COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 5, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP1818-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF4787

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JASEN RANDHAWA,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: MARK A. SANDERS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jasen Randhawa appeals the judgment, entered on 

his guilty pleas, convicting him of three counts of second-degree reckless 

homicide and one count of second-degree reckless injury. He also appeals the 

order denying his postconviction motion for resentencing. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, at approximately 2:34 a.m. on 

October 23, 2016, Randhawa’s vehicle ran a red light and crashed into the driver’s 

side of an Uber vehicle. Randhawa’s vehicle crash data recorder indicated he was 

traveling 63 mph just prior to impact, which was more than twice the posted speed 

limit. Three women who were passengers in the back seat of the Uber vehicle 

were killed, and the driver was seriously injured. Witnesses told police that 

Randhawa and his passenger fled the scene on foot. 

¶3 The complaint relayed the contents of two different videos, taken 

during cab rides in the hours after the accident, during which Randhawa discussed 

making a false allegation that his car had been stolen in order to avoid 

responsibility for the crash. The complaint additionally alleged that Randhawa’s 

license was revoked at the time of the crash as a result of a 2015 conviction for 

operating while intoxicated. According to the complaint, Randhawa had one prior 

conviction for operating after revocation.

¶4 The State charged Randhawa with twelve offenses: three counts of 

second-degree reckless homicide; one count of second-degree reckless injury; 

three counts of hit and run involving death; one count of hit and run involving 

great bodily harm; three counts of operating a motor vehicle while revoked 

causing death; and one count of operating a motor vehicle while revoked causing 

great bodily harm. 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

3

¶5 Randhawa ultimately pled guilty to three counts of second-degree 

reckless homicide and one count of second-degree reckless injury causing great 

bodily harm. The other charges were dismissed and read in at sentencing. The 

circuit court imposed consecutive fifteen-year prison terms with initial periods of 

confinement of eleven years on the second-degree reckless homicide charges and a 

consecutive ten-year prison term with six years of initial confinement on the 

charge of second-degree reckless injury. The total sentence of fifty-five years 

requires Randhawa to serve thirty-nine years of initial confinement followed by 

sixteen years of extended supervision. 

¶6 Postconviction, Randhawa sought resentencing. He argued that his 

sentences were based on inaccurate information and improper factors. 

Additionally, Randhawa claimed that the circuit court erred when it imposed 

consecutive sentences without explaining its reasons for doing so. The circuit 

court denied the motion without a hearing. 

II. DISCUSSION

¶7 On appeal, Randhawa continues to challenge his sentences. 

Sentencing is left to the broad discretion of the circuit court, subject to review only 

for an erroneous exercise of that discretion. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 

¶¶17, 39, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. A court properly exercises its 

sentencing discretion when it relies on a “process of reasoning ... reasonably 

derived by inference from the record” and reaches conclusions “founded upon 

proper legal standards.” Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 

(1975). Because circuit courts are presumed to have acted reasonably, as there is a 

strong policy against interference with the court’s discretion, the complainant must 

show by clear and convincing evidence some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

4

on the record to demonstrate an erroneous exercise of discretion. See id. at 183-

84; see also State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶34, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409; 

Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶18.

¶8 Randhawa frames portions of his argument as implicating his due 

process right to be sentenced upon accurate information. This court independently 

reviews the constitutional issue of whether a defendant has been denied his due 

process right to be sentenced upon accurate information. State v. Tiepelman, 

2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. 

¶9 “A defendant who requests resentencing due to the circuit court’s 

use of inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing must show both that the 

information was inaccurate and that the court actually relied on the inaccurate 

information in the sentencing.” Id., ¶26 (citation and one set of quotation marks 

omitted). Actual reliance generally requires that the sentencing court gave 

“explicit attention” or “specific consideration” to the inaccurate information and 

that the inaccurate information “formed part of the basis for the sentence.” State 

v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶28, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491 (citation omitted). 

Here again, the defendant must establish this reliance “by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id., ¶22. If the defendant shows that the court actually relied upon 

inaccurate information at sentencing, the burden shifts to the State to prove that 

the error was harmless. Id., ¶23. 

¶10 With these standards in mind, we will analyze Randhawa’s claims as 

to how the circuit court erred at sentencing. 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

5

A. The circuit court properly considered information provided by private 

counsel retained by the family of one of the victims.

¶11 Randhawa argues that the circuit court considered misleading and 

prejudicial information provided by a private attorney for one of the victims who, 

according to Randhawa, improperly inserted himself into the role of prosecutor. 

He claims that the circuit court’s consideration—over Randhawa’s objection—of 

the materials and information provided by private counsel violated long-standing 

public policy and statutes precluding private prosecution. 

¶12 The State does not challenge the core proposition that private 

counsel may not prosecute a case. See generally State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 

355-56, 218 N.W. 367 (1928) (“In the prosecution of criminal actions, the district 

attorney prosecutes for public wrongs, not for private wrongs, and such 

prosecution should be by a public officer, and not a private party. This court ...

has declared it to be the public policy of the state.”). Instead, the State’s position 

is that that is not what happened here. The State contends that private counsel 

merely advised the circuit court of the position of one of the victim’s families as to 

sentencing. 

¶13 The parties agree that crime victims in Wisconsin have the right to 

“have the court provided with information pertaining to the economic, physical 

and psychological effect of the crime upon the victim and have the information 

considered by the court.” WIS. STAT. § 950.04(pm) (2021-22)1; see also WIS.

CONST. art. I § 9m(2)(j); Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶65. The parents of a 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

6

deceased person are “victims” within the meaning of Wisconsin’s Constitution. 

See WIS. CONST. art. I § 9m(1)(a)2.

¶14 Randhawa claims that private counsel’s submission went far beyond 

simply advising the court of the victim’s family’s position on sentencing. He 

contends that the submission included misleading information about both the 

police investigation into the crash and Randhawa’s history. Randhawa challenges 

private counsel’s assessment of Randhawa’s “braggadocio” in a Facebook post, as 

well as the allegation that Randhawa was street racing at the time of the crash and 

that Randhawa declined to answer questions from police about it. 

¶15 Private counsel’s submission to the court, which was offered after 

Randhawa pled guilty and after his sentencing exposure was set, made clear that 

he was expressing the position of the victim’s family. We agree with the State that 

an attorney providing that information to a circuit court no more prosecutes a case 

than does a crime victim delivering a statement at a sentencing hearing. Such 

involvement does not amount to a violation of the public policy against private 

party involvement in a criminal prosecution. 

¶16 While Randhawa may have disagreed with the descriptions used by 

private counsel, they amounted to subjective value judgments and assessments of 

the circumstances surrounding the accident offered to support the sentencing 

request by the victim’s family—value judgments and assessments the circuit court 

was free to reject. Randhawa was not entitled to resentencing on this basis. 

B. The circuit court properly considered general deterrence as a 

significant factor in calculating Randhawa’s sentence.

¶17 Randhawa additionally claims that the circuit court relied on

inaccurate information at sentencing. Specifically, Randhawa contends that the 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

7

circuit court relied on general deterrence as a primary reason for imposing the 

fifty-five-year sentence and wrongly assumed that others would be deterred by the 

extreme sentence. He argues that it is widely accepted in social science that 

general deterrence is not accomplished by long sentences and that long sentences 

do not make for fewer crime victims by deterring others from committing crimes. 

¶18 Randhawa is not arguing that general deterrence is an improper 

factor for a circuit court to consider in sentencing a defendant. Indeed, far from 

being improper, the law is settled that “deterrence to others” is a proper sentencing 

objective. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40. Although “general deterrence” 

should not be the “sole aim in imposing sentence,” United States v. Barker, 771 

F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985), what weight to give it among relevant sentencing 

factors in a particular case is left to the sentencing court’s “wide discretion.” State 

v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156, ¶52, 237 Wis. 2d 709, 616 N.W.2d 126. A court 

errs in this endeavor only if it “gives too much weight to one factor in the face of 

other contravening factors.” State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, ¶10, 246 Wis. 2d 

744, 632 N.W.2d 112.

¶19 Randhawa contends that the circuit court’s belief that a lengthy 

sentence might deter others who would drive drunk involved reliance on 

inaccurate information about the deterrent effect of sentences on other would-be 

drunk drivers. He argues that the circuit court relied on inaccurate information 

because his lengthy sentence is “certain to be completely ineffective for its stated 

purpose” as “individual severe sentences, especially in non-intentional crimes 

involving impairment or recklessness, cannot be expected to deter others.” 

¶20 The sources Randhawa relies on, which include an expert’s opinion 

and citations to journal articles, cannot define the bounds of a constitutionally 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

8

appropriate sentence. See generally State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶¶37-38,

389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (holding that “social science research cannot be 

used to define the meaning of a constitutional provision” and adding that “[i]t is 

the legislature that is structured to assess the merits of competing policies and 

ever-changing social science assertions”). In its decision resolving Randhawa’s 

postconviction motion, the circuit court noted: “The differing view of an expert 

does not render the court’s determination inaccurate.” We agree. Differing 

opinions about the circuit court’s sentencing objective of general deterrence does 

not constitute inaccurate information so as to allow for resentencing under 

Tiepelman. 

¶21 Moreover, established precedent accepts general deterrence as a 

valid sentencing objective for cases involving defendants who commit drunk 

driving offenses. See, e.g., Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61 (explaining that part of 

the circuit court’s reasoning behind the defendant’s sentence was society’s 

“interest in punishing [the defendant] so that his sentence might serve as a general 

deterrence against drunk driving”); see also State v. Whitaker, 2021 WI App 17, 

¶33, 396 Wis. 2d 557, 957 N.W.2d 561 (citing Gallion for the aforementioned 

proposition). Randhawa’s claim that the circuit court violated his due process 

rights by relying on inaccurate information in this regard fails. 

C. The circuit court did not give undue weight to improper factors by 

imposing a sentence at odds with Randhawa’s evidence showing 

sentences imposed in other vehicular homicide cases.

¶22 Next, Randhawa argues that the circuit court gave undue weight to 

improper factors when it sentenced him. He claims the circuit court refused to 

consider his evidence of sentences in comparable cases and asserts that “[n]o 

sentence in the 30 cases documented came close to the 39 years of initial 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

9

confinement ordered here.” According to Randhawa, the “virtual life sentence” he 

received “was both unusual and extremely harsh.” He asserts that the circuit court 

improperly relied on the “charged emotional environment of the sentencing 

hearing.”

¶23 We begin by noting that individualized sentencing has been a 

cornerstone of Wisconsin’s criminal justice jurisprudence because no two 

convicted felons stand before the sentencing court on identical footing and no two 

cases will present identical factors. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48. Insofar as 

Randhawa relies on State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 

N.W.2d 530, for the proposition that a court “may ... consider information about 

the distribution of sentences in cases similar to the case before it,” the decision 

does not suggest that a sentencing court erroneously exercises its discretion by 

electing not to consider sentences in other cases. Id. ¶43 (citation omitted).

¶24 Randhawa’s reliance on In re Judicial Admin. Felony Sentencing 

Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984) (per curiam), is similarly 

misplaced. In that case our supreme court declined the legislature’s request to 

promulgate felony sentencing guidelines and stated that it would not interfere with 

circuit courts’ sentencing discretion “by requiring judges to consider how 

convicted felons have been treated in other Wisconsin courts[.]” Id. at 202-03. 

¶25 Randhawa has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 

circuit court relied on an improper factor—i.e., the charged emotional 

environment—when it sentenced him. Rather, the record reflects that the circuit 

court exercised its discretion not to consider the other cases that Randhawa

contended were comparable. Randhawa engaged in reckless behavior that he 

knew was illegal, which resulted in the deaths of three innocent people and serious 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

10

injuries to a fourth. He then fled from the scene and initially sought to cover up 

the crimes. Randhawa agreed to a plea deal that included a recommendation for a 

thirty-five to forty-year period of initial confinement by the State and ultimately 

received a sentence of initial confinement time within that range. We are not 

convinced that this was unduly harsh. See State v. Davis, 2005 WI App 98, ¶15, 

281 Wis. 2d 118, 698 N.W.2d 823 (holding that a sentence is unduly harsh only if 

the length of the sentence imposed by a trial court is “so excessive and unusual 

and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and 

violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper 

under the circumstances” (citation omitted)). 

¶26 Randhawa has not satisfied his burden of showing that the circuit 

court relied on an improper factor when it sentenced him. Like the ones before it, 

this claim fails.

D. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by 

imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment.

¶27 Lastly, Randhawa argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised 

its discretion when it did not explain why it imposed consecutive rather than 

concurrent sentences. Given that all of the charges related to one reckless act by 

the defendant, Randhawa claims the rationale for concurrent sentences is strong. 

¶28 In sentencing Randhawa, the circuit court discussed the “ripples” of 

effect that Randhawa’s actions had. The circuit court specifically mentioned the 

separate and distinct effects that Randhawa had on each of the four victims and 

their families. The circuit court also noted in its order denying Randhawa’s 

postconviction motion, its decision to sentence Randhawa to consecutive terms 

was based on the same factors warranting the overall length of the sentence. The 
No. 2021AP1818-CR

11

circuit court explained that it had structured the sentence to “account for the 

separate harms to each of the separate victims.” See State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI 

App 181, ¶22, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20 (affirming a sentencing involving 

consecutive terms in an OWI homicide case with multiple victims). “To impose 

anything less than consecutive sentences in this case,” the court continued, “would 

unduly depreciate the profound, life-long and life-ending impact the defendant’s 

conduct had on the four separate victims and their families.” These remarks 

provide a “rational and explainable basis” for the sentences imposed. See Gallion, 

270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶39 (citation omitted); see also State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 

915, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that a postconviction motion 

challenging a sentence affords the circuit court an opportunity to further explain 

the sentencing rationale).

¶29 We conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion when it

imposed consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.