Advising Indigenous 

Forces: American 

Advisors in Korea, 

Vietnam, and 

El Salvador

Robert D. Ramsey III

Global War on Terrorism

Occasional Paper 18

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Advising Indigenous 

Forces: American 

Advisors in Korea, 

Vietnam, and 

El Salvador

by

Robert D. Ramsey III

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ramsey, Robert D., 1946-

 Advising indigenous forces : American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador / by Robert D. Ramsey III.

 p. cm. -- (Global war on terrorism occasional paper 18) 1. Military 

assistance, American--History--20th century. 2. Military assistance, 

American--Korea (South)--History--20th century. 3. Military assistance, 

American--Vietnam (South)--History. 4. Military assistance, American--

El Salvador--History--20th century. 5. Military missions. 6. United States. 

Army--Foreign service. 7. World politics--1945-1989. I. Title. II. Series.

 UA12.R35 2006

 355’.0320973--dc22

 2006025616

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can 

be found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.

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ISBN 0-16-076722-9
iii

Foreword

It has been said that the only thing new in the world is the history you 

don’t know. This Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper 

(OP) is a timely reminder for the US Army about the history we do not 

know, or at least the history we do not know well. The Army has recently 

embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. We are simultaneously 

engaged in a huge effort to learn how to conduct those missions for which 

we do not consistently prepare. 

Mr. Robert Ramsey’s historical study examines three cases in which 

the US Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th 

century. In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, 

and in El Salvador in the 1980s the Army was tasked to build and advise 

host nation armies during a time of war. The author makes several key 

arguments about the lessons the Army thought it learned at the time. 

Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to 

adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local 

conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host 

nation’s leadership buying into and actively supporting the development 

of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system. To its 

credit, the institutional Army learned these hard lessons, from successes 

and failures, during and after each of the cases examined in this study. 

However, they were often forgotten as the Army prepared for the next 

major conventional conflict.

These lessons are still important and relevant today. In fact, prior to 

its publication the conclusions of this study were delivered by the author 

to several of the Army’s current advisory training task forces. We at CSI 

believe this GWOT OP can contribute significant insights to the Army as it 

works to prepare for and conduct its current advisory missions. CSI—The 

Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Preface

This survey of American field advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 

Salvador began several months ago as a study on how the United States 

military had built foreign armies in Korea and Vietnam. The renewed interest in advisors caused a shift in the project. The final goal of this survey 

was to understand American field advisors—to determine who they were, 

to see how they prepared, to consider how they performed, and to discover 

what suggestions they had for improvements. The perspective of this survey is from the bottom, not the top. However, as always, what the top does 

and does not do affects how well those at the bottom are prepared, supported, and capable to perform their mission. The emphasis has been on 

understanding what was attempted and how the advisory effort evolved. 

I hope that this survey highlights issues that will be of use to current field 

advisors and to those who oversee advisory efforts.

No one does anything by himself. Among those requiring special 

thanks are Lieutenant Colonel Steven E. Clay for permitting me to do this 

project; Dr. Donald P. Wright for collecting the initial materials; John H. 

McCool for identifying the new materials in the Operational Leadership 

Experiences project; Combined Arms Research Library personnel 

Elizabeth Merrifield, Kathy Buker, and John J. Dubission for outstanding support in ferreting out materials in a short period of time; Martin J. 

Dockery for kindly providing a copy of advisor materials from Vietnam; 

Dr. William G. Robertson and Colonel Timothy R. Reese for supporting 

the project and for reviewing and improving the manuscript; and Betty 

Weigand for editing, instructing, and making it a better product. Without 

the support and effort of those above, as well as many others, this work 

could not have been completed in the time permitted. As always, responsibility for errors in fact or judgment rests with me alone.

For this survey, the spelling advisor vice adviser has been used in 

direct quotations for standardization.

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................iii

Preface ......................................................................................................v

Introduction ..............................................................................................1

Chapter 1. “A Much Tougher Job,” KMAG Combat Unit 

Advisors in South Korea (1950–53) ...................................5

KMAG During the Korean War .....................................5

Combat Unit Advisors .................................................10

Advisory Structure ...................................................10

Advisor Roles ...........................................................11

Advisor Selection and Tour Length .........................11

Advisor Preparation and Training ............................12

Challenges of the Advisory Environment ....................13

Understanding: Culture and Language......................14 

Developing Rapport with Counterpart .....................16

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal ...............18

Counterpart Observations ............................................19

A Special Study.............................................................19 

Summary ......................................................................24

	 2.	 “A Most Difficult and Sometimes Frustrating Task,”

Field Advisors in Vietnam (1961–73) ...............................27

MAAG-V/MACV During Combat Operations ...........28

Field Advisors ..............................................................32

Advisory Structure ...................................................32

Advisor Roles ...........................................................34

Advisor Selection and Tour Length ..........................37

Advisor Preparation and Training ............................40

Challenges of the Advisory Environment ....................43

Understanding: Culture and Language .....................44

Developing Rapport with Counterpart ......................47 

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal ...............51

Counterpart Observations .............................................53

Special Studies and Other Observations .......................57

RAND Study, 1965 ...................................................58

DCSPER-40 (1968 DA Study) and the Military 

Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) ...................62

	A Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 1972 ................ 64
viii

Page

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in 

Vietnam, 1980 ......................................................67

	US Army Official Publications, 1975–88 ................70

Summary .....................................................................73

	 3.	 “A Particularly Tricky Business,” Operations, Plans and

Training Teams (OPATT) in El Salvador (1984–92) .......83

MILGROUP and the El Salvador Civil War................83

Combat Unit Trainers .................................................87

OPATT Structure .....................................................88

OPATT Roles ...........................................................88

OPATT Selection and Tour Length ..........................89

OPATT Preparation and Training ............................90

Challenges of the Advisory Environment ...................91

Understanding: Culture and Language ....................92

Developing Rapport with Counterpart ....................93

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal ..............95

Counterpart Observations ...........................................96

Special Studies and Other Observations .....................97

An Ambassador’s Thoughts, 1987 ...........................97

The “Four Colonel’s” Report, 1988 .........................98

An OPATT After Action Report, 1992 ..................101

A RAND Report, 1995 ..........................................101

Summary ...................................................................102

4. Observations ..................................................................107

What Advisors Did: Organization and Roles ............107

Who Advisors Were: Selection .................................108

How Advisors Prepared: Training and Orientation ..108

How Advisors Did: Strengths and Weaknesses ........109

Advisors Were Deaf ...............................................110

	Advisors Were Partially Blind ...............................111

	Advisors Worked in a Hostile Environment ..........111

	Advisors Worked with Indifferent Counterparts ...112

	Advisors Worked with Limited US Military

Support ..............................................................112

Advisors Did Not Stay Long .................................112

Advisors Faced US Military Cultural Pressures ....113

Final Thoughts ..........................................................113

A Final Question .......................................................117

About the Author ................................................................................121
ix

Page

Glossary ...............................................................................................123

Bibliography ........................................................................................127

Appendix A. “Twenty-Seven Articles,” 1917 .................................135

	 B.	 “Ten Commandments for KMAG Advisors,” 1953 ...141

C. “Role of the Individual,” 1962 ...................................143

D. Advisor “Do’s and Don’ts,” 1962 ..............................147

E. “Tips to Advisors,” 1966 ...........................................155

F. “Counterpart Relationships,” 1967 ............................161

G. “Advising the RF/PF,” 1971 ......................................165

H. “Points for Considerations,” 2001 .............................167

	 I.	 “21 Recommended Practices in Working with

Counterparts,” 2001 ...................................................175


Introduction

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better 

the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is 

their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. 

Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, 

your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you 

think it is.

—T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” 19

T.E. Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, is occasionally read and frequently quoted today. As an earlier advisor to the Arabs, some consider his 

insights useful when facing current US military challenges—major advisory efforts, military and nonmilitary, in Afghanistan and Iraq. The article 

quoted above is frequently cited, but seldom with its last sentence. Yet 

this last sentence offers as much cautionary wisdom as the beginning. We 

must remember that Lawrence was not a soldier by trade. He had years of 

training and experience in the region. His linguistic concern was not with 

speaking the language, but with specifically speaking the local dialect. His 

unique situational understanding came from his academic background, his 

linguistic skills, his deep cultural understanding, his years in the region, 

his personal relationship with his counterpart, his understanding of what 

was and was not possible, his constant awareness of what was going on 

around him, and his unique genius. Only a few can or perhaps should be 

a Lawrence. However, he penned his “Twenty-Seven Articles” as suggestions for his co-workers, people more like us. By reading and thinking 

about the entire “Twenty-Seven Articles” (see appendix A), an advisor can 

grab nuggets worth consideration.

Not only is advising foreign indigenous forces a major focus of the 

United States (US) military today, but it will continue to be a major task 

in the future. During the on-going “long war” according to the latest 

Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, US military 

forces must be able to “train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy 

and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support 

security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.” 2 To accomplish these tasks, advisors must have “language and cultural awareness to 

facilitate the expansion of partner capacity” and must “understand foreign 

cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise 

foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.”3

Fortunately, the US military has done this task before; unfortunately, it did 

not capture that experience in doctrine.
During World War II, United States military assistance missions provided equipment and training to the militaries of Great Britain, France, 

Iran, China, the Soviet Union, and Latin America. After the war, US 

Military Assistance Groups (MAG) or Military Advisory Assistance 

Groups (MAAG) provided equipment, training, advice, and assistance 

in Greece, the Philippines, China (Taiwan), Iran, Japan, and Korea. With 

the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, US advisors faced the demanding

task of providing advice during major combat operations—first, against 

North Korean and then Chinese communist forces. When the French withdrew from Indochina, the United States created the Military Advisory and 

Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V). By 1961, US advisors becam

involved in counterinsurgency operations with South Vietnamese combat 

units. By 1964, they advised province and district chiefs on pacification.4

The advisory effort in South Vietnam continued until the US troop withdrawal in 1973. After Vietnam, US advisors continued to be active in many

nations—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Latin America—working to improve their 

militaries and to maintain a friendly peacetime engagement. Longer-term 

efforts were provided in Iran and Saudi Arabia. In El Salvador, a small 

US Military Group (MILGROUP) oversaw a counterinsurgency effort for 

12 years. Since then, Special Forces units have provided mobile training

teams (MTT) for many small-scale, limited-duration training missions. As 

this brief overview shows, the US military has a vast and varied experience in advisory efforts.

To understand the basic challenges advisors faced and to determine 

what worked and what did not work, this survey looks at three US advisory experiences—Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Korea, one of our 

first major advisory efforts, offers insights from a conventional combat 

experience working with a newly created, inexperienced South Korean 

army. Vietnam, our largest and longest effort, provides a combat and counterinsurgency experience working with a South Vietnamese army with previous combat experience. El Salvador permits a look at advising a limited, 

long-term counterinsurgency effort working with an army with no recent 

combat experience. Each of these conflicts is significantly different, yet 

the challenge confronted by the advisors—how to establish an effective 

working relationship with their counterparts to improve the host nation 

military effectiveness in addressing its security problems—was the same. 

In addition, the requirements to meet these advisory efforts came from the 

entire US military establishment, not just the US Army.

What did advisors do? How were they organized? How were they 

selected? How were they trained? What problems did they confront? 

How did their counterparts respond to their efforts? What suggestions 
did they offer? This survey investigates these questions. By focusing on 

field advisors—combat unit and host nation territorial teams immersed 

in the local situation with continuous face-to-face contact with the host 

nation officials—we can explore the lessons learned from these experiences and provide hard-earned suggestions to those in similar situations 

today. Reproduced in the appendixes are the suggestions these advisors 

developed for working effectively with their counterparts.
Notes

1. T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August

1917 [document online]: available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1

27arts.html.

2. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 23.

3. Ibid., 23, 42.

4. Walter G. Hermes, “Survey of the Development of the Role of the 

U.S. Army Military Advisor” (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief 

of Military History, Historical Report, 1965), 12–85. US Army official histories 

from the World War II period that address aspects of these advisory efforts include 

Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 

1940–1943 (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 

1955); Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French (Washington, DC: US Army Office

of the Chief of Military History, 1957); T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor

and Aid to Russia (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military 

History, 1952); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to

China (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953); 

Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems (Washington, DC: US 

Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956); Romanus and Sunderland, 

Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military 

History, 1959); and Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of

Hemisphere Defense (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military 

History, 1960)


Chapter 1

“A Much Tougher Job”1

KMAG Combat Unit Advisors in South Korea (1950–53)

I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in 

the credit for his successes and in blame for his failures.2

—“Ten Commandments” for KMAG Advisors, 195

US Army forces occupied Korea south of the 38th Parallel in 194

to disarm the Japanese Army and to assist in the establishment of a local 

government. Soviet forces performed the same tasks in Korea north of 

the 38th Parallel. By 15 August 1948, under President Syngman Rhee,

the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) replaced the US Army 

Military Government in Korea. The United States created a Provisional 

Military Advisory Group (PMAG) to improve the effectiveness of the 

Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). ROKA began as a constabulary to the 

national police forces. When it became ROKA, its primary missions were 

internal security and border defense. US advisors, working with ROKA 

units, participated in counterguerrilla operations and monitored border 

incidents. On 1 July 1949, the United States Military Advisory Group 

to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), authorized 500 members, replaced

PMAG. KMAG was tasked to assist the ROK, within the limits of the 

Korean economy, in developing its army, coast guard, and national police 

by advising, assisting, and ensuring US military assistance was used effectively.3

 By the summer of 1950, ROKA had grown into a force of eight

light infantry divisions, each with varying levels of training, force structure, and experience.

KMAG During the Korean War

The North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 caught ROKA in the mids

of its building program. Five divisions had three understrength infantry 

regiments; the remaining three divisions had two regiments. Only five 

divisions had limited artillery units. ROKA had deployed four divisions 

along the 38th Parallel, each with one battalion forward. Three divisions 

were engaged in counterguerrilla operations in the south. Surprised, ill 

equipped, and inadequately trained for the attack it faced, initial ROKA 

resistance collapsed, particularly in the west. KMAG, assigned no 

warfighting mission and caught between commanders, initially recalled 

its unit advisors. Not all were able to comply. Some lieutenant colonel 

and major division senior advisors and some captain and first lieutenant 

regimental advisors remained with their ROKA units during the retreat. 


But, the bulk of KMAG moved south to Taegu with ROKA headquarters. 

A KMAG detachment went to Pusan to facilitate dependent evacuation.

By  July, US Army forces from Japan began delaying the North Korean

advance and reinforced what later became the Pusan perimeter. ROKA 

units on the east coast withdrew in good order, but most ROKA divisions 

required some reconstitution. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth 

US Army (EUSA) commander, took command of US forces in Korea on 

13 July. With President Rhee’s agreement, Walker assumed command of 

ROKA 4 days later. KMAG became a major subordinate command of EUSA 

with a secondary mission to maintain liaison between ROKA and EUSA. 

KMAG continued to advise ROKA on creating, training, and equipping 

units; EUSA controlled combat operations. KMAG advisor detachments 

with ROKA combat units responded operationally to EUSA, but administratively to KMAG. On 25 July, Brigadier General Francis W. Farrell took

command of KMAG.4

Reconstituting ROKA combat units became the immediate task for 

KMAG. Only parts of five ROKA divisions existed after the retreat. All 

divisions lacked personnel, weapons, and equipment; however, ROKA 

divisions defended the northeastern portion of the Pusan perimeter. 

KMAG recommended and on 8 July ROKA created the ROK I Corps with 

two divisions positioned along the east coast, and on 14 July the ROK II 

Corps with three divisions positioned to the west of ROK I Corps. KMAG 

assigned advisors to assist the new ROKA corps commanders and their 

staffs in learning tactical and administrative skills the hard way, under 

combat conditions. Tasked in August to create the ROK 26th Regiment,

Captain Frank W. Lukas, with two ROKA interpreters, contacted ROKA 

staff officers in Taegu. Working with local officials, within 2 days nearly 

1,000 recruits had been drafted, formed into squads, then platoons, then 

companies, and then into two battalions. Those who “looked intelligent” 

were designated noncommissioned officers and platoon leaders. ROKA 

officers who helped recruit the soldiers became the company, battalion, 

and regimental commanders and staffs. Issued rifles, each soldier fired 

nine rounds of ammunition outside the city. Then the regiment, clad in a 

hodgepodge of civilian and military clothing, departed by train to the ROK 

3d Division sector. This regiment, which entered combat less than a week 

after it was activated, received no formal training until April 1951

On 9 August, Walker was authorized to increase ROKA strength 

immediately to any level he felt prudent. The EUSA plan called for 

doubling the number of ROKA divisions from five to ten with the first 

formed by 10 September and one a month thereafter to reach a total of 

ten. Within  weeks, EUSA reported three new ROKA divisions were


organized and partially equipped and the remaining two were being 

activated. With additional divisions, ROKA activated the ROK III Corps in 

October. In November, after Seoul was recaptured, the KMAG chief asked 

an assistant G3 advisor, Major Thomas B. Ross, how long it would take 

to form a new ROKA division. Laughing at the several weeks’ response, 

Farrell told Ross that he expected the ROK 2d Division formed by the next 

day. Ross went to the three personnel centers near Seoul, designated each 

a regiment, gathered recruits in groups of 200, designated each group a 

company, grouped companies into battalions, and grouped battalions into 

regiments. Company officers and noncommissioned officers were selected 

from those who looked intelligent. ROKA provided officers for battalion, 

regiment, and division commanders and staffs. Within days, the ROK 2d 

Division received rifles as it boarded trucks heading to a counterguerrilla 

mission. Units that were raised under such dire conditions and in such 

haste presented unimaginable challenges for ROKA commanders and 

their KMAG advisors.

Fighting continued along the Pusan perimeter. Despite hasty reconstitution, lack of training, equipment shortages, and inexperience, ROKA 

divisions at times gave ground, but held their front. ROKA commanders, 

along with their advisor teams, performed well under demanding conditions. After X Corps attacked at Inchon on 15–16 September and recaptured Seoul by the end of that month, pressure on the Pusan perimete

diminished. EUSA, with the ROK I Corps and II Corps, exploited north 

to the 38th Parallel and then into North Korea. The ROK 1st Division 

served as part of US IX Corps. ROK I Corps advanced along the east 

coast so quickly that it secured the landing of US X Corps at Wonson on 

26 October. In the west, EUSA advanced through P’yongyang, the North

Korean capital, toward the Yalu River with the ROK II Corps on its right 

flank. On 26 October, a reconnaissance element of the ROK 7th Regiment, 

ROK 6th Division, reached the Yalu River, the first and only EUSA unit 

to do so. Unexpectedly, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attacked the 

ROK 2d Regiment late on 25 October and into the early morning of 

October. The ROK 2d Regiment panicked, but 90 percent of its soldiers 

escaped. On 28 October, two additional ROKA regiments collapsed under 

CCF attacks, losing their vehicles and artillery. On 29 October, the CCF 

destroyed the ROK 7th Regiment—over75 percent of the regiment a

all of its advisors were captured or killed. The combined efforts of ROKA 

officers and their KMAG advisors could not overcome the basic weaknesses of the ROKA units. In less than a week, the CCF crippled the ROK 

6th Division and weakened the ROK II Corps on EUSA’s right flank. CCF 

intervention dramatically changed the EUSA situation.
Anticipating another CCF attack, Walker repositioned forces with US 

I Corps to the west, US IX Corps in the center, and ROK II Corps to the 

east. The attack came on 25 November, and by noon on 26 November, th

ROK II Corps front collapsed exposing EUSA to envelopment. Walker 

ordered a withdrawal. Attempting to disengage and move south, the US 

2d Division suffered a severe blow. EUSA broke contact and moved to 

positions north of Seoul in South Korea. In the east, US X Corps and ROK 

I Corps moved to Wonson for an evacuation by sea that was completed 

by 24 December. On 23 December, Walker died from injuries suffered 

in a traffic accident and was replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew B. 

Ridgway. Ridgway, summoned from Washington, assumed command on 

26 December, just as a major CCF offensive commenced. From west to

east, the EUSA frontline was US I Corps with ROK 1st Division, US IX 

Corps with ROK 6th Division, ROK III Corps summoned from the south,

ROK II Corps, and ROK I Corps on the east—eight ROKA and two US 

army divisions.

During his 4 months in command of EUSA, Ridgway confronted CCF 

attacks, low US Army morale, and inherent weaknesses in ROKA. During 

the early 1951 CCF attacks, some ROKA divisions fought well, others not

so well. KMAG advisors, the main source of information on ROKA units, 

proved unable to keep EUSA informed of the tactical situation. Breakdowns 

in communications between the front-line units and ROKA headquarters 

during combat were normal. In February, Ridgway directed the KMAG 

chief to personally accompany withdrawing ROKA units to ensure contact 

was maintained. In March, he warned all commanders against abandoning serviceable weapons and equipment. Lieutenant General James A. Van 

Fleet replaced Ridgway on 14 March when Ridgway moved to the Far 

East Command in Japan.

In April, the ROK 6th Division collapsed during a CCF attack. Despite

the KMAG advisor’s concern about the location of the division reserves, 

the ROK 6th Division commander placed them forward to reassure the

morale of his forward units in anticipation of the attack. On 23 April, 

President Rhee asked Ridgway to support ten additional ROKA divisions. 

Ridgway bluntly informed President Rhee that ROKA needs were leadership and training, not personnel and equipment. Until ROKA demonstrated an ability to meet the demands of combat, Ridgway saw no point in 

raising more units. This meant Rhee, who strongly supported the actions 

of Ridgway and Van Fleet, had to remove incompetents and strengthen the 

ROKA officer corps. Until then, no expansion would occur. At the same 

time, a proposal from Washington for US officers to command ROKA 

units was rejected by Ridgway, Rhee, and the US Ambassador because it 
required a large number of US officers, it faced a language barrier, and it 

required authority to administer and discipline Korean forces. When the 

ROK III Corps failed to hold its ground in May, Van Fleet ordered its 

inactivation and the reassignment of its divisions to the ROK I Corps and 

the US X Corps. Over 24 KMAG advisors were killed or captured in the 

collapse of ROK III Corps.8

Ridgway assisted President Rhee in strengthening the ROKA. He 

directed Van Fleet to consider a special KMAG course for ROKA officers to address leadership deficiencies. Given the task, Colonel Arthur S. 

Champeny visited US Army schools and concluded that US Army courses 

were not suitable because of inadequate emphasis on the aspects of combat leadership required in Korea. On 22 July, in response to a Department 

of the Army (DA) inquiry into what was required to improve ROKA 

forces, Ridgway stated the first requirement was a professionally competent officer and noncommissioned officer corps that possessed a will to 

fight, an aggressive leadership ability, a professional pride, and a sense of 

duty. A second requirement was time. He believed it would take 3 years 

to improve the ROKA forces unless the war ended, then it would require 

2 years. In July, Van Fleet appointed Brigadier General Thomas J. Cross 

as commander, Field Training Command. Within 3 months, each corps 

had a training camp for retraining ROKA divisions in corps reserve. A 9-

week course progressed from individual weapons and tactics instruction to 

squad, platoon, company, and battalion. The tempo of combat operations, 

as usual, prevented most divisions from completing the entire course, but 

by late 1952 all of the original 10 ROKA divisions had completed5 week

of refresher training, and some had returned several times to accumulate 

up to 11 weeks total training. ROKA units benefited from this program by 

returning to the front with more skills, confidence, and esprit and by losing 50 percent less men and equipment than units without the training. The

combined efforts of EUSA commanders, KMAG advisors, and President 

Rhee improved the combat effectiveness of the ROKA.9

The start of negotiations between the United Nations Command and 

China/North Korea in the summer of 1951 did not end combat operations.

Nevertheless, a more stabilized front provided opportunities over the next 

2 years for the improvement and expansion of ROKA. In October 1952, for

example, the ROK 9th Division, suffering over 3,500 casualties, held its

ground against 28 different attacks in a 10-day period by over 23,000 CCF 

soldiers. Late in 1952, a program to expand ROKA to 20 divisions and

corps would permit the replacement of US divisions in South Korea by 

ROKA divisions. However, things were never simple for KMAG. During 

the last half of 1952, it lost a large number of advisors to normal rotation.
10

Despite efforts by Van Fleet to channel additional personnel into KMAG, 

between losses of experienced personnel and increased requirements from 

ROKA expansion, KMAG remained, as normal, shorthanded. ROKA 

strength grew from 273,000 on 30 June 1951, to 376,000 on 30 J

1952, to 591,000 on 31 July 1953. By the July 1953 armistice, ROKA 

become one of the largest combat experienced armies in the world.10

Combat Unit Advisors

KMAG grew from almost 500 personnel for an eight division ROKA

in 1949 to a maximum strength in 1953 of 2,866 with 1,918 authorized; t

rest were EUSA temporary duty (TDY) or attached personnel.11 Because of 

the ROKA expansion during the war and other factors, KMAG personnel 

strength was always less than required. KMAG duties, in addition to advising combat units, included advising and assisting ROKA headquarters, its 

school system, its training base, and its logistics system. Consequently, 

most KMAG personnel were not in the advisor detachments at the ROKA 

division, regiment, or armor and artillery battalions.

Advisory Structure

Although the initial goal was to provide an American advisor to every 

division, regiment, and battalion commander, KMAG never had enough 

personnel for infantry battalions. Initially, a ROKA division had two or 

three infantry regiments with three battalions each and perhaps an artillery 

battalion. In 1951, divisions were authorized three regiments of three

battalions, two artillery battalions, and one armor battalion. In June 1950,

the average division advisory team, led by a lieutenant colonel or major, 

was five officers and three men. The regimental team, led by a major 

or captain, might be two officers. In March 1951, the new organization 

for the division advisory team was 21 officers and 11 men. Authorized 

at division were 2 lieutenant colonels—a senior division advisor and an 

assistant division advisor and executive officer; 5 majors—G1/G4, G2/

G3, artillery, engineer, and signal; 2 captains—artillery and ordnance; 

and 11 enlisted men for mess, administration, communications, and 

maintenance. Each regiment was authorized one lieutenant colonel and 

one major for each battalion. Although authorized, personnel shortages 

prevented infantry battalion advisors throughout the war. By 1953, the

division detachment was 44 officers and men, including a 16-man signal 

detachment from KMAG headquarters. Infantry regimental detachments 

were authorized two officers and two enlisted men; no advisors worked 

with infantry battalion commanders. Artillery and armor battalion 

advisory detachments were smaller. Many regimental advisors considered 

themselves understaffed to be an advisor, to do housekeeping, and to 
11

maintain 24-hour communications. Shortfalls occurred and many advisors 

did not meet the rank authorizations. KMAG regimental and battalion 

advisory teams—artillery and armor—were bare-bone, high-thrill outfits 

with no redundancy.12

Advisor Roles

Brigadier General William L. Roberts, the first PMAG and KMAG 

chief, established the “counterpart system.” Each KMAG advisor was to 

work directly with his ROKA advisee—sharing office, activities, tasks, and 

problems. Unit advisors were to advise and assist—not command. Their 

impact was to come through personal influence, workable suggestions, 

and good guidance. Not only did advisors continue their peacetime advising and training functions, but with the war came the additional requirements to guide a counterpart—usually his superior by one to three ranks 

yet younger and less experienced—through the trials and tribulations of 

combat, to share life in the ROKA unit, and to maintain 24-hour liaison 

with EUSA units and KMAG headquarters. During the initial attack and 

reconstitution in the Pusan perimeter, some advisors clearly did more than 

permitted in responding to the grim situation. In any event, KMAG continued its “advise-and-assist, do-not-command” message. During the turbulent first year of the war, KMAG unit advisors faced the tricky task of 

ensuring that ROKA units stayed in the war and contributed to the effort. 

By 1953, KMAG issued its “Ten Commandments” (see appendix B) to

its advisors. By then, it was clear that advisors still did not command, 

but they were responsible for the successes and failures of their ROKA 

units—they stood or fell with their counterparts.13

Advisor Selection and Tour Length

Before the war, KMAG service was not considered particularly 

desirable, important, or popular. In fact, KMAG duty was a routine 

assignment. Anyone could do it. Officers with the appropriate military 

occupational specialty (MOS), a need for an overseas tour, and the required 

rank found themselves in KMAG. No attempt was made to qualify 

personnel to provide appropriate advice to counterparts who outranked 

them by two or three grades. Often, advisors were junior company and 

field grade officers—willing and eager to do the job, but professionally 

weak. During the war, things did not improve. KMAG competed for 

scarce personnel resources with other US combat units in Korea. Except 

for brief periods in 1951 and 1953, priority for both quantity and qualit

of personnel went to US units. No matter how well an advisor did, he did 

not get the job opportunities or the one- or two-grade promotions many 

of his contemporaries did serving in US units. T.R. Frehrenbach summed 
12

it up, “Traditionally, a nation instructing another should send its best men 

abroad, traditionally, from Athens to the America of 1950, nations do not.

There was little prestige, promotion, or hope of glory with serving with 

KMAG. The United States Army tended to forget these men. Most officers 

who could avoid KMAG duty did so, preferring to serve among their own 

troops, where food, companionship, and the chances of recognition were 

all considerably improved.”14

Until it became important for ROKA units to replace the US divisions, 

little improved for KMAG. By 1953, some former battalion and regimental commanders, after6 months in command in Korea, were assigned t

KMAG as senior divisional and regimental advisors. Assignment criteria 

for other combat unit advisors did not change. Even an augmentation of 

KMAG late in the war by EUSA was a mixed blessing. The lack of qualified personnel was filled by large numbers of EUSA short-term personnel, 

many of whom were cast-offs in their units. While KMAG strength went 

up, the new personnel were of uneven quality and were available only for 

a short time. One adviser observed, “Getting worthless advisors relieved 

was easy. Poor advisors presented a greater problem.” 1

KMAG tour length prior to the war was 18 months unaccompanied 

and 24 months accompanied by dependents. During the war, tour rotation was based on a points system. US officers in combat units required 

38 points to rotate. They received four points each month in line forward 

of regiment, three points each month in reserve between regiment and 

division command posts, and two points each month behind the division. 

KMAG regimental and divisional advisors required 40 points to rotate and 

received only 3 points each month. To KMAG advisors, this was another 

indication that their work was not understood or appreciated.1

Advisor Preparation and Training

KMAG advisors, much less combat unit advisors, received no special 

preparation or training. Before the war, a new advisor received a short 

orientation, met the KMAG chief, visited with the staff, attended a weekly 

staff meeting, and received an advisor handbook and a procedure guide 

for his reading. Then he went to his assignment. During the first 3 years 

of the war, a new advisor received, at most, a brief KMAG orientation 

and/or a short briefing by his immediate superior before going directly to 

his unit at the front. Chronic shortages and frequent turnover of personnel, 

combined with the chaotic tempo of back-and-forth combat operations and 

the expanding KMAG operational duties, meant that many unit advisors 

received little information on their mission or duties, much less the 

conditions under which they worked. As a new advisor commented, “The 
13

officer I replaced met me at the railhead (4 hours behind the division), 

turned his jeep over to me, and gave me directions to the division CP.” 

Division and regimental advisors were often thrown into a make-it-happen 

situation with little guidance and limited support. They learned from their 

co-workers in the combat units and from experience. However, by the 

summer of 1953, things were more organized. KMAG conducted regular

orientations, provided advisors with an Advisor’s Procedure Guide that 

emphasized the twin duties of advising their counterparts and of providing 

accurate and timely reports to US commanders, and ensured each advisor 

received the “Ten Commandments” for KMAG advisors. Not surprisingly, 

during the war many combat unit advisors felt ill prepared for what they 

faced.1

Challenges of the Advisory Environment

Advisory duty in Korea was not typical military duty. Most officers 

considered being in combat with trained, equipped, and well-led US units 

a difficult and demanding task. The KMAG unit advisor faced that same 

challenge with an ill-equipped, inadequately trained, and inexperienced 

unit. In addition, he needed the professional skills and knowledge to advise 

a ROKA commander one to three levels above his rank or experience—

captains and majors advised regiments, majors and lieutenant colonels 

advised divisions. An advisor’s situational understanding was limited at 

best. He did not understand the culture, the language, the capabilities and 

limitations of ROKA units, his counterpart, nor US Army expectations. 

The 1953 Advisor’s Procedure Guide offered a lot on what to do, but little

on how to do it:

In overcoming such obstacles as the language barrier, archaic beliefs, superstitions and a general lack of 

mechanical skills, the task of the Advisor has been an 

arduous one. The function of the Senior Advisor to a ROK 

regiment perhaps best illustrates the problems an Advisor 

faces. Living, working, fighting and training with a regiment, an Advisor must be acquainted with every phase 

of the regiment’s operations. He must be abreast of the 

tactical and logistical situation. He must know the strong 

and weak points of the command and his subordinates. It 

is upon him that the regimental commander depends for 

knowledge that will teach him teamwork in the employment of infantry, artillery, air, signal communications and 

armor in a combat operation and of the various services 

in support of the same. He must criticize their mistakes 
14

without causing them embarrassment or “loss of face.” 

He must teach them economy without seeming to deprive 

them of their needs. He must hold them to proven military 

methods and standards while still applauding their improvisation and, last but not least, he must do these things 

with a view toward building their confidence.18

How a division advisor, a member of a relatively small detachment, or 

how a regimental advisor, at most one of two officers, tackled the arduous 

task of overcoming cultural and linguistic obstacles and accomplished the 

advisory tasks was left largely to trial and error.

Understanding: Culture and Language

Americans and Koreans were different in almost every way—values, 

beliefs, social practices, religion, history, and language to name a few. 

Knowing what those differences were would have benefited KMAG advisors. Understanding the why of those differences would have been even 

better. The US Army and KMAG tended to expect the Koreans to understand and adapt to the Americans rather than to focus on what an advisor 

needed to know to work effectively with his counterpart. Some advisors 

even wondered if American customs and practices could actually replace 

those of Korean culture. The KMAG view that Korean cultural differences were “archaic beliefs, superstitions,” not a different set of legitimate 

customs and beliefs to be understood in developing feasible recommendations, further reinforced the belief that the American way was the best 

way. All of this made it more difficult for most advisors to understand their 

Korean counterparts.19

What passed for cultural awareness was generally superficial, descriptive, and stereotypical. Advisors knew the concept of face was important, but 

few understood what the concept actually meant and why it was important. 

To most advisors, it was a reminder not to embarrass his counterpart. That 

many unknown cultural practices could embarrass a counterpart escaped 

their notice. The importance Koreans placed on respect, proper behavior, authority, and on a unit commander differed from US Army practice. 

Common Korean cultural faults acknowledged by most KMAG advisors 

included lack of initiative, failure to plan, inflexibility, no understanding 

of “the big picture,” “lack of judgment,” and “don’t understand cooperation.” That these judgments reflected an American cultural view remained 

hidden from most US advisors. The many US military concepts introduced 

by Americans, such as leadership expectations and the role that the commander performed, were just as alien to the Korean culture and practice 

as Korean concepts were to the Americans. In a 1953 study, none of the
1

KMAG officers surveyed considered the possibility that a good American 

leader might not be a good Korean leader because of different culture, 

practices, or standards. KMAG advisors knew they were “members of the 

best fighting organization in the world and . . . backed by the most highly 

developed industrial country in the world.” Cultural understanding required 

not only empathy with Koreans, but also self-knowledge—understanding 

American cultural strengths and weaknesses.20

Language problems in Korea were commonly referred to as the language barrier. From the beginning, KMAG had no Americans who knew 

or understood the Korean language. By 1953, only one KMAG advisor

could speak, read, and write Korean with any degree of fluency and only 

one other was fluent in Japanese. Prewar attempts to get KMAG advisors 

to learn Korean failed from lack of interest. An early KMAG chief actually considered making English the common language of the ROK security forces, even though most Korean soldiers were illiterate. Somehow, 

thousands of illiterate Koreans could learn English better and faster than 

educated Americans could learn Korean. To make an initial breach in the 

language barrier, ROKA commissioned university students with English 

language skills as interpreters and established an English language school 

for officers sent to training courses in the United States. Another problem, beyond getting people who generally understood the same word in 

two languages, was that words did not exist in Korean for many military 

terms and pieces of equipment. When there was no appropriate word, the 

item or concept was described as well as possible by the interpreter. For 

example, a machine gun, for which no word existed in Korean, became a 

gun that shoots very fast or a gun of many loud noises or any other way 

the interpreter chose to describe it. Such interpretations were inconsistent, 

inaccurate, and “ranged from the ingenious to the inadequate.” A major 

effort to translate the Dictionary of United States Army Terms into Korean 

terminated with the outbreak of war. The shortage of Korean language 

translators and a lack of vocabulary created a language barrier that made 

communications difficult and created confusion and misunderstandings.21

Communication is critical to situational understanding; situational 

understanding is critical to useful advice. Lacking Korean language skills, 

KMAG unit advisors relied heavily on ROKA interpreters. Sometimes 

an advisor would pick up some Korean phrases or his counterpart might 

know some English. Koreans welcomed even a modest effort by KMAG 

unit advisors to understand them and their culture. Generally, none of 

the three—advisor, interpreter, or counterpart—knew all that he needed 

to communicate effectively without misunderstanding or confusion. 

ROKA interpreters were assigned to the unit. Their primary loyalty was 
1

to the ROKA commander, not to the advisor. Interpreters, commissioned 

from the university, were commonly referred to as schoolboys by their 

commanders. Without any military training, interpreters lacked a necessary understanding of military terms and concepts as well as colloquial 

English. The ability of the interpreter to understand, and then clearly translate not just the words but the meaning was rare. In addition, working 

effectively through a translator in a combat situation remained difficult 

and time-consuming.

Many advisors lacked even the basic ability to assess the reliability of 

the interpreter.22 A study of KMAG advisors concluded: “From the circumstances there can be no question but that the utter dependence of KMAG 

advisors on Koreans for vital military information, and as a corollary the 

inability of KMAG advisors to obtain information directly through the use 

of the Korean language, hampered them in the accomplishment of their 

mission and resulted on numerous occasions in the unnecessary loss of 

territory and lives or wastage of ammunition.” An advisor added: “For an 

individual who does not understand the language the barrier is as complete 

as his counterpart or interpreter wishes to make it.”23 Obviously it was possible for KMAG unit advisors to work successfully with their counterparts 

without knowing any Korean. They did it. However, advisors who did 

not know or try to learn the Korean language expressed greater difficulty, 

more frequent frustrations, and a stronger dislike for their advisory assignment than those who attempted to learn some Korean.24

Developing Rapport with Counterpart

A critical task for an advisor was establishing an effective working 

relationship with his ROKA counterpart based on mutual respect and trust. 

Without this rapport, no KMAG advisor could perform his mission. Ignored 

or unheeded, the best of advice was useless. Professional competence was 

the fundamental requirement that a ROKA commander expected from an 

advisor. Previous combat experience helped. Many, but not all, regimental 

and divisional advisors found that advising units one to three levels 

above their rank and experience was both professionally challenging and 

rewarding. However, not all counterparts worked well with advisors junior 

in rank. No matter how good the advisor or how willing the commander, 

it took time, patience, perseverance, understanding, and luck to develop 

trust and confidence. Working through interpreters and with limited 

cultural knowledge, advisors found misunderstandings and confusion the 

norm. Rapport became the end product of a continuous process of building 

confidence in each other’s honesty and judgment. Requiring hard work 

to gain, it proved easy to damage. While rapport required professional 
1

competence, it rested on the personal relationship between commander 

and advisor.2

For a KMAG advisor to understand his counterpart was not a simple 

task. As Ridgway observed, “Their unfamiliarity with our ways and our 

inability to breach the language barrier with consistency, combined with 

the blundering nature of so many of our dealings with their nation, made 

cooperation extremely difficult, particularly when the pressure of mortal 

danger allowed no time for planning or protocol.”26 First, an advisor had

to understand his counterpart as a Korean national, then as a ROKA commander, and then as a person. ROKA, founded initially as a National Police 

constabulary, was formally created in 1949. Some ROKA senior officers 

had military experience as noncommissioned officers in the Japanese army 

or with the national police force; others gained experience fighting guerrillas before the war. This meant ROKA officers, regardless of rank, had 

limited military training and experience. Ridgway observed that a ROKA 

division commander had the experience level of an average, young US 

Army captain.2 Lacking experience and professional knowledge, division and regimental commanders needed advisors. KMAG advisors were 

older and more experienced than their counterparts, but junior in rank. 

However, some commanders resented this need; others resented what they 

perceived as a superior attitude by some American advisors. Getting to 

know a ROKA commander depended on his willingness to be known and 

the willingness and ability of his advisor to get to know him.

ROKA was not the US Army. Its capabilities and limitations were far 

different from the US Army. ROKA commanders were more sensitive to 

rank and perceived slights. The commander made decisions; no one else. 

His staff might assist in the execution of decisions, but it did not participate 

in decisionmaking. Under these conditions, subordinates were reluctant to 

show initiative, to deviate from the plan, to admit errors, or to submit 

accurate reports if they reflected poorly on the commander or the unit. 

Discipline could be harsh, perhaps arbitrary. Commanders seldom asked 

for advice. Experienced advisors learned to ask timely questions, such as 

“do you think that it would be a good idea to . . .” or “what are you going to 

do about . . . ,” and to discuss options with the commander without forcing 

a decision. No commander wanted to be viewed as a puppet to his advisor. 

The best results came about when the advisor became the key assistant to 

his counterpart, a true member of the team.28

Even when the commander was willing to listen, the advisor found it 

difficult to ensure he had useful advice to offer. With limited situational 

awareness, it was easy to come up with inappropriate solutions to actual 
18

problems or solutions to problems that did not exist. As one advisor 

warned, “Often advice is bad because the advisor does not have the whole 

truth. They only tell you what they want you to know. Advice which is 

given without the facts or based on inaccurate facts is seldom followed. 

It shouldn’t be. One had to be cautious about such matters.”29 Once good 

advice was apparent, then the advisor’s problem became to determine the 

best time, the appropriate place, and the most effective manner to offer it.

Over time, the more effective unit advisors were able to establish a 

good working relationship with their commanders. Some understood that 

the US way was not always the best or the appropriate way. They came to 

understand some Korean ways; a few even were able to acknowledge that 

certain ROKA tactics, techniques, and procedures might be superior to US 

Army practices. KMAG advisors believed patience and tact were critical 

personal characteristics. Unfortunately, not every KMAG advisor was up 

to the task—some lacked ability, others lacked temperament, and others 

lacked desire. One advisor offered, “People who cannot treat Koreans as 

equals or cannot recognize certain so-called shortcomings as simply differences in customs, conditions, and language should not be allowed in 

KMAG.” Other traits considered important for an advisor were emotional 

stability, friendliness, and good humor.30

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal

Throughout the war, KMAG stressed that advisors advised; they did 

not command. At the same time, EUSA combat commanders demanded 

effective combat performance from ROKA divisions as well as accurate 

and timely reports. When ROKA units collapsed, no one was safe, personally or professionally. US combat commanders expected results, not 

excuses. KMAG told advisors clearly in 1953 that they “stand or fall with

[their] counterpart”; advisors were held responsible for their units without 

command authority. As one advisor made clear, “In an American Corps 

the Senior Division Advisor better feel responsible, for the corps commander certainly considers him so.”31 The preferred advisory tools of discussion, argument, and persuasion were sometimes overcome by events or 

were inappropriate for these circumstances. KMAG advisors then faced a 

dilemma. If they threatened or made unfavorable reports to EUSA, they 

risked their hard-earned rapport and future effectiveness with their counterpart. Yet, failing to report concerns carried grave risks.32

An important and unique situation developed in South Korea in July 

1950. President Rhee placed ROKA under EUSA command. He agreed

to support the EUSA commanders in their fight for South Korea. At 

times, EUSA commanders relieved ROKA commanders and, once, even 
19

abolished the ROK III Corps. US officials refused to support expansion 

of ROKA until the Koreans demonstrated their ability to provide effective 

leadership to their army. This firm US resolve, supported by President 

Rhee, was felt and believed throughout the ROKA. ROKA commanders 

knew they ignored advice, particularly in critical tactical situations, at 

their peril. Yet, even this unprecedented common approach confronted 

major obstacles and innumerous difficulties, many of which were not 

surmountable. One KMAG advisor had four different ROKA commanders, 

all considered unfit for command. The last commander faced court-martial 

and was exonerated by his ROKA superiors. The KMAG advisor was then 

removed for ineffectiveness.33 From the top in this war, both through EUSA 

and ROKA channels, a similar message was sent: ready or not—perform 

or else.

Counterpart Observations

Just as advisors had to adjust to their counterparts, counterparts had 

to adjust to their advisors. Not surprisingly, they did not always agree on 

things. Many ROKA commanders felt that Americans were “too rude and 

impatient,” that misunderstandings and ignorance arose from differences 

of customs, and that the language barrier prevented “knowledge of mutual 

courtesy.” When asked, “what was the most important qualification for an 

advisor,” most Korean officers chose a good personality. Although professional competence and combat experience ranked second, the Korean 

officers emphasized that personality was “considerably more important.” 

Willingness to work together in respect and trust was more important 

to ROKA commanders than competence.34 A ROKA corps commander 

emphasized the importance of personality and the willingness to get along 

with Koreans. He believed that a number of KMAG advisors had been 

abandoned during the 1950–51 retreat from North Korea because the

lacked empathy and respect for their counterparts. ROKA units that considered KMAG advisors “their most prized possession” worked to bring 

their advisors out safely, and those with little use for their advisors left 

them to their own devices. He believed that those who had developed rapport with their counterparts were brought out; those without were not.3

A Special Study

In the summer of 1953, the US Army authorized the Operations

Research Office to conduct a study of the advisory effort in Korea. Based 

on interviews, surveys, and documents, a draft report was circulated for 

comment. Published in February 1957 as The KMAG Advisor: Role an

Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for 

Combat Operations in Korea, the final report concluded:
20

1. Each of the assigned duties of KMAG advisors to 

local national tactical units was necessary and could not 

be safely reduced without compromising the success of the 

operation, even though these duties placed a heavy burden on officers serving as advisors. KMAG advisors were 

usually confronted with problems and responsibilities normally encountered by officers two ranks above their own.

2. Advisory duty in a tactical unit of a local national 

army, particularly under combat conditions, is exceedingly difficult and frequently frustrating and personnel selected for such duty must be temperamentally and 

physically able to withstand these stresses, in addition to 

being professionally competent. Qualities needed include 

tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, selfdiscipline, and—in tactical units—command and combat 

experience if possible.

3. The size of KMAG tactical detachments as provided in Korea during combat operations was at minimum practical levels, considering the multiple mission[s] 

assigned. The pressure of the advisory job was most acute 

on the regimental advisor in infantry units during the 

shooting phase of the war.

4. Living constantly with local national army tactical or isolated units, support regiments removed from 

personal association with other US personnel had adverse 

effects on advisors’ morale and efficiency. KMAG advisors in combat units needed the relaxation offered by 

periodic social contacts and off-duty companionship with 

other US personnel, and more frequent R&R than personnel serving with US units.

5. The KMAG advisor had to recognize that certain

practices of a local national group, such as the “welfare 

fund,” were deeply rooted in the national culture, and that 

the advisor’s responsibility was to see that these practices 

did not jeopardize the military effectiveness of the unit.

6. In tactical units the success of the advisor’s mission, his personal safety, and sometimes his life, depended

on his relation with his ROKA counterpart. For a KMAG 

advisor to work effectively with his ROKA counterpart it 

was important that he:
21

a. Establish rapport based on both mutual confidence and respect for ability, professional competence, 

and experience and mutual regard and consideration for 

integrity and personality.

b. Practice military courtesy and protocol appropriate to the counterpart’s rank and the advisor’s level of 

operation as a member of the counterpart’s personal staff.

c. Maintain close and constant association with 

his counterpart during working hours, including visits to 

the field, and be available to observe and advise on all 

matters that arose.

d. Check and inspect closely every day the execution of the counterpart’s orders and the performance of 

subordinates and units in the command.

e. Initiate advice—in private—to the counterpart on all matters requiring attention, with particular 

attention to premeditated problems and plans, decisions 

on current matters, and follow-up of orders or supervision 

of subordinates.

7. When a really important issue was involved and

the counterpart would not voluntarily act in accord with 

the advisor’s proposal, the advisor had to assure compliance by bringing pressure on his counterpart.

8. Logistic support of KMAG advisors serving 

with local national units, particularly in remote or isolated places, was an acute problem that required special 

attention.

9. Advisors for MAAG-type assignments needed 

training in the form of a short intensive orientation before 

being sent to their duty stations.

10. KMAG advisors did not need to know the local 

language to perform their missions; but some knowledge of the language was an important asset in advisory 

duties; efforts to learn the language facilitated personal 

relations.

11. A tour of duty as an advisor in a MAAG is worthwhile professional experience as well as being a highly 

important military service.3
22

Based on the study and its conclusions, The KMAG Advisor report 

recommended that for US Army future advisory efforts: 

1. Selection qualifications for MAAG advisors 

should be based on:

a. The officer’s professional competence, preferably demonstrated by command experience—including 

combat command if possible—for advisors to line units.

b. Special screening of officers and enlisted 

men for qualities temperament and fortitude to withstand 

the strenuous psychological and physical demands of 

advisory duty in tactical units of a local national army, 

particularly under combat conditions. 

c. Personal characteristics of tact, patience, 

emotional stability, self-sufficiency, and self-discipline 

that will enable the officer to work effectively and harmoniously with local national personnel and that will induce 

a respect and confidence in Americans and the US.

d. Preference to officers with facility in the local 

language.

2. Advisors should be given orientation for MAAGtype assignments, preparatory to entering on such duty, 

and be explicitly briefed on: their advisory duties and 

responsibilities; the structure, organization, and the 

known strengths and weaknesses of the local national 

army; and the culture and customs of the local nationals and methods of working with them. Language study 

should be encouraged and facilitated by short intensive 

courses and/or on a self-study basis, unless more thorough preduty language courses are required at the option 

of the chief of the MAAG involved.

3. During combat operations and during the development stage of an immature local national army the 

regimental advisor should be provided with at least an 

assistant advisor, and also with battalion advisors to operate from the regimental detachment.

4. MAAG advisors assigned to local national units 

in the field should be grouped together and live in MAAG 

detachments at regimental or higher headquarters insofar 

as possible, and advisors assigned to tactical or isolated 
23

units where they are removed from normal daily personal 

association with other US personnel should be required to 

spend the equivalent of one 24-hour period per week at a 

higher MAAG or US detachment.

5. The length of continuous assignment for tactical

advisors living with advised units in the field under combat or isolated conditions should be not less than  nor

more than 9 months, and for advisors living in decentralized MAAG detachments 9 to 18 months.

6. Indigenous interpreters in tactical units should be

military personnel of the local national army assigned to 

the US units, MAAG or otherwise, and under the control 

of the US officers to whom the interpreters are responsible. 

This control should include discipline; efficiency rating; 

recommendations through channels to the local national 

army for the interpreters’ promotions, additional schooling 

(including that in US schools), and awards; and (at the 

option of the MAAG chief) messing, billeting, and some 

supplementary pay in money or kind when needed. In 

nontactical units civilian interpreters should be authorized, 

but they should be under corresponding US control and 

direction.

7. Local national officer-interpreters prior to assignment to US commanders and MAAGs should receive 

training in the service branch for which they are assigned 

as interpreters (officer’s basic course, branch material).

8. The factors found important for KMAG advisors 

to work effectively with their ROKA counterparts should 

be referred to, for the information and guidance of advisors in other MAAGs, particularly in underdeveloped or 

Asiatic countries.

9. MAAG or military-mission type problems should 

be included in the curriculums of the Army’s principal 

service schools, with particular emphasis in schools for 

advanced career officers.3

Few of the recommendations were adopted. The war was over. 

KMAG had performed its job—improved the combat effectiveness of 

ROKA. In 1953, during this study, KMAG did tighten its procedures for

briefing and orienting new advisors. It provided each advisor a copy of a 

KMAG procedure manual. However, the recommendations on selection 
24

and preparatory training of advisors, on the size of advisor teams, on 

interpreters, and on general training for officers were not acted on.

Summary

During the Korean war, KMAG unit advisors confronted not only the 

challenges of combat, but also that of working with the ROKA whose 

language, culture, and ways were often incomprehensible. Chosen for 

advisory duty by MOS and occasionally by rank, KMAG advisors 

frequently found themselves working with a counterpart two to three 

ranks above their rank and advising units larger than the ones they had 

served in, much less commanded. Advisor teams were small, seldom 

below regiment, and frequently understrength. Without Korean language 

skills—working through ROKA interpreters with limited English skills—

and without any prior preparation for advisory duty, KMAG advisors 

attempted to comprehend what was occurring around them; to develop 

suitable, acceptable, and feasible advise; and to communicate that advice 

clearly, quickly, and convincingly to their counterparts. At the same time, 

and despite these handicaps, they were responsible for ensuring that US 

commanders received accurate and timely situation reports. Through hard 

work, misunderstandings, mistakes, successes, and working together, 

ROKA had become a large, combat-experienced, and capable military 

force by 1953.

Ridgway observed in a 1969 interview, “No Army in modern times was

ever subjected to the battle stresses, strains, and losses to which the ROKs 

were . . . in the beginning of the war.”38 Under the most trying combat conditions, ROKA—initially unprepared, then shattered by the North Korean 

army, hastily reconstituted in the Pusan perimeter, hurriedly thrown forward into North Korea, smashed by the CCF, rapidly rebuilt, and severely 

tested again by the CCF all in the first year of the war—hung on, survived, 

and evolved into an effective combat force. Despite the numerous differences and misunderstandings, Ridgway emphasized the importance of the 

strong support EUSA commanders received from President Rhee in working toward the common goal of a combat-capable ROKA. Of the KMAG 

advisors who worked under these adverse combat conditions with hastily 

formed, ill-trained units led by inexperienced leaders and who tried to 

establish an effective working relationship with counterparts separated by 

linguistic, cultural, institutional, and personal barriers, Ridgway added, 

“officers in an advisory capacity, unit advisors . . . really had a much 

tougher job than fellows in the regular units, a much tougher job.”39
2

Notes

1. Matthew B. Ridgway, “How the Korean Army Improved,” interviewed 

by MAJ Caulfield, October 1969, in A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam 

War: 1965–1975, vol. 7, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) (BD

Corporation, April 1980), 52

2. Alfred H. Hausrath, The KMAG Advisor: Roles and Problems of the 

Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in 

Korea (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research 

Office, February 1957), 16. 

3. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War

(Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1962), 34–6

4. Sawyer, 114–139; for coverage of the war from June–November 1950,

see Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: 

US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961).

5. Sawyer, 140–148, footnote 16

6. Appleman, South to the Naktong, provides coverage of this phase of the

war; see 673–675 for collapse of ROK II C

7. For this period of the war see Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November

1950–July 1951 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1990); 

Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College 

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989); and Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway 

Duels for Korea (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).

8. Mossman covers these actions; see Sawyer, 170–171, for disapproval o

ROKA expansion; see Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–

1953 (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 876, for advisor loss

9. Sawyer, 171–181; for results of training, see Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan

to Panmunjom (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1999), 162

10. For the last 2 years of the war, see Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and 

Fighting Front (Washington, DC: US Army Office of the Chief of Military 

History, 1966

11. Hausrath, 95

12. Sawyer, 58; Appleman, Ridgway, 350; Hausrath, 95

13. Sawyer, 58–60; Hausrath, 13–

14. T.R. Frehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Preparedness (New 

York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 50

15. Hausrath, 26–27, 92–93; Sawyer, 1

16. Sawyer, 52; Hausrath, 101–10

17. Sawyer, 57; Hausrath, 14, 37

18. Hausrath, 23.

19. Sawyer, 62; Hausrath, 22

20. Draft Copy THE KMAG ADVISOR Circulated for Critical Reading by 

Selected Reviewers (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations 

Research Office, nd.), 121–122, 128, 144. For American culture, see Loren Baritz, 

Backfire: Vietnam—The Myths That Made Us Fight, The Illusions That Helped 
2

Us Lose, The Legacy That Haunts Us Today (New York, NY: Ballentine Books, 

1985)

21. Sawyer, 1, 62–65; Hausrath, 

22. Hausrath, 68–7

23. Ibid., 126

24. Ibid., 44.

25. Ibid., 48–5

26. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: NY: Da Capo Press,

1967), 

27. Ridgway, “How Korean Army,” 4

28. Sawyer, 65–66; Hausrath, 

29. Hausrath, 60

30. Ibid., 28–29.

31. Ibid., 20.

32. Ibid., 82–85

33. Ibid., 28.

34. Ibid., 28–30.

35. Ibid., 11

36. Ibid., 2–3

37. Ibid., 3–4

38. Ridgway, “How Korean Army,” 46

39. Ibid., 52
27

Chapter 2

“A Most Difficult and Sometimes Frustrating Task”1

Field Advisors in Vietnam (1961–73)

You are still the ‘heart and soul’ of our total commitment 

to South Vietnam. . . . Your job is a most difficult and 

sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the 

relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous 

one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and 

different national origins. The training of the US military 

officer is characterized by conditioned traits of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence of your relationship with your counterpart is constituted by patience and 

restraint. As a threshold to development of a meaningful 

affiliation with your counterpart you must succeed in the 

reconciliation of these contrasting qualities.2

—GEN William C. Westmoreland, Letter to Officer 

Advisors, “US Advisor/Vietnamese Counterpart 

Relations,” 1967

Vietnam provided the United States military its longest, largest, and 

most complex advisory effort. Begun in 1950 when the United States 

provided logistical support to the French in Indochina, the Military 

Advisory and Assistance Group, Indochina, became the Military Advisory 

Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V) in 1955. Limited by the Geneva 

Accords of 1954 to 342 personnel, an augmentation of MAAG-V with the 

350-personnel Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in 1956 

increased its maximum strength to 692.3 From 1955 to 1960, MAAG-V 

worked with the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem in building the 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) into 7 infantry divisions, an 

airborne brigade, a marine group, 4 armor battalions, a coastal naval force 

of 10 small ships and 18 amphibious craft, and an air force with a fighterbomber, 2 transport, and 2 small aircraft observation squadrons. RVNAF 

focused on its primary mission: defense of the northern border against 

North Vietnamese invasion.4 Other nonmilitary US agencies trained and 

equipped the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. They handled internal security matters, not MAAG-V. When confronted in 1959–60 with 

an insurgency instead of an invasion, RVNAF found itself committed to 

counterinsurgency operations. Given its inherent weaknesses—politicization 
28

of its officer corps, rampant corruption, divided command, and ill-trained 

soldiers in understrength combat units—RVNAF was unprepared despite 

the 5-year MAAG-V effort.5

MAAG-V/MACV During Combat Operations

From 1961 to 1964, the US military effort, both advisory and combat support, increased in response to the deteriorating situation in South 

Vietnam. MAAG-V advisors, assigned in May 1959 down to regiment for 

infantry units and to battalion for artillery, armor, and marine units, were 

permitted in mid-1961 to accompany RVNAF battalion and company 

units in combat to observe and to offer advice. Advisors were forbidden 

from direct participation in combat and from participating in operations 

near international borders. At the Honolulu conference in December 1961, 

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara authorized MAAG-V to assign 

an advisor to each province and an advisory team to each operational combat battalion. In addition, he provided US combat support units for the South 

Vietnamese. Special Forces teams rotated in and out of South Vietnam on 

temporary duty as mobile training teams (MTT) to train RVNAF units and 

ranger companies and to work with the Montagnards through the covert 

CIA-sponsored Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) program. At 

the same time, RVNAF increased its strength, requiring more advisors. To 

oversee these additional responsibilities and resources, on 8 February 1962 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was created with 

General Paul D. Harkins in command. During 1963, RVNAF had grown 

to 4 corps, 9 divisions, an airborne brigade, a Special Forces group, a 

marine brigade, 3 separate regiments, 19 separate battalions, and 86 ranger 

companies. Bigger was not necessarily better. The combat effectiveness 

of many RVNAF units was not up to fighting the insurgents successfully. 

By the end of 1963, MACV strength had grown to 16,263 personnel with 

3,150 assigned to MAAG-V, of which 1,451 were advisors.6

Political instability followed the death of President Diem in November 

1963. Not until mid-1965 did the Thieu-Ky military government establish 

some control over the factions in RVNAF. During this critical period, the 

situation in South Vietnam worsened. Viet Cong (VC) attacks became 

frequent and more successful. In the midst of this situation, General 

William C. Westmoreland assumed command of MACV on 20 June 1964. 

To improve local security forces, MACV established district advisory 

teams under each of the 44 province advisors. By the end of the year, the 7th 

Special Forces Group deployed to South Vietnam to work with the CIDG 

and to conduct covert operations astride the borders of South Vietnam. 

By the end of 1964, operational requirements for RVNAF units precluded 
29

pacification operations and much-needed retraining.7 As in Korea, in an 

attempt to improve the capabilities of RVNAF units, Department of Defense 

(DOD) asked MACV about providing US cadres for RVNAF battalions. 

Options considered included US officers and senior noncommissioned 

officers; US staff officers and technical personnel; and US fire support 

elements. MACV believed all three options faced the problems of “the 

language barrier, increased exposure of US personnel, the difficulty of US 

personnel adapting to ARVN living conditions, and the greatly expanded 

support requirement that would be generated” and concluded that “US 

assumption of command was neither feasible nor desirable, owing to the 

language barrier as well as the probable non-acceptance by the GVN.”8

From 1965 through 1968, the US military buildup absorbed the attention of MACV. As US combat strength increased from 184,000 in 1965 to 

385,000 in 1966 to a maximum of 550,000 in 1968–69, MACV became 

more an American operational headquarters focused on fighting the North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) and main force VC units rather than on fighting the insurgency.9

 For various reasons, Westmoreland decided to accept 

unity of effort rather than unity of command. RVNAF units did not serve 

under US Army commanders.10 MACV and the RVNAF Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (JCS) developed annual Combined Campaign Plans (CCP) detailing 

the roles and tasks for both US and RVNAF forces.11 During this period, 

the RVNAF focused on pacification. Without any special training for revolutionary development or pacification, RVNAF battalions and their combat 

advisors dispersed to provide security and conduct operations in populated 

areas. When this training deficiency became evident in 1967, mobile training teams (MTT) were organized to train all RVNAF maneuver battalions supporting pacification. By 30 September 132 of 144 battalions had 

received the training.12 Although the US corps commanders were designated senior advisors to RVNAF corps commanders, they focused on US 

combat operations and left their advisor duties to their deputies. However, 

for MACV unit advisors, this meant they now had a US operational chain 

of command and their counterparts had a separate RVNAF chain of command. Seldom were the two in synch. Some initial efforts at combined 

operations during this period were generally no more than separate US 

and RVNAF operations conducted in the vicinity of one another.13 By the 

end of 1966, “the buildup eclipsed what had previously been an advisor 

‘show’” and created additional advisor duties for “law and order, morale 

and recreation, post exchange, base development, liaison, and visitor and 

community relations.” This caused an “inevitable decrease in the attention 

to the primary mission” of advising RVNAF and that “liaison was [now] 

one of the most demanding requirements” placed on advisory teams.14
30

In April 1967, the creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary 

Development Support (CORDS) program under a civilian deputy to the 

MACV commander brought new priority to the counterinsurgency advisory 

effort. By combining the 970 advisors of the Office of Civil Operations, 

who were responsible for revolutionary development and pacification, with 

the 2,260 MACV district and province advisors, the new CORDS organization had 1,413 military and 1,240 civilian advisors. Not only did province and district advisory teams get more attention, but also a major effort 

was undertaken to upgrade the regional force (RF) and popular force (PF), 

formerly known as the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps. An early 

CORDS study discovered that the ratio of US advisors to RF/PF personnel 

was 1 to 929, but the ratio in RVNAF was 1 to 23. To address this shortfall 

of 2,243 advisors for RF companies, Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) and 

Mobile Advisory Logistics Team (MALT) concepts were tested and evaluated. In late 1967, MACV decided to create 354 MATs to work with RF/PF 

units under province and district advisory teams.15

Despite the virtual destruction of the VC and the lack of a national 

uprising during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the direction of the war changed. 

Peace talks started, South Vietnam mobilized, and MACV began planning 

a withdrawal. General Creighton Abrams, who became MACV commander 

in mid-1968, pushed a “one war” concept. Henceforth, MACV focused 

on improving RVNAF combat capability and on supporting CORDS 

pacification efforts. The CCP for 1969 declared, “RVNAF must participate 

fully with its capabilities in all types of operations . . . to prepare for the time 

when it must assume the entire responsibility.” Emphasizing combined 

operations, Abrams hoped US commanders and units would model how 

to do combat operations for RVNAF commanders. For the remainder of 

the war, most US combat units worked alongside RVNAF, RF/PF, and 

the newly created, part-time People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF) militia 

during both combat and pacification operations.16 Creating 354 MATs to 

upgrade RF/PF units remained a major CORDS program, but it proved 

“expensive in terms of . . . experienced infantry officers and NCOs.” By 

the end of 1968, the MACV advisory team had reached 11,596 personnel—

10,544 Army, 615 Marine Corps and Navy, 437 Air Force.17 This meant 

that in addition to 11 division equivalents of US combat units in South 

Vietnam, the “US Army advisor contingent, in terms of officers and senior 

NCOs, was the equivalent of another seven US Army divisions.”18

When the Nixon administration announced its Vietnamization policy 

in 1969, it became clear that the US military effort would decrease and 

RVNAF would need to improve and to expand to meet security requirements. MACV division advisory teams converted to combat assistance 
31

teams (CATs), reducing advisory spaces in the division and changing the 

advisor’s role “from advisory to combat support coordination.”19 The US/

RVNAF attacks into Cambodia in April–May 1970 indicated improved 

RVNAF combat performance, even operating without advisors for a time. 

MACV increased MAT requirements to 487 teams in 1970 to continue the 

upgrade of increasing RF/PF and PSDF units. MAT became “the largest 

advisory element”; however, finding captains to serve as MAT senior advisors proved impossible. By October, less than 80 captains were assigned 

to MATs.20

Although the February 1971 Lam Son 719 operation into Laos raised 

concerns about the RVNAF capability to conduct major operations, the 

withdrawal of US combat units and the reduction of US advisors continued. By 30 June, battalion combat assistance teams (BCATs) were 

gone, except in a couple of units, and regimental combat assistance teams 

(RCATs) began phasing out on 1 September. During 1971, MATs were 

reduced from 487 to 66; the remainder scheduled for elimination in early 

1972.21 The US “advisory emphasis had shifted from tactical operations 

to the function and technical areas and the level of effort in terms of advisors decreased as . . . [the South Vietnamese] gained expertise in various areas.”22 By the end of 1971, only 3,888 tactical advisors remained 

with RVNAF combat units; many were short-time personnel, fillers from 

departing US units assigned to complete their 12-month tour.23

On 30 March 1972, the NVA launched the Easter Offensive, a phased, 

three-pronged conventional attack with tank and artillery support. RVNAF 

divisions, supported by US air power and accompanied by US advisors, fought continuously for several months before forcing the NVA in 

September to consolidate its limited gains in South Vietnam. Some of the 

fiercest fighting occurred during the defense of An Loc and the recapture of 

Quang Tri. At An Loc, MACV advisors played critical roles in coordinating massive US tactical air support, in providing daily situational updates, 

and in encouraging RVNAF defenders by their continued presence on the 

ground. Without those US advisors, many believed that the defense of An 

Loc would have collapsed. Interestingly at An Loc, the RF/PF performance 

was considered better than that of RVNAF regulars, a direct result of training and better leadership.24 Although severely tested, RVNAF did not collapse; nevertheless, significant weaknesses were identified in RVNAF and 

in its leadership. President Nguyen Van Thieu replaced commanders, but 

the results would not be known until 1975.

In the fall of 1972, two separate studies in Washington, DC, 

addressed the US advisory effort for 1973. A Joint Chiefs of Staff review 

recommended cutting the overall advisory effort but continuing battalion 
32

advisor teams for the airborne and marine units that bore the brunt of the 

fighting, reducing the division combat assistance teams (DCATs) from 

36 to 15 personnel, and continuing the support of CORDS with advisors 

at province and district. A separate DOD study recommended a total of 

2,500 advisors—380 tactical advisors (10 per division and 50 each for air 

force and navy), 500 staff advisors (20 per corps, 100 each for air force 

and navy, 220 for RVNAF Joint General Staff), and 1,620 province or 

district advisors.25 None of this mattered. On 28 January 1973, a cease-fire 

went into effect and the withdrawal of the remaining American military 

personnel followed within 60 days. After an almost 20-year effort, 

RVNAF was a battle-tested, well-equipped force of 550,000 regulars and 

525,000 territorials. It had an air force and the largest helicopter force 

in Asia.26 Yet it still had chronic problems—weak leadership, corruption, 

unwillingness or inability to reform, weak support from the people, and 

lack of confidence. When the North Vietnamese attacked again in 1975, 

RVNAF proved inadequate for the task.

Field Advisors

Just as with Korea, the following focuses on those who performed 

daily, face-to-face advisory duty. For Vietnam, this includes MACV combat unit advisors with infantry regiments or marine brigades with infantry, 

airborne, ranger, marine, armor, or artillery battalions and CORDS pacification advisors on province or district teams or with MATs.27 This survey 

does not include Special Forces personnel working in the CIDG program, 

but it does include those on province or district teams. By 1970, MACV 

field advisory strength reached a high of 14,332. This included 2,976 combat unit advisors—regiment, battalion (infantry, marine, airborne, ranger), 

and other teams; 5,685 CORDS advisors—province and district teams; 

and 2,305 advisors on MATs. If the 1968 advisor strength was 7 division 

equivalents of officers and senior noncommissioned officers, the number 

was 8.65 division equivalents by 1970.28 An advisory effort of this scale 

generated a manpower requirement that was seldom fully met. Throughout 

the advisory effort, teams were often understrength and filled with personnel who did not meet the stated requirements for the position. 

Advisory Structure

Prior to 1961, MACV division advisory teams were authorized an 

infantry colonel as the division advisor, an infantry major and two noncommissioned officers for each of the three infantry regiments—no advisors were assigned to the three infantry battalions of four companies each, 

and a field artillery major and three noncommissioned officers for the artillery regiment.29 To address an increasing insurgent threat, the Secretary of 
33

Defense approved battalion advisory teams in December 1961. Authorized 

an infantry captain and a noncommissioned officer, many advisory teams 

consisted of volunteers. In any event, the immediate requirement to create battalion advisory teams for each RVNAF infantry battalion and the 

increase in RVNAF battalions meant that captains did not lead all teams. 

Frequently, a young US Army first lieutenant with 2 years service and no 

combat experience became the advisor to a commander twice his age who 

had 25 years of combat experience.30 In 1962, two USMC captains were 

authorized for each RVNAF marine battalion.31 Expansion of the RVNAF 

marine corps later led to the fielding of brigade and division advisory teams 

and the upgrade of battalion advisors to a major and captain. By 1964, infantry battalion advisory team authorizations increased to five personnel—a 

captain senior advisor, a first lieutenant assistant advisor, and a communications and two light weapons noncommissioned officers.32 Artillery battalion advisory teams and armor units were authorized a branch-qualified 

captain and a senior noncommissioned officer.33 From 1965 to 1969, the 

unit field advisory team authorizations remained constant: regiment with 

3 personnel, infantry battalion with 5, division with 52, and corps with 

143. Even so, at times personnel shortages reduced actual team strength by 

as much as 50 percent.34 In 1969, divisional advisory teams converted to 

CATs. Although the DCAT was reduced in strength, the RCAT and BCAT 

remained unchanged.35 During the drawdown, BCATs were eliminated by 

30 June 1971 except for airborne, marine, and the newly-raised infantry 

battalions. RCATs began phasing out on 1 September 1971.

Advising combat units was considered normal advisory duty. However, 

counterinsurgency generated a demand for civil-military advisors. When 

battalion advisor teams were approved in December 1961, a province 

senior advisor (PSA) was provided to 39 of the 44 province chiefs. By 

1966, there were 44 province advisory teams.36 Normally, province chiefs 

were military men responsible for all governmental and pacification programs in each province. In 1964, the MACV province advisory team was 

authorized 16 personnel: a lieutenant colonel province senior advisor; a 

major assistant province advisor; four captains each responsible for advising intelligence, operations and training, psychological warfare and civil 

affairs, or RF/PF units; a USAF captain air liaison officer; a lieutenant 

assistant RF/PF advisor; three senior noncommissioned officers each 

responsible for advising on intelligence, light weapons, or infantry; and 

five enlisted men for communications, medical, and administrative functions.37 Just as with combat advisory teams, shortages of qualified personnel were not unusual. In 1967, the creation of CORDS consolidated all 

civil-military advisory teams for the first time under MACV. On 28 May, 
34

Ambassador Robert Komer became Westmoreland’s deputy for CORDS. 

Shortly thereafter, DOD developed a program to upgrade the quality of 

military personnel serving in PSA or deputy PSA positions. At that time, 

civilians held PSA positions in 21 provinces with military PSA in the 

remaining 23. Because of the mix of civil-military activities, if a PSA was 

military, then the deputy was civilian; if civilian, the deputy was military.38 In November 1968, PSA positions were upgraded to colonel, but by 

January 1970, only one-third were filled by colonels.39 By 1970, province 

advisory teams generally consisted of at least 25 military and 19 civilian 

personnel.40

Each province was divided into districts governed by a RVNAF officer. In June 1964, 13 two-man teams of a captain and a senior noncommissioned officer were assigned to districts in seven important provinces. 

Although this test was inconclusive, MACV decided to create 113 five-man 

teams—a captain district senior advisor, a first lieutenant assistance district advisor, two senior noncommissioned officers, and a medic. Because 

each district varied significantly from the others, tailoring district advisory 

teams was permitted. Of the 181 teams authorized at the end of 1965, 169 

were deployed—133 by MACV and 36 by Special Forces personnel.41

Each of the 236 districts had advisory teams by the end of 1967.42 By 

1970, eight-man military advisory teams, authorized a major as the commander, worked with South Vietnamese district chiefs.43

Local security was the primary task of RF/PF units; however, no advisors worked with them until 1968. After preliminary testing, Westmoreland 

directed in October 1967 that 354 five-man MATs be raised to upgrade RF/

PF capabilities. MATs, composed of infantry combat veterans, were authorized a captain team leader, a first lieutenant assistant, and three noncommissioned officers—a light infantry weapons advisor, a heavy weapons 

advisor, and a medical specialist. Two RVNAF personnel, a lieutenant and 

an interpreter, joined each MAT.44 At the end of 1968, by using in-country 

personnel and creating a MAT advisory course in Vietnam, MACV met its 

goal of 354 MATs. In February 1970, the program expanded to 487 teams, 

but it proved difficult to provide experienced personnel.45 At the end of 

1971, only 66 MATs existed, and they were deactivated in 1972.

Advisor Roles

For combat units, prior to 1961 and just as the KMAG, the MAAGV field advisors focused on training and staff work at division and regiment. As a history of the early advisory effort emphasized, “Not only were 

most American military advisors unfamiliar with the society, culture and 

language of South Vietnam, but the advisory role itself was unfamiliar.” 
35

According to a senior advisor, the advisory role was “entirely new and 

challenging to most American soldiers . . . [who] spent most of their lives 

giving and executing orders. As advisors to South Vietnamese counterparts, they neither give nor take orders; they have a much less positive 

role—that of giving advice, providing guidance and exerting influence.”46

Accompanying RVNAF infantry battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations in 1962, MACV unit advisors were to advise and assist 

“on all matters pertaining to Operations, Tactics and Technique Doctrine, 

Training, Logistics, and Administration . . . [conduct] inspections to 

ensure . . . equipment is properly used, secured, and maintained . . . [and 

provide] information on status of Training and Logistics, on operations, 

and on major problems.”47 (See Appendix C, “Role of the Individual,” 

and Appendix D, Advisor “Do’s and Don’ts,” for additional guidance provided to advisors at that time.) The primary focus in the field became tactical advice and coordination of US combat support, fixed and rotary-wing 

close air support (CAS), and helicopter support for movement, resupply, 

and medical evacuation. Initial difficulties arose from inexperience with 

helicopter operations, from incompatibility of equipment, and from language problems.48 An advisor from this period said he had three roles: 

a US Army officer following orders and supervising US subordinates, a 

member of a RVNAF unit sharing its experiences and bonding with his 

counterpart, and a mediator interpreting and communicating between his 

counterpart and his US superiors.49

From 1965 to 1968, US combat units assumed the major burden of 

combat operations against NVA/VC units. RVNAF units supported pacification and local security efforts. For MACV unit advisors, life became 

more, not less, complicated. In March 1965, MACV noted that the tactical 

advisory effort had evolved from training to tactical advice to combat support. Advisor duties had increased to include “coordinating both artillery 

and helicopter and fixed-wing air support; acting as a conduit for intelligence; developing supply and support programs; improving communications between combat units and area commands (province and districts); 

and providing special assistance in such areas as psychological warfare, 

civic action, and medical aid.” MACV considered and rejected redesignating advisor teams as “combat support teams.”50 By the end of 1966, 

the US troop buildup had introduced additional advisor requirements “in 

the fields of law and order, morale and recreation, post exchange, base 

development, liaison, and visitor and community relations.” As advisors 

performed these additional duties, there was “the inevitable decrease in 

the attention to the primary mission.” Twenty-four-hour-a-day liaison had 

become a “most demanding” requirement for advisory teams.51
36

From 1968 to 1972, RVNAF assumed a greater role in combat operations, but the advisor’s role did not significantly change. A USMC advisor, 

one of only two assigned to his battalion, said his main job was “to be 

liaison to any American forces, no matter what they are . . . to be sure that 

the Americans know that . . . Vietnamese . . . are operating in that area, so 

we don’t have . . . friendly fire.” He hinted at the difficulty and the frustration in trying to coordinate combat support when planning consisted of 

“We go now.”52 During this period, MACV advisors described their primary field roles as not advising but “the continued coordinating with US 

units operating in the vicinity, obtaining and controlling light fire teams 

(heavily armed helicopters), US Air Force tactical airstrikes, US artillery 

support and helicopters for general use”; and as an “expediter” to get their 

counterparts to do what they knew to do, but put off doing.53 In 1969, unit 

advisor teams became CATs. Not only did the name change, but the mission changed “from advising to combat support coordination.”54 Until the 

US withdrawal in 1973, the coordination of US combat support assets and 

liaison with adjacent US and RVNAF units continued as the major duties 

of MACV unit advisors.

For the pacification effort, before 1964 MACV advisors assisted province chiefs, but no one worked at district level. That year, advisory teams 

were assigned to district chiefs and the province advisory teams expanded 

in size. At both levels, the teams worked security, political, economic, 

and social programs to improve the governance of the population and to 

increase its support for the GVN. The varied skills required, many beyond 

normal military expertise, made working at province or district demanding 

for soldiers, even without the cultural and language challenges. In 1965, 

when pacification focused largely on security, province and district advisors had to “work closely with not only their counterparts but also a myriad 

of higher, lower, and adjacent elements, all of which had to come together 

before anything substantial could be done.”55 The broad range of duties for 

senior advisors included implementing pacification plans; advising their 

GVN chief on security, civil affairs, psychological warfare, RF/PF issues, 

and RVNAF cooperation; coordinating all US and RVNAF operations 

within the province/district; and serving on a joint committee with the 

GVN province/district chief and the Department of State US Operations 

Mission (USOM) representative to oversee all civic action programs.56 A 

typical PSA often supervised and coordinated the efforts of up to 50 US 

military officers and 100 soldiers, 20 American and 50 local civilians, and 

US and third country contract employees in working with his province 

chief on security and pacification programs that involved RVNAF and US 

military units, US Agency for International Development (USAID), USIA, 
37

and non-governmental organizations (NGO).57 District advisors faced the 

same myriad of tasks, only on a smaller scale. Combat unit advisor duty 

appeared rather simple and straightforward when compared to province 

and district advisor duty.

In 1967, CORDS assumed responsibility for province and district 

advisory teams. By providing additional resources, developing better 

selection programs for senior advisors, and creating the MAT concept 

to upgrade RF/PF units, CORDS, in conjunction with GVN programs, 

brought improvement to the pacification programs. Created in 1968, the 

primary MAT mission was “to advise and instruct” RF companies, PF 

platoons, and RF/PF group headquarters on defensive techniques—“field 

fortifications, barrier systems, request and adjustment of indirect fires”; 

and on small unit tactics—“night operations, ambushes, patrols, weapons employment, emergency medical care, and other topics.” Its secondary mission was “to advise and assist” RF/PF headquarters and units in 

improving administrative and logistic procedures—“personnel accounting 

and record keeping, awards, promotions, morale and welfare, supply support, maintenance, field sanitation, and hygiene.” An additional MAT mission was “to provide a liaison capability with nearby US military forces.”58

By 1971, the MAT program had been expanded to include PSDF units 

and its mission modified “to advise and assist RF/PF leaders in improving 

RF/PF and PSDF effectiveness,” “to advise and assist RF/PF leaders to 

improve RF/PF administrative, and RF/PF and PSDF supply procedures,” 

“to provide liaison between the advised unit” and US forces, and “to assist 

PF/PSDF and other local groups and officials in the development and 

rehearsal of village/hamlet defense plans.”59 Each district had at least one 

MAT; most had more.

Advisor Selection and Tour Length

Before the increased involvement in South Vietnam in the early 1960s, 

MAAG-V duty was not a high priority. No particular selection criteria 

were required except rank, MOS, and vulnerability to an overseas tour. 

The underlying selection principle was that “generalists rather than specialists were best suited to the complicated task of advising a foreign army 

on a wide range of activities.” Since most officers were not specialists, this 

“tended to encourage the attitude that any Army officer was . . . qualified 

to serve as an advisor.”60 Officially a 1-year unaccompanied tour was the 

standard for almost all advisors; most served only 11 months. Separated 

from their families, most advisors considered MAAG-V duty a “hardship 

tour,” something to be endured before the next assignment. The short tour 

provided little incentive to tackle difficult cultural and language barriers, 
38

much less a long-term approach to improving RVNAF. An advisor noted 

that a RVNAF division commander would get an advisor “for 11 months, 

and then he’d get a new one. The new one would have to start from . . . 

zero . . . again. [The commander] had heard everything before, and he 

knew that the advisor didn’t understand the language and that the advisor 

couldn’t be everywhere all the time to see what was going on. . . . He knew 

all about how to handle advisors.”61 Even before major involvement in 

combat operations, the 1-year tour had affects on counterpart perceptions 

and behavior, as well as advisor attitudes.

Combat arms volunteers eager to serve in a combat environment filled 

most of the two-man MACV battalion advisory teams in 1962–63. Teams 

generally had an infantry officer, but sometimes a first lieutenant served 

instead of a captain. MACV advisory duty criteria were generally the 

same as those for promotion—attendance at appropriate military schools, 

successful command and/or service with US tactical units, and not having been passed over for promotion. In 1964, when battalion advisors 

were expanded to five-man teams, when five-man district advisory teams 

were fielded, and when RVNAF increased its number of battalions, the 

demand for qualified officers and noncommissioned officers—rank and 

MOS—exceeded supply. By then, “the importance of military experience 

in advisory postings at the lower levels had become irrelevant.”62 Not only 

did many advisors not have the appropriate rank for their position, many 

did not have the appropriate military experience or MOS. To compound 

the problem, the 1-year tour in South Vietnam normally meant 6 months 

advising a combat unit and the rest of the tour serving on a staff or in a 

different advisory assignment. Advisory duty remained desirable until the 

buildup of US combat units in 1965–66. By 1966, emphasis shifted from 

sending the best personnel to the advisory effort to sending them to US 

combat units. On 21 November 1966, Westmoreland wrote advisors that 

their work was “difficult and often frustrating” and that “the finest officers 

and NCOs are made available for assignment to MACV as advisors.”63

However, Westmoreland earlier made clear to his commanders that “the 

number one priority in importance in this theater of war is the quality of 

[the] commanding officer of US units.”64 If a shortage existed, personnel 

were to be transferred from the advisory effort to US combat units. Despite 

its initial attraction, advisory duty became something to avoid.

If combat unit advisory duty became unattractive, working on a province or district advisory team, a much more complex task outside most soldier’s comfort zone, carried even less appeal. MACV policy after October 

1966 directed that province and district advisors would serve a full 12-

month tour in their positions. Even exceptions made only for “compelling 
39

reasons” required approval of the MACV commander.65 By 1967, MACV 

recognized that the PSA or his deputy, if the PSA was a civilian, required 

highly-qualified personnel. On 29 November the Chief of Staff of the Army 

(CSA) approved a program that provided “substantial incentives to them 

and their families” for outstanding officers that met these qualifications: 

combat arms lieutenant colonel with combat and Vietnam service, former 

battalion commander, outstanding record, and ability to speak or aptitude 

to learn the Vietnamese language. Officers who accepted would receive 

special training followed by an 18-month tour in Vietnam. Incentives for 

volunteers included a personal letter of invitation to the program from 

the CSA; promotion preference; location preference in South Vietnam; 

preference for next assignment; special accommodations for family either 

stateside, Hawaii, or Guam; a 2-week leave with family in Hawaii after 

12 months; and a 30-day leave.66 Yet this program—full of personal and 

professional incentives and personally supported by the CSA—challenging 

the best qualified officers to become province senior advisors, received 

only a 35 percent acceptance rate from the initial group of letters. Two out 

of three declined. By December 1969, the acceptance rate reached 41.4 

percent.67

From 1964 to 1970, district senior advisors received no special 

selection or consideration until April 1970 when the Department of the 

Army created a district senior advisor (DSA) program. Similar in concept and incentives to the PSA program, this program was not optional. 

Officers could volunteer for consideration, but unlike the PSA program, 

DSA selectees were directed into the program. Officers were selected and 

assigned without their input or approval. Qualifications for the DSA program were rank of major; combat arms—infantry, armor, field artillery, air 

defense artillery, or engineer; CGSC graduate; prior Vietnam service; suitable personality and temperament; ability or aptitude to speak Vietnamese; 

and prior company command. Additional incentives for a 12-month tour 

included a $50 monthly special pay allowance and consideration for 

advanced civil schooling. An 18-month tour included similar incentives to 

the PSA program plus guaranteed secondary zone consideration for promotion, no involuntary unaccompanied tours for 5 years, and an invitation 

to join the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP).68 By the time the 

DSA program was beginning to get off the ground, the reduction of US 

troop strength brought it to a premature end.

In 1968, the MAT program was created from in-country assets. The 

decision to upgrade RF/PF units with experienced infantry personnel, officers and noncommissioned officers, required US Army, Vietnam (USARV) 

to create an advisory school at Di An, to provide instructors directly from 
40

RF/PF duty, and to provide qualified personnel with 4-to-6-months incountry experience for duty with a MAT. After the creation of the 354 

teams, MAT positions were filled by experienced personnel, as available, 

from the continental United States (CONUS) who spent their 12-month 

tour with a MAT. To reinforce this priority program, MAT leaders and 

their assistants received command credit. However, in October 1970 only 

80 captains were assigned to the 487 MATs.69 As with all the advisor programs in Vietnam, the demand for qualified personnel exceeded supply.

Advisor Preparation and Training

In the early years of MAAG-V, just as with KMAG, advisors received 

no special training or preparation. On arrival, they were provided a general orientation. In 1959, DOD contracted the Military Assistance Institute 

(MAI) to provide courses on different countries. A Vietnam course focused 

on general information on the country, its population, and customs. In 

March 1962, the Kennedy administration issued National Security Action 

Memorandum 131 requiring counterinsurgency instruction for military 

and civilian personnel—DOS, USAID, USIA, CIA—and special preparation for service in underdeveloped areas.70

With the expansion of the advisory effort in South Vietnam by the creation of two-man teams for each RVNAF infantry battalion, the Military 

Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course was created at Fort Bragg 

as part of the Special Warfare Center in February 1962. Initially a 4-week 

course designed for four types of students—infantry officers and noncommissioned officers advising infantry battalions or paramilitary units, 

field artillery officers and noncommissioned officers advising field artillery units, small arms repairmen, and field radio repairmen. The course 

expanded after three classes to 6 weeks. The initial 4-week program of 

instruction (POI) devoted 136 hours to academic subjects: area studies, 

counterinsurgency, weapons, communications, and demolitions.71 The 

April 1962 6-week POI had 217 academic hours for infantry battalion 

advisors—25 hours area study, 46 hours Vietnamese language, 57 hours 

counterinsurgency operations, 8 hours communications, 12 hours weapons, 8 hours demolitions, 22 hours physical conditioning, and 39 hours 

general subjects such as land navigation, first aid, and night operations.72

The MATA course revised its POI frequently to meet the changing needs 

of advisors in Vietnam, and language training increased to 50 percent of 

the course.73

The purpose of the MATA course was to provide “a working knowledge 

of the duties of a military assistance training advisor in counterinsurgency 

operations.”74 It was never intended to make experts in 6 weeks. However, 
41

it was intended to introduce advisors to the essential things they needed to 

be familiar with for advisory duty. Quickly, the focus of the MATA course 

became a familiarization with the Vietnamese culture and language and a 

general knowledge of advisor duties, responsibilities, and techniques—not 

technical or MOS skills. Students were branch qualified. MATA military 

training—weapons, communications, demolitions, counterinsurgency 

operations—focused on the techniques and equipment unique to advisors 

in Vietnam and comprised less than 50 percent of the course. To keep 

the POI current and to establish credibility, many previous advisors—US 

Army and USMC officers and noncommissioned officers—returned as 

MATA course instructors.75 Students found themselves challenged both 

by the amount of language training and by a “big library [of required 

and recommended readings] in each of . . . [their] rooms.”76 A MATA 

Handbook for Vietnam was developed for students, both as a reference 

for their technical training and as a source of suggestions for advisors 

(see Appendix E, “Tips to Advisors”). In October 1967, the US Army 

published its first and only field manual for advisors—FM 31-73, Advisor 

Handbook for Stability Operations. Developed at the Special Warfare 

Center, this manual provided the advisor “a ready reference on doctrine 

and techniques which are employed most frequently in stability operations” 

and included suggestions for advisors on developing counterpart relationships 

(see Appendix F, “Counterpart Relationship”).77 As with most military 

instruction, the MATA course received mixed reviews from students, based 

on varied expectations and abilities. But many would agree with a USMC first 

lieutenant MATA student and a later instructor who said, “I left the MATA 

course knowing that this was going to be a very different experience . . . [and] 

prepared . . . not to expect everything I would face, but to expect that I was 

going to be immersed in a very different culture and adapting to that culture 

and understanding it was going to be complicated.”78

Vietnamese proved a difficult language to learn. At most, students 

took away some conversational and military phrases from their MATA 

instruction. Having native Vietnamese speakers enhanced the introductory 

language training and put a personal face on Vietnam by exposing 

students to cultural issues and introducing the more adventuresome to 

the cuisine.79 One officer recalled, “Fifty percent of your training was 

Vietnamese language, small classes, Vietnamese instructors and no more 

than 8, 10, 12 to a class so you took 4 hours of language a day and you 

had the tapes and you worked with the tapes at night, then you had 4 hours 

where you got cultural studies, tactics, operations, field experience, radios, 

communications—it was a good course.”80 Another said, “In general, you 

will spend 4 hours a day learning how to be an advisor and another 4 
42

attempting to learn the Vietnamese language. The language training is 

probably the most important part of the course.”81 If 50 percent of a 6-

week MATA course seemed excessive, the 12-week MATA POI for Laos 

placed even greater emphasis on language training with 300 hours of 

language instruction out of 420 total hours—71 percent of the course.82

Having some knowledge of the language was considered important both 

for the advisor and for his counterpart beyond basic communications. It 

indicated a willingness by the advisor to try to understand the Vietnamese; 

it suggested an interest deep enough to learn something about Vietnam. 

Those going to battalion, province, or district advisory teams received 

priority for additional language training varying from 8 to 12 weeks at the 

Defense Language Institute.83 Even the best students expected to continue 

to build on their basic language skills once in South Vietnam.

By 1970, a 3-month Marine Advisor Course was taught at Quantico. 

Besides refreshing basic infantry skills, over half the course was devoted to 

total-immersion Vietnamese language training. Unlike the MATA course 

with emphasis on handy phrases and rote memorization, this instruction 

focused on grammar and structure. But unlike the MATA course, it lacked 

Vietnamese instructors. Because Marines who had served on interrogatortranslator teams in Vietnam presented the language training, a former 

student described it as “roughly equivalent to making a photocopy from 

a photocopy. We were two steps away from the original, and not quite as 

precise in our tones.” He declared the result to be a “third language—a 

tongue alien to both Vietnamese and English speakers but perfectly clear 

to us co-van.”84 Most sorted out these differences in South Vietnam. 

However, this example reinforces that in language and cultural matters, 

close is often not close enough.

On 10 January 1969, the Special Warfare School was expanded and 

redesignated the Institute for Military Assistance (IMA). Courses taught 

were a 6-week MATA (ARVN) course for officers assigned as field tactical 

and logistical advisors, a 6-week MATA (SR NCO) course for noncommissioned officer field advisors, and a 6-week MATA (CORDS) course 

for officers assigned as members of district and province advisor teams. 

The first two were updated versions of previous MATA courses. In fiscal year 1972, a 12-week Military Assistance Security Advisor (MASA) 

course that included 8 weeks of language training was initiated for military intelligence officer advisors at the Province or District Intelligence 

Operations and Coordination Center (PIOCC/DIOCC).85 These latter two 

courses met the CORDS requirement for specialized training, although 

late in the process, for all province and district team members, not just the 

senior advisors.
43

CORDS province senior advisors (PSA) and district senior advisors (DSA) had the most complex advisory jobs—including security 

and combat affairs, logistical matters, police affairs, intelligence matters, 

Chieu Hoi program, refugee programs, psychological operations, Hamlet 

Development cadre, civilian medical services, civil construction and 

public works, community development, and civilian governmental programs.86 Yet they received very little specialized training. With the PSA 

program in 1967, a special 11-week training program was provided in 

Washington, DC, at the Vietnamese Training Center of the Department 

of States’ Foreign Service Institute. This was expanded to 33 weeks in 

1970 for each PSA and deputy PSA (DPSA). Other than training for the 

PSA/DPSA, most CORDS advisors attended the MATA or a civil affairs 

course at Fort Gordon.87 A 6-week basic and a 42-week extended course 

designed to prepare military officers and civilians for service with CORDS 

were opened to district senior advisors in 1969. The 6-week POI of 240 

hours devoted 60 hours to country orientation/background, 143 hours to 

operations of which only 57.5 hours addressed the role of the advisor, and 

14 hours for language overview. However, the follow-on 42-week POI 

consisted of 1,125 hours of Vietnamese language study and 135 hours of 

advanced studies: Vietnam/South East Asia orientation, rural development, advisor techniques, military subjects of concern to CORDS, and 

updates on the Vietnam situation.88 Not until 1969–70 could a DSA attend 

District Operation Courses at the Foreign Service Institute.

Although most advisors arriving in South Vietnam went directly to 

their units after a brief orientation, there were two exceptions. After 1964, 

when district advisory teams were created, district advisors received training in Vietnam from the Office of Civil Operations and then CORDS after 

1967. By February 1968, a Handbook for Military Support of Pacification

was available for district and province team members.89 After MATs were 

created in 1968, USARV established an Advisor School at Di An to train 

MAT members. Former MAT leaders served as instructors. The 125-hour 

POI focused on general advisory subjects (38 hours), weapons training (29 

hours), tactics (21 hours), and language training with native speakers (37 

hours).90 A rf / pf Advisors Handbook, published in January 1971, offered 

suggestions for “Advising the RF/PF” (see appendix G).91 The course 

proved effective in getting the initial teams fielded from in-country personnel in 1968 and in getting replacement MAT members ready for their 

duty with RF/PF and eventually PSDF units afterwards.

Challenges of the Advisory Environment

Prior to 1960, MAAG-V advisors had worked for years with a 

RVNAF that valued political reliability over military competence. Divided 
44

command with overlapping responsibilities encouraged by President 

Diem, widespread corruption permitted by Diem, and previous combat 

experience under the French had created a South Vietnamese officer corps 

where “few . . . shared, or even understood, the American officers’ belief 

in coordination, team-work, loyalty to superiors and subordinates, knowhow, and delegation of authority . . . ideas . . . fundamental to US-style 

military operations.”92 Advisors, “separated by a wide gulf of culture 

and language,” had “only the vaguest idea of the effect” of their advice. 

Counterparts appeared to be friendly and open to advice, but the “advice 

seldom produced significant results.” Combined with a short-tour length 

and favorable reports influenced by a “dogged ‘Can-Do’ attitude” of most 

advisors who viewed “all faults in the Vietnamese Army as correctable, all 

failures as temporary,” MAAG-V remained either ignorant or powerless 

to address major RVNAF deficiencies.93 After 1962, US advisors received 

training for advisory duty. How well it prepared a field advisor “to befriend 

and influence his counterpart within the context of the existing South 

Vietnamese politico-military system” remained to be determined.94

Understanding: Culture and Language

Americans and South Vietnamese lived basically in two different 

worlds, separated by a “linguistic and cultural barrier . . . that was almost 

impossible for the advisor to breach.”95 This fact remained despite advisor training programs. At best, the training created an awareness of some 

cultural differences, but understanding, accepting, and respecting cultural 

differences by both the advisor and his counterpart was the real need. 

Many advisors saw Vietnam as both an alien and inferior place.96 They 

treated the Vietnamese like “undereducated and underprivileged children.” The problem became so widespread that MACV forbade use of the 

phrase “little people.”97 Lack of respect worked both ways. An advisor 

observed, “Ironically, what ultimately emerged was a situation in which 

the Americans look down on the Vietnamese, who were at the same time 

looking down on the Americans.” To many Vietnamese, Americans were 

“arrogant, blundering, clumsy, gullible, and wasteful.” Americans liked 

dogs, but did not respect the elderly or traditional things. They “insulted 

everything and everyone . . . by boisterous, intemperate conduct and 

by ungracious displays of wealth.” Rarely were “Americans spoken of 

respectfully.”98 Bringing these two worlds together was at the heart of the 

advisor and counterpart relationship—a key to developing rapport.

Many advisors, reflecting their American military culture, found it 

difficult to understand, much less accept, Vietnamese ways. Just as in 

Korea, the “concept of face” remained critical. Among the more significant 
45

differences—shown through behavior, attitudes, or values—were a 

“preference for indirectness,” both in speech and in confronting issues 

that was viewed by Americans as deviousness or dishonesty; a “relaxed 

and fatalistic attitude toward time” viewed as laziness or indifference; the 

“importance of tradition and ritual” viewed as outdated or irrelevant; a 

“relative indifference to human beings” not directly connected by family 

viewed as uncaring or inhuman; the “importance of taboos” viewed as 

superstition or backwardness; and the “most common criteria of the good 

life” viewed as alien.99 Americans saw themselves in Vietnam to change 

the way things were done, caring little for tradition or how things were 

done before. Americans saw things as good or bad, black or white, caring 

little for reconciling differences or contradictions. Americans attacked 

problems quickly and directly; Vietnamese approached problems slowly 

and indirectly. Americans analyzed a problem, made a decision, and 

then developed a plan; Vietnamese started with a decision and worked 

backwards deciding on what and how to do things. American leadership 

was about the duties and responsibilities of the position, the institution; 

Vietnamese leadership was about the commander, the man.100 It took 

time, even for the best advisors, to work their way through this cultural 

labyrinth. In the meantime, most discovered that “things were not always 

as they appeared to be . . . [many] had formed opinions too quickly . . . 

one of the most common, most serious mistakes a ‘new guy’ was capable 

of making.”101 The advisor had to remember that cultural differences were 

real and “that he must take them always into account. This seems like 

gratuitous advice . . . [it was often] ignored by the complacent advisor 

who has his counterpart ‘all figured out’—by American standards—and 

then is astounded when his counterpart does something ‘entirely out of 

character.’”102

Field advisors learned not to judge Vietnamese reactions by appearances of agreement or by smiles on their faces. A 1962–63 battalion advisor found that his counterpart “would do it in the typical oriental fashion 

and say, ‘Yes, you are right, we will do that,’ and then he would do it his 

own way . . . rather typical in all of Vietnam in those days. They would tell 

you what you wanted to hear and do what they thought had to be done.”103

As with most nationalities, “an ingrained dislike of foreigners was central 

to the Vietnamese outlook. . . . Vietnamese xenophobia was very real. 

Foreigners . . . often overlooked this because the ‘Vietnamese way’ dictated that such feeling be concealed. The polite smile and the seemingly 

obsequious behavior of many Vietnamese was a mask that often concealed 

contempt for the foreigner.” A RVNAF officer reminded an intelligence 

advisor, “you can’t help it if you’re American, but you should always 
46

remember that very few of our people are capable of genuine positive 

feelings toward you. You must assume that you are not wholly liked and 

trusted, and not be deceived by the Asian smile.”104

Lack of understanding worked both ways. Cultural and linguistic differences, combined with institutional, professional, and personal differences, made “it . . . often difficult for an advisor and his counterpart to 

understand one another. What one viewed as a reasonable approach to a 

problem was often viewed as inane by the other. Other than making a sincere effort to understand one another’s views, little could be done to close 

this cultural gap.”105 As one unit advisor observed, “We did not understand 

what was going on in Vietnam. We were in a foreign land among people 

of a different culture and mindset. . . . The information sent across the 

cultural divide was not the information received. There was a disconnect. 

One thing was said and another thing was heard. One thing was meant 

and another thing was understood. . . . Meaning, intent, and truth were 

lost in translation.”106 More than one advisor realized “slowly . . . how little 

I really did understand. . . . [with experience] I was beginning to have a 

deeper appreciation of the questions, and that was a beginning.”107

Despite some familiarization with the Vietnamese language, few 

advisors developed what they considered adequate proficiency. Training 

was too short; the language was too difficult. A district advisor declared 

that language skills are “the single most important prerequisite for 

success” and that a “raw fact is that there can be no more advisors than 

there are people able to communicate,” either advisor or interpreter.108

Another added, “The first step for an advisor is to determine a desirable 

solution to a military problem. The second is to communicate that solution 

accurately, completely (and persuasively) to his counterpart. Obviously 

command of the native language is highly useful here.”109 Situational 

awareness, not to mention understanding, could be jeopardized. “Few 

advisors mastered the language, and we were often hopelessly baffled and 

frequently misunderstood,” said a 1962 battalion advisor who continued, 

“not a day went by that I did not find certain situations confusing. I was 

never entirely certain of what I was being told or what was happening. Most 

time, being in the dark was of no consequence. But it was frustrating and 

at times embarrassing. . . . Advisors did not really know the Vietnamese 

language, and for the most part Vietnamese did not know English. We 

were strangers, one to the other.”110 An early district advisor with only one 

team member found language “the biggest stumbling block. . . . I couldn’t 

speak Vietnamese and no one there could speak English . . . the first couple 

of months, the only thing we did was all with hand signals until we got 

an interpreter. But even working through interpreters is still difficult.”111
47

Hand signal communication was of limited value for skills that could be 

mimicked, but of almost no practical use to a district advisory team.

Many RVNAF officers, particularly at the higher commands, had 

some English language training, but few were fluent. Since advisors 

and counterparts were unable to communicate effectively, Vietnamese 

interpreters attempted to fill the gap. When available, RVNAF interpreters 

of varying ability were assigned to combat units and to district and province 

chiefs. One advisor found that “Interpreters, although useful, have many 

drawbacks... they introduce inevitable inaccuracies into conversations. . . 

[and] discourage the frank exchange of views . . . permitted by a private 

talk between a counterpart and his advisor.” He further recommended using 

written suggestions because they reinforced the advisor’s suggestion and 

might clear up any misunderstanding, because they provided a memorandum 

for the counterpart to consider if he desired to delay decision, and because 

they provided a formality and written authority to the advice.112 A district 

advisor in 1968 found “they tell you in school to try and build rapport, 

whatever that means and so . . . we tried to work on that. I spent an awful 

lot of time with him [counterpart] . . . but I didn’t understand a lot of what 

was going on. I had an interpreter with me all the time, but the interpreter 

knew what was good for him and didn’t always interpret everything . . . the 

interpreter was an ARVN guy, not an American guy.”113 Depending heavily 

on interpreters, most advisors became “victims of the language barrier. . . 

not fully aware of what was going on around them. . . . This . . . was a 

crippling weakness, since few interpreters could or would render faithfully 

what they heard. . . . Failure to interpret accurately and completely was 

the rule rather than the exception. Many interpreters simply could not 

understand their American supervisor’s English, but they would not dare 

to compromise their limitations. . . . The most common result was an 

incomplete and often inaccurate job of interpreting that was bound to lead 

to misunderstandings. And sometimes the interpreters’ inaccuracies were 

deliberate.”114 One advisor added frankly that the “inevitable consequences 

of these limitations was that many Americans were flying blind the entire 

time they served in Vietnam.”115

Developing Rapport with Counterpart

Developing mutual trust and confidence, rapport between the advisor 

and his counterpart, remained the mantra for advisor training. Improving 

the technical proficiency of the unit and establishing a productive personal relationship with his counterpart received emphasis in training, in 

publications, and in Vietnam. By befriending his commander, MACV 

expected the field advisor to “influence his counterpart within the context 
48

of the existing South Vietnamese politico-military system.”116 Unlike in 

Korea, no combined military command was established; where EUSA had 

commanded and demanded, MACV coordinated and suggested. Where 

President Rhee, in response to EUSA concerns, had demanded better leadership and improvements in combat performance from ROKA, no South 

Vietnamese government required RVNAF to respond to MACV concerns. 

Unlike Korea, advisors and counterparts did not receive the same, strong 

message through their chains of command. Without a common understanding of what was expected from the advisor-counterpart relationship, 

MACV advisors found that personal rapport became their primary tool 

for working with their counterparts. The US field advisor was expected 

to work effectively with his counterpart, but the RVNAF unit commander 

or province/district chief felt little need to respond unless he trusted his 

advisor’s advice or unless he needed the combat support or civic action 

assets his advisor could provide.

Establishing credibility and understanding his counterpart facilitated 

rapport. Advisors without combat experience or rank equal to their counterpart were often viewed as less than qualified—thus, an insult or loss 

of face. A district senior advisor noted his district chief “did not like the 

idea that his counterpart was a captain and not a major” as authorized.117

Another found that “I couldn’t do much advising when I got there . . . the 

district chief that was there had been there for 8 or 10 years. He knew 

everything about this district.”118 A Marine advisor noted, “Face is not just 

about embarrassment; face is about power and perceptions of who has it 

and who doesn’t in any given situation. A combat commander who loses 

face, especially when his personal and professional competence is at issue, 

can see his power as an effective leader be undercut severely or evaporate altogether.”119 Not surprisingly, few counterparts initially respected a 

MACV advisor with no combat experience, less military service, less rank, 

and perhaps a MOS unrelated to the unit. Even though the counterpart may 

have had years of combat experience, an advisor noted, “what you finally 

came down to is . . . [the commander] knew more about fighting guerrilla 

war than I knew because he had been doing it most of his life . . . [but] we 

had to coordinate all the helicopter gun ships, and we could get air strikes 

in, and then we could work with people like USOM and USAID, and 

so we were a kind of go-between between him and support activities.”120

While the MACV advisor “was quite capable of putting 100 percent of his 

energy into the war, since his stay was short, but [for the counterpart] it’s 

impossible to put 100 percent effort into a conflict for 20 years. And this 

is what . . . [most advisors] expected.”121 MACV field advisors, normally 

the most junior and least experienced, found it took time, already limited 
49

by duty assignments and tour lengths, and effort by both sides to develop 

an understanding of their counterpart.

Understanding the South Vietnamese military’s structure, roles, 

responsibilities, values, and procedures was equally important for advisors in developing rapport. It required that “the advisor must learn to recognize and evaluate the relative role of his counterpart in the Vietnamese 

military’s social structure, his freedom of action and of expression, before 

he can develop a useful working relationship with him.”122 Leading by 

example, the old American standby, did not always work because RVNAF 

and American leadership concepts were not the same. While counterparts 

“might . . . come to admire the American advisor’s enthusiasm and effort, 

they were not necessarily inspired to follow the example.”123 RVNAF military expectations were not those of the Americans. As a 1970-71 USMC 

advisor later observed:

By inclination and training, we co-vans [advisors] tended 

to be systems oriented. We sought to establish habits, procedures, and systems that would enable the Vietnamese 

Marines to move into new surroundings and face new 

situations and carry out new missions, despite all the 

accompanying uncertainties. We wanted our Vietnamese 

counterparts to step forward and seize new responsibilities 

with confidence whenever the situation demanded, rather 

than staying in their own backyards of military expertise. 

We also sought to ingrain, through training useful patterns 

of service and operations that would help them withstand 

the rough shock of war and continue to function effectively. Finally, we wanted them to understand and appreciate all the ways in which they could support each other 

and strengthen the team.

On the other hand, the Vietnamese, to the extent that they 

still paid homage to the Cult of the Commander, did not 

see fitting themselves into systems and patterns as all that 

important. It was the commander, with his knowledge, 

courage, good instincts, and good luck, with possibly the 

Mandate of Heaven thrown in, who was all all-important. 

Systems were things to be either used or circumvented, 

for the benefit of the commander or his family, or perhaps his units, in some cases. So it was not realistic to 

expect Vietnamese commanders to convert instantly to 

cookbook leadership, no matter how many great ideas we 

might manage to set down on paper.124
50

Besides the “cult of the commander,” important differences included 

the preference for staff positions with promotion and power versus command with responsibility and risk; the importance of political reliability 

versus military competence; the focus on the status quo and doing the 

safe, approved-by-higher-headquarters thing versus independent, bold 

action; the system of rewards and punishments; and different relationships 

between commanders and commanded.125 An advisor could not understand his counterpart nor know what was possible without understanding 

the institutional constraints under which he labored. 

Developing rapport was just the beginning, the prerequisite to advising. The advisor “had to go beyond . . . [a good relationship] by coming 

to grips with the realities of the situation, developing a firm understanding 

of the problem and communicating his suggestions to his counterpart.”126

An advisor noted that gaining trust and confidence was “only the prelude 

to his major objective: inspiring his counterpart to effective action.”127

Experienced advisors learned that the most useful advice addressed 

problems from the perspective of their counterparts working within the 

RVNAF military system and within its capabilities. This was particularly the case for province and district advisors where knowledge of local 

conditions and local expectations was essential to doing effective work. 

Many a well-meaning advisor engaged in projects that made sense to an 

American, but did little for the Vietnamese. As an advisor noted, “Clearly, 

an intimate knowledge of the people—their customs, mores, attitudes, values, taboos—is indispensable in conducting intelligent and effective civic 

actions. Here, the US advisor can be at a real disadvantage.”128 Another 

advisor was told, “you insist on doing it [improving our living conditions] 

as if my people were not Vietnamese but Americans. All the things that are 

good for you are not good for them. . . . A good life here is not the same as 

the good life in America. You must first ask yourself what the Vietnamese 

need and want. We must answer these questions.”129 And there was not a 

universal answer, for local conditions, regional differences, and economic 

variables all had to be considered.

Different advisors used different approaches at different times with 

their counterparts. A 1967 battalion advisor said his RVNAF commander 

“was a seasoned fighter who never spoke to me in English. In fact, he 

rarely spoke to me but I could see signs that he had confidence in my 

ability to function in the capacity he desired.”130 Suggestions were provided 

in various documents to assist advisors. (See appendixes C through F for 

a sample of the ideas provided from 1962 to 1971.) However, the basic fact 

for advisors remained that “criticism, no matter how constructive and well 

meant, is seldom well received, even under the best of circumstances. . . . 
51

The concept of ‘face’ . . . came into play. . . . Vietnamese commanders 

at all levels had an ingrained reluctance to be seen as relying too heavily 

on the advice of their [advisors] . . . many of us had adopted an indirect 

approach. . . . The subtle approach generally worked for nice little gems 

and nuggets of ideas, when there was no requirement for immediate 

actions or decisionmaking. But how could we continue to use this facesaving (for our counterparts), indirect technique of persuasion when 

practically everything needed fixing simultaneously and immediately” 

remained a classic dilemma for advisors.131

Most advisors came to realize that “determination, patience, and perseverance were the most important virtues demanded of advisors . . . more 

important than the ability to face danger with confidence and resolution” 

when working through the daily frustrations and inevitable misunderstandings.132 Another essential trait was common sense—not what made 

sense to an American, but what made sense to an American working in 

Vietnam with his RVNAF counterpart. As a district advisor noted, “There 

was no course to take or book to read that would guarantee success. He 

had to feel his way along, charting his course with great care, hoping to 

avoid pitfalls along the way. Since no two districts were alike, he could not 

rely on the experience of his peers . . . his greatest asset—common sense. 

In the end, it was this uncommon commodity that separated the successful 

advisor from the failure. If he had this everything was possible; without 

it, nothing could save him.”133 A former advisor offered that in working 

with his counterpart, a good advisor “overlooks no opportunity to give 

deserved praise,” “avoids . . . the pernicious practice of criticizing . . . 

behind his back,” “remains unobtrusive . . . directing the spotlight on his 

counterpart,” “voices . . . disagreements in private,” “praises the good features of proposals” with which he disagrees, and does not “box in” his 

“counterpart to the extent that you appear to be forcing him to take action 

in your favor—especially if that action would be unpopular.”134 Not only 

wrestling with their counterparts to improve RVNAF operations, US field 

advisors wrestled with MACV requirements and with their American military background. 

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal

MACV expected field advisors to improve the combat effectiveness of 

RVNAF units or to implement pacification efforts in provinces and districts. 

Without a combined commander making demands on both MACV advisors 

and RVNAF commanders to produce results, advice often was not acted 

on. Most advisors found themselves combat support or pacification support 

coordinators and liaison officers to US and allied units rather than tactical 
52

or pacification advisors to their counterparts. Appropriate advice supported 

by hard-earned rapport, rather than leverage or formal system, accounted 

for whatever effectiveness a field advisor had with his counterpart. The 

frequent turnover of advisors due to 6-month duty assignments and a 

12-month tour meant multiple advisors for RVNAF counterparts, but 

no continuity to the advisory effort. Each time a new advisor arrived, he 

started over in developing a working relationship with his counterpart and 

in developing an understanding of the situation of his unit, province, or 

district. Of course, MACV required regular reports—initially subjective 

assessments followed by a more comprehensive system. Not surprisingly, 

“the dogged ‘Can Do’ attitude of most officers and noncommissioned 

officers who tended to see all faults in the army as correctable, all failures 

as temporary,” and the expectation of results contributed to inaccurate and 

overly optimistic reporting.135 MACV ensured that field advisors “who 

became too frustrated with the performance of their counterparts, or those 

whose reports were too critical,” were “quietly but promptly relieved and 

transferred.”136

American military advisors tended to be confident, self-assured, and 

results-oriented. Empathy was not an American military strength. “If only 

an advisor can place himself in the shoes of his counterpart and truly 

understand and appreciate the counterpart’s problems and frustrations, 

then he can assist in the alleviation of these problems and frustrations,” 

offered an advisor. “Unfortunately, an advisor frequently arrives on the 

scene with preconceived ideas and charges full speed ahead without the 

slightest idea or care about the effect that it has on the counterpart.”137 A 

district advisor described Americans as “playing catch up all the time” 

but wanting to “fix everything right now” by being “always in a hurry,” 

and having “to do things.”138 Another district advisor ran into a senior 

US officer who told him, “We can’t trust these guys to do that. You get in 

there and do it for them!” The advisor responded that “I couldn’t believe 

what I was hearing . . . the American leader, a brigadier general saying 

exactly the opposite of what the advisory courses are teaching.”139 Such 

misunderstandings about advisory duty were common. Another noted 

that the “largest single cause leading to senior advisors being relieved 

was their inability to maintain a working relationship with the district 

chief. Rarely were they relieved due to incompetence, laziness, or lack 

of aggressiveness. Ironically, it was often characteristics such as aggressiveness and a willingness to ‘get the job done quickly’ that led to their 

dismissal.”140 At the other extreme was the experience of a 23-year old 

first lieutenant senior district advisor:

I was determined and eager to do my best. Given free reign 
53

by a do-nothing, but compliant district chief, I began to 

accept a growing list of duties and responsibilities. . . . 

In many ways I controlled life and death of thousands 

of the people. . . . With no one around to give me my 

true measure, I began to accept my elevated status, and I 

began to use the powers in my hands as if they were mine 

by right. Most of the responsibilities were not truly mine, 

but I knew the district chief would approve anything I 

did, and if I didn’t do it, I had the definite impression that 

very little would get done. Perhaps it was only youthful 

American arrogance that made me take those powers that 

were outside my rightful reach, perhaps it was the almost 

mystical idealism with which I took on my whole task, 

but when I had the chance to get something done I byGod took it! Perhaps I was just a high-tone American, but 

in my dreams I was a cavalier for freedom, I was a warrior for Camelot. Even more that that. I was a Warrior 

King.141

MACV field advisors remained what they were: American military 

personnel with all of their capabilities and all of their limitations.

Counterpart Observations

The US Army Center of Military History sponsored a series of 

Indochina monographs written by former South Vietnamese military leaders. The following comments are drawn primarily from two of these studies, 

both published in 1980: The U.S. Adviser and RVNAF and US Operational 

Cooperation and Coordination. The term “advisor” in Vietnam implied 

the “power behind the throne”; a negative connotation that “saving face” 

required RVNAF commanders to avoid.142 Consequently, most advisors were simply dai dien, or “representatives” of the US government.143

Marine advisors were co-van, or “trusted friend.”144 The overall goal of the 

American advisory effort was to organize, train, and equip RVNAF and to 

develop combat effectiveness appropriate to maintain internal security and 

to defend against external attack. 

In the early 1960s, RVNAF commanders “found American training 

and warfare methods too inflexible, too mechanical, and not realistically 

adapted to the Vietnam battlefield. The language barrier and cultural difference . . . formed a wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap. To a certain 

extent, the Vietnamese were not interested in training and did not think it 

was necessary . . . they were experienced enough and knew how to fight 

this kind of war. American tactical advice was something they thought they 
54

could do without.”145 Thus, RVNAF battalion commanders found MAAGV company-grade advisors of limited usefulness when conducting combat 

operations. The advisors tended to focus on technical and logistical issues 

rather than combat or tactical matters. However, with the increase of US 

combat support assets, advisors became more important to their counterparts as providers of combat support.146 From 1965 to 1968, US combat 

forces focused on combat operations and RVNAF assumed a secondary 

role mostly confined to pacification support. Many advisors saw a serious decline during this period as RVNAF units “were seldom given the 

opportunity to develop their combat effectiveness, bound as they were to 

the tedious task of pacification support and territorial security responsibility. Boredom and routine . . . eroded their combat skill and spirit to 

the point that they became almost as passive and as lethargic as the territorial forces.”147 After Tet in 1968, RVNAF resumed combat operations 

with MACV advisors providing combat support and liaison with adjacent 

American units. Combined operations with US combat units, designed to 

increase RVNAF confidence and capability, actually caused many RVNAF 

personnel to “regard Americans as protectors and providers instead of 

advisors and comrades-in-arms.”148 After the war, several former RVNAF 

officers thought, “it is unfortunate that US . . . [personnel] at the top echelons of the structure did not push hard enough for [RVNAF] improvements. . . . The advisory effort should have endeavored first to bring about 

an effective command, control, and leadership system . . . before trying to 

improve the combat effectiveness of small units. If this priority had been 

established, the entire advisory effort would have been more beneficial.”149

At any rate, neither South Vietnamese nor American leaders were willing 

or able to tackle this problem during the war. What was seemingly clear 

afterwards was not so at the time.

The role of the advisor was acknowledged as “not an easy one.” It 

was hard to understand, accept, or change dissimilarities between the 

RVNAF and the US—culture, way of life, and military concepts. It was 

easy to change technical and procedural issues, but it remained impossible 

to reconcile these differences quickly. This became a matter of personality, trust, confidence, rapport, and time. Nevertheless, impatient and often 

inexperienced American advisors tended to deluge their commanders with 

suggestions, plans, and programs seemingly as fast as they could think of 

them. “To his counterpart . . . it was not always easy to cope with all of 

them at the same time, because there were certain things the advisor would 

fail to recognize as difficult or impossible unless he was a Vietnamese 

commander.”150 Advisors did not always consider their counterpart’s situation nor did they always provide advice pertinent to the situation. It 
55

was the quality of the advice, not the quantity, that was important to the 

commander. 

Former RVNAF commanders believed that a lack of advisor language 

skills and the short-tour length adversely affected the advisory effort. A 

former senior RVNAF officer stated, “I know of no single instance in 

which a US advisor effectively discussed professional matters with his 

counterpart in Vietnamese. The learning and development of a new language seemed to have no appeal for US advisors who must have found it 

not really worth the effort because of the short tour of duty in Vietnam.”151

By the end of the war, many RVNAF commanders had worked with 20 to 

30 advisors, and “every change of advisor disturbed the atmosphere of the 

unit.”152 Further, the “1-year tour seemed not conducive to . . . extensive 

preparations . . . other than perfunctory requirements and a brief orientation course prior to field deployment.”153 They believed an advisor only 

really knew his job at the beginning of a second advisory tour. To become 

a good tactical advisor required “a certain continuity and stability of effort 

devoted to a unit” and they recommended 18 months as a minimum tour 

length, with a preference for 2-year tours.154

MACV combat unit advisors, although few in number, were considered 

“instrumental in the gradual improvement” of RVNAF units. Not only 

did their counterparts learn “a great deal from them,” but advisors served 

“as a catalyst through which changes and improvements were attained” 

and provided “the incentive that stimulated and spurred actions” by both 

the commander and his unit.155 But there were downsides. Reliance on 

US combat support assets tended to establish the primacy of the advisor 

during combat operations. One “consequence of over-reliance on material 

assets as substitutes for initiative and prowess was a failure to develop 

the infantryman’s capabilities to the full . . . organized and trained by 

US standards and exposed for a long time to US warfare methods, . . . 

units inevitably became accustomed to conducting operations with an 

abundance of supporting material resources . . . [and] when American 

presence and assistance were no longer available, the morale and combat 

effectiveness of ARVN units became uncertain.”156 Another consequence 

was an “overriding influence” of the advisor that “sometimes tended to 

stifle the . . . commander’s own initiative . . . diminish his authority and 

prestige . . . [and] tarnish the role of the ARVN commander in the eyes of 

his troops.” Sometimes this made the commander “excessively reliant and 

sometimes totally dependent on his advisor.” When this happened, “the 

commander’s initiative, sense of responsibility, and personal authority 

became seriously affected and in the long run, the advisor’s presence had 
56

the undesirable effect of reducing the counterpart’s chances for asserting 

and developing his command and leadership abilities.”157

CORDS pacification advisors received high marks for their work. 

Province chiefs were senior, combat-experienced military officers who 

understood the local situation better than his senior advisor, whether military or civilian ever could. But, the American provincial advisory effort 

brought resources, assets, and an advisory staff much more capable than 

anything available to the province chief. In contrast to province chiefs, district chiefs were young, enthusiastic, and inexperienced; quite incapable 

of managing three to six RF companies, 40 PF platoons, and thousands of 

PSDF personnel, much less the myriad of nonmilitary responsibilities.158

The advisory team “at the district level was truly beneficial for the pacification program and contributed substantially to the general war effort.”159 At 

the lowest-level pacification effort, district advisory team members were 

“a special kind of advisor. Because of the combat and social environment 

in which he lived and operated and the many and highly diversified problems he had to solve, the district advisor at the end of his tour had truly 

become a political-military advisor in his own right.”160 Working with RF, 

PF, and PSDF units for province and district advisory teams, the MAT 

effort was considered the “most important and outstanding among US 

contributions . . . [for] the expansion and upgrading of the Regional and 

Popular Forces which in time made up over one-half of the RVNAF total 

strength and became as modernized in armament as the regular forces.”161

CORDS advisors were “the main source of stimulation, incentive for better performance and more devotion by all Vietnamese concerned with the 

pacification program.”162 Despite this outstanding work, suggestions for 

improvement included, “advisors at the province and district levels should 

have been required to speak the language . . . because this was the only 

means of developing an insight into the local problems of pacification and 

developing the kind of rapport with the local people that was conducive to 

success. . . . The ability to speak the language . . . was a most effective tool 

of winning the battle for the ‘hearts and minds.’”163 In addition, working in 

pacification was the most difficult advisory task, a “dual military-civilian 

one requiring numerous skills and endurance. . . . For a task as demanding 

and as people-oriented as pacification, those who were involved should 

have been carefully prepared for it and should have learned to speak the 

language and to live among rural natives as well.”164

From the RVNAF perspective, for an advisor “the keys to success 

were . . . personal attitude and . . . genuine desire to help his counterpart. Mutual respect and understanding were always required. For without 

mutual respect, nothing could be achieved and no advisor technique could 
57

help.”165 Three techniques were offered for advisors to consider in getting 

a counterpart to act. First, provide a draft plan to the commander. This 

was considered the equivalent of asking the commander to act now, and it 

usually worked. However, since it was the advisor’s plan, it undercut the 

commander and left room for blame if the plan failed. Second, provide a 

remark or suggestion informally to the commander. This indirect, tactful 

encouragement could work with many counterparts given time. Still, from 

the RVNAF perspective, many advisors found this approach too slow and 

difficult because the advisor did not get any credit. Third, provide the commander a written assessment of a problem with options, but without any 

recommendation. This was considered most valuable for commanders with 

staffs—best at division and above, but no lower than regiment.166 While an 

advisor’s personality, his professional competence, and his techniques and 

procedures were important, “what really mattered . . . [to the] Vietnamese 

was a correct attitude, sincerity, and mutual respect.”167 Advisor training 

in skills and techniques was important, but less important than developing 

the attitude and understanding necessary to develop a personal working 

relationship with a foreign counterpart.

RVNAF commanders did not doubt that American advisors did an outstanding job. They acknowledged improvements in combat effectiveness, 

technical knowledge, and managerial skills. This fact notwithstanding, the 

one thing this effort “seemed never able to achieve: the inculcation of 

motivation and effective leadership” was perhaps the most critical to success.168 One added, “In retrospect, the improvement of military leadership, 

particularly at the higher levels of the hierarchy, would have been more 

vital for the purpose of developing combat effectiveness for the RVNAF 

than another program. At the higher levels, what the advisors sought most 

to do was establish good rapport with their counterparts rather than pressuring to do the job.”169 Applied to the highest level, this agreed with the 

assessment of Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., that the “rapport 

approach is dangerous because it lends itself to the acceptance of substandard performance by the advisor. In any future situation where advisors 

are deployed under hostile conditions, the emphasis should be on getting the job done, not on merely getting along with the individual being 

advised.”170 At any rate, at the lowest levels, if the emphasis through both 

chains-of-command to the commander and to the advisor had been to get 

the job done, rapport remained the best tool. 

Special Studies and Other Observations

During and after the Vietnam war, special studies and many after 

action reports addressed the advisory effort. This section will look at the 
58

conclusions and recommendations of several: a 1965 RAND study, a 1968 

DA study and the resulting Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP), 

a 1972 Senior Advisor’s debriefing report, a 1980 US Army-contracted 

study by BDM, a DA study, and a Center for Military History official 

history.

RAND Study, 1965

In March 1965, Dr. Gerald C. Hickey published The American Military 

Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam. The purpose of this RAND study was “to suggest ways in which the relationship 

could be improved so that Vietnamese military authorities would be more 

likely than they are at present to understand, accept, and act on American 

advice.”171 Building on 10 years work on Vietnam, including 4 years in 

country, Hickey interviewed 320 American advisors at 70 locations during a 10-month period in 1964. At the beginning of the study, he gathered 

background information from US military schools that trained advisory 

personnel. In Vietnam, he conducted both informal personal interviews 

and structured, multiday group discussions organized by the Walter 

Reed Army Institute of Research. Although not permitted to question the 

Vietnamese directly, Dr. Hickey, fluent in the language, was able to gain 

insights from listening to conversations.172

At the time of the study in 1964, 30 percent of the US personnel in Vietnam were advisors. Hickey began with the following general 

observation: 

The greater the advisor’s professional competence and his 

ability to establish rapport with the man he is advising, the 

more likely is it that the counterpart will accept and act 

on his advice. One quality without the other will greatly 

diminish the effectiveness of the American. Professional 

expertise is a requirement both obvious and easily measurable, and it has not been the crucial problem in the 

advisor-counterpart relationship. A faculty for effective 

interaction with a foreign national and the skill necessary 

to developing and expressing that faculty are much more 

intangible. They play no part in traditional military pedagogy, and their great importance is perhaps not yet fully 

understood in all quarters that must concern themselves 

with the novel requirements of counterinsurgency.173

From his interviews and discussion groups, Hickey identified “the 

major principles governing the advisory role in a country such as Vietnam, 

and the chief barriers to better understanding and cooperation at present.”174
59

This included a general review of problems, particularly those created 

by language, cultural, and institutional barriers. From his study, Hickey 

offered concrete recommendations on:

● Selection Criteria.175

—Advisory service should be voluntary to ensure strong 

motivation.

—Whether voluntary or not, careful screening of personnel 

was needed to test the suitability of candidates based on professional competence and experience, adaptability to foreign cultures, temperamental 

disposition to work with foreigners, language skills or abilities, and the 

possibility of “culture fatigue” of fully qualified personnel who were no 

longer enthusiastic about this work.

● Desirable Emphases in the Training of Advisors.176

—“Language being the single most important factor in breaking down cultural barriers, language training far more intensive than at 

present should be given to all field advisors.” Advisors at higher levels, 

where face-to-face, almost daily contact with counterparts is not critical, 

required a brief course on the general structure and conceptualization of 

Vietnamese language and on the proper use of interpreters.

—To prepare advisors for the cultural obstacles they would 

have to overcome or bypass, training programs “must insist on the importance of respecting the Vietnamese cultural identity” and must emphasize 

the patterns “most strikingly different from ours.” These included indirectness in the language and general discourse; relaxed attitude toward time; 

importance of traditions; unconcern for those not family or close friends; 

taboos; attitudes toward hygiene and health; and the “most common criteria for good life.”

—Training courses should include instruction on both the 

“special characteristics of the region” and the country itself—history, 

government, economics, society, ethnic groups, religious sects, general 

customs.

—The common distrust of Vietnamese food created “at times 

a barrier to good feeling and camaraderie between advisor and counterpart.” Attempting “to break down the prejudice rather than reinforce it” by 

emphasizing the excellence of native cuisine and the examples of advisors 

who suffered no ill effects should be the focus of training courses. 

—Instruction on the formal structure of the Vietnamese military should be supplemented with how things happen—what advisors 

called its “real workings”—the unofficial and unwritten ways things were 
60

done. Topics suggested were the French military legacy, decisionmaking 

techniques and procedures, position and prerogatives of various ranks, 

rewards and punishments that affect promotion, and how the counterpart 

fits into his military hierarchy and the limits imposed on his autonomy.

—“Far greater attention . . . [needed] to be given to all facets 

of civic action.” Basic understanding of civic action—its importance, its 

principles, its planning, its approaches for working with the Vietnamese—

was missing. However, once the basics were understood, the “prerequisites 

for informed civic actions planning” remained “above all, an awareness 

of specific local needs and wishes (which may be quite different from 

what American standards would dictate and can be acquired only through 

familiarity with the region and consultation with the people and its leaders), and a number of local or economic variables that might make an 

otherwise attractive innovation undesirable.” The most efficient way often 

proved not to be the most effective way. Creating unemployment by doing 

things “better” with machinery, using “better or easily available” external 

resources rather than local materials, and ignoring local taboos and superstitions were offered as examples of how not to do civic action.

—Advisors needed to consider the short-term, long-term, and 

potential adverse impact of any advice offered. Advisors had to “learn to 

weigh the merits of an immediate objective against any undesirable side 

effects it might have” and to keep in mind that “by exploiting a temporary 

advantage . . . an advisor could permanently alienate a counterpart and 

thus lose his cooperation in more important ventures.”

—Instead of having recent advisors address future advisors at 

US training sites, 3-day “exit—entrance seminars” in South Vietnam were 

suggested. Outgoing advisors would address in-coming advisors that were 

to work in a comparable assignment, thus ensuring accurate information 

for the new advisors.

—A pilot program similar to the language and cultural training centers missionary societies had established in-country might serve as 

a useful model for preparing advisors.

● Administrative Considerations.177

—Minimize bureaucratic requirements on advisors, particularly paperwork.

—Because it took months to develop an effective working 

relationship with a counterpart, advisor tour lengths needed to be reviewed 

and extending the 6-month battalion advisory assignment to 9 months 

seemed suitable.
61

—Given both professional and cultural sensitivities, developing mutual respect between an advisor and his counterpart was likely to be 

quicker when the rank and MOS of both matched. 

—Special Forces A-teams should continue to rotate as teams, 

not be individual fillers. 

—Vertical communication between advisors and their superiors needed to facilitate frequent opportunities for discussions of roles, 

issues, and problems that were required to maintain mutual trust and 

understanding with one another. 

—Sharing ideas between advisors would be enhanced by lateral communication. Periodic gatherings of advisors from the same level 

to discuss common problems and experiences and to exchange techniques 

and suggestions were recommended. Attendance by representatives of 

higher headquarters and capturing the discussions on tape to provide a 

permanent record was suggested. 

—To facilitate the advisory transition and to reduce the time 

needed for a new advisor to become effective, departing advisors should 

“draft . . . a brief, informal profile of his counterpart and a record of 

advice already given and either accepted or rejected. A new advisor who 

is prepared for the personality of his counterpart, his idiosyncrasies, and 

his receptivity to advice, and who knows what advice has already been 

tried, will be spared much of the time-wasting trial-and-error phase of the 

uninitiated.”

—Some advisors thought it was time to “explore the wisdom 

of terminating some advisory functions and reducing others.” Some counterparts, benefiting from numerous advisors, reached a point where they 

required no assistance, or only sporadic help that could be provided by an 

advisory pool. 

—However wise terminating advisors for counterparts “saturated with advice” seemed, planners were reminded that field advisors also 

fulfilled the “invaluable function of an American observer” who reported 

on local conditions and situations.

The Hickey study provided an excellent analysis of the many problems caused by the “generalized selection process, limited training, and 

the relatively short tours.”178 In addition, it provided practical suggestions. 

But in 1965, MACV began focusing on the role of US combat forces.

Some of these recommendations were reinforced by a 1965 special 

report by the Army Staff that took into account the comments of over 

300 senior advisors. That study concluded that “the entire advisory system 
62

needed to be strengthened by a unified chain of command, greater control over direct and indirect American military support, longer tours, and 

a comprehensive debriefing and evaluation program for departing advisors.”179 Without a combined US-RVNAF chain of command, by 1969 

another RAND study concluded that the emphasis on “harmonious relations”—rapport—created the attitude that “the advisor only exposes his 

own incapacity when he complains to his own superiors about the stupidity, want of integrity, laziness, ingratitude, or lack of competence of his 

counterpart.” Such opinions “inevitably hampered the effectiveness of the 

advisor, undermined the veracity of the advisory reporting system, and 

masked serious faults in South Vietnamese units.”180

DCSPER-40 Report (1968 DA Study) and the Military Assistance 

Officer Program (MAOP)

In May 1965, the Secretary of the Army convened the Haines Board 

to review the Army officer training and education system for the next 10 

years. Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr. chaired the board of four 

general officers, four colonels, and two lieutenant colonels that looked 

both at officer training and for what officers were being trained. The board 

looked at special career programs that filled vital needs not normally 

addressed by branch-material assignments. Its recommendation 40 was 

“that a modified and enlarged Foreign Area Specialist Program, renamed 

the Foreign Studies Specialist Program, be established to embrace training 

in language, regions, psychological operations, civil affairs and related 

subjects . . . [and] that it absorb the Civil Affairs Specialist Program.” This 

would have centralized control of all functional areas normally considered 

relevant to general political-military missions—CA, PSYOP, etc.—and of 

the Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP), an intelligence-focused area 

and language program. This, in effect would have created “an Army-wide 

academy of social sciences and area studies, with a very broad training 

responsibility and task orientation.” When the Haines Board Report was 

submitted in 1966, recommendation 40 was not adopted. 181

General Harold K. Johnson, CSA, convened a new study group under 

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) in March 

1967 to reconsider the Haines Board recommendation 40. In March 1968, 

the final report, known as “DCSPER-40,” was briefed to the CSA. The 

final report recommended that the FASP remain a separate program, but 

that other politico-military skills and knowledge be organized under a new 

program—initially called the Overseas Security Operations (OSO), it was 

soon redesignated as the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). The 

program aimed to address inadequacies of PSYOP and CA by broadening 

their focus and by developing a more integrated effort, to remedy a lack of 
63

command support for civil-military operations (CMO) by creating a G5/S5 

staff section, to develop the integrated and coordinated skills required for 

successful stability operations, to bring together military functions related 

to advising host nation military forces, and to focus on operational issues 

separate from the intelligence focus of FASP. On 26 April 1968, the CSA 

approved a commissioned officer special career program implemented 

in Army Regulation (AR) 614-134, Military Assistance Officer Program 

(MAOP).

182 Initial estimates were a requirement for 6,000 positions.183 The 

Military Assistance School, Institute of Military Assistance at Fort Bragg 

began a pilot Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Course in 

September 1969.184 In 1971, the course was extended from 19 to 22 weeks 

and limited to prospective candidates of MAOP.185

AR 614-134 established the policies and procedures for the Military 

Assistance Officer Program: to develop officers with the “critical skills 

needed to serve as commanders and advisors and to man key staff positions in the conduct of military activities having social, economic, political, and psychological impact” with a focus on “developing nations and 

the positive role of indigenous military forces in contributing to national 

development.”186 MAOP was designed with two parts—key positions for 

colonels and lieutenant colonels and supporting positions for majors and 

captains. Prerequisites for the program were a rank of captain to colonel; 

US citizen; completion of military schooling appropriate to rank; baccalaureate degree or higher, preferably in the social sciences; exceptional 

performance record; language proficiency of either minimum qualification 

on the Army Language Aptitude Test (ALAT) or a R3/S3 (foreign language 

proficiency); express a desire to participate; a minimum of 3 years active 

service remaining; and not being a participant in another Army special 

career program.187 Officers selected alternated between branch material 

and MAOP assignments with the final objective to “produce fully qualified 

officers capable of filling both brand and MAOP positions.” The education and training program was tailored for each officer. Captains attended 

the MATA, MASA, Military Assistance Program Advisor (MAPA), CA 

Officer, Civic Action, District and CA Advisor, or PSYOPs Unit Officer 

Course. Majors attended the Military Assistance Officer Command and 

Staff Course. Language training and civilian graduate schooling in anthropology, economics, foreign affairs, government, international relations, 

political science, psychology, public administration, or sociology was an 

integral part of the program.188

In April 1970, the Army Research Office contracted a study entitled “Operational and Training Requirements of the Military Assistance 

Officer.” The study, published in May 1971, was based on a review of 
64

literature and a series of questionnaires and interviews of the staff and 

faculty of the Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Course and 

the MAOP students from the first three courses.189 At the time of this study, 

the MAOP had 552 positions that were classified as direct advisory; other 

advisory; attaché; area specialist/monitor; CMO (G5/S5); and other functional PSYOP, CA, HQ DA staff, and service school instructors.190 The 

skills direct advisors identified as necessary, in the order identified, were 

language, military professionalism, intercultural communication, resource 

management, and knowledge of host country forces.191 Suggestions on 

intercultural communication included “understanding and respecting the 

traditional ways and procedures of the host nation military—particularly 

the matter of pacing, which can be infuriating to the nonreflective member 

of an Army founded on the maxim of ‘do it now’”; “seeing the problems 

and prospects through the eyes of the counterpart, a vision that requires 

a sympathetic understanding of his cultural premises and experience”; 

“abandoning the idea that one’s own national/cultural ways of doing 

things always work best, everywhere and in all circumstances—perhaps 

a natural temptation of advisors who come to host countries bearing gifts 

and good advice”; and “the need to tailor one’s advice to the culture and 

conditions of the host country were expressed most succinctly [as] . . . ‘to 

fit in and listen’ rather than to [provide] . . . advice out of a ‘brown book’ 

[field manual].”192 Part II of the study provided “Guidelines for Training” 

the required MAOP skill sets. The study provided many insights into the 

challenges of developing a special career program that focused on advising foreign armies in a nation-building environment.

Despite the expectation of the CSA in 1968 that there would be a need 

for 6,000 MAOP officers, by 1970 only 552 MAOP positions existed. As 

with other special advisory programs during this period, the US Army 

found it difficult to attract the quantity of qualified personnel needed. In 

March 1972, the CSA approved combining the MAOP and the FASP into 

the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Management System. As of 30 June 1972, 

only 433 officers participated in the MAOP and 563 in the FASP. By the 

end of 1972, roughly 900 positions were identified for the new combined 

program.193 With this merger, the attempt to develop advisors with an operational focus to meet the civil-military challenges of stability operations 

ended.

A Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 1972

Major General John H. Cushman submitted his Senior Officer 

Debriefing Report in January 1972 after serving 8 months as the commanding general of the Delta Regional Assistance Command. Reflecting 
65

back on his service in South Vietnam, 22 months advisory duty in the 

Delta and two previous tours, he “set forth in a reflective vein certain major 

views held by me at tour’s end.”194 Those views most relevant for advisors 

included what he called “the need for insight,” “the advisor,” “through 

Vietnamese eyes,” and “the Vietnamese must do it.” Cushman began, “All 

too often insight is gained too late, and through adverse experience.” He 

expressed regret that individual and collective insight had not been better 

in Vietnam and offered the following:

Insight—or the ability to see the situation as it really is—

is the most valuable asset an advisor can have. Intellect 

alone does not guarantee insight. Soldierly virtues such as 

integrity, courage, loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable 

indeed, but they are often not accompanied by insight. 

Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of 

stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and 

reflection, from continuous evaluations and testing, from 

conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, and from the 

indispensable ingredient of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for a responsible officer in this environment; the man who believes he has the situation entirely 

figured out is a danger to himself and to his mission.

He added that insight became “even more a requirement among the intangibles, nuances, and obscurities of a situation like Vietnam.” Acknowledging 

that military officers were men of decision, he explained that “the reflective, testing, and tentative manner in which insight is sought does not mean 

indecisiveness. It simply raises the likelihood that the decided course of 

action will be successful, because it is in harmony with the real situation 

that exists.”195 Insight became the basis of situational understanding that 

formed the foundation of relevant, feasible advice.

Given the requirement for insight, careful selection of advisors—

particularly senior advisors—was necessary. An effective commander 

might not possess the qualities to be an effective advisor and vice versa. 

“A marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain 

unmilitary philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence, and the like—these are often found in outstanding advisors, 

but may be frowned on in a troop chain of command situation. While it is 

entirely possible to find the man who excels both as commander and advisor, these men are too rare, and we need to look for good officers who may 

not be all-purpose officers.” Even when the demand for MACV advisors 
66

declined, Cushman saw that the need for good advisors would not decline, 

and might increase in the near future. Consequently, he recommended that 

a selection board process identify potential senior advisors and that the 

Military Assistance Institute at Fort Bragg periodically host orientation 

seminars.196

Cushman believed understanding how his counterpart saw things was 

critical for an advisor to develop rapport and to make good suggestions. 

He wrote:

Of course, the advisor must try to see the situation 

as it looks through Vietnamese eyes; this is part of the 

insight he strives for—not simply understanding the way 

Vietnamese in general look at matters, but also how his

Vietnamese, his counterpart, does. What are the biases, 

constraints, pressures, and so on, that make up his real 

world? In all of this, the American has to understand that 

he is not Vietnamese. He is only temporarily in the country, and he will be exceptional indeed if in his tour he 

understands a small fraction of how Vietnamese look at 

their situation and themselves. But everything he suggests 

should be tested against the question ‘how does this fit into 

the Vietnamese way?’ Furthermore, it is very important to 

understand ‘the way things move’ and to take advantage 

of natural movement.197

Advisors were reminded that the “natural inclinations” of the Vietnamese—

perhaps just as those of the Americans—sometimes worked against their 

goals. Solutions to these dilemmas should strive to be as “natural” or “least 

unnatural” to the locals.198

Even though Cushman acknowledged that only the South Vietnamese 

could solve their problems, he believed advisors still played an important 

role:

Probably the hardest thing for an American (even for 

advisors) in Vietnam to grasp completely is that, if our 

Vietnamese friends cannot bring this thing off, it is not 

going to get done. We cannot, and should not, do it for 

them. . . . It means not simply that ‘the Vietnamese must 

do it.’ It also means that we must still try to ‘show them 

how.’ The job of the advisor becomes more complex, 

in that he has to figure out what he has to offer at this 

stage of the war. He can offer a great deal—analysis, an 

outsider’s critique, plus friendly encouragement—all 
67

aimed at ultimate withdrawal of even this support and the 

Vietnamese doing almost everything on their own.199

Acknowledging that the advisor worked basically alone with his counterpart, Cushman found that the “daily mingling of the counterpart with 

his view and the advisor with his—is what makes advisorship so interesting, and, when it produces a durable and good result, so rewarding and 

worthwhile.”200

Cushman’s debriefing report contained many valuable observations 

gained from his Vietnam advisory experience. Other advisors and senior 

officers also submitted similar reports. In time, the US Army moved out 

of the advisory trade and focused on defeating Soviet forces in Europe. In 

that shift back to large-scale, conventional warfare, advisory work dropped 

off the US Army mission tasks. 

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 1980

In an effort to capture the lessons of the Vietnam experience, the US 

Army commissioned BDM Corporation to conduct an analytical study 

of the strategic lessons learned in Vietnam. Released in April 1980 and 

declassified in March 1981, the report of over 3,600 pages consisted of an 

executive summary and of eight volumes, one volume organized into two 

books. Although references to the advisory effort can be found in multiple volumes of this massive study, the advisory effort was specifically 

addressed in book two, Functional Analyses, of volume six, The Conduct 

of the War. 

The study indicated that during the initial US advisory effort before 

1965, the RVNAF developed a limited capability in conventional warfare. 

However, it was neither trained nor motivated to target the VC infrastructure, 

its primary threat through 1964, or to conduct counterinsurgency operations. 

To fight the VC, RVNAF required increasing US combat support assets. 

At the same time, police forces, just like RVNAF, were not trained or 

equipped to operate against guerrilla forces. Military advisors were selected 

on the basis of MOS, rank, and vulnerably to an overseas tour, not on the 

basis of language skills or the ability to work effectively with Vietnamese 

counterparts. Because of a lack of civilians with the proper skills that 

were willing to serve in a combat zone and the availability of military 

personnel that could be tasked, the military filled many advisory positions 

more suited to civilians. From 1965 to 1970, MACV combat unit advisors 

performed principally liaison duties and the quality of advice varied. After 

1967 CORDS advisors contributed significantly to pacification and then 

Vietnamization. During the entire period, the study concluded that there 

was a general lack of careful selection of personnel to weed out those 
68

professionally or personally ill-suited for advisory duty, a lack of adequate 

language training, and a lack of thorough preparation before arrival. The 

short tour made it difficult for advisors to acquire the “wide variety of 

combat-associated experiences needed to know and understand their 

counterparts, and to gain the cooperation needed to do the job.” Reporting 

accurately remained a problem because of the complex situation and the 

need to maintain the trust and confidence of the counterpart. An unfavorable 

report embarrassed the counterpart, threatening rapport, and failed to meet 

the US Army expectation of progress.201

The study identified three successes and five failures for the advisory 

effort. The first success, the creation of RVNAF as a regular army, was in 

itself not an easy or simple task. Second, given that counterinsurgency was 

not its strong suit, the US effort achieved more success against the North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) than it did against the VC guerrillas. A third 

success was the advisor liaison role in coordinating and deconflicting US 

and RVNAF combat operations that made it easier to work together and 

for RVNAF units to receive combat support, logistical, and medical support from American units.202 Three of the five failures did not specifically 

address advisors. First, preoccupied with the Korean experience, the military problem was misperceived with a resulting focus on defense against 

an external threat rather than internal security. A second failure, related to 

the first, was that the military effort was misdirected into a conventional 

military to repel an invasion instead of a force capable of counterinsurgency operations. Not learning from others—from the French experience 

in Indochina and from the South Vietnamese themselves—was the third 

failure.203

“Inadequate care in the selection and training of advisors” constituted 

a fourth failure. The study described the advisor task as “immense”—

working and living in an alien culture; establishing rapport with combathardened counterparts; advising “on fighting an enemy they did not know 

or understand, in a terrain they did not know, with troops they did not 

know”; dealing with civil and military matters; and developing an understanding and maintaining an objectivity need for accurate reporting both to 

their counterpart and their American superiors. To accomplish this difficult 

task, young officers, most with limited military service, no combat experience, and little-to-no language skills, were expected to professionally 

communicate with older, more-experienced counterparts. Poorly prepared 

advisors could not get respect from counterparts and could not contribute 

much. “Inadequate language training . . . handicapped them as it made it 

difficult to learn rapidly even after they were in country, and tended to 

isolate the advisor from his environment, cutting him off from valuable 
69

sources of information.” Because the mere presence of a MACV advisor 

could undermine the credibility of the counterpart, the study states, “the 

US should have been intent upon providing advisors only where necessary 

and then making sure that each advisor was so competent that he enhanced 

the prestige of the United States and contributed substantially to the war 

effort.”204

A fifth lack of success was “failure to make maximum use of our 

advisors.” Longer tours could have made up some for inadequate training 

and deficiencies in language. A short tour provided little incentive for an 

advisor to invest extra time and effort into language and cultural studies 

beyond the short training courses. It ensured that advisors were useful for 

only a few months; that “experience was not cumulative because each year 

new advisors were being thrown into the conflict and having to learn all 

over again the lessons which their predecessor had already learned”; that 

counterparts were discouraged from developing close relations with an 

advisor by preventing “good, deep working relationships from developing 

because, given the cultural differences, 1 year was not enough time even 

where intentions on both sides were the best”; and that the “establishment and maintenance of a reliable intelligence network [became] difficult 

because the high need for trust in intelligence work did not have time to 

develop.” In short, “the system of short tours destroyed continuity in the 

US advisor effort and ensured that it was dominated by amateurs.”205

Two other lessons emphasized in volume 2, South Vietnam, affected 

the advisory effort. First, the political role of RVNAF was critical. Where 

it formed the support base for a government, it was vulnerable to politicization. Then military leaders were chosen and promoted based on political 

loyalty, not on military professionalism. Working in this environment was 

extremely frustrating for advisors and not very productive without support 

from above. A second lesson was that there was a “tendency when advising or assisting an emerging nation’s Armed Forces to organize, equip, and 

train them in one’s own image.” Instead of trying to improve the combat 

effectiveness of the local military using its institutions, systems, and procedures, trying to change them into a version of oneself tended to create 

numerous problems and proved a difficult long-term undertaking.206

The BDM study’s final conclusion and recommendation on the 

advisory effort was that:

Any future advisory effort should rely on a cadre of highly 

trained specialists rather than a massive effort by amateurs. The use of specialists familiar with the history, culture and government of the country in which they are to 
70

serve, fluent in the language which they will have to use, 

and well trained in advisory techniques would improve the 

likelihood that the failure of Vietnam could be avoided. 

Specialists with an understanding of the country to which 

they are assigned will stand a far better chance of correctly assessing the situation and of prescribing solutions 

which will address the real problems. Furthermore, such 

advisors would be more likely to earn the respect of their 

counterparts and, thereby, to establish a relationship of 

mutual respect. US prestige and influence can only be 

enhanced by the employment of fully competent advisors 

even if their numbers are necessarily limited.

The US military services have demonstrated their professional excellence in training foreign personnel and units 

in technical skills; they have not performed well in advising in politico-military matters because of their lack of 

background, training, education, and competence.207

As with other studies on advisory efforts, the recommendations were 

not acted on and few lessons were learned. The US Army found the recommendations no longer relevant to its priorities post-Vietnam. At best, they 

were lessons for what happened in a past but would not be repeated in the 

future.

US Army Official Publications, 1975–88 

In the 1970s, the Department of the Army published 22 monographs 

as part of its series of Vietnam Studies. These provided an initial look 

into different aspects of the war by authors directly involved in their 

topics. Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr. wrote The Development 

and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972. At the end of his 

monograph, Collins concluded that:

Although many leadership courses were established and 

continual emphasis placed on the development of leadership, a serious obstacle was United States own overriding 

emphasis on establishing “rapport” with its counterparts 

even at the expense of not accomplishing its mission. Too 

often advisors did not take firm stands with their counterparts on key issues nor recommend the relief of unsatisfactory commanders for fear that such recommendations 

would reflect badly on their own abilities. If more advisors 

had insisted on the relief of ineffective commanders, command positions would have opened up, affording incentive 
71

and opportunity for the more junior officers to exercise 

their leadership ability. The rapport approach is dangerous because it lends itself to the acceptance of substandard performance by the advisor. In any future situation 

where advisors are deployed under hostile conditions, the 

emphasis should be on getting the job done, not on merely 

getting along with the individual being advised.208

What Collins failed to address was that this approach worked in Korea, but 

the situation in Vietnam was different. MACV refused to apply leverage 

from the top and GVN and RVNAF were unable or unwilling to respond 

as President Syngman Rhee had in Korea. The bottom line remained that 

MACV advisors experienced frustration with counterparts and attempts to 

have a RVNAF commander at any level removed from command proved 

unsuccessful. Without leverage and support from the top—through both 

MACV and GVN/RVNAF channels—unit and territorial advisors had no 

tool other than rapport. And the fact remained, as shown in Korea, that 

leverage from the top still required rapport—personal trust and confidence—

at the lowest levels to make the advisory system work.

In the 1980s, the US Army Center for Military History published 

two volumes in a three-part history of the US advisory effort. While 

the first volume covered the period prior to 1960, the second published 

volume addressed 1965–73. During this later period it stated, “MACV 

commanders did not expect their field and staff advisors to play a major 

role in the improvement of the South Vietnamese military forces. As 

liaison teams . . . they kept . . . American commanders abreast of what 

their allies were doing and where and when they were doing it.” Given the 

magnitude and length of the advisory effort, “American leaders . . . still 

had a general belief that the advisory teams would have a direct, personal 

effect on the thousands of Vietnamese commanders being advised. Perhaps 

it appeared almost self-evident that the US field and staff advisors ought 

to have some sort of long-term impact on Vietnamese military leadership, 

if only through sheer weight of numbers. And perhaps it also seemed 

self-evident that that impact should be positive, given the high quality of 

American military personnel, almost all officers and noncommissioned 

officers, assigned as advisors.”209 Unfortunately, what appeared selfevident to some proved false. No MACV commander seriously considered 

the means that CORDS Ambassador Komer adopted—forcing the relief 

of incompetent Vietnamese province chiefs. Without support from above, 

unit advisors had little impact on their RVNAF commanders and found 

that “getting someone relieved or replaced was like getting a politician out 

of office.”210
72

The advisory effort rested on weak foundations. Preparation was 

“minimal”—few advisors developed “useful” Vietnamese-language skills 

and the brief MATA course provided no more than “an introduction to the 

problems of working in a foreign culture.” Recently promoted as lieutenants, captains, or majors, many advisors lacked experience at their rank in 

US units, much less for Vietnam service. Most faced “cultural shock from 

being dropped into a completely alien environment before they could begin 

to become effective.” These challenges were compounded by their almost 

total dependence on Vietnamese interpreters to communicate with their 

counterparts. In addition, time in an advisory assignment “rarely lasted 

more than 6 months with any one unit.” Only territorial advisory team 

members—province, district, MAT—received additional training in South 

Vietnam and most left their jobs just as “they were beginning to know 

their way around.” The quality of field advisors received “only peripheral attention” by MACV and DA. In any case, advisory teams—made up 

of officers and senior noncommissioned officers—were “rich” in terms 

of military education and rank. However, the introduction of US combat 

forces in 1965 made the advisory effort a lower priority.211 Advisors were 

selected based on availability for short-tour overseas duty “over and above 

the needs of regular US units in South Vietnam.” The implication that 

followed was that “given the limited power of the field advisor, and their 

brief training and short stints in any one position, the value of possessing 

a special aptitude for the job was probably unimportant.”212

The sobering conclusion drawn from this history of the advisory effort 

was that “the final judgment must be that it was beyond the capacity of one 

power to reform and reshape the society of another.” Whether one agrees 

or not, among the insights offered from this effort were:213

● Advisory duty was “much more complicated than it appeared.” 

To expect better results from advisors, better preparation and longer assignments were required. 

● Better guidance providing specific goals and the capability of 

accomplishing them was required for advisors at all levels. “Superiority 

in material could not compensate for the lack of a unified command, nor 

could sophisticated plans and programs make up for the absence of more 

cohesive military and political objectives.” 

● At the top, the “cult of optimism” in Saigon and Washington 

was “self-defeating and . . . only encouraged the continuation of policies 

and practices that had little hope of success.”
73

Summary

For most of the time in Vietnam, the majority of MAAG-V/MACV 

field advisors—combat unit and pacification—were selected for advisory 

duty by MOS and rank. Unlike in Korea, almost all attended short periods 

of instruction designed to familiarize them with advisory duties in Vietnam 

and to introduce them to the Vietnamese language and culture. Although 

advisory teams were authorized down to battalion and district level, just 

as in Korea, teams remained small, often understrength, and frequently 

filled by personnel who did not meet the rank or MOS requirements for 

the position. Advisory duty took second place to US military units conducting combat operations. In addition, combat unit advisors served a 12-

month tour, but they were assigned to RVNAF units often for no more 

than 6 months. Facing the same sorts of advisor-counterpart challenges as 

in Korea, few understood the language, the culture, RVNAF customs, and 

the local situation. Under these conditions, developing and communicating suitable, acceptable, and feasible advice proved difficult.

In South Vietnam, the United States faced its largest, longest, and most 

costly advising effort. It addressed a difficult and complex military situation demanding nuanced responses in military and civil-military matters. 

It consumed the best efforts of the US military for a generation. However, 

when all was said and done, the combat capability of RVNAF proved inadequate to withstand the North Vietnamese offensive in 1975. For the US 

military, “no more Vietnams” meant, among other things, no more advisory efforts on the scale or of the duration of that conflict. Consequently, 

hard-earned lessons and in-depth analyses disappeared from mainstream 

US military concerns.
74

Notes

1. Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

“Command History 1967,” vol. 1 (11 September 1968), 219. Hereafter HQ, 

USMACV.

2. Ibid.

3. James L. Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South 

Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975), 

1–7. This is 1 of 22 Vietnam Studies published by the Department of the Army in 

the 1970s.

4. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), 295–302. This is 

the first of a three-part US Army Center of Military History official history of the 

advisory effort in Vietnam.

5. Ronald H. Spector, “The First Vietnamization: U.S. Advisors in Vietnam, 

1956–1960,” in The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth 

Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 1–3 October 

1980, edited by Joe C. Dixon (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 

1980), 111–113.

6. Collins, 17–26, 31. For an overview of Special Forces in Vietnam, 

see Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1973).

7. Ibid., 32, 46.

8. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1965,” 20 April 1966, 82.

9. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1988), 145. This is the 

third of a three-part US Army Center of Military History official history of the 

advisory effort in Vietnam. Part two, covering 1961–64, has not been published.

10. Ibid., 87–96.

11. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York, NY: Dell, 

1980), 331. For a Vietnamese perspective, see Ngo Quan Truong, RVNAF and US 

Operational Cooperation and Coordination (Washington, DC: US Army Center 

of Military History, 1980).

12. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1967,” vol. 1, 237.

13. Clarke, 184–187.

14. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1966,” 30 June 1967, 452.

15. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1967,” vol. 2, 590–591. 

16. Clarke, 391–392.

17. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1968,” vol. 1, 30 April 1969, 

233–234.

18. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25 Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam

(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 178.

19. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1969,” vol. 1, 30 April 1970, 

IV-26.

20. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1970,” vol. 2, 19 April 1971, VII-67. 
75

21. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1971,” vol. 1, 25 April 1972 

VIII-73.

22. Ibid., VII-83.

23. Clarke, 452.

24. James H. Willbanks, The Battle of An Loc (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 2005), 161–164. 

25. Clarke, 489.

26. Ibid., 494–496; a reduced American military presence remained in the 

region: a joint US Support Activities Group in Thailand to coordinate air support 

if the NVA attacked; a US Defense Attaché Office to oversee a restricted security 

assistance program; and a small US delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military 

Commission.

27. Initially designated sector and subsector, the terms province and district 

were used more frequently. To reduce confusion, province and district are used in 

this study.

28. Clarke, 372; for “seven division equivalents,” see Palmer, 178; for 1968 

advisor strength (11,596), see HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1968,” vol. 

1, 23; for 8.65 division equivalents, ratio of 1970 division equivalents (x) / 1970 

advisor strength (14,332 ) = 1968 division equivalents (7) / 1968 advisor strength 

(11,596). 

29. Spector, Advice, 291.

30. Martin J. Dockery, Lost in Translation: VIETNAM, A Combat Advisor’s 

Story (New York, NY: Ballantine, 2003), 36–40. This excellent firsthand account 

of an advisor to the RVNAF 2d Battalion, 33d Regiment, 21st Infantry Division 

from 1962 to 1963 is available in paperback.

31. Robert H. Whitlow, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat 

Assistance Era, 1954–1964 (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and 

Museums Division, 1977), 47, 100.

32. Gerald C. Hickey, The American Military Advisor and His Foreign 

Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 

March 1965), 57. 

33. David Ewing Ott, Field Artillery, 1954–1973 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1975), 24.

34. Clarke, 57.

35. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1969,” vol. 1, IV-26.

36. Peter M. Dawkins, “The United States Army and the ‘Other’ War in 

Vietnam: A Study of the Complexity of Implementing Organizational Change” 

(Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1979), 389.

37. Hickey, 59.

38. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1967,” vol. 2, 592–593.

39. Dawkins, 89 and footnote on 34.

40. Cao Van Vien, et. al., The U.S. Adviser (Washington, DC: US Army 

Center of Military History, 1980), 16.

41. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1965,” 76–77.

42. Dawkins, 29.
76

43. Vien, 16.

44. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1968,” vol. 1, 234.

45. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1970,” vol. 2, VII-67.

46. Spector, Advice, 346.

47. US Army Section, Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam, 

Book of Instructions for U.S. Military Advisors to 42 Tactical Zone III Corps 

South Vietnam (1962), IV-B-1.

48. Collins, 36.

49. Bryce F. Denno, “Advisor and Counterpart,” Army (July 1965), 25–26.

50. Clarke, 60–61.

51. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1966,” 452.

52. Ronald D. Ray, interview by Shelby Sears 21 June 2004 (Virginia 

Military Institute John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic 

Analysis Cold War Oral History Project) [transcript online]; available at http://

www.vmi.edu/archives/Adams_Center/RayR/RayR_intro.asp, 12.

53. Clarke, 321.

54. Ibid., 368.

55. Ibid., 67.

56. Hickey, 59–60. 

57. Mark A. Meoni, “The Advisor: From Vietnam to El Salvador” (Master of 

Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 

1992), 28.

58. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1968,” vol. 1, 234.

59. HQ, UMACV, rf / pf Advisor Handbook, January 1971, 17–18.

60. BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 

vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, April 1980, 12-10.

61. Spector, Advice, 293–294.

62. Clarke, 61.

63. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1966,” 471.

64. Clarke, 187. 

65. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1966,” 473.

66. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1967,” vol. 2, 592–593.

67. Dawkins, 90.

68. HQ, USMACV, “Command History 1970,” vol. 2, VII-79–VII-80.

69. Ibid., VII-67.

70. BDM, vol. 7, The Soldier, 2-7–2-8.

71. Ibid., 2-8–2-9.

72. US Army Special Warfare School, “Program of Instruction for Military 

Assistance Training Advisory Course (MATA)” (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army 

Special Warfare School, April 1962). Hereafter, USAWS, “POI (MATA).”

73. Clarke, 62.

74. USAWS, “POI (MATA).”

75. William Moriarty, interview by Shelby Sears, 24 June 2004 (Virginia 

Military Institute John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic 

Analysis Cold War Oral History Project) [transcript online]; available at http://
77

www.vmi.edu/archives/Adams_Center/MoriartyB/MoriartyB_intro.asp, 4.

76. Anthony C. Zinni, interview by Shelby Sears, 29 June 2004 (Virginia 

Military Institute John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic 

Analysis Cold War Oral History Project) [transcript online]; available at http://

www.vmi.edu/archives/archivecoldwar/Details.asp?ID=9&rform=search, 17.

77. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31–73, Advisor Handbook for 

Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 1967), 

51–54.

78. Zinni, interview, 6.

79. Ibid., 2.

80. Ray, interview, 2.

81. David M. Dacus, “So Now You’re an Advisor,” Infantry (May–June 

1971), 32–35.

82. USAWS, “Program of Instruction for Project 404” (Fort Bragg, NC: US 

Army Special Warfare School, March 1969).

83. Clarke, 62.

84. John G. Miller, The Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 38–39. Co-van was the Vietnamese 

expression for advisor.

85. William E. Colby, “U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam: Hearings 

Before a House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Government 

Operations 19 July 1971” [document online]; available at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/phoenix-hcgo-19710719.html, 227.

86. Dawkins, 218.

87. Collins, 51–53; Robert Barron, interview by Stephen Maxner, 21 April 2001 

(Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive Oral History Project) [transcript online]; 

available at http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet.starweb?path=vva/oralhistory.web&id=newweboh&pass=&search1=WEBOK%3DYES&format=format.

88. Department of State, “Vietnam Training Center District Operations 

Course,” 1 October 1969. 

89. HQ, USMACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, February 

1968.

90. Meoni, 44.

91. HQ, USMACV, rf / pf, 7–9.

92. Spector, “First Vietnamization,” 114.

93. Spector, “First Vietnamization,” 115.

94. Clarke, 58.

95. Stuart A. Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the 

Villages (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 191. This firsthand account of a 

district intelligence advisor for Advisory Team 43, Duc Hue District, from 1971 

to 1972, is available in paperback as Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation 

Phoenix: A Personal Account.

96. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 12–13.

97. Herrington, 191.

98. Ibid., 192.
78

99. Hickey, xiii.

100. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, NH: University Press 

of New England, 1977), 82.

101. John Cook, The Advisor (New York, NY: Bantam, 1973), 42. This is a 

firsthand account of a district intelligence advisor for the Di An District from 1968 

to 1970.

102. Denno, 27–28.

103. William Shelton, interview by Stephen Maxner, 5 June 2000 (Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive Oral History Project) [transcript online]; available 

at http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet. starweb?path=vva/oralhistory.

web&id=newweboh&pass=&search1=WEBOK%3DYES&format=format, 28.

104. Herrington, 23.

105. Ott, 25.

106. Dockery, 93.

107. Cook, 68.

108. James F. Ray, “The District Advisor,” Military Review (May 1965) 

7–8.

109. Denno, 28.

110. Dockery, 24. 

111. Eddie Jones, interview by Stephen Maxner, 13 January 2003 (Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive Oral History Project) [transcript online]; available at 

http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet.starweb? path=vva/oralhistory.we

b&id=newweboh&pass=&search1=WEBOK%3DYES&format=format, 17–18.

112. Denno, 29.

113. Jones, interview, 34.

114. Herrington, 192.

115. Ibid., 193.

116. Clarke, 57–58.

117. Barron, interview.

118. Jackie V. Wright, interview by Dr. Richard Verrone, 12 December 2002 

(Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive Oral History Project) [transcript online]; 

available at http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/ servlet.starweb?path=vva/

oralhistory.web&id=newweboh&pass=&search1=WEBOK%3DYES&format=f

ormat, 19.

119. Miller, 178.

120. Jones, interview, 22–23.

121. Cook, 101.

122. Hickey, 14.

123. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 

12–17.

124. Miller, 182.

125. Hickey, 14–16.

126. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 

12–19.

127. Denno, 26.
79

128. Ibid., 34.

129. Cook, 161.

130. Moriarty, interview, 8.

131. Miller, 177–178.

132. Dockery, 193.

133. Cook, 102.

134. Denno, 29.

135. Spector, Advice, 379.

136. Clarke, 69.

137. Irwing C. Hudlin, “Advising the Advisor,” Military Review (November 

1965), 95.

138. Jones, interview, 28, 37.

139. Wright, interview, 19.

140. Cook, 101.

141. David Donovan, Once A Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in 

Vietnam (New York, NY: Ballantine, 1985), 134.

142. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 

12–14.

143. Clarke, 63.

144. Miller, vi.

145. Truong, 173.

146. Vien, 74–75.

147. Truong, 166–167.

148. Ibid., 163–164.

149. Vien, 76.

150. Ibid., 71–72.

151. Ibid., 31–32.

152. Truong, 170.

153. Vien, 18.

154. Ibid., 69–70.

155. Ibid., 57.

156. Truong, 164.

157. Vien, 58.

158. Ibid., 151–152

159. Truong, 175.

160. Ibid., 175–176.

161. Vien, 142.

162. Ibid., 152.

163. Ibid., 155.

164. Ibid., 193–194.

165. Ibid., 73.

166. Ibid., 61–62.

167. Ibid., 196.

168. Ibid.197–198.

169. Truong, 174–175.
80

170. Collins, 130.

171. Hickey, 1.

172. Ibid., 2–3.

173. Ibid., v.

174. Ibid., vi.

175. Ibid., xii.

176. Ibid., xii–xv.

177. Ibid., xvi–xviii.

178. Clarke, 63.

179. Ibid., 64.

180. Ibid.

181. Edwin E. Erickson and Herbert H. Vreeland, 3rd, Operational and 

Training Requirements of the Military Assistance Officer (McLean, VA: Human Sciences Research, Inc., May 1971), 10–11.

182. Ibid., 11–15.

183. John S. Brown, “The Vietnam Advisory Effort,” Army (March 2006), 

95.

184. Erickson, 15–16.

185. DA, “Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1971” [document online]; available at http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1971/chIV.

htm, 36.

186. Department of the Army, AR 614-134, Military Assistance Officer 

Program (MAOP) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 

June 1971), 1–1.

187. DA, AR 614-134, 1-2.

188. Ibid., 1-3–1-4.

189. Erickson, x, 8.

190. Ibid., 18–19.

191. Ibid., 47.

192. Ibid., 57.

193. DA, “Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1972” [document online]; available at http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1972/

ch02.htm, 23.

194. Headquarters, Delta Regional Assistance Command, Vietnam, “Senior 

Officer Debriefing Report of Major General John H. Cushman, RCS CSFOR-74” 

(14 January 1972), 1. Hereafter referred to as Cushman Report.

195. Cushman Report, 2.

196. Ibid., 2–3.

197. Ibid., 3.

198. Ibid., 4.

199. Ibid., 5.

200. Ibid., 4.

201. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 

12-26–12-27.

202. Ibid., 12-21–12-22.
81

203. Ibid., 12-22–12-23.

204. Ibid., 12-24.

205. Ibid.12-24–12-25.

206. BDM, vol. 2, South Vietnam, 5–56.

207. BDM, vol. 6, Conduct of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses, 

12–17.

208. Collins, 129–130.

209. Clarke, 508.

210. Ibid., 509.

211. Ibid., 510.

212. Ibid., 511.

213. Ibid., 521.

83

Chapter 3

“A Particularly Tricky Business”1

Operations, Plans and Training Teams (OPATT) in El 

Salvador (1984–92)

We discovered a combination of not knowing the lessons 

we should have learned from past experience on one hand 

and having to adapt ourselves to somewhat different and 

new situations on the other. It was a tragedy that there 

was no respectable body of doctrine to be drawn on, 

that we were thrown back onto pragmatism. We had no 

respectable organizational approach to deal with this.2

—Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Ambassador Pickering’s description of the US diplomatic mission’s 

ad hoc response to the civil war in El Salvador applied equally to US 

counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and to the US advisory effort at the 

time. The 55-man US Military Group (MILGROUP) in El Salvador oversaw 

the expansion and training of the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) from 

an untrained and poorly equipped force of 11,000 that routinely abused its 

authority to a more capable force of 56,000 that could engage its enemy 

without alienating the population.3 The MILGROUP provided advice on 

combat operations and on counterinsurgency programs. For many, this 12-

year effort in El Salvador has been viewed as a model for a sustained, 

small-scale effort that succeeded. Although neither side won, a peace 

settlement was reached in 1991.

MILGROUP and the El Salvador Civil War

A military coup on 15 October 1979 removed General Carlos Romero 

from power and served as a catalyst for civil war. The ESAF was an 11,000-

man force officered by tight-knit graduates of the EL Salvadoran Military 

Academy and manned by peasant soldiers.4 A typical Latin American military of that time, it was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and spread 

throughout the country performing security and garrison duties. The 

ESAF had a reputation for brutal suppression of internal threats and for 

involvement in “death squads” that assassinated dissidents. El Salvador 

was divided into six military zones that coincided with territorial divisions of the country. Each military zone, commanded by a colonel who 

was designated a brigade commander, was divided into three departments 

commanded by lieutenant colonels who commanded two or three battalions of various sizes. Traditionally, the department commanders operated 
84

autonomously from the brigade commander.5 Through 1980, the ESAF 

and divergent political groups formed a series of juntas attempting to 

deal with the massive social, economic, and political problems facing El 

Salvador. No group proved prepared to handle the problems of government as the “issues addressed and decisions made were always tactical 

and short-term in nature—the typical bureaucratic ‘in-box drill’ of finding 

a ‘quick-fix,’ and selling it and getting rid of the immediate problem.”6

 By 

October, in frustration, five guerrilla groups formed the Farabundo Martí 

para Liberación Nacional (FMLN) movement in preparation for military 

action. The United States, fearing “another Nicaragua” with support from 

Nicaragua, Cuba, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, reinstated economic aid to the Government of El Salvador (GOES) on 17 December.7

Anticipating a quick victory, the FMLN launched what it called a 

“Final Offensive” on 10 January 1981. Despite expectations, the “Final 

Offensive” failed. Unexpectantly, the ESAF “with all its problems and 

shortcomings” proved better than its opponents. It “forced the FMLN . . . 

[into] its mountain bases where it spent . . . 6 months analyzing its mistakes, 

undergoing a process of self-criticism, and improving its organizational 

unity.”8 In July, the FMLN renewed its attacks, focusing primarily on 

infrastructure and economic targets. From May to December, the ESAF 

conducted a series of sweeps, averaging 3 a month and employing 1,500 

to 4,500 soldiers. Despite its combat operations, ESAF results were 

minimal.

On 14 January 1981, immediately after the FMLN attack, the United 

States restored military aid to El Salvador and sent several advisory teams 

to assess and address the situation. To improve the capability to take the 

fight to the insurgents, a US Special Forces MTT from Panama trained the 

600-man Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion in El Salvador. In March, 

for political reasons, the MILGROUP was capped at 55 personnel—

officially designated as trainers and forbidden by law from participating 

in combat operations. With MILGROUP estimates that a cadre of 50 to 

60 was the minimum required to train another battalion in country, other 

options were needed for training ESAF battalions. After rejecting Panama 

as a training site, the MILGROUP developed a plan to train the Ramon 

Belloso Immediate Reaction Battalion in the United States at Fort Bragg. 

Completed in early 1982, the training required a 180-man cadre of US 

trainers and cost $8 million—enough to train six to eight battalions in El 

Salvador.9 When the training of the Atonal Immediate Reaction Battalion 

in El Salvador was cut short for operational reasons, it became apparent 

that a regional training facility—eventually in Honduras—was needed to 

meet ESAF expansion and training requirements.10
85

In the fall of 1981, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sent a 

seven-man El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team led by Brigadier 

General Fred E. Woerner to work with the ESAF General Staff to develop 

their national military strategy. Woerner saw his task as guiding the ESAF 

leadership in the development of a national military strategy while providing 

the US government a military assessment of the situation in El Salvador 

and while conceptualizing a multiyear military assistance program.11

After 8 weeks’ work, a two-part strategy emerged. First, the preparation 

and training required expanding the ESAF by 10 battalions (8 infantry 

and 2 quick reaction) to a total of 25 battalions; improving the training 

base, the command, control, communications and intelligence system, 

and the combat service support system; modernizing the El Salvadorian 

air force fixed wing and rotary assets; and increasing navy patrol boats. 

Second, the ESAF was to conduct “aggressive, small unit, day and night 

operations” with eight of the new battalions stationed in threatened areas 

while other ESAF battalions focused on the protection of the upcoming 

electoral process and the economic infrastructure. The report identified 

the need for an expensive and long-term American commitment. It noted 

that the ESAF “has a remarkable capacity for tolerating unprofessional 

and improper conduct which does not threaten the institution.” The report 

further warned, “Unabated terror from the right and continued tolerance of 

institutional violence could dangerously erode popular support to the point 

wherein the Armed Force would be viewed not as the protector of society, 

but as an army of occupation. Failure to address the problem will subject 

the legitimacy of the Government of El Salvador and the Armed Force to 

international questioning.”12

By the end of 1981, the basis of the MILGROUP security assistance 

program was in place. Working within the 55-trainer limit, ESAF 

was expanded over time from 11,000 to 56,000. The guiding principle 

could be explained as KISSSS, “Keep it simple, sustainable, small, and 

Salvadoran.”13 It was to be trained by American military personnel and 

equipped with modernized ground and air assets. Eventually, new units 

were trained in Honduras and 500 officers for the fivefold increase of 

ESAF attended officer candidate training in the United States. Training 

and expanding ESAF, however, was not the principal MILGROUP goal. 

Under the “rubric of professionalization,” that goal was to change the 

military tradition within the ESAF—a most difficult task. The goals for 

professionalization—not different from those required elsewhere in the 

developing world—were an ESAF that (1) subordinated itself to civilian 

authority, (2) respected human rights, and (3) institutionally changed “so 

that talent was nurtured, success was rewarded, incompetents were weeded 
86

out, and the officer corps in general became operationally effective.”14

From 1981 to 1984, the ESAF struggled to survive, to expand, and 

slowly to regain the initiative. In January 1982, 70 percent of the El 

Salvadorian air force was destroyed in an attack on the Ilopango air base. 

FMLN forces, operating in strengths up to 600 insurgents, besieged several 

cities and controlled large areas in El Salvador.15 ESAF responded with 

multiple battalion operations—conventional sweeps that did not always 

differentiate between insurgents and noncombatants. An attempt to execute 

its National Campaign Plan, a comprehensive pacification program, in 

two key provinces failed. By mid-1983, ESAF combat effectiveness and 

morale had improved—the result of new leaders, newly trained units, 

new training faculties, and better interservice coordination. However, 

combat operations remained the ESAF focus. It was “still preoccupied 

with killing the guerrillas and little understood that this aspect of the 

war was incidental to winning popular support and ultimately the war.”16

American concerns over continued ESAF human rights abuses prompted a 

visit from Vice President George H.W. Bush whose frank exchange about 

continued US support depending on a better human rights record prompted 

a reduction in abuses. By the end of 1984, the better trained 42,000-man 

ESAF had regained the initiative. With the focus shifting from expansion 

and training new ESAF units to small-unit counterinsurgency operations 

and to pacification and civic action, the MILGROUP deployed threeman OPATTs to work with ESAF brigades in 1984. The ESAF expansion 

had solved its quantity problem; it had enough personnel to stalemate 

the FMLN. However, it had compounded its leadership problems. In 

retrospect, “the lesson here is that you have to manage the force expansion 

very carefully.”17 In addition, officers trained in the United States returned 

with different ideas than those in the ESAF. Unfortunately, on return they 

tended to revert to who they were—ESAF officers. 

Early in 1985, the FMLN acknowledged the ESAF’s improved combat 

effectiveness by reverting to small-scale guerrilla operations. No longer 

provided a large, fixed target, the ESAF resisted the need to revert to smallunit operations. In 1986, the ESAF launched its United for Reconstruction 

civic action plan and Operation PHOENIX to destroy the insurgents near 

the Guazapa Volcano. Neither was particularly successful by 1987. Even 

at its peak strength of 56,000, the ESAF “was still not big enough to fight 

the guerrilla and implement an essentially social-economic-psychological 

operations program at the same time.”18 When an earthquake killed over 

1,000 in San Salvador on 12 October, ESAF units were diverted from 

military duties to conduct humanitarian assistance. Although insurgents 

targeted MILGROUP personnel, other than four USMC personnel killed 
87

at a restaurant when off-duty, the first OPATT member was killed on 31 

March 1987 when the 4th Brigade compound at El Paraíso was attacked.

A stalemate between the ESAF and the FMLN ensued from 1987 

to 1990. In August 1987, President Jose Napoleon Duarte signed the 

Central American Peace Plan and then followed up with a broad amnesty 

program. Off and on attempts at negotiations and an upsurge in human 

rights abuses characterized this period. These prompted visits and threats 

from the US Secretary of State in 1988 and Vice President Dan Quayle 

in 1989. In frustration over the lack of progress in reaching a settlement, 

on 11 November 1989 the FMLN launched attacks in the cities. Despite 

almost a decade of work, the surprise attack exposed a failure of the 

ESAF intelligence in predicting the attack, the ESAF ineffectiveness in 

responding to the FMLN attacks, and the continued abuse of human rights 

by ESAF units. In 1990, the United Nations became involved in trying 

to reach a settlement between GOES and FMLN. That same year, an 

assistant secretary of defense delivered a “scathing lecture” to the ESAF 

leadership on the deaths of Jesuit priests and the US Congress cut funds 

by 40 percent. A helicopter crashed with three US trainers aboard in 1991. 

One died in the crash; the two survivors were executed. On 17 January 

1992, the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed between GOES and 

the FMLN. On 1 February, a 9-month cease-fire went into effect and by 

the summer of 1993, no OPATT personnel remained. On 15 December, a 

ceremony commemorated the ending of the civil war.

In the end, ESAF had averted defeat, but success against the insurgency 

had proved elusive. The ESAF had “probably become Central America’s 

most formidable military force, [and] with much pride they argue[d] that 

if Nicaragua ever started a war, the Salvadorians could finish it. . . . [That] 

may be accurate . . . but also irrelevant” since it could not defeat the FMLN, 

its actual threat.19 Despite the MILGROUP attempts to change the ESAF, 

its “incongruous approach . . . to organizing and equipping the Salvadoran 

armed forces in a general conventional manner . . . complicated the task 

of persuading them to adapt relevant tactics and force structure to the 

counterinsurgency.”20 It proved impossible to professionalize the ESAF to 

American expectations.

Combat Unit Trainers

Whether a good thing or a bad thing—and there are strong opinions on 

both sides of the question— the 55-man limit on the MILGROUP created 

major challenges. During the early years, the majority of the MILGROUP 

personnel worked issues at the higher national levels. Temporary American 

mobile training teams accomplished battalion training. Once the training 
88

ended, the MTT left. Not until 1984 were MILGROUP trainers deployed 

at brigade level in OPATTs.

OPATT Structure

In late 1983, Colonel Joseph Stringham, MILGROUP commander 

from 1983 to 1984, recommended the establishment of three-man OPATTs 

at the six brigade headquarters. Each team consisted of a combat arms 

lieutenant colonel team chief and a combat arms captain training officer, 

both serving 1-year tours. The third team member was a military intelligence officer serving a 6-month TDY. Each OPATT was made up of 

US Army personnel except for the 6th Brigade in Usulutan which had 

USMC personnel.21 The backgrounds of the six OPATT team chiefs were 

one Special Forces, three infantry, one military police, and one USMC.22

At the end of summer in 1984, in the face of ESAF brigade commanders’ 

resistance to lieutenant colonel OPATT chiefs, Colonel James J. Steele, 

MILGROUP commander, reassigned them to other positions. At the same 

time, a shortage of Spanish-speaking military intelligence captains prevented their continued participation after the initial 6-month TDY. Thus 

from late summer 1984 until mid-1985, the OPATT consisted of a captain 

combat arms training officer. A revised OPATT organization, introduced 

in mid-1985, had a combat arms major—Special Forces preferred—team 

chief and two Special Forces warrant officers or noncommissioned officers with training, operations, and intelligence experience. They all served 

1-year tours.23 By the summer of 1991, some of the noncommissioned 

officer positions were eliminated and in the summer of 1993 OPATTs were 

abolished.24

OPATT Roles

From the beginning, all MILGROUP personnel were designated 

trainers, not advisors. However, as one OPATT member noted, “the word 

‘advisor’ . . . is more accurate and is a direct translation of the Spanish 

‘asesor,’ which is what we are called by our Salvadoran colleagues.”25

When initially employed in 1984, the OPATT role was to prosecute 

the war “more aggressively and more humanely.” An additional shortterm requirement became monitoring ESAF activities during the May 

elections.26 After 1985, the reorganized three-man OPATTs focused on 

ESAF brigade staff operations to improve coordination of operations and 

intelligence activities with an emphasis on civil defense, civic affairs, and 

psychological operations. In 1990, monitoring and reporting suspected 

human-rights violations formally became part of the OPATT mission.27 By 

July 1991, being a human rights monitor was a major duty for OPATT.28

After the signing of the peace plan in December 1991, the OPATT role 
89

was described as follows: “Presently, all training activities are restricted 

to the cuartel [garrisons] and must be coordinated with United Nations 

Observers. Advisory assistance is now more concerned with civic action, 

psychological operations and garrison operations and the development of 

peacetime unit training management systems. Peacetime training activities 

should increase in the future as the FMLN is demobilized and disarmed. 

Possible human rights incidents continue to be monitored and reported.”29

In 1992, an OPATT chief wrote in his after action review, “‘Observer’ 

would be a far more accurate term than ‘advisor’ or ‘trainer.’ These latter 

two terms require either a willingness of the host nation to accept advice/

help, or lacking that, some sort of power base from which to implement 

change in spite of local resistance. Neither of these conditions existed 

for me and so during almost my entire tour, I was strictly an observer.”30

Despite these comments, few OPATT members remembered receiving 

what could be called a formal mission statement. Most understood their 

job as improving the combat effectiveness and trying to influence the 

human-rights performance of their ESAF brigade.

OPATT Selection and Tour Length

OPATT requirements were for 18 trainers—15 US Army and 3 

USMC. After 1985, meeting the US Army requirements for 10 Special 

Forces-qualified warrant officers and noncommissioned officers with 

regional expertise; training, operations, and intelligence experience; and 

Spanish language skills proved relatively simple. Most were filled by fully 

qualified volunteers from the 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. 

Finding qualified team chiefs proved more difficult. The MILGROUP 

requirements for an OPATT chief were combat arms—Special Forces, 

Infantry, or Armor after Special Forces branch was created in 1987—major 

or promotable captain, advance course graduate, successful line-company 

command, battalion or higher staff experience, and professional proficiency 

(R3/S3) language skill. Special Forces-qualified officers were preferred, 

but not available in sufficient numbers. In 1990, Special Forces branch had 

only 17 officers qualified—most were in El Salvador, had just returned 

from El Salvador, or were assigned elsewhere. The officer manpower pool 

proved inadequate to meet the need, even when the language requirements 

were reduced to a limited working proficiency (R2/S2). Even though 

MILGROUP preferred Special Forces-qualified officers, not until after 

1991 were OPATT chiefs coded for just Special Forces officers.31

Although the MILGROUP commanders were specially chosen and 

well-qualified for their assignments and further advancement, the same 

was not true for all MILGROUP members. Meeting the limited 55-man 
90

requirement with fully qualified personnel proved difficult. El Salvador 

may have been a SOUTHCOM priority, but it was not the priority of the 

US Army. A 1988 study noted that although superb noncommissioned 

officers with strong Special Forces experience and extensive regional 

background and “a few younger officers—energetic and passionately 

committed to ‘their’ war—serving on the Operations, Plans, and Training 

Teams (OPATTs) . . . [were] anything but mediocre,” the comments of a 

former MILGROUP commander that “we had the third team here” may 

have been too harsh, but it agreed that “the first team went elsewhere.” 32

Volunteers were sought, but MILGROUP took what it was given—some 

against their will and others who had threatened to retire.33 Even the 

MILGROUP commander position could prove difficult to fill. An officer 

indicated that he was offered the job after five others had refused it.34

During the initial MILGROUP effort, many MTTs rotated into El 

Salvador on TDY and others served in Honduras for 89-day or 179-day tours. 

These limited duty assignments did not stress that, as one SOUTHCOM 

commander stated, “It’s a wartime assignment.”35 Ambassador Pickering 

“had an enormous problem with . . . longer tours for military personnel. 

I felt that we were constantly running people through there who had to 

relearn. The 1-year tour did not become effective for 4 to 6 months, and 

it was a tragedy that we did this. We didn’t have that many people who 

wanted to come, first, and secondly, we didn’t have that many people 

who could pick up as rapidly on what their predecessors had done, so in 

a sense we were constantly relearning old lessons.”36 A 1-year tour was 

better than a 6-month tour, but it proved far from effective. A MILGROUP 

military intelligence trainer indicated that it took “3 to 6 months for a new 

advisor to adequately familiarize himself with the enemy situation and the 

history of the conflict. Consequently, the MI trainer/advisors functioned in 

a limited capacity 3 to 6 months of a 12-month tour.”37 An OPATT chief 

stated, “The major problem affecting the OPATT mission was and still is 

the continued use of a 1 year, unaccompanied rotation of personnel.”38

Short tour lengths—just as in Korean and South Vietnam—reduced the 

time available for getting a handle on the local situation, for developing 

rapport with a counterpart, and for developing a long-term approach to the 

task.

OPATT Preparation and Training

In 1992, a US Army Command and General Staff College student 

with 11 years Special Forces experience in Latin America and service in 

El Salvador as an OPATT chief wrote, “Through all of these assignment 

experiences, I never experienced a formal preparation and training 
91

program that specifically addressed how to effectively interact with host 

nation officers and soldiers as an advisor.”39 Although personnel with a 

Special Forces background and Spanish-language capability were sought 

by MILGROUP, no formal training before arriving in El Salvador was 

provided other than a 2.5-day general, non-El Salvador specific Security 

Assistance Team Training and Orientation Course (SATTOC). The course 

did not provide any details on the US military situation in El Salvador or 

on GOES or ESAF. It offered nothing on advisor duties, no ex-advisors 

were on the staff, and there were no role-playing exercises or case studies. 

A student described the training in 1989 as “very close to completely 

useless.” Another noted, “All this time the advisor had expected that, 

somewhere along the line, he would be briefed on his role as advisor, 

counterinsurgency, the Salvadoran National Plan, etc. . . . But this doesn’t 

happen.”40 The assumption was not that anyone could be a trainer, but that 

anyone with regional experience, particularly Special Forces, and with 

Spanish language capability could.

The initial briefings for the newly arrived OPATT members in El Salvador were not much better. In 1986, an OPATT chief “read two three-ring 

binders of policy . . . signed that I read them . . . left for Santa Ana . . . I 

didn’t meet . . . [MILGROUP commander] during my first 100 days in El 

Salvador.” Another described briefings that focused on “telling me what 

not to do . . . nothing about what to do.”41 Another was told, “Do nothing 

that will jeopardize the US Security Assistance Program here. You will 

probably not greatly effect [affect] the status of your unit while you are 

here, so don’t try. Look for the small victories that may have a cumulative 

effect.”42

Challenges of the Advisory Environment

Even with OPATT trainers with Spanish language skills, some cultural 

sensitivity, and service in the region, there remained what an OPATT chief 

called the “fundamental problems in the advisory business.” 

● Advisors are brought into the country by the national level 

host nation [HN] for their own reasons. “This does not mean that the local 

people and lower levels want advisors or advice.”

● Host nation forces are often corrupt to one degree or another. 

They don’t want anybody looking at their operations, finding out about 

certain types of activities, reporting on problems, or fixing money issues.

● Often, the advisor (regardless of rank) could do everybody’s 

job in the HN unit—better than the person holding the job. The advisor 

has all kinds of ideas to improve things. To the counterpart, this is a threat. 
92

They “will generally be hesitant to invite scrutiny because, however nicely 

it may come out, there will almost always be some form of criticism. If 

someone can prevent an inspection of their operation, they will.”

● There are basic misunderstandings between what the advisor 

thinks he should be doing or what he is capable of doing and what the host 

nation thinks the advisor should be doing or wants him to do. Getting this 

straight is an important task for the host nation and top-level US authorities 

to agree on. “Written guidance is needed to make sure this is all perfectly 

clear to all parties. If left to the HN, they will so design the advisor’s 

job that he is no threat, provides only resources—without specifically 

controlling them—and does not see anything which reflects badly on the 

HN unit or personnel.”43

For each OPATT member, even the well qualified, these basic problems 

meant “advising remains a particularly tricky business. Every advisor is 

placed in the tricky position of trying to influence the behavior of others 

over whom he has no authority, causing them to do things that may be 

foreign to their nature and habit, while at the same time attempting to 

interpret, implement, and respond to criticism of the US political decisions 

over which he had no input or control. Furthermore, all of this occurs 

against the backdrop of severe social, institutional, and political stress 

that is inherent in societies in conflict.”44 In other words, “advisory duty 

will continue to be one of the most vexing, enriching, challenging, and 

memorable tours available.”45

Understanding: Culture and Language

The US military had many personnel with experience in Latin America. 

Although alike in many customs and most sharing a common Spanish past, 

each Latin American country had developed in its own way. Although 

many appeared similar from a distance, each country was unique up close. 

An early MILGROUP commander noted, “You can’t look at El Salvador 

unless you understand the Matanza. You can’t look at El Salvador unless 

you understand the impact of the Soccer War. You can’t look at El Salvador 

unless you understand the population pressures, land distribution, the prerevolutionary situation. . . . You have to do your homework.”46 And as 

always with advisors at the lowest levels, one OPATT member noted that 

“cultural immersion is total and the pace is intense.”47

Language proficiency for OPATT members was well above that of 

Korean and Vietnam advisors. However, then as now, Army Regulation 12-

15, Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT), stated, “A request for team 

members with foreign linguistic ability can rarely be honored. Necessary 

interpreter support will be the responsibility of the foreign country. MTT 
93

requests may indicate that language capability is desired but will not 

state a mandatory requirement.”48 After years of assistance training and 

advisory work, providing personnel with appropriate language skills was 

not mandatory. Interpreters, provided by the host nation, were the standard. 

However, as one OPATT trainer observed there was “little excuse for the 

US military not to assure the ‘55’ advisors sent annually to El Salvador 

are linguistically proficient.”49 Even so, the required language skill levels 

for OPATT chiefs were lowered because of a lack of available qualified 

personnel and at least one MILGROUP member was sent home for 

inadequate language skills. Even those who spoke some Spanish indicated 

the need to continue to learn more. An OPATT chief offered, “Language 

Training, Language Training, Language Training! What is the minimum 

acceptable level (1-1, 2-2, 2+-2+)? . . . Non-native speakers should . . . 

be funded to continue formal language training while in country.”50 In 

addition, another believed, “Advisors must be language proficient at the 

native speaker level. They must be experts in LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) 

doctrine, weapons employment, and small unit tactics. And they must be 

diplomats in every regard.”51

Developing Rapport with Counterpart

Without an understanding of the counterpart and his problems as he 

viewed them, improved language skills and cultural awareness counted 

for little. OPATT members needed to develop an understanding of the 

ESAF—its expectations, how it worked, what it was capable of doing, 

and what it was unwilling to do—and of the problems it faced—political, 

social, economic, and security—to be able to develop rapport with their 

counterparts and to provide useful advice based on actual situational 

understanding. This was not simple. As a military attaché observed:

We’re making a lot of assumptions which are incorrect. 

We assume that [an officer] has certain basic leadership 

skills, that he’s going to check on his guys, that he’s going 

to go out himself and make sure that things are being done, 

when that’s probably not the case. . . . We assume all these 

things and we teach at a higher level. The fact is that these 

officers don’t operate that way . . . [and] the training that 

we give the young soldiers and the young cadets won’t 

get employed because they immediately forget all of the 

good things they’ve learned and adapt to the bad habit of 

their own chain of command.52

As in many countries, the officers were not well paid and there was a 

tradition of corruption. The system reinforced the importance of personal 
94

friendships and family ties. There was a “hesitancy to do anything that’s 

confrontational.” Contrary to American expectations, senior officers 

did not “follow through and make sure that his order has been executed 

according to his intent. The sense of urgency and obligation to do that does 

not exist. It’s not there.”53 Brigade, department, and battalion commanders 

often operated independently from one another and were protective of 

their prerogatives.

The ESAF wanted to defeat the FMLN, but it was careful not to 

jeopardize its position in El Salvador. It supported the expansion from 

11,000 to 56,000 personnel. Equipped and trained conventionally, it sought 

to destroy the FMLN using battalion or larger operations depending on 

artillery and air support financed by American military aid. “Gringo” training 

was necessary because of funding, but it did not change the institutional 

ethos and goals of the ESAF. Before the civil war, the “tanda” or military 

academy system produced 30 officers each year.54 They were promoted 

by year group and were practically guaranteed retirement with the rank of 

colonel. Group loyalty was stressed over military competence and honesty. 

Because the ESAF consisted of officers and of illiterate peasant soldiers, 

there was no basis or acceptance for a noncommissioned officers corps 

that was seen to threaten the authority of the officers. Without the smallunit leadership provided by noncommissioned officers, ESAF resisted 

the MILGROUP pressure to conduct small-scale counterinsurgency 

operations.

Often brigade commanders did not welcome OPATT assistance. 

According to one lieutenant colonel OPATT chief, “I know that the 

brigade commanders weren’t comfortable with [us] because we were 

bold enough to ask questions about their plans and operations. And the 

brigade commanders wanted people who responded . . . instead of asking 

questions.”55 After 1985, the OPATT priority shifted from “training, which 

most brigade commanders valued . . . [to] objectives . . .in precisely those 

subjects that their counterparts cared about the least—which included 

monitoring and reporting human-rights violations.” Rapport—“an ability 

to communicate and have suggestions well-received”—depended largely 

on the attitude of the brigade commander. Some were notorious humanrights offenders and others proved just reticent. When brigade commanders 

remained distant, many OPATT members attempted to work with anyone 

receptive to their assistance, particularly the operations and intelligence 

members of the brigade staff. “Clearly, adviser-counterpart relations were 

not uniform. . . . Personal and professional factors could combine with 

cultural differences to make for trying circumstances, especially against 

the backdrop of the drawn-out insurgency.”56
95

Some OPATT members came to accept that “assisting armies may 

involve host-nation political, cultural, economic, or social changes that will 

take years to complete.” Any progress would be slow; nothing happened 

quickly. Some came to realize that American “attitudes and practices often 

have very little validity for Third World armies. Thus, an advisor should 

not measure his progress by US standards but rather by standards that have 

relevance to the host nation.” To understand the situation and to be able to 

develop practical advice:

An advisor needs to be aware of the differences between 

his own military system and that of his host’s and to 

explore all of the reasons that the host nation performs a 

task in a given manner before recommending a different 

way to do it. It is also a good idea to consider the reasons 

why the host nation might not be able to do a given task 

before it is recommended. Host nation capabilities and 

limitations must be considered prior to submission of 

any advice or suggestion. At all costs, the advisor should 

avoid unfavorable comparisons of host-nation practices 

with US methods.57

When working with a nonresponsive counterpart, it proved difficult for 

an advisor “to cultivate friendships . . . to influence the institution in positive 

directions . . . if host nationals are not talking to him.” Advisors needed to 

be aware and sensitive “to the difference in cultural ethics that may exist 

between the two cultures and ensure that his conduct is above reproach in 

either of the societies, particularly with . . . cultures that may have distinctly 

different views and customs about what is financially, morally, or legally 

acceptable.” If “the advisor is a salesman with a worthwhile product that 

will help immeasurably if the consumer just learns a bit more about it,” 

that product had to meet the counterpart’s needs within his resources, his 

system, and his goals.58 Another OPATT chief suggested, “Have advisors 

work on simple things. . . . Philosophy does not count for much, look for 

practical improvements. . . . Advisors need to regress in their thinking 

to understand where problems may be. Think very, very basic . . . can 

everyone see the target? . . . Can the troops read?”59 Problems could be so 

basic that they were not even considered.

US Army Pressures: Formal and Informal

Looking back, a former MILGROUP commander noted early ESAF 

operations of big sweeps and multibattalion operations “looked like a 

repeat of the American Way of War, namely, bigger, louder and more of 

the same.”60 Another ex-MILGROUP commander believed that early in 
96

the training of units “one of our problems [was] . . . the tendency for us to 

want to organize their units around how we are organized.” This tendency 

carried over into expectations for leadership, for noncommissioned 

officers, for combat operations, and for counterinsurgency operations. To 

win, the ESAF did not have to meet US military standards; it just had 

to be better than the FMLN. In working through frustrations and the 

slow, laborious process, MILGROUP members were advised to resist the 

American three-step—“there is a tendency for Americans to want to do 

things quickly, to do them efficiently and the third step in that process is 

to do it yourself.” Anything done by the Americans, rather than the ESAF, 

was “going inevitably to be viewed as a Gringo solution.” Without ESAF 

buy-in, all “Gringo” programs were destined for limited results at best, but 

more likely failure. And it would be the Americans’ fault. A hard-learned 

recommendation was “to the extent that you can make their institutions 

work or you can take what they have, whether it’s leadership in the form 

of people or it’s organization or even equipment, you ought to do that. It 

works and it’s worth the effort.”61

Counterpart Observations

Just because the United States provided the resources for the expansion 

of the ESAF and for fighting the war was no reason for the ESAF leadership 

to accept American military concepts, particularly if they did not meet 

ESAF perceived needs. Many commanders resented US interference, 

particularly the American emphasis on human rights. Others resented 

“American impatience (some would say arrogance) when confronting a 

different culture, as well as the ‘can-do’ inclination to take charge in the 

face of inefficiency or ineptitude.”62 OPATT members expressed frustration 

about being unable to accompany ESAF units during operations to assess 

combat performance and to identify training deficiencies. In fact, an 

ESAF joke was that “asesor”—the Spanish word for “advisor”— actually 

meant “one who tries to tell us how to run a war without ever having been 

there.”63

Both the ESAF and FMLN acknowledged that OPATTs made a 

difference in the war. Although the ESAF never fully accepted small-unit 

operations as a critical component of the security side of counterinsurgency, 

it developed a national pacification plan and focused to a degree on civic 

action and on working among the people. However, its execution fell 

short of its goals because of inadequate ESAF manpower for pacification, 

security, and combat operations; lack of resources for the pacification 

programs; and the diverting of assets to humanitarian relief efforts after 

the earthquake in 1986. One ESAF officer acknowledged, “Our biggest 
97

mistake as military men is to assume that there is a quick and rapid 

solution to this war and that all we need to do is change a few tactics here 

and there. But this is simply not the case. This type war is new and it’s so 

politically inclined that its entire framework is very different.”64 A former 

FMLN leader believed that American advisors at the brigades made the 

ESAF more effective, more professional, and less abusive. To ensure that 

the ESAF did not change its mind about the peace settlement, the FMLN 

insisted on the presence of OPATT members with ESAF brigades during 

demobilization.65

Special Studies and Other Observations

Just as with previous advisory efforts, studies and participants analyzed 

the MILGROUP effort in El Salvador to learn lessons and to understand 

what happened. What follows are some observations, conclusions, and 

recommendations from the 1987 comments of Ambassador Thomas 

Pickering, a 1988 special report completed by four US Army officers, a 

1992 OPATT after action report, and a 1995 RAND study.

An Ambassador’s Thoughts, 1987

Ambassador Pickering served as the US Ambassador to El Salvador 

from 1983 to 1985. His observations about US government inadequacies 

were paralleled by similar US military shortcomings. Facing an insurgency 

in El Salvador, Pickering discovered that he had:

 . . . neither the doctrine nor the support nor the coordination 

in the US Government that would really be required to 

deal effectively with that kind of operation. I don’t think 

we ever developed it. We still are kind of ad hoc in our 

way of viewing the problem. That is really quite a critical 

comment. The fact that we were reasonably successful 

has very little to do with the fact that we had previously 

developed the answers to those issues, and in effect we 

were often condemned to reinventing a lot of them. In a 

way, we were unhampered by doctrinal preconceptions, 

and that helped in pragmatism and flexibility, but in 

another sense this made it very difficult to stay the course, 

to know what other things happened, to do all the things 

that had to be done all at once. 66

According to Pickering, the impact of this shortcoming was “first, that 

in the failure of the United States effectively to study, assess, write histories 

about, and reach conclusions on these types of wars we are condemned to 

refight and rediscover them. Secondly, it’s very important when we deal 
98

with this kind of a conflict that we deal with it on a coordinated basis.” 

Pickering concluded, “The next stage after being able to understand what 

happened before is to have some distilled wisdom to build on as a result 

of having taken a look at what has gone before.”67 Today, 30 years later, 

Pickering’s comments still ring true.

The “Four Colonel’s” Report, 198868

During the 1987–88 academic year, four US Army lieutenant 

colonels attending Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 

Government wrote American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case 

of El Salvador. Published in 1988, the report was based on oral histories 

held by the US Army Military History Institute, interviews with US and 

ESAF military personnel, and firsthand observations from a trip to El 

Salvador in October 1987.69 The report stated, “The results of American 

efforts to professionalize the officer corps—and they achieved partial 

success at best—are instructive.”70 Partial success was acknowledged 

in the ESAF acceptance of civilian control and in the reduction, but not 

the elimination, of human rights abuses. However, “attempts to supplant 

the ethos of the Salvadoran officer corps with a more professional model 

and to develop noncommissioned officers produced little, despite the 

expenditure of prodigious resources. Whether either effort ever had much 

chance of success, given . . . Salvadoran culture and military traditions, 

is questionable.”71 At the lower advisory levels, rapport based on a close 

personal relationship by a militarily competent, linguistically capable, and 

culturally informed advisor still faced another difficult barrier—the host 

nation military culture and its institutional imperatives, which are always 

resistant to any change, much less quick change.

The MILGROUP effort to professionalize the ESAF made the least 

progress in changing the culture or ethos of its officer corps. The chief 

obstacle to a competent officer corps was the military academy class or 

“tanda” system that promoted all its members together based on year group. 

This ensured that “whatever an officer’s personal failings—stupidity, 

cowardice in battle, or moral profligacy—his career [was] secure through 

the rank of colonel, after which he may depart, with his tanda [year group], 

into honorable retirement.” As a privileged class, ESAF officers lacked 

“a commitment to technical mastery or a sense of responsibility for the 

performance of their units . . . [and] concern for the common soldier’s 

welfare.” To Americans, the ESAF leadership undervalued training; had a 

cavalier, unprofessional approach toward combat operations; and did little 

to improve the soldier’s lot, which bordered on neglect. Making limited 

progress in breaking these habits, the MILGROUP placed its long-term 

hope on a new generation of officers created by the expansion of the ESAF 
99

and trained in the United States. Instead of creating a core of military 

competence and professionalism, this program created tensions between 

the “gringo officers,” mostly lieutenants, and the more senior ESAF officers. 

Officers were forced to “choose between being ostracized and . . . adherence 

to Salvadoran military traditions.” Officers who appeared to support the 

military skills and professional values taught at Fort Benning in the United 

States or at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras reverted 

“to the old way of doing things with disturbing frequency once back in 

El Salvador.” Despite MILGROUP efforts, and as most other armies do, 

the ESAF viewed “autonomy over its internal affairs as essential to its 

institutional integrity.” The MILGROUP found it much easier to create 

and train new battalions than to produce competent leadership to command 

them effectively. 72

Efforts to create a noncommissioned officers corps in the ESAF 

proved equally frustrating. Although MILGROUP trainers found “that the 

NCO concept is alien to the Salvadoran military tradition, as it is throughout most of Latin American,” they continued to push the program that 

made perfect sense to them as Americans. Ignoring the ESAF structure of 

commissioned officers and short-term peasant conscripts, a noncommissioned officer rank structure was superimposed on the ESAF; one that it 

did not understand nor accept. Attempting to create a corps of noncommissioned officers in the ESAF underscored “the difficulty of undertaking institutional change that ignores strong cultural biases.” ESAF officers 

did not understand, welcome, or accommodate a noncommissioned officer 

corps that was considered a threat to the officer corps. Looking back, “the 

American attempt to create an NCO corps appears naïve and presumptuous.” A clear lesson both for US military policy and for advisors is to “concentrate on issues that are not only relevant to a counterinsurgency—as 

NCOs indisputably are—but also reasonably attainable given the war’s 

specific context. To do otherwise is to risk squandering resources that are 

already in short supply.”73 Advisory work proved a frustrating and difficult 

enough challenge with its plethora of misunderstandings and divergent 

goals without the added handicap of attempting, out of ignorance or willfulness, the unattainable. Working within the host nation military system 

requires knowledge, thought, understanding, adjustment, and effort; but in 

the long run, it may prove easier and more effective in the short-term than 

trying to change the unchangeable.

By focusing on organization, equipment, training, and tactics, the 

MILGROUP work to change the way the ESAF fought literally transformed 

the ESAF. Reaching a maximum strength of 56,000, the ESAF was bigger, 

better trained, better equipped, and seasoned by years of fighting. The 
100

expansion created a force ratio that ensured the FMLN would not win. 

ESAF soldiers were trained, equipped, and capable of living and fighting 

in the field. However, the ESAF proved incapable of destroying the FMLN 

insurgents. A major improvement, “perhaps the most spectacular,” was in 

the changes in the quality and quantity of its facilities—command and control, 

logistical, medical, training, and airfield. However good the progress, there 

remained disappointments. “Despite the oft-expressed American intent 

to convert ESAF into a counterinsurgent force . . . it failed to wean the 

Salvadorans from their conventional mindset. If anything, American actions 

have reinforced that bias.” Organizing and equipping units conventionally 

with heavier weapons than those suited for counterinsurgency operations 

reinforced the ESAF preference for conventional, large-unit operations and 

stiffened their resistance to decentralized, small-unit saturation patrolling 

more suited to counterinsurgency operations.74 By replacing damaged 

fixed and rotary wing aircraft, the MILGROUP produced an El Salvadoran 

air force capable and willing to support combat operations. The result was 

that for counterinsurgency operations that emphasized “being among the 

people, the UH-1 . . . made ESAF into an army that spends too much time 

above the people.” The report found that “almost instinctively, Americans 

take a rich man’s approach to war.”75

The authors of the study noted that at the Kennedy School, as well 

as in America, “the notion that no problem of public policy lies beyond 

solution has entrenched itself as an article of faith.” They continued, “To 

soldiers, optimism comes less easily, for no historical phenomenon has 

proven more resistant to simplified prescriptions than the subject of their 

profession.” Unfortunately, the American military was not immune to the 

belief that problems have solutions and that as Americans they can “make 

it happen.” The study made the following recommendations:

● Make room for the study of small wars in military 

schools.

● Clarify organization responsibilities for fighting small 

wars, in Washington and in the field.

● Overhaul the procedures governing security 

assistance.

● Before undertaking any intervention, establish a 

vision of what you hope to accomplish and a consensus of political support to sustain that vision.

● Put someone in charge, vesting that official with real 

authority.
101

● Send your first team and permit its members the latitude needed to get the job done.

● Foster institutional change only where it will make a 

difference.

● Avoid introducing inappropriate technology.

● Weight the ‘other war’ as the tougher part of the 

proposition.76

Although these suggestions appear to be simple and common sense, things 

always prove more difficult in practice than they do in theory.

An OPATT After Action Report, 1992

On 18 April 1992, the 2d Military Zone/Brigade OPATT Chief, a 

Special Forces major, submitted his end-of-tour after action report. This 

5-page report and its 10-page attachment provided an analysis of problems confronted during a frustrating tour. He offered suggestions and recommendations on how to do the advisory business better; several were 

referred to earlier in this chapter. Despite working with foreign soldiers 

previously, he found that the “advisory business and the mission of the 

MILGROUP are the most difficult jobs I have thus far seen in my career.” 

Addressing the disparity between relationships between advisor and their 

counterparts, he did not believe that “our doctrinal approach to the advisory business should be based on luck. If the job is worth doing, it is worth 

doing right and requires planning, organization, and systemic solutions not 

trusting to the good will of the host nation and hoping they will do what 

we want.” This required common efforts and expectations through both 

MILGROUP and the ESAF channels. He expressed concern that because 

of the political settlement in El Salvador “the US Army now believes it 

knows how to handle insurgencies and establish effective MILGROUPs.” 

He firmly stated, “It does not.” He thought that the MILGROUP advisory 

work in a counterinsurgency environment “presented a far more difficult 

job and a greater challenge than anything else our army has done in many 

years. For all the difficulty of conventional operations, they are not even in 

the same ball-park as far as the need to be innovative, creative, and juggle 

a host of political, military, social and economic requirements. The fact is 

that nobody is adequately trained for the work that makes a complex job 

extremely difficult.”77

A RAND Report, 1995

In 1995 RAND published The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts 

in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and 
102

Honduras. This comparative study provides some useful insights for 

American advisory personnel to consider. First, that US military trainers 

need “to be more sensitive to the host-nation training needs of Third World 

militaries . . . commonly heard laments that the United States frequently 

teaches skills and ideas that are of little use to the Salvadoran or Honduran 

soldiers. The idea is to teach US doctrine to Third World officers for 

greater understanding and interoperability between the military establishments. However, much of US doctrine is simply not applicable within the 

Third World context.”78 Second, the approach of using military training to 

change a foreign military’s internal ethos rests on a weak foundation:

As the United States has attempted to train the skills 

applicable to internal defense and development, it has 

faced three fundamental hurdles. First, can the United 

States effect basic attitudinal and behavioral change in 

the individual soldier who receives the training? Second, 

assuming the individual soldier internalizes the lessons on 

‘professionalism,’ can this individual-level metamorphosis be translated into a wide institutional transformation? 

Third, given the multitude of exogenous factors that affect 

democratic political development and structurally induced 

political repression, can the military play an instrumental 

role in effecting change on a societal level? Strong political, personal, historical, and financial reasons abound for 

these militaries to remain politically viable and independent. Consequently, it would appear that no amount of US 

training could persuade them to do otherwise.79

Third, many studies have “concluded that US military training and 

equipment have little or no effect, negative or otherwise, on the institutional behavior of Latin American militaries.”80 Basic skills and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can be improved by American military 

training as shown in Korea and Vietnam. However, changing the internal military culture of an army proves to be a difficult, time-consuming, 

and problematic task. While a unique, well-considered, carefully-tailored, 

and long-term approach might work; normal military training and normal military approaches do not. The advisory environment offers no easy, 

quick fixes. It demands hard, focused work and an unusual situational 

understanding. 

Summary

Unlike Korea and Vietnam, MILGROUP trainers were selected for 

their language skills and prior experience in the region, as well as MOS 
103

and rank. As a result, no special courses or preparation were considered 

necessary. Brigade OPATT teams remained small, partly because of the 

MILGROUP 55-man limit. Just as in Vietnam, trainers were limited in 

their approach to problems and in their effectiveness by a 12-month tour. 

Unlike Korea and Vietnam, OPATT trainers appear to have worked more 

with members within the staff and unit rather than as counterparts to the 

brigade commander.

Without MILGROUP training, equipment, and advice, the ESAF 

would have failed. The effort in El Salvador was a long, financially costly 

affair; but the initial aim of preventing a FMLN victory was met. The creation of an ESAF that was organized and capable of conducting small-unit 

counterinsurgency operations among the populace proved elusive—both 

because of the ESAF resistance and the American approach that organized, 

equipped, and trained ESAF for what it knew best—conventional operations. However, the goal of professionalizing the ESAF—of changing its 

internal values, customs, and traditions to those resembling a modern professional military—did not happen. 
104

Notes

1. David L. Shelton, “Some Advice for the Prospective Advisor,” Marine 

Corps Gazette (October 1991), 55.

2. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, quoted in Max G. Manwaring and Court 

Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection 

to the Present (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 244.

3. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, “A Strategic View of Insurgencies: 

Insights from El Salvador,” McNair Paper No. 8 (Washington, DC: Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, May 1990), 12.

4. Andrew J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, and Thomas 

F. Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (New 

York, NY: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 5. A chart on this page identifies both the 

ESAF troop strength and force structure for each year from 1979 to 1987.

5. Colonel Lyman Duryea, US military attaché, quoted in Manwaring and 

Prisk, El Salvador, 298. One military zone had only one department; the other five 

had three departments each.

6. Manwaring and Prisk, “A Strategic View,” 8.

7. For a chronology of events in El Salvador from 1979 to 1991, see 

Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: 

The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 1991), 85–92. 

8. Tommie Sue Montgomery, “Fighting Guerrillas: The United States 

and Low-Intensity Conflict in El Salvador,” New Political Science (Fall/Winter 

1990), 32.

9. Colonel John D. Waghelstein, MILGROUP Commander 1982–83, 

quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 236–237.

10. Mark A. Meoni, “The Advisor: From Vietnam to El Salvador” (Master of 

Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 

1992), 48–49.

11. Brigadier General Fred E. Woerner, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El 

Salvador, 115.

12. Fred E. Woerner, “Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy 

Assistance Team (DRAFT)” [document online]; available at http://www.gwu.

edu/%7ensarchiv/nsa/DOCUMENT/930325.htm. 

13. Montgomery, 29.

14. Bacevich, 24–25.

15. Manwaring and Prisk, “A Strategic View,” 10.

16. Waghelstein, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 223.

17. Colonel James J. Steele, MILGROUP Commander, 1984–86, quoted in 

Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 409.

18. Montgomery, 43.

19. Manwaring and Prisk, “A Strategic View,” 16.

20. Ibid., 17.
105

21. Cecil E. Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador,” 

Special Warfare (December 2004), 20.

22. Ibid., footnote 18, 28.

23. Ibid., 21.

24. Ibid., 27.

25. Roland B. Waters, “The Marine Officer and a Little War,” Marine Corps 

Gazette (December 1986), 54.

26. Bailey, 18.

27. Ibid., 21–22.

28. Meoni, 90.

29. Bailey, 22–23.

30. “After Action Report, 2d MILZONE OPATT Chief, Apr 91–Apr 92,” 

Memorandum for Commander, MILGROUP, 18 April 1992. Hereafter referred to 

as AAR 2d OPATT.

31. Bailey, 21–22.

32. Bacevich, 16–17.

33. Meoni, 167.

34. Bacevich, 18.

35. General Wallace H. Nutting, SOUTHCOM Commander, 1979–83, 

quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 242.

36. Pickering, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 243–244.

37. Victor J. Castrillo, “Contributions, Shortcomings, and Lessons 

Learned From U.S. MI Training/Advising in El Salvador,” Military Intelligence 

Professional Bulletin (October–December 1993), 41.

38. Meoni, 98.

39. Ibid., 4.

40. Ibid., 63, 189.

41. Bailey, 23.

42. Meoni, 195.

43. AAR 2d OPATT.

44. Shelton, 55.

45. Ibid., 57.

46. Waghelstein, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 242.

47. Shelton, 55.

48. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 12-15, Joint Security 

Assistance Training (JSAT) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, 5 June 2002), 171–172.

49. Meoni, 65.

50. AAR 2d OPATT.

51. Jeffrey U. Cole, “Assisting El Salvador,” Proceedings (November 1989), 

69.

52. Colonel Lyman Duryea, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 

303–304. 

53. Ibid., 304–305. 
106

54. Waghelstein, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 278.

55. Bailey, 20.

56. Ibid., 23–24.

57. Shelton, 56.

58. Ibid., 56–57.

59. AAR 2d OPATT.

60. John D. Waghelstein, “Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned 

in the Counter-insurgency Business,” Small Wars and Insurgencies (Winter 1994), 

369.

61. Steele, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 407–498.

62. Bacevich, 23.

63. AAR 2d OPATT.

64. Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, 

El Salvador, 281.

65. Bailey, 27.

66. Pickering, quoted in Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador, 245–246.

67. Ibid., 485.

68. Victor M. Rosello, “Lessons from El Salvador,” Parameters (Winter 

1993–94), 106.

69. Bacevich, 2.

70. Ibid., 25.

71. Ibid., vii.

72. Ibid., 26–27.

73. Ibid., 27–28.

74. Ibid., 28–29.

75. Ibid., 29, 31.

76. Ibid., 49.

77. AAR 2d OPATT.

78. Michael Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal 

Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), xviii.

79. Ibid., 66.

80. Ibid., 12.
107

Chapter 4

Observations

In retrospect the role of the US military advisor has not 

undergone an orderly historical evolution during the past 

quarter century. . . . The patterns established in the advisory effort reflect the influence of circumstances rather 

than of evolution.1

—Walter G. Hermes, 1965

From this brief review of the American advisory experiences in Korea, 

Vietnam, and El Salvador, the above statement from the US Army Center 

of Military History report, “Survey of the Development of the Role of 

the U.S. Army Military Advisor,” remains valid today—over 40 years 

later. Each time the US military response to advisory requirements was an 

ad hoc, secondary endeavor. Each time results were expected. Each time 

advisors tried their best. Each time the results were mixed. Each time the 

experience was forgotten—relegated to that lesser important, not-to-bedone-again-anytime-soon pile of military tasks.

What Advisors Did: Organization and Roles

American MAAGs were forced to get the best results out of the minimum number of personnel. At the lowest unit advisory teams, regiment 

and brigade in Korea and El Salvador and battalion in Vietnam, the teams 

were authorized only two to five personnel. As previously noted, personnel shortages were common. In Vietnam, district and province teams 

involved in pacification found that the variety of their responsibilities and 

the expanse of their territory stretched their capabilities. While these teams 

seem small for their tasks, Sir Robert Thompson, a British counterinsurgency expert in Malaya, believes in the “need on the military side to keep 

the presence of foreign military advisors to the minimum. If things are not 

going right, it is most unlikely that the solution will be found merely 

by increasing the quantity of advisors. This is liable to be counterproductive and can reach the point at which advice begins to revolve on 

a closed circuit.”2 In the advisory and in the counterinsurgency business 

more was not always better. Often more was less effective, particularly 

when it was more of the wrong stuff provided by advisors who were frequently rotating in and out of positions because of short-tour lengths and 

assignment policies.

Advisor roles and duties evolved, particularly in Vietnam and El 

Salvador. For combat unit advisors—even for KMAG—training, teaching, 
108

coaching, liaison, observing, tactical advising, and providing combat 

support were relatively straightforward, basic military tasks complicated 

by language, cultural differences, and institutional barriers. After 1965, 

MACV unit advisors focused primarily on providing American combat 

support assets, liaison with US units, and reporting on the status of their 

units. By the end of the El Salvador experience, a major duty for OPATT 

members was monitoring units for human rights abuses. For pacification 

advisors in Vietnam, civil-military duties in a counterinsurgency 

environment proved a complex, difficult task—something beyond their 

experience and expertise.

Who Advisors Were: Selection

If one thought that the small number of advisors at each level and 

the range of tasks required would mean a special selection process to 

identify those suitable, that proved not to be the case. While the advisor 

requirements in El Salvador did emphasize personnel with Special Forces 

experience, prior service in the region, and Spanish language capability, 

the general overall attitude was that anyone who spoke Spanish and had 

served in the region could do advisory duty. There was no special screening 

before training, except for the limited number of PSA and DSA positions 

at the end of Vietnam. If someone met rank and branch-qualification 

requirements and was eligible for an overseas tour, then he was suited 

for advisory duty. If he volunteered, it was even better. Frequently, even 

the basic rank, MOS, and experience requirements were waived as shown 

by the presence of first lieutenant battalion advisors and MAT team 

chiefs. Advisory duty, even in El Salvador, was never top priority. As an 

OPATT chief and Special Forces officer noted, “There were . . . criteria 

for technical or logistical advisor positions, and yet there is no system 

within the military to measure an advisor’s professional competence in 

required skills, other than the language requirement. This is especially 

true for officers.”3 Consequently, in each of our experiences, the quality 

and suitability of advisory personnel varied. A MILGROUP commander 

observed that in Vietnam “Advisors, who should be the first team, were not; 

the nonmilitary aspects of the conflict we were in had been singled out as 

not being part of our job description; and there was an overall assumption 

that US combat units will win the war primarily with firepower.”4

How Advisors Prepared: Training and Orientation

Other than Vietnam, advisors did not receive any special training prior 

to their duty assignments. Training was not considered necessary for combat unit advisors in Korea or in El Salvador for those with Spanish language 

skills and some experience in the region. Even the training for Vietnam—
109

focused on language, cultural, and advisory than on military skills—was 

considered only an introduction to the challenges faced by advisors. The 

quantity of advisors needed and the time required to develop awareness, 

much less understanding, precluded much more. PSA and DSA, those 

involved most directly in pacification, received longer language and special training toward the end of the Vietnam experience. However, “in both 

the cases of Vietnam and El Salvador, military planners were not worried 

about attendance to advisor courses that dealt with culture, language, or 

irregular warfare. It was the (MOS) schools that took priority.”5

Interestingly, it is almost impossible to find a complaint by any advisor 

in the three experiences surveyed who felt tactically, technically, or 

militarily unprepared for his duties—even for those duties above his rank. 

Evidently MOS-qualification combined with American self-confidence 

met the basic military requirements faced by most advisors. However, 

almost to a man, advisors felt compelled to talk about the demanding 

challenges posed by language, cultural differences, and host-nation 

institutional barriers. It was in these areas—at the heart of an advisor’s 

effectiveness—that most felt inadequately prepared. Although it is true that 

“there has never been a training program of instruction (POI) to prepare 

military advisors for duty that all those with an interest might agree was 

comprehensive and complete,” it seemed clear that topics that enhanced 

situational understanding were considered more critical than those dealing 

with military skills.6

Not only was training generally nonexistent or of limited duration and 

value, the actual in-country orientation of new advisory personnel on the 

situation and procedures, with the exception of CORDS advisory personnel during Vietnam, was haphazard. In many cases, particularly in Korea, 

it was common for the new advisor to report directly to his KMAG team, 

with no orientation or briefing, not to mention his lack of specialized training or language skills. Even in El Salvador with its 55-man limit, at least 

one OPATT chief read the required folders and went directly to his unit, 

and did not see the MILGROUP commander for months. Low priority 

meant too few folks to do too much work which meant routine things were 

not routine.

How Advisors Did: Strengths and Weaknesses

In Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence wrote, “I was sent to these 

Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, 

but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any 

movement of theirs profitable to England in her war.”7 So it was with the 

American advisors in Korea, South Vietnam, and El Salvador. Although 
110

Lawrence’s skills and qualifications were superior to those of American 

advisors, American advisors gave their best effort despite arduous circumstances. In Korea, the result was considered a success. With KMAG and 

EUSA support, ROKA expanded, improved, and ultimately proved capable of conducting effective combat operations against the North Korean 

and Chinese communist forces. In South Vietnam, the effort was considered a failure. With MACV support, RVNAF expanded and improved, but 

ultimately proved incapable of conducting effective combat operations 

against the North Vietnamese. In El Salvador, the results were mixed. 

With MILGROUP support, ESAF expanded, improved, and fought the 

FMLN to a stalemate, but ultimately proved incapable of internal reform 

or of conducting effective counterinsurgency operations. Although factors 

beyond their control often proved decisive, the final results were definitely 

influenced by the work of American advisors.

In advisory and counterinsurgency efforts, Thomas Carlyle’s warning 

that “nothing is more terrible than activity without insight” is particularly 

appropriate. As a former MILGROUP commander wrote, “the problem is, 

and has always been, to get the analysis right before prescribing cures.”8

Analysis requires situational understanding, not awareness. Even in peacetime, under normal conditions, situational understanding can prove fleeting. In wartime, for an advisor in a foreign country, it is almost impossible. 

At a minimum, an advisor needs to understand the local language, the 

local culture and values, the local military institutional ethos and how it 

works, his counterpart as a person in that foreign culture and constrained 

by that military institution, the local capabilities and limitations, and the 

specific local situation to comprehend what is going on around him and 

to preclude misunderstandings. Then, it may be possible to offer advice 

suitable to the situation; acceptable both to his counterpart and to his US 

superiors; and feasible given time, resources, and the capabilities and limitations of host nation forces.

Although difficult, it is imperative that advisors just as all military 

personnel receive appropriate training to master the skill sets necessary for 

mission accomplishment. A review of the American experiences in Korea, 

South Vietnam, and El Salvador indicates that advisors faced significant 

challenges and suffered major shortcomings.

Advisors Were Deaf

Lacking language skills, advisors were basically deaf. They did not 

understand what was being said around them. In Korea, advisors were 

totally dependent on their ROKA translators. In South Vietnam, even 

with some basic language training, advisors were heavily dependent on 
111

their RVNAF translators. In El Salvador, where some language skill was 

required, few advisors were native speakers. Without language training, 

communication is impaired. Unfortunately, suggestions that “to surmount 

the language barrier the American advisor had to be an inventive teacher, 

combining enthusiasm and knowledge with patience and tact,” missed the 

point.9

Advisors Were Partially Blind

Unable to understand or visualize what was going on around them, 

advisors were partially blind. Not understanding the local cultural issues, 

the host-nation military institutional norms and procedures, and the specifics of local conditions, most advisors frequently misunderstood important things. This undercut rapport and increased the frustration and strain 

between the advisor and his counterpart. Although “frequently the success 

of the advisor depended as much upon his behavior as upon his professional ability,” many advisors were unaware of the implications of their 

actions and inactions.10 At best, instruction and orientation may have made 

advisors aware of some of these issues, but without understanding not only 

the “what,” but more importantly the “why” the locals did things as they 

did, it created an illusion of knowledge.

Advisors Worked in a Hostile Environment

Even with support from above, advisors worked in a foreign country where US goals, techniques, procedures, and doctrines—not to mention language, culture, institutional imperatives—were not those of the 

host nation. Although desirous of American training and resources, no 

host nation wanted to become a clone of the US military. They wanted 

to become more combat-effective forms of what they were. Sir Robert 

Thompson emphasized,

It is essential, therefore, for the advisor to look at everything from the local point of view and not to expect that 

the provision of aid will do more than provide the very 

limited benefits for which it was intended. He cannot 

expect that the threatened country will either organize 

itself or conduct its affairs on the same lines, or in accordance with the same standards, as those of the supporting 

power. The real point here, which is all the advisor can 

hope for, is to get the local government to function effectively and at least to take the necessary action itself, even 

if it is done in its own traditional way.11

Advisors found it relatively simple to train basic technical and tactical 
112

skills, but almost impossible to make those deeper institutional changes 

without host nation support from above, as in Korea. And even there, in 

the end, ROKA remained uniquely Korean, despite its American organizational structure and equipment.

Advisors Worked with Indifferent Counterparts

Because of the hostile environment and the frequent turnover of advisors, most counterparts were resistant—indifferent at best if not actually 

hostile—to an advisor’s attempt to establish rapport. Without personal and 

institutional reasons to bond, and given the short-term focus of advisors 

serving brief assignments, establishing rapport was a topic much easier 

discussed than accomplished. Just because an American advisor showed 

up full of enthusiasm with a myriad of projects to improve the unit immediately, it did not translate into the counterpart sharing that enthusiasm, 

immediate focus, nor myriad of projects, most probably of questionable 

utility. When lower-level advisors could provide their counterpart something of value, such as combat support assets as they did in Korean and 

South Vietnam or pacification assets as in South Vietnam, then the counterpart had a personal incentive to work more closely with his advisor. 

Advisors Worked with Limited US Military Support

Advisory duty was never the primary focus in Korea, South Vietnam, 

or El Salvador. It was an important effort, but secondary nonetheless. As 

such it received less support, fewer resources, little guidance, and often 

outdated or inappropriate doctrine. During Vietnam and El Salvador, the 

US military struggled with counterinsurgency operations while trying to 

develop low intensity or counterinsurgency doctrine. Without a grasp of 

the role of combat units in a counterinsurgency, much less the complex 

civil-military implications, American advisors proved more comfortable 

with the theory and less adept at turning theory into practice for a host 

nation.

Advisors Did Not Stay Long

A 1-year tour as an advisor was often viewed as something to be 

endured or gotten through. However, a former OPATT chief reported, 

“Most ex-advisors report that advisor tours longer than 1 year are absolutely essential to a successful effort.”12 Counterparts and repeated studies 

supported the view that advisors did not stay in their jobs long enough to 

understand the situation or to develop the rapport with their counterpart 

necessary to be productive. Longer tours provided longer-term approaches 

and more incentive for advisors to master the language, culture, and other 

factors necessary for doing the job effectively. 
113

Advisors Faced US Military Cultural Pressures

Although most American advisors were not conscience of it, they 

brought US military approaches developed to optimize US military organizations, systems, doctrine, and equipment against a Soviet or conventional threat that were often not appropriate for solving the problems faced 

by the host nation, particularly in a counterinsurgency. In fact, many were 

counterproductive. They had not learned that an “advisor must abandon the 

idea that his way is always best, and try to fit in and listen rather than provide advice by the book.”13 A historian and long-time student of American 

culture noted:

The apparently irresistible bias of the American military is to train other nations’ military organizations as 

our clones. This typically includes the Americans insisting on the bureaucratic organization of other armies into 

divisions, dependent on technology and committed to 

enormous firepower. It was inevitable in Vietnam that 

we would train a local air force, supply the planes and 

bombs, establish military academies, institute annual performance reviews, and suffer daily disappoint that the 

Vietnamese seemed unable to do the job. The unanswered 

question was what was the job. Because we were unable 

to put our own counterinsurgency tactics into operations, 

we trained the South Vietnamese to be similarly incompetent. Counterinsurgency, political war, required discipline and clarity to avoid using artillery and bombs. The 

American[s] . . . would never relinquish . . . technological 

superiority.14

The American military tended to do what it knew best, whether appropriate or not. When confronted with lack of host nation progress, the 

solution often was to increase the effort. The American way seemed better, quicker, “our way.” Often “can do,” “make it happen,” “get over it,” 

and “just do it” became substitutes for thought and analysis, resulting in 

more of the same, often done better but without a different result. Cultural 

understanding of others begins with cultural self-knowledge. American 

capabilities and limitations need to be explicitly defined, just as those of 

the host nation.

Final Thoughts

The prognosis of a “long war” working with host nation forces and 

allies in a counterinsurgency environment means that the likelihood of 
114

advisory duty for many US military personnel is almost a certainty. With the 

growing number of American military advisory teams—Mobile Training 

Teams (MTT), Military Transition Team (MiTT), Border Transition 

Team (BTT), Regional Border Transition Team (RBTT), Special Police 

Transition Team (SPTT), Embedded Training Team (ETT), and Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT)—one thing remains constant: the requirement 

to advise effectively.

Because there is not a lot of material for potential advisors to consult, suggestions for working with counterparts developed from T.E. 

Lawrence, Korea, and Vietnam have been included in appendixes A 

through G. Appendix H, “Points for Consideration,” and Appendix I, “21 

Recommended Practices in Working with Counterparts” are extracted 

from the October 2001 Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Handbook, an 

exceptional source that focuses primarily on advisor-related issues. Three 

firsthand advisory experiences are currently available commercially in 

paperback: Martin J. Dockery, Lost in Translation: VIETNAM: A Combat 

Advisor’s Story, an excellent account of an battalion advisor from 1962 

to 1963; David Donovan, Once A Warrior King: Memories of an Officer 

in Vietnam, the account of a MAT team chief and district senior advisor from 1969 to 1970; and Stuart A. Herrington, Stalking the Vietcong: 

Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account, an account of a District 

Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center advisor from 1971 to 1972. 

In addition to these, the bibliography offers other sources for exploring the 

topic in more depth.

Based on this survey of American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 

Salvador, the following thoughts are offered for those involved in planning, training, and directing advisory work.

● Advisory duty is a complex and difficult job, even more so in 

a counterinsurgency environment. Working effectively with indigenous 

forces in a foreign country—alien culture, unknown language, strange 

ways, incomprehensible actions, different concepts of right and wrong, 

good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate—is probably the hardest military task. As such, it takes time and a long-term focus. There are no quick 

or easy fixes; however, this survey indicates that the advisory effort can be 

more effective.

●	 Careful selection and screening of advisory personnel is required. 

Not everybody can or should do advisory duty. Former advisors acknowledge this; studies reinforce it. This means “to have a valid set of selection 

criteria that works, the military has to formulate a hard set of required 

skills for advisor duty. It should . . . then test them to ensure some level of 
115

proficiency.”15 “Good Marines [and good soldiers] do not invariably make 

good advisors . . . [for many] lacked the patience to work with a culture 

that places little emphasis on qualities that we regard as . . . indispensable 

to military life. . . . The ‘drill instructor’ type of instruction is not generally 

effective in training indigenous soldiers.”16 Those soldiers considered the 

best and most experienced are not always well suited for advisory duty; 

often the normal approach is also not well suited.

●	 Training and educational programs for advisory personnel 

should focus on the knowledge and skills necessary for understanding 

their advisory environment and for developing useful advice. Host 

nation cultural, language, military institutional, interpersonal relations, 

situational, and general advisory skills are more difficult to understand 

and to master and are more critical to advising than technical, tactical, and 

military skills that are normally basic and generally well-understood by 

MOS-qualified personnel. An exception is counterinsurgency operations 

with their civil-military and pacification programs. Training should focus 

on understanding—not awareness and familiarization. Language training 

is a must for situational understanding and for communicating advice. 

If interpreters are used, they should have the language skills of a native 

speaker, they should be trained to understand things military, and they 

should work for the advisor, not the host nation.

●	 The advisory effort should focus on how host nation organizations, 

institutions, systems, capabilities, and limitations—not US organizations, 

systems, procedures, and equipment—can be harnessed to address the 

host nation problems. As one American counterinsurgency expert recently 

noted, “Creating reliable, dedicated local forces . . . is a task as difficult as 

‘eating soup with a knife.’” Yet it is the critical task. “Local forces have 

inherent advantages over outsiders . . . intelligence . . . don’t need . . . translators . . . understand the tribal loyalties and family relationships . . . innate 

understanding of local patterns of behavior that is simply unattainable by 

foreigners.”17 To tap into those advantages, the advisor must resist the “US 

military solution.” To overcome the temptation to do what he knows and 

does best, whether relevant or not to the situation, each advisor must accept 

that he is “bound by a unique set of organizational [US military] fetters. 

Only by understanding those bindings can he take action to make them less 

confining or crippling, but never can he hope to strike them, once and for 

all, from his wrists.”18 As advisors in Iraq recently learned, “simply training, equipping, and organizing is not enough. We cannot undo the influence 

and corruption that has existed for hundreds of years by sending soldiers 

to a school, calling them commando, and expecting them to execute. It just 

isn’t that easy.”19
116

●	 Longer, repetitive advisory tours increase the effectiveness of 

advisors. One-year or shorter assignments reduce the incentives to prepare properly for advisory duty and limit the time to develop rapport, to 

understand the situation, and to develop practical advice. As Sir Robert 

Thompson observed about US advisors in Vietnam, “However high the 

caliber and it was uniformly good, no great achievements in counterinsurgency are possible in such a short period. All that the individual can hope 

to do is to leave his post at the end of the year as he would like to find it. 

He cannot do more than prepare the ground for his successors.”20 Studies 

and comments by ex-advisors support this finding.

●	 Although leverage at lower advisory levels threatens rapport, 

leverage at the highest host nation and US military advisory group level 

can enhance rapport and effectiveness by establishing common standards 

and expectations for both advisors and their counterparts. When this 

happens, the acceptance of common roles and responsibilities for working 

toward a common goal becomes possible. The responsibility for working 

effectively together should not rest just on the American advisor. The host 

nation needs to step up and train its personnel to work with American 

advisors by focusing on the same sort of things that the advisors do—

language, culture, capabilities, and limitations—to better understand things 

from the American military point of view. It is the responsibility of both 

the host nation and the senior US advisory team to create an environment 

in which an advisor can develop the rapport with his counterpart necessary 

to work effectively together. A former advisor suggested “a national level 

agreement . . . to spell out, in writing, what are the specific functions 

of the advisors, what they will do and how they will do them. . . . The 

function of the [senior US advisory team] is to ask the HN forces if the 

advisors are doing what the HN wants and ask the advisors if they are 

being listened to and productively employed.”21 This coincides with the 

view of Sir Robert Thompson who stressed the importance of a treaty 

or formal written agreement. Without one, he stated, “Loose ends have 

a tendency to flap, and will flap their hardest at the end of the line where 

the policy has to be implemented on the ground,” exactly where advisors 

and their counterparts are.22 Much harder to accomplish than to propose, 

this approach clarifies functions, expectations, and feedback—significant 

advantages for a successful advisory effort. Unfortunately in our three 

cases, only when both sides in Korea recognized that they faced dire 

circumstances did a common approach happen. And even then, significant 

challenges—cultural, linguistic, institutional—remained.

●	 Rapport—that personal relationship of trust and confidence in one 

another’s competence, motivation, and honesty—is always critical at the 
117

lower advisory levels. It does not happen automatically; it takes time and 

effort by both the counterpart and his advisor to develop. However, with a 

common understanding of expectations and roles articulated from above 

to both the counterpart and to his advisor, rapport, when it develops, truly 

becomes a force multiplier. Because the problems are complex and differences real, misunderstandings will still occur. Things will still go wrong. 

But at the level where things get done, rapport provides the grease that 

keeps things moving with minimal friction. 

A Final Question

The observations of this brief survey, when combined with current 

advisory activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, point to a final question. Given 

the anticipated demands of the “long war” on US military personnel and 

increased advisory duties in countries facing counterinsurgency threats that 

require increased cultural and linguistic competence for working effectively with indigenous forces, does the US military need a single agency or 

proponent that has responsibility for advisory issues—concepts, requirements, doctrine, training, selection, planning, and operations? Perhaps it is 

now time to move beyond the ad hoc, make-it-up-as-you-go approach of 

the past to a more systematic and experience-based method. Only time will 

tell if the current Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 

(JCISFA), Foreign Security Force Training Center (FSFTC), and Military 

Transition Team (MiTT) efforts are adequate.

The insights of T.E. Lawrence are as appropriate here as they were in 

the introduction of this survey. In a 26 April 1933 letter to B.H. Liddell 

Hart commenting on the draft of a military biography that Hart was writing, Lawrence wrote: 

Do make it clear that generalship, at least in my case, 

came of understanding, of hard study, and brain-work and 

concentration. Had it come easy to me I should have not 

done it so well. If your book could persuade some of our 

new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside 

drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good 

work. I feel a fundamental, crippling, incuriousness about 

our officers. Too much body and too little head. The perfect general would know everything in heaven and earth. 

So please, if you see me that way and agree with me, do 

use me as a text to preach for more study of books and 

history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000 

years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when 

fighting, for not fighting well.23
118

When Lawrence used the term generalship, he was describing his role 

as advisor to Emir Feisal during the Arab Revolt. To paraphrase his final 

sentence: since the beginning of World War II, with over 65 years of 

American examples behind us, we have no excuse, when advising, for not 

advising well.
119

Notes

1. Walter G. Hermes, “Survey of the Development of the Role of the U.S. 

Army Military Advisor” (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 

Historical Report, 1965), 80.

2. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 

Malaya and Vietnam (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 165.

3. Mark A. Meoni, “The Advisor: From Vietnam to El Salvador” (Master of 

Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 

1992), 138.

4. John D. Waghelstein, “What’s Wrong in Iraq? Or Ruminations of a 

Pachyderm,” Military Review (January–February 2006), 114.

5. Meoni, 142.

6. Ibid., 184.

7. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York, NY: 

Anchor Books, 1991), 30.

8. Waghelstein, 117.

9. Hermes, 82.

10. Ibid., 82–83.

11. Thompson, 161.

12. Meoni, 218.

13. Ibid., 155.

14. Loren Baritz, Backfire: Vietnam—The Myths That Made Us Fight, The 

Illusions That Helped Us Lose, The Legacy That Haunts Us Today (New York, 

NY: Ballentine Books, 1985), 243.

15. Meoni, 139.

16. Andrew R. Milburn and Mark C. Lombard, “Marine Foreign Military 

Advisors: The Road Ahead,” Marine Corps Gazette (April 2006), 62–63.

17. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 

2005), xiv.

18. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of 

Failure in War (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 246.

19. David H. Marshall, “Training Iraqi Forces,” Marine Corps Gazette

(April 2006), 60.

20. Thompson, 165.

21. “After Action Report, 2d MILZONE OPATT Chief, Apr 91–Apr 92,” 

Memorandum for Commander, MILGROUP, 18 April 1992.

22. Thompson, 158.

23. Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. 

Lawrence (New York: Antheneum, 1990), 908.

121

About the Author

Robert D. Ramsey III retired from the US Army in 1993 after 24 years 

of service as an Infantry officer that included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and 

the Sinai. He earned an M.A. in history from Rice University. Mr. Ramsey 

taught military history 3 years at the United States Military Academy and 

6 years at the US Army Command and General Staff College.

123

Glossary

AAR	 after action review

ALAT	 Army Language Aptitude Test

AR	 Army regulation

ARVN	 Army of Vietnam

BCAT	 Battalion Combat Assistance Team

BTT	 Border Transition Team

CA	 Civic Action; California

CAS	 close air support

CAT	 combat assistance team

CCF	 Chinese Communist Forces

CCP	 Combined Campaign Plan (Vietnam)

CG Civil Guard (Vietnam)

CGSC	 Command and General Staff College

CIA	 Central Intelligence Agency

CIDG	 Civilian Irregular Defense Group

CMO	 civil military operations

CO	 commanding officer

COIN	 counterinsurgency

CONUS	 continental United States

CORDS	 Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

CP	 command post

CSA	 Chief of Staff of the Army

DA	 Department of the Army

DCAT	 Division Combat Assistance Team

DCSPER	 Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DIOCC	 District Intelligence Operations and Coordination Center

div	 division

DOD	 Department of Defense

DOS	 Department of State

DPSA	 Deputy Province Senior Advisor

DSA	 District Senior Advisor

e.g.	 for example

ESAF	 El Salvador Armed Forces

etc.	 and so forth

ETT	 Embedded Training Team

EUSA	 Eighth US Army (Korea)

FAO	 Foreign Area Officer

FASP	 Foreign Area Specialist Program

FM	 frequency modulation; field manual

FMLN	 Farabundo Martí para Liberación Nacional movement

(El Salvador)

FSF	 Foreign Security Force

FSFTC	 Foreign Security Force Training Center
124

G1	 Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel)

G2	 Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)

G3	 Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans)

G4	 Assistant Chief of Staff (Logistics)

G5	 Assistant Chief of Staff (Civil Affairs)

GOES	 Government of El Salvador

GVN	 Government of Vietnam

GWOT	 Global War on Terrorism

HC	 host country

HN	 host nation

HQ	 headquarters

i.e.	 that is

IMA	 Institute for Military Assistance

inf	 infantry

JCISFA	 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

JCS	 Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSAT	 Joint Security Assistance Training

KISSSS	 Keep it simple, sustainable, small, and Salvadorian

KMAG	 United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of

Korea

LIC	 low intensity conflict

LTG	 lieutenant general

MAAG	 Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAAG-V	 Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

MACV	 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAG	 Military Advisory Group

MAI	 Military Assistance Institute

MALT	 Mobile Advisory Logistics Team

MAOP	 Military Assistance Officer Program

MAPA	 Military Assistance Program Advisor

MASA	 Military Assistance Security Advisor

MAT	 Mobile Advisory Team

MATA	 Military Assistance Training and Advisory (course)

MD	 Maryland

MI	 military intelligence

MILGROUP	 Military Group (El Salvador)

MILZONE	 military zone

MiTT	 Military Transition Teams

MOS	 Military Occupational Specialty

MTT	 Mobile Training Team

NC	 North Carolina

NCO	 noncommissioned officer

NGO	 non-governmental organization

NVA	 North Vietnamese Army

ODCSPER	 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
125

OP	 Occasional Paper

OPATT	 Operations, Plans and Training Team (El Salvador)

OSO	 Overseas Security Operations

PF	 Popular Forces (initially Self-Defense Corps) (Vietnam)

PIOCC	 Province Intelligence Operations and Coordination Center

PMAG	 Provisional Military Advisory Group (Korea)

POI	 program of instruction

PRT	 Provisional Reconstruction Team

PSA	 Province Senior Advisor

PSDF	 People’s Self-Defense Force

PSYOPs	 psychological operations

QDR	 Quadrennial Defense Review

R&R	 rest and relaxation

R2	 Limited Working Proficiency—Reading

R3	 General Professional Proficiency—Reading

RBTT	 Regional Border Transition Team

RCAT	 Regiment Combat Assistance Team

RF	 Regional Forces (initially Civil Guard) (Vietnam)

ROK	 Republic of Korea

ROKA	 Republic of Korea Army

RVN	 Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF	 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S2	 Limited Working Proficiency—Speaking

S3	 General Professional Proficiency—Speaking

S5	 Civil Affairs Officer

SATTOC	 Security Assistance Team Training and Orientation

Course

SDC	 Self Defense Corps (Vietnam)

SE	 southeast

SF	 Special Forces

SOI	 surety operational inspection

SOUTHCOM	 US Southern Command

SPTT	 Special Police Transition Team

SSI	 selection source information

TDY	 temporary duty

TERM	 Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (Vietnam)

TTP	 tactics, techniques, and procedures

TZ	 tactical zone

US	 United States

USAF	 US Air Force

USAID	 US Agency for International Development

USARV	 US Army, Vietnam

USIA	 US Information Agency

USMC	 US Marine Corps

USOM	 US Operations Mission
126

VA	 Virginia

VC	 Viet Cong

VN	 Vietnamese; Vietnam
127

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135

Appendix A

“Twenty-Seven Articles,” 1917

The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for 

greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal 

conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now 

put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are 

meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person’s need, 

or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs 

is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same 

time we have a great chance there; the Sherif trusts us, and has given us 

the position (toward his Government) which the Germans wanted to win 

in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry 

out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest and 

skill we possess.

1.	 Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for,

and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When 

you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with 

yourself and them. 

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all 

this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak 

their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, 

avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little 

stiff at first.

3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and 

reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency’s sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is

advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that 

this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive 

of your joint plans. 

4.	 Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at

your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes 

he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first

T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 27 August 

1917 [online]; available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/27arts.html.
136

instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify 

them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are 

in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to 

it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware 

of your pressure. 

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as 

you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be 

naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not so good 

as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs 

come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out

of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the

Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm. 

6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. 

Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoid 

going behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them 

on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own. 

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way 

you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with 

respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and 

above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you 

must attain it. 

8.	 Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not

be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too

long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. 

To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if 

you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs 

are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle 

of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always 

with a Sherif’s, and share his attitude toward the tribes. When the moment 

comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will 

then follow suit. 

9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the 

natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope of 

union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as 

the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and 

life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be 

insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree
137

and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf. 

10. Call your Sherif “Sidi” in public and in private. Call other people by 

their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh 

“Abu Annad,” “Akhu Alia” or some similar by-name. 

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However 

friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always 

that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you 

like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you 

will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your 

orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show. 

12.	 Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A dry

irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad 

character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped

up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most 

violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it 

sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humor. Do not cause a laugh at a

Sherif except among Sherifs. 

13.	 Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the

resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what you 

have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is 

difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less

you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go 

mad yourself. 

14.	While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the

patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the more 

your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you

wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is 

only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund

of goodwill. 

15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do 

it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 

them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions 

of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it 

is.

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. 

A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious 

sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you 

may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you 

require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for 
138

things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow 

to milk. 

17. Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant 

prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due 

probably to British obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or 

irreligious principle. A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the 

sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you 

in public. 

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly 

known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if

you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and 

intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous and 

difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like

them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre,

playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious 

stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, 

is perhaps only attainable in character: while half-success (all that most 

of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British 

things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the 

comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you 

are caught. 

19.	 If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among

the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. 

Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it. 

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English 

friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is 

possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs 

at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action, and put 

more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an 

immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage food, strange 

clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy and quiet, 

and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others 

for months on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties

of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this road should 

not be chosen without serious thought. 

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your 

own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is 
139

external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, 

Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little 

fervour, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that 

they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share 

in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and 

intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion 

is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food. 

22.	 Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds

ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as 

quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good 

to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them 

more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar 

conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit

small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred 

men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, 

while admirable company commanders, are too “set” to learn to handle 

the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don’t attempt unusual things, 

unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless 

success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack 

like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge 

of the country (don’t take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the 

gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots 

at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from 

another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there 

is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not 

waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying 

to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more 

unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have 

the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don’t play for 

safety. 

23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, 

but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find

these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) 

before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion is more 

effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their 

minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing 

unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of 

them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their 

attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case. 
140

24.	 Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will

get work out of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers

of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, 

are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to 

adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollenheaded to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for 

more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their 

troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough

to give any) would be more readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any 

Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard

each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more 

objectionable than poor strangers. 

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. 

It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our

own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to 

them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally. 

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and 

unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you 

so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and 

leave you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. 

They are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in 

the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects 

owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an 

Ageyli or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels. 

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that 

passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you 

find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and

no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one 

thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips 

that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be

proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it. 
141

Appendix B

“Ten Commandments for KMAG Advisors,” 1953

As Advisor to a ROK Army Unit, I will:

(1) Take the initiative in making observations and rendering advice. 

Without waiting to be asked, I will give advice for such corrective actions 

as I would take if I were the unit commander.

(2) Advise my counterpart forcefully, yet not command his unit.

(3) Follow up to ensure that advice has been acted upon. If it has 

not, take it up with next higher KMAG-ROK Army Echelon for decision

and action. (In ROK Divisions with US Corps, take up with the US Corps

Commanders.)

(4) By sound advice and follow-up:

(a) Develop fully the combat power of all units of the command.

(b) Coordinate and control elements of the command so as to 

gain the greatest effectiveness in destroying the enemy.

(c) Restore promptly any part of the command which may have 

been lost or destroyed.

(d)	 Recognize battlefield conditions which might damage the

potential of the command.

(e)	 Ensure efficient use of supplies and equipment furnished the

command.

(5)	 Keep abreast of the tactical situation by frequent personal contact

with all units of the command, using the presence of myself and my counterpart to motivate the troops and give them confidence. Aminimum of my

time will be spent in the unit command post. (This applies particularly to 

Senior Advisors and G2, G3 Advisors.)

(6) Give special attention to the training of Reserve elements, with 

emphasis on realism and correction of deficiencies developed during

combat.

(7)	 Report all tactical information promptly to the next higher KMAG

level regardless of reports initiated through ROK Army channels.

Alfred H. Hausrath, The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military 

Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea

(Chevy Chase, MD: The John Hopkins University Operations Research Office),

February 1957, 15–16.
142

(8)	 Report deficiencies promptly to the next higher KMAG level;

follow up on necessary corrective action. (Corps Senior Advisors will 

keep Chief, KMAG, personally informed of existing deficiencies and

necessary corrective action within their purview in order that failure may 

be prevented rather than corrected.)

(9) Devote particular attention to the welfare of the individual and to 

the maintenance of high morale and professional standards in my KMAG

Detachment.

(10) Be responsible for good order, discipline, housekeeping and 

efficiency, not only in my own Detachment, but in all KMAG Detachments

advising ROK elements subordinate to the command I advise.

I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in the credit 

for his successes and in blame for his failures.
143

Appendix C

“Role of the Individual,” 1962

1. General

Specific duties ofAdvisors by job title are outlined in Section B. . . . This

section covers the role of the Advisor from a practical, day-by-day viewpoint. Some points expressed here may be more pertinent to one Advisor 

than to another who is assigned an entirely different job. Most of these are 

so indicated. Some points covered here may be repetitious or may cover 

“old ground” for more experienced personnel. The main purpose of this 

section is to offer advice to those who need it and to renew the thinking of 

personnel more experienced in this field.

2. The Role

a. The Advisor performs as an individual and as a member of a team.

b. As an individual, the Advisor takes upon himself the responsibility to get out and see what can be done to accomplish his mission, i.e., 

He generates most of the work toward that end through his own efforts. 

He tries in every way to advise and assist the Vietnamese so that they 

accomplish their work in a proficient manner. He is concerned about every

problem that the supported unit or activity has, whether it be in the field

of administrative and tactical operations of a Military unit or whether it 

be morale, living conditions in dependent quarters, pay and allowances, 

postal service, or general sanitation. Even if the responsible Vietnamese 

does not recognize the problem, still the Advisor must attempt to improve 

conditions which hinder or prevent the unit or activity from attaining combat readiness.

c. As a member of the MAAG Team, the Advisor diligently and willingly carries out the tasks assigned by superiors, abides by policy and guidance of superiors, and keeps superiors informed about his work. It is his duty 

to inform his superior when things are not going too well, or when assistance 

from higher echelon is required. He coordinates with other Advisors, units, 

or agencies when they are involved, thus completing the teamwork.

3. Rules of the Game

a. Establish good relationship with the unit or activity supported and 

the counterpart that you advise.

Extract from Book of Instructions for US Military Advisors to 42 Tactical 

Zone III Corps South Vietnam, US Army Section, Military Advisory and Assistance 

Group, Vietnam, 1962, IV–C–1 through IV–C–4.
144

(1) Develop a genuine interest in the welfare, customs, ethics, and 

beliefs of the Military and Civilian community.

(2) Demonstrate your desire to pitch in and help to get things 

done—don’t mind getting your hands dirty.

	 (3)	 Volunteer to assist in every way possible on “Do-it-Yourself”

projects, such as:

 (a) Design and construction of Ranges for small areas, automatic weapons, mortars and grenades (particularly anti-guerrilla trainfiretype ranges for remote CG/SDC units and training sites).

 (b) Design and construction of training areas for teaching 

principles of ambush, counter-ambush, raids, patrols, compass courses, 

PBX circles, etc.

 (c) Prepare and conduct training. In this regard, it must be 

emphasized that many Advisors, particularly those who go to remote CG/

SDC sites, will be without benefit of interpreter. It is even more important

to develop and utilize training aids so that the Advisor can communicate 

ideas and teaching by demonstration. Such devices—sketches, models, match-stick layouts, cardboard mock-ups, sand table layouts, demonstrations with personnel and/or equipment—can accomplish required 

training.

 (d) Prepare prototypes to sell ideas for improving living conditions, e.g., improvised bath shower, pit latrine, waste disposal sump, 

water purification device, etc.

(4) Demonstrate and assist in supervision of maintenance of 

weapons and equipment.

(5) Participate in athletics. Teach new games. Learn old games. 

Help build facilities for sports and assist in obtaining athletic equipment. 

(6) Assist in design of Security system and in improvement and 

execution of Security plan. Report to next Senior Advisor when required 

Security is beyond local capability.

(7) Avoid offending Vietnamese by showing dislike for their food, 

their customs, their way of life in general.

b.	 Dig into the status of the unit or activity supported so that you find

out those things you need to know in order to give constructive advice and 

assistance.

(1) Determine status of personnel, facilities, equipment, weapons, 

ammunition and ammunition storage, communications, state of training, 

administration, and morale.
145

(2) Determine what has been done or needs to be done to remedy 

shortages or to secure necessary resources—follow through Vietnamese 

channels and keep next higher Advisor informed on assistance required by 

MAAG personnel.

(3) Develop an intimate knowledge of the organization, chain of 

command, communication system, source and system of supply, and intelligence net.

(4) Determine the needs of the Military unit or activity supported 

and its dependent community from the standpoint of medical, adequacy of 

housing, food, and clothing, etc. Work toward self improvements. Submit 

recommendations for assistance in improvement of conditions to next 

senior when such assistance is beyond local capabilities.

c. Find out what you can do to aid the local populace under the Civil 

Actions Program, through things you as Advisors can do or through actions 

the unit or agency you are advising can put into effect.

*

d. Take care of yourself

(1) Take care of your body; you only have one.

(2) Make your living quarters as sanitary as you can.

(3) Be alert mentally and physically, always think of security 

measures and fit them into the accomplishment of your mission.

e. Adhere to chain of command.

(1) Become thoroughly familiar with RVNAF channels, teach 

and sell chain of command to the unit or agency you are advising and 

assist them in effecting coordination and obtaining support through proper 

channels.

(2) Strictly adhere to advisory channels. Do not make promises or 

otherwise go out on a limb offering support, such as helicopters, on your 

own initiative. Senior Advisors will support you insofar as their resources 

allow, but you must coordinate with them or their authorized representatives before you commit such support.

f. These are observations from the present Senior Advisor, III Corps, 

and his principal assistants, the Senior Advisors of the three Inf Div / 

TZ’s.

*

147

Appendix D

Advisor “Do’s and Don’ts,” 1962

Do’s

Maintain your sense of humor, you will discover that the Vietnamese 

also possess a sense of humor.

Approach the subject under discussion from a different direction and 

with different words until you know that your ideas are understood.

After “planting” an idea, let the Vietnamese take the credit if it is 

accepted and put into practice—your satisfaction is in the net overall result 

obtained.

Keep abreast of what is going on in the unit, keep in close contact

with commanders and staff officers to obtain information, and constantly

follow-up on leads obtained.

Transact business directly with your counterpart. Do not permit the 

commander or his staff to subordinate you or your position.

Keep your personal appearance and conduct above reproach.

Remember that the Vietnamese are careful to follow correct protocol at 

ceremonies and social events.

Keep a running account of major events—this is useful when it is necessary to render reports, establish the history of a subject, or follow-up. A 

good filing system is a must, a suspense system is also essential.

Accept invitations to Vietnamese dinners, cocktail parties, ceremonies, etc. You will find that most of them are considerate and understanding as to menus and drinks served, by exercise of reasonable precaution 

your health will not suffer.

When using interpreters, speak in phrases and short sentences; do not 

expect the interpreter to remember long speeches. Have it clearly understood with the interpreter that he will ask you and/or the Vietnamese to 

repeat what has been said rather than to translate incorrectly. On written 

translations from English to Vietnamese, always have the interpreter read 

back from his Vietnamese copy to ensure correct translations, remember, 

the Vietnamese vocabulary is limited.

Study your counterpart to determine his personality and background; 

Extract from Book of Instructions for US Military Advisors to 42 Tactical 

Zone III Corps South Vietnam, US Army Section, Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam, 1962.
148

exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships; learn 

something about the personal life of the Vietnamese with whom you work, 

and demonstrate your interest—it pays dividends.

Always exercise patience in all your dealings with your Vietnamese 

counterpart. Never expect the job to be done at the snap of a finger.

If you find it necessary to make a suggestion or recommendation

which might imply criticism of existing Vietnamese policy or procedures, 

do so in private, never in [the] presence of superiors or subordinates of the 

Vietnamese Commander.

Appreciate the work-load of the Vietnamese Commander. He will be 

unable to spend the entire day with you although he will probably never 

call this to your attention. Make yourself available at all times but let him 

have sufficient time to run his unit and do his paper work.

Respect the Asiatic custom and desire of “saving face.”

Local conditions involving the national economy, customs, and educational development often dictate procedures which are considered inefficient and uneconomical in our Army. Avoid an arbitrary attitude toward

these procedures. Try to understand them before recommending changes.

Maintain the same moral and ethical standards in Vietnam as you 

would at your home station in the United States. Moral degeneracy and 

weakness are indications of national decadence to the Vietnamese.

Try to anticipate the Vietnamese problems that your counterpart cannot foresee because of inexperience, and appraise him of the situation in 

time so that he can make proper and timely decisions.

At every opportunity stress the Chain of Command and its use by 

commanders at all echelons.

Stress at every opportunity maintenance of equipment, supply consciousness and the filling of school quotas with qualified personnel.

When advice is rendered, be sure you are on firm ground and be certain that it is within the capability of your unit to carry it out.

Be truthful in everything you say and do, as the Vietnamese appreciate 

and admire one who speaks the truth.

Encourage your VN associates to widen their horizons by explaining 

US customs, by lending US magazines, and by discussing world affairs.

Use your English classes to put your ideas across. For instance, Field 

Manual 22-10, Leadership, is an excellent textbook for intermediate 

reading.
149

Make a special effort to keep physically fit.

Always praise at least some part of what the Vietnamese do or plan to 

do. Then if you have criticism, couch your suggestions in tactful terms as 

a modification to their plans.

Set a good example in dress, posture, conduct and professional competence for the Vietnamese officer.

Present your suggestions carefully, in detail, with adequate reasons. 

The statement that the United States Army does a certain thing a certain 

way is not generally sufficient for the Vietnamese to be convinced that

way is the best.

Continually stress the mutual advantages of good military-civilian 

relations to avoid the pitfalls of military arrogance which easily irritates 

the civilian populace.

Constantly encourage the strengthening of unit esprit de corps. This 

may well sustain the unit in the face of other difficulties.

Be able to explain or discuss basic US policy. Continually formulate 

in your mind how you will answer inevitable questions on current topics 

of the day such as racial integration, etc. However, be careful to avoid 

being drawn into a heated argument on the subject.

Encourage initiative and inventiveness by all commanders and officers. This trait is especially valuable in an Army of a “have not” nation 

that can never expect to receive all the outside material support it wants 

and needs.

Participate actively in the military, social and athletic functions of 

your unit.

Avoid underestimating the ability and capability of the Vietnamese 

officer. He may not have the Benning-Leavenworth [US Army] touch but

he knows his own country and terrain and has been fighting on it for centuries. He and his men can be formidable opponents on their own home 

grounds.

Treat the Vietnamese with whom you work as you would a fellow 

American—equal in every aspect.

Always remember you are an advisor and have no command 

jurisdiction.

Shake hands with all Vietnamese officers in a room when entering

and leaving.
150

Compliment officers concerned if and when a good piece of work is

accomplished.

Exchange amenities with Vietnamese officers prior to discussing official matters.

Request copies of directives issued by the commander subsequent to 

your submission of a recommendation to determine if your ideas are being 

bought and promoted. A responsive commander will not hesitate to publish a good idea over his signature block.

Request copies of all training schedules, summaries of activities, operational reports, etc., to maintain close contact with what your unit is doing. 

This is also an excellent opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

various staff officers and detect areas of strength and weakness.

Observe your contemporaries carefully, particularly those in key slots 

or with whom you have constant contact, for any indications of hostility or resentment. Such individual feelings exist and your problems are 

compounded.

As time progresses you may think or feel that you are doing all the 

“bending over backwards.” If you observe carefully you will find that this

is not so and that the VN are meeting you halfway.

Stress teamwork and coordination.

Emphasize the importance of doing things on time by being punctual 

yourself. Many VN have a very casual attitude toward time.

Take every opportunity to visit other parts of VN. A knowledge of the 

terrain will help you understand VN military problems and will be invaluable in case of war.

Show an interest in VN customs, language, history and people. Your

ideas will be more readily accepted if you show an understanding of 

theirs.

Keep US officers at higher levels advised of conditions of which you

are aware.

Keep in mind the seriousness and urgency of your mission.

Develop the commander’s efforts toward organized troop discipline.

Develop a recognition of the importance of sanitation and police.

Teach by example wherever and whenever possible.

Maintain close contact with the Commander to whom you are advisor. 

Tactful aggressiveness on the part of the advisor is essential.
151

Use highly qualified interpreters on important matters.

Persuade VN personnel to pass information automatically—up, down, 

and laterally.

Poke around in corners and buildings and you will find usable equipment and training aids that have not been used or even made available.

Spend maximum time in your units so that the troops get to know you 

and trust you.

Encourage staff officers to get out and see other regiments, other battalions train. They can’t have all the good ideas. This should encourage a 

better parent unit esprit as well as better training.

Develop a sense of responsibility toward the unit being advised to the 

degree that you can feel a personal gratification for a job well done.

Try to instill, through a progressive program, US methods and practice 

approved by ARVN.

Consider the age and experience of commanders and staff officers at

each echelon.

Think—be imaginative. The lack or absence of initiative and imagination is the only deterrent to a successful tone as an advisor.

Don’ts

Don’t forget for a single minute that you may have to go to war with 

your unit. Any opportunity for preparation lost now may be fatal in case 

of war.

Don’t relax your standards even though the VN standards may be 

lower and you are far from US supervision. However, don’t flaunt your

higher standard of living.

Don’t forget that the VN are basing their opinion of 160 million 

Americans on even your most casual words and actions.

Don’t forget that a careless word or action of yours can cost the US 

very dearly in goodwill and cooperation which has been built up here at 

the cost of billions.

Don’t hesitate to point out faults, especially when they pertain to 

neglecting the welfare of the troops or wasting US aid.

Don’t assume that the US school solution is the only one for VN.

Don’t try to sell a US method with the sole argument that it is US. An 

explanation of the advantages will be more effective.
152

Don’t condone a VN officer’s attitude that officers are a privileged

class without equivalent responsibilities.

Don’t stimulate VN appetite for more intricate and complicated equipment by boasting about superior equipment available to US units.

Don’t underestimate the VN people. They achieved independence 

from both the French and the Communists against incredible odds.

Don’t lose a single opportunity to learn about SE Asia, especially 

guerrilla fighting and security in rear areas. It will be valuable to you the

rest of your military career.

Don’t be discouraged. Suggestions and advice you have given may 

appear to have been disregarded and then be implemented.

Don’t drink to excess in Vietnamese company. They are a people who 

use alcohol moderately.

Don’t ridicule the Vietnamese in conversation with other Americans. 

Many Vietnamese understand much more English than they admit.

Don’t refuse invitations to quasi-military functions. The presence of 

American Advisors adds prestige to many occasions.

Don’t summon a Vietnamese by shouting, whistling or hand motions. 

Catching the individual’s eye and a head gesture will produce more effective results.

Don’t criticize an individual in the presence of other Vietnamese. 

Always use private constructive criticism.

Don’t discuss Vietnamese politics with Vietnamese personnel.

Don’t fail to recognize military courtesy. Vietnamese personnel render 

courtesies to officers in a variety of ways unfamiliar to Americans.

Don’t take offense at what sometimes appears to be abruptness and 

even actual discourtesy at times, it is part of the job to overlook these attitudes while at the same time doing everything possible to create goodwill 

and mutual understanding.

Don’t accept a “yes” answer at its face value, “yes” may mean only 

that the person to whom you are talking understands what you have said, 

but it may not indicate that he “buys” your suggestion.

Don’t expect the Vietnamese commander (or staff, officer) to accept

all of your suggestions; he is the commander, not you.

Don’t present too many subjects at one time or prolong unnecessarily 

the discussion of any one subject, it is better to have another conference 

at a later time.
153

Don’t make promises which you cannot or should not carry out.

Don’t show an air of superiority—regardless of rank of officers dealing with.

Don’t endeavor to give advice until you have made friends with the 

Vietnamese officers.

Don’t be afraid to get your hands and clothes dirty when giving advice 

in the form of a demonstration.

Don’t compare relative pay scales of the American and Vietnamese 

Army.

Don’t give advice that conflicts with directives from higher echelons

of command.

Don’t do the job yourself, persuade the VN individual responsible to 

do it.

Don’t let VN personnel substitute your chain of command for theirs.

Don’t hesitate to begin a project because you won’t be in Vietnam 

long enough to complete it. Get it started and sell your successor on completing it.

Don’t give up your efforts to analyze training because it is conducted 

in Vietnamese; get an interpreter and find out all the details.

155

Appendix E

“Tips to Advisors,” 1966

*

a. Professional Duties and Interests:

(1) Sell in-place training once units return to posts. Onethousand-inch (approximately 25 meters) firing ranges are ideal for small

posts to fire weapons.

(2) Spend a maximum time in your units so that the troops get to 

know and trust you. Keep abreast of what is going on in the unit, and keep

in close contact with the commander and staff.

(3) Encourage frequent command inspections by the commander. 

Many often show a reluctance to inspect, relying solely on correspondence 

and reports to evaluate the effectiveness of the unit.

(4) Continually stress mutual advantages of good militarycivilian relations to avoid pitfalls of military arrogance, which easily 

irritates the civilian populace. The development of a proper soldier-civilian 

relationship is civic action at its best.

(5) Constantly strive to raise the standards of your unit to your 

standards. Guard against lowering your standards to those of the unit you 

advise.

(6)	 Keep training standards high enough so that the unit is ready

for an inspection at all times. This saves the wear and tear of preparation 

for inspection and the disappointment that follows when it’s cancelled. Do 

not use training time for housekeeping matters; discourage the idea that 

the two of you can conspire to “eyewash” instructors.

(7)	 MACV advisors should have sufficient knowledge of all

aspects of US aid programs to counter insurgent propaganda depicting this 

aid as interference in the affairs of the people.

(8) Constantly observe for signs of fatigue. There is a marked 

difference between American and Vietnamese stamina. Pushing at peak 

performance will cause a long-term decrease in efficiency.

b. Techniques:

(1) An advisor must constantly bear in mind that he is an advisor 

Extract from MATA Handbook for Vietnam, US Army Special Warfare 

School (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Warfare School, January 1966), 211–

216.
156

and not a commander. He is not in Vietnam to fight or to lead troops.

(2) Avoid rushing your acceptance by your counterpart. 

Overselling yourself will arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Time 

spent developing a healthy relationship will pay large dividends later on.

(3) Advising works both ways. Set an example for your counterpart by asking his advice; you will get many good ideas from him.

(4) Avoid giving your counterpart the impression that each time 

he sees you, you are interested in asking for status reports, etc. You will

soon find him avoiding you and information increasingly difficult to get.

(5) Transact important business directly with your counterpart to 

assure full understanding of difficult subjects. Work from the soft sell to

the request for official information.

(6) Don’t present too many subjects at one time or prolong 

unnecessary discussion of one subject; it is better to have another conference at a later time. Don’t speak rapidly or use slang. By the same token, 

don’t speak too slowly; it will insult his intelligence.

(7)	 Correct the most important deficiencies first. When you

arrive you will see many things you will want to correct immediately. At 

all costs avoid the impression that everything is all wrong. In some cases 

it may take a month or more to sell one idea.

(8) Avoid making recommendations that lead to decisions. Leave 

sufficient room for your counterpart to exercise his prerogative. One of

his greatest fears is that he will appear dependent upon his advisor to his 

troops. Carefully choose a time and a place to offer advice.

(9) Use your subordinate advisors to lay the groundwork for new 

ideas at their level.

(10) For successful combat operations do your homework thoroughly. The amount of advising done during combat operations is small. 

The advisor does most of his advising in the preparation for combat, basing his advice upon his observations or those of his subordinates during 

past operations. Hold a private critique with the commander upon completion of an operation.

(11) Don’t be afraid to advise against a bad decision, but do it in 

the same manner you would recommend a change of action to an American 

commander for whom you have respect and with whom you work daily.

(12) Approach the subject under discussion from different 

directions and with different words, until you know that your ideas are 
157

understood. The Vietnamese seldom admit that they do not understand. 

Don’t accept a yes answer at its face value; yes may mean that the person 

understands but does not mean that he buys your suggestion. It may also 

be used to cover a failure to understand.

(13) Always exercise patience in your dealings with your 

Vietnamese counterpart. Never expect the job to be done at the snap of a 

finger—and don’t snap your fingers.

(14) Information from your counterpart cannot be accepted in blind 

faith. It must be checked discreetly and diplomatically, but checked!!

(15) After planting an idea, let the Vietnamese take credit for it as 

if it were his own idea.

(16) Advisors are transient—especially infantry battalion advisors. Try to learn what your predecessor had attempted and has or has not 

accomplished. Ask for his files. Debrief him if you have the chance.

(17) Begin preparing a folder about your advisory area and your 

duties as soon as you report on the job. By posting a worksheet-type folder 

during your tour, you will better understand your job and your successor will have a complete file to assist him in carrying out projects you

initiate. 

(18)	Your supervisor at the next higher echelon will often be

unable to visit. He will travel with his counterpart and not get a good 

chance to talk with you. Your efficiency report will probably be based

largely on your reports. Consider writing at least on a weekly basis to your 

chief. Tell him what your area is like, what [you] are trying to do, what 

you have been able to accomplish, what you need his help on at his level. 

Send him copies of advisory recommendations. Write up ideas you have 

for winning the war or any part of it. Your writings may give people a better idea of what kind of job you are doing. You might come up with a key

solution to a problem.

(19) Take time to brief supporting pilots. Take helicopter pilots 

along on command visits. Try to get helicopter and observation pilots 

included at operations briefings. Pilots are branch qualified officers and

warrant officers; they are more effective when they know the overall situation. They are less apt to complain about how they are being used when 

they are fully briefed on your plans.

(20)	Use proper radio procedure.Your division advisory team publishes its own SSI and SOI. Remember that much advisory FM radio traffic is air-ground communication. The Viet Cong are capable of intercept!
158

c. Personal Attitude and Relations:

(1) Getting accustomed to the native food and drink presents a 

problem in somewhat varying degrees to the advisor. You will not lose

face if you eat and drink with your counterpart; conversely, you will gain 

face.

(2) Don’t become discouraged. All of your advice won’t be 

accepted. Some of it will be implemented at a later date.

(3) Don’t forget that a careless word or action can cost the United 

States dearly in good will and cooperation, which have been built up with 

great effort and at considerable cost.

(4) Don’t discuss Vietnamese policy with Vietnamese personnel. 

It is your obligation to support the incumbent government just as you do 

your own. This is US national policy.

(5) Study your counterpart to determine his personality and background, exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. 

Learn something about the personal life of the Vietnamese with whom you 

work and demonstrate this interest.

(6) Set a good example for the Vietnamese in dress, posture, and 

conduct as well as in professional knowledge and competence.

(7) Emphasize the importance of doing things on time by being 

punctual yourself. Many Vietnamese have a very casual attitude toward 

time.

(8) Develop a sense of responsibility toward the unit being 

advised to the degree that you feel a personal gratification for a job well

done. Do not become so involved with the unit that you cannot readily 

recognize failures.

(9) Accept invitations to Vietnamese dinners, cocktail parties, 

and ceremonies. Shake hands with all Vietnamese in a room when entering 

and leaving. Exchange amenities with officials before discussing business

matters.

(10)	Don’t summon a Vietnamese by whistling or shouting. You

will note that Vietnamese summon each other by a wave of the hand, similar to our farewell wave.

(11) Don’t fail to observe and recognize military courtesy.

d. Personal Qualities and Requirements:

(1) Based upon observation and experiences, US advisors returning from the Republic of Vietnam have pooled their thoughts on what it 
159

takes to be an effective advisor. No doubt each one of us is most anxious to 

do our best in assisting our Vietnamese allies expel insurgency from their 

country as soon as possible. For this reason we feel that you will welcome 

the opportunity to examine what other advisors have said on the subject of 

advising. Give these comments consideration and, to the extent indicated 

by introspection, make them a part of your personal attributes before and 

during your tour in Vietnam. These qualities and requirements, along with 

a general summation of desirable advisor traits, are set forth in the following paragraphs:

(a) Persevere in implementing sound advice; exercise 

patience and tact; display a pleasing personality; be adaptable to environment and changing situations; be honest; maintain high moral standards; 

be understanding and sincere; present a sharp military appearance; evince 

devotion to job assignment; keep in good physical condition; acquire ability 

to demonstrate effectively; know your job; know thoroughly the unit you 

are advising as to organization, equipment, and tactics; know thoroughly 

your own branch and have a good working knowledge of other branches; 

know your counterpart’s problems; and demonstrate your awareness of 

them to him.

(b) Advisors are restricted in their operations because they 

are not authorized to exercise command in accomplishing advisory functions. They must rely on their ability to sell the most indefinite commodity

which is represented in the individual himself. The traits of an advisor 

encompasses all the traits of leadership plus the ability to adapt to his 

environment. This environment changes with the locality or area in which 

the advisor is assigned. In the Far East, he must remember that arrogance 

and dogmatism are all the more taboo, for the religious and philosophical 

background of the Asian strongly opposes this type of personality. To sell 

one’s self, you must prove your value—an advisor must present a favorable personality in the eyes of his counterpart. This can be accomplished 

in due time by a gradual demonstration of your capabilities in an unassuming but firm manner. Be positive but not dogmatic in your approach to any

subject; however, if you are not sure of the subject matter, it is better to say 

so and take timely measures to obtain the correct information. To attempt 

to bluff through a problem will only result in irreparable loss of prestige.

(c) A most favorable trait is persistence, tempered with 

patience. If a problem area is discovered, continue efforts to solve it, 

recommend appropriate measures to be taken, and then follow through; 

again, remembering that patience is of utmost importance. But, the matter must be continually brought to your counterpart’s attention until he is 
160

sold on taking the measures necessary to solve the problem or correct the 

deficiency as the case may be. The ultimate in good advising is to advise

your counterpart in such a way that he takes the desired action feeling that 

it was through his own initiative rather than yours.

(d) Possibly the most desirable traits that you can possess 

as an advisor are knowledge of the subject, ability to demonstrate your 

capabilities in an unassuming but convincing manner, and a clear indication of your desire to get along and work together with your counterpart 

and other associates; however, not to the extent of obsequious behavior 

nor acceptance of abusive treatment. These traits, along with leadership 

ability and desirable character traits accepted in our own society, will usually lead to a successful and satisfying advisory tour.

*
161

Appendix F

“Counterpart Relationship,” 1967

*

(1) The advisor does not command his counterpart’s organization.

(2) He should study his counterpart’s personality and background, 

and exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships.

(3) The advisor should make “on-the-spot” recommendations to his 

counterpart, when appropriate.

(4) The advisor may represent his counterpart in disputes with US 

agencies; however, this representation should be based on sound judgment 

and not blind support.

(5) The advisor must not present too many subjects at once or 

prolong unnecessarily the discussion of any one subject. Suggestions and 

recommendations must be within the counterpart’s capability to carry 

them out. Avoid harassment.

(6) The advisor should never accept “yes” at its face value; “yes” 

may mean only that the person understands what has been said (it also may 

be used to cover the failure to understand), not that the counterpart “buys” 

the recommendation.

(7) The advisor should present recommendations carefully, in detail, 

and supported adequately with an explanation of advantages inherent 

to the proposal. Recommendations which require immediate decisions 

should be avoided, except when the situation dictates. Counterparts should 

be allowed to exercise their prerogatives; one of their fears is that they 

may appear overly dependent upon advisors. The advisor should choose 

appropriate times and places to offer advice.

(8) The advisor should not convey the impression that everything is 

all wrong. A careless word or action on the part of the advisor can impair 

the advisory effort. If there is criticism, it should be couched tactfully, but 

the advisor must not be reluctant to criticize when criticism is in order. 

Failure to do so may leave the counterpart with the impression that the 

advisor does not know or care. Appropriate, timely, and tactful criticism 

can engender respect. If it is necessary to make a recommendation which 

Extract from Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 31–73, Advisor 

Handbook for Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of the Army, October 1967), 51–54.
162

might imply criticism of HC policy, advisors should do so in private.

(9) The advisor should ask the counterpart’s advice; he has many 

good ideas. The advisor who tries to oversell himself may arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Do not make promises which cannot or should 

not be fulfilled.

(10) A subject should be discussed until it is known that the counterpart understands.

(11) Frequent inspections should be encouraged. It may be necessary 

to convince the counterpart of the value of frequent inspections to determine actual conditions.

(12) Initiative and inventiveness should be encouraged. The counterpart may follow orders to the letter and, even if a modified course of

action subsequently appears to be more appropriate, he may not deviate 

(or request permission to deviate) from his original instructions. The advisor should encourage his counterpart to request changes in orders when 

the need is obvious. Encourage him to be receptive to such requests from 

his subordinates.

(13) A project should not be rejected because the advisor will not be 

in-country long enough to complete it. Major events and projects should be 

documented and transferred to successors. Briefings, end-of-tour reports,

and other instructions will assist in providing a smooth transition and continuity of effort.

(14)	Maintain a filing and suspense system. Secure classified

documents.

(15)	Definitive goals and objectives should be developed as part of

the overall advisory program. Systematic evaluation ensures continuity of 

advisory effort.

(16) The advisor should keep abreast of activities and in close contact 

with civilian political leaders, military commanders, and staff officers.

(17) The advisor should participate actively in military, social, and 

athletic functions. If unable to accept a social invitation, regrets should 

be expressed in accordance with the local customs. Invite counterparts to 

appropriate social functions.

(18) A sense of identity with the counterpart’s unit or area should be 

developed. Spend maximum time at the scene of activity. Attempt to learn 

the language and volunteer to teach English.

(19) Subordinate advisors should lay the groundwork at their levels 

for new ideas.
163

(20) The consequences of mistreating suspects or prisoners should be 

stressed. Captured insurgents and other persons taken into custody should 

be treated humanely. The minimum requirements for humane treatment 

are specified in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and include: Care for

sick and wounded; prohibiting violence such as murder, mutilation, cruel 

treatment, and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity 

such as humiliation and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences 

and carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by 

a regularly constituted court. Insurgent subversive elements are subject to 

laws concerning subversion and lawlessness. Advisors must not become 

involved in atrocities. They should explain to their counterparts that they 

must report any atrocities of which they have knowledge. Captured insurgents should be interrogated immediately at the lowest level for tactical 

information. The loss of a prisoner, whatever the justification, is a loss of

a valuable intelligence source (FM 30-15, FM 30-17, and FM 30-31).

*

165

Appendix G

“Advising the RF/PF,” 1971

*

a. Always remember that you are an advisor and have no command 

authority over your Vietnamese counterpart.

b.	 Keep abreast of what is going on, keep in close contact with your

counterpart to obtain information and follow up on leads obtained.

c. Remember that information obtained from your counterpart cannot always be accepted with blind faith. It must be discreetly and diplomatically checked.

d. Don’t hesitate to make on the spot corrections; however, do it tactfully. Don’t walk away from something that is wrong; indicate the need 

for improvement while noting diplomatically those things that have been 

improved.

e. Advising can work both ways. Set an example for your counterpart by asking his advice and you will get many good ideas from him.

f. Always praise at least some part of Vietnamese plans. Then if you 

have criticism, phrase your suggestions in tactful terms as a modification

of their plans.

g. Present your suggestions carefully, in detail, with adequate 

reasons. An explanation of the advantages will usually be effective.

h. Do not present too many subjects at one time or prolong unnecessarily the discussion of any one subject.

i. Understand your counterpart’s personality, know his background, 

and exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relations.

j. Set a good example for the Vietnamese in dress, posture, and conduct, as well as in professional knowledge and competence.

k. Emphasize the importance of doing things on time by being punctual yourself.

l.	 Emphasize the importance of doing things correctly the first time,

to avoid setting a poor example or introducing poor habits.

m. Be familiar with your counterpart’s experience and military 

Extract from rf / pf Advisors Handbook January 1971, Headquarters, US 

Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (RVN: Headquarters, US Army 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, January 1971), 7–9.
166

training. Your ideas will be more readily accepted if you show an

understanding of his point of view.

n.	 Keep in mind the seriousness and urgency of your mission. Many

things can be accomplished if you maintain a high degree of motivation.

o. Don’t be discouraged. Suggestions and advice which you have given 

may appear to have been disregarded but may later be implemented.

p. Don’t fail to observe and recognize military courtesy. If you are 

not of higher grade than your counterpart, treat him exactly as if he were 

your US senior.

q. Be aware of all problems but don’t become engrossed in your 

counterpart’s minor every-day problems. Place your advisory emphasis on 

the overall effort.

r. Remember, you are working with a culture in which methods 

and outlook are not the same as the one to which you are accustomed. 

Therefore, exercise patience and understanding.

*
167

Appendix H

“Points for Consideration,” 2001

This section provides a number of specific points that should be considered when dealing with foreign counterparts.

Successful advisory efforts rest largely upon human relations. 

Everyone knows that it is not always easy to convince people who most 

need assistance that they will receive any real benefits from it; therefore it

is of first importance that SF soldiers help the rank and file people working

with them see how they can benefit from their joint efforts.

Likewise, it is sometimes difficult for advisors to establish rapport and

work effectively with foreign nationals. The following points are based on 

first-hand experiences in recent deployments but they match the experiences of technical cooperation programs abroad, and, before that, in rural 

improvement programs in the Southern United States. They are concrete 

suggestions dealing with the difficult matter of how the advisor can best

use his skills.

Be Sure Your Presence is Understood

The advisor needs to enter the area where he will work under the 

right sponsorship. This will include local military authorities, but also the 

mayor, village head, or some other recognized local civilian leader. Prior 

to this, his arrival may need preparation through the district, sector and/or 

other appropriate local offices. No amount of clearances from the distant

national or state/province/sector government can compensate for local 

explanations of why American Special Forces personnel are in the area. 

This is especially true of small and/or isolated communities where it is 

unusual for a stranger to appear for even an hour without being acknowledged and accepted by local leaders.

Without explanations from locally respected persons (opinion leaders), the local population will arrive at its own explanations, often to the 

detriment of the SF efforts. One Central American village became convinced, for example, that the Americans were there to steal children.

Extract from Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book, US Army Special 

Warfare School, Research Planning, Inc., October 2001, 100–105. Reprinted with 

permission of L3Communications (www.titan.com). This is not a US Army manual; it was developed under contract for Commander, US Army Special Forces 

Command.
168

Find a Basis for Common Interest with the Local People

If the advisor shows appreciation of host country nationals as 

individuals, common ground can usually be found despite culture gaps 

and language barriers. He can listen when they talk, and look with interest 

at what they show him. Initial conversations will usually center on 

universal matters such as food, shelter, clothing, health and education. In 

time discussion can be naturally brought around to the matter the advisor 

wants them to consider. He will be better received if he knows something 

about earlier host nation military history, contributions in such matters as 

agriculture, folk art, religion, architecture, and so on. Naturally, he will be 

more effective and appreciated if he can speak the local language.

Try to Understand Why They Do Things the Way They Do 

Some local practices may seem strange and non-sensible at first but

they generally have good reasons behind them that the advisor can discover 

with good observation. A creative imagination helps. Gleaners in the Near 

East, for example, operate within a folk framework that gives support to 

the elderly, somewhat like the American Social Security program. Food 

habits, family traditions, folk cures, and festive celebrations nearly always 

have a great deal of human experience behind them. The advisor will need 

to be alert to the fact that many local military units or villages contain rival 

sub-groups and factions; he will need to reckon with these. Factionalism 

(in its most intense expression, feuds), in small isolated groups generally, 

seems to serve to lessen the monotony and boredom of everyday life.

Start Where the People Are and with What They Want 

The lives of traditional peoples anywhere in the world are usually 

simple and realistic. It is important to find out what the local people really

want most and work with them to get it. They may want a public school, 

or a road, when the SF team thinks the village most needs a well or a 

clinic. The need the local people feel may often be the best starting point, 

regardless of its comparative merits. Then people are more likely to be 

appreciative and cooperative, to begin to raise their sights and become 

interested in working for other improvements. To service the initial desires 

of the people, the advisor may need to call in other personnel with skills 

needed for the particular project. This can involve some delay, but this 

way he gets eventual full cooperation in other projects. Sometimes the 

desire to show immediate results causes the advisor to press for a project 

despite the desires of the local population. In this case he will at best get 

only a half-hearted response, and may put American assistance in a bad 

light locally.
169

Work within the Local Cultural Framework 

The SF advisor needs to understand such basic cultural matters as the 

ethnic background(s) of the people, family relationships, leadership patterns, value systems, and the technological level of the people as related to 

ways of making a living. He also needs some knowledge of local services 

such as health, education, and communications (including transportation). 

Many things will depend upon the advisor’s understanding of cultural 

issues—for instance, the extent that locally available physical resources 

can be used.

Help People Believe They Can Improve Their Situation

The vast majority of the traditional peoples of South America, Asia 

and Africa have long lived in a more or less static situation. This can even 

affect the local military. Through experience, they have come to be more 

fearful of losing status through change than hopeful of bettering their condition through change. Therefore, a suggested change is often viewed with 

fear. Concrete projects that yield easily observed benefits are helpful in

convincing such people that they can improve their situation and make 

them more willing to cooperate in other projects.

Be Content with Small Beginnings

First changes nearly always come slowly in areas where there have 

been few in recent times. It is good to remember that, historically speaking, scientific development in the West occurred only recently. The advisor

should keep in mind that knowledge, whether technical or otherwise, is 

cumulative, and that once a small beginning has been made, greater activity and changes will likely follow. But remember, it is easier to achieve 

momentum than it is to maintain it. The important thing is to make a start, 

within as promising a framework as possible, and with the support needed 

to sustain the momentum achieved.

In some areas, people may have had the experience of various assistance programs that upset their traditional way of life, but provided no lasting benefit. This can also make them suspicious of outside “assistance.”

Utilize Local Organizations and Recognize Their Leaders 

People everywhere respond best when their local organizations are recognized as important and useful. A program is unlikely to succeed unless 

it is carried forward within the local organizational framework. The recognized local leaders, military and civilian, must be consulted and encouraged to make such contributions as they can. A well-conceived technical 

activity will reflect credit on the local leaders associated with it. But also,
170

attention must often be given to the quiet, behind-the-scenes leaders, no 

less than to ranking military officials and the family heads of local groups.

The surest way for an activity to be continued after the SF team leaves is 

for it to have been launched and carried forward within the local organizational and leadership framework.

Help the Government Get Organized to Serve the People 

For the advisor to be most effective he must understand not only the 

local military but also the local governmentset-up, and how his activity fits

into the overall scheme of things. There should already be a set of agreements between the military, various local national agencies and government Ministries, usually through some sort of inter-ministerial council that 

provides for coordinated effort in servicing the varied needs of the local 

people. The SF leadership should work with appropriate agencies to assist 

in getting such agreements made. If such agreements already exist, SF 

personnel should be careful to recognize and strengthen them. The work 

of the advisor in one field is most meaningful when properly coordinated

with the contributions of individuals and agencies in other fields.

Train and Use Semi-Professional, Multi-Purpose Local Workers

Selected young people in the villages can be trained and used as subprofessional, multi-purpose village workers to enable the advisor to make 

the best use of his time. Otherwise, the SF soldier’s influence is restricted

to where he is standing and the immediate vicinity. Furthermore, the advisors, and especially their leadership, spend much of their time establishing 

and maintaining rapport. The gap between the local population and the SF 

advisor is usually a formidable one because of the great educational and 

cultural differences between them. Often the team works with villagers 

who are poor, illiterate, and often have experienced few or no outside contacts. Volunteer or paid local workers (who serve as liaison between the 

villagers and the advisors) have proven of great help in getting the benefits

of subject-matter technical activities. There are young people in the cities 

and villages of South America, Asia and Africa who are eager to be trained 

and used in local developmental activities. The training of a local worker 

is two-fold: to teach him (or her) the many simple things he or she can do 

to help the villagers help themselves; and to help him or her understand 

what they cannot do, and how to call in advisors as needed.

Expect Slow Progress

As the local people, on the basis of their own successes from their 

joint efforts, begin to have new hope they naturally want a larger hand 

in matters. The advisor may sometimes feel they want to assume more 
171

responsibility than they are able to carry. These evidences of growing 

pains should be appreciated, for they are a necessary part of becoming 

able to assume responsibility. They indicate that the local population is 

beginning to believe they can do more and more things for themselves. 

The advisor needs to adjust himself to these growing desires of the people 

to help themselves.

Transfer Controls Constructively

The matter of institution building is a challenge to the SF team. They 

need to help the local people see how they can build the new (that they 

want) upon the foundations of the old (that they already have). From the 

beginning of a project the team needs to have envisioned, at least roughly, 

and to have discussed with local leaders, the various types of training of 

local personnel needed, the means by which needed financial support can

be had, and the several progressive transfers of responsibilities that are 

to be made before the full operation of the activity can be relinquished. 

How can the team know the timing of withdrawal best related to local 

conditions such as personality characteristics, value systems, and so on? If 

operating responsibility is transferred too early there will likely be some 

breakage, as it were, usually of material things; it is important to note that 

the cost of such breakage can usually be charged more or less to training. 

If, on the other hand, the team keeps control too long, the local people who 

have wanted to take over may become disillusioned with them or even hate 

them for not relinquishing control to them when they thought it should 

have been turned over to them. This delayed handing over of responsibility moves the problem out of the material level and into the psychological, 

which is the more difficult to cope with. It must be clear to all, that the

team has the challenge of working out with local leaders the timing of the 

phasing out of each activity so that changes can be institutionalized.

Don’t Demand Thanks from the People Helped

People who benefit from assistance are seldom in a position to be grateful. Rather, they are usually aware that they are making headway belatedly, and they may tend to be on the defensive. In accepting assistance 

they in a sense admit their own insufficiency. A person’s or community’s

or a nation’s self-esteem is a precious thing. The team therefore should not 

expect thanks, but instead approach the people in a spirit of fraternity and 

humility, taking satisfaction in such progress as they may make and being 

quick to see that the credit rests with them. The team should do its job the 

best it can and accept work well done as is its own reward. Insofar as other 

monuments may be needed, mankind will, even if a bit belated, erect them 

in the right places and to the right people.
172

The full application of the above points rests upon yet another dimension, namely the need for the SF advisor to achieve a working equality 

between himself and the people with whom he is working. One reason this 

dimension is so difficult to achieve is that the advisor tends to assume he

has achieved it already, when in fact he often has not adequately identified its components, many of them quite elusive. This final point warrants

some detail. The relationship between the advisor and his counterpart or 

local people may seem like that of teacher and student. In some cultures it 

may be regarded as that of master and servant. All of these relationships 

imply a basic inequality in individual worth. And any such implication, 

or inference, negates the rapport needed to accomplish the very end the 

advisor seeks, namely the development of that greatest resource of all, the 

human resource.

The degree of identification between the members of the SF team and

the people is a most important component in the achievement of a working 

equality between them. In actuality the SF advisor will be able to accept 

as equals only those in whom he can see himself, though under a differing 

set of life circumstances. He can treat the Bedouin or fellahin as an equal 

only when he understands that if he’d been in the same circumstances all 

his life he’d be making a living in about the same way, speaking his language, following his courtship and marriage customs, and responding to 

about the same set of fears and hopes. Such identification is not a superficial thing; it is learned through extended exposure and deep insights. The 

reverse, too, is important—the advisor helps the local people realize that 

they would be about like he is if they’d been in his situation all their lives; 

such identification becomes a dynamic change that leads to improvements

in local living conditions. The difference between the advisor and advisee 

is a product of circumstances, not a question of individual worth. A really 

important thing happens when, through identification, the advisor “understands” the people with whom he is working; and when they, looking at 

him, begin to believe that they can help change their own situation.

Fortunately, the joint efforts of the advisor and the people in meeting 

a specific local felt need provide a basis for effectively working together

despite differences in religion and value systems, despite differences in 

economic status and social position. This joint effort provides a framework in which the advisor can make maximum use of his supportive 

background (a highly developed country, with a heritage of a successful 

revolution, a high value on class mobility, and an interest in helping other 

people help themselves). Conversely it reduces the inherent handicap in 

the marked national differences in wealth, health, education and technology. In short, the joint effort between advisor and the local people to effect 
173

a desired local improvement—whether of a simple material type such as 

a pump or clinic, or a shift toward greater self-direction for the people in 

their own affairs—constitutes a working relationship that helps to overcome the superficial differences among men and so affirms equality, and

brotherhood.

175

Appendix I

“21 Recommended Practices in Working 

with Counterparts,” 2001

Attitudes, values and beliefs can vary significantly between the various

cultural regions. Nevertheless, small, rural towns and villages in the less 

developed parts of the world have some important commonalities such 

as resistance to change. Experience has shown that the practices shown 

below are effective across cultural regions. 

1. Become well acquainted with the culture of the people with whom you 

will work. A thorough knowledge of their culture is the key that will open 

the door to success. Read all available literature on their culture. Expect 

cultural shifts to occur more rapidly than described in available literature. 

There is no substitute for living closely with the people to absorb their 

culture.

2. Respect the beliefs and taboos of the local people.

3.	 Guard the confidence placed in you. Do not divulge intimate secrets.

4.	 During planning, stay in the background as much as possible. Your

role is that of a catalyst.

5. During execution, do not get so far ahead of the advisees that you will 

lose them.

6. Be willing to compromise.

7.	 Keep an open mind and attempt to operate within the cultural pattern

as closely as possible.

8.	 Include casual conversations as one of your advisory tools. Influence

can be wielded effectively outside formal settings. Try to employ examples and short stories that are relevant to the local culture and point of a 

lesson.

9.	 Keep a keen sense of humor. Humor and laughter are wonderful tools

for building rapport if used in culturally correct ways.

10. Be what you are—don’t pretend. Otherwise unsophisticated people 

often have the knack of looking into your personality.

Extract from Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book, US Army Special 

Warfare School, Research Planning, Inc., October 2001, 112–114. Reprinted with 

permission of L3Communications (www.titan.com). Actually 22 recommendations are provided, not 21. This is not a US Army manual; it was developed under 

contract for Commander, US Army Special Forces Command.
176

11. Patience is a golden attribute in working with non-Western people. 

They may not have the same “drives” as Western people.

12. Expect counterparts to be long on promises and short on deliveries. 

They have warded off the “haves” for centuries by this method.

13. Do not expect to use your Western measuring stick for honesty and 

morals. The same values do not apply.

14. Live as close to those with whom you work as possible, but don’t “go 

native.” You are an ambassador for your country and will be evaluated

accordingly.

15. Accept each local national as he is and respect him as an individual. 

Never look down on a man, but treat him with dignity. In associations with 

local officers and officials, even village officials, dignify their positions.

16. Take nothing for granted and be prepared for surprises.

17. Do not identify or align yourself too closely with either the “Haves” 

or “Have-nots.” To be effective, you must have the respect and confidence

of both groups.

18.	 Do not expect to find US democracy duplicated in an overseas democracy. It has taken us centuries to develop ours.

19. Beware of offhand remarks made in unguarded moments. A casual 

comment can come back to haunt you.

20. The things that don’t concern you should be left alone. People in 

developing areas are often inclined to be superstitious and secretive and 

will guard these with their lives.

21. Work within a team for maximum training possibilities. Even a lone 

wolf is much more productive when he works with the pack.

22. Do not make fun of the actions of your advisees or their people, even 

off to the side. Do not stand in groups of SF soldiers going over the day. 

Avoid laughing out loud while in a group apart. Save all internal critiques 

and reviews for a private place where your team will not be observed or 

overheard. Only “let your hair down” in private.