Cover The cover illustration highlights the words Russia and military 

strategy. The General Staff and the Academy of Military Science 

continue to keep strategic thought in sync with future war scenarios and 

high-tech developments, such as hypersonic missiles. The subtitle 

informs that military reform is designed to incorporate new weaponry 

and organizational shifts into the force. The objects clutched by the 

double-headed eagle signify Russia’s reform progress from the era of 

Kalashnikov rifles to the era of digital input guaranteeing the 

“informationization” of military equipment. Geopolitical initiatives 

ensure that Russia looks out for its strategic interests.

The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the 

US government. 

The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO is a component of the US Army's Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2. FMSO does unclassified 

research and analysis of foreign perspectives of the operational 

environment. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER ONE: VLADIMIR PUTIN: PATRIOT, ZEALOT, OR 

THREAT? ............................................................................................... 7

Introduction .......................................................................................... 7

Putin’s Personality................................................................................ 8

Putin’s 2007 Time Magazine Interview.............................................. 11

Kokoshin’s Way of Considering Conviction: Ideology, Politics, 

Military............................................................................................... 13

Two US Views on Putin’s Pros and Cons: Remnick versus 

Mearsheimer....................................................................................... 17

Two Russian Views on Putin’s Pros and Cons: Trenin versus 

Pavlovskiy .......................................................................................... 22

Putin’s impact..................................................................................... 28

Conclusion.......................................................................................... 31

CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY ................ 37

Introduction ........................................................................................ 37

Concepts and the History of Russian Military Strategy ..................... 41

The 1971 Officer’s Handbook ........................................................ 41

1983 Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary .............................. 42

2003 Military Encyclopedia ........................................................... 43

Objective-Subjective Thought’s Impact on Strategy ...................... 45

History of Russian Military Strategy.............................................. 50

Foresight/Forecasting and the Correlation of Forces................... 53

People and Policies............................................................................. 59

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of A. A. 

Svechin............................................................................................ 59

Andrey A. Kokoshin on Svechin...................................................... 60

Gareev on Frunze and Svechin....................................................... 64

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of V. D. 

Sokolovsky ...................................................................................... 66

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of N. V. 

Ogarkov .......................................................................................... 70

The Journal, Military Thought ....................................................... 73

Major General (retired) Aleksandr V. Rogovoy................................. 80

Conclusions ........................................................................................ 80

CHAPTER THREE: THINKING LIKE A RUSSIAN OFFICER.. 83
Introduction.........................................................................................83

Hybrid Thought...................................................................................85

New-Generation War..........................................................................87

Forecasting, COF, Forms, Methods, and Trends................................91

Russia’s Indirect/Asymmetric Template.............................................95

Cross-Domain Deterrence: An Indirect/Asymmetric Vector?..........111

Reflexing the Adversary and the Civilian Population ......................117

Conclusions.......................................................................................123

PART TWO: FUTURE WAR ...........................................................127

CHAPTER FOUR: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT

...............................................................................................................129

Introduction.......................................................................................129

UAV Types by Agency, District, or Service ....................................130

Characteristics of UAVs...................................................................136

Some Counter-UAV Thoughts .........................................................142

Individual Equipment (Ratnik, Strelets, etc.)....................................146

Army 2015 International Military-Technical Forum........................150

Electronic Warfare ............................................................................152

Armor................................................................................................164

Other New Equipment (Vehicles, etc.).............................................166

Conclusions.......................................................................................171

CHAPTER FIVE: AEROSPACE AND STRATEGIC ROCKET 

FORCES ..............................................................................................173

Introduction.......................................................................................173

Theory, Tasks, and Missions of the VKO.........................................175

The Aerospace Theater of Military Operations................................177

The Big Four Aerospace Threats to Russia ......................................179

Why Form a VKS?............................................................................182

The Defense Ring around Moscow...................................................184

Other Issues.......................................................................................186

Space Troops.....................................................................................188

Air Force ...........................................................................................189

Strategic Rocket Forces ....................................................................190

Developing Hypersonic Weapons.....................................................196

Crimea, the Arctic, and Aerospace Assets........................................197

Conclusions.......................................................................................198

CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIA PREPARES FOR FUTURE WAR ......201

Introduction.......................................................................................201

Automatons in Epaulettes.................................................................201

The Advanced Research Foundation ................................................220
Science Companies........................................................................... 224

2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation ........................... 230

Future War........................................................................................ 232

A Look at Some Recent Articles...................................................... 241

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 251

CHAPTER SEVEN: RUSSIA’S DIGITAL PROMINENCE......... 253

Introduction ...................................................................................... 253

An Important Book on Digital Issues............................................... 254

Some Recent Developments and Case Studies ................................ 259

Russian Cyber Motivation: External and Internal Cyber Dangers... 262

Policy Responses of the Kremlin ..................................................... 267

Intelligence Oversight ...................................................................... 271

Military-Related Cyber/Information Reforms.................................. 275

International and Diplomatic Issues: A China Focus....................... 290

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 297

PART THREE: GEOPOLITICS...................................................... 301

CHAPTER EIGHT: NORTHERN EXPOSURE: REVEALING 

RUSSIA’S ARCTIC INFRASTRUCTURE BUILDUP.................. 303

Introduction ...................................................................................... 303

Part One ............................................................................................ 303

The Use of Diplomatic Subterfuge ................................................... 307

Putin’s Interest in and Design for the Area...................................... 314

Islands of Importance ....................................................................... 316

Military Developments ..................................................................... 319

Part Two ........................................................................................... 321

Military Developments in 2014 ........................................................ 321

Military Developments in 2015 ........................................................ 336

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 364

CHAPTER NINE: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE................................. 371

Background....................................................................................... 371

What Cards Did Putin Have to Play? ............................................... 376

Russia’s New Reality ....................................................................... 380

Russia’s Propaganda Express Provided Intervention Support ......... 383

Trolls................................................................................................. 389

Mission-Impossible: Putin will Disavow any Knowledge of your 

Actions if Caught.............................................................................. 391

Main Developments in 2014 ............................................................ 393

2015: More Fighting, a Ceasefire, and Crimea’s Buildup Continues

.......................................................................................................... 402

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 405
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................411

CHAPTER TEN: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? .........................413

Putin ..................................................................................................413

Strategy .............................................................................................418

Indirect, Asymmetric, Non-Military.................................................422

Military Reform and Future War......................................................424

Aerospace..........................................................................................429

Future War ........................................................................................430

Cyber.................................................................................................432

The Arctic .........................................................................................435

Ukraine..............................................................................................437

Epilogue: Putin, Strategy, and Geopolitical Quests..........................438

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ....................................................................443
FOREWORD

For the past ten years, as Prime Minister and President, Vladimir 

Putin has led an extensive reorganization and reequipping of his 

country’s armed forces. Further, he has taken several opportunities to 

reclaim Russian territory that was taken, from his perspective, illegally. 

This book describes Putin and the military’s use of various strategic 

concepts, the Defense Ministry’s new equipment and reform initiatives, 

and Putin’s geopolitical quest for influence in the Arctic and Ukraine.

Included in the discussion are some of the unintended consequences of

his actions (negative world opinion, sanctions, NATO responses, etc.).

The book is divided into three parts. Part One, Strategy, has three 

chapters. They discuss President Putin’s personality and background that 

drive his thinking, especially his mistrust of the West; Russia’s military 

concept of strategy; and Russia’s use of indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary actions. Part Two, Future War, has four chapters. They discuss

the armed forces new equipment, new forces (the Aerospace Forces in 

particular), and there is an extended discussion of future war and cyber 

age thinking and adjustments. Part Three, Geopolitics, has two chapters. 

One details Russia’s Arctic activities and the second describes the 

methods used to take Crimea and occupy parts of Eastern Ukraine. 

Potential future uses of Russia’s armed forces are described in the 

conclusions. 

The book supplements the author’s prior work titled Recasting 

the Red Star. It should serve as a welcome addition to the shelves of 

those seeking an understanding of Russia’s military strategy, reform, and 

geopolitical thought. 

Thomas Wilhelm

Director, Foreign Military Studies Office

2015 

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated first of all to my wife, our children and their 

spouses, and especially to our grandchildren—it is for the latter that 

grandparents everywhere work to develop an environment in which their 

offspring will live and prosper in safety and cooperation with others.

Second, this work is also dedicated to the friendships that developed 

among Russian and US officers at the end of the Cold War. Those who 

were not involved in the military exchanges cannot fathom the good will 

and sincere desire to work together that was felt after years of 

confrontation. While this work now describes a revitalized Russian 

military that considers the US an adversary again, there is the hope that 

this too will pass someday soon. We have much in common that should 

and can be turned to good use. As one Russian admiral remarked during 

those years of cooperation, we owe better US-Russian relations as part of 

the heritage we pass along to our grandchildren. I couldn’t agree more.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is solely responsible for the selection and analysis of 

the material in this work.

Within FMSO there are several people to thank. In particular, the 

author would like to acknowledge the support of two individuals. First, 

Dr. Harold Orenstein provided countless hours to the development of 

this book, and is due special recognition. He translated several key 

documents from Russian into English, and he had the difficult task of 

editing all of the book’s chapters, which sped along the book’s printing. 

In some cases, I made changes or added more material after his initial 

editing, so any mistakes you find are mine, not his. Second, special 

recognition is also due to Mr. Hommy Rosado, formerly of FMSO, who 

designed the artwork for the cover and the book’s sections. Mr. Rosado’s

images enhance the ties between words and concepts. Finally, the author 

would like to express his thanks to FMSO director Mr. Thomas Wilhelm 

for ensuring time was available to write this work; and to deputy director 

Kent Baumann and analyst Rob Kurz for their help in making sure 

chapters were properly cleared. 
1

INTRODUCTION

Russia is a nation that has always been blessed with creative 

minds, whether it be literary giants like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo 

Tolstoy, artists such as Peter Carl Faberge, composers such as Pyotr 

Tchaikovsky, or the military genius of an Aleksander Svechin or

Aleksander Suvorov. Russia also has been blessed with the work of 

innovators in military equipment, such as Mikhail Kalashnikov, who 

created the world-renowned AK-47. 

Today’s military innovators are the modern-day scientists and 

engineers who assist in the creation of contemporary and new concept 

weaponry; and the military theorists who study changes in the character 

of war. Digital specialists understand how to develop and employ the 

capabilities of electronic warfare equipment, satellite technology, and 

fiber optic cables. While Kalashnikov’s fame is imbedded in Russia’s 

culture, it may be harder to find a current digital entrepreneur whose 

legacy will endure as long as his: there are simply too many of them, and 

their time in the spotlight appears to be quite short, since even now we 

are about to pass from the age of cyber to that of quantum. It is difficult 

to predict whose discoveries will be the most coveted by tomorrow’s 

military-industrial complex, not to mention the decision-making 

apparatus of the Kremlin and General Staff. Military theorists are 

playing an important role as well. They are studying how new weaponry 

has changed the correlation of forces in the world, the nature of war, and 

the impact of weaponry on both forecasting and the initial period of war.

Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov noted in 

March 2015 that the military’s main tasks are to maintain the combat 

readiness of the Armed Forces and to ensure the Russian Federation’s 

defensive capability. Russia’s military heritage will assist this process 

tremendously. Combat readiness includes updated strategic thought, new 

equipment revelations, and future-war projections. Defensive capability 

includes not just protecting Russia’s territory, but also the security of the 

nation’s national interests and conduct of geopolitics. Capturing the 

essence of these developments is the goal of this book. In the process a 
2

few templates for understanding Russian military thought and actions are 

offered for further consideration and use.

The work is divided into three parts. They address Russian 

methods of approaching strategy, future war (focusing on new weapons 

and organizations), and geopolitics. All three are important for foreign 

analysts to consider when attempting to predict the vector (s) in which 

Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. It is vital to

remember that events that have transpired over the past 25 years have 

greatly affected Russia’s view of the world today and its strategic 

thought. Both the military and President Vladimir Putin’s colleagues in 

the Russian security complex are keen to overcome what they perceive 

as feelings of national humiliation and insecurity that they say were 

imposed upon them by the West.

Part One of this book contains three chapters. They are focused 

on the personality of President Vladimir Putin, the development of 

Russian strategic thought over the past several decades, and 

contemporary military thought on the use or non-use of force, to include 

how Russian military officers think. Chapter One provides details on 

how Putin thinks and how he has been affected by specific issues. 

Ideology, politics, and military issues affecting his decision-making are 

discussed. Included in the assessment are several thoughts from some US 

and Russian specialists with key insights into political thought in 

Moscow. Chapter Two represents a detailed look at the development of 

Soviet and now Russian military strategy. The chapter examines strategic

thought from the time of Svechin to the present, highlighting, in 

particular, those elements of strategic thought that continue to influence 

how forces will be used even today. Chapter Three offers a look at how 

Russia utilizes indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary operations, as well 

as how this differs from most Western interpretations of the General 

Staff’s use of strategy. In particular, the chapter examines how Russian 

military officers think and offers commentary on cross-domain 

deterrence thinking in Russia, which is a topic usually discussed only as 

a nuclear issue. Here several other potential adaptations of deterrence 

theory are reviewed. The chapter offers a differing view than some on

the issue of hybrid war as a Russian concept and ends with a look at 

Russian reflexive control theory.
3

Part Two examines Russia’s preparation for future wars. Included 

in the discussion are new military equipment and aerospace

developments, future-war organizations, and digital expertise. Chapter 

Four deals with several new items of equipment that are now in the 

Russian inventory, including an extensive look at Russian unmanned 

aerial vehicles and electronic warfare equipment. Chapter Five is 

dedicated to the new Aerospace Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces. 

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has stated, “Their creation was 

prompted by a shift of the ‘center of gravity’ in combat struggle to the 

aerospace sphere.” The discussion includes the rationale behind Russia’s 

decision to integrate the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Space 

Forces into an Aerospace Force and to declare aerospace a new theater of 

military operations. The continued development of the Strategic Rocket 

Forces is covered, since it has found new impetus from the strategic 

guidance of President Putin. Chapter Six considers several organizational 

aspects of future-war thought, including equipment under development, 

organizational and doctrinal changes, and future-war thinking. 

Equipment under development includes robotics and laser research. 

Organizationally there is a look at Russia’s new science companies and 

the Advanced Research Foundation (the Russian military’s DARPA 

equivalent), followed by a summary of several articles discussing the 

future contours of conflict and the changing character or war. Chapter 

Seven discusses Russia’s cyber thinking and organizational 

development. This includes a review of a Russian-authored cyber book, 

recent cyber developments in Russia, treaties that Russia has made with 

other nations, and several policy efforts directed by the Kremlin and the 

Federal Security Service (FSB) to monitor cyber compliance. A section 

on military thinking on cyber issues is included, along with Russian 

efforts to control the international cyber environment. China is a main 

partner of Russia in this regard.

Part Three is an examination of the application of military power 

and strategy to Putin’s geopolitical goals, specifically as applied to 

military operations in the Arctic and Ukraine. Chapter Eight investigates 

the ongoing militarization of the Arctic. The two goals of the military in 

the region appear to be to establish an overarching monitoring capability 

and a quick response, powerful military deterrent. Russia has continued 
4

to improve its military presence and infrastructure in the region. The 

buildup includes two light brigades, two airborne divisions that are oncall, new Borei- and Yasen-class nuclear missile submarines, rebuilt 

airfields, and new aerospace defense units. Meanwhile, Russian 

administration officials are working feverishly with the United Nations 

and other organizations to establish legal claims to the Arctic. Putin has 

made the Arctic a region of his personal interest, noting that the Arctic 

has been under “our sovereignty for several years. This is how this will 

be in the future.” This does not bode well for the future of the Arctic’s 

peaceful development. Chapter Nine discusses how and why Russia 

became engaged in the conflict in Ukraine, to include the interventions 

into both Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Russia’s strategy and use of new 

concepts (new reality, self-determination, use of surrogates, nonmilitary 

issues, indirect and asymmetric thinking, etc.) are examined. The end of 

the chapter focuses on Russian actions in Crimea, as it appears Russia is 

doing one of two things there with its massive military buildup: either it 

is ensuring that Crimea can never be given back to Ukraine due to all of 

the military equipment it now has stationed there; or it is preparing a 

bridgehead from which it can launch a pincer operation against Mariupol 

or advance quickly on Odessa or Transdniester.

Chapter Ten provides conclusions drawn from this study. 
5

PART ONE: STRATEGY
6
7

CHAPTER ONE: VLADIMIR PUTIN: PATRIOT, 

ZEALOT, OR THREAT?

Convictions largely determine the boundaries of political 

conduct (and of social activity). That which people 

consider important and true, that which they believe to be 

good and worthwhile, serves to orient them when 

performing particular actions and taking particular 

decisions.1

Introduction

This chapter will first briefly examine President Vladimir Putin’s 

personality and how he explained himself to the US nearly eight years 

ago in an interview with Time magazine. It will then utilize Andrey 

Kokoshin’s ideology-politics-military strategy triangle as a way to view 

people of conviction. Kokoshin is a well-known Russian who served as 

the head of the Security Council and as a Deputy Minister of Defense in 

Russia. He wrote that understanding the relationship inherent in the 

triangle helps untangle the convictions, thoughts, and actions of 

individuals or groups that might seem irrational.2 This triangle, when 

applied to Putin’s personality, becomes an interesting measuring tool for 

placing his actions in context. The triangle will be contrasted with the 

views on Putin of two US authors and two Russian authors who also 

have closely considered the Russian President’s decisions and 

personality. 

It is apparent that Putin’s personality is frightening to many, 

since it involves the risk of starting a global war. In an interview in 

October 2014 he noted the following:

 

1 Andrey Kokoshin, The Political Science and Sociology of Military Strategy, The 

Institute of Problems of International Security, URSS/KomKniga (publishers), 2005, p. 

15. Many of the sources used in this chapter are US based. Kokoshin and a few other 

Russian writers are the exception, not the rule.

2 Kokoshin.
8

But let’s not forget the lessons of history. First of all, 

replacements of the world order—and that is the scale of 

developments we are witnessing today—have usually 

brought in their wake, if not global wars, then chains of 

intense local conflicts. And, secondly, world politics 

primarily means issues of war and peace and 

humanitarian issues, including human rights.

3

Putin’s Personality

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is a man of conviction who 

seldom backs down in the face of adversity. Instead he doubles down. 

Masha Gessen, author of a book on Putin titled The Man without a Face: 

The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin, writes that his convictions have 

come from a difficult childhood. Putin was involved in fights as a young 

man anytime someone tried to humiliate him, and he has a barely 

containable temper. He longed to join the KGB since childhood. His rage 

reached paralysis, Gessen notes, when he was forced to standby and 

witness the downfall of his KGB’s Stasi headquarters in Dresden, East 

Germany.4 Putin’s reliance on convictions appears to border on the 

messianic. The West, quite naturally, sees his convictions as a threat to 

world peace and stability. 

Yet despite his convictions, Putin may possess some insecurities, 

perhaps due to the way information is provided to him by his staff. They 

sense conspiracies everywhere and visions of people interested in 

orchestrating color revolutions to overthrow his regime or imposing their

values on Russia’s populace. Their input most likely affects his thinking. 

Putin has an interest in ensuring that the Russian people are 

proud of their heritage and he has even contracted people to rewrite 

Russian history books for the educational system as his sense of history, 

and those around him, differs from the rest of us. The fact that the Soviet 

 

3

Interfax (in English), 24 October 2014.

4 Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin, Granta, 

2012, pp. 43-71.
9

Union broke apart of its own accord, and nations developed 

independently according to law and with the help of Russia, is 

discounted in his retelling of history. He avoids restating how things 

unfolded. So far, no nation that broke away from Russia has offered to 

return to Putin’s Russia. They all appear happier without him.

Rewriting history supports the fact that Putin has created his own 

version of objective reality, which often contradicts the reality in which 

the rest of the world lives. Russian media reflects this reality with 

propaganda that is one-sided and arrogant. Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian 

Kremlin expert, stated that “We can’t trust anything. Even with Soviet 

Propaganda, when they were talking with the Soviet people, there were 

some rules. Now, there are no rules at all. You can invent anything.”5It 

appears that it is Putin’s understanding of reality that is reflected in the 

media.

Putin and his staff are apt to do anything possible to avoid 

responsibility for any action seen in a negative light by the international 

community. No issue better reflects this point than the shoot down of 

MH17. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have voice intercepts of rebel 

transmissions noting that they had just shot down a plane, thinking it was 

a Ukrainian transport plane. An international commission concluded that 

a Buk air defense system shot it down. International opinion strongly 

supports the assumption that it was Russian-supported rebels who shot 

the missile. Russia, on the other hand, has offered several different 

versions of what happened. Each time an independent commission 

concludes the same thing in the West, Russia comes up with “new 

evidence” which then offers an entirely different version (another plane 

in the area, a Ukrainian Buk in the area, different ground coordinates 

from which the intercept took place, etc.). These actions all work 

together—the new objective reality, evasion of responsibility, and sense 

of conspiracies.

 

5 David M. Herszenhorn, “Russia is Quick to Bend Truth about Ukraine,” The New 

York Times, 16 April 2014, p. A11.
10

Putin is a man of surprises. No one expected him to move on 

Crimea in 2014. Russia is a land of eleven time zones (the largest on 

earth, with 6.6 million square miles) and only 146 million people 

(Bangladesh has 156 million spread over only 56,000 square miles). It 

clearly doesn’t need more territory. It has more than enough space for its 

people, which troubles strategists trying to make sense of Russian 

President Vladimir Putin’s land grabs. Troubling, that is, until one begins 

to unravel his personality and understanding of Russian history as 

mentioned above. If the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest 

geopolitical tragedy in the world, as Putin states, then his use of surprise 

makes more sense. He believes he is restoring what is his. 

A further surprise was his criticism of Vladimir Lenin and 

describing the latter’s responsibility (not Putin’s or even former 

President Boris Yeltsin’s) for the conflict in Ukraine. Putin stated that 

Lenin and his government long ago developed the situation in Donbass, 

the industrial region in eastern Ukraine where a rebellion has flared, by 

drawing borders between parts of the Soviet Union in order to “increase 

the percentage of proletariat” in a move Putin deemed “delirious.” He 

also criticized Lenin’s concept of entities in a federative state having the 

right to secede, and attributed the concept to the 1991 dissolution of the 

Soviet Union.6

Putin is also a man of pressure. As the leader of Russia, he is 

quick to use his personal pressure to get what he wants. In Ukraine, he 

was able to pressure President Yanukovych into siding with him over the 

European Union (EU). However, the aftermath of his discussion with 

Yanukovych can be deemed anything but successful. He has used 

pressure internally to dampen dissent and to chase organizations out of 

Moscow. 

 

6 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin Denounces Soviet Founder Lenin,” The Washington 

Post, downloaded on 9 February 2016, at 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/eup=rope/putin-denounces-soviet-founderlenin/2016/
11

His desire to return Russia to great power status is thus 

understandable, although not justifiable, when his background and 

personality are taken into consideration. There are other, more negotiable 

or peaceful ways to achieve his goals than unleashing attacks on a former 

and respected Russian territory. 

Putin’s 2007 Time Magazine Interview

In 2007, at the conclusion of his first Presidential reign, Vladimir 

Putin was recognized as Time’s Man of the Year. In an interview at his 

dacha, he offered several comments that Westerners recognized as 

warning signs even at that early time, due to his contempt toward the 

West and the US in particular. Putin stated that America was out to 

interfere in Russia’s affairs, that the US treats Russia as a party’s 

uninvited guest, or as some savage in the wild. He stated that his 

thoughts are not misconceptions, but based on US attempts to influence 

Russia’s internal and foreign policies.7

Putin, whose paternal grandfather was a cook for both Lenin and 

Stalin, stated that “the ability to compromise is not a diplomatic 

politeness but rather taking into account and respecting your partner’s 

legitimate interests” (which makes one wonder about his unwillingness 

to compromise over Ukraine’s legitimate interests and sovereignty) and 

that “Russia has no intention of joining military-political blocs because 

that would be tantamount to restricting its sovereignty.”

8 He also noted 

that it is not possible to have morality separated from religious values, 

and that the KGB taught him to gather information objectively, first and 

foremost, which has helped him as President.9

Former Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 

interviewed by Time in 2007 regarding Putin’s Man of the Year 

designation, said that he felt Putin had not retreated from democracy and 

that Russia would continue on its path. He also stated that after the chaos 

 

7 Adi Ignatius, “A Tsar is Born,” Time, 31 December 2007-7 January 2008, pp. 48-49.

8

Ibid., pp. 50-51.

9

Ibid., p. 51.
12

of the Boris Yeltsin regime in the 1990s, Russia needed a leader willing 

to take authoritarian steps.10 Few would disagree completely with this 

analysis if they had witnessed Russia’s economic situation in those early

days. 

Henry Kissinger, in the same issue of Time, noted that Russians 

value Putin for restoring the country to a respected place in the 

international system; for improving the standard of living compared to 

what existed when he took over; and for making the system more 

responsive to the public than previous ones.11

Simon Sebag Montegiore, who wrote the books Young Stalin and 

Catherine the Great and Potemkin, noted in the Time issue that any ruler

throughout Russian history has not been able to simply leave power, for 

fear of “exposing himself and his henchmen to vengeance from their 

rivals.”12 Yeltsin did simply leave power, but Putin did not. He became 

Prime Minister and later orchestrated a change in the Russian 

constitution that would allow him to serve more Presidential terms if 

elected. He does not seem to have the same faith as Yeltsin in the current 

Russian atmosphere.

Putin’s belief in restoring Russian greatness and moving those 

standing in his way, whether it be dissidents or competitors or nations, 

is a good methodology through which to view his newest term as 

President, which started in 2012. He is moving on all fronts and vectors, 

with the military in the lead.

 

10 “Viewpoint: Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Russia Needs Putin,’” Time, 31 December 2007-7 

January 2008, p. 60.

11 “Kissinger on Putin: ‘He thinks he is a reformer,’” Time, 31 December 2007-7 

January 2008, p. 85.

12 Simon Sebag Montefiore, “His Place in History,” Time, 31 December 2007-7 January 

2008, p. 86.
13

Kokoshin’s Way of Considering Conviction: Ideology, Politics, 

Military

Andrey Kokoshin is the author of the initial citation at the start of 

this chapter on the importance of conviction as well as the discussant of 

the ideology-political-military triangle. He offered a template for 

measuring conviction. It is applied here to Putin.

Ideologically, Putin has constructed a new reality unlike any 

seen before in Russia, one designed not to persuade but to cast enough 

doubt to make the truth a matter of opinion. The idea of “objective 

reality,” a Marxist concept through which one understands the world

(and which the KGB taught Putin), has taken on a one-sided approach

under him. 

Putin is a believer in Russian Orthodoxy. He was baptized in 

secret as a child. His name inspires confidence in those of religious faith, 

as “poot” means the path or the way in Russian. He has helped 

reconstruct literally thousands of churches that were destroyed during the 

time of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Ironically the 

church’s destruction emanated from the KGB’s orders, where Putin 

served during the USSR’s reign. He has resurrected the image of St. 

Sergius as the savior of Russia, thereby offering a replacement for St. 

Vladimir and Holy Rus. The latter are the most important religious links 

for Russians to Orthodoxy, but both are historically based in Ukraine. 

Severing these relations was a serious blow to Russia. The Russian 

Orthodox clergy believe St. Sergius will serve as an example of spiritual

hope for Russians, since he embodies “what was and is the best in 

Russia” and “in many ways he is the source of Russia itself.”13

Putin’s actions, according to a New York Times editorial, are 

further influenced by several noted philosophers whose beliefs help him

overcome many of his feelings of humiliation, which many Russians 

have felt since the USSR’s disintegration. Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), 

 

13 Neil MacFarquhar, “From Pilgrims, Putin Seeks Political Profit,” The New York 

Times, 3 August 2014, pp. 4, 6.
14

apparently Putin’s favorite, wrote that “we trust and are confident that 

the hour will come when Russia will rise from disintegration and 

humiliation and begin an epoch of new development and greatness.”

14

Russia has a unique spiritual status, a devotion to Orthodoxy and belief 

in autocracy, and a purpose (Russian exceptionalism). Ilyin believed an 

anti-Christian virus was transferred to Russia from the West, introducing 

“materialism, irrationalism, and nihilism” and morally blinding mankind 

while breaking Russia’s bond with God.15 Another favorite philosopher, 

Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948), defended Russia’s traditional values and 

cited the need to ward off moral chaos (emblemized for Putin, perhaps, 

by gays and other activists who do not fit into his world or moral view). 

A final favorite, Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), noted that Russia’s 

historic mission is to unify humanity due to its location between the 

Catholic West and non-Christian East.16

Politically, Putin is an opportunist of the first order. With regard 

to his actions in Crimea, Putin capitalized on the strong political hand he 

had been dealt (chaos in Kiev, German support, US budget woes and a 

tired US military, etc.) and acted out of instinct. Putin appears to be no 

Stalin in the sense that he is willing to take great losses, but he does seem 

to handle risk well, taking them when he has to. He keeps his options 

open and appears prone to “doubling down” in the face of accusations, as 

he has done after the MH-17 tragedy by continuing to arm the 

separatists. And he is not through in Ukraine, not by any means. As early 

as 1994 he said that Russia had voluntarily given up “huge territories” to 

the former USSR republics, including areas “which historically have 

always belonged to Russia.”17 He was thinking “not only about Crimea 

and northern Kazakhstan, but also for example about the Kaliningrad 

area.”18 In Putin’s opinion Russia could not simply abandon 25 million 

 

14 David Brooks, “Now on View: The Rise of Russia’s Messianic Spirit,” The Kansas 

City Star, March 5 2014, p. A13.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Timothy Garton Ash, “Putin’s Deadly Doctrine,” The New York Times, 20 July 2014, 

p. 5.

18 Ibid.
15

Russians, now living in the former USSR republics, to their own fate.

19

His political goal is to recapture lost territory and make the world respect 

the interests of the Russian state and people as a great nation. Since 

Ukraine is THE key element of Russian history, Putin will do all in his 

power to regain this land.

Putin rules Russia’s political hierarchy. He appoints governors, 

sets difficult entry rules for new political parties, and has a pliable Duma 

that bends to his requests. Kokoshin notes that politics, like strategy, is a 

sphere of free creativity, of art. Putin has shown over the years that he is 

an extremely creative artist. Retooling the Russian constitution to ensure 

that he can be reelected and serve as Russia’s President into the next 

decade is but one example of this trait. Further, he remains indebted to 

the KGB and current security services. They are not only a guarantee of 

his security, but also a political arm that can be relied upon to carry out 

Putin’s policies in covert ways. Anna Politkovskaya, a courageous 

Russian journalist who reported on the war in Chechnya and wrote on 

Putin, stated before her death (she was assassinated in the elevator to her 

apartment) that “Putin has failed to transcend his origins and stop acting 

like a KGB officer. He is still busy sorting out his freedom-loving 

citizens; he persists in crushing liberty, just as he did earlier in his 

career.”

20 Indirectly, Putin has been rumored or accused (without any 

evidence) of being behind the bombings of apartment buildings in 

Moscow that were blamed on Chechen terrorists and resulted in the 

second war against Chechnya; and behind the deaths of people related to 

these claims, such as Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian secret 

service office who fled to London and directly accused Putin of 

involvement in the apartment bombings. Litvinenko was later poisoned 

and died. A British court ruled that Putin “probably” was behind the 

slaying. Others who were in open opposition to his orders or policies, 

among them noted journalists and politicians, have also been murdered.

 

19 Ibid.

20 Paul Robinson, “Putin’s Philosophy: the Russian Leader’s Paradoxical, Strong-State 

‘Liberal Conservatism,’” The American Conservative, Vol. 11, No. 4, page unknown, 

downloaded on 5 August from http://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-

287635761/putin-s-philosophy-the-russian-leader-s-paradoxical
16

However, Putin’s complicity in these events are only rumors. There is no 

evidence to support these charges.

With regard to military strategy, Putin’s directors of national 

security, such as Chief of Russia’s General Staff Valery Gerasimov, 

continue to extensively quote the works of famous Russian authors on 

strategy. Gerasimov, drawing on the work of the noted Russian historical 

strategist Alexander Svechin, quoted the famed author in the following 

way: 

It is unusually difficult to foresee the circumstances of a 

war...it is necessary to work out a particular line of 

strategic conduct for each war, and each war represents a 

partial case, requiring the establishment of its own 

peculiar logic, and not the application of some sort of 

model.21

The well-known Russian Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov also noted 

that leaders should “act according to the circumstances and always 

promptly.”

Establishing or uncovering a particular logic involves the science 

of foresight (or an analysis of the future strategic situation) based on the 

contemporary strategic situation and on an assessment of the correlation 

of forces (COF) of two sides, which is a Russian military specialty. 

There is no standard model to follow. Russia’s military activities under 

Putin have followed this logic, as each military intervention has been 

different. In Estonia it was a cyber-attack. In Georgia it was a planned 

intervention, complete with military exercises on the border before the 

invasion began. In Crimea and Ukraine it has been the use of surrogates 

and fixed referendums, supplanted with an extensive domestic 

 

21 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013.
17

propaganda campaign that has been stridently anti-Western and antiinternational institutions (NATO, UN, EU). 

Further, it is clear that in the information age Russia’s leaders 

understand that “strategic ambiguity” can become a key policy 

instrument, a vital aspect of the nonmilitary aspect of warfare and 

military strategy. This could apply to specific military actions (for 

example, Russian counter-claims as to who shot down MH-17, based on 

Russia’s contamination of the crash site and the initial blockading of the 

investigators from the site, making it impossible to place blame) or the 

manipulation of strategic communications, to include the holding of 

fixed referendums in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and then reporting on 

the referendum as the “will of the people.” Through the international 

media, Putin can reach other populations and introduce doubt into those 

audiences that rely on a variety of opinions. His population doesn’t 

always have that option.

Two US Views on Putin’s Pros and Cons: Remnick versus

Mearsheimer

Over the past several months, many US articles and op-eds have 

appeared about Ukraine and Putin. This section examines two of these 

opinions. They offer a contrasting view of Putin’s rationale for acting

from that offered by Andrei Kokoshin’s prism of analysis. The first 

article is by David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, who wrote 

about Putin in August 2014 through his own experiences in Russia and 

through those of his friend, Michael McFaul, who had just returned from 

his two year stint as US Ambassador to Moscow. The second article, by 

John J. Mearsheimer, a well-known writer and professor of political 

science at the University of Chicago, appeared in the September/October 

2014 issue of Foreign Affairs. 

Remnick. The overall tone of this article is that Putin started out on a 

very conciliatory and cooperative path with the US (help with staging 

bases after 9/11, etc.), adding that he was not anti-US and saying in 2000 
18

that it was hard to “visualize NATO as an enemy.”22 Since then, 

however, he has become increasingly aggressive, arrogant, and 

vindictive over the years. For example, Putin accused Hillary Clinton of 

giving “the signal” that sparked the Bolotnaya Movement, which were a 

series of anti-Putin demonstrations in Moscow.

23 Since 2000, Putin has 

disempowered disloyal regional governors, crushing oligarchs who 

didn’t heed his insistence to stay out of politics, taking control of TV 

channels, and neutering several opposition political parties.

24 His 

popularity has risen due to high energy prices, which enabled him to 

increase salaries and pensions and create a growing urban middle class. 

Domestic stability has overcome Russia’s sense that Putin now had his 

own oligarchy and some authoritarian legitimacy.

25

But his arrogance greatly reduced his popularity abroad, Remnick 

notes. In 2009, when talking to Obama, Putin reportedly demanded that 

the US cede to him the former Soviet republics—Ukraine above all—as 

a Russian sphere of influence. From 2004 to 2009 NATO had welcomed 

several former East European nations and former Soviet republics into its 

ranks,

26 which obviously rankled Putin. One former aide said Putin

loathes spontaneity in politics, such as the 2014 events in Ukraine’s

Maidan Square. He believes the West is hypocritical, arrogant, selfrighteous, and dissolute. Putin wants to strengthen traditional Russian 

values such as ties to the Russian Orthodox Church. He lashed out at the 

West for treating Russia like a defeated “vassal” rather than a great 

country.

27 With regard to values, Russian airwaves are full of the 

“treachery” of Russian liberals and US manipulations. Commentators

 

22 David Remnick, “Watching the Eclipse,” The New Yorker, 11 & 18 August 2014, p. 

58.

23 Ibid., p. 52.

24 Ibid., p. 57.

25 Ibid., p. 58.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.
19

such as Dmitri Kiselyov tell viewers that fascists28 abound in Ukraine 

and that the US State Department underwrites revolution.

29

Finally, Remnick writes that Putin has unleashed an ideology of 

ressentiment (deep-seated resentment accompanied by a sense of being 

powerless). Tikhon Shevkunov, a Russian Orthodox priest and Putin’s 

dukhovnik or spiritual adviser, produced the docudrama “The 

Destruction of an Empire: the Lesson of Byzantium” that purports to 

blame the perfidious West for Byzantine’s fall. If Putin is under the 

influence of these people, then they represent a key reason for his 

rationale and policies. Other TV or philosophical supporters of Putin, in 

addition to Kiselyov and Shevkunov, are Aleksandr Prokhanov, 

Aleksandr Dugin, and a host of others.

30 They are all anti-West.

Mearsheimer. 

Mearsheimer’s key points represent a different argument,31 that 

Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea are due to the actions of the 

West, in particular NATO enlargement. The latter progressed with 

countries added to the organization in the following way: 1999 Czech 

Republic, Hungary, Poland; 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; and 2009 Albania and Croatia.32

Mearsheimer writes that NATO and the EU are expanding eastward and 

 

28A Russian dictionary notes that fascism is “A form of open terrorist dictatorship of the 

imperialist bourgeoisie which relies upon the forces of anti-Communism, chauvinism, 

and racism, with the goal of destroying democracy and suppressing the worker 

movement, as well as preparation for aggressive wars.” See S. I. Ozhegov, Dictionary 

of the Russian Language, Moscow 1984, p. 738. This definition differs from a 

Webster’s dictionary definition, which states that fascism is “a political philosophy, 

movement, or regime that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that 

stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe 

economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition.” See 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition, 1998, p. 422.

29 Remnick, p. 60.

30 Ibid., pp. 60-62.

31 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, 

September/October 2014, pp. 77-89.

32 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
20

that the recent “coup” in Ukraine overthrew Ukraine’s democratically 

elected and pro-Russian president. This event, as well as Ukraine’s

Orange Revolution in 2004, were both backed in Mearsheimer’s opinion 

by the West and became a main reason that caused Putin to act.33

Western elites, he adds, believe realism holds little relevance and

instead believe liberal principles such as rule of law, democracy, and 

economic interdependence are in vogue.

34 The result is that the US 

unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. Western leaders 

denied that Putin’s behavior could be motivated by legitimate security 

concerns.35

The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian

to the core and it was clear that “Washington backed the coup,” 

Mearsheimer’s proof being that Victoria Nuland, the US assistant 

Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, and Senator John 

McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations.

36 Putin 

pressured Kiev not to side with the West, “making it clear that he would 

wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become 

a Western stronghold.”37 Mearsheimer concludes by noting that Putin 

and his compatriots are realists, whereas the West adheres to liberal ideas 

about international politics; and that making Ukraine a member of

NATO makes no sense, since other members have no intention of 

defending it.

38

The opinions of Remnick and Mearsheimer clearly represent two 

contrasting ideas about responsibility for Russia’s involvement in 

Ukraine. These are not, of course, the only two writers commenting on 

Putin’s personality and policies.

 

33 Ibid. p. 77.

34 Ibid., p. 78.

35 Ibid., pp. 84-87.

36 Ibid., p. 80.

37 Ibid., p. 82.

38 Ibid., p. 88.
21

Other US Opinions

Recently Karen Dawisha, a professor of political science at 

Miami University in Ohio, wrote a book titled Putin’s Kleptocracy. In it, 

she lays bare the “systemic embezzlement, skimming, fraud, and 

personal enrichment through power”39 that have long been assumed 

about Putin’s inner circle. This was done by Putin and his KGB friends 

because they wanted an authoritarian regime for Russia, since 

“controlling the political and economic development of the country was 

for them a greater ambition than building any democracy.”40 Putin’s 

personal interest in lining his pockets is as important to him as the 

interests of the state, the book implies.

Bret Stephens, writing in the Wall Street Journal, described his 

version of how to “take down Putin,” but it sounded long-term or 

inconclusive. He stated that this might happen only when the country is 

against Putin, due to his humiliation of the population. Stephens noted 

that Russian citizens don’t mind being lied to by their president 

regarding whether Russian troops were in Ukraine or not, and that:

Such is the combination of cynicism and grandiosity that 

lies at the heart of Russia’s political pathology and that 

Mr. Putin has so skillfully exploited. Too frequently, 

Russians have no expectations as to the probity or 

decency of their leaders. But they have great expectations 

of their entitlements as a world power. It needs to be the 

opposite.41

Other authors highlight Putin’s tendency to cherry-pick items in 

support of his notion that Russians are exceptional people who are 

threatened, and that he is the person responsible for saving them. He is 

the savior not only of Russians in Russia but also Russians living abroad. 

 

39 Anna Arutunyan, “Gangsters’ Paradise,” The Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2014, p. 

A15.

40 Ibid.

41 Bret Stephens, “How to Take Down Putin,” The Wall Street Journal, 9 June 2015, p. 

A11.
22

They must be saved from infection by Western values. Putin must defend 

Russia from being, according to one Western report, “politically 

encircled abroad and culturally colonized by Western values at home.”42

Putin meanwhile totally ignores the more humanitarian input for the 

betterment of Russia from someone like Andrey Sakharov or a 

reasonable oppositionist such as the now-deceased Boris Nemtsov. Only 

his version of reality is acceptable.

His accusations against the West do not seem to hurt his 

popularity in some nations. In China, for example, a biography of Putin 

was listed in the top ten non-fiction best sellers at the Beijing News. 

There is little wonder at the book’s popularity, since Putin and Chinese 

President Xi Jinping both want to restore their nations to respectability 

and erase years of what they deem national humiliation. Both fight what 

they characterize as Western ideological influence, such as pro-Western

media outlets and non-governmental organizations. And both, as Xi has 

recently demonstrated with the capture of several Hong Kong book 

dealers, are in control of what is produced and written.

Two Russian Views on Putin’s Pros and Cons: Trenin versus 

Pavlovskiy

Trenin: Russian Dmitri Trenin, a renowned analyst at the Carnegie 

Institute’s Moscow Center, wrote in December 2014 on the issues that 

caused Putin to act. He offers readers a counterpoint to several of the 

issues raised in Remnick and Mearsheimer’s articles. The summary of 

his article is longer than Remnick and Mearsheimers, since fewer 

Westerners are familiar with Trenin’s (and Russians in general) point of 

view.

Trenin offered several instances where Putin felt he had been 

betrayed by the West. They included the following:

 

42 Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen, “Putin’s Empire of the Mind,” Foreign Policy, 

May/June 2014, p. 18
23

 Putin’s alienation from the West began in 2003. An 

event that year that was scuttled by the West was the 

resolution of the conflict in Trans-Dniester via the 

Kozak memorandum, which was cancelled at the last 

moment.

 Putin, in 2007, lashed out against the post-Cold War 

order in a speech at the Munich Security Conference; 

in 2008 he went to the NATO summit in Bucharest to 

stress the dangers of a domestic strife in Ukraine if a 

NATO path were to be offered.

 Putin concluded that the West did not respect Russia’s 

interests or views. Moscow’s 2008 proposal for a new 

European security treaty that would keep NATO from 

admitting new members was dismissed by the West. 

The war with Georgia began that year and led to 

military reform in Russia.

 Putin’s 2010 proposal for a joint ballistic missile 

defense was thwarted by the West, so he went ahead 

with plans to build them against NATO.

 Putin saw no breakthroughs in 2011 on key issues 

such as missile defense, and believed the West 

misused the no-fly zone over Libya to remove 

Muammar Qaddafi from power.

 Putin’s decision to run again for President in 2011 

was met by criticism from Russia’s liberals, and he 

felt this was proof that the West wanted to incite a 

“color revolution” in Russia.

 Putin’s premiership offered him a chance to develop a 

sense of history and receive a mandate from God to 

make Russia great again.

 Putin, by 2013, was on the opposite side from the US 

in regard to Syria.43

 

43 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System: The Drivers of 

Putin’s Course,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 22 December 2014.
24

Full sovereignty for Russia, Trenin notes, is the total exclusion of 

any influence on Russia’s domestic politics or policies; and freedom of 

action on the international stage so that Russia can promote its national 

interests both globally and regionally. Putin would handle important 

decisions on foreign affairs or security polices, while relying on experts 

for economic and social policy decisions. Trenin adds that the 

maintenance of broad support for policies is an essential condition for 

the continuation of Russia’s paternalistic political system. For the future 

Putin decided that he wanted Russia to be the centerpiece of a Eurasian 

Union.44

With regard to Russia’s values, Putin noted that he wanted to 

keep European views out of Russia. He appeared to believe that 

European countries had renounced their roots and Christian values. He 

banned gay propaganda and stated that unique Russian values were 

rooted in the Orthodox Christian tradition. These values included

 The sanctity of the family as a union between a man 

and a woman

 The indispensable role of religious faith

 The function of traditional religions as spiritual 

compasses. Values were also provided by the four 

established religions under Russian law: Orthodox 

Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism.

 The centrality of the state among all political and 

social institutions and

 Patriotism.45

Trenin noted that Putin feels leadership is not measured in terms 

of ideology but in terms of the attitude toward the Russian state. He 

considers opposition to the regime as opposition to the Russian state, 

even the country itself. He lashes out at elites opposing the 

government’s policies, especially those sponsored by foreign groups. He 

 

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.
25

believes the liberal opposition has ties to the US, and the state-run media 

has branded the radical opposition as US stooges. He has tried to 

eliminate nongovernmental organizations engaged in “political 

activities” in Russia, a term very loosely defined there. Finally, Putin 

wants the bureaucracy to be protected from foreign influence. He wants 

the elites and intelligentsia to form around a platform of state-centered 

patriotism. Trenin notes that the Kremlin has now revitalized some 

organizations, patronized by the president and chaired by top officials, to 

reach beyond Russia’s borders46 (at a time when Russia is restricting 

foreign organizations internally). School children are receiving a new 

view of their country’s history and adults are offered TV series about the 

czarist and Communist periods to demonstrate Russia’s complex 

history.47

A central value remains Putin’s attempts to nail down equality 

and reciprocity with the US. First, Putin has actively opposed several US 

initiatives, such as those regarding Syria. Second, Putin is not letting 

charges against Russia go unanswered, such as the 2012 Magnitsky Act, 

which imposed sanctions on Russian officials suspected of human rights 

violations. Third, Putin has actively sought to create a Eurasian 

Economic Union in Central Asian countries, since it would allow Russia 

to build a power center there between the European Union and China.48

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, Trenin delivers a 

compelling story of how Putin “turned the concept of a Russian world, 

until then a low-key, soft-power exercise, into a geopolitical project.”49

He notes the following:

Putin first showed Ukrainian President Viktor 

Yanukovych the stick in the form of losses that would be 

sustained as a result of Ukraine’s choice in favor of 

 

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.
26

association with the EU, and then Putin offered the carrot 

in the form of Russian credits, stimulating Ukraine’s 

accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. 

Yanukovych’s suspension of the EU association process 

in the fall of 2013 was hailed by many Russian 

commentators as a major victory over the EU and the 

West...50

Trenin notes that when the Euromaidan revolution in Kiev came 

to a climax in February 2014, Putin “put contingency plans for Crimea 

and Sevastopol into action” and added that he audaciously “held a 

referendum there, which overwhelmingly supported the territories’ 

accession to the Russian Federation.”51 The referendum, of course, was 

not one “overwhelmingly” supported, since no outside observers were 

allowed to attend. The referendum could better be described as a onesided affair designed to make it look like there was support for the 

Kremlins’ action. 

The move into Eastern Ukraine was less successful. The 

Novorossiya plan aimed at unifying the eastern and southern Ukrainian 

provinces to oppose Ukraine’s central and western regions. In return, the 

West imposed serious sanctions on Russia, which the latter has used as a 

stimulus for domestic production, especially technological research. This 

move was accompanied by the expectation that the elites were now 

expected to accept offers from their Kremlin allies in the name of 

national mobilization.52

Finally, Trenin asserts that even though the elites are feeling 

uneasy about Putin’s demands, the president finds his real power base

from staying in touch with ordinary Russians. His secret to staying in 

power is not government propaganda or various forms of manipulation 

 

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.
27

but the consent of the governed.

53 (In Russia consent can come from 

someone who keeps Russia independent, influential, and strong). Trenin 

ends his long article with the following statement. It underscores the fact 

that Russia needs to avoid squandering its resources and losing its 

independence:

It needs a new, national class of elites that is based on 

meritocracy and devotion to the country and its people, 

not proximity to a leader or membership in particular 

clans. It also needs fair and transparent domestic 

regulations that are based on the rule of law and backed 

by independent courts and a professional law-enforcement 

apparatus that is free of corruption. The demonopolization of the Russian economy is also key, 

including streamlining profligate and inefficient state 

corporations and supporting responsible private 

businesses at all levels. And Russia should build up a

modern science-technology-education complex and 

administrative system that is accountable to the public.54

Of interest is that no mention of military reform or the need to secure 

borders is mentioned. Russia’s future problems all seem to be domestic. 

Pavlovskiy: Gleb Pavlovskiy, who served as an advisor to then President 

Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidential Administration and now is the Head of 

the Effective Policy Foundation, discussed Russia’s system of 

management in late December 2015. He characterized Putin’s style of 

management as “indirect interpretation” and asserts that Putin does not 

want to bear responsibility for decisions, that he uses a technique of 

uncertainty, and that his phrases can be interpreted in contradictory 

ways. His is a stateless system to which orders cannot be given, and it is 

engrossed with deals. Indirect “hints” launch new deals within such a 

 

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.
28

system. Pavlovskiy states that in 2015 the word for this management 

style is absurdity.55

He adds that in Russia there is neoprop—the machinery of 

“stultifying television propaganda. It pumps up the population’s loyalty 

by keeping the mass consciousness in a state of hysteria.”56 This causes a 

loss of a sense of reality in the population. False stories are heaped on 

top of realty, with the latter “dissolved in fantasy” and the 

population/elites fail to see the risks involved as a result. There is only a 

small chance for the population to understand how the world actually 

functions as a result. Only emergency situations create a sense of 

discipline.57 Pavlovskiy notes:

As a country we do not believe in anything, but we are 

able artificially to create a situation of belief in ourselves. 

We do not believe in principles or in long-term coalitions 

based on ideology or friendship and we are not trying to 

create them. ...even the former USSR republics wanted to 

cut loose.58

Pavlovskiy ends his interview on a gloomy note, stating that the 

regime is not thinking about the future while resources are running out. 

He predicts some kind of transformation as inevitable for Russia. Real 

decisions now have to be made, not geopolitical ones, since there will be 

nothing more to play with: no money, no mobility, no supporters, or 

competent cadres.59

Putin’s impact

NATO has attempted to engage Putin, trying to assure Russia’s 

leadership that NATO is not a threat to it, even bringing it into the 

 

55 Natalya Galimova, interview with Gleb Pavlovksiy, “The Kremlin is Living without 

Sensing the Country Beneath it...,” Gazeta.ru (News.ru), 6 December 2015.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
29

NATO fold for the past several years. NATO knows that Russia is 

“border sensitive” and rejects any foreign activity near them. Any 

approach by another country or bloc elicits an immediate reaction. 

Russian conservatives are able to play on this fear. They are influential 

and feed into Putin’s distrust of the West. 

Border security issues and a sense of humiliation due to Russia’s 

loss of power were two primary aspects of Russia’s history and psyche 

that strongly affect Putin’s personality and agenda. To advance the cause 

of grabbing Crimea, the Kremlin used intimidation (demanding Ukraine 

soldier defections), provocation (blocking Ukraine’s warships from 

leaving the harbor at Sevastopol), deception (masking the faces and unit 

insignia of Russian soldiers in Crimea), propaganda (see below), 

disregard of international norms, opportunism, and, in some rare 

instances, the legitimate protection of interests. 

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Kerry found it difficult to 

properly address this chaotic situation, unable even to discuss the actual 

state of affairs on the ground with his Russian counterpart Sergey 

Lavrov. While Kerry looked to solve problems elsewhere such as in the 

Middle East (Iran and Syria), Ukraine and Europe became “open 

seasons” for opportunists like Putin. Perhaps the chaotic state of affairs 

that demands US participation elsewhere is something that Putin and his 

staff realized in their assessment of strategy (“an evaluation of the state 

and development trends of the military-political situation”) and offered 

yet another card for them to consider and play.

Putin’s charges that the West is responsible for the conflict do not 

add up: other nations in the area would be supporting Russia if that were 

the case. When the collision between the EU and Russia became clear to 

Yanukovych, and it appeared the nation was siding with the EU, he 

reacted by traveling to Russia. 

If each war has its own particular logic, as Gerasimov proposed, 

then the logic that Putin has used to justify his actions in Ukraine must 

be a focus of attention. He has ordered these interventions because he 

says Russia has been humiliated and treated as a second-class nation and 

he intends to rectify the situation. In a recent discussion forum in Sochi, 
30

known as the international discussion club Valdai, he blamed the West, 

and the US in particular, for forcing their standards on other countries, 60

which, interestingly enough, is exactly what Putin is doing. Putin charges 

other nations or organizations with tactics that are actually his own.

It is thus ironic to hear Putin state that the US has to deal with the 

consequences of its own foreign policy mistakes and fight new threats,61

since NATO troops were nowhere near Russia’s borders before Putin 

decided to intervene in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Putin must now deal 

with the consequences of HIS actions and HIS strategic logic: he himself 

created the conditions that caused his neighbors to want NATO troops in 

or near their countries. Putin’s actions have scared his neighbors, who 

now view Russia as the threat once again. It was Putin who put the heat 

on Yanukovych and strongly persuaded him to abandon the EU, which 

set off the Maidan protests.

As part of his mission to increase Russian power, Putin wants 

Russia to teach other countries that it does not pay to ignore the feelings 

or concerns of the Kremlin. He ignores the fact that Russian concerns 

were taken into account, and the nation was integrated into many 

Western organizations, including invitations to participate in NATO 

activities and join the G8. Perhaps deep within the Russian leadership’s 

psyche is the necessity of maintaining not only safe and secure borders 

but also control over neighboring lands, even a friendly one such as 

Ukraine. Putin’s concept of the “Russian World” is one that expands 

beyond its borders. He has also used his competitive logic to ascertain 

that former Soviet states were taken from the USSR illegally, when, in 

fact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was accomplished according to 

international law, which he is now breaking. Finally, Putin is worried 

about Russians adopting what he terms the West’s “quasi values,” which, 

in his opinion, are hard for Russians to accept. Not all Russians would 

agree with him. Ukrainian Economic Minister Pavlo Sheremeta noted 

 

60 Interfax (in English), 24 October 2014. The next three Interfax citations are all 

different, but were published on the same day without title or author.

61 Interfax (in English), 24 October 2014.
31

that if Ukraine is successful, it will be proof that democracy, rule of law, 

and human rights are better for development, not the bullying with tanks 

and oil that Putin is professing.62

Conclusion

To understand Putin, then, requires an understanding of many 

things, especially the context in which he was operating as well as where 

he fits in Kokoshin’s ideology-politics-strategy triangle. Putin traveled a 

quick and anonymous path from being at the nexus of the mobsters, 

bureaucrats, and former KGB officials in St. Petersburg63 to becoming 

the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and President of Russia. 

This quick transformation could not but have swayed his appetite for 

power and influence.

Ideologically, he is a man of convictions, an Orthodox believer 

in the sanctity and uniqueness of Russia’s destiny. He appears to detest 

many Western values and desires to undo what to him was the greatest 

geopolitical tragedy in the history of mankind (the dissolution of the 

USSR) and to restore Russia to its former status as a great power. What 

Putin doesn’t appear to understand is that Russia still is a great power 

with its vast energy resources and nuclear weapons but just not as great 

as in the past. Mearsheimer stresses that Putin feels betrayed by NATO 

enlargement, the EU’s movement eastward, and the West’s support of 

Ukraine’s ousting of former President Viktor Yanukovych. NATO 

enlargement seems to be the biggest humiliation for Putin, especially if 

former General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was promised by Secretary 

of State James Baker that this would not happen. Mearsheimer

recommended making Ukraine a neutral buffer zone and that the “US 

and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine.” This idea 

has its own concerns. First, whatever happened to a nation’s right to 

make their own choice? Western nations have no “plan” to westernize 

Ukraine, but they would naturally like to see democracy succeed here, as 

 

62 Thomas L. Friedman, “Who Will Influence Whom?” The New York Times, 27 April 

2014, p. 11.

63 Ibid.
32

it has in Poland. Second, does anyone actually think this will stop Russia 

from infiltrating Ukraine, or moving on Transdniester, when Putin’s 

policy is to get back the land Russia legally lost? This argument ignores 

both Ukraine’s right to act independently (and overstates the West’s role) 

and Russia’s aggressive role in international affairs. Russia had many 

“insiders” in place when Maidan took place.

Remnick argues that ideologically Putin is strangling freedom of 

expression in his country and imposing his own version of reality on 

Russia, being guided by philosophical ideals that do not comport with 

facts on the ground. Further, which often happens to totalitarian realists, 

Russia’s current leaders continue to ignore one important point—that the 

current governments of their former union and members of the Warsaw 

Pact appear to hate the Russian system of control and totalitarian 

approach. This is a carry-over from the Cold War days, not something 

new. It is why these former subordinates so desperately wanted to break 

away from the USSR in the first place. Here Russia can be blamed for 

conducting the same policy of which Putin accuses the West, of treating 

his former allies as vassals. Russia is a strong power and not weak, as 

Mearsheimer contends. Further, the West has tried to bring Russia into 

the realm of economic prosperity, cooperation in space, and partnership 

activities, which are a vastly different set of conditions than Russia’s 

continuing threats to its former friends. These threats apply not only to 

Ukraine but to the Baltic nations. Russia, not the West, has conducted 

the outright seizure of land, such as Crimea. No Western nation has done 

that. 

Politically, Putin sets goals and accomplishes them with the use 

of covert and indirect actions. He is not tied to morality, but is an 

opportunist and strategist who fully utilizes the utility of ambiguity in his 

quest to accomplish a host of geopolitical goals (which include not only 

land grabs, but also energy resources in areas such as the Arctic). He has 

asserted central control over most levers of power, from gas and oil 

industries to law enforcement. He sees conspiracy everywhere and has 

pro-government media accusing non-governmental organizations of 

aiding unrest. As a result he has decided to kick out of Russia any 

foreign agency in which he smells a tendency to threaten constitutional 

order. Those critical of the government are labeled as a fifth column. 
33

Strategically, Putin works out plans on a case by case basis, 

refusing to be tied down to a specific model of military action. In so 

doing he keeps his opponents off balance and unable to prepare a rational 

response to his unpredictable (some say irrational) and ambiguous 

activities. When sanctions are applied against the nation, Putin constructs 

counter-sanctions to offset any potential advances of the West. When 

Russian oil taps were turned off by the West, Putin looked east and 

found Chinese markets for his products. He is a patriot to most Russians, 

while for many Westerners he has become the preeminent threat to 

European security. The sending of convoys into Ukraine without 

permission is a direct violation of not only Ukraine’s sovereignty but 

also of the Budapest Memorandum, which many seem to have forgotten 

after Crimea.

It is of little wonder, then, that Putin is labeled by some as a 

patriot or messianic zealot who works for the defense of his motherland 

and by others as a major threat to international security. Patriot, zealot, 

or threat—where one sits (in Ukraine, Donetsk, Moscow) and how one 

understands history and diplomacy shapes one’s interpretation of his 

aspirations. However, some Russians, such as Andrey Piontkovsky, a 

well-known Russian political writer and analyst who has described the 

Putin regime as “soft totalitarianism,” believe his desire to reacquire land 

that was legally ceded to others is the most dangerous threat to EurAsia 

since the end of the Cold War. With members of Putin’s military openly 

stating that the primary enemies of Russia are the US and NATO,64 after 

all of the cooperation and engagement between and among our nations in 

the past twenty years, it seems he is correct.

What is most unfortunate is that Russia has not tried hard enough, 

it seems, to better its relations with its former colonies, since most still 

want nothing to do with Russia (not counting, of course, some of the 

ethnic Russians in these lands who adore Putin). Russia’s leadership

 

64 The Moscow Times Online (in English), 3 September 2014. Comment by General 

Yury Yakubov, a senior Defense Ministry official.
34

does not understand how it has humiliated others over the years. None of 

its former Warsaw Pact allies want to put up with Russian arrogance at 

this point in time.

Trenin, on the other hand, argues that the West has not done 

enough to understand Russian interests and concerns. He lays out a host 

of examples where the two sides lacked a common agreement on how to 

handle the issue. As a result, he notes, nothing was done and hostility 

and suspicion grew. Putin felt humiliated over the way Russia was 

treated and decided in 2003 to take another path. He watched how the 

West interacted with then President Dmitri Medvedev from 2008-2012 

and saw no improvement, Trenin notes, so he decided to once again 

assume the presidency. He is stronger than at any point in his tenure as 

president and so is his military.

The West has observed Putin’s rise with a mix of consternation 

and disappointment. Many books are being written about him by both 

Westerners and Russians, and most to come to the same conclusion, that 

he is reigning over a near dictatorship that has nothing to do with 

democracy. 

To better understand Putin’s personality, the following books 

have been written by noted authors and are noteworthy for their ability to 

offer different perspectives on Russia’s president: Walter Laqueur’s 

Putinism; AEI’s Putin’s Russia; Karen Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy: 

Who Owns Russia?; Edward Lucas’s The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia 

and the Threat to the West; Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy’s Mr. Putin: 

Operative in the Kremlin; Steven Myers The New Tsar; and Ben Judah’s 

Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell in and out of Love with Vladimir 

Putin. 

Several Russian books show their trepidation with Putin, such as 

Anna Politkovskaya’s Putin’s Russia; Masha Gessen’s The Man without 

a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin; and Garry Kasparov’s 

Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and Enemies of the Free World 

Must Be Stopped. Of course, in Russia (and China) there are many 

positive books being written about Putin as well. 
35

Putin does not need more land. Rather, he needs to find ways to

build better relations and trust with his neighbors, who continue to fear 

Russia. Whether the West and Putin can come together and make the 

situation better does not appear likely in the short term, especially since 

Russia is actively militarizing the Arctic, continuing to pressure Ukraine, 

forming a militarized bridgehead in Crimea from which to potentially 

move into Transdniester, interfering in Kazakhstan’s affairs, and 

intervening in Syria and building up forces in Belarus. The latter ensures 

that in any conflict with Russia Ukraine could be attacked in three ways: 

from the north, east, and south. Russia is beset by problems, and the 

sooner Putin and the West can put the past two years aside (with 

accommodations made by both sides) the better, not only for Russia but 

for the rest of the world as well.
36
37

CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY

Introduction

The understanding and use of the term strategy varies from 

country to country. In China, for example, the concept involves the use 

of planning and guidance for a military situation as a whole, that is, 

strategy involves holistic planning. The goal of a strategic plan is to seek 

a strategic advantage or shi through the use of analytical judgments of a 

host of factors well beyond the instruments of national power that guide 

strategy in the US. Chinese analysts study objective factors present in the 

international or local environment and attempt to find ways to 

subjectively manipulate them to advantage. This is accomplished 

through the use of stratagems and results in a strategy.

For foreign analysts studying Russian strategy, it appears difficult 

to find an approach that can be identified as “Russian.” It is possible that 

“we” Westerners are part of the problem for this difficulty. Foreign 

analysts have suggested several straw-man concepts for Russia’s current 

strategic thought: hybrid, ambiguous, or nonlinear all come to mind 

immediately as ways to describe Russian strategy. These concepts are 

generated by Western analysts looking at how Russia appears to be 

fighting and then applying a term (usually a Western one) to describe it. 

Finding a Rosetta Stone for understanding Russian strategy may not be 

possible based on this line of reasoning. Worse yet, many Russian 

journalists have picked up the Western terms and use them to talk about 

Russia’s military operations, furthering the confusion.

However, when reading pure Russian military journals it 

becomes clear that Russian officers and military analysts do not use such 

Western terms when discussing Russian strategy, relying instead on 

home-grown concepts. Since at least 2005, the terms indirect and 

asymmetric have been used often to describe strategy. Another concept, 

for which there is a direct link from Russian generals Alexander Suvorov 

and Alexander Svechin to Valery Gerasimov, is that strategy depends on 

circumstances (Suvorov) and has a logic all its own

(Svechin/Gerasimov). Gerasimov has added the concept of nonmilitary 
38

actions to strategic thought as well. It thus seems there is some 

continuity in Russian strategic thought that needs to be recognized and 

attributed to them. Western terms are not among them.

The official definitions of strategy in books and encyclopedias

certainly mark Russian strategy as being consistent and traditional, since 

the definitions haven’t changed over the years. As with China, there are 

specific experiences and planning elements that help set Russian strategy

apart from the strategic concepts of other nations. These elements are 

present in official or historically influenced definitions and in military 

writings. They include first and foremost two specific concepts, one 

lumped together as foresight/forecasting and the other being the 

correlation of forces (COF) The work of Suvorov, Svechin, and several 

other officers of renown on the logic and importance of strategic thought

is also of interest. Russia’s contemporary theorists describe strategy 

today as nonmilitary, indirect, and asymmetric. They add that strategies 

differ by conflict. They could range from cyber issues (Estonia) to 

surrogate use (Eastern Ukraine) to the use of traditional forces (Georgia).

First, there are several traditional or historical elements that help 

foreign audiences understand Russian strategy. The standard definitions

available in military encyclopedias describe strategy as a component of 

military art that plans and conducts strategic operations. This official 

military definition has changed little in the past few decades from Soviet 

to Russian times. The entries on military strategy from the 1971 Officer’s 

Handbook, the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, and the 2003 

Military Encyclopedia, for example, are offered in the text below to 

demonstrate this point.

Second, there are the foresight/forecasting and COF issues that 

enable the development of Russian military plans and the conduct of 

operations for which the nation’s military strategists are well known. 

Such analysis is keeping pace with the digital age. A recent Military 

Thought article, for example, was titled, “The Application of Information 

Technology to Forecast Developmental Trends in International 
39

Conflicts.”65 General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the 

General Staff, refers to these terms often when describing today’s 

concept of the changing nature of conflict.

Third, there are definitions of strategy from former renowned 

Russian military theoreticians, officers such as A. A. Svechin, V. D. 

Sokolovsky, N. V. Ogarkov, and others. The writings of these men are as 

important as official definitions, if not more so, since contemporary 

influential Russians such as Andrey Kokoshin (a former Deputy Minister 

of Defense), General of the Army Makhmut A. Gareev (the President of 

the Academy of Military Science), and even General Staff leaders 

reference them (especially Svechin) more often than the encyclopedic 

definitions when discussing strategy. 

Finally, there are Russian definitions of strategy found in other 

works. For example, China’s 2013 book The Science of Military Strategy

states that, according to a course at the Russian Military’s General Staff 

Academy, military strategy is defined as follows: 

Military strategy is a component part and the supreme 

sphere of military art, and it is a complete system of 

scientific knowledge regarding the nature of modern 

warfare and the ways to use military means to prevent 

warfare, regarding the preparations by a nation and its 

armed forces to resist invasion, and regarding methods 

and forms for carrying out total warfare and military 

actions on a strategic scale; it is also the sphere of 

practical activities by the nation’s leaders and its supreme 

military leaders for preventing war, for having the nation 

and its armed forces make thorough preparations for war, 

and for guiding their resistance to attacks and their 

 

65 V. S. Kretov, “The Application of Information Technology to Forecast 

Developmental Trends in International Conflicts,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), 

No. 2 2013, pp. 45-52.
40

smashing of invaders when carrying out military 

actions.66

In contrast to the Chinese method of defining strategy, which 

emphasizes the work of Marx and Engel’s (as well as the ancients and 

Mao, of course), there is less reliance on these two giants to define the 

term. Objective and subjective factors are considered, but not to the same 

extent as the People’s Liberation Army of China to define strategy.

Russian strategists appear to rely more heavily on the 

foresight/forecasting and COF concepts when developing strategy and in 

their descriptions of future war, as well as on the contemporary concepts 

of nonmilitary, indirect, and asymmetric operations.

Since the 1960s independent military theorists who write in 

Military Thought and other military journals have discussed strategy.

These authors have addressed various elements of the concept, yet their 

descriptions usually include the forecasting and COF components. There 

are definitions of strategy in concept papers such as Russia’s National 

Security Strategy that add a civilian touch to the issue. 

Contemporary times and events, such as Russia’s recent 

incursions into Ukraine and Syria, have offered an implied definition of 

strategy from Russia’s leadership that supports the focus on Svechin and 

further indicates he is probably more important as a strategic source 

today than the official definitions. This current understanding of strategy

was offered in 2013 by Gerasimov (as stated earlier in Chapter One):

The renowned Soviet Military Academician Aleskandr 

Svechin wrote: ‘It is unusually difficult to foresee the 

circumstances of a war...It is necessary to work out a 

particular line of strategic conduct for each war, and each 

war represents a partial case, requiring the establishment 

 

66 A. C. Skvoltsov, Course on Military Strategy, Military Academy of the General Staff 

of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 1995. Found in The Science of Military 

Strategy, Military Science Press, 2013, p. 2.
41

of its own peculiar logic, and not the application of some 

sort of model.’67

That is, models and dictionary definitions are useful to a point, 

but unique logic applied to the situation at hand (along with practical 

experience in the use of foresight and the COF) may best demonstrate 

the basis for Russian strategic thinking and creativity. The concepts of 

indirect and asymmetric operations are explored in the next chapter, one 

that specifically refutes the concept of hybrid war being a Russian 

concept (Chapter Three recounts how indirect and asymmetric actions 

have been the primary method of war’s conduct in Russia since at least 

2005).

These varying Russian elements of strategy will be defined and 

highlighted in the following analysis. A general conclusion is offered on 

the integration of these ideas and how they should shape our view and 

understanding of the concept from a particular Russian vantage point.

68

Concepts and the History of Russian Military Strategy

The 1971 Officer’s Handbook

The 1971 Officer’s Handbook describes strategy as a division of 

military art that investigates the principles of preparing for and waging 

war as a whole, as well as its campaigns. It is a direct instrument of 

politics, and is common to all branches of the country’s services within 

the framework of a unified military strategy. Strategy has theoretical 

(principles of war planning, logistical support, troop control, and 

 

67 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February, 2013.

68 For a comparative view as to how strategy was understood in Soviet times, an 

analysis without the benefit of many unclassified sources captured since (old issues of 

Military Thought, etc.), the reader is referred to John J. Dziak’s excellent 1981 study 

“Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice.” This 

work offered US analysts a definitive way for comprehending Soviet military theory

and strategy that has not lost its relevance after all these years.
42

territorial preparation) and applied (specific questions on the preparation 

and execution of strategic attack, defense, and other operations) 

aspects.69

Strategy is further described as a scientific theory that elaborates 

the fundamental methods and forms of armed combat on a strategic scale 

and produces war’s guiding principles. Strategy’s theory influences 

military doctrine and, at the same time, strategy implements doctrine 

directly in the elaboration of war plans and the preparation of the country

for war. In wartime, military doctrine drops into the background 

somewhat, since in armed combat military-political and militarystrategic considerations take the primary lead roles, depending on the 

specific situation. Consequently, war or armed combat is governed by 

strategy, not doctrine.70

1983 Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

The 1983 Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary stated that 

Soviet military strategy is determined through the policies of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union and exerts an inverse influence on 

policy. Its tasks are formulated through the Soviet Constitution. 

Marxism-Leninism is the bases for its formulation, especially its 

teachings on war and the army.71 Military strategy is interlinked with the 

country’s military doctrine and is defined as follows:

A component part of military art, its highest domain, 

encompassing theory and the practice of the preparation 

of a country and its armed forces [AF] for war, the 

planning and conduct of strategic operations and war as a 

whole. The theory of military strategy investigates the 

patterns, mechanisms, and nature of war, the modes and 

 

69 S. N. Kozlov, Editor, The Officer’s Handbook, Ministry of Defense Publishing

Company, Moscow, 1971, as published in English by the United States Air Force, 

1971, pp. 57-58.

70 Ibid., p. 65.

71 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 711.
43

methods of its conduct. It formulates the theoretical 

principles of planning as well as the preparation for and 

conduct of strategic operations and war as a whole.72

The basic points of Soviet military strategy elaborated by V. I. Lenin are 

as follows:

1. Guidance and direction by the Communist Party over 

the organization of national defense, military 

organizational development, and the strategic 

employment of the Soviet AF.

2. Decisiveness of strategic objectives, an aggressive 

emphasis on offense, thorough, painstaking 

determination of and concentration of principal efforts 

on decisive axes and sectors.

3. The ability to select types of strategic operations in 

conformity with the situation and to employ them in 

various combinations.73

Soviet military strategy consists of interlinked strategic operations, to 

include air, air defense, airborne, amphibious, anti-air assault, naval, and 

other operations. While offensive operations are considered as the 

principal type of military operations, Soviet military strategy also 

recognized the important role of defense. Finally, Soviet military 

strategy evolves in conformity with changes in the world’s military and 

political situation.74

2003 Military Encyclopedia

Strategy is discussed officially in the 2003 Military Encyclopedia

of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense as having precepts 

“based on an evaluation of the state and development trends of the 

military-political situation, scientifically sound objectives, principles, 

 

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., p. 712.

74 Ibid.
44

guidelines and tasks, and the objective requirements and actual 

functioning and development capability of a nation’s military 

organization.”75 The encyclopedia lists nine theoretical and practical 

aspects of military strategy at the start of the 21st century:

1. The likely nature of wars in the modern age and the 

ways to avert them by military means

2. The objectives and tasks of the AF in war and in 

strategic military operations

3. The requisite means to conduct them

4. The content, methods, and conditions for preparing 

for and waging war in general and the various forms 

of strategic actions

5. Strategic planning for using the AF in war and for 

using branches of the services therein

6. The fundamentals of strategic, moral-psychological, 

technical, and logistical support of the AF

7. Leadership of the AF in peacetime and wartime

8. Framing of the strategic requirements for building the 

AF and preparing a nation’s economy, population, and 

territory for war

9. The leading states’ and coalitions’ strategic views and 

capability to prepare for, unleash, and wage war and 

conduct strategic military actions76

Military strategy’s tasks are determined by a country’s policy and 

economy, where policy determines war’s objectives, the preparations for 

war, the mobilization of resources, and the means and methods of 

waging war, to include creating favorable internal and external political 

conditions for military strategy. The economy develops from and serves 

policy, but has a reverse effect on policy, since government agencies can 

use military research to resolve issues of war preparations and conduct. 

 

75 Sergey B. Ivanov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 2003, Moscow Military Publishing House, Vol. 7, p. 675.

76 Ibid.
45

The connection between military strategy and the economy “is 

manifested in the fact that the economy creates the basis for building the 

AF and determines their quantitative and qualitative composition.”77

Adapting to technological advances creates favorable conditions for 

developing strategy. In turn, strategy has a reverse effect on the 

economy, since the latter’s development must take into account 

requirements for the AF and strategy.78

Military strategy is also closely linked to military doctrine, and,

in fact, is guided by it. Strategy’s reverse effect on doctrine is that its 

theoretical conclusions help frame military doctrine. What is important is 

that each state defines its military strategy in line with a specific 

constitution, laws, situation, capabilities, and geographic conditions. 

Russia’s military strategy is “revised to reflect socio-political, economic, 

and military changes” and depends on the balance of power in the world, 

means of armed combat, and other issues. After conducting an analysis 

of the nature of future war, strategy then “looks at the likely composition 

and objectives of the warring sides; ways to unleash and wage wars 

using various weapons; the forms of the AF’s strategic operations; the 

intensity and scope of military operations; and the possible duration, 

reoccurrence, and aftermath of wars.” The formulation of nonmilitary 

measures to avert war is also necessary. A primary strategic training task 

is the strategic planning of the AF’s use in war. Military strategy must 

continue to develop and improve to keep up with changes in the global 

military-political situation and the nation’s economic, scientifictechnical, and military capability, and serve defensive purposes.79

Objective-Subjective Thought’s Impact on Strategy

There is mention of the terms “objective reality” and “subjective 

guidance” in several works on Russian strategic thought. However, the 

concept does not receive the same emphasis in regard to strategy as can 

be found in recent Chinese military works. It is usually discussed in 

 

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.
46

general terms and not in relation to strategy, except for the few cases 

noted here. In the first few cases below, it is objective laws and factors 

that are discussed (and not objective reality) in accordance with 

subjective factors. 

V. D. Sokolovsky’s classic 1968 work, Soviet Military Strategy, 

noted that “The knowledge of the general laws of armed conflict makes 

it possible for the military leader to foresee the nature of military events 

in a future war and to use these laws successfully in conducting the war, 

rationally directing the efforts of the AF. This is the subjective aspect of 

the use of objective laws.”80 He noted that “The laws of strategy are 

objective and apply impartially to both hostile sides.”81

The 1971 work in Military Thought titled, “Evolution in the 

Correlation of Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics,” by LieutenantGeneral I. Zav’yalov discussed objective laws and subjective factors. He 

noted that the combat performance characteristics of weapons and 

combat equipment objectively influence military art’s principles. 

However, behind each type of weapon stands man who determines their 

utilization and methods. This is a subjective factor when examining the 

correlation of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Reaching a decision 

requires taking into consideration advantageous aspects of objective 

conditions, with the ideal decision being where maximum 

correspondence is reached between objective and subjective factors. It is 

up to commanders to evaluate and consider the objective factors and 

their influence on troop actions. In a reference to the continuity of 

strategic thought, Zav’yalov notes that objective factors include combat 

capabilities, the correlation of forces, the probable character of hostile 

activities, and the manpower and weapons of strategic and operational 

echelons that can be utilized in the interests of strategy.82

 

80 V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, (English translation by Crane, Russak, 

and Company, Inc.), Third Edition, 1968, p.9.

81 Ibid.

82 I. Zav’yalov, “Evolution in the Correlation of Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics,” 

Military Thought, No. 11, 1971, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from

Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 121-131.
47

Another author, A. A. Paderin, also writing in Military Thought

but in 2006, reference only various objective and subjective factors as 

relevant to military strategy, with political circumstances being the most 

significant.83 Other books have referenced the objective-subjective 

thought process and imply a relationship to strategy. For example, 

Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army states that subjective factors 

play a major role in the military organization of the socialist type, which 

is conditioned by objective laws. Victory requires the “comprehensive 

and efficient mobilization of the objective and subjective factors 

promoting victory...”84 The 1972 work, Problems of Contemporary War, 

stated that Lenin had attached great importance to determining the main 

threat, its main axis of attack, and the necessity to concentrate men and 

weapons at the decisive point and decisive moment. The authors added 

that such statements express Lenin’s logic and approach to a root 

problem of military art, namely “a dialectical combination of the 

objective and the subjective in the process of analyzing the complex 

phenomena of a military response.”85 A. S. Milovidov stated in an article 

in 1973 that military-theoretical problems examine the “correlation 

between material and forces in modern war and the relationship between 

objective and subjective factors in the development of military affairs.”86

The 1987 book, The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, 

Tendencies, Principles, had a section on objective reality and subjective 

thought. It stated that in analyzing military art, where strategy is the 

concept’s main component, the dialectically opposed interrelationship 

 

83 A. A. Paderin, “Policy and Military Strategy: A Unity Lesson,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 2 2006.

84 Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, 1957, translated into English by Progress 

Publishers in 1972 and reproduced by the US Air Force in 1973, p. 208.

85 A. S. Milovidov, editor in chief, Problems of Contemporary War, Ministry of 

Defense Publishing House, Moscow, 1972, as translated into English and published by 

the US Air Force, 1972, p. 103.

86 A. S. Milovidov, “A Philosophical Analysis of Military Thought,” Red Star, 

Moscow, 17 May 1973, pp. 2-3, as translated into English and published by the US Air 

Force in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975, 1976, p. 73.
48

between objective conditions and subjective factors must be considered. 

Marxism-Leninism views history as a unity of that which is objective 

with that which is subjective.87 Objective conditions are listed as 

material possibilities and real circumstances that influence the course of 

armed conflict, such as the state structure, population size, level of 

industrial production, level of science and technology, raw material 

availability, geographic conditions, and other qualities. Subjective 

factors include the comprehension of conditions and laws, mass attitudes 

toward war, leadership effectiveness, political awareness, level of 

training, and so on.88 The author collective warned that rendering 

objective conditions absolute is fatal, since it rejects creativity and 

initiative. Exaggerating subjective factors leads to the rejection of 

objective laws, which always dominate subjectivity.89 This relationship 

was further developed through the use of a quote from Lenin:

Marxism, wrote V. I. Lenin, differs from all other 

socialist theories in that it provides for a remarkable 

combination of complete scientific sobriety in analysis of 

the objective state of affairs and the objective course of 

evolution, and the most resolute recognition of the 

significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary 

creativity, and revolutionary initiative of the masses—and 

of course, individual personalities as well...90

War is further defined as a struggle among minds, strategies, plans, and 

decisions, where victory is achieved through professional knowledge, 

decisiveness, and the will to win. When thus analyzing the development 

of military art, it is necessary to account for the influence of objective 

conditions and subjective factors.91

 

87 F. F. Gayvoronskiy, general editor, Evolyutsiya Voyennogo Iskusstva: Etapy, 

Tendentsii, Printsipy (The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles), 

Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 12 of English translation.

88 Ibid., p. 13.

89 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

90 Ibid., p. 24.

91 Ibid., p. 26.
49

Finally, the 1991 book, The Culture of Military Thought, 

discussed objective reality and subjective guidance in several sections 

and indirectly referenced strategy. The authors noted that “thought takes 

place in the interaction of the objective and the subjective. Surrounding 

reality is objective, and knowledge and a thinking person’s attitude to it 

is subjective.”92 The objective and the subjective interact via the logical 

means of analysis, synthesis, generalization, and so on. A commander 

must be able to creatively apply his knowledge of theory to real 

situations or to use his intuition. It is through creativity that subjective 

thought can influence strategy. Creativity produces something new and 

often nonexistent; thus military art becomes the fusion of creative 

thought and practical activity.93 Further, the authors add that “the depth 

and accuracy of foresight in battle directly depends on how creatively or, 

conversely, how conventionally the contending sides act, and the extent 

to which and in what way they use stratagem, operational and tactical 

camouflage, and disinformation.”94

The authors note that the laws of military science are nothing 

more than the subjective image of objectively existing links among the

various aspects of war. A change in one results in adjustments in the 

other. Military practice is where the unity of the objective and the 

subjective occurs. Subjective goals determine the methods and nature of 

their actions. Knowledge is based on personal experience—one cannot 

learn to swim without being in the water.95

Thus, in the development of Russian strategy, objective reality 

would be represented by the situation before commanders, and subjective 

guidance would be the ability of commanders to creatively manipulate 

the factors of that reality, which include, but are not limited to the 

concentration of forces in a crucial location at a crucial time; surprise; 

 

92 F. F. Gayivoronskiy and M. I. Galkin, editors, Kul’tura Voennogo Myshleniya (The 

Culture of Military Thought), Moscow Military Publishing House, 1991, p. 12.

93 Ibid., p. 34.

94 Ibid., p. 83.

95 Ibid., pp. 252, 255, 282.
50

troop interaction; comprehensive support; correlation of engaged forces

and weapons; time and space of the engagement; switches or leaps from 

one condition to another; elements of randomness, known as the 

uncertainty factor; pace of advance; time to reach an objective; command 

and control capabilities; reconnaissance; electronic or cyber warfare 

means; logistic support; terrain; time of year and day; weather; and so 

on.96 Many of these factors will be highlighted again below in major 

General Ryabchuk and Colonel Tyushkevich’s considerations of a 

commander’s creativity and the COF, which again demonstrates 

continuity in military thought.

History of Russian Military Strategy

In 2000 Russian General-Major V. A. Zolotarev served as the 

main editor of a book on the history of military strategy in Russia. In it

he highlighted a number of issues discussed above. What this reliance on 

former thought indicates is that even after a few decades, the basic 

template to create strategy has not changed much in Russia. This in spite 

of the fact that Russia’s predecessor, the Soviet Union, had disappeared, 

causing existing military-political and strategic tenets to be, for all 

intents and purposes, obliterated. The changing military-political 

circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War resulted in 

rethinking seemingly indisputable strategic postulates. Enemies became 

partners, and partners became neutral or potential enemies.97 Yet old 

templates continued to be used.

Zolotarev states that military policy correlates to a concrete 

situation and the political goals that arise from it. A military organization 

is formulated for the situation, military doctrine is formed, and a national 

military strategy is determined and conducted in accordance with policy. 

Special features of Russian strategy include its national originality; a 

reliance on its own national strengths; a continental point of view; the 

use of peripheral directionality; the sequential neutralization of threats 

 

96

 Ibid., pp. 170, 172. 

97 V. A. Zolotarev, editor, Istoriya Voennoy Strategii Rossii (The History of Military 

Strategy in Russia), 2000, Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, pp. 497-501.
51

from the West, East, and South; the proportional development of forces,

with emphasis on ground forces; decisiveness of actions; and the flexible 

combination of offense and defense and positional and maneuver forms 

of struggle.98

Military strategy includes the theory and practice of preparing the 

country and its armed forces for war, as well as the planning and waging 

of war and the conduct of large-scale strategic operations. Theory studies 

the laws and nature of warfare and methods of waging it in order to 

achieve political goals. With regard to practical activity, military strategy 

helps determine strategic missions under specific conditions and the 

forces and means to conduct them. Military strategy helps prepare the 

armed forces, theaters of operations, the economy, and the population for 

war as planners perceive it. Enemy capabilities are also studied.99

Strategy can be used to wage war or to conduct large-scale 

operations. They differ in scale, how they are used, the content of 

missions, and how they are examined. A war strategy involves longrange political and military goals, a priority listing for their achievement, 

and the forms and methods of their preparation and conduct 

(development of logistics, deployment organization, campaign 

determinations in the political, diplomatic, economic, and strategic areas, 

and economic and military mobilization plans).100

The strategy of the conduct of operations is concerned with 

warfare’s components. It helps determine the operational systems that 

are required of a state’s armed forces when conducting different wars. 

Plans are conceived for coordinating the efforts of various branches of 

the armed forces and for preparing theaters of military operations and the 

organization of command and control issues.101

 

98 Ibid., pp. 6-8.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.
52

Zolotarev added that military strategy now is formed under a 

complex set of varied objective and subjective factors, with political 

factors being the most important. To him, some of the objective factors 

operate in a diametrically opposed direction, with some adding a resolute 

nature to strategy, while others introduce uncertainty. The latter include 

separatist aspirations becoming more exacerbated and a clash of interests 

along a North-South line. Russia’s drop in its military-economic 

potential is another factor that has placed it behind in the development of 

a strategy to confront threats to the nation. Therefore, strategy at this 

juncture (the year 2000) must be based on carrying out just the most 

necessary local tasks with limited force and economic means. 

Interestingly, even at this early juncture Zolotarev writes that the 

extensive buffer zone that has been created between Russia and its

former allies in the Warsaw Pact hides serious negative consequences. 

The only example he offered was that the spatial corridors that brought 

Russia to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, for which the Russian Empire 

fought for many centuries, have narrowed. He adds, however, that 

historically the more active Russia’s foreign expansionist policy became, 

the greater the role that military force would play. In light of recent 

incursions into the Arctic, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria this thought 

pattern seems to have remained in place.102

Finally, Zolotarev states that these new objective factors entail a 

reorientation of many fundamental military-strategic concepts for Russia. 

Subjective factors “are also substantially influencing the development of 

contemporary Russian military strategy; in a number of instances their 

mutual activity is decisive.”103 Among several distinguishing features of 

Russia’s military strategy over the years, the employment of different 

forms, types, and methods of military operations seems to be most

relevant, which seems to support Gerasimov’s notion that each conflict 

has a “logic all its own.” This may be a direct result of the use of creative 

thought to produce different forms, types, and methods of employment. 

How Russia goes about determining its analysis of the nature of war 

 

102 Ibid., pp. 6-8, 497-501.

103 Ibid.
53

should be studied closely by analysts, as it results in the use of new 

methods and procedures for strategic operations.104

Foresight/Forecasting and the Correlation of Forces

Russia’s military encyclopedia defines foresight (predvidenie) in 

the following manner:

The process of gaining knowledge of possible changes in 

the area of military affairs, determination of the prospects 

of their future development. Knowledge of the objective 

patterns and mechanisms of war and dialecticalmaterialist analysis of events taking place in a given 

specific historical situation constitutes the basis of 

scientific foresight.105

With regard to the elements of foresight, it was noted that there are three: 

prediction, planning, and management. Foresight’s complexity is 

determined by risk, chance factors, and insufficient information on an 

enemy.106

Forecasting or prognostication (predskazanie or prognozirovanie, 

with both terms used interchangeably it seems) is defined in the 

following manner:

In military affairs, the scientifically substantiated 

determination of the prospects of future development of 

armed forces, military equipment, military art, the 

probable course and outcome of individual wars. A 

component part of foresight in military affairs.

107

 

104 Ibid., pp. 551-552.

105 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 585.

106 Ibid.

107 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 593.
54

Some of the principal domains of forecasting are military-strategic, 

operational, tactical, military economics, and military-technical. It is also 

a term associated with prediction.108

One Russian who wrote on foresight/forecasting was Major 

General V. D. Ryabchuk. In one article, co-written with Colonel V. I. 

Nichipor, he noted that the famous Soviet theoretician M. V. Frunze 

stated that foresight in military art is dependent on three things: a clear 

understanding of the nature of future war [author: definition of strategy]; 

the correct understanding of the forces available to a potential enemy

[author: COF]; and an understanding of friendly resources [author: 

COF]. A commander’s military art manifests itself in the ability to 

choose from among diverse methods and find the most suitable one for 

each particular case [author: each conflict has a logic all its own]. Here 

the intellectual confrontation is most important, where commanders seek 

to control not only battle but the enemy as well [author: reflexive 

control, defined in the next chapter]. Working out a correlation of 

relative strengths becomes important. It is imperative that commanders 

“develop new unconventional control methods, forms and techniques of 

training the commander for effective purposeful battle control, and the 

achievement of victory over the smart, powerful, highly professional, 

and actively operating enemy.”109 Ryabchuk and Nichipor note that the 

famous Russian commander A. V. Suvorov, stated that a senior officer 

should “not depend on anything, but act according to the circumstances 

and always promptly.”110 Forecasting and foresight ensure effective 

control of battle.

In a later article devoted to military science and forecasting, 

Ryabchuk discussed in greater terms the intellectual confrontation, 

further described as the fact that “thought is the first to join a battle. 

Indeed, thought is a weapon; ...On the other hand, thought also appears 

 

108 Ibid.

109 V. D. Ryabchuk and V. I. Nichipor, “The Role and Place of Forecasting and 

Foresight in the System of Planning Operations and Combined-Arms Battles,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2007, pp. 61-67.

110 Ibid.
55

to be a basis of the scientific potential of the state and a background for 

its forecasting development.”111 He added that, regretfully, calculations 

still need to be made on the intellectual potentials of opposing sides, just 

as there are with the sides’ information or other capability 

measurements.

112

In Ryabchuk’s opinion, the Russian Academy of Military 

Science, headed by M. A. Gareev, is mainly focused on forecasting and 

defining the analytical and system priorities for future wars and any 

other military or nonmilitary form of armed and unarmed confrontations. 

At one conference in 2008 Gareev put forward as a major result of the 

session that it was necessary to put into practice “a long-term strategic 

action plan which would provide for the assessment of advanced 

development of the geopolitical situation in the world, and the role and 

place of Russia in the international community...”113 The development 

of the geopolitical situation around Crimea and eastern Ukraine comes to 

mind.

Ryabchuk referred to the term “correlation of forces” in his 

article, but his focus was on the lack of an intellectual confrontation or 

correlation that should be under consideration. Colonel S. Tyushkevich 

further discussed the correlation of forces (COF) concept in a 1969 

article in Military Thought. He noted that the COF is connected with 

strategic planning and is developed both during the prewar period and 

while a war is in progress. The correlation determines the plan for war 

and for operations, as well as the purpose of strategy and operational 

art.114 Further

 

111 V. D. Ryabchuk, “Problems of Military Science and Military Forecasting under 

Conditions of an Intellectual-Informational Confrontation,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 5 2008, pp. 67-76.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 S. Tyushkevich, “The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War,” Military 

Thought, No. 6 1969, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from Military 

Thought: 1963-1973 (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 57-71.
56

In peaceful conditions, determining and guaranteeing the 

required correlation of forces is connected with the 

development and implementation of programs for 

economic and military organization, and the solution of 

many theoretical and practical problems for the 

comprehensive preparation of the armed forces for a war 

which the imperialists my unleash on the countries of the 

socialist community.115

Developing sound decisions for the conduct of operations can only be 

achieved by the comprehensive evaluation of forces of the contending 

sides and the determination of creating a favorable COF. This evaluation 

includes both quantitative and qualitative considerations and, in addition 

to military-technical evaluations, includes economic, socio-political, and 

spiritual factors. A COF determination requires a calculation of the entire 

aggregate of capabilities.116

The term COF is defined in the military encyclopedia as follows:

An objective indicator of the combat power of opposing 

forces, which makes it possible to determine the degree of 

superiority of one force over the other. Correct 

calculations and estimates of relative strengths help make 

substantiated decisions, established in a timely manner 

and used to maintain the required superiority over the 

adversary in selected sectors. It is determined by 

comparing quantitative and qualitative characteristics of 

subunits, units, combined units, and armaments of 

friendly and enemy troops (forces). It is calculated on a 

strategic, operational, and tactical scale throughout an 

 

115 Ibid., p. 61.

116 Ibid., pp. 61-63.
57

entire area of operations, in the main sector and in other 

sectors.

117

The definition, while accurate, does not provide the depth of the content 

of the concept. Tyushkevich further details several factors beyond the 

quantity and quality issues that are important to consider when 

conducting a COF analysis:

1. Even a significant superiority is nothing but a 

favorable opportunity. The decisive role is played by 

the skill of commander’s ability to exploit it.

2. With conventional forces, the COF usually can only 

change slowly. The use of nuclear weapons will 

change the COF immediately.

3. Timely logistic deliveries are a “most essential” 

element in maintaining a given COF.

4. The most effective way to change the COF is through 

the offensive.

5. Commanders and staffs must prepare ahead of time 

substantial forecasts that enable their forces to

anticipate events, which will facilitate corrections to 

plans during military operations.

6. The COF is a specific function of time, as capabilities 

change continuously during a conflict.

7. The methods and means of using the time factor are 

interrelated with the element of surprise, which can 

change the COF quickly when properly employed.

8. In addition to evaluating quantitative and qualitative 

factors, commanders can also uncover hidden factors 

that have the capability of influencing the COF. 

9. All of the above factors capable of impacting the COF 

are objective opportunities that are dependent on a 

 

117 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 691.
58

commander’s use of his subjective factor to take 

advantage of them.118

It remains likely that Russian military strategists continue to use 

these methods of foresight/forecasting and the COF, but to what degree 

is unknown. In an article in 2014, it was noted that computations of the 

correlation of forces was first pioneered in the 1980s by L. V. Zakharov 

but “an improved version of the same is used in various calculations of 

the RF MOD research organizations.”119 Perhaps more importantly 

Gerasimov still uses the terms in his descriptions of how to design an 

efficient Armed Force’s contingent for Russia and perhaps that is all that 

is really needed as proof of the continued use of the concept. He notes 

that an efficient contingent depends in large degree on finding an optimal 

correlation of forces and means of armed struggle; and that another 

important task is the forecasting and assessment of military threats.120

Thus the concepts appear to be embedded in the military’s DNA when 

analyzing opposing forces or threats. New elements (cyber, hypersonic 

missiles, UAVs, etc.) are likely now part of a new correlation of assets. 

Also of particular interest is how the intellectual confrontation was

stressed by several writers in the discussion above even over the 

technical confrontation. Thinking is paramount in this consideration of 

how strategy will be formed and implemented.

 

118 Ibid., pp. 64-70.

119 S. G. Chekinov and S. A.Bogdanov, “Military Futureology: Its Origin, 

Development, Role, and Place within Military Science,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 8, 2014, p. 26.

120 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved 

by the President of the Russian Federation,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin 

of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22.
59

People and Policies

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of A. A. 

Svechin

Alexander Andreyevich Svechin was born in August 1878 and 

lived until 1938, when he was executed on the orders of Stalin and 

Molotov for allegedly participating in a counter-revolutionary 

organization and training terrorists. He was not only an outstanding 

military leader but also a professional writer. His most famous book was 

aptly titled Strategy. It was translated into English in 1992. In this work 

Svechin offered the following definition of strategy:

Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and 

the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by 

the war for the AF. Strategy decides issues associated 

with the employment of the AF and all the resources of a 

country for achieving ultimate war aims.121

Strategy is an extension of politics. One who understands 

political economy, logic, grammar, and strategy can protect others from 

many errors in working in any of these fields.122 Clear strategic thinking 

enables the accomplishment of operational missions. Strategy begins 

“when we see a series of successive goals, or states, toward the 

achievement of the ultimate goal of the war. Strategy must look forward 

and take the very long term into consideration. The strategist advances 

by operations, and these strategic steps extend several weeks or even 

months in time.”123 Svechin appears to agree with Suvorov, who noted 

that tactics is for today, strategy for tomorrow.

Politicians, Svechin noted, must have an idea of what is feasible 

for strategy in order to achieve political goals. Even in peacetime, 

 

121 Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin, Strategy, 1927, in English, translation provided by 

East View Publications, 1992, p. 69.

122 Ibid., p. 71.

123 Ibid., p. 73.
60

military capabilities must be part of political calculations. This requires 

strategic training for all leaders, military and civilian, and is particularly 

important for military commanders, regardless of the leadership position 

they occupy. For example, corps commanders in Svechin’s time had to 

understand that their decisions would provide a strategic slant to an 

operation.124 He adds further that

Strategy is a discipline in which success depends very 

little on the memorization of precepts issued by a school 

or the assimilation of logical constructs contained in 

textbooks on strategy. A unity of doctrine based on the 

unity of strategic guidelines is illusory. In strategy the 

center of gravity lies in developing an independent point 

of view which primarily requires careful homework.125

A course on strategy should lay the groundwork for subsequent 

independent thought. Strategy is a contemplation of military history and 

not just theory and speculation. It requires historical knowledge based on 

a strategic view. Of course, strategy also requires knowledge of the 

present, since it endeavors to make a prediction about the future. 

Interestingly, Svechin notes that the “entire globe is becoming a 

completely strategic landscape in which the art of war is in many 

respects switching to new methods and techniques.”126 Such a thought is 

hauntingly familiar to those of us living in the cyber age.

Andrey A. Kokoshin on Svechin

Andrey Kokoshin has served as Deputy Minister of Defense and 

as the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. He is a historian of 

renown who writes that Svechin was adamant about the close correlation 

between politics and strategy. Politics is the art of orienting struggles to 

carry out programs of a specific group, the art of maneuvering people. It 

 

124 Ibid., p. 74.

125 Ibid., p. 76.

126 Ibid., p. 77.
61

does not usually take a direct path to accomplish its goals. Rather, there 

are stages that must be achieved on the way to a goal. He noted that

Strategy must broadly look ahead and take into account 

the future in a very broad perspective. Strategy takes its 

steps by means of operations; these steps of strategy 

stretch out in time for several weeks, even months. The 

strategist should thoroughly take into account the 

situation and its possible changes in order to not change 

the foundations of his directives when the operation has 

reached only the beginning of its development. The 

strategist must be forward-thinking so that operational 

and tactical art can work systematically.127

E. I. Martynov, a Svechin colleague and contemporary, adopted 

Moltke the Elder’s formula that “politics must establish the political goal 

of the war and then provide strategy with complete freedom of 

action.”128 Svechin, for his part, assigned an important role to solving 

problems associated with demoralizing the enemy and maintaining unity 

in one’s own nation. This reminds one of Russian actions during 

Ukraine, where the “enemy” (Ukraine’s new government) was castigated 

as fascists and neo-Nazis, while on the home front the propaganda war 

was unrelenting, underscoring the righteousness of Russian actions and 

offering no counter-positions. According to a Russian encyclopedia, 

fascism, as defined for Russians is “A form of open terrorist dictatorship 

of the imperialist bourgeoisie which relies upon the forces of antiCommunism, chauvinism, and racism, with the goal of destroying 

democracy and suppressing the worker movement, as well as preparation 

for aggressive wars.”

129

 

 

127 A. A. Kokoshin, “On the Interrelationship among Politics, Military Strategy, 

Operational Art, and Tactics,” in Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin: Prominent National 

Military Theorist and Commander. On His Life, Ideas, Works, and Legacy for the 

Present and Future, Moscow University Publishing Company, 2013, pp. 157-189.

128 Ibid.

129 S. I. Ozhegov, Slovar’ Russkogo Yazyka (Dictionary of the Russian Language), 

1984, Moscow, p. 738.
62

Further, since strategy is “not indifferent to some resolution or 

another of economic tasks,” and since war preparation strains the 

economy, then this forces “other methods to be employed.” Russia took 

Crimea without much fuss or use of forces and national economic assets. 

The same transpired in Ukraine, using surrogates to stir up trouble on the 

Ukrainian side of the border. Yet another point mentioned by Kokoshin 

was Svechin’s desire to damage an enemy’s economic potential,130

which the taking of eastern Ukrainian industrial areas and Crimea’s 

offshore oil assets certainly did, not to mention imposing more costs on 

oil and gas agreements and bypassing agreements made over Crimea 

regarding the same issue of energy.

Kokoshin noted that correctly establishing goals in politics and 

military strategy is a rare phenomenon, yet it was accomplished in 

Ukraine. Putin and his apparatchiks apparently proceeded to correctly 

analyze the following state of affairs precisely as Svechin meant it:

A politician must have a correct sense of the correlation 

of his and the enemy’s forces...[which] requires 

extremely mature and profound judgment, a knowledge of 

the history, politics, and statistics of both warring states, 

and a certain competency regarding basic military 

issues...The goal will ultimately be formulated by the 

politician only after an appropriate exchange of opinions 

with strategists; it must aid strategy, and not make 

strategic decisions difficult.131

Kokoshin quotes Svechin as saying that strategy is one of 

politics’ most important weapons. Politics must consider both the 

calculations of friendly and hostile states capabilities and an assessment 

of the intention of both possible enemies and neutral friendly states. 

Political goals can be formulated as a result of having taken into account 

 

130 Kokoshin.

131 Ibid.
63

all military-strategic circumstances by realistically assessing the 

correlation of forces and means of the sides, the level of military 

leadership of the sides, and quality of operational-strategic command and 

control and intelligence. Svechin is against the emancipation of strategy 

from politics, and he notes that strategy is a continuation, a part of 

politics. Strategy is the “art of an army’s entire higher command 

personnel” and not of some chosen elite. Operational leaders must raise 

their level of thinking to the strategic level as well.132

Kokoshin believes history teaches that the development of 

military strategic issues is perhaps the most difficult problem in military 

art, military affairs, and military science. Developing operations that 

flow toward a goal is difficult to manage, since forward thought must 

evolve under the guidance of a broad ideological outlook. Everyone must 

be familiar with strategy, and it must not be allowed to remain in the 

hands of an elite staff. One cannot study strategy when a command 

position opens. It must be a continual process. The historical past, one’s 

own experiences, and the contemporary evolution of military affairs 

must all be considered continuously over an officer’s career, and not just 

at a war college. He adds that, in regard to the study of a politicalmilitary or military-strategic problem, Svechin’s level of knowledge has 

not been surpassed to date in Russia.133

In the contemporary political situation, Kokoshin notes, 

economics, diplomacy, and information resources are the most important 

components for the employment of military force. The latter’s proper use 

is now being felt at the political-military and military-strategic planning 

levels and even at the operational and tactical levels. Svechin was one of 

the first to note that some tactical actions under certain political 

circumstances can take on a strategic scope. This was an original thought 

for his time. He came out against the idea of “service strategies,” 

however. His understanding was that only the services could perform 

 

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.
64

operational missions, so naval operational art was understood but not 

naval strategy.134

Svechin, Kokoshin notes, believes that in extreme circumstances 

the strategist should “dictate the basic line of behavior for operational art 

and...concentrate in his own hands direct control of it.”

135 Strategy 

pursues goals and tactics and resolves tasks; the essence of strategy is 

associated with perspective in time, while tactics seldom or never have a 

time measurement. Svechin described strategy in many ways. One 

definition that relates to his understanding of operational art follows:

Strategy is the art of combining preparation for war and a 

group of operations to achieve a goal advanced by a war 

for the AF...If operational art must take into account the 

capabilities presented by the front’s rear area, then the 

strategist must take into account the entire rear area—his 

own and the enemy’s, presented by the state, with all its 

political and economic capabilities...The strategist will be 

successful if he correctly assesses the nature of the war as 

dependent on various economic, social, geographic, 

administrative, and technical conditions.136

Earlier, Svechin had defined strategy as the “art of waging war, 

encompassing that part of its issues, the resolution of which depends on 

the nature of the war and the economic, political, geographic, and/or 

supply conditions.”137

Gareev on Frunze and Svechin

General of the Army and Doctor of Military Science Makhmut 

Akhmetovich Gareev, the President of the Academy of Military Science

in Russia, is one of the most important theorists and writers on military 

 

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.
65

thought in Soviet and contemporary times. Among other things, he is 

credited by Russian officers as the mind behind the Soviet concept of the 

operational maneuver group. He has remained as an advisor to several 

Soviet and Russian presidents, to include President Putin, even though he 

is in his 90s. At the parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of 

World War II, Gareev was seated on the reviewing stand between Putin 

and Kazakstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev. If there is a Russian 

theorist whose ideas most closely resemble the strategic thought of the 

now retired US specialist in the Office of Net Assessments, Andrew 

Marshall, it is Gareev.

Gareev first came to the attention of many US analysts in 1985 

when he authored a book on Soviet theorist Mikhail Frunze. In that work 

he noted the following about strategy:

The theory of strategy...investigates the military-strategic 

nature of war, the laws, principles, and methods of armed 

combat on a strategic scale, and elaborates 

recommendations on preparing the nation in military 

terms, the forms and methods of strategic operations, the 

problems of controlling the Armed Forces, the questions 

of considering and utilizing the moral-political and 

economic capabilities of the state in the interests of 

conducting armed combat, and the organization of 

strategic support.138

When referencing the essence and general laws of war and the army, he 

noted that historical materialism studies the relationship of the objective 

and subjective in a war and in military affairs;139 and that the relationship 

of objective and subjective factors expresses the decisions and actions of 

 

138 M. A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze—Voennyy Teoretik (M. V. Frunze: Military Theorist), 

Moscow Military Publishers, 1985, p. 402.

139 Ibid., p. 395.
66

commanders to the specific situation. This, he notes, is a major law of 

military art.140 

Gareev is clearly a supporter and admirer of Svechin’s works. He 

noted in a 1998 article that the latter’s ideas were always keen, novel, 

and original. Gareev noted that in 1922 and 1923 Svechin published A 

History of Military Art; in 1927 Strategy; and in 1927 and 1928 the 

Evolution of Military Art in two volumes. In 1935 he wrote on 

Clausewitz and in 1937 on 20th Century Strategy at the First Stage. Thus 

Svechin wrote much with which to impress Gareev.

Gareev writes that Svechin could foresee the nature of future war, 

understood that there is a close correlation between politics and military 

strategy, and felt that relations among the army, authorities, and society 

were exceptionally important. He was against commissars supervising 

decision-making, which went against the principle of unity of command. 

He produced an atmosphere for creative freedom and new ideas in the 

area of military-scientific thought and stressed the importance of 

objective investigations, estimates, and conclusions based on existing 

reality rather than theory alone. Svechin believed Russia must prepare 

for both local and large-scale wars. He proposed both annihilation 

(offensive) and attrition (gradually wearing down an opponent, which 

Svechin favored) strategies, noting that the two could not be used in 

tandem. He considered himself a follower of Hans Delbruck and not 

Marx, which caused him serious trouble.141

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of V. D. 

Sokolovsky

Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky was a key member of the Soviet 

war command during the Second World War. He was a good planner and 

leader who was trusted by the high command. Sokolovsky became the 

Deputy Minister of Defense in 1949 and Chief of the General Staff in 

 

140 Ibid., p. 148.

141 M. A. Gareev, “Lessons of A. A. Svechin for Our Days,” Military Thought (English 

Edition), Vol. 7, No. 4, 1998, pp. 35-49.
67

1952. He became widely known in the West in 1962 after his book,

Soviet Military Strategy, was published. The book allegedly contained 

hard-to-get detail on Soviet thinking about war in general and nuclear 

war in particular. He attained the rank of Marshall of the Soviet Union.

Sokolovsky makes it clear in Soviet Military Strategy that politics 

guides the use of military strategy. He writes that “the influence of 

politics affects the determination of general and particular strategic aims, 

the general character of state strategy, and the selection of forms and 

methods of conducting war.”142 Political actors also choose the most 

propitious moment when to start a conflict in accordance with strategic 

considerations. It follows that out of political decisions and the 

development of policy military doctrine is created, which expresses the 

views of the state regarding the political evaluation of future war, the 

state’s attitude toward war, the nature of future war, how to prepare the 

country in the economic and moral sense for war, and how to organize 

and prepare the AF with the methods it needs to wage war.143 Doctrine is 

also influenced by a nation’s geography, its economic status, and its 

relations with neighboring states.144 Military strategy is subordinate to 

doctrine. It utilizes this overall policy development and more concretely 

examines the nature of future war, a country’s preparation for war, and 

its organization and methods for conducting warfare.

Sokolovsky notes early in his work that military experience has 

been the prime mover in developing military strategy.145 In addition, 

military strategy includes “theoretical predictions of possible conditions, 

of methods of conducting armed conflict, and the leadership of war in 

the future.”146 Strategy is thus guided by theory and practice and it is also 

closely connected to other social and natural sciences (economics, 

 

142 V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, (English translation by Crane, Russak, 

and Company, Inc.), Third Edition, 1968, p. 16. The translator and analyst for this book 

was Harriet Fast Scott, one of America’s most prominent and respected Soviet analysts. 

143 Ibid., p. 38.

144 Ibid., p. 39.

145 Ibid., p. 5.

146 Ibid., p. 7.
68

politics, scientific and technical factors, cybernetics, etc.). Further, 

Sokolovsky notes that the content of strategy is not constant but rather is 

dependent on a given time, the means available, the nature of future war, 

the methods and means of conducting war, the problems placed before it 

by state policy, and the views of a potential enemy, which again seems to 

echo Gerasimov’s later notation that each conflict has a logic all its 

own.

147 Yet another focus of strategy is examining questions related to 

the preparation of the country for any potential war.

Sokolovsky defines military strategy in the following way:

Military strategy is a system of scientific knowledge 

dealing with the laws of war as an armed conflict in the 

name of definite class interests. Strategy—on the basis of 

military experience, military and political conditions, 

economic and moral potential of the country, new means 

of combat, and the views and potential of the probably 

enemy—studies the conditions and the nature of future 

war, the methods for its preparation and conduct, the 

services of the AF, and the foundations for their strategic 

utilization, as well as foundations for the material and 

technical support and leadership of the war and the AF.148

In Sokolovsky’s opinion, modern strategic means of armed conflict make 

it possible to attain overall victory without the sum of partial successes 

(that is, on the levels of operational art or tactics). The new concept (in 

1968) of strategic deployment is related to the creation of strategic 

formations of the AF that are developed prior to the outbreak of 

hostilities and are designed according to a war plan and to the conditions 

for unleashing it.149

 

147 Ibid., p. 8.

148 Ibid., p. 11.

149 Ibid., p. 14.
69

Sokolovsky defines the study of future war through the eyes of 

military strategy in the following manner:

Military strategy examines the questions of the 

preparation of the AF for war, where the main attention is 

given to the scientific basis of planning, taking into 

account political requirements, economic potential, and 

scientific and technical accomplishments; the 

organization of strategic intelligence; the composition of 

the AF required to solve strategic problems; the 

composition and method of preparation of strategic 

reserves, the accumulation of material reserves, and the 

preparation of the territory as a theater of military 

operations.150

Two interrelated factors to which Sokolovsky paid special 

attention in his book were economics and the moral factor in war. With 

regard to economics, it was stated that economic conditions determine 

the combat methods of the AF, that is, how war is conducted (the 

military’s strategy). Friedrich Engels is quoted: “Armaments, 

composition, organization, tactics, and strategy primarily depend on the 

level of development of industry and the means of communication 

achieved at a given moment.”151 The economy takes strategy into 

consideration as it develops. This tendency could result in spending 

money specifically on strategic weapons or could even result in 

providing the financing to capture strategically important resources or 

entire regions. States’ economies can even be reorganized in the event of

placing war onto a military footing. 

Further, a highly developed moral factor, influenced by a 

successful economy, is a most important factor affecting military 

strategy, since a man’s fighting spirit is thereby enhanced. He has 

something positive to fight for. Even Lenin noted that the moral factor 

 

150 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

151 Ibid., p. 26.
70

has an economic base, since the material and economic conditions of a 

nation engender strong patriotism and the readiness of people for selfsacrifice. That is, high morale can result in the selection of a specific 

strategic option, whereas low morale may result in a different option. In 

the past, low morale in some nations has renounced the use of planned 

offensives. Since war makes contradictions more acute, the morale of an 

army must be constantly monitored during a conflict.152

Renowned Russian Military Theorists: A Look at the Work of N. V. 

Ogarkov

Born in 1917, Ogarkov was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet 

Union in 1977. Between 1977 and 1984 he was Chief of the General 

Staff of the Soviet Union and became known for his extensive writings 

and involvement in several military issues, such as the shootdown of 

Korean Air Lines flight 007 in 1983. He was viewed as a very competent 

and worthy opponent by many in the West. Ogarkov strongly supported 

the concept of the armed forces undergoing a revolution in military 

affairs, and thus advocated transforming them with new technologies.

In his 1982 book, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, 

Ogarkov discussed the basics of dialectical thought. He noted that the 

unity of scientific objectivity and Communist party-mindedness was the 

most important principle of Marxism-Leninism. This requires an 

“organic unity of scientific objectivity and a high-principled assessment 

of these phenomena and processes from the position of the worker 

class.”153 Scientific objectivity, he writes, presupposes any situation as it 

exists in reality, revealing conflictive trends in its development without 

allowing any one-sidedness and subjectivism.154

The closest Ogarkov comes to mentioning strategy in this book is 

when he discusses the development of the art of war and the general 

 

152 Ibid., pp. 33-37.

153 N. V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashchite Otechestva (Always in Readiness 

to Defend the Homeland), Military Publishing House, 1982, p. 20.

154 Ibid.
71

characteristic patterns that have emerged in the recent past (that is, the 

1970s and early 1980s). These patterns are the impact of the scientific 

and technological revolution on the evolution of military affairs, the 

acceleration of the development of equipment and weapons, the increase 

in the importance of strategic weapons, and the complex nature of troop 

control mechanisms.155 Developments take place as a rule by the entire 

aggregate of Marxist-Leninist laws, since each exerts its own 

characteristic. To strengthen a nation’s defense capability, coordination 

must take place between the mobilization deployment capabilities of the 

armed forces and the national economy.156

Ogarkov was more specific about strategy in his 1985 book,

History Teaches Vigilance. He stated that military strategy encompasses 

the “theory and practice of preparing the armed forces for war, and the 

planning and conduct of strategic operations and the war as a whole.”157

Further, military strategy is subordinated to and guided by 

military doctrine. Military doctrine has two aspects, socio-political and 

military–technical. The former includes political objectives and the 

nature of a potential war, and the latter includes questions on 

constructing, equipping, and supporting the armed forces. Political 

objectives must correspond to the state’s military potential and 

capabilities.158 The basic postulates of military strategy help refine 

doctrinal views and directives. 

Ogarkov added the following items related to the development of 

military doctrine. The list serves as good reminder of doctrine’s 

components in the mid-1980s and its relation to strategy is obvious from 

the preceding discussion:

 

155 Ibid., p. 31.

156 Ibid., p. 44.

157 N. V. Ogarkov, Istoriya Uchit Bditelnosti (History Teaches Vigilance), Military 

Publishing House, 1985, p. 40.

158 Ibid., p. 54.
72

1. What is the probability of future war and with 

what enemy will it be necessary to deal?

2. What nature will the war take, which the Soviet 

Union and its armed forces will be required to wage?

3. What are the objectives and tasks which may be 

assigned to the armed forces in anticipation of such a 

war?

4. What armed forces are required in order to achieve 

the established objectives?

5. What military structuring should be achieved and 

how should the army and country be prepared for war?

6. What war methods will be used if war breaks 

out?

159

Ogarkov adds that military strategy derives from the objective 

laws of war revealed by the founders of scientific Communism.160

Marxism-Leninism is the ideological and theoretical base of Soviet 

military doctrine and is based on the laws and postulates of historical and 

dialectical materialism.161 Ogarkov notes that the general law of 

materialist dialectics “is that various articles, phenomena, and processes, 

both in nature and in society, do not exist in isolation, in and of 

themselves.”162 These issues are linked and constantly changing, since 

they are constantly interacting. External factors such as an economic 

system, a state’s capabilities, and the level of development of science 

and technology in a country interact with internal linkages and 

relationships in war such as the correlation of forces of warring parties, 

the technical level of their equipment, and so on, which can lead to the 

success or failure of military operations.163 For example, the increase in 

the size of a nation’s armed forces led to the increasing spatial scope of 

military operations, and resulted in a new form of military actions, the 

operation, defined as an aggregate of battles and engagements, “separate 

 

159 Ibid., p. 40.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., p. 50.

162 Ibid., p. 28.

163 Ibid., p. 29.
73

in time and space, but unified by a single concept.”164 These 

relationships and linkages must be constantly examined to determine the 

main links to success. 

Ogarkov discussed the dialectical process further. He wrote that 

the law of unity and the struggle of opposites is a way to understand 

society’s development, and this includes the phenomena of war and 

military affairs. The struggle of contradictions or opposites provides an 

impulse to the development of new items and the discarding of the 

old.165 Dialectics teaches that the accumulation of quantitative changes 

transforms at a certain stage into qualitative changes.166 Finally, the 

negation of negation helps explain development. One set of equipment 

supplants and negates old equipment.167

The Journal, Military Thought

Military Thought is the professional journal of the Armed Forces 

of Russia. During the time of the Soviet Union, the journal was 

classified, but ever since the dissolution of the USSR it has been 

available by subscription. The following nine articles were published in 

Military Thought from the mid-60s to 2007, with the classified versions 

that were published from the 60s through the 80s becoming available to 

the West in the 1990s. They are examined for their references only to 

strategy, especially as to how the term is defined and used. 

One article in particular is singled out here for its focus on 

strategy, that being the 1984 article by N. N. Kuznetsov. He discussed in 

some detail the various categories and principles of strategy. Military 

strategy, Kuznetsov noted, “encompasses the theory and practice of 

preparing the country and armed forces for war, and planning and 

conducting strategic operations and war as a whole.”168 The categories of 

 

164 Ibid., p. 31.

165 Ibid., p. 32.

166 Ibid., p. 34. 

167 Ibid., p. 35.

168 N. N. Kuznetsov, “On the Categories and Principles of Soviet Military Strategy,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 1984, p. 29.
74

military strategy are formed based on the experience of past wars, 

peacetime military development, and research of the nature and methods 

of preparing for the conduct of contemporary operations. As such, they 

reflect scientific-technical advances and the history of economic and 

military developments. Forming categories is a long process that 

produces an interconnected and orderly system, creating the logical 

structure of strategy’s theory.169

The main categories in the theory of Soviet military strategy are 

warfare, the armed forces, armed struggle, the armed forces’ branches, 

the nature of warfare, strategic offense, forms of strategic operations,

strategic operations, strategic goals, strategic missions, theaters of 

military operations, and strategic deployments. A strategic goal is the 

anticipated result of military operations in a war or operation resulting in 

a fundamental change in the military-political and strategic situation. The 

content depends on the political goals of a state in the war.170

Disorganizing command and control or undermining an enemy state’s 

military-economic potential are two such strategic goals. Strategic 

missions work out in detail specific strategic goals with respect to the 

objects to which the efforts of force groupings are attached, expressed in 

spatial and temporal limits. The content of the missions depends on the 

military-political situation, the nature of the strategic goal, the make-up 

and capabilities of the force groupings of the sides, the resources and 

methods of armed conflict being employed, and the features of the 

theater or region of military operations.171

Principles are the general, scientifically based tenets, rules, and 

recommendations for the activity of the state and higher military 

leadership regarding the preparation of the armed forces and the country 

for war, the organization and conduct of strategic operations, and the 

command and control of forces in peacetime and during war. They are 

 

169 Ibid., p. 30.

170 Ibid., p. 31.

171 Ibid., p. 31-32.
75

developed based on war experiences and the development of the logistics 

base of the sides. They have an objective foundation.172 It was noted that:

Of course, as laws, the principles in and of themselves do 

not conduct or win wars, operations, or battles. People do 

that. Relying on objective laws reflected in the principles, 

they, as it were, coordinate their subjective activities with 

the natural tendencies of the course of military operations 

in a specific situation, and act upon it in the interests of 

achieving victory. Thus, the influence of objective laws is 

not automatic.173

General laws of warfare and laws of armed struggle both utilize 

the COF’s methodology and are manifested in the principles of strategy. 

The general laws of warfare include the specific role of the political 

goals of a war and the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on 

the correlation of economic, social, moral-political, and purely military 

forces of the warring sides. The laws of armed struggle include the 

dependence of the course and outcome of an armed struggle on the 

correlation of combat power of the forces of the opposing sides, the 

inequality of the distribution of forces along the front and in the depth, 

the dependence of forms and methods of operations on weapons, 

equipment, and personnel, and the interdependence of the forms and 

methods of operations being conducted at different levels.174 However, 

the course and outcome of a war does not depend on one’s superior 

strength in regard to the correlation of forces alone to achieve success, 

but also on the skill and creative use of the principles of military art to 

ensure success. Creating superiority in forces and skill at the decisive 

period and moment of an operation are what ensures success.175

 

172 Ibid., p. 32.

173 Ibid., p. 33.

174 Ibid., p. 34.

175 Ibid., p. 33.
76

Strategic goals must correspond to the political goals of a war, 

since politics determine adversaries, force employment and means, time 

and sequences of battles, intensity and duration of strategic operations, 

and end results and postwar tasks. Further, combat power is reliant on 

economic forces, since armaments, logistics, and maintenance levels 

depend on the ability of the state’s financing to produce the required 

levels of production of weaponry and other equipment.176

The principles of these categories are that there is an 

interconnection among them, with a subordination of categories from 

higher to lower (war, struggle, etc.). Similar categories are linked by 

groups (theaters of military operations could be linked by operations, 

axis, regions, etc.) and the theory of military strategy (philosophy, 

scientific categories, operational art, etc.).177 For example, the totality of 

operations and actions in a theater of military operations, coordinated 

and interconnected with respect to goals, locations, and times of strikes, 

and conducted according to a single plan for achieving a strategic goal,

would be a strategic operation on a continental theater of military 

operations.178

Kuznetsov states that military-political forecasting is one of 

strategy’s most important tasks. This is because practical tasks can only 

be correctly determined with the ability to envision the nature of warfare. 

Otherwise it is not possible to prepare the country to repel aggression. 

Associated with the preparation of the country through correct 

forecasting is the formation of the correct moral-political, psychological, 

and combat mentality in the populace. This preparation can serve as an 

indicator of the viability of a nation’s strategic plans, that is, whether the 

population is prepared to fulfill the plan.179

 

176 Ibid., p. 35.

177 Ibid., p. 30.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
77

The other eight articles referencing strategy are summarized here 

in the order in which they appeared in the journal. A short explanation of 

each author’s main view of strategy, either how it is defined or how it is 

used in context, is listed here for quick reference. 

Major General V. Kruchinin, 1963: Strategic goals are based on the 

military-political goals of the regime, whereas strategic missions can 

result in the creation of favorable conditions for the subsequent 

expansion of military activity and execution of subsequent strategic 

missions. Strategic missions can be conducted simultaneously or 

successively to attain strategic goals, while surprise can disorganize an 

opposing force. Strategic reserves can change the correlation of forces 

and means, which allows for the retention of the strategic initiative.180

Major General Kh. Dzhelaukhov, 1964: The concept of “augmentation 

of strategic efforts” means the “the capability of a given state or coalition

of states to increase the strength of its resistance and at any given 

moment of the war to be stronger than the opposing side, skillfully using 

all its resources, all its economic, psychological-political, and military 

potential.”181 Strategic efforts must be able to retain the strategic 

initiative from the beginning, or initial period, of a war. Also of decisive 

importance are economic capabilities and achievements in science and 

technology.182

Marshall of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovskiy and Major General M.

Cherednichenko, 1968: Military strategy has always been understood as 

a component part of military art. Military strategy is placed in a 

subordinate position in relation to policy, completely depends on it, and 

is inseparably linked with the political system. The authors consider 

 

180 V. Kruchinin, “Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and Missions of Armed 

Conflict,” Military Thought, No. 10, 1963, as translated and printed in Selected 

Readings from Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part I, p. 4.

181 Kh. Dzhelaukhov, “Augmentation of Strategic Efforts in Modern Armed Conflict,” 

Military Thought, January 1964, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from 

Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part I, pp. 28-38.

182 Ibid. 
78

strategy now to be a science, and, as such, the study of strategy requires 

contemporary assessments that are dynamic, branches must be grouped 

according to related attributes, processes must be formalized, problems 

must be compared before optimal ones are selected, mathematical 

models must be created, and computer equipment must be used.183

Army General S. Ivanov, 1969: Doctrine is defined as a system of views 

on the state’s military policy, the organization of its armed force, and the 

country’s preparation for successfully waging war in defense of the 

Soviet Union. It is composed of political principles and militarytechnical principles. Soviet military strategy is guided by these doctrinal 

propositions on the character of a possible war and resolves concrete 

tasks. It studies in detail questions on the organization and preparation 

for war, the methods and forms of waging it, and leadership 

responsibilities.184

Lieutenant General I Zav’yalov, 1971: New weapons are accompanied 

by the “birth of a new military art, new tactics, new operational art, and 

new strategy, unlike anything created in past wars.”185 Nuclear weapons, 

in Zav’yalov’s opinion, have changed the traditional interrelationship 

among strategy, operational art, and tactics and given each of them more 

independence. This is the objective aspect of the correlation. Further, 

behind each weapon stands man, who determines a weapon’s utilization 

and method of operation, the subjective factor, which increases 

“immeasurably under the conditions of nuclear warfare.”186

 

183 V. Sokolovskiy and M. Cherednichenko, “Military Strategy and its Problems,” 

Military Thought, No. 10, 1968, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from 

Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 3-17.

184 S. Ivanov, “Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy,” Military Thought, No. 5, 1968, 

as translated and printed in Selected Readings from Military Thought (in English), 

Volume 5, Part II, p. 18.

185 I. Zav’yalov, “Evolution in the Correlation of Strategy, Operational Art, and 

Tactics,” Military Thought, No. 11, 1971, as translated and printed in Selected Readings 

from Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part II, p. 121.

186 Ibid. 
79

Colonel General V. V. Korobushin, 1990: Military strategy must 

establish possible causes and scenarios for the initiation of wars, their 

periodization, dynamics of the intensity of military operations by phases 

of their conduct, points of greatest crisis, conditions and procedures for 

transition to limited or unlimited use of nuclear weapons, and possible 

preemptive measures to keep a conventional war from developing into a 

nuclear war. If attacked, military strategy “continues to be faced with the 

task of studying, substantiating, and considering the patterns and 

strategic nature of a possible war and determining methods of its 

conduct.”187

Colonel A. A. Paderin, 2006: The interdependence between policy and 

military strategy must be realized in practice. Russia needs to build a 

weighted military strategy. The age in which we live has weapons and 

equipment that are real political instruments, making the use of military 

power more multi-optional and requiring the development of new 

military-political and strategic concepts. Politicians need to handle 

military development issues that consider objective military laws and 

present-day military strategy requirements.

188

Major General A. I. Malyshev, 2007: Military strategy is a component of 

Russian military art. It combines theoretical (nature, forms, and methods 

of modern operations and wars and their prevention) and practical 

(leadership preparation of the country for defense and their direction)

factors. War is the main subject of military strategy. War’s content can 

be determined by a combination of many forms of warfare (economic, 

political-ideological, informational, etc.).189

 

187 V. V. Korobushin, “Some Pressing Problems of Military Strategy,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 12, 1990, pp. 27-33.

188 A. A. Paderin, “Policy and Military Strategy: A Unity Lesson,” Military Thought, 

No. 2 2006.

189 A. I. Malyshev, “Military Strategy of the Russian Federation in the Early 21st

Century,” Military Thought (English Edition), No. 3 2007, p. 55.
80

Major General (retired) Aleksandr V. Rogovoy

In April 2015, in a Letort Paper for the US Army War College’s 

Strategic Studies Institute, Rogovoy noted that, in order to ensure 

military security and guard against threats, it is important to determine 

the nature of dangers and threats to national interests.190 This becomes 

“the defining factor for the planning of organizational development of 

the military with military security in mind.”191 The main strategic task of 

the military was listed as being able to deter potential aggressors from 

waging war against Russia and its allies.192 This requires a strategic 

balance of forces.193

Rogovoy stated that the temporal parameters of warfare are 

compressed and that the initial period of war will be the main and 

decisive one. Military-political objectives are achieved with lightning 

speed as the initiative is won.194 Russian actions in Crimea would 

certainly fit this concept.

Conclusions 

From a Russian perspective, strategy, the highest component of 

military art, is about preparing, planning, and achieving political and 

military goals through the employment of forces and resources. The 

planning and preparing comes about through the integration of a number 

of topics, to include official definitions, Marxist-Leninist thought, the 

historical experience of strategic planners (Svechin, Sokolovsky, etc.), 

and topics that support planning, especially foresight and COF 

calculations. The latter two cannot be emphasized enough.

 

190 Military security was defined as “where society, the state, and its citizens are secure 

against external and internal threats associated with the use of military force or the 

threat of its use.” A threat is “a set of conditions and factors that endanger the vital 

interests of the individual, society, and state.” See Aleksandr V. Rogovoy, 

“Development Prospects for Land Forces,” in A Russian View on Landpower, The 

Letort Papers, April 2015, p. 17.

191 Ibid., p. 23.

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid., p. 26.

194 Ibid., p. 33.
81

It is through the use of these methods that strategy is planned and 

executed. Strategy is revised, as needed, to reflect continuous changes in 

the socio-political, economic, and military context and to adapt to 

changes in the balance of power in the world. The scope, intensity, 

duration, and objectives of military operations are considered. The study, 

consideration, and substantiation of military patterns and future war 

scenarios is an ongoing process, as Svechin noted on several occasions.

Creative strategy can be expressed as subjective thought applied 

to a commander’s objective situation. The strategist of this type uses 

Marxism. Located within strategy’s concept, most likely in the methods 

and forms of fighting, would be where one would expect to find 

deception activities, to include the use of reflexive control concepts. (See 

Chapter Three for a discussion of reflexive control)

When constructing strategy against a potential adversary, the 

latter’s “political, economic, scientific and technical, military, 

ideological, demographic, psychological, geographic and other factors” 

are considered as part of the correlation of forces in order “to uncover 

intentions, plans, capabilities, concepts, and methods.”195 Strategy 

requires a continuous reassessment of the capabilities of potential 

adversaries and results in updated modeling of the correlation of forces 

between nations. To a degree, this is similar to the assessment of 

comprehensive national power among nations that the Chinese military 

makes. 

Russian analysts indicate that events in Ukraine will result in a 

new National Security Strategy and the nation’s military doctrine will 

have new appendixes added to it. In effect the Russian leadership has, 

through its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, resurrected an old 

adversary, NATO, against which they will use their newly developed 

strategy that uses nonmilitary methods in conjunction with military ones.

 

195 Sokolovskiy and Cheredinichenko, pp. 7-15.
82

Russia’s military leadership appears particularly attuned to 

confronting the so-called “color revolutions,” with which Ukraine is 

associated due to the past Orange Revolution that occurred there. 

Retired General of the Army Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that color 

revolutions include total information warfare that is “accompanied by 

other political and economic influence measures.”196 The goal of a color 

revolution, as stated by an unnamed source within the Russian Security 

Council, is to sweep away legitimate regimes through controlled 

chaos.197

Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov noted that 

“wars are now not even declared, but having begun, are not going 

according to a pattern we are accustomed to.”198 He added that the rules 

of war have changed, since non-military methods are now used to 

achieve political and strategic goals. If we look at Russia’s reacquisition 

of Crimea, who appears to understand these new rules better than the 

Russian military? Perhaps more importantly, Gerasimov stated that 

remote noncontact influence on an enemy is becoming the main method 

of achieving goals, where differences among strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels of war as well as differences between offense and defense 

are fading away. 

Gerasimov added that scientific investigation is not worth much 

if military theory does not provide for the function of foresight. It will be 

interesting to see how other nations will come to understand Russia’s 

new view of reality and how they will plan to confront Russia’s concept 

of strategy and its foresight and COF techniques. 

 

196 Vladimir Mukhin, “Moscow Adjusts Military Doctrine. Events in Ukraine Are 

Making Russia Amend Documents Defining National Security Strategy,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta Online (Independent News Online), 1 August 2014.

197 Ibid.

198 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February, 2013.
83

CHAPTER THREE: THINKING LIKE A RUSSIAN OFFICER

Introduction

During the past three or four years Western analysts have tried to 

decipher Russian military actions and find a term to describe them. Two 

concepts in particular have dominated these discussions. The first is the 

issue of hybrid operations. Western analysts have not only labeled 

Russian actions as hybrid but also state that this is the wording Russia’s 

military uses to describe their operations.199 However, until the end of 

2015 at least, Russian military officers refuted their use of hybrid 

operations. Instead they state that it is the West who is using hybrid 

operations against Russia. Second, after 2013 the West added another 

descriptor to their assessment of Russian military actions, labeling 

Russia’s operations to be examples of new-generation wars (NGW). As 

opposed to the hybrid label, for which there was no hard evidence, the 

NGW label is based on wording used by Russian military authors to 

describe future methods of conducting warfare. In 2013 Russian military 

officers on several occasions referred to NGW, with two authors in 

particular using the term as the title of their joint article. However, ever 

since 2013, the Russian military has gone silent on the topic of NGW. 

Meanwhile, Russian military journals continue to stress elements 

of their traditional approach to plan and conduct military operations used

since Soviet times. These aspects of Russian thought are seldom 

discussed in the West at the present time, relying instead on the more 

topical hybrid and NGW concepts. There appear to be five:

1. Forecasting future events

2. Developing the correlation of forces between/among 

the sides

3. Pointing out developing trends in warfare

 

199 See, for example, Dovydas Pancerovas, “Russia’s Sixth Column in Lithuania is a 

Sign Russia is Already Conducting Hybrid War in Our Country, Too,” 15min.lt, 23 

September 2014.
84

4. Developing the organizational forms of contemporary 

warfare

5. Highlighting the weapons and principles used as 

methods in contemporary war

Russian analysis begins with forecasts of the potential shape of 

future war, followed by a correlation of forces (COF) analysis based on 

numbers (quantifying advantages), technologies (quality advantages in 

weaponry), and other factors present in a given geopolitical setting 

(diplomacy, economics, etc.). Forecasts and COF assessments, for 

example, were made of the Arctic. The analysis must have been 

favorable, since it appears to have emboldened the Russian military to 

militarize the Arctic. Other important items that planners appear to 

consider in their preparation of future battlefields are contemporary 

trends (for example, Gerasimov points out that nonmilitary trends are 

used more often than military ones today) along with the more traditional 

forms and methods of warfare that are almost obligatory to mention 

when discussing warfare. However, since forecasts and COF issues were 

discussed in Chapter Two they will not be dealt with in detail here but 

just shortly mentioned and described. The discussion will focus on the 

three other concepts Russian writers utilize: trends, forms, and methods 

of warfare. Perhaps a risk analysis is also performed based on windows 

of opportunity. Westerners may be ignoring these factors at their peril 

due to their focus on hybrid and NGW concepts. 

The discussion below first shortly examines Russia’s response to 

Western accusations that the Russian military uses hybrid thought. That 

is followed first by a discussion of NGW and then by a discussion of the 

three elements of traditional Russian thought not covered in Chapter 

Two: trends, forms, and methods of conducting operations. This is 

followed by the way in which Russia has applied nonmilitary, indirect, 

asymmetric, strategic and cross-domain deterrence, and reflexive control 

thinking to its so-called “objective reality” and how it attempts to 

manipulate the reality of others. To put Russian actions in perspective, a 

combination of all of these vectors helps one’s overall understanding. 

None should be discarded but they need to be understood in context.
85

Hybrid Thought

In 2014 and 2015 many Westerners increasingly referred to 

Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a hybrid war that included the use 

of hard and soft tactics to achieve the goals of Russian President 

Vladimir Putin and the military. However, Russia’s military makes the 

opposite assertion, that the West is using hybrid tactics against Russia. 

For example, with regard to hybrid war, a Military Thought article in 

2015 by two Russian authors stated the following: 

‘Hybrid warfare (gibridnaya voyna),’ then, is not exactly 

the right term and is slightly at odds with the glossary 

used in this country’s military science. Essentially, these 

actions can be regarded as a form of confrontation 

between countries or, in a narrow sense, as a form in 

which forces and capabilities are used to assure national 

security.200

In April 2015 Putin aide Sergey Glazyev noted that “the global

hybrid war that is being rolled out by the USA is conducted with the 

extensive use of projects developed as part of the new technological 

order, and is at the same time the catalyst for the emergence of this new 

order in the US economy.”201 The new technological order includes 

information and communication technologies, high-precision robotic 

weapons, and cognitive technologies, turning the mass media into a 

psychotropic weapon of mass destruction of the minds of the ruling elite 

and the population.202

There have been very few references to hybrid war by Russian 

officers, and, when used, they refer to the term as a Western concept, not 

a Russian one. For example, in February 2015 journalist Vladimir 

 

200 V. B. Andrianov and V. V. Loyko, “Questions Regarding the Use of the Armed 

Forces of the Russian Federation in Crisis Situations in Peacetime,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 1 2015, p. 68.

201 RIA Novosti, 8 April 2015.

202 Ibid.
86

Mukhin noted that, for the first time in the history of the crisis in 

Ukraine, an active-duty commander of the Russian Army acknowledged 

that hybrid-warfare technology was employed a year ago in Crimea. 

Lieutenant-General Oleg Makarevich stated that “It is no secret that the 

Americans are now carefully studying our experience of operations from 

February through July 2014, when our troops accomplished the mission 

in Crimea, which subsequently came to be called a new hybrid war, 

without a shot being fired.”203 The statement “which came to be called a 

new hybrid war” is not necessarily a confession that the Russians call it 

that, just that it “came to be called” hybrid—a distinctly Western term. 

Today, Russia’s military does not mention that is uses hybrid 

operations, although civilian military analysts (and a few military 

authors) state that other nations accuse Russia of hybrid operations or 

techniques. The concept is mentioned obliquely. For example, in January 

2015 Russian officers at Western Military District Headquarters 

discussed hybrid operations as being a military strategy merging 

conventional, low-intensity, and cyber war. These experts lumped 

information operations, psychological actions, and cyber-attacks, which 

are targeted at citizens and a state’s structural technological components, 

as one of the main forms of the conduct of hybrid warfare. These officers 

did not state that Russia used hybrid operations, rather they just said 

what they thought other nations meant by it.204 Instead, other options are 

offered to describe Russian military actions.

If you template your own thought process, such as hybrid 

thought, onto another nations, you might totally miss their key 

assessment and decision-making criteria, follow a wrong path, or make 

unforced errors. Thinking your opponent is using your thought process is 

mirror-imaging. 

 

203 Vladimir Mukhin, “Crimea Was Taken as Part of Hybrid Warfare. Russian Military 

Science Continues to Nonplus Western Experts,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online

(Independent News Online), 13 February 2015.

204 Aleksandr Pinchuk, “In Order to Win in a Hybrid War,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online

(Red Star Online), 23 January 2015.
87

New-Generation War

In 2013 several articles appeared that mentioned the NGW 

concept. A full explanation of the concept was first provided in a 2013 

article titled, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War.” The 

authors, S. A. Chekinov and S. G. Bogdanov, who had earlier discussed 

indirect and asymmetric operations in detail, described the “way” in 

which a future war might be fought.205 In many respects this article 

represented a summary of earlier articles they had written. Initially 

Chekinov and Bogdanov described NGW (which they first mentioned in 

a 2012 article) as based on nonmilitary options, mobile joint forces, and 

new information technologies, more along the lines of the nature of war 

discussions that had preceded their article. NGWs were forecasted to 

radically alter the character and content of armed struggle in the 

following manner: 

Intensive fire strikes against seats of national and military 

power, and also military and industrial objectives by all 

arms of the service, and employment of military spacebased systems, electronic warfare forces and weapons, 

electromagnetic, information, infrasound, and 

psychotronic effects, corrosive chemical and biological 

formulations in new-generation wars will erode, to the 

greatest extent possible, the capabilities of the adversary’s 

troops and civilian population to resist. It is also expected 

that nontraditional forms of armed struggle will be used to 

cause earthquakes, typhoons, and heavy rainfall lasting 

for a time long enough to damage the economy and 

aggravate the socio-psychological climate in the warring 

countries.206

 

205 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New–Generation 

War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2013, pp. 13-25.

206 Ibid., p. 16.
88

A further comment was that new forms and methods of 

employing joint forces in operations and engagements would evolve.207 

The authors then stated that they would venture their own viewpoints on 

the character and content of a NGW. They began by noting that a NGW 

would be dominated by information and psychological warfare and that 

asymmetric actions would be used extensively (in the form of indirect 

actions and nonmilitary measures). Nonmilitary measures would reduce 

the chances for an aggressor to engage in hostile activities, provide an 

unflattering public opinion image of the enemy, and offer friendly forces 

the chance to make sensational denunciations of an opponent’s 

aggressive plans. Of vital importance is that NGWs would be fought “by 

the rules and customs of the side that is best prepared to put the recent 

breakthroughs in warfare economics and technologies to a practical 

test.”208 Thus, the most economically advanced countries will try to 

prevent a potential adversary from achieving superiority in warfare 

technologies. 

Next, the authors described how a future war would be 

conducted. In several instances US or Western armies were said to use 

the techniques under discussion. Of interest is that in the past, during the 

days of the Soviet Union, Soviet officers described techniques 

supposedly used in Western armies to fight wars that, in actuality, were 

descriptions of how the Soviets might or would fight. These examples 

were contained in the journal, Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Foreign 

Military Review). Thus if this methodology has carried over to Russian 

times, then the description of Western techniques below could be a way 

to openly describe to Russian officers how to fight a future war without 

stating so. Whether this same template is used is unknown.

First, the aggressive side would use nonmilitary actions as it 

plans to attack its victim in a NGW. This would be a distributed attack 

designed to strike at a country’s social system with the aim of promoting 

democracy and respect for human rights. Enemy plans would include a 

 

207 Ibid., p. 17.

208 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
89

disinformation campaign to conceal the commencement date and scale of 

operations. This could include measures carried out through diplomatic 

channels and private media, while high-ranking political and military 

officers make public statements for greater disinformation effect. This 

requires the attainment of information superiority as well.209

Second, decisive battles will rage in the information environment, 

where the attacker manipulates the “intelligent machines” at a distance. 

A quantum computer may turn into a tool of destruction in this sense, as 

new-generation “blitz” wars will be created, operating in the nanosecond 

range. Speed, synchronization, and concurrency will decide success or 

failure. These attacks will be set up by information, moral, 

psychological, ideological, and other measures months earlier.210 In an 

eerie reference to what would happen in a year’s time in Eastern 

Ukraine, it was noted that

Heavy propaganda is designed to spark discontent among 

the defender’s population and armed forces personnel at 

the current government agencies’ activities. The 

propagandists expect to depress the moral and 

psychological feelings of the civilian population and 

armed forces personnel to a level where they give up 

resistance and the civil administration and military control 

systems are unbalanced.211

Third, the aggressor may use nonlethal, new-generation, 

genetically engineered biological weapons that affect the human psyche 

and moods, which intensify propaganda effects and thereby help to drag 

the target country into chaos. Undercover agents are planted to 

encourage discontent and unlawful acts, as well as to stoke up chaos, 

panic, and disobedience among the population.212 (Russian authors 

 

209 Ibid., p. 19.

210 Ibid., p. 20.

211 Ibid., p. 20.

212 Ibid., 21.
90

appear to fear this happening inside their country. They write often on 

the fear of so-called “color revolutions” occurring.)

Fourth, the start of the military phase will be preceded by largescale reconnaissance and subversive missions conducted under the guise 

of information operations. These operations will be used to target 

important objectives vital to the country’s sustainability.213 Fifth, the 

attack will probably begin with an aerospace operation lasting several 

days. The goal will be to damage an opponent’s key military and 

industrial capabilities, communication hubs, and military control centers. 

A subordinate mission will be to disorganize the defender’s air force and 

air defense system.214

Sixth, the defender must anticipate an attack by military robots in 

conjunction with the aerospace attack. This implies the extended use of 

UAVs first of all, as well as robot-controlled systems capable of 

engaging in combat activities independently. Robots will be used to 

collect intelligence and reconnaissance data. It seems that ground forces 

will only be deployed after political and military goals are achieved.215

Seventh, the authors relate that the opening period of a NGW will 

be pivotal, breaking it down into several phases, to include targeted 

information operations, electronic warfare operations, aerospace 

operations, and the use of precision weaponry, long-range artillery, and 

weapons based on new physical principles. In the closing period of war 

attackers will roll over any remaining points of resistance and destroy 

surviving enemy units with special operations.216

In conclusion, the authors noted that every kind of power 

containment method, especially nonmilitary ones, must be used to 

persuade an opponent that the cost of his attack will be higher than 

 

213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid., 22.

216 Ibid., 23.
91

expected. A demonstration of Russian readiness and a strongly worded 

statement can be used for the preparation of an information operation to 

mislead the enemy about Russia’s readiness to fight aggression. More 

importantly, the authors concluded by stating that “a country preaching a 

defensive doctrine may get the short end of the deal in the face of a 

surprise attack by an aggressor.”217 Information superiority and 

anticipatory operations will be the main ingredients for success in 

NGWs.218

Forecasting, COF, Forms, Methods, and Trends

What terms DO appear in Russian discussions of armed conflict 

are forecasting, correlation of forces, and, most often of all, the “forms 

and methods” of warfare. These items have been discussed since the 

1960s (or earlier) and represent continuity in Russian military thought 

into which new terms such as NGW are brought. 

Forecasting, if one refers back to a Soviet view from 1975, is 

defined in the following manner:

The study of the military-political situation, the pattern of 

war in the future, the prospects of developing strategy, 

operational art, and tactics, the qualitative and 

quantitative composition of the means of armed conflict 

(one’s own and the enemy’s), the prospects for the 

development of the potential of the war economy in the 

future, and also the forecasting of the enemy’s strategic 

and tactical plans.219

With regard to types of forecasting, nine different types were listed. 

Numbers 1-3 below represent the overall political situation, numbers 4-7 

 

217 Ibid., p. 23.

218 Ibid.

219 Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, Moscow 

1975, translated into English by the DGIS Multilingual Section, Secretary of State, 

Ottawa Canada, p. 14.
92

are elements of friendly forecasting, number 8 is the enemy situation and 

takes into account the same four elements (4-7) of the friendly situation 

but from an adversarial perspective, and number 9 represents the 

combination of an assessment of friendly and enemy considerations:

1. Forecasting the political situation

2. Economic forecasting

3. Forecasting the development of science and 

technology

4. Military-strategic forecasting

5. Operational-tactical forecasting

6. Military-economic forecasting

7. Military-technical forecasting

8. Forecasting the enemy’s situation (which appears to 

take into account all of the above factors from the 

adversary’s point of view)

9. Military forecasting220

The COF, according to the Soviet military encyclopedia, is an 

“objective indicator of the combat power of opposing forces, which 

makes it possible to determine the degree of superiority of one force over 

the other.”221 It is determined by comparing quantitative and qualitative 

assessment of all units and armaments, calculated on all levels of 

military art throughout an area of operation. It is done so with tables and 

computers to speed calculations.222 Some Russian analysts add the 

necessity of including a correlation of intellectual capabilities of 

opposing commanders to the assessment,

223 while others, such as 

General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, are now calling for assessments 

 

220 Ibid., p. 18.

221 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 691.

222 Ibid.

223 See, for example, the work of Ryabchuk in Chapter Two on the topic.
93

of the correlation between the correct use of direct and indirect 

operations.224

With regard to the next element of thought, forms and methods of 

operation, Chekinov and Bogdanov are among numerous authors (to 

include Gerasimov) who clearly state that new “forms and methods” of 

employing joint forces in operations and engagements must evolve. 

Gerasimov has charged the Academy of Military Science, among others,

with developing them and, in his well-known 2013 speech that was 

printed in VPK, he mentioned “forms and methods” 11 times (without 

mentioning hybrid or new-generation war). These two issues, along with 

evolving trends in warfare, appear to be equally as important as 

forecasting and COF elements of Russian military thought when 

planning operations. 

The Soviet military encyclopedia notes that forms of military 

operations are those employed in conformity with the scope or scale of 

combat. They include combat arms capabilities, the objectives of 

military operations, and the nature of assigned missions, to include 

operations, battles, and engagements.225 A 2008 Military Thought article 

noted that the form of military actions represented “goal-oriented, 

organization, spatial, temporal, and quantitative confines for armed 

forces employment.” More importantly, the form of military actions was 

defined as the “organizational side of troop actions, combining most 

important characteristics of actions: goals and tasks, the makeup of

engaged forces and specifics of their command and control under given 

conditions, structure of actions, their scale in time and in space.”226 The 

 

224 M.A. Gareev, “Lessons and Conclusions Drawn From the Experience of the Great 

Patriotic War for Building Up and Training the Armed Forces,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 5 2010, p. 20.

225 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 782.

226 See Eastview publication Military Thought (English editions), Number 3, 2008, pp. 

149-153, for O. V. Korol and N. L. Romas’s article, “Form of Military (Combat) 

Actions: on the Meaning of the Category.”
94

organizational side of troop actions is a good way to remember what is 

meant by forms.

Methods include the aggregate of forms, modern techniques, and 

procedures employed in a specific logical sequence to achieve effective 

solutions to problems of military science.227 A 2010 Military Thought

article, for example, noted that methods differ from one another due to 

the nature of the actions, the forces employed, and the set of typecast 

rules. However, armaments (weapons) and the principles of military art 

have the greatest impact on methods. The nature of methods “consists 

not so much in the quantitative-qualitative characteristics of weapons as 

in the art of their employment.” For example, the “art of their 

employment” can include principles such as concentrating efforts on 

main sectors, coordinating troop efforts and interactions, ways of troop 

control and maneuvering forces and equipment, and manners of creating 

and using reserves.228

With regard to armaments or weapons, consider aerospace 

methods. They are determined by a weapon’s purpose, the number of 

units present, range, height of action, mobility, and so on. Principles of 

military art are determined by the original state of the troops, the nature 

of response to the threat, time of actions, and so on. Each property of a 

military principle can have several alternative methods. For example, 

with regard to time, methods could be either simultaneous or 

consecutive.229 The development of weaponry and the use of the 

principles of military art are thus good indicators for remembering what 

is meant by methods. Within these two somewhat benign-sounding terms 

of forms and methods are found the employment of specific issues, such 

as the manner in which disinformation, the principles of war, the use of 

cunning, and other military actions can be found. When possible, these 

two concepts should be analyzed closely.

 

227 Ogarkov, p. 440.

228 M. G. Valeyev and N. L. Romas, “The Methodological Basis for Choosing the 

Methods of Military Activity,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2010, pp. 3-

10.

229 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
95

In 2013 retired Lieutenant General V. A. Vinogradov discussed 

the trends in the conduct of operations in a major war. He regards trends 

as the hallmark of future operations. In his estimation trends are: the 

growing role of the first electronic and fire strike; the side’s resolve in 

achieving the goals of an operation; the dynamic and maneuverable style 

of combat; the role given to effective strikes using new-generation 

weapons and systems; the seizure and holding of the initiative; the 

changes in the situation caused by mobile troops and efficiency of fire; 

the spread of simultaneous combat operations; and the role of protection. 

Other important trends include the use of surprise, resolve, and the 

offense as well as the employment of specific weapons that can cause 

changes in the situation. While conventional forces are currently used to 

route the enemy consecutively, it will not be long before new weapons 

will allow the simultaneous route of an enemy from front to rear. A 

primary trend is that it remains vital to gain and hold the initiative.230

Western analysts need to continue to focus on Russia’s traditional 

ways of uncovering the evolving forms and methods of conflict. 

Simultaneously they can study and make decisions as to whether the use 

of more interesting Western terms, such as hybrid or gray zone activities, 

actually apply to Russian thought. A continued focus on traditional ways 

of thought will help analysts avoid missing the essence of Russian 

military thought as it relates to geopolitics and Russia’s view of 

objective reality; and avoid missing how forecasts and COF assessments 

are made and when and how Russia may be applying them. The terms 

are ingrained in military thinking and are descriptive of the way Russian 

officers think and come to view the evolving trends of war. 

Russia’s Indirect/Asymmetric Template

Putin has made three important declarations. First, he has let 

nations know that Russians living in former Soviet lands are considered, 

 

230 V. A. Vinogradov, “Trends in the Character and Methods for Conducting a Major 

War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2013, pp. 25-29.
96

from his point of view, to be ruled by the laws of Russia, not the 

countries in which they now reside. Second, he has informed the West 

that he is tired of being humiliated and treated as a second-class nation 

and intends to rectify the situation. Finally, he has made it clear that 

former Soviet states were taken from the USSR illegally and must be 

returned. He does not believe Russia has the strength to make these 

changes directly, so he has relied instead on nonmilitary actions when 

possible, even if that means using surrogates and misleading his 

domestic audience as to what actions the Russian military is taking.

Further, this reliance on indirect and asymmetric operations has been a 

continuous theme of Russian military thought over the past decade, as 

the following analysis demonstrates.

In 2005 Colonel P. A. Dulnev and Colonel (retired) E. A. 

Bryuzgin, writing in the authoritative Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), stated that in the past two 

decades several factors had become apparent in warfare. Of importance 

was that wars are now asymmetrical, that is, fought by adversaries with 

different technologies and different stages of development of their armed 

forces in terms of weapons, forms, and methods of fighting.231 Another 

article stated that the development of an asymmetric approach requires a 

thorough study of the vulnerabilities of a target, its “robustness.” The 

identification of vulnerabilities often requires the identification of key 

assets or the use of sophisticated intelligence efforts to obtain such 

information. For example, a main goal in any future war scenario 

remains the elimination of an opponent’s satellite system, from which 

much intelligence is gathered. This might require the determination of 

the vulnerabilities of a group of objectives united by a common 

operating algorithm.232 Thus, it is clear that the development of an 

asymmetric set of options is not an easy chore. It requires research, 

 

231 P. A. Dulnev and E. A. Bryuzgin, “The Probable Character of Future Warfare,”

Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2,

2005, pp. 126-127.

232 Mikhail Mikhaylovich Rastopshin, “In the Labyrinth of Asymmetric Responses,” 

Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 17, 1 June 2007, 

p. 6, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17 March 2010.
97

intelligence, and development of ways to take advantage of threat 

vulnerabilities.

In 2008 retired General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, the 

President of the Academy of Military Science, stated that Russia must 

confront threats with flexible and asymmetric measures united by a 

common goal and concept of actions. To achieve this goal Gareev 

introduced the concept of strategic deterrence. He defined this 

asymmetric approach as part of a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, 

information, economic, military, and other measures that deter, reduce, 

or avert threats and aggressive actions by any state or coalition of states 

with threats of unacceptable consequences as a result of retaliatory 

actions.233 He offered two other areas of focus that could be termed 

asymmetrical. First, Russia’s main effort will not be directed at the 

destruction of every weapon but rather at the destruction of their unified 

information space, sources of intelligence, navigation and guidance 

systems, and communications and command and control systems. 

Second, only peaceful development will enable Russia to achieve its 

main goal of the country’s “economic, nanotechnological, and 

sociopolitical modernization.”234

With regard to indirect actions, Gareev discussed their 

importance in this 2010 article in Military Thought: 

It is also obvious to everyone that in current conditions, 

the methods of waging armed conflicts are changing 

significantly. Above all, this concerns the correlation of 

direct and indirect actions in strategy. The indirect

actions, which are tied to political, economic, and 

psychological influences on the enemy and to methods of 

feeding him disinformation and destroying him from 

 

233 M. A. Gareev, “Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

(Red Star), No. 183, 8 October 2008, p. 8, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17 

March, 2010.

234 Ibid.
98

within, have always played a big role...in current 

conditions, when nuclear weapons limit strategic goals, 

the role of the above mentioned indirect actions becomes 

significantly greater. We are talking about a greater 

flexibility in military art...including nonmilitary and 

nontraditional ones.235

A year after Gareev’s article, S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov 

discussed the indirect approach in the same journal. They stated that the 

re-division of territory and markets is now being achieved through the 

indirect approach and the employment of nonmilitary means. The 

indirect approach strategy uses various forms and methods of indirect 

military and nonmilitary actions and means, to include information, 

noncontact confrontation, electronic, fire-based, land-sea, and aerospace 

attacks. Nonmilitary means include political, legal, economic standards, 

spiritual values, general-purpose information, and technological systems 

used by the state to influence internal and external relations. These 

means sap an aggressor’s hostile potential, provide a negative image in 

the aggressor’s social media, and help broadcast sensational revelations 

about an aggressor’s plans. States that cannot secure their information 

security risk losing their political sovereignty, economic independence, 

and cannot aspire to be even regional leaders. This may require studying 

more closely the foreign experience in information operations. The US 

conducts its nonmilitary operations, the authors noted, through the 

concealment of its real goals under the cover of the “promotion of 

democracy” or “combatting terrorism.”236

Chekinov and Bogdanov make a reference in their article to the 

Russian concept of reflexive control without referring to it directly. They 

noted that metaprogramming involved 

 

235 M.A. Gareev: “Lessons and Conclusions Drawn From the Experience of the Great 

Patriotic War for Building Up and Training the Armed Forces,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 5 2010, p. 20.

236 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 

Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, pp. 3-13.
99

Installing program filters that force the client to perceive 

the world in a way desired by the programmers. The 

individual, social institution, corporation, or state 

subjected to metaprogramming can be safely left to their 

own devices as long as the ‘route’ they follow is adjusted 

operationally and tactically.237

The authors note that such “methodologies of psychologically 

manipulating and affecting the individual, social institutions, 

corporations, or states” were supervised and implemented by the US. 

Examples included the latter’s use of “color” revolutions.238

Chekinov and Bogdanov’s discussion of what they perceive as 

the US’s indirect actions (and what they fear) did not end here. They 

added that the US’s High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program 

(HAARP) can be used to manipulate the weather and cause earthquakes, 

tsunamis, floods, tornados, and droughts. Thus nonmilitary or indirect 

means can find many sources of inspiration. It is thus expedient, the 

authors conclude, to “map out and eventually also implement a strategy 

of the indirect approach as its state strategy without an alternative.”239

Also in 2010, the same two Russian analysts noted that Putin had 

stated “our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They 

will be asymmetrical, and less costly.”240 Asymmetrical approaches 

feature a combination of forms and methods of using forces and means 

to exploit areas where adversaries have an unequal combat potential as 

compared to Russia. The use of such means allows for the avoidance of a 

direct confrontation.241 In Ukraine there most certainly was an unequal 

combat potential between Ukrainian and Russian forces in Crimea.

 

237 Ibid.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetrical Actions to Ensure Russia’s 

Military Security,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, p. 21.

241 Ibid.
100

Further, the terms “asymmetrical approach” or “asymmetrical 

actions” are close in substance to the concepts of indirect actions and 

indirect action strategy, according to the authors.242 Thus this trend in 

viewing contemporary conflicts as winnable through indirect or 

asymmetric actions instead of direct confrontation appears to continue 

unabated today. It has a history.

In early 2015, in the Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science

of Russia, General-Lieutenant A. V. Kartapalov, then the Chief of the 

Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of Russia (in late 2015 

he was named as the head of the Western Military District), wrote a 

lengthy article on the recent lessons of military conflicts and what they 

had taught Russia. The article examines changes in the nature of armed 

struggle and what is described as “new warfare” or “war of a new type.” 

He also describes what he terms as the U.S. methodology for conducting 

warfare, using Libya and Iraq as examples (from a Western point of 

view, Kartapalov’s description of U.S. methodology for conducting 

conflict fits precisely with the manner in which Russia executed its 

actions in Ukraine).

243

He begins by noting that aggressor states, such as the U.S., 

pressure victim states with various measures in order to increase 

America’s volume of natural resources and thereby enable it to stay at 

the top of the world as an economic power. The U.S. uses direct and 

indirect actions to do so, he adds, and presents a specific scenario for this 

process, which proceeds as follows: Initially a victim state is chosen and 

irrefutable proof is provided of a threat in that state. An information 

campaign is developed that shows there is no alternative to the use of 

force, and later sanctions are introduced. Coalitions are formed, political 

 

242 Ibid., p. 19. For an earlier discussion of indirect operations, see I. N. Vorobyov and 

V. A. Kiselev, “Indirect Action Strategy in its New Form,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 9 2006, pp. 2-5.

243 A. V. Kartapalov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development 

of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in 

Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of 

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, pp. 26-36.
101

pressure is exerted against countries obstructing U.S. policies, and 

United Nations Security Council’s permission is sought to use military 

force.244

To maintain its world hegemony, the U.S. has conducted 

“systemic” deterrence operations against Russia. U.S. actions in Ukraine, 

in Kartapalov’s view, served only as a pretext for a qualitative increase 

in an anti-Russian campaign. In his opinion the U.S. has demonized 

opponents, disrupted communications, formed ideological coalitions, 

advanced NATO’s infrastructure to Russia’s border, imposed an arms 

race on other nations, manipulated energy markets, and drug Russia and 

others into regional conflicts. These means are used to completely 

subordinate the leadership of an enemy to America’s will.245

Increasingly the U.S. is using hybrid operations, which include 

military and non-military measures. These measures are accompanied by 

dynamic information-psychological effects against the population and 

leadership of victim states; by the use of armed internal opposition 

detachments; and by the use of special operations forces [author: which 

mimic almost perfectly Russian actions in Ukraine]. Russia calls such 

actions “indirect.” They consist of covert actions that ignite internal 

problems in an enemy state via a “third force” (described as blocs or 

countries, transnational companies, separate political forces, 

international extremist organizations, and so on for whom war is 

beneficial). The third force acts from behind curtains, provokes conflicts, 

feeds a side with money, or hides behind “information pressure” 

(campaigns against human rights violations or the absence of 

democracy). They differ from “direct” operations, since the latter must 

be especially dynamic and not passive in any form according to 

Kartapalov.246

 

244 Ibid., p. 26.

245 Ibid., p. 28.

246 Ibid., p. 29.
102

The development of an information confrontation campaign by 

an adversary is designed to disorganize Russia’s national development, 

destroy the foundations of sovereignty, and helps change a country’s 

rulers, Kartapalov adds. Thus information effects are equivalent to the 

use of armed force in some cases. The “color revolution” information 

effect primarily uses the Internet to affect the consciousness of people. 

Meanwhile, the leadership is not aware of what is unfolding. There are 

no clear signs of external aggression when, suddenly, demonstrations 

and anti-government protests break out. Front lines are created along 

ethnic or rich versus poor confrontations and external incursions begin 

(foreign extremists and mercenaries, anti-government immigrant 

structures, private military companies, special operations forces, criminal 

bands, etc. appear).247 Foreign nongovernmental organizations 

(humanitarian, medical, social, human rights, etc.) appear as well. As a 

result, Kartapalov writes, it is “difficult to understand who is fighting 

and for what, what is truth, and what is a lie.”248

Once again using the concept of pretext, Kartapalov stated that 

interference in conflicts by force is conducted under the guise or pretext 

of preventing humanitarian catastrophes and stabilizing the situation. He 

also describes what he refers to as changes in the nature of war and “new

warfare” actions, adding that “practically the entire territory of the 

country is the front line.” Changes in the nature of conflict include: 

conducting combat on land, sea, air, space, and in information space; 

developing mid-and long-range hypersonic air-and sea-based guided 

missiles; improving algorithms and the technical basis of 

reconnaissance-strike systems; delivering precision, electronic, and 

information strikes against the most important targets and critical 

structures; and increasing the potential of intelligence, command and 

control, and destruction resources.249

 

247 Ibid., p. 30.

248 Ibid., p. 31.

249 Ibid., p. 34.
103

Warfare changes and new warfare traits include violations of 

humanitarian standards and human rights, which are often the basic 

content of war; the fact that conflicts have a more protracted character; 

the use of indirect actions which have achieved results through 

demoralizing the enemy and inflicting damage on him without the use of 

force; the fact that war is often never declared and it never ends, and that 

powers achieve their national interests on the territory of third countries; 

that only 10-20 percent of warfare consists of violence (with the other 

80-90 percent being propaganda) and that intelligence, command and 

control, and destruction means have increased; and that interference by 

foreign states often has led to the exacerbation of the conflict, not to its 

resolution. New methods of warfare used by extremists include the 

systematic murders of those who “are not one’s own,” the displacement 

of populations, and the conduct of genocide with the aim of introducing 

civil war.250

The potential capabilities of the U.S. military were especially 

underscored by Kartapalov. He stated that America’s basing systems 

abroad, its global missile defense architecture and instantaneous global 

strike concept (which presupposes strategic and non-nuclear precision 

weapons), and its precision electronic information strikes and technical 

development of a reconnaissance-strike system have all been created or 

improved. These actions in Kartapalov’s opinion can undermine global 

stability, disrupt the correlation of forces in the nuclear missile sphere, 

and create a real threat in the mid-term to the security of the Russian 

Federation.251

To balance the technological superiority of countries, such as the 

U.S., nonstandard forms and methods are being developed. Russia’s 

new-type warfare includes “asymmetric” methods for confronting an 

enemy. Measures include the use of Special Forces operations, foreign 

agents, various forms of information effects, and other nonmilitary forms 

of effects. For each conflict a different set of asymmetric operations will 

 

250 Ibid., p. 33.

251 Ibid., p. 35.
104

be created [author: which parallels Gerasimov’s comment that each 

conflict has a logic all its own]. Such actions must be timely and 

coordinated with respect to targets, location, and time in regard to 

various departments of government organizations.252 Kartapalov notes:

Asymmetric operations are inherent to a conflict situation 

in which by means of actions of an economic, diplomatic, 

informational, and indirect military nature a weaker 

enemy uses an asymmetric strategy (tactics) to conduct an 

armed struggle in accordance with his available limited 

resources to level the stronger side’s militarytechnological superiority. A very important condition for 

conducting asymmetric operations is the precise 

determination of the enemy’s most vulnerable and 

weakest areas, action against which will provide the 

maximum effect with minimal expenditure of one’s own 

forces and resources.253

As a result, indirect and asymmetric actions must be included in 

the appropriate regulations and provisions, and they must be introduced 

into the operational training of forces in military schools and institutes. 

Military science must play a major role in the development of these 

concepts. These concepts must be introduced as soon as possible, as any 

lag in their investment will produce a situation that is irrevocable and 

result in losses for our ability to control enemies worldwide.254

Kartapalov noted that asymmetric actions are conducted with the 

aim of eliminating (neutralizing) advantages the enemy has and 

delivering against him (subjecting him to) damage using minimal 

expenditures. Some of the principles of asymmetric operations included 

the following: covertness of preparation for the conduct of operations; 

persuasion of the weak side to use prohibited means to conduct military 

 

252 Ibid., p. 36.

253 Ibid., p. 35.

254 Ibid., p. 36.
105

operations; concentration of efforts against the enemy’s most vulnerable 

locations (targets); searching for and expose the enemy’s weak points; 

imposing on the enemy one’s own variant (one’s own will) for the course 

of the conflict; and expending low resources with respect to enemy 

actions. The goal is to achieve superiority or parity with results.255 See 

the next page for a graphic on “Methods and Ways of Conducting a 

New-Type of War” that was included in Kartapalov’s article.256

 

255 Ibid., p. 35.

256 Ibid., p. 28.
106
107

Priority trends for developing combat capabilities include 

implementing decisions in a timely manner; developing future weapon 

systems and complexes that support the employment of the latest 

technologies; developing robotic complexes and UAVs for military 

purposes; creating a future telecommunications infrastructure for the 

Armed Forces; developing strategic deterrence forces and means to 

counter an instant global strike; and searching for ways to adequately 

model mathematically combat processes.257

Another author noted that several asymmetric responses 

suggested in 2010, invoked in place of operations on the battlefield, 

would be:

 Get Cuba back as an ally

 Develop a friendship with another Latin American 

country, such as Nicaragua

 Establish a support port for the Russian Navy in Syria

 Continue to support Iran

 Reestablish Russia’s links with all nations of the 

Caucasus

 Form up again the Mediterranean Sea Operational 

Squadron.258

Many of these points appear to be under development just five years 

later. It was noted that some asymmetric responses are not only 

technological, but also operational-strategic and operational-tactical. 

This implies an asymmetry in strategic thought and the use of forces on 

the battlefield.

 

257 Ibid., p. 34.

258 Vladimir Kozhemyakin, “Caribbean, Iran, and the Caucasus—Three Painful 

Calluses for the US,” Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts), No. 38, 17 September 

2008, p. 9 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 March 2010.
108

Gerasimov discussed the dramatic change in the nature of 

warfare and the use of asymmetric operations. This change may have 

encouraged Putin’s opportunistic approach. Wars are not even declared, 

Gerasimov notes, and are not following patterns to which Russia is 

accustomed. Asymmetric actions make it possible to offset an enemy’s 

superiority in armed warfare. The element of surprise is key here. 

Related to this, he adds, is the use of special operations forces and 

internal oppositions for the creation of a “continually operating front 

over the entire territory of the opposing state, and also information 

influence, the forms and methods of which are continually being 

improved.”259 Further, he notes that nonmilitary measures, such as the 

involvement of the population’s protest potential, are becoming a new 

method for carrying out combat operations. He makes the important 

point that nonmilitary measures are occurring at a rate of 4:1 over 

military operations. This is a very important detail, and one that 

encourages further the use of surrogates or financial, political, and social 

means. Covert operations, to include information warfare measures and 

special operations forces, accompany such methods. Information 

conflict, in particular, opens up “extensive asymmetric capabilities for 

the reduction of an enemy’s combat potential.”260

Gerasimov concludes by noting that “a dismissive approach to a 

new idea, a nonstandard approach, to a different point of view in military 

science is impermissible...each war represents an isolated case, requiring 

an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique 

character.”261 Asymmetric and indirect operations can be expressed “in 

political isolation, the conduct of economic sanctions, a blockade of 

maritime, air, and land lines of communications, intimidation through 

force, and also in the introduction of an international peacekeeping 

contingent under the pretext of the defense of human rights and 

 

259 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013.

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid.
109

humanitarian operations.”262 His focus on asymmetric and indirect 

operations and the extensive use of the information domain, the civilmilitary component, and special operation forces continued into 2014 

and 2015.

In a recent article in the Bulletin of the Academy of Military 

Science, the authors listed their interpretation of the main characteristics 

of war’s changing character (with no mention of hybrid war). These 

factors were the changes in the essence and content of armed conflicts;

the dependence of the course and outcome of armed struggle on other 

types of struggle in military conflict (political, informational, 

psychological, etc.); the informatization of military affairs, bringing the 

development of means of armed conflict—precision weapons, systems of 

troop command and control and management of resources for 

information effects on humans—to a qualitatively new level; the 

development and adoption of weapons based on new physical and 

technological principles, which will make it possible to implement 

destructive factors that are not manifested earlier on a massive scale; and

the shift of efforts to the space sphere, with the goal of achieving a 

guaranteed force superiority over potential enemies.263

Thus, models and dictionary definitions are useful to a point, but 

unique logic applied to the situation at hand may best demonstrate the 

basis for Russian strategic thinking and creativity. The form and method 

of Russia’s conduct of the conflict in Ukraine is most certainly creative 

and follows a logic all its own. Perhaps the same can be said of Russian 

actions in cyberspace. 

 

262 Oleg Falichev, “The Future is Being Laid Today: Armed Forces Structure Theory 

Must Correspond to the Nature of Future Wars to the Maximum Extent Possible,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 13 March 

2013.

263 P. A. Kul’nev and V. I. Orlianskii, “Principal Changes in the Nature of Armed 

Struggle in the First Third of the 21st Century,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2015, pp. 49-50.
110

After the Gerasimov article was published in 2013, two very 

prominent Russian military authors, retired Major General I. N. 

Vorobyov and retired Colonel V. A. Kiselyov, discussed “Indirect 

Warfare in Cyberspace.” It is included here to demonstrate the breadth of 

the use of indirect operations in Russian thought. In the article they 

combined the concepts of indirect and asymmetric actions. The idea of 

the indirect approach, they note, was advanced by Liddell Hart and it 

focused on avoiding direct clashes, using maneuvers to divert attention, 

and striking at vulnerable spots. For Russia, a cyber-security plan must 

draw upon the strategy of asymmetric actions according to the authors. 

Included in this approach are the following points:

1. Replacing monotony and stereotypes with multiple 

functions

2. Combining centralization and decentralization instead 

of rigid hierarchy in command and control

3. Using joint efforts rather than each unit for itself

4. Using symmetry in place of asymmetry and 

asymmetry in place of symmetry

5. Using alternatives instead of set-course actions

6. Preempting against go-slow or wait-and-see attitudes

7. Using modules instead of open-ended formations

8. Using multipolarity in place of monopolarity

9. Using multiplicity instead of singularity.264

Finally, the authors stated that fire strike maneuver in cyberspace 

is performed to anticipate the adversary and is based on mobility and 

surprise. This meant preventing an adversary’s maneuver by 

concentrating firepower and then relocating it, concentrating and 

building up efforts and then shifting them to another location at the right 

moment, performing electronic warfare and air defense maneuvers, and 

using one’s own software-hardware to destroy an adversary’s computer 

networks. New types of weapons are used as well: cyber weapons, 

 

264 I. N. Vorobyov and V. A. Kiselyov, “Indirect Warfare in Cyberspace,” Voennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 12 2014, pp. 21-28.
111

ultrahigh-frequency weapons, directed energy weapons, and others. 

Present-day warfare is a competition in intelligence, information and 

reconnaissance gathering, and navigational abilities.265

Cross-Domain Deterrence: An Indirect/Asymmetric Vector?

In 2008 retired General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, the 

President of the Academy of Military Science, stated that Russia must 

confront threats with flexible and asymmetric measures united by a 

common goal and concept of actions. To achieve this goal Gareev 

introduced the concept of strategic deterrence. He defined this 

asymmetric approach as part of a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, 

information, economic, military, and other measures that deter, reduce, 

or avert threats and aggressive actions by any state or coalition of states 

with threats of unacceptable consequences as a result of retaliatory 

actions.266

To deter or counter threats to Russia (which appear to be the 

US’s Prompt Global Strike concept; a global ABM system; color 

revolutions; cyber-attacks; and an ISIS threat to the south), Putin’s staff 

is employing some old methods, while developing new ones. Naturally 

nuclear deterrence remains at the top of the list of ways to counter threats 

from the US and will be used, according to Colonel-General Sergey

Karakayev, commander of the Strategic Missile Force, until nuclear 

weapons “lose their deterring force as a result of technological progress 

or changes in the nature of international relations.”267 Another source 

noted that Russia is creating “a system of strategic deterrence against 

which even in the remote future there will be no acceptable defense.”268

 

265 Ibid.

266 M. A. Gareev, “Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

(Red Star), No. 183, 8 October 2008, p. 8, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17 

March, 2010.

267 Interfax (in English), 16 December 2015.

268 Konstantin Sivkov, “Essential and Sufficient: Status-6 System Leaves an Adversary 

No Choice,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier 

Online), 2 Dec-8 December 2015.
112

It appears that Russia is utilizing a series of deterrent concepts (it 

is unclear if this is in fact a “system”) in an attempt to protect its 

proclaimed national interests and territorial integrity. The nature of these 

deterrent actions was highlighted in Russia’s December 2015 National 

Security Strategy, where it was stated that

Interrelated political, military, military-technical, 

diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures 

are being developed and implemented in order to ensure 

strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts. 

These measures are intended to prevent the use of armed 

force against Russia, and to protect its sovereignty and 

territorial integrity.269

That is, Russia’s strategic deterrence concept appears to rely on 

implementing an interlinked package of measures.

Russia has two terms for deterrence, sderzhivanie and 

ustrashenie. The military uses the former much more often than the 

latter. The terms are defined as follows: 

СДЕРЖИВАНИЕ (sderzhivanie) is defined as the 

deterrence of containment. It is used to limit the 

development of weapons or the use of military actions. 

УСТРАШИТЬ (ustrashit’) is defined as deterrence 

through intimidation. It is used to frighten someone via 

fear. 

In effect, the terms seem to be complimentary. Frightening 

someone can result in their containment. Containing someone can result 

in their being frightened. Russian deterrent actions today appear to 

include the following:

 

269 On the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, President of Russia’s 

Website, 31 December 2015.
113

Equal security: President Putin is pushing the term equal security again, 

a concept that implies that all countries should be “equally secure” with 

their own air defenses, missile deployments for deterrent purposes, and 

so on. The Soviet-era military encyclopedia defines the principle of 

equal security as follows:

Basis of approach to resolving the problem of the 

correlations of arms and military forces between the 

countries of the socialist community and the capitalist 

states on the principle of parity... it is expressed in the 

formula ‘no detriment to either party.’270

A May 2015 article at the Russian news website Svobodnaya Pressa, 

offers an insight into this deterrent concept. The article is authored by

two well-known military thinkers in Russia, Aleksandr Perendzhiyev, 

from the Association of Independent Military Political Experts, and 

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a member of the Academy of 

Geopolitical Problems.271 They advocate developing a direct threat to the 

US homeland with nonnuclear deterrents. They believe Russia should 

utilize deterrence via collective security strategies in South America in 

order to counter US moves in Europe. The authors advanced the idea of 

creating a joint troop grouping in Nicaragua with China, and putting 

Russian troops in Venezuela and Brazil. More ominous was the 

suggestion of placing a task force off the coasts of the US, so that it 

would have American territory in its sights. That clearly implies a task 

force stationed in Cuba. Such a “grand coalition” could include India as 

well. Russia should “organize a major diplomatic and information 

offensive” when creating this security alliance.

272 In 1962 it was possible 

for the US to find Russian missiles in Cuba and, through the negotiation 

 

270 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 591.

271 Andrey Ivanov, interviews with Aleksandr Perendzhiyev and Leonid Ivashov, 

“United States Transitioning to ‘Number One’ Combat Readiness. Any Provocation 

Would Give the United States the Opportunity to Attack Russia,” Svobodnaya Pressa

(Free Press), 7 May 2015.

272 Ibid.
114

process known as the Cuban Missile Crises, get them off the island. The 

missiles were placed there by the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, 

Nikita Khrushchev, reportedly to offset US missiles in Turkey that had 

attained an “equal security” advantage. If you threaten us with missiles 

near our border, the Soviet thought went, we will do the same to you. If 

Russia creates a task force in Cuba as the authors suggest with a 

nonnuclear deterrent such as UAVs it will be much harder to find them. 

They could be hidden in buildings or hangers. This type of deterrence 

involves the mutual threatening of the other’s homeland, and involves 

the establishment of threat parity among nuclear or missile forces.

Information: In November 2015, Russian TV carried images of 

supposed “top secret” schematics of a Russian naval torpedo, the Status6. The torpedo allegedly carries nuclear warheads and supposedly can 

travel up to 10,000 kilometers, making it capable of striking the western 

shores of the US and creating a tsunami in the process. The Russian 

press labeled this action as “deliberate stove piping” to deliver an 

information bomb. The torpedo would be impossible for either Prompt 

Global Strike or a Global ABM to detect or intercept. Of interest is that 

the torpedo’s development may not even be complete,

273 but just the 

suggestion of such a capability can help to deter an opponent, who is 

uncertain as to the validity of the claim. A month later Russia stated that 

it’s “Rus” deep-diving submersible, part of the secret Defense Ministry’s 

Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research, had transmitted information 

from NATO’s underwater intercontinental communications cables. The 

Rus can descend to 6,000 meters with a crew of three hydronauts, where 

it can carry out technical, emergency rescue, photography, video filming, 

or scientific research operations.274 This type of deterrence uses 

information to intimidate opponents and could be termed “information 

deterrence” that relies on passing technological parameters of nuclear 

capabilities that can exist in places that are extremely hard to detect and 

intercept.

 

273 Sivkov.

274 No author listed, “Secret ‘Rus’ Surfaces Successfully,” Argumenty Nedeli Online 

(Weekly Arguments Online), 17 December 2015.
115

In the Russian Defense Ministry’s 2011 Conceptual Views on the 

Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information 

Space, deterrence was seen to exist as an asset in information space in 

the following way:

Deterrence and conflict prevention: develop an 

information security system for the Russian Federation’s 

Armed Forces that can deter and resolve military conflicts 

in information space; remain in a constant state of 

readiness; expand the group of partner states; conclude, 

under UN auspices, a treaty on international information 

security; establish control over the escalation of conflict; 

take priority steps to counter the development and spread 

of a conflict; neutralize factors leading to the conflict’s 

spread; and shape public opinion means to limit the 

ability of instigators to further escalate the conflict.275

Space Maneuvering: A Russian satellite “parked itself between two 

Intelsat satellites in geosynchronous orbit for five months this year” and 

maneuvered at times to within ten kilometers of these vehicles.276

Roscosmos declined to comment on the matter, and the Russian Defense 

Ministry said it would “look into the situation.”277 This maneuvering 

was designed to imply capabilities to offset the Prompt Global Strike and 

Global ABM concepts that are seen as direct threats to Russia. In 

addition, Strategic Missile Force commander Karakayev noted that plans 

envisage fundamentally new means and techniques for penetrating any 

missile defense system.278 This type of deterrent force relies on the 

development of new ways to put obstacles in the path of Western 

capabilities or to find ways to knock them out of commission with new 

 

275 “Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 

in Information Space,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2011.

276 Interfax (in English), 12 October 2015.

277 Ibid.

278 Interfax-AVN Online, 16 December 2015.
116

technologies. It is also a way to demonstrate capabilities, which often 

have a deterrent effect.

United Nations Decisions: Russia is using the UN to support its legal 

claims to areas it says are within the nation’s proclaimed “national 

interests.” This applies in particular to the Arctic, where Russia has spent 

much time and money mapping the Arctic Sea. If Russian 

representatives can prove their case with images or numbers, it may be 

able to reserve for itself exclusive access to the region’s oil and gas 

riches. Russia would, in effect, deter other nations from the region. 

Likewise, Russia is using the UN to present its case for defining and 

limiting cyber means, or what is calls “information weapons,” in order to 

prevent other nations from intruding on Russia’s information sovereignty 

(and coincidently limiting the populace’s access to information); and to 

use legal means to prevent an arms race in space, which has the primary 

goal of getting rid of the US’s Prompt Global Strike weapon. This type 

of deterrent force relies on legal issues and winning negotiated 

settlements, and supports containment more than intimidation.

International Security Arrangements: In order to confront NATO and 

the EU, Russia has developed a close association with several 

organizations, most notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 

the association of economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 

China, and South Africa). Russia seems closest, however, to China, since 

both have a communist past (and present, in China’s case) that 

introduces into their thought processes similar patterns (control over 

information, the use of the dialectic thought process, etc.). This type of 

deterrence is somewhat patterned after the equal security concept, in that 

a type of parity is established with the use of international organizations 

that indicate Russia isn’t facing the world alone.

Military Deterrence: Of course, Russia is continuing to develop its 

military capabilities and to threaten other nations with military activities 

with cyber actions, air incursions of territorial sovereignty, or military 

deployments. For example, they have created a new bridgehead in 

Crimea, from which it could move quickly into Transdniester or 

Ukraine; and of course they are militarizing the Arctic. The Defense 

Ministry is quickly modernizing its equipment and has long-term plans 
117

for not only its aerospace force but also its strategic rocket, ground, and 

naval forces. By developing modern electronic warfare, armor, cyber, 

robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other such equipment, the 

military can both contain and intimidate its neighbors and make them 

think twice before engaging in activities that might be noted as harmful 

to Russia (NATO expansion, etc.). President Putin has also ordered his 

military to engage in opportunistic and threatening activities, such as 

conducting probes of air space belonging to the Baltic nations, buzzing 

US and NATO ships, making nuclear threats, or moving strategic or 

operational missiles (Iskander, etc.) up to its borders. Recent flights over 

the US no longer look at just military installations but also at specific 

points of infrastructure. For what purpose? To deter what, a Baltic 

invasion? Just the concept sounds like nonsense, but it is a threat that 

Russia has created.

A conclusion to be reached here is that Russia has noticed that 

technological progress is changing the parameters regarding ways to 

deter an opponent. For example, maneuverable hypersonic weapons may 

be able to bypass ABM systems. Nano weaponry may be hard to find yet 

can pack a wallop. The nature of international relations is changing as 

well, as we are now much more connected globally than ever before—by 

the media, satellites, and optical fiber. Russia’s Status-6 nuclear torpedo, 

whether real or imaginary, is a good example of using the media for 

deterrent purposes. Russia is working to create a system of strategic 

deterrence against which there may presently be no acceptable defense. 

Times are changing and Russia is creating these new deterrent methods, 

both nuclear and nonnuclear, to contain and intimidate its neighbors and 

their partners. 

Reflexing the Adversary and the Civilian Population

Russia has offered a great example of an asymmetric vector 

conflict with its reflexive control (RC) theory. It is likely that RC has 

been used in the Ukrainian conflict. RC is a concept that was developed 

and used in the Soviet era. It is defined in several ways, depending on the 

author. In general it is a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent 

specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the 

predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action. It is 

particularly effective in provoking an opponent to take a desired action. 
118

NATO forces should wonder if, based on Russian actions in Ukraine, 

they unintentionally achieved a goal of Russia’s choosing—recreating 

the Cold War threat. NATO, of course, had little choice but to respond to 

calls from Baltic and East European nations for protection. By doing so, 

it recreated the “NATO threat” for Russia, which it now trumpets loud 

and clear as the reason for their new military doctrine and increased 

defense spending. To a Westerner, it is doubtful that this could have been 

the case, but the example does offer a new way of considering what has 

transpired.

Even though the theory was developed long ago in Russia, it is 

still undergoing further refinement. Recently the theory has been used in 

conjunction with concepts such as friendly embraces, simulacrums, 

analogies, stimulated reactions, and creative and destructive applications. 

In the past several years the concept has been used in articles about 

network-centric warfare, information weapons, deterrence theory, and 

21st century tactics. In other words, the concept has not lost its utility.

The foremost RC theorists of the past in the military sector 

included V. V. Druzhinin, M. D. Ionov, D. S. Kontorov, S. Leonenko, 

and several others. Even at that time, RC was considered an information 

warfare means. For example, Major General N.I. Turko, an instructor at 

the Russian Federation’s General Staff Academy, established a direct 

connection between information warfare/information operations and RC 

when he wrote about the concept in the 1990s, stating that “The most 

dangerous manifestation in the tendency to rely on military power relates 

more to the possible impact of the use of reflexive control by the 

opposing side through developments in the theory and practice of 

information war rather than to the direct use of the means of armed 

combat.”

279

 

279 A. A. Prokhozhev and N. I. Turko, “The Basics of Information Warfare,” report at a 

conference on “Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Theory and 

Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 251.
119

The implication is that even then, nonmilitary issues were 

important. In 2013 two interesting articles on RC appeared in the journal, 

Military Thought. The first, by V. L. Makhnin, has the most potential 

application to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, especially as it applies to 

the media. He notes that going from the reflection of cooperation to that 

of conflict can break the will of the adversary’s military and political 

leaders. This is known as strangling the enemy in a “friendly” 

embrace.280 One is reminded of the Putin-Poroshenko meeting for a truce 

that was immediately followed by a Russian military invasion of 

Ukraine. Was Poroshenko strangled in the “friendly” embrace? One 

should closely observe recent cease-fires to see if the same “friendly” 

embrace repeats itself.

Makhnin stated that the organization of the reflexive process 

between opposing combat systems is related to the development and 

implementation of a series of measures to supply the reflexed combat 

system with interests, motivations, and reasons. These measures combine 

to create a desired operational-tactical situation and provide an incentive 

for making desired inferences and conclusions that benefit the friendly 

decision-maker.281 The use of the reflexive process leads to the 

following:

An analysis of the past experience in preparing and 

conducting operations, combat actions, engagements, and 

other tactical actions with the purpose of misleading the 

adversary in plans conceived by commanders shows that 

reflexive influence on the adversary was confined to 

forming a simulacrum, that is, false-real, information, and 

psychological images of objects, processes, and 

phenomena. Reflexive influence using simulacra 

 

280 V. L. Makhnin, “Reflexive Processes in Military Art: The Historico-Gnoseological 

Aspect,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2013, p. 40.

281 Ibid., p. 34.
120

paralyzes the adversary’s (decision-makers) intelligent 

(creative) activity.282

Simulacrums (images or representations of reality), naturally, are closely 

associated with the formation of a “new reality.”

Yet another way to induce reflection, according to Makhnin, may 

be the most interesting and it involves the use of analogies. Drawing 

analogies in RC over an adversary enables one to draw inferences and 

thus obtain new knowledge. Analogy, in general, can be used to discuss 

subjects that cannot be observed. In military art analogy is a cognitive 

approach that helps one develop concepts and a new way to achieve the 

purpose of specific actions. One is reminded of the use of the fascist and 

Nazi analogy in reference to people fighting in Maidan Square against 

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, an analogy drawn to acquire 

support from the Russian population. Russians well remember the Nazi 

onslaught against Stalingrad and Leningrad in World War II, and so this 

analogy touches a raw nerve in them. Was the population a recipient of a 

form of internal RC through analogy? Most likely it was.

Russia’s leaders worry constantly over internal threats to its 

stability, especially hoping to avoid the development of a “color 

revolution” there. There has even been talk of a new military doctrine 

that must address internal threats. Analogies can reflexively serve as a 

strong unifying force for a population with a strong historical 

predilection, as is the case for Russians and their memories of World 

War II. 

Another Makhnin comment is that the reflexive approach allows 

commanders to uncover an idea unknown to himself or one’s opponent 

“at the moment.”283 Interests, motivations, and reasons that shape the 

operational-tactical situation are conveyed to an adversary and stimulate 

his reasoning and conclusions, which can produce more reflexive input 

 

282 Ibid., p. 37.

283 Ibid., p. 46.
121

by Russian commanders. It could be a desire to make an opponent slow 

down his operations, abandon plans, and make irrational decisions, he 

notes, which could be exactly what is happening in Ukraine. 

Makhnin describes what he terms as creative and destructive 

reflexive functions. The former develops “in a situation when the 

struggle goes on at a slow pace and, accordingly, the operational-tactical 

situation changes slowly as well, when the opponents’ objectives are 

clear, and the way to reach them has been figured out.”284 Clearly the 

slow pace of the five month conflict has offered Russia the opportunity 

to thwart opinions that have developed against the support Russia has 

provided the separatists or to manipulate them, and to keep Ukrainian 

forces from taking control of pro-Russian-controlled territory. 

Destructive reflexive functions refer to a commander’s concept that is 

based on a tested way of action or an old idea.285

The second article on RC control (which could also apply to 

actions in the Ukraine conflict at the combat or even diplomatic level)

was written by V. G. Kazakov and A.N. Kiryushin. The authors ask “is it 

possible, apart from ordering about subordinates, to control people or 

groups that are not directly subordinated to one’s own control body or 

decision-maker?” Since the time of Sun Tzu this has been done through 

deception or premediated actions, they note, which make the enemy 

believe in things that are not true. 286

Kazakov and Kiryushin discussed the concept of complex or 

double-track control over combat actions:

By dividing the control concept into command control 

(legitimizing manipulation of subordinate forces in an 

effort to accomplish a mission) and reflexive control 

 

284 Ibid., p. 44.

285 Ibid.

286 V. G. Kazakov and A. N. Kiryushin, “Complex Management of Military Actions,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7, 2013, pp. 61-67.
122

(seeking to stealthily control enemy forces to create 

hindrances or frustrate their combat missions), we put a 

somewhat different sense into this classification that 

expands the scope of research into the control factor in 

general and control over combat actions in particular, and 

put it forward in a new, other than a pedagogical 

format.287

They add that such control over combat actions needs to result in 

drawing up superior plans to employ reflexive control and maneuver the 

enemy into a managed position, resulting in what they term as “reflexive 

superiority.” The reflexive environment or reality of combat are the 

shared realm of two opponents, and there they “clash for priority and 

superiority of their strategies of reflections, ideas, and decisions” that 

translate into warfare. The authors add that reflexive control expert V. A. 

Lefebvre, who developed the theory of reflexive control, believes that 

RC is “influencing the enemy in a way that sways him into making a 

decision expected of him by the transmitting side.”288

Interestingly the authors also quote V. L. Makhnin, who stated 

that “applying compelling influence is central to RC as a way to 

constrain the generation and absorption of new knowledge, paralyze 

creativity by the opposing combat system’s commanders and staffs, and 

constrict the scale on which the opposing combat systems’ operational 

(combat) potentialities can be exploited.”289 This requires the 

development of an “information package,” which is a RC message, put 

together for the enemy to make a decision. It thus is important to 

understand what an opposing commander “sees” and how he might 

subjectively respond. Again, like Makhnin, the authors think it is 

important to rely on the use of simulacrums, this time in the form of an 

information package to influence enemy decision-making.290

 

287 Ibid., p. 63.

288 Ibid., p. 64.

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid.
123

Meanwhile the Russian military is exercising other types of RC. 

For example, it is conditioning the West to Russian exercises along 

Ukraine’s border. After a period of time these exercises appear less 

important to observers on the other side of the border. Simultaneously, 

Russia’s military looks for a pretext to act. Pretext and conditioning are

two sides of the same coin when it comes to RC. They assist one another, 

with the pretext usually the result of a mistake in an opposing side’s 

understanding of a Russian conditioning exercise.

Conclusions

This article has offered Russian viewpoints on its military 

operations in the 21st century. It has focused on Putin’s creation of a new 

reality, one that used opportunity and asymmetric and indirect operations 

to advantage. By focusing on hybrid war, the West misses the nuances of 

these military actions. While Western analysts ascribe Russian actions as 

the integration of a host of methods, as the term hybrid implies, Russia is 

searching for a unique logic to apply to each conflict. Indirect operations, 

for example, can aim to influence international institutions or decisionmakers instead of fighting on the battlefield. Nor do Western analysts 

pay attention to the changing nature of RC theory, which in the physical 

domain attempts to condition opponents or to cause them to react to 

specific agents of influence or pretext; or, in the cognitive domain, where 

RC theory attempts to manipulate the facts to which a domestic audience 

is disposed to believe in and affect emotions. RC is based on influence 

and deception. 

The use of the general term hybrid causes analysts to lose sight of 

the various vectors of an indirect, asymmetric, or nonmilitary approach. 

The hybrid term is too general. For example, it is apparent that Russia’s 

military incursions into Crimea and eastern Ukraine were not only 

calculated but, at times, opportunistic. For some time (since at least 

2005) the General Staff had been discussing the arrival of warfare’s new 

nature and had undertaken the study of different forms and methods of 

implementing the use of information influence, surrogates, and Special 

Forces in indirect or asymmetric ways. As actions in Maidan unfolded, 

the General Staff saw a chance to implement some of these methods. 

Their military moves were accompanied by a brutal and aggressive 
124

propaganda campaign to create an enemy image that helped implement 

these actions. The use of referendums were probably “on call” missions 

that developed unexpectedly, but were seen as additional great windows 

of opportunity. These actions were not hybrid but asymmetric, nonmilitary, indirect, and on-call at times.

Had Yanukovych remained in power in Kiev, these actions 

probably would not have been undertaken in Ukraine. Unfortunately, as 

a result of his fleeing to Russia, Putin decided that he had to respond 

aggressively, and now the West is faced with an entirely different 

geopolitical situation, as the request for US forces by Baltic countries 

and the increased vigilance of former Warsaw Pact members implies. 

The potential Russian use of energy supplies as a countersanction or 

force deterrent must also be considered. 

Unfortunately, chances for the West and Putin to come together 

and improve the situation do not appear likely in the short term, 

especially since Russia continues to pressure first Ukraine and now 

Transdniester and Kazakhstan through numerous troop rotations and 

actions on their borders. The opening of a new front in Syria presents 

additional problems. Russia seriously misread Western intentions, and 

the Kremlin’s leadership transitioned into an arrogant and mistrustful 

regime. Russian policy has resorted to the bullying and invasive 

techniques reminiscent of its Soviet past, using the same chicanery as 

before.

The creative thinkers inside the Russian General Staff have 

placed their Western counterparts in a quandary. Putin, it is thought, will 

continue to present Western leaders with troublesome decision points 

that are designed to test their resolve and commitment. He will make 

future moves while playing yet another card in his favor, that being the 

series of conflicts (ISIL, Syria, etc.) and other issues (Ebola) that are 

plaguing other regions and involving Western forces. The Western 

security community is thin when it comes to response mechanisms as it 

confronts several emergency situations simultaneously. It will have some 

tough decisions to make in the near future. Meanwhile, Putin will most 

likely try to wait them out, make moves when the situation dictates, and 
125

peck away at Western influence. But at the same time it must be noted 

that Russia’s forces are presently overextended. 
126
127

PART TWO:FUTURE WAR
128
129

CHAPTER FOUR: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT

Introduction

For many years now Russia has been well known for its ability to 

develop reliable weaponry. Much of this notoriety is due to the worldwide success of the Kalashnikov rifle as a trademark example. The rifle’s 

developer, Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov, passed away in 

December 2013, but his memory and the genius behind his 1947 creation 

live on. Today Kalashnikov assault rifles, sniper rifles, carbines, and 

pistols make up 90 per cent of Russia’s small-arms output. The 

Kalashnikov Concern has expanded to include unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs), naval craft, and remote-controlled modules for installation on 

armored vehicles, among other developments.291 Other weapon firms are 

continuing this push to expand and reform the arms industry.

In March 2015 the Russian Ministry of Defense issued a public 

statement on its goals and tasks for weapon and equipment developments 

for the year. Strategic nuclear and aerospace forces (see Chapter Five) 

were mentioned first, followed by the need to make quality adjustments 

to strategically important regions of the Russian Federation. The latter 

included the requirement to create a military infrastructure and the 

deployment of Arctic subunits on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, 

Kotel’nyy, and Vrangel Islands (see Chapter Eight for a detailed 

description of Russian activities in the Arctic). Upgrading subunits in 

Crimea and the Kaliningradskaya Oblast were also mentioned. 

Of importance for this chapter was the next section of the 

document, which discussed how to outfit the Armed Forces with stateof-the-art arms and special equipment.292 It was noted that such 

 

291 Rossiya 24 TV (Russian 24 TV), 14 June 2015.

292 “Public Statement of the Russian Federation’s Defense Ministry’s Goals and Tasks 

for 2015,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 26 March 2015. 

Other tasks noted on the website were the manning of troops, combat training under 

near-combat conditions, resolving social problems of servicemen and their families, and 
130

equipment must comprise 30 percent of all equipment by the end of 

2015. Main priorities included nuclear deterrence forces; aerospace 

defense assets; communications, reconnaissance, command and control, 

and electronic warfare (EW) systems; UAVs; robotized attack complexes

(see Chapter Six); military-transport aviation; precision-guided 

munitions and means of combating them; and servicemen’s individual 

protections systems.293

The weaponry chosen for examination in this section are UAVs, 

several items of individual equipment (Ratnik, Strelets, C3I gear, and 

invisibility cloaks), several items discussed at the June Army-2015 

Forum, electronic warfare equipment, and a few items of equipment 

associated with command and control or armor. 

UAV Types by Agency, District, or Service

Over the past two decades unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use 

has exploded. Most of the major countries of the world have various 

shapes and sizes of drones in their military inventories, and there are 

even more in the civilian world. Terrorists also have access to “off the 

shelf” model airplanes that can be turned into drones. Not only are they 

used on a massive scale but also their performance and employment 

characteristics have changed dramatically. According to one Russian 

source, UAVs can “conduct aerial reconnaissance day and night, engage 

in electronic warfare, deliver strikes against key targets deep inside the 

enemy’s order of battle, guide strike weapons to targets they have 

acquired, produce detectable reflections from targets, and verify fire 

effects...”294

Russia has kept pace with its own updated UAV developments. It

now has many different types of UAVs, and they are present in all types 

 

conducting military parades associated with the 70th anniversary of end of World War 

II.

293 Ibid.

294 R. A. Belous, Yu. G. Sizov, and A. L. Skokov, “Air Defense against Massive Enemy 

UAV and HPW Attacks,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2013, pp. 64-71.
131

of forces: army, navy, air force, the Federal Security Service (FSB), law 

enforcement, and emergency affairs directorates, among others. As with 

other nations, Russia’s UAV force is used for reconnaissance, precision 

attack, transmission of intelligence, unmanned combat air systems, 

patrols, monitoring, communications, data transmission, combat 

missions, and the identification of the source of radio waves. Russia has 

used training grounds in the Arctic, Armenia, and Tajikistan to test 

various geographical and climatic conditions and on its border with 

Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and several other border nations. In December 

2014 Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated that as many as 179 UAVs 

had been delivered to armed forces units in 2014. One report noted that 

the number of UAVs was doubled and flight hours quadrupled after 

2013. Russia now has a state UAV center as well for training 

specialists.295 

This summary will first examine the types of UAVs that each 

ministry desires. It will then focus on the specific characteristics of 

UAVs covered in the Russian press, and will conclude with a few 

descriptions from the specialized journal Military Thought as to how 

Russia plans to counter foreign, in particular US, use of UAVs. Military 

Thought also has several articles on how UAVs are used in the Russian 

Armed Forces districts and during exercises.

Specific UAV deployments by agency, district, or service include 

the following:

General Staff. The General Staff has established a new directorate 

focused only on unmanned aerial vehicles. The Orlenok, Camcopter S100, Grusha, and Story-PD UAVs were mentioned.296

Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia’s military intelligence 

directorate is forming UAV companies. They are equipped with Orlan, 

 

295 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2014.

296 “Unmanned Alabino: Defense Enterprises Battle among Themselves for the Defense 

Ministry’s Attention,” AviaPort, 12 July 2013.
132

Eleron, and Takhion UAV systems, and they also have the Fara-VR 

man-portable short-range radar and the Sobolyatnik-O medium-range 

radar stations. The Orlan is designed for monitoring extended areas and 

objects in inaccessible terrain, as well as search and rescue missions. The 

Eleron-3SV is a special-purpose short-range reconnaissance system.297

Military Districts.

(a) Western District. The Granat (boosts the effectiveness of 

artillery fire), Zastava (aerial reconnaissance and target designation), and 

Orland UAVs are the ones used most often.298 An earlier report, 

however, stated that the Eleron (special close-range reconnaissance 

device) and Takhion (all-weather reconnaissance, control, and 

communications relay) UAVs are also used in the district.299

(b) Southern District. The Grusha, Orlan, Granat, Zastava, Leyer, 

and Forpost UAVs have operated in the Southern District.300 On 19 

August it was reported that missile and artillery troops use the Orlan, 

Zastava, Granit, and Leyer UAVs for fire adjustment.301

(c) Central District. The Zastava, Granat, and Leyer UAVs are 

operating in separate district motorized infantry brigades. The Leyer is 

designed for radio reconnaissance, detection of radio emissions, and 

jamming of radio-electronic means.302 A separate UAV company has 

been activated in the Central Military District, where there is a 

peacekeeping formation. Orlan-10, Leyer-3, Takhion-3, and Eleron-3 

 

297 “Russia’s Military Intelligence to Form Remotely-Piloted Aviation Companies,” 

RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 5 November 2013.

298 “Western Military District Formation Commanders Are Studying Unmanned Air 

Vehicles Capabilities,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 3 October 2014.

299 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Western Military District Servicemen Test new Drones,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 5 July 2014.

300 “Flying Time of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Has Been Increased by One-Third in the 

Southern MD,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 30 June 2014.

301 Interfax (in English), 19 August 2015.

302 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 15 January 2014.
133

portable complexes make up the new company.303 Several squadrons of 

UAVs will receive hand-launched Eleron-3 drones, which can obtain 

information within a radius of up to 25 km. They use GLONASS and 

GPS navigation systems and are equipped with TV and infrared cameras, 

a relay station, and signals-intelligence and jamming stations.304 The 

Takhion UAV was used in Central Military District Spetsnaz exercises. 

They are all-weather mobile reconnaissance sets that permit them to 

supply command posts with information. AF formations have 

Navodchik-2, Zastava, and Eleron-3 SV UAV’s among others.305 In 

August Orlan-10 and Forpost reconnaissance operations commenced. 

They helped find and destroy with Grad missiles.306

(d) Eastern District. In 2013, the Grusha UAV was designated as 

the UAV of choice. It can stay aloft for 1.5 hours at a height of 500 to 

1,000 m.307 It was upgraded in the first quarter of 2015, adding new 

engines, improved video and photographic equipment, and also thermal 

imagers. The latter will help the UAV track ground objects by 

temperature changes, allowing it to find people and equipment.308

Specially equipped Leer-3 UAV systems have been acquired. It is an 

entire technological system that includes a pair of Orlan-10 drones and a 

catapult launch. Its range is up to 120 kilometers at altitudes of up to 

 

303 “Central Military District Peacekeepers Received a UAV Company,” RIA Novosti

(RIA News), 17 December 2014.

304 Interfax (in English), 29 January 2015.

305 Taras Rudyk, “In Reconnaissance with a Takhion UAV: They Permit the Spetsnaz 

to Observe the Enemy from Siberia in the Online Mode,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red 

Star Online), 21 May 2015.

306 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Grads Struck at the Border. The Targets for the Missile Attack 

Were Prompted by Drones,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News online), 19 

August 2015.

307 Petr Asanov, “Eastern Military District: Combat Training under Way: 

Reconnaissance from the Sky, Fire from the Ground,” Suvorovskiy Natisk (Suvorov’s 

Charge), 9 November 2013.

308 Igor Zarembo, “Russia’s Eastern Military District Will Equip Drones with Thermal 

Imagers,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 22 January 2015.
134

5,000 meters, with an Orlan flight duration of 10 hours309 (another 

source said the Orlan-10 can fly for up to 18 hours at an altitude of 5,000 

meters). Motorized rifle formations will receive the Leyer-3 UAV. It can 

jam communications, interfere with radio operations of an enemy, and 

can update terrain relief, among other functions.310

Navy. In 2014 the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka received several drone 

systems, but a specific type was not identified.311 The Northern Fleet’s 

underwater counter-sabotage force will soon get tactical UAVs.312 Much

earlier, in 2013, it was reported that the Pantsir-SM antiaircraft missile 

and gun system would be placed in the Arctic to counter UAVs there.313

Army. In 2013 it was reported that the Defense Ministry was to buy 17 

Eleron UAVs for observation and the collection of intelligence 

information for the ground forces. The Eleron 3 and -10 systems work in 

various climatic zones, whether it be ice and desert, the tropics and taiga, 

or boggy and mountainous localities.314 Russia reportedly is also 

developing ground drones, some of which are quite large, such as big 

amphibious models. The military police are also looking at using UAVs 

in their work.315

 

309 Unattributed report, “Electronic Warfare units in the Far East Will Get Leer-3 

Drones,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 28 June 2015.

310 “Leyer-3s Will Become Operational with Motorized Rifle Units on Sakhalin: Stateof-the-Art Drones Will Keep an Eye on the Status of the Island’s Military 

Infrastructure,” SakhalinMedia, 21 October 2014.

311 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 17 January 2014.

312 “The Northern Fleet Counter-Sabotage Forces Will Receive UAVs,” b-port.com, 12 

December 2014.

313 “By 2015, Russian Federation Air Force Missile Troops Will Receive ‘Pantsirs’ 

That Down UAVs,” RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 18 December 2013.

314 Igor Solovyev, “Observation as Protection,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 25 November 2013.

315 Pavel Zhuravlev, interview with Viktor Zaytsev, “Russia’s Military Police: Going Its 

Own Way,” Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii (Military Bulletin of the South of Russia), 17 

January 2015.
135

Exercises. On 1 December 2013 the Multiservice UAV Center turned 30 

years old. Among other things, it performs troop tests for UAVs. It 

participated in several recent exercises: Combat Collaboration-2011, 

Union Shield-2011, Center-2011, Kavkaz-2012, Barrier-2013, and 

Zapad-2013. In the past this has included the Zastava, Navodchik-2, 

Forpost, and Orlan-10 UAVs.316 During Vostok-2014, Zastava UAVs 

were used.317

FSB. A 2013 report stated that the FSB is testing UAVs fitted with 80-

megapixel cameras and thermal imaging cameras for high-resolution 

operational mapping of terrain and for the monitoring of border areas. A 

Phase One IXA 180 SPECS digital camera has been ordered for the 

Ptero-SM UAV. Other undisclosed UAVs will also be used. It is thought 

that UAVs are much better for monitoring routes than, for example, the 

Tropa (Path) system used in Chechnya, where sensors were buried in the 

ground to identify enemy routes.318 According to a 2014 Russian report, 

Ukrainian border guards have identified an FSB Zastava-type UAV 

along its border with Russia. Earlier the Ukrainians had shot down an 

Orlan-10 UAV.319 According to another report, the FSB (and MOD) are 

interested in procuring a UAV of the Okhotnik family, or perhaps a 

UAV with the working designation Altius-M. This UAV appears to be 

able to stay in the air for four days and can intercept airborne targets, 

conduct close air support of ground forces, and perform reconnaissance 

and EW missions, as well as suppress air defense systems.320

 

316 “Multiservice UAV Center Marks 30th Anniversary,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 29 November 2013.

317 “Correction of Artillery Fire during Strategic Command Staff Exercise Vostok-2014 

Provided by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units of the Eastern Military District,” Ministry 

of Defense of the Russian Federation, 24 September 2014.

318 “The Federal Security Service Will Adopt 80-Megapixel Cameras for 

Reconnaissance,” Izvestiya (News), 27 December 2013.

319 Vasilisa Yegorova, “Drone in Inventory of Russian FSB Spotted Over Ukraine. 

Ukrainian Border Guards Detect it in Kharkiv Oblast,” Novyy Region 2 (New Region 

2), 24 July 2014.

320 Aleksandr Stepanov, “A Heavy Strike Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Has Been 

Developed in Russia: It Will ‘Operate’ Both in Support of the Army and the FSB,” MK

Online (Moscow Komsomolets Online), 25 January 2015.
136

Law Enforcement. A 2013 report indicated that law enforcement was 

interested in obtaining Eleron-3SV and Eleron-10SV drones. More 

purchases of these systems were predicted for 2014, as well as the 

purchase of E-95M small aerial decoy systems and E-08 larger aerial 

decoy systems.321 A Russian law enforcement agency has a contract for 

Aerob 4D drones. They have a takeoff weight of 30 kg and a payload of 

5-12 kg. They can operate at altitudes between 100 and 5,000 m, and fly 

up to 500 km. Top speed is 180 km/hour. The drone is launched by 

catapult and lands using a parachute.322 Law enforcement also has a 

contract for Voron-300 helicopter-mode UAVs. It weighs 45 kg, can 

carry a payload of 16-18 kg, and has a maximum speed of 50 km/hour 

and a maximum altitude of 2,500 m.323

Characteristics of UAVs

In 2014 Russia formed fourteen UAV divisions and some 179 

drones were added to units. Overall the number of UAV flights doubled 

in comparison to 2014 and total flying time more than quadrupled 

according to the defense ministry.324 The numerous types of UAVs are 

listed here with their capabilities, in reverse (newest on top) 

chronological order based on date of publication. For the purpose of this 

review, this list only covers the years 2013-2015.

1. A prototype UAV, with the proposed name “Altair,”

has been created at the Kazan Aviation Plant in 

Tatarstan. It reportedly has a takeoff weight of 5 tons, 

a length of 11.6 m, a wing span of 28.5 m, and a Vshaped fin that is 6 m long. Altair has two RED 

A03/V12 diesel engines. The UAV has a 

reconnaissance configuration and is equipped with an 

optical imagery station. Gazprom, the Defense 

 

321 Interfax (in English), 13 August 2013.

322 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 24 January 2014.

323 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 14 January 2014.

324 Interfax (in English), 6 January 2015.
137

Ministry, and the FSB are all interested in the

UAV.325

2. Early in 2015 Russia will start state trials of a system 

(the Takhion drone) fitted with fuel cells or an 

electricity generator as a power generator instead of 

accumulators. The generator weighs five kg, making 

the drone’s maximum take-off weight about 25 kg. It 

will be able to fly for six hours.326

3. A K-7 UAV fitted with a diesel engine was 

developed. It had an endurance record of 28 hours in 

flight and its range was over 3,000 km. Its stabilizer is 

composed of a high tail with a link between a twinboom fuselage. The working speed is 70-90 km/hour,

and it has a cruise speed of 140-150 km/hour and a 

stall speed of 60 km/hour.327

4. One report noted that the missile-guns Pantsirs, 

Tunguskas, and the newest Verba portable surface-toair missile (SAM) complexes will combat foreign 

UAVs.328

5. The Ptero-SM drone has an engine capable of 200 

hours of flight. Hybrid power can extend flight time to 

1000 hours. The drone’s current range is 800 km at 

speeds of up to 145 miles/hour. Era-50 drones are also 

being developed along with the heavier Era-100 

version.329

 

325 Timur Latypov, “First heavy Drone in Russia Sent up in Kazan...” www.businessgazeta.ru, 23 February 2015.

326 Interfax (in English), 13 January 2015.

327 Interfax-AVN Online, 30 December 2014.

328 Sergey Ptichkin, “Arsenal: A Drone Will Not Fly Past: Tactical Air Defense 

Systems Are Capable of Intercepting Any Targets,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online

(Russian News Online), 29 December 2014.

329 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Reconnaissance Craft Will Silently Appear: Drones Will Fly More 

Quietly and Without Rudders,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 26 

December 2014.
138

6. Orlan-10s have arrived at the Black Sea Naval 

Station. They have a two-meter wingspan, use five 

liters of gasoline mixed with oil, and can spend eight 

hours in the air, reaching a distance of 150 km. Its 

primary mission is to collect information and conduct 

reconnaissance, take videos and photographs, and 

conduct direction finding of communications.330

7. Russia is developing an inertial system and a terrain 

correlation navigation system for UAVs whose 

operation is not tied to GPS or GLONASS. They will 

be installed in the Istra-10 and Istra-17 UAVs. The 

Istra-17 has a launch mass of 500 kg and can fly for 6 

hours.331

8. The Inter Branch (Multiservice) UAV Center, 

established in Latvia in 1983 and moved to Russia 

after the fall of the USSR, has 3-month courses. The 

Center currently graduates about 800 servicemen each 

year. UAV companies have been established in each 

of the motorized-rifle and tank brigades.332 Other 

centers, such as the Chelyabinsk branch of the Air 

Force Academy and the 924th Combat Application and 

Training Center or Kolomna School,333 are also 

training UAV specialists.334

9. The Luch design bureau has reportedly developed a 

new UAV but it has not been named. This UAV 

weighs less than 4 kg, has two cameras with a 30-km 

 

330 Yuriy Bogomolov, “For the Combat Readiness of the Highest Limits: They Can See 

Everything from Above,” Flag Rodiny (Flag of the Motherland), 25 December 2014.

331 Timor Alimov, “Russian Combat Drones Will Be Able to Fly Without GPS or 

GLONASS,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 24 December 2014.

332 Viktor Litovkin, “They Installed UAVs Behind a Desk: Reporting from the InterBranch UAV Center,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online (Independent 

Military Review Online), 6 December 2013.

333 “The First Group of Unmanned Air Vehicle Operators Has Completed Training at 

the Kolomna Conversion-Training Center,” Interfax-AVN Online, 20 September 2013.

334 “Air Force Military Training and Scientific Center Has Begun Training UAV 

Specialists,” Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, 12 November 2013.
139

observation radius at altitudes from 50-3,000 m, and 

can fly around obstacles at low altitude. It can track a 

moving target and relay data to a control center in 

real-time.335

10. Inspector-202 UAVs are used for training. Take-off 

weight ranges from 3.5 to 4.5 kg, depending on how 

the UAV is modified.336

11. The Forpost UAV, using technology transferred from 

Israel, can stay in the air for 17.5 hours, with a 

maximum take-off weight of 454 kg and a payload of 

60 kg, a flight speed of 210 km/hour, and a top 

altitude of 3,600 m.337

12. The September 2013 MAKS-2013 Air Show was 

divided into unmanned aircraft and unmanned 

helicopters. Russian mini UAVs included Eleron-3SV 

and Eleron-10SVs, Orlans, Ptero-UYe and Ptero-Sms, 

and Strekoza and Lastochka systems. Tactical UAVs 

included Dozor, Filin, Pchela, Tipchak, and Shmel. 

Medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs 

were not listed by name and neither were the attack 

UAVs. Unmanned helicopters in the mini class were 

the ZALA 421-22 UAV, and the NELK-V4, NELKV6, and NELK V-12 systems. Tactical-class 

helicopter UAVs were the mBPV-37 and the Voron 

700. The intermediate class (MALE was not listed) 

included the BPV-500, and the heavy-class helicopter 

UAVs included the Roller and Albatros UAV 

projects.338

 

335 Konstantin Kantsidal, “The Veil of Secrecy Has Been Lifted Slightly,” Severnyy 

Kray (Northern Edge), 8 October 2014.

336 Interfax (in English), 3 October 2013.

337 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 30 September 2013.

338 Denis Fedutinov, “MAKS-2013: Varied Palette of Drones. But Only a Few Real 

New UAVs Showed Up at the Show,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online

(Military-Industrial Courier Online), 18 September 2013.
140

13. There is a 3-cm radar under development for the 

Korsar and Orion drones. It is estimated that this will 

ensure reconnaissance capabilities within 20-25 km.339

14. The Kamov Design Bureau has reportedly developed 

a UAV that can operate in Arctic conditions, among 

others. It can be transported on Mi-8 helicopters and 

can ascend to an altitude of 7 km, from where it can 

conduct reconnaissance up to 400-500 km.340

15. The Chirok UAV was demonstrated in July 2014. It 

has an air cushion chassis, permitting it to take off 

without a runway. The air cushion enables it to take 

off from soft ground, such as water, swamp, or

surfaces. Maximum takeoff weight is 700 kg and the 

payload weight limit is 300 kg. It can climb to 6,000 

m and has a range of up to 2500 km.341 Another report 

noted that it resembles a “flying wing” due to its 10 

meter wingspan and could become the progenitor of a 

series of such products.342 In March 2015 it was noted 

that a “Big Chirok” had been produced, weighing over 

two-tons. The drone’s prototype could be ready in the 

summer.343

16. Granat-1 UAV complexes, at altitudes from 800 to 

1500 m, transmitted target coordinates for the Msta-S 

self-propelled artillery pieces during an exercise. The 

Granat-1 is a part of the new Navodchik-2 UAV 

complex.344

 

339 Interfax (in English), 13 August 2014.

340 “Kamov Has Developed an Unmanned Reconnaissance Helicopter,” RIA Novosti 

Online (RIA News Online), 5 August 2014.

341 “Unmanned Vehicle for the Transport of High Precision Weapons on Display at 

Yekaterinburg Trade Show,” Interfax-AVN Online, 9 July 2014.

342 Donat Sorokin, “Drone Test Areas to be Created in Russia,” ITAR-TASS, 15 

September 2014.

343 Sputnik News, 11 March 2015.

344 “Central Military District Artillery Men Destroyed 200 Camouflaged Targets,” RIA 

Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 2 July 2014.
141

17. Russia expected to acquire 40 Eleron-3SV UAVs in 

2014. It has a photo camera, a thermal imager, and a 

video camera with 10-power magnification. It has a 

maximum take-off weight of 5.3 kg, a payload weight 

up to 1 kg, a top speed of 130 km/hour, and can climb 

to an altitude of 4,000 m. Landing is by parachute. It 

uses GPS and GLONASS for navigation.345

18. According to a June 2014 report Russia is developing 

a strike UAV with a weight of 20 tons, and it will fly 

for the first time in 2018.346

19. UAVs from the 1970s and 1980s (Strizh, Reys, 

Pchela-1, Krylo) are being recycled for nonferrous 

metals, silver, gold, and platinum. Reys worked at 500 

m and could identify objects on the ground from 20 

cm in size. It was used in the Caucasus. Strizh tested 

in 1980, and can go up to 6 km at 1,000 km/hr, 

covering 900 km in one sortie. Krylo is similar to 

Strizh. The Pchela-1 was used in the first Chechen 

campaign. These UAVs have been used as targets by 

more modern UAVs.347

20. The Voron 700 unmanned helicopter should be field 

tested by the fall of 2014. It has a transmission 

capability of up to 200 km, a gross weight of 120 kg, 

and a payload amount of 40-50 kg.348

21. The ZALA 421-22 is based on an eight-rotor design, 

with an empty weight of 7.5 kg and a payload of up to 

 

345 Vladimir Bogdanov, no title, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 8 

June 2014.

346 Marina Lystseva, “A 20-Ton Russian Unmanned Strike Vehicle Will Complete a 

First Flight in 2018,” ITAR-TASS, 2 June 2014.

347 Aleksey Krivoruchek, “Defense Ministry Will Destroy Obsolete Soviet Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles; Ferrous and Nonferrous Metals, Silver, Gold, and Platinum Will Be 

Recovered From the Recycled Aerial Vehicles,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 15 

January 2014.

348 “State Trials of the Voron 700 Unmanned Helicopter Will Be Completed in the Fall 

of 2014,” Interfax-AVN Online, 14 January 2014.
142

1.5 kg. Flight duration is 40 minutes. Photo equipment 

and a thermal vision system may be carried, making it 

possible to do night photography. It has a gyrostabilized hovering capability that increases image 

quality.349

22. The Ptero-SM drone’s take-off weight with a payload 

is 20 kg, with the payload weight being 5 kg. It can 

rise to an altitude of 3 km, with a 700-km range with a 

5 kg payload and a 1200 km range with a 3-kg 

payload.350

23. The Vozdukhoplavatel reconnaissance, surveillance, 

and monitoring UAV was made with a flying wing 

design and pusher propeller. Launch weight is about 

4kg, and flight duration two hours. The operating 

radius is 30 km.351

Airborne Commander Vladimir Shamanov stated that he hoped 

there would be UAV elements in all parachute landing companies by 

2016. Artillery, reconnaissance, special subunits, and air defense units of 

the airborne troops have them already.352 Another report stated that the 

Strelets reconnaissance control and communications system is 

compatible with all Russian UAVs.353

Some Counter-UAV Thoughts

Defending against drones has become a huge issue due to their 

unprecedented proliferation. Companies such as Amazon or Domino’s 

Pizza are thinking of using drones for home delivery. The early 2015

crash landing of a drone on the south lawn near the White House 

indicates how easy it is to intrude against even heavily guarded 

 

349 “The ZALA 421-22 Will Continue Testing in the Near Future,” AviaPort, 11-13 

June 2013.

350 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 5 February 2013.

351 “State Tests of the Unmanned ‘Vozdukhoplavatel’ System Will Be Completed This 

Spring,” Interfax-AVN Online, 4 February 2013.

352 “Preparation of UAV Specialists Starts in Russia,” ITAR-TASS, 4 September 2013.

353 Interfax (in English), 13 August 2014.
143

compounds. It is not hard to imagine terrorists planning to send drones 

against nuclear plants or other compounds. Potential counters to drones 

include regulations, sensors and radars, jamming, and destruction. 

Currently none of these systems can be considered “fail-safe” and able to 

protect structures.354

There are several Russian systems that can allegedly be used for 

counter-UAV missions. For example, in one article on the Pantsir-S1 

system, which is capable of destroying a target flying at 1,000 m/sec, it 

was noted that the system “proved itself in the Crimea last year, where it 

shot down Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles.”355 The TOR short range 

air defense missile system (ADMS) and the OSA-AKMR (ADMS) can 

intercept UAVs, while radars that can acquire UAVs include the Kasta2E2 and the IL122 Garmon, among many others.

The journal, Military Thought, has discussed counter-UAV use 

openly over the past several years. From 2012-2014 three such articles 

were written. In the first article, Russian military writers stressed the 

need for a basic defensive concept against drone attacks, one that 

develops methods able to assess their effectiveness. Aerial vehicles 

carrying guided and unguided warheads are the “principal weapons that 

are used against drones.”356 Among these weapons are portable and selfpropelled surface-to-air missile systems, antiaircraft missile and artillery 

systems, and stationary systems. Modern electronic warfare attack and 

electromagnetic pulse weapons are other means. For explosives designed 

to blast drones out of the air, high-explosive, fragmentation, armorpiercing, hollow-core, and incendiary anti-aircraft cannon fire is also 

suitable. Shells are tipped with contact detonators. Military scientists are 

concerned with figuring out several issues, such as the detection 

 

354 Mark Thompson, “Can the Drones be Stopped?” Time, 23 February-2 March 2015, 

pp. 18-19.

355 “Has the Pantsir-S1 Undergone a Combat Test near Luhansk?” Zolotoye Koltso 

Online (Golden Ring Online), 3 February 2015.

356 D. V. Lopatkin, A. Yu. Savchenko, and N. G. Solokha, “Defense Against Tactical 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 2 2014, pp. 41-

47.
144

capability of its radars, specifically their range of detection; an 

assessment of the probability of a drone being hit by a shell (a formula 

based on the number of shells fired and resulting probability of the drone 

being damaged or destroyed); and the number of a drone’s vulnerable 

areas contrasted with its number of invulnerable areas. A problem today 

is assessing the effective scattering area (ESA) of a suspected drone. 

ESA’s of birds are very similar when flying at low altitudes, especially 

in cities. ESAs or cross sections of .01-.03 m squared are most difficult 

to classify with accuracy. At 2 m squared it is easier to perform. Circular 

digital active antenna array scanners were hailed as an option that can 

supply reliable data. Further, shooting down single drones is much easier 

than contending with groups or masses of drones.357 Finally, the authors 

stated that they foresee the use of lasers as weapons and the use of 

hunter-killer drones that “destroy enemy aerial vehicles of the same 

species in flight.”358

In a second article about air defense, this time against both UAVs 

and high-precision weapons (HPW), the authors initially exhibited a 

detailed knowledge of many of the most important UAVs in the US 

inventory. After that two-three-page analysis they discussed how to 

counter them by size. As with the article above, they stated that artillery, 

lasers, and EW capabilities would be used for short- and medium-range 

UAVs; and antiaircraft missiles used for medium- and long-range UAVs. 

Of crucial importance is the ability of radars to detect UAVs at long 

range. The following was noted:

A significant advantage of the meter waveband and 

adjoining decimeter waveband is that the effective 

scattering surface of small-size targets is approximately 

an order larger than it is in the centimeter waveband and 

that for this reason small-size targets, such as drones, 

antimissile missiles, and warheads of HPW, can be 

 

357 Ibid.

358 Ibid.
145

detected at a relatively long range and air defense 

weapons have a significantly easier task fighting them.359

Three different types of drones are dealt with in different ways. 

Stopping mini- or micro-drones is the most costly and least efficient, 

since they are so difficult to spot. Medium enemy drones are countered 

with Russian Tor, Tunguska, Strela 10, and Igla antiaircraft systems, 

along with special-purpose systems. The latter include the use of 

masking techniques and aerosol screens to hide targets within a rather 

wide electromagnetic spectral waveband. Some believe these aerosol 

protection systems can be used under a heavy UAV attack. Larger drones 

(Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper, and mid-size Predators) can be handled 

with conventional piloted aerial attack vehicles. A final recommendation 

was in regard to dealing with a massive UAV attack. This requires the 

use of outside target acquisition capabilities (such as space-based 

weapon detection capabilities, etc.), EW capabilities (suppress UAV 

communications and control lines, etc.), individual and group protection 

systems against HPW (optoelectronic reconnaissance capabilities, etc.), 

and antiaircraft UAV destruction capabilities (large ammunition stocks, 

etc.).360

The third article noted that the area over the tactical battlefield 

will witness the largest number of UAVs. UAVs can be detected at 100-

400 m head on and at 150-700 m sideways. Those flying at 300-1000 m 

are practically impossible to spot, making reliance on radars an absolute 

necessity. The development of a new radar system capable of detecting 

small-size UAVs is an important way to provide air defense units with 

vital information about the threat. A suggestion was made to develop a 

wireless radar station based on a digital circular active antenna array that 

can conduct surveillance.361

 

359 “Air Defense against Massive Enemy UAV and HPW Attacks”

360 Ibid.

361 A. V. Zaitsev, I. I. Nazarchuk, O. O. Krasavtsev, and D. A. Kichulkin, “Special 

Methods for Fighting Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 5 2013, pp. 37-43.
146

At the end of 2014, another system was highlighted, one already 

known to experts for years. The S-400 Triumf system was described as 

capable of hitting any present-day aerial target, whether the target be a 

reconnaissance vehicle or ballistic cruise missile. The S-400 can climb to 

30 km or hit targets that are 10 m off the ground. It can simultaneously 

fire at 36 objects.362

Individual Equipment (Ratnik, Strelets, etc.)

Ratnik

As Russia researched its future soldier systems in 2013, it 

studied, among others, the Italian Future Soldier complex developed by 

Selex ES and the German Rheinmetall Future Soldier-Enhanced System. 

Russia’s defense market at the time had opened up to foreign suppliers to 

an unprecedented degree.363

That situation has now changed, and Russia hopes to stop its 

reliance on foreign firms. It was noted in December 2014 that a decision 

on when to issue the Ratnik (Warrior) combat equipment to the troops 

would be made in a few months. The gear was designed by the 

Tochmash Central Research Institute. There are plans to produce 50,000 

units. The system includes “firearms, sighting systems, body armor, as 

well as electronic communications and navigation systems.”364 The 

Kalashnikov AK-12 was chosen as the new “main” assault rifle in 

February 2015, and the total number of units to be purchased was raised 

to 70,000.365 Plans are underway to ensure that all components are 

Russian-made, with a target date of 2016 to accomplish the importsubstitution program.366

 

362 Inna Kieyeva and Yekaterina Izmestyeva, “Heavenly Shield. Who Guards the 

Capital’s Skies, and How,” Argumenty I Fakty Online (Arguments and Facts Online), 8 

December 2014.

363 Marina Malenic, “Russia Preps for Future Soldier System Trials,” Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, 16 January 2013, p. 23.

364 Interfax (in English), 26 December 2014.

365 TASS, 21 February 2015.

366 Interfax (in English), 22 February 2015.
147

The weight carried by a soldier has been reduced from 34 to 24 

kilograms and the small arms that are part of the Ratnik have increased 

its effectiveness by 1.2 times. Integrated body armor protection has 

increased, and command and control and communications systems have 

been integrated with other elements. Overall operational effectiveness 

has increased at least 1.5-2 times, according to estimates.367

The Ratnik has been classified according to function as a 

protection, destruction, life support, and energy supply system. It has 

more than 150 components, including helmets, overalls, a headset with 

hearing protection, protective glasses, and a joint (knee and elbow) 

protection set. Reconnaissance instruments, a combat multifunction 

knife, sniper and other types of rifles, camouflage kits for winter and 

summer, optical and thermal-imaging gun sights, and an autonomous 

heat source are also included along with standard components 

(decontamination, first aid, etc.). Ratnik-2 is tentatively scheduled to 

appear in 10-15 years.368

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Ivanovich Borisov even 

hinted that the Ratnik may have been used in Crimea. When discussing 

the technology, he noted that the so-called “polite people” looked 

“confident and comfortable in this personal gear and equipment when 

everything is at hand, when communications are well arranged, and 

when they have reliable and effective small arms.”369 In late May it was 

announced that the Armed Forces will receive 50,000 sets in both 2015 

and 2016,

370 for a total of 100,000.

In June a representative of TSNIITOCHMASH, the Central 

Research Institute for Precision Mechanical Engineering, stated that the 

 

367 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Ratnik Has Reached the Troops,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online

(Russian News Online), 15 January 2015.

368 Ibid.

369 I. Korotchenko, “Deputy Defense Minister: Dynamic Outfitting of Armies Has 

Become a Worldwide Trend...” Russkaya Sluzhba Novostey Online (Russian News 

Service Online), 25 January 2015.

370 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 26 May 2015.
148

Ratnik can protect up to 95 percent of a soldier’s body surface from fire 

and shrapnel. The integrated system of control and data exchange allows 

for drones and vehicles to exchange information with soldiers, while data 

about soldier welfare is sent to the command. Third-generation combat 

gear is under development. It will integrate different biomechanical 

devices, including exoskeletons. The gear will enable a solider to 

withstand flamethrowers. Soldiers will be able to carry up to 300 

kilograms. More importantly, equipment will be thought-controlled. A 

neural interface is planned for 2020.371 In July it was announced that 

doctors were successfully testing the Arctic variant of the Ratnik.372

In December 2015 TSNIITOCHMASH announced that it 

planned to develop nine industrial technologies for Ratnik in 2016. 

These technological advancements were not mentioned, but the article 

noted that work on the creation of new-generation high-precision sniper 

systems would continue. In all, the article listed nearly 40 components of 

the existing Ratnik system.373

Strelets

In December 2014 it was announced that several thousand 

Strelets kits had been fielded. In each package is a commander’s 

personal computer, satellite communications radio, a VHF radio, a 

range-finding and angle-measuring device, a Fara-VR portable shortrange reconnaissance radar, an IFF system, standardized information 

transmission apparatus, and individual and group navigation systems 

operating with GLONASS and GPS data. They are incorporated into the 

Ratnik’s combat gear. The modern reconnaissance, control, and 

communications system is supplied to peacekeeping subunits, 

reconnaissance scouts, and paratroopers. Strelets can interface with a 

variety of systems, to include UAVs. The kit identifies enemy facilities, 

 

371 Anton Valagin, “Russian Military Gear Will Include an Exoskeleton,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 17 June 2015.

372 Olga Vorobyeva, “Ratnik Undergoes Testing in the Arctic,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

Online (Red Star Online), 1 July 2015.

373 Mikhail Voskresenskiy, “Russia Developing Nine Technologies to Equip ‘Soldier of 

the Future’ Pack,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 28 December 2015.
149

determines their coordinates, performs target designation, and prepares 

firing data. It helps squad members interact at a distance of 1.5 km. The 

PC can display the tactical environment against a backdrop of a digital 

terrain map.374

Strelets is now integrated into a new strike and reconnaissance 

system.375 The system is reportedly known as the Strelets 

reconnaissance, command and control and communications system 

[KRUS, or kompleksa razvedki, upravleniya, i svyazi (KPYC)]. Actually 

it is not much more than a tablet weighing just over two kilograms. 

KRUS can also work as a relay device. However, its main function 

remains as a transmitter of intelligence about the enemy to fire 

destruction units, greatly reducing the time from discovery to destruction 

of a target.376 In the view of one commander, Strelets allows 

commanders to “see” all of his subordinates and ascertain their physical 

state. The system can also take photographs of targets and transmit them

to firing points.377

C3I Gear

The C3I gear under development looks promising. The systems 

include a portable radio to support receiving and transmitting speech and 

data up to five kilometers; a tactical terminal and a subscriber 

communicator for the automation of command and control, 

communications, and situational reporting; navigation using GPS and 

GLONASS systems; and capabilities to access monitoring and 

intelligence assets, including UAVs. All communication channels in the 

 

374 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Navigation Device for the Soldier, Tabled for the Commander. 

Troops Being Equipped with New Control and Communications Package,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 23 December 2014.

375 Interfax (in English), 29 December 2014.

376 Yuriy Belousov, “With One Movement of the Stylus: Latest Reconnaissance-Fire 

System Being Successfully Introduced in the Central Military District Troops,” 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 20 January 2015.

377 Yuriy Borodin, “Such an Army Does Exist,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 10 February 2015.
150

system are encrypted. This equipment was NOT developed for the 

Ratnik system.378

Invisibility Cloak

One noteworthy piece of gear was the development of an 

“invisibility cloak,” which consists of a weightless fabric with special 

coating that is designed to reflect and distort light so that the soldier 

reportedly becomes invisible. This fabric reportedly can provide 

protection from weapons of mass destruction, and the cloak can be worn

comfortably under Arctic conditions.379

Army 2015 International Military-Technical Forum

The scientific and business program for the Army 2015 

International Military-Technical Forum listed 20 separate topics that 

included roundtable discussions. The breakdown of the forum’s elements 

included the following: one academy (General Staff), eight directorates 

(Main Operations, Troop Service and Safety, Military Topographic, 

Information and Telecommunications Technology, Intellectual Property, 

Scientific Research, Main Cadre, and Medical Service), six commands 

(Ground, Navy, Air Force, Aerospace, Strategic Missile, Airborne), one

support staff (Logistics), and one department (Maintenance and 

Utilities). The General Staff Military Academy offered challenges and 

threats in the modern world, including discussions of military doctrine, 

color revolutions, global missile defense issues, and future armed forces 

composition. The Main Operations Directorate considered command and 

control and fire control as worthy of discussion (to include crisis 

situation monitoring, simulation of combat operations, and training 

equipment issues), along with Arctic security issues.380 Such lists show 

where the troubling issues for Russia’s military reside.

 

378 Unattributed article, “A UAV in the Soldier’s Combat Vest,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 March 2015.

379 Zvezda TV (STAR TV), 24 March 2015. 

380 “Army 2015 International Military-Technical Forum,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation website, 16 June 2015.
151

On the day before the opening of the Forum, it was reported that 

a microwave cannon had been created and that it would be demonstrated 

in the closed part of the exhibition. It reportedly was “capable of out-ofband suppression of electronic equipment of low-flying objects and the 

attack elements of precision weapons. The gun incapacitates aircraft and 

drone equipment and neutralizes high-precision weapons.”

381 The 

system, whose effective range exceeds ten kilometers, can be fitted to the 

Buk antiaircraft missile system. In the past such electronic systems have 

been categorized as nonlethal weapons.382 The advantage of this weapon 

is that it incapacitates and destroys electronics. It generates a very 

compact, narrow beam and has a large antenna with high energy 

radiation. The system’s weakness is that its effect can be reduced if some 

type of screening system is placed on enemy equipment.383

Press reports noted that air defense weapons shown at the Forum

from the Almaz-Antey enterprise included full-scale Buk-M2E, OsaAKM1, and Tunguska-M1 air defense systems as well as the Tayfun-M

combat vehicle; and models and posters of the S-400 Triumf, Antey2500, S-350E Vityaz, Buk-M2E, Tor-M2KM, Tor-M2E, and Tor-M2K

air defense systems and Kalibr-PLE and Kalibr-NKE missile systems. A

radar, the Demonstrator, was shown.

384

The improved Buk-M3 is now reportedly capable of reaching 70 

km in range and has surpassed the Russian S-300 in a number of 

parameters. Its target kill probability is .9999, which is more than the S300 could achieve.385 In addition, the Buk will be armed with a 

microwave cannon that can disable UAVs and high-precision weaponry. 

The cannon purportedly can provide a 360 degree defense over a radius 

of more than 10 kilometers, although this range is often contested. 

 

381 Olga Bozheva, “Microwave Cannon That Disables Enemy Equipment Created in 

Russia,” Moscow MK Online (Moscow Komsomolets Online), 15 June 2015.

382 Ibid.

383 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Shock Wave,” Versiya (Version), 22 June 2015.

384 Interfax-AVN Online, 11 June 2015.

385 TASS, 20 May 2015.
152

Unlike electronic warfare systems, the microwave beam disables 

electronic and electrical equipment.386

The Forum highlighted the Glayder-T underwater robotic 

apparatus with EW functions, capable of orienteering under water 

without the help of GLONASS. It can identify passing ships by sound, 

solve EW tasks, imitate decoy targets, and hinder sonar work, as well as 

that of other hydro-acoustic devices of an adversary. It can work 

independently for up to 180 days. Finally, the robot can collect water 

samples, detect pollution levels, take underwater photos, avoid detection 

due to an innovative engine, and transmit information to computers using

various types of communication means (radio, satellite, etc.).387

Other equipment shown at the Forum included the Verba portable 

surface-to-air missile launcher and missile, which purportedly has a new 

self-homing device and an unsurpassed kill zone. The Msta mortar, 

Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, the T-90 tank, Nebo mobile radar, and 

Su-35 and T-50 jets were also shown.388 Finally, the Strategic Missile 

Troops demonstrated their engineer support and camouflage vehicle, 

which is capable of engineer reconnaissance, assessments of loadbearing capacity of bridges and soil, route maneuverability, radiological 

and chemical reconnaissance, and widening of routes and 

emplacements.389

Electronic Warfare

The Soviet Union was well known for its radio-electronic warfare

(EW) capabilities. Today the Russian military has continued to invest

heavily in EW equipment. A real impetus for developing EW equipment 

came from the five-day war with Georgia. During that conflict it became 

clear than even air superiority was dependent on EW supremacy. 

 

386 Anton Mardasov, “Buk Microwave Weapon Will Shield Russia,” Svobodnaya 

Pressa (Free Press), 15 June 2015.

387 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 18 June 2015.

388 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 21 June 2015.

389 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 17 June 2015.
153

Another impetus was President Putin’s priority demand that at least 70 

percent of the EW equipment must be modern by the year 2020. At the 

current rate, according to Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Borisov, the 

figure could be closer to 80 or 90 percent.390

US and Western analysts have taken note. US Air Force General 

Franck Gorenc reportedly stated that these new capabilities are limiting 

access to certain territories. The EW invisible wall is a real obstacle, 

literally able to wrest a Western trump card from its hands and limiting 

attempts to project power.391

Russian EW development has been continuous for the past 

decade. From 2010-2013, for example, the Borisoglebsk-2, Alurgit, 

Infauna, Krasukha-20, Krasukha-S4, Moskva-1, Parodist, Lorandit-M, 

Leep-2, Leep-3, Lesochek, Less, Magniy-REB, and Pole-21 system trials 

were conducted.392 Several of these systems are described in more detail 

below.

One of the most interesting EW research developments is what 

has been called “radiophotonics,” which is technology that reduces the 

radar signature of an aircraft and allows the plane to be made completely 

invisible. Its use could be widespread within five to seven years. Sixthgeneration avionics include “smart [fuselage] skins,” which are control 

systems that indicate the “aircraft monitors the pilot.” The RadioElectronic Technology Concern (KRET) is working on these issues as 

well as several others, to include an EW system that can conceal 

strategic missile launchers and an aerospace-based integrated 

 

390 Unattributed report, “Defense Ministry: Proportion of Modern Electronic Warfare 

Systems in Troops Could Reach 90 Percent,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 24 September 

2015.

391 Sergey Serov, “Other People’s Weapons Will Not Reach. NATO Has Realized That 

it is Not Possible to Get into Russia’s Skies,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian 

News Online), 30 October 2015.

392 Unattributed report, “New Electronic Surveillance Tools of the Russian Army Have 

Made It Possible to Jam Enemy Sources Ten Times More Quickly Than Before,” 

Interfax-AVN Online, 15 April 2014.
154

multifunctional EW system that will provide wide-band passive radar 

coverage and have “an intellectual-and-disinformation effect” on an 

enemy. No further details were provided.

393 Russian TV showed a 

briefcase-type assembly that provides eavesdropping protection in the 

form of an “electronic blanket” for meetings in buildings or vehicles. A 

handheld receiver that can intercept, listen, or jam was also shown.394

In September the online version of the Military-Industrial 

Courier ran a two part series on myths and truths of EW. Part One 

discussed the uniqueness of Russian EW assets. Organizationally, it was 

noted that the 15th Separate EW Brigade of the Supreme High Command 

appeared in 2009, the only such brigade bearing that name. It has the still 

secret Murmansk-BN communication line suppression station (allegedly 

able to swamp over 20 frequencies in the 200-500 MHz area at ranges up 

to 5,000 kilometers) and the Leyer-3 aerodynamic blanket noise 

generating system. Now each military district has separate EW centers, 

and most of them have been reorganized into separate EW brigades. 

Each district has separate battalions as well. In addition to the Murmansk 

systems there are Infauna tactical systems and R-330Zh Zhitel and R-934 

jamming stations. Separate companies there have the 1L269 Krasukha-2 

(allegedly able to suppress AWACS at ranges of several hundred 

kilometers) and 1RL257 Krasukha-4 (allegedly able to suppress airborne 

radar stations on fighters, fighter-bombers, and the E-8 and U2 spy 

planes); and a company with Leyer-3 systems. It was note that the 

Krasukha-4 could even suppress air to air homing missiles and the radars 

controlling Patriot air defense missile systems.395

It was reported that the Khibiny system is installed on Su-34 

frontline bombers and that the Mi-8 helicopters have the Rychag 

stations. The Russian Air Force has the Il-22 Porubshchik jammer as 

 

393 Interfax-AVN Online, 3 February 2015.

394 Aleksandr Sladkov, “Military Program,” as shown on Rossiya 1 (Russia 1) TV, 29 

August 2015.

395 Aleksey Ramm, “Electronic Warfare—Myths and Truths—Part 1: How Unique are 

the Russian Army’s EW Assets?” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (MilitaryIndustrial Courier Online), 30 September 2015.
155

well. The Avtobaza system can allegedly take out drones through 

suppression, and there was an implied statement that it “clearly” was 

indirectly linked to the downing of the US unmanned aerial vehicle in 

Iran. The Moskva consists of a reconnaissance station to detect and 

classify types of radiation, their direction and signal strength, and the 

control point from where data is coming. The R-330Zh Zhitel is the best 

known satellite navigation jammer.396

The second online version of the Military-Industrial Courier

covered more information on the Rychag-AV, Chibiny, and Il-22PP

Porubshchik systems. The Rychag is designed to suppress weapon 

control radars and warheads of homing missiles from enemy air defense 

systems. Rychag reportedly can detect, receive, analyze, and suppress 

enemy radar signals, “regardless of the emission mode (pulsed, 

continuous, quasi-continuous)” and can simultaneously avoid 

suppressing its own radar stations. The system has been on the Mi8MTPR-1 since 2010.397

The Khibiny, when fitted to a Su-34, continuously exchanges 

information with its avionics and issues situational information on a 

display on the navigator’s work station. The system was used in the 2008 

war with Georgia. The EW station has a multi-channel antenna array that 

can mount noise interference and simulate radio countermeasures while 

conducting technical reconnaissance. The Porubshchik has a sidemounted antennae and towed in-flight station that unwinds, some say, 

several hundred meters behind the aircraft. It is not expected to be 

purchased by the Air Force until 2020. It is thought that the EW system 

may serve as a flying command post for EW assets.398

With regard to training, there now is an Interbranch Training 

Center for the Training and Combat Employment of the Armed Forces’ 

 

396 Ibid.

397 Aleksey Ramm, “Electronic Warfare—Myths and Truths—Part 2: How Did the 

Khibiny Overcome the Destroyer Donald Cook?” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 7 October 2015.

398 Ibid.
156

Electronic Warfare Units in Tambov.399 The training is directed at 

command staffs attempting to master the planning and organization of 

EW, combat employment of command and control items, 

reconnaissance, and electronic jamming equipment.400 Over the past 

three years many new types of radar surveillance, protection, and 

suppression systems have been delivered, including the Krashukha-4, 

Moskva-1, and Khibiny. Such systems are designed to neutralize 

precision weapon systems of an adversary by jamming frequencies or 

other onboard equipment. The modern EW battalion with this new 

technology can cover an area of one hundred by one hundred km. Inside 

this area an adversary would be unable to conduct radio and radar 

reconnaissance or deploy precision weapons with accuracy, according to 

one report.401

In an interview with the Eastern Military Districts Chief of EW, 

Vladislav Kharchenko, it was noted that the Armed Forces had acquired 

the Zhitel and Lorandit automated jamming station and R-330 BMV, 

R378 BMV, and R-934 BMV jamming systems. The latter allow radio 

EW in the HF and VHF spectrums and the jamming of cellular 

communications, navigational communications, and enemy HF aviation 

radio communications. Contract servicemen in EW units are now at 55 

percent of the force, and there is a goal to make all EW units staffed only 

with contractors.

402

EW systems developed for the Armed Forces in the past several 

years used digital processing and signal generation, automated mast 

 

399 Unattributed report, “New Generation Borisoglebsk-2 Special Complex to be 

Delivered to Central Military District’s Combined Heavy Motorized Rifle Unit’s 

Radiotechnical Troop Subunits,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Online, 

8 July 2015.

400 Unattributed report, “The Arctic Formation’s Electronic Warfare Subunits Conduct 

Training at the Interbranch Electronic Warfare Troops Training and Combat 

Employment Center in Tambov,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Online, 21 April 2015.

401 Interfax-AVN Online, 1 May 2015.

402 Vladimir Pylayev, “As in the Past, on the Front Lines,” Suvorovskiy Natisk

(Suvorov’s Charge) (Electronic Edition), 23 May 2015.
157

deployment and remote antenna alignment, modern automation and 

information and communication technologies, and solid-state 

components. Of particular significance of the EW systems entering 

service are the Krasukha-20 and Krasukha-S4, Murmansk-BN, 

Borisoglebsk-2, and the Svet-KU.403 More than 20 EW systems are 

described below.

Borisoglebsk-2: This is reportedly a multifunctional EW complex 

consisting of nine machines. Designed to jam mobile satellite 

communication and radio-navigational systems, the complex “has 

electronic reconnaissance and electronic jamming facilities with an 

expanded frequency band, an increased speed of scanning the frequency 

range, reduced reaction time with regard to unknown frequencies, higher 

accuracy in determining the coordinates of a source of radiation, and 

jamming facilities with a higher throughput capacity.”404 It is stated that 

the complex can suppress over twice the frequency range than its 

predecessors (such as the Mandat or R-330), and it can find a signal to 

jam in a hundredth of the time.405 The Eastern Military District, Arctic, 

and Southern Military District have tested the complex at Tambov, with 

the Arctic units attempting to take into account the specific conditions of 

the Polar Region. It is mounted on a mobile tracked MT-LBu armored 

personnel carrier.406 The Borisoglebsk-2 was produced by the 

Sozvezdiye Concern.

Krasukha-2: The Krasukha-2 system was developed at the Gradient 

Scientific Research Institute. It analyzes signal types and jams enemy 

radar stations. It does not use powerful radiation immediately, according 

to reports. Rather, it first probes a target with mild radiation, determines 

 

403 Russian Defense Press Service and Information Directorate, “About 20 Designations 

of Modern Electronic Warfare will Be Purchased for the Armed Forces This Year,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Online, 16 March 2015.

404 “New Generation...”

405 Zvezda (Star) TV, 2 March 2015.

406 Unattributed report, “Southern Military District’s Motorized Riflemen Master New 

Electronic Warfare System,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Online, 11 

February 2015.
158

its frequency bands, and then imperceptibly inserts itself into a longrange radar detection system such as an AWACS-type system. More 

importantly it “lulls the flying command posts and satellites with virtual 

tales about nonexistent targets and dangers.”407 The result is that the 

target attacks its own military facilities that appear as hostile to an 

AWACS.408

Krasukha-4: The Krasukha-4 is a broadband noise-interference station

that protects ground facilities from radars onboard strike aviation 

aircraft. It can also jam radars of reconnaissance and reconnaissancestrike UAVs.409 The mobile jamming station is touted as being the latest 

high-tech development to come out of the military-industrial complex. 

The system makes it very hard for an adversary to hit Russian aviation. It 

was noted that “this kind of smart technology is like gold dust” and that 

no one knows where this top-secret system will be deployed.410 They can 

establish radio interference in a wide range of frequencies without any 

limitation regarding the location of azimuth or angle. Manufactured by 

the Radioelektronnyye Tekhnologii Concern, part of Rostekh, each 

system is comprised of two KamAZ vehicles with an operating radius of 

more than 300 km. The new system is fully automated and takes into 

consideration changes in wavebands and how the frequencies of homingguidance heads operate as well as the algorithms of its effect. The system 

detects the frequencies on which reconnaissance is being conducted and 

initiates suppression automatically. The old Soviet systems, on the other 

hand, often saturated a waveband with noise and unfortunately 

suppressed its own equipment in the process.411 The system has

successfully countered the US Lacrosse-class radar reconnaissance 

 

407 Sergey Ptichkin, “AWACS Deceived by Whisper; Electronic Warfare Goes into 

Space,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 21 November 2014. 

408 Ibid.

409 Oleg Vladykin, “Battle against AWACS Practiced on Range. Russian Troops 

Receive Systems for Jamming the Opponent’s Reconnaissance and Weapons Guidance 

Systems,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online (Independent News Online), 13 March 2015.

410 Rossiya 24 TV (Russia 24 TV), 31 March 2015.

411 Denis Telmanov, “The ‘Krasukha’ Has Been Sent to the Far East,” Gazeta.ru

(News.ru), 30 January 2015.
159

satellites.412 Lacrosse-class radar surveillance satellites are designed to 

monitor launch sites of the Topol or Yars mobile ground-based 

systems.413 The system creates a dome that is impenetrable to 

electromagnetic waves. It can blind and deafen AWACS-type long-range 

radar surveillance planes, space satellites used to guide rockets to targets, 

and in tough situations, can control a high-frequency beam to “burn out 

all of an airplane’s electronic systems, rockets, or low–orbiting satellite.” 

Finally, it can create the appearance of targets that are not identifiable. 

Adversary systems will not be able to ascertain if the target before them 

is friend or foe.414 On 17 August a report from the Western Military 

District stated that the Krasukha (the article did not state which version) 

had blinded a simulated enemy’s frontline aircraft (in this case Su-34 

bombers). The system disorganized the control system and as a result the 

bomber could not detect targets and aim weapons at them.415 The system 

also can be found in the Eastern and Southern Military Districts and in 

the Arctic.

Krasukha-20: The Krasukha-20, also profiled in a March 2015 report, is 

said to be “truly the pride of the Russian defense industry.” It can be 

serviced by a single person, the driver who is also the operator. When he 

presses a button the system unfolds, lowers its supports, connects with a 

satellite, determines its location, connects to a command post, and 

operates in several minutes. Its range is 400 km with a power of 1GW. 

The system can “switch off” radar reconnaissance devices on even an 

AWACS.416

Moskva-1: This is a reconnaissance and control system monitoring the 

electronic situation in real time on all frequency ranges used by military 

 

412 Interfax-AVN Online, 1 May 2015.

413 Unattributed report, “In Russia Radio Electronic Warfare Assets Have Been 

Developed that Can ‘Hide’ Topol Launch Positions from Space Surveillance,” InterfaxAVN Online, 1 May 2015.

414 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Electronic Warfare Subunits Have Conducted Training in North 

Ossetia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 26 June 2015.

415 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.

416 Vladykin.
160

and civilian equipment. It is accomplished by the so-called digital radio 

frequency memory, analog-digital converter, and digital-analog 

converter methods.417 The Radio Elektronnyye Tekhnologii Concern will 

be supplying ten complexes of the Moskva-1 to the Armed Forces. It is 

described as a nerve center for air defenses and other electronic 

countermeasure systems. It is designed to carry out electronic 

intelligence-gathering and conduct jamming and electronic suppression. 

It can scan airspace and locate and identify electronic countermeasure 

sources with a range of 400 km.418 The system can operate in passive 

radar mode and thus remain invisible to an adversary.419 It can 

simultaneously set missions (targeting and deploying) for nine guided 

EW and PVO systems, can cover 360 degrees, and displays the air 

situation on several monitors, where each is given different visualization 

modes.420 It will act as a “brain” for the entire EW defense system of 

entire regions, revealing “enemy plans and hindering the effective 

functioning of its combat units.”421

Infauna: Used by the Black Sea Fleet, this system is composed of 

multipurpose radio reconnaissance and electronic suppression systems. It 

is designed to protect personnel and military equipment from controlled 

mines and explosives. The system can apply aerosol screens that shelter 

troops from precision weapons using lasers and optical targeting.422 The 

system is present in the Southern Military District’s combined 

formations and units in Armenia. They are located on BTR 80s.423

 

417 Vladimir Mikheyev, “Innovations in the Electronic Warfare Sphere,” Ekho Moskvy 

Online (Moscow Echo Online), 15 June 2015.

418 Interfax-AVN Online, 20 November 2014.

419 Ptichkin.

420 Unattributed report, “Southern Military District Electronic Warfare Subunits Will 

Receive nearly 20 Units of Modern Electronic Warfare Systems before the End of the 

Year,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Online, 14 October 2015.

421 Unattributed report, “Russian Armed Forces Moskva-1 Systems Can ‘Target’ Up to 

Nine Electronic Warfare Systems,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 25 December 2015.

422 Zavolokin.

423 Armenpress (in English), 27 May 2015.
161

Lesochek: this small-sized interference transmitter or EW system is 

designed to suppress radio channels of explosive devices and protect 

military vehicles and armored vehicles from landmine explosions.424 It 

can be carried in a backpack or briefcase, which can prevent 

eavesdropping as well. Reportedly this system, had it been operating in 

1995, it would have prevented the head of the Internal Troops in Russia, 

General Romanov, from being a victim of an explosion.425

Murmansk-BN: This electronic system suppresses shortwave 

communication lines based on new-generation KamAZ vehicles.426 The 

system is designed to create interference on shortwave radio 

communication lines in the operational-strategic, operational, and 

operational-tactical links of enemy command and control systems.427 It 

has been referred to as an automated system of electronic radio 

communication suppression.428

Rtut-BM: The reconnaissance troops use this system. It is mounted on a 

multi-purpose lightly armored universal carrier chassis. It can detect 

enemy missiles in flight, determine their type of radio controlled 

detonator, and apply powerful interference on the desired frequency and 

thereby disable the detonator. It can protect troops in an area up to 50 

hectares from massive bombardment.429 It is used by the Black Sea Fleet.

 

424 Central Military District press office, “Heads of Sverdlovsk Oblast Municipalities 

Will Analyze the Results of the ‘Vostok-2014’ Command and Staff Strategic Exercise,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 3 December 2014.

425 Anton Valagin, “What Frightened the American Destroyer,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 

Online (Russian News Online), 30 April 2014.

426 Yuriy Belousov, “Before the Brigade’s New Banner,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red 

Star Online), 11 September 2014.

427 Ruslan Voronov, “They Battle in the Ether,” Suvorovskiy Natisk (Suvorov’s 

Charge), 27 September 2014.

428 Ptichkin.

429 Pavel Zavolokin, “Infauna and Rtut for Naval Intelligence,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

Online (Red Star Online), 3 October 2014.
162

Vitebsk: MiG 31s430 and Su-25SM3s are equipped with the Vitebsk EW 

system, the latter with the Vitebsk-25.431 It can also be found on the Ka52 helicopter

432 and the Mi-26 heavy transport helicopter, as well as the 

Su-25 assault aircraft. New EW systems using new physical principles of 

operations [not stated in the article] will have improved technical 

characteristics comparable to the Vitsebsk system. The Vitsebsk system 

protects planes and helicopters from infrared homing missiles.433

Avtobaza: This is a radar reconnaissance system and automated 

command-and-control vehicle. The vehicle detects radar emissions from 

aircraft and the radar guidance systems of missiles. The EW system then 

analyses the type of signal and sends the same signal (but amplified 

several times over) back to the target. The aircraft’s radar loses the 

ability to see, and any missiles or UAVs go out of control and crash.434

R-330Zh: This system is an ultra-shortwave radio communications and 

radio navigation jamming station and is located in the Southern Military 

District of troops. It can block signals from some satellites, and as part of 

the overall complex it can oppose the GPS control facilities of UAVs.435

Khibina-U: This is a modification of the Khibina (Khibiny), which is a 

multipurpose system that creates a protective electronic cloud around an 

airplane where even guided rockets lose track of the target. It has been 

 

430 Unattributed report, “MiG-31s Will Learn to Orient Themselves in the Arctic 

without Satellites,” Rossiyakays Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 23 June 2015.

431 Timur Alimov, “SU-25SM3 Ground-Attack Aircraft Will Undergo Graded Tests,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 17 February 2015.

432 Yekaterina Zgirovskaya, “KRET: We Are Creating Equipment for an Advanced 

Spaceship,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 28 April 2015.

433 No author listed, “Electronic Warfare System on New Principles, Capable of 

Repelling Almost All Air Defense Systems, is Being Developed in the Russian 

Federation,” TASS, 11 August 2015.

434 Aleksandr Sofronov, “Russian Weapons Show,” Rossiya 24 (Russia 24) TV, 31 

March 2015.

435 Igor Melnikov, “15 April—Electronic Warfare Specialist Day: Weapons of 

Asymmetrical Response,” Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii (Military Bulletin of the South 

of Russia), 11 April 2015. 
163

deployed on the Su-30SM multirole fighter.436 It purportedly has the 

power to blind an adversary’s instruments. The Russian press indicated 

that the Khibiny system was applied against the USS Donald Cook in 

April 2014 when mounted on a Su-24.437

Lorandit-M: This is a compact radio-control and jamming system that 

underwent state trials in 2014.438

Gimalai Complex: this is reportedly a system composed of active and 

passive radar and optical stations that are integrated into an aircraft’s 

body and function as a “smart skin.” It is being developed for the T-50 

fifth generation aircraft.439

President-S: This complex reportedly can detect a missile, determine the 

degree of the threat, and activate the required passive and active 

electronic jamming, after which a missile from the plane “sees” only 

decoy targets and misses.440

Leyer-2: This system was referred to as an “aerodynamically launched 

jamming system.”441 In another report it was described as a mobile 

automated complex for technical surveillance, electronic spoofing, and 

jamming of electronic equipment. It can reconnoiter sources of radiofrequency emissions and jam enemy electronic equipment.442

Leyer-3: the Leyer-3 EW system uses the Orlan-10 UAV as a jamming 

platform, making it possible to perform from distances of over 100 km 

 

436 Gavrilov, “Electronic Warfare Subunits...”

437 Vladykin.

438 Russian Defense Press Service...

439 Olga Bozhyeva, “Sixth Generation Warfare: How We Will Deafen Foreign Radars, 

Satellites, and Computers: Unique Developments: Moskva-1, Gimalai, and PresidentS,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomolets Online), 2 January 2015.

440 Ibid.

441 Ptichkin.

442 Southern Military District Press Service, “Newest Electronic Warfare Complexes 

Are Being Received by Southern Military District Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 6 October 2014.
164

from a deployment position. It can counteract radio electronic and 

computer systems as well as other assets for up to 9 hours.443

Svet: This is a mobile command and control technical system, capable of 

attaining electronic emissions, creating interference, and suppressing 

enemy communication systems, as well as making their own troops 

“invisible” to the enemy’s radio-technical intelligence assets.444

Armor

It would be an oversight not to mention the recent advancements 

in Russian armor technology, such as Armata, Kurganets, and Koalitsiya 

SV self-propelled systems, and the Boomerang amphibious armored 

personnel carrier. Each has been highlighted in the open press, with a 

huge focus on the new Armata tank. 

The new T-14 Armata, with its turret uncovered, was seen for the 

first time during the rehearsal for the victory parade marking the 70th

anniversary of the end of World War II. The tank is said to have an 

internal armored capsule housing its three-man crew and an automatic 

weapons loading system. This platform is designated to be used as a 

platform for other vehicles. The military is set to receive 2,300 Armatas 

by 2020. The tank will not be sold abroad for another five years.445 It 

was designed as a medium tank capable of maneuvering against any 

enemy under conditions of the employment of nuclear or other types of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

 

443 Unattributed report, “Western Military District Electronic Warfare Specialists 

Master Leyer-3 Modern Electronic Warfare System,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation Online, 14 October 2015.

444 Unattributed report, “The Personnel of the Central MD Electronic Warfare Brigade 

Has Been Presented with New-Specimen Colors,” Nakanune.ru (The Day Before.ru), 8 

September 2014.

445 Alexander Zemlianichenko, no title provided, in the STARS and STRIPES, the 

Associated Press, 4 May 2015, at http://www.sttripes.com/jnews/europe/russia-a-newarmata-tank-makes-debut-in-parade-rehearsal-1.344176.
165

Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin noted that the tank 

eventually will have a 152-mm gun, making it the largest in the world, 

and a projectile which will burn through a meter of steel. Russian tank 

specialist Viktor Murakhovskiy stated that the new caliber main gun will 

be designated as the 2A83. The tank can acquire targets at 5,000 meters 

and engage them at 7,000-8,000 meters, firing on the move if needed. It 

has an aiming and fire control system, battle management and navigation 

system, thermal imager, and anti-mine protection. The tank’s effective 

rate of fire is 10-12 rounds/minute. It can carry 45 rounds.446

“The Armata’s armor is invulnerable to all modern and future 

tank munitions which are to date 120-mm caliber and to 100-150-mm 

anti-tank guided missiles and shoulder-fired grenade launchers,” 

according to an agency source of the Steel Research Institute.447 The tank 

also has active protection, that is, active phased-array radar that tracks all 

threats, and a special on-board computer that calculates intercept points 

for tank-bound missiles. The tank can also be used in the Arctic.

In June it was reported that the Armata will be able to reduce its 

crew from three to two members. Further, the turret is uninhabited due to 

the armored capsule that separates the crew from the ammunition 

compartment. The silhouette has special coating to reduce the Armata’s 

visibility in thermal and radar ranges.448 Retired Colonel-General Sergey 

Mayev, who previously led the Armed Forces Armor Directorate and is 

perhaps the most highly respected armor procurement officer of his 

generation, noted that the T-14 opens the path to creating robotic 

complexes in the future, since the vehicles entire control system is 

electronic. The weight to horsepower (1,500 HP) differential is much 

higher than for other vehicles worldwide, which makes the tank highly 

maneuverable. The Armata, Mayev noted, is the base chassis for an 

 

446 Viktor Baranets, interview with Viktor Murakhovskiy, “Military Expert: ‘Armata’s 

Superprojectile Penetrates a Meter of Armor’,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Online

(Komsomol Truth Online), 14 May 2015.

447 Anton Valagin, “The Armata’s Armor is Deemed Invulnerable,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 

Online (Russian News Online), 8 June 2015.

448 Interfax (in English), 18 June 2015.
166

entire class of armored vehicles.449 Serial production is not expected for 

two or three years.

Other vehicles were shown at the 70th anniversary parade. The 

Kurganets-25 armored infantry vehicle was offered as both an infantry 

fighting vehicle and an armored personnel carrier. The fighting vehicle 

variant had a 30 mm cannon, two Kornet antitank guided missiles, and a 

7.62 machine-gun. The Boomerang fighting vehicle, intended to replace 

the BTR family of vehicles, has the same turret as the Kurganets-25 and 

the same armament package. The Koalitsiya-SV will replace the 2S19 

MSTA-S SPG for the ground forces. It will have a 152 mm gun, a 12.7 

machine gun, and Tucha smoke grenade launchers.450 Another report 

noted that the Koalitsiya has a capsule for its crew of three, like the 

Armata. The same report noted that Russia has developed a 50 mm 

automatic cannon to replace most 30 mm cannons, due to the increased 

strength of steel in tanks. It can be placed on infantry fighting vehicles 

and personnel carriers.451

Other New Equipment (Vehicles, etc.)

Rakushka BTR-MDM: this vehicle will replace the BTR-D, which has 

been part of the inventory since 1974. The new vehicle is more 

comfortable, with heated seats, air conditioning, heat, and special mats, 

as well as a semiautomatic transmission, a GLONASS navigation 

system, and a steering wheel. It is twice as large as the BTR-D and can 

transport 13 soldiers and two tons of cargo. In contrast to the 8-passenger 

BTR-D, a Rakushka driver can fire on the move without getting out of 

his seat. Finally the Rakushka can travel at 70 kilometers per hour on 

paved roads and ten kilometers per hour while afloat. It has a 500-

horsepower engine (versus the BTR-D’s 240-horsepower engine) and is 

 

449 Interview with Sergey Mayev, “Analysis: Armata T-14 Tank Opens the Way for the 

Creation of Robotic Complexes,” Nakanune.ru (The Day Before.ru), 8 May 2015.

450 Nicholas de Larrinaga and Nikolai Novichkov, “Analysis: Russia’s Armor 

Revolution,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 20 May 2015, pp. 5, 24-25.

451 Aleksandr Kurennoy and Aleksey Naryshkin, “Innovations in Russian Armored 

Vehicles,” Ekho Moskvy Online (Moscow Echo Online), 22 June 2015.
167

equipped with the Tucha System for laying smokescreens.452 Another 

source stated that the Rakushka configurations are being tested as 

personnel carriers and medical evacuation and air defense systems.453

BMD-4M Airborne Fighting Vehicle: this tracked army fighting vehicle 

is armed with the Bakhcha-U combat module and has both 100- and 30-

mm cannons, along with a 7.62-mm machine-gun.454 It also has the 

Arkan antitank guided missile.455

DP-64 Anti-Saboteur Grenade Launcher: this weapon is designed to 

deliver fire at underwater targets from ships, to include defending against 

attacks from frogmen when ships are anchored. The launcher can also 

serve as a protective mode for offshore platforms. It can destroy all 

forms of light surface targets and kill frogmen up to 500 meters away.456

2S25 Sprut-SD Self-Propelled Antitank Gun: the gun’s fire control 

system will be better than the T-90 tank’s. It is equipped with the 2A75 

125 mm gun.457

Flying BMD: airborne Commander Vladimir Shamanov announced that 

a four-platoon science company is being assembled on the site of the 

Ryazan Airborne School to build a “flying BMD” in conjunction with 

the Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School.458 Checks were made to 

see if this announcement was made on April Fool’s day...

 

452 Yelena Shulepova, “The Tula Airborne Troops Tested the New BTR,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 14 December 2014.

453 Rossiya 1 (Russia 1) TV, 11 April 2015.

454 Viktoriya Chernysheva, “The Airborne Troops Will Receive 250 New Combat 

Vehicles,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 13 May 2015.

455 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 11 March 2015.

456 Ivan Petrov, “Antisaboteur Grenade Launchers to Go into Serial Production,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 24 February 2015.

457 Timur Alimov, “The ‘Sprut-SD Self-propelled Antitank Gun Should Appear by the 

End of the Year,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 15 May 2015.

458 Anatoliy Petrov, “New VDV Armament to be Displayed at Victory Parade in 

Moscow,” ITAR-TASS, 22 March 2015.
168

Andromeda-D Jamming-Proof Communications System: the airborne 

troops have taken delivery of this new system. It enables 

videoconferencing with any command and control center. 

Communication channels cannot be blocked. If one channel is jammed, 

communication takes place through an alternate channel. The system has 

several mobile points. Telescopic antennas are nearly ten meters high. 

The system still requires cables.459 It allows multiuser access to 

situational information, and plots the information on an electronic 

topographic map,460 and it works when stationary and in motion, 

allowing increased speed of delivery to commands and thus helps with 

decision-making. VDV commander Vladimir Shamanov noted that the 

“automated control system constitutes the most possible complete set of 

means for transmitting data and commands in field conditions,” to 

include satellite, telephone, videophone, and video conferencing 

services. The system also is provides security against the EW systems of 

potential enemies.461 Another source called the Andromeda-D “a 

network of electronic hardware,” connected via a radio channel, 

navigation equipment, a fixed command post, and a person’s tablet 

computer.

462

Polet-K: this is a unified control system that has increased the command 

and control cycle by 30-40 per cent. It was later integrated into the 

Andromeda system.463

 

459 Ivan Petrov, “No Blocking or Jamming: Paratroopers’ Communications Move to a 

New Level,” Vechernyaya Moskva Online (Moscow Evening News Online), 6 May 

2015.

460 Viktor Khudoleyev, “Toward New Standards of Mobility,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online 

(Red Star Online), 30 June 2015.

461 Unattributed report, “Russian Airborne Troops Equipped with Latest Control System 

Developed by Defense Industry Complex,” Unified Instrument Manufacturing 

Corporation, 22 September 2015.

462 Aleksey Krivoruchek, “They Will Equip the VDV with a Command and Control 

System for R9.5 Billion,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 24 October 2013.

463 Anatoliy Yermolin and Aleksey Durnovo Interview with Aleksey Gamburg, 38th

Airborne Troops Separate Communications Regiment, and Valery Salamov, Ryazan 

Airborne Command School, “Technical Reequipping of Airborne Troops 
169

Nebo-M Air Defense Radar: this system was shown at the Armiya-2015 

forum for the first time. It is comprised of three machines, is mobile, and 

can detect stealth technology. It reportedly can simultaneously track 200 

objects to include 20 ballistic targets; and it can decide from which 

country an intruder comes. Four crew members are in the command post 

and four others operate the radar control vehicle, with the latter being the 

electronic brain of the system.464

Arbalet-2 Parachute System: the system allows for descending and 

maneuvering so that airborne soldiers can land precisely on transport 

means or on drifting ice flows up to 20 kilometers away from a launch 

site.465

Navigation-Geodetic Systems: the Armed Forces will receive more than

30 mobile navigation-geodetic systems, which will be accommodated on 

the back of KAMAZ trucks. The system helps determine coordinates and 

heights of terrain points and the coordination of the launching and firing 

positions of missile troops and the artillery, Strategic Missile Troops, and 

Aerospace Defense Troops.466

Zaslon Radar: in August it was noted that the Zaslon-AM radar for the 

MiG-31BM has almost double the range as the older Zaslon model. 

Other work underway includes the Bars and Ibirs radio-electronic 

systems for the PAK FA (Sukhoi T-50).

467

Fundament-M: the Fundament-M automated control resource system can 

automate the collecting and processing of information from different 

 

Communications Subunits..,” Ekho Moskvy Online (Echo Moscow Online), 17 October 

2015.

464 Ren TV, 16 December 2015.

465 Yuriy Gavrilov, “In Ryazan Paratroopers Have Been Taught To Land on Moving 

Equipment,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 5 June 2015.

466 Interfax-AVN Online, 25 February 2014.

467 Interfax-AVN Online, 12 August 2015.
170

radar tracking stations. This facilitates the control of sources of 

information regarding the air situation. 468

Aistyonok 1L271: this is a portable surveillance and artillery control 

radar system. It can track a projectile in flight and locate the impact 

point. It can locate an enemy weapon within a range of 15 km and detect 

moving vehicles up to 20 km away. The system weighs 135 

kilograms.469

Communication Systems: Several new sets of communication equipment 

were on display at the Tsentr-2015 strategic exercise. These included the 

ZVKS-M secure video conferencing sets, the Azart-P1 sixth-generation 

digital radio station, the latest R-419L1 radio-relay station, the R-438 

Baryer-T satellite communication station, and the latest Redut-2US 

digital system.470 The latter system consists of four types of 

communication stations, enabling it to employ a digital field network 

together with a stationary network. All modern forms of communication 

links are available (video conferencing, e-mail, security phone). Redut 

offers multiservice networks with channel-and packet-switching 

capabilities for data exchange and management of field communication 

nodes.471 The system offers communications security and information 

protection at temperatures from minus 50 degrees Centigrade to plus 55 

degrees Centigrade.472

 

468 Unattributed report, “Eastern MD Radiotechnical Troops Receive Fundament-M 

System,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 4 August 2015.

469 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.

470 Unattributed report, “Central Military District Successfully Use New 

Communications Equipment during Tsentr-2015 Strategic Command-Staff Exercise,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 23 September 2015.

471 Southern Military District press service, “Southern Military District 

Communications Troops Currently 60 Percent Reequipped with Modern Hardware,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 13 October 2014.

472 Unattributed report, “Wide Use Made of State of the Art ‘Redut’ Mobile 

Communications System...,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 

28 September 2015.
171

Conclusions

From the discussion it is apparent that Russia’s arms factories are 

back in business and operating at full potential. President Putin has 

supported the arms factories with money and his personal influence. 

Vice Prime Minister Rogozin has spearheaded the drive, pushing for 

reform and modernization. This has resulted in a well-rounded arms 

program, as small arms, strategic missiles, armored vehicles, command 

and control equipment, and individual soldier gear have all shown 

improvement, with some developments (such as the microwave cannon) 

of special interest. Russian theorists have stated that the Armed Forces 

learned several lessons about equipment shortcomings while fighting in 

Georgia, and the recent fighting in Ukraine has most likely provided 

more food for thought. These lessons learned are resulting in suggestions 

and improvements to weaponry and equipment for potential use in future 

wars. 

The focus on developing UAVs and counters to them is well 

underway in Russia. The military will now have the capability to conduct 

extensive reconnaissance of the terrain on which they intend to conduct 

operations. This will enable the country to fight better in the North 

Caucasus and on its borders. Russia’s counter-UAV systems are also 

undergoing renovation. This is particularly clear from the number of new 

radars the military is developing. Drones are clearly an area of extreme 

importance in future war scenarios, and Russia appears well on the path 

to developing an extensive array of these vehicles that can be employed 

by a variety of service elements. The same focus is apparent regarding 

the development of electronic warfare equipment.

This developmental work on equipment has been allencompassing. Each service element has improved its posture, whether 

as a result of more training, infrastructure developments, or geopolitical 

interests (such as ground troop deployments to the Arctic). With Putin 

and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu backing every step along the way, 

Russia is vastly improving the content and modernity of its military 

arsenal, which should enable it to stand firm in the wake of any future 

challenge presented to its leaders. 
172
173

CHAPTER FIVE: AEROSPACE AND STRATEGIC ROCKET 

FORCES

Introduction

In December 2014 there were several reports indicating that 

Russia would soon have a new service, the Aerospace Forces (VKS). 

This development had been under consideration for many months. In 

June 2015 Lieutenant General Alexander Golovko told Interfax-AVN that 

the Aerospace Forces had been established, and “an appropriate 

resolution has already been issued.”473 Golovko noted that the merger, 

which is to mirror the US and Canada’s North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD), is to be completed in 2015. The force 

would be tasked with “building up a reliable missile attack warning 

system, both in space and on the ground, where a network of radar 

systems is to be deployed.”474 However, some sources discounted 

Golovko’s statement.475

On 3 August 2015 the suspense ended. Defense Minister Sergey 

Shoygu stated that, in compliance with a presidential decree, a new 

branch of Russia’s Armed Forces, the Aerospace Forces, began duty on 

1 August. He added that “Their creation was prompted by a shift of the 

‘center of gravity’ in combat struggle to the aerospace sphere. Aviation, 

the air defense and missile defense forces, and the space forces and 

means of the Armed Forces have now been merged under a unified 

command.”476 The Strategic Rocket Forces remain separate. Another 

source said that the new system can be viewed as a Russian response to 

the US’s Prompt Global Strike concept.477 President Vladimir Putin

 

473 Interfax (in English), 16 June 2015.

474 Interfax, 16 June 2015.

475 See, for example, Vladimir Mukhin, “Radar Stations and Fighter Jets Will Cover the 

Arctic by 2016: Idea of Creating in Russia Full-Fledged Aerospace Forces Has Not 

Found Understanding among Everybody,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online (Independent 

News Online), 22 June 2015.

476 Interfax (in English), 3 August 2015.

477 Ibid.
174

designated Colonel General Viktor Bondarev, former Commander-inChief of the Air Force, as the Commander of the Aerospace Forces;

Lieutenant General Pavel Kurachenko, former Deputy Commander of 

the Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO), as the Chief of Staff and First 

Deputy Commander responsible for air and missile defense issues; and 

Lieutenant General Alexander Golovko, former Commander of the 

VKO, as the Deputy Commander of the VKS and Commander of the 

Space Forces.478

The Air Force and those forces currently belonging to the VKO 

have now been integrated into one service. The Air Force will cease to 

exist as a separate service; only the Ground Forces, Navy, Strategic 

Rocket Forces, and VKS will remain. One source noted that the VKS 

will include an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system, an 

aerospace attack deterrence system, a unified control system, and a 

comprehensive support system.479

The VKO did well in 2014, as it received ten state-of-the-art 

radars that can help detect cruise missiles. In particular, the Poldet-K, 

Nebo-M, and the 96L6 radars were mentioned.480 These radars ensure 

that the VKO is fully modernized and able to accept missions as planned. 

According to an interview with Major-General Anatoliy Nikolayevich 

Nestechuk, the Deputy Commander of the VKO Space Command, the 

VKO troops celebrated their branch’s holiday for the last time as a 

separate unit on 1 December 2014.

481 The VKO was established on that 

day in 2011 under the edict of then-President Dmitry Medvedev. Space 

Command Troops, part of the VKO, also celebrate this day.

 

478 Interfax (in English), 3 August 2015.

479 Interfax (in English), 10 December 2014.

480 “Military Space Troops Receive 10 State-of-the-Art Radars,” Abakan AIS, 8 

February 2015.

481 Aleksey Durnovo, Interview with Anatoliy Nikolayevich Nestechuk, “Aerospace 

Defense Troops Space Command’s Primary Mission is to Ensure Russia’s Security in 

Space,” Ekho Moskvy Online (Echo Moscow Online), 29 November 2014.
175

This chapter initially provides a short look at the VKO’s theory, 

tasks, and missions. It then examines Russia’s perception of the 

aerospace threats against it and the rationale behind the creation of the 

VKS. Space troops, hypersonic missiles, offensive and defensive 

missiles and radars, and aerospace deployments in the Arctic and Crimea 

are discussed. Upgrades to the Strategic Rocket Forces are highlighted as 

well, even though they are not part of the Aerospace Force. The chapter 

ends with the latest discussion of what it all means for Russia’s strategic 

deterrence and stability concepts. Where mention is made of the VKO in 

regard to space troops, missiles, or deployments, it is with the 

understanding that this refers to its VKS component.

Theory, Tasks, and Missions of the VKO

VKO theory refers to “the field of military science studying 

problems of the creation of systems of armament and the employment of 

forces and assets” that execute national VKO missions.482 VKO is a 

system of political, economic, military, military-technical, legal, and 

other measures for preparing and conducting military operations in 

aerospace. These measures must take into account the geopolitical and 

geostrategic situation, as well as the military threats that exist now and in 

the future.483 Threats that must be countered include the following:

 ICBM upgrades that increase their capabilities to 

penetrate missile attack warning and missile defense 

systems; equipping of reentry vehicles with 

nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction

 Cruise missile developments that enhance their longrange capabilities

 Hypersonic aircraft developments for various 

purposes

 

482 Valentin Nikolayevich Dybov and Yuriy Dmitriyevich Podgornykh, “On the 

Question of Aerospace Defense Theory—Part 1: Main Military Threats to our 

Country’s Security Continue to Stem from Aerospace,” Vozdushino-Kosmicheskaya 

Oborona Online (Air-Space Defense Online), 11 December 2014.

483 Ibid.
176

 Space system and orbital platform strike 

developments against space, airborne, and ground 

targets

 UAV upgrades, to include strike UAVs

 Ballistic and nonstrategic ballistic missile upgrades

 US missile defense upgrades and their deployment 

near Russia’s borders

 Weapon developments based on new physical 

principles484

Some believe the development of a VKO system that can parry these 

threats is as important to Russia now as was the development of nuclear 

weapons in the 1940s. The VKO system must be strategic, operational, 

tactical, lengthy, active, deliberate, and mobile, and have anti-aircraft, 

anti-missile, and anti-space capabilities due to a potential enemy’s 

offensive aerospace weaponry.485

The overall task of the VKO is to maintain the status of Russia’s 

orbital spacecraft grouping, which provides for Russia’s military and 

national security; and to uncover in a timely fashion any threat from 

other nations building antisatellite means or space forces. As of 

November 2014, Russia had 130 spacecraft with nearly 70 percent 

capable of performing military security missions. Some 30 spacecraft 

utilize the GLONASS system, with 24 primary spacecraft and six in 

reserve. Soon (at least by 2020) the GLONASS-K system will replace 

GLONASS.486

In April 2015 the Military-Industrial Courier published an article 

that explained what steps needed to be taken to solve problems 

associated with forming the new Aerospace Forces:

 

484 Ibid.

485 Ibid.

486 Durnovo and Nestechuk. 
177

 Simultaneously with the VKO’s creation, create the 

Strategic Aerospace Command for the command and 

control of troops being employed regardless of their 

branch affiliation; or allow the VKO Main Command 

to have the same functions

 Restore the territorial principle of organization, where

anti-space potential will only be handled at the 

strategic level

 Create a common command and control of aviation 

and all VKO forces based on a global information 

system

 Return fighter aviation units to air defense divisions

 Draft a new statute on VKO coordination in the 

Armed Forces

 Create a system of information support and 

destruction through integrating air defense and 

missile-space defense

 Introduce specialties and develop methods of 

multipurpose aviation operations.

487

The Aerospace Theater of Military Operations

Russian specialists recognize that near-Earth space (40-100 km) 

is now able to be populated with hypersonic aircraft and aerospace 

aircraft. This will require the creation of an aerospace theater of military 

operations (VKTVD). The TVD concept, as it evolved in Russia, had a 

military-strategic expanse in mind, not just a geographic one,

488 so an 

expansion of the concept into the aerospace realm is not unexpected.

 

487 Vladimir Barvinenko, “Old Problems of a New Branch of the Armed Forces: 

Additional Measures Are Needed to Combat the Aerospace Enemy Effectively,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military–Industrial Courier Online) 29 April 

2015.

488 Yuriy Vladimirovich Krinitskiy, “Aerospace Theater of Military Operations Is To 

Be: Major Aerospace and Strategic Air Operations Involving Military-Space and 

Missile-Aviation Forces of Leading World States Are Possible in Global Aerospace,” 

Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona Online (Air-Space Defense Online), 7 February 

2015.
178

A theater of military operations was defined in the 1983 Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary as 

Part of the territory of a continent with ocean coastal 

waters, inland seas, and airspace (continental theater of 

military operations) or the water area of a single ocean, 

encompassing the islands in that ocean, adjacent seas, 

landmass coastal strips, and airspace above them (oceanic 

theater of operations), within the boundaries of which 

military operations of a strategic force (ground forces, air 

forces, naval forces) can be organized and conducted.489

This concept of a TVD has now been extended due to the merging of air 

and space mediums into an aerospace TVD, one that fills in the layer of 

near-Earth space. Airborne command and control, communications, and 

navigation facilities, refueling points, jammer aircraft loiter zones, and so 

on enable an aerospace attack to achieve more surprise than is possible in 

a conventional TVD. An orbital grouping in peacetime can also represent 

the preparation of outer space in the interests of war. The war footing can 

be established or aligned in hours or minutes, achieving surprise, since a 

defending force will not have time to react accordingly. For that reason, 

Russians believe, an aerospace TVD has to be formed.490

The concept has been under investigation since at least 2006. 

This is indicated by the fact that the Aerospace Defense Officer’s Guide

of that year had a Chapter (Three) titled, “Aerospace Medium as a 

Theater of Military Operations.”491 The Military-Political Dictionary of 

Deputy Chairman Dmitriy Rogozin’s Military-Industrial Commission 

noted the following: 

 

489 N. V. Ogarkov, Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission, Voennyy 

Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983 Moscow, 

Military Publishing House, p. 732.

490 Krinitskiy.

491 Ibid.
179

An aerospace TVD is global aerospace within which 

major military-space and strategic air operations are 

possible involving military-space and missile-aviation 

forces of leading world states. This theater is 

distinguished by...military operations during which space 

supremacy is won and conditions are created for 

executing military-space missions, including for repelling 

an enemy aerospace attack and for delivering strikes 

against facilities and armed forces from space. The 

aerospace TVD is broken down by spheres of operations 

into near-space airspace, near space, mid-space, and deep 

space.492

It was Italian General Giulio Douhet who stated that “victory 

smiles on the one who anticipates changes in forms of war, and not on 

the one who adapts to the changes.”493 This is particularly true in regard 

to the developing aerospace TVD, since it has become the base for 

planning operations and preparing the infrastructure to execute specific 

military-political and military-strategic missions during war.494

The Big Four Aerospace Threats to Russia

In June 2014 nearly 200 scientists took part in the 17th AllRussia Scientific and Practical Conference on Defense and Security in 

Saint Petersburg. The discussion began with a presentation by the 

President of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences, 

Vasiliy Burenok, who listed six 21st century military-technical threats to 

Russia, four of which turned out to be aerospace-related: the US and 

Chinese missile defense systems; the US’s adoption of hypersonic cruise 

missiles; NATO’s development of high-speed kinetic weapons, laser 

 

492 Ibid.

493 Ibid.

494 Ibid.
180

systems, and weapon control systems; and space technology 

developments, such as the use of mini- and nano-satellites.

495

Konstantin Sivkov, the journalist who wrote the article, noted 

that this will require Russia to equip its forces with the next generation 

of high-tech weapons operating on new physical principles and 

supporting the pursuit of contactless and information wars. Robotized 

models of arms must increase by 20-30 percent as well.496 He added that 

Russia already has a number of breakthrough technologies, such as 

direct-flow hypersonic jet engines and flight management systems; 

super-high-yield warheads; laser weapons; small, medium, and large 

robot-based platforms; electrothermal chemical and electrodynamic guns 

with high-speed projectiles; super-high-yield electromagnetic pulse 

generators; multispectral optical target detection devices; ultrabroadband radars with phased-array antennas based on radio photon 

elements; zonal rapidly-deployed active and passive hydroacoustic 

systems for interpreting the underwater situation; and means of 

conducting information wars (particularly in cyberspace) and cognitive 

control.497

It was pointed out in the reports that the main threat to Russia's 

security in the region emanates not from traditional armed forces but 

rather from the destabilization of very important defense capability 

subsystems. The range of hostile measures include the advance of proWestern figures into positions of power, “indirect force operations”

ranging from sorties by environmentalists to the staging of political 

crises and acts of terrorism, and the use of nontraditional military 

systems based on new physical principles, in particular the deployment 

 

495 Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call for Sixth 

Technological Generation to be Adopted into the Armory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014. The other two 

developments were the improvement of information warfare forces and resources; and 

the introduction of the sixth technological advances in equipment, which will signal the 

move to fully intellectual models that implement the concept of “cognicentric” warfare.

496 Ibid.

497 Ibid.
181

along Russia’s borders of ten plasma systems (in the United States, 

Canada, Iceland, Norway, and Japan), which provoke earthquakes and 

other natural disasters.498 Deputy Commander of Aerospace Defense 

Troops Major-General Kirill Makarov noted that such weapons have the 

potential of blinding reconnaissance equipment or destroying weapons. 

Russia is researching this weaponry as well.499

Russia’s missile defense weapons include the following:

 S-300P (SA-10)

 S-300V (SA-12A/B Giant/Gladiator)

 S-300PMU-1/2 (SA-20A/B Gargoyle)

 S-400 (Triumf)

 S-500 ( Prometheus )

The Aerospace Troops, comprising three branches, thus incorporates the 

following:

 Main Command

 Long Range Aviation Command

 Military Transport Aviation Command

 Four air and air-defense armies in military districts

 An air and missile defense army

 An aerospace troops army

 The Ministry of Defense’s State Space Test Center 

 A number of combined and separate units. Specialized 

units include electronic warfare, signals, radiotechnical and automated command systems support, 

engineering and meteorological, logistics, and 

research facilities.500

 

498 Ibid.

499 Korotchenko.

500 Interfax-AVN Online, 11 September 2015. See also the Defense Ministry Collegium 

Session chaired by Army General Sergey Shoygu, at the Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation Website, 11 September 2015.
182

Why Form a VKS?

One of the primary reasons for forming an Aerospace Force is 

that defense in aerospace is so different from other defensive postures. 

When fighting tanks or ground troops the targets are in the same physical 

environment. Aerospace fights are entirely different. Instead of targets 

moving at a few kilometers per hour, aerospace defense systems are 

targeting attacks launched at super-high speeds from hundreds of 

kilometers away, and the attacking forces are usually unseen. As a result, 

aerospace defense responses differ significantly from their ground-target 

counterparts.501 Warning times are extremely short and destruction can 

be significant, depending on the target chosen and the force of the 

incoming projectile/wave.

In April 2015 Makarov provided another reason for forming the 

VKS: echoing Shoygu, he noted that since the end of the last century the 

center of gravity (COG) of warfare had shifted to the aerospace sphere. 

As a result, offensive aerospace weapons have begun executing strategic 

missions. For that reason Putin approved the aerospace defense concept 

in 2006 for further development.

502

Russia’s military sees an aerospace threat from the US in the 

form of the US Prompt Global Strike capability. The concept, according 

to Makarov, “presupposes an instantaneous strike against any state which 

the US considers the enemy within a short space of time, from 40 

minutes to two and a half hours.”503 The threat could include cruise or 

intercontinental missiles, as well as hypersonic aerial vehicles.504 Russia 

is also working on a response to the US’s X-37 system and to laser 

weapons. Makarov stated that he cannot disclose what is being done, but 

that the country is working on ways to counter these threats.505 The 

 

501 A. V. Belomytsev, M. G. Valeyev, and N. L. Romas, “About Ways to Fight against 

the Aerospace Enemy,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5 2014, pp. 6-7.

502 Igor Korotchenko, “General Makarov: No Offensive Air Weapons are Invisible to 

Us,” Russkaya Sluzhba Novostey Online (Russian News Service Online), 5 April 2015.

503 RIA Novosti, 1647 GMT, 4 April 2015.

504 Ibid.

505 RIA Novosti, 1708 GMT, 4 April 2015.
183

global strike threat to Russia has resulted in the Defense Ministry 

increasing its production of air defense missiles threefold in comparison 

to 2014.506 The organizational changes in the Air Force, according to 

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, began in the middle of 2013, when 

aerospace defense brigades were restructured into air defense 

divisions.507

To counter the endo-and exo-atmospheric threats that comprise 

global strike, Makarov stated that the Russian S-500 system will be 

capable of intercepting targets at distances in excess of 600 km and a 

ceiling of several hundred kilometers. It will perform theater and 

strategic missile defense, as well as space defense.508 The S-500, it is 

believed, will operate in tandem with the A-235 Samolet-M strategic 

missile defense system. 

Another air defense system is the S-400. In April 2015 it was 

available in nine regiments, while the S-350 Vityaz and Buk-M3 SAM 

(70 km range) systems should arrive soon. Tactical air defense units are 

already receiving the S-300V4 with a 400-km range. 

In September another explanation of the purpose of the VKS was 

offered. Maxim Shepovalenko, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of 

Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, stated that this “new focus 

reflects lessons learned in the wake of NATO’s intervention in 

Yugoslavia in the late 1990s.”509 Thus, the reason for the merger was to 

“ensure a prompt response to any attack coming from the air or 

space...”

510 Finally, he noted that “it is an incomplete integration. 

Compared to the US Air Force, which wields both the sword and the 

 

506 TASS, 9 April 2015.

507 “Reorganization of Aerospace Defense Brigades into Air Defense Divisions 

Completed, Shoygu Reports,” RIA Novosti, 1 December 2014.

508 Yaroslav Vyatkin, “’Prompt Global Strike’ Russian-Style,” Argumenty Nedeli 

Online (Arguments of the Week Online), 16 April 2015.

509 Matthew Bodner, no title offered, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 3 August 

2015.

510 Ibid.
184

shield, we will be incorporating only the shield.”511 Here it seems he is 

referring to the fact that Russia’s Strategic Rocket Force is under the 

purview of a separate military branch. 

The Defense Ring around Moscow

The defense ring around Moscow is called the S-50 system, and it 

can reportedly intercept from 400-800 complex aerodynamic targets 

simultaneously. As new radar and missile facilities and equipment are 

added, the defense ring will be termed the S-100. New Konteyner-type 

beyond-the-horizon radars are aiding distant early warning capabilities. 

Nebo-M complexes are being delivered. They can operate in several 

frequency ranges simultaneously at distances of 600-1800 km and 

altitudes of 600-1200 km. The complex of such systems is being created

by the production firm Shlyambur, where work on strategic precision 

missile weaponry and other fields are brought together. This could 

include such missiles as the Tsirkon.512

One report noted that five surface-to-air systems of the S-400 

Triumf variety and anti-aircraft missile and gun systems of the Panzer-S 

variety (no number given) will ensure the air defense of Moscow and the 

Central Industrial District in 2015, while mid-range surface-to-air Vityaz 

systems are being created to replace the old S-300P system.513 Another 

report stated that by 2020 Russia will have five S-400 missile regiments 

and 20 Pantsir-S missile battalions. Further, Sukhoi Su-35S, Mikoyan 

MiG-35S, and T-50 fighters are being procured to confront and destroy 

hypersonic and ballistic missiles. Fighter jets now are used not only to 

gain air superiority but also to confront enemy attack means in nearEarth space.514 Radar “aids” to be received in 2015, whose acquisition 

will double the current number, include the “Fundament” model range of 

automated control systems, the “Podlet-K” and “VVO” radar stations, 

the “Test” training system, and others. In 2014 ten sets of new-

 

511 Ibid.

512 Ibid. 

513 Interfax (in English), 10 January 2015.

514 Interfax (in English), 8 December 2014.
185

generation radar equipment, such as the “Nebo-M,” “Podlet-K,” and 

“VVO,” were received.515 These new systems, due to their increased 

range and accuracy, will reduce the number of radars around Moscow 

fourfold by 2021.516

A VKO exercise in January 2005 involved a simulated attack on 

Moscow. In the exercise S-400 Triumf, S-300 Favorit air defense missile 

systems and Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and gun system 421176 took 

part. The Don-2N radar was used to detect and destroy ballistic targets 

with electronic launches of interceptor missiles. Target roles were 

assumed by MiG-31 and Su-27 fighter planes. More than 50 missile 

launches were simulated.517 The Don-2N radars, which reportedly can 

get a fix on missile launches several thousand kilometers away, are part 

of the system known as the A-135. The 96L6Ye (or VVO all-altitude 

target detector) was used as well. It can identify aircraft, helicopters, 

UAVs, and missiles, and can track up to 100 targets simultaneously.

518

The Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system, operational 

since 1995, is currently situated only around Moscow, but it is being 

augmented to protect other major cities in Russia. A successor to the 

previous A-35, it complies with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 

the Russians state, from which the US unilaterally withdrew in 2002. It is 

currently operational although its 53T6 (NATO: SH-11) component has 

been deactivated (as of February 2007). A newer missile is expected to 

replace it. The S-300PMU1 and PMU2 can intercept SRBMs, and the S-

 

515 “Aerospace Defense Troops To Reduce Fourfold the Range of Radar Aids 

Purchased for Moscow Air Defense,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomolets Online), 20 

February 2015.

516 Interfax (in English), 19 February 2015.

517 Interfax-AVN Online, 27 January 2015.

518 “Moscow Missile Defense Destroyed Missiles and Aircraft of Simulated Enemy 

with Help of New Systems,” Newsru.com, 27 January 2015.
186

300V and S-400 Triumf systems are capable of intercepting a multiple 

IRBM attack by all DF-21 model IRBMs.519

Other Issues

In late January 2015 Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev 

submitted a proposal to Putin to merge the United Rocket and Space 

Corporation (ORKK) with the Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos). 

ORKK General Director Igor Komarov was recommended to be its new 

head.520 In February it was announced that the Almaz-Antey enterprise 

would be reorganized. This aerospace concern specializes in the design 

and manufacture of air defense weapons. It will now add the “means” of 

space defense to its products. The A. I. Berg Central Radio Technology 

Research Institute and the Kometa Corporation for special-purpose space 

systems will also be included in the reorganized enterprise. The institute 

and corporation were, until recently, part of the Roskosmos structure.521

In another development, the Radio-Electronic Technology Concern is 

developing an aerospace-based integrated multifunctional electronic 

warfare system for the army. The system will offer “wide-band passive 

radar coverage,” which, according to one source, will “have an 

intellectual-and-disinformation effect” on a potential adversary.522

The enhanced but yet to be produced S-300VM/VMK is capable 

of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 2,500 km and re-entry 

speeds of 4.5 km/s, whereas the S-400 is claimed to be capable of 

intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500 km, which equates to 

re-entry speeds of 4.8 to 5 km/s. A system designed to intercept 

warheads at 5 km/s has the ability to act as a point system against simple 

ICBM warheads, which have a typical re-entry speed of 7 km/s. Apart 

 

519 Wikipedia, accessed on 21 July 2015, at 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense_systems_by_country#Russia

520 Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Space as Corporation,” Vedomosti Online (The Record Online), 

22 January 2015.

521 Interfax (in English), 6 February 2015.

522 Interfax-AVN Online, 3 February 2015.
187

from the main Moscow deployment, Russia has striven actively for 

intrinsic ABM capabilities of its late model SAM systems.523

The S-500 (and the S-400) most likely will use the 77N6-N and 

the 77N6-N1 missiles. They were reported to be capable of direct 

engagement with targets flying at hypersonic speeds (seven kilometers 

per second). However, it is not clear when the 77N6-N and the 77N6-N1 

will enter service. The S-500 is expected to use the following radars: the 

91N6A (M) acquisition and battle management radar, the revised 96L6-

TsP acquisition radar, and the new 76T6 multimode engagement and 

77T6 ABM engagement radars.524 Further, the Aerospace Forces have in 

their inventory some 125 aerodromes. About 80 percent require 

upgrades, and the repair will last until about 2020.525

Of interest is that specialists from the Peter the Great Military 

Academy in Serpukhov have reportedly “devised and successfully tested 

a generator which is capable of hiding mobile missile installations with 

an aerosol curtain.”526 Composed of a pulsing combustion chamber, it 

forms an artificial cloud that covers the Yars, Topol, and Topol-M 

systems with tiny dispersible particles and is capable of hiding the 

missiles from space observation. The generator can also be used as a 

thermal generator to heat hangars or in aerosol form to disinfect military 

equipment.527 Speaking of Yars, there was also a report that holographic 

images that are identical in size to Yars launchers may, with laser device 

assistance, help mask objects as well. The images “can disguise objects 

as their background or as objects designed for a different purpose.”528

 

523 Ibid.

524 See “Missile Threat,” A Project of the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes, 

at http://missilethreat.com/defense-systems/s-500/

525 Interfax (in English), 3 August 2015.

526 Tass, 6 October 2015.

527 Ibid.

528 Interfax (in English), 8 October 2015.
188

Space Troops

The Space Command Troops include the Main Missile Attack 

Warning Center, whose space echelon monitors the launch of ballistic 

missiles of other nations and whose ground echelon monitors their flight. 

A Unified Space System is supporting the space echelon, while new 

Voronezh-type radars are active components of the ground echelon. Near 

Moscow the Don 2N radar system performs missions in support of 

missile defense. The Main Space Situation Reconnaissance Center is 

responsible for warning about foreign objects that might impact the 

International Space Station. Finally the Main Space Systems Test Center 

is developing both the space and ground echelons.529 Outside of Russia 

the Volga and Dnepr radars are located in Belarus and Kazakhstan, 

respectively, and the Okno space surveillance system is located in 

Tajikistan.530

Two educational institutes support the VKO: the Aleksandr 

Fedorovich Mozhayskiy Military Space Academy in Saint Petersburg 

(with a branch in Yaroslavl), which trains air defense force specialists; 

and the Zhukov Air Defense Troop Air Academy in Tver, which trains 

specialists for missile attack warning systems. In addition, a science 

company for air defense troops has been established.

Defense Minister Shoygu stated that the Aerospace Forces 

command and measurement complex, based in Yevpatoria (Crimea), will 

have advanced satellite control equipment. New-generation Voronezh 

radars have entered service in Orsk, Kaliningrad, and Irkutsk, while trial 

service is underway in Yeniseisk and Barnaul.531 Another report noted 

that five more Voronezh-class radars are being positioned in Russia 

(three are now being created in Yeniseisk, Barnaul, and Omsk, and work 

is under-way to build stations in Vorkuta and Murmansk). This will 

 

529 Durnovo and Nestechuk.

530 Ibid.

531 Interfax (in English), 30 March 2015.
189

bring the totally number of Voronezh-class radars in Russia to twelve,

according to the article.532

Air Force

According to one report, the Defense Ministry has plans to 

acquire nearly 1,000 new planes and helicopter by 2020, which will 

ensure that seventy percent of the Air Force’s equipment is new.533

Included in the purchases are the following:

 30 Mikoyan MiG-35S multirole fighter jets, contract 

concluded by 2018.534 At present, the delivery of 48 

Su-35 multirole fighters is being implemented.535

 T-160 strategic bomber production will be restored 

and ready for delivery to the troops in 2021. Fifty 

aircraft will be delivered for service.536

 PAK FA T-50 fighter aircraft, with deliveries to start 

in 2017.537 Tests are to be completed by the end of 

2016. Also known as the Prospective Airborne 

Complex of Frontline Aviation, this multirole fighter 

jet is composed of composite materials and innovative 

technologies, aerodynamic configurations, and low 

radar, low optical, and low infrared signatures.538 This 

advanced long-range system is expected to replace the 

Tu-95 and the Tu-22 bombers. It may not be ready 

before 2025.539

 An Interfax report stated that more than 45 modern 

aircraft will be fielded before the end of 2015. They 

 

532 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.

533 Interfax (in English), 12 August 2015.

534 Interfax (in English), 12 August 2015.

535 Interfax (in English), 26 August 2015.

536 No author listed, “Tu-160 Expected in another Six Years,” Gazeta.ru, 27 August 

2015.

537 Interfax-AVN Online, 26 September 2015.

538 Interfax (in English), 28 September 2015.

539 “Tu-160 Expected in another...”
190

are the Su-30SM, the Su-30M2, Mi-28 attack 

helicopters, Mi-8AMTSh transport attack helicopters, 

and three Su-34 fighters.540

Strategic Rocket Forces

Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov noted that a 

centralized battle management focus for the Strategic Nuclear Forces 

(SYaS) was a priority mission that was fulfilled with the creation of the 

National Defense Management Center (NDMC, also referred to as the 

National Defense Control Center elsewhere in this book, due to different 

translations of the term upravleniya). The SYaS Command and Control 

Center, part of the NDMC, is where leadership decisions will be made 

for the employment of nuclear weapons in emergencies. Another priority 

mission was the completion of a Unified Space System:

It is planned to have in its makeup an orbital grouping of 

ten specialized new-generation spacecraft and modernized 

command posts providing command and control of the 

orbital grouping and automatic reception, processing, and 

transmission of special information to consumers. The 

new spacecraft will be multifunctional and not only 

capable of reliably determining the fact of the launch of 

any ballistic missiles and tracking their flight paths, but 

also...they will comprise the space segment of the 

automated system for battle management of the SYaS.541

There are specific acronyms associated with these forces and 

troops that are noted here for future use, and several are used in the 

discussion that follows. They are: 

 

540 Interfax (in English), 6 October 2015.

541 Viktor Yesin, “Peace Vehicles—Part II: It is Time to Eliminate the Gap between 

Advanced Engineering Solutions and Defense-Industrial Complex Production 

Capabilities,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier 

Online), 25 February 2015.
191

 Strategic Nuclear Forces (SYaS)

 Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN)

 Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces (MSYaS)

 Strategic Missile Submarine Cruiser (RPKSN, with 

eight Borei-class of this type planned) 

 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

 Air Strategic Nuclear Forces (ASYaS)

 Long-Range Aviation (PAK DA, with modernized 

Tu-160s)

 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (KRVBs)

 Nuclear Warheads (YaBZ)

 Missile Complex (RK)

 Heavy Bomber (TB)

 Missile Defense (PRO)

 Developmental Projects (OKR)

 and Rail-Mobile Combat Missile Complex (BZhRK).

Due to the country’s geostrategic position and huge land mass, 

Russia’s SYaS place their main emphasis on ground components. As a 

result, 60 percent of delivery vehicles and some two-thirds of its nuclear 

warheads are located there. Much of the force will be shrinking in the 

coming years, however. By 5 February 2018, under the START III 

agreement, aggregate numbers of launchers, missiles, bombers, and 

warheads will not be able to exceed 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, 

and TBs; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and 

nuclear warheads for deployed TBs; and 800 for deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and TBs.542

Retired Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, a former Chief of Staff for 

the Strategic Rocket Forces, noted that by 2021 the RVSN will have two 

kinds of basing: silo-based (Topol-M RK, Yars RK, and an RK with a 

 

542 Viktor Yesin, “Peace Vehicles—Part I: Voyevoda Will Hold Out to the Last,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 18 

February 2015.
192

heavy-class ICBM) and mobile (Topol-M RK, Yars RK, Yars-M RK, 

and BZhRK). The heavy-class RK will be a liquid-propellant missile and 

the rest will be solid-propellant missiles.543 Russia’s inventory of 

missiles in the Ground, Naval, and Air Force (followed by the NATO 

classification when available) are as follows: 

RVSN

 RS-20V/R-36M2: the Voyevoda or SS-18 Satan can 

be equipped with ten warheads (with an 11,000-km 

range) or one warhead (with a 16,000-km range); it 

should remain in the force until 2022, and will be 

supplemented by the new Sarmat ICBM in two years, 

which eventually will replace it

 RS-18/UR-100N: the Stilet or the SS-19 Stiletto can 

carry up to six nuclear warheads with a 10,000-km 

range; it should remain in the force until 2019

 RS-12M/RS-12M1: this ground mobile Topol or SS25 has a single warhead and a 10,500-km range and 

should be in the force until 2019; it is to be replaced 

by Yars in the future

 RS-12M2: this silo-based Topol-M or SS-27 Sickle B 

carries a single warhead with an 11,500 km range

 R-24: this ground mobile Yars or SS-29 can carry six

nuclear warheads with a 10,500-km range; it should 

remain in service until the mid-2030s; there is also a 

silo-based Yars

MSYaS (RPKSNs with SLBMs are in the Northern and Pacific fleets)

 Project 667BDR (Kalmar): there are two of these 

RPSKNs with a sum total of 32 RSM-50s (R-29RKU 

or SS-N-18) armed with the D-9R, which can each 

carry three nuclear warheads with a range of 6,500 km 

 

543 Yesin, “Peace Vehicles—Part II.”
193

 Project 667BDRM (Delfin): there are six of these 

RPKSNs with a sum total of 96 RSM-54 (R-29RMU 

or SS-N-23) SLBMs, armed with the D-9RM, which

can carry four nuclear warheads with an 8,300 km 

range; an improved RSM-54 was developed in 2014 

named Layner, capable of carrying ten low-yield 

nuclear warheads

 Project 941 (Akula): although six of these RPKSNs 

were produced with 20 RSM-52 (R-39U or SS-N-20), 

armed with the D-19, only one remains in service, the 

Dmitriy Donskoy, which now has the RSM-56 SLBM 

(Bulava) and is known as the 941U. It can carry ten 

nuclear warheads with an 8,300-km range

 Project 955 (Borei): there are three (Yuriy 

Dolgorukiy, in the Northern Fleet; Aleksandr Nevskiy 

and Vladimir Monomakh, in the Pacific Fleet) with a 

sum total of 16 RSM-56 (R-30 or SS-N-32) armed 

with a shipboard missile complex, capable of carrying 

6-10 nuclear warheads with a range of 9,300 km when 

armed with six warheads and 8,000 km when armed 

with ten.

ASYaS (armed with KRVBs)

 Tu-95MS6 (Bear-H6): there are 27 of these TBs 

armed with six Kh-55 cruise missiles on each bomber 

for a total of 162, with a flight range of 10,500 km 

without refueling; the Kh-55 (RKV-500A or AS-15A) 

has a range of 3,500 km.

 Tu-95MS16 (Bear-H16): there are 28 of these TBs, 

armed with 16 Kh-55s cruise missiles on each bomber 

for a total of 448, with a flight range of 6,500 km 

without refueling

 Tu-160 (Blackjack): there are 11 of these TBs armed 

with 12 Kh-55SM cruise missiles on each bomber for 

a total of 132, with a range of 10,500 km without 

refueling; the Kh-55SM (RKV-500B or AS-15V) has 
194

extended flight range due to the installation of 

additional fuel tanks544

Planned KRVBs

 Kh-101 is planned: it will have a fragmentation-highexplosive warhead, with a possible option of a highexplosive, fuel-air explosive, and cluster warhead

 Kh-102 is planned: it will have a nuclear warhead545

These KRVBs reportedly have a maximum range of 5,000-5,500 km. 

They are equipped with electro-optical correlation systems, integrated 

GLONASS system receivers, and an electro-optical homing head. The 

terrain-following missile will be at altitudes of 30-70 m. If these 

characteristics conform to reality, then the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS TBs 

will greatly increase their combat capabilities.546

Another way that Russia has restored its missile shield is through 

the announcement that it will be resurrecting its rail-mobile ICBM 

system. This is in response to the US global strike platform. In the Soviet 

era the RT-23 Molodets (NATO classification as the SS-24 Scalpel) was 

the rail-mobile combat missile complex (BZhRK). It will be replaced by 

the Barguzin BZhRK, which should become operational by 2020. The 

main weapon of the Barguzin will be the RS-24 Yars missile, which 

contains four warheads. Each Barguzin will carry six Yars. Like 

Molodets it can be hidden from space surveillance among “the thousands 

of railroad trains bustling throughout the expanses of an enormous 

country daily.”547 It took less than three minutes for the Molodets to 

receive an order and execute it by launching the first missile.548 Whether 

such parameters are available for the Barguzin is not known.

 

544 Yesin, “Peace Vehicles—Part I”

545 Yesin, “Peace Vehicles—Part II”

546 Ibid.

547 Vadim Ponomarev, “The Elusive Barguzin: A Big Surprise for the United States,” 

Ekspert Online (Expert Online), 22 June 2015.

548 Ibid.
195

Another journalist describing the Barguzin added more 

information about the system. First, the railroad infrastructure for missile 

trains (reinforced tracks in the patrol zone, launch sites, and basing 

locations) remain. Second, each missile train will be armed with six RS24 Yars, “the ground version of the naval Bulava.”549 Thus, this is a 

multipurpose complex that can operate both at sea and on land. Crews 

can stay in the Barguzin up to one month, and the train can travel up to 

1,000 km in a day and it can hide in a dense forest or in tunnels. Other 

concealment means include powerful electronic warfare systems and 

defenses against terrorists. The range of fire is 10,000 km, although in 

the article’s accompanying the Bulava diagram it was 8,000 km. The 

train consists of three diesel locomotives, a command post and duty shift 

“barracks” of seven cars, a tank car with POL supplies, and three 

launchers with missiles.550

Other missile variants are as follows:

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

 RS-26: Rubezh or Avangard: an ICBM that is road 

mobile and is the ground-mobile Yars-M RK

Intermediate-Range Missiles

 RSM-10: Pioner or SS-20 Saber; an intermediaterange ballistic missile

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles:

 OTR-21: Tochka or SS-21 Scarab; a short-range 

ballistic missile system

 OTR-22: Temp-S or SS-22 Scaleboard; a short-range 

ballistic missile system that is road mobile

 Iskander-M: successor to the Oka or SS-23 Spider; a 

short-range ballistic missile

 

549 Sergey Ptichkin, “Train Number One: Russia Completed Design of Super Powerful 

Weapon,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 4 June 2015.

550 Ibid.
196

The RS-26 Rubezh was created on the basis of the RS-24 Yars. It 

will have lighter missiles and thus shorter range. Launched only from 

mobile systems, it will have better armament and a multiple re-entry 

warhead, weighing under 80 tons. Speculation is that it is a Russian 

response to the construction in Europe of US missile defense assets, 

since Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin described the US system as a 

killer of missile defense assets. Experts state that the Russian system can 

change height and direction during flight. The system is scheduled to be 

fielded in 2016.551

Developing Hypersonic Weapons

In March 2015 the Military-Industrial Courier Online noted that 

Yuri Baluyevskiy, the Chief of the Russian General Staff from 2004-

2008, had announced in 2004 that a spacecraft was tested that was 

capable of flying at hypersonic speed “while maneuvering both in course 

as well as altitude.”552 The missile would thus be capable of penetrating 

all missile defense systems currently in existence. The article noted that 

the first mention of the missile’s designation, Project 4202, came in 

2007.553 In June 2015 an Internet report stated that Russia’s hypersonic 

Mach 10 Yu-71 missile, part of a secret missile program codenamed 

Project 4202, had a probable speed of up to 11,200 km/h (7,000 mph).554

This is more than five times the speed of sound.

Russia’s Sputnik News, citing a report from Jane’s Information 

Group, noted that Russia may put as many as 24 nuclear-capable Yu-71 

missiles in service from 2020 to 2025. The Sarmat ICBM is expected to 

carry the new hypersonic device. According to the report, the PAK DA, 

the next-generation strategic stealth bomber, will be armed with 

 

551 Unattributed report, “Killer of Missile Defense Assets,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online

(Russian News Online), 17 September 2015.

552 Aleksey Ramm and Dmitriy Kornev, “Hyperdeath Coming Soon: VPK 

Correspondents Traced Launches of Secret Weapons,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 March 2015.

553 Ibid.

554 See http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/06/russia-has-fourth-test-of-mach10-yu71.html
197

hypersonic cruise missiles.555 Another report referred to the bomber’s

cruise missile as the Kh-90, capable of speeds up to Mach 4.5.556

One Interfax report stated that up to six launches of Project 4202 

were performed in the last decade using the RS-18B (UR-100-N UTTH) 

intercontinental ballistic missile from the Baikonur spaceport.557 Another 

Interfax report stated that tests of the system would continue in 2015 and 

that Project 4202 was an “intermediate stage in the creation of a newer 

combat payload for the existent and prospective heavy intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, including the RS-28 Sarmat.”558

Crimea, the Arctic, and Aerospace Assets

Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Golovko, the Commander of the 

VKO, noted that there is special attention being given to the restoration 

of VKO troops on Crimea. He said that its geographic location provides 

“great advantages for accomplishing space surveillance and spacecraft 

control missions.”559 Russia now must restore VKO infrastructure, as 

well as the missile attack warning system on the peninsula. On 1 

December 2014 the Yevpatoriya complex in Crimea became the chief 

center for space system testing and control. It also appeared to be linked 

to the Titov Main Space Test Center in Krasnoznamensk in the Moscow 

region. The Separate Telemetry Complex in Yevpatoriya will have its 

computer facility and engineering and technological systems 

modernized. The Deep Space Communications Center in Yevpatoriya 

began operations in 1961. It controlled nearly every Soviet space craft 

for 20 years. Its equipment was practically unused in the Post-Soviet 

 

555 No author listed, “Secret Russian Hypersonic Nuke Glider Can Pierce Any Missile 

Defense,” Sputnik (Satellite), 28 June 2015.

556 Sergey Ptichkin, “We Will Fly at Hypersonic Speed: Work Continues on Creating 

New-Generation Missiles,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 22 July 

2015.

557 Interfax (in English), 22 July 2015.

558 Interfax (in English), 22 July 2015.

559 Anna Potekhina interview with Aleksandr Golovko, “1 December—Aerospace 

Defense Troops Formation Day: a Space Grouping from the Arctic to Crimea,” 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 29 November 2014.
198

period, but is now controlling spacecraft of the Russian orbital grouping. 

It has been connected to the space monitoring system.560

Another unit that conducts tracking and telemetry during

launches of strategic missiles and spacecraft for the Space Troops, 

Strategic Missile Troops, and the Navy is located in the northernmost 

unit of the Plesetsk cosmodrome.561 Organizing VKO presence in the 

Arctic is a priority mission. Radio-technical troops went on alert duty on 

1 November 2014 there. A Unified Space System is envisaged for the 

near future; it will allow around-the-clock monitoring of missile threat 

areas. Tests of the Angara rocket at Plesetsk are ongoing as well. 

Containerized radar equipment is under development. Included are 

radars such as the Podlet-K1, Gamma-M, and the Nebo series. So this 

was a very busy time for the VKO,

562 before its eventual integration into 

the VKS.

Conclusions

The creation of an Aerospace Force is a tremendous 

organizational change for the Russian military. Perhaps the main reason 

for the change was the realization that there had been a “shift of the 

‘center of gravity [COG]’ in combat struggle to the aerospace sphere,”

according to Defense Minister Shoygu’s statement in August 2015.563

The discussion in the journal Military Thought about creating an 

aerospace theater of military operations represented one of the most 

important indicators of the significance of the COG shift of military 

struggles and offered a rationale for the reorganization. The new COG

will require different methods for conceptualizing aerospace reality. 

Russia did not want to lag behind in its military development and 

thought the VKS would be a quick way to modernize. 

 

560 Ilya Isotov, “Crimea to be Provided with New Aerospace Defense Systems,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 21 February 2015.

561 “You Think Differently Here,” Zapolyamyy Vestnik Online (Beyond the Polar Circle 

Journal Online), 14 April 2014.

562 Ibid.

563 Interfax (in English), 3 August 2015.
199

Russia’s military offered three reasons for the reorganization 

effort. Primarily, defense in aerospace is very different from other 

defense postures. Aerospace defense systems are defending against 

attacks launched at them at super-high speeds from hundreds of 

kilometers away, which makes warning times extremely short and the 

destruction potentially significant, depending on the target chosen and 

the destructive force of the incoming projectile/wave. Secondly, as 

Deputy Commander of Aerospace Defense Troops Major General Kirill 

Makarov asserted in April 2015 (and repeated by Shoygu in August), 

since the end of the last century the COG of warfare has shifted to the 

aerospace sphere. Finally, Russia’s military sees an aerospace threat 

from the US in the form of the Prompt Global Strike concept, which, 

according to Makarov, “presupposes an instantaneous strike against any 

state which the US considers the enemy within a short space of time, 

from 40 minutes to two and a half hours.”564 The threat could include 

cruise or intercontinental missiles, as well as hypersonic aerial 

vehicles.565

It will take some time for the various components to adjust to 

such a significant change. Several journalists have stated that they 

believe the change will not work. Alexander Golts, a prominent Russian 

author on military affairs for many years, believes the changes will not 

result in any changes to armed forces management.566 Doctor of Military 

Sciences Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical 

Problems, thinks that uniting the military space forces and the missiledefense systems would make more sense, since they fight objects coming 

in through the space sphere. Adding the Air Force makes as much sense 

as adding the Navy, Sivkov noted.567

The military leadership kept the Strategic Rocket Forces out of 

the reorganization plan. This makes sense, since this force was and will 

 

564 RIA Novosti, 1647 GMT, 4 April 2015.

565 Ibid.

566 Alexander Golts, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 10 

August 2015.

567 RIA Novosti, 4 August 2015.
200

remain in the coming years as the strongest deterrent Russia has to any 

attack on the Motherland. Thus, as the VKS continues its reorganization, 

the SRF is developing new missile variants. The end result is a more 

potent force.
201

CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIA PREPARES FOR FUTURE WAR

Introduction

The concept of future war has long been a topic of intense 

interest for the Soviet and now Russian military. This chapter offers a 

summary of recent thinking in the Russian military regarding future war, 

picking up the discussion after 2011 (when future war was described in 

this author’s book, Recasting the Red Star). The chapter begins with a 

look at Russian technological developments affecting future war in the 

following order: the field of robotics; the innovative suggestions for 

equipment development from Russia’s Advanced Research Foundation

(the country’s equivalent of the US’s Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency or DARPA) and the military’s Intra-Branch Research 

Special Projects Directorate; and the work of the military’s new science 

companies. The chapter concludes with a look at future war references in 

the most recent 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation as well 

as the conceptual views found in military journals that discuss both the 

characteristics of a future war and how one might be fought.

Automatons in Epaulettes

Some Russian analysts believe tomorrow’s wars will be fought 

without human participation. To prepare for that eventuality, Russia is 

working hard to prepare selected robotic equipment to conduct 

reconnaissance on land and sea, to fight fires, to conduct rescue 

missions, to fight in cities and the countryside, and to evacuate wounded 

soldiers from the battlefield. Only recently did Russia appear to develop 

a strategy indicating what type of robots are required. 

This section looks at developments in robotic technology in 

Russia over the past three years. One of the most promising 

developments was the 2012 establishment of the System for Advanced 

Military Research and Development of the Ministry of Defense (SPIVR). 

Subordinate to it are the Main Directorate for Innovative Research 

(GUNID), the Main Directorate for the Development of Information and 
202

Telecommunication Technologies (GURITT), and the Main Research 

and Test Center for Robotics (GNITsRT).

568

2013-2014

Robots fascinate everyone, it seems. Russia’s Tank-Biathlon 

contests of 2013 and 2014 were no exceptions. The first competition 

opened with an android cutting the ribbon and last year a metal ribbon 

was cut with a laser beam controlled by a robot.

In August 2013 Colonel-General Oleg Ostapenko, the Deputy 

Defense Minister of Russia, gave a strong indication of the growing 

importance of robots in an interview on the defense ministry’s 

“Innovation Day.” He announced that the ministry is forming an 

integrated targeted program that will saturate the troops with robotics. 

The time frame for reaching this goal is 2020-2025, which may require a

reallocation of funding. A Main Robotics Center to implement these 

programs has been developed, located on “holdings” of the former 

Zhukovskiy Air Engineering Academy, near the Dynamo subway station 

in Moscow. Laboratories have been built and specialists are in place. 

Activities include studying robotic needs, developing support 

requirements for models of arms and equipment, and transferring models 

to industrial production. It was noted that a unique military robot would 

be produced in 2014, one with a tracked chassis equipped with a hybrid 

engine that can clear terrain of mines and perform other missions.569 In 

September 2014 it was reported that military engineers had cleared 

mines from farmland and forests in Chechnya using just such a hybrid 

engine, which was placed on the Uran-6 mine clearing robot.570 The 

Uran-6 remote-controlled multi-functional robotic mine-clearing system 

reportedly can do in a day the work equivalent of 20 combat 

 

568 See the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, most notably 

the link at http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defense

569 Interview with Oleg Ostapenko, “Russian Federation Defense Ministry Innovations 

Day: Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Oleg Ostapenko Held a Press 

Conference,” VPK.name (Military-Industrial Courier.name), 9 August 2013.

570 Interfax (in English), 1 September 2014.
203

engineers.571 It has an adequate power-to-weight ratio (32 hp/t), can be 

controlled from 1,000 meters away, and can withstand explosions of up 

to 60 kilograms of TNT.572

There were many reports on the development of robots in 2014. 

They serve all types of military functions and branches of service. Oleg 

Martyanov, who manages the Combat Robot Laboratory 

Interdepartmental Working Group, noted that the Russian Armed Forces 

are developing separate combat robot companies in each military 

district and in the fleets in accordance with the Robot Complex 

Development and Combat Employment Blueprint for the period to 2025. 

The first real advancements, however, are expected as early as 2017-

2018, which indicates that a variety of robot technology systems will 

soon be on the battlefield.573

As but one example, Russia’s strategic rocket missile systems 

now reportedly have a mobile robot complex to protect them. It will be 

part of the groups’ mobile automated security system. Using the new 

system

One can conduct reconnaissance, detect and destroy fixed 

and mobile targets, carry out fire support of subunits, and 

patrol secure facilities and grounds. It is equipped with a 

Kord heavy machinegun, a Kalashnikov tank machine 

gun, and a mounted 30-mm automatic grenade launcher. 

The unique robot complex permits weapons guidance and 

target tracking and destruction in the automatic and 

semiautomatic mode. It is equipped with optical-

 

571 Unattributed report, “An Exercise with Military Engineers is Being Held at the 

Russian Military Base in Armenia,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Website, 22 July 2014.

572 Unattributed report, “Eastern Military District Engineering Troops to Receive 

Newest Uran-6 Minesweeper Robot,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Website, 2 October 2015.

573 Yuriy Gavrilov, “The Army: Combat Robot Companies Will Be Created in the 

Russian Army,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 7 November 2014.
204

electronic and radar reconnaissance equipment... All of 

this permits it to combat saboteurs even at night.574

Robots will also be developed on the so-called Avatar Principle, which 

means adapting the robot to the physics of a human’s behavior, so that 

the robot can transmit a signal to the machine.575

For the Navy, it was reported that fifth-generation submarines 

will have robots, which will be the generation after the Yasen and Borei 

types. Admiral Viktor Chirkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian 

Navy, stated that in the future submarines will “be enhanced through the 

integration of future robotic systems into their arms arsenal.”576

During the Ministry of Defense’s Innovation Day in 2014, 

Georgiy Antsev, a general designer of the Morinformsistema-Agat 

Concern, noted that in order to protect maritime areas, surface, 

underwater, and flying robots are required. Antsev noted that his group 

can create robotic systems to protect ports and border areas. Together, 

the system consists of “robot-controlled boats, unmanned planes and 

helicopters, various types of buoys, sensors controlling aviation systems, 

and gliders.”577 The group also develops and supplies ships with digital 

computer systems for sea-based missile systems, target detection, and 

target designation.578

The Institute of Problems of Marine Technologies also developed 

an underwater robot, which can scan the seabed for threats at high speed, 

using a multifunctional lighting system, and destroy such threats if 

necessary. The robots can work in pairs, with one robot sighting an 

object (e.g., a mine) and another device brought to the site with an aimed 

explosion device to destroy the threat. These robots, made of high-

 

574 Ibid.

575 Ibid.

576 RIA Novosti, 17 June 2014.

577 “Russian Scientists Have Developed a System of Robots for Protection of the Seas,” 

RIA Novosti Online, 4 August 2014.

578 Ibid.
205

strength aluminum, can operate at depths up to 12,000 meters.579 Leonid 

Naumov, the director of the institute, stated that such a remotelyoperated vehicle could perform these functions (mine detection, 

destruction, etc.) based on its equipment. The latter included an 

autopilot, navigation system, sonar locator, manipulator, and other 

systems.580 On 8 July the Moscow Times reported that Russia is 

developing an underwater robot to protect Russian shores from 

underwater intruders, and the research includes methods of detecting and 

locating ultra-quiet underwater objects. No name was provided for this 

special underwater robot.581 Another report stated that a robot submarine 

was being created at a robot technology laboratory, again to detect 

moving objects far away from the territory being protected.582

For the Army, it was reported in June that tracked Platforma-M 

combat robots, armed with four grenade launchers and a Kalashnikov 

machine gun, would support motorized infantry units and paratroopers 

during exercises. In this case, the robots supported Russian forces 

fighting illegal armed units in urban areas. Stationary and mobile targets 

were hit. The robots assisted in the reconnaissance of enemy minefields, 

aiding in the selection of lanes in order to pass through them.583 Another 

report stated that a test model of a mobile reconnaissance strike robot 

had been created. Together with the Tayfun-M armored counter-saboteur 

vehicle and an unmanned aerial vehicle, it will be involved with 

detecting and liquidating saboteur-reconnaissance formations.584

A report in Russia beyond the Headlines noted that by 2025 at 

least 30 per cent of the military technology in the Armed Forces will 

include robotic hardware. Five robots that are in service now include the 

 

579 Sergey Ptichkin, “Stop, Whoever is Afloat! Underwater Robots Will Protect Marine 

Bases,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 19 September 2014.

580 ITAR-TASS, 17 September 2014.

581 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 8 July 2015.

582 Anton Valagin, “Underwater Robots Will Protect Russia’s Sea Borders,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 9 July 2015.

583 Interfax (in English), 20 June 2014.

584 Gavrilov.
206

Platform-M (missions include reconnaissance, patrol, and guard duties, 

while armed with a grenade launcher and a machine gun); the Wolf-2 

mobile robot (an off road tracked chassis, controlled remotely up to three 

miles away, uses Kalashnikov machine guns and large-caliber Utes and 

Kord machine guns, can fire while moving at 22 mph, has an imager, 

laser rangefinder, and a gyrostabilizer, and is to be used as a guard for 

Tobol-M and Yars missile systems); Uran-6 (demining system controlled 

remotely up to .6 miles away, has bulldozer blades and trawls); the

Shooter robot-commando (Shooter or Strelets is a machine gun fixed 

atop a tracked chassis that can storm buildings in urban areas; it is slow 

moving but can ascend staircases); and the Gnom amphibious robot 

(neutralizes mines under water, sees up to 110 yards, and can do 

underwater reconnaissance).585

An exercise was carried out in the Southern Military District 

where engineering detachments cleared agricultural areas of mines using

two new Uran-6 robots. The self-propelled unit can carry up to five 

separate clearance devices.586 At the Armed Forces engineer troop 

training center near Moscow, not only the Uran-6, but also the Uran-14, 

known as the firefighter robot, were being tested. The Uran-14 has a tank 

capacity of 2,000 liters and can be connected to an external water source. 

Its range is 50 meters.587

In recent field tests in the Astrakhan region, machine-gun 

wielding battle robots took center stage. Mobile and stationary robotic 

systems were explored, to include remote-controlled means of stealth 

technology and signaling. Each robot weighs 900 kb, has a speed of up 

 

585 Tatyana Rusakova, “Automatons with Epaulettes: Russia’s New Generation of 

Military Robots,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, at 

http://rbth.co/2015/01/22/automatons_with_epaulettes_russias_new_generation_

586 Interfax-AVN Online, 16 January 2015.

587 Unattributed report, “Remote-Control Robotic Systems Are Being Tested in the 

Armed Forces Engineer Troops Training Center in Moscow Oblast,” Ministry of 

Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 12 September 2014.
207

to 45 kilometers per hour, and can function up to 10 hours at a time. It

can remain operational in the standby mode for up to a week.588

The goal of such exercises is to ensure that Russian specialists 

learn how to operate effectively in an unsafe environment with minimal 

risk to a person. This is particularly relevant for fire fighters, emergency 

rescue personnel, reconnaissance or police units, and those involved in 

decontamination operations. In the future there may not be a need for 

soldiers on a battlefield. Meanwhile intense research is underway to 

provide systems that can prevent the robotics base components from 

being neutralized or jammed.589

Specialists participating in the exercise included the following:

 Main Directorate for Scientific Research Activities 

and Technological Tracking of Advanced 

Technologies of the Ministry of Defense

 The Main Scientific Research and Testing Center for 

Robotic Equipment of the MOD

 The Directorate of the Chief of Engineering Troops of 

the Armed Forces

 The Open Joint-Stock Company 766 Directorate of 

Manufacturing and Technological Integration

 The Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute 

of MOD’s Engineering Troops

 The Training Center of MOD’s Engineering 

Troops.590

 

588 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 2 January 2015.

589 Anatoliy Yermolin, Aleksandr Kurennoy, and Aleksey Naryshkin interview with 

Igor Denisov and Oleg Martyanov, on “Arsenal,” Ekho Moskvy Online (Echo Moscow 

Online), 1 September 2014.

590 Unattributed report, “Issues Involving the Creation and Use of an Air Mobile Group 

of Robotic Engineering Systems Practiced at Moscow Suburban Chkalovskiy Airport,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 29 October 2014.
208

Colonel Sergey Khripunov, Chief of the Defense Ministry’s 

Scientific Research Test Center of Robot Technology for Combat 

Application and Information, stated that combat robots would participate 

in the Red Square parade in Moscow celebrating the 70th victory 

anniversary over fascism in World War II. He noted that about 20 

wheeled and tracked vehicles with armament will take part. The Defense 

Ministry is still discussing a host of ethical questions regarding robots, 

such as whether they (or their operators) can be held accountable for 

killing people and whether they can cooperate within a group and help 

others seek cover or evacuate damaged robots.

591

One report noted that the development of robotics is caught up in 

the traditional trouble within Russia, its bureaucracy and corruption. At 

times, foreign equipment is blindly copied, such as a Russian sapper 

robot that was copied from a US model. Another problem is the 

continued purchase of Western components, which makes production

easier and less expensive. As a result domestic projects suffer as talented 

employees in Russia depart for private firms abroad. Russia’s Advanced 

Research Foundation needs protection from these issues if it is to 

function properly.592

2015

There were numerous robotic exercises conducted in the various 

service branches in 2015. To highlight the number of robots under 

development, they are place in bold lettering in the analysis for easy 

identification.

In the Navy a Platforma-M robotic system helped repulse an 

attack of enemy frogmen attempting to seize a ballistic missile 

submarine.593 The Navy is also testing a robot underwater vehicle, the 

 

591 Unattributed report, “Combat Robots Will Take Part in Victory Parade on Red 

Square,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 25 November 2014.

592 Unattributed report, “How the Russian Military Will Equip the Army with Robotics 

in the Next Few Years,” Barnaul AMI-Tsentr, 9 November 2014.

593 Unattributed report, “News of the Day (Novosti Dnya),” Zvezda TV (Star TV), 19 

January 2015.
209

unmanned Marlin. It will help ensure the safety of divers at depths of up 

to 300 meters. Both warships and rescue ships will use it.

594

 

For the Army, President Putin was shown a humanoid battle 

robot. It did not get a good write-up, with one paper stating the robot 

carries no visible weapon, can only move at a crawl, and is dumb.595 But 

not all is lost. The Uran-14 firefighting robot, developed by the 766 

Production and Technological Outfitting Directorate, closely resembles 

the Uran-6 multifunctional mine clearing vehicle. The Uran-14 can be 

controlled remotely up to 3 km away and can follow the Uran-6 through 

minefields. It can deliver a continuous jet of water up to 50 m with a 

2,000 liter tank capacity. It also has infrared equipment to see behind 

walls. The vehicle weighs 14,000 kg and has a maximum speed of 12 

km/hr.596

The Army’s Nerekhta robotic system can provide fire support 

for rifle units, and provide reconnaissance data. It can carry up to 700 kg 

and, in effect, is a truck. Presently it is armed with the Kalashnikov 

PKTM machine gun or the Kord machine gun. Fire control still needs to 

be better organized, the weapons magazine needs to be larger, and it 

must be possible to reload it by remote-control. The vehicle’s running 

performance, its protection capability, and its power plant all need work 

as well to keep it safe and silent. The vehicle has the ability to work in 

temperatures ranging from -50 to +50 degrees Celsius; and can withstand 

impacts and vibrations of up to 10-g loads.597

It was reported that the Konstruktorskoye Byuro 

Mashinostroyeniya (Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau) was 

beginning to equip robots with the Ataka antitank system and with the 

Igla-S system from the Strelets launcher modules. Robots are being 

 

594 Unattributed report, Zvezda TV (Star TV), 16 February 2015.

595 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 21 January 2015.

596 Victor Khudoleyev, “Firefighter Uran,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 

6 March 2015.

597 Unattributed report, Rossiya 24 (Russia 24) TV, 28 March 2015.
210

developed to protect and defend intercontinental ballistic missile silos598

and, as noted, to fight fires. In the latter case, not only the Uran-14, but 

also specially fitted T-72 and T-80 tanks are used in this role, able to 

shoot a 100-meter jet of water.599

In May, just before the huge 70th anniversary celebration of the 

end of World War II, there was a report on the Russian Terminator

robotic, known as the Uran in Russia. It can conduct reconnaissance or 

engage armored vehicles at maximum range. No number designation was 

affixed to this particular Uran as was to the above mentioned Uran-6 and 

-14, although a later report noted that the Uran-9 was a remotecontrolled robot system that consists of reconnaissance and fire support 

robots. They can be armed with a 30-mm cannon or a 7.62 machine gun 

and anti-tank missiles, depending on the mission.

600 The Uran-9 can be 

used for local army, anti-terrorist, or urban operations. The robots have 

laser exposure warning and target detection systems, and identification 

and tracking systems.601 Here we are talking about robots supporting the 

action of the land force on the battlefield (operating not only alone, but 

also as subunits), since robots have no fear, can set up and wait for days 

in ambush positions, and are easier to fix than a human if blown up. 

Several prototypes were unveiled at the Army 2015 technology forum.602

Another report noted that Uran has Ataka guided weapon complexes, has 

a remotely controlled range of 1 km, and can hit targets moving at speeds 

of up to 400 km/hr at low altitude.603

Speaking of land battlefields, the United Instrument-Making 

Corporation is making a tracked, robotic platform for combat, 

firefighting, and Arctic expeditions. The URP01G platform can work in 

 

598 TASS, 14 April 2015.

599 Unattributed report, “Russian Army Adopts New Firefighting Tank,” Vzglyad 

Online (View Online), 25 May 2015.

600 Interfax-AVN Online, 30 December 2015.

601 Interfax (in English), 30 December 2015.

602 Rossiya 24 (Russia 24) TV, 14 May 2015.

603 Ilya Shchegolev, “Digest: Russia’s Combat Robots,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online

(Russian News Online), 18 May 2015.
211

mountainous conditions too. It can carry two tons of payload and travel 

at speeds of up to 40 km/hr.604 In another article about combat robots, 

three systems were singled out: the Platforma-M complex, the Strelok, 

and the MRK-27-BT. 

The Platforma-M, briefly mentioned earlier in relation to it 

naval application, can also be used as a tracked, remotely controlled 

platform. It can carry a payload of up to 300 kg, which could include 

four Kornet antitank missile complexes or AGS-30 automatic grenade 

launchers. When used as a scout, it can be installed with a Fara radar, 

thermal imager, rangefinder, and video camera. It has a top speed of 12

km/hr and can move for 10 continuous hours. First deliveries are planned 

for 2018.605 One report noted that it is located at brigade combat level.606

The Strelok is a miniature robot and is used extensively in urban 

environments. It can climb stairs, travel through door openings, and has 

potential counterterrorist use. It can be remotely controlled from up to 20 

km away on open terrain and up to 5 km under urban conditions. It can 

be mounted with a machine gun and several cameras for daytime and 

nighttime observation.607

The MRK-27-BT is armed with two AGS-30 grenade launchers, 

two Shmel flamethrowers, a Pecheneg machine gun, and up to ten smoke 

grenades. All weapons on the vehicle can be taken off and used by 

attacking troops. Special tracks on the vehicle enable it to have increased 

traction and minimized recoil during firing. It has a remote-control range 

of nearly 500 m.608

 

604 Unattributed report, “Russia to Create Combat Robot for the Arctic,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 12 May 2015.

605 Shchegolev.

606 Oleg Falichev, “Soldiers to Order; Military Robots Being Rid of Outside Elements,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 3 June 

2015.

607 Ibid.

608 Ibid.
212

Perhaps the biggest surprise has been the unmanned robot version 

of the new tank, the Armata. Freeing up space on the tank’s internal 

configuration due to robotization allows for more ammunition and fuel to 

be carried. It is estimated that this will increase the vehicles range by 50 

percent.609

Russia’s Main Scientific-Research Robotics Test Center is part of 

the Russian Federation’s Defense Ministry and the Main Directorate for 

Scientific Research and Technological Support for Advanced 

Technology. It works with the Bauman Moscow State Technical 

University, the Moscow Aviation Institute, and an interagency working 

group of the Military Industrial Commission. The robots it tests conduct 

aerial reconnaissance, detect enemy facilities, adjust artillery fire, 

contain systems for radiation and chemical reconnaissance, allow for the 

transportation of radioactive objects, conduct medical evacuation, and 

issue targeting data to weapons. 

Robotic systems include UAVs, a ground robot controlling the 

equipment, and a sensor system. Geoskan 200, Fregat, and Forpost 

UAVs take TV pictures and process them in a three-dimensional model. 

They can also suppress enemy information. The Korshun heavy attack 

UAV has a payload of one ton (two 500-kg bombs with laser guidance) 

and a flight range of 900 km. The Varyag robot system can carry up to 

10 kg and the Vepr up to 50 kg, while the Verkholaz operates on train 

tracks and can move up to 300 kg. The MRK-VT1 Vystrel mobile 

robotic system can work with explosives or volatile items, has a variable 

geometry tracked inlet, a cryogenic installation with liquid nitrogen, and 

a remote control console. The Tral Patrul 4.0 robot has cameras all

around making it a security protection platform or patrol site. The 

Shatun remote-controlled robot has off-road capability. It can cross 

water obstacles, and it can move overland as well. It has a 7.62 PKT 

machine gun, thermal imager, and laser rangefinder. Software makes it 

possible to determine target coordinates. The system can accommodate

 

609 Anton Valagin, “The ‘Armata’ Tank Will Become a Robot,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta 

Online (Russian News Online), 31 May 2015.
213

RPG-26 grenade launchers or RShG-2 manual assault grenades. Finally,

the Sanitar robot locates causalities on the battlefield and evacuates 

them from the zone of fire. Imported components remain the robot’s 

Achilles’ heel.610

There is now talk of the further refinement of the android 

combat robot. This research is taking place under the guidance of the 

Advanced Research Foundation (see section below). The robot is being 

taught to run and negotiate an obstacle course, and it will be used in 

especially difficult conditions via remote control.611 A recent article 

noted the important future role that electronic warfare (EW) would play 

in thwarting an enemy’s robotic system. As a result it was noted that 

“We should build our hardware with a war against a serious 

psychological enemy in mind. If one deploys the most basic electronic 

warfare machine we ever had, then not a single American UAV will be 

able to fly.”

612 Further, “the first thing to do in this situation is just to jam 

the transmitters, and that’s it. It all grinds to a halt. If our hardware has a 

brain inside, then it cannot be jammed.”613

In July 2015 it was announced that the Sistemprom Concern was 

working on a universal robotized platform. It is projected that the 

platform could be transformed into a combat robot, a mine-clearing 

vehicle, or an electronic-warfare system. In short, the vehicle will be 

transformed into whatever its creator wants. The vehicle is 3.5 meters 

long and about 2 meters wide. It could weigh up to seven tons. Factory 

trials are to begin at the end of 2015.614 Also in July there was an 

interesting article that described once again the upcoming ethical 

questions that must be answered when contemplating the use of robotic 

 

610 Falichev.

611 Unattributed report, “FPI: A Combat Android Being Developed in the Russian 

Federation Will Learn to Run by the End of the Year,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation Online, 8 June 2015.

612 Center TV, 19 February 2015. 

613 Ibid.

614 Unattributed report, “A Combat Transformer Robot Has Been Developed in Russia,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 30 July 2015.
214

weapons. Will the desire to escape responsibility for killing of one’s own 

kind reduce the political costs to start a war? A suggestion was made to 

have certain individuals fully answerable for the action of military 

robots. Awareness of the “inevitable responsibility” for humans may 

make it possible to somewhat limit the use of robots.615

In August there was a report of a universal armored robotic 

platform. It can reportedly be used under battlefield conditions, in 

nuclear fallout areas or extreme polar Arctic conditions, and in mine 

sweeping activities. The platform, known as the URP-01G, can weigh 

up to 7 tons. It can carry up to 2 tons of hardware, with a maximum 

speed of 40 km/h.616

A key September report was the need to develop robots for 

assault formations, especially when attacking units in built-up areas. The 

Ground Troop Field Manual states that “a company should attack a 

platoon strongpoint on a 500-meter front in a formation of three 

motorized rifles platoons and a tank platoon.”617 This will involve three 

tanks and 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). An attack formation that 

uses robots will have three echelons. The first is composed of six 

remote-controlled combat robots with mine clearing and reconnaissance 

gear. The second has three tanks and three IFVs, and the third has seven 

IFVs. Thus the actual human based attack force remains three tanks and 

ten IFVs, or 13 combat vehicles. The first echelon of robots can be 

controlled from a distance of 13 kilometers and, according to Russian 

calculations, a robotized company’s firepower is seven times greater than 

 

615 Nikolay Epple, “Killer Robots,” Vedomosti Online (The Record Online), 30 July 

2015.

616 Unattributed report, “Russia Develops 7-Ton Universal Armored Robotic Platform,” 

RT Online (Russia Today Online), at 2 August 2015, https:www.rt.com/news/311372-

unidersal-battle-robotic-platform.

617 Leonid Orlenko, “Breakthrough Robots,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online

(Military-Industrial Courier Online), 23 September 2015.
215

a normal company.618 Both T-72 and T-90 tanks are being equipped with 

remote control features.619

There were three other September announcements. First, the 

Advanced Research Foundation has reportedly developed a competition 

to create artificial muscle for robotized devices. Second, the “Avatar” 

anthropomorphic robot project is under development to, by year’s end, 

tackle an obstacle course and learn to drive vehicles.620 Third, a report 

stated that the Navy Military Rescue Personnel and Diving Specialists 

Training Center has begun training for underwater-robot operators.621

In October the United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation 

announced technology that simultaneously operates “up to ten robots in 

the automatic regime so that they act on a battlefield either individually 

or in a group.”622 There was an extended debate during the month among 

lawmakers, who discussed the possibility of giving robots a legal status. 

Wars in the near future will be between autonomous robots able to 

combine in groups and units, according to Vyacheslav Pshikhopov, 

director of the Southern Federal University Research Institute of 

Robotics and Control Processes. However, Russian legislation to 

regulate this sphere is unable to keep up with technical progress.

Vyacheslav Khalitov, deputy general director for special equipment at 

the Uralvagonzavod Corporation, said “It is necessary right now to 

consider such legal issues as the use of robotic systems in peacekeeping 

operations. When evaluating the appropriateness of their use in various 

armed conflicts, from the point of view of international law it is essential 

 

618 Ibid.

619 Ibid., and “Uralvagonzavod Plans to Combine its Robotized T-90s into a Single 

Network,” TASS, 14 October 2015.

620 Unattributed report, “Advanced Research Foundation Announces Competition to 

Create Artificial Muscle for Robots. Total Prize Money of Competition is 6 Million 

Rubles,” TASS, 2 September 2015.

621 Unattributed report, “Underwater-Robot Operators Now Being Trained in Crimea,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 2 

September 2015.

622 Interfax (in English), 19 October 2015.
216

to put national identification markings on the robots. Turkey still cannot 

determine whose drone they shot down.”623

“Now we are approaching the point where robotic systems are 

moving from being objects to being legal persons,” Yevgeniy Starozhuk, 

pro-rector of the Bauman University for Economics and Innovation, 

explained. “The introduction of elements of artificial intelligence in 

combat systems raises a controversial question: when does property 

become a legal person? Of course, it is still early to amend the Civil 

Code, but it is worth thinking about.”624

On 19 October there was a report about an artificial intelligence 

software package known as Unicum (Latin for “the only one”) that can 

reportedly power a group of up to 10 robotic complexes. It can even 

distribute roles among the robots, such as choosing a commander, and 

request replacements for disabled machines. The Unicum software can 

allegedly be installed on any robotic system, in the air or on land and 

sea.625

In November and December several systems were discussed. In 

November Interfax reported that the United Instrument Manufacturing 

Corporation was developing an artificial intelligence solution so that 

robots could possess computer vision. They can use drone data to detect 

ambushes and adjust routes. The quadricycle (four robotic complexes) 

mounted robot can find its way even when it loses its GLONASS signal. 

This project is only in the research stage.626 In December it was reported 

that an RTK-05 Berloga-R remote-controlled radiation reconnaissance 

robot has been designed at the Central Research and Experimental

Design Institute of Robotics and Technical Cybernetics in Saint 

 

623 Gennadiy Melnik, “Robots Have Long Served in the Russian Army,” 

Parlamentskaya Gazeta Online (Parliament News Online), 29 October 2015. 

624 Ibid.

625 Unattributed report, “Russian ‘Skynet’ to Lead Military Robots on the Battlefield,” 

RT Online (Russian Today Online), 19 October 2015, at 

https://www.rt.com/news/319082-russian-military-artificual-intellience

626 Interfax (in English), 30 November 2015.
217

Petersburg. It conducts radiation and chemical reconnaissance. The 

system consists of a mobile land vehicle that is equipped with a 

manipulator, television system, reconnaissance apparatus, remote control 

console, radio command system, data collection and processing unit, 

software, battery charger, and spare parts.627

Another December 2015 report focused on what the Russian 

press termed “flying combat robots,” or remote controlled cyber 

weapons. The article described development trends of modern weapons

and suggested that a future war would not only be between machines but 

between robots. To this end the author attempted to describe design 

concepts for remote-controlled cyber weapons (cruise warheads). The 

main advantages of such weaponry included rapid delivery with 

maximum accuracy; the rational use of subsonic winged flying vehicles; 

the ability to overcome any counteractions from adversary systems; the 

means to bypass surveillance zones and engagement areas; and the 

ability of nonnuclear weapons to destroy strategically important 

facilities. It was noted that this type of weaponry also would be effective 

for deterrence, warning, and preemption and retribution purposes.628 As 

the author noted:

The remote control of cruise warheads in adjustable 

trajectories from some kind of center is not inconceivable. 

This is a more remote prospect, however. Cruise 

warheads are evidently the prototype of future weapons. 

They will perform strategic-level combat tasks at 

intercontinental distances from the point of launch and are 

essentially flying robots. The high-precision delivery of a 

charge to the destruction objective via adaptable 

 

627 Viktor Khudoleyev, “Berloga for Chemical Reconnaissance,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

online (Red Star Online), 14 December 2015.

628 Grigoriy Vokin, “Remote Custodian. Warheads with Artificial Intelligence Could 

Be Used for Reconnaissance, Guaranteed Destruction of Targets, and Human Rescue,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 10 

November 2015.
218

aeroballistic flight trajectories is ensured with the aid of 

highly intelligent control systems.629

Finally, there was a report from the Military-Industrial Courier 

Online worthy of note. On 23 December 2015 the website discussed the 

“Udar” robotic complex, which means “strike.” The system was placed 

on the BMP-3, and its electronic units are located within the combat 

vehicle’s body. Currently under development are control, movement, and 

video-image algorithms, with special emphasis on the use of this robotic 

complex on unfamiliar terrain. The robot is being constructed, through 

intelligent control algorithms, to identify obstacles and how to get 

around them. An internal inertial system provides for adjustments 

according to satellite signals. Adjustments can be made to satellite 

navigation means as well, such as by using visual processing of the 

terrain (identify and compare objects with what is stored in the system’s 

memory). Three types of machines must be installed on the Udar: 

reconnaissance/strike, engineer support, and transportation/evacuation. 

The control system under development will enable the control of not just 

one but many robots able to perform several types of tasks.630

A Special 2015 Report on Robots

In December 2014 Russia’s Ministry of Defense approved “The 

Development of Future Robot Technology to the Year 2025.” The report 

predicted that the percentage of robots in the overall force structure 

would be approximately 30 percent by that year. Such an optimistic 

report was based on several developments in 2014. For example, in the 

spring the Joint Stock Company “Izhevskiy radiozavod” reported on the 

MRK-002-BG-57 mobile robot-technology (MRK) complex. The oneton tracked armored vehicle reportedly can be controlled at a distance of 

five kilometers and can work autonomously for up to ten hours at speeds 

approaching 35 km/h. The MRK is equipped with a laser rangefinder, 

thermal imager, ballistic computer, a “Kord” heavy machine gun, 

 

629 Ibid.

630 Aleksey Ramm, “’Udar,’ Another ‘Udar,’” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Curyer Online 

(Military-Industrial Courier Online), 23 December 2015.
219

Kalashnikov tank machine gun, and a heavy 30mm automatic grenade 

launcher. It will provide fire support to infantry subunits and 

reconnaissance.631

In 2015 the Russian Army introduced the first underground 

robot-scouts, the 1K144 robotized multi-monitoring system from the 

“Sozvezdie” Company. This small robot (up to 20 cm in height, with a 

weight of only 150-600 grams) creeps underground, practically under the 

enemy’s legs. It can determine the quantity of equipment and their types, 

and it can transmit the coordinates and direction of target movement.632

The “Servosila” Company is producing the “Inzhener” mobile 

robot, which weighs 23 kg and is equipped “by hand” to capture targets

(no further explanation was offered as to what this meant). The Inshener 

reportedly can climb stairs and lift a camera to a height of 130 cm. On 

the robot is a stereovision system, a laser scanner for three-dimensional 

scanning of objects and locations, a GPS/GLONASS system, and an 

inertial system. The “Inzhener” can be transported by one man in a 

rucksack. The intent is to use the robot where conditions are such that it 

could be potentially dangerous for the use of humans. Robot-soldiers

are also under construction. Their functional capabilities should be 

comparable to those of a human. Of course, the robot’s movement is still 

far from perfect, but it is hoped that the finished robot should be able to 

fight like or even better than a human.633

The Russian Navy is testing underwater robot-sappers and 

robot-scouts. These robots light up the sea bottom and sketch a threedimensional picture of the area, such as ports or regions in the open sea. 

They are equipped with an autopilot, navigation system, sonar, a 

manipulator, and other devices. The robot-scouts are used to detect a 

 

631 A. Chepur, “Prospects for the Rearmament of the Russian Army,” Armeiskii sbornik

(Army Journal), March 2015, pp. 13-18.

632 Ibid.

633 Ibid.
220

dangerous object and the robot-sappers are called in to destroy it. These 

systems reportedly have not yet gone into production.634

At years end, the Defense Ministry reported that in February 

2016 it would host the first military-scientific conference on 

“Robotization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.” Members of the 

Armed Forces, the Military-Industrial Commission, law-enforcement 

agencies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and scientific research 

organizations, among others, will attend. It is planned to hold the 

conference on a regular basis.635

The Advanced Research Foundation

Founded in 2012, the Advanced Research Foundation is the 

Russian equivalent of the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA). Even though it has only been in existence a few 

years, the foundation is now responsible for up to 45 futuristic projects, 

some of which are:

 Developing telepathic contact between man and 

machine (allows operators to control drones or even 

quadrocopters, using only the biopotential of their 

brain)

 Creating an android and putting a person in a state of 

hypobiosis (temporary artificial death)

 Testing a robotic system for its ability to guard or 

defend intercontinental ballistic missile launch silos

 Creating a combat robot based on a Tiger armored 

vehicle and equipped with a Kornet antitank missile 

system

 Developing a prototype high-speed wireless 

communication channel

 

634 Ibid.

635 Unattributed report, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 29 

December 2015.
221

 Developing technology for optical memory that offers 

unlimited data storage time.636

Vitaliy Davydov, the Assistant General Director of the Advanced 

Research Foundation, identified a methodology for choosing projects. 

First, threats deemed critical to the country’s defense and security are 

determined. Then, ways and means to counter them are identified, and 

research and development avenues are determined. Scientific-technical 

and technical-economic reviews are made of the application for each 

project, and the foundation’s science and technology council then 

decides whether a project should proceed or not.637 Projects identified in 

the report as undergoing research included high-precision inertial 

systems, soldier gear (Ratnik system), advanced sniper systems,

optoelectronic devices, hypersonic systems, the quick deployment of 

“swarming” small spacecraft, and problems associated with information 

countermeasures (means to ensure the stability of the Internet and social 

networks, based on lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis).638

Of particular interest was Davydov’s focus on robots. He noted 

that conference participants requested the creation of a single robotics 

center to coordinate developers’ efforts in this regard. The hope is to 

“reach the point where an operator controls an ‘avatar’ with his 

thoughts, exactly as we give a command to our hands or eyes.”639 In this 

way, a single operator could control a platoon of robots on the 

battlefield.640

In an Interfax report in October 2014, Davydov stated that

 

636 Unattributed report, “Military Android, Other Secret Developments of the Russian 

Federation’s Armed Forces,” Ekspert Online (Expert Online), 16 October 2014.

637 Interview with Vitaliy Davydov, “Vitaliy Davydov Says ‘We are Decreasing the 

Need for a Person’s Presence on the Battlefield by Leaps and Bounds,’” VPK.Name

(Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Komplex or Military-Industrial Complex Online), 22 October 

2014.

638 Ibid.

639 Ibid.

640 Ibid.
222

 In future military conflicts, it will be more practical to 

use 3D printers to produce weapons, equipment, spare 

parts, and ammunition right on the battlefield

 Robots will replace humans on future battlefields

 Russia’s oil rigs and its transport network in the 

Arctic will use underwater robots for protection

 Proposals for self-guided “smart bullets” are being 

collected.

641

The Advanced Research Foundation is also creating a unified 

control system to provide for shared use of the Gerbariya platform, an 

integrated engineering software platform. A sample of the Gerbariya will 

appear by the end of 2016, RIA Novosti was informed on Tuesday. The 

hope is that the development will improve the internal interaction among

defense industry enterprises and boost their efficiency. Information 

systems “with different architectures which correlate poorly”642 can 

currently be used at a single enterprise. Various products create a need to 

transfer data from one software environment to another, which more 

often than not entails a loss of information and time. The Gerbariya 

platform will relieve the defense sector from these kinds of difficulties.

A single software platform acts as a portal with access to two categories 

of users: developers and consumers.643

A military equivalent of the Advanced Research Foundation 

would probably be the Defense Ministry’s Advanced Inter-Branch 

Research and Special Projects Directorate, headed by Colonel Sergey 

Pankov. The directorate was established in January 2005 when the 13th

and 16th directorates of the Armed Forces were merged. In November

2013 it received its official emblem, a red heraldry shield with several 

items in the center: a silver depiction of a glowing grenade, an anchor, 

 

641 Interfax-AVN Online, 21 October 2014.

642 Unattributed report, “Single Platform Being Created to Unify Software in Russian 

Defense Sector,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 7 April 2015.

643 Ibid.
223

wings on a mace, and a diagonally crisscrossed scroll and barrel of a 

gun. The image has an oval shaped wreath around it.644

The directorate views the US and NATO as striving to achieve 

global domination in the military-technological sphere. This requires 

three countermeasures from Russia, namely (1) imparting new qualities 

to weapon systems and building up troop groupings along the Western 

and Southwestern Axes and the Arctic in order to counter the US’s 

strategy of encirclement; (2) developing weapons based on new physical 

principles (crewless weapons, hypersonic weapons, special equipment);

and (3) conducting basic research in support of defense and security 

issues with specific initiatives from organizations such as the Advanced 

Research Foundation, the Russian Academy of Science, and other higher 

educational institutions to counter the US’s scientific-technological 

breakthroughs and to help neutralize any surprises. The directorate

supports asymmetric and nontraditional responses to an opponent’s 

technological surprises.645

In addition, the directorate develops a scientific-technical reserve 

to support models of fundamentally new weapons; purchases and repairs 

EW equipment, military measurement equipment, and robot systems and 

complexes; develops the electronic component base for weapons and 

equipment; organizes research in the force structure sphere and develops 

weapons systems and fulfills special projects; and develops 

nontraditional weapons, such as lasers and microwave, precision-guided 

kinetic, nonlethal, and hypersonic weapons. Research has been 

conducted in the special technical chemistry sphere, where newgeneration thermobaric compounds (used in Baloban heavy 

flamethrower systems, for example), modular propellant charges, fire 

resistant alloys, composite ceramic armor, tungsten carbide, metal-

 

644 Sergey Pankov, “The Directorate is Ten Years Old. From New Materials to Tests of 

Models of Advanced Weapons,” Federalnyy Spravochnik (Federal Reference Book), 26 

May 2015.

645 Ibid. 
224

polymer composites, and many other items were obtained and 

certified.646

The overall goal is to introduce systems based on the 

achievements of the sixth technological revolution, which includes bioand nano-, cognitive, and information technologies. The Air Force

wants hypersonic operational cruise missiles and reconnaissance-strike 

complexes with UAVs of long flight duration. The Aerospace Defense 

Forces want laser complexes for destroying space and airborne targets. 

The Strategic Deterrence Forces want airborne laser complexes for the 

thermodynamic destruction of targets, as well as aero ballistic hypersonic 

cruise missiles with a multi modular warhead. The Navy wants 

hypersonic sea-launched cruise missiles and unmanned submersibles, as 

well as long-range ship-based electrodynamic launchers. The Ground 

Forces require multifunctional combat root complexes and 

reconnaissance complexes with medium-and short-range UAVs. Finally, 

innovative technical solutions include robots with artificial intelligence, 

to include micro-, bio-like, and bio-hybrid complexes, as well as 

nontraditional power sources and intellectual information management 

systems.647

Science Companies

Information on science companies is somewhat sketchy and 

therefore hard to put together as a complete picture with regard to 

number of companies, their location and manning, and their specialties. 

What is discussed below is far from a complete picture of these 

companies but rather what was available online. 

 

646 Ibid.

647 Ibid. Also, see Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call 

for Sixth Technological Generation to be Adopted into the Armory,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014. The 

two developments at this conference with respect to information were the improvement 

of information warfare forces and resources; and the introduction of the sixth 

technological advances in equipment, which will signal the move to fully intellectual 

models that implement the concept of “cognicentric” warfare.
225

These companies are comprised of soldiers who are guided in 

their research by the specific branch (aerospace, medical, cyber, etc.) to 

which they are assigned. They perform these duties as a soldier in the 

Armed Forces in conjunction with their duty with an actual unit. In this 

way, Russia is using the creativity of new soldiers who are very talented 

in specific engineering, mathematical, or other topics deemed worth of 

study. Simultaneously these soldiers can learn from the scientists who 

are still present and hopefully bypass some of the time wasting errors 

that were made in the past.

The “science companies” (SC) project began in Russia on 5 July 

2013, according to Interfax-AVN. These Russian servicemen are 

involved with solving scientific tasks at least 50 percent of their time in 

the military.648 A 10 July 2013 report noted that initially four science 

companies were to be formed. They would be stationed in Moscow, St. 

Petersburg, and Voronezh. In St. Petersburg, the location will be at the 

Kuznetsov Naval Academy (SC 1); in Voronezh, at the Zhukovskiy Air 

Force Academy (SC 2); in November 2014 (see below) an Aerospace 

Defense Troop SC was established and referred to as SC 3, located at the 

Krasnogorskiy Zverev factory (with optical and electro-optical 

instrumentation specialties), and SC 4 appears, according to reports, to 

have been established for the General Staff but no location was specified. 

Perhaps a SC was established at the Bauman State Engineering 

University,

649 due to its engineering expertise, although a November 

2014 report (see below) discussed the requirement to develop an 

engineering company. 

Another report stated that the companies would focus on studying 

strike UAVs, new types of fuel, the development of weapons based on 

new physical principles, and the improvement of hypersonic 

warheads.

650 However, the only real description of a science company 

 

648 Unattributed report, “The Realization of the ‘Scientific Companies’ Project Begins 

on Friday,” Interfax-AVN Online, 4 July 2013.

649 See assorted RIA Novosti reports from Moscow, 10 July 2013. 

650 RIA Novosti (RIA News), at 

http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130710/948764579.html#ixzz2Ye3Pb82J
226

was the Air Force SC located in Voronezh (SC 2). It was noted that the 

focus would be on improving automated command-and-control systems 

for aviation equipment, such as EW, software modeling complexes of 

aircraft flight, computational-experimental research into increasing 

airship engine effectiveness, and evaluating military airships fitness for 

flight.651

The development of four science companies was intended to 

improve the effectiveness of scientific work, since more demands are 

being imposed on the soundness of scientific recommendations as 

warfare develops. These companies offer young, talented graduates of 

higher educational establishments a place to work and resolve scientific 

tasks for the Defense Ministry.652 Russia’s military leadership has noted 

that the State Armaments Program is aimed at transforming the military. 

To do so, and to equip the Armed Forces with modern gear, the science 

companies were formed in order to attract expertise from among a new 

generation of scientists.

In February 2014 it was stated that by the end of the year six 

science companies would be developed (another report stated that ten 

would be formed). Two such companies that appeared to be under 

consideration for development were a medical science subunit (SC 5) 

and a humanities-focused company (SC 6).

653 Another report stated that 

an additional science company would be added in 2015.

654 In a March 

2014 report, Defense Minister Shoygu stated that four science companies 

had been set up at that time, one each for the Air Force, Aerospace 

Defense Troops, Navy, and the General Staff. 

 

651 Interfax-AVN Online, 30 July-1 August 2013.

652 Gennadiy Miranovich, “Defense of the Country: Scientific Approach,” Krasnaya 

Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 31 January 2014.

653 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Students Will Be Given a Choice. The Army Will Have Medical 

Science and Humanitarian Science Companies,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian 

News Online), 10 February 2014.

654 Unattributed report, “The Number of Science Companies in the Russian Federation 

Armed Forces Will Be Increased to 11,” ITAR-TASS, 25 February 2014.
227

An 18 July 2014 report stated that it must be taken into account 

the new science companies are being formed, based at the “Ground 

Troops Military Training and Research Center” (the Combined-Arms 

Academy of the RF AF, which would be SC 7) and at the Military 

Medical Academy imeni Kirov (already noted above as SC 5).655

Another July 2014 report discussed the activities of the 820th State 

Center for Missile Attack Warning, referred to as an “orbital” science 

unit. However, the ensuing discussion did not mention this location 

specifically as a SC but rather as part of a discussion of the composition 

of a SC in general. So this might or might not be SC 8 (although a 31 

July 2015 report stated that there were presently eight science 

companies). Soldiers at this and other locations have submitted 

numerous applications for patents on inventions. Competition for spots at 

the locations is intense, with more than three applicants for each spot. 

Some 60 soldiers serve in each science company, with ages ranging from 

18 to 27. They are required to serve 12 months, but they do not 

participate in field exercises; rather they concentrate on scientific 

operations in labs and computer centers.656

An example of the work of one soldier was described in the 18 

July article noted above. Corporal Aleksandr Voyevodskiy was serving 

in the Aerospace Defense Troops. His scientific activity centered on 

developing hyperspectral imaging equipment to resolve tasks involved in 

signature exploration for aerospace troops. He also is investigating the 

Earth’s resources for Roskosmos, the Russian Federal Space Agency. He 

eventually proposed an experimental model of a new aviation 

hyperspectrometer. Another soldier-researcher investigated ways to 

increase the efficiency of the Okno opto-electronic system, used for 

space research (with an emphasis on aerospace, most likely SC 3 at the 

Zverev Factory). The article also stated that a science company was 

being formed based on the Troops Military Training and Research 

 

655 Anna Potekhina, “Science Company Wages Combat,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red 

Star Online), 18 July 2014.

656 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Number of Parameters on Conscript’s Card to Be Trebled,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 10 July 2014.
228

Center. The author ended by noting that “we can very soon expect new 

discoveries by the cyber soldiers waging scientific combat.”657

Each August the science companies participate in what is called 

the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s Innovation Day exhibition. In 

2014 two soldiers received awards for their innovative technological 

developments. In November 2014, two SC’s were discussed. The first 

was a report that the Defense Ministry is working on the creation of an 

Engineering Troops SC. However, no further information on this unit has 

been found.658 The second report on a SC was in an interview with 

Aerospace Defense Troop Commander Lieutenant-General Aleksandr 

Golovko, where it was noted that the first call-up for the VKO troop’s 

science company was held in the fall of 2013. It was noted in the same 

article that several servicemen in the Aerospace Defense Troops 3rd

Science Company wanted to continue to serve under contract,

659 which 

solidifies the fact that this is SC 3.

In December 2014 it was noted that the Defense Ministry now is 

planning to open schools for gifted children at military educational 

institutes. The first will be located in Voronezh at the School of 

Engineering that is affiliated with the Air Force Academy. Other schools 

for gifted children are planned for affiliation with the Academy of 

Communications in St. Petersburg (an information technology school 

will open there) and the Military University in Moscow (which will 

house a humanities-oriented school).

660

 

657 Anna Potekhina, “Science Company Wages Combat,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red 

Star Online), 18 July 2014.

658 Anatoliy Yermolin interview with Colonel Ivan Vorobyev, on the Ekho Moskvy

show “Military Council,” Ekho Moskvy Online (Echo Moscow Online), 8 November 

2014.

659 Anna Potekhina, “1 December—Aerospace Defense Troops Formation Day: A 

Space Grouping from the Arctic to Crimea,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 29 November 2014.

660 Aleksandr Stepanov, “The Defense Ministry Will Open Schools for Gifted Children 

at Military Higher Educational Institutions,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomolets

Online), 11 December 2014.
229

In April 2015 a report stated that a ninth SC had been formed in 

Tambov, and that it appears to be a cyber-science/EW company. 

Students will be taught how to wage computer wars, erect barriers 

against Internet attacks, prevent attacks on classified networks, and 

impede an adversary’s troop command and control and weapon use. The 

article noted that the Tambov Company may serve as a building block 

for Russian cyber troops, whose potential development was announced 

back in 2013. The company will develop programmers, mathematicians, 

cryptographers, EW officers, and communications experts.661 Another 

report on the science company stated that the new subunit will make it 

possible to boost the efficacy of applied-science research and testing in 

the EW sphere and the training of specialists, and will help in developing 

data protection methods. The report noted that three science companies 

are supporting the National Defense Management Center in Moscow, 

and the other six are supporting the combat arms.662 It was never 

specifically noted which SCs were supporting the national defense center 

in the article.

On 16 June 2015 it was announced that servicemen of the science 

companies would receive their own emblem. It is to be worn above the 

flap of the right pocket and combines an epaulet, sword, scroll, and 

wreath. The epaulet “signifies the training of junior specialists, the sword 

symbolizes readiness to defend the homeland, the scroll symbolizes the 

high level of knowledge, and the wreath symbolizes allegiance to 

military and official duty.”663

In November 2015 Defense Minister Shoygu announced the 

creation of two more science companies. Both companies (which would 

 

661 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Defense Ministry Announces Recruitment for Science Troop. 

Students Will be Put under Cyber Arms,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomolets Online), 6 

April 2015.

662 Anton Valagin, “The Ninth Company Will Become an Electronic One,” Rossiyskaya

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 26 January 2015.

663 Anton Valagin, “Russia’s Scientific Companies Received an Emblem,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 16 June 2015.
230

be SC 10 and 11) were to be made up of cyber programmers.664 They 

will work for the National Defense Control Center.665 And finally, in 

December, it was noted that a SC with 71 service personnel was created 

as part of the Material and Technical Supply Military Academy (SC 12) 

“with a view to carrying out specific applied scientific tasks in the field 

of the military-economic substantiation of the development and 

functioning of the system of material and technical provisioning for the 

Russian Federation Armed Forces.”

666 Perhaps this is the SC first 

mentioned in July 2015 in an interview with General of the Army and 

Deputy Defense Minister Dmitriy Bulgakov, who noted in response to a 

question of whether there will be a logistics SC that “We will be 

constituting one such subunit this coming fall. The company will be 

stationed in Saint Petersburg on the site of the General of the Army A.V. 

Khrulev Military Academy for Logistics.”667 While it is clear that the 

order of the naming of these science companies is not consistent, this 

appears to be the best one can surmise on what is offered in open 

sources.

2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Russia’s 2014 military doctrine contained a few references to 

either the character of military conflicts or the weaponry to be used. 

They were described as “features of present-day military conflicts” but 

these features appear to be applicable for several years to come. The 

following were listed as the characteristics and features of present-day 

military conflicts:

 

664 TASS, 19 November 2015.

665 Unattributed report, “Defense Minister Army General Sergey Shoygu Participated in 

the Work of the First Interdepartmental Conference on Information Interaction,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 19 November 2015.

666 Interview with General of the Army Dmitriy Bulgakov, by Oleg Falichev; place and 

date not given, “All the Conditions for Carrying out Tasks in Syria Have Been Created. 

From 2016 Defense Industry Complex Enterprises Will Have an Individual Code and 

Materiel Will Have Readable Identification Marks,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 16 December 2016.

667 Viktor Khudoleyev, Interview with Dmitry Bulgakov, “MTO System: In Step with 

the Times,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 31 July 2015.
231

a. Integrated use of military force and of political, 

economic, informational, and other nonmilitary 

measures being realized with wide use of the protest 

potential of the population and of special operations 

forces;

b. Massive use of systems of arms and military 

equipment, precision and hypersonic weapons, means 

of electronic warfare, weapons based on new physical 

principles comparable to nuclear weapons in 

effectiveness, information management systems, as 

well as unmanned aerial vehicles, self-contained 

marine vehicles, and controlled robotized models of 

arms and military equipment;

c. Simultaneous effect on the enemy to the full depth of 

his territory in global information space, in aerospace, 

on land, and at sea;

d. Selectiveness and high degree of destruction of 

targets; swiftness of maneuver of troops (forces) and 

fire; use of various mobile groupings of troops 

(forces);

e. Reduction of time parameters of preparation for 

military operations;

f. Strengthening of centralization and automation of 

command and control and fire control as a result of 

transition from a strictly vertical command and 

control system to a global network of automated 

command and control and fire control systems;

g. Establishment of a permanent zone of military 

operations on territories of opposing sides;

h. Participation of irregular armed force elements and 

private military companies in military operations;

i. Use of indirect and asymmetric methods of 

operations; 
232

j. Use of political forces and public movements financed 

and controlled from outside.668

In another area of the doctrine the tasks for outfitting the Armed 

Forces with military and special equipment noted the following 

requirement: 

Creation of new models of precision weapons and means 

of combating them; means of aerospace defense; 

communications, reconnaissance, command and control, 

and electronic warfare systems; complexes of unmanned 

aerial vehicles; robotized attack complexes; state-of-theart transport aviation; and servicemen's individual 

protection systems.669

The 2014 Doctrine is similar in many respects to the 2010 Doctrine. The 

latter listed the following as high technology devices that may be used in 

future military conflicts: precision weaponry, electromagnetic weapons, 

lasers, infrasound weaponry, computer-controlled systems, drones, and 

robotized models of arms and military equipment.670 Thus not much 

changed in the intervening four years.

Future War

General of the Army Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, a former 

Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union’s Armed Forces 

and currently the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, is one 

of Russia’s greatest living military theoreticians. He has often written or 

lectured on the topic of future war. An indicator of his contemporary 

importance, even though he is in his 90s, is that at the recent 70th

anniversary parade glorifying Soviet achievements in World War II, he 

 

668 Section 15, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia

Website, 26 December 2014.

669 Ibid., Section 46 of the Doctrine.

670 See 

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40266.
233

sat on the reviewing stand between Putin and Kazakh President 

Nursultan Nazarbayev. Chinese President Xi Jinping sat on the other side 

of Putin.

Writing in Military Thought in 2003, Gareev described what he 

termed as the evolving characteristics of future war. He stated that 

Russia should

 Be ready to fight local wars and armed conflicts and, 

under certain circumstances, a regional war

 Focus on the initial period of war, since a war’s 

beginning now may decide its outcome

 Be ready to use and confront indirect actions as much 

as direct actions, due to the enhanced nature of the 

information struggle, which can subvert nations from 

within

 Focus on the air and space theater of war, as it is 

capable of striking deep inside a nation and hitting all 

targets simultaneously (nevertheless Gareev also 

warned not to forget the importance of land forces)

 Work to achieve control and coordination over all 

elements of its armed force

 Realize that high-precision weapons change the 

nature of hostilities to a great extent 

 Place special attention on the antiterrorist struggle.671

Most of these items, especially the importance of the initial period of war 

and indirect operations, are still stressed by prominent writers on military 

activities today. 

Gareev was writing shortly after the US intervention in Iraq, a 

war that reinforced, as Desert Storm had initially demonstrated, the 

 

671 M. A. Gareev, “On Several Characteristic Aspects of Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ 

(Military Thought), No. 6, June 2003, pp. 52-59.
234

ability of new precision technologies to completely overwhelm an 

opponent. With regard to forecasting future war, Gareev noted:

The main problem is to forecast the nature of future wars 

since correct forecasts alone can help determine which 

armed forces and which troops will be required. It is not 

enough to merely outline the nature of a typical war; there 

are many types of armed conflicts each of them with 

unique features of its own. It is within the power of 

military futurologists to use extrapolation and expertheuristic approaches combined with forecasting and 

simulation of all sorts of warfare to identify the general 

trends in which the nature of armed struggle is 

developing. One should always bear in mind that there are 

objective laws according to which the art of warfare is 

developing; and that each war while producing many new 

elements inevitably preserves much from the past, what 

occurred in past conflicts.

672

Gareev’s focus on forecasting the nature of future war and his 

observation that there are many types of armed conflicts today are

reflected in the works of several contemporary theorists. In 2009, 

Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov and Colonel V. N. Gorbunov wrote 

a lengthy article in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) that identified 

future war trends. First, the authors stated that the requirements of 

military science still need to be fulfilled, reiterating Gareev’s statement. 

These requirements include identifying the conditions and factors 

affecting warfare and the patterns and laws governing war’s origins, 

course, and outcome. A potential opponent’s political aims, military 

potential, and the specifics of a theater of operations all influence the 

general character of future war. Time has not affected the importance of 

these characteristics.673

 

672 Ibid., p. 54.

673 S. A. Bogdanov and V. N. Gorbunov, “On the Character of Armed Confrontation in 

the Twenty-First Century,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3, 2009, pp. 2, 11.
235

Second, the authors believe that the exact character of future war 

is still not known since a new world order and security system model 

have not been completed. There is still an ongoing fight for spheres of 

influence, regional domination, and natural resources. This imprecise 

character of future war includes the unknown final impact of information 

technologies on warfare.674 These technologies continue to inspire a new 

generation of weapons and ways they can be utilized. Finally, future war 

also depends on a nation’s economic and military potential, on its 

international position and the popularity of its policies, and on its plans 

for future war. These factors are still undergoing development and 

change. 

Some factors, however, have become identifiable to Bogdanov 

and Gorbunov. They listed six: 

 Wars will use more artificial intelligence, 

nanotechnology, robot-controlled, and new physical 

principle weapons, some comparable to the efficiency 

of nuclear weapons.

 The role of troops, forces, and weapons operating in 

aerospace will grow significantly, where even the 

planet may be a theater of operations.

 The information component of war will grow in 

weight, where information superiority will become a 

principal condition for successful military operations.

 Time frames of operations will change, with 

preparation time shortened and operations carried out 

faster.

 Mobile operations will shift from rigid vertical control 

to automated global network systems that control 

troops and weapons.

 The use of Special Forces will rise. 675

 

674 Ibid.

675 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
236

There are few surprises in this list. The author’s stress on multidimensional actions involving electronic, physical, and information 

warfare is expected in future struggles as is an increase in intensity over 

time and space. However, it is the non-military forms of armed struggle

that the authors stress below that are of special interest. These forms of 

warfare may result in some armed forces conducting no operational 

actions at all or playing a secondary role. 

Non-military forms of actions may involve the internal 

weakening of a state through information, psychological, moral, climatic 

(causing natural disasters, obstructing the movement of troops through 

floods and other means, dispersing clouds to inhibit/enable [depending 

on the purpose] the proper functioning of precision-guided weapons, 

etc.), and organizational measures; setting up an opposition; or 

fomenting ethnic strife. Non-military forms of armed struggle could also 

be used to weaken the external position of a state by ruining its 

international relations through political, economic, legal, information, 

and other means.676 Other new forms of warfare include psychotronic, 

biological, and genetic weapons that do not rely on explosive power.677

Bogdanov and Gorbunov note that “future wars will definitely be 

influenced by the way events develop in a country...a reliable forecast of 

future wars is impossible to make unless we have a profound 

understanding about the exact relationship between peace and war in the 

twenty-first century.”678 Wars in the twenty-first century may be the 

result of geopolitical powers carving up the globalized world by armed 

force and compelling countries to accept political and economic terms 

dictated to them. Most likely, “the main objectives of future wars will be 

achieved in the opening phase and that will become the turning point 

determining the fate of the war.”679 Thus, like Gareev, Dulnev, and 

 

676 Ibid., p. 8.

677 Ibid., p. 7.

678 Ibid., p. 8.

679 Ibid., p. 13.
237

Bryuzgin, Bogdanov and Gorbunov highlight success in the initial period 

of war as the strongest indicator of who will achieve victory in future 

war.

If a conventional war unfolds, then the authors foresee the initial 

period of war focusing on the destruction of military and government 

control centers, the disruption of the system for controlling a country, 

and the targeting of the military-industrial infrastructure. Air, fire, and 

electronic attacks will be followed by paratroopers, Special Forces, and 

then land forces in the final stage. Also included will be strikes against 

the economy and civilian population. The nuclear deterrent is envisioned 

to be used against an opponent who only has conventional weapons at 

their disposal.

680

“Technosphere Warfare” by Yu. I. Starodubtsev, V. V. Bukharin, 

and S. S. Semyonov was one of the earliest post-2011 articles that, from 

a Russian perspective, offered an approach to warfare that differed from 

network-centric and information war. This was termed warfare in the

“technosphere.” The authors stated that “it is not always economical to 

employ an armed force that can only be committed when a conflict 

reaches an extreme.” It is better “to achieve war goals by attacking the 

adversary’s automated control systems (ACS).” This elicits the need for 

“a concept of an entirely new type of warfare—warfare in an artificial 

environment—to be added to the theory of military art.”681

Technospheric warfare (TSW) is “a system of information 

activities coordinated in purpose, place, and time and directed at seizing 

control (partial or complete) over an adversary’s selected automated 

control systems or setting them on a destructive course while they go on 

operating.”682 With regard to conflict, TSW is 

 

680 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

681 Yu. I. Starodubtsev, V. V. Bukharin, and S. S. Semyonov, “Technosphere Warfare,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7 2012, pp. 22-31.

682 Ibid.
238

a form of conflict in which the targets attacked (protected) 

and attack (protection) capabilities are information 

existing within the single worldwide telecommunications 

environment (SWTCE). In this context, information is 

more than data transmitted through (stored in) SWTCE: it 

is also information about the status of SWTCE (or its 

parts) and that of the ACS of the system attacked and 

their operating algorithms.683

The authors stated that, different from traditional information and 

network-centric warfare, TSW allows for seizing an adversary’s 

information resources, changing the adversary’s ACS to a mode meeting 

the attacker’s interests, terminating ACS operations or destroying the 

ACS, and modifying the SWTCE’s characteristics.684 Modeling results 

indicate that TSW’s distinctions include the use of an artificial medium 

to conduct war without troops on any scale without declaring it as a legal 

fact. Only the uncertainty of attack results is a technospheric law. State 

borders and frontlines no longer apply, and people without military 

training can plan operations.

685 While these notions are certainly not new

to digital specialists, it is interesting to see them written up in such detail 

in a military journal. 

In late February 2013 Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery 

Gerasimov wrote an article for the Military-Industrial Courier. He stated 

that in the 21st century wars are not even declared, but, once begun, are 

following different patterns than those to which we are accustomed. 

Trouble-free states can be transformed within a month into hot conflict 

zones and even can be a victims of foreign intervention. These conflicts 

are now comparable in their consequences to actual wars. The role of 

nonmilitary methods (now surpassing military actions by a 4:1 ratio) in 

achieving political and strategic goals has risen, altering the rules of war. 

This is taking place with the involvement of the population’s protest 

 

683 Ibid.

684 Ibid.

685 Ibid.
239

potential, special operations forces, and covert military and information 

warfare measures. Remote noncontact influence methods are achieving 

the goals of battles and operations, and new methods of carrying out 

military operations (no-fly zones, private military companies, etc.) are 

being used.686

Other areas influencing modern methods of war include robotic 

military systems and artificial intelligence research. UAVs and flying or 

walking robots will crowd future battlefields. Aerospace missions must 

be finalized and the system of command-and-control of territorial 

defense must be fine-tuned. Finally, a dismissive approach to 

nonstandard approaches is impermissible and foreign experiences must 

not be copied. Each war requires an understanding of its own particular 

unique character.687 

Gerasimov’s focus on the nature of armed struggle repeated 

many of the topics that Russian military authors had covered in the 

intervening years. For example, the following articles were published in

the well-known Russian journal, Military Thought, from 2009-2012:

 3/2009, pp. 2-15: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, 

“Armed Confrontation in the 21st Century”

 5/2009, pp. 2-12: V. I. Lutovinov, “Development and 

Use of Nonmilitary Measures to Reinforce the 

Military Security of the Russian Federation”

 3/2010, pp. 13-22: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov, “Asymmetrical Actions to Maintain 

Russia’s Military Security”

 6/2011, pp. 3-13: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, 

“Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its Impact on 

Modern Warfare” (earlier, in 9/2006, pp. 2-5, I. N. 

 

686 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013.

687 Ibid.
240

Vorobyov and V. A. Kiselev published “The New 

Strategy of the Indirect Approach”)

 11/2012, pp. 14-27: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov, “The Initial Period of War and its 

Influence on the Preparation of the Country for Future 

Wars”

 11/2012, pp. 40-46: S. V. Kuralenko, “Tendencies in 

the Changing Character of Armed Struggles in 

Military Conflicts in the First Half of the 21st

Century”

After Gerasimov’s article, there continued to be distinct write-ups 

in Military Thought on the nature and content of future war. For 

example, the following articles have appeared from 2013-2015:

 10/2013, pp. 13-24: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a NewGeneration War”

 9/2014, pp. 3-11: A. N. Belsky and O. V. Klimenko, 

“Political Engineering of Color Revolutions: Ways to 

Keep Them in Check”

 1/2015, pp. 32-43: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov, “The Art of War in the Early 21st Century: 

Issues and Opinions” 

 10/2015, pp. 41-49: S. G. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov, “Forecasting the Nature and Content of 

Future Wars: Problems and Opinions”

Several of the articles from the 2009 time frame were the first 

article in the edition, indicating their importance, and the others were 

close to the top of each edition. Thus, the importance of these concepts 

was obvious to all in Russia, but perhaps not to foreign analysts: very 

few foreign analysts focused on indirect and asymmetric operations, but 

rather instead stressed hybrid operations. In fact Russia accuses the West 

of using hybrid operations against them. No Russian military officer has 

indicated that Russia is using hybrid operations.
241

In addition to Gerasimov’s article in 2013, two other noteworthy 

military articles appeared within a month in the Russian press. First, 

there was a Courier article in March written by V. M. Burenok on the 

weapon systems of the future. Second, Gareev wrote in the Courier on 

the connections between war and military science.688 Just the title of 

Gareev’s article, “”Every Era Has Its Own Kind of Military Conflict, Its 

Own Constraints, and Its Own Special Biases,” indicated he was 

repeating what Gerasimov had stated earlier. These articles, plus

Gerasimov’s, considered the character of future war and “how” it would 

look. They described future war’s foundation as built on high-technology 

weaponry, indirect and nonmilitary operations, and specific ways of 

employing joint forces. 

A Look at Some Recent Articles

Andrei Baklanov, writing in 2013 in, Russia in Military Affairs, 

stated that the future rivalry among nations would be for “spaces.” This 

includes control over northern high latitudes, space militarization, and 

the seas and continental shelves. This rivalry is being shaped by the 

development of international legal mechanisms. Interestingly, the 

development of technologies has jump-started this rivalry and is enabling 

the large-scale development of these spaces. If “bridgeheads” (technical, 

technological, financial, legal) are not settled soon, conflict could begin 

to emerge as early as 2018-2020, according to this author.689

In a June 2014 report Russian scientists discussed a number of 

discoveries made in the past several years that are now reaching the point 

of practical application. Many can be used in future situations, including:

 Direct-flow hypersonic jet engines and flight 

management systems

 

688 Makhmut Gareev, “Anticipate Changes in the Nature of War: Every Era Has Its 

Own Kind of Military Conflict, Its Own Constraints, and Its Own Special Biases,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Military-Industrial Courier), 5 June 2013.

689 Andrei Baklanov, “A War of the Future,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4, 

October-December 2013, p. 131.
242

 Super-high-yield warheads

 Laser weapons

 Small, medium, and large robot base platforms (the 

force must be increased by 20-30 percent with 

robotized models of arms)

 Electrothermal chemical and electrodynamic guns 

with high-speed projectiles

 Super-high-yield electromagnetic pulse generators

 Multispectral optical target detection devices

 Ultra-broadband radars with phased-array antennas 

based on radio photon elements

 Zonal rapidly deployed active and passive hydroacoustic systems for interpreting underwater 

situational awareness

 Means of conducting information wars (particularly in 

cyberspace) and cognitive control.

690

The report went on to state that new models of nonlethal devices are 

being developed as well.

Nearly a year after his insightful 2013 article in the Courier, 

Gerasimov spoke at Russia’s Academy of Military Science. He stated 

that the spectrum of tasks before the General Staff was conditioned by 

the change in the nature of armed struggle. By this he meant the latter’s 

fast-moving character and dynamic employment of military and 

nonmilitary means coordinated according to time, place, direction, 

forces, means, and resources. These tasks, in turn, generated the need to 

prepare a new edition of the Statue on Military Planning in the Russian 

Federation.

691

 

690 Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call for Sixth 

Technological Generation to Be Adopted into the Armory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014.

691 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved 
243

The design of an efficient Armed Force’s contingent in Russia 

depends in large degree on finding an optimal correlation of forces and 

means of armed struggle, Gerasimov notes. Another important task is the 

forecasting and assessment of military threats. His mention of the COF 

and forecasting track nicely with the development of strategic thought as 

outlined in Chapter Two. Gerasimov added the following: 

Special attention must be focused on the creation of a 

comprehensive theory of indirect and asymmetric actions 

conducted by various federal executive organs...another 

task of military science is the development of forms of 

employing force groupings and methods of their 

operations, and the determination of their optimal 

composition.692

With regard to future war, Gerasimov noted that new models of 

weapons must be created, and robotic systems, a future 

telecommunications infrastructure, the development of strategic 

deterrence forces, and an aerospace defense system must be developed. 

Future weapon systems should be ones that most effectively oppose 

forecasted threats to Russia’s military security. Such Russian weaponry 

should be found in the State Weapons Program for 2016-2025.693

It is the change in the nature of armed struggle that should affect 

Russia’s future war planning the most. Gerasimov described these 

changes and, consequently, potential changes in the conduct of future 

war in the following way:

 

by the President of the Russian Federation,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin 

of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22.

692 Ibid.

693 Ibid.
244

 A reduction of the military–economic potential of a 

state by the destruction of vitally important objects of 

its military and civilian infrastructure

 The simultaneous effects against enemy troops and 

objectives to the entire depth of his territory

 The conduct of an armed struggle simultaneously in 

all physical media and in the information domain

 The command and control of forces and means in a 

uniform information domain

 The mass employment of precision weapons, largescale use of special operations forces, robotic systems, 

UAVs, and weapons based on new physical principles 

 The employment of asymmetric and indirect 

operations

 The commencement of military operations by 

peacetime force groupings

 The high-maneuver, noncontact combat operations by 

interservice force groupings

 The participation of the civil-military component.

694

Gerasimov noted that the forms and methods of armed struggle 

are being studied by the General Staff’s Center for Military and Strategic 

Studies; that there are 27 central science and research institutions looking 

at command, control, and communications systems; and that there are 46 

central science and research institutions examining the development of 

weapon systems. Additionally, 18 central science and research 

institutions, as well as the Center for the Study of the Military Potential 

of Foreign Countries, are examining intelligence issues and 25 central 

science and research institutions and the Main Science and 

Methodological Center are studying logistics.695 Thus it should be 

expected that Russia is working on many asymmetric approaches, as 

well as on counters to those systems already in existence in the West.

 

694 Ibid.

695 Ibid.
245

In 2015 the future war discussion continued. Some familiar 

authors reappeared, while several new individuals also wrote on the 

topic. However, the dialogue on the nature of armed struggle remained 

quite similar in all cases.

The first issue of Military Thought in 2015 carried another

article by Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Art of War in the Early 21st

Century: Issues and Opinions.” They noted that political and military 

strategic objectives of conflicts are achieved not only by direct military 

interference, but also via legal, psychological, spiritual and moral, 

economic, diplomatic, ideological, and large-scale information impact on 

the public and armed forces of an adversary. Interestingly, indirect 

actions are said to include not only nonmilitary measures but also 

nonviolent actions such as the use of information and remote 

(noncontact) confrontation.696

Many of the issues Chekinov and Bogdanov covered in 2014 

were restated. For example, they stated that the content of combat 

operations will be altered as well by modernized aerospace weapons, 

weapons based on new physical principles, robotized technology, 

automated command and control and armaments, artificial intelligence,

reconnaissance and fire operations, and specialized counter-intelligence 

operations. Of interest was that, while discussing the continued utility of 

old methods that must not be forgotten when applying future war 

thought, the issue of surprise was highlighted. The authors noted that 

ruses in warfare “were seen as a rational and necessary device, and acted 

as a coefficient of increasing the force and might of attacks. Refusing to 

employ cunning in war, conversely, undermined one’s own strength.”697

 

696 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning of the 21st

Century: Issues and Opinions,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), Vol. 1 2015, pp. 

32-43.

697 Ibid.
246

These nonmilitary measures and indirect methods of fighting 

have the capability to change the definitions of the terms “war” and 

“armed struggle.” Military art will interact with these nonmilitary and 

indirect actions. Meanwhile, military strategy will continue to define the 

likely nature of wars and work out the tasks that need to be fulfilled.698

The first issue of the Journal of the Academy of Military Science

in 2015 also contained an article that described changes in the nature of 

armed conflict in the first part of the 21st century. The factors that have 

the most influence were listed as follows:

 The change in the essence and content of armed 

conflicts

 The dependence of the course and outcome of armed 

struggle on other types of struggle in military 

conflict—political, informational, psychological, etc.

 The informatization of military affairs, bringing the 

development of means of armed conflict—precision 

weapons, systems of troop command and control, and 

management of resources for information effects on 

humans—to a qualitatively new level

 The development and adoption of weapons based on 

new physical and technological principles, which will 

make it possible to implement destructive factors that 

are not manifested earlier on a massive scale

 The shift of efforts to the cosmic (space) sphere, with 

the goal of achieving a guaranteed force superiority 

over potential enemies.699

The opposing sides will inflict damage predominantly on enemy 

weapons and military equipment instead of enemy personnel. Thus, the 

 

698 Ibid.

699 P. A. Dul’nev and V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Principal Changes in the Nature of Armed 

Struggle in the First Third of the 21st Century,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2015, pp. 44-51.
247

course and outcome of armed struggle will rely more and more on the 

ability of the opposing sides to regenerate weapons and military 

equipment created on the basis of the latest technologies. This will 

require the implementation of sets of nontraditional measures to support 

armed struggles (timely creation of reserves of different information

resources, etc.).700

Support rendered to an operation (combat), such as operational 

(tactical) camouflage (misleading the enemy), the psychological 

struggle, and moral-psychological support, will substantially increase.

Various types of weapons will be required. Achieving this goal “depends 

on a substantial increase in the effectiveness of information effects on 

humans.” The enemy must be forestalled in resolving tasks.701

The scale of employing more qualitative and principally newer 

weapons will increase. Troops will be equipped, in particular, with 

directed energy weapons and resources to cause software failure, 

increasing the ability to conduct surprise actions. The one-time use of 

new, substantially more effective resources will lead to an increase in 

troop losses for the opposing sides, perhaps even whole elements of an 

operational structure. The following trends in the change of the nature of 

armed struggle must be considered when forecasting: an increase in the 

intensity of armed struggle, a reduction of the duration of operations, and 

the conduct of armed struggles for more decisive goals.702

There will be an increase in the volume of weapons to control 

information objectives, leading to “the development of forms and 

methods of operations aimed at the achievement of superiority in 

command and control and the destruction of the enemy’s precision 

weapons of various ranges.”

703 Further, the development of space 

systems will cause a future redistribution of the percentages of traditional 

 

700 Ibid.

701 Ibid.

702 Ibid.

703 Ibid.
248

and new weapons to destroy the enemy during land (land-air, air-naval) 

operations. The percentage of rocket forces during the fire destruction of 

the enemy in operations may increase, and aviation employment may be 

reduced.

704

Finally, developing weapons based on new physical and 

technological principles will change the percentage contribution of 

various types of effects (fire, energy, software) when destroying the 

enemy. This will cause a change in resource dependence for armed 

struggles. Developing directed energy weapons and software means of 

destruction enables the reduction of explosives and takes into 

consideration using items such as explosive magnetic generators.705

In another 2015 article Chekinov and Bogdanov discussed the 

forecasting of future war.706 To set the stage for what Russia considers 

its future war toolbox, the article developed specific charges against the 

US as to how they conduct operations, noting that the US achieves 

political and economic goals by threatening the use of force or actually 

using it. Further, the authors state that the US wants to enlarge NATO 

toward Russia, and it wants to step up activities in the Arctic. The 

reason, they add, is that the US views Russia’s growing military and 

economic power as a threat to the US’s national security.707 Russian 

President Vladimir Putin was quoted as stating that “we must visualize in 

full measure the nature and outcome of military strategic processes 

unfolding in the modern world to clearly realize the kind of potential 

threats that can affect the situation shaping up around our country.”708

Forecasting is viewed as an instrument that helps avoid errors in 

identifying the principal avenues for promoting military art, avoiding 

 

704 Ibid.

705 Ibid.

706 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 41-

49.

707 Ibid., p. 41.

708 Ibid., p. 42.
249

paths that lead nowhere, and cutting the costs of maintaining military 

security. It is the job of military science to use such a methodology to 

validate the substance and nature of future wars and even to develop 

strategy. Russia must look for new forms and methods of using violent 

and nonviolent measures and indirect moves to protect its national 

interests. Even historical figures such as Svechin said you cannot stick to 

entrenched stereotypes, as such thinking makes it difficult to conduct 

strategic forecasts of the nature and substance of future wars.709

Systematic forecasting can bring out new trends and help formulate 

verified principles for an adequate strategy

Further, the concept of the term “war” needs to be expanded and 

this includes future wars in the first place. The role of other types of 

warfare (economic, ideological, psychological, informational, and so on) 

will not alter the essence of future war. The essence of future war, 

usually stated as warfare using arms, will remain,710 while developments 

in unconventional arms may be used to cause earthquakes, typhoons, 

downpours, and other disasters. Weapons for future wars will be 

designed based on new physical principles. The nature and substance of 

future wars will be changed radically by: space-based attack weapons; 

orbiting battle space stations; new weapons of improved destructive 

power, range, accuracy, and rate of fire; greater capabilities of 

reconnaissance and robot-controlled assets; automated weapons control; 

communication; and information warfare systems. Forecasts of future 

war show that they will be resolved by a skillful combination of military, 

nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures using a variety of forms 

and methods and a blend of political, economic, information, 

technological, and environmental measures, primarily by taking 

advantage of information superiority.711

Information war is the start point for every action now called the 

“new type of warfare (a hybrid war)” in which broad use will be made of 

 

709Ibid.

710 Ibid., p. 43.

711 Ibid., p. 44.
250

the mass media and computer networks (blogs, social sites, etc.). New 

information techniques, operating in the nanosecond format, will be the 

decisive factor for success of military operations. These techniques are 

based on new technologies that are key components of information 

weapons. They may paralyze computer systems that control troops and 

weapons and deprive the enemy of information transmission functions. 

In fact, computers may turn into a strategic weapon in future wars as a 

result.712 Information and psychological warfare will come in all forms 

and methods, with the goal being to achieve superiority in troop control 

and to erode the morale and spirits of the enemy. 

Future wars will be launched by electronic warfare forces, which 

will protect friendly forces, block foreign propaganda disinformation, 

and strike at enemy EW forces and assets. They will blend with strategic 

operations set off by the armed forces and with aerospace operations, 

with the latter augmented by cruise missiles, and reconnaissance “outfits 

(UAVs, robots)” delivering strikes and fires. Long-term forecasts predict 

that strategic goals will not be achieved in future wars unless information 

superiority is assured over the enemy. Russia must be on the lookout for 

a special operation to “misinform and mislead the other side’s military 

and political leaders,” which will include large-scale measures of newtype wars (hybrid), including actions to influence the behavior of the 

armed forces of the adversary to instigate internal tensions in society.713

Making long-term forecasts of the type and substance of future 

wars are difficult due to the number of “wars of surprises” that are 

created. Foresight can be used to preview long-term trends of changes in 

the geostrategic situation and the evolution of relationships between 

countries and their effect on the evolution of military art. Forecasts are 

based on the record of war and armed conflicts.714 Developing doctrine 

requires insights into the forms and methods of violent and nonmilitary 

actions, which are required before reforms, military economies, and 

 

712Ibid.

713 Ibid., p. 45.

714 Ibid., p. 43.
251

infrastructures can be upgraded. Military science must be able to handle 

the transformation of views on the nature of threats, changes in the forms 

and methods of wars conduct by joint and cross-service task forces and 

the laws of warfare, and new areas of military art’s development.715

Main distinctions associated with future war include the fact that 

weapons designed on new technological principles will have an 

overwhelming superiority. Nuclear weapons will have reduced 

significance and strategic operations by the armed forces may become 

the principal form of fulfilling strategic tasks. A unified system will be 

deployed to collect and process information through the integration of 

capabilities in real time. Forecasting shows that future wars will have an 

opening (last about a month) and closing period (which must be as short 

as possible). Forecasts of the development of the geostrategic situation 

must be made and the linkages between warfare employing arms and 

nonviolent and nonmilitary measures assessed.716

Conclusions

This chapter began with a look at Russian military-technological 

developments. The Russian military is spending a huge sum of money on 

scientific research in the hope of attaining information superiority over 

all opponents by 2025, and much earlier if possible. This research has 

resulted in several initial developments that indicate Russia is developing 

some high-technology weaponry that will challenge weaponry in other 

nations. 

While research is being conducted in a host of areas, robotics and 

weapons based on new physical principles appear to head the list. The 

development of an Advanced Research Foundation and an Intra-Branch 

Research Special Projects Directorate has helped to ensure that money is 

being channeled for the right purposes and in the right way. The 

development of new science companies indicates that the military is 

adjusting its focus from considering conscripts as nothing more than 

 

715 Ibid., p. 48.

716 Ibid., p. 47.
252

fodder for the military machine to appreciating the value of smart young 

minds and their ability to make innovative suggestions for new and 

better weaponry. While there are currently nine science companies, 

Defense Minister Shoygu has indicated that he hoped to have 11 

companies helping the military by the end of 2015.

When combined with Russia’s traditional focus on future war 

thinking, which takes into account forecasting and the correlation of 

forces, it appears that President Putin has the military tracking future war 

developments appropriately according to the Soviet/Russian model. The 

military is also assessing contemporary affairs and new advances in 

weaponry, which then offer new methods of conflict. It is doubtful that 

Russia would be totally surprised by foreign technological 

developments, as it has the algorithm writers and other forces to foresee

the types of technologies under development abroad and what types of 

weaponry these technologies are creating. Russia has always been 

blessed with creative thinkers, and this generation appears no less 

capable than those that preceded it. Mathematical capabilities remain a 

key attribute of Russia’s educational system, and this ability is an

extremely topical one in the information age. The impact of algorithm 

writers on software development is most apparent in the next chapter 

dealing with Russian cyber assets.

What is unfortunate is that, through his actions in Ukraine, Putin

has caused his neighbors to no longer visualize Russia as a friendly state

but rather as a threat. Neighbors are rearming and receiving additional 

guidance and funding from the West, upon whom they have called for 

assistance. It is doubtful that Putin’s forecasting and correlation of forces

abilities in the military correctly predicted the fallout from his actions in 

Crimea and elsewhere. It will take some time to alleviate this situation, 

especially as Russia rearms and refocuses on threats everywhere it looks, 

threats that the leadership itself created. Now, whether it be sanctions or 

the increased military buildup on Russia’s borders, the leadership must 

deal with the consequences of its actions. This complicates thinking 

about future war and assessments of its changing nature. 
253

CHAPTER SEVEN: RUSSIA’S DIGITAL PROMINENCE

Introduction

In 1947 Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov developed the AK47 assault rifle. Today the Kalashnikov Concern has expanded to include 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), naval craft, and remote-controlled 

modules for installation on armored vehicles, among other 

developments.717 Although Kalashnikov died in December 2013, his 

name will remain associated with Russian arms for years to come. 

In the digital age in which we now live, there are many excellent 

software writers and digital experts. Math expertise has always been a 

Russian strength. There may not be a certain name associated with this 

expertise as there was with the Kalashnikov, however, since digital 

geniuses are being replaced one by one. Each generation produces more 

adept and informed programmers. Today the name Eugene Kaspersky 

stands above others, but as the age of quantum computing approaches, 

perhaps he will be superseded by some other scientist. This does not 

distract from the fact that the current wave of algorithm writers is as 

important as any of the arms developers in the military-industrial 

complex. Their software is a key element in much of the new weaponry 

that delivers ordinance on target or enables the acquisition of commands 

from faraway places while in flight. 

This chapter will detail some of the recent results of Russia’s

cyber efforts. First, a Russian authored book on cyber and information 

issues is summarized. It covers the history of digital issues in Russia and 

thus serves as a start point for examining the recent past. Next, a list of 

some recent cyber revelations, to include a list of external and internal 

cyber dangers to Russia, is offered. That is followed by the policy 

responses of the Kremlin, which include the close integration of effort 

between the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service (FSB) as a 

monitor of compliance and intelligence oversight of these policies. 

 

717 Rossiya 24 TV (Russian 24 TV), 14 June 2015.
254

Military issues are then examined, which includes a look at the various 

articles that have appeared in the journal Military Thought. The 

discussion ends with a discussion of the recent Russian and Chinese 

cyber agreement. What is clear is that Russia continues its efforts to 

control its domestic and international cyber and information 

environments. Some of these issues are information-technical and some 

information-psychological, which continues a tradition in Russian 

thought as to how to subdivide cyber and information issues. What is 

unknown is how cyber fits into Russia’s concept of the correlation of 

forces and the initial period of war.

An Important Book on Digital Issues

In 2015 two Russian authors, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, 

wrote a book titled The Red Web: The Struggle between Russia’s Digital 

Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries. It offers an excellent 

summary and background on the development of Russian information 

and cyber issues over the past century. The authors, who have their own 

website (Agentura.ru), note that the book is an investigation into what 

happened in their country when two forces, surveillance and control on 

one side and freedom on the other, collided over digital issues.718 The

Red Web demonstrates how a combination of surveillance, control, 

mobilization, information, and manipulation are integrated to the benefit 

of the Kremlin. 

Of course, the control of information is not a new phenomenon in 

Russia. The authors go back to the days of Lenin to explain his 

successful management of newspapers to organize and mobilize the 

masses, not inform them, which thereby prevented the population from 

obtaining an alternative worldview. For this reason, in the days of the 

Soviet Union, dissidents relied on Samizdat (self-published material) to 

obtain such viewpoints.

719 Today, control over information has become 

 

718 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle between Russia’s 

Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries, Public Affairs, New York, 2015, 

p. x. 

719 Ibid., p. 11.
255

especially critical for Russia and President Putin, since he believes the 

US has the technology to enable it to topple political regimes,720 and that 

Russia might be next on America’s list. 

On Control

Control over information did not end with the collapse of the 

Mikhail Gorbachev era, but it was not always the Kremlin that was in 

command of it. In the mid-1990s Russian oligarchs used news media as 

weapons to fight for control of the vast resources that Russia possessed. 

They bought and sold media empires. When the first search engine, 

Rambler.ru, appeared along with the Internet service provider Cityline 

and the first blog, the Evening Internet, it became frighteningly clear to 

the security services that such sources of information had to be 

controlled.721 The oligarchs were controlling more information than the 

Kremlin and people were accessing information outside the Kremlin’s 

comfort zone.

In 1998 Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) produced a draft 

document that made Russia’s Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) install 

black boxes on their lines, thereby connecting the ISP with the FSB. The 

black box system, which furthered control over information, was known 

as SORM (System of Operative Search Measures) and it became a 

technical means to investigate electronic networks, or to conduct 

eavesdropping on the Internet. It was not even mandatory for the FSB to 

show a warrant to anyone when it made inspections. The ISP owners 

were forced to pay for the black box and its installation yet they had no 

access to it.722 There reportedly have been three levels of SORM over 

time. Soviet KGB telephone tapping was dubbed SORM-1. Internet 

tapping, to include Skype, was dubbed SORM-2, while SORM-3 

included all telecommunications.723

 

720 Ibid., p. 124.

721 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

722 Ibid., p. 68.

723 Ibid., p. 70.
256

In 2008, Russian authorities began to worry over other issues 

such as search engine Yandex, which began to replace newspapers in 

popularity in Russia. Yandex offered on its home page five top news 

items, which attracted younger audiences in particular. It soon became 

the ninth-largest search engine in the world.724 Yandex made the 

Kremlin realize that it would need to control not only Russian media but 

also the wider Russian-speaking Internet. It especially wanted access to 

how Yandex algorithms were chosen but were unsuccessful in their 

attempts to do so in 2008.725 Eventually, Yandex was put under 

investigation (for posting news items each day) and was thus deemed a 

“kind of media.” Forcing Yandex to register as media made the company 

subject to Russian media legislation and libel law, and thus it could be 

closed down726 if the Kremlin so desired.

The focus on Internet sites became so intense because the 

Kremlin worried about a so-called “color revolution” happening in 

Russia. When the Arab Spring occurred in 2011, FSB Director 

Aleksander Bortnikov suggested that a Western conspiracy was afoot 

and that it could be aimed at starting similar protests in Russia. On 7 

June 2012 the Russian State Duma introduced legislation for a 

nationwide system of filtering on the Internet, including a single register 

of banned sites, i.e., a blacklist.727 The blacklist would block Internet 

protocol addresses, sets of numbers, URLs, or domain names the FSB 

described as harmful. The Federal Agency for Supervision of 

Communications (Roskomnadzor) maintained the blacklist.728 By March 

2014 Russia had four official blacklists of banned websites and pages: 

those deemed extremist; those that included child pornography and 

suicide or banned drug discussions; copyright problems; and sites 

blocked because they called for demonstrations not approved by the 

authorities (and conducted without a court order). An unofficial fifth 

 

724 Ibid., p. 111.

725 Ibid., p. 114.

726 Ibid., pp. 294-295.

727 Ibid., p. 166.

728 Ibid., p. 196.
257

blacklist was for those sites or groups deemed to be uncooperative.729 

Putin wanted to ensure that the West would never be able to start an 

uprising like Arab Spring in Russia. In April 2014, he declared that the 

Internet was a CIA project.730 Authorities clearly feared the Internet 

might be used to interfere in internal affairs, or undermine sovereignty, 

national security, territorial integrity, public safety, or be used to divulge 

information of a sensitive nature.731

In May 2014 Putin signed a law to tighten control over online 

bloggers with more than 3,000 followers. These bloggers had to register 

with the government, allowing the security services to track them. In 

May 2015 a new law made it possible to block all kinds of sites if they 

carried information without signed agreements from authors or rights 

holders. Thus, any hyperlink to any text or page can result in the

blocking of a website.732

Soldatov and Borogan developed a template through which to 

understand the Kremlin’s approach to media control: Parliament 

produces a flow of repressive legislation that exploits cracks in 

previously published rules and regulations; hacktivists and trolls attack 

and harass liberals online, posing as someone other than a Kremlin 

supporter; Roskomnadzor is granted the power to censor and filter the 

Internet; Kremlin-affiliated oligarchs bankroll and take over media 

companies; specific manufacturers are selected to provide surveillance 

equipment; and Putin’s paranoia of enemies ties these actions together, 

resulting in threats and intimidation. Putin’s system is effective as long 

as people are certain the Kremlin is in control. This dynamic can be

transformed when a crisis occurs and message are shared in real time.733

On Snowden

 

729 Ibid., p. 263.

730 Ibid., p. 238.

731 Ibid., p. 233.

732 Ibid., pp. 215, 220.

733 Ibid., pp. 313-314.
258

Edward Snowden, the authors write, landed in a country with a 

miserable human rights record. He appealed to investigative journalists 

for help, but found out after taking risks “to expose information in the 

interest of freedom of information” that he had landed in a regime that 

suppressed information.734 His disclosures emboldened Russia to exert 

more control over the Internet. It meant Russian citizens would be 

forbidden from keeping personal data on foreign servers, and that digital 

sovereignty for Russia must be provided.735 Digital sovereignty would 

force Facebook, Twitter, Google and its services, Gmail and YouTube, 

to be subject to Russian legislation, and would allow backdoor access to 

them for the Russian security services. In 2013 new SORM technical 

guidelines required phone operators and Internet providers to store 

information for 12 hours at a time until it could be retrieved by the 

authorities. Correspondence through Gmail, Yahoo, and ICQ instant 

messaging could be intercepted.736 In short, everything Snowden hoped 

for had backfired. He was now a prisoner in a land where Internet 

freedom was tightly controlled well beyond anything he had imagined.

On the Ukraine Intervention and Information

A Facebook post on 21 November 2013 by Mustafa Nayyem, 

who was disappointed when Ukraine failed to integrate with the EU due 

to Putin’s pressure, advised people to come to Independence Square, also 

known as Maidan. Some say this started the revolution in the square.737

Such protests were a seminal crisis for Putin due to his fear of color 

revolutions. While Ukraine’s information agency UNIAN reported that a 

cyber-attack had occurred in reaction to events in Maidan, this was not 

the real problem for protesters. Rather, it was the tidal wave of 

propaganda that Russia spread on social networks, infiltrating VKontakte 

first before exploiting the digital pathways for its own purposes. Trolls 

and disruptive online discussions were unleashed with inflammatory 

messages.738 Fake news agencies such as ANNA News were registered 

 

734 Ibid., p. 221.

735 Ibid., p. 209.

736 Ibid., pp. 210-211.

737 Ibid., p. 275.

738 Ibid., pp. 279-283.
259

in places such as Abkhazia, and the agency (presumably ANNA) 

established a Russian replica of YouTube, known as Rutube. Quasi-news 

agencies set up accounts on VKontakte, Facebook, Twitter, Google+, 

and Odnoklassniki. Another faux agency, Novorossia Television, set up 

social network accounts and posted videos that were picked up by proKremlin TV.739

Putin had invested his personal prestige in Ukrainian President 

Viktor Yanukovych and when the latter went missing in February 2014 it 

was a frightening prospect. On 3 March Roskomnadzor quickly blocked 

13 pages of groups linked to the Ukrainian protest movement on 

VKontakte. On 8 March pro-Kremlin activists launched the website 

predatel.net, which means “no traitors,” gathering statements of liberals 

deemed unpatriotic (Navalny, Nemtsov, Parkhomenko, etc.) and then 

threatened them.740

Conclusion Reached on the Red Web

Thus, in the end, the digital directors of the Kremlin have gotten 

what they wanted: a reenergized populace sympathetic to Putin’s actions 

and convinced of Western conspiracies to neuter Russia, resulting in his 

exceptionally high popularity rating. Meanwhile, small pockets of 

resistance to this media takeover remain, but their voices are more muted 

than before. As the authors note, one of the main motivators leading to 

Russia’s extra control over the media was the revelations of Edward 

Snowden. He justified his actions by the need to defend the Internet from 

government intrusion, surrendering countless NSA secrets in the process, 

only to be a guest in a regime that has been suppressing freedom of 

information for years.

Some Recent Developments and Case Studies

A New Information Security Doctrine

As Soldatov and Borogan’s book went to press in early 2015, 

other important cyber developments were underway that have taken us to 

 

739 Ibid., pp. 284-286.

740 Ibid., p. 260.
260

the end of the year. The most significant was probably the statement that 

in 2016 a new Information Security Doctrine, the first since 2000, would 

be published. A Kommersant article in October discussed the doctrine, 

noting that it would contain several threat blocks. First, the threat of a 

potential incursion that would affect critical information infrastructure 

and the conduct of technical reconnaissance of state bodies. Second, the 

threat of an adversaries active use of information communication 

technologies (ICT) (by intelligence services or public organizations) to 

undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia or to 

destabilize the country’s internal political and social situation. This 

includes the ability to use information’s impact to undermine cultural 

and spiritual values or patriotic traditions. Finally, threats to privacy and 

the increase in computer crimes were mentioned. No other specific 

blocks were discussed, but two warnings were provided: don’t fall

behind in the creation of ICT products; and beware of separate states 

desires to use technological domination in information space to achieve 

economic and geopolitical advantages.

741

In addition to the new information security doctrine the press 

continued to publish cyber issues of all types, to include military, 

equipment, new threats and so on. As an example of how many cyber 

issues are being discussed in Russia, consider the following reports from 

September-December 2015: 

15 Sept: Western Military District communication troops 

repel a hypothetical enemy cyber-attack during joint 

Russian-Belarussian operational exercise Union-Shield2015, where computer attacks were blocked and back-up 

channels were used—wired, satellite, and radio relay. 

Special encryption equipment (crypto-router and antivirus software) were also used.742

 

741 Unattributed report, Kommersant (The Businessman), 10 October 2015.

742 “Western Military District Communication Specialists Repel Hypothetical Enemy 

Cyber Attack during Union Shield-2015 Exercise,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation Website, 15 September 2015.
261

17 Sept: Ukraine’s state bodies banned Kaspersky Lab 

products from their organizations, but Lab products keep 

working in other market segments of Ukraine.

743

24 Sept: Linux-based Operating System Zarya has 

appeared in Russia’s Forces. It is designed to work safely 

with classified information.

744

 

21 October: A Russian report notes that there are no 

scenarios for disconnecting the Internet inside Russia. 

Rather the task is to preserve the Russian segment of the 

Internet. 745

27 Oct: US officials claim that Russian submarines may 

damage undersea communication cables; Russia denies 

this.746

10 Nov: A recent Russian military article described

design concepts for remote-controlled cyber weapons. It 

was noted that this type of weaponry also would be 

effective for deterrence, warning, and preemption and 

retribution purposes.747

19 Nov: Command and control systems of different force 

structures and units can be integrated into one information 

space.748

19 Nov: Defense Minister Shoygu stated that two science 

companies of programmers will be set up.749 They will be 

created for the National Defense Control Center.750

 

743 Interfax (in English), 17 September 2015.

744 TASS News Agency, 24 September 2015.

745 Interfax (in English), 21 October 2015.

746 Interfax (in English), 27 October 2015.

747 Grigoriy Vokin, “Remote Custodian. Warheads with Artificial Intelligence Could 

Be Used for Reconnaissance, Guaranteed Destruction of Targets, and Human Rescue,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 10 

November 2015. 

748 TASS, 19 November 2015.

749 TASS, 19 November 2015.

750 “Defense Minister Army General Sergey Shoygu Participated in the Work of the 

First Interdepartmental Conference on Information Interaction,” Ministry of Defense of 

the Russian Federation Website, 19 November 2015.
262

20 Nov: Russian officials cannot use foreign software 

next year if a Russian version exists.751

2 Dec: Russia is developing a computer system to detect, 

prevent, and eliminate consequences of cyber-attacks 

against state agencies.752

7 Dec: Russia has opened in the Samara Region its first 

center to protect local government bodies against cyberattacks. Objectives are to establish non-stop monitoring of 

cyber security incidents and develop a quick response if 

needed.753

13 Dec: An international security system that endorses a 

code or rules of conduct in the form of soft law is needed 

according to Russian Prime Minister Dmitry 

Medvedev.754

Russian Cyber Motivation: External and Internal Cyber Dangers

The external threat to Russia was brought home by the data that 

Edward Snowden provided in 2013. Putin noted in 2014 that cyber 

espionage is “a direct violation of the state’s sovereignty, an 

infringement on human rights, and an invasion of privacy.”755 The same 

year he stated that some countries want to attain a domineering position 

in information space. To deter Russia, those nations “we usually call our 

colleagues and partners” are using all tools, from political isolation and 

economic pressure to full scale information warfare, to do so.756 Here 

they can achieve “not just economic, but also military-political goals, 

and actively apply information systems as a tool of the so-called ‘soft 

force’ for serving their interests.”

757 Protecting Russia’s information 

space against contemporary threats is a national security priority, he 

 

751 Peter Hobson, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 20 Nov 

2015.

752 Izvestiya Online, 2 December 2015.

753 TASS, 7 December 2015.

754 Interfax (in English), 13 December 2015.

755 Interfax (in English), 11 July 2014.

756 Interfax (in English), 26 March 2015.

757 Interfax (in English), 1 October 2014.
263

noted. Control and communication systems are exceptionally important 

for the nation’s defensive capability, as well as its economic and social 

development.758 This makes Russia’s antivirus capability, such as the 

Kaspersky Lab, so important, since it can help protect these vectors. And 

for this reason Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev has noted 

that foreign telecommunication hardware and software must be replaced 

by domestic equipment.759

Internally, Putin worries in particular about calls to overthrow 

existing government systems. He writes:

In defending the freedom of choice, assemblies, 

demonstrations, and rallies, one should not forget about 

one’s responsibility for one’s words and actions. One 

must know and understand that inciting conflicts among 

people of various ethnicities and faiths, propaganda of 

nationalist ideology, and resulting mass violations of 

public order, and calls for toppling the existing 

government system are a direct manifestation of antinational thinking, a direct manifestation of extremism.760

Such thinking about the dangers of color revolutions to government 

systems has definitely spread throughout the security sector in Russia. 

However, it is not just the West and the US that worry Putin. It is also 

websites that promote terrorism, extremism, xenophobia, and religious 

hatred inside the country that must be contained in order to protect 

Russia’s citizens.761

In response to the external and internal dangers that the Kremlin 

visualizes, a series of policies to confront or neutralize them were 

discussed over the past three or four years and only more recently 

 

758 Ibid.

759 Interfax (in English), 2 October 2014.

760 Interfax (in English), 21 November 2014.

761 Interfax (in English), 1 October 2014.
264

realized. In several instances below, the examples used represent more 

lengthy write-ups of issues advanced by Soldatov and Borogan in The 

Red Web.

Case Studies

There have been several countries that have allegedly been 

attacked by Russian hackers in the past six months that have openly 

discussed the incidents. There probably are many others that have not 

been reported. Here we will focus on four, France, Ukraine, Germany, 

and the US. At this point in the investigations it is unknown if the 

hackers were state supported or were acting on their own.

France. 

In June 2015 France suspected that a group of Russian hackers posed as 

Islamic State militants and conducted a cyber attack against a 

TV5Monde, making it look like an attempt to spread terrorist 

propaganda. The group called itself “CyberCaliphate,” and such an 

attack made sense in light of the attack over six months ago on Charlie 

Hebo. However, those investigating the incident think this was an 

example of misdirection, and that evidence was pointing to APT 28, a 

Russian hacker group that will be discussed in more detail later in the US 

section. The IP addresses hosting the CyberCaliphate website matched 

those used by APT. The Russian government denied involvement in the 

incidence.762

Germany. In December 2015 Der Spiegel magazine (electronic version) 

discussed a cyber-attack against the Bundestag and other governments in 

NATO that had taken place in April. Investigators believe that APT 28 

was behind this attack and it turned out to be the most serious attack 

against a constitutional body in Germany. An e-mail contained an 

address ending in “un.org,” so it did not raise tremendous suspicion. 

Hackers dug their way to “other places in the network” and had “had

 

762 Sam Schechner, “France Says Russians Carried Out Cyberattack,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 11 June 2015, p. A6.
265

access to 14 servers of the Parlakom network, including the main server 

that stores all access data in the Bundestag.”763

Ukraine. Before addressing several late 2015 attacks, it is important to 

return to the Presidential elections in Kiev in May 2014, for the 

necessary background. Just 72 hours before the election that potentially 

would offer a mandate to Ukraine’s population to develop a legitimate 

pro-Western government, the election headquarters were hacked by a 

pro-Moscow group known as CyberBerkut. Fortunately operations were 

restored in time for the elections. CyberBerkut has also attached 

government documents on its website, and it has hacked the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs then the Ministry of Defense, among others. 

CyberBerkut is allegedly an independent Ukrainian organization. 

Ukrainian officials, however, strongly suspect Russian involvement with 

the group. There is little surprise in Ukraine’s weak cyber security 

system, since it has much Russian technology in its inventory, is infested 

with Russian supporters, lacks security updates, and hosts much of its email on servers located in Russia. The hacker tools being used against 

Ukraine are sophisticated, further indicating nation-state sponsorship.764

But there is no proof. And that is the same scenario that seems to be 

repeating itself in 2015. 

Russia has been a bit trickier with its use of cyber against Ukraine. One 

Kiev report noted that there was a scheme to bribe voters with Internet 

technologies. As the report noted

The cyber technology to remotely bribe voters has for the 

first time been used at these elections (on 25 October and 

mayoral runoffs in several big Ukrainian cities on 15 

November). It includes several stages. At the first one, 

people are enticed by having their mobile phones topped 

 

763 Maik Baumgaertner, Sven Roebel, Marcel Rosenback, and Joerg Schindler, “From 

Moscow Thieves with Love,” Der Spiegel (The Mirror) (Electronic Edition), 5 

December 2015, p. 33.

764 Margaret Coker and Paul Sonne, “Cyberwar’s Hottest Front,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 10 November 2015, pp. A1, A12.
266

up by 50 hryvnyas (about two dollars). Then those who 

respond are paid 400 hryvnyas for a photo of a ballot 

paper with a tick next to the name of an elected 

candidate.765

A member of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine stated that the funding 

came from Moscow. Law enforcement officials stated that 10,000 people 

sold their votes at the 25 October election.766

In December a report from iSight Partners claimed that it had 

gotten the malicious code that caused a massive blackout in the IvanoFrankivsk region of Ukraine leaving hundreds of thousands of homes 

without power. The size of the blackout was viewed as a milestone in 

hacking, since in the past such attacks, which are commonplace, never 

caused such an incident. The country’s energy minister blamed Russia 

for the attack on the power grid and security firm ESET agrees, since 

malware known as BlackEnergy caused the outage and it is a Trojan that 

has been used by Russia in previous attacks against Ukrainian targets.767

Another report noted that US security agencies were studying malware 

from the 23 December blackout affecting nearly 700,000 homes for 

several hours. They had not decided if the hackers acted on behalf of 

Russia’s government or with its implied consent.768

US. The FireEye report on APT 28, a Russian group that have running 

hacker operations since 2007, further indicated that it was sponsored by 

Moscow. The group targets insider information related to governments, 

militaries, and security organizations that would likely benefit the 

Russian government. Actual targets include the Georgian Defense 

Ministry, Eastern European government organizations, NATO, and other 

European Security organizations. 

 

765 Kiev 1+1 Television, 13 November 2015.

766 Ibid.

767 See http://www.cnet.com/news/cyberattack-causes-widespread-power-blackout-inukraine

768 See http://thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/06/exclusive-cia-eyes-russian-hackersin-blackout-attack.html
267

Russia. In September Vedomosti (Record) discussed coding in general. 

Various firms were accessed. Kaspersky Lab representative Aleksander 

Gostev noted that the Lab follows APT 28 and added that its hacker 

techniques are Russian and the operating system version on which files 

are created are Russian. Infowatch specialist Natalya Kasperskaya noted 

that Russian programmers do code slower than Chinese or Indian 

programmers; and Sergey Golovanov noted that assembly language and 

C programming is typical for the Moscow Engineering and Physics 

Institute.

Policy Responses of the Kremlin

In early November 2013 the State Duma Security and 

Anticorruption Committee recommended the adoption of an amendment 

to an FSB law that will allow it to conduct police investigations to 

counter threats to Russia’s information security. Earlier such actions 

were applicable only to state, military, economic, or environmental 

security threats. The report stated that harmful software, for example,

can be used as an information weapon769 that could threaten security. On 

20 November the President of Russia website noted that the president 

had approved a concept of public security. One provision noted that 

public security proceeds from an improvement in political, 

organizational, socio-economic, information, legal, and other measures. 

Such improvements help counter criminal and other illegal behavior. The 

means of ensuring public security included hardware, software, 

linguistic, legal, and organizational resources that collect, process, and 

transmit information about ways to strengthen public security.770 It is 

unclear if the change to the FSB law and the concept on public security 

are related.

 

769 Unattributed report, “A State Duma Committee Has Approved Amendments 

Relating to Information Security,” RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 8 November 

2013.

770 “President of Russia Official Website: Concept of Public Security in the Russian 

Federation,” President of Russia Website, 20 November 2013.
268

In January 2014 a draft “Concept of Strategy of Cyber Security 

of the Russian Federation” was placed on a government website. The 

goal of the strategy was to provide for the cyber security of individuals, 

organizations, and the state in the Russian Federation by defining a 

system of priorities and measures in the area of internal and external 

policies. Section one was devoted to the urgency of developing a strategy 

to confront emerging cyber threats. Section two defined terms on which 

the strategy must be based (information space, information security, 

cyberspace, cyber security). Section three examined the place of strategy 

in the system of existing legislation. It was deemed necessary to remove 

existing failings, create bases for the process of supporting cyber 

security, systematize the action of interested parties, and formulate a 

model of cyber security threats. Section four discussed the goals of the 

strategy. Section five discussed the principles of the strategy. Section Six

discussed the priorities of the strategy in providing for cyber security, 

including developing a national system for protecting against cyberattacks and warnings about them; raising the reliability of critical 

information’s infrastructure; improving measures for providing for the 

state security of information resources in cyberspace; developing 

mechanisms for the partnering of the state, business, and civil society in 

cyber security; developing digital literacy of the citizenry; and increasing 

international cooperation. Section seven directed activities in support of 

cyber security. Finally, section eight discussed the development and 

acceptance of the strategy.771

In June 2014 the Collective Security Treaty Organization drew 

up regulations for a center to deter cyber threats.772 In July Russia 

reported the creation of a mobile operating system that can be protected 

from spyware wiretapping and that prevents data leakage. One batch of 

this operating system tablet was developed with an impact-proof case for 

the Defense Ministry (MOD), while the other is more ordinary. Still, it 

can work underwater and in high temperatures. One aim of the product 

 

771 “Concept of Strategy of Cyber Security of the Russian Federation,” Government of 

the Russian Federation Website, 10 January 2014.

772 Interfax (in English), 25 June 2014.
269

was to make it available for cyber troops, but more work remains to be 

done.773 In August a law on bloggers, classifying them as mass media, 

took effect. If a blogger site registers more than 3,000 visits a day, then it 

should be entered into a special register and allowed to publish 

advertisements for a fee. Bloggers must check the information they post, 

comply with election campaign regulations, refrain from disseminating 

information on citizens private lives, and state age limits for users.774 In 

September, due to sanctions imposed on Russia because of its 

intervention in Ukraine, Putin stated that Russia must make its own 

software for defense industry and security agency needs and for civilian 

communications.775 The same month the Russian Telecommunications 

Ministry said it is not planning to cut off access to the Internet but is 

preparing a plan in case of external efforts to make that happen. Russia 

worries, since a large part of its important infrastructure is controlled 

from outside Russia.776 A month later the president stated that there is no 

need to restrict access to the Internet or take total control of it. However, 

he added that Internet resources are being used by some countries to 

exert soft power or military-political influence to achieve their 

interests.777 This must be countered.

In March 2015 Deputy Premier Dmitriy Rogozin gave

instructions to create a cybersecurity council, most likely within the 

Military-Industrial Commission. The group will include representatives 

of information security system developers, state users of these systems, 

legislators, and business community representatives.778 Speaking at the 

meeting were representatives of the FSB, Infowatch Company, the 

Federal Service for Technical and Export Controls, Rosatom, Russian 

Railways, the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute, and the 

 

773 RIA Novosti, 3 July 2014.

774 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2014.

775 Interfax (in English), 19 September 2014.

776 Interfax, 19 September 2014.

777 RIA Novosti (in English), 1 October 2014.

778 Sergey Goryashko and Yelena Chernenko, “Dmitriy Rogozin Takes Up ‘Smart 

Weapons.’ Government to Get Cybersecurity Council,” Kommersant Online (The 

Businessman Online), 11 March 2015.
270

Russian Center for Policy Studies. The latter’s representative, Oleg 

Demidov, noted that the foundation for Russia’s policy in the cyber 

security sphere should rest on the adoption of the law “On the Security 

of the Russian Federation’s Critical Information Structure,” which 

classifies critically important facilities.779

Also in March definitions were offered for social networks and 

bloggers. A social network was defined as “an online website that 

provides individuals/users with an opportunity for self-presentation as 

well as the development of social networks by registering accounts/blogs 

and their continuing coordination.”780 A blogger is “an individual who 

registered an account on a social network or owns an independent 

blog.”781 In May the Center for Research in Legitimacy and Political 

Protest, a pro-Kremlin political center, allegedly developed a computer 

program that trawls social networks looking for opposition plans to 

Kremlin activities. Russia feels Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and 

VKontakte, Russia’s main social network, contain information that it 

deems extremist. Monitoring social networks would help warn Russian 

society about cyber activities and threats they represent to the regime.782

Also in May Putin signed an edict that establishes a Russian state 

segment of the Internet. The draft had been prepared over a year and a 

half ago. All state structures will be connected to it before 2018. Termed 

“Gosnet,” the segment will help counter threats to Russian information 

security at the government level. The state segment serves as an 

intermediate link between the ordinary Internet and state entity 

resources. A backup root server has been created and is functioning at 

the Internet Technical Center. By 1 July 2015 official websites of state 

entities were to be placed on servers in Russia; information was not 

available as to compliance with this. In addition, companies such as 

 

779 Ibid.

780 RAPSI (in English), 13 March 2015.

781 Ibid.

782 Anna Dolgov, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 19 May 

2015.
271

Twitter and Facebook must store actions of Russian subscribers on 

Russian servers as well, no later than 1 September 2015.783

In July several cyber actions were addressed in the press. On 14 

July Putin stated that he has nothing against voting on the Internet for 

Russian elections. This would have to be discussed with the Central 

Electoral Commission and deputies of the State Duma, he added. Having 

many companies working in the field of electronic data protection shows 

that Russia has the ability to do this.784 In another cyber item, Putin 

stated that foreign states are using political tools to hamper Russian 

information technology firms from entering international markets, even 

though they state that the market is open and beyond politics.785 In a 

Moscow Times essay, he was quoted as being in favor of only “minimal” 

Internet restrictions, noting that “one should not forbid reading, viewing, 

or listening to something, but we should ourselves promote our 

position.”786 Many in the West realize that promoting Russia’s position 

has on numerous occasions been performed by so-called Internet trolls, 

usually employed by companies with ties to the Kremlin.

Intelligence Oversight

To implement many of the arrangements above, eight agencies 

are reportedly permitted to conduct investigative activities in Russia: the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), 

Federal Protective Service, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR, which of 

course investigates activities outside Russia), Customs, the Federal Drug 

Control Service, the Federal Corrections Service, and the MOD’s 

Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Several of these organizations have 

expanded their surveillance activities as of 2012. For example, the 

Federal Corrections Service purchased the System of Operational and 

Investigative Measures (SORM) equipment, which are packages 

 

783 Unattributed report, “Putin Signs Edict on Establishing State Internet,” Newsru.com, 

22 May 2015.

784 Rossiya 24 TV (Russia 24 TV), 14 July 2015.

785 Interfax, 14 July 2015.

786 Anna Dolgov, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 15 July 

2015.
272

enabling one to intercept phone and Internet traffic. The law was 

expanded to include areas where people did community service for 

crimes instead of being incarcerated. It is nearly possible to wiretap an 

entire city.

787 Earlier the Supreme Court had upheld the Right of the FSB 

to wiretap oppositionists on the ground of engaging in protest activity.788

Overall it appears that the goal of increased agency and FSB surveillance 

of the Internet is designed to highlight pro-Kremlin messaging and limit 

domestic opposition messaging and thus movements. 

In December 2012 Putin tasked the FSB to act systemically and 

offensively in such directions as providing counterintelligence, 

protecting strategic infrastructure, and combating economic and cyber 

space crime.789 This requirement was followed in early 2013 with the

Presidential Decree, “On Creating the State System to Identify, to 

Prevent, and to Eliminate the Consequences of Cyber Attacks on the 

Information Resources of the Russian Federation.”790 The FSB was 

ordered to organize and conduct work related to creating this state 

system, as well as monitoring its work and cooperating with state bodies; 

and to prevent and eliminate the consequences of cyber-attacks on 

Russia’s information resources. Not only does the decree allow for the 

FSB to determine procedures for protecting cyber information in Russia,

but it also allows for exchanging cyber information with foreign 

governments and international organizations.791 The latter appears to 

allow for the exchange of information with computer emergency 

response teams in other nations.

In December 2013 the FSB received the power to investigate

cybercrimes instead of just collecting information on actions threatening 

national, military, economic and environmental security. The new bill 

adds information security to the list, due to the growth of “interstate 

 

787 Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Why Are We Now Being Monitored More?” 

Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal (Daily Journal), 20 December 2012.

788 Ibid., and Soldatov and Borogan in The Red Web.

789 Interfax (in English), 28 December 2012.

790 Unattributed report, base.consultant.ru, 15 January 2013.

791 Ibid.
273

information struggles,” where the term “struggle” implies the use of 

malicious software that can disrupt computer operations or gather 

sensitive information.792

In early 2014 it was decided to enlist civil society representatives 

to help. It was announced that the Public Chamber was setting up 

volunteer online patrols against Internet crime, including extremism, 

drug sales, the spread of child pornography, etc. A critic of the 

announcement, Nikolay Svanidze, the director of the Russian State 

Humanities University Mass Media Institute’s journalism department, 

noted that the Public Chamber does not have the resources for this kind 

of work. Even the FSB does not have them.793 In September 2014 a 

representative of the FSB’s Public Council stated that the council wants 

more public action in preventing extremist content from being 

disseminated via the mass media. The representative added that the 

council was not calling for censorship but rather a reasonable balance 

between freedom of information and accountability for violating civil 

rights protected by law.794

In mid-March 2015 the FSB was said to establish an integrated 

system to counter cyber threats. The mandate for the system was the text 

on the FSB website of the “Concept for a State System for the Detection, 

Prevention, and Management of Computer Attacks on Russia’s

Information Resources.” The system, known as the “National 

Coordination Center for Computer Incidents,” would organize special 

centers supporting cyber security. In addition to the FSB, one other 

executive agency (to be named) would ensure the security of the 

country’s critical information infrastructure. The network of centers 

would monitor information systems 24 hours a day and respond to cyberattacks. If the threat level of the attack is low, it could be put into the 

hands of the MVD or some other agency. At the moment the report notes 

 

792 Russian Legal Information Agency (in English), 23 December 2013.

793 Artem Lunkov, “Catching with Worldwide Web. Plans to Involve Active Internet 

Users in the Fight against Online Crime,” Novyye Izvestiya Online (New News Online), 

29 January 2014.

794 Interfax (in English), 24 September 2014.
274

that to implement the integration of databases for various agencies is 

difficult to predict. There is too much competition among the security 

structures. A recommendation was to develop an analog of the Palantir 

system used by the CIA, FBI, and NSA for these purposes.795

Another source noted that this state system includes a federal 

executive body that is authorized to ensure the security of Russia’s 

critical information infrastructure and to establish and ensure the 

system’s functionality. The main aims of the system are to ensure 

Russia’s information resources are protected from attacks and to ensure 

the normal functionality of these resources in the event of attacks. The 

centers are subdivided into a main system center, regional centers, 

territorial centers, centers servicing specific Russian government bodies 

and regional government bodies, and corporate centers.796

These developments appear to have greatly diminished the cyber 

powers of the MVD, whose role in the past had been to investigate 

cybercrime, hackers, and so on. However, the MVD is hanging on. In 

early 2014 it had noted that lone criminals were giving way to more 

organized criminal groups. Each access to computer data seemed to have 

the ulterior goal of stealing money.797 In October 2014 the MVD

tendered an order for work on the “Troika” code at a value of over nine 

billion rubles. The work is connected “with handling data that constitutes 

a state secret and to perform work on developing, producing, 

disseminating code (cryptographic) equipment,” among other things.798

As another example of ongoing MVD work, the ministry confirmed that 

it is searching the Open Russia offices (the political movement founded 

on the initiative of the former jailed businessman Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky, a strong Putin opponent) due to information that the 

 

795 Vladimir Todorov, “Cyber Threats to be Repulsed from the Center. FSB to Establish 

Centers to Combat Cyber Crime,” Gazeta.ru (News.ru), 20 March 2015.

796 Interfax, 18 March 2015.

797 Interfax (in English), 30 January 2014.

798 Ivan Komarov, “The Russian MVD Special Communications and Information 

Service Will Pay a Record Nine Billion Rubles for the ‘Troika’ Code,” Gazeta.ru

(News.ru), 8 October 2014.
275

group’s activists design and store calls for extremist activities. The 

premises are being searched for other electronic software relevant to the 

case as well.799 

Military-Related Cyber/Information Reforms

Russian theorists and analysts have helped institute a series of 

reforms in the defense sector over the past several years that focus on the 

application of information concepts. First, it appears that the MOD 

closely watched developments in other countries. Now, the ministry has 

developed both a cyber-command and the Advanced Research 

Foundation, an organization similar in function to the US’s Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). A lengthy discussion of 

the pros and cons of the network-centric concept has taken place on the 

pages of journals such as Military Thought. There has been intense 

discussion in military journals and publications on the use of precisionguided weapons, UAVs, and command and control issues, along with 

website and software upgrades. Finally, the Russian leadership is 

beginning to discuss the development of technologies that use 

information technology such as cyber-electromagnetic pulse, rail guns, 

lasers, and other technologies. 

Different types of threats have been identified that required 

defense reforms. They include the development and dissemination of 

malware, the hacking of data processing and transmission systems, and 

the intrusion of false information. Reliable protection is equally 

important. A system can be made to fail by the use of “crooked”

technology in one's work, an uncertified device, or, for instance, the 

introduction into hardware and software products of components that 

perform functions not stipulated in the documentation.800 Russia should 

adopt urgent measures to protect its information space, in particular that 

of the Armed Forces. To this end it is proposed that special subunits be 

 

799 Interfax (in English), 16 April 2015.

800 Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call for Sixth 

Technological Generation to be Adopted into the Armory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014. 
276

incorporated in their structure. Methodologies are needed for assessing 

the survivability of the information and telecommunications system in 

conditions of net aggression and calculating the time-probability 

characteristics of typical computer attacks.801

During the past two years there have been several very interesting 

cyber developments for the MOD. In January 2014 the Chief of the 

General Staff’s Eighth Directorate stated that Russia will create a special 

structure to protect critically important facilities against computer 

attacks.802 In April it was reported that Roselektronika will design a 

supercomputer which will help testing, along with simulations. The 

supercomputer’s processing capacity is 1.2 petaflops.803 On 12 May an 

article noted that the creation of Information Operations Troops would 

be stopped, since it was too expensive.804 However, only two weeks later 

an article described the army’s creation of cyber subunits. Missions 

included both defense and mounting attacks. In addition to programmers, 

the table of organization and equipment would include highly skilled 

mathematicians, engineers, cryptographers, communications personnel, 

translators, and other supplementary specialists. This will require a 

center for cyber defense inside the General Staff and a cyber-defense

center for each military district and fleet.805 To date, however, no 

corroborating evidence has supported this contention in open source 

documents, other than the creation of a science company in Tambov 

dealing with cyber issues; and the desire to create two science companies 

of programmers, as noted in Chapter Six.

In October 2014 it was noted that the Strategic Rocket Force

Troops are setting up cyber defense subunits. They are designed to detect 

and prevent computer attacks. Since digital technologies now control 

 

801 Ibid.

802 RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 30 January 2014.

803 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 9 April 2014. FLOPS (floating point operations per 

second) is a measure of a computer’s processing speed. A petaflop is the equivalent of 

one quadrillion FLOPS.

804 RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 12 May 2014.

805 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Battle of the Computers,” Versiya (Version), 26 May 2014.
277

command and control aspects of weaponry and troops, these units are 

necessary to improve information security.806 In November Shoygu 

reported that Russia’s National Defense Management Center was 

creating a protected hardware and software suite for consolidating 

information. To be activated on 1 December, the center links the military 

high command, Emergencies Ministry, nuclear power agency Rosatom, 

weather agency Rosgidromet, and other agencies. The hardware and 

software suite will automatically update information of major importance 

for the country’s defense. Of interest is that “a system of centers and 

forces control points has already been set up” for control of defense and 

the branches and elements of the Armed Forces.807 This makes one 

believe that Russia is farther along in developing its cyber forces than it 

lets on.

In January 2015 Shoygu stated that at the all-Russian press 

festival, MEDIA-ACE-2015, a new project was created to help the media 

strengthen the military’s positive image; and that information threats and 

the changing forms and methods of armed conflicts must be kept in mind 

by army development planners. It has become accepted knowledge that 

external interference in the affairs of sovereign states is more frequent, 

the Internet and mass media are being used to influence situations more 

and more, and reconnaissance, control, and attack means are improving.

This requires that Russian troops be armed with high-tech weapons and 

hardware.808 Information technology supremacy is now a factor of 

military force.809 Shoygu stated that the day has come when “a word, a 

camera, a photo, the Internet, and information in general have become 

yet another type of weapon.” This weapon can be an investigator, 

prosecutor, judge, and executor in bad hands.810

Ministry of Defense website upgrades and other reform issues

 

806 TASS, 16 October 2014.

807 Channel One TV, 1 November 2014.

808 Interfax (in English), 30 January 2015.

809 Interfax (in English), 31 March 2015.

810 Interfax (in English), 28 March 2015.
278

In January 2012 the Defense Ministry announced it would be 

upgrading its website as part of its reform effort. The purpose was to 

shape a positive attitude toward MOD activities. Information technology 

experts hoped for the following: to get over ten million persons on line 

simultaneously; from one to five million users viewing video relays 

simultaneously; to get 100,000 users able to work with a search engine 

and database; and to allow several thousand people to play 3D online 

games. Viktor Ryasnov, the information technology specialist of the 

Department for the Development of Information Technology, stated that 

the new website assembles network resources currently contained on 

several sites. For example, the website will allow officers to view the 

construction progress being made on their own apartments.811 This 

appears to be a way to strengthen the information-psychological stability 

of soldiers.

Also of interest has been the work of the General Staff’s 

Military-Scientific Committee. The purpose of the committee appears to 

be justifying scientific work. One site lists several of the research 

institutes associated with the committee. The most prominent in regard 

to information security appears to be the 27th Central Research Institute, 

which studies command and control systems and the information 

infrastructure of the Armed Forces, among other duties.812

At the Tambov science company, a military organization 

designed to recruit talented young programmers, students will be taught 

how to wage computer wars, erect barriers against Internet attacks,

prevent attacks on classified networks, and impede an adversary’s troop 

command and control and weapon use.813 Another report on the science 

company stated that the new subunit will make it possible to boost the 

efficacy of applied-science research, testing in the EW sphere, and 

 

811 Denis Telmanov and Artem Kuybida, “Armed Forces: Defense Ministry Has 

Stormed the Internet,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 15 January 2012.

812 See http://eng.mil.ru/en/science /sro.htm

813 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Defense Ministry Announces Recruitment for Science Troop. 

Students Will be Put under Cyber Arms,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomol Online), 6 

April 2015.
279

training of specialists, and will help in developing data protection 

methods.

814 In June 2015 a new cadet information technology school was 

announced. It will open in September in Saint Petersburg. Cadets will 

study physics, math, and information technology. The school will have a 

network center, a multimedia apparatus center, a software lab, a robotics 

lab, and a 3D center.815 The science company and cadet school may 

serve as building blocks for Russian cyber troops. However, there has 

never been confirmation of where they are located or even if they had 

actually been developed. In 2013 Shoygu had supported the development 

of a cyber-command authority,816 but again, even though it may exist, 

there has been no official announcement.

Other significant cyber-related reports in 2015 include Russian 

military reports of foreign spy satellites posing as space junk. They wake 

up and work when directed to do so. This report quoted Oleg 

Maydanovich, the Commander of Troops at the Space Command, who 

revealed that his people had “recently discovered a group of satellites 

created for the purpose of electronic intelligence-gathering.”817 These 

revelations were not substantiated further. Also it was reported that a 

military unit to counter cyber threats would be created in Crimea in 

October or November. The unit will secure Russian information systems 

and disrupt information systems of probable enemies, if needed.818 

In conjunction with these cyber reforms, the military developed 

one new concept on information and updated two of its military doctrinal 

statements. The paper was developed in 2011 and was titled Conceptual 

Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 

Information Space. The two doctrinal statements were the 2010 and 2014 

 

814 Anton Valagin, “The Ninth Company Will Become an Electronic One,” Rossiyskaya

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 26 January 2015.

815 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 24 June 2015.

816 Aleksey Mikhaylov and Dmitriy Balburov, “Shoygu Returns to Rogozin’s Idea of 

Creating a Cyber Command Authority. The Defense Ministry is Preparing for a FullScale War in Cyber Space,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 12 February 2013.

817 Zvezda (Star) TV, 12 April 2015.

818 Interfax (in English), 17 April 2015.
280

military doctrines of the Russian Federation. A summary of their main 

points is developed below.

Conceptual Views. 

In 2011 the MOD proposed a document known as the Conceptual 

Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 

Information Space. This document defined terms that included

information warfare and information weapons, among others. 

Conceptual Views also offered principles (legality, priority, integration, 

interaction, cooperation, and innovation) to guide the activities of the 

Russian Federation’s Armed Forces (RFAF) in information space. Issues 

that the Russian document emphasized included:

 Legality: respect for national sovereignty and 

noninterference in the internal affairs of other states;

 Priority: collection of relevant and reliable 

information regarding threats, protection of

information resources;

 Integration: utilization of a coordinated and unified 

system to enhance the capabilities of the entire 

system;

 Interaction: coordination of defense activities with 

other federal executive bodies;

 Cooperation: development of cooperation on a global 

level to detect and prevent information and 

technological threats to peace, settlement of disputes 

involving these assets, confidence-building measures 

in regard to the use of trans-boundary information 

systems, and ensuring the secure use of common 

information space;

 Innovation: recruitment of skilled personnel; Russia’s 

innovation centers must be able to develop and 
281

produce systems capable of carrying out activities in 

information space.819

The paper proposed several definitions of terms. One of the most 

interesting was the concept of information war, which the paper defined 

in the following way:

Conflict between two or more States in information space 

with the goal of inflicting damage to information systems, 

processes, and resources, as well as to critically important 

structures and other structures; undermining political, 

economic, and social systems; carrying out mass 

psychological campaigns against the population of a State 

in order to destabilize society and the government; as well 

as forcing a State to make decisions in the interests of 

their opponents.820

Of interest is that this last line is nothing more than the definition 

of reflexive control (RC), which the Russians use to deceive decisionmakers into making decisions that Russia desires. RC was defined in

1995 by Colonel S. Leonenko, who stated that RC “consists of 

transmitting motives and grounds from the controlling entity to the 

controlled system that stimulate the desired decision. The goal of RC is 

to prompt the enemy to make a decision unfavorable to himself.”

821

The Conceptual Views further included rules for the use of 

information space when it is used as an agent of conflict deterrence, 

conflict prevention, and conflict resolution:

 

819 “Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 

in Information Space,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2011.

820 Ibid.

821 S. Leonenko, “On Reflexive Control of the Enemy,” Armeyskiy sbornik (Army 

Digest), No. 8 1995, p. 28.
282

 Deterrence and conflict prevention: develop an 

information security system for the RFAF that can 

deter and resolve military conflicts in information 

space; remain in a constant state of readiness; expand 

the group of partner states; conclude, under UN 

auspices, a treaty on international information 

security; establish control over the escalation of 

conflict; take priority steps to counter the 

development and spread of a conflict; neutralize 

factors leading to the conflict’s spread; and shape 

public opinion means to limit the ability of instigators 

to further escalate the conflict. 

 Conflict resolution: resolve information space 

conflicts primarily through negotiation and 

reconciliation; if in a crisis stage, exercise individual 

and collective self-defense rights not inconsistent with 

international law; deploy manpower and resources for 

ensuring information security on the territory of other 

states in the course of negotiations in accordance with 

international law; keep all media informed of the 

situation.822

It was noted that Russia’s defensive capability depends, to a large extent,

on the effectiveness of Armed Forces activities in information space. 

2010 Military Doctrine

In 2010 Russia approved a new military doctrine.

823 This version 

was divided into sections that discussed military dangers and threats, the 

military policy of the Russian Federation, and military-economic support 

for defense. Information issues were not stated as an express external 

military danger, but rather as an internal military danger defined as the 

disruption of the functioning of organs of state power, of important state 

 

822 Conceptual Views.

823 See 

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40266.
283

and military facilities, and of the information infrastructure of the 

Russian Federation. Any impediment to the functioning of state or 

military command and control systems was expressed as a main military 

threat. The intensification of the role of information warfare was noted as 

a characteristic of contemporary military conflicts. The prior 

implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve 

political objectives without the utilization of military force was identified 

as a feature of modern military conflicts. High-tech devices to be used in 

future military conflicts include precision weaponry, electromagnetic 

weapons, lasers, infrasound weaponry, computer-controlled systems, 

drones, and robotized models of arms and military equipment.824

According to the doctrine, Russia must possess the proper 

information technology to deter conflict. Improving the system of 

information support for the troops was given as a main task for the 

development of military organization. With regard to military-economic 

support, the main task was to create conditions for developing militarytechnical potential at a level necessary for implementing military policy. 

This included developing forces and resources for information warfare, 

improving the quality of the means of information exchange using up-todate technologies, creating new models of precision-guided weapons, 

and developing information support for them.825

2014 Military Doctrine

The latest military doctrine noted that “a trend toward a shift of 

military dangers and military threats into the information space and 

internal sphere of the Russian Federation has begun to show.”

826 A 

military danger is characterized by the aggregate of factors capable of 

leading to a military threat. The latter is defined as characterized by the 

real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict, and it is here that 

 

824 Ibid.

825 Ibid.

826 Section 11, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia 

Website, 26 December 2014.
284

things become even more dangerous. Section 12 of the doctrine states 

that a main external military danger is the 

use of information and communications technologies for 

military-political objectives to carry out actions 

contradicting international law, directed against the 

sovereignty, political independence, and territorial 

integrity of states, and representing a threat to 

international peace, security, and global and regional 

stability.827 

Internal dangers include activities aimed at disorganizing the information 

infrastructure of Russia, as well as activities having an information effect 

on the population, especially among young citizens, in order to 

undermine historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions in the area of 

homeland protection.828

A main task of the Russian Federation with regard to preventing 

or deterring military conflict is to estimate and forecast the state of 

interstate relations in the military-political sphere using state-of-the-art 

technical means and information technologies; and to create conditions 

that lower the risk of information and communications technologies 

being used for military-political objectives to carry out actions 

contradicting international law.829 A main task for developing military 

organization is to upgrade the system of information security of the 

Armed Forces. Finally, regarding tasks for outfitting the Armed Forces, 

developing the defense-industrial complex, and implementing militarypolitical cooperation, the following were mentioned:

 Development of information confrontation forces and 

assets

 

827 Ibid., Section 12 of the Doctrine.

828 Ibid., Section 13 of the Doctrine.

829 Ibid., Section 21 of the Doctrine.
285

 Quality upgrading of the means of information 

exchange based on the use of state-of-the-art 

technologies and international standards, as well as a 

unified information space of the Armed Forces, other 

troops, and entities as part of the Russian Federation 

information space

 Creation of basic information-control systems and 

their integration with fire control systems and 

automation equipment complexes of command and 

control entities of the strategic, operational-strategic, 

operational, operational-tactical, and tactical scale830

 Support of Russian Federation technological 

independence in the production of strategic and other 

models of arms

 Formation of a package of priority technologies 

supporting advanced systems and models of arms831

 Development of a dialogue with interested states on 

national approaches to opposing military dangers and 

military threats arising in connection with large-scale 

use of information and communications 

technologies.832

What about Color Revolutions and the Armed Forces?

Russia’s 2014 military doctrine notes that “a trend toward a shift 

of military dangers and military threats into the information space and 

internal sphere of the Russian Federation has begun to show.”833 This 

trend is felt not just within Russia’s political and diplomatic circles but 

also in military ones. Thus, Russia sees cyber dangers lurking 

everywhere. 

 

830 Ibid., Section 46 of the Doctrine.

831 Ibid., Section 53 of the Doctrine

832 Ibid., Section 55 of the Doctrine.

833 Section 11, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia 

Website, 26 December 2014.
286

For example, an article in the authoritative journal, Military 

Thought, titled, “Political Engineering of Color Revolutions: Ways to 

Keep Them in Check” is representative of such dangers.834 At the recent 

Army-2015 Forum Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu noted that the 

Russian Federation plans to order scientific research on the “color 

revolution” topic. While some think it is not right to involve the military 

in political issues, Shoygu noted that it is not right to repeat the situation 

of the collapses of 1991 and 1993.835 Chief of the General Staff Valery 

Gerasimov stated that “the technology of these revolutions has already 

become standard: manipulating the populations protest potential from 

outside using information space together with...other nonmilitary 

measures.”836

Cyber Articles in Military Thought in 2015

The following articles were published in Military Thought in 

2015. Included are articles that reference or are directly involved with 

information topics. They include technologies, moral and psychological 

info support, EW, information systems, and so on. The purpose is to let 

the reader see how intense the discussions are on these topics.

No 1, 2015

“Military and Political Aspects of the State Policy of the Russian 

Federation in the Field of International Information Security” (I. N. 

Dylevsky, V. O. Zapivakhin, S. A. Komov, A. N. Petrunin, and V. P. 

Elyas)

No. 2, 2015

“An Approach to the Construction of an Electronic warfare System in 

the Conditions of Realized Network-Centric Concepts of the Armed 

 

834 A. N. Belsky and O. V. Klimenko, “Political Engineering of Color 

Revolutions: Ways to Keep Them in Check,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 9 2014, pp. 3-11.

835 Ivan Petrov, “Defense Ministry Will Order Scientific Work on the Topic of ‘Color 

Revolutions,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 19 June 2015.

836 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website (in English), 16 April 2015.
287

Forces Development” (Yu. Ye. Donskov, V. I. Zimarin, and B. V. 

Illarionov)

“Hatred of the Enemy as an Important Element of Information Security 

in Wartime” (A. Yu. Golubev)

No. 3, 2015

“About the Tactics of EW Troops” (V. A. Dvornikov, I. A. Korolov, and 

V. N. Pavlov)

No. 4, 2015

“The Media as an Effective Tool in Forming a Positive Image of 

Servicemen of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops” (I. V. 

Maneyev, and V. N. Apanasenko)

No. 5, 2015

“A Model for Training of Electronic Warfare Specialists to Carry Out 

Tasks on Information Support of Military (Combat) Actions” (Yu. Ye. 

Donskov, S. V. Golubev, and A. V. Mogilyov)

No. 6, 2015

“Basic Problems of Modeling Systems and Means of Aerospace Defense 

Based on Advanced Information Technologies” (V. M. Grigorenko and 

D. I. Melnik)

No. 7, 2015

“The Role of Information and Psychological Means to Ensure the 

Country’s Defense Capability” (I. V. Puzenkin and V. V. Mikhailov)

“Socialization and Education of Cadets in a Military Higher School by 

Means of Information Technologies” (E. A. Korzhan, D. M. Kryukov, 

and L. V. Kotenko)

“Theoretical Aspects of the Development of Electronic Documents 

Circulation’s System of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation” (N. I. Yeliseyev and O. A. Finko)

“Analysis of the Possibilities for Extending the Sphere of the Application 

of Geographic Information Systems for Military Purposes” (B. A. Fisich, 

I. M. Rutko, and Ye. Sh. Diveyev)

No. 8, 2015
288

“Assessment and Recognition of Moral-and-Psychological Factors 

during Decision-Making by Commanders Using Automated Systems of 

Command and Control” (S. V. Goncharov and O. G. Zayets)

“Features of Moral-and-Psychological Support of the Combat Service 

Activities of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops in the 

Northern Caucasus” (S. A Sakun and A. V. Kiselyov)

“Efficiency Group of Electronic Warfare Forces during complex Defeats 

of the Information Management System of the Enemy” (A. S. 

Korobeynikov, D. V. Kholuyenko, and S. I. Pasichnik)

“Using Forces and Means of Electronic Warfare for the Protection of 

Ground Objects from Aerospace Attacks” (Yu. Ye. Donskov, S. N. 

Zhikharev, and A. S. Korobeynikov)

“XXXIV All-Russian Scientific-and-Technological Conference 

‘Problems of the Efficiency and Safety of Complex Technological and 

Information Systems’” (Yu. V. Astapenko)

No. 9, 2015

None

No. 10, 2015

“Prospects for the Creation of Corporate Automated Information 

Systems for Military Use” (V. N. Kozichev, V. N. Kargin, A. V. 

Shirmanov, and S. P. Goloshev)

“The Role of Intelligent Decision-Making Support Systems during the 

Control of Electronic Warfare at Combined-Arms Tactical Formations” 

(Yu. Ye. Donskov, O. G. Nikitin, and P. N. Besedin)

No. 11, 2015

“The Experience and Prospects of the Concept of a Unified Informationand-Communication Network for the Control of Troops” (A. V. 

Khomutov)

“On Estimating the Combat Effectiveness of Information Support for the 

Control of Combined-Arms Tactical Formations” (V. V. Kondratyev, A. 

Yu. Krupsky, and D. Ye. Panteleyev)

“Features of the Methodological Support to Evaluate the Effectiveness 

during Modeling of Complex Defeats of the Information-and-Control 

Systems of the Enemy” (S. I. Pasichnik and A. S. Korobeynikov)
289

No. 12, 2015

Seven of the eleven articles were on electronic warfare.

What about a Cyber Dead Hand?

David Hoffman’s excellent book about the fall of the Soviet 

Union, titled The Dead Hand, is certainly one of, if not the, best works

on that historical period from the perspective of the arms race. On page 

422 he outlines a system known as Perimeter that was gleaned from 

interviews in Russia conducted by Brookings Institution scholar Bruce 

Blair with Russian missile expert Valery Yarynich. Perimeter was a type 

of “Dead Hand” system (as if rising from the grave) that allowed the 

launch of rockets that flew across Russia and literally “threw down” the 

codes to intercontinental ballistic missiles, enabling their launch without 

receiving the codes from the leadership in Moscow. It thus could launch 

missiles in case the leadership in Moscow was killed in a strike or 

incapacitated. Yarynich noted the following about Perimeter in a paper 

that Blair reported on:

It outlined how the ‘higher authority’ would flip the 

switch if they feared they were under nuclear attack. This 

was to give the ‘permission sanction.’ Duty officers 

would rush to their deep underground bunkers...if all 

communications were lost, then the duty officers in the 

bunker could launch the command rockets. If so ordered, 

the command rockets would zoom across the country, 

broadcasting the signal ‘launch’ to the intercontinental 

ballistic missiles.837

During Perimeter’s (Dead Hand’s) practice sessions, when US 

agencies were monitoring the activities of the strategic rocket forces, 

missiles did not launch immediately after receiving signals from the 

rockets zooming across Russia. The Soviet command knew the US was 

watching these exercises, so they set a delay in the procedure and 

allowed the missiles to launch, say, 40 minutes or even 24 hours after the 

 

837 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand, Doubleday, 2009, p. 422.
290

rockets gave them the command. Blair went back to Washington and 

checked the data that the US had collected. He found out that heavy 

missiles did fly, just forty minutes after the command rockets, on the 

date the exercise took place. Yarnich had told him the truth.

838 Thus, 

even if the Soviet High Command was eliminated, there was still a way 

for a retaliatory response—via what is often termed a Dead Hand. The 

development of this type of system makes one wonder if, in the age of 

weapons of mass disruption, is there a cyber-Dead Hand ready to initiate 

a retaliatory response against an adversary’s infrastructure in case 

Russia’s information/cyber infrastructure is somehow completely

disabled?

International and Diplomatic Issues: A China Focus

Andrey Krutskikh, a prominent Russian writer on information 

security issues and member of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

noted that Russia has tried to stimulate international discussion of 

information security issues over the past decade. Two mechanisms that 

he backs are the code of conduct disseminated on 12 September 2011 at 

the 66th Session of the United Nations Security Council, and the 21-22 

September 2011 Convention on International Security, presented in 

Yekaterinburg, Russia.839

The discussion below first examines a 2015 directive on 

information security made exclusively with China. The analysis then 

compares the information security sections of the 2009 and 2015 

National Security Strategies of Russia; highlights the objectives of the 

conferences the Russians held in Garmisch, Germany on information 

security issues from 2010-2015; and ends with a UN paper proposed in 

August 2015.

 

838 Ibid.

839 Remarks by Russian Foreign Ministry representative Andrey Krutskikh, Embassy of 

the Russian Federation in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (in 

English), 1 November 2011. For an examination of the Code of Conduct and the 

Yekaterinburg Convention, see “Cyber Strategy: Can Russia Cope in Future 

Conflicts?” May 2012, at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil
291

2015 Directive on a RF/PRC Agreement on International Information 

Security

Directive No. 788-d was dated 30 April 2015. It contained ten 

articles and an annex. The articles were fundamental concepts, principal 

threats to information security, principal areas of cooperation, general 

principles of cooperation, principal forms and mechanisms of 

cooperation, information protection, financing, relationships to other 

treaties, dispute resolution, and concluding provisions. The annex 

defined ten terms.840 They are: information security, infrastructure, area, 

resources, and protection; critical information infrastructure facilities; 

computer attack; illegal utilization of information resources; 

unsanctioned interference with information resources; and threats to 

information security.841 The directive discussed threats to critical 

information infrastructure facilities, such as networks, finance, power, 

and so on; and it discussed the importance of illegally influencing the 

creation or processing of information.

Two terms that were defined are worth highlighting, information 

area and computer attack. An information area is 

the sphere of activity associated with information 

creation, transformation, transmission, utilization, and 

storage exerting an influence on, inter alia, individual and 

social consciousness, information infrastructure [defined 

as the aggregate of technical facilities and systems for 

information creation, etc.], and information proper.842

Thus an information area concerns itself with both information-technical 

(infrastructure, transmission, etc.) and information-psychological 

(individual and social consciousness). An information attack is

 

840 “Directive on an Agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation 

and the People’s Republic of China on International Information Security,” 

Government of the Russian Federation Website, 13 May 2015.

841 Ibid.

842 Ibid.
292

The deliberate use of software (software and hardware) 

tools to target information systems, information and 

telecommunications networks, electrical communications 

networks, and industrial process automated control 

systems carried out for the purposes of disrupting 

(halting) their operation and (or) breaching the security of 

the information being processed by them.843

Thus an information attack appears focused more on systems than 

people, although it can, of course, impact them depending on the type of 

messages transmitted.

Article Two was of interest as well with regard to informationtechnical and information-psychological activities. It considered

information security threats to be constituted by the utilization of 

information and communications technologies for carrying out acts of 

aggression aimed at violating state’s sovereignty, security, and territorial 

integrity; for inflicting economic and other harm, such as exerting a 

destructive impact on information infrastructure facilities; for terrorist 

purposes (to include the propaganda of terrorism); and for perpetrating 

infringement of the law and crimes, such as illegal access to computer 

information. Two of the threats are singled out below for their focus on 

influencing the thoughts of Russian and Chinese citizens, utilizing 

technologies:

To interfere in states’ internal affairs, violate public order, 

inflame interethnic, interracial, and interfaith enemies, 

propagandize racist and xenophobic ideas and theories 

giving rise to hatred and discrimination and inciting 

violence and instability, and also to destabilize the 

internal political and socioeconomic situation and disrupt 

the governance of a state...844

 

843 Ibid.

844 Ibid.
293

To disseminate information harmful to sociopolitical and 

socioeconomic systems and inimical to the spiritual, 

moral, and cultural environment of other states.845

Of special interest was that each state “shall not carry out such 

actions against the other Party and shall assist the other Party in the 

realization of the said right.”846 “Such actions” include the right to 

protect the states information resources against illegal utilization and 

unsanctioned interference, including computer attacks on them. The 

definition of an information area stated that it was “the sphere of activity 

associated with information creation, transformation, transmission, 

utilization, and storage exerting an influence on, inter alia, individual 

and social consciousness, information infrastructure, and information 

proper.”847

Thus the directive appeared to address three main areas: 

technological threats to the sovereignty or internal affairs of a state

(especially infrastructure), cooperation among various organizations in 

regard to cyber affairs, and the refusal to carry out cyber-attacks against 

one another. A cyber-attack was defined as 

National Security Strategy

The strategy of May 2009 listed national security tools as the 

technologies and also the software, linguistic, legal, and organizational 

items and telecommunication channels that transmit or receive 

information on the state of national security.848 The concept was divided 

into The Contemporary World and Russia; Russia’s National Interests 

and Strategic National Priorities; and Organizational, Normative-Legal, 

and Information Bases for Implementing the Present Strategy. 

Information issues that the document either discussed or highlighted 

included the following:

 

845 Ibid.

846 Ibid.

847 Ibid.

848 Russian Federation Security Council Website, 12 May 2009.
294

 The global information confrontation

 The use of information to enhance strategic deterrence

 The ability of information to present a threat to 

military security

 The illegal movement of narcotics and ‘psychotropic 

substances’

 The preservation of information technologies and 

information focusing on the various issues of society’s 

socio-political and spiritual life

 The development of information and 

telecommunications technologies such as computer 

hardware and electronics

 The proper use of the information-telecommunication 

medium

 The implementation of a series of information 

measures serving as the basis of this strategy: 

harmonizing the national information infrastructure 

with global information networks and systems; 

overcoming the technological lag in information 

science; developing and introducing information 

security technologies in the state and military 

administrative systems; increasing the level of 

protection of corporate and individual information 

systems; and creating a single informationtelecommunications support system for the needs of 

the national security system.849

The document did not address in detail some of the salient concepts, 

such as how information would be used to enhance strategic deterrence; 

how information presents a threat to military security; and what the 

proper use is of the information-telecommunication medium, among 

other issues.

 

849 A. A. Strel’tsov, Gosudarstvennaya Informatsionnaya Politika: Osnovy Teorii

(Government Information Policy: Basic Theory), Moscow MTsNMO 2010.
295

The 2015 National Security Strategy used the term information 

36 times. The term cyber does not appear. The main use of information, 

it seems, is as an instrument “set in motion in the struggle for influence 

in the international arena” (along with political and financial-economic 

instruments). The Strategy also noted that the confrontation in the global 

information arena is “caused by some countries’ aspiration to utilize 

informational and communication technologies to achieve their 

geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and 

falsifying history.” For most Westerners, this appears to be exactly what 

Russia did in Ukraine, never mentioning Putin’s influence on 

Yanukovych and striking out on an information campaign that, according 

to even Russian analysts, surpassed anything seen during the time of the 

Soviet Union. Information is also mentioned as a measure to be 

implemented in order to help ensure strategic deterrence. The 

“inadvertent” mention of the Status-6 top secret torpedo on Russian TV 

is an example of an information deterrence application. Information 

associated with extremism or terrorism is taken to be a significant threat 

to public security; and in order to counter such threats, an information 

infrastructure must be developed that ensures the publics access to 

information on issues relating to the sociopolitical, economic, and 

spiritual life of Russia’s citizens.850

Lomonosov Moscow State University Institute of Information Security 

Conferences in Garmisch, Germany

Ever since 2007 Russia has been hosting an international forum 

on information technology issues. The yearly event has two parts: a 

conference in Garmisch and a conference in Moscow (or, as in 2011 and 

later, in another country). The following list sites the topics discussed at 

these conferences in Garmisch:

 

850 Edict of the Russian Federation president, “On the Russian Federation’s National 

Security Strategy,” President of Russia Website, 31 December 2015. See sections 13, 

21, 36, 43, and 53 of the document.
296

2010: international cooperation, counteracting cyber 

terrorism, information warfare deterrence, personal data 

protection, Internet governance mechanisms, and 

international cooperation in R&D 

2011: concept of the international legal framework to 

regulate information (cyber-) space behavior, defining the 

source (organizer) of cyber-attacks (scientific, technical, 

legal), international information security glossary, and 

content monitoring and filtering (to include preventing 

terrorist use of the Internet)

2012: classification of threats for UN documents,

consideration of cyber espionage and intervention in internal 

affairs of another country as threats, relations between state 

responsibility for aggression and the authority for ruling in 

cyberspace, network sovereignty, types of international 

documents needed for information security, and the state of 

international relations regarding legal documents.

2013: Workshop Roundtables, as written, were: Internet: 

space of freedom or a new battlefield?; Multistakeholder 

Internet governance model: best practices, problems,

solutions; National approaches and policies in cyber security; 

National approaches towards content filtration of the 

Internet; The best practices of public-private partnership to 

develop safe Internet Legal aspects (sovereignty and nonintervention, state responsibility, law of armed conflict); and 

Cyber conflicts: models and deterrence mechanisms.

2014: Workshop Roundtables, as written, were: Adaptation 

of international law to conflicts in information space: trends 

and challenges; Critical infrastructure and information 

security: challenges and initiatives; International information 

security research consortium; National approaches and 

priorities of international information security system 

development; and Challenges of international information 
297

security in the context of trends and advanced technological 

development.

2015: Proposals on frameworks for the adaptation of 

international law to conflicts in cyberspace; Improving the 

information security of critical infrastructures: possible 

initiatives; Legal and technical aspects of ensuring stability, 

reliability, and security of the Internet; challenges of 

countering the threat of the use of social media for 

interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and 

national priorities and business approaches in the sphere of 

international information security development851

August 2015 United Nations Report

In 2015 a UN special report was prepared on norms of state cyber 

behavior. Russian cyber expert Andrey Krutskikh listed five aspects of 

the report: that the report attempts to prevent the military-political use of 

information and communication technologies; that sides should not 

accuse one another of cyber-attacks; that allegations that states organize 

and perpetrate cyber-attacks must be proven; that information and 

telecommunication technologies are to be used only for peaceful 

purposes; that backdoors in information technology products are illegal 

and malicious; and that it is the sovereign right of states to be in 

command of information and communication infrastructures in their 

territories. The report was submitted to the UN secretary general who 

would present it at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. Russia 

preferred a legally binding international convention on global cyber 

security under the UN aegis, but Krutskikh noted that his Western 

partners are not ready for this document.852

Conclusions

The Kremlin appears to have constructed a series of policies, 

treaties, weaponry, and other developments to confront what it considers 

 

851 Each list of topics by year was taken from the Lomonosov’s published agenda.

852 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.
298

the contemporary cyber threat. Russia is motivated by dangers and 

threats to its information space, whether they be political, economic, 

military, diplomatic, or others. Luckily it is blessed with an educational 

system that continues to produce outstanding algorithm writers, who are 

constantly in demand in the information age. Software writers and their 

teams are the most well-known elements in Russia. Their software is the 

key element in new weaponry that delivers ordinance on target and 

enables command and control organs to function in a timely manner.

There is also a thriving hacker and troll community to watch.

These code writers represent an important part of Russia’s cyber 

defense. They assist in monitoring social networks, bloggers, and the 

banking industry, among other organizations. In addition, the policies 

enacted by President Putin and his staff have also helped him to control 

cyber issues. The development of a cybersecurity council and the 

approval of treaties and codes of cyber conduct with, among others,

China, Central Asian countries, India, Brazil, and South Africa represent 

the continued forward progress in contending with cyber issues. 

The number of cyber developments has been impressive, from 

the “Cyberspace Strategy of the Russian Federation” (designed to 

provide for the cyber security of individuals, organizations, and the state) 

to the creation of new science companies, such as that at Tambov.

Similar organizations will continue to be developed, it appears, to deal 

with emerging technologies. Perhaps a science company dealing with 

weapons based on new physical principles will appear next. It is 

anyone’s guess when cyber troops as a specific military organization (a 

battalion or brigade) will make their appearance.

The overall intent of this vast program is to further enhance 

military reform by introducing high-tech equipment into the military; to 

use the FSB to control the population’s online activities; to engage the 

international community in developing a cyber-code of conduct; and to 

prevent “color revolutions” from breaking out in Russia. As Defense 

Minister Shoygu stated, words, cameras, photos, the Internet, and other 

types of information can become weapons on their own. These weapons

can serve, in the hands of an investigator, prosecutor, or judge, Shoygu 

notes, as elements that change the course of history. 
299

In the meantime, Russia will continue down the path of 

developing new and exotic cyber equipment for its forces and society. 

Sensitive information will be protected, criminals will be found in 

cyberspace, hacking will be opposed, and a technology infrastructure 

will be constructed throughout the country. Suspicion of the West will, 

however, continue to dominate security thinking. A recent report stated 

that Microsoft is not allowed to gather and process personal information 

(as its user agreement specifies) on Russian territory with its new 

operating system, since it is not included in Russia’s National Register of 

Personal Data Operators.853 Thus the saga continues...

 

853 Unattributed report, RT Online (in English), 11 August 2015.
300
301

PART THREE: GEOPOLITICS
302
303

CHAPTER EIGHT: NORTHERN EXPOSURE: REVEALING 

RUSSIA’S ARCTIC INFRASTRUCTURE BUILDUP

The Arctic has been under ‘our sovereignty for several years. This is 

how this will be in the future.’854

Vladimir Putin, October 2013

Introduction

This chapter will examine Russia’s diplomatic and military 

activities in the Arctic, where it is using all of its assets to strengthen its 

claims in the region. President Vladimir Putin has noted that the Arctic 

has been under “our sovereignty for several years. This is how this will 

be in the future.”855 Other nations do not agree with Putin and will battle 

him tooth and nail for property rights over this vast, prosperous, and 

contestable territory. Some believe the battle over Arctic sovereignty is 

but a prelude to a struggle over future claims, such as moon property 

when landings there become more frequent. That is, earth-bound battles 

over the so-called global commons could set a type of legal precedent for 

other claims, since wherever there is value, “there are eventually 

property rights” involved.856 This provides nations yet another reason to 

focus on the area.

Part One of the chapter covers the general diplomatic and 

military situation as background to the importance and activities of the 

Arctic. Part Two is a more detailed coverage of specific Russian military 

activities in the area since 2014.

Part One

There are reports that 386,000 square miles of Arctic ice melted 

in 2007 alone, thereby allowing the Northern Sea Route (NSR, also 

known as the Northeast Passage) to open for the first time in recorded 

 

854 Interfax (in English), 3 October 2013.

855 Interfax (in English), 3 October 2013.

856 Richard Morgan, “Slicing Up the Moon,” Wired, December 2007, p. 46.
304

history. This event has brought the billions of barrels of oil and other 

minerals that many believe are under the Arctic closer to being extracted 

by someone. Such thinking gets everyone’s attention. No one wants to be 

late for the “big dig.”

Russia has insured not only that it will be on time for the party 

but that it may in fact host it. Using diplomatic cover from Foreign 

Minister Sergey Lavrov, who has assured nations ever since 2009 that no 

military problems exist there, the Defense Ministry has totally 

militarized the area and called 2014 “the Year of the Arctic.” By October 

2014 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu had promised that 

military units would be deployed across the entire Arctic belt. 

The aim of this militarization from a Russian perspective is to 

protect three things: the NSR, national interests (mineral and energy 

resources, national security in the north), and economic facilities in the 

area. A new rationale for militarizing the area has been the Russian 

explanation that NATO is expanding up to Russia’s borders. The Arctic 

thus offers opportunities for a hydrocarbon treasure hunt, a way to 

control a major transport node, and a way to improve national security..

To implement this plan, Shoygu created a Sever (Northern) 

Command (which is now considered by some as the military’s fifth 

major “district” and which started to work on 1 December 2014857), 

developed plans to create a continuous radar field in the country’s north

along with the deployment there of two brigades (the 200th Separate 

Motorized Rifle Brigade at Kola’s Pechenga, and later, by 2016, the 80th

brigade in Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug), and paid special 

attention to the further construction of the Northern Fleet (which will 

serve as the foundation of Sever) and the organization of aerospace 

defense. 

For other nations bordering the Arctic, how the region’s 

boundaries are demarcated and sovereignty asserted (the proposed

 

857 Interfax (in English), 25 November 2014.
305

projections of their continental shelf into the Arctic Ocean and how the 

United Nations rules on their claims) has become THE issue of great 

concern, since it could result in untold fortunes for a nation’s coffers. 

There are many areas of contention. For example, three authors from the 

Mikhaylovskaya Military Artillery Academy noted that the main factors 

giving rise to Arctic conflict are the ownership of underwater ridges, 

exploitation rights over mineral deposits, use of the NSR, and the 

division of the sea area for offshore operations.858

This focus on boundaries and sovereignty has mandated the 

national mapping of multiple off-shore points so that a legitimate and 

internationally recognized claim can be made. Off-shore points, 

according to one source, are measured as:

The area where the ocean depth drops to 2,500 meters, 

and the place where a country’s land mass drops off to 

become seafloor, a spot called the foot of the continental 

slope. If these points are farther out than current 

boundaries, there may be a case for extending the oceanic 

property line. But the foot of the slope can be tricky to 

locate.859

The uncertainty associated with boundaries is relatively new 

since, historically, boundaries were settled in a more simplistic manner. 

For example, at one time the Cannon Shot Rule gave countries control of 

waters up to 3 miles out, or roughly the range of a 17th century cannon. 

In 1994 the United Nations (UN) created the Law of the Sea Treaty, and 

about that time the standard claim on territory extended to 200 miles out 

from shore. Also in 1994 countries were given 10 years to submit maps 

for ratification as to the extent of their continental boundary. These 

claims now have become the main questions of the present decade—how 

 

858 Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call for Sixth 

Technological Generation to Be Adopted into the Armory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014.

859 Geoffrey Gagnon, “The Last Great Land Grab,” Wired, February 2008, p. 87.
306

will the UN treat overlapping claims860 and how will nations’ claims be 

verified?

Russia has continued its attempts to change its Arctic borders 

through additional mapping. On 29 October 2014 Russia submitted a 

new bid to a UN commission regarding border changes in the region (a

2015 bid has been prepared and will be discussed in February 2016). A 

survey mission was carried out by the Akademik Fyodorov Research 

Vessel, and the data it obtained will be sent to the UN Commission on 

the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Russia’s new proposal would extend 

its area by 1.2 million square kilometers. The extension would allow 

Russia a five billion ton oil equivalent resource increase. The acquisition 

would also broaden Russia’s ability to secure its geopolitical interests in 

the area.861 Deputy Natural Resources and Environment Minister Denis 

Khramov believes Russia needs 15-17 drilling rigs for shelf operations in 

2015-2020, along with “over 70 support vessels, six-seven seismic 

survey vessels, and two-three icebreakers.”862

If Putin is successful in obtaining Arctic resources, Russian 

strategists will have accomplished a rare feat. They will have created not 

an iron curtain, but a hydrocarbon curtain or an arc of oil wells flowing 

from the Crimea in the south, through Ukraine’s shale gas deposits in 

Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s vast oil and gas fields, to the north and its 

vast Arctic treasures. Russia will thereby be in charge of many energy 

resources north of the equator. The effort is being assisted through 

Russia’s international negotiation strategy and the militarization of the 

Arctic, to include the construction of a series of military bases on 

strategic islands located in the area. Recently, Putin moved 4,000 troops 

along the border with Kazakhstan. Was this meant to be a warning to 

Kazakhstan, that Putin wants to ensure he will have future access to the 

space platform there, or is this an attempt to eventually exert control over 

 

860 Ibid., pp. 88-89.

861 Interfax (in English), 20 October 2014.

862 Interfax (in English), 24 December 2014.
307

Kazakhstan’s oil fields as well? His thirst for oil deposits makes one 

wonder.

The Use of Diplomatic Subterfuge

Putin used the relaxed international atmosphere of 2009 and the 

pullback of US troops from overseas deployments (due to budget 

constraints and war weariness) to assist in the accomplishment of his 

Arctic goals. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov assured the international 

community that Russia has no interest in militarizing the Arctic (while 

the Russian Defense Ministry did just the opposite). The latter has 

included the construction of a vast military infrastructure and the 

development of a northern strategic command that is the equivalent of 

another military district or, using Soviet terminology, a new theater of 

military operations. The command’s reach extends beyond the North 

Pole according to Russian sources. 

Over the past several years, as the Arctic ice cap began to recede,

diplomats have conducted intense negotiations and planning, mainly 

over who will own the land on which the region’s natural resources are 

located. Eight countries make up the so-called Arctic Council where 

much of the negotiation is being conducted. They are: Canada, Russia, 

Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the United States, Sweden, Finland, and 

Iceland. One source has noted that 

The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental 

forum that addresses primarily environmental protection 

and sustainable development issues in the Arctic region. 

The eight founding nations (Canada, Denmark, Finland, 

Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) 

of the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 

comprise the Member States of the Arctic Council. Six 

Arctic indigenous groups hold Permanent Participant 

status, and a number of other countries and organizations 

are accredited observers. The Council meets every two 

years at the Ministerial level to coordinate Council 

activities and oversee the work of the six working groups. 

Senior Arctic Officials from each member state meet 
308

more frequently to oversee Council operations between 

Ministerial meetings.863

Each Arctic council nation has its own concerns regarding 

borders, access to natural resources, sovereignty issues, shipping rights, 

and other regional factors. The Arctic states bordering the ocean—

Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the US—have a 200-

nautical-mile economic zone around their coasts. Norway, Russia, 

Canada, and Denmark have made claims. While much collaborative 

work has transpired in the Council in the past several years, numerous 

issues remain outstanding.864

One of the most significant Arctic events was the planting of a 

Russian flag under the North Pole in August 2007. As a result of this 

development, foreign ministers and other officials representing Canada, 

Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States met in Ilulissat, 

Greenland on May 28, 2008 and announced the Ilulissat Declaration. The 

goal of the declaration was to block new attempts to govern the Arctic 

Ocean and to ensure that future activities were conducted in a peaceful 

manner. 

In addition to planting the flag, Russia has deployed an 

interesting mix of all types of military forces in support of its diplomatic 

maneuvering. The Navy, Air Force, Army, Federal Security Service 

(FSB), and Emergency Ministry (EMERCOM) personnel are all 

involved in the region. It is clear that Russia’s leaders consider the Arctic 

region to be of major importance and are making an all-out rush to gain 

influence, if not control, over the region and its operational environment. 

In September 2008 Russian Foreign Ministry officials developed 

the “Basis of RF State Policy in the Arctic for the Period through 2020 

 

863 Downloaded from the US Department of State Website at 

http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/

864 “Arctic,” accessed from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, at 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic, on 1 August 2012.
309

and the Remote Future.” The policy is designed to support other 

organizations and agreements already in place, such as the Arctic 

Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Barents Regional 

Council (BRC), and the Arctic Economic Forum. The Foreign Ministry’s 

document shows how Russia was adapting to its emerging operational 

environment, while providing a warning of potential future military 

involvement in the region. Specifically, the document describes the 

conditions, circumstances, and influences that call for the deployment of 

military capabilities to the region. The document noted that a national 

interest was at stake, namely the use of the Arctic zone as a strategic 

resource base of the RF in support of accomplishing socio-economic 

tasks of the country. In that regard, a chief objective of the policy was as 

follows:

In the sphere of military security and protection and 

security of the state border of the Russian Federation 

lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation [a 

priority is] providing favorable operational conditions, to 

include maintaining the necessary combat potential of 

groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) of the 

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, 

military force elements, and agencies in this region.865

The policy’s principal military and security tasks included the 

following: the establishment and provision for military security under 

various conditions; the optimization of a system of integrated 

environmental monitoring in the Arctic; the development of border 

agency capabilities in line with the threats to and challenges for the 

Arctic; the creation of an actively functioning coast guard system to fight 

terrorism at sea, stop smuggling, and guard aquatic biological resources; 

the development of a border infrastructure and the technical equipping of 

 

865

“Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 

goda i dal’neyshuyu perspektivu [Basis of RF State Policy in the Arctic for the Period 

Up to 2020 and the Remote Future],” downloaded from http://www.scrf.gov.ru on 19 

October 2010.
310

border agencies; and the creation of a system of integrated surface 

monitoring.866

Since the development of these policy initiatives Russia has been 

moving full speed ahead to militarize the area. Simultaneously Lavrov 

and other high officials have been involved in making a series of 

diplomatic gestures designed to, it appears, cover the buildup, as exposed 

in the following statements:

 In February 2009 Foreign Ministry Special Envoy 

Anton Vasilyev stated that the formation of special 

Arctic troops is not being planned.867

 Two months later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey

Lavrov stated that everything will be handled on the 

basis of existing treaties and legal norms.868

 In October 2009 Lavrov noted that in the Arctic, there 

were no military issues or problems that required a 

military solution or the presence of military blocs;

869

and he reiterated this position in July 2011.870

 In August 2014, Lavrov stated that Moscow is 

opposed to the Arctic’s militarization and it should not 

be part of military rhetoric.871

 One month later, in September 2014, after a two year 

long buildup of military forces in the region, Russia 

announced the creation of a ‘Sever’ (or Northern) 

Strategic Command in order to defend Russia’s Arctic 

interests.872

 

866 Ibid.

867 Interfax, 20 April 2009.

868 Interfax-AVN Online, 29 April 2009.

869 Interfax, 15 October 2009.

870 Interfax, 13 July 2011.

871 Interfax (in English), 28 August 2014.

872 Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov, “Defense Ministry Creating ‘Sever’ Strategic 

Command. Navy Deployed to Protect Russia’s Interests in the Arctic,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 10 September 2014.
311

 On 20 October 2014 Lavrov stated that NATO has no 

business in the Arctic, since there are no problems 

requiring NATO’s presence there.873

 On 22 December 2014 President Putin said “Once 

again I will stress that we are not going to militarize 

the Arctic.”874

 On 24 December Deputy Defense Minister Anatoliy 

Antonov stated that Russia’s activities in the Arctic 

are not military in nature and are only aimed at 

creating the necessary infrastructure to ensure security 

of the country’s national interests and borders, control 

the situation at sea, and help civilian services ensure 

the functioning of the NSR.875

Such statements over time have exposed this diplomatic cover-up of a 

major Russian military buildup in the Arctic. Everything Russia told 

others not to do, Russia did. Trust can easily be lost, and the continued 

subterfuge in which Russia has participated (first the Arctic, now 

Ukraine) will ensure difficulties for Russian negotiators in the near 

future. In addition, Russia proposed creating an Arctic Ministry as a new 

element of the government apparatus. Dmitry Kobylkin was being 

considered to head the new ministry.876 However, at the moment that 

impetus seems to have died. A government commission was established 

on the Russian Arctic instead.

With regard to the Arctic Council, Lavrov has said that the 

Council will receive observers, but the latter can only join projects in the 

Council that are approved by its permanent members. Further, the Arctic 

will not be made the property of all mankind. Interaction is possible but 

the responsibility must be kept with the eight members of the Council.877

 

873 Interfax (in English), 20 October 2014.

874 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2014.

875 Interfax, 24 December 2014.

876 The Moscow Times Online (in English), 20 November 2014.

877 Interfax (in English), 24 August 2015.
312

An Interfax report in September 2015 noted that the Russian delegation 

to a conference on climate change wanted a broadening of cooperation 

between the Arctic states, joint projects, and prevention of its 

politicization, among other priorities.878

And, with regard to the NSR, Russia wants, as Deputy Prime 

Minister Dmitry Rogozin has stated, more control over it. “We must 

entirely be hosts of the NSR,” he noted on one occasion.

879 The US, on 

the other hand, along with other Western nations, would rather see the 

NSR internationalized.

After conducting exercise “Arktika-2000,” Russia stated that the 

Lomonosov and Mendeleyev undersea ridges are but continuations of the 

continent and that Russia’s continental shelf must therefore be expanded 

some 1.2 million square kilometers. Two Arctic expeditions in 2007 

further studied the oceanic shelf of the Arctic Ocean. Russian author 

Alexander Goltz noted the following:

If successful, this theoretically would provide Moscow 

unbelievable wealth. It would have at its disposal the 

Northern Sea Route (NSR), which, together with the 

Northwest Passage, would give Russia the opportunity to 

control the shortest route between North America, 

Europe, and Asia. Moreover, if Moscow can prove its 

right to own a significant part of the Arctic Ocean, it will 

be allowed to develop oil and gas deposits. Experts 

estimate oil and gas deposits in the Russian part of the 

Arctic at 25 percent of the world’s hydrocarbon 

reserves...880

 

878 Interfax (in English), 3 September 2015.

879 Interfax (in English), 25 August 2015.

880 Alexander Goltz, “The Arctic: A Clash of Interests or Clash of Ambitions,” in 

Russia in the Arctic, Stephen J. Blank, editor, July 2011, p. 48.
313

The NSR has been used for many years by Russia (and the 

former Soviet Union). The route enables savings in time and fuel for 

important trade with the rest of Asia. The route has been kept free in 

many instances due to the fleet of Russian ice breakers, which have been 

in service since the early 1900s. Today there are a number of legal issues 

concerning the route, to include potential transit fees and navigation 

rights. The most important item is that the NSR saves businesses time. It 

takes, according to some estimates, 39 days for a ship in Murmansk, 

Russia to transit the Suez Canal and arrive in Japan. It takes 18.5 days 

using the NSR. Savings in time and money are immense.

In 2009 Yuri Morozov, a professor at the Academy of Military 

Sciences and leading research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern 

Studies and the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian 

Academy of Sciences, wrote on the Arctic for the Carnegie Council. A 

sectorial division of the region, he noted, “has become a recognized 

reality,” although calls for its revision have been heard. Any revision of 

existing norms and principles will, in Morozov’s opinion, carry the 

potential for conflict. The area has many problems, such as 

environmental challenges (industrial waste disposal, etc.), transarctic 

shipping issues (replacing obsolete icebreakers, developing coastal port 

infrastructure, etc.), the demarcation of polar possessions (providing a 

UN commission with scientific proof that the Lomonosov and 

Mendeleyev ridges are part of the North Asian continental margin and 

thus Russia’s Arctic shelf), and the potential militarization of the area 

(with “Scandinavian blocs” or NATO).881 See Figure One.

 

881 Yuri Morozov, “The Arctic: The Next ‘Hot Spot’ of International Relations or a 

Region of Cooperation?” Carnegie Council paper, 16 December 2009, as downloaded 

from http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources.
314

Figure One, from Yuri Morozov, “The Arctic: The Next ‘Hot Spot’ of International 

Relations or a Region of Cooperation?” The Carnegie Council, December 16 2009.

Putin’s Interest in and Design for the Area

When Russian President Vladimir Putin was Prime Minister he 

was already demonstrating his personal interest in the region, taking part 

in an International Arctic Forum in Moscow in September 2010 (Putin 

also participated in the Interregional Conference “The Development of 

the Far East, 2010-2012” in December 2010). It is easy to understand 

his focus on an area with a coast that is 22,600 kilometers long and that 

provides nearly 11 percent of Russia’s national revenue as well as 

twenty-two percent of Russian exports (90 percent of the nickel and 

cobalt, 60 percent of copper, 96 percent of the platinum group of metals,

and 100 percent of barium sulfate and phosphate rock are extracted and 

produced here).882

 

882 Oleg Groznyy, “The Arctic Outpost,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 

25 April 2014.
315

As Prime Minister, Putin outlined Russia’s Arctic priorities at the 

2010 Arctic Forum. He stated that the creation of decent living 

conditions for people of the Arctic, to include taking into consideration 

their traditions and economic realities, was his first priority. His second 

priority was to support new zones of economic growth and to attract to 

the region new sectors of business and investment, both foreign and 

domestic. Finally, he saw as another priority a major investment in the 

scientific nature of the region’s conservation infrastructure.883 What he 

failed to address was the significant military buildup that was 

accompanying these goals.

In particular, there was a campaign underway to establish bases 

on specific islands. This indicates General Staff investment in the 

planning. Those islands offer Western analysts a look at the General 

Staff’s strategy to hold habitable territory and control the region. The 

Russian military has begun construction on a number of airfields on 

several islands and specific equipment has been developed for the 

region. In most cases, this is just the refurbishment of bases that existed 

during the time of the Soviet Union but were abandoned after the latter’s 

fall. This intense military spending indicates that President Putin has 

every intention to make good on his conviction that the Arctic has been 

under Russian sovereignty for years and that “This is how this will be in 

the future.”884 A nation doesn’t spend enormous amounts of money on a 

barren wasteland unless it intends to inhabit it and fight over it. 

Putin appears to have made good on his claim and is continuing 

to expand Russian resources there. By the end of 2014, he had promises 

from Rosatom (the state’s nuclear power corporation) to prepare a draft 

program for addressing electricity and technological supplies, drawn up 

jointly with the Federal Agency for Special Construction (Spetsstroy). 

The question of financing the construction of a low-capacity reactor for 

 

883 ITAR-TASS, 23 September 2010.

884 Interfax (in English), 3 October 2013.
316

the Arctic is also being discussed.885 A federal center for the 

comprehensive study of the Arctic has been proposed as well for 

Arkhangelsk.886

Islands of Importance

There are several islands of importance in the Arctic region to 

Russia. Those most often mentioned in the press are the following: the 

Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land archipelagos (Image One); the 

Novosibirsk (New Siberian) Islands, especially the Kotelnyy Island in 

this grouping (Image Two); and Wrangel Island (Image Three). These 

are the areas of intense focus for the positioning of new military bases. 

Images of these islands and their location off the northern Russian 

coastline are located after the following paragraph. 

The BBC, reporting on the Arctic, noted that Russia plans to 

build thirteen airfields and ten air-defense radar stations in the Arctic. 

The report cited National Defense Control Center representative Mikhail 

Mizintsev, who noted that more special units and drills are also planned

for the region. The BBC report also cited a Channel One Russian 

correspondent who stated that Russia is not militarizing the Arctic but 

just restoring its former greatness in the area. The 2015 budget has been 

amended to cover additional Defense Ministry spending on the Arctic, 

Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Putin on 19 November 2014. 

Finally, the report noted that Russia may increase the state media’s 

output on the Arctic, as it has done with Ukraine—“perhaps even a new 

front in Moscow’s ‘information war’ with the West.”887

 

885 Interfax (in English), 2 December 2014.

886 Interfax (in English), 24 October 2014.

887 BBC Monitoring, 17 December 2014.
317

Image One888

 

888 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kara_Sea
318

Images Two and Three889

 

889 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/Chukchi_Sea_map.png and 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Siberian_Islands
319

Military Developments

Russian Foreign Ministry statements appear in hindsight to have 

been aimed at minimizing “foreign” military influence in the Arctic, 

since there have been a host of Russian diplomatic attempts to outline 

Russian interests and claims to the area. Russian diplomats have drawn 

an imaginary line from the North Pole to the edges of the Murmansk and 

Chukotka regions, thereby forming a triangle in which Russia asserts its 

claim over the waters therein. This would add, as noted, some 1.2 million 

square kilometers of the Arctic to Russian influence and rule.

Alexander Goltz indicated that a symbolic airborne landing at 

the North Pole in 2009 (marking the 60th anniversary of the visit of a 

group of Soviet scientists there), occasional Arctic patrolling of attack 

submarines, and other such activities has signaled a larger Russian 

military interest in the region than diplomats were reporting.890 The most 

important policy statement affecting the military was the aforementioned 

“Basis of RF State Policy in the Arctic for the Period through 2020 and 

the Remote Future,” which recommended the creation of a generalpurpose force in Russia’s Arctic zone to ensure military security under 

various conditions.891 In 2009, Russia’s borders in the region were 

secured by the Arctic Regional Border Directorate of the FSB. It 

included the Linakhamarskiy Division of border guard ships, a separate 

Arctic aviation regiment, a training center, and other border 

detachments.892

An ITAR-TASS report in March 2009 noted that Russia’s leaders 

were getting over their symbolic gesture of planting a flag on the North 

Pole’s ocean floor and moving on to other issues. Then President Dmitrii 

Medvedev called for developing the Northern Sea Route, building up-todate ports, and solving ecological problems. Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, 

the Russian Northern Fleet Commander before 2002, stated that Russia 

 

890 Goltz, p. 44.

891 Aleksandr Chuykov, “The Frozen Arctic Strategy,” Argumenty Nedeli (The Weeks 

Debate), 2 April 2009.

892 Ibid.
320

should augment its right to control the Arctic shelf with technological 

potential and a military contingent. Space forces should survey the shelf, 

and equipment should be placed on the oceanic coast. Naval and air 

bases should be restored in the Arctic as well.893 Many of these 

suggestions seem to have been implemented.

During Soviet times the Arctic was a national treasure for several 

reasons. First, it represented a “Strategic Northern Bastion” for the 

Soviet Navy where its submarine missile cruisers could hide from a 

potential enemy under the meters-thick ice. Nuclear submarines would 

be a natural target if war broke out. Naval experts constructed a detailed 

map of the underwater areas of the Arctic and measured depths, sea 

currents, and ice thickness for new routes where strategic submarines 

could conduct patrols or theoretically launch missiles. Second, it 

contained a host of nonferrous and rare earth metals, as well as timber, 

oil products, furs, and so on. Unfortunately, as Soviet troops withdrew 

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, serious problems arose. As the 

armed forces departed the area, entire cities were threatened with 

extinction, since aircraft, jobs, transport, logistics, and doctors that 

helped civilians had often come from the military bases. Further, 

smugglers moved in on the now uncontrolled Northern Sea Route.894

Today, it is clear that the Arctic is coming to life again. The 

discovery of vast oil resources has resulted in an intense quarrel over 

who maintains possession of the continental shelf on which much of the 

deposits reside. The Defense Ministry’s military preparation of the 

Arctic has prevailed over the Russian Federation (RF) Foreign 

Ministry’s diplomatic gestures, thereby reintroducing many of the jobs 

and commodities that had departed in the early 1990s. The current 

Russian military presence in the Arctic includes long-range nuclear 

bomber patrols, Borei submarines, Emergency Ministry personnel, 

special air squads, land brigades, and potential airborne missions (among 

 

893 ITAR-TASS, 30 March 2009.

894 Yuri Golotyuk, “Safeguarding the Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs, No 3 JulySeptember 2008, at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/n_11281.
321

other forces), as well as the reopening of several Arctic military bases. 

Special Envoy Vasilyev, reversing his 2009 statement cited above, noted

at an international conference in 2012 that military presence is required 

to help exercise sovereignty, protect natural resources, and enhance 

security. States are simply exercising their sovereignty and not the area’s 

militarization,895 he noted, an interesting Russian diplomatic 

reinterpretation of evolving scenarios. Earlier, in 2011, then Prime 

Minister Vladimir Putin stated that military capabilities must be built up 

along the NSR in the Arctic, noting that an entire series of support bases 

will be created.896

Military journals and newspapers have written extensively about 

the region. The military-industrial complex’s journal Military-Industrial 

Courier, the army’s Red Star and Military Thought, and the Navy’s 

Naval Digest all have published numerous articles on the region. Perhaps 

of even greater importance, a special Arctic satellite monitoring system, 

the Arktika Space System, is under development, according to the 

Federal Space Agency of Russia. The system will help ensure safe flight 

operations, effective navigation, and precise weather information for the 

Arctic.

Noted below in Part Two are the more recent developments in 

2014 and 2015. They demonstrate the in-depth nature of Russia’s 

military concern over potential threats in the area; the development of an 

infrastructure plan to control the NSR through military bases on specific 

islands; and the development of new “Arctic approved” equipment.

Part Two

Military Developments in 2014

[Note: This section and the section covering 2015 list several 

pieces of nomenclature, but no further explanation of the characteristics, 

purpose, or parameters of the equipment are offered.]

 

895 Interfax, 12 April 2012.

896 Interfax, 8 November 2011.
322

While there were several very important developments in the 

Arctic region in 2014, the most important was organizational. It was 

noted that the Northern Fleet would be taken out of the Western Military 

District and made a part of the newly formulated (September 2014) 

Sever (North) Joint Strategic Command. Perhaps most important, the 

commander of the Northern Fleet has allegedly been designated to take 

charge of the North Joint Strategic Command.897 This change to a 

“Northern Fleet-Combined Strategic Command [SF-OSK]” was first 

announced in February and only implemented in September. Its mission 

is to defend Russian interests along the NSR, to protect fishing 

resources, deposits, and hydrocarbons, and, most important of all, ensure 

the security in the north of the country.898 

A second key development was the technological upgrades of 

several organizations. On important upgrade was the installation on 

Kotelnyy Island of video links installed by the Voyentelekom Company. 

The links, established with leading Kirov Military–Medical Academy 

specialists (St. Petersburg), will provide round-the-clock support for 

servicemen there in medical need. Satellite communication terminals 

have been installed. Other equipment from Voyentelekom make it 

possible to receive aircraft in complex weather conditions under day or 

nighttime conditions. Telephonic and telegraphic communications with 

the mainland are possible through an R-441LM satellite station. Online 

videoconferencing is available and Iridium satellite-linked terminals 

enable emergency communications. Each servicemen has a personal R168-01 radio set for maintaining communications within the airfield. 

Finally the video-link enables sessions between the airfield and the 

 

897 Sergey Ishchenko, “Powder Keg Beneath the Arctic Ice. Why MiG-31BMs Are 

Being Redeployed to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago,” Svobodnaya Pressa (Free 

Press), 19 September 2014.

898 “Northern Fleet and Arctic Brigades to Form New Military Structure” and “Experts: 

The Creation of a New Russian Federation Military Structure in the Arctic is Logical,” 

RIA Novosti Online (RIA News Online), 17 February 2014.
323

Defense Ministry Situation Center.899 It should be expected that all of the 

islands and outposts will soon be furnished with corresponding 

capabilities.

Another interesting development was the description of a stateof-the-art rapidly-erected independent closed-cycle basic necessities field 

camp. Designed for 300 people, each tent in the camp is designed for 16 

men and keeps people warm even when the outside temperature is minus 

50 Celsius. The snow load of the tents is over 100kg/square meter and 

the wind load is over 120 km/hour. The automatic heating system and 

automatic autonomous power supply ensure general comfort.900

Other key developments that took place in 2014 are listed here in 

the order in which they were reported in the media. These key items are 

then followed by a more general summary of developments that took 

place in the Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces, and other military units 

during the past year:

 A Pantsir-S-1 combined medium range surface-to-air 

missile and anti-aircraft artillery system has been 

tested for use beyond the Polar Circle to help control 

missile threats to Russia.901

 The Murmansk region’s rescue center (part of an 

Emergency Situations Ministry plan) will have rescue 

vehicles, wheeled and tracked off-roaders, snow 

tractors, hovercraft, and air-cushion ships. It will 

operate 24/7 with 83 people.902

 Cadets are being trained at the Far East Higher 

Military Command School to serve as “Arctic 

officers” in motorized rifle subunits as commanders in 

 

899 “Voyentelekom Specialists are Helping the Russian Military to Develop the Arctic,” 

Interfax-AVN Online, 24 January 2014.

900 “Three Hundred Paratroopers Land in the North of Yakutia,” Interfax-AVN Online, 

13 March 2014.

901 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 20 January 2014.

902 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 5 February 2014.
324

Arctic brigades. Arctic first aid, avalanche responses, 

rescue missions, and assorted living conditions 

(igloos, wigwams, mountain tents) and equipment 

(snowmobiles) are taught. Good physical conditioning 

is a must.903

 The 98th Ivanovo airborne division dropped a 350 man 

airborne battalion onto Kotelnyy Island’s airfield 

using Arbalet guided parachute systems.904 Near 

Franz Josef Land, Ivanovo airborne reconnaissance

troops are checking the state of drifting ice flows to 

determine areas for landing people and cargoes in case 

of search and rescue operations905(plane crashes, etc.); 

and testing new polar uniforms that can withstand 

temperatures of minus 50 degrees Celsius.

906

 Artillery and reconnaissance of the Northern Fleet’s 

coastal forces recently conducted 150 training 

sessions. Grad multiple rocket launchers, Gvozdika 

and Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, and Nona and 

Rapira cannons were used, with half of the exercises 

at nighttime. Patrols, ambushes, raids and state-of-theart reconnaissance techniques were practiced.907

 Granat, Zastava, and Orlan unmanned air vehicles 

(UAVs), with ranges of 10-150 kilometers, were 

operated by the Northern Fleet’s Separate Motorized

Rifle Brigade of Coastal Troops.908

 

903 Nadezhda Doronina, “The Arctic Assault Force: DVVKU is Training Unique 

Military Specialists for Duty in the Country’s Northern Territories,” MK Online

(Moscow Komsomol Online), 13 February 2014.

904 Interfax (in English), 14 March 2014.

905 “Airborne Troops Reconnaissance Group Will Evaluate Possibilities of Landing 

People and Cargoes in the Arctic,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Website, 4 April 2014.

906 ITAR-TASS, 7 April 2014.

907 Interfax-AVN Online (in English), 18 March 2014.

908 Interfax (in English), 7 April 2014.
325

 Airborne troops landed near drifting ice base Barneo, 

near the North Pole, to practice the rescue of a polar 

expedition in distress under extreme conditions.909

 Mi-26 helicopters transported quad bikes, tractors, and 

tanker trucks to the Temp airfield on Kotelny from the 

Tiksi airfield in Yakutia.910

 Russia plans to build an Arctic combat training center 

according to defense minister Army General Sergey 

Shoygu. Pilots, sailors, artillerymen, and others will 

all be part of the center. 

 An infrastructure is being developed at the Central 

Test Range in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. The 

Rogachevo airfield on Kotelnyy Island will assist in 

the extraction of lead-zinc ore and the development of 

the Arctic shelf.911

 The Russian Navy flag was raised on Wrangel Island, 

establishing the first Russian Pacific Fleet base.912 It 

was reported that Wrangel Island (a UNESCO World 

Heritage site) and Cape Otto Shmidt on the mainland 

will receive the Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star, the 

form of the complex being a star) nuclear-powered 

modular military garrisons, to be completed by 1 

October.913

 The Northern Fleet is studying the most northerly 

extension of Russian sovereignty, the Franz Josef 

Land archipelago. They are correcting navigation 

charts and verifying coordinates.914

 

909 Interfax (in English), 8 April 2014.

910 Interfax (in English), 14 May 2014.

911 “Novaya Zemlya’s New Life,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 19

August 2014.

912 Interfax-AVN Online, 20 August 2014.

913 Aleksandr Filimonenko, “A Canopy Protects the ‘Polar Star,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta

Online (Russian News Online), 4 September 2014.

914 “Northern Fleet’s Hydrographic Survey Ship the Seleznev Leaves on Arctic 

Expedition,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation’s Website, 25 August 2014.
326

 Russian logistic support will include an 18-month 

supply of fuel, provisions, clothing, and medicines 

where troops are located.915

 During the September Vostok-2014 exercise, airborne 

and naval infantry troops from the Eastern Military 

District landed on Wrangel Island, and Iskander-M 

operational tactical systems were launched.916 The 

Pantsir-S1 coastal missile system commenced 

permanent operation on the Kotelnyy Peninsula. It 

now has a medium range capability, a target detection 

location capability (a 1.5-times detection increase), 

and can fire on the move.917

 The military town Severnyy Klever (Northern 

Clover), designed in the shape of a clover or trefoil, 

was constructed on Kotelnyy Island in the 

Novosibirsk Islands to help defend Russian interests 

from NATO encroachment.918 Another report noted 

that Russia hopes to construct six new bases 

throughout the Arctic.919

 The Eastern Military District, which monitors military 

infrastructure development in the district’s Arctic 

zone of responsibility, has begun forming a UAV 

subunit to ensure security over marine shipping and to 

conduct aerial reconnaissance over its zone of 

responsibility.920

 The Northern Fleet has an underwater saboteur force 

that will soon acquire unmanned vehicles. The force 

 

915 “Russian Defense Ministry Will Deliver Equipment and Armaments to the Arctic 

before the End of September,” RBK Daily Online, 8 September 2014.

916 “Russian Paratroopers Land on Vrangel Island,” Polit.ru, 20 September 2014.

917 Olga Bozhyeva, “New Pantsir Will Down Aircraft While on the Move,” MK Online

(Moscow Komsomolets Online), 15 November 2014.

918 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 25 September 2014.

919 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 1 October 2014.

920 “In the Interests of Developing the Arctic, an Unmanned Air Vehicle Company Has 

Been Formed in Chukotka,” Interfax-AVN Online, 13 November 2014.
327

already has BL-680 fast boats and uses sniper rifles

and grenades. Their task is to guard the coastland and 

to ensure the safe entry and egress of the fleet‘s 

submarines from the coast.921

 In 2015 an S-400 Triumf air defense regiment will be 

formed in the Arctic on the Novaya Zemlya 

Archipelago.922

 The Emergency Situations Ministry will eventually 

establish ten rescue centers in Russia’s Arctic.923

General missions for the inter-service force that is being created 

for operations in the Arctic include power projection, deterrence, and 

control over promising oil and gas reserves, among others. These 

missions are part of a geopolitical strategy to maintain control over the 

region. This will require the construction of many facilities along the 

NSR. And, for the first time, Russia’s December 2014 military doctrine 

noted that a military priority was to protect Russia’s national interests in 

the Arctic.

The Advanced Research Foundation of Russia (the equivalent of 

the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA) is 

also working on Arctic technologies. The foundation’s focus is on 

discovering, recovering, and transporting minerals; working under the 

ice, protecting the infrastructure, and developing underwater robotics and 

other autonomous devices that can protect infrastructure, monitor water 

bodies, detect and track a potential enemy, and destroy them if 

necessary.924

 

921 “Western Military District: Northern Fleet’s Special-Purpose Forces Working on 

Tasks Involving Protection of Bases,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 12 December 2014.

922 TASS, 30 December 2014.

923 Interfax (in English), 5 January 2015.

924 Interview with Vitaliy Davydov, “Vitaliy Davydov Says ‘We are Decreasing the 

Need for a Person’s Presence on the Battlefield by Leaps and Bounds,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), VPK.Name, 22 

October 2014.
328

Many Russian analysts blame the interests of NATO countries in 

the region for the extended missions of Russian forces there, especially 

in light of the demilitarized status of the Russian North.925 In reality, it 

appears that the discovery of resources and their potential extraction are 

to blame for Russia’s movement back to the Arctic, not NATO.

Navy, 2014

The Navy, for many years now, has been the center of attention 

for Arctic missions. This is because it is their job to clear and ensure the 

safety of the NSR, among many other missions such as providing cover 

for nuclear forces in restricted patrol areas and movement routes, 

controlling ice-free Arctic waters, and covering for troops against an 

adversary’s reinforcements or attempts to disrupt supply routes or 

mineral exploitations. Fleet exercises in the Arctic involve 

minesweepers, submarine escort duties, antisubmarine ships, and naval 

aviation. Landing craft deliver mobile coastal missile systems to beaches 

during exercises.926

Russia’s Northern Fleet has stationed one of its newest nuclear 

classes of attack submarines, the Yasen, in the area. The Yasen 

Severodvinsk left its port in September to join an exercise. Maintenance 

on the Yasen will be done at the Zapadnaya Litsa garrison, according to 

reports, where the moorings for the Akulas are still maintained. Its 

permanent assignment will be on the Kola Peninsula, some 45 kilometers 

from Norway’s border. Other Yasen-class submarines will follow to 

phase out the Akula and Alfa Class attack submarines of the Soviet 

era.927 New-generation nuclear submarines will have missiles, torpedoes, 

robots, and remote-controlled submersibles. The latter can remain in an

area and create a semblance of the submarine’s presence, while the 

 

925 RIA Novosti (RIA News).

926 Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov, “Defense Ministry Creating ‘Sever’ Strategic 

Command. Navy Deployed to Protect Russia’s Interests in Arctic,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta

Online (Russian News Online), 10 September 2014.

927 Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov, “The Nuclear Submarine Severodvinsk Will Serve near 

the Border with Norway,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 11 

September 2014.
329

submarine actually moves out of that area. It is not impossible for such 

vehicles or robots to syphon off information from underwater cables, the 

article notes, but the main purpose remains to monitor the operational 

situation and protect the submarine.928

Submarines are not the only item under development. There are 

hopes of procuring over fifteen Project 22350 frigates in the near future. 

The ships have various types of weapons that make their fighting 

capacity universal, and they can resolve a broad range of tasks to fight 

above-water ships, submarines, and aviation.929 A “mosquito fleet” of 

hit-and-run air-cushion vessels is planned. They are of all types and 

dimensions, with some able to carry three tanks or 140 men and 10 

armored personnel carriers. They can move on sea, land, and ice at 

speeds of up to 60 knots. These ships can carry a Titanit radar suite, an 

AK-725 artillery mount, Osa-MA antiaircraft missile systems, and the 

Malakhit, Termit-E, or Oniks PKR. When equipped with OAS (sonar), 

Shkval-E torpedoes, depth charges, and rocket-assisted antisubmarine 

warfare systems, it can serve as an antisubmarine vessel.930

The development of icebreakers is another challenge. Navies 

need not only icebreakers for a fleet but also to serve as full-fledged 

combat entities. The vessel could either escort or operate independently. 

Two or three squadrons of these icebreakers would be nice. Its armament 

system would be similar to that of a guided missile cruiser.931 In 2015 the 

Project 21280 will be developed, a new-generation icebreaker. It will be 

built for the Northern Fleet, with a cruising range of 12,000 miles and 

 

928 Anton Mardasov, “The Russian Federation Navy Has Rejected Small Sabotage 

Submarines but Will Equip Nuclear Cruisers with Drones,” Svobodnaya Pressa (Free 

Press), 15 December 2014.

929 Interfax (in English), 12 December 2014.

930 Dmitriy Verkhoturov, “National Strategy Institute Draft. Russia’s Arctic Fleet: New 

Types of Ships,” Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostey (Political News Agency), 15 

December 2014.

931 Ibid.
330

the ability to break through ice up to 31.5 inches in thickness.932 One 

icebreaker will be received by the Navy in the first half of 2015. The first 

Elbrus ARC4 ice-class logistic support vessel of Project 23120 will be 

built and before the end of 2016, the Captain Shevchenko and MB-75 

will be built.933

As part of the reorganization process, a Northern Fleet Marine 

Regiment, the 61st Separate Kirkenes Red Banner Marine Regiment, will 

be reconstituted as a separate brigade. The regiment took part in the 

fighting in the North Caucasus in both 1995 and from 1999-2000. It thus 

was most likely one of the first units in the fight for Chechnya both times 

the war exploded on the scene.934 In January 2015 it was reported that a 

separate marine brigade (unnamed) of the Northern Fleet will train 

specifically for Arctic operations. The marines will conduct parachute 

jumps, fire artillery and light weapons at ranges, hold tactical and special 

drills, and conduct other exercises under Arctic conditions.935

Northern Fleet rescuers took part in the Arktika-2014 exercises 

that took place in August. The rescuers included the following ministries, 

directorates, and agencies: the Russian Ministry of Transport; FSB 

Border Directorates; Ministry for the Affairs of Civil Defense; 

Emergency Situation and the Elimination of Natural Disasters Ministry; 

the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport; and the Federal 

Air Transport Agency.936

The Navy also owns the military publication that has 

continuously followed Arctic developments for the past several years, 

Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal). Listed below are the issues and 

 

932 Koryakin, “New-Generation Icebreaker to be Built for Russian Navy,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 10 November 2014.

933 Interfax (in English), 1 December 2014.

934 Murmansk b-port.com, 27 November 2014.

935 Interfax (in English), 8 January 2015.

936 “Northern Fleet Rescuers Prepare for Arktika-2014 Exercise,” Ministry of Defense 

of the Russian Federation Online, 31 July 2014.
331

articles from Numbers 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8 that covered Arctic issues in 

2014:

No. 1: “To Franz-Josef Land”937

No. 4: “On Some Problems of Forming and Realizing the 

National Sea Policy of the Russian Federation at the End 

of the 20th—Beginning of the 21st Century” (refers to the 

Arctic)

No. 5: “Arctic Communications and Ensuring the 

Territorial Integrity of Russia”; “The Military-Political 

Situation in the Arctic and the Perspectives of its 

Development”; “The Defense and Economic Peculiarities 

of the Delineation of Sea Space of the Arctic”; “The 

Normative, Economic, and Defense Factors of Forming 

the Arctic Sea Policy”; “The Development of Sea 

Education with the Coordination of Defense and 

Economic Activities in the Arctic”; and “Shipping on the 

Northern Sea Route and the Development of Shipbuilding 

in Russia”938

No. 7: “The Development of the Principles of Ensuring 

the National Security of the Russian Federation in the 

Arctic”939

No. 8: “The National Interests of Russia and the Economy 

of Sea Communications in the Arctic”940

Radars, 2014

The Spetsstroy Engineering Enterprise has installed five 

stationary radar facilities in the Arctic, one each on Sredniy Island on the 

Severnaya Zemlya peninsula; on Zemlya Aleksandry Island in the Franz 

Josef archipelago; on Wrangel Island and Cape Shmidt in the Chukot 

Autonomous Okrug; and in Rogachevo on Yuzhnyy Island in the 

 

937 Table of Contents, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), January 2014, No. 1, p. 2.

938 Table of Contents, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), May 2014, No. 5, p. 2.

939 Table of Contents, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), July 2014, No. 7, p. 2.

940 Table of Contents, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), August 2014, No. 8, p. 2.
332

Novaya Zemlya archipelago. These five points will have an air defense 

radar and a dispatch point. Airspace movements that are detected will be 

transmitted to the Air Defense command post in Moscow Oblast. 941

Air Force, 2014

Air Force missions include covering economic activity such as 

ship convoys as well as engaging an adversary’s strategic bombers or 

cruise missiles in flight. If conflict erupts then fighters will be used to 

disrupt the command and control of enemy troops, hit adversary aircraft 

or nuclear missile assets, or cover friendly troop movement to 

objectives.942 An aviation group of MiG-31 interceptors is deployed in 

Rogachevo as well at Amderma-2 airfield. Aviation will carry out 

reconnaissance and stop violations of Russia’s territorial waters.943

Further, the Rogachevo Airfield has recently been prepared on the 

Novaya Zemlya archipelago to receive aircraft such as the MiG-31BM 

fighter-interceptor.944 Other airfields that are being restored are the Temp 

airfield on Kotelnyy, and the Tiksi, Naryan-Mar, Alykel, Amderma, 

Nagurskaya, and Anadyr airfields.945 Numerous air exercises, involving 

the dropping of bombs against simulated enemies, have taken place in

the Arctic, where Su-24M bombers are covered from the air by MiG31BM fighter-interceptors.

Ground Elements, 2014

Several specific units have been designated to serve with ground 

forces in the Arctic. Elements so identified include those from the 

Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts, which are designed to help fill out 

the new joint command. These units are the 1st Air and Space Defense 

 

941 Aleksey Krivoruchek, “Russia Will Reestablish Air Defense Systems and Airfields 

in the Arctic. Reestablishment of Discarded Aviation Infrastructure Will Cost R6 

Billion,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 2 July 2014.

942 Mikhail Khodarenok, “The Scramble for the Arctic,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 December 2013.

943 Aleksey Krivoruchek, “Russia Will Reestablish Air Defense Systems and Airfields 

in the Arctic...,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 2 July 2014.

944 “Defense Ministry Airfield...”

945 Anastasiya Novak, “Russia’s Northern Might,” Polit.ru, 14 July 2014.
333

Troops, the 531st, 583rd, and 1258th air defense missile regiments, the 

331st and 332nd radio-technical regiments, and other subunits. It is 

thought that the command will interact with the Northwest Regional 

Command of the Ministry of Interior Troops and border directorates of 

the Federal Security Service.946 A signals intelligence unit has been 

established in Alakurtti in Murmansk Oblast. It is located 50 kilometers 

from Finland’s border, 300 kilometers from the Arctic Ocean, and 90 

kilometers from the White Sea. It will be used to monitor foreign 

movements by air and sea in the north.947

Airborne troop commander Colonel-General Vladimir Shamanov 

stated in August that the airborne does not have a permanent plan for its 

presence in the Arctic. However, Russia plans an international exercise 

with Belarussian forces in 2015 and is establishing a training center in 

the Pechenga area along with ground forces and marines.948 In the past 

three years, several additional airborne exercises have taken place in the 

Arctic region and during the recent Vostok-2014 massive exercise in the 

east, airborne units were deployed to training ranges in the north to fulfil 

“tasks under conditions of the extreme north.”949 Airborne troops will be 

outfitted with the BMD-4M, the airborne version of the BMP-3, and the 

BTR-MDM air assault transport vehicle.950 The airborne is thus ready to 

fulfill an Arctic mission if required.

Another report noted that the 99th Tactical Group, whose 

composition has not yet been divulged, will be deployed on Kotelnyy 

Island (where the Temp Airfield is located). The 80th Separate Motorized 

 

946 Vladimir Gundarov, “Russia’s New Line of Defense Will Run via the North Pole. A 

Joint Strategic Command is Being Formed for the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online 

(Independent News Online), 11 September 2014.

947 Aleksey Krivoruchek, “Defense Ministry Returns Naval Intelligence to Border with 

Finland,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 13 March 2014.

948 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2014.

949 “VDV Airborne Assault Formations from Buryatia and the Primorskiy Kray Begin 

Fulfilling Tasks under Conditions of the Extreme North,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation Website, 19 September 2014.

950 Interfax-AVN Online, 5 December 2013.
334

Rifle Brigade will be in the village of Alakurtti in the Murmansk oblast, 

and radar posts and aircraft guidance points will be in several locations, 

to include Franz Josef archipelago, Novaya Zemlya, Wrangel Island, and 

Cape Schmidt.951 It should be formed by the end of March 2015. The 

brigades will patrol the coast and guard facilities there, support the 

passage of ships along the NSR, and demonstrate a military presence in 

the region.952

A massive cleanup is underway on Wrangel Island, as debris is 

removed and a modular settlement established. The special transparent 

dome will not only have household services and a sports hall and sauna 

but also a psychological recuperation room.953 By 2016 it is thought that 

a second motor-rifle brigade will be established in the Yamalo-Nenets 

Autonomous Okrug. Like the 80th brigade, the mission will be to patrol 

coastal areas, provide support to ships along the NSR, and “demonstrate” 

Russia’s military presence in the Arctic.954

Military units will be furnished with “off-highway” vehicles, 

such as double-unit coupled carrier vehicles/transporters, snowmobiles, 

and hovercraft (air-cushion ships) according to Ground Force 

Commander Colonel General Oleg Salyukov.955 A six-wheel jeep called 

the Trekol, along with tracked vehicles, are described as “go-anywhere”

designs. The Trekol can hold ten fully equipped soldiers.956 In 

December Deputy Defense Minister Dmitriy Bulgakov arrived at the 

Northern Fleet to test twenty vehicles. They included tracked vehicles; 

army snowmobiles (Stels Rosomakha V800); the all-terrain ultralowpressure-tire 6x6 vehicle with an all-metal cab; the GAZ-3344-20, DT-

 

951 “Defense Ministry Airfield on Novaya Zemlya Ready to Receive Aircraft,” RIA 

Novosti (RIA News), 17 September 2014.

952 “The First Arctic Brigade Will Appear in Russia by the End of March 2015,” 

Moscow BFM.Ru, 10 December 2014.

953 “Soldiers in the Arctic Will Live Martian-Style,” Vostok Media (East Media), 26 

August 2014.

954 Interfax-AVN Online, 1 October 2014.

955 Interfax (in English), 1 October 2014.

956 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 14 December 2014.
335

3PM, DT-10P, and DT-30P two-link tracked transporters; multirole 

vehicles (LShA, LShA-2, LShA-B); mobile workshops and evacuation 

and repair equipment; and life-support equipment in the form of quickerect inflatable shelters.957

There are plans to build a Mi-8-AMTSh helicopter that can be 

used by the army as well as oil workers. Testing is to begin in winter 

2015. The design and development have taken into account the specifics 

of low temperature conditions, flying in limited visibility, and flying 

during the polar night. The helicopter is designed to be capable of 

navigation even when satellite signals are lost.958

Space, Aerospace, Etc., 2014

Other military units are involved in this inter-service force, or 

supporters of it. The Federal Space Agency intends to deploy the 

Arktika-M satellite network. It will involve putting two satellites into 

high elliptical near-Earth orbit for Arctic monitoring of emergency 

situations. It will also provide weather data and exercise environmental 

control. The satellites reportedly can be used to forecast flight conditions 

and the status of the Earth’s ionosphere and magnetic field.959

Unfortunately for Russia, the remote sensing satellite Meteor-M No. 1 

has become unserviceable. It monitored ice conditions in the Arctic, 

studied ice on large lakes outside the Arctic Circle, and provided 

navigation and weather information. Russia still has four remote sensing 

satellites in orbit, however,

960 and is deploying Russian Aerospace 

Defense Forces in the Arctic. They will monitor the defense of Russia’s 

Arctic zone and the NSR in particular.961

 

957 “A Defense Ministry Expedition Team has Headed Out to the Arctic to Test 

Prospective Types of Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 5 December 2014.

958 “Testing of Russia’s First Arctic Helicopter to Begin in Winter,” RIA Novosti Online 

(RIA News Online), 4 August 2014.

959 Interfax (in English), 6 October 2014.

960 Interfax (in English), 25 November 2014.

961 Interfax (in English), 29 November 2014.
336

Colonel-General Vladimir Kulishov, first deputy director and 

chief of the FSB’s Border Service, stated that the protection of Russia’s 

national interests in the Arctic region remains “among the priorities in 

our border guard activities.”962 In September the NTV program “Smotr” 

profiled FSB border guard life on the Franz Josef Land archipelago, 

indicating that these guards may be located on several islands in the 

Arctic Ocean.963

Military Developments in 2015

Russia continues to state that it is not militarizing the Arctic. 

Critics find this assertion nearly unsupportable, since an infrastructure 

has been constructed in the Arctic, Russia admits it is working to prepare 

the Arctic in the operational sense, the combat potential of the Northern 

Fleet (and development of a new command) has been dramatically 

increased, logistics capabilities have been expanded, nuclear submarines 

are patrolling the waters, and the area is under UAV monitoring. Other 

reports note that the Pantsir anti-aircraft missile system is on islands in 

the Arctic Ocean, new radar stations are being deployed there, 14 

airfields are being rebuilt, and fighter aircraft are there. All of these 

issues are stated directly in the Russian press. 

The Soviet-era Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defines 

militarization as follows: 

The subordination of sociopolitical affairs, the economy, 

and ideology to the interests of preparing for aggressive 

wars. Usually accompanied by an arms race, suppression 

of democratic and revolutionary movements, and 

frequently by the establishment of totalitarian regimes.964

 

962 Interfax (in English), 28 May 2014.

963 NTV, 6 September 2014.

964 S. F. Akhromeev, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military Encyclopedic 

Dictionary), Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1986, p. 443. 
337

As this section will demonstrate, Russia is accomplishing many of the 

points associated with this definition and in effect militarizing the Arctic. 

In the end, the military goal appears to be occupying the Arctic with a 

massive infrastructure and denying access to parts of the Arctic to others.

This results in a significant advantage in the correlation of forces in 

Russia’s favor.

Russia intends to raise the amount of traffic through the NSR by 

20 time in the near future with one target/forecast being the transport of 

nearly 80 million tons of freight annually by 2030. In light of this goal 

Russia has developed its Arctic Coast Guard to help shepherd the freight 

through the NSR or to help rescue stranded vessels. Low oil prices, high 

insurance rates, and the opening of another Suez route have heightened 

Russian concerns that the NSR might not be as big a money-maker as 

originally assumed.

This section on the Arctic will cover activities to the end of 2015. 

The sections will be divided into the following groups: national security 

thinking, ground forces, navy forces, and aerospace forces.

National Security Thinking, 2015

There was no article of concern regarding national security in 

January. In February Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated that many 

non-Arctic nations were trying to secure access to the Arctic through 

political, military, and economic steps. Meanwhile Arctic nations have 

tried to extend their national territories at the expense of the continental 

shelf and islands in the Arctic Ocean. This situation encourages Russia to 

protect government interests there with the means of warfare,

965 which is 

an aspect of the definition of militarization. Shoygu has told the defense 

collegium that the government will not be shrinking Russia’s budget in 

regard to the Arctic.966 Deputy Natural Resources Minister Denis 

 

965 Interfax (in English), 26 February 2015.

966 Aleksandr Boyko, “Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu Tells Government 

Representatives and Subordinates Exactly Where our Army will not be Cutting 

Costs...,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Online (Komsomol Truth Online), 25 February 

2015.
338

Khramov stated that Western sanctions would not prevent Russia from 

continuing its exploration of the Arctic. Further, the sanctions would act 

as a stimulus for Russia to pursue its own technologies.967 To develop 

the region, a governmental commission has been established. It will be

led by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.968

In March the composition and role of the commission was 

discussed in the press. Operationally the commission was formed to 

coordinate all bodies involved in the Arctic. It would evaluate resource 

use, make decisions about regional development, and ensure the 

realization of priority investment projects.969 Commissioner Rogozin will 

have five deputy chairmen: Natural Resources and Environment Minister 

Sergey Donskoy, Energy Minister Alexander Novak, Economic 

Development Minister Alexey Ulyukayev, Transportation Minister 

Maxim Sokolov, and Deputy Security Council Secretary Vladimir 

Nazarov. With 60 members overall, the commission is well stocked with 

prominent ministries and personalities. For example, the commission 

includes the Head of Economic Security Services for the FSB, Yury 

Yakovlev, Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgakov, and 

representatives from several of the big state companies (Gazprom, 

Rosneft, Transneft, etc.).970 Other deputies and companies were to be

added in the coming months. There were reports that two regiments and 

Special Forces divisions of the VDV are to be sent to the Arctic,971 but 

there was no confirmation of this report.

In April the commission set up a board (with 34 commission 

members) and eight working groups (headed by the five deputy 

chairmen, Rogozin, and Arthur Chilingarov and Sergey Shishkarev). 

Funding was set at 222 billion rubles for the next five years; an Arctic 

audit would be conducted by the Economic Ministry by 1 August; and 

the Justice and Economy Ministries would analyze and develop a legal 

 

967 Interfax (in English), 5 February 2015.

968 Interfax (in English), 6 February 2015.

969 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 17 March 2015.

970 Interfax (in English), 17 March 2015.

971 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 17 March 2015. 
339

framework for the Arctic by 1 September. This report will decide 

whether Russia should draft a law on the Arctic.972 Ambassador-at-large 

Vladimir Barbin, commenting on Arctic cooperation, stated that the 

Arctic is a region for dialogue and collective responses, which, he added

somewhat incredulously from a Western perspective, has no military 

dimensions but only breakthrough technological achievements, 

considerations of climate change, and openings regarding economic 

exploration.973 Meanwhile, in spite of these observations and the 

complaints of environmental groups, Rogozin stated that Russia intends 

to go forward with plans to build a floating nuclear power plant that can 

be docked to coastal infrastructure. Energy will be provided by a cable to 

any Arctic city. It should be ready by October of 2016.974

In May the federal government allocated over 250 million rules 

to restart national expedition research in the high-latitude sectors of the 

Arctic, where a North Pole drifting station would expand studies of the 

Arctic on a seasonal basis.975 Russia continued to state that it planned to 

submit an application to extend its borders in the Arctic. The bid is 

expected to include the underwater Lomonosov and Mendeleyev ridges, 

as well as the Podvodnikov basin and perhaps parts of the Gakkel 

ridge.976 Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Alexander 

Grushko, stated that NATO’s involvement in the Arctic is a threat to 

global security.977

In June, State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Tetekin noted that the 

Russian North is the new center of world geopolitics. He stated that the 

center of gravity of Russia’s economic system has shifted north from the 

industrial areas of Europe to the northern gas and oil producing regions, 

 

972 Sergey Goryashko, “Arctic Will Be Given a Separate Law and New State Program; 

Arctic Commission Will Create a Regulatory Framework to Manage the Region,” 

Kommersant Online (The Businessman Online), 15 April 2015.

973 Interfax (in English), 20 April 2015.

974 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 21 April 2015.

975 Interfax (in English), 11 May 2015.

976 Interfax (in English), 21 May 2015.

977 Interfax (in English), 15 May 2015.
340

such as the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrugs. 

Here revenue also includes gold, diamonds, coal, and other mineral 

deposits. Such wealth brings competition from other northern nations 

(especially those from NATO countries), thereby producing a threat that 

hangs over the area.978 However, a meeting of the Foreign Ministry’s 

board noted that there are currently no challenges to Russia in the Arctic 

of a military nature requiring military solutions (which makes one 

wonder about the continued expression of concern over Russian 

suspicions that NATO is encroaching on Russia’s borders). Nevertheless 

Russia is prepared to respond to any situation that harms its national 

security interests.979 Another development was the deployment of 

Rubezh mobile antiship missile systems to Ostrov Kotel’nyy.

Also of note was the Federation Council’s preparation of a draft 

law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” The law’s goal is to 

legalize the status of the Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone and to 

describe the legal mechanisms for implementing state policy there. The 

Arctic Zone contains the following elements: Murmanskaya Oblast;

Nenetskiy, Chukotkskiy, and Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrugs; 

Vorkuta and Norilsk City Okrugs; territories of Krasnoyarskiy Kray’s 

Taymyrskiy and Turukhanskiy Rayons and some territories in 

Arkhangeslkaya Oblast; some of Yakutiya’s northern organs of state 

administration; and islands in the Arctic Ocean.980

There was one very important development in July, a new Naval 

Doctrine. According to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin the 

doctrine has four functional areas and six regional areas. The four 

functional areas are naval activity, marine transport, marine science, and 

mineral resource development. The six regional areas are the Atlantic, 

Pacific, Arctic, Antarctica, and Indian oceans, and the Caspian Sea. The 

 

978 Vyacheslav Tetekin, “The Russian North—Is the New Center of World 

Geopolitics,” Nakanune.ru (The Day Before), 16 June 2015.

979 Interfax (in English), 23 June 2015.

980 Natalya Bashlykova and Konstantin Dorofeyev, “Federation Council Prepares 

Outline of Law on Arctic’s Development...,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 26 June 

2015.
341

stated reason for the doctrine was the increase in Russia’s position as a 

sea power.981 The doctrine was required for Russia to development due 

to the growing rivalry for the ocean’s resources and competition for 

cargo transport. The new doctrine was adjusted in accordance with 

several other new strategic documents of recent years (National Security 

Strategy for the Period to 2020, a new Military Doctrine, etc.).982 The 

same month Russia submitted an adjusted bid to its Arctic continental 

shelf proposal to the UN’s Commission on the Borders of the 

Continental Shelf.983 The bid used information collected from a survey 

of the seabed and seabed sediment taken from a depth of several 

kilometers. The last expedition collecting this information took place in 

October 2014 and it studied the Podvodniky and Amundsen Basins. The 

bid’s goal is to establish Russia’s sovereign rights over an additional 

section of more than 1 million square kilometers of continental shelf.984

There was also a report on calls for improving the current system 

of antiterrorism security of Arctic infrastructures and shipping facilities. 

The existence of hazardous industrial facilities as well as nuclearpowered icebreakers and offshore oil and gas platforms and 

transshipment ports are other economic factors that must be protected by 

antiterrorist rules and regulations.985 Finally a report cited the head of the 

Defense Ministry’s main military medical directorate, Alexander Fisun, 

stating that due to a lack of sunlight and severe living conditions, the 

psychological state of Arctic soldiers is of concern. However, the use of 

antidepressants is highly discouraged, and “pills are the third or fourth 

thing on our list” to correct the psychological state of soldiers.986

 

981 Unattributed report, “Russian Federation Marine [Naval] Doctrine 26 July 2015, 

Baltiysk,” President of Russia Website (in English), 27 July 2015.

982 Interfax (in English), 12 August 2015.

983 Interfax (in English), 4 August 2015.

984 Unattributed report, “Meeting with Government Members: 5 August 2015, NovoOgarevo, Moscow Region,” President of Russia Website (in English), 5 August 2015.

985 Interfax (in English), 11 August 2015.

986 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 21 June 2015.
342

In September, Russian analyst Vladimir Karyakin, a senior 

research fellow at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, noted that 

Russia has 12 diesel-powered and four nuclear-powered icebreakers, and 

funding for three more of the latter has been allocated. It was noted that 

by 2020 Russia hopes to have an Arctic Troop grouping that incorporates 

the Northern Fleet, two Arctic motorized infantry brigades, airborne 

troops, modernized MiG-31 BM interceptors, and transport aircraft. The 

missions will be to protect territories along the NSR and the safety of 

ships on the route. Radar stations will include Podsolnukh surface-wave 

beyond-the-horizon stations.987

Russia wants to keep the US from internationalizing the NSR. If 

the US gets its way, it would be possible for the US to deploy there 

missile defense ships and cruise missiles aimed at Russia. Revenues 

from transport ships would be taken by other nations and impact 

Russia’s budget. Another analyst, Aleksandr Khramchikhin, a deputy 

director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, stressed the 

weakness of the Canadian, Norwegian, and Denmark military potential 

in the region. The US does not have significant contingents of its AF in 

the European Arctic either. This makes it difficult for an armored battle 

to be imagined in the Arctic. What this implies is that Russia is making a 

simple correlation of forces estimate and deciding they will win, which 

gives them more resolve to act with strength in the Arctic. Khramchikhin 

ends noting that “I cannot imagine the passage of any vessel, let alone a 

warship, along the NSR without prior arrangement and without Russia’s 

consent.”988

In spite of Russia’s intense militarization of the Arctic, President 

Putin states that the Russian responsibility there is to preserve “a balance 

between thriving economic activity and conservation of the unique 

environment, and a caring attitude to the culture and traditional lifestyles 

 

987 Anton Mardasov, “Russia-USA: From ‘Cold War’ to ‘Ice War.’ Might the Arctic 

Become a Theater of Military Operations?” Svobodnaya Pressa (Free Press), 10 

September 2015.

988 Ibid.
343

of indigenous small-numbered peoples.”989 Russia’s permanent 

representative to NATO, Alexander Grushko, stated that Russia is 

reinforcing its northern flank due to the increase in the number of 

exercises being conducted near the Arctic Circle by other nations. As he 

states “this will also require very thorough analysis on our part so as not 

to allow any surprises and not to allow the balance of forces that we have 

in the north to be upset.”990 He thus sees the situation differently than 

Khramchikhin. Meanwhile Russia contends it is interested in “the 

formation of an international system of Arctic security and 

cooperation.”991

Russian defense officials continue to brag about their 

achievements. Defense Minister Shoygu stated in October that a big 

military base, bigger than any during the Soviet period, has been created 

on the island of Kotelny. Smaller bases will be built on Wrangel Island, 

Cape Schmidt, the eastern coast of the Chukchi autonomous region, and 

the Kurils.992 Defense Minister Shoygu stated in October that the entire 

Arctic group will be created and armed by 2018, which appears to be a 

faster pace than other projections. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry 

Rogozin noted that military bases and airports are being erected in the 

Arctic “solely in order to defend economic interests of Russia in the 

region.”993 Natural Resources Minister Sergey Donskoi noted that a 

draft law “on the development of the Russian Arctic zone” will be ready 

in the fall of 2016.994 Rogozin added later that he is certain there will be 

a political and diplomatic clash over the Arctic, because “80 per cent of 

all our hydrocarbon deposits are there.”995 Thus, it is clear that militarily, 

economically, and legally the Kremlin continues to expand its influence 

and hold on the Arctic. It was also reported that the Kurchatov Institute 

has created a center for nuclear industry development beyond the Polar 

 

989 Interfax (in English), 16 September 2015.

990 Interfax (in English), 11 September 2015.

991 Interfax (in English), 16 September 2015. 

992 Interfax (in English), 22 October 2015.

993 Interfax (in English), 20 November 2015.

994 Interfax (in English), 23 November 2015.

995 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 20 November 2015.
344

circle. The center will enable the development in the Arctic of nuclear 

technologies and nuclear industry.996

In December 2015 Rogozin stated that the NSR will eventually 

become a “cold Silk Road.” Nuclear-powered icebreakers will be able to 

lead ships through the ice at any time of the year. Russia is also building 

a floating power plant, which is a unique innovative technology. Top 

government priorities in the Arctic are the living conditions of the people 

who reside there; and national security issues.

997 Rogozin contends that 

the Arctic is not militarized, yet over 430 military infrastructure facilities 

are now completed for the deployment of military units to the Arctic 

zone.998 The Arctic will be reinforced with groups of troops in 2016. 

As the year closed, Natural Resources Minister Sergey Donskoi 

stated that in February 2016 he would be submitting an application for 

expanding the orders of the Russian shelf in the Arctic. The area which 

Russia is claiming contains “forecasted hydrocarbon resources of 4.9 

billion tons of conventional fuel.”999

Ground Forces, 2015

In January a base for the 80th Arctic brigade was constructed in 

Alakurtti, Murmansk region. The goal is to finalize the building of all 

military infrastructures in the Arctic by the end of 2015.1000 Alakurtti is 

about 60 km from the border with Finland. The brigade there has in its 

inventory military prime movers, all-terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles. 

The goal of the brigade is to ensure economic security and the protection 

of interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone.1001 An Izvestiya 

report noted that the Ministry of Defense had tested more than 25 models 

of wheeled and snow or swamp-type vehicles developed specially for the 

 

996 Interfax, 7 December 2015.

997 Interfax (in English), 7 December 2015.

998 Interfax (in English), 8 December 2015.

999 Interfax (in English), 24 December 2015.

1000 Interfax (in English), 13 January 2015.

1001 Olga Vorobyeva, “Tested by the Arctic,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 20 January 2015.
345

Arctic. They included the GAZ-3344 and DT-3PM low-mass tracked 

crawlers, quad bikes, and snowmobiles, among many other options. The 

goal is to have equipment that can negotiate water obstacles and trek

over snowdrift conditions and ice ridges for long distances. Many of the 

vehicles failed the late 2014 test and were sent back for more work.1002 It 

is thought that military uniforms capable of withstanding temperatures 

down to minus 57 degrees will be prepared.1003

In February the military-industrial complex created a sixthgeneration radio-technical system for the Arctic. It is designed to provide 

stable communications in EW conditions and to provide for the secrecy 

of data transmissions. One example is the Azart digital radio station, a 

pocket radio that is supposedly difficult to target. It operates in a wide 

frequency waveband and defines coordinates in GLONASS/GPS 

systems. The batteries provide up to 12 hours of Azart operation.1004

With regard to forcing facing Alaska, Russia has improved the fighting 

strength of its Eastern Military District (which comprises the Chukotka 

Peninsula), where it has deployed four brigades of the Aerospace 

Defense Troops along with radiation, chemical, and biological protection 

regiments; and radar squads and aviation guidance stations on Wrangel 

Island and Cape Shmidt. In 2014, new Su-30SM, Su-35 fighter jets, and 

Bal coastal missile systems were delivered to units in the district.1005 In 

other work, the Federal Agency for Special Construction has been at 

work on six islands in the Arctic, preparing them for occupation. They 

 

1002 Anastasiya Kravchenko, “Defense Ministry Sends Vehicles Developed for the 

Arctic Back for Further Work...,” Izvestiya Online (News Online), 13 January 2015.

1003 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Minus 50 and Below. Future Officers to be Checked for Tolerance 

of Freezing Conditions,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 14 

January 2015.

1004 Anton Valagin, “A New Generation of Communications Equipment Will Be 

Developed for Servicemen in the Arctic,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News 

Online), 10 February 2015.

1005 Interfax, 25 February 2015.
346

are the Franz Joseph, Wrangel, Sredniy, and Kotel’nyy Islands; the 

Rogachevo Settlement on Novaya Zemlya; and Cape Shmidt.1006

In March there were reports of a new Arctic Grouping. It would 

consist of two separate motor-rifle brigades from the Murmansk Region 

and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. It is thought that the 61st

Separate Marine Regiment may be transformed into a separate brigade 

and join the Arctic Grouping. They will be deployed on Novaya Zemlya, 

Novosibirsk Islands, Franz Joseph Land, and Wrangel Island.1007 During 

an inspection of the Arctic in March, the training scenario included: the 

deployment of a system supporting the combined-arms group; the 

deterrence of a simulated enemy by a naval force and reconnaissance and 

sabotage group; and the relocation of a special-purpose unit. State 

borders were protected from the air, at sea, and on land in the Extreme 

Northern territories.1008 Also in March a subunit in Chukotka began 

testing the Orlan-10 UAV under Arctic conditions. Chukotka is part of 

the Eastern Military District, so the UAV operated over the districts 

deployment areas of Wrangel Island and Cape Shmidt.

In April Airborne Troops (VDV) began training for an Arctic 

jump with the Arbalet special-purpose parachute system. In mid-March 

more than 80,000 troops were involved in a combat readiness inspection 

in the Western Military District with emphasis on the Arctic. The VDV 

is following up on that inspection with the April exercise.1009 In midApril another inspection was conducted, this one in the Eastern Military 

District. It also focused on the Arctic.1010 One report noted that the 

Russian military contingent is growing on both the mainland and on 

islands. Electronic surveillance companies, air defense divisions, and a 

 

1006 Anna Potekhina, “Spetsstroy’s Arctic Mission: Military Facilities Continue to be 

Developed at Intensive Rates in the Country’s Polar Areas,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online

(Red Star Online), 26 February 2015.

1007 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 11 March 2015.

1008 Interfax (in English), 16 March 2015.

1009 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 1 April 2015.

1010 Unattributed report, “The Ministry of Defense Has Conducted a Snap Inspection of 

Arctic Subunits...” Vzglyad Online (View Online), 16 April 2015.
347

VDV component will include a combat and military transport aircraft.1011

It was announced that the Air Defense Troops in the Arctic will get the 

latest Krasukha-4 EW systems. The system masks ground areas from 

radar detection, can suppress on-board radars of strike and naval aircraft, 

and jams radar frequencies and other radio-emitting sources.1012 Arctic 

subunits trained on the Borisoglebsk-2 EW complex as well at the 

Tambov training center.1013 It was determined that the Orlan-10 would 

be ready for deployment as of 1 May, with tasks to include monitoring 

the ecology and ice in the near Arctic Zone and the NSR, as well as the 

shipping situation and, where necessary, search and rescue operations in 

the Arctic.1014 Main threats to Russia in the April timeframe were stated 

to be the possibility of other states staking territorial claims regarding the 

Russian shelf and the NSR.

1015

In May there were few new items of interest, as much of the 

preparation for new activities appeared focused on June. Both May and 

June did focus on the continuing efforts to construct military 

infrastructure on the numerous islands and archipelagoes that are 

intended for Armed Forces deployments. Also developing infrastructure 

is the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry. They plan ten centers in 

all.1016 Of interest is that Defense Minister Shoygu stated that the 

infrastructure for the military was being prepared “in the operational 

sense.”1017 The Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy area is in receipt of an S-400 

air-defense missile regiment, replacing S-300 missiles.

1018 Scientists 

have developed special fuel and oil for military vehicles that allows 

 

1011 Interfax (in English), 1 April 2015.

1012 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 2 April 2015.

1013 “The Arctic Formation’s Electronic Warfare Subunits Conduct Training at the 

Inter-Branch Electronic Warfare Troops Training and Combat Employment Center at 

Tambov,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2015.

1014 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 23 April 2015.

1015 Interfax-AVN Online, 24 April 2015.

1016 Interfax (in English), 1 June 2015.

1017 Unattributed report, “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergey Shoygu Held 

Conference Call with Armed Forces Leadership,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 1 June 2015.

1018 Interfax-AVN Online, 3 June 2015.
348

operators to start vehicles in temperatures down to minus 70 degrees

Celsius.

1019 Some problems were encountered with the Ratnik infantry 

equipment. It turned out that the optimal time for wearing Ratnik at 

minus 40 degrees Celsius was 60 minutes and at minus 50 degrees it was 

80 minutes.1020 Once again the VDV reported that they may be holding 

an exercise in the Arctic in the near future in conjunction with the 

Northern Fleet.1021

In July a Defense Ministry source stated that Russia will double 

its military force on Novaya Zemlya Island by 2020. It will be provided 

with the most advanced weaponry. It is planned to deploy a surface-toair missile regiment there and to revamp a local airfield.1022 Federation 

Council chairman Valentina Matviyenko stated that Russia will only be 

able to defend its national interests in the Arctic when it reclaims its 

northern territories. In line with such statements, the military intends to 

double its force on the island of Novaya Zemlya by stationing an air 

defense missile regiment there and reconstructing the airfield.1023

In August airborne troops and two Arctic motorized rifle 

battalions supported a Northern Fleet exercise in order to protect 

important economic and industrial facilities in the area. One reporter 

noted that over a third of the world’s known reserves of nickel and other 

rare earth metals are concentrated on the Taimyr Peninsula. Copper, 

cobalt, gold, silver, platinum, iridium, selenium, palladium, ruthenium, 

osmium, tellurium, and other metals are mined there. As a result, Russia 

considers this not just an important economic region but also a potential 

 

1019 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Armed Forces: The Armored Car Doesn’t Fear Freezing Weather: 

Defense Ministry Selected Equipment for Arctic Troops,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online

(Russian News Online), 5 June 2015.

1020 TASS, 18 June 2015.

1021 Gazeta.ru (News.ru), 25 June 2015.

1022 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 9 July 2015.

1023 Unattributed report, “Russian Will Double its Force Grouping in the Arctic,” 

Deyta.Ru, 9 July 2015.
349

war theater1024 (again, a reference to the definition of militarization). The 

scenario for the protection of these facilities included a sabotage and 

reconnaissance group of “Western” forces, whose aim was to damage the 

infrastructure and key enterprises of the Norilskiy Nickel concern. Local 

units of the Russian Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service, Border 

Guards Troops, and Emergency Ministry personnel, along with 

employees of private security companies, participated in the maneuvers. 

Western forces took prisoners and appeared to have plans to conduct 

some type of environmental disaster. Russian forces used Orlan-10 

UAVs to track the movement of the saboteurs. The entire exercise was 

deemed to be a defensive one, of course, by the scenario’s planners.1025

In September one report noted that Russia had cleaned up 

hundreds of tons of scrap metal from the Arctic, but much work still 

remains. According to one report there remain on Kotel’nyy Island some 

100,000 metal drums of 200-liter capacity. Most scrap metal is from fuel 

and lubricant packaging. Compressing these metal drums makes their 

transport easier.1026 In mid-September there was a simulated landing by 

the Northern Fleet’s Arctic brigade on Kotelnyy Island. Exercises 

included an amphibious operation on the island. Ka-27 ship-based 

helicopters carried the landing groups to the island’s western coast, and 

these forces were later joined by the assault ships Georgy Pobedonosets 

and Kondopoga, who offloaded more than 230 servicemen on shore. 

Equipment included TTM-4902PS-10 all-terrain two-section caterpillar 

snow and swamp-going vehicles and MT-LBV multirole tractor 

trucks1027 (an anti-landing defense of a shoreline was conducted later in 

 

1024 Vladimir Mukhin, “Arctic Brigade Will Protect Taimyr Mineral Resources,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online (Independent News Online), 26 August 2015.

1025 Vladimir Levchuk, “Taymyr. Many things Were Done for the First Time,” Na 

Strazhe Zapolyarya (Guarding the Arctic), 4 September 2015.

1026 Unattributed report, “Northern Fleet Ecological Clearance Platoon Readies 

Hundreds of Tons of Scrap Metal for Removal from Kotel’nyy Island in the Arctic,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 10 September 2015.

1027 Interfax (in English), 15 September 2015.
350

the month on the island).1028 About a week later, over 600 military 

personnel and some 160 pieces of military hardware of the Northern 

Fleet naval infantry units took part in a battalion tactical live-fire

exercise at the Combat Training Center in the village of Mulino in the 

Nizhny Novgorod region of the Western Military District. Marines 

worked on defensive and offensive warfare skills in conjunction with 

armored and artillery units of local ground troops. Particular focus 

during the training was on the execution of urban warfare tasks.1029

In October it was reported that an ice-free lead battery designed 

to work in cold climates had been introduced. The battery reportedly 

ensures cold weather engine starts in any military and armored vehicle. 

A special ultrasonic emitter is mounted in the battery to reduce 

electrolyte viscosity during operations in subzero temperatures.1030 An 

anti-terrorist exercise was held to free an important military facility from 

a group of simulated terrorists. This is the third exercise involving the 

Arctic motorized-rifle brigade.1031 Deputy Defense Minister Army 

General Dmitry Bulgakov stated that the servicemen in the Arctic are 

ready for the winter. They have an Arctic uniform which, thanks to 

nanotechnologies, enables servicemen to conduct duties in temperatures 

as low as minus 56-70 degrees Celsius (minus 68.8-94 degrees 

Fahrenheit).

1032

In November, as with the Navy, there was little information about 

ground forces in the media. It was noted that the test model of the 

Arktika two-unit armored personnel carrier will be built in 2016, but that

appeared to be the only important piece of news.1033 In December the 

 

1028 Unattributed report, “Order: Defend the Shore,” Na Strazhe Zapolyarya (Guarding 

the Arctic), 25 September 2015.

1029 Interfax (in English), 22 September 2015.

1030 Unattributed report, “Airborne Troop Scientists Develop Ice-Free Batteries to Be 

Used in Arctic Conditions,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 5 

October 2015.

1031 Interfax-AVN Online, 7 October 2015.

1032 Interfax (in English), 9 October 2015.

1033 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 17 November 2015.
351

Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, Colonel-General 

Sergey Karakayev, stated that positioning new units of the missile force 

in the Arctic is not envisaged.1034 Also in December there was a good 

discussion of the new quad bikes for the military, described as the 

“future of military reconnaissance.” These all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), 

along with the Strelets command and control communications system, 

were tested in December on a training range. ATV’s are quiet and can be 

hard to spot, and they are easy to maintain. The Strelets system is a tablet 

carried by servicemen while on ATV missions. It can determine 

coordinates, take pictures, and send data to a commander’s tablet with a 

range of 3 kilometers. It is thus possible to coordinate actions while in a 

near stealth mode. The command and staff vehicle is the R-149MA-1, 

which has a wi-fi network and communications with the GLONASS 

satellite constellation.1035 Further, new all-terrain vehicles were 

purchased for the force. The Arctic force now has DT-10MP Vityaz 

tracked vehicles, A-1 snowmobiles, TTM-4902PS-10 two-section 

amphibious tracked all-terrain vehicles, and AM-1 army quadbikes.1036

Navy, 2015

In January it was noted that the Northern Fleet will protect 

economic and political interests of the Russian Federation in other areas 

of the world, to include the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean 

Sea.1037 Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Korolev stated 

that the Arctic has strategic significance for Russia, since 11 percent of 

the country’s national product and 22 percent of its export volume is 

created and located there.1038 The Northern Fleet’s Marines received 

some new equipment as well. Included was the new BTR-82AM 

 

1034 Interfax (in English), 16 December 2015.

1035 Olga Kapshtyk, “Going Scouting on ATVs,” Suvorovskiy Natisk, (Suvorov’s 

Charge, Electronic Edition), 11 December 2015.

1036 Unattributed report, “Northern Fleet Arctic Brigade Receives Latest Batch of New 

All-Terrain Vehicles,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 29 

December 2015.

1037 Interfax (in English), 12 January 2015.

1038 Olga Vorobyeva, “The Attraction of the Arctic,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 17 January 2015.
352

armored personnel carrier. It features a 30-mm 2A72 automatic gun, 

coupled with a PKTM 7.62-mm machine gun.1039

In February missions were listed for the Northern Fleet’s 

submarine force. They guarantee safety along key transportation routes, 

prevent strategic mishaps, use standard navigation equipment for firing 

torpedoes and missiles, and function in the main as a deterrence 

force.1040 The Northern Fleet’s Coast Guard Force practiced hardware 

loading and unloading with the Arctic brigade. The drills used BTR-80 

armored personnel carriers, MTLB-V light armored cars for towing, and 

Kamaz and Ural all-terrain trucks.1041 In the past two years the Fleet has 

procured two ice-class ocean tugs and six ice-class harbor tugs. The iceclass transport ship, the Academician Kovalyov, will join the Northern 

Fleet in 2015.1042

The submarine theme continued into March. It was stated that 

they will now patrol the coastlines of all five continents, and that the 

ultralow-noise Yasen-M project 885M with X-102 nuclear cruise 

missiles would begin sea patrols in 2017.1043 Rear Admiral Aleksandr 

Moiseyev, commander of the Northern Fleet’s Submarine Forces, stated 

that the fleet spent 1,100 days at sea last year. The submarines perform a 

peacekeeping mission, he noted, since they are a weapon of strategic 

deterrence. The Northern Fleet’s responsibility remains the seven seas 

with the Arctic remaining one of the main areas of use. The submarine 

forces of the Northern Fleet are the backbone of Russia’s Maritime 

Strategic Nuclear Forces.1044

 

1039 Viktor Khudoleyev, “New Armored Personnel Carriers for Naval Infantry,” 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 30 January 2015.

1040 Andrey Gavrilenko, “In the Arctic Latitudes,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star 

Online), 7 February 2015.

1041 Interfax (in English), 20 February 2015.

1042 Interfax (in English), 27 February 2015.

1043 Unattributed report, bloknot.ru, 19 March 2015.

1044 Olga Vorobyeva, “Knights of the Ocean Depths,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red 

Star Online), 20 March 2015.
353

In April the Transport Ministry’s bill on protectionist measures 

was noted, which was said to include a requirement that work on 

Russia’s continental shelf would only be done by vessels built in Russia 

starting in 2020. The purpose is to localize the construction of vessels 

used in offshore operations.1045 It was reported that Russia will build 

three new nuclear ice-breakers by 2020. The first military ice-breaker in 

45 years, the Ilya Muromets, will be built as well. Of interest is that it 

will have a diesel-electric rudder system with the Azipod propeller, 

which is mounted on a steerable pod that can be rotated 360 degrees. The 

ship can thus move in any direction—backward, forward, or 

sideways.1046 Also in April, it was noted that exercises involving UAVs 

for the defense of submarine bases, as well as unmanned underwater 

systems, were used to detect sabotage groups sent by a hypothetical 

enemy.1047

In May it was noted that the inventory of the Northern Fleet naval 

infantrymen includes the BTR-82A and MTLB vehicles, Gvozdika and 

Nona self-propelled artillery mounts, and Stela and Shilka air defense 

missile complexes.1048 Medical issues were discussed. A system for 

evacuating the seriously ill included a heating system to facilitate 

intravenous injections in a low-temperature environment and an 

evacuation bag with an electric heater. Another system provided 

comfortable conditions, such as thermal fabrics, for soldiers over long 

periods in low-temperature conditions. Compact waterproof batteries for 

divers were developed.

1049 Korolev stated that compared with other 

periods of training, the Northern Fleet was much better this year than 

last. The time underway for submarines increased by a factor of 2.2, 

missile practice fire increased by 1.9 times, artillery fire from surface 

ships doubled, naval aviation employments grew by a factor of 1.8, and 

 

1045 Interfax (in English), 15 April 2015.

1046 Unattributed report, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 23 April 2015.

1047 Interfax-AVN Online, 30 April 2015.

1048 Unattributed report, “Northern Fleet Separate Naval Infantry Brigade is 72 years 

Old,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 4 May 2015.

1049 Ilya Vinogradov, “Unique Life-Support Systems for Military Personnel in the 

Arctic Have Been Presented to the Northern Fleet,” TASS, 15 May 2015.
354

aerial mine-laying by naval aviators increased fourfold.1050 Korolev also 

discussed the newest ships for the Northern Fleet, which retains its ocean 

zone missions as well as the Arctic. These ships included the Project 955 

Borei strategic missile submarine cruisers; Project 855 Yasen multirole 

submarines; a Project 22350 Frigate; a Project 11711 Large Landing 

Ship; the Project 20180TV armament transport vessel; the Project 23120 

logistics support vessel; the Project 02980 multirole rescue vessel; and 

the Project 02690 self-propelled floating cranes. Already on station are 

the S-400 air defense missile system and the Panstir-S air defense missile 

and artillery system. The Bastion coastal missile system is to be 

purchased from industry in 2015 as well.1051 New ice-breakers will 

ensure that the NSR is uninterrupted year-round under any conditions, 

offering great competitive advantages,

1052 and drills simulating distress 

scenarios are increasing. They use Orlan-10 and Takhion UAVs and AS36 rescue submersibles to help find sunken vessels. Use of the Hard Suit 

normobaric diving suit and Venom remotely controlled submersibles are 

also utilized in practices sessions.1053

In June activity slowed. A large-scale exercise was announced, 

but it would not take place until the end of the year. The exercise would 

practice the protection of important economic sites in the Arctic, with 

motorized infantry units interacting with airborne and special purpose 

forces.1054 It was announced that two Arctic-class warships would be 

built to defend the Arctic region. Actually, the ships are patrol vessels 

that can also work as tugboats.1055

In July more information was provided about ongoing events. 

Infrastructure is constantly being improved and the Northern Fleet has 

 

1050 Unattributed report, “The Intensity of Combat Training in the Northern Fleet Has 

Grown Almost twofold,” B-port.com, 25 May 2015.

1051 Olga Vorobleva, “Ocean-Going, Polar, Arctic: On 1 June the Northern Fleet 

Celebrates 282 Years,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 30 May 2015.

1052 Interfax (in English), 27 May 2015.

1053 Interfax (in English), 29 May 2015.

1054 Interfax (in English), 1 June 2015.

1055 Interfax (in English), 1 June 2015.
355

set up an advanced reconnaissance system in the area. This monitoring 

system is able to observe both aerial and surface situations in real time, 

according to Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Korolyov. 

Meanwhile anti-submarine aircraft continue to patrol the Arctic Ocean’s 

seas, and shore forces are continually trained under Arctic conditions. 

Amphibious assault force landings have been practiced on the 

unimproved shore of Arctic islands; and multiservice exercises enable 

the force to practice the defense of strategically important economic 

sites. The state-of-the-art strategic missile-carrying submarines Yury 

Dolgoruky, Alexander Nevsky, and Vladimir Monomakh will perform 

duties in the Arctic this year.1056 As mentioned above amendments to 

Russia’s Naval Doctrine were published as well. It was designed to 

counter what Russian officials portrayed as NATO’s movement toward 

Russia’s borders, and it is designed to increase cooperation with both 

China and India. The Arctic is important because it allows Russia access 

to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Many analysts doubted whether 

in the short term Russia could meet the many goals of the doctrine 

simply due to a lack of resources.

In August Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov stated 

that Russia will build the gas carriers and other vessels that will support 

orders for Arctic oil and gas once the Arctic shelf is further developed. 

The sanctions have forced Russia to rely more on its domestic 

components for fulfilling orders according to the required quality and 

technical requirements.1057 The Northern Fleet’s Naval Infantry and the 

80th Independent Arctic Motor-Rifle Brigade, practiced assault landings 

on islands in the Barents Sea.1058 And a long distance deployment was 

kicked off, with the goal being to maintain Russia’s naval presence in the 

Arctic, by sailing along the NSR and entering a number of transpolar 

ports for the first time in many years. This is deemed to be the fourth 

large-scale deployment of the Northern Fleet over a recent period1059

 

1056 Interfax (in English), 27 July 2015.

1057 Interfax (in English), 5 August 2015.

1058 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 10 August 2015.

1059 Interfax (in English), 14 August 2015.
356

(most likely the meaning is “since 2012). Three other August events 

were, first, the announcement that the ballistic missile submarine 

Aleksandr Nevskiy (possessing Bulava missiles) will be permanently 

based at Vilyuchinsk (Kamchatka) by mid-September;1060 second, that a 

Project 22220 Ural nuclear powered icebreaker will be laid down in 

September 2016;1061 and third, a multiservice tactical exercise with over 

1,000 servicemen and more than 50 pieces of hardware (14 aircraft and 

34 vehicles, to include MT-LBVs, BMD-2s, quadricycles, and UAVs), 

whose objective is to “practice operations of a multiservice force in the 

protection and defense of an important industrial facility.”1062 The 

exercise will both enhance security and keep economic operations in the 

north unhampered from foreign intrusion. During the exercise subunits 

of a motorized rifle brigade will land in the port of Dudinka, airborne 

troops will be airlifted to the region by Il-76 military transport, and 

rehearsals about guarding and defending installations will be 

practiced.1063

In September the Defense Ministry noted that two Tu-142s would 

be conducting flights over the Barents, Kara, and Laptev Seas to monitor 

ice conditions along the NSR. Such flights are important for it allows 

crews to gain experience with the magnetic anomalies and magnetic 

storms in the region. This is due to the proximity to the Earth’s magnetic 

pole and large magnetic declination. Radio communications deteriorate 

in the region as well.1064 Exercises have included anti-amphibious 

defense, sea coast and island zone protection, anti-terrorism, rescue 

missions for ships in trouble at sea, and protecting economic facilities in 

the region. The exercises also demonstrate large-scale command and 

control capabilities. For example, a September command-and-staff 

exercise included an attack force composed of the Admiral Ushakov 

 

1060 Interfax-AVN Online, 27 August 2015.

1061 Interfax (in English), 21 August 2015.

1062 Interfax (in English), 24 August 2015.

1063 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 27 August 2015.

1064 Unattributed report, “Northern Fleet Naval Aviation Conducts Ice Reconnaissance 

in the Arctic,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 1 September 

2015.
357

destroyer, the Vice-Admiral Kulakov anti-submarine frigate, Brest and 

Yunga ASW corvettes, Rassvet and Aisberg fast attack craft, nuclear and 

diesel-electric submarines, a coastal rocket and artillery brigade, and

other ships and support vessels.1065 Two Bastion complexes will be 

supplied to the Northern Fleet before the end of 2015, it was announced 

and, in the future, fleets will receive four complexes per year. The 

Bastion road-mobile coastal missile complex is armed with the 

supersonic homing anti-ship missile 3M55E Yakhont and is capable of 

protecting waterfronts at a distance exceeding 600 kilometers. Each 

complex can be armed with up to 36 missiles, which can hit targets at a 

range of 300 kilometers with 200 kilogram warheads.1066 The article did 

not explain the discrepancy of a system with a 600 kilometer range 

having missiles with a 300 kilometer range.

In October, a Northern Fleet hydrographic service specified 

coordinates for determining the geographical calculation of the width of 

the territorial sea, the economic zone, and Russia’s continental shelf in 

the Arctic. Marking territorial waters allows for an unconditional priority 

for resource exploration, the Russians note, and the information collected 

will be used for filing a request with the United Nations Maritime 

Committee.1067 Russia’s submarine fleet received good news in October

as well, as the Yury Dolgoruky, a strategic nuclear submarine, arrived at 

its main base after a long-distance voyage. The submarine is the leader 

of the Borei Project 955.1068

There were few reports regarding the Navy in November but in 

December the Northern Fleet identified its priorities as the continuation 

of infrastructure development in the Arctic and the maintenance of the 

nuclear deterrent and convention forces in a state of permanent 

readiness. For the year, the Russian’s noted that the Saint Andrew flag is 

now present everywhere. In the Arctic zone it is present in both the 

 

1065 Interfax (in English), 15 September 2015.

1066 Interfax (in English), 29 September 2015.

1067 Interfax (in English), 12 October 2015.

1068 Interfax (in English), 15 October 2015.
358

eastern and western areas, practically on a permanent basis.1069 To sum 

up the Northern Fleet’s presence in the Arctic, the following Arcticrelated articles were published in 2015 in the Navy’s flagship publication 

Morskoy Sbornik (Navy Journal):

Issue 1: National Interests of Russia in the World’s 

Oceans1070

Issue 2: none

Issue 3: The Problem of Cargo Flow Regulation in Arctic 

Water Areas1071

Issue 4: The Economic and Defense Factors of the 

Northern Sea Route’s Development;1072 The Legal 

Regime of the Arctic in Globalized Conditions;1073 On the 

Development of the Normative Legal Base of Sea 

Activities of Russia1074

Issue 5: Flashy Manoeuvers of the Alert Forces of the 

Northern Fleet Search and Rescue Support1075

Issue 6: none

Issue 7: none

Issue 8: A Legendary Polar Region Aviator;1076 The 

Northern Sea Route: the Arctic Sea Communications 

Development1077

 

1069 Interfax (in English), 8 December 2015.

1070 V. Kuroyedov and M. Moskovenko, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 1 2015, 

pp. 42-47.

1071 V. Selin, S. Kozmenko, and V. Tsukerman, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 

3 2015, pp. 52-58.

1072 V. Selin and S. Kozmenko, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 4 2015, pp. 39-

43.

1073 I. Zhudro, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 4 2015, pp. 44-50.

1074 V. Kuroyedov and M. Moskovenko, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 4 2015, 

pp. 51-58.

1075 K. Bezrukov, V. Surma, and S. Kotomkin, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 5 

2015, pp. 52-55.

1076 N. Skritsky, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 8 2015, pp. 29-33.

1077 S. Kozmenko, A. Koryakovskaya, A. Savelyev, and A. Shchegolkova, Morskoy 

Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 8 2015, pp. 40-46.
359

Issue 9: none

Issue 10: none

Issue 11: The Optimization of the Long-Range Aviation 

Application in the Arctic in Peaceful Times;1078 The 

Raising of the Role of the Navy and the Arctic “Naval 

Closed Administrative-Territorial Formations” under 

Conditions of the New Sea Doctrine of Russia and its 

Implementation

1079

Aerospace Forces, 2015

In August 2015 Russia combined its air defense, space, and air 

force into an Aerospace Force. For that reason, this section is so titled. 

In January it was noted that 14 airfields would be ready in the 

Arctic by year’s end, with ten being built this year.1080 An air defense 

detachment is being equipped with the latest S-400 long-range air 

defense missile system. It will be based on the Novaya Zemlya 

archipelago.1081

In February it was noted that the security of the Arctic zone will

be aided by new radars, namely the Podsolnukh surface-wave over-thehorizon radar. It can detect surface and airborne targets at a distance of 

up to 450 km. and has all-weather and around-the-clock monitoring 

capabilities. It can classify up to 300 maritime and 100 airborne targets 

in an automatic mode simultaneously or successively, while determining 

their coordinates and issuing target designations on them to shipboard 

complexes and ground air defense weapons. The same article noted that 

the defense concern making the Podsolnukh also designed the VoronezhM (meter band) and Voronezh-DM (decimeter band) radars that upgrade 

the national missile attack warning system. Their effective range can 

 

1078 V. Alfyorov, I Spirin, and Ye. Kushnir, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 11 

2015, pp. 55-59.

1079 S. Kozmenko and A. Bryzgalova, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), No. 11 2015, 

pp. 60-63.

1080 Interfax (in English), 13 January 2015.

1081 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 15 January 2015.
360

reach 6,000 km and they can detect, track, and classify advanced 

offensive aerospace weapons, to include ballistic and aerodynamic 

targets.1082

In the March-May period it was noted that the army’s request for

Mi-8AMTSh-AV Arctic-class helicopters may reach 100, according to 

Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov.1083 In April Deputy Prime 

Minister Dmitriy Rogozin stated that the Arctic version of the Il-112 

military transport will be ready in 2-3 years which, to him, was another 

indication that Russia will soon have its own aviation in the near future. 

There were no aerospace articles of concern in May.

In June another report appeared on the Mi-8AMTSh-VA 

helicopter. It stated that the helicopter can fly non-stop for 1,500 km with 

two additional fuel tanks on an external sling and two more inside. 

Another helicopter under development is the Mi-171A2, which some in 

Russia think will be the world’s best helicopter.1084 It was noted that the 

MiG-31 interceptor will have a unique navigation system, having an 

orientation capability that does not depend on GLONASS or GPS 

satellites. The system under development is the BINS platformless 

inertial navigation system. Its maximum temperature range is from

minus 70 to plus 85 degrees Celsius.1085

In July a short article mentioned the development and 

deployment to the Arctic of the Pantsir-S surface-to-air missile and gun 

system. The system provides short-range protection for ground assets. 

Modifications are underway to make the Pantsir suitable for use under 

Arctic conditions.1086 It is possible that the new S-500 Prometey may 

 

1082 Yuriy Gavrilov, “The Arctic Will Be Covered Beyond the Horizon: Military 

Personnel North of the Arctic Circle Will Be Equipped with a New Radar,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 19 February 2015.

1083 Interfax (in English), 24 March 2015.

1084 Interfax (in English), 10 June 2015.

1085 Unattributed author, “MiG-31s Will Learn to Orient Themselves in the Arctic 

without Satellites,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 23 June 2015.

1086 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 4 July 2015.
361

also be deployed in the Arctic.1087 Finally, it was noted that the Northern 

Fleet will be reinforced by an air force and air defense army composed 

of MiG-31 interceptors and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. This air 

defense and air force army is being created due to the great distances the 

Northern Fleet has to cover. Su-30 and Su-35 fighters may also become 

part of the Arctic defense, along with EW and reconnaissance assets.1088

In August the aerospace force was officially formed, but this 

development was covered in Chapter Five, so it is not discussed further 

here. Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Korolev reported 

that the fleet had increased its combat potential several fold and that “we 

have already started to work on forming air force and air defense armies 

in the Northern Fleet.” Formation of an extensive military infrastructure 

in the Arctic is continuing. Meanwhile Russian analysts continue to write

that NATO’s activity in the Arctic “substantially exceeds what the 

Russian Armed Forces are doing.”1089 Based on Russia’s clear 

militarization of the region, in comparison to the limited NATO response

that includes virtually no military y force in the region, such logic is hard 

to fathom. The equipment on board the Mi-8AMTSh-VA was noted. It 

includes the PKV-8 digital autopilot for control, an SSKM-M system to 

determine location, and an RPA-500 system that is used to search for 

people and equipment in trouble.1090 Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu 

noted that by the end of the year an air defense regiment and an Air 

Force unit will be stationed in the Arctic.1091

In September there was mention of the desire to create a UAV 

weighing 1.5 tons to monitor the Arctic shelf. It is designed to have a 

 

1087 Zvezda TV (Star TV), 8 July 2015.

1088 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Russia Expands Arctic Military Grouping. Air Force and Air 

Defense Army to Be Part of Northern Fleet,” MK Online (Moscow Komsomol Online), 

27 July 2015.

1089 Vladimir Mukhin, “Cold War in the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online 

(Independent News Online), 7 August 2015.

1090 Dmitriy Grigoryev, “Arctic Helicopter Tests Commence in Russia,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 27 August 2015.

1091 Interfax (in English), 31 August 2015.
362

range of 4,000 kilometers and a flight duration of 35 hours. It is 

equipped with an SAU-9.1 automatic control system that includes a 

piloting system, on-board computer, and the latest-generation actuators. 

It is slated for release in 2017.1092 The Federal Space Agency reported 

that it will set up more centers to receive and process data from remote 

sensing satellites in order to further explore the Arctic.1093 The location 

of air defense units will most likely be on Sredny Island according to 

another report.1094

In October a report on the Mi-8AMTSh-VA noted that its 

advantages include its ability to navigate in high latitudes and fly in 

daytime and nighttime in adverse weather conditions.1095 There were 

reports of a training exercise that included the use of radar detachments 

on Wrangel Island and Schmidt Cape in which the detachments detected, 

identified, and tracked aerial targets;1096 and there were reports that six 

airfields will be rebuilt in the Arctic in 2016-2017.1097 Also of interest 

was that the chief of staff of the 15th (special-purpose) Army of the 

Aerospace Force, Major General Anatoliy Nestechuk, stated that a 

foundation stone was laid for a new radar which will replace and 

complement the current system. Nestechuk also stated that the outdated 

GLONASS-M satellites will be replaced with GLONASS-K 

satellites.1098

In November it was reported that a squadron of UAVs has been 

formed in the Arctic’s area of engagement, namely in the Eastern 

Military District in Chukotka. It is equipped with Orlan-10 and Forpost 

drones that provide visual monitoring of training, help assess the state of 

 

1092 Unattributed report, “Russia Will Create Drone to Monitor Arctic Shelf,” RIA 

Novosti (RIA News), 9 September 2015.

1093 Interfax (in English), 18 September 2015.

1094 Interfax-AVN Online, 29 September 2015.

1095 Unattributed report, “Russian Armed Forces May Receive First Arctic Helicopters 

by the End of 2015,” RIA Novosti (RIA News), 5 October 2015.

1096 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 9 October 2015.

1097 Interfax-AVN Online, 22 October 2015.

1098 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 3 October 2015.
363

military infrastructure facilities, and take part in air patrols.1099 Another 

report noted that new modifications for the Tor-M2U anti-aircraft missile 

system have been developed. They help the system operate in high winds 

and cold temperatures.1100 In an interview with the chief designer of 

long-range radio communications, it was noted that there are two radar 

stations currently in the Arctic (the Dnepr and Daryal), which will soon 

be replaced by Voronezh and Voronezh-DM stations.1101

Finally, in December, it was reported that two S-400 Triumf 

surface-to-air missile separate regiments have been deployed to the 

Arctic in 2015. They are protected by Pantsir surface-to-air missile-andgun batteries, and are located in the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the 

town of Tiksi, Yakutia.1102 The first full-fledged military unit of the 

Northern Fleet in the Arctic is to be formed on the Novaya Zemlya 

archipelago. It is a modernized S-300 anti-aircraft missile regiment. In 

the past only separate subunits and groups were stationed at these 

latitudes. Serving at Novaya Zemlya provides servicemen with increased 

leave and pay, double credit for time served, a supplementary pension 

entitlement, and the right to replacement if so desired at the end of a 3-

year term.1103 They can reportedly destroy helicopters, warplanes, and 

even ballistic nuclear missiles at a range of several hundred kilometers. 

They work in temperatures as low as minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit where 

the cold season lasts almost 10 months.1104 In a 2016 report, it was noted 

that the Northern Fleet’s 45th Air Force and Air Defense Army were 

established in December 2015.1105

 

1099 Interfax (in English), 24 November 2015.

1100 Interfax (in English), 24 November 2015.

1101 Sergey Dmitriyevich Saprykin, interviewed by Anna Potekhina, “Russia’s Surface 

Echelon,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 30 November 2015.

1102 Interfax-AVN Online, 8 December 2015.

1103 Northern Fleet press service, “New Northern Fleet Air Defense Anti-Aircraft 

Missile Regiment Takes up Combat Duty in the Arctic,” Ministry of Defense of the

Russian Federation Website, 9 December 2015.

1104 Aleksey Koshkin, “Military News Live,” Zvezda TV (Star TV), 9 December 2015.

1105 Interfax (in English), 29 January 2016.
364

Conclusions

The competition for ownership of Arctic territory is intense. 

While Russia’s Defense Ministry constructs its infrastructure for future 

use there, Danish and Canadian scientists are working to lay claim to 

sections of the Lomonosov Ridge. Outside players such as China are 

hoping to get their claims to the area approved. Hopefully this 

competition will end peacefully. However, Russian advances in the 

Arctic (and now in Ukraine and Syria) and President Putin’s statement 

that the Arctic has been under “our sovereignty for several years. This is 

how this will be in the future” do not bode well for the future of the 

Arctic’s quiet development.

For Russia there are geopolitical goals they hope to achieve. 

Some of these goals are achievable through diplomatic and negotiation 

means. Russia is not the only nation with geopolitical aspirations in the 

region. To support its goals, Russia has constructed (militarized is a 

better term) its portion of the Arctic to ensure it has a reliable deterrent in 

case some nations tries to snatch territory illegally. However, 

militarizing the Arctic has placed Russia in just such a position. Further, 

there are several serious problems that must be overcome in the region: 

the lure of the Suez Canal for shipping, the observation that the ice field 

might in fact be coming back to hinder NSR passage, the instability of 

permafrost in the region, and the role of nonmilitary organizations to 

trump Putin’s aspirations. All of these issues are discussed below.

Geopolitical Goals

There are really two geopolitical issues at stake. One is the status 

of shipping along the NSR. From this shipping lane, Russia intends to 

garner the traffic and arrears it says it is owed for passing through the 

region. The second and more important issue is laying claim to the riches 

in oil and gas. These acquisitions appear to be planned through two 

means: using the United Nations to certify land as belonging to Russia; 

and militarizing the area to prevent any foreign incursions. Russia is 

attempting to construct an international legal force to help the nation 

control events in the Arctic. Russian academics, scientists, and 

politicians are working in their specific fields to help shape the political 

factors that could affect the discussions. 
365

At stake is a treasure trove of hydrocarbons and major ore 

deposits that, if accessed, could provide a nation with energy security for 

many years to come. Russia already has enough energy resources within 

the country to sustain it for centuries. It doesn’t need oil. The goal of 

President Putin appears to be to control this huge swath of oil resources 

and corner the market on prices, insuring a prosperous Russia. It is easy 

to visualize how Russia, if successful in attaining these goals of resource

and NSR control, could hold many nations hostage to record price 

gauging for its services. The area is one on which all threat analysts 

should keep a keen and wary eye.

The US recently assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council 

for a two year term. Retired US Navy Admiral Gary Roughead recently 

wrote that the US could use the position to offer the lead on shipping, 

resources, and fishery standards and practices; and set the stage for 

constructive regional engagement and cooperative investment. With the 

leadership in its hands, the US can help ensure responsible energy 

exploration and production, and it can help ensure that stringent safety 

standards are followed.1106 Russia may try to delay any agreements until

the US chairmanship expires.

Military Goals

The two goals of the military in the region appear to be to 

establish an overarching monitoring capability and a quick response, 

powerful military deterrent. Russia has continued to improve its military 

presence and infrastructure in the region. The buildup includes two light 

brigades, two airborne divisions that are on-call, new Borei and Yasenclass nuclear missile submarines, rebuilt airfields, and new aerospace 

defense units. The Arktika space-monitoring system, designed to oversee 

the area, has been put into operation. 

President Obama has called the Arctic a global commons but, he 

added, the Russians don’t seem to see it this way. Their new army 

 

1106 Gary Roughead, “In the Race for Arctic Energy, the US and Russia are Polar 

Opposites,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2015, p. A13.
366

brigades—each expected to grow to a strength of 3,600 soldiers—will be 

deployed on the Yamal Peninsula and at a military based 30 miles from 

the Finnish border. Russia has a fleet of 41 icebreakers (the US has two), 

among which six are nuclear-powered to help movement in winter.1107

The concerns of the strategic command’s commander, Admiral 

Vladimir Korolev, were noted. They have resulted in the further 

deployment of military force in the region. He cited the aspiration of 

some foreign states to give the NSR the status of an international line of 

communications; the frictions associated with the partitioning the Arctic 

shelf; and the lack of legal standards between Russia and Norway 

specifically regarding issues over the use of the Spitsbergen Archipelago 

and adjacent waters. Such frictions require Russia to properly organize 

the situational monitoring of the Arctic zone, in particular the NSR. 

Anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense systems must be developed and a 

mobile quick reaction group of forces created that can strike at sea, in the 

air, and on the ground.1108 This process seems to be underway.

Problems

There are several problem areas confronting Russia, some due to 

competition, some to Russian aggression (in Ukraine, which inspired 

sanctions), and some to climatic issues. With regard to competition, a 

recent article in The Economist indicated that the Arctic hype has 

somewhat receded in recent months for several reasons. Falling oil prices 

and Russian/NATO conflicts have lessened the Arctic’s allure, as has the 

decline in melting ice in 2014, which was less than in 2013. The NSR 

had 71 ships pass through it in 2013 and only 53 in 2014. Meanwhile 

16,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal in 2013. So the overall value 

of NSR shipping remains in flux at the present time.1109

 

1107 Steven Lee Myers, “US Seen as Far Behind in Scramble for the Arctic,” The New 

York Times, 30 August 2015, pp. A 1, 8.

1108 Aleksandr Bondar, “We have Returned to the Arctic in Earnest and For a Long 

Time,” Na Strazhe Zapolyarya (Guarding the Arctic), 1 February 2014.

1109 “Not So Cool,” The Economist, 31 January 2015, p. 51.
367

A report at the Russian site ProAtom.ru noted that travel requires 

close relations with European carriers and costly commercial transport, 

but the latter is getting cheaper each year. Further on 6 August a second 

channel for the Suez Canal was opened. It took one year instead of five. 

Waiting time has been reduced by a factor of three and transit time by 40 

percent, and number of ships passing each day has doubled. On the NSR, 

no new icebreakers have been provided as required thus far, and traffic 

fell in 2014 by 4.3 times from the 2013 tonnage. The NSR’s initial 

concept is thus inadequate for five reasons:

1. The NSR will not become a market-maker on the 

global freight market. It cannot control 2-4 percent of the 

transit between prime markets connected by this lane, 

between Europe and Southeast Asia, under the present 

situation.

2. European tensions are rising and with them 

reduced tonnage

3. The southern route now has 14 of the 20 largest 

ports of the world. Of the 71 ports on the NSR route, 66 

turn over less than 100 tons a year or they are not 

functioning at all.

4. In recent years the PRC has been developing the 

Indian Ocean. It provides half of the European-Asian 

trade and almost completely controls many of the ports, 

such as Gwadar and Djibouti. It has another option to 

reduce the distance to Europe, the high-speed auto-and 

railroads from Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou to 

Myanamar; to deep-water ports being built in Dawei and 

Kalargote. This shortens the route by 3-3.5 thousand 

nautical miles.

5. Transport costs are becoming more important than 

transit time. Large shipping companies are reducing their 

speeds to save fuel by up to 50 percent.1110

 

1110 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Absurd Investments: Why the Northern Sea Route May Not 

Make Sense,” ProAtom.ru, 18 August 2015. 
368

Marine transport is increasingly becoming less expensive. As a result, in 

face of the competition on rail and sea, Russia is living in an NSR, BAM 

(Baykal-Amur Main Line) and Transsib (Trans-Siberian Railway) 

parallel reality. Eurasian transit may turn out to be a dead end.1111

With regard to Russian aggression, its advances into Ukraine 

have affected its plans in the Arctic, it appears. Former economic 

development minister Andrei Klepach has noted that Russia, due to 

sanctions for its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, will now have to 

look east for technologies instead of west, since partnerships with 

western companies are now delayed indefinitely. This will delay certain 

plans for the development of energy fields in the Arctic.1112

With regard to climatic issues, critics still question Russia’s 

strategy. They ask whether everyone is moving too fast to establish 

supremacy in the region. According to the website 

http://wattsupwiththat.com/reference-pages/sea-ice-page/ the Arctic ice 

field is coming back. This could eventually, if true, once again shut 

down the NSR and further complicate many of the plans already 

developed. 

In stark contrast to the claim that the ice field is coming back is 

the fact that melting permafrost and associated methane eruptions have 

produced a growing number of craters (20-30 original craters with many 

more secondary ones) that could potentially threaten infrastructure in 

Russia’s north. The cause is said to be the destabilization of relic hydrate 

trapped beneath the permafrost. Methane gas bonds with water to form 

methane ice. Warming results in melting permafrost and allows warmer, 

liquid water to come in contact with the hydrate, resulting in increased 

hydrate instability. The worry for the future is what to do if very large 

sections of hydrate go critical, which is to say what if Russia’s oil and 

 

1111 Ibid. 

1112 Interfax (in English), 9 October 2014.
369

gas infrastructure is sitting on a potentially destabilizing section of 

land?1113

Finally, another source indicated that hostile measures come 

simply from nonmilitary measures such as the advance of pro-Western 

figures into positions of power; indirect force operations ranging from 

sorties by environmentalists to the staging of political crises and acts of 

terrorism; and the use of nontraditional military systems based on new 

physical principles. In the latter case, the issue for Russia was the alleged 

deployment along Russian borders of ten plasma systems, which could 

provoke earthquakes and other natural disasters.1114 Few Americans have 

ever heard of such systems.

Thus, claims over the continental shelf (based on home grown 

scientific data), legal claims through the UN, military presence 

(development of a Northern Command and an icebreaker fleet, early 

warning radars, modern air defense systems, long-range patrols, and 

ground forces stationed in the area) help ensure that Russia can threaten 

or deter any potential intruders to this territory. Since the region holds 

some 13% of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil, a third of the 

undiscovered conventional gas, and a fifth of the undiscovered naturalgas liquids, it will remain exceptionally important for energy suppliers

and will remain a point of contention.

1115 The race is on. Let’s hope it 

ends peacefully with many winners, not just one.

 

1113 See “Siberian Permafrost Methane Shows Growing Eruption: Number of Global 

Warming-Induced Craters Now Estimated at 20-30,” at 

https://robertscribbler.wordpress.com/2015/02/24/arctic-methane-monster-showsgrowing-eruption-number-of-global-warming-induced-craters-now-estimated-at-20-30/

1114 Sivkov.

1115 Sohrab Ahmari, “Putin Opens an Arctic Front in the New Cold War,” The Wall 

Street Journal, 12 June 2015, p. A13.
370
371

CHAPTER NINE: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Background

The year 2014 will long be remembered in Ukraine as one of pain 

and suffering. In years past, it would have been unthinkable to consider 

that Russians and Ukrainians would submit to fighting one another. After 

all, they are brother Slavs and for years were part of the same nation. In 

hindsight, however, there appear to have been specific events over the 

past several years that eventually resulted in Russian President Vladimir 

Putin’s decision to risk capturing Crimea and intervening in eastern 

Ukraine. Some of those events pitted Russia against US or European 

ideals, while others were shaped by domestic or personal issues

involving Putin. 

There were several significant items that most likely influenced 

Putin’s view of his objective or situational environment and changed his 

approach. First, Putin’s ideological development over the past 12 years 

as President and Prime Minister had been slowly shaped not only by 

events on the ground but also by the thoughts of Putin’s favorite 

philosophers who supported the “Russian World” concept, Orthodox 

Christian and Russian values (anti-gay propaganda, etc.), and Russia’s 

cultural heritage of intellectual and geopolitical superiority. During a 

1994 speech in Saint Petersburg, while serving as Deputy Mayor of the 

town, Putin noted that he could not abandon to their fate the 25 million 

Russians now living abroad after the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin’s 

continued return to this theme makes it appear that the protection of 

Russian citizens served as the official engine behind his new push 

westward into eastern Ukraine. However, the lure of coal, shale oil, and 

defense factories in eastern Ukraine added the fuel to keep the engine 

running at full throttle.

Second, Putin had festered negative thoughts about the US for 

over eight years, as stated initially in a 2007 Time magazine interview, in

which he says there were many US attempts to influence Russia’s 

internal and foreign policies. Putin further showed unsubstantiated

paranoia regarding CIA subversion attempts to shape events in Moscow. 

Russian politicians worried about the rash of ongoing regime changes 
372

attributed to the so-called “color revolutions” that were popping up. 

Eventually he began to see Western influence and spies everywhere. 

This has even led to the more recent expulsion of non-governmental 

organizations from Russia, viewing these groups as agents of foreign 

influence.

Third, in 2008 Putin had warned NATO members at their 

Summit in Bucharest against provoking problems with Ukraine, such as 

offering it membership in the alliance (this followed his 2007 Munich 

Security Conference outburst against the post-Cold War order that had 

developed, where he imagined US hegemonic initiatives everywhere he 

looked). NATO appeared to ignore his warnings. Russia’s borders are 

sensitive to any foreign activity near them, and NATO’s approach 

elicited an immediate reaction. NATO has attempted to engage Putin, 

trying to assure Russia’s leadership that NATO is not a threat to it, even 

bringing it into the NATO fold for the past several years. Unfortunately 

Russia still has too much historical sensitivity to make such changes. 

This only furthered Putin’s sense that the West was out to humiliate 

Russia. Later, in another geopolitical issue, Russia and the US supported 

opposite sides in 2012 in Syria, a country with which Moscow has an old 

and important strategic relationship

Fourth, in 2013 Putin decided to grant temporary asylum to 

Edward Snowden, the National Security Agency (NSA) analyst who 

defected with extensive agency computer secrets. This was not the only 

time Putin had insider information but for Ukraine is was a totally 

different situation. He reportedly had insider information on the shape of 

Ukraine’s political and military affairs from covert sources, and his 

skepticism and suspicion of US actions were further advanced with his 

understanding that US State Department representative Victoria Nuland 

had provided $5 billion to support the cause of protestors against then 

Ukrainian President Yanukovych and promote regime change. The US 

website PunditFact explored the last charge and found that since 1992 

the US had spent $5 billion in support of democracy-building programs

in Ukraine, with $2.4 billion going to the promotion of peace and 

security; $1.1 billion going to economic growth; and $1.5 billion going 

to humanitarian assistance, governing democratically, and investing in 
373

people. The site claimed the “Pants on Fire” assessment of the Russian 

TV claim.1116

Fifth, Russia’s military intervention in 2008 in South Ossetia and 

Georgia received only a short-lived negative response from the West. 

This may have encouraged Putin to consider more aggressive actions in 

the future, especially since the incursion into Georgia resulted in a reset 

of relations with the US after only a few years. Meanwhile Putin 

continued to view Ukraine as the soul of Russia’s cultural heritage and 

longed to have it back in the fold of the Motherland. His plans were cut 

short when he and his policy makers tried to push a Eurasian Economic 

Union plan on Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych and offset 

European Union (EU) plans to integrate Ukraine into the EU. Initially, 

Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych chose to join the EU but, at the 

last minute, he reversed his decision. It was an unpopular domestic 

decision and appeared to be based on the last-minute demands, influence, 

or threats from President Putin to get Yanukovych to choose the EEU. 

Ukraine’s population began to protest in November 2013 against 

this change of events and their protests eventually turned into combat 

against the security forces of Yanukovych in Kiev’s Maidan Square. The 

protests and damage resulted in the 20 February 2013 deaths of 

protesters there, who were gunned down by a hail of government 

gunfire. New York Times columnists Andre Higgins and Andrew E. 

Kramer’s investigated the shootings for months, interviewing many of 

the witnesses on both sides of the confrontation, and concluded that the 

bloodshed “prompted a mass defection by the President’s allies” who 

began to understand that the crimes in the square would be blamed on 

them. Inna Bogolovskaya stated that a Parliamentary resolution was 

introduced for all Interior Ministry troops to return to their barracks, 

apparently without orders from the President. 

Without even Parliament on his side, Yanukovych knew he was 

in trouble. The next day, 21 February, he signed a peace agreement and 

 

1116 http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements /2014/mar/19/facebook-posts/...
374

45 minutes later Ukraine’s riot police left all the government buildings. 

This account is based on the eye witness testimony of Poland’s Foreign 

Minister Radoslaw Sikorski who was present at the signing. No longer 

guarded, Yanukovych left Kiev on the afternoon or evening of the 21st of 

February. Higgins and Kramer believe that Yanukovych “was not as 

much overthrown as cast adrift by his own allies, and that Western 

officials were just as surprised” as anyone else.1117 The peace 

arrangement that Yanukovych had signed, according to Higgins and 

Kramer, did not secure Yanukovych’s future but rather “sent a signal to 

Mr. Yanukovych’s allies that it was time to change sides.”1118

Interestingly, when Putin was interviewed for the March 2015 

film “Crimea: The Road to the Homeland” that recounted Yanukovych’s 

decision-making process, Putin omitted any mention of his role in the 

outcome. He instead blamed the US and EU for pressuring Yanukovych 

and for supporting the Maidan protestors. He, of course, was blameless 

in his version of events. Simultaneously, Putin and new Chinese 

President Xi Jinping continued to develop an extensive partnership that 

offset many Russian business relations with Europe and the US and the 

sanctions the West later imposed.

These events preceded and may have motivated Russia’s 2014 

decision to intervene and seize Crimea. Based on the cards he had to play

(see below) and the fate of Yanukovych, Putin’s decision to intervene, 

while risky, most likely appeared worth the chance. Not only were 

Kiev’s new leaders engaged in sorting out what had just happened and 

not anticipating such a move, but Putin had prepared for such an 

eventuality according to his March 2015 film. 

The baklava-masked gunmen in Crimea allowed Vladimir 

Konstantinov, speaker of a local assembly, to convene an emergency 

closed session of parliament. No one knows if there was a quorum or 

 

1117 Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, “Defeated Even Before He Was Ousted,” 

The New York Times, 4 January 2015, pp. 1, 10.

1118 Ibid., p. 10.
375

how many people voted, but a decision was announced to fire Crimean 

Prime Minister Anatoly Mogilyov, who had been appointed by 

Yanukovych, and replace him with Sergey Aksyonov, the leader of the 

Russian Unity Party, who had signed an agreement with the leader of a 

Russian nationalist party (with Kremlin ties) earlier. Russian troops then 

fanned out and surrounded all military installations in Crimea controlled 

by the Ukrainian Army. Events were described by one activist member 

of the Russian Unity Party as “our Crimean Spring.”1119 Ultimatums and 

provocations followed. The lopsided referendum vote of ninety seven per 

cent to leave Ukraine is unreasonable for an area that had a non-Russian 

population of nearly forty percent. Foreign monitors were not permitted 

to observe the voting process, making the count even more highly 

suspect.

Maybe Putin believed the quick reset in relations with the US, as 

occurred with Georgia, might happen again. Perhaps the West would 

soon get over what he had done and move on. But this didn’t happen, as 

things actually got worse. Putin’s new reality really lost its glimmer on 

May Day 2014, which may long be remembered in Ukraine as the day 

the killing really started. While thousands celebrated the day in Moscow, 

up to 50 people died in Ukraine, some on each side, in confrontations in 

both eastern Ukraine and Odessa. Up to this time confrontations were 

tense but the line of confrontation did not include shooting and 

murdering on such a scale. That line was crossed. Further, the opening of 

a second front in Ukraine’s south implied that the development of a proRussian-dominated land corridor from Transdniester to Odessa now had 

to be considered as another Russian goal. Civil war in Ukraine became, 

for the first time, a topic under consideration in press accounts of the 

fighting. Putin further dashed any peaceful consideration with plans to 

construct a Novorossiya or New Russia in the region. 

Recent offensive actions in the Donetsk region in 2015 by 

Russian-supported (or led?) separatists indicate that Putin may not be 

 

1119 Paul Sonne and Alan Cullison, “Old Allies, Old Grudges Help Moscow,” The Wall 

Street Journal, 3 March 2014, p. A8.
376

inclined to stop his plan anytime soon, although Russian actions in Syria 

since September have deflected attention from the region. The temporary 

halts appear designed to improve the separatists’ logistical support 

before going back on the offensive. As Sun Tzu noted years ago in The 

Art of War “if envoys speak in humble terms, but continue preparations, 

they will advance.” Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel doesn’t 

appear to trust Putin as she once did.

What Cards Did Putin Have to Play?

Russia has always championed the development of forecasting 

models that allow leaders to look toward the future. If this was the case 

with regard to Ukraine and Crimea (and no one knows for sure), then the 

forecasters did an excellent job of pointing out weaknesses that could be 

exploited. 

Initially some European groups blamed themselves for the 

conflict. Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, noted 

that the EU’s (unsuccessful) effort to sign a trade and aid agreement with 

Ukraine in 2013 did not have a geopolitical or strategic objective in 

mind. That was the EU’s honest opinion. But Russia did not see it that 

way. Now the EU in a strange twist was blaming itself for being brutally 

naïve,1120 for not properly taking Russia’s concerns into account.

US Secretary of State Kerry was engaged elsewhere at the time, 

looking to solve problems in Syria and Iran. Thus Ukraine and Europe 

became an “open season” for opportunists like Putin. He knows how to 

use intelligence to size up a winning hand and play it, such as he did with 

his move into Crimea. The first card he played was to label the evolving 

events in Maidan as a “specter of an impending coup” initiated by the 

US. Putin’s labeling makes little sense, since former Ukrainian President 

Yanukovych and several Ukrainian generals are now known to have 

been pro-Russian, at least according to US analyst Paul Goble’s research. 

They had been informing Putin of the weakness of the Ukrainian Armed 

Forces, adding to Putin’s rationale for intervening. Yanukovych fled to 

 

1120 Ibid.
377

Russia, not the EU. Goble noted that nearly 5,000 Yanukovych backers 

fled with him to Russia:

Among these 5,000 from Ukraine are former interior 

minister Vitaly Zakharchenko, former defense minister 

Pavel Lebedev, former justice minister Elena Lukash, 

former procurator general Viktor Pshonka, former head of 

the national security service Grigory Ilyashov, and former 

vice prime minister Sergey Tabachnik. They, their allies 

in the banking and business communities, and others have 

fled to Moscow where they have purchased expensive 

properties in the city or land nearby. As a result of this 

emigration, Ukrainian citizens now occupy ‘two-thirds of 

the market for elite Moscow housing.’ In short, they took 

a lot of the wealth they had acquired in Ukraine to 

Russia.1121

Further, Russians cited the promises made by former Secretary of 

State James Baker and others that NATO would not move closer to 

Russia. This point was a much better motive for Putin to use regarding 

events in Maidan than the coup charge, since, in fact, this did occur.

Putin put this anti-NATO card in play to show that you cannot trust 

NATO and therefore the EU as well. However, Baker’s promises were 

not formalized in a legal agreement, as was the 1994 Budapest 

Memorandum, which Russia abrogated in Crimea.1122 According to the 

memorandum, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom all 

committed to: (1) Respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing 

borders of Ukraine (2) Refrain from the threat or use of force against the 

territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and pledged 

 

1121 Paul Goble, Window on Eurasia: 5,000 Yanukovych Supporters Who Fled with Him 

to Russia Await Return, 23 October 2014.

1122 Daniel Henninger, “Cold War 2.0, the Videogame,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 

April 2014, p. A13. In 1999 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, 

while in 2004 Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania became 

members. These are former Iron Curtain countries, in the words of Winston Churchill, 

which chose the West, not Russia.
378

that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in 

self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter (3) Refrain 

from economic coercion (4) Seek immediate United Nations Security 

Council action to assist Ukraine, should it be threatened or attacked with 

nuclear weapons (5) Not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine unless 

attacked by Ukraine in association or alliance with a nuclear-armed state

and (6) Consult if a situation arises that raises a question concerning 

these commitments.1123 Russia failed to live up to this arrangement.

A second card Putin played was economics, that is, the ability to 

hold out against sanctions or look elsewhere for relief. A Chatham House 

report, which focused on Putin’s ability to change the impact of 

sanctions through economic policy, noted that “Across Europe, national 

corporations – such as banks, energy companies, and major law firms –

are strongly lobbying against any further second- and third-tier sanctions 

against Moscow as short-term profits would be undermined...”

1124 Initial 

sanctions imposed by the West did little more than amuse many 

Russians. Moscow’s stock market actually rose a little when the 

sanctions were announced. However, ensuing rounds of sanctions have

hit a bit deeper in the pocket-books of some of Putin’s closest associates 

and the pain of sanctions appears to be growing. Of course, Russia has 

responded with sanctions or geopolitical moves of its own against the 

West. Interestingly enough, and perhaps not by chance, cyber-attacks 

from Russia against Internet sites and banks in the West have reportedly 

increased.

A third card in Putin’s hands is his geopolitical capabilities, that

is, his ability to block nuclear talks with Iran, hinder further the peace 

process in Syria, and make it more difficult for US supplies to be 

transported through Russia to American troops in Afghanistan. Each of 

 

1123 Jeffrey Lewis, “Ukraine and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum,” 29 April 2014, 

condensed here. See http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7316/ukraine-and-the1994-budapest-memorandum

1124 Ilya Zaslavskiy and Robert Bosch, “Europe Can No Longer Cling to Russian Profits 

When Security Is At Stake,” at http://email-chathamhouse.org/1TYG-2BYVBBLOMUK-103L57-1/c.aspx. 
379

these geopolitical issues lies at the heart of Putin’s strength. He and his 

staff know how to manipulate political issues to Russia’s benefit. 

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has the experience and dedication to 

assist Putin in each instance.

A fourth card is Russia’s European supporters who are scattered 

among key nations. Former Premier Silvio Berlusconi of Italy says 

isolating Russia “goes against history” and Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of 

France’s far right National Front, notes that “Mr. Putin hasn’t made a 

single mistake.”1125 In Germany the media’s moniker was “the Putinunderstanders (some say whisperers),” since much of Germany’s support 

for Russia’s actions is tied to strong business links that the nation does 

not want interrupted. Key German figures of influence are involved as 

well. For example, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder called 

Putin a flawless democrat in the past and stated that Putin, as a 

historically thinking person, has a certain fear of encirclement. Who 

would have imagined that Schroeder, after having confronted the Soviet 

Union’s forces in East Germany during the Cold War, would not only be 

working for the Nord Stream AG, which is controlled by Russian energy 

giant Gazprom (not all that unusual), but also be acting as if Russian 

actions in Ukraine today are inconsequential (very unusual). Former 

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt found Putin’s Crimean actions “absolutely 

understandable.” And Siemens AG Chief Executive Joe Kaeser used 

these two former chancellors to justify his visit to Putin in late March.1126

Clearly Putin played this business angle well. He seemingly had several 

of Germany’s economic giants (Siemens, Volkswagen, Adidas, Deutsche 

Bank, etc.) in his hip pocket as well. This did not appear to be a time of 

appeasement. The situation in Ukraine witnessed armed groups storming 

and occupying numerous buildings across eastern Ukraine, holding 

journalists and OSCE negotiators hostage, thwarting attempts at 

imposing order and stability, and shooting down helicopters (and perhaps 

 

1125 Anton Troianovski, David Gauthier-Villars, and Nicholas Winning, “In Europe, 

Putin Also Has His Defenders,” The Wall Street Journal, 5-6 April 2014, p. A8.

1126 Ibid.
380

civilian airliners). This is not about free trade, but rather freedom from 

the illegal conduct of separatists and surrogates.

A fifth card Putin began to put into play was to simply raise gas 

prices (which it has done in the past), as Gazprom did in early March to 

increase the financial pressure on Kiev. It is no secret that six European 

nations rely on Russia for 100% of their gas, while several others get 

about half of their gas from Russia. However, the glut of oil on the 

market and the ensuing low prices have hurt Putin as much as the 

sanctions for Russia’s actions against Ukraine. And other nations are 

trying to reroute oil and gas supplies to the nation.

A final card that Putin holds (and which limits conflict and 

allows him more room to risk taking land) is simply the fact that the US 

Armed Forces are broke and tired from a decade of deployments. The 

US force is reorganizing and reenergizing. This resulted in an anticipated 

lack of an immediate Western response and put doubt into the minds of 

allies as to US priorities. However, Putin may have miscalculated here

for two reasons. First, some NATO forces (to include US forces) have 

since been deployed to nations bordering on Russia in response to 

Russian moves. Putin may have lost some wiggle room for taking 

chances. Second, his assertion that a coup attempt was underway has 

little basis in fact. Why would the US, for example, try to initiate a coup 

when its military was tired from years of fighting and its budget 

drastically reduced? It doesn’t make sense. But, as the next section 

shows, that really doesn’t matter to the Kremlin. They reason differently.

Russia’s New Reality

The Kremlin’s actions in Crimea appeared supported by its 

development of a “new reality” that superseded even the Marxist concept 

of objective reality on which Russian military thought had traditionally 

relied. Some Russian journalists agreed, with one noting that the system 

no longer wants to be what it was, and that it appears Russians are being 
381

prepared for entry into some kind of completely new reality.1127

Similarly, another author stated that the entire system of international 

relations and Russia’s internal life will no longer be what they were 

before, as a new reality is confronting Russians.1128

The “correlation of political and other forces” assessment that 

Putin and the military made must have been influenced by the 

development a new reality. It was one of their making, one based on a 

world view that included Western threats and conspiracies aimed against 

Russia. That perhaps motivated the decision to take the risk of 

intervening. He might face sanctions, Putin reasoned, but the EU and 

Russia’s economy are tightly integrated and they will not hold out for 

long anyway, if history is any guide. His assessment of the calculus for 

success looked favorable, he had cards to play, and so he acted. This 

probably was a strategy that his staff and think tanks developed more 

precisely as events unfolded. It is hard to imagine it was anything more 

than a potential scenario until Yanukovych fled Ukraine. Then all bets 

were off. However, this strategy has not worked in eastern Ukraine. 

Thousands have died and the conflict has dragged on for months. Neither 

has a Novorossiya been created yet.

Further, the narrative that describes and justifies this new reality 

has emerged. It is controlled and encouraged by a host of anti-Western 

propagandists under the tutelage of the Kremlin: 

Putin has manufactured a version of reality to propagate 

the narrative he needs to destabilize Ukraine. He decided 

an ethno-lingual division was needed to achieve his 

objectives—and then cast parts. Now the story is being 

acted out on hundreds of fronts and posted on social 

media, a virtual live-stream of content for Putin’s 

 

1127 Nikita Smagin, “Why Vladimir Putin’s Rating is Breaking All Records,” 

Sobesednik Online (Interlocutor Online), 20 March 2014.

1128 Aleksandr Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos: A False Alternative for Russia,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online (Independent News Online), 9 April 2014.
382

argument of oppression, victimization, and fear in 

Russian-speaking Ukraine. Reality plays no role in all 

this.1129

The images of masked men taking control of buildings or 

standing at checkpoints in eastern Ukraine appeared in most regional and 

international newspapers. Russia again, as initially in Crimea, denied that 

these were Russian troops. Unfortunately there were no attempts to 

unmask these pro-Russian supporters when tensions were not so high, 

such as in Crimea. Today it would be much more difficult and dangerous 

to try. Another component of Putin’s 21st-century new reality offensive

is cyber. Cyber tactics have interrupted the communications of 

legislators and governance, “even as the stream of Russian-language 

misinformation against Nazis and fascists continues to flow.”

1130

Putin has clearly constructed in his mind a vision of the world 

and how to get what he wants. Independent consultants Molly McKew 

and Gregory Maniatis believe that Putin has not miscalculated, but 

instead is purposely redefining how 21st-century warfare is fought. He 

apparently learned something from the 2008 war with Georgia, where 

state propaganda was used to muddle the narrative regarding who started 

the war. Putin uses these lessons learned to assert that he is no longer 

bound by the constraints of nation-state warfare. In Chechnya for years 

he has been confronting separatists, militants, terrorists, and other 

stateless actors. He has, according to McKew and Maniatis, developed a 

pop-up-war type scenario. First, there is the issue of a hidden army.

These troops, whose presence Putin has continued to deny, are seemingly 

unconstrained by the laws, rules, and conventions governing warfare, 

especially since Putin ignores the international treaties and laws to which 

he is supposedly held. Soldiers hid their faces and imparted a dark, 

foreboding psychological aura to a potential conflict situation. These 

confrontations have been confined so far to areas in his own backyard, 

 

1129 Ibid.

1130 Ibid.
383

where the impact is the greatest and easiest to manage. In Kiev the 

absence at first of an identified leader put Ukraine into a negotiating 

vacuum and offered Putin further room for maneuver.1131 

In the particular case of Crimea, tactics included a quick 

intervention without a shot being fired for days. It included the use of 

both physical presence and psychological pressure (such as issuing 

ultimatums to Ukrainian forces to abandon their garrison or face an 

attack; or threatening Robert Serry, the United Nations envoy to Crimea, 

and demanding that he leave Crimea) as the means to accomplish 

specific goals. Limited jamming and cyber warfare occurred. By taking 

patches off uniforms, Russia somewhat neutered local media attempts to 

state with certainty who and what was taking place on Crimean soil. A 

similar tactic seemed to be at work in Transdniester at the time, as there 

were reports of individuals in civilian clothing arriving in large numbers 

at airports, but no further action took place there.

Lilia Shevtsova, as noted in Chapter One, believes Russians now 

can’t trust anything in the media due to Putin’s creation of this new 

reality. US Secretary of State John Kerry, evaluating his negotiations 

with Russia over Ukraine, noted that “You almost feel that he’s [Russian 

President Vladimir Putin] creating his own reality, and his own sort of 

world, divorced from a lot of what’s real on the ground for all those 

people, including people in his own country.”1132

Russia’s Propaganda Express Provided Intervention Support 

Peter Pomerantsev, a television producer and nonfiction writer 

who lives in London, noted the following about the new reality and 

Russian propaganda:

 

1131 Molly K. McKew and Gregory A. Maniatis, “Putin’s Latest War Game,” at 

http://washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/02/kerry-says-russia-isgoing-to-lose-if-putins-troops-continue-to-advance-in-ukraine/

1132 Gerald F. Seib, “Kerry Sees Ukraine Crisis as Uniquely Putin’s,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 29 April 2014, p. A4.
384

Choreographed, made-for-television uprisings in Donetsk, 

Kharkiv, and Lugansk; a carefully constructed media 

message that spins Ukraine’s choice into one between 

federalism or civil war; behind-the-scenes deals with local 

oligarchs—recent developments in Ukraine bear the 

signature of Moscow’s ‘political technologists.’ Over the 

past 20 years this uniquely post-Soviet profession 

has...inherited the Soviet tradition of top-down 

governance and the Tsarist habit of co-opting anti-state 

actors (anarchists in the 19th century, neo-Nazis now), all 

fused with the latest thinking in television and 

advertising. The result is a society of pure spectacle, 

where nothing is ever quite real.1133

Pomerantsev is correct. The Kremlin has developed control over 

information and is managing dissent by dominating most media outlets, 

especially TV, which is the media form most often accessed for news by 

Russians. Control was thus accomplished domestically/internally, while 

externally, especially in those nations Russia hopes to reacquire land, 

such as the Baltics, control is harder to attain. However, ethnic Russians 

living there and elsewhere outside Russia’s borders, with no other news 

access in their language except broadcasts from Mother Russia, were 

often clearly swayed by stations such as RTR TV and their single point 

of view. This is a problem for Baltic leaders. Their ethnic Russian 

population is susceptible to the Kremlin’s message that is based on 

fabrications “where nothing is ever quite real.”1134

A 24 April 2014 evening report on Rossiya 1 TV offers an 

example of this solely Russian interpretation of events. Russian 

spokesmen stated the following: Ukraine is on the verge of civil war; the 

Ukrainian group Right Sector is playing a key role in the attacks on 

Russians; the Ukrainian army is being sent against civilians and Kiev is 

 

1133 Peter Pomerantsev, “A Glimpse inside the Kremlin Puppetmaster’s Mind,” at 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0f6ebf30-bf02-11e3-8683-00144feabdc0.html

1134 Pomerantsev.
385

flouting the Geneva agreements; US officials are influencing the conduct 

of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with high level visits, military training, 

and support to Right Sector; Maidan supporters are undergoing detox to 

wean them off drugs; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the 

USA and EU of inciting a color revolution; there is intense psychological 

pressure on locals and a stress on the inability of the authorities to talk 

with locals; and there is a bounty out for pro-Russian supporters in 

Ukraine.1135

Alexander Nevzorov, a former Russian TV journalist and film 

director who is alarmed by Russia’s propaganda offensive, stated 

recently that the familiar “cocktail of patriotism, chauvinism, 

imperialism” has gone down as easily as it did during the days of the 

Soviet Union. That recipe includes sporting the orange-and-black 

ribbons of St. George, which are most closely associated with the Soviet 

victory over the Nazis and are favored by Russian nationalists. The 

ribbons were also covered in the Rossiya 1 report noted above (implying 

the fight against Nazis was continuing). One US author has noted that 

these types of ultra-nationalists with Soviet imperial ambitions helped 

create the neo-Soviet man as “the latest Putin avatar.”1136 Pomerantsev 

notes that Putin’s ideologies are a unique “fusion of despotism and 

postmodernism, in which no truth is certain.”1137

Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center, an independent pollster 

in Russia, noted that Russia’s propaganda campaign has had several 

stages:

 Portraying Maidan as a Western conspiracy

 

1135 Andrey Kondrashov and Salima Zarif, “News,” Rossiya 1 TV (Russian 1 TV), 24 

April 2014.

1136 Matthew Kaminski, “Putin’s Neo-Soviet Men,” The Wall Street Journal, 27 March 

2014, p. A17.

1137 Ibid.
386

 Portraying the protesters as nationalists, fascists, and 

anti-Semites who had staged a putsch and threatened 

Russian-speakers in Ukraine

 Faking stories of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Russia 

by using footage of a border crossing between 

Ukraine and Poland

 Using the defense of the Russian population (from an 

imagined threat) as the reason for taking Crimea, 

which has morphed into Russia’s reclaiming historic 

lands.1138

One of the best articles that discounted Russian TV’s slanted 

view of reality was that of Vladimir Ryzhkov in Moscow Times on 25 

March 2014. Ryzhkov, a Russian State Duma Deputy from 1993 to 2007 

and now a political analyst, described in detail a conversation he had 

with a former KBG officer’s propaganda experience in Afghanistan from 

the 1980s, in which the officer outlined the Soviet principles of an 

information campaign. It appears that all of these principles were applied 

by Russian information operatives during the current crisis in Ukraine.

Ryzhkov outlined how independent information is losing out to mass 

propaganda in Russia, where the main objective is to mobilize the 

population in support of a geo-expansionist campaign. The methods 

recalled by Ryzhkov from his KGB conversation are listed below, 

followed by an example of the method as used by Russia in Ukraine in 

parentheses:

 It is necessary to convince the general population that 

the government is acting correctly and that the enemy 

is guilty of fomenting the crisis (Maidan protesters are 

to blame, the new government is linked to fascists, 

extremists, the US, and the West, which are the “real

aggressors”).

 

1138 Unattributed report, “A New Propaganda War Underpins the Kremlin’s Clash with 

the West,” at http://www.economist.com/node/21599829, 29 March 2014.
387

 The Kremlin creates myths about the terrible 

persecutions of the Russian-speaking population (the 

spin doctors created a virtual reality that appeared to 

find the right balance between truth and fiction, even 

though a human rights investigation by an 

independent European human rights agency found no 

violations or persecutions of the Russian-speaking 

public in Crimea). 

 The enemy must be demonized (Ukrainian Right 

Sector leader Dmitry Yarosh was used for this. 

Moreover, the moderate forces were presented as neoNazis, and negative background information on 

Ukraine’s new leaders was brought to light).

 The authorities disguise their aggressive actions as 

humanitarian (Russia had a humanitarian need to 

protect “defenseless” Russians in Crimea from the 

events that transpired in Kiev).

 The Kremlin justifies its methods by citing alleged 

enemy actions (the US is trying to take over Ukraine, 

so we must defend our ancestral territories) 

 Authorities must be presented as legal and legitimate 

(Crimeans have a right to self-determination)

 War propaganda depends on a totalitarian approach 

(domestically, Russia cracked down on Dozhd TV and 

Lenta.ru for airing opposition points of view and 

earlier had silenced the media in Crimea once their 

forces intervened, pulling Black Sea TV, a local 

station that supported the new government in Kiev, 

off the air ).

1139

 

1139 Vladimir Ryzhkov, “The Kremlin’s War Propaganda,” 25 March 2014, at 

http://www.the moscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-kremlins-warpropaganda/496779.html
388

Thus it appears these principles were applied by Russian information 

operatives during the current crisis in Ukraine.

The general conclusions about Russian news media and TV 

reporting that Westerns analysts arrive at includes a host of methods to 

influence the situation. These include propaganda and 

counterpropaganda, deception, deflection, provocations, reflexive 

control, disinformation, and psychological pressure. Examples of each 

would include intercepts of fake US e-mails (deception); statements that 

the threat to Ukraine is Kiev’s economy, not Russia (deflection); 

Russia’s claims that the US produces anti-Russian material 

(counterpropaganda); Russia’s subjective interpretation of facts that 

distorts reality (propaganda); using masked men to take over government 

locations (provocations); stating that US servicemen in Russian uniforms 

will attack Ukraine (reflexive control); stating that neo-Nazis and fascists 

are running Ukraine (disinformation); and continuing a military buildup 

on Ukraine’s border (psychological pressure).

Russian propaganda describing the conflict in Kiev has affected 

the views of ethnic Russians living in bordering nations, especially 

where other nations’ radio and television networks receive Russian

language TV programs, such as in Lithuania. A recent panel discussion 

noted that Russia’s propaganda situation in Lithuania is ideal:

The situation is fantastic—channels whose entire content 

is Russian not only obtain EU structural assistance via 

publicity, but also participate in the advertisement market; 

in other words, they worsen the situation of the 

Lithuanian media. In addition, consumers pay them 

additionally via subscription fees in order to be 

brainwashed by them.1140

As a result, a panel member stated that it is important for politicians to 

raise the issue of information wars at the European level. This is because 

 

1140 Delfi, 1 April 2014. 
389

while media on Lithuanian channels is pluralistic and contains various 

opinions, Russian broadcasts show clear, uniform opinions that are 

usually one-sided. One gets the impression that in Lithuania not all is 

well, while in Russia everything is fine.1141

Finally, in a somewhat bizarre propaganda move, Russia allowed 

former NSA employee Edward Snowden to ask Putin the following 

question on a televised call-in show: “Does Russia intercept, store, or 

analyze in any way, the communications of millions of individuals? Do 

you believe that simply increasing the effectiveness of intelligence or 

law enforcement investigations can justify placing societies rather than 

subjects under surveillance?” Putin responded, noting that “We don’t 

have a mass system of such interception and according to our law, it 

cannot exist. We do not have a wide-scale, uncontrolled effort like that in 

the United States.” The US embassy in Moscow immediately tweeted 

that Snowden “will probably be interested to know that the laws of the 

Russian Federation allow for the control, storage, and study of all 

communication data in Russia. This includes facsimile messages, 

Internet searches, and emails. But today Snowden did not get such a 

direct answer.”1142

Trolls

An Internet troll is a person (s) who often chooses to remain 

anonymous, while posting statements that are designed to persuade or 

influence thinking or emotions through the use of half-truths or deceptive 

information. A troll’s point of view is often open to interpretation and 

seldom relies on an abundance of facts or sound research. Russia has 

used Internet trolls for some time. For example, in June 2014 Ukrainian 

journalist Maria Popov wrote about trolls creating Internet propaganda 

for the Kremlin. The propaganda was noteworthy for both its quantity 

(number of posts to make a psychological statement that encourages 

people to agree with the majority) as well as its quality (discussing 

 

1141 Ibid.

1142 Lukas I. Alpert, “Snowden Appears on TV Event with Putin,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 18 April 2014, p. A7.
390

everything bad about the US and Europe and pointing out the good in 

Russia). 

In July 2014, a Latvian journalist also discussed the role of 

Russian trolls. The manipulation of public opinion in Europe was seen as 

a particular goal of the effort. As one study noted “the domestic policy 

administration of the Russian president controls the works of so-called 

trolls and bloggers,” whose jobs include “to publish and disseminate 

commissioned articles, to establish fake accounts on social networks so 

as to distribute commissioned information, as well as to disseminate 

spam and persecute opponents on the Internet.”1143 Several journalists in 

other countries have also examined Russia’s use of Internet trolls. 

In the fall of 2014 investigative reporter Adrian Chen was 

looking into an organization known as the Internet Research Agency in 

St. Petersburg, Russia. The organization purportedly had been posting 

propaganda supporting the Kremlin’s point of view online under fake 

identities in order to create the illusion that Russian activities had a 

massive following of support. People working there were referred to as 

“trolls.” As Chen noted, the word became popular in the 1990s as 

Internet users took on pseudonyms to harass individuals, groups, or their 

opinions. The Russian group was different in that it cast negative light 

on foreigners and domestic opponents, while complementing Kremlin 

officials. He found out that a troll farm in the Ural Mountains had been 

in existence since 2008.1144

Chen discussed a meeting he had with one of the trolls, Ludmila 

Savchuk, who had since left the organization. In February she had made 

a clandestine video of the office and leaked it to a reporter for Moi 

Raion, a local paper. She offered a short yet telling description to Chen 

of several of the many topics she was to discuss at the Agency: 

disparaging comments about Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and 

 

1143 Sarmite Elerte, “Kremlin’s Trolls,” Ir.Iv, 18 July 2014.

1144 Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” The New York Times Magazine, 7 June 2015, pp. 56-

67.
391

Ukrainian Army atrocities; optimistic comments about the financial 

crisis in Russia; and suggestions that opposition leaders had set up the 

murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in March. Content was 

created for every popular social network, whether it be VKontakte, 

LiveJournal, Twitter, Instagram, or the comment section of Russian news 

outlets. Savchuk’s goal was to shut the organization down, since she 

believed that this information war was creating a dark atmosphere in 

Russia.1145

On 18 August 2015 Kommersant Online discussed the outcome 

of a court case involving the same Ludmila Savchuk. She had filed a 

lawsuit in March or April claiming that she had not been paid. The court 

ruled in her favor, and she was owed one month of back pay. The main 

victory in the case, in the opinion of human rights activists, was “an 

officially obtained company dossier, the disclosure of its activities, and 

the admission of distress cased to Ms. Savchuk.”1146 In effect, the article 

noted, trolls create a simulacrum of public opinion in favor of 

government policies and actions, which may be totally made up.1147 The 

Kremlin has denied any involvement with the Agency.

Mission-Impossible: Putin will Disavow any Knowledge of your 

Actions if Caught

It is now clear that in Crimea and eastern Ukraine the Kremlin 

used pro-Russian surrogates and Russian Special Forces in masks to take 

territory while disavowing any knowledge of Armed Forces personnel 

taking part. In the meantime, these forces gained control of government 

facilities, broadcasting stations, and political agendas (such as 

demanding referendums). With these assets under guard, any attack on 

them could be deemed as a rationale for Russian forces to intervene in 

order to protect their brethren. Unlike Crimea, the shooting started and 

 

1145 Ibid.

1146 Unattributed author and title, Kommersant Online (The Businessman Online), 18 

August 2015.

1147 Ibid.
392

has continued unabated in eastern Ukraine to the present time, December 

2015, and most likely beyond.

Disavowing the presence of military forces is one way Putin 

protects pro-Russian surrogates or separatists who fall under the use of 

his self-determination concept. Russia is provoking ethnic Russian 

enclaves to mobilize and complain about their treatment from the nations 

beyond Russia’s borders where they now reside. Some of these charges 

have validity, while others appear based purely on trumped up charges 

and activities stirred up by Russian agents sent to the area. Manipulating 

the concept of self-determination to their benefit enables a logical 

rationale for the intervention of Russian forces and the use of 

psychological pressure, such as issuing ultimatums or demanding 

referendums. Pro-Russian citizens served as Russia’s self-developed 

catalyst and pretext for intervention in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 

The newer NATO countries who had been Soviet Republics (the 

Baltic Countries), or Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 

etc.) were worried the most about the self-determination statement, even 

though they had left the Soviet alliance of their own volition. More 

importantly for these new NATO members, surrogate-based trouble does 

not necessarily trigger a response to NATO’s Article 5, the collective 

defense provision. This Russian methodology in Ukraine, if successful 

they fear, may serve as a trial run for future interventions the Kremlin in 

planning. Political subversion may be an old method, but it still works. 

The warning from the Baltics was that Mr. Putin may have them in his 

sights.

While Moscow insists that it has unique rights and privileges to 

protect Russian-speaking populations outside its borders (and special 

rights regarding “historically Russian” territories), it does not. 

International law is quite specific and correct at limiting nations that start 

announcing out of the blue that they have something unique and special 

that other nations apparently do not. The Kremlin, for example, chose to 

violate the United Nation’s Charter’s principles of the equality of all 

states, the sanctity of their territorial integrity, and noninterference by 

outsiders in their internal affairs. Further, Russia DEMANDED of 

Ukraine that it postpone planned May elections, change its constitution 
393

to provide for regional autonomy, make Russian the second official 

language of Ukraine, and ban certain nationalist political parties. Finally 

Russia said Ukraine must become a non-allied state, much like a term the 

Soviet Union placed on Finland during the Cold War.1148

To obtain these and other goals that work to the Kremlin’s 

benefit, Russia at times has simply changed its constitution on a whim—

be it to develop new terms of office for its former president or to 

abandon older treaties to which it was bound, as in Ukraine. Russia’s 

leaders have become more cavalier at ignoring international and 

domestic law and taking matters into their own hands. In the case of 

Ukraine several laws were broken. Initially the laws were the 1994 

Budapest Memorandum and the agreement between Russia and Ukraine 

regarding the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet’s arrangement to maintain 

a presence in Crimea. Once Russian troops removed their insignia and 

then continuously denied that its forces were even engaged in Crimean 

operations (which Putin eventually admitted), they had violated the 

Geneva Conventions. While this may enhance Russia’s domestic image 

in the short term, it will damage its credibility elsewhere in the long 

term. Russia also had to deal with the fact that former Ukrainian 

President Viktor Yanukovych was in many ways responsible for the 

conflict in Kiev, since it was his law in mid-January banning peaceful 

protests and outlawing opposition group activities that may have been 

the straw that broke the camel’s back and caused the protestor backlash. 

Breaking laws or imposing them can introduce unintended 

consequences. 

Main Developments in 2014

A temporary ceasefire took hold in eastern Ukraine after a 

confrontation that lasted several months. In July Ukrainian troops 

captured Kramatosk and Sloviansk and some pro-Russian equipment as 

well. Donetsk was surrounded and there were complaints of cross border 

shelling from Russia into Ukraine. The biggest development of this 

 

1148 David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “The Outlaw Vladimir Putin,” The Wall 

Street Journal, 9 April 2014, p. A15.
394

month, of course, was the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. 

Russia still blames the tragedy on Ukrainian troops in spite of the 

conclusions of numerous international investigators to the contrary. 

From the very outset, even before it was clear what airliner had been 

destroyed, Ukrainian troops had communication intercepts of proRussian rebels bragging about downing an aircraft (they thought it was a 

Ukrainian transport plane) within minutes of the planes destruction. 

In August Russia changed the correlation of forces in the area 

significantly, supplying its own forces and armor to the conflict region. 

This enabled pro-Russian rebels, surrounded or on the defensive, to 

conduct a counter-offensive and, along with Russian forces, retake some 

territory. The apparent goal of this development was to take Mariupol 

along the Black Sea coast, thereby further developing a corridor from 

Russia to Crimea. The effort stalled and, by early September, a ceasefire 

was discussed. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Minsk 

protocols on 5 September 2014. It has held, but has witnessed numerous 

occasional breaks with shelling and casualties reported by both sides. 

There are reports that over 1000 combatants perished from September to 

New Year’s Day 2015, in spite of the ceasefire, bringing the number of 

deaths to more than 4000. Further, the Russian air force has on numerous 

occasions begun violating the airspace of Baltic countries. As a result, 

the entire region bordering Ukraine remains on edge and off-balance, 

while Russia continues to build up its forces along the Ukrainian-Russian 

border and in Crimea. In this regard, Russia has retained its ability to 

strike at a time and place of its choosing. 

Sanctions imposed by the West on Russia have had some effect, 

but it is uncertain to what extent. Some government sources have warned 

that a recession is possible in 2015. However President Putin has

retained his immense popularity among his domestic population and 

among Russian citizens living abroad. Putin continued to use the 

sanctions as a way to point out that the US and European Union are out 

to encircle Russia and limit the nation’s ability to rightfully protect its 

citizens abroad and allow them (as Russia did in Crimea) to vote

(without international monitors) for independence. Putin continues to 

point out that the threat has returned to Russia’s borders, ignoring the 

fact that it was he who created it. The cause and effect issue was of his 
395

making and resulted in the unintended consequences he is now facing. 

The West must also, however, ask whether the return of the threat has 

furthered Putin’s agenda. 

Meanwhile, Putin’s actions have resulted in increased defense 

spending by its neighbors, promises from NATO to fulfill Article 5 

(protect its member states) in case of a conflict with Russia, and a 

Ukrainian resolution to no longer NOT consider EU or NATO 

membership.1149 In a 2014 year-end review The Economist wrote that 

Putin has a sense of exploitation, resentment, jealousy, and hostility 

toward the West. These emotions serve his concept of Russia’s 

existential struggle for survival. Russia is the victim in Putin’s narrative, 

and a staunch defender of its interests and values from US influence. 

Putin stated that “it was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chersonesus or 

Korsun, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized before bringing 

Christianity to Rus.”1150 In this way, Crimea has “invaluable 

civilizational and even sacred importance for Russia.”1151

Further, Russia’s military incursion into Ukraine resulted in three 

issues of note in 2014: first, Russia created an operational bridgehead in 

Crimea (explained in detail below) with multiple force contingents 

(strategic weapons, special forces, unmanned aerial vehicles, fighter jets, 

etc.) from which Russia could potentially expand operations quickly into 

Mariupol, Odessa, or Transdniester; second, a temporary cease fire was 

developed in the eastern part of Ukraine where Putin can buy time and 

keep neighbors on edge and off-balance. Russia appears to favor frozen 

conflicts; and third, Russian nationalists could point to a renewed Cold 

War threat from NATO, wherein military reforms and modernization 

could find easy Duma funding to confront the threat that Putin had 

created. These reforms were further assisted through an extensive 

 

1149 On 14 August 2015 Russia’s Interfax news service reported that if Ukraine held a 

referendum regarding NATO membership in July 2015, more than half of all 

Ukrainians would vote to join the alliance. The poll did not include the Crimea and 

occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. 

1150 “Putin’s People,” The Economist, 13 December 2014, p. 54.

1151 Ibid.
396

domestic information campaign that told outright lies and exaggerations 

about Ukrainian forces, resulting in strong domestic support for military 

action. With public backing it was easier for President Putin to marshal 

support for the military’s aggressive posture, to include a direct 

intervention into southeastern Ukraine and air violations of the 

sovereignty of several Baltic nations.

Of contextual importance is that at no time did Ukraine threaten 

Russia with military force. President Petro Poroshenko’s forces have 

never moved beyond its borders. In fact, Ukraine had drawn down its 

Armed Forces over the years since the USSR’s dissolution to the point 

that they were so weak that they had practically no military power to 

affect a situation when Maidan erupted. Equipment was out of date, 

troops weren’t trained well, and most of its force was in the western part 

of Ukraine. The Ukrainian forces in Crimea did not put up any 

resistance. Russia was the aggressor on all counts in a peacetime 

situation. There were also many “sympathizers” working on behalf of 

Russia in Ukraine in the winter of 2014. After Yanukovych fled to 

Russia, several hundred former high ranking officials also fled there, 

offering additional proof of Putin’s inside knowledge of Ukraine’s inner 

workings. 

Thus, as 2014 drew to a close, two issues emerged for Russian 

analysts to consider, Russia’s newly published military doctrine and 

Russia’s establishment of a military bridgehead in Crimea. Many of the 

dangers and threats that evolved in 2014 that resulted in the publication 

of a new military doctrine seem to have been the result of several 

“unintended consequences” from Russian actions in Ukraine, such as 

NATO’s increased activity in neighboring nations. Russia’s reaction to 

this “new reality” is reflected in several places of the doctrine. 

2014 Military Doctrine

Russian leaders had talked about the need for a new military 

doctrine for some time, and the events in Ukraine and their outcome 

seemed to underscore this need. At the end of 2014 the doctrine was 

published, replacing the 2010 version. The document’s conclusion noted 

that: 
397

The provisions of the Military Doctrine may be updated 

with the changing nature of military dangers and military 

threats, of tasks in the fields of defense and security, and 

in the conditions for the development of the Russian 

Federation.1152

Putin signed the military’s new doctrine on 26 December 2014. It 

followed the basic format of the 2010 doctrine, but added several new 

and provocative items. Paragraph five of the doctrine noted that military 

measures would only be used after the exhaustion of other possibilities 

(political, diplomatic, etc.). This did not take place with regard to

Ukraine, since military measures were introduced immediately when 

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country. There was no 

negotiation before Russian forces entered Crimea. Putin’s strong arm 

tactics to induce Yanukovych to follow him and not the European Union 

failed, and Putin acted with impunity. 

Paragraph eleven notes that “The existing international security 

architecture does not ensure equal security of all states.” The 

international architecture clearly failed Ukraine. Russia gave little 

passing thought to Ukraine’s equal security, having violated it with 

disregard and later demonstrating that it would use force to resolve the 

issue. Ukraine never threatened Russia.

With regard to external military dangers (paragraph twelve),

many of those present in the new doctrine were Russian induced. 

Russian actions not only encouraged but actually mandated a NATO 

response in the Baltics and elsewhere to Putin’s actions in Crimea and 

Ukraine. NATO was treaty bound to ensure the security of its members 

(who felt threatened by Russian actions in nearby non NATO nations) 

and so it acted accordingly with the deployment of forces. Did Putin 

 

1152 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, President of Russia Website, 26 

December 2014. All other references to paragraphs from the doctrine in this chapter are 

based on this reference. 
398

want this, a recreated threat so that military modernization could be 

further sufficiently funded? 

Internal military dangers (paragraph thirteen) appear based on the 

Russian leadership’s fear that the population might want to disrupt or 

disorganize the country’s social situation. Russia’s leaders have 

continued to direct blame for any type of disruption at the West. The 

political leadership, deemed a kleptocracy by author Karen Dawisha for 

its inherent corruption, does not hold itself responsible for any internal 

unrest, whereas a case could be made that they are to blame for many of 

the nation’s current problems. 

Paragraph fourteen notes that, in regard to main military threats, a 

show of military force during exercises on territories of states contiguous 

with Russia is one type of threat to Putin. Since Ukraine never 

conducted exercises on its border with Russia, Putin’s military is clearly 

referring to NATO’s buildup on Russia’s borders, a build-up which was 

“Putin-induced.” The military doctrine ignores Russia’s own buildup and 

numerous exercises along on Ukraine’s border and later violations of that 

marker. 

Paragraph twenty-one discusses the use of non-military methods 

to neutralize military dangers and threats, yet Russia did just the 

opposite, intervening with military methods. Paragraph twenty-three 

indicates that the decision to employ the Armed Forces was in fact 

President Putin’s, who is designated that power in peacetime.

Paragraph twenty-two noted that the Armed Forces can be used 

to protect Russian citizens outside the Russian Federation “in accordance 

with generally recognized principles and rules of international law.” This 

paragraph represents an interesting contradiction in Russia’s military 

doctrine. Russia is willing to point out this provision when it believes its 

citizens are at risk. On the other hand, it is unwilling to abide by this and 

other principles and rules located in the new doctrine when someone 

else’s citizens, security, and territory are at risk. Russia’s decision 

makers pick and choose ways to implement the doctrine, and they have a 

very different cause and effect rationale to explain why military dangers 

arise. 
399

The Crimean Bridgehead

With regard to Crimea, a strategic bridgehead has been 

constructed that is brimming with military equipment, one that according 

to Russia’s leaders potentially could include nuclear weapons. The 

following recommendations and buildup are suggested or underway by 

Russia’s defense and foreign affairs departments with regard to Crimea:

1. Russia proposed negotiations with Turkey regarding 

the possibility of closing the Bosporus and Dardanelle 

straits for ships of non-Black Sea states in accordance 

with their understanding of the Montreux Convention. 

Russia is worried that the US naval forces will try to 

attain access to the area and threaten Russian forces 

there.

2. Drones, based in Crimea, have violated Ukrainian 

airspace and continue to monitor the latter’s forces.1153

On 25 December Russia reported about the 

deployment of the Orlan-10 drone system to Crimea, 

which can fly for eight hours and up to a distance of 

150 km.1154

3. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that,

since Crimea is part of a state which possesses nuclear 

weapons, it can “use its legitimate nuclear arsenal in 

accordance with its interests.”1155 That is, nuclear 

weapons could be placed in Crimea.

4. A fighter regiment was established in Crimea on 26 

November, according to a report from Interfax. 

Fourteen fighters (modern Su-27SM and Su-30s) were 

welcomed to the Belbek airfield.1156 It is thought that 

 

1153 Kiev UNIAN, 14 December 2014.

1154 Yuriy Bogomolov, “For the Combat Readiness of the Highest Limits: They Can 

See Everything from Above,” Flag Rodiny (Flag of the Motherland), 25 December 

2014.

1155 Interfax, 15 December 2014.

1156 Interfax (in English), 26 November 2014.
400

24 combat aircraft and six combat training aircraft 

will be at Belbek.1157

5. An air defense system with long-range S-300PMU 

and close-range Pantsir systems are now in

Crimea.1158

6. Troops on the Crimean Peninsula include the 501st

Separate Naval Infantry Battalion at Feodosiya; the 

810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade and the 1096th

Air Defense Missile Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet 

at Sevastopol, as well as the 126th Separate Coastal 

Defense Brigade and the 8th Artillery Regiment.1159

7. Russia does not rule out the placement of artillery and 

missile (in particular, Iskander-M) systems in Crimea 

as part of an asymmetrical response to any 

deployment of American missile defense systems in 

Europe, such as in Romania and Poland.1160 ICBMs 

are ruled out.1161

8. The Black Sea Fleet is to be reinforced with a 

submarine (the Novorossiysk, while a second sub, the 

Rostov-na-Donu, undergoes operational trials at the 

moment; a total of six subs are expected) and a patrol 

frigate (the Admiral Grigorovich) in the May-June 

2015 timeframe. Under a federally targeted program 

the Black Sea Fleet is to receive 30 new warships and 

auxiliary ships.1162

 

1157 Ivan Petrov, “On Course for the Arctic: Northern Fleet to be Removed from the 

Western Military District Subordination,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News 

Online), 27 November 2014.

1158 “A Full-Scale Air Defense System Has Been Created in Crimea,” RIA Novosti (RIA 

News), 29 October 2014.

1159 Petrov.

1160 Vladimir Mukhin, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Draw Near to NATO. Positions for 

Iskanders Ready Not Only in the Baltic and Belarus, but Also in the Crimea,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online (Independent News Online), 17 December 2014.

1161 Interfax (in English), 16 December 2014.

1162 Yuliya Krymova, “Black Sea Fleet to be Reinforced with Submarine and Patrol 

Frigate,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 1 December 2014.
401

9. On 18 December the Black Sea Fleet’s Command and 

Control Center’s territorial structures were placed on 

alert duty in the Russian Federation National Defense 

Command and Control Center’s Joint System. The 

Fleet is now part of a system of similar centers created 

throughout the Armed Forces. All centers can support 

decision-making at a moment’s notice and become 

factors in strategic deterrence, while monitoring naval

activities worldwide.1163

10. In late December it was publicized that an 

independent submarine brigade was to be part of 

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.1164 Further, as of 21 

December, the Crimean Naval Base was restored and 

became operational. It is located at Sevastopol along 

with a separate missile brigade of coastal troops. The 

126th separate coastal defense brigade is located at 

Perevalnyy.1165

11. It is planned to modernize the Dnepr radar station, 

located in Sevastopol, which will be part of the 

missile attack early warning system and work with the 

space monitoring system. The Russian Black Sea 

Fleet also has the Podsolnukh short-range radar, 

which can detect targets up to 450 kilometers 

away.1166

12. A group of forces have been created in Crimea in 

accordance with the strength limits stipulated by 

Russia’s treaty obligations.1167 This increase in troops 

 

1163 Vladimir Pasyakin, “At the Highest Level of Coordination,” Flag Rodiny (Flag of 

the Motherland), 20 December 2014.

1164 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2014.

1165 TASS, 21 December 2014.

1166 Sergey Vinnik, “They are Modernizing the Dnepr Radar in the Republic of 

Crimea,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 22 December 2014.

1167 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2014.
402

included seven armed forces commands and eight

military units.1168

This Russian buildup in Crimea is especially noteworthy since, in 

December, Ukraine’s ICTV reported on the seizure of secret documents 

that “prove” rebels are planning to stage provocations to destabilize the 

southeastern regions and seize the sea port of Odessa. Protests conducted 

by trained militants, pro-Russian activists, and criminals are expected, 

according to the documents. They state that a total of 600 protesters plan

to seize the port and hold it until Russia’s armed forces in Crimea 

arrive.1169 Such a plan may have been considered unfeasible in the past 

but, in light of the manner in which separatist militias took over eastern 

Ukraine and declared “people’s republics,” the plan has not only more 

credibility but probability, especially in light of the buildup in Crimea.

Positioning forces there will help ensure a quick takeover of Odessa and 

the ability to move into Transdniester with speed and efficiency if such a 

decision is made.

2015: More Fighting, a Ceasefire, and Crimea’s Buildup Continues

In early 2015 the fighting for the airport in Donetsk ended, which 

had been raging for eight months. It fell to the separatists on 22 January. 

Meanwhile a new front line was established, with the separatists pushing 

the Ukrainian armed forces back to the west. Ukrainian President Petro 

Poroshenko believes up to 9,000 Russian troops are in eastern Ukraine 

supporting the separatists, which is part of Putin’s new reality that is 

denied daily by the Kremlin. In addition Russia is conducting exercises 

in Southern Russia and in Kaliningrad, putting additional stress on 

countries in the region. No one is quite sure what Putin is up to. On 31 

January, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Rozmaznin was warned by 

Russian General Alexander Vyaznikov, with whom he was working at 

the “joint center for coordination and control,” that he needed to move 

from the joint location where they were both monitoring the 

implementation of the September cease-fire. That is, Vyaznikov was 

 

1168 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2014.

1169 Kiev ICTV, 11 December 2014.
403

aware that the separatists were planning an operation that would threaten 

the center.1170

In early February separatist attention was focused on taking 

Debaltseve, which has rail links connecting the region. Another goal 

appears to be to take Avdeyevka, just to the southwest of Debaltseve; 

and Schastye, to the northeast of Debaltseve. The latter two cities have 

important power infrastructure. It is unclear if the separatists’ plan is to 

connect these three cities, but if they did, they would be able to establish 

a front of sorts in the northern section of their Donbas region 

protectorate. By March 2015 separatist forces had taken most of the 

sector of eastern Ukraine just as a ceasefire went into effect, finalized 

when separatists acquired the rail station at Debaltseve. Putin [cynically] 

said of the Ukrainian army’s defeat there that “it is always a hardship 

when you lose to yesterday’s miners or tractor drivers.”1171

From March through August there has been an uneasy truce at 

the line of contact. Uneasy because there were reports of shelling from 

both sides throughout the time period. 

General Rozmaznin, mentioned above, presents the conflict as “a 

sort of civilizational battle” stating further that “Europe should 

understand that Ukraine stands on the frontier defending democracy and 

European Values...That is what we’re defending. If we surrender, I have 

no doubt that the Baltics will be next.”1172 New York Times editorialist 

Thomas Friedman went further, terming Putin’s use of soldiers without 

insignia that are bought and paid by Moscow as the ugliest geopolitical 

mugging in the world today. Putin’s moves are disguised as a web of lies

at which Nazi propagandists would blush. Ukraine matters, Friedman 

 

1170 Paul Sonne, “A Russians Retreat Foreshadows Rebel Advance,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 31 January-1 February 2015, pp. A1, A7.

1171 James Marson, “Separatist Advances Imperil Ukraine Truce,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 18 February 2015, p. A11.

1172 Sonne, p. A7.
404

writes, more than ISIS, since its government and Parliament share our 

values. If Putin gets his way, everyone will be in danger.1173

The ceasefire period that took place after the Ukrainian surrender 

of Debaltseve up to the present time is reminiscent of the earlier 

ceasefire period from September 2014 to January 2015. It has been 

frequently interrupted by indirect fire from both sides as well as the 

preparation of offensive maneuvers. Both sides have continued to 

prepare laws and agreements that are favorable to the side offering the 

plan. That is, both sides continue to abide by the February 12 Minsk II 

agreements in their own way. The separatists continue to assert that they 

desire local elections under their control, while Kiev wants to administer 

local elections that are monitored by the international community. On 

occasion there appears to be links between separatist offensive 

operations and their advancement of proposals, as if the threat of the 

offensive will more easily bring Kiev to the negotiating table. Each side 

is blaming the other for the potential collapse of the Minsk agreements 

weeks ahead of such a potentiality. Meanwhile indirect fire exchanges 

continue to accelerate and violations are reported on both sides, with 

each accusing the other of breaking the ceasefire and not removing 

heavy equipment from the frontlines. It will be worth following to see if 

a strong propaganda narrative will be developed to enhance an attack by 

Russian-backed separatists.

By August Foreign Minster Sergey Lavrov was stating his alarm 

about developments between Ukraine and the separatists. He noted on 17 

August that it appeared the Ukrainian army was prepared for more 

military action. He noted that it was more appropriate now to talk about a 

front line than a contact line. He stated that the militia (separatists) took a 

unilateral position and withdrew weapons to a distance of three km from 

the contact line but Ukraine did not.1174 Separatist leader Denis Pushilin, 

a senior Donetsk People’s Republic defense official, noted that steps 

 

1173 Thomas Friedman, “Ukraine Matters, So West Must Not Waver,” The Kansas City 

Star, 30 January 2015, p. A13.

1174 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.
405

need to be taken to reduce tensions in Donbas, namely having more

OSCE monitoring involvement, checking the removal of weapons with a 

caliber over 120 mm, and signing a document regarding the removal of 

weapons with a caliber less than 100mm. Pushilin added that “once these 

weapons are removed, we will effectively record a cessation of 

hostilities.”1175 On the same day the Ukrainian army claimed 148 attacks 

on its position in Donbas. There were 17 artillery attacks, 59 mortar 

attacks, 13 rocket launcher attacks, and 70 attacks by small arms and 

grenade launchers.1176 So the beat goes on.

Then, in September, Russia began military operations in Syria. 

Ever since then, eastern Ukraine has been on edge but no extensive 

damage or outrage has occurred. Russian analysts indicate the Kremlin’s 

attention will return to Ukraine in due time. For the moment, it is much 

more important to confront ISIS’s potential threat to Russia’s underbelly 

and to support the Syrian army. Putin does not want the Syrian military 

to dissolve as happened to the Iraqi military after the US intervention 

over a decade ago.

Conclusions

To view Russia’s actions against Ukraine requires an 

understanding of the context within which Russia operated and the 

rationale behind the actions which the nation’s leaders eventually took. 

The following list is indicative of some of the factors that affected 

decision-making:

 NATO moving closer to Russia’s borders

 Use of surrogates and separatists

 Ukraine as the historic soul of Russia

 Use of reflexive control measures

 Requirement to control information output

 Development of Putin’s new reality 

 Putin’s personality

 

1175 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.

1176 Interfax (in English), 17 August 2015.
406

 Russian expenditures on armed forces reforms

 Perception of external threats to Russia

 Russian logic/strategic thought

 Predispositions against encirclement

 Risk assessment

 Energy issues

Putin has justified his annexation of Crimea by stating that Russia 

viewed that territory as sacred ground. His actions were based on his 

version of a new reality, one in which Russia can reclaim territories that 

were, in his mind, illegally taken away. Part of this new reality was his

unintentional (or so it seemed!) recreation of external threats, which 

were not present to such a degree before his actions in Crimea. His only 

allies have become these so-called self-declared territories. Perhaps, as 

one journalist noted, he will soon announce that the self-declared 

Donetsk and Luhansk republics seized by pro-Russian separatists are his 

latest allies.1177

One of Putin’s former advisors, Andrey Illarionov, stressed that 

Putin’s aggression must be punished. If it is not, it will continue. Further, 

Illarionov stated that a plan to take Crimea and Ukraine had been 

prepared ten years ago, and that it was leaked in a journal in 2008. 

According to his account, the first time that Russia considered annexing 

Crimea was during the Orange Revolution of 2004 but Russian forces 

were not ready to act in time. The second time was in 2010, when it 

appeared Yulia Timoshenko would be elected president. That did not 

happen and the plan was suspended as Yanukovych, who was loyal to 

Russia, was elected. The next intervention was planned for the 2015 

elections but the Maidan events forced a quicker response from Putin. He 

saw an opening and took it.1178

 

1177 Alexander Golts, Moscow Times Online (in English), 15 December 2014.

1178 Alvydas Ziabkus, “Andrei Ilarionov: West Does Not Notice War That is Starting,” 

Vilnius Irytas.It, 25 September 2014.
407

Illarionov noted two other things: that Putin explained his 

rationale (his “right”) for retaking Ukraine to former US President 

George Bush; and that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy confirmed the plan in an 

interview with the German publication Bild. Today, the Kremlin’s 

weapon is a focused reliance on information, which translates to 

fabricated facts which are often completely made up and thus impossible 

to verify.1179 Journalists and leaders end up chasing their tails as a result. 

Finally, Illarionov stated that Russia recently passed a law which allows 

it to use military force to defend the interests of four types of compatriots 

outside of Russia: ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking people regardless 

of nationality, all former Soviet Union citizens and their descendants, 

and residents of the former Russian empire. Further, he stated that Putin 

has divided the world into two parts: the Anglo-Saxon world against 

Russia (the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Baltic States, Poland, and 

Romania), and continental Europe, which is inclined to make 

compromises with Russia (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain).1180

It thus appears that after a few successes in Chechnya and 

Georgia, combined with a slow return to normalcy in the country and an 

examination of the cards he had to play in Crimea, Putin gained a second 

wind that has enabled him to overcome earlier career humiliations. The 

success of the winter Olympics in Sochi solidified this feeling, which 

was temporarily ruined with the fleeing of Ukrainian President 

Yanukovych to Russia. 

Putin has righted part of his perceived geopolitical wrong (the 

collapse of the USSR) quickly with his movement into Crimea and 

eastern Ukraine. He is basking in the light of these successes, as the 

recent opinion polls suggest, which note that his popularity in Russia is 

at an all-time high. The fear in the West should be that, based on the 

outcome in Crimea, Putin may be motivated to once again reread his 

favorite nationalist philosophers and reenergize his risk calculations and 

put them in play. 

 

1179 Ibid. 

1180 Ibid.
408

Madeleine Albright, writing about Vladimir Putin in April 2014 

in Time magazine, noted that the leaders of great countries are most 

dangerous when they make up their own facts.1181 Putin’s propaganda 

team has developed a rhetoric that corresponds only to Russia’s 

concocted idea of a new reality that envisions Russia reclaiming lost 

territory and constantly blaming the West for his problems. The facts and 

story line that serve as the rationale behind Russia’s maneuvers in 

Crimea and Ukraine are full of half-truths and outright lies. Neighboring 

countries see through this line of conversation and overt attempt at 

manipulation. They are putting up defenses against it and joining hands 

to create a united front against Russia. 

It is now obvious that Russia is not interested in stabilizing 

Ukraine. It is, in fact, more interested in destabilizing that country. 

Russia was able to buy time through negotiations in Geneva and 

agreeing to terms it knew or suspected it might violate. This tendency 

has continued. Russia, it appears, continues to seek to control eastern 

Ukraine and its industrial output, which is sorely needed by Russia’s 

defense industry. The Kremlin is doing this by creating a chaotic 

information environment in which people grow tired of confrontation 

and disruption and ask only for stability and a return to the status quo. 

The abduction of OSCE inspectors underscored both the intimidation 

and disruptive aspects of this strategy. The storming of the local 

television tower in Donetsk and the switching of its signal to a proKremlin channel was another indicator. The separatist rebellion, 

allegedly supported by the Kremlin, desires to turn Donetsk and other 

cities such as Slovyansk into a sovereign republic within Ukraine. 

Following the Crimean game plan, the separatists are asking for a 

referendum on the Donetsk region, while still denouncing the new 

government in Kiev. 

 

1181 Madeleine Albright, “Vladimir Putin: The Leader Who’s Testing the West,” Time, 

April 2014, p. 103.
409

US responses are focused more on Putin than on the actions of 

the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, which are being left to Kiev to 

handle. US sanctions aim to punish the Kremlin for violating 

international law. Some believe they are aimed at uncoupling Putin from 

the Russian people through economic means, but this is not the primary 

reason. Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken noted recently 

that Putin “had a compact with his people, and the compact is this: I’ll 

deliver economic growth for you if you remain politically compliant.”1182

Growth is becoming more painful after the initial gain of 

acquiring Crimea. The question for the immediate future will be who is 

holding the best cards: Putin’s authoritarian regime that wants to develop 

a new post-Cold War order and ignore the Obama administration’s reset 

option; or the sanctions to be delivered by the West in a united stand 

against Putin. The clock is ticking on the decisions that will alter the 

state of European affairs for some time. In short, as long as a delicate 

balance remains in place, there is still a chance for a negotiated outcome. 

 

1182 Scott Patterson, Colleen McCain Nelson, and Naftali Bendavid, “New Curbs to 

Target Putin’s Inner Circle,” The Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2014, p. A6.
410
411

CONCLUSION
412
413

CHAPTER TEN: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

This book was divided into three sections, addressing Russian 

methods of approaching strategy, future war (focusing on new weapons,

organizations, and theory), and geopolitics (Arctic and Ukraine). All 

three are important to consider when attempting to comprehend the 

vector(s) in which Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. 

The book tried to develop Russia’s traditional military thought along 

with its contemporary utilization. 

Putin 

With regard to Chapter One, “Vladimir Putin: Patriot, Zealot, or 

Threat?” much has been written and much revealed about him over the 

past few years. The following summarizes what was discussed:

 He is a man of convictions, surprises, and risk-taking 

who enjoys pressuring people. He reads situations 

well and gets results but also new problems, since his 

actions often produce unforeseen responses. He 

focuses on regime survival and is beset with worries 

over conspiracies and color revolutions. He is a 

Russian nationalist.

 He has garnered respect and popularity for his policies 

among the majority of the Russian population. He 

supports the church and is a fighter who will not be 

pushed around. He appears to think the West is weak 

and thus asserts himself more now than in the past, 

more often acting with impunity.

 He is an opportunist. When opportunities are present, 

he will take action. His move into Crimea was nothing 

short of brilliant. He considered a host of factors 

working in his favor (a tired US military, German 

support, etc.) and acted, undoubtedly, in lock-step 

with the Federal Security Service (FSB) and military.

In Syria, some think he waited too long. He supported 

Assad for two reasons: his southern border was 

threatened, and he saw the need to save the Syrian 
414

army or face a catastrophe similar to the US fate in 

Iraq when the latter’s armed forces disintegrated. 

 He felt betrayed by the West for the movement of 

NATO countries nearer to his border, which several 

politicians indicated would not happen. This is 

perhaps THE major motivator for his actions against 

the West. He has repeated this theme consistently and 

stated that Russia will no longer, from his perspective, 

be humiliated by broken promises. Supporting the 

West by, for example, allowing logistics to pass 

through Russia and help the West to fight in Iraq 

backfired, from his perspective, in the face of NATO 

expansion.

 He is focused on regime survival, as best witnessed by 

the changing of the Russian constitution so that he 

could take another term as President. As an 

authoritarian leader, he fears coups and color 

revolutions from below or above. He sees conspiracy 

theories everywhere that are aimed to overthrow him. 

Working behind the conspiratorial scene, in Putin’s 

opinion, is the US’s CIA. The West is seen as the 

responsible culprit in most all cases where he has 

problems.

 He has created his own reality, one that relies on 

misinformation and ambiguity and assists in the 

continuation of his agenda. For example, he refuses to 

admit where he has played his hand and failed. The 

pressure he applied to Ukrainian President Victor 

Yanukovych to abandon his decision to side with the 

European Union is a good example, which resulted in 

the Maidan uprising. Putin assisted in the 

development of chaos. 

 He has ordered the rewriting of history books to fit his 

agenda; stressed the need to protect Russians living 

abroad; and is worked behind the scenes to garner 

favor in Ukraine with pro-Russian supporters. More 
415

importantly, he needs to find a way to reenergize the 

economy. 

As 2015 drew to a close, a host of problems were confronting 

Putin. His good friend Sepp Blatter, head of The International Governing 

Body of Football (US soccer, FIFA) organization, who had awarded 

Putin the world cup for 2018, was charged with corruption. Putin 

responded by nominating Blatter for a Nobel Peace Prize. Russian 

athletes were charged with doping and humanitarian groups charged 

Russia with multiple violations of its policy. A Russian plane in Syria 

was blown out of the sky by a Turkish asset and a civilian plane leaving 

Egypt was blown up by a bomb onboard, allegedly placed there by ISIS. 

Sir Robert Owens’s report on the death of Alexander Litvinenko was that 

his assassin’s “probably” acted on Putin’s orders (one of the suspects 

was decorated for his actions, which were not explained). The military is 

involved in multiple conflicts and is seemingly overextended. Putin was 

probably happy to see 2015 end.

Putin described 2015’s events and its difficulties in a December 

meeting with the media, which has become a yearly event. His 

assessment is different from the items discussed above:

 He blamed oil prices for the Russian government’s 

failure to meet its economic forecasts. He tried to 

convince people that the Russian economy has gotten 

through the crisis.

 He sees no prospects for improvement in government 

relations with Turkey, but says he likes Turkish 

people. He said he will not back down and placed an 

S-400 in Syria.

 Russia and the US’s position on Syria largely 

coincide, he noted. But no one from the outside 

should be allowed to impose on a country who their 

ruler should be. To settle Syria, joint work needs to be 

done to draw up a constitution; and a transparent 

mechanism of control over future elections that 

everyone would trust must be established. Putin said 
416

he will support the offensive of the Syrian Army for 

as long as the Syrian Army is conducting it.

 Putin said Russia is not interested in an escalation of 

the fighting in Ukraine. He said Ukraine is 

manipulating the Minsk agreements to their benefit 

and for that reason the agreement hasn’t been 

implemented, which Russia wants.

 He said the appointment of former Georgian President 

Mikahil Saskashvili to key posts in Ukraine is like 

spitting in the face of the Ukrainian people. Out of 45 

million people, there is no one better than him, he 

asks?

 Russia and Ukraine should have an “all for all” 

prisoner exchange.

 Russia, he said, is not planning to introduce sanctions 

against Ukraine but it will lose its free trade zone 

benefits as of 1 January and will have to pay tariffs.

 The Georgian war is the fault of Georgia and 

Saakashvili, historical guilt is on their side entirely 

and completely. Russia is ready to improve relations.

 With regard to FIFA, no country has the right to 

extend its jurisdiction to other states. It was improper 

to bring officials to the USA. We should wait to see 

the outcome of the investigation. Blatter deserves a 

Nobel Prize for all the good work he has done.

 Putin said he is ready to work with any new US 

president.

 He does not know if there is a need for a Russian 

military base in Syria.

 He is against doping and wants it to be stopped.

 Putin was asked if a dangerous second generation of 

elite corruption has grown up. Igor Rotenberg, son of 

a Putin associate, has collected the new levy on 

vehicles over 12 tons driving around Moscow (and no 

one appears to know how it is being spent); Pskov 

governor Turchak was accused of involvement in 

beating up journalist Oleg Kashin; and Russian 
417

Prosecutor-General Chayka’s family has been accused 

of corruption. He played down the significance of 

these allegations, and said on one occasion that he 

didn’t want to talk about any of these charges but that 

didn’t mean the regime wasn’t working on it.

 Russia will have to raise the retirement age as people 

are living longer and exhausting the pension system.

 He does not see the Saudi Arabia-led coalition against 

ISIL as “anti-Russian.” But he asks whether another 

alliance is really needed?

 He is for the exposure and punishment of those who 

murdered Nemtsov. A stable political system inside 

Russia is more important than protecting someone.

 He said falling oil prices will not affect the 2020 State 

Armaments Program.1183

But that was in December. Earlier, on 3 July 2015, Putin stated 

that he had recently requested a new analysis of the range of challenges 

and risks (political, economic, information, etc.) before Russia and, on 

that basis, would make adjustments to Russia’s national security strategy

(NSS). Clarifications, if the need arose, would be incorporated into 

Russia’s foreign policy plans. Cooperation with other nations was 

available “on an equal footing” and collective action was possible on key 

items on the international agenda.1184 (See next section for his NSS 

input.)

With such input it is clear that Putin has the final word on all 

important decisions in the foreign policy and especially the national 

security agenda of Russia. He harnesses a host of inputs, from 

geopolitical, reflexive control (RC), and deterrence specialists to 

nationalist philosophers who shape his thinking and the policies that will 

form his response to future security environments. His policies are 

aggressive and focused on reinstating the territory that existed during the 

 

1183 Rossiya 1 TV (Russia 1 TV), 17 December 2016.

1184 Rossiya 24 TV (Russia 24 TV), 3 July 2015.
418

Soviet era, which has resulted in NATO countries strengthening their 

borders against potential Russian incursions. For every action there is an 

opposite and equal reaction as Putin is finding out. Europe represented a 

somewhat stable aspect of his international environment in comparison 

to his immediate south, but he failed to see it that way. 

He cites the requirement for equal security, which means 

matching the West system for system in order to guarantee Russian 

security and sovereignty, while at times using his rationale to ignore 

standard international laws of behavior. With the serious threat to his 

south in the form of the Islamic State and the Taliban, one would think 

that he would embrace European security structures as a reliable 

architect of stability and even assistance. 

The changes to the international situation have seriously hurt the 

Russian budgetary process. The sanctions imposed by the West have hurt 

the economy but perhaps not as bad as the drastic drop in oil prices. Still, 

Putin has not backed off and has continued to support all of the major 

military development programs he initiated. Meanwhile the ruble 

continues to fall and people are becoming more and more dissatisfied. 

What does it all mean for Putin? First, it means that he is now 

experiencing the blowback from policies that he has implemented over 

the past three years. The economy is in worse shape than at the start of 

the year, corruption charges are mounting against members of his 

regime, and his popularity will undoubtedly take some hits soon if the 

situation doesn’t change. Second, Putin is a fighter who refuses to back 

off, one who acts with impunity. However, he must be seen as well as a 

chameleon who can change colors to fit the situation. He will adapt and 

move the nation forward, but he may have to accept more cooperation 

with the West in order to do so. That will be hard for him to do, but 

expect him to take advantage of President Barrack Obama’s lame-duck 

situation. He and his staff will innovate and develop new methods of 

attack or influence options in 2016, both nonmilitary and military.

Strategy

With regard to Chapter Two, “Russian Military Strategy,” the 

focus was on the continuity of Russian military thought over the years, a 
419

contention very few analysts seem to be making these days. Russia’s 

military leaders continue to rely on the heritage of great theorists such as 

Alexander Suvorv and A. A. Svechin. General Valery Gerasimov, chief 

of the Russian General Staff, made this point clear in 2013. He used 

Svechin’s thoughts to note that each conflict has a logic all its own, and 

this has clearly been the case in each recent conflict in which Russia has 

been involved. 

As one looks over the course of several decades Russian strategic 

thought uses many of the same devices to develop strategy. They are 

excellent at forecasting the operational environment, taking a hard look 

at the many factors that compose what a Marxist refers to as objective 

reality. This examination makes up the essence of an overall assessment 

of the correlation of forces (COF), which compares various elements of 

reality and then a decision is made as to where advantages (and 

opportunities) lie. NATO now is approaching 300 tanks and armored 

personnel carriers in countries bordering on the Russian Federation, 

according to Russian sources. This is enough for a full division.1185 This 

announcement was followed, as might be expected, by a statement that 

the Western Military District had been improved with the addition of 

three divisions of equipment. Thus, the COF then was placed at 3:1 in 

favor of the Russians. Further, the former head of the Main Operations 

Directorate of the General Staff, General-Lieutenant A. V. Kartapalov, 

was removed from that position and given the command of the Western 

Military District, which faces the Baltics. If there is a war, a wellqualified officer is now in charge of the area.

During the course of the past two years, Russian involvement in 

several conflicts has caused it to dramatically reassess its doctrine and 

strategy. It is hard to remember if there has ever been a time of such 

overhaul. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2009 was followed by 

 

1185 Vladimir Mukhin, “Tanks Will Add Strike Power to General Shamanov’s Landing 

Force. Russia May Relocate Heavy Combat Equipment to the Western Sector in 

Response to the Creation of NATO Mobile Forces,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online 

(Independent News Online), 12 January 2016.
420

new military doctrines in 2010 and 2014 and even a new naval doctrine 

in 2014. Then, in December 2015 a new NSS was produced, and a few 

days later Russian military officials stated that a new military doctrine 

might be necessary. There is a planned February 2016 release of a new 

information security doctrine. The scale of doctrinal and policy 

developments in such a short period of time appears to be unprecedented.

Putin first mentioned that a new NSS was under development in 

July 2015. Nowhere in the document is the term strategy actually 

defined, so its definition is left to the discretion of the reader. However, 

the document itself was defined as “the basic strategic planning 

document defining the Russian Federation's national interests and 

strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the sphere 

of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian 

Federation's national security and ensuring the country's sustainable 

development in the long term.”

1186 It consolidates the efforts of the 

organs of state power, and it is the basis for the shaping and 

implementation of state policy. 

There were three items of special interest in the NSS. First, the 

Strategy used the term struggle on two occasions, but the sentences 

containing the word may be some of the most important in the document. 

Struggle indicates an active confrontation among various factors for 

control, where east meets west, and is an area that the West should 

consider to remain as a point of contention. There is a struggle 

underway, the Strategy notes, for resources, access to markets, and 

control over transportation arteries. This is a clear reference to the Arctic 

as a primary focus of attention. There is also a struggle for influence in 

the international arena, which includes the use of political, financialeconomic, and information instruments. Included in the discussion was a 

section on “indicators for evaluating the state of national security,” 

factors that will purportedly allow Russian security officials to know if 

 

1186 “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy,” President of Russia

Website, 31 December 2015.
421

and to what extent the Strategy is being fulfilled and implemented.

1187 To 

a certain degree, this resembles the US concept of measures of 

effectiveness.

Second, the document defined Russia’s national security as: 

The state of protection of the individual, society, and the 

state against internal and external threats in the process of 

which the exercise of the constitutional rights and 

freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation 

(hereinafter citizens), a decent quality of life and standard 

of living for them, sovereignty, independence, state and 

territorial integrity, and sustainable socioeconomic 

development of the Russian Federation are ensured. 

National security includes the country's defense and all 

types of security envisioned by the Russian Federation 

Constitution and Russian Federation legislation—

primarily state, public, informational, environmental, 

economic, transportation, and energy security and 

individual security.

1188

Third, the Russian Federation’s objective is defined in the 

document as the attempt to acquire as many equal partners as possible in 

various parts of the world. Perhaps this is an effort to offset today’s or 

tomorrow’s sanctions. Goals include national defense goals, which are 

defined as the creation of conditions to develop and ensure military 

security. Goals are achieved by implementing military policy through 

strategic deterrence, preventing armed conflict, improving military 

organizations and forms and methods for armed force deployments, and 

increasing mobilization readiness according to the document. Strategic 

deterrence is the result of the interrelated political, military, militarytechnical, diplomatic, economic, information, and other measures, such 

as maintaining the capacity for nuclear deterrence. Strategic interests and 

 

1187 Ibid.

1188 Ibid.
422

priorities, values, and future partners are highlighted as well as numerous 

threats to national security.1189

What does all this mean for people examining Russian strategy? 

It indicates continuity of thought in the Russian military that fuses the 

traditional elements of foresight/forecasting and the correlation of forces 

criteria with modern day indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary 

measures. What becomes important after considering the strategic 

thought behind the many military reforms and new policies/doctrines is 

to predict what Russia plans next. Strategic thought and technological 

advances, pushed by Putin’s desire to reclaim a lost heritage, are driving 

the train for geopolitical advances. Understanding strategy helps unravel 

where and why Putin is or may be acting. Decisions will apparently also 

be based on calculated risk-taking, the use of surprise (reflexive control), 

legal measures, and other cards that Putin can put in play. The advanced 

capabilities of new weaponry and equipment clearly help enable any 

plans that are developed. 

Indirect, Asymmetric, Non-Military

With regard to Chapter Three, “Hybrid or Nonmilitary War:

Which is It?” it is clear that the West has offered a number of theories to 

describe Russian actions. Unfortunately, none reflect correctly what the 

Russians say they are actually doing. Hybrid, ambiguous, new generation 

warfare, non-linear, and other such terms have been used to describe 

Russian actions. In turn, the Russians state that it is the West using these 

methods. For example, Russia states that only the West is employing 

hybrid warfare operations. A recent 2015 article in Military Thought

supported this line of thought. Titled “Hybrid Operations as a New Kind 

of Military Confrontation,” the article begins with the following quote:

Hybrid warfare, a concept that was born and gained 

currency in the West in the early 2010s, is, in the view of 

foreign experts, a new form of combat operations. Hence, 

our first concern is weighing the possibility of hybrid 

 

1189 Ibid.
423

warfare operations being conducted in Russia by forces 

having a vested interest in destabilizing the current 

situation in this country. A hybrid warfare operation is, to 

our mind, an attempt to cut off a part of another country’s 

territory by using a combination of coordinated political, 

diplomatic, information, propaganda, financial, economic, 

and military measures.1190

Clearly the reference is to the West using these operations and not 

Russia. The authors cite (in addition to Special Forces) numerous US 

sources and then label nonprofit organizations, private military 

companies, environmentalists, and other units as organizers or 

implementers of hybrid operations. They sum up the article noting that 

“there is a growing probability that Russian territory can be used as the 

battleground for a hybrid operation conducted peacefully or with the 

force of arms,” again implying that this would be a Western operation on 

Russian soil.1191

Russia’s military (and President Putin) appears to focus on five 

significant threats from their perspective. They are the US’s Prompt 

Global Strike concept; a global ABM system; color revolutions; cyberattacks; and an ISIS threat to the south. In the latter case, the Caucasus 

2016 strategic command-and-staff exercises appear designed to indicate 

the Armed Forces preparedness to defend the country’s southwestern 

sector against an ISIS threat in this territory. There is also a significant 

cross-domain deterrence action that is ongoing. These actions were 

explained in the chapter and are geopolitical (equal security), 

information (Status-6 torpedo), legal (UN declarations of the Foreign 

Ministry), international (keeping friends close by), cyber (attack 

demonstrations), and others. These are significant efforts to contain or 

intimidate opponents.

 

1190 V. A. Kiselyov and I. N. Vorobyov, “Hybrid Operations as a New Kind of 

Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5 2015, pp. 41-48.

1191 Ibid.
424

Reflexive control (RC) is a concept that continues to be discussed 

and used in Russia. Since the term is not widely used in the West, it was 

probably not recognized as being part of the definition of information 

war (IW) that the Russian military used in 2011. In that document, 

Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian 

Federation in Information Space, IW was defined as the ability to, 

among other things, undermine political, economic, and social systems; 

carry out mass psychological campaigns against the population of a state 

in order to destabilize society and the government; and force a state to 

make decisions in the interests of their opponents.1192 The latter phrase 

lines up well with the definition of RC, the idea of someone doing 

something allegedly for his own benefit that, in reality, is of benefit to 

you. The concept of RC has existed much longer than the concepts of IW

and information operations; in fact, it appeared in Soviet military 

literature 30 years ago. At that time, V. A. Lefebvre, who was working 

within the context and logic of a reflexive game, defined reflexive 

control as “a process by which one enemy transmits the reasons or bases 

for making decisions to another.”1193

What does this mean for those studying Russian thought? The 

most important lesson is the necessity to study what Russian military 

theorists are saying about operations and not apply or force templates the 

West or others have developed on Russian actions. Applying the wrong 

template can lead policy and decision-makers in the West to make 

improper calculations and decisions about Russia’s future plans.

Military Reform and Future War

With regard to Chapter Four, “New Technologies and 

Equipment,” a number of new developments were discussed. The 

impetus for reform had been felt ever since the 2008 war with Georgia, 

 

1192 Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 

in Information Space, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2011.

1193 Vladimir E. Lepsky, “Refleksivnoe upravlenie v polisubektnikh i mnogoagentnikh 

sistemakh (Reflexive Control in Multi-object and Multi-agent Systems),” an article 

given to the author, p. 1.
425

when equipment was clearly inadequate for the conduct of future 

conflict. Organizationally, this included the development of science 

companies, new theaters of military operation, a DARPA-like structure, 

a revision of the number and boundaries of the military districts, and the 

transformation of divisions into brigades (and some brigades back into 

divisions); technically, this included the development of numerous types 

of UAVs, new radars, missile complexes, air defense systems, cruise 

missiles, electronic warfare, and recon-strike assets; and doctrinally, this 

included the development in 2014 of a new military doctrine, in 2015 of 

a new naval doctrine, and the assessment that aerospace is the new center 

of gravity. These are not slow times for Russia’s military, especially as it 

develops contingency planning for potential operations in Ukraine, the 

Arctic, Trans-Dniester, and Syria simultaneously—and don’t forget 

Russia’s Southern Border and the constant threat of military action in 

Chechnya.

Technologically, there is great pride attached to the new 

equipment under development. This was most clearly demonstrated at 

the Army Forum 2015 held at Kubinka, an event that had great 

significance for the military and its attempts to foster and nurture interest 

in the Armed Forces. The forum was held at the RF Military-Patriotic 

Recreation Park, which has been created for year-round use. It will have 

three congress-exhibition segments (closed-exhibit areas, pavilions 

covering 45,000 square meters, and open areas of some 120,000 square 

meters). These exhibits will foster international military-technical 

cooperation. Other areas at the park include a zone for re-enacting 

historical events, a military sports zone, a museum zone, and a cultureand-leisure zone. Visitors will be able to experience some applied 

military activities, such as parachute jumps, opportunities to fly in light 

aircraft, and the chance to run a combined-arms obstacle course. People 

will be able to reach events by both railroad and vehicular transport.1194

 

1194 Zleksey Solomin, “Interview with Vyacheslav Presnukhin (Head of the Russian 

Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for Research Activities and Technological 

Support of Advanced Technologies),” Ekho Moskvy Online (Echo Moscow Online), 27 

June 2015. 
426

Financially, the military’s budget has been established but due to 

dropping oil prices it continues to be readjusted. It appeared at one time 

that ground troops would receive only 16 percent of the entire amount of 

the State Armaments Program for 2020. However, the government is 

preparing a Separate Ground Troops Interdepartmental Integrated 

Development Program, which would become a component of the 2025 

State Armaments Program. Ground troop missions continue to include 

covering the main strategic axes and participating in both the 

neutralization of local armed conflicts and peacekeeping operations.1195

In this regard it was noted that 

A Ground Troops grouping already covers the Arctic 

Strategic Access; precisely RF Ground Troops 

representatives did not permit the development of a 

military conflict in the Crimea during the spring of 2014; 

and RF peacekeeping formations are prepared to 

accomplish their designated missions in local conflict 

zones in the Donbass, on the border with Afghanistan, 

and at other hotspots.1196

Russia’s Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

published a long report in April 2015 in regard to the State Armaments 

Program. It noted that in 2012 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin 

stated that defense priorities included automated command and control 

systems, battlefield visualization, robots, modularity, and a good 

electronic component base. Now, some three years later, it is possible to 

list a few of the items that are fulfilling these priorities. They compose, 

to a certain degree, what Russia might consider for its Ground Troops as 

a “Big Five” package of technological advances:

 

1195 Vladimir Mukhin, “Wars and Armies: Battalions are Requesting Super-Weapons: 

The Threat of local Conflicts is Compelling the RF to Accelerate the Adoption of the 

Ground Troops Integrated Development Program,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online

(Independent News Online), 15 May 2015.

1196 Ibid.
427

1. Ratnik: this is an infantry fighting system that 

incorporates weaponry, personal protection, connectivity, 

and other functions. For 2015 and 2016 50,000 sets have 

been ordered. Ratnik-2 sets are being researched for the 

years 2025-2030.1197 Ratnik can reportedly protect up to 

95 percent of a soldier’s body surface from fire and 

shrapnel. Third-generation combat gear is under 

development. It will integrate different biomechanical 

devices, including exoskeletons.1198 To a degree, Ratnik 

covers Rogozin’s desire for robotics and command and 

control.

2. Strelets: this tablet-based reconnaissance system is 

composed of a commander’s personal computer, a 

satellite communications radio, a VHG radio, a rangefinder and angle-measuring device, a Fara-VR portable 

short-range reconnaissance radar, transmission apparatus, 

an IFF system, and systems operating with GLONASS 

and GPS data. It has been incorporated into the Ratnik 

system.1199 It can receive information from drones and 

transfer target coordinates to a command post. It has 

protected radio communications, so speech, images, and 

videos can be transmitted by it. The system is compatible 

with devices using laser range finders and other 

navigation devices. It unites all sensors into one system 

and gives commanders a comprehensive picture from 

which to make decisions.1200 The main purpose of 

Strelets is “its level of immediacy in transmitting 

 

1197 RIA Novosti (RIA News), 8 June 2015.

1198 Anton Valagin, “Russian Military Gear Will Include an Exoskeleton,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 17 June 2015.

1199 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Navigation Device for the Soldier, Tablet for the Commander. 

Troops Being Equipped with New Control and Communications Package,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online (Russian News Online), 23 December 2014. 

1200 Interfax (in English), 25 December 2014.
428

intelligence about the enemy to fire destruction units.”1201

Strelets fits the command and control and visualization 

components of Rogozin’s prioritized list.

3. Krasukha-2/Krasukha-4S/Krasukha-20: There is overlap 

among these three systems. However, their technical 

capabilities are heralded by the military-industrial 

complex as gold, as one of a kind. All of the systems 

analyze signals and have jamming capabilities. They can 

purportedly insert themselves into a long-range radar 

detection system such as an AWACS-type system and 

project virtual targets. Russian inventors state that the

result is that an AWACS-type device can be made to 

attack their own military facilities, since they are made to 

appear hostile to them when penetrated by a Krasukha 

system and they provide virtual targets to the AWACS. 

4. Andromeda-D: this system allows for video conferencing 

with any command and control center. If one channel is 

jammed, communications move to alternate channels. The 

system still requires cables and several trucks.1202 This is 

another command and control item for Rogozin.

5. Platforms: the report of the Center for the Analysis of 

Strategies and Technologies noted in regard to Ground 

Troops that one of the main directions of future 

armaments programs should be the “launch of mass 

purchases of brigade sets of tanks and other vehicles 

based upon the Armata Platform.”1203 Other platforms 

were equally stressed, such as the Kurganets-25 and 

 

1201 Yuriy Belousov, “With One Movement of the Stylus: Latest Reconnaissance-Fire 

System Being Successfully Introduced in Central Military District Troops,” Krasnaya 

Zvezda Online (Red Star Online), 20 January 2015.

1202 Ivan Petrov, “No Blocking or Jamming. Paratroopers’ Communications Move to a 

New Level,” Vechernyaya Moskva Online (Moscow Evening News Online), 6 May 

2015.

1203 Unattributed report, “Russian Federation State Armaments Programs: The Problems 

of Execution and Optimization Potential,” Center for the Analysis of Strategies and 

Technologies, 21 April 2015.
429

Boomerang platforms.1204 Reports indicate that the 

development of remotely controlled combat platforms, 

including platforms using 7.62 mm machine guns, is 

underway.1205 This serious shift in the paradigm for 

developing domestic armored vehicles resembles the 

modularity criteria in Rogozin’s priority list. 

Aerospace 

With regard to Chapter Five, “Aerospace and Strategic Rocket 

Forces,” one officer noted that the center of gravity of future conflicts 

will be the aerospace sphere. It comes as no surprise that the June 2015 

issue of Military Thought, then, contained only articles on aerospace 

topics. A few examples from the nine articles in the issue are “The 

Development of International Cooperation in Missile Attack Warning,” 

“Features of a Modern Methodology for Testing an Aerospace Defense’s 

Armament Systems,” “Substantiating the Requirements for Computer 

Technology Regarding the Means and Systems of Aerospace Defense,” 

and “Basic Problems of Modeling the Systems and Means of Aerospace 

Defense Based on Advanced Information Technologies.”1206 It was noted 

that by 1 August “the headquarters of the Air Force’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th

Air Force and Air Defense commands will be reorganized as the 6th, 14th, 

11th, and 4th Air Force and Air Defense armies respectively.”1207 So far 

there has been no confirmation of this realignment. The Air Defense and 

Missile Defense commands of the Aerospace Defense Troops will 

become an army, and the reorganization of the Long-Range Aviation and 

Military-Transport Aviation Commands into the Supreme High 

Command’s 37th and 61st Air Armies is also being considered.1208

The August announcement that an Aerospace Force (VKS) had 

been created as a response to the US Prompt Global Strike program came 

 

1204 Ibid. 

1205 Rossiya 24 TV (Russian 24 TV), 18 October 2014.

1206 Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2015, Table of Contents.

1207 Unattributed report, “Air Force and Air Defense Armies Will be Created in Russia,” 

Lenta.ru, 2 March 2015.

1208 Ibid.
430

as no surprise, since Russian officers had been speculating on its creation 

for over a year. The VKS combines the Air Force, Air Defense and 

Missile Defense Forces, and the Space Forces, but keeps the Strategic 

Rocket Forces separate. There has been a special focus in the press on 

the latter’s mobile missile launchers (Iskander-M, Barguzin, Sarmat, 

etc.), hypersonic missiles, lasers, weapons based on new physical 

principles (directed energy weapons, etc.), unmanned “sixth-generation” 

fighter jets, and other such weaponry that indicate the primary direction, 

in accordance with the center of gravity concept, that the military is 

moving. For example, with regard to hypersonic weapons, Lieutenant 

General Alexander Leonov of the Ground Force’s Air Defense Troops, 

stated that new-generation air-defense weapons are needed, including 

those based on hypersonic technologies.1209

Future War

With regard to Chapter Six, “Russia Prepares for Future War,” 

there were several developments. Doctrinally, Russia’s forecasting of 

future war has resulted in new military and naval doctrines. Much has 

been written about the 2014 military doctrine, where there is 

consideration regarding how war will appear in the age of technology 

and thus what elements are required of a new force. The 2015 naval 

doctrine, according to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin, has four 

functional areas and six regional areas. The four functional areas are 

naval activity, marine transport, marine science, and mineral resource 

development, and the six regional areas are the Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, 

Antarctica, and Indian Oceans, and the Caspian Sea. The stated reason 

for the doctrine was the increase in Russia’s position as a sea power.1210

As a rising sea power, responsibilities must be laid out and the doctrine 

defines such areas.

In June 2014 the Defense Ministry’s Advanced Interbranch 

Research and Special Projects Directorate listed its own research 

 

1209 Interfax (in English), 28 December 2015.

1210 Unattributed report, “Russian Federation Marine [Naval] Doctrine 26 July 2015, 

Baltiysk,” President of Russia Website (in English), 27 July 2015.
431

priorities, and many appear to be future war projects. They were UAVs, 

EW assets, interbranch and system-wide research to develop military and 

special equipment, unconventional weapons (lasers, microwave, highvelocity kinetic energy, nonlethal, and hypersonic weapons), robotic 

complexes, and special assets. Examples of completed work included the 

following:

 Development of a ramjet engine; onboard precision 

inertial navigation systems based on precision sensors; 

low sensitivity explosives; and radar-transparent heatresistant materials and coatings, which have become the 

basis for creating a hypersonic air-to-surface guided 

cruise missile

 Creation of technologies for the detection, selection, and 

monitoring of the damage to electro-optical equipment 

and thermal damage of missiles equipped with optical 

homing heads in the process of creating an airborne laser 

complex

 Creation of an interbranch artillery system based on an 

electro-thermochemical method of propelling armorpiercing discarding-sabot projectiles with increased 

muzzle velocity and velocity in the interests of creating an 

advanced armored fighting vehicle

 Development of very short-pulse radars based on a solidstate active phased array realizing modes of radio-wave 

imaging of low-signature and slow objects in the interests 

of creating advanced SAM complexes for engaging all 

types of offensive air weapons

 Development of a standard series of UAVs for various 

purposes, as well as a family of domestic internalcombustion engines, power supply systems, composite 
432

radar-transparent materials, and standardized assemblies 

and elements of payload.1211

There are other, more exotic, armament developments that, while 

deployed with the Ground Troops, may or may not be considered 

separate from them, as it depends on who is operating them. In July 2015 

two new UAVs were discussed. The first is the Supercam 300M, 

described as a “flying-wing configuration, a multi-role tactical UAV 

capable of being equipped with various payloads depending on 

requirements, including video, thermal imagers, or cameras.”1212 It is 

launched via a pneumatic catapult. The second is the Granad VA-1200, 

which is undergoing testing in Russia. It is capable of deploying small 

arms. The eight-rotor configuration was first shown at the Army Forum2015 exhibition in June 2015. There are plans for a short-range armed 

variant for special subgroups and structures of the Defense Ministry.1213

Cyber

With regard to Chapter Seven, “Russia’s Digital Prominence,” 

the host of excellent mathematicians and algorithm writers in Russia 

continue to exhibit the development of digital capacities that will enable 

Russia to advance far in the cyber age. A recent article in Military 

Thought described Russia’s expectations regarding future war’s reliance 

on information technologies. Authors S. A. Chekinov and S. A. 

Bogdanov noted the following about the information-technological 

aspect of future war: 

 Information warfare is the starting point of every 

action now called the new type of warfare in which 

broad use will be made of the mass media and 

computer networks (blogs, social sites, etc.) 

 

1211 Sergey Yegorovich Pankov, “Role of Military Technologies in Developing a 

Russian Federation Armed Forces Armament System,” Federalnyy Spravochnik

(Federal Reference Book), 26 June 2014.

1212 Interfax-AVN Online, 23 July 2015.

1213 Interfax-AVN Online, 22 July 2015.
433

 New information techniques, operating in the 

nanosecond format, will be the decisive factor for 

success of military operations. These techniques are 

based on new technologies that may paralyze the 

computer systems that control troops and weapons 

and deprive the enemy of information transmission 

functions. As a result, computers will turn into a 

strategic weapon in future wars 

 Future wars will be launched by electronic warfare 

forces, which will protect friendly forces, block 

foreign propaganda disinformation, and strike at 

enemy EW forces and assets. They will blend with 

strategic operations set off by the armed forces and an 

aerospace operations

 Long-term forecasts predict that strategic goals will 

not be achieved in future wars unless information 

superiority is assured over the enemy 

 Russia must be on the lookout for special operations 

designed to “misinform and mislead the other side’s 

military and political leaders,” which will include 

large-scale measures of new-type wars, including 

actions to influence the behavior of the armed forces 

of the adversary to instigate internal tensions in 

society.1214

While these issues are well documented (see for example APT 28 

in the chapter on cyber issues), there is less written about a Kremlin fear, 

the impact of the cyber age on the thought processes of its citizens. This 

is the information-psychological aspect of future war.

Russia’s leadership worries about the arrival of an indirect 

operation in the form of a “color revolution” in Moscow. The latter is a 

 

1214 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 41-

49.
434

reference to the various revolutions that have taken place in the recent 

past and identified by a color (Rose revolution in Georgia, Orange 

revolution in Ukraine, etc.). Several sources, to include the military, 

write often on the topic. For example, in a February 2014 article in 

Military Industrial Courier Online, Professor Igor Sheremet, Vice 

President of the Academy of Military Sciences, touched on the country’s 

information-psychological security. He composed a separate section on 

cyber threats entitled “New Reality.” The article, which preceded events 

in Ukraine, presented a view of a changing Russia. He further notes that 

the “influence of the information sphere on the individual, group, and 

mass consciousness has grown by several orders of magnitude.”1215 To 

him this means that the Internet is the principal way to influence the 

conscience of individuals, in which Putin’s apparatus appears to see a 

direct threat. There are also a variety of nondirective methods for 

controlling groups and people. As a result, 

A new reality has been created in which objects of the 

global technosphere and anthroposphere find themselves 

subjected to a whole spectrum of threats that did not exist 

earlier, the source of which is the total connectedness of 

the global information infrastructure. Each of its 

addresses has the physical possibility of information 

exchange with every other address.1216

Perhaps for this reason Putin is so intent on controlling not only 

the Internet, but TV as well, especially since the latter is the main way 

Russians get their news. In a later interview, Sheremet returns to the 

issue of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, noting that it is “not a 

lesser danger to our country than all the potential threats in the military 

sphere put together.”1217

 

1215 Igor Sheremet, “Cyber Threats to Russia Grow,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online (Military Industrial Courier Online), 11 February 2014.

1216 Ibid.

1217 Igor Sheremet, Part II of “Cyber Threats to Russia Grow,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military Industrial Courier Online), 19 February 2014.
435

What this means is that Russia’s propaganda must be 

continuously strengthened internally, as the Kremlin must keep it 

citizens away from the influence of international or Western 

organizations offering new ways of thinking. Further, Russia’s cyber 

experts must continue to search out weaknesses that can be exploited in 

other nation’s digital defenses.

The Arctic

With regard to Chapter Eight, “Northern Exposure: Revealing 

Russia’s Arctic Infrastructure Buildup,” four Russian goals for the region 

were highlighted. They are to protect Russian national interests; protect 

the Northern Sea Route that runs over the top portion of the nation; 

protect the area’s potential oil and gas reserves along with mineral 

supplies; and confront the threat of NATO moving closer to its borders. 

The Arctic and Atlantic are two of several focal points of Russia’s naval 

strategy at the moment, but they appear to be the most important. 

The Atlantic is important, since NATO operates almost 

exclusively there. Since Crimea and Sevastopol have been reunited with 

Russia, Russia has strengthened its Black Sea Fleet, and further

strengthening it with Kaliper missiles. According to Admiral Alexander 

Vitko, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the fleet’s area of 

responsibility includes not only the Black Sea, but also the Sea of Azov 

and the entire Mediterranean.1218 Black Sea presence enables movement 

to the Mediterranean, which is Russia’s outlet to the Atlantic.1219

The Arctic is important for the opening of the Northern Sea 

Route and its unhindered access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and 

the riches of the continental shelf. Several NATO countries border the 

Arctic and have territorial claims there as well, which can potentially 

produce additional strains between NATO and Russia in the near future. 

 

1218 Interfax (in English), 23 July 2015.

1219 Ibid.
436

A Moscow Times noted that the 2015 Naval Doctrine envisions 

the Arctic as a key access point to enter the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 

unimpeded by NATO.1220 Also mentioned as new elements of the naval 

doctrine are shipbuilding, state management, and providing for sailor 

social issues.1221

It should be assumed that the strategy under development for the 

Arctic will have a logic all its own. A key component of this strategy 

could be termed the use of the United Nation’s deterrent capability, that 

is, if Russia’s claims to the area are verified they can deter other nations 

from such claims. Russia is releasing reams of information about the 

extension of its continental shelf in an attempt to ensure a favorable 

decision by the UN that will cede vast stretches of the tundra and its 

riches to the Kremlin. The Kremlin continues to search for the 

appropriate measurements and language to propose accurate findings to 

the UN so that the latter might rule that the Lomonosov Ridge is on 

Russian territory and should legally be declared under the jurisdiction of 

Russia. 

The Arctic has been militarized by Russia, even though Foreign 

Minister Sergey Lavrov cautioned against that idea a few years ago 

(could this have been a reflexive control operation, thwarting the enemy 

with a friendly embrace?). Russia has subsequently prepared what some 

call a “fifth military district” or new theater of operations in the Arctic 

region. Such a development could have been the result of prescient 

forecasting, which noticed that the West was paying scant attention to 

developing a force to protect the area; and an estimate of the areas COF

was underway. 

After deciding where advantages were located, Russia began 

establishing military outposts on these northern territories. Overall, they 

have established a positive correlation of forces there in regard not only 

 

1220 Matthew Bodner, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 27 July 

2015.

1221 “Russian Federation...”
437

to forces and equipment on the ground but also through its extensive 

fleet of some 41 icebreakers, both nuclear- (6) and diesel-powered. 

Russia has plans to add to its atomic-powered icebreaker fleet. Three 

ships, the Arktika, Sibir, and Ural, are to enter service in 2017, 2019, and 

2020, respectively, although exact dates for each were not specified.1222

Russia can initiate operations against threatening actions by other nations 

or even environmental organizations, if necessary, with the military force 

it has put together. The Northern Fleet has accrued, developed, and 

deployed a vast array of technology, equipment, and personnel in the 

Arctic, to include strategic submarines, marines, infantry brigades, 

radars, air defense systems, and the airborne, to deter or attack rivals and 

ensure the correlation of forces stays in Russia’s favor. The territory, as 

is well known, is vast, with a coast-line thousands of miles long that 

must be protected. This, the Kremlin notes, requires an extensive force 

buildup. 

Ukraine

With regard to Chapter Nine, “Russia and Ukraine,” the story 

continues to unfold even as Russian military interest is deflected by its 

ongoing involvement in the fight over Syria. Ukraine is vastly different. 

Here Russian participation is camouflaged and not nearly as open. 

Events are supported by Russia, but the administration continues to deny 

any actual involvement on Ukrainian soil. Meanwhile, according to 

reports, in August the shelling from indirect fire continued near Mariupol 

and along the highways from Horlivka to Mariupol and from Debaltseve 

to Artemivsk. In Crimea the Russians have continued to prepare a 

bridgehead from which they can attack or influence operations in or 

around Mariupol, Odessa, and even Transdnistria. A June 2015 report 

noted that 24,000 servicemen are in Crimea now and that the goal is to 

station 43,000 servicemen there by 2017. The same report noted that “it 

is highly probable that strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles” may 

also be deployed on the peninsula.1223 A month later it was noted that 

aircraft include Su-34 bombers, Mi-8MTPR special-purpose helicopters, 

 

1222 Interfax-AVN Online, 26 July 2015.

1223 Interfax (in English), 8 June 2015.
438

Mi-28N attack helicopters, and Su-30M2 fighter jets.1224 Black Sea Fleet 

Commander Admiral Alexander Vitko announced the same month that a 

new coast guard unit and missile brigade with anti-ship missile systems 

had been created there. Also now present are a logistics support brigade, 

missile defense and artillery regiments, a marine engineer regiment, and 

two air force regiments.1225

In Kiev, President Petro Poroshenko has his own internal 

problems. A review of a constitutional amendment that would 

acknowledge the special status (a law passed in September 2014) for 

separatist southeastern Ukraine was met with a hail of criticism and 

rioting from Ukrainian nationalist groups, groups that the Kremlin can 

point to as proof that fascism is alive and well in Ukraine. These groups 

present new targets that Russia can exploit and use to defame the 

Poroshenko government. The ultranationalist Freedom Party and Right 

Sector paramilitary groups were behind the rioting. The amendment on 

decentralization, which would grant greater financial power (but not a 

veto over domestic and foreign policy decisions) to local governments 

below the level of a province, would fulfill a clause in the Minsk II 

ceasefire agreement that mandated constitutional reform based on 

decentralization. This was only a preliminary reading of the amendment, 

which will not be put to a vote until December 2015, and then only if the 

separatists and Russia attend to their agreements in the Minsk accord.

Epilogue: Putin, Strategy, and Geopolitical Quests

A May 2015 article at the Russian news website, Svobodnaya 

Pressa, using the breakout of categories in this book, should have made 

the US analytic community shudder, since it implied that at least two 

influential Russian thinkers were advocating a direct threat to the US 

homeland with nonnuclear deterrents. Instead, it was largely ignored. All 

three elements (strategy, future war, geopolitics) were tightly intertwined 

in the article. Andrey Ivanov wrote the article by incorporating 

interviews with two individuals, Aleksandr Perendzhiyev, from the 

 

1224 Interfax (in English), 3 July 2015.

1225 Interfax (in English), 23 July 2015.
439

Association of Independent Military Political Experts, and Colonel 

General Leonid Ivashov, a member of the Academy of Geopolitical 

Problems.1226

The article noted Russia should utilize deterrence and collective 

security strategies if it is to counter US moves in Europe. Here, strategy 

is tightly wound with geopolitics, which is a specialty of Ivashov. When 

advancing collective security the article advanced the idea of creating a 

joint troop grouping in Nicaragua with China and putting Russian troops 

in Venezuela and Brazil. More ominous was the suggestion of placing a 

task force off the coasts of the US, so that it would have American 

territory in its sights. That clearly implies a task force stationed in Cuba. 

The deterrent factor, it was noted, must be moved up to the border of the 

US. This “grand coalition” could include India as well. Russia should 

“organize a major diplomatic and information offensive” when creating 

this security alliance, which clearly ties strategy with geopolitics.1227

With regard to future war, Perendzhiyev and Ivashov reminded 

readers that the 2014 military doctrine of Russia speaks for the first time 

about the nonnuclear deterrent factor, tying doctrine and strategy with 

weaponry in future war scenarios.1228 The section on UAVs in Chapter 

Four of this work, which described a host of Russian advances in UAVs, 

should give pause to every US military planner. In 1962 it was possible 

to find Russian missiles in Cuba and, through the Cuban Missile Crises, 

get them off the island. If Russia creates a task force in Cuba with a 

nonnuclear deterrent such as armed UAVs, it will be incredibly hard to 

find them. They could be hidden in buildings or hangers, and this could 

strongly affect US responses to such potential actions. Size matters as 

does the ability to hide capabilities and use them when needed for 

surprise.

 

1226 Andrey Ivanov, interviews with Aleksandr Perendzhiyev and Leonid Ivashov, 

“United States Transitioning to ‘Number One’ Combat Readiness. Any Provocation 

Would Give the United States the Opportunity to Attack Russia,” Svobodnaya Pressa

(Free Press), 7 May 2015.

1227 Ibid.

1228 Ibid.
440 

Psychologically, there were repeated warnings from these men 

that Russia should not allow the US to provoke (the word was used 

seven or eight times) it into acting. The interviewees noted that if a 

provocation took place in Transdnistria and NATO member Romania 

was dragged into the conflict, then a NATO response would soon follow. 

Or, they added, what if a small clash took place on Latvia’s border and 

exactly what happened there remained unknown to the public. The US 

would say Russia was responsible and the States must respond to defend 

a NATO ally.1229

In Crimea Russia hid the identity of its troops, refusing to 

recognize they were on Ukrainian territory for weeks before admitting it. 

Now they are doing the same in eastern Ukraine demonstrating, 

unfortunately, that they cannot be trusted. If they can’t be trusted, then 

what they say about provocations and other issues (MH17, etc.) has to be 

judged accordingly. Ivashov stated that “everything indicates that the US 

is preparing for a provocation.” This absolutely makes no sense for a 

force that is tired and moving forward with a limited budget. No sane 

person would even consider initiating a conflict with a force exhausted 

from ten years of multiple deployments, especially against a power of 

Russia’s status. This indicates that these men, and perhaps Russia’s 

leadership, are both insecure and intimidated by the US, yet arrogant due 

to the restoration of Russian military power. They are causing real 

headaches for themselves and the rest of the world with their horrific 

logic. 

Other than that, all is fine. 

Thus, as this work draws to a close, it is apparent that if Putin’s 

presidency is not affected by outside events (a resurgent threat in the 

south of Russia from ISIS, Taliban, Chechen fighters, or some 

combination of them), he probably will continue his quest to take back 

the eastern section of Ukraine and perhaps other territories after he 

1229 Ibid. 
441 

finishes operations in Syria. He has established a bridgehead in Crimea 

and is building up a military arsenal that can enable his access to Arctic 

oil and help establish an ice-free Northern Sea Route. He is working to 

restore specific segments of Russia’s old empire, it appears, even though 

he doesn’t need land, and wants to regain the status of a respected world 

player. The strategy he employs will be difficult to predict or uncover, 

and there are sure to be surprises along the way. The worst surprise 

would seem to be attacks along multiple axes or vectors (simultaneous 

actions in the Baltic, Ukraine, and Transdniester, for example). Russian 

military theorists have spoken on occasion of the fact that simultaneous 

attacks are becoming a norm of sorts in contemporary times, so the use 

of such a concept is not out of the question. 

The use of indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary vectors will be 

considered and implemented along with an increasingly active 

propaganda offensive. Ivashov’s thoughts indicate that the West must be 

on the lookout for Russian provocations. How can the West restore a 

stable Europe? When will Putin’s vindictive well run dry? The best one 

can hope for, it seems, is that as Putin is faced with multiple factors 

(sanctions, financial and legal constraints, terrorists, Middle East groups, 

etc.) he might want Europe back as an ally again. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

 Mr. Timothy L. Thomas (BS, Engineering Science, USMA; MA, 

International Relations, University of Southern California) is a senior 

analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. Mr. Thomas conducts extensive research and publishing in the 

areas of peacekeeping, information war, psychological operations, low 

intensity conflict, and political-military affairs. Mr. Thomas was a US 

Army foreign area officer who specialized in Soviet/Russian studies. His 

military assignments included serving as the Director of Soviet Studies at 

the United States Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany; as an 

inspector of Soviet tactical operations under the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe; and as a brigade S-2 and company 

commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. Mr. Thomas is an adjunct 

professor at the US Army’s Eurasian Institute; an adjunct lecturer at the 

USAF Special Operations School; and a member of two Russian 

organizations, the Academy of International Information and the 

Academy of Natural Sciences.