CMH Pub No. 70–85–1

Cover: Jump into Night, Torrijos Airport, Al Sprague, 1990
Introduction

Operation JUST CAUSE, one of the shortest armed conflicts in

American military history, is also one of the most relevant to campaigns as we anticipate them in the twenty-first century. Launched in

December 1989—only six weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall—

JUST CAUSE was extraordinarily complex, involving the deployment

of thousands of personnel and equipment from distant military

installations and striking almost two-dozen objectives within a 24-

hour period of time. The surgical precision and decisive maneuver

employed by these U.S. forces minimized casualties on both sides of

the conflict and avoided excessive damage to Panamanian property.

JUST CAUSE represented a bold new era in American military force

projection: speed, mass, and precision, coupled with immediate public visibility, concern for collateral damage, and early anticipation of

postcombat mandates.

The success of JUST CAUSE was greatly facilitated by carefully

defined objectives, meticulous planning, sound leadership, and focused

training. In spite of uncontrollable compromises in operational security

on the eve of the incursion, preparations were so thorough that opposing forces on several objectives were completely surprised by the speed

with which U.S. forces moved. Unforeseen weather delays posed serious risks to the entire operation, but leaders at all levels adapted to the

exigencies, minimizing adverse effects. Within seventy-two hours of

the outbreak of hostilities, all major combat operations ended. U.S.

forces quickly shifted from the role of war fighters to that of peacekeepers. All of this took place under extensive media scrutiny at home

and abroad.

Almost 26,000 U.S. military personnel participated in Operation

JUST CAUSE; half of these men and women deployed with virtually no

notice to Panama from home stations in the United States. The rapid

deployment and the speed with which the conflict was resolved is a

tribute to the training and leadership of these personnel, as is the compassion and effectiveness with which they assumed their postcombat

roles. Lessons learned from this experience will undoubtedly prove

useful in future military operations as well.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military

History by R. Cody Phillips. We hope it will enhance your appreciation of the achievements and abilities of the United States Army and of

the heritage and history of its soldiers.

JOHN S. BROWN

Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Chief of Military History

4
Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion 

into Panama

On 15 December 1989, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), was appointed by his

handpicked legislative assembly to be the “maximum leader” of the

country. In his acceptance speech, Noriega announced that “the

Republic of Panama is declared to be in a state of war” with the United

States. Although he stopped short of advocating an armed response to

his imaginary conflict, his incendiary language reflected the tension

that had grown between his government and the United States over the

previous three years. Conveniently, he ignored his involvement with

drug trafficking, his repressive political activities, and numerous treaty

violations and documented episodes of PDF provocations that had

helped to escalate the crisis. His speech set the tone among his followers, who would soon provide the catalyst for a U.S. military intervention into Panama code-named Operation JUST CAUSE.

Strategic Setting

Relations between Noriega’s government and the United States

had become increasingly tense through most of the 1980s. The last

two years, however, had been especially difficult. One of Noriega’s

principal lieutenants charged the dictator with murder, drug trafficking, and election fraud. Riots broke out in Panama City, and the internal crisis grew worse as the country’s economy deteriorated. To

deflect rising criticism within Panama, Noriega resorted increasingly

to anti-American rhetoric. At his direction, the PDF was responsible

for initiating relatively insignificant incidents of harassment against

U.S. military personnel in the country, such as the arbitrary arrest and

detention of nine servicemen in October 1987. The soldiers were

detained overnight, refused outside contacts, and then released. The

frequency and seriousness of these incidents increased soon after two

U.S. federal grand juries indicted Noriega on 4 February 1988 for

drug trafficking. The Reagan administration responded to the

increased tension by sending a company of U.S. Marines and several

Military Police units to bolster the forces already in Panama.

In the weeks that followed, additional servicemen were detained

and assaulted. In the late hours of 12 April 1988, at a fuel tank farm

near Howard Air Force Base, gunfire was exchanged between the U.S.

5
A 4/17

C 4/17

B 4/17

A 

A 3/504

C

1 C/3/504   

  





FORT

SHERMAN

ARMY

BASE

COCO SOLO

NAVAL

STATION

FORT DAVIS

ARMY BASE

FRANCE

FIELD

TASK FORCE 

SEMPER FIDELI

FORT ESPINAR

GATUN LOCKS

COLON

GATUN

GAMBOA

LA CHORRERA

CANAL ZONE

PANAMA

ZONE CANAL

PANAMA

 TO RIO HATO 42 Miles
2(-) 504

1 4

C 1/508

B 1/508

A 1/508

193

C 3/75

1 75

D(-) 3/504

1 504

4(-) 325

3(-)

X X

7(-)

X X

82(-)

4(-)

3/504

B 3/504



























ALBROOK

AIR FORCE

BASE

HOWARD

AIR FORCE

BASE

FARFAN

NAVAL BASE

US NAVAL

MMUNITION DEPOT

ARRAIJAN

TANK FARM

FORT CLAYTON

ARMY BASE

FORT

KOBBE

FORT CIMARRON

TASK FORCE 82d TASK FORCE BAYONE TASK FORCE ATLANTIC

FORT

AMADOR

Madden

Lake

CERRO TIGRE

R PRISON

LA COMANDANCIA

PAITILLA

MIRAFLORES 

LOCKS

DRO MIGUEL

LOCKS

PANAMA VIEJO

TINAJITAS TORRIJOS

PACORA RIVER 

BRIDGE

TOCUMEN

MADDEN DAM

PANAMA BALBOA

20 December 1989

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Major Points of Attack

0 10

Kilometers

Miles

 ELEVATION IN FEET

600 1600 2000 and Above

MAP 1
Marine Corps guards and several armed intruders in one of the most

violent episodes in the crisis prior to the invasion. By the end of 1988

there were over 300 incidences of U.S. military personnel and family

members’ having experienced harassment, threats, or assaults at the

hands of the PDF.

The tension continued throughout the following year. In February

1989 PDF soldiers detained a Navy civilian employee who was in

Colon. They beat him and then threatened to kill him. That same month,

the PDF seized an off-duty Navy lieutenant, strip-searched and beat

him, and released him nine hours later. The crisis almost peaked two

weeks later, when nine Department of Defense (DOD) school buses,

loaded with 100 children, were seized for alleged traffic violations. The

Fort Clayton provost marshal, assisted by about twenty military police,

occupied the buses to prevent the PDF from removing the children or

moving the buses to another location. Three hours later one of Noriega’s

lieutenants abruptly ended the negotiations with the provost marshal and

permitted the school buses to return to Fort Clayton.

National elections were held in early May. When the dictator’s personally chosen candidate was overwhelmingly defeated at the polls,

Noriega declared the elections invalid. Two days later the winning

opposition candidates were assaulted at a postelection rally, and one of

their personal bodyguards was murdered. In a separate incident, the

PDF abducted, beat, and robbed a Navy sailor. In response to this violence and a heightened PDF presence around U.S. military installations, President George H. W. Bush deployed 1,900 combat troops and

military police to bolster security.

This deployment marked the beginning of Operation NIMROD

DANCER, largely a show of force also designed to increase the protection of U.S. citizens and property. To demonstrate the U.S. resolve to

protect the Canal Zone, military units initiated a series of prominent

exercises that were permitted under previous treaty agreements.

NIMROD DANCER also enabled several units based in the United States

to deploy to Panama for long-term training (usually at the Jungle

Operations Training Center on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone),

and these units rotated through Panama on a regular schedule. On the

eve of Operation JUST CAUSE, almost two-thirds of the military force

required for the latter operation already was in Panama. The one significant shortcoming of NIMROD DANCER was the indefinite length of

the mission. Unless the Noriega regime collapsed or hostilities began,

it was unclear how long this operation would continue.

Tensions remained throughout the summer, but the opportunities

for provocation were fewer with hundreds of family members evacuat8
ed from Panama and tighter restrictions imposed on access to U.S. military facilities. All remaining off-post military residents were relocated

to quarters on American installations inside the Canal Zone. Within

days of General Maxwell Thurman’s assuming command of U.S.

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), one of Noriega’s senior commanders initiated a coup at the dictator’s principal headquarters, La

Comandancia. It failed within hours, following the quick reaction of

several pro-Noriega PDF units and the calm resolve of the Panamanian

general himself. U.S. authorities did not miss the salient lessons from

this episode: another PDF coup attempt was unlikely to occur anytime

soon, and any armed intervention by the United States would have to be

swift and decisive in order to overwhelm and neutralize all opposition.

In the late evening hours of 16 December, following Maximum

Leader Noriega’s declaration of a state of war, four off-duty U.S. military officers were driving through Panama City when they were

stopped at a roadblock. The PDF guards waved other vehicles past the

barrier, but stopped the civilian automobile carrying the four servicemen. Pointing their rifles toward the car, the guards demanded that the

officers get out of their vehicle. Noticing a crowd beginning to gather

around them, the servicemen refused and started to drive away. The

guards fired at the car, fatally wounding one of the occupants, a U.S.

Marine Corps lieutenant. A Navy lieutenant and his wife, who had

witnessed the episode, were seized by the PDF and taken to La

Comandancia, where the lieutenant was interrogated and beaten and

his wife was assaulted. The couple was released four hours later.

General Thurman, on leave for the Christmas holiday in northern

Virginia, was notified of the incident and immediately returned to

Panama after conferring with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Colin Powell. Traditional Christmas parties already under way

at several installations in the Canal Zone were canceled, and all military

personnel were placed on alert. That afternoon President Bush authorized implementation of the operational plan for a military intervention

in Panama. Its objectives were “to safeguard the lives of Americans, to

defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect

the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty.” Later, the President ordered

the immediate apprehension and extradition of Manuel Noriega.

Preparations

Planning for a military incursion into Panama had begun in 1987.

The military phase of the planning, code-named BLUE SPOON, was part

of a larger operation in which SOUTHCOM considered both the combat and postcombat aspects of an armed conflict with Noriega’s

9
regime. The original military concept called for a gradual buildup of

U.S. military forces in the Canal Zone, with increased economic and

diplomatic pressure on the Panamanian Government. The intent was to

minimize the adverse effects of economic sanctions on the

Panamanian people, while also demonstrating the U.S. resolve to

secure the Canal Zone and force Noriega from power. The assumption

was that progressively more severe sanctions, increasing diplomatic

activity, and more visible military maneuvers ultimately would prevail.

Either the Panamanian electorate would vote the dictator out of office,

or a U.S.-friendly coup would replace Noriega. By early 1989, it was

obvious that the assumptions were incorrect and the plan was not

working.

As it developed, BLUE SPOON relied upon the 7th Infantry Division

(Light), based at Fort Ord, California, to provide the first wave of military personnel into Panama. These units would be followed by a

Marine Expeditionary Force and then elements of the 82d Airborne

Division—if needed. Radical changes were made in planning for both

the troop deployments and the speed with which the movements would

occur when operational planning shifted from U.S. Army South

(USARSO), SOUTHCOM’s Army component command, to the XVIII

Airborne Corps in September 1989. Corps planners were uncomfortable with the awkward sequence of deployments as planned and the

deliberate buildup of forces, which in effect seemed to accept the

probability of a full-scale insurgency and the likelihood of large military forces’ “running out into the woods and chasing after the bad

guys.” Through informers and Panamanian documents, U.S. intelligence analysts surmised that the conventional defensive plans of the

PDF, which totaled at least 8,000 men and women, were to delay a

foreign assault until all organized PDF units could retreat into the

country’s interior to conduct guerrilla operations. Any effective U.S.

intervention would thus have to be rapid enough to avoid giving the

PDF time to disperse in this manner. By September 1989 corps planners completed Operational Plan (OPLAN) 90–1, which essentially

presumed that there would be a provocation by Noriega that clearly

threatened American lives and the security of the Canal Zone.

The failure of the October coup stimulated additional changes in

BLUE SPOON, as OPLAN 90–1 was originally code-named. These revisions, now called OPLAN 90–2, replaced elements of the 7th Infantry

Division with the 82d Airborne Division as the dominant lead assault

force. The critical difference in the change was the speed with which

an invasion force could be inserted into Panama. Paratroopers required

less than half the time to be on the ground as was necessary for air10
landing an equal number of light infantry. A large number of special

operations forces were also included for specific military objectives in

Panama, and a sudden infusion of military force into the country

replaced the planned gradual buildup. By the fall of 1989 the command and staff at SOUTHCOM and the XVIII Airborne Corps realized that the situation was rapidly spinning out of control. If it became

necessary to use U.S. military force, the reaction would have to be

even more swift and decisive to ensure adequate security for

Americans and the Canal Zone and to minimize Panamanian casualties and avoid excessive damage to the country’s infrastructure.

Preliminary planning was not the only aspect of the U.S. Army’s

preparations. Only a small number of senior commanders and staff

officers were aware of a possible military intervention, but this did not

prevent taking appropriate measures in anticipation of implementing

the evolving plans. Even as the first revisions of BLUE SPOON were

beginning, units at military installations in the United States and

Panama altered their training schedules and tempo of activities to prepare for an unknown contingency operation.

In Panama, the number of live-fire exercises increased, with added

emphasis on controlled firepower, marksmanship, and fire discipline.

Personnel were encouraged to use restraint—not to conserve the

expenditure of ordnance, but to minimize damage in the firing lanes.

Soldiers encountered “surrender targets,” silhouettes that were either

unarmed or attempting to surrender. If a surrender target was fired on,

the entire unit repeated the training.

Perhaps the most beneficial training opportunity during the latter

half of 1989 was a series of exercises code-named SAND FLEA. The

SAND FLEA exercises in Panama were deliberately conspicuous demonstrations of the U.S. resolve to ensure that its treaty rights affecting the

security of the Canal Zone and U.S. installations were preserved.

These exercises were part of Operation NIMROD DANCER, which also

provided for the frequent rotation of reserve component and active

duty units from the United States. The 1978 Panama Canal Treaty had

authorized U.S. military personnel unrestricted movement within the

Canal Zone for training exercises, and that included occasional forays

through Panamanian territory en route to specific objectives. Thus,

U.S. military forces were able to practice movement to preselected targets potentially critical to a military operation in the country. These

exercises, including the arrival and departure flights of military organizations coming from and going to the United States, also tended to

desensitize the PDF to the increasingly frequent troop movements,

many of which occurred at night.

11
Typical of the SAND FLEA exercises was a detachment from the

2–62d Air Defense Artillery that would go through night drills setting

up an M61 20-mm. Vulcan gun on a baseball field near the PDF barracks at Fort Espinar, on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone.

Sometimes the gun was left in place overnight, and soon the PDF

observers became accustomed to the evening exercises. Other personnel from the 4–17th Infantry conducted intermittent patrols around the

small installation or its outer boundaries. The participating soldiers

believed that the exercises were designed to improve security for the

400 Americans residing at Fort Espinar. The patrol routes, however,

were deliberately selected to familiarize the troops with the surrounding terrain—and the routes they would follow if it became necessary

to implement BLUE SPOON.

At both ends of the Canal Zone, U.S. military personnel conducted

seemingly simple and repetitive SAND FLEA exercises. U.S. Marines

conducted a variety of timed road marches that often ended at the

Bridge of the Americas, a critical road link that traversed the Panama

Canal and connected the metropolitan areas surrounding Panama City.

Aviation units flew prescribed routes, at night, to different sites along

the Canal Zone. Although no landings actually occurred at such sites,

the timing and routes were carefully monitored. Equally important

were the frequent practices to measure the speed and efficiency with

which aircraft could be refueled and dispatched on subsequent missions. One aviator, concerned about the utility of a “theoretical” landing zone (LZ), donned civilian clothes to go “bird watching” near

Tinajitas, where he discovered a power line that cut across part of the

landing zone. Throughout the summer and autumn months, all but a

very few of the most senior military personnel in Panama thought the

exercises were intended to maintain unit readiness while providing

security for the Canal Zone and the 40,000 Americans living in the

country. The PDF thought no different.

Other units engaged in specific training exercises, such as one in

late May 1989, when a battalion from the 193d Infantry Brigade

launched an air assault into Fort Amador. The massive airlift of infantrymen landed on the golf course that separated the family quarters of U.S.

military personnel from a PDF barracks complex. The practice assault

familiarized soldiers with the terrain and possible objectives while

allowing the brigade staff to evaluate how the PDF responded, particularly where they positioned their crew-served weapons.

Commanders taking units to the Canal Zone became especially

sensitive to the tense environment and the need for specialized training. When the 3–504th Infantry, a battalion of the 82d Airborne

12
ALBROOK

AIR FORCE

BASE

FORT

CLAYTON

QUARRY

HEIGHTS

HOWARD

AIR FORCE

BASE

FARFAN

NAVAL

BASE

US NAVAL

AMMUNITION 

DEPOT

ARRAIJAN

TANK FARM

FORT CLAYTON

ARMY BASE

FORT

KOBBE

FORT

 AMADOR

B A Y O F P A N A M A

PAITILLA

VATICAN EMBASSY

U. S. EMBASSY

BRIDGE OF THE

AMERICAS

Flamenco Island

LA COMANDANCIA

MIRAFLORES 

LOCKS

PEDRO MIGUEL

LOCKS

PANAMA

VIEJO

PANAMA

BALBOA

DIABLO HEIGHTS

PANAMA CANAL ZONE PANAMA CITY

20 December 1989

0 4

Kilometers

Miles

MAP 2
Division, learned that it would deploy to Panama on 10 December for

six weeks at the Jungle Operations Training Center, the battalion commander arranged for extra live-fire exercises, night operations, and

training in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). For him, it

was just a hunch, but the rising tension in Panama suggested that his

battalion might be doing more than training in jungle warfare. Three

days after completing their deployment to the Canal Zone, individual

companies of paratroopers were conducting road marches and night air

assaults, coincidentally seeing every one of their future objectives in

Operation JUST CAUSE.

While these training exercises were under way in Panama, missionspecific training was held in the United States. Many of the commands

and staffs engaged in Operation NIMROD DANCER already had worked

together in a contingency exercise the previous year in neighboring

Honduras (Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT). This experience continued

with several command post exercises (CPXs) held among the headquarters elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division,

7th Infantry Division, 12th Air Force, and selected special operations

forces. In a corps-sponsored CPX, Operation SAND EAGLE, commanders and their deputies played specific roles in a training exercise

involving a joint task force that was suddenly deployed overseas. In an

after-action interview following the actual incursion into Panama, one

of the key players in the exercise repeated after revealing each detail,

“Sound familiar?” Much of what happened during the CPX was replicated during the actual military operation in Panama.

On 29 November the SICILY Drop Zone at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, was reconfigured to resemble a small international airport

with a military airfield adjacent to it. In the scenario, a reinforced

Ranger battalion parachuted onto the simulated airfields and secured

them in advance of a brigade from the 82d Airborne Division’s parachuting onto the drop zone (DZ). Named Operation BLACK KNIGHT,

the paratroopers separated by companies and launched air assaults on

dispersed objectives. One battalion, the 4–325th Infantry, landed at

opposite ends of Fort Bragg’s HOLLAND DZ to attack a small airfield

protected by armored cars and a reinforced enemy company. All this

was done during the evening hours and in conjunction with special

operations forces’ striking other targets beyond the major drop zone.

Some of these training missions were tied to an Emergency

Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE), complete with all the customary preliminaries: alerting personnel for deployment, restricting

personnel to unit areas within the installation, packing individual and

organizational equipment, and conducting operational briefings.

14
Although the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) conducting the EDRE in

November was not deployed to Panama, the experience did improve

the ability of division and garrison support units and staffs to handle

the subsequent contingency mission.

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) conducted its own

rehearsals at different installations around the United States and often

used exact replicas of buildings and military materiel that were located

at possible objectives within Panama. The JSOC commander, Maj.

Gen. Gary E. Luck, did most of the early planning for the special

operations elements of BLUE SPOON, but he was scheduled for reassignment. So the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Carl

Stiner, who also was designated the operational commander in

OPLAN 90–2, arranged for Luck’s replacement, Maj. Gen. Wayne

Downing, to observe the rehearsals and participate in the later planning stages of the operation. This allowed the training and planning to

continue at all levels without interruption.

On 11 December two Ranger battalions conducted a command

post exercise and walked over the ground before conducting a fullfledged parachute assault on an objective at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

The exercise objective was a military airfield surrounded by barracks,

hangars, observation towers, and other facilities. Even the new roads

had been carefully placed in and around the objective. Two companies

from the 101st Airborne Division served as the Rangers’ adversaries.

Although the adversaries put up a tenacious mock fight, the Rangers

were able to secure their objective within thirty minutes. The entire

scenario was designed to replicate the military airfield at Rio Hato,

fifty miles west of the Canal Zone.

Training for personnel in the 3–504th Infantry was canceled at the

Jungle Operations Training Center after the incidents of 16 December,

the killing of the Marine officer and the assault on the Navy officer

and his wife. U.S. forces stayed closer to the U.S. installations in

Panama but continued intensive training exercises by conducting mock

attacks on nearby buildings and using engineer tape to mark roadways

and obstacles. Battalion commanders and their principal staff officers

were briefed on likely missions and objectives as cited in OPLAN

90–2. Throughout the Canal Zone, U.S. military installations assumed

tighter security, officials canceled church programs and Christmas parties, and commanders discouraged military personnel and family

members from traveling outside secure areas.

To the casual observer, little seemed to have changed. The immediate reaction to the killing of the marine appeared a predictable

response: cancel off-post training, increase security, restrict personnel

15
to installations, and postpone social activities. Beyond the surface,

however, significant developments were set in motion.

Several high-level meetings and telephone conversations in

Washington, D.C., Panama, and Forts Bragg and Ord preceded the

final decision briefing for President Bush on 17 December. The operations officer for the XVIII Airborne Corps, on leave to attend a wedding 120 miles away on 16 December, cut his trip short and returned

to Fort Bragg when he learned of the incidents in Panama that

evening. He arrived in time to receive a telephone call from General

Stiner, who directed him to meet at the corps headquarters immediately. Less than seventy-two hours later and accompanied by a small

advance party, the operations officer and his commander were en route

to Panama. The DRB for the 82d Airborne Division, now the 1st

Brigade, was alerted on 18 December. Military leaves were canceled,

and large numbers of Air Force transport aircraft started arriving at

Pope Air Force Base, adjacent to Fort Bragg.

Battalion commanders in Panama enforced a strict “lights out”

during the evening hours, insisting that their personnel receive a full

night’s rest on the eighteenth. Others in Panama noted increased activity at U.S. air bases. Personnel at Fort Bragg packed and repacked

equipment in an effort to conserve weight and space in vehicles and on

aircraft. The level of activity assumed a greater urgency as the hours

passed. By the nineteenth, company commanders in the United States

and Panama who would be involved in the operation had at least been

alerted that the events to follow would be more than just another training exercise—but not all enlisted personnel were officially informed

until after 2100 in order to ensure optimum operational security. Even

the Department of Defense national news media pool was alerted for

deployment in the early evening of 19 December. By then, however,

uncontrollable factors threatened the success of the operation.

President Bush approved the military incursion. General Stiner

selected 0100 on Wednesday, 20 December, for the military operation

to begin. A consideration that influenced the timing was the desire to

have Omar Torrijos International Airport in Panama free of commercial air traffic and passengers. The last commercial flight into the airfield was scheduled to arrive before 2300 on the nineteenth, which

would have allowed the arriving passengers and flight crew at least

two hours to retrieve luggage, clear customs, and leave the airport.

But the flight was delayed, and the plane would not arrive until after

midnight.

The weather and the military aircraft also engendered major problems on both the East Coast and the West Coast. Fort Ord, California,

16
was 152 miles away from Travis Air Force Base, California, the principal departure field for the deployment of the 7th Infantry Division to

Panama. The four-hour road convoy was made more difficult because

of ground fog and the heavy traffic of Christmas shoppers. When

deploying personnel arrived at the base, the aircraft and their interior

configurations were not always as expected. Probably because the aircraft were collected from around the country on short notice, availability was not always consonant with plans. Unit movement personnel

and loadmasters quickly adapted by repacking equipment and amending flight manifests while the loading continued.

At Fort Bragg, conditions were even more serious. A sudden drop

in temperature with precipitation brought freezing rain and icy roads.

Fort Bragg closed for all nonessential personnel on 19 December. This

improved the operational security of the pending deployment, but

there were insufficient crews and machines to deice all the aircraft.

With weather forecasts showing this possible problem, the command

resolved to disperse the departures. The heavy equipment and vehicles

were packed for deployment already, so a road convoy carried this

materiel on the afternoon of the nineteenth to Charleston, South

Carolina, where the weather was less severe.

The Air Force, which began moving its aircraft into position within hours of the president’s decision, allowed for thirty-one planes to

receive the heavy equipment out of Charleston. Another twenty aircraft arrived at Pope Air Force Base for the DRB, a task force of the

First Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division. The freezing rain became a

serious problem after sunset, but the consensus among the senior commanders was “to get airborne with what we got.” Planes delayed on the

ground were expected to fly in groups of three or more and try their

best to catch up with the lead flight.

Throughout the early phase of this deployment, most of the paratroopers assumed this was merely another ERDE. At each cycle of the

deployment—restriction to unit areas, issuance of firearms, packing of

equipment, and convoy to the airfield—many expected the exercise to

end suddenly, with the troops returning to their barracks and the

resumption of a normal routine for the Christmas holidays. But then

they arrived at Pope Air Force Base and passed through the ammunition distribution point to receive their basic load of munitions. Only

then did most realize that this was more than a training exercise. The

paratroopers received formal briefings on the coming combat operation, and, in the words of one battalion commander, “the chaplains had

a lot of business....And good business in New Testaments” too. The

casual banter among soldiers quieted as everyone became focused on

17
the mission ahead of them. This

deployment was for real.

Operations, 19–20 December

Sometime between the decision to invade on 17 December

and when the deployments were

set in motion forty-eight hours

later, OPLAN 90–2 had its code

name changed from BLUE SPOON

to JUST CAUSE. Musing over the

former appellation, senior military leaders thought it appeared

facile and did not describe the

essence of the military operation.

Future veterans of the impending

conflict might not appreciate having participated in “Operation

BLUE SPOON.” JUST CAUSE

seemed more appropriate. The

phrase fit, and OPLAN 90–2 had

a new code name.

Immediately prior to the

operation, American forces in

Panama numbered some 13,000 troops, about the same total as the

various Panamanian military and paramilitary forces. Major U.S. elements stationed in Panama at that time included the 193d Infantry

Brigade, a battalion from the 7th Infantry Division (Light), a battalion

from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), two companies of U.S.

Marines, and an assortment of military police, Army, Air Force, and

Naval personnel. Initial airlifts brought in a strike force of about 7,000

troops, including a composite brigade of the 82d Airborne Division,

the 75th Infantry (Ranger), and the equivalent of five battalions of

other special operations forces. Another 7,000 soldiers followed, mostly from the 7th Infantry Division and the 16th Military Police Brigade.

For the initial assault, Joint Task Force SOUTH, the tactical command

headquarters taken from the XVIII Airborne Corps and operating

directly under the U.S. Southern Command, divided these forces into

four conventional ground task forces, ATLANTIC (centered around the

3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division), PACIFIC (comprised largely of the

1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division), BAYONET (under control of

the193d Infantry Brigade), and SEMPER FI (centered around the 6th

18

Paratroopers from the 82d Airborne

Division in a Waiting Area at Pope

Air Force Base on the Eve of Their

Deployment to Panama, 19

December 1989
Marine Expeditionary Battalion); an aviation task force; and five

unconventional task forces, GREEN (Army Delta Force), BLACK (3d

Battalion, 7th Special Forces), RED (the Rangers), BLUE, and WHITE

(Navy Sea-Air-Land, or SEAL units). Some U.S. forces were stationed

only a few hundred yards away from their assigned objectives; other

objectives brought attacking forces from thousands of miles away.

Together, these forces had twenty-seven different targets to engage or

seize during the first hours of the assault, with about half scheduled to

be taken simultaneously and the rest only hours later. If successful, the

attacking forces would have neutralized Noriega’s military forces to

possess de facto control over the small nation in under twenty-four

hours with a minimal amount of fighting.

Maintaining operational security for these multiple objectives had

become increasingly difficult, and soon it was apparent that some

Panamanians and PDF units were alerted to the imminent invasion.

Late in the evening of the nineteenth, the immediate superior of a

newly promoted PDF company commander was told to tighten security

at Coco Solo Naval Station in preparation for an American attack. A

U.S. civilian in Panama City, listening to a radio news broadcast on the

eve of the incursion noted a report that “there was a lot of movement

going on at the U.S. military bases in Panama.” About this same time, a

reporter staying at the Marriott Hotel in Panama City received a coded

telephone message that the national news media pool had been alerted

for deployment, an unmistakable indication that a military operation

was about to begin. Two evening news programs in the United States

reported that the 82d Airborne Division had left Fort Bragg, and one

reporter speculated that the division might be en route to Panama.

Other equally ominous signs indicated that operational security

had been compromised. In an intercepted telephone conversation, the

commander of the 8th Infantry Company at Fort Espinar was told “the

ball game starts at 0100 hours, get your troops out and get them

ready.” A wiretap picked up a PDF desk sergeant calling PDF headquarters in Colon with a warning to get out of the city before 0100

hours. The commander of the 5th Company at Fort Amador received a

telephone call at about 2300, and he immediately abandoned his post

after telling his subordinate officers that an attack was imminent. By

that time, the PDF already had established roadblocks along different

routes leading to La Comandancia, their military headquarters in

Panama City. In the hour that followed, intercepted radio transmissions

and telephone calls indicated that personnel at La Comandancia were

warning individual PDF commanders and installations of a pending

U.S. assault.

19
Shortly after midnight on Wednesday morning, an unknown number of PDF personnel infiltrated Albrook Air Force Base and fired on

a hangar where Army Special Forces personnel were assembling to

board helicopters bound for the Pacora River Bridge. Two Americans

were wounded before the PDF withdrew. Minutes later a column of

PDF vehicles left Fort Cimarron, heading toward Panama City.

Seizure of the Pacora River Bridge was critical to preventing these

PDF reinforcements from reaching the city. Because of scattered

reports of compromised security and the PDF movement toward the

Pacora Bridge, General Stiner moved H-hour up fifteen minutes to

allow the attack on the bridge to take place at 0045. The fight was on.

The flight of three UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters set the Special

Forces personnel near the bridge just as they saw headlights approaching from a distance to the east. Two soldiers ran forward and fired their

antitank weapons on the lead PDF vehicle just as it started to cross the

bridge. The column stopped. Unsure of what they were facing or how

many personnel were involved, the tactical air control party called in

an AC–130 gunship to engage the column before it moved across the

bridge. Shortly thereafter, the PDF abandoned their vehicles, firing

wildly at the U.S. positions. With continuous suppressive fire from the

AC–130, the Special Forces unit was able to hold the bridge through

the night, preventing the column from reinforcing PDF units in

Panama City or interfering with the American assault on Torrijos and

Tocumen Airports.

Omar Torrijos International Airport and the adjacent Tocumen

Military Airfield were critical objectives in Operation JUST CAUSE.

Specific U.S. objectives were the neutralization of the 2d PDF

Company and the Panamanian Air Force at these two sites. Seizure of

the airport and airfield would also deny an escape route for Noriega

and secure a large air base for incoming U.S. forces. Surprisingly, in

spite of earlier alerts of PDF units at other military objectives, the

attack at the Torrijos-Tocumen airfields caught the PDF unprepared to

offer a coordinated defense.

The attack began at H-hour with two AH–6 attack helicopters

and one AC–130H gunship engaging preselected targets around

Tocumen Airfield. The suppressive fires lifted at 0103, as four companies of Rangers parachuted from 500 feet onto the objectives. The

schedule allowed forty-five minutes to secure the airfields before

paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division were to arrive.

Receiving only sporadic fire from isolated PDF personnel, the

Rangers quickly secured the two airfields and moved to clear individual buildings in the area.

20
The only significant resistance—and surprise—for the Rangers

was the seizure of the terminal for Torrijos Airport. Approximately 400

civilians, most from the delayed commercial flight, were assembled in

the building. PDF personnel who had withdrawn into or had been

caught inside the building put up a stubborn fight. Some simply melted

into the crowd of civilians and were weeded out through individual

interrogations later in the day. During the meticulous room-by-room

search of the terminal, two Rangers were wounded trying to clear a

restroom where two PDF soldiers were hiding. When the enemy fighters refused to surrender, the Americans killed one in hand-to-hand

fighting; the other was shot trying to escape. Another detachment of ten

PDF soldiers took an American woman and baby hostage and held the

Rangers at bay for four hours before finally surrendering. Noriega, visiting a prostitute in the area, was surprised by the parachute assault and

hastily departed, leaving behind his uniform and other personal possessions. His two-car convoy tried to evade a temporary roadblock near the

airfields. When some Rangers signaled them to stop, the cars started to

speed away. The Rangers fired on the lead car and disabled it.

Unknown to them, Noriega was in the second car and escaped.

The inclement weather at Fort Bragg delayed the arrival of the airborne brigade task force. Originally scheduled to parachute onto the

21

Army Ranger at a Roadblock Outside Torrijos Airport
airfields at 0145, the first wave of paratroopers did not “hit the silk”

until 0200—and then, it was only the first wave. Rather than arriving in

one parachute assault, the All-Americans of the 82d Airborne Division

were spread over five insertions, with the last one arriving at 0500.

Significantly, however, even though there was intermittent firing around

the airfield while the paratroopers arrived, not one U.S. soldier was hit

by friendly fire. Sound training and the rehearsals also paid dividends in

the rapidity with which individual units assumed their missions, often in

the confusion of darkness and battle and missing personnel and equipment. Both the division and brigade command posts were fully operational within thirty minutes of the first wave. Within the same time period the division had collection points established for casualties and

enemy prisoners, and all communications were functioning.

Nonetheless, there were problems. Most of the heavy equipment,

principally vehicles and artillery, was airdropped next to the airfield so

that it would not interfere with the paratroopers landing on the runways

or the aircraft that would be bringing troops from Fort Ord later in the

day. But the maps and aerial photographs did not reveal that this area

was a marsh covered by tall elephant grass. One M551 Sheridan assault

vehicle (often identified as a light tank) was destroyed, and another was

damaged. The supporting artillery battery had four M998 high mobility,

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) similarly damaged. Most

of the materiel could not be found in the tall grass until after daylight.

By 0900 the artillery battery had only two M102 howitzers recovered,

cleaned, and operational. The last vehicle from the division equipment

drop was not recovered from the marsh until nine days later.

The delays caused by the ice storm at Fort Bragg forced the helicopters that were to take the paratroopers from the airfields to airassault other objectives to wait precious hours. Also, the helicopters

could not land in the area as long as paratroopers were still dropping

on the airfields. The large number of parachutes that littered the

ground exacerbated the problem by posing a safety hazard for the

rotary wing aircraft when they did arrive and tried to land on the tarmac. The first lift of paratroopers did not leave Torrijos International

Airport for their objective at Panama Viejo until 0615, well after sunrise and almost four hours after the originally scheduled time of attack.

Attacks on other objectives in the predawn darkness of 20

December were unaffected by the events surrounding the action at

Torrijos and Tocumen Airports. Task Force SEMPER FI, comprised of

four companies of U.S. Marines, with additional Army units in support, hit its objectives at H-hour. Two PDF stations were seized, and

the area around Howard Air Force Base was secured after minor resist22
ance. The most critical objective for the task force was the seizure and

security of the Bridge of the Americas, which spanned the Panama

Canal and served as a major road link for Panama City.

Shortly after midnight a Navy SEAL task force of forty-eight men

landed on the beach near Paitilla Airfield, where Noriega’s personal jet

and some PDF security forces were located. At 0105 the SEALs started clearing the airfield. In the firefights that followed, the jet was disabled and the Panamanians guarding the airfield were killed. But this

task proved to be the most costly in Operation JUST CAUSE. Four

SEALs were killed in action, and eight were wounded. Prior to the

assault on this objective, SEALs destroyed two PDF patrol boats near

Fort Amador. Noriega might otherwise have used them as a means to

escape the country, or the 20-mm. cannon mounted on each boat could

have been employed against local U.S. installations.

The area around La Comandancia crackled with gunfire and

explosions minutes before H-hour. In view of the compromised operational security, the assault on the PDF headquarters began at 0045—

fifteen minutes earlier than the original H-hour. As attack helicopters

from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group engaged targets in

and around La Comandancia, a mechanized infantry company from

23

Panama Viejo. The landing zone for U.S. forces is at left center. The objective is the enclosed flat area, right center.
the 4–6th Infantry crossed its line of departure less than a mile away.

Almost immediately, the company encountered a roadblock, and

small-arms fire peppered the area. The M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) crushed or swept away the vehicles and debris used to

block their advance, but the small-arms firing continued to harass the

soldiers en route to their objective. Often, the U.S. soldiers did not

shoot back: some of the hostile firing came from unidentified positions in civilian apartment buildings.

The lead helicopter, an AH–6 “Light Bird,” was shot down and

crashed into the courtyard of the PDF headquarters. The two-man

crew was not injured and successfully evaded both hostile and friendly

fire. The men escaped from the compound, armed only with pistols,

and captured a PDF soldier, scaled the outer wall, and linked up with

the mechanized company just as it arrived on the scene.

Meanwhile, special operations personnel raided a jail adjacent to

the headquarters and rescued an American prisoner. But the evacuation

helicopter flying the party out was hit by hostile fire from the PDF. It

crashed, wounding or injuring everyone on board except the rescued

American. Moments later, an M113 APC arrived to evacuate the entire

party.

24

Final Assault on La Comandancia
Firing around La Comandancia intensified as the PDF resistance

continued in and around the headquarters complex. Positioned on

Quarry Heights only 500 yards away from the PDF compound were

four M551 Sheridans from the 82d Airborne Division, secretly flown

into Panama thirty days earlier, and four U.S. Marine Corps light

armored vehicles (LAVs). The Sheridan tanks, with their 152-mm.

guns, and the LAVs, with their 25-mm. cannon, were to provide

ground support fire for the attack on the PDF headquarters. But the

suppressive fires from the attack helicopters and AC–130 gunship had

caused so much damage and created so much smoke around the objective that the ground support vehicles could not easily identify any targets. Rather than run the risk of hitting civilian homes and businesses

in the neighborhood, they held their fire until the smoke cleared (and

daylight improved visibility).

Most aviators were using night vision devices to fly their aircraft

and identify their targets. But the increasing amount of smoke and frequent flashes from explosions and fires often obscured subtle differences between friend and foe, especially when there were no clearly

defined front lines and hostile fire came from many directions.

Unfortunately, this led to two separate incidents of the AC–130 gunship’s firing on the U.S. forces attacking the PDF headquarters, which

resulted in twenty-one men wounded in action.

Under the concealment of the night and smoke, and with the confusion of the battle, some PDF personnel were able to slip away before

U.S. forces could seal the headquarters complex. As they retreated,

PDF or Dignity Battalion personnel were seen deliberately setting

fires in the El Chorrillo neighborhood, a low-income housing area

near the PDF headquarters. As a result, hundreds of Panamanian civilians fled toward the U.S. forces, creating an unforeseen refugee problem while the soldiers tried to cordon off the headquarters complex

amongst the panic-stricken civilians. La Comandancia finally was

sealed, and firing from inside tapered off before sunrise. On the afternoon of 20 December, after calling upon remaining PDF personnel

inside to surrender, a Ranger company from Torrijos Airport arrived to

clear the remaining occupied headquarters buildings. Another major

military and political objective of the operation was secured.

U.S. military personnel and PDF units jointly occupied Fort

Amador and several other military installations within the Canal Zone.

Alerted by the battle being fought downtown, several PDF soldiers

loaded a bus and a passenger car at Fort Amador shortly after midnight

and headed toward the main gate. At the same time, two PDF guards

at the gate tried to arrest their two American counterparts. The

25
Military Police (MPs) subdued their attackers as a platoon of paratroopers, inserted onto the installation on the nineteenth to protect U.S.

property, arrived. The PDF bus and car barreled down the exit road

just as the MPs and paratroopers were building a roadblock. Shots

were exchanged. The bus crashed through the partial barrier just as the

driver was shot and killed. Although the bus made it out of the installation, it crashed on the darkened street several yards away. Whoever

was in the bus escaped, but the passenger car did not fare so well. It

crashed before reaching the main gate. Four of the PDF occupants

were killed; the other three, wounded, surrendered. The U.S. forces

completed the roadblock and sealed the exit from Fort Amador. A

Navy officer on the SOUTHCOM staff at Fort Amador, who observed

these events from his office complex 200 yards away, said “it was like

sitting on the 50-yard line watching a war.”

In what General Stiner later summarized as “a first-class job by a

very disciplined and professional force,” the 1–508th Infantry

(Airborne) of USARSO’s 193d Infantry Brigade had the delicate task

of securing Fort Amador. Gunfire already had erupted around the

neighborhood surrounding La Comandancia when the UH–60 Black

Hawk helicopters descended onto the golf course that separated the

26

La Comandancia After Being Secured by U.S. Forces
American family housing from the PDF barracks of 5th Company and

some Panamanian Navy personnel also stationed at the fort. The

shooting in Panama City, less than one-half mile away, awakened several family members at the installation, who were shocked to see helicopters pass their homes so close that they could see the faces of the

soldiers inside. The Black Hawks landed 100 yards from their objective and quickly moved to their assigned positions. Seconds later, a

detail from the assault force went to each house to warn the occupants

to stay indoors and away from windows.

This was the easy part. The air assault and a cordon around U.S.

facilities at Fort Amador had been rehearsed during a recent SAND

FLEA exercise. While the Black Hawks landed on the golf course in the

early morning hours of the twentieth, an AC–130 gunship sprayed the

PDF barracks with 105-mm. cannon. Hovering nearby was an AH–1

Cobra attack helicopter and an OH–58 observation helicopter available

for fire support if requested. The OH–58 received ground fire and

crashed into the Bay of Panama about 100 yards from the fort. The

copilot was killed, but the injured pilot was rescued thirty minutes

later. Within one hour, the U.S. facilities were secured, the main gate

blocked, and the PDF cantonment area isolated. A Spanish recording

was broadcast, calling on the PDF to surrender.

There were some isolated shots from PDF positions, but U.S.

forces did not return fire. After the deadline to surrender expired, the

Americans waited. Finally, the USARSO commander, whose headquarters was at Fort Amador, authorized the fire demonstration to

begin. Using a variety of crew-served weapons, including a 105-mm.

howitzer in a direct-fire mode, the Americans targeted and briefly

fired upon individual buildings. The demonstration worked. Dozens of

PDF personnel surrendered as each building in succession was

engaged.

After each building had been fired upon and daylight came, the

paratroopers started clearing the structures one at a time. Some PDF

holdouts delayed this process, and they were either killed in short firefights or surrendered after being cornered. The original plan called for

the installation to be secure by 0900, but it was not until much later in

the day that Fort Amador was declared completely secure. As a testimony to training and fire discipline, the battalion had none of its personnel killed in action, and the tomb of Panama’s popular leader,

General Omar Torrijos, located in front of the PDF barracks, suffered

no damage.

When H-hour arrived, other objectives in the interior of Panama

and on the Atlantic side of the country also were engaged. A company

27
of the 3–504th Infantry left its temporary quarters late in the evening

of the nineteenth in order to have sufficient time to road-march to its

objective twenty miles away. Madden Dam regulated the flow of water

into the Panama Canal, and it was a major source of electrical power

for the country. Moreover, the major road network that connected the

Atlantic and the Pacific sides of Panama passed over the dam. The few

PDF guards that they encountered were quickly subdued, and the dam

was secured within minutes of H-hour.

About ten miles west and downriver on the canal were two more

objectives for the 3–504th Infantry. The small town of Gamboa housed

about 160 Americans; most worked for the Panama Canal

Commission. One company of paratroopers had the mission of airassaulting into the town to protect the U.S. civilians that were there

and also disarming a small PDF detachment outside the town—

including a barracks of Fuerzas Femininas (FUFEM), female counterintelligence soldiers. Across the Chagres River was the Renacer

Prison, where two Americans and some Panamanian political prisoners

were being held. Another company of infantrymen from the same battalion had the mission of liberating these prisoners.

The company targeting the prison made a two-pronged assault

from Landing Craft, Marine (LCM), boats coming down the canal and

28

Madden Dam
from three UH–1H helicopters. With water surrounding the prison on

three sides and only two very small landing zones available outside the

prison fence, this dual approach provided the quickest means of putting the most troops on the target at one time. The attack began as a

sniper fired on the prison’s guard tower and an AH–1 Cobra helicopter

fired its 20-mm. gun on the guard barracks. With surgical precision,

the company freed the prisoners within minutes and isolated the

guards. It required another three hours to confirm that all prisoners

and guards were accounted for before certifying that the prison complex was secure. In spite of the close quarters, no Americans and no

prisoners were killed; seventeen PDF guards were taken prisoner, and

five others were killed in action.

Just as the Cobra helicopter started firing on the prison, one

UH–1H and two CH–47 helicopters approached landing zones across

the river outside Gamboa. Most of the PDF personnel fled into the

jungle after firing a few shots. The most determined resistance came

from the FUFEM barracks, and these defenders also slipped into the

jungle before they could be surrounded and captured. By 0300

Gamboa was secure. Not one American was injured, and none of the

paratroopers was killed in action. Although it was certain that some

PDF personnel had been killed or wounded, the exact numbers were

unknown because of their quick withdrawal into the jungle. Blood

trails indicated that PDF casualties had been evacuated.

Almost ten miles down the canal was the battalion’s final objective, Cerro Tigre. This was an electrical distribution center for the

Canal Zone and the logistical heart of the PDF. There may have

been seventy or more enemy personnel on or around the objective.

The approach route to Cerro Tigre was altered when the element of

surprise was compromised. And then, just as the airlift was about to

leave Fort Sherman, one of the CH–47 helicopters developed maintenance problems. A new Chinook was brought in, and the troops

were reloaded. But in the early morning darkness, only the two

UH–1H helicopters arrived at the designated landing zone on time.

The two trailing CH–47 helicopters became lost and arrived ten

minutes later.

Small-arms fire created the appearance of a “hot” LZ, but the

rounds went high and wide. Frustrated by their efforts to breach the

fence, the infantrymen discovered an open and unguarded gate and

entered the compound. Most of the buildings were empty, but a PDFoccupied guardhouse nearby put up a spirited defense, which resulted

in two soldiers’ being wounded in action—and both men may have

been hit by ricocheted shell fragments from American ordnance. The

29
company could not account for any PDF casualties or prisoners, again

because they were able to escape into the jungle. By sunrise, the entire

installation was secure.

Early in the morning on the twentieth, the company moved on the

PDF ordnance school and an arsenal about one mile away. The route

to the facility was booby-trapped, and one soldier was wounded. There

was a brief firefight outside the main gate before the defending PDF

personnel abandoned the facility and ran into the jungle.

In summarizing what the 3–504th Infantry did in the first few

hours of combat, the battalion commander characterized the four

company objectives and operations as an “enormous and

complex...economy of force mission.” But he credited the individual

soldiers and junior leaders as the ones most critical to the successful

operations, because they adapted so easily to mistakes and problems

as they arose. Indeed, one company commander opined in an afteraction interview that he “had tougher training at Fort Bragg.”

On the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone, troops from the 7th

Infantry Division and U.S. Army South started moving into their preinvasion positions before midnight. With operational security already

compromised, it was not surprising that fighting began well before the

designated H-hour of 0100. A detachment of Military Police was

ordered to seal the main entrance to the Coco Solo Naval Station at

0030 hours. They arrived on time, only to find a group of men idling

around the entrance and a guard on alert at the guardhouse. The senior

MP approached the guard to place him under arrest, but the guard took

his revolver from his holster and tried to seize the MP’s rifle. The MP

shot the guard, and the men standing nearby immediately surrendered.

The entrance was sealed, but the shot was heard by others and set off a

chain reaction.

With all the attacking units in motion but still short of their objectives, events suddenly accelerated. The single gunshot alerted personnel from the Panamanian Naval Infantry Company, who left their

barracks and dashed for their motorboats. At that same moment, a

company from the 4–17th Infantry was moving toward a blocking

position on a bottleneck that led into the city of Colon. When the

infantrymen heard the gunshot one mile away, they knew the element

of surprise had vanished, and they sped down the road to their

assigned positions. And then more gunfire erupted around Coco Solo.

Individual platoons from the attacking company at Coco Solo

Naval Station were approaching the objective from different directions, concealed by darkness and separated by buildings and fences.

When the retreating PDF naval infantry saw the Americans closing in,

30
they fired wildly and ran for the water. The chase was on. Two PDF

boats slipped out of their moorings and headed for the open sea. An

American fire team moved to the water’s edge and engaged the boats

with small arms and antitank weapons. Their exposed position attracted more PDF gunfire, and three soldiers were wounded. A Vulcan gun

began firing from a supporting position to the rear, but the boats

escaped.

Other U.S. units also were busy clearing individual buildings in

the area. Sometimes they encountered civilians; sometimes they

encountered PDF infantry. Within minutes, the firing began to taper

off, but the infantrymen were kept busy ensuring that all facilities

were cleared of PDF and the area was secured. Before sunrise, all

resistance had ceased. Surprisingly, there were only two dead PDF

personnel and twenty-seven captured—less than a third of the total

number of enemy personnel the company expected to engage at the

naval station. It was unknown how many escaped in the two boats.

The explosions of antitank weapons, tracers from small-arms fire,

and the thumping sound of the Vulcan gun confirmed the urgency of

the situation to the U.S. Infantry company that was moving into its

blocking positions outside Colon. While the troops were unloading

concertina wire from vehicles and moving other vehicles into blocking

positions, there was a burst of gunfire from the edge of the city. One

soldier was killed, the only one from the 4–17th Infantry to die in

Operation JUST CAUSE, and another was wounded. The Americans

returned fire, but the harassment continued through the night. The two

boats that had escaped Coco Solo appeared briefly and were fired on

before they could get away. By 0115 the land routes into Colon were

sealed. No PDF could get in or out of the city. After sunrise, the company confirmed twelve PDF casualties. In addition, several

Panamanian civilians had been wounded in the crossfire while trying

to escape from the city.

The firing at Coco Solo put another company, moving into positions at Fort Espinar, into a quandary. The company, split into platoon

formations and approaching their objectives from different directions,

hesitated. H-hour was still thirty minutes away. And then, independent

of others, platoon leaders and the company commander moved the soldiers under their immediate command to initiate their attacks right

away.

The PDF commander of the 8th Company already had been alerted to the impending attack and abandoned his post for the safety of

Colon. The company itself, however, put up a spirited defense as the

American infantrymen closed in and a Vulcan gun sprayed the exterior

31
of the PDF buildings. After an expenditure of a massive amount of

ordnance by both sides within the first few minutes, the Americans

called upon the PDF to surrender. Over forty enemy personnel left

their barracks under a white flag or with arms raised. Only one U.S.

soldier had been wounded in this phase of the attack.

More PDF were discovered in a nearby training facility. The site

was quickly subdued, with another forty PDF personnel captured and

two more wounded. In clearing the final building, however, six U.S.

servicemen were wounded when a hand grenade thrown into a room

bounced back to explode among the soldiers.

Other elements of Task Force ATLANTIC, the principal attacking

force in this area, occupied France Airfield, which was the local airport for Colon—and another possible escape route for Noriega. The

Coco Solo Hospital was secured and roadblocks established along the

Boyd-Roosevelt Highway, the principal thoroughfare that connected

the two ends of the Canal Zone. There was little resistance at these

sites.

The most distant target to be struck was fifty miles away from the

Canal Zone at the Rio Hato Military Base, where about 500 PDF soldiers of the 6th and 7th Companies were stationed. Noriega’s beach

house was near the installation, and there were concerns that if he

eluded capture near Panama City, he might try to leave the country

from the nearby military airfield. Equally important were the two PDF

companies stationed there. The 6th Company was of uncertain ability,

but the 7th Company had played a critical role in rescuing Noriega

during the October coup attempt. OPLAN 90–2 called for two Ranger

battalions, almost 900 men, to parachute onto this objective at H-hour.

At 0100 two F–117A “Stealth” fighters each dropped a 2,000-

pound bomb in the vicinity of the PDF barracks. The intent was to

catch the enemy soldiers in their barracks and stun them with overwhelming firepower. Because of poor targeting data, one bomb overshot its mark by several hundred yards and the second bomb fell

dangerously closer to the barracks than intended. The utility of this

opening attack, however, was minimized by the compromised operational security. The two companies, already alerted to an imminent

attack, had vacated their barracks.

As soon as the bombs exploded, an AC–130 gunship engaged

selected targets around the military base and AH–1 and AH–64 helicopters soon joined in. Less than five minutes after the assault began,

the sky above the airfield was filled with parachutes. This was a 360-

degree fight, with no front lines and PDF and Rangers intermixed

throughout the battlefield. By sunrise Rio Hato Military Base was

32


I I

3(-) 75

I I

2 75

RIO HATO 

MILITARY

BASE

G U L F O F P A N A M A

Anton

Rio Hato

Santa Clara

 TO PANAMA CITY 52 Miles

20 December 1989

D–DAY: RIO HATO

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Airborne Assault

0 10

1 0 Kilometers

Miles

ELEVATION IN FEET

600 1600 2000 and Above

MAP 3
secure. The Rangers had 4 of their own killed in action, 18 wounded,

and 26 others injured in the combat jump. At least 34 PDF personnel

were killed and another 250 were captured (some were caught while

trying to shave their distinctive beards). About 200 either fled in vehicles down the Pan-American Highway or slipped into the nearby jungle. The speed with which the Rangers attacked their objectives and

the surgical precision in their approach were deciding factors in limiting the total number of casualties on both sides and securing the area

within five hours.

Operations, 20–23 December

By sunrise on 20 December most of the military objectives for the

first phase of the operation had been secured. Because of the weather

delays from Fort Bragg, however, three important objectives still had

not been engaged: Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron.

Tinajitas housed the PDF 1st Infantry Company, which was equipped

with several heavy mortars that could engage U.S. facilities at Fort

Clayton and Albrook Air Force Base. Some armored cars and about

250 PDF were quartered at Panama Viejo. Another 200 Panamanian

soldiers, equipped with nine armored cars and several large mortars,

were stationed at Fort Cimarron. The original plan was to engage all

three objectives during the predawn hours to capitalize on the element

of surprise and minimize potential casualties. The approaching daylight was a graphic reminder that neither advantage would apply in the

assaults that were to follow.

Shortly before 0700 the 2–504th Infantry conducted its air assault

from Tocumen Airfield into two “hot” landing zones at Panama Viejo.

Intelligence reports indicated that about 180 PDF from the 1st

Cavalry Squadron and additional personnel from Noriega’s counterterrorist commando unit were located at this site. The two landing

zones flanking the objective were small, and the PDF quickly

engaged the Black Hawk helicopters as they set the paratroopers on

the ground. Exacerbating the situation was the discovery that literally

one-half of the LZ closest to the Bay of Panama was mud. Troops

exiting the aircraft on one side landed on solid ground; troops exiting

on the other side sank into waist-deep mire. Helicopter crews pulled

some of the paratroopers out, while the aircraft hovered only a few

feet above the ground; others received assistance from Panamanian

civilians, who formed human chains in the mud to help the struggling

soldiers.

The presence of large groups of civilians watching the battle interfered with some supporting fire from attack helicopters. On the other

34
end of the objective, the attack from the second LZ started slowly

because some of the soldiers became disoriented in the tall elephant

grass that towered over their heads. Before the hour was done, hostile

firing had tapered off; by 1040 the objective was declared secured.

The battalion had no killed in action, but three Black Hawk helicopters

had been damaged and put out of action for the duration of military

operations for that week. Surprisingly, there were only about twenty

PDF personnel that resisted. Many had abandoned their post hours

earlier when the PDF squadron commander announced that an attack

was likely—and then he himself left. Others who were assigned to the

squadron were captured when they reported for duty later in the morning, after the objective had been seized.

Five miles north of Panama Viejo, the 1–504th Infantry was to airassault into Tinajitas, where the 1st PDF Company was stationed and

several dozen large-caliber mortars posed a threat to U.S. installations

around Panama City. Here too, resistance was stiff, albeit brief, with

many of the PDF fleeing the garrison as soon as the attack began. It

was a confusing assault, with many helicopters struck by the ground

fire that also wounded several paratroopers and aviation crewmen. Two

U.S. soldiers were killed in action. Although the objective was secured

by early afternoon, the men of the 1–504th Infantry continued to

endure harassing sniper fire for the next forty-eight hours.

By now there were too many PDF stragglers and individuals from

Noriega’s paramilitary Dignity Battalions roaming the countryside and

the outskirts of Panama City. A ground convoy of two M551 Sheridan

tanks, HMMWVs, and trucks left Tocumen and Torrijos Airports late

in the morning, bound for Panama Viejo. Small roadblocks and persistent sniper fire from civilian buildings and other nonmilitary facilities made the journey too treacherous. Barely two miles out, the convoy halted and returned to the airport.

The final air assault of the morning was the 4–325th Infantry’s striking east at Fort Cimarron, home for Battalion 2000. With an estimated

200 personnel, this PDF unit had proclaimed its loyalty to Noriega during the October coup attempt. Also at this site were several armored

vehicles and crew-served weapons. Some of the vehicles had been

destroyed at the Pacora Bridge; others had slipped away before daylight.

Several of the PDF personnel also vanished into the jungle or the surrounding civilian communities. The few enemy soldiers who remained

behind put up stubborn but ineffectual resistance through the day. The

last building in the compound was not declared cleared and the objective

secured until after midnight. All the twenty-seven objectives for the initial assaults in Operation JUST CAUSE were now under U.S. control.

35

Air Assault, Tinajitas, Al Sprague, 1990
One of the principal concerns that dominated all planning prior to

the incursion was the protection of U.S. civilians once combat operations began. With almost 40,000 Americans scattered throughout

Panama, it was unrealistic to expect every American citizen to receive

total protection—especially with the paucity of military personnel

available for such a security mission. The situation was simplified by

the May 1989 elections, after which many family members were sent

back to the United States and those that remained were housed at U.S.

installations within the Canal Zone. Nonetheless, this left several thousand Americans who had no military connections living amongst

Panamanians, plus hundreds of American tourists and businessmen

who passed through the country every day. To minimize potential

threats to these individuals, military planners resolved to engage specific military objectives early in the operation. From these secure locations, larger areas could be secured and any remaining danger to U.S.

civilians further reduced.

This plan was altered within twenty-four hours of the campaign’s

beginning, when reports reached Generals Thurman and Stiner of PDF

soldiers’ entering the Marriott Hotel in search of American civilians. The

hotel was almost two miles southwest of Panama Viejo, so a reinforced

company of paratroopers was dispatched from there to break the siege

and secure the site. The unit left early in the evening of 20 December in

a quick road march, suffering two casualties from sniper fire en route.

About a dozen PDF or members of the Dignity Battalions were killed

during the intermittent contacts. The company reached the hotel by

2130, and many of the occupants were evacuated the following day.

Some hostages already had been taken before the paratroopers

arrived at the hotel. (All eventually were released.) Unfortunately,

there were other hostage situations early in the operation, and not all

of them ended satisfactorily. About thirty PDF personnel abducted a

Smithsonian Institution research team, comprised of eleven scientists

and technicians (five of whom were Americans), and a four-year-old

girl. They were abandoned unharmed in a remote village the following

day. An American teacher for a Department of Defense secondary

school, although not a hostage, was shot and killed fleeing a PDF

roadblock shortly after military operations began, and an American

college teacher was taken from his residence by PDF personnel and

killed hours later. Sadly, the only other U.S. civilian to be killed in

Operation JUST CAUSE was shot trying to run through a U.S. forces

roadblock in Panama City shortly after H-hour.

There were several follow-on missions in and around the Canal

Zone during the daylight hours of 20 and 21 December. Some were

38
designed to clear buildings or facilities possibly occupied by remnants

of PDF units. Other missions removed foreign nationals from potentially hostile environments or disabled communications sites that were

still being operated by elements allied with Noriega. This period

marked the transition from seizure of military objectives and confrontations with enemy units to clearing isolated and infrequent resistance by paramilitary personnel. The sudden shift in the operational

tempo now focused on stabilizing the country, to include working with

the new government, providing food and shelter for refugees, and

maintaining order and public services.

Another brigade of the 7th Infantry Division air-landed at Torrijos

International Airport later on 20–21 December. On the second day of

Operation JUST CAUSE, a reinforced battalion from the 7th Infantry

Division flew to Rio Hato to relieve the Rangers. The last brigade of

the 7th Infantry Division started arriving at Howard Air Force Base

two days later and completed its deployment to Panama by Christmas

Day. Also coming into the country at this time were a Military Police

Brigade and additional communications and logistics assets.

Eventually, almost 14,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed

to Panama, doubling the total American troop strength in the country.

These additional forces were designed to provide essential reinforcements to secure the Canal Zone and neutralize any remaining PDF

opposition in outlying areas of the country.

One potentially difficult area remained for U.S. forces: clearing

the city of Colon, on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone. An infantry

company had sealed the landward entrance and exit, which prevented

any PDF units in the city from escaping. However, by the evening of

the first day of the operation, the city had been overwhelmed by lawless elements. Looters were rampant. Twice Army personnel had

assembled to launch an assault into Colon to engage the PDF known

to be there and to restore order in the city. Each time, however, the

assaults had been postponed because of concerns among senior U.S.

military personnel that too many civilians would be endangered in a

major urban shoot-out. The probability of higher U.S. casualties and

excessive damage to civilian property also was a consideration.

The USARSO commander used a former PDF officer to contact

his comrades in Colon by telephone and encourage them to surrender.

The initiative worked. By the morning of the 22 December over 200

PDF personnel, along with two senior PDF leaders, had surrendered

to U.S. forces. That afternoon, in a combined amphibious and land

assault, U.S. forces entered the city to the unexpected cheering of hundreds of civilians. Most of Colon was quickly brought under order.

39
Some PDF customs police refused to surrender, electing to remain in

their headquarters building and defend it with armed force. After giving them sufficient time to surrender, an infantry company, supported

by artillery, shot up the interior of the building, sending one dazed

customs official out to surrender and forcing his companions to flee

out the backdoor. Random sniper fire and a rumored hostage situation

at a hotel prevented a declaration of the city’s being secured until the

morning of 23 December.

Most senior military personnel thought that the capture of Colon

would be the final large-scale combat operations of the campaign. It

certainly marked the termination of any further organized PDF resistance. Unfortunately, the paramilitary Dignity Battalions were less

predictable.

Late in the afternoon on Saturday, 23 December, thirty armed men,

believed to be from Noriega’s Dignity Battalions, approached the paratroopers that were guarding the Madden Dam. The men were carrying a

white flag to surrender, but when the U.S. soldiers left their defensive

positions to collect their weapons the Panamanians attacked them with

small arms and grenades. The paratroopers killed five of the attackers

but suffered ten wounded in action. This was the last major combat

engagement of Operation JUST CAUSE.

In the days that followed, U.S. forces engaged in aggressive

patrolling throughout the Canal Zone, primarily to reinforce the presence of the American military, but also to discourage any further

armed resistance by isolated elements of the Dignity Battalions or the

PDF. Infrequent sniper fire continued to harass U.S. installations and

personnel through the month. The 7th Infantry Division assumed control over the area of operations for Task Force ATLANTIC, and the 82d

Airborne Division did the same on the Pacific side of the Canal Zone.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel conducted several road

marches and air assaults into remote towns to seize arms caches (usually reported by Panamanian civilians) and to capture isolated PDF

garrisons. These exercises also demonstrated the American military

presence throughout the region. A common pattern was to insert a platoon at night outside a village or town, observe the area for twentyfour hours, and then bring in an entire company the following night.

The townspeople would awaken the next morning to find U.S. troops

patrolling the streets. A day or two later, the U.S. forces would be

withdrawn to another town or village.

Where PDF personnel were known to be stationed in Panamanian

communities, Americans sometimes used the “Ma Bell approach,” a

technique begun by Special Forces personnel who simply utilized the

40
public telephones to contact PDF garrisons. With an AC–130 gunship

flying overhead, a soldier would call the local PDF commander on a

public telephone and invite him to surrender. If the PDF commander

declined the invitation, the gunship would fire some of its ordnance

into a clearing or the nearby jungle or some helicopters would buzz by

overhead at treetop level. If these “encouragements” failed, there was

always a company on standby to be inserted into the operation.

Usually the telephone call worked, and no force was necessary in these

remote areas.

One lingering dilemma for U.S. military personnel was the capture

of Manuel Noriega. By daylight on the twentieth, it was obvious to

everyone involved that the dictator had eluded the attackers. But it was

also apparent that he had not escaped the country and that he was on

the move. Numerous reported sightings of the maximum leader

prompted over forty separate efforts to find him. The hunt became so

aggressive that special operations personnel forced a helicopter down

near the Canal Zone and detained an American battalion commander

before realizing that he was not their intended prey. There was some

41

An M113 Armored Personnel Carrier from the 5th Infantry Division

(Mechanized) on Patrol in Panama City
concern that Noriega might seek refuge at the embassy of a friendly

country, particularly Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya. U.S. military personnel cordoned off these areas. Given Noriega’s close association with

illegal drugs, prostitution, and witchcraft, no one expected him to find

refuge at the Vatican Embassy. Surprisingly, he slipped in unnoticed,

with the aid of the papal nuncio, on the afternoon of Christmas Eve.

As soon as General Thurman learned of Noriega’s location, he had

the nunciature sealed. Negotiations began almost immediately between

the State Department and the Vatican and locally between the USARSO

commander and the papal nuncio. Civilians gathered outside the

embassy to chant anti-Noriega slogans, which hampered negotiations

and forced the commitment of more U.S. military personnel for crowd

control. Eventually, the dictator was persuaded to abandon his quest for

political asylum, and he quietly left the nunciature in the evening of 3

January 1990. U.S. authorities immediately took him into custody and

had him flown to Miami, Florida, for arraignment on charges of drug

trafficking. Two years later, he was convicted on eight counts of racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering and sentenced to forty

years in prison.

Postcombat Tasks

In the closing days of December and throughout most of January,

U.S. military forces were kept busy patrolling city streets, collecting a

wide assortment of small arms, and assisting the civilian population in

its recovery from combat operations. Many Panamanians in towns and

cities alike welcomed the presence of U.S. forces. Often they identified former PDF or Dignity Battalion personnel and reported the locations of arms caches that had been scattered around the country. Gifts

of food and flowers frequently were presented to individual soldiers,

sometimes interrupting military operations. Grateful that Noriega and

his henchmen had been removed from office and that most public

services had been preserved intact, one Panamanian exulted, “Thank

God (and the U.S. military).”

The sudden end of hostilities, however, engendered new problems

for the U.S. forces. With the immediate crisis gone, some found extra

time on their hands and were impatient to return home. Others found

that they were ill equipped and ill trained for the policing duties that

characterized most operations after the New Year. As one sergeant later

explained, daily training in his infantry unit did not include “being a

policeman.” There were not enough military police available to provide adequate law enforcement in the major cities. To ease this burden

and to minimize the U.S. military presence in Panama, the new gov42
ernment quickly recruited a new police force. But many of its recruits

were former PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel. In the rush to

rebuild the country’s infrastructure, particularly its police forces, many

of the foes who were incarcerated two weeks earlier were now armed

and walking the streets again as members of Panama’s new police

force. The situation caused some awkward relations amongst both U.S.

military personnel and Panamanian civilians.

These situations were all part of a much larger problem involving

civil affairs activities and the rebuilding of Panama. Although early

conceptual planning, humorously code-named BLIND LOGIC, had been

invested in this topic, little more beyond this early planning had been

done prior to 20 December. The Joint Chiefs of Staff never formally

approved the plan, and its authors in SOUTHCOM merely assumed

that the joint task force under the command and control of XVIII

Airborne Corps would implement this civil-military part of the operation. The corps, however, did not recognize any specific taskings in

BLIND LOGIC and knew that it had not been formally approved. The

focus was on winning the war, but by the last week of December the

new goal became keeping the peace.

The initial increment of civil affairs personnel had arrived in

Panama on 22 December. They were detailed to Joint Task Force

SOUTH on the following day. The number of deployed personnel was

woefully short of the requirements, and the call went out for Army

reservists to volunteer for temporary assignments in support of this

phase of Operation JUST CAUSE. Although plenty of volunteers stepped

forward to meet the call, no arrangements were made for unit equipment to accompany the volunteers in their deployment. Thus, many

arrived in country with no resources to do their jobs, and they found

themselves depending on the few vehicles, aircraft, and administrative

materiel held by units already in Panama. These circumstances only

added to the confusion that followed the sudden shift in responsibilities and the operational tempo. Looking at essentially “another mouth

to feed,” one exasperated commander asked a civil affairs team that

was sent to him, “What the hell can you do for me?”

In fact, the team proved its worth within days as it started coordinating food distribution for civilians, finding housing for displaced

persons, and managing a weapons turn-in program (where one fifteenyear-old boy received $5,000 for the quantity of weapons he brought).

Other civil affairs teams worked with community organizations and

churches to distribute food, collect trash, clean facilities, and manage

local transportation. Still others focused on restoring all public services

and restarting the economy. Thousands were in need of assistance, but

43
the Panamanians made the task easier. As one parish priest said, “We

will take care of this, because this is our problem.” 

In January 1990 another eighty Army reservists arrived to supplement the civil affairs activities in Panama. By this time, all the emergency needs had been addressed. Civil affairs teams were operating

throughout the country, providing training for local officials and coordinating various domestic services. In some cases, their efforts had

gone beyond restoring previous conditions and services to improving

the quality of life. This included improved roads, electricity, and clean

water for smaller communities. Combat units started redeploying to

the United States in early January. On 12 January Operation JUST

CAUSE officially ended.

Summary and Analysis

Some military analysts view the incursion into Panama as “an

idiosyncratic operation.” Hostilities began suddenly and ended just as

quickly. Indeed, the initial deployments from the United States started

within days of the Christmas holidays, and some troops started redeploying to their home stations just as the traditional holiday season

was coming to a close. Compared to previous armed conflicts, total

casualties were extraordinarily light. Of 26,000 U.S. military personnel

stationed in Panama or deployed to the country for this operation, 23

were killed in action and another 322 were wounded. The total casualties included friendly fire incidents and injuries sustained on drop

zones. The Panama Defense Forces, numbering about 15,000 personnel of all ranks and duty assignments, had 314 killed in action, 124

known to have been wounded in action, and over 5,300 detained by

U.S. forces. Estimates vary among sources, but it appears that 200

Panamanian civilians were killed during Operation JUST CAUSE. From

an international perspective, the incursion was sandwiched between

the collapse of the Berlin Wall only weeks earlier and Operation

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM eight months later. Overshadowed by

these events, the incursion seems even more obscure.

However, to dismiss Operation JUST CAUSE as an aberration in

American military history would be incorrect. This campaign offers a

number of key lessons learned: strategic, operational, and tactical.

Many of these lessons will have a much wider application in subsequent developments of new equipment, doctrine, and training.

The equipment the U.S. forces used, even items being phased out

of the Army inventory, consistently received high marks. Though

seemingly outdated or nearing obsolescence, the 90-mm. recoilless

rifle, the AH–1 attack helicopter, the UH–1 utility helicopter, and the

44
M113 APC all performed quite well and sometimes were better

adapted to the tactical situation than more contemporary materiel.

Newer equipment—particularly the AH–64 and UH–60 helicopters,

night vision devices, the more heavily armed AC–130 gunship, and

the HMMWV light trucks (successor to the ubiquitous “jeep”)—also

received high praise. In subsequent interviews with veterans of the

Panama operation, many noted the value of having a credible light

tank such as the M551 Sheridan and the ever-reliable C–130 aircraft—especially where some Panamanian bridges could not support

the Army’s heavier main battle tank and some Panamanian airfields

could not accommodate the Air Force’s larger aircraft. The length of

the incursion may not have adequately taxed all the equipment that

was used, but at the very least its utility in a combat environment was

reaffirmed.

Notwithstanding the successful use of various items of equipment,

there were some deficiencies in unit and individual training. The

AC–130 gunship was a valuable tool for suppressive fires, particularly

in an urban environment where indirect mortar and artillery fire could

not be employed without increasing the amount of collateral damage

to facilities and engendering significant civilian casualties. However,

the lack of training of many units with this kind of aerial fire support

system caused occasional delays in targeting some objectives. Also,

some Army personnel suffered shrapnel wounds because of their close

proximity to exploding U.S. ordnance, perhaps another reflection of

incomplete training with some materiel. Although all units had conducted training in military operations on urban terrain, several participants doubted that it was adequate for what they experienced in

Panama City and Colon. Typical MOUT training on U.S. military

installations included passing through relatively clear streets of vacant

two- and three-story buildings. The U.S. forces in Panama had to

maneuver around roadblocks, negotiate city debris, deal with civilian

refugees, dodge snipers, and clear fifteen-story apartment complexes.

Nevertheless, U.S. forces demonstrated superlative discipline

and leadership throughout the operation. With very few combat veterans in any of the participating units, the personnel of all ranks

quickly adapted to changing circumstances and showed personal initiative when the need arose. Equally important was their compliance

with increasingly complex rules of engagement (ROE) that restricted

individual soldiers to precise criteria for firing on enemy personnel.

On several occasions, especially the ground assaults into Panama

City and Colon, U.S. forces did not engage targets because of their

close proximity to civilians or critical public facilities. The damage

45
or destruction of property was greatly minimized, and the number of

Panamanian deaths (both PDF and civilian) was significantly less

than what it could have been if U.S. forces had been permitted

greater latitude in the application of firepower.

Security caused two serious problems in Operation JUST CAUSE.

Although the element of surprise clearly was compromised only

hours before the operation was to start, it was unclear how the security was breached and by whom. Surprisingly, this did not have a significant effect on individual operations in Panama or on the entire

incursion. The PDF tried to respond, but it failed to provide a coordinated and effective means of meeting the initial attacks. At a higher

level, among U.S. forces, strict security for all the preoperations planning was maintained, but at a price. Some agencies and even military

units were excluded from any knowledge of a possible incursion into

Panama. As a result, the postcombat phase of the operation started

with much difficulty.

In fewer than five days all objectives were secured, major ground

combat operations ceased, and Noriega was cornered inside the

Vatican Embassy. The fighting was over; the war was won. By this

time, however, U.S. forces had suddenly shifted from combatant to

peacekeeper. This dramatic change in roles introduced a new set of

problems, often of a nature alien to the common infantryman’s training

or education. Soldiers were called upon to direct traffic, distribute

relief supplies, settle domestic disputes, provide public services, and

house refugees. These were basic tasks for civil affairs units and nonmilitary organizations, the last to be brought into the planning process

for Operation JUST CAUSE. The oversight was not deliberate, but the

adverse impact on troop morale and the reconstruction of Panama was

unfortunate. Although this deficiency was quickly corrected by military forces in the country and a sudden infusion of the needed personnel from the United States (who assumed the dominant role in the

postcombat phase of the incursion, named Operation PROMOTE

LIBERTY), it represents the one noticeable flaw in an otherwise masterful execution of the operational art of war.

Under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the operational chain of command from the unified commanders to the President of the United

States had been streamlined. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

retained operational authority involving multiservice campaigns, as

opposed to previous situations that involved each of the service chiefs

(which often confused lines of authority and control). Although

Operation JUST CAUSE did not last long enough to thoroughly test the

46
validity of these sweeping changes in the defense establishment, it did

seem to have a positive impact and portend greater benefits in the

future. This final test would come one year later in Operations DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Strategically, the United States had continued to try varying

degrees of nonlethal military and diplomatic pressure to resolve the

growing conflict with Noriega’s regime. When diplomatic and economic pressure did not force the dictator and his cronies from power

in 1988, the hope was that a nascent political movement among

Panamanians, culminating in the May 1989 elections, would force

him out of office (or at least encourage him to leave). It never happened. For the next four months, military planning focused on a

gradual buildup of U.S. forces over a period of several months based

upon the possibility that any hostilities could result in a long-term

armed conflict with Noriega’s supporters. Throughout this process,

there was an awareness that a sudden coup might topple Noriega,

and U.S. forces might be necessary to pacify the region. When a

coup attempt failed in October 1989, military planning shifted to the

probability of an incursion into Panama, which would be prompted

by a confirmed threat on the lives of U.S. citizens and the security of

the Canal Zone.

In the two years preceding Operation JUST CAUSE, the strategy

remained constant: protect American lives, defend U.S. treaty rights in

the Canal Zone, assist a democratically elected government in

Panama, and arrest an indicted drug trafficker. BLUE SPOON, OPLAN

90–1, and OPLAN 90–2 were always mindful of those national strategic goals. The force structures, deployment plans, and tactical objectives of these plans conformed closely to these objectives.

Tactically, the soldiers fought as they had trained. In fact, in some

cases the training had been so effective—to the point of actually replicating the enemy, terrain, and objectives to be engaged—that when the

incursion began unit assaults became virtually set-piece exercises.

Indeed, but for the unexpected height of the elephant grass and patches

of mud and marshy ground at certain landing and drop zones, several

tactical assaults would have been virtually perfect. In two situations,

PDF guards initially thought the assaults were training exercises,

because the attacking Americans moved quickly to precise positions

without firing their weapons. Some PDF guards did not realize what

was happening until after U.S. soldiers actually seized their weapons

and placed them in confinement.

In spite of the short combat engagements around the Canal Zone,

the PDF resistance in many cases was more potent than expected. The

47
departure of the senior leaders among many of the PDF tactical units

should have expedited the collapse of resistance, but individual units

fought on in spite of facing overwhelming odds. Occasionally, this was

because senior noncommissioned officers remained with their units

and encouraged the PDF personnel to continue the fight. In other

instances, the remaining PDF personnel simply did not know what

else to do. Here too, the effective training of U.S. forces prevailed.

Clearly, the number of casualties—both friendly and enemy—were

significantly reduced by avoiding needless destruction and bloodshed,

using psychological operations teams, and allowing sufficient time for

the PDF defenders to consider their options.

In the realm of the operational art the incursion proved its greatest

worth. After the May elections and the October coup attempt, all could

see that Manuel Noriega held a vise-like grip on the country, which he

exercised through his Panama Defense Forces. Thus, the first operational objective was to isolate the maximum leader from his military

forces and to neutralize the PDF as a viable threat to the peace and

security of the Canal Zone, U.S. citizens, and the country of Panama.

Generals Thurman and Stiner identified the operational objectives of

the campaign and capitalized on the strengths of U.S. forces, i.e., using

the element of surprise and a nighttime attack (when most

Panamanians would be off the streets and the value of extensive U.S.

military training at night could be maximized); seizing targets (such as

Fort Amador and Madden Dam) that ensured security for American

citizens and the Canal Zone; and separating the PDF command and

control headquarters from its field units (in this case, the attack on La

Comandancia and the hunt for Noriega).

To ensure a successful fulfillment of these initial operational objectives, U.S. forces used a variety of deceptions to mask their preparations. Senior U.S. commanders and their principal operations staff frequently visited Panama prior to the incursion, but they always arrived

and departed in mufti and usually at night. The M551 Sheridan assault

vehicles that participated in the attack on La Comandancia were flown

from Fort Bragg weeks before the incursion and kept under guard in a

hangar. Their crews, from the 82d Airborne Division, changed the

bumper identifications and donned the patches of the 5th Infantry

Division, a unit that routinely rotated through the Canal Zone for jungle

warfare training. Additional helicopters also were flown in at night and

kept in guarded hangars. The numerous SAND FLEA exercises oriented

soldiers to their objectives. In the realm of operational intelligence,

however, they left the PDF totally unaware of their imminent danger

and often—in spite of episodes of forewarning—unprepared too.

48
Even as the Rangers began parachuting onto the airfields at Rio

Hato and Torrijos-Tocumen, a second wave of paratroopers was literally minutes away. A third wave of light infantry was boarding aircraft in

distant California, bound for the Isthmus of Panama. Operationally,

the senior planners recognized that additional forces would be required

to assert the U.S. presence throughout Panama, maintain the peace,

and assist a new government in establishing its authority in the country.

The initial forces that struck at H-hour were sufficient to secure sites

and engage major PDF compounds. Then, like a starburst, follow-on

units could expand the operation to engage other targets critical to the

campaign.

In spite of very precise planning and the opportunities to rehearse

and prepare for this incursion, mistakes were made. Operation JUST

CAUSE was not error free. Nevertheless, a steady focus, from planning

through execution, and the deliberate coordination among all combat

elements engaged in this operation ensured a highly successful campaign. The close camaraderie and shared vision of the senior leadership in Washington, D.C., Panama, Fort Bragg, and Fort Ord clearly

made this process much easier. But it was the individual soldiers and

small-unit leaders who ultimately won the war. Their initiative, discipline, training, and esprit de corps were consistently demonstrated in

both tactical engagements and peacekeeping operations. Panamanians

frequently noted the restraint and responsible behavior of U.S. forces.

This is especially significant because most U.S. forces spent most of

their time in Panama performing duties for which they received little

or no direct training. This was the payoff for years of refinements in

training and doctrine. Operation JUST CAUSE showed that U.S. forces

could deploy on short notice into an environment that required a combination of both violent engagement and sensitive restraint. It became

the precursor for subsequent operations other than war in the decade

that followed. And that, perhaps, is its most important legacy.

49
Further Readings

Although the memory of Operation JUST CAUSE is fading for many

and is overshadowed by other events that preceded and followed the

incursion into Panama, there still is a large collection of historical data

accessible to the general public. Considerable material is available

through the Internet, including an extensive collection of oral history

interviews that the U.S. Army Center of Military History collected and

has made available through its web site (www.Army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/jcit.htm). Many periodicals and professional journals also include thoughtful analyses of the incursion from different

perspectives and often address specific elements of leadership, training, operational planning, and equipment. Among the more comprehensive reviews of the military operation, the reader may want to consider the following works: Clarence E. Briggs III, Operation JUST

CAUSE: Panama, December 1989, A Soldier’s Eyewitness Account

(1990); Ronald H. Cole, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Planning and

Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January

1990 (1995); Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker,

Operation JUST CAUSE: The Storming of Panama (1991); Edward M.

Flanagan, Jr., Battle for Panama: Inside Operation JUST CAUSE (1993);

and Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds., Operation JUST

CAUSE: The U.S. Intervention in Panama (1991). A two-volume study

about Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, by Lawrence A.

Yates of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, is scheduled for publication in 2005.

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