59

Mr. SouDER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. NESBITT. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I’m here today, rep-
resenting the views of 225,000 firefighters and EMS personnel
across the United States, to discuss the Nation’s preparedness to
acts of terrorism. The IAFF brings two distinct but related perspec-
tives to the issue. First, we represent the Nation’s first line of de-
fense against all terrorist incidents—chemical, biological, or nu-
clear attack. We are acutely aware that the lives of countless
Americans depend upon our preparedness for such a catastrophe.
We are concerned that this ground level perspective is often miss-
ing when the Federal Government designs terrorism emergency re-
sponse programs.

The is the Nation’s premier trainer of firefighters in haz-
ardous materials emergency response. Since 1987, the IAFF has
operated a federally funded hazmat training program that has
trained over 20,000 emergency responders. The curriculum and
presentations we have developed have become a standard for this
Nation as a well as several countries around the world.

T’ve included in my testimony, Mr. Chairman, an evaluation that
appeared in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine regarding
our program and, with your permission, I’d like to have a copy of
that inserted in the hearing record.

Mr. SOUDER. So ordered.

Mr. NEsBITT. Thank you. I wish to introduce two of my col-
leagues who are involved with our training program. I’ve asked
them to join me this morning, so that we may fully respond to any
technical questions you may have regarding the training of re-
sponse personnel.

Eric Lamar is a veteran trainer of our hazmat training program.
He is a Fairfax County firefighter and a hazardous materials tech-
nician. He’s attended numerous hazmat training programs, includ-
ing a number of the programs created under the National Defense
Pre, dness Plan.

so joining me is Scott Solomon with our Hazardous Materials
Training Department. He’s been instrumental in developing the
curriculum and delivering the program that we've used to train
firefighters.

The initial response was to pour resources for preventive meas-
ures. While it would, of course, be preferable to prevent all acts of
terrorism, it would be foolhardy to assume that we could ever
achieve this goal. Additional resources are needed and the alloca-
tion of those resources must be refocused to have the greatest im-
pact on domestic preparedness.

Td like to divide my remarks into two general areas. First, I wish
to offer the firefighter’s perspective on the most effective way to

rovide terrorism emergency response training. And then, I would
Fike to share some specific concerns we have regarding the training
yparedness

Program.

With regard to the effective delivery of training, the first and
most salient point that needs to be stressed regarding training of
emergency response to a terrorist act is that there needs to be more
of it—much more. Despite the array of programs that have been

carried out under the Defense Department Domestic


128

‘U.S, Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of the Assistant Attomey General Washington, D.C. 20531
March 2, 1999

‘The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman

‘Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
USS. House of ives

Washington, D.C. 20515

‘Dear Mr. Chairman:

‘Thank you forthe letter from you and Vice Chairman Souder posing a number of
questions following my October testimony before the Subcommittee regarding the Office of
Justice Programs’ (OJP) domestic preparedness initiatives. 1 also am sending Congressman
Souder a similar response. I apologize for the delay in responding to you.

am enclosing answers to each of the questions, as well as an edited copy of the transcript
of my statement before the Subcommittee. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide
additional information about OJP’s efforts in this critical area,

Sincerely,

Pods

Chief of Staff

Enclosures


Source: California State Emergency Management System Manual


154

effort, the subcommittee did, in fact, generate a rather comprehensive compendium of existing
courses.

‘The report also recommended consolidating training and equipment delivery locations on
a regional basis. In a chemical response, itis important to note that capsbilities/assets are almost
immediately required. A regional approach could prolong response time for local jurisdictions.

‘The time factor in a chemical response is crucial.

‘Summary
The Department of Health and Human Services through the Public Health Service is
committed to assuring the health and medical care of our citizens. We are prepared to quickly
mobilize the professionals required to respond to a disaster anywhere in the U.S. and its
territories and to assist local medical response systems in dealing with extraordinary situations,
including meeting the challenge of responding to the health and medical effects of terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to answer any questions

you may have,


149

To make maximum use of our resources, we also allow state governments to activate our

teams as state resources, if necessary.

‘Special National Medical Response Teams for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Last year, we provided additional training and specialized equipment to three of our
DMATs, to develop a specialized capability known as National Medical Response Teams
(NMRT»). These teams, in North Carolina, Colorado, and California, are capable of providing
medical treatment after a chemical or biological terrorist event. They are fully deployable to
incident sites anywhere in the country with a cache of specialized pharmaceuticals to treat up to
1,000 patients. They also have specialized personal protective equipment, detection devices and
patient decontamination capability. A fourth NMRT is located in the Washington, D.C. National

Capital Area and remains locally to respond in our nation’s capital.

Metropolitan Medical Response Systems
‘Several years prior to initiation of the Domestic Preparedness Program, DHHS realized
that the nation was not prepared to deal with the health effects of terrorism, and that should a
chemical, nuclear or bombing terrorist event occur, our cities and local metropolitan areas would
bear the brunt of coping with its effects. In addition, we realized that the local medical
communities would be faced with severe problems, including overload of hospital emergency
rooms, medical personnel injured while responding, and potential contamination of emergency

rooms or entire hospitals.


COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GARY A. CONDIT, California
STEPHEN HORN, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana DC
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
MARSHALL “MARK” SANFORD, South DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

Carolina JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JIM TURNER, Texas
PETE SESSIONS, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
VINCE GNOWBARGER, Kansas
BOB BARR, Georgis BERNARD SANDERS, ‘Vermont
DAN MILLER, Florida (Independent)

RON LEWIS, Kentucky
Kevin BINGER, Staff Director
Daniet R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director
Davip A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa SMiTH ARAFUNE, Deputy Chief Clerk
PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL

JUSTICE
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona JIM TURNER, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
EX OFFICIO
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

ROBERT CHARLES, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
ANDREW RICHARDSON, Professional Staff Member
‘Amy DaveNPorT, Clerk
MICHAEL YEAGER, Minority Counsel
Davi RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

ap


119

‘Through this initiative, these state and local first responders have received basic
awareness training to better enable them to recognize the signs of a terrorist incident, especially
those involving weapons of mass destruction, and to take those steps designed to best ensure the
public's safety, as well as their own. Under this training initiative, these first responders also are
taught how to best respond to and inanage terrorist incidents.

‘The value of providing the first responder community with basic and fundamental
principles of addressing real and potential terrorist incidents cannot be underestimated. And
because of this, OJP is currently in the process of developing similar basic level training courses,
including awareness training, to other first responders such as law enforcement.

Further, OJP is committed to making these types of basic and fundamental training as
widely available as possible. To achieve that goal, courses under the “Metropolitan Firefighters
and Emergency Medical Services Program” are being taught to certified trainers representing fire
and emergency medical service departments across the county. In tum, these trainers return to
their home jurisdictions and train others. These courses are also being taught at state fire
academies and through a self-study program.

In addition to the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” the Justice
Department's Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations Act provided the Attorney General $16 million
under the Counterterrorism Fund for three purposes. The first was to use $12 million to provide
grants to state and local agencies to assist these agencies purchase equipment needed to respond
to terrorism incidents. The second was to use $2 million to support a training center for state and
local first responders at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The third was to use $2 million to support
training for state and local first responders at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and


68

Monitoring the work of a few such organizations or agencies would be a

relatively simple process.

Training Must be Locally Based--Our experience in the field of
hazardous materials training has shown that the most effective training

takes place in the locality where the fire fighters work, using their own

equipment, geography and structures as part of the training exercise.
Every jurisdiction has its own peculiarities. If fire fighters are trained in
their own unique environment, they are more likely to make the correct
split-second decision that could mean the difference between limited

structural damage and mass casualties.

Similarly, training must be hands-on, and utilize situational exercises. No
lecture, no slide show, no book can ever be as effective a training exercise

as simulating a response in one’s own community.

Strictly from a pragmatic point of view, it is generally more cost efficient
to send trainers into a community than it is to send fire fighters to some
remote training facility. Local communities already complain about the
cost of training their emergency responders. When transportation and
lodging costs are added to limited training budgets, too many jurisdictions

simply opt to forego participating in these training programs altogether.

Fire Fighters Make the Best Trainers of Fire Fighters--Like all
occupations, fire fighters have a unique culture and language. Our shared
experiences form a common knowledge bank that those who have never

donned the Maltese Cross cannot fully understand. Much of the success of


152

contamiated, and that the local system is integrated with state plans. Our goal is to develop 120
of these medical response systems across the country.

‘The DHHS program is « health systems development program, not an equipment or
training program. Ifa city identifies equipment as one of its cost elements under the contract,
DHHS requests that DOD, FEMA, VA, FBI, Department of Energy (DOE) and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) review the list and comment on it, to eliminate any
duplicate equipment purchases by the federal government. Training is not usually one of the cost
elements under our contracts. In fact, training requirements which are identified are referred to

‘our interagency partners.

Biological Incident

However, these activities to date have primarily dealt with the consequences of a
chemical or nuclear attack, or a bombing. A different response is needed should a biological
attack occur, We may not know for days that a biological event has occurred, until state and
local health departments have reported clusters of unexplained illness or deaths. In the case of a
terrorist attack involving a biological agent, the state and local health departments form the first
line of defense. They are, in this case, the first responders. This second chart (Chart 2) shows
the necessary actions to effectively respond to an attack with a biological weapon.

Local and state health departments must have support in five areas: public health
surveillance to detect unusual events, epidemiologic capacity to investigate potential threats,
laboratory capacity at the federal and state levels to identify and diagnose suspected agents,


9

334 Cohen

‘TABLE II LAF Training Resulte—Porcentage of Trainees Giving High-Oua
(Panks in Brackets)

ty and High-UNty Ratings fo te Course Subject Mater

Wega W.vtgila
Pore ty Cyt Oy? ‘Aaa Cy

Course unt Quaity ty uty ty tty tty uty ty
(ommon arms Seem 7K) SHE SI] HTK
eth an satay em SSK THI Ow THT] KT TH RL
Moscal exetiance Cn |
‘ocognten an ent.

eaten TC en Te
Phys rere Sm) OT KT] SH SKI SRT KT] mT
‘Seene management ON GI THE SHIEK] OKT
Preineset pang Sr] OK) TORT] TSI) HMI THA AMR] THE

vera average: 60% mm cy om 6% TM om 79%

extent of followthrough on the actions chosen. This type of
data collection was intended to offer behavioral data on the
course impact. As an alternative to this measure of behavior
change, tainces in followback interviews in some depart
rents were asked to describe incidents where they saw a
connection between their actions and course Also,
to report on any changes they saw in the behaviors of fellow
fire fighters as a result ofthe course.

Level 4: Institutional change. Trainees were asked in
the same followback interviews mentioned above whether
they had observed any changes in incident command
practices, and/or in department policies with respect to
alarms and risks of hazardous materials exposures asa result
of the course.

DATABASE FOR THE EVALUATION

‘Table I depicts the database for use in this repor, and
lists six city fire departments where the IAFF course’ was
sven. While desirable, time pressures and other constraints
‘Prevented data being collected on all the proposed measures
inevery course offering. As shown, data were collected on at
least two measures in each department. Double entries are
shown in the Pre/Post Course Quiz column for three city fire
eparments (TX, WVA1, WVA2) to note that a second
Dost-course quiz was given some months after the taining to
measure how rauch of the knowledge gained was stil
retained. The retention data were collected on a random
sample of trainees who took part in follow-up interviews.
‘The Behavior Change column also contains two types of
ceatries. One notes where followthrough data were collected

White admitedly limited, the database noted in Table IL
offers some first indications of the results of this training
program.

RESULTS
Trainee Reactions

odiscem course strengths and weaknesses, the percent-
ages of trainees giving “high” quality and “high” utility
ratings to different course topics provided the most differen-
tial and useful data. Table II shows such data based on LAFF
first responder classes in four city fire departments. Much
agreement is indicated between and within the department
findings. Variations in the overall percentages of high ratings
of course quality and quality across the four departments is
less than 5%. All are better than 60%, which would indicate
+ highly favorable reaction to the course overall. As
confirmed by the Kendall coefficient of concordance (Siegel.
1956}, rank orders of the percentages shown for each topic
in terms of quality and utility show significant agreemem.
@ < 0101) from department to department. “Health and
/* merits the top ranking in almost every department
for both quality and utility, and suggests success in meeting
f basic course objective. On the other hand, “Physical
Properties of Chemicals” is ranked at the bottom on these
‘course attributes which suggests needs for improvement on
this topie. More is said about this latex
‘As already mentioned, the Course Reaction form in-
cluded a 4-point scale for trainees to rate their competency

‘on chosen action the other where one's "
experiences or those of peers reflecting lessons learned in
the course were described. The numbers of trainees whose,
data were collected on the various measures is as shown.

(1 = high competence, 4 = incompetence) on nine tasks
related to before and now after
the course. Table TV gives these before/after course ratings
from trainees in five departments when averaged over the
nine select tasks. Also shown is the percentage of trainees


15

advantage of existing emergency response structures could hasten the accomplishment of
program goals and reinforce local response integration. Such an approach also could
cover a greater percentage of the population and make effective use of existing
emergency management training venues. Under this approach, WMD training would be

delivered over the long term through existing state training systems.

‘As shown in appendix I, DOD's city approach resulted in clusters of nearby cities, each of
which is to receive training and equipment. Our analysis shows that 14 clusters of 44
different cities, or 37 percent of the total number of the cities selected for the program,
are within 30 miles of at least one other program city. Souther California is a key
example of the clustering effect where training efficiencies could be gained. Appendix II
shows California's mutual aid regions. Consistent with the statewide standardized
emergency management system involving countywide operational areas within six mutual
aid regions, the Los Angeles County sheriff is in charge of the consolidated interagency
response to an incident occurring in any of the county's 88 local jurisdictions and 136
unincorporated areas, These include Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Glendale, all of which
are treated separately in the program. Further, the nearby cities of Anaheim, Huntington
Beach, Santa Ana, San Bernardino, and Riverside are within 30 miles of at least one other
program city and also are treated separately. Through mutual aid and under California's
statewide system, Los Angeles county conceivably could assist or be assisted by these
other neighboring program cities or any other jurisdictions in the state in the event of a
major incident.


128

reasons why the Attorney General has created the National Domestic Preparedness Office within
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Question Number 6:

Subsequent to the initial Domestic Preparedness Program implementation, the Bureau of Justice
Assistance began a grant program to provide WMD training to first responders. Please describe
that program. Why was it initiated when there was already a first responder training program
being conducted by the Department of Defense?

Answer:

‘The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) is a component within the Office of Justice Programs.
The Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency Medical Services Program referenced above
originated as a BJA program. As of August 1999, the Attorney General delegated the authority
for this program directly to the Assistant Attomey General for OJP in an effort to consolidate
OIP’s domestic preparedness initiatives.

The DOD Domestic Preparedness Program and OJP’s Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency
Medical Services Program are two separate and distinct programs. As partially explained in the
responses to Questions Numbers 2 and 3, these programs involve different curricula and are
aimed at different types of emergency responders. Further, under the DOJ Fiscal Year 1998 and
Fiscal Year 1999 appropriations acts, OJP's training initiatives have expanded beyond the
Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency Medical Services Program to include a broad spectrum
of training aimed at enhancing the capabilities of all state and local emergency response
personnel to respond to incidents of domestic terrorism involving chemical and biological agents
and nuclear, radiological, and explosive devices.

OJP initiated its first domestic preparedness initiative, the Metropolitan Firefighter and
Emergency Medical Services Training Program, in Fiscal Year 1997. This initiative was
authorized pursuant to Section 819 of the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996” (Pub. L. 104-132) and delegated to BJA for implementation. That same fiscal year (Fiscal
Year 1997), the Defense Department initiated the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program (the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program), as authorized pursuant (o Title IV (the “Defense Against
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996”) of the “National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997" (Pub, L. 104-201).

Under both Public Law 104-132 and Public Law 104-201, OJP and DOD are broadly authorized
to provide training to enhanee the capabilities of state and local emergency responders to react to
terrorist incidents. Under OJP’s authority, training is limited to fire and emergency medical
services personnel. However, OJP is authorized to train this group to respond to any terrorist act.
Under DOD's authority, the emergency response community is more broadly defined as all state


184

‘our FBI counterparts ~ primarily in a technical role to date. These capabilities include a
24-hour command center watch every day of the year to respond fo any terrorist incident;
a number of specialized military units on alert ready to respond within a few hours; and a
command and control element well versed in all terrorist scenarios. To address WMD,
these forces have been augmented with integral technical expertise, and can rapidly
access our national laboratory expertise to assist them in rendering safe a WMD.

For terrorism consequence management, DoD possesses a broad array of response
assets in both the Active and Reserve components which can also be functionally task
organized to provide support that is suitable to consequence management — for exampte,
decontamination, medical support, mortuary affairs and transportation. DoD teams also
support FEMA in consequence management through technical chemical-biotogical
reconnaissance and assessments, and providing equipment, technical expertise, and links
to other interagency organizations with identified capabilities. DoD assets can also
provide depth to first responder efforts both by making additional assets available as local
capabilities are exhausted and by providing other assets to secure the area, evacuate areas
at risk of becoming contaminated, provide extended decontamination, medical evaluation,
and address other related requirements.

National Guard and other Reserve component personnel will play a prominent
role in supporting local and stale governments in terrorism consequence management. At
its core is the establishment of 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams,
comprised of 22 highly skilled, full-time, and well-trained and equipped National Guard
personnel. One RAID team will be stationed within each of 10 federal regions. Their
purpose will be to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the precise
natuse of an attack, provide expert medical and technical advice, and help pave the way
for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.

The 10 states selected to host a RAID element are California, Colorado, Texas,
Missouri, Illinois, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts and
Washington. The locations were selected based on:

* demographics of the response area (cities, counties, and states);

© availability of National Guard airlift for the team;

* location of other military centers of excellence;

* location of other supported federal response assets and teams;

‘© state support for fielding the team;

+ availability of interstate compacts to allow the team’s use across state lines.

Beginning next month, and subject to Congressional approval and funding, each

team member will undergo more than 600 hours of extensive technical training. The
teams will also be equipped with state of the art detection and analysis equipment, as well


178

Skinheads, Phineas Priesthood, and radical anti-abortionist. Over the past decades these are the
groups that have been suspected of domestic terrorist acts. Mr. Chairman, we know that in working
with gangs, not only must they be dealt with harshly if they commit crimes, but that the toxic
conditions that create their violence must be changed.

Mr. Chairman, if you will bear through one more example. Please look for a moment at how we
dealt with radical anti-war groups (SDS) and the radical civil rights groups (SNC) in the 70’s.
First we took the route of demonizing them, but that only played into their hands and empowered
them. But then we started to dialogue with them and began to address some of their core concerns,
like poverty, homelessness and the de-escalation of war in Vietnam. With their problems being
addressed and solutions formulated, it took away there anger and frustration. Now, in fact, many of
them are respected contributing members of the establishment that they once abhorred.

‘Mr. Chairman, we will not be able to solve all of the problems posed by the right and left wing
groups that employ terrorist tactics, but we can dialogue with them and present to them a system
that is not intransigent, one-sided, and is at least perceived to be fair. We have outstanding
‘examples of other commissions of this sort, let's learn from the lessons of the past. Thank you.

(e)


14

lives. Clearly, terrorism is an issue of national concern, But every
individual act of terrorism will always be first and foremost a local
incident. The lives of the people in the community where the terrorist
strikes depend not on broad national goals, but on the capabilities of their
local emergency responders. We ask you to keep this simple thought in
mind as you review our nation's preparedness to deal with the ugly

specter of terrorism.

The men and women of the International Association of Fire Fighters stand
ready to work with you, Mr. Chairman, and other policy makers at all
levels to achieve the goal of creating a national emergency response
capability that is second to none. I thank you for your attention to our

views, and we would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

12


XN

32

devices exploded, Since 1990, we have had three dramatic, high profile
attacks in the United States:

The World Trade Center bombing in 1993, which kilied six and injured
1024 persons;

* The Oklahoma City bombing, which took the lives of 168 Americans and
left hundreds wounded; and

‘+ The Olympic Park bombing of 1996, which killed a Georgia woman and
injured several dozen bystanders.

The lack of terrorism in the United States is, in my view, a consequence of at
least three factors. First, we have a democratic society that provides people
a chance to express their views freely. Second, we have highly skilled,
professional law enforcement at national, state, and local levels. Finally, we
have caught, prosecuted, and imprisoned many of those who have committed
acts of terrorism

Internationally the trend in terrorism also is down. Chart #2 shows that the
number of terrorist incidents has been falling since 1991. More importantly,
US citizens rarely are Killed or wounded in these attacks. In 1997, for
‘example, there were 304 international terrorist attacks. According to the
State Department 123 of these were anti-US attacks. Only five of these
attacks involved casualties—7 Americans died and 17 were wounded while
38 foreigners died and 427 were wounded. The bombings last month in
Kenya and Tanzania were not atypical in the sense that anti-US attacks tend
to kill and wound more foreigners than Americans. This tact alone is a
compelling reason for other countries to work with us in combating and
stopping those who engage in terrorism

Which countries have been most dangerous for Americans? Conventional
wisdom generally points to the Middle East, but Chart 3 reveals that Peru,
‘Turkey, and the Philippines have been the sites for the most anti-US attacks


103

Because of the strong recommendations of the State and local
stakeholders, the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and the
Director of FEMA have personally engaged in a process to transi-
tion the responsibility for the Domestic Preparedness Program to
the Department of Justice. Additionally, the Office of Management
and Budget is working closely with all parties in support of this
transition.

DOJ’s proposed coordinating structure will incorporate input
from the | agencies with responsibilities in WMD terrorism
and create an informal advisory relationship with first responder
stakeholders. The actual detail and structure in staffing of the pro-
posed national office are being involved within the interagency
community.

I’ve been requested to comment specifically on the value of con-
ducting the threat and the risk assessments for cities or designated
geographic areas prior to providing training and equipment loans.
The FBI’s response letter of March 4, 1998 to Mr. Davis of the
GAO provides our position on the threat and risk assessment issue.
In brief, threat and risk assessments will add value to the overall
domestic preparedness effort. We think that a pilot project to test
the threat and risk assessment process should be done. In the near
future, we will attempt to adapt and test a model for use in the
cities and other local areas, a threat and risk model.

Also, in association with other Federal, State, and local authori-
ties, we intend to explore existing threat and risk methodologies
that may be helpful in better determining the training and equip-
ment requirements of our first responder community across the Na-
tion. The mission of the FBI’s counterterrorism preparedness pro-
gram supports the U.S. counterterrorism effort by increasing the
capacity of Federal, State, and local crisis and consequence man-
agement agencies, to res) ond to any threats or acts of terrorism in
the United States. The FBI i is confident that, through the National
Domestic Preparedness Office, we can support this mission.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blitzer follows:)


39

In my experience, the US Government does a better job of helping foreign
governments deal with terrorist threats than state goverments because the
chains of command are clearer overseas. Consider, for example, the support
the United States provided in 1992 before and during the Barcelona Games.
The US State Department ed the effort, which included several other US
departments and agencies. This process started three years before the games
and included a systematic assessment of Spanish counter terrorism capabilities
and needs and a follow on assessment of the US personnel and equipment that
would be required to help identify and deter terrorist incidents. Working through
the US Ambassador, the US Government team had one point of contact with the
Government of Spain for making important decisions and resolving problems
‘The Government of Spain had the US team work through a designated point of
contact in the Spanish Ministry of interior.

This was not the case in 1996, when the US Government provided similar
services and support to the Atlanta Olympic Committee. The coordination effort
was far more cumbersome. Federal Government representatives wanted to
help, but the delivery of the assistance was confused. The Federal Government
found itself dealing with 22 different jurisdictions, including the City of Atlanta,
Fulton County, and the State of Georgia. There was no single government entity
in charge within the state. Likewise, the Federal agencies on scene had
difficulty sorting out who should set priorities on the federal side because no
single agency had the authority that a US Ambassador overseas enjoys.

GAO's report on the implementation of the NLD Act makes clear that this
kind of well-intentioned chaos continues. | say well-intentioned because the
Federal personnel and agencies involved-—the Department of Defense, the FBI,
FEMA, HHS, as well as the US Congress—are genuinely trying to help combat
the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, Unfortunately, no one is really in
charge of the process.


164
sumed, and used, we have no authority to come back and replenish

it.
When we began this program it was the idea of most of us sittin,
at this table 't we wanted a partnership with State and local
governments. The Federal Government would assist them, but they
would also try to pay their fair share. And I would have to com-
mend folks like Jerry Hauer and others in New York City, who’ve
moved out sharply to try to carry the load.

Over the past year and half or 2 years, a general consensus has
emerged that the Federal Government should take a larger role in
providing equipment. And in fact, the DOJ had $12 million last
year, and I think a larger sum this year. The intent of their equip-
ment program is to provide response equipment. This is the gear
that’s going to hang on the truck, that’s going to be ready to go;
it’s not going to be torn up in the training process. And so, al-
though yes, the suits are very similar, much of the gear is similar,
our intent was training equipment to be used by trainers training
their firefighters, police offers, EMS technicians, and others.

Dr. Knouss gear, on the other hand, is a little bit different yet,
in that as he has explained, it has a particular medical focus, and
it is response gear for the most part. And for example, in New York
City, Jerry Hauer used all of his money to buy pharmaceuticals to
have them pre-positioned in the event of response.

In all of these processes, we allow the city or the principal inter-
locutor to have as much flexibility to design the equipment set as
they need, building on where their shortfalls are. If they have a
huge HAZMAT capability in a given city, they need far fewer suits
than a city that has a MAT team of four folks. So we try to
work through the process, with the city, to allow them to construct
what it is they believe they need. And that’s where we are today
on interagency equipment issues.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you.

Mr. SoupeER. I tend to agree with Congressman Barrett, that this
isn’t an unfunded mandate. But did I understand correctly that, if
they accept the DOD equipment, which is perishable, that they
agree to keep it maintained, and that’s where the unfunded man-
date came from?

Mr. Roserts. I believe that the nature of the loan agreement
calls for them to maintain and replenish it. But, we arrived at this
loan agreement in order to ensure that when we left the city, they
had some equipment to train on.

Mr. SOUDER. What’s the point of having an agreement that you
know is not going to be followed if you're not there?

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, probably in that the legislation only allowed
us to loan equipment.

Mr. SoupDER. So in other words, the law isn’t being implemented
the way it was written?

Mr. RoBErTS. Right. I mean, we recognize that we don’t expect
to get the equipment back, and we expect it to be consumed in the
training process.

Mr. SoupDER. And you also don’t expect that they’re going to re-
place it necessarily.

Mr. ROBERTS. We are not looking for the equipment back, and we
don’t expect that they’re going to replace it in order to give it back


64

emergency response efforts. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would
ask that a copy of this article be included in the hearing record.

At this time, I wish to introduce two of my colleagues who are involved
with our training program, I have asked them to join me this morning so
that we may fully respond to any technical questions you may have

regarding the training of emergency response personnel.

Eric Lamar is a veteran trainer in our hazmat trainer program. Eric is a
Fairfax County fire fighter, and a hazardous materials technician. He has
attended numerous hazmat training programs, including the programs that
have been created under the National Defense Preparedness Plan. Also
joining me is Scott Solomon of the IAFF's hazardous materials training
department. Scott has been instrumental in developing the curriculum and

delivery systems the IAFF uses to train fire fighters.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not preface my remarks by first
expressing my gratitude to you and your colleagues for the heightened
congressional interest in terrorism related training programs for first
responders. When the threat of domestic terrorism first seared the public
consciousness following the cowardly acts at the World Trade Center and
the Murrah Federal Building, the initial response was to pour resources
into preventative measures. While it would of course be preferable to
prevent all acts of terrorism, it would be foolhardy to assume we can

achieve this goal.


148

Response Plan, We also manage the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). NDMS is a
partnership between DHHS, the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, FEMA,
7,000 private citizens across the country who volunteer their time and expertise as members of
response teams to provide medical and support care to disaster victims, and more than

2,000 participating non-federal hospitals.

Disaster Response Teams

Our primary response capability is organized in teams such as Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams (DMATS), specialty medical teams (such as burn and pediatric) and Disaster
Mortuary Teams (DMORTS). Our 24 level-1 DMATs can be federalized and ready to deploy
within hours and can be self sufficient on-the-scene for 72 hours. This means that they carry
their own water, portable generators, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, cots, tents,
communications and other mission essential equipment. These teams have been sent to many
areas in the aftermath of disasters in support of FEMA-coordinated relief activities.

In addition, staff from OEP and our regional emergency coordinators also go to the
disaster sites to manage the team activities and ensure that they can operate effectively. Within
the last week alone, we have deployed to the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Florida, Mississippi
and Alabama to assist with relief efforts after Hurricane Georges.

Our mortuary teams can assist local medical examiner offices during disasters, or in the
aftermath of airline and other transportation accidents, when called in by the National

‘Transportation Safety Board.


35

threat into action. Bin Ladin’s failed fatwa is a reminder that Muslims are not
terrorists and they do not endorse his tactics. He represents a fanatical, isolated
minority.

How Serious is the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism?

This hearing comes at an opportune moment given the recent news that
Mr. Bin Ladin’s followers allegedly tried to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons.
Yet, even before Bin Ladin appeared on the scene, the United States has been
worried about the risk that terrorists could use chemical and biological weapons
against US citizens here or abroad and has taken steps to confront that threat.
In 1990, for example, | participated in an inter-agency counter terrorism exercise
that included training with a live chemical agent. This threat was considered and
prepared for long before Aum Shiryko appeared on scene. As the Congress
considers how best to prepare American communities to meet this contingency it
is important to temper the fear of such attacks with a clear understanding that
such threats are difficult to put into action

‘Chemical and biological weapons are not easy to produce. They require
a level of sophistication in technology and personnel that not readily acquired at
the local pharmacy or hardware store. Chemical and biological agents are
greatly influenced by temperature, wind, and moisture. It is not a simple matter of
finding a recipe and whipping up a batch of plague. Moreover there must be
technological and scientific infrastructure in place to take chemicals and
biological materials from the precursor stage to full weaponization, The
Department of Defense makes this point several times in its November 1997
report, Proliferation: Threat and Response. Libya, for example, is a sponsor of
terrorism and has been working aggressively for years to create chemical and
biological weapons capabilities. On page 37 of the DOD report we learn that
Libya's biological warfare program “remains in the early research and
development stages, primarily because Libya lacks an adequate scientific and


67

Training Funds Need to Be Spent on Training, Not Bureaucracy--
Federal programs are often designed to filter down through various
governmental bodies and layers of bureaucracy. While there may be
justification for this approach in some areas, it does not work for
emergency responder training. By the time administrative costs have been
removed at various levels, there is little left over for the actual training of
fire fighters. In light of the scarce resources devoted to counterterrorism
programs, every dollar allocated to emergency responder training must be
spent on that training. The IAFF recommends that funding for terrorism
emergency response training be provided directly to fire departments or

to organizations that provide direct training of fire fighters.

We are aware of the concern that sending money directly to fire
departments could make the program less accountable. Without the
various layers of bureaucracy involved it is more difficult to track exactly
where every dollar gets spent. We believe that the accountability of the
program can be adequately addressed by requiring fire departments
receiving the funds to provide training based on federally approved
curricula and teaching models. Once such a requirement is in place, you
can rely on the men and women of the IAFF to assure that it is heeded.
We have never been shy about letting the federal government know when
localities are failing to meet congressional standards, and we are especially

committed to ensuring the adequacy of counterterrorism training.

Another way to address the accountability issue is to provide the funds to
organizations or agencies with a proven record of training emergency

responders, and have these entities provide direct training to fire fighters.


104

OCTOBER 2, 1998

GOOD MORNING, THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS
MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S ROLE IN THE PREPAREDNESS OF THIS NATION TO DEAL
WITH TERRORISM, INCLUDING THAT WHICH INVOLVES WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.

THIS MORNING | WILL FOCUS ON THREE SPECIFIC AREAS. FIRST, | WILL
BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE DOMESTIC WMD THREAT AND THE THREAT POSED TO
THIS COUNTRY BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS HERE AT HOME.

SECOND, ! WILL PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT INTERAGENCY
INITIATIVES TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS OFFICE,

FINALLY, | WILL COMMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.

1 HAVE SUBMITTED A WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD WHICH
FURTHER DETAILS MY TESTIMONY HERE TODAY.

DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS, WE HAVE RESPONDED, ALONG WITH
OUR CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE PARTNERS, TO A GROWING NUMBER OF
DOMESTIC WMD THREATS AND INCIDENTS.

‘THESE INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT PRIMARILY BY TWO
‘CATEGORIES OF VIOLATORS WHICH WE IDENTIFY AS “ LONE OFFENDERS”
AND “EXTREMIST ELEMENTS OF RIGHT WING GROUPS.”

WHILE THE MAJORITY OF THESE WMD THREATS WERE HOAXES, THE


167

effort in the United States that perhaps really weren’t cognizant of of
where they fit into the picture in the past. And so we do hear, and
I certainly heard, more and more, many cases rightly so much
greater interest and a yearning for more information, so that the;
can better fulfill their missions. That could be at the Fede:
State, and local levels. So, from that perspective, I think that was
more the context of what I was thinking at that particular point
in time.

But the second point, Mr. Chairman, that you raised?

Mr. SouDER. Was the one- stop-shoppi ,, which you’ve-—

Mr. Buitzer. I think that’s been somet! ting that’s been out there
for a long time, and I first heard it from one of the deput; fre
chiefs up in Chicago, who I've got a very close friendship with.
sat down in Chicago one day, and he said, you know Bob, the. we
gest thing you’re missing out there is you're not leveraging off of
the systems that exist out here, and you should do that in this
training. And I think we heard a little bit about that today. And
I think that’s what he was saying to me, and it made a lot of sense
to me that certainly if you have offices of emergency preparedness
that have structures inside of a community, or a county, or a re-
gion, that’s the way to go—try and leverage and see what they
need and build on that, and train them. So I think that’s really
been the focus of one-stop-shopping. I think he’s right.

Mr. SoupER. Dr. Knouss, in your testimony, I Shhought I heard
you say that one of the things you do is you review those lists to
see whether an area was selected appropriately. Did you have any
risk assessment in that of what things they were more likely to
face in that locality? Or what did you mean by your statement that
you went. through their request lists?

Mr. KNouss. at we review that list for primarily is that there
are some models and some prototypes that have been developed in
order to be able to assist in a response, and to assure the safety
of the personnel that are responding, and to assure that we do as
much as possible for the victims. We review that list to make sure
that it at least falls into that ballpark, because every local system
has it’s own unique peculiarities, and we want to make sure that
we don’t impose a model.

Mr. SOUDER. But what——

Mr. Knouss. But when we review that list—when we review that
list then, we send it to the other agencies to assure that we're not
duplicating what the other agencies are already doing. The purpose
of that review was to avoid exactly what the General Accounting
Office has said is a problem, and that is duplication. So, we're
sending it to our colleagues in the other agencies to assure that we
can all agree that this remains a need in that community for Fed-

eral a) Support
UDER. What did L you mean by unique peculiarities?

Mr. Knouss. I’m sorry?

Mr. SouDER. What did you mean—that was the word that trig-
gered me earlier.

Mr. Knouss. There are some communities that may decide one
particular piece of equipment is the model that they want, as op-
posed to another piece of equipment that has a similar function, be-
cause it fits in with the rest of their system. The way we’ve ap-


126

statutes, the programs are targeted to different groups of emergency responders and provide
different levels of training. Further, given the coordination between both OJP and DOD, as well
4s consultations with FEMA, efforts were undertaken to ensure that these programs were
complementary and not duplicative, despite the fact that they were administered by two different
federal agencies.

OJP launched its first domestic preparedness initiative, the Metropolitan Firefighter and
Emergency Medical Services Training Program, in Fiscal Year 1997. This initiative was
authorized pursuant to Section 819 of the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996” (Pub. L. 104-132). That same fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1997), DOD initiated the Domestic
Preparedness Program (the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program) as authorized pursuant to Title IV
(the “Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996”) of the “National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997” (Pub. L. 104-201).

Under both Public Law 104-132 and Public Law 104-201, OJP and DOD are broadly authorized
to provide training to enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency responders to react to
terrorist incidents. Although under OJP's authority, the OJP program can provide training only
to fire and emergency medical services personnel, these particular emergency responders can be
trained to respond to any terrorist act. Under DOD's authority, the emergency response
‘community is more broadly defined as all state and local emergency response agencies.
However, training is limited to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, which are
defined as incidents involving toxic and poisonous chemicals or biological and radiological
agents causing death or serious bodily harm to “significant numbers of people.”

Because DOD's training is limited to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, the DOD
initiative focuses on providing more highly specialized levels of training to a broader audience of
trainers. The DOD program trains emergency responders in cities or municipalities, based on the
likelihood that these larger municipalities are at the highest risk of being targets for terrorist
incidents. Further, under the DOD program, the training audience involves a wide range of
individuals, including elected officials and emergency management personnel.

The OJP it under Public Law 104-132 is targeted to any terrorist incident and not limited
to weapons of mass destruction. The OJP initiative is limited to fire service and emergency
medical personnel, and is geared to different levels of training, such as basic awareness training,
4s opposed to the DOD's more highly specialized training. In addition, OJP’s statute directs that
training is to be targeted to metropolitan areas, and not restricted to cities alone.

As OJP's and DOD's joint planning effort aimed at transferring the DOD Domestic
Preparedness Program to OJP progresses, both agencies intend to ensure that the various training
programs are delivered in a uniform, coordinated, and complementary manner.


45

Mr. Souper. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman and subcommittee
members. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss weapons of mass
destruction terrorism, and U.S. preparedness. I’m especially grate-
ful, given the role played by CSIS and the Global Organized Crime
Project in helping formulate the issues that were eventually taken
up in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation.

Td like to make a few comments regarding the current state of
the threat, recent U.S. initiatives with respect to domestic pre-
paredness, and the findings and recommendations of the GAO re-
port on threat and risk assessments. I'd also like to offer some ob-
servations and some recommendations aimed at enhancing our gov-
ernmentwide capabilities to plan for, respond to, and manage the
consequences of WMD terrorism.

One of the advantages of working for a think-tank is we're in the
business of ideas, and we’re not held accountable for implementing
those ideas. Furthermore, I don’t have to stand where I sit, which
is truly a rare luxury inside the Beltway. Thus, my remarks will
be based on just that—ideas, strategies, and policies—and I’m not
accountable.

Regarding the threat, there’s been a great deal of discussion on
the changing face of terrorism and the impact of advanced tech-
nology on terrorist ways of doing business. The point of this hear-
ing I don’t think is to focus on that. So rather than elaborating on
the specificities and the likelihood, specifically when dealing with
weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, radiological, chemical, or
biological, which are very different from one another and pose dif-
ferent challenges—they do share some commonalities.

Terrorism is multi-faceted; the intent and motive differs from
group to group and incident to incident. Yet, the single common de-
nominator—and this is often forgotten—is that it’s a psychological
weapon, intended to erode trust and undermine confidence in our
Government, its institutions, its elected officials, its ideal, its val-
ues, and policies in given regions.

What makes a WMD incident unique is that it truly can be a
transforming event. While I don’t disagree that the probability of
a major WMD attack may be low in the near future, the con-
sequences are too high to ignore. Aside from the actual physical ef-
fects and human suffering resulting from the WMD attack, the psy-
chological impact truly can be enormous, and shaking the trust and
confidence of our people in the Government to the very core.

To fully appreciate the considerable changes we are facing, I
think it’s important to put the current fears regarding the threat
into perspective. For decades terrorism experts have debated the
likelihood of a major terrorist event occurring within the United
States—we’ve had many minor events in the past, but not a major
one—and the possibility of terrorists turning to weapons of mass
destruction.

Clearly, the debates ended in February 1993 with the World
Trade Center bombing, and then again on May 20, 1995 with the
sarin gas attack in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo. Threat calibra-
tions since then have done a 180-degree turn. Our Nation’s plan-
ners have been running ever since to catch up with what I consider


87

Mr. Souper. I want to thank you all for your testimony.

I think I would like to start—I have a number of technical ques-
tions, but I think, as a fundamental kind of question, that those
who are following this issue, that a challenge and a fundamental
debate occurred here which is, what is the level of the threat,
which suggests a little bit the debate of how we approach this, and
where and how. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cilluffo had slightly different
perspectives on this. I think that the historical record is very clear
that it has been relatively isolated—that it is relatively con-
centrated.

One statement I slightly disagreed with, Mr. Cilluffo, was that
you said that they would move to the softer places, and I’m not
sure the historical record other than airlines shows that. The
World Trade Center is in a pretty prominent place; the two Leb-
anon hits when we were over there, and it’s a place of constant con-
flict. Even by our Government’s public response in Sudan and Af-

thanistan, it is not illogical to assume that that would be Bin

din’s area of influence; he would take the closest country where

he could deliver the chemicals from. There is not a lack of logic to
that approach.

Nevertheless, you raise a fundamental question that I’d like to
have Mr. Johnson address here, and that is that terrorists are not
necessarily going to always base their actions on historical actions
and they ma be becoming more skilled, and the risk of a catas-
trophe, id. the World Trade Center bombing been more successful
and killed more people, how do you deal with the fundamental
question that was raised that, if there was a catastrophe anywhere,
really, in the United States that was so massive that it would be
demoralizing, that it could strike terror and all kinds of an over-
reaction greater than in fact the current?

Mr. JOHNSON. There are two things people who engage in terror-
ism need. It’s historical and it’s for the future. You’ve got to have
money and you got to have a place to train. If you don’t have those
two things, you cannot operate.

I don’t only look at historically and say it’s been low; I believe
that the threat of future terrorism is low. There will be attacks, but
the ability of these groups to ramp-up and put together operations
is extremely limited.

We even have a case study in the field of chem-bio with Aum
Shinrikyo in Japan. That group had millions of dollars. They
bought a biological lab; they bought a chemical lab. They wanted
to produce the items. They wanted to kill people. And with all of
their “want to,” they still ran up against some obstacles, because
it is still technically difficult.

Now, if technology and science change fairly dramatically over
the next 5 or 6 years, that any, “terrorist in a lab coat” can whip
this stuff up, yes, then I might be pushing the panic button. But
I think it has been grossly irresponsible for several Government of-
ficials to go out with this nonsense that any terrorist in a lab coat
can do it, because they can’t.

I note in my testimony that the Department of Defense, in the
preface, Secretary of Defense Cohen said that a lone mad man can
do this. But when you go back and look at what they say about


8

road structure within some of these places we’re talking about, 30
miles would take you in excess of an hour or maybe 2 hours, de-
pending on what time of day it was.

One of the things that we learned on our visit to the cities and
to the community out there, is that many of these communities
have a whole host of assets, to include air assets to allow them to
get to places quickly if need be.

I would like to turn to another chart that shows the State of Vir-
ginia. This emphasizes the principle again of structures that exist,
the State of Virginia is organized a little bit differently, but the
principle is still the same. It’s organized into regions. Unlike the
State of California, the Virginia structure is designed to deal with
incidents focused on hazardous material responses. They've 13
teams within that State.

We've mentioned the Tidewater area. There are four separate cit-
ies. Three of those cities fall within team L, and one city, Newport
News, falls within Team K—all of them within 30 miles of each
other. One of the reasons Virginia decided to go this way was from
an affordability perspective. In other words, they didn’t think it
was possible to able to afford having response capabilities in
every single jurisdiction. So they organized this way to help and to
organize responses to critical incidents.

One State official that we talked to summarized one of the points
that we are trying to make here. That official told us that, “I don’t
want to seem ungrateful and we'll accept all the help we can get.
On the other hand, it seems like the DOD approach has ignored
30 years of national and State emergency response structure, and
did it their way rather than building on what already existed.”

If the program was refocused, DOD could leverage State emer-
gency management structures, mutual aid agreements among local
jurisdictions, or other collaborative arrangements for emergency re-
sponse. Training in fewer locations, while taking advantage of ex-
isting emergency response structures, could hasten the accomplish-
ment of program goals and reinforce local response integration.
Such an approach also would cover a greater percentage of the pop-
ulation and make effective use of existing local emergency training
venues.

The third issue I wanted to talk about has to do with the equip-
ment component. The legislation authorizes DOD to lend, rather
than to give or grant, training equipment to each city. The loan
agreement between DOD and the cities specifies that the loan is
for 5 years and that the cities are to repair, maintain, and replace
the equipment. The loan agreement terms have caused frustration
and confusion among local officials.

Some cities we visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as
an unfunded Federal mandate because DOD has provided no funds
to sustain the equipment. DOD officials told us that the equipment
was intended only to support city training needs, and they wanted
to encourage cities to share the burden of preparing for ter-
rorism by funding additional equipment needs themselves. But
many local officials told us that they were fairly certain they could
not justify the high cost for this equipment when stacked against
the many other competing priorities for local funding.


COMBATING TERRORISM: IMPLEMENTATION
AND STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PRO-
GRAM

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1998

House OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (acting
chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hastert, Souder, and Barrett.

Staff present: Robert B. Charles, staff director/chief counsel;
Michele Lang, special counsel; Andrew Richardson, professional
staff member; Amy Davenport, clerk; and Michael Yaeger and
David Rapallo, minority counsels.

Mr. SOUDER. Good morning. The subcommittee on National Secu-
rity, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order.

ta light of the perceived increase in the probability of a terrorist
attack on American soil involving weapons of mass destruction,
today the subcommittee will examine several aspects of the Depart-
ment of Defense Domestic Preparedness Program. Commonly re-
ferred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici plan, it is designed to pre-
pare local government authorities, such as police, fire, and emer-
gency services personnel for a terrorist incident involving a chemi-
cal, biological, or nuclear weapon.

Although the pro; >gram is run primarily through the Defense De-
partment, many ot departments, notably Justice and Health
and Human Services, have important roles to lay i in preparing our
Nation for the consequences of a terrorist incident.

The Domestic Preparedness ‘Program has matured to the point
where we can fairly evaluate its performance, and we have many
concerns regarding the manor in which this program is being im-
plemented. Issues such as the criteria for choosing cities which are
to receive Federal aid, the apparent duplication in training and
equipment loans, the sustaining of equipment once delivered, and
the lack of a valid threat and risk assessment demand closer scru-
tiny.

Re garding this last point, the subcommittee took corrective ac-
tion this year. The subcommittee maintains that implementation of

qd)


150

‘Consequently, in FY 1995, DHHS began developing the first prototype Metropolitan
Medical Strike Team in partnership with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
and their 18 local member jurisdictions in and around Washington, D.C. This system became the
prototype for the team that we developed in Atlanta in 1996 to prepare for the Centennial
Olympic Games, and for the 25 systems that we began in 1997 as part of the Domestic
Preparedness Program. The FY 1999 budget currently before Congress includes a total
of $14 million to begin additional local Metropolitan Medical Response Systems and to
supplement systems already begun with a bioterrorism component. We hope to begin
development of 24 additional local systems in the coming fiscal year.

‘Systems Approach to Preparedness

To put this system in perspective, this chart (Chart 1) depicts the systems approach to
preparedness during a chemical incident. As you can see, once the incident occurs, the local first
responders - police, fire, emergency medical services - would respond. HAZMAT teams would
be called in to provide agent identification and hot zone management. These first two actions
have been the focus of DOD, FEMA, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Domestic
Preparedness Program.

(Our focus has been on the development of Metropolitan Medical Response Systems,
which are components of local, city systems that would be called in to provide triage, medical
treatment and patient decontamination. The city systems that we have been developing would

then be able to transport “clean patients” to hospitals or other medical facilities for continued


42

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Larry C otason
1. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN TO
DEVELOP NATIONAL VACCINE STOCKPILES?
Although the plan is well intentioned, it rests on a foolish and false
premise. It assumes that the United States will have ample advance
warning of an impending attack and will be able to marshal public health
Tesources to vaccinate the public and/or military forces at risk.
Unfortunately, the historical record shows that terrorists and rogue states
carry out attacks that generally catch us by surprise. Therefore,
stockpiles of vaccines would likely go unused or offer little help for
dealing with the aftermath of an attack.

In a world of unlimited resources, stockpiling would make sense.
However, since resources are scarce and there are other public policy
Priorities, I view stockpiling as an unwarranted overreaction to a grossly
exaggerated threat. The possibility that terrorist organizations can
develop, much less employ, highly lethal agents is very remote. Rather
than spend money to stockpile vaccines that will probably never be used,
Congress could consider instead bolstering the capability of public health
programs to combat childhood illnesses and other contagious diseases.
We would be better off fortifying our national health care infrastructure.
In case of a biological attack, such infrastructure would prove more
valuable in dealing with the aftereffects and protecting the health and
well-being of US citizens.


161

Mr. CraGin. As I observed, Mr. Barrett, Pine Bluff, AR, is the
latest one to join the group, and we have been directed to integrate
it into the domestic preparedness training community.

Mr. BarreETT. So we still haven’t sort of moved into the Northern
half of the country?

Mr. CRAGIN. There seems to be a geographic demarcation there,
of some sort.

Mr. BARRETT. Most of those people are opposed to Federal spend-
ing, but that’s for another day. I see that I’m out of time.

ir. SOUDER. I wanted to try to clarify again a question that was
raised on the first panel about when an incident occurs, who is in
charge at the scene, and how do you sort that through, particularly
between the FBI and FEMA, in this case. For example, it was clear
to me in watching the exercise, and it’s not that it’s not logical, but
when you see it, it’s a little different, that if the doctors and medi-
cal personnel run right in to try to help out, they don’t know what’s
there initially, and they don’t know furthermore, that there aren’t
other bombs. As we’ve heard, bombs are the No. 1 way this stuff
is still delivered, furthermore, if you don’t get the scientists on the
scene to determine which kind of chemical or biological weapon it
is, you once again could prescribe the wrong things and do terrible
things at the beginning.

Could you describe for us a little bit of how you see this happen-
ing when an incident occurs; and then if you see a tradeoff, a trans-
fer, over to FEMA at a certain point; and how does this work
through? Mr. Blitzer, maybe you could go first.

Mr. BLITzER. Yes, I’d be glad to try to explain that as best I can.
Since PDD-39, and I think that really is an important, important
document for the counterterrorism community—as you know, in-
side the United States, the Department of Justice and through Jus-
tice, the Bureau is lead for counterterrorism. And that’s a whole
array of things, but certainly command and control plays in that
equation. And since 1995, when that document was issued, we’ve
done a lot of work around the Nation, particularly in the wake of
Oklahoma City disaster.

One of the things that we learned from Oklahoma City, which I
think is extremely important in determining whether it’s bio or
chem, is that the police chief, fire chief, and the FBI chief all new
each other. They knew each other extremely well. They had talked
about things such as this long before that bomb went off. And when
the bomb went off, they knew exactly what they were going to do;
there were some quick phone calls made, and the response was on,
and it was a very effective response.

The representative of the fire service is exactly right. The FBI
on-scene commander, he’s the on-scene commander for the Federal
Government; he is not the on-scene commander for the fire depart-
ment. He’s not going to tell a fire chief how to fight a fire or how
to rescue people. He is certainly not going to tell the police chief
or the director of the public works how to shut off utilities and set
up a perimeter. That’s what they do, and that’s what they'll do
when one of these things occurs.

But what he does bring to the table, as the primary representa-
tive of Washington, are those assets that can be brought to the
scene as rapidly as possible, including a highly skilled Domestic


3

Sixth, the DoD program assumes that all fire fighters have received hazmat
training, and it builds on an expected level of knowledge. Unfortunately,
most of fire fighters in the nation have not received operations level
hazmat training, and the DoD program fails to account for the diverse skill
levels of fire fighters.

Seventh, the experts hired by DoD to train the trainers are quite
knowledgeable about weapons of mass destruction, but they often lack
skills in the art of emergency response training, especially the training of
fire fighters. The fire fighters who are now certified as trainers too often
emerge from their classes filled with information, but unsure about the
best way to convey that information to their fellow fire fighters. This is
due, in part, to the failure of DoD to consult with fire fighters in the

development of the course,

Finally, the DoD program does not provide for refresher courses. Terrorism
incidents are thankfully still extremely uncommon in this nation, and as a
result, there is rarely an opportunity for those who have gone through the
DoD training to brush up on their skills. Occasional refresher courses could
serve this function, as well as provide information about the latest

technological developments in the field of terrorism emergency response.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, nothing is more frightening than the thought of a deliberate

act of terrorism which threatens hundreds or even thousands of innocent

n


82

Fire Fighter Training for Hazardous Materials Response

‘TABLE. LAFF Training Resuts, Summary Data on

337

‘tots on Actions Selected by Fire Fighter Trainees

mney ia ty
samp aze = 38 samt an = 40
response rata = 3308 (2%) reponse ta = 3080 76%)
28.89%) ru otowng Brough 20,G0K) rary lowing rege
tieast ene aon nates ene ston
20,61%) ru owing trough 21 (70) replay ftevng Brough
enor moe ent or mare
1 3%) replay ftiwing Brough 12 UR) ey og toch
centres or mor, entieeorere
6 (1%) rear towing Brough en 3) rr flowing rogh on
tor tr
anal ter couse: none = 18 Manuals ter care: Pone = 13
usiicore = 3(@N;more than IW anoe = BT) mar tan
ree = 15 (5) nce = 900%)
‘Novae chy Teach
sapere = 35 same os = 38
response rata = 2788 (774) response rte = 3878 (10%)
27 (100%) rua owing Crovgh 31 BON) egy oie gh
‘ovatleast ne acton nates one action
£23 69%) egy folowing mrugh 27 (778) esa ftorgHreugh
rte rere tee ere
19 (11%) repay otowng trough 72 DK) egy along ugh
cn bre crane
7 (Pri few trou on
tor

(WVAL), There appears to be more attention to HAZMAT:
related procedures, and more tboughtful incident com.
‘ander actions in responding to calls having the potential
for harmful exposures. Regarding the later, two of the most
telling personal accounts of how the course changed com-
mand behaviors are noted below:

Report: “Rail wok ear left track and was spilling
‘contents, I assessed situation from a distance with binoculars
and determined that product in car was chlorine. A defensive
perimeter was set up and a request made for the HAZMAT
team. Before the course I would have just rushed up to the
tank car to sce the situation up close snd probably exposed
myself and others needlessly to this harmful chemical.”

Report: “Before course, our Captain had litle use for
reference sources such as the DOT ERG. (DOT ERG refers
to the Department of Transporution Emergeacy Response
Guidebook, which lists cals along, wit

to call for are slong. with
‘evacuation distances). After the course, we responded to an
alarm at a residence where our Captain spotted several
‘containers on site. Viewing the placards and labels together
with the ERG, a determination was made to pull back the
‘company and call in the HAZMAT team. Itwas learned that
‘one of the container contents would have reacted with water
if we had proceeded and started hose lines: In the past, the
Captain said he would have been the las person to pick up
and use the ERG."

Incidental information obtained during followback con-
tacts with departments suggested other supportive adminis-
trative actions being taken since the course. Among those
noted were:

‘© Computerized information on chemical materials and
properties as found at sites with people occupant
reference texts in vehicles now carry notations of whether
they have equipment onboard to respond salely if called
to the premises

© Arrangements with local hospitals to pick up, sterilize,
and recur firefighter clothing suspected of being coma
nated with biologic material

‘© More decontamination sinks installed in fre stations

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE VARIOUS
MEASURES

Implicit in a popular model of training evaluation
criteria is the assumption that positive aides about the
quality ofthe instruction or course content, gains in skills or
knowledge, behavior change and end goals of such actions
ae intercorelated if not causally inked (Kirkpatrick, 1967;
Alliger and Sanak, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1994). Some suggest
an ascending order of these measures; that is, favorable
reactions to training lead to learning which, in turn, leads to
changes in job behaviors, which then leads to related
changes in an organization [Newstrom, 1978; Clement,
1982}. Data on the multiple measures from the course
‘evaluations just described offered a means for verifying
these assertions. Specifically, it was assumed that more
positive reactions to the qualityhuiity of the course would
be correlated with improved competencies and knowledge

‘basic information about their physical properties. Phone

vet are few and sated among the remaining eure.


COMBATING TERRORISM: IMPLEMENTATION AND
STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 2, 1998

Serial No. 105-208

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

Se

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-394 CC WASHINGTON : 1999

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
‘Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-059635-1
3



108

EXPLOIT THE MOBILITY THAT TECHNOLOGY AND A FLUID ORGANIZATIONAL
‘STRUCTURE OFFER.

SUCH A GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FEBRUARY, 1993
BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND ANOTHER FOR PLOTTING TO
BOMB SEVERAL NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS.

THE FBI BELIEVES THAT THE THREAT POSED BY INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS IN EACH OF THESE CATEGORIES WILL CONTINUE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

AS ATTENTION FOCUSES ON USAMA BIN LADIN IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE EAST AFRICAN BOMBINGS, I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER
THAT ROGUE TERRORISTS SUCH AS BIN LADIN REPRESENT JUST ONE TYPE
OF THREAT THAT WE FACE. IT 1S IMPERATIVE THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR
ABILITIES TO COUNTER THE BROAD RANGE OF THREATS THAT CONFRONT
us.

IN THE FACE OF THESE THREATS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
THROUGH THE NUNN-LUGAR-DOMENICI DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM, HAS ELEVATED THE AWARENESS OF THE NATION'S FIRST
RESPONDERS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF WMD TERRORISM.

FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL RESPONDERS NOW PARTICIPATE IN A
COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE AND HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT AN EFFECTIVE
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM REQUIRES A UNIFIED APPROACH BY ALL
RELEVANT AUTHORITIES.


131

Authorization Act, Congress has called for the creation of an inte-
grated national program for the development of threat and risk as-
sessment methodologies, at the urging of this subcommittee, for the
establishment of an independent advisory committee; for the pro-
duction of regular, detailed reports; and for the certification of
RAID personnel who will be trained to respond to WMD incidents.
The act also authorizes the President to call up reserve forces to
assist in responding to a WMD event.

Continued congressional support and leadership are essential to
this process. Both the Department of Defense and the Department.
of Justice, as you have heard, have recently conducted forums with
first responders. As Mr. Blitzer reported, without exception, the
No. 1 request of first responders has been for the identification of
a single Federal agency to lead the training and equipping of first
responders.

Mr. Chairman, that’s what we’re talking about when we talk
about a transfer. We're talking about a single Federal agency to
deal with the issue of training and equipping first responders.

As the first responders have told all of us who have been partici-
pants in these forums, they want the ease, the convenience, and
the predictability of one-stop shopping. In an effort to respond to
that need, as has been reported this morning, the Department of
Defense and the Department of Justice are working to propose an
interagency agreement which establishes the Department of Jus-
tice as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Domestic Prepared-
ness Program.

As I said, DOD would propose to transfer those facets of the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation that deal with training and exer-
cising first responders, and would be able to rationalize within the
interagency the training and equipping programs that are now
being conducted partially by DOD and partially by the Department
of Justice. If this transfer of authority is accepted, the Department.
of Defense will support the Department of Justice both during the
transition and following its completion.

We believe these actions clearly demonstrate that we are making
real, tangible progress toward an enhanced homeland defense. Our
goal, as we move into the 21st century, is to have in place an effec-
tive, integrated, and flexible response mechanism able to respond
to a wide range of unconventional threats.

Although we may never be fully prepared to respond to all types
of events in every single location in America, we have begun to lay
the foundation for an integrated, across-the-board response, one
that makes sense, and one that is truly responsive to the needs of
the first responders. The continued partnership for WMD prepara-
tion among local, State, and Federal authorities will be essential if
we are to be successful in this endeavor.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to respond to you for questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cragin and Mr. Roberts follows:]


159

what you could in the first year, and now we've got a little bit more
time. How are we going to sort this through?

Mr. Daticu. Well, there are two programs at play. One is our
equipment Program, which this was the first year that we did that.
It was $12 million appropriation, and we moved on that one ag-
gressively to provide equipment to as many jurisdictions as we
could with the amount of money that we had. We limited applica-
tions on that to the 120 jurisdictions that we were working with
under the training program. We received 84 applications, and fund-
ed 41 of those jurisdictions. And had a mix of large, medium, and
small size through it.

On the training itself —

Mr. SoupER. Can——

Mr. DALICH. I’m sorry.

Mr. SouDER. This is a new wrinkle to me, and we'll do some fol-
lowup questions from here in writing. But in the 120, when you
said there were small, medium, and large——

Mr. DaLicn. Right, of the 120 largest, but of those there’s a
range.

Mr. Souper. OK.

Mr. CRAGIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just interject, because I
think this is a perfect example of why Secretary Cohen and the At-
torney General felt it was vitally important to respond and set up
one-stop. shopping.

The Department of Defense, under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
program, has been training the trainers in 120 cities. The Depart-
ment of Justice has been involved in training and equipage in 120
entities that may not necessarily be cities; they might be counties
and things of that nature. And it was felt important to get this all
in one place, with one entity being primarily responsible for having
the lead in integrating and rationalizing these programs.

Mr. SOUDER. My initial question was: how will that training be
different now than it was before?

Mr. Cracin. I think Mr. Dalich was trying to respond to that.
Keep in mind that the agreement to propose this transfer to the
National Security Council is an agreement that has been worked
out over the last 4 weeks. And as Deputy Secretary —

Mr. SOUDER. You don’t have it done yet? [Laughter.]

Mr. CrRaGIN. Well, Deputy Secretary Hamre said, get it done in
4 days, and we at least think we tried to create an artistic render-
ing on how this transition process will take place. Obviously, there
are myriad details that are involved in doing this.

Mr. SouDER. Thank you. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Blitzer, I under-
stand that the DOJ is establishing an office called the National Do-
mestic Preparedness Office. It’s also my understanding that the
FBI has been assigned the lead in this new office. Is that right?
My colleague, Congressman Turner, asked me to ask several ques-
tions pertaining to that. Could you tell me how you intend to uti-
lize the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium and it’s com-
prehensive and broadly based existing national assets, as you de-
velop a national plan?

. BLITZER. I could give you some thoughts on it. I don’t know
that I have a very definitive sense on that yet, because it’s so early




109

DURING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY OF THE NUNN-LUGAR-
DOMENIC! PROGRAM, THE FBI HAS RECEIVED FEEDBACK FROM THE FIRST
RESPONDER COMMUNITY THROUGH OUR FIELD OFFICES LOCATED AROUND
THE COUNTRY.

OUR SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE HAVE UNDERTAKEN NEW
RESPONSIBILITIES TO COORDINATE BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY AND BEGIN PURPOSEFUL LIAISON WITH
MEMBERS OF THE FIRE/HAZMAT, EMERGENCY MEDICAL, AND CONSEQUENCE
PLANNING COMMUNITY.

WE HAVE RESPONDED TO NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR THREAT
BRIEFINGS, CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AND OTHER TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
TO COMMUNITIES PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF WMD.

THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTION OF THIS PROGRAM, WE AND OUR
INTERAGENCY PARTNERS HAVE PLACED THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE ON
DELIVERING A PROGRAM THAT WILL ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF FIRST
RESPONDERS TO SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO A TERRORIST
INCIDENT INVOLVING WMD.

TO SPECIFICALLY SOLICIT FIRST RESPONDER INPUT, THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE RECENTLY CONVENED A STATE AND LOCAL “STAKEHOLDERS”
FORUM IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

MORE THAN 200 STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PLANNERS AND PRACTITIONERS FROM ACROSS THE NATION WERE INVITED


30

TESTIMONY OF LARRY C. JOHNSON BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

October 2, 1998

| am pleased to appear before this committee today to comment on the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness (NLD) Program. While most of
my experience in combating terrorism is in the international arena, | believe the
lessons I have learned from previous operations are relevant to our effort to
protect American citizens and their communities from the threat of terrorism.

Ihave been working directly, and indirectly, on the problem of terrorism
since 1985. | worked in operations and as an analyst at the Central intelligence
Agency from 1985 to 1989. Subsequently, | served in the US State
Department's Office of Counter Terrorism as a deputy director with
responsibilities for police trainng, transportation security, and special
‘operations. Since leaving the Department of State ! have continued to work on
terrorism issues, including analyzing the U.S. Government's databases on
chemical and biological agents and helping script terrorism exercises for the
Department of Defense. | represented the United States at the July 1996
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Terrorism Conference in
Vienna, Austria and | have been involved in domestic anti-terrorism exercises
conducted under the auspices of the NLD program.

My goal today is to assist this committee in its efforts to evaluate the
needs and resources required to protect American citizens from terrorism, but
specifically the threats posed by chemical, biological, or nuclear devices. | will
share with you the facts about the threat of terrorism to the United States and
offer an analysis about the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, | will
conclude by commenting on the recommendations advanced by the latest GAO
report on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and


89

dealt with state-sponsored terrorism, though, there was a threshold
that couldn’t be crossed—fear of retribution, fear of retaliation. We
have diplomatic and military tools which are quite effective. It be-
comes more difficult if you can’t bomb an actor who has no address.
You can’t blockade a port if there is no port to blockade. When
you're dealing with non-state terrorism, again, we need to re-exam-
ine our tools.

I think part of this stems from the fact that the bad guys learned
from the Gulf war. Who is going to defeat us militarily tank-for-
tank on the traditional battlefield? I think it’s likely that smaller
nations using unaccountability, through proxies, as well as non-
state groups, realize that they should adopt asymmetric tactics to
circumvent our strengths and hit us where we're weak. Part of that
is terrorism.

I don’t want to raise the specter that the sky is falling, because
clearly it isn’t, but I do think that we have to remember that unfor-
tunately terrorism is effective. Just look at the impact East Africa
has had. We were all on the tube all the time; it was exceedingly
busy. It had a lot of impact. As did TWA 800, which wasn’t a ter-
rorist attempt. The psychological piece should not be overlooked. It
really is important and it’s not necessarily the thousands killed,
but it’s the millions watching at home on CNN, on BBC, on ABC,
NBC, and watching it unfold on the television screen, who are the
real target.

What makes WMD terrorism different—or even a campaign of
big bombs, which, fortunately, we have not had to deal with, is that
it could shake that our confidence, and we will overreact. We've al-
ways overreacted immediately after an event, because we’re not
used to having to deal with major events, whereas our allies have
and they do not overreact. Legislation is passed; every official is
coming out with statements; laundry lists are being led which
couldn’t be filled for 3 years, some of them probably not appro:
priately. Yet, 3 months later, we’re back to square one. The
hysteria has died down. We need to sustain our effort, and treat
it as a campaign.

Mr. SoupDER. Thank you. No, I appreciate that both your answers
are very good. I want to get into the second round and start going
through subpoints of this.

Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will stick with this threat and risk assessment. Mr. Davis, you
made a case here and in your April 1998 report that DOD should
conduct threat and risk assessments before moving forward with
training and the provision of emergency equipment. However, the
FBI argues that the correlation between risk analysis and an ac-
tual terrorist incident may be impossible to identify. It also con-
tends that we should focus on providing fundamental training and
equipment. What’s your response to those things?

ir. DAvis. Well, the threat and risk assessment process that we
could talk about in our report, the model, is a decision-support tool.
It’s a decision-support tool to help people establish what the re-
juirements might be, to set priorities, and to allocate resources.
early, you can do these things without perfect intelligence, and
just because you don’t have perfect intelligence and just because


Fire Fighter Training for Hazardous Materials Response

84

339

TABLE VIL. AFF Course Resuts: Pearson Correlations () Between Oterent Evaluation Measures

ompetancyenings Keonledge aie
Behavior
measure sat Prat ain ‘ea Index?
Reactonndet — OSOALR= 4) 059A) O10) o1eay ose
O11 (wie = 2-060 (NN) 0.08 CWT) oat ny
oz min=s)  -02 FY — oz gL o12ry 00s Le'an
omqwan=75 -aseqwa) — a2 cw) os)
Company ratog
soe ONAN 4) AMA OSH ALN = 14)
001 Aw n= 3 DOZEN)
OgNAn= 55-0246 024 FL = 2
oxzqwan= 75) O97
ozmn= 27
Feat OB ALORA) -00SUy— -OH AL = 1)
0a itn = 38-036)
Du7mia=s5 — -0.13Y —~028 FL = 20)
aM wwen=75  -0.2502)
017 AL = 27)
roomed
Gait 001 Ln = 14)
ose Ln = 2)
0200%n = 35)
oar -orzain= 14)
001 FL n= 29)
009 (kn = 35)

‘orev
‘ie cared pont fr wag tr an ee Te mf ese reas 2) Wa rfc aebterer

‘The need for extended time schedules o cover the 3-day
‘course requirements may be even more detrimental to scores
‘on the knowledge quiz. One could argue thatthe quiz results
for IAFF training could be better ifthe course were given on
3 successive days and with the same instructors, At the
‘mini

Bains in quiz scores (36%) for the IAFF first
‘course have been posted by cadet classes atthe fire academy
‘where training conditions favor 3 successive days of instruc
tion by the same instructors.
‘Recommendations for resolving the time schedule prob-
Jems just described are being considered by the IAFF. One
possibility is to arrange for and pay backup personne! 19
‘cover the duties of those attending classes so thatthe trainees

‘can complete the courses in minimal time. Another is to
videotape or produce CD-ROM versions of the course so
‘that those unable to meet class schedules, ot called out on
‘emergencies, could still keep up with the course work. The
latter is also being considered for refresher training. On this
point, extra training may be one explanation of why trainees
in one department (WVA2) showed litle loss in knowledge
‘quiz scores when retested 6 months after the end of the [AFF
course, Roughly two moaths after completing the IAFF
course, the WVA2 trainees received an added day of
‘anon inaruton in technics for managing hazardous

‘materials incidents from another organization. Besides bet-

strong carryover effects found for trainees in this department


12

segment could exceed $167 million. This does not include the costs of the Public Health
Service, which hopes to establish and equip (an average of $350,000 of equipment and
pharmaceuticals per city) Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in all 120 program cities.
In addition to the $6.6 million that the Public Health Service initially received, it spent
$3.6 million in fiscal year 1997 to expand the number of strike teams, The Public Health
Service received no additional funding in fiscal year 1998, but it estimates program
requirements at $85 million for the remaining 93 cities.

TRAINING PROGRAM IS BENEFICIAL

Domestic Preparedness Program training gives first responders a greater awareness of
how to deal with WMD terrorist incidents. Local officials in the seven cities we visited
praised the training program content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD's
willingness to modify it based on suggestions from local officials. They also credited the
program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies
together into a closer working relationship. By December 31, 1998, DOD expects to have
trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program. All training is to be
complete in 2001. The first responders trained are expected to train other emergency
responders through follow-on courses. The cities we visited were planning to
institutionalize various adaptations of the WMD training, primarily in their fire and law
enforcement training academies. A related field exercise program to allow cities to test

their response capabilities also has begun.


Center for Strategic & International Studies

Washington, DC
February 1, 1999
The Honorable
J. Dennis Hastert
‘The Speaker of the House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Pursuant to your request, I am attaching my short responses to your follow-up questions

resulting from the October 2, 1998 hearing on the Domestic Preparedness Program. If
can be of further assistance, please don't hesitate to call anytime.

Frank Jt ffutfo

Terrorism Task Force

(1) Whatdo you think of the Administration’ plan to develop national vaccine
stockpiles?

As I referenced in my prepared testimony, I firmly support initiatives aimed at assuring a
national capability to acquire vaccines, antidotes, and antibiotics in order to administer
aid in the event of terrorisin involving weapons of mass destruction — to tura victims into
patients. Given the short shelf-life and the fact that some vaccines may degenerate

quickly, the solution is more complicated than merely stockpiling. It also requires

10 surge and provide timely distribution of vaccines if and when needed. While 1
do support the underlying concept proposed by the Administration, I do not feel I am ina
position to accurately assess the Administration’s plan to develop national vaccine
stockpiles. You may, however, want to consider the following over-arching issues:

1 Sauces is eoninge’ upon verging advances in he iosholoy,
and medical communities. This requires fostering true partnerships

Eatween the public and private sector and abandoniag the mindset thet “goverament
leads and the private sector follows.” It also demands that the Federal Government
provide incentives to research, develop, and produce such vaccines, antidotes and

1800 K Street, Nonhwest + Washington, DC 20006 » Telephone 20287-0200 FAX 2027753199 » WEB: hitpiiwww esi.org/


71

TODAY, HOWEVER, OUR FOCUS IS DOMESTIC
TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS.

1 AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH AND
INTERESTED IN THE DOD PROGRAM
BECAUSE NOT ONLY IS BALTIMORE ONE OF
THE 120 CITIES CHOSEN FOR PARTICIPATION
IN THE PROGRAM, BUT BALTIMORE HAS
ALREADY UNDERGONE A TRAINING
EXERCISE IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR.

ALL REPORTS FROM BALTIMORE ON THE
TRAINING HAVE BEEN POSITIVE AND
SUPPORTIVE OF DOD’S PROGRAM.

CHIEF GARY E. FREDERICK, ASSISTANT FIRE
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF THE BALTIMORE
CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, TOLD MY OFFICE
THAT HE STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE
PROGRAM.

CHIEF FREDERICK STATED THAT THE
TRAINING HE AND HIS FIRE FIGHTERS
RECEIVED IN MARCH WAS EXCELLENT;
THAT THE TRAINING WAS WELL
COORDINATED WITH OTHER CITY

2


96

right away, or continuity of government when it was robust during
the Reagan years, which has withered away to nothing.

I’m somewhat surprised that FEMA is not here today, because
I'd like to see what their comments are on some of these issues,
since at one point they did have a very robust capability. I agree
with Mr. Nesbitt that they would be the ideal place for this to sit;
yet, I don’t think that their current mission priorities have looked
into that area. It’s leveraging what’s out there, but it’s making sure
they get to that table.

Mr. BARRETT. Very quickly, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nesbitt?

Mr. NessiTT. I know that you said funds are limited, and we re-
alize that. We want to make sure that the limited funds are spent
well, but when I hear someone like in Virginia say, well, we can’t
train all fire departments and all firefighters in terrorism response,
and we realize that there are different levels of response. I’m only
saying that if I’m a firefighter on an engine and we get a call to
respond and we roll in and there’s a terrorist incident there and
Tm not trained and I’m not equipped, what am I suppose to do?
Am I supposed to say to citizens, “Well, good luck. Somebody else
will be around later to take care of this incident”? You’re talking
about 4 minutes, 6 minutes, 8 minutes, 10 minutes.

These so-called teams, how many? I know they’re within 30
miles, but when’s the arrival? Like in Oklahoma City, would you
have wanted to tell the citizens—well, at 9:02, when the explosion
occurred, the fire department was there at 9:05, and there were
casualties and the people needed to be evacuated, but you say,
“Well, we're not trained; we'll have to wait for someone else to ar-
rive. We'll just pull back and just kind of do nothing”? Or you place
our people in jeopardy where they’re going to die.

So, it’s a question that Congress is really going to have to grap-
ple with. What is our response? How do we respond? How do we
maximize the use of these limited resources?

Mr. SouDER. I want to do one more round of questioning because
there’s a fundamental question that you've all raised that we’ve
discussed and that helps set up what we’re going to do in the next
panel, and that is kind of the command-and-control function. We’ve
talked about the proliferation of first responder training, about the
difficult questions of command and control, and who’s in charge of
what? We also see this moving from Department of Defense to
DOJ. There’s a difference between international incidents and do-
mestic incidents; that we have certain constitutional questions that
we have to address.

Could you each, and I'll start with Mr. Davis, comment on, what
do you think about the move of this from DOD to DOJ? Where
would you concentrate this structure? For example, Mr. Cilluffo
raised the question of a CINC, that would be inside Defense.

Mr. CILLUFFO. And their interface beyond——
ton SouDER. And beyond. I’d like to hear your comments related

it.

Would you separate the response from the training for trying to
spot—are there different functions here that require multiple
places? Just kind of address this fundamental question of—we

ve, by the way, have an anti-terrorism czar in the White House
with no authority. In the drug area, we wound up—through this


170

CONGRESSMAN ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND

+

+

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OCTOBER 2, 1998

HEARING ON IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

OPENING STATEMENT
THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

1AM LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR
DISCUSSION TODAY OF THE DOD
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND I COMMEND
THE CHAIRMAN FOR HIS CHOICE OF
HEARING TOPIC.

1 AM ALSO INTERESTED IN A DISCUSSION OF
THE STATUS OF OUR PREPAREDNESS FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN
LIGHT OF THE HORRENDOUS BOMBINGS IN
KENYA AND TANZANIA THIS YEAR. I HOPE
THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL CONDUCT A
HEARING ON THIS TOPIC IN THE NEAR
FUTURE.


15

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS”
ALFRED K. WHITEHEAD VINCENT J. BOLLON
GarerlPremdert ‘General Secretary Teaser

FEDERAL FUNDING DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

‘The Intemational Association of Fire Fighters is proud of our
hazardous materials emergency response training program, and we are
pleased that the federal government is a partner in this effort.

During the past two years, the following federal agencies have
provided support to our hazardous materials training program:

1998-1999

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH): $1,806,000
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): $550,000
Department of Energy: $400,000
Department of Transportation: $250,000
1997-1998

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH): $1,806,000
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): $550,000
Department of Energy: ‘$300,000

Details regarding all of these grants can be obtained from the International
Association of Fire Fighters.

1750 NEW YORK AVENUE, NAW. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006-5395 (202) 737-8484 # FAX (202) 737-8418
_>


36

technical base’. in other words, wanting to produce weapons is very different
from being able to do so.

If itis difficult for Libya it is a more daunting challenge for terrorists left to
their own devices. The case of the ill-fated Japanese terrorist group—Aum
‘Shinryko—provides important insights that we should consider in reviewing the
NLD program. Aum was determined to create such weapons, in part to confirm
its founder's apocalyptic predictions. Starting in 1990 Aum invested millions of
dollars, employed several Ph.D. scientists, and acquired labs specifically
designed to create chemical and biological agents capable of causing mass
casualties. They tried twice unsuccessfully to produce and use Botulinus Toxin
A (one of the deadliest biological agents). They had a similar failure with
anthrax. They successfully produced the nerve agent sarin, but it lacked the
purity and effectiveness associated with military-grade weapons, Their attack on
the Tokyo subway system injured five thousand people and killed 12. Despite
the attack the subways were back in operation the same day

‘We cannot ignore the possibility that a terrorist group will try again to
produce such weapons, but we should acknowledge that producing such
‘weapons is not easy Unfortunately that is not the message the American
people are receiving. Last November Secretary of Defense Cohen appeared at
a press conference holding a bag of sugar and warning that “this amount of
anthrax could wipe out Washington, DC". The Secretary of Defense also
warned that, “A lone madman or nest of fanatics with a bottle of chemicals, a
batch of plague-inducing bacteria, or a crude nuclear bomb can threaten oF kill
tens of thousands. A few months later the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 27 1998)
ran an editorial that perpetuated this myth, claiming that “Chemical and
biological weapons can be concocted by just about any determined terrorist in a
lab coat". The truth is otherwise. Producing these types of weapons requires
infrastructure and expertise more sophisticated than a lab coat and a garage


48

of the Marine Corps, Army’s Tech Escort Unit, and NEST, which
are extremely valuable when pre-positioned at fixed site events, as
they were at the Atlanta Olympics or the G—7 session in Denver.
Unfortunately,.their value falls off precipitously in a no-notice ter-
rorist attack. This is not surprising, given the lengthy lead time,
as we heard earlier from the GAO, required to deploy to the site
of the event.

An extremely compressed window of opportunity for administer-
ing first aid, identifying the agent, administering lifesaving anti-
dotes during a chemical or biological event, this so-called “golden
hour,” or perhaps even minutes, Federal assets would obviously ar-
rive after the last viable victim has been removed from the site.

In light of these shortcomings, it may turn out that the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici legislation truly did serve as a marker in the sand.
I do think in many cases it’s a historical milestone in our national
security planning, and subsequently, a number of programs have
been spawned. I’m sure that there are some issues—Justice not
talking with DOD—but I'm not here to comment on that. You'll
hear from them later on this morning.

Vd like to leave you quickly with two possible recommendations
for your consideration. One, in terms of coordination, at least with-
in the Department of Defense, deals with designating a Com-
mander-in-Chief, a CINC USA responsible for homeland defense;
and the second, a newly federally funded research and development
center strictly looking at biological issues. Without getting into any
detail in terms of the CINC USA, I think that it would create a
more systematic and integrative approach, protecting the continen-
tal United States from threats, not only WMD terrorism, but also
critical infrastructure protection, where the United States may not
be able to deploy forces to a given site because a critical node is
disabled, and also missile defense. I think the Rumsfeld Commis-
sion should have opened a lot of people’s eyes on the true chal-
lenges on that front.

The CINC USA would be responsible, clearly, for all Department
of Defense related strategies and activities related to homeland
events and would serve as a focal point, a single focal point, and
facilitate the coordination within the Department of Defense and
the many Federal and local and State government agencies. It also
designates a single budget, accountability, and access to forces, if
we need them, and that is crucial where the Guard cannot access
cross-service forces.

And rather than getting into any detail on the FFRDC, it’s mere-
ly to put bio-defense into one place, to sustain R&D efforts, to ac-
celerate sensor development, and to leverage again the private sec-
tor’s advances in creating and producing and, ultimately, stock-
piling antidotes, vaccines, and antibiotics.

Td like to close with some words of caution. At this time next
year the funds of the defense preparedness program, as you know,
run out, as currently mandated. I think it’s imperative that Con-
gress recognize the importance of the program and more impor-
tantly, the spirit of the NLD legislation. The keys to success are
continued leadership as a policy priority and sustained funding
throughout the outyears to ensure all agencies—local, State, re-


qT

OJP’s comprehensive initiative under this umbrella is to provide training and equipment
support to help build this critical capability to enable the seamless integration of state and federal
assets —- if ever needed. OJP’s efforts, coordinated with the Federal interagency community,
primarily the DOD, FBI, DOE, EPA, FEMA, HHS, and the NSC, can provide the targeted,
threat-specific training, equipment, exercise and technical assistance necessary to build the
capacity of the nation’s state and local emergency responders.

Thus, the mission of OJP’s Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support is
to assist state and local jurisdictions to be better prepared and to enhance their capability to
respond to incidents of domestic terrorism.

And while domestic preparedness is a new mission for OJP, working in partnership with
state and local jurisdictions is not. OJP, and our predecessor agencies back to LEAA (the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration), have three decades of experience working in
partnership with state and local agencies and locales. OJP, through our bureaus and offices, has
spent years working as partners with state and local agencies bringing innovation, program
development, financial and technical assistance, and capacity building to the criminal and
juvenile justice systems, including support for victims of crime. And now, through the Office for
State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, OJP will continue that tradition by assisting
‘America’s communities ~ its emergency response agencies, its First Responders ~ to prepare for
incidents of domestic terrorism.

Under this initiative, OJP restricts its focus to three, very specific tasks:

+ First, OJP is providing financial assistance to enable state and local jurisdictions

to buy much needed equipment.


53

‘A central theme of the NLD legislation was that detecting and preventing the use of weapons of
mass destruction is not always possible. No matter how robust our intelligence gathering
capabilities may be, it simply will not be able to provide early warning of all WMD terrorist
attempts. NLD also appreciated the role of the first responders and that WMD terrorism and
emergency preparedness cannot only be addressed at the national level, from the top down, but
must also be viewed from the bottom-up. From the eyes of the local first responders, our first
line of defense--these are the men and women who will ultimately decide whether the battle is
either won or lost. There are some true pockets of excellence at the national level, such as the
Marine Corps’ Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the Army's
‘Technical Escort Unit and the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team
(NEST), which are extremely valuable when pre-positioned at fixed-site events--as they were
during the Atlanta Olympics. Unfortunately, their value falls off precipitously in a no-notice
terrorist attack. That this is so is not surprising given the lengthy lead-time required to deploy to
the site of the event. In an extremely compressed window of opportunity for administering first
aid, identifying the agent, administering life-saving antidotes after a chemical or biological
event-the so-called golden hour or minutes, federal assets would likely arrive after the last viable
victim had been removed from the scene.

In light of these shortcomings, and it may tur out that the passage of the Nunn-Lugar-Domi
legislation served as a marker in the sand. In retrospect, one can look back and see that the
legislation represents a truly historical milestone in national security. Not surprisingly , the
legislation has subsequently spawned a number of valuable initiatives and programs, including
the Defense Preparedness Program; The NDMS Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams; the
Department of Justice State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program; the
National Guard and Reserve Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams.

1 would like to leave with you two recommendations for your consideration, The first deals with
designating a Commander-in-Chief for “homeland defense” (CINCUSA) and the second with a
new federally funded research and development center.

In order to institute a more systematic and integrative approach to protecting the Continental
United States from threats such as WMD terrorism, critical infrastructure protection and missile
defense, it may be worthwhile to create a new Commander-in-Chief (CINC) USA. The
CINCUSA would be responsible for all Department of Defense related strategies and activities
related to homeland defense issues and would serve as a focal point and facilitate coordination
within the department of defense and between the many federal, state and local law enforcement,
intelligence and medical communities with related responsibilities. It also designates a single
budget, accountability and access to forces (across services).

Of all WMD terrorist threats, the U.S. is arguably least prepared for and most vulnerable to
terrorism involving biological weapons. In order to leverage advances in the commercial
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical communities it may be worth considering
establishing a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) wholly dedicated to

4


138

For more than a year, the Group served as the interagency policy forum for
identification, discussion and resolution of issues involving the federal strategy to provide
guidance and training support to federal, state and local first responders who may be
called upon to respond to a terrorist WMD event. The Group focused on programs to
develop and deliver emergency response training, including DoD Domestic Preparedness
activities, under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.

After May 19, 1998, with the promulgation of PDD-62 and the creation of a
National Security Council (NSC) chaired interagency structure for WMD preparedness,
the Group was subsumed by the NSC’s Senior Management Groups and related
‘Subgroups.

‘Training of first responders is viewed as the single most critical area for enhancing the
nation’s capability to respond to domestic terrorism. The training program is based upon a
“‘vain-the-trainer” concept, wherein a small number of local responders ideally recognized for
their training expertise become the trainers for the remainder of the city’s
‘Training is focused only on the “nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) delta,” that is, only those
aspects of response which are different fom how each responder would react in a non-NBC
event.

Training course development was based on 26 performance objectives resulting
from focus group sessions with over 100 first responders from across the U.S. Focus
‘groups were used to identify emergency responder requirements for Domestic
Preparedness training. The training program is modular, consisting of medical and non-
medical courses, each with text and supporting audio/visual materials to include a video
of a simulated terrorist incident. The modular training program allows for tailoring to
accommodate each city’s requirements.

A major player in the training program has been the U.S. Amy Chemical and
Biological Defense Command, which leads interagency training development and city
visits. These interagency teams coordinate with fire, police, emergency medical and
hazardous material officials and tailor training to city requirements. Additionally, FEMA
has developed a Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to ensure
coordination across all agencies at all levels.

‘The Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) completed the
development of the medical portion of the Domestic Preparedness training program.
‘MRMC utilized focus groups to develop course requirements. Input was received from
hospital providers, emergency medical service personnel, DHHS and MRMC research
institutes, Efforts resulted in two medical courses.

‘The overall training program includes two medical and six non-medical courses.
Four non-medical courses are interwoven with a segmented video presentation to provide
course continuity. The medical courses also utilize videos and this medium has proven to


49

gional, and Federal—are sufficiently equipped, trained, exercised,
and prepared to respond effectively to a D terrorist event.

This requires long-term capital investment strategies, not merely
6 months out or because you pet early warning or indications and
warning of a potential crisis. It requires projecting into the future.
We simply can’t wait, afford to wait, for them to come over the hill.

Nothing less than a seamless integration—and that’s somethi:
you are clearly honing-in on—of such efforts must be achieved.
This requires in some cases reexamining how we as a Nation per-
ceive national security and in making sure that all the proper par-
ties have a seat at the policy planning table upfront, including my
colleagues in the first responder community.

Given the Department of Defense’s experience, expertise, capa-
bilities, and resources, I would suggest that it’s mandate be ex-
tended beyond fiscal year 1999, as initially required by the defense
authorization bill, and that it remain the Bxecutive agent.
he you for your time, and I welcome any questions you may

ive.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]


78

Fire Fighter Training for Hazardous Materials Response 333,

TABLE Il, Coren Database for AFF Fi-Responder Course Evaluabon”

Statue
(ime span tr Trace Pripost
3 mg days) rascton ratings ue change change
is Cy 4-6 wa) x19) Y= 39) (stent 2
towed)
Free Fy Cay wk) X= A) X= BX BH Y= 20h acne
owed)
WE Vega WAT) Cay X40 = 15) A 150) Xin = 131) Yo = 26) Gsm motes) n= 28 acbons
aw Vin = 20) (eas reported)
WE igen wR) X= 19) KM BN Xn = BH YE TBs not) Y f= 18) actos
Yin © 18) tes "eps
Amana Gay GA we) K(U= 10H Ke = 108) K=O Y= Zh actans tok
tome
Texas (0 Gry 8 we) xen 45 Y (n= 39 ctor
towed)

Yn = 3 frees) Vn = 33 fessons note) (n= 39 aetons

reper

“tree we be trae presen sss sg ao eagrate mea. neue can aye means cane WA
sane cegurert owns veorlge reaver ose as rsa ees es vg ae a Sat apd wa,
[my stand ona non song ef ees Snr Wo Wal Cs a an cece 612 man aor e cae sat. DOR
permese

oocae unre ote op ta aes

‘THE EVALUATION PLAN

‘The latest recommendations for evaluating health educa.
tion and safety taining programs suggest using combination
techniques and measures to corroborate results as well as
‘bin information about the processes that may be involved
{Israel et al., 1995]. Accordingly, the evaluation plan for the
JAFF first responder training program included a variety of
measures reflecting four different kinds or levels of course
impact. The four types of measures are described below
‘along with the methods used for actual data collection.
‘Copies of the forms to be noted are available from the LAFF

Level I: Trainee reactions. The trainees completed 2
“Reaction to Course" form at the end ofthe course wherein
they rated the various units in terms of the quality of the
instruction (either high, satisfactory, or low), the amount of
information covered (either too much, okay, of too litte),
and its utility (either high, medium, or low). In addition,
cach trainee was asked to rate their competency in nine (9)
tasks connected with hazardous materials response as they
judged them to be before the training and now

tence). Both the pre- and post-course competency ratings
were made atthe end of the course to ensure the same level
‘of reference in these judgments. This procedure, referred to
by Berger etal (1996) asa “retroactive pretest design,” was,
intended to void a respond shift problem wherein the rater's
basis for making judgments about their capabilites before
taking he instruction changes as a result of the training, This
response shift would confound pre- and post-course differ-
ences if measured in the conventional way.

‘Level 2: Learning. Each trainee took a 75-item
“Knowledge Quiz” atthe outset of the instruction and also
at its conclusion, the difference between the two scores
yielding a measure of knowledge gain as a result of the
‘raining. A repeat administration of this quiz was given to
‘samples of trainees in follow-up sessions, ranging from 6 tu
12 months after the course, to determine how much of the
original learning was retained.

Lavel 3: Behavior. set of forms, one foreach course
unit, was developed, each listing five (5) specific, positive
actions capturing the major lessons to be learned in that unit

‘The task statements simply framed the course topics ia
‘operational terms. (Examples: Recognises at hazard

te
information. Apply knowledge of chemical properties in
assessing exposure risk). A 4-point scale was used for rating
task competency (I= highest competency: 4 = incompe-

(he list of action for each unit in the
Appendix.) After each course unit, the trainee chose one of
these actions for followthrough in their roles as first
responders. They could also draft their own statement if
‘bone of those listed applied to their situation. The trainee
retained one copy of the actioos selected for the 4 units; 8
‘second copy was collected by the instructor for forwarding
to the IAFF office. The plan was to contact a sample of
trainees, 6-12 months after the course, to determine the


88

Libya, even Libya’s chemical capabilities or biological capabilities
are limited by lack of scientific and technical expertise.

So I come back fundamentally, that since we cannot predict the
future, since we do not have a very good track record on reading
the minds of people who are going to conduct major attacks, I think
prudence requires that the Federal Government take appropriate
measures to put in place capabilities to deal with the possibility of
a chemical attack, whether it’s by terrorists or otherwise.

The fact of the matter is, the fire department on a daily basis
deals with chemical hazardous material spills that are as lethal as
some chemical attacks by terrorists, and they do an effective job of
it. We need to reinforce those kinds of capabilities.

We need to prepare for the possibility of biological. We need to
be prepared to deal with the possibility of nuclear. But being pre-
pared is different from what’s going on. And in my view, what has

ippened is, once the cold war ended—I mean, the level of terrorist
attack and terrorist activity was greater during the cold war, not
less. It was greater.

Many of these agencies that are now bellying-up to a table to
say, “I’m here to fight terrorism,” they weren’t there 10 years ago.
Or if they were involved, it wasn’t the top priority. What’s going
on is they see that terrorism means budget, and I don’t know of
a single Member of Congress that would back away and not vote
money to protect American citizens.

Mr. SoupER. Mr. Cilluffo, I read Rainbow Six, which is clearly
at the top of all the bestseller lists. We’re likely to see a range of
TV movies. I think Mr. Johnson is correct, none of us are going to
vote against money for this type of thing. Yet, in fact, we have to
make hard decisions—other national security questions on national
defense systems, whether or not we in fact focus on the targeted
terrorist groups and try to limit their capability. Do you want to
comment any further on Mr. Johnson’s? We're going to get into the
technical as we go—

Mr. CiLLurro. I fully agree with Mr. Johnson that terrorism is
nothing new; it’s always been the weapon of the weak to target the
strong, a way to circumvent conventional Projections of power—eco-
nomic, military, diplomatic, et cetera. think that you’ve got
groups that are motivated with different aims and objectives in
some cases, and I agree that the Aum Shinrikyo did have a huge
budget; it did have the intent, and it made it semi-public, yet was
it on our radar screen? No.

This is a group, that had 100,000 followers, 30,000 in Russia. I
would have hoped we’d accidentally pick up intelligence, because
we should have robust intelligence capabilities in Russia, to iden-
tify this group.

, that is my problem with the threat assessments. It really is
a moving target, and in some cases you’re not going to get the
warning and they're not going to get on your radar screen. Terror-
ism tends to germinate within very si cells which are difficult
to discern against the backdrop of the larger organization. Theyre
autonomous; they’re highly compartmentalized.

There are some unique challenges, and the United States needs
to equip its toolkits to personalize its response to terrorism. I also
agree that the number of incidents have declined. When you’ve


43

2. ARE THERE ANY DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR BUREAUS

THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY TERRORISM-

RELATED MISSIONS?
The Federal Government is blessed with a wealth of resources and
expertise and it is no surprise that most Departments, Agencies and
Bureaus of the Federal Government want to find a way to use their
particular expertise in combating terrorism. The challenge for the
Clinton Administration is to manage more efficiently how these
resources are organized and employed. The problem is a duplication
of effort. For example, the Army, the Marine Corps, the FBI, the
Environmental Protection Agency, Health and Human Services, and
the National Guard are competing to provide services to deal with a
chemical attack. The responsibility for dealing with the crisis and the
consequence of a chemical attack, which is now spread among several
agencies, should be assigned to a single Commander within the US
Armed Forces. Specialists from other agencies could be detailed to
the command to provide support, but we do not need five different
departments and agencies offering to provide the same function.

In the international arena, the key bureaucratic players are defined and
their roles are fairly clear—the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Energy (nuclear
incidents), and the Federal Aviation Administration (aircraft
hijackings and bombings). Such is not the case domestically. The
Departments and Agencies that have roles on the international front,
with the exception of the Department of State, should be permitted to


129

and local emergency response agencies. However, training is limited to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction, which are defined as incidents involving toxic and poisonous
chemicals or biological and radiological agents causing death or serious bodily harm to
“significant numbers of people.”

Because of DOD’s limitation to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, the DOD
initiative focuses on providing more highly specialized levels of training to a broader audience of
trainers. For this reason, DOD made a decision to train emergency responders in large cities or
municipalities, due to the likelihood that these larger municipalities are at the highest risk of
being targets for terrorist incidents. The list of these cities was restricted to 120 due to the
resources available to implement this effort over a three-year period. Further, these cities were
ranked by geographic size.

The OJP initiative under Public Law 104-132 is targeted to any terrorist incident and not limited
to weapons of mass destruction. The OJP initiative is limited to providing training only for fire
service and emergency medical personnel, and provides different levels of training, such as basic
awareness training, as opposed to the DOD's more highly specialized training. Under the OJP
statute, training is to be targeted to metropolitan areas, and not restricted to cities alone. In
cooperation with FEMA, OJP targeted its training effort to the nation’s largest jurisdictions
(based on population and as identified by the Census Bureau).

Asa result, the initial training offered by DOD and OJP, although complementary and not
duplicative, is targeted to two different lists of jurisdictions. As of Fiscal Year 1999, OJP has
consolidated these lists to ensure that OJP’s training and equipment programs include, and
continue to complement and reinforce, the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program list. As OJP’s
and DOD’s joint planning effort aimed at transferring the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
to OSP progresses, both agencies intend that a single list of eligible jurisdictions be maintained to
censure that OJP’s training and equipment programs are delivered in a uniform and coordinated
manner.


113

Mr. SoupeER. Thank you.

Mr. Dalich.

Mr. DaticH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barrett, my name is Mike
Dalich, and I serve as Chief of Staff to the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Office of Justice Programs. On behalf of the Attorney
General and OJP Assistant Attorney General Laurie Robinson, it’s
my pleasure to discuss OJP’s effort as part of the broader adminis-
tration initiative to assist State and local jurisdictions in enhancing
their capabilities to respond to incidents of domestic terrorism.

As the recent bombings at the embassies in Africa illustrate, acts
of terrorism are very much a part of today’s world. And as past
events in the United States prove, the World Trade Center, Okla-
homa City, and others prove these incidents and similar acts can
happen here.

The Department of Justice has reached an agreement in prin-
ciple with the Department of Defense, FEMA, and the National Se-
curity Council to establish the Department of Justice with the FBI
as the lead agency for U.S. domestic preparedness for weapons of
mass destruction terrorism. The Department of Justice would as-
sume overall responsibility for the formulation and execution of
programs and activities, to prepare the United States for incidents
of terrorism, and would establish the National Domestic Prepared-
ness Office and the FBI as the coordinating structure for these pro-
grams and activities.

The Office of Justice Programs will work closely with the NDPO
to incorporate the policy and planning decisions of the new office
and in our equipment, grant, and training programs. While the de-
tails about the structure and composition of the NDPO are still
being developed, we will work closely with all agencies involved in
supporting the counterterrorism preparedness of States and cities.
We believe that this action will help resolve many of the problems
of overlap and lack of coordination identified in the GAO reports.

OJP will provide training and equipment support to help build
this critical capacity, to enable the seamless integration of the
State and Federal assets, if ever needed. OJP’s efforts, coordinated
with the Federal interagency community, can provide the targeted
threat-specific training, equipment, exercises, and technical assist-
ance necessary to build the capacity of the Nation’s State and local
emergency responders.

The mission of OJP’s Office of State and Local Domestic Pre-
paredness Support is to assist State and local jurisdictions and en-
hance their capabilities to respond to incidents of domestic terror-
ism. Although the domestic preparedness is a relatively new focus
for OJP, we have a 30-year history of working with State and local
law enforcement and other officials. OJP will build on successful
partnership with three specific initiatives.

First, OJP, again as part of the coordinated DOJ and interagency
effort, is providing financial assistance to enable State and local ju-
risdictions to buy much-needed equipment. With funds appro-
priated for this purpose by Congress last year, we recently, for ex-
ample, made $12 million available to 41 local jurisdictions to assist
in the purchasing of personal protection, decontamination, detec-
tion, and other equipment to assist first responders.


122

In closing, I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee for
the opportunity to be here today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.


127

Question Number 4:

When the Department of Justice takes over the authority for the Domestic Preparedness Program
next year, is it OJP’s intention to run two almost identical programs out of the same office under
different names? Or will the two programs be merged after the transfer?

Answer:

The DOD Domestic Preparedness Program and the OJP Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency
Medical Services Program are two separate and distinct programs. As partially explained in the
responses to Questions Numbers 2 and 3, these programs involve different curricula and are
aimed at different types of emergency responders. Further, in the Justice Departments Fiscal
Year 1998 and Fiscal Year 1999 appropriations acts, OJP’s training initiatives have expanded
beyond the Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency Medical Services Program to include a
broad spectrum of training aimed at enhancing the capabilities of all state and local emergency
response personnel to respond to incidents of domestic terrorism involving chemical and
biological agents and nuclear, radiological, and explosive devices.

At this time, both OJP and DOD are in the initial phases of planning the integration of the DOD
Domestic Preparedness Program into the OJP domestic preparedness programs. As this is done,
both OJP and DOD are committed to ensuring that all these training efforts, beginning in Fiscal
Year 1999 are delivered in a complementary and not duplicative manner. Both DOD and OJP
consider the integration of the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program into OJP as an opportunity
to begin coordination of both training development and delivery at the earliest possible time.

Question Number 5:

Is it the Department of Justice’s intention to try to consolidate all first responder and
consequence management training courses, even those at FEMA, within OJP?

Answer:

Neither the Department of Justice, nor its component agency, the Office of Justice Programs
(OJP), intends to consolidate all first responder training courses within OJP. Although OJP is
DOI’s lead agency for the development and delivery of ali DOS first responder training, both the
Department and OJP recognize that other federal agencies, such as FEMA, also offer training to
first responders. It is DOJ’s (and OJP’s) intention that every effort be made to ensure that all
federal first responder training be coordinated to avoid duplication. The Department will also
‘work with other federal agencies, such as FEMA, to ensure that current and future training is
delivered to the first responder community in the most efficient and effective manner possible.
Indeed, the Department's commitment to ensure coordination of federal efforts is one of the


151

care. The hospitals are developing procedures to ensure that patients coming in would be
decontaminated before entering the facility where they would be treated for their exposures.
They are also developing procedures to determine which patients should remain in the hospital,
and which patients can and should be moved to facilities elsewhere in the city or in other cities
for care, if necessary. Through NDMS, DOD can evacuate these patients to VA and DOD-
managed NDMS Federal Coordinating Center areas across the country where participating non-
federal hospitals have NDMS beds available should patients need to be relocated out of an
affected area. In addition, our response team doctors, nurses and support staff can help relieve or
augment overburdened hospital staff.

Domestic Preparedness Program

As legislated, DHHS’ role in the Domestic Preparedness Program was the development
of Metropolitan Medical Strike Team systems. The purpose of these systems is to ensure that a
city’s health system is able to cope with the injuries and chaos that results from a terrorist act.
DHHS has contracted with 27 cities to date. Because each city has a public safety and public
health system with unique characteristics, the contracts we have awarded to the cities specify that
each city will develop an enhanced health and medical response system, within their current
emergency response structure. These Systems provide an integrated pre-hospital, hospital and
public health response capability to local metropolitan areas. Each system must ensure that
health workers be able to recognize a chemical injury, know the proper treatments (or know
‘where to get the information), be able to ensure that medical facilities do not become


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CONTENTS

Hearing held on October 2, 1998 .
Statement of:
Blitzer, Robert M., Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism
Planning ‘Section, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tiga ation, Department of Justice, accompanied by Michael J. Dalich,
Chief of Staff, Office of Justice Programs, Dey tment of Justice;
Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense; James ie berts, Prin-
cipal Director for Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Depart-
ment of Defense; and Robert Knouss, Director, Office of Emergency
Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services a
Davis, Richard, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security
and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, ac-
companied by Davi D'Agostino, Assistant Director, National Security
‘Analysis jis, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
General ‘Accounting Office; Larry C. Johnson, Berg Associates, former
Deputy Director, Office of Counterterrorism, Department of State;
Frank J. Cilluffo, senior analyst, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and Frederick H. Nesbitt, director of governmental affairs,
International Association of Fire Fighters ...
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record b
Blitzer, Robert’ M., “Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism
Planning Section, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, Dey a, Department of Justice, prepared statement of
Cilluffo, Frank J., senior analyst, Center for Strategic
Studies, Prepared statement of
Cragin, Charles L., Principal Dep Ly
Reserve Affairs, artment of Defense and James Q. Roberts, Prin-
cipal Director for Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Depart-
ment of Defense, pre repared statement of
Dalich, Michael J., Chief of Staff, Office of Justice Programs,
of Justice, prepared statement of .. am
Davis, Richard, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security
‘and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, pre-
pared statement of
Hastert, Hon, Dennis J.. a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, prepared statement of ..
Johnson, Larry C., Berg Associates, former Deputy Director, Office of
Counterterrorism, Department of State, prepared statement of ..
Knouss, Robert, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Department
of Health and Human Services, prepared statement of .
Nesbitt, Frederick H., director of governmental affairs, International As-
sociation of Fire Fighters, prepared statement of .

(qm)

Page
1

101

104
50

182
115


145

than the first response to a biological incident involving a weapon
of mass destruction.

Our responsibility in the Department of Health and Human
Services, and particularly in the Public Health Service, is to deal
with the health consequences and to assist to the extent that we
can to increase the capability of the local community to be able to
respond to the health affects of the release of a weapon of mass de-
struction. And I’ve brought a couple of posters along to illustrate

is.

Basically, what has been discussed today is primarily the re-
sponse to an incident involving a chemical release, and has been
expressed on many occasions, that the first response is going to be
from our law enforcement, or our fire personnel, or from the emer-
gency medical services personnel at the scene. What is next going
to happen is likely that a HAZMAT team is called in. But what is
going to be most important at that point is that we be able to deal
very rapidly with the health consequences of one of these chemical
incidents.

And what we are trying to do within the program and the sup-
port that we are providing to the cities, is to deal with those health
consequences through the creation of teams that have enhanced ca-
pability to deal with those medical affects of one of those events,
to be able to safely transport victims to a hospital, and to make
sure that the hospital personnel are able to decontaminate patients
and to adequately take care of those patients.

If those local hospital systems are overwhelmed, the National
Disaster Medical System is being prepared to be able to transport
people from the local community to regional or national institu-
tions, that can then provide for the definitive medical care of the
victims that are overwhelming local systems. And one of the things
that happened, for example in Tokyo when the saran gas attack oc-
curred in the subway, is that over 5,000 people overwhelmed the
local hospital system, whereas fewer than 1,000 were exposed.

Yd like to turn attention to the biological incidence, and that is,
there we have really a health response that’s required. Because ini-
tially, what one needs to have is a surveillance system that is going
to be able to detect that a pathogen has been released in the envi-
ronment; that there has been a biological incident that is occurring
and people are suffering because they've been infected by that
pathogen, and that we need to very quickly identify what that
pathogen is, and that’s through the public health laboratory sys-
te

m.

At that point, if we are dealing with an issue of small pox, or tu-
laremia, or anthrax, or plague, which are some of the most
daunting of the biological agents that might be used, then we need
to immediately respond with a system to provide for preventive
prophylaxis of the population against the affects of one of those bio-
logical agents; we need to deal with the consequences in our health
care system from mass care; and we need to, unfortunately, be pre-
pared to be able to deal with mass fatalities, and then eventually,
environmental cleanup.

Our contract program that we have launched with the 27 cities
that were the first Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cities, really has focused
on several things. It has not focused on duplicative responses, in


106

IMPACT OF THESE RESPONSES IS COSTLY AND DISRUPTIVE.

IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL DOMESTIC WMD THREAT, YOU HAVE
REQUESTED THAT | COMMENT ON THE THREAT TO THE U.S. FROM FOREIGN
TERRORISTS.

THE MAJOR EXTERNAL THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS OVERSEAS MAY
COME FROM A NUMBER OF STATE SPONSORS OR NON-ALIGNED TERRORISTS
‘WHO MAY HAVE ACCESS TO COUNTRIES WITH OFFENSIVE WMD PROGRAMS.
DOMESTICALLY, WE HAVE SEEN MINIMAL ACTIVITY FROM STATE SPONSORS
DIRECTED AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL U.S.

‘THE SOFTER TARGETS OF U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD IN EMBASSIES,
BUSINESSES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE AT GREATER RISK OF
ATTACK FROM BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, AND AS THE BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE
CENTER IN FEBRUARY 1993, KHOBAR TOWERS IN 1996, AND THE RECENT
‘TRAGEDIES IN EAST AFRICA ILLUSTRATE, THIS THREAT CONFRONTS BOTH
THE UNITED STATES DOMESTICALLY AND U.S. CITIZENS AND INTERESTS
ABROAD.

THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT CAN BE DIVIDED
INTO THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES, EACH OF WHICH POSES A SERIOUS AND
DISTINCT THREAT:


66

resources are inadequate to meet even this reasonable goal. If we want
emergency response personnel in these jurisdictions to be able to begin the
initial response to a terrorist incident, additional resources will have to be

allocated.

Terrorism Training Must be an On-Going Activity--The one-shot
approach of current federal programs misunderstands the nature of

emergency response work. The high rates of injury and early retirement
ages in the fire service means that there is a high degree of wrnover, and

a steady crop of fresh faces that must be trained each year.

Moreover, changes in terrorist and emergency response technologies
require constant upgrading of a fire fighter's knowledge. Periodic
refresher courses for those fire fighters who have received training should

be a staple of any terrorism response training program.

Terrorism Training Must at the Operations Level--Too often
terrorism training for fire fighters is limited to awareness level training.
This is completely inadequate for fire fighters who need to be able to both
recognize a terrorist incident and begin the initial defensive response to
the incident. Fire fighters cannot wait until some specialized
counterterrorism team reaches the scene when lives are at stake, With or

without adequate training, the fire department will begin the initial

response in an effort to save every life possible. Performing such work
without operations level training, however, jeopardizes both the fire
fighters and the public they seek to protect.


52

recent near simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa are clear reminders that
terrorists may strike when and where we least expect them to. By its very nature, terrorism
inherently extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society and terrorists often take the path of
least resistance. Furthermore, this approach merely displaces risk, and forces the terrorist, who is
ofien flexible, to select a “softer” target, in this case a city which did not receive the needed
training and equipment.

For these reasons, I think we must work toward achieving a nationwide baseline of common
policies, plans and procedures and resources— irrespective of resource rich or resource poor
environments. New York City, for example, has recognized the threat and has demonstrated the
urgency and leadership needed to accomplish what must get done--even at a cost politically
‘They took matters into their own hands. The same cannot be said, however, of other major
metropolitan cities. I was taken, by the way, with the remark made by the FBI in its comments
con the report that “even the best prepared cities do not always have the inherent capability to
manage the potential magnitude of a WMD incident.”

In order to prioritize and allocate resources and assets, a better approach in my eyes, might be to:
(1) require each of the 120 cities originally selected for the NLD program to develop their own
‘emergency response plans, including initial assessments aimed at identifying capability gaps and
resources shortfalls; (2) have the plans evaluated by the Department of Defense and other
entities, e.g., the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS); (3) undertake training and
exercising; (4) review lessons leamed from the exercises; and (5) loan equipment commensurate
with the needs identified from the exercise. One cannot overstate the enormous value of training
and exercising. Such activities not only go a long way in fostering a culture of cooperation but
also allow us to make the big mistakes on the practice-field as opposed to the battlefield or on
“Main Street, USA.”

This now leads me into my observations and recommendations regarding consequence
management.

Our program here at CSIS has, 1 hope, been helpful in raising awareness and identifying strategic
and tactical gaps and shortfalls. Over the past few years we have produced a number of reports,
some of which you are familiar with, and an interagency WMD simulation. Our resulting laundry
list for preparedness is quite long and expensive and continues to grow. It includes, among other
things, accelerated training; gaming and exercising; development and fielding of technology to
detect, identify, and contain chemical and biological agents; epidemiological enhancements
(unfortunately, with respect to biologicals, the “silent killers,” the first indication may be falling
bodies--as symptoms may take days or even weeks to manifest themselves); and improved
intelligence sharing between agencies at the federal level and timely dissemination to state and
local officials. It also includes leveraging advances in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries and providing them with incentives to research, develop and produce vaccines,
antidotes, and antibiotics that would ultimately be stockpiled.


173

I HOPE THAT OUR SPEAKERS WILL ADDRESS
THIS FUNDING AND EQUIPMENT ISSUE IN
THEIR TESTIMONY TODAY.

I AM ALSO INTERESTED IN A DISCUSSION ON
THE LEVEL OF ATTENTION BEING PAID TO
THE THREAT OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPON
TERRORISM.

THIS IS THE TYPE OF TERRORISM THAT WE
CONTINUE TO WITNESS MOST OFTEN
WORLD-WIDE AND DOMESTICALLY.

IN ADDITION, MOST EXPERTS PREDICT THAT
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL CONTINUE
TO BE THE PRIMARY MODE OF TERRORISM
WELL INTO THE FUTURE.

I HOPE OUR PANELISTS WILL ADDRESS THIS
CONCERN AS WELL.

ONCE AGAIN, I WISH TO THANK THE
CHAIRMAN FOR CONVENING THIS HEARING
AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THE TESTIMONY
OF OUR ASSEMBLED WITNESSES.

THANK YOU.


101

Knouss, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness is from the
Department of Health and Human Services.

Thank you all for coming and for your patience. Now that you're
all comfortably settled, would you please stand again? Raise your
right hands.

{Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SouDER. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in
the affirmative.

Mr. Blitzer, would you please proceed?

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT M. BLITZER, SECTION CHIEF, DO-
MESTIC TERRORISM/COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SEC-
TION, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED
BY MICHAEL J. DALICH, CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF JUS-
TICE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; CHARLES L.
CRAGIN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
JAMES Q. ROBERTS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR POLICY AND
MISSIONS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND ROBERT
KNOUSS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPARED-
NESS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Mr. BLITZER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barrett, staff.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today regarding the
FBI’s role in the preparedness of this Nation to deal with terror-
ism, including that which involves weapons of mass destruction.

This morning I will focus on three specific areas: First, the do-
mestic WMD threat and the threat posed to this country by inter-
national terrorists here. Second, I'll provide an overview of the cur-
rent interagency initiatives to establish a National Domestic Pre-

aredness Office. Finally, I'll comment on the Government Account-
ing Office report concerning the value of the threat and risk assess-
ments.

During the past 2 years we have responded, along with our crisis
and consequence management partners, to a growing number of do-
mestic ‘D threats and incidents. These incidents have been car-
ried out primarily by two categories of violators which we identify
as lone offenders and extremist elements of right-wing groups.

Typical lone offenders fit into one or more categories; for exam-
ple, those seeking revenge; those who are mentally unstable; those
who belong to violent extremist elements, usually splinters of those
elements, and those who intend to disrupt our Government activi-
ties and our emergency response modes through the use of pranks
or hoaxes.

Although most of the threats we’ve handled over the past 3 years
have proven not to have endangered the public safety, investiga-
tive, emergency and medical personnel respond seriously to each
and every incident. The impact of these responses is both costly
and disruptive.

The current international terrorist threat really can_be divided
into three general categories. I think Mr. Johnson’s definition was
quite on the money. I would only add to his description that, al-


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22

initial hours of an incident and because numerous support units within the military and
other federal agencies already can provide backup assistance to local authorities as
requested. Examples of existing support capabilities include the Army's Technical Escort
Unit, the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the Public
Health Services’ National Medical Response Teams.* State and local officials were more
supportive of the traditional National Guard role to provide requested disaster support
through the state governor. We are currently reviewing the proposed role of the National

Guard and reserves in WMD consequence management.

As noted in our December 1997 report’ and in our April 1998 testimony,’ the many and
increasing number of participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area
across the federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management and
coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. We believe
that the National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counter-Terrorism, established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision
Directive 62, should review and guide the growing federal training, equipment, and

response programs and activities.

"Fora more comprehensive overview of federal support capabilies, see Combating
(GAOMNSIAD-97-264, Sept

Management and Coosdination (GAOMNSIAD 9639, Dee. Cia.

“Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr.
1998).


105

NUMBER OF CREDIBLE THREATS AND INCIDENTS IN 1998 HAS SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASED OVER THOSE OF PREVIOUS YEARS.

IN 1997, WE INITIATED 68 NEW INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE USE OR
THREATENED USE OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL OR NUCLEAR
MATERIALS. AS OF SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, THE FBI HAS OPENED IN
EXCESS OF 86 SIMILAR INVESTIGATIONS.

WE HAVE RESPONDED TO ACTUAL INCIDENTS IN BOTH URBAN AND
RURAL AREAS; FROM CHARLOTTE TO LOS ANGELES, AND FROM MADISON TO.
DALLAS.

THE TYPICAL “LONE OFFENDERS” FIT INTO ONE OR MORE
CATEGORIES, SUCH AS:

1) THOSE SEEKING REVENGE FOR INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES OR VENDETTAS
AGAINST OTHER CITIZENS;

2) THOSE WHO ARE MENTALLY UNSTABLE;

3) THOSE WHO BELONG TO VIOLENT EXTREMIST ELEMENTS AND BELIEVE IN
THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT;

4) AND FINALLY THERE ARE THOSE WHOM WE CALL “DISRUPTERS,” WHOSE
INTENT IS TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT INTO AN “EMERGENCY RESPONSE
MODE” WITH PRANK WMD THREATS.

ALTHOUGH MANY OF THESE THREATS ULTIMATELY PROVE NOT TO
ENDANGER THE PUBLIC SAFETY, INVESTIGATIVE, EMERGENCY, AND MEDICAL
PERSONNEL RESPOND SERIOUSLY TO EACH AND EVERY INCIDENT. THE


162

Emergency Support Team, which has scientific people, and military
assets, and the rest. They get out to the scene within 4 hours. The
critical time is the first couple of hours though, and we all recog-
nize that. But those first few hours do extend, and it’s his job to
make sure those assets can get out there as quickly as possible.

It’s also his job to work very closely with the person from FEMA
who is the on-scene commander for consequence management folks.
And we look to him. That FBI SAC looks to that FEMA chief to
say, what do we do in terms of consequence management here?
One of the prior panelists very accurately described what happens;
it’s everything happens at once; it’s crisis, it’s consequence, it’s
medical.

I hope at the end of the day, after this program is mature, be-
cause it’s not mature right now, that we have the kind of system-
atic approach to whether it’s a big bomb, or a chem, or a bio—we
have the kind of systematic approach and assets that are needed
out there. It’s not there. We want to get it there. We’ve been work-
ing to et it there, but it’s not there.

ir. SOUDER. Mr. Knouss, I wonder, could you explain this a little
from FEMA's perspective? We had a question raised, which I’m
sure Mr. Blitzer will hope to get the best ide on the gray card
for cooperation possible from the FBI. Could you describe a little
bit from FEMA’s perspective how in real life this works, and when
you come in, who you check with. For example, in the Oklahoma
City bombing, what if there had been a time delay chemical that
was going to come after the first hit, and the population reacted
like it was conventional bomb and moved toward the site. Where
does FEMA come in and who does that kind of analysis of the situ-
ation?

Mr. Knouss. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me make sure that I
haven’t left the wrong impression. I work for the United States
Public Health Service. What I’m responsible for is the health and
medical portion of FEMA’s response plan. So from our perspective,
our responsibilities purely relate to how can we function best,
whether we’re supporting FEMA or whether we're supporting the
FBI from a technical assistance point of view, of dealing with the
health consequences of one of these incidents. We are responsible
for that, whether we’re dealing with a big bomb, or whether we’re
dealing with a chemical incident, or a biological incident.

Mr. Souber. In your chain, do you work through FEMA then, or
FBI, or some other agency?

Mr. KNouss. We really have uniquely here two responsibilities:
One is to support FEMA on the health and medical portions of the
response to an event if it actually occurs; we also have a respon-
sibility to the FBI in the law enforcement perspective of providing
technical assistance on what the nature of the threat is, and how
we might go about a threat reduction. So we’re playing on both
sides of the aisle, as it were, but primarily bringing a unique
health perspective to all of this.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Barrett, did you want to—we have a vote on—
do you want to ask another question? I heard a buzzer, and I just
assumed it was a vote.

Mr. BarRETT. I will ask a few questions though. Mr. Roberts, if
I may, Mr. Nesbitt from the firefighters group has stated that your


165

to us. If they need continued equipment for training we would ex-
pect that they would replenish it.

Mr. SoupeEr. But there’s no checking on that.

Mr. ROBERTS. No.

Mr. Souper. And the question of replenishing and repairing it
was theoretically to give it back to the Department of Defense?

Mr. RoBerts. No. The question of replenishing and repairing it
was so that they could continue training.

Mr. Souper. Because the intention of Congress—which is hard
for you to read, and hard for me to read—the implication in that
is that we intended in passing that bill, that if you accepted this
equipment, you were also accepting that you were going to main-
tain; not just use it up. That’s the implication.

Mr. Roperts. Actually, I think that the loan provision that’s in
the law probably was an idea that, if there were a major disaster,
DOD could loan equipment to a city to help them with the re-
sponse. As we started the training program, we said, this makes
no sense at all to go out and train a city, and then walk away with
all the training aids and leave them with nothing. You've got to
have suits, you’ve got to have detection devices, you’ve got to have
some minimal training stuff. And so, we took the loan provision
and used it to long term loan training equipment for training pur-
poses.

Mr. SoupeR. It strikes me that we need to sort through—I cer-
tainly agree that that’s the minimum expectation—that in the De-
partment of Justice, in the grant program when people apply now
and can apply for this followup equipment, do they have to dem-
onstrate that either they’ve been through a particular training pro-
gram, that they’ve had some of this equipment? In other words, is
there any correlation between what we've been doing in the train-
ing-specific and the grants that you’re providing?

ir. DALICH. We do have correlation on that. If they have not
been—we had rather an elaborate risk and threat assessment re-
quirement as to what they needed and what level of equipment
ey required. We chose the winners based on the ones that dem-
onstrated the most need through that process. Virtually all of them
already had been trained; on those few that had not, we provided
special conditions that before we ceded the grant, they had to go
through the training.

Mr. SOUDER. Could you explain to me what you meant by threat
assessment?

Mr. DaLicu. I don’t think it’s in the same sense as we were talk-

earlier—the Exxon model, and that kind of thing. But it was
a look at what their threat was, and where they were to be able
to respond to the threat, and the kind of equipment that they
thought that they needed, and what they currently had on hand to
be able to respond to that. And then we used that criteria for rat-
ing and ranking the applications to determine which ones out of
the mix were going to get the awards.

Mr. Souper. I don’t think we've specifically said in the record,
although Mr. Blitzer made a reference to the GAO, that the Exxon
model you just mentioned is a way that they determined, in a given
area, the risks to their employees. And the question is, should we


169

where you have the organizations coming in and targeting U.S. citi-
zens. I work in a Federal building, my staff in Indiana works in
a Federal building, we had a shooting just recently in the Capitol
building. We clearly could be targets. I don’t want to minimize
that.

It’s also the FBI’s responsibility to enforce very difficult laws
when individuals don’t want to pay their income taxes, when they
don’t want to obey the gun laws, and various things that we’ve
seen, whether it be Waco, or Weaver, or the different types of cele-
brated cases, whether they be lone wolves or working in a group
for the Oklahoma City bombing.

At the same time, we have to be very careful that we don’t actu-
ally precipitate the groups becoming more aggressive, as happened
in the 1960’s from the left, or currently from the right. And also
be careful of individual liberties, because we can breed a paranoia
that in actuality, leads to more problems than we currently have,
because they argue in terms of self defense when they’re not nec-
essarily the most balanced individuals to start with.

And so I just want to say that, because many of us who are very
supportive of the antiterrorism efforts, are also concerned about
that. You bear a tremendous responsibility in trying to sort that
through.

Mr. Bitzer. I agree with you completely. I couldn’t agree with
you more. And this particularly holds true when we have to con-
sider opening a domestic intelligence case on U.S. persons. And of
course, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we work very closely within
the Attorney General’s guidelines and we're awfully sensitive to the
same concerns that you’ve expressed here today.

Mr. SoupeER. I have a question from Mr. Gilman, who couldn’t be
here. Did the FBI Director provide Chairman Hal Rogers his
antiterrorism budgetary needs? And, if so, can a copy be provided
for us as well?

Mr. BLITZER. Yes, he did. He did provide Chairman Rogers that
information, and I’ll be glad to furnish that to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SoupDER. Thank you. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BarRETT. In closing, I just want to thank all of you for being
here. You obviously all have important jobs and take it very re-
sponsibly, and just to let you know that I appreciate the work you
are doing for the people in this country. Thank you, and I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SouDER. We could probably stay here a couple more hours,
but I think you all are tired, the audience is tired, and we'll cer-
tainly be doing followup hearings. I thank you very much for your
patience and your willingness, and we'll leave the record open for
additional materials. Will you respond to some written questions,
if some come up directly on today’s topics?

(Witnesses all responded affirmatively to the Chair’s question re-
garding responding to additional written questions.]

Mr. SoupER. Thank you very much. With that, the committee
stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to
the call of the Chair.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]


34

out attacks during the period 1990-97. For several of these groups,
‘American citizens were incidental rather than primary targets. However,
there are many groups that have targeted, and continue to target, Americans.
Principal among these is the organization, Al-Qaida, headed by Osama Bin
Ladin, The question mark beside Bin Ladin indicates several attacks where
his involvement was suspected or has only recently been identified. Let me
emphasize that he is not simply the scapegoat of the moment, rather he has
deliberately encouraged, supported, and planned for attacks against US.
targets.

8. The nature of the threat posed by Bin Ladin is highlighted by my final chart,
number 8. | have calculated the number of killed and wounded by each
group and divided it by the number of attacks. Osama Bin Ladin and his
cronies on average have killed or wounded 125 people (this includes US
citizens and foreigners) per incident.

This data tells us where we have been. It does not tell us where we are
going, | disagree with recent declarations by President Clinton and Secretary
Albright that we are facing a “new terrorist war’. | do not recall that the United
States ever declared a truce with terrorism and would note that we have been
fighting this threat for almost thirty years. Terrorism is not spiraling out of contro!
but neither has it disappeared. We should not exaggerate it but neither should
we ignore it. itis a threat that we must be continually prepared to confront.

We have had some important successes capturing and deterring terrorists.
Our experience over the past decade suggests instead that sound policies,
aggressive law enforcement, and good intelligence yield important results in
containing terrorism. Moreover, | believe there is circumstantial evidence that
groups and individuals that advocate terrorism are losing support rather than
winning adherents Consider Osama Bin Ladin’s fatwas that have called for
Muslims to rise up and attack US citizens and installations around the world. His
fatwa has fallen on deaf ears. It is one thing to make a threat another to put the


175

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUB-
COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE BY ATIF HARDEN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN MUSLIM COUNCIL

Good morning Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the committee.
PRONOUNCEMENT

I come before you today to pronounce that there need not to be a “clash of civilizations” between
Islam and the United States. Further, you should reject the McCarthy-like tactic used by some
unethical people of asserting that Islam, Muslims and American Muslim organizations endorse
terrorism. You are here today to discuss solutions to the problem of terrorism. The American
Muslim community shares your concer regarding this plague. As the Executive director of the
American Muslim Council I would like to propose a measure that may help remedy the problem.

But first I would like to talk about the American Muslim community and the recent bigotry that we
have had to endure concerning this question of terrorism. Mr. Chairman the American Muslim
population and its organizations pose no violent threat to the United States and our way of life.
‘Speaking as an American, | am weary of hearing and seeing Islam and Muslims portrayed as foreign
and different. We are cousins of Jews and Christians. We worship the same god, follow the
teachings of the same prophets, and believe in the same books. We are the all followers of
Abraham.

Islam is not new to our homeland. There is strong evidence that Muslims were trading with the
Americas before Columbus “discovered” the New World. Many more Muslims came in the holds
of slave ships. We literally helped build this nation. Our roots are deep in America, and as
immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, the sub-continent, Southeast Asia, and the Balkans
arrive, they continue to enrich us.

Mr. Chairman I can proudly say to you today that the Muslim community in America is the model
minority community in the United States. We are a value driven community that shares a faith that
is pro-family, pro-education, anti-racist, pro-business, law abiding, and anti-crime. There are no
Arab, Pakistani, Somalian, Senegalese or Indonesian ghettos in the United States. Muslims living
in disadvantaged communitys are often the lights of those community's, promoting family,
‘education, cleanliness, chastity, self-sufficiency, and zero tolerance towards drugs and the mental
slavery it produces. We are one of the best-educated groups in the nation, and have one of the
lowest crime rates. Because of our commitment to serve God and our country Muslim doctors,
lawyers, teachers, accountants, and businessman are serving in inner city and rural communities that
no one else in the country is attracted too,

Mr. Chairman, let me answer some questions for you and the committee.
Is terrorism a tenet of Islam? No!


115

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good aftemoon. My name is Michael J. Dalich, and I serve as Chief of Staff to the
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). In my capacity, I have
played an integral role in the development of OJP's newest office —- the Office for State and
Local Domestic Preparedness Support — and I continue to oversee this office’s efforts and play a
lead role in representing OJP’s interests within the Department of Justice's broader
‘counterterrorism and domestic preparedness initiatives. For much of this fiscal year,
considerable work has gone on to establish this new office, which officially became a part of OJP
on August 21, 1998.

On behalf of the Attorney General, and Assistant Attomey General for OJP Laurie
Robinson, it is my pleasure to be with you today to discuss OJP"s efforts to assist state and local
jurisdictions to enhance their capabilities to respond to incidents of domestic terrorism.

‘As the recent bombings at the embassies in Africa illustrate, acts of terrorism are very
much a part of today’s world. And, as past events in the United States illustrate — the World
‘Trade Center, Oklahoma City and others — these and similar acts can happen here. We all know
‘too well that the threat of a terrorist attack on America’s communities is a real one.

‘And what we also know is that if terrorist attacks occur in American communities, it will
be the ability of those communities to respond well that’s going to be critical to protecting lives,
‘and property and ensuring public safety. And if such incidents occur, it will be state and local
Jaw enforcement, fire and emergency medical service personnel, and state and local officials who
will be first on the scene and bear the initial, if not most of the burden and responsibility.


136

WMD attacks. Without such capabilities, mass confusion and lethal delays would very
likely result.

Based on the nature and scope of the terrorism consequence management mission,
two response task force (RTF) headquarters elements have been organized, validated, and
exercised within the United States Atlantic Command. They are drawn from elements of
the First and Fifth Army Staffs. These Joint headquarters elements may be deployed
under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Other military units, including chemical
and medical units (to include Nationat Guard and other Reserve components), could also
be attached to the RTF based on their capabilities and proximity to the incident site. The
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) of the Marine Corps and the U.S.
Army's Technical Escort Unit (TEU) are examples of consequence response capabilities.

‘The CBIRF is a standing, highly trained consequence management force tailored
for short notice response to terrorist initiated chemical and/or biological incidents. The
CBIRF provides an expert and robust decontamination capability that can augment other
response capabilities by being prepositioned or deployed for an incident in support of
consequence management. The CBIRF is fully integrated into the DoD response plan as.
an asset of the Unified Commander's Response Task Force.

‘The TEU provides worldwide escort, neutralization, disposal and emergency
response to toxic chemicals, munitions and other hazardous materials. The TEU
‘maintains a 24-hour a day on-call emergency response capability to respond to a chemical
or biological incident with personnel trained in chemical, biological and explosive
ordinance disposal operations to perform render safe procedures, damage limitation,
reconnaissance, recovery, sampling, mitigation, decontamination, transportation. It also
performs or recommends final disposition of weaponized and non-weaponized chemical
or biological materials and hazards encountered.

DoD also has a limited stockpile of medical supplies and protective gear, which
can be used in a WMD incidemt, upon approval of the Secretary of Defense. We are also
conducting research and development through the Counterterror Technical Support
Program and the Technical Support Working Group to develop personnel protection,
agent detection and identification equipment, and mitigation and decontamination
equipment for use by first responders.

This completes the broad policy overview and general description of the DoD
combating terrorism program. We will now discuss DoD’s actions to implement the
domestic emergency preparedness program mandated under the NLD legislation,

Several years ago, we saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and hoped for a safer
world. Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar saw the break-up of the Soviet Union as
precipitating a new and perhaps more dangerous threat - that Soviet WMD would flood
the global black market and land in the wrong hands. So they drafted, and Congress
enacted, the Nunn-Lugar legislation under which we participated with Russia in


117

as Irish Americans supported Catholics in Ireland. Just as Polish Americans supported solidarity.
Just as American Jews support Israel. Just as African-Americans supported the liberation struggles
in Africa and more specifically Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Muslims do nothing different than
any other sub group in our nation. We may support causes that are not always understood by the
public, but we are never in favor of injustice whether committed by non-Muslim or Muslims. And
‘we should not be persecuted for holding different political and policy beliefs.

POLICY

‘Mr. Chairman, under no circumstances, no matter how righteous the cause, can the taking of
innocent human life be justified. The politica! style of early Muslims was one where participants
aimed to persuade a wide audience to the spiritual, moral, and political superiority of their cause.
‘They were principled about methods and were willing to compromise and to move patiently from
‘one limited end to another. Political violence is now becoming theatre where the aim of the political
act is nothing more than the venting of outrage. The cowardly acts of terrorism can not drown out
the ultimate righteousness of a cause. It is important that we realize that the significance or
legitimacy of a cause is not diminished because of the actions of a few radicals. Every significant
movement in this country has been plagued by radical excess. The Independence Movement, the
Anti-slavery Movement, the Labor Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, the Anti-war
‘Movement, the Environmentalist Movement, the Animal Rights Movement, and now even the Anti-
abortion Movement. Terrorist acts ocour when groups or individuals feel ignored, marginalized and
inadequate facing a superior force. People’s tactics must be condemned, but their legitimate
grievances must still be addressed.

Mr. Chairman 1 would now like to recommend a policy position. I would like to suggest that in
order for us to effectively fight this problem of terrorism that we look closely not only at the effects
of this horrible problem, but also at its causes.

PROGRAM

‘Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like to recommend that the President and/or Congress establish a
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Terrorism. 1 know that congress has
proposed a committee on counter-terrorism, but that will only deal with the effects of the problem,
and will not address the root causes of the problem.

Mr. Chairman we have used this model quite effectively in the past, especially concerning matters
related to violence in our society. We have had the Warren Commission report that helped mute
much of the agitation the country felt after the Kennedy Assassination. We have also had the
Commission of the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the National Advisory Commission on
Civit Disorders, In both cases if we had heard the complaints and grievances of those who testified,
carlier, we probably would not have seen the violence we ended up enduring. Image how many
lives would have been saved if Timothy Mevee could have told us what was troubling him and
those like him. It is easy for people to condemn him and his like for the awful crime they
‘committed, but we have to still ask ourselves why his complaints and grievances couldn't have been.
addressed through our political system. Granted, some people are just criminal, but what harm
would it do us to establish dialogue with political dissidents. Lets talk to the Puerto Rican groups,
the Popular Liberation Army, MEK, Mexican Revolutionary Movement, American Front


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112

PROGRAM IS TO SUPPORT THE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT BY
INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL CRISIS AND
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT AGENCIES TO RESPOND TO ANY THREATS
AND/OR ACTS OF TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. THE FBIIS
CONFIDENT THAT THROUGH THE NDPO, IT CAN SUPPORT THIS MISSION.

10


16

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE 34:331-341 (1998)

A Multidimensional Evaluation of Fire Fighter
Training for Hazardous Materials Response:

First Results from the IAFF Program:

Alexander Cohen, pho

‘The International Association of Fire Fighters (/AFF) course on hazardous materials training
{for frst responders is described together with an evaluation plan that includes multiple levels,
‘of assessment. Trainee appraisals ofthe course, shifts in their ratings of task competencies,
{gains in knowledge quiz scores, and self-reports on actions reflecting lessons learned from the
‘course are among the measures used. Evaluations of courses given in several city fire
departments found more than 60% of trainee judgments of course quality and utility to be
highly favorable, along with significant posi-course improvements in their competency ratings
and quit scores. Follow-up interviews witk samples of trainees also suggested more
self-protective behaviors and preventive actions being taken with regard to alarms and risks
of hazardous materials exposures. However, cross-comparing the results for the various
‘evaluation measures gave only limited support to a popular evaluation model that
‘nypothesized that they would be interdependent. Limications in appreciating technical course
subjects, the value of add-on or refresher instruction, and variable risk experiences are noted
im explaining differences in some training results. Am. J. Ind. Med, 34:331-341,
1998. © 1998 Wiley-Liss, nc.

KEY WORDS: occupational safety training; fire fighters; hazardous materials exposures

INTRODUCTION

AAs frst responders 10 common alarms, fire fighters face

an increased risk of being exposed to hazardous materials

Sat maybe generated dict by afi, stored a the fir st,

cor spilled as a result of accidents during tansit This risk
to grow with the pr of

and other harmful agents found in our workplaces, communities

hazardous materials. As a consequence, their own safety as well
as that of others may be jeopardized. Events that underscore
these concerns have beea reported Table { summarizes some of

especially in areas where household chemicals may be
stored, similarly present risks for exposures to harmful
substances, In light of these concerns, training in responding
to hazardous materials incidents has become a priority for
firefighters as well a other emergency responders.

This anicle describes an evaluation of a training course
intended to educate fire fighters about procedures to sefe-
guard their health and safety when emergency calls involve

‘Orennat, io Cantact gat sponsor: Maton te for Occupation
‘Safety ond Hoan.
a: Alaner Cohen, 6782 Est Farmures Ore, Gren
nasa?
Aoceped Ag 1808

© 1998 Wiley-Liss, ne,

potential exposures to Its purposes are
threefold: first, to describe the course and an evaluation plan
designed to yield multiple measures ofthe course's effect on
trainees; second, to summarize data collected on the various
measures from courses ‘given to several city fire
eparments: and third, related to the second purpose, to
‘compare the evaluation data with expectations based on &
popular mode! of training evaluation criteria end outcomes.


28

This doesn’t mean that that’s going to stay the same in the fu-

ture, and as you look at it year by year, the countries change, but
ou're not looking at a situation where American citizens are being
it in 20, 30, 40 countries.

If we go to the next chart, No. 4, this shows the vast majority
of the attacks against Americans that involve casualties come from
two sources: either ambushes or bombs. The bombs are shown by
the red.

If we go to the next chart, chart No. 5, this was no intent—I'm
from the Midwest, as is Congressman Souder, and my intent is not
to say that there is a problem with Indianapolis. But what this
chart shows, it looks at the number of U.S. deaths in red from
international terrorism. The blue shows the number of foreigners
who have died in international terrorist attacks directed against
the United States. The green shows the number of people who have
been murdered in Indianapolis. There have been more people mur-
dered in Indianap in the last 6 years than have died, both for-
eigners and U.S. citizens, from international terrorism. I’m not
wanting to minimize the loss of life of either murder victims or vic-
tims of terrorism, but, again, we need to avoid the hysteria of pre-
tending that we’re besieged at every turn. That’s not the case.
What we saw, tragically, in both Tanzania and Kenya, where more
of the locals died from the anti-United States terrorist attack, that
has been the consistent pattern over time.

We go to the next chart, chart No. 6. This shows who has actu-
ally killed Americans, where the major loss of life has taken place
over the last 20 years. The largest loss of life from a terrorist at-
tack remains the 1983 assault on United States Marines in Beirut,
Lebanon, 241. In 1988, 198 Americans killed by the Government of
Libya in an attack on PanAm 103; in 1995, Oklahoma City, the at-
tack by Tim MeWVeigh and Terry Nichols.

Also, I've highlighted Tehran in 1996, the bombing of a United
States Embassy in 1983, the 1998 attack in Kenya, as well as in
1993 World Trade Center. These are the high profile incidents.
These are the areas where we've had the major loss of U.S. life.
But let’s pet it into perspective.

Chart No. 7, which you have, and I'll just briefly touch on it,
shows two Broups in particular that have been involved with at-
tacks against ericans, Sindera Luminoso, and the question
mark next to Osama Bin Ladin really should probably be relabeled
the Al-Qaida, but this is developing information that has been un-
folding this year, in part because of the effective work of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
But, we're not looking at hundreds of groups attacking us. It’s a
fairly well-defined threat.

If you look at chart No. 8, this shows exactly who’s killing Ameri-
cans, who’s killing foreigners. The red with Osama Bin Ladin
shows Osama has killed more Americans in terrorist attacks than
any other individual or group. I don’t think the FBI or the Central
Intelligence Agency are simply coming up with a convenient villain
of the moment. The fact is he’s killed more and he’s wounded more
than any other group. The rest of the chart speaks for itself.

Let me just conclude by saying, I think GAO is right on target
with pointing out the need to have one lead agency. As you walk



94

with your assets that are needed based on that training, that you
will get to a common baseline that can be applied elsewhere.

I think that exercising publicly serves as a pretty damn good de-
terrent in itself. If you demonstrate an ability to be able to re-
spond, it may stop one or two or three of these wackos from taking
the next step. I think that that shouldn’t be lost in the shuffle as
well.

Mr. SoupeR. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Nesbitt, you heard Mr. Johnson comment that
he thought that a good way to set up a program would be to have
contacts with the 50 Governors. I think in your testimony, your
written testimony at least, that you argued that a better place
would be to go right to the local government. Why don’t you let me
know so I can sort of flesh-out the decision there?

Mr. NEssitTrT. I guess our approach is pretty simple. The people
that I represent, who are the firefighters and the emergency medi-
cal personnel within the city, the local jurisdiction, when an inci-
dent occurs, we’re there in 4 minutes and we have to assess the
situation and begin some kind of operation. Our people need to
know what to do. They need training. They need equipment. They
need to be able to respond. In other services, like the State Emer-
gency Management, and the National Guard bringing in resources,
perhaps the military bringing in resources, but these resources
would come later.

One of the concerns we have is some of the DOD training that’s
gone on, there is an assumption that a certain level or certain
number or certain percentages of first responders will simply be as-
sumed casualties; that they'll just simply be wiped out until these
other resources get there, which, of course, is totally unacceptable
to us.

Our big problem, historically, Congressman, has been when the
Federal Government sends money down to the Governors, there’s
an administrative cost taken off and then the money comes down
to perhaps the counties, and then it comes down to the cities, and
there’s administrative cost, and a lot of meetings go on and a lot
of reports and a lot of paper and a lot of forests are wiped out. The
next thing you know, the people that I represent who ride on an
engine, respond to an alarm, and they are standing there confront-
ing a situation without the benefits of any training. They may have
gotten some equipment, but it may be equipment they don’t need;
they don’t know how to use it; the equipment isn’t maintained.
They're the ones who have to, one, initiate some kind of operation;
two, their lives are in jeopardy immediately; and, three, they’re try-
ing to protect the lives of the citizens they’re sworn to protect.

We can talk about international terrorists and all these things,
but when you look at Oklahoma City, you were talking about am-
monium nitrate. You look at a situation, an incident in Oregon, I
believe it was, where people sprayed salad bars in restaurants to
try to make people sick with botulism, so that they could affect the
outcome of a local election. You’re talking about the Una-bomber
who creates a certain hysteria, or simply—not simply, anthrax. We
had an incident in Washington, DC, where there was a package left
and we thought it was anthrax. We must respond to that.



9

The final topic I'd like to offer a few comments on is the need
for an overall strategy. Our reviews of various aspects of counter-
terrorism issues over the past few years have clearly demonstrated.
a need for government-wide priorities, and a well-conceived, over-
arching strategy for achieving a defined end-state. Such a strategy
could provide a roadmap for the $7 billion that is being spent on
counterterrorism programs annually. We see a growing number of
training programs and courses, multiple programs with equipment
segments, and more response units being formed.

ie Domestic Preparedness Program is one of many Federal pro-
grams among the growing list. Some local officials view the grow-
ing number of WMD consequent management training programs as
evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful approach toward
combating terrorism.

Similarly, multiple programs with equipment segments, such as
the separate DOD and Public Health Service programs and a new
Department of Justice equipment grant program, are causing frus-
tration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further
complaints that the Federal Government is unfocused and has no
coordinated plan or defined end-state for domestic preparedness.

As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 tes-
timony before this committee, the many and increasing number of
participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area
across the Federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a dif-
ficult management coordination challenge to avoid program dupli-
cation, fragmentation, and gaps. We believe that the National Se-
curity Council’s National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counterterrorism, established in May 1998 by Pres-
idential Decision Directive 62, should review and guide the growing
Federal training equipment and response programs and activities.
We understand that the National Coordinator recently has formed
several senior management groups and related subgroups to coordi-
nate the growing number of Federal WMD consequence manage-
ment training equipment and response programs.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my remarks. We'll be prepared to
answer any questions that you may have.

{The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]


17

332 Cohen

TABLE Select incidents Where Fire Fighters Were Kiled or Injured
trom Exposures to Hazardous Materials

Fee gua n Kingman, Azra responded oat ona 3,000-pton
‘tank care that was reading ul petrol pus ta strap faity
“Though here was no rato intermediate wy oe beTng
tanker, te fre Agta on te scene ook un hse pistons to apni
‘waar on the bring tak ce The volume of wae impinging on
er space ofthe bring an cay, cased «iguléecanceg vapor
epsinreuting he geno 12 re tars

Fre gts Aut, nina, wre summons to a etal ping ty
‘wherever plant workers had bean overcome by myarogen cyan
‘umes we cleaning a meta pang tank wou ny repeat protc-
‘bon. Te fre gts, wearing stale ching and se-cantaned
‘rating apart, removed te tins. The yrogen cynic apar
rouced nthe tank permeated the exposed skin lhe eer and
‘contamiated ter protective ng ands paces tem eae sk
tones chemical hazard

efter tom Feces Cau, Ven responce tora acient
Inviving an veranda ater. wife grants pow was
soing tom the camaged cantar nthe area arone be ale. Fee
‘eparment members wore suture ging cng res-quarer
lengn boos and cemane.ype beating appar. Wibod owing
eu! the traler contents the igtars removed he camaed rus nd
grea thse tat ware ntact. nding 0, ey began a compl ot a
ing sersaton and the wrists and anes. Upon removing ter
loves ane buts, several ee tre were fou twee and second
dere tars eased by expanse to som mSroxde,

ns Angles, Cf fire pars were called to We aa wares
‘owned by 2 research copraon Numerous fammaol,coresie and
‘mace compound were sore nthe bulking ane runs of chemicals
‘em.es dung the ae. A coud ft Smoke developed and spread
doen more tan one-th ot ameFee ters aswel as police
sumsaned tote scene wer sujet obo baton an ret sn
erposare hazards tram chemical preset at water. Tee posce
dst ee gars were hasta for apparent ects abiy,
catches, cae Dives, naa and mary os rom snc alton
nt tne chemical exposure read t eden. Se heath r=
le prt fr eet one yar are.

Fre toners in Geneson Fal, New Yar, responded oon aba can-
‘aring a rum ola chemi. Fry-ane people, most re
‘ers, were sent othe hapa tr breating cotinine oka
‘fumes, tyne students aa local coal were aso eps, ac
‘sere headaches and stomach problns.

ESSENCE OF THE TRAINING COURSE

‘The course “Hazardous Materials Training for First
Responders” was developed by the International Associ
tion of Fire Fighters (AFF) Hazardous Materials Training

‘The IAFF is one of several groups offering such
‘waining 10 emergency responders and has done so in two

ways. One is by dispensing packages of course manuals and
materials to persons already serving as instructors in the
field. The second is by providing direct onsite training to fire
fighters and others who have emergency responder roles in
loca! fire departments. In this case, specially trained IAFF
instructors present the course. This evaluation report deals
‘with first results from the latter type of LAFF training.

‘Consistent with objectives set forth by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (1989} and the National
Fire Protection Association (1992), the IAFF hazardous
materials course for first responders emphasizes hazard
awareness, self-protective and preventive measures, and
defensive roles, Actions to neutralize or clean up a hazard
‘ous materials event are left to HAZMAT teams with more
advanced training and equipment. The IAFF course covers
the following four units of subject matter:

Unit 1: Common alarms. Explains the need for recog-
siring material hazards in common alarms; notes material
hazards likely to be found at select locations and industry
sites

Unit 2: Health and safety. Deseribes toxic substances,
routes of entry into the body, health effects and the
importance of medical surveillance

Unie 3: Hazardous materials. Depicts placards, le
bels, cargo container shapes for identifying hazardous
materials; demonswates how chemical properties can affect
reactivity

Unit 4: The planned response. Explains limits of
structural fie Sighting gear, use of self-contained breathing
appararus (SCBA), other personal protective equipment
(PPE), and decontamination methods; defines zones in
‘managing hazardous materials incidents, and pre-incident
surveys lo identify high-risk sites,

“The course is designed to be taught in 24-h class hours,
usually arranged as three 8-h class days, and led by two
IAFF inscuctors. Class sizes cannot exceed 30 trainees, and
tos multiple classes have to be formed in departments to
cover the numbers normally scheduled to attend. Given
limited means to provide backup to those attending classes.
the 3 days of training for any one class may have to be
stretched over weeks as opposed to being taken on succes-
sive days. Completion of the three training days for classes
in some departments supplying data for this evaluation
report took as much as 6-8 weeks (Table TI). This extended
time period can also necessitate using other than the same
‘wo LAFF instructors to cover clases.

Deusls on IAFF trainer qualifications, teaching tech-
niques, course materials, are available from the TAFF
{eddress: 1780 New York Aveave, Washington, DC 20006).
Requests for IAFF training courses should be addressed to
heir offices.


338 Cohen

‘TABLE Vil, Trainee Responses to Questions on IAFF Course impact

‘metornsie
ra Tex Cty Wei yt Wirt cy 2
recta pend traning on 57%: ts to update, crease 18% aed tars in procedures 39%: eats made fo reve, update
‘parent SOPs rage of SOP mre stom nating formalin raters
se approaches fo HAZMAT uta noled na spece scl on BBM: art how
tome ‘soPe =
49% orton
‘ct of ret remponder rang on 77K: grata arenas of chemical 39%: aon ng up scene OK: mee cauten sng up scene
fleneamand at ‘zarés cal ng up scone bef tag act: check fr ‘eto tkng art; nor use ot
‘afore tking actor; more abor- agent tat may pose ‘SOA and PPE washngkieanng
‘ae ngtenahing needs ‘30%: no eee 17%: no eect
23%: poet 2 ou respore
[Bcf fet respec tring on 94%: mor eof SCBA cargo pat> BEV me USE SCBA sb st > BON: gale awareness aks bout
‘wow om ‘wna rroces choca or check on haar mats cats wih mapect materi more
get properties bate taking ‘super needs rte 0 of SBA; mere requet gear
too 188: none ed ‘ezataninaton
oo eect 11%: meet
Cormac offre spond raning 71%: mor conning of SCBA ‘0: reter seo Soman "Te: cargo cater sapeslacaris
told emperence ‘coum alan; eernce sources common alarms cance or b= —_cedca o gryaRs
checked on agent azar; actions tatons of PE alma aa (hing ar came vse con-

{aten wii agent area unt
WADMAT eam aries
29%: pone read

ceric storage st defense trl spread of reical gents wh
measures hang ad ‘SCA ly Spgs, an washed
ots er we

‘0%: none recated 20%: ne read

Even measures of competeacy and knowledge show signifi-
‘cant association in only a few instances and correlations
‘between these measures and behavior are fewer still.

DISCUSSION
First results from

the IAFF mate:

than others, and course time devoted to this area may not be
sufficient to ensure compreheosion. In i ideas
for dealing with this topic, [AFF instructors have developed
‘many novel laboratory-type demonstrations, enabling the
trainees to witness examples of various chemical reactions.
Bu the uainees may be viewing thete effects as no more

than exotic Farther use of exercises 10
Satna eeeaages ofa der bppeas Positive. size how such ‘could and have affected the
high in quality and utility, and judge themselves more {arn mes of hazardous materiels events would appear

exposure
two in the level of knowledge post training, and trainees
report more self-protective and preventive actions based on
‘course learning. Lastly, and though still fragmented, there
are indications of institutional changes which seem due in
part othe trainees’ learning experience.

While overall, the aforementioned results
‘also reveal variable effects in some cases which deserve
‘comment or explanation. In doing so, issues are raised not
only to this IAFF course but to others having similar

‘While competency shifts for all departments suggested
improved capabilities, the shifts shown for some depart-
iments were greater than found in others. As already men-
tioned, these results may simply be a case of those with the
poorer ratings a the outetof the course catching up withthe

objectives. For example, “Physical of Chemi-
cals," were ranked lowest in the quality and utility ratings
‘given to various course topics, and also showed lesser shifts
in related task competency. This mubject ix more technical

3 days of instruction, with some classes having 3- to 4-week
intervals the units of i ‘and taught by
different instructors. By contrast, other department training
‘techedules were more compact and used the same instructors
‘thoughout,


5

have received under the program. The General Accounting Office,
however, has raised a number of questions about the planning and
execution of our Federal effort to manage the consequences of a ter-
rorist attack.

At the most fundamental level, GAO concludes that the effort is
not guided by an overarching strategy to reach defined goals. GAO
also contends that we are seeing wasteful and inefficient duplica-
tion of effort in our Domestic Preparedness Program and the bene-
ficiaries of our local programs, local governments, are not getting
the guidance they need to make use of scarce resources.

Given the stakes and importance of this program, these criti-
cisms are cause for concern. I look forward to hearing from all of
our witnesses, and I thank you again for preparing and providing
your testimony.

Mr. Souper. Thank you, Mr. Barrett.

A large and diverse number of witnesses will testify before us
today. We have asked them to address a wide variety of issues re-
garding both policy and implementation.

Our first panel is composed of Government auditors, outside ex-
perts, and an advocacy group who will present their insights into
the program to the subcommittee.

The second panel is composed of officials from the executive
branch who will discuss implementation and status of the program.

On our first panel we have Mr. Richard Davis, director of Na-
tional Security Analysis for the U.S. General Accounting Office,
and with him is Davi D’Agostino, Assistant Director of that office.
Mr. Larry Johnson is former Deputy Director of the Office of
Counterterrorism, Department of State, and Mr. Frank Cilluffo is
the senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Mr. Frederick Nesbitt is the director of government affairs
at the International Association of Firefighters, who are, obviously,
going to be involved in any incident anywhere in the United States.

We thank you all for coming today, and in accordance with the
many rules we swear-in all of our witnesses. So would you please
all stand and raise your right hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SoupeER. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in
the affirmative.

Mr. Davis, the GAO’s work in this area has been very thorough
and we appreciate your efforts and have enjoyed both meeting with
you in the hearings and behind the scenes in your report. Will you
proceed?


lll

‘THE PROPOSED NATIONAL OFFICE ARE BEING DEVELOPED IN THE
INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT | COMMENT ON THE VALUE
OF CONDUCTING THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR CITIES OR
DESIGNATED GEOGRAPHIC AREAS PRIOR TO PROVIDING TRAINING AND
EQUIPMENT LOANS.

‘THE FBI'S RESPONSE LETTER OF MARCH 4, 1998 TO MR, DAVIS
PROVIDES OUR POSITION ON THE THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT ISSUE. IN
BRIEF, THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS WILL ADD VALUE TO THE OVERALL
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORT. WE THINK THAT A PILOT PROJECT TO
TEST THE THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESSES SHOULD BE DONE.

IN THAT REGARD, MY STAFF AND | HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH A
PRIVATE CORPORATION RECOMMENDED BY GAO, AND ARE EVALUATING THE
SPECIFIC THREAT AND RISK MODEL UTILIZED BY THAT COMPANY.

IN THE NEAR FUTURE WE WILL ATTEMPT TO ADAPT AND TEST THIS
MODEL FOR USE IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCAL AREAS. ALSO, IN
ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL , STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, WE
INTEND TO EXPLORE EXISTING THREAT AND RISK METHODOLOGIES THAT
MAY BE HELPFUL IN BETTER DETERMINING THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS OF OUR FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY ACROSS THE
NATION.

‘THE MISSION OF THE FBI'S COUNTERTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS


81

336 Cohen

“ oo
Mean Percent Correct
&] Pre-course ll Post-Course
Fig 1. Pre rpost-qu scares by departure on inttona Assocation of Fe Fgh (AF) Training Course

‘TABLE V. AFF Training Resuts: Comparison of Pre, Post, and
Folow-up Course Quiz Rests in Three Departments

fects Paste
precoune tolon-ap

had affected their behaviors or that of theit peers in
responding to alarms. Responses to these questions gained
from interviews in three departments (WVA!, WVA2, TX)
aze among those summarized in Table VIL Positive answers
in two departments (WVA2, TX) appear to outnumber those
shown for a third department (WVA1), especially with
regards to linking personal actions in the field with course

Pre Pes Felon (noni (ant
cour cours teat)
#3 ms no MSs
rr
v3 m7 ome ke

8. Excerpts from all three include greater use of
‘SCBAs in responding to common alarms, checking refer-
ence guides 10 identify potentially hazardous chemicals
ves responding eal ining sons defeasive

strange odors, unknown spilled materials, or other poten-
tial chemical releases,

‘Those specific to the different departments were:
© Conducting site visits for pre-planning for potential

response in case of an alarm) to ensure accuracy, complete-
‘ness (IL City)
© Discussing with others on shift, responses to calls involv-
‘ing hazardous materials and lessons learned (FL City, AL
Gin, TX City)
Giving further substance to these actions were trainee
answers to questions describing if and how course lessons

‘while awaiting the HAZMAT team, and
Saning pemona rote ‘equipment more frequently

Institutional Change

{In the post-course interviews described above, trainees
were also asked:

‘What effect, if any, has this first responders training had
‘on your department's standard operating practices
(SOPs)?

‘What effect, if any, has this ist responders training had
‘on officers and command staff within your depart-
meat?

Responses to these questions for three departments are
found in Table VIL.

Interview data of trinces in two departments (WVA2,
TH) suggest a greater effect than that found in the third


107

THE FIRST CATEGORY, IS STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM, WHICH
VIOLATES EVERY CONVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. STATE SPONSORS
OF TERRORISM INCLUDE IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SUDAN, LIBYA, CUBA, AND
NORTH KOREA. PUT SIMPLY, THESE NATIONS VIEW TERRORISM AS A TOOL
OF FOREIGN POLICY.

‘THE SECOND CATEGORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
1S MADE UP OF FORMALIZED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE
LEBANESE HIZBALLAH, THE EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA’ AL-ISLAMIYYA, AND THE
PALESTINIAN HAMAS.

THESE AUTONOMOUS, GENERALLY TRANSNATIONAL, ORGANIZATIONS
HAVE THEIR OWN INFRASTRUCTURES, PERSONNEL, FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS, AND TRAINING FACILITIES. THEY ARE ABLE TO PLAN AND
MOUNT TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS ON AN INTERNATIONAL BASIS, AND THEY
ACTIVELY SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE THIRD CATEGORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
‘STEMS FROM LOOSELY AFFILIATED EXTREMISTS - CHARACTERIZED BY
ROGUE TERRORISTS SUCH AS RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF AND INTERNATIONAL
‘TERRORIST FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADIN.

THESE LOOSELY AFFILIATED EXTREMISTS MAY POSE THE MOST
URGENT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE GROUPS ARE OFTEN
ORGANIZED ON AN AD-HOC, TEMPORARY BASIS, MAKING THEM DIFFICULT

FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO INFILTRATE OR TRACK. THEY ALSO CAN


92

Mr. Souper. In a similar vein, as we move in the subject of the
training along with the equipment, how confident are you that the
train-the-trainer techniques currently being employed will provide
adequate expertise? We heard some skepticism earlier from Mr.
Nesbitt. Do you think the training and technical expertise cur-
rently provided should be repeated? More targeted? How would you
address that?

Mr. Davis. I think that what we heard from the people that we
talked to is that there was some unevenness in terms of training.
One of the principal points that I’d like to leave with you today is
the fact that we thought it was important that they really should
try to institutionalize the training and build on the training insti-
tutions that already exist in most of the States within the United
States. That gets at the issue raised by DOD—you have people that
are qualified to do the training. I think one of the other panelists
this morning talked about refresher training and things of that na-
ture. Once it’s institutionalized, then it'll be easier to do this re-
fresher training.

The other observation we heard was that sometimes some of the
people who were showing up at the training programs, the people
who were supposed to pass on the training, were not necessarily
the people that you would hand-pick, nor necessarily were they the
best trainers to provide follow-on training to the rest of the people.

Mr. SoupDER. I want to ask a question about the proliferation of
rapid response teams, and then I want to relate it back to the ques-
tion and ask each of you to comment, if you will.

We have the training of the first responders, and the Federal
Government has significant capabilities and assets to respond to
major events. There’s the Army Technical Escort Unit, the Marine
Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the Public
Health Service Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams. The Depart-
ment of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency also
have quick response capabilities. Furthermore, the National Guard
is establishing 10 rapid assessment and initial detection units, and
the Department of Defense is trying to figure out how to involve
reserve units as part of the Multi-Agency Chemical Biological
Rapid Reaction Team.

nitially, it’s good to have a lot of activity and a lot of training,
but when we get a hot area like this, this happens. I've worked a
lot in the drug areas where they have every single agency. It’s
partly how Congress has structured it. Everybody wants a piece of
the action. GAO has made that point; I agree with that point as
well. It’s partly that agencies, as referred to earlier, realize that
this is the way to get their budgets up and to hold their budgets
up. But, a fundamental question we have to look at, if, indeed,
budgets are relatively tight and we’re not sure of what risk we're
actually at, given other types of risks we’re facing in our society in
a zero-sum game—for example, Mr. Johnson, what can a Technical
Escort Unit do that a Marine Incident Response Force can’t do, and
vice versa? Does it make sense to have both?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, it doesn’t. But what has happened in the slic-
ing of the salami is the emergence of the terms “crisis manage-
ment” versus “consequence management.” So the way it’s been di-
vided up is that the TEU, the Technical Escort Unit, will handle


60

developed in recent years, we have only just begun the process of
assuring that our Nation’s emergency response personnel are ade-
quately trained.

Second, the one-shot approach of the current Federal programs
misunderstands the nature of emergency response work. Fire de-
partments have a high level of turnover, and we must continue to
train new people each and every year. An approach where you go
in and do one training and say, “This fire department is trained”
will not work. There needs to be periodic refresher courses for
those firefighters who have already been trained as a staple of any
terrorism response training program.

Third, too often, terrorism training for firefighters is limited to
awareness-level training. This is completely inadequate for fire-
fighters who need to be able to both recognize a terrorist incident
and begin the initial defensive response to that incident.

Fourth, Federal programs are often designed to filter down
through various governmental bodies in layers of bureaucracy. The
IAFF recommends that funding for terrorism emergency response
training be provided directly to fire departments, or to organiza-
tions that provide direct training to firefighters.

Fifth, our experience in the field of hazardous material has
shown that the most effective training takes place in the locality
where the firefighters work, using their own equipment, the geog-
raphy, and the structure as part of that training exercise. Training
must be hands-on and must utilize situational exercises. No lec-
ture, slide show, or book can ever be as effective a training exercise
simulating a response in one community. It is generally more cost-
efficient to send trainers into a community than it is to send fire-
fighters to some remote training facility.

Sixth, firefighters have a unique culture and language. The suc-
cess of the IAFF training program is due to the fact that we have
a cadre of highly qualified firefighter trainers who travel the Na-
tion training their colleagues with a program that is specifically
tailored for firefighters. Real-world emergency response does not
take place in a vacuum, so it makes little sense to train firefighters
as if they are isolated from their environment. The IAFF believes
the most efficient way to ensure coordination and interoperability
is to conduct joint training exercises as a part of any counter-
terrorism preparedness. Specialized equipment is a staple of terror-
ism emergency response work, and firefighters must be adequately
trained in the use of such equipment.

The final general comment I wish to make about the Federal
Government’s counterterrorism training program concerns the
array of Federal agencies that have undertaken some sort of
counterterrorism activity in the last couple of years.

We recommend that the Congress or the administration identify
a single national agency to serve as a clearinghouse and coordina-
tor of the various programs. We believe that FEMA would be the
most appropriate agency to assume this role. The agency could
serve as a central contact point for all fire departments involved in
terrorism emergency response training, thereby eliminating waste-
ful duplication and confusion among various agencies.

At this point, I’d like to turn my attention to the Department of
Defense Terrorism Training Program, which we understand to be


56

antibiotics, as there is no true market for them (and hopefully never will be) and the
return on investment is limited. This must incorporate producing vaccines for known
toxins and agents, as well as devoting research toward unknown or “designer” toxins
or agents including strains for which there currently are no vaccines.

2. Any stockpiling initiative must be part of a larger systems prevention and response
process including research; detection (indications and warning), epidemiological
surveillance and symptom recognition; and administering aid. An integral part of this
process requires sustaining long-term R&D efforts such as accelerated strategic and
tactical sensor development to provide early warning (for example, on the tactical
side, the first responder community needs access to cheap, hand-held devices, with
low false alarm rates to identify potential agents or toxins') and training EMT’s and
primary care physicians in symptom recognition which would ultimately be
disseminated between hospitals at the local, state, and federal levels.

(2) Are there any departments, agencies or bureaus that you believe should not have
any terrorism-related missions?

‘Among the contemporary challenges for U.S. antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts is
that terrorism inherently extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society and that the
terrorist often takes the path of least resistance striking when and where you least expect
them to. The “changing face in terrorism” and the increasing terrorist use of advanced
technologies (to obtain information, plan attacks, protect their information, and conduct
attacks) necessitates the involvement of agencies which traditionally have not had a role
in antiterrorism and counterterrorism to feed into the overall process and to sit at the
national policy-planning table. For example, with respect to weapons of mass destruction
terrorism or information assurance and critical infrastructure protection certain agencies
possess unique skills, capabilities, assets and experience (which support their core
missions) that could take generations to re-engineer. Furthermore, while U.S. persons
and property have always served as a “lightening rod” for terrorist activity abroad, there
is increasing recognition that the terrorist threat within the continental United States is
very real - whether committed by foreign or domestic perpetrators. This too prescribes
additional agencies, especially state and local, also play a major role in preventing,
deterring, managing the consequences of, and responding to terrorist attacks. (Along
these lines I would like to submit for the record an op-ed I co-authored with a
Washington D.C. Battalion Chief on the role of the first responders.)

‘The greatest challenge from my perspective is not only determining which departments or
agencies should or should not have a terrorism-related mission, but also assuring
effective coordination between the many federal, state and local departments and
agencies. There is no question in my mind that coordination can be improved. While I
think its premature to gauge the effectiveness at this stage, pethaps the recently created

' The Department of Energy's “Felix” is an example of one such exciting new
development,


18

mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain the equipment. At least two cities
were reluctant to accept the equipment unless DOD would provide assurances that they
could be use it operationally and would not be asked to return it. Although such
assurances conflict with the loan agreement terms, DOD officials acknowledged that
cities could keep the equipment and use it operationally if necessary. DOD officials also
pointed out that much of the equipment has no more than a 5-year useful life and is

largely incompatible with standard military-specification equipment.

Further, expectations have been raised among some local officials that the federal
government may eventually provide funds to sustain the program and to provide even
more equipment to meet cities' perceived operational requirements. DOD officials said
that the equipment was intended only to support cities’ training needs. Also, DOD wanted
to encourage cities to share the burden of preparing for WMD terrorism by funding
additional equipment needs themselves. However, no assessments have been undertaken
as part of the Domestic Preparedness Program to help define equipment requirements for
WMD over and above what is needed for an industrial hazardous materials incident
response. Although the FBI and the intelligence community see growing interest in WMD
by groups and individuals of concer, the intelligence community concluded that
conventional weapons will continue to be the most likely form of terrorist attack over the
next decade. Such threat information would be a factor in a threat or risk assessment

process that could be used as a tool for determining equipment requirements.


AT

nally selected for the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici Program to develop
their own emergency response plans—they know their cities better
than the Feds—including initial assessments aimed at identifyin,
capability gaps and resource shortfalls. Two, have those plans ewale
uated by the Department of Defense and other entities, such as the
National Disaster Medical System and the Department of Justice.
Three, undertake the training and exercising. Four, review the les-
sons learned from those exercises, and five, loan equipment com-
mensurate with the needs identified from those exercises—not by
filling laundry lists elsewhere, but directly coming from those exer-
cises.

I don’t think you can overstate the enormous value of training
and exercising. Such activities not only go a long way in fostering
this culture of cooperation, but also allow us to make the big mis-
takes on the Practice fields as opposed to the battlefields or on
Main Street, USA.

This now leads me into my observations and recommendations
regarding consequence management. Our program here at CSIS
has, at least I hope, been helpful in raising awareness and identify-
ing strategic and tactical gaps and shortfalls. Over the past few
years, we have produced a number of reports, some of which you
are undoubtedly familiar with, and an interagency WMD simula-
tion.

Our laundry list for preparedness is quite long and expensive,
and I might add, continues to grow. That includes, among other
things, accelerated training, gaming, exercising, development in
fielding of technology to detect, identify, and contain chemical and
biological agents; epidemiological enhancements, especially with re-
spect to the biologicals, the so-called silent killers, since the first
indication in many cases will be the fallen bodies, as symptoms
may take days or even weeks to manifest themselves, and improve
intelligence sharing between agencies at the Federal level, and ulti-
mately, timely dissemination to officials at the State and local
level.

It also includes leveraging advances in the bio-technology and
the pharmaceutical industries—they’re the ones who are lightyears
ahead of the Government—and providing them with incentives to
research, develop, and produce vaccines, antidotes, and antibiotics,
which would ultimately be stockpiled, maybe on a rotating basis—
we may not go overboard.

A central theme of the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici legislation was that
detecting and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction is
not always possible. No matter how robust our intelligence capa-
bilities, we simply will not provide early warnings of all events.
Therefore, managing the consequences, mitigating damage, and
minimizing loss of life should be a priority, and that’s something
we can do.

Nunn-Lugar-Dominici also appreciated the role of the first re-
sponders, and that it cannot only be addressed from the national
level, from the top down, but from the bottom up. From the eyes
of the first responders, these are the people who ultimately decide
whether the battle is won or lost.

Again, we do have some true pockets of excellence at the Federal
level, such as the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force out


51

probability of a major WMD attack may be low in the near future, the consequences are too
severe to ignore. Aside from the actual physical effects and human suffering resulting from a
WMD event, the psychological impact would be enormous, shaking the nation’s trust and
‘confidence in its government to its core.

To fully appreciate the considerable challenges we are facing, itis important to put the current
fears regarding the threat into perspective. For decades, terrorism experts have argued the
likelihood of a major terrorist incident occurring on U.S. soil. They also argued over the

possibility of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. The debating ended abruptly with the
February 26, 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the May 20, 1995' sarin gas attack of the
Tokyo subway, Threat calibrations did a 180-degree tum, and our nation’s planners have been
running ever since to catch up with the change and back-fill shortfalls that had been allowed to
‘grow during the debating years.

Recognition that acts (possibly involving weapons of mass destruction) can indeed occur in
America has been a cornerstone of both the Congress’ and the Clinton Administration's national
security agendas in recent years.

This acknowledgment has triggered a number of initiatives including: the issuance of
Presidential Decision Directive 39, updating our national policy in countering terrorism signed
by President Clinton in 1995; the promulgation of Public Laws 104-201, the Defense Against
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and 104-132, the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1996; the “Gore
Commission” on Airline and Airport Security; and the recent promulgation of Presidential
Decision Directives 62 and 63 on weapons of mass destruction terrorism and critical
infrastructure protection and cyberterrorism. WMD terrorism has also figured prominently in
every major recent Department of Defense study (e.g. the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transnational Threats, and the National Defense Panel
Report).

Regarding the GAO report, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments, | fully endorse conducting threat and risk
assessments and prioritizing countermeasures to mitigate vulnerabilities and manage risk. While
recognize the need for processes to best allocate finite resources, however, I do not believe that
it is an effective mechanism for selecting which cities qualify to receive NLD-legislated training
and equipment and when—based on the likelihood of an attack,

Firstly, this approach is subjective and contingent upon threat intelligence which is a “moving
target.” Secondly, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and the

' The Aum Shinrikyo first carried out a nerve gas attack in Matsumoto killing four and
injuring over 100 in June, 1994 unbeknownst to western diplomatic and intelligence services at
the time.


Fire Fighter Training for Hazardous Materials Response

‘TABLE. IAFF Training Rats: Average Pre/Post-Courto
‘Competency Ratings for Wine Tasks elated o Hazardous
‘Matera Response

Precourse  Pestcoure
ratios tgs

ho patie

Departrect oe air

ols cry
2s

2s

20

showing upward shifts in their competency ratings as a
result of the taining.

‘Two departments (WVA1, WVA2) display near-identi-
‘cal results in trainee competency ratings when compared to

“amounts of positive shift afterward. A higher percentage of
trainees in these two departments also display positive shifts
than inthe other thee, In effect, these changes bring the two
departments up to the same post-course competency levels
as the other three, Statistical treatments of the competency
data nine analy vaiace [ANOVA] a described by

80

335

Gepartment (11.3%). Neverbeless, stitisical tess (i.e,
mixed ANOVA treatments with post hoc multiple compar.
sons as described by Hatcher and Stepanski [1994]) found
al such differences tobe significant (p <0.01).

Follow-up visits in three departments (WVA1, WVA2,
‘and TX), conducted from 6 to 12 months ater the course
ended, included retests on the original quiz for samples of
trainees randomly drawn from the class rosters. Table V
‘shows the mean quiz scores for the pre-, post-, and follow-up
course test times for these trainees and differences between
these measures, Most notable is the slight drop (less than
34) in the follow-up test scores for one department (WVA2)
when compared to its post-course results. Similar compar-
s00s fr the two other deparments (WVAI, TX) show losses
that are 3-4 times greater. A mixed analysis of variance and
post hoe muliple comparisons of the data [Hatcher and
Stepanski, 1994) confirmed significant follow-up losses only
for he later two deparments. One probable reason for these
ifereoial findings in retention is offered inthe discussion.

Behar

Change

‘The aforementioned follow-up sessions with samples of
trainees, also included one-on-one interviews with IAFF
staff to determine carryover impacts of the course. Iner-
to determine the extent of followthrough on actions
‘chosen by the trainees have been conducted in four depart-
ments as of this reporting. During such inerviews, each
‘ction statement originally chosen by the fire fighter was
read, and questions asked about followthrough. An add-on
question during each interview was whether the course

and 5 [1994)) yielded differ.

al had been used by the trainee after the course, and if

ences between for both the percent showing.

shift and amount of shift values. Post hoc analysis showed

the WVAI and WVAZ departments to be superior to the

other three in these comparitons; the TL department was

{ound to be significantly poorer than al others in terms of

the percentage showing shift.
Rank-ordering the competency data by the nine tasks

revealed no a

Ploted in Figure 1 sre the mean of correct

130, how frequendy. The responses of trainees in four
departments are shown in Table VI

‘The percentage of trainees in all samples reporting
regular adherence to at least one action is 85% or better and
to two selecied actions is greater than 60%, Followthrough
for three or more actions shows a significant drop forall but
the TX City trainees. Almost twice as many TX City trainees
also report atleast a one-time use of the course manual in
‘comparison to the other

‘answers on the 75-item teat taken just before and at the end
be-

© Devise my own ways for thinking about or reinforcing
actions in respondi

to alarms that involve


142

response and consequence management support with appropriate Active and Reserve
component elements.

DoD is also prepared to provide: support for the proposed Do} WMD program
office as needed during the transition period; ongoing technical assistance and advice at
the national, state and local levels, as needed and requested for planning, training,
‘exercises, and research and development; acquisition support to Dol as it provides
‘equipment to first responders, which state and local authorities could utilize to ensure
compatibility and interoperability; and inter-agency policy coordination and support
through the National Security Council's Senior Management Groups and related Sub-
Groups. DoD and Dol are currently working the details of this proposed transfer,

‘We will now respond to the findings and recommendations of the General
Accounting Office reports, “Combating Terrorism: Opportunities Exist to Gain Focus and
Efficiencies in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program,” (currently in
draft), and “Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments.”

DoD non-concurs with the report’s recommendations to redesign the domestic
preparedness program and to conduet threat and/or risk assessments to help determine
Cities” requirements or needs. Serious ramifications would result if the Domestic
Preparedness Program were halted while the program is redesigned and/or threat
assessments were conducted, as cities scheduled to receive training in FY99 have already
begun to prepare for training.

The organization and composition of the SICG was based on NSC guidance and
PDD-39. The group was chaired by FEMA (the lead federal agency for consequence
‘management as outlined in PDD-39) and included senior representatives from six federal
agencies. The SICG served as an excellent information exchange forum and program
design and description body. However, it was not an ideal decision making body in that
only DoD was funded for and charged with the task of executing a national city training
program. At times, FEMA was unable to move the program forward and DoD did drive
‘on. For example, a sense of urgency prevailed at DoD to train the first eight to ten cities
before the funds appropriated for FY97 expired. The Secretary of Defense was charged
with program execution and we moved forward without consensus in instances when we
deemed it necessary to do so.

‘The ability of state and local governments to deal with the immediate effects of a
WMD terrorist attack is essential to the success of any response. That first hour will be
‘crucial to containing the attack and reducing casualties. The ability of first responders to
correctly identify an incident as a terrorist WMD attack - and respond accordingly — will
mean the difference between life and death in the outcome and will prevent first
responders from becoming victims. It is far better to have redundant coverage than to
wait until the regional first responders can reach the scene of an incident. In addition, the


185

as computer models to help assess and project the affected areas for various types of
attacks. When needed, these teams will be called to action by the state governor, who can
deploy them to assist local agencies quickly, before a National Disaster Declaration by the
President. The existence of interstate compacts allows governors in adjoining states to
deploy their National Guard members to surrounding states, as needed, before a
Presidential Declaration occurs. The teams are also available for use as a federal asset to
respond as needed via the Federal Response Plan.

‘Complementing and supporting the RAID teams are 54 reconnaissance and 127
decontamination teams located within existing Reserve component force structure. They
will receive additional training and equipment in FY99 and FY00 to perform these
missions.

To ensure the continued integration of the Guard and Reserve into our national
‘WMD preparedness strategy, the Reserve Component Consequence Management
Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) has been established within DoD. It reports
directly to the Director of Military Support and, through that general officer, to the
Secretary of the Army, the DoD Executive Agent for WMD Preparedness. This office
coordinates the identification, training, equipping and exercising of Reserve component
WMD assets and manages their integration into national WMD response plans. In
addition to structuring the training and equipping of the new Reserve component response
elements, CoMPIO will:

improve the information flow between military response elements;

# document the specific functions, positions, and procedures for each element;

* develop distance learning capabilities that will allow us to train and sustain these
elements;

© refine the planning and training for subsequent elements;

‘© integrate these elements into exercises with defense coordinating officers,
response task force commanders and their staffs, and emergency preparedness
liaison officers;

© document the location and capabilities of the elements in the DoD resources
database.

This plan to integrate the Reserve components into our national WMD strategy is
a prudent one. By incorporating and leveraging existing forces into current WMD
response planning, while creating only one new type of unit (the RAID team), this plan is
highly cost effective. It will help fill the existing gaps in civilian response capabilities,
especially those of local responders who need to rapidly determine the precise nature of


13

CITIES WERE SELECTED BASED
ON POPULATION SIZE

DOD decided to select cities based on core city population. It also decided to select 120
cities, which equates to all U.S. cities with a population of over 144,000 according to the
1990 census. The 120 cities represent about 22 percent of the U.S. population and cover
at least one city in 38 states and the District of Columbia. Twelve states" and the U.S.
territories have no cities in the program, and 25 percent of the cities are in California and

Texas.

DOD took a city approach because it wanted to deal with a single governmental entity
that could select the most appropriate personnel for training and receive equipment. In
selecting the cities DOD did not take into account a city's level of preparedness or
financial need. There was also no analysis to evaluate the extent to which the cities
selected for the program were at risk of a terrorist attack warranting an increased level of
preparedness, or whether a smaller city with high risk factors might have been excluded
from the program due to its lower population. In fact, in none of the seven cities we
visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a WMD attack, which would

be one factor considered in a threat and risk assessment.

?Three locations on DOD's list of 120 cities are not technically cities.

3Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming,


137

destroying nuclear missiles, warheads and bombers; and are on the verge of destroying
tons of chemical munitions.

But as long as there are chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the world,
proliferation is likely to occur, So, the second line of defense must be to protect ourselves
through deterrence and through defense. We've made it very clear to Iraq and to the rest of
‘the world that if WMD are ever used against our forces we will deliver a response that is
overwhelming and decisive. But we also deter adversaries by making sure that our forces
are ready to fight and win on any battlefield, even one that has been contaminated.

We are protecting our troops by providing them with state-of-the-art protective gear
against chemical or biological agents; by inoculating them against anthrax; by researching
new vaccines against other biological agents; and by developing longer range, improved
detection equipment to give our troops more advanced warning of any danger.

But the front lines are no longer just overseas. They are also right here at home.
Some believe that a deadly chemical or biological terrorist attack in this country is
inevitable. We believe that we have to prepare for the possibility that WMD could be
uused on American soil. So we are now building a third line of defense that is grounded in
domestic preparedness.

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, sponsored by
Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici, mandates that the United States enhance its
capability to respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving nuclear, biological,
chemical and radiological weapons. The legislation designated DoD as the interagency
lead to carry out a program to provide civilian personne! from federal, state and local
agencies with training and expert advice regarding emergency responses to a use or
threatened use of WMD or related materials. The legislation also allows the loan of
training equipment; it is not intended to be a grant program. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1997
Defense Appropriations Act added funding for DoD to improve the capability of the
federal, state and local emergency response agencies.

From the beginning, DoD sought the active participation of the other federal
agencies. This approach has allowed a comprehensive and integrated interagency federal
approach to meet the needs of local communities. The Senior Interagency Coordination
Group was established to facilitate the interagency coordination of federal policy issues
and program activities in support of federal consequence management training initiatives
concerning terrorist incidents involving WMD. The Group was chaired by FEMA and
‘was composed of senior members from FEMA, FBI, DoE, EPA, the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and DoD. Representatives from the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Department of Transportation (DoT), Bureau of Justice Assistance
(BJA), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Communications
System (NCS) also attended the meetings.


55

sustaining R&D efforts aimed at preventing and protecting the U.S. against biological threats.
‘Such R&D programs could include accelerated sensor development (to provide detection and
identification of biological agents), and producing antidotes and vaccines.

1 would like to close with some words of caution. At this time next year, the funds for the
Defense Preparedness Program run out. I think itis imperative that Congress recognize the
importance of this program and the spirit of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation. The keys to
success are continued leadership as a policy priority and sustained funding through the outyears
to ensure that all agencies local, state, regional and federal, are sufficiently equipped, trained,
exercised, and prepared to respond effectively to a WMD terrorist event. This requires long-term
capital investment strategies, which project into the future. We simply cannot afford to wait
“until they are coming over the hill,” to embark on an upgrade program. Nothing less than a
seamless integration of such efforts must be achieved. This requires re-examining how we as a
nation perceive national security and in making sure that alt of the proper parties have a seat at
the policy planning table,

Given the Department of Defense's experience, expertise, capabilities and resources, I would
‘suggest that its mandate be extended beyond FY 1999, as initially required by the Defense
‘Authorization Bill and that it remain the Executive Agent.

‘Thank you for your time. I welcome any questions you may have.


2

this program should be closely linked to a valid threat and risk as-
sessments.

We worked with the House National Security Committee on this
year’s defense authorization bill to include language required in the
Department of Justice to perform such assessments. This require-
ment is now in title XIV of the Defense Conference Report which
has passed both the House and the Senate. As we continue our ex-
amination of this program, we may decide that further legislative
action is necessary to correct other deficiencies.

I now yield to Mr. Hastert, the subcommittee chairman for a
statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Hastert follows:]


114

Gee 02 38 04:53p American Muslim Council 202-788-2550 pe

American Muslim Council, Inc.

October 1, 1998
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
United House of Representatives
2241 Raybum House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515,
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the Board of Directors and our members from Illinois | would
{ike to submit you my testimony for publishing it on record to the National
Security, international Affairs and Criminal Justice subcommittee
‘Thank you for your kind consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,

Atif Harden

THAT new oa Aes RW, Be OD Waban DG GE = Ta) TO EE ~ Pax (SE) TROLIED “EGR ame@anarrna aip= i TOG


163

program does not allow for feedback or input from the student
trainers, and the trainers often have suggestions to improve the
course, but there is no process for them to recommend such en-
hancements. I’d like you to respond to both of those criticisms, if
you would please.

Mr. RoBERTS. As we complete the training in each of the cities,
there’s a detailed critique sheet that is provided to all the people
who sit in the classroom. Those critique sheets are compiled by the
trainers and put together, and discussed in out-briefs with city offi-
cials and others. So, I am a little surprised that some of the people
who apparently participated in the process didn’t feel that they had
an adequate feedback loop.

We have been continually modifying the program as we have
gone along, and it might be possible that in one of the first or sec-
ond iterations, the critique sheet and feedback loop process was not
there. But to my knowledge, today and certainly as we move for-
ward, there is an insistence on the part of the instructors that they
ask the students to fill out written sheets that give them grades,
and we roll those grades up into booklets, and I, from time to time,
review the booklet from each city to see how well we did or didn’t
do, based on classroom critique comments.

I must say, frequently firefighters and police officers are quite
blunt, if you’re wasting their time, on some of those critique sheets.
They don’t pull a munch. So, I believe there is an adequate feedback
loop. It is through the process of a critique sheet that is given to
the students in the classroom and who work on that.

I would also take—I’d like to explain that although four of our
classes are not hands-on and are basically awareness classes, it’s
my recollection that two of the six classes we provide do involve
hands-on training and have the firefighters, police officers, and oth-
ers in suits, attempting to move their way through the detection
and identification process, and the rest of it. So those two points,
Tm a little bit surprised by the comment.

Mr. BARRETT. Had you heard those complaints before today?

Mr. Roserts. I had not heard the feedback—the lack of a feed-
back loop—complaint, before today, no.

If I might just quickly try to sort through the equipment issue,
because we’ve been central to that. The equipment that DOD pro-
vides is equipment designed to allow the first responder trainers,
who we have trained, to in turn train the first responders in their
cities.

We recognize—we call it an equipment training set—we recog-
nize that if the equipment were brand new, before it’s been used
much in training, it might have some ancillary ability to be used
in response. But, it’s not designed for response. It’s intent is to be
used for training, and after one or two training sessions, the gear
starts to deteriorate, there’s no question. And after four training
sessions, no responder should respond in it, because it’s been put
on the wrong size person, it’s been hooked up backward, it’s had
all the things happen to it that happen in training.

Insofar as the—TI’ll call it unfunded mandate, although we don’t
see it as that—what we did say was that we can provide you with
one set of equipment, one time, and we'll loan it to you on a long
term loan basis. But as that equipment gets torn up, and con-


72

only a "1 out of 10" if the intent is to actually train fire fighters in the

methods of responding to a terrorist attack.

Second, the program does not actually pay for the training of fire fighters.
The program trains trainers and makes money available for training
equipment, but does not fund any of the actual training of line-level fire

fighters.

Third, the DoD program does not allow for feedback or input from the
student-trainers. The fire fighters who are being wained as trainers often
have suggestions to improve the course and make it more applicable to the
real world, but there is no process for them to recommend such

enhancements.

Fourth, the DoD program offers awareness level and operations level
training as separate courses. Since Jocal trainers are not required to take
both courses, some fire fighters may be receiving only awareness level
training. As noted above, every fire fighter needs to be trained at the
operations level--which should include awareness training. Awareness

training alone is simply inadequate.

Fifth, the operations level course presented by DoD consists entirely of four
hours of classroom lecture. This is inadequate in both content and time.

Situational and hands-on exercises should be a routine part of all terrorism
training, and more than four hours needs be devoted to this complex topic.
For example, the nationally validated standard for operations level hazmat

training requires a minimum of 32 hours of course work and exercises.

10


27

Mr. SoupDERr. Thank you very much.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Good morning. I appreciate the chance to appear
before this committee.

Having followed the issue of terrorism for several years both in-
side and outside the government, I’ve watched what’s unfolding
with both a bit of amusement and bewilderment—bewildered be-
cause of the seeming discovery that terrorism appears to be a new
phenomenon, when we've been facing it as a threat for over 30
years; amused that we have to go through the kinds of reports the
GAO is doing. I have to say I endorse the report; I think the find-
ings are right on target, because the interest of everyone that’s in-
volved with this I believe is genuine. No one is out trying to do
something to either hurt the United States or to hurt some other
agency. But, unfortunately, with all of this goodwill and good inten-
tion, we are left with what can best be described as a bureaucratic

mess.

I would like to begin by discussing what the actual threat of ter-
rorism is to the United States and then make some comments on
the chem-bio issue. The first chart you see is drawn from FBI sta-
tistics, and it’s a good news chart, in my view. It shows that we're
not seeing a rising tide of terrorism in the United States, but rath-
er it’s been declining. Last year they recorded 13 incidents, but 11
of those involved the same package bombs/letter bombs that were
sent to Leavenworth Prison and the Al-Hayat Arabic Newspaper.

The good news is in the red. The FBI is doing a very good job
of anticipating, detecting, and preventing terrorist incidents. While
I’m a critic of the FBI on some things, I think that they deserve
a lot of commendation and praise for the effective job they’ve done.

If we go to the second chart, the purple shows all international
terrorist attacks. The yellow bars show those attacks which were
considered anti-U.S. attacks by the Department of State.

The red shows the number of attacks in which there were U.S.
casualties. For anyone to make the claim that there are rising cas-
ualties from international terrorism and Americans are being in-
creasingly victimized, they are simply not looking at the facts. That
is not true.

Mr. SoupER. Are those annual?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, those are annual.

This is not to say that there is not a threat of terrorism; I’m the
first to admit it. We must be prepared to deal with it, but we
should not exaggerate that threat and pretend that Americans are
the No. 1 target in the world and that American citizens are being
killed or wounded by terrorists. It’s just not the case.

We'll go up to the third chart. This shows countries where
they've had at least two anti-U.S. terrorist attacks over the last 7
years. These statistics cover the 1990 through 1997 timeframe.

I think what’s instructive about this chart is that it destroys the
conventional wisdom that terrorism is somehow a Muslim phe-
nomenon. It is not. Where have most of the anti-U.S. attacks taken
place? There is one in Peru, South America; one in Turkey, Europe,
Middle East area; one in the Philippines—those three countries
have had the most anti-United States terrorist attacks over the last
7 years.


10

Identify a Single National Agency for Terrorism Training--The
final general comment I wish to make about the federal government's
counterterrorism training programs concerns the array of federal agencies
that have undertaken some sort of counterterrorism activities in recent
years. Although it is reasonable and even beneficial for a variety of
agencies to be involved in terrorism emergency response preparedness, we
believe there is a need for more coordination between these agencies to
assure the most efficient use of limited resources. We therefore
recommend that Congress or the Administration identify a single national
agency to serve as a clearinghouse and coordinator of the various
programs. We believe that FEMA would be the most appropriate agency to
assume this role. The agency could serve as a central contact point for all
fire departments involved in terrorism emergency response training,
thereby eliminating wasteful duplication and confusion among various

agencies.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn my attention to the
Department of Defense terrorism training program, which we understand

to be of particular concern to this committee.

The DoD program consists of two main parts. First is a train the trainer
program designed to provide terrorism emergency response capability to
emergency responders in 120 jurisdictions. DoD experts in
counterterrorism travel to the selected jurisdictions where they perform

training for a limited number of fire fighters and other members of the


146

our judgment, to what the Department of Defense has been imply-
ing—or has been developing. But we have asked the cities to plan
what a comprehensive response would be—a health response to one
of these incidents.

We have been, as a second priority, providing pharmaceuticals.
In fact, in some cases, in the case of ‘New York City, all of their
money was spent on pharmaceuticals, even though we have re-
quired that all the contract requirements be fulfilled, and if they
have a plan for a response to one of these incidents in New York

City.

Finally, should any funds be left over, we have provided that
some of those funds can be used for equipment. But whatever
equipment requests have been submitted by the cities, we have
transmitted those to an interdepartmental group, made up of the
Department of Defense, the FBI, FEMA, Department of Veterans’
Affairs, and others within the Federal establishment, to review
that equipment list to assure that it was not duplicative of what
was being provided by other programs, and then to move ahead as
rapidly as possible with the purchase of that equipment.

To date, we have receive uipment lists from 13 of the cities;
we have acted on 6 of them, and we're still in the process of review-
ing the other 7; and, we expect the remaining cities to come in with
their equipment lists after the fact. In other words, what we are
trying to do is fill in the gaps that may exist after other programs
have already been in effect.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on with some additional comments. I’ve
submitted them for the record, in terms of response to some of the
issues that GAO has raised in their report. However, I’ll leave that
for the record and your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knouss follows:]


63

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman. My name is Frederick Nesbitt, and I am the Director of
Governmental Affairs for the International Association of Fire Fighters.

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today on behalf
of IAFF General President Alfred K. Whitehead and the other 225,000
members of the organization to share our views on the nation’s

preparedness to acts of terrorism.

The IAFF brings two distinct but related perspectives to this issue. First
and foremost, we represent the nation’s first line of defense against all
terrorist incidents, Whether it is a chemical, biological or nuclear attack,
the members of the IAFF will be first on the scene. We are acutely aware
that the lives of countless Americans depend on our preparedness for such
a catastrophe. We are concerned that this ground-level perspective is
often missing when the federal government designs terrorism emergency

response programs.

The second perspective we bring is that of the nation’s premier trainer of
fire fighters in hazardous materials emergency response. Since 1987, the
IAFF has operated a federally funded hazmat training program that has
trained over 20,000 emergency responders. The curriculum and
presentations we developed have become the standard for this nation, as
well as several countries around the world. A recent independent survey
published in the prestigious American Journal of Industrial Medicine found

that the TAFF training program was highly successful in improving hazmat


20

and needs, But the group did not press for an alternative assessment methodology, which
resulted in the lack of any analytical basis for cities to determine their requirements for a
prudent and affordable level of preparedness for WMD (a desired end state) or to guide

DOD or the cities in defining individual cities’ requirements or needs.

‘The Senior Interagency Coordination Group did not resolve the issue of similar or
potentially overlapping terrorism-related courses. A joint Department of Justice and
FEMA 2-day basic concepts course on emergency response to terrorism was being
developed at about the same time as the Domestic Preparedness Program, and FEMA
teaches subjects applicable to WMD and terrorism in its Emergency Management Institute
and the National Fire Academy. ‘The Department of Justice and FEMA courses and the

DOD courses were developed separately.

STRATEGY NEEDED TO COORDINATE AND:
FOCUS MULTIPLE TRAINING, EQUIPMENT,
AND RESPONSE ELEMENTS.

Some local officials viewed the growing number of WMD consequence management
training programs, including the Domestic Preparedness Program, the Department of
Justice and FEMA courses, FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses, National
Fire Academy courses, and the National Guard's National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute course, as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach

toward combating terrorism. Similarly, multiple programs with equipment segments—such


37

Besides being tough to produce these weapons also are difficult to use.
At minimum people handling such substances must wear bulky protective gear
or risk killing themselves. Wind, rain, and temperature also adversely affected
the performance of chemical and biological weapons. Aum Shinryko, for
‘example, tried but failed to kill three Japanese magistrates with a cloud of sarin
because of a wind shift

Saddam Hussein is one of the few leaders in the world who knows
firsthand the limits of these weapons, Saddam used mustard gas, tabun, and
anthrax against people—the Kurds and the Iranians to be specific. According to
publicly released CIA document on the fran-iraq War, Iraq used chemical
weapons “under two types of circumstances: as part of a spoiling attack to repel
Iranian forces . . . and as preparation firing in advance of an Iraqi assault... .By
the end of the war, Iraqi forces used chemical weapons frequently.” Although
more than 600,000 Iranians died during the eight-year war with Iraq, only 5,000
died from the chemical weapons. Saddam, however, also discovered that such
weapons were unreliable and dangerous to his own troops and people. The
same CIA document reports that, “large numbers of Iraq's own troops were killed
or injured during Iraqi Chemical attacks." Conventional weapons killed far more
Iranians than did the “weapons of mass destruction”.

NLD and Domestic Terrorism

| believe it is highly unlikely that terrorists on their own will be able to
produce and use chemical and biological weapons within the next five years to
cause mass casualties. Producing such weapons generally requires the
infrastructure and wealth of a nation. However, as demonstrated by Aum
Shinryko, it is possible that a well-financed, well organized group staffed with
good scientists can produce potentially lethal chemical or biological agents even
if they have not perfected reliable delivery systems to produce mass casualties.
Itis appropriate, therefore, that the US Government continues steps to help
American communities detect and manage this threat.


157

Mr. SoupErR. Thank you very much for your testimony, and I just
want to make a couple of opening comments. I appreciate the
amount of time this has taken, but this is one of those things that
isn’t glamorous or necessarily as news-demanding as right r the
bombing in Africa or some of the more dramatic things, but this
is the kind of preparation we go into to try to minimize the impact
of those kinds of actions, and avoid them whenever possible.

Because we didn’t talk about this in the first panel in any of the
questions, I just want to say for the record, my background discus-
sions with a number of you have suggested that it’s basically un-
derstood in the administration that we have grave concerns about
the lack of caste clustering, and the de; that we can cluster in
some of the training, as was advocated by GAO and how FEMA
does it and others, would be very helpful.

Because this has all the earmarks to those of us who were grow-
ing up during the nuclear scares of the early 1960’s or in World
War II of the ranking of a city on Hitler’s bomb list, that the big-
gest cities are going to be covered. I think, Fort Wayne, my home
area, is 4 years out. Some States don’t have any cities in the 120,
and we hear that there may be some vulnerabilities. Well, it’s kind
of scary for Americans.

We need to look at some creative ways to do cluster training,
then how to spin that into the second nature of training, whether
it’s conferences or a training school where local governments, if
they wanted to train, certainly have some of the response stuff al-
ready through FEMA and other agencies, but to the degree that it
could hit the level of sophistication.

Thad the privilege a few weeks ago to attend an air guard unit
in Fort Wayne doing a training in this particular area, because
they'd been assigned in the Middle East, and they’re headed to
Panama and other places. I saw, for example, in an exercise, they
had four real life casualties because the uniforms are so hot. Let
me say, Fort Wayne is not Africa, or the desert, or for that matter,
Arizona or Florida. They had some people move too fast and they
passed out; they went through the process of trying to identify first
what hit—they were trying to get the F—16’s in and out; these are
not easy matters. Furthermore, the number of variations of the size
of what it was, and then down to the emergency tents of where you
go with the first victims and the first identification. What if there’s
seepage in those areas?

is is something that requires a fairly sophisticated-type train-
ing, which in the first panel we had some fair questions raised as
to whether the training that was being done was sufficient. What
can be done to supplement that? What can be done beyond this
first training? I know there are other materials provided—what are
they? Do you have more sophisticated variations? I know there are
people trained in some areas to do that. How can they be inter-
related? Specifically, there’s been a pass-off from the Department
of Defense to the Department of Justice, and I wondered if Mr.
Dalich, you in your testimony said that you were continuing that—
have you made any changes, or are you revamping, what are you
looking at in some of these areas?

Mr. Daticu. Our training ? uses a different 120 cities,
which in the beginning, caused us some difficulties. We are looking


57

national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism
(promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive 62), will help.

As | suggested in my prepared testimony, one option ~ which is currently being discussed
=~ to better protect the continental United States from WMD terrorism, critical
infrastructure protection, and missile defense would be to designate a Commander-in-
Chief for “homeland defense.” Clearly the CINC/America would only be responsible for
Department of Defense-related issues in support of civilian authorities and would not
overturn current “lead federal agency” status. Nonetheless, it would streamline
Department of Defense “terrorism-related” missions.


23

Just as the broadening scope of efforts to combat terrorism poses a serious challenge for
the executive branch, it also can be a coordination and oversight challenge for the
Congress. The current committee structure is aligned with an agency and functional
focus for authorization, appropriations, and oversight, and multiagency crosscutting
issues, such as combating terrorism, proliferation, and others, fall within the jurisdiction

of many authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We will continue to finalize our
report, receive agency comments, and develop recommendations on program focus, and
will be issuing that report in the next few weeks. We would be happy to answer any
questions at this time,

uM


144

Mr. SoupDER. Mr. Roberts, do you have any opening statements
you’d like to make?

Mr. RoBERTS. I'll wait for the questions. I have been one of the
principal players in the Department of Defense’s development and
execution of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici training program. I have
followed its evolution in detail, and I look forward to your ques-
tions about the diversity of equipment programs, diversity of train-
ing programs, and the rest of it.

From a personal viewpoint, I identify most closely with the com-
ments of Mr. Nesbitt. The most important person in responding to
a weapons of mass destruction terrorist attack is the first re-
sponder who arrives on the scene prepared, equipped, and ready to
deal with it. Everybody who arrives before him or her is a probable
victim. I believe our project, or program, seeks to give that training
in the most efficient manner we can to that responder. But I’ll wait
for your questions.

Mr. SoupeER. Dr. Knouss.

Mr. Knouss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleas-
ure for us to be able to be here today and to share some of our
thoughts with the committee. Thank you for that invitation.

In addition to directing the Office of Emergency Preparedness in
the Department of Health and Human Services, I am also respon-
sible on behalf of our department for the health and medical serv-
ices portion—it’s called the emergency support function No. 8
under the Federal response plan that is coordinated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency—as well as direct the National
Disaster Medical System, which is a unique system in the Federal
Government made of a partnership of the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency, and DOD.

That system has over 7,000 primary care medical personnel in it,
as well as specialized teams to deal with specialized health prob-
lems, as well as over 100,000 hospital beds in 2,000 hospitals
around the country in the private sector that are volunteering to
participate in this rather comprehensive system; little known but
comprehensive system.

Our approach to dealing with the issues that have been raised
today is that we believe very strongly that, as we are trying to
grapple with the health issues, which is our department’s respon-
sibilities, that the only way that one can adequately address these
is at the local level, and that basically any response to a terrorist
act involving a weapon of mass destruction is going to start at the
local level. Therefore, what our responsibility as a department is,
is to enhance the normal response patterns and to make sure that
the health needs of any victims of one of those incidents are ade-
quately addressed.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted testimony for the record. I'd like
to just highlight a few of those issues that I’ve addressed in the tes-
timony in the interest of the time and the hour of the day.

I would like to first draw attention to the difference between a
chemical and a biological incident, because I think it’s very impor-
tant to recognize that when we're talking about first response, the
first response to a chemical incident is going to be very different


90

you might view that the threat’s low, or whatever, that still
shouldn’t stop or preclude you from doing these types of assess-
ments.

We think that they make sense. When we talked to people at the
local level, they said, we would love to be able to do this. Why? “Be-
cause,” they said, “then we’d have some idea of what level of pre-
paredness we should prepare for.” I mean, they get a set of equip-
ment lists, and they say, well, how do I decide how much to pick;
what do I pick; how much do I pick? If it’s free, obviously, they
want everything they can get. But how do you decide?

Mr. BARRETT. Well, I think to just sort of set up a framework for
me to at least understand what we are assessing. Are we assessing
the likelihood of an attack? Are we assessing the location? Are we
assessing the types of attack? Could you run through that for me?

Mr. Davis. Right. I think you could be assessing all of that. For
example, the key components of the model, as we described it in
our report, and it’s used by other people, are—the first item is the
threat analysis, understanding—or trying to understand—and
identifying what the risk is, and making some judgments to iden-
tify and evaluate the risk, seeing what the intent and capabilities
mught be, the lethality of the threat. Then you try and look at the
risk and have a better understanding of the risk, and see what the
consequences might be.

You do this to try to get some understanding of what some of the
counter-measures might be. You’re trying to understand and evalu-
ate the threat, so that you can see how that threat might be able
to exploit the vulnerabilities that exist in a particular asset—not
that you can prevent an attack—so that you can better develop
counter-measures to mitigate the consequences that might occur.

Tf you take, for instance, what took place in Africa recently in the
last couple of months, and like DOD and others have pointed out,
and the State Department has pointed out also, we had embassies
where that the threat was considered low. So, how could we have
prevented something like that? Well, the answer is that you prob-
ably can’t. Maybe you couldn’t prevent it. But even when you have
a situation where the threat might be low, if you have established
requirements and if you have established some baseline—those em-
bassies probably didn’t meet a minimum standard or a baseline for
protection or for security.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Johnson, I agree with the comment of Mr.
Davis, that if the local governments think it’s free, they’re going to
say, “We're going to take it.” I also agree that we're going to vote
for anti-terrorism funds, but there’s a limit. From your standpoint
of the assessment issue, I’d like to hear your thoughts.

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me give you an example of what took place
when the U.S. Government supported the Barcelona Olympics in
1992. That process started 3 years out. We sent over an inter-
agency team that sat down with the Government of Spain. We
weren't trying to predict, will you have terrorism or won’t you, be-
cause they had the Basque Terrorists, which was one of the most
active terrorist groups at that time. But what we looked at were
the various capabilities that they had to deal with a variety of sce-
narios. We weren’t trying to predict, will this happen? We were
looking at, do you have the capability to deal with this scenario;


172

DEPARTMENTS AND WITH OTHER CITIES;
THAT THE FOCUS ON BOTH CHEMICAL AND
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WAS
APPRECIATED; AND THAT HE LOOKS
FORWARD TO AN ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN
OCTOBER.

HIS ONLY CONCERN, HOWEVER, WAS WITH
FUNDING AND EQUIPMENT.

CHIEF FREDERICK COMPLAINED THAT HE
HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ANY EQUIPMENT
TO DATE AND WHAT MONEY HAS REACHED
BALTIMORE HAS GONE TO THE HOSPITALS.

THEREFORE, AT PRESENT, HE FEELS THAT
BALTIMORE HAS NEITHER THE EQUIPMENT
NOR THE FUNDING REQUIRED TO MEET THE
DEMANDS PLACED ON THE CITY BY THE
PROGRAM.

1 AM INTERESTED TO KNOW IF THIS IS A
PROBLEM FACED BY OTHER FOCUS CITIES
AND HOW THE PROBLEM IS BEING
ADDRESSED.


44

perform similar missions domestically. This would both avoid a
duplication of function and promote a more efficient use of resources.
Departments and Agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Department of Agriculture should not have terrorism-
related missions. However, specialists from these Departments with
skills that could support and enhance counter-terrorism efforts could
be detailed to the counter-terrorism centers maintained by the CIA and
the FBI respectively.


340 Cohen

(Table VIt), Recommending added training days or refresher
courses should have some merit in light of these findings.
IAFF has given consideration to adding an extra day to their
first responder course for staging mock drills and practical

are currently under review as part of the OSHA proposal for
‘an occupational safety and health program standard (OSHA,

the responses of the TX city department trainees. A greater
number of TX city firefighters followed through on more of
their chosen action statements, made use of the course
manual, and reported similar actions by their peers. Two
reasons for this result come to mind. The frst is tht the TX
city in question was a major pezochemical hub where
hazardous materials calls are near daily occurrences. This
increased risk preseated numerous opporninities to put the
‘course lessons to use. The second is thatthe LAFF instructors
of the TX city course were themselves local fre fighters who
used the local experiences and incidents to give the course
and its objectives added cogency. Fire Fighters in the other
cities included in this report were not subject to the same
risks, and thus could not be expected to have the same
motivation.

Correlations found between the various evaluation
measures give only limited support to the assumption that
they would be interdependent. The evidence for association
‘was most obvious for reaction index and competency
‘measures and not for the others. One possible explanation is
thatthe data on these two measures were collected from the
same form which was administered atthe same time (ie., at
the end of the course). Measures of knowledge gain reflected
two different times of administration, and data on behavior
change were obtained well after the course ended. Hence,
temporal factors may enhance associations in one instance
and obscure them in another.

‘Admittedly, restrictions in the variance for the different
-measures used in this analysis probably hampered prospects
for obtaining larger correlations. For example, competency
ratings could vary only across a 4-point scale, and reaction
and behavior indices were likewise limited in their range of
numerical scores. On the other hand, and as reported by
Alliger and Janak [1989], atempts to show interdependency
‘among different levels of evaluation for other training
‘courses have similarly yielded uncertain results. It is be-
lieved that uncontrolled factors such as differences in trance
‘motivation and attitudes, and situation-specific conditions
affecting transfer of training may be responsible for the
failure to show greater linkages.

Way ior he ccc nd dative ofthe LAF
first responder training course and its

been mentioned. Refinements to the evaluation plan are also
being addressed, especially easier ways to collect and
process data on the various measures to gauge course benefits,
However the plan remains built on largely subjective or self.
report measures and, as we have soen, positive changes in some
do not correspond to similar changes in others. Whether such
‘raining results in fewer oocurences of the Sort reported atthe
‘outset ofthis paper will require more verifiable evidence. More
objective study of first responder actions and their conse-
quences before and after training is needed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

‘The author thanks the staff of the Hazardous Materials
Training Department of the LAFF for their support in
developing the evaluation plan, oversecing its implementa:
tion, and the collection of data, Thanks are also due the [AFF
‘raining instructors and trainees who furnished the critical
data for assessment. Materials for the LAFF first responder
training course were developed via grants from the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. The National
Instnate for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is
currently funding LAFF direct training ofthis course and its,
evaluation. The opinions, findings, and conclusions ex-
pressed in this document are those of the author and not
necessarily those ofthe LAFF or NIOSH.

APPENDIX: ACTION STATEMENTS.

{Lead sentence to each unit}: “I intend odo things that
have not done up to now or will do differently Specifically,
Iwill

Unit 1: Common Alarms

|. Review department’s standard operating procedures
(SOPs) and guidelines to see whether they cover risks of
hazardous materials in responding to common alarms.
Will suggest ideas for improving SOPs or guidelines.

2. Routinely discuss with others on my shift our responses
to calls involving hazardous materials, reviewing condi-
tions and any particular risks to department personnel,
civilians, or the environment. Discuss lessons leamed
from these incidents.

2. Request to mend ter bazar mates tinng
4, Drive or walk hough my first du wea to oot places

likely to be occupied by people, transportation corridors,
and other sites where hazardous materials may be stored,

carried, or disposed of.
5. Devise my own ways for thinking about or reinforcing
actions in to alarms that is

te the subject of intra review. Adding exe deys tthe
‘course for practical hands-on exercises, and computerized.
versions for refresher training and other uses have already

strange odors, unknown spilled materials, other potential
‘chemical releases.
16. (Use this space to write your own statement


176

‘Are Muslims, or those who claim Islam as their motive, sometimes involved in terrorist acts? Yes.
Are Muslims involved in the majority or at least in a significant number of domestic terrorist
attacks? According to the FBI, no!

Is the killing of innocent men women and children supportable by Islamic religious doctrine? No!
Mr. Chairman I would like to share with you a verse from the Qur'an that addresses Muslim
behavior in regard to conflict:

‘The Qur'an:
“Fight in the cause of Allah with those who fight against you, but do not exceed the limits. Allah
does not like transgressors.” (2:190)

And what are these limits? Some light is shed on them when we read the instructions of the Prophet
Muhammad to his followers, and also from the first Caliph, Abu Bakr.

Prophet Muhammad:

“T recommend you to have fear of Allah, and be good to the Muslims who are with you. Fight with
the name of Allah and in the cause of Allah. Do not betray, do not be excessive, do not kill a child
nor a woman or an old person, or a person who is secluded in his hermitage. Do not bum a date
tree, nor cut the trees, nor demolish structures.” (Sahih Muslim)

‘Abu Bakr, first Caliph of Islam:

“Do not betray or be treacherous or vindictive, Do not mutilate. Do not kill the children, the aged
‘or the women. Do not cut or bum palm trees or fruitful trees. Don’t slay a sheep, a cow or camel
except for your food. And you will come across people who confined themselves to worship in
monasteries...leave them alone to what they devoted themselves for.”

PLEA

Mr. Chairman, given our long history, commitment and contribution to our nation, I hope that in our
public policy statements concerning Islam and Muslims, we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past.
‘You must resist those who want to blame and demonize an entire community for the crimes of
few. Let us not give credence to the bigotry of those who will say that “Islam is a terrorist religion”
or “all Muslims are terrorists” or “ American Muslim organizations are front groups for terrorists”
We already know the danger and stupidity of mass stereotyping. Mr. Chairman, we didn’t elect a
Catholic president until this century, because people feared that a Catholic would be under the
control of the Pope. Others believe that we can’t have an Ttalian president because he would be
under the influence of the Mafia, And still others believe that Jews are a fifth column that can’t be
trusted and whose loyalty will never lie with the United States. All of these fears have not only
proven to be unfounded, but they are patently ridiculous. Mr. Chairman, we let our fears get out of
control in the past, and we made a terrible mistake with the Japanese community by interning them
during the Second World War. Our national shame and regret over this incident continue to haunt
us. Please, le’s not make this same mistake with Islam and the Muslim community.

Our Prophet taught us that when one of us is oppressed, we all are oppressed. So yes, Muslims feel
the pain of our co-religionist and do support the causes of our brothers to escape oppression in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, Palestine, Kenya, Uganda, Russia, India, China and the Philippines. Just


62

committee to achieve the goal of creating a national emergency re-
sponse capability that is second to none.

I thank you for your attention to our views and will be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nesbitt follows:]


86

Fire Figh

Unit 2: Health and Safety
1. Avoid contact with persons or equipment that may have
‘been contaminated in a hazardous materials incident until
they have gone through a decontamination procedure.
Review my department's procedures for reporting expo-
sure to ensure that reports are handled effcienly and
confidentially.

Report any unusual signs of ivtation, dizziness, breath-
‘ng difficulty, hand/fect tingling, nausea that I might fee!
following responses to alarms where toxic materials were

present
Keep record of my responses to alarms where hazard-
‘ous materials were detected. Lear about the hazardous
materials and their possible harmful effects.

‘Take steps to decontaminate my own clothing and
equipment in cases where actions taken on the fieground
exposed me to toxic materials,

6. (Use this space to write your own action statement.)
Unit 3: Hazardous Materials

|. Make up a chart showing container/tank/vessel shapes
and label them for likely contents of hazardous materials.
Compare recommended actions in the DOT Emergency
Response Guidebook for major chemicals found at sites
in my first due areas with department SOPs, resolve any
significant differences.

Refer to hazardous materials references, materials safely
dats sheets, or shipping papers to learn more about the
properties of chemicals commonly used or stored in large
amounts in Fist due area and actions tobe taken in cases
of overexposure.

Routinely observe placards and other information signs
at fixed sites and on transportation cargo caries to test.
sy accuracy in recognizing hazard

chemicals, chemicals with high vapor densities, liquids in
loved vessel, radioactive materials, ther unique hazards.
6. (Use this space to write in your own action statement}

Unit 4: The Planned Response

ter Training for Hazardous Materials Response 341

based on information gained in the course, personai
knowiedge or experience,

Conduct pre-incident surveys of occupant sites, visit
‘warehouses, factories, fabrication shops in my first due
area to lear if large amounts of chemicals or other
substances are in use or stored, ensuring that chemical
information is. and accurate,
‘Make up a list of the “top 10” sites im my frst due area
‘posing the greatest risk of exposure ts/hazardous chemi-
cals, Analyze and discuss plans or actions in responding
‘o alarms at these sites with other companies.

Use the course manual to make up a checklist of actions
appropriate for first responders at hazardous materials
incidents, and grade myself for several incidents, noting
the circumstances where I was unable to follow proper
actions.

6. [Use this space to write in your own action statement.)

REFERENCES

‘Alergee OM, Janak EA (1989): Kikpatic’s levels of waning eruena
‘Ty years ner Personnel Payee 42:331-342.

Benger PK, Gunto Sf, Rice, C, Haley 5V (1996): Estumating he impact of

alt nd safety traning using aeboapective pres design. Appl cup
Environ Hyg 12198-1203

‘Clement RW 1982}: Testing the Neary theory of wang evauabon: An
‘npanded role fr trang reacuons.Puble Personnel Mgmt 1-176 184

HiacherL, Stepashi EI (1984) “A Step-by-Step Approseh 10 Using the
‘SAS Spuem for Univariate and Mulivane Staiascs” Cary, NC" SAS
Inve

iret BA, Cummings KM Digna MB, Heaney CA, Perales OP, Simoes
‘Menos BG, Zimmerman MA (195): Evaluation of health education
popes: erment and fru directions. Health Educ’ Q
Bro 08,

Kirkpasick DL (1967): Evaluation of
“Training and Developnest
win

‘pune DL (190) “Eouig Tg Progen: The Ft Lave

stig ncn lt)
sodbook.” New Yor: McGraw-Hill

Nudonal Fue Protection Association (1992): "Sundar {or Profesional
Competence of Responder to Hazardeus Maerls Incidents” Quincy,
MASNFPA, p472_

‘Newsom JW (1978): Citch 22: The problems of ioenpete evaluation of
‘ing, Traning Dev J32:22-24,

1, Check SOPs in my department on plans and
for routine and emergency

tained in the course, personal inowledge, or experience.
Check SOPs in my department dealing with cleaning,
inspection, and storage of persoaal protective clothing
‘and respirators, suggesting changes to my supervisor

Sly He 989
‘penton sod enerpency respon: Fad re, Feden) Regie, 29 CFR
1910.12 @X6,), March 6, 1989, p 9329.

‘Heaih Adsinieraion (1996): Drah proposed
Safety Sundar, Washing:

Siege (1956): “Non Paramenc Sutnica “New York: McGraw Hil pp
sais


121

‘Support Program, through which we made $12 million available to 41 local jurisdictions across
the nation to assist them in purchasing personal protection equipment, decontamination
equipment, and detection and other needed equipment to assist First Responder efforts. And,
under this program, we designed it to ensure that funding goes not just to large urban
communities, but also to medium, small, and rural jurisdictions.

FP is also working, through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, with
several universities and research facilities - Texas A&M, the Nevada Test Site, the Louisiana
State University, and the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology ~ to utilize their
resources and expertise in the development and delivery of training and technical assistance to
‘America’s First Responder Community.

And just last month, on the 27th and 28th of August, OJP sponsored, in partnership with
the FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, and EPA, a conference for state and focal stakeholders, which
brought together over 200 state and local officials and representatives from the first responder
community to discuss how the federal government can best assist them in addressing the issues
involved in incidents of domestic terrorism. This conference was highly successful, particularly
in opening better lines of communication among state, local, and federal agencies. Although a
full final report on the conference is still being prepared, there is an executive summary of the
conference's significant findings and recommendations, which | will be happy to share with the
Subcommittee.

It is through these initiatives, and the initiatives and programs to be developed and
expanded over the next fiscal year, that we hope - - in tandem with the FBI and our other federal

agency partners - - to fulfill the mission of assisting state and local jurisdictions in this critical


124

‘Responses to Questions:
Question Number 1:

Has the National Security Council met with representatives from OJP on a regular basis to
coordinate efforts, not just on the Domestic Preparedness Program, but with all domestic
terrorism related programs?

‘Answer:

‘There are regular communications between the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), other
components of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Security Council (NSC),
particularly the NSC’s Office for Infrastructure Protection and Counter Terrorism's Working
Group on Assistance to State and Local Authorities. OJP maintains a staff representative as a
member on this NSC Working Group, which is comprised of senior federal officials representing
the various federal agencies with responsibility in the counter terrorism area. As part of OJP"s
involvement, OJP attends regular weekly Working Group meetings and has briefed this group on
the various components of the OJP domestic preparedness initiative. Further, the NSC is aware
of the planning currently underway between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOI to
transfer DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Program) to OJP in Fiscal Year 2001. As the plans for this transfer progress, it is DOL’s and
DOD's intent to keep the NSC fully apprised of all developments.

Question Number 2:

IP has developed its own first responder program, What criteria have you used for site
selection? When the Department of Justice takes over the Domestic Preparedness Program, will
the cities selected for training change?

Answer:

OJP initiated its first domestic preparedness initiative, the Metropolitan Firefighter and
Emergency Medical Services Training Program, in Fiscal Year 1997. This initiative was
authorized pursuant to Section 819 of the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996” (Pub. L. 104-132). That same fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1997), the Department of Defense
initiated the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program (the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program), as
authorized pursuant to Title IV (the “Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of
1996”) of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997” (Pub. L. 104-201).

Under both Public Law 104-132 and Public Law 104-201, OJP and DOD are broadly authorized
to provide training to enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency responders to react to
terrorist incidents. Under OJP's authority, training is limited to fire and emergency medical
services personnel. However, OJP is authorized to provide training to respond to any terrorist
act. Under DOD's authority, training may be provided to the entire emergency response


31

suggest measures this committee should consider to improve the effectiveness
of the U.S. Government's effort to combat terrorism.

Do We Face a Rising Threat of Terrorism?

The August bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania left
an indelible impression that we are facing a worsening threat of terrorism. When
we see the images of crumbled buildings shrouded in smoke and battered,
bloody victims crawling to safety from the rubble it is no surprise that Americans
feel vulnerable and helpless. These events have reopened the wounds left in
our national psyche from the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma
City.

While mourning the loss of American, Kenyan, and Tanzanian citizens and
taking every necessary measure to catch those responsible for this heinous
deed, the U.S. Government also has a responsibility to accurately describe the
nature of the threat we face.

+ Terrorism is not widespread,
© Terrorist groups are not proliferating at an uncontrollable rate.
© Terrorism has and can be contained,

We are not helpless victims who have no option but to cower in fear. There are
things we can do to reduce the threat and manage the risk

‘The following charts present the facts about who is attacking Americans and
the frequency of these attacks. These are not my facts, rather these charts are
drawn from information gathered by the FBI and the Diplomatic Security Service
of the U.S. Department of State:

1. There has been little terrorism in the United States. There have been no
significant acts of domestic terrorism this year. Chart #1 shows that the
number of domestic incidents has been falling since 1982. Eleven of the
incidents in 1997 were letter bombs sent to an Arabic newspaper office in
New York City and to Leavenworth prison. Fortunately, none of these


156

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In essence, it covers all cities in the United States at that time
that had a population over 144,000. It represented 22 percent of
the population at that time, and includes cities in 38 States and
the District of Columbia. It excludes 12 States. Thirty of the cities,
or 25 percent, are located in two States: California and Texas. Se-
lecting the 120 cities, as DOD did, resulted in clusters. There are
14 clusters that represent 44 cities that are within 30 miles of an-
other program city.

If you could look at the State of California, at the bottom, in one
of those clusters there are about 8 different cities that are all with-
in about 30 miles of another program city.

In Texas, in the Dallas area, there are four cities: Dallas, Fort
Worth, Irving, and Arlington, also, again, are clustered within 30
miles of another program city.

On the East Coast there’s another cluster in Virginia, the Tide-
Water area of Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Newport

ews.

To demonstrate a little about the clusters and some of the issues
that we want to talk about in program design, I’d like to now go
over to these charts and talk a little bit about it.

You can see the map of the State of California. The State of Cali-
fornia has organized into six mutual aid regions. They've organized
so that each of the regions or the areas are to help each other in
times of crisis. Whether the crisis be a terrorist incident, a fire,
flood, earthquake, whatever, they’re organized that way, and that’s
the way the State structure is.

Within region No. 1, at the bottom, there are a number of coun-
ties including Los Angeles County. In the State structure within
Los Angeles County, the principal person is the local sheriff. He
has responsibility for the 88 cities that are within that county, as
well as over 130 unincorporated areas.

Within Los Angeles County, the DOD approach was to select
three cities. They selected 3 of the 120 cities: Glendale, Los Ange-
les, and Long Beach. They targeted their program to those cities
rather than the county, the way it was structured.

The Los Angeles County people went to DOD and explained the
situation, how they were organized in the State, to try to see if
they could come up with a different arrangement. Unfortunately, it
didn’t work. DOD is stuck with their program of focusing, or tar-
geting the city. So in other words, within Los Angeles County, DOD
is going to make three separate trips; they will visit the cities of
Glendale, Los Angeles, and Long Beach. They will have three sepa-
rate training programs; they will have three separate deliveries of
equipment packages.

In nearby region 6 there are another five cities that are also
within 30 miles of another program city. So within that area you
basically have eight cities. In fact, in the State of California there
are 18 of the 120 cities. And under the approach the DOD is using,
the DOD will make 18 separate visits to the State; they will visit
18 cities; it will have 18 training programs and it will have 18
equipment packages.

Now, one of the other points I would like to make is that you say
30 miles; when you have an incident, it’s really important to get
there quickly and to be there onsite, and if you had to move by the


139

be a very effective tool by raising student awareness regarding recognition, coordination,
and response issues. The Domestic Preparedness training courses include:

«Emergency Responder Awareness
‘Emergency Responder Operations

© Technician/Hazardous Materials

‘© Technician/Emergency Medical Services
© Hospital Provider

Incident Command

* Senior Officials’ Workshop

The goal of the Domestic Preparedness Program is to train 120 cities by FYO1 and
to provide mechanisms for every community in the nation to leverage federal expertise.
Initial city visits are conducted to inform the cities about the program, to assist city
personnel in starting to better define their training requirements, and to allow for a better
understanding of the cities’ unique requirements. To date, the interagency team has
trained nearly 10,000 first responder trainers in 32 cities. The trainers are drawn from the
fire fighting, law enforcement, emergency medical and 911 operator/dispatcher
communities. Based on city and interagency feedback, we continually evaluate the initial
city visit and training approaches to improve them with each iteration.

In FY97, DoD spent $30.5 million on the training and civil response aspects of the
program. An additional $10.0 million was dedicated to improving CBIRF. In FY98,
Congress appropriated $50.0 million for the Domestic Preparedness Program. However,
the amount available for obligation was reduced to $43.2 million because of undistributed
reductions that were allocated 1o Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide programs.
‘The President's FY99 budget proposes $49.9 million for the program.

Funding appropriated pursuant to the program may be used for training purposes
only ~ there is no direct provision for acquiring WMD response equipment for state and
local agencies. However, DoD can loan equipment to state and local agencies for training
purposes. From NLD legislation funding, DoD is providing a long-term loan of up to
$300,000 in training equipment to each of the 120 cities trained in order to ensure that
first responders could be trained on appropriate equipment. Training equipment provided
by DoD under NLD legislation must be drawn from the following categories: personal
Protection equipment; detection equipment; decontamination and containment equipment;
and training aids, There is no requirement for states or local agencies to commit matching
funds to be eligible for this training equipment loan.

‘The Domestic Preparedness Program also included both a Helpline and Hotline.
The Helpline was activated on August 1, 1997 to provide access to chemical and


a7

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

‘Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss activities of the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in responding to the health and medical
effects of terrorism. I am Dr. Robert Knouss, Director of the DHHS Office of Emergency
Preparedness (OEP).

‘The fist link in the response chain to any terrorist incident in the United States will be
local in nature and will be supplemented by state and federal assistance. This is why local
capability and capacity building is absolutely crucial to reducing preventable mortality and
morbidity caused by terrorist attacks. The critical issues are the level of preparedness, rapidity of
response, and the integration of all levels of government that will result in either the success or
failure of our nation’s ability to respond to a major terrorist attack.

My remarks today are organized in the following manner: First, OEP’s role and the role
of the National Disaster Medical System; second, the Department's role in implementing the
Domestic Preparedness Program with emphasis on our “bottom up” strategy and the
development of local Metropolitan Medical Response Systems; third, the unique challenge to
public health systems to detect and respond to biological attacks; and fourth, some comments on

two recent GAO reports, one of which is still in draft,

OEP coordinates the health and medical emergency preparedness activities within DHHS,
and is the lead DHHS organization to coordinate disaster and emergency activities with other
federal agencies, including the FBI and DOD. DHHS is the primary agency that provides the

health and medical response under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal


153

communications systems with other government agencies and the general public, and stockpiles
of vaccines and antibiotics to treat exposed populations and prevent infection in others.

Mass patient care, mass fatality management, and environmental clean up may also be
required, The NDMS would mobilize to help assure that patients can access needed services.
Itmay be used to augment local medical resources, including pharmaceuticals, or it may assist in
assuring safe transportation of patients to other regions where the hospital systems have unused

capacity.

General Accounting Office Reports

IT would now like to offer a few comments about GAO's recent draft report on
“Combating Terrorism: Opportunities Exist to Gain Focus and Efficiencies in the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program” (September 1998).

The report made reference to the lack of a “sound assessment process, such as a threat
and risk assessment” for the 120 cities included in the program. 1 am concerned that threats are
evanescent - what may be Valid today may not be valid in the future, We believe that,
population density continues to be a valid basis for measuring risk. Within the funds available
for preparedness activities, this interagency approach has focused on population centers of our
nation in their descending order of size.

‘The report mentions that the training subcommittee formed by the interagency group
made little progress in compiling a list of terrorism related courses. DHHS's Public Health
Service (PHS) was represented on this DOD-led training subcommittee and through substantial


46

backfill shortfalls that have been able to grow over the debating
years.

Recognition that acts, including weapons of mass destruction
acts, can indeed occur in America have been a cornerstone of both
the Congress’ and the Clinton administration’s national security
agendas. There have been a number of recent initiatives, a number
of recent pieces of legislation and national security directives, and
Presidential decision directives on the subject, and I’m not going to
list them, but there are a couple that are important, the first one
being the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act. I also think that Public Law 104-182, the
Antiterrorism Act of last year, which Congress deserves a lot of
credit for passing, is a crucial one and the recent promulgation of
Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, which, aside from creat-
ing this National Coordinator, also focused on some of the WMD
threats as well as on critical infrastructure protection and cyber-
terrorism.

WMD terrorism has also figured prominently in every recent
DOD study, at least every major one, including the QDR, the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Science Board Summer
Study on Transnational Threats, and the NDP, the National De-
fense Panel.

Regarding the GAO report, per your specific question, on combat-
ing terrorism threat and risk assessments, and helping prioritize
and target program investments, I fully endorse conducting threat
and risk assessments to prioritize countermeasures to mitigate
vulnerabilities and manage risk. While I recognize, Mr. Chairman,
the committee’s desire to identify processes to best allocate finite
resources, I do not, however, believe that it is an effective mecha-
nism for selecting which cities qualify to receive NLD training and
equipment and when, based on the likelihood of an attack.

‘irst, this approach is subjective and contingent upon threat in-
telligence that is a moving target. Second, the bombing of the Al-
fred P. Murrah Building and the recent bombings in East Africa
are clear reminders that terrorists may strike when and where we
least expect them to. By it’s very nature, terrorism inherently ex-
tends the battlefield to incorporate all of society, and terrorists
often take the path of least resistance.

Furthermore, this approach merely displaces risk and forces the
terrorist, who is often flexible, to select a softer target, in this case
a city which did not receive the needed training and equipment.

For these reasons, I think we must work toward achieving a na-
tionwide baseline of common policies, plans, procedures, and re-
sources, irrespective of resource-rich or resource-poor environ-
ments. New York City, for example, has accomplished, or has dem-
onstrated, the urgency and the leadership needed to achieve what
must get done, even if it costs so politically. That cannot be said,
though, of other major metropolitan cities. And I was taken, by the
way, with the remark by the FBI in response of the GAO report
that, “Even the best prepared cities do not always have the inher-
ent capability to manage the potential magnitude of a WMD inci-

lent.”

In order to prioritize and allocate resources and assets, a better
approach, in my eyes, might be to, one, require the 120 cities origi-


6

STATEMENTS OF RICHARD DAVIS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SE-
CURITY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND _ INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVI D’AGOSTINO, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; LARRY C. JOHNSON, BERG AS-
SOCIATES, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; FRANK J.
CILLUFFO, SENIOR ANALYST, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; AND FREDERICK H. NESBITT, DI-
RECTOR OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL AS-
SOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS

Mr. Davis. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We thank you for the
opportunity to be here this morning to share some of our thoughts
on this very important topic that you mentioned. Sir, I would like
to submit my prepared statement for the record and I will just offer
some remarks in summary fashion.

Mr. SOUDER. Without objection, it will be so ordered and I will
do that for all witnesses who have written testimony and would
like to submit it.

Mr. Davis. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness
Program is an interagency program led by the Department of De-
fense which provides training equipment intended to prepare se-
lected cities to manage the consequences of a possible attack by ter-
rorists using weapons of mass destruction. We expect to issue a re-
port on these matters within the next few weeks.

It is worth noting that very recently, under National Security
Council initiative, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Justice, and other agency officials have been considering transfer-
ring lead responsibility for the Domestic Preparedness Program
from the Department of Defense to the Department of Justice.

Td like to offer comments this morning on four topics: first, pro-
gram training; second, how the program was designed; third, the
equipment component of the program; and last, the need for an
overall strategy.

Program training. Domestic Preparedness Program training

ives first responders a ater awareness of how to deal with
WM terrorist incidents. Local officials in the seven cities we vis-
ited praised the training program’s content, instructors, and mate-
rial, as well as DOD’s willingness to modify it based on suggestions
from local officials. They also credited the program with bringing
local, Federal, State, and regional emergency response agencies to-
gether into a closer working relationship.

By the end of this year, DOD expects to have trained about one-
third of the 120 cities it selected for the program. All training is
to be complete in 2001.

The second issue is program design. In designing the program,
DOD decided to select cities based on population. We have a map
over there on the right—hopefully, you can see it—a map of the
United States that lays out the 120 cities the DOD selected for this
program. The 120 cities are the cities with the largest population
based on the 1990 census.


40

Scarcity of resources may be a problem in some federal programs, such
is not the case in the field of terrorism. There are too many resources and too
many duplications of effort. Responsibility for dealing with chemical and
biological ‘weapons of mass destruction’, for example, is split among the U.S.
‘Amny Technical Escort Unit, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases, the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological incident Response
Force, and the Naval Medical Research Institute. In addition, the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency all claim to have
a critical role in the process. Meanwhile, the FBI has created its own hazardous
materials response unit. The FBI also has proposed building its own forensic
labs to handle chemical and biological agents even though facilities already
exist at the Center for Disease Control, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the National Institutes of Health, at Edgewood Arsenal, and U.S. Army Medical
Research institute of infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

‘We have many lead agencies but we do not have a single leader. DOD
has the lead for enhancing domestic preparedness. The FBI, by virtue of a
Presidential Decision Directive, has the lead for domestic terrorism while FEMA
has the lead for managing the consequence of terrorist incidents. In addition,
HHS has the lead for Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams, and the National
Guard now has been given the lead for creating ten regional response teams
Having lead agency authority should include the ability to coordinate budgets
and programs to ensure they are used efficiently and effectively.

Although the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act has provided ample resources to
prepare for the threat of chem-bio terrorism, it has inadvertently contributed to
bureaucratic chaos and duplication. As I noted earlier the general outlines of
the effort is sound—e., help train and equip first responders to deal with the
threat. | believe three fixes are in order:


120

sevanviogy. Also included were conference report instructions to work with the Texas A&M
University and the Nevada Test Site to further develop programs to assist state and local first
responders.

On April 30, 1998, the Attorney General, based on OJP's long-standing experience in
working with state and local jurisdictions, delegated the responsibility for administering these
initiatives to OJP, specifically to the Assistant Attorney General for OJP. At that same time, and
in an effort to consolidate OJP’s counterterrorism initiatives, the Metropolitan Firefighter and
Emergency Medical Services Program was moved from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to OJP.
With the authority for these initiatives placed in OJP, the Office for State and Local Domestic
Preparedness Support was established to implement these programs and work in partnership with
state, local, and federal agencies.

Mr. Chairman, we have made real progress in the litte less than four months since the
Attomey General signed the delegation of authority designating OJP as the Justice Department
agency responsible for that mission.

On June 1, 1998, we opened a newly created Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort
‘McClellan, Alabama dedicated to training state and local emergency responders in both basic and
advanced methods of responding to, and managing, incidents of domestic terrorism. In
particular, the Center, through its Chemical Defense Training Facility, will be offering advanced
training in the handling and management of live chemical agents. Even now in its initial stages
of operation, the Center has already trained over 450 First Responders in basic awareness,
incident command, and incident management.

Also in June, OJP announced a State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment


19

NUNN-LUGAR-DOMENICI INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION HAS BEEN LIMITED

‘The Congress intended the Domestic Preparedness Program to be an interagency effort
with DOD as lead agency. Under FEMA leadership, the Senior Interagency Coordination
Group provided a forum for DOD and the other involved agencies to share information
However, in developing the program, some member agency officials stated that DOD did
not always take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed to
dealing with state and local officials and more knowledgeable of domestic emergency
response structures. For example, some agency representatives said that they offered
Suggestions such as taking a metropolitan area approach and coordinating with state
emergency management agencies instead of dealing directly and only with cities. DOD
officials noted that because the group often did not react to DOD proposals or could not
achieve consensus on issues, DOD moved forward with the program without consensus

when necessary.

According to participants, the group did influence two decisions. DOD initially planned to
cover 20 cities in the first phase of the program, but the group raised the number to 27 so
that seven cities would be trained sooner than their population would otherwise warrant.
‘The seven cities were raised in priority to account for geographical balance, special
events, and distance from the continental United States. Also, concemed about DOD's
methodology and cities' presumed negative perceptions, the group recommended that.
DOD abandon its plan to have cities conduct a formal self-assessment of their capabilities

10


14

In our April 1998 report, we cited several public and private sector entities that use or
recommend threat and risk assessment processes to establish requirements and target
investments for reducing risk.‘ Although we recognize there are challenges to doing
threat and risk assessments of program cities, we believe that difficulties can be
overcome through federal-city collaboration and that these assessments would provide a

tool for making decisions about a prudent level of investment to reduce risks.

LINKING FUTURE TRAINING TO EXISTING STRUCTURES
COULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND ECONOMICAL

In implementing the Domestic Preparedness Program, DOD could leverage state
emergency management structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions, or
other collaborative arrangements for emergency response. By delivering the program to
cities based on population size, DOD is replicating training in nearby cities that might be
part of the same response system or mutual aid area. Because of such mutual aid
agreements and response districts or regions-as well as traditional state roles in both

training and the established federal response system-a more consolidated approach could

have resulted in fewer training iterations. Training in fewer locations while taking

Program Investments, (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). In that report, we recommended
that federal-city collaborative threat and risk assessments, facilitated by the FBI, be
included as part of the assistance provided in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program. The
pending national defense authorization legislation for fiscal year 1999 requires the
Attorney General, in consultation with the FBI and others, to develop and test
methodologies for conducting such assessments.


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Opening Statement of
the Honorable J. Deanls Hastert
Chairman

‘Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice
October 2, 1998

Good moming. I want to thank the Vice Chairman for chairing this hearing. We
are here today to examine another aspect of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. Our focus
today is on the domestic response to terrorism, which I believe is very timely given the
‘events that have occurred during the last few months.

To say that this issue “hits home” would be an understatement. Experts disagree
‘on the severity of the terrorist threat in the U.S., and some believe itis remote. However,
it has been the opinion of Congress that a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass
destruction has the potential to be so devastating that we must be fully prepared to
respond. As Members of the oversight committee, we have the important responsibility
of determining whether or not the Domestic Preparedness Program will adequately
prepare local fire, police, and emergency service personnel for such a terrible scenario.

‘This examination of the Domestic Preparedness Program is part of @
‘Subcommittee review of all Federal government terrorism-related programs. As part of
this investigation, we requested extensive information from the executive branch
regarding these programs. | would like to thank those departments and agencies that have
‘oo imety with ter ubmssion, which are coment under review by Suboommitie

‘Thank you Mr. Souder.



132

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of
Defense (DoD) role in the federal response to domestic terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Our comments will focus on actions taken to date by DoD to
provide the domestic emergency preparedness training mandated in Public Law 104-201,
better known as the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, or
‘Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Legislation. We will also discuss the integration of the
National Guard and other Reserve components into our preparedness plans, our efforts to
establish a single lead federal agency for domestic WMD preparedness, and our
comments on two GAO draft reports.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) serves as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense for policy oversight related to combating terrorism. In that capacity,
SO/LIC is responsible for overseeing the policy and resource aspects of DoD’s activities
in the Domestic Preparedness Program. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs (ASD(RA)) serves as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense on
all matters involving Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces. In that
capacity, RA is responsible for overall supervision of Reserve component affairs of DoD.
ASD(RA), in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), is responsible to integrate and rationalize
the WMD domestic preparedness training program with the program to equip first
responders with WMD-related equipment.

‘We have organized our remarks in the following manner: first, we will provide a
short overview of DoD’s combating terrorism program, describing how, in accordance
with Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, we support the Department of Justice
(Dol) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the crisis management phase of a
domestic terrorist incident and how we support the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) in the consequence management phase, second, we will discuss the
general DoD policy for domestic preparedness training for first responders; third, we will
update efforts to improve the National Guard and other Reserve component contributions
in the mission area; fourth, we will address DoD’s intent to transfer the domestic
preparedness program to DoJ; and finally, we will respond to the findings and
recommendations of the General Accounting Office reports, “Combating Terrorism:
Opportunities Exist to Gain Focus and Efficiencies in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program,” (currently in draft), and “Combating Terrorism: Threat
and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments.”

Before we begin, there are three critical points to make as background for our
discussion. First, DoD's combating terrorism program is part of a coordinated United
States Government (USG) interagency team response. No single agency possesses the
authorities, response mechanisms and capabilities to effectively deter or resolve terrorist
incidents. The Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for combating terrorism
overseas. Dol is the lead agency in the U.S, its trusts, and territories. Certainly, as a
major supporting agency, DoD brings a wealth of resources to the effort, unique and
highly sophisticated in many instances. In the United States we provide support to the


110

TO DISCUSS CURRENT FEDERAL DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS AND
TO PRESENT THEIR SUGGESTIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

THEY ASKED THAT A SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT BE DESIGNATED FOR
THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES THAT PROVIDE TRAINING, EQUIPMENT OR OTHER
ASSISTANCE FOR TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS TO STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES.

THEY SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION OF
‘TERRORISM-RELATED DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS AND
ACTIVITIES,

BECAUSE OF THE STRONG RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STATE AND
LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND THE DIRECTOR OF FEMA HAVE PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN A PROCESS:
TO TRANSITION THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ADDITIONALLY, THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH ALL PARTIES IN
‘SUPPORT OF THIS TRANSITION,

DOJ’S PROPOSED COORDINATING STRUCTURE WILL INCORPORATE
INPUT FROM THE FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN WMD
TERRORISM AND CREATE A FORMAL ADVISORY RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRST
RESPONDER STAKEHOLDERS.

THE ACTUAL DETAILS REGARDING THE STRUCTURE AND STAFFING OF


69

the IAFF's training program is due to our cadre of highly qualified fire
fighter trainers, who travel the nation training their colleagues. No one
knows how to train fire fighters, like fire fighters.

Joint Exercises Are Needed With Other Emergency Agencies--Real
world emergency response does not take place in a vacuum, so it makes
little sense to train fire fighters as if they are isolated from their
environment. Too often training programs fail to account for the other
personnel who will play a role in the event of an actual terrorist incident.
Most significant among these other groups is law enforcement who often
arrive on a scene simultaneously with fire fighters. The ability of fire
fighters and police to interact efficiently is crucial. The IAFF believes the

most efficient way to ensure coordination and interoperability is to

conduct joint training exercises as part of counterterrorism preparedness.
Equipment is an Integral Part of Training Exercises--Specialized
equipment is 4 staple of counterterrorism emergency response work, and
fire fighters must be adequately trained in the use of such equipment.
Counterterrorism training programs should go hand-in-hand with
programs to help local jurisdictions obtain appropriate emergency
response equipment. In this regard, we are pleased to note that the FY ‘99
Commerce, State, Justice Appropriation bill proposes to increase federal
spending on fire fighter equipment in its counterterrorism account. We
urge the members of this Committee to support that effort, and build on it
in future years.




143

bureaucratic process at the city level is such that each city will likely exhaust its integral
resources before calling on regional actors for support,

‘The GAO proposal assumes that sufficient data is available to conduct threat and
risk assessments. That is not the case. Given what little data is available and our
experience with post-operational analysis in the wake of terrorist attacks, we do not
believe a credible pre-attack predictor is available. DoD does not have the information to
assume a particular city is a target nor can we identify targets within cities. We have
asked the FBI, the lead federal agency for domestic intelligence, about specific WMD
threats to NLD cities and found no specific identifiable threat. The threat and risk
assessment described in the report is intended for point targets with controlled perimeters
and intemal traffic, i.e. airports. Cities are area targets with virtually no control over
entry, exit or internal traffic.

‘Mandated assessments are not appropriate for the NLD program. NLD cities
conduct a self-assessment prior to the initial city visit and determine their training and
equipment requirements. DoD does not support withholding equipment until cities
comply with an assessment mandate, The NLD program is an element of consequence
management. Training is directed at responses to terrorist attacks. ‘The program
described in the report is defensive in nature and directed toward pre-attack anti-terrorism
actions.

DoD recommended that GAO approach the issue of threat and risk assessments
from a different perspective - from outside NLD and as part of a generational process to
improve protection. As the report identified, the Defense Special Weapons Agency
(DSWA) conducts assessments on U.S. military facilities. The General Services
Administration (GSA) has purview over U.S. Government buildings and may be
interested in reviewing the newly developed anti-terrorism standards that DoD applies to
military facilities and DSWA’s assessment process. The GSA can then make its own
judgment on our standards and assessment process and its value and application to other
federal facilities. The GSA, in cooperation with FEMA, might also consider making U.S.
Government standards and assessment methodologies available through the states to
cities (and the private sector) as a paradigm for unmandated, voluntary anti-terrorism
improvements.

‘The Department of Defense has made tremendous progress in developing and
providing comprehensive and integrated WMD consequence management response and
training for cities. The goal of the Domestic Preparedness Program is to train 120 cities
byFYO1. At that juncture, we expect that city and state first responder training programs
will have incorporated these concepts (the NBC delta) into their own courses so that all
new first responders will routinely be trained on WMD terrorism considerations.


10

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work and observations on the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and related issues. This interagency
program, led by the Department of Defense (DOD) provides training and equipment
intended to better prepare selected cities to manage the consequences of a possible
attack by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).' We expect to issue a
report on these matters within the next few weeks. It is worth noting that very recently,
under a National Security Council initiative, DOD, Department of Justice, and other
agency officials have been considering transferring lead responsibility for the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program from DOD to the Department of Justice.

Today, I will discuss program objectives and costs,the training DOD is providing to local
emergency response personnel, issues we identified on the way the program is structured
and designed, the equipment segment of DOD's program, and interagency coordination of
this and other related programs. As requested, we also have some observations about the
congressional committee structure for oversight of counterterrorism and other
crosscutting issues.

"The program was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997. For purposes of this statement, WMD refers to chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear devices.


141

characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use. DoD has supported FEMA in the
development of the database by providing technical expertise needed to prepare the database.
FEMA will update the database annually.

Access to this database is available through FEMA's Intemet site
(www.FEMA.Govirris). It is currently available on the Internet system as is a database on
radiological materials. These two databases work on a keyword search system.

Access to supplemental technical information is also available through FEMA’s Internet
site. This information includes a descriptive listing of current NBC unique equipment
used by federal agencies; information on Improvised Explosive Devices; an intemet
reference library of NBC-related resources; background information on the agencies that.
were involved in the development of the RRIS; and 2 comment page for user feedback
and recommendations.

Information requests concerning excess and/or surplus property are accessed
through an Intemet connection to the GSA-maintained State Agency for Surplus Property
(SASP) web page. State and local government agencies should coordinate their efforts
for acquiring excess and surplus property and equipment through their designated SASP.

DoD has made tremendous progress in developing and providing comprehensive
and integrated WMD consequence management response and training for cities.
‘However, as the program bas developed, the need for one-stop shopping in the Domestic
Preparedness Program has become evident, At a recent DoJ sponsored forum, over 200
state and local emergency response planners requested that the President identify a single
lead federal agency to implement the domestic preparedness programs and activities of
this nation. The National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism,
the Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of FEMA have
agreed in principle to that concept.

‘Toward that end, DoD has proposed to transfer its current Domestic Preparedness
Program responsibilities to Dol, who would then become the lead federal agency for first
responder training and related activities as specified in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
legislation. DoD and DoJ hope to accomplish the transfer as soon as legally permissible
but no later than October 1, 1999. This transfer would designate a single lead federal
agency to be responsible for the overall coordination and implementation of terrorism-
related domestic preparedness programs and activities.

The four major components of the program proposed in the transfer to DoJ are:
the city training program, the training equipment loan program, the exercise program, and
portions of the expert assistance program.

Under this transfer concept, DoD will, in its support role, provide needed
technical support, assistance and expertise; establish RAID teams; continue efforts to
improve other WMD support capabilities in the Reserve; and continue to provide crisis


29

through the testimony, you'll see you have a lead agency for a vari-
ety of categories, but you have so many lead agencies; there’s no
one single leader. I would see that the duplication of effort, particu-
larly in the hazardous material area, is silly. Firefighters are very
well equipped, maybe not as well equipped as they should be, but
quite competent to handle that mission. I think there should be one
national response team. We don’t need 10 national regional guards,
National Guard units. We don’t need hazardous material units
from EPA. We don’t need the FBI hazardous material team on top
of that. There should be one and some organizations brought to
this chaos.
{The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]}


166
be having a similar model, and you're saying it’s not exactly like

it.

I'm a little confused, because it appears that you just said that
you have some kind of a way that you're sorting through whether
one area might need this equipment or not. And if so, why wouldn’t
that be partly determining who's going to get some of the training?
And if so, why wouldn’t that go down to the local level a little bit?
Because, obviously, if you have a nuclear launch facility near you,
such as they have in some areas, or if you have major chemical
plants, or if you have potential pass—I mean, I don’t know what’s
in that mix. gould you describe that?

Mr. DaLicH. I guess in answer to your question, we started off
with a universe of 120 that we were already dealing with, and that
was not a factor. The risk or threat assessment was not a factor
in the creation of that list; it was strictly on the largest jurisdic-
tions. Within that, we didn’t have enough money to award everyone
grants, and we used this as a way to determine which ones were
best prepared to use the money and were in most need of it. It was
a process of sorting out which of the grantees would be able to get
what part of the $12 million, and we didn’t have enough to do it
for them all. It seemed logical to us to take a look at that.

Mr. SoupER. I agree, it seems logical. It just seemed logical in
some of the other parts too, and that’s what some of our discussion
is. Because, that was part of the question is—if we could do some
consolidations—the population isn’t the worst way to do this, be-
cause every big city—the bigger the city, the more types of places
that a terrorist could hit, and the more potential terrorists there
are in that city for domestic terrorism.

At the same time, by clustering some of the training, even if you
wound up giving each of those subdivisions their $300,000 to
$350,000, presumably, you might be able to extend the training
faster at least and maybe even to more areas, and particularly if
there are cities down the list who may have a higher threat assess-
ment, which you just implied it wasn’t just in the numerical order
of the size of the city. That’s one of the questions we've been rais-
ing.

If I may, I'd like—did you want to go?

Mr. BARRETT. Go ahead.

Mr. SoupER. I wanted to followup on two things with Mr. Blitzer
here yet, and I appreciate we’ve had you here a long time. One is
that you were quoted earlier this year as saying that you felt a lot
of people, agencies in particular, had suddenly discovered a terror-
ism role. Having been quoted in the media myself, I know some-
times frustrations, but it suggests that you too—and you also ex-
pressed in another story, what you've expressed here, and that is
that you were hearing from local agencies that they need one-stop-
shopping, there needs to be more coordination.

Could you explain a little bit what you meant by that? Who
might be some of the people that you feel we could look at in whit-
tling down and saying this needs to be consolidated more?

ir. BLITZER. Well, I wish I could remember every quote that was
thrown out there. But I think that certainly over the last couple
of years, particularly with this WMD incident, that many organiza-
tions now see themselves as part of terrorism or a counterterrorism


98

Mr. SoupeER. Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CiLLUFFO. I agree. PDD 39, which clearly assigned roles and
missions, and reaffirmed roles and missions, did give the FBI the
lead Federal ag ncy for all terrorism occurring in the United States
or on U.S. soil, and FEMA, the consequence management phase.
However, as most real-world events would prove, there is no pass-
ing off the baton from the crisis management phase to consequence
management phase. They’re running side-by-side simultaneously.

I think that was a misjudgment on this Presidential decision di-
rective. You’re going to be doing the investigations while you're
saving lives. Saving lives is priority No. 1 for any agency, regard-
less of the case. You also have to maintain the evidence to identify
the perpetrators.

But when you're dealing with WMD—the reason I mentioned
DOD to remain as the executive agent is they have the expertise;
they have the experience; they have the capabilities and the assets
that can be brought to bear that others do not. I’m not saying to
give them lead Federal agency on anything CONUS, but what Iam
saying is that (a) you’re building upon something and that you
don’t have to start from scratch; (b) if you’re dealing with a major
event or campaign of events, CONUS, within the United States, I
don’t think too many people will be questioning as to who suddenly
is responsible to deal with how we handle it. Clearly, the Depart-
ment of Defense would be the agency that has the assets that can
be brought to bear and to respond to the crisis.

I think that one of the challenges is to identify when do you hand
off, pass the baton within the United States. If it’s a major event,
the assets just can’t be brought to bear outside of the Department
of Defense.

Mr. NEsBITT. First of all, we’ve seen some of the DOD training;
we've seen some other training, and while they've got some good
elements, they're certainly inadequate for what we think the cri-
teria ought to be. I think you also need to keep in mind that when
you've got a terrorist incident—as I said, the fire department and
the law enforcement are the first ones to respond—the commander
of the fire service, the fire chief, or whoever the commander is, re-
mains the incident commander of that whole incident. He is in
charge of that particular incident.

We're concerned with operational response, initially to respond to
that particular emergency. Then comes the question of law enforce-
ment and crime, and has there been a crime, and has it turned into
a criminal investigation?

We go back to our testimony again, and we think the lead agen-
cy, from our point of view, in terms of response at the local level
and as far as training and who’s in charge and who can best coordi-
nate it, we believe it should be FEMA.

Mr. SouDER. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BarreTT. Thank you. I want to just spend a couple of min-
utes on the loan equipment program and make sure I understand.
Then I’ve got the three fundamental questions.

Mr. Davis. Sure. OK.

Mr. BarrETT. It’s $300,000 worth of training equipment for each
Participating city? Is that the way the program——

Mr. Davis. That’s right. It’s roughly $300,000.


140

biological experts on a routine, non-emergency basis. The Helpline furnishes non-
‘emergency expert advice to state and local emergency responders, planners and other
need-to-know customers. Operators have the capability to access and retrieve information
quickly, and distribute it by a variety of means including fax and e-mail. The Helpline is
staffed weekdays from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m, Eastern Time,

The Helpline operators require all callers to undergo a one-time verification
procedure. The first time a caller contacts the Helpline, operators will request information
‘on the caller's organization and supervisor. Prior to releasing information, the operator will
confirm the caller's eligibility for this information. All subsequent calls from that specific
individual will not require this procedure.

DoD's 24-hour Hotline provides access 10 expert assistance in the event of a
chemical or biological emergency. DoD signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the
National Response Center, which provides for the transfer of emergency calls concerning
‘chemical and biological WMD to the CBDCOM/MRMC emergency operations center
and to the FBI simultaneously.

DoD has established a network of specialized chemical and biological defense
‘experts for the purpose of providing technical advice and data to answer specialized
Helpline and Hotline inquiries. Access to nuclear expertise in DOE continues to be
available through the DOE 24-hour emergency operations center.

DoD also supports the Domestic Preparedness web site (w»nw.nbe-prepare.org),
which provides accurate, helpful information to officials, emergency responders and the
general public. It can link requests for Domestic Preparedness training or catalogs
directly to the Helpline, to the web page created for emergency first responders, to
additional relevant information sites, and can provide direct linkage of media inquiries to
the CBDCOM public affairs office

FEMA has compiled a master inventory containing information on the resources
and capabilities owned by each of the FRP agencies that would be made available for use
to aid state and local officials in emergency situations involving WMD. The master
inventory includes assets associated with search and rescue, detection and analysis,
personne! protection, medical treatment, monitoring and decontamination.

Access to FRP departments’ and agencies’ inventory listings is available through
the FEMA Internet using an Intemet web server that is part of the National Emergency
‘Management Information System. Access is limited to authorized federal and state
‘emergency planners. Authorized users include FRP agency representatives, the FEMA
regional offices, and the state emergency management offices. Access to the system that
contains the inventory listings requires a user identification and password.

FEMA, with the support of DoD and other agencies, has prepared a database, which
provides a source of information on chemical and biological agents, munitions


91

how will that be handled? Once we figured out what they had, we
came back and sat within the interagency community, figured out
what it was the United States could do, and went out and offered
a package. I think that’s along the lines of what GAO is offering.

This notion that we’re going to predict what people are going to
do with terrorist acts I think is fanciful. I worked in the intel-
ligence community; I wish we had that kind of intelligence. You
rarely get it. When the bomb goes off and the debris is raining
down on people, then we say we have a problem.

Instead of worrying about predicting, we need to continue efforts
to try to anticipate. However, let’s recognize the more likely sce-
nario is we’re going to be picking up the pieces and let’s put in
place some capabilities to deal with that possibility. But what has
happened is, instead of a national hazardous material training pro-
gram, you’ve got at least three different agencies that I’m aware of,
and maybe more. I don’t think we have a good handle on everybody
that’s offering that capability, not to mention what DOD has in
both the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit and the Marine Corps
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. You’ve had this pro-
liferation of agencies that now want to get into the game.

I think the risk assessment/threat assessment process requires
sitting down and figuring out on a State-by-State basis, dealing
with the Governors first, what do States have in place? Then let’s
work through those States. I mean, at least you have 50 points of
contact to start with, which makes it somewhat more manageable
than 120 cities. But I think there’s a way to bring some rationality
to this.

I would note FEMA has provided a very good parallel; it’s dealt
very effectively with hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes. So, the
issue of dealing with the consequences from terrorism are not that

istinct.

Mr. SoupER. Thank you.

Mr. Davis, I’m going to, first, get into some equipment loan ques-
tions. The Department of Defense loans $300,000, which in reality
they’re really granting, because it can be used, and HHS is giving
$350,000. Are these the same types of things? Could they be com-
bined as opposed to two different grants? What is your feeling?

Mr. Davis. Some of it is identical-type equipment. There is some
overlap, but there are some differences, too. For example, in the
Public Health Service program, there are some pharmaceutical and
medical supplies that are not included in the DOD package.

Mr. SouDER. What would be some overlap?

Mr. Davis. For example, both of them have personal protection
equipment, some detection equipment, some decontamination
equipment. These would be some examples of the overlap.

Mr. Souper. In any of your research did you find that this was
confusing to local authorities, how to mix and match?

Mr. Davis. Absolutely. In fact, some of the questions or observa-
tions we got—they used the phrase a couple of times that they
would like to have “one-stop shopping.” They now had to deal with
at least two different organizations, the Department of Defense and
HHS, in terms of reviewing equipment lists, deciding what they
wanted, getting back to at least two different agencies in this case.


ot

OBJECTIVES AND COSTS OF
THE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

The Domestic Preparedness Program is aimed at enhancing domestic preparedness to
respond to and manage the consequences of potential terrorist WMD incidents. The
authorizing legislation designated DOD as lead agency, and participating agencies include
FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Health and Human Services’ Public
Health Service, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
‘The Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command designed a “train-the-trainer”
program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of local first responders-fire,
law enforcement, and medical personnel and hazardous materials technicians-who would
deal with a WMD incident during the first hours. The legislation also designated funds for
the Public Health Service to establish Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams to help improve
cities' medical response to a WMD incident. Other aspects of the program included
systems to provide information and advice to state and local officials and a

chemical/biological rapid response team.

DOD received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement its part of the program, and
the Public Health Service received an additional $6.6 million. DOD's fiscal year 1998 and
1999 budgets estimate that $43 million and $50 million, respectively, will be needed to
continue the program. DOD expects the last 2 years of the 5-year program to cost about
$14 million to $15 million each year, and continuing an exercise program for 2 more years
could add another $10 million. Thus, the total projected program cost for the DOD


97

committee, we fund the drug czar’s office. He has some control, but
even that, it’s hard for a “czar” reporting to the President to be
able to really move a Defense Department, for example, yet alone
other agencies. Mr. Davis.

Mr. Davis. Sure. As you know, they’re talking about moving the
program from the Department of Defense to some other place, and
some people say it might be within the Department of Justice. We
haven't seen the details of that plan, but from our perspective, we
would hope to see that there would be a process, in which we con-
sider all of the alternatives. In fact, we heard a couple of people
this morning talk about FEMA. I think that you can make a very
good case for sending it to FEMA because they have the statutory
and otherwise lead responsibility for consequence management.
Also, they're tied into the fire academies and the structures that
exist in the State and local jurisdictions.

I think that, in considering all the alternatives, you might even
be able to make a case for EPA, because EPA has responsibility for
the hazardous material incidence responses. WMD could be just an-
other evolution of that or an extension of that response capability.
I think that you could also make an argument for transferring the
program to the Department of Justice, because there are some
parts of the Department of Justice that deal with training pro-
grams, have equipment components to their programs, and there
would be some advantages to consolidating some of them.

I think the important thing from our perspective is that we con-
sider all the different options, and the pros and cons laid on the
table, and reasonable decisions be made.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JoHNSON. I think that not all of the functions need to be con-
solidated into one place, but there does need to be a solid lead
agency concept working. It’s worked fairly effectively overseas be-
cause, in events where we have the Ambassador in charge and
there’s a handoff to a military on-the-scene commander, it’s a very
stylized kabuki dance that, if they get into a disagreement, they go
up their chains of command, so that the President ultimately does
resolve this. That kind of structure is not in place domestically.

Because the FBI is the lead agency for handling terrorism, in my
view, it ought to be genuinely the lead agency over all of this,
which includes consequence management, crisis management, do-
mestic preparedness. But that is not saying that the FBI should
have all of those functions, because the fact of the matter is FEMA
does the domestic preparedness better than the FBI. The real dan-
ger with the FBI heading it is in the past they haven't always
worked and played well with others; they didn’t get the good mar!
that you did in kindergarten. They tend to ignore other agencies.

The really good news here is that the U.S. Government has a
vast, wonderful resource of personnel, talent, and capability. When
you look at the array that’s there through EPA, through FEMA,
through Health and Human Services, through Department of De-
fense, I think it would be a mistake to take the response for chem-
bio incidents out of DOD because Department of Defense has that
expertise. So, what I am advocating is let FBI be lead agency, but
let’s let each agency that has those unique capabilities use those
in a way that’s most efficient.


102

though we're seeing fewer attacks, we're seeing a lot of people hurt
during specific attacks. This is, of course, of great concern to us.

The first category of threat stems from State sponsors. State
sponsors include the countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya,
Cuba, and North Korea. Put simply, these nations view terrorism
as a tool of foreign policy and many of these countries do have
WMD capabilities, or at least are working hard on them.

The second category of international terrorist threat is made up
of formalized terrorist organizations, such as the Hizballah, the
Egyptian Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas.
They’re able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns on an inter-
national basis.

The third category of international terrorist threats stems from
loosely affiliated extremists characterized by rogue terrorists such
as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef of the World Trade Center and inter-
national terrorist financier Osama Bin Ladin. These loosely affili-
ated extremists may pose the most serious threat to the United
States because they are often difficult for law enforcement and the
intelligence community to penetrate or tract. They also can exploit
the mobility, the technology, and rapid transportation, and a fluid
organizational structure.

‘he FBI believes that the threat posed by international terrorists
in each of these categories will continue for the foreseeable future.
In the face of these threats, the Federal Government, through the
Domestic Preparedness Program, has elevated the awareness of the
Nation’s first responders with the possibility of WMD terrorism.
Federal, State, and local responders now participate in a coopera-
tive dialog and have come to realize that an effective response to
terrorism requires a unified approach by all relevant authorities.

Our Special Agents-in-Charge across the country—as you know,
we're located in 56 different field divisions, as well as over 400 resi-
dent agencies—have undertaken new responsibilities to coordinate
beyond the traditional law enforcement community efforts and to
begin useful purposeful liaison with members of the fire/hazmat
emergency medical and consequence planning community. Through
the execution of this program, we and our interagency partners
have placed the utmost importance upon delivering a program that
will enhance capabilities of first responders to safely and effectively
respond to a terrorist incident.

To specifically solicit first responder input—and this has been
fairly recent—the Department of Justice convened a State and local
stakeholders’ forum here in Washington, DC. This was from the en-
tire crisis and consequence management community—police, fire,
Office of Emergency paredness, et cetera. More than 200 State
and local emergency response planners and practitioners from
across the Nation were invited to discuss current and Federal do-
mestic preparedness efforts and to present their suggestions to the
Attorney General. They asked that a single point of contact, one-
stop shopping, as someone on the prior panel mentioned, be des-
ignated for the various initiatives that provide training, equipment,
or other assistance for terrorist and preparedness for both State
and local authorities. They specifically proposed that the Depart-
ment of Justice become responsible for the overall implementation
of terrorism-related domestic preparedness programs and activities.


118

+ Second, OJP will offer a broad spectrum of training to ensure that state and local
emergency response personnel and public officials have the knowledge, skills, and
abilities to enable them to respond well if such incidents occur. DoD will
‘continue to finance the Nunn-Lugar training through FY 2000, after which the
program will shift to DOI (i.., FY 2001).

+ And, third OJP will offer technical assistance to state and local personnel to help
in sharing the information to make the critical decisions domestic preparedness
requires.

‘OJP’s legislative authority for this mission is found in two separate laws passed by the
Congress. The first is the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” and the
second is the “Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998.”

Under Section 819 of the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” the
Attomey General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), is authorized to fund training programs for metropolitan fire and emergency
service departments to enable these agencies to better respond {o terrorist acts.

‘Under the Section 819 authority, which was originally implemented by OJP’s Bureau of
Justice Assistance and now directly by OJP’s new office, we have developed a “Metropolitan
Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services Training Program.” Under this program, which
hhas been funded at $5 million in both Fiscal Year 1997 and Fiscal Year 1998, OJP, in partnership
with FEMA, has trained or has scheduled to be trained over 101,000 fire and emergency medical

service personnel.


65

We therefore have been extremely pleased that in the last few years
Congress and the Administration have increasingly turned their attention
to emergency response issues. While this attention is an important step in
the right direction, much remains to be done. Additional resources are
needed, and the allocation of those resources must be refocused to have

the greatest impact on domestic preparedness.

I would like to divide my remarks into two general areas. First, I wish to
offer the fire fighters’ perspective on the most effective way to provide
terrorism emergency response training. I would hope that these
comments will help guide this committee as it reviews existing terrorism
programs. Second, I wish to share some specific concerns we have
regarding the training carried out under the Defense Department Domestic
Preparedness Program, an area which I understand to be of particular

interest to this committee.

TRAINING FOR TERRORISM EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Additional Resources are Needed--The first and most salient point
that needs to be stressed regarding training for emergency response to a
terrorist act is that there needs to be more of it. Much more. Despite the
array of programs that have been developed in recent years, we have only
just begun the process of assuring that our nation’s emergency response

personnel are adequately trained.

The IAFF supports the approach taken by the Departments of Justice and

Defense targeting the nation’s 120 largest jurisdictions, but current


71

emergency response community who are selected by the locality. These

local trainers then go out and train the rest of the employees with

emergency response responsibilities.

The second aspect is an equipment distribution program which makes
$300,000 available to cach selected community to purchase specialized
emergency response equipment. This equipment is an integral part of the

training program.

The program's eventual goal of establishing 120 adequately trained and
equipped jurisdictions is a long term objective, spread over several years.
In FY ‘98 for example, 26 cities were selected for the training program
(although the IAFF is concerned by reports that even this modest goal
proved too much for the allocated resources. One source told us that the

program reached only 17 jurisdictions this year).

While there are some admirable aspects of this program, such as its use of
fire fighters to perform training and its equipment distribution program,
on the whole the program has been surprisingly ineffective.

The first, and most significant, problem is that the program does not
provide appropriate training for first responders. Our members who have
gone through the course complain that its curriculum focuses largely on
the problems of a terrorist incident, without providing solutions. One
typical reaction came from a member who said that he would rate the
program as a "7 out of 10° if its intent is to encourage fire fighters to

understand the importance of terrorism emergency response training, but


16

Similarly, as shown in appendix Ill, Virginia has 13 regional hazardous materials teams to
respond to a WMD incident. Through these regional teams operating under state control,
four adjacent program cities-Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Newport News, and Chesapeake—
would assist one another along with Portsmouth and Hampton, which are not program

cities.

Texas has four program cities less than 30 miles from each other: Dallas, Fort Worth,
Irving, and Arlington. In yet another example, the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
established a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team with a council-of-govemments approach
involving six jurisdictions in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia-these
jurisdictions would support each other in the event of a WMD incident. DOD treats
Washington, D.C., and Arlington, Virginia, separately for the training and equipment
segments of the program. Similar strike teams in other cities are designed to be

integrated into the local emergency response and medical systems for that particular area.

In response to comments by state and local officials, DOD began holding regional
meetings to introduce the program. Nevertheless, each program city still receives its own
training and equipment package. Cities may invite representatives from neighboring
jurisdictions and state agencies, but classroom space is limited, and if the neighboring

city is a program city, it will eventually receive its own on-site training.


160

on. But I will mention to you, as a prelude to my comment, that
next week we're going to have a 2-day conference where we're
bringing in some of the people we’ve been working very closely with
at the State and local level to help us to put the concept down for
this office.

The consortium that you mentioned I think plays an important
role. And I say that to you because we were just discussing the
training, and certainly, that consortium has a tremendous amount
of assets that can be brought to bear. Some of the things that we
as a group have discussed here in recent months and perhaps over
the last year, is how are we going to do this training in the long
term. How are we going to do this—it’s big. It’s a lot more than
I think certainly we’re doing right now, and we discussed distance
learning; we've discussed satellite broadcast. These are the kinds
of things that perhaps could outreach. Some of the members of the
consortium have, excellent facilities that we can leverage that kind
of training out of.

So I think that’s the direction that we’d like to go, and to use
those assets, and leverage them, and whatever else may be out
there that, at this time, we just don’t know about. But, that’s a
pretty tight community. They've been pretty helpful to us so far,
and I certainly think all of us here have a very open mind in terms
of, again, leveraging what they know into further training efforts.

Mr. BarRETT. This is Congressman Turner’s second question: I
understand that there is also an office within DOJ which deals
with State and local domestic preparedness. Is the function of
training the Nation’s first responders going to reside within the of-
fice? And, can you elaborate on the role of this office regarding co-
ordination with the National Domestic Preparedness Office and the
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium’s capabilities.

mt BLITZER. That might be better for Mike to answer, than for

ir. DALICH. Our office, the Office of Justice Programs, is the of-
fice that conducts the training. We’re working very directly with
the consortium members—Texas A&M, LSU, New Mexico Institute,
the Nevada test site—having them do some of our training. We'll
continue to do that. We will work under the operational planning
and direction of the FBI office. They will set the frameworks, deter-
mine where they want a product delivered, how they would like to
see it delivered. And our job, as the organization that deals with
State and local government, is to get the program on the road,
make it be in compliance with the various Federal regulations, but
it will be under the direct policy leadership of the FBI.

Mr. BarRETT. And I'll follow that up, Mr. Dalich, with a very pa-
rochial question of my own. You mentioned, and in your testimony,
you made reference to Texas A&M, the Nevada test site, Louisiana
State University, and the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology. I’m from Wisconsin, Mr. Souder’s from Indiana, and
I'm just curious—it sort of jumped out at me as a Southern, South-
western vantage.

Mr. DALIcu. Some of this was legislatively mandated.

Mr. BaRRETT. That’s not a shocker. [Laughter.]


99

Mr. BARRETT. There are 120 cities?

Mr. Davis. 120 cities.

Mr. BARRETT. Has each of these cities taken advantage of the
program?

Mr. Davis. Well, by December this year, one-third of the cities
will have received their training. The equipment is following the
training. I’m sure there’s only a handful of cities that have the ac-
tual equipment. They’re beginning to get it in, but they don’t have
all the equipment today.

Mr. BARRETT. Am I correct in assuming that all 120 cities will
take advantage of it?

Mr. Davis. Absolutely. In fact, the response that we’re getting,
for example, to our draft report that’s out to the agencies for com-
ments, which we also sent to the cities that we dealt with, came
back favorably. They’re supportive of the positions that we’ve taken
and they’re supportive of building on existing State and local struc-
tures. At the same time, they’re saying we sure want that equip-
ment, though; don’t take that equipment from us.

Mr. BARRETT. Knowing my local officials, I’d be surprised if they
didn’t say that.

Mr. Davis. Right. [Laughter.]

Mr. BARRETT. I know Mr. Souder asked a couple of questions, so
I apologize if these are redundant. There’s a corresponding, if you
will, program, Health and Human Services program. Can you tell
me about that program?

Mr. Davis. Well, there’s a program with Health and Human
Services that’s lead by the Public Health Service, that is also pro-
viding what they call Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams. They
also want to be able to provide equipment to 120 local jurisdictions.

Mr. BARRETT. The same 120 that’s there for the use of ——

Mr. Davis. Right. And right now they provide a certain number
of them; I don’t know the exact amount. I think they’re following
the DOD in terms of the first 27 cities; then they’re trying to build
it up to 120 cities. First, they follow DOD with the first 27; then
they want to get up to 120.

Some of the equipment components are overlapping. We talked
about that earlier. But some of it is very different. The issues that
we're dealing with at the State and local level are that they find
that cumbersome in terms of having to deal with different agency
people and to look at more lists. There’s not, as they refer to it,
one-stop shopping. They’d like to be able to have one-stop shopping.

Mr. BARRETT. In the Department of Health and Human Services
program, what’s the amount that a city is eligible for?

ir. Davis. Well, it’s averaging about $350,000 a city. It’s some-
what of a sliding scale, but it’s an average.

Mr. BaRRETT. And is that a program where each city is eligible
to get the money, or will some cities not get it? In other words, will
all 120 cities take advantage of that program?

Mr. Davis. Right, if it is expanded. It’s a contract grant, unlike
the DOD program which is basically a loan program.

Mr. BARRETT. OK.

Mr. Davis. One of the real issues that we’re hearing from the
locals—and they used the term “unfunded mandate”—is that the
legislation allows DOD to loan equipment to the cities for training-


21

as the separate DOD and Public Health Service programs and the new Department of
Justice equipment grant program are causing frustration and confusion at the local level
and are resulting in further complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has

no coordinated plan or defined end state for domestic preparedness.

Both equipment portions of the program, which were designed and implemented
separately, cover personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment. The
separation of the $300,000 worth of DOD equipment and the average $350,000 Public
Health Service equipment and pharmaceuticals required local officials to deal with two
federal agencies’ requirements and procedures. It also required local officials to develop
separate equipment lists and to ensure compatibility and interoperability of the
‘equipment, optimize the available federal funding, and avoid unnecessary duplication. A
truly joint, coordinated equipment program could have alleviated the administrative
burden on city officials and lowered the level of confusion and frustration. Although the
Public Health Service circulated cities' proposed equipment lists among the Domestic
Preparedness interagency partners for comments, this coordination at the federal level did

little to simplify the process for the cities.

State and local officials and some national fire fighter organizations also raised concerns
about the growing number of response elements being formed, including the new
initiative to train and equip National Guard units, These officials did not believe

specialized National Guard units would be of use because they could not be on site in the

12


ATS

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

‘Weapons of Mass Destruction And U.S. Preparedness

‘Statement of
Frank J. Cilluffo
Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Project
Co-Director, Terrorism Task Force
Center for Strategic & International Studies
to the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice
U.S, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
2 October 1998

Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Members, [ appreciate the opportunity to discuss weapons of
‘mass destruction (WMD) terrorism and U.S. preparedness. I am especially grateful given the
role played by CSIS and the Global Organized Crime Project in helping formulate the issues
‘eventually taken up in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) legislation.

I would like to first make a few comments regarding the current state of the threat, recent U.S.
initiatives with respect to domestic preparedness, and the findings and recommendations of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) report on threat and risk assessments. I would also like to
offer some observations and recommendations aimed at enhancing our government-wide
capabilities to plan for, respond to, and manage the consequences of WMD terrorism.

Regarding the threat, there has been a great deal of discussion on the “changing face” of
terrorism and the impact of advanced technology on terrorists’ ways of doing business.

Without elaborating on the specificities of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical), which are very different from one another and pose extraordinary
challenges, they do share certain commonalities. Terrorism is multifaceted and differs from
‘group to group and incident to incident. Yet the single common denominator is that it is a
psychological weapon, intended to erode trust and undermine confidence in our government, its
elected officials, institutions or policies. What makes a WMD terrorist incident unique is that it
can be a transforming event. A terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction would
have catastrophic effects on American society beyond the deaths it might cause. While the

1800 K Street Northwest» Washington DC 20006 « Telephone 202/887-0200 + FAX. 202/775-3199 « WEB; Mtb cis org?


95

A lot of the time, like in Oklahoma City, there are casualties;
people had to be evacuated; we had to begin operations, and we
can’t wait for someone to come in an hour or 2 hours or 3 hours.
We must begin work immediately.

We do have concerns about the point of contacting Governors. I
think there’s probably a role for the Governors, but, I say, again,
we cannot overlook the fact that the people who are in an engine,
the first engine to arrive at an incident, our members, they must
be trained; they've got to be equipped; they need to know what to
do; they need to begin to operate immediately, and not unneces-
sarily place their own lives in jeopardy.

Mr. BarrETT. Mr. Johnson, you have a response to that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I don’t disagree with Mr. Nesbitt. I’m not
talking about let’s give the Governors the money and let’s create
another bureaucratic structure. I’m simply saying we have existing
State and local emergency response services in place, and the fire
departments around the country are critical to that. I’m saying let’s
use them. Instead of trying to create two or three other units that
can do what they are already capable of doing, let’s make sure they
get the right kind of training and support. I offer the Governors
from the standpoint that, frankly, how the Federal Government.
deals with its response overseas in international terrorism, it’s a
lot like how it has to deal with State and local government. I’m not
trying that our different States represent foreign territories, but
this issue of a Federal response to local, there’s still a local govern-
ment entity that has to be dealt with. But I do not disagree with
what Mr. Nesbitt is saying.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Davis, you want to add something?

Mr. Davis. I'd like to use this as an opportunity to reinforce what
we're saying. I agree that the States don’t necessarily have to get
the money. But if you remember the chart that we had with the
State of Virginia where there are 13 teams, well, according to peo-
ple in FEMA, there are 663 teams across the United States. In
other words, there is an organizational structure, and we think
that the program ought to be designed to build on that and use
that, just like they're organized. The States don’t necessarily have
to get the moneys. The money wouldn’t have to go through Rich-
mond. It could still go directly to locales.

But, the other thing that it gets to, what’s the strategy and how
we're going to go about doing this, and what are the requirements
that we’re going to set for ourselves? Virginia, for example, told us,
“We can’t afford to have this type of capability in every local juris-
diction and city.” There has to be some structure. And that’s the
way they devised it.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Congressman, if I could just add to that very
quickly—everyone, I think, has come to that same conclusion, at
least at this table. I think, though, in some cases that requires
making sure the right people have a seat at the policy-planning
table, whether it’s within Congress, the administration or else-
where, because people just don’t know what skills and assets and
capabilities are out there. I really do think we have to re-examine
how we think about national security. This is not too much unlike
civil defense in some cases, although the terminology kills the issue


a

N

33

involving casualties since 1990. Yet the list of countries is constantly
changing. In 1997, for example, the attacks that caused casualties occurred
in Colombia, Israel, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The simple fact is that the
number of countries where Americans face consistent threat is relatively
small.

|. How are most of the casualties caused? Chart 4 shows that bombs and

ambushes, i.e. attacks with guns, are the two most common means for killing
and wounding Americans, with bombings the biggest culprit.

3. Chart 5 is a comparison of Americans killed in acts of international terrorism,

citizens of other countries who have been killed in anti-US international
terrorist incidents, and the number of murders in Indianapolis. | chose
Indianapolis at random since | am from the Mid-West. | am not suggesting
that Indianapolis is the most dangerous place in America but the juxtaposition
of the data puts the threat of terrorism in a new light. More people have been
murdered in Indianapolis in a six-year period than have been killed in anti-US
terrorist attacks over a seven-year period. In fact, since 1990 only 116
‘Americans have died from terrorist attacks. The loss of even one US citizen
at the hands of terrorists is too many, however we should also acknowledge
that there are other threats far more serious than terrorism that merit our

attention.

Chart 6 takes a combined look at the major terrorist attacks, domestic and
international, that have killed Americans. The three deadliest terrorist
attacks in American history are the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut, Lebanon by Hizbollah; the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 by the
Government of Libya; and the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City by Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Six of the seven incidents
listed on the pie chart involved a truck bomb.

Who is killing and wounding American citizens? Generally it is foreign rather
than home grown terrorists. Chart 7 identifies 21 groups that have carried


168

proached this—we haven’t mandated that a unique piece of equip-
ment be part of that list; that this conform and be consistent with
what else is done in that community. At least that was the idea.
Now whether or not it’s been perfectly implemented, I can’t say,
but that was the way we approached this at the beginning.

Mr. SOUDER. Without opening up a whole can of worms, Mr.
Blitzer, I want to ask you, because we’ve discussed this personally,
but I think it’s important for the record, and as this develops, we
need—this is one of the things we need to be looking at. In your
written testimony, you said that the incidents that you’ve looked at
predominantly fall into two categories, which you identify as lone
offenders and extremist elements of right-wing groups.

Mr. BLITZER. Right.

Mr. SOUDER. That most of these threats were hoaxes, you went
on to describe in your verbal testimony, as well, the specific things.
You also, in your written testimony, said that in 1997, you initiated
68 new investigations, and this year—as of September—86, which
suggests they are rising to some degree. Do you have any—if you
can’t say, that’s fine too—do you have any idea of the 86 and 68,
how many were lone wolf, which really means individual criminals,
and how many were right-wing groups, and how many——

Mr. BLITZER. I would have to say that right uP about 80 percent
would be lone wolf-type people, individuals, the Larry Wayne Har-
ris-type individual. And a very small percentage are ups. But
the groups seem to me—I mean, I worry about all of them, Mr.
Chairman—the groups, particularly one last year that we worked
against, it was a Klan group who was seeking to blow up a chemi-
cal storage facility. And we were very fortunate. We got lucky; we
penetrated that group, and we were able to stop it.

But that’s the kind of issues that we’re seeing. And even the
hoaxes, and I think I mentioned in my testimony, are very time-
consuming. And Bob Knouss mentioned just the procedures we go
through just in assessing a threat are very intense, they’re inter-
agency, and we've really developed I think a very good procedure
that when we’re assessing a threat, we’re on a conference call with
State and locals who are on the scene, telling them, this is what
we think you have or this is what we think you don’t have. So they
have the right assets at their fingertips.

We had an interesting incident a few months ago, where a guy
had gone into a local courthouse strapped with a bomb, and inside
the bomb he had chemicals. We were on the line directly with the
fire chief and the police chief, as well as our group. We assessed
that thing as certainly was a bomb, but we didn’t think he had ac-
tually had chemicals. That helped the negotiators who were able to
diffuse that situation. He did have a live bomb; he did not have
chemicals. That’s how it’s been working.

But again, lone individuals. Believe me, when I tell you this,
they’re the hardest ones, as we saw here on the Hill recently.
They’re the hardest ones to get intelligence on.

‘ir. SOUDER. As you know, and I would just like to say for the
record, two parts here. One is that both currently and not that long
in American history, in the 1960’s and early 1970’s it was the left,
and now to some degree, from the right more frequently. There is
a difficult balance when it’s domestic as opposed to international,


133

aw enforcement authority of the DoJ and the FBI. For consequence management, there
is specific technical expertise not only within DoD, but also within the Public Health
Service (PHS), Department of Energy (DoE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the FBI and others, all of which FEMA must bring together in a team effort to respond to
a domestic WMD release. Simply put, any response to a WMD release requires an
interagency team response.

Next, DoD has been looking at mitigating the effects of a WMD incident for several
years, well before it became a subject of public discussion following the demise of the
Soviet Union and the 1995 sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway. Although the combating
terrorism community inherited a solid foundation and a well functioning interagency process
from previous administrations, our review of WMD terrorism dramatically illustrated new
tactical, technical, and policy challenges posed by domestic terrorism.

The USG is working hard to deter or to prevent, and should that fail, to minimize the
effects of a WMD terrorist incident. Neverthefess, there are no silver bullets. We have an
excellent response capability, probably the finest in the world; but we cannot say with absolute
certainty that we can prevent the eventual use of a WMD device, or that our current procedures
could negate the mass casualties and damage associated with such an attack.

Finally, the programs we discuss today to help solve these challenges wil take
time — several years at a minimum; significant resources, including adequate funding;
public education; and a committed partnership by the nation’s leadership at all levels ~
local, state and federal - to create a system in the United States in which a WMD incident
can be successfully managed with a minimum loss of life and physical damage.

Within DoD, we divide our Combating Terrorism Program into three components:
anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism and terrorism consequence management. Ant i
involves all defensive measures employed to protect personnel and facilities against a
terrorist incident. Conversely, counter-terrorism refers to offensive response measures to
deter, resolve and mitigate a terrorist act. Terrorism consequence management includes a
range of activities required to provide emergency assistance to alleviate damage, loss,
hardship, or suffering caused by WMD terrorism attacks and to protect the public health
and safety and restore essential government services.

It is DoD policy to protect its personnel, their families, facilities and equipment
from terrorism. Toward that end, DoD specifically funds and executes programs for
security at military installations and DoD dependent schools, for a widespread training
and awareness program and for upgraded antiterrorism/force protection measures for
military commands abroad and at home.

When looking at counter-terrorism efforts, DoD has a number of rapid response
elements for responding to specific terrorist events including WMD incidents. We have
several expert capabilities which have been well developed over a number of years,
intensely exercised with our interagency partners, and used on several occasions to assist


7

DOD could have used state structures to deliver its training. Some states have academies
and institutes to train first responders and emergency managers. For example,

California's Specialized Training Institute provides emergency management training to

first responders statewide. In Texas, the Division of Emergency Management conducts
training for local first responders, and fire protection training is provided through the
‘Texas Engineering Extension Service. Under current circumstances, the individual cities
whose personnel were trained as trainers are to ensure that the appropriate courses are
delivered to rank-and-file emergency response personnel. Cities we visited were adapting
the DOD courses differently and using different venues to deliver the training. Cities
planned to deliver portions of the courses both directly and through their local
academies. One delivery method that DOD could consider to reach large numbers of first,
responders while minimizing travel costs is distance learning. The U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, for example, has used distance learning
techniques through satellite-to-television links.

TERMS OF DOD EQUIPMENT
AGREEMENT CONCERN CITIES.

The legislation authorizes DOD to lend rather than give or grant training equipment to
each city. The loan agreement between DOD and the cities specifies that the loan is for 5
years and that the cities are to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment. The loan
agreement terms have caused frustration and confusion among local officials. Some cities
we visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an unfunded federal


61

a particular concern of the committee. It has two main parts—a
train-the-trainer program that is targeted toward 120 jurisdictions
across the United States; and a second aspect is an equipment dis-
tribution program which makes $300,000 available to each selected
community to purchase specialized emergency response equipment
for training. The program’s eventual goal of establishing 120 ade-
quately trained and equipped jurisdictions is a long-term objective
spread over several years.

On the whole, we find the program to be surprisingly ineffective.
The program does not provide appropriate training for first re-
sponders. The curriculum focuses Prgely on the problems of a ter-
rorist incident without providing solutions or operations for our
members. One typical reaction came from a member who said that
he would rate the program as a 7 on a scale out of 10, if its intent
is to encourage firefighters to understand the importance of terror-
ism emergency response training, but only as 1 out of 10 if the in-
tent is to actually train firefighters in the methods of responding
to a terrorist attack.

The program does not actually pay for the training of firefighters.
The program trains trainers and makes money available for train-
ing equipment. The DOD program does not allow for feedback or
input from the student trainers, which is a criticism that we've
heard from many of our members across the United States who
have been involved in the training.

The DOD program offers awareness level and operations level of
training as two separate courses. As we have noted, every fire-
fighter needs to be trained at the operations level, which includes,
of course, awareness training. When an emergency occurs and
someone calls 911, we’re there in 4 minutes and we cannot stand
there and wait for someone else to arrive. We must begin oper-
ations to respond to this particular incident.

Operational-level courses Presented by DOD consist entirely of 4
hours of classroom lecture. This is inadequate in both content and
time. It needs to be more than 4 hours devoted to how a firefighter
responds to a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruc-
tion. The DOD program assumes that all firefighters have received
hazmat training, and it builds on an expected level of knowledge.
Unfortunately, most firefighters in this Nation have not received
operations-level hazmat training.

Finally, the DOD program does not provide for refresher courses.
Terrorism incidents are, thankfully, still extremely uncommon in
this Nation. As a result, there is rarely an opportunity for those
who have gone through the DOD training to brush up on their
skills.

Mr. Chairman, nothing is more frightening than the thought of
a deliberate act of terrorism which threatens hundreds, or even
thousands, of innocent lives. Clearly, terrorism is an issue of na-
tional concern. The lives of the people in the community where the
terrorist strikes depend not on broad national goals, but on the ca-
pabilities of their local emergency responders. We ask you to keep
this simple thought in mind as you review our Nation’s prepared-
ness to deal with the ugly specter of terrorism.

The International Association of Firefighters stands ready to
work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the sub-


130

Mr. SoupDER. Thank you. I'll do that.

Mr. Cragin.

Mr. CRAGIN. Thank you very much and good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman and Congressman Barrett. My colleague, Mr. Roberts,
and I are pleased to have this opportunity to report to you on the
activities of the Department of Defense in providing support to the
lead Federal agencies, and our Nation’s first responders—the fire-
men, police, emergency medical technicians, and Hazmat person-
nel, who are always the first to arrive at the scene of any incident.

In addition to responding to your staffs data and information re-
quests on DOD's programs, we have submitted a comprehensive
joint statement which we understand will be entered in the record
of this hearing.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barrett, since the President signed Presi-
dential Decision Directive 62 last May, significant advances have
taken place in regards to our efforts to support first responders.
PDD 62, which we've been discussing here this morning, also
known as the Combating Terrorism Directive, highlighted the
growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United

tates.

President Clinton detailed a new and more systematic method of
fighting terrorism here at home, and it brought a program manage-
ment approach to our national counterterrorism efforts. This direc-
tive also established, as oon are aware, within the National Secu-
rity Council, the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, In-
frastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, who was charged
with overseeing the efforts of the Federal interagency. Secretary
Cohen, Deputy Secretary Hamre, Attorney General Reno, FEMA
Director Witt, and National Coordinator Clark are thoroughly en-
gaged and are giving the challenges associated with this process
their direct, personal, and continuing attention.

Within the interagency coordination process, having now been
formalized under the auspices of the National Security Council,
multiple subgroups have been formed to implement the guidance
provided under PDD 62. This method addresses one of the foremost
issues facing an undertaking of this magnitude. It helps ensure a
cohesive approach, and for the first time it fully integrates the Fed-
eral effort in support of State agencies and local first responders.

I co-chair the Assistance to State and Local Authorities subgroup
within the Department of Defense, and I meet regularly with my
interagency colleagues at the National Security Council subgroup
level. I can assure you that this process holds at promise and
that we are making important headway. Nevertheless, I must tell
you, in all candor, that much work remains to be done.

Within this context, congressional leadership has been a vital
factor in assisting our combined progress thus far. Congress, as you
are aware, yesterday passed the National Defense Authorization
Act, which adopted the recommendation sent forward by the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense to create 10 rapid assessment
and initial detection [RAID] elements, and to train and equip up
to 170 reconnaissance and decontamination teams.

In the Defense appropriation bill passed on Monday, Congress
has appropriated money for, and directed the creation of, a first re-
sponder training facility at Pine Bluff, AR. In the National Defense


114

Second, OJP is offering, again, in concert with a broader initia-
tive, a wide spectrum of training to ensure that State and local
emergency response personnel and public officials have the knowl-
edge, skills, and abilities to enable them to respond well if such in-
cidents occurred. DOD will continue to finance the Nunn-Lugar
training through year 2000, after which the program will shift to
the Department of Justice; that’s in fiscal year 2001.

In June, we opened the Center for Domestic Preparedness at
Fort McClellan, to train State and local emergency responders.
We've already trained over 450 first responders in basic awareness,
incident command, and incident management.

Third, OJP is offering technical assistance to help State and local
communities in sharing the information needed to make the critical
decisions domestic preparedness requires. We’ve written to several
universities and research facilities to develop the capacity, and re-
cently held highly successful listening sessions with State and local
first responders to find out how the Federal Government can best
assist them in responding to domestic terrorism.

The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Dr. Hamre, and
FEMA Director James Lee Witt were active participants in these
sessions, demonstrating their clear personal commitment to this
issue and hearing directly concerns and needs from over 200 first
responders.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the sub-
committee, for the opportunity to be here today. I ask that my
statement be incorporated.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dalich follows:]


116

Enhancing the capabilities of state and local governments to deal with the immediate
effects of a terrorist incident is essential to the success of the federal government's efforts to
prepare for such an incident. Local emergency responders must be able to provide critical
resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of a terrorist incident.

‘The Department of Justice has reached an agreement in principle with DoD, FEMA, and
the National Security Council to establish the DOJ, with the FBI in the lead, as the lead agency
for U.S. domestic preparedness for weapons of mass destruction terrorism. In this capacity, DOJ
would assume overall responsibility for the formulation and execution of programs and activities
to prepare the United States for incidents of WMD terrorism. DOJ would establish the National
Domestic Preparedness Office in the FBI as the coordinating structure for these programs and
activities. We believe that this action and the work of the NDPO will help resolve many of the
problems of potential overlap and lack of coordination identified in the GAO report.

For its part, the Office of Justice Programs will work closely with the NDPO,
incorporating the policy and planning decisions of the new office into the equipment grant and
‘raining programs undertaken by OJP and supporting the operations of the NDPO. While the
details about the structure and composition of the NDPO are still being developed, the NDPO.
will work closely with all agencies involved in supporting the counterterrorism preparedness of
states and cities, particularly including the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. The NDPO will also work closely with the strategic
planning processes being conducted by the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure

Protection, and Counter-Terrorism.


4

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I want
to thank the vice chairman for chairing this hearing.

We are here today to examine another aspect of the U.S. efforts
to combat terrorism. Our focus today is on the domestic response,
which I believe is very timely given the events that occurred in the
last few months.

To say that this is an issue that hits home would be an under-
statement. Experts disagree on the severity of the terrorist threat
in the United States and some believe that it is remote. However,
it has been the opinion of Co: ss that a terrorist attack involving
a weapon of mass destruction has the potential to be so devastating
that we must be fully prepared to respond.

As a member of the oversight committee, we have an important
responsibility of determining whether or not the Domestic Pre-
paredness Program will adequately prepare local fire, police, ans
emergency service Personnel for such a terrible scenario. This ex-
amination of the Domestic Preparedness Program is part of the
subcommittee review of all Federal Government terrorism-related
programs.

As part of this investigation, we requested extensive information
from the executive branch regarding these programs. I would like
to thank those departments and agencies that have been timely
with their submissions, which are currently under review by the
subcommittee staff.

Thank you, Mr. Souder, and I yield back.

Mr. SoupDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I now yield to Mr. Bar-
rett, the ranking minority member, for an opening statement.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Souder, and good morning to our
distinguished witnesses on both panels.

This is the subcommittee’s third hearing on U.S. efforts to com-
bat terrorism at home and abroad. Today we plan to examine the
accomplishments and challenges of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Do-
mestic Preparedness Program, which is designed to improve the
Federal Government's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

Although it is a Federal program, the primary point is to im-
prove the emergency response capabilities of local agencies that
will be the first to respond on the scene. Given the size of our coun-
try, the limitations of our Federal budget, and the ill-defined na-
ture of the threat, this is no easy task.

We've seen dramatic changes in our Government’s approach to
terrorism. Just this past May, the President announced an effort
to ensure the critical infrastructures in our country: our system of
telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation,
and essential Government services. The President also unveiled the
new management approach to our counterterrorism efforts, creat-
ing a new National Coordinator of Security, Infrastructure Protec-
tion and Counterterrorism, responsible for interagency coordina-
tion.

Effects of these changes and others, including the proposed
transfer of agency authority for domestic preparedness, will, hope-
fully, be among our topics of discussion today.

I understand that a great many first responders and local offi-
cials have given praise to the training and equipment that they


93

the crisis management response and the CBIRF will handle the
consequence management. The fact is you can have one unit that
can do both.

But what you’re dealing with here are internal intra-grants, ri-
valries, and DOD budget issues, as they battle it out. I mean, the
fact of the matter is you don’t—TEU, as an example, is rarely
called upon and deployed operationally, because there have been so
few chemical/biological incidents. So, they spend more time train-
ing. I think if there is a more efficient way to use the resources,
to maybe beef them up a little bit, maybe make it interservice,
where it’s not just Army—maybe it’s an intermixture of Marines
and Navy and Air Force—but at least create the one function, so
it’s there available for international and domestic. We’ve done a
good job of sorting out some of the international food fights. That
hasn’t taken place domestically yet.

Mr. SOUDER. You’re not saying they don’t do different things.
You're saying that it’s because they’re trained that they do dif-
ferent things, and in fact they could both be trained to do them?

Mr. JOHNSON. The way they’ve justified creating CBIRF is to say
it deals with consequence management. If there’s an incident and
there are people to be dealt with, CBIRF goes in to deal with that.
But, I’ve spent a lot of time scripting exercises for the forces that
are involved with this response overseas, and where you actually
in real world draw the line between where one stops and one
starts, that hasn’t been clearly demarcated, and that’s a real prob-
lem.

The crisis response units tend to be covert, secretive. They don’t
want to alert someone that they’re coming to deal with an issue.
The consequence management is like watching a circus march
through town—they’re large; they’re not low-key, and it’s just dif-
ferent missions that require different operational procedures. I
think those need to be consolidated and one unit given both func-
tions, and if it’s a matter of beefing one unit up, do so, but having
two different units out there trying to figure out who does what,
when, and where, in my view, I think it’s silly.

Mr. SoOUDER. So all of you in your testimony addressed this sub-
ject a little. Do any of you want to have additional comments at

is point?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Well, I think that we do need to recognize that
these are very specific skill sets that need to be brought to bear.
Tm not saying that you can’t put it in a more cohesive fashion or
in a more integrated fashion. And perhaps the CINC USA could
take steps to accomplish that. Yet, I think the bigger picture is
coming up with common baseline institutionalized policies, plans,
procedures, and assets, which gets to a whole host of issues, where
it’s more than just the Department of Defense; it’s more than just
the given agencies that have a role, where you really.do need to
have a template that’s common.

I agree with vulnerability assessments like there’s no tomor-
row—I think it’s crucial, and I agree with identifying capability
gaps, skill sets, asset gaps, what resources need to be brought to
bear, and I think only a city which has unique assets and unique
skills, that we may not even be aware of, can only do that effec-
tively. I think if you go through the training and then come up


38

| believe the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996 was a step in the right
direction but share the concems of the GAO that the good intentions underlying
this legislation are not producing good policy results and that resources are
being wasted. Specifically, | see two major, inter-related problems:

1. There is a wasteful duplication of effort;
2. No one is really in charge.

The US Government is not paying attention to lessons we have leamed
from coordinating and organizing resources to deal with international terrorism.
Intemational terrorist assistance starts when the US Government offers help or a
foreign government request assistance. In either case, there must be the
permission and cooperation of the host government. In the case of a specific
terrorist incident, such as the bombings in Africa, the US Government personnel
‘and resources dispatched to the scene operate under a clear chain of command.
Inall cases, there is someone in charge, usually the US Ambassador, who is the
President's representative on scene. If military action is required (and the host
government has approved that course of action) then there is a set procedure for
passing the authority from the Ambassador to the appropriate US military
commander on scene. Both the Ambassador and the military commander are
acting on behalf of the President as directed by the National Command
‘Authority. Once hostilities cease the military commander retums authority to
the Ambassador. In all cases there is a clear understanding of who is in charge
and who has authority to do what.

Domestically the chain of command is murky and confused. The US
Government has an impressive array of capabilities and services available to
help American communities deal with all kinds of disasters, including terrorism,
If itis a tornado, a flood, or a hurricane than the chains of command are clear—
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge. FEMA has
done an outstanding job in this area. However, when the issue is terrorism, the
clarity disappears and we have a bureaucratic morass.


158

at trying to revamp the program to make it more compatible across
the board. Just by way of explanation, our differences—we include
counties in addition to cities, and we have 120 of them, but it’s the
largest jurisdictions under the legislation that established the pro-

gram.

Mr. SoupER. Can I ask you a specific question on that?

Mr. DALicu. Yes.

Mr. SOuDER. For example, Washington, DC, has about roughly
700,000 people; Fairfax County, over 1 million; Montgomery in the
Maryland suburbs, over 1 million.

Mr. Daticu. Right.

Mr. § Souper. When you say a county, how would Washington be
treated?

Mr. DaticH. Washington is not treated under that list—Wash-
i n, DC, specifically.

ir. SOUDER. So, would Fairfax County?

Mr. DALICH. Fairfax County would be. It’s one of the larger coun-
ties.

Mr. SOUDER. Montgomery County?

Mr. DALICH. Montgomery County as well.

Mr. SOUDER. Would they be treated at the same time, or sepa-
rately?

Mr. DaLicu. No, they are eligible for the program, but it’s not
necessarily done at the same time. And that’s an excellent sugges-
tion, although the idea of training at the individual location we be-
lieve is quite useful, and that doesn’t necessarily make it conven-
ient to do it for both of them at the same time necessarily.

Mr. Souper. I would like to ask you a question following up on
that. For example, in Fort Wayne, they were training. They’d made
an assumption that they were based somewhere overseas at the
time where this facility was. It doesn’t seem to me that necessarily
the most critical part of this training is where you are; it’s helpful
to know how far you are from the hospital and those different
things, but there are certain basic fundamental things and then
the second tier is where you are. Because you have no idea really
where it’s going to occur. It could occur right on the border between
two places.

Mr. DALICH. That’s correct. I think a lot of the firefighters and
local first responders feel comfortable training in their jurisdiction.
We've done the training both ways, through the National Fire
Academy and onsite. I think arguments can be made either way.
We've not settled on which of those is necessarily the best way to
go, although we've trained about 1,100 first responders; about 400
at the National Fire Academy, and a little over 700 onsite.

Mr. SouDER. Have you looked at—in other words, they're not
necessarily mutually exclusive, and what other materials do you
provide for followup? Have you thought about proposing some of
these types of things where cities that aren’t going to be covered
either in counties for the next 4 years, or quite frankly maybe for
the next 10 years, would have access to this information, or if, par-
ticularly if they were willing to pay for the training, what kind of
thought process? We all understand that when Congress passed the
bill, and everybody said, jump fast, you partly plunged into it, did


125

community, which is more broadly defined as all state and local emergency response agencies.
However, training is limited to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, which are
defined as those involving toxic and poisonous chemicals or biological and radiological agents
causing death or serious bodily harm to “significant numbers of people.”

Based on DOD's limitation to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, the DOD
initiative focuses on providing more highly specialized levels of training to a broader audience of
trainers, As such, DOD made program decisions to train emergency responders in cities or
municipalities, based on the likelihood that these larger municipalities are at greater risk of being
targets for terrorist incidents. The list of these cities was restricted to 120 due to the resources
available to implement this effort over a three-year period. Further, these cities were ranked by
geographic size.

Under Public Law 104-132, the OJP initiative is targeted to any terrorist incident and not limited
to weapons of mass destruction. However, the OJP initiative is limited to providing training only
for fire service and emergency medical personnel, and is geared to different levels of training,
such as basic awareness training, as opposed to DOD's more highly specialized training. Under
the statute, however, the OJP training is to be targeted to metropolitan areas, and not restricted to
Cities alone. In cooperation with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA),
SP targeted its training effort to the nation’s largest jurisdictions (based on population and as
identified by the Census Bureau).

As a result, the initial training offered by DOD and OJP, although complementary and not
duplicative, is targeted to two different lists of jurisdictions. As of Fiscal Year 1999, OJP has
consolidated these lists to ensure that OJP"s training and equipment programs include, and
continue to complement and reinforce, the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program list. As OJP’s
and DOD's joint planning effort aimed at transferring the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
to OJP progresses, both agencies intend that a single list of eligible jurisdictions be maintained to
ensure that OJP's training and equipment programs are delivered in a uniform and coordinated
manner.

Question Number 3:

Based upon the description in OJP’s October 2, 1998 testimony of the Metropolitan Firefighter
and Emergency Medical Services Training Program, the Subcommittee would conclude that this
is essentially the Domestic Preparedness Program simply being run out of a different
bureaucracy. Can you please explain how they are different?

Answer:

AAs partially explained under the response to Question Number 2 (above), the DOD and OJP
‘raining initiatives originated from two separate pieces of legislation. Based on their authorizing


100

the-trainer; but now, the cities are responsible for maintaining, re-
pairing, and replacing the equipment. Some of this equipment is
going to wear out. As you use it, it’s going to wear out—the protec-
tive suits, et cetera.

Mr. BARRETT. Do you really see the unfunded mandate with this
program?

Mr. Davis. The people say they’re not sure—the loan agreement
that they have with DOD right now calls for them to replace the
equipment—to repair, maintain, and replace it. There are no provi-
sions right now in terms of the Federal Government providing that
replacement.

Mr. BaRRETT. Are they able to pay it back? In other words, rath-
er than replace it, just say we don’t want to do this program any-
more? Is that something—I’m just surprised that I hear the un-
funded mandate argument when this program is essentially a loan
program.

Mr. Davis. Yes, we haven’t heard anybody who said they want
to turn it back in DOD. They’re out there with their hands out.
They’re willing to accept it and they want to take it. But they think
that, by taking it, maybe someday later the Federal Government
will come along and replace it for them. They told us they’re fairly
confident that training equipment is not going to get the priority
to compete successfully against other demands on local budgets.

Mr. BARRETT. Anybody else want to comment on this program?
Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. NEssiTT. Say the money is for training equipment. To actu-
ally equip a fire department that was properly trained to use this
equipment, you're talking about a substantially larger amount of
money. Some of this equipment is very expensive, and once you use
it once, you can’t use it again. It has to be disposed of and you have
to replace it. So, it’s a very expensive proposition.

To equip and train a fire department, for example, if you train
them properly and you give them all the equipment for training,
but then you say, OK, you’re trained but now there’s no equipment
if you’re going to respond, it doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense
to us.

Mr. BarreET?. And I understand that argument. I just don’t un-
derstand how that would constitute unfunded mandate if it’s a vol-
untary program. That was my point.

That’s all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Souper. I thank you for your time and your responsiveness,
and if you have additional information you want to submit for the
record we would like to have that.

The second panel could now come forward. The second panel con-
sists of officials from three Federal departments. Representing the
Department of Justice are Mr. Robert Blitzer, Section Chief, Do-
mestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section, Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation; Mr. Michael Dalich, Chief of Staff, Office of
Justice Program. Representing the Department of Defense is Mr.
Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, and Mr. James Q. Roberts, Principal Director
of Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Mr. Robert


41

1. One agency should be given the lead to coordinate all domestic counter
terrorism efforts and held accountable for the priorities and use of these
resources. This includes crisis management, consequence management,
and domestic preparedness. Because the issue involves the possibility of @
domestic terrorist attack | believe the FBI is the appropriate agency to handie
this task.

2. Duplicative missions and capabilities should be eliminated. The coordinator
of this effort needs to scrub the entire menu of resources currently on the
table. It makes little sense to train and equip ten national guard units for
chemical/biological incidents when we already have a US Army Technical
Escort Unit and a Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response
Force that are underutilized. Let us not forget that the EPA has several
hazardous material response units throughout the United States that deal
effectively with chemical spills every day.

»

Resources, equipment, and training to combat chemical and biological
terrorism should be coordinated by the lead Federal agency with the
Governor of each state. Existing state and local emergency management
and response systems already in place around the country should be used
as starting point for the NLD program.

These steps will help us use scarce resources more efficiently and effectively
to prepare for the possibility that terrorists might attack US citizens or
communities with chemical or biological agents. Although | am optimistic that
this threat will not become a reality, | believe prudence requires that we take all
feasible measures to prepare for such an event. Prudence also demands that
our response be realistic, sensible, based on clear priorities, and grounded on
developing a system to enhance existing capabilities—not just building new
programs and bureaucracies to run them.

Larry C. Johnson is a managing partner with BERG Associates, LLC and can be
reached at www.BERG-Associates.com