amounts of force and 

to deploy them with great speed. We have not conducted a NATO 

SNAP exercise since the end of the Cold War. I do not think NATO 

commanders have the authorities to even do a SNAP exercise. That 

has to be changed. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

If I could follow up, I am going to have my first interjection. 

On the unity issue, you know, we go to the Munich Security Conference each year. We obviously have a great friendship with Germany, a lot of investment in our country by German entities. So 

a good relationship. 

I will tell you the fact that Germany, the powerhouse of Europe, 

the driver of European policy, spends 1.18 percent of their GDP on 

NATO, I find it to be highly offensive. And you know, when you 

look at the fact we have just under 40,000 U.S. troops based in 

Germany, so if you are sitting there and the United States has 

40,000 troops in your country, you have no concerns. And by the 

way, the majority of people in Germany believe that they should 

not take part in providing Article 5 protection for other NATO 

countries. 

So, I mean, I would like greater explanation as to whether we 

really have unity. I mean, in essence, we are the provider of security services. They are the consumer of security services. We have 

nearly 40,000 troops on the ground in Germany, and they cannot 

contribute 2 percent of GDP to defense spending, the economic 

powerhouse of Europe. I got to tell you I find that offensive. 

And I would just like for you all to respond as to how we push 

these countries. Most experts do not believe they are gong to get 

to 2 percent anytime soon. I think you all would agree with that. 

So how do we deal with this? 

And by the way, it may be one of the moderating forces that 

keeps these sanctions from continuing to go in place on the second 

round. I do not know if that is true or not, but we will see. The 

second part—I said maybe that is not true. The rest of it if you 

would respond to it, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, Senator, I share your frustration on defense 

spending in Europe, in Germany specifically, but more broadly 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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among all but five of the members, and really one of those five is 

Greece. That is a different story. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is because their economy imploded and all 

of a sudden—— 

Mr. CHOLLET. And we have had the same conversations, I am 

sure, you and I when I was in government and now that I am out 

of government with our German colleagues. 

I think it is important to note in the specific case of Germany, 

obviously, they have their own difficult history that they grapple 

with when it comes to questions of their military. It was only 20- 

some years ago that Germany deployed its military outside of Germany for the first time since World War II, which was in the Balkans. And Germany has been a partner of ours in Afghanistan for 

10-plus years. 

And they have a very active defense minister, who I know you 

know, who is trying very hard to push that bureaucracy and push 

the German parliament to spend more on defense, modernize its 

capabilities, and it is a good thing. So we want to encourage that 

because there are forces within Germany who want what we want, 

which is greater capability, a Germany that is more willing to 

project its power militarily. But we are not there yet, and there are 

counter-forces, some of those counter-forces aided and abetted by 

the Russians, to push back on those efforts. 

I think we have to share our realism about the odds of having 

all of the Alliance get to 2 percent. But I think, nevertheless, we 

have to keep pressing this very, very hard. Ultimately it is going 

to be a political decision, and that is one of the frustrations I certainly had in government because defense ministers and security 

experts would get together and everyone would agree vigorously 

that they need to spend more on defense, but then they would go 

back to their capitals and get shouted down by their finance ministers and others. So it is just a fight we need to keep fighting. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have nearly 40,000 troops in their country. They feel no threat. They feel no threat. They are living off of 

us, and I just find it offensive. And again, I could see some of the 

other countries that have had difficulties. Germany, with them 

being the leading entity in the European Union right now—I just 

find it more than offensive. And it is a lot of rhetoric. The action 

is not there. You say bureaucracy. It is a vote. It is a vote of their 

parliament. And the majority of the people there do not believe 

they should respond in protection of other allies. I just think they 

have got a lot of work to do, and I am going to keep hammering 

on this. They are being laggards. They are laggards as it relates 

to NATO. Laggards. And I just do not think we are strong enough 

in our discussions with them. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

So NATO is an alliance not to counter Russian aggression. It is 

an alliance to counter all threats, all aggression. In fact, the only 

time that Article 5 has been operationalized is in defense of an attack against the United States by Al Qaeda. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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So here is just a simple question. We spend all of our time talking about Russia. What is the greater threat to NATO today? Is it 

Russia or is it ISIL and Islamic extremism? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, I would say without question it is Russia because Russia has the force buildup on the Alliance’s eastern 

frontier. It has demonstrated state-on-state aggression. It has invaded two countries in the last decade: Ukraine and Georgia. It 

continues to occupy part of Moldova. If you look at the pattern of 

Russian military provocations, they have become more brazen and 

more risky over the last 2 years. It has not been steady state. It 

has steadily escalated and become more confrontational. 

I am not talking just about the Donald Cook being buzzed by aircraft. I am talking about SNAP exercises in which they simulate 

the seizure of all the islands of the Baltic Sea. I am talking about 

nuclear threats and exercises they conduct that involve integration 

of nuclear and conventional operations. 

So, yes, ISIL is chaos. It is horrible. The violence there and to 

the south is disturbing, but I do not think it presents the same existential threat that Putin’s provocations and his geopolitical aspirations present the Alliance. 

Senator MURPHY. So I think that is very interesting answer. So 

as you look out over the next 24-month time horizon or you pick 

your time horizon, 24 months, 5 years, you think it is more likely 

that you are going to have a Russian attack inside the NATO alliance than it is to have a large-scale or series of large-scale ISIL 

attacks. That is a slightly different way I am asking the question, 

but it is more specific. I mean, you think there is a greater threat 

of Russia moving across the border of NATO than there is of major 

attacks from violent extremist groups. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No. I would say that there is—almost guaranteed, almost certain to have some sort of terrorist attack against 

a NATO ally by ISIL. That is certainly a higher probability than 

a Russian maneuver to seize Warsaw or Berlin. Much higher. 

But what I am worried about is the buildup that Russia has on 

its western frontier, the provocative nature of its military operations that increases the likelihood of inadvertent conflict. And we 

had a small taste of that in southern Turkey. We were very lucky 

that that engagement between the Turkish air force and the Russian air force occurred against an expeditionary Russian force and 

not well defended, that was very much on its own. It could have 

been a whole different ball game if that shootdown had happened 

in a highly militarized area such as the Baltic area. So I am not 

worried about an intentional attack against NATO. I do not think 

that is in Putin’s plans, but I am worried that his activities do 

raise or increase the risks of inadvertent conflict with all the 

escalatory dynamics that would come with it. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Chollet, I think that is an interesting answer. I do not have it, but I think—well, tell me your thoughts. 

Mr. CHOLLET. While completely agreeing with the threat that 

Russia poses, I think the answer to your question is it is really 

both. One of the challenges, getting back to this question of unity 

that we have within the Alliance, is a growing divide between those 

countries who are most exposed to the threat to the east and those 

countries who are most exposed to the threat to the south. And 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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from a U.S. perspective, I really think when we look at our interest 

in a transatlantic relationship that is strong and a Europe that is 

whole, free, and at peace, it really has to be both. And that is why, 

as I said in my statement, the Warsaw Summit has to show meaningful steps that the Alliance is addressing threats from both the 

south and the east. 

One of the challenges NATO has is when we look at the tools of 

the Alliance. They are actually better for the challenges of the east 

in deterring Russia than they are to the south. And one of the 

things NATO has struggled with is how actually to address the 

threats to the south, and some of that is by actually acting within 

the Middle East, as I mentioned earlier, in Jordan and Iraq or contributing capability to the anti-ISIL fight. Some of that is maritime 

mission, which NATO is involved in now, to help with the migrants 

coming up through the sea. But that is going to be a real challenge 

for the leaders when they get together is how they show a signal 

of resolve to the east, but then also determination to deal with 

threats to the south. 

Senator MURPHY. I thank you both for that answer. And I agree 

it is both. But we have major challenges with the Europeans today 

with respect to their counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence 

operations. They see those questions about how they work together 

to try to catch bad guys within Europe as a question that is often 

separate from the conversation about the future of NATO. 

And so I do not disagree with almost any of the recommendations 

that you have made vis-a-vis the threat from the east, but I would 

hope that part of the discussions about the future of NATO is 

standing up a truly continent-wide counterterrorism capability that 

is fully integrated with ours that is seen as part and parcel of our 

mission under the umbrella of NATO. If it is viewed that way, I 

think it is much more likely that some of the tough decisions that 

are necessary will actually get made. 

I think you are right that it is both, but I think we tend to spend 

almost all of our time thinking about NATO through the prism of 

the Russian threat when we might be able to get more done on the 

counter-ISIL threat if it was viewed through this construct. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. Oh, I am sorry. Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Kaine, I thank you very much for that. I appreciate that. 

And thank you to the two witnesses for your time and testimony 

today. 

A couple of weeks ago, we had a hearing with Deputy Defense 

Secretary Carpenter talking about a number of issues. I asked him 

about the RAND study that came out about 4 or 5 months ago that 

stated that Russian forces could overrun NATO’s Baltic states in 

less than 3 days, and Deputy Secretary Carpenter basically said, 

yes, that is true. 

General Hodges yesterday, I think it was reported, made statements that Russia could overrun the Baltic states within 36 to 60 

hours. 

Mr. Carpenter mentioned that there were some studies and analysis that they had conducted at the Department of Defense. Are eiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

ther of you familiar with the studies or analysis that the Defense 

Department has done along the lines of the RAND studies? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I am aware that they were doing those 

studies, but I was not a participant. 

Senator GARDNER. You have not had a conversation with them 

to see what exactly and where the analysis—— 

Mr. CHOLLET. My understanding is, as I think Secretary Carpenter mentioned to you, it is not different than what outside 

groups, RAND and others, have been doing to try to do tabletop exercises to run scenarios about what that would look like. 

Senator GARDNER. We spent a lot of time in Europe recently 

talking about sort of the muscle memory of what it means to protect Europe, to fight a war in Europe. We talked about, as our focuses turned to the Middle East and intelligence needs in the Middle East and terrorism, the intelligence loss that we have in Europe when it comes to Russia. Would either of you like to expand 

on that and what we are doing to fill the gap when it comes to our 

sort of blind spots in intelligence in Europe? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. When it comes to intelligence, most of those intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that we 

once deployed against the Soviet Union and for a limited time 

against Russia have been redeployed out of the EUCOM area of operations, and probably rightfully so. But it has left us with our eyes 

sort of half closed, and as a result, we are not really as aware of 

Russian movements as we were, so to speak, during the Cold War 

against the Soviet Union. Russia’s SNAP exercises have underscored this blind spot because they have often caught EUCOM and 

our NATO allies off guard. 

For example, I was in Poland a year and a half ago, and there 

was an exercise in Kaliningrad, that enclave between Lithuania 

and Poland. It involved 10,000 troops, 50 ships, 250 APCs. We were 

caught surprised. The exercise I mentioned about a year ago in 

which they simulated the seizure—the Russians did a 40,000 to 

50,000-man exercise simulating the seizure of parts of northern 

Norway, the islands Aland off Finland, Gotland off Sweden, and 

Bornholm off Denmark. It was a surprise to us. 

That is why I mentioned in my testimony the importance of 

bringing increased ISR capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities, for these forward-deployed forces because it is going to be essential to give them as much time as possible to hunker down in light of the Russians’ ability to leverage 

proximity for surprise. 

Senator GARDNER. And do you see this—I am sorry. Go ahead. 

I am sorry. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, Senator, just briefly I concur completely that 

we lost a lot of muscle memory in the 25 years since the end of 

the Cold War that we are slowly trying to build back. 

Intelligence is a key gap. One of the things I hope will be agreed 

to in Warsaw is a decision by NATO to create a new senior leadership position within the Alliance, an Assistant Secretary General 

for Intelligence, which can help bring together the various pieces 

of intelligence capability that NATO does have, but more importantly try to augment that over time. That is a U.S.-proposed iniFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

tiative. So I am hopeful that at Warsaw we will see some success 

there. 

Senator GARDNER. And so the $3.4 billion that we have in the fiscal year 2017 budget for the European Reassurance Initiative—how 

much of that can address this need? Is that enough? Is it working? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That money is largely allocated for forces. There 

is some sliver of some funding for ISR in there, but probably not 

enough to address the requirements. It cannot just be U.S. ISR. It 

has to also be—as the chairman has mentioned, it has got to be 

European ISR. They have to make those investments too. 

Senator GARDNER. And do you see any movement that they are 

beginning—I mean, when we talk about the need to fulfill their obligation to NATO in the funding, do you see any movement on ISR 

and others? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. There is some good news over the last 2 years, 

and Derek deserves some commendation for that. Spending has actually reversed its long downward trend. It is now upward in Europe. The Secretary-General came out, I guess a week or 2 ago, and 

said that of NATO allies, 20 of them in 2016 are spending more 

money than they did last year. In the overall, it is about a point 

and a half up, not enough, not fast enough, but at least going in 

the right direction. And some of that investment is going into ISR. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Just to add to that, the 2 percent GDP metric is 

one that we talk about the most, but within that is an agreement 

to spend 20 percent of your new money on modernization, of which 

ISR is the central part. And that is actually a better story than the 

2 percent. So even though we are not where we need to be, even 

close to that, on the 2 percent, we are actually looking all right on 

the 20 percent across the Alliance. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. If I could add. If there was a second key area 

that has to be a focus on how money is spent, it is to increase the 

readiness of the force pool in Europe. The force pool has degraded 

over the last decade and a half significantly. The ready forces that 

the Europeans have are now stretched thin with the operations 

they have underway, be it in Afghanistan or in Africa. The Europeans may not be as ready as we would like them to be to rapidly 

mobilize and deploy battalion or brigade level assets to the east to 

reinforce NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the event of a crisis. The readiness pool of European forces is a real concern. 

Senator GARDNER. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. Do you mind 

if I have one more question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator GARDNER. I think you have talked about this, when I 

was trying to smack in to smash in other hearings today in between those hearings, the Brexit vote that is taking place. Obviously, they would stay and remain in NATO, but what impact do 

you see that having should they leave the European Union, if any 

at all, on NATO? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, I think there is no question that it would— 

because if they were to choose the European Union, it will mean 

for the next several years Europe will yet have another existential 

question before it. And unfortunately, it will mean less bandwidth 

for all of what we are talking about this morning because political 

leaders, publics will be consumed by the future of the EU project 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

and, therefore, have less energy to deal with the issues that we 

have been talking about today. 

Now, oddly, it may make NATO more important, and it may help 

the Brits, oddly enough, to want to be closer to NATO to show that 

they are still part of an alliance. So it could change the incentives 

that way. But I think it is very hard to see this as anything but 

negative for our security interests in Europe. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree completely with Derek. I should add another dimension. An EU that is minus the U.K. is likely to be a 

slightly less transatlantic oriented EU. It is going to be an economically weaker EU. It is going to be probably a little bit more 

of a divisive EU. Most importantly from NATO’s perspective, it is 

going to be less of an Atlanticist EU. And to have a community of 

nations like that, who make up much of NATO, to have that 

Atlanticist orientation diluted cannot be a net gain for the Alliance. 

It is actually a net loss. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses. 

My perception—and you know, I think one of the virtues and 

vices of this committee is you kind of really dive into the regions 

where you are assigned, and my committee is more Middle East 

and Latin America. So I am always fascinated by these hearings 

about Europe because I really learn, and I am going to have you 

educate me a bit. 

But my perception, as an educated layperson watching the Russian situation, is that the economy is horrible and Putin is the kind 

of leader than when there are threats because things are not going 

well internally, he is a little more likely to be externally adventurous. 

There are elections coming up in September, legislative elections 

in Russia. Are you at all worried that the next 90 days might be 

a period where there might be a little more likelihood of something 

being a little nutty on the adventurism side from Russia, on an aggressive side because of the need to try to gain torque in this electoral campaign, or does the election look fairly set right now and 

they would not need to worry about that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Very briefly. I am sure we agree on this. The answer is yes. I am worried, and it is not just the election. It is actually how Russia responds to the Warsaw Summit because if we succeed in having the Warsaw Summit be a show of unity, a demonstration that the NATO has resolved in augmentation of the deterrent, Putin may feel the need to respond in some way to show 

that he is still willing to do what it takes. And so I think it is already a pretty perilous period, but I think given the summit, given 

their elections, given perhaps an EU that is mired in an existential 

crisis about Brexit, I think it is an opportunity for Russia’s adventurism to come back. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree but allow me to add another angle. First, 

I do not think Putin’s reelection is much in doubt. He has a good 

grip on the polity there and the electoral dynamics. It is not even 

an election. It is a recoronation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

Second, actually the economy is kind of going in his direction due 

to a slight increment in gas prices. That takes a little bit of economic pressure off of him. 

But I do think that Putin will be looking at how to discredit the 

Alliance’s decisions at Warsaw, including the credibility, at least 

the perceived credibility, of NATO’s force posture decisions, and 

that leaves me concerned. And certainly, as Derek pointed out, he 

will try and exploit any divisions within the Alliance that flow from 

Brexit or a division within the Alliance over how much support to 

provide Ukraine. My big fear is that he will interpret a reinforcement of NATO’s eastern frontier with no change in the NATO– 

Ukraine relationship as basically a green light to press further on 

into Ukraine. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask a question so that I will sound smarter at my next Armed Services Committee hearing. On that committee, I am always digging into our folks over cyber issues. I do 

not really think we have got a clearly articulated cyber doctrine in 

this country in terms of what is deterrence, do we have a publicly 

announced posture of doing X if somebody does Y, and if you do not 

have a publicly announced posture, you do not have a deterrence 

doctrine. I think all kinds of questions. What does it mean to be, 

quote, under attack? What is war in the cyber domain? I do not 

really think we have answered those things. 

But Russia has been pretty darned effective. They conducted 

cyber war during conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. They had a role 

in sponsoring a statewide attack in Estonia in 2007. The Estonians 

did not invoke Article 5 because of perceived lack of support from 

NATO allies. At the time, NATO was not sure were they, quote, 

under attack. If they were, quote, under attack, was it a Kremlininduced attack. And so there was a lot of paralysis/analysis going 

on. 

This summit is supposed to have NATO designating cyber as a 

fifth domain of warfare. But I would like your all’s thoughts about, 

as we are going into NATO, what should we be trying to achieve 

in Warsaw with respect to, A, cyber being a fifth domain of warfare 

but, B, really trying to hammer down on doctrine because the 

NATO nations have a combined capacity that is massive. Russia 

has got a capacity. They are good at this and they use it. We have 

a combined capacity. I am not sure we are harnessing it, and I 

think we are somewhat paralyzed about how to use it. And I would 

love your thoughts about that. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You are absolutely right that Russia and other 

adversaries are much more sophisticated, much more experienced 

in the use of cyber as an element of hybrid, multifaceted strategies 

to pursue their aggressions. You could have mentioned also the 

cyber attack against Estonia being the first large-scale cyber attack. 

It is good that NATO is moving forward with the development 

of a doctrine to guide the cyber dimension of its operations. I think 

it is good the NATO has a cyber center. We have to incorporate 

this dimension of warfare into NATO operations. 

With that said, I think for the foreseeable future cyber activities 

are really going to be in the realm of NATO member states rather 

than the Alliance as a whole. Just as the way we have tank diviFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

sions that are U.S. divisions and are allocated to a NATO operation, cyber operations are not probably going to be conducted out 

of NATO headquarters in Brussels for a number of reasons. NATO 

will not, for a long while, have the personnel necessary for that. It 

will not have the computer set-ups for that, and it probably will not 

come to full agreement on exactly what to do. 

I am not too worried about that because during the Cold War, 

we had lots of elements of a comprehensive Western strategy, of 

which NATO was a lead player, a partial player and not much of 

a player at all. The latter two will be the likely direction cyber warfare plays in the West’s response with the threats, for example, 

from Russia. It will remain primarily a dominion of a national 

armed force rather than the Alliance. It will not be like AWACS. 

It will be more like a national contribution to an Alliance operation. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Very briefly, and I concur with all of that. Last 

week, at the defense ministerial, they announced that cyber would 

become an operational domain. They said that a cyber attack can 

be considered an Article 5 attack. That will help within NATO for 

better coordination, for better planning, for greater management of 

resources, and that is all good, but I think the caveat that Ian has 

mentioned is very important, which is it will probably mainly in 

the national realm. 

However, this is also an area where NATO–EU cooperation could 

be important and particularly when we think of resilience. So when 

there is an attack, it is one thing to understand what has happened 

and respond to it in some way, but then there is also the resilience, 

getting the systems back online. And I think this is an area where 

NATO could explore that further. And since it is not a purely military answer—it is something that involves other realms where it 

may be more appropriately done in the EU context - it is where 

NATO and the EU can work together, which is yet further reason 

why we do not want the EU mired in another crisis for the next 

2 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first draw a premise for my question, so you understand 

where I am coming from. 

So of NATO’s 28 member states, only five are meeting or exceeding the 2 percent GDP defense spending for support of the Alliance, 

which leaves the United States spending about 75 percent of the 

military spending for all NATO members. 

At the last summit in Wales, 28 members agreed on three main 

outcomes: enhancing readiness and collective defense in response to 

Russian aggression; increasing defense spending and boosting military capabilities; and third, boosting NATO’s support for partner 

countries outside the Alliance. 

And these main outcomes were a recognition of several driving 

forces. First, Putin had already gained control, from my perspective, of the narrative and successful international intervention in 

Georgia, was in the process of repeating this in the Ukraine; and 

second, fear in Europe among our friends and our allies alike that 

commitments are not necessarily always going to be steadfast, as 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

is exhibited in the context of Ukraine where our commitments were 

enshrined in the Budapest Agreement and memorandum. 

So my question is—and in fact, it was not until Congress passed 

strong new sanctions legislation against Russia that Putin had any 

indication that the United States would be an obstacle to his ambitions, either personal or nationalistic. 

So in my view, the U.S., and NATO by extension, should be 

thinking about what Putin’s reaction will be but more focused on 

registering what NATO will not tolerate at the end of the day. In 

essence, how do we go from merely defense to deterrence? Because 

when we have seen actions taken—all right, Ukraine was not a 

NATO member, but I get concerned that the message being sent 

is that what we will do in response to Russian aggression is signaling to the Russians that they can be more and more aggressive 

in Putin’s grand design. 

So what is it that NATO needs to do to move from just defense, 

which is important, but also to a sense, a more muscular sense, of 

deterrence? How do we ultimately prepare? How does NATO prepare for the out-of-the-norm actions of an irregular military action, 

as we saw in the Ukraine? And what is our comprehensive ability 

to deal with that? Those are some of my key concerns because if 

we are doing 75 percent, we want everybody to step up, but in the 

interim, Russia feels that it can continue to make these incursions 

without real consequences other than some sanctions, which are 

important. You know, I was one of those who tried to lead on that. 

But it just seems to me that NATO needs to have both in its defense posture, through its diplomacy, through a whole host of 

things a more robust sense of deterrence, not just simply defense. 

Could you speak to that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Sure, Senator, I can take the first crack. 

I completely agree with you that we need to move into a strong 

deterrence mode right now. I think there are multiple components 

of that. One starts with presence and posture. Being in particularly 

those most vulnerable states, particularly in Poland and the Baltics, is very important. There is going to be a question on numbers, 

as Ian has raised, whether we have enough there. But it is very 

important that those forces are warfighting forces. They are forces 

that can get into the fight in hours, not days or weeks. They are 

forces that have the capability both in terms of the lethal capability 

but also the ISR and the resupply to be able to be in that fight. 

They need air defense as well. So I think that is very, very important. 

Secondly, planning—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. But that is not present right now. 

Mr. CHOLLET [continuing.] No. Well, hopefully in Warsaw there 

will be a decision to ensure that that is present. And some of that 

is also what the quadrupling of U.S. defense spending in Europe 

is going to be towards as well. So it is not present now. It needs 

to be, and hopefully in Warsaw we will have good news. 

Second is planning. We need to do greater planning for all sorts 

of contingencies in Europe. That planning was the other thing that 

had atrophied in the 20 years since the end of the Cold War. And 

the U.S. is doing its own planning, but also it needs to be NATO 

planning for various contingencies, some of which you discussed. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

And then third is procedure, ensuring that military authorities 

and the political leaders in Brussels have the right procedures in 

place to be able to make quick decisions. And I know that is a very 

difficult issue to get at because it is about ultimately political control and how much you want to pre-delegate to military leaders. 

There has been some modest progress over the last several years 

in that realm, but I think it is something we need to explore further at Warsaw. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You asked the ultimate question about deterrence. I was listening to Derek, and I agree with everything he 

says. What I would add is that the key element of deterrence is 

your ability to exhibit, demonstrate steely determination. And in 

the case of Russia, I do not think the West has exhibited steely determination against the aggression and provocative actions it has 

taken. 

When Russia invaded Ukraine, we should have immediately mobilized and moved forces out to the Baltics and to Poland and to 

the Black Sea. We should have imposed immediately much harsher 

sanctions, sanctions that would have had some blowback, but that 

would have exhibited in itself determination to fully leverage that 

dimension to impose high costs on the aggressor. 

The problem with the West’s policy over the last 2–3 years in response to Russia is that we have had an incrementalist approach, 

slowly ratcheting up our presence levels and our sanctions. We 

went through several iterations of sanctions, and I would argue 

they are not even as powerful as they should be. They should be 

sectoral sanctions. We have deployed largely U.S. company-level 

elements to central Europe, not battalions, not brigades, elements 

that the Russians knew they could overrun anytime. 

With Ukraine, our assistance has been half-hearted. They have 

been begging for lethal assistance for 2 years. The West still balks 

on that. This communicates a lack of resolve to the Russians and 

gives someone like Putin a feeling that he can continue to push on. 

So decisiveness and speed and leveraging our advantages, which in 

our case I believe includes the respect that even the Russian general staff has for U.S. forces, using our economic leverage—we have 

a 15 to 2 economic advantage in terms of GDP of the United States 

and Europe against Russia, $30 trillion versus $2 trillion. We are 

not leveraging that as we should. We should leverage it immediately. That kind of speed of response reflects determination and 

I think would have registered more profoundly within Moscow’s decision-making circles. If we had done that, we probably would not 

be in as deep of a mire as we are today. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I will just close by saying the sooner 

we exhibit that steely determination, the better off we will collectively be. 

Thank you both. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

both for being here. 

Before I get into my questions, I wanted to just follow up on that 

comment, Mr. Brzezinski, because I do not disagree with what you 

are saying. I think steady, quick resolve is very important. But how 

would you have suggested we should have dealt with the EuroFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

peans who were reluctant on the lethal weapons issue? Listening 

to the French and the Germans talk about their response on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they were very reluctant. Are you suggesting that we should have gone ahead and provided those weapons despite the concerns of the Europeans? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. The problem with seeking complete unity 

sometimes means you are diluting the effect of your response. So 

sometimes you have to break out of 100 percent unity. You seek 

and go with coalitions that would be willing to act together. It is 

my assessment that we would have had a number of Europeans 

who would have been willing to work with us to arm the Ukrainians from the start. We should have done that, and I believe the 

rest would have followed. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me thank you both for your open letter in 

support of Montenegro’s accession to NATO. And can you talk a little bit, both of you, about what you see are the benefits of their 

joining NATO and whether this sends any kind of a message to the 

Russians that is helpful? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Senator, I think that Montenegro has been a partner of ours for many years. They have contributed to NATO missions. They have worked alongside the United States military in 

difficult places. They are a key player within the Balkans, and the 

Balkans, as you know very well, is a region that is still struggling, 

and I think having another member of NATO from that region 

would be very important. And Montenegro, over the past several 

years, when I was in government and worked very closely with 

their defense minister and other senior folks, has made great 

strides in addressing some of the concerns that the United States 

and others had about their readiness to be a full member of NATO. 

And they deserve great credit. And the parliament, just in the last 

week, has yet again endorsed their entry into NATO. 

So I think one cannot overstate what Montenegro will bring to 

our collective defense, but I think certainly having it a part of the 

member states and as well as the signal it sends to other aspirant 

countries and also to Russia and others who may want to have a 

veto over what NATO may do is very, very important for the Warsaw Summit. If we had had more time before Wales, I think we 

might have been able to get it done before the Wales Summit. That 

is why I am very glad and very hopeful that it will be done this 

year, if the administration can get the paperwork up to you all and 

hopefully the Senate could be able to act before the end of the year. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I want to pick up on Senator Kaine’s comments about cyber because I certainly agree with him that we do not seem to have a 

uniform strategy around our response on cyber. 

And I had the opportunity to visit Estonia back in March and see 

the Cyber Center of Excellence there that has been accredited by 

NATO and was very impressed with the kinds of work that they 

are doing and the research that I think then is available to all of 

the NATO members. 

So can you talk about how important that kind of a center is to 

developing the capacity that NATO needs as they are looking at 

the challenges they are facing today compared to, say, 20 or 30 

years ago? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is very important, and I commend the 

Estonians for taking the leadership on this position. They have 

been some of the most adept at leveraging the commercial and social capabilities that come with the Internet and other elements of 

cyber. 

Yes, it is important to have a center of excellence. It is important 

for NATO to give emphasis, as it is now, to developing and deploying cyber capabilities and doctrines. The Alliance’s designation of 

cyber as a warfare domain is a needed step., That will help ensure 

continuity and consistency and a synchronization of national efforts 

in the cyber domain. This is important because it is very easy for 

nations who are pursuing national approaches to cyber to do so in 

very different, in not conflicting, ways—in large part because this 

is some of the most secretive dimensions of warfare. It is very unlikely, I think, that everyone in NATO is going to have the same 

outlook and also same capacities and same capabilities in the cyber 

domain simply because it is not a bullet. It is not a rifle. The classified, secret character of this domain will make it a challenge to ensure full continuity of cyber operations across NATO allies. 

So with that said, I will just reiterate what I said earlier which 

is that it is important that NATO do this. It needs to drive forward. The more consistency and continuity and more assured capability we have across the Alliance, the better, but it is most likely 

that this is going to remain primarily in the realm of the most edgy 

stuff. It is going to remain within the national domains. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And I think that was clear as the result of 

what I saw there at the center. But the fact that they are doing 

work that can then be shared with other countries within NATO 

seems to me one of the really important aspects of what NATO can 

provide on the cyber issue. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Just to follow up on Senator Shaheen’s comment relative to the 

lethal weaponry to Ukraine, I would just be interested, Mr. Chollet, 

in your response though it does not matter now in some ways, although I will say 35 Ukrainians died last month. 40,000 troops are 

amassed, both regular and irregular, in eastern Ukraine. They are 

killing Ukrainians. And I just would love to hear what your response to that would be. I know there are differing opinions. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Sure, I am happy to, Senator. 

When I served in government, I was for lethal assistance to 

Ukraine, but I also do think it is important to put it in context. 

The United States has provided around $600 million in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014. That is compared to about $10 million or so that we gave to Ukraine in 2013. So that is a pretty significant up-tick. And that is going to training and reforming the 

Ukrainian military, which needs a lot of help. It is not going to lethal assistance. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we support that effort, but the lethal weaponry—— 

Mr. CHOLLET. Understood, yes. When I served in government 

and now that I am out of government and able to speak for myself, 

I support lethal assistance. I know that President Poroshenko will 

be attending the Warsaw Summit, and there will be a meeting with 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

him with the North Atlantic Alliance there, and that is very important. NATO has made some decisions to augment its own effort to 

help reform the Ukrainian military. It is very important for us to 

have the Ukrainian military get up to NATO standards for a lot 

of reasons because it makes it easier to partner, but also it helps 

their professionalization to deal with the corruption problems that 

the Ukrainian military has as well. So I think that is all very, very 

important. 

I still actually think the lethal assistance issue is still relevant 

today, and I am hoping my former colleagues in government are 

still taking a close look at that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is an election taking place and things 

may change in January. 

I do want to acknowledge, as the ranking member did, the Ambassador from Montenegro. He sat expressionless when you all 

were talking about his country’s accession to NATO. I thought he 

would smile, but he did not. Now he is smiling. 

I want to thank you both for your testimony. 

I just will say this. I think that all of us, I mean, everybody on 

this committee, knows the importance of NATO. I think one of the 

greatest threats to NATO is when people begin to realize that 

maybe it is not a true alliance. And I just hope that in Warsaw 

there is some commitment demonstrated, especially by our European partners. I think everybody understands we are very committed. We are more than committed. 

But I have to tell you it is so frustrating. We have been talking 

about—Madeleine Albright was here 4 years ago talking about this 

and was concerned about it when she was Secretary of State. And 

it just does not change. And it is almost like we want it to be a 

strong alliance so badly we continue pushing. 

And I appreciate what you mentioned the 20 percent going to upgrading, and obviously you can spend 2 percent and it will all be 

on salaries and take you nowhere. And I think the qualitative 

changes are important, and I applaud those. 

But I just hope that our NATO friends realize the frustration 

that is mounting as we deal with our own economic issues, as we 

deal with our own indebtedness and the realization more and more 

by people that most of the countries are not pulling their load and 

they depend so heavily upon us, on the other hand, for their security. 

So, anyway, we thank you all for highlighting the many things 

you did today. You are outstanding witnesses. Thank you for your 

service to our country. 

I do not know if our ranking member wants to close with anything. 

Senator CARDIN. I just join you again. I thank both our witnesses 

for their contributions. 

I think the point that you made, Mr. Chairman, is shared. NATO 

is extremely important but it is an alliance, and if it does not act 

as an alliance, if there is not a shared commitment, then it is not 

as strong as it needs to be. And the challenges today are on two 

fronts. There are more than two fronts, but two major fronts, both 

of which are extremely serious: Russia and terrorism. And the AlliFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

ance needs to be as strong as it must be, and it is not at its full 

potential, and it has got to improve. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

If you could, the record will be open until the close of business 

Friday. I know you have all done this before. And please, if you 

could, answer fairly promptly any written questions that come in. 

Thank you again for your patience on the front end and for sharing your wisdom with us today. 

And with that, the meet is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER